Sherman Tanks of the Red Army 9781911658474, 1911658476

Citation preview

Peter Samsonov is a Russian-Canadian military historian with a focus on Second World War-era armoured warfare. In addition to running the renowned Tank Archives blog, he writes articles for various online and print publications based on English, Russian and German language primary documents.

SHERMAN

TANKS OF THE RED ARMY

Peter Samsonov

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by Gallantry Books an imprint of Mortons Books Ltd. Media Centre Morton Way Horncastle LN9 6JR www.mortonsbooks.co.uk Copyright © Gallantry Books, 2021 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, or any information storage retrieval system without prior permission in writing from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-911658-47-4 The right of Peter Samsonov to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Typeset by Burda Druck India Pvt. Ltd. Printed and bound in Great Britain by The Magazine Printing Company

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Acknowledgements I would like to thank Yuri Pasholok, Pavel Borovikov, Dmitriy Ukryukov, and Yevgeniy Profiryev for their contribution of photographs and documents that made this book possible, as well as H. G. W. Davie for help with making the maps. I would also like to thank Maryse Beuregard for proofreading the finished work.

4

Contents • Introduction

7

• Chapter 1 - America’s War-Winning Tank

8

• Chapter 2 - The First Lend-Lease Customer

19

• Chapter 3 - The Sherman Goes East

27

• Chapter 4 - The Foreign Favourite

32

• Chapter 5 - Old Tank, New Gun

40

• Chapter 6 - ‘Emcha’ with Big Feet

46

• Chapter 7 - Lend-Lease Substitute

50

• Colour Profiles

56

• Chapter 8 - Westward on the Eastern Front

60

• Chapter 9 - Kursk Salient and Beyond

68

• Chapter 10 - Closing the Korsun Pocket

80

• Chapter 11 - Heavy Cavalry

86

• Chapter 12 - Over the Mountains

93

• Chapter 13 - Berlin Bound

101

• Chapter 14 - March through Manchuria

107

• Chapter 15 - Conclusion – Legend or Death Trap?

112

• Glossary

114

• Notes

115

• Index

120 5

Introduction In 1954, the Soviet Ministry of Defence published a book on tank technology aimed at the general public, describing the history of tank design and the operation of various components and assemblies used by tanks at the time. Only a handful out of more than 600 pages are dedicated to foreign tank development during the Second World War. Although the text describes the Medium Tank M4 as the most common American tank of the war, there are few specifics. Not even a photograph of this vehicle is included. This brevity was not out of a lack of information. More than 4000 M4A2 tanks and two M4A4 tanks were shipped to the Soviet Union during the war. Thousands of pages of documents with impressions from the specialists who tested the tanks, crews who fought in them, and commanders who directed them in battle were written – only to be buried in the ideological battle of the Cold War. More than half a century later, the popular history of the Sherman tank in service with the Red Army is based largely on memoirs, rumours, and guesswork. This book will attempt to give the reader a glimpse through the decades-long information barrier at the experience of Soviet crews recorded in the moment, untarnished by political pressure and uneroded by time.

7

Chapter

1

America’s War-Winning Tank

The United States had few modern tanks when war broke out in Europe on September 1, 1939. News from the front lines revealed that the Germans fielded a medium tank with a 75mm cannon. Despite the limited information at hand, the army decided that its newest tank, the Medium Tank M2, was no match for the new German tank. Since it was only a matter of time before the US was pulled into the war, a new American tank had to be developed 8

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M3 with a British-designed turret on display at IWM Duxford. These tanks were named ‘Grant’ in the British army. The tank’s 75mm M2 gun was powerful for its time, but its position in the sponson reduced its effectiveness.

America’s War-Winning Tank

that could defeat it. The work put into the Medium Tank M2 served as a foundation for a new medium tank that could be competitive in the current war. The United States already had a candidate for the gun. The T6 was a promising AA gun developed from the 75mm M1897 field gun and had the semiautomatic breech that a tank gun required. It was developed into the T7 tank gun. Since no turret large enough to accommodate such a gun was available, the 75mm gun was installed in a sponson mount. This concept was previously tested in the Medium Tank T5E2, an earlier experimental tank. Due to the rush, the new medium tank was accepted into service as the Medium Tank M3 on July 11, 1940, before the first

example had even been presented. The army was not thrilled about the vehicle’s unconventional layout, but it was regarded as sufficient for a temporary solution.1 Characteristics of a tank that would have its main gun in a turret were drawn up on August 31, 1940. Engineers began working on this new tank on February 1, 1941, as soon as the design of the Medium Tank M3 was finished. This design was approved on April 18, 1941. For the sake of expediency, the lower hull, engine, drivetrain and suspension would be taken from the M3. As many components as possible were reused to speed up the design and development process. The 69in turret ring specified gave the tank a number of options for armament:

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A1 named ‘Michael’ on display at the Bovington Tank Museum, United Kingdom. This is the earliest surviving Sherman tank. The tank originally had the same M2 gun as the M3, but in a rotating turret, which greatly increased its effectiveness. The suspension bogeys are an early type with the return roller in the middle.

9

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: ‘Michael’ from the front showing features of early Sherman tanks: direct vision ports for the driver and assistant driver, two fixed machine guns in the front hull, a narrow gun mantlet that does not cover the coaxial machine gun port, differential cover made of three parts bolted together, and smooth T41 rubber tracks.

the same 75mm M2 gun used in the Medium Tank M3, a 105mm howitzer, two 37mm M6 guns, a British 57mm 6-pounder, or three .50 calibre machine guns. All options but the last included a .30 calibre coaxial machine gun. The first option was selected as this gun had already proven itself in the Medium Tank M3. Some historians interpret the consideration of a British gun as evidence that the Canadian Ram tank, also based on the M3 chassis, influenced the design of the new American tank. This is unlikely: the Ram tank arrived at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in July, by which time the choice of armament was already made. Additionally, the Canadian tank that arrived at Aberdeen 10

ABOVE: One half of the GM 6046 tank engine used by M4A2 tanks on display at the Ontario Regiment Museum in Oshawa, Canada.

America’s War-Winning Tank

ABOVE: A complete GM 6046 engine at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, France. Each half has its own set of accessories, including two air filters. Issues with the filters were common in early M4A2 tanks.

ABOVE: A cutaway tank showing the layout of the GM 6046 engine and its accessories in an M4A2(76)W HVSS tank. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, Canada. The engine fitted perfectly into the existing compartment without any need to enlarge the tank’s hull.

11

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: Clutch adjustment procedure in the Medium Tank M4A2. This operation had to be performed quite frequently, as clutch problems were common. (Library and Archives Canada).

carried a 2-pounder gun, which was never considered as an option by the Americans.2 A wooden model of the new tank was built in May of 1941. After inspection of the model, approval was given for the assembly of two prototypes: a tank with a welded hull built at Rock Island Arsenal and a tank with a cast hull built at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds. On September 5 the Ordnance Committee recommended the standardization of these two tanks as the Medium Tank M4 and M4A1 respectively. Production of the M4A1 began in February 1942; production of the M4 began in July. There was only one small problem: Continental Motors could not keep up with the demand for R-975 engines to satisfy the needs of the American tank industry so a new source of engines 12

was needed. Thankfully, the Americans had plenty of alternatives. A General Motors 6-71 two-stroke diesel engine was first tested in the light tank M2A2E2 on February 2, 1939. Other nations also specified GM’s engines for tank production. A Valentine tank with a GM 6-71 engine was sent to Canada in the autumn of 1940 and became the template for production of the Valentine VI and VII tanks.3 By the end of October 1941, GM’s diesel engine division had expanded its capacity to 1000 diesel engines per month. These engines were a tempting option to solve the Medium Tank M4’s engine shortage, but some work had to be done in order to make them suitable for the task. For one, the M4 was quite a bit heavier than

America’s War-Winning Tank

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A2 at the Musée des Blindés in Saumur, France. This is a later model dry stowage small hatch tank with the wide gun mantlet and applique armour to protect the ammunition racks. The tank carries markings of the Free French forces. M4A2 tanks were used by many nations during the Second World War, but they were chiefly sent to the UK and USSR.

the Valentine, so a large boost of power was needed. The solution was simple: two engines were combined into one unit, with their output coupled together and connected to one drive shaft. The resulting engine was named GM Model 6046.4 The maximum power output was 410hp at 2900rpm, but 375hp could be provided at a more sustainable speed of 2100rpm, which was still sufficient for a medium tank. The only downside was increased weight: the new engine weighed 2323kg compared to 517kg for the R-975.5 An experimental diesel engine was installed in a Medium Tank M3 in October 1941. The tank performed well in trials and production was authorized. There were two variants of the M3 tank with diesel engines: the M3A3 with a cast hull and the M3A5 with a welded hull. Production of both variants began at Baldwin Automotive Works in January 1942.6 Production of diesel engines was ramped

up in anticipation of the increased demand: the expansion of the General Motors Detroit Diesel Engine Division to produce 2000 twin diesel engines per month for medium tanks was approved by the Office of the Undersecretary of War on January 23, 1942. On March 7, 1942, the General Staff decided that the diesel-powered tank would only be produced until sufficient production capacity for gasoline engines was developed. There was no plan to send the diesel tanks abroad – they would remain in the United States and only be used for training, while the gasoline-powered tanks that they freed up could be sent to fight overseas instead. It was soon discovered that Great Britain and the Soviet Union were quite fond of diesel-powered tanks. With an ample market available, the tanks remained in production long after the US Army’s requirements could be met with gasoline-powered tanks alone. 13

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: A 76mm M1A2 gun from the Musée des Blindés. This gun allowed the Sherman tank to defeat the armour of most German tanks from a considerable distance. The muzzle brake has been removed and the threading can be seen.

The success of the M3A3 and M3A5 made it clear that the next generation American medium tank should also be built with a diesel engine. Work on this variant began in late 1941. In December of 1941 the tank was designated Medium Tank M4A2.7 A prototype of the M4A2 was built and sent to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in April of 1942. Despite its increased weight, the tank performed well in trials. A top speed of 30mph (48kph) was attained. The engine had good torque, which gave it better performance than gasoline engines with a similar power rating. There were also downsides: the prototype exhibited issues with the cooling system, clutch, and air filters. The tank’s mass increased to 73,114lb (33 tons) due to the heavier engine, which strained the suspension.8 Trials of 12 pilot tanks with the Desert Warfare Board confirmed that these issues were 14

widespread.9 However, there was no time to iron them out: production had already begun. Although they were imperfect, these tanks were desperately needed overseas. Nearly a year later the reliability of the Medium Tank M4A2 was tested in wide scale trials. Ten each of the M4A1, M4A2, M4A3, and M4A4 attempted to complete a 4000 mile trek over the course of 400 hours. A tank was only disqualified when an internal component of the engine broke down; any other part or assembly could be replaced during the trials. By April 23, 1943, the M4A2 tanks had travelled for 16,215 miles in total: 8229 on a highway and 7986 off-road. Compared to other tanks, the M4A2 came first in fuel economy at 1.1mpg (214 litres per 100km) on roads and 0.5mpg (470 litres per 100km) off-road.10 The average speed of this variant was also the highest of the competitors: 9.5mph (15.3kph).11 However,

America’s War-Winning Tank

ABOVE: As the Sherman tanks gained weight, attempts were made to improve their off-road performance. This was one solution: extended end connectors. These extensions made the track wider, lowering the vehicle’s ground pressure, but could easily break off on rough terrain. Museum of the Battle of Normandy, France.

reliability left much to be desired. The tank was judged to have come third in this regard, beating only the M4A1. The first engine was disqualified after 75 hours of running, and only two made it to the 400 hour mark, one of which was badly worn and the other in good shape. On average, the engines lasted for 225 hours. The M4A2 came second in total servicing time, and the M4A4 equipped with the Chrysler A57 Multibank engine came in first.12 The tanks were put through even more gruelling tests later that year. Six M4A2 tanks were tested in the Californian desert. These trials showed the negative effects

of extra weight: 16 suspension springs, 45 tyres, one road wheel, three rollers, and five track connectors had to be replaced over the first 15 days of trials alone.13 More reliability trials were held as of the end of 1943. The trials were completed on May 18, 1944, and showed that reliability had improved: out of the four M4A2 tanks taking part, three were disqualified after 276, 278, and 353 hours of running respectively. One M4A2 ran for 403 hours, having travelled for 4295 miles. The M4A2 came second in reliability this time, but at the cost of maintenance time: the average tank required 594.5 hours of maintenance to run 15

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: Up close view of an HVSS suspension bogey. The volute springs and shock absorber are arranged horizontally. The road wheels are doubled up, allowing for a wider track to be used which improved the tank’s performance in mud and on other difficult terrain. Musée des Blindés, Saumur, France.

for 327 hours with the engine and drivetrain causing the most trouble.14 The first significant upgrade made to the M4A2 improved its firepower. The 75mm M3 gun was sufficient to defeat the armour of any German tank when it was introduced, but such advantages are often temporary. It was clear that the enemy would not take long to deploy a tank with thicker armour, and so the development of a more powerful gun was a high priority. A new gun was developed based on the 3in T12 anti-aircraft gun, initially called 75mm Gun T13, but quickly renamed to 76mm gun T1 to avoid confusion. The length of the barrel was reduced from 57 to 52 calibres. Special ammunition was produced to maintain 16

muzzle velocity with the reduced barrel length. The gun was installed in the standard Combination Gun Mount M34, along with the M51 (T60) telescopic 3x sight. This powerful sight allowed the crew to engage targets at a range of up to 3km. Two T1 guns arrived at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds by August 1, 1942. One was installed in the tank with registration number USA W-3060572, another was first fired in a test rig, then installed in tank USA W-3015305. A recoil length of only 12in (305mm) provided impressive elevation and depression: from -12.5 degrees to +25 degrees. The decision to produce the tank was made soon after. The Armor Board gave its recommendation to adopt the tank as a

America’s War-Winning Tank

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W VVSS tank (serial number S64465) next to a demilitarized M4A2(76)W HVSS tank-turnedtractor (serial number S64669) on display in Murmansk. This photo shows the differences between the two suspensions. (Dmitriy Ukryukov)

limited standard under the index Medium Tank M4A1 (76 M1). A series of 1000 units was planned, but this was not to be. Trials at Fort Knox revealed that the installation of the gun left much to be desired. It made the turret front-heavy, and required a 363kg counterweight to be installed in the bustle. Similarly, a 310kg counterweight had to be installed on the gun breech. The recoil guard made it difficult to exit the tank quickly, it was difficult to aim the gun, and the travel clamp blocked the driver’s view. The Armor Board rescinded its recommendation on April 5, 1943, and only two M4A1 (76 M1)

tanks were kept. The rest were converted into ordinary 75mm gun tanks. Despite these setbacks, the idea of a 76mm gun in a medium tank persisted. The 3in Gun M7 was successfully used on the Gun Motor Carriage M10, and both the M7 and aforementioned M1 guns were considered an option during the development of the new T20 series of tanks. Development of these tanks dragged on for much longer than expected. Ultimately the programme did not result in a tank that would replace the M4, but the development work did not go to waste as 17

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

the Medium Tank T23 had the same turret ring diameter as the M4. The turret of the T23 with a commander’s cupola and the better balanced 76mm M1A1 gun in the improved Combination Gun Mount T80 could be installed on the older tank. In the spring of 1943 one turret was installed on a Medium Tank M4 Hybrid. This tank was indexed Medium Tank M4E6. Trials in July of 1943 at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds showed that this tank performed much better than its predecessor, and this gun mount was standardized as the Combination Gun Mount M62. A cast muzzle brake based on the German type was given the index T8 and was tested on the new gun. This design proved unsatisfactory, leading to the development of several variations: the cast T8E1, forged steel T8E2, and forged aluminium T8E3. The T8E1 and T8E2 were similar in performance, but the T8E1 was easier to produce. This muzzle brake was standardized under the index M2. The 76mm gun equipped with this muzzle brake received the index M1A2. These guns received a 30kg counterweight to make up for the weight of the muzzle brake. Older M1A1 guns could also be converted to take this muzzle brake, receiving the index M1A1C. Production of tanks with the new gun began in January of 1944. Tanks with this gun received the suffix (76) to indicate the calibre and W to indicate that they came with wet ammunition racks, an invention that surrounded the ammunition racks with a protective layer of water or antifreeze to help prevent ammunition fires. The first M4A2(76) W tanks were produced in May 1944 at the Detroit Tank Arsenal. These tanks had another new feature also seen in late model M4A2(75) tanks: ‘large hatch’ hulls with thicker front armour presented at a smaller angle, which eliminated some vulnerabilities of the earlier hull design. The tank’s increasing weight had a negative side effect on its mobility,

18

especially in mud, requiring one final upgrade. Work on an improved suspension with horizontal volute springs began in 1942. Two Medium Tanks M3 were modified with a suspension of this type. Similar suspensions were also developed for the High Speed Tractor M4, M5, and M6. An improved version of this suspension with a telescoping shock absorber was developed and installed on one M4A3 and one M4A4 in April 1943. Tests with different variants of suspension and tracks continued until March 1944, when a final version was approved for production. The new bogeys came with new tracks: these T66 track links were 23in (584mm) wide and offered better flotation than their predecessors, but were later replaced with the T80 track links. Tanks with this type of suspension received the suffix HVSS (Horizontal Volute Spring Suspension). For instance, the official full name of a diesel Sherman with a 76mm gun, wet ammo rack, and HVSS suspension would be Medium Tank M4A2(76)W HVSS. The experimental designation E8 (or ‘Easy Eight’) was commonly used to refer to any tank with a horizontal volute spring suspension and a 76mm gun, and remains in use to this day.15 Production of the Medium Tank M4A2 began at the Fisher Tank Grand Blanc plant in April 1942. This factory built the most M4A2s: 4614 tanks with 75mm guns and 2894 tanks with 76mm guns. M4A2 tanks armed with 75mm guns were also built at American Locomotive (150 tanks), Baldwin Locomotive (12 tanks), Pullman Standard (2737), and Federal Machine & Welder (540). The latter also refurbished 317 tanks of this type and Fisher refurbished an additional 218 M4A2s. Pressed Steel, the only other company to build M4A2 tanks with 76mm guns, produced only 21 units. In total, 10,968 Medium Tank M4A2s were built: 8053 with the VVSS suspension and 2915 with the HVSS suspension.16

Chapter

2

The First Lend Lease Customer

ABOVE: A Sherman III tank on display at Canadian Forces Base Borden, Canada. This is an earlier variant as demonstrated by the direct vision ports and M34 gun mount with a narrow mantlet, but the bogeys are already upgraded.

19

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

The Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, more commonly known as the Lend-Lease Act, permitted the President of the United States to send military aid to any country whose defence was deemed essential, allowing it to supply Great Britain, Canada, and later other nations with food, resources, and weapons. The British Army was an avid user of the American tanks that it received through this programme. The Light Tank M3, serving in the British and Commonwealth armies under the name Stuart, was roughly equal to the British Crusader tank on the battlefield, surpassing it in a few ways. The Medium Tank M3, serving under either the name Lee or Grant, was truly a leap forward compared to what the British tank industry could offer at the time. The tank perfectly fit the ‘heavy cruiser’ role that was envisioned in 1941: a tank with the speed of a cruiser tank and the armour of an infantry tank. The versatile 75mm gun of the M3 also surpassed both the British 2-pounder gun and the 3in howitzer

in effectiveness. It was no wonder that the British enthusiastically received the new M4, which provided all the same advantages, but without the unconventional placement of the armament in the sponson. Keeping to the theme of American Civil War generals, the new tank was named ‘Sherman’. A Medium Tank M4A1 was shipped across the Atlantic in the summer of 1942 and given to the Department of Tank Design for testing in July. Soon after, the British found out about a new kind of Sherman tank. It was known that, unlike the cast hull M4A1 (designated Sherman II in British nomenclature), the hull of this tank was welded. The biggest new feature of the tank was its engine: two supercharged Valentine engines paired together. According to British sources, increasing the power of each engine from 185 to 225hp caused some issues. It was also known that the new engine made this tank heavier than a Sherman II.17 The first Shermans meant for the front lines began arriving in Great Britain in

ABOVE: The same tank from the other side shows the unusual shape of applique armour over the ammunition racks. This was likely a field modification.

20

The First Lend Lease Customer

ABOVE: The same tank from behind. Dual mufflers are one of the easiest ways to identify that this is a Sherman III or M4A2 tank. Unlike many Shermans that went through British modernization, this one does not have a rear tow hook.

ABOVE: A closeup view of the VVSS suspension bogey. The return roller is shifted to the rear and a metal skid is used to guide the track. This skid is the intermediate production type; later models had a much more pronounced curve. The road wheels are different: these parts wore out quickly and had to be replaced often.

21

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

October of 1942. Despite all of their advantages, they did not entirely meet British requirements, and had to be modified before entering service. This was done at the Jack Oldings & Co factory in Hatfield. A thorough inspection of an M4A2 tank took place there on October 10. Distinctive features were discovered and recorded. It was noted that these tanks already had some improvements compared to the earliest models: they had new suspension bogeys with the return roller moved backwards, heavier volute springs, a new cast differential cover, protection from petrol bombs via a metal plate under the grille and over the engines, and a large overhang of the rear plate to protect the radiators. Two exhaust mufflers, one per engine, were installed under this overhang. Unlike the Sherman II, which had a Logansport turret traverse mechanism, this new variant used the Oilgear type. A Westinghouse stabilizer

was also installed. This new type of Sherman tank received the index Sherman III.18 The turret traverse and stabilizer were the most interesting features of the new tank, and thus were tested thoroughly. The Oilgear hydraulic turret traverse mechanism worked by means of a pump that was powered by the tank’s 24V electrical system. Oil was used as the hydraulic fluid, pushing two pistons that turned the turret. Since the oil reservoir was separate from the main supply, there were no vulnerable pipes leading from the engine compartment, nor did a leak in the system threaten to stop the entire tank. The traverse mechanism was very responsive, allowing the turret to rotate at a speed of 0.325-24.2 degrees per second to the left and 0.275-25 degrees per second to the right. Even though there were issues with jamming pistons and burning fuses during trials, the Oilgear outperformed both the Logansport traverse used on the Sherman II and the system used on the Churchill tank.

ABOVE: Closeup view of the drive sprocket and tracks. The track is made of T51 links: smooth rubber with a thicker outside layer in order to prolong service life.

22

The First Lend Lease Customer

The hand traverse was not as smooth. The turret was unbalanced, and traversing was difficult. It took 25 seconds to rotate the turret by 120 degrees. There was also a significant backlash in the traverse gear. The testers theorized that thick lubrication, applied to the tanks before shipping, concealed this defect when they were first received. Orders were

ABOVE: The 75mm cannon wasn’t the Sherman’s only weapon. The versatile .50 calibre Browning M2HB machine gun installed in a pintle mount on the turret allowed the crew to engage low-flying aircraft and ground targets. Unfortunately, it interfered with using the commander’s hatch, and was often dismounted and used outside of this tank using a tripod mount as shown here. Museum of the Battle of Normandy, France.

