Security sector reform in transforming societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro 9781526130891

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Security sector reform in transforming societies

Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro

Timothy Edmunds

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Security sector reform in transforming societies

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Security sector reform in transforming societies Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro Timothy Edmunds

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York

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Copyright © Timothy Edmunds 2007 The right of Timothy Edmunds to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA, UK

www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

ISBN 978 0 7190 6888 1 hardback First published 2007 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Typeset in 10.5 on 12.5 pt Sabon by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong

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Contents

Acknowledgements

ix

List of abbreviations

xi

1

Introduction: security sector reform in transforming societies Approach Conceptualising change The organisation of this book

1 2 8 10

Part I Security sector reform 2

Security sector reform: a framework for analysis The origins of security sector reform Defi ning security sector reform A framework for analysis Conclusion

15 16 22 27 44

Part II The political level 3

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Security sector reform at the political level: Croatia The legacy of the 1990s First generation security sector reform Second generation security sector reform Conclusion

53 53 58 67 75

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vi

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4

Security sector reform at the political level: Serbia and Montenegro The legacy of the 1990s First generation security sector reform Second generation security sector reform Conclusion

83 84 89 101 110

Part III The organisational level 5

6

Security sector reform at the organisational level: Croatia The legacy of the 1990s Role Expertise Responsibility Conclusion

121 121 127 137 141 144

Security sector reform at the organisational level: Serbia and Montenegro The legacy of the 1990s Role Expertise Responsibility Conclusion

152 152 159 172 176 180

Part IV The international level 7

8

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Contents

Security sector reform at the international level: Croatia Security assistance Pre-conditionality Direct conditionality Conclusion

191 191 198 202 207

Security sector reform at the international level: Serbia and Montenegro Security assistance Pre-conditionality Direct conditionality Conclusion

213 213 221 226 230

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Contents

vii

Part V Conclusion

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Conclusion: security sector reform in comparative context The specificities of reform The political level The organisational level The international level Conclusion

Index

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237 238 242 247 251 256

259

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Acknowledgements

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This book would not have been possible without the support and assistance of many different people and organisations. The early stages of the project took place under the auspices of an Associate Research Fellowship with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the fi nancial support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. Subsequent research fieldwork was made possible through a British Academy Small Research Grant, while the manuscript was completed with the help of a University of Bristol Research Fellowship. Miroslav Hadžic´ and the Centre Civil-Military Relations in Belgrade lent me valuable assistance during successive rounds of fieldwork Serbia, while Ozren Žunec from the University of Zagreb did likewise in Croatia. Many of the concepts and ideas which underpin the approach taken in this book were developed during my previous work with Andrew Cottey at University College Cork and Anthony Forster at the University of Bristol, and to them I owe a debt of gratitude. I am also grateful to all the people who took time to read and comment on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Particular thanks must go to Alex Bellamy, Miroslav Hadžic´, Witek Nowosielski and an anonymous reviewer from Manchester University Press, all of whom read and commented on the draft manuscript in its entirety. Thanks also to Malcolm Chalmers, Anthony Forster, Alice Hills and Elke Krahmann who commented on Chapter 2; to Amadeo Watkins and Ozren Žunec who commented on Chapters 3, 5 and 7; and to Terrell Carver for his thoughts on titles. All provided critical and insightful comments that were invaluable to the development of the manuscript as a whole. Finally, many thanks to my parents Peter and Anne for their support over the years, and especially to my wife Kathryn for all her encouragement, enthusiasm and patience. Thanks also to my son Harry for always making me smile. It is to him this book is dedicated.

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List of abbreviations

BIA BiH CARDS CCMR CEFTA DB DCAF DFID DOS DPS DS DSS FMF FRJ HDZ HIS HRM HRZ HV HVIDRA ICC ICJ ICTY IMET IMF ISAF JETC

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Security Information Agency (formerly the RDB) Bosnia and Herzegovina Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation programme (EU) Centre for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade Central European Free Trade Association State Security Service (Montenegro) The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Department for International Development (UK) Democratic Opposition of Serbia Democratic Party of Socialists (Montenegro) Democratic Party (Serbia) Democratic Party of Serbia Foreign Military Finance (US) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Croatian Democratic Union Croatian Intelligence Service Croatian Navy Croatian Air Force Croatian Army Association of Invalids of the Patriotic War International Criminal Court International Court of Justice International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia International Military Education and Training programme (US) International Monetary Fund International Security Assistance Force (NATO) Joint Education and Training Command (Croatia)

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xii

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JNA JSO KOS

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MAP MPRI NATO NGO OA OAS ObU OSCE OSRH PARP PfP PJP POA PRISMA RDB SAA SAJ SAP SDG SCP SDR SEEI SFRJ SIS SNP SOA SONS SP SPS SRS SZUP TO UÇK UN UNDP

List of abbreviations Yugoslav People’s Army Special Operations Unit (Serbia) Popular name for the JNA/VJ Department of Security (became the VBA in 2003) Membership Action Plan (NATO) Military Professional Resources Incorporated North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Organisation Intelligence Agency (formerly HIS) (Croatia) Organisation of American States Directorate of Intelligence Affairs of the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia Planning and Review Process (NATO) Partnership for Peace (NATO) Special Police Unit (Serbia) Counter Intelligence Agency (formerly SZUP) (Croatia) Programme for Resettlement of Redundant Personnel Department of State Security (became the BIA in 2002) (Serbia) Stabilisation and Association Agreement (EU) Special Anti-terrorist Unit (Serbia) Stabilisation and Association Process for South Eastern Europe (NATO) Serbian Volunteer Guard Serbian Chetnik Movement Strategic Defence Review South East European Initiative (NATO) Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Security Information Service (Croatia) Socialist People’s Party (Montenegro) Securing and Intelligence Agency Joint National Security Committee Special Police (Croatia, Serbia) Socialist Party of Serbia Serbian Radical Party Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order Territorial Defence Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) United Nations United Nations Development Programme

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List of abbreviations UNS UPNS USAID VBA

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VJ VNSS VONS VRS VSA VSCG VSO WTO ZNG

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National Security Office Committee for Domestic Policy and National Security (Croatia) US Agency for International Development Military Security Agency (formerly KOS) (Serbia-Montenegro) Yugoslav Army Council for the Supervision of the Security Services (Croatia) Defence and National Security Committee (Croatia) Army of the Serbian Republic Military Security Agency (former SIS) (Croatia) Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro (Serbia-Montenegro) Supreme Defence Council (Serbia-Montenegro) World Trade Organisation National Guard Corps (Croatia)

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1

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Introduction: security sector reform in transforming societies

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This book is about the relationship between societies and their instruments of coercion at times of great political and societal change. Specifically, it uses the experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro1 to examine the control, management and reform of armed forces, police and intelligence agencies in the aftermath of conflict and authoritarianism. Referred to in this book as the ‘security sector’, these organisations can play a particularly significant role during any process of transformation. Between them they retain a monopoly or near monopoly on the use of coercive force. This unique capacity gives them the potential to assert their will in the political process in a manner that is not shared by other institutions in society. This is especially so during periods of social and political transformation when old norms, interests and relationships will be challenged by emergent new patterns of governance. But this book is about more than just the security sector’s relationships in the political sphere, important though they may be. It is also about its reform; about the subsequent governance and organisational evolution of the military, police and intelligence agencies in accordance with the requirements of transforming societies themselves, but also as a feature of normative international policy. Societies that are emerging from confl ict will face a particular set of challenges in this area. Most security sector actors will have been deeply affected by the experience of confl ict, in terms of their force structure, organisational culture and position in society. Domestically, security sector reform of some sort will be necessary to adapt to changing security circumstances as well as changing political and economic priorities. Internationally, post-conflict security sector reform may be promoted as a conflict prevention and/or peacebuilding strategy by external donors. Security sector reform will also be an important consideration in any process of post-authoritarian political change. In addition to the basic question of how to establish civilian control over the security sector, the manner in which a political community manages

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and deploys its means of coercion is closely linked to its wider system of governance. Therefore political change, and particularly democratisation, will generally entail inevitable changes (or ‘reform’) in the nature of security sector governance as well. Because of this inter-relationship, security sector reform is often an important component of international democracy promotion activities. In this context, the book assesses the theory and practice of security sector reform programmes in the context of Europe and the Western Balkans, the relationship between security sector reform and normative international policy more generally, and the broader dynamics of postauthoritarian and post-conflict transformation. In so doing it addresses two underlying and inter-related questions. First, how and in what ways does reform in the security sector inter-relate with wider processes of political and societal transformation, particularly democratisation efforts. Second, how and in what ways do these processes relate and respond to internationally driven efforts to promote a particular type of security sector reform as part of their wider peacebuilding and democratisation strategies.

Approach As Chapter 2 discusses in greater depth, the security sector reform agenda builds on existing literatures and debates in a number of different fields, including civil-military relations, police studies, security studies and development studies. Even so, the concept of security sector reform itself remains comparatively new, and there is relatively little in the way of detailed empirical analysis to either support or refute many of its underlying claims and assumptions. Studies have tended to focus either on the discrete elements of the security sector – such as defence or police reform for example – either in comparative context, or on the basis of individual country case studies. The former are often useful on their own terms, but generally say less about the security sector reform agenda more widely defi ned. 2 Similarly, specific country cases studies have produced some rich empirical data on individual reform experiences. However, they have struggled to come to generalisable conclusions about the concept and policy security sector reform because of the cultural or historical specificity of their analysis. In addition, there have been relatively few studies of security sector reform as a unified policy at all, whether comparative or particularistic in nature. 3 In order to address these gaps, this book takes a comparative approach to the concept and policy of security sector reform in transforming

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societies. Specifically, it examines the security sector reform experiences of two paired case studies – Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro – through a systematic analytical framework, developed in Chapter 2. The paired case study approach is important because it allows for an appropriate balance between detail and generalisability. By limiting the number of case studies countries to two, the book is able to explore their security sector reform experiences in sufficient empirical depth. However, the comparative nature of the analysis also allows for more generic conclusions to be drawn. The two cases studies have been chosen on the basis that they are roughly matched in a number of key areas related to security sector reform, discussed below.4 These similarities mean that each state has faced a broadly similar set of security sector reform challenges. However, they have done so in the context of their own specific national and historical circumstances. This paired comparison enables the analysis to move beyond the unique particularisms of each individual country, and draw conclusions that are generalisable across the two case studies themselves. In addition, the two case study countries themselves have been explicitly chosen because they are especially representative of the underlying preoccupations of the security sector reform agenda as a whole, at least in the European context. As such their experiences also have a wider generic relevance above and beyond the paired comparison itself. Indeed, the Western Balkan region as a whole offers an important set of case studies of security sector reform in action. This is both because of the particular recent history of the region – characterised by common experiences of war and authoritarianism – and because of the extent of international interest and engagement in subsequent processes of societal transformation.

Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro in comparative context The 1990s were a period of trauma for almost all the societies of the Western Balkans. Economic decline and the rise of secessionist and nationalist politics combined to destroy the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) in the bloodiest confl ict on European territory since the end of the Second World War. The dissolution of the SFRJ incorporated a number of separated, though closely interlinked conflicts – the ‘ten-day war’ in Slovenia in 1991; the war of Croatian independence between 1991–5; the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 1992–5; the Kosovo confl ict of 1999; as well as widespread violence in Macedonia in 2001, and in South Serbia between 1991–2001. These conflicts led to the fragmentation of the old Yugoslav state into a number of new, sometimes contested entities. Croatia,

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Slovenia and Macedonia emerged as independent states. The Dayton peace agreement of 1995 ended the war in BiH, but left a divided parastate under partial international administration in its wake. Between 1993–2003, the two former SFRJ republics of Serbia and Montenegro formed a reconstituted federation in the form of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ). Kosovo, itself an autonomous province within the Serbian republic, was placed under United Nations (UN) administration and removed from Belgrade’s de facto control in 1999. The FRJ itself was dissolved in 2003, to be replaced by a new, looser constitutional arrangement between its two constituent republics, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG). SCG itself was dealt a fatal blow in May 2006 when the citizens of Montenegro voted for full independence in a referendum on the future of the Union. 5 The dissolution of the old Yugoslavia left a number of negative political, social and economic legacies for the states and societies concerned. Of all the post-Yugoslav states, only Slovenia’s transformation was relatively trouble free. Slovenia democratised swiftly and joined both North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in 2004. In BiH and Kosovo, peace settlements were imposed from outside and both of these new (para-)state entities were only sustained under international auspices. Macedonia struggled with continued political instability and ethnic violence. Croatian independence was consolidated through the nationalist authoritarianism of President Franjo Tu
man. In FRJ, Slobodan Miloševic´’s authoritarian regime – and the Serbian nationalism it exploited – remained the dominant political force throughout the 1990s and beyond. Hence, all states in the region – with the partial exception of Slovenia – experienced confl ict and authoritarian governance in one form or another, and all later embarked on processes of post-confl ict and post-authoritarian transformation. These experiences had a transformative impact on security sector organisations in the region. The armed forces, police and intelligence agencies of the SFRJ were broken up or reshaped in line with the new geopolitical circumstances. Secessionist republics and sub-state political communities – such as the Kraijina Serbs in Croatia or the Bosnian Croats in BiH – established their own security formations, and everywhere militias, paramilitary groups and special units proliferated. In all cases, security sector actors were co-opted into the political and nationalist projects of their respective civilian regimes, and often deeply politicised. Many were implicated in war crimes while others became corrupt and criminalised. As a consequence, the role of the security sector – and the question of security sector reform – loomed large in all ensuing attempts at peacebuilding and democratisation. States in the

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region were faced with incorporating powerful, sometimes predatory or dysfunctional, and occasionally actively obstructionist security sector actors, into wider processes of political, economic and social change. These efforts have been the subject of unprecedented international attention. The region’s position on the borders of the EU and NATO gave European countries a particularly keen interest in the promotion of peace and stability there. This was evidenced in part by the extensive involvement of western forces in the Yugoslav confl icts themselves – in both peacekeeping and war-fighting capacities – but also by their subsequent enthusiasm for democracy promotion and economic development programmes. From the late 1990s, these increasingly took place in the context of the EU and NATO enlargement processes, and the ongoing work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague. Many of these initiatives addressed issues of security sector reform, including particularly the question of democratic and civilian control over the security sector, organisational reform in line with evolving EU and NATO norms and priorities, and the legacy of war crimes in the security sector itself. Against this background, this book concentrates specifically on the security sector reform experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. These cases are useful exemplars for a number of reasons. As the largest and most influential of the Yugoslav successor states, the question of how they manage their processes of post-confl ict and post-authoritarian transformation has relevance throughout the Western Balkans and beyond. Indeed, the experience of the 1990s – when nationalist regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb intervened calamitously in the affairs of their neighbours – demonstrates the importance of stability in these two countries for the wider stability of the region as a whole. Security sector reform is a particularly important feature of this process given the prominent – indeed sometimes instigatory – role that security sector actors played in conflicts of the previous decade. Both states also have some important advantages over their formerYugoslav counterparts as objects of comparative study. In contrast to BiH or Kosovo which remain under at least partial external control, Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro are functionally sovereign6 political communities, and so to a large degree in control of their own domestic reform circumstances. This allows security sector reform in these countries to be analysed in its proper domestic context, without the intervening variable of direct international administration. Moreover, while they share some important similarities of experience with the wider region, neither Macedonia nor Slovenia are such useful case studies, both because of their relatively small size7 and because neither society

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was quite so defi nitively shaped by war and nationalism as its neighbours. The security sector reform experiences of Croatia and SerbiaMontenegro are starker and less diluted in nature. They have both taken place in the context of a largely domestically-driven process of transformation – albeit with an important international dimension – and they have both had to address the unambiguous legacies of conflict and authoritarianism in their security sectors. As a consequence, they throw into sharp relief many of the core concerns and dilemmas of the security sector reform concept identified above and in Chapter 2. Security sector reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro has also taken place over roughly the same timescale – from 2000 onwards – and in the context of a broadly similar set of reform challenges. Though the war in Croatia ended in 1995, the political stagnation of the Tu
man regime meant that little was accomplished in terms of reform during the latter half of the decade.8 In FRJ the situation was even worse. Here the period between 1995–9 saw the further authoritarian consolidation of the Miloševic´ regime, and culminated in the disastrous Kosovo conflict of 1999. In both countries it was only in 2000 that the winds of political change began to blow in earnest. In Croatia, December 1999 saw the death of president Tu
man. Shortly afterwards, in January and February 2000, his nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party was defeated in parliamentary and presidential elections by a six-party reformist coalition. In October 2000 in FRJ, president Miloševic´ too was ousted from power by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition. These events removed the political forces and personalities that had dominated the domestic and regional scene for the best part of a decade. In so doing they created the political space for both societies to come to terms with the legacies of the past and build new futures. New personalities and politics offered the prospect of a move away from the ethnic nationalism and international isolation of the past towards democratisation and reintegration into the European mainstream. These political changes had important implications for security sector reform in the two countries. The security sectors of both Croatia and FRJ had been deeply embroiled in the confl icts of the 1990s. They were also extremely politicised and functioned as partisan instruments to promote and protect the interests of the Tu
man and Miloševic´ regimes. These experiences had a profound impact on the character and structure of the security sector in each state and left a common set of problems and opportunities in relation to security sector reform. Initially, the main challenges faced by Croatia and FRJ in this area were primarily political and fairly immediate in nature. The new gov-

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ernments in Belgrade and Zagreb had to ensure that security sector actors did not intervene to prevent or frustrate the process of political change. This early challenge was not straightforward. The military, police and intelligence agencies of both states had been closely tied to the old regimes and elements of them were deeply threatened by the prospect of security sector reform. Moreover, their position as powerful interest groups within the political system as a whole gave them the means to try and shape or constrain the reform process according to their own interests if they chose to do so. Even once the basic principle of non-intervention in the political process was established, both states then faced a further series of further political level reform challenges. These included the need to consolidate existing (and often rather precarious) mechanisms for civilian control and then to further democratise the nature and practice of security sector governance. In SerbiaMontenegro, this process was also linked to the need to fi nalise the constitutional shape of the federation/union itself. As well as these pressing political level reforms, Croatia and FRJ faced serious security sector reform challenges at the organisational level. The experience of war and authoritarianism left a series of difficult organisational legacies in both countries. The Croatian and FRJ armed forces were oversized and outdated and faced severe problems in adapting to the new demands of their radically changed security circumstances. The police were oversized and militarised, and to varying degrees policing in both countries was characterised by authoritarian methods and practices. The cessation of conflict and the political changes of 2000 necessitated a change in the role, structure and operational practices of the police and intelligence agencies in ways more suited to democratic governance. The experience of confl ict also left more insidious and deeply rooted scars on the security sectors of both countries, the most significant of which was their association with and responsibility for war crimes. Coming to terms with this legacy was one of the most serious organisational level security sector reform challenges faced by either country in 2000. All of these organisational level security sector reforms had to take place in the context of extreme budgetary constraint, as the new governments of both states slashed the previously swollen defence and security budgets of their predecessors. Finally, from 2000, security sector reform in Croatia and SerbiaMontenegro had an important international dimension. Domestically, both states identified closer integration into European political, economic and security structures as early foreign policy priorities. While the intensity and ambition of this agenda differed in each case, both made efforts

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to join or associate themselves with the major European and Euroatlantic institutions, up to and including the EU itself. Externally, a number of international actors identified security sector reform in the two countries as a component of regional stabilisation in the Western Balkans more widely, and embarked on a range of proactive initiatives and policies designed to encourage the process from outside. These twin dynamics exposed Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro to a range of externally-derived assistance programmes, conditionality criteria and common standards in their security sector reforms. The extent and depth of these interactions has been such that they lay bare the role and limitations of externally driven attempts to promote and shape domestic processes of security sector reform in transforming societies.

Conceptualising change Security sector reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro has taken place in the context of a wider twofold process of political and societal change. These processes have commonly been conceptualised in terms of a double ‘transition’. First a transition from the socialist and later nationalist authoritarianisms of the SFRJ and its subsequent successor states to democratic politics. Second a transition from a milieu of violent conflict to one of peace. The transition concept is rooted in scholarly and practitioner understandings of democratisation. It origins lie in the apparently global trend of political liberalisation that Samuel Huntington famously called the ‘third wave’ of democratisation.9 This began with the collapse of right-wing dictatorships in Southern Europe in the 1970s and continued in various ways in Latin America, east and southeast Asia, Africa and central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union through the 1980s and 1990s. Against this background, the concept of transition emerged as the dominant analytical model for conceptualising democratisation. This considered that countries moving away from authoritarianism were moving towards liberal democracy, albeit over the course of a sometimes flawed and often long term process. It also saw democratisation as an essentially sequential process: begining with an opening, when the old regime weakens or begins to crumble; continuing with a breakthrough when a new reformist government comes to power, introduces elections and establishes a new institutional structure; and culminating in consolidation, a long term process through which liberal democratic norms become embedded in the state and society.10 The idea of transition is also prominent in the literature on peacebuilding. Specifically, conflict – and particularly civil conflict – is viewed

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as a process of social breakdown. ‘Normal’, generally state-based, patterns of political and economic activity disintegrate to be replaced by criminality, violence and disorder.11 In this context, post-confl ict transition (or post-confl ict reconstruction) is about a return to normality after the chaos and anarchy of war. It thus shares many of the assumptions of democratic transition. It concerns an essentially linear move from wartime to peacetime (often liberal democratic) norms, incorporating a sequential process of normalisation in the state, society and economy. These views of transition have dominated the discourse of change at a domestic level in both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro since 2000. They have provided the underlying rationale for political reform and a self-conscious roadmap of sorts for the reformers themselves. They have also dominated at the level of international level international policy. Indeed, many international actors have justified their democracy promotion and peacebuilding activities in the two states – of which security sector reform is an important part – explicitly in terms of these transitional terms.12 The transition concept thus has a very real expression at the level of both practical policy and the rhetoric of reform. Even so, conceptualising post-authoritarian and post-conflict change in transitional terms can be problematic. In particular, both the outcome and process of change can be more complex and ambiguous than is sometimes suggested. Democratisation does not always follow the sequential path the transition concept identifies, particularly in environments where the state itself remains weak or unconsolidated. Political change is not simply a neutral, technical process, but is likely to be influenced by what Thomas Carothers calls the ‘underlying conditions’ for reform, including issues such as economic development, political history and institutional legacies.13 Indeed, post-authoritarian political change – or even a self-conscious process of democratisation – does not always result in consolidated liberal democracy. Often it leads to another form of non- or semi- democratic politics instead.14 Similarly, the political, societal and economic consequences (and often causes) of violent conflict do not simply disappear once the fighting stops, and their legacies run deeply in the societies affected by them. Mark Duffield and other scholars have argued that the experience of conflict is less about social breakdown and more about the emergence of alternative – generally non-state based – patterns of political and economic governance.15 In this context, the binary division between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ that the transition concept implies can be misleading. There may be as many commonalities as there are differences between conflict and post-conflict environments, particularly in relation to for

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example, patterns of economic relations or the underlying power structures in society. As a consequence, post-confl ict change is often less a question of simple re-construction than a long term process through which the existing political and economic order adapts to the new circumstances of peacetime. This is a particularly significant caveat given the importance of the ‘underlying conditions’ discussed above in any concurrent process of democratisation. For these reasons, this book rejects linear, sequential notion of transition as a way to conceptualise post-authoritarian post-confl ict change. It argues instead that change under these circumstances is best understood as part of a wider process of social transformation. This is an important distinction. Transformation does not exclude the prospect of democratic consolidation or liberal peacebuilding. However, neither does it assume that these are the obligatory outcomes of postauthoritarianism or post-conflict ‘reconstruction’. Instead it acknowledges that any process of reform must take place within – and interact with – the transforming political, economic and societal realities of the society in which it occurs. Even so, any process of process of reform under these circumstances must inevitably be premised against a series of the explicitly normative criteria and assumptions. This is particularly the case in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro where domestic and international conceptions of change have been clearly articulated in terms of a transition to democracy and peace. This book therefore recognises the value-laden nature of the reform process and outlines an analytical framework that is premised explicitly on this basis. It thus incorporates some of the underlying normative assumptions of the transition concept – such as democratic ‘consolidation’ for example – without accepting either their inevitability or their inherent analytical value outside the specific context of transformation itself. In so doing it aims to provide a critical examination of the interaction between the self-consciously normative agenda of the security sector reform process itself and the wider dynamics of post-authoritarian and post-confl ict transformation.

