Sergiu Celibidache: Analytical Approaches to his Teachings on Phenomenology and Music

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SERGIU CELIBIDACHE ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO HIS TEACHINGS ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND MUSIC by Tom Zelle

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Musical Arts

ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY May 1996

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SERGIU CELIBIDACHE ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO HIS TEACHINGS ON PHENOM ENOLOGY AND MUSIC by Tom Zelle

has been approved April 1996

APPROVED: , C h a ir

Supervisory Committee

ACCEPTED:

Director o f the School

MMlX' l&UiMjdkm Dean, Graduate College

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ABSTRACT Published materials on Sergiu Celibidache’s teachings on phenomenology and music were reviewed to present an analytical overview of his central ideas. The research project concentrates on the following primary sources: Celibidache’s interviews, documentation o f his seminars, rehearsals and performances, and his own texts. The results of this research project are based on the utilization of Celibidache’s main topics and central themes as categories for applying the constant comparative analytical method. Each publication was analyzed in reference to each of the previously determined categories. The first part of the research project presents an introduction to phenomenology for the reader, with special reference to the topic of Celibidache and music. The second part presents Celibidache’s essential points of view and arguments which include the question of phenomenology, Far Eastern philosophies, time, tempo, reduction, and aesthetic points on recordings. The research project concludes with a description of the most significant and apparent principles of Celibidache’s rehearsal techniques and a bibliography of primary sources on the subject of Celibidache's teachings for future research.

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To my father, mother, and brother.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation owes its existence to Sergiu Celibidache, whose impact on my understanding of life, music, and my role within them has been immeasurable. I want to thank the students of the Phoenix Symphony Guild Youth Orchestra, whose example and work have served as a constant source of inspiration.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER

Page

I.

INTRODUCTION IN T R O D U C T IO N ...............................................................................................01 Context o f the S tu d y .............................................................................. 04 The Historical Context............................................................... 04 The Philosophical Context ....................................................06 PURPOSE OF THE S T U D Y ...........................................................................09 DEFINITIONS....................................................................................................... 10 D E L IM IT A T IO N S ............................................................................................... 12 METHODS .........................................................................................................13

II.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE IN T R O D U C T IO N ............................................................................................... 15 SERGIU C E L IB ID A C H E ..................................................................................16 PHENOM ENOLOGY........................................................................................... 19 G e n e r a l......................................................................................................19 Phenomenology of T im e ........................................................................24 Phenomenology of M u s i c .................................................................... 27

III.

SERGIU CELIBIDACHE - A BIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW IN T R O D U C T IO N ...............................................................................................34 C H R O N O L O G Y ..................................................................................................35

IV.

INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY INTRODUCTION TO E. HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY . . 44 THE MOST IMPORTANT M ETHODOLOGICAL STEPS OF PH E N O M E N O L O G Y .................................................................... 54 Intentionality ........................................................................................ 55 E p o c h e ..................................................................................................... 60 Noema and n o e s i s ..................................................................................62 Transcendental reduction .................................................................... 67 Eidetic re d u c tio n .....................................................................................72 PHENOMENOLOGY AND INTERNAL TIME CONSCIOUSNESS . 74 IN T E R SU B JE C T IV IT Y .....................................................................................76 CONCLUSIONS AND S U M M A R Y ..............................................................79

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CHAPTER V.

SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO M U S IC ...............................................................................................83 IN T R O D U C T IO N ...............................................................................................83 COSMOS, W ORLD, AND S O U N D ..............................................................86 Introduction ........................................................................................... 86 Death - the natural tendency of e v e ry th in g .......................................88 Tension and d i r e c t i o n ...........................................................................90 The f i f t h .................................................................................................. 93 Extroversion and in tro v e rsio n ..............................................................95 Phrasing .................................................................................................. 96 E p ip h e n o m e n a ........................................................................................ 98 THE MIND ..................................................................................................... 99 Pure consciousness................................................................................. 99 Noema and n o e s i s ................................................................................ 102 T h i n k in g .................................................................................................103 L a n g u a g e .................................................................................................105 Emotion, beauty, and interpretation ............................................... 106 Truth and r e a l it y ................................................................................... 108 Intersubjective o b je c tiv ity ................................................................... 110 Conditions that something may become m u s i c ...............................I l l REDUCTION........................................................................................................113 TIM E AND TEM PO ...........................................................................................118 CONDUCTING BY M EM ORY....................................................................... 124 P H E N O M E N O L O G Y .......................................................................................125 ....................................................................................................... 128 MUSIC W ILHELM FURTW AENGLER...................................................................... 131 FAR EASTERN INFLUENCES...................................................................... 135 RECORDINGS AND R E P E T IT IO N ............................................................ 140

VI.

SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S REHEARSAL T E C H N IQ U E S ..................144

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 148 Sergiu Celibidache .......................................................................................... 148 Books Dissertations and Theses ................................................................................ 162 Articles and Interviews....................................................................................... 165 Papers Unpublished S o u rc e s .......................................................................................... 174 Laser Discs, Video Tapes, Audio T a p e s ......................................................175 Archives ....................................................................................................177

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION Ever since Sergiu Celibidache began his career as the conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra in 1945 much attention has been drawn to his work and achievements because o f his unique artistic ability and personality, as well as his philosophical impact on musicians and music making. Celibidache was born in 1912 in Rumania. He studied in Berlin, including composition with Heinz Tiessen, counterpoint with Hugo Diestler, conducting with Walter Gmeindl, musicology with Arnold Schering, and philosophy with Eduard Spranger and Nicolai Hartmann. He conducted his first concert with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra in 1945, later taking the orchestra on tour to Europe and South America. W hen Herbert von Karajan was appointed as the new music director of the Berlin Philharmonic in 1954, Celibidache left Berlin to conduct in Italy, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden. In 1972, Celibidache started teaching conducting classes, and he was appointed music director1 of the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra in 1979. His working relationship with this orchestra marks the last major phase in

'D ue to various difficulties with the administration and the orchestra, it took six years to sign the contract with the city of Munich as permanent music director (Weiler 1993: 361-371).

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his artistic career. Celibidache’s theoretical influence on the musical world originates from his utilization of Far Eastern thinking and his specific approach to music, an approach which is based on phenomenology. During the twentieth century, phenomenology has affected almost all aspects of the natural sciences, the humanities, and the arts. Phenomenologically influenced ideas have especially entered discussions concerning the meanings and ideals of human artistic expression. Various attempts have been made in recent years to create a well-defined theoretical system for a phenomenology of music. However, most conductors seem to struggle in an attempt to integrate philosophy in general or specifically phenomenology into their actual practice (Reverter n.d.: 1-5). Celibidache can be seen as unique in twentieth-century approaches to conducting, especially from the standpoint of how conductors integrate, utilize, and put into practice a personal position of philosophy and spirituality (Weiler 1993: 352 and Umbach 1995a: 7-16). In 1984, Celibidache conducted a concert with the orchestra of the Curtis Institute of Music in New Y ork’s Carnegie Hall. This concert is an event which musicians still speak of today (Umbach 1995a: 318). John Rockwell of the New York Times called Celibidache a "musical spiritualist" whose performances he would remember for the rest of his life (Rockwell 1989: 17 and M uenchner Philharmoniker 1989: 85). In addition, the 1989 United States/Canada tour of the Munich Philharmonic under Celibidache’s baton left a profound impression on the music world (Zelle 1994). Still, in the United States almost nothing substantial has been

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published about Celibidache. This research project has sought to shed some light on his background, his teachings, and his philosophical positions.

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Context of the Study In order to comprehend more adequately Celibidache’s work and achievements, it is necessary to look at his career from an historical standpoint as well as a philosophical one. The Historical Context Although bom in Rumania, historically Celibidache will always be perceived within the German tradition of conducting. Celibidache himself consistently referred to Wilhelm Furtwaengler as the figure in his life who had influenced him the most (Lang 1988: 208-231). Celibidache not only conducted Furtwaengler’s orchestra, the Berlin Philharmonic, from 1945 until 1954, but also referred to him several times as the figure who personifies his musical ideals. Gar n ic h t. . . Es ist gar nicht wahr, dass ich das wollte. Ich wollte nicht Nachfolger von Furtwaengler werden. Keiner kann Nachfolger von Furtwaengler sein ....V on ihm habe ich die tiefgreifendsten musikalischen Erkenntnisse (Celibidache 1988: 221-229).2 Even though Celibidache had conducted 414 concerts with the Berlin Philharmonic, and even though he was generally considered to be Furtwaengler’s successor, he had always hoped Furtwaengler would return as music director.2 Never,

2Not at all...It is not true that I wanted that. 1 did not want to become Furtwaengler’s successor. No one can be Furtwaengler’s successor....I have received from him the most profound and influential knowledge o f music, [translation mine T. Z.] 2Furtwaengler was struggling with a complex de-nazification ("Entnazifizierung") process in Germany, which prevented him from conducting during that time. Celibidache him self had helped Furtwaengler personally to succeed with the de-nazification process in

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according to himself, during that time had Celibidache perceived himself as a rival trying to take over Furtw aengler’s position (Mueller et. al. 1992: 26). W hen Herbert von Karajan was announced as new music director for the Berlin Philharmonic after Furtwaengler’s death in 1954, Celibidache became institutionally rootless (W eiler 1993: 93) and his career was interrupted. The transition from Celibidache to von Karajan, as well as Celibidache leaving Berlin caused numerous discussions.3 It is interesting to examine how Celibidache’s and von Karajan’s careers have developed differently in the shadow of Furtwaengler’s legacy. Historically, Celibidache’s context - of what he himself refers to as the 20th century European/German tradition of orchestral conducting - is composed of four factors: Wilhelm Furtwaengler, the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, von Karajan, and the impact of the Second World War. Clearly, Celibidache’s goals and ideals have always been different from those of von Karajan’s. Whereas von Karajan continuously lead the Berlin Philharmonic in a direction that would enhance commercial success (numerous recording cycles, first on LPs and then on CDs and videos), Celibidache withdrew from the commercial aspects of classical music. For the past three decades he has continuously refused to

the hope that Furtwaengler would some day be able to return to Berlin to his old position as music director. 3See for a more detailed discussion and documentation Weiler (1993) and Matzner (1986).

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make any recordings which would place him in a commercially-oriented environment.4 And now, almost at the turn of the century, it is inspiring to look at von Karajan’s and Celibidache’s overall impact on the German tradition of conducting and orchestral culture. Besides this historical context, yet interdependently related to it are the philosophical, theoretical, and aesthetical contexts in which Celibidache’s career evolved. The Philosophic Context During his early years in Berlin, Celibidache developed a close relationship to the Buddhist master and teacher M artin Steinke (Mueller et. al. 1992: 19). Steinke’s profound influence on Celibidache determined the overall direction of his life. In an interview given on May 5, 1992, in Santiago de Chile, Celibidache said, "Ich bin Anhaenger des M eister Baba"5 (Celibidache 1992: 28). In his rehearsals and his teachings, Celibidache often referred to Far Eastern traditions such as Zen, Hinduism,

4According to Celibidache, those CD recordings that are available on the market were made either illegally or against his will. In the past, Celibidache had conducted several radio symphony orchestras (Germany, Italy) which had been recorded due to the nature o f the orchestra (purpose being to make recordings for radio broadcasts). Celibidache’s work with these radio symphony orchestras had one reason, that is that these orchestras allowed the highest amount o f rehearsal time. The video tapes and laser discs that are available were made due to the influence of Celibidache’s son, Serge (Weiler 1993: 342). Celibidache stated several times that the purpose o f these videos and laser discs is a purely educational and non-commercial one, not a musical or artistic one. tra n s la tio n by author: "I am a devotee o f the master Baba." Celibidache refers to the Indian Guru Bhagavan Sathya Sai Baba.

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Chinese philosophies, and as well others. Far Eastern influences represent the first main aspect of Celibidache’s thinking. The seminars Celibidache taught in Germany at the University o f Mainz and the Musikhochschule in Munich were entitled "Die Phaenomenologie der M usik." Phenomenology represents the second main aspect of Celibidache’s thinking. Phenomenology is a school o f Western philosophy that was founded by Edmund Husserl at the very end of the 19th century (Held 1985: 6). Phenomenology’s essential focus has been defined as the human experience, consciousness, and the laws and structures of their processes as opposed to the object prior to experience. Together with the question o f how to distinguish and how to separate the object outside of an experience from the object within an experience, the question of time perception, time experience, timelessness, and duration have played a major role in phenomenological discourse. Phenomenology has been one of the major foundations for Celibidache’s life work. In many ways, his work appears to be congruent with Husserl’s philosophy, but at the same time, differs in other essential questions. Both streams of thought, the Far Eastern philosophies as well as the Western t

school of phenomenology, determine the philosophical structure within which Celibidache has developed his own personal philosophical position. It is essential to understand that he not only utilizes these streams of thought separately, but also emphasizes many common denominators between the two. This synthesizing of thought can be considered ground-breaking and unique within conducting and musicmaking, for it has lead to concepts within the context of music (such as

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transcendence, timelessness, and reduction) that might have existed before, but have not been addressed and incorporated into the actual practice of musicianship. Celibidache refers to these philosophical backgrounds with such intensity that they affect both his rehearsal and his conducting technique (Eggebrecht 1992: 62-77). This study will place emphasis on the philosophical context of Celibidache’s work. Celibidache’s philosophy will be analyzed in two ways: First, it will be presented within the context of phenomenology in general (Husserl); and second, it will be related to Celibidache’s actual rehearsal techniques and conducting.

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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY The design of this study emerges from the two contexts previously discussed: the historical context and the philosophical context. The purposes of this study are: 1. To present a documentation in English of Sergiu Celibidache’s life, philosophy, and approach to conducting that is based on published and available materials which are predominantly written in German. This documentation is to be perceived as a basis for future research on the subject. 2. To outline Celibidache’s contribution to a phenomenology of music, which includes the areas in which his position is in harmony with that of Husserl and other phenomenologists, as well as areas in which he differs from them. 3. To present a bibliography of materials which is as complete as possible and which can be used for future research.

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DEFINITIONS The fundamental terms relevant to this study are defined as follows: Phenom enology: A scientific6 method based on the writings of Husserl that excludes any object outside of consciousness from analysis, and defines the domain of experience as the only locus of reality. Phenomenology o f m usic: A scientific method in which the point of focus is no longer sound as it is assumed to exist independently from perception, but only the experience o f sound itself. Epoche: The world itself, but only as it appears in consciousness. According to Ferrara (1991) a synonym for transcendental reduction (pp. 60-64). Transcendental reduction: The bracketing o f all physical/sensational information and relations, and the exclusive concentration on pure self-reflection, which is the sole reflection o f conscious onto itself (including its acts). Eidetic reduction: The filtering of all common features of several transcendental reductions and the exclusion o f specific individual features within transcendental reductions in order to come to some sort of universal conclusion about the condition o f knowledge and truth. Durational tem porality: The temporal quality of an experience of succession, which distinguishes between before and after.

6The term scientific is part o f Husserl’s own definition o f the phenomenological method and it expresses his critique o f the scientific method generally used. The key notion in Husserl’s argument is that o f consciousness being the focus of analysis. For a more detailed discussion, see Husserl 1985 (pp. 196-224) and Husserl 1962.

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Non-durational tem porality: The temporal quality of an experience of something within which no before and after exist. Timelessness: The quality of an experience which does not contain any type of temporality and in which duration does not exist. Music education: All forms and institutions concerned with the teaching of music.

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DELIMITATIONS The purpose of this study was to examine Celibidache’s teachings on phenomenology and music. Although a biographical chronology is presented in chapter III, the study was not intended to be a biography. It was not the purpose of this study to represent Celibidache personally, biographically, or philosophically. The research project was exclusively based on previously published materials, and Oil notes taken by the author and other students of Celibidache as he taught. Sergin Celibidache has neither read nor approved this text. Phenomenology, Far Eastern traditions or schools of thought are discussed only in the context of Sergiu Celibidache, and—by necessity—are represented only partially. The philosophical analysis focuses primarily on the most recent period of Celibidache’s career with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra. Changes in and developments of his artistic views and philosophical standpoints were not the focus of this study.

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METHODS The methods for this research project are drawn from the following publications: Ball and Smith (1992), Colwell (1992), Glaser and Strauss (1967), Goodenough (1957, 1969, and 1970), Kleinschroth (n.d.), Lincoln (1985), Patton (1990), Zelle (1992/93). The methodology is based on the outlines and discussions published in the Handbook ot Research on Music Teaching and Learning by Richard Colwell (ed.).7 It will consist of the utilization of qualitative research that includes ethnography, biography, and descriptive research, including observational research, and spoken responses to questions. "Responses to questions" and "observational research" mainly refer to the author’s participation in Celibidache’s master classes and his questions addressed to Celibidache. All research methods mentioned are discussed in a broader sense in Colwell (1992). Colwell’s Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning has become a work of fundamental importance to the community of music educators in the United States. In addition, the methodology used in this research project utilizes the theoretical foundations outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), Patton (1980), and Lincoln and Guba (1985).8

7See Section B, Chapter six, Qualitative Research Methodology in Music Education (pp. 75 - 90) and Section B, Chapter nine. Descriptive Research: Technique and Procedures (pp. 115- 123) . 8The methodological references also apply to the analysis o f visual data. Ball and Smith (1992) have discussed the utilization o f qualitative research methods for visual data. Similar to the discussions in Lincoln and Guba (1985), and Glaser and Strauss

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The first and main methodological procedure for this research project is that of structuring the given material by creating topics (i.e., coding). The author will find categories with which the data can be organized. The categories are primarily theoretical and are drawn from Celibidache’s philosophical teachings. The main categories used in this research project are congruent with the main categories in Celibidache’s teachings. These are key terms or key topics (for example: time and reduction). These categories are developed through the methods o f triangulation, cross checking, and content analysis. The second methodological step consists o f the integration o f the developed categories. Here, the findings o f single categories will be related to the findings of other categories. The third methodological step consists of the development o f generalizations which are supported by the data. This includes the presentation o f summaries, characteristics, and implications for future research.

(1967), Ball and Smith outline the methods o f coding and content analysis for visual data (See especially Ball and Smith 1992: 20-31).

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CHAPTER II REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION The following areas were considered in this review: 1) published materials on Sergiu Celibidache, and 2) current research and developments in musical phenomenology with special emphasis on musical time. No dissertations have yet been published on Sergiu Celibidache.

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SERGIU CELIBIDACHE In the past, Sergiu Celibidache has consistently refused not only to conduct/work for audio recordings, but also to publish texts on his teachings. Few people have been permitted to conduct interviews with him. The reader of this research project must keep in mind that Celibidache has been highly critical of what other have people said, written, and published about him. For example, several times during Celibidache’s seminars and master classes he would not tolerate even literal quotes.1 In general, his position towards publications, the written word, and language as a means to communicate the essence of his art is thoroughly negative (Zelle 1992: 36-42). The interviews that were published and documented, however, formed the basis of the second part of this study which specifically analyses Celibidache’s approach to music and phenomenology. Those interviews that played a major role in this research project were conducted by Wolfgang Schreiber (1992), Joachim Matzner (1986), Matthias Fischer (1986), Harald Eggebrecht (1992), Klaus Lang (1988), Heinz Ludwig (1976), Antonio Morales (Umbach 1995b), Klaus Umbach (1995a and 1995b),2 and Jan Schmidt-Garre

’In his 1992 seminar at the University of Mainz, for example, Celibidache strongly censored a student quoting what Celibidache had just said previously. Celibidache refers to an experience (which includes anything a human says) as something unique, to be experienced only once, placed in the present moment of its appearance, and hence unrepeatable. The repetition of words (quotes) implies a separation of the communicated experience from the linguistic medium (language). His censorship appeared to be his way of teaching this distinction (Zelle 1992: 36-42). 2Klaus Umbach collected many materials on the subject "Sergiu Celibidache" for his own research. Most of the material collected in this archive originates directly from the archive of P e r Sniegel/Germanv. which is not open to the public. Klaus

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(1992).3 These individuals developed long working relationships with either Celibidache or the orchestras he conducted. Besides the interviews with Celibidache, only two major texts exist that were written about Celibidache by friends of his.4 In this research project these materials played a major role for chapter three (biographic overview). Newspaper review-articles played a minor role in this research project, since these articles were written by authors rather unfamiliar with phenomenology and present subjective impressions and judgments. However, the review-articles that were collected by the author strongly supported the data given in the interviews and other primary sources. Some review-articles were used in this research project. Sony Classics published four video recordings of the Bruckner symphonies number six, seven, and eight with the Munich Philharmonic and number seven with the Berlin Philharmonic, and Teldec Video has published a video recording of Prokofiev’s Symphonie Classique (all conducted by Celibidache). All are available on

Umbach kindly offered the author the use of his archive. The author photocopied 968 pages of documents from Klaus Umbach’s archive. Most documents are newspaper review articles. 151 pages consist of interviews with Sergiu Celibidache. Most documents give the source (usually newspapers), and the date. Page numbers and newspaper sections are not given. Several documents do not give the source. The pages of this archive are not numbered. Klaus Umbach’s archive consists exclusively of photo copies. The author of this research project is therefore using photocopies of the photocopies of Klaus Umbach’s archive. Throughout the research project the author will refer to documents of this archive with the reference: (Umbach 1995b). If the used document states its source and date of publication it will appear in the text. 3Some published interviews do not list the name o f the person who conducted the interview (for example Celibidache 1992a). 4See Sombart 1984 and Weiler 1993.

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laser disc as well. Celibidache insistently described these recordings as educational documents and not as authentic substitutes for his conducting and for music (Zelle 1992: 16). Several TV broadcasts were made in Italy, the United States, Great Britain, and other countries of concerts conducted by Celibidache. These audio-visual documents were partially used for the discussion of Celibidache’s rehearsal and conducting techniques.5

SA good documentation of Celibidache’s most recent work with the Munich Philharmonic is published in the series Philharmonische Blaetter (1986, 1989, 1992/93, 1993, 1994a, and 1994b). See as well Gaag 1992, Lesle 1991, Schreiber 1987, n.d., and 1992, and Umbach 1989.

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PHENOMENOLOGY General Historically, the term phenomenology refers to the works and thinking of Edmund Husserl, although similar ideas originated from Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, M erleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre.6 Husserl was born in 1859 in Germany and studied mathematics and philosophy in Leipzig and Berlin. After completing his dissertation on the philosophy of mathematics, Husserl studied philosophy in Vienna with Franz Brentano, who profoundly influenced him in the development o f phenomenology. Following his Habilitation,1 Husserl published his first major work—Logische Untersuchungen.8 Besides Husserl, M artin Heidegger, although in general classified as an existentialist, plays an essential role in the development and illumination of the phenomenological tradition. Phenomenology, as it is described and introduced by Husserl, represents a scientific method. The key terms of H usserl’s philosophy are those of reduction and epoche. Reduction is defined as the elimination of any object outside of consciousness from scientific analysis. Epoche is defined as the analytical relationship of consciousness with itself, which is the methodological prerequisite for any analysis per se based on reduction. Husserl’s philosophy is extremely complex and many other

6See Held in Introduction to Edmund Husserl, Die Phaenomenoloeische Methode - Ausgewaehlte Texte I (Stuttgart: Phillipp Reclam ju n ., 1985). 7The term Habilitation refers to the thesis that has been a requirement in the European academic system to be appointed as professor. 8Husserl 1975 and 1984.

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essential terms must be comprehended to cover the whole spectrum of his work. Other m ajor concepts that emerge from the understanding of reduction and epoche are noema, noesis, eidetic and transcendental reduction, among others. This discussion, however, uses only the key terms (reduction and epoche) as a point of departure for an understanding of a phenomenology of music. Epoche and reduction actually represent acts of consciousness, which define the relationships among experiencing subject, experienced object, and reflecting consciousness. From these acts of consciousness, which are the fundamental of phenomenological methodology are derived the understandings that the world only appears as consciousness and that no assumptions whatsoever can be made about a world outside o f consciousness. According to Husserl, consciousness constitutes the world as it appears to us rather than the world constituting consciousness. Bednarz (1984) expressed this fundamental hypothesis as follows: Reason means for Husserl to be able to supply not only evidence needed to support knowledge but also the source o f this evidence. The source of the kind of evidence that will satisfy the ultimate justification claims of any knowledge is co-extensive, therefore, with discovering the foundations of knowledge itself. This foundation can not limit itself to being a purely logical foundation of the objective-ideal type because it does not take into account the acts in which evidence presents itself (DAI-A 42/02, p .733). Bednarz described the scientific justification and legitimacy that becomes possible through the concepts of reduction and epoche. He pointed out that the legitimacy o f this approach emerges not only because the objects of and within consciousness are being analyzed, but also because of the modes by which these

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objects are represented by consciousness within consciousness. Altmann (1981) approached this problem from a slightly different angle. He pointed to the implications Husserl’s phenomenology has for our understanding of the human body. Altmann stated in his dissertation on corporeality: For Husserl there is in every act of consciousness an element that is irreducible to nature. In his assessment of the naturalistic tendency he demonstrates that spiritual/psychical phenomena cannot simply be reduced to mere epiphenomena of physical or material nature. On the contrary, nature is a correlate of consciousness and the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity....Corporeality, therefore, does not have its traditional connotation of a material entity existing within a presupposed spatial-temporal world matrix in accordance with the law of a natural causality (DAI-A 41/11, p. 4737). Altmann hinted at an important implication that is often overlooked in phenomenological writings: the body can not be perceived as a material object with the world, but as an "organ of spirit" (1981). Altmann created the point of departure for understanding that the body is essentially interconnected with its spiritual and mental processes. With this connection phenomenological discussions have focused on the temporal qualities of the acts of consciousness. The understanding of the methodological steps of epoche and reduction play an indispensable role for the concept of temporality, which is essential in the realm of music and music making. Reimann (1969) argued not only that the positivistic attitude of the mind and the body as objects is naive, but also that the traditional concept of duration and measurable time is no longer applicable. Reimann’s philosophical

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conclusion was congruent with concepts of quantum physics,9 namely that the traditional space/time matrix does not exist, and that consciousness is directly related to this fact. Reimann’s distinction between "inside of" and "outside of" time is essential. Reimann concluded in his dissertation: All that is argued is that the epoche requires for its very possibility that the subject of our awareness is a transcendental ego, and specifically that temporality can appear for a transcendental ego not itself in time (Reimann 1969: DAI-A 30/03, p. 1205). The significance of phenomenology has been pointed out by many authors for a variety of contexts, such as linguistics (Barfoot), communication (Schrag), aesthetics (Lipps), anthropology (Scheler), axiology and the philosophy of religion (Hartmann), sociology (Mannheim), psychology (Benswanger), psychiatry and psychotherapy (Frankl), and psychology of personality (Rogers) (Sahakian 1968). Millikan (1967), for example, placed emphasis on "showing positively the self-transcendence which Heidegger saw in both in-authentic and authentic existence, and in explaining time as the ontological condition of the possibility of self-transcendent existence" (DAI-A 27/08, p. 2561). Mason (1973) and Malik (1937) discussed the phenomenological problem of time and self-transcendence in relation to W hitehead’s philosophy of the metaphysics of time. Alexandersson (1981) applied Husserl’s methodology to a "phenomenologically grounded empirical psychology" which bears implications for the field of educational psychology. In all these works there is a strong emphasis on

9See as well Heidegger 1992, Popper and Eccles 1982, Dossey 1982, Fraser 1990, and Wilber 1977.