ABOVE: Most Sherman tanks also had two .30 caliber Browning M1919A4 machine guns: one coaxial, fired by the gunner, and one in a ball mount in the front of the hull, fired by the assistant driver. The .30 cal also had a tripod mount, allowing it to be used outside the tank. Base Borden museum.

given to pay special attention to backlash on newly arriving tanks.19 Unlike the traverse mechanism, the Westinghouse stabilizer performed poorly. According to the British testers, the stabilizers used on Lee, Grant, and Sherman II tanks worked better. In their opinion, the stabilizer was only suitable for firing the machine gun on the move. If the 75mm gun absolutely had to be used while moving, it should only be fired at point blank range.21 Gruelling trials were in store for the engine as well. Exercise Spartan, a simulation of an armoured breakthrough, was held in March of 1943. General McNaughton, the commander of the 1st Canadian Army in this exercise, spoke very highly of the diesel-powered Sherman tank. He was most impressed by its high torque, and even suggested that Canada should develop its own diesel tank engine for use in tanks or assault boats.21 The Sherman III made its combat debut in the North African desert, alongside the Sherman II. The latter was much more numerous; only 30 Shermans of the 252 available by October 23, 1942, had diesel engines. These tanks were gathered in the 24th Armoured Brigade at first, but combat losses forced the British to abandon segregation by engine type and issue tanks of both types indiscriminately. Only a few units managed to preserve their homogeneity.22 The tanks did well in the African desert and proved better than gasoline-powered Sherman IIs. They carried enough fuel for 90-100 miles (145-160km) of driving, or up to 120 miles (193km) on good roads.24 The tanks had their share of drawbacks as well, such as issues with injectors fouling up due to oil leaks. It seems that the Americans knew about these issues, as British specialists noted that later tanks had different types of injectors, but the problem persisted. One of the causes was faulty oil level indicators which caused the crews to fill up their tanks with too much 23

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

oil. The clutch also had to be adjusted about every 30 miles (48km) of driving.24 Like all Shermans, driving at high speed resulted in rapid disintegration of road wheel tyres and rubber track pads. The tank’s speed was limited to 20mph (32kph) outside of combat in order to prolong the lifespan of these relatively fragile parts.25 The top speed of the tank was recorded as 32mph (51.5kph). The tank’s engines did not exhibit mechanical problems often, although the left one gave more trouble than the right.26 The estimated lifespan of a Sherman III before overhaul was set at 1500 miles (2414km)27, although individual tanks remained in service after as much as 2000 miles (3220km)28 of running. Issues were also found with the .50 calibre anti-aircraft machine gun; while it was superior to the British 7.7mm machine gun, its location on the roof of the turret made exiting the tank difficult. These machine guns were removed from all but one tank per platoon and mounted on trucks instead.29 Sherman tanks faced an even harsher challenge in Italy. Few tanks received routine maintenance as a result of difficult terrain and increasingly intense

combat. After 1000 miles (1600km) of driving without proper service, the tank’s performance began to wane. Problems with poorly performing air filters were common, amplified by the fact that the grating protecting the mufflers directed the exhaust downwards which kicked up large clouds of dust behind the tanks. Issues with the clutch cropped up more and more often, engine power dropped, problems with oil pressure and Homelite generators became more frequent.30 The tracks and road wheels also suffered: the heat and rocks of the Italian theatre of war wore the rubber down after 400 miles (644km) of driving,31 and after 600 miles (965km) some tracks were completely bare. Replacements were hard to come by, and some crews had no choice but to keep driving their tanks like this.32 Issues with injectors remained: according to British mechanics they arrived rusted, plugged with debris, or incorrectly assembled. Tanks had to be checked in the UK and suitably refurbished before they could be issued to troops. Armoured ammunition racks also had to be installed to curb ammunition fires. Crews often did not find this sufficient and hung spare track links

ABOVE: A common change made to American tanks in British service was the installation of the All Round Vision Cupola, which improved observation compared to the American rotating periscope.

24

The First Lend Lease Customer

ABOVE: ‘Fury’, one of the most famous tanks in the world thanks to its appearance in the movie by the same name. This is an M4A2(76)W HVSS tank, which was not actually used by either British or American forces in the Second World War. Bovington Tank Museum Vehicle Conservation Centre, United Kingdom.

ABOVE: Two M4A2(76)W HVSS tanks from the Ontario Regiment Museum at a reenactment event. Nearly 300 M4A2(76)W HVSS tanks were sold to Canada after the war, where they replaced Canadian built Ram and Grizzly tanks. The Shermans served as training tanks until 1970.

25

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

from their tanks as additional protection. The formerly high opinion that crews had of the tank began to decline. Complaints about the armour, reliability, and firepower became increasingly common. As the Normandy landings neared, the tanks were put through more trials to gauge their suitability for the upcoming battle. Sherman III tanks were tested to see how well they would work in landing actions. The tanks had their air intakes sealed and idled for some time, then driven around a beach at a speed of 6mph (10kph). The trials showed that the engine worked well even in these conditions. It could remain idling nearly indefinitely before coming into action. The temperature remained stable at 20 degrees Celsius above ambient, and could reach as high as 60 degrees when the tank was driving. This was tough on the tanks, but these trials proved that they could be waterproofed and sent straight into battle after landing on the beaches.33 The tanks were also put through lengthy marches to ensure that they were suitable for a rapid advance. In May of 1944 two each of Sherman II, Sherman III, and Sherman V tanks (British designations for the M4A1, M4A2, and M4A4, respectively) were subjected to an 11-hour march with only an hour of preparation permitted. These were not new tanks – with an average of 1292 miles (2080km) already under each vehicle’s belt. Nevertheless, the six tanks completed their trials successfully, covering 142 miles (228 km) in this time. No difference was recorded in reliability, breakdown rates depended on what kind of track links the tanks were using rather than the engine. Fuel economy was much more variable: the Sherman III burned 151 litres per 100km of driving, compared to the Sherman II’s 205 and Sherman V’s 294.34 Despite complaints about the 75mm gun, the British did not use the M4A2(76)W as the American 76mm gun was considered insufficient to combat the latest German tanks. Only a small number of Sherman 26

IIA (the suffix A indicated that the tank was armed with a 76mm gun) were used by Commonwealth forces, and even then the British did not favour them. Two hundred M4A2(76)W HVSS (referred to as M4A2E8 or Sherman IIIAY in British nomenclature) were reserved for shipment to the UK, but only five were ever sent. One of them ended up in the Bovington tank museum, and later starred in the movie Fury.35 Interestingly enough, Canada could have produced its own M4A2. As engines were already available at the Angus Shops for Valentine VII tanks, such a move would have been sensible. Plans made on March 26, 1942, called for two types of Sherman to be built in Canada: Montreal Locomotive Works, which had been building Ram tanks, would switch to M4A1 tanks with a cast hull and R-975 gasoline engine, while Angus Shops would build M4A2 tanks.36 These plans went as far as to give these Shermans their own names: the M4A1 would be called ‘Buffalo’ and the M4A2 would be ‘Bear’. Production of 579 tanks of this type was expected before 1945.37 However, it was not to be. Angus Shops was used to produce parts for M4A1 tanks assembled at MLW, whose name changed to ‘Grizzly’. Considering that only 188 Grizzlies were built and 46 made it to Europe before the end of the war, Canadian production would not have had a significant impact on the total number of diesel Shermans available. Canada did end up receiving a very large quantity of M4A2 tanks, but only after the war. Two hundred and ninety-four M4A2(76)W HVSS tanks (called M4A2E8 in Canadian documents) were purchased from the United States at a cost of only $1460 per tank in 1946. These tanks were used for training until 1970. Even though many were shot up as range targets, a large number of them can still be found in the country as gate guards or monuments. Several are still in running order and are routinely used in historical reenactments.

Chapter

3

The Sherman Goes East

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M3 sent to the USSR on display at Patriot Park, Russia. The Soviet designation for this tank was ‘M3s’ or ‘M3sr’. Due to the tall profile, odd placement of the main gun, and gasoline engine, these tanks were not popular with the Red Army. (Pavel Borovikov)

The USSR first learned about the existence of the Sherman tank in November of 1941 while the Medium Tank T6 was still under trial. Soviet intelligence reported that a diesel engine was being considered for use in this tank. Precise characteristics of the Medium Tank M4A1 were made available in April of 1942. Information about a tank equipped with

“two 6-cylinder 2-stroke diesel engines, 210 hp each, also used on the Canadian Valentin (sic) 7 tank” arrived in May. However, the name of the tank in the report was wrong: Medium Tank M3A4. In reality, only the M3A3 and M3A5 had diesel engines. The GABTU (Main Automobile, Armoured Vehicle, and Tank Directorate of the Red 27

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: Medium Tanks M4A2 prepared for shipment. The first Sherman tanks arrived in the USSR in December of 1942. Large scale deliveries did not begin until the end of 1943. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

Army) decided to order 100 of these tanks per month to replace the gasoline powered Medium Tanks M3. Interest in the new M4 tank grew. In the summer of 1942, the GABTU inquired as to whether or not this tank could be equipped with a diesel engine. Soviet envoys learned about the Medium Tank M4A2 by August. The tank was referred to as M4A2 or M4-A2 in Soviet documentation, the name ‘Sherman’ was not used. Instead, the nickname that stuck was ‘Emcha’, derived from the pronunciation of the index M4 (em-cheteerie). The interest in these tanks was premature however: delivery of Lend-Lease cargo through the Arctic was reduced to a trickle of ships after the destruction of the PQ-17 convoy. PQ-18 did not bring any M4A2

ABOVE: M4A2(76)W tanks with serial numbers S64370 and S64423 recovered by the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy from a wrecked transport ship. These tanks are equipped with M1A2 76mm guns and late type loader’s hatches with one flap. (Dmitriy Ukryukov)

28

The Sherman Goes East

tanks, and ships sent as a part of operation FB brought only 26 tanks of this type. Ten more were delivered through Baku in December, followed by 20 more through the north and six through the south in January of 1943. This was the last delivery through the northern route for several months, but the southern route remained active: 69 tanks came through Baku in February, nine in March, nine in April, and 52 in May. A six month break in deliveries followed as production of these tanks for the needs of Great Britain was a higher priority objective at this time. The British made an effort to supplement the flow of Shermans with their own tanks. According to British sources, the Soviets did not like the M4A2 as the tank’s smooth rubber tracks performed poorly in winter. In the spring of 1943 a Soviet delegation was shown the Centaur tank, which was rejected on May 6 due to its unreliable and fire prone Liberty engine.38 Churchill tanks were offered by the British on May 19,39 and Cromwells on May 24 but by this time it was clear that the USSR preferred the M4A2, with the Valentine as the only acceptable alternative.40 Deliveries resumed in November of 1943. Thirty-two tanks arrived in Baku through the southern route, and 149 through Vladivostok in the far east; a previously unused route. Another 45 arrived through Baku in December. Precise data regarding shipments through the northern route is not available, but as the total number of shipments in 1943 is known to be 469 tanks, it stands to reason that 78 tanks arrived through the north in late 1943. Some of these tanks were formerly used by the British, as some tanks that arrived in December had British 2in bomb throwers installed. Others were painted in desert camouflage and showed signs of heavy use. Large scale shipments of M4A2 tanks began in 1944. Four tanks arrived in Baku in January of 1944, 64 in February, 97 in March, 137 in April. Eight hundred tanks came into the USSR through the southern

route and 1465 through the north in 1944. Eighty more tanks arrived in the second half of 1944 through Vladivostok. The same injector issues that the British experienced were discovered fairly quickly, with injectors getting fouled after as little as 5-10 hours of use. This problem was investigated before the tanks were sent to the foreign AFV training centre in Gorky. Three types of GM diesel injectors were in stock: S type (for Valentine tanks), A type

ABOVE: Characteristics of the “American M4-A2 General Sherman” tank published in a Soviet tank industry magazine. The name ‘Sherman’ was almost never used to refer to this tank in Soviet sources. (Vestnik Tankovoy Promyshlennosti)

29

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

LEFT: Characteristics of the “American medium tank M4-A2 76-mm” published in a Soviet tank industry magazine. (Vestnik Tankovoy Promyshlennosti)

(for tractors), and M type (for medium tanks). Substituting S type injectors did not resolve the issue and caused additional problems: fuel expenditure increased by 12-20% and the tank’s speed dropped by 10-15%. A few hundred A type injectors were sent from the United States to see if they would perform better. The two parties involved had different ideas about the cause of these problems: the 30

Americans insisted that the issues came from improper use of the engines while the Soviet side maintained that the engines were poorly assembled. It was not until 1944 that General Deane admitted that the issue was with the production quality of the injectors. Tanks also frequently arrived with poorly fitted turrets, leaking radiators, loose drive sprocket crowns, and defective running gear ball bearings. All

The Sherman Goes East

ABOVE: Starting with large hatch M4A2(75) tanks, grates were installed over the mufflers to protect them from damage. Ontario Regiment Museum.

of these problems kept the tanks away from the front lines until the summer of 1943.41 The USSR was not informed of design changes made to the tanks and came up with their own classifications. The first major change was spotted in late 1943. Tanks with wet sumps, extra armour welded on the sides, new oil filters, and ammunition capacity reduced to 85 rounds were classified as second generation. The third generation consisted of tanks with large hatch hulls, which began arriving in the summer of 1944. The large hatch M4A2 tanks were also equipped with a grate on the back to protect the mufflers from damage. On August 22, 1944, the NKIT (People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade) informed the GBTU that shipments of a new type of M4A2 tank were about to begin. These tanks were armed with a 76mm gun, and were classified as the fourth generation of the M4A2. These tanks were also referred to as ‘M4A276mm’. The first tanks of this type arrived in September, but the majority of Shermans were still armed with 75mm guns. The situation was reversed in October: only four out of 131 M4A2 tanks that arrived in Baku that month

had a 75mm gun. Shipments of M4A2s with 75mm guns stopped altogether not long after. The training centre in Gorky received 319 M4A2 tanks of both types in October. Out of the 279 tanks issued to troops that month, 203 had 76mm guns.42 The USSR learned about the fifth and final variant of the Medium Tank M4A2, the M4A2(76)W HVSS, in February of 1945. Precise information about this new type arrived on March 13, 1945. The first tanks of this type arrived in the USSR that same month, but the number of tanks with the new suspension was not recorded separately. The number of HVSS-equipped tanks received can be estimated at around 350. One hundred and eighty-one tanks of both types arrived in the USSR in April of 1945, and 128 arrived in May. The last shipments of M4A2 tanks came in June of 1945. In total, 1088 Shermans were delivered in 1945. Overall, 2095 tanks with 76mm guns, including both the M4A2(76)W and M4A2(76) W HVSS were sent to the USSR over the course of the war. And in total 4102 M4A2 tanks of all subtypes were sent to the USSR, of which 3938 arrived at their destination.43 31

Chapter

4

The Foreign Favourite

ABOVE: M4A2 tank at the NIBT proving grounds, summer of 1943. The tank is equipped with rubber T41 tracks, illsuited for driving in mud or in snow. (TsAMO)

The first Sherman to be sent to the Scientific Research Proving Grounds (NIBT) at Kubinka was a tank with the registration number W-3021079 produced at the Fisher Tank Arsenal in August of 1942 taken from the November 1942 shipment. This tank 32

was almost brand new, with only 74km on the odometer. A number of interesting new features were discovered over the course of a thorough inspection. Unlike the Medium Tank M3, which was built with rivets, the hull of the M4A2 was welded. The height

The Foreign Favourite

ABOVE: The same tank from the left. This model does not yet have applique armour on the sides to protect the ammunition racks. Mid-production bogeys with the return roller brought backward were already in use at the time. (TsAMO)

of the tank was reduced compared to its predecessor, although it was still deemed too tall. The AA machine gun cupola was replaced with a Browning M2HB .50 calibre machine gun. Trials began on December 19, 1942. The trials programme called for the tank to cover a distance of 500km: 100 on a highway, 250 on dirt roads, and 150 off-road. Actual trials went on for longer, spanning 665km. Special experiments were performed to test how American-made track links behaved in winter conditions. The first 421km (203 on a highway, 92 on dirt roads and 126 off-road in snow) were covered with tracks made of all-metal T49 links. Later, the tracks were swapped for the old rubber-metallic T41 with additional spurs welded on, and the tank drove for another 117km on the highway, 73km on dirt roads, and 54 off-road. The tank was tested in difficult conditions. The air temperature was 12-22°C below freezing and trials were held during a blizzard which covered the roads with snow. Nevertheless, the M4A2 equipped with T49 links performed well with a recorded top speed of 45kph. The average speed of the M4A2 on T49 metallic tracks was

29.1kph on a highway, burning 195 litres of diesel per 100km of driving. Average speed on a dirt road covered with snow was an impressive 22.4kph. The tank consumed 268 litres per 100km in these conditions. The final trial was much more difficult. The tank achieved an average speed of 17kph driving off-road through snow banks up to 40cm deep, burning 350 litres per 100km. The M4A2 performed worse with T41 tracks installed: its top speed was only 38.1kph, with an average speed of 25.6kph. Fuel consumption also increased: the tank burned 306 litres per 100km on highways. On dirt roads the average speed dropped to 19.1kph and fuel consumption increased to 396 litres per 100km. The average speed in deep snow was not much lower than with the metallic tracks, 16.5kph, although the fuel consumption was much higher at 474 litres per 100km. This performance was still significantly better than the tank’s predecessor: the Medium Tank M3 burned 387 litres per 100km with no spurs and 582 litres per 100km with spurs on a highway, up to 715 litres per 100km on a snow covered dirt road, and 965 litres per 100km off-road in snow. 33

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: The same tank from the front. This tank still has the old direct vision ports and narrow mantlet that does not cover the machine gun port. A later type one piece cast differential cover is used. (TsAMO)

ABOVE: The same tank from the rear. The dual mufflers for the two diesel engines can be seen in this photo, a distinguishing feature of the M4A2. (TsAMO)

ABOVE: An M4A2 tank on display at Victory Park in Moscow. This is a later type of M4A2 with no direct vision ports, but it still has a small hatch hull with no applique armour. (Pavel Borovikov)

34

The Foreign Favourite

These trials revealed a weakness of the T49 tracks: they became packed with snow and quickly lost traction, causing the tank to slip off the highway and flip over. T41 tracks with spurs were better in this regard as the spurs did not become packed with snow and lose traction during the trials, but their lifespan was limited. Driving on a highway was especially hard on them and caused the spurs to break off quickly. Tracks with spurs also had better results when climbing: while wearing T49 tracks the tank could climb a 15 degree slope, but with T41 tracks and spurs the maximum grade increased to 25 degrees. The T41 tracks also allowed the tank to drive at a tilt of 22 degrees, while the maximum tilt with T49 tracks was only 17 degrees. Despite the difficult conditions, only three mechanical failures occurred during these trials. However, there were notable issues with using the tank in winter. The water from the cooling system drained directly onto the floor of the tank, forming an icy crust that jammed control linkages. Additionally, the snow kicked up by the tank’s tracks quickly covered up the periscopes of the driver and his assistant. Aside from issues with snow, the observation devices used in the tank were deemed good. Their number ensured adequate visibility from the tank, but the sights did not receive as much praise. Soviet specialists did not like the fact that the gun sight had no markings for the machine gun or corrections for elevation difference. The gunner’s station was adequate in every other way, as was the commander’s. The loader’s station was praised, but with one exception: it was hard to take the ammunition out of the racks. The specialists found no issues with driver and assistant driver’s stations. While the coaxial machine gun had to be aimed with the cannon’s sights, the bow machine gun had no sight at all and had to be walked on target by following the stream of tracers. Trials showed that both methods were adequate: firing 100 rounds at a 2x2m

ABOVE: Instead of direct vision ports, later types of Sherman tanks had retractable fixed periscopes installed in the front of the hood in case the primary rotating periscope was knocked out. (Pavel Borovikov)

ABOVE: Sectional view of the M4A1 periscope. Soviet testers found some issues with the design of this sight. (Vestnik Tankovoy Promyshlennosti)

target from 100m resulted in 86 hits from the bow machine gun and 85 hits from the coaxial machine gun. Like the British, the Soviets noticed the presence of a stabilizer and tested it in separate 35

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: Sectional diagram of the Oilgear turret traverse mechanism controls and pump. This mechanism was rated very highly by Soviet testers. (Vestnik Tankovoy Promyshlennosti)

trials. Unlike British trials, Soviet results were unambiguously positive. Firing the main gun on the move with the stabilizer active resulted in a rate of fire of 5.17 rounds per minute with an 87% hit rate, compared to 47% and 3.87rpm without the stabilizer. The peak rate of fire from a standstill was 20rpm. The hydraulic traverse mechanism was also praised. Despite the issues with driving in winter conditions, the tank was praised very highly. The gun stabilizer and turret traverse mechanism specifically were highlighted as worthy of study and introduction into domestic tank production. This was not the end of the tank’s career at the NIBT Proving Grounds. Summer trials 36

began on May 28, 1943, but lasted only until June 3, when they had to be paused due to a breakdown of the engine. As spare parts were hard to come by, the trials resumed only on July 29, lasting until August 19. The tank was driven for longer than expected once more: by the end of these trials it had driven 3050km. The M4A2 was beginning to show its age: after 1758km the road wheel tyres started to crumble and at 1930km one of the T49 tracks tore and had to be replaced with the older T41 track. Despite all of this, the tank was still considered reliable. It was also noted that the American tank was easy and quick to service. It could reach a speed of 50kph in summer conditions with T41 tracks. The average

The Foreign Favourite

ABOVE: Result of firing the 75mm M3 gun at the side of a Tiger tank. The Sherman’s gun could penetrate it from a range of up to 650m. (TsAMO)

speed on a highway was 39.7kph with a fuel expenditure of 167 litres per 100km. On a badly beaten dirt road the tank achieved an average speed of 20.1kph, burning 246 litres per 100km. The cruising range of the tank was 310km and 210km for highway and dirt roads respectively. In the summer the T41 and T49 tracks performed equally well. While the T41 tracks allowed the tank to drive up a slope of up to 25 degrees and a tilt of 23 degrees without slipping, they did not wear as quickly as the T49 tracks. The latter increased the maximum slope to 28 degrees and the tilt to 26 degrees at the cost of more frequent maintenance.44 The performance of the gun was next to be tested. Two Tiger tanks were delivered

ABOVE: Most bogeys on this M4A2 tank are the later type with the return roller brought backwards, but the front right bogey is an earlier type with the return roller in the middle. (Pavel Borovikov)

37

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: T49 (left) and T54E1 (right) tracks. (Voyenizdat)

to the NIBT Proving Grounds in April of 1943, one of which was shot up in order to determine the effectiveness of domestic and foreign guns against the armour of the new heavy German tank. The M4A2 present at the proving grounds was one of the tanks that took part in the trials. Its 75mm gun proved effective against the side armour of the Tiger. At a distance of 400m an M61 APCBC shell penetrated the 82mm thick side, breaking off a 300x300mm chunk of armour from the inside. Another shot from 625m only resulted in a 60mm deep dent in the side of the turret, but fragments from the bursting shell pierced

ABOVE: This tank also features several different types of road wheels (from left to right): smooth concave, welded spoke with small holes, and welded with open spokes. Removable grousers used to improve off-road mobility can also be seen in this photo. The bogeys have the latest variant of track skid. (Pavel Borovikov)

38

The Foreign Favourite

ABOVE: Steel T49 track links on the M4A2 tank on display in Victory Park. This type of track link performed better than the T41 off roads, but still rapidly lost traction when packed with mud or snow, drastically reducing the tank’s off-road performance. (Pavel Borovikov)

ABOVE: The other track of the tank in Victory Park features several different types of track links. This photo shows (from top to bottom) the smooth rubber T41 track link, steel parallel grouser T56 and T49 track links, and a steel chevron T54E1 track link. The USSR received many types of tracks with its Shermans, but none were found to be satisfactory in snow or mud. (Pavel Borovikov)

the superstructure roof. Another shot at the turret resulted in a 40mm deep dent. Two shots against the thinner 62mm side armour from 650m resulted in penetrations, with the shell knocking a plug out of the armour. M72 AP shot was also tested. At 625m it penetrated the 82mm thick turret armour on both tries, causing spalling on entry and exit. Soviet testers were impressed with the quality of the M72 shot. It did not shatter after penetrating the armour, but only deformed slightly.45 Penetration trials were also held against a captured Ferdinand tank destroyer in

