Self-talk in Sport 9781138624672, 9780429460623

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Self-talk in Sport

Athletes are naturally exposed to significant psychological challenges in sports, but do not wait helplessly for the assistance of sports psychologists or trainers. Instead, they practise one form or another of self-regulation. Self-talk in Sport explores one such self-regulatory strategy: self-talk, the inner voice that accom­ panies every human being throughout their lives. Over time, research has revealed many secrets of self-talk in sport, though many others remain unveiled. This book offers you the opportunity to discover the multiple iden­ tities of our self-talk, how the “inner coach” serves as a rational counterpart to the irrational self, and what we need to do to develop our inner voice to reach its maximum self-regulatory potential. There is a general need for concrete interventions in sport, exercise, and performance psychology. In addition, the autonomous functioning of people is a central aim of psychological interventions that align with positive psychology and focus on people’s strengths rather than weaknesses. In this volume, researchers and applied practitioners are shown how they can use self-talk interventions to strengthen people’s rational self-regulation in order to deal with a variety of situations that apply to both sport and other exer­ cise and performance contexts. Since self-talk is a tangible result of cognitive processes and inner experi­ ences that researchers and applied practitioners can barely access, Self-talk in Sport is a tool for sports psychologists to understand and interact with hidden parts within athletes that have a major impact on sport and exercise experiences and performance. A book demonstrating the diverse – both rational and irrational identities – of self-talk, as well as specific interventions to change the inner dialogue of athletes, is a fundamental piece in the edu­ cation of sport scientists. Alexander T. Latinjak is a senior lecturer and the course leader of the BSc (Hons) Sport and Performance Psychology at the University of Suffolk, and visiting researcher at the EUSES Schools of Health and Sports Sciences in Catalonia. Although Alexander wrote his dissertation on strategic self-talk interventions for tennis players, he has recently been more intensively involved in the study of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk. His research

led to the design of a reflexive self-talk intervention and the development of a conceptualisation of self-talk based on the distinction between organic and strategic self-talk. Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis is a professor at the Department of Physical Education and Sport Science at the University of Thessaly, and director of the postgraduate programme Psychology of Physical Education and Sport. His main research interest has been self-talk, on which he has authored more than 35 articles and six book chapters. He is Associate Editor at Sport, Exercise and Sport Psychology, and has served as member of the man­ aging council of the European Federation of Sport and Exercise Psychology for 12 years.

Routledge Psychology of Sport, Exercise, and Physical Activity Series Editor: Andrew M. Lane University of Wolverhampton, UK

This series offers a forum for original and cutting edge research exploring the latest ideas and issues in the psychology of sport, exercise, and physical activity. Books within the series showcase the work of well-established and emerging scholars from around the world, offering an international perspective on topical and emerging areas of interest in the field. This series aims to drive forward academic debate and bridge the gap between theory and practice, encouraging critical thinking and reflection among students, academics, and practitioners. The series is aimed at upper-level undergraduates, research students, and aca­ demics, and contains both authored and edited collections. Available in this series: Persuasion and Communication in Sport, Exercise, and Physical Activity Ben Jackson, James A. Dimmock, and Josh Compton Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy in Sport and Exercise Martin Turner and Richard Bennett Self-talk in Sport Alexander T. Latinjak and Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ sport/series/RRSP

Self-talk in Sport Edited by Alexander T. Latinjak and Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis

First published 2020 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Taylor & Francis The right of Alexander T. Latinjak and Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this title has been requested

ISBN: 978-1-138-62467-2 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-429-46062-3 (ebk)

Typeset in Galliard

by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

In memory of Dr Bernat Llobet, a dear friend and inspiring colleague. Alexander To Nadia. Antonis

Contents

List of Figures List of Tables List of Contributors 1 Locating Self-talk in the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology

xi xii xiii

1

ALEXANDER T. LATINJAK

2 Pieces of the Self-talk Jigsaw Puzzle: An Introduction

11

ALEXANDER T. LATINJAK, JAMES HARDY, AND ANTONIS HATZIGEORGIADIS

3 Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk

28

THOMAS M. BRINTHAUPT AND ALAIN MORIN

4 Metacognition and Goal-Directed Self-talk

51

NOEL E. BRICK, MARK J. CAMPBELL, AND AIDAN P. MORAN

5 Self-talk and Emotion Regulation

64

JULIAN FRITSCH AND DARKO JEKAUC

6 Organic Self-talk Antecedents: An Interpretative Review and Implications for Practice

77

ARISTEA KARAMITROU, EVANGELOS GALANIS, YANNIS THEODORAKIS, AND NIKOS COMOUTOS

7 The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention: Detailed Procedures ALEXANDER T. LATINJAK, LUCÍA FIGAL-GOMEZ, PHILIP SOLOMON-TURAY, AND RAFEL MAGRINYÀ-VINYES

91

x Contents

8 Rational Self-talk: A Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT) Perspective

109

MARTIN J . TURNER, ANDREW G. WOOD, JAMIE B . BARKER, AND NANAKI CHADHA

9 Strategic Self-talk Interventions

123

ANTONIS HATZIGEORGIADIS, EVANGELOS GALANIS, AND YANNIS THEODORAKIS

10 Self-talk Mechanisms

136

EVANGELOS GALANIS AND ANTONIS HATZIGEORGIADIS

11 Self-talk Interventions in Tennis and Golf

154

ROBERT WEINBERG AND ALEXANDER BIANCO

12 Self-talk Interventions in Team-Sport Settings

165

JAMES HARDY

13 Self-talk and Endurance Sports

176

ALISTER MCCORMICK AND PAUL ANSTISS

14 Self-talk in Physical Education: Motivational Aspects and a Guide for Physical Education Teachers

188

MAŠA MARJANOVIĆ, CHARALAMPOS KROMMIDAS, EVANGELOS MPRISIMIS, ATHANASIOS PAPAIOANNOU, AND NIKOS COMOUTOS

15 Contesting the Role of Self-talk in Sport Psychology in Views of Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering

201

DANIEL BIRRER, PATRICIA C. JACKMAN, AND ALEXANDER T. LATINJAK

Epilogue: Some Facts and Personal Reflections on My Self-talk

218

ANTONIS HATZIGEORGIADIS

Index

222

Figures

1.1 The Knowledge Map of Sport Psychology, with Examples of

Psychological Concepts, Including Highlighted Self-talk

Concepts 2.1 An Overview of the Conceptual Framework for the Study of

Self-talk in Sports 4.1 Illustration of the Hierarchical Organisation of the Meta-Level

and the Object-Level (Adapted with permission from Nelson

and Narens 1990) 5.1 Cycle of Emotions 5.2 Example of How Emotions Can Impair Sports Performance

When Not Properly Regulated 7.1 25-Step Board-Game Format to Engage in the Reflexive

Self-talk Intervention with Athletes 8.1 The GABCDE Framework of REBT 12.1 An Example of a Team-Oriented Input – Process – Outcome

Conceptual Framework (Adapted from McEwan and

Beauchamp 2014)

4

17

54

65

67

94

110

167

Tables

3.1 A Sampling of Sport-Related and General Self-talk

Self-Report Measures and their Characteristics 3.2 Summary of Main Advantages/Disadvantages and Some

Psychometric Characteristics of Self-talk Assessment Methods

Reviewed 4.1 Possible Questions to Integrate Metacognitive Processes

within Reflexive Self-talk Interventions 13.1 Examples of Self-talk Cues for a 10 km Runner 13.2 Example Self-talk Plan for a 5 km Run 14.1 Practical Examples of Instructional Self-talk Cues to

Teach a New Skill 14.2 Examples of Motivational Self-talk Cues

33

44

60

182

183

195

197

Contributors

Paul Anstiss, is with the University of Birmingham, England, UK. Paul completed a PhD in sport psychology at the University of Kent. He examined self-efficacy in endurance sports. Jamie B. Barker, is a senior lecturer in sport and exercise psychology at Loughborough University, England, UK, and a chartered sport and exercise psychologist with the British Psychological Society. He has an international research profile in applied (sport and performance) psych­ ology in intervention effectiveness, group dynamics and leadership, and stress. Alexander Bianco, is currently a doctoral student at the University of Ten­ nessee – Knoxville, USA, specialising in sport psychology and motor behaviour. He has a background in both general psychology and kinesi­ ology, having received both his BA and MS at Miami University. Alexander has delivered multiple research presentations at the national level and currently has two published peer reviewed articles. Alexander’s research interest includes how psychological techniques, such as self-talk, can be better incorporated into injury rehabilitation. Daniel Birrer, is head of the sport psychology department of the Swiss Federal Institute of Sport Magglingen (Switzerland). As a certified sport psychologist, he provides sport psychology services to numerous top-level athletes and coaches in various sports. Besides, Daniels research interests are in the complex relationship between mood and performance, overtraining, the verification of the efficiency of mental training techniques and the effects of mindfulness-based interventions in the sports domain. Noel E. Brick, is a lecturer in sport and exercise psychology at Ulster Univer­ sity, Coleraine, Northern Ireland, UK. He received his PhD from the University of Limerick, Ireland. His research interests focus on the effects of attentional focus, cognitive strategy use, and metacognitive processes on endurance performance and endurance exercise adherence. Noel’s research also focuses on endurance activity and cognitive functioning in adults.

xiv Contributors Thomas M. Brinthaupt, is with the Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, USA. Thomas’s primary area of research is the psychology of self and identity, in particular self-talk and individual differences in self-related processes. He also conducts research in personality psychology, measurement and assessment, sport and exercise psychology, and the scholarship of teaching and learning. In addition, he serves as Director of Faculty Development at the Learning, Teaching, and Innovative Technologies Center at MTSU, where he promotes and supports the professional development of faculty members. Mark J. Campbell, is a senior lecturer and course director for the MSc Sport, Exercise and Performance Psychology in the Department of Physical Education and Sport Sciences at the University of Limerick, Ireland. Mark is a Science Foundation Ireland Funded Investigator (SFI-FI) and his primary research interests focus on exploring the neu­ rocognitive characteristics of expertise in skilled performers. Nanaki Chadha, Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, England, UK is a trainee British Psychological Society (BPS) sport & performance psych­ ologist and a doctoral student. She is a PhD scholar in the application of REBT within golf, at Staffordshire University. She is a primary certified practitioner in Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT). Nikos Comoutos (formerly Zourbanos), is an associate professor in psychology of physical education and sport at the Department of Physical Education and Sport Sciences, University of Thessaly in Trikala, Greece. His research applies self-regulation strategies and motivation theories to understand and enhance performance. He has co-authored more than 50 articles in international peer-reviewed journals, and six chapters in inter­ national handbooks of sport and exercise psychology, and served as a referee in more than 20 journals of sport and exercise psychology. Lucía Figal-Gomez, is a PhD student at the University of Suffolk and the University of East Anglia (both UK). Her research interests focus on psy­ chological skills training and performer profiles. She previously received her BSc in Psychology at the University of Granada, and was awarded a scholarship at the University of Liège, followed by an MSc in Sport and Exercise Psychology at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Julian Fritsch, is currently employed as a research assistant at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Germany. He has completed the European Master’s in Sport and Exercise Psychology at the University of Thessaly and Leipzig University in 2015 and was previously employed at the University of Copenhagen (2016–2017) and Frankfurt University (2017– 2018). The main focus of his research is on the interplay of self-talk and emotions in relation to sport performance.

Contributors xv Evangelos Galanis, has been working as a post-doctoral fellow at the Laboratory of Exercise Psychology and Quality of Life (University of Thessaly – Greece). His research interest focuses mainly on maximising performance through the use of psychological techniques, but also in exercise programmes for improving general health and well-being. His contribution to the field of sport and exercise psychology is recognised through his participation in numerous internationally and nationally funded research programmes that respond on both theoretical and practical levels. James Hardy, is with Bangor University, Bangor, Wales, UK. James obtained his undergraduate degree from the University of Birmingham and completed his postgraduate training at the University of Western Ontario, Canada, before returning to his native North Wales. He has published numerous research articles focusing on mental skills and group dynamics, and is currently associate editor of the Journal for Applied Sport Psychology. In his spare time, James enjoys coaching men’s artistic gymnastics, road cycling and off-piste skiing (although clearly not at the same time). Patricia C. Jackman, is a lecturer in sport and exercise psychology at the University of Lincoln, UK. Her current research coheres around optimal experiences in sport, exercise, and physical activity. Specific areas of inter­ est include the psychological states underlying excellent performance in sport (i.e., flow and clutch), goal setting, attentional focus, affect, and self-regulation. Beyond this, Patricia also conducts research that examines mental health in doctoral students and policing. Darko Jekauc, is professor and head of the Department for Health Education and Sport Psychology at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology in Germany. From 2014 to 2017, he was assistant professor at the Humboldt University of Berlin and from 2017–2018 head of department for sport and exercise psychology at the Goethe University of Frankfurt. He completed his doctoral degree in 2009 at the University of Konstanz and his habilita­ tion in 2015 at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Aristea Karamitrou, is currently a PhD candidate in sport and exercise psychology in the Department of Physical Education and Sport Sciences at the University of Thessaly, Greece. She holds a first degree in psychology from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, and a master’s degree in sport & exercise psychology from the University of Thessaly in Greece. Her doctoral thesis, co-financed by the State Scholarships Founda­ tion (IKY)-Greece, focus on the antecedents and measurement of athletes’ organic self-talk. Charalampos Krommidas, is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Physical Education and Sport Science, University of Thessaly in Greece. His main areas of research interest are motivation, measurement of

xvi Contributors physical activity and health promotion in youths. He has been involved in the implementation of two European projects on the promotion of physical activity and youth sport (PAPA and IMPACT) and has authored relevant articles and book chapters. Rafel Magrinyà-Vinyes, is academic director at the EUSES-Schools of Health and Sports Sciences in Catalonia. He earned a BSc and MSc in Sport Sciences and specialised in football. He has coached at Club Gimnàstic de Tarragona and FC Barcelona. Currently, Rafel is a PhD candidate at the University of Girona. His doctoral thesis deals with selftalk interventions in football and academic education. Maša Marjanović, is a specialist in sport and exercise psychology. She graduated from the European Master in Sport and Exercise Psychology (EMSEP) programme, at the University of Thessaly in Greece and Univer­ sity of Leipzig in Germany. Her research has been focused on motivation theories and the use of self-talk in sport and physical education. Alister McCormick, is a chartered Sport and Exercise Psychologist and a senior lecturer at Plymouth Marjon University, United Kingdom. Alister’s PhD (University of Kent) examined performance-enhancing psychological interventions for endurance events and sports. He is passionate about making psychology research findings practical and useful for the public. Aidan P. Moran, is full professor of cognitive psychology in University Col­ lege Dublin (Ireland). His research investigates imagery, attention, and expertise in skilled performers. His most recent book is Pure Sport: Sport Psychology in Action (Kremer, Moran, & Kearney, 2019; Routledge). He is a former psychologist to the Irish Olympic squad and Irish rugby team. Alain Morin, is with the Mount Royal University, Calgary, Canada. Alain’s research has consistently focused on self and inner speech, for which he has developed explanatory models published in various journals and book chap­ ters. Other research interests include self-recognition and other self-related phenomena, inner experiences, and consciousness. Recently, Alain and his colleagues have been using an open format thought-listing approach to assess naturally occurring inner speech; the team is currently developing a more ecological inner speech questionnaire based on these results. Evangelos Mprisimis, is a teacher of physical education in primary education, specialising in football. He completed his master’s in “exercise and quality of life” at the Department of Physical Education and Sport Science, Dem­ ocritus University of Thrace. Futhermore, he is a PhD candidate at the Department of Physical Education and Sport Science, University of Thessaly and his research focuses on self-talk measurement in physical education. Athanasios Papaioannou, is dean at the University of Thessaly and director of the European Master in Sport and Exercise Psychology. He is the

Contributors xvii treasurer of FEPSAC, editor of the International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology and editor of an international handbook. He has received funding for projects in physical activity and physical education and has over 100 publications and six books. He directed the 10th World Congress on Sport Psychology and received the ISSP Honor Award. Philip Solomon-Turay, is a sport psychology consultant for Ipswich Town FC Academy. He underwent his master’s degree at St Mary’s University, with his research projects focusing on the unique relationship among decision-making, self-efficacy, and stressor appraisals. He is also in the process of starting his PhD at the University of Suffolk. Yannis Theodorakis, is professor of sport psychology in the Department of Physical Education and Sport Science at the University of Thessaly, Greece. He has published 25 books and chapters, and more than 180 articles in the areas of sport and exercise psychology, health psychology, health education, goals setting, and self-talk. He has been involved in projects related to physical activity promotion, health education, exercise and smoking, exercise programmes for patients with dementia using vir­ tual reality, reintegration, and equality through sport. Martin J. Turner, is reader in psychology and a Health Care Professions Council (HCPC) registered sport and exercise psychologist at Manchester Metropolitan University. His main expertise is the scientific understanding of stress and emotion, and the application of REBT within achievement settings. Martin is the 2018 Albert Ellis Award for Research recipient, and practises across a variety of sport and organisational settings. Robert Weinberg, is with the Miami University, Oxford, USA. Bob has served as president of the North American Society for the Psychology of Sport and Physical Activity and the Association for the Advancement of Applied Sport Psychology. He has also served as editor-in-chief of the Journal of Applied Sport Psychology He has over 150 scholarly refereed articles and is co-author of the popular text “Foundations of Sport and Exercise Psychology.” He has also been voted one of the top 10 sport psychologists in North America by his peers. Andrew G. Wood, is with Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent, England, UK. Andrew is a British Psychological Society (BPS) chartered and Health Care Professions Council (HCPC) registered sport and exercise psycholo­ gist. Andrew is a published researcher, specialising in understanding stress, emotion, and rationality in high performance contexts. Andrew is currently the lead sport psychologist with a national para-football squad.

1 Locating Self-talk in the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology Alexander T. Latinjak

Introduction This book is about self-talk in sports and is therefore part of the literature in sport psychology. Sport psychology is, content wise, one of the broadest subdisciplines in psychology and therefore one of the most complex fields to master. This is a judgement based on my personal experience gained in developing an undergraduate educational programme in sport psychology. A degree in sport psychology is implicitly linked to the educational offer in psychology, and one of the main questions I had to answer was which core psychology modules should be taken by sport psychology students. To the frustration of some of my less diligent students the answer was: basically all. The magnitude of the diversity of topics in sport psychology is easy to imagine, if one looks at the content lists of the comprehensive handbooks in this area. For instance, in 62 chapters, the Routledge Companion to Sport and Exercise Psychology (Papaioannou & Hackfort, 2014) represents the essence of our field. This comprehensive handbook includes such diverse chapters as “Attention and Neurocognition,” “Gender and Sexual Orientation,” “Organizational and Community Physical Activity Programs,” and “Self-talk.” One consequence of this breadth of topics in our discipline is the challenge of being at the cutting edge of scientific developments. Sadly, it is much more likely that sport psychologists specialise in certain areas within the field and neglect others. In order to avoid overspecialisation, one should keep an eye on the big sport-psychology picture when studying self-talk, which represents in our massive area a niche topic. This may be all the truer for self-talk as a concept with multiple meanings compared to other concepts with a single unambiguous meaning. To open this book, it seems therefore essential to locate the concept of self-talk in the universe of sport psychology before dealing with the definitions and research lines of self-talk (in Chapter 2). In terms of psychology subdisciplines, self-talk as a topic fits into cognitive psychology. Self-talk is closely and inextricably linked with spontaneous and rational thought processes (Latinjak, Zourbanos, LópezRos, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014), in line with cognitive self-regulation (Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 2016). Self-talk also presents similarities with

2

Alexander T. Latinjak

mind wandering (Chapter 15), when the content of self-verbalisations is unrelated to the task at hand (Latinjak, 2018a, 2018b). Self-talk, however, is also a relevant topic in developmental psychology. Vygotsky (2012), for example, has paid close attention to the role of self-talk, often referred to as private or inner speech, in the internalisation process of language for the formation of verbal thoughts in children. Furthermore, clinical psychologists have recurrently focused on their clients’ self-talk. For example, self-defeating self-talk often manifests itself in mood, anxiety, and eating disorders (Wright, Basco, & Thase, 2006). Finally, self-talk is also crucial for various psychotherapeutic approaches, such as Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy (CBT) and Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT, Chapter 8), as it has been identified as an important mechanism for behaviour change (Michie et al., 2016).

Self-talk: A Psychological Concept My goal in this opening chapter is to locate self-talk within the wide range of sport psychology topics. However, this undertaking is a challenge because of a particular feature of the term “self-talk” in sport psychology. “Self-talk” is a generic term, a psychological concept that is used to describe distinct psychological experiences that are scattered all over the knowledge map of sport psychology (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019). Psychological concepts, including self-talk, are essential to understanding the world around us and sharing our psychological experiences with others through a socially constructed network of meaning units. And the variety of qualitatively different psychological experiences we try to share is enormous. Countless interconnected events in our nervous system lead to an entangled network of various psychological phenomena: both of intrapersonal nature, such as thoughts or beliefs, as well as of interpersonal nature, such as cohesion or communication; some happen unintentionally, such as selective attention or emotions, others happen intentionally, such as planned behaviour or rational decision-making. In our quest to fathom our own being, we are constantly constrained by a massive restriction. Our ability to understand is overwhelmed by the immense complexity of human individual and collective construction. It is virtually impossible to comprehensively understand even a single incident that is as common as a child playing in the school yard. The vast number of interconnected variables that precede, explain, and follow the incident outstrips the ability for integration of the human brain. As humans, our strategy of countering the immense complexity of reality is to break it down into smaller, digestible units. In a few words: we simplify. We divide reality into concepts. Popular concepts in sport psychology include motivation, identity, visualisation, cohesion, emotion, or, as shown in this book, self-talk. Concepts represent comprehensible domains in this complex reality. Keep in mind, however: as important as the concepts we use may be, they are a by­ product of simplification. At a tangible level, most psychological concepts

Locating Self-talk in the Knowledge Map 3 cease to exist. As important as our thoughts, emotions, goals, and identity are to us, when we look into the human brain, they dissolve into countless interactions within our nervous system (Marupaka, Iyer, & Minai, 2012) that give rise to the intricate and incomprehensibly complex network of psychological experiences. Concepts such as self-talk are useful and necessary subdivisions in our knowledge, but often do not correspond with subdivisions in nature. As important as concepts for human thinking and communication are, when these artificial subdivisions are misunderstood for natural entities, we let them tyrannise over our future understanding of the world.

Self-talk and the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology Given the transversality of sport psychology, it is obvious that the area is dealing with innumerable psychological concepts. In attempting to locate selftalk in the sea of concepts, it became clear that a schema was needed to orient and generally guide us in our quest for expertise in the field. The scheme we use is called the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology (Latinjak, unpublished manuscript). I have dedicated considerable efforts to create such a map for both myself and my students. A systematic review of reviews in sport psychology published in sport psychology journals over the past decade has revealed what is still my greatest achievement on the road to simplification. A map that at its heart has the form of a triangle. In the three vertices of that triangle, psychological concepts are divided into three broad groups: psychological processes, psychological skills, and psychological interventions (Figure 1.1). Connected to the triangle, there is a fourth set of concepts that are central to sport psychology: environmental factors that contribute to the sport experience.

Environmental Factors Environmental factors, which may be transient situational or relatively stable contextual factors (Figure 1.1), play an important role in sport performance and well-being. These environmental factors are diverse, ranging from cultural variables, such as the media, religion, or sport policies, to task characteristics regarding training (e.g., the difficulty of an exercise) and competition (e.g., the score during a game). They include physical conditions such as heat or sports material as well as behaviour by others such as coaches, peers, and parents. Self-talk is usually not considered an environmental factor in sport psychology. However, some authors have recognised that self-talk audible to others may have self-representative effects and influence others (Van Raalte, 2010). For example, an evolving line of research deals with self-talk as an expression of emotions and the effects of such self-talk on opposing athletes (Fritsch & Latinjak, 2019). If an individual’s self-talk affects another athlete, the self-talk can be viewed as an environmental factor that influences the psychological processes of others.

• • • • • •

• • • • • • •

Figure 1.1 The Knowledge Map of Sport Psychology, with Examples of Psychological Concepts, Including Highlighted Self-talk Concepts.

•

• • • •

Locating Self-talk in the Knowledge Map 5

Psychological Processes and Spontaneous Self-talk Psychological processes can be conceived as intra- and interpersonal processes that are inescapable building blocks of the experience of life (Dohme, Backhouse, Piggott, & Morgan, 2017). Psychological processes describe the state of an individual or a group in a particular time frame that ranges from seconds (e.g., an emotional outburst) to decades (e.g., one’s own identity). Events such as physical sensations, team cohesion, or personality are part of our existence. These events are part of everyday sports practice, regardless of our attitudes towards sport psychology or our intentions to prevent them from happening. Psychological processes change and can be shaped, but they never disappear until the end of our days. Athletes may try to avoid certain emotions such as anger, but it is a futile effort to prevent all emotions from occurring. Self-talk can be a psychological process if it happens unintentionally and effortlessly and reflects other psychological processes such as emotions (I am the worst), beliefs (I can’t make it), or attributions (I’m the unluckiest person ever). This self-talk, which is associated with psychological processes, is called spontaneous self-talk (Figure 1.1). After scoring, we can say well done, or after making a mistake, we can express our frustration by insulting ourselves. These statements are part of sports practice and it makes little sense to make efforts to avoid them. Psychological processes interact with each other and are shaped by environmental factors (Dohme et al., 2017). A competition might elicit anxiety, whilst anxiety is associated with spontaneous self-talk (I can’t make it) (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2017; see also, Chapter 6). In addition, a task-oriented motivational climate can turn anxiety into excitement and subsequently change the content of spontaneous self-talk (I really want to try; Zourbanos et al., 2016). Conversely, psychological processes also shape environmental variables. For example, frustration and negative spontaneous self-talk (I hate this sport) can lead to less support from the trainer and peers. Regarding spontaneous self-talk, despite similarities with other psychological processes, it would be misleading to regard them as equal. To illustrate this, all other psychological processes can be experienced independently of spontaneous self-talk, whereas spontaneous self-talk never appears without other psychological processes. You can be angry without saying I’m so angry, but you would not say I’m so angry without feeling anything like anger. I would call spontaneous selftalk therefore rather an expression of psychological processes such as attitudes, emotions, or motivation, which break through into awareness. For example, a negative performance belief grows subconsciously until it is spontaneously verbalised (I’m playing too bad today) and becomes, thereby, accessible to consciousness. This self-consciousness is a key element in sports because athletes are not just passive observers of their own psychological processes. By putting into practice psychological skills, athletes actively attempt to alter the course of their psychological processes (e.g., by settling a dispute), or to modify how they are expressed (e.g., by acting as if nothing had happened).

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Psychological Skills and Goal-Directed Self-talk Psychological skills are used by athletes to regulate psychological processes (Vealey, 1988). In the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology, the concepts grouped into this cluster refer to the ability of individuals or groups to regulate themselves or other persons belonging to their own group. In contrast to psychological processes, psychological skills are used rather consciously and experienced as effortful and intentional. Psychological skills are in many ways similar to physical skills (Baumeister, Tice, & Vohs, 2018). They develop through maturation and can be trained for extraordinary challenges. If neglected, psychological skills may also subside, similar to physical resistance after a period of inactivity. Examples of interpersonal psychological skills include leadership skills to guide others to pursue shared goals, communication skills to mediate in conflicts, and persuasion skills to enhance self-efficacy of others. In terms of intrapersonal psychological skills, athletes may have imagery skills to visualise a chain of technical actions, concentration skills to remain focused despite distractions, and relaxation skills to stay calm in critical moments of the game. There is also some kind of self-talk that goes well with the cluster of psychological skills in the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology. The self-talk used for selfregulatory purposes is called goal-directed self-talk (Figure 1.1). Goal-directed self-talk is described as verbalisations that are used intentionally to solve a problem or make progress on a task (Latinjak et al., 2014). Interestingly, goal-directed self-talk often works differently from other psychological skills. Most psychological skills are attempts to exercise self-control over related psychological processes. For example, concentration skills aim to control attention. Goal-directed self-talk is not used to change spontaneous selftalk. Instead, goal-directed self-talk is used to control all psychological processes that may or may not be expressed through spontaneous self-talk. Goal-directed self-talk can be used, among other things, to regulate appraisals, control technical execution, take strategical decisions, regulate psychophysiological arousal, elicit functional emotions, increase effort, resist temptations of disengagement, strengthen confidence, and re-establishing goals (Latinjak, Masó, Calmeiro, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2019). Therefore, goal-directed self-talk should be understood more as a support mechanism for all types of psychological skills, as diverse as leadership skills, relaxation skills, or concentration skills. In applied practice, sports psychologists are dedicated to exploring the use of psychological skills, including the goal-directed self-talk, as psychological skills are the key to successful athletic performance (Birrer & Morgan, 2010). As a rule, at least two complementary questions are needed to adequately test the quality of the use of psychological skills. First, were the psychological skills strong enough to handle relevant psychological challenges? Second, what psychological skills have been used to deal with these psychological challenges? While the justification for the first question seems intuitive, the justification for the second question requires some elaboration. The way in

Locating Self-talk in the Knowledge Map 7 which some psychological skills, including goal-directed self-talk, are used can be detrimental in the long run, even though they are momentarily effective. For example, self-statements such as “Don’t worry; he has no idea what he’s talking about” can help lessen the perceived meaning of criticism from the coach, effectively dealing with frustration. Ignoring the coach’s comments, however, may be detrimental to learning in the long term and can severely affect the relationship between trainer and athlete. If it turns out that the athlete’s psychological skills are not strong enough to cope with psychological challenges, or if the psychological skills selected have potentially negative long­ term effects, the athlete can benefit from external help in the form of a psychological intervention. Of course, psychological interventions can also enhance strong skills that are used appropriately, to prepare the athlete for new, greater psychological challenges that are to be expected in the future.

Psychological Interventions Psychological interventions, in the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology, include groups of actions of third parties, who are not intricated in a psychological challenge, with the aim of preventing or regulating unpleasant and/or detrimental psychological processes. In addition, these actions can also promote pleasant and/or functional psychological processes and help individuals or groups achieve psychological growth and autonomy. Psychological interventions are of course performed by sport psychologists, but also by coaches and staff members, parents, or other athletes. Psychological interventions are described in this synthesis either as targeted interventions (see, Harackiewicz & Priniski, 2018) or as therapeutic frameworks (e.g., REBT) that encompass a wide range of strategic measures used to improve athletic experience and well-being. The most recurrently used targeted interventions include self-talk, goal-setting, relaxation, mindfulness, imagery, and bio-feedback training (Birrer & Morgan, 2010). Therapeutic frameworks usually include a wide range of actions, so that their final effect can only be explained by the conjunction of changes in environmental factors, psychological processes, and psychological skills. Along these lines, self-talk is considered within several of these major therapeutic frameworks. For example, changes in organic self-talk have been identified as a mechanism of change in CBT (Michie et al., 2016). Compared to therapeutic frameworks, targeted interventions consist of fewer actions and their effect can usually be explained by changes in mainly one of the three other clusters in the Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology (Figure 1.1). The first strand of targeted interventions aims to change environmental factors that precipitate a psychological challenge. Although no self-talk intervention is included in this group, some interventions, like autonomy support training for coaches, can affect spontaneous self-talk as an outcome variable (Marjanović, Comoutos, & Papaioannou, 2019; Oliver, Markland, Hardy, & Petherick, 2008; see also, Chapter 6).

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The second group of targeted interventions aims to change psychological processes. For instance, a goal-setting intervention aims to set specific, measurable, accepted, realistic, and time-based goals for sport practice and competition (Locke & Latham, 2002). Along these lines, the possibly most popular self-talk intervention where athletes strategically repeat cue words is mainly focused on changing psychological processes, such as attention and spontaneous thoughts, emotional processes, such as anxiety and confidence, and motivational processes, such as effort and persistence (Galanis, Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, & Theodorakis, 2016; see also, Chapter 9). These strategic self-talk interventions have also been used to facilitate learning of new sport skills (Ziegler, 1987). Although strategic self-talk interventions are often (to some extent erroneously) considered to be part of psychological skills training, they are not tested in applied research for their impact on psychological skills. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no study has yet addressed the long-term effects of strategic self-talk interventions, including changes in metacognition, self-control, or mental toughness. All studies instead focused on immediate cognitive, affective, motivational, and behavioural outcomes. However, strategic self-talk interventions could theoretically have long-term implications for self-regulation if athletes autonomously reflect on the self-talk cues and integrate them in their repertoire of goal-directed self-talk (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). It is the third group of targeted interventions that primarily aim to aid individuals or groups to prevent or master psychological challenges by strengthening their psychological skills. Stronger psychological skills, and better use of these skills, will, in turn, lead to a more effective self-regulation and, thus, more pleasant and/or constructive psychological processes (MacIntyre, Igou, Campbell, Moran, & Matthews, 2014). In terms of self-talk, reflexive self-talk interventions involve a process of reflection about goal-directed self-talk to enhance the athlete’s metacognitive knowledge and psychological skills. So far, research has shown that reflexive self-talk interventions help self-regulation by facilitating awareness of psychological challenges and by improving sensibility for more problem-relevant psychological skills (Latinjak, Font-Lladó, Zourbanos, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2016).

Final Remarks Adopting a pure self-talk perspective, we can summarise the previous sections as follows: most psychological processes can be expressed through spontaneous self-talk and thus become more accessible to awareness. When individuals become aware of psychological challenges, including unwanted unpleasant and/or detrimental states and longed-for pleasant and/or functional states, they can use goal-directed self-talk to support a variety of psychological skills and self-regulatory strategies. If the goal-directed self-talk supports the wrong strategies, or if the supported skills are too weak, or simply to prepare the individual for future major challenges, self-talk interventions can be used. Strategic self-talk interventions aim to change psychological processes directly

Locating Self-talk in the Knowledge Map 9 through the repetition of cue words, while reflexive self-talk interventions indirectly influence psychological processes by enhancing goal-directed self-talk through a process that creates metacognitive knowledge. Creating a Knowledge Map of Sport and Exercise Psychology has helped me and my students to steer strategically through the numerous concepts in our field; concepts that were created for the purpose of simplification, to make sense of the vast complexity of human experiences, which clearly subjugates our, comparatively, restricted intellectual capacity. However, when attempting to place self-talk on the map, I have also discerned that, in our attempt to simplify, we have blended different psychological experiences into the same concept. Although all facets of self-talk share a communality, that is, the act of talking to the self, they are rooted in fundamentally distinct psychological experiences. The steady growth of self-talk research has produced findings that rendered our simplification as growth-inhibiting – a conceptual deficiency we intend to resolve in this book by demonstrating all that the term self-talk encompasses.

References Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Vohs, K. D. (2018). The strength model of self-regulation: Conclusions from the second decade of willpower research. Perspec­ tives on Psychological Science, 13, 141–145. Birrer, D., & Morgan, G. (2010). Psychological skills training as a way to enhance an athlete’s performance in high-intensity sports. Scandinavian Journal of Medicine & Science in Sports, 20(2), 78–87. Dohme, L. C., Backhouse, S., Piggott, D., & Morgan, G. (2017). Categorising and defining popular psychological terms used within the youth athlete talent develop­ ment literature: A systematic review. International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 10(1), 134–163. Fritsch, J., & Latinjak, A. T. (2019). Emotionen, stress und coping im sportlichen wettbewerb. In A. Güllich & M. Krüger (Eds.), Sport in Kultur und Gesellschaft (pp. 1−14). Heidelberg: Springer. Galanis, E., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., & Theodorakis, Y. (2016). Why selftalk is effective? A review on the self-talk mechanisms in sport. In M. Raab, P. Wylleman, R. Seiler, A. M. Elbe, & A. Hatzigeorgiadis (Eds.), Sport and exercise psychology research: From theory to practice (pp. 181–200). London: Elsevier. Harackiewicz, J. M., & Priniski, S. J. (2018). Improving student outcomes in higher edu­ cation: The science of targeted intervention. Annual Review of Psychology, 69, 409–435. Latinjak, A. T. (2018a). Athletes’ self-reports on mind wandering while practicing sports:

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and mind wandering in a competitive context. The Sport Psychologist, 32, 51–59. Latinjak, A. T., Font-Lladó, R., Zourbanos, N., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2016). Goaldirected self-talk interventions: A single-case study with an elite athlete. The Sport Psychologist, 30, 189–194.

10 Alexander T. Latinjak Latinjak, A. T., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Comoutos, N., & Hardy, J. (2019). Speaking clearly … 10 years on: The case for an integrative perspective of self-talk in sport. Sport, Exercise and Performance Psychology, 8, 353–367. Latinjak, A. T., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Zourbanos, N. (2017). Goal-directed and spontaneous self-talk in anger- and anxiety-eliciting sport-situations. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 29, 150–166. Latinjak, A. T., Masó, M., Calmeiro, L., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2019). Athletes’ use of goal-directed self-talk: Situational determinants and functions. International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 1–16. DOI: 10.1080/1612197X.2019.1611899. Latinjak, A. T., Zourbanos, N., López-Ros, V., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2014). Goaldirected and undirected self-talk: Exploring a new perspective for the study of ath­ letes’ self-talk. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 15, 548–558. Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal set­ ting and task motivation. A 35-year odyssey. American Psychologist, 57(9), 705–717. MacIntyre, T. E., Igou, E. R., Campbell, M. J., Moran, A. P., & Matthews, J. (2014). Metacognition and action: A new pathway to understanding social and cognitive aspects of expertise in sport. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1155. Marjanović, M., Comoutos, N., & Papaioannou, A. (2019). The relationships between perceived motivational climate, achievement goals and self-talk in physical education: Testing the mediating role of achievement goals and self-talk. Motivation and Emotion, 43, 592–609. Marupaka, N., Iyer, L. R., & Minai, A. A. (2012). Connectivity and thought: The influence of semantic network structure in a neurodynamical model of thinking. Neural Networks, 32, 147–158. Michie, S., Carey, R. N., Johnston, M., Rothman, A. J., Bruin, M. D., Kelly, M. P., & Connell, L. E. (2016). From theory-inspired to theory-based interventions: A protocol for developing and testing a methodology for linking behaviour change techniques to theoretical mechanisms of action. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 52, 501–512. Oliver, E. J., Markland, D., Hardy, J., & Petherick, C. M. (2008). The effects of autonomy-supportive versus controlling environments on self-talk. Motivation and Emotion, 32(3), 200–212. Papaioannou, A. G., & Hackfort, D. (2014). Routledge companion to sport and exercise psychology: Global perspectives and fundamental concepts. New York, NY: Routledge. Van Raalte, J. (2010). Self-talk. In S. J. Hanrahan & M. B. Andersen (Eds.), Routledge handbook of applied sport psychology (pp. 510–517). New York, NY: Routledge. Van Raalte, J. L., Vincent, A., & Brewer, B. W. (2016). Self-talk: Review and sport-specific model. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 22, 139–148. Vealey, R. S. (1988). Future directions in psychological skills training. The Sport Psych­ ologist, 2(4), 318–336. Vygotsky, L. S. (2012). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wright, J. H., Basco, M. R., & Thase, M. E. (2006). Learning cognitive-behavior ther­ apy. An illustrated guide. London: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. Ziegler, S. (1987). Effects of stimulus cueing on the acquisition of groundstrokes by beginning tennis players. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 20(4), 405–411. Zourbanos, N., Haznadar, A., Papaioannou, A., Tzioumakis, Y., Krommidas, C., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2016). Τhe relationships between athletes’ perceptions of coach-created motivational climate, self-talk, and self-efficacy in youth football. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 28(1), 97–112.

2 Pieces of the Self-talk Jigsaw Puzzle An Introduction Alexander T. Latinjak, James Hardy, and Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis Introduction Young Marti shoots some hoops, narrating the events alone in the garden, as if he were both a player and a journalist. Clara recites in her mind the steps required to master the cartwheel, just as her physical education teacher had told her class. Gioele sits on the bench and considers how he can win his tennis game, which he is currently losing by a large margin. Aloma keeps repeating the cue words her sports psychologist had prepared with her to calm her nerves before the race. In maths class, Selma invents stories, in her mind, about what it would be like to win one day at the Olympics and to develop into a teenage sports star. Little Joe prays silently before he executes the decisive penalty. Helena’s brave part of her mind says how cool it would be to try the leap, while the conservative part of her mind argues about what would happen if she falls and gets hurt. Charlie tells his father about his goals, just to put them into words, while at no time does he really care about what his father thinks or wants to say. While to some extent, each of the above examples are variations of the self-talk of athletes, no two cases represent exactly the same phenomenon. Some seem more like self-talk than others. For most researchers and practitioners, talking alone and silently would likely represent self-talk, while talking to others, just to hear one’s own voice, would certainly trigger some debate. Repeating words that someone else has prepared for you also seems to be something other than thinking about solutions for yourself. Until relatively recently, most of these experiences, in spite of the differences, have been viewed as self-talk, thus illustrating the prevailing conceptual ambiguity regarding the term self-talk. Concepts in the scientific language are an indispensable tool of science and an irreducible element in the process of scientific explanation (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2016). Therefore, in many areas of science, including sports psychology, inconsistencies in definitions and concepts constrain advances in knowledge (Beedie et al., 2018). In the research on self-talk in sport, efforts have been made to create a theoretical framework that allows different types of self-talk to be placed into

12 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. categories that, over time, should help create a common language that enhances understanding and communication between researchers and practitioners (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019). This chapter presents the basic tenets of our perspective of self-talk, which are also the basis of this book’s structure. In addition, an overview of the placement of self-talk as a scientific concept within the field of sports psychology can be found in Chapter 1.

Defining Self-talk In sport psychology, the term self-talk has been conceptualised as verbalizations addressed to the self, overtly or covertly, characterised by interpretative elements associated to their content; and it also either (a) reflects dynamic interplays between organic, spontaneous and goaldirected cognitive processes or (b) conveys messages to activate responses through the use of predetermined cues developed strategically, to achieve performance-related outcomes. (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019, p. 11) In other areas of psychology, researchers use the terms private speech, inner speech, and inner dialogue. We prefer self-talk to inner dialogue, and not without reason. Although some research in sport has indeed focused on dialogue within the minds of athletes (Latinjak, 2018a), an established strand of sport research has looked at the impact of self-talk cues on athletic performance (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011; Tod, Hardy, & Oliver, 2011). Since cue words are by their nature a rather monologic form of self-talk (Alderson-Day et al., 2016), we consider self-talk a broader term than internal dialogue, as it also encapsulates self-talk cues used in the sport setting. We also prefer self-talk to private and inner speech. Private speech is understood as an audible conversation with the self that is closely related to the process of internalising the socio-cultural tool of language in children (Vygotsky, 2012; Winsler, Carlton, & Barry, 2000). Inner speech, on the other hand, is defined as the silent production of words in the head (e.g., Jack et al., 2019). In sports, self-talk is used by children and adults both silently and audibly. However, care should be taken not to overlook subtle differences in research approaches by using concepts from the various fields of psychology interchangeably. By preferring the term self-talk we implicitly assume that selftalk plays a different role in a sporting context than in developmental psychology. Private speech and inner speech refer to psychological processes that play a markedly different role in the development of complex thinking and reasoning. Therefore, in developmental psychology it is essential to treat private and inner speech as different terms. Instead, in sports psychology, we propose to distinguish between organic and strategic self-talk and between

Pieces of the Self-talk Jigsaw Puzzle 13 spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, as these terms represent crucial nuances in the conceptualisation of self-talk illustrated in various lines of research. A general psychological perspective concerning self-talk can be found in Chapter 3.

Defining Attributes of Self-talk Self-talk is a realist concept with two necessary attributes that, when combined, define its essence: (a) self-talk always consists of linguistic elements, including semantics and syntaxis and (b) the sender of the message is also the intended receiver. In terms of the nature of self-talk, it can be defined as “an act of syntactically recognisable communication” (Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 2016, p. 140). This feature distinguishes self-talk from many other cognitive phenomena such as inner seeing or unsymbolised thinking (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). However, since particularly inaudible self-talk is accompanied by processes of syntactic and semantic abbreviation (Fernyhough, 2009), the theoretical line that distinguishes self-talk from nonverbal thinking processes becomes blurred. It is also noteworthy that, in contrast to grammatical aspects (e.g., Hardy, Gammage, & Hall, 2001; Son, Jackson, Grove, & Feltz, 2011), the process of abbreviation and condensation (Vygotsky, 2012) has not yet attracted the systematic attention of researchers in the sport context (for a noticeable exception see, for example, Hardy, Gammage et al., 2001). The second fundamental issue pertaining to self-talk concerns to whom the self-talk is addressed. Logically, self-talk is always directed at the self (e.g., Hardy, 2006; Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, & Kazakas, 2000), but it should be noted that self-talk can influence others (Van Raalte, 2010). Our position is that self-talk in sports should be seen as the conversation that the athlete has with him or herself. For example, if the main purpose of the conversation was self-representation (i.e., impression management), we would not consider it self-talk. In a related matter, however, there is an interesting question about who the self speaks to (Puchalska-Wasyl, 2015), that is, what different roles the self can take in these conversations. In this context, a controversial question might be whether praying to a divine entity is a form of spiritual self-talk (Van Raalte, Morrey, Cornelius, & Brewer, 2015), or some other kind of inner dialogue that can be compared to self-talk (Belding, Howard, McGuire, Schwartz, & Wilson, 2010). We believe that the topic of internal interlocutors is relevant for future research.

Descriptive Attributes of Self-talk While the definition delineates self-talk as the basic unit of thought, a selftalk conceptualisation like the above is broader than the definition in that it includes decisions about what is important about the concept (Goertz, 2006). Descriptive aspects that have received significant scholarly attention

14 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. in the sport self-talk literature – and have been considered as key elements of self-talk – include the already mentioned dimension of openness (e.g., Hardy, 2006; Theodorakis et al., 2000; Van Raalte et al., 2016; Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Kolovelonis, Latinjak, & Theodorakis, 2016) and interpretive elements of verbalisations addressed to the self (e.g., Hardy, 2006; Van Raalte, Cornelius, Copeskey, & Brewer, 2014). The first descriptive attribute is concerned with the articulation of self-talk. We subscribe to the views of Hardy (2006), who referred to a bipolar overtness continuum with covert selftalk (which cannot be heard by any other person) anchored at one end, and overt self-talk (what is said aloud, in a way that allows another person to hear what has been said) located at the other. Another characteristic of the conceptualisation of self-talk is that the meaning of messages in self-talk involves a subjective element that is related to the content of the statements (Hardy, Hall, & Alexander, 2001). The results of some self-talk studies confirm that the interpretations of researchers and athletes differ in the categorisation process of self-statements (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2017; Van Raalte et al., 2014). However, it is important not to automatically assume that the interpretations of athletes are more important or more accurate than those of researchers. The participation of athletes in self-talk categorisation procedures is essential to capture the authentic and idiosyncratic self-talk experience. However, it is also reasonable to assume that the interpretation of athletes could be biased. Athletes are sometimes unaware of the functions of their self-talk, and their judgement may be distorted, for example, by the influence of recent performances (Brewer, Van Raalte, Linder, & Van Raalte, 1991). On the other hand, researcher-generated categories may have greater theoretical value, as researchers are best able to link self-talk functions with important theories in sports psychology, leading to integrative outcomes.

What Self-talk Is Not As we showed in the previous section, great efforts have been made to describe what self-talk is (e.g., Hardy, 2006; Van Raalte et al., 2016). By comparison, much less has been written about what is not self-talk, which would potentially outline its conceptual boundaries. First, the two most closely related concepts that are not easily distinguishable are thoughts and self-talk. As already mentioned, thoughts that have no linguistic structure are by definition not self-talk (Hardy, 2006). Moreover, thoughts that have a linguistic structure but are addressed to others are also not self-talk (Dickens, Van Raalte, & Hurlburt, 2018). As theoretically sound as this argument may be, there are some noteworthy problems in practice. First, as already explained, abbreviation and condensation processes (Fernyhough, 2009) deteriorate the linguistic structure of self-statements, which sometimes makes it difficult to distinguish self-talk from unsymbolic thinking.

Pieces of the Self-talk Jigsaw Puzzle 15 The second problem, which has received much less attention, is that it is not always easy to see when someone is talking to others or to the self in the presence of others. Furthermore, it would be misleading to assume that someone speaking alone is necessarily addressing the self (Morgan, 2019). In the first case, there is a risk that we confuse self-talk with social speech. In the second case, we can classify an experience as a self-talk, when it is really private or inner speech that is not directed at the self. For example, someone could repeat, sub-vocally, a telephone number to store it in long-term memory. This form of inner speech, which is not directed to any internal or external receivers, is part of the phonological loop. Although this phenomenon has been carefully analysed and plays an important role in working memory models (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), there are reasonable doubts that it can be included as self-talk. All in all, we must acknowledge that concepts such as self-talk and thought, although conveying different ideas, at least partially overlap and have blurred boundaries. However, there are also problems with conceptual delimitations that go beyond self-talk, including a variety of psychological processes that involve emotions, cognitions, perceptions, and behaviours (Marupaka, Iyer, & Minai, 2012). Since the beginning of psychology, researchers have assumed that words such as emotion or motivation refer to separate and distinct types of mental categories (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012; Uttal, 2001). According to Lindquist and Barrett (2012), each category was thought to have its own biological core responsible for its formation, such as a location in the brain or a pattern in the physiology of the body. However, neuroimaging research shows that the brain does not respect such categories (Barrett, 2009; Gonsalves & Cohen, 2010). Current understanding in neuroscience suggests that concepts such as thinking, emotion, or action are essentially the same phenomenon, an activity pattern across complex networks of neural elements (Marupaka et al., 2012). The importance of remembering that social science concepts, including selftalk, are manufactured, can best be expressed by a quote from Maudsley’s (1867, p. 323) philosophical work: There is in the human mind a sufficiently strong propensity not only to make divisions in knowledge where there are none in nature, and then to impose the divisions on nature, making the reality thus comfortable to the idea, but to go further, and to convert the generalisations made from observations into positive entities, permitting for the future these artificial creations to tyrannise over the understanding. Through the definition and conceptualisation of self-talk we create a comprehensible and understandable area in otherwise too complex everyday experiences.

16 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. For example, under the self-talk label, we can prepare a book like this and present knowledge in a coherent way. Instead of having to grasp the full complexity of human experience at once, one can study self-talk, understand the self-talk phenomenon, and try to become an expert in self-talk. Then one can move on to other research entities, such as emotions, motivation, or selfesteem, gradually conquering areas of human experience to one day comprehend the complexity of life. However, when we confuse a useful and advantageous demarcation applied to reality with actual, qualitatively different entities in reality, we distort our view of what really happens. Therefore, we would consider self-talk as another concept that contributes to the understanding of living human beings and is intrinsically inseparable from other psychological concepts such as emotions, thoughts, perceptions, and so on.

A Conceptual Framework for Studying Self-talk Over the years, various attempts have been made to create a conceptual framework for the study of self-talk. For example, Hardy’s (2006) theoretical work “Speaking clearly: A critical review of the self-talk literature” has inspired a large body of research that has greatly expanded our understanding of selftalk. In addition, several research groups have presented models of self-talk, in which the antecedents and consequences of self-talk are presented schematically in order to create valuable, verifiable hypotheses that guide future research (Hardy, Oliver, & Tod, 2009; Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2012; Van Raalte et al., 2016). A clear advantage of these models is the classification of the antecedents and consequences of self-talk, which has stimulated the emergence of research lines. In Chapter 6, for example, the results of a research area focusing on the social-ecological antecedents of organic self-talk are presented. Regardless of the importance of the self-talk models, in our view two developments in the self-talk research literature have highlighted the need for a new conceptualisation of self-talk: (a) the identification of two separate selftalk entities (organic self-talk and strategic self-talk) and (b) the distinctions between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, as these emerge within organic self-talk. Recently, we proposed our conceptualisation (Figure 2.1) to allow clearer communication between researchers, to facilitate a cleaner comparison between self-talk studies, and to support the consolidation of an increasingly diverse self-talk literature (Latinjak, Hardy, Comoutos, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2019).

Organic Self-talk versus Strategic Self-talk The most fundamental distinction we make concerning the phenomena of sport self-talk pertains to organic self-talk as opposed to the use of strategic self-talk. We describe organic self-talk as verbalisations, addressed to the self, that reflect various spontaneous and goal-directed psychological events

Figure 2.1 An Overview of the Conceptual Framework for the Study of Self-talk in Sports.

18 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). Importantly, organic self-talk is not part of a psychological intervention, although it may, of course, be indirectly influenced by interventions such as cognitive-behavioural therapy or mindfulness-acceptance approaches. On the other hand, strategic self-talk is described as the use of predetermined cue words and phrases that are verbalised to achieve performance-related outcomes (e.g., Galanis, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, Charachousi, & Sanchez, 2018). Ziegler (1987) even called these procedures self-cueing instead of self-talk in her classic study. While investigation of organic self-talk is related to and influenced by the exploration of inner dialogue and private and inner speech in general psychology (e.g., Alderson-Day, Mitrenga, Wilkinson, McCarthy-Jones, & Fernyhough, 2018), sports psychology is at the forefront of research into strategic self-talk (Hatzigeorgiadis & Galanis, 2017). Overall, organic self-talk is the result of inherent psychological and cognitive processes, whereas strategic self-talk is more based on behavioural rules, as predetermined plans have to be followed (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). On the one hand, an athlete can debate internally after a mistake where the mistake was and how it can be fixed in the future (e.g., “I hit the ball way too late; move quickly to get a better position next time”). On the other hand, an athlete can repeat cue words (e.g., “fast” [to prepare to receive the ball]) at set times (e.g., when the ball is moving in his/her direction) as determined before the game. While the content and use of cue words in strategic self-talk are always predetermined and frequently fixed, the use of organic self-talk results from momentary events. We would like to address three considerations in order to avoid confusion in the distinction between organic and strategic self-talk. First, with regard to strategic self-talk that is normally part of psychological interventions (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011), it is worth pointing out that its content may also be due to athletes’ self-reflections. Unlike organic selftalk, however, these reflections do not take place during but before sport practice. In this sense, it is a strategic but self-managed intervention, for example when athletes decide at home which cue words they use later during training (i.e., self-talk use is predetermined and prefixed). Second, strategic self-talk interventions, like so many other events in life, can eventually influence the organic self-talk of athletes when athletes decide, during sport practice, to use the strategic cue words with which they have previously trained (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). Importantly, in order to be organic self-talk, the athletes must choose on-site to use these earlier self-talk cues for self-regulatory purposes. The use of these statements may not be predetermined or prescribed. When the athlete remembers and subsequently internalises the statements that s/he has purposefully used during a strategic self-talk intervention, the strategic self-talk has morphed into an organic form of self-talk. This is because athletes’ metacognitive knowledge is built on a variety of life experiences, such as coach–athlete interactions, information from the

Pieces of the Self-talk Jigsaw Puzzle 19 media, or, less commonly, strategic self-talk interventions (Efklides, 2014). For a discussion of the relation between metacognition and self-talk, see Chapter 4. Third, although the content of an extract of organic self-talk may be identical to a cue word used as strategic self-talk, this does not mean that organic and strategic self-talk are one and the same. A statement like “calm down” can be organic if it is the result of a rational cognitive process purposely used to solve a problem, such as heightened anxiety. However, it may also be strategic, if the athlete follows a predetermined plan that consists of repeating this particular phrase at certain moments. In such instances, our position is that it is the content of the self-talk that is identical, not the self-talk phenomenon. The difference between organic and strategic self-talk lies in its origins and is therefore independent of the content of the self-statements. In terms of the origins of organic and strategic self-talk, no study has yet attempted to compare their neurobiological core, though we recognise a clear conceptual difference between them. However, very closely related to this topic, Alderson-Day et al. (2016) have compared neurological activation patterns between monologic inner speech (similar to the use of cue words and phrases as strategic self-talk) to dialogic inner speech (similar to the interplay between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk). Their results showed that different types of self-talk are indeed neurologically distinct phenomena. We believe that neurobiological research into the differences between organic self-talk and strategic repetition of cue words will generate an empirical understanding of the extent and manner in which both self-talk phenomena differ.

