Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics

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COLLECTION LATOMUS VOL.

142

SENATORIAL WEALTH AND ROMAN POLITICS

LATOMUS REVUE D’ETUDES LATINES 60, nue Colonel Chaltin, B. 1180 Bruxelles Fondee en 1937, la revue Latomus, que dirigent MM. Leon Herr­ mann, Marcel Renard, Jean Preaux et Guy Cambier, publie des ar­ ticles, des varietes et discussions, des notes de lecture, des comptes rendus, des notices bibliographiques, des informations pedagogiques ayant trait a tous les domaines de la latinite: textes, litterature, histoire, institutions, archeologie, epigraphie, paleographie, humanisrne, etc. Les quelque 1000 pages qu’elle comporte annuellement. contiennent une riche documentation, souvent inedite et abondamment illustree. Montant de l’abonnement au tome XXXIV (1975): Abonnement ordinaire :

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Argentine . M. le Prof. Fr. N6voa, Laprida, 1718, Buenos-Aires. Bresii. : M le Prof. Vandick Londres da Nobrega, 32, Rua Araucaria, Jardim Botanico, Rio-de-Janeiro. Etats-Unis et Canada . M le Prof. J. R. Workman, Brown University, Providence 12, Rhode Island. France : M. J. Heurgon, Membre de i’Acad. des Inscr. et Belles-Lettres, Le Verger, rue des Bois, 78, La-Celle-St-Cloud.

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Im primerie UNIVERSA, W etteren (B elgique )

COLLECTION LATOMUS VOLUME 142

Israel SHATZMAN T he H ebrew University, Jerusalem , Isra el

Senatorial W ealtli and Rom an Politics

LATOMUS REVUE D’ETUDES LATINES 60, rue C olonel C haltin , B. 1180 BRUXELLES 1975

PARENTIBUS ET UXORI SACRUM

D /1975/0415/59 D roits de trad u ctio n , de reproduction e t d ’a d ap tatio n reserves p o u r tous pays. T o u te repro d u ctio n d ’un extrait quelconque, par quelque procede que ce so it et no tam rnent p a r p h o to co p ie ou m icrofilm , est strictem ent interdite.

PREFACE

Although the social composition of the Senate, the various groups within it and the political activity of its members have been thoroughly in­ vestigated by modern scholars, there is no special study of the economic condition and concerns of Roman senators. There is no need to dwell upon the importance of this subject for the understanding of the behaviour and activities of the members of a governing institution ; it is the aim of this book to remedy this lack. The book has three parts. The last of these, which represents the first stage of my investigation, is a collection of the extant evidence of economic significance bearing upon senators as individuals. The paucity of particulars of this kind no doubt deterred scholars from treating this subject, though it is more than forty years since Rostovtzeff called for such an investigation. He believed that there was sufficient information in the sources, and though the results of my efforts, fatiguing as they were, cannot equal the materials in the files of to-day’s income-tax officials, it may be said that Rostovtzeff s optimism was not totally unjustified. Part one describes the economic con­ dition of Roman senators as a class, under several headings : property, sources of income, finances and expenditure. The political activity of Roman senators in the second and first centuries B.C. is analysed in part two, in view of the evidence and conclusions of the other parts. This study is not a description of static conditions ; it is rather an at­ tempt to investigate and delineate processes and changes that influenced the senatorial class during the period from the end of the Second Punic War to the fail of the Republic. The chronological limits need some explanation. To a certain extent, they are imposed by the nature of the sources, which provide scanty information at best for the study of the economic history of the Roman Republic before the second century, let alone data needed for this particular subject. In fact, it is only for the first century that we have comparatively satisfactory evidence. The economic condition of Roman senators is particularly attractive as a subject for study at the time when their senatorial rank meant and conferred political importance and in­ fluence which was closely connected with the position of the Senate itself. The Senate lost control of the state with the outbreak of the civil war in 49 B.C. and under the dictatorship of Caesar, and, despite the efforts of

6

PREFACE

Augustus to disguise his personal rule, there can be no doubt that the establishment of the Principate brought an end to the traditional role of the Senate in the state. I am well aware of the fact that social and economic history deals with a continuing process, which does not cease abruptly in a certain year, but I hope that the above considerations justify the chronological framework chosen. The scope of the book is such that it is impossible to take into account all relevant modern work. Moreover, in the last two years since the book went into press, there appeared much new and important work bearing on par­ ticulars and main subjects of this book. I may mention here E. Badian’s Publicans and Sinners (1972), relevant to the relationships between senators and Equites, and H. B. Mattingly’s article «The Date of the Senatus Consultum De Agro Pergameno» (AJP, 1972) that, if accepted, requires careful consideration of the identification of many senators. I could not deal adequately with the new work. However, as I do not find it necessary to alter my views, I only added references wherever this could have been done. This book is a revised version of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1967. 1 wish to express my deep gra­ titude to my supervisor, Professor C’h. Wirszubski, whose critical guidance and advice were invaluable throughout the long years of research. I owe a special debt to Professor P. A. Brunt, who kindly read a draft of this book and who, by his benevolent correction, spared me many errors of fact and judgement. For this, and for other help during my stay in Cambridge in 1968/1969, I offer him my sincere thanks. I am grateful to Dr. P. T. Wiseman, who was kind enough to let me use his book New Men in the Roman Senate in typescript, and to Mr. M. H. Crawford, who helped me with some numismatical problems. I wish also to thank Professor A. Fuks, who first introduced me to the study of Classics at the Hebrew University, and who has since then helped me in various ways. I owe special thanks to my friend Professor M. Amit who read the proofs. Finally I would like to acknowledge the kind assistance of the Hebrew University and Friends of the Hebrew University in England which made possible my stay in Cam­ bridge. Jerusalem, 1973.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface.....................................................................................................

5

Abbreviations .................................................................

8

Part On e . — Economic C onditions ..........

9

Chapter I. — Property .................................................................... Chapter II. — Sources of Income .............................................. Chapter III. — Financial Activities .............................................. Chapter IV. — Expenditure ........................................................... Chapter V. — The Economic Characteristics of the Senatorial Class ...............................................................................

11 47 75 84 99

Part Tw o . — The Political Activities of Roman Senators in the Light of their Economic Conditions ......................... Ill

Chapter VI. — Senatores, Principes,Partes .................................... Chapter VII. — Economic Conditions and Political Conduct . . Chapter VIII. — Senatores versus Equites ................................. Chapter IX. — Problems ................................................................ Epilogue .............................................................

115 143 179 213 233

Part T hree . — Economic Prosopography of Roman Senators 237

Tables

...................................................................................................

Appendices

440

..........................................................................................

465

N o te s .......................................................................................................

473

Bibliography ..........................................................................................

489

Index .......................................................................................................

497

ABBREVIATIONS

P eriodicals are generally cited as in I ’A n n ee P hilologique, in som e cases w ith slight m odifications, w hich sh o u ld n ot cause confusion. F am iliar ab b rev iatio n s o f sta n d a rd reference w orks are n ot listed here, b u t the follow ing sh o u ld be noted :

Diz. Ep. D G. D S. E SAR F IR A 2 /L L R P Ins. It. M RR ORF! P A. S B. SM RR SRH T P.

D e R u g g iero , D izionario epigrafico d i antichita romana. D ru m a n n -G roebe , G eschichte R o m s 2. D aremberg -Sa glio , D ictionnaire des antiquites grecques et rom aines. Frank (ed .). A n E conom ic S u rv e y o f A ncient R om e. Fontes lu ris R om ani A n te iu s tin ia n i2 (ed. R iccobono) Publicae. Inscriptiones Italiae. Bro ug h to n , The M agistrates o f the R om an R epublic. Malcovati, O ratorum R om anorum F ra g m e n ta 2. Pla in er -Ash b y , A Topographical D ictionary o f A ncient R om e. Shacki.eton Bailey , Cicero's L etters to A tticus. Bro ughton , S u p p lem en t to th e M agistrates o f the R om an R epublic G r ee n id g e -C lay -G ray , Sources fo r R om an H istory1. T yrrell -P urser , The Correspondence o f Cicero2.

D egrassi, Inscriptiones L atinae L iberae R e i

O th e r w orks are cited by a u th o r's nam e an d a sh o rt title, w hich can be easily checked in the B ibliography

N B Asconius is cited by the pages of Clark's edition in OCT Other Scholia to Cicero's writings are cited by the pages of Stangl's edition

PART ONE ECO N O M IC CO ND ITIO NS

CHAPTER I

Property “ C ’est a la terre que s'en prend l'aristo cratie, c 'e st au sol q u ’elle s ’attach e et q u 'elle s'a p p u ie ; ce ne so n t p o in t les privileges seuls qui l ’etablissent, ce n ’est pas la n aissan ce qui la constitue, c 'e st la pro p riete fonciere h ereditairem ent tran sm ise ".

Tocqueville , De la democratie en Amerique.

After the struggle between the patricians and the plebeians had been con­ cluded, and with the ascendancy of the Senate over the magistrates, Roman senators became the aristocratic class of Roman society. The existence of a closed group, called nobilitas, is quite natural, as it is possible to discern subdivisions almost in every class, in every place and time (’). The economic position of the aristocratic class might be instructive from several points of view : the links between individual members of the class, the con­ nections of the class with other people of the same society, and the attitude of the aristocracy towards questions of material gain. Naturally, an examination of senatorial property can disclose and bring to light various changes and processes which influenced the aristocracy during the period in question. Moreover, we must pose and at least try to solve such problems as the types of property, the size of the possessions, the concentration of property by individuals and families, the distribution of property among the different groups within the class. Nov/, these involve phenomena which are not isolated and we have to discover the inter-relations between them and other developments, political and social as well.1

(1) On nobiles see G elzer, Nobilitat, 2 1 -4 2 ; A. Afzelius, Cl. & Med., 1 (1938), 4 0 -9 4 ; 7 (1945), 150-200.

12 I. — F rom

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

the

E nd

of the

S econd P unic W ar

to the

G racchi

It is a fair assumption that all senators owned houses. Nevertheless, it is desirable to set out the positive information v/e have on this subject. In this period 13 senators are known to own a house in Rome, and possibly the known houses of three more were situated there ( 2). Of course, that does not mean that no other senators had houses in Rome. Of those known one is the title house of Q. Aelius Tubero, in which 16 of his kinsmen lived with him. On the other hand, we can note the magnificent house of Cn. Oc­ tavius on the Palatine. Manius Manilius owned a modest house on the Carinae. Though these data do not allow us to draw any conclusions, it is clear that Octavius' house was not typical (C'ic., Off., 1. 138). Apart from their houses four senators had additional possessions in the city or in its vicinity : gardens, tracts of land or villas ( 3). In other words, the size of the house is not the sole criterion for estimating the amount of property senators had in Rome. Details concerning horti owned by senators are in­ teresting too. A hortus was not simply a garden, but an estate in the city or in its vicinity, in which the owners possessed, to use Pliny’s words, ‘luxury lands and houses’ (4). The first senator known to us as an owner of gardens is M. Claudius Marcellus, the conqueror of Syracuse. Scipio Africanus, his grandson Scipio Aemilianus and D. Iunius Brutus were also owners of gar­ dens. The appearance of gardens at Rome is commonly explained as a result of the influence of the Hellenistic civilization and, indeed, the philhellenic inclinations of the senators named are well known. It seems that expansion of this kind of property began in this period, but the evidence is too scanty for following up the process and delineating its spread among senators (s). According to the data at our disposal, senators’ possessions were to be found from Etruria in the north to Lucania in the south. Two senators owned estates on the Ager Romanus in Etruria (Alsium, Veii). In Latium the known estates are more numerous. It is attested that senators had

(2) See nos 2. 4. 5. I I, 13. 14, 16, 17. 18, 24, 31, 32, 34, 35. On M’. Manilius and T. Marcius Figulus see table I (3) See ri“5 I I, 13, 14. 35. (4) lam quidem hortorum nomine in ipsa urbe delicias agros villasque possident (Pu n ., NH, 19. 50). On gardens see G rimal, Jardins, passim. According to Shackleton Bailey, horti denoted suburban estates IS. B.. 3, 307 ; 4, 377 ; 5, 405). I would not deny that the word may mean that, but there is little doubt that such a property usually comprised gardens, and certainly there were to be found horti in the city it­ self, as Pliny explicitly states (5) On gardens see n01 11, 13, 14, 24, and on the connection with Hellenistic culture see G rimal, Jardins, 108-122. Grimal dates the introduction of gardens to Rome at the end of the second century (cf. Lugli, Diz. Ep.. 3, 994 ; D'A rms, Romans, 6). But he does not mention the gardens of Marcellus and Scipio Africanus.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

13

possessions in the following places : Alba, Laurentum, Tusculum, Praeneste, Tibur, Labici, Antium, Tarracina, Caieta, Formiae, and in the Anio valley. We get the impression that senatorial property was scattered all over the country : near the coast and in inland districts, nearby Rome and faraway from it. Three estates of senators are known in Sabinum. Senatorial property in Campania is recorded in Lavernium, Liternum, Puteoli, and Misenum. L. Aemilius Paullus probably had possessions in Lucania ( 6). Now a question arises : does this information reflect the true proportion of the spread of senators’ property over the various districts of Italy? It could be expected that senators would own land in Latium Adiectum, where Roman rule had spread in an earlier period. It was also quite predictable that senators would be attracted by opportunities to acquire property in Campania, and the available data do testify to such a tendency. Cato’s possessions, concentrated in Latium and Campania, might therefore be taken as a typical example. Yet, the known estates in Sabinum, Etruria and Lucania prove that senatorial property existed outside the two main regions. Moreover, it would be hasty to conclude that this was rare, or that such property was not to be found at all in other regions. Some particulars are known bearing on the question of the size of the possessions. Tubero had more than 100 iugera in his estate at Veii (no. 2). This estate made a living for him and 16 of his family. It can be inferred that Scipio’s vineyard, in his estate at Liternum, comprised more than 60 iugera. Probably the estate was more extensive. Here one fact claims at­ tention, viz. the distribution of the property of individual senators. Scipio Africanus possessed gardens and a tract of land in the neighbourhood of Rome, an estate at Liternum, and possibly another at Misenum (no. 13). Scipio Aemilianus had three estates : at Lavernium, Laurentum and Caieta (no. 14). Cato’s possessions were scattered over several regions. He inherited properties in Sabinum and Tusculum, and afterwards he acquired estates in several places in Latium and Campania (no. 33). M. Iunius Bru­ tus had estates at Privernum, Tibur and Alba (table 1). It is reasonable to assume that the inclination to obtain land in different places restricted the process of formation of large estates. The information obtainable from Cato’s book on agriculture points rather to the existence of medium-sized estates. The proposed unit for a vineyard is of 100 iugera (Agr., 11. 1). Speaking generally about the desirable crops Cato refers to an estate of 100 iugera (ib., 4). The recommended olive plantation comprises 240 iugera

(6) See table I. Note also the estate of Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus near Casilinum (Liv., 22. 25,

7).

14

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(ib., 10. 1), but he also mentions an oliveyard of 120 iugera (ib., 3. 5). Cato wishes to instruct his readers on the best methods of cultivating their farms. Actually he recommends them to specialize in one branch according to the qualities of the land (7). The size of units he mentions corresponds with the few details we have about senators’ estates. As to Cato’s own property, it is well to bear in mind that he inherited several fields, and that he himself estimated such fields at 24,000 sesterces each (Polyb., 31. 25, 5). The size of such a field might have been about 20-40 iugera ( 8). These data suggest that the property of senators was composed of small and medium-sized units, but this conclusion will have to be reconsidered from another point of view. The question of the size of senators’ property is connected with the problem of ager publicus. Unfortunately details concerning public land possessed by individual senators are too meagre to offer valuable help. P. Scipio Nasica Serapio and M. Octavius are the only senators known to us as owners of public land in excess of 500 iugera (910). In the absence of more specific details it is necessary to turn to general information on this subject. As a result of the Second Punic War public land increased immensely,chiefly in south Italy ( ,0). It has been estimated that the whole area of public land amounted to 3,000,000 iugera in the period preceding the agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus (” ). The census statistics might be reasonably interpreted to show that following Tiberius’ lav/ 756,000-2,280,000 iugera were

(7) !n my opinion this is the meaning of the passage Praedium quod primum siel, si me rogabis, sic dicam : de omnibus agris optimoque loco iugera agri centum, vinea est prima, si vino (bono et) multo est, secundo loco hortus irriguus (A gr. 1.7). Cf. V arro. RR. I. 7, 9. According to Gummerus, Cato had in mind certain actual estates when fixing an olive plantation of 240 iugera and a vineyard of 100 iugera. But it is erroneous, says Gummerus. to suppose that these two plantations together with a tract of land for cereals and some public land formed one continuous unit (Rom. Gut., 17-9). Tibiletti writes that the agriculture discussed by Cato is typical of latifundia ILatifundia, 247), and yet he says that Cato does not mention estates of 500 iugera and that the possession of several estates could also amount to trans­ gression of the Law (ib.. 245 f). But latifundia must be distinguished from the possession of several discontinuous estates Jaczynowska claims that Cato describes an ideal estate, contemporary estates being much larger (I, 14). This view is hardly convincing as Cato's description conveys the impression that it is based on experience For a sober account see Dohr, It Gut., 30-33. (8) See note E on land prices. (9) Plut., TG. 10. 5 ; 13. 3. (10) Frank, ESAR. 1, 112-3; 118 ; 2 3 8 ; T ibiletti, Latifundia, 261-2 ; Earl, Gracchus, 2 4 -5 ; Toynbee, Han. Leg., 2, chap. 2 (p. 10 ff.). (11) Last, CAH, 9 ,1 7 ; F rank, E c. H is t, 97. Last does not explain his estimate and Frank refers to Beloch, Rev. But 1 have not been able to find such an estimate in Beloch’s book. Yeo writes that the state had about 14,000,000 acres after the Second Punic War referring to Beloch, RG, 621 (Rom. PI., 326). But he confuses ager publicus with ager Romanus. It should be remembered that the margin of error in these estimates and calculations may be very high.

CHAPTER I

PROPERTY

15

distributed, namely 25-65% of the entire ager publicus which is supposed to have existed at that time ( 12). Thus it may be inferred that hundreds ot people, perhaps thousands, possessed public land exceeding by hundreds of iugera the lawful maximum of 500 iugera. Surely this group of large proprietors included many a senator. Now, it is not surprising that the detailed data we have do not indicate the existence of large possessions. They reflect the situation in Campania and Latium, and Cato’s book, too, is concerned with property in these regions, while most public land was out­ side these two regions ( 13). Not much public land survived in Latium, and the Ager Campanus was not occupatorius ; even the Gracchi left it in­ tact O4). The situation in other parts of Italy cannot be deduced from con­ ditions prevailing in Latium and Campania, and consequently the above conclusion that senatorial property was composed of small and medium­ sized units may be valid only for these two regions. It is probable that

(12) Not every one agrees that the 76,000 increase in the census statistics from 130 to 124 is to be connected with the law of Tiberius, but it seems to me that we cannot explain it otherwise The question is closely connected with the meaning of the census statistics which have been interpreted in different ways. However, it is almost certain that the numbers represent all the adult male citizens, as Beloch thought (Rev, 314 ff). But Beloch despaired of finding an adequate explanation to the increase and resorted to emendation (Ber .3 5 1 ). So did Fraccaro after a long discussion in which he disproved all ex­ planations suggested so far (Opuscula, 2. 87-102). Now the census lists were primarily intended to help military conscription and levy of tributum. After the year 167 tributum was no longer imposed, while the capite censi were not useful for military purposes, especially as the Roman navy was neglected and there was no need of rowers (F rank, ESAR, 1, 226). It is very likely that under these conditions the censors did not trouble themselves to register all the poor Since one of the motives for Tiberius' reform was the acute shortage of military manpower, one might expect the censors to have taken more care to register the recipients of public land The results would have become apparent only in 124 and not in 130 because it took the commissioners some years to accomplish their task. For a detailed discussion see Brunt, It Man., ch. 2. Brunt attempts to show that we can alternatively accept Beloch's emendation, but this seems to me untenable In thirty three years between 163 and 130 the decrease of citizens reported in the cen­ sus was no more than 18,000, whereas if the emendation is accepted we have to assume a decrease of 26.000 in six years, which is implausible On the other hand, it is easy to understand why the number reported m 115 is not higher than that of 124. Not only was distribution of public land not continued, but a law was passed (? 121) permitting the alienation of the distributed land (App., BC, 1 27). See also Earl. Gracchus, 26 (confusing ager publicus with ager Romanus), 35-7. For evidence on possession of public land contrary to the law see Cato in G ellius, 6 3, 37 , cf Liv .3 4 4, 9 , App BC. I 7 See also C ardinali. St. G r, 136 f . T ibiletti, Latifundia, 243-6. (13) Cf. G ummerus, Rom. Gut., 17. Large estates may have developed in some parts of Latium (R ostovtzeff. SEHRE, 30 ; Yeo, Rom. P i . 326 ; Brunt, It. Man., ch 20, i) But since Latium suffered less than other parts of south Italy from the Hanmbalic War (Brunt, i b , ch. 16) farmers could more successfully keep their estates in their han d s; on the whole, it seems that where soil was fertile yielding good profits long army service could not have compelled the small farmer to sell his p lo t, where land was poor and pestilential, as in some parts of Latium, small landholders were doomed to lose their estates. (14) See Liv., 42. 1, 6 , 19. 1-2 ; Cic., Leg Agr . 2. 81-2. C f Last, CAH, 9. 15 , Tibiletti. Latifun­ dia. 251, n. 1 ; E arl, Gracchus, 26 f.

16

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

senators had large estates, including public land, in other parts of Italy ( 15). At least there was one branch of husbandry that needed far stretched lands — breeding of cattle and sheep. To judge by modern practice, one hundred head of cattle need an area of 1,000-2,000 iugera of natural pasture per year, and one hundred sheep need an area of 150-300 iugera i 16). Varro mentions sheep flocks of 700-1,000 heads (R. R., 2, 10. 11). Granting the possibility of the division of pasturage between two regions ( V a r r o , ib., 2. 2, 9-10), one for the summer and one for the winter season, it is still ob­ vious that livestock breeding fostered the creation of large units of landed property. Agricultural possessions constituted the main part of the property of senators. Cato seems to express a typical Roman view when writing that agriculture is the economic field best fitting for a Roman (Agr. Praef). For M. Antonius, the orator, farms are the typical kind of property of Roman senators and agriculture is known to everybody ( 17). There is no need to add general evidence bearing on the importance of agriculture in Roman society. What we have to ask is whether the known data about senatorial property fit the general background. As usual the sources are deficient. There is no doubt that Aelius Tubero had a farm (no. 2). In his estate at Liternum Scipio had vineyards and olivegroves (no. 13). The evidence concerning L. Furius Purpurio is interesting, since he is probably an example of a senator who invested his money in buying land after the Second Punic War. Irrigation enriched the soil he had bought cheaply (no. 21). Cato’s property consisted mainly of agricultural estates. He had arable land and pasture, and it is very likely that he owned vineyards and olive plantations. However, he acquired other possessions not strictly agricultural: ponds, pitch manufac­ tures and forests (no. 33). Probably this was not an isolated case, but it is the only one we know. As to the question of preferences in crops we have to be content with Cato’s advice (Agr., 1.7). He puts his preferences in this or­ der : a vineyard, an irrigated garden, willows, an oliveyard, a meadow, grain

(15) The opposition of senators to the law of Tiberius is usually interpreted as proving their desire to hold on to public land (see e.g., M. J aczynowska, Historia, 11 (1963), 468). On this aspect see ch. 9, i. On Tiberius and large estates see T ibiletti, Latifundia, 252-9. (16) Tibiletti gives details of conditions in modern Italy CAthenaeum, 27 (1949), 9-12). Yeo refers to experience in Australia where 70 sheep need one square mile with 20" rainfall, which is slightly below that of Apulia (TAPA, 79 (1948), 296). According to Cato, an olive plantation of 240 iugera needs a flock of one hundred sheep (Agr., 10). Since the sheep grazed on the plantation it seems that conditions have not changed. Mommsen, too, says that estates based on pasturage were at least of the or­ der of 800 iugera and might have become much more extensive (H ist, 3, 74). See also Note A. (17) Cic., De Or., 1. 249. Cf. T ibiletti, Latifundia, 238-242. On agriculture in general see F rank, Ec. Hist., 1-15; 55-68 and 90-107.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

17

land, and a forest. To be sure, he also indicates that the choice of crops should be determined by the soil and the location of the farm. It seems that in another place Cato especially recommended pasturage. There is no doubt that the developments characteristic of the Italian agriculture in general ap­ plied to senatorial estates as well, namely the transition from cereal culture to vineyards, olive plantations and raising of livestock (18). Senatorial estates were generally cultivated by slaves. A group of slaves worked in the estate of C. Laelius at Formiae (Cic., Rep., 1. 61). Already in his youth Cato employed slaves in his estates and later he bought many more slaves. In his book Cato states that an olive plantation of 240 iugera needs 13 slaves and a vineyard of 100 iugera 16 slaves C9). A passage in Livy indicates the existence of slave labour even in small farms at the end of the third century. Livy says that it was difficult to renew the cultivation of the farms in Italy in 206, since free farmers were far away from their lands and slaves were rare (28. 11, 8-9). Nevertheless, hired labourers were employed too, if only for seasonal work, as can be learnt from C ato (20). In any case, we may assume that an estate of 100 iugera had a staff of 10-15 slaves according to the crops raised in it, whereas large-sized estates that specialized in stockbreeding needed a relatively smaller staff)21). A senator like D. Iunius Brutus, who had three estates, might have owned several scores of slaves, apart from domestic servants, whose number was at least 10 in the second century)22). A senator like Cato, who had many estates and also employed craftsmen in great numbers, might have possessed hundreds of slaves. These are single examples and it is impossible to state which of the two is typical, nor whether they charac­ terize particular subdivisions within the senatorial class. Some details concerning the value of senators’ property may complete the discussion of this subject. L. Aemilius Paullus owned land worth about (18) Olives and vines are the crops most discussed by Cato. On Cato’s preference for breeding of livestock see Cic., Off., 2. 89 ; P lin., NH, 18. 29. On the encroachment on public land by graziers see Liv., 33. 42, 10; 35. 10, 11-2. Cf. the works cited in Note A. (19) See n° 33 ; C ato, Agr., 10-11 ; Plut., Cal. Mai., 3. 2. On numerous slaves in Latiurn at the end of the third century see Liv., 32. 26, 4-14 Westermann dates the beginning of slave economy to the 4,h century, and thinks that it was powerfully stimulated in the second century by the development of large estates and industry (Slaves, 59-62 ; 70). For the view that Roman foreign policy in the second century was influenced by the interests of the landowning class in importing slaves, see Yeo, Rom PI.. 327 f. and notes 15-16, where detailed bibliography can be found. (20) C ato, Agr., 136-137 ; 144. Cf. Gummerus, Rom. Gut., 25-7. (21) One hundred sheep need two shepherds, but they can look after a greater number. See Varro, RR, 2. 10, 11. (22) On the number of domestics see Note F. It should not be forgotten that employement of free workers went on. See Z ancan, Ag. Pub., 37.

18

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

280.000 denarii (no. 5). The property of Scipio Africanus was worth at least 1,200,000 denarii (no. 13) and that of Scipio Aemilianus about 950.000 denarii (no. 14). 25 million denarii was the value of the property of IP. Crassus Mucianus (no. 25). According to these data, Paullus might have possessed 1,200 iugera, Scipio Aemilianus 3,800 iugera, Scipio Africanus 4,800 iugera and Mucianus 100,000 iugera ( 23). Paullus and Aemilianus were not exceptionally rich ; as a matter of fact they may be regarded as mien of medium fortunes. We may add that Livy gives in­ formation that can be interpreted to mean that in the Second Punic War senators were expected to possess property worth more than a million asses ( 24). These data permit us to conclude that senators’ lands extended over areas of at least several hundreds of iugera. These possessions were not concentrated in one place, nor even in one region ; yet a considerable properly could consist of a set of estates and not merely of latifundia. II. —

F

rom

the

G

racchi

to

S ulla

Our chief aim in this section is to examine whether changes occurred in senatorial property in this period. The agrarian reforms of the Gracchi, and the economic, social and cultural processes of the preceding period are fac­ tors that might have caused changes or accelerated a process that had already begun. Of the 15 known houses of senators iri this period seven were situated on the Palatine)25). Since all these seven senators were nobiles, we may infer that the Palatine was now an aristocratic quarter. It is possible that the beginning of this development is to be sought in the previous period when a magnificent and expensive house was built there (no. 32). The value of one of these houses was 6 million sesterces (no. 55), and we know that another house was more expensive (no. 61) Surely these houses cannot be con­ sidered as typical senatorial houses, and yet they do show that there was a steep rise in senatorial dwelling standards. The new style houses that Sergius Orata was building were in great dem and)26). We may also note the acquisition of houses near the Forum, for instance by Marius and C. Gracchus (nos. 63, 73). No doubt they wanted to be close to the centre of political life, and the fact that they acquired these houses when their political influence was in decline might be significant.

(23) (24) (25) (26)

On land prices see Note E. Liv., 24. 11, 7-8. See infra, n. 121. See n“ 43, 54, 55, 59, 61, 62, 73 and table II. Val. Max., 9. 1, 1 ; Pun ., NH, 9. 168.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

19

No revolutionary changes in the location of senators’ estates is discer­ nible on the basis of extant information. Latium is still the main region of senatorial property. In addition to Tusculum, Tibur, Formiae, Minturnae and Tarracina senatorial estates are to be found in Solonium, Lanuvium, and Arpinum, the number of the owners amounting to 15 ( 27). The ten­ dency to acquire land in Campania may have increased ; in this period we can note about 10 senatorial estates scattered between Misenum, Cumae, Puteoli, Baiae, Suessa Aurunca and Pompeii. Most of the possessions were located close to the sea in the area between Puteoli and Cumae, a phenomenon that was to become more conspicuous in the period after Sulla (28). Two senators had property in Picenum ; one is the famous Pom­ peius Strabo (no. 69) and the other the quite unknown Q. Sergius, owner of an estate near Asculum (Cic., Cluent., 21). Probably it was a large-size estate for he had an ergastulum there. Senatorial estates were to be found near Tarentum (nos. 60, 69). It is very likely that senatorial possessions were located at Spoletium in Umbria, at Capena and Veii in Etruria and at Heraclea in Lucania ( 29). Three senatorial families can be shown to have owned estates in Sabinum ( 30). The estates of Lucilius in Sicily and Sardinia may be mentioned too, though it is not certain that he was a senator (no. 60). All this shows no essential changes; Latium and Campania are still the main regions where senatorial property is to be found. However, the few known estates outside these two regions suggest that a substantial part of senatorial property may have been distributed over many regions in Italy. Who might have been the owners of senatorial possessions in these regions? The dispersal of senatorial property might be delusive, the result of the admission to the Senate of new men from the local aristocracy of the Italian municipalities. Conversely, it might indicate acquisition of property in new places by senators from Latium. We may assume that the possessions of Marius in Campania and of Lucilius in Sardinia and Sicily were not unique. On the whole, it does not seem probable that the first factor was significant, since few Italians entered the Senate before Sulla ( 3I).

(27) (28) (29) (30) Cluent.,

See ab le II and n°! 39, 43, 44. 50, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 71. See able II and n“ 40, 50, 55, 57, 62, 63. See n“ 51, 56, and on L. Gellius Poplicola and P. Servilius Vatia ab le II. On the property of the Ancharii, including vineyards, see ILLRP, 487 ( = CIL, l2, 1853), Cic., 161 with N icolet, Or. Eq., 302 f. On property of the Plautii Silvani at Trebula Suffenas see T aylor, MAAR, 24 (1956), 9 ff., esp. p. 13 ; cf. Dessau, CIL, 14, p. 398 on Cic., Plane.. 54 and Beloch, RG, 338. On L. Marcius Philippus, cos. 91, see Mor . Ep. 1. 7, 75 ff. (31) The problem o f the lalian s in the Senate has been examined byP. T.Wiseman, who con­ centrates more on their political leanings than on the question of their numerical represenation in the period before Sulla. Nevertheless he makes it quite clear that few lalian s became senators in the second century, and that of the novi homines the majority came from Latium (NMRS, ch. 2).

20

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

In this period, as in the former one, there were senators whose estates spread over several regions. It is very likely that the possession of a house or other property in Rome was rather common ( 32). Nine senators owned estates in Latium and in Campania in addition to their houses in Rome (33). In total we can note 12 senators who owned more than one estate, apart from property in Rome, namely about half those of whom we know any particulars. This phenomenon by itself suggests a certain limitation in the concentration of property in a single place and reveals a desire to obtain possessions in more than one district (34). We have only meagre details of the size of senatorial possessions. It is probable that the estate of Lucullus at Tusculum spread over several square miles, but we cannot be sure that it represents a typical kind of estate in Latium (no. 160, n. 639). In other regions senators probably owned large estates, like those of Pompeius Strabo and Sergius in Picenum. The whole landed property of a senator might have been quite extensive. It seems that Q. Servilius Caepio owned several thousand iugera (no. 74), as did C. Lucilius, who bred herds and whose property was distributed among several regions (no. 60). The landed property of Marius and Scaurus amounted to tens of thousands of iugera (nos. 39, 63). The amount an Eques might own is also significant. Roscius of Ameria owned 13 estates in the Tiber valley, the value of which was 6 million sesterces (Cic., Rose. Amerin., 6 ; 20). It follows that each estate comprised about 400-600 iugera and the total property 5,000-7,000 iugera. These data convey the impression that not a few senators possessed tracts of land of the order of several thousand iugera. Some senators had large estates that might be called latifundia. Basically the same conditions obtained as in the previous period (3S). Very little is known about public land held by senators. The herds of Lucilius grazed on public land (no. 60). Undoubtedly the distribution of public land caused by the agrarian laws of the Gracchi substantially reduced the holdings of senators. Though Tiberius allowed possessors to retain 500 iugera, we have to bear in mind that public land amounting to 756,0002,280,000 iugera was probably distributed ; surely this is a considerable decrease (36). We cannot determine in detail what effect this distribution (32) See n“ 37, 40, 43, 50, 54, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 73 and table II. (33) See n“ 40, 43, 44, 50, 55, 60, 61, 62, 63. (34) See table II. (35) Many scholars have reached the conclusion that the property of a senator was composed of more than one estate. See Mommsen, Hist., 3, 65 ; Yeo, Rom. SI., 459 ; Kuzischin, Latifundia. 6 5 -6 ; J aczynowska, I, 1 4 ; Earl, Gracchus, 26-30. Yet it should be stressed that this does not exclude the possibility of the growth of large estates, either in the second century or in the first. See p. 18 and Note A. (36) On the law of Tiberius see Liv., Per., 58 ; App. BC, 1. 9 and E arl., Gracchus, 16-8. The

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

21

had on the senatorial property because no relevant data have survived (37). But the view that the agrarian reforms of the Gracchi diminished the total landholdings of senators needs some qualification. During the second cen­ tury senators increased their property not only by occupying public land but also by buying land from the state and from small farmers who had become impoverished. These possessions, of course, were not touched by the agrarian laws. Secondly, the agrarian law of 111 permitted sale of the distributed land, thereby obviously renewing the process of the sale of land by small farmers to capitalists, some of whom were presumably senators ( 38). It is probable that in this period too the estates of senators were in the main agricultural (Cic., De Or., 1. 249). This is certainly true for estates outside Latium and Campania. The estates of Scaevola and Lucullus at Tusculum shed some light on conditions in Latium. In both there was actual agricultural production (no. 67). Sulla’s estate at Cumae was probably of the same type (no. 50, ii). Yet we can also discern a tendency to transform estates to places of amusement and recreation. Licinius Murena built fish ponds for profits ; others did it for luxury. Marius’ villa at Baiae was magnificently built. We shall see the sequence of this development in the next period (S9). (iii) — F rom S ulla

to

A ugustus

This period is marked by violent upheavels, tense political struggles, and occasionally by short periods of anarchy. It started with the dictatorship of Sulla, and 30 years later the Second Civil War broke out terminating in the dictatorship of Caesar. The wars of the triumvirs against the tyrannicides and among themselves prevented peace and normalization of life till after the battle of Actium. It is necessary to bring to light the effects of these events on the social composition as well as on the property of the senatorial

distribution of public land surely curtailed the profits of graziers who had previously occupied such land, but the attempt of Tibiletti to assess how much loss they sustained is not cogent (Latifundia, 268 f.). (37) Frank writes that the power of the Senate declined and that magistrates were more inclined to use their official position in exploiting the provinces to reimburse themselves for their expenses (ESAR, 1, 252) It is hardly possible either to prove or to refute his assumption. (38) FIMA2, f, 8. According to Apptan IBC, f . 27), a taw was passed permitting the sale of the allotments (7121) which resulted in their rapid purchase by the rich. Last writes that this law did not alter the maximum amount of public land which could legally be possessed, and that the results Appian ascribes to it are doubtful (CAH, 9, 99). But it is doubtful whether the allotted land was public, and, m any case, the development described by Appian surely took place after the passing of the extant lex agraria (7111). The exaggerated assertion of Philippus (Cic., O ff, 2 73) shows the failure of the Grac­ chi. See also F rank, ESAR, 1, 247 f. , Z ancan, Ag Pub., I l l , T ibiletti, Latifundia, 276 ff. (39) See n0! 57, 63 and p. 24 f

22

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

class. The comparatively abundant information for this period enables us to discuss in detail these problems, and other developments too. 1. — Urban Property Urban Property includes houses for owners’ use {domus, villa), flats in big houses for leasing {insulae), gardens and sometimes open areas. The view has already been expressed that senators usually had houses in Rome (40). We know the names of about 62 senators who possessed houses in Rome in this period. The examination of their property in Rome yields some interesting results. In the first place, it is noteworthy that 16 of these senators had more than one dwelling house, i.e. about 25 % were not con­ tent with one house for their own use (4I). Apart from their houses, 17 senators owned other property in Rome (42). Twenty two of these senators were owners of horti at Rome (43). These particulars are indicative of a ten­ dency of senators to accumulate urban property at Rome, and it is to be noted that they served the purpose of luxury, not profit. The question to be asked is whether these data are typical of the whole senatorial class. If we classify the sixteen senators who owned more than one house, the following results emerge : patricians — 5 ; plebeians — 11; nobiles— 12 ; non-nobiles — 4 ; consulars— 13 ; praetorii— 2 and one aedilicius. It becomes clear that our information relates particularly to a single group, holders of higher magistracies. Thirteen consulars out of about one hundred in this period may be considered as a fairly adequate sample for the group. But we should be cautious and refrain from concluding that the group was exceptional, since we know so little of the circumstances of other groups. The location of the houses is also instructive, and one fact deserves attention — 17 senators owned houses on the Palatine. Of these senators 14 were nobiles and 3 non-nobiles ; 1 1 were consulars, 6 praetorii (40) See p. 12. Willems suggests that senators were bound by law to own a house in Rome, but he admits that there is no positive proof for this (Stnat. 1, 178). Domicile in Rome was required for jury service under the Gracchan L ex repetundarum (FIRA', 1, n° 7, v. 17), while the 5th Cyrene Edict implies that senators normally had a residence in Rome or in its vicinity up to 20 miles (FIRA2, I, n° 68, vv. 107-110). Yet this is not a legal requirement, only a matter of custom and convenience. (41) See nM 86, 91, ii, 105, 107, 1 15, 1 18, 150, 152, iv, 153, iii, 159, 160, 186, and on Messala Niger see table III. (42) S e e n " 91, ii, 101, 105, 115, 121, 152, iv, 153, iii, 159, 160, 165, 186, i, 212, 214, 220 and table HI. (43) See n“ 77, 91, iv, 93, 101, 109, 1 10, 1 15, 121, 136, 152, iv, 153, iii, 160, 199, 201, 214, 220. On P. Servilius Isauricus, C. Trebonius and L. Volcatius Tullus

i, 211, 214, 220, 193, 20 1 ,2 1 1 , i, 164, 186, i, 193, see table III. The

identification of Rebilus in Ctc., Alt., 12. 4 1 ,3 with the consul of 45 seems more probable than that of Trebonius (Alt., 12. 38, 4) with the consul of 45 (Grimal, Jardins, 120; S. ,6., 5, 412). For horti see supra, n. 4.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

23

and one was aedilicius (44). Once again it becomes apparent that in fact we are mainly dealing with one groupe : consulars and nobiles. Already in the preceding period the owners of houses on the Palatine were nobiles (45). M. Caelius Rufus, M. Cicero and his brother are exceptional. I suspect that their desire to live on the Palatine reflects the ambition of some novi homines and sons of Equites to emulate the nobility. Our inquiry so far has made it clear that the location of houses and their number are useful indications in studying the standard of living of senators or at least of certain groups. No less instructive are the known particulars of the character of senatorial houses and gardens in Rome. According to Pliny, Catulus’ house was the most magnificent in Rome at the time, and yet after 35 years there existed hundreds of more beautiful houses (NH, 36. 109). L. Crassus’ house was worth 6 million sesterces and that of Catulus, so we may infer, was more expensive (nos. 55, 61). Pliny’s statement, exaggerated though it may be, proves that such sumptuous houses, costing several million sesterces, became common in Rome. As usual, few precise details are given by our sources. The house and ground of M. Cicero on the Palatine cost 3. 5 million sesterces (Cic., Fam., 5. 6, 2). P. Autronius Paetus sold his house to Messala Niger for at least 3. 7 million sesterces, possibly for 13,400,000 (no. 99). Clodius paid M. Scaurus 14. 8 million sesterces for his house on the Palatine (no. 81). And luxury houses were not situated only on the Palatine, as can be learnt from the villa of Appius in the Campus Martius (no. 115), from Lucullus’ houses on the Pincius (no. 160) and from Pompey’s houses in the Campus Martius (no. 186, i). It looks as if holders of higher magistracies, whether nobiles or non-nobles imbued with a desire to emulate the nobilitas, made efforts to obtain luxurious dwelling-houses in Rom e(46). Not that a given senator (44) See n0! 62. 8 1 ,9 1 , ii, 10K ?), 105, 107. 113, 118, 150, 153, m, 169, 172, 197, 211, i, 212, 214, and on Ti. Claudius Nero and Messala Niger see table III. 1 have not taken into account the houses of Agrippa and Statilius Taurus, which had belonged to Antony and L. Marcius Censorinus till Actium (n0! 201, 220). (45) See p. 18. Comparatively there are more patricians (W illems, S in a i, 1, 555), but the numbers are too low for drawing any conclusion. (46) Cicero’s censure is very instructive: Ornanda enim est dignitas domo, non ex domo tota quaerenda, nec domo dominus, sed domino domus honestanda est, et, ut, in ceteris habenda ratio non sua solum, sed etiam aliorum, sic in domo clari hominis, in quam et hospites multi recipiendi et admittenda hominum cuiusque modi multitudo, adhibenda cura est laxitatis... Cavendum autem est, praesertim si ipse aedifices, ne extra modum sumptu et magnificentia prodeas, quo in genere multum mati in exempto est. Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hanc partem facta principum imitantur, ut L. Luculli, summi viri, vir­ tutem quis? at quam multi villarum magnificentiam imitati! Quarum quidem certe est adhibendus modus ad mediocritatemque revocandus (O ff, 1. 139-140). For details on the gardens and the houses see the entries mentioned in notes 42-44, and for modem accounts Grimal, Jardins, passim (esp. 107-142 ; 213-289); Luoi, Diz. Ep„ 3, 993-1044; Lafayet, D. S„ 276-393.

24

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

necessarily acquired or built his expensive house only after he had attained the consulship, but the tendency to possess and buy luxurious houses was prominent in nobiles who aspired to attain the public position they thought their due, and also in non-nobles who had the same aspirations. To put it in other words : there were accepted conceptions about the conditions of dwelling and standard of living fitting the higher group in the senatorial class, and everyone who wished to enter this group endeavoured to live ac­ cording to these notions!47). It would be wrong to assume that senators possessed no more than luxurious houses in Rome. Crassus acquired whole quarters in Rome and used to let flats for hiring (no. 159). M. Cicero had at least two insulae, one on the Aventine and the other on the Argiletum [and it is possible that he had more (no. 211, i)]. The value of this property was more than one million sesterces. Q. Cicero had an insula on the Argiletum, which was worth about one million sesterces (Cic., Au., 1. 14,7). It seems that Hor­ tensius owned profitable property in Puteoli (no. 150). Lucceius had vici in Rome which were bought by Caelius (no. 105). Octavian probably had in­ sulae (no. 153, iii). It may be added that senators sometimes leased out their own houses. Q. Cicero let his house in the Carinae, when he was away from Rome (no. 212). Clodius leased out a part of his house on the Palatine (no. 118). We may, therefore, conclude that senators had not only luxurious houses ; that even luxurious houses could be profitable ; and finally, that the same group of senators prominent for their luxurious houses owned profitable property as well. 2.— Types o f Property Before considering senatorial property outside Rome it will be usefull to insert a short discussion of the terms used to describe the possessions we are going to deal with. Cato uses three words : villa, fundus, praedium. The word villa in Cato’s book denotes merely the building, or group of buildings, in an estate. He distinguishes between the dwelling-building of an estate, the villa urbana, and the buildings assigned for production needs, the villa rustica (48). Fundus denotes the entire estate, but mainly its fields (49). The word praedium conveys the same meaning as fundus, and in a few cases he uses the word a g e ri50). Cato’s view is that an estate, and it (47) The fact that so little is known about houses of other groups of senators does not invalidate my conclusion. Ancient writers wanted to illustrate the luxury style of living, and therefore the instances they give are typical, and show that this style was prevalent among a certain group of senators. (48) C ato, Agr.. I. 4 ; 2. 1 and 3 ; 3. 1-2, 4 ; 5. 5 ; 14. 1 and 3-5; 15; 39. 1-2; 143. 2. (49) C ato, Agr., 2. 1 ; 3. 1 ; 7. 1 , 141. 1-2 . 142. 1 ; 144. 1-2; 146. 1-2. (50) Cato, A gr. I . 1 and 5 -7 ; 4 ; 105 1

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

25

does not matter which term he uses, is a productive unit primarily based on agriculture, though it is desirable to develop industry too. The villa exists only as a part of an estate ( 50. The same terms appear also in Varro's book. Like Cato he uses fundus to designate an estate or its fields ( 5152). Praedium has the same meaning as fun­ dus, but its use is restricted to a few instances ( 53). Ager means an estate in a few cases ( 54). Villa has more than one meaning, as shown by the con­ versation of the interlocutors in the second chapter of the third book. A splendid urban house, like Appius’ house at the Campus Martius, may be referred to by this word. This meaning is clearly connected with the original meaning of the word. At first it had signified the estate’s buildings and we have already noticed the distinction made by Cato between dwellingbuildings and productive ones. The distinction appears in Varro’s book too. Though Varro knows that the term villa was sometimes used to denote ur­ ban houses, this is not the villa he is interested in. Outside town the villa is a part of an estate. !t might refer to a luxurious house, but primarly it denotes a unit of agricultural production. The third book of Varro treats of villae, in which poultry, fish, bees, and other livestock are bred in closed structures and in a limited area ( 55). It is Varro’s opinion that every estate has to include such a villa ( 56), and yet he admits the existence of villae that are not included in large estates (57). Finally, an estate might be denoted by a neuter adjective derived from a place-name ( 58). We may assume that the meanings given to these terms by Cato and Varro conform to actual conditions in their time. Both of them use the same

(51) For all this cf. Schulten, RE, 7, 296-301 ; O rth, RE, 12, 6 5 7-660; Hug, RE, 22, 1213-9 , Van Boren, RE, 8A, 2142-2153 ; Schulten, Diz. Ep., 3, 338-347 ; Humbert. D. S., 2. 1366 f. •, 4, 611 ; Grenier, D. S„ 5, 870-881 ; Lafayet, O. S., 5, 8 81-892; Dohr, /r. Gut., 9-11. (52) Varro, RR, 1 . 5 , 3 ; 11, 1. The meaning of fundus is quite clear in Varro's book. See 1. 1 ,2 ; 2, 9-10 and 21 ; 4, 2 ; 5, 3-4 ; 6, 1 ; 7, 5 ; 11, 1 ; 13, 3-6 ; 14, 1 ; 15 ; 16, 1-6 ; 17, I , 5 ; 18, 3-4 and 6 ; 19, 2 ; 20, 5 , 21 ; 22, 2-3 ; 23, 1 ; 24, 3 , 35, 1 , 2 Praef 6 , 2 3. 7 , 4 , 3 ; 3 2. 13 ; 1 White’s view seems to be that the normal meaning of fundus does not include the fields of an estate (Latifundia, 7 3 ); if so, he is surely wrong. (53) Varro, RR, 1. 5, 3 ; 15, 1 ; 16, 2-3 and 6 ; 29, 2 ; 2. 3, 10. (54) Varro, RR, 1. 2, 23 ; 4, 4-5 ; 6, 1 ; 7, 1. (55) Varro, RR, 3. 2, 10-11 ; 3, 1 ; 5, 9-17. On the villa as a dwelling house in a city see 3 2, 1-18;

17, 10. (56) Varro, RR, 1. 1. 11 ; 3. 2, 16-7; 3, :5. (57) Varro, RR, 3. 2, 13 ; 16, 10. For the use of villa by Varro, see 1. 1 ,1 1 : 2 , 10 and 14 ; 5, 4 , 11, 1-2; 12, 1 and 3 ; 13, 1 ; 3-4 , 6 - 7 , 16, 3-4 , 22, 6 ; 36 ; 37, 4 , 56 ; 2. Praef, 5 ; 2. 4, 19 ; 10, 6 ; 3 1, 8-10 ; 2, 2-18 ; 3, 1 -7 ; 5, 9 , 7, 1 ; 9, 1-2 and 16-7 ; 15, 2 ; 16, 10-12 and 15 ; 17, 1-3. (58) Varro, RR, I. 15 ; 3. 2 , 7, 17, 9. This usage is very common in Cicero's writings.See lam ., 5 15, 2 ; 7. 11, 2 ; 11. 27, 3 , 12 20 , A tt, 1 4. 3 , 2 4, 6 , 16, 4 ; 5. 2, I ; 10 15, 4 , 1 5 26, I. Some estates derived their names from those of their owners, cf. Kuzischin, Latifundia. 73 f

26

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

terms and on the whole with the same meanings. Still there is one im­ portant difference. Cato is not aware of the possibility that a villa might exist separately. For him the villa is an inseparable part of an estate. By Varro’s time conditions had changed. Every estate includes a villa but a villa might have an independent existence. Moreover, Varro has to admit, though with disapproval, that in his times there are villae whose function is not to produce for profit (59). Having examined the terms used to indicate estates, we can now proceed to a detailed discussion of the character of senatorial property based on the specific details we have. To some extent the character of the possessions is connected with their geographical location. It can be demonstrated that senators' possessions were scattered all over Italy despite the apparent prominence of Latium and Campania (see infra). There is no doubt that possessions outside Latium and Campania were basically agricultural estates. This is proven by the fact that they included pastures, where herds of cattle, sheep and horses were bred, and in some, if not in all, even cereals were grown ( 60). Furthermore, it is only in Latium and Campania that we read in literary evidence of country seats kept merely for pleasure. Our next, task is to find out what sorts of estates senators had in Latium and Campania. The question is whether the villae were merely dwellingbuildings or formed part of an estate. In other words, did the villa urbana exist as an independent unit or was it accompanied by a villa rustica and a fundus ? The archeological excavations held in Campania provide some relevant material. The 4.3 villas that have been revealed in these excavations can be classified into the following types : a) A composite estate of which the component parts were a vast tract of land ; buildings for the exploitation of the estate’s crops; a quite luxurious residence: which served the absentee land-owner on his visits.

(59) RR, 3. 2, 6. I think that in discussing these terms we have mainly to rely on agronomists and only in the second place on other literary evidence. O f course, definitions by jurists and lexica may help too. These definitions may reflect later conditions, yet see the remark of H. D’Arbois de Jubainville on Dig., SO. 16. 27 : "Ainsi ie fundus est propriete rurale avec batim ent— ou bailments — d ’exploitation ; la villa e’est le batiment ou l’ensemble des batiments destines a rexploitation" (NRHD, 24 (1900), 212). See also N icolet, Or. Eq., 299 ff. (60) On livestock breeding in Umbria, Lucania and Apulia see Varro, RR, 2. Praef., 6 ; 2. 9, 6 ; 10, 11. We can get an idea of conditions in Sabinum from Axius’ estate at Reate (n°. 100); see also Varro, RR, 2. Praef., 6 ; 2. 6, 1. For conditions in Etruria see n° 118 with n. 24 and n° 139. On cattle breeding in Bruttium see V arro, RR, 2. I, 2. On the continuation of cereal growing see Varro, RR, 1. 2, 6 f. ; Strabo, 5. 2, 10 ; D ion H al., 1. 37 ; Plin., NH, 3. 41 and Brunt, It. Mart., ch. 20. On ar­ cheological evidence for grain production in south Campania see Day, YC'LS, 3 (1932), 172 f.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

27

b) A small estate cultivated by the farmer himself or with the help of few workers. c) An estate that formed an economic manufacturing unit, almost an agricultural factory. Manufacturing of wine and oil was dominant in the first and third types. It is important to note that Agrippa Postumus owned one of these villas which had probably belonged to his father. This villa is of the first type (61). The above classification, however, which is repeated by almost all who write on these villas, is somewhat misleading, since in some of the villas no evidence of agricultural activity has been produced. This, of course, does not prove that these villas were no more than luxurious residences, as it is admitted that a separate villa rustica may have existed too (62). The villa of Agrippa Postumus might be typical of senators’ possessions, but we cannot be sure. And again all the 43 villas, including that of Agrippa, are situated in southern Campania and on the slopes of the Vesuvius and nearby Pom­ peii, whereas most senatorial estates were close to the coast; at Cumae, Neapolis, Puteoli and Baiae. The coastal villas were probably different from those excavated in other parts of Campania. On the other hand, it is plausible that senators aimed at making their estates as self-sufficient as possible, to keep down costs ( 63). Thus the archeological evidence cannot provide a clear and definite an­ swer to the question posed. It is time to turn to information available from literary sources. Varro says that a villa by the seaside is a profitable business (RR, 3.2,17). The third book of Varro’s De Re Rustica is devoted to villas situated in the vicinity of cities. He mentions an estate at Alba that yields an income of 10,000 sesterces from the fields, while its villa’s in­ come is 20,000 sesterces (RR, 3.2,17). What we know about Cicero’s possessions in Latium and in Campania is instructive. His estates at Tusculum, Puteoli, Cumae and Pompeii consisted of luxury villas as well as considerable tracts of land. At Arpinum, Frusino and other unidentified places he had purely agricultural estates (no. 211, i). The estates of Q. Cicero at Arpinum had been originally agricultural farms, but he enlarged

(61) For these villas see C arrington, JRS, 21 (1931), 10-30 ; id., Antiquity, 8 (1934), 261-280; id., Pompeii, 84 ff.; Day, YCLS, 3 (1932), 167-208 ; Yeo, Rom. SI., 446-451 ; Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, 551-3. For two recently excavated villas, about ten miles north west from Capua, see PBSR, 33 (1965), 55-69. For Agrippa’s villa see D’Arms, Romans, 231-2. (62) “ Thus ... the villa di Diomede built during the lifetime of Varro contained no sign of agricultural equipment, which must have been housed in separate buildings” (C arrington, Pompeii, 94). (63) Cf. C arrington, JR S, 21 (1931), 12. On wine produced by Hortensius see n° 150. For the location of the villas see Day, YCLS, 3 (1932), 168.

28

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

and embellished the dwelling-buildings. L. Abuccius’ estate near Alba in­ cluded pasturage and aviaries (no. 76). Varro’s estate at Tusculum was a fundus, that is, comprised more than a house (RR, 3. 3,8). Metellus Scipio owned an estate in which he bred geese for commercial purpose. It is likely that this farm was in the vicinity of a town, perhaps in Latium (no. 103). The estate of M. Aufidius Lurco was situated in a similar place, and there he raised peacocks, which brought him high profits (no. 96). The villa ur­ bana was only one part of Varro’s estate at Casinum (no. 204). It seems then that senatorial estates in Campania and Latium usually included productive parts even in this period, though the upkeep of a villa urbana at Puteoli or Cumae might have exceeded the income of its fundus. What do we know about the development of the luxurious villas? We first find these villas at the beginning of the first century ; they became prominent after Sulla ( 64). In the places where extravagant villas were to be found there had been previously agricultural estates. The owners either inherited these estates, or bought them, or obtained them during the proscriptions of Sulla. Having acquired these possessions, they enlarged and decorated the mansions. The works carried out by Q. Cicero in his estates at Arpinum disclose the usual process: the erection of a country seat on an agricultural estate. The little we know from archeological finds, the information provided by literary sources and the reconstruction of the historical development all in­ dicate that the luxurious villa was usually part of a larger estate ; the presence of a villa indicates the existence of an estate. Of course, as Varro says explicitly, there were also independent villas and, indeed, Cicero had such possessions at Antium and Astura (211, i), but these were not the common type. Therefore we may assume that when senatorial property out­ side Rome is mentioned in our sources it normally refers to agricultural possessions, except perhaps in Campania and Latium. In both these regions estates with luxury villas, and, to a less extent, independent luxury villas were to be found. But it should not be supposed that senators’ estates were solely devoted to agricultural production. We have seen that already in the

(64) Fish ponds were characteristic of these villas; on them see Varro, RR, 3 3, 10 and cf. 3. 2, 6. Some scholars date the origin of the villa urbana to the second century as a result of the profitable wars in the East (see, e.g. Schmidt, Villen. 312). There may have been some development in the second cen­ tury (see Cic., L e g . 2. 3), but surely the villa urbana of that time should not be imagined as a luxury establishment of the type known from the post-Sullan period ; the villa of Scipio Africanus at Liternum is evidence to the contrary (Sen., Ep.. 84). For a detailed study of the evidence of the second century see d'A rms, Romans, 9-16, with some of his arguments I cannot agree. Thus he is wrong in considering Scipio Aelimianus as one of the wealthiest men of the time (see n° 14), while Laelius’ villa at Formiae was very likely productive.

CHAPTER I.

PROPERTY

29

second century Cato possessed woodland, ponds and pitch manufactures. Asinius Pollio, Octavian, Pansa and Agrippa are known to have manufac­ tured tiles and bricks on their estates, not to mention senators who produced amphorae for their own products ( 65). However, we are not able to say to what extent industry was developed, though it may be assumed that natural resources in estates were utilized by the owners. Outside Rome senators also owned deversoria, which are known to us especially from Cicero's writings (no. 211, i). These houses were designed to give a resting place and shelter for the night for their owners when passing through the country. They could thus avoid the necessity of resor­ ting to inns. These might be called villae too. 3.—- Property outside Rome Latium holds on to its prominent place — about 71 senators are known to have owned property there in this period (66). Tusculum is very popular as can be inferred from the fact that 25 senators have estates here. Next comes senatorial property in the vicinity of Minturnae-Formiae with 18 senators. Lanuvium has 9 senators and both Alba and Tibur have 8 senators. The other places are : Aricia — 4 ; Astura — 4 ; Antium — 4 ; Arpinum — 3 ; Ostia — 2 ; Anagnia — 2 ; Circei — 2 ; Casinum — 2 ; Tarracina— 2 ; Caieta — 2 ; Sinuessa— 2 ; Praeneste— 2 ; Lauren­ tum — 1 ; Bovillae— 1 ; Velitrae— 1 ; Norba — 1 ; Interamna— 1 : Labici— 1 ; Solonium— 1 ; Frusino— 1 ; A tina— 1 ; Ferentinum — 1 (67). Next to Latium comes Campania ; 46 senators are known as owners of property in this part of Italy (68). The estates are distributed among the

(65) See nos 93, 153, ii, 219, 220. More or this subject see in ch. 5, i. (66) See table IV (including men who had begun their senatorial career in the former period). (67) Tusculum — nos 44, 62, 8 1 ,9 1 , ii, 93, 121, 129, 136, 147, 148, 150. 153, m. 155. 160. 165, 186, i, 191, 199, 204, 206, 211, i, 121. For Q. Coelius Latiniensis, M. Coelius Vinicianus and Q. Terentius Culleo see table IV. Formiae — n°! 62. 92, 97, 98, 110. 125, 127, 141, 168, 186, i, 202, 207, 208, 211, i. For M’. Lepidus, L Aurelius Cotta and L. Vargunteius see table IV Lanuvium — nos 78, 86, 121, 153, iii, 155, 162, 207, 211, i. For L. Luscius Ocrea see table IV, Alba — n” 76, 104, 118, 125, 153, iii, 186, i, 194, 211, i. Tibur — nos 78, 91, ii, 103, 107, 152, iv, 153, iii, 177, 193. Aricia— n“ 118, 152, iv, 153, iii, 154. Astura — n“ 155, 171, 209, 211, i. Antium — n“ 78, 153, iii, 211, i, and for Caecilius see table IV, Arpinum — n“ 104, 211, i, 212. Ostia — n“ 98, 115. Anagnia— n° 211, i, and T. Titius (table IV). Circei — n " 78, 155. Casinum — nos 91, ii, 204. Tarracina — n° 140 and M. Favonius (table IV). Caieta — nos 80, 177. Sinuessa — n°s 80. 211. i. Praeneste— n“ 153, iii, 157 (?). Laurentum — n° 150. Bovillae — Sex. Teidius (table IV). Velitrae — n" 178. N orba— n° 180. Interam na— n° 109. Labici — n° 152, iv. Solonium — n° 101. Frusino — n° 211, i. Atina — n° 182. Ferentinum — n° 148. (68) See table V (including men who had begun their career in the former period).

30

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

following places : Cumae — 20 ; Neapolis — 12 ; Puteoli — 8 ; Baiae — 8 ; Pompeii — 3 ; Nolla — 2 ; Bauli — 2 ; Herculaneum — 2 ; Falernum — 2; Vesuvius — 2 ; Pausylipum— 1 ; Surrentum— 1 ; Mi­ senum— 1 ; Liternum— 1 ; Acerrae— 1 ; Salernum— 1 ; Casi­ linum— 1. Senators also have possessions in islands close to the Cam­ panian coast: Aenaria— 1 ; Nesis— 1 (69). Senatorial possessions can be located in the followinv regions of Italy : Etruria — ca. 19 senators; Sabinum — ca. 8 ; Picenum — ca. 6 ; Lucania — 5 ; Umbria — 5 ; Sarnnium — 5 ; Gallia Cisalpina — 5 ; Brut­ tium — 4 ; Apulia — 2 ; Calabria — 2 ( 70). For the provinces we have the following information: Asia — 5 ; Spain — 4 ; Africa — 4 ; Sicily — 4 ; Chersonese — 3 ; Greece —- 3 ; Gallia — 2 ; Istria — 2 ; Epirus — 2 ( 71). The all important question is to what extent these figures truly represent the actual distribution of the property of the whole senatorial class. I have already expressed my uneasiness about the data we have for the former period and I think to accept the extant information for this period as it stands, thereby implying that it is something like a statistical sample, would be hasty and uncritical. Nor are we without means for checking and evaluating the particulars given. First, it is useful to examine the propor­ tional representation of the various groups that form the senatorial class. The classification of the known senators into these groups give the following results (see p. 31) (72). These tables show that the various groups of the senatorial class are not represented in our data in true proportion to their relative numbers in the Senate. The percentage of the patricians is disproportionate to their actual number in the Senate during this period (except as regards estates in other parts of Italy and the provinces). Under one tenth of the senators were patricians, and yet according to our information 21.2 % of the senators in (69) Cumae — n“ 62, 84, 88, 91, n, 1 13, 121, 132, 148, 155, 168, 171, 186, i, 194, 202, 204, 211, i, 219. For P. Servilius Isauricus, C. Valerius Triarius and L. Volcatius Tullus see table V. Neapolis — n“ 110, 121, 133, 139, 144, 154, 160, 171, 186, i, 188(?), 192(?), 219. Puteoli — nos 121, 125, 129, 150, 165, 171, 21 1, i, 219. Baiae— n“ 72, 101, 125, 152, iv, 153, iii, 160, 186, i, 204. Pompeii — n“ 62, 211, i, 219-220. Nola — rios 153, iii, 178. Bauli— n“ 150, 187. Herculaneum— n“ 107, 116. Note also the estate of M. Fabius Gallus (Cic., Fam., 9. 25, 3). Falernum — n° 186, i, and L. Quinctius (table V). Vesuvius — n” 204, 210. Pausylipum — n° 153, iii. Surrentum — n° 153, iii. Misenum — n° 91, i. Liternum — n° 113. Acerrae — n° 145. Salernum — n° 184. Casilinum — M. Minatius Sabinus, (table V). Aenaria — 91, i. Nesis — n° 160. (70) See table VI. It should be remembered that some cases are doubtful. (71) See table VII. (72) See tables IV-VII. Doubtful cases have been taken into account in the preparation of the tables of comparison.

31

CHAPTER I — PROPERTY

Region

Patricians

Plebeians

Total

Latium

15-21.2%

56-78.8%

71

Campania

9-19.5%

37-80.5%

46

Etruria

5-26.3%

14-73.7%

19

Other parts of Italy

1- 2.9 96

34-97.1 %

35

Provinces

1- 4.3%

22-95.7%

23

Region

Nobiles

Non-Nobiles

Total

Latium

40-56.4%

31-43.6%

71

Campania

26-56.5%

20-43.5%

46

Etruria

10-52.6%

9-47.4%

19

Other parts of Italy Provinces

7-20 % 10-43.4%

28-80

%

35

13-56.6%

23

Region

Consulars

Praetorii

Others

Total

Latium

37-52.1%

19-26.7%

15-21.2%

71

Campania

26-56.5%

14-30.4%

6-13.1%

46

8-42.1 %

3-15.8%

8-42.1%

19

Other parts of Italy

13-37.1%

10-28.5%

12-34.4%

35

Provinces

11-47.8%

5-21.5%

7-30.7%

23

Etruria

32

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Latium, 19,5% of the senators in Campania and 26.3% of the senators in Etruria were patricians. The nobiles were a minority in the Senate, especially after the enlargement of the Senate by Caesar and the triumvirs, but they are represented in inverse ratio to their number in the Senate. Similarly con­ sular, who constituted less than 9 % of the members of the Senate in 55 (73), appear in the tables as 37 to 56 %. Despite this lack of correlation, or just because of it, this information makes it possible to draw some con­ clusions. The tables show that the percentage of the smaller groups in the Senate, to wit patricians, nobiles and consular, is higher in Latium, Cam­ pania and Etruria, but diminishes in other parts of Italy. On the other hand, the percentage of the larger groups is smaller in Latium, Campania and Etruria but increases very much in other parts of Italy. We must deduce that the higher concentration of senatorial estates in Campania and Latium, and to some extent in Etruria, gives a false impression. Most of the reported senators were consulars, patricians and nobiles and they indeed had especially numerous possessions in Latium and Campania, as well as property in other parts of the peninsula. On the other hand the property of aedilicii, tribunicii, and quaestorii was better distributed all over Italy. On examing the details concerning the consulars alone one can see that they may supply a representative sample of this group. Between Sulla and Ac­ tium there were approximately 100 consuls. The fact that 37 consulars owned property in Latium and 26 consulars in Campania justifies us in concluding that persons of this group usually had possessions in these regions. If fewer consulars are known to have owned property in other parts of Italy this may suggest that there really was less consular property in these regions. But we must not exaggerate. Estates in other regions are not likely to attract attention and consequently their chance of being mentioned is smaller. Another consideration leads to the same conclusions. Most of our in­ formation is derived from Cicero’s works, especially from his letters. Cicero’s possessions, which are fairly well known to us, were situated in (73 i The following are the results of the investigation of Willems on the composition of the senate in 55 (Sena!, I, 555) Patricians Princeps Senatus Ordo Censorius Ordo Consularis Ordo Praetorius Ordo Aedilicius Curulis Ordo Aedilicius Plebeius Ordo Tribunicius Ordo Quaestorius

1 7 :>s 120 7 '» 53 199

_ 2 6 16 2 — — 17

Plebeians 1 5 22 104 5 9 53 182

CHAPTER i — PROPERTY

33

Latium and Campania. He often mentions his neighbour senators in these places, hence the comparatively abundant information about senatorial estates in these regions. It is also noteworthy that Cicero mostly refers to either consulars or nobiles and these are precisely the dominant groups in our data. Varro, on the other hand, does not provide much specific in­ formation about senators’ property, but it is significant that he discusses property outside Latiurn and Campania. Finally, the problem of the location of senatorial possessions rnay be ap­ proached from another aspect. After the grant of Roman citizenship to the entire population of Italy, citizens from all parts of the peninsula could become senators. Sulla added 300 members to the Senate, some of them Italians !74). In the period following his dictatorship, many individual senators are known to be of Italian origin, to say nothing of general statements about Italian senators!75). Caesar admitted to the Senate many from all parts of Italy !76). These new senators of Italian origin generally did not advance to the higher magistracies in Rome, that is, they belonged to the groups whose property we have other grounds for thinking was distributed throughout the peninsula. Naturally these Italians had property in their native places. The problem of the location of senators' property has been approached from three aspects and in each the results have been the same. Most con­ sulars, nobiles and patricians owned property in Latium and Campania. Im­ possible though it is to state how many of them owned property in other regions, it can be maintained that the number was considerable. The

(74) On the Sullan senators see Note B (with some bibliography). The following Sullan senators had property outside Latium and Campania ; C. Annaeus Brocchus (n° 85), Q Axius (n° 100), L. Minucius Basilus (n° 176). As the tribes of the following senators did not include any territory in Campania and Latium, it follows that they probably had property outside these regions L Claudius, C. Claudius Glaber, L. Faberius, L. Lartius, M. Octavius Ligus, L Titurius Sabinus and L. Voluscius See T aylor, VDRR, ch. 13. Following Wiseman (NM RS, ch. 3, i), we may add the following (the number in brackets refer to Wiseman’s list): Gallia Cisalpina — C. Publicius (346), C. Publicius (347). Picenum — C. Sornatius (406). Etruria — C. Flaminius (179), C. Tarquitius Priscus (420). Sabinum — C. Attius Celsus (58). Samnium — L. Marcilius (247) Apulia — M. Fabius Hadrianus (167). Sicily — Cn. Heius (202) (75) See Cic., Sui/., 24 ; Sall., Ep. Caes. Sen., 2. 11,3. On Italian senators in the post-Sullan period see Syme, PBSR, 6 (1938), 4-6 ; 24 ; Gadba, Athenaeum, 32 (1954), 98-108 ; Wiseman, NM RS, ch. 3, ii. (76) On Caesar’s new senators see Syme, lb., 12-22 ; RR, 78-96 ; Wiseman, NM RS, ch. 3, m. See also Cic., Phil., 3. 15.

34

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

possessions of other groups of the senatorial class were spread over all parts of Italy. Our information regarding senatorial property in the provinces is disap­ pointing. We would expect to find many senators owning property in Sicily, the oldest province. Actually only three are known ; a consular’s wife also owned property in the island. One can infer from a passage of Cicero that the number of landowning senators in Sicily was not insignificant but with this our information is exhausted ( 771. L. Volumnius and M. Crassus were possibly not the only senators to own property in Spain ( 78), and I suspect that more than four owned property in A frica!79), but it is impossible to prove it. The position was possibly similar in Asia and Greece ( 80). We may assume that during the civil wars of the last two decades of the Republic many senators acquired possessions in the eastern provinces!81). Positive evidence for the existence of senatorial property in Egypt is known only from the period after Actium ! 82). To sum up, the paucity of evidence is no proof that there was little senatorial property in the provinces ; on the other hand, because we know that 23 senators owned property in the provinces, we cannot conclude that such ownership was very common. How far were senators accumulating property in this period? We can deal with this question by various considerations. It is significant that some senators had several estates, sometimes numerous ones, normally dis­ tributed among diverse regions of Italy. Sixty seven senators owning more than one estate are known. Of these senators 39 are consulars, 18 are praetorii and 10 of lower magistracies ; 36 are nobiles ; 12 are patricians as against 55 plebeians ! 83). It becomes evident enough that the property of consulars was made up of a set of estates and was not consolidated into one unit. The property of the nobiles was of the same type. The extant in­ formation suggests that senators of lower ranks too tended to own separate estates but to what extent cannot be said. This phenomenon by itself in­ dicates considerable accumulation of property by senators.

(77) See n“ 85, 205, 220 ; Cic., Verr.. 2. 3, 97. On Roman citizens in Sicily see Scramuzza, ESAR, 3, 337 f. (78) On Spain cf. Van Nostrand, ESAR, 3, 125 f . ; 143 f. On L. Volumnius see V arro, RR, 2. 4, II.

(79) On property of Romans in Africa see H aywood, ESAR, 4, 28 f. ; 83 f. (80) On Romans in Asia in this period see Broughton, ESAR, 4, 543-554 ; Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, 9 5 8 ; 1565; Magie, Asia, 2 5 0 -2 5 8 ; 1129, n. 5 5. (81) On conditions in Asia Minor during the civil wars see Broughton, ESAR, 4, 579-590; Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, 989-1 0 1 4 ; Magie, Asia, 402-426 (82) See the list of Roman landowners in Egypt in SEHRE, 669-672. (83) See (able VIII, which includes some doubtful cases.

35

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

A list of senators whose property value is more or less known to us may give a further clue to this question T. Antistius L. Balbus Augustus M. Crassus

L. Lucullus Pompey Cato Q. Malleolus L. Tarius Rufus M. Cicero

18 million sesterces several tens of millions of sesterces more than 1000 million sesterces 1. In his youth he had 7.2 million sesterces 2. Afterwards — ca. 200 million about 100 million sesterces at least 200 million sesterces about 3.6 million sesterces at least 2.5 million sesterces estates in Picenum — 100 million sesterces about 13 million sesterces

n° 87 n° 121 n° 153

n° n° n° n° n°

159 160 186 189 190

n° 189 n° 211, i

The list is significant as it reveals a differentiation in the amount of property owned by senators. There existed one group of very rich senators, viz. consulars who owned property worth 100 million sesterces and more. But we know very well that these were precisely the richest people in Rome. They had made unusual profits: in wars, external and civil as well. Probably other consulars had less property, especially those who had no access to war profits, like Cicero. Secondly, the list shows that senators who had not at­ tained the higher magistracies owned property worth several million sester­ ces. It is clear, therefore, that it is misleading to talk about an ‘average property’ of senators. But despite this differentiation in the amount of property owned by senators of different standing, it should be remembered that even senators of low standing in the senatorial hierarchy owned con­ siderable property ( 84). We have information on the value of several estates. The suburban estate of C. Albimus Scaurus' estate at Tusculum An estate of Lucilius Hirrus Lucullus' estate at Baiae An estate of M. Silius Cicero’s estate at Tusculum Cicero’s estate at Formiae Cicero’s deversoria The 13 estates of Roscius Amerinus The average value of each estate

HS HS HS HS HS HS HS HS HS HS

11.5 million 30 million 4 million 10 million 3.2 mtHton 875,000(7) 437,500(7) 30-50,000 6 million 460,000

n° 83 Plin., NH, 36. 115 n° 166 P lut, Mar., 34 t i c ., An., 12. 25 n° 211, i n° 211, i n° 211, i Cic., Rose. Am., 6 ; 20

(84) Mommsen writes that a modest senatorial property was worth HS 3 million (Hist., 4, 175 f.).

36

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The estates of Lucullus, Scaurus and Hirrus were extravagant and ex­ ceptional. Their high value depended on the luxurious buildings, the precious embellishments, decorations, jewellery and fish ponds they comprised!85). The estate of Albinius owed its high price to its neigh­ bourhood to Rome ( 86). The estates of Cicero, of Silius and of Roscius are probably representative of the more common type, that is, estates worth several hundred thousands of sesterces. Previously we came to the con­ clusion that the property of senators was made up of a set of estates. A set of estates like that of Lucullus is worth several scores of millions of sester­ ces and a set of estates of the other type is worth several million sesterces, though, of course, a senator would not possess only one type of estates. The last problem we want to treat is that of the extent of the acreage owned by senators. Pliny states that the landed property of Crassus was worth 200 million sesterces, and that of Sulla seems to have been of the same order (HN, 33. 134). A considerable part of Crassus’ lands was urban (no. 159) and it is likely that Sulla too owned urban lands. Nevertheless it is clear that they had tens of thousands of iugera ( 87). L. Tarius Rufus had a similar amount of land, as his lands in Picenum were worth 100 million sesterces (no. 203). Metellus Pius (no. 44). 1L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (no. 139) and T. Pompeius (no. 185) owned estates of similar extent. What we know about their property makes it reasonable that the following possessed acreage of the same order: M. Aemilius Lepidus (no. 78), M. Scaurus (no. 81). Clodius (no. 118), Caesar (no. 152), Octavian (no. 153), Lucullus (no. 160), Pompey (no. 186), Varro (no. 204), and Agrippa (no. 220). Most of these senators not only had in common consular standing or noble origin ; they had also acquired, or enlarged, their possessions by war profits (88). The existence of property of such large scale must have brought about the formation of latifundia, even though it was not concentrated in one region but made up of several units. Where could these latifundia be found? The only senators known to have owned a large-sized estate in Latium is Lucullus (no. 159), though, it is probable that Brutus (no. 155), and Varro

(85) Probably the estates of Piso at Herculaneum (n° 107), of Gabinius at Tusculum (n° 147), of Clodius at Alba (n° 118), of Hortensius at Baiae (n° 150) and of Caesar at Aricia (n° 152, iv) were of this type. (86) Urban property was, of course, very expensive. For prices of houses in Rome see p. 23. Ac­ cording to Duncan-Jones, Caesar paid HS 73 millions per iu^erum for the erection of the Basilica lulia (PBSR, 33 (1965), 225). (87) See Note E on land prices. (88) Pompey’s elder son enlisted 800 men from his slaves and shepherds in the civil war (C aes., BC, 3. 4, 4). This large number shows that he had extensive estates.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

37

(no. 204) had large estates at Lanuvium and Casinum respectively. Other large estates were situated in Picenum, Etruria, south Italy and in the provinces (89). Alongside these latifundia there existed medium-sized estates. We have already noted that the average size of the 13 estates of Roscius Amerinus in the Tiber valley was 400 — 600 iugera (p. 20). Q. Axius’ estate at Reate in Sabinum spread over 200 iugera (no. 100). Cicero’s property at Arpinum was composed of several moderate fields or farms (no. 211, i). The little evidence about Cicero’s estates at Tusculum and Campania hints rather at moderate tracts of land. These data are far from what we would like to know, but they suggest that medium-sized estates were quite common. IV.—

P

r o s c r ip t io n s

and

C

o n f is c a t io n s

Senatorial leaders had a decisive part in the fierce political struggles of the late Republic, and the majority of the senatorial class were involved in these contentions, willingly or unwillingly. The property of senators was directly influenced by these events as military and political victories were generally accompanied by physical annihilation of the defeated adversaries, whose property passed to the victors. Moreover, these victories caused changes in the Senate’s composition. A survey of the changes in the social structure of the Senate as well as of the confiscations might complete the discussion of the problems that have already been treated.

(89) Large estates of Crassus were probably situated in Marsicum and in Bruttium (n“ 159). Pompey and L.Tarius Rufus had large estates in Picenum(n“ 186, i, 203). Considerable landed property of Clo­ dius, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and probably of Caesar and Augustus was to be found m Etruria (n“ 118, 139, 152, lv, 153, ii). The absorption of small holdings into larger estates in southern Etruria in the iate Republic may be inferred from an archeological survey made north of the Via Flaminia, few miles from Rome. See C. D. B. J ones, PBSR, 31 (1963), 146. Antony, Augustus, T. Pompeius and Agrippa had large estates in the provinces (nos 91, iv, 153, iii, 185. 220) The pagus Lucullanus in Samnium must indicate a great estate of a Lucullus near Beneventum (CIL, 9, 1618, 3). It is very likely that Lucilius Hirrus possessed large tracts of land in Bruttium (n° 166). Since breeding of herds and flocks was prac­ tised on large scale in Lucania and Apulia, it follows that large estates were to be found there (Varro, RR, 2. 9, 6 ; 10, 11). Varro had possessions both in Apulia and Lucania, and Pompey owned property in the last region. Great estates were probably developed in several parts of Latium (supra, n. 13). In ad­ dition to Lucullus, Brutus and Varro, mentioned in the text, note Valgius’ estate in Casinum (Cic , Leg. Agr., 3. 14) and the concentration of the Praenestine land in few hands (Cic., Leg. Agr., 2. 78). The Eques Gaberius owned 1,000 iugera near R ome (Varro, RR, 2. 3, 10), and another such estate of 1,000 iugera is known, which perhaps belonged to a senator (n° 83). For the probable development of large estates in the less fertile parts of Latium see Brunt, It. Man., ch. 20, i. I do not agree with Yeo that latifundia spread in great numbers in Campania (Roin. SI., 455 fT.). That this is not true of southern Campania we can infer from the archeological evidence, which is admitted by Yeo himseif. Yeo’s arguments are too general and depend heavily on later evidence. This is not to deny that there were some latifundia there. See also Note A.

38

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

First, let us consider the changes brought about by the civil wars of the years 90-80. According to Eutropius, 291 senators were killed in the Social and civil wars (90). From Appian we may infer that 105 senators were killed in the civil wars of 83-81 and in the proscriptions (91), which suggests that the censors of 89 and 86 had to replace almost 200 senators ( 92). In 81 the number of senators, taking into account those who died naturally, might have diminished by half!93). After the addition of 300 new senators by Sulla the composition of the Senate was completely different from that of the Senate of the nineties (94). Two questions suggest themselves : did the change in the personal com­ position of the Seriate affect the social structure of the institution ? Second, were there resultant changes in the size of properties owned by the senators? Since the activity of the censors of 89 and 86 is hardly known to us, it is useless to raise conjectures about the possible social results of their work C95). Things are different with the addition of 300 senators by Sulla. It is sufficiently clear that we have to prefer the tradition describing them as men of the equestrian order rather than the tradition that describes them of low social classes. But the term ordo equester might be misleading. About 100 of the Sullan senators can be identified, some of them with certainty and the others with high probability ; two thirds of these are descendants of senatorial families. It seems to me that when our sources use the term ordo

(90) Eutrop., 5. 9 ; cf. O ros., 5. 22, 4. Willems rightly remarks that it is impossible that 60 aedilicii were killed and that Eutropius substituted the aedilicii for the praetorii (Senat, 1, 403). (91) App. BC , 1, 103. Information given by other sources (Val. M ax., 9. 2, 1 ; Flor., 3. 21, 25) is useless, since it refers to the number of all the victims. The number of consulars stated by Appian to be killed is certainly mistaken. See Mommsen, H is t , 4, 102 n. and Note B (92) On the censors of 89 and 86 see in MRR. In 89 the census was not completed (Cic., A rch., 11), but this is no proof that a lectio senatus was not held. We must not then take too seriously Appian's statement that Sulla added 300 members to the Senate in 88 (App., BC, 1. 59). By itself this is hardly credible, since Sulla had not enough time to carry out a lectio in that year, and we seem to have here an anticipation of Sulla’s work in 81. Nicolet wants to accept the evidence for the enlargement of the Senate by C. Gracchus, or by Drusus, by the addition of some equites (Or. Eq., 110 and 482 ff.). But Appian, his main support, is not reliable on this point. Appian says that because of the ardaeu; the Senate hardly numbered 300 members in 91 (BC, 1. 35). But no ozdong could have had reduced the number of senators by that year; it seems then that this was the usual number. (93) Cf. W illems, S enat, 1, 403 f . ; Gabba, Athenaeum, 34 (1956), 124. (94) For the sources see Sall ., C at., 3 7 ; Dion Hal ., 5. 77 ; Liv., P er., 89 ; App., BC, 1. 100, and for a discussion Note B. (95) Wiseman thinks that many Marians were among the new enrolled senators in 86 (NM RS, ch. 2, iii). This is doubtful, and, in any case, has no bearing on their social or ethnical position. On the other hand, Wiseman says that the Marians were not ready to open the comitia to the newcomers, and indeed it seems that the censors o f 86 were not favorable to the new citizens. Cf. Badian, SGRH, 223 and 233, n. 8 on Liv., P er., 84.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

39

equester in this connection they mean that Sulla added to the Senate persons qualified by an equestrian census (96) if the proportion between senators of old senatorial families and senators of non-senatorial families was the same as the one that can be established from the extant names, then 100 men of non-senatorial families were added to the Senate. But the number may have been more numerous, since offspring of old senatorial families were usually more successful in advancing in the cursus honorum and are therefore more likely to be mentioned in our sources. The death of so many senators and their relations, about whom we are ill-informed, had a direct bearing on the distribution of property among sons of old senatorial families. The decrease of the number of heirs and the premature death of the testators must have caused concentration of property on a larger scale in the hands of fewer people compared to the normal process of equal division of property among heirs!979810). We cannot in­ vestigate this hypothesis in detail, reasonable though it is (9S). The ad­ mission to the Senate of new senators from Italian families naturally means that their property was to be found in all parts of Italy. The fact that they are called equites does not necessarily mean that they farmed state taxes, or were bankers and men of busi ness rather than landowners arid, hence, it is wrong to draw any inference on their property ("). On the other hand, the confiscation of the property of Sulla’s adversaries, probably of those who had been killed in the war and certainly of people put in the proscriptions (Plut., Sull., 31.4), and its distribution or sale at low price enabled many of the supporters of the dictator to acquire large possessions. Besides, people were proscribed not only on account of their Marian sympathies but also because of their fortunes ; some were first killed and then proscribed ( 10°), and thus the confiscated property is to be reckoned in terms of hundreds of millions of denarii ( I01). Sulla also confiscated much or all the territory of many towns, and thus, though he had to provide his soldiers with land, much remained with which he could compensate his supporters for their h e lp !102). The names of nine senators who made great profits in the

(96) See Note B. (97) On inheritances see ch. II, ii. (98) The mortality among the Licinii Crassii and the Caesares may be taken as an illustration. P. Licinius Crassus, cos. 97, and his two sons were killed in 87 (Z>. G . 4, 612 f.). Five of the Caesares were killed during the years 90-85 (D. G., 3, 114). (99) On Equites see also ch. 5, i. (100) Cic., Rose. Amen, 15 ff.; Cluent., 25 ; Parad., 6. 46; Sall., Hist., 1. 55, 17 ; Uv., Per., 87 ; Vell. Pat., 2. 28, 4 ; Purr., S u it, 31 ; Crass., 6 ; App., B C , 1, 9 6 ; Oros, 5. 21, 4. (101) For sources on rich proscribed see the preceding note, and for discussion Note B. (102) For a list of places where Sulla established colonies or divided lands to his soldiers see SRH, 216-8 ; Frank, ESAR, 1, 220 ; Gabba, Athenaeum, 29 (1951), 271 f. See also Mommsen, Hermes, 18

40

PART ONE — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

proscriptions are known and some more may be identified with plausibility. It can be maintained that the proscriptions enabled three men to ob­ tain possessions almost beyond precedent at Rome : Sulla, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and Crassus we should perhaps add Metellus Pius ( 103). It is obvious that they are not alone as the donations Sulla gave to his adherents and the low prices are mentioned time and again in the sources ( 104). Many of Sulla’s supporters had been persons of substantial means even before and the proscriptions enabled them to create larger estates. To sum up : the civil wars and the proscriptions resulted in an increase in the number of senators owning property outside Latium and Campania, as also in the number holding considerable property. The donations Sulla gave his supporters and the easy opportunities to buy property cheap during the proscriptions were not the sole factors bringing about large-sized possessions. The confiscations and colonization of Sulla had similar, if not immediate, results. Some confiscated lands were not sold or divided, and these, nominally public, were occupied by private people. These persons would have become the legal owners of the occupied land under the bill introduced by Rullus in 63. Cicero emphasizes, perhaps with exaggeration, that these lands were in the possession of a few ()0S). The territory of Arretium and Volaterra in Etruria belonged to this category, though the former owners kept possession of their lands (Cic.,

(1883), 163-8 ; 174 f. ; Beloch, RG, 51! f. ; K ornemann, RE, 4, 522 ; Brunt, It. Man., ch. 19, in. In addition to the property of the proscribed there was the land confiscated from pro-Marian towns, and it is probable that bona vacantia, which were considerable in this period, belonged to the state. See C-aius, 2. 1 5 0 ; Ulp., 28 7 and Brunt, It. Man., 301 and n. 5. The important point is that in addition to the confiscated property of individual persons Sulla had at his disposal large tracts of land with which he could provide the necessary plots for his soldiers, 80,000 according to Brunt, It. Man., ch. 19, 305. (103) The other senators who profited by the proscriptions are the following: M. Aemilius Lepidus (n° 37). C. Antonius !n° 90). Q. Cornelius (n° 120), P. Cornelius Sulla (n° 133), C. Scribonus Curio (n° 72), L. Catilina (n° 197),C Verres (n° 218). The following probably had profits : Lepidus Livianus (n" 38), P. Cornelius Cethegus (n° 124), Cn. Cornelius Dolabella (n° 48), Q Catulus (n“ 62). Note also the Tunranii and the Septimii in Cic., Leg. Agr, 3 8, on which see Syme, Sallust, 13, n. 29. Pliny (NH, 35. 200) states that freedmen of Suila, Catulus, Lucullus and Pompey made fortunes in the proscriptions. That gains were enormous may be inferred from the fact that even a centurion acquired property worth HS 10 million (Ascon.. 90) and that only HS 2,000 were paid for the estates of Roscius Amerinus worth HS 6 million (C ic., Rose Amen, 6). See also P lut., Pomp., 9. 1 ; Comp. Lys. etSull., 3. 3, and next note. (104) Sulla remitted payment for property sold in public auctions in many cases. See Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 81 ; Leg. Agr., 2. 81 ; 3. 7-8 ; 10-12 ; Sa lu Hist., 1. 49 ; 4. 1 (Gellius, 18. 4, 4). Cf. Sall., Cat., 37. 6 ; 51. 34 ; Plut., Pomp., 9. 1 ; Crass., 2 ; 6. 5-7 ; Comp. Lys. et Sull., 3. 3. An estate of Marius bought for 75.000 denarii was later sold for 2. 5 million denarii (Plut , Mar., 34. 2). Sulla’s wife made enor­ mous profits (Plin., NH, 36. 116). Under these conditions it was easy to acquire large possessions. (105) Cic., Leg. Agr, 3. 1 2 -3 ; cf. ib„ 2. 6 8 ; 3. 7.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

4!

Art., 1.19, 4). In general it is probable that the occupiers were Sulla’s sup­ porters, including senators. Valgius, the father-in-law of Rullus, had such holdings at Casinum and in the region of the Hirpini. Cicero claims that Valgius occupied the whole region of the Hirpini, and there is reason to suggest that he was a senator ( 106). The distribution of land to the veterans resulted, no doubt, in breaking up some large-sized properties, but only for a short time. Both Cicero and Sallust assert that the veterans sold their plots of land. The territory of Praeneste, where a colony had been established by Sulla, was not owned by the colonists by 63, but had passed into the hands of a few people, not­ withstanding the prohibition laid down under the lex Cornelia ( l07). Many of the soldiers colonized by Sulla in ETruria joined Catilina. Having become insolvent, they were about to sell or had actually sold their plots. Thus the Sullan colony at Faesulae was the centre of the rebellion (108). The purchase of neighbouring small plots in order to create large estates was well known and Cicero refers to this process in his speech against Rullus’ bill (Leg. Agr., 2.70 ; 78). Thus the information at our disposal shows that in ad­ dition to large-sized possessions formed as an immediate result of the civil war and the proscriptions, latijundia developed in territories where Sulla had distributed lands to his veterans as well as where the confiscated land had not been distributed. We may also note that the extension of estates as a result of buying continuous plots occurred in Tarquinii and Casinum, places which, so far as we know, had not suffered from the Sullan proscrip­ tions (I09). The results of the Second Civil War were different. Caesar had no desire to order proscriptions and total consfiscation of his adversaries' property. We can name no more than 4 senators whose property was certainly con­ fiscated, though we may add other probable instances!110). The decision (106) On Valgius see Cic., Leg. Agr.. 3 8 ; 14. The two sons of a senator named Valgius served in Spam in the second civil war (B ell. H is t , 13. 2). On Q. Valgius, a senator in 129, see Syme, Historia, 6 (1956), 206 ; T aylor, VDRR, 262. Dessau identified him with C. Quinctius Valgus, a rich llvir in Pom­ peii, whose connections with Casinum and Aeclanum are attested by inscriptions (ILLRP. 523 -, 565 = CIL. 9, 1140; 10. 5282). See H erm es. 18 (1883), 620-622. (107) Cic., Leg. A gr., 2. 78. Cf. F lor., 2. 9, 27. (108) Sall., Cat, 16. 4 ; 24. 2 ; 27. 1 ; 28. 4 ; Cic., Cat., 2. 2 0 ; 3. 14 (109) Cic., C aec.. II ; 16; Leg. A gr., 3. 14. On the connection between the activities of Sulla and the development of large-sized estates cf. T ibiletti, Latifundia, 282-6; H ug., RE, 22, 1218; J aczynowska, H istoria , 1 1 (1962), 488 ff. Frank writes that the colonization of Sulla checked the spread of latifundia, but he did not consider the entire evidence (E SAR , 1, 368 ff.). (110) T Antistius (n° 87), Pompey (n° 186), C. Sextilius Rufus (Cic., A l t , 14 6, 1) and Varro (n° 204). We may add E. Afranius fn“ 82), Metettus Scipio frC 104), F. Lentulus Spintner (n° 129), Faustus Sulla (n° 132) and L Domitius Ahenobarbus (n° 139).

42

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

whether to confiscate someone’s property was exclusively Caesar’s, and it seems that only his inveterate enemies or those who went on fighting after the battle of Pharsalus forfeited their property ; yet even after the battle of Thapsus the property of some opponents was not confiscated, as the case of Cato’s sons shows ( m ). Given Caesar’s unwillingness to effect wholesale confiscations, it becomes clear that at this time less property was con­ fiscated though Dio claims that prices fell because of the great amount of sequestered property put up to auction (42.51!, 2). In any case, there was no increase in the number of large units of property. There were, no doubt, some people who considerably enlarged their possessions, but it was at the expense of former great landowners such as Pompey. On the whole then the second civil war did not result in a profound change in the state of property of the senatorial class. Some former landowners were replaced by new ones, in part consulars, nobiles and old senators, and in part new senators ( u2). Moreover, Caesar was not generous with confiscated property as Sulla had been. Antony and Dolabella were compelled to pay for the property they bought at public auction and were forced to resort to borrowing. Finally, many more new senators were admitted to the Senate by Caesar than by Sulla. Given these considerations, it seems that there was no extension of latifundia as a result of the victory of Caesar ( u3). Changes probably occurred in the location of senatorial property. Caesar put up to auction the enormous property he confiscated in the provinces (no. 152, iii). Positive evidence is lacking, but we may assume that senators of the Caesarian party did not miss the opportunity to buy. Furthermore, many people from all parts of Italy and even a few from the western provin­ ces, Spain and Gaul, were enrolled in the Senate. Once again in default of explicit evidence, we may assume that they owned property in their native places (1M).1234

(111) See n° 152, iii. The property of M. Marcellus, a bitter enemy of Caesar, was not confiscated (n° 114). On the property of Cato see n° 189. On Caesar's generosity to the kinsmen of his enemies who were killed in battle see Dio, 43. 50, 2. For Bibulus’ son see Cic., Att., 12. 32, 2. On his unwillingness to confiscate property see App., BC, 2. 9 4 ; Suet., /«/., 38. 1 ; Dio, 42. 54, 1. (112) The following senators took advantage of the sale of confiscated property : C. Albinius (n°. 83), Antony (n°, 91, ii), Q. Cornelius (n°. 120), Dolabella (n°. 125), P. Sulla (n°. 133), Q. Cornificius (n°. 134), L. Decidius Saxa (n° 137), P. Decius (n° 138), C. Fufieius Fango (n° 145), Caesar (n° 152), iv), L. Marcius Censorinus (n° 169), L. Munatius Plancus (n° 177), Rabirius Postumus (n° 192), Messala Rufus (n° 215). (113) On Antony and Dolabella see n°s91, ii, 125. On the number of the senators see Dio, 43. 47, 13 ; Macrob., 2. 3, 10. Cf. W illems, Sem i, 1, 582 f. (114) On the Caesarian senators whose origin was from all parts of Italy and from the provinces see Willems, Sinat, 1, 596 f . ; Syme, PBSR, 6 (1938), 9-22 ; RR, 78-96.

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

43

Loss of property and life characterized the first years following the mur­ der of Caesar. Hundreds of senators; and thousands of other men perished as a result of the lex Pedia, the proscriptions and the wars. As usual, there are no precise details. According to Appian, 2,000 Equites and 300 senators were on the proscription list ( 115). We know the names of about 120 persons, senators and Equites, who were killed or proscribed ( ll6). The senators were not only nobiles, but from all groups within their class. Claiming that their object was to avenge Caesar's death, the triumvirs proscribed and put to death his assassins. Since, however, they were in sore need of money and land, they proscribed many others, including senators and Equites. It looks as if the triumvirs kept part of the confiscated property, since the auction v/as not financially successful. But only few of their partisans could enlarge their estates, as Octavian and Antony had to pay amazing sums to their soldiers, and in addition they had to provide the veterans with land ( 117). Now there was a great increase of new members admitted to the Senate, which numbered almost 1,000 senators on the eve of the battle of Actium, despite the proscriptions and the wars. Many of the new senators were doubtless ‘domi nobiles’ from all over Italy, who still had their ancestral estates and were unaffected by the proscriptions. These con­ siderations suggest that there was a certain group of senators owning con­ siderable property ; some were old senators who had, managed to retain their property and even to enlarge it thanks to political adroitness, and some were newcomers who had helped the new masters of the state. This minor group mainly replaced old owners of large-sized estates, so that it is likely that the amount of property owned by senators was not radically changed as compared with the preceding generation!118). The battle of Actium was followed by the expropriation of Antonians. A part of the confiscated property was taken by Octavian, who also let his close followers take advantage of this opportunity. Property was offered for sale and senators who had been faithful to Octavian could now have their reward. The outcome was that senatorial property increased in the provin­ ces. Only from this time have we evidence for senatorial estates in Egypt. It

(115) Apr., BC, 4. 5 ; Liv., Per., 120 ; Plut., Cic., 46 ; Brut., 27 ; Anton, 20 ; Oros., 6. 18, 10. (116) See D.G., I, 470-474. On the effect of wars and proscriptions on the old nobility see Syme, RR, 187-213. To the list in D.G. add the: son of Cato, the son of Lucullus. Sex. Quintilius Varus (V ell. Pat., 2. 71, 2 ; n” 160, n. 642), Ti. Cannutius, C Flavius and Clodius Bithynicus (App. BC, 5. 49). (117) On the problem of the distribution of land and collection of the money needed see n°. 91, ii. Cf. Brunt, It. M an, ch. 19, vi. (118) Suet., Aug., 35. 1 ; Dio, 52. 42, 1-2. On senators in this period see Willems, Sinat, 1, 603 f . ; 613-5 ; Syme, PBSR, 6 (1938), 2 5 -9 ; RR, 196-201.

44

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

is hard To estimate The amount of property obtained by senators in general, but it is beyond doubt that Augustus’ intimate friends were enriched to a great extent ( 119). In conclusion we can say that as a result of the civil wars property was transferred in quick succession, especially senatorial property. Two factors contributed to the process whereby senatorial estates were to be found more and more all over Italy and in the provinces ; the purchase of confiscated property and the admission to the Senate of people from a new social and ethnical origin. Of the numerous senators who owned large possessions in the period after Sulla, most belonged to the nobility. Though the wars of 49-31 occasioned the building up of new units of large property, they also brought about the disintegration of old u n its !120). The main loser in this process was the old nobility ; it lost its estates in the same way as its political predominance was shattered. S

u m m a r y

Several features characterize the property of the senatorial class during the period in question. Political activity made it necessary for every senator to have a house in Rome. In the course of time, a desire for more than one house is discernible. This tendency characterized chiefly the nobles and senior statesmen, but sometimes other senators in their attemps to imitate these groups. Easy profits arid a rise in the standard of living accompanied this phenomenon, which reached its climax towards the end of the Republic. A similar development marked the handling of senatorial property out­ side Rome. In the second century the senatorial estate was an agricultural

(119) On the confiscation of Antony's property see no. 91, iv. On the gains of Augustus see no. 153, iii. O f Augustus’ partisans who obtained possessions after the battle the following can be n oted: T. Statilius Taurus, L. Tarius Rufus, M. Messala Corvinus and Agrippa (nos. 201, 203, 214, 220). Livia, M. Lurius, a prefect of Octavian in Actium (M RR, 2, 421), Maecenas and Agrippa, possessed estates in Egypt (Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, 670 f ). On Augustus’ handling of Cleopatra's property see Frank, JRS, 23 (1933), 146. On the enrichment of Augustus’ partisans cf. F rank, ESAR, 5, 23-6 ; S yme, RR, 379381. (120) The following senators are known to have owned very large property in the period after Ac­ tium : Augustus (153, in), Cn. Cornelius Lentulus (T ac., Ann., 4. 44 ; Sen., De Ben., 2. 27, 1-2 ; Suet., Tib., 49. 1), M. Lollius (P lin., N ff, 9. 117-8), T Statilius Taurus (no. 201), L. Tarius Rufus (no. 214), Agrippa (no. 220), and L. Volusius Saturninus (T ac.. Ann., 3. 30). O f these five do not belong to the old nobility. In the preceding period the richest people were nobiles: Sulla, Antony. Caesar, Crassus, Lucullus, Pompey (nos 50, 91, 152, 159, 160, 186). See also p. 106. It is known or probable that the property of the following nobiles was confiscated during the years 49-30 : Antony. Metellus Scipio, Bibulus, Cassius, Faustus Sulla, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Hortensius, M. and D. Brutus, Lucullus, Pompey and Cato (nos. 91, iv, 103, 110, 129, 132, 139, 150, 155, 156, 160 n. 20, 186, i, 189.)

CHAPTER I. — PROPERTY

45

u n it; but as time went by, senators introduced new elements into their estates and improved the villa urbana. Thus in the first century on many estates there were palaces, fish ponds, hunting-grounds and aviaries. These belonged in most cases to nobles arid consulars, and were to be found in Latium and Campania. In other parts of Italy the purely agricultural charac­ ter of the senatorial property was maintained. According to our data, senatorial property was located mainly in Latium and Campania till the beginning of the first century. Only a few estates are known outside these districts during that period. Still, the proportion bet­ ween the known senatorial property in Latium and Campania and that in other parts of the peninsula need not reflect the actual situation. Ancient writers usually had no interest in senatorial property outside these two districts. The number of senators who owned estates in other regions of Italy increased considerably during the period between Sulla and Augustus. This change was occasioned by two factors. First, many Italians from these regions entered the Senate in this period. Second, senators from old families had acquired possessions all over Italy. Though the evidence is scanty, it seems that senators began to obtain property outside Italy in the second century, and that it was firstly done in Sicily and Sardinia. In the first cen­ tury, mainly since the second civil war, the number of senators who owned property in the provinces increased. A senator’s land was not necessarily consolidated in a single u n it: it might be made up of several separate estates, perhaps in different regions ; indeed this was the practice the richest preferred. But there were latifundia, vast tracts continuously in one man’s possession, already in the second century and they became more frequent in the first. Their owners were mostly consulars and successful generals. The differentials in property owning between different sectors within the senatorial class are important. In the second century, while an average senator possessed several hundred iugera, some had much larger estates. By the first century a few senators possessed land a hundred times greater in extent than the rest. But we are not to suppose that they had become richer at the expense of their fellows. The senatorial class as a whole enlarged its possessions, but one group within it, composed of consulars and generals, was exceptionally successful. The proscriptions brought no change in these proportions. Some senators lost property and rank; they were replaced by others, who seized the op­ portunities of the turmoil to enlarge their holdings!121).