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the indispensable use of the phenomenological methodology for understanding the human mind and its perception o f and position in the world. Chapters four and five will further discuss how these philosophical concepts relate to Celibidache’s work, and how he is utilizing them. Several works that apply principles o f phenomenology within the domain of education have been completed. Garrison (1988) emphasized the importance of Dewey’s and Husserl’s epistemologies for the philosophy of education. Stone (1979) presented "phenomenology as an alternative approach in conducting educational research." Atkinson (1972: 295) established a "familiarity with the vocabulary and concepts o f phenomenology as an aid to the general scholar" which serves an important function. Atkinson’s contribution is particularly important because, in the past, the specific fields of academia have not incorporated phenomenological methods, particularly due to the extreme degree of abstraction involved. The vocabulary developed by Husserl and Heidegger (especially in Sein und Zeit) is so complex that it prevented the emergence of generally accepted linguistic tools for expression, thought, discussion, and practice. Atkinson tried to help overcome these problems of comm unication.10

,0See as well Johnston 1992, Orth n .d., Barfoot 1981, and Schrag 1979.

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Phenomenology o f Time A focus o f Husserl’s, which is also a general focus of phenomenological research, is that of time and time consciousness. It is the dichotomy o f duration and non-duration, o f time and timelessness, as two different states o f consciousness which causes the human condition to be torn between two realities: the outside and the inside, or as Reimann (1969) pointed out, the ego and the transcended ego. Gallagher (1981) wrote: The human body, temporal, incomplete, and imperfect, is thought to be somewhat the initiator of error and the spoiler for freedom. The soul, in its relation to the body, is conceived to be entrapped in temporality, and yet in other respects it is understood to be a participant in the non­ temporal essence of the eternal. The soul is thought to be somewhat between time and timeless (DAI-A 42/05, p. 2164). Gallagher’s conclusion correlates with Altmann’s dissertation on corporeality. As later chapters on music and time perception will discuss, Gallagher’s concept of temporality and the body/mind relationship can play a significant role for an aesthetic o f m usic.11 Tougas (1981) concurred in his dissertation on "Internal Time Consciousness and Transfinity." Tougas’ terms o f reflection and totality, when applied to music, refer respectively to analyses o f music and experiencing/being music. Although his analytical approach originated from a different perspective, he came to very similar conclusions. Instead of the dichotomy of body and soul, he analogously distinguished between reflection and totality: For reflection, totality is essentially an infinite continuity,

"F o r further discussions see Ferrara 1991, Kramer 1988, Smith 1989, Dowling and Harwood 1986, Stockhausen 1989a and 1989b, and Barry 1990.

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wherein all parts are connected in foundation. By its logic, totality is transfmite and underlying but not concrete and finally lim ited....Reflection and totality are nevertheless both founded in the continuity of the absolute founding now of the innerly aware, not in "bigness." Reflection limits; totality transcends. Their Now is the limit of each past and the openness to each future (Tougas 1981: DAI-A 42/02, p. 735). The essential idea of phenomenology is the premise that the quality of human perception is constituted by what exists within the perceiving apparatus and not by the object of perception prior to perception. The object is an internal—not an externalentity. In applying this premise to the understanding of time, Portmess (1978) wrote: The assumption which underlies much contemporary philosophy of time is that reality is as our most sophisticated physical theories tell us it is, and that ultimately we are to understand reality in light of certain abstract theoretical concepts. In keeping with the phenomenological tradition, I shall argue that time ought to be understood as it is revealed in ordinary experience, and that essentially time is a problem, not of abstract thought, but of life itself—a problem that arises from the human need to find reconciliation with the passage of time (pp. ii-iii). White (1977) and Pageler (1967) discussed the question of time within the contexts of Heidegger’s and Kirkegaard’s philosophies. To them a phenomenology of time was not a problem that can be understood by looking outside, for example with the concept of "clock time" or the durational continuum of measured time in physics. Rather, time and timelessness are determinations of the specific states of human consciousness.12 Schwartz (1977) studied the various experiences of time among graduate

12See for a complex discussion of time and phenomenology Heine 1980, Herman 1974.

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students. His study on Heidegger’s concept of "being-in-the-world" showed that different qualities of human responsibility toward one’s own experiences and differences in personality ("actively internalized" and "passively externalized") correlate with significant differences about how temporality is experienced.13 Schwartz demonstrated that an understanding o f temporality needs to be contextualized—in this case with the factors of personality-in order for one to understand fully the dimension o f time as it is actually experienced.

13See as well a related study on personality and time perception by Barnes 1977.

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Phenomenology of Music Husserl’s philosophy raises significant issues for music. The questions that emerge are: How do human consciousness and the human mind relate to the difference between sound and music? W hat is it that lets music emerge out of sound? How does temporality differ in the realm of music and in the realm o f sound? These questions yield different responses when they are applied to the positivistic and Cartesian paradigms versus phenomenologically and spiritually oriented paradigms. Not only are the answers different, but the laws and structures of the two paradigms are distinct, too. Consequently, it is crucial for the field of music, and especially music education, to contextualize clearly assumptions and conclusions when referring to the realm of sound (positivistic; objectified and measured) or the realm of music (phenomenological). As Bartholomew (1986) noted in his critique of Reimann’s aesthetics for music education, we are constantly dealing with a confusion of the "experienced object and the experiencing of the object" (p. 4). Historically, Ansermet and Celibidache were probably among the first who understood the importance of this connection between phenomenology and music. Thakar (1988) seems to have based his research on Celibidache’s teachings, although no specific citations to Celibidache are given.14 Celibidache not only taught a phenomenology of music in his master classes, but also puts the phenomenological method in practice during rehearsals and performances. As will be outlined later,

,4See as well Thakar’s unpublished materials on phenomenology and Celibidache (Thakar 1988 and n.d.).

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Celibidache eliminates any assumption about musical objects outside the mind during his work as a conductor. For example, a musician will execute a musical indication (a crescendo for example) not because it appears on the page of the score, but because of a conscious, internal necessity and the musical context of which it is an integral part. Because of this, the motivation to execute a crescendo is internal and not external. Phenomena only exist within consciousness and that is the exclusive realm to which the musician refers and within which he/she works. Ansermet (1961, 1991) attempted the same goal in "Les Fondements de la Musique dans la Conscience Humaine," which is of historical importance. In this work he emphasized the importance of self-reflection within consciousness. In his complex argument, Ansermet followed H usserl’s methodology, in which the noema/noesis difference play an essential p a rt.15 Although several scholarly works have been published on the phenomenological studies by Ernest Ansermet, they are of minor importance for this dissertation.16

15The constituting act of consciousness is the main field of H usserl’s studies. He demonstrates several mechanisms of the presentation of information within the human mind. Only a few can be mentioned here. First of all, Husserl distinguishes the actual experience and feeling of an act of consciousness from the act of reflecting on that activity of consciousness. Both the actual experience (Erlebnis) and the reflection (Auffassungssinn) are constituting acts. The act of reflection Husserl calls noesis (or noetische Phase) and the actual experience o f the internal object of experience he calls noema. Noema refers to the physical dimension of an conscious experience, which is expressed and manifested through language o f objectify mg terminologies. Beyond that, a noema always contains two aspects: an aspect of objects (appearing within experience in their material sense) and an aspect of contents appearing in their non­ material sense (for example, values) (Prechtel 1991: 42). 16See Piguet’s discussion of Ansermet’s phenomenological interpretation of logarithmic structures as the foundation of human consciousness (Piguet 1985).

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Any attempt to apply systematically the phenomenological method to the field of music creates tensions with current practices o f musicology, theory, and performance. Kimmey (1984) discussed the history of musicology from a phenomenological perspective. He tried to establish "the eidetic structure of musicology through a phenomenological approach" (p.7). In doing so he concluded that the dualistic schematization of musicology into speculative and practical aspects is not appropriate in relation to its goals: It seems more in keeping with the phenomenon under scrutiny, i.e., musicology, that the traditional discussion is unw arranted....M usicology is a unified discipline not a divided one (pp. 256-258). This investigation is the application of methods to produce the science of musical phenomena: musicology. To disengage these methods and view them as an object for investigation is to move into the realm of metamusicology. The change in focus from musicology to metamusicology is a change from an objective focus...to a subjective one (the tools and methods used by musicologists to investigate the musical field) (pp. 4-5). Kimmey insisted that any research result must not be separated from context o f the researcher (who is he/she, what are his/her intentions, etc). Instead the researcher him self/herself plays an integral function in understanding the research result itself. It can no longer be perceived as being separated (what traditionally justifies the quality of objectivity) from the researching mind. Analogously, current research in education makes a distinction between positivism and interpretivism. M ost studies on a phenomenology of music have noted that current musical and educational institutions seem to ignore the phenomenological approach as a possible instructional device. Smith (1973) wrote:

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It is suggested that traditional musicology has over­ emphasized the thematical and cognitive aspects of musical structure and underemphasized the study of sound perception.... It is concluded that the attempts of 20th century musicology to explain auditory perception can benefit both psychological empiricism and phenomenology (p.64).17 The attempt to understand music phenomenologically became a serious scientific encounter only in the most recent decades of this century. Whereas initial works (for example Arcaya 1975) outlined and defined the problems o f a phenomenological approach to music, later studies systematized and structured this new field of study into a phenomenology of music. Bartholomew (1985) specifically discussed the importance of phenomenology for music education and suggests several questions for music teachers (especially at conservatory and university levels). He emphasized the relationship between the whole of a piece of music and the abstracted parts (such as rhythm, pitch, articulation, dynamics, etc.). Although he fails to present concrete practical concepts for the actual rehearsal/classroom situation, his work stands as an initial breakthrough toward a phenomenology of music. Shaerer (1976) applied similar concepts to the question of aesthetic values in music, primarily referring to Heidegger’s concepts expressed in Sein und Zeit (1976). He describes the goal of his phenomenological approach as follows: The aim of this work, then, is to show, by strict phenomenological exhibition, that the reduction of interest to self-contained context, and the concentration on aesthetic structure as it appears in consciousness within that context, have

17Smith’s critique of musicology encompasses many parallels to H usserl’s critique of Western science in general and psychology in particular (psychology debate).

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indeed provided us with the most appropriate ground for aesthetic valuation (p. 2). [emphasis mine T. Z.] Delpaz and his co-authors (1978: 252) discussed the "modalities of musical attention and perception" as a "view of aesthetics and style." Again, the important quality of this approach is the attempt to explain aesthetic value by focusing on the act of experiencing as opposed to focusing exclusively on the object of experience. The fact that the object of experience is inseparably connected with the modes of the act of experiencing leads to a new understanding of what an aesthetic value can be. Together with Bartholomew, the works of Pelt (1983) and M agnusdottir (1980) can be seen as more general approaches toward a phenomenology of music. These authors tend to work toward a more generic model of a phenomenological conceptualization of music. Magnusdottir critiqued "the psychological-neurological model for overlooking the primordial perceptual relation of the perceiver and the perceived" (pp. 164-166), primarily using M erleau-Ponty’s philosophy as a starting point. Pelt focused on the ontology of a piece of art, using Heidegger’s philosophy as a starting point. Although both authors presented important research for the development of a phenomenology of music, both failed to create a systematic outline that bears clear practical guidelines that can be used in the actual rehearsal/classroom situation. Other studies discuss the philosophical and aesthetic difficulties in greater detail in the context of specific musical problems. Lochhead (1982) and Bodreau (1992), who critiqued other phenomenologically-oriented studies, specifically dealt with a phenomenology of musical time.

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Streb (1984) applied phenomenological thinking to the elementary and secondary education in the arts and Panzarella (1977) investigated concrete "peak experiences in response to music and visual art and some personality correlates" (p. 4). Analogous to Schwartz’ findings of personality differences as an important factor for the evaluation o f experience-qualities, Panzarella pointed to various individual factors as being responsible for the aesthetic meaning of peak experiences. Crucial in this work was the attempt to eliminate the exclusive fixation on an object outside of human consciousness and to contextualize the peak experience with the consciousness that is experiencing it. Lewin (1986) and M oog (1977) discussed phenomenological methodologies from a psychological perspective. W hereas M oog focused on the "influence on music theory o f phenomenological investigations of perception and potential or at least metaphorical links with artificial intelligence" (p. I l l ) , Lewin discussed "musical experiences phenomenologically as time gestalts existing only in experience. The division o f time gestalts into noise, speech, and music implies various experiential functions" (p. 364) [emphasis mine, T. Z.]. M ore specific are the works o f Carpenter (1974), who primarily dealt with the question of musical form (including some questions o f temporality), Cordes (1971), who exclusively discussed specific twentieth-century pieces utilizing a phenomenological methodology, and Clifton (1983), who included the parameters of

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time, space, feeling, and motion in his extensive discussion.18 Carpenter attempted to define the concept of a fugue, using a phenomenological approach to interpret the temporalities and structures implied in a fugue. She used in her research examples of Pachelbel and Bach. Cordes came to this conclusion: It seems to be true that composers in the latter decades of the twentieth century have indeed found a way of symbolically representing sound per se, that is, not a demonstration of what man the master of nature can do with the sound phenomenon at his disposal but rather a truer picture of all the possibilities of the musical sound-phenomena of nature without the purposive manipulation of man (p. 186).

18See as well the work of Brodhead (1983) on "Structural Time in TwentiethCentury Tonal Music."

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CHAPTER III SERGIU CELIBIDACHE - A BIOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION In general, relatively little is known about Celibidache’s personal life. However, available literature does reflect the main stages and points o f Celibidache’s professional life. The following data are given in the form of a chronology of the most important (mainly professional) events of Celibidache’s life. It is a summary of the following three sources, which can be considered fundamental to the biographical data collection of Celibidache’s life: Klaus Umbach (1995a: 330-331), Klaus Weiler (1993: 361-371), and Konrad M ueller et. al. (1992: 134-136). Most o f the listed data are overlapping and published in two or in all three publications. Some data that are indirectly related to Sergiu Celibidache are included in this chronology for a better understanding of the circumstances of Celibidache’s career and life.1

•Some o f the texts used for this chronology (especially Weiler 1993) are so short that the English representation in this research project comes very close to a translation o f the original German text. This resemblance was not intended but unavoidable.

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CHRONOLOGY 1912-35

Celibidache born on the 11th of July 1912 in the city of Roman in Rumania (date according to the Gregorian Calendar). According to the Julian Calendar, which was valid in 1912, his date of birth is 28th of June 1912. Lived in Rumania until 1935. At age four started to play piano. Nine years o f piano lessons. After basic school training, studied mathematics and philosophy in the city of Jassy. In Jassy, beginning of regular studies of music. Continuation of studies in Bukarest. Pianist at a dance school in Bukarest.

1935/36

Studies in Paris. Played in a Jazz Band.

1936-45

Studies in Berlin at the Musikhochschule and the Friedrich-WilhelmsUniversitaet. Most influential teachers were: Heinz Tiessen (composition), W alter Gmeindl (conducting), Hugo Distler (counterpoint), Kurt Thomas and Fritz Stein (theory), Eduard Spranger and Nicolai Hartmann (philosophy), Arnold Schering and Georg Schuenemann (musicology). Began dissertation on the subject of formcreating elements in the composition technique of Josquin des Pres. Concert tours as piano accompanist. Autodidact and self-teachings in dancing. Concerts with amateur ensembles and choirs. Performance of the six Brandenburg Concertos with students of the Musikhochschule at Berlin (approx. fall 1944). Began to compose and to perform his own compositions.

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8. 1945

W inner of the conducting competition of the Russian occupation army/district with the Berlin Radio Symphony Orchestra.

8. 23. 1945

Leo Borchard, the first post war conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, died.

8. 29. 1945

First concert under Celibidache’s baton with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra.

12. 1. 1945

Appointment as conductor (Lizenztraeger)-n o t music d ire c to r-o f the Berlin Philharmonic.

1946

Started to teach at the International Institute of Music in Berlin. Appointed Music Director of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra until the return of Wilhelm Furtwaengler (who at that time was not allowed to conduct in Germany because of accusations of having collaborated with the nazi regime). Premier of Shostakovich’s seventh symphony in Germany with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra under the direction of Sergiu Celibidache. First personal meeting with Wilhelm Furtwaengler.

5. 1. 1947

Denazification of Furtwaengler (which was supported and prepared by Celibidache, who was trying to help Furtwaengler return to the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra).

5. 25. 1947

First concert with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra under the direction of Wilhelm Furtwaengler after the war. Celibidache, however, remained designated Music Director of the Berlin Philharmonic

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Orchestra. 1948

First concert with the London Philharmonic Orchestra under the direction of Sergiu Celibdiache. Concert tour with Sergiu Celibidache, Furtwaengler, and the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra to England

1949

Highly acclaimed conducting successes in England, Vienna, Italy, and France.

1950 - 51

Highly acclaimed concerts in Central and South America.

5. 1951

Serious throat surgery in Mexico City.

1951 - 52

Concert tours in Italy, Central and South America.

1952

Furtwaengler again Music Director of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra.

5. 1952

Highly acclaimed success in Buenos Aires.

12. 19. 1952 Last meeting with Wilhelm Furtwaengler in Turin/Italy. 1953

Berlin Art Award (Kunstpreis) for music.

10. 1953

First concert with the Orchestra of the M ilan Scala.

11. 28. 1954 Grosses Verdienstkreuz des Verdienstordens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (highest award of the Federal Republic of Germany) for the reconstruction of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra after the second world war. 11. 29. 1954 Last concert with the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra until 3. 31. 1992. 30. 11. 1954 W ilhelm Furtwaengler died. 12. 13. 1954 Herbert von Karajan appointed new Music Director of the

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Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra. Celibidache left Berlin and the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra (which he had conducted, until this date, 414 times in concert performances). 1955

Award of the Association of German Critics (Preis des Verbandes Deutscher Kritiker) [Translation mine, T. Z.]. Intensive work in Italy. From 1953 - 1967 Celibidache conducted the season opening concerts of La Scala in Milan. Intensive work and cooperation with the Orchestra of the Academia di Santa Cecilia in Rome. Guest conducting with the Radio Symphony Orchestras of Rome, M ilan, Turin, Naples, Bologna, and Florence. Guest conducting in Israel and England.

10 . 7 . 1957 Celibidache conducted for the first time in three years in Berlin again, namely the Radio-Symphony Orchestra Berlin during a concert celebrating the seventieth birthday of his composition teacher Heinz Tiessen. 1957 - 58

Various concerts with the Radio Symphony Orchestra of the West Deutscher Rundfunk in Cologne. Celibidache took this orchestra on several tours throughout Germany and Italy.

1958 - 59

First concerts with the Radio Symphony Orchestra Stuttgart/Germany.

1960 - 63

Intensive work and cooperation with the Royal Orchestra Copenhagen. In 1961 Celibidache took this orchestra on an extensive tour throughout Germany and West Berlin.

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10. 1962

First concerts with the Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra.

1962

Celibidache moved to Italy.

1963 - 71

Principal Guest Conductor and Artistic Director of the Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra. 1967 concert tours to Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany. Additional tours to Switzerland and Spain in 1968, to Finland and Austria in 1969, and to the Netherlands, Austria and Rumania in 1970.

1967

Concerts with the Staatskapelle Berlin in East Berlin, Dresden, and Leipzig (former German Democratic Republic).

1968

His wife Joane gave birth to their son Serge.

1969 - 70

Concerts with the Bamberger Sinfoniker (Symphony Orchestra of Bamberg/Germany).

1970

Appointment as knight of the Vasa Order {Ritter des Vasa Orcfewj/Stockholm) in Stockholm and recipient of the award of the Leonie-Sonning Music Price of Denmark in Copenhagen.

3. 21. 1971

Last concert with the Swedish Radio Symphony Orchestra.

6. 1971

Conducted the 25th anniversary concert of the Radio Symphony Orchestra Stuttgart/Germany.

1972

Taught conducting masterclasses in Bologna and Siena/Italy.

1972 - 77

Principal Guest Conductor and Artistic Director of the Radio Symphony Orchestra Stuttgart. Celibidache took this orchestra on numerous tours

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abroad: Yugoslavia, Spain, France, and Austria in 1977. 1973 - 75

Principal Guest Conductor of the Orchestre National de l’ORTF in Paris. Celibidache moved to Paris with his wife Joane and their son Serge.

1977 - 78

Taught conducting masterclasses in Trier/Germany.

1978

Taught conducting masterclasses in Bukarest with the Bukarest Philharmonic Orchestra. Begining of his teaching at the Institute for Musicology at the University of Mainz/Germany in phenomenology of music. Concerts with the NHK-Symphony Orchestra Tokyo, the London Symphony Orchestra, and the Rheinlandpfaelzischem Staatsorchester/Germany.

2. 14. 1979 First concert with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra. 6. 1979

Appointment as Music Director o f the city o f Munich ('Generalmusikdirektor) and subsequently as Music Director o f the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra. Appointed member of the Bavarian Academy o f Fine Arts (Bayrische Akademie der Schoenen Kuenste).

10. 15. 1979 First performance o f Bruckner’s eight symphony with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra. 1980 - 82

Taught conducting masterclasses in Munich with the M unich Philharmonic Orchestra.

10. 1981

First concert tour throughout Germany with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra.

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1982

Concert tour with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra throughout France, Italy, and Spain.

6. 9. 1982

Last concert with the Radio Symphony Orchestra Stuttgart/Germany.

2. 27. 1984 Concert with the Orchestra o f the Curtis Institute o f M usic/ Philadelphia (with which Celibidache had intensively rehearsed during a three week period) in New York City’s Carnegie Hall. 1984 - 1985

Serious illness, which lead to severe difficulties in Celibidache’s relationship with the city of M unich and the M unich Philharmonic Orchestra. Celibidache almost left all his positions and responsibilities in Munich. Resigned from his positions in M unich on the 11. 19. 1984. Because o f the initiative o f various composers, musicians, professors, journalists, and administrators in Germany, Celibidache later returned to his position in Munich.

1985

Celibidache worked with the orchestra o f the Musikhochschule Munich. Since 1985 extensive tours throughout the world with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra.

11. 1985

For the first time, signed a contract with the city o f Munich. All previous engagements were carried out without a definite contract.

1987 - 88

Conducted the orchestra of the Schleswig Holstein Musik Festival.

1987

First appearance at the International Bruckner Festival at Linz. Performance of Bruckner’s eight symphony at the Stiftskirche o f St.

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Florian. 1988

Celibidache conducted four concerts in Moscow during the visit of German Chancellor Kohl.

1989

Concert tour throughout the USA and Canada with the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra. Celibidache conducted, on invitation of the German President, the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra at the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Federal Republic o f Germany.

1990

Concert tour to Japan with the M unich Philharmonic Orchestra, where Bruckner’s fourth, seventh, and eight symphonies were commercially recorded on video and laser disc.

1991

Celibidache appointed professor honoris causa of the Staatliche Musikhochschule Muenchen (Academy o f Music at Munich).

1992

Serious illness which lead to the cancellation of various concerts. For the first time in 37 years, Celibidache conducted the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra again on the invitation of the German President Richard von W eizsaecker. Honorary (Ehrenbeurger) of the city of Munich. East Asia concert tour. Highly acclaimed concert in Tokyo with Benedetti-Michelangeli.

1993

Celibidache taught his masterclasses on phenomenology o f music at the Musikhochschule at M unich for the last time.

1995/96

Concerts in Poland and Spain (1996).

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This chronology2 gives a basic idea about Celibidache’s professional career. In general, his private life is not well documented. With great consistency, Celibidache protected his private life from the outside world. Klaus Umbach’s biographical reports (1995a) contain some further anecdotal and private information which will be left aside in this research project.

2The data of this chronology were selected from the given ones in the publications of Umbach (1995a), Weiler (1993), and M ueller et. al. (1992).

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CHAPTER IV INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY

INTRODUCTION TO EDMUND HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY Quentin Lauer (1958b: 1) wrote in The Triumph of Subjectivity that "with the passage of time it becomes more and more difficult to determine what the words "phenomenology" and "phenomenological" are supposed to mean in the contexts in which they are used." The phenomenological literature—especially of The International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society and The W orld Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning (Tymieniecka 1971, Nitta and Tatematsu 1979)-has developed to a complexity that makes it impossible to generate simple and clear explanations and definitions. First, phenomenology has entered almost all m ajor fields of twentieth century thought. W ithin these fields (philosophy, aesthetics, sociology, anthropology, theory of science, religion, and many others) distinct schools have developed independently. Second, a group of distinct philosophers must be considered when analyzing the historic origin of phenomenological thought. Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, Jean Hering, Franz Brentano, M erlau-Ponty, Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, and Victor Frankl are only a few numbers o f this group (Husserl 1985: 5, Sahakian 1968: 327, and Lauer 1958a: 1).