The organisation of this book This book is organised into four main parts. Part I traces the scholarly and policy origins of the security sector reform concept, locating its recent rise to prominence in earlier debates about development, security and civil-military relations. It goes on to present a working definition of security sector reform and a three level framework for analysis. Subsequent parts of the book apply this framework to the experiences of

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Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro respectively. Part II analyses security sector reform at the political level. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the political legacy of the 1990s in the security sectors of each country. They examine the post-2000 governments’ efforts to establish civilian control over their armed forces, police and intelligence agencies, and then to subsequently democratise the nature of this control. Part III examines security sector reform at the organisational level. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the organisational legacy of the 1990s in each country. They trace how the reform process has impacted on issues of role, force structure, expertise and responsibility in the security sector itself. Part IV addresses the international level of security sector reform in each country. Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the various strategies that international actors have used to try and encourage security sector reform in the two countries, including the provision of reform assistance programmes, and the application of pre- and direct conditionality. Finally, Part V considers the experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro in a comparative context and draws out a series of more generic conclusions regarding the security sector reform concept as a whole and its relationship to wider processes of political and societal transformation.

Notes 1 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ) became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) in February 2003. SCG itself was voted out of existence after Montenegro held a successful independence referendum in May 2006. To avoid excess complexity and confusion in its nomenclature, this book employs the generic term ‘Serbia-Montenegro’ to refer to the FRJ and its successor states, except when greater specificity is required. It addresses security sector reform in both Serbia and Montenegro, but not Kosovo, which while still nominally part of Serbia remains under de facto international administration, with its own unique political and security circumstances. 2 See for example, Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe (Münster: Lit Verlag, April 2004); Timothy Edmunds, Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster (eds), CivilMilitary Relations in Postcommunist Europe: Reviewing the Transition (London: Routledge, 2006). 3 One exception is Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of the Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003), though even this otherwise excellent volume retains a bias towards military actors. 4 This approach draws on that outlined by David Collier. Collier, cited in Tony Mackie and David Marsh, ‘The comparative method’, in David

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6

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8 9 10 11

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13 14

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Introduction Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p. 179. There is a rich literature on the dissolution of SFRJ and the subsequent Yugoslav confl ict. For good general discussions see: Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequence (New York: NY University Press, 1995); Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds), Understanding the War in Kosovo (London: Frank Cass, 2003); James Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy for War Crimes (London: Hurst & Company, 2003); Tim Judah, The Serbs: The Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Nebojša Popov (ed.), The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1996); Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin, 1996); Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven & London: Yale University Press). Though in the case of the FRJ and the SCG, this sovereignty was contested by Montenegro, leading to its successful vote for independence in May 2006. Both states have populations of around 2 million, compared to around 4.5 million in Croatia and 7.5 million in Serbia and Montenergo (excluding Kosovo). With the partial exception of the Croatian police. See Chapter 5 for details. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Thomas Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, 13:1 (January 2002), p. 7. See for example, Paul Collier et al. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil-War and Development Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press and the World Bank, 2003). See for example, European Commission, The Stabilisation Process for South East Europe: First Annual Report (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 04 April 2002), which uses the language of transition extensively. Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, pp. 6–9. Thomas Carothers identifies what he calls ‘feckless pluralism’ and ‘dominant power politics’ as two common post-authoritarian political syndromes. Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, pp. 10–14. See for example, Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London: Zed Books, 2001); David Keen, ‘War and peace: what’s the difference’, International Peacekeeping, 7:4 (2001).

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Part I

Security sector reform

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Security sector reform: a framework for analysis

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The concept and policy of security sector reform is still relatively new. It was only in the late 1990s that the term emerged into common parlance. Even then it was under-theorised and ill-defi ned, and employed by a variety of different actors in a number of different ways. Despite a number of subsequent efforts to address these flaws,1 the security sector reform agenda remains rather amorphous in meaning and elastic in application. At one end of the spectrum it is often employed as a more fashionable alternative to the long established concerns of the civil-military relations or police reform communities. At the other, it can function as a ‘catch all’ policy, incorporating such a diverse range of issues as judicial reform, the regulation of private military companies or small arms proliferation. These different approaches can each have value depending on the specific circumstances in which they are employed. However, their sheer diversity makes security sector reform both a contested concept and one that is slippery to apply in practice. This chapter addresses this problem by advancing a systematic framework for analysing security sector reform in transforming societies. It locates this framework in those development and security debates that highlight the importance of security sector reform in transforming societies because of its assumed contribution to democratisation, human security and peacebuilding. It goes on to provide a clearly articulated, analytically coherent defi nition of the security sector itself, understood to be those organisations that apply and manage coercive force for collective purposes. It then proposes three levels of analysis for understanding the dynamics of the security sector reform process: the political level; the organisational level; and the international level. These levels of analysis each focus on a key aspect of security sector reform, though all of them addresses the generic issue of how the security sector as a whole relates to wider processes of political and social change.

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There has long been a recognition of the importance of the security sector to the wider processes of political and economic transformation. The fields of civil-military relations and police studies have always been concerned with the relationship between military or police organisations and governance for example. These organisations represent power and influence in potentia, because of the concentration of coercive means in their hands. As Samuel Finer has observed with regard to the armed forces, [they] . . . have three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotional symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms. They form a prestigious corporation or Order, enjoying overwhelming superiority in the means of applying force. The wonder, therefore, is not why this rebels against its civilian masters, but why it ever obeys them. 2

This observation is often of particular relevance in the case in transforming societies, when the existing political order is threatened and societies and institutions may be subject to instability, change and reform. Under these circumstances, the motivations for – or pressure on – armed forces or other security sector actors to use their coercive advantages to influence the domestic political scene can be particularly strong. This relationship between armed forces, politics and power received new attention from the scholarly community in the 1960s, not least as a consequence of the frequency of military coups d’état in Latin America, Africa and Asia. 3 At this time, many scholars viewed military involvement in politics and governance in a positive light. Recognising that armed forces were often the most coherent, unified and effective institution in new, post-colonial states, many saw military intervention as a potential catalyst for national unity, modernisation and industrialisation. Writing in 1963 for example, Marion Levy argued that armed forces were ‘the most efficient vehicle for the maximization of modernization with the minimization of the uncontrolled spread of side effects’.4 This positive image of the military’s role in political and economic development began to change towards the end of the decade as it became clear that military regimes were not producing the expected development outcomes. Indeed, as Martin Edmonds has observed, armed forces who were ‘confidently expected to be obedient, committed and disinterested agents of modernization . . . became aggressive political actors, intervening frequently with violence in the affairs of govern-

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ment and assuming total power within the state themselves’. 5 Edmonds identifies the failure of armed forces in the development role as a consequence of the internal characteristics of the military institution itself: a prioritisation of its own institutional interests; an antagonism towards the ‘political’; and an inclination towards order and control over political development.6 From the late 1960s onwards therefore, civil-military relations and development studies literature increasingly characterised the role of the military in transformation as problematic. Armed forces were seen to threaten democratisation through their potential for conducting military coups; military governance was generally perceived to be synonymous with human rights abuses; and uncontrolled and inappropriate military spending was widely viewed as damaging to economic development. These views were supported by the apparent failure of the developmental aspects of many Western military assistance programmes during the Cold War period. As Jane Chanaa notes, these were frequently framed in terms of development assistance, but in practice their emphasis was often very much on military training and the supply of weapons.7 Critics alleged that the impact of these programmes was overwhelmingly negative, particularly in Latin America. In particular, that US military assistance programmes aimed at professionalising armed forces and improving their counterinsurgency capacities in practice contributed to widespread human rights abuses and arguably to the establishment of military regimes across the continent.8 As a consequence, the main concern of the civil-military relations literature shifted from the military as an agent of modernisation to the question of how to keep the military out of politics and under fi rm civilian control. The period since the end of the Cold War has seen a renewed interest in the role of armed forces and other security sector organisations in transforming societies. The momentum for this reappraisal has emerged from several distinct scholarly and practitioner communities: civilmilitary relations and (to a lesser extent) police studies; security studies; and development studies. The civil-military relations field was reinvigorated in response to the multiple transformations in central and eastern Europe following the collapse of communism. In the early 1990s at least, the military and other security sector organisations appeared to be of key significance to the democratic changes occurring there. Armed forces, police and intelligence agencies across the region had been politicised and many were closely tied to the old regimes.9 In this context, many observers worried that they might be tempted to take steps to either reinstall fallen communist governments or in order to protect their own institutional

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interests and privileges. While in the main these concerns proved ultimately to be unwarranted, central and eastern European experiences of postcommunist transformation did encourage a new interest in the role of the armed forces in processes of political and social change.10 They also led to a renewed emphasis on military reform as a foreign policy objective. In particular, western states and organisations developed a series of proactive ‘defence diplomacy’ programmes, both in order to support the establishment of democratic civil-military relations in the former communist region, and also to promote organisational reform and integration as part of the NATO and EU accession processes. These initiatives refocused attention on the military as an agent of transformation amongst both donor and recipient states. Military actors from donor states were employed at the heart of initiatives aimed at encouraging and promoting change amongst their postcommunist counterparts, while central and eastern European armed forces often found themselves at the forefront of their governments’ integrationist foreign policy agendas. Finally, many states in the postcommunist region also possessed large, politicised and sometimes militarised police and other security forces. These organisations often had as important a role in domestic governance and transformation as their military counterparts. This recognition led to a renewed interest in the specific field of police studies, and to an increasing embrace of the wider concept of the ‘security sector’ – rather than the more restrictive defence sector – to explain the role of ‘armed forces’ in processes of postcommunist transformation.11 The role of the military and other security actors in society also received new attention due to developments in the wider discipline of security studies. These reflected a diverse critical literature that refocused attention on the subjective and relative nature of the security concept itself, and particularly how the security of one type of entity could be in tension with, or detrimental to, the security of another.12 So for example, all states to some extent prioritise the security of the state over and above that of the individual. Indeed, those who pose a threat to national security are likely to feel the full force of the states’ coercive apparatus. They may loose their liberty or even their lives. However, the asymmetry of this relationship is not an objective given. It is the result of a normative judgement on the appropriate balance between the security of the state and the security of the individual, and this will vary according to the nature of the society concerned. In democratic societies for example, the power of the state over the individual in this respect is strictly regulated by the rule of law – at least in theory. In contrast, authoritarian societies are characterised by the

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clear prioritisation of regime security over and above other considerations. This may lead to state power being exercised in a more arbitrary and repressive manner, to the extent that in many parts of the world the major threat to the security of the individual is often the state itself, often through the medium of its own security forces.13 Thus, a deepening of the security concept to incorporate security at the individual level actually refocuses attention on the nature of the relationship between individuals and the states of which they are a part.14 In so doing, it implies that security sector reform within the state itself may be at least part of a solution to human security dilemmas. Indeed, if dysfunctional or predatory security forces are detrimental to security at an individual level, then reforming those forces to, for example, incorporate a better respect for human rights may be one of the key strategies for ameliorating these problems. This is particularly the case during processes of democratisation, when the relative balance between security priorities tends to shift away from the narrow interests of the regime in favour of the individual and the rule of law. This reassessment of the role and importance of the security sector and security sector reform in transformation was also reflected in the changing concerns of the development community. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, development scholars and practitioners tended to either ignore or problematise security issues, focusing instead on what many saw to be their core business of economic development and reform. During the 1980s particularly, this was characterised by a preoccupation with economic liberalisation and free-market reform in recipient states, and an effort to de-emphasise the role of the state in all aspects of the domestic economy. Where armed forces and security sector actors were considered, they tended to be seen – not wholly without justification – in terms of the barriers they posed to economic development rather than the ways in which they could contribute to these processes.15 The development community began to look more seriously at the role of the security sector in the 1990s. This reflected a wider turn away from the neo-liberal orthodoxies of the previous decade, and particularly a reassessment of the appropriate role of the state in development. Broadly, this new thinking suggested that the effective and efficient use of resources – ‘good governance’ rather than simply small government – was the key to successful development. As large and expensive public institutions, security sector organisations were often seen to be ripe for good governance reforms, particularly in relation to their sometimes excessive budgetary allocations – which were believed to divert scarce resources from more pressing development needs elsewhere – or in some cases their arbitrary or corrupt behaviour.16

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Security sector reform also received a new prominence as a result of a wider conceptual re-examination of the relationship between development and security. Drawing particularly on the experiences of conflict and post-conflict societies – where centralised state authority was often weak or even non-existent – a number of scholars argued that security itself was a necessary precondition for development. They also suggested that the security sector had an important and potentially constructive role to play in this relationship.17 This linkage between development and security issues rests on three main assumptions. The fi rst of these is that effective security provision within the political community is a laudable and necessary development goal in and of itself.18 According to this view, societies and individuals will be unwilling or unable to engage in normal political or economic activity if their own security is threatened, and that this in turn undermines wider development goals. As Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh observe, ‘. . . a prerequisite for social development and human rights protection is the security and stability that comes through an effective, impartial and humane introduction of law and order, alongside the extension of sound governance to the military sector itself’.19 This understanding of the development and security relationship incorporates an inherent bias towards the state – or at least state like formations – in peacebuilding activities. 20 It implies that political communities which can monopolise and regulate security provision in their territories are the most effective mechanisms through which to achieve human security and development goals. This has important implications for security sector reform because it suggests that the creation of an effective and properly regulated security sector lies at the heart of the development agenda – at least as traditionally conceived. 21 A second (though related) assumption underlying the developmentsecurity relationship relates to the impact of underdevelopment on state, regional and international security more widely. This approach identifies an explicit linkage between conflict and underdevelopment. Paul Collier for example contends that the experience of conflict represents a process of ‘development in reverse’. He argues that the economic, social and political costs of conflict tend to be negative for the state and its citizens and leave persistent damaging legacies. 22 The damage caused by conflict – even in civil war environments – is unlikely to be restricted to the confl ict state alone. It also tends to have important regional and international implications, due for example, to the potential of the conflict itself spreading, the disruption it causes to regional trade networks, as well as other factors such as cross-border refugee flows or a growth in transborder criminality. The economic,

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political and societal legacies of conflict do not simply dissipate once fighting stops and thus become key factors in post-conflict development processes. In this context, security sector reform is important because of the role it can play in breaking this vicious circle of conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment. For example, demobilising, downsizing and disarming formerly warring factions will make a return to violence in future more difficult. 23 The security sector itself will also generally have been shaped by its role in the conflict. It may be viewed as highly partial by some sectors of society; its role and presence in society is likely to have been inflated by the conflict environment; it may be under only loose or contested civilian control; and elements of it may be engaged in criminality and corruption. 24 Conflict thus generally exacerbates the existing problems of security sector dysfunctionality and so increases the need for security sector reform for the reasons discussed above. Finally, conceptualising conflict and civil war as transnational in nature leads to the inevitable internationalisation of development and security concerns. If the negative effects of civil war and ‘development in reverse’ cross borders – through for example, refugee flows, terrorism, criminality and wider regional insecurity – then they are no longer so easily dismissed or ignored by societies in richer and more stable parts of the world. One of the consequences of understanding confl ict and underdevelopment is these terms is that development (or at least underdevelopment) becomes a security issue in itself. As Mark Duffield critically observes, ‘the threat of an excluded South formenting international instability through confl ict, criminal activity and terrorism is now part of a new security framework. Within this framework, underdevelopment has become dangerous’. 25 This linkage between underdevelopment and insecurity has had two important policy impacts at the international level, particularly amongst Western countries. First, it has helped to drive and legitimise a renewed – and increasingly ambitious – wave of peacekeeping and post-confl ict interventions in confl ict and post-confl ict environments from the 1990s onwards. These occurred at least partially on the grounds that it was and is in the West’s own security interests to try and prevent conflict, stop fighting once it has broken out and contribute to long term peacebuilding once fighting has ceased. Second, it has encouraged a new focus on democratisation as a conflict prevention strategy. Indeed, all the major international organisations and agencies engaged in confl ict prevention and peacebuilding activities include a commitment to the principles of liberal democracy

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Security sector reform

in their activities in one form or another. 26 Alex J. Bellamy directly links this trend to a renewed enthusiasm for the Democratic Peace thesis amongst international donors. 27 While it is not uncontested, this suggests that democratic states are more likely to be externally pacific than their non-democratic counterparts, at least as far as other democracies are concerned. It also implies that once established democracies may be internally peaceful too. 28 Democratisation has thus emerged as an important component of the wider western security agenda, and plays a part in a whole range of peacebuilding, development and good governance programmes – including security sector reform. This is important not just because it refocuses attention on the relationship between the security sector and governance as discussed above, but also because it posits a particular normative view of what this relationship should look like in practice. In this context, security sector reform is generally incorporated as part of wider democracy promotion activities and thus tends to include clear normative objectives such as the democratic control of armed forces. To summarise, security sector reform has emerged as an increasingly prominent policy tool since the late 1990s. It claims to be able to contribute to both democratisation and peacebuilding through the reform and regulation of security sector actors. Even so, many of the underlying suppositions of the agenda are at present implicit or assumed, and as Chapter 1 discussed, there remains a paucity of detailed empirical studies to either support or refute them. In particular, it remains unclear how and in what ways reform in the security sector inter-relates with wider processes of political and societal transformation, particularly democratisation efforts. It is also unclear how and in what ways do these processes relate and respond to internationally driven efforts to promote a particular type of security sector reform as part of their wider peacebuilding and democratisation strategies. There is also a continuing degree of confusion as to the scope of the security sector reform concept itself, and it is to this defi nitional question that this chapter now turns.

Defining security sector reform There are no clear and agreed set of definitions for security sector reform. In particular, the question of which organisations comprise the security sector – and hence how broad or narrow the remit of security sector reform should be – remains contested. As the previous discussion illustrated, security can be viewed in much wider terms than simply the defence of the state from external military

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threats. At their broadest, human focused approaches to security incorporate the concerns of the development agenda as a whole, including issues such as the alleviation of poverty, healthcare provision or the protection of human rights. 29 However, using such an all-encompassing conceptual framework for the purposes of understanding security sector reform is problematic. As Roland Paris has observed, ‘existing defi nitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological wellbeing, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritisation of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied’. 30 The danger is that too wide a definition of the security sector would essentially include all aspects of society and governance. All hope of analytical or policy coherence in anything but the broadest terms would be lost. In order to avoid this problem, this study takes a means based approach to defi ning the security sector. It identifies the management and application of coercive force for collective purposes as the unique distinguishing feature of the security sector as a whole. It is this shared coercive capacity that puts security sector actors in such a powerful position with regard to other organisations, institutions and groups in society. It provides them with the opportunity to exert their will in a manner that is potentially non-negotiable and irresistible by other actors in the political process. It also means that they are particularly well equipped to threaten security at the individual level if they choose – or are used – to do so. This definition is rooted in the existing civil-military relations, police studies, and intelligence studies literature. As early as 1941 Harold Lasswell distinguished the military as ‘specialists on violence’, 31 while Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz respectively defi ned them as being experts in ‘directing the application of violence under certain proscribed conditions’, 32 and ‘. . . the organised use of violence’. 33 The police studies literature offers its own set of means-based defi nitions. Egon Bittner for example, understood the police to be ‘a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiable coercive force’34 while David Bayley referred to ‘people authorized by the group to regulate interpersonal relations through the application of physical force’. 35 There are some important differences between these approaches. Those concerned with the military concentrate explicitly on violence, with the implication that it is the application of lethal force that lies at the heart of the armed forces’ role. Those concerned with the police are more circumspect in this regard. Even so, all of these defi nitions incorporate a focus on coercive force to one degree or another, with important implications

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for the security sectors’ relationships in the political community more widely. The intelligence sector presents a more complex and ambiguous picture in this regard. As its name suggests, the existing intelligence studies literature tends to focus on the nature, role and uses of intelligence rather than coercive force in domestic governance, foreign policy and international relations. 36 Certainly, most intelligence gathering activity – and by extension the work of many intelligence agencies – is entirely non-coercive in nature. However, there are three important qualifications to this observation which merit the inclusion of the intelligence sector in the defi nition of the security sector presented above. The fi rst is that the intelligence sector as a whole is closely – often inextricably – linked to military and police sectors proper. As Michael Herman notes, modern intelligence originally developed out of existing military structures and from emergent special policing needs. 37 As a consequence, in many countries the intelligence agencies (or at least elements of them) remain formally located within existing military or police chains of command. A second and related point is that while the application of authorised coercive force may not be the defi nitive characteristic of the intelligence sector broadly defi ned, it is an important feature of certain organisations within it. Many intelligence agencies – particularly those within the armed forces – are militarised, while others have policing powers. This is especially the case in authoritarian societies where intelligence sector’s primary role is likely to focus around regime protection. 38 Finally, one of the most important functions of the intelligence sector is to produce, analyse and prioritise information about security threats and challenges for other organisations in the security sector to act on. 39 As such, while intelligence agencies may not always be directly responsible for the application of coercive force themselves, they do generally play a central role in its management, and so are an inseparable part of the wider coercive nexus of the security sector as a whole. There is also a second component to the definition of the security sector used in this book: the management and application of coercive force for collective purposes. The collective in this respect is taken to mean the wider political community within which the security sector is located. In most cases this is represented by the state. However, in more fragmented or contested political communities it may also include alternative governance structures, such as secessionist territories or other more localised communities and networks. This focus on coercive force for collective purposes is important because it establishes a clear and explicit link between the security sector and the governance of the

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political community of which they are a part. This linkage lies at the heart of the concept of security sector reform, which, as the previous discussion demonstrated, is premised on an assumed relationship between security, governance and development. It also distinguishes the security sector from a whole range of other groups within society who also utilise coercive force in their activities but do so for essentially private purposes, such as criminal gangs or private security guards.40 To summarise, the security sector is considered to be those organisations that apply and manage coercive force for collective purposes. Clearly, the exact composition of the security sector will vary according to the particular circumstances of the political community concerned. Nevertheless, as an approximate guide, and for the purposes of this book, the security sector is considered to incorporate the regular armed forces, the police, paramilitary formations, and the intelligence agencies, as well as those elements of the civil structure that oversee and manage the security sector proper. These include the civilian chain of command, parliamentary oversight committees, relevant governmental ministries, and civil society actors who engage with defence and security issues such as the media and security-related non-governmental organisations.