Spontaneous Self-talk versus Goal-Directed Self-talk Of particular importance to this chapter and book are theory-based classifications of organic self-talk based on dual-process theories (Furley, Schweizer, & Bertrams, 2015). The adaptation of these theories to self-talk research in sport has revealed differences between undirected self-talk, which takes place automatically, and controlled self-talk, which is deliberately and effortfully used for self-regulation (Latinjak, Zourbanos, López-Ros, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014; Van Raalte et al., 2016). In this book, we refer to the former as spontaneous self-talk, and to the latter as goal-directed self-talk (for a discussion about terminology, interested readers can refer to Latinjak, Hardy, et al., 2019). Regarding spontaneous self-talk, it is notable that it is not the only form of undirected self-talk. Unintentional mind wandering can also manifest itself in the form of undirected self-talk (Latinjak, 2018a, 2018b). Remember the example of Selma, who, in maths class, invents stories for herself about what it would be like to be a young sports star. As long as the stories contain linguistic elements, including semantics and syntax, the example of Selma’s self­

20 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. storytelling may be considered self-talk. Although research has begun to address the role of unintentional mind wandering in relation to sports, much of the research on undirected self-talk so far has focused on spontaneous self-talk. Spontaneous self-talk includes unintended, non-working, noninstrumental statements that come to mind unbidden and effortlessly, but are, nevertheless, linked to the task or activity at hand and relevant contextual stimuli (mind wandering on the other hand, is unrelated to immediate stimuli and behaviour). For example, an athlete who ruminates about the referee’s decision, using linguistic forms directed to the self, is engaged in spontaneous self-talk. In contrast to undirected self-talk, goal-directed selftalk consists of statements deliberately employed towards solving a problem or making progress on a task. According to Latinjak et al. (2014), there are several differences between the two types of organic self-talk in terms of nature and structure. In terms of nature, spontaneous self-talk can be viewed as a window into the mind of the athlete; it informs, among other things, upon the athletes’ performance beliefs (“I can score points”), goal orientations (“I do not want to lose”), irrational beliefs (“I have to win”), thoughts of quitting (“I want to quit”), and causal attributions of success (“I am the best”), and of failure (“He did not pass the ball”). Therefore, spontaneous self-talk cannot exist on its own; it is always accompanied by at least one psychological process that is expressed through spontaneous self-talk. Conversely, goaldirected self-talk is a rational process of thought that is deliberately used for self-regulation. Compared to spontaneous self-talk, goal-directed self-talk can be considered more as a separate psychological entity. A spontaneous statement like “I’m too tense” could be an expression of the somatic component of anxiety and would make no sense if the athlete does not perceive him/herself as tense. In comparison, an athlete could formulate a goal-directed statement, such as “Don’t get too tense, breath calmly,” to avoid getting tense before actually feeling any tension. Along these lines, goaldirected self-talk is distinct from other psychological processes, for example, when goal-directed self-talk is used proactively to anticipate potential psychological challenges and prevent them before they even occur. In terms of structure, spontaneous self-talk varies in terms of valence (from positive to negative; e.g., “I am the best/I am the worst”) and time perspective (from past-related to future-related; e.g., “I have won/I will win”), whereas goal-directed self-talk has most often been classified based on its functions or mechanisms (Latinjak, Masó, Calmeiro, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2019). With regard to the latter, there are two interrelated questions that research on goal-directed self-talk has targeted for some time: what athletes want to accomplish using goal-directed self-talk (i.e., its functions) and by what means goal-directed self-talk could help achieving those goals (i.e., its mechanisms). The main function of goal-directed self-talk in sports is usually to increase performance. However, goal-directed self-talk also has more specific functions related to this overarching objective. Goal-directed self-talk

Pieces of the Self-talk Jigsaw Puzzle 21 can help performers deal with adversity, psych up, increase drive, learn a specific technique, or monitor performance (Gammage, Hardy, & Hall, 2001). By way of comparison, research on goal-directed self-talk mechanisms, for example, has examined how goal-directed self-talk could fulfil one of these functions, namely, to regulate emotions such as anger and anxiety (Latinjak et al., 2017). Evidence shows that goal-directed self-talk can focus directly on the regulation of emotions by identifying dysfunctional emotions (e.g., “Don’t be so angry”) and promoting more functional emotions (e.g., “Calm down”). However, goal-directed self-talk can also change emotional states without focusing directly on emotions; for instance, by controlling cognitive reactions (e.g., “Mistakes are part of learning”), by focusing attention on task execution (e.g., “Focus only on what you need to do”), or by boosting confidence (e.g., “You can really win this game”). For a detailed discussion about self-talk mechanisms, see Chapter 10. Although there are marked differences between spontaneous self-talk and goal-directed self-talk, both are closely related and collectively essential to the process of self-regulation. Spontaneous self-talk is a default process that helps to raise awareness of current experiences and to identify psychological challenges (Van Raalte et al., 2016). Goal-directed self-talk, however, is specifically used to select and apply psychological skills as soon as a psychological challenge has been identified (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). Moreover, the link between spontaneous self-talk and goaldirected self-talk is far from one-way traffic (Latinjak, 2018a). Spontaneous self-talk can also signify a response to self-regulatory attempts, some of which may be supported by goal-directed self-talk, highlighting a potential need for change in self-regulatory strategies. Overall, the interplay of organic spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk explains large parts of the self-control process that involves triggering, selecting, implementing, and evaluating psychological skills. The dynamic relationship between spontaneous self-talk and goal-directed self-talk is clearly illustrated in Chapter 5, which focuses on the multivariate relationship between self-talk and emotion.

Self-talk Interventions Although researchers have increasingly focused their attention on organic self-talk over the last decade, most of the literature on self-talk is still based on studies of the impact of self-talk interventions on performance and performance-related variables (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011; Tod et al., 2011). However, in studies on the effects of self-talk, the intervention protocols have differed quite markedly (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). Most of the self-talk interventions involve athletes repeating cue words during the execution of sport tasks (Zourbanos et al., 2016). The self-talk in these interventions is, of course, a strategic self-talk, since its content is predetermined, and its use is obligatory. In these studies, researchers have compared different types of cue words (Hardy, 2006). The

22 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. most commonly used subtypes of cue words have been described as either instructional (“Bend your knees”) or motivational (“Try harder”). In addition to cue word content, other potentially important factors in strategic self-talk interventions are the degree to which cue words are determined by the athlete him/herself (Hardy, 2006) and the amount of training each athlete has with the cue words (Perkos, Theodorakis, & Chroni, 2002; Walter, Nikoleizig, & Alfermann, 2019). Furthermore, emerging studies indicate that grammatical characteristics can also influence the effect of selftalk cues (Hardy, Thomas, & Blanchfield, 2019). Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2011) and Tod et al. (2011) provide a review of the effects of self-talk interventions. For a general view on strategic self-talk interventions in this book, see Chapter 9. A common observation from the two main systematic reviews of the empirical literature on strategic self-talk interventions (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011; Tod et al., 2011) is the call for more ecologically valid research to be conducted with greater applicability to the typical end user – competitive skilled performers. Consequently, practitioners should not thoughtlessly adopt the methods of experimental studies in their field work with athletes, as most of these studies do not have strong ecological validity (for an exception see, Galanis et al., 2018). Instead, practitioners must tailor the cue words and their implementation to the specific needs and requirements of each athlete. For example, applied practitioners and coaches can follow the self-talk IMPACT guidelines (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Latinjak, & Theodorakis, 2014) for successful strategic self-talk interventions: (I) identify what you want to achieve, (M) match self-talk to needs, (P) practise different cues with consistency, (A) ascertain which cues work best for you, (C) create specific self-talk plans, and (T) train self-talk plans to perfection. To provide useful practical examples for the application of strategic self-talk interventions, this book contains reports on interventions in various sport contexts: see Chapter 11 for individual sports including tennis and golf, Chapter 12 for team sports, Chapter 13 for endurance sports, and Chapter 14 for physical education. However, not all self-talk interventions described in the literature require that participants use predetermined cue words. While strategic self-talk interventions focus on the effects of repetition of predetermined self-talk cues (e.g., Hardy, Begley, & Blanchfield, 2015), a recent approach to selftalk interventions targets the organic self-talk of athletes through the creation of metacognitive knowledge. In short, this new reflexive self-talk intervention protocol is best summarised as follows: (a) a description of recurring problematic situations in and around the sport, (b) reflections on situation-specific goal-directed self-talk and its effectiveness; and (c) the development of alternative self-statements that can be used in future situations (Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, Lorido-Méndez, & Hardy, 2019). For a detailed description of the reflexive self-talk intervention protocol, see Chapter 7.

Pieces of the Self-talk Jigsaw Puzzle 23 According to our recent review on self-talk interventions (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019), there are three main differences between traditional strategic self-talk interventions and the newly proposed reflexive selftalk intervention. First, the content of cue words in strategic self-talk interventions is always pre-set and only sometimes self-determined (Hardy, 2006), while the organic self-talk discussed in the reflexive interventions emerges from sport situations and is always self-determined. Second, the moment when the cue words are verbalised in strategic self-talk interventions is usually prefixed to before or during the execution of a task. In reflexive self-talk interventions, participants must decide on-site if and when to use self-instructions discussed in previous sessions. Third, while verbalising cue words is imperative in strategic self-talk interventions, the actual use of goal-directed self-talk discussed in sessions is optional in the context of reflexive self-talk interventions. The result of a reflexive self-talk intervention could therefore even be to use less goaldirected self-talk, for example, to prevent ironic processes of mental control (Wegner, 1994). A discussion of situations in which strategic and goal-directed self-talk can lead to such ironic effects can be found in Chapter 5. Research on reflexive self-talk interventions is still in its infancy, especially in comparison to the existing large body of research investigating cue-word interventions. Nonetheless, diverse therapeutic frameworks such as Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (Ellis, 1976) and Cognitive-Behaviour Modification (Meichenbaum, 1977) effectively applied to the sports setting (e.g., Neil, Hanton, & Mellalieu, 2013; Turner & Barker, 2014) serve as indirect support for the efficacy of reflexive self-talk interventions in sport. This is because the reflexive self-talk intervention shares several core characteristics with these psychotherapeutic frameworks. For instance, both cognitive-behaviour approaches and reflexive self-talk interventions aim to sensitise athletes to their organic self-talk/inner dialogue, to identify automatic, emotionally charged thoughts and, when dysfunctional, replace them with functional self-instructions (Beck, 1976; Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, et al., 2019). It is important to keep in mind that both reflexive and cue-word interventions can change organic selftalk. However, other therapeutic approaches such as Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), where self-talk is an important behaviour change mechanism (Michie et al., 2016), can also be used to modify organic self-talk. In these therapeutic approaches, changes in self-talk are usually a means of modifying the cognitive and behavioural responses of athletes. For an example of how to use REBT to change athletes’ organic self-talk, see Chapter 8.

Conclusions The goal of this chapter was to set the scene for the following chapters in this book. For this purpose, we have presented our framework for the study of self-talk. In this framework, we distinguish organic self-talk, which is a cognitive process, from strategic self-talk, which refers to the act of vocalising according to set plans. Organic self-talk represents the inner

24 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. dialogue of athletes, which includes spontaneous self-talk that reflects psychological processes, and goal-directed self-talk, which supports selfregulatory strategies used to prevent or solve psychological challenges. The repetition of predetermined cue words is characteristic of strategic self-talk interventions. As an alternative to strategic self-talk interventions, reflexive self-talk interventions do not require athletes to repeat cue words. Instead, athletes reflect upon their organic self-talk to generate metacognitive knowledge. When we look collectively at all these different perspectives of self-talk, we believe that self-talk is a valuable research topic in sports psychology. It is a centrepiece of self-regulation, integrating with awareness and self-control, and is a malleable phenomenon that has been considered in various intervention protocols. Importantly, while not a panacea, there is certainly empirical evidence supportive of the performance-related benefits of self-talk interventions. On a more personal note, the topic of self-talk has piqued our interest and captured our imagination for in excess of two decades, and this has helped us to develop as both researchers and humans. This is the first book on self-talk in sport and we hope the hard work of the contributors will both help more athletes to achieve their goals, and inspire the next generation of self-talk researchers.

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3 Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk Thomas M. Brinthaupt and Alain Morin

Introduction Organic (naturally occurring or automatic) self-talk represents the activity of talking to oneself in silence or out loud for multiple reasons, such as when one says to oneself “I’d better take my umbrella today, it might rain,” or “I feel tired.” Professional and recreational sports enthusiasts use self-talk to motivate themselves (e.g., “I can do it, almost there!”), to assess their performance (e.g., “Mmm, not as good as in the previous round …”), to formulate strategies (e.g., “Maybe try slower next time?”), to repeat to themselves what their coach frequently tells them (e.g., “Don’t forget to breath!”), and more. This chapter explores organic self-talk in sport – specifically, how to assess it in order to better understand how talking to oneself when practising sport activities influences learning, performance, motivation, and emotions.

Definitions and Theories of Self-talk Definition People engage in “inner speech” when talking to themselves in silence (Fernyhough, 2016). Various synonyms exist to designate inner speech, such as “phonological loop,” “self-statements,” “internal dialogue,” “inner speaking,” “verbal thought,” and “self-directed,” “subvocal,” “covert,” or “acommunicative speech” (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Kelsey, 2013). “Private speech” specifically denotes self-directed speech emitted out loud by children in social situations (Winsler, 2009). Adults also engage in private speech for self-regulatory purposes, spatial navigation and search, concentration, and emotional expression and control (Duncan & Cheyne, 1999). The term “self-talk” encompasses both inner and private speech. In this chapter, we use this term since it is most commonly used in the sport psychology literature (Hardy, 2006). One of the most precise definitions of self-talk has been put forward by Van Raalte, Vincent, and Brewer (2016, p. 141): “the syntactically

Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk 29 recognizable articulation of an internal position that can be expressed internally or out loud, where the sender of the message is also the intended receiver.” A more detailed overview of the definitional nuances of self-talk both within and outside of the sport context appear in Chapter 2. It is important not to confuse self-talk with other recognised inner experiences (Morin, Duhnych, Racy, Hagerty, & Patton, 2019). Any nonverbal mental experiences are not inner speech instances, such as physical sensations, pure emotions, mental images, and “pure” thinking without the support of symbols. Of course, self-talk can occur as a consequence of or antecedent to these other kinds of mental experiences, so it is important that researchers are careful to differentiate self-talk from them.

General Theories and Functions of Self-talk According to Vygotsky (1943/1962), the development of self-talk arises from one’s social environment, where social speech comes first, followed by private speech, and then inner speech/self-talk. Vygotsky emphasised the important role of self-talk for self-regulation, which includes planning and problemsolving. Decades of research in developmental, cognitive, educational, and personality psychology support this assertion (e.g., Baddeley, 1992; Deniz, 2009; Fernyhough, 2016; Winsler, 2009). Self-talk (both spontaneous and goal-directed) has been shown to facilitate problem-solving and goal progression in general (Kendall & Hollon, 1981) via the following stages: (1) defining what the problem is (e.g., “what am I supposed to do here?”), (2) determining the best approach to the problem (e.g., “I should try that move and see how they respond to it”), (3) emitting effective problem-solving self-talk (e.g., “Ok. Just concentrate on the ball and where it is …”), as well as (4) evaluative observations (e.g., “Good! That worked!”), and (5) directive notes (e.g., “Let’s keep focused on the other players”). Morin (2005, 2018) established theoretical and empirical links between self-talk and self-awareness – the act of processing information about the self (Morin, 2011). The basic idea is that a substantial part of describing, defining, and understanding our self is done through internal verbal conversations about any and all aspects of our self. One of several lines of evidence in support of this hypothesis is that patients who suffer self-talk deficits following brain damage also exhibit selfawareness deficits (Morin, 2009). In terms of underlying mechanisms, self-talk can reproduce already existing social means of learning about the self, and the use of a sophisticated vocabulary about one’s current internal experiences (via self-talk) increases self-knowledge. This is one important reason why sport researchers have been interested in studying how the self-talk of athletes is related to their performance and motivation.

30 Thomas M. Brinthaupt and Alain Morin

Self-talk in Sport In their meta-analysis, Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, and Theodorakis (2011) discussed the effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions on sport performance. Overall, the use of self-talk cues is more beneficial when it matches the type of task it is supposed to enhance (i.e., self-talk about fine or gross motor skills; motivational self-talk cues when endurance is involved vs. instructional selftalk cues when the task is more novel and requires precision), when the participant is unexperienced, and when self-talk is positive, self-assigned, and overt. Not surprisingly, any type of intervention is better than no training. The “sport-specific model” of self-talk (Hardy, 2006; Van Raalte et al., 2016) emphasises the circular, reciprocal, and interrelated relationships between various factors such as the antecedents of self-talk, self-talk itself, and the consequences of self-talk. This model emphasises the important roles of context and culture in understanding self-talk effects. Self-talk can be shaped by team mates, opponents, parents, and media depictions of athletes. To illustrate, acceptance of self-talk use as a performance strategy within a team produces greater use of self-talk, and coach behaviours influence the types of self-talk used by their athletes. In summary, it is clear that researchers have found self-talk to be an important and interesting topic of study in sport (as the other chapters in this volume attest). This makes a consideration of self-talk assessment methods crucial for conducting, understanding, and evaluating research in this area. As argued in other chapters in this book, researchers should aim to consistently identify what sort of self-talk intervention (e.g., strategic or reflexive) they are testing. In the next section, we discuss the features and characteristics of a wide variety of techniques that have been or can be used to study self-talk in sport contexts.

Assessment Methods General Features of “Good” Measures Within the scale-development literature, there are several psychometric properties that serve as recommendations or requirements for “good” measures (Anshel & Brinthaupt, 2014; Saw, Kellmann, Main, & Gastin, 2017). Among these properties are that the measure possesses reliability (or consistency) and validity (or accuracy). There are several variants or subtypes within each of these general categories. For example, measures should demonstrate internal consistency (i.e., that inter-item correlations are high), test-retest reliability (i.e., that total and subscale scores are consistent across repeated measurement intervals), and alternate-forms reliability (i.e., that scores on different versions of a measure are strongly correlated with each other). Some of the important kinds of validity include face (i.e., that the measure appears on the surface to tap into the domain of interest), construct (i.e., evidence that the inventory measures the desired attribute[s]), discriminant (i.e.,

Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk 31 that the scale is differentiated from other, unrelated measures), and predictive (i.e., the extent to which a measure is effective at predicting future behaviour). Ecological validity, meaning the accuracy of a measure in reflecting behaviour in real-world settings, is particularly important for sport psychologists. It is also important that researchers follow a process of careful and systematic item selection and refinement and that they tie measures to relevant theoretical models. Establishing these properties typically requires extensive time and effort, which is why researchers and practitioners should first try to use existing and validated measures before developing their own for a specific study or project. Failing to provide evidence of reliability and validity of one’s measures limits the interpretability of any self-talk study. Because of the potentially elusive or difficult-to-measure nature of self-talk, demonstrating the psychometric properties of one’s measures is crucial for research progress within the sport domain.

Self-Report Measures As in other areas of assessment across many disciplines, self-report questionnaires are the most common form of measuring self-talk. There are several reasons for this preference (for reviews, see McDonald, 2008; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Self-reports are typically easy to obtain and complete, and they tend to be less expensive to use compared to other approaches. Self-report measures permit a level of standardisation and interpretability that is attractive for researchers, assessors, and practitioners. There are also some constructs where self-reports are the best or even only method of assessment (such as when studying people’s perceptions or interpretations of events or experiences). Finally, respondents typically have more access to information about themselves than anyone else, especially for behaviours, such as self-talk, which may be performed in private. Despite their popularity, there are several disadvantages to using selfreport measures (Brinthaupt & Erwin, 1992; De Guerrero, 2005; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Uttl, Morin, and Hamper (2011) provide a review of the psychometric properties of general (non-sport) self-talk measures. With respect to self-talk, respondents’ self-reports may be susceptible to primacy or recency effects or reflect self-presentational concerns. Respondents may show response sets (e.g., perseverating in an acquiescent or extreme pattern), lack access to their internal processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), forget or recreate their experiences based on heuristics (e.g., Matt, Garcia, Primicias, Frericks, & De Fabia, 1999), and provide socially desirable responses rather than reporting what they actually think or feel (e.g., Van de Mortel, 2008). These kinds of problems are likely to be exacerbated when researchers study athletes’ self-talk retrospectively. One lesson from this list of self-report challenges or disadvantages is that sport psychology researchers and practitioners should be sensitive to topics or behaviours that might be susceptible to response biases and adjust their

32 Thomas M. Brinthaupt and Alain Morin research designs accordingly. As several reviewers have noted (e.g., Anshel & Brinthaupt, 2014; Hardy, Hall, & Hardy, 2005; Saw et al., 2017), there are many reasons why care must be taken in the selection and use of selfreport inventories in the sport domain. When assessing self-talk, researchers should be careful about and attentive to how they describe the construct and associated phenomena. For example, we would expect differences in response patterns depending on whether the researchers do or do not tell their participants that self-talk is “a common experience for most athletes.” In addition, assessors might need to be sensitive to cultural differences or even sport-specific stereotypes in respondent understanding or perceived acceptability of the phenomenon of self-talk (Van Raalte & Vincent, 2017). Table 3.1 provides an overview of the characteristics of several popular and frequently used self-report scales in sport psychology as well as some in general psychology. As the table shows, self-talk self-report measures identify a wide range of sport-relevant dimensions, enabling researchers to utilise those measures that best address their research questions. Many of the content dimensions have been derived from thought listing or sampling techniques based on a variety of sports (see below), so they are likely to have some ecological validity. If one looks for trends in Table 3.1, there seems to be a tendency over time from an emphasis on self-talk content to self-talk functions served. Note also that some of the non-sport psychology self-talk scales could be used with athletes. For instance, Brinthaupt, Hein, and Kramer’s (2009) Selftalk Scale, which contains self-criticism, self-reinforcement, self-management, and social-assessment subscales, could measure self-talk use for self-regulatory purposes during training and competition events. Also, Siegrist’s (1995) Inner Speech Scale, which measures self-talk use for introspection and self-awareness, could be employed to examine whether self-reflective self-talk in general affects performance or motivation in sport. Although self-reported self-talk measures are most popular within sport psychology, there are several other approaches to measuring self-talk in the sport domain. In the following sections, we summarise these approaches and illustrate how they might be useful for measuring athletes’ self-talk.

Thought Listing The thought listing technique invites participants to list their thoughts, feelings, ideas, expectations, appraisals, and imagery either before, during, or after a task has been completed or in specific situations (e.g., anxiety experienced during social interactions; Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). The thought listing method captures all sorts of mental experiences and cognitions; indeed, typical instructions invite participants to list everything that goes through their mind in a specific situation (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). Woelke and Pelzer (2017) report use of the thought listing method in communication research when participants are reading a newspaper article or comments on Twitter or Facebook, listening to a song, or watching a video.

Hardy et al. (2005)

Zervas, Stavrou, 11 items; extent to which and Psychountaki respondents experience each (2007) statement during an important competition

Self-talk Use Questionnaire

Self-talk Questionnaire for Sports

39 items; provided definition of self-talk: “what you say to yourself in relation to your sport” (p. 916)

24 items; the frequency of interfering thoughts experienced during competitions

Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (2000)

Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport

64 items; includes a glossary of terms used in the measure (e.g., skill, competition, workout)

Length & Instructions

Thomas, Murphy, and Hardy (1999)

Authors

Test of Performance Strategies

Sport-Related

Measure

Factors

Self-talk, emotional control, automaticity, goal setting, imagery, activation, negative thinking, attentional control Measures self-related Thoughts of escape, thoughts about cogni- situation-irrelevant tive interference during thoughts, and sport or athletic performance worries competition Measures contentDomains of what, related dimensions of when, and why of athlete self-talk across self-talk different settings and times Measures motivational Motivational, cognitive and cognitive self-talk functions

Measures psychological processes and skills used in different athletic performance contexts

Purpose

Table 3.1 A Sampling of Sport-Related and General Self-talk Self-Report Measures and Their Characteristics.

(Continued )

Item stem: “I talk to myself …”; frequency (1 = never, 5 = always)

Frequency (1 = never, 9 = all the time)

Frequency (1 = almost never, 7 = very often)

Frequency (1 = never; 2 = rarely; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often; 5 = always)

Response format

General Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire Revised Inner Speech Scale Measures automatic thoughts that pop into people’s heads Measures specific, primarily dysfunctional situations in which people talk to themselves

40 items; how often respondents have had these thoughts over the past week

18 items; “conversations or monologues which we do not engage in with another person but rather have with our own selves” (p. 261)

Kendall, Howard, and Hays (1989)

Siegrist (1995)

Frequency (1 = not at all, 5 = all the time)

Item stem: “when I talk to myself during training or competition, I …”; amount or frequency (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) Frequency (0 = never, 4 = very often)

Response format

Total inner speech score Frequency (6-point scale)

Positive and negative self-talk thoughts

Positive: confidence, anxiety control, psych-up, and instruction; Negative: worry, disengagement, and somatic fatigue; Neutral: irrelevant thoughts

Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni, and Papaioannou (2009)

Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sports

40 items; frequency of Measures content and self-talk thoughts that athletes structure of athlete selfusually experience or talk intentionally use while performing

Effort, automaticity, Measures self-talk functions served during cognitive/emotional training or competition control, attention, and confidence

25 items; “a common phenomenon that athletes talk to themselves” (p. 16)

Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis, and Chroni (2008)

Functions of Self-talk Questionnaire

Factors

Purpose

Length & Instructions

Authors

Measure

Table 3.1 (Cont.)

Calvete et al. (2005)

Brinthaupt et al. (2009)

Alderson-Day, Mitrenga, Wilkinson, McCarthyJones, and Fernyhough (2018) Racy, Morin, and Duhnych (2019)

Heavey et al. (2019)

Self-talk Inventory

Self-talk Scale

Varieties of Inner Speech QuestionnaireRevised

Nevada Inner Experience Questionnaire

GISQ

Duncan and Cheyne (1999)

SelfVerbalisation Questionnaire

10 items; characteristics of one’s own inner experience

57 items; contextual prompts about content, functions, and activities

Measures inner speech in a broad sense based on what people report talking to themselves about in everyday life Measures five frequently occurring inner-experience phenomena

Inner speaking, inner seeing, unsymbolised thinking, feelings, and sensory awareness

Dialogic, condensed, other people, evaluative/critical, and positive/self-regulatory inner speech self-reflection, selfobservation, cognition, and activities

Measures the phenom35 items; different types of inner speech with applications enological form and quality of inner speech for clinical work

Cognitive, mnemonic, attentional, and spatialsearch functions Negative (depressive, anxious, angry) and positive (minimisation, positive orientation, coping) self-talk Self-criticism, selfreinforcement, selfmanagement, social assessment

Measures overt selfverbalisations across a variety of situations

Measures positive and negative self-related thoughts people might have across a variety of situations 16 items; frequency of talking Measures selfregulatory functions to oneself across different served by self-talk contexts and situations

52 items; distributed across 10 emotionally laden imaginary situations

27 items; situations when people talk to themselves aloud

Visual-analog scales with frequency (11-point, never– always scale) and portion of inner experience (11-point, none–all scale) ratings for each phenomenon

Frequency (0 = never to 5 = all the time)

Item stem: “I talk to myself when …”; frequency (1 = never; 2 = seldom; 3 = sometimes; 4 = often; 5 = very often) Frequency (1 = never, 7 = all the time)

Probability (1 = not very probable, 2 = somewhat probable, 3 = quite probable, 4 = very probable)

Frequency (7-point scale)

36 Thomas M. Brinthaupt and Alain Morin Thought listing represents an open-response method for acquiring and categorising mental contents. The technique is particularly useful when the researcher has no predetermined ideas about the cognitive dimensions that are relevant or has only a few hypothetical intuitions. This method can help explore recently occurring (proximate) or less recent (distant) cognitions and emotions. Comparison groups as well as eliciting situations are fundamental in interpreting data obtained using this procedure. In sport psychology, Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni, and Papaioannou (2009) followed this approach when they developed their Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sports (ASTQS). They first asked athletes to list their performance-related inner speech and thoughts immediately following a competition. They then used content analysis to categorise these thoughts into specific kinds or functions of sport self-talk. Those categories constituted the major facets of the ASTQS. Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, and Zourbanos (2017) had participants recall past sport-related situations that had elicited anger and anxiety and then list their thoughts and self-talk that occurred during those situations. Researchers have also utilised samples of common motivational and instructional self-talk statements for specific sports (e.g., Miller & Donohue, 2003; Miller Taylor, Brinthaupt, & Pennington, 2018). A major advantage of the thought listing approach is that it is less restrictive and more ecologically valid than questionnaires, because participants selfgenerate the items as opposed to endorsing pre-determined self-verbalisations selected by researchers. The self-talk content listed better reflects naturally occurring inner speech in everyday life. One disadvantage is that the coding and analysing of verbal data are laborious and time-consuming. There is also debate about whether athletes or researchers are better sources for coding and interpretation of self-talk (see Latinjak, Torregrossa, Comoutos, HernandoGimeno, & Ramis, 2019; Van Raalte, Cornelius, Copeskey, & Brewer, 2014). Athletes may have better access to the interpretive aspects of their self-talk, whereas researchers are likely to be better positioned to link theoretical knowledge to self-talk examples. In the sport context, athletes might not recall condensed or automatic self-statements they made in the throes of competition, or be resistant to reporting self-talk instances that might be embarrassing or socially undesirable. See Morin, Duhnych, and Racy (2018) for a summary of other limitations of the thought listing technique.

Thought Sampling PRIVATE SPEECH RECORDINGS

Vygotsky (1943/1962) proposed that studying the spontaneous production of private speech in children was the most reliable way to access inner speech and, by extension, self-talk. Private speech has been widely studied in natural settings (e.g., in the classroom) and in more controlled environments (e.g., with others vs. alone). Typical categories are task-irrelevant private

Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk 37 speech (e.g., word play, emotional release, conversations with imaginary others), task-relevant private speech (e.g., vocalisations about the task or the child’s current or future task-related actions), and partly internalised private speech consisting of faint muttering, whispers, and silent lip movements. The frequency and content of private speech are then correlated with behaviour or performance. Adults too engage in private speech, typically when alone (Duncan & Cheyne, 1999). To our knowledge, athletes’ private speech recordings have been under-utilised in sport psychology. But it is conceivable that such recordings could be obtained by means of a mobile and concealed device worn during training or competitive events. In one study (Van Raalte et al., 2014), volunteers’ spontaneous self-talk was audio recorded during a dart-throwing task. Private speech was coded (by both participants and researchers) as motivational, instructional, positive, negative, and irrelevant. An advantage of using athletes’ private speech recordings is that the recordings can be used to assess real-time self-talk as well as retrospective analyses by participants (e.g., by probing what they were thinking before, during, and after a specific utterance). A disadvantage of this approach is that it does not allow direct access to inner speech (silent self-talk) during training or competition. Because athletes are talking to a recorder in these instances, it is also debatable whether this behaviour is actually self-talk. THINK ALOUD METHOD

Whereas the thought listing procedure is retrospective in nature, the think aloud technique is concurrent because it involves the recordings of adults’ thoughts produced as they are working on a given task or engaged in a given situation. In a typical think aloud study, participants verbalise cognitions while performing a task (e.g., solving complex problems, trying to perceive correctly an ambiguous image), and responses are recorded for subsequent coding comparable to the coding done using the thought listing data (e.g., positive, negative, neutral, self- or other-focused, anxious, angry, calm, etc.). To reduce the likelihood of having participants produce a biased or unnatural sample, instructions explicitly specify not to edit thoughts or to worry about being understood. The think aloud approach has been used frequently to study self-talk in sport psychology (e.g., Calmeiro, Tenenbaum, & Eccles, 2010). To illustrate, Samson, Simpson, Kamphoff, and Langlier (2015) examined real-time thought processes of ten runners recorded during a long-distance run. Qualitative analysis of the data revealed three major themes that characterised participants’ thought processes: (1) pace and distance, (2) pain and discomfort, and (3) environment. Swettenham, Eubank, Won, and Whitehead (2018) studied 16 competitive tennis players who were assessed for anxiety levels prior to practice and competition, and asked to verbalise their thoughts in both conditions. Results showed that anxiety significantly increased from practice to

38 Thomas M. Brinthaupt and Alain Morin competition. Performance-focused coping (e.g., planning, technical) and stressors (e.g., outcome, tactics) were verbalised most frequently in both conditions. Another representative research example looked at the relationship between cognitions, pacing strategies, and performance in ten trained cyclists performing a real-life 16.1 km cycling time trial (Whitehead et al., 2018). As was the case with the thought listing approach, the think aloud method taps into a variety of mental experiences such as emotions and imagery, not uniquely self-talk. Consequently, researchers who want to exclusively focus on self-talk need to alter instructions accordingly. One main advantage of the think aloud method is its concurrent quality, circumventing the problems of memory biases addressed earlier for the thought listing technique. In addition (like the thought listing technique), the response format is unstructured, yielding more unconstrained and potentially natural cognitive elements. There is increased situational control and specificity because the researcher precisely selects the situation or scenario in which participants verbalise their thoughts. One issue with the think aloud approach is that internal thoughts probably occur much more rapidly than speech. As a consequence, when a series of thoughts proceeds rapidly, it becomes difficult – if not impossible – for participants to verbalise each and every thought in the series, leading to unreported or under-reported information (Fonteyn, Kuipers, & Grobe, 1993). To address the concern that thinking aloud may not come naturally or easily to participants, researchers sometimes use training protocols to facilitate the process and improve its accuracy (e.g., Arsal, Eccles, & Ericsson, 2016). Another, perhaps more important, limitation is that it lacks anonymity, potentially leading participants to censor or omit thoughts for self-presentation or social desirability reasons. VIDEOTAPE RECONSTRUCTION METHOD AND INTERVIEWS

The videotape reconstruction method consists of presenting participants with video recordings of their behaviour in precise situations (e.g., during task performance) and encouraging them to recall (reconstruct) self-talk instances and other mental experiences. Typically, this involves an interview immediately following the execution of a given task, where volunteers are probed for self-talk use during task completion (e.g., Chiauzzi & Heimberg, 1983; Ickes, Robertson, Tooke, & Teng, 1986). Although instances of video reconstruction with athletes’ self-talk are rare (e.g., Miles & Neil, 2013), this approach has been used successfully with children and in clinical interventions to reduce fear and anxiety (e.g., Eifert & Lauterbach, 1987; Lodge, Tripp, & Harte, 2000). This approach might be useful when studying private speech during competition, given the overtness and observability of out-loud self-talk. However, assessing inner speech by watching a video of oneself is more problematic. For instance, athletes might have difficulty identifying what they were thinking at that moment and concoct or speculate about their actual self-talk.

Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk 39 The interview approach component is a conversation with a purpose and is non-experimental in nature (Keegan, 2002). In a one-to-one conversation, the interviewer collects detailed personal information from individuals using oral questions. Interviews can provide researchers with both quantitative and qualitative information about participants’ thoughts, feelings, and behaviours. Two categories of interview are the structured interview and unstructured interview. The structured interview is pre­ planned, can be conducted face-to-face, by telephone, videophone or via the internet, and allows for replication because it is standardised, which increases reliability. Variations are the semi-structured interview, which allows for unplanned spontaneous questions, and the clinical interview. The unstructured interview is made up of spontaneous questions which may be specifically tailored to the participant at the cost of generalisation. One example of interview use to assess self-talk in sport is offered by Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, Lorido-Méndez, and Hardy (2019). The team followed the experiences of three skilled athletes who took a reflexive self-talk online intervention. The study consisted of an initial interview, a four-week intervention, and two post-intervention interviews. The online treatment encouraged participants to describe difficult scenarios, think about their use of self-talk and its effectiveness, and explore substitute self-statements to be used in future situations. Interviews involved questions pertaining to participants’ personal descriptive questions (e.g., age, hours of practice, best results in competitions), emotions, confidence, motivation, thoughts in sport, selfregulation skills, and self-talk frequency, content, and effects on sport participation. The intervention was effective with variables such as emotions, motivation, and confidence inside and outside of participants’ sports life domain. EXPERIENCE SAMPLING METHOD

The experience sampling method (also called “Descriptive Experience Sampling” or DES; e.g., Hurlburt, 2011) consists of collecting a representative sample of people’s inner experiences (including self-talk) in natural settings. Volunteers wear a beeping apparatus (or cellphone) that produces audio signals at random intervals throughout the day and report the content of their inner experiences upon hearing the beep. Because people cannot always discern between inner experiences such as inner speech and mental imagery, DES requires intensive training and interviewing in order to increase participants’ ability to accurately report what they were experiencing at the exact moment of the beep (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011). DES thus entails a time-consuming process but presents one major advantage over all others discussed here: the likelihood of mnemonic bias is greatly reduced because reports are not retrospective. DES has established that there exist five main inner experiences: inner speaking, inner hearing, sensations, emotions, and unsymbolised thinking (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Experience sampling has been used to investigate

40 Thomas M. Brinthaupt and Alain Morin inner experiences while brain activity is being measured (Kühn, Fernyhough, Alderson-Day, & Hurlburt, 2014) and to validate self-talk scales (Brinthaupt, Benson, Kang, & Moore, 2015). DES is starting to be used in sport psychology. For example, Dickens, Van Raalte, and Hurlburt (2017) sampled inner experiences of golfers during a tournament and observed that more selftalk occurred during play compared to other natural environments, and that inner speech was more frequent than private speech. Such a study confirms that DES can successfully be implemented in sport settings and can represent a useful method for researchers exploring athletes’ inner experiences (also see Van Raalte, Vincent, & Dickens, 2019). One potential limitation of the approach is that, if DES occurs at random intervals, it may miss critical moments in sport performance or competition. OTHER SELF-TALK MEASUREMENT APPROACHES

In addition to the many approaches and measures reviewed here, there are other self-talk assessment methods that, to our knowledge, have not yet been systematically utilised in sport psychology (for a review of the advantages and disadvantages of other non-self-report assessment approaches, see McDonald, 2008). We discuss some of these in this section. OBSERVER REPORTS

Van Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, and Petitpas (1994) developed a 14-category measure of observable self-talk, the Self-talk and Gestures Rating Scale. They studied the external self-directed utterances (e.g., instructional, positive, and negative) and gestures (e.g., fist pump, ball abuse) associated with each point during competitive tennis matches. This scale measures observable self-talk (private speech) and gestures in naturalistic sport settings. One advantage of this kind of measure is that it bypasses the problems and limitations associated with self-reports. A disadvantage is that it only focuses on private speech rather than inner speech during athletic competitions. It is unclear whether gestures made during competition align with inner speech and we were unable to find any research assessing this possibility. It is also possible that some overt “self-talk” in sport contexts may be made for self-presentational or impression management goals, such as appealing to or affecting fellow athletes or coaches. It therefore may not be technically accurate to consider such instances as “self”-talk. Another external observer approach to measuring self-talk is electromyographic recordings of movements of the lips and tongue. Sokolov (1972) extensively used this approach to measure self-talk incidence during problem-solving tasks. Electromyography makes it possible to observe and record physiological properties of muscles. This is accomplished with an electromyograph that measures the electrical potential created by muscle cells when these cells contract and are at rest. Movements of the lips and tongue

Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk 41 detected during overt speech are also produced (with much less intensity) during covert speech. Using this approach, researchers can infer self-talk activity (but not content) during completion of diverse cognitive tasks such as mental calculation, silent reading, listening to speech, recall of verbal material, and manipulation of graphic–visual information, or induced rumination (e.g., Nalborczyk et al., 2017). Given the rather intrusive quality of this method, it is unlikely to be employed during physical activity, especially vigorous actions. Perhaps some sort of portable device attached to the aforementioned anatomical parts could circumvent this problem, but this does not exist to our knowledge. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the fact that electromyographic recordings do not provide information on what athletes might be saying to themselves during task completion is very limiting. Finally, informant (e.g., significant others or team mates) reports are possible when studying self-talk. This approach is occasionally used outside of the sport context (e.g., Brinthaupt et al., 2015). It is more likely to be useful for private speech rather than inner speech instances. An advantage of this approach is that informants can report the frequency and content of overt selftalk. A disadvantage is that informants might have to infer the meaning or motivation associated with specific utterances (e.g., whether it was directed to the speaker or a team mate or coach). We are unaware of any research that has tried to use this source of data in sport contexts. BRAIN SCANS

Well-established techniques such as the electroencephalogram (EEG) and recent developments in brain-imaging techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) allow neuroscientists to record or alter brain activity of participants performing various cognitive tasks (see Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000). Activation of the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) indicates self-talk activity during task completion because the LIFG is consistently recruited during the silent generation of words or sentences (McGuire et al., 1996). Researchers can identify which mental activities depend on self-talk, as well those which do not or partially do so. For example, work investigating self-referential activity suggests that thinking about one’s personality traits or remembering personal past episodes engage self-talk, whereas recognising one’s face on a photograph does so much less (Morin & Hamper, 2012). There is already a relatively important tradition of looking at differences in resting brain activity between individuals not involved in exercise and sport activities and those who are (e.g., Ermutlu, Yücesir, Eskikurt, Temel, & İşoğlu-Alkaç, 2015; İşoğlu-Alkaç et al., 2018). Such studies do not involve active participants, and current efforts aimed at developing small and portable brain recording devices represent a potentially useful or even ground­

42 Thomas M. Brinthaupt and Alain Morin breaking way to measure self-talk in situ for athletes in training or competition. Park, Fairweather, and Donaldson (2015) reviewed the sport psychology literature pertaining to the use of EEG recordings. The goals of sports neuroscience are to better understand the basic mechanisms underlying sporting behaviour and to develop new methods to increase performance via real-world EEG data collection during extended periods of time. Since some brain waves recorded with an EEG can be associated with left frontal activity (e.g., Delta waves), and thus potentially the LIFG, it can be possible to infer self-talk activity during sport training and activities. Brain scans could potentially address, for example, questions about whether goaldirected organic self-talk (i.e., intentionally coming up with and giving oneself instructions during sport practice) is different from strategic use of cue words (i.e., repeating mechanically predetermined cue words). Note, however, that an important limitation of the EEG and other brain imaging techniques is that they do not allow access into the content of selftalk – only its presence or absence can be objectified. Furthermore, at present, these methods cannot give insight into the type of self-talk that is being used, i.e., spontaneous, goal-directed, or strategic, because it remains unclear whether different types of self-talk produce different brain activations. Park et al. (2015) describe recent studies that have employed small portable devices that can effectively handle motion artefacts, and which do not disrupt sport training and activity. Brain activity is recorded with small electrodes set in a headband and transmitted wirelessly in real time to a computer for on- and off-line analyses. Results have already been collected during golf and bicycle riding, but the aforementioned devices still present problems when used during swimming and high-impact sports like running. Given their size and the need to remain motionless, traditional PET and fMRI machines are unsuitable for use during in-situ training and performance. However, small implantable brain-machine interface systems are currently being tested (Ando et al., 2016). It remains to be seen if such an approach, which obviously is quite invasive, could become applicable in a sport psychology context. A much less intrusive yet highly controversial approach is the use of transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS), reviewed by Edwards et al. (2017). tDCS consists of applying constant, low direct current through electrodes. These are placed in a brain region of interest and the current induces intracerebral current flow. This current flow in turn either increases or decreases the neuronal excitability in the specific area being stimulated depending on the type of stimulation being applied, which alters brain function. One example in sport psychology is the observation that tDCS increased performance (e.g., endurance) in an incremental cycling test when applied to the left temporal cortex and motor cortex during 20 minutes using a portable devise (Okano et al., 2015). Ethical and safety issues surrounding the use of tDCS in sport are hotly debated.

Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk 43 ARTICULATORY SUPPRESSION

As briefly mentioned earlier, articulatory movements are associated with self-talk. As a consequence, interfering with those movements will produce self-talk disruption. In a representative experiment, volunteers completed a task while simultaneously saying a word aloud continuously or mentally counting backward from 100 (Norris, Butterfield, Hall, & Page, 2018). The forced articulation created by the recitation or counting blocks any other articulation that would be otherwise needed when naturally engaging in selftalk. Performance deterioration implies that the task normally benefits from self-talk use. To further illustrate, Tullett and Inzlicht (2010) observed poorer performance on a Go/No-Go task designed to test impulsive responding (i.e., lack of self-control) in participants engaged in articulatory suppression, supporting the notion that self-talk is importantly involved in self-regulation. Articulatory suppression obviously does not give access to self-talk content but informs the researcher as to what types of cognitive work cannot be accomplished without self-talk. For that reason, and most importantly because it is difficult to imagine how to implement articulatory suppression while engaging in physical activity, it represents an unlikely candidate for self-talk assessment/manipulation in sport psychology.

Conclusion Table 3.2 summarises the main advantages and disadvantages offered by the self-talk assessment techniques reviewed in this chapter. This summary highlights several key observations. First, measuring self-talk in situ presents a constant challenge – this can be done by adopting methods such as private speech recording and DES, but these are either subject to various biases or difficult to implement. Second, researchers and practitioners frequently have to rely on retrospective self-talk accounts. As soon as a self-report becomes retrospective (even in the short term), it becomes potentially inaccurate because of possible mnemonic distortions. Third, as far as existing sport selfreport scales are concerned, they may miss important features of self-talk that researchers in other fields have identified. Future researchers might consider some of these other self-talk categories, features, and functions when creating their measures. For example, current measures fail to distinguish between athletes’ spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk. Also, it may be desirable or necessary to shorten, customise, or otherwise adapt existing measures due to time, relevance, or other constraints (Horvath & Röthlin, 2018). If researchers or practitioners choose to make such adaptations, they should always check and report the psychometric properties of their altered measures. Most reviewers of self-reports (e.g., McDonald, 2008; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007) note the value of using multiple, converging methods of assessment, if time and resources permit. In the sport domain, studying self-talk might be best accomplished through some combination of available techniques.

Ecological

No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes

Measure

Self-report scales Descriptive Experiential Sampling Articulatory suppression Brain activity Facial movements Thought listing Private speech Video reconstruction Interviews Observer reports

Yes No No No No Somewhat Somewhat Somewhat Somewhat No

Ease of use Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Somewhat Somewhat Somewhat Somewhat Yes

Reliability Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No

Retrospective Varies Yes NA NA NA Yes Yes Somewhat Somewhat Yes

Valid Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Self-talk content

Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Possibly Yes Yes

Suited for sport

Table 3.2 Summary of Main Advantages/Disadvantages and Some Psychometric Characteristics of Self-talk Assessment Methods Reviewed.

Assessment Methods for Organic Self-talk 45 To illustrate, in the preliminary stage of an investigation, it would be reasonable to employ an open-format or thought-sampling approach to collect selfgenerated statements from a relatively small sample of athletes (e.g., golfers, swimmers, runners). In a second part of the study, a validated questionnaire could be constructed based on these vocalisations and administered to larger samples. Multiple assessment techniques should be used to aim for convergent validity. For instance, in three independent studies on self-talk in golfers, one could use diaries (thus collecting self-generated content), the DES procedure during training or competition (see Dickens et al., 2017), and a questionnaire administered to an expanded sample. Results could then be integrated into one broader research report. In light of our review of self-talk assessment tools in sport psychology, we suggest that future research efforts might benefit from differentiating self-talk use between training/practice contexts and performance/competition situations. In the same vein, it will prove informative to look at possible selftalk use differences between team and individual sports, as well as between sports (e.g., badminton vs. recreational and competitive shooting). We also encourage researchers to consider how general (non-sport-specific) measures might be usefully applied to sport contexts. Such measures might help researchers with determining the validity of sport-related measures (e.g., through discriminant and congruent validity checks). Interest in self-talk in sport continues to grow, as reflected by the contributions to this volume. We hope that sensitivity to the kinds of measurement issues and opportunities we describe in this chapter will help the field to move forward.

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4

Metacognition and Goal-Directed Self-talk Noel E. Brick, Mark J. Campbell, and Aidan P. Moran

Introduction: Cognition and Metacognition Expert performance and feats of human endurance – both sporting and nonsporting – typically require the ability to be aware of, and exert control over, one’s own thoughts and actions in order to achieve a desired goal or outcome (i.e., self-regulation; Forgas, Baumeister, & Tice, 2009). Describing one of the ultimate feats of endurance, Edmund Hillary wrote of his thoughts en route to the summit of Mount Everest on 29 May 1953 that, “whenever I felt feelings of fear regarding it [the environmental conditions] I’d say to myself, forget it. This is Everest and you’ve got to take a few risks” (Auckland Museum, 2013). Individuals are not always successful in their attempts to effectively regulate their thoughts, however. During his final round collapse in the 2011 US Masters golf tournament, for example, Rory McIlroy recounted that: I heard the big roar for Charl [Schwartzel, the ultimate winner of the 2011 US Masters]. I knew then that my lead was gone. I think that was one of my mistakes. I was thinking too much about what every­ body else was doing instead of concentrating on myself. (Donegan, 2012) As these examples suggest, people’s inner dialogue not only reflects their thoughts and feelings in a given situation (i.e., their cognitive processes) but also attempts to monitor, control, and evaluate the effectiveness of those cognitions (i.e., metacognition). The latter processes are important, because the metacognitive ability to monitor and control one’s thoughts is not only fundamental to effective self-regulation (Dinsmore, Alexander, & Loughlin, 2008; Tarricone, 2011) but is also a feature of expert performance in sporting contexts (MacIntyre, Igou, Campbell, Moran, & Matthews, 2014; Moran & Toner, 2017). Accordingly, this chapter aims to provide an understanding of the role of metacognition, or thinking about thinking (Miller, Kessel, & Flavell, 1970) on self-talk: the inner dialogue in which people engage when they “talk” to themselves either covertly, or overtly (e.g., as when a tennis player criticises themselves aloud on court).

52 Noel E. Brick et al. In line with the overarching conceptualisation of self-talk in this book (see Chapter 2), this chapter will distinguish between goal-directed self-talk and spontaneous self-talk. To explain, goal-directed thinking will be considered a conscious, deliberate mental process employed intentionally towards solving a problem or progressing a task (e.g., Christoff, Gordon, & Smith, 2011; Latinjak, Zourbanos, López-Ros, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014). Goal-directed thoughts contrast with undirected thoughts, which include mind-wandering, stimulus-independent thoughts, and spontaneous self-talk (Christoff et al., 2011; Latinjak et al., 2014). Of such processes, spontaneous thoughts may be described as task-relevant but unintended, non-instrumental, and non-goal directed thoughts that come to mind unprompted and effortlessly (Christoff et al., 2011; Latinjak et al., 2014). These latter thoughts will be considered most relevant to the present discussion. Accordingly, this chapter is organised into three main sections. We will begin with an exploration of the concept of metacognition and provide a description of its main components. This section will also differentiate between cognitive (i.e., goal-directed and spontaneous self-talk) and metacognitive processes in a sporting context. Next, we will provide a brief overview of metacognition research in the sporting domain with a particular emphasis on distinctions between expert and less skilled/experienced performers. Given that some chapters in this book focus mainly on spontaneous self-talk (Chapter 5 and 6) and other chapters provide an insight into goal-directed self-talk (Chapters 7 and 8) and strategic self-talk interventions (Chapters 11−14), this chapter will only explore these aspects of self-talk within the context of metacognition. Finally, to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of metacognitive interventions, the final section of this chapter will provide suggestions on how metacognitive processes might be integrated into different types of self-talk intervention in sporting settings (see Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, LoridoMéndez, & Hardy, 2019).

What Is Metacognition? Over a decade ago, Eccles and Feltovich (2008) distinguished between domain-general psychological skills (e.g., goal-directed self-talk, relaxation, goal setting) and higher-order cognitive processes such as metacognition. These authors suggested that traditional psychological skills serve a support function to enhance psychological processes, such as the ability to sustain high levels of motivation and self-confidence, the ability to control anxiety, and the ability to control attention/concentration. Thus, an athlete’s goaldirected self-talk may serve to increase motivation during a prolonged endurance task (e.g., Blanchfield, Hardy, de Morree, Staino, & Marcora, 2014), for example, or act to direct attention towards important aspects of skill execution during discrete, precision-based motor skills such as a basketball free throw (e.g., Abdoli, Hardy, Riyahi, & Farsi, 2017; Latinjak, Torregrossa, Comoutos, Hernando-Gimeno, & Ramis, 2019).

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Metacognition, in contrast, refers to our insight into, and control over, these cognitive processes (Matlin, 2009; Moran & Toner, 2017). Early work in the field of educational and developmental psychology highlighted the importance of metacognition to a variety of intellectual enterprises, such as directing attention, monitoring memory and comprehension, communication of information, and solving problems (e.g., Flavell, 1979; Miller et al., 1970). According to Baker and Brown (1984), metacognitive processes involve two dimensions: metacognitive knowledge and regulation of cognition. Metacognitive knowledge includes declarative knowledge of one’s own cognitive abilities (e.g., knowing that one tends to lose focus during competition), knowledge of cognitive strategies (e.g., goal-directed self-talk to enhance concentration), and knowledge of task demands (e.g., the task-specific requirement for attention and concentration). Importantly, these components of metacognitive knowledge are believed to interact such that metacognitive knowledge also includes procedural knowledge of how specific cognitive strategies may be used and conditional knowledge of when and why to use them (e.g., Efklides, 2014; Flavell, 1979). Regulation of cognition comprises two additional facets, metacognitive skills and metacognitive experiences (Efklides, 2008). Metacognitive skills align with the cyclical subprocesses of self-regulation (e.g., Cleary, Zimmerman, & Keating, 2006; Dinsmore et al., 2008; Zimmerman, 2002) and include a forethought phase (i.e., metacognitive planning), a performance phase (i.e., metacognitive monitoring and control), and a selfreflection phase (i.e., metacognitive reviewing and evaluating). Accordingly, metacognitive skills represent the control function of metacognition and are typified by the use of contextually appropriate cognitive strategies, such as goal-directed self-talk, during task performance (e.g., Baker & Brown, 1984; Efklides, 2014). Metacognitive experiences, in contrast, are based on monitoring processes and include predominantly implicit metacognitive feelings (e.g., feelings of confidence, feelings of task difficulty) and more explicit metacognitive judgements (e.g., judgements about the effectiveness of a cognitive strategy). Regulation of cognition during task performance is exemplified by Edmund Hillary’s “feelings of fear” (a metacognitive experience based on monitoring of negatively valanced, spontaneous thoughts) on the ascent of Mount Everest and his subsequent use of goal-directed, instructional self-talk (“Forget it. This is Everest and you’ve got to take a few risks”) to exert control over his cognitions, and regulate his emotional state and behaviour, in an effort to make progress towards the top of the mountain. To delve deeper into the distinction between cognitive and metacognitive processes, Nelson and Narens (1990) developed a theoretical framework of metacognition. These authors proposed a model consisting of two interrelated levels: the object-level and the meta-level (see Figure 4.1).

54 Noel E. Brick et al.

Figure 4.1 Illustration of the Hierarchical Organisation of the Meta-Level and the Object-Level (Adapted with permission from Nelson & Narens, 1990).

The meta-level is considered superordinate, and contains a dynamic “mental simulation,” or representation of the object-level (Nelson & Narens, 1990, p. 126). Accordingly, information flowing from the objectlevel (e.g., spontaneous thoughts such as “feelings of fear”; see also, Chapter 1) allows the meta-level to monitor ongoing cognitive activity at the object-level. Consequently, activity at the meta-level is updated in a continual, dynamic fashion. In turn, information flowing from the metalevel to the object-level represents the control function of metacognition. Thus, regulatory control of the object-level may include the initiation of an action (e.g., employing goal-directed self-talk; “Forget it … you’ve got to take a few risks”), continuation of an ongoing action, or termination of an action. The success of the resultant activity is determined by continued monitoring of the object-level by the meta-level. Relevant to a discussion on spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, the meta-level is held to contain a representation of current goals or objectives, and how these might best be achieved by the object-level (Flavell, 1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Goal-directed self-talk can thus be seen as a result of continuous interactions between the object-level and the meta-level. The success (or otherwise) of ongoing actions by the object-level towards goal achievement is monitored by the meta-level. Should further discrepancies between a desired state (e.g., solving a problem, remaining focused on a task) and the current state result from this monitoring process, cognitive control and the regulation of cognitive strategies results from the metalevel. The metacognitive ability to review and evaluate one’s cognitions is also important to update the meta-level on how current or future goals might best be achieved. To exemplify this process, Rory McIlroy indicated how his unsuccessful attempt to control his spontaneous thoughts during the final round of the 2011 US Masters golf tournament influenced his subsequent thoughts during the 2011 US Open, ten weeks later:

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I think you learn about yourself and you learn that you can handle the pressure or you can do certain things under pressure that you mightn’t have done before … you make a mistake and you try to make sure that you don’t make it again. (Kelly, 2015) This quote aptly illustrates the important role of metacognition in regulating athletes’ thoughts during sporting performances. Not surprisingly, metacognition has also been considered a feature of expertise in sporting performance. The following section will briefly review literature on metacognitive processes and expertise in sporting contexts.