December of 1943. Five attempts were made to penetrate the side of the casemate (85mm thick at 30 degrees) with M61 shells at ranges between 100m and 1000m. No penetrations were recorded. Two penetrations were scored against the vertical 85mm thick hull side from 500m, but only a dent was made at a range of 700m. Two attempts were made to penetrate the armour with M72 shot from a range of 100m, one aimed at the sloped casemate side and one at the vertical side hull armour. Neither shot penetrated.46

39

5 Old Tank, New Gun Chapter

ABOVE: The side of a Tiger II turret after trials. The 76mm M1 gun could penetrate it from up to 2000m. (TsAMO)

The Red Army was familiar with the American 76mm tank gun long before receiving M4A2(76)W tanks. The existence of this gun was first mentioned in a report submitted on March 1, 1943, by Major Barayev, an assistant to the military attache in the United States. According to the report the penetration of these guns was equal to that of the Tiger’s 88mm gun. 40

It took some time to procure a sample and on August 3, 1943, a ship carrying two GMC M10 tank destroyers arrived in the Persian Gulf. From there, the M10s were sent to Baku. One of them was sent to the NIBT Proving Grounds in Kubinka for mobility trials, the other to the Gorohovets Artillery Proving Grounds (GANIOP) to test the gun itself. Unfortunately, the latter trials were delayed

Old Tank, New Gun

due to a lack of 76mm ammunition. Trials began on March 13, 1944, despite the fact that the HE ammunition, tools, manual, and spare parts for the M7 76mm gun had not arrived. The proving grounds could not wait any longer. The trials lasted until April 4 due to the fact that the proving grounds staff had to figure out how to service the gun without any documentation. A total of 390 shots were fired, including 25 supercharged rounds, and the performance of the gun was found to be excellent. The American M62 APC shell penetrated up to 120mm of armour at a range of 500m, and the precision of the gun was notable.47 A second type of American armoured vehicle with a 76mm gun arrived in the USSR on February 1, 1944. This was the GMC T70, later adopted by the US Army as the GMC M18 and commonly known as

Hellcat. Since the ballistics of the gun were similar to those of the M7 the gun did not go through extensive trials,48 but it was tested against some captured German vehicles. One of the targets for the American 76mm gun was a Tiger II tank against which the M62 APC round was used. Out of a total of 12 shots, only one failed to penetrate. Three shots were fired at the side of the tank from 500m: one at the turret, one at the superstructure, and one at the lower hull. Three more shots were fired from 1200m: one at the side of the superstructure and two at the lower hull. At 1500m, two shots were fired at the turret and one at the hull. Only at 2000m did a shot fail to penetrate; out of the three shots that hit the superstructure at this range only two went through.49 Precise information about the Medium Tank M4A2(76)W began arriving in the

ABOVE: Medium Tank M4A2(76)W at the NIBT Proving Grounds, November 1944. Shipping markings can be seen on the upper glacis and the side of the tank. As a rule, American markings, including registration numbers, were not painted over. (TsAMO)

41

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: The same tank from the front. This tank is armed with a 76mm M1A1 gun, which was not equipped with a muzzle brake. The improved commander’s cupola and flatter upper front plate without the driver and assistant driver’s hoods can be seen. (TsAMO)

ABOVE: The tank from the left side. Like all wartime production 76mm Shermans, it is equipped with a large hatch hull and wet ammunition racks, therefore applique armour was not installed. The slope of the upper front plate is decreased to allow for larger hatches. (TsAMO)

42

Old Tank, New Gun

USSR in mid-September of 1944. This allowed the Main Tank Directorate of the Red Army (GBTU KA) to compose a trial programme that would determine the difference between this new tank and the M4A2(75). Since the specialists at the NIBT Proving Grounds were already familiar with the M1A1 76mm gun from trials of the GMC T70, the gunnery trials were brief: only 131 AP and 51 HE shells would be fired. One of the objectives of these trials was to find out if the ammunition that shipped with these two vehicles was compatible. Another point of interest was the ability to use domestic ammunition, especially APCR and HEAT rounds, as the threat of ammunition shortages was still very real and alternatives had to be explored. The programme was finalized by September 20 but the tank to be tested

was only chosen in Gorky on October 7. The tank with the registration number U.S.A. 3080832 was selected. By the time it arrived, the specialists at the NIBT Proving Grounds had been instructed to only conduct a brief study of it instead of full trials. This was completed on November 14, 1944. Due to the brevity of the study and the volume of work that the proving grounds had to deal with at the time, it contained many mistakes which were quickly discovered. Despite the fact that its mass had increased from 30.9 to 34.1 tons, which indicated that much more had changed than the gun, full trials of the tank were still not conducted. The proving grounds staff were scolded for missing obvious changes, such as the fact that the turret basket was no longer present and that new T54E1 tracks were fitted.

ABOVE: The tank from the rear. The mufflers are covered with a screen to protect them from stray bullets. This Sherman is equipped with steel T49 tracks. (TsAMO).

43

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

The GANIOP was tasked with studying the gun, and was given an M4A2(76)W with the registration number U.S.A. 3081179 equipped with T49 tracks. The inspection showed that the gun was the same as the one on the GMC T70, barring some minor differences in its use. Because of this similarity, full trials were skipped once again. Other elements of the tank proved interesting on their own, such as the new commander’s cupola, which earned a detailed study in December of 1944. In addition to a rotating periscope in the hatch, the periscopes around its perimeter each had an impressive 90 degree vertical and 145 degree horizontal range of view. The report noted that its dimensions allowed it to be installed in T-34 and IS tanks. The list of recommendations given after proving grounds trials of the IS-3 prototype included the suggestion to install a “commander’s cupola of the same type as the American M4-A2 tank”.50 Very similar cupolas were later used on a prototype of the IS-7 tank. Soviet specialists resumed studies of the M4A2(76)W in early 1945 when they were less busy. The aforementioned cupola and periscopes used by the rest of the crew were thoroughly analysed and rated highly. The new ammunition layout was also described in detail. The tank only carried 71 rounds: six in a ready rack on the floor of the turret basket, 30 in a rack to the left of the loader, and 35 more along the floor of the fighting compartment, the latter often called ‘wet ammo racks’. Filling a special container located in between ammunition slots with water reduced the risk of fire if the tank was penetrated by a shell. This new rack forced the designers to get rid of the turret basket sides and a portion of the floor, which Soviet specialists considered a plus as it made getting out of the tank easier if one of the hatches was blocked. However, the design and position of the racks left much to be desired, especially since help from the assistant driver was 44

ABOVE: Sectional view of the M10 periscopic sight which was closely studied by Soviet specialists. A similar sight was later used on the experimental SU-85B SPG.51 (Voyenizdat)

required to load ammunition from the right side of the hull. The stabilizer was tested again with excellent results: when activated, gunfire was twice as accurate at a speed of 15kph and five to six times better at 25kph. Extensive mobility trials were also planned, mostly to judge whether or not the tank’s reliability had decreased after such a significant increase in weight. The reliability trials were scheduled to last for 300 hours of driving or 2000km, whichever was greater. The total length including special obstacle trials was 3000km: 100km on a highway, 1700 on dirt roads, and 1200 in springtime mud. The top speed of the tank on a highway was measured at 51.4kph, even higher than the speed of 50kph reached by the M4A2(75). However, the average speed was lower at 26kph, compared to the older tank’s 39.7kph. Due to bad road conditions, the fuel expenditure was higher, 330 litres per 100km. The tank burned a similar amount of fuel compared to its predecessor (370 litres per 100km) driving on dirt roads in

Old Tank, New Gun

ABOVE: A sunken M4A2(76)W tank turret, recovered near Murmansk. This photo shows the commander’s cupola, one of the most important upgrades to this variant of the tank. (Pavel Borovikov)

the winter where the average speed was recorded as 15.8kph. The speed increased in the spring on softer roads, but so did the fuel expenditure: 19.2kph at the cost of 410 litres per 100km. Additionally, the tank could tow a T-34-85 in second and third gear with an average speed of 9.5kph and a fuel expenditure of 490 litres per 100km. The performance of the M4A2(76)W on slopes was similar to that of the M4A2: the new tank could climb slopes of up to 22 degrees in winter and 26 degrees in the summer. The maximum tilt was 12 degrees in winter and 20 in the summer. The T49 tracks were still the weakest link as they did not provide enough traction, but the double differential turning mechanism also slipped in soft mud.

As with previous trials, faults with the tank were bound to develop. The right engine broke after 949km of driving while the left engine lasted until 2126km. The road wheel tyres began to disintegrate after 1339km of driving – with the rearmost ones being the first to go. The tracks proved more resilient this time around and only tore after 3120km of driving. The suspension volute springs and drive sprocket crowns also had to be replaced during the trials. The trials showed that aside from the running gear and suspension, the reliability of the tank was still high. As troops on the front lines had already discovered, the M4A2(76)W was a very effective and reliable tank.52

45

6 ‘Emcha’ with Big Feet Chapter

ABOVE: The Medium Tank M4A2(76)W HVSS from the front. Only the wide T66 tracks differentiate it from its narrowtracked predecessor from this angle. (TsAMO)

46

‘Emcha’ with Big Feet

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A2(76)W HVSS at the NIBT Proving Grounds, summer 1945. The most noticeable feature, the new suspension and running gear, is plainly visible. (TsAMO)

M4A2(76)W HVSS tanks began arriving in the USSR in March of 1945. A tank with the registration number U.S.A. 30122430, which arrived on March 21 with six other tanks of this type, was selected for trials at the NIBT Proving Grounds and sent there on March 25. It was given the unwieldy name ‘M4A276 mm with a modernized suspension’. This tank was scheduled for relatively brief trials amounting to 1000km in total. Of this, 350km were allocated for driving on a cobblestone and gravel road, 400km on dirt and country roads, 200km off-road, and 50km were reserved for special trials. The new suspension was the most notable change in the tank and thus most of the testers’ attention focused on it. The new

bogeys with paired road wheels combined with wider tracks decreased the ground pressure of the tank from 0.98 to 0.714kg/ cm². Soviet specialists also commented on the change in the positioning of the volute springs and addition of shock absorbers on each bogey, which gave the tank a much smoother ride. The only drawback was that the track links were now more complex and more difficult to connect and disconnect. There was another cost to pay for these new tracks: due to higher rolling resistance the average speed of the M4A2(76) HVSS on a dirt road decreased from 19.2 to 17.4kph. The new tank also lost to its predecessor in acceleration time from 0 to 30 kph and had a wider turning radius. However, the wider 47

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: The tank seen from the left. Unlike most M4A2 tanks in Soviet service, the Browning .50 cal machine gun is still installed. (TsAMO)

ABOVE: The tank as seen from above. This angle shows the improved commander’s cupola installed on tanks with T23 turrets. (TsAMO)

48

‘Emcha’ with Big Feet

ABOVE: The tank seen from the back. T66 tracks are installed and the machine gun has been removed. (TsAMO)

tracks offered better traction and the new tank could travel much more easily through the mud. The fuel expenditure dropped from 410 litres per 100km to 370, which increased the tank’s cruising range from 135 to 150km. The new tank could also climb hills better. The maximum slope passable by the M4A2(76)W HVSS increased from 26 to 29.8 degrees, now limited by the power of the engine rather than the traction of the tracks. The new tank could also drive at a 30 degree tilt, noticeably better than its predecessor. The new suspension was not the only change. Unlike the M4A2(76)W that was tested previously, this tank had a M1A2

76mm gun which had a muzzle brake and a counterweight installed on the breech to balance the gun. The Browning M2HB .50 calibre AA machine gun mount moved from the commander’s cupola to the rear of the turret. The layout of the commander’s turret traverse controls also changed. Trials demonstrated that the tank’s reliability had improved. The only defects that showed themselves during the trials were caused by poor assembly of the gearbox and engines; the suspension and running gear defects observed on the M4A2(76)W were gone. After 1064km of driving the tank showed little signs of wear and was ready for further use.53 49

7 Lend-Lease Substitute Chapter

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A4. Two of these tanks arrived in the USSR, but trials showed that they were inferior to the M4A2. This tank is now on display at Patriot Park. (Pavel Borovikov)

50

Lend-Lease Substitute

It is possible that the famous ‘Emcha’ might not have been the M4A2 model of the Sherman, but another variant. Due to a shortage of M4A2 tanks, an alternative was considered in late 1942: the Medium Tank M4A4. The USSR first learned about these tanks in September 1942, when a Soviet delegation visited the Detroit Tank Arsenal. One of the members of the delegation, an engineer by the name of Sorvin, composed a report about a new type of Sherman tank equipped with the Chrysler A57 Multibank engine. Two engines were demonstrated to Soviet specialists at the factory: one worked for 300 hours nonstop on a testbed, the other for 400 hours. Engines working in a cooler

at a temperature of -30°C were also shown. There would be no shortages of a tank produced in such an enormous factory. According to the Americans, the Detroit Tank Arsenal was due to produce 600 tanks in September and would reach a rate of 1000 tanks per month by December 1942. A colonel conducting the tour, not named in the report, pressured the Soviets to accept these tanks instead of the M4A2, suggesting that the M4A2 might be cancelled altogether due to shortages of diesel engines. According to the colonel, there was no such issue with the A57 Multibank as it was based on an automotive engine that the factory produced by the millions and 35 A57s were being built every day. Even though

ABOVE: The same Medium Tank M4A4 from the side. The spacing between the suspension bogeys is an identifiable feature of the model. The M4A4 never received wet ammo racks, but this is an early tank that does not have applique armour to protect the dry racks. (Pavel Borovikov)

51

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: This M4A4 tank also has a narrow gun mantlet, like other early Shermans. (Pavel Borovikov)

ABOVE: Closeup of the assistant driver’s direct vision port. Despite the armoured shutters, these ports proved vulnerable to small arms fire and shell splinters, so they were removed from production. Field workshops and crews would often weld armour plates or spare track links over the ports for additional protection. (Pavel Borovikov)

52

Lend-Lease Substitute

the engine still ran on gasoline, it could work with low-octane fuel which was an acceptable alternative to diesel. This report piqued the interest of the GBTU. The diesel M4A2 was preferable, but these tanks could be acceptable as an interim replacement. In any case, the M4A4 was clearly superior to the Medium Tank M3, Crusader III, Centaur, and Cromwell tanks that were also offered as substitutes for the M4A2. Sorvin had the opportunity to travel to the factory’s testing grounds where new tanks were run through a 50 mile (80km) quality assurance course. He also had the chance to drive a Medium Tank M3 and an M4A4. He evaluated the M4A4 as equivalent to the M4A2, and superior to the M3, although in

his opinion both tanks were inferior to the T-34 and the KV-1.54 A decision was made to order a batch of these tanks for trials in the spring of 1943. Two M4A4 tanks with registration numbers U.S.A. W-3057449 and U.S.A. W-3057484 arrived in the USSR through the southern route. These tanks were produced in October 1942 and unlike the M4A2 tanks seen in the USSR previously, they had improved metallic chevron T54E1 tracks and electric turret traverse motors. The tanks were sent to the NIBT Proving Grounds fairly quickly, and tank W-3057484 was sent to trials on June 13. This tank was very new with only 202km on the odometer. It was scheduled to drive 500km on a highway, 1000km on a dirt

ABOVE: The M4A4 tank from the front. T49 tracks are installed along with an earlier differential cover composed of three sections of rolled armour held together with bolts. (Pavel Borovikov)

53

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

road, and 500km off-road. Special trials to evaluate the effectiveness of the new tracks would also be held. Trials lasted from June 13 to August 18. The tank drove for 1296km on dirt roads and 564km on highways for a total of 1850km over 15 days, as the rest of the time the tank sat idle awaiting spare parts. Even though the tank accepted low octane gasoline, domestic B-70 fuel had to be mixed with R-9 aircraft gasoline additive to improve performance. R-9 was typically added at a quantity of 1cm³ of per kilogram of fuel for American tanks that ran on 80 octane gas.55 Mobility trials showed that the M4A4 had a lower top speed than the M4A2: only 40.3kph compared to 50kph. The average speed was closer, but still not as good:

33kph vs 39.7kph. The fuel expenditure was also much higher than the diesel Sherman as the Chrysler A57 Multibank consumed 309 litres of fuel per 100km, nearly twice as much as the M4A2. The tank had a cruising range of 182km on a highway, compared to the M4A2’s 310km. The M4A4 was also not as good on dirt roads despite the improved tracks: the average speed was 16.5kph at the cost of 509 litres per 100km, consuming more than twice as much fuel as the M4A2. The cruising range on dirt roads dropped to 115km. Additionally, the A57 Multibank proved more difficult to service. The improved tracks showed themselves better than the T41 or T49 tracks during off-road trials. The tank could climb a slope up to 27

BELOW: The shape of the upper rear plate and double engine access doors are additional identifiable M4A4 tank features. (Pavel Borovikov)

54

Lend-Lease Substitute

ABOVE: The pistol port was used to load ammunition and extract spent shell casings more often than for its intended purpose. The turret markings for this tank are copied from an M4A2 tank in Soviet service. (Pavel Borovikov)

degrees or at a tilt of 26 degrees, after which they started to slip. The armament was also tested. The tank had the same 75mm gun as the M4A2, but the peak rate of fire was 12-16rpm compared to the M4A2’s 20rpm, largely due to trials being performed in dustier conditions. The rate of fire on the move was similar: 5rpm when using the stabilizer and 3.8rpm without it. The stabilizer also increased the effectiveness of fire on the move: the hit rate went up from 50% to 80%. As with the M4A2, the sight markings were criticized. The turret traverse motor of the M4A4 was deemed superior to that of the M4A2.56 These minor advantages were not enough to compensate for the abysmal fuel efficiency, especially since the same improvements could be had on the M4A2. The Soviets elected to wait for supplies of diesel Shermans to pick up, which proved to be the correct decision.57

ABOVE: Sectional drawing of the traverse mechanism of the Medium Tank M4A4. It was rated higher than the turret traverse mechanisms of the M4A2, T-34-76, Tiger and Tiger II, but it alone was not enough to make the M4A4 worth buying. (Vestnik Tankovoy Promyshlennosti)

55

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

Profiles

ABOVE: A small hatch Medium Tank M4A2. Tanks of this type were first delivered to the USSR in November of 1942. Soviet acceptance documents referred to them as “first generation” M4A2 tanks. Thierry Vallet

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A2(76)W used by the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps at Brno, April 1945. Thierry Vallet

56

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A2(76)W used by the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps. Original shipping labels are still present, with the slogan “Forward to Victory!” painted over them. Thierry Vallet

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A2(76)W, 1st Ukrainian Front, Torgau, 1945. The slogan on the hull reads “Russians have always beaten Prussians!”. Thierry Vallet

57

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A2(76)W used by the 1st Mechanized Corps in Berlin, 1945. These “fourth generation” tanks began arriving in September of 1944 and went into battle starting January 1945. Thierry Vallet

ABOVE: A large hatch Medium Tank M4A2(75). Tanks of this type began arriving in the USSR in the summer of 1944. Soviet acceptance documents referred to them as “third generation” M4A2 tanks. Thierry Vallet

58

ABOVE: A Medium Tank M4A2(76)W HVSS, known as the “fifth variant”. Tanks of this type began arriving in the USSR in March of 1945 and were used in August against Japanese forces in Manchuria. Thierry Vallet

ABOVE: A demilitarized M4A2(76)W HVSS tank retained in the USSR after the end of the war as a railway tug. Thierry Vallet

59

Chapter

8

Westward on the Eastern Front

LEFT: The 5th Guards Tank Brigade spent the summer of 1943 carrying out probing attacks against the German defences around Krymskaya. A decisive offensive against the fortifications of the Blue Line followed, in which the 5th Guards TBr played a part in liberating Novorossiysk.

60

Westward on the Eastern Front

As thousands of M4A2 tanks entered service with the Red Army over the course of the Great Patriotic War and the Soviet-Japanese War, it would be impossible to recount the complete history of every unit that used them. Instead, Chapters 8-14 contain a selection of experiences recorded from the point of view of the tanks’ users across a variety of operations and fighting conditions intended to provide the reader with representative examples of the tank’s service.