The normative nature of security sector reform The defi nition presented above provides a clearly proscribed, analytically coherent conception of the security sector itself. In this context, security sector reform is considered to be the process through which security sector actors adapt to the political and organisational demands of transformation. At one level, this can be seen as a neutral, technical activity. It is about how societies organise and control their security sector organisations at times of political and social change. When viewed in this way, security sector reform is a value free concept. It could just as easily refer to a process of militarisation in an authoritarian society as to the establishment of civilian control of armed forces in a democratising one. In practice however, the concept and policy of security sector reform is not generally used in this value-free manner. Indeed, locating the rational for security sector reform in development and security debates gives it an inherently normative quality. It suggests a preferred way in which the security sector should be organised. In the words of Otwin Marenin, The defi nitions and the planning and implementation of strategies for producing reforms in local . . . [security] systems are not givens, obvious

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to any observer. They are the consequences of human agency, choices made or forgone by considerations of values, interests and knowledge of the actors involved in reform projects at the international and local levels.41

In this context, there are two main axes of normative prescription against which security sector reform is commonly premised. The fi rst of these relates to governance and concerns the subjective nature of the security concept more widely. As we have seen, there are inherent tensions and trade offs between the security of the state, the group and/or the individual. Security sector reform thus involves a necessary value-laden assessment both of the relative importance of and appropriate balance between different levels of security and threat, and the manner in which it is legitimate for the security sector to address them. These dilemmas are often especially pressing in transforming societies where pre-existing security referents – such as for example a weakening authoritarian regime – may be existentially challenged. Different patterns of governance also make quite different normative demands in this regard. In democratic societies for example, the use of coercive force within the political community is generally closely proscribed and regulated. As a consequence, changes in the political sphere – and particularly processes of democratisation – will also lead to a related, normatively-driven, process of change in the security sector itself. Secondly, because security sector reform is at least partially premised on the contribution that it can make to security in the political community more widely, it incorporates normative understanding of effectiveness. Any notion of effectiveness is to a large degree relative.42 Even so, the development and security debates in which the security sector reform concept is located generally associate state weakness or collapse with insecurity and so with dysfunctional, predatory or ineffective security provision. In practice therefore, security sector reform tends to link effectiveness in the security sector with a normative preference for institutionalised security provision in a state or state like context. As Robin Luckham observes, The bottom line is that states are indeed supposed to be ‘well policed states’, able to deliver security to their citizens. This is what both their own citizens and the international community of states expect of them. States not meeting this responsibility are not only failing their citizens, they are likely to be less legitimate and less likely to survive.43

With this in mind, this book utilises an explicitly normative framework for understanding and evaluating security sector reform. It con-

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siders security sector reform in the Western Balkans to be taking place explicitly within a wider, self-conscious context of democratic transformation and post-conflict state-building and consolidation. It is thus about how the security sector contributes to the security of the political community, in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control.44 Each of these processes makes their own specific normative demands on security sector reform that are outlined more fully in subsequent sections. This approach allows for a critical evaluation of the interaction between the self-consciously normative agenda of the security sector reform process itself and the wider dynamics of transformation in the two country case studies themselves.

A framework for analysis Against this background, this study advances a systematic framework for the comparative analysis of security sector reform in transforming societies. This incorporates three main levels of analysis: the political level; the organisational level; and the international level. The political level is considered first. It is here that the political community’s interaction with its security sector is most apparent. Indeed, in transforming societies, it is generally change at the political level which establishes the underlying context for subsequent security sector reform. The framework then turns to the organisational level. This addresses how organisations and actors with the security sector itself respond and relate to the wider demands of political and social transformation. Finally, the international level considers the various ways in which external actors interact with the domestic security sector reform process as a whole, including both its political and organisational aspects. These levels do not exist in isolation from each other, and are inter-related through a linked network of governance mechanisms and relationships. However, each addresses a core aspect of the security sector reform process as outlined above and each provides a discreet conceptual lens through which to understand the role of security sector reform in wider processes of post-conflict and postauthoritarian transformation.

The political level Security sector reform at the political level addresses the relationship between the security sector and the political process. In transforming societies, it is concerned primarily with the establishment and consolidation of externally derived mechanisms for civilian and democratic control over the security sector.45

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It has already been argued that the security sector’s unique coercive capacities potentially give it a powerful – and sometimes determinative – role in the domestic politics. Hence, any government that wishes to exercise its authority in an uncontested manner must establish and consolidate mechanisms for civilian control over the security sector. This is rarely a straightforward task, particularly in transforming environments. Under these circumstances, civilian control over security sector actors may be weak or contested, at least in the early stages of transformation. The security sector’s own institutional interests may be challenged; its budgets threatened and its influence in the political system undermined. In this context, security sector actors may be tempted to intervene directly in the political process in order to either veto or otherwise influence the nature of the changes that are taking place. In the most extreme cases this can take the form of an outright seizure of power, with the aim of either installing a military government or facilitating the formation of a new more acceptable civilian administration. However, naked praetorianism is just one of the ways – albeit the crudest and most dramatic – in which the security sector can intervene in the political process. Even once the basic principle of civilian control has been secured, there are – to quote Luckham again – manifold other ways in which . . . . . . authoritarianism and military politics may continue behind the formalities of civilian and democratic governance . . . These include the perpetuation of military, police and security service privileges and prerogatives; the continued assertion of military ‘guardianship’ of the national interest; the entrenchment of military and ex-military men in politics, administration and business, military and security impunity from past and present human rights abuses; protected military and security budgets; secrecy and the insulation of military and security issues from public debate.46

More widely, a focus on praetorianism generates an assumption that the primary problem in civil-security sector relations is the security sector’s desire to intervene in domestic politics. In practice however, the security sector’s relationship with the political sphere is complex, and not easily captured – in either an analytical or normative sense – by an understanding of civilian control that simply aims to maximise civilian power over the security sector. Often, for example, a more pressing challenge in transforming societies is that general political and socioeconomic instability, deep political cleavages and new – and hence weak or contested – political institutions create circumstances which might

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draw security sector actors in to domestic politics at the behest of their civilian allies or masters.47 To address these complexities and distinctions, this study understands security sector reform at the political level as comprising of two related and overlapping processes: ‘fi rst generation’ and ‘second generation’ security sector reform.48 First generation security sector reform focuses on the formal establishment of civilian control over the security sector at all levels. Second generation security sector reform concerns the substantive consolidation and further democratisation of these measures in practice. This twin conceptualisation of political level security sector reform is explicitly normative. It assumes that the security sector reform process is taking place as part of a wider process of selfconscious democratisation or attempted democratisation and premises its analysis on that basis. The fi rst and most pressing task of any process of political level security sector reform is often to prevent the praetorian intervention of security sector actors in domestic politics. These initial strategies for civilian control will generally be determined by the opportunities and constraints offered by the specific circumstances of transformation. In some cases, for example, security sector actors may willingly subordinate themselves to the new authorities. This might be because they already have strong organisational habit of civilian control that they are unwilling to compromise. It might also be because they are broadly sympathetic to the process of change itself, or because they fear the negative consequences that praetorian intervention might unleash. In other cases, civilian control may only be secured through a negotiated transfer of power between the new authorities and key security sector actors, or even on occasion through a more violent struggle for power within and between the security sector itself. Establishing the basic principle of civilian control over the security sector is only a fi rst step however. If democratic civil-security sector relations are to be entrenched and sustained, then a number of further fi rst generation security sector reforms are also generally required. Perhaps the most important of these is the creation of a clear institutional framework for (democratic) civil-security sector relations. This normally entails the establishment of constitutional, legal and institutional provisions that delineate the roles and responsibilities of the various actors in the civil-security sector relationship, including the executive, bureaucracy, legislature and the security sector themselves. A core normative principle of democratic civil-security sector relations is that this process establishes a clear chain of command with democratically elected leaders at its head. These civilian-dominated chains

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of command ensure that ultimate command responsibility in the security sector rests with the democratically legitimated (civilian) government, and that the role of the security sector itself is limited to that defi ned by legislation and the constitution.49 This process also establishes the basic principles and structures for centralised oversight and transparency of security sector issues. This generally entails the establishment of a clear role for parliament in the civil-security sector relationship. In representative democracies the democratically elected legislature is the institutional expression of popular accountability. Legislatures play a central role in holding the executive and bureaucracy to account by examining and approving legislation and broader public policy. In the security sector, the legislature’s major role concerns its ability to scrutinise policy, exercise control over the budgets, and approve or reject legislation. They also introduce a crucial element of democratic legitimacy to civil-security sector relations more widely. 50 Departification in the security sector is another common fi rst generation security sector reform, particularly in formerly authoritarian environments. In authoritarian societies, a common strategy to maximise civilian control over the security sector is to co-opt the interests of the security sector with those of the regime. In most cases this leaves a persistent legacy of political partisanship in the security sector. This can encourage exactly the kind of military politics referred to by Luckham above and foster clientalist relationships between civilian politicians and sympathetic figures in the security sector itself. In contrast, in democratic societies it is generally accepted that the security sector should function as the impartial servants of the democratically elected authorities, whatever the political complexion of those authorities might be. 51 As a consequence, some form of departification generally forms part of any process of post-authoritarian security sector reform. Departification is not the same thing as depoliticisation, though the two terms are related and often used inter-changeably. At a minimum most scholars accept that even apparently neutral security sector actors will often act politically to defend and promote their own interests as bureaucratic actors within government, while many well established democracies also explicitly incorporate some element of politicisation into their civilsecurity sector relationships. It is thus rarely either desirable or realistic for depoliticisation to be absolute. Departification is concerned with eliminating the most rapaciously partisan aspects of the civilsecurity sector relationship. In so doing it aims to limit praetorian tendencies within the security sector itself and also to safeguard against the misuse of security sector organisations by civilian political actors.

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Departification has a further relevance in the transformation of the police and domestic intelligence agencies. One the main roles of these organisations in authoritarian societies is to protect the interests of the regime – narrowly defi ned – against internal threats and challenges. Under these circumstances the police fulfil a nakedly partisan role. Their work (or at least a large part of it) takes place at the behest of the regime and in the name of the regime. In contrast, policing in democratic societies is premised against a set of normative principles which prioritise impartiality, accountability and the adherence to the rule of law. 52 This distinction lies at the heart of the concept of democratic policing – discussed in greater detail below – and departification in the police as a whole is one of the most important strategies for ensuring its implementation in practice. First generation security sector reform thus aims to establish the basic principle of civilian control over the security sector, create an appropriate institutional structure for its further consolidation and democratisation, and remove the most obviously partisan elements from security sector itself. These initial steps are important elements in any system of democratic civil-security sector relations. However, the effective functioning of such a system also depends on the existence of a general political culture and a specific security sector culture in which the subordination of the security sector to civilian political control is widely accepted by the civil and security sectors alike, and actually works in practice. The development of such a culture is likely to be at least as great a challenge as reforming institutions and may be hindered by resistance to civilian control within the security sector itself, civilian reluctance or inability to assert effective control or a more general ineffectiveness of governmental and administrative structures. 53 Some of these challenges are internal to security sector itself and are more appropriately considered at the organisational level, discussed below. Others relate to the wider political system in which security sector governance takes place. These are the second generation security sector reforms referred to previously. These aim to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation in practice and to consolidate, strengthen and widen existing procedures and capacities for democratic oversight and accountability. They take place in parallel to the fi rst generation reforms discussed above, but are generally longer term and often more demanding in nature. Second generation security sector reforms specifically concern the development of (civilian) expertise and capacity in relation to: policy making and implementation; parliamentary oversight; and the wider engagement of civil society actors in security governance.

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If democratic oversight of the security sector function in practice, then the civil sector needs to be in a position to actually be able to exercise its de jure powers and responsibilities in a meaningful and effective way. A key requirement for this is the development of an adequate degree of civilian expertise in defence and security issues. If civilian expertise is not present – as is often the case in environments where defence and security issues have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of the security sector itself – then the ability of civilian actors to understand the implications, and hence provide adequate scrutiny, of the policies they are being asked to oversee will be limited. 54 The development of an informed civilian cadre – both amongst parliamentarians and in the security sector bureaucracies – that has the skills, commitment and experience required to provide effective and sustained scrutiny of the more technical aspects of security policies is thus a key second generation security sector reform. 55 Expertise in new areas does not develop quickly, and this is clearly a long term element of the security sector reform process. However, it is crucial if democratic oversight of the security sector is to function properly. A related issue is the capacity of security sector bureaucracies both to implement policy, and to adequately support the oversight and transparency functions of other areas of the security sector infrastructure. For example, if the Ministry of Defence does not have the resources, mechanisms and qualified staff to provide a detailed breakdown of where and how the budget for the armed forces is spent, then effective oversight of that budget will be difficult. Capacity problems can manifest themselves in a number of different ways. These include an inability to provide a detailed breakdown of security sector spending, poor analysis of available policy options, unrealistic assessments of the relationship between goals and resources, and bureaucratic structures unable or unwilling to implement security policy. 56 These problems may be intensified by expertise issues amongst new civil servants in the security sector bureaucracies, and this in turn may reinforce the reluctance of security sector actors to facilitate further reform because of a perception (real or imagined) of civilian incompetence in security sector issues. 57 Many of these challenges are also faced by parliamentarians as well. These can be as basic as a lack of appropriate office space or an absence of support staff or library facilities. As elsewhere, administrative incapacity in parliament can inhibit its effectiveness in practice, with a concomitant impact on the quality of democratic oversight and scrutiny in the defence and security system as a whole. Building bureaucratic and parliamentary capacity is a long-term component of the security sector reform process. However, without it, it

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will be difficult to consolidate procedures for effective democratic governance of the security sector, making the formulation, implementation and oversight of defence and security policy problematic in practice, and often leading to continuing reliance on the experience and expertise of the security sector itself. Finally, the wider engagement of civil society actors with defence and security issues is another important part of any second generation security sector reform process. According to Ernest Gellner, civil society comprises of ‘that diverse set of non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of society’. 58 For the purposes of this book, it is considered to consist of the variety of formal and informal organisations and groups that contribute to debate on defence and security policy issues. These include the media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including dedicated think-tanks, pressure groups and so on, and academics in universities. There is nothing about this particular group of actors that is either inherently or necessarily democratic. Often civil society organisations can be havens for extremist or non-democratic politics, while the roles that these groups play in wider processes of democratisation are both complex and contested. 59 Even so, most approaches to the study of democracy and democratisation incorporate some role for civil society in their analysis. For example, Alfred Linz and Juan Stepan observe that ‘a robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and the state can . . . help consolidate and help deepen democracy’.60 Similarly, David Beetham argues that ‘. . . the quality and vitality of a country’s democracy will be revealed in the character of its civil society, as well as in its formal institutions’.61 Hence, with the provisos indicated above and in the context of the explicitly normative evaluative framework presented here, it is considered that civil society groups can contribute to democratic security sector governance in three main ways. First, they can form an alternative, non-governmental source of information on defence and security issues. In this capacity, civil society serves to inform both the public at large and the narrower policymaking community. Second, the arena of civil society can provide the opportunity for popular debate, discussion, and criticism of defence and security matters – for example, through newspapers, public meetings, or specialist journals. Finally, civil society actors can act as an important mechanism for holding others in the civil-military relationship to account. They carry out this function by

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exposing malpractice, forming critical judgments on policy, and mobilising public opinion.62

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The organisational level

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The organisational level addresses change within the security sector itself. It is concerned primarily with how security sector organisations adapt to changing political and security circumstances. Post-authoritarian and post-conflict environments have a number of special implications for security sector reform at the organisational level. In formerly authoritarian environments, security sector organisations are likely to face a change in the nature of their roles. Externally, regime change may alter a country’s geopolitical circumstances, making some existing roles obsolete, changing the importance of others, or introducing new tasks and demands.63 Internally, the changes are likely to be even more significant, especially during processes of democratisation. The most common distinction that is made in this respect is between regime-orientated internal security approaches and democratic policing approaches. In the former, the roles of the police, intelligence agencies and even the armed forces were centred around defending and maintaining the narrow sectional interests of the authoritarian regime itself. In contrast, democratic policing is characterised ‘by an orientation towards service for civic society rather than the state’ and by the management and organisation of the police system according to democratic principles.64 Democratic policing is an eclectic and somewhat ill-defi ned notion. At a minimum most democratic police reforms favour a degree of police departification, demilitarisation and often decentralisation, though none of these measures – with the exception perhaps of departification – are necessarily sacrosanct to the process itself. Indeed, democratic societies incorporate a wide variety of different policing approaches, ranging from the centralised gendarmerie-style systems prevalent in much of continental Europe to the constabulary model of the United Kingdom.65 Even so, Rachel Neild argues that democratic policing approaches all share a number of common features. They imply that ‘. . . the police should respond not only to government direction, but also directly to the expressed security needs of the public at large. And they should be accountable for their performance to multiple audiences through different channels’. As Neild goes on to observe, ‘democratic policing . . . exists in a symbiotic relationship with democratic government. It cannot create a democratic regime, but police conduct is a stark manifestation of the state’s relationship with its citizens’.66 It therefore is an important and unavoidable feature of security sector reform in democratising societies,

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providing as it does the underlying normative framework against which organisational level reform in police and domestic intelligence agencies is premised. Post-conflict environments also make their own set of demands on the security sector reform process at the organisational level. The experience of conflict is likely to have had a defi nitive impact on the security sector itself. Security sector organisations may be large in size and structured around the specific – often rather narrow – demands of the conflict itself. Promotion and advancement within the security sector may be based around performance in the field rather than professional or educational qualifications. Recruitment will generally have been driven by necessity, and occurred in an ad hoc and un-discriminatory manner, rather than according to the demands of a professional selection process. Often, and particularly in civil war environments, internal security organisations such as the police will have had their roles and organisational structures militarised.67 Security sector reform thus confronts a number of challenges at the organisational level in the aftermath of confl ict. Security sector organisations have to re-orientate core roles from the demands of war to the demands of peace, and adapt their force structures in line with these changes. For the armed forces this is likely to mean a shift from an unambiguous role based around territorial war-fighting towards one premised against emergent new peacetime missions. Role changes can also be expected for the police and other internal security agencies. For these organisations post-conflict security sector reform is likely to involve a process of demilitarisation and a shift to the demands of democratic policing as described above.68 Post-conflict security sector reform also generally involves major structural changes in the security sector itself. At a minimum these are likely to entail efforts to reduce manning levels and demobilise former combatants as security sector organisations themselves adjust their force structures in line with their new roles. This in turn commonly poses a series of challenges associated with resettling and retraining demobilised personnel. If the wider economy has also been damaged by the confl ict then the demobilisation process may simply create large numbers of unemployed former combatants, with negative political and societal consequences.69 Post-conflict transformation is also likely to have an impact on the internal structure of security sector organisations, particularly in the areas of recruitment, career structure and education and training programmes. Each of these areas will have been conditioned by the constraints and opportunities provided by the confl ict itself and will often have taken place on an ad hoc basis rather than according to any formal

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criteria. Peacetime demands are likely to be very different however, requiring at the very minimum a degree of organisational adaptation and professionalisation. Finally, security sector actors and organisations will also have to adapt to a peacetime political and societal context in which their own importance will commonly diminish. This is likely to have a number of direct impacts on the security sector itself, including a probable decline in its budgetary allocations and a decrease in its political influence. These specific demands of post-authoritarian and post-confl ict transformation are paralleled by a series of generic organisational challenges that face security sector organisations across Europe and North America. In particular, changing threat perceptions since the end of the Cold War have had a major impact on the security sector at an organisational level. The collapse of communism in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed the previously dominant threat of external military attack in states on both sides of the Iron Curtain. At the same time, a series of ‘new’ security challenges have risen to prominence which have their roots in the development and security concerns discussed above. These include such concerns as the threat of international terrorism; the dangers of regional instability caused by intra-state conflict; organised crime; illegal immigration; and drugs and people trafficking.70 These changing threat perceptions have been reflected in defence and security planning documentation across Europe and North America, and are central to NATO’s vision of its future role.71 They also have important implications for the security sector as a whole. According to this reading of global (in) security, armed forces must be able to be deployed swiftly and effectively to where they are needed in order to meet emergent security challenges, often in the company of other multinational forces. Such missions might take the form of peacekeeping operations aimed at stabilising war-torn regions or out and out expeditionary war fighting actions aimed at tackling threats head on. These kinds of operations are complex in nature and make difficult demands on the armed forces involved. They tend to require high skill levels from soldiers of all ranks and so predicate a shift towards more professionalised force structures, supported by welldeveloped training and educational capacities. In this respect, they can be very different from the conscript-based mass armies of the Cold War period.72 As a consequence, they make particularly challenging organisational reform demands on those armed forces which remain primarily structured around traditional defence of national territory missions, but that are attempting to restructure in line with new security and foreign policy priorities.