Metacognition and Expertise in Sporting Performance Metacognitive processes have been studied in a variety of settings including education (e.g., Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Tarricone, 2011), mental health and psychotherapy (e.g., Normann & Morina, 2018; Wells et al., 2012), and in the performance of perceptual-motor skills and physical activities (e.g., Augustyn & Rosenbaum, 2005; Setanni, Magistro, & Rabaglietti, 2012). The latter application is particularly relevant to the present discussion, given that cognitive aspects of intellectual and perceptual motor skills share many similarities (e.g., rates of learning, or the functional equivalence between mental imagery and like-modality perceptual motor skill preparation and execution; Jeannerod, 1994; MacIntyre et al., 2013; Rosenbaum, Carlson, & Gilmore, 2001), and the domain-generality of metacognitive abilities has been evidenced between tasks requiring similar cognitive processes (e.g., Rouault, McWilliams, Allen, & Fleming, 2018). Drawing on these assertions, this section will provide an overview of research that has explored metacognition as a mechanism to underpin expertise in sporting performance (for a recent review, see also, Moran, Campbell, & Toner, 2019). Within sporting contexts, there is general agreement that greater metacognitive knowledge and skills are evident amongst expert performers (e.g., MacIntyre et al., 2014; Moran & Toner, 2017). Experts generally possess greater declarative and procedural knowledge than novices, and these knowledge structures are thought to enhance their decision-making abilities during task performance (e.g., Huber, 1997; McPherson & Thomas, 1989; Williams & Davids, 1995). Huber (1997), for example, noted content differences between elite and non-elite divers such that elite divers verbalised more detailed knowledge of diving movements and actions and evoked these by employing a greater array of cognitive strategies (e.g., goal-directed self-talk, visualisation) before, during, and after diving performances. Importantly, elite divers also reported a greater number of “production rules” (i.e., if–then or condition–action rules, in which a specific action is carried out whenever a given condition is present;

56 Noel E. Brick et al. Eysenck & Keane, 2015) that Huber (1997) suggested acts as a metacognitive strategy to determine which features of a dive should be attended to during dive preparation and execution. Collectively, this research suggests that sporting experts are not only more proficient than novices in motor skill execution, but are also more adept at using metacognitive knowledge and skills to control lower-order cognitive processes (e.g., goal-directed and spontaneous thoughts) before, during, and after task execution (Huber, 1997; MacIntyre et al., 2014; McPherson & Thomas, 1989). Metacognition also plays an important role in endurance-based sporting activities. Specifically, certain athletic endurance tasks such as running through complex environments not only require control over motor activity, but they also engage several components of executive function such as planning, monitoring, inhibition, attentional switching, and multi-tasking (e.g., Raichlen & Alexander, 2017; Raichlen et al., 2016). Accordingly, Nietfeld (2003) examined cognitive strategy use and competitive runners’ abilities to regulate pacing during a one-mile running task performed at 80% of runners’ personal best time. The findings suggested that more strategic runners were more accurate at monitoring and executing the required pace during the running task. In particular, these individuals engaged in more metacognitive planning and monitoring of cognitive strategies, could flexibly adjust cognitive strategy use as required during running, and engaged in greater metacognitive evaluation of cognitive strategy effectiveness after running. Nietfeld (2003) suggested that expert runners operate on intelligent domain-specific cognitive strategies (e.g., goal-directed self-talk, pacing, relaxing) that develop as a result of task experience and are not related with general cognitive ability. In a subsequent study, Brick, MacIntyre, and Campbell (2015) applied a metacognitive perspective to understand attentional focus and cognitive strategy use during an endurance activity. Their findings suggest that elite endurance runners metacognitively planned cognitive strategies before running, monitored cognitive processes during running, and evaluated cognitive strategy use after running. The findings suggested that elite endurance runners engaged attentional strategies, such as goal-directed, motivational self-talk, in a contextually appropriate manner based on the demands (e.g., difficulty) of running events. Coupled with the findings of Nietfeld (2003), these studies highlight the importance of acquiring metacognitive knowledge of when and why various cognitive strategies may be used to optimise endurance performance. More recent research with novice runners (Brick, Campbell, Sheehan, Fitzpatrick, & MacIntyre, 2018) suggested that these individuals may be less strategic in their thinking than their more experienced counterparts, and may not have developed the detailed, domain-specific metacognitive knowledge (e.g., declarative and conditional knowledge of cognitive strategies) or metacognitive skills (e.g., planning and evaluation of cognitive strategies) that are typically associated with expert performance in sport.

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Finally, Love, Kannis-Dymand, and Lovell (2018a, 2018b) surveyed the metacognitive beliefs of triathletes in two separate studies conducted before competitive triathlon events. Metacognitive beliefs (e.g., positive beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about worry, beliefs about the need for thought control, and beliefs about acting with awareness) were assessed using subscales of the Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). In the first study, Love et al. (2018a) suggested that metacognitive beliefs positively predicted both cognitive anxiety (both positive and negative beliefs about worry) and somatic anxiety (negative beliefs about worry only). In contrast, confidence was negatively predicted by positive beliefs about worry and positively predicted by beliefs about the need for thought control. These findings suggest that metacognitive beliefs can influence psychological states (e.g., anxiety, confidence) which, in turn, impact on sporting performance. In a subsequent study, Love et al. (2018b) suggest that metacognitions, and specifically metacognitive beliefs about the need for thought control and acting with awareness, may play an important role in the occurrence of “flow states” – those coveted and elusive experiences in sport where an athlete performs to the best of his or her ability, mainly as a result of being totally focused on the task at hand (e.g., Moran & Toner, 2017). Collectively, this corpus of research suggests that metacognitive processes play a key role in sporting expertise. Specifically, they appear to facilitate the flexible allocation of cognitive resources, such as the use of goal-directed self-talk, in a situationally appropriate manner during sporting performance. Importantly, engaging higher-order metacognitive control over one’s thoughts may be particularly relevant during situations or tasks that are considered difficult or challenging (e.g., MacIntyre et al., 2014) or when psychological states (e.g., anxiety) need to be regulated to optimise performance (e.g., Love et al., 2018a, 2018b). This recruitment of metacognitive processes is exemplified in the accounts of both Edmund Hillary and Rory McIlroy presented earlier in this chapter. The associations between metacognition and flow states highlighted by Love et al. (2018b) are also noteworthy. Furthermore, recent research that differentiates between flow and “clutch” states in sporting performance reinforces the notion that metacognitive processes are a feature of expert performance. Specifically, during a clutch performance, characterised by an intense and effortful state of heightened concentration and awareness (i.e., “making it happen”; Swann et al., 2017) athletes tend to report deliberate engagement of conscious cognitive control to produce higher levels of performance (Swann et al., 2017; Swann, Keegan, Crust, & Piggott, 2016). This contrasts with flow states that share a state of intense focus, but which tend to occur more spontaneously and automatically (i.e., “letting it happen”; Swann et al., 2017). Interpreting these states from a metacognitive perspective, Moran et al. (2019) suggest that clutch performances are

58 Noel E. Brick et al. underpinned by metacognitive control and flexibility in the allocation of attentional resources and the use of cognitive strategies to produce optimal clutch performances in pressurised conditions. As such, it may also be that athletes engage in more goal-directed self-talk during clutch performances, whereas flow states may be characterised by unintended, non-goal directed thoughts that come to mind unbidden and effortlessly but, nevertheless, facilitate a flow state (i.e., spontaneous thoughts; Christoff et al., 2011). Investigation of this alignment between flow and clutch states; goal-directed and spontaneous self-talk; and metacognitive processes may prove a fruitful line of future research enquiry and intervention development. Accordingly, the final section of this chapter will discuss how integrating metacognitive processes within different types of self-talk intervention may be important to optimise both intervention delivery and subsequent sporting performance.

Metacognition-Informed Self-talk Interventions A number of systematic and meta-analytic reviews support the use of strategic self-talk interventions both to facilitate skill acquisition and to enhance sporting performance (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011; Tod, Hardy, & Oliver, 2011). Based on such evidence, metacognition seems to be particularly important during three circumstances: (i) initial learning, (ii) during self-correction, and (iii) when coping with tasks of increased difficulty (Ferrari, 1996; MacIntyre et al., 2014; Martini, Wall, & Shore, 2004). Given the focus of subsequent chapters of this book on reflexive (Chapter 7) and strategic self-talk (Chapters 11−14) interventions, this final section will consider how metacognition can be integrated to inform and guide these different types of self-talk intervention in sporting performance settings. Psychological skill interventions in sport, including strategic and reflexive self-talk interventions, are largely considered metacognitive in nature (Foster & Weigand, 2008; Moran, 1996). Indeed, Moran (1996) claimed that “in order to benefit maximally from mental skills training programmes, athletes must cultivate some sophistication in meta-cognitive awareness and self-regulation” (p. 249). More recently, Latinjak, Font-Lladó, Zourbanos, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2016) differentiated between reflexive self-talk interventions and strategic self-talk interventions. Briefly, in these authors’ view, the former is concerned with athletes’ previous attempts to regulate their own cognitions in problematic situations. By contrast, strategic self-talk interventions consist of planned attempts by others (e.g., sport psychologists, coaches) to influence performers’ cognitions (see Chapter 2 for a more indepth discussion of reflexive versus strategic self-talk interventions). From a metacognitive perspective, both types of self-talk intervention require “supra-personal” (Shea et al., 2014) or socially shared (Efklides, 2014) metacognition to allow individuals to acquire metacognitive knowledge of

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task-relevant self-talk statements and conditional knowledge of when to employ them to enhance performance. Reflexive self-talk interventions specifically aim to develop “the coach within,” however (Latinjak et al., 2016, p. 194). Accordingly, they focus on developing metacognitive skills (e.g., planning, monitoring, and reviewing one’s thoughts) that enable performers to become more effective, self-determined regulators of their own self-talk beyond the time frame of the intervention used (e.g., Latinjak et al., 2016, 2018). Given the importance of metacognitive processes for effective selfregulation, sport psychology practitioners may find it useful to assess athletes’ metacognitive abilities as part of the intervention process. Previous studies have adapted metacognitive inventories from academic domains and applied them for use in sporting contexts (e.g., Love et al., 2018a, 2018b; Nietfeld, 2003). Although it may appear helpful, the task of adapting instruments developed originally for non-sporting domains has clear limitations and hinders the use of these instruments in applied athletic contexts. Recently, however, Love, Kannis-Dymand, and Lovell (2019) developed and validated a Metacognitive Processes during Performances Questionnaire (MPPQ) specifically for use with athletic samples. The MPPQ consists of three sub-scales: (i) cognitive coordination (measuring planning of cognitions pre-competition and awareness of environmental information and actions during competition), (ii) cognitive evaluation (measuring the ability to monitor and evaluate cognitive processes during and after competitive events), and (iii) thought control (measuring nonreactivity to negative events and the ability to inhibit and shift attention). Specific to sporting contexts, the factors align well with Brick and colleagues’(2015, 2016, 2018) metacognitive framework of attentional focus and cognitive control in endurance athletes. As such, it reinforces the notion that self-regulation in sporting contexts is influenced by the planning, monitoring, and evaluation of thoughts during task performance (e.g., Brick et al., 2015; Love et al., 2019). To demonstrate how metacognitive processes may be integrated within different types of self-talk intervention, Table 4.1 provides an overview of possible strategies sport psychology practitioners or athletes themselves can employ to develop metacognitive skills (i.e., review and evaluation, planning, monitoring and control) in the context of a reflexive self-talk intervention. The context, the metacognitive processes, and some typical questions are presented in Table 4.1. These are based on the metacognitive framework of cognitive control during endurance activities developed by Brick and colleagues (2015, 2016, 2018), the MPPQ (Love et al., 2019), and the reflexive self-talk intervention processes outlined by Latinjak et al. (2016). In the future, assessing and integrating these metacognitive processes may provide a sound basis for developing and applying more effective types of self-talk intervention in the sporting domain.

60 Noel E. Brick et al. Table 4.1 Possible Questions to Integrate Metacognitive Processes within Reflexive Self-talk Interventions. Context

Metacognitive processes

Problematic event or situation

Review and evaluation during or after the event

Possible questions by athlete or by practitioner during self-talk intervention

What goal-directed self-talk did I/you use

in the past?

What were the effects of that self-talk?

Which thoughts were good and bad for

performance?

What did I/you learn about those

thoughts during the event?

Which goal-directed thoughts should be

maintained?

Planning before an How can I/you mentally prepare for this

event event?

If the event happens, then how will I/you

think during that situation?

Are facilitative effects expected from a new

goal-directed self-talk strategy?

Could alternative goal-directed thoughts

be more facilitative in the situation?

Monitoring and control Do I/you monitor thoughts experienced

during an event during an event?

Do I/you shift attention away from nega­ tive events while competing?

When I/you experience a negative thought

during an event do I/you refocus attention

back on the task?

Did I/you apply the new self-talk strategy

when I/you experienced that problematic

event?

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5 Self-talk and Emotion Regulation Julian Fritsch and Darko Jekauc

Introduction Ronja has been through all the preliminary stages and made it to the final of the National Judo Championship. After long and exhausting fights, she is now facing the great favourite who won the last three championships. Ronja does not normally suffer from a lot of pre-competitive anxiety; however, this time it is different. Just before stepping into the fight arena her muscles are tightening, her heart is pounding, and she is struggling to maintain concentration. Unfamiliar with these reactions, she keeps telling herself “Keep calm, Ronja, it is just a game! Try to enjoy it as much as possible!” and “No one expected that you could make it that far. Put the focus on the fight!”

What is an Emotion? Experiences like Ronja’s are typically considered to be emotional. Athletes often strive for highly valued goals with uncertain outcomes, which explains why emotions are an integral part of sports competitions. Although the term emotion appears intuitively obvious, there is a great deal of debate about its definition in the scientific field. One key controversy centres around the question of whether there are a small number of universal emotions (e.g., anxiety, happiness, sadness) with discrete and specific patterns of response or, on the contrary, if an emotion is subjectively constructed (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 2013). Notwithstanding these discrepancies, the various theoretical approaches agree that an emotion is a psychological response to a personally relevant stimulus. This response involves changes in subjective experience (e.g., feeling angry), physiological processes (e.g., changes in heart rate) and observable behaviour (e.g., frowning; Mauss & Robinson, 2009).

Cycle of Emotions In sports psychology, various models, such as the inverted-U hypothesis (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), the catastrophe model (Hardy, 1990), or the IZOF model (Hanin, 2000), have contributed significantly to our understanding of the

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relationship between emotions and sports performance. In addition to these models, we outline in the first part of this chapter how a cycle of emotions, operating according to cybernetic principles and mainly referring to high activation emotions, can map emotional processes during a sports competition. This cyclic system is an attempt to explain how an initial event (e.g., the loss of an important point in tennis) can trigger a series of reactions accumulating to an extreme emotional state. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the emotional cycle consists of four components: a trigger, bodily reactions, feelings, and cognitions.

Trigger A trigger represents an automated mechanism that activates the emotional cycle. This mechanism is characterised by the principles of classical and operant conditioning. When a situation is associated with positive or negative consequences, the dominant cues of the situation will trigger comparable emotional responses in the future. For example, in tennis, experiences of losing a break point, which were associated with negative consequences, may trigger some degree of heightened levels of arousal and hastiness in athletes when faced with the same situation in the future. Since even the anticipation of a situation can lead to an emotional response, expectations greatly influence whether certain cues trigger emotional responses.

Bodily Reactions The activation of a trigger leads to bodily reactions. According to LeDoux (1996), emotional stimuli are simultaneously processed on a fast and imprecise low road as well as a slow and thorough high road (for the latter see the Cognitions section below). On the low road, information about the

Figure 5.1 Cycle of Emotions.

66 Julian Fritsch and Darko Jekauc stimulus is sent through the thalamus directly to the amygdala. The amygdala induces the release of hormones that lead to an elevated activation (e.g., increased blood pressure, heart rate, muscle tone), preparing the body for action. All of this happens instantly after the confrontation with the stimulus, and the individual is not fully aware of what is happening. Notably, in the context of competitive sports, specific nonverbal behaviours, such as dominance and submissiveness, are shown to have a direct effect on onlookers’ impression formation (Furley & Schweizer, 2014).

Feelings Bodily reactions are associated with facial, vocal, and postural expressions which influence the emotional experience, highlighting the reciprocal relationship between emotional experience and bodily reactions (e.g., Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). The attempts to make sense of the bodily reactions lead to a subjective impression that, in relation to the situation, is affectively coloured. This subjective impression is reflected in one’s affective state, representing the raw feeling that something is pleasant or unpleasant, accompanied by a certain level of arousal (Russell, 2009). Importantly, according to the hedonic asymmetry, negative stimuli have a stronger impact on our affective state and behaviours than positive ones (Frijda, 1988).

Cognitions The basic emotional feeling stimulates higher cognitive processes that essentially involve an interplay of organic, spontaneous and goal-directed selftalk. The information processing on the high road involves cortical areas allowing a thorough analysis of the stimulus (LeDoux, 1996). Attention is directed to certain aspects of the situation, memory systems are searched for comparable situations, and scenarios for the course of the ongoing situation are worked out. In line with the mood-state-dependent memory, past situations corresponding to the current affective state are more likely to be recalled (Bower, 1981), amplifying the emotional state. The higher the intensity of the affective state, the more cognitive processes are stimulated. This analysis requires considerable depleting of cognitive resources (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), which cannot be used to concentrate on the task. As a result, the individual might not have enough cognitive resources to focus on the task at hand. These processes most likely result in performance degradation, increasing the chance of further negative events in the competition, and thereby continuing the cycle of emotions. During a game or match, an athlete can go through multiple accumulating loops in the cycle of emotions. If these automatic and uncontrolled psychological processes are not appropriately regulated, emotions can therefore exert significant influence on performance in sports. When the loops of negative emotions repeat several times, an athlete may enter a downward spiral that

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Figure 5.2 Example of How Emotions Can Impair Sports Performance When Not Properly Regulated.

results in a temporal state of crisis (see Figure 5.2). This points to the importance of deliberate strategies that regulate emotions and ultimately avoid performance degradation which athletes should make use of. As we outline in the second part of the chapter, the recently introduced conceptualisation of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk provides a promising platform of assessing the role that self-talk can play in emotion regulation (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019; Latinjak, Zourbanos, López-Ros, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014).

Self-talk and Emotion Regulation Significant and emotionally charged moments are naturally an integral part of sports competitions. The cycle of emotions is an example of how emotions affect sports performance, thereby emphasising the importance of emotion regulation. Emotion regulation is a key competence, and athletes who have developed functional strategies for emotion regulation are less likely to be negatively affected by the cycle of emotions. Similarly, coaches with well-developed emotion regulation strategies are considered to be more empathic and better valued by their athletes (Strauch, Wäsche, & Jekauc, 2018). In light of the central role of self-talk in emotion regulation and in line with the conceptualisation of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk (Latinjak et al., 2014), we first briefly present the role of

68 Julian Fritsch and Darko Jekauc spontaneous self-talk as an integral part of the emotion experience. Then, based on the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), we identify the different emotion regulation functions of goal-directed self-talk. Spontaneous self-talk, which is automatic and uncontrolled self-talk, is often emotionally charged (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2017; Latinjak et al., 2014) or even considered as an expression of emotions (Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 2016). This implies that spontaneous self-talk is neither an antecedent nor a consequence, but rather an integral part of the emotion (see also, Chapter 2), the same way that changes in the peripheral nervous system, in the subjective experience, and in one’s observable behaviour are (Russell, 2009). As such, similar to emotions, spontaneous self-talk contains dimensions of (a) valence ranging from positive (e.g., I feel good today) to neutral (e.g., the ball was out), to negative (e.g., I suck), and (b) time-perspective ranging from retrospective (e.g., that was a great shot) to present-related (e.g., the weather is bad today) to anticipatory (e.g., I will win today; Latinjak, 2012; Latinjak et al., 2014). As explained in Chapter 2, spontaneous self-talk cannot exist on its own. There is always at least one psychological process that is expressed through spontaneous self-talk. This can explain why spontaneous self-talk can be considered as a window into athletes’ minds, reflecting underlying emotional processes (Van Raalte et al., 2016). Goal-directed self-talk, which is controlled and deliberate, aims at making progress on a task, or self-regulation. As emotions are an integral part of sports competitions, it is no surprise that a main function of goal-directed self-talk is emotion regulation (Latinjak et al., 2014; Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Chroni, 2008). For hedonic reasons, athletes usually try to upregulate positive and downregulate negative emotions (Gross, 2015). For instance, shortly before the competition, an athlete might think about past successful competitions in order to reach a positive state of mind and to avoid negative emotions. Nevertheless, instrumental goals can explain counter-hedonic regulation (Lane, Beedie, Jones, Uphill, & Devonport, 2012). For instance, a study showed that 15% of runners preferred strategies to increase anxiety and/or anger before competition (Lane, Beedie, Devonport, & Stanley, 2011). Similarly, rugby players rated a moderate frequency of anger as beneficial as long as they are able to control their emotions (Robazza & Bortoli, 2007). Notably, when directly comparing the effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies, emotions are reported to be generally easier to regulate when they are experienced as positive rather than negative (Martinent, Ledos, Ferrand, Campo, & Nicolas, 2015). Goal-directed self-talk can regulate emotions by several means. On the one hand, goal-directed self-talk can focus directly on emotions by enhancing facilitative emotions (e.g., be happy) or dealing with debilitative emotions (e.g., don’t be anxious). Here, goal-directed self-talk is often a strategy to deal with spontaneous self-talk and its underlying psychological processes in a reactive manner (Latinjak et al., 2014). On the other hand, goaldirected self-talk can also influence emotions without having a direct focus

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on emotions, by shifting the attention (e.g., focus on the next point) or by altering the meaning of a situation (e.g., mistakes are important for learning). These examples highlight how goal-directed self-talk can also regulate emotions in a proactive manner early in the emotion generation process. A model that aims to classify the different ways of how individuals try to regulate emotions is the process model of emotion regulation, postulating five emotion regulation strategies; namely, situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation (Gross, 1998). While situation selection and situation modification refer to attempts aiming at directly modifying the external environment, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation focus on changing the individual’s internal environment and the related bodily reactions (Gross, 2015). In the latter three strategies, athletes can use goal-directed self-talk as a technique in itself, as a psychological meta-skill that helps to initiate (e.g., imagery) or as part of other techniques (e.g., pre-performance routines). The potential use of goal-directed self-talk to regulate emotions is supported by neuroscientific findings that indicate how cortical brain regions related with cognitive strategies, such as the prefrontal cortex, can influence subcortical regions related with affective responses, such as the amygdala (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012). For this reason, in the remainder of the chapter we examine the role of goal-directed self-talk in attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation.

Attentional Deployment According to the process model of emotion regulation, attentional deployment is a strategy that, at an early stage in the emotion generation process, regulates the potential of a stimulus to elicit an emotional response (Gross, 2015). As a stimulus is more likely to trigger an emotional response when one’s attention is focused on the stimulus, strategies that move the attention away from or towards the stimulus can either prevent or create an emotional response, respectively (Gross, 1998). Although attentional deployment is considered an antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy (Gross, 2015), evidence in the sports context shows that goal-directed self-talk can be effective in changing the focus of attention even after the emotion has already emerged (Latinjak et al., 2017). In other words, directing one’s attentional focus through goal-directed self-talk can also help athletes decrease the intensity after its occurrence, or prevent it from reoccurring. Interestingly, in the sports context, there is evidence that goal-directed self-talk can improve the effectiveness of attentional focus as well as countering the debilitative effects of internal (Hatzigeorgiadis, Theodorakis, & Zourbanos, 2004) and external (Galanis, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, Charachousi, & Sanchez, 2018) distractions. Anxiety is an emotion that has received a great deal of scrutiny in sports psychology research. According to the attentional control theory, changes in athletes’ attentional focus can explain the detrimental effects of anxiety

70 Julian Fritsch and Darko Jekauc on sports performance (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). To elaborate, a high focus on either internal (e.g., concerns about the outcome of an event) or external (e.g., the opponent goalkeeper in a penalty) stimuli can diminish processing efficiency when attention is taken away from other task-relevant stimuli. For instance, a study showed that football players tend to focus too much on the goalkeeper under anxiety-eliciting condition (Wilson, Wood, & Vine, 2009). As goal-directed self-talk is shown to counteract the detrimental effects of internal and external distractions (Hatzigeorgiadis & Galanis, 2017) as well as anxiety (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Mpoumpaki, & Theodorakis, 2009), it appears to be an effective strategy to reduce these debilitative effects. Importantly, going beyond anxiety and supporting the relevance of instrumental counter­ hedonic emotion regulation, Martinent et al. (2015) demonstrated that athletes use attentional deployment, including goal-directed self-talk, for a wide range of positive and negative emotions. Finally, a point of concern relates to the ironic effects of mental control (Wegner, 1994). It is common to observe that people find it difficult to not think about a certain aspect (e.g., the outcome of the match), especially if they really try. In fact, the deliberate attempt to avoid a specific unwanted thought can even enhance its intensity and the associated emotions (Wegner, 1994). For this reason, it is advisable that goal-directed self-talk does not focus on the stimulus/thought to avoid (e.g., don’t think about the past error), but is rather directed to the relevant task (e.g., focus on the next point).

Cognitive Change Cognitive change refers to attempts to alter the meaning of a situation (Gross, 1998) and is often advocated as the most effective emotion regulation strategy (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). The basic idea behind cognitive change is that the way an athlete appraises a situation influences the quality as well as the intensity of the emotional response (Lazarus, 2000). In other words, it is not the situation per se that shapes the emotional response but rather the athlete’s interpretation of the situation. A tennis player who is trailing might appraise that the goal of winning is threatened and consequently experience anxiety. Another player in the same situation perceives that situation as a chance to prove her or his abilities and thus experiences hope or excitement. The fact that goal-directed self-talk can be used to change cognitive reactions towards an emotion-eliciting stimulus points to the inherent relationship between goal-directed self-talk and cognitive change (Latinjak et al., 2014). Sports competitions are often characterised by their stressful nature. Various theoretical approaches distinguish between a challenge and a threat state as possible psychological reactions to such a situation (Blascovich, 2008; Jones, Meijen, McCarthy, & Sheffield, 2009). Through subjective evaluations, athletes weigh their own coping resources against the task

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demands. Whilst in a challenge state athletes evaluate their coping resources as being equal to or greater than the situational demands, in a threat state athletes evaluate the situational demands as being greater than their coping resources (Blascovich, 2008). Since a challenge state is consistently related with superior performance in comparison to a threat state (Hase, O’Brien, Moore, & Freeman, 2019), it is no surprise that athletes are generally advised to consider a competition as a challenge rather than a threat (Jones et al., 2009). Challenge or threat states can enter into an athlete’s awareness through spontaneous self-talk. If debilitative threat states are identified, athletes can use goal-directed self-talk to reframe this interpretation (e.g., I’m too many points behind to win this match) into an interpretation reflecting a challenge state in the very same situation (e.g., this situation is a chance to show my abilities). Notably, a recent study explicitly examined the effect of a strategic self-talk intervention on athletes’ challenge/threat states (Hase, Hood, Moore, & Freeman, 2019). The results revealed a trend showing that athletes in a threat state might benefit more from instructional self-talk cues whereas athletes in a challenge state might benefit more from motivational self-talk cues. The rational emotive behaviour therapy (REBT; Ellis & Dryden, 1997) is another cognitive-behaviour approach that has recently attracted research in sports psychology in general (Turner, 2016) as well as in relation to self-talk specifically (Turner, Kirkham, & Wood, 2018). Studies consistently show that while rational beliefs (e.g., I really want to win, but it is ok to lose) are associated with adaptive emotions and behaviours, irrational beliefs (e.g., if I lose today, that will be the end of the world) are associated with maladaptive emotions and behaviours (for a review see Turner, 2016). Although it is important to acknowledge that athletes’ self-talk is not always reflective of their deeply held beliefs, self-talk has been proposed as one strategy for the application of REBT in the sports context. To elaborate, in a field-based experimental study in golf, rational self-talk was related with better putting performance and was rated as more usable and facilitative by the participants compared to irrational self-talk (Turner et al., 2018). Although much remains to be discovered concerning the interplay between self-talk, one’s deep beliefs, and emotions, these results indicate that REBT is a promising avenue in the sports context to promote rational beliefs and adaptive emotions. For a thorough discussion on the use of REBT to change organic self-talk, see Chapter 8.

Response Modulation Although it is often difficult to precisely identify when the emotion generation processes end, and when the emotion regulation processes start (Koole, 2009), according to the process model of emotion regulation, response modulation takes place at a later stage, compared to attentional deployment and cognitive change (Gross, 1998). Once an emotional response has been initiated, changes can be noted in athletes’ subjective

72 Julian Fritsch and Darko Jekauc experience, physiological processes, and observable behaviour (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). For instance, after losing a point, a tennis player might experience anger, his heartbeat might increase, and he might visibly shake his head. Here, athletes can use goal-directed self-talk to influence the different components of an emotion by focusing on the subjective experience (e.g., calm down), the physiological processes (e.g., breath slowly), or the observable behaviour (e.g., stand straight). Research in general psychology indicates that the active suppression of an emotion is typically related to a stronger physiological response (e.g., increased reaction of the sympathetic nervous system) and cognitive costs (e.g., worse memory; Gross, 2015). Of relevance for the sports context, a study, in which a 10 km cycling time trial was used, showed that the effortful use of emotion suppression leads to a higher perceived exertion and lower performance outcomes (Wagstaff, 2014). Two possible explanations for these detrimental effects are that active emotion suppression (a) exhausts resources that subsequently cannot be used for task performance (Englert, 2016) and (b) can lead to ironic effects of mental control (Wegner, 1994). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that other studies support the effectiveness of response modulation in the sports context (Kubiak, Rother, & Egloff, 2019; Wagstaff & Weston, 2014). In a study of military personnel during a two-month Antarctic mountaineering expedition, expressive suppression, together with acceptance, were rated as the most effective emotion regulation strategies (Wagstaff & Weston, 2014). In addition, Kubiak and colleagues (2019) found that table tennis players with a higher performance status were more likely to use response modulation strategies. These findings highlight the need for future research exploring whether the evidence from general psychology, suggesting negative implications of response modulation, is applicable in the heat of a sports competition, where it is often difficult to inhibit an emotional response altogether. Specifically, outward emotional reactions, i.e., the behavioural component of emotions, imply various performance-related interpersonal consequences (Fritsch, Elbe, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2018). For instance, it has been found that negative outward emotional reactions increase whereas positive outward emotional reactions diminish the opponent’s confidence (Furley, Moll, & Memmert, 2015). Similarly, a series of studies looking at the effects of body language provided comparable findings (e.g., Furley & Schweizer, 2014). These studies consistently showed the benefits of a dominant and the downsides of a submissive body language. In addition, regulating one’s own outward emotional reactions is important to convey strength to the teammates (Tamminen & Crocker, 2013). Thus, goal-directed self-talk targeting one’s own body language (e.g., keep your head up) appears suitable, specifically when other strategies targeting the emotion generation process at an earlier point did not work.

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Conclusions Emotions are an integral part of competitive sport. They can stimulate athletes to peak performances as well as plunge them into a deep crisis (Jekauc, 2018). The cycle of emotions offers a theoretical explanation of how emotions affect sports performance and emphasises the importance of emotion regulation as a key competence in sports psychology. Athletes can use goal-directed self-talk that directly – but also indirectly – influences emotions. In line with the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998), goal-directed self-talk can direct athletes’ attention, cognitively change the interpretation of a situation, or modulate the emotional response. Attempting to provide potential research directions on the emotion regulation functions of self-talk, it would be interesting to explore how goal-directed self-talk could most effectively target the cycle of emotions; whether goal-directed self-talk can be more effective with a direct or an indirect focus on emotion regulation; and whether an explicit focus on the underlying psychological processes of spontaneous self-talk could help and thus make the use of goal-directed self-talk more effective.

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Lazarus, R. S. (2000). How emotions influence performance in competitive sports. The Sport Psychologist, 14, 229–252. LeDoux, J. E. (1996). The emotional brain: The mysterious underpinnings of emotional life. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. Lindquist, K. A., Siegel, E. H., Quigley, K. S., & Barrett, L. F. (2013). The hundred-year emotion war: Are emotions natural kinds or psychological construc­ tions? Comment on Lench, Flores, and Bench (2011). Psychological Bulletin, 139, 255–263. Martinent, G., Ledos, S., Ferrand, C., Campo, M., & Nicolas, M. (2015). Athletes’ regulation of emotions experienced during competition: A naturalistic videoassisted study. Sport, Exercise, and Performance Psychology, 4, 188–205. Mauss, I. B., & Robinson, M. D. (2009). Measures of emotion: A review. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 209–237. Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: Does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126, 247–259. Ochsner, K. N., Silvers, J. A., & Buhle, J. T. (2012). Functional imaging studies of emotion regulation: A synthetic review and evolving model of the cognitive control of emotion. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1251, E1–E24. Robazza, C., & Bortoli, L. (2007). Perceived impact of anger and anxiety on sporting performance in rugby players. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 8, 875–896. Russell, J. A. (2009). Emotion, core affect, and psychological construction. Cognition and Emotion, 23, 1259–1283. Strack, F., Martin, L. L., & Stepper, S. (1988). Inhibiting and facilitating conditions of the human smile: A nonobtrusive test of the facial feedback hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 768–777. Strauch, U. G., Wäsche, H., & Jekauc, D. (2018). Positive affektive Reaktionen in Sport und Bewegung durch allgemeine Kompetenzen und spezifische Verhaltens­ kompetenzen von Trainerinnen und Trainern. Zeitschrift für Sportpsychologie, 25, 53–67. Tamminen, K. A., & Crocker, P. R. E. (2013). “I control my own emotions for the sake of the team”: Emotional self-regulation and interpersonal emotion regulation among female high-performance curlers. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 14, 737–747. Theodorakis, Y., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Chroni, S. (2008). Self-talk: It works, but how? Development and preliminary validation of the functions of self-talk questionnaire. Measurement in Physical Education and Exercise Science, 12, 10–30. Turner, M. J. (2016). Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), irrational and rational beliefs, and the mental health of athletes. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1423. Turner, M. J., Kirkham, L., & Wood, A. G. (2018). Teeing up for success: The effects of rational and irrational self-talk on the putting performance of amateur golfers. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 38, 148–153. Van Raalte, J. L., Vincent, A., & Brewer, B. W. (2016). Self-talk: Review and sport-specific model. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 22, 139–148. Wagstaff, C. R. (2014). Emotion regulation and sport performance. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 36(4), 401–412. Wagstaff, C. R., & Weston, N. J. (2014). Examining emotion regulation in an isolated performance team in Antarctica. Sport, Exercise, and Performance Psychology, 3, 273–287.

76 Julian Fritsch and Darko Jekauc Webb, T. L., Miles, E., & Sheeran, P. (2012). Dealing with feeling: A meta-analysis of the effectiveness of strategies derived from the process model of emotion regulation. Psychological Bulletin, 138, 775–808. Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic processes of mental control. Psychological Review, 101, 34–52. Wilson, M. R., Wood, G., & Vine, S. J. (2009). Anxiety, attentional control, and per­ formance impairment in penalty kicks. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 31, 761–775. Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. (1908). The relation of strength of stimulus to rapid­ ity of habit-formation. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 18, 459–482.

6

Organic Self-talk Antecedents An Interpretative Review and

Implications for Practice

Aristea Karamitrou, Evangelos Galanis, Yannis Theodorakis, and Nikos Comoutos

Introduction People experience approximately 4,000 thoughts on a 16-hour day (Clark & Rhyno, 2005) and nearly 96% of adults talk to themselves (Winsler, Feder, Way, & Manfra, 2006), engaging in what is called internal dialogue, inner speech, or self-talk. Although we are often not fully aware of this internal dialogue and its content, according to cognitive behavioural theories (Ellis, 1994; Meichenbaum, 1977), it influences our emotions and our behaviour, and sometimes it can keep us from doing our best. Various terms have been used in general psychology to describe this internal dialogue, such as automatic thoughts, internal dialogue, inner conversation, self-statements, self­ verbalisations, and self-instructions (see Chapter 2); in the sport psychology literature the term “self-talk” has prevailed (Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2012). The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview on the antecedents of athletes’ organic self-talk (previously referred to as “automatic self-talk”) followed by directions for future research and applications. In particular, first, we review research examining the factors that shape athletes’ organic self-talk, and then we provide relevant directions for future research based on identified gaps in the literature. Finally, based on the existing evidence, we present interventions that can be used to change factors that influence self-talk. Thus, these interventions would indirectly regulate self-talk. In this chapter, we assume a contemporary conceptual framework (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019) that distinguishes between two major dimensions of organic self-talk: spontaneous and goaldirected self-talk. This theoretical perspective could lead to the discovery of new interpretations of previous findings, since much of the research into the antecedents of organic self-talk of athletes has been conducted before researchers began to distinguish between types of organic self-talk. Instead, researchers who studied organic self-talk have previously distinguished between positive and negative self-talk and their respective sub-dimensions, regardless of their spontaneous or goal-directed nature. This distinction between spontaneous and goal-directed was not only introduced much later in sports psychology; it has not yet been operationalised in order to provide

78 Aristea Karamitrou et al. researchers with an assessment tool appropriate for quantitative research inquiries. The purpose of this chapter is primarily to contribute to the existing literature by attempting for the first time to reinterpret earlier research on the antecedents of athletes’ organic self-talk with regards to the distinction between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk. To do this, we turn to recent findings from the study of organic self-talk to re-examine the differences between positive and negative self-talk categories used in previous research. First, considering the content of negative self-talk in established scales, negative self-talk has been described as performance worries and disengagement (e.g., Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle, 2002; Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni, Theodorakis, & Papaioannou, 2009), somatic fatigue (e.g., Zourbanos et al., 2009), self-blame, and self-attack (e.g., Conroy & Metzler, 2004). Given our knowledge of the content and structure of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, it can be assumed that negative self-talk almost always reflects spontaneous self-talk. This assumption was recently confirmed by a study exploring the content of spontaneous self-talk (e.g., Latinjak, Corbalan-Frigola, Alcoy-Fabregas, & Barker, 2019). Second, considering the content of positive self-talk scales, but also from studies examining self-talk as a psychological skill used by athletes during practice and competitions (e.g., Harwood, Cumming, & Fletcher, 2004; Zourbanos, Theodorakis, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2006), positive self-talk has been described as psyching-up, building confidence, controlling anxiety, and providing instruction (e.g., Zourbanos et al., 2009), or self-affirming and self-protecting (e.g., Conroy & Metzler, 2004). From studies of the nature of goal-directed self-talk, we can infer that most of the positive self-talk described in earlier studies is likely to be goal-directed self-talk. The types of positive self-talk mentioned above match many of the categories introduced in the study of athletes’ goal-directed self-talk functions (e.g., Latinjak, Masó, Calmeiro, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2019). Nonetheless, these interpretations should be viewed with caution, because the classification into spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk was made by us, posthoc, and not by the researchers who conducted the studies, and also because it is fairly certain that there is a small overlap in the content between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk.

Self-talk Antecedents Theodorakis et al. (2012) identified three key research questions regarding understanding of self-talk in sport. The first refers to the description and the content of athletes’ self-talk, the second involves the antecedents or the factors that shape athletes’ self-talk, while the third involves the consequences or impact of self-talk on various outcome variables, of which sport performance is the most important. Until recently, in sport psychology, research on strategic self-talk and its effects on sport performance has dominated the self-talk literature. Recently, however, after Latinjak, Zourbanos, López-Ros, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2014) introduced the distinction between the two types of

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organic self-talk, and after suggestions were formulated on the importance of identifying the mechanisms through which self-talk influences performance and self-regulation (Hatzigeorgiadis & Galanis, 2017), research on the functions and mechanisms of self-talk has also attracted significant research attention. Despite increasing research efforts, research on the factors that influence athletes’ organic self-talk is still at a developmental stage. Research on the antecedents of organic self-talk is based on a review by Hardy, Oliver, and Tod (2009) and later works by Zourbanos and colleagues (Zourbanos et al., 2011; Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Tsiakaras, Chroni, & Theodorakis, 2010), who proposed and developed a framework for the study of self-talk. Hardy et al. (2009), based on the existing research evidence, proposed two classes of self-talk antecedents: personal and situational. Zourbanos et al. (2010, 2011), meanwhile, examined the influence of coaches on athletes’ self-talk and found that aspects of coaching behaviour have an important impact on athletes’ organic self-talk. In view of these findings, but also the importance of motivational climate and team dynamics for athletes’ cognitions and emotions, Theodorakis et al. (2012) introduced a third class of antecedents designated as socialenvironmental factors. Empirical evidence in the sport psychology literature regarding these clusters of self-talk antecedents are presented in the next section of this chapter.

Personal Factors A primary factor of importance in human functioning are the variables that relate to individual differences. Among them, Hardy et al. (2009) identified personality traits as a type of self-talk antecedent. Research in sport has indeed shown that more global personality traits (e.g., self-concept, trait anxiety, motivation) may be related to athletes’ self-talk. Particularly, Perry and Marsh (2000) attributed the extremely negative-spontaneous self-talk exhibited by an elite swimmer to his negative self-concept. Regarding trait anxiety, Conroy and Metzler (2004) found that recreational athletes’ organic self-talk was strongly related to fear of failure and sport anxiety, and mildly related to fear of success. In particular, considering the conceptualisation of organic self-talk, negative-spontaneous self-talk, such as self-blame, self-attack, and self-neglect were positively related to trait anxiety, whereas goal-directed self-talk, such as self-affirmation, selfprotection, and self-control were negatively related to trait anxiety. Among the potential personal self-talk antecedents, motivational orientations have attracted considerable research attention. In a series of studies, Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle examined the relation between athletes’ negative-spontaneous self-talk and their goal orientations (Hatzigeorgiadis, 2002; Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle, 1999, 2002). This line of studies reached some interesting findings regarding a type of negative-spontaneous self-talk that expresses the desire to disengage from a competition. With regards to goal-orientation, (1) task orientation was negatively related to disengagement

80 Aristea Karamitrou et al. self-talk. Furthermore, (2) for athletes with lower perceived competence, ego orientation was positively related to disengagement self-talk, whereas for athletes with higher perceived competence, no relationship between ego orientations and disengagement self-talk emerged. In addition, (3) athletes with high ego and low task orientations were more vulnerable to disengagement self-talk than were athletes with different goal profiles. Lastly, (4) self-consciousness mediated the relationship between ego orientations and disengagement self-talk. Overall, these studies evidenced that goal-orientation is linked to observations of negative-spontaneous self-talk. Looking at more positive, goal-directed self-talk, Harwood et al. (2004) examined self-talk as a psychological skill used by athletes during practice and competition, similar to imagery or goal setting. Harwood et al. reported that athletes with higher task and moderate ego orientations had more positive-goal-directed self-talk than did athletes with lower task and moderate ego orientations and athletes with moderate task and lower ego orientations. The aforementioned findings suggest that task orientation is related to more adaptive self-talk (at least in terms of self-talk content), whereas for ego orientation, relationships with self-talk may depend on other personal or situational factors. In a similar vein, Karamitrou, Comoutos, Hatzigeorgiadis, and Theodorakis (2017) examined the links between athletes’ organic self-talk and motivation under the self-determination theory prism. They found that autonomous motivation positively predicted positive-goal-directed self-talk and negatively predicted negative-spontaneous self-talk. Otherwise, controlled motivation negatively predicted positive-goal-directed self-talk and positively predicted negative-spontaneous self-talk. Overall, the results of this study provided further support for the role of motivation in shaping athletes’ self-talk, suggesting that autonomous motivation encourages athletes’ self-regulation via the use of more goal-directed self-talk, whereas controlled motivations makes people self-regulate less and therefore dwell on their unpleasant or detrimental psychological processes, which are often expressed through spontaneous self-talk. Regarding other personal factors, Hardy et al. (2009) looked at Paivio’s (1971) dual coding theory to propose coding preferences as a potential factor influencing athletes’ self-talk. According to Paivio, each person prefers encoding and processing information either verbally or nonverbally. Hardy et al. (2009) hypothesised that athletes with a strong verbal cognitive processing preference are likely to use self-talk more frequently than athletes with a strong nonverbal processing preference. However, this hypothesis has not yet been confirmed in sports-specific research, which is limited, compared to research in general psychology, by the lack of relevant sport-specific assessment tools. Thus, more research is needed to test the above hypothesis on significant differences between athletes in terms of their processing preferences. The focus of interest would be on the impact of verbal cognitive and nonverbal processing preferences on the frequency of organic self-talk and, in

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particular, on the occurrence of spontaneous self-talk and use of goaldirected self-talk and their respective subcategories. Moreover, athletes’ belief in the true potential of their self-talk in bringing about a change in psychological processes, has been identified as an important antecedent for using goal-directed self-talk. Related to athletes’ self-talk beliefs, a study in sport-specific research (Van Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, & Petitpas, 1994) showed that tennis players who believed that self-talk influences the outcome of their matches won more points than non-believers, despite there being no differences between them in the amount of observable self-talk displayed. Υet, this study only assessed observable self-talk, which reflects only a small part of one’s actual self-talk; therefore, the findings can only be considered cautiously. More recently, in further support of previous findings, athletes in reflexive self-talk interventions (Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, Lorido-Méndez, & Hardy, 2019; see also, Chapter 7) have identified that belief in their inner voice is crucial. The study of beliefs about the effectiveness of self-talk warrants further attention, as it has considerable implications for sport psychology practice and the development of effective self-talk interventions. Future research on that topic could explore cognitive factors that are related to beliefs regarding the power of self-talk, such as mental fatigue or ego depletion. Overall, compared to the other clusters of antecedents, research on personal factors that may shape athletes’ organic self-talk has been limited. Further examination of personal factors will facilitate our understanding regarding individual differences in self-talk experiences.

Situational Factors Although self-talk is partly determined by personal factors that describe who we are, it is also shaped by the immediate events that precede a self-talk experience. These events are called situational factors, and include aspects as diverse as winning or losing a point, or having had an argument with a team mate. A key situational self-talk antecedent proposed by Hardy et al. (2009) is match circumstances. First, Van Raalte, Cornelius, Brewer, and Hatten (2000) examined match circumstances as an antecedent of positive and negative self-talk in tennis players. They found that for most players, negative-spontaneous self-talk was observed following lost points or fault serving, even though some participants, after losing points used goaldirected, mainly instructional and motivational self-talk. However, the study assessed only observable self-talk and therefore provided only preliminary evidence that competition progress could influence athletes’ self-talk. In another early relevant study, Hardy, Hall, and Hardy (2005) found that athletes use more self-talk in competition than during practice. The authors also reported that athletes use almost all the goal-directed self-talk functions (e.g., relaxation, nerve control, mental preparation, focus, copying) more in competition than in practice. Finally, Hardy et al. found that athletes use

82 Aristea Karamitrou et al. more self-talk during their practice and competition compared to moments before or after sport practice. Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle (2008) provided additional support to Van Raalte et al.’s above preliminary findings when they examined discrepancies between goals and performance as predictors of negative-spontaneous self-talk in middle-distance runners during a race. Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle found that goal-performance discrepancies strongly predicted performance worries. Hence, these results confirmed that what happens during the competition determines to a large degree athletes’ spontaneous self-talk; at least its negative facet. In the same study, Hatzigeorgiadis and Biddle also examined the relationship of the intensity and the direction of pre-competitive anxiety with negative-spontaneous self-talk. They reported that the intensity of pre-competitive cognitive anxiety positively predicted negativespontaneous self-talk in the form of performance worries. In addition, they reported that a facilitative interpretation of anxiety symptoms was negatively related to this type of negative-spontaneous self-talk. Lastly, Hatzigeorgiadis (2006) also provided experimental support for the role of goal-performance discrepancies in shaping negative-spontaneous self-talk. After creating conditions of attainable and unattainable goals in a rowing task, he found that participants in unattainable goal conditions experienced more self-talk reflecting impulses to disengage. After the introduction of the spontaneous/goal-directed distinction in organic self-talk research in sports, a series of qualitative studies have examined the role of practice and match circumstances in relation to new self-talk classifications. Particularly, Latinjak, Masó, and Comoutos (2018) investigated novice Ultimate Frisbee players’ goal-directed self-talk during technical skill acquisition, looking into three situations: before task execution, and after unsuccessful throws, and successful throws. The results showed that players used mainly instructional self-talk in all situations. However, before their throws, self-talk was generally aimed at technical instruction (e.g., keep your back straight); after unsuccessful throws at negative reinforcement (e.g., that was wrong), error detection (e.g., you bent your back), and technical adjustment (e.g., keep your back straighter); whereas after successful throws self-talk aimed at positive reinforcement (e.g., well done) and technical transference (e.g., continue to keep your back straight). In another recent qualitative study, Latinjak, Torregrossa, Comoutos, Hernando-Gimeno, and Ramis (2019) examined basketball players goaldirected self-talk in stereotypical competitive situations: seconds before a challenging game, while clearly winning or clearly losing, and at the close of a tight game. In line with previous studies, Latinjak et al. concluded that athletes’ self-talk may serve functions specific to the psychological demands experienced in each situation. For instance, prior to a challenging game self-talk was about anxiety control and goal engagement; while clearly winning self-talk was aimed to down-regulate excesses of confidence and control dysfunctional low-arousal states (e.g., relaxation); while clearly

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losing self-talk could help to prevent from disengagement and control debilitative low-arousal states (e.g., sadness); and at the close of a tight game self-talk may serve to instruct and motivate. Finally, Latinjak, Masó, et al. (2019) in a third related qualitative study examined the situational antecedents of athletes’ goal directed self-talk. They found that goal-directed self-talk may be used more in competition than in training. More specifically, they found that goal-directed self-talk may be used more in competitions that are perceived as demanding compared to undemanding, and that athletes may use more goal-directed self-talk to self-regulate during the competition than prior to or after the competition. Although the qualitative evidence presented in this study cannot confirm Hardy et al.’s (2005) previous quantitative findings, it is in line with earlier studies on the situational antecedents of athletes’ goaldirected self-talk. In addition, the study by Latinjak, Masó, et al. (2019) reported that in both competition and training, goal-directed self-talk was elicited after both successful and unsuccessful actions; however, it was more frequent after unsuccessful actions, which fits well with previous qualitative findings (Latinjak et al., 2018). Overall, research on situational factors has shown that the progress of a competition and the quality of performance relative to goals determine in a high degree the athletes’ organic self-talk. Regarding spontaneous self-talk, there is considerable evidence suggesting that failure and goal-performance discrepancies are associated with athletes’ negative-spontaneous self-talk. Regarding goal-directed self-talk, quantitative research before the conceptualisation of organic self-talk, and qualitative research after the conceptualisation of organic self-talk, have indicated that athletes also use goaldirected self-talk to cope with success and failure both in practice and competition, and to face the psychological demands experienced in different competitive situations. To further confirm these findings, and to advance our knowledge regarding the situational antecedents of organic self-talk, a direction for future research would be to examine the situational antecedents of athletes’ spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk through quantitative methods.

Social-Environmental Factors Based on research in educational settings (Burnett, 1996), Zourbanos and colleagues considered the role of significant others in shaping athletes’ selftalk, focusing primarily on the role of one of the key agents in the social environment of the athletes: their coaches. In a series of preliminary studies (Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Theodorakis, 2007; Zourbanos et al., 2006), there was evidence in support of the links between coaching variables and athletes’ self-talk, thus encouraging further research. Following the development of the Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sports (ASTQS; Zourbanos et al., 2009), which contributed to a more systematic framework for research into self-talk antecedents, Zourbanos

84 Aristea Karamitrou et al. et al. (2010) in a multimethod investigation provided more robust field­ correlational evidence regarding the links between coaching behaviours and athletes’ organic self-talk. The results from a correlational field-study (Zourbanos et al., 2010; Study 2) showed that supportive coaching behaviours were positively related to positive-goal-directed self-talk and negatively related to negative-spontaneous self-talk. Accordingly, unsupportive coaching behaviours were negatively related to positive-goal-directed self-talk, and positively related to negative-spontaneous self-talk. Importantly, these findings were confirmed through experimental evidence (Zourbanos et al., 2010; Study 3) regarding the impact of coaching behaviours on athletes’ organic selftalk, thus supporting the causal nature of the relationship. More specifically, it was found that in the experimental condition, supportive coaching behaviours decreased tennis players’ negative-spontaneous self-talk related to worry, whereas unsupportive coaching behaviours were found to decrease tennis players’ positive-goal-directed self-talk related to confidence, psych up, and instruction. De Muynck et al. (2017) extended and partially supported the above evidence with an experimental study in tennis clubs, combining the ASTQS and a thinking-aloud procedure for the assessment of self-talk. In line with Zourbanos et al. (2010; Study 3), they reported that positive normative feedback decreased tennis players’ negative-spontaneous self-talk. However, positive normative feedback was not found to cause tennis players to use more positive-goal-directed self-talk, supporting Zourbanos et al.’s (2010; Study 2) assertion that negative-spontaneous self-talk is more vulnerable to the influence of significant others than positive-goal-directed self-talk. Lastly, in another cross-sectional study, Zourbanos and colleagues (Zourbanos et al., 2011) found that perceived social support provided by their coach was positively related to athletes’ positive-goal-directed self-talk and negatively related to athletes’ negative-spontaneous self-talk. Coach-created motivational climate is another social-environmental factor that may influence athletes’ self-talk. Duda (2013) integrated achievement goal theory and self-determination theory to propose a hierarchical conceptualisation of the coach-created motivational climate. According to Duda’s conceptualisation, an empowering climate is task-involving, autonomy supportive, and socially supportive. Inversely, a disempowering climate is highly ego-involving and controlling. Duda suggested that an empowering climate will satisfy athletes’ basic psychological needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness, whereas a disempowering climate will thwart these needs, and this will have an impact on athletes’ cognition and emotion. Based on the above assumptions, Zourbanos et al. (2016) examined the links between coach-created climate and athletes self-talk and found that empowering coaching positively predicted athletes’ positive-goal-directed self-talk, whereas disempowering coaching positively predicted athletes’ negative-spontaneous self-talk. Finally, further supporting the existing evidence regarding the important role of the social environment in relation to athletes’ self-talk, Karamitrou et al. (2017) looked at self-determination

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theory to examine whether satisfaction of basic psychological needs within a sport environment could predict athletes’ self-talk. They found that satisfaction of the need for competence positively predicted positive-goal­ directed self-talk and negatively predicted negative-spontaneous self-talk, both directly and indirectly via autonomous motivation. Satisfaction of the need for autonomy positively predicted positive-goal-directed self-talk both directly and indirectly via autonomous motivation. It also negatively predicted negativespontaneous self-talk, in an indirect way via both autonomous and controlled motivation (inversely). Lastly, perceptions of relatedness indirectly predicted athletes’ positive-goal-directed self-talk (positively) and negative-spontaneous self-talk (negatively) through autonomous motivation. Overall, research on social-environmental antecedents indicated that social context can determine athletes’ organic self-talk. Supportive coaching behaviours, an empowering coach-created motivational climate, and a needsupportive sporting environment have been linked with athletes’ use of goaldirected self-talk, and thus self-regulation attempts, while simultaneously diminishing the use of negative-spontaneous self-talk. Conversely, negative coaching behaviours and a disempowering coach-created motivational climate have been positively linked to athletes’ negative-spontaneous self-talk. Although we attempted to present the existing research on social-environmental antecedents of athletes’ organic self-talk in terms of spontaneous/goal-directed self-talk, a limitation of this body of research is that it has been based entirely on the wider positive/negative distinction of self-talk. Thus, it is important to note that (a) this interpretation is considered with caution, and (b) further examination of the social-environmental antecedents of athletes’ organic self-talk is warranted, adopting the recent conceptualisation of organic self-talk, to further advance our understanding regarding the influences of social contexts on athletes’ self-talk.