Debut at the Black Sea The first M4A2 tanks to see action in the Red Army were the tanks that came to the USSR via the southern route through Baku. Nine tanks were assigned to the 563rd Independent Tank Battalion on January 4, 1943. On January 12, two Shermans were assigned to the 5th Guards Tank Brigade along with a batch of M3 light tanks. On January 21 the brigade traded nine of the latter to the 563rd ITB for its Shermans, gathering up a total of 11 tanks of this type.58 In addition to Shermans, the brigade had 18 Valentine tanks, four M3 medium tanks, and three M3 light tanks. The brigade continued training through January and set out towards the front on February 3. These tanks seem to have suffered from the same mechanical defects as the ones that arrived in the north and routinely fell behind the brigade’s advance. As a result, only six M4A2s were keeping up with the brigade by February 5. Four fell behind and one had to be shipped back to a repair base after it slipped off a mountain road and fell down a cliff.59 60 The Shermans were not the only tanks that fell behind: one M3 medium dropped back during the march while one Valentine and one M3 light were undergoing repairs. One of the four Shermans that fell behind broke down on the next day and had to be sent to a repair battalion.61 By February 15, five M4A2 tanks were still in working order, two were awaiting spare parts for repairs, and four were left behind.62

Mechanical failures continued until the end of the month. As of March 1, only five tanks were fully operational, three M4A2s were being repaired within the unit, and three were being repaired externally. Combat losses also began to take a toll when the brigade was hit by a bombing raid on March 2. One junior commander was killed and one M4A2 tank’s radiator was damaged by splinters. The Shermans were slow to return to service: six were reported as operational on March 5, and another by March 10. On April 24, 1943, the 5th Guards TBr was assigned to the North Caucasus Front Tank Group commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel V. S. Titov. Titov organized another trade, and a further 11 M4A2s were received from the 63rd Tank Brigade on April 25 in exchange

ABOVE: Fragment of an M4A2 driver’s compartment roof recovered in the vicinity of Krymskaya by the Kubanskiy Platsdarm archeological team. (Yevgeniy Profiryev)

ABOVE: A close-up photo showing the part number D51029. (Yevgeniy Profiryev)

61

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: M4A2 tanks enter liberated Novorossiysk. (Novorossiyskiy Istoricheskiy Muzey-Zapovednik)

for the M3 medium and light tanks. The 5th Guards TBr went into its first battle with the new tanks on May 1, 1943, equipped with 18 operational M4A2s and 17 Valentines.63 The brigade’s first objective was to attack towards height 118.0, preventing the enemy from freely moving troops between the town of Krymskaya and the village of Neberdzhayevskaya. The tanks took up initial positions at 05:00 on May 2, but the order to attack was not given that day. The approaching tanks were heard by the enemy and were subjected to attacks by artillery and bombers, but fortunately losses were slight. The attack only took place at 07:00 on May 3 after a half-hour artillery barrage. The tanks forded the Psyzh river and reached height 118.0 by 14:00, despite heavy resistance. Success in the attack was credited to careful reconnaissance and preparation, as well as tight cooperation with the brigade’s motorized infantry battalion. In addition to fighting enemy infantry, they helped tank commanders find their way on the battlefield. The 5th Guards TBr continued pursuing the enemy, crossing the Adagum river and capturing Nizhnegrecheskiy on May 5. May 6 was spent pulling out bogged down tanks and 62

performing repairs which continued on May 7 after the brigade assembled at height 240.3 Many awards were issued for these battles. Guards Senior Sergeant A. P. Antonov, the driver of an M4A2 tank, was awarded the ‘For Courage’ medal for his skilful driving through enemy defences that allowed his tank to destroy a 75mm gun, an anti-tank rifle position, two dugouts, five carts, and kill up to 40 enemy soldiers and officers.64 Loader Guards Sergeant V. K. Plekhov, whose M4A2 tank took out two 75mm guns, suppressed seven machine gun nests, and killed up to 30 Germans was awarded the ‘For Battle Merit’ medal.65 Guards Senior Sergeant P. I. Pitsko also received the ‘For Courage’ medal as his tank crew was credited with the destruction of a mortar pit, two dugouts, and up to 25 Germans.66 It was not only those who damaged the enemy that were rewarded. An Order of the Red Star was given to Guards Senior Technician-Lieutenant I. S. Zhidkov for evacuating six M4A2 tanks under fire67, while Guards Senior Technician-Lieutenant K. L. Burachkov was nominated for the same award for evacuating four tanks.68 Guard Senior Technician-Lieutenant L. L. Sukstanskiy received a ‘For Courage’ medal

Westward on the Eastern Front

ABOVE: An M4A2 tank passes through the ruined city. (Sevastopolskiy Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Muzey-Zapovednik)

for repairing an M4A2 with damaged track and bogeys under fire,69 and Guards Senior Sergeant V. A. Tyutin received a ‘For Battle Merit’ medal for excellence in restoring knocked out tanks, including one M4A2 that was put back into action with a drive sprocket that he removed from another knocked out tank mid-battle.70 Tankers who were able to preserve their tanks were rewarded as well. Guards Sergeant A. A. Glushenko received a ‘For Courage’ medal for putting out his burning M4A2 and ensuring its successful evacuation,71 and Guards Starshina K. S. Bederdinov repaired three Shermans and drove them off the battlefield, which also earned him a ‘For Courage’ medal.72 New orders were received on May 9. The brigade was tasked with penetrating enemy defences at height 167.4 and continuing the offensive towards Leninskoye. This time, the enemy’s defences were much better prepared, and the reconnaissance was not as thorough: the tanks hit a large minefield as they approached their objective. Immobilized tanks came under fire from anti-tank guns. Attempts to make paths through the mines were unsuccessful and 19 tanks were knocked out or destroyed that day. The attack was repeated

on the next day with greater success, but the Shermans still took heavy losses in this battle. Three were immobilized by mines, 11 knocked out by enemy artillery. Of those 14, seven could not be recovered and were left on the battlefield. The 1st battalion blamed torn tow cables for its inability to recover immobilized tanks.73 One tank was destroyed by its own crew and two more burned out. The Shermans were not alone in their fate as the Valentines performed similarly: four were hit by mines, nine knocked out by artillery, three burned up, and eight were stuck on the battlefield. Tanks that could not be recovered were blown up to deny them to the enemy. Despite the unsuccessful battle, many crewmen and technicians still displayed exceptional heroism. Guards Senior Lieutenant-Technician I. S. Ivanitskiy received an Order of the Red Star for repairing a knocked out M4A2 tank and then using it to evacuate seven more tanks from the battlefield.74 Guards Sergeant V. F. Gryazev received a ‘For Courage’ medal for staying in his knocked out Sherman over the course of 10 hours under fire and driving it off the battlefield at night.75 These losses were heavy enough that the brigade had to stop its 63

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

attack and return to performing repairs. By May 25, 16 Shermans and 23 Valentines were operational. Additionally, tanks received new markings to avoid friendly fire and each tank was equipped with two or three unditching logs 3-4m long by 15-20mm thick. 76 Many battles like those fought on May 9-10 followed. The brigade would probe the enemy defences around Krymskaya, attempt a breakthrough, then retreat to patch up its tanks. The number of functional tanks in the unit slowly declined even though many awards were handed out for crews and technicians that were able to recover and restore damaged vehicles. Sometimes, entire crews received awards such as the crew of one tank (commander Guards Lieutenant A. D. Vostrov, gunner Guards Yefreytor I. S. Aleksenenko, loader Guards Junior Sergeant D. I. Deyanov, driver Guards Red Armyman A. D. Miroshnichenko, and bow gunner Guards Sergeant M. P. Aladashvili) all received ‘For Courage’’ medals after their tank was immobilized by a mine. Instead of abandoning it, the crew worked to repair the tank, defused mines to form a passage out of the minefield, and successfully returned to their unit despite many of them suffering wounds.77 The inevitably thinning ranks of the brigade meant that it needed reinforcements, but there were no more M4A2 tanks available. Fourteen Valentines and 4 T-34 tanks arrived on July 20. The T-34s were formed into a separate tank company. On July 22 the brigade was ready for action once again with 12 Shermans, 28 Valentines, and four T-34s. After several more probing attacks the brigade returned to the reserve on July 27, with the exception of two platoons of Valentines (six tanks) that were used by the 6th Guards Tank Regiment to conduct reconnaissance. By August 4, three T-34s, 13 Shermans, and 21 Valentines were operational. Another probing attack towards Gornoveseliy and Mekkerstuk on August 8-9 left the brigade with just four tanks in running 64

ABOVE: A closer view. Note that this tank has the early suspension bogeys with a return roller in the middle, the early type of gun mantlet, and direct vision ports. (Sevastopolskiy Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Muzey-Zapovednik)

order, all Valentines. One of the awards issued after this battle went to the aforementioned Guards Sergeant V. F. Gryazev who received an Order of the Red Star for a daring escape from the battlefield. After bailing out of his burning tank, he ended up unarmed. Pretending it was a grenade, he threw a clump of dirt at nearby German troops. This bought him several crucial seconds that he needed to jump over their trench and escape. Despite suffering from 16 wounds, Gryazev returned to his unit.78 August 10 and 11 were spent on repairs while reinforcements arrived in the form of 10 T-34 tanks, increasing the brigade’s total active tanks to four Shermans, 11 T-34s, and 13 Valentines. On the next day the tanks were sent to attack towards Leninskoye, but came across a ravine that neither they nor enemy tanks could cross. Three German counterattacks were recorded that day, all of which were successfully repelled. The crew of an M4A2 tank commanded by Guards Lieutenant A. T. Kalmykov was credited with knocking out two enemy tanks on that day.79 The 5th Guards Tank Brigade was taking heavy losses. From August 6 to 12, four Shermans were burned up and 10 knocked out (including those subsequently repaired). Five Valentines also burned, 13 were knocked out, and five were immobilized by mines, while

Westward on the Eastern Front

one T-34 was knocked out and another was immobilized by a mine. Thirty-nine tankers were killed, 88 wounded, and six were missing. This once again proved too much to continue fighting and the brigade was pulled out of combat for training and restoration. T-34 tanks were slowly edging out the foreign ones. Since the number of T-34s kept growing, training in the brigade now centred around the operation of Soviet guns and engines. The training was not arbitrary, as the brigade had a difficult task ahead of it. A decisive offensive was coming after a summer of probing the German defences. At dusk on September 9 the forces of the North Caucasus Front began to assemble for the NovorossiyskTaman Offensive Operation. The 5th Guards Tank Brigade was assigned to the 18th Army and given the toughest task of all: the tanks were to break through the line of fortifications known as The Blue Line, called Gottenkopf by the Germans, and liberate Novorossiysk. The size of the strike force gathered up for this task hinted at the difficulty of the upcoming fight. The 5th Guards Tank Brigade was reinforced with nine self-propelled guns from the 1448th SPG Regiment, 20 ZIS-3 towed guns from the 103rd Tank Destroyer Regiment, the 174th Army Engineers Battalion, a battalion of infantry from the 2nd Guards Rifle Division, and a transport company of 40 Ford cargo trucks and 21 Ford trucks with anti-aircraft guns. The brigade assembled at Kabardinka at 11:00 on September 13 with 14 T-34s, 14 Valentines, and seven Shermans operational. ABOVE LEFT: Penetration diagram of a German 20mm KwK 38 against the Sherman tank. Heavy anti-tank rifles and low calibre autocannons mounted on aircraft were still a threat to the tank. In this and other diagrams the penetration data is calculated. (TsAMO) BELOW LEFT: A similar diagram for the 5cm KwK 38 L/42 gun. Only a small part of the front armour was vulnerable at close range, but the sides were vulnerable from up to 800m. (TsAMO)

65

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

The city’s garrison put up a staunch resistance. The Soviet force was split up into assault teams consisting of between two and five tanks, two SPGs, a platoon of infantry, and a squad of engineers. The tanks and SPGs would cover the approach of the infantry and assist them in clearing buildings by firing on the upper floors while the infantry fought their way up from below. Two M4A2 tanks burned up during the fighting for the city and five T-34s were knocked out while 23 men were wounded and four were killed. Despite the dwindling number of Sherman tanks, their crews still made a great contribution to the battle. One M4A2 knocked out a German tank destroyer, four dugouts, five machine gun nests, and killed 35 enemy soldiers. Crews of two more claimed credit for the same Pz.Kpfw.III tank along with six dugouts, six machine gun nests, an anti-tank rifle position, and up to 57 Germans.80 Gunner Guards Sergeant M. I. Zinovyev received an Order of the Red Star for destroying an anti-tank gun, three machine gun nests, four dugouts, and up to 25 Germans with his Sherman.81 The bow gunner of an M4A2 tank, Guards Senior Sergeant M. I. Polevoy, received an Order of the Red Star for taking out an anti-tank gun, three machine gun nests, and up to 15 soldiers.82 The city was cleared of enemy forces by September 16 and the brigade continued pursuing the enemy westward. In gratitude, the brigade was granted the title ‘Novorossiyskaya’ meaning ‘of Novorossiysk’. ABOVE RIGHT : The longer 5cm KwK 39 L/60 tank gun and 5cm Pak 38 anti-tank gun could penetrate the Sherman from a larger distance, and could even penetrate the turret frontally, albeit at a short range. (TsAMO) BELOW RIGHT: In 1942 the newest Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks were armed with the 7.5cm KwK 40 L/43 gun. This could penetrate the Sherman’s armour from a fair distance away, although the sloped front armour still presented a difficult challenge. The diagram points out that the direct vision ports are a weak point and can be penetrated from a greater distance. (TsAMO)

66

Westward on the Eastern Front

Few Shermans remained in service, and that number declined by the day as the fighting went on. One tank burned up on September 19 at Ravenskoye, two more on the next day. Another M4A2 was knocked out at Anapa on September 22, and the final functional Sherman in the brigade was lost on September 26. Two M4A2 tanks were repaired on September 29, but were disabled by mines on the same day. Guards Senior TechnicianLieutenant M. A. Starkov was awarded an Order of the Red Star for repairing three M4A2 tanks on October 3, but these were quickly lost as well.83 Despite how few Shermans were left and their continued disabling, their crews still performed admirably. On October 3, bow gunner Guards Sergeant H. K. Ragimov received a ‘For Courage’ medal for replacing the loader of his M4A2 tank who was wounded in battle and could not continue carrying out his duties. Ragimov’s tank was credited with the destruction of a 120mm gun as well as up to 60 enemy soldiers.84 M4A2 tanks became a rare sight as the offensive continued as it was difficult to repair knocked out tanks while keeping up the pace of the fighting. Only six M4A2 tanks remained in action by the time the brigade was pulled out into the Stavka’s reserves in December85 . This was the end of the 5th Guards Tank Brigade’s experience with Sherman tanks, as after a rest period the brigade returned to the front with a standard outfit of T-34 and T-70 tanks.86 Its six Shermans were handed over to the 257th Independent Tank Battalion which was previously equipped with M3 light and medium tanks. The debut of the Sherman tanks on the Eastern Front may not have been marked with the dazzling success of their cousins in the British Army at El Alamein, but these tanks arrived at the front lines in very different conditions. The 5th Guards Tank Brigade spent several months grinding away at the fortifications of the Blue Line, which would have been a tough job for any tank. Despite the heroic performance of the brigade’s repair

technicians, most Shermans were lost to mines by the time the brigade began its large scale offensive. The remaining tanks performed admirably and there is no reason to believe that the attack would have failed had the brigade received more Shermans instead of T-34s. The brigade’s evaluation of the tanks recorded on October 23, 1943, was generally positive: “Thanks to its high speed, the M4A2 tank is very good in pursuit and is very manoeuvrable. The armament is suitable for its role, as both a high explosive shell and high penetration armour piercing ammunition (shell or shot) is available. The 75mm cannon and two Browning machine guns work flawlessly. Drawbacks include the tank’s height, which makes for a large target on the battlefield. The armour, despite being thick (60mm) is of poor quality. There were cases where it was penetrated by anti-tank rifles at a range of 80m. There were also cases where Ju-87 bombers strafed the tanks with 20mm gun fire, which resulted in penetrations of the side and turret armour, leading to losses among the crew. Compared to the T-34, these tanks are easier to control and are more resilient during long marches, as the engines do not need adjustments often. The tanks fared well in battle.” In addition to penetration by comparatively small calibres, there were cases of back-spall when the tanks were hit by high explosive shells. American representatives were сontacted about this issue, and tanks that arrived after November of 1943 were noted to have higher quality armour.87 These battles also revealed another weakness of the tank: these early Shermans did not have wet ammunition racks or even armoured ammunition bins and were prone to devastating fires when hit due to the vulnerable location of the ammunition. Burned out Shermans were not an uncommon occurrence even when relatively few tanks of this type remained in action. Like the armour, this issue was also quickly rectified. Second generation tanks had an improved ammunition layout that reduced the likelihood of fire when the tank was hit. 67

Chapter

9

Kursk Salient and Beyond

ABOVE: The 229th Independent Tank Regiment fought to keep the Germans out of Maloarkhangelsk in mid-July of 1943. The regiment was attached to the 15th Rifle Corps which led a series of counterattacks, pushing the Germans back to the river Neruch.

M4A2s arriving through the northern route reached Murmansk and were shipped to the training centre in Gorky, to be assigned to the 190th Training Tank Brigade (renamed the 5th Training Tank Brigade in January 1943). From there, they would be reassigned to combat units. Sixteen M4A2 tanks were assigned to the 92nd Tank Brigade but they were quickly returned due to widespread mechanical troubles. Just as on the southern 68

portion of the front, mechanical issues delayed the Sherman’s combat debut. In consequence, the 5th Training Tank Brigade kept all arriving M4A2s for training purposes. As of March 20, 1943, it had 40 tanks of this type: 35 running and five being repaired. Four were run so hard in training that fixing them required external assistance, and they were shipped off to Repair Base 97.

Kursk Salient and Beyond

ABOVE: The 229th Independent Tank Regiment handed over its remaining 10 M4A2 tanks to the 237th Independent Tank Regiment, which continued to push the German forces northward.

69

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

M4A2 tanks that arrived through the northern route first saw battle with the 229th Independent Tank Regiment. Thirty-one tanks were received by April 10, 1943, which soon increased to 39 tanks. The unit remained in reserve until July 194388 and as of July 1, the regiment reported it had 38 functional M4A2 tanks.89 The 229th ITR was subordinate to the 48th Army, which set up defences on the northern flank of the Kursk Salient. The regiment was in reserve at Kazakovka on July 5 when the German offensive began. Lucky for the 229th ITR, the attack of the German 9th Army was aimed further west towards Olkovatka and Ponyri. However, the regiment spent little time on the sidelines. The German 41st Tank Corps peeled off from the southward attack and headed east towards Maloarkhangelsk. The 229th ITR was moved 20km northeast of Maloarkhangelsk to Ivanovka on July 790 and on July 10 it was transferred to the 13th Army, which was in the path of the German attack. The regiment was assigned to the 74th Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps and ordered to guard the Tinyakovskiy farm. All 39 M4A2 tanks in the regiment were ready for battle.91 A counterattack was ordered on July 11. The Soviet tanks were ordered to take the line through Troska, height 255.6, and height 238.6. The attack was made without infantry cover in the expectation that the infantry would join the tanks later, but this never came to pass. The regiment came under antitank gun fire on approach, burning up three of its tanks. The surviving M4A2s were caught in a battle with 15-16 German tanks supported by infantry.92 The attack stalled as a result of poor coordination between two Soviet companies, and only support from the 3rd company of the regiment ensured a successful withdrawal towards Vavilonovka. A followup attack was personally organized by the Chief of Staff of the 15th Rifle Corps, where 3rd and 4th companies supported by infantry attacked height 255.6 and managed to hold that position. 70

The enemy broke through to Grinevka overnight and the 229th ITR was ordered to push them back. The 2nd company attacked with the support of the 78th Rifle Regiment but was repelled and all of the regiment’s tanks retreated towards Vavilonovka. Eight of the regiment’s tanks burned up over the two days of combat and 11 more were knocked out. Personnel losses consisted of 15 killed and 13 injured. The Commander of Motorized and Mechanized Forces of the Central Front was not impressed with this performance and blamed the staff officers of the 229th ITR for the failure. Not only could they not organize effective cooperation with supporting infantry, but cohesion inside the unit itself was lacking. Despite being pushed back, the regiment claimed to have knocked out six enemy tanks and SPGs, five antitank guns, eight machine guns, two mortar batteries, and killed 530 enemy soldiers.93 Individuals in the unit excelled as many M4A2 tank crews received medals for destruction of enemy infantry and artillery. Among these, the M4A2 crewed by radio operator Jr. Sergeant D. I. Aksenov was credited with the destruction of an enemy medium tank and a Goliath demolition vehicle; another enemy tank was destroyed by the crew of loader Jr. Sergeant P. I. Bogachev and radio operator Jr. Sergeant B. M. Kochetkov, earning all three ‘For Courage’ medals. 94 A third tank was destroyed by driver Sr. Sergeant F. V. Lukyanov’s tank, which earned him a ‘For Battle Merit’ medal. 95 Once again, medals were also handed out for preserving the regiment’s tanks: radio operator Jr. Sergeant O. V. Goryachev’s crew towed three disabled tanks off the battlefield and earned ‘For Battle Merit’ medals as a reward. 96 Technician V. S. Lebedev earned a ‘For Courage’ medal by performing five medium repairs during the battle and restoring two tanks on the battlefield.97 Fortunately for the 229th ITR, these battles were costly for its opponents as

Kursk Salient and Beyond

well. A break in the fighting which lasted several days followed, during which repairs could be conducted. Twenty-two tanks in total were available for action by July 15. On that day the regiment’s tanks moved towards Protasovo, this time supporting the 360th Rifle Regiment of the 74th Rifle Division. This attack was much better organized: an artillery barrage began at 5:15, followed by the tanks and infantry at 5:30. The attack was successful and the villages of Pavlovka and Petrovka were taken by 7:00 98, but this streak didn’t last. When the tanks ran into a group of enemy SPGs, three of them burned up and five were knocked out. While they were tied up in this fighting, a group of four enemy tanks supported by infantry forced the 360th Rifle Regiment out of its positions near Petrovka.99 Even though gunner Jr. Sergeant I. T. Antonov claimed to have knocked out an enemy SPG, there were few lasting successes achieved.100 The fighting for Protasovo resumed on the next day. To augment its tanks’ guns,

ABOVE: Illustration from the Red Army M4A2 manual, depicting a ‘first generation’ tank. The first tanks to arrive in the USSR had direct vision ports, M34 gun mounts, and suspension bogeys with a return roller in the centre. (Voyenizdat)

the supporting infantry formed tank hunter squads armed with anti-tank rifles, Molotov cocktails and anti-tank hand grenades. Detailed instructions on cooperation with tanks were also issued.101 These new tactics had some effect and the 360th Rifle Regiment held on to the outskirts of Protasovo and Soglasniy,102 despite reports

ABOVE: The M4A2 as seen from above. Another sign that this is a very early tank is the lack of a loader’s hatch. (Voyenizdat)

71

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

of mobile groups of German tank destroyers that foiled any attempts at a tank attack.103 An interrogation of a POW revealed that German forces were retreating behind the river Neruch, and a decision was made to move the infantry up to the river alone and reassign the tanks to another sector. The 229th ITR was transferred out of the 15th Rifle Corps on July 18. By this point 14 of its tanks burned up and 17 were knocked out, with 117 men lost. Eight tanks remained in running order. All knocked out M4A2s had been evacuated.104 These heavy losses were not in vain. The 3rd company of the 229th ITR was in the thick of the tank-ontank fighting and claimed six enemy tanks, two SPGs, and one tankette (likely a Goliath demolition vehicle) in this engagement. For this performance, company commander Captain D. S. Matveev received an Order of the Red Star.105 The same reward was given to his subordinate Lieutenant V. G. Sokolov, whose platoon was responsible for knocking out two of those tanks and one SPG.106 Lieutenant S.M. Shuvalov’s 1st company was also credited with knocking out one tank.107 Five radio operators received various medals for flawless communications during these battles. Military Technician 2nd Class I. S. Meter received a ‘For Battle Merit’ medal for repairing 25 Wireless Sets No.19 (Soviet tankers preferred to equip their M4A2s with British radios),108 and four drivers received medals for flawless operation of their tanks which did not exhibit any mechanical failures during the fighting. Twenty-six tanks were evacuated from the battlefield and 60 medium repairs were performed under the direction of Captain S. A. Glukharev, for which he received an Order of the Red Star.109 Members of his repair company who evacuated and repaired the tanks under enemy fire were also decorated. As the German offensive ran out of steam, the Red Army mounted its counterattack. In these conditions it was not possible to 72

stay and repair the damaged tanks. On July 23 the decision was made to hand over the 10 remaining M4A2 tanks, seven of which were still in running order, to the 237th Independent Tank Regiment, subordinate to the 70th Army. In addition to the 10 M4A2s, the 237th ITR had 13 T-34 tanks and seven T-70s. These tanks re-entered the fray on July 25, taking Novoryzhkovskiy and Krasnoye Znamya without resistance then moving up to take Pokhvisnevo. This is where the tanks ran into a much more dangerous opponent than any they had faced before: Tiger tanks from the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion. Four M4A2s were burned up in this attack, and two more were knocked out. The regiment’s other tanks also suffered heavy losses: one T-70 and three T-34s burned up while five T-34s and two T-70s were knocked out. The regiment held its ground. On the next day, the 237th ITR continued to move forward in support of the 43rd Rifle Regiment, deflecting enemy tank attacks. Enemy resistance on that day was much less aggressive and only two tanks were lost: the remaining M4A2 and one T-34. The 237th ITR’s repair units were not very keen on recovering their foreign tanks and only one M4A2 was listed when the regiment handed off its tanks to the

ABOVE: An illustration of a modernized M4A2 tank. Improvements to this type of tanks are marked on the image: 1) applique armour protecting the ammunition racks, 2) applique armour protecting the direct vision ports, 3) travel clamp for the gun. (Voyenizdat)

Kursk Salient and Beyond

ABOVE: Profile and front view of the M4A2 tank. Flyers like these were distributed to Soviet anti-tank gunners to prevent friendly fire. (TsAMO)

ABOVE: Penetration diagram for the 7.5cm KwK L/24 gun against the Sherman tank. The armour piercing round is not very effective, but many areas of the tank can be penetrated with HEAT ammunition. (TsAMO)

251st Independent Tank Regiment before departing for refitting, and even that tank required major repairs.110 The 229th ITR left a complete report of their experience with M4A2 tanks. According to the tankers, the tanks drove exceptionally quietly and smoothly, and were easy to steer. Driving at a tilt caused issues as the road wheels tended to run up on the guide horns, which resulted in damage to both the track and the wheel. There were also issues with tracks slipping on muddy terrain and it was noted that the tank had a very large turning radius. Repairs were also complex, although the tanks were deemed reliable enough that they were not performed too often.