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The organisational impact of these challenges is not just apparent in the military. A number of the security threats discussed above – such as terrorism or organised crime for example – have an important domestic impact. As such, they will often fall primarily under the responsibility of the police or intelligence agencies rather than the armed forces, and these organisations may fi nd themselves at the forefront of efforts to combat them. Similarly, many peacekeeping operations require policing rather than war-fighting skills, and a notable development of the past decade or so has been the increasing use of paramilitary police elements as well as regular armed forces in these deployments.73 A new emphasis on these kinds of missions will thus place additional organisational demands on the police and intelligence agencies. These will generally be less severe than in the case of the military. However, at the very least they are likely to redirect resources from old tasks to new ones, and may lead to the development of specialist formations – such as special police units – to fulfi l new functions. Finally, a number of wider societal changes also have important implications for security sector reform at the organisational level. These are broadly characterised, at least in the European context (and including the Western Balkans), by declining societal threat perceptions; increasingly individualistic and egalitarian societal norms, a shrinking consensus as to what comprises the public good; and an increasingly competitive wider job market, particularly for those with desirable skills in areas such as computing or the English language.74 These changes have had at least three implications for the security sector at the organisational level. They have undermined the popular legitimacy of methods of conscription as a recruitment method for the military. They have forced the security sector as a whole to compete on increasingly equal terms in the labour mark to both recruit and retain personnel. Finally, they have increased existing pressures towards organisational professionalisation, particularly in relation to the need to offer competitive salaries and more attractive career development opportunities. In order to analyse the impact of these challenges at the organisational level of security sector reform, this study utilises an analytical framework – outlined previously by this author with Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster – based around the concept of professionalisation.75 Professionalisation in this sense is understood to refer to explicit preparation to perform the unique function of the organisation concerned, be that the armed forces, police or intelligence agencies.76 In the context of this book, this process takes place on the basis of the explicitly normative assumptions of the security sector reform agenda itself: that is,

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it is process through which security sector actors and those charged with their management and oversight adapt to the new organisational demands of democratisation and post-conflict transformation. Two further normative assumptions follow on from this initial supposition. First, that the ultimate purpose of the professionalisation process is to develop an effective and efficient organisation that is fit for purpose.77 Second, that the definition of that purpose should, in democratic (or democratising) societies, lie in the hands of the democratically elected civilian government and be rooted in the rule of law.78 Hence, professional organisations in the security sector are considered to be those which are capable of undertaking their activities in an effective and efficient way in a framework of democratic civilian control, and whose organisation and internal structures reflect these assumptions. In this sense, organisational professionalisation is an ideal type end state or goal, an analytical construct that serves as a benchmark that allows analysts to determine the extent to which real types are similar and how they differ from it. Correspondingly, professionalisation is a set of processes whereby organisations in the security sector become closer to the ideal type of organisational professionalism, but also – to the extent that one accepts the goals of the security sector reform agenda more widely – a normative goal in and of itself. Following from the twin assumptions outlined above, this framework argues that professionalisation in the security sector is defi ned by three core characteristics, which themselves generate a number of sub-characteristics. 1. Role: Professional organisations in the security sector have clearly defi ned and widely accepted roles. • They have a detailed statement of their role(s), goals and responsibilities which is explicit, understood, and internalised within the organisation concerned; • They have legal and constitutional constraints on their role in domestic politics; • They are goal-orientated organisations designed according to rational principles in order to efficiently attain their goals in terms of personnel, equipment and procurement; • They are structured and organised to reflect broader defence and security policy objectives. 2. Expertise: Professional organisations in the security sector have the expertise and skills necessary to fulfil their external and domestic functions effectively and efficiently.

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• They have fi xed standards and formal qualifications for entry in terms of education, training, experience, health and age; • They have effective training and education systems, to prepare personnel for their roles and functions; • Appointments are specialised requiring technical knowledge and expertise; they are made; • They have promotion procedures which are transparent and based on notions of competence or achievement rather than ascribed political (or other similar) criteria; • They have methods of retaining personnel. 3. Responsibility: Professional organisations in the security sector are characterised by clear rules defi ning the responsibilities of the organisation as a whole and of individuals within it. • Their operations are characterised by impersonal rules that explicitly state duties, responsibilities, standardised procedures and conduct of office holders; • Information and orders can flow freely; • They are regulated appropriately to ensure discipline and discourage insubordination; • They adhere to international law and the Geneva Conventions; • They have mechanisms to establish standards preventing corruption and human rights abuses. This framework offers a number of specific advantages in the context of this study. First, it takes the institution as a whole – be that the police, the armed forces or the intelligence agencies – as the main referent object for analysis, rather than individual officers, soldiers or policemen within it. This is important because it places the underlying normative fit for purpose criteria at the very heart of the analysis. Second, it incorporates a dynamic conceptualisation of professionalisation. It thus allows for the fact that different security sectors, and different organisations within those security sectors, may exhibit varying degrees of professionalism. Finally, it outlines three underlying normative characteristics against which professionalisation can be analysed and assessed. To summarise, this study considers professionalisation to be a key element of security sector reform at the organisational level. It is a process of policy adaptation that is particularly acute in transforming environments. It involves defining security sector roles, revising force structures to be consistent with these new roles and adopting professional standards – in particular in the areas of expertise, promotion and responsibility – so that security

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sector organisations can carry out their responsibilities effectively and efficiently.

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The international level

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The international level addresses the relationship between domestic security sector reform processes and external pressures and influences. The international level is of generic significance for the whole concept of security sector reform. It is also of particular importance in the Western Balkan region where international factors have been especially intrusive in domestic processes of reform. If security sector reform generally occurs on the basis of specific normative criteria, then the question of who or what sets these criteria becomes of great importance to the whole process. This is where the international level is often significant. Because security sector reform has been identified as a development and security concern, its promotion has commonly been incorporated into donor states and organisations’ foreign, security and development policies. The aim of these policies is to encourage security sector reform in recipient states. As such, they have clear normative goals which can play a role (or aim to play a role) in shaping the overall normative criteria against which domestic security sector reforms take place. The UK, for example identifies ‘defence diplomacy’ (incorporating clear normative security sector reform objectives such as promoting democratic control of armed forces) as one of the eight core missions of the UK armed forces, while its Department for International Development prioritises security sector reform as a key development goal.79 Many other states, including the US, the Netherlands, Germany and France amongst others, have similar programmes. Security sector reform has also been embraced by a number of international organisations as part of their confl ict prevention and postconflict reconstruction programmes. For example, the UN has engaged in a number of programmes aimed at demobilising and reintegrating former combatants in war-torn societies that incorporate important elements of security sector reform.80 The EU, OSCE and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) all have programmes aimed at ‘addressing the root causes of confl ict’ in war-torn states, including initiatives to encourage the reform and restructuring of local security sectors. Similarly, both the IMF and World Bank also have their own security sector reform initiatives, focusing particularly on issues of military expenditure in developing and post-conflict states.81 Finally, there are also a variety of NGOs who have an interest in promoting security sector reform. This can comprise

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either of their core focus – as is the case with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) or the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) – or as part of a wider conflict prevention agenda – as with organisations such as International Alert or Saferworld.82 The influence of international actors in local security sector reform processes has been especially pronounced in postcommunist central and eastern Europe and the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The geographical proximity of these states to western Europe and their very direct importance to wider European security, has encouraged western donor states to take an especially close interest in their domestic processes of transformation. In the central and eastern European region, the focus of this interest has been on issues of postcommunist democratisation, economic reform and institutional integration. This interest has been justified at least partially on the basis of development and security and democratic peace rationales that link democratisation and economic development in the postcommunist region with stability and security in Europe as whole.83 In relation to security sector reform, these donor policies have prioritised the establishment of democratic and civilian control over formerly communist armed forces and the development of greater cooperation and interoperability with (particularly) NATO forces. NATO has often been at the forefront of these activities through programmes and initiatives such as its Partnership for Peace (PfP), its Planning and Review Process (PARP) and its Membership Action Plans (MAPs).84 These approaches have been mirrored in much of the former Yugoslavia, albeit on a more delayed timescale, and paralleled by a series of related activities aimed at addressing the specific security sector reform challenges of this postconflict region. Recipient states in these regions have also been especially receptive to external influence in their security sector reforms because of the close connection between these specific concerns and their wider foreign and security policy priorities. For many postcommunist states, EU and NATO accession emerged as clear national goals in the early to mid 1990s. Both of these organisations – but particularly NATO – stipulated certain standards from potential member and associate states in relation to the control and reform of their security sectors. The character of this relationship – whereby the EU and NATO established a clear set of reform criteria for an area of often relatively low domestic political importance (defence and security policy) – has given these organisations a strong influence over the normative direction of local reform processes. This has occurred at both the political

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and organisational levels. At the political level, the EU and NATO’s wider commitment to democratisation has meant that security sector reform in the postcommunist region has tended to be equated explicitly with the establishment and consolidation of democratic control over the security sector. In many of the countries in the Western Balkans – including Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro – this external influence has also extended to the issue of war crimes and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague. These issues are significant for security sector reform because so many war crimes indictees were members – and until very recently at least continued to be members – of local security sector organisations. At the organisational level, domestic reform efforts have been heavily influenced by the technical and organisational demands of the two organisations. NATO, for example, has been particularly active in promoting a particular model of military reform that reflects the way its own role and missions have developed since the end of the Cold War. This encourages member states (or potential member states) to develop the interoperability of their armed forces with each other, as well as their capacity to deploy them in multinational operations abroad.85 The role of the international level in security sector reform is important because it relates closely to the issue of causality in local reform processes. It illuminates how far – and under what circumstances – external factors shape the direction of domestic security sector reforms in recipient states. It thus goes to the heart of questions over the efficacy of the security sector reform concept as a whole, and indeed of many of the underlying normative assumptions of the wider development and security agenda. There are three distinct – though interrelated – strategies that external actors have used to encourage security sector reform in the Western Balkan context: security assistance, pre-conditionality, and direct conditionality.86 Security assistance incorporates external programmes and activities that aim to directly assist local security sector reform processes. These include, bilateral initiatives between states, multilateral programmes under the auspices of international organisations such as NATO, and individual or joint initiatives by non-governmental organisations and actors. Cottey and Forster identify six main forms of international security assistance activities, including: conferences and seminars; the provision of specialist advice on specific issues; the placement of advisors from member states in key positions in local security sector ministries and organisations; the participation of local security sector actors

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in the central administration of relevant international organisations – such as NATO HQ in Brussels; the establishment of structured programmes – such as NATO’s PfP or the EU’s Stability Pact – that aim to coordinate recipient states’ security sector reforms with international organisations’ normative priorities; and joint participation in multinational exercises.87 These activities are predicated on the basis that they can influence local security sector reforms in a number of different ways. They can offer direct advice and models of best practice to local reformers, enabling them to learn from the experiences of others and shortcut their own reform processes. They can provide visible political support for reform and reformers; they can provide direct training for security sector personnel when local capacities may be insufficiently developed to do so adequately themselves. Finally they can promote a ‘broader socialisation’ in the democratic and organisational norms of donor states and organisations.88 Pre-Conditionality refers to those criteria that recipient states are asked to meet in order to gain certain benefits on the international stage. In the European context, pre-conditionality most often refers to the conditions that international organisations such as the EU or NATO impose on potential new members or associates. Membership of the EU, for example, is premised on the acceptance and implementation of a body of common rights and obligations – the aquis communautaire – that incorporate all the treaties, regulations and directives passed by the European institutions as well as judgements laid down by the Court of Justice.89 Similarly, full NATO membership – or even membership of NATO’s associate programmes such as the PfP – requires prospective states to fulfil certain conditions in relation to, for example, ‘civilian and democratic control over the military’.90 Direct Conditionality differs from pre-conditionality in that it is coercive or punitive in nature (though as the two case studies in this volume illustrate, the two concepts are inter-related and in some circumstances the distinction between them can be blurred). It is not a process that target states themselves opt into but something that is imposed upon them and therefore entails a higher degree of coerciveness. In Europe, direct conditionality has been used most frequently in order to encourage compliance with specific demands of the ICTY amongst the states of the former Yugoslavia. In the main it has taken the form of threats to withdraw or to freeze fi nancial assistance packages or other forms of assistance, or to actively block the target state’s membership or participation in key international fora such as the IMF or the World Bank.

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Conclusion

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The concept and policy of security sector reform synthesises the concerns of several distinct scholarly and policy communities. These include the specific disciplines of civil-military relations and police studies, as well as the fields of security studies and development studies more widely defi ned. Each of these literatures advances or implies a view of how the security sectors should best be constituted in order to contribute to the wider goals of democratisation, peacebuilding and statebuilding. These ideas have had a direct impact at the policy level. They have led to the prioritisation of security sector reform programmes in societies emerging from conflict and authoritarianism. They have also resulted in a range of normatively driven initiatives from international actors that aim to encourage security sector reform in recipient societies. Even so, many of the underlying claims of the security sector reform agenda remain implicit and assumed. In order to address these knowledge gaps, this chapter has advanced a systematic framework for the comparative analysis of security sector reform in empirical case studies. This framework identifies three loci for security sector reform in transforming societies – the political level, the organisational level, and the international level – as well as the key reform variables within them. In applying these variables to the two country case studies presented in this book the framework aims to identify the main factors that have influenced security sector reform in each case. It also aims to draw out more generalisable conclusions about the security sector reform agenda more widely defi ned. It is to the application of this framework that the next chapter now turns.

Notes 1 Nicole Ball, Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy options for the British government (London: Saferworld, December 1998); Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Security sector reform: prospects and problems’, Global Change, 15:2 (June 2003); Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, DCAF Occasional Paper No. 4 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2003); Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 344 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, Security-Sector Transformation in PostConflict Societies (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 2002); Timothy Edmunds, ‘Security sector reform: concepts and implementation’, in Wilhelm N. Germann and Timothy Edmunds (eds) Towards Security Sector Reform in Post-Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment

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2 3

4 5 6 7 8

9

10

11 12

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(Baden-Baden: Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003); Heiner Hänggi, ‘Conceptualising security sector reform and reconstruction’, in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (eds), Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector (New Brunswick, NJ & London: Transaction Publishers, 2004); Dylan Hendrickson, A Review of Security Sector Reform (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1999); Chris Smith, ‘Security-Sector Reform: Development Breakthrough or Institutional Engineering?’, Conflict Security and Development, 1:1 (2001). S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p. 5. Martin Edmonds, Armed Services and Society (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), pp. 201–3. The police received much less attention than the military in this regard, for reasons that are discussed in David Bayley, Patterns of Policing (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1985), pp. 3–7. For some notable exceptions see, ibid. Egon Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society: A Review of Background Factors, Current Practices and Possible Role Models (Rockville: National Institute of Mental Health, 1972); Laurence Lustgarten, The Governance of Police (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1986); James Wilson, Varieties of Police Behaviour: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968). Even these studies remain preoccupied with Western (particularly US and UK) experiences. Marion J. Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies Vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 605. Edmonds, Armed Services, p. 202. Ibid. pp. 202–3. For perhaps the defi nitive discussion of military intervention in politics see, Finer, The Man on Horseback. Chanaa, Security Sector Reform, p. 14. Paul G. Buchanan, ‘Chameleon, tortoise or toad: the changing US security role in contemporary Latin America’, in Jorge I. Domínguez (ed.) International security and democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the post-Cold War era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 268–71. Zoltan D. Barany ‘Civil-military relations in communist systems: western models revisited’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 19 (Summer 1991). Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, ‘Civil-military relations in postcommunist Europe: assessing the transition’, European Security, 14:1 (March 2005). Edmunds, ‘Security sector reform’. Richard H. Ullman, ‘Redefi ning security’, International Security, 8:1 (1983); Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd Edn (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).

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13 Caroline Thomas, Global Governance, Development and Human Security: The Challenge of Poverty and Inequality (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Ken Booth, ‘Human wrongs and international relations’, International Affairs, 71:1 (1995). 14 Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ‘From strategy to security: foundations of critical security studies’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), p. 46. See also: Susan L. Woodward, ‘Should we think before we leap? a rejoinder’, Security Dialogue, 30:3 (1999), p. 280. 15 Though there were some exceptions. See for example, Nicole Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 16 Brzoska, Development Donors, pp. 13–16. 17 See for example, Ball, Spreading Good Practices. 18 Hendrickson, A Review of Security Sector Reform, pp. 16–17 19 Cooper and Pugh, Security-Sector Transformation, p. 14. 20 Paris, ‘International peacebuilding’, p. 654. 21 More critical scholars have argued that this bias towards the state in development is unrealistic or ill-conceived. They contend that it is unhelpful to view confl ict as a regression or a breakdown in a linear process of ‘normal’ economic development. Instead, confl ict encourages the emergence of, alternative, non-state based, often transborder patterns of authority and legitimacy that are as much a product of globalisation as the specific local circumstances of confl ict. Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security (London & New York: Zed Books, 2001). See also, David Keen, ‘War and Peace: What’s the Difference’, International Peacekeeping, 7:4 (2001). 22 Paul Collier et al. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil-War and Development Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press and the World Bank, 2003), pp. 13–32. 23 Mats R. Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 303 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 43. 24 See, for example: Hänggi, ‘Conceptualising security sector reform’, pp. 8–11; 13–15. 25 Duffield, Global Governance, p. 2. 26 Roland Paris, ‘International peacebuilding and the “mission civilisatrice” ’, Review of International Studies, 28:4 (2002), pp. 639–42. 27 Bellamy, ‘Security sector reform’, pp. 106–7. 28 Ibid. pp. 106–7. For more on the democratic peace thesis see: John M. Owen, ‘How liberalism produces democratic peace’, International Security, 19:4 (1994). Others argue democratisation can be a principle cause of insecurity and confl ict. Håvard Hegre et al. ‘Toward a democratic civil peace: democracy, political change and civil war, 1816–1992’, American Political Science Review, 96:1 (March 2001). 29 See for example, Thomas, Global Governance, pp. 9–13.

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30 Roland Paris, ‘Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?’, International Security, 26:2 (Fall 2001), p. 88. 31 Harold D. Lasswell, ‘The Garrison State’, American Journal of Sociology, 46 (January 1941), pp. 457–8. 32 Samuel P. Huntington, The Solider and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 12. 33 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 15. 34 Bittner, The Functions of the Police, p. 46. 35 Bayley, Patterns of Policing, p. 7. 36 See for example, Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1–5; Andrew Rathmell, ‘Towards postmodern intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 17:2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 88–9; Len Scott and Peter Jackson, ‘The study of intelligence in theory and practice’, Intelligence and National Security, 19:2 (Summer 2004), pp. 141–6. 37 Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 35. 38 Christopher Andrew, ‘Intelligence, international relations and “underthreorisation” ’, Intelligence and National Security, 29:2 (Summer 2004), pp. 176–82. For these reasons, the intelligence agencies are often referred to as the security services, particularly in authoritarian societies. However, to avoid confusion with the ‘security sector’ more generally defi ned, and in the light of the provisos introduced in the text, this book employs the term ‘intelligence agencies’ to refer to all organisations in this sector. 39 Peter Wilson, ‘The contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform’, Conflict, Security and Development, 5:1 (April 2005), p. 92; Rathmell, ‘Towards postmodern intelligence’, pp. 88–9. 40 Private actors can also apply coercive force for the collective purposes of the political community. An example discussed later in this book is the cooption of criminal gangs into paramilitary militias under the command of the Serbian State Security Service (RDB) in the early 1990s. Under these circumstances they should rightly be considered part of the security sector as well. 41 Otwin Marenin, Restoring Policing Systems in Conflict Torn Nations: Process, Problems, Prospects, DCAF Occasional Paper No. 7 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, June 2005), p. 2. 42 In patrimonial societies for example, a corrupt and inefficient police force may be considered to be ‘effective’ if it facilitates the ruling elite’s exploitation of government resources for clientalist purposes. Indeed, what is or is not considered to be effective in any given context will generally be dependent on concurrent normative judgements in the areas of security and governance. For more on the relative nature of ‘effectiveness’, see Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as a Political

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43

44 45

46 47

48

49

50 51

52

53 54 55

56 57 58

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Security sector reform Instrument (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 3–16. See also Alice Hills, ‘Defence diplomacy and security sector reform’, Contemporary Security Policy, 21:1 (April 2000), pp. 52–6. Robin Luckham, ‘Democratic strategies for security in transition and confl ict’, in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of the Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies (London & New York: Zed Books, 2003), p. 12. Edmunds, ‘Security sector reform’, p. 16. These are normally complemented by a series of internally derived control mechanisms, including such measures as hierarchical supervision, disciplinary procedures and professional socialisation. However, these are more appropriately addressed at the organisational level of security sector reform, and are discussed in more detail in the following section. See also, Bayley, Patterns of Policing, pp. 160–1. Ibid. p. 14. Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, ‘The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations and Democracy’, Armed Forces and Society 29:1 (Fall 2002), pp, 36–7. This conceptualisation was fi rst posited by this author with Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster. See Cottey et al. ‘The second generation problematic’. Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, ‘Introduction: The Challenge of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe’ in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 6–7. Cottey et al. ‘The second generation problematic’, pp. 44–6. For a further discussion of the relationship between military politicisation and democracy see, Anthony Forster, Armed Forces and Society in Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 37–9. Otwin Marenin, ‘The goal of democracy in international police assistance programs’, Policing, 21:1 (1998), p. 171; Rachel Neild, ‘Democratic police reforms in war-torn societies’, Conflict, Security and Development, 1:1 (2001), p. 23. This section draws on Cottey et al. ‘Introduction’, p. 7. Cottey et al. ‘The second generation problematic’, pp. 43–4. Ben Lombardini, ‘An Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 12:1 (March 1999), pp. 16–24. Cottey et al. ‘The second generation problematic’, pp. 41–2. Chris Donnelly, ‘Shaping Soldiers for the 21st Century’, NATO Review, 48:2 (Autumn 2000), p. 33. Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil-Society and its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), 5.