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Besides the work of Edmund Husserl (see Husserliana - Edmund H usserl’s gesammelte W erke. Aufgrund des Nachlasses veroeffentlicht mit dem Husserl Archiv an der Universitaet Koeln, vom Husserl Archiv (Lowen) Den Haag 1950ff and other writings), the works of the following three authors, who essentially helped build the foundation for the idea of phenomenology and its development, need to be mentioned to cover the term phenomenology in a broader historical sense: Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik of Max Scheler (1913/16) (Scheler 1945); Sein und Zeit of Martin Heidegger (1927) (Heidegger 1976); and Die Phanomenologie der Wahrnehmung of M erleau-Ponty (1945) (see Klaus Held in Husserl 1985: Einleitung). Third, Edmund Husserl’s work presents a multitude o f open questions and inconsistencies. Ricoeur (1967: 3) opened his introduction to H usserl-A nalvsis of His Phenomenology with the assertion that "all of phenomenology is not Husserl, even though he is more or less its center." The literature does, however, present Husserl’s thinking as key to what is considered phenomenology (Ricken 1984: 141-144), stating that he is "generally regarded as one of the most important philosophers o f the twentieth century" (de Boer 1978: XIX). Nevertheless, the focus on Husserl does not make the attempt to define phenomenology any easier. De Boer (1978: XlXff) points out that no full agreement on the interpretation has been reached and considerable problems exist in coherently interpreting and understanding Husserl’s works. H usserl’s own students never reached agreement, and beyond that, the analysis of Husserl’s work shows that his ideas not only changed continuously during his lifetime, but that "Husserl utilizes language in a

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number of different ways. First, he introduces some new terms and [then] uses old ones in novel ways" (Natanson 1973: 7). In the context of this research project, this chapter on phenomenology represents an approximation of the fundamentals of Husserl’s work. The under­ standing o f these fundamentals contextualizes the analysis of Celibidache’s teachings. By no means is the introduction to phenomenology, provided in this research project complete or absolute. This chapter serves the following main purposes: 1) To attempt to represent the core of phenomenological propositions as well as the various components which comprise the general ideas and which qualify as belonging within the phenomenological arena. 2) To focus the discussion/description on those features of phenomenology which will help clarify and give context to the subsequent discussion of Celibidache’s work. Husserl was born on the 8th of April, 1859, in Maehren, where he studied mathematics and philosophy in Leipzig and Berlin and later became, after completing his dissertation, a student of Franz Brentano. After his Habilitation (published 1900/01), his first m ajor work, Logische Untersuchuneen. set the starting point for phenomenology. Subsequently, he continued his work at the Universities of Goettingen and Freiburg (Natanson 1973: 7). In 1930, Husserl wrote in the epilogue of Ideen I (Ideas I): Philosophic gilt m ir, der Idee nach, als die universale und im radikalen Sinne strenge Wissenschaft. Als das ist sie W issenschaft aus letzter Begriindung, oder, was gleich gilt, aus

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letzter Selbstverantwortung, in der also keine pradikative oder vorpradikative Selbstverstandlichkeit als unbefragter Erkenntnisboden fungiert. Es ist, wie ich betone, eine Idee, d ie.... nur in einem Stil relativer, zeitweiliger Giiltigkeit und in einem historischen ProzeB zu verwirklichen ist -aber so auch in der Tat zu verwirklichen ist" (Husserl 1987:X).’ [emphasis mine, T. Z.] Husserl wanted, and this is the fundamental motivation in all his work, to find a way in which he could achieve knowledge without any preliminary assumption or prejudice. The problem inherent in Kant’s and Descarte’s philosophies is that knowledge always depends on some axiomatic assumption that is so fundamental that it cannot be proven by any method. Because of that, positivistic science is not able to limit itself as an isolated subject matter, and, furthermore, science is not able to use its own knowledge radically to understand itself; self-reflection in its absolute meaning is not possible with the preliminaries given in science (Elisabeth Stroecker 1887: x-xi). H usserl’s most consistent claim and most dominant insistence was that of being scientific, of developing a critique of positive science, and of claiming his methodology to be objective. The core concepts for this argument were that of being and reality. "We need a science of Being in the absolute sense" (Husserl quoted from

'"F o r me, philosophy, as an idea, means universal, and in a radical sense, "rigorous" science. As such, it is science built on an ultimate foundation, or what comes down to the same thing, a science based on ultimate self-responsibility, in which, hence, nothing held to be obvious either predicatively or pre-predicatively, can pass, unquestioned, as a basis for knowledge. It is, I emphasize, an idea, w hich...is to be realized only by way of relative and temporary validities and in an infinite historical process-but in a way it is, in fact, reliable. In our positive sciences, in conformity with their historical origin, this idea lives on, no matter how little they themselves actually do justice to it on account of the way they are founded" (Husserl 1989b: 406).

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Kim 1976: 7). The realization of the claim of a pure science and of an absolute methodology that lead to objective knowledge, Husserl argued, could only be achieved by the analysis of human consciousness and its modes of appearances within consciousness. Phenomenology looks for what is only assumed to be "out there" (German: es sei) and at the very same time at the mode in which its state of being is presented within human consciousness. The mode of presentation of the information cannot be separated from the meaning information contains (Elisabeth Stroecker in Husserl 1987: x-xi). Husserl’s concern about the notion of pure science and his critique of conventional positive science is reflected especially in the title of his last major work, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (written 1934 1937) (Husserl 1982a and 1962), which in many ways contains the last evolutionary stage of his philosophy. In it he wrote: The spirit, and indeed only the spirit, exists in itself and for itself, is self sufficient; and in its self sufficiency, and only in this way, it can be treated truly rationally, truly and from the ground on scientifically...The spirit is by its essence capable of practicing self-knowledge....Only when the spirit returns from its naive external orientation to itself, and remains with itself and purely itself, can it be sufficient unto itself. The development of an actual method for grasping the fundamental essence of the spirit in its intentionalities, and for constructing from there an analysis of the spirit that is consistent in infinitum, led to transcendental phenomenology. It overcomes naturalistic objectivism ...through the fact that he who philosophizes proceeds from his own ego, and this purely as the performer of all his validities, of which he becomes the purely theoretical spectator....H ere, the spirit is not in or alongside nature; rather nature is itself drawn into the spiritual sphere (Husserl 1970: 297-298). Positivistic science always assumed that the material world exists

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independently outside of human consciousness, and that this "factuality" can be perceived, understood, and accepted as such by human consciousness. Husserl goes exactly in the opposite direction. He assumes that objective knowledge and understanding can only be achieved if that which appears to "be" is contextualized through the mode in which the quality "being" presents itself in human consciousness. If something appears in human consciousness, then it can no longer be separated from the constituting performance mechanisms of consciousness. The individual consciousness contains necessary conditions for any constituting action/mental information. The scheme "Part-Whole" determines the direction of any phenomenological analysis (Prechtel 1991: 19ff). M erleau Ponty expressed this in his Phenomenology de la perception, dated 1945, in a very similar manner: Die Welt ist kein Objekt, deren Konstitutionsgestz ich besitze, sie ist das natiirliche Milieu und das Feld all meiner Gedanken und all meiner ausdriicklichen Wahmehmungen. Die Wahrheit wohnt nicht nur in dem inneren M enschen... oder vielmehr: es gibt keinen inneren Menschen, der Mensch ist in der W elt, er kennt sich in der Welt. Wenn ich vom Dogmatismus des gesunden Menschenverstandes aus oder vom Dogmatismus der Wissenschaft aus zu mir selbst komme, treffe ich nicht auf ein Zentrum innerer Wahrheit, sondem auf ein der Welt hingegebenes Subjekt (Klaus 1974: 929).2

2The world is not an object with laws of constitution I can own or know. The world is the natural milieu and the field of all my thoughts and all my obvious perceptions. The truth does not only live inside the human being; the human being is in the world and he knows himself in the world. If I come from the dogmatism of natural humanness or from the dogmatism of science to myself, I do not meet an actual center of inner truth, but only do I meet a subject that is devoted to the world. [Translation mine, T. Z.]

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Therefore, a phenomenon, in the sense Husserl meant it, cannot exist independently of its own presentation within the human mental system; it exists within the specific vogue o f its presentation (Husserl 1985: 14-15). Basically, it is only the mental appearance itself that one studies in phenomenology. It is not assumed that this mental appearance is related to any kind o f external object that the mental appearance tries to express/represent for human consciousness, nor is what might have caused such an external object actually to be represented within a conscious act assumed. It is necessary to use the term might because Husserl assumed that, since all forms of knowledge, experience, and perception (this includes the objects of knowledge, experience, and perception) exist exclusively within the human mind, it is not possible to make a statement about the world outside of the human mind. He excluded the question about any external reality from his interest and concentrated exclusively on the subject o f consciousness-acts, which constitute the various forms o f mental facts. However, in leaving all questions about the external world aside, he broke with the W estern traditions o f science and philosophy. Kant as well as Descartes, for example, based their systems of thought on the assumption that a reality that can be objectified and analyzed exists independently of human consciousness. Descartes ignored an egological standpoint per se. His Cogito Ego Sum was based on the dichotomy between the human act o f thinking and the world that is being thought of. The "I" o f the Cogito was left out o f his analysis of contents (Natanson 1973: 64). Husserl wrote in his Cartesian M editations:

Unlike Descartes, we shall plunge into the task of laying open

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the infinite field o f transcendental experience. The Cartesian evidence—the evidence of the proposition, ego cogito, ego sum-remained barren because Descartes neglected, not only to clarify the pure sense o f the method of transcendental epoche, but also to direct his attention to the fact that the ego can explicate him self ad infinitum and systematically, by means of transcendental experience, and therefore lies ready as a possible field of work (Natanson 1973: 64-65). Historically, the insistence on introspection (as opposed to looking outside at the world) follows Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1993), in which Descartes describes the significance of self-examination, questioning one’s own beliefs in consequent reflection to create evidence for objective knowledge. But Descartes does not acknowledge the significance of lived experience, its processes, formal laws, and structures. The term "phenomenology" originates from the idea of phenomena, which was described by Kant: phenomena are data that derive from our experience. Husserl discussed in depth Descartes’ and Kant’s philosophies3 [see especially Husserl (1987) Cartesian Meditationsl with which he shares some common ground in his departure. H usserl’s philosophic axiomata, however, stood far apart from them and created a world of their own w hich-in this form—was new to occidental philosophy (Reeder 1986: 2-3). Husserl throws the Cartesian tradition overboard. Ricken commends this by stating that the fundamental assumptions of daily life are abandoned, which means the spontaneous assumption of something "out there." The direction of focus is turned one-hundred-and-eighty degrees around from looking outward to looking exclusively

3For a comparison of Husserl’s philosophy with that of Kant see Broekman (1963: 109ff) and Kockelmans (1977: 269ff).

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inward (Ricken 1984:142ff)Husserl developed a highly complex methodology and formal analysis of this focal point towards subjectivity, which tries to explain the constitution, condition, relationship, and processes of the internal acts of consciousness. In addition to the focus on singular, specific, and individual acts of consciousness, another goal of phenomenology is the determination of essences that are shared by various acts of consciousness simultaenously. The revelation of these essences4 give the phenomenological methodology its transcendental quality; phenomenology becomes transcendental phenomenology (Schischkoff 1965: 455ff). In concluding this introduction, Reeder’s working definition will serve as a useful basis for the discussion. What follows it: Phenomenology is a self-critical methodology for reflexively examining and describing the lived evidences (the phenomena) which provides a crucial link in our philosophical and scientific understanding of the world (Reeder 1986: 1). The following statements confirm the aforementioned definition: 1. The term "methodology" designates the theory behind the phenomenological method. Methodological process and theory-although not identical-are inseparable. 2. Phenomenology wants to answer the question of how we know, not what we know, about reality external to us, to analyze the lived evidence (the conscious experience) of knowing (something).

4German: Wesensschau; Wesen.

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3. Phenomenology is reflexive because the method focuses on evidence that belongs to the consciousness and that uses the process of focusing/analyzing. 4. Phenomenology is a science, because it is "an explicit, self-critical...and inter-subjective examination of its subject matter, our experience....W hile the naturalist is taking a meter reading, the phenomenologist is interested in the structure of the meanings-as-li'-'ed by the scientist....T his experience is important to science, since human experience is the basic evidence for our claims about the world" (Reeder 1986: 2-3). The actual and lived evidence and the conscious self-reflection upon it is important as a scientific methodological means because human experience is the foundation of any human claim about the reality, meaning, and contents of the world, and any comprehension of truth.

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THE MOST IMPORTANT M ETHODOLOGICAL STEPS OF PHENOM ENOLOGY Husserl’s main achievement consists of the thesis that consciousness creates the human world, not that the world creates the human consciousness. The individual methodological steps of his philosophy can only be mentioned briefly here. If one only looks at his discussion of Descartes’ statement Cogito Ego Sum (in Husserl (1987): Cartesian M editations), one realizes how difficult it was for Husserl to make the step that has been described in the previous sections. This research project only describes brief summaries, which are oversimplified and designed only to set the stage for the following chapters. Furthermore, it needs to be clear that the relation to Celibidache’s philosophy makes things even more difficult. Celibidache’s interpretation of "phenomenology" goes far beyond that of Husserl. It is surely based on Husserl’s work, but it extends it. In fact, Husserl’s work was extended by several people after his death. Today the work of the phenomenological societies in Europe and the U.S. is an important aspect of contemporary philosophy.

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Intentionality Husserl’s criticism was focused primarily on the practice of psychology and all academic branches that were dealing in any way with mental acts [see as well the historically important issue of the so-called psychology-critique ("Psychologism uskritik")5 in the history of psychology (de Boer 1978: 52-62)]. Husserl hebt sein V orgehen...scharf von der psychologischen Betrachtungsweise ab. Er sieht den entscheidenden Unterschied zwischen phaenomenologischer und psychologischer Analyse darin, dass die Psychologie es mit dem Subjektiven als Eigenart eines in der Welt lebenden animalischen Wesens zu tun hat, die Phaenomenologie dagegen mit dem von jedem Realbezug losgeloesten Subjektiven, das in keinem kausalen Abhaengigkeitsverhaeltnis zum Naturhaften, Empirischen steht. (Janssen 1976: 39)6 Husserl developed from this critical attempt the term intentionality (Kohak 1978: 105ff and Mohanty 1971: lOOff), which is one of the very few terms whose meaning was not altered by Husserl over the years. Its meaning remained consistently the same and therefore reflects the importance for the overall understanding of

5For the problem of Husserl’s psychology-critique, see especially section B of his Die Krisis der Europaeischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phaenomenologie (Husserl 1962: 194-278). 6Husserl clearly differentiates his own conduct of analysis from that of psychology. He sees the fundamental difference between psychology and the phenomenological analysis in the fact that psychology treats subjectivity as something animalistic, that exists objectively in this world. On the contrary, phenomenology understands anything subjective as being detached from the world outside, having no relationship to objectiveness whatsoever. Furthermore, it has no causal dependency to what is considered to be natural. [Translation mine, T. Z.]

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Husserl’s philosophy.7 Husserl not only describes intentionality as a way of focusing on something, but as an achievement of consciousness that constitutes meaning/sense. Intentionality is the mechanism on which the possibility of meaning/sense for the human consciousness thoroughly depends (Brauner 1978: 39). There are...no two things present in immanent experience; the object is not immanently experienced and then next to it the intentional, immanent experience itself;...rather, only one thing is present, the intentional, immanent experience, of which the essential descriptive characteristic is precisely the relevant intention (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993: 91). [emphasis mine T. Z.] It is important to understand that the reason for creating an act of consciousness is created by consciousness itself and only exists within consciousness; again, the reason does not exist outside of consciousness, nor is it imposed onto the subject by something from the outside (problem of self-responsibility as mentioned before in the quote by Husserl). Husserl defines the state of being focused on something as intentional. Clearly, together with this state of being focused goes the desire of fulfillment, which means that the focusing of the mental apparatus becomes a success. Success means primarily that something appears as a oneness, which means it has identity with clear limits and borders, which are necessary for any type of understanding, meaning, identification and self-identification. Without this possibility of fulfillment (i.e., being perceived as a one/oneness), no consciousness of any entity would be possible, because without limitations due to definition, nothing could/would

7The notion of intentionality is treated by Husserl consistently. It is one of the few concepts/terms which Husserl interpreted invariably throughout the period of his writings. This is significant, since several other key terms were thoroughly re­ interpreted by Husserl during his lifetime.

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be represented within consciousness (Held in Husserl 1986: 10). Intentionality signifies an a priori structure of any conscious experience, and it is this structure that the phenomenological method uncovers and analyzes. Any conscious experience is two-fold, or "bi-polar" as Reeder calls it (Reeder 1986: 6, 45ff). Conscious experiences are founded on the ego-pole and the object-pole. Both poles form a oneness through the emergence of conscious experience. By experiencing an object X, the presence of an object is dependent on the subject.8 No object can appear without a subject. No subject can appear without an object. Reeder summarizes logically that, according to Husserl, "there can be no evidence for idealism (which tries to reduce all object-poles to ego-poles) or for realism (which tries to reduce all ego-poles to object-poles) (Reeder 1986: 6). An analysis of lived experience therefore must always include the appearance of an object within consciousness as well as the "mode of attention peculiar to that object" within consciousness (Reeder 1986: 6ff)-9 Because the object of consciousness is constituted by consciousness itself, consciousness seems to always be conscious o f something. The notion of oneness plays an important role in regard to the formal structure of conscious acts. Additionally, oneness as a quality appears in several of Husserl’s discussions of internal time consciousness and inter-subjective objectivity. Husserl elaborates at great

8Without an ego (without me) the object within experience could not exist. Without an object an ego (me) could not be experienced. 9For the discussion of Husserl’s analysis of the various dimensions of intentionality, see de Muralt 1974: 341-374.

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length on the phenomenon o f "the present" and the indivisible unity of his pretention/retention model (Husserl 1964: 96-97, 155-188). This aspect of his philosophy, although only briefly introduced at this point, plays a significant role in Celibidache’s musical teachings on the phenomenology of music. Husserl’s conceptualization of oneness and the unification of consciousness within which experiences (although divisible in the material/positivistic sense of the word as matter) are not divisible phenomenologically (Husserl 1964: 96-98) shows remarkable resemblance to Zen concepts of time. The Zen teaching, "One in all and all in one" (Suzuki 1973: 34-35), reflects this dialectic relationship between conscious experiences and positivistic/material interpretations of life. That is why in Zen teachings, for instance, it is said that the closer the mind wants to get to an object, the further it will move away, until eventually it will not see anything. On the other hand, the more the mind distances itself from an object, the more closeness will emerge; and eventually, once it is eternities away from the object, it will be able to grasp it. That is a typical Zen paradox. In this school of thought, it is contradictory thinking and illogical paradoxes that designate truth to the human mind. The act of experiencing two material objects as oneness at the very same time requires the indication/definition of clear borders and limits, of clear denotation of what belongs to something and what does not. M oreover, the meaning of a mental object always is one single meaning out of innumerable possible meanings/aspects of that object. Any expression o f human consciousness and all constituting acts of consciousness depend on the limitation of an object’s aspects: namely, that limitation

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reduces it to one single aspect that is perceivable, but not identical with the object itself. The aspect of an object is only one possible aspect. The object itself remains unperceivable. Perception, therefore, always means reduction, always means a cipher, something that wants us to become closer to the object, but that actually distances us from it more and more. We now see that the mind always needs to make a decision about which fractional aspect concerning something it wants to use in order to be able to function at all. Therefore, the subject always defines automatically a clear intention of meaning once it starts to work. The step that creates a mental object in its specific intentional context is defined with the German word venneinen, which can doubtlessly translate that psychological mechanism best (Prechtel 1991: 31). Husserl tried in his analysis as well to find a general structure of vermeinen, hoping to discover universal principles o f intentionality. In summary, it is now apparent that the importance of conscious acts is not the object outside or prior to experience, but the situation from which the context of experience and object together emerged (Kohak 1978: 121). Die phanomenologische Frage "Wie bietet sich unserer Betrachtung unser eigenes Bewusstseinserlebnis dar?" kniipft an die Behauptung an, daB die Bedeutung nicht einem auBeren Gegenstand abzulesen sei, sondern eine Leistung unseres BewuBtseins, unseres Denkens ist....A kte sollen die Erlebnisse des Bedeutens sein und das Bedeutungsmassige im jeweiligen Einzelakt soli gerade im Akterlebnis und nicht im Gegenstande liegen (Prechtel 1991: 3 5 ).10

“’The phenomenological question, "How does our own perception present itself as an act of consciousness?", is related to the statement that the meaning o f something can never be designated from an exterior object, but can only be understood through the act of consciousness itself....In addition, the meaning of an act lies in the

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Epoche The pure reference of consciousness towards itself and nothing else but itself is defined as epoche. Very often, the term "epoche" is translated to mean "bracketing" or "inhibition." However, such a translation and definition leaves one major characteristic aside. Bracketing would mean that something would be excluded, since, if there is something within the brackets, there must be something outside of the brackets. Husserl assumes in his outline of this subject not that the existence of the exterior world itself is negated, but only the assumption or the intuition of it. That allows us to leave the question as to whether our assumptions are true or false aside. Husserl asserted, as did Plato, that all science, with the exception of philosophy, always places its own elaboration on at least one single hypothesis that cannot be certified (see again critique of psychology). One of the most consequential aims of Husserl was to fulfill the Platonian promise that the phenomenological approach has to free itself from all sorts of assumptions (Magill, v2, 1961: 795ff). The term pure phenomenology suggests exactly this. Hence, knowledge and understanding are not connected whatsoever anymore with anything outside of the subject, but only with the subject itself. Pure phenomenology concentrates on the conditions which make knowledge possible, and which logically determine the quality o f knowledge. Because of the new attitude based on the definition of "epoche," the world appears in a totally new light (Prechtel 1991: 60). It is very practical in writing

experience of the act itself and not in an object of the experience. [Translation mine, T. Z.]

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and thinking to distinguish objects in their material-positivistic context from those in their purely phenomenological context by using quotation marks. Tree, therefore, means the material-physical object outside and independent of human existence, whereas "tree" designates the mental constitution within the human sphere of consciousness."

"Some authors of the secondary literature use the terms "epoche" and "reduction" in a broader sense and mention different stages of reduction (for example, Harvey 1989: 89ff and Lauer 1958a: 46ff). This is of importance, since this research project will show that Celibidache too utilizes the term reduction in a broader sense than does Husserl. Reduction, therefore, is very often used as a concept for several methodological steps of phenomenology, not only for one single step (epoche).

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Noema and noesis12 The constituting act of consciousness is the main field of Husserl’s analysis. In very broad analyses, Husserl demonstrates several mechanisms associated with the presentation of information within the human mind. Here only a few can be mentioned. First of all, Hussserl distinguishes the actual experience and feeling of an act of consciousness from the act of reflecting on the activity of the conscious. Both the actual experience (Erlebnis) and the reflection (Auffassungssinn) are constituting acts. The act of reflection Husserl calls noesis and the actual experience he calls noema. "Noema" means the physical dimension of a conscious experience, which is expressed and manifested through language by objectifying terminologies. Beyond that, a noema always contains two aspects: an aspect of objects (appearing in their material sense) and an aspect of contents appearing in their non-material sense (for example, values) (Prechtel 1991: 42ft). An example should demonstrate that difference between noema and noesis: A person joyfully sees an apple tree. As it was stated before, the apple tree exists in its positivistic meaning (that is if we look at it in a non phenomenological manner) outside o f the perceiver in an eternally independent time-space continuum and also the joy exists within the parameters of these four dimensions. Phenomenologically, however, the matter is different. Using the phenomenological method of epoche, the world is excluded from the investigation (bracketing). Now the tree and the joy

12Probably H usserl’s most profound discussion of the noesis/noema relationships can be found in his Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (Husserl 1982b: 211-235).

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become "tree" and "joy," being independent from any exterior system of reference (Magill, v2 1961: 795). The term "phenomenon" designates all contents of consciousness, but nothing else. The step from tree to "tree" and the step from joy to "joy" do not take away anything from the experience, which is a significant realization. This realization is usually ignored by the "typical" positivistic attitude, which involuntarily claims that the phenomenological method takes us away from reality into some sort of "spaced out" dimensions; actually, the very opposite is true. Very often, the consideration of human consciousness as a factor that forms our notion of reality has a negative connotation among positivistic traditions. The negative quality is what I described before as "spaced out." This mode o f reacting to new approaches of self-understanding displays our daily fallacies, which actually prevent us from gaining understanding of who we are as well as attaining communicative depth between each other. This attitude, as the following section on intersubjectivity will show, can destroy essential understandings of human communication and culture (Husserl 1973). It is truly important to understand completely that—although the experience is not reduced by any m eans-its meaning and manifestation is totally different for the individual, because the viewpoint now allows the individual to understand that the entities perceived are created by him/herself. Therefore, the individual experiences the possibility of self-responsibility, because now, and only now, it becomes apparent that change of perception and being is only possible from the inside (i.e. through the phenomenological shift of an individual’s mind) and that it

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is senseless to expect change to occur from the outside, because the outside is not the essential basis of one’s own state of conscious perception and being. Eventually, change must refer to the interrelationship and balance between one’s ego and self. People who only perceive the world/reality as something exterior (ego-oriented), and who cannot mentally refer to perception as something that they created by themselves (self-oriented), will naturally expect change of any type to emerge from the outside, but never from within themselves. Husserl calls this attitude "naive" (Husserl 1987: 157). The inner reflection of consciousness on an entity that is presented by consciousness means nothing else but the reflection of consciousness on itself. This act is called noesis. Due to the reflection of consciousness, a dialogue and a reaction (proposing change and growth possibilities) become possible. In our example of the apple tree, the noesis would be equivalent to the substitution of tree and joy by "tree" and "joy," which appears due to conscious reflection of the self onto itself. The joy about an apple tree in the material sense of the word (positivistic-empirical) would not designate a noesis, because it does not automatically require self reflection. The German distinction between erfahren and erleben reflects this: I take the word experience to mean what the German language refers to as Erlebnis. As the root implies, Erlebnis refers to an individual living-through of some event. The other German word for experience is Erfahrung, which means experience-ingeneral. Erlebnis is a "first" experience, by which I mean a first-order, and not first-hand, experience. This distinction enables us to say that the Erlebnis of a twelve-tone composition is different from the Erfahrung of deducing its se t....I see, hear, and touch objects because I am in the world, and have eyes,

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ears, and a body. But then these objects become objects-for-me (Clifton 1983: 7-8). It is interesting to note that there exist many analogies between the phenomenological differentiation of noema and noesis and the differentiation of the ego and the self, which is of greatest importance in several contemplative methods (see, for that comparison, Tulku 1977 and d ’Aquili 1990). Actually, the differentiation between ego and self, as well as the active role of the self due to selfreflection (meaning self-reflecting on the ego), are the indispensable factors that make contemplative methods effective (see, especially, introductions to transcendental meditation, Za Zen, breathing exercises, etc.). In this sense the act of joy needs to be seen from two different viewpoints: one is the ego and the other is the self. In the case o f the ego, again we could not call the joy a noesis; in the case of the self, we would have to call it noesis. This distinction was first developed by Husserl’s teacher Brentano, who stated that real mental acts only refer to their own consciousness and never to something peripherally outside, whereas "non-mental" acts do refer to entities outside of the consciousness. Again this distinction reveals the greatest differences in the possibilities of self-responsibility an individual has, depending on his/her potential of self. A person with little or no self will automatically have little or no potential for autonomous self-responsibility. It needs to be emphasized that this relationship between a) noesis vs. noema, b) ego versus self, and c) the question of self-responsibility is fundamental to the following discussions. Based on this distinction, one can say that the noema includes a quality of being that can be looked at, scrutinized, interpreted and mentally digested. The

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quality of being that emerges through noesis only consists of essences that simultaneously belong to the domain of "knowledge" of consciousness and of being. Consequently, it would be appropriate to say that the noesis always includes an act of being (as opposed to an intellectually reduced and deducted act of exclusively thinking intellectually). The noema, contrarily, only includes objects that do not separate the individual from its self. Magill summarizes this concept in his discussion of the noema-noesis relationship: But in the present work Husserl does not consider mental acts per se. He studies them, because they provide the key to the various grades and types of objects which make up the noemata, for corresponding to "perception" there is the realm of "colors," "shapes" and "sizes," and corresponding to "perceptual enjoyment" there is "dainty" pink and "gloriously" scented, these qualities owe their actuality in consciousness to the noesis, but they are part of an order of being, which is absolute and independent. Husserl calls all such absolute forms or essences eideia, to avoid ambiguities of such words as Ideas and Essences (Magill, v2 1961: 798). Especially in his Logische Untersuchungen. Husserl (1975) has expressed several times the importance of the timeless a priori character of the interrelationship between noesis and noema.