Future Research Directions Along with the future research directions already mentioned in the previous sections of this chapter, a number of important methodological suggestions can be raised. It should be noted that research on organic self-talk antecedents are almost exclusively field-correlational studies, thus not justifying causal inferences. This is particularly so, considering that many of the identified links between antecedents and organic self-talk may reflect reciprocal relationships. Consequently, longitudinal and experimental studies are warranted to better understand these relationships and to claim causality with some confidence. In addition, several other antecedents warrant further investigation. The highest priority should be given to antecedents susceptible to change by interventions (Theodorakis et al., 2012). Some of these include the motivational climate created by coach, peers or parents, leadership factors, athletes’ basic needs being satisfied or thwarted, behavioural regulations,

86 Aristea Karamitrou et al. goal-orientations, and interpretation of competitive situations. Finally, as future research should focus on the antecedents of organic self-talk based on this recent self-talk conceptualisation, the need for quantitative instruments reflecting this perspective is important. Although, there are some qualitative findings regarding the antecedents of athletes’ spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2017; Latinjak et al., 2018; Latinjak, Masó, et al., 2019), concepts of spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk have not yet been operationalised. Such efforts provide assessment appropriate for quantitative research methodologies. While the ASTQS includes statements, and accordingly factors, that can be described as spontaneous self-talk (e.g., worry and disengagement), and goal-directed self-talk (e.g., instruction and anxiety control), these distinctions have not been made in the development of ASTQS. Thus, a direction that would help guide future research is the refinement of ASTQS, so that the questionnaire takes into consideration the recent self-talk classifications. Such a refinement will allow us to examine quantitatively the recent self-talk classifications in relation to different antecedents, thus further enhancing our understanding regarding athletes’ organic self-talk and the factors that shape it.

Interventions Regulating Athletes’ Organic Self-talk According to Theodorakis et al. (2012), studying the factors that shape athletes’ organic self-talk is an important research direction because it could help us to intervene and change such factors, thus regulating organic self-talk according to individual needs. Regulating athletes’ organic self-talk includes both preventing unwanted self-talk and fostering facilitative self-talk (Theodorakis et al., 2012). Based on the existing research evidence, interventions could be implemented at three levels of self-talk antecedents to change athletes’ organic self-talk in effective directions: attempting to change personal factors, regulating perceptions of circumstances and consequences, and changing the environment within which sport takes place. We begin this section by describing interventions on social-environmental self-talk antecedents (such as motivational climate and coaching behaviour), because based on existing knowledge, such interventions have the potential to also change personal self-talk antecedents (goal orientation, anxiety, emotions; Duda, 2013) and situational perceptions. Therefore, we assume that without such interventions, we will be less effective in our attempts to regulate athletes’ organic self-talk to match athletes’ individual needs. Research on social-environmental self-talk antecedents indicated that supportive coaching behaviours, an empowering coach-created motivational climate, and an environment that supports athletes’ psychological needs are positively linked with athletes’ positive-goal directed self-talk and negatively related to negative-spontaneous self-talk. Inversely, negative coaching behaviours, and a disempowering coach-created motivational climate, which is a need-thwarting environment, have been positively linked to athletes’

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negative-spontaneous self-talk. Overall, the above social-environmental antecedents correspond to Duda’s (2013) integrative approach introducing the concepts of empowering (i.e., task-involving, autonomy-supportive and socially supportive) and disempowering coach-created motivational climate (ego-involving and controlling). Thus, interventions that educate coaches how to create a more empowering and less disempowering motivational climate (e.g., Empowering Coaching™; Duda, 2013) have the potential to diminish unproductive negative-spontaneous self-talk and maximise positive­ goal-directed self-talk, in turn facilitating self-regulation and performance. Previous implementation of Empowering Coaching interventions have resulted in improving athletes’ well-being (e.g., self-esteem) and reduced illbeing (e.g., anxiety). Thus, a positive motivational climate appears to influence factors (such as task-orientation, anxiety, emotions, self-esteem) that are related to organic self-talk, thus further assisting, indirectly, the prevention of unwanted self-talk and the promotion of facilitative self-talk. Experimental studies in sport (De Muynck et al., 2017) and educational contexts (Oliver, Markland, Hardy, & Petherick, 2008) provide support to the above assertion and further confirm the correlational evidence in sport settings. Especially, De Muynck et al. (2017) in their experimental study in tennis clubs found that positive feedback and an autonomy-supportive style of providing it, positively influenced tennis players’ enjoyment and persistence, with psychological need satisfaction and self-talk playing a mediating role. More specifically, the beneficial effect of positive feedback was explained via greater satisfaction of the need for competence and decreased negative self-talk, whereas the beneficial effect of an autonomy-supportive communication style was explained via greater satisfaction of the need for autonomy. Regarding personal and situational self-talk antecedents, interventions that target goal orientations and trait/state anxiety can help regulate organic selftalk. Previous research showed that task orientation was related to less negative-spontaneous self-talk, while trait/state anxiety were related to more negative-spontaneous self-talk. Also, the progress of the competition or the performance quality relative to the goals, was considered a crucial self-talk antecedent (Theodorakis et al., 2012). Thus, interventions aimed to promote the pursuit of self-referenced and controllable goals will likely reduce athletes’ negative-spontaneous self-talk, due to the self-referenced nature of goals, and by reducing the probabilities of large goal-performance discrepancies and accompanying negative emotions. Regarding precompetitive anxiety, research has shown that anxiety intensity and direction are respectively positively and negatively related to spontaneous-negative self-talk. Thus, cognitive behavioural interventions (see for example, Chapter 8) could be designed with the aim of training athletes to reduce anxiety symptoms, and accompanying negative-spontaneous self-talk, with the use of cognitive restructuring and relaxation strategies. Concerning anxiety interpretation, athletes could be trained to accept anxiety as a normal response to competition and interpret it as facilitative to their performance (for ideas on mindfulness-acceptance approaches,

88 Aristea Karamitrou et al. see Chapter 15). Cognitive restructuring could also help athletes to regulate other dysfunctional emotions and accompanying negative-spontaneous self-talk. In line with cognitive behavioural interventions, acceptance approaches, and cognitive reconstruction, an intervention has been developed that aims to address many of the personal antecedents of organic self-talk. Reflexive self-talk interventions (Latinjak, Font-Lladó, Zourbanos, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2016; see also, Chapter 7) could further assist the regulation of organic self-talk by training athletes to identify problematic sport situations and goal-directed self-talk, and substitute problematic goal-directed self-talk with alternative, more facilitative self-instructions. This intervention has shown that it is possible to increase awareness of negative spontaneous self-talk and to promote belief in the potential of goal-directed self-talk to solve psychological challenges. In summary, research has expanded our knowledge of self-talk antecedents. Although much research has been done with a self-talk model that differentiates between positive and negative self-talk, in this chapter we have succeeded in translating some key findings into the new self-talk framework. One might think that recognising spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk might invalidate earlier research, but we have come to appreciate reality as being closer to the opposite. The recent advances in conceptualisation discussed in this book are in line with previous findings, reinforcing their value and, meanwhile, opening up new fascinating research questions for the future.

Acknowledgement This work is co-financed by Greece and the European Union (European Social Fund [ESF]) through the operational program: Human Resources Development, Education and Lifelong Learning, in the context of the project “Strengthening Human Resources Research Potential via Doctorate Research” (MIS-5000432), implemented by the State Scholarships Foundation (ΙΚΥ).

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90 Aristea Karamitrou et al. Latinjak, A. T., Torregrossa, M., Comoutos, N., Hernando-Gimeno, C., & Ramis, Y. (2019). Goal-directed self-talk used to self-regulate in male basketball competitions. Journal of Sports Sciences, 37, 1429–1433. Latinjak, A. T., Zourbanos, N., López-Ros, V., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2014). Goaldirected and undirected self-talk: Exploring a new perspective for the study of ath­ letes’ self-talk. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 15, 548–558. Meichenbaum, D. (1977). Cognitive-behavior modification: An integrative approach. New York, NY: Plenum Press. Oliver, E. J., Markland, D., Hardy, J., & Petherick, C. M. (2008). The effects of autonomy-supportive and controlling environments on self-talk. Motivation and Emotion, 32, 200–212. Paivio, A. (1971). Imagery and verbal processes. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Perry, C., Jr., & Marsh, H. (2000). Listening to self-talk, hearing self-concept. In M. B. Andersen (Ed.), Doing sport psychology (pp. 61–76). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Theodorakis, Y., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Zourbanos, N. (2012). Cognitions: Self-talk and performance. In S. Murphy (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of sport and perform­ ance psychology (pp. 191–212). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Van Raalte, J. L., Brewer, B. W., Rivera, P. M., & Petitpas, A. J. (1994). The relation­ ship between observable self-talk and competitive junior tennis players’ match per­ formances. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 16, 400–415. Van Raalte, J. L., Cornelius, A. E., Brewer, B. W., & Hatten, S. J. (2000). The ante­ cedents and consequences of self-talk in competitive tennis. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 22, 345–356. Winsler, A., Feder, M. L., Way, E., & Manfra, L. (2006). Maternal beliefs concerning young children’s private speech. Infant and Child Development, 15, 403–420. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Chroni, S., Theodorakis, Y., & Papaioannou, A. (2009). Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sports (ASTQS): Development and preliminary validity of a measure identifying the structure of athletes’ self-talk. The Sport Psychologist, 23, 233–251. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Goudas, M., Papaioannou, A., Chroni, S., & Theodorakis, Y. (2011). The social side of self-talk: Relationships between percep­ tions of support received from the coach and athletes’ self- talk. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 12, 407–414. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Theodorakis, Y. (2007). A preliminary investi­ gation of the relationship between athletes’ self-talk and coaches’ behavior and state­ ments. International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching, 2, 57–66. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Tsiakaras, N., Chroni, S., & Theodorakis, Y. (2010). A multimethod examination of the relationship between coaching behavior and athletes’ inherent self-talk. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 32, 764–785. Zourbanos, N., Haznadar, A., Papaioannou, A., Tzioumakis, Y., Krommidas, C., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2016). The relationships between athletes’ perceptions of coach-created motivational climate, self-talk, and self-efficacy in youth soccer. Jour­ nal of Applied Sport Psychology, 28, 97–112. Zourbanos, N., Theodorakis, Y., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2006). Coaches’ behavior, social support and athletes’ self-talk. Hellenic Journal of Psychology, 3, 150–163.

7 The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention Detailed Procedures Alexander T. Latinjak, Lucía Figal-Gomez, Philip Solomon-Turay, and Rafel Magrinyà-Vinyes Introduction Since the dawn of self-talk research, we have collected evidence that shows the crucial role of self-talk for improving self-regulation in sport (e.g., Highlen & Bennett, 1983; Rotella, Gansneder, Ojala, & Billing, 1980). Therefore, it is not surprising that much of the self-talk research has focused on interventions that seek to harness the potential of self-talk to positively impact sport performance. The result of numerous attempts to harvest the benefits of self-talk have led to the development of self-talk interventions that include repetition of cue words (e.g., Landin & Hebert, 1999; Ziegler, 1987). In particular, instructional and motivational cue word interventions (Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, & Kazakas, 2000) have been developed and applied to a variety of sports and have generally produced positive results (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011; Tod, Hardy, & Oliver, 2011). However, as our research into self-talk in sports has expanded, it has become clear that the repetition of cue words in traditional interventions is qualitatively different from the organic, goal-directed self-talk that athletes use to support their self-regulation (Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2012). Goal-directed self-talk is a form of rational and intentional thinking, which includes the representation of current and desired states and develops coordinated actions that attempt to convert the former to the latter (Unterrainer & Owen, 2006). While the goal-directed self-talk is generated autonomously by the athlete, the self-talk in traditional interventions is derived from pre-established self-talk strategies and is therefore associated with memory and following a plan (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019). To reflect the prescribed nature of repeating cue words, these interventions are today identified as strategic self-talk interventions (see Chapter 2). Regardless of the value of strategic self-talk interventions, it should be noted that these are process-oriented interventions (see Chapter 1). Accordingly, strategic self-talk interventions aim to change psychological processes, such as attention, emotions, and motivation, directly rather than by strengthening psychological skills.

92 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. Although the most important research focus has been strategic self-talk interventions, the relevance of goal-directed self-talk has not gone unnoticed by applied psychologists. A variety of cognitive behavioural approaches, including cognitive-behavioural therapy (Beck, 1976) and rational-emotive behaviour therapy (Ellis, 1976), have identified and used self-talk as a key mechanism for change (see Chapter 8). For example, a traditional assumption underlying these therapeutic approaches is that rearranging and reconstructing verbal statements about oneself and one’s own context leads to a corresponding reordering of behaviour in relation to one’s own context (Risley & Hart, 1968). However, there was a gap in the sport psychology literature with regard to specific methods used to strengthen goal-directed self-talk. Irrespective of the research mass on strategic self-talk interventions, there was a demand for interventions that place goal-directed self-talk in the centre of applied practice. Such interventions could be crucial, as goal-directed self-talk is much more than just verbalisations: it raises awareness of possible or current psychological challenges and enhances the use of psychological skills to meet those challenges. Since goal-directed self-talk is closely linked to metacognition and metacognition is developed through planning, monitoring, and reflection (see, Chapter 4), this new procedure was called a reflexive self-talk intervention (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). Overall, reflexive self-talk interventions aim to strengthen the goal-directed self-talk of the athlete by (a) raising awareness of psychological challenges, (b) improving the choice of psychological skills, and (c) thinking about the content of goal-directed self-talk.

Setting Up a Reflexive Self-talk Intervention Session A reflexive self-talk intervention consists of conversations that take place outside the regular training facilities in small groups, in personal meetings or in online sessions. In our first attempt to illustrate the intervention procedures and to report on the experiences of an elite athlete with the reflexive self-talk intervention, we organised a series of face-to-face sessions in an office at the university (Latinjak, Font-Lladó, Zourbanos, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2016). From practical experience, we have found that physical distancing from regular training sites helps athletes to take a different perspective when exploring psychological challenges. The assessment of the intervention by the athlete supported our assumption. However, in a second study, we decided to include the intervention procedure in a gym session just before and after the exercises that caused the relevant psychological challenges (Latinjak et al., 2018). The results of this study could not prove the effectiveness of the intervention. We strongly believe that performing the intervention in the gym and immediately before and after the sport task is partly responsible for the fact that athletes did not scrutinise the goal-directed self-talk enough to cause a significant change in

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 93 performance. In a parallel study, we decided to deliver the intervention online via a popular text messenger service (Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, Lorido-Méndez, & Hardy, 2019). The online implementation received both positive and negative feedback from the athletes and sports psychologists. However, the fact that athletes reviewed their goal-directed self-talk at home, in coffee shops, or while traveling, was important. The distance from sports environments allowed the athletes to gain new and enriching self-regulation perspectives. Regardless of the mode of delivery, reflexive self-talk interventions are always athlete-centred, as the sports psychologist merely guides the athlete into considerations that may lead to new insights into self-regulation. For this reason, the sports psychologist pursues an instructive and challenging, questioning approach, mainly using interrogative feedback. Accordingly, Socratic Questioning (McArdle & Moore, 2012) is a useful concept for promoting the development of metacognitive skills. These skills, in turn, help to gain non-judgmental self-awareness and then to think logically and empirically to challenge, correct, and replace self-regulation strategies. In cognitive-behavioural therapy, Socratic Questioning, which consists of asking a person a series of open-ended questions to help promote reflection, is considered useful for raising awareness and improving thinking for problem-solving (Neenan, 2009). In this chapter, we summarise the key actions and present them in a 25-step board-game format to demonstrate to sports psychologists how to engage in reflexive self-talk interventions (see, Figure 7.1). In the following sections of this chapter, we will describe each of these steps and offer examples from various reflexive self-talk intervention sessions conducted with talented and elite athletes.

Finding a Psychological Challenge to Explore The start: every reflexive self-talk intervention session focuses on one psychological challenge. The athlete must select for the session a situation in which he/she experienced an unpleasant and/or detrimental psychological process (Figure 7.1, Step 1). These psychological processes are often intrapersonal, such as anxiety, demotivation, or distraction. Yet, sometimes these psychological processes can also be interpersonal, such as social conflicts, peer pressure, or lack of team cohesion. It is important to note that, especially during the first sessions, the sports psychologist may need to explain to the athlete what we mean by a psychological challenge. SPORT PSYCHOLOGIST (SP): Today we will first explore a psychological chal­

lenge related to sports practice. A psychological challenge occurs when a situation is unpleasant, such as boring, exhausting, or painful, or when you play worse because of your mental game, like when you are impa­ tient or distracted.

Figure 7.1 25-Step Board-Game Format to Engage in the Reflexive Self-talk Intervention with Athletes.

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 95 Once the athlete has described a situation, the sports psychologist should determine if the psychological challenge is appropriate for exploration. Most importantly, a psychological challenge should be situational, that is, the athlete describes a specific event. Athletes frequently report general challenges, such as being demotivated or feeling unwell. Since selfregulation and thus goal-directed self-talk take place at certain moments, we ask the athlete to refer to certain situations in which the general challenge has shown its dysfunctional nature. ATHLETE (A): I feel demotivated when I see that my teammates are not

ambitious enough. I just want to go home. SP: I understand that this happens to you frequently. To better address your

challenge in today’s session, I would like to talk about a specific day when this challenge took place. Could you pick a day when it happened? A: Yes, it happened just today. I came to training and three boys came too late. Another group spent the whole warm-up talking about getting drunk. I felt bad for the coach, who is constantly being ignored by many players, and I just wanted to quit training or even handball. As shown in the previous example, athletes often choose a psychological challenge that has recently taken place in training or competition. However, athletes may also choose to explore psychological challenges they expect in the future. Of course, this is more common in the days prior to an important event. A: Next week, I will be playing my first tournament abroad, and if I start

losing, I might have doubts that the whole trip was worth it. For sure I will feel very bad when this happens and then I will play even worse. Any psychological challenge can lead to a meaningful discussion as long as the athletes see it as a personally relevant challenge. However, athletes sometimes find it difficult to find a suitable challenge. To prevent the athletes from providing irrelevant stereotyped answers that often lead to insignificant discussions, the sports psychologist can encourage their athletes to record psychological challenges in a notebook in the days before the session as a preparatory exercise. SP: I feel that today we do not find a specific situation that is challenging for

you and that we could explore to improve your self-regulation strategy. A: I have the feeling that I have no challenges that I would like to talk about

today. It’s hard for me to invent just one. SP: That is completely understandable. We can spend the session today

doing … [something different]. However, I would like to suggest that you list all the psychological challenges you might experience during training or competition in your notebook over the next two weeks.

96 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. For effective intervention, it is important for the athletes to perceive the psychological challenges as significant. Otherwise, all subsequent considerations are irrelevant to their personal growth.

Exploring the Psychological Challenge Once a challenge has been selected, the next part of the reflexive self-talk intervention aims at facilitating athletes’ ability for early awareness of psychological challenges. This can be achieved by asking questions about situational and contextual environmental factors that create a challenge, and about unpleasant and/or detrimental psychological processes that make up the challenge. The more athletes learn how environmental factors influence their psychological processes, the easier they find it to anticipate a potential psychological challenge and take preventive action. Normally, at this time, athletes first examine fluctuating, state-like situational environmental factors. Accordingly, the first question relates to the events that led to the psychological challenge (Figure 7.1, Step 2). In addition, the question of who was involved in the challenge (Figure 7.1, Step 3) often provides further relevant insights. It may also be crucial to understand why certain events in this case led to a psychological challenge, while in other cases they did not produce the same response (Figure 7.1, Step 4). SP: Could you think about what happened before you lost your temper? A: Well, Irene had called a ball out, when it was clearly in. SP: Who else was there except you and Irene? A: Joel, one of the coaches, who is usually with another training group. He

didn’t do anything, though he saw what had happened. SP: Do you always lose your temper when someone makes a bad call? If not,

why this time? A: Ok … I admit, I played bad all day and got a little bit upset about it. I was

also tired from school. We just have to do too much … I can’t get it all done. I think I was already a bit nervous when I came to training.

It is quite common for athletes to mix information about situational factors (e.g., a bad call) and psychological processes (e.g., fatigue). The information on psychological processes that will be specifically explored in later steps should be taken note of without further discussion until then. Following questions about situational factors, we focus on contextual environmental factors. Contextual factors are relatively stable and trait-like. As a result, the same factors are likely to reappear over a series of sessions, with different psychological challenges being discussed. To study contextual environmental factors, athletes consider why their psychological challenge might be similar to other athletes’ experiences in the same context. We specifically ask why a psychological challenge in a team, club, or sport is common, normal, or to be expected (Figure 7.1, Step 5).

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 97 SP: Is this level of anxiety common when the club manager comes to

a training session? Do others experience similar emotions? A: Most of us get nervous. The manager has the last word on who is allowed

to participate in international competitions. I think everyone is a bit scared when he’s there. SP: Can this be more the case in your club than in other clubs? AT: I think that happens elsewhere too. My friends in [another city] have the same problem. In a sport where resources are scarce, it is normal for selection procedures to be brutal. While questions about situational factors should shed light on the immediate causes of a psychological challenge, the question of contextual factors should provide information about more stable environmental influences on psychological processes. Usually, athletes’ answers relate to sports policy, scholarships, competition requirements, team structures and dynamics, motivational climate, and coaching behaviour. In combination, situational and contextual environmental factors largely explain how psychological challenges are evoked. Even more important for the intervention, however, is to understand the psychological processes that make up the psychological challenge. To approach psychological processes, we ask athletes about the thoughts and feelings that have arisen in connection with the psychological challenge (Figure 7.1, Step 6). Continuing the previous sequence, we begin again to examine situational processes such as thoughts, emotions, action tendencies, sensations, attention, attributions, and social behaviour. SP: What did you think when you noticed your mistake? A: I felt like everyone was looking at me. And I just could not look back at

them, I was ashamed. I just wanted to get out of there. SP: What else did you feel at the moment besides the shame? A: I felt like I was floating. I could not feel the ground beneath me. I felt my

face turn red and hot. I was sad, I think. Not angry, not at this moment. Later yes. When I got home, I was angry. Because situational processes are closely related to sport performance, a follow-up question should also look at how the unpleasant and/or detrimental psychological processes could have affected behaviour and performance (Figure 7.1, Step 7). [Continuation of the previous example:] SP: What happened after that when the game went on? A: Others came and tried to cheer me up. I’m not sure why, but I turned

away from them. As the game went on, I felt insecure. I didn’t want the ball to come to me.

98 Alexander T. Latinjak et al. Although situational processes and their relationship to performance are judged to be critical by most athletes, they alone cannot provide a detailed picture of the psychological challenge. Other, more abstract processes also play an important role in composing psychological challenges. Therefore, it is important to examine other contextual processes (e.g., motivation and athletic identity) and global processes (e.g., personality or religious beliefs). Contextual and global processes are likely to repeat over the course of several sessions, while discussing different psychological challenges. With the repeated observation of the same contextual or global process, athletes tend to perceive this process as more important. To approach contextual processes, we pose a simple, open question about differences between athletes. We ask the athletes why their reaction to the events was different than the reaction of other athletes in the same situation (Figure 7.1, Step 8). SP: Why were you more nervous than some of your teammates? A: I’m usually more nervous than others. I do not know … Maybe it’s

because I see more than others, that I have to prove that I’m worth the money that they pay me. SP: What do you think makes you more vulnerable to this pressure? A: I think that’s just who I am. All my life I felt that others overestimate me. That makes it harder for me to live up to their expectations. To end the section on the psychological challenge, we summarise the key situational and contextual environmental factors and psychological processes that have surfaced so far (Figure 7.1, Step 9). To simplify this action, we use a template sentence that includes: what we have explored (i.e., the challenging situation), the external triggers (i.e., the situation and context environmental factors), the internal challenges (i.e., situational processes and contextual processes), and how performance and behaviour were affected (i.e., how situational factors affect performance). We recommend working out the summary in writing as the athletes can easily make changes to a sentence on paper. Likewise, it is easier to reread a written summary later in the session, such as when you select psychological skills to master psychological challenges.

Selecting Psychological Skills The next step in the reflexive self-talk intervention is to build metacognitive knowledge about psychological skills and their link with psychological challenges. For this purpose, the athletes learn about the variety of psychological skills and assess their own skills and confidence in them. They also train to identify the psychological skills needed to regulate the unpleasant and/or detrimental psychological processes that shape the psychological challenge currently being studied.

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 99 To stimulate metacognitive knowledge, we help the athlete to discover a variety of skills and to judge the extent to which various skills have been acquired (i.e., perceived skill strength) and can be trusted (i.e., perceived skill confidence). Based on the psychological challenge, the athletes identify mental skills that they consider necessary to master psychological processes in sport (Figure 7.1, Step 10). We support athletes in their efforts with two strategic actions. First, we translate everyday concepts into academic concepts. This allows them to view their psychological skills in much more abstract terms. Academic concepts are particularly relevant, as they make it possible to identify similarities between psychological experiences that can otherwise be overlooked. Regarding the second strategic action, we provide hints and clues when athletes have difficulty thinking about alternative mental skills. SP: Can you list various mental skills that are helpful in controlling anger? A: I need emotion-control skills to control my anger. SP: Indeed. But how could your mind be able to gain emotion control and

reduce anger? For example, do you think your attention plays a role in anger control [i.e., hint and clues]? A: I guess so. I have to focus on the game and forget what happened. SP: Perfect. Should we call the ability to direct attention an attention-control skill [i.e., translation]? A: Fine. That sound good. In each new session that discusses a psychological challenge, new psychological skills will emerge. The more reflexive self-talk intervention sessions have been held, the longer the list of psychological skills. In addition to listing new psychological skills, athletes must also assess how far these skills have developed (Figure 7.1, Step 11) and how confident they are with these skills (Figure 7.1, Step 12). Normally, in each session, we ask the athletes to re-evaluate all their skills in order to represent them as somewhat variable. For subsequent intervention steps, consider that the more complete the list is, the more enlightening the selection process of appropriate psychological skills. By looking together at the summary of situational and contextual factors and psychological processes as well as the list of psychological skills, athletes can start with selection reflections. First, the athletes must select some unpleasant and/or detrimental psychological processes from the summary (Figure 7.1, Step 13). These are the psychological processes that should be targeted by psychological skills to cope with the psychological challenge. SP: When you look at the summary of the mental factors that make up the

challenge, you can pick out the two or three most needed to be resolved. A: I think the anxiety is central, but also the need to always be perfect in

front of my parents. If I could solve these problems, the whole situation would not be a challenge anymore.

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Athletes often find it difficult to look beyond the most obvious answer to this task. If we believe that it is potentially enlightening, we will cautiously suggest other psychological processes that the athlete may have overlooked. [Continuation of the previous example:] SP: I understand why you chose anxiety, but you mentioned earlier a certain

aspect of anxiety that made you play worse. You may want to consider that solving one aspect of anxiety can be more efficient than trying to master the entire emotion. A: Yes, we talked about muscle tension, right? The worst thing about anxiety is the tension. I accept being nervous as long as there is no tension. Yes, we want to solve the tension. The selection of specific psychological processes (e.g., muscle tension) compared to complex, multivariable processes (e.g., anxiety) facilitates the following selection of relevant psychological skills. In order for the athletes to make the right decisions, we ask them to consider the correspondence between psychological processes and skills as well as the strength and their confidence in those skills (Figure 7.1, Step 14). [Continuation of the previous example:] SP: As for muscle tension, which psychological skills from your list fit best?

Also consider how strong a skill is and how much confidence you have in the skill. A: Obviously, a relaxation skill would fit fantastically; nevertheless, I do not trust mine at all. Therefore, I would choose my attention-control skills. As I focus on the game, I stop looking at my parents and become more and more relaxed. I’m pretty good at fading things out if I want. With the selection of psychological skills critical to addressing the psychological challenge, it is time to complete the brief written summary to record the progress of the session. To the previous summary, we add a sentence that summarises the key psychological processes and psychological skills needed to master the challenge (Figure 7.1, Step 15). Understanding the intricacies of a psychological challenge and clearly identifying the key skills required to solve it provides athletes with a solid foundation for the central reflections around goal-directed self-talk.

Questioning the Use of Goal-Directed Self-talk In the crucial phase of a reflexive self-talk intervention session, athletes analyse past goal-directed self-talk applications and examine future alternative self-statements. For athletes to consider goal-directed self-talk as a psychological meta-skill that supports a multitude of self-regulatory processes, we direct reflections in two directions: to self-statements that

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 101 they actually used, and to self-statements that they could have used to master the challenge. To begin the discussion about goal-directed self-talk, the athletes recall what goal-directed self-talk they had used when they experienced the psychological challenge. In all sessions, we formulate an open question about goal-directed self-talk in the past, to encourage athletes to remember as many statements as possible (Figure 7.1, Step 16). SP: When you sat on the bench, did you talk to yourself to feel better and act

in accordance with expectations? A: I was very angry … yet I told myself to calm down. But at the same time,

I just wanted to go home. But I said, “You have to stay,” yet, only much later did I realise that the coach might have had his reasons for getting me off the field.

Intuitively, we expect the athletes to remember concrete statements, as in the previous example (e.g., calm down). Based on our research expertise, we consider this to be an intellectual legacy from the first studies on strategic self-talk interventions (Landin, 1994), in which cue words and phrases were used to evoke cognitive or motivational effects. However, goal-directed self-talk often results from prolonged conversations in the athlete’s mind (Latinjak, 2018), in which analysis and instruction pieces are combined. It is therefore not surprising that athletes are sometimes unable to reproduce concrete statements and instead report vague topics of conversation. A: I tried to understand why I made all these mistakes. I remembered that

my coach had reminded me of my timing, but I did not see that my timing could be wrong. Actually, I thought, I moved well. That’s why I’ve decided to choose better tactical options next time. In addition, after several sessions, a psychological challenge could be discussed a second time. Similarly, some of the psychological challenges athletes originally considered to be different turn out to be very similar. In such cases, we can supplement the open question about the past goaldirected self-talk by asking about the use of statements that were discussed in a previous session. However, this question should not be judgemental in any way. Essentially, a reflexive self-talk intervention never requires the athletes to use statements that are discussed during the sessions. SP: What did you tell yourself to calm your nerves? A: I tried to focus on the moment, not what might happen. SP: Have you thought about relaxing your muscles? We discussed this option

a few weeks ago? A: Honestly, I didn’t. I’m not sure if I forgot it or intuitively thought it was

wrong.

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Regardless of the potential future use of statements, exploring the current use of goal-directed self-talk is crucial, as the strengths and weaknesses of goal-directed self-talk gradually become more apparent. Furthermore, on that basis, alternatives to current goal-directed self-talk arise almost implicitly. Next, we use the summary that includes the selection of psychological skills to help athletes find potential alternative goal-directed selftalk that they could use instead of or in combination with previous statements. In particular, we ask the athletes to work out different self-statements that would support each selected psychological skill (Figure 7.1, Step 17). SP: As you can read in the summary, you have decided that patience is the

ideal skill to deal with the frustration that comes with losing. What could you say to be more patient in your game? A: Of course, I have to remember to take my time. I could also instruct myself to hit the ball safely into the court during the first three shots. This could underline the intention to play a high percentage game. While easy to explain, this step can be time-consuming, especially if the athletes have chosen different skills and made several statements for each. Nevertheless, it is worth taking your time as the athletes gain flexibility in goal-directed self-talk use during this exercise. However, if the number of statements increases excessively and the list is difficult to manage, we recommend that athletes select a few statements per skill. Having combined the list of alternative statements with the statements that have been used successfully in the past, we return to our written summary. In addition to the previous information, we add a sentence that concerns the previous use of goal-directed self-talk and possible self-talk alternatives for the future (Figure 7.1, Step 18). This step often requires the active participation of athletes, not just to select statements, but to decide whether to retain statements that have been used in the past. Consider, as an example, this short summary: Part 1: We examined your lack of motivation to get out to run in the evening. This situation is triggered by recent poor results, problems at school, and long hours of training. It’s a challenge, as feelings of lazi­ ness, guilt, and a lazy personality affect performance, and behaviour by reducing the effort, increasing the dishonesty towards the coach, and increasing the frustration in training sessions. Part 2: We have identified laziness and dishonesty as important psycho­ logical processes. We have selected self-motivation and communication skills as key psychological skills for today’s psychological challenges. Part 3: In the past you have told yourself that “tomorrow will be another day” and “it is better not to tell the coach because he would be disappointed with me.” In the future it could be better to instruct yourself

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 103 to “set smaller goals for the session” and “get out of the house.” More­ over, you could generally rehearse how you could tell the coach that this routine is difficult for you to follow, because you are a bit lazy, which, however, also has positive effects for your game. Reviewing the summary, athletes may opt to introduce modifications. It is important that the athletes are satisfied with the summary as we next try to defy the athlete to change their perspective and, as a result, question all previous decisions. We invite athletes to choose a contrasting approach to goal-directed self-talk. Such a change not only leads to alternative statements, but also to the consideration of new psychological skills that control psychological processes and explain the challenge from a different angle. If successful, this can lead to surprising findings for athletes. One means of achieving this goal is to encourage the athletes to take the perspective of one person helping another person to solve the psychological challenge. Therefore, athletes develop alternative messages by imagining that someone else has experienced their psychological challenge (Figure 7.1, Step 19). This could be someone the athlete admires, like a sports idol, or someone the athlete protects, like a little brother or sister. In addition, we ask athletes if the new messages that should help others can be applied to the self through goal-directed self-talk (Figure 7.1, Step 20)? SP: Could you imagine, that, instead of you, it is your daughter who is afraid,

to mess up, for example, her school ballet exhibition. What would you tell her? A: (laughs) … I would tell her that it’s ok to be nervous. I would say that her mom also gets nervous when she plays with the team. I would tell her to try to do her best. As long as she does her best, people will love her no matter what the result is. SP: These messages are very different from the self-statements we discussed earlier. Could you imagine applying one of them to yourself? A: Of course. All of them. I would tell myself we all get nervous, that it’s part of the game. Of course, I should only ask myself to do my best. Obviously, there is an interest in pursuing potentially new lines of selfregulation that manifest in messages that differ from the self-statements collected in the last summary. First, the athletes follow the statements back to the psychological skills that are supported (Figure 7.1, Step 21). [Continuation of the previous example:] SP: Let’s consider the idea of acknowledging that we are all getting nervous.

Since self-talk supports psychological skills, I wonder what psychological skill would be supported by the statement? A: I’m not sure what to call it. But it would help you to take the pressure off … it would help you to accept your imperfections.

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SP: That is fine. Would you agree that we call these skills self-acceptance skills

[i.e., translation]? A: Why not.

Further reflection leads the athletes back even further, from psychological skills to psychological challenges. To assist athletes in this step, we acknowledge that the skills they have just discovered are relevant, and ask what relevant unpleasant and/or detrimental psychological processes might benefit from these skills (Figure 7.1, Step 22). [Continuation of the previous example:] SP: I agree that self-acceptance can be helpful in overcoming the challenge.

Remember, too, that your psychological challenge is defined by mental processes that are unpleasant or bad for performance. In view of the fact that we have just discovered a new relevant psychological skill, can you rec­ ognise a previously undiscovered mental process that these skill target? A: Well, I think, my excessively high expectations. The ones I put on myself. This new message could help me to see that I am like others in a positive and negative way. It is not uncommon for the process of tracing back alternative selfstatements, which are achieved through a change of perspective, to lead to new insights – insights that often differ significantly from the previous considerations recorded in the summary. To clarify incoherent ideas to solve a challenge, we invite athletes to make a final reflection. To this end, we offer a brief, written alternative summary of the statements that emerge from a change of perspective, the psychological skills that are supported by those statements, and the psychological processes that these skills target (Figure 7.1, Step 23). We place the alternative summary next to the longer summary of all previous considerations. Looking at both summaries, we ask the athletes to integrate both approaches to solving the psychological challenge (Figure 7.1, Step 24). Sometimes athletes reject the new insight in favour of the previous considerations. When asked why, athletes often say that earlier considerations lead to statements that are more in line with their personality and modus operandi in sports. A: I feel the temptation to change what we did before. But I simply think

that this wouldn’t be me anymore. It sounds good, but it sounds like something I wouldn’t do when it really matters. Conversely, other athletes prefer the new findings to earlier considerations. For some athletes, their previous considerations were too close to what they have already tried unsuccessfully to solve their problems, while the change of perspective elicits exciting new ideas.

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 105 A: In any case, the last part is better than the first one. I have to change

something if I want to overcome my anger problems, and that sounds like it’s what’s needed to change things. In most cases, however, the athletes mix the ideas of both summaries. They connect them and together they form a coherent answer to the psychological challenge. A: I take both. The statements about concentration and letting go of the past

were important. I have worked successfully with them for several weeks. However, the search for social support is new and could add value. I do not think these options cancel each other out. They could be complementary. Regardless of the athlete’s decision, the reflexive self-talk intervention session is nearing its end. At the end of the session, we prepare a takeaway message for the athlete that summarises the psychological challenge and the statements that athletes could use in the future when a similar challenge occurs. We tend to use an if (psychological challenge) then (goal-directed selftalk) sentence because it is short and easy to remember (Figure 7.1, Step 25). When handing over the takeaway message, we remind athletes that no decision taken in the session is binding. Athletes on-site must decide whether or not to use the explored goal-directed self-talk. This decision can only be made if the psychological challenge is experienced again. The effects of the reflexive self-talk intervention are relatively independent of the application of goal-directed self-talk. Instead, the value of intervention lies in the reflection process, which aims to provide metacognitive knowledge about the use of goal-directed self-talk that supports the psychological skills required to solve psychological challenges by controlling psychological processes.

Closing Comments The reflexive self-talk intervention has only recently been introduced into the literature and, therefore, evidence supporting its effects are scarce, exploratory, and non-conclusive (Latinjak et al., 2016, 2018; Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno et al., 2019). However, there is indirect support for the reflexive self-talk intervention, insofar as its procedures have roots within traditional cognitive-behavioural approaches that have successfully been applied in sport settings. The reason is that our reflexive self-talk intervention is similar to these psychotherapeutic approaches as it shares several core features. For instance, both cognitive-behaviour approaches and reflexive self-talk interventions aim at making athletes conscious about their internal dialogue, identifying automatic, emotion-filled thoughts and, when dysfunctional, replacing them with functional self-instructions (Beck, 1976; Latinjak et al., 2016).

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Future research should inquire further into best practices of reflexive selftalk interventions and study the intervention’s power to enhance awareness of psychological challenges, improve the selection of psychological skills and refine the use of goal-directed self-talk to enhance athlete self-regulation. There is a need for quantitative evidence in regard to the intervention effects, yet, there is also a need to explore questions around dosage. How many sessions are required and how frequently should these sessions be scheduled? To date, this is an unanswered question in all self-talk interventions, and, as far as we know, in almost all sport psychology practice. Regarding quantitative evidence, we also anticipate that research on the effectiveness of reflexive self-talk interventions will remain much more limited, compared to strategic self-talk interventions. This is because the nature of the intervention is less controlled, more self-determined and, most importantly, less directly aimed at changes in psychological processes. Whereas in strategic self-talk intervention, we know what athletes are supposed to say, and when they will say it, in reflexive self-talk interventions, athletes remain free to use, or not to use, self-talk whenever they deem appropriate. The effects of instructional self-talk cue words are likely to be observed in technical execution (Cutton & Landin, 2007) and concentration (Latinjak, Torregrosa, & Renom, 2011). The benefits from using motivational self-talk, on the other hand, are likely to be observed in effort (Blanchfield, Hardy, De Morree, Staiano, & Marcora, 2014), endurance (McCormick, Meijen, & Marcora, 2018), confidence (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Mpoumpaki, & Theodorakis, 2009), and emotion (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, & Theodorakis, 2007). Reflexive self-talk interventions, compared with that, are by far more unpredictable. Almost any psychological process could be improved, possibly rather mid- and long-term than short-term, and in both sports and other life contexts. Therefore, the search for positivistic evidence in favour of the intervention is a complex undertaking, and research is likely to continue focusing more intensively on strategic self-talk interventions. This methodological complication, nevertheless, is, in our opinion, also an implicit side effect of what can be considered the beauty of the intervention. It uses meaningful sport experiences to onset a conversation with athletes that can lead to an overall growth of the person, far beyond the context-specific role of the athlete.

References Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. New York, NY: New American Library. Blanchfield, A. W., Hardy, J., De Morree, H. M., Staiano, W., & Marcora, S. M. (2014). Talking yourself out of exhaustion: The effects of self-talk on endurance performance. Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise, 46(5), 998–1007. Cutton, D. M., & Landin, D. (2007). The effects of self-talk and augmented feedback on learning the tennis forehand. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 19, 288–303.

The Reflexive Self-talk Intervention 107 Ellis, A. (1976). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. New York, NY: Lyle Stuart. Galanis, E., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., & Theodorakis, Y. (2016). Why selftalk is effective? Perspectives on self-talk mechanisms in sport. In M. Raab, P. Wylleman, R. Seiler, A.-M. Elbe, & A. Hatzigeorgiadis (Eds.), Sport and exercise psychology research: From theory to practice (181−200). London, UK: Elsevier. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Galanis, E., & Theodorakis, Y. (2011). Self-talk and sport performance: A meta-analysis. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 348–356. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Mpoumpaki, S., & Theodorakis, Y. (2009). Mechanisms underlying the self-talk–performance relationship: The effects of motiv­ ational self-talk on self-confidence and anxiety. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 10, 186–192. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., & Theodorakis, Y. (2007). The moderating effect of self-talk content on self-talk functions. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 19, 240–251. Highlen, P. S., & Bennett, B. B. (1983). Elite divers and wrestlers: A comparison between open- and closed-skill athletes. Journal of Sport Psychology, 5, 390–409. Landin, D. (1994). The role of verbal cues in skill learning. Quest, 46(3), 299–313. Landin, D., & Hebert, E. P. (1999). The influence of self talk on the performance of skilled female tennis players. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 11, 263–282. Latinjak, A. T. (2018). Goal-directed, spontaneous and stimulus-independent thoughts and mindwandering in a competitive context. The Sport Psychologist, 32, 51–59. Latinjak, A. T., de Las Heras, B., Sacot, A., Fernandez, D., Robinson, D., & Lane, A. M. (2018). Effects of reflection to improve goal-directed self-talk on endurance performance. Sports, 6, 55. Latinjak, A. T., Font-Lladó, R., Zourbanos, N., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2016). Goaldirected self-talk interventions: A single-case study with an elite athlete. The Sport Psychologist, 30, 189–194. Latinjak, A. T., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Comoutos, N., & Hardy, J. (2019). Speaking clearly … 10 years on: The case for an integrative perspective of self-talk in sport. Sport, Exercise, and Performance Psychology, 8, 353–367. Latinjak, A. T., Hernando-Gimeno, C., Lorido-Méndez, L., & Hardy, J. (2019). Endorsement and constructive criticism of an innovative online reflexive self-talk intervention. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 1819. Latinjak, A. T., Torregrosa, M., & Renom, J. (2011). Combining self talk and per­ formance feedback: Their effectiveness with adult tennis players. The Sport Psycholo­ gist, 25(1), 18–31. McArdle, S., & Moore, P. (2012). Applying evidence-based principles from CBT to sport psychology. The Sport Psychologist, 26(2), 299–310. McCormick, A., Meijen, C., & Marcora, S. (2018). Effects of a motivational self-talk intervention for endurance athletes completing an ultramarathon. The Sport Psycholo­ gist, 32(1), 42–50. Neenan, M. (2009). Using Socratic questioning in coaching. Journal of RationalEmotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 27, 249–264. Risley, T. R., & Hart, B. (1968). Developing correspondence between the non-verbal and verbal behaviour of preschool children. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1 (4), 267–281.

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Rotella, R. J., Gansneder, B., Ojala, D., & Billing, J. (1980). Cognitions and coping strategies of elite skiers: An exploratory study of young developing athletes. Journal of Sport Psychology, 2(4), 350–354. Theodorakis, Y., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Zourbanos, N. (2012). Cognitions: Self-talk and performance. In S. Murphy (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of sport and perform­ ance psychology (pp. 191−212). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Theodorakis, Y., Weinberg, R., Natsis, P., Douma, E., & Kazakas, P. (2000). The effects of motivational versus instructional self-talk on improving motor performance. The Sport Psychologist, 14, 253–272. Tod, D., Hardy, J., & Oliver, E. J. (2011). Effects of self-talk: A systematic review. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 33, 666–687. Unterrainer, J. M., & Owen, A. M. (2006). Planning and problem solving: From neuropsychology to functional neuroimaging. Journal of Physiology, Paris, 99(4–6), 308–317. Ziegler, S. (1987). Effects of stimulus cueing on the acquisition of groundstrokes by beginning tennis players. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 20, 405–411.

8

Rational Self-talk A Rational Emotive Behaviour

Therapy (REBT) Perspective

Martin J. Turner, Andrew G. Wood, Jamie B. Barker, and Nanaki Chadha

Introduction The notion that our conscious thoughts, or internal dialogue, can influence our emotional and behavioural responses to life’s ills is not new. In recorded history, the formalised propagation of cognitive mediation as a way to elicit self-control has its roots in Ancient Greek philosophy. Of course, the Ancient Greeks did not use the term “cognitive mediation,” and who knows how longago humans came to the realisation that we can in some way exercise some conscious control over our cognitions. It won’t have started with the Greeks, but they had the awareness to make cognitive mediation one of the key aspects shaping their view of reality. Far from being archaic and outdated, Ancient Greek philosophy is still relevant today, and arguably is experiencing another renaissance in psychology and self-help milieux. Much credit for bringing this ancient philosophy into our modern thinking rests with the conception of cognitive behavioural approaches to psychotherapy (CBTs). Arguably the first recognised CBT is Albert Ellis’ Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT; Ellis, 1957). Ellis drew heavily on Stoicism when developing REBT and, as such, REBT represents the translation of ancient ideas into the modern world we now inhabit. At the core of REBT is the philosophy that “people are disturbed not by things, but by the view they take of them.” This maxim is credited to Epictetus, a freed slave whose teachings were documented by Arrian around AD 108. The idea that our thoughts and beliefs about adversity determine to some degree our emotional and behavioural reactivity is reflected in the GABCDE framework at the core of REBT (see Figure 8.1). The GABCDE framework of REBT has major implications for the utility of organic self-talk, or self-talk that is addressed to the self, and reflects spontaneous psychological events (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019). Even before an athlete understands how the content of their internal dialogue influences their emotions and behaviours, they must first realise that their internal dialogue is implicated in their responses, and that in many circumstances they have a choice about what they think. This metacognitive awareness and regulation (Crum, 2018) is foundational for the application of cognitive restructuring, or “disputation” in REBT parlance;

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Figure 8.1 The GABCDE Framework of REBT.

how can you restructure cognition if you are not aware of your cognitions? In the case of irrational beliefs, spontaneous irrational or rational self-talk arises when an adversity (A) that thwarts one’s goals (G) is perceived, bringing into awareness deeply held beliefs (or schemas) that are salient for the specific context. That is, irrational beliefs may lay dormant until a stressor is perceived, at which point we become conscious of the beliefs. The focus on cognitive mediation within REBT is shared with other CBTs, but REBT is distinct from other CBTs in various ways; most notably, it is distinguished by its focus on rational and irrational beliefs as core cognitive mediators. Rational beliefs are non-extreme, flexible, and logical and comprise preferences (primary), anti-awfulizing, frustration tolerance, and unconditional acceptance (secondary) beliefs. In contrast, irrational beliefs are extreme, rigid, and illogical and comprise demandingness (primary), awfulizing, frustration intolerance, and depreciation (secondary) beliefs. Irrational beliefs are related to a host of maladaptive emotional and behavioural consequences, whereby rational beliefs are related to more adaptive emotional and behavioural consequences (Turner, 2016a). Indeed, research in sport has demonstrated the positive relationship between irrational beliefs and psychological distress (Turner, Aspin, & Gillman, 2019; Turner, Carrington, & Miller, 2019), and increased burnout (physical and emotional exhaustion; Turner & Moore, 2016). As such, the main aim of REBT is to discourage irrational beliefs, and encourage rational beliefs.

REBT Applied to Sport Growing literature has reported the application of REBT with athletes (Turner & Bennett, 2018). The extant applied research is reliant on single-case designs (e.g., Turner & Barker, 2013), although group designs have also been employed (e.g., Vertopolous & Turner, 2017). Broadly, as well as reducing irrational beliefs (e.g., Si & Lee, 2008) and increasing rational beliefs (Cunningham & Turner, 2016), REBT has been shown to reduce anxiety (e.g., Turner, Ewen, & Barker, 2018), increase resilient qualities (Deen, Turner, & Wong, 2017), reduce resting systolic blood pressure (Wood, Barker, Turner, & Sheffield, 2018), increase self-determined motivation (Davis & Turner, 2019; Turner &

Rational Self-talk 111 Davis, 2019), and enhance athletic performance (e.g., Wood, Barker, & Turner, 2016). Bespoke measurements (irrational performance beliefs inventory; Turner & Allen, 2018), applied tools (athlete rational resilience credo; Turner, 2016b), and digital self-help resources (Smarter Thinking App; Turner & Wood, 2016) have been developed in order to promote the use of REBT with athletes. In sum, the literature concerning the application of REBT in sport is growing.

REBT and Self-talk One of the ways in which REBT has been operationalised in sport settings is via the use of rational self-talk, or rational self-statements. Self-talk strategies have been extensively examined and considered one of the most widely used, and effective, approaches to enhance athletic performance (Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 2016). Variations of self-talk have been categorised into a taxonomy that includes: valence (i.e., positive, negative, & neutral), overtness (i.e., spoken out loud), systems 1 (i.e., rapid & autonomous) and 2 (i.e., slow and consciously monitored), and grammatical form (Van Raalte & Vincent, 2017). Although, positive vs. negative self-talk (valence) is amongst the most utilised, a systematic review of the literature (Tod, Hardy, & Oliver, 2011) concluded that whilst positive self-talk was associated with successful outcomes, negative self-talk was unrelated to performance. Subsequently, researchers have highlighted the importance of function over valence (i.e., positive vs. negative) when employing self-talk strategies with athletes. Thus, it appears negative self-talk can help or hinder performance (Weinberg, 2018), by enhancing or down-regulating confidence and promoting goals and engagement (Hardy, Roberts, & Hardy, 2009; Latinjak, Zourbanos, López-Ros, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014), a notion reflected within the central tenets of REBT. Indeed, Latinjak et al. (2014) suggest that goal-directed self-talk should be classified in terms of functionality (facilitative/debilitative) instead of valence (positive/negative). However, in REBT little attention to is paid to the valance of beliefs, since beliefs are more reflective of our deeply held goals and preferences. According to REBT theory, when faced with adversity (e.g., rejection, set­ backs, or failure) one’s core beliefs, emotions, or actions are characterised in terms of functionality (i.e., helpful vs. unhelpful). As such, when disputing irrational beliefs practitioners will offer a pragmatic argument to clients by asking: “how helpful are your beliefs in reaching your goals?” Indeed, many of the original self-talk studies largely drew from the ideas of Albert Ellis and REBT (Van Raalte & Vincent, 2017), and, although sparse, research examining the effects of self-talk to gain insight into the detrimental effects of irrational beliefs is not a new endeavour.

Early Studies In line with the central premise of REBT, early experimental researchers showed that compared to rational self-statements, those who adopted irrational

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alternatives suffered significantly more motor skill execution errors, reduced anxiety, and reduced behavioural efficiency (Bonadies & Bass, 1984; Kombos, Fournet, & Estes, 1989; Schill, Monroe, Evans, & Ramanaiah, 1978). To explain, irrational beliefs were considered detrimental for performance because when faced with adversity, they exaggerate the magnitude of underperforming (i.e., awfulizing) and not being accepted by others as a result of unreasonable and self-imposed demands (e.g., “I must win, otherwise it is terrible and this makes me a complete failure”). On the contrary, rational beliefs are likely to reduce the excessive concerns of failure or not being accepted by others, whilst offering reasonable and self-imposed preferences (e.g., “I really want to win, but that doesn’t mean I have to, if not it’s not terrible and this does not make me a complete failure”). Whilst promising, this early pocket of research was fraught with methodological shortcomings and limitations (e.g., imagined rather than real-life stressors, no control group, leading self-statements, low ecological validity, or novice performers).

Contemporary Studies Fast forward 30 years, and in an attempt to overcome previous limitations we re-visited this line of research to better understand the effects of irrational and rational beliefs on performance using self-talk (Wood, Turner, Barker, & Higgins, 2017). Using a more rigorous research design that consisted of a control, rational, and irrational self-statement condition we first examined the effects of this self-talk on motor-skill performance during a golf-putting task (Experiment 1). Secondly, using a similar study design, we then examined the effects of similar self-statements on markers of performance effectiveness (hazard perception score) and efficiency (visual search behaviour) during a modified hazard-perception task, and on task persistence during a breath-holding task (Experiment 2). These findings disagreed with previous research and the predictions of REBT and reported no differences in the effects of irrational and rational self-talk across all performance markers. These findings were explained by two reasons: first, it is possible that irrational and rational self-talk can both facilitate performance, depending on a variety of mediating factors (e.g., individual, task, or context). Second, and from a methodological perspective, the use of novice golfers and laboratory settings did not reflect an ecologically valid task, thus failing to imitate a meaningful and real-life context central in triggering the mediating effects of irrational beliefs (Ellis, 1994). Subsequently, we then examined the effects of irrational and rational self-statements on pressurised golf-putting performance, importantly with skilled amateur golfers and in the field (Turner, Kirkham, & Wood, 2018). After controlling for the participants’ playing ability (i.e., baseline scores) data showed that the novice golfers who adopted rational self-statements recorded higher putting accuracy compared to when engaging with irrational alternatives. The golfers also suggested the rational self-talk was both more usable and facilitated their putting

Rational Self-talk 113 performance. It appeared that the inclusion of a meaningful and stressful scenario, with skilled performers, provided a more accurate method by which to examine the effects of irrational and rational self-talk on skilled performance.

Double Think Whilst the benefits of using rational self-talk prior to/during a sporting performance have been put forth, there remains surprisingly little evidence to directly suggest that irrational self-talk, if used in-situ is directly harmful for athletic performance. Instead recent anecdotal reports (Wood et al., 2017) point towards a more complex and nuanced insight into the operationalisation of irrational self-talk on performance. That is, for some who operate in the context of elite sport, the adoption of an extreme and dogmatic self-talk may help rather than hinder success. Overcoming the dichotomous label attached to irrational and rational beliefs, researchers have hypothesised why the benefits of irrational vs. rational self-talk may be a function of contextual (i.e., type of task/sport), idiosyncratic, and conceptual factors (i.e., definitions of rationality). To explain, according to REBT theory rationality is characterised as being empirically true, logical, and pragmatic (DiGiuseppe, Doyle, Dryden, & Backx, 2013); but, what if irrational self-talk were to deny all logic and empirical arguments yet serve a pragmatic role in goal achievement? (Wilson, 2010). Perhaps then, both irrational and rational beliefs that manifest in self-talk are a result of evolutionary design in response to their environment (Pelusi, 2003). More so than in today’s society, irrational beliefs served adaptive functions for our ancestors, wherein the extreme, dogmatic, and radical responses to an adversity would have ensured favourable outcomes were met (e.g., survival). In a recent review by Turner in 2016, irrational and rational self-talk were conceptualised in terms of double think, that is: “… the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them” (Orwell, 1949, p. 32). Simply put, an athlete may be able to forget any fact or belief that has become inconvenient and to then draw it back only when it is needed. For example, an ultra-runner may hold deeply rational beliefs regarding adversity, yet employ irrational selftalk (i.e., “I must finish, otherwise it would be terrible”) during the most arduous stages of a race. Accordingly, the irrational self-talk would drive them to tolerate feelings of extreme discomfort and ultimately, race completion. Although the impact this has on one’s physical health are contextually specific and beyond the scope of this chapter, this demonstrates humans’ capability to override their innate warning systems and “perform” (i.e., reach their goal).