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59 See for example, Roberto Belloni, ‘Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Journal of Peace Research, 38:2 (2001); Ivan Sardamov, “Civil society” and the limits of democratic assistance’, Government and Opposition, 40:3 (2005). 60 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 9. 61 David Beetham, ‘Key principles and indices for a democratic audit’, in David Beetham (ed.), Defi ning and Measuring Democracy (London: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 39. 62 Cottey et al. ‘The second generation problematic’, p. 47. 63 Chris Donnelly, ‘Learning from security sector reform in central and eastern Europe’, in Bryden and Hänggi (eds), Reform and Reconstruction, pp. 46–7. 64 Marenin, Restoring Police Systems, p. 28. Some scholars are sceptical as to the extent to which regime character can affect the nature of the tasks performed by the police, but all agree that it does have an important impact on those aspects of the police function that are related to politics. Bayley, Patterns of Policing, p. 210; Marenin, ‘The goal of democracy’, p. 159. 65 Forster, Armed Forces, pp. 228–9. 66 Neild, ‘Democratic police reforms’, p. 24. Neild draws heavily (and selfconsciously) on Bayley, Patterns of Policing in making this argument. 67 On the impact of confl ict on the security sector see: Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation, Cooper and Pugh, Security-Sector Transformation, pp. 9–13; Hänggi, ‘Conceptualising security sector reform’; Neild, ‘Democratic police reforms’. 68 Neild, ‘Democratic police reforms’, pp. 22–4. 69 See for example, Paul Collier, ‘Demobilization and insecurity: a study in the economics of the transition from war to peace’, Journal of International Development, 6:3 (1994). 70 Timothy Edmunds, ‘What Are Armed Forces For: The Changing Nature of Military Roles in Europe’, International Affairs, 82:6 (November 2006). 71 See for example, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), pp. 50–3. 72 Karl Haltiner, ‘The defi nitive end of the mass army in western Europe’, Armed Forces and Society 25:1 (Fall 1998). 73 Annika S. Hansen, From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations, Adelphi Paper 343 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 15–31. 74 Forster, Armed Forces, 102–15. 75 Much of the following discussion is adapted from Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, ‘Introduction: the professionalisation of armed forces in postcommunist Europe’, in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds), The Challenge of Military Reform in

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76 77 78

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79

80 81

82 83

84 85

86

87

88 89 90

Security sector reform Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 6–8. This approach draws on Bayley, Patterns of Policing, p. 13. Forster, Armed Forces, p. 43. Huntington, The Solider and the State, pp. 80–97; Marybeth P. Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 11– 18. ‘Fact sheets: defence diplomacy’, in Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World (London: Stationary Office, 1998); Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform (London: Department for International Development, 2002), pp. 8–9. Chanaa, Security Sector Reform, pp. 16–19. Nicole Ball, ‘Transforming security sectors: the IMF and World Bank approaches’, Conflict Security and Development, 1:1 (2001), pp. 50–2; 54–7. See for example: DCAF, www.dcaf.ch; BICC, www.bicc.de; International Alert, www.international-alert.org; Saferworld, www.saferworld.org.uk. See for example the European Commission’s own rationale for the EU enlargement process at: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/understand_ enlargement/index_en.htm. Timothy Edmunds, ‘NATO and its new members’, Survival, 45:3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 148–53. See, for example: Edmunds, ‘NATO and its new members’, pp. 153–4; Jeffrey Simon, NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts upon New Members and Partners (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, March 2005), pp. 1–4. This framework is developed from that fi rst presented in: Timothy Edmunds, Defence Reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, Adelphi Paper 360 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 53–71. Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance, Adelphi Paper 365 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 35–6. Ibid. p. 36. ‘Community aquis’, European Union Glossary, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/ leg/en/cig/g4000.htm. NATO, 1995 Study on Enlargement, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ enl-9502.htm.

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Part II

The political level

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3

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Security sector reform at the political level: Croatia

Croatia faced a number of difficult political level security sector reform challenges in early 2000. The death of Franjo Tu
man and the electoral defeat of his HDZ party changed the domestic political landscape entirely. However, the military, police and intelligence agencies were all still deeply partisan actors, institutionally sympathetic towards the old HDZ regime and actively resistant to outside interference in their affairs. The new reformist government under Ivica Racˇan thus faced the initial challenge of establishing and consolidating its own authority in the security sector, while at the same time managing a divided and fractious governing coalition, an emergent integrationist agenda with NATO and the EU and thorny question of war crimes responsibility in the military. Against this background, Croatia has had some remarkable successes in its political level security sector reforms. In particular, many of the fi rst generation security sector reforms discussed in Chapter 2 – including the question of civilian control – have been fi rmly established, while initial progress has also been made in some key second generation reform areas. Even so, a number of important problems persist. These include: fi rst, a complex and ambiguous set of institutional relationships which leaves the effective management of the security sector at the mercy of civilian political squabbles and disputes; second, a continuing legacy of partification within the security sector, particularly in relation to the intelligence agencies; and fi nally, the need to further consolidate many second generation security sector reforms.

The legacy of the 1990s The Croatian security sector was created in the context of the Homeland War of 1991–5. Indeed, the fact that Croatia was, in the words of Marcus Tanner, ‘a nation forged in war’ at the beginning of the 1990s gave the army, police and intelligence agencies a particularly special

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place in the nationalist mythology of the country.1 They were widely perceived to be not just the defenders of the Croatian people against the Serbian aggressor, but in many respects the architects of the Croatian state itself. This gave the security sector as a whole – and especially the military – a high degree of nationalist legitimacy in Croatian society. 2 The image of being national saviours elevated them above the mundane concerns of workaday politics in the eyes of many Croatians, and cultivated a culture of exclusivity within the security sector itself and a suspicion of external interference in its internal affairs. It also linked them inextricably to Tu
man and the HDZ, whose own legitimacy and standing in Croatian society rested in large part on their role as the founders of the independent Croatian state, and, in the case of Tu
man at least, the Command-in-Chief of the armed forces themselves. 3 These shared foundations of nationalist legitimacy underpinned the regime’s more explicit partification strategies in the military, police and intelligence agencies – discussed below – and encouraged a deeply ingrained institutional sympathy towards the HDZ within the security sector as a whole. Tu
man and the HDZ bequeathed their own important political legacy to the Croatian security sector. This included a strong tradition of civilian control, though one that was based firmly around authoritarian rather than democratic strategies for civil supremacy. These included the cultivation of an institutional and political context that ensured the supremacy of the presidency in the chain of command; the formal and informal partification of the security sector itself; and fi nally the cooption of security sector actors through the provision of material incentives to those who proved loyal to the regime. The Croatian constitution of 1990 established a semi-presidential system in which power was, at least in theory, shared between the presidency, the government and the parliament. In practice, however, Tu
man, as head of the dominant HDZ party, was able to exercise complete de facto control over the activities of both the government and parliament and so establish his personal dominance of the Croatian political system as a whole.4 The presidency also had a particularly important constitutional position when it came to security sector issues. The constitution identified him as commander in chief of the armed forces, with influence over all aspects of military development. This was a highly significant power given that the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies were to all intents and purposes created from scratch at the beginning of the 1990s, in the context of what many Croatians saw as a war for national survival. 5 It thus gave Tu
man – as well as those close to him such as his powerful and hard-line defence minister

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Croatia

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Gojko Šušak – a defi nitive role in moulding the institutional character and subsequent development of the Croatian security sector, particularly in the area of personnel. Tu
man also established chains of command and responsibility that exploited loopholes in Croatia’s constitutional provisions for democratic control, and allowed him to take personal control of the country’s fledgling security sector. Under Article 101 of the 1990 constitution for example, he had the right to issue presidential decrees with the full force of the law in the event that regular government bodies did not function properly. The decision as to when these Article 101 powers came into force was in practice Tu
man’s alone. This was a power he utilised extensively with regard to the security sector, providing him as it did with a constitutionally sanctioned mechanism through which he could personally direct its activities.6 He also created two advisory committees – the Defence and National Security Committee (VONS) and the Joint National Security Committee (SONS) – in the areas of defence and intelligence respectively.7 These were made up of ministers and other personnel personally appointed by and personally accountable to Tu
man himself. When combined with the president’s powers of presidential decree, these committees functioned as ad hoc executive bodies, directing the work of both the armed forces and intelligence agencies in a manner that effectively circumvented any form of parliamentary scrutiny.8 He also established a National Security Office (UNS), again directly subordinated to him, to coordinate, direct and oversee Croatia’s multiple intelligence agencies at the operational level.9 In effect therefore, throughout the 1990s, key elements of the Croatian security sector were answerable to the president alone, while the president in turn was largely accountable to no one. A second strategy that the Tu
man regime pursued to ensure its control over the security sector was partification. This built on the strong earlier tradition of political partisanship in the security sector that had developed during the SFRJ period, and aimed to bind the military, police and intelligence agencies to the HDZ by penetrating it throughout with instruments of party control. In theory at least, the Croatian armed forces were established as a self-consciously apolitical organisation, with the 1991 Defence Act prohibiting ‘political activities’ and banning servicemen from belonging to political parties.10 The reality however was different. Initial recruitment into the fledging Croatian security sector in the early 1990s exhibited a heavy bias towards the HDZ. Indeed, as Chapter 5 discusses in greater depth, the fi rst volunteer defence units that would later form the core of the new Croatian National Guard (ZNG) and eventually

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the Croatian Army (HV)11 proper consisted primarily of HDZ enthusiasts, and subsequent political interference in the affairs of the military by the HDZ was extensive. This increased throughout the 1990s as the immediate operational demands of the war receded and allowed the regime to turn more of its attention towards consolidating its grip on the domestic political scene. HDZ influence penetrated the armed forces at a number of both formal and informal levels. Formally, a Political Directorate for the HV was established in March 1993 and Deputy Commanders for Political Affairs were present at every level in the command structure. Informally, Tu
man’s role as commander in chief of the armed forces gave him a controlling influence over who was appointed or promoted to positions of influence in the HV. In the early 1990s top positions in the HV were often fi lled by HDZ officials to encourage party control and military loyalty and throughout the decade, appointment to positions of influence within the HV and Ministry of Defence became increasingly dependent on HDZ membership. At the same time, former Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) officers – many of whom had joined the HV at the start of the war and subsequently attained command positions within it – were steadily marginalised in favour of HDZ loyalists, often nationalist hardliners drawn from the Croatian diaspora.12 Similar strategies of partification were also pursued in the police and Ministry of the Interior. As with the military, there was a difference between the de jure theory and de facto practice in this area. So, while the 1991 Law on Internal Affairs prohibited police officers from becoming members of any political party, in practice loyalty to the HDZ emerged as a prerequisite for advancement within the force. This ensured that all the top positions in the police were fi lled by HDZ supporters and over time entrenched strong pro-HDZ sympathies within the institution as a whole.13 HDZ partification went furthest in the intelligence agencies however. Tu
man assured his personal control of the services by appointing his own son, Miroslav, to the positions of director of HIS (the ‘main and supreme’ service in the intelligence system) and deputy director of the main intelligence coordinating body, the UNS.14 Defence minister Šušak played a similarly influential role in the two military intelligence agencies, the SIS and the ObU. Tu
man frequently purged those personnel he suspected of being disloyal to him and cultivated an atmosphere of intense competition and rivalry between the services themselves. This served to prevent any one service – or personality – within the intelligence sector from concentrating enough power in their hands to challenge his rule.15 Throughout the 1990s therefore, the regime was able

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to use its intelligence agencies in an overtly political manner: spying on and intimidating its opponents in the opposition, media and civil society.16 Tu
man and the HDZ thus created a sometimes formal, often informal, pyramid of clientalism throughout the Croatian security sector, where the regime’s interests could be represented at every level of the promotion system, and through which strong political influence could be exercised.17 The regime also worked to tie the institutional interests of the security sector itself directly to its own through a series of cooption strategies. These took the form of material incentives which allowed key personnel to enrich themselves and gain social prominence as long as they toed the party line. Security sector personnel were often the fi rst to take over property that had been abandoned by Serbs during the war. Security sector budgets were maintained at high levels and subject to massive embezzlement and fraud from within, while trusted personnel were rewarded with high rank or a stake in Tu
man’s privatisation process.18 In the police, widespread corruption was tolerated throughout the Tu
man period, while they in turn turned a blind eye to the corrupt practices of some of the regime’s most senior figures.19 Underpinning all these strategies for civilian control of the Croatian security sector was the nationalist legitimacy of the regime itself. Tu
man and the HDZ were able to successfully portray themselves as the architects of Croatian independence and defenders of the new state at a time of existential threat. At the same time, for all its authoritarian proclivities, the regime presided over a political system in Croatia that at least provided the veneer of democracy. While they lasted, these associations provided a powerful mechanism for legitimising the regime and mobilising support for its policies. They also gave it unrivalled authority in the national security sphere. 20 Even so, while Tu
man and the HDZ undoubtedly exercised substantial control over the Croatian security sector, this was not entirely unconditional. For example, some have suggested that Tu
man always remained particularly suspicious of the military preferring instead to rely on those special formations he had directly subordinated to him such as his Presidential Guard. 21 What is clear is that no part of the Croatian security sector intervened to prevent the fall of the HDZ after the party was defeated in parliamentary elections in January 2000. 22 Pressure was put on military personnel to vote for HDZ candidates during the elections and a number of pro-HDZ generals campaigned actively in support of the party. In the fi nal event however, the military,

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along with the police and the intelligence agencies, remained passive in the face of the system change. This passivity demonstrated that the democratic trappings of the Croatian state were not wholly superficial. It was also reflective of a collapse in the legitimacy and popularity of the HDZ regime in Croatian society more widely. This had occurred largely because of the country’s deepening economic woes and the rampant corruption of the party elite.23 Given the unpopularity of the regime and of the security sector itself – and coupled with the indisputable confirmation of this in the election result – the leadership of the Croatian security sector was clearly aware that any intervention on their part to obstruct the political changes of 2000 would have been a dangerously risky and unpopular exercise.24

First generation security sector reform Despite the peaceful nature of the political changes in 2000, the legacy of the 1990s ran deeply throughout the Croatian security sector. Its formative development had been shaped by the immediate demands of the war, while the remainder of the decade had seen it increasingly politicised and tied to the old HDZ regime. Subsequent governments thus faced a series of difficult security sector reform challenges. The most pressing of these was the need to establish and consolidate the basis principle of civilian control. This had two distinct though related aspects. First, there was the need to construct a new system for civilsecurity sector relations based around democratic rather than authoritarian methods. Secondly, the post-Tu
man government was faced with the task of eliminating the most rapaciously partisan tendencies of the security sector itself.

Institutional and legislative changes Croatia’s pre-existing 1990 constitution did provide a basically sound structure for democratic control over the security sector, outlining a semi-presidential system with the president as commander in chief of the armed forces. However, it was also replete with overlapping responsibilities and ambiguities in relation to the defence and intelligence sectors particularly. These gave a very strong role to the presidency and – as the Tu
man period had clearly demonstrated – were potentially open to serious abuse. One of the fi rst actions of the new government in this area was to try and iron out some of these loopholes through a number of constitutional amendments. These established Croatia as a parliamentary democracy. Executive power was to reside primarily in the hands of the

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government, which in turn was to be accountable to parliament.25 In most areas, including command of the police26 and the role of the presidential decree, these changes diminished the power of the presi-dency considerably. Nevertheless, even this amended constitutional framework gave the presidency some important powers in relation to national security and foreign affairs. According to the constitution, he or she is ‘responsible for the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia’; is Commander in Chief of the armed forces and; through the National Security Council,27 cooperates in directing the activities of the intelligence agencies.28 The president also has important powers of appointment in both the military and intelligence sectors. However, in order to pre-empt any future Tu
man style presidential excesses, these powers were also offset by a series of checks and balances, with many of the president’s decisions in these areas also having to be approved or confi rmed by either the government or the parliament. 29 One of the consequences of this system is that the chain of command in the defence and intelligence sectors contains a number of ambiguities and overlapping responsibilities. For example, while the president is responsible for the overall defence of the country, he or she has no role in either the development or fi nancing of the armed forces. As one member of the president’s Military Cabinet has observed, the constitutional role of the president in the chain of command thus . . . . . . resembles the position of the Chief Executive Officer in a large company who is responsible for the operations and well-being of the company, but cannot influence its fi nances or development plans. 30

While this complex division of responsibilities is neither inherently unworkable nor undemocratic in theory, it is unwieldy, and relies on close cooperation between the three branches of government to be effective. In practice, since 2000, this cooperation has not always been easily forthcoming which in turn has sometimes had a negative impact on the workability of Croatia’s defence and security policymaking machinery. Croatia’s fi rst post-Tu
man government was made up of a fragile coalition of six (and from June 2001, five) political parties. This fractured political situation meant that the new government was characterised by inter-coalitional tensions and rivalries from its very inception. Moreover, while widely respected and popular in the country at large, the new president – Stipe Mesic´ – came from one of the smaller and least influential parties in the governing coalition, a factor which set the scene for further confl ict between the government and presidency.

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Matters were compounded by the fact that the new defence minister, Jozo Radoš, was a senior member of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), whose leader, Dražen Budiša, had been Mesic´’s main opponent, and fierce rival, in the presidential elections. These tensions and rivalries did not disappear after the creation of the new government. Instead, throughout 2000–2 they found expression in a bitterly fought turf war between the Ministry of Defence and the presidency over control of the military and intelligence agencies. Mesic´ for example, complained that the Defence Minister regularly blocked his orders to the armed forces’ Chief of General Staff, Petar Stipetic´. In June 2001 Stipetic´ himself went so far as to declare that both he and President Mesic´ had been placed under surveillance of the Ministry of Defence’s own intelligence agency, the SIS. 31 These divisions and enmities meant that for the period of the fi rst Racˇan government – between December 2000 and July 2002 – there was no clear and uncontested agenda for security sector reform. It was not always even clear who it was that was actually responsible for the reform process and each new piece of legislation was the product of months of debate, often reflecting the lowest common denominator that all members of the coalition could subscribe to. 32 For example, it took until March 2002 to introduce key defence legislation such as the National Security Strategy, the Defence Strategy, a new Defence Act, and the Security Services Act, despite this being identified as a priority from 2000 onwards. Even then, the legislation itself remained a compromise and incorporated a number of complicated institutional interrelationships and ambiguities. 33 This early inertia in Croatian defence reform began to lift after the collapse of the fi rst Racˇan government and its replacement by a new coalition, also led by Racˇan. Perhaps most significantly, defence minister Radoš – a member of one of the most disruptive parties in the old government34 – was succeeded by Željka Antunovic´, a deputy prime minister and more proactive and politically authoritative figure. The negative influence of intra-governmental political infighting reduced further with the election of a reformed HDZ-government under Ivo Sanader on the basis of a much stronger coaltional arrangement in November 2003. The Sanader government found it much easier to articulate a clear security sector reform agenda, and the period from 2003 saw the pace of the reform process pick up considerably. Even so, divisions within the HDZ, between centre-right reformists and more hard-line nationalists, persisted and undermined security sector reform policies in contentious areas such as cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague

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(ICTY). 35 Moreover, tensions between the presidency and government were if anything more severe. For example, Sanader and Mesic´ clashed bitterly over the activities of the Counter Intelligence Agency (POA)36 in November 2004. POA was accused of engaging in a number of (proHDZ) activities aimed at undermining Mesic´ in the run up to the presidential elections the following month. In response Mesic´ demanded the dismissal of the head of the agency, Joško Podbevšek, as well as those agents directly accused of misconduct. According to the Constitution and the Security Services Act, however, the power to dismiss Podbevšek was shared between the president and the prime minister. Sanader initially refused to agree to Mesic´’s demands, sparking two weeks of political tensions and talk of a constitutional crisis. 37 The Prime Minister eventually backed down and the scandal was resolved. However, the affair demonstrated the continuing problem of Croatia’s unwieldy chain of command and it’s potential vulnerability to political disagreements in the civilian sector. In the event of a disagreement between the president and the prime minister over the appointment or dismissal of key personnel in the Croatian security sector – in this case the head of POA – the only solution under current arrangements is political negotiation and compromise. There is no clear and unambiguous constitutional solution to such an impasse. Despite these very visible and sometimes serious problems, the institutional tensions and ambiguities inherent in the Croatian defence and security policy system have served only to slow rather than to completely derail political level security sector reform. Since 2000, and while the process has rarely been smooth, Croatia has succeeded in introducing a number of important acts and laws. These include the aforementioned legislation and documentation, but also the Law on the Police (2000), the Law on Service in the Armed Forces (2002), the Law on the Participation of Members of the Croatian Armed Forces in Peace Operations Abroad (2002), a Strategic Defence Review (2005), and the Long Term Development Plan for the Croatian Armed Forces (2006), amongst others. While at the time of writing in mid 2006 there was still a continuing need for further documentation in this area – in particular a proposed study on the professionalisation of the armed forces – the achievements of 2000–6 do provide the foundation for a working, albeit occasionally complex and flawed, system of democratic civilsecurity sector relations.