The armour of the tank was judged sufficient for its class, but the silhouette was far too large and made it a very easy target. The tank was especially vulnerable to HEAT ammunition which the Germans began to use in large quantities starting in mid-1943. The vulnerable placement of ammunition resulted in many detonations when the tank was hit with a HEAT shell. The driver and assistant driver’s direct vision ports were identified as glaring weak points, and the rear of the turret was another weak point: even nonpenetrating hits to the turret bustle put the radio out of action. The armament of the tank was deemed modern and satisfactory with the exception of the high explosive round, which was found to be too weak.111 73

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

Although this was the end of the M4A2 at the Kursk Salient, a few more of these tanks took part in the offensive towards Orel just north of the famous battle. The 54th and 160th Reserve Tank Regiments arrived with materiel and personnel to refill the 70th Tank Brigade which was stopped in the vicinity of Reutovo between July 22 and 26. By July 26, the brigade numbered 29 M4A2 tanks, 19 Valentines, and five T-34s. The newly reinforced brigade also had new orders: to cut across the Bolkhov-Hotynets highway, capture a crossing across the river Nugr, and continue an attack at Hotynets proper. At 19:45 the brigade attacked enemy positions in the valley near Vetrovskiy, carrying infantry riders to break through areas of heavy enemy resistance. The enemy was routed but the tanks were ordered to retreat to initial positions and defend against an enemy counterattack. This attack cost the brigade seven M4A2s and four Valentines, but casualties were slight: three killed, five wounded, eight missing. The brigade claimed to have destroyed six cannon, two machine gun nests, and up to 50 enemy soldiers. The tanks and attached infantry reached their defensive positions at 04:00 on the following day, and the German counterattack came at 13:00. The brigade’s staff officers evaluated the defence effort as poor although the enemy was still driven back thanks to the supporting artillery. Another attack towards the highway ran into a German rear guard, which tied up the tanks until nightfall. However, that was long enough for the Germans to prepare their defences. The 70th TBr reached Krivusha at 06:00 on July 28, only to discover that the bridge across the river Nugr was destroyed and German artillery was zeroed in on its remains, ready to repel any attempt to ford the river. 11 M4A2s were lost during the push to the crossing: five knocked out, five burned up, and one lost for technical reasons. 74

ABOVE: Tactical diagram from the Tigerfibel, the Tiger tank manual. According to this diagram, the Tiger can reliably penetrate the front armour of a Sherman tank from 800m. From this range, the Sherman can only penetrate the Tiger’s side armour.

The brigade gathered up in Krivusha and waited. Tanks that were bogged down in the river kept the enemy’s heads down with suppressing fire while the brigade’s engineers prepared a crossing for the tanks that weren’t stuck. A group of eight M4A2s, four Valentines, and two T-34s supported by 36 infantrymen under the command of Captain Tuchkov was sent across under the cover of darkness. At 06:00 on the morning of July 30 the group occupied Krasniy Sadok. Reconnaissance showed that a group of 30 enemy tanks and SPGs was located just to the south and heavy fighting ensued. The neighbouring units that were supposed to support Tuchkov’s flanks were bogged down at the river. The Soviet tank

Kursk Salient and Beyond

group was repeatedly attacked by groups of between five and eight German tanks with artillery cover from SPGs starting at 13:00. Even though the defenders held, there was next to nothing left of the Tuchkov’s forces. Twenty-one men were killed, 52 wounded, and 10 missing. In total, the 70th Tank Brigade claimed to have knocked out seven enemy guns, 11 tanks, 16 cars, and killed up to 600 enemy soldiers but was in no shape to keep fighting. Surviving tanks were passed on to the 24th Tank Brigade to continue the advance, but there were no Shermans among them. On July 31, the 70th TBr reported that 17 Shermans burned up and 12 were knocked out during the previous week of fighting. Compared to other tanks, the M4A2s burned very frequently: out of the three T-34s that

were lost by the brigade in this period only one burned, and only four Valentines burned out of 18 lost. On average, Red Army tanks in the Orel-Kursk Offensive Operation burned 32% of the time when hit, nearly half as often as the Shermans did.112 Even in this brief period of fighting, important conclusions were drawn. The brigade’s commander wrote that one of the most important aspects of a tank attack was its infantry escort. A decisive attack closely supported by infantry was the least bloody way of breaking through enemy lines, and infantry had a better chance of survival when riding on tanks than running after them, even when moving through fields of dense cannon or machine gun fire. This was an aspect in which the Sherman was inferior to the T-34: only six infantrymen could

ABOVE: The 70th Tank Brigade received 29 M4A2 tanks as reinforcements, but they were all lost in an attempt to quickly secure the Bolkhov-Hotynets highway and capture a crossing across the river Nugr.

75

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: This M4A2 has extra handholds welded onto the hull to allow for more infantry riders. Carrying infantry into battle on tanks was the fastest and safest way of ensuring that they could keep up with tank attacks. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

fit on the M4A2’s engine deck, while the T-34’s wider fenders and handrails allowed it to carry 12. Another batch of Shermans arrived at Kursk in early September to meet the newly formed 9th Mechanized Corps which included three mechanized brigades: the 69th, 70th, and 71st. The 53rd Tank Regiment attached to the 69th brigade was equipped with a combination of M4A2

medium tanks and Valentine tanks of various marks. Interestingly enough, the aforementioned 229th Tank Regiment was attached to the 70th Mechanized Brigade and was now equipped with T-34 tanks instead of Shermans.113 The corps was formed in a hurry and the enlisted men arrived towards the end of August. Most commanders, especially the staff officers, only arrived as the unit was embarking on its way to join the 3rd Guards Tank Army. The corps commanders decided that it was prudent to take some time and train the newly assigned crews, as 70-80% of drivers only had five to eight hours of hands-on experience. Expenditure of 25-30 operating hours per vehicle was permitted.114 The drivers got more practice on the way to the front lines. As there were not enough railway cars available, the tanks had to make their own way from Kursk to Sumy and then to the shores of the Dnieper, some 400km away. The journey was not free of technical difficulties. Out of the 14 running M4A2s in the 53rd Tank Regiment at the start of the trip, only 11 arrived at their destination. Each tank had already accumulated 50-100 hours

ABOVE: Ammunition layout of the M4A2 tank. The ammunition stored in the sponsons had a tendency to catch fire when hit, giving the tank an unfortunate reputation. 1-6) main gun ammunition, 7-10) .30 cal ammunition, 11-12) .50 cal ammunition 13) .45 cal ammunition. (Voyenizdat)

76

Kursk Salient and Beyond

of use before heading out115 and the repair technicians were not familiar with foreign tanks which made returning the vehicles to working order a complicated task.116 The rest of the corps also experienced difficulties in their travels as a lack of available transport, confusion during planning, and activity of German aircraft forced supply columns to travel only at night – which left the rear echelons of the 9th Mechanized Corps struggling to keep up. Despite their fuel and ammunition falling hundreds of kilometres behind, the tanks pressed on. The 3rd Guards Tank Army was relentlessly pursuing the enemy to the banks of the Dnieper and any delay was unacceptable.117 The river proved to be a serious obstacle. The only means of crossing that could be found were six dried-out rowboats and

a sunken pontoon which was recovered and patched up. While the infantry could start crossing the river with even these rudimentary tools, the tanks had to wait for the engineers to arrive.118 This let the tanks regroup: one of the remaining Shermans arrived on September 23.119 Three more were still missing, reported as under repair.120 Pontoons arrived on September 24121 but medium tanks only began crossing the Dnieper on September 27.122 Crossing the river during the day was impossible, which severely limited the amount of cargo that could be transported. Only three tons of diesel and 1200kg of gasoline were delivered across the river, a tiny fraction of what was needed to carry out a mechanized offensive.123 Strict limits were established on usage of cars and trucks beyond delivery of cargo.124

ABOVE: The 9th Mechanized Corps crossed the Dnieper and assisted in the attempts to break out of the Bukrin beachhead. The corps was pulled out to attempt a breakthrough elsewhere after a month of fighting.

77

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

Soviet tanks continued to assemble on what came to be known as the Bukrin beachhead, but the Germans would not wait forever. An attempt to push the Red Army back across the river came on September 29. An attack by the German 8th Army aimed at the joint between the 100th Rifle Division and elements of the 9th Mechanized Corps was successful, and the Germans captured height 244.5 – threatening the supply lines of the 70th MBr. As the 53rd Tank Regiment was the only unit on the beachhead with tanks, it was their responsibility to defend the neighbouring brigades as well. A counterattack was launched, leaving only three tanks behind as a reserve. Since another German attack was expected at any time, a significant infantry escort could not be allocated and only elements of the 70th MBr supported the tanks. The attack came at noon, before the tanks returned. The Germans managed to push back the 1127th Rifle Regiment and one battalion of the 69th MBr, but the front line held.125 The enemy did not resume their attack on the next day and September 30 was spent receiving new reinforcements and shoring up the 9th MC’s defences.126 Losses were also tallied: from September 22-29, four M4A2s and 14 Valentines were knocked out leaving nine tanks operational.127 128 The supply situation was also dire: only 1.1 refills of diesel and 0.1 refills of gasoline remained, while the corps was running low on food and uniforms too.129 The enemy ceased attempts to crush the beachhead for several days, allowing repairs to be carried out. Seven Shermans were operational as of October 3, five more needed repairs, and three were written off completely. Three Valentines were also operational.130 Unlike their opponents, the 3rd Guards TA was not content with sitting in place and an offensive was prepared. Sufficient resources for an attack were gathered by October 10. The 53rd TR had three refills of diesel fuel and 78

0.5 refills of gas stocked up.131 Additional repairs were also performed in the meantime for a total of nine M4A2 tanks in service, one under repair, and two more salvageable but in need of a major overhaul that could not be performed with the limited resources available at the beachhead.132 The offensive began on October 12 at 07:40. The 69th MBr took height 216.3 by the end of the day but hit a minefield afterwards, losing three M4A2s and two Valentines and stalling the offensive.133 The M4A2s remained in place until October 16 when the 69th MBr was pulled back to regroup. Another Sherman was written off leaving five in service, two needing minor repairs, and four in need of an overhaul. Eight Valentines (five of them Canadian production) remained operational.134 Another offensive was announced on the evening of October 18. This time the battered 69th MBr was relegated to the second echelon where its tanks would be used to tow the brigade’s artillery.135 Even though the brigade did not see any combat, it arrived at its initial positions on October 19 with only 12 tanks.136 Two more tanks were put back into action by the end of the next day, giving the 53rd Tank Regiment five Shermans and nine Valentines.137 The long marches began to take their toll on the tanks and one of the Valentines had to be left behind when the regiment moved on the next day.138 The brigade began to dig in against potential counterattacks and prepared to conduct another offensive, but new orders came in on October 25: the 3rd Guards Tank Army was being pulled off the Bukrin beachhead. Further offensives in this sector were considered unprofitable and another attempt would be made near Lutezh, north of Kiev.139 The five remaining M4A2 tanks in the inventory of the 9th Mechanized Corps no longer appear in combat reports. As of November 4, 1943, nine tanks remained with the corps and all were listed as needing major repairs.140 The heavy use of the

Kursk Salient and Beyond

ABOVE: An M4A2 tank from the Lenino-Snegiri Military Historical Museum. The running gear is in poor condition. Issues with destruction of road wheels and tyres after a prolonged march were common among Sherman tanks. (Pavel Borovikov)

vehicles took its toll. All 15 Shermans went through minor repairs in September, but only five repairs were performed in October: two minor and three medium. The 9th MC could not keep up with the increasingly involved repairs that these tanks required141 even though the heroism displayed by the repair crews was on par with that of the tankers. For instance, Technician-Lieutenant M. S. Tsuprikov rode into battle on the engine deck and repaired tanks mid-battle.

He was able to repair a knocked out tank and drive it off the battlefield, an act which earned him an Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class.142 Private Ye. A. Savin received a ‘For Courage’ medal for conducting battlefield repairs of four tank guns, three Browning machine guns, and two BESA machine guns. 143 Other repair technicians and tankers received orders and medals, but even their hard work and heroism was not enough to break open the beachhead.

79

10 Closing the Korsun Pocket Chapter

ABOVE: An M4A2 tank from the 233rd Tank Brigade. This tank has a small hatch hull with applique armour welded to the sides, protecting the ammunition racks. (Yuri Pasholok)

Soviet formations that used M4A2 tanks in 1943 were typically not very large: brigades and regiments at most. Small units equipped with uncommon vehicles had difficulty receiving spare parts and specialized troops, typically not lasting very long on the front lines before being re-equipped with domestic tanks. However, this situation did not go on 80

forever as shipments of M4A2 tanks picked up again at the end of 1943 and many units received a significant number of these tanks. This allowed for a more efficient distribution of spare parts and training of dedicated crews. The 5th Mechanized Corps was among those units. On January 1, 1944, it had a previously unseen amount of M4A2

Closing the Korsun Pocket

tanks: 29 each in the 252nd, 46th, and 156th Tank Regiments (attached to the 2nd, 9th, and 45th Mechanized Brigades respectively), and another 44 in the 233rd Tank Brigade. Valentine tanks were also fairly common in the 5th MC as each regiment had four of them and the 233rd TBr had 21. These new Valentine Mk.IX tanks came equipped with more powerful 57mm 6-pounder guns. The 5th MC also had a large number of domestic vehicles: 12 SU-152s, 16 SU-85s, 21 SU-76 SPGs, four T-34s and a single KV-1.144 Unlike the 9th MC, officers of the 5th MC were mostly satisfied with the level of training their soldiers had. All tankers went through three months in training regiments and the drivers already had sufficient experience with driving tanks. There was more time to train, and all of December of 1943 was spent on exercises. By the end of the month, the corps was in good shape. Officers were used to working with each other, the tankers mastered their vehicles, and morale was high.145 Orders to proceed to the front were received on December 31, 1943. The 5th

MC was needed at the 1st Ukrainian Front to keep the Zhitomir-Berdichev Offensive Operation rolling. The corps began embarking on trains on January 3 and the first units began to arrive at Kazatin railway station on January 11, but due to insufficient transport capacity the process stretched on for an uncomfortably long time. The last units embarked on January 21 and arrived on February 6.146 There was no time to wait until the corps was fully unloaded as the first combat orders arrived on January 14 at 07:00, requiring the 233rd TBr to transfer to the 31st Tank Corps. The brigade now had an 80km march ahead of it to reach its new destination in addition to the 85km march from the train station to initial positions. As there were still not enough trucks available, the brigade’s infantry company had to walk. Forward elements of the 233rd TBr made contact with the 31st TC by midnight, but new orders were received at 00:30 and the brigade was once again transferred, this time to the 40th Army. Another 115km

ABOVE: Process of installing grousers on an M4A2 tank, which was the only way to ensure good performance in snow. Proper grousers were often unavailable, and improvisations had to be made. (Voyenizdat)

81

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: The 233rd Tank Brigade conducted a raid to reach Zvenigorodka and seal the Korsun pocket while the majority of the 5th Mechanized Corps dealt with the core of the German defences. Come February, the Red Army had to withstand a determined assault by Hermann Breith’s III Panzerkorps who were attempting to break the encirclement.

march followed; the infantry and staff were still en route to their former destination and had to change direction mid-way. The brigade’s repair company had just reached the train station and was still far behind. These repeated marches not only exhausted the infantry, but were detrimental to the tanks. Seven M4A2s slid off the road and became stuck in roadside ditches, and 17 tanks fell behind on the way for technical reasons.147 Of those 17, four M4A2s were left behind due to damage to the main clutch and another two tore their tracks.148 The Shermans’ tracks had very poor traction on the icy roads and in 20-30cm deep snow banks. Commanders suggested that spurs should be welded onto them to improve 82

performance,149 but there was no time. As a field expedient measure, slopes were covered with sand before the tanks could negotiate them.150 Other units reported similar issues in the winter, while logs and branches were also used to help with traction.151 Another measure used was to weld used T-34 track pins to every fourth track link as improvised grousers, but these wore off quickly.152 A lull followed, allowing the brigade to regroup. The 233rd TBr was assigned to support the 104th Rifle Corps on January 16. At 10:30 on January 17, orders came in that an attack was planned for 11:00 on the same day. M4A2 tanks from the 1st battalion would attack Nagornaya, the 2nd battalion would attack Bashtechki, and

Closing the Korsun Pocket

three Valentine tanks from the 3rd battalion would cover the others and act as a reserve in case of an attack by enemy armoured vehicles. Given only half an hour to prepare, there was not enough time to coordinate with infantry or artillery. The result of such a rushed attack was not surprising: the 1st battalion reached the western outskirts of Nagornaya before running into an anti-tank gun battery and lost eight tanks, of which two were knocked out and six burned. The 2nd battalion fared a little better. The tanks reached the outskirts of Bashtechki successfully and held it until nightfall when the infantry finally arrived. The cost of this success was high as two M4A2 tanks burned up and nine were knocked out. Two of the accompanying Valentines also burned up and the remaining one was knocked out. In return, elements of the 233rd TBr claimed to have knocked out an enemy Pz.Kpfw.III tank, three tank

destroyers, three cannon, eight machine guns, and killed up to 40 soldiers and officers. These attacks were followed up with more attempts on January 19 and 20 to little effect. The brigade lost another two M4A2s and six Valentines, claiming to have knocked out three Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks, two SPGs, nine mortars, 15 machine guns, and killed up to 100 enemy soldiers and officers. In these first fruitless battles, 24 men were killed and 42 wounded in the 223rd Tank Brigade.153 Nearby, the 156th Tank Regiment was also separated from the 5th MC and assigned to the 40th Army, who directed it to support the 359th Rifle Division. The commander of the regiment, Major Troshin, received an order to attack the village of Tynovka with the 1198th Rifle Regiment at 13:00 on January 17. This time, the infantry followed its tanks eagerly and Tynovka was taken by 15:00. The next target, Votylevka, was a harder nut to crack. Artillery and mortar

ABOVE: A German soldier inspects a knocked out M4A2 tank, winter 1944. This tank already has improved VVSS bogeys with a rear return roller, but no applique armour over the ammunition racks. (Yuri Pasholok)

83

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: A page from the Panther tank manual describing the Sherman tank and the M10 tank destroyer, which was also used by the Red Army. The M4A2’s 75mm gun could not penetrate the front armour of the Panther tank, but it could penetrate the thin side at a relatively large angle.

84

Closing the Korsun Pocket

fire drove the infantry from the village, leaving the tanks on their own. Not willing to lose his tanks in close quarters combat with no infantry support, the commander of the 359th Rifle Division ordered the tanks to retreat and set up an ambush outside of the village to ward off potential counterattacks. Only one tank was lost in this battle. Its commander, Lieutenant I. P. Aksenov, continued to fire at the enemy over the course of four hours while his crew dismounted and prevented enemy infantry from closing in. Aksenov received an Order of the Patriotic War 2nd Class for his actions.154 Other members of his crew were also rewarded with orders and medals. The vastly different experiences of the two units highlight the importance of coordination with other branches, especially infantry, during tank attacks. With similar objectives in similar environments the 233rd TBr fought without effective infantry support, took heavy damage, and was unable to take its objective while the smaller 156th TR was able to not only achieve its objective but also attempt to take another village afterwards, all with negligible losses. Both the 233rd TBr155 and 156th TR156 returned to the 5th MC on January 21, 1944. That same day marked the formation of the 6th Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. G. Kravchenko. The 5th Mechanized Corps was included among its ranks. The 6th TA had an important objective: to break through the German defences and complete the encirclement of the enemy forces at KorsunShevchenkovskiy. The offensive began on January 26, 1944. The battered 233rd TBr was held in reserve but was soon dispatched to play a vital role. Its tanks would take part in a raid to capture the city of Lisyanka in cooperation with the 1228th Self Propelled Gun Artillery Regiment and elements of the 160th Rifle

Division. With 22 M4A2s and 11 Valentines functional, the 233rd TBr set out on its mission at 12:00 on January 27. Lisyanka was captured at 22:00. Even though the infantry was lagging behind again, the damage to the brigade was minimal: three M4A2s and two Valentines were lost with 16 men killed and 22 wounded. The brigade claimed three enemy SPGs knocked out, the destruction of an APC carrying ammunition, three cannon, 10 machine guns, and up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers. The advance continued. By 12:30 on the next day the brigade entered Zvenigorodka and linked up with elements of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The ring around the Korsun Pocket was closed.157 The 5th MC had plenty of time to get to know its tanks over the course of the next month as they stood in the way of the III Panzerkorps’ attempt to liberate its encircled comrades. Overall, opinions on the M4A2 were positive. The layout of the fighting compartment was comfortable and the crew could reach a rate of fire of 6-8rpm from the main gun or 2-3rpm from the breech-loaded 50mm bomb thrower, a feature of tanks that went through the British modification process. The M4A2 tanks generally fired either on the move at a speed of 15-20kph or from short stops. The effective range of the gun was 800m as penetration at greater ranges was insufficient. The after action report indicates that it took seven to eight direct hits at 800-1000m to destroy a Pz.Kpfw.IV tank. Generally, three to four rounds or two to three bursts of machine gun fire was enough to destroy or suppress a soft target.158 Despite these drawbacks, the 5th Mechanized Corps used its tanks effectively and withstood the enemy’s onslaught, albeit at a high cost: 92 M4A2 tanks, 25 Valentines, seven SU-152s, eight SU-85s, and 14 SU-76s were written off as a result of the fighting in January-February 1944, with 1100 men killed and 5003 wounded.159

85

Chapter

11

Heavy Cavalry

LEFT: The Cavalry Mechanized Group rapidly exploited the penetration of enemy defences, reaching Senno on the second day of the offensive and continuing deeper into enemy territory. Despite a landscape criss-crossed with rivers and swamps, the group was moving at a pace of about 40km per day.