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Transcendental reduction Husserl calls the second methodological step after the epoche "transcendental reduction." The constellation at which we arrived after the introduction of the epoche and the noema-noesis distinction leads to the discovery of a more complicated structure of subjectivity, the ego. W ithin the phenomenological realm, the ego appears twofold: First, the ego defines its identity through the specific intentional acts in its specific relationship to its individual intentional objects. This ego is bound in its relation to the specific qualities of the experienced objects. This dimension of the egopole is called "factual ego," and it refers to the natural attitude of the ego (Kim 1976: 26). The factual ego receives its qualities from the intentional object. Second, the ego reveals a constitutional quality, which does not change from intentional act A to intentional act B; it remains in its characteristic the same; its function, its functioning, and its structure always persist as the same. Husserl calls this dimension of the ego-pole the "transcendental ego." It is the ego that reflects upon the factual ego and that looks at the noema-noesis relationships within itself. The method of transcendental reduction leads to the revelation of the transcendental ego. Husserl claims that through the act of transcendental reduction: the living Ego in mental processes is not something taken for itself and which can be made into an object proper of an investigation. Aside from its "modes of relation" or "modes of comportment," the < E g o > is completely empty of essencecomponents, has no explicable content, is undescribable in and for itself: it is pure Ego and nothing more (Reeder 1986: 74).

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Now, the quality giving direction to the transcendental ego is reversed: "The (transcendental - phenomenological) dimension represents...the direction from consciousness to object" (de M uralt 1974: 358). W ith this methodological step, any form of positivistic empiricism is eliminated from the phenomenological analysis (Prechtel 1991: 60ff). Suzanne Cunningham (1976: 9) wrote in Language and the Phenomenological Reductions o f Edmund H usserl: The purpose of the transcendental reduction is more positive, the uncovering of the subjective pole of consciousness, the transcendental ego, as the necessary correlate o f the objective pole in every conscious act...the ego’s only concretion is in its acts and objects. Nevertheless, it is this subjective pole which gives unity and direction to the various acts of consciousness and which designates the objects of consciousness as being and as being-thus-and-so. Hence, for Husserl the ego was termed "transcendental," i.e., the meaning-giver for its entire universe of consciousness. This function of the ego is bestowing unity and meaning on all acts and objects o f consciousness, as well as on itself, this is what Husserl calls "constitution." [emphasis mine T. Z.] In a sense, the transcendental ego is my personal ego; however, it is not what constitutes my personality. As a personality, I am a musician, leader, student, religious believer, but as a transcendental ego (pure ego), "I am the one living through my every experience. Personality may change, but the structure of the "I"...rem ains the same" (Reeder 1986: 73-74). The transcendental ego summarizes the essence of all my object-bound experiences, but in itself it is not object-bound, or as Reeder calls it, "a datum" (p. 74). It is pure processual and structural essence. The past (historical, personal, and biological), heritage, and culture determine a subject’s personality, but all this past is quite independent from what actually makes a subject a

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person. Transcendental ego belongs to being a person, whereas the factual ego belongs to having a personality (Reeder 1986: 78). Earlier we defined the two structural components of the epoche as the ego-pole and the object pole. The transcendental ego is the "correlate of the objective pole in every conscious act" [emphasis mine T. Z.] (Cunningham 1976: 9), whereas the factual ego is the correlate of the objective pole in each specific conscious act. The quality of the factual ego changes, whereas the quality of the transcendental ego remains the same. It is an a priori constituted consciousness itself and it is transcendental reduction that reveals the transcendental ego. Because the awareness of the transcendental ego is based on a reflective act of consciousness upon itself, Husserl also calls it "transcendental reflection" (Miller 1984: 177). For Husserl, the scientific methodology of formal logic was not free o f any pre-suppositions. The phenomenological analysis that leads to the transcendental ego consequently leads to an extension of formal logic. Husserl calls this extension "transcendental logic." It is, according to Husserl, the subjective a priori by nature (de M uralt 1974: 355). As we have seen in previous examples, the actual empirical/physical dimensions of experiences were never excluded; even if they were used, they were still simultaneous parts of the specific state of being. For example, the experience of the tree and the "tree" was bound to the utilization of the eyes (the senses do something). The transcendental reduction is supposed to lead the individual towards a "pure consciousness" which is characterized by the fact that it is separated from any

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naturalistic viewpoint (factual ego and its objects). Because of this separation, the transcendental ego has the capability to investigate the factual ego and its objects. The reflection of the conscious towards itself now is not only separated from the assumption of an exterior world13 (epoche), but it is also separated from all appearances that are somehow related to specific factual information. Therefore, the case of the perception of the tree and/or the "tree" does not contain the transcendental reduction. Due to this methodological step, the "real" is crossed out and what is left over is "pure" reality in its most fundamental form of any conscious content, namely how something manifests itself for the transcendental ego. Die Reduktion fuhrt vom Ding zur Dinghaftigkeit, vom Gegenstand zur Gegenstandlichkeit, vom Raum zur Raumlichkeit,. . .Dinghaftigkeit, Gegenstandlichkeit, Raum lichkeit,...sind im transzendentalen Ego auffindbare und dadurch in reiner Selbstgegebenheit evident zu beschreibende Grundformen, die eine geschlossene Wissenschaft ermoglichen, aber keine Schliisse auf die wirkliche Welt zulassen (Rombach 1980: 49ff).14 Things can never emerge within consciousness in their totality, because it is the mechanism of intentionality and perspectiveness which is necessary for them to

13It needs to be consistently remembered that the term "exterior world" already represents a dimension that is not part of the phenomenological analysis. It is used-so to speak—to look at the phenomenological process from the outside which, indeed, correlates with day-to-day traditional scientific thinking: namely, that there is a factual, material, objective, and objectifiable world out there. 14The reduction leads from the thing to the thingness, from the object to objectiveness, from space to spaceness....Thingness, objectiveness, and spaceness...can be found within the transcendental ego and therefore are only determinable in true self-evidence, which finally enables the possibility of a pure science, but which does not allow us to draw any type of conclusion about the exterior world at all. [Translation mine, T. Z.]

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emerge in the first place. This does not apply to entities that emerge due to transcendental reduction, which is based on the reflexive act of the self, in which the self fills out all space that can possibly be mentally used. In relation to the act of self­ reflection,15 according to Husserl, one can describe this as an act of "adequate factuality," because any conscious factuality that arises due to transcendental reduction can only appear in absolute self-authenticity (Prechtel 1991: 60). The transcendental reduction, which is the most substantial part of the phenomenological encounter, represents the part of human consciousness that can only reveal, if at all, the conditions of knowledge (See Brauner 1978: 3 Iff).

I5Some of the available secondary literature uses in this context the English word self-consciousness (for example Natanson 1973: 205). At first consideration, the usage of this term might appear to be useful; however, because of the complexity of the subject matter, it would at this point lead to more confusion than clarity.

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Eidetic reduction In quoting Immanuel Kant, Husserl states that "all knowledge begins with experience, but it does not therefore arise from experience" (quoted from de Boer 1978: 247). Husserl tried to compare all transcendental reductions, in order to create some sort of access to what is common in all transcendental reductions. This commonness would then, as he hoped, enable one to determine scientifically objective knowledge in the phenomenological sense of the term. The eidetic reduction simply tries to eliminate all individualities, coincidences, and specific features that are not common to all transcendental reductions. What Husserl wanted to investigate was the commonness of these processes to achieve some sort of understanding of what is universal and what is the ecumenical structure concerning the condition of human consciousness. Prechtel comments on this problem as follows: Da die gefundenen Wesensgesetze nicht nur die allgemeinen Strukturen der vorgefundenen Denkakte, sondem auch die idealiter denkbaren Moglichkeiten von Denkakten desselben Gegenstandsbezuges umfassen, konnen sie fur sich unbedingte Allgemeinheit beanspruchen. Jeder Einzelfall stellt ein Exemplar dieser Allgemeinheit dar. Die eidetische (Variation) Reduktion soil aber auch zu jenen notwendigen Strukturelementen fuhren, die konstitutiv sind fur den spezifischen Gegenstandsbezug und dessen Annahme unabdingbar ist (Prechtel 1991: 62ff).16

16Because the laws of entities are identical with the structures o f their (i.e. the entities) appearances as thoughts, and further are identical with the structures of potential appearances as thoughts, they can claim universal applicability. Every single individual case, therefore, is an example of this universal structure. The eidetic (variation) reduction should lead to those necessary elements of structure which are constitutive for the specific object-relation and which must be indispensably accepted. [Translation mine, T. Z .]

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For Husserl, two very distinct types of experiences exist: First, the experience of individual and particular objects that belong to the factual ego-pole. Second, the experience o f eidetic intuition that create an idealized meaning of factualities. Edie states,"the objects o f eidetic intuition are not real objects as such but rather the same objects insofar as they are presented from the aspect of their essential

types and

meanings" (Edie 1987: 8). These idealized essentials are neither a reproduction of an "existing object (which would require an unprovable relation of causality between object and consciousness); nor is it a term projected...by consciousness. Rather it is a term "constituted" in [and by] consciousness" (Lauer 1958b: 54). Reeder concludes (1986: 109): Now that we have completed our exposition of Husserl’s concept o f "essence," let us summarize his view. Essences are a priori, universal meaning-structures, which are independent of their actual appearances in thought and reality, and which provide the de jure epistemological foundation for our claims. These essences are objects o f a special sort, which may be directly encountered in founded acts o f essential categorical intuition, as a result of a careful exercise of free variation in phantasy. The essences "govern" the world, not in a causal sense, but in the sense that they are the a priori structures of pure possibility, unaffected by beings, thoughts or theories. As such, knowledge of essence provides a grounding for knowledge which is "transcendental," in Husserl’s new sense o f the term.

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PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERNAL TIM E CONSCIOUSNESS Husserl believed that for his phenomenological departure, the most important structure of consciousness is that of time consciousness. He developed a complex philosophy on this subject and based the beginning of his analysis on Franz Brentano’s work (Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 1993: lO lff). Husserl made the distinction between an appearance that is constituted in time and an appearance that constitutes a time quality itself, which belongs to the realm o f transcendental phenomenology. Husserl illuminates this point with his discussion of the now (protention/retention relationships; Sokolowski 1974: 138-168). The now contains a paradox, namely, that the experience of a now contains a fusion (simultaneous existence) of the past and the future (which by definition exclude each other) and that the now as a single entity is non-durational (non-flowing): Time is motionless and yet it flows. In the flow of time, in the continuous sinking away in the past, there is constituted a non­ flowing, absolutely fixed identical objective time. This is the problem ....A n objectivity such as a melody cannot itself be originally given except as "perceived" in this form. The constituted act constructed from now-consciousness and retentional consciousness, is adequate perception of the temporal object. In an ideal sense, then, perception...would be the phase o f consciousness which constitutes the pure now, and memory every other phase of the continuity (Fuchs 1976: 66-69). Husserl used his discussions of internal time consciousness for the development of intersubjective objectivity. He wrote: Immanent time then becomes a manifesting of the objective "sim ultaneous."...but objective temporality is intersubjectively graspable and determinable, and there it is a priori clear that such (temporality) can only be grasped and determ ined...through the only possible medium of mutual understanding, through

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animate organicity. Only by the fact that I take the animate organism as a Now and take what is interpreted into it as simultaneous with the animate organism, do I also grasp the simultaneity and the temporal order of alien consciousness with my own, and likewise conversely. Every time-determination performable in physical nature, which time-determination leads back to intersubjectively graspable periodic processes and space measurements intersubjectively relatable thereto, can also serve to determine something psychic according to its time, precisely on the basis of the relations mentioned (Husserl 1980: 101:102) The notion of the now-point has different dimensions. In his discussion, Husserl, first refers to single images as points of now, but further on he develops the idea of the unity of a flux of images and the unity of multiplicity (Husserl 1964b: 167 and Husserl 1991: 79ff). In the context of transcendent perception (transcendental ego/reduction), Husserl states that it is not true that the preceding appearances are merely preserved as appearances of what have been. The (primary) consciousness of memory of earlier phases is memorial consciousness, to be sure, but with regard to the earlier perception. What was perceived earlier not only is present now as the earlier perceived but is taken over into the now and is posited as still in being now ....A nd the same is true with regard to the future... Every thing seen can also be unseen but still remains capable of being seen....These appearances bring about the exhibition of one and the same objectivity in a way which is always incomplete (Husserl 1964: 168-169). This notion of "the exhibition of one and the same" through the perception of a plurality of images by the transcendental ego is of great importance for the discussion in the following chapters.

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INTERSUBJECTIVITY Husserl proposes (which is similar to his argument of temporal unity of a flux of appearances) the possibility of a unity of two or more subjects/egos.17 This notion of intersubjectivity is ultimately grounded in the aforementioned discussion of internal time consciousness. Yoshimiro Nitta wrote that "Husserl assum es...that the identity of the primordial world of the I and of the primordial world of the Other

can be

grounded on the co-operation of presence and a-presence" (Nitta 1979:

29).H usserl’s

aim is to show that, even though there exist two distinct egos and two distinctly experienced objectivities of transcendental egos, there only exists one world. For Husserl, the transcendental ego is the bridge that allows us to suspend our naturalistic separation from the world and each other to consequently eliminate the isolation of the individual subject from all other subjects. In his phenomenology, the transcendental ego is the key for the oneness of human existence. Halten wir uns an das letzte transzendentale Ego und an das Universum des in ihm onstituierten, so gehoert ihm unmittelbar zu die Scheidung seines gesamten transzendentalen Erfahrungsfeldes in die Sphaere seiner Eigenheit - mit der zusammenhaengenden Schicht seiner eigenheitlich reduzierten W elterfahrung (in der alles Fremde abgeblended ist) - und in die Sphaere des Fremden. Dabei gehoert aber doch jedes Bewusstsein von Fremdem, jede Erscheinungsweise von ihm mit

17Fuchs (1976: 74ff) and many others have pointed out that Husserl’s discussion of intersubjectivity is inconsistent and ultimately "fails." The inadequacy of H usserl’s argument is supported, according to Fuchs, by critical evaluations of Heidegger, Sartre, M erleau-Ponty, and Levinas. Here, however, the phenomenological discussion of intersubjectivity plays an essential role for the following chapters. It is not the purpose o f this research project to reflect critically on the validity of Husserl’s philosophy.

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in die erste Sphaere. W as irgend das transzendentale Ego in jener ersten Schicht als Nichtfremdes - als "Eigenes" konstituiert, das gehoert in der Tat zu ihm als Komponente seines konkret eigenen W esens, wie noch zu zeigen sein wird; es ist von seinem konkreten Sein untrennbar. Innerhalb und mit den M itteln dieses Eigenen konstituiert es aber die "objektive" Welt, als Universum eines Ihm fremden Seins, und in erster Stufe das Fremde des Modus alter ego (Husserl 1987: 102103).18 W ithin the realm of the transcendental reduction, the "heres and theres" and the ego and the alter ego are identical. The transcendental ego is universal since it not only creates objectivity: it depends on it. Natanson points out that in reading Husserl, one can either speak of the (universal) transcendental ego or of transcendental egos. Consequently the meaning of "my" and "your" transcendental ego designates the meaning of the transcendental ego. As Natanson writes, "referred to in the singular or plural, "transcendental ego" signifies the primacy o f consciousness" (1973: 101). Although not the same, the I is in the you and the you is in the I. Transcendental reduction creates the ground for the ego’s realization of living within the same objectivity of all other egos. Subjective objectivity is as well the objectivity of what

I8Restricting ourselves to the ultimate transcendental ego and the universe of what is constituted in the universe, we can say that a division of his whole transcendental field o f experience belongs to it immediately, namely the division into the sphere of its ownness—with the coherent stratum consisting in his experience of a world reduced to what is included in his ownness (an experience in which everything "other" is screened o ff)-a n d the sphere o f what is "other." Yet every consciousness of what is other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere. W hatever the transcendental ego constitutes in that first stratum, whatever he constitutes as nonother, as his "peculiar own"—that indeed belongs to him as a component o f his own concrete essence...; it is inseparable from his concrete being. Within and by means of this ownness the transcendental ego constitutes, however, the "Objective" world, as a universe of being that is other than him self-and constitutes, at first level, the other in the mode: alter ego (translation from Natanson 1973: 101).

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Husserl calls the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). Lifeworld is the constitutional quality within which human life exists; it is the common ground o f life and the medium that forms the plurality of egos into one unity. In The Crisis o f European Sciences (Husserl 1982a) Husserl wrote: so every ego-subject has his horizon of empathy, that of his cosubjects, which can be opened up through direct and indirect commerce with the chain of others, who are all others for one another, for whom there can be still others, etc....B ut this means at the same time that within the vitally flowing intentionality in which the life of an ego-subject consists, every other ego is already intentionally implied in advance by way of empathy and the empathy horizon. Within the universal epoche which actually understands itself, it becomes evident that there is no separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their own essential nature....all souls make up a single unity of intentionality with the reciprocal implication of the life-fluxes of the individual subjects, a unity that can be unfolded systematically through phenomenology; what is a mutual externality from the point of view of naive positivity or objectivity is, when seen from the inside, an intentional mutual internality (Husserl 1970: 255-257).

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CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY Husserl re-defined the notion of objectivity by relating it exclusively to subjectivity, because objectivity can only appear within subjective experience. His methodological goal is to define and describe the different ways in which subjective experiences appear, how they function, and how their constituents relate to each other. What positive science—to remove it from the positivistic/naturalistic analysisgenerally describes as merely subjective now becomes purely subjective, and last but not least, the ground for objective knowledge. The two major aspects of subjective experiences are intentionality, which constitutes the dependent interrelationships between the ego-pole and the object-pole within experience, and internal time consciousness, which is the most basic structural level of consciousness. Consciousness appears simultaneously with temporalities of various kinds. I tried to demonstrate that the phenomenological approach consists of three fundamental methodological steps: 1. Epoche (noema versus noesisj-R eduction-Bracketing: The world itself, but only as it appears in consciousness. 2. Transcendental reduction. The bracketing of all physical/sensational information and relations, and the exclusive concentration on pure self­ reflection. 3. Eidetic reduction. The filtering of all common features of transcendental reductions and the exclusion of specific individual features within

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transcendental reductions in order to come to some sort of universal conclusion about the condition of knowledge and truth. The possibility of universals as knowledge and the constitution of the ego as being part of one single universal ego through transcendental reduction leads towards the deepest questions of ontology. Surely, this introduction of phenomenology was selective in the sense that its purpose is to prepare for Celibidache’s philosophy. At this point, it is fascinating to point out an interesting aspect of Husserl’s work: it bears a very close relationship with Far Eastern philosophies (such as Zen, for example). In 1925, Husserl published an article on the German publication of the speeches of Gautamo Buddhos (Ueber die Reden Gautamo Buddhos) (Husserl 1989a: 125-126). In this article, Husserl described his profound fascination with Buddhist thinking. He emphasized the cultural, political, and philosophical importance of these writings. He considered the study of these translations as inestimably valuable for the ethic, religious, and philosophic renewal of our "naive" culture (Husserl 1987: 157161). Apparently, Husserl did not perceive his understandings of Buddha’s writings as contradictory to the goals and values of his own life-long philosophic endeavor in which the struggle over the methodological possibilities of gaining objective knowledge plays an essential role. Klaus Held stated: The natural belief of existence reaches extreme dimensions within science: In the assumption that a subject exists in the world, as an isolated entity, all traces and possibilities of the subjects relatedness and perspective interrelationship and correlationship are destroyed. The radical liberation of scientific knowledge from the limitation through subjectively relative modes of appearances, the necessity for objectivity becomes the highest norm (Klaus Held in Husserl 1986: 47).

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H usserl’s comments on Buddhist thinking do not play a significant role in current secondary literature on his works. However, current developments among scholars of these matters support the relevance of the Far Eastern/phenomenology connection: with the 1979 publication o f Japanese Phenomenology (Nitta and Tatematsu ed. 1979) within the series of Analecta Husserliana,19 an East/W est forum for phenomenological research was born. Other authors have made major contributions to the phenomenology/Far East connection (see Laycock 1994 and Chattopadhyay, Ebree, adn Mohanty 1992).20 The preceding introduction makes implications of phenomenology for music readily apparent. Phenomenologically, music is not a subject m atter that exists positively outside o f human consciousness, but exclusively inside. This shift from the exterior to the interior of human experience allows a different focus. The laws of the physics of (exterior) sound are quite different from the laws o f sound experienced by human consciousness. Chapter two gave an introductory view of literature related to the phenomenological interpretation of music. This introduction to the variety of phenomenological approaches to music together with the introduction to Husserl’s phenomenology should serve as a sound basis for a closer look at Sergiu

19Analecta Husserliana is the yearbook o f phenomenological research, published in cooperation with The World Institute fo r Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning. 20See for further discussions as well Chattopadhyaya 1992, Klein 1988,, Jones 1980, Dubs 1987, Steindl-Rast n .d ., Santos 1991, and Veith 1978.

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Celibidache’s teachings on the phenomenology of music to better understand the context o f his statements.

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CHAPTER V SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO MUSIC

INTRODUCTION The following chapter is based on the primary sources of Celibidache’s interviews, the documentation of his seminars, rehearsals and performances, and his own texts. Celibidache’s main topics and central themes in these materials serve as categories for applying the constant comparative analytical method. Each publication was analyzed in reference to each of the previously determined categories. Some discussions contain similar content analyses. The order of the topics/categories is not hierarchical but rather sequential. The greatest difficulty in this analytical approach is the scattered and unorganized structure of the material. Celibidache jumps from one topic to the other and neither in his publications nor in his seminars does he follow a well structured plan that could be described here as a generic model. In his seminars, his teachings unfold through dialogue. Students always ask questions which he then answers. Very often a single question can alter the direction of how content unfolds during a seminar day. It is not possible in this presentation to present simple concepts first and complex concepts later. Some initial statements will help to make sense of the overall picture this chapter creates. One of the most interesting aspects of this analytical approach, the method of cross checking through the constant comparative method, is that all published

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interviews (the oldest being 34 years old) reveal an incredible consistency: first, the choice of topics/themes mentioned are consistent throughout; second, the choice of examples is consistent; and third, the explanations of his arguments are identical. These research results are rather surprising because the primary material consists of over 456 pages of photocopies, books, journals, magazines, and newspapers, which have accumulated over a period of more than 34 years. Because of the reiteration of the same arguments, examples, and topics, the material that has been analyzed in this research project can be condensed to a very small fraction of the original. The material stems from two areas that were not examined in this research project: a) anecdotal incidences, jokes, and personal matters that are not directly related to the problem of music and phenomenology, and b) critical remarks by Celibidache about colleagues and institutions, such as orchestras, conservatories, broadcasting corporations, and journalists. Most of these comments are highly provocative because of the choice of language or content, which was very often perceived as highly cynical (Umbach 1995a: 195, 197, 206, and 260). It is interesting to note that his commentary on colleagues makes up a rather large quantity of the published materials; almost every interview found contained such remarks. Practically all conductors of high reputation are negatively mentioned or criticized, including: Muti, Mehta, Boehm, Maazel, von Karajan, Abbado, Fruehbeck de Burgos, Boulez, Haitink, Swarovsky, Solti, Toscanini, and Knappertsbusch. The same is true for orchestras such as the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra and the Vienna Philharmonic

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Orchestra. Additionally, many extremely critical comments are made about journalists, music critics, and authors. Altogether, this aspect of Celibidache’s statements makes up more than fifty percent of the analyzed material. The analytical representation of Celibidache’s comments concerning his theoretical approach of a phenomenology of music is based on his language and his choice of words for each individual example. Possible contradictions among and between explanations of different topics are not further discussed.1 Instead, the topics and their analytical representations are kept separate.

'One apparent contradiction appears in his theoretical discussion of transcendence, pure consciousness, and reduction on the one side, and a metaphorical comment about inner freedom and inner search on the other. Celibidache argues, as later parts of this chapter will explain, that the state of pure consciousness, which is a result of total and absolute reduction of the given material of a piece, excludes the existence of an object per se. The phenomenological argument that consciousness is always consciousness o f something does not apply. At the same time, Celibidache talks about growth, inner search, and finding freedom in the context of pure consciousness. The choice of the word finding indicates that there is something to find which hints at an object of consciousness. This type of contradiction does not affect the overall presentation of this analytical approach. It is important to mention, though, that these contradictions exist on a strictly formal and literal level and that they were ignored in this presentation.

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COSMOS, W ORLD, AND SOUND

Introduction Three m ajor themes dominated Celibidache’s spiritual and artistic growth: a) the analysis of tone in the context of its impact on human consciousness and its specific static and dynamic aspects, b) the analysis o f the mind and spirit ( Geist) and of how both, mind and spirit, react to the acoustic phenomena of music, and c) the analysis of those aspects of music that cannot be interpreted and that cannot be influenced by human will, aspects that existed a priori and which led Celibidache to the conclusion that "in music nothing can be interpreted," but that instead "everything is given" (Celibidache 1993a: 49). One of Celibidache’s most fundamental distinctions points to music on one side and to the conditions of music on the other. Music and the conditions of music are two very distinct concepts which can only be approached and understood by two very different methodologies: music by pure experience and pure consciousness, and the conditions of music by logic and science. Music has no definition. Sound has definitions, but sound is not music. Instead, sound is something that can lead to music, but sound itself has nothing to do with music. Music, as opposed to sound, is not logic and, as well, the laws of spatio temporality, such as physical time/tempo, can not be applied to music. However, the conditions which are necessary for something to become music need to be approached scientifically and logically. The scientific method for the study and understanding of these conditions is the

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phenomenological method (Celibidache 1993a: 49-56). The conductor himself has no impact on music itself. Instead, he is solely responsible for the conditions that are required for something to become music. But once these conditions themselves are realized, music happens beyond the realm of human will, intelligence, understanding, and action. In looking back on his own career and life, Celibidache points out that the first years o f his career were devoted to being sensational, effective, and presenting a show to impress the audience, rather than devoted to making music. At the age o f 31, he stood as a conductor for the first time in front of a major orchestra - the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra. However, by his own admission, he was 42 before he started to experience music in a state of "pure and transcendental consciousness" (Celibidache 1993a: 54). As well, the appearance of a transcendental reduction and pure consciousness in music is not a guarantee itself; many unpredictable factors can prevent the desired goal. Only nine to ten percent of all his performances can be called music. The rest o f his performances, ninety percent, are sound production only (Celibidache 1993a: 54).