Departification Departification was one of the most serious security sector reform challenges faced by the new government in 2000. The extent of partification

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in the security sector under Tu
man was such that some even feared that parts of it – and particularly the military – might even be tempted to interfere in the political process, either to protect their own sectional interests or to obstruct or influence the nature of the political changes occurring in the country. This was no idle threat during 2000–1. Indeed, much of the early period of the Racˇan government’s term in office was characterised by quite severe civil-military tensions: both between the government and the presidency and between the civil and military sectors more generally. The new government took several concrete steps to root out the most pernicious elements of the old regime’s civil-security sector relationships soon after coming to power. The Presidential Guard, which had been personally subordinated to Tu
man and fell outside the army’s normal chain of command, was disbanded, while a number of officials within the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior were dismissed. 38 Action was also taken in the intelligence sector. The agencies’ most compromised senior figures were either dismissed or resigned, while HIS itself was reorganised. 39 In addition, Croatian parliament ratified a government measure on increased cooperation with the ICTY, a move which exposed a number of security sector personnel, some of them senior, to possible arrest and transfer to the Hague. These actions did not go unchallenged. Perhaps the most serious incident occurred in September 2000, after 12 suspects, including two Army generals were arrested on suspicion of war crimes. This provoked a furious reaction from the HDZ, but also from within the military itself. Seven serving and five retired generals wrote an open letter to the government, attacking its policies and accusing it of ‘slandering of war heroes’. As Zoran Kusovac has observed, the proclamation ‘reeked of thinly veiled threats of a military coup’ and questioned the extent to which the armed forces were really under full civilian control. President Mesic´ acted decisively in response, defusing the crisis by quickly pensioning off the serving generals who had signed the letter.40 Mesic´’s actions established an important precedent of civilian control over the Croatian security sector, which in the main has persisted ever since. Indeed, while there were a number of further incidents of borderline military insubordination by elements of the military over the ICTY issue between 2000–1, these never seriously challenged the principle of civilian control over the armed forces in the same way as the ‘generals’ letter’ incident had done.41 However, while the threat of direct praetorian intervention by serving military officers may have been negated, the legacy of Tu
man-era partification proved more pernicious in other areas and it has continued

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to exercise a two-fold influence of Croatia’s security sector reform process. This has occurred fi rst, in relation to the continued influence pro-HDZ veterans’ associations and other HDZ sympathisers within the security sector proper; and second, to the persistent legacy of a culture of partification within the Croatian political system as a whole. While the HDZ was roundly defeated in the 2000 elections, it was not completely eliminated as a political force. This was particularly the case in relation to defence and security policy issues. During the Tu
man period, it had cultivated a network of well organised veterans’ organisations such as the Association of Invalids of the Patriotic War (HVIDRA). Moreover, and whatever personnel changes had occurred amongst the top ranks, the military, police and intelligence agencies all remained to a degree institutionally sympathetic towards the HDZ. Throughout 2000–3, the HDZ was able to use these remaining tendrils of partification to exercise a continuing influence over Croatian defence and security policy. In particular, it was able to mobilise vocal opposition to government security sector reform policies in areas such as the prosecution of war crimes indictees or reducing the size of the armed forces. For example, in February 2001, HVIDRA, with strong HDZ support, organised a series of protests and roadblocks in protest at Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY. At their height these attracted as many as 100,000 people, including the seven generals that Mesic´ had dismissed earlier in the year and a number of serving soldiers in uniform. These scenes were repeated in March 2003 when a Croatian court sentenced former Army general Mirko Norac to 12 years in jail for war crimes.42 On each occasion, the veterans’ protests ultimately petered out due to a lack of sustained public support, and their direct impact on government policy was limited. However, their indirect effect was significant. Their activities served to raise the political stakes involved in implementing potentially contentious policies and to hamper the government’s ability to forge ahead with root and branch security sector reforms. Senior policy makers admitted in 2002 that nervousness over the reaction of the veterans’ organisations had helped to stall the implementation of certain key reforms such as military downsizing.43 While Antunovic´’s appointment as defence minister did mark a more assertive approach to defence reform in the face of these pressures from mid2002 onwards, the potential for criticism and obstruction from the veterans’ groups remained an underlying constraint on the government’s security sector reform policies throughout the period of both Racˇan governments.

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The re-election of a new HDZ government in November 2003 changed the political context for security sector reform in Croatia significantly. Perhaps ironically given their close connection to the HDZ, it also drastically reduced the influence of the veterans’ groups. To the surprise of many, once in office the Sanader government continued its predecessor’s reform programme. It was able to do so without fear of criticism from the veterans’ groups and other conservative organisations in Croatian society precisely because of its close (often symbiotic) links with them, and its own impeccable nationalist credentials. This did not mean that the influence of hard-liners in the security sector reform process completely disappeared. The HDZ itself was split between reformist and nationalist wings, and serious disagreements over key policies (such as cooperation with the ICTY) persisted. However, it did make it easier to contain the influence of these groups and meant that disagreements over reform were generally addressed within existing party structures rather than through open criticism and obstructionism of government policy. Perhaps the most significant question over the role of the veterans’ groups in Croatian society has been the extent to which they represent opinion within the military itself and whether this in turn has implications for civilian control over the security sector. What is clear is that groups such as HVIDRA have reflected a far wider ambiguity over the war legacy that has persisted within the military, police and intelligence agencies, and to a degree within Croatian society as a whole. This comprises of a view that the ‘Homeland War’ of 1991–5 was a wholly legitimate war for national survival, forced on Croatia by a ruthless aggressor.44 Accordingly, it is unacceptable and unfair to condemn Croatian actions over the course of the conflict, and downright offensive to equate them to those of the Serbs.45 It is unsurprising that this account of the war has emerged as dominant within the Croatian security sector. The armed forces, police and intelligence agencies – and indeed the Croatian state itself – were created in the circumstances of the confl ict, and their own institutional identities remain closely linked to it. In itself this is unproblematic. However, it does become an issue for democratic, civilian control over the security sector if it then colours the willingness of these organisations to implement government policy. There has been some evidence that this has been the case in Croatia, particularly in relation to the arrest and extradition of ICTY indictees to the Hague. For example, there were a number of allegations that elements of the intelligence agencies and the police actively assisted runaway ICTY indictee General Ante Gotovina, including providing him with false passports and obstructing the work

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of Hague investigators.46 For its part the military has been publicly content to leave policy issues to the government, at least since 2001. However, a number of former officers have been vitriolic in their condemnation of government policy towards the Hague, a position which almost certainly reflects a wider unease with the ICTY process in the army proper.47 A second impact of security sector partification in Croatia has been the continuing tradition of appointing and dismissing key security sector personnel according to the political preferences of the government of the day. Indeed, arguably the Croatian security sector has undergone not so much a process of departification but successive processes of repartification since 2000. The implication here is that personnel policy within the security sector has still often been based as much on personal connections and political sympathies as on fitness for the post.48 The institutional potential for abuse is certainly present. The defence minister, for example, nominates assistant ministers to head up the various departments49 within the Ministry of Defence, as well as a number of advisors and assistants. These have to be approved by the government, but can be – and generally are – explicitly political appointments with party affi liations who in turn are responsible for appointments and promotions within their own departments. In this context, some critics have alleged that advancement within the Ministry of Defence has often occurred on nakedly clientalist grounds. Certainly, the extensive personnel changes which occurred within the Ministry after the Racˇan coalition came to power in 2000 appeared to suggest as much, with four of Defence Minister Radoš’s five assistant ministers of defence being drawn from his own HSLS party. 50 A similar ‘changing of the guard’ also took place after the new Sanader government came to power in November 2003. 51 This process was if anything even more pronounced in the police and Interior Ministry. In 2000, for example, there was extensive and rapid personnel change throughout the police management structure. Many argued that these changes were clearly politically inspired, not least because many of the new appointees had no previous policing experience. 52 A similar, if more gradual process of personnel change occurred after the election of the Sanader government, with key posts in the Ministry of the Interior and the Police being fi lled with HDZ sympathisers. Again, these appointments appear to have taken place at least in part on explicitly political grounds. 53 In the intelligence agencies, the Podbevšek affair discussed above illustrates the extent to which key posts and appointments have been

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personally and politically linked to key figures in the civil sector. 54 In this case, Prime Minister Sanader fought hard to protect POA director Podbevšek despite the serious nature of the charges against him and his agency. Again, the implications of the incident are that Sanader’s actions were motivated less by the justice of Podbevšek’s case, and more by his personal and political connections to the prime minister. 55 Many of these practices and incidents have undoubtedly resulted from the pressing need to address the rampant partification of the Tu
man-era. The Racˇan government was, after all, faced with the task of removing one set of political appointees and replacing them with a new set of – inevitably – government appointees. Defence Minister Radoš stated in 2002 for example, that while there may be bad practice at some levels of Croatia’s defence system, this resulted less from explicitly party political reasons than from problems associated with adaptation to a new and radically different system of human resource management – an issue that will be discussed in greater detail below. He also stressed that the Ministry was working hard to establish clear objective rules for promotion and that in many respects he considered it safer for staff to declare their political allegiances openly rather than to pretend that they did not exist. 56 Certainly, many long established democracies have a tradition of making political appointments at the top level of their government bureaucracies. This has the advantage of ensuring that those tasked with implementing government policy are likely to be sympathetic to that policy themselves. Many senior government officials in Croatia argue that ‘politicisation’ in the Croatian security sector needs to be seen in the same context: that it is an inevitable, and to some extent desirable, consequence of the character of the wider political system in the country. 57 At the very least, the Racˇan government did take concrete steps to introduce a more transparent and merit-based promotion system in both the ministries of defence and interior, a process which was continued and consolidated under Sanader. 58 Even so, most observers consider that culture of politicisation has continued to persist to one degree or another within the Croatian security sector since 2000. The real question is the extent to which this represents an ultimately benign bias within the Croatian political system or instead a more malign influence that serves to coopt the security sector in a nakedly partisan manner. What is beyond doubt is that because of the circumstances of its creation, much of the Croatian security sector remains institutionally sympathetic towards a more conservative reading of the country’s recent history. As the war years recede further into history and Croatia continues its process of closer integra-

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tion with the EU and NATO, this bias is likely to become less and less significant a factor in the country’s civil-security sector relations. However, until late 2005 at least it continued to have important implications for key areas of government policy. As Chapter 7 will discuss in greater depth, this was particularly the case in relation to cooperation with the ICTY, where since 2000 the role of the security sector has been at best ambivalent and at worst actively obstructive.

Second generation security sector reform Radoš’s assertion that many of the Ministry of Defence’s problems stem from issues of institutional adaptation rather than from more overt questions of partification points to a wider series of challenges in the Croatian security sector reform process. These concern the deeper institutional legacies of both the Tu
man and SFRJ periods, where structures for the management and control of the security sector were organised around authoritarian procedures and norms. Key elements of a system of democratic control over the security sector were not present to any appreciable degree. As Chapter 2 argued, implementing institutional reforms and security sector departification are only the fi rst steps in a process of political level security sector reform. These need to be accompanied by a series of longer term changes in the way that the security sector as a whole conducts its business. Increasingly, these ‘second generation’ concerns have emerged as the dominant challenges in Croatian security sector reform. Broadly, they have related to three main issues: fi rst, to the effectiveness of policy planning and implementation processes in the defence and security bureaucracies; second, to the willingness and ability of the parliament to exercise its powers of oversight; and fi nally to the wider engagement of civil-society in defence and security matters. Common problems across all of these areas have included the lack of a clear direction for the security sector reform process; an absence of transparency both within and between different actors in the Croatian security system; and fi nally capacity problems including a lack of defence and security expertise.

Policy planning and implementation Policy planning and implementation in the Croatian security sector is primarily the responsibility of the two main security sector bureaucracies: the Ministry of Defence which is responsible for the armed forces and its associated intelligence agencies; and the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for the police and the internal security

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service. 59 Since 2000, the ability of both of these organisations to effectively develop and implement policy has been hindered by a number of problems. The fi rst of these has related to the wider political context in Croatia. In 2000, security sector reform was only one reform challenge amongst many others. To many Croatians, issues such as unemployment and a faltering economy appeared to be much more pressing concerns. This did not mean that the security sector was a politically insignificant issue. As the previous discussion has illustrated, the constitutional position of the military and intelligence agencies lay at the heart of the struggle between the government and presidency. However, once it became clear that no element of the security sector was likely to intervene overtly in the domestic political process, the question of security sector reform for its own sake – rather than as a component of wider political battles within the civilian sector – did slip down the political agenda. This tendency was reinforced by the fact that under Tu
man, defence and security issues had been almost the exclusive preserve of a closed HDZ nomenclature or the security sector organisations themselves. As a consequence, there was no cadre of experienced (or even interested) civilian politicians in the new government who were naturally placed to take a fi rm grip on the defence and security portfolios. When combined with the executive turf wars over the new defence and security legislation, this political de-prioritsation led to sluggish progress in many areas of security sector reform. For example, over the period of the fi rst Racˇan government, the Ministry of Defence struggled to push through key reforms such as the downsizing of the armed forces, despite the fact that such measures were widely recognised to be crucial to the future of the military.60 Similarly, it took until Spring 2002 to finalise the legislation reorganising the intelligence agencies, despite the Prime Minister having earlier claimed their internal situation to be ‘catastrophic’. Even then, the provisions of the new law were implemented only slowly and erratically. Indeed, in late June 2006, the 2002 law was itself replaced by yet another new intelligence agencies act (the Security and Intelligence Systems Law) that aimed to rectify the weaknesses and deficiencies of its predecessor.61 The situation was somewhat different in the Interior Ministry, not least because control over the police was not subject to the same degree of political disagreement as the military. Nevertheless, even here it took until April 2003 for the Ministry to introduce a police reform strategy plan. New momentum was leant to the defence reform process by Antunovic´’s appointment in 2002 and as Chapter 5 will illustrate, the

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period of her tenure saw some important progress in key reform areas. From 2003, this was built upon by the Sanader government, spurred on in part by the gathering pace of Croatia’s NATO and EU accession bids. Even so, political will problems have persisted in relation to security sector reform in Croatia, and the Defence Ministry in particular has tended to be an unpopular portfolio amongst ministers.62 Political divisions within the Racˇan coalition also had an important impact on the transparency of defence and security policy making within and between the security sector bureaucracies. Another legacy of the Tu
man era was the development of what has been dubbed a ‘secrecy psychosis’ in the defence and security system.63 This applied both with regard to the wider civilian environment, but also to relations within the system as well. Indeed, the clientalist nature of the Croatian political system under Tu
man encouraged a climate of paranoia and suspicion both within and between governmental ministries. As a consequence, different departments within the ministries of defence and interior rarely cooperated and routinely withheld information from each other.64 This practice proved difficult to shake off after 2000, and in many respects was actually reinforced by the politically fragmented nature of the new government. This encouraged party political competition and suspicion between different departments in the Ministry and so hampered the effectiveness of its work.65 Since 2000, the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff has also been characterised by significant rivalry. This reflected both the traditionally unclear division of responsibilities between the two organizations,66 but also the wider political divisions between the president and subsequent governments. In this respect, the Ministry has been the main vehicle of government policy, while the president, as commander in chief of the armed forces, has exercised a greater influence in the General Staff. These institutional tensions have manifested themselves through a distrust of each other’s activities, and an unwillingness to cooperate and share information. For example, in Summer 2001, Defence Minister Radoš made a public – and as it turned out, premature – announcement of his intention to abolish conscription without asking for the advice or opinion of the Chief of the General Staff.67 In 2005 a heated row broke out between the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff – and indeed between Defence Minister Berislav Roncˇevic´ and President Mesic´ – over a major deal to purchase new trucks for the armed forces. Mesic´ alleged that the purchase had occurred on the basis of an illegal direct deal arranged by the Ministry of Defence after the supplier, Stupnik, failed in its original tender for the contract. For his part, Roncˇevic´ labelled Mesic´’s

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allegations ‘tragicomic’ and claimed there had been no wrongdoing on the part of his Ministry.68 The Racˇan and Sanader governments both made efforts to address these transparency problems. The reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence into four rather than eight departments helped to reduce bureaucratic fragmentation and duplication in the defence sector at least, while the more unified nature of the Sanader coalition reduced the potential for intra-governmental rivalry and competition. Nevertheless, ‘stove-piping’ and duplication within the Croatian security sector has remained an issue in some areas, and relations between the Ministry of Defence and General Staff are still often frosty.69 These challenges of political will and transparency have been compounded by a lack of relevant expertise within the security bureaucracies. Under Tu
man, promotion in the military and the police – and in the ministries of defence and the interior – generally occurred on the basis of either HDZ affiliations, or ‘in the field’ through experience gained at a tactical level during the war.70 This had two consequences. It meant that police and military officers appointed to administrative positions within their respective ministries often did not have the appropriate education or experience to enable them to carry out their jobs effectively.71 In addition, the politically partisan nature of the promotion system in the 1990s meant that there was little need to keep objective career records on individual officers. The absence of this information meant that it has been difficult for the ministries to properly assess the quality and experience of their existing staff, and this has made the principle of promotion on the basis of merit difficult to implement. It has also reinforced the tendency towards ‘partification by default’ by making prior knowledge and existing connections crucial in any assessment of a potential candidates abilities.72

Oversight A related set of challenges have impacted on the Croatian parliament’s ability to provide proper oversight of defence and security policy. The parliament has wide ranging powers in this area. These are outlined in the constitution as well as in subsequent legislation such as the Defence, Police and Security Services acts. They identify the parliament as the highest legislative branch of the Republic of Croatia and mandate it to supervise the work of all other areas of the Croatian government.73 However, as in other areas of Croatian civilsecurity sector relations there has been a discrepancy between the powers of the parliament in theory and the effectiveness of their implementation in practice. Again, key issues have included a lack of parlia-

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mentary interest in defence and security matters and the dominant influence of party politics; a lack of transparency in the defence and security system; and a lack of defence and security expertise amongst parliamentarians. The parliament’s main mechanism for exercising oversight over the Croatian security sector is its Committee for Internal Policy and National Security (UPNS). This is a 12 member, all-party committee with extensive de jure powers of oversight over defence and security policy matters. These include the right to ‘send for people and papers’ to appear before it and as well as the power to relieve senior security sector personnel of their duties.74 The committee also has a number of sub-committees that address its more specific areas of responsibility such as the armed forces.75 In addition, the Security Services Act of 2002 established a Council for the Supervision of the Security Services (VNSS), an independent advisory body, appointed by parliament, and authorised to monitor and report on the activities of the intelligence agencies. These powers were strengthened even further in the new Security and Intelligence System Law of 2006. This authorised the VNSS to carry out inspections based on complaints by civil associations or private citizens or if it learns that the intelligence agencies have violated their civil rights.76 Despite the extent of these powers however, the parliament has remained the junior partner in the Croatian defence and security system since 2000. In part this results from the continued legacies of the Tu
man and SFRJ periods in the security sector as well as the wider political context. As discussed above, the exclusivity of the security sector in Croatia prior to 2000 meant that most civilians had little to do with defence and security matters. This tradition continued into the post-Tu
man era, and many parliamentarians have been disengaged from and disinterested in security sector reform issues. While the UNPS committee has become somewhat more active since 2003 – asking more questions and requesting documents for example – there remains, in the words of one insider, ‘a long way to go’ to fully invigorate parliamentary interest in the defence and security sector.77 The strong influence of party politics in the Croatian political system has also played a role in encouraging parliamentary passivity. Most parliamentarians have been content to take direction on defence and security matters either from the security sector ministries themselves or from their party hierarchies.78 As one source has observed, The problem is that, because of the weighting of the membership [of the UPNS committee which favours the government], the ruling party

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or parties can decisively influence what the Committee enquires about, how it conducts its business and the conclusions that it reaches.79

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The impact of party influence on parliament’s ability to do its job has on occasion been severe. At the height of the Podbevšek affair in 2004 for example, the chairman of the VNSS resigned on the grounds that other members of the committee had refused to even discuss the case. The implication here was that the governing party – which was, after all, one of the key protagonists in the scandal – had put pressure on committee members to limit the scope of their investigations.80 Effective parliamentary oversight of the security sector in Croatia has also been hindered by a continued lack of transparency on the part of the security sector organisations and ministries. This has applied across the security sector, but has particularly the case in relation to the Interior Ministry and the intelligence agencies, which have been reluctant to divulge information unless actively pressed to do so. For example, while obliged to answer to the UPNS committee, in practice the Ministry of the Interior has not been questioned frequently and has been deeply suspicious of the potential for intrusive parliamentary scrutiny of its business.81 Transparency problems have been even more pronounced with regard to the intelligence agencies, where they have reflected both the traditional culture of secrecy within these organisations and their fear that parliamentarians may abuse secret information for party political purposes.82 Finally, capacity issues – including an absence of relevant defence and security expertise – have also had an important impact in this area. Parliamentary expertise on defence and security matters is widely recognised to be limited, again, primarily because of Croatia’s strong traditions of security sector exclusivity in defence and security matters.83 Not only has this sometimes limited the parliament’s ability to properly understand the policies it is mandated to scrutinise, it has also reinforced existing tendencies for parliamentarians to look to their parties for guidance. Even those members of parliament who have wished to engage more fully in defence and security matters have faced practical obstacles in doing so. Many of them did not even have offices in 2000, for example, and while this situation has certainly improved in recent years, Croatian parliamentarians still have had only limited access to support staff such as researchers or expert advisors.84 These obstacles have all acted as brakes on the willingness and ability of the Croatian parliament to exercise its powers of security sector oversight in a meaningful way. While some important steps towards addressing these weaknesses have been taken since 2000, the core

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underlying challenges of political will, party influence, transparency and capacity have all persisted into 2006. As a consequence, the parliament has taken a largely quiescent approach towards the governments’ defence and security policies and in the main has used its powers of oversight in these areas extremely sparingly.85

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Civil society

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The fi nal set of second generation security sector reform challenges faced by Croatia relate to the issue of civil society engagement in defence and security matters. Croatia does have a tradition of civil society activism in the defence and security sector in the form of the veterans’ organisations. However, these were originally established by the HDZ and have remained close to the Party ever since. In many respects therefore, it is more useful to view these groups as a component of existing political structures rather than as independent civil society organisations in their own right. Away from the veterans’ groups, the role of civil society actors in the Croatian defence and security system has been limited. During the Tu
man period, the regime was overtly hostile towards civil society organisations in general.86 This animosity was particularly pronounced in the security sector, where its strong traditions of exclusivity effectively closed it off from any ‘external’ influences. The HDZ regime disbanded defence and security related subjects at Croatia’s universities, such as the University of Zagreb’s Defendology programme. Nongovernmental analysis of defence and security issues was often censored, and media comment on defence matters was infrequent and restricted.87 Against this background, there was a limited expansion of the involvement of civil society in defence and security matters after 2000. Undergraduate and postgraduate course in Defendology were reintroduced at Zagreb University, several defence and security related think tanks were established or reinvigorated,88 and the military themselves introduced civilian university courses into their own Cadet training programmes. The Racˇan and Sanader governments also made some effort to utilise non-governmental defence expertise in their reform efforts. For example, an independent team of Croatian academics and experts was commissioned by the fi rst Racˇan government to prepare a Study on National security as the basis for Croatia’s new security legislation and strategies.89 Civil society actors were also drawn into the security sector reform process more directly through their appointment to positions of responsibility in the organisations themselves. Ozren Žunec, a professor of military sociology from Zagreb University, was appointed to be the

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new director of HIS in 2000, while the parliamentary VNSS was made up of civilian experts. Even so, civil society engagement in security sector reform in Croatia has generally been limited. Indeed, while civil society actors have certainly been brought into the Croatian security sector reform process in a very visible manner, the extent to which they have been able to have an impact on policy is less certain. Žunec, for example, resigned as director of HIS after only three months, claiming that political interference made his job impossible, while Vlatko Cvrtila – another Zagreb University professor – stood down as chair of the VNSS for similar reasons in 2004.90 Elsewhere, the team which drafted the widely respected National Security Study complained that many of their recommendations were not incorporated into the new legislation in 2002.91 Civil society interest in and expertise in defence and security matters has also been restricted to a rather small group of Zagreb-based specialists and experts. There are only a limited number of specialist defence correspondents in the Croatian media, for example, and when defence and security issues have been reported, this has often been in a superficial or sensationalist manner.92 These tendencies have helped to reinforce the Croatian security sector’s traditional mistrust of external interest in its affairs. Both the ministries of defence and interior have established public information offices and each has a well developed website with news and document archives. Even so civil society groups have complained that the classification of even quite mundane documents is common, and that accessing material on all but the most uncontentious subjects is often difficult.93 Many civil society organisations and NGOs in Croatia have also faced considerable fi nancial and organisational difficulties, and most have been reliant on some form of external, generally foreign, funding for their continued existence.94 More widely, Croatian society as a whole has remained somewhat ambiguous in its attitude to the security sector. The nationalist legitimacy that the Homeland War conferred on the Army, police and intelligence agencies meant that they retained a very high standing amongst the Croatian public for much of the early 1990s. However, much of this goodwill dissipated in the later Tu
man-era as widespread partification and corruption took their toll. Since 2000, all sections of the Croatian security sector have continued to struggle with this legacy, and the military and intelligence agencies in particular have been viewed as bastions of nationalist conservatism by many Croatians.95 The security sector’s own traditions of institutional exclusivity and a decline in popular threat perceptions have also contributed to these sentiments,

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leading to a widespread societal disengagement from defence and security matters more generally.96 In combination, these factors have led to a generalised popular apathy towards security sector issues amongst many Croatians, and by extension contributed to the limited engagement of civil society groups in the security sector reform process.