(121) It has been suggested by Nicollet that a senatorial census was already in existence in the Republican period {Or. Eq., 65 f.), and this is cautiously endorsed by Wiseman speaking about a senatorial census de facto (NMRS, ch. 6. it. This view, based mainly on an interpretation of Liv., 24. 11

46

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The estates of Roman senators were important not only because of the profits they brought in, but also as sources of power and influence. The soil was cultivated by hosts of hired labourers, tenants and slaves who con­ tributed to the political importance of their landlords by acting as voters and bodyguards iri time of anarchy during the last hundred years of the Republic. In brief, estates were sources not only of financial profit but also of social esteem and political influence ( l22).

and on Suet., Aug., 41, seems to me wrong. Cf. Willems, Sinat, 1, 189-194 ; Mommsen, StR, 1, 498 with notes 1-2. It is true that the Livian passage proves not only the patriotic spirit of Roman senators (so Willems, contra Mattingly, JR S, 27 (1937), 104), but also that senators were generally expected to own property of the value of at least one million asses. However, the passages quoted by Mommsen in my opinion demonstrate that Augustus was the first to fix a legal minimum census for senators. See Ovid., Amor., 3. 8, 55 ; Plin., NH, 14. 5 ; Dio, 54. 17, 3 ; 26, 3. Suetonius may be wrong, or perhaps may mean that Augustus raised the first census he had fixed from 800,000 to 1.2 million sesterces. That senators were poor is not to be inferred from the fact that they were indebted (contra Willems, loc. cit.). Senators might borrow and yet own property. (122) The following senators used tenants, slaves or clienti for personal defence or for military pur­ poses : Scipio Aemilianus, Pompeius Strabo, C. Gracchus, T. Annius Milo, C. Antonius, Antony, P. Autronius Paetus, Clodius, C. Cornelius Cethegus, P. Cornelius Sura, haustus Sulla, P. Cornelius Sulla, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, C. Lucilius Hirrus, P Plautius Hypsaeus, Pompey, Catilina and Sestius (nos 14, 69, 73, 86, 91, iii, 99, 118, 123, 130, 132, 133, 139, 166, 183, 186, i, 197, 198). On Q. Metellus Nepos see Plut., Cat. Min., 27. 1 and on Pompey’s son C aes., BC, 3. 4, 4 and on the quaestorius C. Decimus, Bell. Afr. 34. 2. See also ch. IV, iv. Cf. Rostovtzeff, Kolonut, 313.

CHAPTER

II

Sources of Income I.— P roperty

The discussion in the preceding chapter has shown that Roman senators were a class of proprietors, whose property consisted mainly in land. We shall now proceed to examine what is known of their income from landed estates. Obviously we can make only rough calculations, the marginal error of which may be very high. T. Frank attempted to estimate the costs and profits of an olive plantation of 240 iugera and concluded that the annual profit was 6 96, after deducting depreciation at 2 96 and 6 96 interest on basic investment, which amounts to 460,000 sesterces including the price of the land and costs of buildings and implements (‘). Following his calculations we may suggest a rough estimate of costs and returns of a vineyard of 100 iugera i12).

(1) See Frank, ESAR, 1, 170 f. •, CAH, 8, 342. Frank bases his calculation on the particulars given by Cato (A gr., 6 ; 10 ; 22. 3 ; 144). He assumes that the planting of olives cost half of that of vines (C olum., RR, 3. 3, 8). I do not agree with Frank's assumption that only 200 iugera were planted out of the 240 iugera plantation suggested by Cato. For different calculations see C avaignac, Population , 97 -8. (2) According to Columella, costs of planting and staking are HS 2,000 per iugerum and the price of iugerum is HS 1,000 (R R, 3. 3, 8). As the implements were not more expensive than those needed for an olive plantation (see C ato, Agr., 10-11), I suggest a sum like the one given by Frank for the olive plan­ tation (ESA R, 1, 171). On produce of vineyards see C ato, A gr., 11 (32 amphorae per iugerum ; this passage was wrongly in­ terpreted by Frank, ESAR, 1, 163 ; see Gummerus, Rom. G ut., 3 4 ) ; C olum., RR, 3. 3 (100-160 am ­ phorae per iugerum ); Pun ., N H , 14. 52 (140-200 am phorae per iugerum ). But Columella also mentions crops of 20 and 60 amphorae per iugerum (R R, 3. 3, 7 ; 11). It is obvious that Varro, Pliny and Columella assume above average returns, and, therefore, I suggest a more modest return of 80 amphorae per iugerum. Prices of wine varied according to quality. The average price was HS 20 per am phora in the second and

48

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Basic Investment 100 iugera costs of planting and staking buildings and implements total

HS 100,000 HS 200,000 HS 20,000 HS 320,000

Annual Expenses interest at 6 96 depreciation at 2 96 16 slaves, HS 2 per day vintage and wine manufacturing total

HS 19,200 6,400 HS HS 11,500 HS 80,000 HS 117,100

Annual Income yield of 80 amphorae per iugerum average price of amphora total income

8,000 amphorae 20 HS HS 160,000

The 6 96 interest on basic investment is misleading, as it is based on irrelevant modern theories!3) ; besides landowners either inherited their tracts of land or acquired them by using extraordinary profits and usually had no need to apply for loans. The annual income of 100 iugera under vines could then have been about HS 60,000 (4). Apart from these calculations, there are some definite details. The gross income of pasture land, meadow and forest was 100 sesterces per iugerum ( b). The gross income of an estate of 200 iugera at Reate was 30,000 sesterces per year (Varro, RR, 3. 2, 15). The fields of an Alban

first centuries (Frank, ESAR, 1, 193 ; 404). Cato states that a 100 iugera vineyard needed 16 permanent workers (Agr., 11. 1). The calculation of the costs of the vintage: and the manufacturing of the wine is based on Frank’s interpretation of Cato, Agr.,1 3 7 (ESAR, 1, 168). The calculation of Columella (RR, 3. 3, 8-11) is wrong, since he did not take into account overhead costs. Cf. Mommsen, Hist., 3, 80, n. 2 ; Yeo, Rom. S i , 475-6. (3) For a criticism of the 'interest on investment’ see Yeo, Rom. S i , 472 ff. (4) Frank shows that the calculation of Columella means a net profit of HS 621 per iugerum (ESAR, 5, 149-150), which is very near to the results of my calculation. But he neglected some operating ex­ penses, while I do not take into account the ‘interest on investment'. According to Billiard, who discusses this question in detail (La vigne dans / 'antiquite (Lyon, 1913), ch. IV), the net profit of 100 iugera under vines was ca. 37,000 sesterces, but he bases his calculation on a yield of 4,000 amphorae (ib., 144-5); this is far too low in my opinion. (5) C olum., RR, 3. 3, 3. Cavaignac is mistaken in interpreting this passage as if it refers to corn (Population, 99).

CHAPTER M. — SOURCES OF INCOME

49

estate yielded HS 10,000 per year; the income of the villa rustica of the same estate was 20,000 sesterces (id., ib., 3. 2, 17). Breeding geese, pigeons, fish, chickens and pigs in a villa rustica could yield an annual in­ come of HS 50,000 (id., ib., 3. 2, 14). Bee-keeping in a villa of 1 iugerum brought in HS 10,000 (id., ib., 3. 16, 10-11). A villa on the sea-shore might produce HS 100,000 per year (id., ib., 3. 2, 17). The gross return from keeping peacocks could rise to HS 60,000 (id., ib., 3. 6, 6). Varro’s aunt had a gross income of HS 60,000 from the thrushes she bred in her villa in Sabinum (id., ib., 3. 2, 15-16). Cicero let the garden of his estate at Tusculum for HS 1,000 (Cic., Fam., 16. 18, 2). The returns cited from villas were extraordinary, and could be obtained only near cities, especially Rome. Moreover, they were irregular and dependent on a rise in the standard of living. Profitable sales could be made on the occasion of public feasts, triumphs and lavish private banquets given by successful statesmen and victorious generals (Varro, RR, 3. 2, 16). Profits of this kind had presumably been less common in the second cen­ tury. The returns from the estates at Reate and at Alba seem likely to represent the average more faithfully. They are in harmony with the calculations made above for the return from an olive plantation as well as with the figure for income from meadow, forest and pasturage given by Columella. In brief, owners of estates of 200 iugera could expect an annual income of 20-30,000 sesterces. Vineyards were most remunerative ( 6), but because of the variations in wine prices and in yields it would be misleading to suggest an average income. We have, however, to recognize the limitations of the above conclusions. Agricultural income depended on the quality of the soil, on the kind of cultivation and on the efficiency of the supervision exercised by the owners. Needless to say, the weather is all im­ portant. Crops must have varied from one year to another, from one region to another and from the fields of one owner to those of another, even in the same vicinity. Some owners must have had high profits, others low, while some suffered losses. We have to bear in mind that large-sized estates must have included some barren soil, and we should not expect owners of several estates, like most senators, to possess only good soil. Some tracts of land could not be cultivated at all. Thus, the average income of the entire lan­ ded property of a senator is not to be based on the calculated profitability of

(6) Cf. the order of preference of crops in C ato, A g r , 1. 7. If Cicero is to be trusted, people ruined themselves by expecting to repay their debts out of the proceeds of their estates (Cat., 2. 18). In 62 the rate of interest was 6 96 (Billeter, GZ, 163 f.), and it follows that the return on land was lower. However, it is probable that the rate of interest was higher in 63, and in any case Cicero is tendentious here.

50

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

land exclusively either under vines or under olives. Perhaps 5-6 96 was the reasonable overall expectation ( 7). Our sources provide no more than scanty evidence about profits from ur­ ban property. The income of the two insulae of Cicero, in the Argiletum and the Aventine, was 80-100,000 sesterces per year. He had income of the same order from the insulae left to him in inheritance by Cluvius (8). The cost of these buildings is unknown and, consequently, we cannot infer the rate of profit. Caelius paid an annual rent of HS 30,000 (no. 105), but in this case too the value of the house is unknown. However, what is known of Crassus’ business (no. 159) shows that acquisition of urban property was a profitable investment. Land and, to some extent, urban property constituted the fundamental sources of income of the senatorial class. The rate of profit was sometimes high, as was the necessary basic investment. Furthermore, plantations do not bring in returns in the first years, while breeding of livestock is quite risky, as whole herds may be wiped out by disease!9). Nevertheless, these limitations did not deter senators from acquiring land and engaging more deeply in agriculture, which is highly praised by Varro, no doubt with exaggeration (RR, 1. 2, 6 f.). Not only was this proper occupation for senators, but favourable opportunities occurred which reduced the costs of acquiring and developing land. li. —

I n h e r it a n c e s , L e g a c ie s

and

D

o w r ie s

A natural source of capital was the inheritance left by a father to his son, often specifically attested (10). It was almost unknown for a father to disinherit his sons!11), who most usually succeeded to their parents’ possessions. We may say then that inheritance formed the basis of the for­ tunes of most senators and provided them with the necessary means for the outlay occasioned by their political careers. Thus the huge expenditure Oc(7) On inferior lands see Cic., Leg. Agr., 2. 70. On the deterioration of lands in Italy see F rank, E c. Hist., 4-10 ; ESAR , 1, 365 f. ; Yeo, TAPA. 79 (1948), 277-9 ; 294 f. Frank assumes an annual income of 5 % of the value of the entire property (.ESAR, 5, 17). Calculating the prices of land, Duncan-Jones accepts 6% as the rate of land rent in the first and second centuries A. D. (PBSR, 33 (1965), 224), on which see Note E. (8) See n° 211, i (pp. 407 and 410). (9) On a flock of 1,000 goats lost in an epidemic s:ee Varro, RR, 2. 3, 10. (10) See n°s 11, 17, 33, 38, 39, 44, 50, i, 52, 53, 62, 64, 73, 81, 89, 91, i, 115, 118, 132, 134, 149, 152, i, 153, i, 159, 160, 162, 178, 186, 189, 194, 211, ii, 212, 214. (11) C. Egnalius Maximus, a senator who took a bribe in 74, did not receive any inheritance from his father (Cic., Cluent., 135). Hortensius did not carry his purpose not to leave anything to his son (n° 149).

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

51

tavian had to meet at the beginning of his political career was financed by putting to sale the inheritances left to him by his parents (no. 153, i). But this is not to say that some or many senators did not considerably enlarge their possessions from other sources. Cato the elder, for example, was a very rich rnan in old age, though it was the patrimonial property that had enabled him to save the capital needed for his other financial enterprises (no. 33). Senators were often beneficiaries under wills of relatives and friends. We know the names of some senators who benefited to a large extent in this way ( 12). On the other hand, only a few senators are known to have acquired considerable possessions and capital, after inheriting little from their parents: Scaurus (no. 39), Marius (no. 63), Antony (no. 91, i), P. Clodius (no. 118) and his brother Appius (no. 115). Succession to property on adoption was well known at Rome and not a few senators profited from income of this kind. In most cases there existed connections of blood or friendship between the adoptive son and father ( 13). The natural process of division of the patrimony among several heirs could have diminished the amount left to any one among them. Primogeniture was not practised at Rome, and yet senators' sons in general became senators in due course The outcome of this process might have been that after some generations sons of senators would have received inadequate inheritances ( 14). Such a process was checked primarily because senators had access to exceptional sources of income during the second and first centuries. Nor is that all. We have already noticed that senators inherited property from friends and relations as well including people out­ side the senatorial class. We know the names of some senators who were beneficiaries under wills of such people, and three of them obtained a large part of their property in this way ( 15). Thus the entire property owned by the senatorial class was increasing.

(12) See n“ 86, 94, 107, 118, 153, li, 160, 174, 189, 211, ii. (13) See n” 14, 17, 2 5 .3 8 , 6 5 ,8 6 , 103, 117, 121, 153, ii, 155, 156, 176, 192. Dolabella took into consideration how much he was to inherit when he considered whether to accept the name of a testatrix (n° 125). L. Roscius Otho may have inherited from a Scapula. See C ic., A it., 13. 37, 2 with Syme, Historia, 13 (1964), 112, but also S . B„ 5, 410. (14) See J olowicz, Roman Law, 123-134 ; 252-268. Some examples may illustrate the possibilities of the division of patrimonial property: M. Aemilius Lepidus, cos., 187, had four sons (Munzer, RA 307) and Metellus Macedonicus had four sons and three daughters (D. G., 2, 14). C. Cestius, pr., 44, left his property to six people (C1L, 6, 1375 = IL S , 917 a). (15) On senators who received legacies or inheritances from friends see n“ 50, i, 91, ii, 107, 118, 186, ii, 211, ii, 214. On C. Antonius, pr., 44, see Cic., P hil., 10. 11 — had the testators been strangers Cicero would not have missed the opportunity to attack him on that account. C. Trebonius, cos., 45, may have received an inheritance from a friend (C ic , A n , 13. 38a, 2 ; 41, 2).

52

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The chances of a senator to benefit under wills were closely connected with the number of his friends and clients. Holders of higher magistracies had more windfalls of this kind. Lucullus’ intervention on behalf of the people of Asia earned him many inheritances (no. 160). Cicero had ample compensation for his efforts in defending his clients in courts (no. 211, ii). The bigger clientela a senator had, the more he would receive under wills. One group of clients were the freedmen. Under the Twelve Tables if a freedrnan died intestate and without sui heredes his property passed to his patron, but he could freely dispose of his property by will, and sui heredes inherited even when he died intestate. A freedwoman needed the patron’s endorsement for her will and was obliged to get his consent if she intended to leave him nothing. Since she had no sui heredes the patrons inherited from intestate freedwormen. The praetor extended the right of the patron when giving bonorum possessio. He gave half the inheritance to the patron when the heirs of the freedman, whether testamentary or intestate, were not his natural, but adoptive sons, a wife in manu or anyone else ( ,6). Freedmen were very numerous at Rome. According to one estimate half a million slaves were set free in the years 80-50, but it is hardly reliable ( n). Too few freedmen of senators are known for even the roughest calculation of their numbers. Sulla set free 10,000 slaves, the famous Cornelii, but this is an exceptional instance!161718). We know the names of eight freedmen of Cicero and three of Pompey. Demetrius, Pompey’s freedmen, was very rich, his property amounting to 4,000 talents (19). Pliny mentions a freedman, C. Caecilius isidorus, who owned more than 4,000 slaves, 7,200 oxen, 257,000 heads of cattle and 60 million sesterces in cash (NH., 33. 135). Of course not all freedmen were so successful!, but the financial enterprise and material success of some are beyond question ( 20). Given these cir­ cumstances, it is clear that senators derived considerable capital from freedmen’s estates!21). (16) See G aius, 3. 3 9 -4 3 ; U lpian, 27, 29 ; D ig., 38. 2. Cf. A. Watson, The Law o f Persons in the L ate Roman Republic (Oxford, 1967), 231-6.

(17) This estimate is based on the amount o f money in the aerarium sanctius , which received the 5 % tax on manumitted slaves. According to Frank, 16,000 slaves were manumitted per year in the late Republic (AJP, 53 (1932), 360-363), but the data are not reliable. Some scholars accept the calculations of Frank (L ast, CAN, 10, 428 f.), but see Westermann, Slaves, 70 f. and esp. Brunt, It. M an., ap­ pendix. 7 ; T reogiari, Freedm en, 31-2. On the amount of money in the aerarium sanctius see Plin., N H 33. 56 ; O ros , 6. 15, 5 and n° 152, n. 462. (18) Ar p ., BC, 1. 100 ; CIL, I2, 722 ( ~ IL L R P , 353). Q. Cornelius was probably one of them (n°

120). (19) See D. G., 4, 359 f . ; 6, 353-6 ; T reggiari, Freedm en, 252-264. (20) See F rank, E c. H ist., 2 1 5 ; 2 6 8 ; 330 f . ; ESAR, 1, 3 79-282; Kroll, K ultur, 2, 9 1 -5 ; Treggiari, Freedm en, 87-161. (21) On inheritances left by freedmen see n“ 186, ii, 213, 218 and perhaps 39.

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

53

Another source of wealth consisted in dowries on betrothal or marriage. The dowry of L. Aemilius Paulus’ wife was 25 talents (no. 5). Both sonsin-law of Scipio Africanus received 50 talents (no. 13). Pompeius Strabo probably obtained his possessions near Tarentum through his marriage (no. 69). In some cases the dowry formed a main part of senators’ fortunes and in others it was the motive for the marriage. The dowry C. Gracchus received by his marriage with the daughter of P. Crassus Mucianus seems to have enabled him to meet the costs of his political career (no. 73). Antony’s marriage to a daughter of a freedman probably improved his financial cir­ cumstances (no. 91, i). This holds good for the marriage of Ap. Claudius Pulcher (no. 115). Dolabella married Cicero’s daughter taking into account the dowry he would receive (no. 125). Cicero himself married Publilia, his second wife, because he was in need of money (no. 211, ii with n. 64). The dowries of Paullus and the sons-in-law of Scipio Africanus, and those Cicero received, about one million sesterces (no. 211, ii), suggest that sums of the order of several hundred thousand sesterces were quite nor­ mal ( 22). But there are two sides to the coin. The same senator who had received a dowry had also to provide them for his daughters. Cicero’s statement reflects more than his personal experience (Parad., 6. 44). Never­ theless there is a difference between taking and receiving a dowry. Usually a senator received a dowry at the beginning of his career, when it was most helpful to his political success. The chances are that by the time his daughters were of marriageable age his financial resources would have im­ proved. Thus the benefits of dowries, generally speaking, outweighted the disadvantages. I II .— - P

r o f it s

fro m

the

P

r o v in c e s

There were several ways in which senators could enrich themselves from the provinces. Some drew income from provincial possessions; others had subventions from provincials when they celebrated gam es; not a few received bribes and presents in Rome, and many more profited from wars. These sources of income are discussed elsewhere ( 23). There were, however, still other ways of profiting from the provinces, some legitimate and some illegitimate.

(22) O f course, there were senators who did not look for dowries, e.g. Lucullus (Varro, RR, 3. 16, 2). (23) On senatorial property in the provinces see p. 30 and 34. On the financing of games with the help of provincials see ch. IV, i. On booty and war profits see ch. II, iv-v, and on loans to provincials ch.

54

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Bribery and Presents. Since the Roman governors wielded almost unlimited power, provincials were interested in gaining their good-will. Naturally they tended to give presents to the governors and sometimes to members of their suites ; and it was difficult, even dangerous, to ignore the governor’s demands (or hints) for contributions. We learn from Cicero that Verres’ demand of money from a magistrate of Sicyon was not exceptional : fecerunt alii (Verr., 2, 1, 44). A governor might receive presents when acting as a judge, as did L. Calpurnius Piso (no. 107), Q. Cassius Longinus (no. I l l ) , C. Verres (no. 218, ii) and perhaps C. Sallustius Crispus (no. 193). According to Cicero, Piso’s gains under this heading were several hundred talents, but he was no doubt exaggerating (no. 107, n. 204). Verres made some million sesterces in this way in Sicily (no. 218, ii). Cities and rulers gave presents and donations to governors to gain support for their claims. A fair number of senators enriched in this way is known to us (24). Nor are the sums of money given on such occasions without interest. Having promised peace to Numantia, Q. Pompeius, cos., 141, received thirty talents from that city (App., Iber., 79). A Spanish city gave L. Licinius Lucullus one hundred talents on the understanding that he would not wage war against it (no. 26). Pompey received 1,000 talents from Ptolemy son of Mennaeus for securing his position (Joseph., AJ, 14. 39), Scaurus 300 talents from Aristobulus and an equivalent sum from Aretas (no. 81). Gabinius, too, was presented 300 talents by Aristobulus (no. 147), but he probably did not actually get the 10,000 talents promised by Ptolemy Auletes. The conspirators against Q. Cassius Longinus saved their lives by bribing h i m; one paid HS 6 million and the other 5 million (no. 111). This kind of enrichment was most common in war time and where Roman rule was not firmly established : in Spain during the second century, in Pergamum when it was being transformed into a province and in the eastern provinces in general during the wars against Mithridates. Needless to say, many cities and rulers sought to confirm their position by bribery during the wars of the last two decades of the FLepublic (25). Unscrupulous governors did not need wars or anarchy to put pressure on

(24) See n'” 27, 39, 41, 42, 50, 68, 70, 81, 147, 186, ii, 217. On Q. Pompeius, cos., 141, see App. Iber., 79. On C. Sulpicius Galba, legate in 110, L. Calpurnius Bestia, cos., I l l , Sp. Postumius Albinus, cos., 1 10, see Sall., lug., 28. 4-29. 7 ; 40. 1 ; Cic., B rut., 127-8. On C. Sosius, cos., 32, see Joseph., AJ, 14, 4 8 6 ; 15. 5 ; B J, 1 18, 3. See also n° 101. (25) The actions of Antipater and Herod were probably typical of other rulers in the East at that time. Gabinus, Ventidius and Sosius were bribed by them. Pompaedius Silo, Antony’s legate, was bribed by Antigonus (J oseph., AJ, 14. 393-412; BJ, 1. 15, 3-6).

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

55

provincial cities and interfere in their local management. In Sicily Verres found hundreds of people ready to pay for appointment to municipal magistracies (no. 218, ii). L. Valerius Flaccus extorted 50 talents for con­ firmation of a contract of tax farming in Asia (no. 213). In brief, governors and their attendants could reasonably look for profits by way o f ‘presents’. The acceptance of presents entailed a risk, for it was legally limited to a certain amount, a ruling which is first attested in the Gracchan law. Un­ fortunately a lacuna in the text prevents us from knowing the maximum allowed by this law (26). Subsequent laws specified commodities which the governors were authorized to accept for their needs on their journeys ( 27). It becomes apparent that until the passing of the first law of repetundae, governors and other senators on duty in the provinces were free to profit by accepting gifts. After the Gracchan law was passed, or possibly earlier, after the passing of the lex Calpurnia, governors could be prosecuted if the sums they received exceeded the maximum allowed. Buildings and Statues. Cicero accused Verres of having appropriated to his own use money collected for the sole purpose of erecting statues in his honour (Verr., 2. 2, 142-3). Cicero did not deny the governor’s right to accept money for this purpose but only his freedom to use the money as he chose. Now, the freedom of governors in using this money is proven by the very complaints of Cicero!28). Bearing in mind that senators incurred par­ ticularly heavy expenditure in the pursuit of dignity and fame, we can com­ prehend the advantages of this source of income. Moreover, as five years might legally pass before the buildings and statues had been erected, the governors were free to use the money collected as they pleased within that period. In fact money of this sort may be considered as a loan without in­ terest for a long period. It should be remembered that governors did not transgress the law by taking advantage of this custom. Verres’ alleged profits from this source of income, about 2 million sesterces, might be ex­ ceptional, yet there is no reason to doubt that other governors too enjoyed profits of this kind (29).

(26) FIRAz, 1, n° 7, v. 2 ; cf. D ig . 48. 11. 6. 2. Liv., P er, 57 perhaps implies some ban on presents as early as 134, but it is too vague. For the question of gifts see Mommsen, S tra f, 714-6 ; Brunt, Historia, 10 (1961), 191. Mommsen’s view (ib., 715, n. 3) that the maximum was less than 4,000 sester­ ces is not convincing because of the uncertainty of the figures given in the mss. of the passages relevant to the case of C. Porcius Cato (n° 70, n. 169), on which he depends. Furthermore, whatever may have been the sum Cato was convicted of, it was in excess of the legally allowed value of gifts. (27) CIO, A ll, 5. 16, 3 ; D ig, 1 18. 8. (28) Verres’ requisitions from Syracuse show his liberty to collect money for the erection of statues. See Cic., Verr., 2. 2, 145, and for the law Cic., QF, 1 1, 26. (29) On Verres’ profits see n° 218, n. 969. A monument was erected in honour of Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos., 54, in the Phrygian town Epia (Cic., Fam , 3. 7, 2-3). See also C IL \2, 710 ; 711 ; 714 ;

56

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Taxes and collection o f Money. In most provinces the governor and his staff did not normally collect the taxes due to the Roman state; nor did they impose taxes. The Senate used to allocate a sum of money for the governor’s needs and if it was not sufficient he could apply for another allocation (30). However, governors levied custom duties and taxes on some occasions. Some did so legally, acting on the authority of the Senate, for in­ stance L. Valerius Flaccus (Cic., Flacc., 27). The Senate’s resolution was drafted, according to Cicero, an broad lines : it empowered Roman gover­ nors in provinces to demand money for the construction of ships when they thought it necessary ; resolutions to this effect were ratified by the Senate every year. A Roman governor levying money under these resolutions acted within his lawful authority, and although it was public money, em­ bezzlement of which fell under the law of peculatus, it seems that governors often set aside sums for themselves with impunity. Cicero said in 66 that governors, with few exceptions, had enriched themselves by exploitation of the ship-tax (31). He was perhaps exaggerating, yet in his speech for Flaccus he maintained that his brother was the first governor of Asia who had not imposed the ship-tax. It seems that it was not easy to detect or prove acts of embezzlement of this kind, which was therefore quite freely practised (32). In a few instances the Senate, or the Assembly, authorized governors to levy taxes, or to use taxes which were collected in the provinces. The lex Gabinia authorized Pompey to use public money in provincial chests. It seems that L. Calpurnius Piso was empowered to raise money in Macedonia (57-55 B.C.). The Senate permitted Q. Cornificius and Brutus, and perhaps also M. Antonius, to levy taxes ( 33). It looks as if only extraordinary con­ ditions in the provinces occasioned the bestowal of this right, that is, civil

738 ; 739 ; 746 ; 747 ; IL S . 8766-8768 ; 8771-8779 ; Cic., QF, 1. 1, 26 (Cicero’s refusal to accept a contribution). (30) On the collection of taxes and state-revenues in the provinces see Frank, ESAR. 1, 148-158 ; 342 -7 ; Stevenson, CAH, 9, 468-471 ; Mommsen, StR . 2, 2 6 7 ; Marquardt, R S. 2, 182-205 ; 245254. On the allocation to the governor see Mommsen, StR , 1, 296 •, Balsdon, CR , 51 (1937), 8-10. ( 3 1 ) Ora maritima, Quirites, Cn. Pompeium non solum propter re i m ilitaris gloriam sed etiam propter

anim i continentiam requisivit. Videbat enim praetores locupletari quotannis pecunia publica p raeter paucos, neque hos quicquam a liu d adsequi classium nomine nisi ut detrimentis accipiendis m aiore adfici turpitudine videremur (Leg. M an., 67).

(32) See Cic., Flacc., 33. Other senators who probably had such profits are L. Calpurnius Piso (Cic., Pis., 90), M. Antonius (n° 90), C. Verres (n° 218, iv). Cf. J olliffe, FCRA, 35-8 ; 47-9 ; Rostovtzeff, SEH H W , 948-952 and 963.

(33) On Pompey see Plut., Pomp., 25 ; App ., M ith, On Brutus see Cic., P h il. , 10. 26. On Piso see n° 107, n. 56. Messena paid a property tax of 296 at one time zeff, SE H H W , 750-752. Cf. J ones, Studies, 101-3 ;

94. On Q. Cornificius see Cic., Fam ., 12. 28, 2. n. 196. On M. Antonius, pr. 74, see n° 90 with UG, 5, 1432 ; 1433). On this tax see Rostovt­ Millar, J R S , 54 (1964), 37.

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

57

or external wars. Of course, governors exercising their authority under such conditions had ample opportunities to enrich themselves. Some governors levied customs duties and imposed taxes without any authorization. This was done by M. Fonteius, governor of Transalpine Gaul in 74-72. When a governor was brought to court on such a charge, he could claim that imperial needs had compelled him to impose taxes ( 34). Sulla too levied taxes and collected money, but no one could prosecute him and all his actions were ratified retroactively (no. 50, ii). Caesar imposed taxes in Gaul (no. 154, ii). The tax-farmers handed the taxes of Syria in 49-8 to Metellus Scipio, who also levied extraordinary taxes in Asia (no. 103). An­ tony levied taxes in Asia after the battle of Philippi (no. 91, iii). Brutus and Cassius imposed fines and taxes in Greece, Macedon and in other provinces in the East (nos. 110, 155), and Pompey too had collected money in Greece, Asia and Syria during the Second Civil War (Caes., BC, 3. 3). Dolabella and the younger Lentulus Spinther did the same in Asia ( 35). It is easy to see that governors would most often impose taxes, customs and fines in times and places when and where they felt themselves free from the Senate’s control. It should be noted, however, that in most cases such measures were taken primarily in order to supply the money necessary for a political struggle, and only in the second place for personal profit. We may also add that the taxes and fines collected were technically public revenues, and that eveyone who appropriated them might be prosecuted for peculatus. But the legal point is purely abstract in such cases. No one would dare prosecute such generals, if victorious ; if defeated, they would lose life and property without trial. Governors and Publicans. Governors acting in cooperation with the publicani could make considerable profits. As they were free to draft and issue their edicts almost at will they could restrain the tax-farmers, or they might also put the provincials at the mercy of the publicani. Verres, to take a famous example, and the tithe-farmers acted with full mutual un­ derstanding. Verres’ edict forbade farmers to transport the grain from the threshing floor unless the publican had received his share; the farmer had to deliver the crops on the coast before the first day of August, and to give surety that he would appear before any court chosen by the tithe-farmer; the publican had-the right-to prosecuteevery- farmer who in his opinion made a false declaration on the acreage sown. Cicero describes in detail the rapacity of Verres and the publicans who took advantage of these edicts

(34) See n° 144. Cf. Cic., Flacc., 27. On Ap Claudius Pulcher in Cilicia see n° 115, n. 244. (35) See n° 125, n. 326 and Cic., Fam., 12. 4-5.

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(no. 218, iii).Verres was not alone in acting in this way, though he was probably more unscrupulous than others. App. Claudius Pulcher issued an edict favourable to the publicani, who asked Cicero to issue one in similar terms (Cic., Fam., 3. 8, 4). Obviously the publicani were ready to cooperate with the governors, and usually a governor would cooperate, unless he was particularly honest or there were special circumstances ( 36). Requisitioning. Whenever the Senate decided to requisition a second tithe, it allocated a sum of money for this purpose, fixing the price the far­ mers were to be paid. Verres’ acts, however, show that the governor could refuse to accept the crops and demand money in exchange. The price Verres fixed was equivalent to the market price at the time, and thus he was able to save the money allocated by the Senate (no. 218, iiib). This was an ex­ ceptional profit, because the Senate did not requisition alterae decumae (or frumentum imperatum) every year. But he might also have profits by ex­ ploiting the institution of frumentum aestimatum (in cellam), that is, the duty of the provincials to provide the governor and his suites with the grain they needed. Again the Senate allocated the necessary funds, as the case of Verres reveals. The sum he received was based on the assumption that a modius of wheat cost 4 sesterces ; actually it cost HS 2 (37). Nevertheless, Verres did not use this money at all, since he compelled the farmers to pay HS 8 per modium instead of providing him with wheat (no. 218, iiic). This time Verres did not act in an exceptional way. The provincials themselves preferred to pay money, since sometimes they had no wheat or it was most inconvenient to deliver the wheat where the governor wanted it. Governors knew well how to profit by imposing inconvenient conditions for delivery of the wheat, and, as Cicero says, many governors improperly demanded money instead. The important point is, as Cicero admits, that it was legally difficult to bring a prosecution in such cases (38).

(36) M. Fonteius exploited the provincials in Gaul in cooperation with Roman Equites (n“ 144), but Gabinius and Piso checked the Roman publicani (nos 107, 147). The cooperation between governors and publicans is at least implied, or even explicitly stated (according to the reading preferred), in Diod . Sic ., 37. 4, 1. See also Cic., QF, 1. 1, 6-7 ; 31-5, and for more instances ch. VIII, i and p. 193-4. (37) Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 174; 188-9; 194. (38) On the wish of provincials to pay money instead of wheat and its exploitation by governors see Cic., V e rr, 2. 3 , 189-190 ; 195. Cf. Liv., 38. 38, 14 ; 43. 2, 12, which imply the abuse of this in­ stitution as early as the first half of the second century. For the legal difficulty : In hoc genere facilior est existimatio quam reprehensio, ideo quod eum qui hoc fa c it avarum possum us existimare, crimen in eo constituere non tam facile possumus, quod videtur con­ cedendum m agistratibus nostris esse ut iis quo loco velint frum entum accipere liceat (Cic., Verr., 2. 3,

190), For the whole question of the collecting of frum entum , and of its various kinds, see J. Carcopino, L a loi d e H ieron et les Romains (Paris, 1914), 17.2-204.

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

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Cicero admits that many governors profited from their right to frumen­ tum in cellam, though not to the same extent as Verres. Some, he claims, were honest, like C. Sentius, who yet made a fortune as a governor of Macedonia when wheat was scarce, and we know the names of a few others who profited similarly!39). The governor was also authorized to ask for other articles he and his attendants needed, and at times governors would collect money instead (40). In any event the governor could gain. He might value the articles at a higher price than their actual worth, and, on the other hand, he could save the allocated money by living at the expense of the provincials. How much governors could benefit from their right to frumen­ tum in cellam is unknown, but it should be born in mind that a governor with an army, who got on allowance proportional to the number of his troops (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 211), could legally make very large savings under this head. There were other modes of enrichment. Provincials were ready to pay considerable sums to prevent soldiers being lodged in their houses. The cities of Cyprus paid Appius 200 talents on this account (Cic., Att., 5. 21, 7). A governor could evade the necessity of paying port duties (no. 218, iv). Works of art could easily be obtained by officials in the provinces, as the cases of Piso (no. 107) and Verres (no. 218, iv) show. Provincials con­ tributed ransom money to release senators captured by pirates (nos. 118, 152, i). Governors and their suites sometimes did business in their provin­ ces, though certain business transactions were legally forbidden (4142). That they were able to help friends and men of influence was also important, even though no immediate profits could be netted C2). Governors might save the allocation for their army by not paying the troops ; of course, this

(39) On Sentius see Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 217. See also n“ 10, 48, 66, 90, 95, 103, 107, 144, 155, 181. Caecilius Niger, Verres’ quaestor, had such profits (Cic., Dir. in Caec., 30-33). Q. Lutatius Catulus, both the father and the son, Marius, Metellus Numidicus, Q. Mucius Scaevola, Scaurus and P. Servilius exacted com and did not demand money instead (C ic , Verr., 2. 3, 209 ; 211). But it looks that they too made profits. Another senator who profited from his right to demand corn was C. Licinius Sacerdos. He received 3 denarii per modium instead of corn (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 115). (40) On the governor’s right to demand necessary commodities see Cic., All., 5. 10, 2 ; 16, 3 ; 6. 1, 2. (41) On money-lending see ch. 3. On exploitation of official rank for doing business see n° 190. Cf. Cic., All., 6. 3, 1 ; Fam., 13. 55. For restriction on business transactions see Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 169 ; 4, 9-11. (42) Piso arranged free transportation and accommodation to his friends (Cic., Pis., 90). He sent people to take part m the games prepared by C lodius (Id., tb - 89). Caelius’ requests from Cicero, though rejected, show that assistance of governors to friends was a matter of course. (Cic., Fam., 2. 11, 2 ; 8. 9, 3), and Cato’s speech de sumptu suo implies that the practice dates from the first half of the second cen­ tury (ORF3, p. 71).

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

was illegitimate and probably uncommon (4S). In sum, we may say that governors and their attendants had almost unlimited opportunities of making profits. The scale of enrichment varied with a man’s lack of scruple and, to some extent, with the number of years he spent in the province. Neither in an­ tiquity nor to-day was it easy to estimate the amount of profit, as no one would disclose it. Only a few particulars can be given. Dolabella’s takings as a governor of Cicilia in 80-79 were probably more than HS 3 million (no. 49). As a pro-quaestor Scaurus the younger received a bribe of 3.6 million denarii (no. 81). Gabinius was given 1.8 million denarii, when he was a legate of Pompey (no. 147). The receipts of Piso as governor of Macedonia in 57-55 amounted to several million denarii (no. 107). As governor of Cilicia in 53-51 Appius had gains of the same order (no. 115). L. Valerius Flaccus obtained about one million denarii during his gover­ norship of Asia in 61 (no. 213). According to the prosecution, Verres squeezed 10 million denarii out of his subjects in defiance of the law (no. 218, n. 984). Cicero made HS 2.2 million in one year’s service in Cilicia (F a m 5. 20, 9). These data show that a governor could expect to obtain several million sesterces in a year’s service. But did governors and their suites usually exploit these opportunities fully? It may be argued that we usually hear of offences because there was nothing to be said about an honest governor. Indeed we can cite a few in­ stances of integrity. L. Piso Frugi, the author of the first lex repetundarum, did not pocket the surplus of the allowance for frumentum in cellam but returned it to the Treasury (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 195), as, it seems, did Cato (no. 33), and Q. Mucius Scaevola, cos., 95 (no. 67). Scipio Aemilianus did not take the allowance the Senate voted (no. 15). It is said that L. Paullus made nothing from his command against Perseus (no. 5), and the same ab­ stinence is ascribed to L. Murnmius (no. 31). C. Gracchus claimed that he spent his own money in Sardinia (no. 73), and the younger Cato refused gifts from Deiotarus (Plut., Cat. Min., 15). Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that such abstinence was exceptional. And Paullus did draw some personal advantage from his command (no. 5). Speaking of Verres’s abuse of his right to frumentum aestimatum, Cicero enumerates the opportunities open to governors in using their allowance. While L. Piso Frugi returned the surplus to the Treasury, some liberal and ambitious governors let the provincials benefit, but ut plerique faciunt, in quo erat aliqui quaestus, sed id honestus atque concessus, frumentum,43

(43) N° 107. See also Cic., Leg. Man., 39 and Jolliffe, FCRA, 12-4.

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quoniam vilius erat, ne emisses, sumpsisses id nummorum quod tibi senatus cellae nomine concesserat (Verr., 2. 3, 195, cf. 218). Evidently the majority of the governors made money in this way. More significant is the fact that C. Sentius, who was considered honest governor, made an enormous profit by demanding money instead of corn (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 217). In the same connection Cicero refers to P. Servilius V atia: P. Servilius quinquennium exercitui cum praesset et ista ratione innumerabilem pecuniam facere cum posset, non statuit sibi quicquam licere quod non patrem suum, non avum Q. Metellum ... facere vidisset (Verr., 2. 3, 211). The context shows that what Cicero means is that P. Servilius refrained from the harsh demand of money instead of corn, and was content like his ancestors with the comparatively modest profit of saving the allowance. Cicero made HS 2.2 million salvis legibus in Cilicia (Fam., 5. 20, 9), and it is instructive to learn that he would not have grudged Verres his profits si quae ad te lege venerunt (Verr., 2. 3, 217). Hence, we may feel pretty sure that governors did not generally hesitate to avail themselves; of all legal means of enrichment: saving the money allocated by the Senate, often collecting money instead of wheat and articles which the provincials were under obligation to deliver, and using sums contributed for the creation of monuments in their honour. Again there is reason to think that a fair number of governors made illegitimate profits. First of all, we have to remember that although the principle of the law of repetundae was clear, for it was illegal for officials pecuniam auferre capere cogere conciliare avertere (FIRA2, 1, no. 7, v. 3), some kinds of gain, from shipmoney or cooperation with the publicani or unfair aestimatio of frumentum in cellam, were difficult to prove as offences in the court (4445). In addition, senators were reluctant to convict members of their class. Given these two considerations, it seems that governors without high principles were ready to exploit means which would not endanger them. Secondly, extant information about enrichment of governors and other senators on service in the provinces shows that about fifty persons are known to have made profits from provinces in one way or other, without taking into account war profits ( 43). This number by itself is very con-

(44) For the ship-tax see p. 56 f., and for the aestimatio, n. 37. See also Cic., Flacc., 2 7 ; Font., 16-8. I think that when Cicero says, in connection with the farming out of the tithe, quid est a liu d capere e t conciliare pecunias, in quo te lex tenet, si hoc non est, vi atque imperio cogere invitos lucrum dare alteri, hoc est pecuniam dare ? (V err., 2. 3, 71), he interprets the law, which actually was not specific on this point (45) See n“ 8, 20, 27, 29, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 48, 49, 50, 56, 70, 78, 81, 90, 91, 98, 103, 106, 107, 110, 111, 115, 122, 130(7), 140, 144, 147, 152, 155, 161, 162, 174, 177, 186, 193, 197, 212,

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

siderable and is suggestive about the normal behaviour of governors, the more so as it cannot be maintained that other governors made no profits. Thirdly, the establishment of a special permanent court that had jurisdiction over cases of exploitation in the provinces reveals the need to provide redress for common and rooted malpractices and not for extraordinary cases ( 46). Finally, there are implicit and explicit statements in our sources pointing to service in the provinces as a means of extricating people from debts and making a fortune. Cicero’s first letter to Quintus, in which he ad­ monishes his brother not to abuse his authority as a governor, suggests that governors usually exploited it to enrich themselves (QF, 1. 1, 8-9). The remark of Verres on the need for three years service in a province is notorious (Cic., Verr., 1. 40). In 61, speaking in connection with the trial of Clodius, Cicero claimed that Clodius pointed out to his creditors that he had a good chance to serve in a province. Commenting on this passage, the scholiast says that Clodius' debts were so enormous that it was only by plundering provinces that he could defray them (Schol. Bob., 87). Whether Cicero’s allegation is true or not does not make any difference from our point of view, because in any case, it bears witness to an accepted con­ ception that service in the provinces was a suitable device for repaying debts. Cato’s speech in the Senate «luring the debate on the accomplices of Catilina aiso testifies to the exploitation of the provinces as a normal oc­ currence (Sail., Cat., 52. 12), and it is easy to find many more generalizations and hints of this k in d (47). In conclusion, we have to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate profits. There is little doubt that governors generally exploited op­ portunities to make legitimate profits, which would be considerable. Cicero’s salvis legibus profit of HS 2.2 million from a year’s service can be taken as a yardstick for profits of honest governors. Obviously governors with a larger army could make more profits. As to illegitimate profits, it seems that many were unscrupulous enough to violate the law, especially in

(?), 213, 217, 218. To these add L. Cornelius Lentulus Lupus, cos., 156 (Val. Max., 6. 9, 10 ; F estus, 360 L), D. lunius Silanus, pr. !4 ! (Cic., Fin., 1. 24 ; V al. Max., 5. 8, 3 ; Liv., Per., 54), M. Papirius Carbo, pr. 114 (Cic., Fam, 9. 21, 3), C. Papirius Carbo, pr. 6 2 (V al., Max., 5. 4, 4 ; Dio, 36. 40, 4), T. Albucius, p r ca. 105 (Cic., Div. in Caec., 63), C. Claudius Pulcher and M. Servilius (Cic., Fam., 8. 8, 2-3 ; c:f. T. P ., 3, 109 f.). On other senators see notes 23, 24, 31, 38. (46) On the establishment of the quaestio d e rebus repetundis see Rorondi, Leges, 2 9 2 ; Ferguson, JU S , 1 i (1921), 86-100. See also Balsdon, PB SR , 6 (1938), 98-114 ; Badian, AJP, 75 (1954), 374394. (47) C ic., V err, 1. 45 ; 2. 3, 207-8 ; Leg. Man., 57 ; 65-7 ; F a m , 1. 17, 3 ; Sall. Cat., 2 0 . 7 ; lug., 31. 9-10 ; 41. 7 ; Liv., P e r , 57 ; Tac., Ann., 1. 2 ; C. Gracchus in Gellius 15. 12, 4 (cf. Plut., CG, 2.

5).

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63

those cases which were difficult to prove in court. A Verres was probably exceptional, but not so much in the kinds of his illegitimate profits as in the scale of his systematic extortions. On the whole, therefore, the exploitation of provincial office for personal gain, particularly by legitimate means, was an accepted usage, a regular source of income so to speak. It is important to remember that quaestors, legates and comites profited too, and not only the governors; that is to say, the whole senatorial class and not merely the consulars and the praetorii ( 48). A word of warning is perhaps necessary here to prevent a wrong inference. The fact that senators in general made profits while on provincial service does not necessarily mean that when they competed for office in Rome they invariably looked for such gains (49). I V .—

W

ar

P

r o f it s

War was a specially favourable occasion for enrichment for the senatorial class as a whole and above all for holders of imperium, who commanded ar­ mies in the provinces. I shall first state briefly what 1 think was the authority of the Roman commander over war booty (50). I take the term manubiae to signify that part of the booty which the commander took for himself. He was entitled to use it for his personal needs, though many commanders used it for public objects. Our sources do not provide sufficient information for deciding what part of the booty the commander kept for himself, nor whether there were any clear criteria determining his share. The commander also had complete authority to divide booty among soldiers and officers. Furthermore, he was competent to set aside part of the booty for other purposes such as erection of public buildings and donations to temples, and to decide what part, if any, should be paid into the aerarium. After he had assigned booty to the soldiers or to the aerarium, his power over it expired. For his own use he kept records of the booty divided and reserved for the treasury ; yet he was not bound by law to submit any report. Attempts to limit the authority of holders of imperium failed, and

(48) See the complaints of Cicero’s comites (A t t 7. 1, 6) and those of Piso and Memmius

(Catullus, 10. 5-13; 28). (49) See Epilogue and Note D. (50) It has been argued by F. Bona that manubiae was that part of the booty which was kept by the commander for public benefit He also maintains that manubiae was included in the category of pecuniae residuae, and, therefore, that the commander could be prosecuted on charge of peculatus (SDHI, 26 (1960), 105-175). Fabia, on the other hand, held that manubiae was that part of the booty legally kept by the commander for himself (D. S., 3, 1583 f.). Vogel’s opinion is that the Roman commander was not liable to charges of peculatus iZ S S , 66 (1948), 394-423). On the whole, I accept the views of Fabia and Vogel, and I think that Bona’s arguments are open to refutation, but this problem needs special treatment. See now Historia, 21 (1972), 177-205.

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commanders were completely unfettered in disposing of the booty as they chose. Wars yielded more than booty. Under threat of war or promise of peace foreign cities and rulers were ready to comply with the demands generals made. The provincials also used to give presents to successful commanders and their officers. This is the meaning of Caesar’s response to Pharnaces : Si fecisset (i.e. Pharnaces), iam time sibi mitteret munera ac dona, quae bene rebus gestis imperatores ab amicis accipere consuessem (Bell. A i, 70. 8). Tigranes sent 6000 talents to Pompey, 50 denarii to every soldier, 1000 denarii to every centurion and 6000 denarii to every military tribune (51). Other rulers too sent gifts to Pompey, who did not keep it all for himself (52). It must be remembered that war profits were shared by legates, quaestors and military tribunes. No wonder commissions in the army were often sought because of the chances of enrichment. Many volunteered to serve in the Third Macedonian War from this motive (Liv., 42. 32, 6). Trebatius Testa endeavoured to get a tribunate in Caesar’s army in Gaul, as did M. Curtius. Q. Cicero seems to have gone to Gaul to enrich himself and he was able to favour other people by appointing them to posts in the army. And the cupidity of Roman generals, legates and military tribunes is strongly censured by Cicero, though his account is surely exaggerated (5354). Most provinces were not peaceful in the Republican period. At all times there were chances of fighting in Gaul, Spain, Macedonia, Cilicia and Syria, and in Sardinia in the second century. Sicily, on the other hand, was a peaceful province, except for the servile wars, and so were Africa and Cyrene. There were other wars: in northern Italy against various tribes, the Macedonian wars, the Third Punic War, the wars against Jugurtha and the Germans, the Mithridatic wars etc. Degrassi was able to list about 130 triumphs in the period between the end of the Second Punic War and the battle of Actium, mainly on the basis of the fasti triumphales (°4). But not only are there lacunae in our sources ; there were also commanders who certainly obtained booty and yet were not awarded triumphs, e.g. Piso, Gabinius and

(51) Vell ., Pat ., 2. 37, 5 ; Strabo, 11. 14, 10 ; Af p ., M ilk, 104 : Plut ., Pomp., 33. 4-5. Cf. Dio., 36. 53, 5 - 6 ; 37. 20, 4. (52) Joseph., AJ, 14. 35-6 ; 39 ; Plut., Pomp., 36. 6-7 ; Schol. Gronov., 316. See no. 186, ii with n. 723. (53) For Trebatius see Cic., Fam., 1. 5 ; 6, I ; 7, I ; 8, 1 ; 13, 1*, 16, 3 ; 17, 1-3, for M. Curtius, Cic., QF, 2. 13, 3 ; 3. 1, 10, for Q. Cicero, n° 212. For Cicero’s account see Leg. Man:, 64-7. Cf. J olliffe, FCRA, 15-8, who gives too much credit to Cicero. (54) Ins. It., 13. 1. 551-569.

CHAPTER Ii. — SOURCES OF INCOME

65

Cicero (5i). On the supposition that during the period in question there were about 3,000 senators, it seems that at least a third had chances of making war profits as governors, legates, quaestors or military tribunes. It will be worth while to list the known profits of Pompey’s officers in the East. Aristobulus gave 300 talents to both Gabinius and Scaurus (nos. 81, 147). Pompey awarded his officers presents and donations after the cap­ ture of Jerusalem (Joseph., BJ, 1. 7, 6). Appian relates that before his return to Italy Pompey bestowed 1500 denarii on every soldier and a proportionate sum on the officers (Mith., 116). The proportion of the sum given to soldiers by Tigranes to that given to military tribunes was 1 : 120 ; so Pompey might have given 180,000 denarii to every military tribune, let alone quaestors and legates. Nor was this all. At the time of his triumph Pompey distributed 100 million sesterces to his legates and quaestors. Each one received about one million denarii, since they numbered about 25 (no. 126). Of these officers 22 are known to us, and it is interesting to examine their careers ( 556). Two were consulars and seven were praetorii; they had probably served as governors in provinces. The careers of four are unknown to us, but of the rest seven were to serve as governors. We see that more than 70 96 of these senators served several years in the provinces and in dif­ ferent capacities. Hence, they had more than one opportunity to enrich themselves, and in fact three are known to have made large profits in ad­ dition to those they gained while serving under Pompey (nos. 81, 147, 213). How many senators did actually serve in the provinces? It can be shown that before the reform of Sulla more than ten senators went to the provinces on official duty every year and more than 20 in the post-Sullan age. It follows that almost all senators served in the provinces at one time or other, except perhaps a few who systematically refrained from going abroad (57). (55) See nos 107. 147. 21 1 (p. 413). Note also C Aurelius Cotta who died on the eve of his triumph (Cic., Pis., 62 ; A scon., 14). (56) On the legates and quaestors of Pompey see MRR, 2, 148 f , 153 ; 156 ; 160 , 168 and D G , 4. 486, notes 4-5 , n° 126 (nn. 331-2) I give a list of Pompey's legates and quaestors adding in brackets their number in the present work, and in default of this their number in R E : Scaurus (n° 81), Afranius (n° 82), P. Atilius (23), Metellus Celer (n° 101), Metellus Nepos (96), Ti Claudius Nero (253), Cn. Lentulus Clodianus (n° 126), Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus (n° 128), Sisena (n° 131, died too early for gaining booty), Gabinius (n° 147), L. Gellius Poplicola (17), L Lollius (6), Manlius Priscus (62), A. Manlius Torquatus (n° 167), L. Manlius Torquatus (79), L. Octavius (27), P. Plautius Hypsaeus (n° 183), A. Plotius (8), M. Pomponius (10), M. Pupius Piso Calpurnianus (n° 191), V arro(n° 204), L. Valerius Flaccus (n° 213). (57) Before the reform of Sulla the Senate numbered 300 members (Mommsen, StR, 3, 845 ft). Assuming that the age expectation of a man aged 30, the usual age for entering the Senate, was about 30 years, it follows that on an average ten men became senators every year or 50 per lustrum. Cf. W illems, Serial, 1. 406. Until the middle of the second century there were four permanent provinces: two in

66

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Now in the last section the view was expressed that enrichment during provincial service, especially by legitimate means, was accepted and normal rather than a casual occurrence. The discussion of war profits, too, shows that commanders, legates, quaestors and military tribunes often obtained profits on duty in provinces. Of course, it is impossible to prove that every senator who went to the provinces gained thereby, yet we may regard those v/ho went to provinces or took part in a war as likely to have profited, unless there is evidence to the contrary (58). Since, as we have seen, at one time oir other almost all senators served in provinces, it becomes clear that provincial service was a regular source of income of the senatorial class. How much an individual might make depended on various factors : his length of service, the situation in his province and the readiness and ability of the commander to wage a lucrative war. Regarding the first factor, in the period after Sulla, the number of long-term commands, those of more than three years, increased (59). This, however, did not mean that fewer senators profited from the provinces ; the number of the provinces increased and men with long-term commands employed many legates : about 20 served under Caesar at one time or other and even more under Pompey, and Lucullus, too, had several. Generally speaking, it was the readiness of senators to exploit their position that determined the amount of their profits rather than the con­ ditions prevailing in the provinces. Caesar in Spain, Piso in Macedonia, and App. Claudius Pulcher in Cilicia had profits of the same order, though

Spain, Sicily and Sardinia. The length of service in Spain in that period was 1-2 years, and in Sicily and Sardinia it was one year (Jashemski, OH PI, 115; 119-120; 123 f.), which means that about six senators went to these four provinces every year. But then we have to take into account the wars in the East, against Macedonia and Antiochus the Third, and the wars against the Gauls, Ligurians, and Istrians. Furthermore, the governor was accompanied by legates, military tribunes and friends, of whom many were senators (see, e.g. MRR, 1, 429 ; 434). It becomes apparent that more than ten senators were on official duty in the provinces every year. Their number increased with the establishment of the provin­ ces of Macedonia, Asia and Gallia. Similarly it is easy to show that the number of senators in provinces in the period after Sulla, when the Senate numbered about 600 senators, was much more than 20. (58) See the sharp remarks of C Gracchus on those who went to the provinces (Plut., CG, 2. 5 ; Geilius 15. 12) , also what Polybius knew about the changes in the behaviour and morals of Roman commanders occasioned by the overseas wars (18. 35, 1-2 ; 31. 25, 2-7; cf. D iod., Sic.. 37. 3, 2-5). Cicero and Sallust held different views; the first writes that Roman commanders were upright in Aemilianus’ time (Off., 2. 76) and for the second the destruction of Carthage was the turning point that had brought about the corruption of the good old virtues (Cat., 9-10 ; lug., 41). But L ivy (39. 6, 6-9) and Pliny (AW, 34. 14 ; 37. 12) dated the corruption of Roman morality to the importation of luxury by the army of Cn. Manlius Vulso in 187. See also Diod. Sic. (Posidonius), 37. 2-6. (59) This conclusion is based on the tables given by J ashemski, OHPI, 114-158 together with the en­ tries in MRR.

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

67

Caesar stayed only one year in his province and the others three years. Sex. Peducaeus’ revenues in Sicily were certainly lower than those of Verres, though both made availed themselves of their right to frumentum in cellam. We may conclude that every province might have given some op­ portunity for gain, if only the governor had the will (60). Booty and war profits added substantially to the wealth of some of the richest people at Rom e: Scaurus, Marius, Sulla, Caesar, Pompey and Lucullus (61). The enormous profits made by a few did not deprive other senators of their share in the exploitation of the provinces. The incomes of Pompey’s legates and quaestors were not inferior to those of some gover­ nors, and Caesar, too, was very generous to his followers. Besides, many a senator in Rome shared indirectly in the proceeds of the booty of Gaul (no. 152, ii). To sum up, while some senators became exceptionally rich from the spoils of the provinces their disproportionate gains did not diminish the income other senators derived from service abroad, which in fact continued to increase (62). It was this income that enabled senators to finance their expensive contributions to public purposes: erection of buildings, construction of roads, celebration of games, feasts for the people, donatives to citizens, cities and temples. This expenditure will be examined later (63). V.— M agistracies

and

S enatorial R ank

It is commonly maintained that no salary was paid to magistrates at Rome (64). This assertion needs to be qualified. Certain minor officials did receive a salary from the state. Thus holders of imperium were entitled to remunerate, through their quaestors, their legates, military tribunes, proquaestors, prefects and other people under their command ( 65). These of­ ficers were mainly senators or would-be senators. Senators functioning as judges were in a position to enrich themselves by taking bribes. Certainly, the corruption of the senatorial courts was one of the causes that spurred C. Gracchus to transfer the quaestio de rebus (60) The distinction between consular and praetorian provinces suggested by J aczynowska (II, 312) is completely wrong. (61) See n“ 39, 50, 63, 152, 160, 186. (62) Overlooking the fact that the governor’s associates shared their superiors' profits, M. Jaczynowska wrongly concludes that though profits increased they were shared by fewer people at the end of the Republic (II, 313 f.). (63) See ch. 4 and nos 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 31, 32, 35, 39, 40, SO, it, 52, 61, 63, 92, 108, 116, 122, 140, 152, t53, 158, t77, 186, 201, 214, 220. (64) Mommsen, StR , 1, 293. (65) Cic., Verr., 2. 1, 3 6 ; Fam, 5. 20, 7. Cf. T. P . 4, 14.

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

repetundis to the Equites, after he had possibly passed a law to punish corrupt judges ( 66). The corruption of the senatorial courts was attacked once again in 70 (Cic., Verr., 1. 38 ; 43-5). Of course, it was not limited to criminal cases, but also occurred in civil(67). Fifteen senators who suc­ cumbed to bribery when hearing a case are known to us by nam e)68). But this is too small a number for determining what types of senators, if any in particular, were liable to take bribes. Needless to say, our information on bribery, secret as the transactions tend to be, must be meagre. There is, however, some evidence suggesting that judges might have been offered tens, even hundreds, of thousands of sesterces for their votes (69). To secure favourable decisions, provincial cities and rulers were ready to pay considerable sums to magistrates and men of influence at Rome. A famous and profitable transaction of this kind was concluded between Caesar, and perhaps Pompey, and Ptolemy Auletes, the latter undertaking to pay 6,000 talents, provided he was recognized as the legitimate king of Egypt (no. 152, i) ; it seems quite certain that not a few senators shared in the bribe. M. Antony made capital out of Caesar's papers after the death of the dictator (no. 91, iii). Clodius received promissory notes for the service he rendered to Byzantium and Brogitarus in passing laws in their interest in 58 (no. 118). Vatinius, and probably C&elius, made money in the same way as tribunes (nos. 105, 216), and a few more possible instances can be cited (70). These date show the readiness of magistrates to act for provin­ cials in Rome, but it does not enable us to determine whether the practice became very common. (66) Cic., Cluent ., 151 ; 154 ; App ., BC. 1. 22. Cf. Last, CAH, 9, 53 ; 70. Last’s theory has been contested. See N. J. Miners, The L ex Sempronia Me Quis ludicio Circumveniatur in CQ, 52 (1958), 2413 ; Ewins, J R S , 50 (1960), 94-107 ; Brunt, Equites, 141-8. However, it is agreed that Gaius' concern was the corruption of the courts. (67) For more references on the corruption of judges, either for getting condemnations or acquittals, see Cic., Verr., 1. 1-3 ; 8 ; C a e c , 73 ; D ig., 48. 8 1 .1 .; 48. 10. 1 .2 ; 48. 11. 7. For the whole question see J. M. Kelly, Roman Litigation (Oxford, 1966), ch. 2, esp. p. 33 ff. He seems to exaggerate in writing that “The bribing of ju d g es... was apparently constant factor in Roman life” (p. 33). (68) See n“ 8, 142. On Hostilius Tubulus, pr. 142, see Cic., N D , 3. 74 ; Fin., 2. 54 ; Ascon., 23 ; on M. Atilius Bulbus, Cic., Verr., 1. 39 ; Cluent., 71-5 ; on C. Egnatius Maximus, Cic., Cluent., 135 ; on T. Gutta, Cic., Cluent., 71 ; 120 ; 127 ; on C. Herennius, Cic., Verr, 1. 39 ; on Q. Manlius, Cic., Cluent., 38-9 (but see Cic., Verr., 1. 3 0 ); on C. Popilius, Cic., Verr., 1. 3 9 ; on P. Popilius, Cic., Cluent., 103 ; 131-2 ; on P. Septimius Scaevola, Cic., Verr., 1. 38. See also n “ 218, i on Verres’ profits praeto r urbanus. Clodius bribed 31 judges in 61 (n° 118, with n. 265). See also nos 130, 147, 150 on bribery of judges. I do not agree Hawthorn that the bribed senators were necessarily poor (G. & R., 31 (1962), 56 f.). (69) See n° 118 with n° 265 ; Cic., Cluent., 69-73. Q. Calidius, who was convicted in 70, said that the conviction of a praetorius needed, at least, H S 3 million (Cic., Verr., 1. 3 8 ; Ps. Ascon., 219). (70) For Timarchus, the satrap of Media ca. 161, see D iod. Sic., 31. 27 a, and for Cinna and the Italians see n" 47. See also J olliffe, FCRA, 56-61.

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

69

Indirectly most senators shared in the profits of governors in the provinces. Thanks to the ease with which profits could be made and provin­ cials exploited at will, governors were able and tended to assist senators in Rome. Piso sent people to act as combatants in the games Clodius was to give (no. 107). Preparing his games as aedile, Caelius applied, quite nor­ mally, for Cicero’s help, though without success (no. 105). Numerous senators had pickings from Caesar’s, profits in Gaul (no. 152, ii) and Metellus Creticus and Hortensius from those of Verres, when he helped them in their canvassing for the consulate (nos. 102, 150). Cicero ascribes to Verres the saying that a governor needed one year’s profits for distribution among men of influence in order to secure immunity on coming back from his province (Verr., 1. 40). Lucullus tried, in vain, to defeat the proposal for his replacement by offering sums of money (Sail., Hist., 4. 71). In conclusion it may be said that it was in virtue of the political connections and conceptions prevalent at Rome that governors were bound to let other senators share in their profits!71). Commenting on the division of public land Siculus Flaccus writes : In­ scribuntur quaedam EXCEPTA, quae aut sibi reservavit auctor divisionis et assignationis, aut alii concessit (157 L). It follows that commissioners responsible for the division of public land could reserve plots of land for themselves, and it would be surprising if they did not take advantage of this right. They belonged, of course, to the senatorial class. Senators engaged in business in the provinces had rights and advantages due to their rank. The grant of the status of legatio libera to senators visiting provinces was very useful, The provincials were obliged to offer them accommodation and to attend to their needs. Accompanied by lictors, they were able to apply pressure in collecting debts, taking pos­ session of inheritances etc. Five senators are known by name to have en­ joyed this status : C. Anicius (no. 84), C. Antonius (no. 89), M. Aufidius Lurco (no. 94), P. Clodius (no. 118), and M. Livius Drusus Clodianus (no. 164). It is interesting to note that it was attained by senators of low rank, like Anicius and Aufidius, and not only by nobiles and consulars (72). Through their relations with governors senators attempted to obtain the rank of prefects, for -their agents, thereby promoting their own interests. Scaptius, Brutus’ agent in Cilicia, was appointed as a prefect by Appius, the governor of the province and Brutus’ father-in-law. Pompey, Torquatus and

(71) See ch. VI, esp. v. (72) See Cic., Place., 86 ; Leg. Agr., 2. 45 , Leg., 3. 18. Cf. Mommsen, StR, 2, 690 f . ; Willems, Sinat, I, 149 f . ; J olliffe, FCRA, 77-89.

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many other senators asked Cicero to appoint their agents as praefecti (Cic., Att., 5. 21, 10), though he declined. VI. —

A

dvocacy

In dealing with advocacy as a source of income of the senatorial class we must ask two essential questions : (a) what was the precise limitation set by the lex Cincia of 204 ; (b) did advocates abide by the law ? In 204 the tribune M. Cincius Alimentus passed a law de donis et muneribus, the general content of which is known to us, though we have no detailed account of its clauses (73747S). Under the law it was forbidden to give presents in general worth more than a certain amount, unknown to us, and in particular in payment for advocacy. We are comparatively well informed on the more general provision, which, however, is not our main concern here!74). Three inferences may safely be drawn : (a) gifts up to a certain amount were legally allowed ; (b) there was no limitation at ali on gifts among near relatives and other personae exceptae (Fr. Vat., 298-309) ; (c) the law was a lex imperfecta, i.e. it neither invalidated gifts nor punished the offenders (75). These points are generally accepted by modern scholars, but it is unclear whether they apply only to the general provision or to both. The question has not explicitly been posed or con­ sidered, though the first alternative is usually accepted (76). 1 see no reason for this ; in the absence of a detailed, clear account of the second provision, one cannot be certain, but it seems that the second alternative is as likely as the first. What positive evidence do we have? Legal sources and some of the references to the law in historical writings provide no helpful in­ formation (77). The first significant reference is to be found in a letter of Cicero of May 60 : L. Papirius Paetus ... mihi libros quos Ser. Claudius reliquit donavit. Cum mihi per legem Cinciam licere capere Cincius amicus tuus diceret, libenter dixi me accepturum si attulisset. From what Cicero says we gather that he believed the value of the books to be con-

(73) For sources and bibliography see R otondi, Leges, 261-3 ; A. Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary o f Roman Law (Philadelphia, 1953), s.v. Lex Cincia-. F. C asavola. Lex Cincia (Napoli, 1960), 2-4. (74) See esp. Fr. Fat., 260-316, and Dig., 39. 5. (75) Mommsen, S tr a f , 705 ; Leonhard, R E, 5, 1537 ; Rotondi, Leges, 262 ; Jolowicz, Roman Law, 85 ; M. Kaser, D as romische Privatrecht (Munchen, 1955), 1, 216, n. 17 ; 503-4. That it was a lex imperfecta follows from Ulp., Regulae, 1.1. Cf. G. G. Archi, La donazione (Milano, 1960). 15 ; B. Biondi, S critti giuridici (Milano, 1965), 3, 652. (76) Mommsen, S tr a f , 706. See, however, C asavola, op. cit., 17-8. (77) Cic., D e Sen., 10; D e Or., 2. 2 8 6 ; Liv., 34. 4, 8-9.

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

71

siderable (78). It is believed that Paetus had been Cicero’s client, for other­ wise the jest would have been pointless (79). If so, we may infer that the law of Cincius laid down exceptions to the rule that advocates should not be allowed to take fees or gifts, and that gifts worth less than a certain amount could be given legally. Dio says that in 17 B. C., Augustus zoug pqzopag dfuadi auvayopeueiv, i) zEzpanXaoiov oaov av Xaficoacv exzlvelv, exeXeuoe (54. 18. 2). It is strange that Tacitus and the younger Pliny, who deal with the question of ad­ vocates’ fees, as we shall presently see, do not mention a law of Augustus pertinent to this subject, though they do refer to the lex Cincia (8081). Why did senators invoke the old law of Cincius in 47 A. D. and not a recent law of Augustus (Tac., Ann., 11. 5)? Even if Dio’s statement be well based, it leaves the main questions unsolved. Did Augustus’ law merely renew the law of Cincius ? Did it entirely forbid the acceptance of fees by advocates, or were certain gifts and payments allowed? Was or was not the quadruple penalty an innovation of this law? All these interpretations are possible, and hence no conclusions as to the content of the lex Cincia can be drawn from Dio’s account. The next evidence dates from 47 A.D. Tacitus relates that the Eques Samius had paid 100,000 sesterces to his advocate Suillius and, having been betrayed by him, committed: suicide. The case was brought before the Senate by C. Silius, the consul designate: consurgunt patres legemque Cin­ ciam flagitant, qua cavetur antiquitus ne quis ob causam orandam pecuniam donumve accipiat (Tac., Ann., 11. 5). When Silius finished his address to the Senate, parabatur sententia qua lege repetundarum tenerentur (i.e. those advocates who took fees), but then Suillius and the rest asked forgiveness of Claudius {Ann., 11. 6), who capiendis pecuniis posuit i 61) modum usque ad dena sestertia quem egressi repetundarum tenerentur {Ann., 11. 7). This ac­ count, which is the most detailed we have of the second provision of the lex Cincia, gives what purports to be the essence of the law : ne quis ob causam orandam pecuniam donumve accipiat; yet this brief summary does not ex­ clude the possibility that the law did allow the acceptance of fees worth less than a certain amount or in certain cases. It seems to me that the natural interpretation of posuit modum is that this was a reduction of a previous ( 7 8 ) Nunc si me amas, si te a me am ari scis, enitere p e r amicos, clientis, hospites, libertos denique ac

servos tuos ut scida ne qua d e p erea t, nam et Graecis iis libris, quos suspicor, et Latinis quos scio illum reliquisse, m ihi vehem enter opus est (Att., 1. 20, 7). ( 7 9 ) C f. S. B ., t ,

3 4 3 ; CASAVOLA, op. c/7., T5.

(80) The jurists never refer to a lex lu lia concerning gifts to advocates, but this is less significant as they do not touch at all upon this provision of the lex Cincia. (81) See apparatus criticus a d loc

72

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

higher maximum (8283), and not that this was a slight concession in view of the decline of morals, with the implication that earlier no fees had been allowed (8S). This account of Tacitus implicitly gives a clue concerning another im­ portant question. If the lex Cincia imposed a penalty for the acceptance of fees by advocates, one may wonder why those who took fees were to be prosecuted under the lex repetundarum. This suggests that there was no other way to proceed against offenders who contravened the lex Cincia, which was, therefore, lex imperfecta in its first provision as well as in its second. Another passage of Tacitus seems to be at variance with this inference. In 58 A. D., says Tacitus, Suillius was prosecuted and condemned: eius op­ primendi gratia repetitum credebatur senatus consultum poenaque Cinciae legis adversum eos, qui pretio causas oravissent {Ann., 13. 42). Yet this cannot be taken as a precise and careful account. It rather seems that, by its decision in 47 A. D. that offenders against the lex Cincia were to be prosecuted under the lex repetundarum, the Senate ipso facto created a poena legis Cinciae, which had not existed before. Finally we may consider this passage of Tacitus : Nec defuit fides, multaque arbitrio senatus constituta su n t: ne quis ad causam orandam mercede aut donis emeretur {Ann., 13. 5). This decision was adopted in 54 A. D. I think, with Fumeaux, that the stress is laid on emeretur, and that the Senate forbade a bargain before the trial (84). In any case, this decision clearly established a new prohibition, which had not been included in the lex Cincia. We can now answer the first question posed (S5). It seems that the law allowed advocates to take fees or gifts worth less than a certain amount from their clients. Sums in excess of the legitimate maximum, once paid, were not originally recoverable in court (86). It is also probable that the law did not fix a penalty for offenders. Did advocates in fact take fees from their clients? Cato is reported to have said : sic cupiditates prius natae sunt quam leges quae iis modum (82) For this interpretation cf. Suet., Aug., 34. 2 and see H. Furneaux, The Annals o f Tacitus'1 (Ox­ ford, 1907), 2, 7 ; FriedlAnder, SG, I, 132. (83) See Mommsen, S tr a f , 706 ; A. N. Sherwjn White, The Letters o f Pliny (Oxford, 1966), 320. The attempt of Casavola to estimate the original modus of the lex Cincia is not convincing {op. cit., 2834).

(84) Furneaux, op. c it, 2, 158-9, referring to Pun ., Ep., 5. 9, 4. (85) T ac., Ann., 15. 20 and Pun ., E s p , 5. 4 ; 9 ; 13 do not shed any light on this question. (86) For a similar attitude see Liber Graeco-Syriacus, 122 (FIRA 2, means advocates.

3,

p. 796), where oxoXatmxoi

CHAPTER II. — SOURCES OF INCOME

73

facerent. Quid legem Liciniam de quingentis iugeribus nisi ingens cupido agros continuandi? Quid legem Cinciam de donis et muneribus nisi quia vec­ tigalis iam et stipendiaria plebs esse senatui coeperit? (Liv., 34. 4, 8-9). We may say that as the rich did not abide by the lex de modo agrorum and oc­ cupied public land in excess of the maximum allowed, so advocates took fees in payment for their service (87). In the debate that arose in the Senate in 47 A. D. in consequence of the suicide of Samius, all agreed that fees were commonly taken. Silius, the accuser, reproached contemporary ad­ vocates, and praised Asinius Pollio and Messala Corvinus, orators of the good old days who had not taken fees. The accused defended their right to remuneration in principle and adduced the examples of Clodius and Curio, who had drawn a large income from practice at the bar. (Tac., Ann., 11. 6). If these had been the motives and spirit of orators as early as the end of the third century — as Cato’s speech implies— there is little doubt that they found ways to circumvent the limitations imposed by the lex Cincia, whatever these might have been!88). A brief glimpse at the index of orators in O R P , and hence of advocates, will show that the vast majority of them were senators!89): Very littie is known about advocates’ fees in the Republic. When Cicero defended P. Sulla in 62, he received a loan of HS 2 millions, which he may never have repaid (p. 412). Part of his numerous inheritances and legacies were posthumous payments for advocacy (no. 211, ii). Hortensius surely drew a large income from his activity at the bar (no. 150), and a few other senators can be cited (90). In the first century A. D., according to Tacitus, Vibius Crispus and Eprius Marcellus had their eloquence to thank for their enor­ mous wealth, three hundred million sesterces apiece {Dial., 8.1.). M. Aquillius Regulus, too, made his fortune of almost 60 million sesterces by advocacy (Plin., Ep., 2. 20, 13). Thus it appears that a certain number of senators reaped substantial profits from their activity as advocates (91). S

u m m a r y

The income senators drew from their estates was often less significant than that from other sources, though it was admittedly regular and steady.

(87) Cf. T ac., Ann., 15. 20 where the analogy to the laws on ambitus and repetundae suggests the same inference. (88) Cf. Ovid., Amor., 1. 10, 3 9 ; Martial, 8 16, 2 ; 17, 1 ; Q uintil., 12. 7, 8-11. (89) Cf. G elzer, Nobilitat, 56-7. (90) See nos 39, 51, 55, 92, 159, 200. (91) Cf. FriedlAnder, SG, 1, 132 ; E. P. Parks, Roman Rhetorical Schools (Bakimore, 1945), 56-9.

74

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

whereas gains from war and provincial service were occasional; still, it seems that land was sought after for other reasons besides profitability. In that profitability no change can be traced during this period, except for the growth in profits from villas producing luxury food at the end of the Republic. Senators usually inherited estates from relations, friends and freedmen. Legacies from extranei were a direct consequence of their social and political position. War was highly remunerative like service in the provin­ ces. Unfortunately for the second century we hardly have any figures ; presumably gains increased in the first century. Once they had become ac­ customed to these gains the senators increased their demands, while the eastern provinces were richer ( 92). The whole senatorial class benefited but some individuals or groups were disproportionately enriched.

(92) L. Licinius Lucullus received 100 talents for promising to establish peace in Spain (n“ 26). Aristabulus paid 300 talents to Scaurus and Gabinius each (nos 81, 147).

CHAPTER III

Financial Activities Some forms of senatorial expenditure, such as bribing of voters and judges and celebration of games, required enormous sums of money. It is important to find out how senators financed this expenditure and an attempt will be made in this chapter to deal with this question. Senators also lent money quite willingly on various occasions. This activity too calls for examination. I. —

L

o a n s

Cato condemns money-lenders in traditional terms in the preface to his book on agriculture: Maiores nostri sic habuerunt et ita in legibus posiverunt, furem dupli condemnari, feneratorem quadrupli. Quanto peiorem civem existimarint feneratorem quam furem, hinc licet existimare. Now, it is interesting to note that Cato is the first senator known to have been engaged in lending money. He took shares in bottomry loans. But he was not directly connected in the shipping ventures ; his freedman Quintio represented his interests as agent. He also lent money to some of his slaves to train apprentices. In this case, too, he was able to conceal his ac­ tivity (0. What we know about Cato’s money-lending is a sufficient warning not to take too seriously his statement about the Roman aversion to lending money, even though there are not any more details about senators’ loans in the second century. Perhaps Cato refers only to those who lent at an illegal rate of interest. When we come to the first century there is ample in­

ti) Plut . Cat. Mai., 21. 7 ; 25. 1 , n° 33.

76

PART ONE.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

formation on this point from Cicero’s works. There are about 25 senators known from literary evidence to have engaged in lending money and here is the list: L. Aelius Lamia(?); C. Albinius, C. Anicius, M. Anneius(?), M. Antony, M. Aufidius Lurco, Q. Axius, Q. Metellus Scipio, L. Piso, Q. Considius, P. Cornelius Sulla, C. Fundanius, C. Caesar, M. Brutus, M. Crassus, L. Lucullus, L. Lucceius, L. Munatius Plancus, Pornpey, M. Cato, C. Publicius Malleolus, C. Rabirius Postumus, Q. Selicius, Q. Titinius, M. Cicero, Q. Cicero, and Verres ( 2). Apart from these, there is evidence bearing on money dealings of senators in the form of the tesserae num­ mulariae which in some cases have senatorial names ( 3). Some of the names are identical with known monetales, but since it is not certain that the latter became senators we shall leave them aside. However, the correlation of names of senators known to have financial interests with names inscribed on tesserae suggest not only that they are identical but also that other tesserae belonged to senators. Thus we have tesserae with the names of Axius, M. Servilius, Manlius, and Rabirius Postumus, who may probably be identified with Q. Axius, M. lunius Brutus, A. Manlius Torquatus and C. Rabirius Postumus (4). To these we can add other senatorial names on tesserae ( 5) : Autronius ( 6), Falerius(7), Fidiculanius (8), Q. Fulvius (Flac­ cus?) ( 9), lunius ( i0), Lollius)11), Lucilius ( 12), Lucretius ( 1314), LuriusO4),

(2) See n“ 77, 83, 84, 91, i, 96, 100, 103, 107, 119, 133, 152, ii, 155, 159, 160, 165, 167, 177, 186, ii, 189, 190, 198, 208, 211, iv, 212. On M. Anneius, C icero's legate, Fam ., 13. 55 ; on C. Fun­ danius, C i c , QF, 1 .2 , 10-11 and RE, s.v. Fundanius, 1 ; on Q . Selicius, C i c . , A lt, 1. 12, 1 ; Fam., 1. 5a, 3-4. Cf. W illems, S in a t. 1, 201 ; 508 (n" 258); S. B„ 1, 298; MRR, 2, 134. (3) H erzog, RE, 17, 1415-1455 ; C ary, JR S , 13 (1923), 110-1 13 ; N icolet, Or. Eq„ 367 f. ; Wiseman, NM RS, ch. 6, iii. See also ILLRP, 987-1063. (4) See rios 100, 155, 167, 192. (5) Cf. Herzog, RE, 17, 1439 ff. and Wiseman, NM RS, Appendix A, who gives a complete list in­ cluding tesserae of the Augustan period. (6) ILLR P, 1063 (33 B. C.) = cos., suf. 33 (?). Cf. H erzog, 17, 1447. (7) IL LR P, 1000. Note M. Falerius M. f. (R E , 1). (8) IL LR P, 1027 ; 1030 (62 B. C ) . See n° 142. (9) ILLRP. 1056; 9 9 5 ; 997 (48 and 17 B. C) (10) IL LR P, 1012 (71 B. C ) . See H erzog, RE, 17, 1441 f.

(11) ILLRP, 1025 (62 B. C.). He was probably related to M. Lollius Palicanus. See H erzog, RE, 1442 f. ; Wiseman, NM RS, no. 231. (12) IL LR P, 1016 (70 B. C ) . (13) ILLRP, 1015 (71 B. C ). (14) ILLRP, 1052 (51 B. C .) ; for his possible identification with M. Lurius, a governor of Sardinia in 42-40, see H erzog, RE, 17, 1445.

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77

Memmius C5), Munatius C6), C. Octavius C7). Petillius (ls). Scribo­ nius (151678920), Volcacius (21). It is probable that some of these were senators or at least of senatorial families. Even if we ignore the evidence of the tesserae, the first list by itself is very significant. First of all, it proves that lending of money was practised by senators of varying rank. There is no difference between nobiles and sons of Equites : both groups lent money. There are at least 10 nobiles and the rest are of equestrian origin. There are patricians, slightly more than their relative number in the senate of 55 B. C. ( 22). Of course, this is not a statistical sample, but it is clear that by any criterion making loans was practised by senators of every degree. Secondly, it is noteworthy that sons of Equites did not find it necessary to give up lending on interest on becoming senators. The fact that there were nobiles who lent money made it easier for them to continue!23). In what circumstances did senators lend money ? Take first the case of Malleolus. He went to Asia as quaestor in 80. Before leaving Rome he had collected as much ready money as he could, which he lent to provincials when on duty (no. 190). It is evident that Malleolus took advantage of the financial straits erf the Asian cities, which ensued from the ruinous fines and tributes imposed by Sulla (no. 50, n. 70). It is significant that Malleolus knew of the opportunities existing in Asia ; other senators probably invested their money in the same way about the same time. As is well known, Lucullus put into effect certain measures which helped the provincials to repay their debts (24), thereby enraging interests in Rome. He was soon un­ der attack, and, indeed, lost his command of Asia in 69. The Senate’s

(15) ILLRP, 1001 (96 B. C.). See Herzog, RE, 17, 1440 f (16) ILLRP, 1011 (72 B. CD. (17) ILLRP, 1046 (53 B.C.). He is identified with the father of C . Octavius, pr 61. See H erzog. 17, 1443 f (18) ILLRP, 1042; 1044; 1060 (56, 54, 46 B. C ) . (19) ILLRP, 1034 (59 B. C .) . See Wiseman, NMRS. no. 341. (20) ILLRP, 1048 (5 3 /2 B C ) See n" 195 of the present work (21) ILLRP, 1053 (50 B. CD. (22) On the proportion between patricians; and plebeians see ch. I, note 73. (23) C . Octavius came from a family of bankers (n° 178). Munzer assumes that he severed his con­ nections with the bank on entering the senate (Hermes, 71 (1936), 222 f.). But the information about other Equites in the senate does not justify his assumption. For the view that not only Equites but also senators engaged in money-lending see Brunt, Equites, 118 ; 121 f . ; Nicolet, Or. Eq., 367 f. ; 373 f. ; 470 f . ; Wiseman, NMRS, ch. VI, i. (24) Plut., Luculi, 20 ; 23. 1 ; App. Mith., 83. See F rank, ESAR, 1, 343 ; Broughton, ESAR, 4, 545 f. ; Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, 1563, n. 28 ; Magie, Asia, 252.

78

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

decision to deprive Lucullus of his command at this point suggests that senators, too, had suffered losses by his rulings!25). Other senators serving in the provinces besides Malleolus took the oc­ casion to lend money. Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, owed enormous sums of money to Pompey, sums of the order of 20 million denarii. It is possible that Pompey lent some of this money during his command in the East (no. 186, ii). Ariobarzanes also borrowed from Brutus, who was in the East some years before the loan is mentioned in Cicero’s letters, once accompanying his uncle Cato to Cyprus, and again as quaestor in Cilicia in 53. The debt amounted to over one hundred talents (no. 155). The loan to the" Salaminians, too, originated from Brutus’ sojourn in the island (no. 155). Torquatus made loans in Cilicia probably while a legate under Pom­ pey (no. 167). Verres lent in Sicily when governor (no. 218, iv). It is probable that other senators in official positions lent money to provin­ cials!26). For one reason provincial loans might be preferable. In ex­ ceptional conditions a high rate of interest could be charged, even 48 % ( 27), while the normal rate of interest in the first century was 12% ( 28). In Rome by contrast it was lower; only 6% in 62 decreasing to 4% in 54 ( 29). This difference made provincial loans more attractive, though they were less secure. It was not invariable that loans were given primarily for the sake of profit. Senators who wished to help friends or sought political influence would readily lend money. Cato used the 600,000 denarii he had inherited in this way, lending it to his friends free of interest ( P l u t ., Cat. Min.. 6. 4). It was Crassus’ avowed system to lend money without interest iin order to obtain political influence (no. 159). Caesar too made an extensive use of this practice when he was in Gaul. Cicero received a loan of 800,000 sesterces at a rate of interest probably less than 1 % (no. 211, iv). Suetonius relates that it was Caesar’s deliberate policy to attract supporters and followers by offering loans at low interest or without any interest at all (Iul., 27-28). Social and family connections obliged Cicero to give similar

(25) Sall., Hist., 4. 71 ; L ucutl., 20. 5 ; Dio, 36. 2, 2. On the date see MRR, 2, 133. (26) See n“ 77, 81 (?), 165. On M. Anneius see Cic., Fam., 13. 55. (27) Brutus exacted a montly interest of 4% (n° 155 with n. 583). The city of Gytheum in the Peloponnese had to pay 48 % interest and the creditors were highly praised when they reduced the in­ terest to 24 % (S I G \ 748, 15-48). (28) See Larsen, ESAR, 4, 372-4 ; Broughton, ESAR, 4, 561-2. According to Billeter, an interest of 7-8 % was common in good conditions, but he seems to be too optimistic. Yet he admits that 12 % interest was quite normal and that a higher interest was exacted in bad conditions (GZ, 87-102). (29) See Billeter, GZ, 163-5; F ruchtel, Geld., 130-133.

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79

loans (no. 211, iv). The borrowers were generally Roman citizens, especially senators. Provincials normally had to pay interest. In one of his speeches Cicero refers to a commander who invested in Rome the money allocated to him for the conduct of a war overseas {Leg. Man., 37). He makes a similar accusation against L. Piso (Pis., 86). His venality, however, is suspect since the sum allocated to Piso was insufficient for his needs m Macedonia (no. 107, n. 196). Moreover, as the rate of in­ terest was higher in the provinces, it seems unlikely that commanders will have left their money in Rome, if, indeed, they only intended to charge in­ terest. In fact, we know of one Roman who benefited from the money allocated by the aerarium. Q. Cicero let his brother have money voted to him as a governor of Asia (no. 211, iv). Thus we may believe that when Roman magistrates lent public money in Rome instead of taking it with them to provinces, they probably did it as a political or social rather than as a financial investment. However, since repayment was more secure in Rome, we should not exclude the latter possibility. The amounts of some loans are attested in our sources. We have already mentioned the sum of about 20 million denarii owed by Ariobarzanes to Pompey, but we do not know whether all of it had been actually lent, and surely this is an extraordinary case. The same king repaid 100 talents to Brutus. According to Brutus’ agent, the debt of Salamis amounted to 200 talents, but the original loan was certainly much less (no. 155). Caesar lent 800,000 sesterces to Cicero (no. 211, iv). Q. Considius had 15 million sesterces invested in loans in the time of the Catilinarian conspiracy (V al., Max., 4. 8, 3). The following sums were lent by Cicero : 12,000, 110,000, 200,000, 600,000, 2.2 million sesterces (no. 211, iv). The case of Con­ sidius is the most interesting, because it shows how even ordinary senators could put considerable money on loan, and not only the very rich like Caesar and Pompey. II. — C redit

and

F inancing

We shall first present the data we have on the debts of some senators. Caesar owed 25 million sesterces in 61 (no. 152, i). Milo’s debts probably amounted to HS 70 million (no. 86). The minimum estimate of Curio’s debts was HS 10 million (no. 194). Antony had debts of HS 6 million in his youth,and later he became liable for HS40 million through buying auc­ tioned property in Caesar's dictatorship (no. 91, i-ii). Other senators too were heavily indebted at one time or other ( :Kl). Many sustained heavy ex-30 (30) See n“ 89, 103, 105, 125, 127, 130, 132, 138(7), 147, 193, 195, 197, 198, 211, iv. 212

PART ONE — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

80

penses though they were not entangled in debts (Ch. IV). Faced by this in­ formation, we must ask two questions. First, from whom could senators borrow such enormous sums? Second, how could senators repay their debts or, to put it in other words, what prospect had creditors of getting their money back? Some senators could, of course, pay their way from their own income but this does not concern us now. Senators could apply to bankers for loans, and Polybius tells us a fine anecdote which may illustrate this possibility. After inheriting from his grandmother Aemilia, Africanus’ wife, Scipio Aemilianus ordered his banker to pay the dowry due to Africanus’ daughters, a sum of 50 talents (31. 27, 6-8). It is possible that Aemilianus had deposited money at his banker, but it is more probable that he applied for credit!31). In any case, it is implicit in Polybius’ narrative that ap­ plication for a banker’s service was a normal usage in his time. Our next in­ formation comes from the first century. We are particularly familiar with Cicero’s dealings. Cicero borrowed money from Vestorius, a banker from Puteoli, and perhaps from another banker from the same city, Cluvius (no. 211, iv). He also mentions his need to use the services of people whose oc­ cupation was lending money (Att., 1. 12, 1), and in fact he borrowed money from the bankers of the Forum in 60 ( 32). The creditors who prevented Caesar from setting out for his Spanish province were probably of the same type. In the rare cases when senators suffered bancruptcy they had ap­ parently borrowed from bankers ( 33). Ordinary people, let alone bankers, lending money expect their money back in due time. Some cases reveal what creditors and borrowers alike looked for. In 61 Caesar’s departure to Spain was delayed by the in­ tervention of his creditors. Their, and Caesar’s, chances of getting the necessary money were improved when Caesar obtained a provincial gover­ norship ; they would not let him leave for his province without better security for their loans ( 34). What happened to Milo after his conviction may also clarify this matter. So long as he was a prospective candidate for the consulate his creditors did not press for their money, though he probably owed 70 million sesterces. But when his hopes of election were shattered, they demanded their money and Milo’s property was auctioned. It is clear that both Milo and his creditors calculated that a provincial command

(31) See no. 14. On the methods of bankers see Fruchtel, Geld, 13-76, esp. 37-41. (32) (33) 8, 2-3 (34)

C ic., Att., 2. I, 11 ; Fam., 5. 6. 2. On the faeneratores of the Forum see Liv., 40. 51, 5. On senators compelled to sell their property because of debts see n“ 89, 129. Cf. Cic , Fam ., 8. and F rederiksen, JR S , 56 (1966), 128 ff Plut., Caes., 11. 1 ; Crass., 7. 6 ; Suet., /«/., 18.

CHAPTER III. — FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES

8 1

would provide the necessary means to repay his debts (no. 86). After his consulate Cicero incurred debts, looking forward for a share in C. Antonius' profits in Macedonia (no. 211, iv). It is likely that Catilina too hoped to repay his debts with the help of provincial profits ( 35). These data as well as what we know of the profits senators made in provinces show that service in the provinces was a recognized way of repaying loans, especially the enor­ mous ones. Plutarch’s biography of the younger Cato contains information on the possibility of loans from the state-treasury. Cato the younger offered lands and slaves as pledges for the debts of his friends to the Treasury (Cat. Min., 6. 4), which very likely refer to loans. Plutarch also writes that Cato found many people owing money to the public (17. 2). Octavian asked Antony to help him in getting a loan from the Treasury (App., BC, 3. 17; 20). Perhaps some of the money missing from the aerarium in the post-Sullan period was connected with loans not repaid (Ascon., 73). Suetonius, too, writes that Augustus cancelled debts due to the Treasury (Aug., 32. 12). This evidence suggests that people, obviously senators in the main, could borrow from the Treasury. For one reason or another some senators were prepared to offer financial help to other senators who needed it, mainly to gain supporters. Numerous senators benefited from Caesar’s aurum Gallicum. A few are known by name : L. Aemilius Paullus, Antony, M. Calidius, P. Lentulus Spinther, C. Memmius, Curio, Ser. Sulpicius Galba, and Cicero (no. 152, ii). Caesar, Clodius and Catilina had been financially helped by Crassus (no. 159). It was mainly Pompey’s money that Afranius distributed among the voters before the consular elections of 61 (no. 82). In 56 Crassus and Pompey aided their candidates to win the elections by bribery on a large scale)36). Verres subsidised Metellus Creticus and Hortensius in canvassing for the consulate of 69, thinking apparently that their election would be in his in­ terest (nos. 102, 150). In a later period Augustus and Tiberius used to present considerable grants to impoverished senators)37). In conclusion we may say that since senior statemen were interested in enlarging the circle of their adherents and friends, other senators could obtain financial support from them. Not only political considerations but also social relations induced people

(35) See n° 197. C f K roll, K ultur, I, 104. (36) Plut., Cat Min., 4 2 ; Pomp., 52. 2 , Dio, 39. 32. (37) Vell. Pat., 2. 129, 3 ; T ac ..Ann., 1. 7 5 , 2 37 ; Suet.. Aug., 41. I ; Dio, 54. 17, 3 ; 57. 10, 3. Cf. F riedl’ander, SG, 1, 233.

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to bring relief to friends in need. Cicero was short of money in exile. Terentia suggested sale of some of his property, but he opposed this solution : tantum scribo si erunt in officio amici, pecunia non derit: si non erunt, tu efficere tua pecunia non poteris (Fam. 1. 14, 5). Cicero tells At­ ticus that Messala had bought the house of Autronius : Quid ad me ? inquies. Tantum quod ea emptione et nos bene emisse iudicati sumus et homines intellegere coeperunt licere amicorum facultatibus in emendo ad dignitatem aliquam pervenire ( 38). The importance of friendship as a means of obtaining money is illu­ minated by many instances. The case of Cicero is well known. His bro­ ther Quintus, Atticus, Caerellia, C. Ateius Capito, Cn. Plancius, Cn. Sal­ lustius, Sestius, these and many other friends whose names have escaped us came to his help time and again in financial distress!39). Indeed, it seems that Cicero was twice saved from financial bankruptcy : when he was in exile and after the outbreak of the civil war. Information about other senators is less detailed but still useful. At the beginning of his political career Marius was aided by friends to bribe the voters (no. 63). His son had financial support from Atticus when fleeing from Sulla in 88 (no. 64). Scaevola helped P. Rutilius Rufus, whose property had been confiscated on his condemnation (no. 71). Though M. Antonius was not rich, he did not decline to help a friend who asked for it (no. 90). Cato gave loans without interest to his friends (no. 189). Friends and connections supported Octavian in 44 (153, i). D. lunius Brutus was given money by friends for the maintenance of his army in 43 (no. 156). These examples are not exhaustive!40). Together with the passages from Cicero’s letters quoted above, they bring to light a peculiar state of mind and way of acting ; friendship carries with it a duty to offer financial aid to one’s friends. Hence a loan given to a friend is termed mutuum to distinguish it from fenus, of which the sole aim was profit. It is true that despite this difference in terms interest was usually demanded even from friends in the first century!41).

(38) Cic., A lt., 1. 13, 6. Cf. Off.. 2. 56. (39) See n " 94, 182, 199, 21 1, iv. (40) M. Antony was helped by the younger Curio (n“ 91. i). C icero himself assisted friends and con­ nections (n° 211, iv). See also n“ 100, 159 and Sa li ., C a t, 24. 2 , H ist.. 2. 98, 9 , V al. M ax., 6. 2, 11. (41) On mutuum see F ruchtel, Geld., 47 f. ; Michel, Gratuite, 103-127 (and on friendship in general 480-577). Cf. G elzer, Nobilitat, 83-102. Fruchtel writes that mutuum was equivalent to fenus in Cicero’s time. It is true that it is impossible to show, on the basis of Cicero's writings, that interest was not paid on mutuum, but neither is it possible to prove to the contrary. And we do know that Caesar, Crassus and Cato lent money without interest. See Suet., /»/., 27. 1 ; Plut., Crass. 3. I ; 7. 2 ; Cat. Min., 6. 4.

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The duty of clients to assist them was of great advantage to patrons. Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes that a client was obliged to aid his patron to pay dowries and court fines, to raise money to ransom him from cap­ tivity, and in general to contribute to his political expenditure (2. 10, 2). Livy tells that when Camillus was prosecuted, accitis domus tribulibus clientibusque quae magna pars plebis erat, percontatus animos eorum responsum tulisset se conlaturos quanti damnatus esset, absoluere eum non posse i*2). Generally the client’s obligations include dona, munera and operae. Unfortunately very few specific cases are known!4243). S umm ary

The examination of the financial activities of senators has yielded some interesting results. It is notable that money was lent by people of all ranks within the senatorial class, whether for profit or political purposes. Senators were also exceptionally well-placed to obtain credit. They could, of course, like other Romans, apply to bankers, but cheaper methods were open to them. At ail times people seeking political support and influence were ready to offer loans at low interest, or even none. The very nature of friendship in Roman society gave rise to financial help of this kind. So long as senators were politically successful, they could so surmount financial difficulties. Once more we see that their political and social status made up for the ex­ penses their career involved!44).

(42) Liv., 5. 32, 8. Cf. D ion. H al., 13. 5, 5 ; Plut.. Camill.. 12. 2. (43) On connections between patrons and clients see Premerstein, RE. 4, 23-55 ; Mommsen, RF. 3 21-354; G elzer, Nobilitat, 49-56 ; Kaser, Z SS, 58 (1938), 88-135, esp. 104-6 ; Michel, Gratuite, 115-176; T reggiari, Freedmen, 68-81. See also Dig., 38 1. 2. 1 ; Paulus, Sent., 2. 32. Caesar probably had the benefit of a client’s money in his youth (no. 152, i). (44) It is interesting to note senators lending in Tiberius’ time, or perhaps earlier. See T ac., Ann., 6. 16.

CHAPTER

IV

Expenditure A political career at Rome involved heavy expenditure and in this chapter its kinds and scope will be surveyed, as well as the means of meeting it. Private expenditure of senators calls for attention too, not the least because it indicates how the standard of living rose in the senatorial class. I .—

G

a m es

Certain magistracies imposed on their holders a duty to celebrate games. During the Republican period the praetor urbanus was responsible for the celebration of the ludi Apollinares and the ludi piscatorii, the curule aediles for the ludi Romani and Megalesia, and the plebeian aediles for the ludi Florales, the iudi Ceriales and the tudi piebeii. After the victory of Sulla in the civil war the urban quaestor gave the ludi victoriae Sullanae in Praeneste ('). This means that before the enlargement of the Senate by Sulla, 4-5 senators gave games every year, hence about half the senators (12) did so in the course of their career This proportion decreased to a quarter after Sulla. In addition private games were usually given on certain occasions. It was quite common to honour deceased parents and relations by giving games either at the funeral or some years later. We happen to know of 15 senators who celebrated games of this kind ( 3). Other games were given by victorious

(1) See Mommsen, StR, 2, 236 f. ; 517-9, F riedlAnder in Marquardt, R S, 3, 498-503. Cf. Taylor, AJP, 60 (1939), 194-202. On the ludi victoriae Sullanae see Mattingly, NC, 6lh ser., 16 (1956), 189-203. (2) This follows from the assumption that about ten new senators joined the senate every year. See ch. II, note 56. (3) See n“ 3, 14, 17, 103, 1 15, 131, 152. i, 205. On the games celebrated by the sons of M. Aemilius Lepidus in 216 see Liv., 23. 30, 15. On the games given by the sons of M. Valerius Laevinus

CHAPTER IV. — EXPENDITURE

85

commanders ; there are twelve cases known to us l4). The inauguration of temples and other public buildings was another occasion (5). Furthermore, senators gave games whenever they considered it useful to promote their political career. Sulla did so when praetor to appease the voters for his failure to stand a second time for the aedileship (no. 50, i). Milo courted the people by giving games (no. 86), Gladiatorial shows were exhibited by Gabinius before his election to the praetorship (no. i, 47), by Q. Gallius when canvassing for the praetorship of 65 (Ascon, 88), and by Metellus Scipio in 57 under the pretext of honouring his adoptive father, who had died six years earlier (no. 103). Augustus gave several scores of games on various occasions ( 6). In sum, it is very likely that most senators gave games, especially those who advanced in the cursus honorum above the rank of quaestor. The Senate made grants from the Treasury to assist magistrates giving the annual games on behalf of the community : praetors, aediles, and quaestors; it also voted sums of money to other officials specially nominated for the inauguration of public buildings ( 7). Similarly, in certain extraordinary cases, like games vowed on behalf of the state, the men responsible for the performance got allowances from the Treasury by the Senate's decree ( 8). The Senate might also decide to contribute sums of money for the celebration of games vowed by commanders under the stress of battle!9). The allocation to the ludi Romani was 200,000 sesterces till the second Punic War and the sum was raised to 333,333 sesterces in 212, which was probably connected with the coinage change ( 10). The sum in 200 see Liv., 31. 50, 4. On the games occasioned by the death of P. Licinius Crassus in 183 see Liv., 39. 46, 2-3. On the games given by T. Flamininus in honour of his father in 174 see Liv., 41. 28, 11. See also on C. Terentius Lucanus in Pu n ., NH, 35 52 . Mommsen, RM, 554, n. 278. The games celebrated by Lucullus in 88 were perhaps given in honour of his father. See n° 160 n. 623 Cf F riedlander, SG, 3, 554 and in Marquardt, RS, 2, 50 f (4) See n”! 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 63, 68, 152, lii with note 485. 186. in On Octavian see RGDA, 22-3 Cf. F riedlander in Marquardt. RS, 3. 497 f. (5) See nos 3, 18, 61, 201 Some of the games given by Caesar in 46 were occasioned by the inauguration of the temple of Venus Genetrix (n” 152, in with notes 484-5). See also Liv , 36. 36, 3-7 (6) RGDA, 22-3. Sometimes we do not know the reason for the games ; see n° 216 and Cic., Alt., 2. 1

,

1

.

(7) Mommsen, StR , 2, 61 with notes 1-2 ; Marquardt, R S, 2, 85 f . ; F riedlXnder in Marquardt, RS, 3, 487 f. (8) Liv., 31. 9, 7-10; Mommsen, StR, 1, 295 f . ; Marquardt, RS, 2, 85; F riedlXnder in Marquardt, RS, 3, 487. (9) Liv., 28. 38, 14 (Scipio Africanus), 40 52, 1-2 (M. Aemilius Lepidus). On the other hand the Senate rejected the request of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica for a grant of money for the games he had vowed in Spain (Liv., 36. 36, 1). (10) Dion., H al., 7. 71 ; Ps. Ascon., 217. Cf. FriedlXnder in Marquardt, R S, 3, 488 ; M. H. C rawford, “ War and Finance”, in JR S, 54 (1964), 29-32.

86

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

appropriated to the ludi Apollinares was HS 12,000, and in 179 when M. Aemilius Lepidus inaugurated the temples he had vowed he received HS 20,000 for the games ( n ). Our next information dates from 51 A. D. Then the ludi Romani were voted HS 760,000, the ludi plebeii HS 600,000 and the ludi Apollinares HS 380,000 ( 112). Aediles could use the fines they im­ posed for their games ( 13). Victorious commanders were entitled to devote the proceeds of booty at their disposal to the celebration of games (Liv., 36. 36, 1-3). They were mostly consulars and praetorii ( 14). It was an accepted practice to collect money for games from the provin­ cials ; under the blessing of the Roman magistrate they will have ‘volun­ teered’ contributions. Thus M. Fulvius Nobilior levied 100,000 denarii in Greece (no. 19) and Q. Fulvius Flaccus collected money in Spain (no. 18). The people of Asia raised money for the games vowed by L. Cornelius Scipio in commemoration of his victory at Magnesia (no. 15). This usage resembles that of exacting aurum coronarium from provincials for triumphs, which was of oriental origin. Aediles used to collect money and other material they wanted from the allies in Italy and from provincials. The demands of Ti. Sempronius Grac­ chus were so oppressive that the Senate set limits to what aediles were en­ titled to demand (Liv., 40. 44, 10-12). When Q. Cicero was governor of Asia he altogether forbade such contributions ; one of the aediles estimated his loss at HS 200,000 (Cic., QF, 1.1, 26). Ap. Claudius Pulcher amassed works of art and money in Greece when he intended to celebrate games as aedile (no. 115). It was necessary to get the cooperation of the governor of the province. Cicero did not comply with Caelius’ requests, but it is in­ teresting to note that Caelius regarded the whole business as a matter of course (no. 105). Piso sent men to fight in the shows of Clodius (Cic., Pis., 89). Connections with provincial clients were useful too. The people of Messana gave help to their patron, C. Claudius Pulcher, when he celebrated games as an aedile (no. 46) and Bocchus, the king of Mauretania, to Sulla when he was praetor (no. 50, i). Cicero was assisted by the Sicilians in his aedileship (no. 211, iii, n. 76). This evidence justifies us in stating that

(11) Liv. 25. 12, 12 ; 40. 52, 1. (12) CAL, 1 2, p. 248 f. On the data see Mommsen, ib, p. 207. For costs of games in the Principate see Duncan-J ones, PBSR, 30 (1962), 61 (Roman Africa); id., ib., 33 (1965), nos 1074A-1079. (13) Mommsen, StR, 1, 242; 496. (14) See n‘“ 3, 7, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 63, 152, i and iii. On the games celebrated by Octavian in 29 site RGDA, 22-3 ; Dio., 51. 21, 4-9. See also n“ 186, i, 201. It is plausible that the games given by Sulla as praetor in 97 and those of Scaurus as aedile in 58 were partly financed by proceeds of booty. See nos 50, i, 81.