Self-Determined Motivation To garner insights into the motivational properties of irrational and rational selftalk, researchers (Turner, 2016a) have drawn upon the organismic integration theory (OIT; Ryan & Deci, 2000), a core facet of self-determination theory

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(SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985). To explain, irrational language such as (“I should/ I must participate in this event”) can be conceptualised by the internalisation of external regulations and self-imposed pressure. Specifically, one form of extrinsic motivation, named “introjected motivation,” is proposed to hold saliency with irrational beliefs, whereby an athlete’s actions are governed by self-placed sanctions to avoid feelings such as guilt and shame, hence they engage in activities because they feel they “have to” instead of “wanting to” (Standage, Duda, & Ntoumanis, 2003). In recent studies by Turner and Davis (2019; Davis & Turner, 2019), the effects of REBT on triathletes’ irrational beliefs and self-determined motivation has been examined. The data shows that participants’ reductions in irrational beliefs were matched with increases in selfdetermined motivation. Ultimately, the study of irrational and rational self-talk has developed our understanding of, and gained insight into, a more nuanced appreciation of irrational beliefs and athletic performance. However, the precise mechanisms by which such self-talk directly links to changes in performance outcomes remains to be answered. Of course, the overt internal dialogue of athletes may not reflect deeply held beliefs or schema (Bunker, Williams, & Zinsser, 1993), and in the extant research the more complex cognitive processing of competitive situations that occur alongside irrational beliefs is only just being explored. Specifically, irrational beliefs may form an important part of the Lazarusian cognitive appraisals process (Lazarus, 1999) that determines the emotional response to stressors (David, Schnur, & Belloiu, 2002; Turner, 2016a). Indeed, participating in sports can be a stressful experience and is often associated with athletes experiencing a gamut of emotions. While emerging victorious in a competition can generate positive emotions among athletes, similarly a defeat can result in negative emotions. One of the most common theoretical frameworks that have examined the emergence of emotions among athletes is the Lazarus’ cognitive appraisal theory (CAT; 1991, 2000).

Cognitive Appraisal According to CAT (Lazarus, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Smith & Lazarus, 1993), information processing includes a transaction between the goals of the individual and the representation of environmental encounters. This transaction can be appraised as harmful, beneficial, threatening, or challenging. The CAT comprises primary appraisals, which are concerned with the extent to which the encounter is relevant to one’s well-being and congruent with one’s goals, and secondary appraisals which concerns one’s resources and options for coping with the encounter (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Specifically, primary appraisal comprises components of motivational relevance (MR: evaluation of the extent to which the encounter is relevant to one’s goals) and motivational congruence (MC: evaluation of the extent to which the encounter is consistent with one’s goals). In anticipation of stressors, the components of the secondary appraisal are problem-focused coping potential

Rational Self-talk 115 (PFC: evaluations of one’s ability to act directly on the situation to bring it in accord with one’s goals), and emotion-focused coping potential (EFC: evaluations of one’s ability to psychologically adjust to the situation by altering one’s interpretations, desires, or beliefs; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). The primary and secondary appraisals combine to form different corerelational themes that result in emotions. For anxiety, the core relational theme is uncertain, existential threat (Lazarus, 1991), where primary appraisals of high MR and low MC combine with secondary appraisals of low EFC (Smith & Lazarus, 1993). With regards to irrational beliefs, growing research places irrational beliefs into the cognitive appraisal theory of emotions (David, Ghinea, Macavei, & Eva, 2005; David et al., 2002). Researchers have explored the links between irrational beliefs and cognitive appraisals, finding that anxiety is most effectively predicted by a combination of high MR, low MC, low EFC, and irrational beliefs (David et al., 2005; David, Schnur, & Belloiu, 2002). Also, Ziegler (2001) suggests that cognitive appraisals (both primary and secondary) are thoroughly couched in, and interconnected with, beliefs as represented in the REBT GABCDE model. Further within a sporting context, researchers have investigated the association between irrational beliefs and challenge and threat. Evans, Turner, Pickering, and Powditch (2018) found that soccer athletes who received a rational team talk (promoting rational beliefs) at half-time reported significantly lower levels of threat compared to athletes who received an irrational team talk (promoting irrational beliefs). In addition, researchers have found that soccer coaches who report evaluating stressful situations as a threat, also report greater irrational beliefs (Dixon, Turner, & Gillman, 2017). So, irrational beliefs appear to be part of, or related to, the Lazarusian notion of cognitive appraisal. How irrational beliefs interact with cognitive appraisals to elicit affective states amongst athletes has been investigated by a recent study (Chadha, Turner, & Slater, 2019) within the sporting context. Data revealed that irrational beliefs interact with cognitive appraisals of challenge and threat to elicit pre-competitive affective states within golfers. To illustrate this further, consider the following example: A golfer is anticipating the tee-off for an important competition with a lucrative reward (reflecting G in the REBT model, and MR in the CAT). The golfer has not competed in such a prestigious event before and is unsure whether he will perform well (reflecting A in the REBT model, and low MC in the CAT) and believes that he absolutely must perform well and he could not tolerate underperforming (reflecting irrational beliefs in the REBT model). Because the prospect of underperforming (A) is rendered highly dangerous to his goals (G) by the irrational beliefs, the golfer is likely to appraise the situation as a threat (Lazarus, 1999). If the golfer believes that he cannot psychologically adjust to the encounter (low EFC) and is not flexible in his coping abilities (Ziegler, 2001), then he is more likely to experience dysfunctional anxiety (David et al., 2002) in anticipation of the tee-off. Importantly, cognitive appraisals and irrational beliefs are seen as co­

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occurring simultaneously rather than occurring in a sequential and fixed order. It remains to be seen whether the findings reported by Chadha et al. (2019) are repeatable and relevant to other sports.

Case Studies So far in the chapter we have introduced REBT as a framework through which self-talk can be operationalised, and have posited how irrational self-talk may form part of the cognitive appraisal process. Now we turn to some applied examples of how REBT could be applied with athletes. There is a growing literature concerning the application of REBT in sport (see Turner & Bennett, 2018 for an extensive selection of case studies). But here, we focus specifically on changes in self-talk that could be supported using an REBT approach, and that echo the idea of reflexive self-talk interventions (Chapter 7) posited by Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, Lorido-Méndez, and Hardy (2019). We present two case studies for illustrative purposes.

The Case of Lucy Lucy is a 22-year-old professional tennis player with approximately two years’ experience on the professional tour. Overall, whilst her performances are becoming more consistent due to her increasing competence, she tends to get unhealthily angry (C) when she perceives that poor umpiring decisions have been made against her (A). Indeed, when poor line calls are made in favour of her opponent, she demonstrates violent aggression on court, which typically includes verbal and inappropriate (e.g., swearing) outbursts to the line judges and the umpire, and physical confrontations with officials. Occasionally she has been known to smash her rackets on the floor. Her behaviour to date has meant that she has come into trouble with the tour officials with warnings made against future behaviour. Following conversations with her coach, Lucy agrees to explore alternative ways to deal with poor umpiring calls and hence employs the services of a sport psychologist. During the first meeting with Lucy, the psychologist challenges Lucy around the A–C connection, discouraging “the umpire made me so angry” utterances. Lucy appears to quite easily grasp this concept. However, Lucy somewhat struggles to understand how her self-talk and overall internal narrative about herself and the world she exists in, could influence her emotional reactions on court. To this end, Lucy is set a homework activity that aims to get her to explore, connect, and reflect on her self-talk, in relation to both training and general life. This homework requires her to note down her thoughts in a self-talk diary to enable discussion during future meetings with her sport psychologist. Upon exploration of the diary it is evident that Lucy has a tendency to demand that “things must go my way,” that “tennis should be fair to me,” and that she “cannot bear it when officials penalise me” (B).

Rational Self-talk 117 Based on REBT theory, the sport psychologist outlines to Lucy how her self-talk appears to reflect prevalent frustration intolerance. Furthermore, insight is offered regarding how such self-talk will likely lead to unhealthy anger. Lucy demonstrates some clear resistance when informed of this summary. This resistance appears to be around how she can change her self-talk given she has probably had this narrative with her for a long time. The sport psychologist suggests working on her overall philosophy to include self-talk, which highlights greater tolerance and acceptance that bad things and unfair things can happen to hard working people such as herself, and that just because she wants fairness, it doesn’t mean that she can demand it (D). To do this it is recommended that the development of an athlete rational resilience credo (ARRC; Turner, 2016b) is compiled, which can be recorded and listened to prior to training and competition along with general downtime. The sport psychologist works with Lucy to write and edit this credo narrative until Lucy is satisfied it reflects the key language and perspective that she wishes to demonstrate (see Deen et al., 2017, for an example). The overall essence is about reducing her demandingness, and her frustration intolerance, to enable more helpful emotional consequences and coping self-talk (E).

The Case of Chris Chris is a 28-year-old professional cricketer who is an opening batter. He has been a professional for 9 years and has recently made a move to a top division county – meaning a move of house for him and his family. He sees the new role as a step-up in challenge but one that will bring expectations from the supporters and teammates. Chris has been brought to the county as a high profile, marquee signing. At his previous county, Chris enjoyed consistent success in all formats of cricket; he was a pivotal and key team member and was considered composed and well able to deal with pressure and expectations. During his initial matches for his new county, Chris looks tentative in his performances, his decision-making inconsistent, his movements jittery, and consequently his form is below his typical standard. Around the changing room, he is quiet, reserved, and strikingly withdrawn from the typical dressing room jokes and banter he normally engages in. In sum, Chris is experiencing a high level of unhealthy anxiety (C). At a team event, Chris manages to get some time with the sport psychologist and begins opening up about some of his struggles. Chris expresses how his performances are bothering him and that he is worried that he is not fulfilling his role or satisfying the expectations of the head coach, teammates, and supporters (A). He is concerned about what others think of him (specifically his teammates). He further outlines that when going out to bat his head is full of negative thoughts. He worries that he is not up to the task, and that others are watching and waiting for him to fall short and fail. He describes

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his self-talk to be over critical and punishing (e.g., “I’m a failure,” “if I don’t succeed at this, then that shows how stupid and useless I am”). Chris agrees to further one-to-one sessions with the sport psychologist. During the initial session, Chris outlines how he places a lot of pressure and expectation on himself, and how his self-worth is tied up in his cricket success. Accordingly, he is a self-confessed perfectionist who is also striving for more success, and for the approval of others. Chris grasps the link between his below-par batting performances (A) and his unhealthy anxiety (C) with limited resistance or questioning. As the sessions progress, focus shifts onto Chris’s beliefs about himself and others. What is clear is that Chris “absolutely must succeed in all he does” and that “others must always approve of him and say good things” (B), indicating demandingness beliefs. Also, his belief that his self-worth is at stake when he performs poorly is evidence of self-depreciation beliefs. Following this disclosure, Chris is then challenged to dispute such beliefs by “acid testing” these statements as true, logical, and helpful. After much debate, Chris resigns to the fact that his beliefs are not underpinned by evidence, not consistent with reality, and seemingly unhelpful to him in relation to both life and cricket (D). As a homework task, he is encouraged to use the Smarter Thinking App (Turner & Wood, 2016) to help challenge his thoughts and beliefs about adversity. Over a few weeks working with the psychologist and using the app, he starts to recognise that the demands he has been placing on himself have consequently been leading to his anxiety, and that he can choose to believe something different. The sport psychologist and Chris then begin on re-framing (E) his self-talk so that it is more flexible and non-extreme, with clear preferences and negated demands (e.g., “I really want to be successful, but that does not mean that I have to”; “I would like others to respect me and approve of me, but it will not make me useless if they don’t”). These statements are then placed on cue cards in his kit bag, developed into a mobile phone screen saver, and included in a self-recorded narrative that he listens to prior to going out to bat.

Conclusion In this chapter, we introduce REBT as a framework for understanding and applying self-talk with athletes. Whilst the research evidence concerning the utility of rational self-talk is still growing, there is sufficient evidence supporting the use of REBT in athletic populations. At the core of REBT is the recognition and construction of individual self-talk, and deeper core beliefs. The mechanisms through which rational self-talk can influence athletic performance are still under debate, and in this chapter, we have posited some potential factors that have been considered in research. Clearly, more research is needed that examines how rational self-talk can be used in performance settings, and practitioners are encouraged to report their application of REBT in sport to provide real-world applied accounts

Rational Self-talk 119 of REBT. In the case studies we included here, we hope to illustrate how REBT can be used with athletes on specific self-talk issues. However, as research continues to grow, more and more REBT-based strategies are emerging (e.g., educational, one to one, apps, credos, interactional). In an age where third-wave CBTs are being proliferated with particular gusto, we must not look past valuable second-wave approaches, such as REBT, which have yet to garner the research attention in sport that they warrant.

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Strategic Self-talk Interventions Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis, Evangelos Galanis, and Yannis Theodorakis

Introduction The onset of interest for self-talk research in sport can be traced back in the late seventies/early eighties of the 20th century. As identified in the Reflections on the maturing self-talk literature in sport by Hardy, Comoutos, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2018), the interest and the growth of self-talk research in sport can be largely attributed to its high applied value. The idea behind the value of self-talk lies in a fundamental – since the times of the Ancient Greek philosophers – principle of psychology: the way we talk to ourselves influences our emotions and behaviour. This has been emphatically expressed in modern times through the cognitive behaviour therapy approaches (Ellis, 1976), and presented thoroughly through the Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy perspective in this book (see Chapter 8). Thus, put in a simplistic way, managing to change the way we talk to ourselves in an effective way should help us regulate our behaviour and emotions, and ultimately help our performance. Back in 1987, Ziegler examined the effect of a four-step verbal cueing programme, each step reflecting the attentional focus appropriate for different phases of a movement, on tennis strokes (Ziegler, 1987). She found the use of the verbal cues improved the quality of forehand and backhand strokes. The applied value of self-talk in sport had just been empirically documented. Since the early years of self-talk research the interest in performance-enhancing interventions has dominated the sport psychology literature. Several terms have been used to describe the techniques implemented through such interventions, such as verbal cueing, instructional cues, and selftalk strategies, and the progress in the conceptualisation of self-talk in sport has led to the identification of such techniques as strategic self-talk (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019). Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis, and Zourbanos (2012) first described the two different perspectives used in self-talk research: (a) research exploring self-talk as a naturally occurring phenomenon – what had previously been called automatic self-talk (Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni, Theodorakis, & Papaioannou, 2009), and recently conceptualised as organic self-talk (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019) – and (b) research exploring the use

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of self-talk as a mental strategy, in which self-talk cues are used with the aim of enhancing performance or achieving other related outcomes, through the activation of appropriate responses. The principle underlying the implementation of self-talk strategies was that individuals provide to themselves instructions or directions for action, and subsequently execute the appropriate action by simply following the self-instruction they have used, or reinforce themselves towards a desired outcome (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Latinjak, & Theodorakis, 2014). Following the introduction of reflexive self-talk interventions (see, Chapter 7), Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al. (2019) provided additional descriptive features that could help differentiate reflexive from typical strategic self-talk interventions. Accordingly, strategic self-talk aims to convey a message through cues that have been predetermined and used based on a particular plan, thus being a more behavioural process, compared to reflexive interventions that involve more complex mental processes. Summarising, strategic self-talk involves the use of self-talk cues that are pre-determined and practised, aimed at triggering a specific response, and thus serving a specific purpose – activating according mechanisms, and ultimately enhancing performance or achieving selfregulation goals. As already identified above, research on strategic self-talk has been the most popular topic within the self-talk sport psychology literature. This line of research has explored the impact of strategic self-talk interventions on sport performance, and recently other sport-related outcome variables, through experimental designs in which a variety of sport tasks, participants, and interventions have been employed. Even though the effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions has been well documented, a prudent look into the literature suggests that the specifics of the designs, the materials, and the participants involved should be carefully considered when attempting to interpret the findings. In the following section we will provide an overview regarding the effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions and will identify key issues that needs to be addressed before firm conclusions are to be made.

Effectiveness of Strategic Self-talk Attempting to map the different studies examining the facilitating effects of strategic self-talk on sport performance, Hatzigeorgiadis, Galanis, Zourbanos, and Theodorakis (2014) identified that interventions involved different levels of performance-related variables: (a) fundamental motor tasks in lab or field settings, such as vertical jumps (e.g., Edwards, Tod, & McGuigan, 2008) and sit-ups (e.g., Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, & Kazakas, 2000); (b) components of different sport skills, such as shooting (e.g., Hardy, Begley, & Blanchfield, 2015) and tennis strokes (e.g., Cutton & Landin, 2007); (c) sport performance in non-competitive context (unofficial timings or experimentally induced events), such as sprinting (e.g., Mallett & Hanrahan, 1997) and middle-distance running performance (e.g., Weinberg, Miller, & Horn, 2012); and (d) competitive

Strategic Self-talk Interventions 125 sport performance (e.g., swimming, Hatzigeorgiadis, Galanis, et al., 2014). Overall, the effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions has been well documented in two reviews published in 2011: a systematic review (e.g., Tod, Hardy, & Oliver, 2011) and a meta-analysis (e.g., Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011). The former identified that the majority of studies using strategic self-talk have shown statistically significant performance improvements. The latter identified a moderate effect size (d= .42), suggesting that strategic self-talk interventions have a meaningful impact on sport performance and can be considered a valuable tool for athletes, coaches, and sport psychologists. Considering the diversity of the research designs, a variety of factors should be considered when examining the effectiveness of self-talk. In particular, four important aspects were identified: the nature of the task, the identity of participants, the length of the intervention, and the specifics of self-talk. Regarding the type of the task, two key distinctions can be made. In relation to motor demands, tasks have ranged from fine to gross tasks; in relation to familiarity, tasks have ranged from novel to mastered. Closely related to the familiarity of the task is the identity of participants, which has varied from athletes (e.g., Landin & Hebert, 1999), to students (e.g., Theodorakis, Chroni, Laparidis, Bebetsos, & Douma, 2001), and exercisers (e.g., Horcajo, Paredes, Higuer, Briñol, & Petty, 2019). In research with athletes, most studies have employed beginners or young athletes and only a few studies have involved athletes of high or elite level. For the former, the goal of strategic self-talk would either be to facilitate learning or to enhance sport skills, whereas for the latter the goal would be to enhance performance. In studies with athletes, regardless of the level and the task mastery they already possessed, tasks could not be novel. In studies with students, however, in many cases the experimental tasks were novel, thus the experiments addressed issues of learning in non-expert samples. Why are these distinctions important? Because in many cases they are crucial in shaping the length of intervention and the specifics of self-talk that would be most suitable for the objectives of the studies. Accordingly, interventions varying in length (cross-sectional, shorter, and longer interventions) and content/purpose (without prior self-talk training, with self-talk training on different tasks, or with self-talk training on the experimental task) have been delivered. In addition, different types of selftalk, broadly categorised as instructional or motivational depending on the purpose the self-talk was designed to serve, have been used. Expectedly, the effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions has varied as a function of these characteristics. In the meta-analysis by Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2011), the factors described above were tested as potential moderators for the effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions. The analysis showed that selftalk interventions were more effective for tasks involving relatively fine, compared with relatively gross, motor demands, and for novel, compared with well-learned, tasks. In addition, interventions including self-talk training

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were more effective than those not including self-talk training. Additional moderating variables that were examined did not prove significant; nevertheless, in many instances the number of studies per moderator level was small, thus the identification of moderators was not possible.

Matching Hypotheses – Choosing the Right Type of Self-talk Considering issues related to the appropriateness of self-talk cues, Theodorakis et al. (2000) proposed a hypothesis regarding the matching between the nature of the task and the type of self-talk. In particular, they suggested that instructional self-talk should be more beneficial than motivational self-talk for tasks requiring accuracy and precision, whereas motivational self-talk should be more beneficial than instructional for tasks requiring strength and endurance. This matching hypothesis received, more or less, partial support in the experiments of Theodorakis et al. (2000) and later research that tested the hypothesis within single studies (e.g., Abdoli, Hardy, Riyahi, & Farsi, 2018; Chang et al., 2014; Hatzigeorgiadis, Theodorakis, & Zourbanos, 2004; Kolovelonis, Goudas, & Dermitzaki, 2011), but not in all instances (e.g., Hardy et al., 2015). Theodorakis (2000), in a series of experiments, reported that for two accuracy tasks – a football (soccer) passing and a badminton serve – only instructional self-talk was effective; for a sit-up endurance task no effects were identified, whereas for an isokinetic strength task, instructional and motivational self-talk were both effective. In all, the effectiveness of self-talk varied, but not always in the hypothesised direction. Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2004) in two experiments with sport students tested in water-polo tasks, found that (a) in a shooting precision task both instructional and motivational self-talk groups improved their performance in comparison to the baseline measure, with participants who used instructional self-talk improving more; and (b) in a throwing at distance task, only the motivational self-talk group improved its performance significantly. Similar results were reported by Kolovelonis et al. (2011) and Chang et al. (2014) in studies with primary and secondary education students, performing accuracy and strength tasks. Finally, in a study with professional basketball players Abdoli et al. (2018) found that shooting accuracy improved from baseline to final measures for players using instructional self-talk, whereas no differences emerged for players using motivational self-talk. Interestingly, the matching hypothesis was also tested across studies in Hatzigeorgiadis et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis. The results showed that instructional self-talk was more effective for fine tasks than motivational self-talk; moreover, instructional selftalk was more effective for fine tasks than for gross tasks. The findings provided further partial support for the matching hypothesis. The lack of full support for the “motor demands/self-talk type” matching hypothesis, led Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, et al. (2014) to consider as additional matching factors, the learning stage and the performance setting. With regard to the matching between learning

Strategic Self-talk Interventions 127 stage and type of self-talk, they suggested that at the early stages of learning, the use of instructional self-talk can facilitate learning more than motivational self-talk, because it can help direct and shift attention to appropriate stimuli. Respectively, they suggested that instructional self-talk can be more beneficial than motivational self-talk for beginner athletes, whereas more experienced and highly skilled athletes should benefit more from motivational cues, because at that level of expertise a more conscious skill execution, as guided by instructional self-talk, is not necessarily beneficial for performance (Beilock, Carr, MacMahon, & Starkes, 2002; Bell & Hardy, 2009). The matching of athletes’ expertise with self-talk type received support from Hardy et al. (2015), who found that kicking accuracy with the dominant foot (mastered skill) in Gaelic football players was better when using motivational self-talk, compared to instructional self-talk, and that a reverse but not statistically significant effect was found for the non-dominant foot (non-mastered skill), with instructional selftalk showing a better trend than motivational self-talk. Similarly, in a physical education setting Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Bardas, and Theodorakis (2013) reported that in a handball overarm accuracy throw students using instructional and motivational self-talk improved their performance in comparison with the control group for both the dominant and the non-dominant arm; however, for the non-dominant arm instructional self-talk had a larger effect compared with motivational self-talk. These findings suggest that the learning stage by self-talk type matching is a hypothesis that requires attention, and further research on athletes with different levels of expertise is to be encouraged. With regard to the matching between performance setting and type of self-talk, Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, et al. (2014) suggested that in competitive situations motivational self-talk seems to be more appropriate than instructional self-talk, as the primary goal for athletes would typically be to increase confidence, reduce anxiety, and psych-up or maintain composure. In contrast, in training, instructional self-talk may be more appropriate than motivational, as training is where skills are developed, corrected, and mastered. Indirect evidence for the matching between setting and self-talk type were provided in a field intervention study, where a six-week intervention programme was implemented with swimmers (Hatzigeorgiadis, Galanis, et al., 2014). During the six-weeks swimmers were trained through a self-determined approach to use and devise instructional and motivational self-talk plans, which they subsequently practised. Upon the completion of the interventions, the results showed that competitive performance of the self-talk intervention groups improved compared to that of a control group. Importantly, while in the training setting, swimmers chose to develop and use both instructional and motivational self-talk plans; the competition self-talk plan involved only motivational self-talk for the vast majority of swimmers. Even though the above findings do lend some indirect support to the hypothesis matching setting to self-talk type, one could also argue that swimming is a task requiring mostly gross skills, so this may be the reason why swimmers chose motivational self-talk plans. Similar considerations for

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the hypothesis of matching setting to self-talk type are easy to postulate. For instance, a runner instructing him/herself during a competitive race to keep the pace or to stick behind the leader (i.e., instructional self-talk) may be beneficial for performance in that situation. Respectively, while training, athletes have to motivate themselves to maintain their drive and commitment to the often hard and painful training regime, so the use of motivational selftalk may be of high importance. It is this sort of inconsistency and uncertainty that makes us believe that, even though some basic principles in strategic self-talk planning have been established, a variety of factors should be considered when designing strategic self-talk interventions. Accordingly, the matching hypotheses should be cautiously interpreted and potential interactions between confounding factors should be considered.

New Trends and Additional Issues in Strategic Self-talk Research In addition to research examining directly the impact of strategic self-talk on task or sport performance, there has been an interest in outcomes other than performance, either as mediators of the effects of self-talk on performance – that is, viable mechanisms – or as independent outcomes. The former topic has attracted particular attention in recent years and is therefore presented in a separate chapter (see Chapter 10). For the latter, one such quest involves the role of strategic self-talk in emotion regulation, to which a separate chapter has also been devoted in this book (see Chapter 5). A final aspect that requires consideration is recent research attempts to link self-talk with flow states. Even though researchers investigating flow argue that the intentional nature of goaldirected, and thus strategic, self-talk could oppose the experience of flow (see Chapter 15), there is at least preliminary evidence suggesting that this is not necessarily the case. Taylor, Brinthaupt, and Pennington (2017), in a field correlational study with competitive runners, examined relationships between flow states and different types of self-talk. The results showed that overall flow state scores were moderately correlated to instructional self-talk and highly correlated to motivational self-talk. Similar patterns of correlations were revealed for the different flow state dimensions as operationalised through the Flow States Scale 2. The higher correlations involved challenge, action, and goals for both instructional and motivational self-talk. Similar correlational findings have been reported for dispositional flow in a study with physical education students (Ada, Comoutos, Karamitrou, & Kazak, 2019). Importantly, these correlational findings have been partially supported in a recent strategic self-talk field intervention. Minja, Tzeli, Galanis, Tsatsalas, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2019) examined the impact of an 8-week intervention on flow states in competition. During the intervention, athletes practised instructional and motivational selftalk cues and developed their own competitive self-talk plan. Flow states were assessed in competitions before and after the intervention. The results showed a notable increase for the experimental group in overall flow and the dimensions of challenge-skills balance, clear goals, unambiguous feedback, concentration on

Strategic Self-talk Interventions 129 the task at hand, and sense of control, whereas no changes were found for the control group. The findings were linked to results from studies supporting the attentional and motivational effects of strategic self-talk, to explain the impact of strategic self-talk on flow states during competition. These findings, although preliminary, should not be disregarded; thus the potential of strategic self-talk to trigger or initiate flow states requires further investigation. An area that has attracted considerable research attention recently is endurance performance. Research has primarily examined the impact of strategic self-talk on performance per se, but also, since the introduction of the psychobiological model of endurance performance (Marcora, 2019), on the underlying mechanisms that may explain the important benefits of strategic self-talk for endurance performance (see Chapter 13). Finally, another interesting line of research that has started to receive some attention involves the grammatical aspects of self-talk. To our knowledge, three relevant questions, and respective studies, have been examined in a sport context. Son, Jackson, Grove, and Feltz (2011) examined the use of individually focused (e.g., I will perform well) versus group-referenced (we will perform well) self-talk in a team-based dart-throwing activity. The results indicated that participants using self-talk focusing on the group’s capabilities performed better than those using individual-focused self-talk. Van Raalte et al. (2018), examined the use of declarative (I will) versus interrogative (will I?) self-talk on a hand pedalling task. In contrast to findings in nonsport contexts (e.g., Senay, Albarracín, & Noguchi, 2010) the results showed no differences between the two types of self-talk. However, as Hardy, Thomas, and Blanchfield (2019) noticed, contrary to typical self-talk interventions in sport that place an emphasis on the use of self-talk during task performance, Van Raalte et al. (2018) employed a design where self-talk cues were used prior to the task. Finally, Hardy et al. (2019) examined the use of first person (I can keep going) versus second person (you can keep going) self-talk, in an 10 km cycling time-trial. The results showed that second person self-talk generated significantly faster time-trial performance than first person self-talk. These studies have provided findings that encourage further research on grammatical aspects of self-talk, the underlying theoretical postulation upon which these hypotheses are based, and the potential implication for sport psychologists and athletes.

Research Implications for Self-talk Interventions The applied value of self-talk in general, and strategic self-talk in particular, has been strongly acknowledged at the beginning of this chapter, but also in the self-talk literature. Thus, providing implications for practice should be an integral part of such chapters. Considering, however, the abundance of relevant sections throughout the chapters of this book, and in particular in the chapters that follow, we instead found it more intriguing to address implications for research. The development of the self-talk literature in

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recent years, and the scientific evidence that has helped shape our research perspectives with regard to strategic self-talk, encouraged us to choose this focus. Accordingly, below, we present some of what we perceive as important issues in the development and implementation of strategic self-talk interventions.

Selection of Self-talk Cues (Researcher/Participant) An interesting issue in strategic self-talk research is the selection of the self-talk cues that are to be used by participants. In some strategic self-talk interventions, self-talk cues have been assigned to participants by the researchers, whereas in others participants were involved in the selection of the cues, either by selecting from among a list of proposed cues, or deciding their own. Hardy (2006) argued that adopting a self-determined approach to the use of self-talk cues would be beneficial, as this would enhance the participants’ sense of autonomy, and subsequently the effectiveness of the intervention. This aspect was examined in the meta-analysis by Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2011) and the results showed that assigned and self-selected cues were equally effective. The lack of superiority for interventions where participants were allowed to select their own cues could be attributed to the nature of the task and the identity of participants. In particular, in many studies, cross-sectional designs without self-talk training were employed, whereas in others, participants were students tested on novel tasks. In such studies, the lack of adequate familiarisation of participants on the use of self-talk, or the participants’ lack of knowledge of the task could have risked the use of inappropriate self-talk. Subsequently, the use of researcherselected cues is likely to be a more effective option. Considering these postulations, we would offer the following guidelines with regard to the selection of self-talk cues. In experiments involving tasks that are novel for participants, or in experiments with no element of self-talk training, the researcher should explore in advance, through pilot testing, the appropriateness of self-talk cues and assign cues or provide participants with a small number of alternatives, in particular with regard to instructional self-talk cues. In cases of motivational self-talk cues, more alternatives could be provided for participants to choose the one(s) that feels best for them. In interventions with athletes, participants should be more involved in the selection of cues. In shorter interventions, when instructional self-talk is used, athletes should be aware of their needs and therefore be in a position to select the most appropriate cues, with guidance from the researcher, if needed; for motivational self-talk, athletes would almost always know what fits best for them, so the selection should be free. In longer interventions, where athletes spend several sessions training with self-talk, coaches could also be involved, helping to identify aspects of task performance, movements, or tactics that need to be improved.

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Training and Transfer of Self-talk Cues As with all mental skills, effective self-talk can be developed through training. Expectedly, studies including extensive self-talk training have been documented as being more effective than those without; thus, our recommendation would be that in any strategic self-talk study, participants should be trained in the use of self-talk. An interesting aspect in interventions including shorter or longer self-talk training, is the selection of the task(s) on which the self-talk training will take place. In particular, researchers should decide whether the self-talk training will take place on the experimental task or on other, more or less similar, tasks. The crucial point is that, depending on the task and the identity of participants, training in self-talk on the experimental task will induce learning effects that could possibly shadow the impact of self-talk. As described in the opening paragraphs of the chapter, the rationale behind self-talk strategies is that individuals give themselves an instruction that initiates appropriate responses. Training in self-talk serves the purpose of familiarising participants with how to use self-talk and learn following the instruction; such training will maximise the effectiveness of the strategy. This goal should be a priority, particularly in longer interventions with athletes. Ideally, such training could involve the use of different self-talk types and cues, so that participants can understand how different self-talk cues can serve different purposes. A successful intervention, even at research level, is one that enables the athlete to develop the skill. As Latinjak, Hardy, Comoutos, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2019) postulated, strategic self-talk interventions may eventually impact organic goal-directed self-talk; this would depend on the athletes’ involvement in determining the cues, and the length of the intervention. Accordingly, an interesting prospect for future self-talk interventions would be to follow-up – examining long-term effects of the interventions on goal-directed self-talk. Considering these postulations, we would offer the following guidelines with regard to training in self-talk. For novel experimental tasks, training in self-talk would be ideally implemented using tasks other than the experimental task (e.g., forehand/backhand in tennis, freestyle/backstroke in swimming) to reduce the learning effect that is likely to lessen the self-talk effect. For tasks that are well learned or mastered, and in particular in interventions with athletes, practising self-talk can be implemented on the experimental task. This will more specifically target the task of interest and thus the value of the training for participants, which is important for the resources they invest in research, while the risk of learning effects is minimal as the task is already well learned. Obviously, in cases where the design of the study does not include training in self-talk, this is not an issue.

Manipulation Checks (Cross Sectional/Longer Interventions) The use of manipulation checks is also an important issue in experimental research. The purpose of such manipulations is to ensure that the experimental

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treatment is understood by participants in the experimental groups, and that the control condition is not contaminated. In relation to self-talk treatments, this would mean that the experimental group made use of self-talk in line with the plan of the study, whereas the control group did not. In everyday life in general, and in sport in particular, people intuitively talk to themselves while performing a task, but only sometimes will this self-talk be systematic and serve a specific purpose. The purpose of manipulation checks for the experimental groups is to ensure that they use the designated self-talk cues in a systematic way, whereas the control groups should not use any similar self-talk cues in a systematic way. Hardy, Hall, Gibbs, and Greenslade (2005) were the first to introduce a detailed manipulation check for the use of self-talk within experimental groups, whereas Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2009) extended this elaborate check to control groups. Gregersen, Hatzigeorgiadis, Galanis, Comoutos, and Papaioannou (2017) provided, based on previous empirical evidence, guidelines for evaluating these manipulation checks. They recommended a cut-off point of 7 on a 10-point scale, asking how frequent the use of self-talk was; meaning that participants of experimental groups scoring six or lower could be considered as not adhering to the intervention and excluded, whereas participants of control groups scoring seven or higher could be considered as making systematic use of selftalk, thus contaminating the condition, and excluded. In light of the above suggestions we offer the following guidelines with regard to the implementation and use of manipulation checks, which should also be considered in relation to the design of the intervention. In cross-sectional designs and in studies without self-talk training, where participants are simply instructed to use some self-talk cues, the use of manipulation checks is crucial for controlling the internal validity of the experiment. In such studies, if participants of experimental self-talk groups are not using self-talk, then it would be legitimate to analyse the data and consequently report the results after excluding them (or reporting both when including or excluding them). Likewise, if participants of control groups report using self-talk cues relevant to the task, then it would be legitimate to analyse the data and consequently report the results after excluding them (or reporting both when including or excluding them). The reason is that without training, the use of the appropriate self-talk cues alone contaminates the experimental manipulation and equate individuals of control groups to those of the experimental groups, as the different treatments had the same outcome (using self-talk). In longer interventions, where participants have the chance to better understand and master the use of self-talk cues, the manipulation check can be mostly used for descriptive purposes, rather than controlling experimental integrity, especially if the use of self-talk by participants has been evaluated in the training phase of the intervention. In such interventions, experimental participants have been offered a more or less extended treatment that may have led them to decide the degree to which it is helpful to use the designated self-talk. In addition, participants of control groups have not received the extended treatment, and any use of self-talk can therefore be

Strategic Self-talk Interventions 133 considered as not contaminating the condition (unless we become aware of participants following a strategic self-talk intervention for other reasons). Therefore, in interventions including extended training, the treatment is the training, and thus we recommend that participants of experimental or control groups should not be eliminated.

Conclusions The present chapter focused on research involving strategic self-talk, and in particular on strategic self-talk interventions in sport. Our aim was to overview what we feel are important aspects of the literature, to consider what we have learned so far, and to provide some directions and guidelines for future research. As research in strategic self-talk is rapidly growing, our understanding of self-talk processes and scientific procedures may eventually change, to further enhance our knowledge on the effectiveness of strategic self-talk. We hope that this chapter will contribute towards this direction and the flourishing of strategic self-talk research.

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Strategic Self-talk Interventions 135 Son, V., Jackson, B., Grove, R. J., & Feltz, D. L. (2011). “I am” versus “we are”: Effects of distinctive variants of self-talk on efficacy beliefs and motor performance. Journal of Sports Sciences, 29, 1417–1424. Taylor, R. M., Brinthaupt, T. M., & Pennington, J. T. (2017). The relationship between self-talk and flow experiences in competitive athletes. Journal of Sport Behavior, 41, 88–106. Theodorakis, Y., Chroni, S., Laparidis, K., Bebestos, V., & Douma, I. (2001). Selftalk in a basketball shooting task. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 92, 309–315. Theodorakis, Y., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Zourbanos, N. (2012). Cognitions: Self-talk and performance. In S. Murphy (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of sport and perform­ ance psychology (pp. 191–212). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Theodorakis, Y., Weinberg, R., Natsis, P., Douma, I., & Kazakas, P. (2000). The effects of motivational versus instructional self-talk on improving motor performance. The Sport Psychologist, 14, 253–272. Tod, D., Hardy, J., & Oliver, E. J. (2011). Effects of self-talk: A systematic review. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 33, 666–687. Van Raalte, J., Cornelius, A., Mullin, E., Brewer, B. W., Van Dyke, E., Johnson, A. J., & Iwatsuki, T. (2018). I will use declarative self-talk … or will I? Replication, extension, and meta-analyses. The Sport Psychologist, 32, 16–25. Weinberg, R., Miller, A., & Horn, T. (2012). The influence of a self-talk intervention on collegiate cross-country runners. International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 10, 123–134. Ziegler, S. G. (1987). Effects of stimulus cueing on the acquisition of groundstrokes by beginning tennis players. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 20, 405–411. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Bardas, D., & Theodorakis, Y. (2013). The effects of self-talk on dominant and non-dominant arm performance on a handball task in primary physical education students. The Sport Psychologist, 27, 171–176. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Chroni, S., Theodorakis, Y., & Papaioannou, A. (2009). Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sports (ASTQS): Development and preliminary validity of a measure identifying the structure of athletes’ self-talk. The Sport Psychologist, 23, 233–251.

10 Self-talk Mechanisms Evangelos Galanis and Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis

Introduction The study of the human mind explores, in our view, one of the most intriguing questions of science: how thoughts govern our behaviour and emotions, but also our body and self-concept altogether. If the way we talk to ourselves has such an important function, then, can we make thoughts happen, can we stop thinking, or, ultimately, can we have control over our thoughts? Such questions reflect the wider quest of self-regulation, referring to self-created thoughts, feelings, and actions that are planned and interact for the attainment of personal goals (Zimmerman, 2000). Considering achievement contexts from a motivational perspective, Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory introduced the reciprocal determinism approach, postulating that the interaction of individuals’ thoughts and affects energise, direct, and regulate behaviour. More emphatically, cognitive behaviour therapy approaches (Ellis, 1976; Meichenbaum, 1977) have identified how self-statements influence individuals’ attentional and appraisal processes, and subsequently stressed the importance of self-instructional training for improving cognitive and emotional behaviour. Indeed, the way we talk to ourselves and what we say – self-talk – has been highlighted as a key process for the regulation of behaviour and, in particular, performance in sport. Accordingly, the sport self-talk literature has been dominated by the exploration of performance-enhancing interventions. As evidenced in the previous chapter (Chapter 9), self-talk interventions have proven effective in improving sport performance, and through the development of the literature have become more comprehensive. Yet, as Hatzigeorgiadis, Theodorakis, and Zourbanos (2004) argued, to fully grasp the effects of self-talk on performance in different settings and populations, we should become aware of the possible mechanisms that explain its effectiveness. Understanding self-talk mechanisms and subsequently targeting specific mechanisms through strategic self-talk, will enable us to develop and implement more effective interventions, matching contextual demands and individual needs, but also will provide a basis for refining and further developing better theory (Michie & Abraham, 2004). Accordingly, the main objective of this chapter is to provide a synthesis of

Self-talk Mechanisms 137 approaches to self-talk mechanisms, intertwined with research findings, and accommodate in this process the new self-talk conceptualisation differentiating between organic and strategic self-talk.

What Mechanisms Are About To understand why things happen, we should be able to see how they are produced by mechanisms (Salmon, 1984). By “mechanisms,” we mean the processes involved in the transition from one event/episode (thought, emotion, behaviour) to another. In the case of self-talk and its effects on performance, in a simplistic way, this could be expressed as what does self-talk do to us (or makes us do) that influences our performance? The idea of self-talk mechanisms was expressed in a rational way by Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, and Theodorakis (2007) through an observation regarding the effectiveness of strategic self-talk. They noticed that certain self-talk cues can be more effective for some tasks than for others, but also that some self-talk cues can be more effective than other self-talk cues in certain tasks. Thus, they argued, self-talk cues may operate through different mechanisms. Such postulations were also evident in reports by athletes following strategic self-talk interventions. In particular, in anecdotal reports following strategic self-talk interventions, athletes particularly identified that self-talk helped them feel more confident, but also directed their attention efficiently (e.g., Johnson, Hrycaiko, Johnson, & Halas, 2004; Thelwell & Greenlees, 2003). Similar evidence emerged from more systematic qualitative studies showing that self-talk helped athletes to maintain motivation, regulate effort, focus their attention, and reduce performance anxiety (Cutton & Hearon, 2014; Miles & Neil, 2013). One of the first empirical studies to explore self-talk mechanisms was the study by Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2004), who suggested an attentional interpretation for the facilitative effects of self-talk on task performance. Subsequently, the importance of self-talk mechanisms was raised by Hardy’s (2006) review, where theoretical underpinnings of self-talk were discussed. Further, the mechanisms were put into perspective by Hardy, Oliver, and Tod (2009), who presented a framework for the study of self-talk in their throughput model. They proposed four clusters of mechanisms: cognitive, motivational, behavioural, and affective mechanisms. Cognitive mechanisms referred to attentional control and information processing; motivational mechanisms referred to aspects such as self-efficacy, effort, and persistence; behavioural mechanisms referred to movement patterns relevant to motor task execution; and finally, affective mechanisms referred to the regulation of affective states such as anxiety. Considering the onset and the progress of research on self-talk mechanisms, and based on Hardy et al.’s (2009) framework, Galanis, Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, and Theodorakis (2016) presented a model portraying up-to-date empirical evidence from self-talk mechanism research. They identified that two clusters of mechanisms had

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received noteworthy research interest: attention and motivation, and presented the different perspectives reflected in these two mechanisms. These attempts to map the viable mechanisms explaining the effects of self-talk on performance have enhanced our understanding regarding the operation of self-talk, and forwarded relevant lines of research.

Mechanisms in the Framework of the New Self-talk Conceptualisation The new conceptualisation of self-talk establishes a distinction between two self-talk entities: organic and strategic self-talk and, further, within organic self-talk, differentiates between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, et al., 2019). On the one hand, organic self-talk reflects ongoing cognitive processes, including spontaneous and goal-directed statements addressed to the self. Spontaneous self-talk is unintended and non-instrumental; it comes unbidden and effortless, as a result of a relevant contextual stimuli. In contrast, goal-directed self-talk is rational and deliberately employed to make progress on a task. On the other hand, strategic self-talk is described as the use of pre-determined self-talk cues that aim at triggering a specific response, thus serving a specific purpose, and ultimately enhancing performance or achieving self-regulation goals (Hatzigeorgiadis, Galanis, & Theodorakis, this book; see Chapter 9). Below we will try to provide some ideas, but also evidence, regarding how self-talk mechanisms could fit within this new self-talk conceptualisation.

Spontaneous Self-talk Spontaneous self-talk is characterised by three features: nature, structure, and content (Latinjak, Zourbanos, Lopes-Roz, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2014). In terms of nature, spontaneous self-talk can be viewed as a window into the mind of the athlete (e.g., athletes’ performance beliefs, goal orientations, causal attributions). In terms of structure, spontaneous self-talk can vary in terms of valence (positive and negative) and time perspective (past-related/outcomes and future-related/expectations). Finally, in terms of content, spontaneous self-talk mostly describes, evaluates, and explains past outcomes and makes predictions concerning upcoming events. The examination of the above aspects of spontaneous self-talk may help researchers to better understand the relationship between self-talk and performance. Even though spontaneous self-talk and performance seem to be tightly linked, considering the above features but also its stimuli driven roots, intuitively it would appear that spontaneous self-talk is more of a consequence of sport performance and less of an antecedent. This, however, is not to imply that it does not affect performance. Some postulations can be made through past literature exploring the content of organic self-talk in relation to performance. Such research has provided indications that organic positive self-talk is positively

Self-talk Mechanisms 139 linked with performance, whereas organic negative self-talk may have negative, neutral, or positive effects (Tod, Hardy, & Oliver, 2011). Nevertheless, it has to be noticed that without knowing if organic self-talk is spontaneous or goaldirected it is risky to make any conclusions. For negative self-talk, the vast majority of which is assumed to be spontaneous (see Chapter 6) the results are equivocal. For positive self-talk, the positive links with performance may be due to this self-talk being goal-directed, rather than spontaneous. An additional issue would be that the alleged impact of spontaneous self-talk on performance, may not really be the impact of self-talk per se, but rather the process that stimulated self-talk (i.e., the bad shot, or the emotion that the bad shot brought about, rather than the “how bad” spontaneous self-talk that followed). Until such research questions are actually explored, we cannot have any answers, yet some theoretically based postulations could be made. One possible mechanism that can be assumed based on the principles of the attentional control theory, is that spontaneous self-talk may influence performance through two pathways: attentional and motivational (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). On one hand, a detrimental effect on performance can occur due to impaired processing efficiency and decreased attentional control, in particular when negative self-talk becomes rumination. A similar negative attentional effect would also be likely for positive self-talk, when, for example, seemingly positive statements (such as, “I’m winning it”) before a tennis point or a race has ended detract, even momentarily, athletes’ attention from task-relevant stimuli and thereby harm performance. On the other hand, a potential motivational effect is also viable. This effect could be positive, i.e., motivating, through the allocation of additional resources, such as effort or alternative tactics. However, it could also be negative, i.e., demotivating, if resources are depleted (Englert & Bertrams, 2015) or if expectancies of goal attainment are negative (Carver & Scheier, 1988). These propositions should be cautiously considered. One could argue that the motivating effect is not the outcome of the negative spontaneous self-talk, but rather of the goal-directed self-talk that may follow (see Chapter 2), as part of the interplay between spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk. Finally, the attentional control theory considers such effects a function of anxiety, and mostly its cognitive component, i.e., worry, which reflects negative spontaneous self-talk. However, the same mechanisms may operate in a performancefacilitating way for positive spontaneous self-talk. As research based on the new conceptualisation of self-talk is only developing, in particular with regard to spontaneous self-talk, such postulations remain to be explored in the future.

Strategic and Goal-Directed Self-talk From the definitions of strategic and goal-directed self-talk, it becomes apparent that despite representing different self-talk entities, they share a common characteristic: both aim at serving a purpose; in the first case through organic processes and in the second through pre-determined plans. Strategic self-talk has been mostly researched as a performance-enhancing

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strategy, whereas early research on goal-directed self-talk has primarily focused on several functions that can be pursued. In particular, recent evidence has identified that goal-directed self-talk can be used to control and regulate cognitive and emotional reactions, such as appraisals, decision-making, arousal, and confidence (Latinjak, Masó, Calmeiro, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2019). Moreover, research on self-talk mechanisms has been almost exclusively based on experimental designs, thus having strategic self-talk as a background. Nevertheless, it is imperative to stress that strategic and goal-directed self-talk serve the same objective – the pursuit of a goal. Subsequently, until further research challenges our claims, we assume that goal-directed and strategic self-talk operate through the same mechanisms. In the following section we will attempt to introduce updates on the self-talk mechanisms literature. Stemming from Hardy et al.’s (2009) working framework and Galanis et al.’s (2016) empirically based model, the starting point would be that the cognitive and the motivational clusters are the ones that have attracted the most research interest. This may be due to early differentiation between instructional and motivational self-talk that were assumed to serve different, attentional and motivational, purposes. In addition, the affective cluster, despite its deep roots in the literature of cognitive behaviour therapy, only now seems to be receiving some attention, in particular with regard to emotion regulation, as also evident in this book (see Chapter 5). Finally, regarding the behavioural cluster, there is research postulating its relevance; however, this may have underpinnings in attentional and motivational mechanisms.

Attention and Information Processing – Cognitive Mechanisms Research on self-talk mechanisms suggests that the effects of self-talk on attention are a key mechanism explaining the effectiveness of self-talk strategies. Following preliminary anecdotal reports for the beneficial effects of self-talk on attention (e.g., Landin & Hebert, 1999), experimental research has provided robust, direct and indirect, empirical evidence. We consider direct evidence the findings from studies exploring the effects of self-talk on cognitive attention tasks or in sport tasks where aspects of attentions have been assessed. We consider indirect evidence the findings from studies exploring the effects of self-talk on performance of sport tasks with particular attentional demands, or under conditions that are challenging for attention. In some cases, designs involving direct evidence have been transferred to designs examining indirect evidence, i.e., sport task performance, to also support the ecological validity of the findings. Over the last few years, attempts have been made for a rather direct examination of the attentional effects of strategic self-talk. Galanis et al. (2016) reported on a series of six experiments testing the effectiveness of strategic self-talk cues on computerised attention tests (Test Battery for Perception and Attention Functions from the Vienna Test System). Each experiment involved one or more tests of the six attention functions, as conceptualised by Sturm

Self-talk Mechanisms 141 (2005); namely, alertness, vigilance, focused, selective, divided, and spatial attention. Overall, the findings showed that in all experiments, in 16 out of 17 tests that were implemented, the experimental groups had better attentional performance, evidenced through faster reaction times, than the control groups; a meta-analytic synthesis of the results showed a large effect size (d = 0.91). Two more studies have used such measures of attention (Perception and Attention Functions from the Vienna Test System) to examine the effects of strategic self-talk on dimensions of attention, under conditions of ego depletion and physical fatigue. Gregersen, Hatzigeorgiadis, Galanis, Comoutos, and Papaioannou (2017) examined the effects of strategic self-talk on selective attention in a state of ego depletion. The results showed that the use of self-talk led to better performance; in particular, the experimental group had faster reaction times in a visual and an auditory test and a greater percentage of correct responses for the visual test compared to the control group. Subsequently, Papagiannis, Karathanasi, Nurkse, Galanis, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2018) examined whether strategic self-talk can help attentional performance, and in particular the function of divided attention, under conditions of physical fatigue. The results showed that following a near-exhaustion run on a treadmill, the experimental group displayed faster reaction times and fewer mistakes on the divided attention test. Finally, Wallace et al. (2017) explored the effects of motivational self-talk on a cognitive test battery in heat conditions. Participants of the experimental group underwent a two-week motivational self-talk intervention, aiming at improving focus and increasing concentration for performing the cognitive task, specifically in heat. The results showed that the self-talk group increased in both speed and accuracy of responses to the test assessing executive function in heat conditions. Additional evidence for the attentional effects of self-talk can be inferred from two experimental studies exploring the effectiveness of different attentional focus on task performance. Bell and Hardy (2009) examined the effects of strategic self-talk on a golf chip shot through cues that aimed to direct golfers’ attention to internal, proximal external, and distal external focus. Their experimental manipulation checks showed that participants in the three conditions reported greater focus on the respective type of attentional focus induced by the manipulation, thus supporting the hypothesis that self-talk enhances the strength of a particular focus. Similar results have been reported in an experiment involving a cycling task where a control group was also included (Charachousi, Christodoulou, Gourgoulias, Galanis, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2015). Participants of the experimental group who used self-talk cues directing their attention either internally or externally, reported greater internal or external focus respectively, compared to those of the control group who only received respective pre-task instructions. Finally, probably stronger, direct evidence for the impact of self-talk for attentional focus has been provided in a study examining the effect of strategic self-talk on quiet eye in a golf-putting task (Sarig, Ruiz, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Tenenbaum, 2017). The results showed that the use of

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instructional self-talk resulted in longer quiet eye duration compared to a control group. Importantly, the self-talk group also scored higher in the index of putting proficiency post intervention. Overall, this direct evidence has provided valuable support for the attentional mechanism of self-talk, which has been further backed by indirect evidence. Indirect effects regarding the attentional self-talk mechanism can be inferred from a large number of studies, where sport tasks with increased attentional demands have been used. These could be studies with tasks requiring accuracy and precision, like dart throwing (Dagrou, Gauvin, & Halliwell, 1992), tennis (Latinjak, Torregrossa, & Renom, 2011), and golf-putting (Bell & Hardy, 2009), but also basketball free throws (Abdoli, Hardy, Riyahi, & Farsi, 2018), and football shooting (Johnson et al., 2004). Moreover, amongst these studies, some had particular attentional features, mostly related to shifting attention to appropriate performance features. Ziegler (1987) examined the effects of a four-step self-talk plan with each cue reflecting the attentional focus appropriate for the different phases of tennis groundstrokes; in particular, shifting between narrow external and broad external focus. The results showed that the intervention was indeed effective in enhancing performance. Similar results were reported in a study with sprinters by Mallett and Hanrahan (1997), where self-talk cues were designed to direct attention, so that it matched the requirements of the three race segments. Their results showed that sprinting performance was enhanced. Through the improvement of performance, the authors in these studies concluded that self-talk cues were successful in directing attention. In addition to this type of indirect evidence, research has recently explored the effects of strategic self-talk under conditions that have been shown to inhibit attentional performance. One line of such experiments addressed the impact of self-talk on countering ego depletion and physical fatigue, which have detrimental effects on attentional functions (Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). Nurkse et al. (2019) reported on two experiments assessing performance in a mini-golf putting task, before and after a depleting cognitive attention task, with sport students having no prior golf experience. In the first experiment, performance was assessed on a typical putt following some training sets; in the second an additional divided-attention parameter was added, which was paying attention to the direction of a waving flag at the side of the golf course. In both experiments, participants of the self-talk group improved their performance, whereas for those of the control group performance did not change. The authors supported the facilitating effects of self-talk for focused and divided attention, arguing that for both groups the depleting effects were countered by the learning effects, thus performance of the control groups did not change, yet, the use of self-talk resulted in performance increases for the experimental group. A last study on this line of research examined the effects of physical fatigue on free throw performance in basketball players (Charachousi, Tzeli, Makri, & Galanis, 2018). Following a baseline assessment, participants,

Self-talk Mechanisms 143 divided into experimental and control groups, received a three-week training intervention practising free-throws, with or without self-talk respectively. In the final assessment participants were asked to repeat the free throw test immediately after completing a near-exhaustion shuttle run. The results showed that the participants of the experimental group maintained performance compared to baseline assessment and scored higher compared to participants of the control group, whose performance decreased. Collectively the above experiments suggest that self-talk can help counter the effects of ego depletion and physical fatigue. Another attention-inhibiting factor that has been explored is distractions. Moran (1996) suggested that external, coming from the environment (e.g., noise), and internal, coming from within the self (e.g., interfering thoughts), distractions can significantly harm attention functions and subsequently sport performance. Galanis, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, Charachousi, and Sanchez (2018) examined experimentally the effects of self-talk strategies on performance under conditions of auditory distractions (extreme, non-continuous, sudden, high-tone noise) in two different settings (laboratory and field). The performance in the laboratory experiment was tested on a computerised task, while in the field experiment performance was measured through a free-throw basketball test. In both experiments, the results showed that under conditions of external distraction the participants of the experimental group performed better than participants of the control group. With regard to internal distractions, Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2004) examined the effects of instructional and motivational self-talk on the occurrence of interfering thoughts and performance on two water-polo tasks (precision and power) with similar characteristics. The results showed that both self-talk types were effective in reducing the occurrence of distracting thoughts in both tasks, while reductions in interfering thoughts were related to increases in performance. Even though in this experiment distraction was not induced, but rather assessed, the findings further support the idea that self-talk can prevent or reduce distracting effects. Overall, the evidence presented above makes a strong case for the attentional effects of self-talk as a mechanism explaining its facilitating effects on sport performance. Considering the physical but also the attentional demands of sport, the limited capacity approaches to attention could further justify such attentional effects, in particular with regard to the function of attention under adverse conditions. Distractions, either external of internal, but also ego depletion, reduces available attentional resources and constrains the processing of relevant cues (Hagger et al., 2010; Janelle, Singer, Williams, 1999). The use of strategic self-talk cues can help to block, or deteriorate the intensity of, the distracting stimuli, thus preserving attentional resources; further, it can help in countering the depleting effects of fatigue by renewing attentional resources. Such attention effects can reduce the detrimental impact of adverse conditions, benefit attentional processes, and subsequently performance.