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Conclusion

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Since 2000 Croatia has made significant progress at the political level of security sector reform. Constitutional and legal provisions for democratic, civilian control over the security sector have been established and consolidated, the rampant partification of the Tu
man period has been curtailed, old patterns of behaviour in the security bureaucracies have begun to change, while parliament and civil society have been brought into the Croatian defence and security system in a way that would have been unthinkable under the old-style HDZ. All these changes have occurred in the context of a negative set of legacies from the 1990s, including strong traditions of security sector partification and a habit of exclusivity and secrecy in its affairs. Even so, the security sector reform process in Croatia continues to face a series of deeply rooted challenges at the political level. In particular, the chain of command over the armed forces and intelligence agencies remains ambiguous and unclear, which on occasion has allowed the security sector to become the subject of bitter political disputes in the civilian sector. This infighting has held back the reform process and encouraged the continued use of partification strategies in the security sector itself. More widely, and while positive change in all of these areas has undoubtedly taken place, capacity, transparency and expertise issues persist in relation to policy planning and implementation, parliamentary oversight and civil society engagement in defence and security matters. Political and popular interest in these areas has also generally been limited. In many respects it is hardly surprising that many of these problems have persisted. They are indicative of deeply embedded institutional cultures that developed during the earlier Tu
man and SFRJ periods and it would be unrealistic to expect them to disappear overnight. The broader picture since 2000 has been one of continued democratic consolidation, and Croatia’s continuing second generation security sector reform challenges need to be seen fi rmly in this context. Many of these issues – such as a lack of popular or parliamentary interest in defence or the use of cadre policies in the security bureaucracies – are also familiar in many established democracies. They are certainly given a

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sharper edge in Croatia because of the twin legacies of war and authoritarianism. Nevertheless, at the political level at least, security sector reform in the country is increasingly moving from the special circumstances of transformation to the realm of everyday democratic politics.

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Notes

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1 Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997). 2 Though this had begun to decay by the late 1990s as corruption and increasing authoritarianism began to tarnish the nationalist legacy in Croatia. Alex J. Bellamy, ‘A crisis of legitimacy: military and society in Croatia’, in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds), Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 193–4. 3 Renéo Lukic and Jean-François Morel refer to the ‘charismatic legitimacy’ that the war years conferred in Tu
man, the HDZ and the Croatian armed forces. Renéo Lukic and Jean-François Morel, ‘Croatia, 1990–2001’, in Albert Legault and Joel Sokolsky (eds), The Soldier and the State in the Post-Cold War Era (Kingston, Ontario: Queens Quarterly Press, 2002), pp. 164–5; 170–3. 4 For more on Tu
man’s domestic political supremacy see Lukic and Morel, ‘Croatia’, pp. 164–5. 5 One partial exception to this was the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP). This was a continuation of the old Yugoslavera State Security Service (SDS). The Serb cadres left in 1990–1 but that was all. I am grateful to Ozren Žunec for this point. 6 Damir Grubiša, ‘Democratic Control of Armed Forces’, in Jan A. Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri (eds), Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003), p. 349. 7 VONS dealt primarily with political matters while SONS coordinated the work of state ministries with that of the UNS and the intelligence agencies. 8 Grubiša, ‘Democratic Control of Armed Forces’, pp. 348–9. 9 These comprised of the Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS); the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP); the Security Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defence (SIS); and the Directorate of Intelligence Affairs of the Army General Staff (ObU). For more information on the structure and responsibilities of the Croatian intelligence agencies see Chapter 4. See also, Miroslav, Tu
man, ‘The fi rst five years of the Croatian intelligence service: 1993–8’, National Security and the Future, 2:1 (2000), pp. 50–1, 56.

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77

10 Article 42, Defence Act, 1991, cited in Ozren Žunec, ‘Democracy in the “Fog of War”: Civil–Military Relations in Croatia’, in Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds), Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 225. 11 The HV were renamed the Armed Forces of Croatia (OSRH) in 1996. 12 For an excellent discussion of the (changing) composition of the HV officer corps in the early 1990s see Lukic and Morel, ‘Croatia’, pp. 174–9. 13 Author’s interview, Zagreb, 7 July 2004. 14 Tu
man, ‘The fi rst five years’, p. 56. Miroslav Tu
man occupied these roles between 1993–8. 15 Marko Milivojevic´, ‘Croatia’s Security services’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 1994 (online version), pp. 2–4. There was also much speculation that – before his death in 1998 – Šušak had established a strong enough power base in the HDZ and defence sector to form a potential challenge to Tu
man. 16 Ozren Žunec, ‘Democratic oversight and control over intelligence and security agencies’, in Trapans and Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 384–5. 17 Biljana Vankovska-Cvetovska, ‘Between the past and the future: civilmilitary relations in the Balkans’, Südosteuropa, 48:1–2, 1999, p. 40. 18 Zoran Kusovac, ‘HDZ tests Croat coalition’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 April 2001, pp. 20–1. 19 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic´, ‘Distinct and different: the transformation of the Croatian police’, in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe (Münster: Lit Verlag, April 2004), pp. 34–5. 20 Vesna Pusic´, ‘Dictatorships with democratic legitimacy: democracy versus nation’, East European Politics and Societies, 8:4 (1994), p. 397. 21 Biljana Vankovska and Håkan Wiberg, Between Past and Future: CivilMilitary Relations in the Post-Communist Balkans (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 212, 223. This was particularly the case with regard to the large numbers of former JNA officers (as many as 2500) who joined the HV in 1991, many of whom were subsequently purged. I am grateful to Ozren Žunec for this point. 22 Tu
man himself died in December 1999, an increasingly unpopular figure in the face of economic decline and the widespread corruption of his regime. 23 It was also a consequence of the unpopularity – and perceived illegitimacy – of the military’s interventions in BiH between 1993–5. See Bellamy, ‘A crisis of legitimacy’, pp. 188–9. 24 Vankovska and Wiberg, Between Past and Future, p. 212. 25 Articles 80, 112, Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 2001. 26 The police force operates under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. Under Tu
man this had been closely controlled by the presidency.

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27 The National Security Council was established by the Security Services Act of 21 March 2002. It comprises of the president and the prime minister as well as other relevant government ministers. In practice this arrangement squeezes the president out of the day to day chain of command in the intelligence sector, though he or she does retain important powers of appointment. For further details see, Vlatko Cvrtila, ‘Parliament and the security sector’ in Jan A. Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri (eds), Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003), pp. 366–7; Zvonimir Mahecˇ ic´, ‘Civilians and the military in security sector reform’, in ibid. p. 377. 28 Articles 93, 99, 102, Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 2001. 29 Grubiša, ‘Democratic control of armed forces’, in Trapans and Fluri, Defence and Secuirty Sector Governance, pp. 349–54. 30 Zvonimir Mahecˇ ic´, ‘Civilians and the military in security sector reform’, p. 373 31 Lukic and Morel, ‘Croatia’, p. 188. 32 Alex J. Bellamy and Timothy Edmunds, ‘Civil-military relations in Croatia: politicisation and the politics of reform’, European Security, 14:1 (March 2005), p. 75. 33 For example, the government proposes the appointment or dismissal of the appointment or dismissal of the Chief of General Staff. The parliament also has an input into the matter, while it is the president who actually carries out the appointment or dismissal. The exact position of the defence minister in the chain of command also remains unclear. Articles 6, 7, 8, 10, Defence Act of the Republic of Croatia, 2002. 34 Radoš was a member of the Croatian Social Liberal Party, which resigned from the government in protest at its increasingly cooperative policy towards the ICTY. 35 See, for example, Drago Hedl, ‘Croatia: HDZ makes astonishing u-turn’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 9 January 2004, www.iwpr.net. 36 POA succeeded SZUP in a reorganisation of the intelligence agencies in March 2002. At the time of writing POA itself was due to be superseded by a newly created SOA: Security and Intelligence Agency (formerly OA and POA). See Chapter 5 for more details. 37 Drago Hedl, ‘Watergate-style spying scandal rocks Zagreb’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 16 December 2004. 38 Zoran Kusovac, ‘HDZ tests Croat coalition’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 April 2001, p. 21. 39 ‘HIS to return to basic tasks through reorganisation’, Hina, 24 May 2000. www.hina.hr. 40 Kusovac, ‘HDZ tests Croat coalition’, pp. 21–2. 41 For example, Mesic´ was insulted by military personnel during visit to a barracks in May 2001, while his policy on the ICTY was the subject of

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43 44

45

46

47 48 49

50 51

52 53

54 55

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thinly veiled criticism in a speech by a serving military officer during opening ceremony of the military arts games in August that same year. See Lukic and Morel, ‘Croatia’, pp. 190–1. Kusovac, ‘HDZ tests Croat coalition’, p. 22; ‘Veterans end protest in Croatia’, RFE/RL Newsline, 28 March 2003, www.rferl.org. Author’s interview, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, July 2002. See, for example, Željko Cepanec, Croatia and NATO: The Stony Road to Membership (Zagreb: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 2003), pp. 25–35. These views are reflected in a widespread popular hostility to the prosecution of Croatian ‘war heroes’ in the Hague. See for example, Richard Rose, ‘Croatian public opinion and the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria’, Chatham House Briefi ng Paper EP BP 05/04 (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, December 2005), pp. 6–7. ‘PM announces more replacements at the Interior Ministry’, Hina, 19 April 2005; ‘Sander on media reports on govt’s action plan pertaining to Gotovina case’, Hina, 2 May 2005; ‘Former intelligence chief to be interviewed about forged passports’, Hina, 23 May 2005. See, for example, ‘Retired Croatian generals to organise separate celebration of anniversary of Operation Storm’, Hina, 1 August 2005. Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2002; July 2004. The Ministry of Defence was organised into eight departments, each headed by an Assistant Minister until 2003. A new structure was introduced in 2003 which reduced the number of departments to four: Defence Policy; Human Resources; Material Resources; and Finance and Budgeting. Lukic and Morel, ‘Croatia’, p. 187. Author’s interview with Dr Tomo Radicˇevic´, Director, Institute for Research and Development of Defence Systems, Ministry of Defence [formerly Head of Defence Policy and Planning (to 1 August 2003), Ministry of Defence], Zagreb, 5 July 2004. Authors interview, Zagreb, 7 July 2004. One of the fi rst moves of the new government on coming to power, for example, was to appoint Stipe Cˇacˇ ija – previously Sanader’s personal bodyguard, and someone few thought was properly qualified for the post – to the position of Assistant Interior Minister. Cˇacˇ ija resigned shortly afterwards due to a public scandal over his personal life. For more details of personnel change in the police under the Sanader government see Jutarnji list, 20 June 2004. See also footnote 31 for allegations of Radoš’s abuse of the Ministry of Defence’s SIS. Other interpretations of the affair suggest that Podbevšek was sacked precisiely because he had come across compromising material on Mesic´. See for example, ‘PM Sanader refutes reporter Cicak’s statements on POA, Mesic . . .’ Hina, 30 December 2004.

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56 Author’s interview with Jozo Radoš, Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia (2000–2), Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, 10 July 2002. Radoš’s critics remained sceptical of his attempts to play down partification and patronage in the Croatia defence sector. 57 Author’s interviews with Ivan Kozlica, Assistant Minster for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, 11 July 2002; Jelena Grcˇ ic´ Polic´, Assistant Minister for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, 7 July 2004. 58 For example, a new position of Chief of Police was established to explicitly act as a buffer between the minister as a political appointment and the police force itself. Even so, the government was heavily criticised in February 2006 for still having failed to introduce clear criteria for the appointment of Ministry of Defence Staff. ‘Parliament starts debate on readiness of defence system, situation in the armed forces’, Hina, 1 February 2006. 59 The position of the two coordinating bodies in the Croatian intelligence system – the UNS and Intelligence Agency (OA, formerly HIS) – in the chain of command is more complex. See Žunec, ‘Democratic oversight’, p. 383 for further details. 60 Radoš himself recognised the significance of military downsizing in an interview with the author in 2002. Author’s interview with Radoš, 10 July 2002. 61 ‘Parliament adopts law on security-intelligence system’, Hina, 30 June 2006. 62 Author’s interview, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, July 2004. 63 Mladen Stanicˇ ic´, ‘Security sector reform in Croatia’, in Trapans and Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, p. 340. 64 Tatjana Cˇumpek, ‘Transparency and accountability in the defence and security sectors’, in Trapans and Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, p. 425. 65 Mladen Stanicˇ ic´, ‘Civil society and the security sector’, in ibid. p. 435. 66 Until the Ministry of Defence was reorganised in 2003, both organisations had internal departmental structures that mirrored the others’ in a number of areas such as personnel management. Information provided by the Ministry of Defence, Zagreb, July 2002. 67 Mahecˇ ic´, ‘Civilians and the military’, p. 375. 68 ‘Mesic announces probe into purchase of army trucks, defence minister responds’, Hina, 8 January 2005. 69 Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2004. 70 Lidija Cehulic, ‘Development of civil-military relations in Croatia’, International Issues, 10:1, 2001, p. 127. 71 For a breakdown of the educational background of the OSRH officer corps that clearly illustrates this point see, Zvonimir Mahecˇ ic´, ‘Izagovi reforme I smajenja oružanih snaga Republike Hrvatske’ Polemos, 6:1–2 (2003), pp. 49–69.

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72 Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2002; July 2004. 73 Cvrtila, ‘Parliament and the security sector’, pp. 361–9. 74 For further details on the UPNS committee including how membership is ‘shared out’ between parties see ‘Croatia’, in David Greenwood (ed.), Transparency and Accountability in South East European Defence (Sofia: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces & the George C. Marshall Association, 2003), pp. 361–9. 75 Though in effect some of these exist only on paper. At the time of writing in early 2006, the Sub-Committee for Defence had still never met. 76 Unlike the UPNS committee the Council can only draw attention to malpractice and has no executive powers itself. ‘Parliament adopts law on security-intelligence system’, Hina, 30 June 2006. 77 Author’s interview with Vlatko Cvrtila, Chairman, Council for the Supervision of the Security Services, 5 July 2004. 78 An exception to this was Croatia’s decision to send troops to Afghanistan when a more serious debate did take place. Amadeo Watkins, ‘PfP Integration: Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro’, CSRC Balkans Series Report 04/5 (Camberley: CSRC, April 2004), pp. 10, 30. 79 ‘Croatia’, in Greenwood, Transparency and Accountability. 80 ‘Chairman of council for civil control of security services resigns’, Hina, 7 December 2004; Hedl, ‘Watergate-style spying scandal rocks Zagreb’. 81 Author’s interview, Zagreb, July 2004. The interviewee – who had formerly held a senior position within the Interior Ministry – criticised parliamentarians for ‘trying to fi nd out what they should not know about’. 82 Author’s interview with Ivan Jarnjak, Chairman, Internal Policy and National Security Committee of the Hrvatski Sabor [Interior Minister of the Republic of Croatia, 1992–6], Zagreb, 8 July 2004. 83 Stanicˇ ic´, ‘Security sector reform’, p. 339; ‘Croatia’, in Greenwood, Transparency and Accountability. 84 This situation has slowly began to change from 2002. The VNSS is a good example of this. It is made up of experts from a variety of fields including political science, law and electronics. Vlatko Cvrtila, the Council’s fi rst chairman, was a professor of political science and recognised expert in defence issues. 85 Stanicˇ ic´, ‘Security sector reform’, p. 339; Cˇumpek, ‘Transparency and accountability’, p. 423. 86 Gojko Bezovan, ‘Croatian Civil Society: On the Path to Becoming a Legitimate Public Actor’, CIVICUS Occasional Paper, 1:4 (Zagreb: Centre for the Development of Non-Profit Organisations, July 2004), p. 1. 87 Author’s interview with Božidar Javorovic´, Director, Centre for Defendological Research; Professor of Political Science, Zagreb University, 10 July 2002; Ozren Žunec, Professor of Sociology, Zagreb University, 9 July 2002, 7 July 2004. An exception to these trends was the introduction of a new course on Military Sociology and the Sociology of War at Zagreb University in 1995.

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88 These include the Atlantic Council of Croatia, the Centre for Defendological Research and the Institute for International Relations (IMO). 89 Interview with Žunec. 90 ‘Chairman of council for civil control of security services resigns’, RFE/RL Newsline, 21 April 2000, www.rferl.org. Cvrtila later rejoined the committee. 91 Authors interviews with Žunec; Cvrtila, 11 July 2002. 92 Watkins, ‘PfP Integration’, p. 10; Stanicˇ ic´, ‘Civil society’, p. 432. 93 Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2002; July 2004, Stanicˇ ic´, ibid. p. 432. The websites of the Croatian ministries of defence and interior can be found at www.morh.hr and www.mup.hr respectively. 94 Edin Forto, ‘Croatia’, in Nations in Transit 2004 (New York: Freedom House, 2004), pp. 9–10. 95 Bellamy, ‘A crisis of legitimacy’, pp. 186–92. 96 In late 2005 for example, only 25 per cent of Croats believed neighbouring countries such as Serbia-Montenegro posed a threat to national security. Rose, ‘Croatian opinion’, p. 6.

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Security sector reform at the political level: Serbia and Montenegro

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Serbia-Montenegro confronted a formidable series of political level security sector reform challenges in October 2000. The Army,1 police and intelligence agencies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ) had been deeply politicised under the old regime, while many of their most senior personnel were implicated in war crimes, corruption or organised crime. All were threatened by the prospect of security sector reform and all were highly suspicious of the new authorities and their promises of democratisation. The fi rst task faced by the new Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) government at this time was thus to secure the non-intervention of the security sector in domestic politics. Once this basic civil-security sector understanding was in place, they had to consolidate their mechanisms for civilian control before embarking on a longer term process of democratisation and root and branch organisational reform. Since 2000, Serbia-Montenegro has taken some important steps in all of these areas: the military and the police have, in the main, been placed under civilian control; the most rapacious and ideologicallybased aspects of Miloševic´-era partification in the security sector have been eliminated; important new legislation has been adopted – albeit after some delay – and a strategic vision for the future of the reform process has begun to emerge. In addition, Montenegro’s successful independence referendum of May 2006 has fi nally ended the uncertainty and speculation which surrounded the future of the state itself, and by extension large parts of the security sector reform process as well. Even so, the security sector reform process in Serbia-Montenegro has faced or continues to face at least three persistent and severe problems at the political level. First, for much of the period between 2000–6, the state itself (FRJ, and later the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, SCG) was an unconsolidated and contested political community. This situation encouraged inertia and stagnation in relation to many security

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sector reforms, and particularly those associated with the military. Second, the domestic political scene in Serbia-Montenegro has been deeply fractured. This has made it difficult to outline a clear vision for the future of the security sector and delayed the introduction of key framework legislation for reform. In addition, while the most obvious features of Miloševic´-era partification had largely been addressed by the end of 2003, the divided nature of the new civilian political elite has encouraged the entrenchment of a pervasive culture of civil-security sector clientalism that has continued into 2006. Finally, while the security sector as a whole has been placed demonstrably under civilian control since 2000, significant elements within it remain resistant to this principle in practice. These tendencies have been reinforced and sustained by the strong traditions of institutional exclusivity that developed across the security sector during the SFRJ and Miloševic´ periods and which to a large degree have persisted ever since.

The legacy of the 1990s In October 2000, the FRJ security sector was burdened by a series of extremely negative legacies from the past. In particularly, the negative impact of the events surrounding the collapse of the old Yugoslavia still loomed large. This had three main aspects. First, the Army, police and intelligence agencies in FRJ differed from their Croatian counterparts in that they retained much stronger political, cultural and institutional links with the SFRJ past. Major organisational changes did occur under Miloševic´, not least the dissolution of the old Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and its transformation into the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Bosnian Serb Army of Rebublika Srbska (VRS). However, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, these were of an evolutionary rather than revolutionary nature, at least in terms of their impact on organisational culture. To all intents and purposes therefore the organisations of the FRJ security sector represented the true institutional heirs of their SFRJ predecessors. This legacy was important because it also brought with it the political baggage of that period. For the Army this meant a tradition of institutional and to some degree political autonomy. For the police and intelligence agencies it also meant the prioritisation of state and regime security over and above public policing and the rule of law. Second, the dominant theme of the war for the FRJ was one of consistent defeat and frustration rather than victory. Indeed, rather than forming the vanguard of a successful nationalist state-building project – as was the case in Croatia – the security sector in the FRJ found itself the ultimately unsuccessful defender of a failed political community. This

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undermined its popular and political legitimacy amongst key sections of the surviving federation and led to fragmentation of both political authority in the FRJ – between the federal and two republican governments, and in the security sector itself. This legacy imparted an unstable and unpredictable context for security sector reform at the political level. It meant not only that the future of the state itself remained unresolved and open to question, but also that security sector reform post-2000 would have to take place across several different levels of governance, incorporating a number of different and sometimes competing political actors, and in a complex variety of different security sector organisations. Finally, the authoritarian nature of the Miloševic´ regime itself also had a number of important and lasting impacts on civil-security sector relations. These included a tradition of civil supremacy over the armed forces, but also of partification, civil-military distrust, and mutual suspicion and rivalry within the security sector itself. The federal nature of the Yugoslav state and the different levels of governance and political authority within it obliged Miloševic´ to utilise a number of different strategies for control over the security sector. His fi rst problem was the Army. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1990s the then JNA was not one of his natural allies. Although its officer corps had always been dominated by ethnic Serbs, the Army had selfconsciously fulfilled an explicitly pan-Yugoslav rather than pro-Serbian role in the SFRJ. It also had a strong tradition of professional and institutional autonomy which made it resistant to manipulation by the Miloševic´ regime. 2 Yet by Spring 1991 the JNA was actively fighting on his behalf. The JNA’s conversion to the Miloševic´ cause was a consequence of the Army’s inherent conservatism, coupled with an inward-looking attempt to preserve its own interests and identity. The JNA was the pre-eminent federal institution in the SFRJ and its identity and institutional privileges – including a constitutionally mandated political role, 3 a tradition of generously high defence spending and a wide degree of institutional autonomy – were threatened by the decentralising demands of the secessionist republics such as Slovenia and Croatia. The one political agenda which appeared to offer a degree of protection for the Army’s corporate interests was that of Miloševic´, who at least promised to maintain the existing federal structure of the Yugoslav state albeit in a manner that would be dominated by Serbia.4 Consequently, as the Yugoslav crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s progressed, and in the absence of what it considered to be viable alternatives, the JNA leadership was increasingly drawn into the Serbian nationalist project. Before long it had been almost completely co-opted by it.