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magistrates quite normally turned to the help of provincials for their celebrations. Games in honour of deceased persons were presumably financed by the inheritances left to their organizers. A connection between the games and the inheritance is very likely when the heirs were not the deceased man’s sons, but outsiders who might also have been adopted (no. 103). Horace tells us of one Staberius whose heirs were bound to honour him by gladiatorial games (Sat., 2. 3, 84-90). Since grants by the Senate were evidently non sufficient, the aediles were expected to spend their own money as well; in Urso this was required by the la w (15). The burden of expense on the games is mentioned by Cicero ( 16). Only in two instances are the actual amounts stated. According to Polybius, a gladiatorial show on a large scale at a funeral cost HS 720,000 (31. 28, 6). M. Aemilius Lepidus, consul 187, instructed his sons to limit the cost to one million asses (no. 3). Other data come from the Principate ( 17). Though precise items are lacking, we can name many senators whose expenditure exceeded the Senate’s grant ( I8). Public sub­ ventions seldom relieved a senator from the necessity of using his own resources, and not a few ran into a debt. His liberality as an aedile en­ tangled Livius Drusus the younger in debt, although some considered him the richest man at Rome (no. 59). Caesar’s enormous borrowings before the praetorship were partly entailed by his expenses as aedile (no. 152, i). Milo is another case (no. 86). Scaurus the younger spent several million denarii on games, and consequently sank into debt (no. 81). There are other examples ( 19). No doubt the debts were occasioned by extravagant liberality ; some senators gave games more than once for political reasons. It looks as if costs were steadily increasing ; they absorbed amazing sums in the period after Sulla. It should be stressed that the games were a political device designed to win popular support, especially when elections were in view. Since a great number of senators adopted this device, the competition became more and more fierce ( 20). (15) See the comments of Munzer on the election of P. Licinius Crassus as aedile (RA, 184 ; 188). In Urso the duumviri and the aediles were bound to spend a minimum sum of money equivalent to that which they got from the municipal treasury. See FIRA '■>, 1, n° 21, LXX-LXXI; Marquardt, R S, 2, 86 ; F riedlander in Marquardt, RS, 3, 488. (16) Cic., Off., 2. 55. Cf. V al. Max., 2. 4, 6. (17) F riedl'Xnder, SG, 2, 10-12. (18) See nos 46, 56, 59, 67, 79, 81, 89, 105, 118, 129, 132, 139, 150, 152, i, 155, 160, 162, 170, 205, 220. On Bibulus see Suet., /«/., 10. 1 ; Dio, 37. 8, 2, and on D. Iunius Silanus, Cic., Off, 2. 57. (19) See nos 81, 103, 105, 129, 132, 194. (20) Liv., 7 2 ,1 3 : Inter aliarum parva principia rerum ludorum quoque prima origo ponenda visa est, ut appareret quam ab sano initio res in hanc vix opulentis regnis tolerabilem insaniam venerit. Cf. Plin.,

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II.—

F e a st s

On certain occasions senators used to entertain the populace by feasts and by the distribution of corn, oil and wine. Private games in honour of deceased parents were occasionally accompanied by banquets (21). The aediles too regaled the public and distributed corn and other commodities on the occasion of their games (22). A candidate to the censorship is known to have feasted the people (no. 1), and on another occasion a consul designate distributed wine (no. 12). Victorious commanders, too, gave public banquets ; L. Mummius, Sulla, Crassus, Lucullus, Caesar, Augustus, and Agrippa are the known instances ( 23). Feasts and distributions were financed in the same way as the games they accompanied : from grants voted by the Senate, inheritances, booty and provincial contributions. III.—

B r ib e r y an d D o natio n s

The desire to enlarge the circle of supporters and adherents, and in general the nature of social life at Rome, led senators to make grants and loans. Senators under prosecution would often try to bribe the judges ; this has been discussed already, though from the point of view of the bribe­ takers!24). But some other kinds of expenditure still demand examination. Bribery of voters was almost indispensable. Twenty senators, from all ranks, are known to have resorted to it most as candidates for the praetorship or the consulate ( 25). We may also note how Livius Drusus dissipated his money to ensure the passing of his bills (no. 59). Apart from the many particular cases attested in our sources, there is general evidence in abun­ dance to show that bribery was accepted and frequent practice. People engaged in this occupation were divided into those who arranged the bribery, those in whose hands the money was deposited, and those who

NH, 36. 115-120. 22 pairs of gladiators took part in funeral games in 215, 25 in 200 (Liv., 23. 30, 15 ; 31. 50, 4), while Caesar prepared 320 pairs of gladiators (n° 152, i). On the advance of aediles in the cursus honorum see ch. VII. iii. (21) Liv., 39. 46, 2-4; 41. 28, 11. See also n° 132. (22) See n“ 30, 33, 220. On M. Seius, aedile 74, see Cic., Off., 2. 55 ; 58 ; P u n ., NH, 15. 2. (23) See n“ 31, 50, ii, 152, iii, 153, iv, 159, 160, 220. On distribution of food see Marquardt, RS, 2, 136 f .; Rostovtzeff, RE, 4, 875-880 ; H. T edenant, D. S., 1, 1442-4 ; Esp£randieu, Diz. Ep., 2, 599-601. (24) See p. 68 f. (25) See n« 39, 45, 50, i, 59, 63, 81, 82, 86, 89, 99, 103, 106, 1 1 3(?), 133, 152, i, 162, 165, 181(7), 186, iii, 191, 215, 218. When Bibulus resorted to bribery during his campaign for the consulate of 59, many cooperated with him, including Cato (Suet., /«/., 19. 1).

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distributed it ( 26). Each tribe had its own professional divisores ( 27). In fact to make gifts and to give meals and shows to one's own tribules was legal ( 28) ; it became ambitus only when largesse extended through all the tribes. Even this prohibition could be circumvented by employing friends as intermediaries ( 29). The number of laws against bribery is good proof of its persistence. A chronological list of bills passed or proposed betrays how it became more and more ram pant: lex Cornelia-Baebia in 181, lex Cornelia-Fulvia in 159, lex Cornelia in 81, lex Aurelia in 70, lex Calpurnia in 67, lex Cornelia in 67, lex Tullia in 63, lex Aufidia in 61, lex Licinia in 55, lex Pompeia in 52 ( 30). The impression this list creates, that bribery intensified after Sulla, is corroborated by other evidence in ancient authors!31). Perhaps the im­ pression is in some degree exaggerated and misleading in consequence of the abundance of sources for the later period and their scarcity for the earlier. Nonetheless, the increasing severity of the legislation proves that the old laws were inadequate and that candidates were more and more prone to bribe voters. Distributions to the populace which had no direct connection with elections were not uncommon. Thus Marius distributed largesse after the war against the Cimbri and the Teutones (no. 63). Immediately after his acquittal Scaurus gave presents to the people (no. 81). Milo presented 1000 asses to every citizen registered in the tribes after Clodius murder (no. 86). To celebrate his triumph in 46 Caesar gave 400 sesterces to each of the ur­ ban plebs (no. 152, iii, n. 50). Sensing the approaching war against Oc(26) Cic., Verr., 1. 36 ; 2. 4, 45 ; Har. Resp., 42 ; Com. Pet., 57 ; Ascon., 74. See T P., 1. 176 ; Liebenam, RE. 5, 1237 f . ; Mommsen, Straf. 869-875 , Kroll, Kultur, 1, 52-5 ; Taylor, PP, 67 f. (27) Cic., Verr, 1. 22; Har. Resp., 42; Ps. Ascon., 212. See Mommsen, StR, 3, 195 f. (28) Cic., Plane., 44-5 : Noli enim putare. Laterensis, legibus istis quas senatus de ambitu sanciri

voluerit id esse actum ut suffragatio ut observantia, ut gratia tolleretur Semper fuerunt viri boni qui apud tribulis suos gratiosi esse vellent: neque vero tam durus in plebem noster ordo fuit ut eam coli nostra modica iiberalitate noluerit, neque hoc liberis nostris interdicendum est, ne observent tribulis suos, ne deligant, ne conficere necessariis suis suam tribum possint ne par ab eis munus in sua petitione respectent. See also Alt, 1. 16, 13 and next note. (29) Cic., Plane, 48 : Sic enim tecum ago. Quam tibi commodum est, unam tribum delige; tu doce, id quod debes, per quem sequestrem, quo divisore corrupta sit; ego, si id facere non potueris quod, ut opinio mea fert, ne incipies quidem, per quem tulerit docebo. See also Mur., 72-3 ; Com. Pet., 44 ; Suet., Aug, 40. 2 and Taylor, PP, 63-4. (30) See Rotondi, Leges, 227 ; 288 ; 361 ; 369 ; 370 ; 374 ; 379 ; 384 ; 404 ; 41 1. Despite Polyb., 6. 56, 4, it is hardly credible that bribery of voters was a capital offence at his time. See Plaut., Trim, 1033. At any rate, there was no protiibitron on congiaria (Liv., 37. 57, 11). For the laws against ambitus see also Hartmann, RE, 1, 1800-1803 ; Humbert, D. S., 1, 223 f. ; Mommsen, Straf, 865-8. (3!) Cic, Verr., 2. 2, 138 ; Alt, 1. 16, 12 ; 4. 15, 7 ; 17, 2-5 ; Plut., Cat Min., 44. 2-3 ; 47. 1 ; Caes., 28. 3.

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tavian, Antony tried to ingratiate himself with the people of Italy by donatives (no. 91, iv) and Augustus too made distributions on several oc­ casions (no. 153, iv.). Finally, there are the legacies to Roman citizens by the wills of Caesar, Balbus, Agrippa and Augustus ( 32). Liberality of this kind was evidently characteristic of holders of the highest magistracies : candidates to these magistracies tended to spend considerable sums in this way ; victorious commanders were eager to win popular favour by lavishing money on the people and a few consulars wished to commemorate their name after death by giving further proof of their generosity in the form of legacies left to Roman citizens. Such grants, which appeared only in the late Republic, were recognised by the Roman Emperors as a useful device for preserving public goodwill ( 33). IV. —

P u b l ic B u ild in g

Public building includes construction of temples, arches and porticoes, paving of roads, decoration of public buildings and setting of works of art in public places. We may classify expenditure of this kind by the sources from which it was defrayed ( 34) : a) Buildings constructed by aediles. In so far as these were financed by the fines they imposed, the aediles did not need to spend their own money!35). b) Works carried out by commanders. Generally these were temples, and oc­ casionally walls, theatres, roads and markets, in Italy and in the provinces as well. In the period under discussion 35 senators are known to have erected buildings, but the practice itself goes well back to the beginning of the Republic and even to the regal period (36). It can be asserted that proceeds of booty covered the expenses of these works. Literary sources and inscriptions provide the names of numerous commanders who used their personal share in the booty for this purpose (37). Even (32) See nos 121, 153 notes 506 and 561, 220. (33) See Marquardt, RS, 2, 138-141 ; T edenant, D. S , 1, 1442-4; 2, 385-7. (34) The building operations of the censors were financed by the state. See Marquardt, RS, 2, 879 ; Mommsen, StR, 2, 449-457 (35) See n“ 1, 3, 5, 11, 23. Cf. Mommsen, StR, 1, 242; 2, 496.

(36) See n“ 1, 5, 6, 9, 12, 18, 19, 21, 22, 26, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 61, 63, 68, 78, 93, 116, 122, 152, iii, 153, iv, 186, iii, 201, 214, 220. On L. Porcius Licinus, cos., 184, see Liv., 40. 34, 4 ; on L. Stertinius, Liv., 33. 27, 3-5 ; on Ser. Fulvius Flaccus, cos., 135, CIL, l 2, 635 ( = ILLRP, 332); on L. Caecilius Metellus Dalmaticus, cos, 119, Cic., Verr., 2 1, 154 ; Scaur., 46 ; Ascon., 28 ; Ps. Ascon., 254; on L. Marcius Philippus, cos., 38, Ovid, Fasti, 6. 801 ; Tac., Ann., 3. 72 ; Pun ., NH, 35. 66 ; 144 Suet., Aug., 29. 5 and cf. P. A., 428 ; on L. Cornificius, cos., 35, Suet., Aug., 29. 5 ; P. A., 150. For earlier periods see Liv., 1. 53 and F rank, ESAR, 1, 50. (37) CIL, l 2, p. 195 ; CIL, 1 2, 635 ; 6, 1301 ; 1316 ; 10, 6087 ( = ILLRP, 332 ; 429 ; 431 ILS, 886); RGDA, 21. 1, Cic., Arch., 27 ; Verr., 2. 1, 154 ; Dom.. 102 ; 114; De Or., 3. 10 ; Liv., 10. 46,

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when the use of booty is not explicitly stated, it may reasonably be assumed (38). Since it was lawful to construct public buildings from its proceeds, commanders quite naturally took full advantage of their right when proceeding to erect public monuments (39). c) Public buildings constructed by senators with their own money. Not only were these comparatively few, but many of the donors benefited from exceptional resources which enabled them to implement their building plans. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos. 54, built temples in Greece, probably with money he had extorted in Cilicia (no. 115). Q. Marcius Rex constructed a circus in Antioch, but perhaps with money voted by the Senate (no. 171). Ap. Claudius Pulcher completed the propylaea in Eleusis begun by his uncle, the consul of 54 (no. 117). Profits from the proscriptions enabled M. Aemilius Lepidus, cos. 78, to start the reconstruction of the Basilica Aemilia (no. 37). Unable to complete this work himself L. Aemilius Paullus, cos. 50, obtained financial aid from Caesar (no. 80). It is possible that Ser. Sulpicius Galba used his profits from Spain on his paving works in Tarracina (no. 35). However, in some cases no exceptional sources of income can be shown to have covered the costs (40). The construction of public buildings by senators was an old practice at Rome. The costs grew steadily, but in most cases profits derived from the holding of magistracies probably enabled senators to meet them. Most buildings were erected in Rome and only a few in Italy and in the provin­ ces (41). V.— B odyguards

and

P ersonal A rmies

From the Gracchan period, especially in the first century, there were to be found senators who maintained bodyguards or personal armies. This was an outward sign of the fierce political contest as well as of the decline of the constitutional institutions of the state. The maintenance of these bodyguards and personal armies was a heavy burden. 14-5 ; 33. 27, 3 ; V al. Max., 8. 14, 2 ; V itruv., 4. 3, 15 ; P lin., NH, 7. 97 ; 1 1 5 ; Suet., /»/., 26. 2 ; Aug.. 30. 1 ; Tib., 20 ; F lor., 1. 7, 7 , I sidor., 6. 5, 2. See also n“ 18, 19, 22, 31, 40, 63, 91, 152, iii, 153, iv, 177, 186, iii, 201, 214. For others see the preceding note. (38) See nos 1, 3, 6, 12, 21, 39, 68, 78, 116, 123, 220. On M. Minucius Rufus see P. A., 424, and on C. Sosius, Plin., NH, 13. 53; 36. 28; P A.. 15. (39) Though the exact meaning of manubiae is disputed, no one denies that it was lawful to use it for public needs. See Bona, SDH1, 26 (1960), 105 ff. (with full bibliography). (40) No exceptional resources are known in the following cases: Scipio Africanus when he built an arch and statues on the Capitol after his second consulship (n° 13), Paullus Aemilius Lepidus when he completed the reconstruction of the Basilica Aemilia (n° 79), Metellus Scipio who erected equestrian statues on the Capitol (n° 103), Faustus Sulla who built anew the Curia Hostilia (n° 132), C. Licinius Murena who, as an aedile, embellished the comitia (Pun ., NH, 35 173 ; V itruv., 2. 8, 8), L. Scribonius Libo who built a basilica and towers in Caudium in Samnium (n° 195) and C. Staienus who erected golden statues (n° 200). (41) See n“ 31, 115, 153, iv, 220.

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Scipio Aemilianus had a special corps of 4000 soldiers in the Numantine War, consisting mainly of volunteers sent by cities and kings who stood in friendly relations with Aemilianus, but including 500 clients and friends of Aemilianus. Since he dispensed with a vote of public money, Scipio had to bear the cost of these soldiers, but probably not of the legions (no. 14). Now, it is possible that Scipio used his own resources to some extent, but it is clear that he could sustain the liability only with financial help from his friends, notably Attalus of Pergamum (no. 14). Two points deserve at­ tention : the subventions of his friends and the existence of an army partly composed of friends and clients. The mere fact that bodyguards might consist of clients, tenants and slaves is important in itself. It also lessened the cost, as the clients were bound to help their patrons. In his last struggle C. Gracchus had the assistance of clients (no. 73). Slaves and tenants from Pompey's estates in Picenum served in his army when he joined Suila and were sent for when he clashed with Clodius (no. 186, i). L. Domitius Ahenobarbus enlisted his tenants and slaves in 49 (no. 139). Altogether about twenty senators are known to have mobilized personal armies or bodyguards in this way (42). Of these the majority, at least sixteen, were nobiles. The fact that bodyguards might be clients and slaves did not mean that no costs were incurred, but they increased considerably if gladiators were bought and maintained. We know the names of about ten senators who owned gladiators for a considerable time. Once again it is remarkable to notice the great proportion of nobiles, at least seven. Of these, eight began maintaining gladiators as aediles or tribunes (43). Far greater expense resulted from the enlistment and maintenance of per­ sonal armies during the civil wars of the first century. Donations and other payments to hired soldiers were of the order of hundreds of millions of (42) See n“ 14, 69, 73, 86, 89, 103, 1 18, 123, 132, 13.3, 139, 166, 183, 186, iii, 197. On Scipio Nasica, cos., 138, see Plut., TG, 19 ; on C. Manilius, tr.pl., 66, Ascon., 45 ; 60 ; 66 ; Dio, 36. 44, 2 ; on Q. Metellus Nepos, cos., 57, Plut , Cat. Min., 27. 1 and on the elder son of Pompey, C aes., BC, 3. 4, 4. P. Sestius may have organized his bodyguards from his clients, and slaves. See Cic., Red. Sen., 20. It is possible that Ti. Gracchus’ bodyguard consisted in part of his clients. See App., BC, 1. 1 1 ; 15 ; Gellius 2. 3, 14. For violence at Rome see the detailed study of Lintott, Violence, passim. Though he says that Roman tradition tolerated and even encouraged violence in political and private disputes, he regards the events of 133 as a turning point. (43) See n“ 86, 89, 91, iv, 118, 152, i, 156, 200. From Varro we leam that Caecilius, Aquilius and Cascellius owned gladiators ILL, 9. 7). The first rnay be identified with Q. Metellus Nepos (Plut., Cat. Min., 27. 1) or with M. Metellus (Cic., Alt., 2. 1, 1). For Cascellius see MRR, 2, 115. C. Porcius Cato, tr. pi., 56, owned gladiators for some time (Cic., O f. 2. 4, 5). Note also Cn. Cornelius Lentulus and his school in Capua (Liv., Per., 95 ; Oros., 5. 24, 1). Not a few senators held gladiators for a short time. Cf. Lintott, Violence, ch. VI, esp. 83-5.

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sesterces. Of course, only a small group of senators found it necessary or possible to bear these expenses, namely those who sought for primacy in the state: the younger Marius, Sulla, Lepidus, Caesar, Pompey, Metellus Scipio, L. Domitius, Brutus, Cassius, Antony, D. Brutus Albinus, Dolabella and Augustus!44). Almost all of them were nobiles and. apart from Octavian, they were at least of praetorian rank when they enlisted soldiers from private funds. How did senators obtain the money necessary for these formidable ex­ penses ? First, let us examine the maintenance of bodyguards. C. Gracchus and P. Sulpicius Rufus were assisted by friends (nos. 73, 75), while C. Por­ cius Cato and Clodius had Crassus’ support (nos. 118, 159). However, the financial help of friends and principes was not sufficient; in the main men had to spent their own money and to borrow as well. In fact senators who had bodyguards were deeply involved in debt. C. Porcius Cato was com­ pelled to sell his gang of gladialors (Cic., QF, 2. 4, 5). Others continued to keep their gangs despite the ruinous expense: P. Sulpicius Rufus, Milo, C. Antonius, Metellus Scipio, Faustus Sulla and Sestius!45). Senators took advantage of the disorder in civil wars to lay their hands on public funds. Thus though Sulla had received a grant, he collected fines and taxes in the eastern provinces (no. 50, ii). The same practice was followed by Antony, Metellus Scipio, Dolabella, Cornificius, Caesar, Octavian, Brutus, Cassius, Pompey and Varro ( 46). The real problem was to get the sums needed for maintaining an army till it was possible to extort money from the provincials. Some commanders were trusted and admired by the soldiers and thus gained the respite they needed. That was the case of Caesar, and Brutus and Cassius, too, first acquired the allegiance of the eastern legions and then proceeded to accumulate the sums needed by im­ posing tribute and fines. Not less important was the seizure of money deposited in the Treasury, effected by Antony, Dolabella, Caesar, Domitius Ahenobarbus and Pompey ( 47). The younger Marius was alone in being unable to collect money in the provinces. Octavian overcame his financial difficulties thanks to the loyalty of his friends who supported him materially and by selling off his own and Caesar’s property (153, i). Afterwards the Senate began to provide him with funds and then came the proscriptions. D. Brutus used up his own money and that of his friends, and also became im­ mersed in debt (no. 156). This had happened to the younger Marius too. (441 Seen»*-37. 50. ii. 64, 9t. Itt-iv. TO37H0, 125. 139, 152. ii-m, 153. i, 155. 156, 186. in.

(45) See nos 75. 86, 89, 103, 198. (46) See n" 91, in. 103. 110, 125, 134. 152, ii. 153. i, 157. 186. in. On Varro see C aes., SC 2 18. (47) On the Senate’s grant to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus see C aes., BC 1 23, 4.

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The maintenance of personal armies was a new item in the expenditure of senators, peculiar to the last hundred years of the Republic. Only those who tried to attain a dominant place in the state needed to incur it. The for­ mation of personal armies from one’s own slaves and clients was also a prominent feature of this period. It is noteworthy that the heaviest expenses, which occurred in times of civil wars, did not involve commanders in debts, since they were able to appropriate public finds and to exact fines and tribute. As such devices were not possible in other times, senators were then obliged to use up their own liquid capital or to borrow. Conditions of this kind make it easy to understand why Crassus defined the rich man as one whose annual income could maintain a whole army (48).

VI.—

C

o st

of

L iv in g

Our primary task here is to describe and delineate the changes in the cost of living in the course of the second and first centuries as well as to examine how far they affected the whole senatorial class (49). Changes in the stan­ dard of senators’ houses can serve as guiding indicators. Unfortunately almost no relevant information has survived from the second century, ex­ cept that we know that the magnificent house of M. Octavius on the Palatine was exceptional (Cic., Off., 1. 138). At the end of the second cen­ tury a sharp rise began in the standard of senator’s houses. The value of Crassus’ house was HS 6 million and that of Catulus was more (nos. 55, 61). At that time a new attractive style of building was developed, as the extensive demand for the houses of Sergius Orata shows ( 50). But the shar­ pest change occurred in the period after Sulla, when consulars, nobiles and other senators who wished to imitate them vied with one another in building spectacular mansions (see p. 23). Obviously people who were suc­ cessful in exploiting the provinces tended to construct luxurious houses, like Mamurra who built a marble palace on the Caelius (Plin., NH, 36. 48). It is also significant that about 25 % of the senators known as owners of houses in Rome possessed at least two houses there (p. 22). The development of gardens is linked with the rise in the standard of dwellings. Gardens are attested comparatively very early, but luxury gardens appear to have come into existence only in the first century. Of the 22

(48) Cic, Parad., 6. 45 ; Off, I. 25 ; Plin., NH. 33. 134 ; Plut., Crass., 2. 7 ; Dio, 40. 37, 3. See also Adcock, Crassus, 22-4. (49) F riedlXnder, SG, 2, 268-383. (50) V al. Max., 9. 1, 1 ; Plin., NH, 9. 168.

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senators known to have owned horti 11 are nobiles ; 16 are consulars and 6 are praetorii ( 51). It seems that the possession of gardens was characteristic of holders of higher magistracies, though some had been owners of gardens before election to the praetorship. Our information about luxury villas out­ side Rome corresponds to what is known about houses and gardens within the city. The luxury villa became fashionable only in the first century and probably did not exist at all in the first half of the second century. This is proved first by the strict meaning of the word villa in Cato’s book as com­ pared with its two-fold meaning in Varro’s book (p. 24 f.). For Cato the villa was a part of an estate, whereas Varro was aware that some villas had a separate and independent function. Secondly, fish ponds, which were characteristic of luxury villas, were introduced only in the first century (Varro, RR, 3. 3, 10). The greatest piscinarii were Marcus and Lucius Lucullus, Philippus and Hortensius ( 52). In the period after Sulla many senators introduced luxury villas on estates which had formerly been agricultural farms with plain buildings. Clodius was building an imposing house on his land at Alba when he was killed (no. 118). Unsatisfied with the extravagant house he had built in Aricia, Caesar ordered its demolition (no. 152, iv). Lucullus added luxury buildings to his paternal estate at Tusculum (no. 160). Another luxury villa was built there by Gabinius (no. 147). Varro, too, added buildings to his villa at Casinum for ostentation and amenity (no. 204). A thorough work of reconstruction was carried out by Q. Cicero on property he had inherited at Arpinum, to turn it into a place of recreation (no. 212). His brother planned similar operations in Ar­ pinum ; moreover, he was not content with the house on the estate he had acquired at Tusculum, which had once belonged to Sulla, but embellished it with costly statues and added more buildings, including a library, gym­ nasium, portico, and exedra. Probably he reconstructed the villae urbanae on other estates (no. 211, i). But was it the whole senatorial class that participated in the developernent described or only a minority ? The senatorial property at Tusculum forms a good sample, since luxury villas were concentrated there. Of the 25 senators known to have owned villas at Tusculum 13 are nobiles, 16 consulars, 7 praetorii and two tribunicii. Senatorial estates at Cumae were of the same type, and there we find 11 nobiles and 9 non-nobiles ; 13 consulars, 3 praetorii and 4 of lower ranks. Baiae presents a more telling situation: all the known senators are nobiles, 7 consulars and one

(51) See ch. I, note 43. (52) See n“ 150, 160, 171, 216 ; also 164, 166.

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praetorius (53). These data make it quite clear that luxury villas were acquired mainly by the nobility or consulars. We may add some details. The magnificent house of C. Octavius, cos., 165, did not satisfy Scaurus, who bought and demolished it in order to enlarge his own mansion {Cic., Off, 1. 138). The value of the Basilica Aemilia was estimated at HS 100,000, and yet Cicero’s villa at Tusculum was worth 500,000, that of Marius at Baiae 10 million and that of Scaurus at Tusculum 30 millions (54). The possession of precious articles made of silver and gold is a faithful index to the rise in the standard of living. The censors of 275 removed P. Cornelius Rufinus from the Senate because he owned silver vessels to the weight of 10 pounds. Q. Fabius Allobrogicus, the consul of 123, possessed 1000 pounds of silver plate, and the younger Drusus 10,000 pounds ( 55). But this development of luxury did not encompass the whole senatorial class. Two silver bowls of five pounds were all the silver plate that Q. Aelius Tubero, tr. p i, 177, possessed (no. 2). Scipio Aemilianus had - 32 pounds of silver plate and 3 pounds of gold (no. 14). But his brother-in-law, C. Gracchus, bought silver dolphins at 1250 denarii per pound, while the usual price of a pound of silver was 84 denarii (Plin., NH., 33. 147). L. Licinius Crassus paid HS 100,000 for two silver goblets made by the artist Mentor, and he had more silver pieces bought at the price of HS 6000 per pound (Plin., NH., 33. 147). It is very likely that Pliny selec­ ted unusual and extremely extravagant instances, but however exceptional they may be, the general trend was clearly upward. Thus a sumptuary law from the year 161 forbade the principes civitatis to serve meals with plate that weighed more than 100 pounds!56). Pliny says that there were 150 silver dishes of the weight of 100 pounds in existence before the civil wars of Sulla (NH, 33. 145). But the process did not stop at that, and Pliny seems to say, quoting Nepos, that silver couches became common in the following period (NH, 33. 146). Nov/, compared with the development of luxury buildings, the acquisition of precious articles started at an earlier stage. The predilection for silver plate on the part of senators was already manifest during the wars Rome conducted in the East at the beginning of the second century. Pliny states that it was a result of the victory in Asia, by which he obviously means the victory over Antiochus the Great, that

(53) See ch. I, notes 67 and 69 with table III. (54) See n“ 63, 81, 211, i. On the Basilica Aemilia see F rank, ESAR, I, 153. (55) Plin., NH, 33. 141 — on Drusus and Allobrogicus. On Rufinus see Liv., Per., 14 ; Val. max., 2. 9, 4 ; Sen., Ep„ 98. 13 ; Pun ., NH, 18. 39 ; Plut., Suit, 1. 1 ; G ellius., 17. 21, 39 ; Non., Marc., 465. 21. (56) G ellius, 2. 24, 1-2; Rotondi, Leges, 287 f.

CHAPTER IV. — EXPENDITURE

97

such luxury goods reached Rome. Later, the auction of the property of At­ talus the Third was the occasion for fierce competition for the acquisition of his precious plate (57). The rise in luxury expenditure was accelerated by the demand for works of art, which cost hundreds of thousands of sesterces, or even millions. Prices of this order are known from the first century ( 58). It is well to bear these prices in mind when we read that Cicero’s son and other young nobles had allowances of about HS 80,000 for a single year’s residence at Athens (Cic., Att., 12. 32, 2). Sumptuary laws too witness to the rise in the standard of living. The law of Fannius in the year 161 fixed HS 100 as the maximum cost of a meal at certain days. The Licinian Law, to be dated not later than 103, fixed the maximum cost of a meal at 200 sesterces on some occasions, and yet Sulla raised it to 300 sesterces ( 59). Actual costs were surely much higher, but the difference between these maximum offers a clue for judging what changes occurred in costs on these items, it reflects a rise in the proportion of 1 : 2 : 3 during a period of 80 years. After the dictatorship of Sulla prices went much higher; Lucullus certainly reached a peak in serving Cicero and Pompey with a meal that cost HS 200,000 (Plut., Lucui, 41. 5). The great demand for extravagant birds, like peacocks and thrushes, and the high prices of fish and pigeons are symptomatic of prodigious squandering ( 60). In the De Officiis Cicero admonishes his readers — he clearly thinks of senators — against excessive sumptuousness, but at the same time he says that many imitated Lucullus’ magnificence and attests the compulsion to ostentatious living and open-handed hospitality (1. 138-140). It was to check extravagance that sumptuary laws were enacted, but in vain ; they were disregarded and became obsolete ( 61). A senator had to live up to the

(57) Liv., 39. 6, 7-9 ; Plin., NH, 33. 149. Cf. Polyb., 31. 25, 3-7. (58) Hortensius paid HS 144,000 for a pidure (Plin., NH, 35. 130). Caesar paid 80 talents for two pictures (P lin., NH, 7. 126 ; 35. 136). Lucullus paid two taients for a copy (P lin., NH, 35. 125), and his son intended to pay o ne million sesterces for a statue (P lin., NH, 35. 156). Verres paid HS 200,000 for carpets (Cic., Verr., 2. 4, 28). Cato paid HS 800,000 for a tablecloth (P lin., NH, 8. 196 ; that the reading is Cato and not Capito can be inferred from Plut., Cat. Min., 57). It seems that Agrippa paid I. 2 million sesterces for two pictures (P lin., NH, 25. 26). Cicero paid HS 500,000 for a table (P lin., NH, 13. 93), but his other acquisitions were modest (Cic.. Att., 1. 7 ; 8, 2). For prices of statues in the im­ perial period see D uncan-Jones. PBSR, 23 (1965), 196 ff„ and n” 491-504 in his list (59) Gellius, 2. 24. See Rotondi, Leges, 287-8; 327-8 ; 354-5. (60) Hortensius was the first to serve peacocks, which cost HS 200 per head (Varro, RR, 3. 6, 6). A pair of ordinary pigeons cost HS 200 and exceptional might have cost HS 1,000 (id., ib., 3. 7, 10). Thanks to its fish ponds the villa of Hirrus was sold for HS 4 million (id., ib., 3. 17, 3). Thrushes were expensive (id., ib., 3. 2, 15 ; 4, 1). Varro explicitly says that these high prices were connected with feasts offered on occasions of triumphs (ib., 3. 2, 16). (61) T ac., Ann., 3. 54; see also 52-3; 56.

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

style of his class, if he wanted to keep his ‘senatorial dignity’ ( 62). Cicero seems to say that he did well with an income of 100,000 sesterces (Parad 6. 49), but he certainly cannot be trusted. His_ annual expenditure may be estimated at 400-500,000 sesterces not including running costs of the agricultural parts of his estates (no. 211, iii). Admittedly not every senator spent as much as that, but Cicero was not a spendthrift and there were others who dissipated larger sums. Cicero’s expenditure may then give us some idea on the general costliness of senatorial life. It is apparent that Rome’s wars in the East caused a rise in the standard of living. Once the senators discovered the refined and sophisticated tastes of the Hellenistic world, they were not slow to immitate what they found, and to increase their private outlay. This process, begun in the first half of the second century, reached extravagant heights in the first. Our in­ formation suggests it was consulars and nobiles who were chiefly respon­ sible for this extravagance, but the entire senatorial class increased its cost of living. S um m ary

The expenses of Roman senators rose steadily from the beginning of the second century and culminated in the period after Sulla. The increase was felt both in private and public outlay, the latter including games, feasts, building, bribery and donations. The maintenance of personal armies and bodyguards was a new item in the last hundred years of the Republic. This process affected the entire class, but particularly the consulars and the nobility. As a rule, senators did not call on their own money for these purposes. The aediles erected public buildings from the fines they exacted. Generals used proceeds of booty for the same purpose. Games were financed partly by appropriations from the state treasury, partly by fines and contributions from provincials, and sometimes by booty. Since, however, the competition for office was fierce, the desire to gain popular favour knew no bounds and many senators were forced to resort to borrowing. Two other factors could entangle senators in debts : the need for bodyguards and the higher stan­ dard of living. But while only a minority of senators had bodyguards, the entire class felt the rising cost of senatorial life. (62) Dites olim familiae nobilium aut claritudine insignes studio magnificentiae prolabebantur. Nam etiam tum plebem socios regna colere et coli licitum, ut quisque opibus domo paratu speciosus, per nomen et clientelas inlustrior habebatur (Tac., Ann., 3. 5.'5). On sumptuary laws see D. D aube, Roman Law (Edinburgh, 1969), 117-128.

C H A PT ER

V

The Economic Characteristics of the Senatorial Class

I. —

S

e n a t o r s

a n d

E

q u it e s

The discussion so far has brought to light differences in economic con­ ditions among groups and individuals within the senatorial class, but also features characteristic of the class as a whole. Since the senatorial class is defined by a political and not by an economic criterion, these features may not have been peculiar to the senatorial class, but also have characterised other groups within Roman society. It will be useful to compare the results of our investigation with what is known about the economic activities of the equestrian class. It is commonly held that the Ordo Equester comprised Roman citizens with property which was certainly HS 400,000 in the first century and had probably been so as early as the Second Punic W ar(J). It is evident from the very definition of this class that it cannot have been economically(I)

(I) Mommsen, StR, 3, 476 ft. ; G elzer, Nobilitat. 2 f t . , G abba. Athenaeum, 29 (1951), 225 . 32 (1954), 122 (refuting the view of Hill that no special census had existed for the equites before the Gracchart period)-: G assola, GP, 8t f , Nicolet, Or. Eq.. 52 ff I am not convinced by the arguments of Nicolet that there were only equites equo publico, that is, the ordo equester was equivalent to the members of the 18 centuries, and the term eques Romanus was ap­ plied to equites equo publico alone. Nicolet rejects the possibility that other citizens holding the same census could be called by the same term (Or. Eq., passim). In fact, a similar theory was expounded for the late Republic by M. 1 H enderson URS, 53 (1963), 61 -5) For criticism of Nicolet's view see J. M ar­ tin, Gnomon, 39 (1967), 795 ff, and esp. W iseman, Historia, 19 (1970), 67-83. Wiseman distinguishes between a colloquial usage and a strict constitutional definition Badian's view may be quoted here : “ In fact, in the post — Sullan age, there was clearly no recognized way of either acquiring equestrian status ... or, correspondingly, of stopping anyone with sufficient wealth and influence from claiming it” (/?/, vtti).

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PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

homogeneous (2). The economic activities of the Equites ranged over agriculture, money lending, farming of state revenues in Italy and in the provinces (3), and commerce (4). There is no doubt that agricultural possessions formed the economic basis of the senatorial class, but although it may be maintained that many Equites had agricultural property in Italy and in the provinces as well, agriculture was comparatively less important for the Equestrian class. Many Equites were engaged in financial activities, though this was true of many senators too. Nevertheless there is an essential difference between the financial business of senators and Equites. Prominent among the loans made by senators were those that were given at low interest or without interest at all for political and social reasons. Prompted by social and friendly obligations, Equites too tended at times to lend money without claiming the maximum interest, but usually not from political reasons and not to the same extent as senators (5). Some Equites were engaged in commerce. It is usually held that senators were debarred from this activity by the plebiscitum Claudianum (Liv., 21. 63, 3-4). Livy says that the tribune Q. Claudius enacted ne quis senator cuive senator pater fuisset maritimam navem, quae plus quam trecentarum amphorarum esset, haberet. Various interpretations have been suggested of this law and of C. Flaminius’ support of it (6), but there can be no doubt that at the time it was enacted some senators must have invested capital in maritime trade. Moreover, it does not appear that the law excluded senators altogether from engaging in any kind of commerce, and in fact even maritime commerce was only indirectly prohibited. And it is well to remem­ ber that Cato did not stigmatize maritime commerce, but merely pointed out its risky character (Agr. Praef., 3). A very few senators are actually known

(2) See, e.g. H ill, RMC, 48. Frank insisted too much on the importance of the Equites as proprietors. See AHR, 1912/13, 250 f. Nicolet has collected the prosopographical evidence, proving the economically heterogenous character of the Equites (Or Eq , II partie, chs ii-vn). (3) On Equites as proprietors see Nicolet, Or. Eq., 285 ff. and the tables in 312-5. But one may wonder why Varro is included in these tables. Note also the equestrian neighbour of Lucullus in Tusculum (Cic., Leg., 3. 30). On money-lending and the contracting of public works and of staterevenues see Frank, CP, 28 (1933), I - 11 ; H ill, RMC, 45-86 ; Nicolet, Or. Eq.. II partie, chs. iii-iv. (4) It is true that Equites avoided calling themselves mercatores and that negotiatores were not necessarily traders (Wilson, Emigration, 4 ff. ; 156 ff ; Nicolet, Or. Eq., 358-362). But it is one thing to admit that petty traders were not Equites, and another one to say that Equites were not engaged in commerce at a ll; after all what else can we term the business of Rabirius Postumus, whose amphorae were found in south Italy, Sicily and Germany, if not commercial? (5) See n° 211, iv, for the loans Cicero received. See also N epos, A lt., 2. 2 ; 4. 4 ; 8. 6. On loans given for political motives see ch. 3, ch. 4, ii and oh. 6. (6) See Stein, RR, 7 f. ; F rank, E c Hist., 115; H ill, RMC, 51 ; YIavetz, Athenaeum, 40 (1962), 325-344 (summarizing previous interpretations), C assola, GP, 83; 215 ff Lippold, Consules, 93-5.

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101

to have invested in commerce. Cato himself was a partner in a shipping en­ terprise (no. 33). The quaestor Malleolus invested in various ways in Asia, partly in trading undertakings (no. 190). Cicero implies in his speech against Verres that the plebiscitum Claudianum was a dead letter at the time, and Caesar thought it necessary to re-enact it (7). Thus, despite the scanty evidence, it seems that some senators did engage in commerce. But there is more to be said. Many passages in ancient authors praise the natural resources of Italy, referring to minerals of all sorts, lakes for fishing, forests, etc. (8). No doubt there is some exaggeration in these descriptions, and yet we should underestimate the business enterprise of Roman senators if we assumed that they did nothing to develop the natural resources of their estates (9). To exploit these resources they had to launch out into com­ mercial manufacture. Even purely agricultural production necessitated some commercial operations, given the size of their estates and senators’ need for income (1012). Cato’s directions concerning the implements necessary for estates make it perfectly clear that the owners themselves manufactured wine and oil from the crops of olive plantations and vineyards (n ) ; and it was for commercial purposes that proprietors bred large herds and flocks (,2). Indeed the third book of Varro’s De Re Rustica conveys the im­ pression that proprietors were eager to learn better methods of cultivation whose purpose was to increase their income by supplying the market with lucrative commodities. Thus it cannot be true that senators held landed property merely for its own sake or for the subsistence of their own households.

(7) Cic., Verr., 2. 5, 45; Paulus, fr. Laid., 3-4; Dig., 50. 5, 3. (8) Varro, RR, 1. 2, 3-4 j 6-7 ; Dion. Hal., I. 36-7 ; Stra bo , 6. 4, 1 ; Pun ., NH, 3. 41 ; 33. 78 ; 37. 201-2. (9) On the eagerness of Romans to make profits see Polyb., 31. 27, 10-11. Cato regards farms as commercial units. See his advice to landowners, Agr., 2. 5-7. Q. Caecilius Metellus, cos., 206 said of his father, L. Caecilius Metellus cos., 251 and 247, that one of his aims was pecuniam magnam bono modo invenire (Plin., NH, 7. 140), on which cf. Lippold, Consules, 79-80. (10) On senatorial estates see ch. 1 For returns expected from agriculture Duo in primis spectasse

videntur Italici homines colendo, possentne fructus pro impensa ac labore redire et utrum saluber locus esset an non... Nemo enim sanus debet velle impensam ae sumptum facere in cultura, si ridet non posse refici, nec si potest reficere fructus, si videt eos fore ut pestilentia dispereant (Varro, RR, 1 .2 ,8 ; cf. 1. 1, 2). According to Cicero, people believed, wrongly in his opinion, that they could repay usury from the profits of their estates (Cat., 2. 18). (11) Cato, Agr., 10-13. Cf. Varro, RR, i. 22, 3-5. Hortensius left 10,000 jars of wine on his death

(P lin., NH, 14. 96 ; Macrqb., 3. 13, 3). (12) The entire second book of Varro is imbued with the aim of making livestock breeding more profitable. It is worth noting the Eques who bought 1,000 goats when he heard that goats yielded a denarius per day (Varro, RR, 2. 3, 10).

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We have some evidence for the natural resources owned by senators and the use made of them. Cato the elder bought property that included ponds, pitch manufactures and forests (no. 33). Crassus owned silver mines (no. 159), to say nothing of his building activities. Pottery was a very important industry in antiquity, and, indeed, some ancient sources refer to the existence of potters on estates ( 13). Finds in various sites of amphorae bearing the names of senators suggest that the owners had suitable clay in their lands manufactured into pottery ( 14). Probably the owners used the amphorae not only for exporting the products of their estates but also marketed them, to what extent cannot be said ( 15). It is also known that tiles and bricks manufactured by Asinius Pollio were sold in several places in Latium ( l6), and it is very likely that Augustus inherited his brick industry in north Italy from Pansa (no. 219). Agrippa seems to have had a similar business in Bruttium as well as quarries in Phrygia and Africa. In any case, it is certain that Agrippa had horrea in the eighth Region of Rome, and he was not the only senator to own horrea ( 17). It is not out of place to note here the senator who was responsible for the textiles of Cleopatra (Oros., 6. 19, 20). Thus general considerations are supported by some positive evidence on manufacturing and trading activities of senators. However, what senators primarily did was to dispose of the produce of their own estates ; this is different from commerce properly speaking, which is charac­ terized by buying and selling and not by manufacturing and selling. Senators were debarred by law from taking part in state contracts ( 18), and in fact we cannot cite any certain example of the law being broken. Yet (13) Varro advises owners to have their own artisans in large estates and not to buy what can be manufactured within the estate (RR. 1. 1 6 ,4 ; 22, I) See a ls o . quidam cum in fundo figlinas haberet, figulorum opera maiore parte anni ad opus rusticum utebatur (Dig., 33. 7, 2 5 ); mayxaidrarov Si xai xepapiag ixav navrtov evcxa, nenacapivov ori iv nam) rfi yf) itni ebpav xepapixrjv yf/v (G eoponica, 2. 49, 3). Cf. Bohn , Germania, 9 (1925), 82-3 (14) On Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos.. 38, C. Rabirius Postumus and L. Tarius Rufus see nos 117, 192, 203. On M. Herennius Picens, cos., 34, whose amphorae were found in Attica, Africa, Mutina and Rome, see Callender, Rom. Am., 1099-1105. On M. Cispius, tr. pi, 57, see Not. d. Scari, 1948 p. 248 and cf. the Arretine potter C. Cispius (CIL, 5 ,8 1 1 5 , 2 8 ; 1 0 ,8 0 5 6 ,9 2 - 3 ; 11,6700, 185-195: 13, 10009, 85-7 ; 15, 5098- 5100). On T. Rufrenus, Lepidus’ legate in 43, see CIL, 11, 6700, 558-562 On C. Vibienus, senator in 58 (Cic., Mil., 37), see CIL, 11, 6700, 760-764. On the latter two see Wiseman, Mnemosyne, 4th ser., 16 (1963), 277 ff. Note also L. Cornelius L. f. Q(aestor) — Callender, Rom. A m , 829. For all this cf. Oxe. Germania, 8 (1924), 80-81 ; Bohn, Germania, 9 (1925), 83 ; Wiseman, NM RS, Appendix IV B. (15) Cf. Bohn, Germania, 9 (1925), 83. (16) On Asinius Pollio, see n° 93. On bricks manufactured by his descendants see PIR2, I, 250 (n“ 135-136); J. H. Oliver, AJP, 68 (1947), 156; H. Bloch, HSCP, 46 (1947), 58 (n“ 235-239). (17) On Agrippa see n" 220 and P. A., 260. On horrea of the Sculpicii Galbae see n° 35 and P. A., 261. (18) Paullus, fr. Leid,, 3 - 4 ; Ascon., 93 ; Dio, 55. 10, 5 ; 69. 16, 2. Cf. Mommsen, StR, 3, 509 ; 898-9.

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doubts may arise regarding men who had been in this business before they entered the senate. We may ask more generally whether Equites gave up their previous economic activities on becoming senators. This can be negatively answered with regard to financial activities (Chap. Ill, i), and to some kinds of commercial manufacture as well. Now, it is known that P. Rupilius, cos., 132, had been a partner in a societas publicanorum (Ps. Ascon., 264). As governor of Sicily he collaborated with the publicani to his own financial advantage (Val. Max., 6. 9, 8). It is very tempting to sup­ pose that he did not withdraw his money from the company on becoming a senator. It seems that this was also the case with T. Aufidius, who had been a shareholder in the company that farmed the revenues of Asia ( 19). Some other names may be mentioned : C. Marius, L. Aelius Lamia, Q. Considius, P. Rupilius Rex, P. Ventidius Biassus and M. Terentius Gibba (20). In the absence of clear evidence nothing certain can be said, but it is probable that shareholders in public contracts did not give up their business when laun­ ching on a senatorial career. Now we learn from Cicero that Vatinius ‘ex­ torted’ shares from Caesar and the publicani in 59 (Vat., 29). Cicero’s words make it clear that the owning of the shares was legitimate, and we may infer that a way was found to circumvent the law. It appears then that some senators owned such shares at this period, though this single evidence cannot tell us whether investment in shares became normal in the senatorial class ( 2I). Proceeds of booty and profits made from provinces and from the ex­ ploitation of their official position were significant sources of income to the senatorial class. Equites had no profits of the last kind, and their income from provinces and wars was essentially different. Wars gave them the op­ portunity to contract for the supply of army equipment. The farming of state revenues in the provinces was a main source of their income. And here lies the important difference: whereas equestrian investments and business activity were economic in essence, the profits senators made from provinces flowed from their political careers and not from truly economic activity.

(19) See n° 95. On the partners of the conlractors for state-works and revenues see Polyb., 6. 17, 34 with Walbank, ad loc.. and Nicolet, Or Eq.. 222 f. Cf. Cic., Leg. Man.. 6 ; 17-8. (20) See n“ 63,-77, 119, 192, 217. On Varro Gibba see Cic., Fam., 13. 10, 2, and on P. Rupilius Rex, Cic., Fam., 13. 9, 2. On his identification with the praetor of 43 see RE, s.v., n° 10 ; W iseman, CQ, 58 (1964), 129 ; Badian, Historia, 15 (1966), 143. (21) Senators were allowed to take part in contracts for the supply of chariots to the state (B adian, Publicans, 16, 120, n. 120). Almost all of what Badian writes about the participation of senators in societates publicanorum in the post-Sullan age, and its political consequences, is based on Cic., Vat., 29 alone ( Publicans, 101-5), and is obviously conjectural. But I suspect that Caesar and Vatinius are not typical senators in this respect, and therefore I cannot accept Badian’s view that many senators invested their money in publica which became a regular source of income for them.

104

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Again, though we can find some similarities between the sources of in­ come enjoyed by senators and Equites, their expenditure was of a very dif­ ferent kind. A political career bound senators to incur heavy and diverse ex­ penses from which Equites were exempted, even though they too might give bribes at times, and were of course also affected by the rising standard of living. It is clear enough that the economic circumstances of senators and Equites had much in common. But though common features can be found when we examine each source of income separately, the whole balance of income and expenditure in the senatorial class was peculiar to that class, and was mainly determined by the political careers of the senators. People launching on such a career were debarred from some economic occupations by rules which could be circumvented only indirectly. Furthermore, only senators had to spend money for the benefit of the public. On the other hand, a senatorial career offered opportunities for exceptional profits, which could more than make up for the costs. The senator’s obligations and ad­ vantages, his tendency to invest in landed property and to keep up a certain standard of living, all form a special economic framework characteristic of his class!22). I I .—

T

r e n d s

a n d

T

e n d e n c ie s

in

E

c o n o m ic

D

e v e l o p m e n t

Examination of the property owned by senators before the Gracchi has shown that in general we may assume that they owned tracts of land of the order of at least several hundreds of iugera or even more ; some certainly possessed much larger areas. Despite the natural process by which property was broken up among heirs in the course of generations, our evidence in­ dicates that the possessions of senators, so far from diminishing, tended to increase in the late Republic (Chaps. I ; II, ii). This tendency has to be ac­ counted for, but before we attempt to do so, the question of the succession to property needs further clarification. Inheritance from parents usually constituted the kernel of a senator’s property, transmitted from one generation to another in the family. It is very likely that the property of Marcellus, the conqueror of Syracuse, in Rome and its vicinity was still in the hands of his descendants in Cicero's day (no. 1 I). Metellus Numidicus had an estate at Tibur and left it to his son Metellus Pius, who in his turn bequeathed it to Metellus Scipio, his adoptive son, and only the catastrophe of the Second Civil: War led to its acquisition by a man outside the family,

( 2 2 ) Cf.

Stein, RR,

7 - 1 2 ; 49-52.

CHAPTER V. — THE' SENATORIAL CLASS

105

Antony ( 23). L. Licinius Lucullus, cos., 74, inherited the estate of his father, pr., 104, at Tusculum and left it to his son. This estate too was confiscated after the battle of Philippi, since the younger Lucullus fought on the side of Brutus and Cassius ( 2425). The property of Scipio Africanus passed to his son who left it in turn to his adoptive son, Scipio Aemilianus (no. 14). Pompey inherited his father’s possessions in Picenurn. His elder son enlisted 800 men of his slaves and shepherds at the beginning of the Second Civil War. Since at that time he was less than 30 years old, it is probable that his father had given him the pastures ( 2;>). The Sulpicii Galbae owned an estate at Tarracina from the second century till the Principate. They also con­ tinuously kept their property on the Aventine (no. 35). We know of many other senators who inherited from their parents (Chap. 11, ii). The low birth rate in the senatorial class and the extinction of some senatorial families must have brought about a certain concentration of property ( 26). But the growth in the size of senatorial estates is not to be ex­ plained by patrimonial succession, especially as some senatorial families were still prolific and the father’s estates were, therefore, divided among several so n s(27). We have to turn elsewhere for the answer. The relative importance of various sources of wealth can be inferred from the following table (next page) which specifies the main revenues of the richest senators. As a word of warning, it is well to bear in mind that the table is not in­ tended to include all sources of wealth but only those which were specially profitable. We may also note the profits Balbus made as Caesar’s agent, Crassus from speculations and building operations and Varro perhaps from agriculture. Given the state of our information, we cannot be sure about the negative side of the table, but at least it definitely shows booty as an all im­ portant factor in the creation of senatorial fortunes. Next come other profits associated with a political career: from provinces, magistracies and proscriptions. Under the rubric of inheritances we find the names of Augustus, Crassus and Pompey ; but they also considerably enlarged the substantial property left them by their parents. Antony inherited not from

(23) See n"' 43, 44, 91, ii, 103. (24) See nos 56, 160 n. 20. The estate may have been owned by the consul of 151 (no. 26). (25) See no. 186, t On the son see C aes., BC. 3. 4, 4 and for his age D. G., 4, 562.

(26) On extinct senatorial families in the late Republic see W illems, Sinat, 1, 618-620. (27) M Aemilius Lepidus, cos., 187, had four sons and Metellus Macedonicus had seven children. Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos., 212, had three sons. Scipio Africanus had two daughters and two sons. Even in the first century some families were prolific Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos., 79. had six children. Both P. Licinius Crassus, cos., 97, and M. Aemilius Lepidus, cos., 78, had three sons. M. Antonius, the famous orator, had two sons and a daughter and six grandchildren. For ail these see D. G.. 1 ,4 2 , 2. I and 14 f . ; 140 f , 3, 13 ; 4, 60 f ; 612 f. , Munzer, RA, 179 , 224 ; 282 ; 307

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

106

Name

N°

Booty

Crassus Mucianus

25

Lepidus Livianus

38

M. Scaurus

39

+

L. Sulla

50

+

M. Livius Drusus

59

Marius

63

M. Lepidus

78

M. Scaurus

81

Antony

Proscriptions

Provinces

Magistracy

Inheritance

+

+

+ +

+

+

+ +

+ +

+

+

+

+

91

+

+

+

Clodius

118

+

L. Balbus

121

+

L. Domitius Ahenobarbus

139

Caesar

152

+

+

Augustus

153

+

+

Crassus

159

+

+

Lucullus

160

+

Pompey

181

+

L. Tarius Rufus

203

+

Varro

204

+

Agrippa

22.0

+

+

+

+ +

+ +

+ +

+ +

+

+

+

+

CHAPTER V. — THE SENATORIAL CLASS

107

his parents, but from unknown persons, probably because of his political position (no. 91, ii). The enormous property inherited by the younger Scaurus had been built up by income from provinces and from the proscrip­ tions. Thus it is only for Mucianus and Drusus the younger that we cannot find any sources of wealth other than inheritances. The greater importance of booty, offices and provinces as sources of wealth can be inferred from another consideration. Of the senators named Scaurus the elder, Sulla, Marius, Antony and Clodius were in very modest financial circumstances in their youth. To these we may add L. Licinius Lucullus (no. 26) who was in the same condition in the beginning of his career, and also Caesar and Curio who both succeeded in repaying their enormous debts. Proceeds of booty, and income from provinces and offices as well, enabled these men to grow rich or extricate themselves from debts. Thus it is clear that the increase in the wealth possessed by the senatorial class is mainly to be attributed to such exceptional profits. On the whole, the enrichment of the senatorial class cannot be explained by truly economic activity. It may be assumed that some senators were able to accumulate capital sufficient to enlarge their possessions thanks to at­ tentive supervision of their estates, improvements in the methods of cultivation and strict economy. Applying these methods to his patrimony, the elder Cato succeeded in expanding it considerably (no. 33). But how many senators were like him? It is obvious that income from agriculture was negligible in comparison with profits accruing from a senatorial career. The wars and service in the provinces affected the enrichment of the senatorial class directly in two ways : they brought in a large income and they facilitated the acquisition of cheap labour in the form of slaves. Indirectly, the wars also impoverished the small Roman farmer who was compelled to offer his farm for sale ( 28). Moreover, as a result of the Second Punic War there was an abundance of public land. The coexistence of all these factors enabled senators to enlarge their estates in and after the first half of the second century ( 29). Taking advantage of the accumulated capital, senators were able to develop crops that needed considerable basic investment, olive plantations, vineyards and livestock breeding. In the first century there was a further factor, the proscriptions and confiscations which accompanied the civil wars, ami which meant financial gains beyond measure for some senators and complete ruin for others. Large and easy profits were connected with the steady increase in

(28) This is the common opinion. See tire bibliography cited in Note A. (29) See App ., BC, 1. 7. Cf. Frank, ESAR, 1, 11 f.

108

PART ONE. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

senatorial expenditure on private needs, which had already started in the first half of the second century. This increase was felt in the purchase of luxury articles, silver and gold plate and works of art, in higher building standards and in the rising cost of meals. It is manifest that income from the land was not sufficient to finance this growing expenditure, and that only the profits of a political career enabled senators to spend so lavishly. At the same time, it is apparent that as soon as some senators began to use their easy profits for luxurious living, others were not slow to imitate them, and once this tendency became fashionable it could not be restrained. As long as the rise in the standard of living followed easy profits it did not cause financial embarrassment for senators. But once they became well aware that profits were normally due to accrue from service in the provinces and in the army, and once new notions of the standard of living appropriate to their dignity had gained general acceptance, it was quite a natural con­ sequence that some tended to incur expenses in anticipation of income and to run into debt. But the expectation of easy profits was not always fulfilled, and they were then at a loss how to satisfy their creditors. The situation became graver in the first century with the steep rise in the costs of a political career. With the growing competition for offices electioneering for­ ced candidates to spend more money, and the cost of maintaining bodyguards was even higher. No wonder then that some senators were in danger of bankruptcy. For them political success and advance in the cursus honorum was more than the way to the dignity they thought appropriate ; it was the only means to preserve their possessions ( 30). If, however, they were satisfied with the rank of quaestorius or tribunicius, and made no attempt to be elected to the aedileship or higher magistracies, they did not need to incur such heavy expenses ; about a third of the senators in the period after Sulla were in this position (31). They had access to profits in the provinces by serving as legates and in the entourage of governors without burdening themselves with the disbursements necessary for further advance in a political career.

(30) On indebted senators see ch. IV, i and iv. (31) It is probable that most candidates to the aedileship and the tribunate were quaestorii, and it is almost certain that most candidates to the praetorship had served as tribunes or aediles. Assuming 11-12 quaestorian candidates for the intermediate offices and 2-3 for the praetorship we may estimate 13-15 quaestorian candidates for higher magistracies every year. According to Willems, there were 199 quaestorii, out of 415 known senators, in the Senate of 55 (Senat, 1, 555). But surely some of these were unsuccessful candidates for higher magistracies.

CHAPTER V. — THE SENATORIAL CLASS

S

109

u m m a r y

We have attempted to examine the economic conditions of Roman senators in order to illuminate the economic background of their political activities. Though there were differences in property, income and ex­ penditure between various groups within the senatorial class, and though the impact of the developments traced above had not the same effect on all senators alike, a genera! framework can be discerned. All senators had in common the same types of income and expenditure. In some degree all had opportunities to profit from their political position, of which individuals might make a different use, varying with their own special talents or dispositions ; the greatest opportunities generally came to those whose social origin and family relations gave them exceptional advantages. From the economic standpoint, senators in a sense formed a class ap art; although they were subject to some of the same economic factors as Romans of lower rank, they alone lived in a peculiar complex of economic, financial and political conditions, from which they sometimes suffered but more often benefited.

PART TWO TH E POLITICAL ACTIVITIES O F ROM AN SENATORS IN TH E LIGHT O F T H E IR ECONOM IC CO ND ITIO NS

In his work on the English Parliament in the 18th century Sir Lewis Namier writes : “ At all times a system of spoils and benefits obtains in governing representative bodies where sharp contrasts of ideas and interests or strong party organizations do not pre-determine the vote of the individual Member and do not reduce him to a pawn in the parliamentary game With the help of the sources at his disposal, Sir Lewis was able to describe in detail the material motives that influenced Members of Parliament and to point out the correlation between the payments they received secretly and their political attitudes. We cannot hope to have such sources for Roman history, nor was the Roman Senate an institution com­ posed of elected representatives, not to mention other differences between Roman senators and Members of the English parliament. Nevertheless, while admitting that each society has its own peculiar conditions, it is still true that the problem exists at all times : to what extent are the political aims and actions of members of the governing institutions shaped in correlation with their personal interests? The aim of this part of the work is to examine the political activity of senators, as individuals and as a class, in the light of their economic con­ dition. The question is whether a direct correlation can be indicated between the results of Parts One and Three and what we know of the political at­ titudes and connections within the senatorial class, and of the policy of senators towards internal and foreign problems. Several subjects call for detailed study and analysis : the connections between senators and Equites, the relations among the senators themselves and especially between senatorial leaders and ordinary members of the class, the influence of their economic condition on their political attitude and position and vice versa, and, not least, the views and reactions of senators to political problems. It may be said from the start that not all senators necessarily adopted the same views on political problems or reacted in the same way to the same exigen­ cies ; differences are to be expected. Furthermore, I am inclined to think that human activity cannot be explained by one factor, and, therefore, even if sufficient proofs can be found of the influence of their economic background on their political behaviour, that does not imply that the sole or dominant factor has been identified.

(1) L. Namier, The Structure o f Politics at the Accession o f George I I I 2, p. 17.

CHAPTER VI

Senatores, Principes, Partes The prosopographical and philological studies of scholars of the present century have changed our comprehension of the nature of politics at Rome, which is no longer interpreted by terms and concepts that fit modern par­ ties. There was no central organisation, no political programme or party tickets in Roman politics, but on scrunity the political parties and groups turn out to be associations basically founded on personal relations of various types (2). This is not to deny that Roman politicians made use of slogans and, at times, launched political, economic and social reforms. Yet there is no doubt that family relationships and matrimonial and friendly connexions often determined the political attitude of Roman senators to a great extent. Friendship at Rome was many-sided, formed for various reasons and motives, and not only because of genuine affection. Since politics and personal relations were intermingled it is possible that political association was the outcome of economic or financial connections. In other words, we have to examine whether’ senators who were materially helped by others felt they were obliged to repay the benefactors in the sphere of politics. I .—

T

he

S

econd

C

entury

Our information for the second century is meagre. It would be interesting if we could investigate the support offered by members of the old nobility to new men in the cursus honorum (3). A given senator may have attached himself to a certain group or individual in return for material support, and

(2) It is enough to mention the works of Gelzer (Nobilitat), of Munzer (RA) and of Syme. See also

C assola, GP, 5-11. (3) On the advancement of new families in the early Republic see MOnzer, RA, 55-67 ; Scullard, RP, 17.

116

PART TOO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

thus become indebted politically as well as financially. However, such an approach to Roman politics in the second century is impossible: not only are there no explicit data to support such a hypothesis, but we can seldom reconstruct political factions except from indirect information and by -methods-that; to say the least, are controversial (4), Ye-t-it -seems that this factor may have been of little importance in the second century. Firstly, the costs of a political career were then much lower, and senators therefore needed less financial support ( 5). Secondly, so long as the voting in the Assemblies was open and not by secret ballots, it was easier and safer to ob­ tain the good will and support of other senators by setting in motion one’s own clients than by bribery. The mere willingness of a noble to promote a new man' and to put at his disposal his connections and political influence was the important factor; financial support was no more than a secondary factor. The connection of Cato the elder with L. Valerius Flaccus might perhaps be taken as an example of an association between a homo novus and a nobilis. We suggest that the costs of the games given by Cato as aedile in 199 were financed in part by Flaccus (no. 33). But even if this suggestion is right, it can hardly change our view of their association. It had started years before, and according to Plutarch Cato was elected military tribune and quaestor thanks to Flaccus’ h elp(6). If Cato became a member of his fac­ tion, this must be ascribed to political and not to financial support. In fact it is misleading to maintain that Cato became an adherent of Flaccus, since it is evident that of the two Cato was the dominant figure and that he in­ fluenced Roman politics much more than Flaccus ( 7). The career of Cato is not the best example, since he was an exceptional man, but at least it con­ forms with our view, based on other considerations, that it is improbable that financial obligations played a major role among the fators that cemen­ ted political connexions among senators in the second century.

II.—

C

r assus

The state of our sources is better for the first century and enables us to examine the possibility of political influence being acquired by loans and (4) Munzer, RA, i-8 ; Scullard, RP. 4 - 6 ; C assola, GP, 13-23. For criticism see D e Sanctis, RFIC, 14 (1936), 193-4 ; Momigliano. JRS, 30 (1940), 77-8 ; Last, Gnomon, 12 (1950), 360-365 ; H erderson, JRS, 42 (1952), 114-6. See also M eier, RPA, ch. IV. (5) See ch. IV.

(6) P lut., Cat. Mai. 3. 3. Cf. Nepos, Cato, I. 1 , Vir lit. 41 1. (7) For the cursus honorum of Cato and Flaccus see MRR, 2, 606 ; 629, and for Cato's censorship and his independent position D. G. 5, 123-162 ; Schjllard, RP, 153-172. Kienast, Cato. 68-87.

CHAPTER VI. — SENATORES, PRINCIPES, PARTES

1 17

financial aid. It is well known that Crassus regarded money lending as a means of obtaining political power (no. 159). Describing Crassus’ business, Plutarch distinguishes between economic activity solely for profits and economic activity with a political aim, and he states that Crassus lent money to friends without demanding interest!8). We may assume that of these friends some were senators and Equites. Cicero, too, notes Crassus’ ‘commercial’ system of obtaining supporters ( 9). On two occasions Crassus’ influence in the Senate is mentioned. When Plutarch describes the relations between Crassus and Poimpey in the year 70, he remarks that the first was more influential in the Senate, while the second had the support of the masses (Pomp., 22. .3). Pompey enjoyed the people’s favour because he restored full powers to the tribunes of the plebs, but there is no explanation of Crassus’ influence in the Senate. Ely connecting Plutarch’s statement with what has emerged as. Crassus’ system of obtaining supporters, we may sup­ pose that political influence here followed financial dependence ( 10). On the second occasion it is explicitly stated that the line taken by senators in the Senate was determined by their business connections with Crassus. When Catilina’s associates in Rome were caught, an informer, L. Tarquinius, ap­ peared before the Senate and testified to Crassus’ cooperation with Catilina, but, as Sallust writes, plerique Crasso ex negotiis privatis obnoxii conclamant indicem falsum esse, deque ea re postulant uti referatur. (Cat., 48. 5). What Sallust writes is illuminating not only because it discloses how some senators behaved on a particular occasion, but mainly because he himself took part in the politics he described, and when he writes that senators were attached to Crassus because of their business connections we can believe him, and infer that they might have behaved similarly on other occasions. It is desirable to examine the connections between Crassus and Caesar and Clodius in the light of their financial transactions. Crassus twice gave financial help to Clodius ; first in 61, when Clodius was prosecuted because of the scandal of the Bona Dea and Crassus seerns to have helped him in his financial difficulties (no. 118), and again in 56, when Pompey un­ is ) P lut., Crass.. 3. 1 ; 7i 2. (9) Sic, qui domi tuae per te accusatorum atque indicum consociatos greges; qui nocentes et pecuniosos reos eodem te actore corruptelam iudici molientes; qui tuas mercedes pactiones in patrociniis, impensas pecuniarum in coitionibus candidatorum .. qui denique omnia venalia: dilectum decretum alienam suam sententiam forum domum vocem silentium, quis hunc non putet confiteri sibi quaesito opus esse (Cic., Parad., 6 46). (10) Plutarch’s description is schematic, as Crassus, too, made efforts to win the favour of the populace (P lut., Crass., 3. 1-3 ; 12. 2 ; Comp. Crass, et N ic , 1. 4) and Pompey had supporters and in­ fluence in the Senate as well Yet there is no need to doubt the evidence on the extensive influence of Crassus in the Senate

118

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

derstood that Clodius was receiving financial support from Crassus ( u). Clodius is sometimes described as an agent of Crassus, sometimes as an adherent of C aesar; other scholars ascribe to him an independent position and policy ( 12). No doubt it is erroneous to regard him as a mere tool. As a descendant of an old and proud patrician family, not to mention his audacious character, he was surely ambitious to attain at least an equal footing with the principes civitatis, and there was no reason why his dignitas should not equal that of his ancestors ( 13). Clodius' problem was to find in­ fluential persons who could further his political advancement (no. 118). In 61 he needed financial help to extricate himself from the troubles connected with his trial, while Crassus was always on the alert to render beneficia, ex­ pecting some return in the future, and this situation prompted the cooperation between them. But there was another factor. Cicero’s testimony against Clodius’ alibi made Clodius a mortal enemy and Crassus too had good reasons for hostility to Cicero, though it was not avowed nor so ar­ dent as Clodius’ (M). It is true that at a meeting of the Senate in early 61 Crassus praised Cicero’s actions as consul, but this was interned to annoy Pompey, and does not show Crassus’ true attitude to Cicero ( 15). Not only (11) Nam Pompeius haec intellegit nobiscumque communicat... C. Catonem a Crasso sustentari Clodio pecuniam suppeditari, utrumque et ab eo et a Curione, Bibulo, ceterisque suis obtrectatoribus confirmari (Cic., QF, 2. 3, 4). It seems to me that the order of the sentence indicates that it was Crassus who provided Clodius with the money Cf. D G., 2, 273 ; Meyer, Caes Mon., 133. Rice Holmes leaves the question open ( Republic, 2, 69). (12) An agent of Caesar: D. G„ 2, 183 ; Marsh, CQ, 21 (1927), 30-36 ; Rowland, Historia, 15 (1966), 217-223. Caesar’s tool: Pocock, CQ, 18 (1924), 56-65 ; 19 (1925), 182-4 ; R ice Holmes, Republic, 1, 317 ; 328 f. ; 2, 54. Sometimes served Caesar and sometimes acted for Crassus’ interest: C ary, CAH, 9, 522 ff. Meyer ( Caes. Mon., 103) and Syme (RR, 36) consider him more independent See also next note. (13) On the sentiments of a nobilis with regard to his dignitas see Sall., Cat., 35. 3-4. Cf. Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome (Cambridge, 1950), 36-7. On the patrician Claudii see Suet., Tib., 1-2, and for the traditional arrogance of the family T ac., Ann., 1. 4. Mommsen has shown that the Claudii were not bitter opponents of the Plebs (RF, 1, 285-315). While I agree that Clodius was not subordinate to any one, it seems to me that there is some exaggeration in recent works on this subject Obviously prior to his tribunate Clodius could not have had extensive influence, and it is a mistake to envisage his policy as based only on the support of the collegia or the masses without cultivation of ties with senatorial leaders. For recent works see Seager, Latomus, 24 (1965), 519-531 ; Gruen, Phoenix, 20 (1966), 120-130 ; G.&R.. 36 (1967), 157-169 ; Lintott, Violence, 190-197. (14) On Crassus’ character see P lut., Crass., 7. 8. On the hostility between the two cf. Brunt, Pr. Cam. Phil. Soc., 191 (1965), 9. (15) C ic., Alt., 1. 14, 2-4. Cf. Meyer, Caes M on, 46-7. For the envy and competition between Crassus and Pompeius see Sall., Cat., 17. 7 ; 19. 1 ; Hist., 4. 48 ; 51 ; P lut., Crass., 7. 1-3 ; 12. 1-2 ; Pomp., 22. 1-2 ; App., BC, 1. 121 ; Dio, 39. 26, 3 is not reliable. See D. G., 4, 95-7. Adcock’s attempt to refute the rivalry between the two is not convincing (.Crassus, 40-44). Cf. V olkmann, Gnomon, 39 (1966), 336-7.

CHAPTER VI. — SENATORES, PRINCIPES, PARTES

1 19

had Cicero supported Pompey's interests since 70, but Crassus believed he had instigated the attempt to implicate him in Catilina’s conspiracy ( 16). There is a tradition that Crassus supported the other candidates in the elec­ tion for the consulate of 63 (Ascon., 83). Cicero's banishment in 58 was brought about not against Crassus’ will, but rather with his consent, and subsequently he made difficulties in agreeing to Cicero’s return ( 17). Thus it seems that there wa$ a sufficient incentive for his cooperation with Clodius in 61, Crassus hoping to obtain a valuable amicus. His investment paid off in 58-56. Two facts should be borne in mind : first the establishment of the triumvirate did not bring an end to the envy and tacit competition between Crassus and Pompey ; second, of the three Pompey was the most powerful, since in 60-59 Caesar did not enjoy the power and influence which the conquest of Gaul was to confer on him, while Crassus was never equal to Pompey ( 1819). In the absence of Caesar, who was on good terms with both and had negotiated the rapprochement necessary for the formation of the triumvirate (w), Crassus probably once again wished to couterbalance Pompey’s influence and took advantage of his quarrel with Clodius. That began when Clodius set free Tigranes, the son of the Armenian king, for a bribe and not with the intention to insult Pom­ pey (20), but the reaction of Pompey and the offensive counter-reaction of Clodius resulted in an overt rupture and profound hostility (21). There can be little doubt that the weakening of Pompey’s influence, due to the attacks of Clodius, delighted Crassus. At the same time he showed himself reluctant to agree to Cicero’s return, which Pompey promoted, impelled by the provocative attacks of Clodius (22). The scope of the financial help rendered by Crassus to Clodius is unknown to us. But it is obvious that Clodius’ abuse and humiliation of Pompey worked for Crassus’ interest, and their collaboration becomes more

(16) Sall., Cat., 48. 8-9 ; P lut., Crass., 13. 3-4 Cf. Cic., Phil., 2. 7. Cicero also opposed Crassus’ intentions with regard to Egypt See Schol. Bob., 92 and n. 28 below. (17) On Crassus’ attitude in 58 see Dio, 38. 17, 3. Cf. P lut., Crass., 13. 4. On Cicero’s ap­ prehensions of Crassus when he was in exile see Farn, 14. 2 2. C f A lt, 3. 23, 5. (18) V ell. Pat., 2. 44, 2 ; F lor., 2. 13, 10-11. For modern views see M eyer, Caes. Mon., 58-62 ; G elzer, Caesar, 6 1 -2 ; Syme, RR, 35-6. (19) R ice Holmes, Republic, 1, 475. (20) A scon, 4 7 ; Dio, 38. 30, 1-2. (21) For a reconstruction of the sequence of the events see M eyer, Caes. Mon., 103 ff. (22) On the struggle for Cicero’s return see M eyer, Caes. Mon., 107-113 -, R ice H olmes, Republic, 2, 55-61. Clodius’ threats to annul Caesar’s laws of 59 must not be taken seriously (Cic., Dorn., 39-40 ; Har. Resp., 48). They were intended to forestall any attempt to invalidate his bill which exiled Cicero by linking his acts with those of Caesar in 59.

120

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

patent in the attempts to restore Ptolemy Auletes to his throne. It is possible that Crassus coveted the commission for himself; at least it is cer­ tain that he was concerned that it should not be given to Pompey, as this might have resulted in an extraordinary imperium disturbing the balance between the leaders. He proposed that the king be restored by three legates (Cic., Fam., 1. 1, 3 ); a commission of this kind did not suit Pompey’s plans. This occurred in early January 56. On 7th February the clash of in­ terests between them was divulged in the Forum ; Pompey was abused by Clodius, who claimed that the people wanted Crassus to be responsible for restoring the king (Cic., QF, 2. 3, 2). C. Porcius Cato, tribune of the plebs in 56, was cooperating with Clodius, and he too was supported by Crassus (Cic., QF, 2. 3, 3-4). Cato previously frustrated the ambitions of Pompey by producing the oracle that prohibited the use of military force for the restoration ( 23). The fact that he had already shown himself an opponent to Pompey made it easier for Crassus to attach him to the campaign against Pompey in 56 (Cic., QF, 1. 2, 15). However, after he had achieved his pur­ pose, Crassus had no further need of Cato, and when he stopped rendering him help, Cato was compelled to sell his gang of gladiators (Cic., QF, 2. 4, 5). In the same way collaboration between Crassus and Clodius was ter­ minated 'with the renewal of the triumvirate. It seems that once again, Caesar sponsored the reconciliation between the two rivals!24). The con­ ference in Luca secured Crassus’ position as against that of Pompey, for both were to become consuls and to have command of provinces!25). Next, the connections between Crassus and Caesar. Crassus intervened in the dispute between Caesar and his creditors in 61, and by becoming surety for a sum of 830 talents enabled Caesar to set out for his province!!26). Probably this was not the first time he aided Caesar; cer­ tainly, there is evidence for their collaboration before 61. While the allegations of their complicity in the so-called 'First Catilinarian con­ spiracy’ are unreliable ( 27), it is quite clear that Caesar supported Crassus’

(23) See Fenestella in Non . Marcel. 385 L ; Cic., Fam., 1. I, I ; 2, 4 ; 5a, 2 ; QF, 2. 2, 3 ; Dio, 39. 15. Cf. Gelzer, RE, 7A, 933-4. (24) Caesar’s initiative is seen from his meeting with Crassus in Ravenna prior to the conference in Luca (Cic., Fam., 1. 9, 9), and it seems that Appius’ visit in March was connected with efforts to renew the coalition (Cic., QF, 2. 4, 6). See also Suet., Iu l, 24. 1. (25) On the conference in Luca see Meyer, Caes. Mon.. 140-144; Gelzer, Caesar, 110-111. (26) See no. 152, i. Gelzer thinks that this infonnation (P lut., Caes., 1 1 .1 ; Crass., 7. 6 ; Suet., Iul., 18. 1) is based on rumours, but he admits that Crassus’ help is proved by his subsequent support of Caesar (Caesar, 55). I disagree v/ith this criticism, as the fact that Caesar did not go to his province because of the lenders’ demands could not be concealed, and therefore the information is not based on a rumour. (27) R ice H olmes, Republic, 1, 446-9; G elzer, Caesar, 35.

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plans for the Transpadani and Egypt ( 28). From Crassus’ point of view, subventions tightened Caesar’s connections with himself and were the more desirable as in 62 Caesar had shown his readiness to cooperate with Pompey by backing the motion to call him in and to entrust him with the com­ mand against Catilina as well as by proposing that the commission to com­ plete the building of the temple of iuppiter should be transferred from Catulus to Pompey ( 29). It is alleged by Plutarch that Crassus left Italy in 62 out of fear of Pompey ; actually he went to Asia, possibly with the vain intention to do a deal with him ( 30). In view of their past relations, it is ob­ vious that Crassus welcomed an opportunity to render a beneficium to Caesar, and this came when his creditors were detaining Caesar in R om e(31). It is hardly possible to estimate the importance of the financial aid rendered by Crassus to Caesar within the complicated relations between the triumvirs. However, it looks as though the connection between Crassus and Caesar were established on a safer ground. This is suggested by the aloofness of Pompey after 59 and by the fact that Crassus' meeting with Caesar in Ravenna preceded the conference in Luca. It is also plausible that Caesar was readier to back Crassus in order to counterbalance the position of Pompey. The preceding examination of Crassus’ connections with senators and principes civitatis makes certain conclusions possible. There is sufficient evidence in our sources to indicate that Crassus systematically used his financial resources to extend his political influence. His connections with senators did not always have the same pattern, and we can distinguish bet­ ween several sorts of influence. As a result of his enormous fortune and the immense scope of his economic activity, he had business connections with many senators, who found it difficult to ignore their personal obligations when a subject was debated in the Senate in which Crassus had an interest, at least when his interest did not diverge from their own. Though it cannot be maintained that the recipients of loans undertook to act in a specific way, they were obviously expected to show their gratefulness by helping him, and (28) For Caesar’s attitude towards the Transpadanians and the Egyptian question see Suet., Iu i, 8 ; 11, and for Crassus see Cic., Leg. Agr., 2. 44 (?), Plut., Crass., 13. 1 -2 ; Dio, 37. 9, 3. Cf. R ice Holmes, Republic, 1, 225-7 ; 237. (29) For references MRR, 2, 173. Cf. Syme, R R , 35. (30) Cic., Place., 3 2 ; Plut., Pomp., 43. 1. R ice Holmes, Republic, 1, 467, accepts this story. (31) It is said that thanks to the influence of Crassus, Cn. Calpurnius Piso was sent to Spain as governor in 65. Piso is described as impoverished and as an enemy of Pompey. We do not know whether Crassus gave him financial help, but this seems to be another example of Crassus’ system of having in­ fluence with men in official positions. See CIL, ! 2, 749 ( = 1LLRP, 3 7 8 ) ; Sall., Cat., 18-9 ; Ascon., 6 6 ; 9 2 ; Suet., Iu i, 9. 3 ; Dio, 36. 44, 4-5.

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Crassus could assume that they would not fail in case he needed their sup­ port. In view of what we know of his system, the behaviour of such senators in 63 seems typical, and answered Crassus’ expectations!32). The support he lent to Cato was of another sort, as this time he had a specific aim, to frustrate Pompey. It was not accidental that he chose C a to ; he could be trusted to act against Pompey. The financial support rendered to Caesar and Clodius can be reckoned as of another kind. Crassus could not regard them as henchmen or tools for a specific aim, but he could reasonably calculate that they would render some return for his financial help. As we have seen, he always tried to counterbalance Pompey’s power and influence, and after Luca he came nearer to his aim. He and Pompey were to be elected consuls and to have provinces, and there is no doubt that Crassus expected his com­ mand in Syria to be a basis for achievements similar to those of Caesar and Pompey ; he lacked only military glory to complete his career. On the whole, it may be said that his system succeeded. Many senators supported him because of their business connections, and he also succeeded in ob­ taining the collaboration of men of real prominence by clever and timely use of his money. III. —

C

aesar

Towards the end of the year 59 Caesar was attacked by C. Memmius and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and soon afterwards the tribune L. Antistius sought to prosecute him. Although Caesar repulsed these attacks he was taught a lesson : Ad securitatem ergo posteri temporis in magno negotio habuit obligare semper annuos magistratus et e petitoribus non alios adiuvare aut ad honorem pati pervenire, quam qui sibi recepissent propugnaturos absentiam suam ; cuius pacti non dubitavit a quibusdam ius iurandum atque etiam syngrapham exigere (Suet., I u i . 23. 2). The evidence is plain and simple : Caesar required a formal obligation to defend his personal interests in return for financial aid. We hear of loans and presents which enabled Caesar to win numerous supporters. Suetonius says that in this way Caesar put under obligation the following groups : a) members of Pompey’s party ; b) a great part of the Senate; c) men of other orders including freedmen and slaves ; d) accused persons ; e) debtors and young spendthrifts; f) kings and provincials (/«/., 27-28. 1). Similar accounts are given by Sallust, Plutarch and Appian ( 33). Obviously Caesar

(32) I suspect that Crassus got his nomination to the command against Spartacus in 72 by exploiting his influence with senators. See Athenaeum, 46 (1968), 349 f. (33) Sall., Cat., 54. 2 - 4 ; P lut., Cat. M in, 49. 1 ; Pomp., 51. 1 -2 ; Cues.. 20-21.

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was using the wealth of Gaul for bribery from his first campaign in 58. In brief, his influence in Rome was due to a clever use of the aurum Gallicum. These are generalizations and our first task is to see whether they can be verified by specific cases. Secondly, it is necessary to examine and evaluate the political advantage Caesar derived from the supporters won by such means. In his speech against Vatinius Cicero ascribes to Caesar the following words: Illum (Caesarem) respondisse Vatinium in tribunatu gratis nihil fecisse; qui omnia in pecunia posuisset honore animo aequo carere debere (Vat., 38). As is well known, Vatinius passed the law conferring on Caesar the governorship of Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul for five years ( 34), thereby giving Caesar the basis for his political ascendancy. Cicero’s assertion, repeated elsewhere ( 35), implies that Caesar obtained the command of Gaul for a payment to Vatinius. Yet, even if true, this does not fully cover their relations. To begin with, they may have been associated before 59 : Vatinius may have been with Caesar in Spain (36). This connection is uncertain, but the state of our information improves after 59. Vatinius attached himself to C aesar: he served under him as a legate in Gaul, he was backed by Caesar when candidate for the praetorship, and fought on his side during the Civil W a r(37). The bribe Vatinius allegedly received from Caesar is to be judged in the light of these facts. Caesar and Vatinius came to a political agreement securing for Caesar the governorship of Gaul and the office of legate for Vatinius (Cic., Vat., 35). Caesar strengthened the political pact by a financial g ran t; later their association became close as a result of Vatinius’ services in Gaul and the other support he received from Caesar. Financial support only supplements political agreement. Vatinius, no doubt, thought he deserved his rewards and regar­ ded them as a proof that it was for his interest to keep on collaborating with Caesar. The establishment of the political alliance with Vatinius partly by a pecuniary grant shows that Caesar knew how to use such means to extend his political influence even before his proconsulship in Gaul. The command there widened his resources and his chances of attracting followers. A mi­ litary post in his army was widely coveted, and the efforts of C. Trebatius

(34) MRR, 2, 190. (35) Cic., Vat.. 29. Cf. Sest., 114. (36) In 62 Vatinius was a legate of C. Coscomius, Caesar’s predecessor in Farther Spain (Cic., Vat., 12). Cicero's words do not exclude the possibility that Vatinius continued to serve with Caesar. (37) It is true that actually Crassus and Pompey secured Vatinius’ election to the praetorship (MRR, 2, 216), yet they surely lent their support in consequence of the conference in Luca.

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Testa to obtain a tribunate are no doubt typical ( 38). Trebatius wished to enrich himself and looked for gold and silver in the expedition to Britain. He got his office and subsequently enlarged his fortune ( 39). Q. Cicero, too, seems to have joined Caesar to make money ( 40). Caesar was generous to his soldiers, and his officers got a considerable share of the booty. Antony, Labienus, Mamurra and probably Q. Cicero were enriched by service in Gaul ( 41). D istribution of booty was not necessarily enough to ensure the political support of the beneficiaries. Hence Caesar’s success has to be evaluated by examining their political behaviour. For the sake of convenience the discussion will be first limited to the year 58-50. Now some officers served in Gaul so continuously that we cannot say what would have been their political attitude as senators or magistrates in Rome (42). Ser. Sulpicius Galba was Caesar’s legate in 58-56. Unfortunately no details are known of his praetorship in 54. On the other hand the aid he received from Caesar when he was candidate for the consulate in 50 shows that Caesar was satisfied and thought it in his interest to go on supporting him (Hirtius in Caes., BG, 8. 50, 4). Antonius served under Caesar as quaestor and legate in 52-51. Caesar supported his candidacy for both augurate and tribunate (43). As tribune Antonius defended Caesar’s interests till he was forced to take to flight from Rome ( 44). Vatinius’ served as legate in 58-56. Crassus and Pompey secured his election as praetor in 55, apparently in deference to Caesar’s wishes (45). His activity as praetor is not known, but the fact that later he again served as a legate in Gaul shows that Caesar was content with h im (46). IP. Licinius Crassus was Caesar’s legate in the years 57-56. We have only meagre information of his quaestorship in 55. Yet we do know that he was sent by Caesar to Rome to support the election of

(38) C ie , F a n , 7. 5 ; 6, 1 ; 7, 1. (39) Cic., F a n , 7. 7 ; 8, 1 ; 13, I ; 16, 3 ; 17, 1-3 (40) See Cic., QF, 2. 15, 2-3 ; 3. 6, 1 (reading in pecuniis; cf. Wiseman, JR S, 56 (1966), 108). (41) On Antony see Cic., Phil., 2. 50 (Cicero’s assertion that Antony immediately squandered his wealth does not carry conviction). For Labienus see no. 158, and for Mamurra Catullus 29 ; 57 ; 114115 (Mentula is generally taken as a. nickname for M am urra); Cic., A tl, 7. 7, 6 ; P u n ., NH, 36. 48. For Q. Cicero see no. 212. (42) See D. G„ 696-701 and MRR for the years 58-50. (43) H urt, in C aes., BG, 8. 50; Plut., Anton., 5. 1. (44) Antonius, as well as Q. Cassius, attacked Pompey, compelled the consuls to read out Caesar’s letter and vetoed the senate’s resolution. See MRR, 2, 258. (45) V al. Max., 7. 5, 6 ; Liv., Per., 105 ; Plut., Cat. Min., 42 ; Pomp., 52. 1-2. For Caesar see Cic., F a n , 1. 9, 19. (46) It is attested that Vatinius was a legate in 51 (H irt. in C aes., BG, 8. 46, 4), but he possibly had served under Caesar earlier.

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Crassus and Pompey to the consulate of 55 ( 47). Though it was quite natural for Publius to support his father, this case exemplifies Caesar’s ability to use men who served in Gaul to advance his interests in Rome. Desire for financial gain might have induced magistrates to support Caesar in Rome. In 55 the tribunes A. Allienus, Sex. Peducaeus, C. Fabius, L. Roscius Fabatus and Mamilius carried through a law that completed the agrarian law of Caesar of 59 (48). Roscius was a legate in Gaul in 54, and Fabius from 54 to 49. This coincidence does not seem casual. C. Trebonius was a tribune in 55 and a legate of Caesar from 54 onwards. As tribune he carried the law granting the governorship of Syria and Spain to Crassus and Pompey respectively ( 49). C. Messius was an aedile in 55 and a legate in 54 ( 50). This continuity in offices might be significant!51). Caesar himself writes that military tribunes, prefects and other people came from Rome amicitiae causa (BG, 1. 39, 2). The origin of these friendships is unknown to us, though L. Iulius Caesar and Q. Pedius were probably prompted by their kinship to Caesar ( 52). At any rate, one has to bear in mind that hopes of enrichment in Gaul might explain the motivation of the political behaviour of many a magistrate in Rome with no previous ties to Caesar. Of course, genuine friendship or kinship could also induce people to join Caesar, especially when combined with the prospect of gain. But friendship and kinship with Caesar's opponents could also cause people to reject Caesar’s proposals, as indeed Brutus did ( Vir. III., 82. 3). As far as we know, people related to Cato and his faction did not serve with Caesar. Clearly the wealth of Gaul was not enough to break their previous con­ nections. Candidacy to office at Rome required considerable sums. Caesar had resorted to borrowing to finance his own election (no. 152, i). Financial aid to candidates was an effective way to win their political support. Some were (47) Dio., 39. 31, 2. Cf. Plut., Crass., 14. 6 ; Pomp., 51. 4 (48) C ary, JR S, 19 (1929), 1 13-6; 27 (1937), 4 8 ; MRR, 2, 220. (49) MRR, 2, 2 1 7 ; 220, n. 1. According to A nderson, Pompey, 22-3 all the tribunes of 55 were Caesar’s men, but this cannot be proved. (50) For the games of Messius see Val. M ax.,-2. 10, 8. Syme suggests that Messius was a Pompeian who joined Caesar in the civil war (R R , 66, n. 1). But the connections between them go back to 55-54. See Cic., A lt, 4. 15, 9 ; Sen., Rhet. Coni, 7. 4, 8. Cf. Bell. Afr., 33. 2 ; 43. 1. (51) More people probably served in Gaul after holding an office in Rom e; L. Munatius Plancus, legate from 54, was praetor in 45, and hence probably quaestor in 55 ; Q. Pedius, legate from 58, was praetor in 48 and may have been quaestor in 59 ; L. Minucius Basilus was legate from 53 and praetor in 45. His quaestorship probably falls in 54, or in 55 if he was legate already in 54 (MRR, 2, 217), and this holds for T. Sextius, legate since 53 and praetor in 45. (52) On this kinship see D. G., 3, 114; G elzer, Caesar, 312-3. We do not know who were the friends who worked against the triumph of Pomptinus (S chol. Bob., 149-150).

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already Caesar’s men before their candidacy, so that he lent his aid as a matter of course ; Antonius and Galba are typical examples. From Caesar’s point of view, the election of these people was very important. He also at­ tempted to win the support of other senators, including even opponents. In 58 Memmius attacked Caesar’s legislation and activity as consul and also tried to prosecute Vatinius. Four years later he was a candidate for the con­ sulate, helped by Caesar’s m oney!53). Clearly there had been a political pact between them, and this case is to be regarded as a specific example of Suetonius’ words {supra). P.Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was supported by Caesar during his candidacy for the consulate, as earlier in his election to the pontificate and in his nomination to the governorship of Spain (Caes., BC, 1. 22, 4). Memmius was not returned, while Lentulus’ political activity is almost unknown to us between 54 and 49. Perhaps M. Calidius was sup­ ported by Caesar as a candidate for the consulate, but he failed. At the beginning of 49 he proposed in the Senate that Pompey should leave Italy for his province, a motion in Caesar’s interests (54). Would such men have defended Caesar’s interests in the Senate but for the Financial aid they had received from him? No doubt, had Caesar not given the aid, men who ser­ ved in Gaul, like Antony, would have considered it as an insult and an ex­ pression of non-confidence, and would not have backed him in the Senate. Senators like Memmius, who had previously attacked Caesar, would not have changed their attitude without sufficient cause. According to Suetonius, Caesar won supporters and influence at Rome by lending at low interest, or none (/«/., 27. 1). This practice can be exem­ plified only by a single case and it is worthwhile to go into it in detail. Cicero received 800,000 sesterces front Caesar, probably in 54 ( 55). The loan is first mentioned in a letter of May 51 (Cic., Alt., 5. 1, 2). After the conference at Luca Cicero had collaborated with the triumvirate (56) and his correspondence testified to his good relations with C aesar!57). Caesar presumably wished to confirm his hold on Cicero by a loan showing his good will. As long as Cicero was prepared to do nothing or to defend Caesar’s men in court, it was easy for him to keep the money. In May 51 he (53) Cic., Atl. 4. 15, 7 ; 16, 6 ; 17, 2-3; QF, 2. 15, 4 ; 3. 2, 3. Cf. S uet., /»/., 73. (54) Cic., F a n . 8. 4, 1 ; 9, 5 ; C aes., B C 1. 2, 3. See T. P . L X X I; MLnzer, RE. 3, 1353. (55) Cic., F a n . 1.9, 12; 7. 17, 2. Cf. Lichtbnberger, Cicero. 79 -, F rDchtel, Geld., 71. The rate of interest was lower than 1 96, since the additional sum after three years was HS 20,000, Cic., Att.. 5.

5, 2 ; 9, 2. (56) On Cicero’s failure to act against Caesar in 56 and his change of attitude see Fam., 1. 9, 9-12 ; Atl., 4. 5. For recent interpretations of Cicero’s volte-face see Stockton, TAPA, 93 (1962), 471-489 ; Wiseman, JRS, 56 (1966), 14-5. (57) Cic., QF, 2. 11, 4 -5 ; 14, 1-3; 15, 2 ; 16, 5 ; 3. 1, 8-13; 5, 3 ; Att, 4. 17, 7.

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expressed his wish to return it. It is clear that with the possibility of a rup­ ture between Caesar and Pompey he wanted his hands to be free. Con­ versely, Caesar was only interested in exacting repayment as a means of political pressure. At least this was what Cicero himself thought and ex­ pressed in a letter to Atticus of 9 December 50 : he would be censured if his action in the Senate was timid ; but if he spoke for the Republic courageously, Balbus, Caesar’s agent, would demand the money ( 58). As far as we know, Cicero had not been required to act in conformity with a stric­ tly defined policy, and this is precisely why his case is instructive. The pur­ pose of the loan was to make their existing good relations closer. Cicero regarded it as proof of Caesar’s good w ill; Caesar knew that Cicero had become dependent on him as he would incline to show that he was not ungrateful, in ordinary times do his best to help Caesar, and in a crisis would carefully consider his obligations to him. It is plausible that others felt like Cicero. Caesar knew how to cast his net, using loans as a successful political instrument. The volte-face of Paullus as consul, and that of Curio as tribune were startling political events at Rome as well as great successes for Caesar. The two candidates returned for the consulate of 50, C. Claudius Mercellus and L. Aemilius Paullus, were known as anti-Caesarian (59). Since an attempt had already been made in 51 to take over his command, it was imperative for Caesar that there should be some magistrates to defend his interests. Paullus’ financial difficulties, resulting from his efforts to restore the Basilica Aemilia, gave Caesar his opportunity. He undertook to pay the costs of the restoration, a sum of 1500 talents; Paullus restrained his hostility, to be sure, without becoming an enthusiastic champion of Caesar, but his failure to cooperate with the other consul was useful to Caesar. Curio’s support was much more important. Apart from Curio and Furinus, no other tribunes of 50 are known. Had any of them assisted Curio in the campaign he launched against Caesar’s enemies, it would surely have been mentioned by one of the ancient writers. Hence it is legitimate to assume that Caesar’s candidates failed (60). Though ancient writers claim to know that Curio was bribed by Caesar, they differ on the sum paid. Probably Caesar took over Curio’s debts, the different sums men­ tioned in our sources resulting from different attempts to assess their (58) Cic., Alt., 7. 3, 11. Cf. 7. 8, 5. (59) On Marcellus see H irt. in C aes., BG, 8. 53 , 55 ; P lut., Pomp., 58-9. 1 ; Anton., 5. 2 ; App., BC, 2. 26-31 ; Dio, 40. 64, and for Paullus Cic., Fam., 8. 10, 3 ; App., BC, 2. 26. (60) Servaeus, the condemned tribune designate, is assumed to have been Caesar’s adherent by T. P., 3, LXXI, yet nothing certain is known about him, as they admit (T. P., 3, 63).

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amount. But Curio may have had other reasons for transfering his allegiance to Caesar. His friendship with Antony as well as his hostility to Ap. Claudius Pulcher could have also driven him to: this ste p ; even so the subvention was probably decisive (61). And Curio rendered Caesar out­ standing service : he prevented the Senate from discussing the question of Caesar’s successor and the question of recalling Caesar from his provincial post. He also forced the Senate to vote on his own proposal, that both Caesar and Pompey should resign their imperia. This proposal was ap­ proved by the Senate by 370 to 22, and, though vetoed, was a great victory for Curio and Caesar in the campaign to win public opinion (62). Appian says that all who were sentenced to banishment in the trials of 52 went to Caesar {BC, 2. 25), and this is hinted by Cicero {Att., 7. 3, 5). Some cases are known to us. Caesar supported T. Munatius Plancus Bursa who went into exile in consequence of his conviction (Cic., Fam., 8. 1, 4). He also gave aid to C. Rabirius Postumus (Cic., Rab. Post.. 41-4). A. Gabinius may have been assisted by Caesar after his condemnation ( 63). On the other hand, the fact that Milo was not allowed to return to Italy in 49 suggests that Caesar did not support him. After his tribunate, Q. Pompeius Rufus was prosecuted and sentenced to exile, but he did not join Caesar (64). Memmius went as an exile to Greece and Asia and not to Gaul, though Caesar had previously given him financial- aid ( 6S). These cases prove that not every exile turned to Caesar when in need, and, at the same time, that Caesar did not give aid to everyone. Still,: there is some truth in Appian’s-assertion, and the political astuteness of Caesar’s policy was revealed later, after the outbreak of the Civil W at It is time to sum up the pattern of the financial aid given by Caesar in order to extend his political influence. To judge by the types of aid and of people supported by Caesar, we may distinguish the following groups ( 66) : (61) For the payment to Curio see Cic., A lt, 6. 3, 4 ; V ell. Pat., 2. 48, 4 ; V al. Max., 9. 1, 6 ; Lucanus, 1. 269 ; 4. 8 2 0 ; P urr., Pomp., 58. 1 ; Anton., 5. 1 ; App., BC, 2. 26 ; Dio., 40. 60, 4 ; Serv., Ad. Aen., 6. 261. Miinzer minimized the importance of the payment (BE, 2A, 870). Syme lays stress upon Curio’s marriage to Fulvia, his friendship with Antony and his hostility to Ap. Claudius Pulcher (RR, 63). Lacey emphasizes Curio’s independence and tries to show that ancient writers exaggerated the importance of the payment (Historia, 10 (1961), 318-329). Granting the: possibility that there were con­ tributory motives to Curio’s change of attitude, the attempt to belittle the ancient evidence is not cogent, the more so as we have the testimony of Caelius as to Curio’s efforts to court Caesar’s favour (Cic., Fam, 8. 4, 2). (62) On Curio’s tribunate see M eyer, Caes. Mon., 2159-276 ; R ice H olmes, Republic, 2, 246-254. (63) There is no direct evidence, and the aid may be surmised only on the basis of the fact that Gabinius was later restored by Caesar (Dio., 39. 63, 5). (64) Cic., Fam , 8. 1 , 4 ; V al. Max., 4. 2, 7. (65) For Caesar’s aid to Memmius see Cic., A lt, 4. 15, 7 ; 16, 6 ; 17,; 2-3 ; QF, 2. 15, 4 ; 3. 2, 3 ; 8, 3. On Memmius’ exile see Cic., Att., 5. 11, 6 , Far/i, 13. 1-3. (66) This classification does not include people outside the senatorial class.

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a) b) c) d) e)

bestowal of booty on officers in Gaul; presents to senators and magistrates in Rome; financial aid to'candidates for office; loans without specific undertakings to help Caesar; payments to senators and magistrates in exchange for undertakings to defend Caesar’s interests ; f) support given to condemned senators. This classification does not exclude the possibility that the same in­ dividual received aid under several heads. The second group is the only one that is known to us merely by general descriptions and cannot be verified by specific examples. Nevertheless, presents were not rare and there is no need to question that Caesar gave them*'6768). What did Caesar achieve by these means? First, he obtained the support of tribunes, thereby securing his provincial command. The law conferring the command of Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul was proposed by Vatinius, a tribune who himself profited from it. Tribunes obstructed the motions to recall Caesar from Gaul, and thus to prevent continuity between his gover­ norship and a second consulate. It was in Caesar’s interests that the tribunes of 51, C. Caelius, P. Cornelius, C. Vibius Pansa,-L. Vinicius, vetoed several decrees of the Senate (Cic., Fam., 8. 8, 6-8). We do not know how Caesar obtained their support but it is reasonable to assume that he adopted his usual methodes. In 50 it was Curio who prevented the at­ tempt to nominate a successor. Curio, and Antony and Q. Cassius ( 6S) as well, suggested various compromises, designed to maintain the balance of power between Pompey and Caesar. The tribunes were important to Caesar for both their positive and negative powers. The law of Vatinius in 59, the agrarian law of the five tribunes in 55, the law of the ten tribunes in 52, permitting Caesar to be candidate for the consulate in absence ( 69), the various proposals of Curio and Antony, all illustrate the former, while the failure of his enemies to pass a decree of the Senate against him was due to the intercession of the tribunes, the successful use of their negative powers. The achievement of Caesar is also seen in the creation of a solid party of adherents in the Senate. For this purpose, a comparison of Caesar’s position in 59 to that of 55 is very instructive. In 59 the united action of the trium­ virs was powerless to overcome the opposition in the Senate. The acts of

(67) Cato’s remark proves that Roman generals used to divide booty among friends (ORF\ p. 82). (68) For Cassius see MRR, 2, 259. (69) On this law see MRR, 2, 236. Of course: not all tribunes were pro-C aesarian; Pompey and Cicero exerted their influence in support of the law. See Cic., Alt., 7. 1 , 4 ; R ice Holmes, Republic, 2, 236.