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Death - the natural tendency of everything Celibidache very often creates an ontological connection with his work as a conductor. Very fundamental points of view are seen and presented in an ontological context. The natural tendency of sound is to disappear or to die. All natural phenomena of music have the tendency to disappear. The same is true for anything in life; life is a continual process of coming closer to death. A violin string is set into vibration by a player. The player causes the string to change its existing mode from that of passiveness into that of activeness. Nevertheless, right after the string is brought into vibration, the cosmos—as Celibidache describes it—counteracts this human impact by bringing the string back into passiveness. Consecutive sounds or notes of a melody or a piece represent the "fight" against this natural tendency of sounds to disappear. No string will vibrate infinitely long, and neither can nature produce an ongoing, controlled, and stable pitch. Only the human being can do this. The "fight" is kept alive by a pulsating balance of tensions and relaxations in all music. Music does not consist of an infinite growth of tension or an infinite growth of relaxation. When the cosmos or nature takes back what was initialized by a human being (i.e. bringing the action or vibration of the string back into its original passive state) a universal law comes into place. Death itself, the taking back of the impulse, the act of becoming passive again and disappearing, is structured and is determined by a universal law. The sequence and the appearance of infinite overtones is a priori defined. The string, once it is set into vibration, starts to divide itself according to an universal plan (Celibidache 1992i: 62). Celibidache says that each single process of

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dying is structured. The way the cosmos takes everything back cannot be determined by human will: instead, nature dictates this process. The human being can only witness this process, but he can not influence it. Based on this ontological viewpoint, Celibidiache argues that the phenomena of a continuously identical pitch, a melody, a piece of music, music per se are created through human nature, but do not belong to human nature; they belong to the unity of the cosmos (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63).

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Tension and direction The phenomenon of tension is caused by two opposing factors that are directing their energies against each other. Through this process o f directing their opposing energies against each other, eventually, a climax or a point of highest tension will appear, after which relaxation takes place. The two energetic tendencies do not do anything by themselves. Only by working together and becoming one can they develop naturally as a unit. The tide is a good example2 of this principle: the interplay of gravity, physical and material conditions, time, motion of moon and earth, etc. cause the oceans to create tides. The phenomenon of the tide is the unified expression of the multiplicity of all these elements, factors, and parameters. A tide, so to speak, is the transcended quality that appears when this multiplicity o f opposing energies becomes one, or a single unit. As well, the phenomenon of the tide does not appear because the water itself is doing something. Instead, it is being affected by the interplay and context of all forces of which water is an integral part. The tide is nothing but a form of increase and decrease of tensions and relaxations. The cosmic pulsation and vibration of opposing forces create a natural process which expresses harmony, stability, and beauty for the human experience (Celibidache 1992i: 62-65). It is part of human nature to search for this harmony, balance, stability, and beauty that is created by cosmic laws and not by human will. W hen two or more opposing tendencies are turned into a single unit, human consciousness experiences a

2Example chosen by author, not presented by Celibidache.

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different temporal quality: that of eternity. With the experience of multiplicity it is very different: here, human consciousness experiences physical time and duration. When humans find love, or find themselves in love, they want to love eternally. The quality of eternity and non-temporality is a crucial one. In nature, the opposition of forces or energies is structured in any process that utilizes opposing energies. Each process has a definite structure o f directions: either the direction of increase or the direction of decrease,3 the direction towards the climax, or the direction away from the climax. Music, melodies, and developments do nothing else but this: they can either go towards the climax or they can go away from the climax. No point or moment of this process can be without the context of this overall structure of process, direction, and unity. It is not possible for a natural process of opposing energies to unexpectedly liberate itself from this principle and be without direction at all. The natural tendency of the human mind is to search for this kind of stability, the stability that emerges when two become one, when multiplicity disappears and unity appears. This form of natural stability, balance, and harmony, even though it can be called processual on a physical level, is non-processual on an experiential level. Furthermore, it is non-durational, non-sequential, and individable. Stability is nothing but truth. Truth does not change. Each process of opposing energies (such as a tide) can be divided on a

in fin ite examples of opposites can be listed here: growth and decrease, light and dark, male and female, up and down, etc.

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physical and material level into the following phases: beginning, increase of tension and decrease of relaxation, climax and maximum of tension, decrease of tension and increase of relaxation, and end. This structural sequence exists everywhere: the heart­ beat, breathing, birth and death, etc. If the forces of the present moment are balanced, stability exists. The essence of stability is truth. Stability, truth, balance, oneness, and eternity are terms that are used by Celibidache equally; they are interchangeable (Celibidache 1992i: 65). Multiplicity exists when the appearance (for example, setting a string into vibration) and the disappearance (for example, division of the string and creation of infinite overtones) are perceived as separate phenomena; multiplicity disappears and unity appears when that which was two or more becomes one.

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The fifth The essential characteristic of the fifth is the opposition of two and three. The mathematical opposition of two and three is the maximal opposition within one single unit. Because the fifth is the interval that contains this maximum opposition, it stands out in quality from all other intervals. There is another reason, however, why the fifth is of greatest importance in comparison with all other intervals. The fifth is the first interval in the sequence of appearing overtones that creates a real contrast. The first overtone that appears in the natural sequence is the octave, but the octave does not produce any opposition to the fundamental/root. The next overtone that appears in the natural sequence is the fifth (Celibidache 1992: 62-63). Celibidache draws many analogies to the opposition of the forces two and three, which is an integral part of the interval fifth.4 The geometrical angles of 135 and 90 degrees which appear in the kinetic action of the human legs while walking is a form of the two to three opposition. As well, he calls non-mathematical examples of opposition a representation of the two to three opposition; for example, the opposition of man and woman (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63). Life could not exist in its current form without the structuring element of the two to three opposition. Any internal structure of a single unit is affected by the universal two to three opposition. Structure is not possible without it. Without structure nothing can be communicated, nothing can be assimilated, nothing can be

4The second overtone is produced through the structural division of the string into two and three parts.

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reduced (multiplicity reduced to unity), and finally, nothing can be articulated or expressed. Communication without articulation is impossible. Thinking without articulation and communication is impossible. Again, Celibidache creates a universal and ontological context. The fifth not only represents a unique structural component in life and in music; it represents an unique temporal component of music as well. Because the fifth is the very first interval of the overtone series that creates opposition, in temporal terms it can be called the future o f the fundamental. The fifth is the future of its very own origin (Celibidache 1992i: 64). Celibidache talked during his seminars on several occasions about undertones as a phenomenon that structurally appears prior to its origin. In this sense, the fifth is also the past of its own origin. Both the past and the future of the original fundamental form the basic cadence of subdominant, dom inant, and tonic (Zelle 1992: 86 and Kleinschroth n.d.: 16).

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Extroversion and introversion The previously described process of bringing a string into motion and its subsequent return to motionlessness can be described by two different qualities. In order for a string to be set into motion, an extrovert attitude is necessary. An extrovert attitude is a quality that desires something to get out of its original state. The process o f returning back to motionlessness requires an introvert attitude. The extrovert attitude belongs as a quality to the human being, whereas the introvert attitude belongs to nature or the cosmos. Both qualities form a unified balance. The introvert quality can only be as strong as the extrovert and vice versa. The relationship between the extrovert attitude of human will to create something, and nature’s introvert attitude to always take back what has left its own origin, resembles the energetic characteristics of human emotions. Extroversion and introversion are nothing else but analogies to all forms of vibration and pulsation o f all existing levels of life (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63).

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Phrasing Celibidache defines "phrasing" as follows: "Phrasing emerges when the individuality of the components of the intervals of a melody are secured and expressed" (Celibidache 1992i: 64-65). Phrasing has nothing to do with punctual phenomena. It consists of the relationship between single and individual phenomena. Phenomena of a melody can only do two things: a) they can expand (extroversion), or b) they can decrease (introversion). Any melody, piece of music, or natural phenomenon consists of these two aspects which are divided by a turning point or climax, the point o f maximal expansion (and the point of maximal tension). Celibidache stresses two important factors. First, the point of maximal expansion can­ not be interpreted. Second, the relationship between the two single phenomena that lead from the beginning to the point of maximal expansion and from the point of maximal expansion to the end cannot be interpreted. Both the point of maximal expansion and the coherent relationships that go with it are inseparably connected with each other. If one part of this structure is changed, automatically the totality of the structure itself is changed. The point of maximal expansion and its structural relationships to the whole can either be ignored or witnessed, but they are not subject to human will, taste, emotion, or interpretation. As well, the point of maxima! expansion within a musical unit only exists once; it is unique (Celibidache 19921: 65). When Celibidache talks about these relationships between the point of maximal expansion and its structural relationships, very often he mentions Furtwaengler. For Celibidache, Furtwaengler was the only conductor who approached music with the

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two following questions: How far does the phase of expansion go? Where is the turning point where expansion transforms into decrease? Too many times, he says, people ignored the fact that music has a point where the return starts, and that potentially the return is the point of departure. The end of a piece is the potential beginning, because both, beginning and end, are an inseparable unit that transcendentally exist in complete synchronicity as an inseparable unit (Celibidache 1992i: 65).

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Epiphenomena Celibidache very often uses the term "epiphenomena" instead of "overtones." However, in his thinking epiphenomena include overtones, but beyond that consist of far more. The epiphenomena of sound are pre-determined. They create a structure which excludes interpretation because the process of structuring is cosmically pre­ defined. The character and constitution of epiphenomena are not controllable by human will. The sequence of overtones, their quantity and quality are an ontological fact o f life itself. Ontology categorically excludes human will, interpretation, beauty, choice, and emotion. Celibidache sees an analogy between the structure of epiphenomena of sound and the formal structure of pieces of music. In both cases, the return (introversion) from the point of maximal expansion or the climax to the end is a determination of the extrovert process consisting of the beginning to the point of maximal expansion (Celibidache 1992i: 64). The discussed principles of the phenomena of tone, death, tension, direction, extroversion and introversions, and expansion and decrease, are the same. The important aspect of these discussions is that Celibidache continuously emphasizes the human position in the fundamental processes of life: there is no human impact, influence, or interpretation that changes the given.

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THE MIND

Pure consciousness F or a conductor, the study o f musical material (score, instrumentation, etc.) is essential. The second component in Celibidache’s work is the phenomenological one which includes the study o f the mind and consciousness, as well as the study of what impact the musical material has on the mind. Celibidache clearly advocates the study of Husserlian phenomenology, but in some basic concepts he leaves the Husserlian route. He points at a contradiction between Husserl and Husserl’s teacher Brentano: according to Celibidache, Brentano felt that consciousness is always a consciousness o f something, even if consciousness reflects upon itself and transcends the separation between the outside world and itself, which is what Husserl called transcendental reduction. In the case o f self-reference, consciousness is its own object. Celibidiache argues that pure consciousness is not consciousness of something. Consciousness that refers only to its own self and being, cannot be called pure consciousness, because it still implies a separation between consciousness and an object of which consciousness is conscious or aware of (Celibidache 1992i: 73). Pure consciousness is a concept primarily originating from Far Eastern philosophies, which holds that it is the goal to develop an "empty"or pure mind. Pure consciousness has no object. Pure consciousness excludes any form o f separation, of thinking. Language, especially grammatically structured and non-poetic language, can­

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100 not explain or describe this quality called pure consciousness. For Celibidache, the musical act is an act of pure consciousness. It is an act in which multiplicity, ambiguity, or separation of subject and object do not exist. As well, logical structures do not exist in a pure consciousness. Temporal structures do not exist; the only temporal characteristic that might be able to describe it is eternity (Celibidache 1992i:73). For a pure consciousness, the following is true: the beginning is in the end, the end is in the beginning, opposites are the same, and nothing but eternal synchronicity exists. It is only a mind that has developed a pure consciousness that can potentially experience the beginning and the end of something as a synchronic oneness (Celibidache 1992i:73). Because music is not possible without the overcoming of separation and the laws of spatio-temporal dimensions of the physical world, Celibidache encourages the musician to develop the ability necessary for a pure consciousness to emerge. He points out that inner peace and balance are essential to become able to experience with a pure consciousness. The transcendental experience with a pure consciousness experiences truth that has not been touched, influenced, or manipulated by the act of thinking or will. For Celibidache, pure consciousness and truth always go together. In keeping with the tradition of Zen, he points out that the truth exists behind and/or after language and thinking. Truth in this sense cannot be thought, defined, categorized, grasped, intellectually understood, or structured by contrast. Celibidache considers pure consciousness and the elimination of thinking as an absolute condition

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101 for music to emerge (Celibidache 1992i: 73-74). In one of his student lectures, Celibidache was asked a question concerning a passage of a Brahms symphony about its beauty. Celibidache’s response to the student was, "We do not look for beauty, our ultimate goal is to look for truth. I have no interest in beauty; it is truth that draws my attention" (Zelle 1992: 15).

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102 Noema and Noesis Celibidache calls the very first and initial contact of consciousness with a material (subject - object relationship) the noetic phase. The noetic phase is part of any rehearsal during which the orchestra rehearses a piece for the first time under the specific conditions of the present. He states that "noetic is that which comes to me, which occupies my consciousness" (Celibidache 1992i: 73). That which imprints itself onto consciousness consists of an infinite amount of information, aspects, ambiguities, diversities, variations, and multiplicities. On several occasions, Celibidache talked about the multiplicity of the world as something that can destroy a human being. Human beings have the natural tendency to turn multiplicity into unity in order to digest the pressure of chaotic multiplicity. They are forced to somehow organize their perceptions and the only way they can do that is by reducing chaos and multiplicity into unity. The mind cannot function without this process: orientation would not be possible, and thinking would be impossible. Any word, for example, is a form of this reducing process. The term tree is a unification of all possibilities of trees as well as a unification of a single tree. After the initial noetic phase, consciousness begins to turn the formerly external information into its own. Consciousness incorporates what has occupied consciousness. An exterior information/impact is transformed into an interior component of consciousness itself. Then it cannot be called noetic anymore. Celibidache defines the act of turning an information/impact from exterior to interior as noeme (Celibidache 1992i: 73).

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Thinking Any analogy between musical process and thought process is not applicable because music is not semantically structured. The primary or fundamental values of music are absolutely clear and exist without ambiguity, whereas in language they are symbolic, ambiguous, and based on the specific past experiences of the individual. Music does not contain linguistic meaning in a semantic sense. Celibidache points out that it is a highly profound experience when a musician has liberated himself from the process of thinking and when there is no separation between sound and being. Sound, musical process, and being itself can be so identical that a distinction between the experience and the object of the experience is not possible anymore (Celibidache 1994b: n.p.). Sound by itself can be an object of experience. But in this phenomenological approach, it is not the sound that is experienced. Sound appears as a musical medium, but what appears (sound) is not what is actually appearing. Celibidache differentiates between something5 appearing (music) through the appearance (sound). This process is not logical, yet is true and real (Celibidache 1992j: 2). The world of appearance is not the world of appearing, or the world of appearance is not the world of being. Specific qualities of being, however, can be promoted through appearances. Intelligence and thinking can be an incredible hindrance to someone’s

5Here, the choice of words becomes difficult. In the distinction between what appears materially and physically (i.e. the sound) on the one side, and the appearing the word something is not applicable in the context of the appearing. This is so because Celibidache refers to an experience that contains no objects: consciousness that does not want to grasp something.

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experiencing multiplicity (opposing tendencies) as one. To transcend multiplicity into oneness, logical thinking must be excluded. Thinking has the tendency to materialize or to objectify (i.e. to create objects of thought and consciousness) everything. In order for something to be thought, there needs to be a something in the first place. W ithout the objectification, the mind cannot think what it wants to think. Realities that are not intelligible are turned into objects, things, items, or subjects in order for thinking to take place. Thinking requires separation, pairings, confrontation, and polarities in order for thinking to function. The human being cannot be separated from the act of thinking. Thinking is an essential, indispensable fact of human existence. But thinking is not all that the human being is capable of doing (Celibidache 1992i: 66). Celibidache often uses the terms "freedom" and "liberation" in the context of the elimination o f thinking. Music does not teach one to become free; instead, only the free person can make music, and by making music he practices being free, "which means he meditates." For Celibdiache, music is meditation (Celibidache 1992i: 75). M usic in its direct form does not allow thinking. W hen it comes to the conditions of music which need to be organized in rehearsals, thinking is crucial. A rehearsal is not music. The rehearsal ends when music begins. Rehearsing is thinking. Thinking appears when music has not yet appeared (Zelle 1992: 24).

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Language Language is functional and it is always based on associations and symbols which are ambiguous. Language can not be un-ambiguous. With music, it is quite different. Nothing in music is ambiguous. W ith music, opposites, duality, and multiplicity appear as one. The transformation of multiplicity into oneness is an act that takes place through human consciousness (Celibidache 1992i: 66, and Celibidache 1986a: 322). However, language is the structural component of human thinking. Because of Celibidache’s view that thinking and language on one side and music on the other exclude each other, he has never been actively involved in operatic conducting. Music that is dominated by or originates from language, such as baroque recitatives, are not music in his point of view. Although Celibidache acknowledges the semantic meaning of language as it occurs in oratorios, songs, and arias, he always approaches the material from the musical perspective. In a seminar at the University of Mainz he once said: "I would rather spend six months in prison than listening to a performance of Tristan and Isolde" (Zelle 1992: 84).

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Emotion, beauty, and interpretation Celibidache insists on his point of view that emotion and beauty have no place in music. Emotional experiences and the concept of beauty are the initial qualities that draw the human being to music in the first place. In that sense they are necessary, because if there was no beauty involved in the initial process of perception, no one would turn to music. However, they are not the final qualities of musical experience. In the complete musical experience, in a state of pure consciousness, emotional qualities and so called beauty do not exist (Celibidache 1986a: 322). Anyone who still has not gotten past the stage of the beauty of music still knows nothing about music. Music is not beautiful. It has beauty as well, but the beauty is only the bait. Music is true. (Umbach 1995b: n.p.) [Translation mine, T.Z.] Beauty and emotion are qualities that are transcended when music appears. The beauty of music is only the catch to draw people to music in the first place. But beauty is not its essential goal. Beauty is necessary for someone to be drawn to something, but it is not the final goal. What leads to interpretation is the confusion between music and emotions. Certainly, music cannot be separated from emotions, just as thinking cannot be separated from language. But music itself is not emotional. Music emerges where emotions are transcended. Interpretation emerges when sound itself becomes the center of attention and when sound remains an object of consciousness. In order for musicians to become liberated from the material aspects of music, they must distance themselves from sound as an independent entity (Celibidache 1978: n.p.). Absolute identity between being and musical experience, which implies the

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elimination of the separation between experience and an object of experience, excludes emotional involvement. The exclusion of emotional involvement excludes interpretation. Interpretation represents a process in which human will and arbitrariness have an effect on listening to or playing music. In a state of pure consciousness, where the dichotomy between object and subject is transcended, the human mind has no choice. To have no choice excludes the choice of interpretation, or in other words, the choice to individualize music. In the context of pure consciousness, Celibidache argues, freedom means to have no choice. This quality of having no choice stands for the total elimination of human action. Here, the only thing a human can do is to become conscious. To say the only thing a human can do is to become conscious o f something would already distort the intended meaning (Celibidache 1992b: 2). Celibidache often uses the analogy between musical conditions and a landscape. The musical material, in a sense, is like a landscape. It has mountains, valleys, colors, and structural changes on various levels. All one can do is to become aware of this landscape to then integrate all information into a single unity. One can­ not interpret the landscape itself. Musically speaking, one cannot start to change the landscape to make it more expressive or meaningful (Celibidache 1986a: 322).

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Truth and reality Clearly, Celibidache believes in the existence of reality independently of the human mind. The destruction of the ego allows a person to experience reality "as it is" (Celibidache 1992i: 77). The experience of truth requires the elimination of human ego and the emergence of pure consciousness. There are infinite possibilities of how to not experience truth. But there is no alternative for how to experience truth. Truth cannot be interpreted. In applying this viewpoint to music, Celibidache argues that in the context of pure consciousness, only one single first symphony o f Brahms exists, whereas in the realm of interpretation, an infinite number of versions of Brahms’ first symphony exist. W hen Celibidache reduces Brahms’ first symphony to only one single possible one, he is not referring to the material/physical object that one hears in performance, and he is not referring to the material/physical conditions (i.e. the notes for example). Instead, he is referring to the transcendental reduction and the transformative appearance of multiplicity as oneness that takes place in the human mind. In this sense, no alternative exists to what is experienced in pure consciousness. Brahms’ first symphony does not exist as an object outside of human consciousness, Neither does it exist as an object in human consciousness; each time it is played, it is re-created as absolute identity between pure consciousness and human being. This is an explanation for the following statement Celibidache has made on various occasions: that a first symphony of Brahms never existed, nor exists, but that it can only be re­ created (Zelle 1992: 18). Music as truth cannot be "made" by a person. Music and truth can appear, can

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happen or can emerge within a person, if he/she establishes the right conditions for this to happen. The essential condition for this to happen is the destruction of ego (i.e. identification with the self and body as separated objects; or metaphorically speaking, becoming a vessel for truth to manifest itself). Human life has no impact on truth; the only choice human life has to offer is to work on the material conditions so that truth can become apparent (Celibdiache 1992i: 77). Freedom and spontaneity are the essential characteristics of how pure consciousness manifests itself in this world. It is spontaneity that Celibidache asks for in his musical approach, by destroying all constructs of thinking, logic, language, physical time, and material empiricism (Celibidache 1994a:3).

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110 Intersubjective objectivity The only way objectivity can become possible is when subjectivity is eliminated. In quoting Husserl, Celibidache defines the state of objectivity as follows: "When subjectivity (ego) is eliminated two people will find each other within the other" (Kleinschroth n .d., Zelle 1992: 51, and Celibidache 1992i: 62). Celibidache often uses the phrase: I find myself in you and you find yourself in me. In this state, two subjects have eliminated the separation between the "I" and the "You". Subject/object relationships are transcended. Intersubjective objectivity, a term that originates from Husserl, is only possible through the emergence of pure consciousness. Any impact of what the ego produces (for example, disappointments, expectations, wishes, hopes, etc.) and any form of distinction between "I" and "not-I" (i.e. "You" or "it") leads to interpretation and therefore away from music. Where interpretation exists, there is ego. What Celibidache calls the ego hinders a person to experience a musical phenomenon for what it is and causes a person to imprint qualities onto the phenomenon that belong to the person (ego) but not to the phenomenon itself. If this happens, conducting (or music making) becomes mechanical and exclusively related to the material conditions of music (sound).

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Ill Conditions that something may become music W e can now say the following about the conditions necessary for something to become music: 1) Sound is an essential condition in the beginning.6 A phenomena is called sound when the following three factors fall together: a) vibration of something (string, instrument, etc.) b) an organ that can perceive this vibration c) consciousness that is conscious of what is perceived Sound becomes a mentally valuable phenomenon once it is structured. Structure and sound together allow the experience of relationships. Relationships and proportions are a form of duality and multiplicity. The phenomenon o f relationships and proportions make it possible to reduce multiplicity into oneness (Celibidache 19921: 62). 2) Sound itself has nothing to do with music. Sound disappears. What remains is a function and a quality. Once music appears it has nothing to do anymore with sound (Celibidache 1992i: 62). 3.

Sound appears in human experience as a single phenomenon, whereas

physically the production of sound is always connected with the structured disappearance (death) of sound. Nature does not offer a continuously equal vibration (sound); only human beings can do that (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63). Sound as it

6Here, sound not only stands for the physical vibration that the human ear perceives. It includes as well the experience of sound on an internal level, such as Beethoven composing while already deaf.

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112 appears in music needs to be structured so that it can be perceived as relationships and proportions on all possible levels. The process of structuring sound so that all relationships and proportions can be perceived is the rehearsing process. 4. The transformation of multiplicity into unity through transcendental reduction. 5. Pure consciousness, which excludes any form of subject/object relation outside as well as inside of consciousness. 6. Elimination of all forms of ego-identification, such as emotions, expectations, interpretation, human will, etc.