86

Heavy Cavalry

As news of the D-Day invasion shook the German high command in June 1944, the Red Army was preparing to deal a devastating attack from the east. The Belorussian Offensive Operation known more commonly as Operation Bagration was one of the socalled ‘Stalin’s Ten Blows’: massive strategic offensives executed in 1944 which left no doubt that the end of the Third Reich was only a matter of time. Preparations for Operation Bagration were carried out far in advance in absolute secrecy. One of the units mobilized for the offensive was the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps. The 3rd Guards MC had just been refitted with the tried and true duet of Sherman and Valentine tanks. Each of the corps’ tank regiments (43rd, 44th, and 45th attached to 7th, 8th, and 9th mechanized brigades respectively) was equipped with 22 M4A2 and 13 Valentine Mk.IX tanks. The 35th Guards Tank Brigade had 44 Shermans and 21 Valentines. The corps also had 10 Valentine Mk.X tanks in its motorcycle reconnaissance battalion along with 16 T-34s, three of which were in the signals battalion and 13 in a reserve company.160 However, these reserve tanks were quickly appropriated by the 35th Guards Tank Brigade. The self-propelled artillery was all Soviet made: 21 SU-76 SPGs from the 1510th Self Propelled Artillery Regiment and 21 SU-85 tank destroyers from the 1823rd Self Propelled Artillery Regiment.161 The corps also had five recovery vehicles on the T-34 tank chassis.162 The tanks were prepared for fighting in difficult terrain: each was equipped with two to three logs and a section of bridge, enough to form a 20m-long crossing for each brigade.163 The corps left its positions near Tula on May 28, 1944, and made its way towards the 3rd Belorussian Front. Even though it took nearly two weeks to regroup after the long journey by rail, the corps arrived completely intact. By June 14, the 3rd Guards MC had made its way to initial positions 15-20km from the front lines. All movement was

done in strict secrecy. Tanks only drove at night and personnel were issued with special passes that did not mention their unit number. Despite these difficulties, not a single tank or soldier fell behind.164 On June 16, the commander of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General Obukhov, met with the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front and General of the Army Chernyahovskiy, the commander of Armoured and Mechanized Forces Colonel General Rodin, and the commander of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps Lieutenant General Oslikovskiy. The four of them formed their plan. The tanks and cavalry would be united in a highly mobile Cavalry Mechanized Group which would exploit the breakthrough made by the 5th Army to carry out a rapid raid through the enemy rear towards the city of Senno, a classic Deep Battle manoeuvre.165 The 5th Army began an artillery barrage to pave the way for its offensive at 03:00 on June 23, 1944, but the Cavalry Mechanized Group did not take part in this fighting. The tankers and cavalry saved their strength for when the 5th Army opened a breach. Until then, their instructions were to follow the advancing infantry and reach new positions some 15-20km away by 04:00 on June 24. This proved a challenge and the 3rd Guards MC arrived three hours behind schedule. The terrain was not friendly for tanks as the roads were of poor quality, bridges were nonexistent, and what little infrastructure was available had to be shared with the rear echelons of the advancing 5th Army. Swamps made off-road movement completely impossible. The German defences cracked before long and the tanks were ordered forward into the breach at 11:00. Contact was made by 21:00 that day, but the Germans were not as disorganized as initial plans would have indicated. The 8th Guards MBr ran into well prepared defences propped up by artillery that was dialled in on chokepoints. German counterattacks were common. Soviet 87

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: The Cavalry Mechanized Group crossed Viliya and captured several cities across the river before being broken up to pursue new objectives.

88

Heavy Cavalry

tankers blamed the inaction of their own artillery for their difficulties as the enemy’s anti-tank batteries were not suppressed, but the only way out was forward. Coordination with infantry proved very effective in these battles. Tanks with four to five infantry riders would rush forward as soon as the enemy was discovered, while the rest of the motorized rifle battalions would use the confusion to deploy and attack with support from the SU-76s.166 The brigade moved well and the village of Strigi was taken by 12:00 on June 25, followed by Sloboda at 19:00. This progress came at a cost: four M4A2 tanks burned up and three more were knocked out, while six Valentines were also knocked out.167

The 9th Guards MBr was also moving quickly and reached Senno on June 25. Like the 8th Guards, the unit discovered that speed was the key to success. A sudden attack from the flank early in the morning took the Germans by surprise, and the city was cleared by 06:30. The brigade lost no tanks, claiming to have destroyed four enemy Panthers, three smaller tanks, 400 enemy soldiers and officers, up to 70 cars, and reported the capture of several warehouses full of supplies.168 The 7th Guards MBr had its chance to shine shortly thereafter, delivering a similar surprise attack at the city of Lepel on June 28. The tanks of the 43rd Guards Tank

BELOW: Early Sherman tanks had the .50 cal AA machine gun pintle mount placed directly on the commander’s hatch which made using the hatch difficult according to Soviet crews as well as other users. This Medium Tank M4 from the Musée des Blindés has its .50 cal moved to a separate mount, making the hatch easier to use.

89

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

Regiment attacked from three directions at 07:00, causing the enemy’s defences to buckle. The brigade claimed two enemy tanks destroyed and 425 Germans killed, as well as the capture of 93 soldiers and warehouses full of supplies.169 The Cavalry Mechanized Group was making great time travelling about 40km per day despite German resistance but this rate of progress did not last. The tanks encountered a new obstacle on June 29: the Berezina river.170 The opposite bank was heavily fortified and engineers had a difficult time building a crossing under fire from enemy aircraft in addition to artillery and machine guns. The raid had progressed too far from Soviet airstrips for friendly fighters to protect them from the sky.171 As if that wasn’t bad enough, another problem cropped up: the tanks and the trucks were running out of fuel.172 While the tanks were waiting for their supply units to catch up, infantry went ahead on foot to keep up the momentum of the offensive. The tanks were also hampered by the washed out roads, forcing the corps’ engineers to work double time digging and preparing fascines to make sure the

ABOVE: An M4A2 tank in August of 1944. It is also carrying supplies and riders, both infantry and tankers. The AA machine gun is not installed. (Multimediyniy Kompleks Aktualnykh Isskustv)

90

ABOVE: M4A2 tanks on the move in 1944. When operating far from their supply lines, the tanks had to carry everything they needed with them. The tank in the foreground has a frame made of logs to carry two drums of fuel and ample spare track links, of which this tank used at least two different types. The AA machine gun is installed but covered up with a tarp. The M4A2 in the background appears to be a large hatch variant. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

tanks could keep moving. This left them in a vulnerable position and they suffered high losses from enemy aircraft.173 With the infantry far ahead and the ranks of the engineers dwindling, the tank crews had to put in a lot of manual labour to keep their vehicles moving forward.174 On July 2, the Cavalry Mechanized Group reached the Viliya river and encountered the same problem yet again. Small groups of infantry were able to cross and form beachheads, but the tanks ran out of fuel once more175 and deliveries by air had to be organized. The following day, the group received 6400kg of fuel delivered by Douglas A-20 bombers.176 Fuel was of paramount importance as the momentum of the offensive had to be maintained to prevent the enemy from regrouping. Orders and medals were handed out to mechanics for timely repairs of even one truck,177 to fuel truck drivers, and fuel warehouse workers.178 These fuel deliveries were not enough to supply the entire 3rd Guards MC however, and the decision was made to only refuel the Valentine tanks of the 35th Guards TBr. On

Heavy Cavalry

the night of July 4 the tanks crossed the river and attacked the city of Smorgon at 09:30, capturing it and entrenching by 15:00.179 New orders were received as the forces of the Cavalry Mechanized Group pulled up to Smorgon and the group split up on July 5. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps moved towards Lida and Grodno, while the tankers of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were given a different task. A large enemy group was retreating from Minsk to Vilnius. The 3rd Guards MC’s goal was to take Vilnius and prevent the enemy from joining its garrison.180 Since leaving Tula on May 28, the 3rd Guards MC had lost 21 M4A2 tanks, 21 Valentine Mk.IX tanks, seven SU-76es, and four SU-85s.181 The unit’s mechanics had a difficult time ahead of them not only preparing the tanks for battle, but organizing recovery and repair in the inevitable chaos of city fighting.182 Without a significant infantry escort, losses in the city would be high and the corps would not hold out for long. Thankfully, the 5th Army was not far behind and the 3rd Guards MC only had to fight alone for a few days. The infantry linked up with its tanks on July 8 and on the night of July 11 the 3rd Guards MC handed its positions over to the 5th Army and retreated from the city. The brigade claimed to have inflicted significant damage on the enemy: 3000 Germans killed, 300 taken prisoner, as well as four tanks and 14 SPGs destroyed.183 However, city fighting without an infantry escort also proved costly. When the dust settled and knocked out tanks were either evacuated or written off, the corps was left with 31 functional M4A2s, 18 that could be repaired, and 61 tanks permanently lost. The Valentine Mk.IXs were also in rough shape: 22 in service, five needing repairs, and 43 written off. The Mk.X tanks, on the other hand, took no losses. Soviet-built vehicles also survived relatively well: eight T-34s were still running, four could be put back

into service, and only four tanks were lost. All 13 remaining SU-76es were functional, while nine SU-85s were still in service and eight could be repaired.184 The majority of these losses were taken during the few days of city fighting, rather than the prolonged raid behind enemy lines. Despite the heavy losses sustained, the 3rd Guards MC was left with a good impression of the M4A2 tank. The tanks were tough: the corps had travelled 500km between June 23 and July 15 with some tanks having travelled twice that distance. Several crewmen received an Order of the Red Star for making this journey without breakdowns or emergency stops. 185 186 The performance of the crews in this operation was well rewarded. Among other medals and orders, five tankers received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: commander of the 43rd Guards TR, Guards Lieutenant Colonel N. K. Shalayev187, tank company commander Guards Senior Lieutenant G. G. Kiyashko188 from the 45th Guards TR , tank commander Guards Lieutenant L. I. Tsarenko189 from the 44th Guards TR, and tank commanders Guards Lieutenants M. A. Aniskin190 and I. O. Mozgovoy.191

ABOVE: M4A2 tanks navigating a muddy road. The crew of the tank in the foreground wisely prepared several large logs to break free of the mud if necessary. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

91

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: A large hatch M4A2 with extended end connectors, another means of improving performance in mud. These are rarely seen in photos since they broke off quickly in difficult terrain. (Yuri Pasholok).

However, there were complaints about some aspects of the tanks. Tankers of the 44th Guards Tank Regiment considered the muzzle velocity of the gun to be low and the penetration insufficient. Furthermore,

92

the gun would misfire often and the projectile would get stuck in the barrel when the dud was extracted. The tankers stacked their ammunition loadouts to favour engagement of soft targets, carrying 70% HE-fragmentation, 20% AP, 10% HVAP (if available).There were fewer complaints about the machine guns. If maintained properly, the Brownings worked flawlessly. The .50 cal on an AA mount received special acclaim. In the absence of a fighter escort, these weapons were incredibly valuable. In one case, radio operator Guards Sergeant Jumeikov managed to repel an attack by German bombers with machine gun fire, earning him an Order of the Red Star.192 Tank commander Guards Lieutenant V. S. Kazakov even managed to shoot down an aircraft, for which he was rewarded with an Order of the Patriotic War 2nd Class193 The tankers claimed that the AA machine gun got in the way during actual fighting and suggested that it should be stowed before battle,194 but documents show that it was put to good use. Loader Guards Sergeant I. F. Skvortsov successfully defended his bogged down tank from German infantry with his .50 cal.195 The pistol port was also used for its intended purpose: radio operator Guards Senior Sergeant F. I. Zalotkin killed eight Germans with his pistol during the fighting for Sloboda.196 The TT pistol was considered ideal for firing out of a tank and captured Walther P38 pistols were also valued, but the Nagant revolver was considered poor for this purpose as it took too long to reload.

12 Over the Mountains Chapter

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W tank on display at the Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineers and Signal Corps, St. Petersburg, Russia recovered from a sunken transport ship in the Barents Sea. Tanks of this type only reached the front lines in early 1945. (Pavel Borovikov)

Operation Spring Awakening was the last offensive that the Germans managed to muster against the Red Army. As German and Hungarian forces gathered at Lake Balaton, the 6th Guards Tank Army was preparing a thrust behind them to cut off their retreat westward. To achieve this, it was temporarily reassigned to the 3rd Ukrainian Front.197

Within the ranks of the 6th Guards TA was the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps, formerly the 5th Mechanized Corps, which retained the use of Sherman tanks throughout 1944. It had 164 functional M4A2 tanks by March 16, 1945: 29 in the 18th Guards Mechanized Brigade, 32 in the 30th Guards Mechanized Brigade (plus one being repaired and two fallen behind), 26 in 93

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: The 9th Guards Mechanized Corps was tasked with cutting off the German retreat westward from Lake Balaton by capturing the transportation hubs at Veszprém and Pápa. The corps split up into two groups to navigate the narrow passages through mountainous terrain.

the 31st Guards Mechanized Brigade (plus four being repaired and two fallen behind), 65 in the 46th Guards Tank Brigade, nine in the 14th Guards Independent Motorcycle Battalion (plus one fallen behind), and three in the HQ company.198 Corps documents do not differentiate between M4A2(75) and M4A2(76)W tanks, but the majority of ammunition issued was 76mm, suggesting that most of the tanks were the newer type which had just begun to arrive on the front lines in the winter of 1945.199 In addition to the Shermans, the corps had 17 SU-76 SPGs available in the 697th Self Propelled Gun Regiment, with one more being repaired.200 The corps received its orders at midnight on March 17: the goal of the offensive was to exploit a breakthrough by the 38th 94

Rifle Corps in the vicinity of Bodajk, reach Veszprém by the end of the day, and establish a defensive perimeter there.201 However, by the evening of March 17 the breakthrough had not taken place. Instead of saving its strength for the exploitation, the 30th Guards MBr had to step in and knock the enemy out of Bodajk, capture a beachhead across the Sárvíz river, and cover the engineers while they put up a bridge. The 9th Guards MC’s tanks only began to pull up to Bodajk towards the end of the day, assembling on the other side of the river by 08:00 on March 19.202 This was not the end of the corps’ tribulations. The four tank units had to stretch out in single file as the mountain valley did not allow them to advance side by side. The terrain was

Over the Mountains

ABOVE: The 9th Guards Mechanized Corps linked back up after entering Austria. Rising resistance on the approach to Vienna forced the corps to strike at the city unexpectedly from the west.

95

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

difficult for tanks to traverse and five M4A2 tanks fell behind for technical reasons.203 The 46th Guards TBr headed the column but the first attempt to take the village of Balinka with tanks ended in failure. It was simply not possible to deploy them effectively in such a confined space and infantry from the 30th Guards MBr had to be brought forward to form the bulk of the offensive force. After Balinka was taken, the infantry continued on without tanks but the next settlement, Mecsér, proved much better defended. Even the tanks that arrived by the end of the day could not tip the scales.204 Guards Captain L. G. Sushko, Technical Deputy Commander of the 84th Guards TR of the 30th Guards MBr, had to escape from a burning tank twice during the battle but did not leave the battlefield, an act which earned him an Order of the Red Banner.205 Other tankers were not so lucky. Out of a great many Orders of the Patriotic War 1st

and 2nd class awarded for this battle, at least 16 were issued posthumously.206 As of March 20, seven of the corps’ M4A2 tanks burned up and 14 were knocked out, with seven more stuck in swamps en route.207 As the cramped terrain did not favour fighting in a corps-sized formation, the commander decided to split it in two. The 18th Guards MBr and 46th Guards TBr formed a group under the deputy commander Major General Yermachek whose job was to make an unexpected move through the mountains and cut off the enemy’s retreat from Lake Balaton at Hajmáskér.208 The attack was a success as the Germans were not expecting the Red Army to appear in this direction. A vehicle repair yard with many intact AFVs was captured at Tés, but the real prize awaited closer to Hajmáskér. The southern group of the 9th Guards MC ambushed a large enemy force, leading to the destruction of 76 German tanks and

ABOVE: Some of the earliest M4A2(76)W tanks to arrive in the USSR. These tanks arrived with some spare parts, but there was often a shortage of road wheels and track links as they wore out very quickly. (Muzey Istorii Murmanskogo vMorskogo Torgovogo Porta)

96

Over the Mountains

ABOVE: These M4A2(76)W tanks were equipped with T51, T54E1, and T54E2 track links. Sometimes a tank would have each track made up of different links. (Muzey Istorii Murmanskogo Morskogo Torgovogo Porta)

SPGs. The commander of the 46th Guards TBr, Guards Lieutenant Colonel M. N. Mikhin earned the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for arranging this successful raid.209 Guards Senior Lieutenant L. F. Loza, the commander of the 1st battalion, 46th Guards TBr, did particularly well in this battle. His battalion knocked out 29 enemy tanks and SPGs, for which he also earned the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.210 Many commanders from his battalion were also rewarded for exceptional performance. The 2nd battalion did well too and its commander Guards Captain A. M. Scherban received an Order of the Red Banner.211 This success was enough of a distraction for the 30th and 31st Guards MBr to be

able to finally take Mecsér and continue to Bakonycsernye without much trouble. Prisoners of war revealed that Szápár, the next village along the northern group’s route, was heavily fortified. Once again, an unexpected attack was key: tanks and infantry from the 31st Guards MBr circled around during the night and captured Jásd. With their flanks threatened, the Germans retreated to Csetény. This move put them in a less favourable position as the open country allowed the tanks to manoeuvre more easily. At this point, the Germans could no longer offer significant resistance and by March 23 the northern group of the 9th Guards MC took the town of Zirc.212 This progress came at a cost: the corps was 97

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: Two M4A2 tanks in Vienna. The one in the foreground has a 75mm gun while the one in the background is equipped with a 76mm gun. The 9th Guards Mechanized Corps used both types of tanks. (Yuri Pasholok)

down to 85 running Shermans and 13 SU-76 SPGs.213 However, the goal of the flanking manoeuvre was achieved and the German forces at Lake Balaton were unable to retreat successfully after their failed offensive. The two halves of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps continued westward separately with their sights set on the town of Pápa. The northern group had to fight in a narrow valley once again, but the algorithm to crack open German defences was already worked out. The heavy resistance at Pénzesgyőr collapsed once a flank attack by the 14th Guards Independent Motorcycle Battalion reached Bakonybél. The battalion commander, Guards Major D. P. Plotnikov, only managed to bring a small number of tanks through the mountains, but this was enough to catch the Germans unawares. These actions earned him an Order of Alexander Nevskiy.214 Since manoeuvres with a large force were impossible in the narrow valley, the 30th Guards MBr was sent to reinforce the southern group.215 This group did not face heavy resistance until it reached the outskirts of Pápa 98

by dawn on March 25. The first attack on the city failed. Once again, the key to success was surprise and on March 26 the 31st Guards MBr unexpectedly emerged from the mountains, attacking from the east. The manoeuvre was successful and the 9th Guards MC handed the town off to the 9th Guards Army before continuing westward towards Austria. Remaining enemy forces in Hungary were incapable of putting up significant resistance and the 9th Guards MC progressed quickly over the open country, crossing the AustroHungarian border at 10:00 on March 29. The resistance in the Austrian mountains was also minimal, mainly limited to attacks by aircraft that were repelled with the M4A2’s .50 cal machine guns.216 The corps reached the river Leitha by April 1. Of its 164 initial tanks, 66 M4A2 tanks were still running, 49 were lost irreparably, and the rest required fairly involved repairs.217 Unfortunately, there was no time to stop and repair them at the risk of losing the momentum of the attack. Leitha was crossed on April 2, and Wiener Neustadt was taken with a wellpracticed flanking manoeuvre.218

Over the Mountains

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W tank with Soviet riders in Vienna. Having infantry ride the tank was one of the best ways of making sure they could keep up with the advancing armour and protect the tank from Panzerfaust troops in ambush. (ÖNB/Wien, OEGZ RA-Panzer)

The fighting grew fiercer as the 9th Guards MC neared Vienna where it was clear that a head on assault would be futile and another flanking manoeuvre was needed. On the evening of April 5, the corps handed off its positions to the 9th Guards Army and headed into the Föhrenberge forest, emerging near Purkersdorf early on April 6.219 The lull in fighting allowed the corps to repair some of its tanks, bringing the total number of functional M4A2s from 56 on April 5 to 64 on April 6.220 While the rapid flanking manoeuvre was a success, it put the 9th Guards MC in the unenviable position of having to fight in a city without infantry support. The only solution was to keep the pressure on the defenders and prevent them from organizing a successful resistance. Another flanking attack by the 46th Guards TBr and 30th Guards MBr from the south through Ober St Veit into Hacking led to panic among the defending forces in Mariabrunn, allowing the main forces to seize Baumgarten. A lack of infantry meant that the ground behind the attackers could not be held and the 14th Guards Motorcycle Battalion had to be deployed to keep the area clear. This was no

proper substitute for infantry, and the tanks progressed with difficulty.221 On the night of April 10, reinforcements arrived in the form of an assault brigade equipped with flamethrowers. This allowed effective assault groups to be formed where three to six submachinegunners or two to four combat engineers rode on each tank.222 A recce in force would be performed by a small group of tanks. When the tanks were fired upon, they would retreat to cover from which they could support accompanying infantry (by bursting through walls, if necessary). The ambush would then be eliminated by a group of infantry with flamethrowers supported by the tanks’ guns.223 This tactic allowed the 9th Guards MC to reach the Danube canal (Donaukanal) by April 11. There was no need to go much further: forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were coming across the border from Czechoslovakia and were in a much better position to clear out the eastern half of the city. Vienna was taken on April 13, 1945.224 The 9th Guards MC had another brief moment to catch its breath. Repairs of disabled tanks began on April 15. At that 99

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W tank driving through the same area of Vienna. Some of the infantrymen dismounted and are walking behind their tank. (ÖNB/Wien, 283,802 - B)

point, 41 M4A2s remained in service with 68 written off.225 A total of 542 soldiers of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps had been killed and 2326 were wounded but their sacrifice was not in vain: the corps claimed to have destroyed 270 tanks and SPGs with another 57 captured, and 8450 enemy soldiers and officers killed with 3135 captured.226 The tactical conclusions made after these battles were no surprise. The corps commander advised against sending tanks into a city without infantry cover, and recce in force was also deemed a mistake. Using infantry, flamethrowers, and combat engineers in the first echelon with tanks supporting them from the back was a preferable option. Tanks and SPGs were to be placed in ambush behind the advancing forces in order to impede enemy movements through captured territory. In this kind of fighting, the safest and most effective place for brigade and battalion headquarters was as close to the front lines as possible.227 Mobile observation

100

posts made up of an armoured car or APC equipped with a radio and a rangefinder, an artillery officer, and two to three scouts proved effective at being the HQ’s eyes and ears on the battlefield.228 Conclusions were drawn about the tanks as well. The M4A2 was still prone to running gear issues, road wheel tyres would wear out rapidly, and poor traction led to losses as tanks slipped off the roads and fell into ditches.229 Of the tanks that ended up in repairs, 45% had clutch issues and 30% had engine trouble.230 Combat losses were usually a result of penetration by 75mm or 88mm gun fire while losses from Panzerfausts and aircraft were negligible.231 The tendency to burn when hit was still an issue as 55 of the 46th Guards TBr’s tanks burned up compared to only 23 instances of repairable damage, most of which was relatively minor.232 The high burn rate was not an isolated incident: in the battle for Brno several weeks later the same 46th Guards TBr lost six Shermans that burned while only two were knocked out.233

Chapter

13

Berlin Bound

ABOVE: Brand new M4A2(76)W tanks loaded on a train in Murmansk. One hundred tanks of this type arrived at the front in preparation of the assault on Berlin. (Muzey Istorii Murmanskogo Morskogo Torgovogo Porta)

Another major offensive in which M4A2 tanks played a significant role began just a few days later: the Battle of Berlin. One of the formations chosen for the attack on the German capital was the 2nd Guards Tank Army. One of its constituent units, the 1st Mechanized Corps, was equipped with Sherman tanks. Like the 9th Guards MC, the 1st MC received brand new M4A2(76) W tanks in January-February 1945 but they did not have the luxury of sitting in reserve.