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a c t iv it ie s

Pompey in the East and the cancellation of one third of the payment due from the tax-farmers of Asia were ratified by laws passed in the Assembly and not by the Senate, although the authority of the Senate was recognized for such matters ( 70). By 56 the situation had changed. At the conference in Luca 200 senators were present. Since 59 Crassus and Pompey had not in­ creased their parties considerably, and it is to Caesar that we have to turn our attention, if we want to account for the gathering of these numerous senators : some came to show their gratitude for help already given and others were present in expectation of financial aid (71). Following the con­ ference and in the same year, the Senate ratified two proposals in favour of Caesar, the first authorizing Caesar to appoint ten legates of his own choice, and the second providing the pay for Caesar’s additional legions. Obviously Caesar’s adherents, some of whom naturally participated in the conference, took pains to pass these proposals, and, of course, Crassus, Pompey and Cicero used their influence ( 72). it was not enough to acquire the support of magistrates and to create a party of adherents in the Senate. The success of Caesar was a result of his clever combination of that system and of an alliance with other influential principes. When the triumvirate was founded, Caesar had not a large party and his financial resources were not exceptional. Yet the wish of other statesmen, his avowed enemies apart, to retain good relations with him depended to a large extent on his political influence : the more it increased, the more it became necessary to attach importance to Caesar’s view. Yet this development had its own shortcoming : Pompey’s envy of his in­ creasing power was notorious!73). Hence the decline of Caesar’s influence in the Senate after 52 : his adherents could not maintain his position without the collaboration of Pompey and with Crassus dead. There were other ways of gaining the good will of senators besides financial aid and alliances with other principes. Candidates might be recommended to the

(70) For the laws passed by Caesar in his first consulship see MRR, 2, 188, and for the Senate’s op­ position to Caesar Plut., Caes., 14. 2 ; A pp., BC, 2. 10; Dio, 381 2-4. (71) App., BC, 2. 17. Cf. P urr., Pomp., 51. 1-3; Caes.. 21. 1-3 ; Crass., 14. 5. The number of senators may be an exaggeration (200), but not as great as Gelzer thinks (.Caesar, 110, n. 75). (72) Cic., Pam, 1.7, 10 ; Prov. Cons., 28 ; Balb., 61 ; P lut., Caes., 21. 3. T. Ligarius may have been one of these senators. While he was an urban quaestor Ligarius gave some help to Caesar (Cic., Lig., 356). Broughton suggests that Ligarius was quaestor in 54, but 56 is preferable. Cicero’s aid to Caesar is mentioned side by side with that of Ligarius, alluding to the support in connection with the pay to the additional legions and the prolongation of Caesar’s command. As urban quaestor Ligarius could have rendered Caesar an important service, by securing quick payment. (73) C aes., BC, 1. 4, 4 ; V e l l . Pat., 2. 33, 3 ; Lucan, 1. 125; F lor., 2. 13, 14.

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voters, many of whom were under Caesar’s influence ( 74). The loyalty of Caesar to his adherents was an important factor that kept them around him, and this is especially conspicious when compared to Pompey’s haughtiness, which insulted and estranged many a senator ( 75). Thus the bribes and sub­ sidies given by Caesar must be considered against the background of all the other factors by which he rose, though the systematic character and large scale of the financial aid he supplied suggest that it counted for most in winning him adherents)76). IV. —

M

is c e l l a n e o u s

P

a c t s

Various methods pf using material aid to win adherents and extend political influence have been disclosed in our analyses of the activities of Crassus and Caesar. These two were probably most conspicuous in ex­ ploiting these methods, at least according to extant data. But they were not alone. Financial pacts could form part of political agreements not only be­ tween senatorial leaders and ordinary members of the senatorial class, but also between statesmen of equal position. Plutarch and Appian say that M. Octavius who opposed the.agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus was influenced by the rich who were to lose their land, should the bill p a ss)77). According to Plutarch, Octavius possessed public lands and Tiberius offered to recompense him for the loss of his land from his own money, if he withdrew his opposition (T(7, 10. 5). Under the cir­ cumstances, Tiberius’ proposal was doomed to fail. Octavius represented the interests of people who could easily have offered more to secure his support. Secondly, if Plutarch is reliable (/A, 10. 4), it seems that Tiberius’ proposal was made publicly, and Octavius could not have accepted it, without ad­ mitting that his opposition to the law was prompted by his private interests. Thirdly, Octavius’ consistent opposition shows that he was not merely a tool, and that he believed in the rightness of his action. It is instructive to turn to the relations between Scaurus and Marius. Pliny tells us that Scaurus was associated with Marius in the exploitation of the provinces (//A7, 36. 116). Scaurus and Marius also cooperated in politics in 100, when it was Scaurus who prompted Marius to launch the attack on (74) Hirt. in C aes., BG, 8. 50-51. On Caesar's efforts to win followers outside the senatorial class see S all., Cat., 54. 2-4 ; Suet., Iu l, 27. (75) On Caesar see Suet., Iul., 71-3 and on Pontpey Plut., Pomp., 55. 6 ; App., BC, 2. 24. Cf. Syme, RR, 65-7. (76) On senator’s motives see also section v of this chapter. On Caesar's followers in the civil war see ch. 9, iii. (77) Plut., TG, 10. 1-2; App., BC, I. 12.

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Saturninus and Glaucia ( 78). The sources are too scanty to follow the con­ nections between them in detail, but it is noteworthy that they collaborated both economically and politically. It is particularly significant that they were on good terms even in 100, when Scaurus was. already connected with the Metelli, Marius’ enemies. In a speech of 66, Cicero refers to a Roman commander who distributed to magistrates part of the money allocated to him in order to secure his province, and this is explained by the scholiast: Quando ibat Lucullus ad bellum, petierat pecuniam infinitam, ut suis militibus bello daret.- iste ac­ cepit et partem pecuniae dedit multis magistratibus, ut eorum auxilio non succederetur ( 79). He also states, on the authority of Sallust, that Lucullus bribed Quinctius so that he would not be superseded in his command (80). Cicero may be alluding to Lucullus, but that is far from certain. The first part of the commentary of the scholiast is hardly credible, since we know that Lucullus actually did without an allocation from the Senate for his army and fleet and that he deposited large sums of money in the Treasury ( 8182). Moreover, the problem of sending a successor to Lucullus was raised not at the beginning of the war, but several years later. Sallust’s words seem more reliable. Plutarch tells us that L. Quinctius, praetor in 68, made efforts to terminate Lucullus’ command!32) ; indeed he was partially successful, as Cilicia was taken from Lucullus, after he had been already deprived of Asia in 69 (Dio., 36. 2, 2). Two factors contributed to the failure of Lucullus. First, Quinctius could not be bribed, as he was not likely to forget that Lucullus, as consul in 74, had frustrated his activity as tribune. Money could not atone for the insult inflicted on that occasion and the enmity that ensued : and this was not the only time when Lucullus failed to make political use of his money ( 83). Second, other influential in­ terests worked for Lucullus’ dismissal, and against a combination of power­ ful forces Lucullus’ money was of no avail (84). A dominant figure in the political intrigues in the seventies was P. Cor­ nelius Cethegus. Cicero gives a detailed account of his influence (Parad., 5. 40). It is said that M. Antonius, pr., 74, got his imperium gratia Cottae con-

(78) V al. Max., 3. 2, 8 ; Vir. l i t , 72. 9. See n° 39 and my article in Ancient Society 5 (1974).. (79) C ic,, L eg. M an., 37 ; Schol . G ronov ., 321. (80) ScHOIL. Gronov., 320 Sall., Hist., 4. 71. (81) See n0 160 with notes 632-3 and 635. (82) Plut., Luculi, 33. 5 ; MRR, 2, 138. See also Maurenbrecher’s comment to Sall., Hist. 4. 71. (83) Cic., Cluent., 110-112; Sall., H ist, 3. 48, 11 ; P lut., Luculi, 5. 4. Despite his liberal donatives Lucullus was not liked by his soldiers, see no. 160. (84) See eh. 8, iv.

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sulis et Cethegi factione (Ps. Ascori., 259). It was only after he had won over Cethegus’ mistress by gifts and flatteries that Lucullus obtained Cilicia (Plut., Luculi, 5-6). Sallust very likely has such men in mind when writing of the attempts of Q. Marcius Rex and Q. Metellus Creticus to obtain triumphs : hi utrique ad urbem imperatores erant, impediti ne triumpharent calumnia paucorum, quibus omnia honesta atque inhonesta vendere mos erat {Cat., 30, 4). It becomes clear that a magistrate who needed the Senate’s consent for a triumph, an allocation of money or a province could be in­ duced to pay for it by influential senators, whose support was decisive. Cicero exchanged the province of Macedonia with C. Antonius, where there was a favourable chance to make profits and obtain a triumph (85). As Antonius and Catilina had worked together in the canvassing for the con­ sulate of 63, the agreement to exchange the provinces was apparently in­ tended to isolate Catilina ; probably Cicero expected a share in Antonius’ profits. Since the date of the pact is not known, we cannot say whether it was concluded in order to prevent the election of Catilina as consul for 62 or later to obtain the collaboration of Antonius in defeating the plot ( 86). However, it was not before February 61 that Cicero got his share, though in the meantime he had defended Antonius in the Senate and seen to it that he was not superseded (87). Later, in 59, Cicero appeared for Antonius on his prosecution (no. 89). There are two possibilities : Cicero continued to represent the interests of Antonius in the Senate, so as to secure the profits due to him in accordance with the pact of 63 ; or Antonius promised to share his profits with Cicero in return for his services ( 88). How can we ex­ plain the behaviour of the two? Clearly the indebted Antonius did not scruple to forsake Catilina and to come to an agreement with Cicero, which would give him a profitable province and a chance to get rid of his debts. As far as we know, there was no long standing amicitia between Catilina

(85) Cic., Fam., 15. 4, 13; Pis, 5 ; 38 ; Sali., Cat., 26. 4 ; P lut., Cic., 12. 4. (86) On the competition between Cicero and Catilina and Antonius see esp. Ascon., 8 2 -9 4 ; cf. Sall., Cat, 21. 3 ; 26. 1 ; P lut,, Cic., 11. On the pact between Cicero and Antonius see n° 211, u, with n. 867. Allen has shown that Cic., Att., 2. I, 3 does not refer to the exchange of the provinces, but to the cession of Cisalpine Gaul by Cicero {TAPA, 83 (1952), 233-7 , contra H ardy, JRS. 7 (1917), 184-5). But I do not agree with his. view thatThe cession preceded the election of the consuls o f6 2 (237 f.l. If it is true, as Allen argues, that Gaul was important and (hat the consul could set out for his province in his year's office, it is unlikely that Cicero would have ceded his province before he was certain that Catilina would not be elected. See also G elzer, RE, 7a , 876. (87) Cic., Fam., 5. 5, 2-3 ; An.. 1. 14, 7. See also no. 211, ii with n. 867. (88) It is impossible to determine which possibility is more likely, though the one does not necessarily exclude the other. As it is, the service of Cicero to Antonius is mentioned before the debt of Antonius, that is, Fam, 5. 6 (and 5. 4 too according to Watt’s edition in 0. C T.) precedes Att., 1. 12-4.

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and Antonius ; their cooperation had been limited to the election, while Cicero had helped Antonius to be elected praetor for 66 (Ascon., 85). Un­ der these circumstances, there is no wonder that Antonius’ decision was determined by material motives. Cicero’s attitude too is easy to understand. He did not wish to leave Rome, as is shown by his letters from Cilicia and his not taking a province after his practorship. In exchange for something he did not value, he obtained the cooperation of the other consul. And though his service to Antonius after 63 was not popular (Att., 1. 12, 1), it did not cause any estrangement with other senatorial leaders, while it brought him gratia. Antony was a rival of Dolabella before the murder of Caesar and opposed his election to the consulate. However, after Caesar’s death he gave his sanction to Dolabella becoming consuli89). But when Antony left Rome, Dolabella crushed the mob that wanted to establish a cult to Caesar and demolished a pillar in his honour ( 90). These actions made Antony feel uneasy, as they could mean that Dolabella was ready to oppose his plans. But to adopt Cicero’s language, when Antony gave a share to Dolabella in the public money he had embezzled, Dolabella betrayed the cause of the Republic. On the same occasion Antony obtained the support of another consular whose name remains unknown ( 91). Transactions between Roman senators or magistrates and foreign rulers and states sometimes resulted in decisions in the sphere of Roman foreign policy. Already in the second century Timarchus,; the Seleucid satrap of Media, had procured a Senate's decision in his favour by bribery (Diod., Sic., 31. 27a— ca. 161). Ptolemy Auletes. King of Egypt, was not secure in his throne, since many believed that Egypt had been bequeathed to Rome by Ptolemy Alexander I. In 64 it was proposed to annex Egypt to the Roman Empire and in 63 Egypt was perhaps comprised in the agrarian bill of Rullus (92). Auletes was anxious to safeguard his title by all possible means, and he achieved his aim in 59, when Caesar ratified his position as king of Egypt and a treaty was concluded recognizing him as socius et amicus populi Romani in return for the huge sum of 6,000 talents (no. 152, i). Vatinius, too, as tribune of the plebs in 59, passed bills settling Roman relations with cities and rulers in return for bribes; at least this is what

(89) (90) (91) 1, 96; (92)

Cic., Phil.. 1. 31; 2. 79-83; P urr., Anton, III. 2-3; Caes„ 62. 5. See MRR, 2, 317. Cic., Att.. 14. 15, 1; 16, 2; 20, 2 ; 4 ; F a n , 9 14; 12, 1, 1. C ic, Att., 14. 18, 1 ; 1(5. 15, 1. For the consular see F a n , 12. 2, 2 and T. P., 6, 13. Cf. D. G., R ice Holmes, Empire, 1, 13. Cic., Leg. Agr., 1. 1 ; 2. 41-4; Suet., /«/., 11 ; Plut., Crass., 13. 2 ; Schol. Bob., 92.

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Cicero tells u s ( 93). A year later, Clodius passed bills of the same sort. Brogitarus of Galatia was recognized as king and Pessinus was annexed to his dominion. Another law authorized the return of exiles to Byzantium (no. 118). In return; Clodius was given promissory notes. It also seems that Caelius, as tribune in 52, carried out transactions with the king of Galatia and with the king of Egypt (no. 105). In 44 Antony made a fortune by passing several bills : one for Deiotarus, king of Galatia, who was to get back territories taken away by C aesar; a second conferred Roman citizen­ ship on the Sicilians, and a third exempted the people of Crete from paying taxes and cancelled the status of the island as a province (no. 91, iii). In 59 Caesar enacted that the receipt of money in return for an undertaking to ex ­ press a certain view in the Senate or the acceptance by magistrates of presents worth more than a certain amount were not lawful (Dig., 48. 11. 6. 2). This law, and the known cases, suggest that such behaviour was not rare. This short survey clearly shows how senators attempted to secure political decisions from which they were to profit, and also how others were ready to collaborate with them. These attempts are instructive^ whether they failed or succeeded. They indicate that often material interests of influential individuals determined Roman relations with clients-kings, cities and states ; yet it was not money alone that counted in such transactions : one had to know how to conduct the negotiations and to consider the other obligations and ties of the prospective allies. V . —

F

in a n c ia l

S

u p p o r t

a n d

P

o l it ic a l

F

r ie n d s h ip

Friendship (amicitia) at Rome was a term that designated not only close relations between men based on mutual sentiments and affections, but also social and political connections ( 94). Friends helped each other in politics, sometimes even at the expense of their obligations to the state (95). Several factors could create friendship of a political or social nature. The question is whether material aid, such as loans, presents and the like, could have resulted in a political friendship. To put it in other words: can we find proof that the feeling of gratitude for material help involved the recipients not only in financial but also in political obligations to the benefactors? (93) Cic., Vat., 29 ; Att., 2. 9, 1 ; Fam., 1. 9, 7. This is accepted by MRR, 2, 190, but doubted by Rotondi, Leges, 392. (94) On friendship in Roman society see G elzer, Nobilitat, 83-102 -, Michel, Gratuiti, 501-577 ; Hellegouarc’h, Vocabulaire, 4 1 -9 0 . C ombes, REL, 36 (1958), 176-186. Against the excessive in­ sistence on the political meaning of amicitia see Brunt, Pr. Cam. Phil. Soc., 191 (1965), 1-20. (95) Cic., Amic., 36-7 ; Fam., 11. 28, 2. Cf. Schulz, Principles, 233-6 ; C ombes, ib., 181; Michel, Gratuite, 510-511.

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First, let us describe in brief some aspects of friendship at Rome. In many cases amicitia is based on utilitarian interests, the benevolent man ex­ pecting to enjoy a reciprocal service. The very efforts of Cicero and Seneca to depict true as against utilitarian friendship indicate how common the lat­ ter was in Roman society (96). Material aid occupies an important place among deeds of benevolence and liberality, as Cicero says : de beneficentia ac de liberalitate dicendum est, cuius ratio duplex. Nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut pecunia. Facilior est haec posterior, locupleti praesertim, sed illa lautior ac splendidior et viro forti claroque dignior. Quamquam enim in utroque inest gratificandi liberalis voluntas, tamen altera ex arca, altera ex virtute depromitur, largitioque quae fit ex re familiari fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. (Off, 2. 52). On reading this passage one gets the impression that Cicero rather reluctantly includes the second type of liberality, out of concession to a recognized phenomenon in Roman society. It should be remembered that acts of benevolence, beneficia, create feelings of gratitude and promote influence, gratia. The recipient becomes beneficio obligatus, and the benefactor may expect services in return, officia. It is typical of acts of liberality that evoke feelings of gratitude and obligation that they are not motivated by financial advantage ( S e n . , Benef, 4. 13, 3). Interest-free loans are such acts. Moreover, the view is also expressed that if one party is always given and the other always receives, the latter loses his freedom ; a man, who wishes to keep his liberty must be capable of ren­ dering services in turn (97). Thus it becomes apparent that material aid could create friendly connections and confer influence, and this is not con­ tradicted by Cicero’s words about the difference between a financial debt and an obligation of gratitude ( 98). And this holds true for Seneca’s words : Itaque eligendum est a quo beneficium accipiam, et quidem diligentius quaerendus benefici quam pecuniae creditor. Huic enim reddendum est quantum accepi et, si reddidi, solotus sum ac liber. At illi et plus solvendum est, et nihilo minus etiam relata gratia cohaeremus. Debes enim, cum red­ didi, rursus incipere manetque amicitia. (Benef, 2. 18, 5). Seneca’s words (96) Cic., Antic., 31 ; 56 ; Off.. 1. 56 ; 58 ; ND, 1. 122 ; Sen., B enef, 1. 1, 3 ; 9, 2 ; 27; 7 ; 3. 15, 4 ; 4 14, i. For a detailed analysis see Michel, Gratuite, 507-529. An illuminating anecdote is told by Valerius Maximus on Rutilius Rufus : cum amici, cuiusdam rogationi resisteret (Rutilius), atque is per summam indignationem dixit ‘quid ergo mihi opus est amicitia tua, si quod rogo non facis?’ respondit 'immo quid mihi tua, si propter te aliquid inhoneste facturus sum?’ (6. 4, 4). (97) Pubiilius Syrus : Beneficium accipere libertatem est vendere (4 8 ) ; Rogare officium servitus quoddammodo est (583). On gratia see V istrand, Eranus, 39 (1941), 17-26 ; Hellegouarch, Vocabulaire,

202-228. (98) Cic., Plane., 68. Cf. Gellius, 1. 4, 2-8. Cicero mentions one Pythius who as a banker had in­ fluence in large circles (O ff, 3. 58).

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imply that as long as someone owes money he is unfree and limited in his actions. Further, it appears that if the lender does not demand interest, it is impossible to requite him merely by repaying the money ; he has performed an act of liberality that creates gratitude. This brief survey of friendship at Rome makes it clear that material aid was a factor that could create connections of this kind. In this light we have to judge the loans made by Crassus and Caesar. Caesar lent money to Cicero, to tie his hands : Cicero tried to repay to regain his freedom of ac­ tion ; and yet repayment did not entirely end his obligation, as the loan had been an act of benevolence, not intended to secure a profit. It was his wish to be able to choose freely between his friendship with Pompey and with Caesar that prompted Cicero to repay. He notifies Atticus that he intends to join Pompey, but is inhibited by the debt ("). Cato, too, who was not ex­ ceptionally rich, lent money free of interest to friends, and in other cases stood surety for their debts to the Treasury (no. 189). There is no difference in principle between his action and what Crassus and Caesar did, only of degree and scope. It is a pity that we do not know who these friends were. There is also explicit evidence to show that financial aid resulted in con­ nections of friendship or created political obligations. In a letter to Cicero, dated August 51, Caelius in recording Curio’s candidature for the tribunate, explains Jus supposed intention to support the bont as follows : Huius autem voluntatis initium et causa est quod eum non mediocriter Caesar, qui solet infimorum hominum amicitiam sibi qualibet impensa adiungere, valde con­ tempsit (Fam., 8. 4, 2). Caelius was surprised by Caesar’s behaviour to Curio, as it contradicted his usual policy of acquiring friends by sub­ ventions. Caelius words constitute further proof not only of Caesar’s methods, but of the way in which political friendship could be founded on financial advantage. In the Senate’s debate on 1st January 43 on how to deal with Antony, Cicero attacked the proposals of Fufius Calenus and assailed anyone who spoke in behalf of Antony Nullae istae excusationes sunt: 'meus amicus est’. Sit patriae prius. 'Meus cognatus’. An potest cognatio proprior ulla esse quam patriae in qua parentis etiam continentur ? ‘Mihi pecuniam tribuit’. Cupio videre qui id audeat dicere. {Phil., 5. 6). Three factors might have in­ duced senators to support Antony on that occasion : he was a friend, or related to him, or had given him money. Cicero concedes the existence of these motives as factors determining the political attitude of senators, and9 (99) Cic., Att., 7. 3, 5 ; 11. The friendship with Caesar and Pompey was basically political. For the attempts of each of them to draw Cicero to his own side see Att., 7. 1, 3 f. There ( § 7 ) Cicero discloses his wish to keep Caesar’s favour.

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his rhetorical argumentation cannot disguise this truth, though this is not to deny that there were senators who made their choice according to what they thought was the common good. Thus it can be asserted that financial aid created friendly relations and obligations of political significance. Evidence, express or implicit, has been found in our examination of the activities of leading senators and of relations among senators, and of the nature of friendship at Rome. Yet the last quoted passage of Cicero requires us to continue the inquiry. When was financial aid feasible and effective, in which periods was it typical of political life and what happened when it clashed with other factors? The Roman general had full discretion to dispose of the booty as he wished, and he could show his attitude towards his subordinates by giving them part of it; this was a means of attaining gratia ( 10°). However, the custom of distributing donatives to soldiers and officers was so recognized and rooted that it was regarded as natural and a matter of course. If the of­ ficers did not receive their share, it was a justified cause for resentment against their superior. Now the distribution of booty was merely one of several ways in which a commander could foster friendly relations with of­ ficers and gain influence over them. Certainly it is wrong to say that Laelius was Scipio’s friend because of the donatives he received (no. 23). It is true that the political leanings of Caesar’s officers and men were shaped to a considerable extent by their profits in Gaul, but at the same time, as has been shown, some were connected with Caesar in other ways as well, which had nothing to do with pecuniary considerations. And, of course, the per­ sonality of the commander is an all important factor. Lucullus’ soldiers got large donatives, perhaps the largest in this period, yet they were not loyal to him (no. 160). In order to understand the conditions obtaining in alliances between senators and senior statesmen and the factors and lines of reasoning charac­ teristic of them, a brief survey of the relations between Pompey and his of­ ficers will be profitable. Twenty-two officers of Pompey are known, who each secured about 4 million sesterces from his military service)10101). One was Scaurus the younger, whose sister was Pompey’s second wife, though she died soon after the marriage ( 102). The adherence of Scaurus to Pompey (100) Alter consulum Q. Fulvius ex Liguribus triumphavit: quem triumphum magis gratiae quam rerum gestarum magnitudini datum constabat. Armorum hostilium magnam vim transtulit, nullam pecuniam admodum. Divisit tamen in singulos milites trecenos aeris, duplex centurionibus, triplex equiti

(Liv., 40. 59, 1-2). See ch. II, iv. (101) See n° 126 with notes 331-2. (102) Plut., Pomp., 9 ; Sui!.. 33 3.

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becomes comprehensible; evidently they were closely connected before Scaurus’ military service. On the other hand, Pompey was later so much irritated by Scaurus’ marriage to Mucia, his divorcee, that he virtually severed their relations ( 103). Afranius had fought with Pompey in Spain, and his Picentine origin helps to explain their connection ( l04). Metellus Celer and Metellus Nepos were half-brothers of Mucia, Pompey's third wife ( 105). Pompey and the Metelli had been Sulla’s allies in the first Civil War. It is no wonder that the two brothers served with Pompey. In 62 Nepos represented his interests at R om e!106). But at the end of the year Pompey divorced Mucia, thereby cutting his link with the Metelli ( 107). As consul in 60 Celer resisted the plans of Pompey and his adherents!108). Cn. Cor­ nelius Lentulus Clodianus and Cn Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus had probably served with Pompey in Spain ( 109). As Censor in 70 Clodianus presumably cooperated with Pompey, and so did L. Gellius Publicola, who had apparently been a legate of Pompeius Strabo!1101). Gabinius probably came from Picenum and may have had some connections with Pompey before his tribunate ( u l). In any case, as a result of the law he passed in 67 he obtained the lucrative office of legate. His good relations with Pompey continued till his condemnation in 54. Pompey made efforts on his behalf but surprisingly did not save h im !112). Probably his failure induced Gabinius to go over to Caesar in the Civil War. Though the evidence is scanty, L. Lollius may have come from Picenum, like M. Lollius Palicanus, another supporter of Pom pey!113). The mother of L. Manlius Torquatus was a native of Asculum in Picenum iCic., Sull., 25). P. Plautius Hypsaeus began his career by serving under Pompey. He kept up good relations with him till 52, when he was condemned, Pompey contemptuously rejecting his entreaty for help (Plut., Pomp., 55. 6). A. Plotius seems to be the tribune who passed the agrarian law providing land for Pompey’s soldiers who had

(103) Ascon., 19-20; App., BC, 2. 24. (104) Syme, RR, 31 ; 396. (105) See the genealogical table (I) in Syme, RR. (106) MRR, 2, 174. (107) D. G„ 4, 561. (108) Cic., Alt., 1. 17, 10 ; 18, 6; 19, 4 ; Dio. 37. 49-50. Cf. Syme, RR, 43; S. B., 1, 328. (109) Syme, RR, 44. n. 2. (110) S yme, R R, 66. For the identification ofPubTicoIa with the legate of Strabo see C ichorius, RS. 139; MRR, 2, 36. ( 111) Syme, RR, 31, n. 6. On Gabinius’ early career see Badian, Philologus, 103 (1959), 87-9. (112) Cic., QF, 3. 2, 1 ; 4, 1-3 ; Rab. Post, 33-4 ; Dio, 39. 55, 4-6 ; 62, 3-63, 5. Cf. Syme, RR, 67. (113) On Palicanus see Sall., Hist., 4. 43. On C. Lollius see MOnzer, RE, 13, 1376.

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served in Spain C 14). Nothing is known of the connections between M. Pupius Piso and Pompey prior to the wars against the pirates and in the East, but possibly they went back to the time when Pupius succeeded Pom­ pey in Spain ( U5). Varro and Pompey had had familiar relations before 67 and their friendship lasted into the Civil War ( 145116). L. Valerius Flaccus can be described as a professional soldier and not as a supporter of Pompey, despite the profits he gained under h im (117). This survey shows that most of the legates already had connections with Pompey before 67. From their point of view service under his command was one more step in their political careers and an opportunity for gaining easy profits as well. We may say that they expected their commander to be generous and liberal on account of their past relations. Pompey’s grants drew them closer to him, yet they were not enough by themselves to ensure their political loyalty for a long period. Pompey lost the support of many of his legates not because the grants had not satisfied them but because he of­ fended them later. It looks as if war profits were often the rewards a com­ mander gave his political associates. But the rewards in themselves do not invariably create and cannot ensure permanence of friendly relations. On the other hand, if the commander is parsimonious, he is likely to lose the support of his followers. The conclusion is that distribution of booty is not in itself a guarantee of future friendship, which has to be continuously cemented in other ways. There is some similarity between the distribution of booty by generals and financial aid rendered by leading senators to candidates for offices. The general distributes booty to persons who often have close ties with him, while financial aid at elections is generally rendered to allies and political friends. It is one more act that connects the candidate with a man who has helped him, or been helped by him and, in turn, the political support given by the successful candidate to his benefactor is one more link in the chain of mutual services. We have noticed this in our discussion of Crassus and Caesar. Pompey too helped his friends to bribe the voters (no. 186, iii). Cato and his allies distributed bribes to secure the election of Bibulus, Cato’s father-in-law (Suet., /«/., 19. 1). Cato the elder’s words in his speech de sumptu suo indicate that the enrichment of friends, even at the

(114) See Smith, CQ, 51 (1957), 82-5. (115) M RR, 2, 124. (116) C ichorius, R S, 191-6. (117) On Flaccus see the index of his career in MRR, 2, 629 and no. 213. The relations between some legates and Pompey are not known at all. These are P. Atilius (RE, s. v., 23), Ti. Claudius Nero (RE, s. v., 253), L. Cornelius Sisena (RE, s. v., 374) and Manlius Priscus (RE, s. v., 62).

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expense of the public, was already a familiar phenomenon in his day ( 1181920). A man who had once received aid might regard it as a sign of his right to ask for more ; this tightened the connections ( u9). Yet political support was as important as such links of financial aid, if not more. It is very likely that Metelli helped Marius with money at the beginning of his career, but when Metellus Numidicus scorned his ambition to be elected consul, Marius became his mortal enemy ( 12°). By making a mere financial grant, in lieu of a provincial governorship, to L. Minucius Basilus Caesar pushed him into joing the conspirators (no. 176). The foregoing instances and the behaviour of Pompey’s legates reveal the limitations of purely financial support. It might bring a political friendship into being, and no doubt might be a means of pressure on the recipient. Thus senators could hope to escape from financial embarrassment by taking a suitable political stand, while in such circumstances principes could hope to gain their collaboration by financial assistance. But this was most easily secured when aid was offered to men with whom an earlier connection had existed, or who at least had no previous connections which tied their hands, least easily if it involved the dissolution of existing friendships or if the prospective benefactor was adverse to the political ambitions of the would-be recepient. Caesar vainly tried to tempt M. Brutus to serve in his army in Gaul, — he preferred to serve with his father-in-law (no. 155) — and to win over C. Claudius Marcellus, cos., 50 ; though he had married Octavia, the daughter of Caesar’s sister, he chose to follow the policy of his cousin, the consul of 51 ( 120. Caesar could surely not have had much hope that Metellus Scipio or Faustus Sulla would consent to receive financial aid from him with all its implications, despite their heavy debts (nos. 102, 132). Only men who were both deeply involved in debts and not his avowed enemies were likely to succumbed to financial temptations, like Curio and L. Aemilius Paullus. The importance of financial aid must also be considered from a chronological viewpoint. Analysis of the economic condition of senators has shown that their expenses grew steadily from the beginning of the second century, and cultimated in the post-Sullan age, when some faced financial difficulties or bankruptcy ( I22). Hence opportunities for winning political friends by loans or even bribes existed mainly in the last decades of the (118) ORF 3, 70-71. (119) Michel, Gratuite, 521 f. (120) See Passerine Athenaeum, 12 (1934), 22 ff. (121) See D. G., 2, 336 f and the genealogical table (III) in Syme, RR. (122) See ch. 4, v-vi.

142

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Republic; previously Perhaps it is no mere these methods belong C aesar. If Cato tried more than ordinary, Similarly, bribery of

they were less common and played a minor role. accident that the earliest known politicians to exploit to the first century: Pompey, Crassus, and above all to ttse the same system, though his fortune was no it is obvious that others acted in the same way. voters, became common in the same a g e (123). S ummary

To conclude, the more family relations and ties between clients and patrons were loosened and the more the expenditure of senators grew, the more the importance of the financial factor increased among the complex of motives that determined the political affiliations and behaviour of senators. But one factor did not change, especially among scions of the old nobility, the ambition to achieve political success and to advance in the cursus honorum. Financial temptations were not sufficient to offset this ambition, and a senatorial leader who used only this means of winning supporters and promoting his influence or who did not pay heed to the political ambition of others inevitably faced disappointaments.

(123) See ch. IV, iii.

C H A PTER

VII

Economic Conditions and Political Conduct

It is enough to refer to the organization of the comitia centuriata to realize that the Roman constitution was basically timocratic (0. Legally, no property census was demanded from senators or candidates to magistracies. Actually senators had to incur considerable expenditure in the course of their advancement in the cursus honorum ( 12). Since a political career in­ volved heavy costs, it is necessary to examine whether the less affluent as such faced setbacks in their career or whether and how they could overcome their disadvantage. But our concern is not only with individuals : we have to see whether the rise and decline of families were correlated with their economic condition. That might have influenced their political position, but equally changes in their political position might have had economic results. It is also necessary to find out whether and how far expenditure helped senators to attain political success. Another aspect needs consideration. Since senators obviously tended to recompense themselves for political ex­ penditure, it is our task to see the political consequences of the attempt of magistrates to enrich themselves from office!3). I .—

F

in a n c ia l

P o s it io n

and

P

o l it ic a l

S u ccess

There are celebrated traditions of distinguished Roman statesmen who succeeded in their political career despite their poverty!4). In this section (1) Cf. G elzer, Nobilitat, 1-2. (2) For the census see ch. 1, n. 121 and for the expenses of senators ch. IV. (3) Cf. ch. II, v. (4) On the poverty of M'. Ctirius Dentatus, censor and three times consul, see V al, M ax., 4. 3, 5 ; Plut., Cat. Mai., 2. 1-2 ; Vir. III., 33 (but he received 500 iugera and a house from the sate). On C. Fabricius Luscinus, censor and two times consul, see V al M ax., 4. 3, 6 ; Dion. H al., 19. 14, I ; 15, I ;

144

PART TWO. — THE FOLTTTCAL ACTIVITIES

we shall examine the career of senators described as poor or those whose financial circumstances are known to have been very moderate. How did this condition affect their advance? Did ‘new men” with slender means en­ ter the Senate? Cato the Elder is said to have been poor in his youth, but it is more ac­ curate to say that he was not rich ; in any case, he was a proprietor, owning lands of the order of at least 150 iugera. His advancement in the cursus honorum was accompanied by improvement in his economic circumstances. But it cannot be maintained that in his case there was any close correlation. His political success was the outcome of his friendship with L. Valerius Flaccus and of his activity as orator and in the courts, by which he obtained a clientela and made a name. It was only in 199, on the occasion of his aedilician games, that he incurred heavy costs, but by then he already possessed the necessary means. Cato achieved enrichment gradually, thanks to attentive and thrifty management of his estates, as well as to exploiting the favourable economic conditions that prevailed in the first decades of the second century (no. 33). Cato was a homo novus, and, therefore, his success is significant. In his time, when political expenditure was moderate, even persons of no great wealth could overcome the limitations set by their social origin. His talents and friendship with an old noble family were much more important to his advance than his economic resources. Two men attained to the consulate, although they were poor according to our information : L. Licinius Lucullus cos., 151 and Manius Manilius cos., 149 ( 5). Both were the first of their families to be elected ( 6). The difficulty is that almost no additional details are known by which we can judge their achievements. Lucullus may have been helped by other Licinii, and Manilius later had friendly relations with Scipio Aemilianus, but these fac­ tors do not necessarily explain their success (?). Manilius was an eminent jurist. However, their description as poor may have originated from a fallacious evaluation by later standards. After all Manilius had an estate at Labici and a house in Rome, and if Lucullus’ poverty was like that of L. Aemilius Paullus (no. 5), then his financial circumstances were not bad at all. Q. Aelius Tubero had a moderate property, a house in Rome and an Iustin, 18. 2, 6 -1 0 ; G ellius, I. 14; F ront., Stm t., 4. 3, 2 ; EutropJ, 2. 12, 3. These traditions are doubtful and unreliable. See G elzer, Nobilitat, 18-9; MUnzer, RE, 6, 1935. (5) For Lucullus see n° 26 and for Manilius, C ic , Farad., 6. 50. (6) On the Licinii Luculli see D. G., 4, 132 f . ; MU nzer , RE, 13, 372. On the Manilii see RE, 14, 1114 f. ; 1134-1144. Manilius was a distinguished jurist and an able orator. See Clc., De Or., 1 .2 1 2 ; 2 4 6 ; 3. 133; Brut., 108; Dig., 1. 2. 39. (7) On the connexion l>etween the various branches of the Licinii see Cic., Alt., 13. 6a. On Manilius and Aemilianus see MUnzer, RE, 13, 1138.

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

145

estate at Veii that he shared with 16 kinsmen. Whether his slight means handicapped his political career is unknown. He was probably tribune of the plebs in 177 and legate in 168. Since the fasti after 167 are incomplete, we cannot tell if he became praetor. His marriage to Paullus’ daughter might have helped him in this period when the Aemilii and the Scipiones were successful in the elections!8). Asconius correlates political failure and economic decline, speaking of Scaurus’ ancestors. Verum Scaurus ita fuit patricius ut tribus supra eum aetatibus iacuerit domus eius fortuna. Nam neque pater neque avus neque etiam proavus, ut puto propter tenues opes et nullam vitae industriam, honores adepti sunt. Itaque Scauro aeque ac novo homini laborandum fuit. (23). One tradition relates that at first Scaurus thought of giving up a political career ( Vir. /II., 72. 2). It can easily be seen that his advance was delayed for some years. He was born in 162, but was elected aedile only about 122, namely 6 years later than the minimum age fixed by the lex Villia (9). Probably he improved his economic condition first (no. 39). Sulla’s career has some similarity with that of Scaurus. He too was a descendant of a decayed and impoverished patrician family, and he too had to overcome financial difficulties in his youth ( 101). His career was delayed, though to a less extent. He was born in 138, was quaestor in 107, tried to be elected to the praetorship of 98, and was consul in 88 ( u). He stood for the quaestorship after about a 5 year delay and it is interesting to note that he decided to do so after his financial circumstances had been improved by two inheritances (no. 50, i). Thereafter Sulla did not proceed to the aedileship but preferred military service, in which he remained in various duties for 7 years. He won fame (Pint., Sull., 5. 1) as well as profit. But the long interval between his praetorship and consulate is not to be explained by a reference to his economic condition, for he had become rich in the meantime. He probably felt that this office was out of his reach. Marius came from a non-senatorial family. He served in the cavalry in the Numantine War, but this is no proof of his wealth or of the financial standing of his family. The fact is that the Marii found their subsistence from agricultural possessions at Arpinum (no. 63). As a ‘new man’, not ex­ ceptionally rich, Marius’ career was delayed : quaestor about 35, tribune of (8) S e e n ° 2. S c ip i o A e m i lia n u s w a s b r o t h e r - i n - l a w o f T u b e r o . O n th e s u c c e s s o f th e S c ip i o n e s s e e Scullard, RP, 226 f. (9) F o r t h e d a t e o f b i r t h o f S c a u r u s s e e Ascon., 22, a n d f o r h is c a r e e r MRR, 2, 528. O n V i l l i u s ’ la w s e e Astin, Latomus, 17 (1958), 59. (10) S e e n " 50, i. F o r S u lla ’s a n c e s t o r s , D. G., 2, 360. (11) F o r t h e d a t e o f b i r t h o f S u lla s e e V al. Max., 9'. 3, 8 ; V ell. Pat., 2. 17, 3 ; Purr., S u it., 6 ; A p p ., BC, 1. 105. O n h is o ffic e s s e e MRR, 2, 557 ; SM RR, 21.

146

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

the plebs — 38, praetor— 45 and consul — 51 ( 12). His enrichment followed his political success and mainly resulted from his continuous military commands in 109-10Q, in Numidia-and against: the Germans. His election to magistracies up to the praetorship was due to support by nobiles, mainly Metelli, and connections with equestrian friends. He won the consulate with the support of Equites who had interests in Numidia and by popular agitation ( 13). When Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos., 79, died, he allegedly left a small inheritance to his children. This did not hinder his three sons from ad­ vancing in the cursus honorum and attaining political influence. Military service and successful marriage connections offset initial economic in­ feriority. Appius married a rich heiress, Servilia, to whom much of the patrimony of the Servilii Caepiones was left. One sister was married to Lucullus, the other to Marcius Rex, cos., 68, and the third to Metellus Celer, cos., 60. Appius and his brother Publius served in Lucullus’ army. No clear details are known of the early career of the third brother, Gaius. However by the time they canvassed for magistracies Appius and Publius were no longer poor ( 1415). Antony, too, had to face a similar difficulty in his youth, for the extravagance of his fattier brought him to the threshold of bankruptcy. But he had bettered his condition before his election as quaestor for 52 (no. 91, i). This list of senators who were “ poor” at the beginning of their career or in the course of it is not: lo n g (i:’). Admittedly, it can be argued that it would be longer, if our sources were more abundant. But this plea is only half true. M’. Curius Dentatus and C. Fabricius were the two statesmen that were taken time and again as examples of principes who were poor. It was apparently difficult to cite other examples, and this is conceded by Cicero when he mentions one other (Parad., 6. 50). This survey of the known cases of “ poor” senators shows that what an­ cient authors say on this matter cannot be regarded as reliable. Some “ poor” senators appear to have owned property, and it is only by com-

(1 2 ) F o r M a riu s ’ d a te o f b irth see

Weynand, RE,

S u p p . 6 , 1 3 6 7 , a n d f o r h is c a r e e r MRR, 2 , 5 8 9 ;

SM RR, 4 0 . ( 1 3 ) N ° 6 3 . O n M a r iu s a s

popularis

a n d o p p o n e n t o f t h e n o b il ity s e e

Sall., lug.,

7 3 ; 8 4 -6 . 3 ;

Plut.,

M ar., 9. ( 1 4 ) O n A p p iu s a n d C l o d i u s s e e n “ p ro p e rty see n "

1 1 5 , 1 1 8 , a n d o n t h e i r s is te r s D. G., 2 , 3 1 3 - 9 . O n C l o d i a ’s

101.

( 1 5 ) T h e s e a r e a ll t h e s e n a t o r s w h o a r e s a id t o h a v e b e e n p o o r . T h e e p i th e t

egens

e m p lo y e d in a b u s iv e

p o li tic a l s p e e c h e s is n o p r o o f f o r th e b a d e c o n o m ic c o n d i t i o n o f t h e a t ta c k e d p e r s o n , e g. O c ta v iu s th e M a r s ia n ( C i c . , P h il.,

11 . 4 ) . S e e

W irszubski, JR S ,

51

(1 9 6 1 ),

1 7 -8 .

CHAPTER VIE — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

147

parison with the very rich that they can be reckoned poor. Secondly, when details are known to back up the testimony that they were poor, it turns out after scrutiny that they had improved their economic condition before en­ tering public life: Cato, Scaurus, Sulla, Antony, and the Claudii. Hence some could stand for magistracies at the earliest possible date under the lex annalis (Antony and the Claudii). The career of the others was delayed for some years by their concern with their material circumstances; only after these had improved, could they afford to embark on a political career (Scaurus, Sulla and, to some extent, Marius). The conclusion is very sim­ ple : at Rome political ambition was not likely to be fulfilled without a cer­ tain economic basis (16). Two moire examples may clarify the circumstances under which senators and candidates to magistracies had to operate. M. Op­ pius refused to hold office as aedile in 37, as his financial resources were not equal to the costs of the games he would have had to celebrate (17). Curtius would not have been able to keep up his senatorial position, if an estate of his were to be confiscated (18). At the same time, property and capital alone were not sufficient for success in politics. Eloquence, con­ nections with influential nobles and friendly relations with people who were prepared to render financial aid were often more important. A man who aspired to a political career had to take account of all the factors. II.—

V

ic is s it u d e s

o f

F

a m il ie s

In the preceding section we have seen that a senatorial career was open only to men of means. We shall proceed to discuss the problem not from the point of view of the individual senator, but by following changes in the position of families over several generations. The family of the Aelii Tuberones can be dated back to the end of the third century. P. Aelius Tubero was aedile in 202, praetor in 201 and again in 177 ( I9). Another praetor is known, C. Aelius Tubero, perhaps to be dated to the same period ( 20). Q. Aelius Tubero was tribune of the plebs in 193 ( 2I). A tribune of 177, Q. Aelius, seems to be identical with the legate

( 1 6 ) O n s e n a t o r s a s p r o p r i e t o r s s e e c h . I. I t is im p o s s ib l e to s ta t e w h a t w a s t h e n e c e s s a r y m i n im u m f o r s t a r t i n g a p o li tic a l c a re e r , a s th is w a s a m a tte r f o r p e r s o n a l a n d s u b je c tiv e ju d g e m e n t . E v e n i f w e a s s u m e t h a t s e n a t o r s h a d , a t le a s t. E q u e s t r i a n c e n s u s ( L i v ., 4 2 . 6 1 , 5 ; c f.

Willems, S in a t,

t h i s w ill n o t h e l p v e ry m u c h , a s o n e m i g h t c o n s id e r it a sa fe b a s is a n d a n o t h e r n o t. (1 7 )

App., BC ,

4 . 41 ; D io , 4 8 . 5 3 , 4 - 6 .

W illems, S enat, 1, K lebs, R E , 1, 5 3 5 ( n ° 1 5 3 ) . (20) MRR, 2, 462 ; Klebs, R E, 1, 534 ( r i“ 148, 149). (21) MRR, 1, 347 ; Klebs, R E, 1, 535 (n'“ 153). (1 8 ) C ic ., F a n ,

1 3 . 5 , 2 . C f. T. P „ 5 , 2 0 0 ;

( 1 9 ) S e e MRR f o r th e s e y e a rs a n d

194.

1, 1 9 4 - 6 ) ,

148

PART TOO. —

t h e : p o l it ic a l

a c t iv it ie s

of 168 and the son-in-law of L. Aemilius Paullus ( 22). Another tribune, ca. 130, is Q. Aelius Tubero, the grandson of Paullus ( 23). Thereafter the Aelii Tuberones disappear from the fasti till L Aelius Tubero, legate in Asia in 61-59 and praetor before the outbreak of the Second Civil W a r(24). The Tuberones belong to a gens whose other branches were more prominent and had already won the consulate in the fourth century ( 25). We cannot recover the exact affiliation among those names, but we do know that Q. Aelius Tubero, tribune in 177, and sixteen of his family were of slender means (no. 2). The son of this Quintus, the tribune of 130. failed to be elected to the praetorship, since he gave only a modest feast in honour of his deceased un­ cle, Scipio Aemilianus (Cic., Mur., 75-76). It looks as though he could not afford to spend with munificence. The coincidence of the family’s poor economic conditions and the failure of Quintus in the election with the disappearance of their names in the fasti suggests that political decline followed economic ( 26). The Aemilii Lepidi were one of the oldest noble families at Rome ( 27). Its most prominent member was M. Aemilius Lepidus, cos., 187 and 175, cens., 179, Pontifex Maximus and princeps senatus from 179 till his death in 152 ( 28). His son, or grandson, was M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina, cos., 137 and perhaps also 126 ( 29). Though the evidence is scanty, it suggests that both were men of means (nos. 3, 4). One other Lepidus obtained the consulate in the second century, Marcus cos., 158 ( 30) ; his financial cir­ cumstances are not known. There are more Lepidi known in this century, but none is recorded in the extant fasti ( 31). An interesting phenomenon ap­ pears : Lepidus, the Pontifex Maximus, had four sons and it is obvious that equal distribution of the patrimony would have reduced the property owned by each of them, but possibly he preferred one of them in his testament; this might explain why the consul of 137 is known to have been a man of

(22) M RR , 1, 399, n. 4 ; Klebs, RE, 1, 535 (n° 153). (23) MRR, 1, 502; K lebs, RE, 1, 535 f. (24) Syme, CP, 50 (1955), 133; SM RR, 2. ( 2 5 ) O n t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e tw e e n th e T u b e r o n e s a n d o t h e r A e lii s e e c o n s u ls

o f th e gens A eiiia s e e MRR to t h e y e a rs

G elzer, Nobilitat,

3 3 7 , 2 8 6 , 2 0 1 ,1 9 8 ,

172

and

2 5 , a n d f o r th e

167.

( 2 6 ) O n th e p o v e r t y o f t h e t r i b u n e o f 1 3 0 s e e S en ., Controv., 2 . 1, 8 . C f. Sen., Ep., 104. 19; K lebs, RE, 1, 536. (27) O n th e A e m ilii, e s p . t h e L e p id i, s e e D. G., 1, 1 f f . ; MUnzer, RA, 1 1 5 Of. (28) S e e n ° 3 ; MRR, 2 , 5 2 6 ; MUnzer, RA. 1 7 0 ff. ( 2 9 ) S e e n ° 4 ; MRR, 2 , 5 2 7 ; MUnzer, RA 2 4 0 ; 2 4 2 . (30) MRR, 2, 446. ( 3 1 ) S e e D ie g e n e a lo g ic a l ta b le in Munzer, RA, 3 0 7 . M a r c u s , th e P o n tif e x M a x im u s , b r o th e r s ( L i v ., 2 3 .

30,

1 5 ) , b u t th e ir d e s c e n d a n ts a t e n o t k n o w n .

21 ; 1 2 0 .

h a d tw o

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

149

means. There might have been other reasons for absence of the other brothers from the fasti, but it is tempting to suppose that this is somehow connected with their economic condition. In Porcina’s time the Lepidi were in decline ( 32), and after 126 no magistrates of this family are known for almost fifty years. It is probable that the recovery of the family in the postSullan age ensued from shrewd political decisions, but, at the same time, it is significant that Marcus, cos., 78, and Mamercus, cos., 77, were rich men. The first enriched himself during his provincial service and by taking ad­ vantage of the proscriptions ; Mamercus, a Livius Drusus by birth, so it seems, inherited property from his natural father and was then adopted by a Lepidus ( 33). Marcus’ sons too were men of considerable means, even though the consul of 50 needed a subsidy from Caesar, and they too were elected to the consulate (nos. 78, 80). Thus, it may be said that the changes in the political position of the family were closely correlated with its economic condition. It is probable that M. Aemilius Scaurus’ origin was from the Aemilii Bar­ bulae (34). Until the year 230 this family obtained four consulates, one cen­ sorship and one dictatorship (35). Thereafter the Barbulae disappeared and their name is no longer recorded by the fasti. Scaurus was patrician and noble, but his ancestors for the three last generations were not elected to magistracies on account of their modest means (Ascon., 23). Scaurus him­ self was more successful; he acquired capital, obtained all the important magistracies and wielded great influence in the Senate. His son inherited from him, began his political career at an early age, advanced in the cursus honorum, and but for his conviction for repetundae might have obtained the consulate (36). It is evident that the decline and ascendary of this family followed changes in their economic condition. Apart from those of the fifth century, the Antonii are known from the beginning of-the-second century : Q. TMTtonius, legate 190, A. Antonius, legate 168 and M. Antonius, tribune of the plebs 167 ( 3738). M. Antonius, the famous orator, was probably the grandson of the tribune ( 3S). We know (32) Munzer, RA, 242-5. (33) S e e n“ 37, 38 ; Munzer, RA, 307-313. F o r th e p o li tic a l c i r c u m s ta n c e s a n d t h e c o n n e c tio n s b e ­ tw e e n t h e tw o s e e Badian, FC, 275 ff. S e e , h o w e v e r , Meier, RPA, 171. (34) BLOCH, S caurus, 8-9. (35) K lebs, R E, 1, 548 ; M RR, 2, 526. (36) N" 81 ; MOnzer, RA, 281 f. (37) D. G„ 1, 42 f. (38) B o th t h e f a t h e r a n d th e g r a n d f a t h e r o f M . A n t o n i u s th e o r a t o r w e r e c a lle d M a r c u s (CIL, 12, p. 27). H e w a s b o m in 142 ( C i c . , B rut., 161). I f th e t r i b u n e o f 167 w a s a b o u t 30 in h is y e a r o f tr i b u n a te , h is e l d e r s o n m i g h t h a v e b e e n t h e f a t h e r o f t h e c o n s u l o f 99. C f . Klebs, R E, 1, 1590.

150

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

next to nothing of their financial circumstances in the first half of the second century. On the other hand it is clear that M. Antonius the orator had considerable property (no. 40). He had two sons and a daughter; he was killed by the Marians in 87 and there is no clue how his children got the patrimony. Yet we do know that the sons were men of some property ; it was only their prodigality that entangled them in debt (nos. 80, 90). An­ tony’s villa at Misenum evidently passed in inheritance from his grandfather (no. 91, i). They were all politically successful: Antonius the orator was consul and censor, his elder son reached the praetorship, obtained an extra­ ordinary imperium and might well have reached the consulate but for his premature death (no. 90), Though his brother, C. Antonius, was expelled from the senate in 70, he obtained the consulate of 63 and even the cen­ sorship of 42. The descendants of the orator amassed property not so much by inheritance as by their share in the easy profits of the Sullan proscrip­ tions, by connections with Crassus and Caesar, by exploiting the provinces and by purchases during Caesar’s dictatorship. Their political success was the result of good marriages, political connections, oratorical talent, or of the right choice in political struggles)39). But is is noteworthy that the period of the family’s political ascendancy coincides with its material prosperity. The great period of the Caecilii Metelli falls in the last quarter of the second century : all the four sons of Macedonicus and the two sons of his brother Calvus obtained the consulate within 16 years, and four of them were elected censors. In the first century, too, the Metelli gained victories in the elections and enjoyed political influence ; till the middle of the century they numbered seven consulates (40). The economic condition of most mem­ bers of the family is obscure. The little we know is mainly concerned with three of them; Numidicus, cos., 109, Pius, cos., 80, and Metellus Scipio, cos., 52. They were all rich. It is very likely that Pius had immense tracts of lands ; he had inherited from Numidicus and in his turn adopted Scipio (nos. 43, 44, 103). Thus it can be maintained, at least with regard to one branch of the family, that during the period of its political prominence it

ORF3,

( 3 9 ) O n A n t o n i u s th e o r a t o r s e e M a r iu s (H istoria,

6

2 2 1 - 2 3 6 . A c c o r d in g to B a d ia n , A n to n iu s w a s a n a lly o f

( 1 9 5 7 ) , 3 3 3 ) , b u t I d o u b t h is in t e r p r e ta tio n . S e e

Gruen, JRS,

55 (1 9 6 5 ), 6 7 -8 . O n

th e p o li tic a l in t r ig u e s b e h i n d t h e in v e s t m e n t o f M . A n t o n i u s w ith t h e s p e c ia l imperium in 7 4 se e

Badian,

FC, 2 8 0 f. H e o b ta in e d th e c o m m a n d th r o u g h th e in f lu e n c e o f t h e c o n s u l M . A u r e li u s C o t t a ( P s . Ascon., 2 5 9 ) , w h o w a s h is d i s t a n t r e l a ti o n . S e e to n i u s s e e n os 8 9 ,

( 4 0 ) F o r a g e n e a lo g ic a l ta b le s e e

MRR,

D. G.,

3 , 111 ;

Munzer, RA, 327.

1 5 9 . O n A n to n y a s a n o r a to r see

D. G.,

ORF3,

O n C ra ssu s' su p p o rt o f C . A n ­

4 6 8 -4 7 6 .

2 , 1 4 , a n d f o r a c o n v i n i e n t s u m m a r y o f th e i r c a r e e r s se e

2 , 5 3 8 - 5 4 0 . O n t h e p o li tic a l in f lu e n c e o f th e C a e c il ii M e te lli s e e

Syme, RR,

2 0 f.

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

15 1

enjoyed economic prosperity (41). Yet they suffered failures and delays. Marius brought about the downfall of Numidicus. Pius obtained his con­ sulate after a delay of several years, caused by the circumstances of the Civil War. Metellus Scipio became deeply involved in debts, because of his political expenditure. The significance of their political defeats is clear. The Metelli had the advantage of capital and property, of their great number and their manifold connexions in the struggle for magistracies and political power. However, all this was outweighed by the forces that pushed forward the popular hero, namely business men and popular agitation. The first consul of the Cornelii Dolabellae dates back to the year 283. His descendants did not achieve impressive victories at the elections, only three more consulates before the end of the Republic (42). We are not in a position to account for this lack of success of the family. In one instance we can note a political eclipse that followed loss of fortune. C. Cornelius Dolabella was praetor in 81 and in the following year he went to Cilicia as proconsul. On his return to Rome he was charged and convicted. His property was confiscated and his sons were left without means (no. 49). They were never elected to any magistracy, at least as far as we know. Few families could equal the achievements of the Scipiones in the number of their consulates and in political power. For about 200 years, beginning in the middle of the fourth century, they were dominant figures in Roman politics (43). Some details and allusions to the material condition of the family can be gathered from our sources. In his youth Africanus was already rich enough to give as an aedile extravagant games. It is significant that it was widely expected he would celebrate grand games and that this helped him to win the aedileship (Liv., 25. 2, 6-8). He is also known as a great proprietor (no, 13). His son- was hindered from taking part in politics only by physical disability)44). His grandson by adoption, Scipio Aemilianus, who eventually inherited from him, may be reckoned as well-to-do (no. 14). Both Africanus and Aemilianus had extraordinary careers and enjoyed almost inequalled political influence. They resorted to methods that can be termed, in the political phraseology of the first century, 'popular’. In their attempts to win the people’s favour they made use of donatives, presents

( 4 1 ) F o r th e e c o n o m ic c o n d i t i o n o f o t h e r M e te lli s e e n os 9 , 1 0 1 , 1 0 2 . S o m e M e te lli w e re p o s s i b ly im ­ p o v e r i s h e d a t t h e la te R e p u b l ic , b u t I c a n n o t a c c e p t t h e e v id e n c e W i s e m a n f in d s f o r it ( Latom us , 2 4 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 6 0 ). ( 4 2 ) T h e c o n s u ls w e r e : G n a e u s - 1 5 9 , G n a e u s - 8 1 , P u b l i u s - 4 4 . F o r a c o r r e c te d g e n e a lo g ic a l ta b le o f th e D o la b e lla e s e e

Badian, PBSR,

33 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ,

( 4 3 ) S e e t h e s u m m a r y in MRR, 2 , 5 5 5 (4 4 ) See

Munzer, R E,

4,

1437.

51.

f a n d cf. R E, 4 ,

1429.

152

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

and games (45). Another line of the Scipiones begins with Nasica, the cousin of Africanus. They are: Publius cos., 191, Publius cos., 162, Publius cos., 138, Publius cos., I l l , Publius pr., 93 (46). The expenditure of the consul of 191 as early as his aedileship, the dowry received by the consul of 162 and the public lands possessed by tire consul of—H58 suggest that all were men of means (47). But it seems that the economic condition of the consul of 111 had declined ( 48), perhaps because of the confiscation of his father's public lands. Economic decline did not handicap his advance in the cursus and no wonder: he married the daughter of Metellus Macedonicus. It is probable that his association with the dominant family in these years helped him to reach the consulate. His son married the daughter of L. Crassus and obtained a rich dowry as well as an important connexion!49). Untimely death deprived him of the consulate. The conclusion is obvious : sons of noble families, like the Scipiones, were sought after as sons-in-law and even when impoverished, they had chances of recovery through successful marriages. One of the ancestors of Sulla was a consul at the beginning of the third century. The descendants of this consul reached only the praetorship, but Sulla’s father was not elected to any magistracy (5051). It is known that he left a meagre inheritance to his son (no. 50, i), and it looks as though the political failure of this L. Sulla had something to do with his poor finances. As we have seen, Sulla first engaged in politics after the improvement of his fortune. His rise helped his relations. P. Sulla, the dictator’s nephew, enriched himself during the proscriptions and was elected consul for 65, though his conviction for ambitus debarred him from holding the office (no. 133). Faustus, the dictator’s son, squandered his money and was compelled to sell part of his estate (no. 132). But only his adoption of the losing side in the Civil War prevented him retaining the dignitas of his father. The decline of the Fabii, one of the five patrician gentes maiores, can be followed in part ( 5!). In the interval between 116 and 45 no Fabius won the ( 4 5 ) O n A f r ic a n u s a s ‘p o p u l a r ’ s e e

Earl, Gracchus,

k n o w n . A e m i lia n u s h a d n o c h i ld r e n a n d v /ith h is d e a th

7 4 -5 ;

Astin, Aemilianus, 26

ff. A s is w e ll

th e lin e o f A f r ic a n u s w a s e x tin g u is h e d .

(46) D. G., 4, 80; Munzer, RA, 102. (47) On Nasica, cos., 191, see n° 16. For the 50 talents dowry see Polyb., 31. 27, 6-8, and for the public lands held by the consul of 138, P lut., TG, 13. 3. ( 4 8 ) Plin., NH, 2 1 . 10, w h e r e h e is w r o n g ly s a id to h a v e b e e n t r i b u n e o f th e P le b s . C f . C i c . , B rut. 1 2 8 ; Diod. Sic., 34/5. 33, 1-8. (4 9 ) S ee

D. G.,

4 , 8 0 . O n th e p ro p e rty o f L. C ra s s u s see n ° 5 5 . A s C ra s s u s h a d n o s o n s, h e w as

p r o b a b l y g e n e r o u s to w a r d s h is s o n s - i n - l a w . H e a d o p t e d h is g r a n d s o n , S c ip i o ’s s o n , in h is w ill ( C i c . ,

B rut., 2 1 2 ) .

(50)

See

D. G„ 2, 360 f.

( 5 1 ) O n t h e gentes maiores s e e see

Mommsen, H ist.,

3,

15, n .

Mommsen, RF, 1,

2 5 8 f . ; StR , 3 , 3 0 f. F o r t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e F a b ii

1 ; MRR, 2 , 5 6 1 - 4 .

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

153

consulate ( 52). Now Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus who obtained the con­ sulate of 145 was well-to-do (no. 17). His son, Allobrogicus, won the con­ sulate of 123 and was a rich man, owning a large property (no. 52). The grandson, however, was a spendthrift and it is doubtful whether he was a senator (no. 53). Thus squandering the patrimony was accompanied by ab­ stention from politics. The consul of 45 was probably the son of the spend­ thrift. As aedile in 57 he spent great sums on building and games, but he owed his consulate to his collaboration with Caesar, who favoured patricians ( 53). If we disregard the beginning of the Republic, the political rise of the Iunii Bruti^can be dated to the end of the fourth century* In the second cen­ tury, we can note the brothers Marcus and Publius, praetors in 191 and 190 respectively. Marcus’ son was consul in 178, and of his grandsons Marcus was praetor in 140 and Decimus consul in 138 ( 54). Marcus, pr., 140, had some estates and may be regarded as a rich m a n (55). His son was im­ poverished and was compelled to sell his patrimony, and he is the sole member of the family who did not enter politics, or whose efforts to be elec­ ted were fruitless ( 56). The other line of the family that began with his uncle kept its political position for three generations: D.Iunius Brutus cos., 138, D. Brutus cos., 77, D. Brutus, consul-designate of 42 ( 57)- The first is known to have enriched himself as proconsul, and there are indications that both son and grandson were rich men (nos. 22, 158). No doubt, friendly relations and clever political choice helped these three to advance in politics, yet it is interesting to note that the dividing line between the politically successful members of the family and those who failed can be also seen in an economic differentiation ( 58). The establishment of the right relationship among the various Licinii Crassi is a tedious problem that has not been solved in full. However, the

(52)

I n th e s e c o n d c e n tu r y th e F a b ii M a x im i s u r v iv e d b y th e a d o p t io n o f s o n s f r o m th e S e rv ilii a n d

th e A e m ilii. S e e

(53)

Munzer, RE, 6, 1778; RA. 224. 28; C IL \ 762; 763 ( = ILLR P, 392); Munzer, RE, 6, g e n e a lo g ic a l ta b le in D. G., 4, 3. C f. MRR, 2 , 5 7 6 f.

C i c . , Vat.,

( 5 4 ) S ee th e

1791 ;

Syme, R R, 68.

( 5 5 ) H e h a d th r e e e s ta te s : a t P r iv e r n u m , T i b u r a n d A lb a , a n d h is b a t h s a r e m e n tio n e d to o . S e e C i c . ,

Cluent., 141 ; D e O r., 223-4; Q uintil., 6. 3, 44. ( 5 6 ) O n h im se e

Munzer, R E,

1 0 , 9 7 1 , w h e r e it is s u g g e s te d t h a t p h y s ic a l d is a b i lit y p r e v e n t e d h im

f r o m e n g a g in g in p o litic s . ( 5 7 ) S e e t h e ta b le m

(58)

M unzer , RA, D. B r u tu s to

F o r t h e e l e c ti o n o f

407. c o n s u l s e e th e s u g g e s tio n o f B a d ia n , EC,

277.

B r u tu s A l b i n u s '

c a r e e r d e p e n d e d o n h is tie s w ith C a e s a r , M . B r u tu s th e t y r a n n ic i d e w a s v e ry r ic h , b u t h is e x a c t r e l a t i o n ­ s h ip to th e B ru ti o f t h e s e c o n d c e n tu r y c a n n o t b e e s ta b lis h e d .

154

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

rise and decline of some members of the family are of interest !5960). The first to reach the consulate is called dives, a surname that was sometimes at­ tached to other branches of the family, but wrongly!80). Miinzer analysed his career and showed the connections between his richness and political success!61). After 214 and 213, when there was a rise in the cost of the games and in the donations given by the aediles, the voters tended to elect rich men as aediles, and thus Crassus obtained this office and fulfilled the expectation of the public !62). Moreover, in the same year Crassus was elec­ ted Pontifex Maximus ! 63), and it is likely that his games secured this office, and the censorship in 210 as well. This, was the second and last time that anyone obtained this office without holding any curule magistracy before (Liv., 25. 5, 4), and this was the single instance of the censorship going to one who had not been praetorius or consularis. Further, Crassus was plebeian and quite young, born about 234. Probably his wealth as well as his connections with the Scipiones contributed to his rise !64). There is no clue to explain the absence of Crassus’ son from the fasti. We may note that the closeness betv/een the career of Scipio Africanus and that of Crassus continues in the next generation : the sons of both abstained from politics, and being childless adopted extranei for heirs. The one chose the son of Paullus and the other the son of P. Mucius Scaevola, cos., 175. The one was Scipio Aemilianus, and the other P. Crassus Mucianus. He was one of the richest men of his day, gave splendid games, obtained the con­ sulate and was elected Pontifex Maximus (no. 25). With him this line of the Crassi terminated, as he had no male descendants. Another line of the Licinii Crassi began with Marcus, the brother of cos., 205. What became of his sons is unknown, but his grandson obtained the praetorship of 126. The son of this praetor was Publius, cos., 97, who is known to have been rich. He left an inheritance worth at least 300 talents ( 5 9 ) S e e t h e g e n e a lo g ic a l ta b le in D.

G.,

4,

g r a n d s o n s o f P . L ic in iu s V a r u s , th e p r a e t o r o f

60 f . ; 612 f. T h e 208, a s D r u m a n n

tw o c o n s u ls o f

171

and

168

w e re e i th e r

t h o u g h t o r m o r e lik e ly , w ith

M unzer ,

RA, 1 8 4 , th e n e p h e w s o f P . C r a s s u s , th e c o n s u l o f 2 0 5 . ( 6 0 ) S e e D. G., 4 , 6 9 ; (6 1 )

MOnzer, RA,

(6 2 ) F o r 2 1 4 - 2 1 3 see a l s o D. G., 4 , 6 9 ;

Munzer, RE, 1 3 , 2 4 5 ( o n Scullard, R P 6 7 .

C r a s s u s t h e tr i u m v ir ) SMRR, 3 4 .

1 8 7 f. C f.

Liv.,

24. 42, 7

Munzer, RA,

;

25. 2,

8,

a n d o n th e g a m e s o f C r a s s u s

Pun ., NH,

2 1 . 6 . S ee

1 8 8 . B r o u g h to n a r g u e s t h a t t h i s p r o d ig a lit y d o e s n o t h a r m o n iz e w ith th e

s u m p tu a r y la w o f O p p iu s , a n d th e r e f o r e a s c r ib e s P lin y ’s w o r d s to M u c ia n u s , cos., 1 3 1 , o r to C r a s s u s cos., 9 7 ( M RR, 1, 2 7 1 , n . 4 ) . B u t t h e /ex Oppia w a s d ir e c te d a g a i n s t p r iv a te e x t r a v a g a n c e , n o t a g a in s t c o s ts in p u b li c g a m e s . T h o u g h th e P u b liu s m e n tio n e d b y P lin y c a n n o t b e id e n tif ie d w ith c e rta in ty , th e r e is s o m e r e a s o n to s u g g e s t c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n th e g a m e s o f th e f ir s t C r a s s u s D iv e s a n d h is p o litic a l s u c c e s s .

(63)

On

the chronological confusion

in

Livy see M unzer, RA, 187 f.

( 6 4 ) O 'n C r a s s u s a n d th e S c ip i o n e s se e M u n zer , RA, 1 8 3 fi, a n d o n th e r e l a ti o n s b e tw e e n th e L ic in ii and

th e C o r n e l ii se e

Scullard, RP, 276.

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

155

to his only surviving son, the future triumvir (no. 159). A grandson by one of his other sons is known to have gone bankrupt, and to have failed as a candidate for offices ( 65). It is noteworthy that the first Crassus of this line to have obtained the consulate was rich and that of his descendants the one who succeeded in politics was among the richest people at Rome. Con­ versely, the failure of the grandson of Publius looks as if it was connected with his impoverishment, though perhaps he was also of little talent (66). The Licinii Murenae appear for the first time in the middle of the second century. For three generations in succession they obtained the praetorship and in the fourth generation they rose to the nobility by obtaining a con­ sulate in 62 ( 67). The circumstances of the earlier elections are not known, but it looks as though the consul of 62, and his father, pr., 88, and perhaps his grandfather, praetor before 100, were men of means ; they were the first to develop fish ponds (nos. 57, 162). C. Octavius cos. 165, who ennobled his family, seems to have been a rich man, to judge by the magnificent house he built on the Palatine; it was thought to have won him the con­ sulate (Cic., Off.. 1. 138). One of his sons was M. Octavius, tribune of the plebs 133, the other, consul in 128, had sons who obtained the consulate of 87, 76 and 75 ( 68). Octavius the tribune had public lands, presumably oc­ cupied after the Second Punic War' (69). No doubt, the lands, held in cxeess of the amount allowed by the law, were confiscated by the commissioners created by the law of Tiberius. But in this case it was not the loss of his possessions that caused Octavius’ elimination from politics. After the events of 133 he had little chance as a candidate in the Assembly. Pompeius Strabo was elected consul for 89. He was a rich man with large estates in several parts of Italy. It is probable that his election to the con­ sulate had something to do with his ability to enlist the manpower of his estates, and it is significant that he was sent to Picenum, where he had large possessions (no. 69). Strabo’s father had obtained only the praetorship, but his economic condition is obscure!70). Pompeius Strabo’s son enlisted many men from his estates in his private army, and thereby he prepared the way for his brilliant career. It is also worth mentioning that when he was in

(65) Val. Max., 6. 9, 12; Pun ., N H , 33 133. See D. G„ 4, 83. ( 6 6 ) T h e f in a n c ia l c i r c u m s ta n c e s o f th e f a m ily , w h ic h b e g a n w ith G a iu s th e b r o t h e r o f th e c o n s u l o f 2 0 5 , a r e a l m o s t u n k n o w n . L . C r a s s u s , t h e ric h o r a t o r ( n °

(67) (68) (1960), (69) (70)

5 5 ) , w a s th e g r e a t g r a n d s o n o f G a iu s .

the praetors see C i c . , M ur., 15. For a genealogical table see D. G., 4, 196. See D. G., 4, 234, and for the political rise of the family and its success Earl, Latom us, 19 657-665. Plut., TG, 10. 5. Cf. Earl, Gracchus, 80. See Miltner, R E , 21, 2059. On

156

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Spain he used his own money to cover the costs of the war, as the Senate had not sent the necessary allocation (no. 186, iii). Cato the Elder ennobled his family. In old age he was a great landowner, and he seems to have left a considerable inheritance to his descendants (no. 33), though their financial circumstances are not directly attested. Certainly they succeeded in politics. One son, by his first wife Licinia, was elected to a praetorship for 152, but died before entering the office. His two sons reached the consulate, Marcus in 118 and Gaius in 114 ( 7*). The second son of Cato Censorius, by his second wife, died while praetor (Plut., Cat. Mai., 27. 5). He had two sons : Lucius cos., 89 and Marcus, tribune of the plebs in 99, who died too early to hold another office. He was the father of Cato Uticensis, to whom he left a not insignificant inheritance (no. 189). The fact that the grandson of Cato Censorius was able to leave to his son an inheritance worth 3 million sesterces after the division of the patrimony that had taken place in the course of three generations suggests that the members of the family continued to prosper economically throughout the period of their political success. The ancestors of Ser. Sulpicius Rufus had not been elected to the highest magistracies since the fourth century ( 7172>. Cicero relates that Servius’ father was a well-to-do man and belonged to the ordo equester; apparently his grandfather was not rich enough to reach this status {Mur., 16). Thus though we do not know the history of the family, it is evident that Servius’ grandfather was of modest means and was not elected to any magistracy. His father was enriched and became an Eques Romanus ; Servius himself reached the consulate and is known to us as a landowner (no. 202). Thus it is quite obvious that the improvement of the financial circumstances of the family brought it back into politics. These are all the families for which we have been able to discover evidence relevant to the present subject. Naturally we would like to know more. Thus, to take one example, the Acilii rose to prominence in the second century. One line, the Balbi, secured two consulates, for 150 and 114, but disappeared thereafter ( 7374). Another branch, the Glabriones, con­ tinued into the first century, obtaining four consulates, and even into the Empire (?4). There are indications that the first consul of the Acilii was a rich man (no. 1), but with this our information is exhausted. To take

( 7 1 ) F o r a g e n e a lo g ic a l a b l e s e e D. G., 4 , 9 7 ;

(72)

1 6 0 -1 6 3 .

388, 387, 383 a n d 377. Munzer, RE, 4A, 851.

S u lp ic iu s R u f u s w a s a c o n s u l a r t r i b u n e in

of t h e t r i b u n e o f 88 (73) K lebs, R E, 1, 254.

c o u s in

a c c o r d in g t o

S e r v iu s ’ f a t h e r w a s b r o t h e r o r

( 7 4 ) MRR, 2 , 5 2 5 . I n o n ly o n e g e n e r a tio n d id t h e fa m ily n o t w in t h e c o n s u la te , t h a t o f M \ A c iliu s G l a b r i o th e f r ie n d

of

G ra c c h u s. S ee

Klebs, R E,

1, 2 5 5

a n d P 1R 2, 1,

6-8.

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

157

another example, the Aquilii who are known as holders of the highest magistracies in the early Republic ( ” ). The family shows a recovery in the last quarter of the second century. Manius Aquillius and his homonymous son obtained the consulates of 129 and 101. Both made money in the provinces, but as further details are lacking, we can say nothing on the con­ sequences (nos. 42, 43). Again, we have some details of the wealth of the Aufidii, who obtained two praetorships at the end of the second century and a praetorship and a consulate in the first ( 7576). Even our knowledge of the Iulii Caesares leaves much to be desired. The family could show consuls and consular tribunes in the fifth and the fourth centuries, but then fol­ lowed almost 150 years of eclipse. It began to rise slowly at the end of the third century, but it was only at the beginning of the first century that its achievement was something to be proud o f : two praetorships, two con­ sulates and one censorship within five years!77). Though there are a few hints on its possessions (nos. 152, i, 154), we can form no clear idea of its economic standing. These few examples show how fragmentary is our ex­ tant information, and how desirable it would be to have more data. It was our aim to examine the political position of senatorial families from the point of view of their economic condition. The results show a correlation between economic prosperity and political prominence in the history of sixteen families ; in other words, their members can be shown to have been men of means at the time of their political success, while political eclipse corresponded with loss of the economic basis. But this does not mean that the rich all of necessity enjoyed political influence and were elec­ ted to magistracies. The right conclusion is that of the previous section : property and capital were indispensable means towards success in Roman politics. It is true that only in one case is it explicitly said that the reason for political downfall was poverty, (Scauri). Yet the different fortunes of dif­ ferent lines of the same family, the one successful in politics and economically prosperous and the other declining politically after an economic reverse, indicate that the explanation explicitly given in one case probably holds good in others. Of course, there may have been additional factors, and it is quite plausible that lack of talent was also a cause of failure. But since in other cases this did not prove to be a handicap, as perhaps in those of Metellus Macedonicus’ sons (Cic., De Or., 2. 267), it seems that incapacity of its members only contributed to a family’s decline ; lack of financial resources was no less important. Further, it may be ( 7 5 ) M RR, 2 , 5 3 2 f. ( 7 6 ) MRR, 2 , 5 3 5 ( 7 7 ) D.

G.,

3,

; SM RR, 2 . S e e a l s o n os 9 6 , 9 7 .

I I I ; 114.

158

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

assumed that noble families in decline had the strongest desire to recover their political standing, and iit is therefore instructive that they often suc­ ceeded only when their financial circumstances improved. Thus the (correlation we have noticed is to be regarded as causal rather than ac­ cidental. This correlation may be clarified in various ways. Firstly, men without means and, what was more serious, those who were heavily in debt or had lost their property were not likely to gain public favour. The rooted attitude of the society towards such men can be revealed by study ing the terms used in slanderous attacks, especially from political rivals. Inops, egens and per­ ditus are employed iri order to represent the opponent as an unreliable man, potentially criminal and dangerous to society. Such abusive language is mainly conspicuous in the attacks of the boni on their adversaries. Cicero, who defines the boni in his speeches and expresses their views, blackens his political rivals by describing them as poor and impoverished ; one who has lost his possessions constitutes a threat to the existent order of society and iits security ( 78). Sallust too regards poverty, among other things, as a source of evil and the poor as audacious and dangerous to society ( 79). Since these views were expressed in a period of serious social and political upheavals, it iis clear that in a calmer period, that is before the Gracchi, men with slender means or those who had been impoverished were not likely to gain public confidence. Secondly, in view of the costliness of a political career, a man of political ambitions had to consider whether his financial resources were equal to the prospective expenses ( 80). In the last hundred years of the Republic the problem became graver for some of those who aspired to the highest places, as it was sometimes necessary to control military forces, to say nothing of the steep rise in the traditional expenditure of senators. The maintenance of bodyguards was occasionally needed to preserve a senator’s political position and, at times, his personal security. The dominance of the trium­ virs in 59 was manifest in their virtual control of the Forum, and Clodius too became a powerful factor in Roman politics by his organization of gangs. For these purposes senators enlisted the service of clients and tenants from their estates, of slaves, gladiators and other professionals. To conclude, the more security was banished and anarchy spread, the more property and money became indispensable for success in politics!81). (7 8 ) C ic .,

P hil, (7 9 )

2. 7 8 ;

Cluent., A lt, 7 .

Sall., C at.,

66 ; 70 ; 163 ; 3 , 5 . C f.

12. 2 ;

Bom.,

116;

S e s t,

W irszubski, JR S,

51

85 ;

Prov. Cons.,

(1 9 6 1 ),

17

43 ;

3 7 . 3 ; lu g ., 8 6 . 3 . S e e a ls o T a c ., Ann., 2 . 4 8 ;

( 8 0 ) S e e c h . IV . ( 8 1 ) S e e c h . I V , v. O n v io le n c e a t R o m e s e e

Plane.,

f.

Lintcitt, Violence, passim.

6 . 7.

8 6 ; M il., 8 8 ;

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

111 .

—

F

in a n c ia l

O

u t l a y

a n d

t h e

C

u r s u s

H

159

o n o r u m

In his speech for Murena, accused on a charge of ambitus, Cicero says : Odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam, publicam magnificentiam diligit ; non amat profusas epulas, sordis et inhumanitatem multo minus, distinguit rationem officiorum ac temporum, vicissitudinem laboris ac voluntatis. Nam quod ais (Cato) nulla re adlici hominum mentis oportere ad magistratum mandandum nisi dignitate, hoc tu ipse in quo summa est dignitas non ser­ vas... Qua re nec plebi Romanae eripiendi fructus isti sunt ludorum, con­ viviorum, quae omnia maiores nostri comparaverunt, nec candidatis ista benignitas adimenda est quae liberalitatem magis significat quam largitionem (Mur., 76-77). The necessity of gaining the favour of the voters by donations and various acts of benevolence was deeply rooted in the con­ sciousness of candidates. These grants clearly could have been a real benefit only to the poor, yet even the well-to-do, who did not need them as finan­ cial relief, would regard them as as proof of magnanimity prompted by con­ sideration for the feelings of the electors. As the phenomenon is well known, it remains to examine whether such expenditure brought positive results. The influence of the games given by the aediles on their political promotion is shown by their election to higher magistracies and by the in­ terval that elapsed. Before the lex Villia the games had greater influence, for there were no legal limitations : neither minimum age nor compulsory in­ tervals between offices. It was only the curule magistrates who were prohibited from proceeding immediately to another magistracy ( 82). The ex­ tant books of Livy permit a detailed examination of the advancement of aediles during the years 2 17-182 ( 83), and the following table shows the results (84). C u r u le A e d ile s P a tr i c ia n s

P le b e ia n s

P le b e ia n A e d ile s

K now n

27

25

44

P ra e to rs

21

19

32

C o n s u ls

19

17

13

2

2

11

F a ile d

(8 2 )

Mommsen, StR ,

1, 5 2 4

ff.

( 8 3 ) L iv y d o e s n o t g iv e a f u ll r e c o r d o f t h e e l e c ti o n s o f th e a e d ile s b e f o r e 2 1 6 a n d a f t e r 1 8 7 , a n d th e r e f o r e t h e r e s u lt s o f lex Villia c a n n o t b e in v e s tig a te d . F o r p r e v i o u s e x a m in a t io n s o f e x t a n t e v id e n c e se e

Mommsen, StR ,

1, 5 2 6 - 5 3 3 ;

Willems, S in a t,

1, 3 7 2 - 3 8 0 . C f.

Scullard, R P,

( 8 4 ) S e e a p p e n d ix B f o r th e a d v a n c e m e n t o f a e d ile s a n d tr i b u n e s .

2 4 -5 .

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PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL. ACTIVITIES

To judge by the table, service as curule aedile secured promotion to other curule magistracies almost in every case (85). Four of the patrician curule aediles and four of the plebeian curule aediles who did not serve as praetors were elected as consuls. Altogether about 69 96 of the curule aediles reached the consulate. Of the plebeian aediles 72 96 obtained the praetorship, as against 76 96 of the plebeian curule aediles and 77 96 of the patrician aediles. Only one plebeian aedile was elected consul without serving as praetor, but he also served as curule aedile, Q. Caecilius Metellus (209208). Indeed the striking difference between the plebeian aediles and the curule aediles is in their obtaining the consulate: only 27 96 of the former succeeded. The fact that most aedilicii won the higher curule offices does not necessarily prove the influence of the games they celebrated. Firstly, in many instances, men were elected praetors without serving as aediles (86). Secondly, if there was a long interval between the aedileship and canvassing for the praetorship, we cannot assume that the voters were under the in­ fluence of the games. This aspect of the question is conveniently sum­ marized in the following table. C u r u l e A e d ile s I n te r v a l

P a tr i c ia n s

P le b e ia n s

P le b e ia n A e d ile s

1

2

17

1

16

13

8

2

2

2

3

1

1

S u c c e s s iv e ly

3

5

—

1

1

12

—

—

13

—

—

15

T o ta l

1

21

1 1

—

—

19

32

Election for the next year is a striking proof of the influence of the games on the voters. Curule aediles were prohibited from standing in their year of ( 8 5 ) I t s e e m s t h a t L . L ic in i u s L u c u llu s , a e d ile 2 0 9 , w a s h a n d i c a p p e d b y t h e c o n v i c ti o n o f h is a s s is ta n t s ( L i v ., 3 0 . 3 6 , 6 - 7 ) . T h e o t h e r th r e e w h o d id n o t a d v a n c e w e r e S e r. S u lp ic iu s G a lb a , a e d ile 2 0 9 , S ex . C o r n e l i u s L e n tu lu s , a e d ile 2 0 7 , a n d L . L a e to r iu s , a e d ile 2 0 2 . ( 8 6 ) A c c o r d in g t o e x t a n t in f o r m a ti o n , in th e y e a r s 2 1 6 - 1 8 2 th e r e w e r e 9 0 p r a e t o r s w h o d id n o t s e r v e a s a e d ile s , 'w ith o u t ta k in g i n t o a c c o u n t s o m e w h o h a d s e r v e d a s c o n s u ls o r p r a e t o r s b e f o r e 2 1 6 ( t h e s e d a t a a r e b a s e d o n M RR). T h e n a m e s o f 4 6 a e d ile s o f th is p e r i o d a r e u n k n o w n t o u s , b u t e v e n i f w e a s s u m e t h a t a ll b e c a m e p r a e t o r s , t h e r e s til l r e m a in 4 4 v a c a n c ie s .

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

16 1

office, and it was only because of the unusual conditions during the Hannibalic war that three were elected without interval to the praetorship ( 87). A similar prohibition with regard to the plebeian aediles was probably enacted in 196 ( 88). Altogether 64 of the 72 aediles who won the praetorship were elected within two years, and it can be maintained that the voters remem­ bered who had shown their readiness to entertain the people. The success of aediles in obtaining the higher magistracies becomes clearer by comparison with the advancement of tribunes in the same period (89). Sixty-one tribunes of this period are known but only 23 of them obtained the praetorship. Further, ten of the 23 successful were also aediles ; so only 13 proceeded directly to the praetorship. Eleven were even­ tually elected consuls, but only three had not been aediles too. This brings us to the final table that summarizes the promotion of those known to have been lower magistrates to the higher offices (in percentages).

Praetorship Consulate

Curule Aediles

Plebeian Aediles

Tribunes

Tribunes who were not Aediles

77 96

72 96 2796

37,5 96 18 96

21.496 5.6 96

69 96

The table does not represent the whole picture and is quite misleading. For a true evaluation we have to take into account not only those magistrates who are known to us by name but all those who took office. 72 curule aediles, 72 plebeian aediles, and 360 tribunes served from 217 to 182. The previous careers of about 100 praetors of this period, who may have served as tribunes or aediles before 182, are not recorded ; if the suc­ cess of missing aediles corresponded to that of those recorded, 35 of them would obtain the praetorship (1 start with the aediles because the number of those known may be taken as a statistical sample). This leaves 65 offices to the unknown tribunes, who with those known would amount to 88, that is

(87) These are the following: Q. Fabius Maximus in 215, Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sem­ pronius Tuditanus in 214. Fabius’ father presided over the election of his son, and also brought about his own re-election to consul (Liv., 24. 7, 11-9, 5). As censor in 209 Tuditanus nominated Fabius Cunctator as princeps senatus, despite the opposition of his colleague; this may suggest some collaboration between them (Liv., 27. 1 1 ,7 -1 1 ); Fabius also held the election when Tuditanus was elec­ ted as praetor for 213 (Liv., 24. 43, 5-6). (88) Mommsen, StR, 1, 533. (89) See appendix B, iv. The attribution of some of the tribunes to this period is uncertain.

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PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

24.4% . We have also to bear in mind that since there were four praetors until 197 and six from 196 onwards, for the tribunes election successes of 40% and 60% respectively are to be counted as the maximum possible. The maximum possible success for the aediles was always 100%. Hence, compared to the potential maximum, the curule aediles actually obtained 77% , the plebeian aediles 72% , the tribunes 61 % (24. 4 : 40) and 40% from 196. Again, there are eleven consuls whose previous careers we do not know, and I doubt if more than a third of them served as tribunes ; the total would amount to 15 or 4.1 %. We may then conclude that the aediles who gave games were more successful than the tribunes who did not. Another factor that has to be considered is the social origin of the senators. As we have seen, the promotion of plebeians to the praetorship is only slightly less than that of patricians. But when we take a glimpse at the results of the elections to the consulate, we can observe a patent splitting: the percentage of plebeian aedilicii, let alone tribunicii, who obtained the consulate is much lower than that of the curule aedilicii. There are two reasons for this difference : the social origin and the date of the games. Patricians had an advantage over plebeians in this period because until 172 one consul was always patrician. Of the eight aediles of two years, the two patricians had a prospect of 100 96, the two plebeian curule aediles 100%, and the four plebeians 50%. The twenty tribunes could get no more than 10%. The patricians actually obtained 69%. Part of the explanation is that several patricians served in the consulate more than once. But it must be admitted that a few men, e.g. T. Quinctius Flanininus, obtained the highest magistracy without serving as aediles. The plebeian curule aediles obtained 68%, the plebeian aediles 27% of their maximum of 50%, that is 54%. The tribunes would get 4.1% of their 10%, that is 41%. These dif­ ferentials speak for themselves. We have still to account for the fact that there is no difference between patrician and plebeian curule aedile, while there is a substantial one between them and the plebeian aediles, which does not exist in their advancement to the praetorship. The demarcation line seems to be found in the difference between nobiles and non-nobiles( 90).The patricians were nobiles, and of the plebeian curule aediles only five were n o t ; three of them did not obtain the praetorship and the others failed the consulate!91). Of the 44 plebeian

(90) My calculations are based on Gelzer’s definition of nobiles. I have also checked the evidence ac­ cording to Afzelius' definition, that nobiles were descendants of curule magistrates in this period (.Cl. & Med.. 7 (1945), 150) The results are essentially the same, but in this case we cannot be sure because most of the aediles and praetors before 217 are not known. (91) See appendix B, u (including a few uncertain cases).

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

163

aediles, 23 were not nobiles ; of these 6 did not continue to the praetorship, 11 continued successively, 4 were elected after a year, one after 12 years and one after 13 years (92). Only five reached the consulate : P. Villius Tappulus, Glabrio, Cato, Laelius and Cn. Baebius Tamphilus. 35 tribunes were non-nobiles, of whom 14 won the praetorship, but only three the con­ sulate (93). The advancement of the non-nobiles plebeian aediles to the praetorship is higher than that of the noble ones, but only 21 % of them (5 : 23) obtained the consulate as against 33.3 96 (7 : 21) of the noble plebeian aediles. The long interval between the tribunate and the praetor­ ship is a strong argument against attempts to prove that service in the lower office enhanced the chance of obtaining the higher. However, there is a dif­ ference between the promotion of the noble tribunes and the non-nobiles to the praetorship and to the consulate : 14 of the 35 non-nobiles reached the praetorship as against 19 of the 26 nobiles. On the other hand, 8 of the nobiles and only 3 of the non-nobiles obtained the consulate. It appears that scions of the nobility had an advantage in consular elections. Since almost all the curule aediles, including plebeians, were nobiles, this must be the reason for the typical divergence in their subsequent careers from those of the plebeian aediles. The consulate was more enviously guarded by the nobility than the praetorship. Besides, only two men could be consuls each year, while four could obtain the praetorship and six from 196. Now, to return to the second reason : the eclat of the games was short-lived. Rarely were aedilicii candidates for the consulate without serving as praetors, and since 197 this was probably prohibited (94), the result being that candidates could not immediately exploit popularity gained by giving games in elec­ tions to the highest curule magistracy. The lex Villia of 180 made compulsory a two-year interval between curule offices ( 95), and thereby reduced the extent to which curule aediles could enhance their chance of winning the praetorship by giving splendid games. The secret ballot too, introduced by Gabinius in 139, expanded freedon of voting in the Assemblies. Yet it may be supposed that those who gave games had a better chance in elections than those who did not en­ tertain the public. Unfortunately, we cannot demonstrate the validity of this supposition. The 90 known aediles, from 180 till the fall of the Republic, are of no use for this purpose, as the date of aedileship is not known in

(92) See appendix B, in (including a few uncertain cases) (93) See appendix B, iv. Presumably the vast maiontv of the unknown tribunes were non-nobiles. (94) See Astin, Latomus, 16 (1957), 613. (95) Mommsen, StR, I, 526-530. On the biennium as part of the lex Villia or of a law that shortly af­ terwards supplemented it see Astin, Latomus. 16 (1957), 602.

164

PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

many cases and, in addition, many of the praetors are not known or, if known, their date is lacking. Under these circumstances a statistical ap­ proach is out of the question. However, there are some instructive cases. Sulla failed to be elected for the praetorship at his first attempt, allegedly because he had not served as aedile. He succeeded in his second attempt, presumably thanks to his promise to celebrate games as praetor (no. 50,i). In some instances the success of the candidate depended on his ability to persuEule the voters that he was the suitable man to hold the games. The cases of Crassus as aedile in 212 and of Scipio as aedile in 213 have alread been mentioned. Scipio Nasica probably made public his intention to give games if elected consul (no. 16). Ml. Seius defeated M. Pupius Piso in the election for the aedileship of 74. As aedile he showed his liberality by selling cheap corn and oil. The year 75 witnessed a scarcity of corn, a rise in -food prices and mob violence in consequence ; given these conditions, it seems that the voters elected the man likely to relieve their distress, and preferred Seius to the noble Piso ( 9697). Similarly, we may assume that Caesar announced that he would give gladiatorial games in honour of his father in his aedileship (no. 152, i). Candidates for magistracies gave games or feasts to the public, hoping thereby to become popular with the voters. Glabrio bettered his chances as candidate for the censorship of 189 by providing the people with congiaria (no. 1). Q. Fulvius Flaccus celebrated games in 181 and was elected consul in the following year (no. 18). Q. Aelius Tubero, on the other hand, failed to win the praetorship on account of the poor feast he presented on the death of his uncle, Scipio Aemilianus (Cic., Mur., 75-6). Q. Gallius held gladiatorial games while a candidate for the praetorship in 66, and he was elected (Ascon., 88). The magnificent games of Murena as praetor helped him to win the consulate (no. 162). Gabinius gave gladiatorial games when a candidate for the consulate (no. 147), and Ap. Claudius Pulcher as a can­ didate for the praetorship (no. 115). Domitius Calvinus’ games helped him to gain the consulate (no. 140). Metellus Scipio too held games as a can­ didate for the praetorship (no. 103). These instances indicate that even after the passing of Villius’ law, games continued to influence the voters, and that candidates found new ways to circumvent the regulations of the law by celebrating private games (” ). (96) On M. Seius see Cic., Plane., 1 2; Off., 2. 58 ; Pun ., NH, 15. 2 ; 18. 16. On the scarcity of grain see Sall., Hist., 2. 44-8. As M. Seius had been an Eques, it is possible that the rich Eques M. Seius, mentioned by V arr.0, PR, 3. 2, 7 ; 13-4 ; 10, 1 ; 11, 1 ; 16, 10 Plin., NH, 10. 52, was his son. Cf. C ic horius, Hermes, 39 (1904), 4 6 5 -6 ; Munzer, RE, 2A, 1121. (97) But it is worthwhile mentioning that Asconius (20) says that in 54 people remembered Seal games, and that the judges favoured him on account of them. Scaurus’ games were indeed exceptional (ri 81).

CHAPTER VIi. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

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Cicero observes that some senators obtained the consulate without being aediles. The consuls he mentions are the following: P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica — 138, Marius — 107, L. Iulius Caesar — 90, Cn. Oc­ tavius — 87, M. Tullius Decula — 81, Ap. Claudius Pulcher — 79, L. Volcatius Tullus — 66 and M. Pupius Piso -— 61 (Plane., 51). But we know that of these Marius did seek election to aedile, and so did Piso. However, these instances corroborate what we have already said -. that on the whole the games of the aediles had no decisive influence on the chances of candidates for the consulate. Evidently the long interval tended to neutralize their effect and the results of the elections were apt to be deter­ mined by recent events!989). Games did not invariably have positive results and there were limits to what they could achieve. The splendid games given by L. Cornelius Scipio in 186 could not stop the decline of his family, and he failed to win the election for the censorship. Despite his extravagant expenses Milo was not popular, as became patent after the murder of Clodius (no. 86). Brutus failed in a similar way in 44. The games he gave did not placate the mob, enraged by the murder of Caesar (rio. 155). Thus games were an important factor in normal electoral circumstances, but were unlikely to bring about a profound change in current public opinion. Games and feasts were not given for the sole purpose of office. Vic­ torious generals and senators who built temples used to celebrate games and to provide the people with grants and feasts ("). They had not retired from political life and it was quite easy for the good will of the public to be won by these means by statesmen at times when they did not need the citizens' votes. Marius, Crassus, Pompey, Lucullus, Caesar and others acted in this way and with Agrippa and Augustus it became a custom ; especially notable are Agrippa’s games and grants, when he was aedile in 33 -, they were part of the campaign to win public support against Antony (no. 220). We may add that the Roman mob was sensitive to the behaviour of his rulers and resented absence .from the games -or lack of interest (Suet.7 Aug., 45). in conclusion some points may be stressed. In most cases games had a positive influence on candidates’ chances of office, but the influence was probably short-lived, as human memory is forgetful and as new games dim­ med the glory of the previous ones. Yet the tradition of presenting games was so deeply rooted that the chances of those who did not yield to the custom diminished. Till the passing of the lex Villia an aedile’s chance of (98) I do not agree with Broughton (MRR, 2, 466 f.) that Philippus, Cotta and Curio, mentioned in Cic., Off., 2. 58. were aediles. See Athenaeum, 46 (1968), 353-4 Thomsen refers to this passage of Cicero and to Brut., 166 and Mur., 36 to explain the failure of Philippus to win the consulship of 94 (Cl. Si Med., 4 (1942), 27) It looks as if the systematic avoidance of giving games cost Philippus something. (99) Ch. IV, i.

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PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

being elected praetor was as high as about 75 %, and there is reason to sup­ pose that it did not decline after 180. Election to the consulate was less connected with service as aedile, for only in a few cases, and not after 197, did men proceed directly to the consulate, without holding the praetorship. But the limitations of the lex Villia were circumvented by the possibility of giving private games. Many senators took advantage of this, and it was especially important for non-nobiles in the second century. The nobility had dignitas and clientelae, and its scions were, so to speak, designated to office from birth. New men had to compensate for the disadvantage of their origin, and games were among the possible devices. Since the praetorship could be won by such means, this rneant.a real achievement form, new man,, and if he cultivated friendly relations with influential people he might rise to the consulate ( 10°). Many candidates bribed the electors. The phenomenon appeared as early as the beginning of the second century and became more and more common in course of time ( 1010110234). We know the names of about 20 candidates guilty of this practice, 16 of them successful ( 10:!). The triumvirs secured the election of their adherents for 55, partly by bribery and partly by force. Caesar is the best known case ; there is no doubt that bribery on large scale coun­ terbalanced the dignitas and influence of his competitors for the office of Pontifex Maximus and secured his election ( 10:9. Significantly it is said that the first law against ambitus was sponsored by the patres to curtail the prac­ tices of novi homines (ILiv. 7, 15, 12-3). But bribery and grants were not in­ variably sufficient. Though at first only a few senators distributed money to the electors, their number increased gradually till the practice became very common. Consequently this expedient must sometimes have failed, and other factors could determine the results of the election. However, the generosity of a senator who distributed money could turn the scale, if his competitor avoided the practice. True, Cato was elected praetor, though Crassus and Pompey spent money to prevent his election, but even he thought it prudent to distribute money in order to secure Bibulus’ election to the consulate ( I(l4). (100) The arguments of Sulpicius Rufus against Murena reflect the contrast between the nobilis who did not give games and the non-nobilis who won public support by this means. See Cic., Mur., 15-6 ; 74-8. (101) See ch. IV, iii. (102) See n“ 39, 45, 50, i, 63, 81, 82, 86, 89, 99. 103, 106, 113, 133, 152, i, 159, 162, 165, 186, iii, 191, 218. (103) Plut., Cass., 7. 1-3 ; Suet., Iul., 13; Duo, 37. 37. (104) Cic., Fam., 1. 9, 19 ; Liv., Per., 105 ; Plut , Cat. Min., 42 ; Pomp., 52. On Bibulus see Suet., t u t , 19. I. Cotta implies that he sought the favour of the people by eloquence, councel and money (S all., Hist., 2. 47, 4).

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL. CONDUCT

167

In a letter to Atticus in which he discusses the possible candidates for the consulate of 64 Cicero writes Nostris rationibus maxime conducere videtur Thermum fieri cum Caesare. Nemo est enim ex iis qui petunt qui, si in nostrum annum recederit, firmior candidatus fore videatur, propterea quod curator est viae Flaminiae, quae tum erit absoluta sane facile. (Alt., 1 1, 2). Cicero’s words imply that building for public purposes enchanced the chances of a candidate, and indeed we can list some senators who were perhaps elected on this account ( l05). But in most cases of which we hear public buildings were erected by victorious generals, from proceeds of booty ( 106). No particular and immediate political purpose existed in these cases. The generals wished to commemorate their names, and the monuments they left might help the reputation of their descendants. Ob­ viously we cannot estimate the influence of building activity of this kind. Thus, by expenditure on public purposes senators could gain popular support and magistracies. From a social point of view, this was important, as it enabled new men to compete against sons of old senatorial families. Wealth was a possible substitute for lineage. But while such expenditure could be regarded as a prudent political investment, there were risks ; as the number of candidates exceeded the number of magistracies, some were bound to fail. Because expenditure was necessarily heavy, some social mobility resulted, but, at the same time, losing candidates might become impoverished and embittered. IV.— T he D esire

for

P rofits

and its

P olitical R esults

I have tried to describe in detail the ways senators exploited official positions for their own profit (ch. II, ii-v). I shall now try to show that (a) in some cases their desire for booty and profits prevented the establishment of peace, by prolonging internal revolts and causing external wars, and that (b) the frontiers of some provinces were partly determined by wars stirred up by the governors. It should be borne in mind that it was not only the personal profits of governors that were involved ; they used to distribute gains among their soldiers and officers and to erect public monuments from their spoils, practices that also enhanced their political influence!107). Ob­ viously generals also sought to win distinction and glory in their wars. (105) See n“ 32, 37, 80, 132, 152, i. On the popularity of C. Gracchus as a result of his building operations see Plut., CG, 6-8. 1 ; A pp., BC, 1. 23 Cf. Munzer, RA, 317 f. (106) See ch. IV, iv with notes 36-40. (107) On Caesar’s exploitation of his booty for political aims see ch. VI, ii. See also supra, p. 145 f. Building operations or distribution of booty to Italian or provincial cities resulted in the formation of clientelae. See nos 15, 31, 152, ii, 158.

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PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

We shall start with Spain. After the expulsion of the Carthaginians, the Romans organized the occupied territory in two provinces : Nearer and Far­ ther Spain ( 108). The first spread from Emporiae in the north to a point north of Baria in the south. It included a large part of the Ebro vally, but its western line no-where exceeded the western meridian 140\ Farther Spain in­ cluded the southern part of the peninsula from Baria in the east to the Enas valley in the w est; the Sierra Morena mountains was its northern fron­ tier (10910). The cities and other small political units were bound to pay fixed sums of money, and sometimes to contribute food, especially corn (no). Rome also drew revenues from the rich silver m ines!111). The first serious rebellion of the Iberian tribes broke out in 197, starting in Farther Spain. L. Stertinius had been governor there from T99. It was peaceful tribes that rose, joined by trading towns, and this points to a reac­ tion against oppression by the governor (112). Two kinds of facts deserve at­ tention in the development of events during the next 18 years : the sums of booty generals brought to Rome, and the places where the war was con­ ducted. Fifteen governors returned with large quantities of silver and gold, and though these may have included some proceeds from the mines, there is little doubt that booty produced the large p a rt! 113). Roman commanders also went outside their provinces and attacked tribes in the interior. Of course, they had a military justification, for these tribes had rendered help to the rebel provincials. Yet they presented no serious danger, and, what is more important, less oppressive conduct on the part of the governors could have precluded the rising, or restored peace without any need to invade the

(108) Mommsen, S tR , 2, 6 4 7 ; 6 5 2 ; Schulten, CAH, 8, 3 0 6 ; J ashemski, OHPI, 41-7. The organization was carried out in 197. See Liv., 32. 2 8 ; cf. Badian, FC, 120. (109) See Schulten, CAH, 8, 306 with the map facing p. 324. (110) Liv., 29. 3, 5 ; Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 12 ; Balb., 41 ; P u n ., NH, 3. 7. For grain collection see Liv., 43. 2, 12. (111) F rank, ESAR, 1, 154 f (112) Cf. Schulten, CAM. 8, 312. But he WTongly deduced from the fact that Stertinius did not demand a triumph that the money he deposited in the Aerarium was not booty (Liv., 33. 27, 3-5). That it was is proved by the manubiae of Stertinius, who did not ask for a triumph because he was a privatus (Liv., 31. 50, 11). (113) For a list of the sums deposited in the Aerarium by the magistrates see V an Nostrand, ESAR, 3, 129. Van Nostrand’s opinion is that these were the proceeds of the mines (ib., 128). and Frank wrote that half of the revenues came from the mines (ESAR, 1, 154). Since there is no regularity in the sums and since the money was deposited in the Treasury by generals after they had given donatives to the soldiers and held triumphs, it is evident that in the main these could not have been regular taxes or proceeds of the mines. In one instance at least the handing over of the money to the Treasury was clearly in the discretion of the commander, which proves that it was booty (Liv., 39. 29, 6-7). Besides, the mines were probably let to publicans from 195 (Brunt, Equites, 139).