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REDUCTION

A piece of music, or a musical unit (melody, exposition, development, etc.) contains a multiplicity of vertical points, information, and components. Human consciousness can only perceive one entity at a time. Therefore, when dealing with multiplicity, the human mind has the following choices: 1) To ignore multiple elements of perception 2) To separate elements to then perceive them successively 3) To reduce the multiplicity of elements and to then perceive them as one Multiplicity cannot become an experiential part of the mind at a single given moment. Only one punctual entity can become that. In music, two very basic forms of multiplicity occur: 1) Multiplicity exists during a piece of music at a single moment; various elements are active at the same time simultaneously and exist at one single point (moment) o f time (for example, counterpoint, or chords o f more than one note). This simultaneity is called vertical pressure. 2) Multiplicity exists through time. It consists of the various successive vertical points and it exists in time successively. This simultaneousexistence of multiple elements is called horizontal pressure, or horizontal flow. Reduction occurs when the mind transcends multiplicity into oneness. Both forms of multiplicity can be reduced individually and/or together. If this kind of complete reduction appears, the beginning, end, part, and the whole are all identical; as well, durational time or physical time ceases to exist. To work with an orchestra is nothing else but to continuously face the

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responsibility to determine and create the material conditions that are necessary so that duality and multiplicity on all existing levels disappears within the realm of consciousness (Celibidache 1986a: 318). Transcendence means nothing else but reduction of multiplicity. Celibidache defines transcendence as "accumulating multiplicity and reducing it to oneness in order to become able to perceive more multiplicity" (Celibidache 1986e: 118). Once consciousness has achieved the reduction of multiplicity, it is ready to face and reduce the next form of multiplicity. If the multiplicity of horizontal flow is reduced, multiplicity then occurs from the outside through time, whereas from the inside multiplicity does not exist anymore. Short sentences, for example, can be forms of reduction. A sentence consists of an infinite amount of information, such as words, letters, sounds, etc. But in communication, the experience of a sentence can be a single one. The multiplicity of information is reduced to a single unit of contents and expression. As discussed above, the spoken or written sentence itself takes time in the physical dimensions of time since it can only exist within the four-dimensional realm of spatio temporality. But the reduced and transcended experience of it does not. The dimensions of pure consciouss experience are not the same dimensions as those of the physical world with its spatio temporal structure. If a sentence is truly reduced in this form by pure consciousness, it can be said that the beginning of the sentence is in the end and the end is in the beginning, and, furthermore, that the part relates to the whole as the whole relates to the part. It is crucial to understand that the fact that a sentence is

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spoken does not allow any judgment of whether the execution of that sentence occurred in the spatio temporal dimensions of the physical world, or if the execution of the sentence occurred in the transcendental state of pure consciousness. Even though the reduction of a sentence into oneness is a small-scale example, the principle in music is the same. The four movements of a symphony, are in the experience of pure consciousness, reduced to a single unit, if the specific structural conditions of the musical material and its presentation are realized, and if the mind liberates itself and realizes a pure consciousness. Here, beginning and end of a symphony are one (Celibidache 1986c: 118-119). Reduction is an achievement of the human mind. It only appears in the dimensions of human consciousness and it cannot be realized through language, thinking, writing, and or utilization of logic. The partial aspects of music, such as melody, rhythm, harmony, dynamics, etc. need to be put together through the action of the mind. The mind reduces complexity continuously and it can do this on an infinite number of different levels. The basic condition of humans in their confrontation with the universe is the fight against multiplicity. Multiplicity, or in other words non-unity, is forced onto them through their senses, through the cognitive structures and processes of their brains. In order to function on a material level, they are genetically forced to utilize those functions that perpetuate the separation between themselves ("I") and everything else ("It", "You", "Non-I"). At the same time, multiplicity is against human internal nature. In order to reduce multiplicity, and to create order, orientation, and to become

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capable of dealing with the world, the human consciousness unifies. This process of unifying information is defined as reduction. Celibidache explains that the human condition is that o f unifying and not that o f separating. He says: "The world dispersed, scattered, and broke up, for reasons that are not known to us, and every single human is on his way to put the world together again" (Celibidache 1992i: 73). The reduction of a sentence is a different problem for the human mind than is the reduction of the vertical and horizontal pressure o f an entire symphony. In general, the mind needs training to develop this ability. This form of training is not very common to the Western musician and student. Celibidache continuously promotes the importance of Far Eastern techniques to achieve altered states of consciousness. Multiplicity is analyzed and defined in the discursive realm o f thinking. In contrast to that, when making and experiencing music, we are all one and we experience the infinite freedom of absolute oneness. However, in Celibidache’s terminology: when we produce and coordinate sounds without this transformative quality of our consciousness, we are not one, but instead a sum of players producing a sum of sounds and rests. Reduction is the act of human consciousness that transforms the experience of multiplicity into a conscious experience of unity (Celibidache 1993a: 56). Celibidache’s term of reduction is very distinct from H usserl’s. Husserl used the notion o f reduction for the bracketing of the world and consciousness or to put the world into parentheses. Here, the contents of consciousness are separated from the

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physical world outside o f consciousness. Celibidache does something quite different: In his phenomenological approach, Celibidache first insists on the logical and scientific acquisition of the given material (score, knowledge, etc.). In this sense, he does not exclude the physical world from the working process. Next, he does indeed concentrate on the transcendental quality of pure consciousness. Here, reduction occurs and it implies the transformation of multiplicity into oneness. Whereas Husserl refused to make any statement about the physical world, Celibidache does. For Celibidache, reduction does not mean to reduce something in quality. Rather, it means to establish a new quality that did not exist before. To reduce in this way is an integral part of human nature that tries to confront itself with the multiplicity o f the cosmos (Celibidache 1986e: 116).

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TIM E AND TEMPO

Time as a theoretical topic plays a fundamental role in Celibidache’s teachings. The question of time is discussed on various levels: 1) The appearance of oppositeness, contrasts, and tensions within a piece of music, which continuously revitalizes the fight to create sound against the natural tendency of sound to disappear, introduces the dimension of time into music. Because polarities in a melody can only appear through time, they are inseparable from time itself. The degree of tension, opposition, and contrast among the main themes of a piece very often determines the length of a piece. For example, the degree of contrast and tension in a minuet of a classic symphony is usually smaller than that of a finale or first movement. Consequently, minuets are usually smaller than the first or the last movement of a symphony. 2) The natural tendency of the universe to take back all material phenomena that emerge is structured. Death is structured. Concerning the phenomena of sound, this structure is represented by the pre-defined sequence of overtones. Celibidache calls the root of a tone the main-phenomenon {Hauptphaenomeri) and the following overtones the sub-phenomena (Nebenerscheinung, or Nebenphaenomeri). The main phenomenon and sub-phenomena form a pre-defined temporal relationship. All phenomena that occur after the main phenomenon (root) represent the pre-defined future of that main phenomenon. The first overtone that appears is the octave. Because the octave contains so little contrast to the root, it is not very strong in its

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characteristic. The interval (overtone) that has the strongest structural impact on the relationship of presence and future is the second overtone: the fifth (Celibidache 1992i: 62-63). The analogy between the structured process of the appearance of overtones and death as a natural phenomenon plays an essential part in Celibidache’s teachings. Celibidache makes the important point that two different sides of one phenomenon are interdenendenily connected with each other: extroversion

vs.

introversion

creating a sound

vs.

how the sound disappears

birth

vs.

death

expansion

vs.

decrease

departure

vs.

return

increase of tension

vs.

decrease of tension

human

vs.

cosmos

multiplicity

vs.

unity

In his ontological understanding of the fundamental aspects of music, nothing can be influenced by will, power, choice, or interpretation. Celibidache applies this concept of opposites to the concept of time as well (Celibidache 1986a: 319-322). Anything extrovert remains in time, meaning it is part of physical durational time. Any motion of musical form, structure, and harmony is based on the law of extroversion and introversion. A piece starts its way from the beginning to the point of maximal tension (climax), and then returns by moving away (back) from the

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120 climax to the end.7 The first phase is an extrovert phase characterized by extroversion; the second phase is characterized by introversion. In physical terms, a piece as it is experienced transcendentally in the realm of pure consciousness continuously goes through time during its extrovert phase, but then goes back in time through its introvert phase. Both phases represent two opposite directions of time. At the end of a piece of music, both opposites of time (past and future) have outbalanced each other, and in the totality of the experience, never existed. The only temporal quality that existed is eternity. Physical time and musical timelessness are two very different aspects of the conditions of music itself. Physical time belongs to the conditions of music, whereas musical timelessness belongs to the metaphysical experience of pure consciousness (Celibidache 1992i: 64, and Celibidache 1978: n.p.). Pure consciousness is a form of transcendence. The physical world which exists only on the structural cognitive basis of the distinction between I and not-I is transcended. Transcendence, as well, excludes time. Musical experiences happen

7For Celibidache, there are compositions that do not fulfill this structural requirement. Mahler symphonies, for example, do not contain the unity of extroversion and introversion. Celibidache does not consider these pieces as music and refuses to conduct them. The compositional process in music requires the non­ intellectual utilization of intuitive being and the entering of the dimensions o f pure consciousness; at the same time, intellectual craftsmanship is required as well. However, logic and intellectual calculation by itself cannot produce a composition which later on can be transformed into conditions that allow music to emerge. This position might explain why Celibidache refused to conduct late Schoenberg pieces that utilize twelve-tone techniques. For the discussion of the correlation between musical form, composition and transcendence, see Adkins 1986, Thakar 1987 and Salzer 1962.

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121 outside of time; no duration is experienced (Celibidache 1992i: 76-77). The various elements of music, which are more than pitch, length, color, etc., of the vertical pressure, affect consciousness at one single moment synchronically. But, in addition, all elements that pass by successively in physical time affect pure consciousness synchronically. The experience of the second note of a melody includes and is inseparably connected with the experience of the first note (retention) and with the following third note (protention).8 This specific double polarity (now/past and now/future) constitutes the horizontal/vertical simultaneity of music (Celibidache 1976: 313). The tempo is nothing but a condition which is necessary for that double polarity to be experienced synchronically. If the vertical pressure, for example, increases with increasing complexity (three notes as opposed to two) a different time structure is required to realize the simultaneous connection between vertical pressure and horizontal flow (Celibidache 1976: 313). The same is true if the horizontal pressure increases. Phenomenologically speaking, tempo is nothing but a condition so that the simultaneous relationship of horizontal and vertical elements can stay alive within human experience. If the tempo is too fast, the various elements cannot be perceived in their unified relation and meaning (similar to a person speaking too fast and consequently losing the ability to communicate). If the tempo is too slow, the

8Celibidache uses Husserl’s terminology. Protention and retention appear in Husserl’s discussion on the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893-1917) (Husserl 1991).

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122 relationships fall apart, because the human mind cannot connect elements with each other anymore (similar to speaking too slow). The relationship of mass, intensity, and time is not a matter of interpretation for human consciousness. It is a determination of the non-ambiguous law o f balance. Haydn, for example, stated that the harmonic structure of a finale/presto has to be rather simple. This is so because too many chromaticism and complexities would not allow the desired tempo of a finale/presto (Celibidache 1986e: 126-128). Celibidache states: The concept of an external metronomic tempo that is imposed onto the acoustic situation has no place in this phenomenological approach....It is a completely inhuman idea to suggest that music has to conform to metronome markings, irrespective of the capacity of the instruments, of the expressive powers of the players, of the acoustics, of the overblowing, of the role of contrapuntal theory in the dialectic of what has to be played!... If the variety of phenomena is great, I need more time to reduce everything to a unity; if the variety is small, correspondingly less time. That was why Haydn said that the harmonies of a presto had to be kept very simple, so that it would be understood. By contrast chromatic harmonies can be developed in a largo because there is time for the middle parts to mature and be consistently developed.... Also, of course every musical space has different characteristics, and not every such space amplifies the nine audible octaves to the same extent. And there is no tempo which is suitable for all spaces. Only physical time is always the same. (Umbach 1995b: n.p.)9

’Celibidache never takes metronome markings as literal indications. Rather, he uses them as means of direction. Sometimes he does not accept them at all (for example, Beethoven symphony number nine, finale). Tempi are never based on the metronome markings themselves. They are always a result o f the acts of consciousness that reduce multiplicity to unity.

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Phenomenologically speaking, tempo is not a reality that exists autonomously outside of music by itself. But instead, tempo is a consequence of several factors that work together (consciousness, multiplicity of physical/material aspects, instruments, acoustics, articulation appropriate for the specific piece, etc.). The experience of music takes place in a non-metronomic mind (Celibidache 1976: 310-312).

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CONDUCTING BY MEMORY

Celibidache conducts everything by memory. But his understanding of "by memory" is a phenomenological one. To memorize phenomenologially means to not memorize the score or the pitches, and to not visualize the score, cues, and all other information that play a role in conducting. Instead, to memorize phenomenologically means to be able to correlate all aspects of the musical experience into one transcendental unity. Because the unified transcendental experience is the only reference point, it is possible to always know where one is in reference to, and in correlation to, the structural and energetic proportion of the beginning, the climax, and the end (Celibidache 1988:224ff). As indicated before, Celibidache does not consider his work as a conductor as a form of interpretation. Essential in his orchestral and rehearsal work is the distinction between conventional and phenomenological analysis. The core principle of a phenomenological analysis is to investigate how the musical material relates to human consciousness. The study does not concentrate on the material itself (even though a complete understanding and knowledge of the material is a prerequisite), but instead only on its impact on consciousness (i.e. how consciousness reacts) (Celibidache 1988: 226).

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PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology as Husserl has introduced it, especially in the meaning of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (Husserl 1987), represents a science and a scientific method. Because it is a scientific method, it can only explain what music is not, and it can only deal with the conditions which are necessary for something to become music. For Celibidache, the phenomenological discourse is of great importance. By becoming aware of what music cannot be, one develops an intuition concerning what music might be (Celibidache 1976: 312 and Celibidache 1993a: 57-59). Even though Celibidache’s complete teachings are based in their roots on Husserlian phenomenology, he points at severe contradictions and problems. In an interview that took place in 1985, Celibidache said that he felt that he could not use Husserl’s or Brentano’s terminology anymore. He still considers Husserl’s work as his strongest point of departure. However, Celibidache followed a very different direction in his work. Brentano’s statement that consciousness is always consciousness of something does not apply to the experience of pure consciousness, since pure consciousness does not include objects. Meditation, as practiced in so many various cultural and religious traditions, attempts to liberate the human being from thinking, objectification, and a generic subject/object distinction. The altered state of consciousness that is the goal of most forms of meditation, and that appears when a symphony is reduced to a single unit, is not applicable to

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discussions o f phenomenologists such as Husserl or Brentano (Celibidache 1986e: 121). According to Celibidache, Husserl was never able to solve the contradiction of the following statements which are essential to his phenomenology: Celibidache states that while Husserl said that humanity is the subjectivity that constitutes the world, Husserl also said that humanity is dependently structured by the world outside o f the human mind (Celibidache 1986e: 121-123). Celibidache argues that in Husserl’s discussion of intentionality and with his extreme emphasis on intentionality phenomenology in H usserl’s and Brentano’s tradition always looks exclusively at consciousness (as consciousness of something) and its objects, whereas in a transcendental experience o f pure consciousness, consciousness itself is not intentional anymore and therefore does not focus on objects (pure consciousness even eliminates itself as its own object) (Celibidache 1976: 310). Husserl described intentionality as an inseparable quality of consciousness. Intentionality implies duality, which is the duality between a) consciousness and b) the object of which consciousness is conscious. Celibidache sets against this description of Husserl’s work a very different kind of quality of consciousness: that of onepointedness; or in other words, as the Hindu tradition calls it: that o f advaita (i.e. non-duality) (Celibidache 1986e: 120-122). Nevertheless, even though these substantial contradictions exist between Celibidache’s and H usserl’s approach, Celibidache clearly expresses the greatest respect for H usserl’s work, without w hich-he believes-he would have never been

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able to reach his understanding of music (Celibidache 1986e: 122). Celibidache makes the teachings on Husserl a fundamental part o f his teachings and his approach to rehearsals.

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MUSIC

Celibidache consistently refuses to define music, because it is beyond linguistic possibilities to explain (Celibidache 1978: n.p.). Considering the previous discussion and accepting the affiliation of Celibidache’s approach to Far Eastern philosophies, it appears appropriate to call music a form of nothingness. Music does not exist as a continuous material or physical form. In that sense, it is wrong to say that music is something at all. The semantic function of the word is puts music on an objectified level which consists of the differentiation between subject and object. Celibidache tried to solve this linguistic problem by saying that something becomes music, always admitting that none of these attempts is satisfactory. The act of becoming is continuous and never leads to an act of being something. Using Beethoven’s fifth symphony as an example, Celibidache concludes that there is no fifth symphony by Beethoven that exists; it can only be originated and re­ created each time it is experienced. Because music and the idea of objects (material objects, or objects of consciousness) exclude each other in Celibidache’s phenomenological approach, it is wrong to say that music becomes something: rather, it is more correct to say that something can become music. This something is exclusively mental and conscious energy of the actual experience (phenomenological reduction). At the same time, the material conditions for this to happen are absolutely essential (Celibidache 1976: 305310).

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It is the human mind, spirit, and consciousness that transform the physical, psychological energy into music, because the human mind correlates and transcends factors that are materially separated into a unified experience in which separation does not exist (Celibidache 1976: 305). If this does not happen, hearing remains linear and successive. If it does happen, hearing is simultaneously spread out forwards and backwards into the future and into the past at the very same time (Celibidache 1986a: 321-322). The appearance is not the appearing. In referencing the ideas of Rudolf Steiner, Celibidache says that it is not music that one hears, but that music unfolds in the realm where one experiences beyond what one hears. Music is not in the notes, nor between the notes; music is not anywhere, not even nowhere; music is not in time. Music is not. Something allows something to become music (German: werden) within the transcendental state o f pure consciousness (Celibidache 1976: 306). With this phenomenological approach to music, the concept of now changes. Now is not anymore the moment after what is experienced as past, nor is it the moment before what is thought to be the future. Now expands over the totality of the complete piece of music (Celibidache 1976: 306). In this synchronicity, the past still becomes future and the future becomes past, until there is neither future nor past. Music is not a form of searching or quest. Music has to do with the reality of our being and the conditions into which we were born. In several seminars, Celibidache expressed his viewpoint that it is natural for a young musician to not understand the phenomenological world of music and to subconsciously, just as he

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himself did in the beginning o f his career until the age of 42, to ignore the reality in which music exists. In the evolution of the individual, it is natural to start from the physical, material, and external aspects of life, and to confuse them with the reality of our life, to then eventually turn to the inside (experience, consciousness, phenomenological reduction) and to leave (detachment) the exterior aspects as not real, though essential, behind (Celibidache 1976: 311). Music is not beautiful. Music is not sound; it has nothing to do with sound. Music has nothing to do with the instrument. All these external factors need to be transcended so that another reality can emerge (Celibidache 1984c: 15). Music is not thinking. Music is not beautiful Music is not. Music.

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W ILHELM FURTW AENGLER

Among all conductors that Celibidache has mentioned in the analyzed material, one person very clearly stands apart from all others: Wilhelm Furtwaengler. The most obvious reason why Celibidache talks about Furtwaengler quite differently is that he is one of the very few conductors about whom Celibidache expresses positive judgment (Celibidache 1984b: n .p ., Celibidache 1979: 11, Celibidache 1993e: 2, and Celibidache 1984a: 21). Several times, Celibidache has mentioned die following incident between him and Furtwaengler: After a rehearsal, Celibidache asked Furtwaengler about the tempo of a specific passage of a piece. Furtwaengler answered: "Well, that depends on how it sounds" (Celibidache 1986d: 142, Celibidache 93a: 88, and Zelle 1992: 84). As Celibidache has said many times, Furtwaengler’s answer was a revelation to him. In Celibidache’s understanding, Furtwaengler tried to say that tempo is not an intellectual reality that exists independently from the musical experience and that can be imposed onto a performance situation. Rather, tempo is a condition of the experience itself. If the multiplicity that needs to be reduced and correlated is great, more time will be necessary to realize that. If the multiplicity is small, less time will be necessary. That is why the temporal experience of a W agner overture is not comparable to a Mozart symphony, even though physically and materially the pulse may have the same metronome marking (Celibidache 1986d: 142). Tempo is not the physical quality of sound, but rather a condition of sound

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necessary for consciousness to become able to reduce and to transcend multiplicity. Beginning in 1936, Celibidache went to all of Furtwaengler’s concerts in Berlin. Furtwaengler has been, since their very first meeting, one of the people who had influenced him most. In the very beginning of his career, Celibidache was driven by exterior aspects to music (sensation, emotion, sound, beauty). As well, from the very beginning in Berlin, Celibidache was drawn to phenomenological theories. Furtwaengler represented both to him; the implications phenomenology had to offer as they were realized in the actual musicai experience, and his pragmatic and charismatic personality. Celibidache considers Furtwaengler as the only person who has been able to fully understand what phenomenology calls "vertical pressure," which is the sum of all factors that are active and that appear in the very present moment (punctual pressure). Beyond that, Celibidache considers Furtwaengler as the only person who was able to experience the vertical pressure in relation to the horizontal pressure (or horizontal flow), which is the sum of all factors what are experienced as active in the present moment but which do not appear materially/physically in the present moment (Celibidache 1976; 313). All elements of the horizontal pressure have a lasting impact on consciousness even though their material representation does not last. If there was no lasting impression, there would be no horizontal pressure. A second tone is perceived in relation to the impact the first one made on consciousness in the past. This horizontal web of occurrences is always and continuously in relation to the vertical web of the present moment. Music, therefore, structures and determines the

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vertical pressure through its horizontal context (Celibidache 1986b: 106). Furtwaengler’s outstanding ability was, according to Celibidache, to transcend and reduce the two dimensions of vertical and horizontal pressure into a single and absolute unity (Celibidache 1986d: 142-145, and Celibidache 1986b: 106). It appears rather significant that Celibidache calls Furtwaengler the only person who was able to do that. Furtwaengler matched in his approach to music what the phenomenological method requested: reference of experience unto itself (i.e. pure experience or pure consciousness). Furtwaengler realized this, as Celibidache explains, without being able to theorize about it or even without being aware of what it is that he was actually doing (Celibidache 1978: n.p., and Celibidache 1976: 314). Furtwaengler was, throughout Celibidache’s life, the most significant person (Celibidache calls him a "lighthouse") who provided guidance and orientation for his career. "Everything I have done in my life is related to what Furtwaengler has given me," Celibidache asserts. "Meeting him was pure grace and mercy" (Celibidache 1986d: 143). Celibidache acknowledges as well Furtwaengler’s capacity as a composer (Celibidache 1986b: 107). He points out that Furtwaengler himself was not aware of what he had passed on to Celibidache. All musical matters of profound impact were perceived and experienced by Celibidache through Furtwaengler, but they were never directly taught. Furtwaengler communicated all these experiences subconsciously. He conducted with a naivety and childlike innocence, of which he was not aware (Celibidache 1986b: 106). In another interview, Celibidache describes Furtwaengler’s

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influence on him as a trauma (Celibidache 1988: 329). For Celibidache, Furtwaengler was the very first and only one who disclosed music to him. Although he describes Furtwaengler as a conductor who had an inadequate and unclear sense of rhythm, and a rather poor conducting technique, he points at Furtwaengler’s incredible capacity to transcend the material conditions o f his work to rely purely on his own experience (Celibidache 1993a: 58).

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FAR EASTERN IN FLU EN C ES10

Only very few documents exist that were written autonomously by Celibidache himself. An article by Celibidache that was published 34 years ago in 1962 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung very clearly shows the influence Far Eastern philosophies had on him (Celibidache 1962: n.p.). In this article, Celibidache asks the reader to give more serious attention to Far Eastern philosophies, especially to those of Zen and Buddhism. In this article, Celibidache refers to M artin Steinke, whose teachings on Buddha had a profound impact on him in his very early years in Berlin. Already in this article, Celibidache emphasizes that the significant contribution of Buddha’s teachings for the W estern world is that understanding the reality o f our life has nothing to do with any kind o f subject/object relationship, and that life in its constituting form is not a m atter of interpretation. It exclusively consists o f the directly experienced experience. All laws o f life are complete and total in the sense that no aspect of our human life can escape from these realities. As well, in this article, Celibidache critically mentions the limitations of language, which is always ambiguous. He stresses that language cannot be a substitute for the actual experience. He also discusses the fact that the contents of Buddha’s teachings exclude logic.

10A good insight into the significance o f Far Eastern philosophies and the teachings o f M artin Steinke for Celibidache already during his time in Berlin is provided in the chapter on Sergiu Celibidache in Nicolaus Som bart’s book, Jugend in Berlin (Sombart 1984: 223-236).

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In this article, Celibidache makes a statement that has proven prophetic for his life. He asks the reader to investigate the difference between static and fixed thinking, and dynamic thinking. Static thinking consists of ego identification, wanting to grasp an object in order to give consciousness something to look at, and subject/object differentiation. Dynamic thinking, as he called it in this article, consists of the infinitely continuous realization of the continuum of the laws of life, from which we cannot escape, which we cannot change, but which we can only either ignore or not ignore. The contents of this article sums up Celibidache’s lifelong quest and proclaimed aesthetic position. It is important in the analysis of the given material to mention that all materials show a rare and convincing consistency in what is being said (Celibidache 1962: n.p.). In a 1986 interview, Celibidache stated that he believes that his ability as a conductor to reduce a whole symphony, and to accordingly know which conditions are necessary for this to happen, is a direct result of his enduring practice of Yoga (Celibidache 1986e: 129). For Celibidache, the act of listening can have a strong impact on a performance. This notion is a Far Eastern one, since it does not create a hierarchy between the active doer and the passive listener. The consciousness of both groups, the orchestra and the audience, have a significant impact on the performance itself. In this context, Celibidache believes that Far Eastern audiences have a greater capacity to listen to his performances than do many W estern audiences. This seems to be one reason why his present orchestra, the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra, so often tours

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Asia. In a 1990 interview, he stated that the act of listening with or in pure consciousness is a responsibility that is equally shared by musicians and audiences. Especially Asian audiences, in his opinion, have this capacity. Not only in this respect, but also in many others, Celibidache severely critiques US - American audiences (Celibidache 1991a: 96). In a Zen experience, the beginning and the end are one, the ego does not interfere, and life does not consist of separated entities (objects, subjects, I, non-I, etc.). The experience through Zen is not intelligible; it can only be experienced. The Zen-quality of the identity of the beginning and the end as one (absolute unity) very much resonates with Celibidache’s approach to Bruckner symphonies. Bruckner’s music is not a material phenomenon. It is not logic, but it is only true (Celibidache 1991a: 99). The Zen quality of unity and identity of those things that our perceptive sensory system perceives by the act of separating and distinguishing is a requirement not only for the musician and the listener. In addition, this quality has to be inherent in the composition itself. Celibidache, for example, does not see this quality of unity in the form of Mahler symphonies. Although recognizing Mahler as one of the greatest artists of instrumentation and sound balance, Celibidache calls the form and structure of Mahler symphonies chaotic and confusing (Celibidache 1991a: 99). For him, the structure and form of Mahler symphonies did not originate from the freedom of pure consciousness and complete reduction. This is why Celibidache has refused to conduct Mahler symphonies (Celibidache 1991a: 99).