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Self-Efficacy and Effort – Motivational Mechanisms The motivational effects of self-talk have been identified since the early years of self-talk research in sport. Zinsser, Bunkerl, and Williams (1998) suggested that self-talk can be motivating through enhancing confidence, inspiring greater effort, and creating a positive mood. Subsequently, the motivational properties of self-talk have been widely researched and supported, in particular in studies exploring the effectiveness of self-talk interventions in tasks requiring strength and endurance, such as running and muscular leg endurance (Weinberg, Smith, Jackson, & Gould, 1984), knee extension tasks on a isokinetic dynamometer (Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, & Kazakas, 2000), and cycling (Hamilton, Scott, & MacDougall, 2007). Such findings have provided preliminary support for the motivational mechanism of self-talk; however, contemporary research has more systematically investigated and supported it. A motivational perspective to understanding the effectiveness of self-talk for performance is through the postulation of the self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1997). Self-efficacy has proven the most consistent predictor of behavioural outcomes than any other motivational construct (Graham & Weiner, 1996). Importantly, self-talk has been identified as an extension of the verbal persuasion source, originally postulated from the theory. Self-talk has been claimed as a self-induced reinforcement about one’s capabilities to execute a course of action (Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). Subsequently, increases in self-efficacy may be a viable mechanism explaining the facilitative effects of self-talk on performance. In a primary attempt, Hardy, Hall, Gibbs, and Greenslade (2005) examined the effects of instructional and motivational self-talk on a task performance and self-efficacy, and noted that both type of self-talk cues were positively related to self-efficacy. Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Goltsios, and Theodorakis (2008) examined the effects of motivational self-talk on self-efficacy and performance in young tennis players and noted that self-efficacy and performance of the experimental group increased compared to that of the control group. Importantly, increases in self-efficacy were positively related to increases in performance. Similar results have been reported in studies with volleyball (Zetou, Vernadakis, Bebetsos, & Makraki, 2012) and softball (Chang et al., 2014) players. Finally, Walter, Nikoleizig, and Alfermann (2019) examined the effects of shorter (one week – three sessions) and longer (8 weeks – 24 sessions) strategic self-talk interventions on self-efficacy and performance in young athletes. Their findings showed that only the longer intervention resulted in improved performance. Interestingly, it was revealed that following the intervention, self-efficacy improved for both intervention groups, however, for the longer intervention the effects lasted longer, as identified in a six-week follow up assessment. Overall, these findings provide relatively robust evidence for the self-efficacy enhancing attributes of self-talk and suggest self-efficacy as a viable mechanism explaining the facilitating effects of self-talk on performance.

Self-talk Mechanisms 145 Another line of research that has attracted considerable attention in recent years is the effects of self-talk on endurance performance (see Chapter 13). There seem to be two reasons behind it, a pragmatic and a scientific – respectively, the increasing trends of recreational endurance athletes, and the introduction of the psychobiological model of endurance performance, which particularly addresses aspects of motivation (Marcora, 2019). The psychobiological model of endurance performance presents a motivational approach to endurance performance, suggesting two crucial factors: perception of effort, as in how heavy and strenuous an endurance task feels, and potential motivation, as reflected in the amount of effort individuals would be willing to invest towards goal achievement. The model posits that exhaustion, which causes reduction or termination of task performance, is a conscious decision that reflects perceptions of effort. Accordingly, any physiological or psychological factor that may influence such perceptions can have a considerable impact on performance. Strategic self-talk, in particular motivational, has been considered as such a psychological factor; in four studies endurance performance has been assessed and linked to perceptions of effort. Blanchfield, Hardy, de Morree, Staiano, and Marcora (2014) found that in a time-to-exhaustion trial, the self-talk group cycled for longer and reported lower ratings of perceived exertion (RPE) during the task than a control group. Barwood, Corbett, Wagstaff, McVeigh, and Thelwell (2015) reported that in a 10 km cycling test the self-talk group improved their times following the intervention, through a higher power output in the second half of the trial, while no changes in RPE were recorded; performance of the control group remained similar. Finally, two more studies explored tenets of the model when performing in heat conditions. Wallace et al. (2017) found that self-talk assisted, trained cyclists perform for longer in a time-to-exhaustion test compared to a control group, whereas no differences were found in RPE. Moreover, Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2018) in a 30-minute cycling trial in heat conditions found that participants of the self-talk group produced greater power output during the final third of the trial, while reporting similar levels of RPE and thermal sensation. Taken together these findings provide support for the interpretation of the self-talk effect based on the postulations of the psychobiological model, as better performance through self-talk was not at the expense of higher perceived exertion. Further research examining in combination the two factors identified by the model – perceived exertion and in-task motivation – would further strengthen the evidence for the psychobiological interpretation of the facilitating effects of self-talk on performance.

Emotion Regulation – Affective Mechanisms Emotion regulation in sport can be an “end” or a “means to an end.” In other words, emotion regulation is equally important as an outcome or as a mediator, i.e., a mechanism, towards performance enhancement. The role of self-talk as an emotion regulation strategy has been extensively discussed

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by Fritsch and Jekauc (this book, see Chapter 5), so in this section we will briefly overview how emotion regulation can act as a self-talk mechanism for performance. The use of strategic and goal-directed self-talk cues for emotion regulation can act in a proactive or a reactive way (Fritsch & Jekauc, this book). In a proactive way, self-talk can be used to prevent the experience of an emotion or control its expected intensity, as in the sport context, and in particular in competitions, it would not be feasible to completely prevent emotions such as anxiety. Respectively, in a reactive way, self-talk can be used to cope with an emotion that is experienced. Also, of particular interest, with regard to the role of self-talk in emotion regulation, Latinjak, Hardy and Hatzigeorgiadis (this book, Chapter 2) suggest that goal-directed or strategic self-talk can effect emotion regulation in two ways: directly and indirectly. In particular, they argue that self-talk cues can help by identifying and changing dysfunctional emotional states to more functional ones, or they can change emotional states without focusing directly on emotions. In that case, self-talk may be used to help focus attention on task execution or boosting confidence, thus dismissing, or taking attention away from, negative emotional states. Interestingly, this indirect approach to regulating emotions through goal-directed self-talk may be more effective given the possible paradoxical effects of self-talk attempting to suppress unwanted emotions (Gardner & Moore, 2004). Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Mpoumpaki, and Theodorakis (2009) assessed confidence, anxiety, and performance on a forehand-drive test, under evaluative conditions before and after a three-day training programme in young tennis players. The results showed that for the self-talk group using motivational cues, confidence increased and anxiety, in particular cognitive, decreased, whereas no changes were found for the control group. They concluded that the training and subsequently the use of motivational cues prevented raises in anxiety and thus facilitated performance under evaluative conditions. Walter, Nikoleizig, and Alfermann (2019) provided similar results though a shorter and a longer self-talk intervention, however, the effect was significant only for somatic anxiety. Importantly, in follow-up measures six weeks after the completion of the intervention, the effects were sustained. These findings would best fit the proactive-indirect interpretation of the emotion regulation mechanism, as players (a) were trained to use selftalk and used it as a strategy regardless of the experience of the emotion, and (b) used self-talk to instil confidence rather than deal with anxiety. In another proactive and indirect approach to emotion regulation, Hase, Hood, Moore, and Freeman (2019) examined the impact of instructional and motivational self-talk on challenge and threat appraisals and performance in a dart-throwing task. The findings indicated that motivational and instructional self-talk did not directly influence challenge and threat states. Nevertheless, the authors reported trends showing that athletes in a challenge state may benefit from motivational self-talk, whereas those in a threat state may profit from instructional self-talk.

Self-talk Mechanisms 147 Emotion regulation has been among the first-identified functions of inner speech (Ellis, 1976), yet in sport research remains relatively scant. The development of the new self-talk conceptualisation has encouraged such research and the findings provide valuable preliminary evidence for the importance of goal-directed self-talk for emotion regulation, either as outcome or mechanism (e.g., Latinjak, Torregrossa, Comoutos, Hernando-Gimeno, & Ramis, 2019). Such evidence can provide the basis for further research on emotion regulation as a mechanism for the effectiveness of self-talk.

Movement Patterns and Effortless Performance – Behavioural Mechanisms Hardy et al. (2009) argued that changes in movement patterns are likely to contribute to the influence that self-talk has on performance. This postulation was examined by Tod, Thatcher, McGuigan, and Thatcher (2009), who investigated self-talk on vertical-jump performance in college students, using a within-participant design. Self-talk led to greater centre of mass displacement (i.e., participants jumped higher) and increased angular velocity around the knee joint (participants drove up quicker prior to leaving the ground). The latter may have caused the former, so it could be considered a mechanism, however, such increases could also be due to attentional impact of the cues (bend and drive) or the motivational impact of the cues (I can jump high). Similar results were reported in a study with male rugby union players (Edwards, Tod, & McGuigan 2008). Moreover, Abdoli et al. (2018) examined free-throw performance and movement patterns in professional basketball players. They found that instructional self-talk improved performance and reduced elbow–wrist coordination variability. They also suggested that cognitive factors could underpin the changes in the behavioural markers. A different approach regarding the behavioural mechanism could be considered through findings that seem to support an automatic execution perspective. Automatic execution has been identified as a potential effect of self-talk through athletes’ reports (Theodorakis, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Chroni, 2008). Some recent preliminary evidence could possibly be connected with such effects. Galanis et al. (2016) reported on two experiments where pupil diameter was recorded during two computerised fine motor tasks. Performance of the self-talk group in these tasks was superior to that of the control group, whereas pupil dilation was smaller. They suggested that considering the results from the pupillometry, the performance differences could be due to reduced mental effort, thus attributed to an effortless attention effect of self-talk. In a study with sport students, the effects of strategic self-talk on heart rate variability were examined during a 30-minute cycling task (Stojković, 2017). The use of cue words (steady and calm) for the experimental group led to greater vagal activation, compared to the control group. These findings were considered as preliminary evidence suggesting that self-talk may trigger a more composed or effortless performance. A construct that has been linked with effortless performance is flow. Minja, Tzeli, Galanis,

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Tsatsalas, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2019) examined the effects of a self-talk intervention on flow in elite Tae Kwon Do athletes, who were trained to develop competition self-talk plans. Flow was assessed through self-reports immediately after two competitions with an 8-week interval, in-between which the intervention was implemented. The results for the experimental group showed increases in overall flow and the dimensions of challenge–skills balance, clear goals, unambiguous feedback, concentration on the task at hand, and sense of control, in the post-intervention competition. The results were linked to findings from studies supporting the attentional and motivational effects of self-talk. Such relationships have been also reported through correlational data (Taylor, Brinthop, & Pennington, 2017). Taken together, these findings seem to indicate a behavioural response to the use of self-talk, which, however, should be considered with caution. As indicated above, considering the conceptualisation of flow, these could be attributed to attentional and motivational effects. Nevertheless, these preliminary findings suggest that this research perspective warrants further attention.

What We’ve Learned So Far Self-talk works! The evidence has accumulated sufficiently to confidently state that self-talk strategies can enhance sport performance. But how? Research on mechanisms has been steadily growing, providing valuable evidence for the potential factors mediating the effects of self-talk on performance; yet still a lot remain to be unveiled. Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2004) reported that motivational and instructional self-talk cues, i.e., cues targeting seemingly different mechanisms, served a common attentional mechanism, as they both reduced internal distractions. Similarly, in a study by Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2007) athletes reported that under evaluative conditions, an anxiety-control self-talk cue had greater impact on anxiety control than an attentional cue; however, athletes reported that both types of self-talk cues mostly assisted their attention to the task. Abdoli et al. (2018) reported that improvement in movement patterns suggests a behavioural interpretation of self-talk effectiveness, yet they acknowledge the potential of cognitive mechanisms underlying such effects. There are two things we could infer from such findings. First, that self-talk cues may influence performance though different mechanisms, which, however, may operate in tandem – an idea first expressed by Hardy et al. (2009). Second, our attempt to provide clusters of mechanisms may seem in vain. Improvements in kinematics have been considered a behavioural mechanism; however, to produce such a change, we would argue that attention is also involved. Similarly, applying additional effort can be considered a behavioural reaction, however one would argue that it is the motivational drive that underpins such behavioural change. Instilling self-efficacy or confidence are considered motivational aspects, yet they involve cognitive and affective processes. Reflecting back to Latinjak (this book, see Chapter 1), our strategy to deal with the complexity of reality is to simplify it by breaking it into

Self-talk Mechanisms 149 smaller units. Accordingly, subdivisions, such as the clustering of self-talk mechanisms, do not necessarily represent solid entities, but rather attempts to describe and understand how the self operates. Thus, we come to believe that our efforts to classify are not in vain, as they help us brainstorm, develop a scheme, produce research ideas and questions, and, ultimately, understand the different perspectives of phenomena such as the self-talk mechanisms. We feel that research on self-talk mechanisms has a long future, and this should now involve more psychophysiological and neurophysiological perspectives. For instance, measures of heart rate variability, gaze behaviour, and eye fixations can help explore autonomic nervous system modulations and cognitive processes under different self-talk conditions. Furthermore, electroencephalography can help identify the activation of brain regions through different types of self-talk. Such approaches will allow us to further explain the ways in which self-talk functions through mechanisms, thus further enhancing our understanding of the self-talk phenomenon altogether and its impact on sport performance and sport behaviour.

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Self-talk Mechanisms 151 Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Theodorakis, Y., & Zourbanos, N. (2004). Self-talk in the swim­ ming pool: The effects of self-talk on thought content and performance on water polo tasks. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 16, 138–150. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Goltsios, C., & Theodorakis, Y. (2008). Investi­ gating the functions of self-talk: The effects of motivational self-talk on self-efficacy and performance in young tennis players. The Sports Psychologist, 22, 458–471. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Mpoumpaki, S., & Theodorakis, Y. (2009). Mechanisms underlying the self-talk-performance relationship: The effects of motivational self-talk on self-confidence and anxiety. Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 10, 185–192. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., & Theodorakis, Y. (2007). An examination on the moderating effects of self-talk content on self-talk functions. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 19, 240–251. Janelle, C. M., Singer, R. N., & Williams, M. A. (1999). External distraction and attentional narrowing: Visual search evidence. Journal of Sport & Exercise Psychology, 21, 70–91. Johnson, J. M., Hrycaiko, D. W., Johnson, G. V., & Halas, J. M. (2004). Self-talk and female youth soccer performance. The Sport Psychologist, 18, 44–59. Landin, D., & Hebert, E. P. (1999). The influence of self-talk on the performance of skilled female tennis players. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 11, 263–282. Latinjak, A. T., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Comoutos, N., & Hardy, J. (2019). Speaking clearly … 10 years on: The case for an integrative perspective of self-talk in sport. Sport, Exercise & Performance Psychology, 8, 353–367. Latinjak, A. T., Masó, M., Calmeiro, L., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2019). Athletes’ use of goal-directed self-talk: Situational determinants and functions. International Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology. DOI: 10.1080/1612197X.2019.1611899. Latinjak, A. T., Torregrossa, M., Comoutos, N., Hernando-Gimeno, C., & Ramis, Y. (2019). Goal-directed self-talk used to self-regulate in male basketball competitions. Journal of Sports Sciences, 37, 1429–1433. Latinjak, A. T., Torregrossa, M., & Renom, J. (2011). Combining self-talk and per­ formance feedback: Their effectiveness with adult tennis players. The Sport Psycholo­ gist, 25, 18–31. Latinjak, A. T., Zourbanos, N., López-Ros, V., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2014). Goaldirected and undirected self-talk: Exploring a new perspective for the study of ath­ letes’ self-talk. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 15, 548–558. Mallett, C. J., & Hanrahan, S. J. (1997). Race modeling: An effective cognitive strat­ egy for the 100 m sprinter? The Sport Psychologist, 11, 72–85. Marcora, S. (2019). Psychobiology of fatigue during endurance exercise. In C. Meijen (Ed.), Endurance performance in sport: Psychological theory and interventions (pp. 15–34). Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Meichenbaum, D. H. (1977). Cognitive behavior modification: An integrative approach. New York, NY: Plenum. Michie, S., & Abraham, C. (2004). Interventions to change health behaviours: Evi­ dence-based or evidence-inspired? Psychology & Health, 19, 29–49. Miles, A., & Neil, R. (2013). The use of self-talk during elite cricket batting perform­ ance. Psychology of Sport & Exercise, 14, 874–881. Minja, N., Tzeli, K., Galanis, E., Tsatsalas, T., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2019). The effects of self-talk on flow in elite TaeKwonDo athletes. Proceedings, 15th FEPSAC European Congress of Sport Psychology (p. 51), Munster, Germany.

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11 Self-talk Interventions in Tennis and Golf Robert Weinberg and Alexander Bianco

Introduction As Epictius noted “we are not disturbed by things, but rather the view we take of them,” or, as Shakespeare put it, “there is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so.” These quotes highlight the important role that our thoughts play on how we evaluate and respond to events in our life. It is typical for most people to feel that some things are good (e.g., getting married, getting a new higher-paying job), while other things are bad (e.g., getting fired from your job, getting a divorce). But in reality, events are simply events. It is our evaluation of events that makes them positive or negative and this in turn determines our emotional, cognitive, and physical responses to the events. Your self-talk (both organic and strategic) is not only important in coping with events in your life, but also with performance in competitive sports. This chapter will focus on individual sports, with a specific focus on tennis and golf. One reason to focus on these two individual sports is the amount of “dead time” involved with each sport. For example, in tennis, there is about 20–30 seconds between each point and then 90 seconds for the changeover, which occurs on all odd games (e.g., 1, 3, 5, 7). In golf, the typical grouping is a foursome, and once players hit a shot, there is usually several minutes before they hit another as the other golfers take their turns. Additionally, it could take time to walk to their ball, such as after a drive. In a typical tennis match, for example, about three-quarters of the time is spent between points or on changeovers, and one-quarter of the time is actually spent playing tennis. In golf, even less time is actually spent playing golf (hitting the ball) with most of the time being between shots. So, what is a player thinking between points and between shots? During this “dead time” the mind is likely to wander and often can get absorbed in many other distractions such as “I hope I don’t double fault,” “I can’t believe I hit the ball in the water,” “that was a stupid shot,” and “I just need to par the next two holes to win the tournament.” So, let’s look at an example of the same situation in tennis being evaluated very differently due to organic self-talk. Let’s say you are playing the finals of a major tournament, have split sets but are up a double break 4–1 in the second set. However, you start to tighten up and play more

Self-talk Interventions in Tennis and Golf 155 tentatively, which allows your opponent to become more aggressive. This gives him more and more confidence and he comes back and beats you in a tiebreaker 7–6. You can’t believe you lost the match and are mad, frustrated, and depressed about blowing a 4–1 lead in the 3rd set. Consequently, you start beating yourself up with negative spontaneous selftalk such as “I can’t believe I choked the match away,” “I just can’t finish off a match,” or “I suck.” This really takes the “wind out of your sail” and you lose motivation to continue to work hard to improve. Now consider the same situation except that you change your self-talk and perspective after the match. Specifically, instead of getting mad and upset, you say to yourself “I really wanted to win, but the match showed me that I have to work a little harder in practice on staying calm and focused as I try to close out a match.” So, helped by goal-directed self-talk, you realise you have the ability to win and are motivated in practice to work harder to try and put everything together. Another example focuses on how self-talk can inadvertently help make something happen that you don’t want to happen. This is known as ironic processes (Wegner, Ansfield, & Piloff, 1998; Woodman, Barlow, & Gorgulu, 2015). This has special reference to real-world activities where often athletes or coaches say what not to do such as “don’t double fault” or “don’t choke” instead of focusing on what to do (e.g., “bend your knees” or “maintain racquet speed”). What evidently happens is that athletes hear the word “choke” or “double fault” as it is part of the instruction “don’t double fault.” Because of this they start thinking about the thing that they absolutely want to avoid. The first author had a situation consulting with a high school golfer, who was part of a team playing for a state championship. The team was ahead by several strokes on the 17th hole and on the brink of victory. Before starting the 17th hole she told me the coach said to all the women on the team, “we’re in good position so whatever you do, just don’t hit the ball into the water.” All four girls on the team hit the ball into the water. She said that all the women couldn’t get the “water” out of their minds after the coach told them not to hit the ball in the water. Now that we have discussed some of the practical aspects of self-talk, we will turn to the empirical and theoretical bodies of literature, especially as they relate to individual sports. This will include such things as the different types of self-talk, self-talk for different tasks, self-talk interventions, factors affecting self-talk effectiveness, and a theoretical approach to self-talk.

Research/Theory Regarding the Effects of Strategic Self-talk Interventions Although there was some research on self-talk prior to 2000, the amount of empirical research and theory development has significantly increased since the turn of the century. It is way beyond the scope of this chapter to thoroughly review this literature. Instead meta-analytic reviews and individual studies

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investigating the general effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions as well as the matching hypothesis (matching certain types of self-talk cues to certain types of sport skills) will be presented with specific reference to sports involving fine motor skills such as tennis and golf. The use of self-talk cues in strategic self-talk interventions is usually related to increases in performance, as demonstrated by a meta-analysis of positive self-talk interventions (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011), which revealed a moderate positive effect size (d = 0.48). However, the meta-analysis, similar to other theoretical self-talk models (Hardy, Oliver, & Tod, 2009), also suggests that the situational antecedent of the type of task might influence the type and effectiveness of self-talk employed. First, it is important to note that strategic self-talk can be broken down into instructional and motivational self-talk cues (Hatzigeorgiadis, 2006). Motivational self-talk cues would include statements such as “You got this!” or “You can beat this guy!” This form of strategic self-talk is expected to improve athletic performance via increases in physical effort, motivation, and confidence (Goudas, Hatzidimitriou, & Kikidi, 2006; Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Mpoumpaki, & Theodorakis, 2009). Conversely, instructional self-talk cues include statements relating to one’s skill execution such as “Follow through” or “Keep your eye on the ball.” This form of strategic self-talk is expected to increase performance due to improvements in an athlete’s focus and enhanced utilisation of proper technique (Chroni, Perkos, & Theodorakis, 2007). Due to the different mechanisms through which motivational and instructional self-talk cues have shown to enhance performance, these two forms of strategic self-talk are hypothesised to be more effective in different sport tasks. Specifically, this is referred to as the “task-matching hypothesis” (Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, & Kazakas, 2000). This hypothesis suggests that motivational self-talk cues are more beneficial in sport tasks that require gross-motor skills, such as endurance running or blocking in football. Conversely, instructional self-talk cues are expected to improve performance more in sports that require fine-motor skills, which would include tennis and golf. This proposed matching hypothesis has been investigated via individual studies, which have been combined in the metaanalysis noted above (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011). Besides investigating the overall effects of positive self-talk, this analysis investigated moderator variables such as type of task and the type of self-talk. Results revealed that strategic self-talk interventions were more effective for tasks involving relatively fine-, compared to gross-motor, tasks. More specifically, regarding the matching hypothesis, instructional self-talk cues were found to be more effective for fine-motor tasks as opposed to motivational self-talk cues. This finding offers support for one-half of the matching hypothesis, as the results regarding the effectiveness of motivational self-talk cues on strength and endurance tasks were equivocal. Since this chapter is focused on the effects of self-talk on the individual sports of golf and tennis, a brief discussion of a couple of these individual golf and tennis studies will be presented.

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Research on Strategic Self-talk in Golf and Tennis As noted above, while empirical evidence is inconsistent regarding the relationship between motivational self-talk cues and gross motor skills, several studies have demonstrated the importance of instructional self-talk cues in finemotor skill sports such as golf and tennis. The effectiveness of instructional self-talk cues was specifically demonstrated in golf by Harvey, Van Raalte, and Brewer (2002). This study involved 80 golfers with a moderate amount of experience in the sport. As opposed to other studies, in which participants were assigned self-talk statements, participants in this study selected which statement they would like to use from a list of 84 that had been generated via a pilot study. Potential selections included positive, negative, and instructional statements. While not specifically described as such, positive statements seemed to be relatively motivational, with an example statement being “This is easy!” Participants were tasked with using a pitching wedge to hit a target hole a distance of 45 metres away from the tee. Those who utilised instructional self-talk cues (i.e., “Smooth”) were significantly more consistent with their shots than those in the control and negative self-talk groups. While the use of instructional self-talk cues was not significantly related to one’s shot accuracy, the total amount of negative and positive self-talk utilised was negatively correlated to one’s accuracy, whereas no such relationship existed with instructional self-talk. Overall, the current body of research shows that due to the highly technical aspects of golf, the employment of instructional self-talk cues would be recommended to enhance performance. The effects of instructional self-talk cues can also be seen in tennis through an intervention study conducted by Landin and Hebert (1999). Results of this study showed that introducing five skilled tennis players to an instructional selftalk training plan improved both their movement patterns and their stroke accuracy. Qualitative interviews revealed that participants believed that the instructional self-talk cues improved their performance via an improved attentional focus as well as by improving their technique. Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Goltsios, and Theodorakis (2008) have demonstrated that motivational self-talk cues may also serve a role in improving tennis performance. A study of 46 young tennis players demonstrated that incorporating motivational self-talk cues into their training increased their performance on the Broer-Miller Forehand Drive Test. It is hypothesised that their performance improvement was due, in part, to the concomitant increase in self-efficacy that was seen in the experimental group. As such, it is possible that a combination of both instructional and motivational self-talk cues may be important in improving one’s tennis performance. Interestingly, recent theorising and empirical studies have discussed the role of instructional vs. motivational self-talk cues for skilled performers, as most previous studies have used more convenient samples. Specifically, Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Bardas, and Theodorakis (2013) have hypothesised that the benefit of instructional self-talk cues over motivational self-talk cues may not

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hold for skilled performers, as consciously attending to the requirements of task execution may constrain the automated processing necessary for highly skilled performance. Thus far, the limited research conducted investigating this issue has been equivocal, with one study finding motivational self-talk cues superior for skilled performance (Hardy, Begley, & Blanchfield, 2015) while another study found instructional self-talk cues superior for skilled performance (Abdoll, Hardy, Riyahi, & Farsi, 2018). Future research needs to address this important area, as it can have important implications for coaching high-level skilled athletes. Now that we have discussed some of the theoretical and empirical research underlying the effectiveness of strategic self-talk interventions, we will discuss a couple of personal examples of interventions (conducted by the first author) with a tennis player and a golfer using mainly goal-directed self-talk to enhance thoughts, feelings, and performance. However, the two examples also show two different forms of self-talk interventions. In the golf example, the athlete focused mainly on perceiving his negative spontaneous self-talk and the situations in which it occurs. This intervention largely corresponds to the reflexive self-talk interventions described in the literature (e.g., Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, Lorido-Méndez, & Hardy, 2019). In the tennis example, a strategic self-talk intervention was used, similar to experimental studies (e.g., Landin & Hebert, 1999), taking into account the necessary adaptations for applied practice (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Latinjak, & Theodorakis, 2014; Weinberg & Gould, 2019). In addition, the strategic self-talk intervention was used in conjunction with other psychological procedures used in sport, such as the creation of routines and images. The tennis example is therefore perfect for illustrating how self-talk interventions can be embedded in a broader practice.

Golf Intervention In the golf example, the golfer (Roger – a college golfer) was especially interested in becoming more positive while he was playing, because he knew that he tended to get negative when he was not playing well. In one form of self-monitoring, while playing a round of golf (i.e., 18 holes), I asked him to place a bunch of rubber bands in his right pocket and whenever he said something negative to himself (e.g., “that was a stupid shot,” “you can’t make even one putt”) he should move a rubber band from his right pocket and place it in his left pocket. I asked him how many negative statements he thinks he makes in a typical round and he responded with “about 7–8.” After the round I asked him how many rubber bands were now in his left pocket and sheepishly he said, “34.” To get even more specific information, I asked Roger to self-monitor himself, by identifying his spontaneous self-talk, the situations in which his self-talk occurred, and the performance consequences after a round of competitive golf. I asked him to pay particular attention to the situations

Self-talk Interventions in Tennis and Golf 159 that tended to trigger negative spontaneous self-talk and undermine his performance. These might include (a) after missing an easy putt, (b) after a double bogey, (c) after hitting a drive in a bad place (e.g., water, sand trap, woods), (d) after losing the lead, and (e) after forgetting to do your pre-shot routine. So, I asked Roger if these negative statements were helpful to his performance and he categorically said NO. If this is the case, I said, “so why do you do it?” He said “negative thoughts were just the thing that came into his mind.” The best outcome would be to get rid of these negative selfstatements altogether. However, if these negative statements do rear their ugly head, then they need to be replaced by positive (i.e., motivational or instructional) statements. So, the intervention focused on two things. One was replacing negative self-statements with positive ones. Specifically, Roger was asked to write down the different negative statements he typically made and then replace those with ones that were either motivational (e.g., “just hang in these,” “one shot at a time”) or instructional (e.g., “keep your head down,” “follow-through”). Replacing negative with positive statements was practised regularly during team practices until Roger was doing this frequently and consistently. He then started to implement this during actual matches. Additionally, to help Roger limit his negative statements, he was asked to become an “objective observer.” In essence, he was asked to simply observe where his shot landed with no positive or negative emotion attached. For example, if he hit a tee shot into the woods behind a tree, he would not get upset and become negative because of his “lousy shot.” Rather he would simply see where the ball landed, and then determine the next best shot given his position. Getting mad and upset was not helping him hit a good next shot or make the best decision. In summary, increasing Roger’s awareness of his organic self-talk, practising replacing negative statements with positive statements, and becoming an objective observer helped Roger significantly reduce his negative self-talk and be able to more effectively cope with negative self-talk in the few instances when it still invaded his mind.

Tennis Intervention The next example of an intervention was with a young (14-year-old) tennis player (Sarah). Sarah was a very good player and ranked in her age group in the Midwest. But Sarah had a temper and would berate herself with organic negative self-talk when she missed an easy shot or made an unforced error. Her self-talk was often out loud but always directed at herself and not her opponent (i.e., not bad sportsmanship). After an initial intake interview, which highlighted several areas in which Sarah could work on and improve (e.g., setting process goals, working on pre-serve and pre-return routines), similar to Roger, I asked Sarah if yelling at herself helped her performance and, as expected, she said no. In fact, she said besides being detrimental to her performance she was not enjoying tennis as much as she used to with all this

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negativity. Interestingly, when asked why she yelled at herself and put herself down she said the following: “if I knew what to do I’d do it, I just don’t know what to do when I miss an easy shot and get mad.” It was evident that Sarah did not have the tools to be able to cope with her emotions. The first thing I did was attend a couple of Sarah’s matches (she did not know I was there so she hopefully would act how she normally acted in terms of her self-talk). This would give me an idea of the kind of specific situations in which negative self-talk was problematic. I discussed these observations with Sarah in our next meeting, and she agreed with my analysis of the situations in which she was most vulnerable to making negative statements. I explained to her that the literature suggests there are two major types of strategic self-talk: those that are focused more on enhancing motivation (e.g., “hang in there,” “just remain calm”), or those that provide specific instructions (e.g., “take a deep breath,” “hit with more topspin”). Sarah felt that both could be helpful and that she would use whichever type best fit the specific situation. For example, if her errors tended to go long, instructional self-talk focusing on “added topspin” would be most appropriate. If she was feeling tight in her muscles, she may instruct herself to “take a deep breath.” Because saying negative things had become such a habit for Sarah, it was unrealistic to expect that she would totally stop making negative statements after errors. Therefore, when practising, whenever she started saying a negative statement, she would say “STOP” (either out loud or to herself) and then focus on one of the instructional or motivational self-statements she was practising. To help her stop her negative self-talk at the outset she tried to envision a big red STOP sign. When I observed Sarah, I also noticed that when she got upset and berated herself she would also play too fast. If serving, she would just step up to the line and serve without taking her time and deciding how to play the next point. Another strategy to help cope with her negative self-talk and slow down her pace when things were not going well, was to develop a consistent pre-serve routine. Sarah had a semblance of a routine but it wasn’t consistent and was forgotten when she got mad and frustrated due to a string of errors. So, we worked on putting together a routine that Sarah felt comfortable with, as a routine should fit the specific needs of each individual. However, to make sure she slowed down, the pre-serve routine started by going to the back curtain or fence and taking a deep breath before moving up to the baseline to start her serve routine. Her routine was practised and implemented on every serve that she took in practice, whether playing a set against another player or simply warming up, so it would become automatic in a match. The specific routine was as follows: • • • •

Determine positioning and foot placement. Decide on service type and placement. Adjust racquet grip and ball. Take a deep diaphragmatic breath.

Self-talk Interventions in Tennis and Golf 161 • • •

Bounce the ball for rhythm. See and feel the perfect serve. Focus on the ball toss and serve to programmed spot.

A final piece to this intervention involved the use of imagery. Imagery can be used to recreate previous experiences as well as to create new experiences. In this case, the focus was on creating new experiences. There are many factors that influence the effectiveness of imagery, and it is beyond the scope of the present chapter to discuss them all (see Holmes & Collins, 2001; Murphy, Nordin, & Cumming, 2008; Weinberg & Gould, 2019). However, one point to emphasise is that one’s imagery should be vivid and include all senses whenever possible. I went over the important points that enhance imagery effectiveness with Sarah, and then I had her practise (in her mind) playing in a match. In the match sometimes she was playing well, hitting smart, high percentage shots, and sometimes she was making mistakes and having to use her new self-talk strategies to cope with them. These errors were especially practised at important points in a match (e.g., break points, set points), in order to place pressure on her that was similar to that she would feel in a match. By practising these strategies via imagery, Sarah was better able to cope with errors during actual practices and ultimately competitive matches. To determine the effectiveness of the above techniques, different types of data were collected, some of it quantitative and other qualitative. On a bi-weekly basis, Sarah answered questions via a questionnaire, which focused on the amount of negative and positive self-talk that she used in practices and matches as well as her perceived effectiveness of her self-talk. The percentage of points won after unforced errors was calculated, as well as her intrinsic motivation and enjoyment of playing tennis. Results revealed that as the amount of negative self-talk significantly decreased, her perceived performance improved, and she was enjoying tennis more.

Guidelines for Self-talk Interventions with Tennis Players and Golfers We started by describing why self-talk is especially important in stop-and-go sports such as tennis and golf. This was followed by a brief review of the relevant conceptual approaches and empirical studies to help understand the process of self-talk. Next, a couple of practical examples of interventions with a tennis player and golfer respectively were presented to show practitioners how self-talk can be improved, which in turn can help performance and psychological outcomes. This final section will simply provide some overarching guidelines to keep in mind when developing and implementing a self-talk intervention. 1

Intake Session. The opening session could include both interview and paper and pencil questionnaires. The interview could ask about how the player deals with adversity, errors, missed opportunities, etc. Sometimes

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these types of questions will yield some discussion of self-talk issues. If not, self-talk could be briefly explained to the player and specific ques­ tions can be asked about the player’s use of the different types of self-talk, the conditions that produce self-talk, and the effect of self-talk on per­ formance and psychological variables (e.g., enjoyment, anxiety, motiv­ ation, confidence). A self-talk questionnaire can also be given, as recently several different self-talk questionnaires have been developed. For example, the Functions of Self-talk Questionnaire (Theodorakis, Hatzi­ georgiadis, & Chroni, 2008) measures the different functions of self-talk (e.g., for attentional focus, to regulate effort, increase confidence, and con­ trol emotions). Similarly, the Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sport (Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni, Theodorakis, & Papaioannou, 2009) measures 8 distinct dimensions of both positive and negative selftalk (e.g., psych-up, anxiety control, instruction, worry, disengagement). Information from the interview and questionnaire(s) should help deter­ mine the need for a self-talk intervention, and the specific aspects to focus upon. Observation. To get a first-hand (and unbiased) view of the athlete in competition, direct observation is extremely helpful in determining under what conditions organic self-talk occurs, the type of self-talk, the amount of self-talk, and the effects of self-talk. More than one observa­ tion is desirable, although not always feasible. Awareness. It is important that the athlete is aware of the presence of organic self-talk in practice as well as competition. Some athletes are very aware of their self-talk although others just have a general idea but no specifics. Different techniques can be used to enhance awareness, like those used in the sample interventions above (see also Chapter 7 on reflexive self-talk interventions). Intervention Planning. At the next meeting with the athlete, an inter­ vention is developed based on the interview, questionnaire results, and observation. It is important that the athlete has input into the interven­ tion to enhance his or her commitment to the process. The implemen­ tation of the intervention is written down so the athlete knows what is expected of him or her. Intervention Implementation. As noted in the example provided above, there are many different strategies that can be employed when imple­ menting a self-talk intervention. These might include changing negative to positive self-talk, using strategic cue words, employing imagery, using thought stopping, or combining self-talk with self-feedback. The length of time of the intervention depends on many things, such as the time of the season, skill level of the player, amount of physical practice, and the dedication of the athlete. Evaluation. It is always important to evaluate the effectiveness of any intervention although it is often difficult to do so. This is especially true when working in applied settings, as it is often difficult to provide

Self-talk Interventions in Tennis and Golf 163 adequate controls so you can confidently say that it was the self-talk inter­ vention that that caused the increase in performance as opposed to some other variable. For example, if a tennis player changed her self-talk to be more positive and reduced her unforced errors since she started her selftalk intervention, you would like to say it was the self-talk that caused the improvement. But what if she simultaneously also started hitting with more topspin and gave herself a greater margin of error. Could her reduced unforced errors be just as likely due to the change in topspin as well as the change in self-talk? So, in these applied settings we sometimes just need to rely more on the player’s (and possibly coach’s) perceptions of what helped cause the change and their assessment of the value of the self-talk intervention, not only from a performance perspective, but also considering aspects such as increased motivation, decreased anxiety, increased confidence, and greater effort after mistakes.

References Abdoll, B., Hardy, J., Riyahi, J., & Farsi, A. (2018). A closer look at how self-talk influences skilled basketball performance. The Sport Psychologist, 32(1), 9–15. Chroni, S., Perkos, S., & Theodorakis, Y. (2007). Function and preferences of motiv­ ational and instructional self-talk for adolescent basketball players. Athletic Insight, 9 (1), 19–31. Goudas, M., Hatzidimitriou, V., & Kikidi, M. (2006). The effects of self-talk on throwing-and jumping-events performance. Hellenic Journal of Psychology, 3(2), 105–116. Hardy, J., Begley, K., & Blanchfield, A. (2015). It’s good but it’s not right: Instruc­ tional self-talk and skilled performance. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 27(2), 132–139. Hardy, J., Oliver, E., & Tod, D. (2009). A framework for the study and application of self-talk within sport. In S. D. Mellalieu & S. Hanton (Eds.), Advances in applied sport psychology: A review (pp. 37–74). New York, NY: Routledge. Harvey, D. T., Van Raalte, J. L., & Brewer, B. W. (2002). Relationship between self-talk and golf performance. International Sports Journal, 6(1), 84. Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2006). Instructional and motivational self-talk: An investigation on perceived self-talk functions. Hellenic Journal of Psychology, 3(2), 164–175. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Galanis, E., & Theodorakis, Y. (2011). Self-talk and sports performance: A meta-analysis. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(4), 348–356. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Goltsios, C., & Theodorakis, Y. (2008). Investi­ gating the functions of self-talk: The effects of motivational self-talk on self-efficacy and performance in young tennis players. The Sport Psychologist, 22(4), 458–471. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Latinjak, A. T., & Theodorakis, Y. (2014). Selftalk. In A. Papaioannou & D. Hackfort (Eds.), Routledge companion to sport and exercise psychology (pp. 372–386). New York, NY: Routledge. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Mpoumpaki, S., & Theodorakis, Y. (2009). Mechanisms underlying the self-talk–Performance relationship: The effects of

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motivational self-talk on self-confidence and anxiety. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 10(1), 186–192. Holmes, P., & Collins, D. (2001). The PETTLEP approach to motor imagery: A functional equivalence model for sport psychologists. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 13(1), 60–83. Landin, D., & Hebert, E. P. (1999). The influence of self-talk on the performance of skilled female tennis players. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 11(2), 263–282. Latinjak, A. T., Hernando-Gimeno, C., Lorido-Méndez, L., & Hardy, J. (2019). Endorsement and constructive criticism to an innovative online goal-directed self-talk intervention. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 1819. Murphy, S., Nordin, S., & Cumming, J. (2008). Imagery in sport, exercise and dance. In T. Horn (Ed.), Advances in sport psychology (3rd ed., pp. 297–324). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Theodorakis, Y., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Chroni, S. (2008). The Functions of Self-talk Questionnaire: Investigating how self-talk strategies operate. Measurement in Phys­ ical Education and Exercise Science, 12(1), 10–30. Theodorakis, Y., Weinberg, R., Natsis, P., Douma, I., & Kazakas, P. (2000). The effects of motivational versus instructional self-talk on improving motor performance. The Sport Psychologist, 14(3), 253–271. Wegner, D. M., Ansfield, M., & Piloff, D. (1998). The putt and the pendulum: Ironic effects of the mental control of action. Psychological Science, 9(3), 196–199. Weinberg, R., & Gould, D. (2019). Foundations of sport and exercise psychology (6th ed.). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Woodman, T., Barlow, M., & Gorgulu, R. (2015). Don’t miss, don’t miss, D’oh! Per­ formance when anxious suffers specifically where least desired. The Sport Psychologist, 29(3), 213–223. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Bardas, D., & Theodorakis, Y. (2013). The effects of self-talk on dominant and non-dominant arm performance on a handball task in primary physical education students. The Sport Psychologist, 27(2), 171–176. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Chroni, S., Theodorakis, Y., & Papaioannou, A. (2009). Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sports (ASTQS): Development and preliminary validity of a measure identifying the structure of athlete’s self-talk. The Sport Psychologist, 23(2), 233–251.

12 Self-talk Interventions in Team-Sport Settings James Hardy

Introduction As has been covered in previous chapters, self-talk is a multidimensional and individually oriented construct. Consequently, it is not a surprise that research findings support its use for multiple individual-level performance related purposes (e.g., Hardy, Comoutos, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2018). In the present chapter, however, I focus on how self-talk might be optimally shaped to benefit both individual and team-level factors important in team sports. In doing so I debunk the idea that self-talk and teams are ill-fittings partners. To this end, I present the conceptual and empirical rationale behind practical advice regarding the optimal utilisation of self-talk in the team context.

Embedding Self-talk in Team Sport Social Factors and Organic Self-talk Despite being an intrapersonal phenomenon, of particular relevance for understanding how self-talk warrants consideration within the context of teams are the interpersonal factors that can shape players’ use of self-talk. For instance, self-talk research, as covered in an earlier chapter (Chapter 6), has previously highlighted the role of situational and social factors that can influence self-talk (e.g., Hardy, Oliver, & Tod, 2009). Research has identified that the psychosocial conditions we experience can influence our mind-set and our self-talk. Drawing from self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), Oliver, Markland, Hardy, and Petherick (2008) found that when in an autonomy-supportive condition – consisting of promoting structure, choice, and encouragement – participants’ self-talk was more informational/ autonomous, less controlling, more positive, and less negative than in the counterpart controlling social-context. Within sport, coaches are an important social influence on athletes and have been found to promote athletes’ use of self-talk (e.g., Hardy & Hall, 2006). In fact, how coaches interact (i.e., speak and behave) with their athletes impacts on players’ positive and negative selftalk (Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Theodorakis, 2007). The implication for

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coaches is two-fold: coaches need to be aware that their influence on their players extends to intrapersonal processes such as self-talk and, as a consequence, ought to be conscious of the nature of interactions with their players. For example, applying self-control when frustrated is desirable compared to “letting off steam,” which can have adverse effects on their players. For practitioners, these findings speak to the utility of adopting and promoting self-determination theory principles, as doing so should elicit both effective and efficient (i.e., both coach and player level) gains. Research has previously documented the beneficial links between constituent parts of selfdetermination theory and coach outcomes (e.g., reduced burnout; Bentzen, Lemyre, & Kenttä, 2014). Oliver et al.’s (2008) research reminds us of the importance of social-context, including coach-created team climate, and how this can influence players’ optimal or sub-optimal self-talk.

Self-talk and Team Effectiveness To understand better the potential role of self-talk in sports team, it is useful to draw from the group dynamics literature and, in particular, current viewpoints on team effectiveness. Although relatively underdeveloped in sport psychology (see for example Webster, Hardy, & Hardy, 2017 for an exception), there are a large number of frameworks that outline factors influencing team effectiveness. The majority of these models adopt an input – process – output perspective, with team performance (e.g., win–loss record) as an output and a variety of hierarchical (e.g., individual, team, and organisational) factors conceptualised as inputs (see Figure 12.1 for an illustrative example). Given the complexity of teams nested within larger organisations (e.g., Manchester City women’s U18s team nested within the academy section of Manchester City FC); this is a reasonable perspective to embrace. By definition, as teams are comprised of individuals, the presence of individual inputs in these models of team effectiveness is equally reasonable. Nevertheless, specific details regarding influential personal factors are not typically forthcoming, although conceivably mental skills (such as goal-directed self-talk) are worthy of further consideration by group dynamics researchers, practitioners, and coaches. For instance, team cohesion is a cornerstone of group dynamics research in the sports setting, and has been positively associated with the use of mental imagery (Hardy, Hall, & Carron, 2003). Of particular relevance to self-talk, Latinjak, Hernando-Gimeno, Lorido-Mendez, and Hardy (2019) recently attributed a team level benefit to a reflexive goal-directed self-talk intervention.

Strategic Self-talk and Taskwork An emphasis within traditional views of team effectiveness is the central throughput element of these models (Figure 12.1). This is where the role of teamwork comes to the fore, as these team processes are pivotal in converting inputs into outcomes. It is, however, important to distinguish

Figure 12.1 An Example of a Team-Oriented Input – Process – Outcome Conceptual Framework (Adapted from McEwan and Beauchamp, 2014).

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between teamwork and taskwork, as both underpin team success. Taskwork centres on the jobs or tasks, characterised by limited interdependence with others, that a player needs to do to fulfil their role on the team; these include cognitive (e.g., effective decision-making such as when to enter a ruck in rugby) and physical (e.g., execution of specific skills such as a curled shot in football) tasks. There is evidence within the self-talk research base demonstrating its relevance to taskwork, although it is unlikely to have been interpreted through a group dynamics lens before. For example, Johnson, Hrycaiko, Johnson, and Hala (2004) conducted one of the few strategic self-talk studies to date that was grounded in a team sport. In this single-subject experiment, three skilled youth-aged footballers were recruited to examine how the use of instructional self-talk cues impacted on the execution of shots driven into the bottom corners of the goal. The words “down” and “lock,” whereby “down” referred to pointing the foot down to the ground and “lock” reinforced the need to have the ankle locked at impact, were used by participants. Results indicated that two of the three footballers had improved shooting accuracy and all three had a propensity to utilise low drives during competitive matches. While this is a relatively rare example of data that directly speaks to the relevance of self-talk for the enhanced proficiency of open motor skills, there are far more studies that have utilised closed motor skills in their design; for example, Perkos, Theodorakis, and Chroni’s (2002) use of basketball passing and shooting. Generally, positive effects emerge from these studies lending support for the inclusion of strategic self-talk cues in pre­ performance routines. For sports such as football and hockey, for instance, pre-performance routines might be particularly useful for designated corner and penalty takers. There are two striking features of specialised roles within teams, such as penalty takers: (a) these personnel are comparatively highly skilled and (b) they need to cope well with pressure. Available data corroborates the notion that these two contextual factors are important for practitioners and coaches to be aware of when devising strategic self-talk interventions aimed at enhancing taskwork. For instance, while the traditional view that instructional self-talk cues are better than motivational self-talk cues for the learning of fine motor skills has some empirical support (cf. Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, & Kazakas, 2000), this does not necessarily hold for skilled players. Hardy, Begley, and Blanchfield (2015a) found that skilled free-kick takers in Gaelic football performed with superior kicking accuracy when using motivational (“come on, I can get this”) as compared to instructional (“one, two, laces and through”) self-talk cues. Emerging data also warns against the use of traditional forms of instructional self-talk interventions when performance occurs under pressure (cf. Hardy, 2006). Relatively recently, Hardy et al. (2015b) drew from the reinvestment theory literature to test the effectiveness of part-process (or traditional), “arm follow-through” or “weight transfer,” versus holist, “smooth” or “push,”

Self-talk in Team-Sport Settings 169 instructional self-talk cues for enhancing execution of low flighted badminton serve under pressurised conditions. Rather than highlight specific key features of skill execution, holist self-talk cues are concerned with the global representation of the whole movement bolstering against the deterioration of knowledge. Under pressure, serving was significantly more accurate for the holist group compared to the traditional instructional self-talk group, a finding that was subsequently replicated. The up-shot for both the skilled athlete and for stress-oriented lines of research is that they ought to be very careful when implementing instructional self-talk cues within designated specialists’ pre-performance routines. Fortunately, the existing research also provides clear direction for alternative and superior types of self-talk (e.g., motivational or holistic-instructional self-talk cues) that should be considered.

Self-talk and Teamwork Outside of sport, an abundance of research has been conducted on teamwork, and one notable model was developed by Salas, Sims, and Burke (2005). Salas and colleagues reviewed and integrated the essential features revealed within the preceding 20 years of research on teamwork to inform their own model. Self-talk is likely to influence at least three features of Salas et al.’s model of teamwork; team orientation, shared mental models, and team leadership. Team orientation refers to players’ preference to cooperate with others, and to work towards team, as opposed to their own personal goals (e.g., looking out for teammates). It can aid team performance by increasing players’ task involvement, information sharing, strategising, and goal setting. Son, Jackson, Grove, and Feltz (2011) examined how altering the phrasing of motivational self-talk cues to reflect individual versus collective capabilities impacted team performance and confidence. They found that saying statements such as “We are confident performers,” “We are focused and ready,” and “We will perform well” led to both higher team confidence and team performance levels compared to when self-talk referring to an individual’s own competence was used. Brown (2003) had reported similar findings with regard to teams working in the business context. Seemingly, self-talk that reinforces a collective mind set elicits team-level benefits consistent with an enhanced team orientation. An additional advantage for coaches working with players with higher team orientation is that the team is likely to be more amenable to team-building activities. In fact, the data so far indicates that team-referenced self-talk cues could be a useful adjunct team-building strategy. Shared mental models refers to the shared understanding of team goals and how to effectively coordinate actions among individual players to achieve common tasks. Interestingly, the importance of this aspect of teamwork is increased when teams need to perform under pressure; a defining feature of elite sport. For instance, research indicates that teams

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with developed shared mental models are better able to support their teammates during stress situations (Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Johnston, 1997). Fortunately, it has been well established that verbal rehearsal can aid memory and learning (e.g., Paivio, 1971). Furthermore, athletes report using goal-directed self-talk to help them learn and refine tactical plays and strategies (e.g., zonal marking in hockey, tactical runs in rugby; Hardy, Gammage, & Hall, 2001). Although research has demonstrated the utility of such strategy-oriented instructional/goal-directed self-talk for aiding performance in sports such as the 100 m sprint (Mallet & Hanrahan, 1997) and cross-country skiing (Rushall, Hall, Roux, Sasseville, & Rushall, 1988), the precise details as to how best use this type of self-talk for more interdependent tasks remains unexplored. Given the practical advice and strength of empirical support for the use of more skill-oriented instructional cue words (e.g., Tod, Hardy, & Oliver, 2011), it is likely that strategyoriented self-talk will facilitate the acquisition and performance of tactical plays and that borrowing principles from this literature base should be encouraged. For example, strategic cues should be brief, phonetically simple, and logically associated with the task (Landin, 1994). Alternatively, Latinjak et al.’s (2019) reflexive self-talk intervention targeting goal-directed self-talk may be particularly useful when dealing with more interactive and dynamic tasks. Team leadership in the context of sports teams can be provided by at least two formal sources, from the coach and the team captain. Most sports leadership research has treated the coach as the sole source of leadership; however, without the presence of contradictory evidence, I look to treat these two sources of leadership as being comparable. Within Salas et al.’s (2005) model of teamwork, team leadership is a key factor and is concerned with directing and coordinating the activities of team members, motivating players to achieve these tasks, and organising and creating a positive atmosphere within the team. Although Salas and co-workers theorise team leadership to affect team effectiveness not by handing down solutions to the team but rather by facilitating team problem solving, it is difficult to see how this can occur optimally without the coach and captain possessing strong selfleadership skills (this refers to the self-regulation skills of Chapter 2). Put simply, someone is likely to be more effective at influencing others if they are first skilled at regulating their own motivation and drive. Given the range of challenges faced and emotions experienced by players (e.g., media scrutiny, tough training regimes, bouncing back after on court/in field mistakes), these speak to relevance of self-leadership; the management of one’s own motivation through effective thought control (Neck & Manz, 1992). At the core of self-leadership, are goal-directed self-talk and imagery and how these two variables coordinate to create constructive thought patterns. In essence positive goal-directed self-talk fosters more constructive thought patterns, reflective of enhanced self-leadership, and improved performance, be it better taskwork or a less emotion-oriented mind-set facilitating superior interpersonal interactions. Findings from self-talk research conducted in the context of sport

Self-talk in Team-Sport Settings 171 align reasonably well with this Neck and Manz’s model. Tod et al. (2011), in a systematic review of the sport self-talk literature, reported a consistent beneficial effect of positive strategic self-talk cues on motor performance. Interestingly, the findings were not as clear-cut for negative self-talk; as opposed to an expected detrimental effect of negative self-talk, in actuality a null effect emerged for this type of self-talk. Consistent with the propositions of self-leadership, these sport data support the recommendations that goaldirected self-talk should be promoted so as to change the psychological processes that are expressed through negative self-talk. The implications for the practitioner attempting to develop the leadership capabilities of a team are that s/he might profit from focusing the intervention on coaches and captains in a coordinated fashion. Drawing from the framework provided by Neck and Manz (1992) has merit, although it has only attracted limited sports-oriented research attention to date.

Situations When Self-talk Is Beneficial for Team Sport Players Although a common perception is that team sports are dynamic, and perhaps too dynamic to enable the potential benefits of self-talk to emerge, in reality there are circumstances when using self-talk would likely aid footballers, basketball, hockey, and rugby players alike. Confidence in this sentiment can be gleaned from research findings confirming that team sport athletes report using self-talk in a variety of situations associated with competitive matches (Hardy, Hall, & Hardy, 2004). Two specific and pivotal scenarios centre around what the layperson would probably term, “pre-match nerves” and “giving 100%” or “leaving everything on the pitch/court.”

Dealing with Pressure Research backs up what coaches see from the sidelines, for some, nerves or pressure can affect performance. In fact, research confirms that athletes naturally use goal-directed self-talk to aid their control of anxiety provoking situations (Hardy et al., 2001). More importantly, evidence exists that speaks to the effectiveness of deliberately designed self-talk cues to help athletes cope with stress. For example, Maynard, Smith, and Warwick-Evans (1995) examined a 12-week positive thinking intervention with semi-professional footballers. Over the course of the intervention, participants were introduced to gradually more bespoke and abbreviated versions of positive thinking. This resulted in the footballers reporting lowered anxiety before their competitive matches. Furthermore, Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Mpoumpaki, and Theodorakis (2009) reported on the effects of a motivational self-talk cues (e.g., “go,” “I can,” “strong”) intervention targeting confidence, anxiety, and tennis performance. Tennis players receiving the strategic self-talk intervention reported improved confidence, reduced anxiety, and enhanced performance.

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Thus, use of positively phrased motivational self-talk cues has relevance for athletes experiencing pressure. However, seemingly at odds with this is the relatively common and wellintended advice issued by coaches, parents, and teammates to players who are stressed, “Just focus on what you need to do.” Such advice has a clear emphasis on technique and instruction but is inconsistent with contemporary thinking for at least two reasons. First, according to the reinvestment theory literature, carrying out this advice will likely result in reduced, not enhanced, levels of performance as it will trigger a situation that has been termed “paralysis by over analysis”; a popular explanation behind choking. Part of the reason for this is linked to the second reason why this is not optimal advice. It will encourage the use of more instructional self-talk reinforcing the specific steps necessary to execute the motor skills. This dovetails with research by Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, and Theodorakis (2007) conducted using a stationary water polo shooting accuracy task. Hatzigeorgiadis et al.’s data clarified that self-talk representing arousal control (e.g., “calm”; a form of motivational self-talk cue) reduced anxiety to a greater extent than instructional (“ball-target”) cue words. The upshot of the aforementioned findings is that irrespective of whether the issue is performance under pressure or experiencing high levels of stress, motivational self-talk cues as opposed to instructional self-talk cue words will likely yield superior results. An important caveat to this statement is that adequate time is required by the practitioner and client in order to develop bespoke interventions, fit for use within the time constraints inherent in competitive sport.