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mountains in the interior!114). Elut it looks as if they preferred a state of war, which enabled them to win triumphs, to accumulate booty and to collect money in other ways (no. 18). It is significant that Ti. Gracchus restored peace to the country by concluding mild treaties with the Celtiberians rather than by subjugating th em (115). But the restoration of peace did not totally end oppression by the Roman governors. Represen­ tatives of the two provinces complained of their extortions in 171. Two were convicted and went into exile, but others, strongly backed by in­ fluential persons, escaped with impunity. Needlees to say, the Senate’s decision on that occasion was of no effect (Liv., 43. 2, 12). For some 25 years after Gracchus’ settlement Spain remained com­ paratively quiet, and then in 154 a new war began ; this time the respon­ sibility falls on the Lusitanians. Yet it was Lucullus and Galba who were responsible for throwing away chances of finishing the war. When Lucullus arrived in 151, he found that his predecessor, Marcellus, had established peace. This was not to his liking. His ambition to win glory and wealth drove him to attack the Vaccaei, whose territory was far from the Roman province, and thus to renew the war (no. 26). Galba too behaved per­ fidiously to satisfy his greed, and provoked the insurrection of the Lusitanians, headed by Viriathus, which lasted tili 138 (no. 35). Viriathus defeated the Roman army time and again until a treaty was concluded in 140 ( 116). In the very next year the governor Q. Servilius Caepio took the initiative in renewing the w a r(117). Q. Pompeius too turned war into a profitable business. When he realized he could not subdue Numantia, he concluded a treaty for a sum of 30 talents. The moment his successor arrived, he proclaimed the treaty rtult and void, keeping the money for him­ se lf!118). Similarly Aemilius Porcina is said to have conducted his military campaign from a desire for booty (no. 4). It is very doubtful whether the Senate approved of the governors’ bellicosity. The generals profited ; the state had to bear the costs. Still more serious was the burden on the

(114) See Schulten, CAH, 8, 307 and on the arena of the war 3 12 f. Apart from the short descrip­ tion of A ppian (Ib er, 39-43). Livy is the main source 33 21, 6 - 9 , 26, 3-5 ; 27, 1-5 ; 44, 4-5 . 34. 821 ; 35. 1-2; 7, 6-8 ; 22, 5-8 ; 36. 2, 7-9 ; 37. 57, 1-6 . 39. 7, 6-7 , 21, I -1 0 ,2 9 , 4-7 : 30-31 ; 38. 8-12. 56, 1-2; 40 1, 4 -7 . 16, 7-11 ; 30-34, I . 35, 3-7; 39-40; 47-50. (115) App., Iber., 4 3 ; Liv., 40. 49. Cf. Schulten, CAH, 8, 314. (116) Liv., Per., 54; D tod. Sic., 33. 1, 3 ; App., Iber., 69. (117) Astin argues that the treaty was unfavourable to Rome and was regarded as temporary (Aemilianus, 142 f.). But he himself shows that there was a strong opposition to the renewal of the war (144). It is clearly attested that it was Caepio who dragged the Senate into renewing the war, Diod. Sic., 33. 1, 4 ; App., Iber., 70 and MRR, 1, 482. (118) Cic., Font., 23; Val. Max., 8. 5, 1 ; App., Iber., 79.

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decreasing military manpower!119120), lit is significant that a permanent quaestio repetundarum was set up in 149, soon after the misbehaviour of Lucullus and Galba and the latter’s acquittal ( 12°). Aggression by governors could greatly damage the state and an attempt was made to curtaft it. The establishment of the permanent court did not bring a change, and censure by the Senate did little to check governors (Plut., CG, 6. 2). New revolts gave opportunities for new victories and triumphs (m ). From 99 Lusitanian and Celtiberian tribes were in revolt!122). The operations took place outside the provinces, and though the tribes were poor, the sale of captives as slaves was profitable!123). The provincials’ hatred for Rome becomes manifest in the Sertorian wars. It was the Lusitanians who called him back, after his expulsion by C. Annius in 81, to renew the w a r!124). Finally carne Caesar’s conquest. As governor of Farther Spain, he extended his operations to the western part of the peninsula, sent a fleet from Gades to Brigantium, and subdued the tribes bordering on the Atlantic shore. He needed money to pay his debts, as well as glory, and both were to be won by w a r!125). Caesar was not the last Republican governor to conduct a war in Spain ; the Spanish provinces were finally pacified only under Augustus!126). Yet the pattern of the extension of Roman rule in Spain is clear. There is no reason to assume that the Senate deliberately aimed at expanding the

(119) Liv., P er., 4 8 ; App., Iber., 4 9 ; F rank, ESAR, 1, 110. (120) Badian connects the lex Calpurnia with the imminent annexation of Carthage and Macedonia to the Empire (R I, 9 f.), which is doubtful. (121) L. Calpurnius Piso, praetor of Farther Spam ca. 112, was killed in battle (Cic., Verr., 2. 4 , 56 ; App., Iber., 99). Q. Servilius Caepio, governor of Farther Spain in 109-107, won victories over the Lusitanians, for which he was awarded a triumph (Ins. It.. 13. 1, 8 4 ; 561 ; Val. M ax., 6. 19, 13; Eutrop.. 4. 27, 5). M. Marius, governor ca. 101, defeated the Lusitanians (App., Iber., 100). According to Gardner (CAN, 9, 313), the Lusitanians and the Celtiberians revolted because they were elated by their success in repulsing the Germans. But Caepio’s operations preceded the invasion of these tribes. (122) L. Cornelius Dolabella, governor of Farther Spain 99-98 (Inst. I t , 13. 1, 84-5 ; 562), T. Didius, governor of Nearer Spain 97-93 (Ins. I t , 13. 1, 93 ; Liv., P e r., 70 ; Gellius, 2. 27, 2 ; App., Ib er., 99-100 ; P lut., S e r t , 3. 3), P. Licinius Crassus, governor of Farther Spain 96-93 (Ins. I t , 13. 1, 84-5 ; 562 ; Cic., Pis., 58 ; Ascon., 14 ; Schol. Boil., 137), P. Scipio Nasica, governor in Spain ca.93 (Obsequens, 51), C. Valerius Flaccus, governor in Spain in 92 (App., Iber., 100). (123) For a typical maltreatment see App., I b e r , 99.

(124) Sall., H is t, 3. 94-103; Plut., S e r t, 7-12. (125) See n° 152, i. Rice Holmes rejected the evidence of Suetonius and Dio because in his opinion Lusitania had nothing valuable to offer as booty (Republic, 1, 302). This is an exaggeration, and, what is not noticed by Rice Holmes, Plutarch too, who is more favourable to Caesar, reports Caesar’s enrich­ m ent See also Gelzer, C aesar, 55 f. (126) See n“ 78, 111. On the military operations in Augustus’ time see R ice H olmes, Em pire, 1, 610.

CHAPTER VII. — ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

17 1

territory of the two provinces created after the Second Punic War. An­ nexation was not premeditated, but in part a gradual result of oppression by governors who goaded the provincials into revolts, in which they were helped by tribes in the hinterland ( 127). The governors there exploited pretexts to extend operations in ways which were militarily plausible and financially profitable. The first phase of the Lusitanian and Celtiberian wars, terminated about 179, resulted in only a small extension of territory, while Roman control of the interior was based on the treaties concluded by Gracchus with the tribes there. The extension of Roman rule to the central plateau was the outcome of the second phase of the wars, in the years 154133. It is very doubtful whether this time there was unanimous agreement with an expansionist policy, and in the absence of accurate information the point may be argued either way. What cannot be denied is that at the start the ambition of generals for glory and booty prolonged the war when it could have been finished or limited, and that their perfidy drove the provin­ cials to desperate resistance ; once a Roman army had been defeated, the prestige of the state was involved, and in this way the commanders on the spot were responsible for the policy, because they left Rome with little alternative ( l28). The repeated victories over the Lusitanians at the end of the second century and the beginning of the first extended Roman rule to the south-western part of the peninsula, and finally Caesar carried it into the western--and north- western parts-hTrc governors acted independently. Looking for profits and glory (i29), they exploited military grounds or pretexts for extending the arena of the war, and the Senate had to endorse their actions and the growth of Roman territory.

(127) On the non-annexation policy of the Senate see Badian, R I, ch 1 He writes . "B ut against the barbarians, where publicity need not be feared and where, incidentally, the gradual advancing of the fron­ tier did not, on the whole, lead to any major commitment at any time, so that the whole process would not easily become obvious — there policy was openly brutal and agressive, and triumph-hunting an ac­ cepted technique" (R I, 11). Badian does not make it clear whether this was due to private initiative by the governors on the spot or to the Senate (128) Astin writes : “ it is very unlikely that imperialism and expansionism as such were at issue. The Celtiberians were unequivocally rebels, and, in view of Galba’s conquests in 150, it is highly probable that the Lusitanians were regarded in much the same light” (Aemilianus, 140). But he over-simplifies the situation, for he does not take into account what dragged the Celtiberians into revolt, and ignores the fact that Galba's conquests were the product of his personal ambition, not the implementation of the Senate’s policy. It is true that the “ wars were rather the product of the very fact of the Roman presence in Spam” Ub., 154), yet, once again, one factor is ignored. But for the personal ambition of the Roman com­ manders, a policy of containment might have been a realistic alternative. (129) For the aspirations of the nobles, mainly connected with the concept of virtus , see Earl, S allu st., ch. 2 -, id.. The M oral a n d Political Tradition o f Rome (London, 1967), 20 ff. Cf. Badian, R I,

13.

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PART TOO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

The Ligurian wars in the decades following the conclusion of the Hanniballic war betray the same characteristics. The Roman tradition describes the Ligurians as predatory tribes whose inroads compelled the Romans to resort to a punitive policy which resulted in the conquest of their country. This may have been the case, but the evidence is one-sided. Even the an­ nalistic tradition does not conceal that in some cases the campaigns of the consuls and praetors were in fact plundering raids. Thus, it is doubtful whether the Ligurians were more responsible for the incessant struggle than the Roman generals ( 13°). It was in 187 that In Gallia M. Furius praetor in­ sontibus Cenomanis in pace speciem belli quaerens, ademerat arma. (Liv., 39. 3, 1-3). The Senate disapproved his action, the arms were returned and the consul Lepidus ordered the praetor to leave the provincia. In the same year the second consul, C. Flaminius, defeated the Apuani and established peace (Liv., 39. 2, 5-6). But the consul of 186 out of personal ambition re­ opened the war. To his humiliation, he was defeated (Liv., 39. 20, 5-10). The military prestige of Rome could not afford to swallow the insult and continuation of the war became necessary. Perhaps the behaviour of Popillius Laenas, the consul of 173, is the case par excellence. He attacked the Statielli, demolished their town, confiscated their property and sold the captives as slaves. After his report reached Rome, the Senate strongly cen­ sured him, for this tribe had enjoyed peaceful relations with Rome and the consul had acted on his own initiative. The Senate instructed him to redeem the Ligurians, and to give them back their property. Even his personal ap­ pearance in Rome could not induce the Senate to change its mind (Liv., 42, 7-9). However, Popillius persisted in prosecuting the war and killed several more thousand Ligurians. On the expiry of his office, he was prosecuted, but his connections were too powerful for him to be convicted ( 130131). Liguria in itself had rio intrinsic value, and it is hard to believe that its conquest and annexation were accepted aims of Roman policy. It was the roads that led to the Po valley and the ports along the coast that counted. Nor can we deny that the Ligurians invaded Roman territory and attacked Roman settlements. In the long run the Roman conquest may have been (130) Most of the consuls of the first three decades of the second century acted in Liguria. See MRR to the years 200, 197, 196, 194, 193, 192, 188, 187, 186, 185, 183, 182, 181, 180, 179, 178, 177, 176, 175, (.73, 172. On plundering of crops and seizing of captives, obviously sold to slavery, see Liv., 39. 2, 7 ; 32, 1-4. In 201 the consul L. Aelius Paetus concluded a peace treaty with the Ingauni. Next year the Ligurians joined in the revolt of the Gauls, which was provoked by a Roman inroad upon the Boiam territory. As the Roman commander was defeated, experience taught the Gauls that a punitive Roman expedition was inevitable. We do not know what the consul did in Etruria, but it is possible that the Ligurians too had to fear Roman reaction (Liv., 31. 2, 5-11 ; 10, 1-2). (131) Liv., 42. 21-2. For the internal politics see MOnzer, RA, 216-223 , Scullard, RP. 194-6.

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inevitable. Yet it is clear that Roman magistrates seized every occasion to extend the war, and sometimes initiated hostilities for the sake of booty and triumphs. These actions catalysed, if they did not cause, the extension of Roman rule over the whole a re a (132). The behaviour of Roman magistrates in the East in the first decades of the second century offers analogies. As proconsul in 189-188, Cn. Manlius Vulso led his army on a predatory expedition in Galatia. After the victory over Antiochus, neither political considerations nor military necessity could justify this campaign (no. 28). Both he and M. Fulvius Nobilior were at­ tacked in the Senate: vagari eos cum belli terrore per nationes, quibus bellum indictum non sit, pacem pretio venditantis (Liv., 38. 42, 1 1). Desire for booty underlies the military operations of C. Lucretius Gallus, praetor in the Third Macedonian War. He plundered the towns of Haliartus and Thisbe and sold the captives as slaves ; he was prosecuted and fined by the Assembly (no. 27). Crassus, cos. 171, showed the same arrogance and cupidity; he too destroyed towns and sold the captives as slaves (I33). In the same year, the praetor L. Hortensius captured Abdera, sold its inhabitants as slaves and plundered Chalcis. The Senate censured his actions and sent envoys to arrange the redemption of the enslaved (I34). A second decision ruled that no town should provide Roman magistrates in Greece with any war supplies, except on the Senate's instruction (Liv., 43. 17, 2). Here there were no annexations as in Spain and Liguria, for obvious reasons. In the latter, the Roman presence had already been established, and served as a basis for further operations. As Liguria was included in the provincia Italia, the consuls were entitled to operate there. In Spain two per­ manent provinces existed. The situation in Greece and Asia Minor was dif­ ferent. There the provinciae were temporary, occasioned by the wars against Antiochus III and Perseus, and it was only for the duration of the wars that generals could pursue personal interests. When peace had been made, magistrates no longer received provinciae in the a re a (135). Later, however, we once more find the same factors at work in the East. M'. Aquillius, proconsul in Asia 128-126, is said to have been influenced

(132) Cf. Frank, CAM. 8, 328 f. (133) Liv., 43. 4, 5 ; Per., 4 3 ; Z onaras, 9. 22. (134) L iv, 43 4, 5-13 C f D iod Sic., 30. 6 The attempt of C Cassius Longinus, cos.. 171, to at­ tack Macedonia, though his provincia was Italia, shows the desire to engage in war and to enjoy its profits On his way he attacked several tribes. Gauls, Istrians and others, who sent envoys to complain at Rome. The Senate ordered the consul to return and sent legates to appease those who suffered (Liv., 43. 1, 4-12 ; 5, 7-10). (135) Cf. Badian, Rl. ch 1

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by the presents of Mithridates V king of Pontus in his settlement of Pergamum (no. 41). Mithridates received Phrygia, an arrangement that was not to the Senate’s liking ; indeed after a few years, not later than 116, it was taken away from Pontus ( 136). Aquillius’ son shared the responsibility for the outbreak of the war against Mithridates VI in 89. The Roman governor C. Cassius with the cooperation of three legates evidently in­ stigated Nicomedes IV, king of Bithynia, to invade Pontus, thereby causing the war. This time the persons concerned in the agression included not only senators but also Roman financiers. Perhaps the legates acted in the in­ terests of Marius. In any case, there is little doubt that the raid into Pontus was carried out to enable the Bithynian king to refund his debts to the Romans (137). Seven years later the war was renewed. Murena, left by Sulla as governor of Asia, annulled the treaty with Cibyra, annexed it, and then invaded Pontus (no. 57). The actions of Aquillius and Murena are not essentially different from those of governors elsewhere, only their adversary was of a different stamp. Mithridates reacted strongly, and took the initiative himself. The ultimate effect was to extend the Roman Empire to the frontiers of Parthia. Igitur primo pecuniae, deinde imperi cupido crevit: ea quasi materies om­ nium malorum fuere {Cat., 10. 3) writes Sallust, when describing the changing of moral standards at Rome. His chronological turning-point, the destruction of Carthage, is a mistake, rior did the desire for gain precede in time that for imperial power. But basically the Roman historian is right in selecting these two motives as decisive. We have seen that senators, especially those who aspired to attain a prominent position, needed large sums of money. No wonder a governor would tend to exploit legitimate op­ portunities for profits, and indeed if he was unscrupulous, illegitimate as well. War gave ample opportunities. It also enabled the general, if vic­ torious, to achieve a triumph and glory, to ingratiate himself with his of­ ficers and influential men in Rome, and to create a clientela in the province. All these factors surely played a part in the considerations of the governors, and it would be misleading to pick any one of them in isolation. Roman magistrates sought out occasions for wars, and sometimes provoked them on spurious pretexts ; raids of wild tribes often gave the occasion. The cumulative result of these wars was a gradual territorial enlargement of the

(136) Iustin., 38. 5, 3 ; A pr , Mith., 57 , I GRP, 4. 572. See Last. CAH, 9, 106 ; Magie, Asia, 169 For the cynical and sharp remarks of C. Cracchus on the concern for personal advantage that guided senators’ attitudes see Gellius, II. 10. (137) See nos 42, 63. For Marius' intrigues see Badiam, Historia, 6 (1957), 331 ; 344. Cf. RI, 56 f

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Empire. Wherever possible, the Senate checked such aggressive conduct. Yet occasionally it had to endorse a fait accompli ( 138). In the first century the scope of the wars increased. It is said that Marius had a personal interest in a war against Mithridates, and that his associates provoked it. His enemies accused him of coveting the treasures of Asia (no. 63). But even if the allegations are true, his motives have surely been distorted. Marius’ ambition was to gain one more military victory and distribute largess to the people. Lucullus was accused of prolonging the war in order to enrich himself. The charge as it stands may be doubted, but Lucullus was obviously interested in money for distribution to soldiers, of­ ficers and the people in Rome (no. 160). The same charge was not brought against Pompey, yet his war profits in the East exceeded those of Lucullus. He too acted independently, enlarged the province of Cilicia, created the large province of Bithynia-Pontus and annexed Syria. Pompey notoriously received his provincia despite the opposition of some leading senators, and he exploited it to his own advantage, creating an immense clientela at home and abroad and achieving military glory and enormous profits!139140). Next came Caesar. He regarded Cisalpine Gaul as a suitable base for operations before he was invested with Gallia Transalpina ( 14°). He quickly realized the possibility of exploiting Gaul to secure and enhance his political power at Rome, and pushed his conquests whenever and wherever a chance occurred until the whole country was subjugated ( 14‘). Crassus had anticipated Caesar in the use of financial subventions to achieve political influence. But he now learnt that imperia of the sort given to Pompey and Caesar provided more ample resources. He too, like Lucullus, is accused of personal greed in his command in Syria, but the charge sprang from misunderstanding of his motives. Crassus need not have troubled himself to go to the East merely for enrichment. What he sought was military glory and new clientelae in the province and at Rome. If he had been successful, a new annexation would have followed ( 142). To conclude, it was the scope of operations and

(138) A long experience stood behind Sulla’s law on maiestas, which forbade a governor to leave his province or wage a war without the authorization of the Senate or the people (Cic., Pis., 50). The lex Appuleia had probably enacted a similar prohibition. What Cicero says of L. Crassus and C. Cotta is very instructive (De In ., 2. I l l , Pis., 62). (139) See n° 186 and Badian, RI, 80 ff., where the case of Pompey is elaborated. (140) Caesar thought of Illyricum and Transalpine Gaul as possible provinciae for his proconsulship. See Rice Holmes, Republic, 1, 324 f . ; G elzer , Caesar, 77-9. --------------------------(141) See n° 152, ii and ch. VI, iii. Cf. Badian, R I, 89-91. There is no doubt that the Senate was opposed to the conquest of Gaul. See Strasburger, Hist. Zeit., 175 (1953), 236-8 ; T iempe, Historia, 19 (1965), 189-214. (142) See n° 159 and cf. Badian, R I, 88 f.

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the extent of the ambitions that changed in the first century, but essentially the same motives had prevailed in the second century. The change was con­ nected with the decline in morals and in allegiance to the state, and in turn it had its impact on internal politics, __ Less conspicuous, but not unimportant, were acts of oppression, designed to enrich the governors. Gallia Transalpina suffered much from requisitioning and exploitation by Roman governors in the 70’s and 60’s. The complaints of the Gauls were of no avail, a Roman governor was acquitted, and the Allobroges soon became aware that their loyalty at the time of Catilina’s plot would not move the Senate to relieve their burdens. The result was a hopeless uprising!143). It has been noticed that Roman governors were often ready to support the interests of their friends in the provinces ( l44), a practice detrimental to the provincials. One case is in­ structive. Brutus lent money to the envoys of Salamis who came to Rome and was able to procure two senatus consulta to validate the loan. The first exempted him from the penalties of lex Gabinia, which forbade lending money to provincials in Rome, and the second directed the governors of Cilicia to respect the special conditions of the loan ( l45). We do not know whether this was a typical occurrence, but if Brutus who was not a senator at the time could procure these decisions:, there is reason to suppose that it was not rare. It was the behaviour of the governors and senators on the spot which actually shaped the relations between the Roman state and the sub­ jects. Of course, there were the leges repetundarum, but senators were reluc­ tant to condemn members of their own class and the provincials knew it too well. From the point of view of the subjects, Roman administration, taxation, legislation and jurisdiction were directed to a certain extent towards the enrichment of the rulers. The worst cases, like those of Galba and other notorious offenders, may have been exceptional, but oppression, together with what might be called normal exploitation, i.e. the utilization of legitimate means of enrichment, created the image of Roman rule ( 146). Accordingly, warlike peoples, in Spain, Liguria and Gaul, kept on fighting as long as they could. Others- were bound to accept the situation and to make the best of it, sometimes by charging oppressors before the courts, sometimes by submitting their complaints to the Senate and sometimes ap­ pealing to influential patrons at Rome. (143) On the requisitions of Fonteius in 74-72 see n° 144. C. Calpurnius Piso, proconsul 66-65, was charged by the Allobroges (Cic., Place., 98 ; Sale , Cat., 49. 2). On Murena see n° 162, and for the Allobroges and the conspiracy of Catilina see Cic., Cat., 3. 4-5 ; 14;F7acc., 102 ; Sall., Cat., 40. 1 ; 4 ; 41. 1 ; 44-5 ; 50. 1 ; Plut., Cic., 18. 3-4. For their revolt see Liv., Per., 103 ; Dio, 37. 47-8 ; 39. 65, 1-2. Schol. Bob., 149-150. (144) On senators’ profits from the provinces see ch. II, iii. (145) Cic., Att., 5. 21, 12; 6. 2, 7. Cf. n° 155. (146) On legitimate profits see ch. II, iii.

CHAPTER VIII

Senatores Versus Equites

Equestri ordini indicia tradidit ac bicipitem civitatem fecit discordiarum civilium fontem. (Varro in Non. Man, 728 L). Ancient authors and modern historians quite often depict the history of the late Republic as a struggle between the senatorial class and the Equestrian class. On this interpretation the attitude of senators and Equites towards certain problems reflected the corporate policy of their respective classes. Class interests enforced cooperation between the members of each class, and since these were contradictory, a deep antagonism ensued, which shook and demolished the stable traditional constitution (■). This view, I think, at least as it is usually expounded, is groundless ; it has to be rejected or thoroughly modified. My objection to this approach is based on two kinds of consideration, economic, and social-political. Since the Ordo Equester was economically heterogeneous, it is hardly credible that Equites had common interests ; the policy of the publicani need not have been iden­ tical with that of the great traders, and there was almost nothing to induce the landowners to back these two groups. Further, there was economically much in common between the Equites and the senators; agricultural possessions were the basic source of income not only of senators but of many Equites as well ( 2). This is not to deny that there were causes of fric­

ti) T ac., Ann., 12. 60; F lor., 2. 5, 3 ; App., BC, 1. 22. For sources on the lex iudiciaria of Gaius see SRH, 34-5. For modern views see, e.g. Taylor, PP, 19 ; Hill, RMC, 113 f. See also Brunt, Equites, 141 ff. (2) See ch. V, i ; G elzer, Kl. Schr., 1, 326 , Broughton, Equites. 150; Nicolet, Or. Eq., 253. I think Meier simplifies the situation, when he distinguishes merely between two groups: the landowners

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tion, but they sprang not from basically opposed policies of each class as a whole, but between groups within the classes and on specific occasions. Similarly it is difficult to discern a social-political cleavage. If it is true that politics at Rome were founded, to a considerable extent, on personal con­ nections, then prima facie we have to assume that Equites, or groups of Equites, would tend to establish personal ties with ordinary or leading senators. The idea that the Equites disregarded such ties, and combined to attack the whole senatorial class is strange in view of the common opinion about the very nature of Roman politics. Since ancient authors record the cleavage of the state into two parties, we must explain their observations. But we must also investigate the con­ nections between individual senators and Equites. If we can prove that amicitiae existed between them, and that senatorial factions, loose and flexible as they were, included Equites, then we are justified in rejecting the hypothesis of conflict between the two classes. Above all, we must examine the ways in which Equites acted and the scope of their influence on the Senate’s policy and on individual senators in Rome, and in the provinces as well. Since most of our information is derived from Cicero’s writings, it is useful to start by discussing his connections with Equites. I. — C icero

and the

O rdo E quester

Cicero’s own father was an Eques with estates at Arpinum. So far as we can judge, his income came mainly from agriculture ( 3). Cicero mentions or alludes to ties with Equites in numerous passages in his orations and letters. He represented members of the Ordo in public on many occasions, and even defended them in court. It was Cicero who championed the idea of con­ cordia ordinum, an alliance between the ordo equester and the senatorial class to safeguard the stability of the state and society!4). As the Ordo Equester was important to his career, we must clarify what he means when speaking of it, by studying the circumstances that brought the idea of con­ cordia ordinum to the fore, by examining what he says of the Equestrian or­ der and by investigating his personal ties with Equites.

and the publicani (RPA , 66-7). And though it is true that the latter group had landed property as well, it was not this that formed their primary economic concern, nor were they important on this account; see n. 20 below. Similarly though they had various ties with other Equites (Meier, RPA, 74-5), there is no warrant for the view that the whole class was connected with or supported them. (3) On Cicero’s father see D. G., 5, 225. (4) Strasburger, Concordia, esp. 13 ; 39 ; 59 f . ; 71 f . ; How, J R S , 20 (1930), 33 f . ; H ill RMC, 164 f.

CHAPfER VIII — SENATORES VERSUS EQUITES

179

Cicero was not the first to suggest the program of concordia ordinum, and he himself modified his views more than once in the course of his career ( 5). To judge by his own words, he thought the program was realised in his con­ sulate, while the following years witnessed his efforts to strengthen and ex­ pand the achievement of 63 ( 6). What happened in that year ? Cicero was elected .consul with the support of some of the nobiles. His election by itself did not create an alliance between the orders!7). Only the crisis brought about by the conspiracy of Catilina and the firm backing he got from the Equites, together with the decision of the Senate to put Catilian’s ac­ complices to death, made Cicero proclaim that the concordia ordinum had been achieved (Cat., 4. 15). Tabulae novae was the main aim, or slogan, of Catilina’s program, and Cicero himself considered his action in 63 as a defence of creditors!8). The bankers would have been the first to lose if Catilina had been successful. Unfortunately the identity of the Equites who came to Cicero’s aid, even before he got the unequivocal support of the Senate, evades us. Presumably, in view of the threat of tabulae novae, they were mainly businessmen ( 9). In any case, it is noteworthy that according to Cicero the concordia ordinum was realized when a serious threat to creditors and bankers brought about collaboration between the two classes. In 63 Cicero defended Murena, consul-designate for 62, on a charge of

(5) On concordia ordinum before Cicero see Strasburger, Concordia, 11 f. On the shaping of Cicero's concept of this idea and on the consensus omnium bonorum, ib., 15 ff.; 59 ff. (6) Cic., Cat.. 4 . 1 5 ; Pis., 7. Cicero was proud of his achievement as consul and tried to record it for future generations. See Att.. 1. 18, 3 ; 19, 10 ; 2. 1, 1-2 ; Fam., 5 . 1 2 ; Suit., 67 ; P is, 7 ; Plane., 85 ; Schol., Bob., 167. On Cicero after his consulship see C ary, CAH, 9, 506. (7) This is maintained by Hill, RMC, 167. Some nobles supported Cicero, but it is exaggerated to claim that the Senate as a whole backed him (Sall., Cat., 2 3 ; P urr., Cic., 10). (8) The first four groups that joined Catilina, according to Cicero's classification, had debts as a common denominator (Cat., 2. 17-20) The Allobroges, who were approached by Catilina, were indebted (S all., Cat.. 40. 1). For Cicero’s self-praises of his handling of the plot see n. 6 above. See also Sall., Cat., 14. 2-16. 4 ; 20. 8 ; 15 ; 21. 2-4 ; Cic., Off., 2. 84 ; Dio, 37. 30, 2. On tabulae novae as the main concern, and slogan, in this event see Yavetz, Historia, 12 (1963), 491 ff. Cf. Meyer, Caes Mon., 256 ; F rederiksen, JR S, 56 ( 1966), }38-1-4 0. (9) Cic., C at, 1. 21 ; 3 2 ;S » //., 51 ; Pis., 7 ; S e s t, 28 -.Phil., 2. 16 , 19 ; 7. 24 ; A tt, 2. I, 7 ; QF, 1. 1, 32 ; Sall., Cat., 49. 4. Cf. H ill, RMC, 168. It was maintained by Henderson that Cicero's Equites in 63 were in the main publicans, JR S, 53 (1963), 62. Cf. Meier, RPA, 314. Cicero's exercitus in 63 perhaps included young equites, who had probably supported him in the canvassing for the consulate (Com. Pet., 33 ; 5 0 ; Cic., Att., 2. 1 , 7 ; 19, 4 ; Phil., 2. 16; Plut , Cic., 14. 5). Cicero used delecti adulescentes from Reate (Cic., Cat., 3. 5), said to have been semi professionals by Lintott, Violence, 77 ; 90, but surely his bodyguard included friends and clients (Sall., Cat., 26. 4 ; Dio, 37. 29, 3-4). That some of the Equites were of mature years, like Atttcus, is certain, yet is enim est noster exercitus hominum ut tute scis, locupletium (Alt., 1. 19, 4) does not refer particularly to 63 (contra Lintott, Violence, 74, n. 5).

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ambitus, and his arguments deserve attention. He implies that the con­ viction of Murena would cause damage to Roman businessmen, for as governor of Gaul Murena had backed their interests and enforced the payment of money owed to them. Not all groups within the ordo equester, but only lenders or publicani were concerned in this (1U). Yet, if they were to suffer a loss, the concordia ordinum would have been shattered. It is Cicero’s reactions in 61-60, more than anything else, which show what part of the Equestrian class was vital in his opinion if the concordia ordinum were to be preserved. As he saw it, the first blow to the coalition of 63 was the motion suggested in the Senate to investigate cases of Equestrian judges wfro had taken bribes ( u >. ft collapsed with the rejection of the demand by the Asian tax-farmers that part of the sum they owed to the Senate should be remitted ( 12). In a letter to Atticus, dated 5. 12, 61., Cicero mentions the split between equites nostri and the Senate because of the attempt to subject them to the law against taking bribes, and he adds Ecce aliae deliciae equitum vix ferendae quas ego non solum tuli sed etiam ornavi and then describes the claim of the taxfarmers (Att., 1.17, 8-9). He identifies the publicani with the equites and with the Equestrian judges ( 13). The concordia ordinum was transformed from an abstract idea into concrete reality, when the financial circles within the Equestrian class found it prudent to cooperate with the senators. It was finally broken, according to Cicero, when the Senate refused to grant the request of the Asian taxfarmers ( H). Cicero records his close connections with the ordo equester in his speeches and letters, and often appears as a champion and quasi-patron of the class. General, vague statements may be disregarded. Nor is it significant that Cicero usually backed proprietors and cultivated good relations with people from all Italy, men from coloniae and municipia ( l5). Yet in some instances we can identify the group Cicero refers to when he speaks of the class. In his speech for Manilius’ bill Cicero says : Equitibus Romanis, honestissimus viris, adferuntur ex Asia cotidie litterae, quorum

U0) Cic., Mur., 4 2 ; 89. Cf. Hill, RMC, 168.

('ll) Cic., Att., 1. 17, 8; 18, 3 ; 19, 6; 2. 1, 8. (12) C ic., Att., 1. 17, 9-10 ; 18, 7 ; 19, 6-7 ; 2. I, 7-8 ; Fam., 1. 8, 4, 16, 4 ; Off., 3. 88 ; Schol. Bob., 157. Cf. App., BC, 2. 13; Brunt, Equites, 123; 128; Meier, RPA, 314, n. 9. (13) On the publicani as judges see Cic., Mur., 69 and n. 28 below. (14) Cf. Strasburger, Concordia, 44-50; Brunt, Equites, 123. (15) Cic., Att. 1. t9 , 4 ; Red. Sen., 12 ; 26 ; 39 ; Red. Quit., 10 ; Pis., 34-6 ; Dorn., 90; for Equites who supported Cicero in 58 see Sest., 18; 25 ; 27 ; 29 ; 32 ; Dom., 55 ; Pis., 23. But see Syme, RR, 889 ; T aylor, PP, 61-2.

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magnae res aguntur in vestris vectigalibus exercendis occupatae ; qui ad me pro necessitudine quae mihi est cum illo ordine causam rei publicae periculaque rerum suarum detulerunt. {Leg. Man., 4). We hear of a necessitudo between Cicero and the Ordo Equester; actually it was the publicani of Asia who stood on good terms with Cicero. And the orator records, with much praise, the interests of the publicani in Asia, and their importance for the state (16-18). The Ordo Equester is mentioned in the Verrines for the first time in the extant speeches of Cicero. Here he contrasts the uprightness of the equites as judges with the corruption of the senators ( 16). What he says about the farmers of the scriptura, who passed a decree in favour of Verres, is in­ structive : decumani, hoc est principes et quasi senatores publicanorum, removendas de medio litteras censuerunt. Habeo ex iis qui ad­ fuerunt... homines honestissimos ac locupletissimos, istos ipsos principes equestris ordinis. (2. 2, 175). The very first time, as far as we know, that Cicero spoke about the Ordo Equester in public, he took pains to praise the publicanii. In the same speech he dwelt on the submissiveness of provincial governors to the tax-farmers during the domination of the Ordo Equester over the courts ( 17). In a later and illuminating passage he says : Proximus est huic dignitati (i. e. senatoriae) ordo equester : omnes omnium publicorum societates de meo consulato ac de meis rebus gestis amplissima atque or­ natissima decreta fecerunt {Domo, 74). Cicero evidently equates the ordo equester with the societates publicanorum; according to him, the resolutions of these bodies expressed the views of the Ordo as a whole ( 18). Cicero, of course, knew that the Ordo was not a homogeneous class. In a letter to Atticus of the year 50, he distinguishes three groups : faeneratores, publicani, agricolae (19). However, scrutiny of his speeches reveals that when

(16) Cic., Div. Caec., 8 - 9 ; Verr., 1. 38 ; 2. 3, 2 2 3 -4 ; 4, 45. (17) Antea cum equester ordo iudicaret, improbi et rapaces magistratus in provinciis inserviebant publicanis; ornabant eos qui in operis erant; quemcumque equitem in provincia viderant beneficiis a liberalitate persequebantur (.Verr., 2. 3, 94). For the meaning of decumani in Verr., 2. 2, 175 see Nicolet, Or. Eq., 330 ff. Some passages may be interpreted as if the publicani were influential because other Equites followed them. But when we put together the whole Ciceronian evidence we can realize that Cicero was interested in equating the publicani with the Ordo Equester. Other ancient writers too sometimes imply identification between the publicans and the Equestrian class, but the first were the only organized group within the Ordo Equester; hence, I think, the misrepresentation. For a discussion of texts that identify publicani with the Ordo Equester see Nicolet, Or. Eq., 3 18 ff., whom I do not follow in his rigid juridical definition of the ordo publicanorum. (18) See also D om , 142 ; Har. Resp., 1-2 ; 60 ; Sest., 32 ; Vat., 8 ; Prov. Cons., 10 ; Pis., 41 ; Plane., 23-4; 33; QF, 1. 1, 6 ; Fain, 1. 9, 26; 13. 9, 2. Cf. Brunt, Equites, 124. (19) Cic., Att., 7. 7, 5. Cf. Font., 46. See Brunt, Equites, 126; Broughton, Equites, 156.

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he mentions the Ordo in a concrete way, not merely by a vague reference, he is usually alluding to the tax-farmers and in some cases to moneylenders and bankers. Mere proprietors seldom appear, and then only as individuals or indirectly as viri municipales ( 20). Cicero had scores of Equestrian friends and connections. He sent numerous letters of recommendation to leading senators in Rome or gover­ nors in the provinces on their behalf. Some of them owned estates in Italy or in the provinces!21). Others had business whose exact nature remains obscure, though perhaps some were in trade ( 22). Moneylenders and bankers too are frequently mentioned in the letters; some had business relations with C icero!23). And naturally there are the tax-farmers. There was a close friendship between Cicero and L. Aelius Lamia, who tried to give him aid in 58. Larnia had property and business in Africa, but was also probably con­ nected with the Syrian publicani (no.77). Plancius was a distinguished publicanus who, as Cicero claims, always gave him help (Plane., 25 ; 32), as did his son during Cicero’s exile (no. 182). It is significant that the father was a prominent member of the Asian societas which asked for the reduc­ tion of its contractual payment in 61. Cicero's personal ties with members of the societas seem to explain his great concern on its behalf. In Cilicia he sent an illuminating letter to Furius Crassipes, quaestor in Bithynia : Volo enim te existimare me, cum universo ordini publicanorum semper liben­ tissime tribuerim idque magnis eius ordinis erga me meritis facere debuerim, tum in primis amicum esse huic Bithynicae societati, quae societas ordine

(20) Cicero mentions the numerous Equites of the praefectura Atina (Plane., 21). Plancius the great publicanus came thence (ib., 23-4 ; 32). He of course owned real estates, but it is not this that Cicero stresses: Adiungamus... patrem publicanum; qui ordo quanto adiumento sit in honore quis nescit? Flos enim equitum Romanorum ornamentum civitatis, firmamentum rei publicae publicanorum ordine con­ tinentur. (21) L. Genuciiius Curvus — Fam., 13. 55 , M. Fadius — Fam., 9. 25, 2-3 (see next note); C. Valgius Hippianus — Fam., 13. 7 6; L. Manlius Sosis — Fam., 13. 3 0 ; L. Bruttius — Fam., 13. 38 ; L. Castronius Paetus — 13. 13 ; Q. Fufidius, M. Paucius, Q. Mamercius — Fam., 13. 11, 1. On Fufidius and Cicero see n° 211, ii. On A. Caecina see next note. M. Aemilius Avianius — Fam.. 13. 21 ; 2 7 ; C. Subernius — Fam., 9. 13; L. Aelius Lamia — n“ 77. (22) A. Trebonius — Fam., 1. 3 ; L. Aelius Lamia — n° 77 ; L. Egnatius Rufus — see next note ; C. Avianius Flaccus — Fam., 13. 7:5 ; 79 ; Atilius — Fam., 13. 62 -, M. Laenius Flaccus — Fam., 13. 63, 1 ; 14. 4, 2 ; M. Fadius — Fam., 7. 23-7 ; 13. 59 ; L. Flavius — Fam., 13. 31 ; Cn. Otacilius Naso — Fam., 13. 33 ; A. Cacina — F am , 6. 8, 1-2 ; 9 ; 13. 66. Cf. Caec., 104 ; M. Curius — Fam., 7. 30, 3 ; 13. 17 ; 50. Cf. n° 211, ii, T. Manlius — Fam , 13. 22 ; Q. Turius, Cn. Saturninus, T. Aufidius, C. Anens, Q. Considius Gallus, L. Servilius Postumus, C. Rubellius — Fam., 12. 26-7 ; L. Genuciiius Curvus — Fam, 13. 53. (23) L. Egnatius Rufus — Fam., 13. 43, 1 ; 44 ; 45 ; 47 ; 73, 1 ; 74. Cf. A tt, 4. 12, 1 ; 7. 18, 4 ; 10. 15, 4 ; 11. 3, 3 ; 12. 18, 3 ; 30, 1-2 ; Cluvius — Fam., 13. 56 and n° 211, i i ; T. Pinnius — Fam., 13. 61 ; L. Titius — Fam., 13. 14.

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ipso et hominum genere pars est maxima civitatis (constant enim ea ceteris societatibus) et casu permulti sunt in ea societate valde mihi familiares in primisque is cuius praecipuum officium agitur hoc tempore, P. Rupilius P.f. Men., qui est magister in ea societate. (Fam., 13. 9. 2). This letter speaks for itself. We may allow for some stylistic exaggeration, but it is evident that Cicero’s friendship with publicani was based on mutual services, Cicero backed the tax-farmers in the Senate and gave them letters of recom­ mendation to magistrates. And the tax-farmers had nothing to complain of his governorship!24). In view of what Cicero says in this letter, we may assume that his relations with other tax-farmers for whom he wrote recom­ mendations were of the same s o rt!25). The commentariolum petitionis says that Cicero had the support of all the publicani, almost the whole Equestrian class, many municipia, many who had been defended by him in the court, some collegia, and young men who wished to study rhetoric (§ 3). No doubt Cicero was always ready to assist Equites who asked for his help, and he would give a letter of recom­ mendation quite wHiingiy ( 26). Yet it is dear that the publicani had a special position, and for an obvious reason. The Equestrian class was not an organized body, it had no institutions of its own where common policy could be planned, nor officials to carry out such a policy. There were in­ fluential Equites with close ties in the right places, thanks to their financial or commercial transactions, or to their agricultural estates. But their in­ fluence was personal. It was different with the publicani. They were organized, could debate and pass resolutions, could act as a pressure group, to see that their policy was realised. What Cicero says in De Domo reveals the truth. It was not the whole Equestrian class that passed a decision for Cicero’s return from his exile, only the societies of tax-farmers. As early as 70 he had stood on good terms with them, admitted their importance and flattered them, and his letter to C'rassipes shows that he gave them what they deserved from him.

(24) Cic., Fam., 3. 8, 4 ; 2. 13, 3 ; Alt., 6. 2, 5 ; 3, 3. (25) It is noteworthy that many of the men called principes equestris ordinis by Cicero were publicani: L. Aelius Lamia, Cn. Plancius (nos 77, 182), C. Curtius (Rub. Post., 3). See also Verr., 2. 2, 172-5 ; Plane., 23. Sometimes the Equestrian judges are accorded this title. See Flacc., 4 ; Plane, 41. Cf. H ellegouarc’h, Vocabulaire, 456 f. Cicero sent letters of recommendation for the following taxfarmers: P Cornelius, P. Cuspius, L. Iulius — Fam , 13. 6 ; P. Terentius Hispo — Alt., 11. 10, 1 ; Fam. 13. 65, 1-2 ; M. Terentius Giba — Fam., 13. 10. See also Fam.. 13. 56, 2 ; A lt, 2. 16, 4 ; QF, 1. 1, 6 ; 32-5. (26) Com Pet., 16 ff. ; Cic., Fam , 13. 6a shows Cicero’s readiness to send letters of recom­ mendation.

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PART TWO. — THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Two conclusions emerge. First, Cicero promoted his political career by collaboration with the publicani. Second, the tax-farmers were the organized group within the Equestrian class, the group able to repay services. Now in a well known passage Pliny writes Iudicum autem appellatione separare eum ordinem (i.e. equestrem) primi omnium instituere Gracchi discordi popularitate in contumeliam senatus, mox debellata auctoritas nominis... circa publicanos substitit et aliquamdiu tertiae sortis viri publicani fuere (HN, 33. 34). It is usually held that the judges in the epigraphic lex iudiciaria were defined by a census qualification ( 27), and according to Pliny it was Cicero who stabilized the use of the term equites in 63. In view of Pliny’s statement, it is clear that those who functioned as judges, after the elimination of senators from the quaestio repetundarum, were called indices, not equites. It implies that it was the publicani, out of the heterogeneous persons qualified to serve as judges, who mainly functioned in this office. We do not know how they brought this about; perhaps it was because they were organized and other qualified men were not, though the selection of the 450 judges was in the hands of the praetor peregrinus (FIRA, 1, no. 7, v. 12). Indeed Plancius the elder, the great publicanus of the Asian society, was a iudex and there is more evidence on publicani as in judges!28). If then the publicani sought to man the panels of the judges, it means either that they were not sure of the collaboration of the other Equites to ensure their interest or that there was something else in this office they wanted for themselves. Equites and senators fought for the right to serve as judges in the quaestiones. Ancient authors writing on the division of the state into two parties as a result of C. Gracchus’ activity mainly refer to this (29). Some

(27) This law (FIRA2, 1, n° 7) belongs to the Gracchan period and is probably identified with the lex Acilia. See Balsdon, PBSR, 6 (1938), 98-1 14; Badian, AJP, 75 (1954), 374-384. For census qualification as the criterion for the judges in this law see Last, CAH, 9, 892-6. Cf. G elzer. Nobilitiit, 7- 8; Stein , RR, 20-21. Some would prefer a definition by the possession of eques publicus. See Nicolet, Or. Eq., 487 ff. (28) Cic., Plane., 32. Cicero equates the Equestrian judges with the publicani: Verr., 2. 2, 174 ; 3, 94 (See n. 1 7 ) ; 3, 168 ; Mur., 69. See also D iod. Sic., 37. 5, 1 ; Ltv., Per., 70 ; Val. Max, 2. 10, 5 ; F lor., 2. 5, 3. Cf. Meier, RPA, 73-4. Perhaps publicani were usually selected for the juries because it was natural for them to have a domicilium in Rome, which was the requirement of the law (FIRA2, 1, n° 7, vv. 13; 16-7), while other qualified men were less apt to acquire a house in Rome. (29) See the texts collected in SRH, 34-5. While Rowland admits that more than one reason promp­ ted Gaiusi, he thinks that it was not by mere chance alone that the equites were so frequently the beneficiaries of the Gracchan legislation ( TAPA , 96 (1965), 361-373). In my opinion, he mixes up Gaius’ main concerns with secondary results, which become, according to his interpretation, the leitmotive of Gaius’ laws. I regard it as a gross distortion to consider the lex militaris, lex frumentaria, lex viaria, the colonies and the new taxes as aiming at the extension of Equites’ profits. The same reasoning

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185

modern historians would like to see in this struggle an attempt on the part of the Equestrian class to safeguard its material interest by controlling the courts. This is very doubtful, and at the most such an attempt could be ascribed to the tax-farmers, the only Equestrian sector which appears as a pressure group in Cicero’s writings. What caused the friction ? Why was the office of judge sought after? Before answering these questions, we shall review the personal relations between equites and senators(30). II.—

R

e l a t io n s

b e t w e e n

S

e n a t o r s

a n d

E

q u it e s

Senators and equites did not live apart, and there was no separation bet­ ween the two classes. Every kind of association between human beings existed between senators and Equites : matrimonial ties, business con­ nections and friendly relations. There were also connections due to common origin. Were these associations common? It is commonplace to speak of the domination in the Senate of the nobility and of the few who advanced in the cursus honorum (31). This is right if it means that nobiles usually occupied the higher magistracies, especially the consulate. Yet throughout the whole Republican periode nonnobiles were entering the Senate. Cicero claims that innumerable men of Equestrian stock obtained the quaestorship, tribunate and the aedileship (Plane., 60), and this is more than a rhetorical exaggeration. The number of plebeians in the Senate increased from generation to generation, a process in which non-nobiles shared!32). It was scions of the nobility or old senatorial families who more frequently obtained the higher magistracies, but since we know less of lower offices, we cannot properly estimate how many sons of Equestrian families attained senatorial rank by holding them ( 33). The number of new men in the Senate considerably increased in could suggest that all censors had Equestrian interests in mind when they carried out their building operations, which is a sheer absurdity. Meier's view is akin to that of Rowland on the constitutional aspect of Gaius’ legislation, but without exaggerating the profits of the Equites (RPA, 72 ff.). However, the 'constitutional approach’ to Gaius’ policy is doubtful in my opinion I think that his concern was to solve practical and urgent problems by appropriate legislation, not to implement constitutional theory. (30) On Equites in politics see H ill, RMC, 87-119 ; Nicolet, Or. Eq., 347-354 ; 381-6 and below sections iii-iv. On the publicans in the second century cf. Macdonald, CHJ, 6 (1939), 124-146. My ex­ planation to Cicero’s attitude mainly conforms with Brunt’s views in Equites. See also Meier, RPA, 75-6. (31) Mommsen, Hist., 3, 13-7; Gelzer, Nobilitat, 2 2 -4 4 ; Scullard, RP, 8-12. (32) On the composition of the Senate in the third century see Willems, Serial., 1, 267-282, and on its composition in 179 id., ib., 1, 308-368, and in the year 55 id., ib., 1, 423-555. Broughton writes that the Lists of officers an d low magistrates shew 75 new families (Equites tST). Cf. G elzer, Nobilitat, 26-8. On prefects and military tribunes see Soulahti, Officers, 169-187; 288-295. (33) Quaestors became senators automatically from Sulla’s time (T ac., Ann., 11. 22), and tribunes of the Plebs after the lex Atinia, whose date is uncertain. See Rotondi. Leges, 333-331 ; MRR, 1, 458 f . ;

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the first century. Many were added to the Senate by Sulla, though not 300, as alleged by Livy and Appian (34). The annual addition of 20 quaestorii to the Senate increased the chances of entry for new men (35). Caesar too ad­ ded Equites to the Senate!36), What is the significance of this process? There is little reason to assume that ex-Equites cut their ties with their families and with their Equestrian friends. They did not even give up their former sources of income and occupalions (3!). Cicero, as we have seen, always kept up his connections with Equites, and this is the more notewor­ thy as he also attempted to establish good relations with nobiles. Plancius had close ties with Equites and publicani, who supported him in canvassing for the aedileship (Cic., Plane., 23-24). Caelius too aided Equestrian friends and had their aid in turn (no. 105). Obviously there were many senators whose social origin gave them close contacts with Equites. Betrothals created family links between senators and Equites. In contrast to other aristocratic societies, there was no legal ban on marriage between nobiles or senators and citizens of other orders. Probably impoverished senators looked for rich brides to free themselves from financial em­ barrassments. Antony even married a daughter of a freedman, probably because he needed the dowry (no. 91, i). The name of Caesar’s fiancee was Cossutia, a daughter of a rich Equestrian family according to Suetonius (/«/., 1.1). The Cossutii are recorded in Delos and Greece, where they were engaged in building operations and traded in works of art (38). The second wife of Cato the Elder was daughter of a scriba (Plut., Cat. Mai., 24. 2-4). The mother of Piso, cos. 58, came from Placentia, and her father was a rich and respectable man, despite all the calumnies of Cicero (39). Torquatus, cos. 65, married a daughter of a respectable family from Asculum (40). Numitoria, the wife of Antonius praetor 74, came from501

501. Nicolet, who has collected the prosopographical evidence on senators of Equestrian origin (Or Eq.. 256-268), thinks too that there was no social cleavage between the two classes. See also Wiseman, NM RS, ch. VI and appendix IV. (34) See supra, p. 38 f. and Note B. (35) See the lists of quaestors of 80-50 in MRU. (36) Syme, PBSR, 6 (1938), 9- 22; RR, 78-96 ; Willems, Serial, 1, 586-597. (37) See ch. III. i and ch. V, i. (38) RE, 2, 1673 f . ; Syme, JR S, 34 (1944), 93 f. M. Cossutius had business in Sicilia (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 55 ; 185). Caesar’s aunt married a senator of Equestrian origin and his sister first married Pinarius and then Pedius. Pedii are recorded in the E ast and it seems that they got Roman citizenschip only after the Social War. See MUnzer, RE, 19, 38. (39) Cic., Pis., 9-11. But see Ascon, 4. Cf. n° 107. (40) Cic., S u it, 1 1; 25 ; 3 0 ; 49-50.

CH APTER

V III. —

187

S E N A T O R E S V E R S U S E Q U IT E S

Fregellae (41). Ilia, Sulla’s first wife, was of non-senatorial family (Plut., Su!L, 6. 11). Crassus, cos. 97, married a Venuleia, of a non-senatorial family (Cic., Att., 12. 24, 2). Cicero mentions a Venuleius, a tax-farmer and an accomplice of Verres in Sicily (42), Agrippa married the daughter of Atticus (43). Verres' wife was of Equestrian family (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 1668). Then there were Equites who married senatorial daughters. Q. Pedius married Caesar's sister, and their son was the consul of 43 (44). Octavius, Augustus’ father, married Atia, a daughter of an old senatorial family, ac­ cording to Suetonius (45). Milo's mother came from a consular family, but his father was of municipal origin (46). Asinius Pollio's wife belonged to an old senatorial family, the Quinctii (47). Cicero too, while still an Eques, married Terentia, of a senatorial line (48). The Equestrian Plancius was a kinsman of the Manlii Torquati and of the Appuleii Saturnini (Cic., Plane.. 27-28). In brief, though many noble families were inter-married, families of no less nobility, let alone ordinary senatorial families, were connected by marriage ties with non-senatorial families. Military service occasioned friendly connections between Equites and senators. Probably many of the military tribunes and prefects in the second and the first centuries were of Equestrian origin (49). After 129 only Equites

(4 1 ) C ic .,

(MRR,

Phil.,

n o t in c lu d e F r e g e lla e

Verr., 2 . C i c . , Verr.,

see C ic ., (4 2 )

D. G.,

3 . 17 ;

1, 4 6 . T w o N u m it o r ii w e r e t r i b u n e s o f th e P le b s in th e f ifth c e n tu r y

2 , 5 9 5 ) , b u t th e y a r e h a r d l y r e le v a n t. T h e s e n a t o r C . N u m it o r iu s w a s o f t h e L e m o n ia , w h ic h d id

(T aylor, VDRR,

5,

5 6 ; 9 3 ) . a n d f o r C . N u m it o r iu s , a n E q u e s R o m a n u s in S ic ilia ,

163.

2 . 3 , 9 9 . V e n u le iu s , th e

triumvir ( capitalis?)

o f 8 2 , is n o t a p r o o f f o r th e s e n a t o r ia l

s ta n d i n g o f h is fa m ily . H e c e r t a in l y d id n o t liv e to b e c o m e a s e n a t o r

contra SMRR,

Badian, SGRH, 4 6 ) . G r u e r i ( Historia, 15 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 4 1 ) . S e e

68 ;

s e n a t o r ia l f a m ily

(F lor.,

2. 9, 26 ;

O ros.,

5 . 2 1 , 8,

d o e s n o t s u p p o r t h is a s s e r ti o n t h a t th e V e n u le ii w e r e a a ls o

D. G.,

4 , 6 0 7 , n. 1 ;

G undel, RE,

8 A , 8 2 0 . O n ly

f o u r R e p u b l ic a n V e n u le ii a r e k n o w n . (4 3 )

Nepos, A tt,

(4 4 ) C ic .,

Caesar,

Plane.,

12.

1 -2 ;

17;

19. 4. S ee

Suet., lu l,

D. G„ 5 , 9 2 . A pp., BC, 3 .

83. 2 ;

9 4 . See

Munzer , RE,

19, 3 9 ;

G elzer.

2 1 2 f.

(M RR, 2, (Aug., 4 ) . m is u n d e r s t o o d C i c . , phil., 13. 16 (Historia, ju s ti f ie d th e multae senatoriae imagines o f

( 4 5 ) O n O c ta v iu s s e e n ° 1 7 8 . W e d o n o t k n o w o f a n y s e n a t o r ia l A tii b e f o r e th e S u lla n a g e 5 3 5 ) . Y e t S u e to n i u s s a y s t h a t M . A tiu s B a lb u s , O c ta v iu s ’ f a t h e r - i n - l a w , h a d c u r u l e a n c e s t o r s T h i s is c o n t e s te d b y W i s e m a n w h o s u g g e s ts th a t S u e to n i u s 14 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 3 3 3 f.), a n d t h a t it w a s B a l b u s ’ m o t h e r w h o

S u e to n i u s . I f s o , t h i s is a n e x a m p le o f m a r r ia g e b e tw e e n s e n a t o r ia l a n d n o n - s e n a t o r i a l fa m ilie s . B u t I a m n o t s u r e o f e i t h e r s u g g e s tio n .

(4 8 )

D. G„ 1, 2 9 - 3 1 .. S e e n ° 8 6 . Alt., 7 . 9 , 1 ; A p p ., BC, D. G., 6 , 6 0 4 .

(4 9 )

Suolahti, Officers,

(4 6 )

( 4 7 ) C ic .,

4.

12;

D. G„

2,

10.

1 0 9 - 1 4 5 ( m i lit a r y t r i b u n e s ) ; 2 5 3 - 2 7 9 ( p r e f e c ts ) . T h e e v id e n c e is c o n t e s te d

b y N ic o le t, w h o w a n ts to r e d u c e th e n u m b e r o f o f f ic e r s o f E q u e s t r ia n o r ig i n f.), b u t h is d e f i n iti o n s e e m s t o o rig id .

(Or. Eq.,

1 5 4 f. ; 2 7 2 f . ; 4 3 4

188

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were registered in the 18 centuries ( 50). The few known lists of consilia of generals include Equites and military tribunes!51). It is obvious that close relations could be established between Equites and senators in military ser­ vice ( 52), and indeed, some Equites embarked on a senatorial career with the help of their former commanders!53). Equites often assisted senators to administer their properties, or even gave them financial support. The case of Cicero is the best known. He could almost always get credit, and it looks as though Atticus managed his affairs more than he did himself !no. 211, iv-v). Oppius, Matius and Balbus took care of Caesar’s business affairs while he was in Gaul (no. 152, iv). When Lentulus Crus, cos. 49, left Italy, Balbus undertook to look after his property as well; they had been friends earlier (nos. 122, 127). Most is known of Atticus. He systematically assisted senators with money and took care of their possessions. He helped Marcus and Quintus Cicero, Hor­ tensius, A. Manlius Torquatus and Cato to manage their affairs. Marius the younger, Cicero and Brutus all benefited from his financial support ! 54). His readiness to help his intimate connections placed him on an equality with senators, and if he had wished, he could have made a successful senatorial career !55). Pompey was helped by the banker Cluvius, who managed his loans in Asia Minor (no. 186, ii). The agents of Brutus and Torquatus in Cilicia were probably Equites, otherwise they would hardly have been nominated as prefects (nos. 155, 167). P. Cornelius Sulla was a patron of the Eques P. Sittius (no. 133). Nepos writes that the rich Caecilius, Atticus’ uncle, was a friend of Lucullus (Att., 5. 1), and we know from Cicero that both were involved in a loan to one P. Varius (Att., 1. 1, 3). It seems that close and intimate relations ensued from the concern of Equites in senators’ business affairs. Obviously they could easily approximate to senators and nobiles in wealth. It is not improbable that they cultivated business relations for the sake of influential connections, and that Atticus was not exceptional. (5 0 ) C ic ., fro m th e

Rep.,

4. 2 ;

Stein , RR,

1 -2 ;

H ill, RMC,

1 0 5 - 6 . N ic o l e t d a t e s t h e e x c lu s io n o f s e n a t o r s

1 8 c e n tu r ie s to a f t e r 1 2 3 , b u t h is a r g u m e n ts a r e w eak .

consilium o f P o m p e i u s S t r a b o (ILLRP, 5 1 5 ) n u m b e r e d 6 0 m e n , o f equites. A c c o r d in g to C i c h o r iu s , a l l th e t r i b u n e s a n d 9 equites w e re o f s e n a t o r ia l f a m ilie s (RS, 1 8 1 ) , b u t M . M a lo le iu s , o r M a io l e iu s ULLRP, 5 1 5 , n . 8 ) , c e r t a in l y w a s n o t o f s e n a t o r ia l s to c k . S u o l a h t i w r ite s t h a t 4 0 % w e r e o f E q u e s t r i a n o r ig i n ( Officers, 1 3 9 ) . O n t h e con­ silium o f L e n tu lu s C r u s in 4 9 s e e J oseph., AJ, 1 4 . 2 2 9 ; 2 3 8 ; Suolahti, Officers, 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 ; 3 4 0 . M a n y m u n i c ip a l equites s e r v e d w ith L . D o m it iu s A h e n o b a t b u s (C aes., BC, 1. 1 7 , 2 ; 2 3 , 2 ). (5 1 )

Mommsen, StR,

1, 3 1 5 f. T h e

w h o m 1 7 w e r e m i lit a r y t r i b u n e s a n d 3 3

( 5 2 ) O n C a e s a r 's v e t e r a n E q u i te s s e e c h . IX , iii, a n d o n r e p r e s e n ta tiv e s o f E q u i te s in th e S e n a t e a n d in t h e p r o v in c e s c h . V I I I , iii-iv . (5 3 ) S ee

Suolathi, Officers,

1 8 1 -7 ; 2 9 4 -5 .

(54) N epos, Att., 15. 2-3. (5 5 )

N epos, Att.,

2. 2 ; 4. 4 ;

6. 2 ;

8 . 6 ; 11. 4 - 6 ;

19. 2 . S ee a lso n°

2 1 1 , iv.

CHAPTER

V III. —

SEN ATORES V ERSUS

189

E Q U IT E S

Not a few Equites are recorded as friends of senators, though we do not know the nature of many of these friendships. The fact by itself is noteworthy, especially as friendly relations were not restricted to a certain sector of senators. The likely assumption that senators of Equestrian origin kept up connections with Equites is corroborated by specific instances of friendship ( 56). Other cases illustrate friendly relations between Equites and men of old senatorial families ( S7), even nodlies ( 58). Significantly these Equites were not merely Italian agricolae but also tax-farmers, contractors and men of business in the provinces. In conclusion, we may say that there was no social separation between the two classes. If more details were known, we could perhaps detect some differentiation. Presumably some Equites like Atticus, Balbus, Caelius and Plancius, who had property and business on a large scale, enjoyed a higher social standing than others. They enjoyed splendor, dignitas, gratia and auctoritas ( 59). Others were of inferior rank, perhaps because their resources

( 5 6 ) O n C i c e r o s e e s e c tio n i o f t h i s c h a p t e r a n d n '1 2 1 1 ; th e E q u e s M . V a r is id i u s a c te d f o r h is f r ie n d L. M u n a ti u s P la n c u s in 4 3 ( n ° 1 7 7 ) . T h e s e n a t o r F id ic u la n i u s F a lc u la g a v e e v id e n c e f o r S ex . A e b u ti u s (n °

1 4 2 ) . T h e E q u e s C . A r p in e i u s w a s a f r ie n d o f Q . T i t u r i u s S a b in u s , le g a te o f C a e s a r ( C

a e s .,

BG,

5.

2 7 , 1 ; 2 8 , I ) . T h e p r a e t o r F la v iu s h a d c o n n e c tio n s w ith T . O c ta v iu s N a s o , w h o w a s a c tiv e in A s i a a n d le ft h im a n in h e r ita n c e ( n ° 1 4 3 ) . Q . L ig a r iu s w a s a f r ie n d o f C . C a e s e tiu s ( C i c . , E ques (V

a l .,

Lig.,

3 3 ), w h o w as an

M a x ., 5 . 7 , 2 ).

( 5 7 ) O n th e E q u e s C n . C a l id iu s a n d S is e n n a s e e n ° 1 3 1 . C i c e r o ’s w o r d s im p ly t h a t o t h e r g o v e r n o r s t o o h a d f r ie n d ly r e l a ti o n s w ith C a l id iu s , i.e . C . L ic in iu s S a c e r d o s a n d S e x . P e d u c a e u s

(Verr.,

2. 4 , 4 3 -4 ).

T h e la tte r h a d a n E q u e s t r ia n f r ie n d in N u r s i a ( n “ 1 8 1). C . C l u e n t i u s H a b it u s w a s a f r ie n d o f th e s e n a t o r M . B a e b iu s ( C i c . ,

Cluent.,

4 7 ) . L. Q u in c t iu s ,

pr.,

6 8 , w a s a p a t r o n o f O p p ia n i c u s ( C i c . ,

Cluent.,

74;

1 7 5 ).

nobiles

( 5 8 ) T h e f o llo w in g 3 9 , 2 ) ; C rassu s,

cos.,

h a d E q u e s t r ia n f r ie n d s ; C n . C lo d i a n u s ,

cos.,

7 2 (n ° 1 2 6 ) ; C a e s a r

(BC,

1.

9 5 ( n ° 5 5 ) . T w o E q u i te s le ft in h e r ita n c e s to A n t o n y ( n ° 9 1 , ii). T h e E q u e s C .

M in u c i u s R e g i n u s s e r v e d w ith h is f r ie n d M e te llu s S c ip io

(Bell. Afr.,

6 8 . 4 ) . C . C a s s is u s L o n g i n u s s e n t a

le tte r o f r e c o m m e n d a tio n f o r h is f r ie n d , th e E q u e s M . F a d iu s ( C i c . , G a ll o n iu s w a s a f r ie n d o f L . D o m it iu s A h e n o b a r b u s , f r ie n d ly r e l a ti o n s w ith th e E q u e s C . F la v i u s ( C i c . ,

cos.,

Fam.,

Fam.,

15. 14, 1 -2 ). T h e E q u e s

5 4 ( n ° 1 3 9 ) . P is o , C i c e r o 's s o n - i n - l a w , h a d

1 3 . 3 1 ) . M . C l a u d i u s M a r c e l lu s w a s a f r i e n d o f

th e E q u i t e s P . l u n i u s a n d C n . M u s tiu s , t h e f ir s t a c o n t r a c t o r o f p u b li c b u il d in g a n d t h e s e c o n d a ta x fa rm e r ( C ic .,

Verr., 2 . 1, 1 2 9 - 1 5 0 ) . A tti c u s cos., 4 5 , V a r r o a n d t h e

F a b i u s M a x im u s ,

h a d m a n y n o b l e f r i e n d s : Q . M e te llu s C e l e r , M e te llu s S c ip io , C la u d ii M a r c e lli ( D.

G.,

5, 8 2 -3 ;

MUnzer , Hermes,

40

( 1 9 0 5 ) , 9 4 f f .) . S e x . R o s c iu s A m e r i n u s h a d c lo s e tie s w ith th e S c ip i o n e s , th e M e te lli a n d th e S e rv ilii

Leg., 3 . 3 0 ) . F o r H o r ­ comites in h is l a s t j o u r n e y w a s C . C a u s in u s S c h o la , a n E q u e s f r o m I n t e r a m n a ( C i c . , M il. , 4 6 ; A scon, 3 1 ; c f. S chol ., Bob., 8 5 ) . ( 5 9 ) F o r splendor s e e C i c . , Rose. Am., 1 4 0 ; Sest., 1 3 7 ; Plane., 12 ; H ellegouarc’h, Vocabulaire, 4 5 8 - 4 6 1 ; N icolet, Or. Eq., 2 1 3 - 2 2 4 . F o r dignitas, C i c . , Att., 1. 1 7 , 9 ; Cluent., 1 5 2 ; Pros. Cons., 1 0 ; Pis., 4 1 ; Plane., 21 ; 3 2 ; Cael., 3 ; N epos, A tt, 1. 1 ; 6 . 2 ; V al. M ax., 4 . 5 , 1 ; H ellegouarc’h, Vocabulaire, 4 5 7 - 8 ; N icolet, Or. Eq., 2 3 6 - 2 4 1 ( e x a g g e r a tin g th e ju r i d i c a l a s p e c t o f th e s e te r m s o f s o c ia l p r e s tig e ) . F o r gratia a n d auctoritas C i c . , Verr., 2 . 3 , 61 ; Pros. Cons., 2 4 ; Plane., 3 2 ; N epos, Att., 6 . 2 ; 1 1 . 5 . C f. Stein , RR, 3 0 flf.; H ellecouarc’h, Vocabulaire, 4 6 1 - 6 . ( C ic .,

Rose. Amerin.,

1 5 ) . L u c u llu s ’ n e i g h b o u r in T u s c u l u m w a s a n E q u e s ( C i c . ,

te n s i u s a n d C u r i o s e e D io 3 8 . 1 6 , 2 - 4 . O n e o f C l o d i u s ’

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were inferior, or because of the nature of their business ( 60). However similar differences existed within the senatorial class as well. On the whole, there is little doubt that intermixture was the most common aspect of relations between senators and Equites, not alienation. The ties between them were personal and did not extend beyond the familiar framework of Roman society as it is usually depicted. III.—

S

e n a t o r s

a n d

E

q u it e s

in

t h e

P

r o v in c e s

Governors and their officers sometimes cooperated with Equites, sometimes curbed their operations and prevented them from exploiting the provincials. How can we explain this? Can we discern a pattern of action on the part of the governors to justify the view that there was a senatorial policy, consciously or unconsciously hostile towards the Equites ? Did friction result from incompatible economic interests or were there other reasons? Finally, did collaboration spiring from identity of economic in­ terests? As governor of Sardinia in 198 Cato took strong action against money lenders till they were forced to leave the island ( 61). At first sight it looks as if Cato was opposed to usury. In fact this was not so. Two principles guided his provincial administration, in Sardinia and in Spain : saving public money and concern for good relations with the provincials. He refused money the Senate voted for his personal needs and did not make use of his right to requisition commodities from the provincials. It was in line with this policy that he curbed the profits of money lenders!62). On the other hand, it seems that it was Cato who let the silver mines to publicani in Spain ( 63). The best known clash between Equites and a governor happened in Scaevcila’s governorship of A sia!64). Scaevola and Rutilius, his legate, restricted the operations of the Asian publicani out of concern for the provincials ! 65). Badiain claims that the Seriate, instigated by the intrigues of Scaurus, sent Scaevola specifically in order to restrain the tax-farmers’ ac-

(6 0 ) C ic .,

QF,

1. 2 , 6 . S e e

G elzer, NobilUnt,

1 2 -4 .

L i v ., 3 2 . 2 7 , 3 - 4 . F r a n k s u p p o s e d t h a t th e le n d e r s w e re C a r t h a g i n i a n s ( ESAR, 1, 2 0 8 ) . B u t it

(6 1 )

is h a r d l y c r e d i b le t h a t th e y r e m a in e d in th e is la n d a t th e tim e o f t h e H a n n i b a l i c W a r. (6 2 ) 6. 2 ; (6 3 )

ORF\ fr. 8 3 , p. 3 6 ; Liv., Front., Strat., 4. 3 . 1. Brunt., Equites,

139 ;

32. 27, 4

; Vai, Max., 4 .

Badian, Publicans,

3 2 f.

3 ,1 1 ;

(.contra

Pun., N il

14. 91

; Plut., Cat. Mai.,

F r a n k w h o d a t e d it t o 1 7 9 .

ESAR,

1,

1 5 4 ). ( 6 4 ) A c c o r d in g t o B a d ia n (6 5 )

D iod. S ic.,

14. C i c . ,

Verr.,

37. 5

in 9 4 ( Athenaeum, 3 4 ( 1 9 5 6 ) ,

; Cic., Fam,

2. 3 , 2 0 9

1. 9 , 2 6

; Att,

5 . 17, 5

;

1 0 4 FT.). S e e a l s o 6. 1 , 1 5 ;

SMRR,

Val. M ax.,

42.

8. 1 5 , 6

d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r ily r e f e r t o t h i s S c a e v o la . S e e n ° 6 6 , n .

; A scon.,

159.

CH APTER

V III. —

SEN A TO RES V ERSUS

191

E Q U IT E S

tivity. I think that this theory is based on incorrect assumptions and that it has rightly been rejected ( 66). The simple truth is that Scaevola acted on his own initiative, and wanted merely to give just and efficient administration ; he could not condone extortion from the provincials by the tax-farmers. His arrangements were exemplary for subsequent governors. Cicero based his edict on that of Scaevola, and this is the more telling in view of his equestrian connections. This case is not a sign of anti-Equestrian policy ; it rather sprang from the concern of an honest governor for good adminis­ tration, which at the same time was for the benefit of the Empire ( 67). We may add that about the same time, L. Sempronius Asellio, the governor of Sicily, was mainly helped by an Eques in his efforts to restore the prosperity of the province, half-ruined by the slave war (Diod. Sic., 37. 8, 1). In 84 Sulla imposed a fine on the Asian cities and the payment of a 5 years tax. The collection of the money was not let to tax-farmers, for the province was divided into 44 districts, each one of which was responsible for the levying of its quota. The system was used on some later oc­ casions!68). Sulla’s device has been considered as an expression of his hostility to the publicans ; wrongly, because the circumstances have not been taken into account!69). The organization of the tax-farmers was destroyed by Mithridates’ invasion in 88 ; some of the personnel had been killed, others who escaped the massacres had fled. The head-quarters of the societies were in Rome, where Sulla’s enemies had control. Sulla needed money urgently, and in the circumstances he had to dispense with the ser­ vices of the tax-farmers. It was administrative necessity, not policy that for­ ced him to devise a new system for collecting the money!70). Verres damaged the interest of many Equites in Sicily by his demands of

(6 6 ) See

Badian, Athenaeum,34

( 1 9 5 6 ) , 1 0 4 - 1 2 3 IB a d ia n 's r e c o n s t r u c tio n o f p o litic s in th e 9 0 's is

v itia te d b y tw o f a c to r s . H e a s s u m e s t h a t th e r e w e re m a in ly tw o

factiones, nobiles

M a r iu s , a n d th u s u n d e r r a t e s th e a s p ir a tio n s a n d in d e p e n d e n c e o f m a n y o f h is a r g u m e n ts o n

e v id e n c e f r o m

tr ia ls , w h ic h

th a t o f th e M e te lli a n d t h a t o f in g e n e ra l. S e c o n d ly h e b a s e s

in m y o p i n i o n is a m b ig u o u s a n d m a y b e

m is le a d in g . M a n y o f h is r e c o n s t r u c tio n s h a v e b e e n re je c te d b y G r u e n , i n c lu d in g th e i n t e r p r e ta tio n o f th e s o c a lle d ‘ S c a e v o la ’s m i s s io n ’ ( Historia, 15 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 3 2 - 6 4 ) . B u t G r u e n h i m s e l f d e p e n d s t o o m u c h o n e v id e n c e f r o m tr ia ls . C £ his. b o o k , m e th o d s e e

RPCC, passim .

Meier, Bonn. Jahrb.,

16 1

F o r a n a c u te c r i tic is m o f B a d i a n ’s th e o r y a n d th e w h o le

(1 9 6 1 ), 5 0 8 -3 1 3 .

( 6 7 ) O n S c a e v o la ’s e d i c t a s a m o d e l f o r o t h e r g o v e r n o r s s e e C i c . , 15 ;

V al. Max.,

(6 8 ) C ic .,

8.

1 5 , 6 . F o r R u ti liu s ' tr ia l s e e s e c t io n

Verr., 2 . 1, 8 9 ; Flacc., Chr., 6 7 0 .

32 ;

QF,

1. 1, 3 3 ;

Fam.,

1. 9 , 2 6 ;

Att.,

5 . ! 7 , 5 ; 6 . 1,

iv b e lo w .

Plut., Suit.,

25. 2 ;

Luculi,

2 0 . 4 ; A p p .,

Mith.,

6 2 ; C assiod ., (6 9 )

Mommsen, Hist., 4,

1 0 0 f. ;

Marquardt, R S,

1, 3 3 8 ;

H ill, RMC,

69 ;

F rank, RI,

316 ; 326,

n. 5.

(70) Rice Holmes, Republic, 1, 395 f. ; Broughton, ESAR, 4, 518 and esp. Brunt, Latomus, 15 (1956), 17-21.

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high quotas of tithe and various pretexts to collect money (no. 218). Yet he did not spare senators. The senator C. Annaeus Brocchus was compelled to pay grain and money to the tax-farmer Symmacchus (Kerr., 2. 3, 93). All the grain was taken from the fields belonging to the wife of C. Cassius Longinus, cos. 72 (Ferr., 2. 3, 97). Verres’ acts against Equites were not motivated by anti-Equestrian policy, but, if we believe Cicero, by un­ scrupulous ambition to collect money. All alike suffered from his extortion : senators, Equites, Roman citizens and provincials. In 70 Lucullus made arrangements to enable the Asian cities to escape from the debts caused by Sulla’s fines ( 7l). The creditors resented his in­ terference and reacted strongly. What was his purpose? Lucullus himself had been responsible for levying the fine of 84. He remainedTn Asia as proquaestor till 80, and was able to see how indebtedness had grown as a result)72). If he had been guided by anti-Equestrian policy, he could already have shown his hand at that time. It was the desperate condition of the provincials that now drove Lucullus to impose a settlement, and it was by no means easy on the provincials. 25 % of debtors’ income was turned over to repayment of the debts, and Lucullus also imposed extra taxes for the same purpose)73). In Macedonia and Cilicia such taxes were strongly resented and denounced as acts of extortion ( 74). Thus no anti-Equestrian policy can rightly be ascribed to Lucullus. Besides, from the time when the fines were imposed the creditors had been operating without interference by the governors ; in a period when it is alleged an anti-Equestrian oligarchy ruled at Rome, the governors did nothing to check the Equites in Asia. It was surely only Lucullus’ concern for the provincials, not his imaginary hostility to financiers, that distinguished him from his predecessors. Piso seems to have abolished the right of publicani to collect customs in Dyrrhachium and on one occasion his verdict was favourable to a provincial and went against the Eques Fufidus (no. 107). It is obvious that his con­ cern was efficient collection without oppression of the provincials. Gabinius’ actions against tax-farmers are frequently cited. Certainly he exempted some cities from taxes and in others introduced direct collection ;

Plut., L uculi, 2 0 - 2 3 . I ; A p p ., Mith., 8 2 . S e e G elzer, RE, 1 3 , 3 9 4 ; Broughton, ESAR, 4 , Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, 1 5 6 3 , n . 2 8 ; Magie, Asia, 2 5 2 - 3 ; 1 1 2 8 , n . 4 8 . (72) O n t h e c o l le c t io n of th e f in e s a n d th e ta x by L u c u llu s s e e Cic., Acad., 2 . 1 ; Plut., L uculi, 4 . ; 2 0 ; S u li, 2 5 . 2 ; A p p ., Mith., 6 2 . For h is s ta y i n g in A s i a s e e MRR o n p r o m a g is tr a t e s in 8 4 - 8 0 . (73) F rank, ESAR, 1, 3 4 3 ; Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, 1 5 6 3 , n. 2 8 ; Magie, Asia, 2 3 8 . L u c u llu s ' (7 1 )

545 ; 567 ;

1

q u a e s t o r s h i p is r e c o r d e d in (7 4 )

CIL,

Broughton , ESAR,

P , 714 ( =

4, 5 6 7 -9 ;

a g a i n s t L u c u llu s in R o m e s e e s e c t io n

ILLRP,

3 6 2 );

S IG \

Rostovtzeff, loc. cit. iv.

745 ( =

1LS,

8 7 7 2 );

IGRP,

4, 701.

; n os 1 0 7 , 1 1 5 , n . 2 4 4 . O n th e r e a c tio n

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E Q U IT E S

he refused to hear the complaints of publicani and removed guards from custom-posts. The provincials were very grateful and Tyrian envoys came to Rome to testify on his behalf (no. 147). All Gabinius’ actions may be ex­ plained by his sincere concern for the welfare of the subjects. Yet there is another consideration. When Gabinius restored Ptolemy Auteles to his throne, he acted for his own benefit, but also in the interests of the king's creditors, foremost among them was the famous Eques Rabirius Postumus. Since Gabinius collaborated with this group (7S), which no doubt included other Equites, he cannot have been opposed to the whole Equestrian class. His concern for good administration worked to the detriment of taxfarmers, while his care for his own interest benefited Equites. Q. Cassius Longinus extorted money from Roman knights in Spain (no. 111). His behaviour was quite typical of a Roman governor in quest of private profits, and the Equestrian status of his victims was irrelevant, except, of course, for the fact that they were rich. Nor can one cite fines and taxes imposed on Equites in times of civil war as evidence of anti-Equestrian policy. These were occasioned by urgent needs, not by deliberate policy. Now to the other side of the coin. As governor of Sicily, P. Rupilius profited from support of tax-farmers. He himself had been a member of the Sicilian society before he became a senator. Another P. Rupilius, a magister of a large societas publicanorum in 50, is mentioned by Cicero (Fam., 13. 9, 2). The Rupilii disappear from the fasti after 132, perhaps because of the consul’s unpopular action against the supporters of Tiberius Gracchus. Ap­ parently the family was still engaged in publica ( 76). Rupilius’ collaboration with the tax-farmers is understandable in view of his origin and pre-senatorial occupation. Nicomedes IV, King of Bithynia, undertook to pay a large sum to Aquillius in return for his restoration to the throne. He had borrowed from Romans in Aquillius’ retinue. Aquillius, with C. Cassius, governor of Asia, induced the king to invade and plunder Pontus so as to raise the money needed for repayment. Marius may also have been connected with the in­ trigue!77). The moneylenders, Aquillius, Cassius and Marius had a com­ mon cause. But it was not the ordo equester, only a particular group of financiers that was interested in this operation, while Aquillius, Cassius and

(7 5 ) S ee n“

147,

191.

E arl, Latomus, N tcolet, Or. Eq., 2 6 6 . (7 6 )

19 ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 6 6 5 . F o r th e R u p ilii s e e

MUnzer , RE,

1A , 1231,

nos

6 a n d 10 ;

( 7 7 ) S e e n “ 4 2 , 6 3 . T h e c o o p e r a tio n b e tw e e n t h e g o v e r n o r s a n d p u b li c a n s o f A s ia , b e f o r e S c a e v o la , is c le a r ly a tte s te d b y

D iod. Sic .,

3 7 . 5 , 1 a s r e a d in ( h e e d i tio n o f

a t le a s t im p lie d e v e n in th e e m e n d a ti o n o f D in d o r f f .

W alton

in

LCL

A n d th e c o o p e r a t i o n is

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Marius were not implementing any Equestrian policy, but acting for their own profits ( 78). Many cases of cooperation between governors and Equites are recorded in the post-Sullan age. P. Servilius Vatia confirmed the rate of interest in the contracts between publicani and the Cilician cities (Cic., Att., 6. 1, 16). The requisitions of M. Antonius from Greek cities in 74-72 gave Roman moneylenders splendid openings ; possibly there was some understanding between them (no. 90). In Gaul Fonteius backed the interests of Roman Equites, tax-farmers and bankers (no. 144), and so did Murena (no. 167). It looks as though T . Aufidius, himself a tax-farmer before his senatorial career, was not averse to the publicans’ interests while governing Asia (no. 95). As proquaestor in Cyrene, M. luventius Laterensis was generous to tax-farmers (no. 157). Ap. Claudius Pulcher, governor of Cilicia 53-51, gave them full support (no. 115). While proconsul of Africa Vetus, Q. Cor­ nificius was ready to assist Roman businessmen, those who had personal ties with him or came with letters of recommendation from Cicero (no. 134). And Sulpicius Rufus, proconsul of Greece 46-45, received favourably letters from Cicero on behalf of friends with business in his province. Mo distinction can be drawn between the kind of governors who resisted operations of Equites' and those who backed them. The first group includes a man of Equestrian origin : the elder C a to ; the second group senators of all possible origins: ex-Equites, senators from old, but non-nobiles, families and nobiles. We can now answer the questions posed at the begin­ ning of this section. The attested facts show that the relations between governors and Equites in provinces do not conform to the hypothesis that there was a recognized and coherent senatorial policy towards the Equestrians class, favourable or hostile. The truth is that every governor ac­ ted independently for his own considerations ; they were of course in­ fluenced by personal connections. Hence, the policy of one governor was not necessarily identical with that of his predecessor or successor. Even in the decade of the rule of the ‘anti-Equestrian Sulian oligarchy’, no con­ sistent policy on the part of governors can be proved. Secondl> it cannot be claimed that the clashes between governors and Equites were caused by in­ compatible economic interests; for example, they did not arise because senators were interested in agriculture and Equites in money lending. There were two reasons why governors sometimes limited the freedom of action of

(78)

C f.

Brunt, Equites, 130 ; 132.

B ad ian . w r o te t h a t M a r iu s ' in t r ig u e s w e r e p r o m p t e d b y t h e i n ­

te r e s ts o f th e E q u e s t r ia n o r d e r (Athenaeum ,

34 (1956), 104 (.RI, 57

a s s o c ia te M a r iu s w ith t h e E q u i te s o n t h i s o c c a s i o n

ff.), y e t in h is r e c e n t b o o k h e d o e s n o t f.).

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Equites, or even damaged their interests. First, a governor sincerely con­ cerned for state-revenues, the welfare of the subjects and the security and good order of his province was likely to collide with Equites. Second, greed might make him injure Equestrian interests for his own advantage. On the other hand, the support governors gave Equites is not, generally speaking, to be understood as meaning that they had common business interests. It need only mean that they collaborated in mutual enrichment at the expense of the provincials ; both parties belonged to the ruling class which exploited the subject (T9). And there is further factor. Personal ties and letters of recommendation often determined the attitude of governors towards Equites. The correspondence of Cicero reveals the ways in which Equites acted : they tried to find suitable connections and so to influence gover­ nors (7980). Governors were often quite ready to comply with their friends' wishes ; there was nothing unusual in this. A governor was a politican seeking friends and influence, who were more important to him than the provincials or, sometimes, than his own profits. Most probably this was the usual way in which Equites managed to safeguard their interests : they would seldom have needed to resort to vindictive action in Rome. IV.—

S

e n a t o r s

a n d

E

q u it e s

in

R

o m e

Before the Gracchan period, Equites, apart from the agricolae, were chiefly engaged in operating the silver mines of Spain, in constructing public buildings and in army contracting (81). At times disputes broke out between publicani and magistrates or Senate. What is their significance? The first case occurred in the Hannibalic War. Publicani had undertaken to supply the Roman Army in Spain. They had purposely used rotten ships ; when those sank, they demanded compensation much higher than the value of the goods. Livy writes that the senators did not wish to raise a serious conflict with the publicani at such a grave time for the state, and therefore took no strong action against M. Postumius from Pyrgi, who was respon­ sible for the fraud. But two tribunes of the plebs prosecuted him. As a third tribune, his kinsman, was afraid to veto the proceeding, the publicani began to riot and threw the Assembly into disorder. The Senate then showed a (79) There is no warrant for Jaczynowska’s assertion that after 70 Equites obtained their aims thanks to the economic dependence of senators on them. Nor is it true that consulars seldom supported Equites (II, 317). (80) On Cicero’s letters of recommendation see section i of this chapter. They are not unique, cf. de Ste. C roix, Br. Jour S o c , 5 (1954), 42-3. (81) Frank, CP, 28 (1933), 1-1 1 ; ESAR, 1, 102 ; 148-157. Frank unduly minimized the business affairs of Equites. See Brunt. Equites, 138-140; Badian, Publicans, chap. l-II. Cf. ch. V, i.

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stronger hand, and Postumius was punished. This incident has a certain ressemblance to cases in provinces. Probably Postumius tried first to exploit his personal connections within the Senate; next his kinsman who was a tribune was approached but in vain, and only then did the publicani resort to force. There was probably no change in the system as a result of this ex­ perience ; army supplies continued to be provided by contractors ( 82). Another dispute occurred in 184. As censors, Cato and Flaccus imposed unfavourable terms on contractors. Their action is sometimes cited as proof of the supposed anti-Equestrian policy of the Seriate in the first half of the second century. But Livy's narrative implies that the former censors had offered easy terms to contractors. Cato and Flaccus may well have been motivated by concern for public finance, and not by hostility to Equites as such. It is also significant that those who suffered had access to influential senators and that the Senate, after discussing the matter, cancelled the first contracts and instructed the censors to invite new- tenders.-The Senate did not endorse the censors’ action, and though Cato and Flaccus took vengeance on the former contractors by excluding them from the auction, they were compelled to accept terms more profitable to contractors. The publicani themselves were not united in this case(83). It has been held that the proceeding of the censors of 179 showed the Senate’s desire to obtain the support of wealthy elements in Roman society. Perhaps, yet there is no proof that the censors did not act on their own, and obviously the new customs and taxes were primarily intended to increase the state’s revenues, not those of the publicans (8‘). On the other hand, the conduct of the censors of 174 does not necessarily reflect a struggle between Senate and publicani. Many lost their place in the 18 centuries, but that proves little for we do not know who the victims were; they could have been senators and senators’ sons as well (85). Moreover, the contractors whose tenders were accepted in 174 did not complain of the terms, as had happened ten years before ; they resented the decision of the censors of 169 to exclude them from bidding again that year. This action did cause some tension, yet it cannot have meant that the censors aimed at estranging all contractors. They may have been influenced by other competitors, or it may (82) For the fraud of the publicans and the case of Postumius see Liv., 23. 48-9 ; 25. 3, 8-5, 1. On army contracts see Liv., 34. 9, 12 (1 9 5 ); 44, 16, 3-4 (169) and Brunt, Equites, 138; Badian, Publicans, 17-20. (83) Liv., 39. 44, 7-8. Cf. Plut., Cat M ai, 19. Nicolet wrongly cites this incident as proof that the Senate was hostile to the publicans in the first half of the second century (Or. Eq., 347). (84) Liv., 40. 51. See Mc D onald, CHJ, 6 (1939), 134.

(85) Liv., 41. 27, 13 ; McDonald, ioc. cit.. On senators as equites equo publico see Stein, RR, 2, n. 1 and for the censors of 174, M RR , 1, 404.

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have appeared to them that the contractors of 174 were inefficient or fraudulent. Matters reached a critical stage, because this time the old publicani were not successful in the Senate, where they set their friends to work. Only then did they induce the tribune of the plebs Rutilius to prosecute the censors, C. Claudius Pulcher and Ti. Gracchus Sempronius. When eight centuries of the equites equo publico and many in the first classis had voted against Claudius, leading senators and his colleague in­ terfered on his behalf; he was acquitted but only by a narrow majority (Liv., 43. 14-16). At first sight one is inclined to conclude that the publicani wielded powerful influence. Indeed this is the view of some scholars, but it is wrong in my opinion ( 86). The censors were unpopular for other reasons : they had compelled many men to serve in the Macedonian war and had deprived many of their horses, and even those who retained their public horses may have resented their severe census equitum. Rutilius’ prosecution also sprang from a personal quarrel with the censors, who had punished his client. The publicani who had lost their contracts exploited general hostility to the censors. We cannot then conclude that there was a total clash of the publicani, let alone the whole Equestrian class, with the Senate. Sometimes the Senate decided to close down mines, thereby presumably cutting the profits of publicani. Thus in 167 the Senate stopped the operation of the gold and silver mines in Macedonia. Livy says that it was imprudent to leave them to Macedonians, nor was it fair to put the provin­ cials at the mercy of Roman publicans ( 87). Does the second part of Livy’s explanation stand scrutiny? The working of mines had nothing to do with the free population of Macedonia, for it was presumably done by slave labour. There is ample evidence of maladministration by Roman governors in Spain, but complete silence on misbehaviour by the mining contractors. It seems that neither experience nor probability could have suggested the impossibility of Roman publicani operating the mines without harassing the Macedonians. The second part of Livy’s explanation is thus unintelligible in its historical context, and is probably coloured by experience of a later period. The first reason given by Livy may then be the only motive for the Senate’s resolution, perhaps coupled with the fact that it was impracticable to lease the mines to Roman contractors. There is little doubt that the foreign policy of the Senate was not guided by economic motives in this

(86) Mc Donald, CHJ, 6 (1939), 134 f. ; Brunt, Equites, 140 , Meier, RPA, 70. Nor do 1 agree with Nicolet's interpretation of this incident (Or. E q , 348) or with Badian, Publicans, 39-44. (87) Uv., 45. 18, 3 - 4 ; 29, 11 ; D iod. Sic . 31. 8.

198

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period, and that annexations were avoided, as far as possible (88). The only precedent for working mines outside Italy was in Spain, but there mining was done in a Roman province under the protection of Roman legions. Once the Senate decided not to annex Macedonia, there was no basis for the activity of publicani there. Besides there was plenty of bullion in this time, while the Macedonian mines were probably exhausted and their operation was perhaps of little value to Rome ( 89). When they were reopened in 158, the production was probably restricted to local needs ( 90). On the whole, this case seems to be irrelevant to the question of relations between Senate and publicani. Pliny writes that an old resolution of the Senate forbade the operation of mines in Italy, and that by a decision of censors, publicani were not allowed to employ more than 5,000 workers in the gold mines at Vercellae (91). It is hard to understand the reason for these decisions, because no dates are given. The restriction on the number of workers may have- been a precaution against an uprising, or perhaps intended to prevent grave monetary consequences from overproduction ( 92). As to the Italian mines, which were quite insignificant, the Senate may have been concerned to preserve them, and in any case its decision did not stop the working of the iron mines in Elba (Strabo, 5. 2, 6). It has also been conjectured that the Spanish contractors were interested: in the closing down of the Italian mines ( 93). Though the circumstances are obscure, it is surely very hasty to infer that the Senate was simply seeking to restrict the contractors’ activity or was guided by a preference for agriculture ( 94). These are all the known disputes between Equites and senators till the Gracchan period. All were connected with the authority of censors, and in all cases it was publicani who were concerned, not the Equestrian class. The evidence does not allow us to assume that the Senate or senators were guided by anti-Equestrian motives. Magistrates who caused losses to con­ tractors acted from a desire to increase the state’s revenues and on their own

(88) See Badian., RI. chs. I-II. (89) F rank, ESAR, 1, 156; 262 ; Brunt, Equites, 140' (contra McDonald, CHJ, 6 (1939), 136). (90) McDonald, ib., 139; Brunt, loc. cit. (91) For the Senate’s decision see Plin., NH, 3. 138 , 37. 202 and for the censors’ id., ib., 33. 78. (92) Cf. Frank, ESAR, 1, 264. (93) F rank, loc cit (94) Pais’ assumption that the policy of the Roman government was influenced by preference for agriculture cannot be accepted, nor is there any reason to accept his view that the free circulation of gold was abolished after the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul. See Dalle guerre Puniche a Cesare Augusto (Roma, 1918), 545-619. In his appendix on publicani in politics, Nicolet includes the case of Pandosinus and the Thisbenses (FIRA2, 1, p. 246), as a possible instance of a dispute (Or. Eq., 348). This is very doubtful, as he admits, and the Senate's decision to appoint judges does not imply anti-publican policy.

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initiative, while contractors had supporters, ready to back their interests within the Senate itself. Polybius states that the Senate ruled the people by its control of the leasing of public works, and by the ' people' he in fact means the Equestrian class!95). It cannot be shown that hostility to this class made the Senate use its power to the detriment of contractors. It is significant that the publicani were themselves not united and did not make common cause when some of them suffered ; the censors could play them off against each other. It is also remarkable that while Equites were later to insist on their right to function as judges, they did not question the authority of the Senate over state contracts, though it had probably at­ tained this authority by custom, not law!96). Even in the post-Gracchan period when the Senate’s authority had declined, no objection seems to have been raised then against the Senate’s and censors’ powers in this field. In brief, extant evidence indicates that before the Gracchan period, the Senate’s policy was not anti-Equestrian, nor was the Equestrian class united nor did it question the Senate's control of administration. Friction did not arise from different economic interests. If particular publicani found them­ selves at a disadvantage, they tried to obtain redress in the Senate through their connections there (97). This state of affairs must be kept in mind when we come to discuss the situation in the following period. We are often ready to judge an action by its results. A popular theory maintains that C. Gracchus wanted to obtain the support of the Equestrian class in his struggle against the Senate, and, therefore, gave them the collection of the Asian taxes and the right to function as judges in the quaestio repetundarum (98). That Gaius could rightly expect to extend his personal influence by passing his laws is a reasonable view, but it is super­ ficial to single out this motive as the only one. Nothing in the past relations (95) Polyb., 6. 17. See Frank, ESAR, I, I4S-9 and Walbank’s commentary. (96) K V on F ritz, The Theory o f Mixed Constitution (New York, 1954), ch. 7, esp. 162-4. (97) For the good relations between Equites and senators before the Gracchan period see Dio d . Sic ., 35. 25 ; Uv., Per., 60. My conclusion differs from that of Brunt, though I agree with his view that the scope of publicans' activity was fairly considerable even before the establishment of the province of Asia (Equites, 138-141). I think he did not consider all the known details, nor did he pay attention to the fact that the Senate's authority over contracts was. not questioned. Broughton rightly remarks that It was groups within the Ordo Equester that were involved in the disputes, which were sporadic happenings. See also Meier , RPA, 67-9 ; who concludes: [Die Ritterschaft] “ nahm dem Senat grosse staatliche Aufgaben ab, und dabei waren ihre Menschen und ihre Mittel so glucklich beschaftigt und ausgelastet, dass sie die adelsstaatliche Ordnung und Politik kaum shorten." (98) For ancient authors see SRH, 34-7, and foir modern views, e. g. H ill, RMC, 106 f. Recently it has been claimed that Gracchus' aim was to revive the 'Polybiain constitution' by weakening the Senate and strengthening the Equites and the lower classes. See Rowland, TAPA, 96 (1965), 361-373, but see supra, n. 29.

200

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of the orders entitles us to suppose that Gracchus’ law on the Asian taxes was passed in the teeth of the Senate’s opposition. After all, the publicans’ activity in Asia Minor, attested in the S.C. de agro Pergameno, preceded that law ; the Senate had already approved the use of publicans, even though it was at first limited to the royal domain. On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence that Gracchus’ aim was to increase revenues, specifically because his building operations, colonization and lex frumen­ taria demanded more income. Cicero says that judged by his orations Grac­ chus was a champion of the Treasury (7 ms. Dis., 3. 48), and Gellius records a speech, in which he shows his concern for the increase of revenues (11. 10, 3). Velleius telSls us that C. Gracchus introduced new customs (2. 6, 3). It is in this light that we have to judge the law on the collection of the Asian taxes, and not merely by its results in enriching the publicans and strengthening their importance ("). A similar consideration may hold good for Gracchus’ laws on the judicature. According to Appian, it was the corruption of the senatorial judges that called his attention to the courts. Cicero relates that he passed a law to punish judges taking bribes (Cluent, 151-154). If he was sincere in his intention to secure justice in the courts, it was only logical to exclude senators from that which tried cases of senatorial maladministration. After all it was not difficult to see that the provincials had little chance of a fair hearing, so long as accused and judges were members of the same class ( 10°). No doubt senators strongly resented their exclusion from such courts, while Equites, once they had the taste of jurisdiction, were very reluctant to surrender their prerogative. Hence ensued a bitter struggle between the two classes, which is th;e foundation for the view that the state was divided bet­ ween Senate and Equites (101). But what was the aim of these parties? Did

(99) Antony’s speech to the Greeks in Asia implies that it was the expenditure proposed by the tribunes, obviously the Gracchi, that necessitated the collection of the Asian tax (App., BC, 5. 4). See also Last, CAH , 9, 65 f. Rowland concedes that Gaius was really a champion of the Treasury (ib ., 370). Following Frank and Campari, Meier says that Gaius’ law did not spring merely from tactical con­ sideration, but was also intended to compensate the Equites, who had lost public land (RPA, 70). Perhaps this is true, yet the Senate had already done something in leasing the revenues of the royal domain of Attalus III. (100) Cf. Last, CAH, 9, 52-5 ; Badian, FC, 182-5 ; N icouet, Or. Eq., 474 ff. Brunt’s interpretation of Gaius’ judiciary legislation has not convinced me and I still prefer Last’s view (Equites, 139 ff.). (101) On the division of the state as a result of Gaius' law see V arro in Non. Marcel., 728 L ; T ac., Ann., 12. 60 ; F lor., 2. 5, 3 ; App., BC, 1. 22. For the Equites' desire to pressure their judicial rights see Cic.. De In., 1. 92 (in connection with the lex Servilia). See also S R //. 78. Despite what he says on the legislation of Gaius for the benefit of the Equites, Meier maintains that no political conflict

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they wish to safeguard incompatible material interests by dominance in the courts? Were the courts used to inflict vengeance on opponents? It seems to me that on the whole the answers must be negative. It is often main­ tained that Marius promoted his career by close cooperation with the Equestrian class. One proof: his acquittal by Equestrian judges from a charge of ambitus in 116 ( 102). This case would not have been cited, if the details of the trial had been considered. At first the jury was about to con­ demn Marius. But his ‘patron’ Herennius refused to give evidence and some judges changed their mind. Even then he escaped conviction only by a very narrow margin ( 103). Thus, contrary to what is alleged, this case shows that the Equestrian jury was not united even when the accused was an ex-Eques, not that the Ordo Equester exerted its influence on the jury to save its ‘sup­ porter’. Next the case of Metellus Numidicus. It is maintained that Marius was elected as consul by the Equestrian class and that those who had engineered his election later brought a charge de repetundis against Numidicus. Actually it can be shown that it was business circles concerned in Numidian affairs who exerted their family and personal influence to bring about a change in the conduct of the war, not the whole Equestrian class, while the Equestrian jury declined to cooperate with the prosecution. Clearly the assumption that Equites engaged in provincial affairs had the support of Equestrian judges is not supported by this case ( 104). Indeed the results of trials in the 90’s may give pause to those who think that the Equestrian class used the courts as a political weapon. On the view that the two classes were hostile, the Equestrian juries might have been expected to take advantage of prosecutions to eliminate their rivals, but all known trials, Rutilius' apart, terminated in acquittals ( 105).

ensued, and even the question of the judicature was riot so important in the following years as it appeared to later writers (RPA, 75-6). (102) The theory of cooperation between Marius and the Equestrian class was elaborated by Carney ( M arius p assim : Athenaeum, 36 (1958), 229-237 , NC, 6 th S er, 19 (1959), 80-81), but see Meier, Gnomon, 36 (1964), 64-70 and n° 63. (103) V al. Max., 9. 6, 14; P urr., M a r , 5. (104) Contra Nicolet, Or Eq., 532. Velleius writes that Marius p e r publicanos aliosque in Africa negotiantes crim inatus M etelli lenitudinem ... effecit ut consul crearetur (2. 11) and Sallust equites Romanos, milites e t negotiatores, alios ipse, plerosque pacis spe impellit, uti Romam a d suos necessarios aspere in M etellum d e bello scribant, M arium imperatorem, poscant U u g , 65. 4), that is, they turned to

their personal friends, not to the Equestrian class as such. For the refusal of the Equestrian jury to suspect Metellus see Cic., B alb., 11 ; Val. Max., 9. 10, 1. This is significant because it follows from P . , N H , 33. 34 that at that time the publicani dominated the courts. For Equites who supported Metellus Numidicus in 102 see Oros., 5. 17, 3. (105) For a survey and analysis see Gruen, H istoria , 15 (1966), 32-64. The acquittals are certain, but I do not agree with some of Gruen's suppositions. Thus I cannot follow him in maintaining that the l in

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A distinction should be drawn between an attempt by a group to prosecute an hostile governor in court in its own special interest, not an unlikely possibility, and a corporate action of the Equestrian class as a whole to punish a governor who had opposed the interests of an Equestrian group in a province, an improbable and unattested eventuality. Thus, the African publicani may have instigated the prosecution of Metellus Numidicus, but if so it was their affair, not that of the class, and the jury turned it down. Of course, there is the cause celebre of Rutiiius. But though our sources ascribe his conviction to Equestrian revenge, the situation was not so sim ple!106). First, Rutilius’ and Scaevola’s concern had been the welfare of the provincials, not the curtailment of the publicans’ profits per se, though this was an indirect consequence. Secondly, to a certain extent Rutilius himself was responsible for his own condemnation, for he played the role of Socrates in his trial. He did not let Crassus and Antonius, the best orators of the day, speak for his defence ; his nephew, C. Aurelius Cotta, and Scaevola could speak only for a short time, and he himself did not resort to the accepted methods of oratory ( 107). Thirdly, Marius was ac­ tive in procuring the condemnation of Rutilius as his personal enemy ( 108). The Asian publicani were successful not because the whole Equestrian class backed them, but because other factors as well worked for the conviction of Rutilius. The story of the conviction of Gabinius, if one looks at details, is similar. The Syrian publicani had a grudge against him, because he had cut their profits as a governor. Yet it is very hasty to cite his conviction on a charge de repetundis as a proof of the power of the Equites in the courts!109). We do not know how the Equestrian judges voted in his trial, while very probably many senatorial judges voted against him. Cicero’s let­ ters show that a large number, perhaps the majority, of the Senate was

very consistent acquittals inspired members of the oligarchy to press for jury reform in 91, which aimed at the renewal of the ‘old political game of making or breaking one's opponents through judicial processes’ (52 and 60). Not only is this a misrepresentation of the case of Rutilius, but it surely cannot account for the desire of all senators, some of whom would have welcomed such an attitude in Equestrian juries, to regain the courts. (106) Val. Max., 2. 10, 5 ; V ell. Pat., 2. 13, 2 ; Liv., Per., 7 0 ; Dio, fr. 97. Cf. Cic., Fam., 1. 9,

26; SR H , 125-6. (107) C i c . , D e Or., 229-230 ; B rut., 115 ; Quintil., 11. 1, 12 (illo paene Socratico genere defen­ sionis est usus) -, Oros., 5. 17, 12. (108) Dio, fr. 97. See also Plut., M ar., 28. 5. Nicolet thinks that Rutilius’ hostility to populares weakened his position (Or. Eq., 547). Badian emphasizes Marius’ part in Rutilius’ condemnation (Athenaeum, 34 (1965), 117 ; cf. Pais, op. cit., (n. 94), 45 ; 58). His interpretation of the initiative of

Scaurus (ih., 104 f f.; followed by Meier, RPA, 77) has not convinced me, but even he regards it as an exceptional case.