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Celibidache talks often about Zen and what an important role Zen has played in his growth as a conductor, and his career (Zelle 1992: 75). He stresses the fact that in Zen, the act of thinking is dismissed as trifling, and that, in Zen, teachers consciously destroy the semantic grammatical structures of language in the poetic Zen form of Haiku. Celibidache uses Haikus in his seminars and rehearsals; those Haikus either conform to traditional Zen, or are of his own creation. In a Haiku poem, causality and logic as the general structural elements of language do not exist. In the poetic form of Japanese Haikus, there is no causality, and there is no temporal structure as in language. One cannot find things/objects in a Haiku. A Haiku has nothing to do with beauty. One can only experience a Haiku; nothing can be fixed or repeated (Celibidache 1992i: 74). Celibidache admires Zen masters. He points at the significance and profound meaning of a human who has liberated himself from the acts of thinking, conditioning, and logic, so that his existence in the presence of the present moment reaches full and complete identity with the reality and truth of that very moment. This kind of consciousness cannot function if thinking happens. Pure consciousness and thinking exclude each other. One personality of the Far Eastern context clearly stands out. Whereas Martin Steinke was a German Zen master who had spent many years in Asia, Celibidache mentions in the analyzed material an Indian spiritual leader of the present: Sathya Sai Baba (Celibidache 1993c: 3). Celibidache has publicaliy mentioned his devotion to Sathya Sai Baba several times (Celibidache 1994a: 2, Celibidache 1992k: 4, and

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Celibidache 1993c: 3). He has also visited Sai Baba several times in South India. Celibidache asserts his meetings with Sai Baba have been a continuous personal inspiration (Celibidache 1993e: 1-2). In May 1992, Celibidache said that he is a student of Sai Baba (Celibidache 1992b: 5), and he emphasized that he is a being who tries to not distance him self from God (Celibidache 1992k: 6, and Celibidache 1992a: 27). Indeed, Sathya Sai Baba’s teachings are perfectly congruent with the results of the analyses of this research project: God is omnipresent. That is, He is ever present. This moment is God. There is only God. Truth is the same in the past, in the present, and it will remain the same in the future. Therefore, the time sequence of past, present, and future is just imagination. But "I" am timeless, beyond time. "I" look at past, present, future; they are not me. O f course, past, present, and future must be taken into account in daily affairs. These two aspects of time must be mixed and in operation at the same time. The perception that the time sequence is only imagination, that "I" am timeless and beyond time; both should be there at the very moment that one is using the time sequence in his daily affairs (Hislop 1978:72)

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RECORDINGS AND REPETITION

For Celibidache, a recording is the antithesis of music. A recording cannot re­ construct the original spontaneity of the original present moment (Celibidache 1992i: 75). He admits a serious conflict that arises when he refuses to make orchestral recordings. That conflict is a financial one: Recordings are sometimes necessary for an orchestra to survive economically. However, Celibidache has always been more concerned with artistic issues, not economic or financial matters (Celibidache 1986e: 116-120, and Celibidache 1986c: 131-138). He feels that the multiplicity that is reduced in the actual performance situation can never be identical with the multiplicity that a recording of that very same performance offers. Therefore, the original reduction that took place during the performance situation, and that was responsible for all decisions that were made for the physical/material conditions of that performance, is not possible when listening to the recording. It is not possible to speak of the same situation and the same multiplicity of a performance and of a recording of that performance. Any specific multiplicity requires a specific tempo in order for reduction to take place. Tempo, therefore, is the necessary condition for reduction to take place, and it is this tempo that does not appear anymore as a physical quality of time. Consequently, the tempo of a recording appears different. The tempo that appeares during the performance and which in that specific situation had no alternative and is not influenced by interpretation or human will, now appears differently in the recording. The tempo of the recording does not

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relate to the specific uniqueness of the specific present moment. What we experience in space (performance) cannot be preserved, documented, or recorded. Celibidache criticizes the recording industry for being responsible for training audiences to become insensitive. People are so strongly influenced, that they cannot experience reality anymore (Celibidache 1986c: 116-118, Celibidache 1978: n.p., Celibidache 1975: 1066, Celibidache 1993d: 3-4, and Celibidache 1993b: 4546). Time is not time consciousness. Acoustical parameters and factors are a form-constituting elements. This means that the form of music as it appears in a performance is partially determined by the acoustic setting within which it takes place. The spatio-temporal setting and the given material are inseparable. The tempo, for example, is the most direct consequence of the specific acoustic setting. Celibidache calls the acoustic condition a living condition (Celibidache 1988: 212): because the musical space cannot be reduced. It cannot even be photographed: what exists in the original musical space can not be reproduced in the same form anywhere except in that same space. The space has a back, a front, a right and a left, a bottom, and a top. So it is polarized from the standpoint of the observing intellect. The record can never recapture that. Do you listen to the record in the same acoustic environment in which it was recorded? O f course not! It kills the most important living, unique, unrepeatable thing. It leads to a standardization of all sensations, all aesthetics. A microphone cannot record the harmonies of the human ear, so that on record you hear completely different harmonies, completely different instrumentation, different counterpoints; because the viability of counterpoint depends on the harmonic zone which the human ear can perceive.... So a record is a document but only a historical one. It is not a musical actuality. (Umbach 1995b: n.p.) His point of view on recordings seems to conflict with the fact that for many

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years he preferred to work with European radio symphony orchestras which pre­ dominantly work in order to record. But the reason for this long-time working relationship (Italy, Sweden, Germany, and France) was not based on the goal to make recordings. The reason was that these orchestras guarantee the longest possible rehearsal times among all professional orchestras of this world (Germany, for example, 8 - 12 rehearsals can be standard for new and difficult works). One of the best orchestras in the world, the Orchestre National de l’ORTF, granted Celibidache 14 rehearsals for one single concert (Celibidache 1988: 213). Personality, spontaneity, and uniqueness of truth cannot be recorded. Art is unique and can not be repeated (Celibidache 1991a: 96, Celibidache 1992n: 2, and Celibidache 1992k: 4). The musical situation (he calls it "musical room")11 cannot be reduced by itself. Reduction can only take place within that room. Celibidache compared the relationship of a recording to the originally recorded performance with a photograph of a person and the actual person. The living dimensiona o f music are "killed" through recordings (Celibidache 1986e: 132). In a time when music recordings play a more and more important role, Celibidache argues that the modes or perceptions and sensitivities of people’s consciousness are standardized and cannot be called as free as they used to be. The recording plays sound, but phenomenologically speaking, not music.

“ W hen Celibidache speaks of the musical room, he does not only refer to the performance hall, stage, and building itself. The musical room has a historic, cultural, and sociological dimension too, which plays an important role in musical experiences. A Beethoven symphony played in 1945 in Germany appears in a very different context than if it were played in 1995 in Tokyo.

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Sound and tones are not music; they actually have nothing to do with music itself (Celibidache 1986e: 132). They only represent the material/physical vehicle that transports a metaphysical substance. Celibidache admits that a certain historic documentary value is secured with the making of recordings (Celibidache 1986e: 134136). Very similar assertions can be made about the concept of so-called repetitions. Repetition only exists in the mathematical, mechanical domain. Phenomenologically, repetition does not exist. If consciousness is confronted with subject X for the first time, it will be different compared to how it was before. If consciousness is confronted with subject X a second time, it cannot react or function as it did the first time. Physical or mechanical repetition can mean phenomenologically only two things: either increase of tension or decrease of tension (Celibidache 1992i: 65). Music, therefore, does not contain repeats. The physical dimension of music does, but not the phenomenological dimension (Celibidache 1976: 311, and Celibidache 1992k: n.p.).

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CHAPTER VI SERGIU CELIBIDACHE’S REHEARSAL TECHNIQUES

Celibidache defines his role as a conductor through the purpose to create conditions which make music possible (Celibidache 1986e: 128, and Celibidache 1986e: 128). The theoretical analyses o f the previous chapters, of course, have practical implications. However, it is not possible to define practical rules that could enable conductors to achieve results similar to Celibidache’s. The emphasis of his rehearsal techniques is not a physical technique. His conducting style is extremely reduced in motion and expression. The movement of his baton follows fundamental rules of kinesthetics. To describe his rehearsal technique best, scholars need to focus on the act of his consciousness, and the consciousness of the musicians. These acts are not physically perceivable, but can only be experienced. The rehearsal process itself is an educational and not an exclusively functional one (Celibidache 1980: n.p.). Celibidache’s approach to an orchestra is manifold. Besides the aspect of the actual rehearsing, a great deal of time and energy is invested in the education of the orchestra members. This is the case with professional as well as non-professional ensembles. The members o f the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra, for example, went through a series o f lectures on phenomenology and music that were offered by Celibidache (Celibidache 1984c: 15, and Zelle 1995: 16). The same is true for his work with the orchestra of the Curtis Institute of Music (Zelle 1994: 2), and the

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orchestra of the Schleswig Holstein Musik Festival 1992 (Zelle 1992: 11). The motivation for this teaching effort was to give the orchestra the theoretical foundation to better understand and cooperate in rehearsals (Celibidache 1992m: n.p.). Beyond that, Celibidache believes that the human capacity and quality to transcend, to correlate, to reduce, and to utilize a pure consciousness, is the same in all human beings (Celibidache 1984c: 15). Consequently, he applies the same working ethic and expectation to each individual player. The rehearsals are conducted by memory, without a score (Celibidache 1992b: 4). Celibidache never lets the orchestra "read" a piece in rehearsals; he always starts from the very beginning in detail. The essence of his conducting style, which he has also taught during his seminars on phenomenology and music, consists of the proportion of the arm/baton movement and the movement of the musical energy (Celibidache 1984c: 15).1 After preparing a score, he insists on the fact that he "forgets everything" he has studied in order for spontaneity to emerge (Celibidache 1993c: 2-3). He believes that, music can only be lived; it cannot be understood. The score and its material do not exist anymore in the conductor’s consciousness as stored objects during an ideal performance. The mind does not recall any objects. Spontaneity is a quality that he would not have been able to develop without his study of Buddhism, Yoga, Zen, and phenomenology (Celibidache 1993c: 3). Orchestra and conductor need to become one

‘For the study of video documentation of Celibidache’s conducting see Celibidache 1991, 1992b, 1992c, 1992h, and n.d.b.

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in order to make music (Celibidache 1993b: 44). The essential ability that a conductor needs is to develop a mind that can correlate all musical factors from beginning to end into one single unity and simultaneity (Celibidache 1986e: 136). This is the antithesis of linear successive thinking. What appears materially and physically, in a causal linear manner, needs to be experienced in a transcended synchronicity (Celibidache 1993b: 44, and Celibidache 1986b: 106). As a conductor, Celibidache had to focus on the following main aspect: he had to study what is objective in the given material. Objectivity, here, refers to Husserl’s exclusive form of objectivity, which is the intersubjective one. Studying intersubjective objectiveness means to only focus on what human will, taste, and interpretation cannot influence. The transcended unity of a piece is a given truth that can either be experienced or ignored. It can not be changed or influenced. This truth is experienced through pure consciousness, reduction, and transcendence of multiplicity into unity. There is only one possible way to experience that. And there are infinite numbers of possibilities to not experience that (Celibidache 1978: n.p.). Many and very long rehearsals are essential for Celibidache. As well, he believes in a continuous educational process between the conductor and the orchestra which is one of the reasons why he has not guest conducted very much in recent years, but instead has only focused on the Munich Philharmonic Orchestra for which he serves as music director (Celibidache 1991a: 98). The goal of this educational process is to enable performances in freedom of mind. This means to allow pure

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consciousness to work. Celibidache never conducts operas. There are two reasons why he never showed much interest in operas: first, the acoustical situation o f the pit does not allow him to realize his understanding of music, and second, he feels that the predominance of language and the word block the realization of transcendence, reduction, and pure consciousness (Celibidache 1979: 11).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY SERGIU CELIBIDACHE Celibidache, Sergiu. "Verstehende sind schwer zu finden - Lebensfragen in Buddhistischer Sicht," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 7/28 (1962): no page number. __________________ . "Interview mit Sergiu Celibidache,” Interview with Klaus Lang in Hifi-Stereophonie. 11 (1975): 1065-1976. __________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Musik und M usikleben heute." Interview with Heinz Ludwig, Das Orchester. 5 (1976): 305-317. __________________ . "Sind die Dirigenten alle Ignoranten ? - Ein sehr offenes Gespraech mit Sergiu Celibidache?" Interview with Eberhard von Lewinski in Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 8/17 (1978): no page number. __________________ . "Karajan - der ist wie Coca-Cola," Interview with Helmut Lesch in AZ, 7/23-24 (1979): 11. __________________ . "Nichts kann mich aufhalten," Interview with Wolfgang Schreiber in Der Spiegel. 6/28 (1980): no page number. __________________ . "He leaves both discord and disciples in his wake," Parts o f an interview with Daniel W ebster in The Philadelphia Inquirer. 2/25 (1984a): D01. __________________ . "Kritiker sind Flaschen mit Sauerkraut-Ohren," Interview with Hans Richard Stracke in AZ, 10/10 (1984b): no page number. . "Ich habe fuer das Orchester gekaempft." Interview with Wolfgang Schreiber, Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 10/28 (1984c): 15. . "Es gibt keine Alternative zur M usik." Interview with Harald Eggebrecht, Sonderband der Muenchner Philharmoniker 1985/86. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker, (1986a): 315-324. . "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Wilhelm Furtw aengler." Interview with Joachim M atzner, Furtwaengler - Analyse Dokument Protokoll. Zuerich: Atlantis Musikbuch Verlag - Moos & Partner, (1986b): 105-108. . "Sergiu Celibidache." Interview with Joachim M atzner, Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetik der musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihrer technischen Reproduktion. Muenchen: Peter Kirchheim Verlag, (1986c): 131138.

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__________ . "Wie ein Leuchtturm." In Ein Mass. das heute fehlt—Wilhelm Furtwaengler im Echo der Nachwelt. Salzburg: Otto M ueller Verlag, (1986d): 141-143. __________ . "Musik verschwindet." Interview with Matthias Fisher, Dietmar Holland, and Bernhard Rzehulka, Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetik der musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihrer technischen Reproduktion. Muenchen: Peter Kirchheim Verlag, (1986e): 115-130 __________ . "Ursula Huebner - Zum 75. Geburtstag von Sergiu Celibidache Ein Gespraech," Interview with Ursula Huebner, M usica. April 1987: 336 -341. __________ . "Durch Furtwaengler Traum atisiert." Interview with Klaus Lang, Lieber H err Celibidache. Muenchen: Verlag Musik und Theorie, (1988): 209231. _________ . "In Pursuit of Truth," Parts of an interview with Jeffrey Gantz, n .p ., (1989): no page number, photocopy from Umbach 1995b. Bibliographical reference: (Celibidache 1989/Umbach 1995b). _________ . "Alles, was ich will, wird von diesem Orchester geleistet," Interview published in Jahrbuch der M uenchner Philharmoniker 1990/91. Direktion der M uenchner Philharmoniker ed., (1991a): 96-101. __________ . Sergiu Celibidache - Prokofiev - Svmphonie Classiaue- Rehearsal and Performance - M uenchner Philharmoniker. A coproduction of the Bayrischer Rundfunk and Metropolitan, 1991. 57 min. Teldec Video, (1991b). Laser Disc. . "Musik ist Etwas Ganz Anderes." Interview in El M ercario, Santiago de Chile. 5.5.1992, Jahrbuch der M uenchner Philharmoniker 1991/92. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker, (1992a): 27-29. . Grandi Interpreti: Sergiu Celibidache. M ozart Piano Concerto KV.271, produced by Raitre/Italy, 1967. Broadcasted by Raitre/Italy 6.28.1992b. Videocassette. . Grandi Interpreti: Sergiu Celibidache. Bruckner Symphony No. 9, produced by Raitre/Italy, 1968. Broadcasted by Raitre/Italy, 3.29. 1992c. Videocassette.

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__________ . "Die Wirklichkeit hinter dem Denken." Interview with Jan Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nicths - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen/Germany: Pars, (1992d): 11-28. __________ . "Musik dauert nicht." Interview with Jan Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen: Pars, (1992e): 29-42. __________ . "Ende im Anfang - Anfang im Ende." Interview with Jan Schmidt- Garre, Celibidache- Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen: Pars, (1992f): 43-68. __________ . "Ueber musikalische Phaenomenologie." Speech given for the Beethoven Gesellschaft at the Universitaet Muenchen, 06. 26.1985, published in: Jan Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst esentstehen. Muenchen: Pars, (1992g): 43-68. __________ . Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Produced and directed by Jan Schmidt-Garre. Muenchen: Pars, 1992h. Videocasette. __________ . Parts of interviews with Wolfgang Schreiber and Harald Eggebrecht, Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Wolfgang Luebbe Verlag, (1992i): 62-84. __________ . Parts of an interview with Sergiu Celibidache published in Cronica de H oy, no date, no author. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika-Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Expo’ 92. (1992j): no page number. __________ . "Keine Theologie hat fuer mich Gueltigkeit. Das sind Kruecken, die die Leute als Stuetze benoetigen," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de Chile, 5/5 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992k): no page number. __________ . "Sergiu Celibidache: Ich habe die Musik nicht im Gedaechnis, ich lebe sie," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de Chile, 5/10 (1992): no page number.Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992): no page number.

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__________ . "Es ist eine Pflicht, die Jugend zu unterichten," Interview in Globo. Rio de Janeiro, 5/14 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992m): no page number. __________ . "Nur Perfektion stellt Celibidache zufrieden," Parts of an interview with Satoru Nagoya in Japan Times/Tokio. 10/18 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedostasien Tournee - 1. bis 17 Oktober 1992. (1992n): no page number. __________ . "Das Phaenomen Musik hat keine Grenzen- Madrid (2): Ein Interview aus dem Jahr 1987," Interview with Antonio Morales in Scherzo. 2 (1987): no page number); printed in Jahrbuch der M uenchner Philharmoniker 1992(93. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker ed., (1993a): 49-59. __________ . "Sie koennen sich jeder Musik anpassen - Auszuege aus einem Interview einer japanischen Musikzeitschrift mit Celibidache," reprinted in Barth, Joachim. Die Muenchner Philharmoniker auf Japan-Tournee mit Maestro Sergiu Celibidache. Beckingen-Haustadt: Verlag J. M. O. Barth, (1993b): 44-47. __________ . "Worauf es in der Musik ankommt, ist auf Spontaneitaet," Interview in Ideal, 7/2 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache Gastspiele in Granada am 2. und 3. Juli 1993 in der Alhambra zu Granada. (1993c): no page number. __________ . "Muenchner Philharmoniker mit befreienden Augenblicken," Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/6 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee - 1. bis 21. Oktober 1993. (1993d): no page number. __________ . "Celibidache meint, dass man Musik nicht auf Schallplatten verkaufen kann," Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/5 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee 1.bis 21. Oktober 1993. (1993e): no page number.

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__________ . "Sergiu Celibidache zeichnet ein katastrophales Bild von der Musikwelt," Interview in El Pais. 4/28 (1994): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der M uenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994: Gastspielreisen nach Sofia und Wien vom 9. bis 13. April 1994 - Lissabon und Madrid vom 22. bis 28. April 1994 - Koeln. Bonn und Amsterdam om 11. bis 18. Mai 1994. (1994a): no page number. __________ . "Das Ende am Anfang innerlich zu erleben," Parts of an interview with Ekaterina Tschamulijska in Demokratie 4/11 (1994): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994: Gastspielreisen nach Sofia und Wien vom 9. bis 13. April 1994 - Lissabon und Madrid vom 22. bis 28. April 1994 - Koeln. Bonn und Amsterdam om 11. bis 18. Mai 1994. (1994b): no page number. __________ . Johannes Brahms - The Piano Concertos - Daniel Barenboim Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video, 1995a. __________ . Robert Schumann - Piano Concerto in a M inor. Op. 54 - Pvotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky - Piano Concerto No. 1 in B Flat Minor. Op. 23 - Daniel Barenboim - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video, 1995b. __________ . Antonin Dvorak - Symphony No. 9 in E M inor "From The New World" - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - You don’t do anything - you iust let it evolve - A documentary by Jan Schmidt-Garre. Teldec Video 1995c. __________ . Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 6. Muenchner Philharmoniker - Recorded at the Muenchner Philharmonie am Gasteig. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette. __________ . Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 7 - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntory Hall, Tokyo. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette. __________ . Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 8 - Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntaory Hall, Tokyo. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette.

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__________ . After 38 Years ... The Triumphant Return - Celibidache Conducts the Berliner Philharmoniker - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 7 - Docmentarv and Performance - Recorded at the Schauspielhaus, Berlin. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette. __________ . Interview with Harald Eggebrecht, broadcasted at the Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Hamburg, n.d. Audio-Cassette. __________ . Sergiu Celibidache. Rehearsal of Faure’s Requiem, Broadcasted by BBC London, n.d. Videocassette.

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BOOKS Ansermet, Ernest. Les Fondements de la Musique dans la Conscience Hum aine. Editions de la Baconniere, 1961. ______________ . Die Grundlagen der Musik im Menschlichen Bewusstsein. R. Piper & Co. Verlag Muenchen, 1991. Ball, Michael S., and Gregory W. H. Smith. Analyzing Visual Data. Qualitative Research Methods Series 24. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992. Barry, Barbara R. Musical Time - The Sense of Order. Harmonologia Series No. 5. Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1990. Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, and Eduard Marbach. An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwesern University Press, 1993. Brauner, Hilmar. Die Phaenomenologie Edmund Husserls und ihre Bedeutung fuer soziologische Theorien. Meisenheim am Gian: Verlag Anton Hain, 1978. Broekman, Jan M. Phaenomenologie und Egologie - Praktisches und Transzendentales Ego bei Edmund Husserl. Den Haag/The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963 Chattopadhyaya, D. P ., Lester Embree, and Jitendranath Mohanty ed. Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992 Clifton, Thomas. Music as Heard - A Study in Applied Phenomenology. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983. Colwell, Richard, ed. Handbook of Research on Music Teaching and Learning - A Project of the Music Educators National Conference. New York: Schirmer Books, 1992. Cunningham, Suzanne. Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl. The Hague/The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. d ’Aquili, Eugene, Charles D. Laughlin Jr., and John Me Manus. Brain. Symbol & Experience - Toward a Neurophenomenology of Human Consciousness. Boston & Shaftesbury: Shambala, 1990 de Boer, Theodore. The Development of H usserl’s Thought. The Hague/The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.

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de M uralt, Andre. The Idea of Phenomenology - Husserlian Exemplarism. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy. Stanley Tweyman ed. London and New York: Routledge, 1993. Dossey, Larry. Space. Time & M edicine. Shambhala. Boulder and London, 1982. Dowling, Jay W. and Dane L. Harwood. Music Cognition. San Diego: Academic Press, 1986. Edie, James M. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology - A Critical Com m entary. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987. Eggebrecht, Harald, Konrad Mueller, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag GmbH, 1992. Ferrara, Lawrence. Philosophy and the Analysis of Music - Bridges to Musical Sound. Form and Reference. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991. Fischer, Matthias. Dietmar Holland, and Bernhard Rzehulka. Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetic der Musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihreer tehnischen Reproduktion M it Beitraegen von Sergiu Celibidache und Glenn Gould. Muenchen: P. Kirchheim Verlag, 1986. Fraser, Julius Thomas. O f Time. Passion. And Knowledge - Reflections on the Strategy of Existence. Second edition. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 1975. Fuchs, Wolfgang Walter. Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence. The Hague/The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Glaser, Barney G ., and Anselm L. Strauss. The Discovery of Grounded Theory Strategies for Qualitative Research. New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967. Goetz, Phillip W ., Editor in Chief. The New Encyclopedia Britannica. vol 28., s.v. "phenomenology." Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1990. Goodenough, Ward. Description and Comparison in Cultural Anthropology. Chicago Aldine, 1970. Harvey, Charles W. Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Foundations of Natural Science. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989.

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Heidegger, M artin. Sein und Z eit. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. _______________ . The Concept of Tim e, trans. William M cNeill.Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992. Hislop, John. Conversations with Sathva Sai Baba. San Diego: Birth Day Publishing Company, California, 1978 Husserl, Edmund. Die Krisis der Europaeischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale Phaenomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die Phaenomenologische Philosophic. Den Haag, vol VI, ed. W alter Biemel, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962. _______________ . The Phenomenology of Interanl Time-Consciousness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964. _______________ . The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970. _______________ . Zur Phaenomenologie der Intersubiektivitaet - Texte aus dem Nachlass - Dritter Teil: 1929-1935. Iso Kern ed.. Den Haag/The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. _______________ . Logische Untersuchungen. Husserliana - Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. Aufgrund des Nachlasses veroeffentlicht in Gemeinschaft mit dem Husserl Archiv an der Universitaet Koeln vom Husserl Archiv (Loewen). Den Haag 1950ff, vol XVIII, ed. E. Holstenstein, Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. ______________ . Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences - Third book Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. The Hague/The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980. ______________ . Die Krisis der Europaeischen Wissenschaften und dieTranszendentale Phaenomenologie. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1982a. ______________ . Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Pheno­ menological Philosophy - First Book. The Hague/The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982b. ______________ . Logische Untersuchungen. Husserliana - Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke. Aufgrund des Nachlasses veroeffentlicht in Gemeinschaft mit dem Husserl Archiv an der Universitaet Koeln vom Husserl Archiv (Loewen). Den Haag 1950ff, vol XIX, ed. U. Panzer, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.

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______________ . Die phaenomenologische Methode - Ausgewaehtle Texte I . Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam Verlag, 1985. ______________ . Phaenomenologie der Lebenswelt - Auseewaehlte Texte II. Stuttgart: Phillipp Reclam jun. Verlag, 1986. ______________ . Cartesianische M editationen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987. ______________ . Aufsaetze und Vortraege (1922-1937). Dordrecht/The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989a. ______________ . Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a phenomenological Philosophy (Second Book). Dordrecht/The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989b. ______________ . On The Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893 - 1917). Dordrecht/TheNetherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. Janssen, Paul. Edmund Husserl - Einfuehrung in seine Phaenomenologie. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1976. Johnston, Bernard, Editor in Chief. Collier’s Encyclopedia, vol. 22., s.v. "phenomenology." New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1992. Harvey, Charles W. Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Foundations of Natural Science. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989. Kim, Sang-Ki. The Problem of the Contingency of the W orld of H usserl’s Phenomenology. Amsterdam/The Netherlands: B. R. Gruener B. V ., 1976. Klaus, Georg, et. al. Philosophisches W oerterbuch. Leipzig: VEB Verlag Enzyklopaedie, 1974. Klein, Jean. Who Am I? The Sacred Quest. Longmead, Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books Limited, 1988. Kohak, Erazim. Idea & Experience - Edmund Husserl’s Project of Phenomenology in Ideas I . Chicago and London: The Univeristy of Chicago Press, 1978. Kramer, Jonathan D. The Time of M usic. New York: Schirmer Books, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., 1988.

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Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2d ed. . International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. 2, no. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. i__________ . The Essential Tension. Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and i Change. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977. Lang, Klaus. "Lieber Herr C e l i b i d a c h e . W i l h e l m Furtwaengler und sein Statthalter - Ein Philharmonischer Konflikt in der Berliner Nachkriegszeit. Zuerich/St, Gallen: M usik & Theater Verlag AG, 1988 Lauer, Quentin J. Phenomenology - Its Genesis and Prospect. New York: Fordham University Press, 1958a. ________________ . The Triumph of Subjectivity - An Introduction to Transcendental Phenom enology. New York: Fordham University Press, 1958b. Laycock, Steven W. Mind as M irror and the M irroring of Mind - Buddhist Reflections on Western Phenomenology. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Lincoln, Yvonna S., and Egon G. Gruba. Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985. M atzner, Joachim. Furtwaengler. Analyse. Dokument. Protokoll. Stefan Jaeger ed., Zuerich, Atlantis Musikbuch-Verlag, 1986. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenologie de la Perception. France: Collection Tel Gallimard, 1945. M iller, Izchak. Husserl. Perception, and Temporal Awareness. Cambridge, Amssachusetts: The M IT Press, 1984. Mueller, Konrad R ., Harald Eggebrecht, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, 1992. M uenchner Philharmoniker. Philharmonische Blaetter 1985/86. Muenchen, 1986. __________________________ . Philharmonische Blaetter 1988/89. Muenchen, 06/1989. __________________________ . Philharmonische Blaetter 1992/93. Muenchen, 1992/93. __________________________ . Philharmonische Blaetter 1993/94. Muenchen, 1993.