The corps saw nonstop active combat since January and its tanks were in poor condition with many that were run for up to 220 hours.234 These tanks were beginning to show issues characteristic of Sherman tanks – such as the tearing of tracks and peeling road wheel tyres.235 The corps’ mechanics estimated that they had enough spare parts to keep the tanks going for another 500-600km.236 A hundred brand new M4A2 tanks arrived on April 5237 to bring the total 101

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

number of tanks in the 1st MC to 160 out of an authorized strength of 170 as of April 16238. Like the 9th Guards MC, the 1st MC ended up with a mix of 75mm and 76mm gun armed Shermans. No distinction between the models is made in documents but the proportion of ammunition in stock suggested that the split between the two types was about even. The Shermans were accompanied by 16 SU-76s, 10 SU-85s, and 19 SU-122s as well as 10 M17 halftracks.239 It is not uncommon to find claims that Soviet tank units exchanged their T-34-85 tanks for Shermans right before the assault on Berlin as a tacit admission by the Red Army of the Sherman’s superiority. While the arrival of 100 M4A2(76)W tanks might suggest that this is the case, these Shermans

were only used to replace other Shermans. The 1st MC was a seasoned M4A2 user, having received its first tanks of that type in the summer of 1944.240 In addition to 100 new Shermans, the 2nd Guards TA received 200 T-34-85 and 21 IS-2 tanks as well as 26 ISU-122, 15 SU-100, and 30 SU-76 SPGs. While the Sherman certainly played an important part in taking Berlin, it was far from a lead role.241 The offensive began on April 16, 1945. Resistance during the approach to Berlin was light and the corps reached the Berlin suburb of Bernau by April 20. The 1st MC then turned southwest and headed for Weissensee. The corps reached Berlin proper by April 22 with relatively few losses.242 However, they did not proceed further into

ABOVE: The 1st Mechanized Corps attacked Berlin from the north-east then skirted around the periphery to strike south, before finally advancing eastward towards the city centre. The inner city borough of Charlottenburg was taken on May 2, 1945, on the same day the garrison of Berlin surrendered.

102

Berlin Bound

ABOVE: Location of penetrations found on knocked out and destroyed M4A2 tanks. The large vertical thin sides of the tank presented a perfect target even for low calibre artillery. BELOW: A column of M4A2(76)W tanks and Soviet SPGs from the 1st Mechanized Corps. Even units filled with American tanks received Soviet-made artillery as support. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

the city as orders were received to circle around to the right flank of the 2nd Guards TA and attack the city from the west, moving through Rosenthal, Wittenau, and Westend. The corps began the attack in the new direction at 11:00 on April 23, progressing quickly: by the evening of April 24 the corps took Tegel and had reached the banks of the Berlin-Spandau Ship Canal. It fell to the engineers of the 35th MBr to cross the canal, capture a beachhead, and build a crossing for the tanks under enemy fire. This was done by 10:00 on April 25. Another crossing had to be built when the corps reached the river Spree, but once again this obstacle did not delay the tanks for long. The vanguard of the 35th and 19th MBr linked up with the 55th TBr of the 3rd Guards Tank Army by noon on April 26. The ring around Berlin was closed.243 The corps tallied up their losses: 169 tanks were knocked out between April 16 and 26, but only 30 were written off. The most common cause of damage was artillery as 124 tanks had suffered a hit from a cannon, while only five tanks were damaged by aircraft, two were lost to mines, and two more to Panzerfausts. A total of 36 tanks were lost for non-combat reasons of which 22 broke down, seven became bogged down in swamps, and seven more were stuck in ditches.244

103

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

With plenty of strength left, the 1st MC turned eastward to advance on the centre of the city through Charlottenburg. This attack was carried out along three parallel routes in two echelons. The first echelon was composed of the 219th TBr, 37th MBr, and elements of the 35th MBr. The 19th MBr and remainder of the 35th MBr followed in the second echelon. The latter group was tasked with holding the ground captured by the first echelon, but those plans quickly

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W tank from the 1st Mechanized Corps in Berlin. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W tank from the 1st Mechanized Corps on the streets of Berlin with the pistol port cover missing. As a rule, M4A2 tanks were not repainted and the original English and Russian language shipping markings can still be seen on the side of the tank. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

104

changed when the19th MBr had to be set up in Ruhleben to prevent the enemy from coming in from the rear. The second echelon of the offensive was now entirely formed by the 35th MBr. This formation remained in force until May 2 when the 1st MC captured the entirety of Charlottenberg. On this day, the garrison of Berlin surrendered and the 1st MC was taken out of the city to rest and conduct repairs.245 The nature of the fight for Berlin was radically different from that of the approach to the city. The tactic of assault groups was widely used, where each group was composed of five to seven infantrymen, four to five engineers, and two to three light or heavy machine guns. Assault groups were supported by one or two SPGs, up to two towed guns, and often three or four tanks as well. When the assault group attacked, the infantry hugged each side of the street, clearing basements with grenades. Tanks and SPGs followed, firing at the buildings across the street from them. The SU-122 was particularly useful in this endeavour as its 122mm HE shell was much more effective against fortifications than the M4A2’s 75 or 76mm shells. The procession was concluded by a heavy machine gun that hosed down the top floors on both sides of the street. For this purpose, 12.7mm DShK machine guns on wheeled carriages246 and mounted on IS tanks247 were used, as well as .50 calibre machine guns on Shermans and M17 halftracks. If the enemy retreated, the infantry would mount the tanks and ride on them to catch up. Sometimes infantry riders were used for deeper operations: two to three tanks with infantry riders and towed guns hitched to them would make a rapid push five or six buildings deep behind enemy lines, dismount, and strike the enemy from the rear. This tactic frequently resulted in a complete collapse of the demoralized enemy’s defences. The brigades’ HQs stayed no further than 100-500m behind the front lines. This was

Berlin Bound

the only way to properly observe the rapidly changing situation, but also the safest place to be as snipers and squads of enemy soldiers roamed behind the Soviet lines, ambushing officers. There was one significant issue with the assault group tactic: there was not enough infantry to carry it out to its full potential as the losses in infantry taken on the way to Berlin were never refilled. Tankers without tanks fought as infantry in these battles and tank crews often had to leave one or two men in their tanks with the rest patrolling the area at night.248 This ersatz infantry was often quite successful and award orders for the operation show that many tank crews made fine infantry squads.249 250 251 Despite the need for improvisation, the technique achieved impressive results and earned the commander of the 1st Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General S. M. Krivoshein, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.252 The corps claimed 8900 enemy soldiers killed and 1538 captured in the Battle of Berlin, as well as 106 destroyed and 12

captured enemy tanks and SPGs. This cost the 1st Mechanized Corps 481 men killed, 2281 wounded, and 119 fallen ill.253 A total of 209 tanks were knocked out during the operation, but the majority of them could be repaired. The biggest killer of tanks was still artillery as 112 vehicles, more than half of the total, fell victim to enemy guns. By comparison, only 26 had been disabled by a Panzerfaust and 41 tanks were recorded as “burned up” without a specified reason. Losses also included one tank that drowned and 16 that were stuck in swamps.254 As of May 2, 83 M4A2 tanks remained in action, 53 were written off, two required minor repairs and 20 needed medium repairs.255 The tanks were fairly worn out: of the 83 remaining M4A2s, 58 had run for over 100 hours, 21 ran for 50-100 hours, and only three ran for less than 50 hours. One tank was not used at all.256 After the corps emerged from Berlin on May 4, 69 M4A2 tanks were deemed suitable for further service.257 The success of the operation hinged in many ways on the repair crews’

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W tank from the 1st Mechanized Corps with tank riders advancing in Berlin. (TsAMO)

105

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W crew and civilians celebrating victory in Berlin. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

ability to keep their tanks going as they had carried out 163 light, 85 medium, and 1 major repairs during the Battle of Berlin. One hundred and five disabled and bogged down tanks were evacuated.258 The knocked out tanks were thoroughly studied to determine the nature of their damage. Overall, 135 tanks were examined, including 25 written off M4A2 tanks and 31 in need of major repairs. Of those studied, 60% were knocked out by artillery and 34% by Panzerfausts. Forty-one tanks that were lost inside the city showed a different proportion: 73% of the losses came from Panzerfausts and only 27% from artillery. The M4A2 followed this trend and out of 11 tanks examined in the city, three were knocked out by artillery and eight by Panzerfausts.

106

While the ratio of tanks destroyed by artillery was similar across different models, the type of artillery differed for each. Twelve per cent of Shermans were destroyed or disabled by 20mm AA guns, 57% by 75mm guns, 24% by 88mm guns, and 6% by 100mm guns. The average calibre of guns that took down the M4A2 tanks was lower than the Soviet tanks as just one T-34-85 was knocked out by a 20mm autocannon (3%), 48% were destroyed or disabled by a 75mm cannon, 34% by 88mm guns, and 14% by 100mm guns. This is likely due to the Sherman’s tall and flat side presenting a tempting target even to lower calibre guns: 34.9% of M4A2 tanks were hit in the side of the hull, compared to 14.5% T-34-85s and 12.5% IS-2s.259

Chapter

14

March Through Manchuria

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W HVSS tank at the Lenino-Snegiri Military Historical Museum in Snegiri, Russia. Tanks of this type arrived too late to see any action in Europe and were only used in Manchuria against Japanese forces. (Pavel Borovikov)

Stalin made a promise at the Yalta conference in February 1945 to declare war on Japan three months after the defeat of Germany. An invasion of Japanese-occupied Manchuria required a great deal of preparation and experienced forces would have to be brought over from Europe to staging grounds in

Mongolia. Since a rapid crossing of the Greater Khingan mountain range was essential to the plan, troops with previous experience of fighting in the mountains were needed. Among them was the 6th Guards Tank Army which had experience fighting in the mountains of Austria and Hungary. 107

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: Tanks of the 6th Guards Tank Army drove between 1000 and 1600km through a waterless desert and over the mountains of the Greater Khingan range to appear where Japanese forces were not expecting them to strike.

108

March Through Manchuria

The 6th Guards Tank Army was reassigned to the Transbaikal Front on June 26, 1945, and began its 9000km journey to the city of Choibalsan in Mongolia. It took 30 days and 88 trains of 60 cars each to transport the army. The units received new tanks on arrival. The 6th Guards TA’s 9th Guards Mechanized Corps received 100 M4A2 tanks including a number of brand new M4A2(76)W HVSS tanks, referred to as “M4A2 with wide tracks” in the corps’ documents. The entire 46th Guards Tank Brigade and one company in each of the corps’ mechanized brigades were equipped with tanks of this type.260 Upon gathering its forces, the 9th Guards MC made the 300km march to the town of Tamsagbulag261 where the tankers’ had their first taste of desert warfare. The air temperature at noon was 45°C so tanks had to drive exclusively at night in order to avoid overheating. This also helped keep the tanks hidden from enemy aircraft since there was no way to hide on the road in broad daylight. The M4A2 tanks were more resilient to the heat than T-34-85s, but army documents note that this came at the cost of much greater fuel consumption: Shermans consumed BELOW: An M4A2(76) HVSS tank, climbing up a 30 degree slope during trials. The wider tracks gave the tank good off-road mobility. (TsAMO)

60kg of diesel per hour in this environment compared to a norm of 40kg, reducing their cruising range significantly. In contrast, the T-34-85 consumed only 28kg of fuel per hour.262 The tanks also used up a lot of water and Sherman crews were instructed to carry two extra tanks of water: one for their vehicle and one for themselves. Road wheels on tanks with both HVSS and VVSS suspensions showed issues with rapid wear. Tanks with a VVSS suspension wore out their fourth and fifth road wheel on each side the fastest while tanks with an HVSS suspension predominantly wore out the fifth wheel. Breakdowns of road wheels were common: the 46th Guards TBr and 84th Guards TR lost 69 road wheels during this march alone. Air filters had to be cleaned out every two to three hours because of the high concentration of dust.263 A mobile repair detachment followed the marching tanks to assist their crews with issues that they encountered.264 A formidable force had gathered at Tamsagbulag by early August. The 6th Guards Tank Army consisted of 185 M4A2 tanks, 416 T-34 and T-34-85 tanks, 193 SU-100 tank destroyers, 26 SU-76 SPGs, 177 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, and 22 T-26 tanks265 Artillery included 359 guns of all calibres, 129 AA guns, 102 mortars, and 46 Katyushas.266 Each tank unit was issued three refills of fuel and two to three loads of ammunition.267 The Soviet Union declared war on Japan at 23:00 on August 8, 1945, Manchurian time. At midnight, Red Army forces crossed the border and headed towards the Greater Khingan mountain range. The 9th Guards MC began the invasion with 183 M4A2 tanks in service, reinforced with 26 SU-76 and 65 SU-100 SPGs, as well as 11 T-26 and 100 BT tanks.268 Rapid progress was required to make it over the mountains quickly enough to achieve surprise: 120km on the first day, 100km on the second and third, and 80km on the fourth and fifth. Thanks 109

Sherman Tanks of the Red Army

ABOVE: The same tank driving at a 30 degree tilt during trials. Tanks with an HVSS suspension behaved much more confidently on slopes than their predecessors, making them more useful in the mountains. (TsAMO)

to little resistance, the corps managed to keep on schedule and reached the foot of the mountains by the evening of August 9. Reconnaissance conducted in the morning showed that the mountain pass initially chosen was made impassable to the tanks by the rain. The corps had to march along the Holin Gol river valley in search of another way across the mountains.269 A backup

ABOVE: M4A2 tanks of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps lining up for inspection. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

110

crossing was found, but using it was not easy as rain had turned the roads turned to mud which tanks could only negotiate at a speed of 4-5kph. The grade of the road was sometimes up to 20-25 degrees, leading to tanks slipping and tipping over. Bad weather also meant that fuel could not be delivered by air.270 Tank units had to consolidate their fuel and leave all but a handful of their vehicles along the way.271 The terrain was easy going once the mountains were overcome, some elements of the corps making the 170km long march from the mountains to Lubei in under a day.272 There was an airstrip here, greatly facilitating the delivery of fuel. The tanks that fell behind were brought up and the corps resumed its movement on August 13, only to run out of fuel again by August 16. The 9th Guards MC once again resorted to sending out only vanguards, leaving most of its tanks behind. Orders changed when it became known that Japanese forces were ordered to lay down their arms.273 All fuel was collected in the 46th Guards TBr which allowed it to carry out a rapid march

March Through Manchuria

on Mukden (modern Shenyang) in order to occupy the city. The rest of the tanks gradually concentrated in Tongliao as soon as fuel was delivered to them.274 Enemy resistance during the entire operation was virtually nonexistent aside from a few skirmishes in the mountains. Reconnaissance groups of the 30th Guards MBr clashed with squads of enemy cavalry that retreated, losing men to wounds and capture.275 Tanks were used to clear barricades and other impediments.276 Overall, combat was the least of the tankers’ worries. The 6th Guards Tank Army lost 99 men in the campaign (20 killed, 11 wounded, 63 fallen ill) while 280 enemy soldiers were killed, 125,047 surrendered and over 300 Japanese tanks were captured.277 As of August 31, 1945, the 6th Guards Tank Army had 161 M4A2 tanks of various types remaining in service from their original stock of 185. Nine needed minor repairs, 14 needed medium repairs, and one needed a complete overhaul. Of the 416 T-34 and T-34-85 tanks that began the journey, 361 survived: eight tanks needed minor repairs, 44 needed medium repairs, one needed an overhaul, and two were lost in

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W tank from the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps and Chinese civilians. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

ABOVE: M4A2(76)W HVSS and VVSS tanks of the 9th Guards Mechanized Corps in a field. This photo shows the flat open terrain encountered in this operation, with nowhere to hide from the sun or enemy reconnaissance. (Gosudarstvenniy Tsentralniy Muzey Sovremennoy Istorii Rossii)

battle. The reliability of the M4A2 and that of Soviet tanks was at around the same level: 87% of them made it to their destination in working order. The SU-100 also did well with 183 out of 193 tank destroyers reaching their destination, the remaining 10 only needing medium repairs. The BT and T-26 tanks did not perform as well as their modern brethren. These worn out obsolete vehicles began to fall behind on the march almost immediately. Recovery vehicles and prime movers issued to the corps had to be used to tow the older tanks to collection points, forcing the M4A2(76)W HVSS to work double duty and pull narrow-tracked Shermans out of the mud. Thankfully, the wide tracks significantly improved the tanks’ off-road performance.278 Breakage of road wheels on Sherman tanks was still a widespread issue: a total of 300 had to be replaced during the operation.279 Despite these issues, many tankers and commanders knew their tanks well enough to make the 1000-1600km journey and expend 130-150 run hours without a single breakdown. These crews received orders and medals ranking as high as an Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class.280 281

111

15 Conclusion – Legend or Death Trap? Chapter

ABOVE: An M4A2(76)W and an IS-3 restored by the Northern Fleet of the Russian Navy. Although Marshal Bogdanov’s vision of the ideal tank was based on the T-34-85, it included features of both these tanks. Note that this Sherman (serial number S64465) was originally built with a VVSS suspension but HVSS bogeys and tracks from another tank were installed during restoration. (Dmitriy Ukryukov)

M4A2 tanks began arriving in the USSR when the crisis of the early war had already passed, but the future was still uncertain. As supplies picked up towards the end of 1943, regiments, brigades, and then entire corps were equipped with these tanks. While no formation larger than a mechanized corps 112

was ever entirely composed of Sherman tanks, the M4A2 took part in a great many of the Red Army’s operations, both successful and not. As with any tank, the relationship between the Red Army and the M4A2 was mixed and several complaints cropped

Conclusion – Legend or Death Trap?

up repeatedly during its service. Tankers complained about the tall profile, thin side armour, lacking armament, and the propensity to burn when hit. Long marches were plagued by failing road wheels and poor traction on ice and mud. Clutch, track, and engine failures were not uncommon, especially early on. None of these complaints were unique to the Red Army as similar faults were noted by both British and American users. Red Army officers also noted many positive aspects of the M4A2 tanks. Upgrades such as the 76mm gun and wide tracks were very positively received. Several officers listed the commander’s cupola of the M4A2(76)W as a feature that was worth taking inspiration from.282 Various components such as the Oilgear turret traverse motor283 and M10 periscope284 were studied and described in detail in Soviet tank industry publications. With some exceptions, the tank was comfortable for the crew to operate. The fact that foreign-made tanks of every other type slowly retreated from the front lines to make room for the M4A2 speaks volumes about its quality. However, the prevalent myth that the M4A2 was a luxury tank reserved for well-connected officers or elite crews is not confirmed by any documents. Both Guards and regular units received these tanks as their turn came to refit. The Soviet system is often presented as a homogeneous and uniform monolith. In reality, it was anything but. The active Red Army, rear echelon organizations like the GBTU, the tank industry, and Soviet government each valued different aspects of an armoured vehicle and had their own opinions about tanks, which were often quite distinct. The Medium Tank M4A2 was no exception. The complexity of this relationship is best illustrated with two examples.

A proposal to the GBTU was written by two engineers of the Central Artillery Design Bureau (TsAKB), A. S. Chasovnikov and S. D. Kazarin, in early 1944. The pair developed a novel scheme for upgrading foreign tanks including Shermans: their turrets would be removed and the chassis would be used to make tank destroyers armed with 85 or 100mm guns. This would allow factories to ramp up production of the T-34-85, as the latter’s chassis would no longer be needed to make tank destroyers. The proposal was rejected on February 15, 1944, in no small part due to manufacturing problems that would need to be solved to put the plan into action. There was another reason, as noted by Engineer-Major Biletkin in his response to the letter. The GBTU decided that the foreign tanks were fine as they were.285 In 1946, Marshal of the Armoured Forces S. I. Bogdanov, the commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, thoroughly analyzed his army’s performance from December 1944 to May 1945 in order to determine what an ideal tank for the Red Army would look like. Not surprisingly, the T-34-85 was taken as the starting point. The armour of the tank had to be increased, with the IS-3 given as an example of a way to augment a tank’s armour without increasing the mass. The suspension and turning mechanisms also came from the IS series of tanks. Finally, the tracks would be taken from the M4A2 tank, provided that the issue of poor traction could be resolved. The exact type of track link was not specified in the Marshal’s report.286 Red Army tank crews and proving grounds staff evaluated their tanks thoroughly. As with any tank, crews found some features to praise and some drawbacks to bemoan. Overall, the Medium Tank M4A2 played the same role as the T-34 and T-34-85 in the fight against Germany and Japan, and it played that role well.

113

Glossary Awards and decorations mentioned in the book in ascending order of prestige: ● For Battle Merit medal: awarded for risking one’s life in conspicuous and brave actions in defence of the USSR that aided the success of battle. ● For Courage medal: awarded for personal courage demonstrated in battle. ● Order of the Red Star: awarded for personal courage in battle, excellent performance in a command position, in keeping up battle readiness. ● Order of the Patriotic War: awarded for exceptional achievements on the battlefield, in commanding a unit, or for making a significant contribution to the army’s battle readiness. Awarded in two classes. ● Order of Alexander Nevsky: awarded to commanders of the Red Army that showed personal heroism and exceptional skill in command. This order was generally awarded to commanders of brigades or smaller units. ● Order of the Red Banner: awarded for exceptional bravery and courage in dangerous conditions. Initially introduced as the first order of the RSFSR and issued to exceptional commanders in the Russian Civil War, the order remained in use throughout the lifespan of the USSR as one of its highest honours. ● Hero of the Soviet Union: this title was the highest honour awarded by the USSR for a heroic deed in either war or peacetime. Recipients of this title also received an Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal, worn above all other awards. GABTU: Glavnoye Avto-bronetankovoye Upravleniye, Main Automobile, Armoured Vehicle, and Tank Directorate. The branch of the military responsible for dealing with design and purchase of military vehicles. Reformed into the GBTU (Glavnoye Brone-Tankovoye Upravleniye, Main Armour and Tank Directorate) on December 7, 1942. GANIOP: Gorohovetskiy Artilleriyskiy Nauchno-Issledovatelniy Opytniy Poligon, Gorohovets Scientific Research Experimental Artillery Proving Grounds located in the vicinity of the village of Mulino near the town of Gorohovets. HK: Hartkern. Armour piercing shot with a hard core made of tungsten carbide. Hl: Hohlladung. Shaped charge. MBr: Mechanized Brigade. A unit consisting of three mechanized rifle battalions and one tank regiment, as well as support units. MC: Mechanized Corps. A unit consisting of three mechanized brigades and one tank brigade, as well as support units. NIBT Proving Grounds: Nauchno-Issledovatelniy Bronetakoviy Poligon, Scientific Research Armoured Vehicle Proving Grounds. Located in Kubinka. Presently the site of the Kubinka Tank Museum and Patriot Park. Pz: Panzergranate. Armour piercing shell. Sp: Sprenggranate. High explosive shell. TA: Tank Army. A combined arms formation consisting of several tank and mechanized corps, as well as artillery, engineers, and other supporting units. TBr: Tank Brigade. A unit consisting of three tank battalions and one mechanized rifle battalion, as well as support units, with an authorized strength of 65 tanks. TR: Tank Regiment. A unit typically attached to a mechanized brigade consisting of three tank companies with an authorized strength of 35 tanks. Tank regiments typically did not have their own support units. An Independent Tank Regiment (ITR) was subordinate to an Army and attached to rifle divisions or corps as needed. It had an authorized strength of 39 tanks, a company of infantry, and other support elements. The number of tanks in independent tank regiments was reduced to 21 on April 1, 1944. 114

Notes America’s War-Winning Tank 1 Y. Pasholok Levaya Rezba Po-Amerikanski, Warspot.ru 2 P. Samsonov Glavniye Tanki Yanki, Warspot.ru 3 P. Samsonov Perviye Tanki Kanady, Warspot.ru 4 R.P. Hunnicutt, Sherman A History of the American Medium Tank, Presidio Press, p.74 5 P. Ware, M4 Sherman Tank 1941 Onwards (All Variants) Owners’ Workshop Manual, Zenith Press, p.76 6 R.P. Hunnicutt, Sherman A History of the American Medium Tank, Presidio Press, p.75 7 R.P. Hunnicutt, Sherman A History of the American Medium Tank, Presidio Press, p.143 8 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5774 image 4391 9 R.P. Hunnicutt, Sherman A History of the American Medium Tank, Presidio Press, p.144 10 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5779 image 236 11 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5773 image 5390 12 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5774 image 3756 13 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5774 image 3782 14 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5774 image 3965 15 R.P. Hunnicutt, Sherman A History of the American Medium Tank, Presidio Press, pp.241243