(109) Contra Hill, PM C, 179 f . ; Broughton, Equites, 153.

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hostile to Gabinius ( uo). His enemies could not secure his conviction in his first trial because he resorted to bribery on a large scale ; they were suc­ cessful only at the second attempt (no. 147). His conviction should be at­ tributed to personal enemies, senators as well as Equites. Rutilius and Gabinius were the only known governors whom publicani succeeded in convicting ( U1). This seems strange if the courts were indeed a vehicle for Equestrian vengeance on senators who had shown their hostility in provincial posts. The answer that one conviction sufficed to intimidate senators is not satisfactory, as tihe first did not occur until 30 years after Gracchus’ law. So long as there was no such precedent, there was nothing to deter senators from activity against publicani. What was it, then, that made governors avoiding clashes v/ith publicani ? I think the answer is very simple. They usually cared little for the provincials and preferred to back their fellow-citizens. Moderate and reasonable profits at the expense of provincials were condoned, and only excessive exploitation would be checked ( 10I12). Yet it is evident that jurisdiction was the bone of contention between the two orders. Why? The equites did not compete for magistracies, but this does not mean that they did not care for social prestige. The annexation of the province of Asia, the creation of other provinces later and the lucrative wars considerably enriched the class. Aware of their economic importance, they desired social and official recognition : auctoritas, dignitas, gratia and splendor. Judicial rights gratified this ambition, for they conferred auctoritas and dignitas ( 113). After Gracchus had given them the prerogative, they

(110) Cic., Q F 1. 2, 15; 2. 6, 1; !2, 3 ; 3. 1. 15 ; 2 4 ; 2, 2 ; 3, 2. ( 1 1 1 ) Crassus' words in his suasio legis Serviliae are rhetorical exaggeration ( eripite nos ex miseriis, eripite ex faucibus eorum, quorum crudelitas nisi nostro sanguine non potest e x p le ri; nolite nos cuiquam servire, nisi vobis universis, quibus e t possumus e t debemus Cic. D e Or„ i. 225). At most, it might refer to

the quaestio M amiliana. In any case, as we cannot take seriously Crassus' claim that senators were the servants of the voters, so we cannot be sure of his first allegation. That Crassus played the demagogue in this speech can be learnt from Cicero : e t invidia concitatur in iudicum e t in accusatorum factionem, contra quorum potentiam populariter tum dicendum fu it ( B r u t , 164). But what does Cicero mean by iudicum el accusatorum fa c tio ? I do not think that he refers to the popular party’ ( contra Nicolet, Or. Eq., 531 f.). It rather means a coalition between accusers and judges, to .convict a defendant. ( 1 12) Cf. Meier, RPA, 78-9 ; 82-3. For the view that the publicans did not begin their provincial ex­ tortions before the first century see Badian, FC, 184 f Broughton's opinion is that the publicani learnt to use their power as judges to defend their interests only after a transitional period (Equites , 153). but he does not produce evidence to prove his claim. For cooperation between governors and Equites see p. 193 f. (113) In this I follow Brunt, Equites, 130 ff. For auctoritas of judges see Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 10 ; C aec. , 81 ; C luent., 6, and for dignitas, Cic., Rose. Am., 9 ; Verr.. 2 . 1, 10 ; 5, 178; Font., 2 6 ; C luent., 107 ; 147 ; 2 0 2 ; Rab. P o s t, 2 0 . See also supra, n. 59.

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soon learnt to appreciate its value. Though there was no community of economic interests among all Equites, they were united in defending their right to the only political function they had. The senators quite un­ derstandably regarded their exclusion as a blow to their prestige and tried to reverse the situation. Hence ensued the bitter contest. Cicero mentions the hostility of Sulla to the Ordo Equester and Asconius says that the Equestrian class supported Cinna’s party against Sulla (I14). Relying on this evidence, and on other arguments, some scholars view the civil wars of the 80’s as a contest between the Senate and Ordo Equester ( 115). But the whole theorjrcoilapses, when one scrutinizes the per­ sonal composition of the pars Sullana and pars Cinnana, the victims of the belligerents and their legislation. The wars started in 88. But though it is attested that Marius coveted the command against Mithridates, it is very doubtful it the Equestrian class backed his ambition ( 116), or whether the Senate regarded Sulla as its representative. When he marched on Rome, he was followed only by his soldiers, while the Senate disapproved of his ac­ tion ( 11718). After his departure, with the renewal of the civil war, there are no signs of a split on class lines. Cinna was trusted and supported by many nobles ( " 8). Needless to say, many also joined Sulla in 83-81. Indeed (114) Cic., Cluent., 154; Ascon., 89. (115) See e.g. T aylor, P P , 19 ; Hill, RMC, 146-7 ; Broughton, Equites, 153 ; Meier, IIP A, 2189 ; 253-4. (116) See supra, n. 78 and n° S3. Cf. Brunt, Equites, 130. The only connection is indirect: Sulpicius had young Equestrian bodyguards and he passed the law to nominate Marius as the com­ mander. See n° 75. Meier is not convincing on this point, and he does not give evidence for his view that Sulpicius’ aim was to distribute the Italians in the tribes so as to favour the publicans CRPA, 83). That Sulpicius had the support of individual Equites is certain, but there is no proof of general support I also cannot see why we cannot regard M. Iunius Brutus and P. Cornelius Cethegus, apparently Sulpicius’ sup­ porters, as representatives o f senatorial interests on the same ground that the Grand of Puteoli, other adherents, are “Vertreter ritterlichen Interesses” Ub., 218). Similarly I cannot follow Meier’s argument in considering the support Sulla received from Equites as ‘Banalitat’ Ub., 217, n. 65), while he attributes so much importance to those Equites who backed Sulpicius. (117) Badian, SGRH, 211-5. In this he seems to be right For criticism of other points see Balsdon, JR S , 55 (1965), 230-232. (118) Apart from C inna note the following who actively supported or merely collaborated: M. Aemilius Lepidus, Cos., 78 (Badian, SG RH , 217 f . ) ; Ap. Claudius, 7>. mil., (M RR , 2, 4 9 ) ; P. Cornelius Cethegus ID. G., 2 , 4 7 8 ); Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, p r., 81 (G ruen, AJP, 87 (1966), 389 f .) ; L. C or­ nelius Scipio Asiagenus, cos., 83 (MUnzer, R E 4. 1483 f f . ) ; C. Flavius Fimbria (Munzer, R E, 6, 2599 ff.) ; M. Iunius Brutus, tr. p i , 83 (D. G., 4, 1 8 -2 1 ) ; L. Iunius Brutus Damassipus, p r., 8 8 (D. G , 4, 178 ); C. Marcius Censorinus (Munzer, R E, 14, 1550 {.) ; L. Marcus Philippus and M. Perpema, censors 86 (M RR, 2, 5 4 ) ; Cn. Papirius Carbo, cos., 84 (Munzer , R E , 18, 1024-1031) ; M. Perperna Veiento (MOnzer , R E, 19, 8 9 7 -9 0 1 ) ; M. Popilius Laenas, tr. p i., 86 (M RR, 2 , 4 7 ) ; L. Valerius Flaccus, cos., 86 (M unzer , R E, 8A, 25 -3 0 ); note Q. Antonius Balbus, pr., 82 (M RR, 2, 67) and C. Fabius Hadrianus, pr., 85 (M RR. 2, 60 ; 68). Some changed sides at the right time : Philippus, Lepidus, Brutus,

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members of the same families were to be found in different sides. Thus, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, C. Carbo Arvina and Q. Mucius Scaevola were killed by the Cinnani, though the last was adfinis of Marius, the second of the consul Carbo, and a kinsman of the first, Cn. Ahenobarbus, was to be put to death by Pompey in Africa ( U9). Similarly the numerical evidence on the victims shows the cleavage within the senatorial class. A few score senators were put to death by Sulla ; an unknown number, but not in­ significant, by the Cinnani. According to Appian, Sulla killed 1600 Equites, but the whole number of Equestrian and senatorial victims on both sides was 2700. After deducting about 100 senators, there remain some 1000 Equites for whose death the Cinnani were probably responsible!120). It seems that proportionately Sulla did not kill more Equites than senators. Besides, his victory enabled people to take vengeance on private and rich enemies, and all counted as the victims of S u lla!121). On the whole, the civil war was a struggle between two groups of nobiles, joined by senatorial and Equestrian supporters. When men had to decide which side to follow, their choice was dictated by personal leanings and considerations for legitimacy and practical advantage, not by a loyalty to class!122). Does the legislation of the two sides reflect anti-senatorial or anti­ equestrian policy? It has been argued that the financial legislation on the Sullan side was directed to benefit indebted aristocratic landowners against Equestrian creditors. Thus the aristocratic Drusus passed an inflationary law by introducing a silver denarius of reduced intrinsic value, a measure that was cancelled by the ‘democratic’ M. Gratidianus ! 123). Then in 89 the praetor A. Sempronius Asellio was killed by money-lenders in the Forum, te. p i , S i, Cethegus, D olabella and Catrtnra ftC J9 ?) Meter unduTy minimizes the significance of these data, claiming that the noble magistrates of this period did not represent their class (RPA, 231). Yet it is not d ear how they could represent, and at any rate Meier does not show that they did not or that they ac­ ted against their class. (119) Badian, SGRH. 231. (120) See Mommsen, Hist., 4, 102, n. 1 and Note B. Of course some of the 1,000 Equites may have been killed by the Sullans. We cannot be sure that these are the exact numbers, but at least it is clear that the Marians included senators and the Sullans Equites. For Marian senators who fled to Spain see Plut., 22. 3. Meier's view on this point is one-sided (RPA, 84). yet he points out the differences between Sulla and the nobility (/At, 247 flf.). (121) The best known case is that of Roscius, of Ameria, and Cicero’s speech is illuminating on this point. For references see ch. I, n. 100 For Caesar's fate see the interesting discussion in Motzo, Cues, et Aug., 62-3. (122) Naturally there were other factors, like the question of the Italians. See Badian, PC, 243 f. Yet 1 do not think that the evidence we have justifies the class struggle interpretation ( contra Meier, RPA 216 ffi). (123) For Drusus see Plin., AW, 33. 46, and for Gratidianus Cic., Off., 3. 80 ; Plin., AW, 32. 132 ; 34. 2.

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because he tried to help the debtors by enforcing the old usury laws ( 124). Sulla cancelled the laws of Sulpicius in 88, but left intact the coinage of Drusus, and then passed his lex unciaria, which fixed the maximum lawful interest at 12 96 while abolishing a tenth part of all debts ( 125). Finally, when Sulla came back from the East, he killed Gratidianus, cancelled his measures and reintroduced the plated coins (126). In short, the senatorial land- owners used their political power to rob the Equestrian moneylenders of their legitimate profits. The theory disregards the fact that a substantial part of the Equestrian class drew its income from landed property. What is more, it is based on misinterpretation of extant evidence. First, the problem of coinage. What­ ever was the aim of Drusus’ monetary expedient, it obviously required legislation. Yet his laws were invalidated by the Senate on one pretext or other ( l27h and there is no reason to suppose that the monetary law was ex­ ceptional. Nor can the plated coins of this period show that his bill was put in effect. Once this view of Drusus’ measure is disposed of, there is no need to interpret Gratidianus’ edict in the light of what Pliny says, which is un­ tenable, because the ars denarios probare had existed before Gratidianus. The right interpretation seems to be that Gratidianus’ edict enforced the old exchange rate between denarius and as, thus putting an end to disastrous fluctuations!128). There remains the lex Cornelia, yet the only evidence called in support of the theory proves the opposite Lege Cornelia testamen­ taria (tenentur) ... quive nummos aureos argentos adulteraverit laverit con­ flaverit raserit corruperit vitiaverit, vultuve principum signatam monetam praeter adulterinam reprobaverit. (Paul., Sent., 5. 25, 1). Evidently Sulla, if indeed he is the author of the law, directed it against monetae adulterinae. ,

(124) Liv., P er., 74 ; V al. Max., 9. 7, 4 ; App., BC, 1. 54. Badian admits that the ordo equester was not a class of financiers, but since he regards the financiers as the political leaders of the ordo , he en­ visages Asellio’s action as an attempt to secure interests of indebted aristocrats and to recapture the loyalty of the Plebs ; hence followed a violent reaction in defence of profits and power as well, Historia, 18 (1969), 476-480. (125) For the lex unciaria see F estus, 516L. C'f. R E, 6, 2195. (126) For the lex Cornelia see Paul., S ent., 5. 25. The theory is elaborated, and the texts are so in­ terpreted, by Frank, AJP, 54 (1933), 54-9 -,ESAR, 1, 268-9. Cf. Mommsen, RM , 387 -9. See, however, Bulst., H istoria, 13 (1964), 330-337. (127) Cic., D o tn , 41 ; 50 ; Leg., 2. 14; 31 ; D iod, Sic:., 37. 10 ; Ascon., 68-9. There is no evidence for Bulst’s assertion that the law was not rescinded (ib., 330). (128) For a discussion of these points see C rawford, Proc. Cam. Phil. Soc., 194 (1968), 1-4. He refutes Frank’s explanation, that Gratidianus succeeded iri eliminating plated coins, by pointing out the existence: of large number of plated coins of about 100. That Gratidianus could not have invented the ars denarios probare, as Pliny says, is proved by a tessera of 96 (IL L R P, 1001); a nummularius, whose duty was nummos spectare, had been employed at least ten years before Gratidianus.

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So the monetary evidence does not reflect different economic interests of the two parties ( 129130). Though Asellio was killed by moneylenders, we cannot be sure either that they acted on behalf of the Equestrian class or that it was only senators he sought to protect and not all in distress. It is a one-sided view to think that only senators were forced to borrow by losses in the Social War. Frank wrote that Asellio’s assassins were not brought to trial because after 88 the ‘democratic’ party and the Equites ruled the state. But he overlooked the fact that in 88 Sulla was in power and that the Mariani conquered the city only in late 87. Had Sulla, and those in power after his departure, regarded Asellio’s murderers as enemies of the senatorial class they would have taken measures against them. They failed to do so not only because they had other matters to deal with, but also because Asellio’s was not a partisan ac­ tion. The evidence for the lex unciaria is obscure: unciaria lex appellari coepta est quam L. Sulla et Q. Pomipeius Rufus) tulerunt qua sanctum est ut debitores decimam partem ... (Festus, 516 L). The law probably aided debtors to repay their loans, whether in ten instalments or by abolishing a tenth and giving a moratorium. Who were to benefit? That it helped senators who are supposed to have incurred debts in 90-89 is only a con­ jecture. There is a better explanation. Cicero records that the Mithridatic war caused a financial crisis in Rome, since considerable sums of money were invested in Asia (Leg. Man., 19). Clearly the losers were mainly Equites. But it is important to observe that the law had nothing to do with class interests. The crisis jeopardized the whole financial organization, and the consuls sought a solution. Finally, there is the law of Valerius Flaccus, cos. 86. This law introduced partial tabulae novae by cancelling 75 96 of the debts. Such a law cannot accord with the view that the Equites, equated with the creditors, came to power with the victory of the Cinnani ( 13°). The theory must be abandoned, and it must be admitted that victorious parties in this period did not employ financial legislation for factional purposes. Does the legislation of Sulla after his final victory show hostility against publicani or the Equestrian class? Many have argued that Sulla abolished the system of leasing the collection of the Asian taxes, thereby cutting the profits of Roman tax-farmers. This view has convincingly been refuted by

(129) Cf. “ the notion of a difference of opinion between the two parties at Rome (commonly and erroneously called Senate and Equites) over the merits of plated coins can disappear” (Crawford, ib., 4). (130) On Flaccus’ law see F rank, ESAR, 1, 270 f. Cf. Brunt, Equites, 128-9 ; Bulst, Historia, 13

(1964), 334.

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Brunt and there is no need to repeat his arguments here ( 131). I may only add that the farming of populi Romani vectigalia to publicani is mentioned in the lex Antonia de Termessibus, which is probably to be dated to 72 ( 132), and that the activity of publicani in Greece is recorded in the SC. de Am­ phiarai Oropii agris ( 133) of 73. On the other hand, Sulla enrolled many Equites in the Senate. This fact alone should have shattered the idea that he was motivated by hostility to the Equestrian class ( 134). True, he transferred the courts to senators, but by now many of them were ex-equites. Thus the evidence we have undermines the long established view that the civil wars -of the 80’s were fought between, the—two-classes... --------- _ On occasions the Senate or magistrates took action against publicani. Yet to interpret this as if they reflect anti-Equestrian policy is tantamount to denying the Senate discretion in provincial administration. The SC. de agro Pergameno, of the year 129, records a dispute between the city of Pergamum and the publicans, the nature of which is not sufficiently clear. It perhaps concerned territories not clearly defined by the testament of Attalus III, and consequently claimed by both sides. On another interpretation bqot refers to certain areas set apart as r epevr) from the lands bequeathed to the Romans. As copies of the decision of the magistrate and his consilium were preserved in the provincial cities it seems to have been in favour of Pergamum ( 135). In any case, the procedure of the Senate, in instructing a magistrate to settle the dispute in his consilium shows that it wished to set­ tle the case on the facts, not to predetermine it from a bias against the taxfarmers. Another case in point is the quarrel between publicans, some time at the end of the second century, and Ephesus over the revenues of lakes that belonged to the Ephesian Goddess. According to Strabo, the Romans had restored this property to the temple, but the publicans appropriated the revenues to themselves (14. 1, 26). Another dispute affected publicani who tried to enforce their claims on the lands of Athena Polias of Priene, pen­ ding a resolution of the Senate (136), In 89 the censor L. Caesar exempted (131) Brunt, Latomus, 15 (1956), 21-5. (132) IL S, 38 (w . 3 4 -5 ); J. Beranger, M elanges A. Piganiol (Paris, 1966), 723-737. See also FIR A P 1, p. 257, v. 6 ; p. 259, v. 24. (133) F !R A \ 1, p. 262. (134) For the Sullan senators see Note B. Cf. G abba, A thenaeum, 34 (1956), 124 f. (135) For text and discussions see Passerine Athenaeum, 15 (1937), 252-283 ; T ibuletti, JR S , 47 (1957), 136-8 ; Nicolet, O r . E q „ 348-350. The second interpretation of opo $ , based on Ael. Arist., Pan., 163 d, is suggested by J. H. O liver, Greek. Roman and Byzantine Studies, 4 (1963), 141-3. For the date see M RR , 1, 496-7. (136) See H iller Von G aertringen, Insch. v. Priene, n° 111 ; 112-120. The exact date is not

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the temple of Athena of Ilium from paying taxes I 137). Finally, we have the case of Oropus. Sulla had granted lands and revenues to the temple of the god Amphiaraus with immunity from taxes. The publicani tried to reverse Sulla’s decision, but their plea was rejected by the Senate in 73 ( 13813940). Thus in most of these cases the publicani were trying to step up their profits at the expense of the provincials. More important is the fact that nearly all the disputes concerned temples, and it is quite understandable that the Senate refused to encroach on their immunities. But it is interesting to note that L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the future consul of 54, represented the publicani in the last case. In the proscriptions he had made a fortune at the expense of Sulla’s opponents (Dio,, 41. 11, 1-2). Eight years later, he was trusted to represent Sulla’s supposed opponents. It is only to those who stick to the old interpretation of the civil war that this need cause surprise. This was precisely the way in which Equites handled their interests with magistrates or Senate : through their ties with senators. Thus C. Matrinius, an Eques Romanus in Sicily, suffered under Verres. He was connected with Lentulus Clodianus, cos., 72, who interfered on his behalf (Cic., Verr., 2. 5, 15). Cicero says that other victims asked Sisenna, who was on good terms with Verres, to act on their behalf ; Sisenna’s appeal did not save the Eques Cn. Calidius (Verr., 2. 4, 43). Again, as praetor urbanus Verres ex­ torted a large sum of money from the son of the contractor P. Iunius. Brutus, cos. 77, who was perhaps a relation of the contractor, interfered and succeeded in recovering part of the money (no. 218, i). Lucullus’ debt settlement in Asia evoked the hatred of the Equites. They showed their hand by engineering his downfall. Yet, it was not only the of­ fended Equestrian money-lenders and tax-farmers who combined to divest him of his province. Probably senators too had lost something by his arrangements, for it is very likely that some had invested their money in loans to Asian cities and provincials in the 70’s C 39). Lucullus also had per­ sonal enemies in the Senate, like L. Quinctius the praetor of 68 ( 14°). So it was not the Equestrian class alone that brought Lucullus down, but all his enemies, senators as well as Equites ( 141).

(137) ILS, 8770. (138) FIRA2, 1, n°. 36. Cic., ND, 3. 49. For these disputes cf. N icolet, Or. Eq., 346-353. (139) See ch. Ill, i. (140) See ch. VI, iv and on Clodius and Lucullus, n° 118. (141) According to Brunt, the efforts of Equites were fruitless at first; only in 68 did the Senate deprive Lucullus of Asia. He adds that only a military success could have justified prorogatio imperii in 67, because Lucullus’ command had been of exceptional duration (Equites, 148-9). Broughton argues that Asia had been taken away as early as 69 and that our sources do not explicitly say that the Senate

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We mentioned earlier the request of the Asian publicans to reduce their payment to the treasury (p. 180 f.). It became apparent that Cicero exaggerated when he described its non-acceptance as the end of the con­ cordia ordinum ; only one group of Equites was concerned. Since Cicero ad­ mits that the request was disgraceful (Att., 1. 1, 9), it is clear that the Senate was fully justified. The question was whether it should secure the revenues of the state or gratify the publicans. However, the Senate was not united, and the publicans failed to get their way only because Cato’s ob­ struction prevented it from coming to any decision at all ( 142). Cicero sup­ ported the publicans, and so did Crassus. It is noteworthy that the head of the Asian society was the elder Cn. Plancius (no. 182), who had served un­ der P. Crassus, the father of Crassus the triumvir (Plane., 32) ; their friend­ ly relations had apparently passed down to the son, though business ties may also help to explain Crassus’ attitude. In my opinion there was no unity of economic interests among the Equites. A relevant piece of evidence is recorded in 60. In that year the portoria were abolished in Italy. It goes without saying that the company of publicans affected suffered severe damage and that its members were em­ bittered. Yet they were not alone in opposing the measure. Responsible senators deplored the loss of revenue. Other senators and Equites who cared only for their personal advantage welcomed the abolition. Cicero was aware of the effects, but he did not foresee a crisis, presumably because the com­ pany was not influential enough ( 143). Again in 59, provincials and Roman negotiatores worked for the abolition of the Asian portorium cir­ cumventionis. But the company that farmed this tax was more powerful than that which farmed the Italian portoria ; so this time Cicero found it wise to back it in order to keep up the concordia ordinum ( I44).

was responsible. He also assumes that Pompey exerted his influence (Equites , 154-5). I think, with Broughton, that Lucullus lost Asia in 69, but Dio’s words (36. 2, 2) refer to the normal assignation of provinces by the Senate, not to a bill in the Assembly. Both Brunt and Broughton, like Meier (RPA, 85), do not pay due attention to the fact that the Senate and the Equites did not split on this point. The Senate's resolution was the final result of a contest to win the support of senators. Lucullus himself had obtained the provinceof Cilicia by intrigue (B adiian, FC. 280-281). (142) Cic., A lt, 1. 17, 9 ; 18, 7 ; 2. 1, 8. (143) Cic., An.. 2. 16, 1 ; QF, 1. 1,33; Dio, 37. 51, 3-4. (144) Cic., Alt., 2. 16, 4. Cf. S. B., 1, 383-4 ; B runt , Equites, 128.

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S ummary

The theory, found in ancient authors and elaborated by modern historians, that there was a grave split between the senatorial and the Equestrian classes seemed improbable at the start, in view of what we know of the economic condition of the two classes. The personal aspect of Roman politics makes it even less likely. Investigation of Cicero’s relations with Equites shows that when he speaks of the Equestrian class, he is often thinking only of the strong and organised group within the class, the publicani. His writings indicate that only the publicans acted as a pressure group to secure their aims. From a social point of view. Equites and senators were often linked by friendship and marriage. These links were ef­ fective in a variety of ways. Equites exploited them to gain access to gover­ nors in provinces and so to promote their financial interests, while in Rome they could submit their cause to the Senate through friendly senators and magistrates. With all their diverse views on the influence of the Equites, modern historians often neglect one important aspect of the question and thereby obscure the truth. We have to ask not only how much influence the Equites wielded but also how they had obtained it. It has been shown that it was not by applying financial pressure, or making senators economically dependent. They did not even try to change the structure of the government and to set up new institutions manned by themselves. They acted and reac­ ted within the system characteristic of politics at Rome, by manipulation of personal ties of various types with the principes and other senators. The hypothesis that there was an anti-Equestrian policy on the part of the Senate arising from its divergent material interests is devoid of proof and must be rejected. Such actions as magistrates or Senate took against Equites were incoherent and sprang from the desire of individual senators to enrich themselves or from genuine concern for the subjects and public revenues. On the other hand, it must be admitted that the societies of publicans were powerful, made efforts to increase their income at the ex­ pense of provincials on legally doubtful pretexts and strongly resented at­ tempts to cut their profits, whatever the aims or reasons. Yet even these societies sought to secure their interests through their connections with senators. The facts that the senatorial class was not united but split into several groups, and indeed that every senior statesman kept his in­ dependence, helped them to achieve their aim. In their lobbying, the publicans acted on their own ; no evidence can be cited to prove that they enjoyed organized support from the whole Ordo Equester, while several in-

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stances prove that there was not even unity among the publicans them­ selves, or between them and negotiatores ( 145). There was only one subject on which the two orders stood united against each other, jurisdiction. In their efforts to secure this prerogative, the Equites did not seek to use the courts simply to protect their interests, for these were mainly secured by personal ties. In fact, there was usually no occasion for friction, since senators would condone moderate exploitation of provincials. The principal explanation of the Equites’ frame of mind is that they wanted public recognition of their social importance. The office of judge could gratify their ambition for dignity, but the senators had no in­ tention to give up their rights and hence ensued the fierce struggle that ter­ minated in the compromise of 70 ( 146).

(145) Meier says that on the whole even the publicans did not interfere in politics and that as con­ servatives they usually supported the Senate LRPA, 56-7 ; 89). (146) On Equites see also ch.IX, iii. I may add here that in my opinion the theory that ascribes economic motives to Roman imperialism has convincingly been refuted. See F rank , AHR , 1912/13, 233-252 ; R l, 277-297 ; B runt , Equites, 130-134 ; Badian , RI, chs. 2-5. Even RostovtzefTchanged his views on this subject, SE H H W , 737-8 ; 787-8. Though Cassola does not discount the ‘economic motive’, he has some reservations (GP, ch. 2, esp. 68-71). Gabba wrote that the Italian socii demanded the Roman civitas to secure their commercial interests, the intention was to make Roman foreign policy more imperialistic (Athenaeum , 32 (1954), 41-114 ; 245-293). See, however, S herwin W hite , JR S, 45 (1955), 168-170 ; Balsdon , Gnomon, 26 (1954), 343-4 and for the Italian aims in the Social War, B runt , J R S , 55 (1965), 106-123.

CHAPTER IX

Problems Some events m the late Republic might seem to have had their roots in the economic condition of the senatorial class. Economic explanations of major transactions in this period have often been expounded, and, in my opinion, have led to over-emphasis of economic motives and to misun­ derstanding of internal and external processes and problems at Rome. Thus the economic approach to Roman imperialism so suggestive to the modern, contemporary mind, produced, on the whole, inadequate, distorted and mistaken interpretations. I shall not repeat old arguments here (0. The in­ ternal development, however, is entitled to a detailed scrutiny. Political crises and civil wars characterize the last hundred years of the Republic. Some modern historians think that these violent political upheavals had their basis in economic differentiation within the senatorial class or in a cleavage between the successful and the unsuccessful in the upper classes ( 12). In my opinion this explanation is due partly to misun­ derstanding of the economic condition and partly to inadequate in­ vestigation of the problems. I.— T

he

G

racchi

and

the

P roblem

of

t h e A g e r P u b l ic u s

The agrarian law of Ti. Gracchus met with strong opposition, followed by revolutionary reaction and counter-reaction. Ancient writers suggest that Tiberius’ opponents were the rich and the great landowners, who as the

(1) Cf. ch. VIII, n. 146. For Cic., Rep., 3. 16 see Note C. (2) The view that the political crises of the late Republic sprang from economic differences within the senatorial class was elaborated by Jaczynowska (II, 323 ; Historia, 11 (1962), 494-7). But see summaries of chs. I-II.

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prospective losers would not accept the consequences!3). Some modern historians note that the rich who had unlawfully occupied the ager publicus were the senators and Equites. Tiberius acted single-handed against the senatorial class. The inevitable clash between the idealist and his materialistic opponents was the starting point of the revolutionary period at Rom e!4). This exposition is attractive and sounds sensible, yet it is in­ complete and misses major points. To begin with, Tiberius did not lack senatorial support. His law was sponsored by Ap. Claudius Pulcher, cos., 143, censor 136 and princeps senatus, by P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, then only praetorius but later cos., 131 and Pontifex Maximus from 132 and by P. Mucius Scaevola, cos., 133 (5). Some of the Fulvii Flacci were Tiberius’ supporters. A senator Fulvius Flaccus warned Tiberius of the intention to murder him (Plut, TG, 18). Perhaps he may be identified with the consul of 125, who, in any case, supported Tiberius, as can be inferred from his membership of the agrarian commission in 130 and from his future behaviour!6). Probably another Fulvius, identified with Servius the consul of 135 or Gains the consul of 134, gave his support!7). Other adherents were C. Porcius Cato, the cen­ sor’s grandson, Cn. Papirius Carbo, C. Villius and the tribune who replaced Octavius!8). Obviously a strong group of leading senatorial personalities (3) On the rich and landowners as Tiberius’ opponents see P lut ., TG, 9. 3 ; 10. 1 ; 7 ; 11. 2; 12. 34; 18. 2 ; 20. 2 ; App., BC, 10 ; 11; 15. Roman writers describe the opponents as the Senate, the nobility, the optimates and the Equites; Cic., Sest., 103 ; S all ., tug., 42. 1 ; Liv., Per., 58 ; V ell ., Pat., 2. 3, 2. (4) Mommsen was aware of Tiberius’ supporters, yet he wrote that one magistrate stood in opposition to the aristocratic government (Hist., 3, 321). According to Jaczynowska, who mixes up the actions of Tiberius and Gaius, the senators were united against the agrarian reforms of the Gracchi, thereby showing concern for their own possessions. The Equites’ resistence was weaker because public lands were not important for them and because they were given judicial powers (II, 15-6 ; Historia, 11 (1962), 4867). Of course this is not the only interpretation. Munzer drew attention to the relevance of the struggle between senatorial factions (RA, 257-270), which is the basis of the analysis of E arl , Gracchus. Boren’s interpretation offers some just observations on the opposition’s behaviour (AJP, 82 (1961), 358-369). For a summary of the research on the Gracchi and the problem of ager publicus in the last decades see Badian , Historia, 11 (1962), 196 ff. (5) Cic., Acad., 2. 13; Rep., 1 . 31 ; P lut., TG, 9. 1 ; App., BC, 1. 18. That Scaevola was an in­ dependent statesmen, who changed his allegiance several times, is shown by G ruen , Athenaeum, 43 (1965), 321-332. More convincing is Wiseman’s view in Athenaeum, 48 (1970), 152-3. (6) According to E arl , Gracchus, 13 they are not identical. (7) P n /r ., TG, 11. 1 ; App., B C 1. 12; E arl , Gracchus. 13; G ruen , RPCC, 52. (8) On Cato and Carho see C i c , Amic., 29. Carbo, who was later a member of the agrarian com­ mission, was suspected to be involved with Aemilianus’ death (Cic., QF, 2. 3, 3 ; Fam., 9. 21, 3 , D e Or., 2. 170). For the tribune who replaced Octavius see P lut., TG, 13. 2 and MRR, 1, 493. On C. Villius, usually ignored, see P lut ., TG, 20. 3. I do not think that Metellus Macedonicus supported Tiberius ( con­ tra S cullard , JRS, 50 (1960), 73). Cic., Rep., 1. 31 shows only the enmity with Aemilianus.

CH APTER

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backed the law, and they were naturally able to exert their influence on kinsmen and connections to help it pass(9). And that is not all. Though Tiberius did not at first submit his law to the Senate, a significant proceeding to those who think that the whole Senate opposed him, he was later persuaded by the Suvazoi to do it, as he thought that good senators would support him (App., BC, 1. 12), And Plutarch records that it was the consulars MaUfoog and Fulvius who advised Tiberius to bring his law before the Senate. This suggests that Tiberius had a chance of a good reception in the Senate (10). Roman writers relate that the turning-point in Tiberius’ career was the rejection of the treaty with N um antia!11). There is no doubt that internal contests between nobles influenced the Senate’s Spanish policy, and that Scipio Aemilianus and his followers were responsible for its action ( 12). In 133 Aemilianus was in Numantia, but another Scipio appeared as Tiberius’ arch-enemy, P. Scipio Nasica, the Pontifex Maximus ( 13). Aemilianus him­ self, after his return from Spain, censured Tiberius in public. The censure was cautious, for he was anxious not to lose the support of the masses, as he eventually did ( 14). Other persons who opposed Tiberius were: M. Oc­ tavius, tr. pi., 133, Metellus Macedonicus, cos., 143 ; Q. Pompeius, cos., 141, T. Annius Luscus, cos., 153, P Rupilius, P. Popillius Laenas, cos., 132, Satureius, tr. pi., 133, Lucretius Vespillo aed., 133 and L. Rufus whose rank is unknown!15).

(9 ) This thesis has been elaborated by E arl , Gracchus, 8-15. Cf. B oren , AJP, 82 (1 9 6 1 ), 360361 ; A stin , Aemilianus, 191-2 ; G ruen , RPCC, 51-5. I do not follow their whole reconstruction, as I

am sceptical about evidence based on family relations in former generations, and in particular on the fasti. Thus the Calpurnii Pisones were Tiberius' supporters according to Earl, but this is denied by Astin,

though they use the same method. (10) P lut., TG, 11.1 The identification of MaXXtog with M’. Manilius, cos., 149 (G abba, Appian 356 ; E arl, Gracchus, 83-5) is rejected by A stin , Aemilianus, 348 and G ruen , RPCC, 53. (11) See the collection of sources in SRH, 3. (12) See S cullard , JR S, 50 (1960), 66-72 ; E arl, Gracchus, 66-71. Astin tries to exculpate Aemilianus from responsibility to the policy of subjection in Spain (Aemilianus, ch. XII, esp. 158). He may, or may not, be right but for Tiberius it did not make any difference, since he did not consider general policy, but saw the personal insult inherent in the rejection of the treaty. (1 3 ) A uct ., A d Heren., 4. 68 ; Cic., Cat., 1. 3 ; V al . M ax ., 3. 2, 17 ; Liv., Per., 58 ; P lut ., TG, 13. 3 ; 19. 3-4 ; 20. 4 ; App., BC, 1. 16. (14) V ell., P at ., 2. 4, 4. Cf. Cic., Rep., 1 . 3 1 ; V al . M ax., 6. 2, 3. See also Bilz , Aemilianus, 7078.

(15) On Octavius see the references in MRR, 1, 493. On Pompeius, Metellus Macedonicus and An­ nius see Liv., Per., 58 ; P lut ., TG, 14. Cf. E arl, Gracchus, 96-104. On Popillius and Rupilius see Cic., Amic., 3 7 ; V al . M ax ., 4. 7, 1. For Lucretius see V a l M ax., 1. 4, 2 ; Vir. III., 64. 8 and for Rufus, P lut ., TG, 19. 6.

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An all-important question, for our point, suggests itself: is it possible to discern an economic boundary between the supporters of the agrarian bill and Tiberius’ opponents? Plutarch ( TG, 13. 3) and Appian (BC, 1.12) tell us that Octavius and Nasica were to lose public lands as a result of the law, but with this our information is exhausted. Yet there is no reason to sup­ pose that his opponents occupied public land while his supporters did not. Crassus probably had public land, being one of the richest men at the time (no. 2.5). It can also be shown that some..opponents.were. not-.provoked merely by the law. Some years before 133, Laelius had promulgated an agrarian law, designed to divide public land. He surely had the backing of his friend Aemilianus ( 16). The famous inscription from Polla shows that a Roman magistrate evicted shepherds in order to find room for farmers (ILLRP, 454). Even if he was T. Annius Rufus (cos., 128), and not P. Popillius Laenas, as is the old view (17), it remains significant that a mem­ ber of the oligarchy, son of T. Annius Luscus who was one of Tiberius’ op­ ponents, took pains to eject the rich possessores, for they were the pastores ( 18). And though Tiberius’ supporters were ruthlessly persecuted and convicted with the backing of a senatus consultum, the Senate saw to it that the agrarian commissioners could continue at work ( 19). The view that those who killed Gracchus and his supporters in the Capitolium and prosecuted his sympathizers thereafter were motivated only by concern for their pockets does not make sense, in view of their subsequent behaviour.

(16) P lut ., TG, 8 . 3 -4. We do not know whether Laelius' bill resembled Tiberius’ law, but it was surely based on reclaiming land held iri excess of the law. See C ardinali, St. Gr., 113-4. The doubts of Tibiletti (Athenaeum, 28 (1 9 5 0 ), 234 If.) have been answered by S cullard , JR S, 50 (1960), 6 2 -3 . Cf. A stin , Aemilianus, 3 0 7 -8 .

(17) For the old view see D egrassi, ILLRP, 454 ; Philologus, 99 (1955), 259-265 ; H inrichs , Historia, 18 (1969), 251-5 ; contra E. B racco , “ L’elogium di Polla”, Rend, d ell’ Acad, di Napoli, 29 (1954), 5-38 ; 35 (1960), 149-163 (T. Annius Luscus); W iseman , PBSR, 32 (1964), 21-37 (with full bibliography), in my view no one has offered conclusive argument. (1 8 ) E arl , Gracchus, 43 ; G ruen , RPCC, 68. The interpretation of the sentence primus fecei ut de agro poplico aratoribus cederent paastores (ILLRP, 45 4 ) is disputed. For a summary of modem views see H inrichs , Historia, 16 (1 9 6 7 ), 162-3. 1 think that at the present state of our knowledge we cannot know what is precisely meant by this, yet some concession to small farmers at the expense of rich graziers is surely implied thereby. According to Hinrichs Ub., 170-174 ; Historia, 18 (1969), 2 5 3 -5 ), the roads conslructed after 133 and the distribution of public land to viasii viceni were mainly planned and carried out by the opponents of the Gracchans, which means that they were ready to cut down their profits in or­ der to maintain political influence. (19) On the trial see the sources collected in SRH , 13, and for the continuation of the commission’ work, backed by a senatus consultum, V al . M ax., 7. 2, 6 ; cf. P lut., TG, 21. An attempt was made in 129 to stop the work of the commission by depriving it of judicial power, but it was stirred up by the complaints of the Italian allies. See A pp ., BC, 1. 19 ; S cho l . Bob., 118. Cf. L ast , CAH, 9, 40-45 ; B adian , PC, 174-5; B oren , AJP, 82 (1961). 358-9

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Besides, the agrarian law left 500 iugera in secure possession to the rich, and did not introduce additional restrictions on the use of pasturage lands ( 20). So far we have shown that 1) a group of leading senators backed Tiberius’ law and that he could expect considerable support in the Senate; 2) that there is no proof that Tiberius’ opponents all possessed public land, while his supporters did n o t; 3) that the opposition to Tiberius, especially the final attack and the trials of his adherents after his death, cannot satisfactorily be interpreted as if it were intended to preserve private in­ terests in the public land. Senators would naturally have liked to retain their possessions, yet it was not from this motive that they took the law into their own hands. From the standpoint of the contests between noble and senatorial groups for political influence, the law was an effective means to gain an extensive clientela. Now political groups at Rome were not rigid, inflexible factions. Certainly consulars or prominent members of the nobility did not lose independence by belonging to family groups. Yet some senators combined in support of Tiberius' law, and it does not matter if one considers their collaboration as traditional in their families or as a tem­ porary alliance. The fact is that they could expect to enjoy the benefit of in­ creased patronage. This is not to deny that Tiberius and the sponsors of the law were sincere in their reform ( 21). But if they were to benefit, who were to be the losers ? The most likely candidate was Scipio Aemilianus, who had advanced his career by appealing to the masses ( 22), and who did ac­ tually forfeit his popularity after 133 ( 23). But other nobiles too might have wished to prevent the increase of the influence of the group backing the law ( 24). Yet even this consideration does not entirely clarify men’s motives and cannot be an adequate explanation. It was the abrogation of Octavius’ office (20) T ibiletti, Latifundia, 256-8 says that Tiberius was not in principle hostile to the large landowners, and in principle he is right However, we cannot be sure that he allowed occupiers an extra 500 iugera for two sons, B adian , Historia, 11 (1962), 210, n. 52; E arl , Gracchus, 6-8. (21) Earl’s thesis was criticized for attributing too much selfishness to Roman nobility by explaining the reform as an intention of a factio to strengthen its position (C rak e , Phoenix , 20 (1966). 172-5). He was also censured for neglecting the ideological aspect of the reform and the influence of Greek ideas (N icolet , REA, 67 (1965), 142-158). See also B runt , Gnomon, 37 (1965), 189-192. While 1 admit that a whole complex of factors led to the reform, I do not think that it is right to reject motives of per­ sonal and political gains. Cf. A stin , Aemilianus , ch. 14. (22) On Scipio Aemilianus as a ‘popular’ statesman and his clientela see S cullard , JR S, 50 (1960), 65-73 ; E arl, Gracchus, 1 4 - 1 ; 108 ; A stin , Aemilianus, 34 ; 182-3, and for his conservatism E arl, Historia, 11 (1962), 477-485. Cf. MIJnzer . RA , 267-9 ; S yme , JR S , 34 (1944), 144-5 ; B adian , FC, 168-9. (23) A stin , CQ, 54 (1960), 135-9 ; Aemilianus, 231-4; G ruen , RPCC, 64-5. (24) E arl, Gracchus, 47 ; 78 ; 86. Cf. S cullard , JRS, 50 (1960), 73 ; Astin, Aemilianus, 197-9.

218

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PROBLEM S

and especially Tiberius’ intention to us,e Attalus’ inheritance that raised strong opposition and united the majority of the Senate against him. Only then did Metellus Macedonicus and Q. P'ompeius join Scipio Nasica. These actions of Tiberius involved profound changes in the constitution and would have resulted in the Senate’s loss of control which it traditionally exer­ cised ( 25). Things came to a head, when Tiberius announced his intention to be re-elected as tribune. Dio tells that Gaiius too was to be elected as tribune and Appius, cos., 143, as consul (fr., 83). This evidence may come from the propaganda of Tiberius’ opponents. Nonetheless, it reveals their frame of mind, and thus Nasica perhaps did really believe that Tiberius was aiming at popular tyranny (Plut., TG, 19. 3), and that he might perpetuate his dominance by appealing to the Assembly. Now for the nobiles the Republic was a constitution which gave them all equal and open opportunities to ad­ vance in politics. They could at once see a real threat to this traditional form of government, and this threat drove them to the murderous act ( 26). When we pass to C. Gracchus, the problems become more complicated, but for our point of view the basic situation is completely clear. The com­ plication is due to the fact that his legislation was more extensive and that the details of his agrarian law are obscure. The basic situation is simple, because it is easy to demonstrate that the opposition to Gaius and the final crisis did not spring from the interest of the landowners in defending their property. Plutarch again describes Gaius’ opponents, even before he became tribune, as the nobiles and the powerful, but the rich as such are not men­ tioned (27). Appian does not relate any struggle before 123. Gaius’ influence in the Senate is recorded by Plutarch. Q. Fabius Maximus collected corn in Spain and sent it to Rome. Gracchus persuaded the Senate to sell the corn, to return the money to the Spaniards and to censure Fabius (CG, 6. 2). Evidently he was not in opposition to the whole Senate. There was a political struggle, and for a time Gaius obtained the upper hand in the Senate, though later his opponents drew the Senate to their side ( 28). (25) On Pompeius, Macedonicus and T. Annius see P lut ., TG , 14. On the political ties and the question of clientela see B adian , FC, 173-4; E arl, Gracchus, 93-102; G ruen , RPCC , 54-6. (26) For the constitutional question and the opposition view see L ast , CAH, 9, 30-35 ; E arl , Grac­ chus, 104-113 ; B oren , AJP , 82 (1961), 362-9. Badian argues that the Senate let the commission work in order to appease the people and regain its trust (FC, 174), but this means that senators were ready to sacrifice economic advantage to secure their political position. Even the argument that this was a tem­ porary device (C ardinali, St. Gr„ 184) does not invalidate this conclusion. Astin suggests that the violence was unplanned and that no one intended to use force (Aemilianus, 219-225). But his in­ terpretation is extremely hypothetical, as he himself admits. See L intott , Violence, 68; 221. (27) Plut., CG, 1. 3 ; 2. 2-3; 3. 1-2. (28) For the political contest see Gaius in G ellius 10. 11. Cf. Sen, D e Ben., 6. 34. 1-2 ; Badian , FC, 180-181.

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219

The content of the agrarian law is unknown, but the intention was surely to distribute public land on the basis of the programme of Tiberius, and this brings us to the senatorial reaction ( 29). It is commonly held that the law was passed in 123, without encountering serious opposition. One may argue that in the circumstances resistance was useless, but this corroborates our view on the catastrophe of 133. Senators would not go to extremities on ac­ count of their interests in the public land ( 30). Furthermore, even Gracchus’ enemies were ready to adopt his method. Livius Drusus’ law of 122 planned to establish 12 colonies, each with 3000 settlers ( 30. His law is usually regarded as a tactical move, and some maintain that the programme was not implemented (323). Yet this view is based on an argumentum e silentio, or on rejecting references to Livian colonies (3S). Drusus' proceeding may puzzle us, but it is -unsafe- to--interpret it by-ar hypothesis supported by lack of evidence, as our sources are very poor for this period. Drusus may have been more sincere than is granted by modern historians, and, in any case, it is significant that he was ready to risk public land. Senators’ attitudes to agrarian laws were thus not mainly determined by their private interests. Already Plutarch noticed that the struggle was political, for he writes that the Senate, i.e. Gaius' enemies, did not oppose the laws as such, but worked for Gaius’ failure!34). An agrarian law, based on the distribution of public land held by old

(29) Plutarch says that the law provided the poor with public land, and that Gaius intended to injure the Senate (CG, 5. 1) According to Liv, Per., 60, Gaius passed a law similar to that of his brother. Velleius tells that Gaius distributed lands and forbade the possession of more than 500 iugera, like the Licinian law (2. 6, 3). The epigraphical lex agraria mentions a law of Gaius, but the only positive evidence that can be learnt from 4t is that eertatn lands were not distributed (FIRA 2, I, n* 8, vv. 1,2,3, 4, 6, 13, 22). The evidence of Siculus Flaccus (p. 136, ed. BIume-Lachmann) that under Gaius' law the maximum amount was fixed at 200 iugera is contradicted by Velleius and the epitomator, and is not usually accepted, unless as if it refers to plots in colonies. See Last , CAH, 9, 67 ; S cullard , From the Gracchi to Nero (New York, 1959), 386, n. 23. Any interpretation of such evidence is highly conjectural. (3 0 ) On the date of the law and the lack of insistence see R otondi , Leges, 307 ; C ardinali, St. Gr., 1 9 0 ; MRR, 1, 514.

(31) P lut., CG, 9. 2 ; A p r , BC, I. 23; R eid , JRS, 1 (1911), 82-3. (32) C ardinali, St. G r , 195 (but the silence of V ell . P at ., 1. 12 is no proof) ; L ast, CAH, 9, 72. (33) Boren thinks that V ell. P at ., 1 .1 5 , 4 -5 indicates that Scolacium Minervium was actually foun­ ded (cf. K ornemann , RE, 4, 5 22), and regards Drusus' plan as serious. See CJ, 48 (1 9 5 2 /3 ) , 31. Beloch thought that Abellinum in Samnium was founded by Drusus, for its name was Livia Veneria (CIL, 10, p. 127). See, however, M ommsen , Hermes, 18 (1883), 164, where this colony is attributed to Sulla. Carcopino attempted to identify 12 colonies, but he thought that the commissioners distributed the lands in such a way so not to injure the aristocracy W es Gracques a Sylla, 264, n. 58). App., BC, 1, 35, 156 is too vague. (34) P lut., CG, 9. 1. Needless to say the events that brought the death of the Gracchani in 121 were not connected with the agrarian law. Equites too suffered. See C aspari, Klio, 13 (1913), 192-3.

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possessors to poor citizens, was not likely to gain the support of the prospective losers. Yet the view that the struggle on the agrarian laws merely reflects the desire of senators to defend their possessions distorts the issue. Determination to stick to occupied ager publicus did not unite the Senate, and certainly did not drive senators to violence. Even in 133, the situation did not deteriorate to the point of crisis for this reason, but because the prerogatives of the Senate were threatened and because it was feared, rightly or wrongly, that one man or a group of senators would dominate the state. Thereafter, agrarian law's became part of the complex of ‘popular’ laws. The Populares introduced agrarian laws, invoking the right of citizens to share in public land and addressing themselves to social problems. By so doing, they were also laying foundation for their own future political success. The Optimates opposed them, because they were aware of the political benefits that would accrue to the sponsors, and of the detriment to the government caused by these methods. Besides, the division of public property was bound to diminish the state’s revenues, and respon­ sible senators could, foresee the damage that would ensue ( 3536). III.— T he C onspiracy

of

C atilina

Few events have been so extensively discussed and differently interpreted as the Catilinarian plot. The conspiracy is reviewed here, as it directly bears upon our subject. Neither Catilina’s personality nor the general aims of the plot concern us. Our object is to see to what extent senators were ready to join the conspiracy, and what their motives were. What was the economic condition of those involved in the plot, and does it suffice to account for their participation (3S) ? A distinction must be drawn between events before and after the election of the consuls for 62. Some ancient writers record that there was an abor­ tive plot at the end of 66 or at the beginning of 65. The evidence is conflic­ ting and raises the suspicion that it originated from lampoons of political rivals. Catilina was surely not involved, to say nothing of the absurd idea of a dictatorship of Crassus, supported by Caesar ( 37). If there was a plan for

(35) Cic., Leg. Agr., 1. 21 ; Att., 2. 16, 1. Cf. Tusc. Pis., 3. 48. On the contention between optimates and populares and the points at issue see Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome , ch. 2. (36) For a summary of modern views, and analysis of one aspect of the failure of Catilina, see Y avetz , Historia, 12 (1963), 485-499. (37) See F risch , Cl. & Med., 8 (1947), 10-35 ; S yme, Sallust, 87-102; S eager , Historia, 13 (1964), 338-347; G ruen , CP. 64 (1969), 20-24. Stevens tries to rehabilitate this tradition (Latomus, 22 (1963), 396-435), but even he exculpates Catilina.

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violence, it was the convicted consuls designate who were responsible for it, P. Cornelius Sulla and P. Autronius Paetus ( 38). Though a plan to massacre senators, or the whole Senate, is attributed to the plotters, no source suggests any social or economic motive, such as abolition of debts or distribution of property. It is significant that the two men involved were rich. The costs of canvassing and of his trial in 62, including a payment of HS 2 million to Cicero, did not ruin Sulla (no. 133). Despite his expenses in 66-65, Autronius continued to keep up his luxurious house in Rome which he sold only after he had been convicted and gone into exile (no. 99). The conclusion is that rich men who could afford to bear financial losses were yet so embittered by political defeat as to contemplate the use of violence. Catilina probably had no intention to seize power by violence before the election of the consuls for 62. His purpose was, in 63 as in 64, to be elected consul. Sallust dates the plot to June 64, yet his own account makes it clear that after that time Catilina was still aiming at the consulate and nothing else ( 39). In 65-64 he had been able to benefit from the help of respectable men. L. Manlius Torquatus, whose life he is alleged to have attempted, bore witness for him at his trial de repetundis (Cic., Suit., 81). Cicero says that consulars too gave evidence on his behalf (ib., 81-82). Catulus was probably one of them ; he had testified for Catilina on a previous oc­ casion ( 40). Cicero himself had thought of appearing for the defence (Att., 1. 2, 1). No change occurred in the course of the year that could have urged Catilina to contemplate a revolutionary programme in 64. Besides, in all likelihood he enjoyed the support of Crassus in 64, and he canvassed in cooperation with C. Antonius ( 41). When we consider his other connections, the support of Crassus and the cooperation with Antonius, it is clear that Catilina’s aim in 64 was simply to obtain the consulate.

(3 8 ) C ic., S u it, 11 ; 4 9 - 5 0 ; 81 ; Fin., 2. 62 ; Sall., Cm , 18-9 , Liv., P er , 101 ; A scon ., 75 . 88 , S uet ., I uL, 9 ; D io, 36. 44, 3-5 ; S cho l . Bob ., 78-9. (3 9 ) S all., Cat., 17-24. 1. Sallust in fact does not know anything positive about a real attempt to im­ plement the plot, for in his narrative the gathering of June 64 is followed, the digressions apart, by the election in 63. It is clear that Catilina simply waited till after that election. No other ancient author dates the plot to 64. (4 0 ) S all., Cal, 35. 1 ; O ros ., 6. 3, 1 (4 1 ) A scon ., 83. Obviously Caesar was not able to give a valuable financial aid, but he rendered other help (A scon ., 90-91 ; S uet ., /«/., 11 ; D io, 37. 10, 2). Brunt discounts the evidence o f Asconius, since he depends on the d e consiliis suis of C icero , CR, 71 (1957), 193-5 ; cf. S eager , Historia, 13 (1 9 6 4 ), 34 6 -7 . But Asconius twice mentions Crassus’ support of Catilina, and only cites Cicero as his source on the second occasion. We have also to distinguish between support for election, a natural phenemenon at Rome, and complicity in a plot

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THE

P O L IT IC A L

A C T IV IT IE S

One aspect of political life at Rome in these years deserves attention. The use of violence by some senators in the fifties is well known. No doubt their purpose was to intimidate or eliminate adversaries, but they were not con­ spiring to effect a revolution. The phenomenon was not new. Clodius had gangs in 61 (Cic., Att., 1. 14, 5). Autronius tried to preclude his trial for ambitus by organizing a riot with gangs of slaves and gladiators (Cic., Sull., 15). Manilius delayed his trial by the same means (42). The abolition of collegia in 64 ( 43), and the lex Plautia de v /(44), passed before 63, in­ dicate that violence had been used to intimidate and disturb the proceedings of magistrates, the Assemblies anddieSenate.-Gatilina’s actions-before the elections of 63 have to be seen against this background of increasing violence, not to speak of slanderous propaganda, so characteristic of Roman politics. In 63, even before the election, he had a gang, presumably in­ tending to frighten his rivals and Cicero himself, in order to secure his elec­ tion. This activity could later be represented as the beginning of a con­ spiracy (45). The plot to seize power by force was an alternative he chose only after his failure at the polls, though he had considered this line of ac­ tion earlier as his answer to Cato’s threat to accuse him clearly shows (46). The beginning of the plot must be dated after the elections in 63, which were held at the end of September!47). What prompted Catilina to organize a conspiracy? The usual answer, the attractive answer, is that he had been deeply involved in debts, which he could only have defrayed from provincial profits. His hope of a provincial post was frustrated at the election, and since he would not sell his possessions, his only recourse was to seize power and proclaim tabulae novae. Perhaps there is some truth in this interpretation, but it is surely in­ complete, not to say that he himself denied it (Sail., Cat., 35. 3). In the let­ ter to Catulus he left in Rome he wrote that he had striven to win the con­ sulate and to preserve his dignitas, but that unworthy competitors had been preferred, and that for that reason he had turned to revolution (48). Catilina

(4 2 ) A scon ., 6 0 ; Dio, 36. 44, 2 ; S cho l . Bon., 119. For the whole subject see L intott , Violence passim, esp. ch. 6 and appendix A. See also B runt , Past and Present, 35 (1966), 18 ff. (4 3 ) Cic., Mur., 71 ; Pis., 8 ; A scon ., 8. (4 4 ) F o r the lex Plautia see R otondi , Leges, 377-8 ; MRR, 2, 128 and the detailed discussion of Lintott , Violence, 111 ff. T h e exact date o f the law cannot be established. (4 5 ) Cic., Mur., 4 9 -5 1 ; Cat., 1. 3 0 ; P lut ., C ic , 14. 1 ; D io, 37. 29, 2-5. (4 6 ) Cic., Mur., 51 ; V a l M ax ., 9. 11, 3. (4 7 ) R ice H olmes , Republic, 2, 4 58-461. (4 8 ) S all ., Cat., 35. 3 -4 . Sallust seems to be reliable here. See E a r l Sallust, 94 -5 ; S yme , Sallust., 71-2.

CH APTER

IX . —

PROBLEM S

223

was proud of his ancestors and: his patrician origin and till his last hour his dignitas was dear to h im (49). When he wrote about competitors unworthy of the consulate, he was mainly alluding to Cicero, but also to Murena who was not a nobilis. The haughty noble showed in public more than once his contempt for the inquilinus civis urbis Romae i 50). If Caesar’s dignitas was so dear to him that he started a civil war for its sake, we may believe that Catilina’s claim was genuine, and that this was another motive for his ac­ tion. Caesar had an army when he set out to defend his dignitas. Catilina had to create one, and tried to exploit economic difficulties and social embitterment by raising the slogan of tabulae novae. Here we are not con­ cerned with the chance of success among the general public of a plot based on this programme!51). What of the senators? Cicero and other ancient authors tell us that a large group of Catilina’s followers consisted of noble proprietors, heavily indebted and ambitious for office ( 52). A dozen senators who supported Catilina at one time or another are known by name : Q. An­ nius C h ilo !53), P. Autronius Paetus!54), L. Calpurnius Bestia!55), L. Cassius Longinus!56), C. Cornelius Cethegus!57), P. Cornelius Lentulus S u ra!58), P. Cornelius Sulla ! 59), P. and Ser. Cornelius S ulla!60), Q. C urius!61), M. Porcius Laeca!62) and L. Vargunteius!63). Curiously Sallust, who emphasizes that egentes and inopes joined Catilina, does not explicitly say that these senators, Q. Curius apart, were indebted. Only in(49) Salu C at. 31. 7 , 60. 7. Sa lu C a t. 31. 7 . AscuN- 9 1:--------(5 1 ) For references to indebted people as C'attliria’s followers see ch. VIII, n. B. Cf. Y avetz , Historia.

im

12 (1 9 6 3 ), 4 9 1 - 9 ; N icolet , Or. E q . 383-5.

(52) Cic., Cat, 2. 18-9 ; S u it. 56 ; P lut , Cic . 10 3. Cf S all., C at. 14 2 ; 5 ; 21 4 ; 52. 4 (5 3 ) Cic., C at, 3. 1 4 ; S all ., Cat, 17. 3 ; 50. 4 ; Com. P et. 10. Cf. K lebs, RE. 1, 2263. (5 4 ) Cic., S u it, 6 -7 ; S all., C at. 17. 3 ; 47. 1 , 48 7. See also n° 99, K lebs, RE, 2, 2612-3 (55) S all., C at, 17. 3 ; App., BC, 2. 3. Cf. MOn z er , RE, 3, 1367 (nos 24-5). (56) Cic., Cat, 3. 9 ; S all., C at, 17. 3 ; 44. 1-2 ; 50. 4 ; App., BC, 2. 4. Cf. M unzer , RE, 3, 17389. (57) Cic., C at, 3. 6 ; S all., Cat, 17. 3 ; 32. 2 ; 43. 2-3 ; 44. 1 ; 46. 3 ; 47. 4 ; 48. 5 ; 50. 2 ; 52. 33; 55. 6 ; 57. 1. Cf. M unzer , RE, 4 ; 1278-9. (58) Cic., C at, 3. 4 ; Sall., C at, 17 3 ; 32. 2 -, 39. 6 ; 43. 1 ; 44. 1 , 3 , 46 . 3 -, 5 , 47 2 ; 4 ; 48. 4 , 50. 1 ; 51. 7 ; 52. 17 ; 32; 55. 2; 5 ; 57. 1 ; 58. 4 ; Plut., C ic, 17 ; App , BC, 2. 2 , Dio, 37. 30, 4. See also n° 130; MOn z er , RE, 4, 1399-1402. (59) Sulla was acquitted, but he was probably involved. See D G , 2, 443. (6 0 ) Cic., S u it, 6 -7 ; S all ., C at, 17. 3 ; 47. 1 ; F lor ., 2. 12, 3 Cf. M unzer , RE, 4, 1518 ; 1521. (61) S all., Cat, 17. 3 ; 23. 1 ; 4 ; 26. 3 -, 28 2 ; App., BC, 2. 3. Cf. M unzer , RE, 4, 1840. (62) S all., Cat, 17. 3 ; 27. 3 ; Cic., Cat, 1. 1 , 2 . 13 ; S u i t , 52 ; F lor ., 2. 12, 3. See G undel , RE, 22, 213.

(63) Cic,, C a t, 1. 9 ; SttU., quibus potuit, pecunias Appio dictas coegit (Hist., 2. 80). It follows that Curio collected the money which had been promised to Appius, his predecessor !177). His financial resources are indicated by the fact that he agreed to pay his son’s debts amounting to HS 6 million. Even if he had not the whole

70. — C. Porcius Cato (169) Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 184. Cic., Verr., 2. 4, 22 and V ell. Pa t , 2. 8, 1 record the sum of HS 4,000. See D. G., 5, 162, n. 11 and G elzer, RE, 22, 105. who accepts 8,000. The reading of P 7776 of Cic.. Verr, 2. 4, 22 is HS 18,000 (170) Cic., B rut, 128; Balb., 28. (171) On the connections of the Porcii with Spain see Badian, FC, 161, n. 6 ; 318. 71. — P. Rutilius Rufus

(172) His commander received 200,000 pounds of gold (Sall., lu g , 62. 5). (173) Val. Max., 2. 10, 5 ; Dio, fr. 97. 4. For full references see MRR, 2, 8.72 72. — C. Scribonius Curio (174) Plut., S u it, 14. 7 ; App., Mith., 39 ; 60 ; Pausan, 1. 20, 6. For Sulla's profits see n° 50, ii. (175) Cic., Alt., I. 16, 10; Schol. Bob., 89. (176) Liv., Per., 92; 95; F lor., 1. 39, 6 ; Eutrop., 6. 2, 2 ; O ros., 5. 23, 20. (177) For Ap. Claudius Pulcher’s governorship see MRR, 2, 94

285

O F RO M A N SEN A TO RS

money and resorted to borrowing, he must have had the means to repay without much difficulty ( I78). 73) C. Sempronius Gracchus (47) Tr. PI, 123. The political activity of Gaius caused him considerable expense. He him­ self said that his questorship in Sardinia cost him money ( l79). His actions as tribune perhaps demanded personal outlay!180). His private ex­ travagance caused him to be charged of having bought silvered dolphins for 1250 denarii per p ound!181). Gaius’ property, but not his wife’s dowry, was confiscated after his death ! 182). He had a house on the Palatine, and in 122 he bought or hired a house near the F orum !183). Plutarch says that Gaius was not devoted to money-making (CG, 1. 2), which all the more poses the question of his sources of income. We may assume that he inherited from his father, cos. 179 (no. 34). Obviously his wife, the daughter of the very rich P. Crassus Mucianus (no. 25), brought him a considerable dowry !184) ; and as Crassus had no sons, it is very likely that he bequeathed his property to his daughters and sons-in-law (no. 25). In addition there are indications that he might have got help from various friends. Thus he had large influence in Sardinia, and Micipsa, king of Numidia, rendered him aid !185). 74) Q. Servilius Caepio (49) Cos., 106.

_____________

He possibly received booty when he served in Asia with M’. Aquillius in 129-126 (186), and as governor of Farther Spain in 109-107 where he waged a w a r!187). As consul Caepio captured the sacred treasury of

(178) Cic., Phil., 2. 45-6; V al. Max., 9. 1. 6 ; Plut., Anton., 2. 3-4. 73. — C. Sempronius Gracchus

(179) Plut., CG, 2. 5 ; Gellius, 15. 12, 4. (180) Plut., CG, 5-7. In his. last struggle he seems to have enlisted semi-mercenaries (P lut., CG, 13. 1- 2).

(181) Plin., NH, 33. 147; Plut., TG, 2. 4. (182) Plut., CG, 17. 5 ; Oros., 5. 12, 9 ; Dig., 24. 3. 66. See Munzer, RA, 269, n. 1. (183) P lut., CG. 12. 1. It was after the establishment of Junonia. Plutarch whether he bought or hired the house. (184) Plut., CG, 17. 5 ; Dig., 24. 3. 66. C'f. MOnzer, RA, 269. Gaius had a (Plut., TG, 2. 5 ; CG, 16. 4), probably a freedman of P. Crassus Mucianus, the Munzer supposed that the marriage with Mucianus’ daughter brought Gaius the

13, 217 (185) (186) (187)

doesnot make it clear servant named Licinius father-in-law of Gaius. means he needed (RE,

; 495 ; 2A, 1397). Plut., CG, 2. 2-3. Cf. Munzer, RE, 2A, 1382. On his service in Asia Minor see Holleaux, REA, 21 (1919), 7-16. Ins. It., 13. 1, 84-5; V al. Max., 6. 9, 13; Eutrop., 4. 27. 5.

286

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

Tolossa, which mysteriously disappeared. It was alleged that he ap­ propriated it, but his guilt cannot be accepted as certain!188). After his defeat by the Germans, Caepio’s property was confiscated and he went into exile!189). According to Vir. III., 73. 5, it seems that Satur­ ninus intended to use the money obtained from the sale of Caepio’s property to buy lands for the establishment of colonies in Asia, Macedonia and Sicilia (19°). If this is the right interpretation iit follows that he was a very rich man !191). In exile Caepio went to Smyrna !192). 75) P. Sulpicius Rufus (92) Tr. PL, 88. Sulpicius had a debt of 3 million denarii on his death (Plut., Suit., 8. 2), which probably was a result of his political activity. He had 3000 bodyguards in 88 (id., ib., 8. 1), whom he had to maintain. It is obvious that though Sulpicius is recorded as a rich man (Veil. Pat., 2. 18, 5), his in­ come did not cover his expenditure. Plutarch relates that Sulpicius sold the citizenship to freedmen and aliens (Sul/., 8. 1). This information probably comes from hostile propaganda, which was based on the support he gave to the Italians, who probably gave him financial a id ! 193). Sulpicius perhaps hoped to be recompensed by Marius for his law which transferred the command against Mithridates from Sulla ! 194). He may also have been aided by Equites, for 600 young Equites served in his bodyguards!195). Altogether it seems that both his own

(188) According to Iustin., 33. 3, 10, he took the treasure. See also Strabo, 4. 1, 13 ; G ellius, 3. 9, 7 ; Dio, fr. 9 0 ; O ros., 5. 15, 25 His contemporaries would believe anything after his defeat (see n. 189). (189) Cic., Balb., 28; Liv., Per., 67; Val. Max.. 4. 7, 3 ; Ascon., 78. (190) Saturninus .. Siciliam novis colonis destinavit et aurum dolo an scelere Caepionis parium ad emptionem agrorum convertit. As the aurum cannot be that of Tolosa, which had disappeared, it seems that the author refers to proceeds of the auctioned property of Caepio. See Badian, FC, 203, n. 6. (191) Though the colonies were not established and the money was perhaps not sufficient, it is ob­ vious, if the information is based on good sources, that Caepio must have owned extensive property. (192) Cic., Balb., 28. V al. Max., 6. 9, 13 is contradicted not only by Cicero but also by himself in 4. 7, 3. Cf. Munzer, RA, 290.75 75. — P. Sulpicius Rufus (193) For Sulpicius’ support of the new citizens see Liv., Per., 77 ; V ell . Pat., 2. 20, 2 ; Apr., BC, 1. 55. Cf. Badian, FC, 232, with n. 2. (194) Diod. Sic., 37. 29, 2 ; Liv., Per., 77 ; V al Max., 9. 7. E xt 1 ; V ell. Pat., 2. 18, 2 ; Plut., Mar., .34-5; App., BC, 1. 55-6; F lor., 2. 9, 6 (195) Plut., Mar., 34-5; App., BC, 1. 55-6; F lor., 2. 9, 6. (195) Plut., Sul!., 8. 2 ; Mar., 35. 2.

OF

ROMAN

SEN A TO RS

287

resources and the help of powerful supporters enabled Sulpicius to obtain ample lo an s!196).

(196) Some scholars regard Sulpicius as an independent statesman, but assume that when he passed his bill in favour of Marius, he hoped to win the support of the Equites who backed the latter See Hill, RMC, 140-141 ; G abba, Athenaeum, 32 (1954), 77 ; Badian, FC, 232-3. Yet though some Equites probably wanted Marius, there is no evidence, and I think it improbable that this was the attitude of the class as a whole.

III. —

F rom S ulla to the F all of the R epublic

76) ? L. Abuccius. Abuccius was possibly a senator, like other persons and interlocutors in the De Re Rustica of Varro. He had an estate at Alba, in the pastures of which cattle and sheep were bred. Peacocks and poultry were bred in the villa rustica of the estate. The income of the pastures was HS 10,000 a year, and that of the aviaries HS 20,000. It seems that this was the gross income (0. 77) L. Aelius Lamia (75) Pr., 42. Lamia had been a princeps equestris oridinis in the 50’s, when he ren­ dered help to Cicero and acted against Gabinius and Clodius {2). He became a senator before 45 and after 54, probably under C aesar!3). It seems that he was connected with the Syrian publicans, who appeared before the Senate in 54 to submit their complaints (Cic., QF, 2. 1 1, 2). He also had business in Africa. A letter of recommendation of Cicero of 43 discloses Lamia’s procurators, freedmen and slaves there (Fam., 12. 29, 2). These may refer to various interests, but the saltus Lamianus (CIL, 8, 25943) indicates that he had lands there. He also owned property in Rome, and Cicero hoped to buy his gardens which were situated on the other side of the Tiber (4). He also seems to have owned property in Formiae (5). As aedile in 45 he gave games (6).

76. — L. Abuccius (!) Varro, R R , 3. 2, 17 ; 6, 6. All the Abuccii known from inscriptions have the praenomen Lucius, CIL. 6, 8117-8172; 10, 1991.7* 77. — L. Aelius Lamia (2) Cic., Fam. 11. 16, 2 ; 12. 29, 1 ; Sest., 2 9 ; Pis., 64. (3) Syme, RR. 81-2. (4) Cic., A lt. 12. 19, 1 ; 22, 3 ; 29, 2. (5) Hor., Car., 3. 17. Cf. Syme, Historia, 13 (1964), 110; Nicolet, Or. Eq., 4 0 6 ; 410. (6) Cic.. Fam.. 11. 16, 3 ; 17, I.

OF

289

ROM AN SEN A TO RS

78) M. Aemilius Lepidus (73) Cos., 46. As proconsul of Nearer Spain in 48-47 he was guilty of extortion and on his return celebrated a trium ph!7). He had an estate at Lanuvium, bought from Balbus (Cic., Att., 13. 46, 2). He bought a house from Cicero in Antium (Cic., Att., 13. 47a). He possibly owned estates at Tibur and Circeii ( 8). He had a house in Rom e!9). Lepidus completed the building of the temple of Felicitas (Dio, 44. 5, 2). It seems that Lepidus was a very rich man in 43 (Cic., Phil., 13. 16-7 ; 49). He probably inherited some of his possessions from his father, the consul of 78 (no. 37). it is noteworthy that Lepidus bought the estate at Lanuvium and the house in Antium a short time after he had returned from Spain with booty. Lepidus probably took advantage of the auction of the property of Caesar’s rivals and profited from the proscriptions of the trium­ virate. — 79) Paullus Aemilius Lepidus (82) Cos. S u f, 34. He completed the building of the basilica Aemilia and inaugurated it in 34 (Dio, 49. 42, 2). As his tribe was the Palatina, he must have had property in Rome ( >°). It seems that he was included in the proscriptions of the triumvirate ( u). 80) L. Aemilius Paullus (81) Cos., 50. Paullus began the rebuilding of the basilica Aemilia in 55 (Cic., Att., 4. 17, 7), but did not complete the work (no. 79). The costs surpassed his financial resources ; he agreed to receive financial help from Caesar, though he had been his political opponent OH. Caesar gave him 1500 talents, and he in turn refrained from attacking him in politics (13). 78. — M. Aemilius Lepidus (7) Dio., 43 1, 1-3. Only the second triumph is recorded in the acta triumphalia (CIL, l z, p 50). (8) Cic., Att., 8. 14, 3. The reading is not clear, and only according to the emendation of Madvig it refers to Tibur. For Circeii see S u e t ., Aug., 16. 4. (9) Cic., Mil., 13 ; Ascon., 33 ; 43 ; Dio, 45. 17, 7 ; Schol. Bob., 116. Cf. P lut., Caes., 67. 2. For the identification of the interrex see Munzeh, RA, 353. 79. — Paullus Aemilius Lepidus (10) T aylor, VDP.R, '8 7 , (11) Dio., 54. 2, 1. Cf. D. G., 1, 4 7 0 ; Rohiden, RE, 1. 565.80 80. — L. Aemilius Paullus (12) Cic., Fam., 8. 10, 3 ; App., BC, 2 26. (13) Plut., Caes.. 29. 3 ; Pomp., 58. 1 ; Suet , /«/., 29

1 ; A pp., BC, 2. 26 ; Dio, 40. 63, 2.

290

PART

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E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

Paullus seems to have owned a house in Caieta and another in Sinuessa ( 14). His name was put on the proscriptions of the triumvirate, but he escaped to Miletus ( 1516*). 81) M. Aemilius Scaurus (141) Pr., 56. The inheritances Scaurus had received from his father cos. 115, from his mother Metella who had profited by the proscriptions of Sulla, and from his step-father Sulla, formed the main part of his wealth (Plin., NH 36. 116). As these were enormously wealthy (nos. 39, 50), he must have had inheritances of the order of tens of millions of denarii. It follows that in­ directly he enjoyed profits from the Sul Ian proscriptions C6).---As quaestor of Pompey in the East he profited several million sester­ ces ( ,7). Aristobulus gave Scaurus 400 talents, but did not enjoy the results of this bribery, as Pompey came and arrested h im (18). Scaurus also received 300 talents from Aretas, against whom he waged a war when he was left as governor of Syria in 63-61 ( 19). All this enabled him to give games, as aedile in 58, which by far exceeded every previous or subsequent games (Plin., NH. 36. 113-14). He built a theatre which had seats for 80,000 men. The scene was a complicated structure, with 3 floors and 360 columns. The first floor was made of marble, the second of glass and the third of gilded planks. 3,000 bronze statues were set together with precious paintings and scenic decorations ( 2021). Scaurus also gave expensive com­ petitions and other entertainments ( 20. It is said that the costs of these games were so vast that Scaurus had to take a large loan (Ascon., 18). Now Scaurus had obtained millions of denarii in the East, to say nothing of the income of his enormous possessions. We must assume that he spent more money in 58. However, it is possible that he did not bring all the money back from the East, but had

(14) Cic., A lt. 14. 7, 1 ; 8, 1. (15) Liv., Per., 120 ; V ell. Pat., 2 67, 3 ; Plut , Anton., 19. 2 ; App., BC. 4. 12; 37 ; F lor., 2. 16 ; Dio., 47. 8, 1. 81. — M. Aemilius Scaurus (16) Pace, Ascon., 18. Jaczynowska misinterprets this passage (Historia, 11 (1962), 4 8 7 ; 497). (17 ) See n” 126. Scaurus probably was not present in Rome at the time of the triumph, but Pompey surely gave him a share. (18) Joseph., AJ, 14.2 9 -3 3 ; BJ, 1. 6, 3-4. (19) J oseph., AJ, 14. 8 0 ; BJ, 1. 8, 1. (20) V al. M ax.,2. 4, 6 ; Plin., NH, 34. 3 6 ; 35. 127; 36. 114-6. (21) V al. Max., 2. 4, 7 ; Ascon., 18; 27 ; Plin., NH, 8.64 ;96 ; 9. 11. Scaurus’ games are often mentioned. See Cic., Sest., 116; Off., 2. 5 7 ; Att., 4 19, 6 ; Amm. Marcel., 22. 15, 24.

OF

ROMAN

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SENATORS

invested it in loans, as his commander did (no. 188). Or perhaps he had bought property. Indeed we know that he bought a house, but the date is unknown. He surely incurred some expenses in the canvassing for the aedileship. In any case, we can estimate the costs of his aedileship at several million denarii (22), though part of the investment could be recovered ( 23). As governor of Sardinia in 55 Scaurus incurred a charge of extortion. There is little doubt that it was well founded, though the aim of the ac­ cusers was to prevent Scaurus obtaining the consulate (24). He had 6 ad­ vocates, including Clodius, Cicero and Hortensius. He and Faustus Sulla made a very impressive appearance before the court, and his games and the good fame of his father helped him to be acquitted ( 2526). He then distributed gifts to the people (Cic., Att., 4. 17, 4). Soon afterwards Scaurus was charged with ambitus (Cic., QF, 3. 2, 3). This time he was convicted and went into exile (2B). Clodius bought his house on the Palatine, in late 5.3 (Ascon., 32). It comprised two parts : the original house and a new enlargement, added after he had bought and demolished the neighbouring house of Octavius, cos. 165. Clodius paid HS 14,800,000 for the whole edifice (27). Obviously only his conviction com­ pelled Scaurus to sell. He probably had debts, and it is noteworthy that Clodius, who had been his advocate, bought the house. Scaurus’ behaviour must astonish u:s, if we accept the view that he aimed at obtaining magistracies in order to make profits in his province (28). He was a very rich man, and his political expenditure surpassed all possible gains he could hope to make. Though he made profits in the provinces, these were a means towards, not the motive for, his ambition to advance in the cursus honorum.

(22)

T h e f o u r c o l u m n s u s e d b y S c a u r u s w e r e b ig g e r a n d

(Ascon., 27 ; Plin., NH, 36. 5-7). By c o m p a r is o n H S 50,000 T h e o r d in a r y c o l u m n s w e re le s s e x p e n s iv e , b u t o f th e o r d e r o f s e v e r a l m illio n s e s te r c e s . T h e 3,000 b r o n z e C rassu s

m o r e e x p e n s iv e th a n

(see n"

55

95),

w ith n

a s th e r e w e r e

360,

th o s e u s e d b y L

each m ay have cost

t h e c o s ts m u s t h a v e b e e n

s ta t u e s p r o b a b l y c o s t s im i la r s u m s , a n d th e

c o n s tr u c tio n o f th e th e a tr e a n d th e c o m p e ti tio n s d o n o t s e e m le s s e x p e n s iv e . A lto g e th e r it a p p e a r s th a t th e c o s ts w e re o f th e o r d e r o f s e v e ra l m illio n d e n a rii.

(23)

S c a u r u s k e p t t h e f o u r b ig c o l u m n s , w h ile th e o th e r s w e re p r e s u m a b ly s o ld . T h e g o ld u s e d in th e

d e c o r a tio n o f th e t h e a tr e d id n o t lo s e its in t r in s ic v a lu e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d th e s c e n ic d e c o r a tio n s w e re b a d l y d a m a g e d , o r c o m p le t e ly d e s tr o y e d , w h e n th e T u s c u l a n v illa w a s b u r n t

(Plin., NH. 36. 116)

(2 4 )

A scon.,

1 8 . C i c e r o d o e s n o t a n s w e r th e c h a r g e b u t p r e f e r s to d e f a m e th e w itn e s s e s a n d th e S a r ­

d in i a n s

(Scaur.,

7 - 1 3 ; 3 8 - 4 5 ) . T h e i n t e r e s t o f th e c a n d id a te s f o r th e c o n s u la te is r e v e a le d in th e a tta c k

on

F a u s tu s S u lla

(A scon.,

S e e a l s o C i c . , An., 4. 1 5 , 9 ; V al. M ax., V al. M ax., 8 . I. A bs., 1 0 ; A scon., 2 0 ; 2 8 . 1 3 8 ; Q uintil., 4 . 1, 6 9 ; A pp., S C , 2 . 2 4 . 138; Ascon ., 26-7; Plin., NH, 36. 6 ; 103.

(2 5 ) C ic .,

Alt.,

(2 6 ) C ic .,

Off.. 1. Off, 1. D. G„ 1,

(27)

C ic .,

(2 8 ) T h u s

4.

2 0 ).

17, 4 ;

23.

8.

1.

A bs.,

10 .

292

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

Of all Scaurus’ possessions we know only of his house in Rome and of the estate in Tusculum, which was worth HS 30 million. This estate, which he had inherited from his father, seems lo have spread over a considerable area (Cic., Caec., 54), but its enormous value was the result of the luxury villa urbana, embellished probably by the younger Scaurus, not by his father (Plin.. NH, 36. 116). No doubt he squandered his money profusely. His luxurious way of life is also illustrated by his collection of precious germs (Plin., NH, 37. 11). 82) L. Afranius (6) Cos., 60. As legate of Pompey in the East he made several million sesterces (no. 126). In his canvassing for the consulate, in which bribery was used, he was helped by Pompey ( 29), Afranius was probably a native of-Ricenum. where he seems to have owned property ( 30). 83) C. Albinius (1). A senator who was father-in-law of P. Sestius. One M. Laberius owed him money and paid it with estates which had belonged to Plotius and were confiscated and auctioned off by Caesar (Cic., Fam., 13. 8, 1-2). Perhaps he had an estate of 1000 iugera near Rome, for which he paid HS 11. 5 million ( 31). 84) C. Anicius (I). A senator who had friendly relations with Cicero. He had an estate at Cumae, near that of Cicero ) 32). Cicero sent a letter of recommendation to Q. Cornificius, governor of Africa, where his friend had business. Anicius obtained the status of legatio libera to his journey to the province, and ap-

82. — (2 9 ) C ic ., (3 0 )

L. Afranius Ati, I . 16,

1 2 ; P u rr.,

Pomp.,

4 4 . 3.

H is tie s w ith P o m p e y a n d a n in s c r i p tio n f o u n d n e a r C u p r a M a r it im a

s u g g e s t h is P ic e n tin e o r ig in . S e e

Syme, RR,

ULS,

878

=

ILLRP,

385)

31 ; 3 9 6 . M o m m s e n d e d u c e d f r o m t h e in s c r i p tio n t h a t

A f r a n iu s o w e d a n e s ta te th e r e , w h ic h is v e ry p r o b a b l e . L o m m a t z s c h ’s o b je c ti o n , b e c a u s e A f r a n iu s w a s

ignobilis,

is g r o u n d le s s ( C/L, l 2, 7 5 2 ) , a n d

83. — (3 1 )

84. — (3 2 ) A n tiu m

C.

Albinius

Cic., All., 13.

C ic .,

3 1 , 4. S ee

Ancius QF, 2 . 8 ,

S. B .,

th e r e f e r e n c e to

D. G.,

1, 2 6

d o e s n o t h elp ,

5 , 3 4 8 . 84*

C.

3. I f o llo w 7’

P., 2,

1 0 0 in a s c r i b in g t h e w r iti n g o f th is le tte r to C u m a e , f o r in

h e c o u l d a c c o m m o d a te M a r iu s in h is o w n h o u s e .

OF

ROMAN

SEN A TO RS

293

plied, through Cicero, for lictors Obviously he wanted official status and lictors to back his own interests, which probably included money-lending (Cic., Fam., 12. 21). 85) C. Annaeus (Brocchus) (3). He had fields near Segesta in Sicilia (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 93). He is probably identical with the senator C. Annaeus who was registered in the Clustumina (SIG3, 747), where he must have owned property. Two in­ scriptions connect him with Forum Novum in Sabinum, which was included in the Clustumina ( 33). 86) T. Annius Milo (67) Pr., 5.5. Milo had an estate at Ocriculum in Umbria (Cic., Mil., 64). We may note a C. Annius T.f. Milo at Assisium in Umbria (CIL, 11, 5448), which is admittedly quite far from Ocriculum. Milo very likely had property in Lanuvium U4). He also owned two houses in Rome, one on the Clivus Capitolinus and the other on the Cermalus. The first he inherited from his grandfather (3S). An estate of Milo is mentioned in Ascon. 37, but it may be identical with that at Ocriculum. Milo also had possessions in the Cher­ sonese (36). In all likelihood Milo inherited most of his property and money. He was bequeathed three inheritances : from his father Papius, from his grandfather T. Annius, who adopted him, and from his mother)37).

85. — C Annaeus Brocchus

(33) For the identification see MRR, 2, 115, and for the inscriptions C IL, 9, 4806 ; 4860. See Syme, Historia, 13 (1964), 110-111 ; Nicolet, Or. E q , 585-6; Wiseman, NM RS, n° 26.6 8 86. — T. Annius Milo

(34) Milo was a native of Lanuvium where he served as dictator (Ascon, 31). (35) Cic., Att., 4. 3, 3 makes it clear that Milo had two houses, one on the Cermalus and the other that is called domus Anniana. When Clodius' men attacked the first house they were surprised by Milo's men from the second house where many weapons were stored (Cic., Mil., 64). The domus Anniana was evidently inherited from Milo’s grandfather. The house mentioned in Cic., Mil., 28 may be that on the Cermalus (see CIL, 6, 30689). The identification of the Anman house with the one on the Cermalus by P. A , 185 is a mistake. Cf. T P., 2, 16; D. G., 1, 35, C onstans, Ciceron, 2, 185. (36) For the complicity of Philotimus with the sale of Milo's property see Cic., Alt., 6. 1, 19 ; 4, 2-3 , 5, 2 ; 7; 1 ; Fam., 8. 3, 2. The Chersonesian property is mentioned in 6. 5, 2. (37) Cic., Mil., 95 ; Ascon, 53. Milo’s father obviously married a rich woman, who had property of her own after the marriage. For the Papii as senators see MRR, 2, 599 ; one at least was from Lanuvium ; L. Papius Celsus (T aylor, VDRR, 241). The Papa's origin was from Samnium (Z). G., 1, 30-31 -, Munzer, RE, 18, 1079-9 ; Salmon, Samnium, 314 -, 392). it is attested by an inscription of the late Republic that C. and M. Papius Celsus probably had possessions at Narona in Dalmatia ULS, 8893 = ILLRP, 417).

294

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

The known expenditure of Milo was caused by his political activity. He bought the gang of C. Cato in 56 (38) ; these gladiators enabled him to put up effective resistance to Clodius, though already in 57 he had organized armed men (39). He kept his armed forces till 52, when he killed Clodius. His men, who numbered some hundreds, were partly professional gladiators and partly ordinary slaves to whom the special task of defending their master was assigned (40). Milo spent considerable sums of money in his canvassing for the con­ sulate. He began his petitio in 54, when he gave games which cost hundreds of thousands o f sesterces (41). He gave scenic-games and-gladiatorial shows, and also distributed money to the people (Ascon., 31). After the murder of Clodius he distributed 1000 asses to every man in the tribes (Ascon., 33). Cicero’s censure of this extravagant outlay implies that Milo had to borrow money to defray the costs (42). Milo became heavily indebted because of this expenditure (Ascon., 54). It is said that he admitted debts of HS 6 million (Schol. Bob., 169). Pliny says that Milo’s debts were one of the prodigia animi humani (NH, 36. 104), but the reading of the mss (DCC) has surely been corrupted. Some emmend it to HS 7 million and some to HS 70 million which seem more probable, to judge by Pliny’s remark. After his conviction in 52, Milo’s property was sold for a trifle because encumbered by debts (Ascon., 54). Milo went to Massilia in exile (43). He kept very many of his slaves, and something was done for his wife, Fausta the daughter of Sulla ( 44). It ap­ pears that when he had married her in 55 (45), he received some property, which she now tried to recover. Fausta had property of her own, including slaves (Ascon., 34).

(38) Cic., QF, 2. 4, 5 ; Off., 2. 58. (39) Cic., A lt., 4. 3, 3 ; QF, 2. 3, 4 ; Red. Sen., 19 ; Red. Q uir., 15 ; H ar. R esp., 6 ; S e s l, 86 ; Vat., 4 0 ; Dio, 39. 8 ; Schol. Bob., 122; 125. (40) Asconius writes that Clodius was accompanied by 30 slaves, while Milo had a large band when he killed his rival (31-2). In the trial Metellus Scipio witnessed that Milo had a force of 300 men on that occasion (Ascon., 35). He probably exaggerated, but at the same time Milo had other slaves who defen­ ded his house in Rome (Ascon., 33). All were Milo’s slaves; some were gladiators (Ascon., 3 1 -2 ; Dio, 39. 8 ; Schol. Bob., 122 ; 125). For the arming of ordinary slaves see Ascon., 31 on Clodius’ slaves. (41) C ic., QF, 3. 9, 2. The reading is not clear. Constans accepted CCC (C iceron, 3, 122). See also T. P., 2, 226 (C C C IDDO). Watt in the last edition of O. C. T. thinks the crux insoluble. (42) Cic., QF, 3. 8, 6 ; 9, 2. Milo had not been aedile (contra T. P., 2, 224). Cf. D. G , 1 ,3 3 ; K lebs, RE, 1, 2273. (43) C aes., BC, 3. 21, 4 ; Liv., Per., 107; Ascon., 5 4 ; Dio, 40. 54. (44) Cic., Att., 5. 8, 2 ; C aes., BC, 3. 21, 4. See T. P., 3. 29-30. A woman recovered her dowry after the death of her husband (n° 73). Milo perhaps divorced his wife to enable her to get the dowry, or perhaps she had lent him money (Gellius, 17. 6). See J olowicz, Roman Law, 246-8. (45) Cic., Att., 4. 13, 1 ; Ascon., 28.

OF

ROM AN

SEN A TO RS

295

87) T. Antistius (22) Q., 50. Antistius served as quaestor and proquaestor in Macedonia in 50-49, where he collaborated with Poimpey. His property was confiscated by Caesar. After his death Cicero acted for the heir, C . Ateius Capito. The sixth part of the inheritance was almost HS 3 million ; hence Antistius’ property was worth some HS 18 million (46). 88) C. Antistius Vetus (47) Cos. S u f, 30. Pliny records that Cicero’s estate at Cumae passed to Antistius Vetus, probably the consul of 30 (47). In 43 he served under Brutus (48), but in 37 he was already with Octavian ; it seems that he obtained Cicero’s estate as an adherent of the triumvirs (49). In 43 he gave public funds, HS 2 million, to Brutus, which he had from his governorship of Syria ( 50). 89) C Antonins (Hvbrida) (19) Cos.. 63. Antonius probably profited as prefect under Sulla in Greece in 84. He used cavalry for extortion from the people of Achaia ( 51). He returned to Italy in time to profit in the proscriptions (Ascon., 88). Antonius was expelled from the Senate in 70, ‘because he had plundered the allies, refused trial, sold estates on account of heavy debts and did not hold his property in his hands’ (52). The estates sold had obviously been given as a pledge for loans, which he could not repay. But he apparently had other property, which he perhaps transferred to relations in order to keep it from the creditors. Pastures and cattle had been handed over to them according to Cicero (Ascon., 87). Cicero probably misrepresented the facts ; he says that Antonius kept his shepherds to stir up revolt. This allegation is

87. — T. Antistius (46) ClC., Fam.. 13. 29 For the reading see T P., 3. 362. 88. — C Antistius Vetus

(47) Pun ., NH, 31. 6. For the estate see

S c h m i d t , Villen. 480, n. 1 and n° 211, i. (48) Cte., Ad. B rut, 1. i t ; 4 2, t ; 3. (49) See MRR, 2, 407 ; 417, and for the identification of Antistius, mentioned by Pliny, Klebs, RE,

1, 2558 (50) Ctc., Ad Brut., 1. 11, 1 ; 2. 3, 5 ; Plut., Brut., 25. 1. For the date, February or March 43, see T P . , 6, 149 (contra MRR, 2, 327).89

(51) (52)

89. — C. Antonius Hybrida A s c o n . , 84; P l u t . , C aes, 4. I . C i c . , Flacc., 95 , Com. Pet., 8 ; Ascon., 84.

296

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

perhaps better discounted, but it is obvious that these shepherds might have been used as a military force. Antonius also had a house in Rome (Com. Pet., 8). His debts did not prevent him from celebrating extravagant games, and he also bought gladiators, possibly for more shows (Ascon., 88) which were to enhance his chance as a candidate. These involved him in heavier debts, because of which he followed Catilina according to Plutarch (C/c., 12. 3). As he had lost much of his property, he must have been provided with money without sufficient securities, apparently by Crassus ( 53). As proconsul of Macedonia in 62-60 Antonius wrung money from the provincials and waged a war for booty (Dio, 38. 10). He obviously needed the money, part of which Cicero probably was to receive (Att., 1. 12, 2), though the latter denied it (S4). For his maladministration Antonius was charged and convicted in 59 (55). He went into exile to Cephallenia. Strabo says that he ruled the island as if it were his private property, and he even started building a town (10. 2, 13). As an exile Antonius could not have enjoyed official status, and his former behaviour in Greece certainly does not suggest that the islanders willingly received him. Strabo’s words then probably mean that Antonius had extensive property in the island so that the inhabitants depended on him. 90)

M. Antonius (29) Pr., 74.

As proconsul to fight against the pirates in 73-71 he extorted money from the Sicilians, who had to compound their obligation to supply grain at the tariff of 3 denarii to the modius. As this was a short time after the har­ vest, surely the operation was highly remunerative (Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 213-

6 ). Antonius collected money from other cities under his control. The soldiers were lodged in the inhabitants' houses, and grain, clothes and men were requisitioned. By these means Antonius saved money voted by the Senate for the war. His requisitions enabled the brothers Cluatii, who lent

(53) Sall., Cat., 17. 7 ; Ascon., 83. On Crassus see ri° 159. The Senate passed a motion for a law against bribery, induced by the practice of the candidates for 63 (Ascon., 83) Antonius' legatio Ubera to Asia in 65 (Com. Pet., 8) indicates his interests there. Cf. 7 P , 1, 158 ; C onstans, Ciceron, 1, 279 (con­ tra MRR, 2. 160). (54) For the exchange of the provinces see C ic , Pis. , 5 ; Phil., 11. 23 ; Sall., Cat., 26. 4 ; Plut., C ic, 12. 4 ; Dio, 37. 33, 4, and for Cicero's attitude with regard to Antonius A lt., 1. 13, 1 ; Fam., 5. 5. See also T. P , 1, 192 ; Klebs, RE, 1, 2580 (on Att., 1 16, 16). (55) Cic., Cael.. 74 ; Vat., 27-8 ; Dio, 38. 10, 3-4 ; Schol. Bob., 94. For the trial see D G , 1, 3956; Klebs. RE, I, 2580-2582; Austin, Caelius, 158-9

OF

ROMAN

297

SENATORS

money to Gytheum, to enforce interest at 48 96. The city could not repay the debt, part of which (1500 drachmas) the Cluatii agreed to rem it; they also reduced the interest to 2 4 96 ( 56). Plutarch reports that Antonius had little property but was generous and helped his friends (Anton., 11). These liberalities are considered by Sallust as extravagance (Hist., 3. 3). Cicero says that Antonius’ debts brought his son, Antony, to bankruptcy ( 57). It follows that Antonius left considerable debts together with the inheritance (Cic., Phil., 2. 42). 91) M. Antonius (30) Cos., 44. (I) Till 49. In his youth Antony was bankrupt because of the debts left by his father ( 58). Cicero’s plea that Antony did not inherit from his father is not convincing ( 59), for he could have become bankrupt because of his father’s debts, only if he had inherited (€fl>. At any rate, Antony’s debts amounted to HS 6 million, which had probably been incurred partly by the father and partly by the son (61). Obviously Antony must have had some property to offer as a pledge. Antony succeeded in repaying the debts. Curio the elder paid the sum for which his son had become surety (no. 72). Antony’s resources even enabled him to make a loan to Q. Cicero, who collected money for his brother’s

M. Antonius

90. — (5 6 )

SIG 3,

7 4 8 , 1 5 - 4 0 . I t is n o t e x p lic itly s a id t h a t A n t o n i u s d e m a n d e d th e 4 , 2 0 0 d r a c h m a s , a n d it is

p o s s ib le t h a t h e a g r e e d to c o m m u te t h e r e q u i s i tio n s o f f o o d a n d e q u i p m e n t f o r m o n e y . E a r lie r , w h e n

mparr/yds o f th e c ity , th e le g a te s o f A n to n iu s p lu n d e r e d it b y riatpopai ( c o m p a r e th is i n ­ /G, 5 . 1. 1 1 4 5 ) T h e r e is n o th i n g in th e in s c r i p tio n s t h a t ju s ti f ie s th e v ie w t h a t A n to n iu s le v ie d a ta x (contra R o sto vtzeff , SEHHW. 9 5 1 - 3 ; M a c ie , Asta. 2 9 3 ; 1 1 2 7 , n . 4 5 ) . F o u c a r t w r o te th a t A n t o n i u s ' le g a te s d e m a n d e d m e n , e q u i p m e n t a n d m o n e y {REG, 21 ( 1 9 0 8 ) , 4 0 8 ) , b u t th e c o m p a r is o n b e tw e e n th e tw o in s c r i p tio n s s h o w s t h a t datpopm in c lu d e f o o d , e q u i p m e n t a n d m e n a l o n e . A c c a m e 's view t h a t th e s e w e re n o t A n t o n i u s ’ le g a te s is n o t c o n v i n c in g ( Dom. Rom.. 1 3 1 - 2 ) ; s e e M u n zer , RE, 1, 1 5 3 4 , MRR, 2 , 1 1 2 - 3 . F o r th e r e q u i s i tio n s in E p id a u ru s , s e e IG. 4 , 6 6 . ( 5 7 ) C i c . , Phil, 2 . 4 4 . C i c e r o ’s c h a r g e s c o n t r a d i c t e a c h o th e r . C f . D io , 4 6 . 1 4 , 3 - 4 . 91 B ia d a s w a s th e

s c r ip t io n w ith

91. — (5 8 ) C ic ., (5 9 ) C i c ,

M Antonius Phil, 2 . 4 4 . F o r c r i tic is m o f Phil., 2. 4 2 . C f. D io , 4 5 . 4 7 ,

C i c e r o s e e D io , 4 6 .

in h e r ita n c e in o r d e r n o t to r e p a y h is f a t h e r 's d e b t s a lle g a t io n s

(RE,

(D G .

1, 7 0 ) , a n d G r o b e , to o , a c c e p te d C i c e r o ’s

1, 2 5 9 5 ) . B u t C i c e r o w o u ld s u r e ly h a v e u s e d a s h a r p e r p h r a s e h a d A n to n y 'r e j e c t e d h is

f a t h e r 's in h e r ita n c e . ( 6 0 ) J olowicz , (6 1 ) C ic .,

14, 3 -4 .

3 - 4 . D r u m a n n d e d u c e d t h a t A n t o n y d id n o t r e c e iv e th e

Phil.,

Roman Law, 2. 4 5 ;

23;

P l u t ..

1 2 7 -8 ,

Anton., 2.

262. ).

298

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

needs in 58 ( 62). Antony’s first wife was a daughter of a freedman ( 63). It is very plausible that he married her for a rich dowry. Possibly he had already received some of the rich inheritances mentioned by Cicero (Phil., 2. 40). As praefectus equitum of Gabinius in 57-55 Antony probably received some of the profits of his superior!64). Altogether it appears that even before his attachment to Caesar Antony’s capital was not insignificant!65). Apart from the general information on Antony’s possessions, we know that he had an estate at Misenum, which had passed from his grandfather!66). Possibly he already had the estate at Cumae, mentioned for the first time in 49 ! 67), and a big house on the Palatine (Dio, 53. 27, 5). Cicero says that it was poverty that induced Antony to join Caesar, because this was his only hope of repaying his debts (Phil., 2. 50). No doubt he had done well in Gaul where he served as quaestor and legate in 52-51. But we have seen that his financial circumstances had already im­ proved before then. Cicero’s political slanders cannot be trusted!68). Am­ bition for command and military success, especially after his distinguished service in the E a s t!69), was probably a no less important motive than the desire for gain, and even that by itself does not prove that he was still poor. (II) 49-44. Most of our evidence is derived from Cicero’s writings, especially the Philippics, which must be cautiously used. The fact that even later writers on Antony depend much on Cicero makes the task difficult. It is said by Cicero (Phil., 2. 40) that Antony’s receipts from inheritances were higher than his ; if so, they exceeded 20 million sesterces. He also ac(6 2 ) C i c ,

QF,

i. 3 , 7

F o r th e c i r c u m s ta n c e s see 7

g o o d te rm s w ith C lo d i u s in 5 8 h e a d d s t h a t A n to n y (6 3 ) C ic ., (6 4 ) C ic .,

Phil.. Phil.,

(6 .5 ) T h e r e is n o c r e d i to r s (6 6 )

tr ie d

(Phil.,

to k ill C lo d i u s

2. 3 ; 3.

17;

2 . 4 8 ; P lut .,

P.,

1, 3 7 6 - 7 . C i c e r o s a y s t h a t A n to n y w a s o n

s o m e y e a rs la te r

13. 2 3 . S e e

O. G, 1,

(Mil.,

40 ;

; 73 ;

Alt.,

4 ), but

3 7 9 -3 8 0 .

Anton., 3.

s u p p o r t f o r D r u m a n n ’s c la im t h a t A n t o n y w e n t to

(D. G., 1, 4 7 ) . C i c . , Phil., 2. 4 8

Anton., 2. Phil., 2. 4 9 ) .

2. 4 8 ; f o r a s h o r t tim e a c c o r d in g to P lutarch ,

G r e e c e in

5 8 to e s c a p e h is

10. 8 , 9 ; 14. 2 0 , 2 , 1 5 . 1, 2. S e e a ls o n ° 4 0 . C i c e r o 's a lle g a tio n

t h a t t h i s w a s th e o n ly p r o p e r t y o f A n to n y c a n n o t b e ta k e n a s r e lia b le e v id e n c e . (6 7 ) C ic .,

An.,

10.

11 , 4 ; 1 3 ,

( 6 8 ) S e e W irszu bski ,

JRS,

1

51 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ,

a b u s e . P o m p e y , to o , u s e d a s im i la r s ty le

1 2 -2 2 . esp

1 7 -8 .

(infirmus et inops)

Audax

and

egens

a r e te r m s o f p o litic a l

w ith r e g a r d to A n to n y in 5 0 ( C i c . ,

Alt.,

7. 8,

5 ). P lu ta r c h w r ite s t h a t C a e s a r b r ib e d A n to n y , w h o w a s in d e b te d b e c a u s e o f h is f r ie n d s h i p w ith C u r i o

(Pomp.,

5 8 . I ) . E v i d e n tl y h e d r a w s o n C i c . ,

w h e n A n to n y

had

Phil, 2.

4 5 . N o w C u r i o g o t C a e s a r 's a id in 5 0 a t a tim e

a l r e a d y s e r v e d u n d e r C a e s a r tw o y e a rs , w h ic h m a k e s th e a c c u s a tio n o f b r ib e r y

rid ic u lo u s . ( 6 9 ) P lut .,

Anton..

3 , J oseph ..

B.I.

1- 8 , 3 - 4 ;

At,

14. 8 6 .