Dealing with Fatigue It is almost inevitable that players’ energy levels will drop as a match approaches the end of regulation playing time. The psychobiological model of fatigue (Marcora, Bosio, & de Morree, 2008) places motivation and effort in a position of central importance for understanding which factors influence endurance performance. It is perhaps because of this implicit understanding that coaches (e.g., Jurgen Klopp) will often try to motivate their players to offset exhaustion by urging them on from the side of the court or pitch. Relatively recent self-talk research highlights how practitioners and coaches can work with players to be able to help themselves, however. Utilising a time-to­ exhaustion paradigm, Blanchfield, Hardy, Morree, Staiano, and Marcora (2014) found that motivational self-talk cues lead to enhanced performance but lowered ratings of perceived exertion compared to a control group. According to the psychobiological model of fatigue, this can be interpreted thus: participants felt like they had “more left in the tank” and so were able to push themselves harder. Comparable findings have been reported when similar self-talk has been examined in heat conditions mimicking environmental surroundings commonly experienced by teams at major tournaments (e.g., the soccer world cup; Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2018). Using a different fatigue­

Self-talk in Team-Sport Settings 173 inducing protocol, a 10 km time-trial, Hardy, Thomas, and Blanchfield (2019) examined an important nuance of the positive effect of motivational self-talk cues on endurance performance. They showed that the way in which motivational self-talk cues are said could also have an effect. More specifically, when participants employed motivational cue words framed using a secondperson (e.g., “You’ve got this!”) rather than a first-person (e.g., “I’ve got this!”) pronoun perspective, this resulted in superior power output and performance. Again, ratings of perceived exertion seemed to play a role in these findings, as despite participants working at an absolute workload that was heavier, they did not perceive themselves as working harder. The practical guidance that can be taken away from these studies is that developing motivational self-talk phrases that players can use when they feel fatigued might facilitate a marginal gain that may make all the difference. Moreover, self-talk phrases framed with “you” rather than “I” would more often than not elicit a further performance benefit.

Summary In summary, I hope that having now read this chapter the reader is able to see how self-talk and team sports are not such odd bedfellows. While empirical evidence that is directly pertinent to team sports remains limited, it is apparent that self-talk can impact upon sports teams at the team and individual level. I hope that the numerous lines of (theoretical) reasoning presented here stimulate a surge of interest and appreciation for self-talk and sports team by researchers, practitioners, and coaches.

References Bentzen, M., Lemyre, P., & Kenttä, G. (2014). The process of burnout among profes­ sional sport coaches through the lens of self-determination theory: A qualitative approach. Sports Coaching Review, 3, 101–116. Blanchfield, A. W., Hardy, J., de Morree, H. M., Staiano, W., & Marcora, S. (2014). Talking yourself out of exhaustion: Effects of self-talk on perceived exertion and endurance performance. Medicine and Science in Sport and Exercise, 46, 998–1007. Brown, T. C. (2003). The effect of verbal self-guidance training on collective efficacy and team performance. Personnel Psychology, 56, 935–964. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behaviour. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268. Hardy, J. (2006). Speaking clearly: A critical review of the self-talk literature. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 7, 81–97. Hardy, J., Begley, K., & Blanchfield, A. W. (2015a). It’s good but it’s not right: Instructional self-talk and skilled performance. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 27, 132–139. Hardy, J., Comoutos, N., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2018). Reflections on the maturing research literature of self-talk in sport: Contextualizing the special issue. The Sport Psychologist, 32, 1–8.

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Hardy, J., Gammage, K., & Hall, C. R. (2001). A description of athlete self-talk. The Sport Psychologist, 15, 306–318. Hardy, J., & Hall, C. R. (2006). Exploring coaches’ promotion of athlete self-talk. Hellenic Journal of Psychology, 3, 150–163. Hardy, J., Hall, C. R., & Carron, A. V. (2003). Perceptions of team cohesion and ath­ letes’ use of imagery. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 34, 151–167. Hardy, J., Hall, C. R., & Hardy, L. (2004). A note on athletes’ use of self-talk. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 16, 251–257. Hardy, J., Oliver, E., & Tod, D. (2009). A framework for the study and application of self-talk within sport. In S. Mellalieu & S. Hanton (Eds.), Advances in applied sport psychology: A review (pp. 37–74). New York: Routledge. Hardy, J., Roberts, R., Collins, R., Tod, D., Oliver, E., & Murray, J. (2015b). Does instructional self-talk always aid performance? Paper presented at the European Congress of Sport Psychology, Bern, Switzerland. Hardy, J., Thomas, A. V., & Blanchfield, A. (2019). To me, to you: How you say things matters for endurance performance. Journal of Sports Sciences, 18, 2122–2130. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Bartura, K., Argiropoulos, C., Comoutos, N., Galanis, E., & Flouris, A. D. (2018). Beat the heat: Effects of a motivational self-talk intervention on endurance performance. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 30, 388–401. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Mpoumpaki, S., & Theodorakis, Y. (2009). Mechanisms underlying the self-talk–performance relationship: The effects of motiv­ ational self-talk on self-confidence and anxiety. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 10, 186–192. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., & Theodorakis, Y. (2007). The moderating effects of self-talk content on self-talk functions. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 19, 240–251. Johnson, J. M. J., Hrycaiko, D. W., Johnson, G. V., & Hala, J. M. (2004). Self-talk and female youth soccer performance. The Sport Psychologist, 18, 44–59. Landin, D. (1994). The role of verbal cues in skill learning. Quest, 46, 299–313. Latinjak, A. T., Hernando-Gimeno, C., Lorido-Méndez, L., & Hardy, J. (2019). Endorsement and constructive criticism to an innovative online goal-directed self-talk intervention. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 1819. Mallet, C. J., & Hanrahan, S. J. (1997). Race modeling: An effective strategy for the 100 m sprinter? The Sport Psychologist, 11, 72–85. Marcora, S. M., Bosio, A., & de Morree, H. M. (2008). Locomotor muscle fatigue increases cardiorespiratory responses and reduces performance during intense cyc­ ling exercise independently from metabolic stress. American Journal of Physiology: Regulatory, Integrative and Comparative Physiology, 2008, R874–883. Maynard, I. M., Smith, M. J., & Warwick-Evans, L. (1995). The effects of a cognitive intervention strategy on competitive state anxiety and performance in semiprofes­ sional soccer players. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 17, 428–446. McEwan, D., & Beauchamp, M. R. (2014). Teamwork in sport: A theoretical and integrative review. International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 7, 229–250. Neck, C. P., & Manz, C. C. (1992). Thought self-leadership: The influence of self-talk and mental imagery on performance. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 13, 681–699.

Self-talk in Team-Sport Settings 175 Oliver, E., Markland, D., Hardy, J., & Petherick, C. (2008). The effects of autonomy-supportive versus controlling environments on self-talk. Motivation and Emotion, 32, 200–212. Paivio, A. U. (1971). Imagery and verbal processes. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Perkos, S., Theodorakis, Y., & Chroni, S. (2002). Enhancing performance and skill acquisition in novice basketball players with instructional self-talk. The Sport Psych­ ologist, 16, 368–383. Rushall, B. S., Hall, M., Roux, L., Sasseville, J., & Rushall, A. S. (1988). Effects of three types of thought content instructions in skiing performance. The Sport Psych­ ologist, 2, 283–297. Salas, E., Cannon-Bowers, J. A., & Johnston, J. H. (1997). How can you turn a team of experts into an expert team?: Emerging training strategies. In C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds.), Naturalistic decision making (pp. 359–370). Hillsdale, NJ: Law­ rence Erlbaum. Salas, E., Sims, D. E., & Burke, C. S. (2005). Is there a “big five” in teamwork? Small Group Research, 36, 555–599. Son, V., Jackson, B., Grove, J. R., & Feltz, D. L. (2011). “I am” versus “we are”: Effects of distinctive variants of self-talk on efficacy beliefs and motor performance. Journal of Sports Sciences, 29, 1417–1424. Theodorakis, Y., Weinberg, R., Natsis, P., Douma, E., & Kazakas, P. (2000). The effects of motivational versus instructional self-talk on improving motor performance. The Sport Psychologist, 14, 253–272. Tod, D., Hardy, J., & Oliver, E. (2011). Effects of self-talk: A systematic review. Jour­ nal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 33, 666–687. Webster, L., Hardy, J., & Hardy, L. (2017). Big hitters: Important factors characteriz­ ing team effectiveness in professional cricket. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1140. Zourbanos, N., Hatzigeorgiadis, A., & Theodorakis, Y. (2007). A preliminary investi­ gation of the relationship between athletes’ self-talk and coaches’ behaviour and statements. International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching, 2, 57–66.

13 Self-talk and Endurance Sports Alister McCormick and Paul Anstiss

Introduction In this chapter, we will review research on self-talk in the context of endurance sports and offer guidance for self-talk interventions. We define self-talk as what people say to themselves, either silently in their head or aloud (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Latinjak, & Theodorakis, 2014; Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, Comoutos, & Hardy, 2019), and we define endurance sports as sports where a person performs continuous, dynamic, and whole-body exercise over middle or long distances (McCormick, Meijen, Anstiss, & Jones, 2019). These sports include running, cycling, swimming, rowing, triathlon, and speed skating. Throughout the chapter, we use language that reflects a contemporary conceptualisation of self-talk, distinguishing spontaneous and goal-directed organic self-talk, reflexive selftalk interventions, and strategic self-talk (Latinjak et al., 2019; see Chapter 2), although we recognise that self-talk research on endurance sports has typically been informed by earlier conceptualisations. Endurance events include different distances and types of event. In running for example, endurance events could include the following: 1,500 metre track running; 5km parkruns; mud and obstacle courses; road events such as 10km events, half-marathons, and marathons; single-day ultramarathons; and multiday ultramarathons such as the Marathon des Sables. Each of these events has distinct demands, but they also share commonalities. In particular, a person completing them needs to remain motivated and persevere through muscle pain, injury pain, exertion, and discomfort, they need to make difficult decisions about their pacing, and they need to cope with a range of demands that include the weather and temperature, nutrition and hydration, equipment problems, and mistakes (McCormick et al., 2019; McCormick, Meijen, & Marcora, 2018b). Self-talk could play an important role in shaping how well people manage these demands. Participants in endurance sports vary in their motives, fitness, experience, and competitive standard. At one extreme, people participate in massparticipation events for non-competitive reasons, such as to become fitter, to lose weight, or to support or raise money for a charitable cause. At another

Self-talk and Endurance Sports 177 extreme, people compete for medals in a range of events at the summer and winter Olympics. Learning about self-talk and how to use it could benefit people who participate in a range of endurance events, independent of their motives, fitness, experience, or standard, through helping them to cope and persevere during training and events, to perform better, and to enjoy the experience more. For example, research shows that when people strategically use motivational self-talk cues (e.g., “Keep going!,” “You can do this!”) during strenuous endurance exercise at a fixed intensity, they can perform for about 20–40% longer before stopping, compared to when they are thinking normally (Blanchfield, Hardy, de Morree, Staiano, & Marcora, 2014; Wallace et al., 2017). This is comparable to getting 20–40% further up a hill before you choose to stop running and to walk instead. In terms of improving your personal best time (e.g., in a 10 km event), research also shows that using motivational self-talk to counter spontaneous, negative selftalk can improve performance time by approximately 3.75% (Barwood, Corbett, Wagstaff, McVeigh, & Thelwell, 2015).

Self-talk Research in Endurance Sports It is helpful to think of there being three clusters of self-talk research (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014). Descriptive research describes the qualities of people’s organic self-talk (e.g., content, frequency, purpose); antecedents research examines factors that shape and determine people’s organic selftalk; and research on the effects of self-talk examines the effects of self-talk interventions (particularly strategic self-talk cues) on outcomes such as performance, as well considering as the mechanisms that can explain these effects. McCormick and Hatzigeorgiadis (2019) thoroughly reviewed the research on self-talk in endurance sports within this framework. As an example of a descriptive study, Van Raalte, Morrey, Cornelius, and Brewer (2015) described the self-talk of marathon runners. Although the marathon runners reported various types of self-talk, associative self-talk that focused on their bodies (e.g., “My breathing is controlled”), positivemotivational self-talk (e.g., “You can do it”), and incentive self-talk (e.g., “I will be able to eat anything I want”) were most prevalent. In addition, associative self-talk, which is comparable to instructional self-talk in other sports, was more prevalent in elite runners compared to non-elite runners. In endurance sports, there is a distinction between associative thoughts (where the person’s attention is directed towards bodily sensations such as heart rate, breathing, temperature, and muscle fatigue) and dissociative thoughts (where the person’s attention is directed away from them) (cf. Brick, MacIntyre, & Campbell, 2014). Associative self-talk is likely used more by elite marathon runners because of the role it can play in controlling important aspects of performing, such as breathing, running form, and pacing. With consideration to antecedents, research has particularly considered the effects of exercise intensity and duration on a person’s thoughts, including their

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self-talk (McCormick & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2019). This research demonstrates that thoughts and self-talk are mostly dissociative during low-intensity exercise, they become increasingly associative when at higher exercise intensities and as performance duration increases, and they are almost exclusively associative close to exhaustion (e.g., Aitchison et al., 2013). With consideration to research on the effects of self-talk, there is good evidence that planned, strategic self-talk strategies improve endurance performance. Strategic self-talk strategies may involve the use of motivational self-talk cues, which aim to increase drive or confidence (e.g., “Come on! You can do this!”), and/or instructional self-talk cues, which aim to provide direction for action (e.g., “Run your own race”) (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014). In the endurance context, research has focused on motivational self-talk cues and has demonstrated that using motivational self-talk cues (1) helps people to perform exhausting endurance exercise at a fixed intensity for a longer duration, in both normal conditions (Blanchfield et al., 2014) and in the heat (Wallace et al., 2017); (2) helps people to complete more work in a fixed duration (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2018); and (3) helps people to complete a self-paced time trial quicker (Barwood et al., 2015). In addition, self-talk cues relating to self-encouragement (e.g., “Stay on. Don’t give up”), anticipation of positive consequences (e.g., “I will be proud of myself if I can do it”), and self-calming (e.g., “Stay calm and you will do it”) have been effective at buffering against negative effects of a psychological crisis on marathon performance (Schüler & Langens, 2007). A psychological crisis, which occurs after approximately 30 kilometres, is characterised by a strong desire to give up, and thoughts about the benefits of stopping (e.g., resting, relaxing) and the costs of continuing (e.g., unbearable exhaustion). Further, contemporary research has shown that how motivational self-talk cues are spoken may influence performance. When recreational exercisers used motivational self-talk cues from a third-person pronoun perspective (e.g., “You can do this,” “You’re hanging in well”), they performed 2.2% faster in a 10km cycling time trial than when they used similar self-talk from a first-person perspective (e.g., “I can do this,” “I’m hanging in well”) (Hardy, Thomas, & Blanchfield, 2019). Interestingly, published endurance studies have not examined the effects of using instructional self-talk cues, which could be a valuable strategy for endurance performers. Instructional self-talk cues are well suited for supporting the early stages of learning, by helping people to pay attention to appropriate cues (e.g., technical aspects, feedback from the body) and to correctly apply technique or strategy (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014). Instructional self-talk cues could therefore be useful for novice performers or athletes who are transitioning into different endurance sports (e.g., a runner/cyclist moving into triathlon). Instructional self-talk cues could also benefit performance in events by helping performers to pay attention to the most relevant cues in their environment (e.g., other competitors, the route on a trail) or through helping them to monitor and control their pace, stride, form, or technique.

Self-talk and Endurance Sports 179 Finally, reflexive self-talk interventions may offer a contemporary alternative to strategic self-talk. Reflexive self-talk interventions involve analysing past use of self-talk and exploring alternative self-talk for coping with future challenges (Latinjak et al., 2019). They aim to influence spontaneous and goal-directed organic self-talk, which are differentiated from strategic self-talk (Latinjak et al., 2019). There are three main differences between strategic and reflexive self-talk interventions: (1) the content of strategic self-talk cues is often pre-determined (in reflexive interventions, self-talk remains organic); (2) the timing of strategic self-talk cues is often pre-determined (in reflexive interventions, it is not); and (3) verbalising self-instructions is typically prescribed in strategic self-talk interventions (in reflexive interventions, it is not) (Latinjak et al., 2019). Research on reflexive self-talk interventions within sport is in its infancy (see Chapter 7). Nevertheless, in an endurance context, Latinjak et al. (2018) examined the effects of an intervention that encouraged athletes to reflect on the organic self-talk they used during endurance performance. Participants identified goal-directed self-talk they used during two cycling tests performed to exhaustion, they anticipated possible thoughts (e.g., about disengagement), emotions (e.g., dejection), or physical sensations (e.g., fatigue) that could impair their performance in two subsequent cycling tests, and they considered goal-directed statements that they could use. The findings did not show that the intervention benefited the performance. The authors reflected upon how the findings could indicate that we currently have incomplete conceptual understanding of self-talk interventions.

Theoretical Foundations In addition to examining whether self-talk strategies improve performance, research on the effects of self-talk can also consider how self-talk improves performance. One relevant theory is self-efficacy theory. Self-efficacy is a psychological construct that represents our perception of our capability to perform certain actions or tasks (Bandura, 1997). Essentially, it represents what an individual believes they can do, not what they have done (which is an experience), or what they will do (which is an intention). In an endurance context, self-efficacy beliefs might relate to a performance (e.g., “I am confident that I can run this marathon in three hours”) or to a behaviour (e.g., “I am confident that I can cope with the pain during my event”). Individuals who perceive themselves as more capable set themselves more challenging goals, invest more effort into tasks, and persevere for longer in the face of difficulty (Bandura, 1997; Feltz, Short, & Sullivan, 2008). Self-efficacy beliefs are an adaptable and changeable construct, which are formed and altered based on several sources of information. While a full review of these sources and this process is not given here (cf. Anstiss, 2019), an important point is that self-talk is a source of self-efficacy used by endurance performers (Feltz et al., 2008; Samson, 2014). Self-talk is primarily believed to

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influence self-efficacy through reinforcement of other sources of information, such as past successes and achievements (Feltz et al., 2008). Self-talk, therefore, does not necessarily provide any “new” information regarding self-efficacy (unlike, for example, winning a difficult and challenging race), but instead helps reinforce existing information about our capability. The use of self-talk to reinforce a previous success has been shown to increase self-efficacy more than solely experiencing a successful performance (Wise & Trunnell, 2001). While this provides a rationale for how motivational self-talk cues may influence selfefficacy (e.g., “I can do it!”), one possible reason for instructional self-talk cues (e.g., “Soft feet” during a distance run) being helpful is that individuals may become more aware of the task requirements and required steps for success. As self-efficacy represents an individual’s perceived capability, the use of instructional self-talk cues could help make clear what that capability is being judged against (i.e., “What do I need to do?”), which is a key component of the formation of self-efficacy beliefs (cf. Gist & Mitchell, 1992). It is important to consider what specific aspects of self-efficacy self-talk may influence. Self-efficacy beliefs have three dimensions: level, strength, and generality. The generality of a self-efficacy belief represents how transferable it might be across situations, and while this dimension is important, we will only focus on level and strength. The level of self-efficacy refers to the different level of performance that an individual believes is attainable. For instance, a runner may believe they are capable of completing a half-marathon in 1hr 30min and 1hr 20min but not 1hr 15min. In an endurance context, this level of self-efficacy is likely to be primarily determined through an individual’s physical fitness. Because of the role of physiology in determining these levels, it is unlikely that self-talk would have a significant impact on helping raise an experienced endurance athlete’s level of self-efficacy. Self-talk could, however, raise the level of self-efficacy for a novice performer, who may not have as much understanding of their physical limits. The second dimension, strength, refers to the certainty of a self-efficacy belief. For example, two cyclists could believe they can achieve the same time in a cycling time trial (i.e., their level of self-efficacy is the same), but one may have a stronger sense of certainty in this belief (i.e., they are more confident that they can achieve it). This strength of a selfefficacy belief is hypothesised to influence the extent to which individuals persevere with a task (Bandura, 1997), and it is here that we propose self-talk is likely to have most impact. As stated, self-efficacy beliefs are dynamic and change as new and relevant information is appraised (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). We suggest that self-talk could act as a “buffer” against exercise-related sensations like pain and exertion that might otherwise reduce self-efficacy, helping to maintain the strength of self-efficacy through the reinforcement of capability. Together, these points provide a theoretical rationale for the role of self-talk on self-efficacy in endurance performance (for further discussion of self-efficacy in an endurance context, see Anstiss, 2019).

Self-talk and Endurance Sports 181 A second relevant theory is the psychobiological model of endurance performance (Marcora, 2010, 2019). The psychobiological model proposes that the determinants of endurance performance are psychological in nature, although they have an underlying biological basis. The main determinants are potential motivation and perception of effort. Potential motivation is the most amount of effort that a person would be willing to offer to satisfy a motive (Brehm & Self, 1989), and perception of effort is the conscious sensation of the effort exerted while performing (Marcora, 2019). During self-paced endurance exercise, the model proposes that performers make conscious pacing decisions to control the increase in their perception of effort over time, so that they experience the greatest amount of effort they are willing to offer (reflecting their potential motivation) at the end of the event (Marcora & Bosio, 2007). Individual and team strategy, and the behaviour of other competitors, also influence pacing decisions, and therefore performance, in endurance events (Marcora, 2019). Applying the psychobiological model, self-talk could improve endurance performance by reducing a person’s perception of effort, increasing the amount of effort that the person is willing to offer (i.e., increasing their potential motivation), or supporting pacing decision-making. Research on the effects of self-talk provides some support for the role of perception of effort, by demonstrating that endurance cycling can feel less effortful at the same power output when using motivational self-talk cues compared to when thinking normally (Blanchfield et al., 2014), and that cyclists can increase their power output during a self-paced task without perceiving greater effort (that is, they work harder for the same perceived effort), compared to when thinking normally (Barwood et al., 2015; Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2018). The reason why motivational self-talk might decrease perceived effort is unclear, but one potential way is through increasing self-efficacy strength (Rudolph & McAuley, 1996). Nevertheless, other research found that self-talk did not reduce perception of effort during endurance cycling in the heat, but instead helped people to perform for longer when they were close to exhaustion and offering close to their maximal effort (Wallace et al., 2017).

Self-talk in Practice In this section, we provide guidance on self-talk interventions for endurance sports. First, we describe a detailed IMPACT approach that includes a strategic self-talk plan, which may be suitable for athletes to follow, or for coaches or practitioners to use on a one-to-one basis with athletes. Second, we suggest that a brief education approach (such as psyching team activities) can provide group-level self-talk guidance to people who may not have one-to-one access to a practitioner or coach (McCormick, Anstiss, & Lavallee, 2018; Meijen, Day, & Hays, 2017).

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IMPACT Approach The IMPACT approach (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014; see also, McCormick &

Hatzigeorgiadis, 2019) provides a structured framework for learning or

teaching self-talk, which involves identifying purposeful self-talk cues, practising

and refining self-talk cues, and developing and mastering a self-talk plan.

I M P A C T

Identify what you want to achieve.

Match self-talk to needs.

Practise different cues with consistency.

Ascertain which cues work best for you.

Create specific self-talk plans.

Train self-talk plans to perfection.

The first step is to consider the valuable outcomes that using self-talk could help the person to achieve in training or competition. These could include tolerating pain and exertion, remaining motivated, developing confidence or concentration, improving technique or form, or coping with difficult or stressful situations such as low moments, weather, or equipment problems. The second step is to then identify instructional and motivational self-talk cues that are purposeful for achieving these outcomes. Self-talk cues should be brief (perhaps one or two words, or a short phrase), memorable, and “feel right” to the performer (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014; Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 2017). Consider the examples in Table 13.1 for a person who enters 10 km mass-participation running events.

Table 13.1 Examples of Self-talk Cues for a 10 km Runner. Purpose

Self-talk

Push harder in training to improve fitness

At the beginning: “Let’s go to work,” “Come on! Let’s make this a session to be proud of!” In the middle section: “Keep pushing,” “Keep it up,” “Let’s smash this!” Towards the end: “One last push to reap the rewards on race day!” “Stick with your plan,” “Run your own race.”

Stick to pacing strategy despite crowd support Persevere when starting to tire Keeping good posture when tired Deal with having a bad run Adjust to very hot weather on race day

“It’s tough, but I can do this,” “Dig deep.” “Drop your shoulders.” “It’s ok. There’s days like these – time to adjust my goal.” “Don’t push too hard too early.”

Self-talk and Endurance Sports 183 The third and fourth steps involve practising the chosen self-talk cues in a structured way during training, reflecting on their usefulness, and subsequently replacing, adjusting, and refining them. Practising self-talk in training can help performers identify self-talk cues that are helpful for them personally, and to use constructive self-talk cues more automatically. Using a training diary could support this process. A training diary could include the following questions (McCormick, Meijen, & Marcora, 2018a): • • • •

Which self-talk cues did you use during this run? Which were helpful? How did these cues help (e.g., when did they help, what did they help you with)? Which self-talk cues were unhelpful during this run? You could con­ sider replacing these, and practising different statements instead.

The fifth step involves creating a self-talk plan for training or competitive events. A series of self-talk cues could be chosen for during different stages of the performance, and for specific situations. Table 13.2 gives an example for a person who recreationally runs in weekly 5 km parkruns, and who wants to improve their performance time. The final step is to train the self-talk to perfection through consistent practice. We recommend starting by practising using the self-talk plan during training runs or non-competitive events, before using it during competitive events. Doing so will help you to test the self-talk plan, to become familiar with it, to remember it well, and to use it more automatically. The IMPACT approach above appears prescriptive, and therefore a strategic self-talk intervention. We believe, however, that the structure and content also encourage reflection on organic self-talk and engagement

Table 13.2 Example Self-talk Plan for a 5 km Run. Self-talk Cues First 500 metres 500 metres to half way Half way Last 500 metres Uphill segment If achieving a PB* becomes unlikely * personal best

“Go out strong.” “Can I sustain this pace?,” “Keep pushing,” “Nice work.” “You’re doing great, keep this up,” “Dig deep,” “Keep focusing.” “Push! Push! Push!” “Leave nothing in the tank” “You’ve got this!” “Push hard – effort over performance time!”

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with important self-talk principles. By doing so, the IMPACT approach could encourage constructive organic and strategic self-talk during endurance performance.

Brief Interventions In the endurance context, many performers are sub-elite athletes or participants who are involved recreationally rather than professionally. These people, who may or may not be motivated by competing, are unlikely to access a psychologist or coach on a one-to-one basis (McCormick, Anstiss, et al., 2018). Endurance researchers and practitioners are increasingly considering how research-informed knowledge of psychology, such as the intervention evidence base (e.g., McCormick, Meijen, & Marcora, 2015), can be made accessible to these people using methods such as online videos, webpages, coach education, workshops for the public, and psyching teams who are present at mass-participation events (Day, 2019; McCormick, Anstiss, et al., 2018; Meijen et al., 2017). Researchers and practitioners can consider ways of communicating research-informed knowledge to the public in ways that are: concise and simple; contextualised to endurance sports; in accessible and user-friendly language; practical; and concrete through use of specific examples, activities, exercises, tools, and materials (e.g., Martindale & Nash, 2013). We believe that important principles relating to self-talk can be communicated in these ways, and could benefit the performance and experience of many endurance performers. Psyching teams aim to make psychology accessible to people who could benefit from it, in the context of mass-participation endurance events such as 10 km runs, half-marathons, and marathons. They use a variety of media such as seminars or workshops, webinars, webpages, social media, written handouts, dinner speeches, and brief conversations before, during, and after events (Day, 2019; Meijen et al., 2017). The Plymouth Marjon University Psyching Team have shared information on self-talk through its inclusion in workshops on preparing for the Plymouth 10k and Ocean City Half-Marathon, and through motivational signs that are held up on the course during the event for runners to read. The workshops briefly introduce motivational and instructional selftalk cues and encourage people to identify self-talk cues that could be valuable during different stages of the event (e.g., at different distances, during sections with no crowd, if they fall behind a target pace, if things aren’t going to plan). During the events, one of the motivational signs reads, “Make your inner voice your ally,” and is intended to encourage constructive self-talk. At this point, it is important to remember that these brief interventions do not act as a “silver bullet.” As noted in the IMPACT section, for self-talk to become a useful skill, it should be practised and reflected upon. Brief interventions provide an accessible introduction to self-talk and, given the minimal resources involved with their delivery, they represent a beneficial and cost-efficient method of delivering psychological support.

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Conclusion Endurance performers can choose to use their self-talk to benefit their performances. The principles of learning to use motivational and instructional self-talk cues are fairly simple ones, but research shows that they can translate to meaningful benefits during performance. We described an IMPACT approach that can provide a detailed structure for athletes, coaches, and practitioners reading this chapter. Nevertheless, briefer self-talk interventions can also be delivered to larger groups of people, such as before massparticipation events, in order to make these important self-talk principles accessible to more performers.

References Aitchison, C., Turner, L. A., Ansley, L., Thompson, K. G., Micklewright, D., & Gibson, A. S. C. (2013). Inner dialogue and its relationship to perceived exertion during different running intensities. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 117, 11–30. Anstiss, P. A. (2019). Self-efficacy and endurance performance. In C. Meijen (Ed.), Endurance performance in sport: Psychological theory and interventions (pp. 96–106). Abingdon, England: Routledge. Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York, NY: Freeman. Barwood, M. J., Corbett, J., Wagstaff, C. R. D., McVeigh, D., & Thelwell, R. C. (2015). Improvement of 10-km time-trial cycling with motivational self-talk com­ pared with neutral self-talk. International Journal of Sports Physiology and Perform­ ance, 10, 166–171. Blanchfield, A. W., Hardy, J., de Morree, H. M., Staiano, W., & Marcora, S. M. (2014). Talking yourself out of exhaustion: The effects of self-talk on endurance performance. Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise, 46, 998–1007. Brehm, J. W., & Self, E. A. (1989). The intensity of motivation. Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 109–131. Brick, N., MacIntyre, T., & Campbell, M. (2014). Attentional focus in endurance activity: New paradigms and future directions. International Review of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 7, 106–134. Day, C. (2019). Application to recreational settings: Working with the public, psyching team activities, and suggestions. In C. Meijen (Ed.), Endurance performance in sport: Psychological theory and interventions (pp. 201–211). Abingdon, England: Routledge. Feltz, D. L., Short, S. E., & Sullivan, P. J. (2008). Self-efficacy in sport. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Gist, M. E., & Mitchell, T. R. (1992). Self-efficacy: A theoretical analysis of its deter­ minants and malleability. Academy of Management Review, 17, 183–211. Hardy, J., Thomas, A. V., & Blanchfield, A. W. (2019). To me, to you: How you say things matters for endurance performance. Journal of Sports Sciences, 37, 2122–2130. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Bartura, K., Argiropoulos, C., Comoutos, N., Galanis, E., & Flouris, A. D. (2018). Beat the heat: Effects of a motivational self-talk intervention on endurance performance. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 30, 388–401. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Latinjak, A., & Theodorakis, Y. (2014). Self-talk. In A. Papaioannou & D. Hackfort (Eds.), Routledge companion to sport and exercise

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Self-talk and Endurance Sports 187 Van Raalte, J. L., Vincent, A., & Brewer, B. W. (2017). Self-talk interventions for athletes: A theoretically grounded approach. Journal of Sport Psychology in Action, 8, 141–151. Wallace, P. J., McKinlay, B. J., Coletta, N. A., Vlaar, J. I., Taber, M. J., Wilson, P. M., & Cheung, S. S. (2017). Effects of motivational self-talk on endurance and cognitive performance in the heat. Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise, 49, 191–199. Wise, J. B., & Trunnell, E. P. (2001). The influence of sources of self-efficacy upon efficacy strength. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 23, 268–280.

14 Self-talk in Physical Education Motivational Aspects and a Guide for Physical Education Teachers Maša Marjanović, Charalampos Krommidas, Evangelos Mprisimis, Athanasios Papaioannou, and Nikos Comoutos Introduction In the physical activity domain, self-talk research has flourished mostly within the sport context, and the majority of research has focused on the effectiveness of self-talk interventions for enhancing sport performance. Overall, the evidence has supported that strategic self-talk can enhance sport performance (Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Galanis, & Theodorakis, 2011), through self-regulatory functions. Not surprisingly, strategic self-talk has become an essential part of psychological skill training programmes in sport. More recently, it has been argued that implementation of strategic self-talk interventions can be helpful for the wider contexts of physical activity and health behaviours. More emphatically, Hardy, Comoutos, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2018) suggested that the maturing sports-oriented selftalk literature could provide grounds for implementation of self-talk interventions to related contexts, including physical education (PE). In PE, research on self-talk in general, and self-talk interventions in particular, have been progressing slowly. Yet, the limited research available provides encouraging support for the importance of self-talk interventions for learning and self-regulation. The few studies that have investigated self-talk interventions in PE reported that self-talk can act as a powerful learning tool (e.g., Anderson, Vogel, & Albrecht, 1999), and self-regulatory or selfcontrol agent (e.g., Kolovelonis, Goudas, & Dermitzaki, 2012) that students can use to facilitate the learning of new motor skills. Zourbanos (2013) further emphasised the importance of self-talk interventions in PE, suggesting that beyond its capacity to facilitate learning, self-talk can also get students to enjoy and like physical activity, and gain more selfconfidence and self-esteem. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to review the PE-related self-talk literature and present guidelines for the development and implementation of strategic self-talk interventions in PE classes.

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Self-talk Research in PE To the best of our knowledge, the first self-talk study in the PE context can be traced back to the end of the last century. Anderson et al. (1999) were the first to investigate the impact of a strategic self-talk intervention in a PE context, considering its potential as a learning strategy that can help students to acquire new motor skills. The authors explored the effects of instructional self-talk cues on learning the overhand throw among third-grade students in primary school PE. Their results demonstrated that students who used instructional self-talk cues improved more than students who received other instructional treatments. It was concluded that active engagement in the mental activities associated with learning, such as self-talk, can enhance the learning process. Since that time, research in the sport self-talk literature has expanded a great deal, while the idea for exploring self-talk in PE contexts has attracted some attention and shown slow but steady progress. Two main research questions have been addressed through research in PE: the antecedents of self-talk with particular emphasis on aspects of the PE environment, as this is unique to the context, and strategic self-talk interventions for facilitating learning and enhancing self-regulation and life skills. These research lines will be reviewed in the section that follows.

Motivation and Self-talk Based on Hardy, Oliver, and Tod’s (2009) theoretical postulations, Zourbanos, Papaioannou, Argyropoulou, and Hatzigeorgiadis (2014) explored the relationships between students’ achievement goals, perceived competence, and self-talk during PE lessons. Results of the study suggested that taskoriented goals have the most favourable outcomes for students’ self-talk, irrespective of perceptions of competence. Positive outcomes were also found for mastery-approach and performance-approach goals. On the other hand, relationships between ego goals and self-talk depended more on students’ perceived competence. That is, students with low perceived competence used more negative self-talk. Overall, the study confirmed the potential influence of achievement goals and perceived competence on students’ positive and negative self-talk (see also, Chapter 6). Following this study, Marjanović, Comoutos, and Papaioannou (2019) explored the relationships between perceived teacher-created motivational climate, students’ achievement goals and self-talk in PE. The results showed that (a) mastery motivational climate was linked to task orientation, which was linked positively with positive (goal-directed) self-talk and negatively with negative (spontaneous) self-talk, and (b) that a performance-avoidance climate was directly linked with negative (spontaneous) self-talk. In sum, the study emphasised the importance of the climate created by the teachers in PE classes for students’ self-talk. Finally, Ada, Comoutos, Karamitrou, and Kazak (2019) explored the relationships between motivational climate,

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dispositional flow, and self-talk in PE. It was found that dispositional flow and the perceptions of a task-involving motivational climate were positively related to students’ positive (goal-directed) self-talk and negatively related to students’ negative (spontaneous) self-talk. On the other hand, the perceptions of an ego-involving motivational climate was positively related to students’ negative (spontaneous) self-talk. In addition, the authors observed some differences in the related factors as a function of gender, leisure-time sport participation, sport type, and grade level. In summary, the studies exploring motivational antecedents of self-talk indicate that environmental factors, such as motivational climate, but also personal factors, such as achievement goals and perceived competence – which can be regulated through motivational climate – can play important role in shaping students’ functional self-talk during PE lessons. Hence, teachers are encouraged to create a supportive environment and promote a task-involving motivational climate as this would contribute to children’s functional self-talk and positive experiences in PE.

Strategic Self-talk Interventions The second line of self-talk research in PE involves the implementation of strategic self-talk interventions following the early research of Anderson and colleagues. Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Bardas, and Theodorakis (2013a) explored the effects of instructional self-talk cues on performance of a soccer task among elementary school PE students. Their study revealed that students who used instructional self-talk cues improved their performance more than the control group. In line with sports literature (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011), the authors suggested that self-talk, as a learning strategy, takes time and practice in order to produce maximum results; however, it can be useful from the early ages of learning. Research in PE has also explored aspects of the matching hypotheses initially introduced by Theodorakis, Weinberg, Natsis, Douma, and Kazakas (2000) and further amended by Hatzigeorgiadis, Zourbanos, Latinjak, and Theodorakis (2014). The matching hypothesis suggests that several factors need to be considered when choosing the appropriate self-talk cues in relation to different self-talk functions; that is, task characteristics, learning stage, and setting or circumstances. Regarding the matching for task characteristics, it has been argued that instructional self-talk cues will be more effective for tasks requiring skill, precision, and timing when compared to motivational self-talk cues (Theodorakis et al., 2000). This is mainly because instructional self-talk cues should facilitate performers’ understanding of a task and help them to focus their attention to task-relevant cues (Hardy et al., 2018). On the other hand, motivational self-talk cues, due to their psychophysiological (e.g., mood, confidence, and effort) benefits (Hardy et al., 2018), should be more effective for tasks requiring strength or endurance (Theodorakis et al., 2000). The studies in PE partially supported these assumptions. More

Self-talk in Physical Education 191 specifically, Kolovelonis, Goudas, and Dermitzaki (2011) examined the effects of instructional and motivational self-talk cues on a basketball chest pass and a modified push-ups test among elementary school students in the fifth and sixth grade. The study found that both instructional and motivational self-talk cues were effective in the precision task, a chest pass test, while motivational self-talk cues was more effective in the power-endurance task, a modified pushups test. The authors argued that both types of self-talk cues helped students to increase their attention during the chest pass test, while motivational selftalk cues helped students to exert more effort during the push-ups test. It was concluded that matching the content of self-talk cues with the task demands can be critical for self-talk effectiveness. In a similar study, Chang et al. (2014) examined the effects of instructional and motivational self-talk cues on high school students’ softball throwing performance. In line with Kolovelonis et al. (2011), results showed that instructional and motivational self-talk cues were equally effective in improving the throwing accuracy, while motivational selftalk cues were more effective in improving the throwing distance. In addition, both types of self-talk cues increased students’ self-efficacy on the precision task, while motivational self-talk cues were more effective in increasing students’ self-efficacy on gross-motor task. The authors suggested that the nature of the self-talk and the type of motor task may moderate the relationship between self-talk and task performance. Regarding the matching of the learning stage with the type of self-talk, it is suggested that instructional self-talk cues could be more effective for beginners, or at the early stages of learning, while motivational self-talk cues could be more beneficial for more skilled performers, or at the later stages of learning (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014). In particular, the use of instructional self-talk cues can improve concentration and focus attention to the taskrelevant stimuli, and thus facilitate early learning. On the other hand, motivational self-talk cues can help students to boost motivation and increase self-confidence, once the basic motor demands of a task have been acquired. In this respect, Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Bardas, and Theodorakis (2013b) compared the effects of instructional and motivational self-talk cues on a novel and a learned task in handball among elementary school PE students. They found that both instructional and motivational self-talk cues improved students’ performance. However, instructional self-talk cues were more beneficial for the novel task, at the early stages of learning, while motivational self-talk cues were more suitable for the learned task. The study indicates that, at the acquisition phase of skill development, when movements are consciously controlled and effortfully produced, the use of instructional self-talk cues can be particularly useful as they direct attention to the desired movement. On the other hand, motivational self-talk cues may be more effective when a skill is well learned and automatically performed. Finally, with respect to the setting or circumstances, the matching hypothesis suggested that motivational self-talk cues could be more effective in an evaluative setting, while instructional self-talk cues should be more

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suitable for practising. This hypothesis could have great applied value in PE settings when taking a PE exam or participating in a school competition. However, no research in PE has tested this assumption. Overall, it is proposed that PE teachers can implement self-talk interventions in PE classes as an appropriate learning strategy that students can use to enhance their performance. In addition, PE teachers should aim to match the type of selftalk with the motor task characteristics, learning stage, and circumstances, in order to maximise the potential gains.

Self-talk for Self-Regulation and Life Skills Research on the implementation of strategic self-talk interventions has also been linked with self-regulation and life skills. Kolovelonis and colleagues argued that school-based PE has limited time and resources, and that development of effective teaching approaches would be of great interest (Kolovelonis, Goudas, Hassandra, et al., 2012). In this context, the authors emphasised the benefits of self-regulated learning. Self-regulated learning can be described as: “an active, constructive process whereby learners set goals for their learning and then attempt to monitor, regulate, and control their cognition, motivation, and behaviour, guided and constrained by their goals and the contextual features in the environment” (Pintrich, 2000). Foremost, self-regulated learners are more independent. They tend to see themselves as agents of their own behaviour and use different strategies in order to proactively engage in the learning process (Kolovelonis, Goudas, Hassandra, et al., 2012). One such strategy that can help students to regulate their learning is self-talk. It has been shown that self-talk can reduce the occurrence of interfering thoughts and enhance concentration on the task (Hatzigeorgiadis, Theodorakis, & Zourbanos, 2004). Thus, self-talk has been considered as a self-control technique that students can implement throughout the learning process (Kolovelonis, Goudas, Hassandra, et al., 2012). Following this premise, Kolovelonis, Goudas, & Dermitzaki (2012) examined the effects of instructional self-talk cues combined with goalsetting strategy on self-regulated learning of a new motor skill in PE lessons. The study involved primary school fifth- and sixth-grade students. It was found that students who used instructional self-talk cues improved their dartthrowing performance more than students who did not use it. The authors suggested that instructional self-talk cues most likely increased students’ attention to the task, and thus enhanced their learning and performance. Overall, the study results provided evidence that self-talk intervention can be used as an appropriate technique that can help students to self-regulate their learning and performance in primary school PE. Finally, some studies including self-talk interventions in PE contexts used strategic self-talk cues as a part of life-skills training programme. It has been recognised that life skills training can contribute to positive youth development (Goudas & Giannoudis, 2008). Life skills can be defined as “the

Self-talk in Physical Education 193 abilities for adaptive and positive behaviour that enable individuals to deal effectively with the demands and challenges of everyday life” (The World Health Organisation, 1999). In particular, Goudas, Dermitzaki, Leondari, and Danish (2006) investigated the effectiveness of a life-skills programme delivered within PE lessons. Elementary school seventh-grade students were initially assessed in seat-and-reach and push-ups tests, and then taught several life skills: goal setting, making plans, and positive thinking. Results showed that students improved in their fitness skills relative to the control group, increased knowledge about life skills and enhanced their self-beliefs about personal goal setting. In a similar study, Goudas and Giannoudis (2008) examined the effects of life skills intervention among elementary and junior high school PE students. Students were taught two basketball skills – dribbling and chest pass – and two volleyball skills – overhead pass and underside service. In addition, an experimental group had life-skills training, that is, goal setting, problem-solving strategies, and positive thinking. The authors extended upon the strategic self-talk intervention, by teaching students how to spot negative performance-related self-talk cues and change them into positive ones. The study showed that students who received the life-skills training, including the use of self-talk cues, improved in sport skills relative to the control group, and enhanced their knowledge about life skills and self-beliefs about changing negative self-talk into positive. In sum, the authors emphasised the benefits of the life-skills programme suggesting that students who received life-skills training were more likely to enhance their learning and performance in the PE context and beyond. Moreover, it was proposed that self-talk can itself be considered an important life skill that could be taught in PE and then transferred to other life contexts. To conclude, research in PE setting supports the effectiveness of self-talk as an effective learning tool. Stemming from the above findings and based on previous relevant recommendations from Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Kolovelonis, Latinjak, and Theodorakis (2016), the purpose of the closing section is to provide guidelines for the development and implementation of self-talk interventions in school-based PE contexts.

Guidelines for the Use of Strategic Self-talk in PE Self-talk interventions in PE mainly incorporate instructional and motivational cue words that aim to facilitate learning and enhance task performance. It has been suggested that verbal instructions may not be sufficient to bring students’ attention to critical task information (Lee, Landin, & Carter, 1992). However, verbal cues could be used in order to help students to focus attention on relevant task elements (Landin, 1994). Verbal cues implemented in a form of self-talk may be particularly beneficial as they can enhance students’ active involvement in the activity and encourage active learning (Anderson et al., 1999; Landin, 1994). This is particularly important if we consider that many factors can influence the teaching effectiveness. For instance, providing

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individual feedback in a class of 35 to 40 students can be very challenging (Landin, 1994). Thus, teaching students how to become more independent and self-paced learners or how to individually boost motivation and enhance self-confidence could be beneficial. In line with this, we present below basic guidelines for the development of self-talk interventions in PE classes.

Development of Strategic Self-talk Intervention in PE When developing self-talk interventions, several factors need to be considered. Firstly, based on the matching hypotheses described earlier (see also, Chapter 9), strategic self-talk interventions need to be developed in relation to the task characteristic and learning stage or task experience (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014). In particular, instructional self-talk cues will be more effective when trying to teach or correct a specific skill, while motivational self-talk cues will be more effective when trying to boost motivation or enhance self-confidence. In addition, instructional self-talk cues may prove more suitable for fine skills that require precision and timing, while motivational self-talk cues could be a better choice when executing gross skills that require strength or endurance. Moreover, the choice of self-talk cues could be determined by students’ familiarity with the task (Zourbanos, 2013). Instructional self-talk cues are more effective for students who are not familiar with the task (i.e., when learning a new skill), while motivational self-talk cues are more effective for experienced performers (Zourbanos et al., 2013b). Further, the chosen cue words should be brief, simple, accurate, and relevant to the task performed (Landin, 1994). When cue words are too complex, they might overload the learner and hinder task execution. Hatzigeorgiadis et al. (2014) proposed an approach to teaching self-talk in class, namely IMPACT (Identify, Match, Practice, Ascertain, Create, Train). Based on this approach, teachers first need to identify what students need to achieve (e.g., learn a new skill), match the appropriate self-talk cues with the chosen activity, practice the chosen cue words, ascertain which cues are the most suitable for students, create a specific self-talk plan, and train based on the plan (see also, Chapter 13). Taking into consideration the above suggestions, previous research, and selftalk guidelines for interventions in PE (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2014; Zourbanos, 2013; Zourbanos et al., 2016), we summarised a set of instructions for PE teachers who intend to incorporate self-talk interventions as a part of their teaching method in class. We present below some practical implications for the use of instructional and motivational self-talk, which can facilitate learning processes and enhance performance in PE.

Instructional Self-talk Interventions in PE – Practical Implications Once a new skill has been introduced to students, the steps of the IMPACT approach can be considered for the effective understanding and use of self-talk strategies. As IMPACT has been proposed within the sport context, in our

Self-talk in Physical Education 195 section we use it as a reference point but have adjusted the guidelines accordingly to fit the context of PE. As an example, we included below one skill commonly used in elementary school PE, that is, gymnastics forward roll (see Table 14.1). First, instructions related to the foreseen task need to be provided. It is important that students have good understanding of the instructions. If possible, the task should be divided into simple and logical segments and briefly practised before introducing the related self-talk cues. For instance, the gymnastics forward roll can be divided into three segments: (a) taking the correct starting position, (b) forward roll, (c) finishing position. Students should practise the task for 5–10 min along with teacher’s instructions and feedback. The practice duration will depend on the complexity of the task. Next, teachers need to introduce the notion of self-talk to the class. Primarily, students need to understand what self-talk is, in general and simple terms (e.g., “Everything we say to ourselves either out loud or as a small voice inside our heads,” Theodorakis et al., 2000, p. 254). Then, discuss instructional self-talk and clarify its main functions, that is, how self-talk helps students learn, through following the instruction they have just given to themselves. It would be beneficial if students understand the importance of self-talk and its impact on task performance. It has been shown that students who believe that self-talk is an important and useful strategy will most likely receive more benefits from the intervention (Van Raalte, Brewer, Rivera, & Petitpas, 1994; Zourbanos et al., 2016).

Table 14.1 Practical Examples of Instructional Self-talk Cues to Teach a New Skill. Instructional self-talk for gymnastics forward roll Task-related instructions

Cue words

Squat down with your feet shoulder-width apart. Place your hands on the ground in front of you and shoulder-width apart. Tuck your chin into your chest. Push over onto the upper back, so that the body rolls forward and the hips are pushed over the head. Follow the curve of your spine. Keep your back curved, knees and chin tucked and hands in position. Stand up by following through with the momentum, without using your hands for support. Straighten your legs, then finish upright with your hands over your head.

“Squat down” “Hands down” “Chin tucked” “Push and roll” “Stay curved” “Stand-up” “Hands up”

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Afterwards, each task-related instruction should be linked with a specific cue word. The relationship between the selected cue words and each segment of the task needs to be logical and clearly emphasised (Landin, 1994). Examples of task instructions and related cue words are provided in Table 14.1. Preferably, the teacher or another proficient student should model the task execution while using the selected cue words. This would facilitate students’ understanding of the task and enhance learning process (Landin, 1994). Teachers should also discuss with students if the related cue words make sense to them, based on the instructions provided. If applicable, students should be encouraged to participate in the selection of the self-talk cues. This would create a sense of choice and ownership among students and increase the likelihood that they will engage in the activity (Ntoumanis, 2012; Zourbanos, 2013). Subsequently, students need to practise the skill with the use of selected self-talk cues. During practice, students should be monitored by the teacher and encouraged to use self-talk (Zourbanos et al., 2016). For instance, the teacher can ask students if they are using the cue words while practising the task or if they use it with each repetition of the task (e.g., forward roll). Finally, the use of self-talk should be discussed with students after the practice. For instance, the teacher can ask students to elaborate on their understanding of self-talk, by using some of the following questions: “What is self-talk?” “How often did you use it during practice?” “Did you find it difficult to use self-talk during practice?” “Did the self-talk help you to learn the new skill?” “How?” and, “Is there is any other situation where you could use self-talk?” Above are presented some practical examples on how to choose the content of instructional self-talk cues when teaching a new skill (see Table 14.1). After the students have demonstrated good understanding and performance of the skill, the cue words could be reduced to more simple self-instructions. For instance, when performing the gymnastics forward roll, students can use shorter cues: “Push – Roll – Stand.”

Motivational Self-talk Interventions in PE – Practical Implications Once the skill has been sufficiently practised, teachers could introduce the use of motivational self-talk to the class. In a similar fashion, teacher can explain what motivational self-talk is and emphasise its main functions, that is, to instil belief on oneself, enhance self-confidence, and regulate effort. For instance, when performing the task, students can say to themselves “I can do this!” “Push hard!” etc. Research evidence suggests that motivational self-talk cues are more beneficial for students who have already mastered the skill (Zourbanos et al.,

Self-talk in Physical Education 197 2013b). However, the proper timing to put motivational self-talk cues into practice will most likely be situation specific. For instance, some students might be afraid to perform the gymnastics forward roll. In such situation, the use of motivational self-talk cues at early stages of learning could be more beneficial. Hence, the students can say: “I can do this!” “I am ready!” “I got this!” to encourage themselves. If the student feels too anxious, or distracted, the content of self-talk should be adjusted to the specific situation. To help students to self-regulate their feelings and cognition (e.g., to regain focus or reduce anxiety) students can say: “Stay calm,” “Breathe deeply,” to reduce tension, or “Stay focused,” to regain focus. Overall, motivational self-talk cues can help students to regulate their arousal and anxiety, increase focus and confidence, and maintain or increase drive and effort levels (Hardy, Gammage, & Hall, 2001). In the table below are presented some practical examples of how students can use self-talk in order to regulate their thoughts and feelings before or during a task performance (see Table 14.2; the examples and categories provided in the table are based on Hardy et al.’s [2001] functions of motivational self-talk, Hogg’s [2000] display of self-talk cues for athletes, and strategic self-talk cues suggested by Karageorghis & Terry, 2011). When using motivational self-talk cues, it is important that students learn how to recognise the type of self-talk that is the most appropriate for their performance regulation. Teachers can help students to identify how they feel or think during practice, by asking: “How do you feel when performing this exercise?” “What do you say to yourself?” or more directly “Does that make you feel anxious?” “What can you say to yourself when

Table 14.2 Examples of Motivational Self-talk Cues. Motivational self-talk cues for self-regulation Purpose Regulate arousal • (from high to low) • (from low to high) Reduce anxiety

Increase focus Build self-confidence Control effort

Cue words/Phrases

“Slow down!”; “Easy!”; “Channel the force!” “Optimistic!”; “Positive!”; “Ready!”; “Pump it up!”; “Wake up!” “I’m ready!”; “I’m in control!”; “Keep cool.” “Relax”; “Stay calm”; “Breathe deeply”; “Cool as a cucumber.” “Here and now!”; “Wary!”; “Switch!”; “Focus!”; “Watch the ball!”; “Eyes wide open!” “I am confident!”; “I can do this!”; “Great job!”; “This will be fun”; “Let’s go!”; “I’m ready!” “Push!”; “Explode!”; “Fast!”; “Strong!”; “Hang in there!”

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you feel anxious?” “What type of self-talk can you use?” then discuss examples with the whole class. Teachers should also encourage students to be creative when choosing self-talk cues and help them to identify cues that will be most effective for each student individually. Implementation of a self-talk intervention should be conducted over several lessons, in order to avoid students’ confusion or overload of information. For instance, each category listed in the table above can be covered over one PE lesson (see Table 14.2). It is also important to emphasise that a self-talk intervention takes time and requires practice, as with any other skill. Thus, teachers need to be patient and persistent when teaching self-talk in order to maximise gains (Hatzigeorgiadis et al., 2011).

Conclusions In conclusion, the aim of these guidelines is to encourage PE teachers to implement self-talk interventions in their curriculum. Extensive research has provided evidence that the implementation of self-talk intervention can enhance performance. Self-talk can represent a powerful learning tool because it enables learners to interact with the content and become active agents of their own learning (Anderson et al., 1999). In addition, self-talk can help students to regulate their thoughts and feelings in order to have maximum gains in PE class. As indicated, teachers should be careful in selecting the appropriate self-talk cues, match them with the task demands, and teach students how to choose self-talk based on their individual needs. Teachers are encouraged to be patient and persistent when teaching self-talk. Finally, PE is the environment where children develop motor skills. If a selftalk intervention is implemented correctly and consistently, there will be greater likelihood that children will enhance performance, which will grow their feelings of success and self-confidence, and create positive experiences in PE.

References Ada, E. N., Comoutos, N., Karamitrou, A., & Kazak, Z. (2019). Relationships between dispositional flow, motivational climate, and self-talk in physical education classes. Physical Educator, 76, 357–384. Anderson, A., Vogel, P., & Albrecht, R. (1999). The effect of instructional self-talk on the overhand throw. Physical Educator, 56, 215–221. Chang, Y. K., Ho, L. A., Fu, F. J. H., Ou, C. C., Song, T. F., & Gill, D. L. (2014). Self-talk and softball performance: The role of self-talk nature, motor task character­ istics, and self-efficacy in novice softball players. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 15, 139–145. Goudas, M., Dermitzaki, E., Leondari, A., & Danish, S. (2006). The effectiveness of teaching a life-skills program in a physical education context. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 21, 429–438. Goudas, M., & Giannoudis, G. (2008). A team-sports-based life-skills program in a physical education context. Learning and Instruction, 18, 538–546.