16

P. Ware, M4 Sherman Tank 1941 Onwards (All Variants) Owners’ Workshop Manual, Zenith Press, p.61

The First-Lend Lease Customer 17 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5779 image 949 18 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5777 image 4650 19 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5776 image 3434 20 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5773 image 3223 21 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (1939-1947) - 17473 image 151 22 Oliver, Dennis and Starmer, Michael. The New Breed. Part 1: North Africa. Colour and Marking Series — The Factory Publishing, 2007 23 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5775 image 3817 24 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5837image 4814 25 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5776 image 2980 26 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5775 image 3829

115

Notes continued 27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35 36

37

Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5775 image 3829 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5775 image 3611 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5776 image 2979 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5776 image 271 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5776 image 271 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5775 image 3758 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5779 image 469 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5777 image 1945 Y. Pasholok, Noviye Nogi dlya Emchi, Warspot. ru Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (1939-1947) - 17473 image 362 Library and Archives Canada RG 24 C 2 Canadian Military Headquarters, London (CMHQ), Files Block No. 55 - 5775 image 496

The Sherman Goes East 38 TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11355 D.1389 L.79 39 The National Archives FO 954/3B/458 Convoys and Supplies to Russia: From War Cabinet Offices Tanks for Russia 40 The National Archives FO 954/3B/461 Convoys and Supplies to Russia: From War 116

41 42 43

Cabinet Offices Tanks Y. Pasholok, Luchshiy iz Varyagov, Warspot.ru Y. Pasholok, Emcha s Dlinnoy Rukoy Warspot. ru Y. Pasholok, Noviye Nogi Dlya Emchi, Warspot.ru

The Foreign Favourite 44 Y. Pasholok, Luchshiy iz Varyagov, Warspot.ru 45 TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11377 D.12 L.22-23 46 Y. Bakhurin, Panzerjager Tiger (P) Ferdinand, Tactical Press, Mosccow, 2014 Old Tank, New Gun 47 Y. Pasholok SU-76 Amerikanskogo Proizvodstva, Warspot.ru 48 Y. Pasholok Avtostradniy Istrebitel, Warspot.ru 49 TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11355 D.2860 L.38-39 50 RGASPI F.644 Op.2 D.464 L.107 51 Y. Pasholok, Lyogkie SAU s bolshimi pushkami, Warspot.ru ‘Emcha’ with Big Feet 52 Y. Pasholok, Emcha s Dlinnoy Rukoy, Warspot. ru 53 Y. Pasholok, Noviye Nogi Dlya Emchi, Warspot. ru Lend-Lease Substitute 54 TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11355 D.760 L.1-2,6-11 55 TsAMO RF F.202 Op.20 D.1 L.207-208 56 Y. Pasholok Massoviy Tank dlya Soyuznikov, Warspot.ru 57 TsAMO RF F.38 Op.11355 D.1755 L.57 Westward on the Eastern Front 58 Y. Pasholok Perviy iz Varyagov, Warspot.ru 59 TsAMO RF F.371 Op.6367 D.173 L.49 60 TsAMO RF F.3017 Op.1 D.43 L.19-23 61 TsAMO RF F.371 Op.6367 D.173 L.54 62 TsAMO RF F.371 Op.6367 D.173 L.127 63 TsAMO RF F.51 Op.932 D.573 L.139 64 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1670 L.17 65 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1670 L.35

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87

TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1139 L.20 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1670 L.11 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.598 L.27 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.826 L.2 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.826 L.6 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1670 L.23 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1347 L.23 TsAMO RF F.3071 Op.1 D.43 L.39 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1670 L.5 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1670 L.17 TsAMO RF F.3071 Op.1 D.43 L.41 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1139 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1347 L.7 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1357 L.33 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1067 L.1 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1067 L.35 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1067 L.59 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1021 L.33 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1021 L.71 TsAMO RF F.449 Op.9921 D.18 L.20 TsAMO RF F.3071 Op.1 D.10 L.3-39 M. Baryatinskiy, Tanki Lend-Liza v Boyu, pp.126-127

Kursk Salient and Beyond 88 TsAMO RF F.62 Op.321 D.171 L.5 89 TsAMO RF F.62 Op.321 D.46 L.22 90 TsAMO RF F.62 Op.321 D.46 L.58 91 TsAMO RF F.1214 Op.1 D.19 L.470 92 TsAMO RF F.1214 Op.1. D.19 L.449 93 TsAMO RF F.62 Op.321 D.46 L.81 94 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.748 L.2-3 95 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1659 L.6 96 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1650 L.4 97 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.748 L.2 98 TsAMO RF F.6961 Op.37674s D.7 L.112 99 TsAMO RF F.1214 Op.1 D.19 L.462 100 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.1650 L.3 101 TsAMO RF F.1214 Op.1 D.15 L.83 102 TsAMO RF F.1214 Op.1 D.15 L.84 103 TsAMO RF F.1214 Op.1 D.19 L.472 104 TsAMO RF F.1214 Op.1 D.19 L.470 105 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.674 L.17

106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143

TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.674 L.23 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.674 L.25 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.674 L.129 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.682526 D.674 L.9 TsAMO RF F.4421 Op.318625s D.1 L.47-55 Y. Pasholok Lutchiy iz varyagov, Warspot.ru TsAMO RF F.3171 Op.1 D.2 L.202-224 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.154 L.1-2 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.134 L.1 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.134 L.5 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.154 L.10 10 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.140 L.2-5 2-5 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.6 L.19-20 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.102 L.26 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.102 L.140-141 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.140 L.6 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.16 L.1 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.6 L.39 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.2 L.26 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.6 L.58 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.140 L.8-10 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.6 L.68 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.81 L.9 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.6 L.62 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.102 L.60 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.6 L.139 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.102 L.76 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.124 L.25 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.102 L.99 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.2 L.67 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.81 L.52 TsAMO RF F.236 Op.2673 D.81 L.54 TsAMO RF F.3442 Op.1 D.7 L.12 TsAMO RF F.315 L.4440 D.124 L.64 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.134 L.31 TsAMO RF F.315 Op.4440 D.134 L.27 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.1501 L.24 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.717037 D.260 L.2

Closing the Korsun Pocket 144 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.17 L.5-6 146 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.62 L.64 146 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.17 L.11-13

117

Notes continued 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157

TsAMO RF F.3139 Op.1 D.3 L.152 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.62 L.251-254 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.62 L.65-66 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.717037 D.260 L.2 TsAMO RF. F.33 Op.690306 D.2394 L.19 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.412 L.212 TsAMO RF F.3139 Op.1 D.3 L.149-152 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686044 D.3886 L.17 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.62 L.68 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.17 L.22 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.62 L.73-75

Heavy Cavalry 158 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.62 L.251-254 159 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.17 L.49 160 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.30 L.42 161 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.42 L.3 162 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.34 L.34 163 TsAMO RF F.241 Op.2593 D.701 L.10-11 164 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.82 L.76-78 165 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.82 L.79 166 TsAMO RF F.3322 Op.1 D.4 L.82 167 TsAMO RF F.3322 Op.1 D.7 L.3-4 168 TsAMO RF F.328 Op.1 D.30 L.17 169 TsAMO RF F.328 Op.1 D.30 L.19 170 TsAMO RF F.241 Op.2593 D.701 L.17-18 171 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.82 L.87 172 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.82 L.83-84 173 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.82 L.92 174 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690155 D.7034 L.81 175 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.30 L.24 176 TsAMO RF F.241 Op.2593 D.701 L.28 177 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.7012 L.8 178 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.7012 L.17 179 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.30 L.26 180 TsAMO RF F.241 Op.2593 D.701 L.29 181 TsAMO RF F.3428 Op.1 D.34 L.34 182 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.6180 L.99 183 TsAMO RF F.460 Op.5047 D.501 L.8 184 TsAMO RF F.460 Op.5047 D.501 L.12-13 185 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.6180 L.53 186 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.6189 L.47 187 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686046 D.24 L.143

118

188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196

TsAMO RF F.33 Op.793756 D.21 L.331 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.793756 D.52 L.16 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.793756 D.2 L.325 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.793756 D.32 L.54 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.7012 L.16 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690155 D.7034 L.47 TsAMO RF F.3322 Op.1 D.4 L.119 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.7011 L.16 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690155 D.6964 L.72

Over the Mountains 197 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.292 198 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.294 199 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.59 L.370 200 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2900 D.1847 L.6 201 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.297-299 202 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.301 203 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.184 L.40 204 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.302-303 205 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690306 D.2393 L.26 206 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690306 D.890 L.1 207 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.184 L.46 208 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.308-309 209 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.793756 D.31 L.591 210 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.310 211 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690306 D.951 L.87 212 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.309 213 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.184 L.54 214 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690306 D.2393 L.14 215 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.315-165 216 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.690306 D.951 L.13 217 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.187 L.1 218 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5197 D.81 L.328 219 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5197 D.81 L.331 220 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.187 L.17 221 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.334 222 TsAMO RF F.240 Op.2770 D.1944 L.9 223 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.336 224 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.81 L.339 225 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.187 L.44 226 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.59 L.370-371 227 TsAMO RF F.3139 Op.1 D.3 L.231 228 TsAMO RF F.240 Op.2779 D.1944 L.15

229 230 231 232 233

TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.13 L.418 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.13 L.438 TsAMO RF F.243 Op.2928 D.13 L.420 TsAMO RF F.3139 Op.1 D.3 L.192 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.35 L.83

Berlin Bound 234 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.331 L.33 235 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.85 236 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.71-72 237 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.79 238 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.319 L.285 239 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.319 L.193-194 240 TsAMO RF F.3347 Op.1 D.1 L.119 241 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.79 242 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.327 L.306 243 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.327 L.307-312 244 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.319 L.264 245 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.327 L.313 246 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.4855 L.140 247 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.237 L.435 248 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.327 L.16-20 249 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.4855 L.22 250 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.4855 L.96 251 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.4855 L.108 252 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.793757 D.24 L.463 253 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.327 L.314 254 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.100 255 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.98 256 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.99 257 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.319 L.288 258 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.327 L.351 259 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.339 L.101-105

March Through Manchuria 260 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.34 L.356 261 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.130 L.2-3 262 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.34 L.375 263 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.34 L.359 264 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.97 L.1-13 265 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.98 L.47 266 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.130 L.3 267 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.86 L.851 268 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.130 L.11 269 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.130 L.23 270 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.130 L.26 271 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.34 L.368 272 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.98 L.56 273 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.130 L.30 274 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.130 L.34-35 275 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.34 L.367 276 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.6897 L.80 277 TsAMO RF F.339 Op.5179 D.86 L.853-862 278 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.34 L.356 279 TsAMO RF F.3443 Op.1 D.34 L.376-377 280 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.6897 L.36 281 TsAMO RF F.33 Op.686196 D.6898 L.21 Conclusion – Legend or Death Trap? 282 TsAMO RF F.3322 Op.1 D.4 L.119-123 283 Vestnik Bronetankovoy Promyshlennosti #8-9 1944 NKTP, Moscow, p.10 284 Vestnik Bronetankovoy Promyshlennosti #10-11 1945 NKTP, Moscow, p.8 285 Y. Bakhurin, Bronefantazii 40-kh godov. Tankoviy Tuning. 286 TsAMO RF F.307 Op.4148 D.478 L.78-83

119

Index Allied armies 1st Canadian Army 23 24th Armoured Brigade, British Army 23 Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, USA 10-12, 14, 16, 18 Aksenov, D. I. 70 Aksenov, I. P. 83 Aladashvili, M. P. 64 Aleksenenko, I. S. 64 Anapa, Soviet Union 67 Aniskin, M. A. 91 Antonov, A. P. 62 Antonov, I. T. 71 Bakonybél, Hungary 98 Bakonycsernye, Hungary 97 Baku, Soviet Union 29, 31, 40, 61 Balinka, Hungary 96 Barayev, Major 40 Bashtechki, Soviet Union 82, 83 Baumgarten, Austria 99 Bederdinov, K. S. 63 Berlin, Germany 102-106 Biletkin, Engineer-Major 113 Bodajk, Hungary 94 Bogachev, P.I. 70 Bogdanov, S. I. 113 Burachkov, K. L. 62 Chasovnikov, A. S. 113 Chernyahovskiy, General 87 Csetény, Hungary 97 Deyanov, D. I. 64 Douglas A-20 Havoc 90 Exercise Spartan 23 factories Angus Shops, Montreal, Canada 26 Baldwin Automotive Works, Pennsylvania, USA 13 Detroit Tank Arsenal, Michigan, USA 51 Fisher Tank Arsenal, Detroit, Michigan, USA 13, 18, 32 Jack Oldings & Co, Hatfield, UK 22 Montreal Locomotive Works, Canada 26

120

Föhrenberge forest 99 Fort Knox, Kentucky, USA 17 GANIOP (Gorohovets Artillery Proving Grounds) 40, 44 GABTU/GBTU (Main Automobile, Armoured Vehicle and Tank Directorate) 27, 28, 31, 43, 53, 113 German army III Panzer Corps 85 VIII Army 78 XXXXI Panzer Corps 70 505th Heavy Tank Battalion 72 Glukharev, S. A. 72 Glushenko, A. A. 63 Gorky foreign AFV training centre 29, 31, 43, 68 Gornoveseliy, Soviet Union 64 Goryachev, O. V. 70 Grinevka, Soviet Union 70 Grodno, Soviet Union 91 Gryazev, V. F. 63, 64 Hajmásker, Hungary 96 High-Speed Tractor M4-M6 18 Hotynets, Soviet Union 74 Ivanitskiy, I. S. 63 Ivanovka, Soviet Union 70 Jásd, Hungary 97 Jumeikov, Guards Sergeant 92 Junkers Ju-87 67 Kabardinka, Soviet Union 65 Kalmykov, A. T. 64 Kazakov, V. S. 92 Kazakovka, Soviet Union 70 Kazarin, S. D. 113 Kazatin, Soviet Union 81 Kiev, Soviet Union 78 Kiyashko, G. G. 91 Kochetkov, B. M. 70 Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy, Soviet Union 85 Krasniy Sadok, Soviet Union 74 Krasnoye Znamya, Soviet Union 72 Kravchenko, A. G. 85 Krivoshein, S. M. 105

Krivusha, Soviet Union 74 Krymskaya, Soviet Union 62, 64 Lake Balaton 93, 96, 98 Lebedev, V. S. 70 Leninskoye, Soviet Union 63, 64 Lepel, Soviet Union 89 Lida, Soviet Union 91 Lisyanka, Soviet Union 85 Loza, L. F. 97 Lubei, China 110 Lukyanov, F. V. 70 Lutezh, Soviet Union 78 M17 half-track 102, 104 Maloarkhangelsk 70 Mariabrunn, Vienna, Austria 99 Mateev, D. S. 72 McNaughton, General Andrew 23 Mecsér, Hungary 96, 97 Mekkerstuk, Soviet Union 64 Meter, I. S. 72 Mikhin, M. N. 97 Minsk, Soviet Union 91 Miroshnichenko, A. D. 64 Mosgovoy, I. O. 91 Mukden, China 111 Murmansk, Soviet Union 68 Nagornaya, Soviet Union 82, 83 Neberdzhayevskaya, Soviet Union 62 NIBT (Scientific Research Proving Grounds) 32, 36, 38, 40, 43, 47, 53 Nizhnegrecheskiy, Soviet Union 62 NKIT (People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade) 31 Novorossiysk, Soviet Union 65, 66 Novoryzhkovskiy, Soviet Union 72 Ober St Veit, Austria 99 Obukhov, Lieutenant General 87 Olkovatka, Soviet Union 70 Operation Bagration 87 Operation Spring Awakening 93 Orel, Soviet Union 74 Oslikovskiy, Lieutenant General 87 Pápa, Hungary 98 Pavlovka, Soviet Union 71

Pénzesgyör, Hungary 98 Petrovka, Soviet Union 71 Pitsko, P. I. 62 Plekhov, V. K. 62 Plotnikov, D. P. 98 Pokhvisnevo, Soviet Union 72 Polevoy, M. I. 66 Ponyri, Soviet Union 70 PQ-17 convoy 28 PQ-18 convoy 28 Protasovo, Soviet Union 71 Purkersdorf, Austria 99 Ragimov, H. K. 67 Ravenskoye, Soviet Union 67 Red Army 7, 40, 43, 61, 72, 75, 78, 87, 93, 96, 102, 109, 112, 113 1st Mechanized Corps 101, 102, 104, 105 2nd Guards Rifle Division 65 2nd Guards Tank Army 101-103, 113 2nd Motorized Brigade 81 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps 91 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps 87, 90, 91 3rd Guards Tank Army 76-78, 103 5th Army 87, 91 5th Guards Tank Brigade 61, 62, 64, 65, 67 5th Mechanized Corps 80, 81, 83, 85, 93 6th Guards Tank Army 93, 107, 109, 111 6th Guards Tank Regiment 64 6th Tank Army 85 7th Guards Mechanized Brigade 89 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade 87, 89 9th Guards Army 98, 99 9th Guards Mechanized Brigade 89 9th Guards Mechanized Corps 93, 94, 96102, 109, 110 9th Mechanized Corps 75, 77-79, 81 13th Army 70 14th Guards Independent Motorcycle Battalion 94, 98, 99 15th Rifle Corps 70, 72 18th Army 65 18th Guards Mechanized Brigade 93, 96 19th Mechanized Brigade 103, 104 24th Tank Brigade 75 30th Guards Mechanized Brigade 93, 94, 96-99, 111 121

Index continued 31st Guards Mechanized Brigade 94, 97, 98 31st Tank Corps 81 35th Guards Tank Brigade 87, 90 35th Mechanized Brigade 103, 104 37th Mechanized Brigade 104 38th Rifle Corps 94 40th Army 81, 83 43rd Guards Tank Regiment 89-91 43rd Mechanized Brigade 87 43rd Rifle Regiment 72 44th Guards Tank Regiment 91, 92 44th Mechanized Brigade 87 45th Guards Tank Regiment 91 45th Mechanized Brigade 87 45th Motorized Brigade 81 46th Guards Tank Brigade 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 109, 110 46th Tank Regiment 81 48th Army 70 53rd Tank Regiment 76, 78 54th Reserve Tank Regiment 74 55th Tank Brigade 103 63rd Tank Brigade 61 69th Tank Brigade 76, 78 70th Army 72 70th Mechanized Brigade 74-78 74th Rifle Division 70, 71 78th Rifle Regiment 70 84th Guards Tank Regiment 96, 109 92nd Tank Brigade 68 100th Rifle Division 78 103rd Tank Destroyer Regiment 65 104th Rifle Corps 82 156th Tank Regiment 81, 83, 85 160th Reserve Tank Regiment 74 160th Rifle Division 85 174th Army Engineers Battalion 65 190th Training Tank Brigade (aka 5th Training Tank Brigade) 68 219th Tank Brigade 104 223rd Tank Brigade 83 229th Independent Tank Regiment 70, 72, 73, 76 233rd Tank Brigade 81-83, 85 237th Independent Tank Regiment 72 251st Independent Tank Regiment 73 122

252nd Tank Regiment 81 257th Independent Tank Battalion 67 359th Rifle Division 83, 85 360th Rifle Regiment 71 563rd Independent Tank Battalion 61 697th SPG Regiment 94 1127th Rifle Regiment 78 1198th Rifle Regiment 83 1228th SPG Regiment 85 1448th SPG Regiment 65 1510th SPG Regiment 87 1823rd SPG Regiment 87 North Caucasus Front Tank Group 61 Reutovo, Soviet Union 74 Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, USA 11 Rodin, Colonel General 87 Savin, A. 79 Scherban, A. M. 97 Senno, Soviet Union 89 Shalayev, N. K. 91 Shushko, L. G. 96 Shuvalov, S. M. 72 Skvortsov, I. F. 92 Sloboda, Soviet Union 89, 92 Smorgon, Soviet Union 90 Soglasniy, Soviet Union 71 Sokolov, V. G. 72 Sorvin, engineer 51 Stalin, Josef 107 Starkov, M. A. 67 Strigi, Soviet Union 89 Sukstanskiy, L. L. 62 Sumy, Soviet Union 76 Szápár, Hungary 97 Tamsagbulag, Mongolia 109 tanks / AFVs 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage M10 (aka Wolverine) 40 76mm Gun Motor Carriage M18 (aka T70, aka Hellcat) 41, 44 BT-5 109 BT-7 109 IS-2 102, 106 IS-3 44, 113 IS-7 44

KV-1 53, 81 Light Tank M3 20, 61, 62, 67 Medium Tank M2 8 Medium Tank M3 (aka Lee, aka Grant) 9, 10, 13, 14, 18, 20, 28, 32, 33, 53, 61, 62, 67 Medium Tank M4A1 (aka Sherman II) 11, 14, 15, 20, 23, 26, 27 Medium Tank M4A2 (aka Sherman III) 7, 14-16, 22-24, 26, 28, 29, 31-33, 36, 38, 40, 41, 43-45, 47, 49, 51, 53-55, 61-70, 72-76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 98-102, 104-106, 109, 111-113 Medium Tank M4A3 14, 18 Medium Tank M4A4 (aka Sherman V) 7, 14, 15, 18, 26, 51, 53-55 Medium Tank M4E6 18 Medium Tank T5E2 9 Medium Tank T6 27 Medium Tank T23 18 Panzerjäger Tiger (P) (aka Ferdinand tank destroyer) 39 Panzerkampfwagen III 66, 83 Panzerkampfwagen IV 83, 85 Panzerkampfwagen V Panther 89 Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf. B (aka Tiger II) 41 Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger Ausf. E 38, 40, 72 SU-76 81, 85, 87, 89, 91, 94, 98, 102, 109 SU-85 81, 85, 87, 91, 102 SU-100 102, 109, 111 SU-122 102, 104 SU-152 81, 85 T-26 109, 111 T-34 44, 45, 53, 64-67, 72, 74-76, 81, 82, 87, 91, 102, 106, 109, 111, 113 T-70 67, 72

Tank, Cruiser, Ram 10, 26 Tank, Cruiser Mk.VI, Crusader 20, 53 Tank, Cruiser Mk.VIII Centaur (A27L) 29, 53 Tank, Cruiser Mk.VIII Cromwell (A27M) 29, 53 Tank, Infantry, Mk.III, Valentine 12, 13, 20, 26, 27, 29, 61-65, 74-76, 78, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89-91 Tank, Infantry, Mk.IV, Churchill 22, 29 Tank Museum, The, Bovington, UK 26 Tés, Hungary 96 Titov, V. S. 61 Tongliao, China 111 Troshin, Major 83 Troska, Soviet Union 70 TsAKB (Central Artillery Design Bureau) 113 Tsarenko, L. I. 91 Tsuprikov, M. S. 79 Tula, Soviet Union 87, 91 Tynovka, Soviet Union 83 Tyutin, V. A. 63 Vavilonovka, Soviet Union 70 Veszprém, Hungary 94 Vetrovskiy, Soviet Union 74 Vienna, Austria 99 Vilnius, Soviet Union 91 Vladivostok, Soviet Union 29 Vostrov, A. D. 64 Votylevka, Soviet Union 83 Weissensee, Germany 102 Wiener Neustadt, Germany 98 Yalta conference 107 Yermachek, Major General 96 Zalotkin, F. I. 92 Zhidkov, I. S. 62 Zinovyev, M. I. 66 Zirc, Hungary 97 Zvenigorodka, Soviet Union 85

123