OF

ROMAN

299

SENATORS

cused Antony of not even knowing those by whose will he benefited. Two of the testators are mentioned by nam e: L. Rubrius, an Eques from Casinum, and L. Tursellius, who was perhaps an Eques too. It can be seen that these inheritances came to Antony in 47, when he was magister equitum of Caesar or afterwards (70). Antony perhaps received many inheritances merely because of his special position in Caesar’s dictatorship but Cicero may have exaggerated the sum. Antony acquired much property in these years. He obtained the house, gardens and other property of Pompey in Rome together with some of his estates, including that in Tusculum ( 71), also the estate of Varro at Casinum and that of Metellus Scipio at Tibur ( 7273). His gardens near the Tiber were perhaps bought in these years ( ” ), as well as the property that he probably owned in Aenaria ( 74). Antony made these purchases partly in public auction hoping that Caesar would not demand payment ( 75), in which he was wrong. Caesar sent soldiers to Antony and to his sureties, and he was given a short time to pay the money (Cic., Phil., 2. 73-4). Yet we know from a letter of Cicero of 13. 3. 45 that Antony did not pay and had to return from Narbo to Rome to prevent his sureties from being sold by L. Plancus, the prefect of the city ( 767). Now Antony’s debts amounted to HS 40 million in March 44 ( ” ). Yet he had acquired much of Pompey’s property, had received many valuable inheritances, and even before the outbreak of the civil war had improved his financial circumstances. And in 46 he married the rich Fulvia,

(7 0 ) C ic .,

Phil.,

(7 1 ) C ic .,

Phil.,

2. 4 0 -4 1 ; 6 2 ;

74.

2 . 15 ; 6 4 - 8 ; 1 0 9 ; 1 3 . 11 ; V ell . P at ., 2 . 6 0 , 3 ; P lut ,

Anton.,

10 2 ; A pp„

BC,

2.

1 2 6 ; 3 . 14 ; 5 . 7 9 ; D io , 4 5 . 9 , 4 ; 4 8 . 3 8 , 2 . T h e h o u s e w a s s itu a te d o n th e C a r i n a e n e a r th e T e m p le o f T e llu s

(P A.,

(7 2 ) C ic ., (7 3 )

CIL,

5 1 1 ).

Fan,

Phil.,

2.

6 , 9 9 9 0 ; D io , 4 7 . 4 0 ,

2.

12. 2 ,

I ;

103;

1 0 9 ; 5.

19.

( 7 4 ) I n 3 9 A n t o n y in v ite d L i b o to ta lk s w h ic h w e r e h e l d in A e n a r ia ( A p p .,

BC,

5 6 9 ) . N o w A u g u s tu s

v e ry lik e ly c o n f i s c a te d A n t o n y ’s p r o p e r t y , a n d w e k n o w t h a t h e e x c h a n g e d A e n a r ia f o r C a p r i w ith N e a p o l is (S trabo , 5 . 4 , 9 ; S uet .,

Aug.,

9 2 . 2 ; D io , 5 2 . 4 3 , 2 ). A n in s c r i p tio n f r o m A e n a r ia r e c o r d s th e

n a m e s o f M . A n to n iu s a n d A n to n ia , fre e d m a n a n d fre e d w o m a n o f A u g u stu s n a m e s b e tr a y t h a t t h e y t r a d f o r m e r t y b e l o n g e d t o A n t o n y . H t r s c h f e ld sen

(CIL,

(Kl Schr ,

(CIL, 534. n

10, 6 8 0 4 ). T h e ir 1) a n d M o m m ­

10, p . 6 7 9 ) a s s u m e d th a t A e n a r ia h a d b e e n p u b lic p r o p e r t y s in c e 3 2 6 a n d th a t A u g u s t u s c o m ­

p e n s a te d th e T r e a s u r y . T h e r e is n o p r o o f o f th is , b u t a s S u e to n i u s m a k e s it c l e a r th a t C a p r i b e c a m e A u g u s t u s ' p r iv a te p r o p e r t y b y th e m e r e e x c h a n g e , w h ic h is a ls o im p lie d b y S t r a b o a n d D io , it f o llo w s th a t th is h a d b e e n tr u e o f A e n a r ia P r o b a b ly A n to n y h a d a c q u ir e d it a n d a f t e r h is d e a th it p a s s e d to A u g u s tu s .

(75)

C ic .,

Phil., 2. 71-2 ; Plut., Anton., 10. 2 ; D io , 42. 50, 5 ; 45. 28, 3. B u t A n t o n y w a s Phil., 2. 64) a s C i c e r o h i m s e l f r e v e a ls (Phil., 13.

o n ly m a n t o b u y P o m p e y ’s p r o p e r t y ( C i c . , ( 7 6 ) C ic .,

Alt.,

(7 7 ) C ic .,

Phil.,

12. 2.

Phil, 2 . 7 8 . 35; 93. C f. D. G., 1, 18a,

1 ;

61

n o t th e 1 1-2).

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who obviously brought a significant dowry ( 78). His enormous debts in 44 seem inexplicable ; he can hardly have squandered such sums in so short a time ( 79). But we can account for his loans in March 44 by connecting them with his return to Rome a year before. Once he realized that Caesar would not give in, he preferred to borrow money, to pay for Pompey’s property. A short time after his return to Rome he set out to meet Caesar on his way back from Spain, and they were reconciled ( 80). His attempt to avoid payment had caused the split with Caesar, who was appeased when Antony yielded. (Ill)

44-42.

After the murder of Caesar most of Antony’s expenditure was political, while most of his receipts was of public funds. The interesting period is 4442, when Antony had to fight for his position which was not secure. Our main purpose is to investigate the sources of income, which were vital to his military dominance. Antony commenced accumulating money immediately after the death of Caesar. Calpurnia handed to him the private treasury and papers of Caesar. This must have been a considerable sum, though we cannot have full faith in Plutarch’s evidence that it was HS 100 m illion!81). Antony also ap­ propriated some of Caesar’s property, though our source, Cicero, certainly exaggerates this matter ( 82). He seized a large part of the public money, HS 700 million, deposited in the temple of Ops (83). He also made profitable use of Caesar’s papers. In return for cash or promissory notes he pardoned exiles, granted exemptions from taxes, and gave rights and offices (84). Cicero may often exaggerate and distort the facts, but the allegations cannot be entirely false ; the evidence is to be found not only in the Philippics but

(7 8 ) C ic ., (1 9 6 5 ),

Phil., 3.

16 . S e e

D. G., 2,

3 1 0 f. I th i n k B a b c o c k o v e r r a t e s th e w e a lth o f F u lv ia

(AJP,

86

1 -3 2 ).

( 7 9 ) F o r c o m p a r is o n : e a r l ie r , A n t o n y ’s d e b t s , in c lu d in g w h a t h e in h e r ite d f r o m h is f a t h e r , a m o u n te d to H S 6 m i lli o n ( n . 6 1 ) . C a e s a r ’s d e b t s b e f o r e h is S p a n is h g o v e r n o r s h ip w e re H S 2 5 m illio n ( n ° 1 5 2 , i).

(D. G., 3 , 5 9 0 f.). A n t o n y w e n t to m e e t h im a n d Anion., 11 . 1). D io , 4 5 . 2 8 o b v io u s ly fo llo w s C i c .,

( 8 0 ) C a e s a r a p p r o a c h e d R o m e a t th e e n d o f A u g u s t th e y r e t u r n e d r e c o n c ile d ( C i c . ,

Phil., 2. (8 1 ) 15, 2 ;

Phil., 2.

7 8 ; P l u t .,

7 2 - 3 , a n d is c o n t r a d i c t e d b y D io , 4 5 . 9 , 4

Plut., Cic., D to , 4 6 .

43. 6 ;

23,

Anton.,

15

1 ( 4 , 0 0 0 ta le n t s )

(8 2 ) C ic .,

Phil., 2.

(8 3 ) C ic .,

Ail ,

14 . 1 4 , 5 ; 1 6 . 1 4 , 4 ;

BC,

3 . 5 2 ; 5 4 ; D io , 4 5 . 2 4 ,

60, 4 ;

A p p .,

35;

109;

T r e a s u r y in th e n ig h t o f 1 5 / 1 6

1 5 ; P's.

3 . 3 0 ; A p p .,

Phil.,

o f M a rc h

Fam., 1 2 . 1, 1 ; At!., 14. 12, C i c . , Octav., 3 ; V e l l . P a t ., 2 .

(8 4 ) C ic .,

S e e a l s o A p p .,

BC, 2.

125 ; 3. 1 7 ;

Flor.,

2.

1 - 2 . S e e N o te J.

BC,

3.

17

1. 17 ; 2 . 3 5 ; 9 3 ; 5 . I I ; 8 . 2 6 ; 1 2 . 1 2 ; V ell . P a t .,

2.

1. G r b b e w a s w r o n g in w r itin g t h a t A n t o n y r o b b e d th e

(RE, 1, 2 5 9 8 ) . S e e Phil, 1. 2 4 ; 2 . 6 ;

1 ;

60, 4 ;

N o te I 3 5 ; 9 7 ; 1 0 0 ; 3 . 1 0 ; 3 0 ; 5 . 12 ; 7.

D io , 4 4 . 5 3 , 3 - 4 .

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also in letters. A few specific cases are mentioned. Deiotarus, king of Galatia, gave a promissory note for HS 10 million in return for the restoration of the lands taken by Caesar (8S). According to Cicero, Antony made large sums by conferring the Roman citizenship on the Sicilians !86) as well as by exempting the Cretans from taxes and by cancelling the provincial status of the island after the governorship of Brutus (87). He was already collecting money at the end of March and continued in April ( 88). What was his purpose? It is obvious that he did not aim merely at private enrichment, though his gains enabled him to repay his debts ( 89). It seems that from the beginning he was aware of his need for ample finan­ cial resources. He could have learnt from Caesar that money was an all im­ portant means to secure hegemony in the state!90). Antony shared the public money with Dolabella after the latter had shown that he could cause damage to Antony's plans. And the support of a consular was also bought!91). Antony is said to have recruited 6000 bodyguards among Caesar’s veterans in the second half of A pril!92). The distribution of lands to soldiers and the establishment of colonies required more money, which could properly be taken from the Treasury!93). An­ tony’s expenditure increased when he had to buy the loyalty of the legions. He promised 100 denarii to soldiers of the 4 legions which crossed to Italy from Macedonia (App., BC, 3. 43-4), in total some 2 million denarii. When 2 legions deserted to Octavian he gave 500 denarii to the soldiers of the 2 remaining legions, in total some 5 million denarii (App., BC, 3. 45). He had another legion when he set out to Gaul, which must have received its share. In Cisalpine Gaul Antony recruited three more legions till January 43 and had '6 legions under his command !94). These too had to be paid.

Alt., 14. 1 2 , I ; 1 9 , 2 ; P hil , 2. 9 3 - 5 . (86) Cic., Alt., 14. 1.2, 1 ; Phil, 1 24; 2. 92; 3. 30; (87) Cic., Phil, 2. 97; Dio, 45. 32, 4. (8 5 ) C ic .,

5. 12; 7. 15

( 8 8 ) C a e s a r 's m o n e y w a s s e iz e d in th e f ir s t d a y s a f t e r h is d e a th (n . 8 1 ) . T h e le tte r

Ail , 1 4

1 2 , w h ic h

w a s w r itt e n o n 2 2 n d o f A p r il, m e n tio n s th e la w s o n D e io t a r u s , S ic ily a n d o th e r s a k i n to th e m . C i c . ,

2.

93

(89) Cic., Phil., 2. 35; 93; Dio, 45 24, 1. ( 9 0 ) C f . D. G, I, 7 9 - 8 0 ; R ic e H olmes, Empire, 1, 5 - 6 ; f o r C a e s a r s e e n ° 1 5 2 , ( 9 1 ) C i c . , Alt., 1 4 . 1 8 , 1 ; 16 1 5 , 1 ; Phil., 2. 10 7 ’, a n d f o r th e c o n s u l a r s e e Fam., 1 2 . 13 ;

P hil,

im p lie s t h a t t h e p u b li c m o n e y w a s a lr e a d y ta k e n b y A n t o n y in M a r c h .

D. G.,

i i ; c h . V I,

in .

2 , 2 ; 7"/ ’ , 6 ,

1, 9 6 .

(92) A n to n y le ft R o m e in b e tw e e n 22-27 o f A p r il S e e D. G , 1, 427-8. C f. R ice H olmes, Empire. 1, 190 f. F o r th e r e c r u i tm e n t s e e C i c . , Atl., 14. 21. 2 ; Fam., 11. 2 , 1 ; Phil., 1. 27 ; 2. 100 ; 108; A p p ia n {BC, 3 . 5 ; 29) w r o n g ly w r ite s t h a t A n to n y r e c r u ite d th e s o ld ie r s b e f o r e th e j o u r n e y to C a m p a n i a a n d w ith o u t th e S e n a t e 's a u t h o r i z a t i o n . S e e D. G., 1, 421-2. C f Botermann, Soldaten, 19-25. ( 9 3 ) F o r f u ll r e f e r e n c e s s e e

MRR,

2, 3 1 6 ;

333.

(94) C]C., PhjJ,-,. 8. 25.; 27 ; T.JCr-Er-250. F or Antony's legions in 44-43 see V. G., I, 210 ; 44U ; R ice Holmes, Empire, 1, 201-2; Botermann, Soldaten, 181-197; Brunt, It. Man., ch. 26, iii. It

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Antony was possibly helped by the old clientela of his family at Bononia (Suet., Aug., 17. 2). After the battle in Forum Gallorum two legions disin­ tegrated, but Ventidius soon arrived with 3 legions which were recruited in Caesar’s colonies and in Picenum ( 95). After the junction with Asinius Pollio and L. Plancus and the death of D. Brutus Antony had 16 legions ( 96). The annual pay of a soldier, which had been doubled, was 225 denarii and that of a legion was some 1.6 million denarii l 97). However these legions received special grants apart from their pay. As we have no complete data, we cannot arrive at a precise assessment of Antony’s ex­ penditure, but obviously it was of the order of tens of millions of denarii. However he seems to have prepared enough money to cope with this ex­ penditure. After the establishment of the triumvirate Antony, Lepidus and Octavian ruled Italy and the western provinces. They used the proscriptions to an­ nihilate their enemies and, at the same time, to obtain the land and money they needed. According to one version the lists included 300 senators and 2,000 Equites ( 98). Yet the results were disappointing and no wonder. The offer exceeded the bid. According to Appian the triumvirs needed 200 million denarii (BC, 4. 31), but having realized that prices went down, they resorted to other means, though our information is not entirely satisfactory. 1,400 rich women were required to submit valuations of their properties which were to be taxed. After protest the number was reduced to 400. Every man with property worth more than HS 400,000 was to pay a sum equivalent to his annual income with 2 % compulsory loans. Appian also writes of a tax of HS 100 on slaves ("). Though the triumvirs had to spend enormous sums, it seems that they managed to enrich themselves as well ( 10°). should be remembered that the nature of our evidence makes futile any attempt to arrive at precise estimate. (95) Cic., Phil., 12. 23 ; F a n , 10 17, 1 ; 18, 3 ; 33, 4 ; 34, 1 ; 11. 10, 3 ; 13, 3 ; App., BC 3. 66 ; 72. The force under Antony after the battle cannot be estimated. See Botermann, Soldaten, 192-4, and for Ventidius’ legions 195-7; Brunt, It Mart., 481-2. (96) S eeD .G ., 1, 468-9 ; R ice Holmes, Empire, 1, 217-8. This is apparently also the view o f Boter­ mann, although heir table does not show it (Soldaten, 204), but Pollio came with 2 legions and Plancus with three (ib., 200-201), so that with 11 of Antony there were under his command 16 legions. See also Brunt, It. Man., 483-4. (97) Suet., Iul., 26. 3 ; Watson, Historia, 7 (1953), 119. Previously the pay was about 800,000 denarii. See n° 50, n. 64. (98) App., BC, 4. 5. Cf. Liv., Per., 120 ; Plut., C ic, 46 ; Anton., 20 ; Brut., 27; F lor., 2. 16, 3 ;

Oros., 6. 18, 10. (99) Val. M ax., 8. 3, 3 ; Q uintil., 1. 1 ,6 ; App., BC, 4. 32-4 ; 5. 67 ; Dio, 47. 14 ; 16-7. No doubt the censors of 42 were to deal with problems of assessment and taxation. (100) On property not sold see App., BC, 5. 12 ; 20 ; also Dio, 47. 14, and for the proscriptions see ch. I, iv.

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303

After the first battle of Philippi the triumvirs promised 5,000 denarii to soldiers, 25,000 to centurions and 50,000 to military tribunes (App., BC, 4. 120). 22 legions were assigned to the war against Brutus and Cassius; 2 perished at sea and 3 apparently in the battle. The remaining 17 legions numbered 80,000, which meant that the pay was to be some 400-450 million denarii. Yet the other legions, about 20, had also to be p a id (101). We may assume that the price of the lands which were to be divided to the soldiers was deducted from this sum ( l02). Antony took it upon himself to collect the money in the eastern provinces, while Octavian had to take care of the distribution of the lands ( l03). Antony went to Asia Minor where he required the provincials to pay in advance the taxes of 9 years in 2 years. He also sold titles, imposed fines and collected money in other ways. Plutarch relates that Asia alone paid 1200 million denarii, an incredible sum, especially as Brutus and Cassius had squeezed the provincials a short time before ( l04). Ultimately not all the soldiers received the money ( 105). (IV)

42-31.

Payments to soldiers and war expenses continued to form the main part of Antony’s expenditure ( 106). When Antony and Octavian divided the Em­ pire, they surely arranged for the division of the revenues. In most of these

(101) See the discussion of Brunt , It. Man., ch. 26, 484-498. According to App., BC, 5. 5 Antony had to provide the pay for 28 legions, which numbered with the auxiliary forces 170.000 (except the horsemen), on which see Brunt , It. Man., ch. 26, 489 f. (102) Soldiers who had finished their service were discharged after the battle of Philippi. 8,000 preferred to continue their service. There were kept 11 legions, including Brutus' soldiers, but we cannot say how many of them had served under the triumvirs (App.. BC, 5. 3 ; Dio, 48 2. 2-3). (103) V ell. Pat., 2 74, 1 , Plut., Anton., 23. 1 ; Suet., Aug., 13. 31 , App, BC, 5. 3 , Dio, 48 2. 2-3. According to Brunt, It. Man., 492-3, at least 50,000 veterans were entitled to allotments. (104) Plut., Anton., 24. 4-5 ; App., BC. 5 5-7 ; Dio, 47. 3 1 ,4 ; 48. 24, 1. See also Joseph., AJ, 14. 301-329; BJ, 1. 12, 4. Cf. Broughton, ESAR, 4, 585, Magie, Asia, 428 (105) According to Groag (Klio, 14 (1915), 49-50), Antony squandered the money and did not give the donatives to the soldiers (cf R ice Holmes, Empire. 1, 100) Yet the extravagance of Antony is ob­ viously derived from the propaganda of his rivals; he simply did not keep his word. Dio says that Octavian’s soldiers were not paid (48. 30, 2) However, soldiers seized property and lands, even of men who were not proscribed (App., BC, 4. 35 ; 5. 22 , Dio, 47. 14, 4). I may add that we do not know what hap­ pened to the chests of Cassius and Brutus (106) We are ill-informed on the total number of Antony’s legions after 42 , 22-30 according to Kromayer, Hermes, 33 (1898), 23-30 ; 68 ; Tarn, CQ, 26 (1932), 75-81. 1 do not understand why T am rejected Plutarch's evidence on the num ber of Antony's army, while be was ready to accept his evidence on Octavian (Anton., 61). He assumed that Antony already had 30 legions in 34, but his assigning of the legionary coins of Antony to 34 has not been followed (see, e.g. Sydenham, CRR, 1956). However, it is very doubtful whether he had more than 23 legions at any time. See Brunt, It. Man., ch. 26, 504-7.

304

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years Antony ruled the eastern provinces whose taxes he presumably received. Though these do not concern us, it would be interesting to know whether Antony was careful in separating liis private finances from those of the state under his control. The few details we have suggest that this was not always the case. When he retreated from Parthia in 36, Cleopatra sent 100 denarii to every soldier, but because there was not enough money, An­ tony completed the donatives from his own purse ( 107). His private procurators took care of the army supply in the war against Octavian, but as he had quaestors they should have had the control of the public mo­ ney C08). Perhaps it was only in emergencies that the separation was not observed. Antony could have taken, not only given. It seems that the money collec­ ted in Athens in 39 was his own, and surely he took for himself the booty captured in Armenia in 34 ( l0910). Cleopatra was prepared to help him, as she did in 36 and again in 31 when she gave him 200,000 talents (Plut., An­ ton., 56. 1). At this time Antony tried to obtain support, friends and followers in Italy by sending donatives. And of course he had to incur the usual expenses of war, including the cost of his special troop of gladiators ( no). Antony’s possessions spread over several parts of the Empire. We have already mentioned his procurators, who had to manage his property. The chief procurator was a freedman ; so probably were most of the others (Plut., Anton., 67. 7). One, who probably administered Antony’s property in Greece, lived in Corinth. But Antony presumably also had property in Asia Minor. Plutarch's story that Antony granted HS 2 million to a friend {Anton., 4. 4) reveals that Antony assigned a special man to take care of the money, and it seems that he had this large sum at his house. Obviously his possessions were confiscated by Octavian ( 110. (107) P lut., Anton.. 51. 2 ; Dio, 49. 31, 4. (108) Only a few quaestors are known in this period, one of whom, M. Titius, served under Antony in 36 (P lut., Anton., 42. 3). Note also C. Sosius, quaestor 39, who served under Antony in 38 (M RR, 2, 387 ; 393). For the procurators see P lut., Anton., 67. 7 ; 68. 5. (109) Sen.. Suas., 1 6 (6 million denarii); Dio. 48. 39. 2 (1 million). T arn (CAH, 10, 53) and Lar­ sen (E SA R , 4, 434) had doubts on this information, which perhaps originated from Antony’s rivals. But Antony collected money in the Peloponnesus in the same year (App., BC, 5. 77 ; Dio, 48. 39, 1 ; 46, 1). Booty: Dio, 49. 39, 5-40, 2. (110) Donatives: Dio, 50. 7, 3 ; 9, 1 ; gladiators: Dio, 51. 7. (111) Antony’s house on the Carinae, which had belonged to Pompey, passed to the Caesars (Suet., Tib., 15 ; P. A., 188), and the house on the Palatine was given to Messala and Agrippa (Dio, 53. 27, 5). See also note 74. It is very likely that Antony had possessions in Asia, even if we do not follow the theory of Rostovtzeff on the king’s lands: Kolonat, 283-297 ; SEHHW, 815-6 , 1525, n. 88 ; SEHRE, 652-3 ; for criticism see F rank, JR S, 17 (1927), 141-161 ; Broughton, TAP A, 65 (1934), 207-239 ; ESAR, 4, 587. Cf.

OF

ROM AN

305

SENATORS

92) Q. Arrius (7) Pr., 73. Cicero mentions one Q. Arrius of humble origin who obtained magistracies, money and influence by his rhetorical talent (Brut.. 242-3). He may be identified with the praetor of 73 (>12). Inscriptions of the Arrii have been found in Campania: in Capua, Cales and Vulturnum ( 113). Cicero had a neighbour, C. Arrius, at Formiae, who seems to be identical with the master and patron recorded in inscriptions found at Min­ turnae (m ). It is obvious that the Arrii had possessions in these places. And a Q. Arrius is recorded in an inscription found at Formiae, who may be the praetor (U5). Arrius gave a lavish feast to the people (U6). 93) C. Asinius Poliio (25) Cos. 40. Pollio had an estate in Tusculum, where were found bricks with the in­ scription Asin. Poll., which probably refers to h im (117). We may add that Pollio’s descendants are known to have owned manufactures of bricks and tiles (7). Now if the grandson of Hortensius the orator, who was supported by Augustus (Tac.. Ann . 2. 37-8), was the son of the praetor of 45, his impoverishment was probably due to the confiscation of his father’s property. There are. however, good reasons to think that his father was not the praetor of 45, but a second son of the orator, born from his second marriage with Marcia (418). 150) Q. Hortensius Hortalus (13) Cos., 69. Hortensius married the daughter of Catulus, cos. 102 (419). Though his

148. — A Hirtius (412) Hirtius' father was censor in Ferentinum, where he rebuilt walls and constructed arches (CIL. 14 1522-1525 = ILLRP, 584-586) (413) For the estate at Puteoli see Cic., A t t , 14 9, 2 , 21, 4, for that at Tusculum, Cic., Att., 15.5, 2 ; 6. 2-3, and for Cumae, Att., 14. 11, 2. He perhaps had a house in Aquinum (Cic., Fam., 16. 24, 2). (414) G rant, FITA, 3-4 ; 18-9 ; 88-9 , 391-2. But municipal origin is no proof that he was ‘ in business' (contra Grant) 149 — Q Hortensius (415) Cic., Alt, 16 2, 1 See T p , 5, 3 8 2 ; yet see S B.. 6, 286. (416) See D. G., 1, 474 For his fate at Philippi see Liv., Per., 124 ; Plut., Anton., 22. 4 ; Brut., 28. i. C f V ell. Pa t , 2. 71, 2 (417) There is no evidence that Augustus bought Hortensius' house on the Palatine (contra P A., 181). (418) J. G eiger , C R., 84 (1970), 132-4 150

150. — Q Hortensius Hortalus (419) MUnzer , RA, 286-7.

OF

ROM AN

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34 5

father-in-law was killed in the civil war (App., BC, 1. 74), and his brotherin-law served with Sulla (id., ib., 1. 105). he stayed in Rome and often ap­ peared in court (Cic., Brut., 308). He may have joined Sulla on his return, but hardly profited from the proscriptions)420). In the early seventies he benefited from a forged testament, and thus became co-heir of 1.. Minucius Basilus. a rich man who had died iri Greece t 4-’1). Hortensius was surely rewarded for his activity as advocate. In the ab­ sence of details we can only refer to Cicero's inheritances, which he probably received from his clients in the court; they amounted to some HS 20 million) 422). As aedile in 75 Hortensius gave games on a large scale and distributed corn to the people )423). He was helped by Verres in the decoration of the city )424). In 70 he defended Verres, who repaid him, among other things, by helping his canvassing for the consulate) 425). Hortensius had an estate at Bauli, with fish ponds ) 426). In Rome he had a house on the Palatine )427), and another near the porta Flumentana (Cic., Att., 7. 3, 9). He had an estate at Tusculum on which he built a gallery for the picture he bought for HS 144,00 0 ) 428). His estate at Laurentum in­ cluded a forest of more than 50 iugera )429) ; and he had lucrative property in Puteoli) 430). We know very little of these estates, which seem to have been pleasure resorts, except for Puteoli. Yet the 10,000 jars of wine

(420) Cic., Fam.. 2. 16, 3 C f D G, 3, 98 (contra F rank. ESAR, I. 398) (421) Cic., O ff, 3. 73-4 ; Val . Max , 9. 4. 1.Basilus, the military tribune of Sulla in Greece, is probably identical with the rich L. Minucius Basilus See Munzer. RE, 15, 1947 , MRR. 2. 55, and n" 176, n. 685 (422) Cic., Phil., 2. 40 For Hortensius as orator see ORF3, 310-330 He used to bribe the juries. See Cic., Div. in Caec., 2 4 ; Verr., 1. 4 0 ; 2. 5, 173; Ps. Ascon , 193-4. (423) Cic., O ff, 2 57 ; Verr. 2 3, 215. (424) C ic., Verr, 2. 1, 58 ; 3, 9 ; Ps. A scon., 238. (425) P lin., NH, 34. 4 8 ; Q uintil., 6 3, 9 ; P lut., Cic., 7. 6 ; Apophth C ic, 11. For hints on payments by Verres to Hortensius see Cic., Verr., 1 8-9 -, 40 -, 4 7 ; 2. 5. 176 ; Ps A scon., 221 (cf. Verr., 2. 3, 9). Verres seems to have financially supported Hortensius’ canvassing for the consulate: C ic ., Verr, 29 duo igitur consules et quaesitor erunt ex illius voluntate: Ps. A scon., 215 Cf. n° 102. (426) C ic., Acad, 2. 9 , 125; 145, V arro, RR. 3 3, 1 0; 17, 5 ; Pu n , NH, 9 170; 172. (427) S u e t . A u g , 72 1 Cf fl C , 3. 98 (428) C ic . Verr. 2 4, 126 ( ? ) . Plin. NH 35 130 ; M acrob . 3. 13. 3 (429) Varro. RR, 3. 13, 2-3 There was a game-preserve there (430) Cic., Att., 7 3, 9 I cannot find any reference to property in Sabinum and Picenum in Val. Max., 9. 4, 1 (contra Von der Muhl , RE, 8, 2475). I think that he had two distinct estates at Puteoli and Bauli (contra D. G., 3, 99, notes 4-5). For the town holdings in Puteoli see D 'A rms, AJP, 88 (1967), 195-200. Cic., A tt, 5. 17, 5 seems to refer to Cicero's estate at Cumae, not to Hortensius' estate (contra J aczynowska, I, 4 6 ); see Alt., 5. 2, 2.

346

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inherited by his son had probably been made on his lan d (431). It is noteworthy that his estates spread over several districts. Hortensius’ fondness of luxury is shown by the fish ponds, the picture and his being the first to serve peacocks ( 432). He opposed the sumptuary law of Crassus and Pompey (Dio, 39. 37, 2-3). 151) ? (Hostilius) Saserna (22 f ) . Saserna, the author of the book on agriculture, had an estate in Cisalpine Gaul (Varro, R R , 1. 18, 6). Of the three Sasernae known at the middle of the frst century, at least 2 were senators!433). We may suppose that the author was a senator too( 434). 152) C. / itlins Caesar (13) Cos., 59. (i)

Till 59.

We are told by Appian that Caesar was completely without resources when he began his political career (BC, 2. 151). This is an exaggeration that has some justification in the context, since Appian is comparing Caesar with Alexander the Great. However, there is evidence that Caesar was already a man of means in his youth. His first wife brought him a dowry and he shared in the gentiliciae hereditates. Moreover, though some of his kinsmen lost their properties in the dictatorship of Sulla, Caesar himself was not proscribed and retained his patrimony, though not the dowry and the gens' inheritances (43S). Perhaps he had possessions in Sabinum, for he sought refuge in that district. He eventually got rid of his pursuers by bribes (436). Caesar very likely enriched himself in his military service in the E a st; during the siege of Mytilene he fought with distinction, and he took part in (431) P lin., NH., 14. 9 6 ; see also Macrob., 3. 13, 3. (432) V arro, RR, 3. 6, 6 ; Macrob., 3. 13, 1. Hortensius was one of the famous piscinarii. See Cic., Alt., 1. 18, 6 ; 2. 1, 7. Cf. Varro, RR, 3. 17, 6-8 ; Macrob., 3. 15, 6, and for his love of works of arts, Cic., Verr., 2. 3, 9 ; 4, 6 ; P un ., NH, 34. 48.

151. — (Hostilius) Saserna (433) MRR, 2, 5 7 3 ; SMRR, 29. (434) See M unzer , RE, 8, 2513.152 152. — C. Iulius Caesar (435) For the dowry and the inheritances see Plut.. Caes , 1 . 1 ; Suet., lul, 1 1 , also Dio, 44 39, 1. On Caesar during t f e Sulla’s dictatorship see M orzo, Caes. et Aug., 62-4. (436) V ell. Pat., 2. 41, 2 ; P lut., Caes., 1. 3 ; Suet., /«/., 1. 1, Catullus (29. 17) alludes to Mamurra and not to Caesar ( contra D. G., 3, 658).

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the war against the pirates of Cilicia (Suet., Iul., 2-3). He probably profited as legate of M. Antonius Creticus (437). It also seems that he was assisted by clients, for he collected a debt in Bithynia for one of his freedmen (Suet., Iul., 2. 2). A few years later, when he was captured by pirates, he had a considerable retinue. The ransom money was paid by the cities of the province Asia, but then Caesar captured the pirates and took their money for himself!438). Caesar incurred heavy expenses as aedile in celebrating the Ludi Romani and the Megalesia; his colleague, Bibulus, bore part of the costs. He exhibited gladiatorial games in honour of his father, in which 320 pairs of gladiators were to take p a rt(439). By his magnificent games, decoration of the city, restoration of the trophies of Marius, and other prodigalities he won great popularity (44°). His adversaries were alarmed at the huge number of the gladiators, and in consequence a law was passed limiting the number of gladiators allowed to participate in games. The majority of the gladiators he had bought for the occasion (441). He still had many gladiators at Capua in 49 ( 442). Certainly he had not just acquired them, and he may have retained them since his aedileship, though we also know from Suetonius (Iul., 26. 3) that on deciding to exhibit gladiatorial games in memory of his daughter (died 54), he began to collect gladiators. As candidate for the office of Pontifex Maximus, he succeeded by bribery on a large scale (443). And the repair of the Appian way increased his debts (Plut., Caes., 5. 4). It is said that at the beginning of 61 they amounted to 25 million sesterces!444). It is difficult to explain on what securities Caesar had borrowed such enormous sums. In 61 the creditors were satisfied when Crassus went surety for Caesar’s debts to the amount of 830 talents. He must have had sureties in the preceding years too. It is probable that Crassus had helped him earlier, and that in 61 the creditors

(437) SIC?. 7 4 8 ; Broughton, TAPA, 79 (1948), 63-73. (438) V al. Max., 6. 9. 15; Vell. Pa t , 2 4 2 , Plut., Caes., 2 , Suet., I u l. 4. (439) Pun ., NH, 33. 53 ; Plut., 5 5 , Suet., I u l, 10; Dio, 37 8, 1-2. Cf. Sall., Cat.. 49. 3. (440) Sall., Cat., 49 3 ; 54. 2 ; V ell. Pat , 2. 43, 4 ; Plut., Caes.. 4. 3 ; 6 -, Suet , / « / , 1 ! , App.,

BC, 2. 1. (441) Plut., Caes, 5. 5 ; Suet., I u l, 10 2. (442) C aes., BC, 1. 14, 4 ; Cic., A tt, 7 14, 2, 8. 2, 1. Their number must have beenconsiderable, perhaps 5,000. See Cic., A lt, 7. 14, 2 with T. P , 4, 32; contra S. B., 4, 309 (443) Plut., Caes., 7 1-2, Suet., I u l, 13 (444) App., BC, 2. 8. According to Plutarch (Caes., 5. 4), Caesar’s debts amounted to 1300 talents before he was elected to any office. Since, however, Caesar’s mam expenditure was connected with his political activity between the quaestorship and the praetorship, this looks like a chronological mistake.

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took advantage of his haste in going to his province to better the conditions of payment or to obtain better securities! 44546). The governorship of Farther Spain gave Caesar an opportunity to enrich himself. There are two traditions on his. stay in Spain, one hostile and one favourable. According to Appian, Caesar neglected the ordinary duties of a governor in his eagerness to fight wars (BC, 2. 8). Suetonius relates that since his sole aim was personal enrichment, he attacked peaceful cities and received financial aid from allies to repay his debts (Iul., 54. 1). Plutarch's narrative is more friendly, Caesar’s enrichment being the result, not the aim, of his wars (Caes., 12). Yet, his eagerness to fight is prominent even in Plutarch and Dio conveys the same impression (37. 52-3). No doubt he wanted military experience, glory and money, and all these aims could be attained only by war. Provincial profits might have enabled Caesar to repay his debts, but on his return to Rome he went on squandering money with his usual liberality. At least this is Appian’s version ; and Suetonius too tells that Caesar give Servilia a pearl costing six million sesterces in his first consulship (44f>). He surely incurred expense as candidate in 60, though he was helped by Lucceius ( 447). Yet Suetonius also says that Caesar stole 3000 pounds of gold from the Capitol in his first consulate (Iul., 54. 3). If this is true, it is difficult to understand why he was in need of loans at the same time. Besides, in return for 6000 talents Caesar ratified the position of Ptolemy Auletes as king of Egypt (448). In 47 the sum still due was 17.5 million denarii (Plut., Caes., 48. 4). Probably Pompey and Crassus were associated to the pact; hence we may estimate Caesar’s share in 59 at several million denarii. All this suggests that by 59, i.e. before the subjugation of Gaul, Caesar was very well off. (II)

58-50.

The proceeds of the wars in Gaul were Caesar's main source of income during the years 58-50. As usual, we have no precise information and can make only a rough estimate of some items. The number of the captives stated in our sources is surely exaggerated, but cannot be checked. If Caesar sold the 1,000,000 captives at a tenth of the ‘normal price' he could have got 50 million denarii (449). The booty was enormous. Suetonius says that (445) (446) (447) (448) (449)

Plut., Caes., 11. 1 ; Crass., 7. 6 ; Suet., I u l, 18. 1. App., BC, 2. 1 3; Suet., I u l, 50. 2.

Suet., Iul., 19. 1. Cf. Cic., Alt., 1. 17, 1;1 ; 2. 1, 9. Cic., Alt., 2. 16, 2 ; Rab. Post., 6 ; C aes., BC, 3. 107; Suet., I u l, 54. 3. For the number of the captives (about one million) see Plut., Caes., 15. 3 ; A pp., Celt., 2. Cf. Y ell. Pat., 2. 47, 1. For the normal price of a slave see F rank, ESAR, 1, 195; 384.

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by pillaging temples and cities Caesar got so much gold that he could sell it at 3,000 sesterces to the pound, 75 96 of the usual price. Sometimes Caesar himself mentions his booty!450). But the evidence does not enable us to estimate his gains from this source. Caesar also levied ordinary taxes. He refers to them only twice: the annual tax on Britain, and the immunity granted to the Atrebates (451). According to Suetonius, he fixed the yearly tribute of the newly conquered part of Gaul at 40 million sesterces (lu i, 25. 2). It is doubtful whether an ordinary collection of taxes could be enforced for more than four years, and hence 1 estimate that Caesar’s income from the new taxes was about 40 million denarii (452). The prospects of booty were important in deciding Caesar's conduct, probably all important for his followers. This can be seen from the hopes entertained before the invasion of Britain ; Caesar expected to find gold, silver, pearls and slaves! 453). Pay and donatives to the army constituted a large part of Caesar's ex­ penditure, even though the ordinary pay was drawn from public funds. Caesar recruited two additional legions in 58 and two more in 57. But the Senate did not allocate pay for these newly raised legions-till 56 ! 454). Suetonius tells that Caesar doubled the pay of his soldiers (/«/., 26. 3). He does not state the date of the raising of the pay, but the order of his narrative makes clear that it was not earlier that 52 ! 455). No doubt Caesar had to make the extra payments from his own resources. After the loss of a legion in 54, Caesar enlisted three new legions in 53 and two more in 5 1. Although he handed over two legions for the war against the Parthians in 50. he probably recruited a new legion in the same year! 456). The Senate took no responsibility for these legions, if Suetonius is right in saying that it was Caesar who paid legions raised since 55 (/«/., 24. 2). it appears that

(450) C aes., BG, 6. 3, 2 ; 7. 11, 9 ; 8. 4, 1. On the gold resources of Gaul see D iod. Sic ., 5. 2 7 ; Strabo, 3. 2, 8. Cf. Grenier, ESAR, 3, 455-464. (451) C aes., BG , 5. 22, 4 , 7. 76, 1 ; Pluv., C aes., 23. 3. (452) Sherwin White suggests that a tribute was imposed only on the tribes subjugated in57-55 (G & R, 25 (1957), 41-3) (453) Cic, Ait., 4. 17, 6 ; Fam, 7. 7, I ; Suet , lul., 47. 1. (454) C ic., Fam., 1. 7, 10 ; Prov. Cons., 23 ; B e lt., 61 ; Plut., Caes., 21. 3. (455) The increase of pay follows the events of 52 and the purchase of the Forum ( lu i, 26). Of course the date cannot be fixed with certainty. See Watson, Historia, 7 (1958), 120. (456) For detailed discussion see D. G., 3, 2 1 3 -6 ; 702-9. See also Parker, Legions, 5 6 ; R ice H olmes, Republic, 3, 354-7 ; Adcock, CAH, 9, 898. There is no agreed opinion on the number of the legions of Caesar in 50 : 1 think he had 11. See Hirtius in C aes., BG, 8. 54, 3-4 ; Cic., Alt., 7. 7, 6 ; Sen., Ep„ 95. 70 ; Plut., Pomp., 58. 6 ; Suet , l u i , 29. 2 ; F lor., 2. 13, 5.

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Caesar paid to his troops 44-50 million denarii not voted by the Senate (457458). He also gave 250 denarii to every soldier of the two legions he handed over in 50, viz. 2. 5 million denarii (45S). After the final subjugation of Gaul Caesar promised, and probably fulfilled his promise, to pay 50 denarii to every soldier (Hirtius in Caes., BG, 8. 4, 1). At that time the number of the soldiers at his disposal amounted to 50,000 and the sum paid was about 2.5 million denarii. The total sum received by the legions was about 50-55 million denarii. The value of booty including slaves divided among the soldiers cannot be estimated. Caesar used his profits in Gaul to enhance his influence at Rome. He supported officers, magistrates, senators, men who were impoverished or under prosecution, kings and other provincials as well. Some received gratuities and others loans at low interest, or none. These efforts to gain supporters were not limited to the senatorial class. Caesar endeavoured to win over public opinion, and sent presents to decorate public buildings in Italy, Spain, Gaul, Greece and Asia (Suet., lul., 28. 1). He began the con­ struction of his new Forum in Rome, and aiso took steps to celebrate gladiatorial games and to feast the people, which were interrupted only by the outbreak of the civil w ar(459460). It is impossible to determine how Caesar’s finances stood at the end of the Gallic War. The conjectures that on the eve of the civil war he was pen­ niless are groundless. All that can be said is that his income as well as his expenditure amounted to hundreds of million of denarii (46°).

(457) I take the ordinary pay of a legion at the old rate to be 1,000,000 denarii (F rank, ESAR, 1, 327), and assume that Caesar had to find this amount in 53 for each of the 2 additional legions raised since 55. In 52-50 he had also to find, as a result of the doubling of the pay. an equal sum for each of his 8 old legions, and 2,000,000 denarii for each of the additional legions raised since 55 , of these there were in my view 2 in 52, 4 in 51 and 3 in 50 If the Senate had not paid retroactively in 56 for the legions he had raised without authority between 58 and 56, then he had also to find stipendia for two legions for 2 years and for 2 other legions for one year, and the total sum will have been 50,000,000 denarii. (458) App., BC, 2 29 To simplify the calculation I ignore pay for centurions and cavalry On the other hand, we have to remember that the legions were not at full strength (459) Cic., Art., 4. 17, 7 ; Suet., l u l , 26. 2. (460) According to Frank, Caesar used almost all the money he had collected in Gaul before the civil war (ESAR, 1, 337) Syme writes that Caesar had borrowed money from his centurions before he crossed the Rubicon (RR, 70). He seems to refer to Suet., l u l , 68. 1, where it is said that the centurions proposed that each one of them should supply a horseman, and that the soldiers offered their service without pay and without rations. Indeed Mommsen repeated this story almost verbatim (Hist., 5, 199). But Suetonius does not say that Caesar accepted the proposal; he only wants to show the soldiers’ devotion to Caesar. He says elsewhere that at the beginning of the war, Caesar gave 500 denarii to each soldier (lul., 38. 1). C ic , Att., 6. 1, 25 may suggest that Caesar borrowed from Pompey, not from At­ ticus (S. B., 3, 253-4), but see T P., 3, 203. Yet Pompey may have regarded Caesar's money as his own.

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49-44.

In Gaul Caesar had used revenues at his disposal as governor of the province. During the years 49-44 he became sole ruler of the state, and as a result, the public revenues he controlled and the expenditure he was of­ ficially liable for increased. There was no clear-cut distinction between Caesar’s own income and expenditure and those of the state, but his private finances were administered by his private representatives, and there is no proof that he treated public funds as his own in the same way. As a matter of fact, it was not an innovation of Caesar to use private income for public purposes or to profit by exploiting his official position ( 461). Here I shall limit the discussion to the use of public funds including booty, confiscated property, fines and contributions ; and under expenditure only extraordinary items, such as donatives to the soldiers and the plebs, building operations and games and other entertainments. In 49 Caesar seized the state-treasury in Rome, which contained 4135 pounds of gold and 900,000 pounds of silver, that is 79,735,000 denarii (Oros., 6. 15, 5). Pliny says that Caesar took 15,000 bars of gold, 30,000 bars of silver and 30,000 sesterces in coins (AW, 33. 56). As the weight of the bricks is not known, the two texts are not necessarily contradictory, the only difference being that Orosius does not note the coins ( 462). Much booty came from the war. In 46 Caesar celebrated his triumph over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus and Africa. According to Appian, the booty carried in the triumph comprised 65,000 talents of silver and 2822 golden crowns, weighing 20,414 pounds, viz. 410,414,000 denarii (BC\ 2. 102). Velleius, on the other hand, gives the figure of more than 150 million denarii, yet he also includes the later triumph over Spain (2. 56, 2). Of the two versions, Appian’s seems the more reliable, as it contains specific data. Yet Velleius probably refers to money actually deposited in the Treasury, Appian to what was carried in the procession ; indeed he adds that it was out of sums named that the soldiers and the citizens received their pays and donatives O63). as he was his heir (Suet., Iul., 83. I). In any case, a debt to Pompey is no proof that Caesar was finan­ cially embarrassed; Pompey himself borrowed at the same time (n“ 186, ii) Similarly when Caesar borrowed from his centurions and military tribunes in Spain (BC, 1. 39, 2-3), he probably did it from a temporary shortage on the spot, and certainly he wanted to ensure their loyalty C f F rederiksen, JRS, 56 (1966), 138. (461) See ch. II, iii-v •, IV, i-iv, and also Note 1 (462) Frank’s emendation of Orosius (ESAR, I, 338), for all its ingenuity, is unacceptable. We have no right to assume that there were no coins in the Treasury. Further, the details in Plin., NH, 33. 55 ex­ clude the possibility of an error of the kind ascribed by Frank to 33 56 Cf. Meyer, Caes Mon. , 353-4 ; A dcock, CAH. 9, 644 ; G elzer, Caesar, 192 (463) Cf. D. G., 3, 552, notes 1-2; Meyer, Caes. Mon., 385, n. 5 , F rank, ESAR, 1, 338.

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The civil war was accompanied by the confiscation of the property of some of Caesar's enemies. The sale of IPompey's property probably brought in 50 million denarii, which may give some idea of this source of revenue! 464). But first we shall review the confiscations, fines and collec­ tion of money iri the provinces. Already in 49 Caesar collected money in Spain (Dio, 41. 24, 1). After Munda he treated his adversaries there more severely, exacting money, increasing the tribute and confiscating lands (Dio, 43. 39, 4). In Egypt he collected the debt owed to him since 59, though he was content with 10 million denarii ( 465), and in Asia again he exacted money, besides changing the system of taxation after Phar­ salus ( 466). Back from Alexandria, he pillaged the treasuries of the temple of Tyre, collected money on various pretexts and demanded gold crowns from dynasts and kings. Pythodorus of Thralles alone had to pay 2000 talents ( 467). Another who had to pay cash and furnish supplies for the army as well, was Deiotarus king of G alatia!468). Caesar also sold titles and rights (Cic., Att., 13. 2. a, 2). In Africa he sold the properties of king Iuba and of the Roman citizens of Zama and Utica who had borne arms against him (Bell. Afr., 97). He com­ muted the confiscation of the property of the ‘three hundred’ at Utica for a fine of HS 200 million. The citizens of Thapsus and Hadrumetum were fined HS 2 and 3 million respectively and Roman citizens HS 3 and 5 millions. Sulci in Sardinia was fined HS 10 million (469470). But it seems that the fines were to be paid in instalments ; the ‘three hundred’ in Utica had to pay 6 instalments in 3 years (Bell. Afr., 3. 90). In Italy, too, Caesar received presents and introduced compulsory loans (47°). These details, in-

(464) According to Cicero the Senate promised to repay HS 700 million to Sex. Pompeius for his father’s property (Phil.. 13 10-12), but Appian says that it was 50 million denarii (BC, 3 4), and ac­ cording to Dio the sum was fixed at 17. 5 million denarii in 39 (48. 36, 5). Now the treaty of 39 is irrelevant (App., BC, 5 71-2 , Dio, 48. 36, 4), for it was a compromise, and Sex. Pompeius may have received something since 44. Appian is preferable to Cicero, who perhaps wanted to confuse it with the sum that was in the Treasury (Phil., 5 11; 12. 12). The proposal was probably based on what had been brought in from the confiscated property Cf. D G., 4, 566, n 7 ; Frank, ESAR. 1, 393 ; C adoux, G & R, 25 (1956), 161. (465) Plot., C aes, 48. 4 Cf. Dio. 42. 34, 1-2. (466) D io, 41 63, 2 , 42. 6, 3 ; 49. 1 (467) For Pythodorus see Strabo, 14. 1, 42. Cf. Cic., Place., 52. See also Dio, 42. 49, 1-3 ; Magie, Asia, 4 0 6 -7 ; 1130, n. 60. (468) Cic., Reg. Deiol., 14 ; 24. Caesar does not m m tion his requisitions, but cf. Bell. A l , 65. 4 and 70. 8 with Dio, 42. 49, 3. (469) Bell. A fr , 9 0 ; 9 7 ; 98. 2. (470) Nepos, Att., 7. 3 ; B ell Afr., 64. 2 ; Dio, 42. 50, 2-3. There is no evidence that he did not repay the loan (contra Gelzer, Caesar, 242).

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complete as they are, show that Appian’s statement that the sum of money carried at Caesar's triumph exceeded 1600 millions need not be an exaggeration, and what we hear of the collection of gold crowns in the provinces tends to corroborate one detail. How did Caesar treat these revenues? Did he consider them his private property? In my opinion, the answer must be negative, and the key to Caesar’s handling of the finances of the state lies in his position and powers as a Roman commander fighting against the enemies of the Republic. The author of the Bellum Africanum writes : Caesar interim Zamae auctione regia facta bonisque eorum venditis qui civis Romani contra populum Romanum arma tulerunt (97. 1). He evidently justified the confiscations on the ground that since they had fought against him they were enemies of the state, and that their property could be seized as booty. We may compare his answer to Deiotarus of Galatia : quis urbem Italiamque teneret, ubi senatus populusque Romanus ubi res publica, esset, quis denique post L. Lentulum C. Marcellum consul esset (Bell. A i, 68. 1) ; Caesar regarded himself as the lawful consul of the Republic, and as such there was no reason why he should not exercise his rights over the enemies of the state and their possessions. These passages, and there are more, show that Caesar did not base his management of the confiscated property on an oriental theory of the rights of a monarch over his subject ( 471). Now we have to distinguish between : (a) confiscation of property ; (b) fines ; (c) presents; (d) taxes. Nowhere is it said that Caesar applied the taxes to his private purposes, only that he reformed the system of taxation or that he imposed taxes where they had not been previously collected. As to the presents, it was a long-established institution to give presents to a victorious general, as Caesar himself told Pharnaces : S i fecisset, iam tunc sibi mitteret munera ac dona quae bene rebus gestis imperatoribus ab amicis accipere consuessent. Miserat enim ei Pharnaces coronam auream (Bell. A i, 70. 8). Caesar of course was entitled to distribute booty and donatives to his soldiers (472). Though there are many references to fines he imposed, mainly in Dio, in only one case is it specifically said to whom the fines were to be paid : Itaque bis milies sestertio his imposito ut per triennium sex

(471) Contra Frank, JR S, 17 (1927), 154. According to what Appian ascribes to Brutus (BC, 2. 140), for what it is worth, Caesar took lands noXttwu vo[a*j xai Xrjrjzripiou voiioj ; there is no reference to any oriental theory. See also Plut., Caes., 35. 3 , Dio, 41. 17, 3. (472) Bell. At., 19. 1 ; 77. 2 ; Suet., tut., 38. 1 ; App., BC, 2. 102 ; Dio, 43. 21, 3. Drumann cites Bell. Al., 77. 2 to refute V irg il Aen., 1. 289 which refers to Caesar's enrichment in the East (D. G., 3, 501). But Virgil refers not only to Zela.

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pensionibus populo Romano solverent (Bell. Afr., 90. 3). We may suppose that in other cases, too, the money was to be paid to the Treasury, not to Caesar’s private chest. We can distinguish between: (a) confiscation of the properties of Caesar’s enemies and (b) lands confiscated from others for division among his soldiers. Lands confiscated from enemies belonged to the state ( 47347). Nor is there evidence that Caesar regarded them as his own. Cicero’s references to the public auction of the property of Pompeians by Caesar are generally valueless {,,41. But it is noteworthy that while he does say that Sulla regar­ ded the confiscated property as his sua praeda, he never makes the same allegation of Caesar, though he couples him with his predecessor as dic­ tator. This may in itself suggest that Caesar did not follow Sulla's precedent (475). From Dio we learn that the confiscation of Pompey’s property was decided by the Senate, though, admittedly, it acted in accordance with Caesar’s instruction {4b. 14, 2), and the morrey-was paid to the Treasury (Dio, 45. 9, 4). Finally, Appian implies that Caesar bought property, and did not confiscate for himself(476). Caesar indeed seems to have confiscated property from innocent parties, but this proves nothing. Such land too became public, before being assigned to veterans in conformity with law (477), and the owners were probably compensated with money or other lands ( 478). The evidence then indicates that Caesar did not consider the confiscated property as his own. Yet it is clear that it was he who decided what property was to be confiscated ( 479). He could reward his followers, though his actions against Antony and Dolabella prove that buyers of auctioned property often had to pay con-

(473) (474) (475) Per., 89

Vogel, Z S S , 66 (1948), 395 Cic., F a n . 9. 10, 3 , 15. 17, 2 ;

1 9 , 3 , Phil., 2 64 , 8. 9 , O ff. 1. 4 3 ; 2 83. For Sulla see Cic., Verr., 2 . 3 , 8 1 ; Cluent., 94 ; Leg. A g r , 1. 12 ; 2. 56 ; Off., 2. 27. Cf. Liv., ; Vell. Pat., 2. 22, 5 ; A scon., 73. For Sulla and Caesar see Cic., Off., 1. 43 ; 2. 27-8 ; 83. (476) App., BC, 3. 22. Appian is not very reliable in these chapters, but in this case he conforms with Dio’s testimony and Cicero’s position. (477) Cicero says that Caesar singulorum civium bona publicaret {O ff, 2. 27) Nowhere does he say that Caesar expropriated private owners for his own behalf. According to Brunt, Caesar did not con­ fiscate private land for his soldiers (It. M an, 320 f) (478) See Gelzer, Caesar, 262-3, n. 36 ; 2.89, n 197 and Note I. Here I may only say that Cic., Fain, 15. 3, 2 and 8, 1-2 do not necessarily imply that the owners were not compensated, and that Suetonius reports that in order not to injure landowners Caesar did not allot land in continuous blocks ( lu l, 38. 1). (479) Antony had to send a man to Caesar in Alexandria to buy an estate (Cic., Phil., 2. 103), which merely shows that Caesar’s endorsement was necessaiy. That Caesar repaid Pompey’s debt to Sulpicius Galba only implies his generosity (Val. Max., 6'. 2, 11), not that he succeeded to all Pompey’s wealth and consequently to obligations.

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35 5

siderable sums. However, Servilia acquired estates at low prices, and Caesar himself surely did not pay in full for his acquisitions (48°). Now to Caesar’s expenditure. The regular army pay obviously came from public revenues. Donatives to the veterans are another matter. When Caesar returned from the East, he discharged some of them ; each received 1,000 denarii, and Caesar promised them allotments from his own estates and from public land as well. The outlay is unknown for the number of the discharged is not recorded (480481). After the triumph of 46, every veteran received 5,000 denarii, centurions 10,000, and military tribunes and praefecti equitum 20,000. According to Suetonius, these donatives were given to the veteran legions, presumably those who had fought in Gaul, namely about 11 legions. The money given was about 160 million denarii, and Caesar used the proceeds of the booty carried in the triumph (482). He also gave 100 denarii to those entitled to corn rations, probably 150,000, which will have been 15 million denarii; (483). The public was also feasted in 46 and 45, but the expenditure was not high, as Caesar could have used supplies he had requisitioned in Africa ( 484). On the same occasions he gave various games : venationes, gladialorial shows, land and naval battles, athletic contests etc. Some were given in honour of his daughter!485). It is impossible to estimate the costs of these games, but Caesar obviously finan­ ced them from the proceeds of booty. In 46 he completed the building of his Forum and the temple of Venus Genetrix. He had paid for the land alone HS 100,000,000 out of the booty of G au l(486). The building and the (480) For Servilia see Cic., A tl, 14 2 1 , 3 , Suet , Iul., 50. 2 ; Macrob., 2. 2, 5, and for Caesar, App., SC, 3. 22. (481) Plut., Caes. ,5 1 . 1 ; Dio, 42. 54 Appian does not make it clear whether Caesar paid the 1,000 denarii at once, and he does not distinguish between the discharged soldiers and those who were tran­ sferred to Africa (BC, 2. 92-4). (482) Suet., Iul., 38. 1 ; App., BC, 2. 102 ; Dio, 43. 21, 3. Suetonius, who gives 24,000 sesterces, probably includes the 1,000 denarii which had been previously given (n. 481). Caesar did not keep his legions in full strength His 80 cohorts at Pharsalus numbered only 22.000 (C aes . BC. 3 89, 2) The 6th legion numbered less than 1,000 men before Zela (Bell A l ,6 9 1). Adcock thought that the average number of soldiers in Caesar's legions was 2,000-2,500 after several battles (CAH, 9, 899). See also R ice Holmes, Republic, 3, 472-6. I assume that each of the veteran legions numbered about 3,000. (483) Suet., Iul., 38. 1 ; App., BC, 2. 102 ; Dio, 41 16, 1 ; 43 21, 2-3. Some suggest that the num­ ber was 320,000 (Gelzer, Caesar, 264 ; Schmitthenner, Oktavian, 82), but Dio, 43. 21, 4 says that it had been reduced. (484) For the fines see Bell. Afr., 97. 3-4. Cf. Plut., Caes., 55. 1, and for the feasts, Liv., Per., 115; V ell. Pat., 2. 56, 1 ; Plut., Caes., 55. 2 ; Suet., Iul., 38 1 -2 ; Dio, 43. 21, 3 ; 42, 1. See also Plin., NH, 9. 171 ; 14. 97. (485) Bell. Hist., 1. 1 ; L iv , Per., 115 ; V ell. Pat., 2. 56, 1 ; Plin., NH, 7 94 ; 8. 21 ; 53 ; 69 -, 182; 36. 102 ; P lut., Caes., 55. 2 ; Su e t , I u l, 3 9 ; App., BC, 2. 102; Dio, 43. 22-4. (486) Cic., A il , 4. 17, 7 ; Plin., NH, 36. 103; Suet., Iul., 26. 2. Cf. P A., 225-7.

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decoration were very costly; 80 talents went on only two paintings t 487). In conclusion we can say that Caesar’s position as general and dictator enabled him to meet his enormous expenditure: donatives to soldiers and people, building operations, games and other entertainments. His actions followed an old Roman tradition, though the scale was new. He need not have resorted, and there is no sign that he did, to an un-Roman theory to justify his administration. He could reward his followers and add to his own wealth from booty and his control of the public auctions. Obviously it all ultimately depended on his military success. (IV)

Property.

We have already noted that Caesar acquired some property by inheritance, perhaps, for instance, the house in the Subura7~where he lived till his election to the office of Pontifex Maximus (Suet., Iul., 46). He had an estate at Labici — it is unknown for how long he had possessed it (Suet., Iul., 83. I) — and another at Tibur ; after his death this was owned by Sallust (Ps. Cic., In Sail.. 19). Another estate near Baiae (Sen.. Ep.. 5 1. 11) he evidently acquired after enrichment in the provinces, presumably Gaul. He also had property at Aricia where he built a magnificent house during his governorship of Gaul ; the results did not satisfy him and he or­ dered it to be destroyed and a new one built ( 488). He seems also to have had an estate at Alsium ( 489). Finally, we hear of his gardens at Rome, both near the Porta Collina and near the Tiber (49°). In 46 he promised allot­ ments to soldiers from his private property. No doubt he had acquired ex­ tensive possessions since 58 ( 491). It is appropriate to mention here the men who assisted Caesar in the management of his affairs. Balbus, Oppius and Matius took charge of his financial transactions, private as well as political, and managed his property (492).

(487) Pun ., NH , 7. 126; 35. 136. (488) Suet., Iul. , 46. Cf. Cic., A n . 6. 1, 25. (489) Cic., Fam., 9. 6, 1. Cf. Att.. 13. 50, 4 ; T. P , 4, 391. I doubt if Cic., An.. 9. 18,3 implies an estote of Caesar in Pedutn (contra J aczynow ska , I, 142); see T. P., 4, 185; S. B.. 4, 394.The estate in Pausilypum belonged to Augustus and not to Caesar (P u n ., NH, 9. 167 ; Dio, 54. 23, 5 ; cf. H ir sch feld , Kl. Schr.. 518 ; contra J aczynow ska , I, 142). (490) C ic., A lt, 15. 15, 2 ; Phil., 2. 109 ; T a o , Ann., 2 .4 1 ; Suet., Iul., 83. 2 ; P lut., Brut., 20. 2 ; A pi>., BC. 2. 143 ; Dio, 43. 27, 3 ; 44. 35, 3 ; O bsequens 71. Caesar had possibly had a house on the Quirinal (Cic., Att., 12. 45, 2 ; 48) See G elzer, Caesar, 285, n. 175; contra T. P., 583. (491) App., BC, 2. 9 4 ; P lut., Caes., 51. 1 ; Dio, 42. 54, 1. (492) On Balbus see n° 121, and on Oppius: Cic., Att., 4. 17, 7 ; QF, 3. 1 , 8 ; 10; 18, and for Matius, C ic., A n , 9. 1 1 , 2 ; 13, 4 ; 15, 6 ; Fam., 6. 12, 2 ; 7. 1 5 , 2 ; 11. 27; 28. Cf. P lin., NH, 12. 13; T ac., Aim., 12. 60.

OF

153)

ROM AN SENATORS

357

C. Julius Caesar (Augustus) (132) Cos. S u f, 43. (I)

44-43.

In this section the main aim is to find out the sources of income out of which Octavian financed his political expenditure from the death of Caesar to the establishment of the triumvirate)493). Octavian had at his disposal the inheritance of his father, C. Octavius, who had been a rich man, though there is no way to estimate it (494). Oc­ tavian was heir to 3 quarters, or half, of Caesar’s inheritance)495), which consisted mainly of real estate, partly of cash. Yet it was not easy to lay hands on the money. Caesar had deposited money in several places for the war against the Parthians ; it included his own, which it was necessary to separate from that belonging to the state )496). Appian tells that Octavian notified the praetor C. Antonius of his ac­ ceptance of the adoption, and that he actually put up the property for sale and that he was sued as Caesar’s heir in 44. Yet elsewhere he says that only after taking possession of Rome in 43, Octavian passed a lex curiata, ‘which is the most legal way of adoption in such a case’ (497). According to Dio, Antony had prevented this lex being passed in 44, so that Octavian should not be able to dispose of Caesar’s property ; he too writes that the adoption was legally confirmed only in 43. We may add that Cicero thought that Antony would make it difficult for Octavian to receive the inheritance)498). How could Antony prevent Octavian from doing so? If the Roman law did not recognize adoption by will, as some contend, and what Caesar had written in his will was condicio nominis ferendi, then it was enough for Octavian, as extraneus, to appear before the praetor, to declare his acceptance of the will s conditions, and to take possession of the

153., — C. Julius Caesar (Augustus) (493) Cf. Schmitthenner, Oktavian, 77-90. (494) All estimates of C. Octavius’ property are pure guesses. See F rank, JRS, 23 (1933), 143 (HS 50 million); ESAR, 5, 16 (HS 24-44 million — implied); Schmitthenner, Oktavian, 78 (HS 15 million).

(495) Liv., Per., 116 ; Suet., /«/., 83. 2. Schmitthenner follows the Epitomator (half), Oktavian, 1821, but see E. D. Staveley, Erasmus, 1954, 55. (496) The money Antony took from Caesar’s house included public funds for the Parthian expedition. See P lut., Cic., 43. 6 ; Anton., 15. 1 ; App„ BC, 2. 125 ; 3. 17 ; F lor ., 2. 15, 2 ; Dio, 46. 23, 1-2. Cf. Sibi r, Prinzipat,- -15-; Sc-HMEFFHENNER-, Oktavian, SOr r or Caesar’s money hr Asia, Nicol. Damas., 18. 55, see Note K.

(497) A pr., BC, 3. 14; 21-2; 94. (498) Cic., Att., 14. 10, 3 ; Dio, 45. 4. 3-4 ; 46. 47. 4-5. See T. P , 5, 266-7 ; R ice Holmes, Em­ pire, 1, 12; S. B., 6, 223.

358

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PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

inheritance, indeed this procedure is probably that implied by Appian. But it is not certain that there was no testamentary adoption under Romen law, and the most detailed information we have on Caesar’s will (Suet., /«/., 83) does not suggest that the act of inheriting was conditional on confirmation of the adoption. In his attempts to restrain Octavian, Antony possibly pleaded that he could not dispose of the inheritance before the passing of the lex curiata. Be this as it may. Octavian was not the man to be checked by such arguments, and he did use those of Caesar’s possessions on which he was able to lay hts hands ( 499>. Dio informs us that Octavian had large sums of money on his arrival in Brundisium (45. 3, 2), and according to Appian, soldiers and Caesar’s freedmen, who had been assembling supplies and money, flocked to him there (BC, 3. 11). Brundisium was obviously a base for the Parthian ex­ pedition, and Octavian, so it seems, succeeded in taking possession of the money and supplies gathered there. It was at Brundisium that he made public his acceptance of the inheritance and the adoption, and took the name of Caesar. Caesar’s slaves and freedmen came to him and handed over the money of their late master. He also tried to get Caesar’s money from Asia, but it is improbable that he succeeded ( 500). It was his need for immediate cash that made him offer property for sale, estates he had inherited both from his father and from Caesar, even at low prices. He seems to have been helped by his mother and his step-father, Philippus, and by Pedius and Pinarius, who are said to have given him their part of the inheritance ( 500. His associates, Agrippa. Maecenas and Salvidienus Rufus, probably helped him, but their financial circumstances are unknown to u s ( 502). Rabirius Postumus, once an ardent follower of Caesar, Saserna, who was probably one of the Caesarian Sasernas ( 503X and (499) For the condicio nominis ferendi in wills, not adoption, see Siber, Prinzipat, 28-9 ; SchmitOktavian, 44 f f.; contra Volkmann, Gnomon, 26 (1954). 42-5 ; Staveley, Erasmus, 1954, 54-5. According to Suet., Aug., 8. 2 and Plut., Cic., 43. 6, Octavian entered upon the inheritance. It also seems that Caesar’s gladiators were at his disposal (Ps. Cic., Octav., 9). For the procedure of the acquisition of hereditas see W. W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law" (Cambridge, 1963), 312-5 ; J olowicz, Roman Law, 258-9, and for the irrelevance of the adoption to the entry upon the inheritance Schmitthenner, Oktavian, 56. (500) On the use of the name Caesar see Cic., Alt:, 14. 10, 3 ; 12, 2 ; cf. Schmittthenner, Oktavian, 65-76. 1 think that App., BC, 3. 11 and Dio, 45. 3, 2 refer to Octavian’s efforts to take possession of Caesar’s wealth with the collaboration of the slaves and freedmen. The aid of the rich freedmen was very important (App., BC, 3. 94). See also Note K. (501) App, BC, 3. 21-3. For Philippus see n° 171, and for the relationship with Pedius and Pinarius, Syme, RR. 128 and genealogical table III (502) Nicol. Damas., 31. 132-3 Cf. Syme, RR, 129 (503) Cic., Alt., 15. 2, 3 ; MRR, 2, 573. thenner,

O F ROMAN

SENATORS

359

Matius helped him to prepare for his games in 44. Probably he also had the support of Oppius and Balbus ( 504). We know from Cicero that by October 44, he had accumulated large sums of money (F a m 12. 23, 2). On the whole, it seems that he succeeded in mobilizing enough cash for the ex­ penditure he had to face in summer and autumn 44, by the sale of inherited possessions, by the seizure of Caesar’s money, which included public money as well, with the connivance of the late dictator’s freedmen, and by the sup­ port of kinsmen and Caesarians. Yet we cannot estimate how much he amassed ( 505). Money was needed to win over public opinion and to gain power. He sought the favour of the citizens in Rome by paying Caesar’s legacy of 75 denarii to every citizen ; it seems that he intentionally increased the number of recipients to 300,000. The whole sum amounted to 90 million sesterces, but it was paid in instalments, the last in autumn 43. There were other legacies of unknown sums! 506507). He also financed the celebration of the games to commemorate Thapsus in late July ( r>07). In October he went to Campania to recruit soldiers, and enlisted 3000 veterans and other soldiers up to 10,000. Each received 500 denarii, at a cost of some 20 million sesterces! 508509). In November he won over 2 legions of Antony by paying 500 denariLa piece .at..a cos.t of about HS—2-0 million 15Q9>. He also promised

(504) Cic., Att., 15. 2, 3. Cf. Fam., 11. 28, 2 and for Oppius, Alt., 16. 15, 3. See Syme, RR, 131-4. Note also Caecina of Volaterrae (C ic , A tt , 16. 8, 2), of a local noble family And for the family there see C ic , Caec , passim Fam., 6 6. 3 , 9 ; 13, 66 ; Plin., A'//. 11 197 ; CIL. 1 1. 1743 , 1760-1768 (505) Frank considered only the two inheritances (E SA R , 5, 16) Schmitthenner writes that Atia and Philippus delayed their support (Oktavian, 72, n. 2 ; 80 f ) But Brutus' letter to Atticus of early 43 is not very reliable evidence (Cic., Ad. Brut., 1 17, 5) I think that Schmitthenner is wrong in one major point, namely his assumption that Octavian realized the full financial problem that faced him as early as April. It was only after his meeting with Antony in the middle of May that he could become aware of the latter’s attitude, which forced him to use every weapon at his command (506) RGDA, 15 ; N icol. D amas., 17. 48 ; P llt ., Brut., 20. 1 ; A scon., 16. 1 , Suet., lul., 83. 2 ; App., BC, 2. 143. In his will Caesar may have appointed only 30 denarii (Dio, 44 35, 3 ; Zonaras 10. 12); in that case Octavian raised the sum (D 6., 1, 73). Caesar probably left the legacy to those who were entitled to the com dole, 150,000, but Octavian raised the number (App., BC, 3. 17). For the last instalment see Dio, 46. 48, 1. (507) Cic., A tt, 14. 20, 5 ; 21, 4 ; 15. 2, 3 ; App., SC, 3. 28 ; Dio, 45. 6, 4-5. See R ic e Holmes, Empire, 1, 18, n. 6. (508) Cic , Att., 16. 8, 1-2 , Phil., 3 3 , 4 3 , 5 2 3 .4 4 - 6 . RGDA, 1 ; Nicol. Damas., 31. 131-3 : Plut., Cic., 44. 1 ; Anton, 16. 3 , Ta c , Ann., 1 10 ; Suet , Aug.. 10. 3 ; App., BC, 3 40 ; 42 ; Dio, 45. 12, 1. I think Appian gives the whole number of the soldiers, and is not necessarily contradicted by Cicero or by himself in 3. 58 ( contra D. G., 1, 157; 440-441). (509) Cic., Fam., II 7, 2 , P h il, 3. 7 ; 2 4 . Liv., P er, 117; V ell. Pat., 2. 61, 2 ; T ac., Ann.. 1 10 ; App., BC, 3. 45 ; 48 ; Dio, 45 13, 3-4. Antony's auxilia who joined Octavian obviously received donatives (Cic., Phil, 5. 46 ; Dio, 45. 13, 4 ; 42, 1 ; 46. 37, 2). A pp., BC, 3. 48 is perhaps mistaken in

360

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another donative of 5,000 denarii, in the event of a war and victory (App., BC, 3. 48). However, in January 43 the Senate decided to pay the sums promised to Octavian’s soldiers from the Treasury ( 5I°). After the battle at Forum Gallorum Cicero proposed that the payment he rrradeC11), hut months later nothing had been paid, and the Senate under pressure only furnished half the cash required (512). When Octavian set out to Rome with his army, it was decided to pay 5,000 denarii to every one in his 8 legions, which did not stop him from capturing the public money in Rome and giving 2,500 denarii to every soldier; he promised to pay the remainder later. Even so, it is not likely that he could pay some 80 million denarii ( 5i3). At the same time he discharged the balance of Caesar’s legacy to the people (Dio, 46. 48, 2). When Octavian first appeared in April in Italy, he had only to pay the legacies of C aesar; later he undertook the celebration of the games in honour of Caesar’s victory. He clearly began collecting money from the first and sought the support of Caesar’s friends and followers, but there was no reason as yet for him to resort to every possible means of raising cash. Only after he met Antony and found him obstructive, did he initiate sales of property. Yet it is a gross exaggeration to claim, as Cicero and Octavian did, that he sold most of his inheritances ‘for the sake of the public’ ( 3I4). He soon needed more money to raise troops and seduce Antony’s soldiers. In 43 the situation changed for Octavian had a legal position with a claim on public money. However, his liabilities had risen because of the huge donatives promised to the legions. Octavian entered politics as a private man, had exploited his private resources and his position as Caesar’s heir to accomplish his political aims. In a year and a half he became one of the masters of the state, and he was never to lay down his power. We shall not discuss his official expenditure

writing that Octavian paid another payment of 500 denarii to the legionaries. He does not record a previous payment to these soldiers. Possibly his ‘additional 500 denarii’ means additional to the 500 denarii paid to the soldiers Octavian had recruited in Campania. If he is not in error, Octavian incurred extra expenditure of HS 20 million. (510) Cic., Phil., 5. 53 ; App., BC, 3. 51 ; Dio, 46. 29, 2-3. Cicero makes it clear that the reference is to the donative promised, not to that already paid. (511) Cic., Phil., 14. 3 8 ; App., BC, 3. 74. (512) App., BC, 3. 8 6 ; Dio, 46. 40, 6. (513) App., BC, 3. 9 0 ; 9 4 ; Dio, 46. 44, 2 ; 46, 5-6. For Octavian’s legions seeBotermann, Soldaten, 203. I assume that each legion numbered about 4,000. (514) Cic., Phil., 3. 3 .; RGDA, 1 ; Suet., Aug., 101. 3. For estatesAugustusinherited from his father and Caesar see section iii.

OF

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SEN A TO RS

361

and income, only his use of private wealth for public purposes and his per­ sonal profits from his official position!515). (II)

Inheritances and legacies.

The custom of making friends heirs or legatees was fairly common in the Republic, and Augustus’ gains under this head were new only in range and magnitude. Augustus expected his friends to mention him in their wills, and his circle of friends was very wide (Suet., Aug., 66. 4). He himself wrote that he had received 1400 million sesterces in the 20 years that preceded the writing of his will (SI6), i.e. after B.C. 7. We can list some of those who appointed Augustus heir or left him legacies. Our information is partly derived from literary sources, and partly from inscriptions. Certain names of slaves or freedmen of Augustus or Livia or Tiberius show that Augustus had received them by will (S17). 1) C. Vibius Pansa, died in 43. Workshops of bricks and tiles ( 518) ; 2) Amyntas King of Galatia, died in 25. Imperial estates in Phrygia and slaves and freedman of Livia and Tiberius named Amyntiani prove the inheritance ( 519) ; 3) L. Cornificius, cos. 35, probably died before B. C. 7. Slaves of Tiberius named Cornificiani (52° ) ; 4) Virgil, died in 19. Augustus received a quarter of the inheritance whose value was HS 10 million. The freedman Maronianus is connected with this inheritance ( 521) ;

(515) Octavian’s finances till the battle of Philippi are linked with those o f the triumvirs in general, for which see n° 91, iii. After the battle he had to provide the soldiers with land, which he sought to get by confiscations in Italy (App., BC, 4 3 ; 5. 3 , 12 , Dio, 48. 6-12) See MRR, 2, 377-8. For the Perusine War he took loans from temples (App., BC, 5 24 ; Dio, 48. 12, 4), and after it he confiscated the lands of his adversaries and imposed fines (Suet., Aug., 15). (516) Suet., Aug., 101. See section iv. (517) For previous lists see HUlsen, Rom. Mitt., 4 (1888), 222-232 ; Hirschfeld, Kl. Schr., 5 lb575 ; Rogers, TAPA, 78 (1947), 140-158. I have not included A. Cascellius because he could have left his slave directly to Livia (CIL, 6, 3952 ; contra Rogers, ib., 141), Similarly the slave Potitianus (CIL, 6, 4012 = IL S , 7887) is not a sufficient proof for an inheritance from M. Valerius Messala Potitus (cf. HOlsen, ib., 229 ; contra Rogers, ib., 142). As M. Maecilius Tullus and Q. Autronius Scapula probably died after Augustus, slaves of Livia and Tiberius cannot prove an inheritance to Augustus. (518) CIL, 3, 3213 ; 5, 8110, 1-28 ( = IL S , 864 8 ); 11, pp. 1026-9. See Mommsen, StR , 2, 1007, n. 1 ; Rogers, TARA, 78 (1947), 141. Hirschfeld had doubts about the date of these inscriptions (Kl. Schr., 546). (519) CIL, 6, 4035 ; 4715 ; 8738 ( = ILS, 786 6 ); 8894 ; 10395 ; Strabo, 12. 8, 4. But there is no reason to assume that Amyntas left all his kingdom to Augustus. Magic’s objection to the evidence of the inscriptions is not convincing (Asia, 1304, n. 3). See Broughton, TAPA, 65 (1934), 224. (520) CIL, 6, 5 2 4 5 ; 8 7 5 3 ; 16658. Cf. P IR \ 3, 1503. (521) Donatus, Virgil, p. 5 ; 1 0; P robus, p. 23 (O. C. D .) ; CIL, 6, 4173.

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5) Vedius Pollio, died in 15. Augustus inherited a considerable part of his property: an estate at Pausilypum, which is later attested in Trajan’s possession, a house in Rome, demolished by Augustus’ order. Augustus’ freedmen named Vediani were part of the inheritance! 522); 6) Agrippa, died in 12. Left most of his property to Augustus. The revenues of certain possessions were intended to cover the costs of the baths Agrippa left to the public. The inheritance included Agrippa’s possessions in the Chersonese, and perhaps his property in Egypt. Slaves and freedmen of Augustus are named Agrippiani ! 523) ; 7) Maecenas, died in 8. Some legacies apart, he left to Augustus all his property, which included buildings and gardens on the Esquiline and estates in Egypt. Slaves of Augustus and Livia are named Maecenatiani!524); 8) Horace, died in 8. Left all his property to Augustus (Suet., Vit. Horat.). These were not included in the 1,400 million sesterces mentioned by Augustus in his will, because they had died before the date he gives. We proceed to inheritances included in this sum. 9) Herod, died in 4. Left to Augustus about 10 million denarii, as well as silver and gold piate and precious clothing. Augustus handed most of the cash to Herod’s sons, but certainly kept slaves! 525). 10) L. Cornelius Lentulus, cos. 3 B.C. Left a legacy!526) ; 11) Cornelius Cinna, cos. A. D. 5. Appointed Augustus as sole heir (Sen., Clement., 1. 9 ); 12) L. Sempronius Atratinus, died iri A. ID. 7. Left his property to Augustus. A freedmen of Atratinus is recorded at Thyatira, where Livia had possessions. It is obvious that Livia received her possessions there from Augustus, who had inherited them from Atratinus! 527). Augustus did not always accept inheritances and legacies. In some cases while accepting a legacy, he paid the money back with the interest to the sons of the testators when they married or came of age! 528). (522) Ovid, Fasti. 6. 639-644 , Pun ., NH, 9 167 ; Dio. 54. 23 , CIL. 6, 1963 . 5 1 8 0 ( = IL S , 1948): 5858 ; 8893 .; 10377 ; 10395 ; 8, 21098 ( = ILS, 5238). For Trajan see CIL, 6, 8584, and for Pollio, Syme, JR S, 51 (1961), 23-30. (523) CIL, 6. 4808 ; 5202 ( = IL S , 1778); 5203 ; 5223 ; 5299 ; 5849 ; 8012 ( = ILS. 8436); 8 820; 33768; Dio, 54. 29, 4 - 5 ; R ostovtzeff, SEHRE. 670, n. 7 (Agrippa’s estate in Egypt). (524) Dio, 55. 7, 5. For the gardens and the buildings in R om e; Hor ., Sat., 1. 8, 1 with Porphyrio and Ps. Aero ad. loc. ; Tac., A nn, 15. 39 ; S u e t ., Tib., 15. 1 ; Nero, 38. 2. Slaves: CIL, 6, 4016 ; 4 0 3 2 ; 4 0 9 5 ; 19926 ; 22970; property in Egypt, Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, 671, n. 16. (525) J oseph., AJ, 17. 190; 3 2 2 -3 ; C IL , 6, 9005 ( = IL S , 1795). (526) I ustin ., Ins., 2. 25. Cf. Schulz, Principles, 182. (527) IGRP, 4, 1204; 1212; 1219 ; Jerome 165 H. Date of death, Munzer, RE, 2A, 1368. (528) Suet., Aug., 66. 4 ; Dio, 56. 32, 3 , 41, 8. See R ogers, TAPA, 78 (1947), 143; 158.

OF

(III)

ROMAN

SENATORS

363

Estates.

We cannot assume that every estate of later Emperors or every thing his father and Caesar had owned belonged to Augustus. But estates that had belonged to his father, to Caesar, or to his successors and for which we can adduce corroborative evidence are included hereC’29). (a) Rome. The enormous complex of buildings of the Caesars on the Palatine had its origin in Augustus’ time. We can note the following : 1) Hortensius’ house, probably acquired in the proscriptions ( 53°) ; 2) Catulus’ house which had been acquired by Clodius, was probably inherited by Antony from his wife Fulvia, formerly Clodius’ wife, and presumably confiscated after Actium ( 5S1); 3) the house he received from the public in compensation for the ground he had bought on the Palatine and dedicated to Apollo ( 529301532534) ; 4) possibly Germanicus’ house ( 5:i3); 5) the house he inherited from Vedius Pollio ( 534); 6) his father’s house, where a temple was built after his death (Suet. Aug. 5). Augustus had still more property in Rome : 7) the house of the orator Calvus near the Forum (Suet./f/g.. 72. 1) ; 8) Sex. Pompeius’ house near the Forum Augustum, probably confiscated in 36 ( ms) ; 9) Antony’s house on the Carinae, which had belonged to Pompey, surely confiscated after Actium (Suet:., Tib., 15. 1); 10) Maecenas’ gardens and buildings on the Esquiline ( 536) ; 11) possibly some insulae ( 537).

( 5 2 9 ) Cf.

H irschfeld, Kl. Schr.,

5 1 6 - 5 7 5 . My lis t d if f e rs in s o m e c a s e s f r o m t h a t o f H ir s c h f e ld .

h a v e a d d e d s o m e p a r t ic u l a r s , b u t d o n o t f o llo w h is a s s u m p t i o n s o n A u g u s t u s ’ e s ta te s in th e p r o v in c e s . (5 3 0 )

Suet., Aug.,

72.

1. S e e n °

150

(531) Suet., Gramm. , 17. See n° 118 with n . 279. ( 5 3 2 ) V ell. P at., 2 . 8 1 , 3 - 4 ; D i o , 4 9 . 15, 5. S e e P. A., 1 6 - 9 . (533) J oseph., AJ, 19. 117. Cf. H irschfeld, K l Schr, 527. ( 5 3 4 ) Ovid, Fasti. 6 . 6 3 9 - 6 4 4 ; D io , 5 4 23 (535) O vid. E x. Ponto, 4 5, 9-10; 15, 16 ( 5 3 6 ) S e e n . 5 2 4 . A d d . S u e t ., (5 3 7 )

C1L,

6, 8 6 6 2 ( =

ILS,

Aug.,

72

2

1 6 3 1 ) ; 8 6 6 5 ; 8 8 5 6 ; 15, 7 1 4 9 .

I

364

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

In conclusion we may note that Augustus acquired his property in Rome by inheritances and purchases, and that he took the advantage to acquire confiscated property of his vanquished enemies!538). (b) Italy. Suetonius gives a description of several estates and houses of Augustus outside Rome (Aug., 72. 2-3) : 1) estates near the coast, probably in Cam pania; 2) Campanian islands; 3) villas in Praeneste, Tibur and Lanuvium (also in Aug., 8-2. 1) ; 4) a palace built by his granddaughter Iulia, which he destroyed ; the site is unknown. Of estates of Augustus known from other sources some are probably identical with those mentioned by Suetonius : 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 13) 14) 15)

his father’s estate in Nola (Suet., Aug., 100. 1-2); the estate inherited from Vedius Pollio at Pausilypum ( 539) ; that inherited from Caesar at A ricia!540); that inherited from Caesar at Baiae(541) ; probably Caesar’s estate at Alsium (542) ; an estate at Surrentum in Campania (543) ; one on the via Flaminia, 9 miles from Rome near the Tiber (54454) ; one at Alba (CIL, 14, p. 216) ; one at Tusculum (CIL, 15, 7814); Aenaria, probably confiscated; after Antony’s death ( 545) ; Capri which he received in exchange for Aenaria ( 546) ;

( 5 3 8 ) I t is d o u b tf u l w h e th e r A u g u s t u s b e c a m e t h e le g a l o w n e r o f a n y c o n f i s c a te d p r o p e r t y e x c e p t b y p u r c h a s e f r o m t h e s ta te . S e e ( 5 3 9 ) P l in .,

NH,

9

B runt, JRS,

5 6 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 8 1 - 2 a n d m y re m a rk s o n C a e s a r (n °

( 5 4 0 ) C a e s a r h a d o w n e d a n e s ta te a t A r ic i a ( C i c . , /1 « ., 6 . 1, 2 5 ; th e r e is r e c o r d e d b y in s c r i p tio n s o n w a te r p ip e s C a e s a r ’s (5 4 1 )

[CIL.

Suet.,

55.

11; Suet., Aug., 64. 2.

/ « / . , 4 6 ) , a n d T i b e r i u s ’ e s ta te

15, 7 8 1 5 ). W e m a y su p p o se th a t A u g u stu s k ep t

e s ta te a n d le ft it to T ib e r iu s . G a iu s , to o , h a d a n e s ta te th e r e

Sen ., Ep.,

(CIL,

s e c o n d c e n tu r y

Fam , (CIL,

Alt., 1 3 . 3 7 2 0 = ILS,

1 5 , 7 8 1 6 = ILS,

8 6 7 7 ).

H ir s c h f e ld w r o te t h a t t h e e s ta te b e l o n g e d to th e C a e s a r s

f r o m C a l i g u l a ’s tim e , a p p a r e n t l y o v e r l o o k in g t h e e v id e n c e o f S u e to n i u s (5 4 2 ) C ic .,

1 5 2 , iii).

1 6 7 ; D io , 5 4 . 2 3 .

(Kl. Schr.,

5 3 8 ).

9. 6 , 1 ;

5 0 , 3 - 4 . A n im p e r ia l e s ta te is r e c o r d e d in a n in s c r i p tio n o f th e

11,

1 5 8 0 ) , w h ic h m a y s u g g e s t t h a t A u g u s t u s r e t a in e d C a e s a r 's e s ta te

th e re . (5 4 3 )

CIL,

S uet., Aug.,

65. 1 ;

CIL,

10, 6 9 0 -7 1 3 . S ee

H irschfeld , Kl. Schr.,

539.

(contra Mommsen,

10, p. 7 6 ).

( 5 4 4 ) P l i n .,

NH,

15.

1 3 7 ; c f. D i o , 4 8 . 5 2 , 3 - 4 .

(545) Strabo, 5. 4, 9 ; Suet., Aug., 92. 2 ; ( 5 4 6 ) S e e n. 5 4 5

and

T ac., Ann., 4.

67;

D io ,

CIL,

52. 43, 2 ; See

6, 8 9 5 8 ( =

ILS,

n°

91,

1 7 8 4 ).

n.

74.

OF

ROM AN SEN A TO RS

365

16) the island of Planasia (547) ; 17) workshops between Pisaurum and Ariminum, probably inherited from Pansa, cos. 43 !548). Augustus inherited many of these properties, but a not insignificant num­ ber he acquired through confiscation. Almost all were in Latium and Cam­ pania, yet we should not conclude that Augustas had very little property in other regions, because these were the places that attracted the attention of ancient authors, while there was nothing of note to record of other places. Tacitus says that Tiberius had only a few estates in Italy (Ann., 4. 6), which is sometimes taken as a proof that Augustus did not acquire con­ fiscated property, and that in general he did not own much property ( 549). Yet the above list, which is obviously incomplete, proves that Augustus’ estates were rather numerous. Further, we must see Tacitus’ evidence in the framework of his description of l iberius which is marked by the gradual revelation of his true nature. Tacitus insinuates that Tiberius mainly in­ creased his property in his last years, and it is also obvious that he writes from the viewpoint of his own time, after whole areas had been confiscated by later emperors. So what he says of Tiberius does not contradict the evidence on Augustus. (c) Provinces. Asia. It was once thought that Augustus had large estates in Asia, but much of the evidence has been contested. Yet we may note : 1) Antony's property, confiscated after his death ; to estimate its extent is a matter of opinion or speculation!550); 2) the property Augustus inherited from A m yntas!551) ; 3) possessions near Sardis!552);

(547) Tac., Arm., 1. 5.

C f.

n” 191.

( 5 4 8 ) N . 5 1 8 . T i b e r i u s ’ e s ta te a t B a ia e , o n c e L u c u llu s ’ e s ta te , h a d p o s s ib ly b e lo n g e d to A u g u s tu s . S ee n°

160, n. 6 40. (5 4 9 )

F rank, ESAR,

5,

16.

R ostovtzeff, Kolonat, 2 8 7 - 2 9 1 , w h ic h w a s c o n t e s te d b y F rank, JRS, 17 ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 1 5 6 a n d Broughton, TAPA. 6 5 ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 2 1 3 - 7 . R o s to v tz e fT d e f e n d e d h is v ie w in SEHHW, 1 5 8 0 , n . 19 a n d SEHRE. 6 5 2 - 3 . I th i n k t h a t t h e c r itic is m , t h o u g h m a in ly w e ll - b a s e d , w e n t to o f a r . S e e M agie, Asia, 1 0 1 5 , n . 6 0 ; 1 0 4 7 , n . 3 7 . ( 5 5 1 ) Strabo, 1 2 . 8 , 1 4 . S e e H irschfeld , Ki Schr., 5 6 2 - 3 . S o m e o f t h e e v i d e n c e h a s b e e n re je c te d . S e e Broughton, TAPA, 6 5 ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 2 2 0 ; 2 3 1 - 6 ; M agie , Asia, 4 6 4 ; 1 3 2 5 , n . 4 4 . ( 5 5 2 ) I n 17 A . D . T i b e r i u s c a n c e lle d th e d e b t s o f S a r d is to t h e A e r a r i u m a n d th e F is c u s ( T a c ., Ann., ( 5 5 0 ) S e e th e e v id e n c e c o lle c te d in

2 . 4 7 ) , w h ic h h e r e s e e m s t o m e to b e t h e p r iv a te c h e s t o f T i b e r iu s , a n d t h a t it im p lie s t h a t a lr e a d y A u g u s t u s h a d o w n e d p r o p e r t y th e r e .

Cf. Miliar, JRS,

53

(1 9 6 3 ), 31.

366

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

4) the estates in the Chersonese, which Augustus inherited from Agrippa, and perhaps some property in Chios I 553). 5) the property inherited from L. Atratinus at Thyatira (above ii, 12). On the whole, the more cautious view on Augustus’ property in Asia Minor is justified. Yet we have always to bear in mind the fragmentary nature of our sources, which in this case suggests that Augustus’ lands in Asia were not insignificant ( 554). One thing is clear: he had acquired his estates by inheritances and by purchase of confiscated property. Judaea. The private property of Archelaus was confiscated by Augustus. The balsam plantations in Jericho, known to have been possessed by the Flavian dynasty, may have been acquired either then or earlier after the death of Cleopatra) 55556). Cyprus. Augustus had copper mines in the island, which he obtained af­ ter the death of Cleopatra. After 12 he gave half the revenues and the ad­ ministration to Herod for 300 talents. Augustus’ property here is also in­ dicated by the presence of a procurator ( 555). Egypt. We must not assume that the royal land had become Augustus’ private property. Yet he inherited Maecenas’ property and probably Agrippa’s as well) 55758). Africa. Augustus had an estate in Byzacium and another one at Bisica. It also seems that he inherited a marble quarry of Agrippa at SimitthLIS (558). Most of the known estates of Augustus were situated in Italy, which is quite understandable, as our information is mainly derived from authors

( 5 5 3 ) F o r t h e C h e r s o n e s e s e e D io 5 4 . 2 9 , 5 a n d n o t e th e p r o c u r a t o r o f T r a j a n th e r e ( CIL, 3 , 726 = se e

ILS,

1 4 1 9 ) . A g r ip p a p r o b a b l y h a d m a r b le q u a i r i e s in A s i a

J oseph., AJ,

(5 5 4 )

(CIL,

3 , 7 0 4 7 ; 15, 9 8 8 ). F o r C h io s

16. 2 6 .

N o te a l s o A u g u s t u s ’ p r o c u r a t o r in A s i a

(Strabo,

1 3 . 2 , 2 ) . I n 2 3 A . D . th e p r o c u r a t o r o f

T i b e r iu s w a s a c c u s e d b y t h e e n v o y s o f A s i a o f h a v in g u s e d s o ld ie r s to s e c u r e th e in t e r e s t o f th e C a e s a r ’s e s ta te s . W e

hear o f

servitia et pecuniae familiares (T ac., Ann,

4.

15;

D io , 5 7 . 2 3 , 4 - 5 )

T h ese

p r e s u m a b ly g o b a c k to A u g u s t u s ’ tim e .

J oseph., AJ, 1 7 . 3 4 4 ; BJ, 2 . 7 , 3 , a n d f o r th e Millar, JRS, 5 3 ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 3 0 . B r u n t ’s o b je c ti o n

( 5 5 5 ) F o r t h e c o n f i s c a tio n o f A r c h e l a u s ’ p r o p e r t y s e e b a l s a m p la n t a t i o n s ,

(JRS,

Plin., NH,

1 2 . 1 1 1 - 2 ; 1 2 3 . C f.

5 6 ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 7 9 ) is b a s e d o n M o m m s e n ’s v ie w o f th e

(5 5 6 )

J oseph., AJ,

16.

128;

CIL,

manubiae,

w h ic h is i n c o r r e c t in m y o p in io n .

1 0 , 3 8 4 7 ; 73:51

Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, 6 6 9 - 7 0 1 ; f o r t h e r o y a l la n d in E g y p t, JRS, 2 3 ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 1 4 6 . ( 5 5 8 ) P l i n ., NH, 1 8 . 9 4 ; CIL, 8 , 1 2 3 1 4 . Officina Agrippae a r e r e c o r d e d a t S i m i tth u s in t h e s e c o n d c e n tu r y (CIL, 8 , 1 4 5 8 0 - 1 4 5 8 2 ) . F o r th e m a r b le th e r e s e e P l i n ., NH, 3 6 . 4 9 . I t w a s u s e d f o r t h e b u il d in g of th e P a n t h e o n , th e te m p le of C o n c o r d i a a n d th e F o r u m A u g u s t u m (H aywood, ESAR, 4 , 5 3 - 4 ) . F o r im p e r ia l e s ta te s in A f r ic a s e e Rostovtzeff, SEHRE, 5 8 4 , n . 8 ; Haywood, ESAR, 4 , 8 3 ff. ( 5 5 7 ) F o r a lis t o f e s ta te s in E g y p t s e e

F rank, JRS,

17 (1 9 2 7 ) ,

159 ;

OF ROMAN

SENATORS

367

who were interested in Augustus’ activity there ; generally we depend on in­ cident references. We cannot then be sure that what we know reflects the true distribution of his estates in Italy and the provinces. Yet perhaps it is significant that his property is not recorded in the provinces of the West, because, as we have seen, he acquired most of his provincial property by inheritances and purchases of the confiscated property of Antony. Now most of the testators, too, had acquired their provincial estates from the confiscated property of Antony and his associates, which brought about the concentration of the provincial property of Augustus in the East. (IV)

Income and Expenditure.

In this section I shall try to summarize the ‘budget’ of Augustus, assuming that he subsidized his public expenditure from his private wealth and from booty ( 559*). But first we have to clarify three points which have not sufficiently made clear in former analyses of this subject. We know from Suetonius that Augustus claimed that he had inherited 1400 million sester­ ces from B. C. 6 to A. D. 13, almost all of which, together with his father’s and Caesar’s inheritances, he spent for the public (Aug., 101. 3). Our discussion of Augustus’ inheritances and legacies (section ii) shows that of the known inheritances most had been received before B. C. 7. Further, some of the testators can be regarded as the richest people of the period : Maecenas, Agrippa, Vedius Pollio and Amyntas. Obviously the total value of Augustus’ inheritances before that date was not less than that of his last 20 years. Now Augustus’ claim that he had spent almost the whole of the 1400 million sesterces, and other inheritances as well, is not acceptable. We have a fairly detailed account of his public expenses in his own Res Gestae, which, although not entirely comprehensive, surely contains his main outlays. According to Frank, Augustus’ expenditure from his private wealth, apart from the booty of Egypt, did not exceed 1200 million sesterces, and

(559) The theory o f ‘diarchy’ has prevented true evaluation of the details in RGDA. But Wilcken, who accepted Hirschfeld’s view on the Fiscus, had already made it clear that the expenditure Augustus records came from his private wealth (RG). Millar went too far in arguing that fiscus always meant the private wealth of the Emperors (J R S , 53 (1963), 2 9 -4 2 ); see Brunt, J R S , 56 (1966), 75-91. However, the confusion between fiscus as the private purse of the Caesar and as a public chest began in Augustus’ time, probably because of his enormous expenditure on the public from his private wealth, which in turn had its roots in the Republican period. See also Frank, JR S , 23 (1933), 143-8 ; ESAR , 5, 7-8 ; Last, JR S. 34 (1944), 5 1 -9 ; Sutherland, AJP, 66 (1945), 151-170; Jones, Studies, 101-114.

368

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the expenses in the last twenty years, according to Augustus’ report, were about 850 million sesterces ( 560). There is another consideration. A com­ parison between the lists of his known estates and legacies and inheritances shows that he retained much of the property he had inherited. Augustus no doubt spent enormous sums of money for public needs, but the statement in his will is an attempt to justify the delay in the payment- of some of Iris legacies, which should not be taken seriously. We can now proceed to the third point. Augustus left legacies to the praetorians, the urban cohorts, the legionaries and the people, which amounted to over 93 million sesterces ( 561), and for which he always kept cash money to ensure immediate payment, There were other legacies, some of which were probably of HS 2 million, while his heirs were to receive 150 million sesterces ( 562). Does this mean that the heirs received property worth 150 million sesterces or that they received it in cash, and were to receive real property as well? The discussion so far indicates that this refers to cash, not taking real property into account. This can be corroborated. Tiberius doubled the legionaries donatives, for which he needed to find an additional 37.5 million sesterces (Suet., Tib., 48. 2). Evidently he had large sums of ready cash, which he must have inherited. Suetonius says that

(560) F r a n k , JR S, 23 (1933), 147; ESAR, 5, 15. On the assumption that the grants given to the Aerarium were made after 7 B. C , the data Frank gives for the last 20 years show expenditure of 844. 8 million sesterces. My calculations differ in some particulars, but the basic picture does not change. Wilcken had noticed that Augustus did not take into account the inheritances before 7. B. C., but he did not draw up a ‘budget’ (RG, 783). Frank’s and Sutherland’s view on the nature of the sums in the RGDA are thus reinforced. (561) T a c . , Ann.. 1. 8 ; S u e t . , Aug., 101. 2 ; Dio, 56. 32, 2. We can make the following table:

People Legions 25 x 5,000 x 300 Praetorians 1,000 x 9,000 Urban cohorts 500 x 6,000 Tribes Cohortes civium Romanorum 300 x

40,000,000 37,500,000 9,000,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 ? 93,000,000

Gardthausen arrived at 375 million sesterces for the legionaries simply by an arithmetical error (Augustus und seine Z eit (Leipzig, 1904), II, 3, 852), which was not noticed by W i l c k e n (.RG, 782, n. 1). Cf. F r a n k . JR S, 23 (1933), 143. (562) Dio writes that legacies were left to senators, Equites and kings (56. 32, 6). I think that Perizonius’ emendation of the reading in S u e t . , Aug., 101. 3 from vicina to vicies is to be accepted. It is inconceivable that the highest legacies to such persons were only 20,000 sesterces.

OF

ROMAN

369

SENATORS

Caligula spent enormous sums of money in one year, including the 2700 million sesterces which he inherited from Tiberius (Calig., 37. 3). This clearly refers to cash, and the analogy should hold for what Suetonius says of Augustus. Finally it is incredible that the yearly income of property of 150 million sesterces could have yielded the sums necessary for the legacies. The following tables do not include income and expenditure before 30, which were partly discussed in section (i). Besides, too little information is available for this period. I give separate tables for the years till B. C. 7 and from then to Augustus’ death. year

Details

millions of HS

References

30 and 14

Land for soldiers

860

29

HS 400 to the plebs, at least 250,000 HS 1,000 to soldiers in colonies 120,000 HS 400 to the plebs; at least 250,000 Corn to the plebs Com to the plebs Gifts to the people after Agrippa’s death Aid to the Aerarium (half)

100

RGDA. 16, Dio, 51. 4, 6 RGDA, 15, Dio, 51 21, 3 RGDA. 15

29 24 23 22 12 28, 16

120 100 60 ?40 100 75

RGDA. 15, Dio, 54 23. 1 see note ( 563564) see note ( 561) RGDA, 15, Dio, 54. 29, 4 RGDA, 17, Dio, 53. 2

To these we have to add expenditure on temples, other buildings and shows, which surely amounted to some hundred million sesterces ( 565). How could Augustus pay these sums? About 650 million sesterces he spent in 30-28, which is not accidental ( 566). He himself says that the donatives to the people and soldiers in 29 were paid ex manibiis (RGDA, 15), with reference to his personal share of the booty, obviously of Egypt. The building of the Forum Augustum and the temple of Mars was also

(563) RGDA, 15 ; F rank, ESAR, 5, 5 and next note. (564) RGDA, 5. Augustus did not merely take over the administration of the com supply (contra Frank, JR S, 23 (1933), 143; ESAR, 5, 8), but also subsidized from his private resources. Cf. Sutherland, AJP, 66 (1945), 153. Pompey had received 40 million sesterces in similar conditions (Cic., QF, 2. 5, 1), and for a comparison with him see Dio, 54. 1, 3. (565) RGDA, 19-23 ; Suet., Aug., 29-30 ; Dio, 51. 22, 1-2 ; 53. 1, 3. Frank’s figures for these items are far too low (ESAR, 5, 14). (566) For simplicity I assume that half of the land for soldiers was purchased in 30-28.

370

PART

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PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

made ex manibiis (RGDA, 21). Dio tells that the soldiers’ needs after the conquest of Egypt were covered by the treasuries found there (51. 17, 7). He obviously refers to the purchase of land for the discharged soldiers. Thus there is little doubt that the expenditure of the years 30-28 was covered by the large booty of the Egyptian war ( 567568). Hence Augustus paid some 800 million sesterces from his private wealth ("'*). As we have seen, at the same time he inherited property worth much more than his total ex­ penses, even if we allow for costs of those building operations and shows which were not subsidized from booty : he certainly retained immense property. Now. to the other expenditure. Year

Details

Sum

References

5 2 7-2 A D. 6 6

HS 240 to the p leb s; 320,000 men HS 240 to the p leb s; 200,000 men Pay to discharged soldiers

76 8 48 400

RGDA, 15 RGDA, 15 RGDA, 16

To the Aerarium Militare Corn supply; about Aid to the Aerarium (half) Total

170 60 75 829 8

RGDA, 17 see note ( 569570) RGDA, 17

9

To these we have to add costs of buildings and shows, donatives, and financial support which he gave to Italian and provincial cities, and to individuals, like senators who had not the necessary census. Yet this could not have consumed the huge surplus of Augustus’ income over his ex­ penditure ( 57°). (567) For Cleopatra’s treasuries see J oseph.. AJ, 15. 90 ; P lut., Anton., 74. 1-2 ; 78. 3 ; Dio, 51. 5. 5 ; 17, 6-8. The influx of bullion caused the rate of interest to fall from 1296 to 4% (S uet., Aug., 41. I ; Dio, 51. 21, 5). For the treasuries of the Ptolemies see Broughton, AJP, 63 (1942), 328-332. (568) There is no doubt that Augustus gives an account of his expenditure on the public from his private wealth. This is sometimes explicitly stated (RGDA, 15. 1 ; 17. 1-2 ; 18), and should be assumed when he does not expressly say so. Thus in 20. 2 where he enumerates aqueducts which had been repaired, including the Marcia, it is not said ex patrimonio meo, yet this is reported by F . , D eA q., 125 ; cf. 12 ; CIL. 6. 1243 ; 1244 , 1249. See also Dto. 49 43, 8 ; 53 22, 2-3. Augustus also mentions the manubiae (RGDA, 15. I ; 2 1 1-2), which he was entitled to do because this was the commander’s personal share of the booty. (569) Dio, 55. 26, 3 ; F rank, ESAR, 5, 5. (570) For other expenses of Augustus see the appendix to RGDA ; Strabo, 12. 8, 18 ; Suet., Aug., 47 ; Tib., 8 ; Dio, 54. 23, 7 ; 55. 10, 9 ; Z onaras, 10. 36. In the appendix to the RGDA it is said that Augustus’ expenditure on the people, soldiers and the Aerarium was 2,400 million sesterces, while I have been able to give an account of 2284. 8 million for these purposes. Yet to these we have to add 75-90 million sesterces that had been given to the citizens under Caesar's will, and other donatives referred to in RGDA, 18, which will probably make up the amount. r o n t i n

OF

ROMAM

SENATORS

371

This discussion of Augustus’ finances suggests the following con­ clusions : (a) Augustus was the richest man in the Roman Empire. A comparison between his expenditure and income from inheritances, booty and the profits of estates, which increased during the years, will show that he had wealth to the value of more than 1000 million sesterces ( 570. (b) In spending money for the public Augustus followed an old Roman tradition which characterized the political activity of most senior senators during the Republican period. There was nothing new in his building operations, the donatives to the soldiers and the celebration of games, ex­ cept for the difference of scale. Yet he also invaded new fields in sub­ ventions to the Aerarium Saturni and Aerarium Militare and in providing land allotments at his own cost and, in a sense, in his constant care for the corn supply of Rome. His private finances were entwined with those of the state ; so began a long process with important consequences during the im­ perial period (572). (c) We can hardly miss the significance of Augustus’ liberality. It was one of the main supports of his personal power and influence, which did not escape tile keen eyes of Tacitus (A n n 1, 2T 154) L. lulius Caesar (143) Cos., 64. He had a house in Neapolis ( 573), and an estate at Aricia, where it seems much property of the lulii Caesares was to be found) 574). He was proscribed by the triumvirs in 42 ( 575). 155) M. lunius Brutus (53) Pr.. 44. Brutus was adopted by his uncle, Q. Servilius Caepio, yet it seems that he did not receive an inheritance from his adoptive father ( 575). Brutus' estates.