Self-talk in Physical Education 199 Hardy, J., Comoutos, N., & Hatzigeorgiadis, A. (2018). Reflections on the maturing research literature of self-talk in sport: Contextualizing the special issue. The Sport Psychologist, 32, 1–8. Hardy, J., Gammage, K., & Hall, C. (2001). A descriptive study of athlete self-talk. The Sport Psychologist, 15, 306–318. Hardy, J., Oliver, E., & Tod, E. (2009). A framework for the study and application of self-talk within sport. In S. D. Mellalieu & S. Hanton (Eds.), Advances in applied sport psychology: A review (pp. 37–74). London, UK: Routledge. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Theodorakis, Y., & Zourbanos, N. (2004). Self-talk in the swim­ ming pool: The effects of self talk on thought content and performance on water-polo tasks. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 16, 138–150. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Galanis, E., & Theodorakis, Y. (2011). Self-talk and sport performance: A meta-analysis. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 348–356. Hatzigeorgiadis, A., Zourbanos, N., Latinjak, A., & Theodorakis, Y. (2014). Self-talk. In A. Papaioannou & D. Hackfort (Eds.), Routledge companion to sport and exercise psychology: Global perspectives and fundamental concepts (pp. 372–385). London, UK: Taylor & Francis. Hogg, J. M. (2000). Mental skills for competitive swimmers. Alberta: Sport Excel Publishing. Karageorghis, C. I., & Terry, P. (2011). Inside sport psychology. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Kolovelonis, A., Goudas, M., & Dermitzaki, I. (2011). The effects of instructional and motivational self-talk on students’ motor task performance in physical education. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 12, 153–158. Kolovelonis, A., Goudas, M., & Dermitzaki, I. (2012). The effects of self-talk and goal setting on self-regulation of learning a new motor skill in physical education. Inter­ national Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 10, 221–235. Kolovelonis, A., Goudas, M., Hassandra, M., & Dermitzaki, I. (2012). Self-regulated learning in physical education: Examining the effects of emulative and self-control practice. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 13(4), 383–389. Landin, D. (1994). The role of verbal cues in skill learning. Quest, 46, 299–313. Lee, A. M., Landin, D. K., & Carter, J. A. (1992). Students’ thoughts during tennis instruction. Journal of Teaching in Physical Education, 11, 256–267. Marjanović, M., Comoutos, N., & Papaioannou, A. G. (2019). The relationships between perceived motivational climate, achievement goals and self-talk in physical education: Testing the mediating role of achievement goals and self-talk. Motivation and Emotion, 43(4), 592–609. Ntoumanis, N. (2012). A self-determination theory perspective on motivation in sport and physical education: Current trends and possible future research directions. In G. C. Roberts & D. C. Treasure (Eds.), Motivation in sport and exercise: Volume 3 (pp. 91–128). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics. Pintrich, P. R. (2000). The role of goal orientation in self-regulated learning. In M. Boekaerts, P. R. Pintrich, & M. Zeidner (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation (pp. 451–502). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Theodorakis, Y., Weinberg, R., Natsis, P., Douma, I., & Kazakas, P. (2000). The effects of motivational and instructional self-talk on improving motor performance. The Sport Psychologist, 14, 253–271.

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15 Contesting the Role of Self-talk in Sport Psychology in Views of Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering Daniel Birrer, Patricia C. Jackman, and Alexander T. Latinjak Introduction Self-talk researchers have a deep interest in the concept of self-talk and, consequently, may tend to overvalue the relevance of athletes’ inner dialogue for sport performance. This self-talk book contains contributions from many self-talk researchers and could convince the reader that self-talk is the ultimate key to successful sport performance. However, it is important to note that many researchers outside of this area have had different perspectives on this. For one disagreeing view on the relevance of self-talk, contemplate the following example. For some time now, self-talk researchers have used instructional self-talk cues in strategic self-talk interventions to facilitate learning and enhance performance (Cutton & Landin, 2007; Latinjak, Torregrossa, & Renom, 2010). Intrigued by the potential utility of self-talk cues, these researchers set out to prove that the repetition of technical cue words (e.g., shoulders low) would be key to facilitating skill acquisition and elevated performance in sports. Yet, in the meantime, other researchers have had a very different opinion about the role of instructional self-talk cues in learning and performance. Some researchers have studied the negative effects of internal foci of attention (e.g., Wulf, 2013), which are implicitly fostered when using most instructional cue words (Bell & Hardy, 2009). Indeed, it was only the joint consideration of both lines of research that led us to recognise that instructional cue words are best if they direct the focus of attention on external aspects of technique execution (e.g., racquet head up; Bell & Hardy, 2009; Latinjak et al., 2010). To enable scientific advancements, it is important to think critically about existing knowledge and consider alternative viewpoints on an area. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to review self-talk with respect to three contrasting phenomena: mindfulness, flow, and mind wandering. While each of these share common features with self-talk, mainly regarding cognitive control and thought content, they also present substantial discrepancies, particularly concerning their idea of what constitutes an optimal performance state. To further our understanding of self-talk, one researcher in each of the

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respective areas attempts to interpret, from the limited evidence available, how self-talk could reconcile with these phenomena. Furthermore, a series of applied recommendations on the use of self-talk in relation to mindfulness, flow, and mind wandering are also advanced.

A Mindful Perspective on Self-talk: Daniel Birrer The human mind is full of internal events such as thoughts, feelings, and sensations. Sometimes, these internal experiences are present in the form of ruminations, dysfunctional thinking, and erratic inner speech. Occasionally a person is fully aware of these experiential contents that pop up across the consciousness as temporary events. Yet, most of the time, individuals are unaware of the exact content of these internal experiences. Human beings are fused together with these internal experiences and held fast by the ropes of their own first-person phenomenological experience. Additionally, there is a large individual and situational difference in the characteristics and frequencies of these different inner experiences (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Seli, Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, & Smilek, 2015). In fact, there exist various psychological concepts that represent the multitude of possible categories of perceived inner events. Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) name inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolised thinking, feeling, sensory awareness, inner hearing, and just “doing” as the most frequent phenomena of inner experience. Self-talk as “an act of syntactically recognizable communication in which the sender of the message is also the receiver” (Van Raalte, Vincent, & Brewer, 2016, p. 140) is one specific form of these internal events. Having said this, it has also to be conceded that there is no mutual agreement on what categories of inner experience are distinguishable, how they are named, and how these various concepts are related (for a reflection on what distinguishes self-talk from other inner experiences see, Chapter 2). Especially in sports, various opinions and diverse lines of research on the nature of self-talk appear to exist. Self-talk is sometimes viewed as a form of goal-directed or undirected thinking (Latinjak, Hatzigeorgiadis, & Zourbanos, 2017), involving different processing mechanisms (automatic, intuitive, fast, effortless, and contextualised vs. decontextualised, involving reasoning, slow, requiring more conscious effort, and demanding of working memory – Van Raalte et al., 2016) or having a variety of other functions (Hardy & Oliver, 2014). Amazingly enough, although in some self-talk literature the connection between self-talk and thoughts is made (e.g., Hardy, 2006), the view that self-talk strongly relies upon consciousness and its experience is not explicitly made. Consciousness as a scientific term is viewed as “the subjective awareness of momentary experience interpreted in the context of personal memory and present state” (Roy John, 2003, p. 244). Seeing self-talk as a specific process of the human consciousness with a past, present, and future time perspective might be useful in illuminating some contradictory findings in the self-talk discourse.

Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering 203 At the same time, as in the tradition of cognitive therapy, one central element in the self-talk literature appears to be that a key feature of self-talk is the centrality of cognitive causes with regard to emotion and behaviour. Emotions and behaviours are seen as products of thoughts when they cooccur with a behaviour of interest. To change behaviour, an individual has to change his organic self-talk – or more precisely, the content of their inner dialogue. Nevertheless, sometimes athletes seem to experience difficulty in controlling their cognitive processes by employing traditional psychological skills training methods like self-talk. Some promising alternative perspectives to enhance behavioural functioning are mindfulness and acceptance-based concepts (Birrer, Röthlin, & Morgan, 2012). Mindfulness and acceptance are core features of the so-called third-wave of cognitive-behavioural therapies (Hayes, 2004). Third-wave therapies are characterised by the renunciation, or cautious use, of content-oriented cognitive interventions. The concept of mindfulness hinges on focusing on one’s own awareness of the present moment with an accepting, non-judgemental, and non-reacting attitude (Kabat-Zinn, 2003), which is traditionally fostered by mindfulness practice through formal or informal exercise. Both mindfulness and self-talk are associated with a particular state of consciousness. The experiential contents of the consciousness as well as the selftalk itself are likely to be caused by the interaction between exogenous factors (i.e., environmental stimuli) and endogenous factors (i.e., internal bodily inputs or unsymbolised thinking) (Manuello, Vercelli, Nani, Costa, & Cauda, 2016; Van Raalte et al., 2016). The dimension of contents and sources of both selftalk and conscious experience can therefore be divided into external awareness (i.e., what we perceive through the senses) and internal awareness (i.e., thoughts that are independent of specific external stimuli; Manuello et al., 2016). Internal and external awareness are crucial for consciousness and the sense of self. The sense of self or conscious presence, which is understood as the subjective sense of reality of the world and of the self within the world, emerges when predicted interoceptive signals (i.e., expected information from the muscles, articulations, skin, and organs) and real input signals (i.e., actual information coming from the muscles, articulations, skin, and organs) match (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012). All these signals are conjointly processed in different brain areas and produce in their sum and quality the sense of self. This subjectively experienced conscious state or sense of self is thought to be formed by a global workspace with its characteristic feature of the conjointly distributed availability of information due to long-range neuronal projections (Manuello et al., 2016). Within this global workspace other important areas in the generation of behaviour, like speech and motor areas, can be connected to the associative areas that deal with the contents of experience. Areas involved in the generation of the conscious experience are also reported to be involved in mindfulness meditation (Manuello et al., 2016). Mindfulness practice is thought to increase awareness and recognition of bodily sensations, as well as to improve interoceptive observational skills. In

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contrast to cognitive behavioural or self-talk concepts, mindfulness and acceptance-based concepts are focused more on the person’s relationship to thoughts and emotions than on their content. Three different processes are proposed to be relevant for enhanced psychological functioning through mindfulness and acceptance (Birrer & Röthlin, 2017): (a) purposeful present-moment awareness (e.g., continually returning attention to external or internal present-moment experience), (b) metacognitive awareness (e.g., mindful self-focused attention of internal processes, thoughts, emotions, bodily sensations, images, and desires as observable events of the brain), and (c) acceptance. Regarding metacognitive awareness, this process is sometimes referred to as defusion or decentring, the conscious observation of whatever flickers across the consciousness as a temporary experience in the mind without identifying with them or believing that thoughts and emotions are accurate reflections of reality or the self. As for the third process, (c), it refers to acceptance of what is in the consciousness and what may arise or come into consciousness in an open, non-judgemental and non-avoiding way, regardless of whether it is considered pleasant or not. Another main feature of third-wave therapies is the assumption that thoughts, together with organic self-talk as a specific form of thought, do not necessarily represent reality. Instead, they are seen as events in the mind that can or cannot tell us how things are, and we can choose to pay attention to them or not. The concept of mindfulness stems from Buddhist tradition, where internal experiences of thoughts and emotions are regarded as a sixth sense (the mind sense; Kang & Whittingham, 2010). Thoughts and emotions can be observed equally well as bodily sensations, which is compatible with the conception of interoceptive attention and its neuronal correlates (Manuello et al., 2016). Mindfulness and acceptance practice allow for thoughts and emotions to simply be recognised in the stream of consciousness without attempting to evaluate their validity or being caught up in them. In mindfulness and acceptance approaches, thoughts are just thoughts; they are not regarded as reality itself. Similarly, moods come and go; individuals do not have to identify with them or own them. Within a mindfulness and acceptance approach there is no need to alter or reduce emotions or thoughts, no matter if they are goal-directed thoughts, or involuntary and unintentional undirected thoughts (mind-wandering, stimulus-independent thoughts, and spontaneous thoughts) or anticipatory, retrospective, present related, or contextually related self-talk, with a positive, negative, or neutral valence. Findings suggest that increases in the selfreported ability to step back psychologically from thoughts and view them as mental processes rather than absolute truths (i.e., metacognitive awareness or cognitive defusion) is a mediator in treatments of cognitive therapy as well as acceptance commitment therapy (Forman et al., 2012). It is plausible that present-moment awareness is helpful in the development of metacognitive awareness, because it helps to detect outer and inner experience. Acceptance, although as a mediator of change only present in mindfulness and acceptance

Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering 205 approaches (Forman et al., 2012), may help to view thoughts and emotions as being acceptable as they are, with no need to modify them. Mindfulness and acceptance approaches effectively encourage engagement in behavioural activity regardless of distressing inner speech or emotions. It allows an individual to notice the thoughts, emotions, feelings, and sensations and choose what to hold on to and what to let pass. Additionally, acceptance commitment therapy sees thoughts as tools (Hayes, 2004). As tools in a chest, they need not be thrown away if the situation calls for another tool to repair something. Just as a carpenter uses a hammer to drive in a nail, although they were holding a screwdriver in their hands the moment before, an individual can use a different thought to follow their personal values, although another thought may have previously appeared in their mind. In that sense, self-talk is neither good nor bad; it is functional or non-functional depending on the situational context, and there are good reasons why a specific inner voice has spoken up in a certain situation. In this respect, it is helpful that a person is aware of their inner dialogue and accepts its content. In doing so, they can choose to either react to this stimulus, and thereby cause possible distress from their efforts to change or eliminate this inner event (e.g., the experience of pain-elicited self-talk resulting from physical exhaustion), or they can engage in goal-directed behaviour (e.g., keeping to an exercise regimen with the same focus and intensity). Mindfulness helps a person to realise their inner voice and to disengage from autopilot mode. Instead of reacting, a person is able to respond to the events in life (i.e., inner or outer experience). Mindfulness empowers them to engage in goal-directed behaviour in spite of negative thoughts and feelings. A mindfulness and acceptance approach considers thoughts and self-talk as an essential part of human consciousness. Nevertheless, these inner experiences are not regarded as causative factors; instead cognitive, affective, and behavioural phenomena are all seen as interdependent and mutually determined. Furthermore, experiences are formed by the words and ideas people attach to (Langer, 1992). Calling a competition “tough” can mean joy to one person and resignation or defeat to another. Mindfulness will help one to embrace the sweaty, messy, and sometimes difficult aspects of being an athlete. It helps to create space between a person and their inner speech. People are not at the mercy of their thoughts and emotions. From a mindfulness and acceptance approach, efforts to change one’s thoughts, feelings, and other internal states are often ineffective and consume resources. The ability to step back psychologically from one’s own thoughts and view them as mental processes rather than absolute truths decreases the amount of dysfunctional thinking and changes the person’s relationship to them. Mindfulness, and particularly present-moment awareness and metacognitive awareness, helps to detect the nature of organic self-talk and let go of non­ functional inner speech. Private speech or organic self-talk is regarded as a construction of the human brain and not reality (acceptance). Nevertheless,

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it is relevant for human behaviour. The mindful way is not letting go of selftalk, but letting go of the belief in the absolute truth of it.

Flow Experience and Self-talk: Patricia C. Jackman Athletes who achieve excellent performance often acknowledge the importance of their psychological state (Jackson & Kimiecik, 2008). Optimal experience is an umbrella term used to capture positive psychological states that create feelings of happiness and culminate in self-fulfilling experiences, which are a consequence of exerting effort (Jackson & Wrigley, 2004). The most-studied framework for understanding optimal experience in sport is flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975), which is defined as an intrinsically rewarding psychological state that occurs when individuals are challenged beyond normal levels but believe they possess the ability to meet the demands of the task (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). Flow states are characterised by a sense of harmony between body and mind, distinct perceptions of control, and total immersion in a specific activity, with such episodes often leaving people feeling as though something special has occurred (Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). Most common understanding of flow centres on Csikszentmihalyi’s (2002) flow framework, which conceptualises this experience as an amalgam of nine dimensions:1 (i) challenge-skills balance; (ii) action-awareness merging; (iii) clear goals; (iv) unambiguous feedback; (v) concentration on the task at hand; (vi) sense of control; (vii) loss of self-consciousness; (viii) transformation of time; and (ix) autotelic experience. Flow has been associated with peak performance (Jackson & Roberts, 1992) and a range of positive psychological consequences, including increased athlete engagement (Hodge, Lonsdale, & Jackson, 2009), future motivation (Schüler & Brunner, 2009), self-concept (Jackson, Thomas, Marsh, & Smethurst, 2001), and well-being (Haworth, 1993). Given that these outcomes are desirable and pertinent for athletes of all ages, levels, and activities, understanding how athletes can experience flow more often is beneficial for athletes, coaches, researchers, and sport psychology practitioners.

Occurrence of Flow Despite over four decades of research, flow states are still considered to be rare and elusive (e.g., Swann, Piggott, Schweickle, & Vella, 2018). Since the inception of scholarly work on flow in sport in the early 1990s (e.g., Jackson, 1992), researchers have primarily sought to advance understanding of the occurrence of flow through qualitative interviews (e.g., Jackson, 1995). While research has identified a myriad of factors associated with flow (see Swann, Keegan, Piggott, & Crust, 2012 for a review), this does not guarantee that they are involved in the causal mechanisms underpinning flow states, as it is conceivable that flow could be experienced even in the absence of one or more of these factors (Swann, Piggott, Crust, Keegan, & Hemmings, 2015).

Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering 207 Indeed, despite calls to understand the causal mechanisms underlying flow in early work in sport (Kimiecik & Stein, 1992), the majority of research has focused on association, with the absence of an explanatory theory for flow persisting as an issue in the field (Swann et al., 2018). To move towards developing a causal explanation for flow, Swann et al. (2017a) conducted interviews soon after recent performances to explore the contexts and processes underlying the occurrence of flow in sport. Flow was reported in contexts that involved novelty, uncertainty, exploration, and experimentation. During such contexts, flow occurred through a gradual increase in confidence, which was triggered by the occurrence of positive events and provision of positive feedback. This feedback prompted an increase in confidence and encouraged athletes to challenge themselves and set “open” goals (e.g., “see how well I can do”), which facilitated the transition into flow. While this research has advanced understanding of the occurrence of flow and provided new insights into the potential importance of goal types for inducing flow (Swann et al., 2017a), further investigation of the process underlying the occurrence of flow and the effect of open goals on subjective experience in sport is required.

Self-talk and the Flow Experience The sport-specific model of self-talk in sport (Van Raalte et al., 2016), which integrates key elements of dual-process theories (Evans & Stanovich, 2013), proposes that self-talk can be classified into two categories: (i) System 1 selftalk, which is rapid, intuitive, and automatic; and (ii) System 2 self-talk, which requires cognitive effort, is reliant on working memory, and is intentional, slow, and analytical. System 1 self-talk corresponds to spontaneous self-talk, whereas System 2 self-talk refers to goal-directed self-talk (see Chapters 1 and 2). Given that flow is characterised by automatic and spontaneous skill execution, absence of analytical, critical thoughts, and a perceived ability to direct complete attention towards the task more effortlessly compared to normal (e.g., Jackman, Crust, & Swann, 2017; Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999), these signature qualities appear to be in conflict with the deliberate, rational, and cognitively demanding nature of goal-directed self-talk. Indeed, although there is limited empirical evidence concerning the nature of self-talk during flow states in sport, athletes have reported a perceptual “switching off” or silencing of their internal dialogue during flow (Swann et al., 2017a). Therefore, it is possible that strategic, pre-planned self-talk statements could be unhelpful if used unnecessarily or inappropriately during flow.2

Applied Recommendations Due to the limited evidence base that athletes, researchers, coaches, and sport psychology practitioners can draw upon, any applied recommendations regarding the use of self-talk to induce and prolong flow states can only be

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tentatively advanced at this point and require further empirical investigation. Qualitative studies have reported that positive self-talk can facilitate flow (Jackson, 1992), while negative self-talk is considered to be inhibitory (Jackson, 1995). Based on the steps involved in the process of flow occurrence (Swann et al., 2017a), expressing affirmative self-statements after positive events during performances could help to build confidence. In turn, this boost in confidence could encourage athletes to challenge themselves and, combined with the setting of open goals, facilitate the transition into flow. Upon entering flow, athletes have reported the adoption of dissociative psychological skills, such as positive distractions, to manage and prolong flow states (Swann et al., 2015, 2017a). Thus, it appears that focusing attention away from the task could help athletes to sustain flow states and reduce the potential for excessive cognitive processing, over-analysis, and critical thoughts, which are purported to disrupt flow (e.g., Chavez, 2008; Jackson, 1995). Although speculative, employing self-talk that seeks to direct attention away from performance outcomes, and therefore reduces the likelihood of analytical and critical thought, could help athletes to prolong flow states. However, it should be noted that further investigation of self-talk and flow states adopting progressive research methods (cf. Swann et al., 2018), such as event-focused interviews (e.g., Swann et al., 2017a, 2017b; Swann, Jackman, Schweickle, & Vella, 2019), is required to enable the development of more robust, evidencebased recommendations for athletes, coaches, and practitioners.

Mind Wandering and Self-talk: Alexander T. Latinjak Mind wandering is a cognitive process that would include any thought that is unrelated to the ongoing task or activity, thus unrelated to the thought-eliciting situation (Klinger, 2009). With regards to everyday life, mind wandering is considered to occupy between 30% and 50% of waking time (e.g., Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). Examples of mind wandering are as conventional as thinking about the past game while sitting in school, rehearsing one’s argument while driving to work, or thinking about vacations while running in the park. In terms of research, mind wandering is a thriving topic (Szpunar, Moulton, & Schacter, 2013) with 1,116 entries for a search on the topic mind wandering in the Web of Science (date: October 2019), including 875 articles and 72 reviews. Yet, when searching for the topic mind wandering in combination with the topic sport, the results merely display two articles (Latinjak, 2018a, 2018b). Studies in the sport context have, however, considered the wandering mind using different terms, such as dissociative attentional styles (e.g., Hutchinson & Karageorghis, 2013) and irrelevant thoughts (Englert, Bertrams, Furley, & Oudejans, 2015). Additional popular concepts used instead of mind wandering in the general psychology literature are daydreaming (Klinger, 2013) and fantasising (Oettingen, 2014). However, as with mind wandering, neither daydreaming nor fantasising have

Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering 209 been studied in the sport domain (for the sole fantasising-related study see Tay, Valshtein, Krott, & Oettingen, 2019). With regards to mind-wandering experiences, research has shown that mind wandering occurs in competition, primarily before the game, while winning, during breaks when the coach is talking, and when bored. In training, mind wandering happens when the coach is talking, in physically demanding tasks, and with boredom or fatigue (Latinjak, 2018a). In terms of the consequences of mind wandering, there is evidence that control over mind wandering is essential for its effects. The more athletes perceive control over their mind wandering, the more likely it is to function as a helpful distraction, source of creativity, and means of emotion-regulation. On the contrary, if athletes detect problems controlling mind wandering, it is more likely to be a detrimental distraction in sport training and competition. Despite these interesting insights, the aforementioned study (Latinjak, 2018a) ought to be interpreted with caution, since it has not sufficiently taken into consideration that not all mind wandering is created equal (Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015). For example, it should be obvious that casual mind wandering during a team briefing is not the same as conscious attempts to think about a sunny beach to distract from pain. In general psychology, many researchers have identified this difference as crucial (Christoff, 2012; Seli, Carriere et al., 2015; Smallwood, 2013). Accordingly, mind wandering can be intentional, for instance when athletes bid their minds to wander and become distracted from an unpleasant concurrent experience, such as pain or boredom; or unintentional, when athletes find their minds have passively drifted away from the present to a distant place somewhere in the present or future (Seli, Wammes, Risko, & Smilek, 2015). The distinction between intentional and unintentional mind wandering will be equally pertinent to sport as to other life contexts. Whereas unintentional mind wandering might lead to detrimental distraction (Englert et al., 2015), intentional mind wandering could lead to the dissociative attentional style that has proven to be helpful in tasks requiring endurance and pain management (Stanley, Pargman, & Tenenbaum, 2007). Unintentional mind wandering in school settings has shown to be mediated by lower levels of motivation and to negatively impact performance (Hollis & Was, 2016). Likewise, in sports, unintentional mind wandering could be elicited in tasks perceived by athletes to be intrinsically less appealing. In fact, the previously mentioned exploratory study found that mind wandering occurs frequently while the coach talks, during breaks, and while experiencing boredom (Latinjak, 2018a). Yet, it is noteworthy that unintentional mind wandering could also be positively related to creativity. Along these lines, mind wandering and creativity share the use of the default network, a complex of brain regions (Beaty, Benedek, Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015). Unintentional mind wandering might support creativity by facilitating new associations between previously unconnected ideas (Williams et al., 2018). Generally, intentional mind wandering is seen as beneficial for the mind wanderer. Overall, researchers consider that voluntary shifts of attention

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would seem to involve higher orders of control in information processing or be motivationally determined and benign because of their controlled nature (Seli, Risko, Smilek, & Schacter, 2016). Specifically, intentional mind wandering can have immediate positive effects, such as pleasing reverie, insight, or new synthesis of material. In addition, intentional mind wandering can also have delayed benefits that come from reinterpreting past scenarios in light of new information, rehearsing upcoming scenarios or projecting desired performances and outcomes (McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013). Given the growing interest in mind wandering in the psychology research literature, and preliminary findings that point to the important role mind wandering may play in sports, it is timely to promote the study of mind wandering in sport. Along these lines, self-talk, a highly developed research area in sport psychology, could be an interesting lens through which to investigate this concept. Mind wandering can easily be related to inner dialogues, when their content is unrelated to the ongoing task, and, thus, be linked to a significant part of the sport psychology literature.

Mind Wandering and Self-talk As can be inferred from the previous section, there are similarities between the uncontrolled nature of unintentional mind wandering and spontaneous selftalk, and the controlled and effortful nature of intentional mind wandering and goal-directed self-talk. Some forms of spontaneous, stimuli-oriented cognition, including spontaneous self-talk, may be closely related to unintentional mind wandering, as they are relatively free of deliberate or goal-directed constraints (Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016). When looking for unintentional mind wandering in the spontaneous self-talk literature, we quickly encounter the idea of task-irrelevant self-talk. In the self-talk literature, task-irrelevant self-talk has been measured already in questionnaires, such as the Thought Occurrence Questionnaire for Sport (Hatzigeorgiadis & Biddle, 2000) or the Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire for Sport (Zourbanos, Hatzigeorgiadis, Chroni, Theodorakis, & Papaiannou, 2009). Statistically, these scales have consistently contributed to a larger second-order factor called negative self-talk (Latinjak, Viladrich, Alcaraz, & Torregrosa, 2016). Thereupon, task-irrelevant self-talk has often been equalled to other types of spontaneous self-talk, such as performance worries or thoughts of disengagement. The assumption that unintentional mind wandering is similar to other negative types of spontaneous self-talk is, nevertheless, likely to be erroneous on two accounts. First, research has shown that spontaneous thinking and mind wandering have partly different neurological activation patterns (c.f., Christoff, 2012; Raichle et al., 2001). Second, the structure of mind wandering content is different to the content of spontaneous self-talk, even though this difference has not been adequately reflected in self-talk questionnaires. In our study on thought processes in sport (Latinjak, 2018b),

Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering 211 we have captured instances of both spontaneous thought and mind wandering. While spontaneous thoughts were relatively brief and simple constructions (e.g., “This was crap; you’re not good at this game”), extracts of mind wandering were much longer with different intertwined ideas: I’m lucky not to work today. Just imagine being on my feet for 8 hours – Yes, but Sunday I won’t be able to see the other game because I’ll have to work – Well, better Sunday than Saturday, when I play – I hope I’ll play well, because since my injury I haven’t had much luck. Overall, these are solid grounds to believe that undirected self-talk that is unrelated to the task, and hence constitutes some sort of unintentional mind wandering, is qualitatively distinct from spontaneous self-talk that reflects task-related psychological processes (see also, Chapter 2). In future research, it could be interesting to inquire into the neurological processes associated with spontaneous and goal-directed self-talk, to ascertain the degree to which they correspond to the neurological underpinnings of unintentional and intentional mind wandering. Furthermore, considering that spontaneous self-talk reflects task-related psychological processes (e.g., emotions, see Chapter 5), it would be important to explore what psychological processes, if any, unintentional mind wandering reflects. With regards to goal-directed self-talk and intentional mind wandering, the research focus would lie on the self-regulatory potential of both psychological skills. The studies on dissociative attentional style (e.g., Brick, MacIntyre, & Campbell, 2016) hint that intentional mind wandering could be used as a coping strategy. Hence, could goal-directed self-talk serve as a meta-skill for intentional mind wandering? It is plausible that the conscious verbalisation would reinforce the potential of intentional mind wandering for effective self-regulation. Moreover, applied research could explore instances in which athletes use goal-directed self-talk to force the mind to wander, away from current thoughts and contextual stimuli. If this self-regulatory strategy were to be effective in enhancing performance, another relevant question would be whether athletes could be taught to use goal-directed self-talk to start and control mind wandering, and to control, thereby, relevant psychological processes. In this regard, our findings have already hinted that the more athletes are able to control the initiation and content of mind wandering, the better the effects of mind wandering for emotion regulation and facilitative distraction (Latinjak, 2018a). Other intriguing research questions about intentional mind wandering and, thus, task-unrelated goal-directed self-talk, refer to when and why athletes force their minds to abandon their immediate reality to focus on sports. Hence, this set of questions regards sport-related goal-directed self-talk that happens in non-sport environments. For instance, thinking about sport while watching TV, could be beneficial if it leads to motor learning or finding

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innovative solutions in sport. Yet, it might also be detrimental if is a symptom of obsessive passion or excessively strong athletic identity. Altogether, the line of sport self-talk research could stimulate the study of mind wandering in sport, mainly because some task-unrelated spontaneous self-talk and goal-directed self-talk also reflect instances of unintentional and intentional mind wandering, respectively. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that unintentional and intentional mind wandering go beyond the bounds of self-talk, as they include preverbal sorts of thinking linked, for example, to imagery.

Conclusions The aim of this chapter was to adopt a critical perspective towards the role of self-talk in sport psychology by connecting self-talk with three popular phenomena: mindfulness, flow, and mind wandering. The contents in this chapter provide an alternative perspective regarding the degree to which selftalk can be seen as a central concept in sport psychology. For instance, considering the tenets of the mindfulness-acceptance approach, we are reminded that thoughts, together with spontaneous self-talk as a specific form of thought, do not necessarily represent reality. From the perspective of mind wandering, self-talk, as it is conceptualised in sport psychology, is restricted by a task-focus approach. Mind wandering considers thoughts and self-talk that have a far-reaching impact on sport performance, but do not fit within a task-related mindset. Furthermore, flow is an optimal experience in sport that is characterised by effortless attention (Swann et al., 2017a). Thus, it is argued that the intentional nature of goal-directed self-talk could be adversative to the experience of flow and that athletes might not benefit from such effortful self-regulation attempts when trying to prolong flow states. With regards to applied practice, we raised the question as to whether interventions should look beyond self-talk content and focus on conditions in which self-talk is actually helpful. For example, in a mindfulness-acceptance approach, there is no need to alter emotions, thoughts, or spontaneous self-talk. In contrast, self-talk interventions consider the alteration of self-talk crucial for eliciting performance improvements. This is especially true for strategic self-talk interventions, where the repetition of cue words is an ostensible feature. Alternatively, in reflexive self-talk interventions (see, Chapter 7), self-talk use is not compulsory, although it is promoted. Yet, it is also noteworthy that reflexive self-talk interventions share similarities with the mindfulness-acceptance approach, especially with regards to the centrality of awareness. Arguably, goaldirected self-talk is used by athletes to raise awareness and even foster acceptance of psychological challenges. Of course, both awareness and acceptance are central to a mindfulness-acceptance mindset. Thus, goal-directed self-talk could be the means to support mindfulness-acceptance processes, as long as such goal-directed self-talk does not follow the urge to alter current states. In that sense, goal-directed self-talk can be regarded as a specific form of

Mindfulness, Flow, and Mind Wandering 213 consciousness, which is purposefully used to pursue a goal, for example, being in the present moment. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that goal-directed self-talk seems to be in conflict with the characteristics of flow.2 Therefore, in reflexive selftalk interventions, athletes should explore moments in which self-talk could be detrimental to the sustainment of flow states. Similarly, it is important to acknowledge that, from a theoretical point of view, strategic self-talk interventions, as they are described in the literature, could impede flow states. Based on empirical evidence, it is tentatively suggested that using self-talk cues to draw attention away from the task could help to prolong flow states. In light of the potential benefits of unintentional mind wandering, especially when it comes to creativity, there is a need to discuss when goal-directed selftalk should be used to support attention control skills with athletes. In a similar vein, in reflexive self-talk interventions, the procedures should include questions on the conditions in which self-talk could be helpful if it supports intentional mind wandering, both in sport and outside the sport context. Altogether, it is advisable to avoid being misled by a book on self-talk. Such specific books place a sport psychology concept into the spotlight, and could present it as being more crucial than it is in the broader literature. While selftalk is important, it is just another piece in the knowledge map of sport and exercise psychology (Chapter 1). In this chapter we compared self-talk with three somewhat-related states: mindfulness, flow, and mind wandering. We have come to consider this perspective-taking exercise as paradigmatic, insofar as it has led to a deeper understanding of these specialities. By embracing the deep complexity of sport psychology and accepting contradicting points of view as inherent to psychological science, this has allowed us to explore new and exciting ideas regarding self-talk research and practice.

Notes 1 Although generally accepted as the conceptualisation of flow across many domains, some issues have been raised with this conceptualisation of flow in sport (e.g., Jackman, Fitzpatrick, Lane, & Swann, 2019; Swann et al., 2018). 2 Athletes have reported using self-talk to sustain “clutch” states (Jackman, Crust, & Swann, in press; Swann et al., 2017a). Clutch states are considered to underlie clutch performance, which is defined as enhanced performance in pressure situations (Otten, 2009), and includes several characteristics that are distinct from flow, includ­ ing: effortful, complete, and deliberate focus; intense effort; and conscious awareness of the situation (Swann et al., 2017b, 2019).

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Epilogue Some Facts and Personal Reflections on My Self-talk Antonis Hatzigeorgiadis

As a Primary School Kid … … sport was my life; I was trying to mime/copy any sport I could possibly watch on TV. Outdoors, in our small house yard, playing tennis against the wall, long jumping in the small green; or even in my room, high-jumping above a rope attached to the edges of the bed, or basketball throwing with tennis balls into a box at the corner of the room. Mostly, however, I played football, first with the bottle-cups at the school yard, where balls were not allowed, then, with the young lads in the streets, but with a real (we thought) football! I was also running, even though I didn’t consider that as sport. Anywhere I had to go I would run, walking was boring. At the age of 11, without any proper/structured training in any sport, I decided to try running as a sport and my goal was set at running 10 km. The venue was inspiring, one of the side tracks of the, at that time, new Olympic stadium. I went there alone, with my new Casio. It was a present from my uncle from the USA who had visited us that summer. I started running around the track counting laps. After many, many “one more,” “come on,” “you can do it,” I completed my 25th lap after 65 minutes and I was elated. Then a guy approached me and, noticing that I had been running for a while, he asked how many laps I did. I proudly said 25 laps, only for the guy to reply: “come on kid, you lost the count.” How could I possibly lose the count??? I couldn’t understand how he thought this could be possible, as counting had been my only concern! I hadn’t lost count. Counting was what kept me going. At the age of 11, I thought I knew everything about self-talk.

At High School … … and as captain of the high-school football team, I led my team to the semi-finals of the regional school championship. Although not exactly the leadership type, I was the captain as I was the best player and undisputed goal scorer, despite my small size and trailing in strength; I believe I had some sort of football intelligence and power to complement it. Trailing

Epilogue 219 3–2, two minutes before the final whistle, we were awarded a penalty kick. I was the one taking the penalty kicks in the team. I took the ball, placed it on the spot and positioned myself to take it, only for that thought to strike me “I’m gonna lose it.” At that exact moment I knew this would happen, but I suppressed it; I wouldn’t allow someone else to take it. Suddenly the goalkeeper looked big and the post small … I kicked the ball out. At the age of 17 I realised that 11 was too early, and that I had to reach 17 before I truly knew everything about self-talk.

At University … Student … … following my first degree in sport science that had been my choice since I was 15, a master’s thesis, and a PhD. Negative self-talk first attracted the interest of researchers in psychology – as all negative events catch more attention than positive ones in one’s mind – and in the news! I studied cognitive interference in sport. What a surprise! They say people study their own problems; I certainly did!

… and Staff For some weird reason, however, in sport-related research, it was the positive self-talk that made the breakthrough in the literature, and I was lucky to be there when it mattered. It was a quest for performance improvement (I have always been telling my students about the fundamental difference in the principles between psychology and sport psychology: psychology is about getting well, while sport psychology is about getting it right! Or getting it better). I joined the University of Thessaly in 2001, just after the publication of the “motivational versus instructional self-talk” paper by Theodorakis – who was there – the legendary Weinberg, and colleagues. It was a landmark paper introducing the matching hypothesis that gave a great boost to sport self-talk research. It caught my interest of course, and I tried to combine it with my research on cognitive interference. The “self-talk in the swimming pool” paper came out of it, and introduced the idea of self-talk mechanisms, along with Nikos Comoutos (then known as Zourbanos), who following his master’s graduation returned as a member of our team. In the years that followed, self-talk research developed steadily, with an emphasis on strategic self-talk interventions and the first “speaking clearly” paper from James Hardy opening new directions for self-talk research. In 2009 the Automatic Self-talk Questionnaire in Sport, which was followed by research on self-talk antecedents, and in 2011 the two reviews, the “systematic review” and the “meta-analysis,” which climbed the high steps of impact factor, established self-talk among – I feel –the important topics in sport psychology. This was just after I had met Alex! And three years later, the “goal-directed and undirected self-talk perspective” appeared in the literature. At the same time, the potential of self-talk for self-regulation has attracted the fascination of

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researchers in endurance sport, and study of self-talk in these contexts has flourished. The field since has opened-up and several prominent researchers have grown the literature to deserve a sport-specific self-talk model, a second “speaking clearly” paper and, eventually, a … self-talk book!

My Engagement with Sport Psychology Came from the Failed Penalty! At the time, devastated for letting down my team, I was trying to understand how this had happened. Now I realise: the situation, an important kick at a crucial timing (the antecedent – I had taken many penalties, never one that mattered that much), the “I’m gonna lose it” (the self-talk, it was spontaneous and negative), and the lack of concentration and confidence (the mechanism, I felt weak and small and I was thinking “now what” instead of where to shoot the ball), led to the failed penalty (the outcome, which I knew before it happened). But hold on – negative self-talk harms attention, but can have motivational effects. I lost the penalty – I became interested in studying the “I’m gonna lose it”!

My Drive for Self-talk Strategies Was the 10k The personal stake was high (the antecedent, what a challenge to take – what a great achievement this would be), the “one more” and the “come-on” but also the “8,” “9,” … “16,” “17,” … “21,” “22” (the self-talk, goal-directed – motivational), the psych-up and the effort, the pace and the patience (the mechanism), helped me to run the 25 laps (the glorious outcome). I still remember the many “one more”s and “come-on”s, and today I realise that these had probably replaced the “I’m tired” and the “I’m not gonna make it,” which I would have experienced had I left my mind idle. Also, I now realise why I did not lose the count, as the guy thought that I did. It’s the processor! At the age of 11, few things were worrying me and loads of space (free memory) was available in my brain (the processor). So, concentrating on counting laps, an important task for my objective, was not difficult at all. Trying to count laps today, in the swimming pool, is almost impossible. Rarely do I not lose the count after two or three turns. My “processor” is almost full (of worries) and the “memory” worn out.

On the Future of Self-talk Considering the dramatic lifestyle and technological changes we have experienced over the last few decades, it is hard to make long-time predictions. I work in front of my screen and it gets back to me with messages and products about things I have just been self-talking about; not even aloud! I hope this book leads younger researchers to the fresh ideas that we cannot forecast.

Epilogue 221 In the meantime, I would be thrilled to see the new self-talk framework explored in the lab and on the field, in research and practice. Basic research could go deep through multidisciplinary approaches to self-talk, combining psychology with neurological, psychophysiological, biomechanical, and biochemical perspectives to the study of self-talk. Applied research should align more closely with the real applied field. We hope that sport authorities, organisations, and stakeholders will eventually capture the importance of sport psychology, invest resources, and grant sport psychology researchers access and trust to research sport in the field. This would be important for self-talk, as the mindset of the sport context can hardly be “reproduced” out of the field, or with young and novice athletes alone. Research with elite athletes is lacking, and we need that research in self-talk. I also believe firmly that the self-talk field will grow even further and faster once we start exploring it in a health-oriented physical activity frame. The health benefits of exercise for the general, but also for the ill-health, population can help advancing research as self-talk can be a powerful tool for initiating and maintaining exercise. Such developments will benefit both self-talk in the exercise psychology field, but also in sport psychology field, as the evidence will flow and evoke new ideas. I think this will be the next big thing for self-talk in physical activity research.

Back at 48 … Twenty years after my first publication on self-talk, I now admit how little I know and that I keep learning. This book has been a great learning experience, and a great experience overall, and all thanks to my friend Alex, a young bloke I met 10 years ago, whose passion for self-talk cannot be matched. My work with Alex throughout the 10 years has greatly advanced my understanding of self-talk. Alex was always challenging me to go for more and for new, and it was maybe the endless, and still unfinished, discussions that led to his idea about this book. So, thank you Alex … Hope you have all enjoyed the reading, and after reflecting on your own experiences you have now learned a bit more about the weird world of self-talk.

Index

Abbreviation 13–14 Acceptance (self-) 18, 30, 72, 87–88, 104, 110, 117, 203–205, 212 Action tendencies 97 Anger/angry 5, 17, 21, 35–37, 64, 68, 72, 97, 99, 101, 105, 115–117 Anxiety/anxious 2, 5, 8, 17, 19–21, 32, 34, 36–38, 52, 57, 64, 68–70, 78, 79, 82, 86, 87, 93, 97, 99, 100, 110, 112, 115, 117–118, 127, 137, 139, 146, 148, 162, 163, 171–172, 197–198 Appraisal 6, 32, 114, 115, 140, 146 Articulatory suppression 43–44 Attention 1–2, 4, 6, 8, 21, 34, 52–53, 59–60, 66, 69–70, 73, 91, 97, 99–100, 127, 137–144, 146–148, 158, 177–178, 190–193, 201, 204, 207–209, 212–213, 219–220 Attentional: control theory 69, 139; deployment 69–71; focus 56, 59, 69, 123, 141–142, 157, 162 Attribution 4–5, 20, 97, 138 Autonomy (support) 7, 84–85, 87, 130, 165 Awareness (self-) 4–5, 8, 17, 21, 24, 29, 32, 35, 57–59, 71, 88, 92–93, 96, 106, 109, 110, 159, 162, 202–206, 212, 213 Awfulizing (Anti-) 110, 112 Basic psychological needs 84–85 Behaviour 2–3, 11, 23, 31, 37–38, 42, 53, 64, 68, 72, 77, 79, 86, 92, 94, 97–98, 102, 105, 112, 116, 123, 136–137, 149, 179, 181, 192–193, 203, 205–206 Bodily reaction 65–67 Brain activity 40–42, 44

Brain scans 41–42 Burnout 110, 166 Challenge state 71, 146 Clinical 2, 35, 38–39 Coaching 79, 83–87, 97, 158, 167 Coding preferences 80 Cognition 15, 32, 35–38, 51, 53–54, 58–59, 65–66, 79, 84, 109–110, 192, 197, 210 Cognitive: change 69–71; defusion 204; mediation 109–110; restructuring 87–88, 109; strategies 53–56, 58, 69 Cognitive-Behaviour/CBT 2, 7, 18, 23, 71, 92–93, 105, 109–110, 119, 203 Cohesion 2, 4–5, 93, 166–167 Concentration 4, 6, 28, 52–53, 57, 64, 67, 105–106, 128, 141, 148, 182, 191–192, 206, 220 Confidence 6, 8, 21, 34, 39, 52–53, 57, 72, 78, 82, 84–85, 94, 98–100, 106, 111, 127, 140, 144, 146, 148, 155–156, 162–163, 169, 171, 178, 182, 190–191, 194, 196–198, 207–208, 220 Consciousness (self-) 5, 80, 202–206, 213 Consequences 16, 30, 65, 72, 78, 86, 110, 117, 158, 178, 206, 209 Contextual 3–4, 20, 35, 94, 96–98, 113, 136, 138, 168, 192, 211 Coping 4, 35, 38, 58, 70–71, 114–115, 117, 154, 179, 182, 211 Covert 12, 14, 28, 41, 51 Creativity 209, 213 Cricket 117–118 Cue word 8–9, 11–12, 17–19, 21–24, 42, 91, 101, 106, 147, 162, 170, 172, 173, 193–197, 201, 212

Index 223 Cycle of emotions 64–67, 73 Cycling 38, 42, 72, 129, 141, 144–145, 147, 176, 178–181 Daydreaming 208 Default network 209 Demandingness 110, 117–118 Demotivation/demotivated 93, 95 Depreciation 110, 118 Descriptive experience sampling 39 Developmental psychology 2, 12, 53 Dialogic 19, 35 Disputation 109 Dissociative 177–178, 208–209, 211 Distance running 124 Distraction/distracted 6, 69, 70, 143, 148, 154, 208 Double think 113 Dual-process theories 19, 207 Ecological validity 22, 31–32, 112, 140 Effort 3, 5–6, 8, 11, 14, 31, 34, 41, 45, 53, 79, 86, 99, 102, 106, 137, 139, 144–145, 147–149, 156, 162–163, 172, 179, 181, 183, 190–191, 196–197, 202, 205–207, 213, 220 Effortless 5, 20, 52, 58, 138, 147, 202, 207, 212 Ego depletion 81, 141–143 Electroencephalogram (EEG) 41–42 Electromyographic 40–41 Elite athletes 93, 184, 221 Emotion 2–6, 8, 15–16, 21–23, 28–29, 33–39, 53, 64–73, 77, 79, 84, 86–88, 91, 97, 99–100, 106, 109–111, 114–117, 119, 123, 128, 136–137, 139, 140, 145–147, 154, 159–160, 162, 170, 179, 203–205, 209, 211–212 Emotion regulation 67–71, 73, 128, 140, 145–147, 209, 211 Empowering 84–87 Endurance 30, 42, 51–52, 56, 59, 106, 126, 129, 144–145, 156, 172–173, 176–185, 190–191, 194, 209, 220 Environmental factor 3–5, 7, 83, 94, 96–98, 190 Epictetus 109 Evaluation 56, 59–60, 114, 154, 162, 167 Executive function 56, 141 Experience sampling method 39 Expertise 3, 55, 57, 101, 127

Fatigue 34, 78, 81, 96, 141–143, 172–173, 177, 179, 209 Fantasising 208–209 Feedback 4, 7, 84, 93, 128, 148, 162, 178, 194–195, 206–207 Feeling 5, 20, 32, 35, 39, 51, 53–54, 64–67, 94–95, 97, 102, 113–114, 136, 158, 160, 197–198, 202, 205–206 Flow states 57–58, 128–129, 206–208, 212–213 Frustration (in)tolerance 110, 117 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 41 GABCDE framework 109–110 Global 79, 98, 169, 203 Goal orientation 20, 79, 86–87, 138 Goal-performance discrepancies 17, 82–83, 87 Golf 17, 22, 42, 51, 54, 71, 112, 141–142, 154, 156–158, 161 Grammar/grammatical 13, 22, 111, 129 Group dynamics 166, 168 Growth (personal/psychological) 7, 106 High road 65–66 Idiosyncratic 14, 113 Implantable brain-machine interface systems 42 Informant reports 41 Information processing 66, 114, 137, 140, 210 Inner: dialogue 1, 12–13, 19, 23, 51, 201, 203, 205, 210; seeing 13, 35, 202; speech 2, 12, 15, 18–19, 28–29, 32, 36–41, 77, 147, 202, 205 Internal and external awareness 203 Internal focus/foci of attention 201 Internal interlocutors 13, 26 Internalisation process 2 Interoceptive observational skills 203–204 Interpersonal factors 165 Ironic (effects/processes) 23, 70, 72, 155 Irrational (beliefs) 20, 71, 110–115 Irrelevant thoughts 33–34, 208 Knowledge map of sport and exercise psychology 1, 3, 6–7, 9, 213

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Index

Language 2, 11–12, 72, 114, 117, 176, 184 Lazarus 70, 114–115 Leadership 4, 6, 85, 169–171, 218 Learning 4, 7–8, 21, 28–29, 55, 58, 69, 88, 125–127, 131, 142, 168, 170, 177–178, 182, 185, 188–194, 196–198, 201, 211, 239 Left inferior frontal gyrus 41 Life skills 189, 192–193 Low road 65 Manipulation check 131–132, 141 Marathons 176, 184 Mass-participation events 184–185 Match circumstances 81–82 Matching Hypothesis 126, 156, 190–191, 219 Meditation 203 Memory 15, 38, 53, 66, 72, 91, 170, 202, 207, 220 Mental toughness 8 Metacognition/metacognitive 8–9, 17, 19, 22, 24, 51–59, 92–93, 98–99, 105, 109, 204–205 Mind wandering 2, 19–20, 201–202, 208–212 Mindfulness 7, 18, 87, 201–205, 212–213 Monologic 12, 19 Motivation 2, 4–5, 8, 15–16, 22, 28–32, 79–80, 85, 91, 98, 102, 110, 113–114, 145, 156–157, 160–163, 170, 181, 184, 189, 191–192, 194, 206, 209 Motivational climate 4–5, 79, 84–87, 97, 189–190 Objective Observer 159 Observer reports 40 Online sessions/delivery 92, 58, 93, 184 Perceived exertion 72, 145, 172–173 Perception 15–16, 31, 85–86, 112, 140–141, 145, 163, 171, 179, 181, 189–190, 206 Performance 1, 3, 5–6, 12, 14, 17–18, 20–21, 24, 28–30, 32–33, 36–38, 40, 42–43, 45, 51, 53, 55–60, 65–67, 69–73, 78–79, 82–83, 87, 91, 93–94, 97–98, 102, 104, 111–114, 116–118, 123–130, 136–149, 154, 156–159,

161–163, 165–173, 177–181, 183–185, 188–198, 201, 206–213 Personal factors 79–81, 86, 165, 190 Personality 4–5, 29, 41, 97–98, 102, 104 Physical education 2, 11, 22, 127–128, 188 Positron emission tomography (PET) scans 41 Present-moment awareness 204–205 Pressure 55, 66, 93, 98, 103, 110, 114, 117–118, 161, 168–169, 171–172, 213 Prevention 87 Private speech 12, 28–29, 36–38, 40–41, 43, 205 Problem-solving 29, 40, 93, 193 Process model of emotion regulation 68–69, 71, 73 Psyching teams 184 Psychobiological model 129, 145, 172, 181 Psychological: challenge 4, 6–8, 20–21, 24, 88, 92–106, 112; experience 2, 3, 9, 99; intervention 3, 4, 7, 17–18; process 3–9, 12, 15, 20, 24, 33, 52, 66, 68, 73, 80–81, 91, 93–94, 96–100, 102–106, 171, 211 Psychological/mental skill(s) 3–9, 12–13, 15–18, 20–21, 24, 33, 52, 57–58, 66, 68–70, 73, 78, 80–88, 91–106, 109–110, 115, 119, 131, 145, 158, 161–162, 166–167, 171, 178–179, 181, 184, 188, 202–206, 208, 211–213 Psychometric properties 30–31, 43 Psychotherapy 55, 109 Qualitative 37, 39, 82–83, 86, 137, 157, 161, 206, 208 Questionnaire 31, 33–36, 45–47, 57, 59, 83, 86, 161–162, 210, 219 Ratings of perceived exertion/RPE 143, 145, 172–173 Rational (beliefs) 1–2, 19–20, 23, 72, 91–92, 109–119, 123, 128, 131, 137–138, 207 Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy/ REBT 2, 7, 23, 71, 92, 109–119, 123 Rational resilience credo 111, 117 Reinvestment theory 168, 172 Relaxation 5, 7–8, 52, 81–82, 87, 100 Reliability 30–31, 39, 44

Index 225 Response modulation 69, 71–72 Response sets 31 Retrospective measures 37, 43 Rowing 82, 176 Scientific language 11 Self-concept 79, 136, 206 Self-cueing 18 Self-determination theory 80, 84, 113, 165–166 Self-efficacy 6, 137, 144, 148, 157, 179–181, 191 Self-instruction 23, 77, 88, 105, 124, 136, 179, 196 Self-leadership 170–171 Self-regulation 1, 4, 8–9, 17, 19, 21, 24, 29, 43, 52–53, 58–59, 79–80, 85, 87, 91, 93, 95, 106, 136, 138, 170, 188–189, 192, 197, 211–212, 219 Self-reports 31, 40, 43–44, 148 Self-representative effects 3 Self-talk: Antecedents 16, 30, 77–79, 81, 83, 85–88, 177, 189, 190, 219; Automatic 23, 28, 34, 36, 66, 68, 77, 83, 105, 123, 147, 160, 162, 202, 207, 210, 219; Brief interventions 184; Coding 36–23, 80; Content 2, 5, 14, 18–19, 21–23, 32, 37, 41–43, 45, 55, 77–78, 80, 92, 109, 125, 138, 177, 179, 191, 196–198, 201, 203, 210–212; Deficits 29; Functions 14, 20, 29, 33, 35, 68, 73, 78–79, 81–82, 142–143, 147, 162, 197; Goaldirected 1, 4, 6–9, 13, 16–17, 19–24, 43, 51–58, 60, 66–73, 78–88, 91–95, 100–103, 105–106, 111, 131, 138–140, 146–147, 155, 158, 166, 170–171, 176, 179, 202, 204–205, 207, 210–213, 219–220; Instructional 22, 30, 36, 53, 80, 82, 91, 123, 125–128, 130, 136, 140, 142–144, 146–148, 156–160, 168–170, 172, 177–178, 180, 182, 184–185, 189–196, 201, 219; Interviews 38–39, 206–208; Mechanisms 79, 129, 136–140, 144–145, 147–149, 156, 177; Motivational 22, 30, 33, 36, 56, 81, 91, 125–128, 130, 140–141, 143–146, 148, 156–160, 168–169, 171–173, 177–178, 180–183, 184–185, 190–191, 193–194, 196–197, 219–220; Negative 5, 34, 67–68, 77–78, 81, 85, 87–88, 111,

139, 155, 157–162, 165, 171, 189–190, 193, 208, 210, 219–220; Organic 7, 12, 16–24, 28, 42, 66, 77–88, 109, 123, 131, 137–139, 154, 159, 162, 165, 177, 179, 184, 203–206; Overt 14, 41, 114; Positive 20, 68, 77–82, 88, 111, 138–139, 156–157, 159, 162–163, 170–171, 178, 189–190, 193, 208, 219; Spiritual 13; Spontaneous 4–8, 17, 19–21, 24, 37, 52, 58, 68, 71, 73, 78–88, 138–139, 158–159, 189–190, 207, 210–212; Task-irrelevant 210; Training 125, 130–132; Type 126–128, 131, 143 Self-talk intervention: Reflexive 96, 98–100, 105–106, 116, 124, 158, 162, 170, 179, 212, 213; Strategic 1, 8, 17–19, 22–24, 30, 52, 58, 71, 91–92, 101, 106, 123–124, 128, 130–131, 133, 137, 144, 155–156, 158, 168, 171, 179, 183, 188–190, 192–194, 201, 212–213, 219 Shared mental models 169–170 Single-subject experiment 168 Situational 3–4, 94–99, 156, 165, 202, 205 Skill acquisition 58, 82, 201 Smarter thinking 111, 118 Social factors 165 Social support 84, 105 Social-environmental 83–87 Socially desirable responding 31 Socio-cultural 12 Socratic Questioning 93 Speed skating 176 Stimulus-independent 52, 204 Stoicism 109 Stress 169–172 Targeted interventions 7–8 Taskwork 166, 168, 170 Team effectiveness 166, 170 Team orientation 169 Teamwork 166–170 Tennis 11, 17, 22, 37, 40, 51, 65, 70, 72, 81, 84, 87–88, 116, 123–124, 131, 139, 142, 144, 146, 154–155, 156–159, 161, 163, 171, 218 Theoretical framework 11, 53, 114 Therapeutic framework 7, 23 Think aloud technique 37 Third-wave 119, 203–204

226

Index

Thought listing technique 32, 36, 38 Thought sampling 36, 45 Thought(s)/think(ing) 1–3, 8–9, 11–16, 20, 22–23, 29, 31–39, 44–45, 51–59, 70, 77, 88, 91–94, 96–99, 101, 104–106, 109, 111, 113, 116–118, 136–137, 143, 154–155, 158–159, 162, 170–172, 177–179, 181, 192–193, 197–198, 201–203, 205, 207–212, 218–221 Threat state 70–71, 146 Time perspective 20, 138, 202 Trait 4, 41, 79, 87, 96 Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) 41

Triathlon 57, 176, 178 Trigger 11, 65, 69, 98, 129, 147, 159, 172 Unconditional acceptance 110 Unsymbolised thinking 13, 35, 39, 202–203 Valence 20, 68, 111, 138, 204 Validity 32, 45, 112, 132, 140, 204 Videotape reconstruction method 38 Well-being 3, 7, 87, 114, 206