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_. Philharmonische Blaetter 1994/95. Muenchen, 1994a. _. Philharmonische Blaetter 1994/95. Muenchen, 1994b. Natanson, Maurice. Edmund Husserl - Philosopher of Infinite Tasks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. Nitta, Yoshihiro, and Hirotaka Tatematsu ed. Japanese Phenomenology. Dordrecht/The Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979. Orth, Ernst Wolfgang. Husserl. Scheler. Heidegger in der Sicht neuerO uellen. Freiburg/Muenchen: Verlag Karl Alber, n.d. Patton, Michael Quinn. Qualitative Evaluation and Research M ethods. Second edition. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990. Popper, Karl, and Eccles, John C. Das Ich und sein Gehirn. Muenchen/Zuerich: Piper, 1982. Prechtl, Peter. Husserl zu Einfuehrung.Hamburg/Germany: Junius Verlag GmbH, 1991. Reeder, Harry P. Theory and Practice of Husserl’s Phenomenology. Lanham, New York, London: University Press of America, 1986 Ricken, Friedo. Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphvsik. Muenchen: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1984. Ricoeur, Paul. Husserl - An Analysis of his Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwesetern University Press, 1967 Rombach, Heinrich. Phaenomenologie des gegenwaertigen Bewusstseins. Freiburg/Muenchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1980. Salzer, Felix. Structural Hearing - Tonal Coherence in M usic. New York: Dover Publications, 1962. Sahakian, William. History of Philosophy. Harper Collins, 1968. Scheler, Max. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiell Wertethik - Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines Ethischen Personalismus. Bern and Munich: Francke Verlag Bern, 1966.

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Schischkoff, Georgi. Philosophisches W oerterbuch. Stuttgart: Alfred Koerner Verlag, 1965. Schmidt-Garre, Jan. Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen: Pars, 1992. Smith. Joseph F. (ed.). U nderstanding the Musical Experience. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1989 Sokolowski, Robert. Husserlian Meditations - How Words Present Things. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. Sombart, Nicolaus. Jugend in Berlin. Muenchen: Hanser-Verlag, 1984. Stockhausen, Karlheinz. Stockhausen on M usic. London: Marion Boyars, 1989. ______________________ . Towards a Cosmic Music - Texts by Karlheinz Stockhausen. Longmead: Element Book, 1989. Suzuki, Daisetz T. Zen and Japanese Culture. Princeton: Bollingen Series - Princeton University Press, 1973. Tulku, Tarthang. Time. Space, and Knowledge - A New Vision of Reality. Emeryville/California: Dharma Publishing, 1977 Tymieniecka, Anna Teresa ed. Analecta Husserliana - The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, v l . Dordrecht/The Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971. Uhde, Juergen and Renate Wieland. Denken und Spielen - Studien zu einer Theorie der Musikalischen Darstellung. Kassel: Baerenreiter, 1988. Umbach, Klaus. Celibidache - P e r Andere M aestro. Muenchen: Piper GmbH & Co. KG, 1995a. Vernon, P. E. ed. . Creativity - Selected Readings. Penguin Education Psychology Readings, 1970. W eiler, Klaus. Celibidache - M usiker und Philosoph. Muenchen: Schneekluth Verlag, 1993. W ilber, Ken. The Spectrum of Consciousness. The Theosophical Publishing House. Wheaton, 111., 1977.

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DISSERTATIONS AND THESES

Adkins, Donald Glenn. "Golden Mean Durational Analysis as a Guide to Orchestral Repeats and Tem pos." D .M .A . diss., University of M issouri, 1986. Altmann, Ronald W alter. "Being-In-The-World and Corporeality." Ph.D . diss., Duquesne University, 1981. DAI-A 41/11, p. 4737. Arcaya, Jose M anuel. "A Social Psychological Investigation of Orchestra Conducting: The Evolution of a Musical W ork from Inception to Performance." PhD. diss., Union Graduate School, 1975. Barfoot, James Houston. "A phenomenology of the Self as World in Walt W hitman’s ‘Song of M y se lf." Ph.D . diss., Auborn University, 1981. DAI-A 41/12, p. 5104. Barnes, Thomas John. "Time Perception and Time Orientation as Assessment Devices o f Suicide Potential." Ph.D . diss., Depaul University, 1977. DAI-B 38/01, p. 343. Bartholomew, Douglas Roy. "A Phenomenology of Music: Themes Concerning the ‘M usical1 Object and Implications for Teaching and Learning." Ph.D . diss., Case W estern University, 1985. Beaudreau, Pierre. "Recent Contributions to the Phenomenology o f Musical Time: Critical Survey." Ph.D . diss., McGill University (Canada), 1992. Bednarz, John Alexander. "The Development of the Concept of Foundation in Husserl’s Philosophy." Ph.D . diss., New School for Research, 1981. DAI-A 42/02, p .733. Brodhead, Gary L. "Structural Time in Twentieth-Century Tonal M usic." Ph.D . diss., Indiana University, 1983. DAI-A 44/06, p. 1617. Carpenter, Patricia. "The Janus-Aspect of Fugue: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Musical Form ." Ph.D . diss., Columbia University, 1974. DAI-A 94/07, p. 4308. Cordes, Robert. "Existentialism and Phenomenology: Objectivism and Non-Purposiveness in the Music o f Selected Twentieth-Century Composers." MA. thesis, California State University, Fullerton, 1971.

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Dubs, John Gregson. "Acquisition of a Novel View of Reality: A Study of PsychoSpiritual Development in Zen Buddhism." Ph.D. diss., The University of M ichigan, 1987. DAI-B 48/03, p .873. Gallgher, Shaun Andrew. "Lived Body and Time: A Phenomenologically Based Account of Human Nature." Ph.D . diss., Bryn M awr College, 1981. DAI-A 42/05. p. 2164. Heine, Steven. "Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen." Ph.D . diss., Temple University, 1980. DAI-A 41/05, p. 2166. Herman, Paul Edward. "The Contributions of Ramana Maharshi and Heidegger to an East-West Integral Psychology." Ph.D . diss., California Institute of Integral Psychology, 1974. Jones, Richard Hubert. "Mysticism and Science: A Comparative Study of the Claims About Reality in W estern Natural Science, Theravada Buddhism, and Advaita Vedanta." Ph.D . diss., Columbia University, 1980. Kimmey, John A. "A Critique of Musicology (Phenomenology)." Ph.D . diss., The Florida State University, 1984. Lochhead, Judith Irene. "The Temporal Structures of Recent Music: a Phenomeno­ logical Investigation." Ph.D . diss., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1982. Magnusdottir, Anna Margret. "Toward a Phenomenology of Music (Perceptual Experience)." Ph.D . diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980. Malik, Charles H. "The Metaphysics of Time in the Philosophies of A. N. Whitehead and M. Heidegger." Ph.D . diss., Harvard University, 1937. ADD W1937. Mason, David R. "A Study of Time in the Philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead and Martin Heidegger with Implications for a Doctrine of Providence." Ph.D . diss., The University o f Chicago, 1973. ADD X1973. Millikan, James Dean. "Heidegger, Time, and Self-Transcendence." Ph.D . diss., Yale University, 1967. DAI-A 27/08, p. 2561. Pageler, John Charles. "The Soul and Time: First Principles of M odern Metaphysical Speculation as Represented in the Thought of M artin Heidegger." Ph.D . diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1967. DAI-A 20/01, p. 292.

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Panzarella, Robert. "The Phenomenology of Peak Experiences in Response to Music and Visual Art and Some Personality Correlates." Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1977. Pelt, Michael Albert. "Being Attuned: An Ontological Analysis of Music." Ph.D. diss., The Florida State University, 1983. Portmess. Lisa Rafferty. "Time and Paradox, a Phenomenology of Time." Ph.D .diss.,Q ueen’s University at Kingston (Canada), 1978. Reimann, Jeffrey Howard. "Time and the Epoche of Husserl." Ph.D . diss., The Pennsylvania State University, 1969. DAI-A 30/03, p. 1205. Shaerer, Robert Lawrence. "A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Value in Music." Ph.D. diss., The Florida University, 1976. Thakar, Markand. "The Transcendent Musical Experience: As Permitted by the Structural Harmonic Activity of Sonata Form Development Sections." D.M .A . diss., University of Cincinnati, 1987. Tougas, Cecile Therese. "Internal Time-Consciousness and Transfinity." Ph.D . diss., Duquesne University, 1981. DAI-A 42/02, p .738. White, Carol Jean. "Time and Temporality in the Existential Thought of Kirkegaard and Heidegger." Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1977. DAIA 38/02, p. 853. Zelle, Tom. Sergiu Celibidache und die Phaenomenologie der Musik. Diplom Arbeit. Luebeck: Musikhochschule Luebeck 1992/93. Zhang, Xianglong. "Heidegger and Taoism (Horizontal Thinking, China, Lao Tzu, Huang Tzu)." Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1992. DAI-A 53/03, p. 837.

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ARTICLES AND INTERVIEWS "Ab geht der Dvorak". P e r Spiegel. 14 (1992): 250-252. Alexandersson, Claes. "Amedeo Giorgis Empirical Phenomenology." Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences, Stockholm. Goteborg University, Molndal, Inst, of Education, (1981): 39. Atkinson, Michael. "A Precise Phenomenology for the General Scholar." Journal of General Education. 23/4 (1972): 261-297. Celibidache, Sergiu. "Verstehende sind schwer zu finden - Lebensfragenin Buddhistischer Sicht," Frankfurter Alleemeine Zeitung. 7/28 (1962): no page number. . "Interview mit Sergiu Celibidache," Interview with Klaus Lang in Hifi-Stereophonie. 11 (1975): 1065-1976. __________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Musik und Musikleben heute." Interview with Heinz Ludwig, Das Orchester. May 1976: 305-317. . "Sind die Dirigenten all Ignoranten - Ein sehr offenes Gespraech mit Sergiu Celibidache?" Interview with Eberhard von Lewinski in Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 8/17 (1978): no page number. __________________ . "Karajan - der ist wie Coca-Cola," Interview with Helmut Lesch in AZ, 7/23-24 (1979): 11. __________________ . "Nichts kann mich aufhalten," Interview with Wolfgang Schreiber in Der Spiegel. 6/28 (1980): no page number. __________________ . "He leaves both discord and Disciples in his Wake," Parts of an interview with Daniel Webster in The Philadelphia Inquirer. 2/25 (1984a): D01. __________________ . "Kritiker sind Flaschen mit Sauerkraut-Ohren," Interview with Hans Richard Stracke in AZ, 10/10 (1984b): no page number. ________________ . "Ich habe fuer das Orchester gekaem pft." Interview with Wolfgang Schreiber, Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 10/28 (1984c): 15. ________________ . "Es gibt keine Alternative zur M usik." Interview with Harald Eggebrecht, Sonderband der Muenchner Philharmoniker 1985/86. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker, 1986a: 315-324.

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__________ . "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Wilhelm Furtw aengler." Interview with Joachim M atzner, Furtwaengler - Analyse Dokument Protokoll. Zuerich: Atlantis Musikbuch Verlag - Moos & Partner, 1986b: 105-108. __________ . "Sergiu Celibidache." Interview with Joachim M atzner, Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetik der musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihrer technischen Reproduktion. Muenchen: Peter Kirchheim Verlag, 1986c: B i ­ ns. __________ . "Wie ein Leuchtturm." In Ein Mass. das heute fehlt—Wilhelm Furtwaengler im Echo der Nachwelt. Salzburg: Otto Mueller Verlag, (1986d): 141-143. __________ . "Musik verschwindet." Interview with Matthias Fisher, Dietmar Holland, and Bernhard Rzehulka, Gehoergaenge - Zur Aesthetik der musikalischen Auffuehrung und ihrer technischen Reproduktion. Muenchen: Peter Kirchheim Verlag, 1986e): 115-130 __________ . "Ursula Huebner - Zum 75. Geburtstag von Sergiu Celibidache Ein Gespraech," Interview with Ursula Huebner, M usica. April 1987: 336 -341. __________ . "Durch Furtwaengler Traumatisiert." Interview with Klaus Lang, Lieber Herr Celibidache. Muenchen: Verlag Musik und Theorie, (1988): 209231. . "In Pursuit of Truth," Parts of an interview with Jeffrey Gantz, n.p., (1989): no page number, photocopy from Umbach 1995b. Bibliographical reference: (Celibidache 1989/Umbach 1995b). . "Alles, was ich will, wird von diesem Orchester geleistet," Interview published in Jahrbuch der Muenchner Philharmoniker 1990/91. Direktion der M uenchner Philharmoniker ed., (1991a): 96-101. __________ . Sergiu Celibidache - Prokofiev - Svmphonie Classique- Rehearsal and Performance - M uenchner Philharmoniker. A coproduction of the Bayrischer Rundfunk and Metropolitan, 1991. 57 min. Teldec Video, 1991b. Laser Disc. __________ . "Musik ist Etwas Ganz Anderes." Interview in El M ercario, Santiago de Chile. 5.5.1992, Jahrbuch der M uenchner Philharmoniker 1991/92. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker, 1992a: 27-29.

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__________ . "Die W irklichkeit hinter dem Denken." Interview with Jan Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nicths - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen/Germany: Pars, (1992d): 11-28. __________ . "Musik dauert nicht." Interview with Jan Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen: Pars, (1992e): 29-42. __________ . "Ende im Anfang - Anfang im Ende." Interview with Jan Schmidt- Garre, Celibidache- Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Muenchen: Pars, (1992f): 43-68. __________ . "Ueber musikalische Phaenomenologie." Speech given for the Beethoven Gesellschaft at the Universitaet Muenchen , 06. 26.1985, published in: Jan Schmidt-Garre, Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst esentstehen. Muenchen: Pars. (1992g): 43-68. __________ . Parts of interviews with Wolfgang Schreiber and Harald Eggebrecht, Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Wolfgang Luebbe Verlag, (1992i): 62-84. __________ . Parts of an interview with Sergiu Celibidache published in Cronica de H oy, no date, no author. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika-Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Expo’ 92. (1992j): no page number. __________ . "Keine Theologie hat fuer mich Gueltigkeit. Das sind Kruecken, die die Leute als Stuetze benoetigen," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de Chile, 5/5 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992k): no page number. __________ . "Sergiu Celibidache: Ich habe die Musik nicht im Gedaechnis, ich lebe sie," Interview in El M ercurio. Santiago de Chile, 5/10 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 - Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992): no page number.

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__________ . "Es ist eine Pflicht, die Jugend zu unterichten," Interview in G lobo. Rio de Janeiro, 5/14 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedamerika Tournee - 1. bis 17. Mai 1992 Gastspiele in Sevilla - 23. und 24. Mai 1992 - Exdpo’ 92. (1992m): no page number. __________ . "Nur Perfektion stellt Celibidache zufrieden," Parts o f an interview with Satoru Nagoya in Japan Times/Tokio. 10/18 (1992): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Grosse Suedostasien Tournee - 1. bis 17 Oktober 1992. (1992n): no page number. __________ . "Das Phaenomen Musik hat keine Grenzen- Madrid (2): Ein Interview aus dem Jahr 1987," Interview with Antonio Morales in Scherzo. 2 (1987): no page number); printed in Jahrbuch der Muenchner Philharmoniker 1992/93. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker ed., (1993a): 49-59. __________ . "Sie koennen sich jeder Musik anpassen - Auszuege aus einem Interview einer japanischen Musikzeitschrift mit Celibidache," reprinted in Barth, Joachim. Die Muenchner Philharmoniker auf Japan-Tournee mit Maestro Sergiu Celibidache. Beckingen-Haustadt: Verlag J. M. O. Barth, (1993b): 44-47. __________ . "Worauf es in der Musik ankommt, ist auf Spontaneitaet," Interview in Ideal, 7/2 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der M uenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache Gastspiele in Granada am 2. und 3. Juli 1993 in der Alhambra zu Granada. (1993c):no page number. __________ . "Muenchner Philharmoniker mit befreienden Augenblicken," Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/6 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee - 1. bis 21. Oktober 1993. (1993d): no page number. __________ . "Celibidache meint, dass man Musik nicht auf Schallplatten verkaufen kann," Interview in Folha de Sao Paulo. 10/5 (1993): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache -Suedamerika - Spanien - Tournee l.b is 21. Oktober 1993. (1993e): no page number.

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________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache zeichnet ein katastrophales Bild von der Musikwelt," Interview in El Pais. 4/28 (1994): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994: Gastspielreisen nach Sofia und Wien vom 9. bis 13. April 1994 - Lissabon und Madrid vom 22. bis 28. April 1994 - Koeln. Bonn und Amsterdam om 11. bis 18. Mai 1994. (1994a): no page number. ________________ . "Das Ende am Anfang innerlich zu erleben," Parts of an interview with Ekaterina Tschamulijska in Demokratie 4/11 (1994): no page number. Reprinted in Pressespiegel der Muenchner Philharmoniker unter der Leitung von Maestro Sergiu Celibidache - Tournee "Europaeische Hauptstaedte" 1994: Gastspielreisen nach Sofia und Wien vom 9. bis 13. April 1994 - Lissabon und Madrid vom 22. bis 28. April 1994 - Koeln. Bonn und Amsterdam om 11. bis 18. Mai 1994. (1994b): no page number. Delpaz, et. al. "Modalities of Musical Attention and Perception: A Phenomenological View of Aesthetics and Style." Journal of Research in Music Education. 26/3 (special edition) (1978): 252. Eggebrecht, Harald, "Sergiu Celibidache im Gespraech," in M ueller, Konrad R., Harald Eggebrecht, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, (1992a): 61-84. __________________ , "Nur der Freie Kann Musik Machen," in M uellerr, Konrad R., Harald Eggebrecht, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, (1992): 86-116. Foucault, Michel and Pierre Boulez, "Contemporary Music and the Public." In Forum: Music in Culture, ed. John Rahn, 6-13. Perspectives of New Music, (1986): 6-12. Gaag, Wolfgang, "Mit Celibidache M usizieren," in Mueller, Konrad ., Harald Eggebrecht, and Wolfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, (1992): 118-130). Gantz, Jeffrey, "In Pursuit of Truth", n .p., n.d. Garrison, James-W. and Shargel, Emanuel-I. "Dewey and Husserl: A Surprising Convergence of Themes." Educational - Theory. 38/2 (Spring 1988): 239-247.

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Goodenough, W ard. "Cultural Anthropology and Linguistics." In Report of the Seventh Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Study. (P.L. Garvin, ed.) Washington: Georgetown University Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics, 9 (1957): n.p. ________________ . "Frontiers of Cultural Anthropology: Social Organization." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. 113/5 (1969): 329-335. Gross, Gail. "T’ai chi C h’uan in the Art of Piano Practice - Piano Practicing as a Meditative Art Form ." The Piano Quarterly. 148 (W inter 1989-1990): 53-56. Held, Klaus. "Einleitung," in Edmund Husserl - Die Phaenomenologische Methode Ausgewaehlte Texte I . Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam Jun., (1985): 5-51. ____________ . "Einleitung," in Edmund Husserl - Phaenomenologie der Lebenswelt Ausgewaehlte Texte II. Stuttgart: Phillip Reclam Jun., (1986): 5-53. Kockelmans, Joseph J. "Husserl and Kant on Pure Ego," in Husserl - Expositions and Appraisals (F. A. Elliston and P. Me Cormick ed.), Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, (1977): 269-285. Lesle, Lutz. "Ploetzlich klingt das Vertraute unvertraut." Die W elt. 4/18 (1991): 26. Lewin, David. "Music Theory, Phenomenology, and Modes of Perception." Music Perception. 3 (1986): 327-392. Ludwig. Heinz, "Sergiu Celibidache ueber Musik und Musikleben Heute," in Das Orchester. 5 (1976): 305-317. Magliocco, Hugo. "A Special Endurance." International Trombone Association Journal. 20/2 (Spring 1992): 22-25. Mohanty, J. N. "Husserl’s Concept of Intentionality," in Analecta Husserliana - The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research (Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka ed.), Dordrecht/The Netherlands, D. Reidel Publishing Company, v I: (1971): 100 -132. Moog, Helmut. "On the Contentof Music Psychology," in Psvchologische-Rundschau. 28/2 (April 1977): 111-125.

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Nitta, Yoshihiro. "Husserl’s Manuscript ’A Nocturanl Conversation’: His Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity." in Japanese Phenomenology Phenomenology as the Trans-Cultural Philosophical Approach (Yoshihiro Nitta and Hirotaka Tatematsu ed.), Dordrecht/The Netherlands, D. Reidel Publishing Company, (1979): 21-36. Piguet, J. Claude. "The Logarithmic Ontology of Tone: Ernest Anserm et’s Phenomenology of M usic." Journal of Social and Biological Structures. v8(l) (1985): 59-62. Potter, Tully. Laser Disc note o f Sergiu Celibidache - Prokofiev - Svmphonie Classique - Rehearsal and Performance - M uenchner Philharm oniker. by Bayrischer Rundfunk and M etropolitan, Teldec Video, 1991. Reissinger, M arianne. "Du wirst ein Koenig ohne Krone sein - Klaus Um bach’s Biographie ueber Sergiu Celibidache." Allgemeine Zeitung/Germanv. (1995): n.p. Rockwell, John. "Music: Celibidache In America Debut." The New York Tim es. 29 February 1984. Photocopy obtained through the library o f The Curtis Institute o f Music - n.p. ______________ . "A Musical Free Spirit Warms Up for Carnegie," The New York Tim es. 4/20 (1989): C17. Santos, Ramon P. "From Mannerism to new Aesthetics - Levels o f Adaptaion in the "classicization" o f Asian Music." Canzona. 14/34 (1991): 16-21. Schwartz, Adria-E. "Being-In-Time: A Phenomenological Exploration of the Existential Past, Present and Future." Review o f Existential Psychology and Psychiatry. 15/2-3 (1977): 150-162. Schreiber, W olfgang. "Musik ist wahr - Wie der Dirigent Sergiu Celibidache sein musikalisches W issen weitergibt." Sueddeutsche Zeitung. 7/144 (1987): 27/28. _________________ . "Sergiu Celibidache: Naehe zur Musik - Treue zu sich selbst." In Sonderband der M uenchner Philharm oniker. Direktion der Muenchner Philharmoniker, n.d.: 139-142. _________________ . "Andere Wege zur M usik," in M ueller, Konrad P ., Harlad Eggebrecht, and W olfgang Schreiber. Sergiu Celibidache. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Luebbe Verlag, (1992): 7-60.

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Smith, F.J. "Musical Sound as a Model for Husserlian Intuition and TimeConsciousness." Journal o f Phenomenological Psychology. 4/1 (1973): 271296. Steindl-Rast, David. Learning to D ie, n.p., n.d. Stone, Frank-Andrews. "Philosophical Phenomenology: A Methodology for Holistic Educational Research." Multicultural Research Guides Series. 4 (1979): 20. Streb, Joseph. "Thoughts on Phenomenology, Education, and Art." Studies in Art Education. 3/25 (1984): 159-166. Stroecker, Elisabeth. "Einleitung," in Edmund Husserl - Cartesianische Meditatioen Eine Einleitung in diePhaenomenologie. Elisabeth Stroecker ed. Hamburg: Felix M einer Verlag, (1987): x-xxxiv. Umbach, Klaus. "Der Fliegende Hollaender in L.A ." Der Spiegel. 16 (1989): 224230. Veith, Ilza. "Psychiatric Foundations in the Far East." Psychiatric Annals. 8/6 (1978): 275-289.

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PAPERS Schrag, Calvin-O. "A Phenomenological Perspective on Communication." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 1-5, 1979.

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UNPUBLISHED SOURCES Kleinschroth, Dorothee. "Privataufzeichungen", unpublished notes from Celibidache’s seminars and classes, n.d. de Lancie, John. "The Corporate Sound." TMs [photocopy], n.d. Reverter, Arturo. "Sergiu Celibidache - Auf der Suche nach der Wahrheit - Dossier Celibidache ein Sonderfall." Typewritten manuscript, n.d. Thakar, Markand. "On the Listener’s Contribution." TMs [photocopy], n.d. ______________ . "Tribute to a Teacher." TMs [photocopy], 1988. Zelle, Tom. Privataufzeichnungen - Phaenomenologie der Musik. Soltau/Germany. By author, 1992. ________ . Interview with John de Lancie. The interview was held on the topic of John de Lancie’s experiences with Sergiu Celibidache at the Curtis Institute of Music. Aspen, Colorado, 1994. ________ . Interview with Klaus Umbach, chief editor of the feuilleton/music of the Der Speieel/Germanv. The interview was held on the topic of Klaus Umbach’s experiences with Celibidache at the office of D er Spiegel in Cologne/Germany, 1995.

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LASER DISCS, VIDEO TAPES, AUDIO TAPES Celibidache, Sergiu. Sergiu Celibidache - Prokofiev - Svmphonie ClassiqueRehearsal and Performance -Muenchner Philharm oniker. A coproduction of Bayrischer Rundfunk and Metropolitan, 1991. 57 min. Teldec video, 1991. Laser Disc. __________________ . Grandi Interpreti: Sergiu Celibidache. M ozart Piano Concerto KV.271, produced by Raitre/Italy, 1967. Broadcasted by Raitre/Italy 6.28.1992b. Videocassette. ________________ . Grandi Interpreti: Sergiu Celibidache. Bruckner Symphony No. 9, produced by Raitre/Italy, 1968. Broadcasted by Raitre/Italy, 6.29.1992c. Videocassette. ________________ . Celibidache - Man will nichts - man laesst es entstehen. Produced and directed by Jan Schmidt-Garre. Muenchen: Pars, 1992h. Videocasette. ________________ . Interview with Harald Eggebrecht, broadcasted at the Norddeutscher Rundfunk, Hamburg, n.d. Audio-Cassette. ________________ . Sergiu Celibidache. Rehearsal of Faure’s Requiem, Broadcasted by BBC London, n.d. Videocassette. ________________ . Johannes Brahms - The Piano Concertos - Daniel Barenboim Muenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video, 1995a. Videocassette. ________________ . Robert Schumann - Piano Concerto in a Minor. Op. 54 - Pvotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky - Piano Concerto No. 1 in B Flat M inor. Op. 23 - Daniel Barenboim - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache. Teldec Video, 1995b. Videocassette. ________________ . Antonin Dvorak - Symphony No. 9 in E M inor "From The New World" - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - You don’t do anything - you just let it evolve - A documentary by Jan Schmidt-Garre. Teldec Video 1995c. Videocassette. ________________ . Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 6. Muenchner Philharmoniker - Recorded at the M uenchner Philharmonie am Gasteig. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette.

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Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 7 - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntory Hall, Tokyo. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette. __________ . Celibidache Conducts Bruckner - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 8 - M uenchner Philharmoniker - Sergiu Celibidache - Recorded at Suntaory Hall, Tokyo. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette. __________ . After 38 Years ... The Triumphant Return - Celibidache Conducts the Berliner Philharmoniker - Anton Bruckner Symphony No. 7 - Docmentarv and Performance - Recorded at the Schauspielhaus, Berlin. Sony Classical, n.d. Videocassette.

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ARCHIVES Umbach, Klaus. Archive of Der Spiegel. Koeln/Germany, 1995b.

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