(571) Contra F rank. ESAR, 5. 16-7 See Sutherland. AJP. 66 (1945), 154 (572) C f Sutherland, i b . 153. Millar, JR S, 53 (1963), 29 154. — L lulius Caesar (573) Cic., Alt.. 14. 17, 2 , Fam., 9. 14, 3 (574) Cic., An., 15. 4a. See also Cic., Alt , 6. 1, 25 ; Suet., /«/., 46. (575) App., BC, 4. 12; Dio, 47. 6, 3.15 155. — M. lunius Brutus (576) For Brutus’ relations see D. G., 4, 19; MUnzer, RA. 282 ; 333-347. Munzer thought that this was a fictitious adoption (.RA, 337), but see G elzer, RE, 10, 976 Plut., Cat. Min., 11. 3 shows that Brutus did not inherit from Caepio.

372

PART

THREE. —

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known to us only from a late period, after 45, were at Tusculum ( 577), Circeii (Cic., Att., 15. 10), Antium ( 578), Cumae ( 5795801), Astura (Cic., Att., 15. 12, 1) and Lanuvium where he had his river ‘Eurotas’, which suggests that it was a large estate ( 58°). He was also lending money at least as early as 13 June 58, when Cicero mentions that his brother had received a loan from Caepio, who is to be identified with Brutus ( ;>81). His loan to the people of Salamis is notorious. His connections with Cyprus originated in his service with Cato there ( 582). There is no way to find the original sum of the loan, for which he charged compound interest of 4% per month, lit seems that the Salaminians did not repay the debt when due, and as a result had from time to time to sign new contracts. In 50 when the matter was brought before Cicero, they were prepared to pay 106 talents, claiming this was all they owed, while Brutus’ agent demanded 200. The difference probably sprang from his insistence on the conditions laid down in the contract of the loan, while they adduced Cicero’s edict limiting the rate of interest to 1296 per year. It is noteworthy that though such a loan was prohibited under Gabinius’ law, Brutus was able to procure two senatus consulta which in his view made it legal. It is also significant that Brutus’ agents, M. Scaptius and P. Matinius, were sup­ ported by Ap. Pulcher, his father-in-law. As governor of Cilicia he ap­ pointed them prefects and gave them cavalry to enforce the collection of the debt. Cicero refused to grant Scaptius’ request for such a position or for troops, and did not enforce the conditions of the loan. Yet pressed by At­ ticus and Brutus, he rejected the request of Salamis' envoys to deposit the 106 talents in a temple, and thereby to terminate their liability. What hap­ pened after Cicero’s departure we do not know( 583).

(577) Cic., Att., 13. 4, 2 ; 7 a ; 11, 1 ; 23, 1 ; 25, 2 ; Brut., 3 0 0 ; Orator, 110. (578) Cic., Alt., 15. 10; 11, 1 ;Plut., Brut., 21. 1. (579) Cic., A tt, 12. 36, 2 ; 14. 10, 1-, B rut, 300. (580) Cic., Att., 14. 10, 1 ; 15. 9, 1 ; V itruv., 1. 1, 6. (581) Cic., QF, 1. 3, 7. Cf. A tt, 2. 24, 2 where Brutus is called Caepio. This reference is usually ignored (T. P „ 1, 377), but cf. FrOchtel, Geld., 9 0 ; 119. (582) P lut., B ru t, 3. Cato returned from Cyprus in 56 (M RR, 2, 211), in which year the loan was cotracted (T . P ., 3, 338). (583) The sources are Cic., Att., 5. 21, 10-13 ; 6. 1, 5-7 ; 2, 7-9 ; 3, 5. For modern discussions see M o m m s e n , Hermes, 34 (1889), 145-150 ; T. P , 3, XXIII-XXVI; 337-341 ; D. G„ 4, 2 4 -6 ; R i c e H o l m e s , Republic, 2, 327-8. All the calculations that have been suggested are very doubtful, because the Salaminians had surely paid something since 56. An astonishing feature of this affair is the fact that Bratus was a patron of Salamis, like his uncle Cato. See Cic., Att., 6. 1, 5 ; Fam., 15. 4, 5 ; Fin., 4. 56.

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Brutus also lent money to Ariobairzanes, king of Cappadocia. In this case Cicero was more cooperative : he appointed Brutus’ agents as prefects and induced the king to make a partial repayment of 100 talents ( 584). We may note that Brutus preferred to serve as quaestor in Cilicia, and not in Gaul ( Vir. Ill, 82. 3 -4 ); he was probably influenced by his interests there and by his relationship with Appius. And after the outbreak of the civil war, he was appointed legate of P. Sestius in Cilicia, perhaps because he desired to take personal charge of his affairs there ( 585). Finally a tessera nummularia of 46, inscribed M. Servilius, may refer to Brutus ( 586). In 44 Brutus gave games as praetor, but he failed to conciliate the multitude in this way (587). In the same year, his associates C. Trebonius and L. Cimber, governors of Syria and Bithynia respectively, collected money and ships for him ( 588), and he took similar action in Greece and Macedonia, after he had left Italy. He received money from the quaestors of Syria and Asia, claiming that he represented the state (Veil. Pat., 2. 62, 3). C. Antistius Vetus handed over HS 2 m illion!5895901), and M. Appuleius, proquaestor of Asia, gave him 16,000 talents; yet Brutus complained of lack of supplies and money ( 59°). The Senate empowered him to resort to forced loans and requisitioning in his provinces ( 59‘). He received two loans from Atticus, one of HS 100,000 and the other of HS 300,000 (Nepos, Att., 8. 6) ; probably he got money from other friends as well. He collected money in Greece and Thrace (App., BC, 4. 75), but the main burden fell on the peoples of Asia Minor. Cyzicus and the Bithynian cities were ordered to fit out a fleet, and the Bithynians were fined 400 talents for a delay in their delivery. Cos too was ordered to provide ships. Pergamum gave 200 talents, and the city of Tralles was

(584) Cic., A tt, 6. 1, 3 - 4 ; 3, 5. See D. G„ 4, 26-7. (585) Plut., B rut, 4. 2 ; Vir. III., 82. 5. Brutus’ interests in Cilicia are also indicated by Cic., F a n ,

3. 7, 1. (586) ILLRP, 1058; H erzog, RE, 17, 1445. But properly speaking it should be Q. Servilius. (587) Cic., Phil., 1. 36 ; 2. 31 ; 10. 7 ; Plut., Brut., 21. 2-3 ; App., BC, 3. 23-4. He seems to have been supported by Atticus (Cic., Att.. 15. 17, 2 ; 18, 2). (588) Cic., A lt, 14. 10, 1 ; F a m , 12. 13, 3 , App., BC, 3 6 , Dio, 47. 21, 3. (589) Cic., A d Brut., 1. 1 1 , 1 , Plut., Brut., 2.5. 1 For the date see T P , 6, 149-159 (contra MRR,

2, 327). (590) Cic., Phil., 10. 24 ; 13. 3 2 ; A d Brut., 1 7, 2 ; App., BC, 3. 63 ; 4. 75 ; Dio, 47. 21, 3, and for Brutus’ complaints, Cic., A d Brut., 2 3 , 5 ; 4, 4. In his letter to the Senate of February 43 (71 P , 6, 149 on Cic., Phil., 10. 24 ; 13. 32), Brutus probably did not state haw much he had received from Ap­ puleius. See Note K. (591) Cic., A d Brut., 2. 4, 4 , Phil., 10. 26. His provinces were Illyricum, Greece and Macedonia, and he also operated in western Asia Minor. See Hor., Sat., 1 . 7 ; Plut., B rut, 27. 1 ; 28. 3-4.

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required to send the money left by Dolabella ( 592). Brutus received a third of Cassius’ money on their meeting in Smyrna (Plut., Brut., 30), under the pretext that he had to spend much money on the fleet. The truth is that the ships were mainly provided by the cities of Asia Minor and the islands. Birutus surely did not reveal the true facts to his partner, and indeed Cassius’ friends would not have given him the money {id., ib.). It is temp­ ting to suppose that their later quarrel had something to do with this matter (Plut., Brut., 34). In any case, Brutus received a sum of the order of several thousands of talents. Then he set out to Lycia to collect more money and ships. Xanthos was destroyed, and Myra and Patara were required to pay 150 talents, after their silver and gold plate had been plundered)593). In total Brutus must have collected and received much more than f 3f) mittion denarii. His main expenditure was on army pay. At Melas he paid about 85 million denarii, and before the first battle at Philippi another 1. 5-2 million ( 594). In case of victory Brutus and his associates would have made large profits from the war( 595). 156)

D. I unius Brutus Albinus (55 a Sup 5) Pr. ?, 45.

D. Brutus had a house in Rome near the Forum (Sail., Cat. 40. 5). In 44 he intended to give games, and his gladiators were the only force the tyrannicides had (596). After Caesar’s death he had to finance the costs of his army, which eventually numbered 10 legions (597). He had more than 40

(592) Much evidence is to be found in Brutus' letters in Greek (R. H ercher, Epistolographi Graecii (Paris, 1873), p. 178-191). Their authenticity is dubious (R E. Smith, CQ, 30 (1936), 194-203), but, as Smith says, they may contain some genuine letters., and in any case their evidence may not be wor­ thless, even if they are not authentic. Cf. M aoie. Asia. 422 ; 1274, n. 54. For Pergamum see n“ 9-10 , Bithynia — 61 ; 65 ; 67 , Cyzicus — 35 , 37 , Tralles — 57 , see n. 593 (593) V e u . Pat.. 2 69, 6 ■ , Plut., B ru t , 30-31 , App., BC, 4. 65 , 7 6 -8 2 ; Dio, 47. 34. See also Brutus’ letters • Rhodes — 11; Lycia — 25 ; Myra — 45 ; Smyrna — 4 1 ; Miletus — 47 ; 49 ; also nos 17; 2 1 ; 2 3 ; 27 C f G elzer, RE, 19, 1010-1012; Broughton, ESAR, 4, 584-5. (594) Brutus had 9 legions Each soldier received 1,500 denarii and a donative, which was perhaps 500 denarii (App., BC, 4. 8 8 -9 ; 100-101) See n° 110 notes 223-224. (595) Plutarch implies that Brutus profited in thewars (Comp. Brut. et. Dio, 1. 2). After the first battle he gave 1,000 denarii to each soldier (App., BC, 4. 1 Hi), and Cassius’ soldiers, who had lost their money (Dio, 47. 47, 1), were promised 2,000 denarii per man (Plut., B ru t, 44. 2 ; Gelzer, RE, 10, 1016). Cassius' chest may have been captured by the enemy (P lut., B rut, 43 ; App., BC, 4. 112; Dio, 47. 45, 3), but Brutus perhaps captured Octavian's chest (P lut., B rut, 41-2 ; App., BC 110 ; Dio, 47. 45, 3).156* 156. — D. I unius Brutus Albinus (5 9 6 ) N icol . D amas., 26 a (F Gr Hist, 90, fr. 1 3 0 ); P lut ., B ru t, 12. 4 ; A pp ., BC, 2. 1 1 5 ; 1 1 8 ; 1 2 2 ; D io, 44. 16, 2.

(597) Brutus' army increased from 2 legions at first to 10 legions (Botermann, Soldaten, 201).

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million sesterces, but was compelled to resort to borrowing, in which he was assisted by his friends (Cic., Fam... 11. 10, 5), one of whom was Pontius Aquilia ( 598). In a letter to Cicero of 3 June 43, he repeated a request for an allocation for the soldiers' pay (Fam.. I 1. 26). which, as we learn from a letter of 6 June, was then voted (Fam.. II. 24. 2). He can hardly have received it before his death. At that time he also had to pay a denarius per man to the Salassi, whose territory he passed (Strabo, 4. 6. 7). Though his army had increased to ten legions, he had apparently managed to get together enough funds for he still had money when he tried to escape from Antony (App., BC. 3. 97). Decimus probably derived his wealth from his father’s inheritance, as well as from that of his adoptive father ( 599). He had very likely profited from his service with Caesar in Gaul and as governor there in 48-46. 157) M. Iuventins Laterensis (16) Pr.. 51. As quaestor he gave games in Praeneste (600). As proquaestor in Cyrene he was generous with the publicans (Cic., Plane.. 63). He probably had property in Tusculum, whence his family originated, and perhaps a house in Praeneste (68). Unfortunately the identity of many testators is unknown, and the sup­ position that some were not Cicero’s friends is possibly right, as the appointment of a famous, and influential, senator could sometimes ensure

(855) See also Att., 6. 2, 3 with T. P„ 3, 2 1 0 ; 5. B„ 3, 257. (856) Alt., 15. 1, 1 , 2, 4 ; 3, 2. Cf. D. G„ 6, 353. (857) Plut., Cic., 8. 2 cannot refer to the inheritance from Cluvius (contra D. G.. 6, 332, n. 14). Cf. Lichtenberger, Cicero, 50. (858) Cic., Phil., 2. 40. Carcopino’s discussion of Cicero’s inheritances is wrong and misleading, not taking into account the manifold nature of friendship at Rome (Cicero, 100-110).

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the execution of the will ( 859). Yet it is rather surprising that Cicero's numerous clients in court are not recorded in this list, though some of the unknown testators may have been his clients. However, Cicero had profited in one way or another from his services at the bar, despite lex Cincia (860). His great profits from this source of income are mentioned with much exaggeration by his adversaries ! 861). The Sicilians sent him many gifts and presents in 69, thereby reducing the costs he incurred as aedile (Plut., Cic., 8. 1). In 62 Cicero defended P. Sulla, who lent him 2 million sesterces for the purchase of his Palatine house. Indeed we do not know whether Cicero ever returned the loan, which perhaps was cover for an outright pay­ ment ( 862). In 60 Cicero received books from L. Papirius Paetus, probably a former client!863). The question that suggests itself is whether our information relates to typical sources of Cicero's wealth. The presents of the Sicilians and Paetus and the possible inheritances from former clients were made after the event. The loan or payment from Sulla was obviously part of a transaction between them, but it seems exceptional. On that occasion Cicero was in urgent need of money to realize his ambition for a house in the heart of the nobility’s quarter in Rome. We may add that in 45 he did not think well of Sulla ( 864). We can hardly find similar circumstances in other cases. His defence of Murena was occasioned by the political uncertainty at the time, and that of Gabinius under Caesar's pressure. Yet it is possible that when he defended senators charged of extortion, like Flaccus, Fonteius or Scaurus, his price had been fixed in advance. Generally speaking, we may regard his activity at the bar as providing only a potential source of income. He knew that his clients were under moral obligation to make him some return, not in­ variably in the form of a paym ent!865). Cicero exploited his rank for financial advantage. He exchanged the province of Macedonia with C. Antonius ; there it was easier to make profits than in Cisalpine Gaul, which he took instead and later resigned!866). But he also defended Antonius in the Senate, and probably (859) Of. M o h leh , TAPA, 73 (1932), 73 ; 86. Note the case o fT . Pinnius, said to have been closely connected with Cicero (Fam., 13 61). (860) For the lex Cincia see ch. II, vi arid R otondi, Leges, 261-3. (861) Ps. S all ., Cic., 4 - 5 ; Dio, 46. 6-7 (862) G ellius, 12. 2, 2. Cf. Fam., 5. 6, 2 ; Alt., 1. 13, 6. (863) Alt., 1. 20, 7. See S. 11, 1, 342-3. (864) Fam., 9. 10, 3 ; 15. 17, 2. (865) Cf. L ich ten ber g er , Cicero, 32-6. Carcopino’s view, based on misinterpretations, that Cicero stipulated for rewards in advance is unconvincing. (866) Cic., Fam , 15. 4, 13; Pis., 5 ; Plut., Cic., 12. 4.

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supported the prorogation of his office. Probably there was a pact under which he was to share in Antonius' profits. Hilarus, Cicero's freedman, stayed in the province to back his interests, until Antonius divulged the presence of Cicero's agent and he had to leave. It was only at the beginning of 61 that Cicero received his share!866). Cicero’s governorship in Cilicia brought him large profits. He writes that he made HS 2.2 million salvis legibus (Fam., 5. 20, 9). In addition, he returned a large sum to the Treasury, perhaps 1 million sesterces, and left another sum, part of his allowance, to his quaestor (Art., 7. 1, 6). He surely did not use the same methods as Appius, his predecessor (no.l 15), to enrich himself, and even boasted that he had declined to receive presents from provincials, though we do read that Ariobarzanes promised to present him some money ( 867868). Cicero may have saved part of his personal allowance, but it is more likely that he drew his gains chiefly from booty. In a letter of 19 December 51, he writes that he gave his soldiers the whole of the plun ­ der of Pindenissus, excepting the captives, who were being sold at that day, and he noted the sum of the proceeds of the sale so far. Unfortunately the reading CXX, cannot be sure, while |CXXl would be too much. Perhaps it would be better to emend it. to IXXl In any case, this was only part of the proceeds of the auction, and obviously the sale of the whole population of the town must have brought in some millions ( 869870). Yet in the end Cicero lost most of his profits which he lent to Pompey in the civil war (p. 419). Cicero’s marriages enhanced his income. He married Terentia about 79 (87°). Plutarch says that Terentia brought him a dowry of HS 400,000,

(867) Sestius, Antonius’ quaestor, and his brother-in-law Cornelius were probably intermediaries bet­ ween Cicero and Antonius (Fam, 5. 6 ) ; the debt is alluded to in Fam., 5. 5. See also Alt., 1. 12, 1-2 ; 13, 6 ; 14, 7. In the last passage it is said that Teucris ( = Antonius?) has fulfilled his promise. Cf. C arcopino, Cicero, 136-9 -,T.P., 1, 192. Though we may infer from Fam , 5. 6 that Cicero needed money on account of his Palatine house, there is no reason to follow Carcopino (/*., 134) that he received HS 1. 5 million. The view that Cicero applied for a loan from Antonius ignores the whole context of the ties bet­ ween the two (contra S. B., 1, 297). If Cicero had exchanged his province only to gain Antonius’ political support at that time, he could not later have expected him to be under obligation to give a loan ; Antonius had already fulfilled his part to the agreement Again Cicero is careful to use a cryptic name (Teucris) in his letters to A tticus; his innocence cannot be inferred from these letters. (868) Alt., 5. 9, 1 ; 10, 2 ; 16, 3 ; 20, 6 ; 21, 7 ; Plijt., etc., 36. 2. For the present from Ariobar­ zanes, perhaps 100 talents, see Att., 6. 1, 3 and S. B., 3, 240. (869) See Att., 5. 20, 5 ICXXl is suggested by W att yet see S. B., 3, 228 who would prefer IXXl Assuming that there were thousands of people in the town, and that the prices were 500-1000 sesterces, which is far below the ordinary price of a slave (F rank, ESAR, 1, 100-101 ; 195 ; 384), we may form some idea of the potential proceeds. Of course Cicero did not take the whole amount for himself; thus he kept some money for his triumph (Att., 7. 8, 5). (870) D. G., 6, 604.

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which seems to be that part of the dowry paid in cash ( 87i). The insulae on the Aventine and the Argiletum were probably part of the dowry , their value was more than the sum given by Plutarch, as the annual income amounted to 80-100,000 sesterces, or 2. 6-3.3 million sesterces till 46, when Cicero divorced Terentia. We do not know whether, or to what extent, Cicero benefited from other property of his wife ( 872). At the end of 46 he married the rich Publilia, who brought him a considerable dowry, perhaps HS 1.2 million, but the divorce soon followed tn July 45, and compelled him to return the dowry! 873). We have seen that the tabernae inherited from Cluvius had an annual return of HS 100,000, and obviously Cicero had income from his other possessions as well, which we cannot estimate. We may add that despite the divorce from Terentia, Cicero continued to receive the income of the insulae on the Aventine and the Argiletum, which had probably been part of the dowry, to cover the expenses of their son who stayed in Athens! 874). In conclusion, inheritances were clearly the main source of Cicero’s wealth. His activity at the bar was indirectly lucrative, mainly in that clients made him bequests. He could also profit by his political career and rank. Besides income from his properties, it seems that he occasionally lent money at interest (infra iv). Almost all his sources of income, apart perhaps from the annual income of the insulae, must have been irregular and changed from year to year; returns on agricultural land, unless leased to tenants, were naturally variable. On the whole, it is probable that Cicero’s income during his lifetime was at least twice the value of his property in his last years. (Ill)

Expenditure.

We have seen (section i) that Cicero bought a large part of his property, for which he perhaps paid 5 million sesterces. He embellished some of his houses and villas at a heavy cost. At the end of 68, or the beginning of 67, hie asked Atticus to acquire objets d'art for his Tusculanum and on 13 February 67 he paid 20,400 to L. Cincius for statues! 875). Then he or­ dered Megairian statues and herms for his Academia, which arrived in July-

(871) Plut., Ctc., 8. 2. After the divorce Cicero had to pay cash to Terentia (A ti, 16. 6, 3 ; 15, 5). (872) Terentia had a forest near Tusculum (A ti, 2. 4, 5), urban property (Fam., 14. 1, 5) and public land (A lt, 2. 15, 4). (873) Plut., Cic., 41. 5 ; Dio, 46. 18, 3. The third instalment was ofH S 400,000 (An., 16. 2, 1). Cf. F ruchtel, Geld, 74-5. (874) Alt., 12. 32, 2 ; 15. 17, 1 ; 20, 4 ; 16. 1, 5. (875) A lt, 1. 5, 7 ; 6, 2 ; 7 ; 8, 2.

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August, and he had to pay the freight as well ( 876). He bought more statues in 62 or 61, presumably for his Palatine house and the villas at Tusculum, Formiae and Pompeii ( 877). In his villas he had silver plate and precious furniture. The sum he paid for a table could have purchased a deversorium (Fam., 7. 23, 2), and Pliny writes that Cicero paid HS 500,000 for a table (NH, 13. 92), which is hardly credible. Yet we shall not exaggerate if we estimate his outlay on embellishing his houses at 1-2 million sesterces (878). In most of his villas he needed books, which cost considerable sums ( 879). Even the running expenses of the villas and houses were high. He often entertained friends. We have already noted that Diodotus lived in his house in Rome for some years. Atticus, his wife Pilia, Ariarathes, the son of the King of Cappadocia, stayed on many occasions at his villas. In 45 he en­ tertained Caesar with his huge entourage. Perhaps we may estimate running costs at 300,000 sesterces per y ear!880). When Cicero left Italy in 49, he needed money for his personal expenses. He wanted to collect debts of 13.000 and 10,000 sesterces, and that was not all he required (Att., 10. 11, 2). In Epirus he received HS 70,000 from Atticus’ agents and in 47, at Brundisium, he twice received HS 30,000 ( 881). When not resident in his houses he evidently needed sums of the order of his son’s allowance in Athens, namely about 100,000 sesterces per year. It follows that his current annual expenditure, excepting expenditure on the agricultural parts of his estates, was about 400-500,000 sesterces. On the other hand, just as he en­ tertained friends at his own villas, so he benefited from their hos­ pitality (882 ). (876) Alt., 1. 3, 2 ; 4, 3 ; 9, 2 ; 10, 3. (877) Cic., Fam., 7. 23. Cf. A tt, 2 1, 11. (878) For Cicero’s trapezophorum see T. P., 2, 270-271. See also T ertul., De Pallio, 5 (the HS 500.000 table). (879) A tt, I. 4, 3, and for the libraries at Tusculum and Antium, 2. 2, 2 , 4 4a. 1 ; De Div., 2. 8. Tiro was ordered to make a catalogue in 45 (Fam., 16 20) (880) According to Frank, the living cost of a free labourer, who received the corn ration, was 2-2 5 sesterces a day (ESAR , 1, 385). Cicero’s domestics were riot supported by the state, and probably their standard of living was higher than that allowed by Frank to free labourers ; 4 sesterces per day would not be an exaggerated estimate. Assuming a staff of at least 100 domestics in all Cicero’s houses and villas, the annual expenditure will have been about HS 150,000. But there were also costs on entertainment and repairs of the buildings. For Cicero’s guests see Att., 13. 2, 2 ; 52 ; 14. 15, 3 -, 16, 1 ; 19, 6 ; 15. l a ; 3, 2 ; QF, 2. 8, 2, (881) Att., 11. 2, 4 ; 11, 2 ; 14, 3. (882) What Cicero says about his income and expenditure in Parad., 6. 49, if indeed he refers to himself, cannot be taken seriously in view of what we know about his actual profits and expenses. For his entertainment by friends see Fam., 7. 23, 3 (Tarracina); Att., 3. 4 ; Fam., 14. 1, 3 ; Red. Sen., 20 (in exile); Att., 7. 2, 3 ; Fam., 13. 17, 1 (P atrae); Att., 14. 6, 1 (Fundi), and of course he used his brother's villas. See e.g. QF, 2. 5, 1-2.

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Dowries for his daughter were apparently large. Tullia was first married to C. Piso Frugi before 63 (Cic., Cat., 4. 3) ; the dowry is unknown and will have been returned on his death in 57. In 56 she married Furius Crassipes. Cicero had difficulty in paying the dowry. The marriage ended in divorce and presumably again iin the return of the dowry ( S83). Then Tullia v/as married to Dolabella in 50. The dowry was to be paid in 3 instalments, and the first two were actually paid, though Cicero had reservations and doubts on his son-in-law. Cicero did not recover this dow ry!883884). Cicero did not incur large expenses in his political career. As aedile he was assisted by the Sicilians in gratefulness for the conviction of Ver­ res f885 ). In all likelihood he did not resort to bribery to win elections, at which he always came in first. It seems that the total expenditure of Cicero during the years 70-45 did not exceed his income. Yet there was no regularity in income or ex­ penditure ; hence at times he was short of cash, at others, had plenty. (IV)

Creditors and Debtors.

We shall first give a list of persons to whom Cicero owed money. 1) P. Sulla lent him US 2 million in 62, when he bought his Palatine house and defended Sulla in court. We do not know whether he repaid the debt, if indeed he had to repay at a ll( 886). 2) Bankers of the Forum lent him money in 60 (Att., 2. 1, 11). 3) As governor of Asia Q. Cicero lent the money voted to him to his brother in 59, and gave him other financial aid when he was in exile. Mar­ cus repaid his debt in 56 (887). 4) Unnamed friends lent Cicero money in 56 to enable him to repay his brother. We dlo not know when they were repaid {Att., 4. 3, 6). 5) C. Vestorius, a banker from Puteoli, seems to have lent him money in 56, apparently not repaid till 54. In 50 Cicero repaid a debt to someone in Puteoli, probably Vestorius ( 888). 6) Caesar. A loan of HS 800,000 of Caesar to Cicero is first mentioned

(883) For Piso see Fam , 14 1, 4 3, 3 , Sest., 131, and for Crassipes, QF, 2. 4, 2 ; 5, 1-2. Cf. D G„ 6, 614-6. (884) For the betrothal see Fam., 2. 15, 2 ; 8. 13, 1 ; and for the payments, Att., 11. 4 a ; 25, 3. Perhaps he did pay the third instalment (Att., 12. 5c). See also n“ 125. (885) Cic., Verr., 1. 2 4 -5 ; 2. 5, 3 6 -7 ; M ur, 4 0 ; O ff. 2. 5 8 -9 ; P lut., Cic., 8. I. (886) G ellius, 12. 2. Cf. Att., I 13, 16 which may suggest that he was also helped by friends. (887) QF, 1. 3, 7 ; Att., 2. 16, 4 ; 4. 3, 6. Cf. F ru c h t el , Geld., 89-90. (888) See A tt, 4. 6, 4 ; 16, 4 ; 6. 8, 5. Note also Alt., 10. 13, 2 where Vestorioreddidi maymean, despite 5. B., 4, 420, repayment o f a loan.

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in May 51, but it probably dates from 54 (889). The rate of interest was less than 1 %, since only 20,000 sesterces had been added to the principal by 51 (89°). In view of the changed political situation, Cicero wanted to repay the debt, and probably did so before the outbreak of the civil w ar(891). 7) Numerius. It seems that Atticus arranged repayment of a debt to him in 50 (An., 7. 2, 7). 8) Cn. Sallustius gave him : IS 30,000 in Brundisium in 47, which he soon repaid!892). 9) C. Ateius Capito lent money to Cicero when he was in difficulties. This is mentioned in a letter of 46 when he tried to help Capito to enter on an inheritance (Fam., 13. 29, 2). 10) In 45 Cicero was required to pay a debt of Cornificius to lunius, for which he had become surety in 70. As Cornificius was a rich man, he presumably did not suffer financial loss! 893). 11) Caerellia. Some time before May 45 Cicero borrowed money from his friend Caerellia ; Atticus disapproved. Cicero replied that he would repay her when Meto and Faberius repaid him! 894). 12) Obia, wife of Lollius. In March 45 Cicero owed her HS 100,000 !895). 13) Patulcius. He gave Cicero a loan, which had to be repaid in May 44 !896). 14) Arpinum. Cicero seems to have borrowed a sum of money, perhaps 110,000 sesterces, from the municipality, which he had to repay in June 44 ( 890. 15) He may have owed HS 110,000 to one Statius in June 44 ! 898). 16) Ofilius and Aurelius. Cicero seems to have owed them some money in November 44 (Fam., 16. 24, 1).

(889) Att., 5. 1, 2 ; see Fam., 1. 9, 12 ; 7. 17, 2. Cf Lichtenberger , Cicero, 79 , Fruchtel , Geld., 71. (890) A ll, 5. 5, 2 ; 9, 2. Cf. D. G„ 6, 351. (891) Att., 5. 4, 3 ; 5, 2 ; 6, 2 ; 9, 2 ; 110, 4 ; 7. 3, 11 ; 8, 5. No more is heard of the debt, and it had probably been repaid. See ch. VI, lii. (892) A tt, 11. 11, 2 For the ties see A tt, I. 3, 3 ; 11, 1 ; 11. 17, 1 , 20, 2 ; Fam., 14 4, 6 ; QF, 3 5, 1. (893) A tt, 12. 14, 2 ; 17; 19, 2. See n" 134. (894) Att., 12. 51, 3, and for their connections see Att., 13. 21a, 2 ; 22, 3 ; Fam, 13. 72. (895) A tt, 12. 21, 4 ; 24,1 ; 30, 2 ; 13. 22, 4. See 5 B„ 5, 318. (896) A tt, 14. 18, 2. See S. B., 6, 237. (897) Att.-, 15. 15, 1. See (898) A tt, 15. 15, 1 which Statius. Yet perhaps we have to text implies, in any case, that

S. B., 6, 262 and next note. as it stands (H S CX quae Statio curarentur) surely indicates a debt to emend to a Statio (F rOchtel, Geld., 46 ; T. P., 5, 339-340). The con­ Cicero’s debt to Arpinum was of the same order.

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17) L. Plancus. Cicero agreed to pay a sum of 25,000 sesterces owed by L. Tullius Montanus, his son’s companion in Athens, to L. Plancus. He probably paid it at the end of 44 ) 899). 18) In June 44 he had to borrow HS 200,000 to repay a debt (90°). 19) Atticus often lent sums of money to C icero)901). Who are the persons to whom Cicero owed money? Most of them had close connections with him: his brother, unnamed friends, Cn. Sallustius, C. Ateius Capito, Caerellia, the people of Arpinum and Atticus. He probably did not have to pay a high rate of interest in these cases. Next come Caesar and Sulla, who needed Cicero’s services. The first charged a very low interest, and we may assume that this holds also for Sulla, if he collected the money at all. The debts to Iunius and Plancus were occasioned by Cicero’s concern for his friends. Vestorius is the only banker to appear in this list, but we know that in 60 Cicero had to apply to the bankers of the Forum for loans. Yet at that time the rate of interest was not high, about 6 96 ( 902), and in 61 he sought to avoid paying 12 96 (Att., 1. 12, 1). On the whole, therefore, it seems that Cicero benefited from convenient conditions in financing his needs, partly because of the general situation and mainly because his friends were ready to support him. Next for people who owed money to Cicero: 1) Atilius. He owed Cicero money in 51, probably for an estate he had purchased. Messala was a surety) 903). 2) Egnatius. Cicero lent him a sum, probably not a large one, in 50 ) 904). 3) Q. Axius. Cicero lent 12,000 sesterces for his son in 49 or some time before. In 49 he demanded the money ) 905). 4) Lepta and other unnamed persons owed Cicero money in 48 but could

(899) A tt. , 12. 52, 1 ; 53 ; 14 16, 4 ; 17, 6 ; 18, 3 ; 116. 115, 5. The extra 5,000 (12. 52, 1 ; 16. 15, 5) may have been accumulated interest, which suggests a rate of 15-18%. F ruchtel, Geld.. 85 gives no proof that Cicero did not pay. (900) Att., 15. 15, 3 ; 20, 4 ; possibly connected with the payment of the dowry to Publilia (16. 2, 1 ; 6, 3). (901) See A tt, 11. 1, I ; 2, I ; Nepos, Att., 4. 4 (probably refers to 43). (902) For Cicero’s efforts to finance his needs in 62-60 see Fam., 5. 6, 2 ; Att., 1. 13, 6 (helped by friends); 2. 1, 11. The rate of interest went down from 6% in 62 to 4% in 54 (F rUchtel, Geld., 1SO­ US). Plutarch reports a story that Cicero refused to accept money from friends when going into exile (Comp. Cic. el D ent, 3. 6), yet see Fam., 14. 1, 5. (903) A tt, 5. 19, 1. See 5. 1, 2 and S. B„ 3, 223. (904) Att., 6. 1, 23, not to be confused with L. Egnatius Rufus, with whom Cicero had business ties. Fani, 13. 43. (905) A tt, 10. 11, 2 ; 15, 4. See n° 100.

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not repay. Lepta had been praefectus fabrum of Cicero in Cilicia, and they stood on good terms. He may have borrowed the money in Cilicia (906). 5) Funisulanus. He owed a large sum to Cicero in 49, when he promised to repsiy the debt, whose origin is unknown! 907). 6) Pompey. Cicero made 2.2 million sesterces in Cilicia, which he deposited with the tax-farmers. After the outbreak of the civil war he had to lend it to Pompey, though his own finances were embarrassed at the time. He gave the money in two instalments. It is improbable that he was ever repaid ( 908). 7) Some Pompeians owed Cicero money, the repayment of which Caesar made possible in 46 ( 909). 8) Precius and Cispius perhaps owed Cicero money in 45 (91°). 9) Cocceius and Libo. In March 45 Atticus asked them for payment of their debts to C icero!911). 10) Aufidius. It seems that he owed money to Cicero, who in August 45 wrote lo Tiro to collect the m oney!912). 11) Hermogenes. In March 45 Cicero wrote to Atticus to collect HS 600,000 from h im !913). 12) Meto. In May 45 Cicero expected to receive what this man owed him (Att.. 12. 51, 3). ----13) Faberius, Caesar's secretary, owed a large sum to Cicero in 45. He tried to avoid paying and suggested repayment by promissory notes from his own debtors. He may have repaid, or some settlement may have been made, in October 44 (914). 14) Tullius, Cicero’s freedman, had borrowed money from his patron before July 45 at 6 96 The loan was still outstanding after a y ear!915). .

(906)

10. 11, 2; for their ties see Fam ., 3.7, 4 ; 5.20, 4 ; 6. 18-9 ; 9. 13, 1-3 ; 16. 4, 4 ;23. 1 17, 2; 8. 3, 7; II. 8, 1 ; 13. 48, I. (907) A n , 10. 15, 1. Cf. A n , 5. 4, 1 ■, T P ., 4, 252. (908) F am ., 5. 20, 9; A n , 11. 1, 2 ; 2, 3 ; 3, 3 ; 13, 4. (909) A tt., 13. 3, 2. See T. P ., 4, 388. Neither of Shackleton Bailey’s arguments, that it was Caesar who owed the money, has convinced me. There is no reason to suppose that Faberius’ debt originated from a loan of Cicero to Caesar. See S . B ., 5, 398-9. (910) A n , 12. 24, 3 ; 13. 33, 2. Cf. S . B ., 5, 321 (but it is improbable that Preciana concerns the legacy of Precius). (911) A n , 12. 13, 2; 18, 3; 19, 2. (912) F am ., 16. 19. See Lichtenberger, C icero, 85 ; F rUchtel, G eld ., 77. Yet perhaps it was Cicero who owed the money. This Aufidius may be the man mentioned in Fam ., 12. 26-7 (913) A tt., 12. 25, 1 ; 31, 2. There is no reason to suspect this sum (contra T. 5, 36), which im­ plies that Cicero was ready to pay 1. 2 millionsesterces for Silius’ estate. Cf. S. B ., 5, 321. (914) A n , 12. 21, 2; 25, 1 ; 29, 2 ; 31, 2 ; 40,4 ;51, 3; 13. 27, 2 ; 28, 1 ; 29, 2-3 ; 30, 1 ; 31, 1; 32, 1 ; 33, 1-2; 15. 13, 3. For a detailed account see F rUchtel, G eld ., 79-83. (915) A tt., 13. 22, 4. Cf. F rUchtel, G eld., 83 ; A n , 15. 26, 4 probably refers to Montanus (S . B ., 6, 274). 2;

An,

A n .,

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15) Flaminius Flamma. He owed probably HS 25,000 to Cicero at the end of 44 (9I6). 16) Papia. In November 44 Cicero ordered Tiro to ask for repayment of her debt (Fam., 16. 24, 2). 17) Dolabella had to return the dowry after his divorce. The first in­ stalment was due for payment on Is' July 45, but he intended to give Cicero a promissory note of Balbus. By May 44 the second Instalment, probably due on 1st January, had not been paid. Finally he gave promissory notes of unknown persons, but Cicero intended to sue him. In December 44 the debt was still due, and we do not know how the matter ended. Probably Cicero never received his m oney!917). 18) Q. Cicero owed Marcus HS 200,000, due on 1st November 44. He may have borrowed it in August 45 ( 918). Some of Cicero’s debtors had family ties with him, Quintus and Dolabella, or belonged to his household as his freedman and secretary Tullius. Some were his friends, in the Roman sense of the word, as Axius, Lepta and other unnamed persons. Pompey is a special case. How did they become Cicero’s debtors? Some of them, relations and friends, received loans which were really financial aid. In a few cases, e.g. Dolabella, the debts did not originate from loans. Unfortunately in most cases the cir­ cumstances of the debts are not known. The possibility that many of them had bought property from Cicero is unlikely in view of what we know of Cicero’s estates. At any rate, we cannot maintain that loans were a basic source of Cicero's income, which is not to say that he did not charge in­ terest. The impression is that he lent money to connections out of social obligation or to people whom he wanted to be grateful to h im !919). Can we outline Cicero’s finances? Too few details are known before his consulate, but thereafter our information increases. The period from his consulate till his exile in 58 starts with the purchase of the house on the Palatine, and perhaps of the estates at Pompeii and Antium. At the same time he received a loan of 2 million sesterces from P. Sulla and had some

(916) For references see n. 899. (917) Fam., 6 IS. 5 ; A n ., 12 12, 1 ; 13. 29, 2 ; 14. 18, I , 19, 1 ; 20, 2 ; 21, 4 ; 15. 13, 5 ; 16. 3, 5 ; 11, 2 ; 15, 1-2; 5. See Fruchtel, G eld ., 87-9. (918) A lt., 15. 20, 4 ; cf. A lt., 13. 36, 4. (919) My conclusions are akin to those of FrOchtel, G eld ., 68. Cf. Lichtenberger, Cicero, 84-7. There is no reason to suppose that any of the debtors were Cicero’s tenants. Lichtenberger’s suggestion that d elegation es are involved in these debts does not solve the problem, for we still do not know how those who made the delegatio n es had become Cicero’s debtors.

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transaction with Antonius. He also found it necessary to apply to bankers (.Att., 1. 12, 1), and even after Antonius had paid him, about February 61, he was still short of money. In a letter of June 60 he speaks of his debts to bankers ; the reason was that Tusculanum et Pompeianum valde me delec­ tant (Att., 2. 1, 11). As the estate at Tusculum had been bought in 68, the debts cannot be connected with its purchase, but with his embellishment of the Palatine house and of the villas at Formiae and Pompeii as well as Tusculum (p. 415). In 59 he inherited from Diodotus, but in the same year he had to borrow from his brother (p. 416). Cicero says that he had squan­ dered the money, i.e., spent it on current needs or luxury. On the whole, we get the impression that during these years Cicero was ready to borrow, to buy or improve property, and to raise his standard of living, apparently because he could expect his income to rise proportionately. Next, the period between his exile and the governorship in Cilicia. He seems to have obtained the estate at Cumae in this time, though possibly earlier. He certainly bought Catulus’ estate at Tusculum. Other expenses resulted from building operations necessary after the destruction caused by Clodius in 58. He also had to pay the dowry to Crassipes (QF, 2. 6, 1). How did he raise the funds? Under the heading of inheritances we find that of L. Nustius, which was presumably not large, and that of the architect Cyrus. The latter brought Cicero a considerable sum, but only in 52 ; it could not help him earlier when he urgently needed money. In 57 Cicero’s finances were in a very bad condition (Alt., 4. 1, 8 ; 3, 6), obviously the result of his political downfall in 58. His brother, friends and the banker Vestorius lent him the money he needed (p. 416). And yet despite this financial embarrassment he acquired Catulus’ estate at Tusculum. Probably in 54 he received a loan of 800,000 sesterces from Caesar. Altogether the period is marked by Cicero’s efforts to repair the losses consequent on his political defeat in 58. His ability to do so was due to the generous aid ren­ dered by his connexions and friends. During 51-49 Cicero’s finances were improving. He acquired the house of Canuleius, and probably the estates at Aquinum, Minturnae and Alba. We know only of his debt to Numerius. Of the inheritances he received, one was very considerable, to which we have to add that of Cyrus. In this time he was also lending money (p. 418). Yet he remained in debt to Caesar, ap­ parently because of the convenient terms. Only the change of the political situation induced him to endeavour to repay. We should remember that at this time he made profits in Cilicia. Thus the improvement of his finances enabled him to buy more property and to lend money. The civil war involved him in grave financial condition. Mot only could he not collect his debts, but he actually lost the large sums he had made in

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Cilicia. In addition political considerations led him to repay Caesar. His departure from Italy and enforced stay in Brundisium resulted in exceptional expenses, increased by the payment of the dowry to Dolabella. His regular income from the insulae diminished because of Caesar’s regulations, which he naturally resented (Off., 2. 83). No wonder he needed loans, which were not easily raised (92°). He had to sell his property at Frusino in 49' or 48, and even silver plate and furniture in 47 ( 920. He was much relieved by an inheritance in 48 (Alt., 11. 2, 1), and in 47 from Fufidius and Galeo, yet these did not suffice. Besides Atticus there were other creditors, and it seems that they threatened to sell his house in February 48 ( 9201922). Clearly 48 was the worst year for Cicero, yet although he auctioned some property, ap­ parently reluctantly, he managed to raise the necessary money in the end. In 46-43 Cicero was the debtor and creditor of many people at the same time. We have already noted that we cannot account for some of the debts to him ; considering his known estates at the time, they are not likely to have originated from sales of property. In this time some of those connected with him must have died ; some debts due to him perhaps resulted from inheritances and legacies. His exceptional expenses include the repayment of the dowries to Terentia and Publilia ; but that alone cannot explain his need for loans. In fact his balance sheet in 44 was good as he repeatedly says in letters. He resorted to borrowing since he had lent again to Quintus and others, and some of his debtors, Faberius and Dolabella, did not repay him. And he found it necessary, or profitable, to acquire more property : the shares of his co-heirs in Cluvius’ inheritance and, perhaps, the estate at Astura ( 923). It follows that his debts were only temporary, and he could have repaid them without difficulty in due time. (V)

Management and inspection.

The complicated nature of Cicero’s finances and property and the large number of his domestics and slaves needed good administrators as well as constant inspection. Indeed he tried to keep touch with and to inspect his property and financial affairs as his instructions to his bailiffs and agents show. He even thought himself capable of taking care of his brother’s af­ fairs, when the latter was absent from Italy !924). He sometimes managed

(920) Alt.. 8. 7, 3 ; 10, 1. (921) All., 11. 4, 1 ; 13, 4 ; 25, 3 ; cf. 24, 3. (922) For the loan see A lt., 11. 13, 4. and for the house 11. 2, 3. But see 5 . B., 5, 267. (923) In 46 he thought to buy Sulla’s house in Neapolis {F a n , 9. 15, 5 ; 16, 10). For Cicero’s finan­ ces in 45-44 see Alt., 15. 15, 3 ; 20, 4 ; 16. 2, 2 ; 6, 3 ; 15, 5. (924) QF, 2. 5, 4 ; 3. 1, 1-4.

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his own affairs personally ; thus he set out to Arpinum to let his estates there and bothered himself about letting his garden at Tusculum, though the return was only 1,000 sesterces ( 925926). Yet, for all the concern he showed about his economic affairs, the main work of inspection and management was done by others. Atticus was for Cicero chief administrator, banker and a friend prepared to offer help in hour of need. Nepos writes that he gave Cicero HS 250,000, probably in 43, or perhaps iri 58 (Att., 4. 4), and his aid in 58 is recorded in a letter of Cicero (Att., 3. 20, 2). In 57 he probably gave Cicero financial aid again and helped him in putting his private affairs on a sound footing (Att., 4. 1, 3). Before leaving Rome in 51, Cicero received a bill of exchange from his friend for the latter’s account in Asia (925). When Cicero entertained the hope of celebrating a triumph, it was Atticus who had to make the preparations including financing ( 927), and it was to him that he turned for surety (Att., 5. 1, 2). Atticus also controlled the activity of other agents, as Philotimus, particularly when Cicero became unwisely involved in the purchase of Milo’s property t 92892). The repayment of the loan to Caesar and the dowries to Terentia and Publilia were also made by him( 930931). In brief Atticus did everything for Cicero: he bought and sold, collected debts and repaid loans, checked balance-sheets and went over ac­ counts. As far as can be judged from Cicero’s letters, Atticus was par­ ticularly active in the management of Cicero’s affairs from the latter’s governorship of Cilicia, while up to that time he had mainly helped him by getting loans ( 93!). There is no evidence that Terentia was connected with the management of Cicero’s property before his exile, when he needed her help. Yet he was not satisfied with her, and wrote disapprovingly to Atticus (4. 1, 8 ; 2, 7). A grave dispute broke out between them in the civil war, when he again needed her help. He accused her of having taken money without his sanc­ tion and of not carrying out his instructions. Obviously this quarrel con­ tributed to the deterioration of their relations and to their divorce ( 932). (925) Att., 13. 9, 2 ; 11, 1 ; Fam, 16. 18, 2. (926) Att., 5. 13, 2 ; 15, 2. It was probably payable in Ephesus.

(927) Att., 6. 8, 5 ; 9, 2. (928) Att., 7. 3, 7, and for Cicero’s involvement in the purchase of Milo’s property, Att, 5 .8 , 2 ; 6. 4, 3 ; 5, 1-2 ; 7, 1 -, Fam., 8. 3, 2. (929) Att., 12 24, 1 ; 27, 2 ; 32, 2 ; 14. 7 , 2 ; 16, 4 ; 20, 3 ; 15. 15, 4; 17. 1 ; 20, 4; 16. 1, 5. (930) For the debt to Caesar see n. 891 ; and for that to Pubhlia A tt. 1347a ,1 6 2, 1 ; 6, 3 ;and for Terentia, Att, 16. 6, 3 ; 15, 5.

(931) See references in n 923, and add e.g. A tt , 12. 22, 3 , 23, 3 ; 42 ; 43, 2 See also Nepos, Alt., 15. 2-3. (932) A tt., 10.

4,

1 2 ; 11. 2, 2

;

11, 2

;

16, 5

;

24, 3

, P lut ., C ic . ,

41. 3. Cf. D. G., 6, 608-610.

“4 2 4 ---------------

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Cicero was often helped by Philotimus, Terentia’s freedman. The best known case is his attempt to acquire some of Milo’s property, which was auctioned off after his conviction. Cicero could not appear in public as a purchaser, and let Philotimus represent him. When the secret leaked out, Cicero had to give up and even lost some sum to his representative, which did not prevent him from employing him in acquiring property, auditing ac­ counts and other matters (933). After Cicero’s divorce from Terentia Philotimus is heard of no more. Cicero employed other freedmen in the management of his affairs. Hilarus, his freedman, stayed in Macedonia to see to it that Antonius should pay what he owed him (Att., 1. 12, 2). Eros collected the rents of the insulae, drew up accounts, raised money and prepared what Cicero needed for his journey in 44 ( 934). Tiro, too, was sometimes assigned ad­ ministrative tasks. Occasionally he checked Eros’ accounts, repaid and collected debts, let the garden of the Tusculan estate and served as an in­ termediary between Cicero and Atticus or others who had dealings with him, like Dolabella ( 935). Obviously we have no complete list of Cicero’s managers. We may assume that he had a vilicus in each of his estates ; probably they, too, were freedmen. We cannot say whether the management was efficient or not, the more so as no yardstick is known. A large staff of domestics surely involved some waste, but it was necessary for Cicero’s social position. We can say, however, that apart from the expenditure of money he had received from the Treasury in 59 through his brother, there are no indications that Cicero’s difficulties arose from bad financial administration. C

o n c l u s io n

Considering the various aspects of Cicero’s economic condition, we may say that in general it was prosperous. His property increased over the years despite some setbacks. His expenditure was considerable, but so was. his in­ come and, not less important, his ability to raise money. He had property worth about 13 million sesterces iri his last years, while his inheritances

(933) For Milo's affair see n. 928, and for other services A lt., 10. 5, 3 ; 7, 2-3 ; I I. 16, 5 ; 19, 2 ; 23, 2 ; 24, 4-, 12 5, 1 ; 44, 3. (934) Alt., 12. 18, 3 ; 21, 4 ; 13. 12, 4 ; 50, 5 ; 14. 18, 2 ; 21, 1 ; 15. 15, 1 ; 3-4 ; 17, 1 -2 ; 20, 4 ; 16. 2, 1 ; 15, 5. (935) All., 12. 5 c ; 19, 4 ; 15. 4, 5 ; 12, I ; 15, 3-4 ; 17, 2 ; 18, 2 ; 18, 1 ; 20, 4 ; 16. 15,5; Fam., 16. 18; 19; 24.

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amounted to larger sums. His profits from magistracies were of the order of millions of sesterces, and his expenditure on the embellishment of his villas and their current maintenance during the years was of the same order. There were fluctuations in his finances in the years 6.3-43. Twice he faced crises which sprang from political causes. In the first case it was his political ruin that shattered his finances and the second crisis was connected with the civil war and his joining Pompey. His recovery from these crises in particular as well as his ability to finance current expenditure and the acquisition of estates were made possible by the facility with which he could borrow and by inheritances. His finances were closely connected with his social and political position, his activity at the bar and his various ties with relatives, friends and clients. 212) Q. Tullius Cicero (31) Pr., 62. Quintus had a house in Rome on the Carinae, which his brother gave him iri 62. When he was legate of IPompey in 57-56 he let it, but con­ sequently had to hire a house for a short time( 936). In 61 he intended to buy another house, for which purpose he offered his Tuscuilan estate for sale, but the transaction did not materialize (Att., 1. 14, 7). However he did acquire a house on the Palatine, near his brother’s house, at the latest in 59 ; badly damaged by Clodius in 58, it required extensive repairs!937). Quintus had yet another house in Rome, on the Argiletum. Till 61 he owned only one quarter, and then acquired the rest for HS 725,000 (Att., 1. 14,7). This was probably an insulae, like the one his brother had there (938). Outside Rome Quintus owned several estates. The Tusculan estate seems to have been sold in 61, for it is not heard of again. He had property at Ar­ pinum. The Laterium there he inherited from his father, but enlarged its area in 56-54 by buying adjacent lands. He carried out building operations there, under the supervision of his vilicus Nicephorus, which included the construction of a road, water pipes, a garden, and the embellishment of the villa which cost more than HS 16,00 0 (939). Quintus also carried out building operations in his second estate at Ar-

212. — Q. Tullius Cicero (936) Cic., QF, 2. 3, 7 ; 3. 1, 14 ; Har. Resp., 31 ; P l u t . , Cic., 8. 3. For Quintus’ properly and finances cf. D. G., t>, 659-662. (937) Cic., A tt, 2. 4, 7 ; 6, 2 ; 7, 5 ; 4. 3, 2 ; QF, 2. 4, 2. (938) For the Argiletum see P. A., 53-4, and for Cicero’s insulae see n” 211, i. (939) Cic., Fam , 1. 9, 2 4 ; A tt, 4. 7, 3 ; 10, 1 ; QF, 2. 5, 4 ; 3. 1, 4 - 5 ; 3, 1.

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PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

pinum, called Arcanum. He built a canal there in 54, and intended to erect a palaestra and to dig a fish pond (94°). Nearby was his estate Manlianum, in which were built baths and porticoes, rooms were added and pavements were constructed in 54 under the supervision of the architect Diphylus. To judge by the scope of the operations, either a villa urbana of the estate was entirely rebuilt, or it was only then that it was built at all (940941). In the same year Quintus paid HS 101,000 for an estate he bought from Fufidius. This estate had plenty of water, and there was need to carry out drainage in one part which spread over 50 iugera (Cic., QF. 3. 1, 3). At the same time he thought of selling another estate, not far away (? 3 miles). But then he decided to keep it, for he realized that it could be watered from the Fufidianum (942). It is apparent that all these agricultural estates at Arpinum were extensively reconstructed in 56-54 so that they would be places of amenity as well. We have seen that in 61 Quintus bought a house on the Argiletum and perhaps another on the Palatine, which he may have financed with profits from his governorship of A sia(943). It is also noteworthy that the enlargement of his property at Arpinum coincided with his service as legate, first of Pornpey in Sardinia and then of Caesar in Gaul, which was probably lucrative ( 944). Quintus sometimes had to borrow, e.g. from Brutus (Caepio) and Antony on his brother’s behalf in 58 (QF, 1. 3, 7). Atticus had lent him money before 56, and Quintus was in his debt on the eve of the civil war ( 945). But he was also able to lend. In 59 he let his brother receive the allowance of the Treasury for his governorship, a loan repaid in 56. Lentulus Spinther and Sestius too borrowed from h im (946). In 45 his brother was ready to lend him money (Alt., 13. 46, 4). In 44 he took a loan from Egnatius to

(940) Cic., Ati., 1. 6, 2 ; 5. 1 , 3 ; 7. 5 , 3 ; 10. 2, 1 ; QF, 2. 5, 4 ; 3. 1, 1 ; 3, 1 ; 9, 7. (941) Cic., QF, 3. 1, 1-2. It was suggested that Cicero had bought this estatea short time before the works started ( I P., 2, 165). The Aipinates did not like the building operations of Quintus (All., 4. 7, 3). (942) Cic., QF, 3. 1, 3. The estate is called either Bovillianum or BobiKDianum. It cannotbe iden­ tified with the one bought from Fufidius, for it got water supply from the other (contra T P.,2, 167 ; C onstans, Ciceron, 3, 184). Besides, Quintus was informed by this very letter of the purchase of the Fufidianum ; he could not express his wish to enlarge the buildings of an estate which he had not known that was his. (943) Cic., QF, i. 1, 8. See Magie, Asia, 381-2. (944) On Quintus’ hope to make profits and repay debts by service in Gaul see QF, 2 14, 2-3 ; 3. 6, 1 with Wiseman, JRS, 56 (1966), 108. Cf. D. G., 6, 659. (945) Cic., A ll., 7. 18, 4 ; 10. 11, 2 ; 15, 4. See F rUchtel, G e ld , 91. (946) Cic., QF, 2. 2, 1 ; T. P„ 2, 38.

OF

ROMAN

427

SENATORS

repay the dowry of Pomponia (Att., 14. 13, 5), and from his brother he borrowed 200,000 sesterces, which he was due to repay on 1st November 44 (Att., 15. 20, 4). Earlier he had received financial aid from Caesar (Att., 11.9, 2). Part of his debts were caused by his son’s expenditure ( 947). He was apparently buying slaves in 45 !948). The evidence is insufficient to reconstruct the financial condition of Quintus, yet it is interesting to see that he was creditor and debtor at different times. 213) L. Valerius Flaccus (179) Pr., 63. Though Cicero’s defence saved Flaccus from the charge of de repe­ tundis, he certainly turned his provincial governorship of Asia in 62 into a lucrative post ( 949). He was alleged to have made profits b y : a) collecting moneys for ship building!950) ; b) confiscating several hundred thousand sesterces collected by Jews to be sent to Jerusalem!951); c) charging 50 talents for approving a contract of tax-farming !Flacc., 903) ; d) taking money which had been collected in Tralles for games in honour of his father, the consul of 86 (Flacc., 56-7); e) exacting 206,000 drachmas from the town of Acrnonia, and a similar sum from one of its citizens!952) ; f) taking the inheritance of Valeria, his freedwoman ! 953). It seems that the profits of Flaccus amounted to more than 1 million denarii. It is noteworthy that Flaccus spent many years in military service, which was probably profitable, and surely as legate of Pompey he made millions of sesterces ; no doubt he had gains as legate under Piso in

(9 4 7 ) C ic .,

Att..

(9 4 8 ) C ic .,

Att.,

15. 26,

1 ; 16.

1, 6.

12. 2 8 , 3 , 3 0 , 2 , F

n o t s u f f ic ie n tly c le a r. S e e S

B,

ruchtel,

Geld.,

1 1 5 - 6 ( contra

T P,

2 , 4 0 ) . Y e t th e m a tte r is

5, 323

213. — L. Valerius Flaccus ( 9 4 9 ) C ic e r o s e c u r e d t h e a c q u itt a l F la c c u s , b u t h is r e a d e r s h a v e n o t b e e n m is le a d . S e e

(9 5 0 ) C ic .,

Magie, Asia, 3 8 0 . Flacc., 2 7 - 3 2 . S e e Magie, Asia,

(9 5 1 ) C ic .,

Flacc.,

13;

Schol. Bob.,

Macrob.,

2 . 1,

102;

1242,

n.

3.

6 7 - 9 . F la c c u s m a y h a v e k e p t p a r t o f th e

aurum Iudaeorum

; C ic e r o p r o b a b l y d o c s

n o t n a m e c itie s in w h ic h t h e g o ld w a s ille g a lly c o n f is c a te d . S m y r n a , M ile tu s a n d E p h e s u s , c itie s w ith J e w is h c o tn m u n itf e s , a r e n o t h e a r d o f. (9 5 2 ) C ic .,

Flacc.,

3 4 - 8 ; T e m n u s a n d D o r y la e u m , 3 9 - 4 4 .

(953) Cic., Flacc., 84-9; Schol. Bob., 106.

428

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

Macedonia in 57-56 I 954). Sallust aptly defines him as a military man {Cat., 45. 2). 214) M. Valerius Messala Corvinus (261) Cos., Suf, 31. In 45 he could spend HS 80,000 a year in his stay at Athens (Cic., Alt., 12. 32, 2). Messala used his Gallic booty to reconstruct the via Latina and to decorate Rome (955). On the Velia he had a house which had belonged to his father, M. Messala N iger!956). Together with Agrippa he received the house of Antony on the Palatine ; he probably made more gains in the war between Augustus and Antonius ( 957). He was appointed among the heirs of C. Cestius, praetor 44 {CIL, 6, 1375). He had gardens on the Pincian, for­ merly owned by Lucullus whose son was killed in Philippi!958). He probably had an estate at Arretium (Tib., 4. 8, 3-5). 215) M. Valerius Messala Rufus (268) Cos., 53. He bribed the voters, for which he was charged and though at first acquitted, was convicted in a second tria l!959). He may have received a legacy from his uncle, Hortensius (Val. Max., 5. 9, 2). He acquired possessions in Caesar’s dictatorship (Cic., Att., 14. 10, 2). As legate of Caesar in the civil war he probably won booty!960). 216) P. Vatinius (3) Cos., 47. It is difficult to decide what amount of truth lies behind Cicero’s allegations against Vatinius. He is said to have extorted money from the

(9 5 4 ) See n“ 214. —

107,

1 2 6 a n d h is in d e x o f c a r e e r in

MRU.

M. Valerius Messala Corvinus

T ibullus, 1. 7 , 5 7 - 6 3 . C f. Suet., Aug., 3 0 . 1 ; D io , 5 3 . 2 2 , 1. F o r th e Martial, 8 . 3 , 3 - 6 ; 1 0 . 2 , 9 - 1 2 . C f. V ell. Pat., 2 . 8 9 , 4 ; Suet., Aug., 2 9 . 5 . 1, 5 7 1 ; T ibullus, 1. 7 , 1 - 1 2 ; 2 . 1, 3 3 . C f. Hammer, Messala, 8 1 - 2 .

(9 5 5 ) F o r th e V ia L a tin a see d e c o r a t i o n o f t h e c i ty s e e S ee a lso

Ins. It., 1 3 . P. A., 1 9 6 - 7 . T a c ., Ann.. I I . 7 ; D io , 5 3 . 2 7 , 5 . S e e G rimal, Jardins, 1 3 4 - 5 . T h e i n s c r i p tio n CIL,

(9 5 6 ) S ee (9 5 7 ) (9 5 8 )

6, 29782 ( =

IL S,

5 9 8 9 ) sh o w s th a t C o r ­

v in u s h a d la n d n e a r t h e P in c i a n , b u t a s a f o llo w e r o f t h e T y r a n n ic id e s h e s u r e ly c o u l d n o t h a v e o b ta in e d L u c u llu s ’ p r o p e r t y b e f o r e P h ili p p i, a f t e r w h ic h h e c h a n g e d s id e s . F o r th e g a r d e n s s e e a l s o

ILS,

(=

CIL,

6, 2 9 7 8 9

5 9 9 0 ).

M. Valerius Messala Rufus Cic., Alt., 4 . 1 5 , 7 ; QF, 3 . 2 , 3 ; Fam.,

215. — (9 5 9 )

8. 2, 1 ;

Brut.,

328 ;

34. (9 6 0 )

Bell. Afr.,

2 8 ; 8 6 ; 88. S ee

MRR,

2, 282 ; 2 8 5 , n. 9.

V al. Max.,

5 . 9 , 2 . S ee

T. P ,

3,

OF

429

ROM AN SEN A TO RS

people of Puteoli as quaestor (Vat., 12). Cicero also alludes to his interests in Sardinia and Africa, but he does not give details (id., ib.). As tribune in 59 Vatinius allegedly made profits by passing various laws which settled the relations of Rome with cities and rulers. He also drew profits from the taxfarmers (961). He gave gladiatorial games in his canvassing for the praetorship ( 962). He probably obtained booty as legate of Caesar in 58-56 and in 51-47. and as proconsul of Illyricum in 45-43; in 42 he celebrated a triumph (963). 217) P. Ventidius Bassus (5) Cos. Suf, 43. Ventidius, who was from Picenum, is said to have been led in triumph by Pompeius Strabo in 89. He became a publican and contractor for army transportation, but later joined Caesar under whom he served in Gaul (964). In his wars in the East as proconsul in 40-38, Ventidius collected moneys from Antiochus of Commagene, from Antigonus of Judaea and from the Nabatean Malchus ( 965). Dio says that he waged the war against Antiochus because he coveted his treasuries (49. 20, 5). 218) C Verres (1) Pr., 74. Thanks to the Verrines of Cicero, v/e have ample information on Verres’ profits as magistrate. Admittedly Cicero sometimes exaggerates, and even distorts the facts, but this does not lessen the importance of his account, which was supported by documents and witnesses in some cases. Cicero ad­ mits that some of Verres’ actions cannot incriminate him, thereby revealing how magistrates could make legitimate profits. In the main the Verrines are valuable because they disclose the methods by which a governor could enrich himself. It is a secondary question whether Verres actually exploited

216. — ( 9 6 1 ) C ic .,

P. Vatinius 2 9 ; A 11. ,

Vat.,

2 . 9 , 1 - 2 , Fam ., 1. 9 , 7

V a t i n i u s w o u ld s e t o u t to c o l le c t m o n e y (9 6 2 ) C ic .,

Sest. ,

1 3 3 -5 ;

Vat.,

37;

1 0 . 1, a n d o n h is p r o c o n s u l s h i p

a c r o b

Schol Bob.,

1 4 9 . I n 5 9 C i c e r o t h r o u g h t th a t

2 . 7 , 3 ). S e e a l s o c h . V I , iii. .,

2. 6,

Vat., 3 5 ; H i r t C i c . , Fam., 5 . 1 0 a ,

( 9 6 3 ) O n V a t i n i u s a s le g a te s e e C i c . ,

Afr.,

M

(Att.,

in

1. C

a e s

.,

BG,

8. 4 6 , 4 ;

Bell. A t, 4 4 - 7 ; Bell. Ins. It., 1 3 . 1,

3 ; 1 0 b ; 1 1 , a n d f o r h is tr i u m p h

5 6 7 -8 . 217. — (9 6 4 )

Plin.,

P. Ventidius Bassus

G ellius,

1 5 . 4 , 3 ; D io , 4 3 . 5 1 , 4 - 5 . O n V e n ti d iu s a s m u l e te e r s e e C i c . ,

N i l , 7 . 1 3 5 ; h is n ic k n a m e r e s u lt e d f r o m h is b u s in e s s a s a r m y c o n t r a c t o r

S y m e su p p o se s th a t h e w as (9 6 5 )

J oseph., AJ,

14.

praefectus fabrum o f C a e s a r . RR, 7 1 , n 3 9 2 - 3 ; BJ, I . 1 5 , 2 ; 1 6 , 6 ; D io , 4 8

3 ;

Latomus,

4 1 , 5.

Fam.,

10. 18, 3 ;

(Schol. Bob.,

1 2 0 ).

17 ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 7 3 - 8 0 .

430

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

all these methods and in the extreme manner alleged by Cicero. In what follows Cicero’s allegations are generally treated as facts, even though proof is not always available. (I)

Before 73.

Verres’ accounts as proquaestor professed to show that he had left HS 600,000 in Ariminum which was never recovered by the Treasury. It is alleged by Cicero that Verres chose Ariminum, which was captured in the civil war, to cover embezzlement. Though this case must remain open, it becomes clear that in times of disorder, like the civil war, magistrates could lay their hands on public money with impunity!966). Verres also acquired possessions in the Sudan proscriptions; indeed, according to Cicero, cupidity made him change sides in the civil w a r!967). As legate and proquaestor in Cilicia in 80-79, Verres not only collaborated with the governor, Cn. Dolabella (no. 49), in various forms of extortion, but sometimes acted independently. He demanded money from a magistrate of Sicyon, and punished him for refusing (2. 1, 44). With Dolabella, he robbed the temple of Athena in Athens of its gold (2. 1, 45). They also carried off silver and statues from temples in Chios, Eretria, Halicarnassus, Tenedos, Samos, Aspendos, Perga (2. 1, 49-53), and pillaged the Cilician cities (2. 1, 95-8). Verres requisitioned a ship from Miletus and then sold it and kept the money (2. 1, 86-90). He seized the property of the deceased quaestor Malleolus, selling part and keeping the rest. Verres admitted that he received 1 million sesterces for the property, but handed only HS 50,000 to Malleolus’ son (2. 1, 91-3). The accounts submitted by Verres and Dolabella revealed embezzlement of public moneys. Under one heading there was a discrepancy of 535,000, and under another of HS 232,000. According to the corn accounts 1.8 million sesterces were missing. Altogether 2,567,000 sesterces disappeared. Cicero also found out that Verres had an account at the bankers Q. and Cn. Postumus Curtius, where he deposited the profits he made as legate and proquaestor; from his profits he also paid 4 million sesterces to P. Tadius in Athens, but Cicero does not make clear the reason for the payment !968).

218. —

C. Verres

( 9 6 6 ) 2 . 1, 3 5 - 7 , a c c e p te d

by C owles, Verres,

6 . A ll u n n a m e d r e f e r e n c e s in t h i s e n t r y a r e t o C i c . ,

Verr. (9 6 7 ) 2.

1, 3 5 - 8 ; 4 3 ;

(9 6 8 ) 2.

I, 9 9 - 1 0 0 ;

3,

102.

177.

For

th e tw o b a n k e r s s e e

F ruchtel, Geld.,

108.

OF

ROMAN

SEN ATORS

431

Both the governor and his legate had apparently made profits of the order of millions of sesterces in cash apart from objets d ’art. As urban praetor Verres formulated his edict in such a way as to enable people who were not instituted as heirs by their deceased relatives to submit legal claims to the property. Verres would endorse such claims on condition that the plaintiff agreed to pay him. Cicero dilates on three cases in which Verres made profits in this way, adding that he can cites hundreds more, an obvious exaggeration (969970). Verres also turned to his own gain his appoint­ ment by the Senate to examine works done on public buildings. He pronounced that the reconstruction of the temple of Castor and Pollux had not been properly carried out, and gave it to another publican for HS 560,000, though the real cost was HS 40,000. The heir of the original con­ tractor was compelled by Verres to pay the HS 560,000, but it was Verres who received the money. Brutus, cos. 77, intervened on behalf of the heir of the first contractor (P. lunius, perhaps a relative) and Verres returned HS 1 10,000 (97°).

(II)

Profits from appointments and trials in Sicily.

As governor of Sicily, Verres welcomed claims against the validity of wills, and thereby extorted moneys from heirs ; he found other excuses for demanding money when administering justice. Cicero notes several cases : 1) Dio of Halaesa gave him 1 million sesterces, silver plate and precious carpets. (2. 2, 19-24). 2) The brothers Sosippus and Philocrates of Agyrium paid him HS 400,000 (2. 2, 25-6). 3) Verres convicted Heraclius of Syracuse, appropriated HS 300,000 of the proceeds accrued from the auction of his property and took other precious articles (2. 35-50). 4) The property of Epicrates from Bidis, worth 1.5 million sesterces, and an inheritance of HS 500,000 were confiscated (2. 2, 53-61). 5) He hoped to make HS 400,000 in another case, but the judge ap­ pointed to hear the case did not collaborate (2. 2, 66-7). 6) Sopater of Halicya paid HS 80,000, and yet was convicted, because the prosecution offered more (2. 2, 68-81). 7) Varius’ agents paid HS 130,000 for a decision (2. 2, 119).

(9 6 9 ) 2.

1,

1 0 5 - 1 11 ; 1 1 5 - 7 ;

1 2 5 -7 .

( 9 7 0 ) 2 . 1, 1 3 1 - 1 5 0 ( e s p . 1 4 4 - 1 5 0 ) ; P s .

G.

4,

P .

Ascon.,

2 5 3 . F o r t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e tw e e n th e I u n i i s e e

D.

432

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

8) The Equites M. Modius and Cn. Sertius paid for favourable decisions ; so did also Sicilians (2. 2, 119). Verres interfered in the internal administration of the cities of Sicily and appointed magistrates and members of municipal councils. There were men ready to pay for appointment. Cicero cites specific cases in Halaesa, Agrigentum, Syracuse and Cephaloedium (2. 2, 120-130). Verres ap­ pointed 130 men as censors in the Sicilian Cities (2. 2, 131-7), each of whom contributed HS 1200 for the erection of statues in his honour, that is 156,000 sesterces ; in addition they gave him secret payments (2. 2. 137). Contributions by others brought up the total to perhaps 2 millions (971). Verres was entitled to keep the money for 5 years till the erection of the statues, and to use the money in the interim, as he saw fit. However Cicero admits that some statues he did erect (972). (Ill)

Corn taxes.

(a) Decumae. Verres made large sums by abusing his power in the let­ ting of the decumae, with the collaboration of the tax-farmers. He issued edicts which favoured the publicans to the detriment of the farmers. In fact he virtually put the aratores at the mercy of the publicans, who presumably shared their profits with Verres, though the amount must remain unknown. Cicero lists numerous instances of extortion, and though his account is not always clear we can note the methods by which Verres and the publicans enriched themselves. 1) Cities were compelled to pay a lucrum to the publicans. This ‘profit’, consisted of cash or crops, was in addition to the tithe, and it seems that the cities did not object to the right of the publicans to this gain, but to their excessive demands. Herbita, for instance, was forced to pay 38,000 modii of wheat as profit to Atidius, though he farmed the tithe at 18,000 modii (973). 2) In several cases, after the tithes had been leased to publicans, the cities were forced to collect them and yet to pay a ‘profit’ to the publicans. The city of Agyrium, to take one example, gave Apronius 33,000 medimni of wheat as well as HS 63,000 as his ‘profit’. In this case the cash payment was imposed under the pretext that Apronius had to inspect the grain ( 974).

( 9 7 1 ) 2 . 2 , 1 4 1 - 2 . C i c e r o is n o t c l e a r in 2 . 2, 1 3 7 . A c c o r d in g t o Z u m p t 3 m i lli o n , b u t C i c e r o d id n o t k n o w th e su m fo r su re . (2 . 2, (9 7 2 ) 2. 2,

145 ; 1 5 0 ;

154;

1 5 3 ). S ee a ls o 158;

(9 7 3 ) 2. 3 , 7 5 . S e e a lso 2. 3 , 7 6 ;

C owles, Verres,

5 2 , n. 3.

1 6 1 -2 . 8 6 -7 ; 8 8 -9 0 ; 100.

( 9 7 4 ) 2 . 3 , 6 7 - 7 3 . S ee a lso 2. 3 , 8 4 - 5 ; 9 9 , a n d p e rh a p s

1 0 5 -8 .

OF

ROMAN

SENATORS

433

3) The amount actually collected by the tax-farmers often exceeded by far the tithe. At Leontini the tithe should have been at most 1 medimnus per iugerum, but Apronius collected 3, sometimes 4 and even 5 medimni, and finally agreed to 3 medimni. Hence, though he farmed the tithe at 216,000 modii, he was able to keep for himself more than 324,000 modii (975). 4) Farmers were convicted for allegedly making false declarations of the acreage sown. Apparently this was a means to induce them to accept the terms of the publicans, which obviously left the latter excessive gains. In general Verres administered his jurisdiction so as to intimidate farmers to yield to the demands of the publicans!976). 5) Under sheer violence farmers, even Roman Equites, were forced to agree to excessive payments (977). 6) Verres imposed additional payments (accessiones and quinquagessimae) of 2,000-3,000 sesterces on every district. The total amount in 3 years was HS 500,000 (2. 3, 118). The following conclusions may be drawn : 1) It was generally accepted that the tax-farmers were entitled to a ‘profit’, an extra-payment of crops or cash, in addition to the tithe. Under Verres’ rule the publicans used violence and intimidation to extort excessive sums. Verres surely had a share in their profits (978). 2) Verres had no scruples in abusing his power in dealing not only with Sicilians but also with Roman Equites, and even senators, who farmed land in Sicily. 3) The total amount of Verres’ profits under this heading must have been of the order of at least several million sesterces. 4) The collection of the tithe left a large amount of corn at the disposal of Verres, which as we shall see, could be exploited to make more profits. (b)

Alterae Decumae and Frumentum Imperatum.

Under a decree of the Senate and the lex Terentia Cassia the civitates decumanae were bound each year to deliver (a) a second tithe, for which they were to be paid HS 3 for a modius of wheat (2. 3, 163) ; (b) an ad­ ditional 800,000 modii of requisitioned wheat Lfrumentum imperatum}, for

(9 7 5 ) 2. 3,

1 1 1 - 1 1 6 . S e e a ls o 2 . 3 , 9 3 ;

97;

102.

( 9 7 6 ) 2 . 3 , 5 3 - 5 . S e e a ls o 2 . 3 , 6 7 - 9 . (9 7 7 ) 2. 3, 5 6 ; 5 9 -6 3 ( 9 7 8 ) F o r V e r r e s ' e d ic ts s e e 2

3 , 3 2 - 8 a n d c h . I I, in

F o r th e c o l la b o r a t io n b e tw e e n V e r r e s a n d th e

t a x - f a r m e r A p r o n i u s s e e 2 . 3 , 2 2 - 3 ; 4 9 - 5 2 ; 1 3 0 - 1 4 0 ; 1 5 2 - 7 . W e d o n o t k n o w w h e th e r C i c e r o ’s i n ­ te r p r e t a t i o n o f

pecunia capta

( 2 . 3 , 7 1 ) w a s a c c e p te d .

434

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PRO SO PO G RA PH Y

which they were to be paid HS 3.5 a modius (2. 3, 163); the second burden was to be equitably apportioned among the cities. Verres received HS 9 million each year to buy the second tithe and HS 2.8 million for the ‘requisitioned wheat’. Thus he received 35.6 million sesterces in 3 years, which he turned to his own profit in 3 ways : 1) He lent some of the money to the societates publicanorum charging 2 96 interest per month. In fact he had to receive the money from the societies, because the Senate did not send cash money, but ordered the publicans in Sicily to hand the money they owed the state to the gover­ nor!979). 2) In some cases Verres refused to accept the corn under the pretext that it was bad. Instead he demanded HS 15 per medimnus for the quota the far­ mers had to deliver, which he could do because there was sufficient surplus of corn at his disposal, out of the decumae, from which he provided Rome with the necessary corn. Hence Verres’ profit was : HS 36 per medimnus less the price of the corn sent to Rome, which had been cheaply acquired. Cicero gives a detailed account of one case. The city Halaesa was ordered to deliver 60,000 modii, which enabled Verres to make a profit of HS 210,000 (150,000 the price of the corn sent to Rome). It is said that the same oc­ curred in Herbita, Tyndaris, Amestratis, Thermae and Cephaloedium (2. 3, 170-9). 3) In some cases the farmers were not paid the full price because deduc­ tions were made under the following headings : (1) Spectatio — a payment for the examination of the corn or coins. (2) Collybus — a payment on currency exchange, superfluous in Sicily where only one currency was in use. (3) Cerarium — perhaps a sealing tax. (4) A deduction of 4 % for the salary of the scribae, who in fact were paid by Rome. The total profit from this source was 1.3 million sesterces (2. 3, 181-4). (c)

Frumentum Aestimatum

The Senate gave an allowance to Verres to buy wheat and barley for his needs and his companions’. He had the right to demand a certain amount of corn for which he had to pay HS 4 per modius of wheat and HS 2 per modius of barley. Verres kept the allowance of the Senate, and in addition compelled the farmers to pay HS 8 per modius on the basis of an amount 5 times as large as that which he was entitled to demand; hence his profit was HS 12 per modius for he did not need the corn, having managed to ac-

(9 7 9 ) 2 . 3,

1 6 5 - 9 . F o r V e r r e s ’ lo a n s see F r u c h t e u

Getd.,

1 3 3 -6 .

OF

ROM AN

4.35

SEN A TO RS

cumulate enough from the decumae (9B0). But if he had wished, he could have bought grain at HS 2 per modius of w heat!980981). (IV)

Various Profits.

The fourth part of the actio secunda includes a detailed, and tiresome, ac­ count of the objects d ’art acquired by Verres during his governorship of Sicily. Cicero catalogues statues, wall paintings, pictures, silver plates, bowls, vases, vessels, coins, bronze couches, tables and carpets obtained from private people as well as from temples. Verres’ collection included some old works of famous artists, like Myron, Praxiteles and Polyclitus. Sometimes he stole works such as the statue of Apollo from Agrigentum (2. 4, 93), and sometimes he forced the owners to sell for insignificant prices. Verres said that he had paid HS 6500 for the statues of IHeius (2. 4, 12), while Cicero claimed that a bronze statue was worth HS 40,000 in Rome (2. 4, 14). Whatever opinion one may have on Verres’ taste and interest in a r t( 982). there is no doubt that his official position made it possible to acquire such a collection so cheaply. Verres was ready to pardon condemned slaves and to return them to their masters in return for money, sometimes sums such as large as HS 60,000 or even 100,000 (2. 5, 15). Verres enlarged his profits from the sale of offices by ingenious devices. He himself lent the money, through one C'arpinatius, to the would-be pur­ chasers, who then returned it as bribes ; in due time they were to repay the loan with the interest. The same Carpinatius, who was a promagister of the societas that farmed the pasture tax, helped him to export his goods without paying custom duties. Though the documents were falsified, Cicero was able to show that in a few months Verres exported goods from Syracuse alone of the value of 1.2 million sesterces, on which he saved HS 60,000 by not paying duty. The obligation of the Sicilian cities to provide Rome with ships Verres turned to his own profit: 1) Messana was exempted, on condition that a merchant ship was given to Verres (2. 5, 44-7).

( 9 8 0 ) In h is lo n g d is c u s s io n o f V e r r e s ’ p r o f it s u n d e r th is h e a d in g s ( 2 . 3 , 1 8 8 - 2 2 5 ) C ic e r o in s in u a te s t h a t th e f a r m e r a l o n e p a i d H S 12 ( 2 . 3 , 1 8 8 - 9 ; 1 9 1 - 4 ; 2 2 5 ) , b u t s e e 2 . 3 , 1 9 7 ; 2 0 2 . H o lm h a s s h o w n t h a t i f w e w e r e to a c c e p t w h a t C ic e r o s a y s , V e r r e s w o u ld h a v e p r o f it e d H S 1 0 0 m i lli o n f r o m

tum in eeiiam a l o n e , 9;

w h ic h , a s h e w r ite s , i s im p o s s ib le . S e e

1 9 1 - 4 ; 2 2 5 ), b u t see 2 . 3 , (9 8 1 )

2. 3,

(9 8 2 ) See

174;

189;

197;

194.

C owles, Verres,

1 2 5 -1 3 5 .

202.

Geschichte Siciliens ( L e ip z ig ,

the frumen­

1 8 9 8 ). 3 . 4 1 8 -

436

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

2) Verres ordered the cities to deliver the money needed for the main­ tenance of the fleet directly to himself and not to the navarchs (2. 5, 60). 3) Not a few cities paid for. -exemption from_ihe_ obligation to provide quotas of sailors (2. 5, 61). 4) Individuals paid HS 600 for immunity from service (2. 5, 61-2 ; 112). 5) Verres reduced the pay of those who served in the fleet (2. 5, 61). Verres took for himself every valuable man who was on board the pirate ship he captured (983). In other cases he confiscated ships and cargoes whose owners were Sertorius’ men according to his version. Thus he acquired purple, incense, scents, cloth, pearls, wine, slaves and money (2. 5, 145-6). Cicero names two victims: P. Granius whose ship and cargo were confiscated and whose freedmen were executed, and L. Herennius (2. 5, 154-6). Cicero accused Verres of having taken 40 million sesterces against the law (984). The details he gives corroborate the figure ; indeed it seems not to include sums which he was not able to prove to have been obtained contrary to the law. (V)

Miscellaneous data.

Verres inherited from his client Chelido (985986). He distributed HS 300,000 as bribes when a candidate for the praetorship, and HS 300,000 to cancel a charge brought against him (2. 4, 45). Verres assisted his friends Hor­ tensius and the Metelli when they functioned as aediles and praetors. He had a house in Rome and estates in Italy, of which one, acquired in the proscriptions, was at Beneventum! 98798). In this house in Rome he had a grove (2. 1, 50-1). His brother-in-law was an Eques (2. 3, 166-8). After conviction in 70 he went into exile in Massilia, where he lived until the

(9 8 3 )

2

(9 8 4 )

i . 5 6 ; 2 . 1, 2 7 . i n th e

5 , 6 3 - 4 , P s . A s c o n ., 2 2 7 .

Div. in Caec ,

19 h e s p e a k s o f H S 1 0 0 m illio n .

h e c a n h a r d l y h a v e k n o w n th e e x a c t s u m a t t h a t tim e ( P s . Ascon., th is m i g h t b e th e f in e , n o t th e s u m o f th e d a m a g e s

19 1 ;2 2 3

(C owles, Verres,

P e r h a p s h e e x a g g e r a te d

;

D. G , 5,

;

34:5. n . 6 ) , o r

1 7 7 a n d n . 1). P lu ta r c h s a y s t h a t

C i c e r o d e m a n d e d o n ly H S 3 m illio n ( C i c . , 8. 1 ), b u t it is in c r e d ib l e t h a t V e r r e s w a s n o t r e a d y to p a y s u c h a c o m p a r a ti v e ly tr i f lin g s u m a n d p r e f e r r e d t o g o in t o e x ile . C f.

C owles, Verres,

1 9 0 , n. 3 . H a b e r -

m e h l m a y w e ll b e r i g h t in s u p p o s i n g t h a t H o r te n s iu s r e f u te d p a r t o f th e e v id e n c e o f th e

darum

o f V e rre s

(RE,

(9 8 5 ) 2.

1, 1 0 4 ;

(9 8 6 ) 2.

I, 5 8 ;

(9 8 7 ) 2.

8A ,

1 6 3 0 ).

1 3 6 - 7 ; 2, P s.

Ascon.,

1 1 6 ; P s . A s c o n ., 2 5 0 . 2 3 8 ; n“

102,

150.

1, 3 8 ; 4 , 3 6 ; 5 8 ; 1 2 6 .

( 9 8 8 ) P l i n .,

NH,

34.

6 ;

Lactant., Instit. Div.,

2. 4, 3 4 .

crimina repetun­

OF

ROM AN

SENATORS

437

triumvirs proscribed him and had him killed for his wealth. Evidently he was able to recover much of his property, probably in cash. 219) C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus (16) Cos., 43. Pansa owned a house in R om e(989), estates at Puteoli and Cumae, a house in Neapolis, and perhaps an estate at Pompeii (99°). He was probably the owner of workshops of bricks and tiles between Pisaurum and Ariminum which were later owned by Augustus!991). It seems that he camie from Perusia, and that his father, a Marian, had been proscribed by Sulla!992). 220) M Vipsanius Agrippa (2) Cos., 37. The evidence on Agrippa’s origin is very scanty, and all that has been said on his early economic position is devoid of support!993). Certainly he made an enormous fortune by his political success. Dio writes that charges were brought against the tyrannicides in order to obtain their properties (46. 49, 3). Agrippa was one of the accusers and though it is misleading to maintain that his prime motive was the desire to acquire property, Dio’s in­ formation probably contains reminiscences of a tradition that Agrippa was enriched from their possessions after Octavian took power in R om e!994). Agrippa had vast areas in Sicily, probably near Catania, which were managed by Iccius, and very likely acquired after the fall of Sex. Pom­ peius ! 995). In Egypt, too, he had an estate, which had obviously come into

219. — C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus (989) Dio. 46. 33, 1-2; O bsequens 69 (990) P uteoli: Cic., Alt., 14. 9, 2 ; C um ae: Cic., Att., 14. 1 1 ,3 ; N eapolis: Cic., Alt., 15. 1, 3 ; Pompeii: Cic., Att., 24. 20, 4. (991) CIL, 5, 8110, 1-28 ( = ILS, 8648a) See M o m m sen , StR, 2, 1007, n. 1 ; R o g ers , TAPA, 73 (1947), 141 (contra H ir sc h fe l d , Kl. Schr., 546). (992) CIL, 1 1, 1994; Dio, 47. 17, 1 ; S y m e , RR, 90. Yet see G u n d el , RE, 8A, 1954; W isem a n , CQ, 58 (1964), 131. 220. — M. Vipsanius Agrippa (993) 4.11 agree that Agrippa was ignobilis. Daniel says that he was poor (Agrippa 80), while Motte wrote that he came from a rich family (Agrippa, 175-9). Reinhold rejects Motte’s view and seems to assume tha t Agrippa was a man o f modest means (Agrippa, 1-11 ; 21, n. 2). See also S yme , RR, 129 ; H a n sl ik , RE, 9A, 1227-9. All this is pure guesswork. (994) For the charge of Agrippa against Cassius see V el l . Pat ., 2. 69, 5 ; P lut ., Brut., 27. 3-5. Cf. D a n iel , Agrippa, 81 ; R ein h o l d , Agrippa, 22. (995) H o r ., Ep., 1. 12, 1. The emendation of Agriliae to Agrippae is generally accepted. See K ieslin g -H e in z e , ad. loc. ; S y m e , RR, 238, n. 6 ; R o sto vtzeff , SEHRE, 562, n. 17 (contra D a n ie l , Agrippa, 81, n. 8). However, Agrippa’s ownership of these possessions does not depend on i t for Iccius

438

PART

THREE. —

E C O N O M IC

PROSO POG RA PH Y

his hands after the defeat of Antony and Cleopatra (996). He received part of Antony’s house on the Palatine, no doubt after Actium (Dio, 53. 27, 5). Agrippa owned other properties which we cannot precisely connect with his political career. He owned a vast area in the Campus Martius, where he erected many buildings (Tac., Ann., 15. 39). There he constructed his gar­ dens and baths which he left to the public in his will. He also built there a pool, a canal, the Pantheon, the Porticus Argonautarum, the Saepta Iulia and the Diribitorium (997). He also possessed Horrea in Rome in the 8th Region ("*). One estate of Agrippa is known in Campania probably at Pompeii (998a) ; there he died (Dio, 54. 28, 2). The Thracian Chersonese belonged to him, part of which he had probably acquired with his betrothal to Caecilia, Atticus’ daughter (999). He had marble quarries in Africa (100l)), and probably also at Synnas in Phrygia (1001). He also had brick factories in Bruttium (,002). His numerous

is known as Agrippa’s procurator in Sicily from Pirophyrio and Ps. Aero ad loc. Reinhold deduces from the appearance of the name Vipsanius near Catania (CIL, 10, 7101 ; IG, 14, 495) that Agrippa had property there (Agrippa, 42 and n. 100). (996) An ouata aypiiziuavri is known from Hadrian’s time (for the term see R osto vtzeff , Kolonat. 120). Though Rostovtzeff thought that Agrippa Postumus might be a possible alternative (Kolonat, 123), it is very likely that it had already belonged to his father, who, like other associates of Augustus, had ex­ ploited the opportunity to acquire property in Egypt. C f D a n ie l , Agrippa. 81 ; R ein h o ld , Agrippa. 61 and n. 54. See also R o sto vtzeff , SEHRE. 670-671 ; F r a n k , J R S , 23 (1933), 146. (997) Gardens: CIL, 6, 29781 ( = IL S. 600 3 ); O v id ,E x Ponto, 1. 8, 37-8 ; Dio, 54. 29, 4 ; Baths: Pl in ., NH, 34. 62 ; 35. 26 ; 36. 189 ; Dio, 53. 27, 1 ; 54. 29, 4. See P. A., 518-520. Canal and p o o l: O v id , E x Ponto, 1. 8, 37-8 ; S trabo , 13. 1, 19 ; S e n ., Ep., 83. 5 ; T a c ., Ann., 15. 37, 3 ; F ront ., De Aq., 84. See P. A., 496. Pantheon: CIL, 6, 896 (== IL S, 129); P lin ., NH, 9. 121 ; 34. 13 ; 36. 38 ; Dio, 53. 27, 2-3. See M otte , Agrippa, 229-231 ; P. A., 420. Saepta Iulia : P. A., 460 ; Diribitorium : P. A., 51. For two slaves responsible for these public buildings see CIL, 6, 5731 ( = IL S, 7 8 8 8 b ); 8871 ; Agrippa had prepared a sepulchre for himself in the Campus Martius (Dio; 54. 28, 5), and for the camp of Agrippa, part of the Campus Martius, see Dio, 55. 8, 3-4 ; P A., 90. The inscription CIL. 6, 29781 suggests that Agrippa’s land spread to the Tiber. (998) CIL, 6, 9772 ; 10026. See P. A., 260. (998a) See D’A rms, Romans, 231-2. (999) Dio, 54. 29, 4. Dio admits that he does not know how Agrippa acquired it. Some supposed that it was a gift from Augustus or that Agrippa bought it from the state. See H irsch feld , Kl. Schr.. 518 ; R osto vtzeff , Kolonat, 187 ; F r a n k , JR S, 17 (1927), 156, n. 2. Broughton refers to Cic., Alt., 6. 1, 19 ; 5, 2, which, he thinks, suggest that Atticus had acquired possessions there, later (N epos , Att., 12. 1) given to Agrippa (TAPA, 63 (11934), 219-220). But surely Atticus had not acquired the whole penin­ sula. (1000) Officina Agrippae are recorded in inscriptions of the middle of the second century al Simitthus (CIL, 8, 14580-14582). For the marble there see Plin ., NH. 36. 49. Agrippa used it for the building of the Pantheon (H ayw ood , ESAR. 4, 53-4). (1001) CIL, 15, p. 988. Cf. CIL, 3, 7047 (a tabularius of Neron) and see F ieh n , RE, 3A, 2278-9, but also B roughton , ESAR, 4, 648. (1002) CIL, 10, 8041, 1, 19-21. See H irsc h feld , Kl. Schr., 546, n. 1 ; R ein h o ld , Agrippa, 130 (contra D a n ie l , Agrippa, 82, n. 17).

OF ROMAN

SEN ATORS

439

slaves included a special group, perhaps of 240, which specialized in the upkeep of the aqueducts. Many others are recorded in inscriptions (1003). He also left possessions to Augustus whose revenue was to cover the costs of the public baths (Dio, 54. 29, 4). He left HS 400 to every citizen, an ex­ penditure of at least HS 100 million (1004). In the course of his career Agrippa spent much money on the public. As praetor in 40 he celebrated the ludi Apollinares (Dio, 48. 20, 2). As aedile in 33 he repaired all public buildings, streets and the sewers. He also distributed oil and wine, celebrated games, opened baths freely and gave tickets which entitled their holders to money, clothes and other ar­ ticles ( 1C'05). No doubt the purpose was to attract the public in view of the imminent struggle with Antony ( 10061078). Agrippa paid special attention to the problem of the water supply of Rome. He repaired old aqueducts : Annio Vetus, Marcia, Appia and constructed two new: the Iulia and the Virgo (,007 ). His building operations spead over all Italy C 008), and exten­ ded to the provinces. He built temples and baths in Nemausus in Gaul ; in Antioch he constructed a new quarter and baths, enlarged the theatre and repaired the stadium ; in Lusitania he built a theatre, and erected an edifice for Asclepius in Epidaurus ( 100910). He took part in the celebration of the ludi Saeculares in 17, and in the next year gave the games for Augustus’ health ( ,0I°). This expenditure made him the people’s favourite, and ac­ cording to Dio helped Augustus to establish the monarchy (54. 29, 1-2). (1003) The special group was inherited by Augustus, who gave it to the state. In Frontinus' time it numbered 340 men (De Aq., 116). Hulsen was the first to collect inscriptions of slaves who belonged to Augustus by inheritance from Agrippa (Rom. Mitt., 3 (1888), 223). See CIL, 6, 4808 ; 5202 ; 5203 ( = IL S, 1778); 5223 ; 5299 ; 8012 ( = IL S, 843 6 ); 8820 ; 33768. R ein h o ld , Agrippa, 129, n. 29 gives a list of freedm enof A grippa: 0 X ^ 6 , 5 730 ; 5 731 ( = IL S , 78&8a-h) „ 6184 ; 8 8 7 1 ; 10 0 4 6 ; 18269 ; 29010 ; 29012 ; 39051. (1004) Dio, 54. 29, 4. Augustus executed Agrippa’s will, and it is known that his donatives were distributed to no less than 250,000 men (RGDA, 15). Frank wrongly writes that Agrippa left property worth 100 million sesterces to Augustus (ESAR, 5, 25-6). This was only the sum distributed according to the will. (1005) Dio, 49. 43, 1-4 gives a detailed account. See also Strabo, 5. 3, 8 ; Plin., NH, 36. 104; 121 ; Suet , Aug., 20. 5. Horace alludes to the great expenses: S a t, 2. 3, 180-185 with Porphyrio and Ps. Aero. Cf. Daniel, Agrippa, 42-8 ; R einhold, Agrippa, 47-52. (1006) Cf. R ein h o ld , Agrippa, 46-51 (but what he says on Agrippa’s games as praetor, ib., 22, is unlikely). (1007) Marcia : P A., 24-7 ; Appia and Amo Vetus : P. A , 1 2 -3 ,2 1 .Iulia : P A., 23-4 ; Virgo : P A., 28-9. (1008) CIL, 5, 4315 ; 9, 5576. (1009) Nemausus: R ein h o ld , Agrippa, 9 0 -9 1 ; A ntioch: M alalas , 9, 222-5 ; the theatre in Lusitania: IL S, 130; Epidaurus: IG, 4, 1363. See also IG, 3, 575 (Athens) with R ein h o ld , Agrippa, 108. (1010) RGDA, 22 ; IL S, 5050. Agrippa gave horse races, and it seems that he has a permanent stable of horses (CIL, 6, 10046).

P roprietors

Name

Pat.

2 3 4 5 9

+ + +

before the

G racch i

NonNob.

Rank

pi.

Nob.

+

+ + + + +

Tr. Pi. Cos. Cos. Cos. Cos.

+ ? T ^ +

Cos. E>-

+ +

-

i

.

+

Cos.

House Hired house? House

House, gardens, suburban estate House, gardens, suburban estate House, gardens

11

P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio ( 3) Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus Q. Fulvius Flaccus M. Fulvius Nobilior P. Furius Philus

i3

+

+

Cos.

14

+

+

Cos.

16

+ +

+ +

Cos. Cos.

House

-

17

+

+

Cos.

House

+ + +

Cos. Cos. Pr.

House?

+ + +

Veii Tarracina Alsium Lucania? Amo valley Alba Sabinum

M. Claudius Marcellus

18 19 20

Italy

Rome

Liternum, Misenum? Laurentum, Caieta, Lavernium Public lands more than 500 iugera

Tusculum Praeneste?

TABLES

Q. Aeiius Tubero M. Aemilius Lepidus M. Aemilius Lepidus Porcina L. Aemilius Paullus Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus C Cassius Longinus (') T . :..„ a — it.._ S2 \ 11. rV' iI-------i d U U l U S r \ 3 C !!U 3 \ /

N°

440

TABLE

Non'r

N°

L. Furius Purpurio D. Iunius Brutus M. Iunius B rutus!4)

21 22

C. Laelius C. Licinius C rassus!5)? C. Lucretius Gallus M \ Manilius ( 6) C. Matienus S. Marcius H g u iu st7) L. Mummius Cn. Octavius M. Octavius ( 8)

Pat.

PI.

+

Nob.

Nob i

Cos. Cos. Pr.

+

+

+

-

+

+

24 27

+

+

+

+

-

+

+

29 31 32

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Rank

+ +

?

Bought cheap lands

House Estate near the city

r y .o

uuuou

Pr. Sen ? Cos. Cos. Tr. PI.

+

M. Porcius Cato

33

+

Ti. Sempronius Gracchus Ser. Suipicius Gaiba

34 35

+ +

+

Cos. Cos.

L. Valerius Flaccus

36

+

+

Cos.

Italy

Gardens

Cos. Sen.? Pr.

-

+

Rome

Privernum, Tibur, Alba Formiae, Puteoli Antium

uu

u iv

v a i m av.

i o a i/tw i

Tibur? House House? House on the Palatine Public lands, more than 500 iugera Sabinum, Tusculum, probably other estates in Latium and Campania, pools, hot springs, pitch works, wood

Cos.

I „ „ ,4 ia u u +

House Land on the Aventine, house

Misenum ? Tarracina, Anio valley Sabinum

TABLES

Name

442

TABLE II Proprietors

Name

N°

Pat.

M. M. Q. M. i

37 39

+ +

Aemilius Lepidus Aemilius Scaurus Ancharius ( 9) Antonius AppuIeiuS Sfltiiminns ( *°)

Pl.

from the

Nob.

Gracchi

NonNob.

+ +

to

Sulla

House

4-

40 43

+ + +

4-

Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius

44

+

+

Cos.

L. Cornelius Sulla

50

+

Cos.

House

Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus ( 10 C. Erucius? M. Fulvius Flaccus L. Gellius Poplicola ( 12) C. Iulius Caesar V o p iscu s!13) L. Licinius Crassus L. Licinius Lucullus L. Licinius Murena

Cos. Sen? Cos. Cos. Aed. Cos. Pr. Pr.

House

51 54 55 56 57

M. Livius Drusus

59

Q. Caecilius Metellus

House House House on the Palatine

Tusculum Amiternum Estates, one at Misenum Tibur

NnmiVlipiic

+

-

+ + + + + + + + +

+ + + + + + + + +

Tr. Pl.

Tibur, Tusculum, large estates Tusculum, Minturnae, Cumae, Puteoli Spoletium

House on the Palatine

House on the Palatine

House on the Palatine

Veii Tusculum Tusculum, Baiae ? Tusculum, Heraclea ? Lanuvium, fish ponds probably in Campania

TABLES

-

Cos. Cos. Pr. Cos. Tr. Pi. Cos.

+ + +

Italy

Rome

Rank

NonN°

C. Lucilius?

60

+

Q. Lutatius Catulus Q. Lutatius Catulus

61 62

+ +

+ +

-

+ +

■f

L. Marcius Philippus (15a) C. Marius

63

M. Marius Gratidianus C. Memmius ( 14) Q. Mucius Scaevola Q. Mucius Scaevola A. et M. Plautius Silvanus O 5) Cn. Pompeius Strabo P. Rutilius Rufus C. Sempronius Gracchus

65

Q. Sergius C 6) P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (>’)

Pat.

+ + + + + + + +

-

66 67 -

69 71 73 -

Pl

+? +

Nob.

Nob.

Rank

+

Sen.?

House

Cos. Cos.

House on the Palatine House on the Palatine

Cos. Cos.

House near the Forum

+

+ +

Pr,

+

Pr. Cos. Cos. Sen. Cos. Cos. Tr. P!.

+ ? +

Sen. Cos.

+ + + + +

Rome

Italy Suessa Aurunca, Tarentum, public lands Estates in Sicily and Sardinia Tusculum Tusculum, Minturnae, Cumae, Pompeii Sabinum Arpinum, Solonium, Minturnae, Baiae. Misenum

House (Rome?) Tarracina Solonium, Tusculum Tusculum Minturnae, Sabinum Picenum, Tarentum Formiae Houses on the Palatine and near the Forum Picenum Capena

TABLES

Name

444

TABLE III Proprietors

N°

L. Abuceius? L. Aelius Lamia M. Aemilius Lepidus

76 77 78

+

+

Paulius Aemilius Lepidus L. Aemilius Paullus M’. Aemilius Lepidus ( l8) M7 Aemilius Scaurus

79

+

+

OA OU

+

+

+

+

+

+

1

Afraning

8i

C. Anicius C. Annaeus Brocchus T. Annius Milo

82 84 85 86

C. Antistius Vetus C. Antonius Hybrida M. Antonius

88 89 91

a ___ :u: ___ ___( to\ V- /q u in iu s vjaiiua v

r \

Pat.

P l

Nob.

NonNob.

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

.+

Sen.? Pr. Cos.

+

+

4- ?

R a n k

Cos. Cos. Cos. Pr.

+

?

Sulla

Cos. Sen. Sen. Pr.

Cos. Cos. Cos.

Pr.

to

Augustus

Rome

Italy

P fQ V iflQ g S

Alba Gardens House

Africa Lanuvium, Circeii, Tibur, Antium

Property

House on the Palatine

v_.