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Even so, Miloševic´ never entirely trusted the Army and throughout the 1990s civil-military relations in FRJ were characterised by his attempts to fully subjugate it to his own control. He did so in three main ways. First, he established new chains of command that bypassed or manipulated the FRJ’s existing constitutional provisions for civilmilitary relations. Under the SFRJ’s 1974 constitution, command over the Army lay in the hands of the federal presidency. Given that for most of the 1990s, Miloševic´ was Serbian rather than federal president, this arrangement would have given him no formal authority over the military. This changed in 1992 however, with the introduction of a new constitution and a new chain of command for the VJ. This established a Supreme Defence Council (VSO) – comprising the federal, Serbian and Montenegrin presidents – that would exercise ultimate command over the military. 5 The tripartite command structure represented in the VSO ensured Miloševic´’s own pre-eminence in the military chain of command by giving him a new and constitutionally sanctioned mechanism for exercising direct influence over the VJ. Indeed, while the VSO arrangement appeared to share power between the three presidents, in reality it contained manifold loopholes that Miloševic´ was able to exploit to exercise his personal power. For example, the constitution failed to specify the VSO’s decision making procedure, leaving it unclear whether it commanded through consensus or majority, or indeed what should be done if one or more members of the council failed to attend one of its meetings.6 The degree of control that Miloševic´ exercised in the FRJ political system more widely meant that he could manipulate these ambiguities to his own advantage and in practice guarantee at least one close ally on the council. This combination of factors allowed Miloševic´ to effectively and consistently dominate the joint military command structure from both the Serbian and (later) federal presidencies, in a manner that was considered legal by the Army itself. Miloševic´ also established an alternate chain of command in the VJ itself through his allies in the ideologically hard-line Department of Security (popularly known as KOS and the VBA from 20037). KOS maintained officers at all levels of the VJ and so was able to exert pro-Miloševic´ influence throughout the military command structure.8 Second, Miloševic´ and his allies worked to change the political and ethnic character of the military and its intelligence agencies through personnel changes and purges in the officer corps. This process began in the early 1990s with the resignation or early retirement of many non-Serbs from the JNA.9 Throughout 1992–3, many of the remaining senior JNA officers in the VJ were either dismissed or forced into early

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retirement by a series of purges which left only nine former JNA generals in the entire institution, and eliminated any vestiges of old-style ‘Yugoslavism’ in the VJ general staff. Fierce Miloševic´ loyalists were also placed in key positions in the influential military intelligence agencies.10 Even then, this was a drawn out process. Indeed, the Army continued to exhibit what for Miloševic´ was a worrying degree of autonomy for most of the 1990s, and it was only in 1998 – when the fi rm Miloševic´ loyalist General Dragoljub Ojdanic´ was appointed Chief of General Staff – that he fully consolidated his personal control over the VJ’s leadership.11 Finally, Miloševic´ undermined the influence of the Army through the cultivation of direct institutional competitors from other parts of the Yugoslav security sector. This strategy included the militarisation of the Serbian police forces and the development of a number of semiautonomous special forces and paramilitary organisations outside the Army’s normal chain of command. It forced the VJ to compete for favour and funding from the regime in Belgrade, and developed the police as an alternative power base should the Army prove unreliable.12 Throughout the period of his regime, Miloševic´ always trusted the Serbian police and state security service (RDB) more than the Army, for three main reasons. First, being republican rather than federal organisations, the police and RDB chains of command were less complex than that of the military. Until 1997, Miloševic´ was Serbian rather than federal president. He also kept a tight personal reign on his Serbian Radical Party (SRS), which in turn dominated the Serbian political scene. As a consequence, Miloševic´ was able to exercise clear and unambiguous control over the Serbian Interior Minister and Interior Ministry, and through them the police. Moreover, while the RDB was formally subordinated to the Interior Ministry, Miloševic´ cultivated close personal and ideological connections with its leadership which allowed him to exert extensive influence over its activities. He was also able to establish a heavily militarised police formation – the Special Operations Unit (JSO or ‘Red Berets’) – which he personally controlled via the RDB, and which in effect functioned as his elite praetorian guard.13 Second, there was strong institutional continuity between the Serbian police and intelligence agencies under Miloševic´ and their predecessors from the SFRJ period. This was important because it brought with it an institutional habit of heavy handed state repression. During the SFRJ period, the police and especially the RDB had regularly been regularly used in the regime defence role. They had also been dominated by ethnic Serbs and were ideologically sympathetic to Miloševic´’s

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nationalist project. In common with the Army leadership, they also saw Miloševic´ as the most likely protector of their own corporate interests and privileges.14 As a consequence, it was a small step for them to transfer their allegiances to the new regime and to the new ideology of Serbian nationalism. As in the Army, political reliability was consolidated by the careful placement of committed Miloševic´ loyalists in key positions throughout both organisations. Finally, Miloševic´ also cultivated the support of the police and RDB by according them a number of material and fi nancial benefits. Policemen were better paid and often better equipped than their military counterparts, while the regime as a whole turned a blind eye to corrupt and arbitrary practices amongst the police rank and fi le. The corruption of the RDB was even more complete, and mirrored that of the regime itself. Indeed, Miloševic´ actively used the state security service to foster his own connections with organised crime. These relationships allowed the regime to exploit organised criminal networks to circumvent the economic sanctions which were imposed on the country for much of the 1990s. They were also extremely lucrative and provided the Miloševic´ elite – including many in the security sector – with numerous opportunities for personal enrichment.15 A notable blind spot in Miloševic´’s otherwise extensive personal control over the FRJ security sector lay in Montenegro, which had its own separate police force and security service (DB). These fell under the close personal control of key figures in the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS), which until 1997 was closely allied with Miloševic´ and his SRS. This situation changed in 1997 when Milo Ðukanovic´, then the Montenegrin Prime Minister and leader of a reformist wing in the DPS defeated his long time political ally and President of the Republic, Momir Bulatovic´ in a battle for control of the DPS and later at the ballot box. Subsequently elected president himself, Ðukanovic´ quickly moved to distance himself from the regime in Belgrade and to consolidate his own dominance of the Montenegrin political scene. His actions had two important consequences for the security sector in Montenegro. First, by advocating increasing autonomy from Belgrade, Ðukanovic´ antagonised both Miloševic´ and the VJ. For Miloševic´, Ðukanovic´’s actions directly challenged his own authority and conjured the uncomfortable prospect of the further fragmentation of the FRJ. They had similar implications for the Army, which as a federal organisation was partly funded by Montenegro and retained bases throughout its territory. The prospect of Montenegrin separatism meant that for much of the late 1990s tensions between Belgrade and Podgorica ran high. The

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VJ was used to threaten and intimidate the Montenegrin leadership and people, and for a time the prospect of direct military intervention in the republic seemed very real. In response, Ðukanovic´ militarised the Montenegrin police and in so doing reinforced its independence and autonomy in the overall security sector of the FRJ. Second, Ðukanovic´ moved to cement his own personal control over the Montenegrin police and DB. To do so he used similar tactics to those of Miloševic´ in Serbia. As the now undisputed leader of the dominant DPS, he was able to exercise significant control and influence throughout the Montenegrin political system as a whole. This allowed him to place reliable allies in key positions in the police and Interior Ministry as well as to dominate the chain of command.16 Moreover, and again as in Serbia, a blind eye was turned to corrupt practices in the Montenegrin security sector. The police and DB – as well as senior figures in the Montenegrin elite, allegedly including Ðukanovic´ himself – profited extensively from their close association with organised crime in the 1990s, particularly cigarette smuggling, car theft and people trafficking.17 This strategy had the effect of tying key elements of the Montenegrin security sector to Ðukanovic´ both in terms of their fi nancial interests but also because of their mutual culpability in illegal activity. The practices and policies of the Miloševic´-era in relation to the FRJ security sector had a lasting impact on security sector reform in SerbiaMontenegro. They left a legacy of legislative ambiguity, organisational fragmentation, conservatism, partification and corruption that have hampered the implementation of democratic reforms across the Army, police and intelligence agencies ever since.

First generation security sector reform In October 2000, FRJ faced a number of pressing first generation security sector reform challenges. These included the urgent need to establish civilian control over the security sector; the need to introduce a new institutional and legislative framework for democratic civilsecurity sector relations; and the need to address the rampant partification of the Miloševic´ period. Since 2000, Serbia-Montenegro has made some important progress in these areas. In particular, the military, police and intelligence agencies have been placed under civilian control and some important new defence and security legislation has been introduced. Even so, a number of serious obstacles have hampered further progress. These include or have included ambiguity and uncertainty over the future of the State Union itself (at least until May 2006);

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a need for further legislation to consolidate existing vision documents; and a continuing problem of clientalism and partification in the security sector itself.

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Civilian control and (de)partification

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The fi rst political level security sector reform challenge faced by the DOS in Autumn 2000 was a stark one: how to prevent the military and police (as well as their various associated special units such as the JSO) from intervening to prevent the fall of Miloševic´. Not far behind was the question of how to keep the security sector out of domestic politics and under fi rm civilian control once the new government had assumed power. This was not an abstract concern. The FRJ security sector was packed with Miloševic´ cronies whose own positions and interests appeared to be endangered by any political change and who had publicly implied that they would defend the regime by force.18 Moreover, the process of democratisation and rapprochement with the West that the DOS had promised in their pre-election campaign would most likely raise uncomfortable issues of war crimes responsibility and root and branch organisational reform in the security sector. This threatened to expose it to much greater external scrutiny and challenge its still privileged and relatively autonomous position in Serbian society. DOS’s response was to negotiate with the leadership of the military and police in the hope of persuading them not to intervene in Miloševic´’s defence. This strategy had two important implications for security sector reform. First, it suggested the potential for a new pattern of security sector partification that would mirror the deep personal and political rivalries in the DOS and subsequently the Serbian political scene more widely. Initially, these focused around the two largest political parties and personalities in the coalition: Vojislav Koštunica and his conservative nationalist Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and Zoran Ðin
ic´ and his more reformist Democratic Party (DS).19 Koštunica therefore used the October negotiations to forge a close relationship with the VJ and its controversial Chief of Staff, General Nebojša Pavkovic´. Ðin
ic´ did likewise with the Serbian police, including the JSO and its notorious commander Milorad ‘Legija’ Lukovic´. 20 In one sense, this division of power and influence was uncontroversial and reflected the constitutional division of power within the FRJ: Koštunica as federal president elect was de facto commander in Chief of the federal Army, while Ðin
ic´ as the Serbian Prime Minister in waiting assumed command of the republican police forces. However, given the rivalries within the DOS – and indeed between the VJ and the Serbian police – this arrangement also provided both Koštunica and Ðin
ic´ with their

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own potentially partisan supporters and power bases in the FRJ security sector. Second, the police and Army’s non-intervention in the October 2000 events appears to have been at least partially bought with the promise of a ‘soft’ approach to military and police reform (and particularly personnel reform) by the new government. 21 This is almost certainly not the whole – or even the most significant – reason for the passivity of what were after all deeply politicised and partisan security sector actors. At least as important was a clear sense amongst the Army leadership particularly that their own (mainly conscript) soldiers would at best be reluctant to take violent action against their fellow citizens, together with a dawning realisation of the political bankruptcy of Miloševic´ himself, both in Serbian society more widely but also in terms of his continued ability to foster and protect their own institutional, fi nancial and criminal interests. 22 In short, not only did the DOS need the security sector on side, but the generals themselves needed new allies for what were clearly new times. Even so, most observers agree that the political changes of October 2000 in Serbia were in part negotiated between old security sector actors and the new civilian elite. This in turn raised uncomfortable questions over the extent to which the security sector was actually under civilian control, rather than simply tolerating it temporarily. Between 2000–3, this legacy of ambiguous, negotiated civilian control had a number of important and largely negative implications for security sector reform at a political level in Serbia-Montenegro. These were most visible in two areas. First, in relation to the implementation of personnel change amongst the Miloševic´-era old guard in the security sector leadership; and second to the realisation of civilian supremacy over key elements of the Army, police and intelligence agencies, particularly special units such as the JSO. On personnel, two figures were of particular concern. The fi rst of these was Radomir Markovic´, a key Miloševic´ loyalist and head of the RDB. The second was the head of the VJ, General Pavkovic´. For many in Serbia, Markovic´ embodied the worst aspects of the criminalised police state created by Miloševic´. Markovic´ and the RDB were implicated in a wide variety of criminal activity, including a number of extra-legal state sponsored assassinations. These included the so-called Ibar highway killings of October 1999 – when four members of the opposition Serbian Renewal Party (SPO) were murdered and its leader, Vuk Draškovic´ injured – the assassination of former Serbian president Ivan Stambolic´ in August 2000, as well as numerous murders in the criminal underworld. 23 As a consequence, most

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observers expected Markovic´ to be one of the fi rst of those dismissed by the new DOS government once it gained power. In practice however, Markovic´ remained in his position until 25 January 2001. This period of grace gave him the opportunity to ‘spring clean’ the RDB and eliminate as much incriminating evidence of its former activities as possible. 24 Technically, the DOS’s sluggish response on the Markovic´ question was a result of the FRJ’s complex, multi-level chain of command. This meant that Koštunica – as federal president – had no authority over the republican level RDB, and the DOS had to wait until Ðin
ic´ was elected Serbian prime minister before it could legally take any fi rm action against its commander. However, it was also a consequence of DOS’s own weak authority in the early days of its government and revealed the extent to which negotiation rather than direct command would be necessary in at least its initial dealings with the security sector. The DOS was even slower to move against General Pavkovic´. This was despite his background as a staunch Miloševic´ ally and commander of the VJ’s Third Army in Kosovo in 1999, during which time he was implicated in ethnic cleansing and war crimes.25 Throughout 2000–2, Pavkovic´ openly commented on sensitive political issues in FRJ – such as cooperation with the ICTY – in a deeply partisan manner, and under his command VJ elements actively obstructed the Serbian police’s attempts to arrest Miloševic´ in March/April 2001.26 He also engaged in a bitter and public dispute with former Chief of General Staff and Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Momcˇilo Perišic´, which culminated in the latter’s arrest by KOS on a charge of spying in March 2002. Koštunica’s reluctance to move on Pavkovic´ appears to have been informed by his increasing rivalry with Ðin
ic´ and was indicative of the continued partification of civil-security sector relations in FRJ. In return for a tentative approach to military reform and protection from the ICTY, Pavkovic´ provided Koštunica with a useful, if unpredictable, ally at a time when Ðin
ic´’s power in the DOS was in the ascendant. 27 For his part, Ðin
ic´ cultivated a similar set of relationships in the Serbian police, including amongst such controversial figures as General Sreten Lukic´, who was also implicated in war crimes in Kosovo. 28 By June 2002, domestic and international pressure on Koštunica to remove Pavkovic´ had reached its peak. Further civil-military reform appeared unlikely whilst he remained in his position. His public comments had undermined the government’s efforts to place the Army under civilian control, while NATO countries had made it clear that they would not do business with the VJ while he was still in place. This stance had direct ramifications for FRJ’s evolving relationship with the Alliance and particularly its potential membership of the Partnership

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for Peace programme (PfP). Koštunica eventually moved to dismiss his controversial Chief of Staff in March 2002, soon after the Perišic´ affair. However, he did not manage to do so successfully until late June, after a convoluted and divisive series of events – discussed in the following section – that exposed serious and continuing problems in FRJ’s civilmilitary relations. Despite the chaos and political bitterness surrounding the affair, Pavkovic´’s dismissal had ultimately positive implications for security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro. It demonstrated that in the fi nal analysis, the VJ was willing to submit to the principle of civilian control, as was the tradition under Miloševic´. Despite Pavkovic´’s considerable efforts to protect his position, the Army’s leadership united behind the president and publicly declared their ‘full readiness . . . to implement all decisions taken by the Supreme Defence Council and the president’. 29 The removal of Pavkovic´ also eliminated a persistent and often vocal irritant from the civil-military relationship in FRJ. His replacement, General Branko Krga, proved more reluctant to comment publicly on questions of domestic policy beyond those which fell under his specific remit as Chief of Staff, a tradition that has been continued by his successors. Subsequent events confi rmed that civilian control over the Army was in large part a reality. In March 2003 for example, the VSO proved itself able to implement further sweeping personnel changes in the Army’s leadership, dismissing 16 high ranking military officers, including the controversial head of KOS, General Aco Tomic´. 30 However, for much of 2000–3, a number of quite serious weak points existed in the government’s control over the security sector. This was especially the case in relation to the intelligence agencies (both civil and military) and other elite and paramilitary units. The JSO was a particular problem in this respect. During the October 2000 events – and in contrast to the Army or regular police – most observers believed that it would have willingly opened fire on civilian demonstrators had its leadership ordered it to do so. 31 As a consequence, securing the JSO’s quiescence to the political changes of that time had been a high priority for the DOS leadership. However, the price of their cooperation was high. They were able to maintain their organisation wholly intact and free from any meaningful transparency or accountability to the civil sector. They were well funded and equipped and isolated from the rest of the FRJ security sector at their own base in northern Serbia. In return for being left to their own devices, the JSO were willing to act on the government’s behalf when it suited them to do so, even helping to secure Miloševic´’s arrest in March 2001. Even so, any genuine process of reform would deeply threaten their own organisational

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interests. Three issues were of particular significance. First, a number of JSO personnel – including their commander Milorad Lukovic´ – were implicated in war crimes. If the government deepened its cooperation with the ICTY – as seemed likely, these figures faced potential arrest and extradition to the Hague. Second, the organisation maintained close links with the Serbian underworld and cultivated a network of criminalised fi nancial interests and allies throughout the Serbian state and society. Any attempt by the government to move against these networks would threaten JSO interests and potentially expose its personnel to prosecution. Finally, security sector reform – particularly if it involved increased accountability and transparency, or indeed demilitarisation or the geographical dispersion of police special units32 – would directly challenge the institutional interests and identity of the JSO. The fi rst open sign of trouble came in November 2001 after the government extradited two war crimes suspects, whom the JSO itself had earlier arrested, to the Hague. Claiming that they had been tricked into making the arrests, for a week the unit mutinied, erecting roadblocks in Belgrade and elsewhere and refusing to obey government orders to disperse. 33 The crisis was defused after Ðin
ic´ and his Interior Minister Dušan Mihajlovic´ made a number of concessions to the JSO leadership’s demands. These included the resignation Goran Petrovic´, Ðini
ic´’s reformist replacement for Markovic´ at the head of the RDB; a dilution of plans to reform the chain of command over the unit by transferring it from the state to public security sectors of the Interior Ministry;34 and a public statement by Mihajlovic´ promising no more police extraditions to the Hague. 35 The manner in which the standoff was resolved exposed serious weaknesses in FRJ’s civil-security sector relations and had a number of negative consequences. First, the mutiny clearly demonstrated that the Serbian government under Ðin
ic´ was not strong enough to move against the JSO in force, even if it had wanted to. At that time the only organisation with the resources to have done so effectively was the Army. However, as a federal institution, the VJ was commanded by Koštunica through the VSO rather than Ðin
ic´, and in the increasingly divisive political atmosphere of 2001, he was in no hurry to help the Serbian prime minister out of a tight spot. 36 Second, not only were the JSO left intact and unreformed after the mutiny, but by conceding to their demands the government actually strengthened their hand and removed them even further from public scrutiny and accountability. Moreover, by negotiating with its leadership the government suggested that the use or threat of force could still achieve visible political results. Subsequent events demonstrated that this was a lesson the JSO took to heart.

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Soon after the mutiny, Ðin
ic´ began to take concrete steps to address the criminalisation of the Serbian state and elements of its security sector. In July 2002 the Serbian government passed a new Law on the Security Information Agency. It renamed the RDB the Security Information Agency (BIA), subordinated it directly to the Serbian government instead of the Ministry of the Interior, and introduced a small measure of parliamentary oversight over its activities. 37 While flawed, this legislation was still very significant. For the fi rst time it introduced a regulatory legal framework for the RDB/BIA’s activities, including an (albeit still very weak) element of public accountability and transparency. It also made a clear separation between the public and state security spheres. This provision not only had important implications for the wider police reform process in Serbia, but also, at least in theory, narrowed the BIA’s operational responsibilities considerably. Ðin
ic´ went even further in early 2003. In January he appointed a loyal ally – Miša Milic´evic´ – as the head of the BIA. His government also announced that it intended to establish a specialist anti-corruption bureau and on 6 March appointed a Special Prosecutor for organised crime. 38 Finally, by early 2003 Ðin
ic´ was also planning to initiate a more cooperative approach towards the ICTY. 39 These initiatives challenged the JSO’s interests on every level. They exposed its personnel to potential arrest and prosecution on corruption and war crimes charges; they endangered its fi nancial and criminal connections; and they threatened the unit itself with organisational reform. In response they moved against the Serbian prime minister directly. In February, Ðin
ic´’s car narrowly avoided a high-speed collision with a freight truck in what was widely interpreted as a failed assassination attempt by criminals close to the JSO.40 On 12 March a second attempt was more successful: Ðin
ic´ was shot and killed by a JSO sniper in central Belgrade. The assassination sent shock waves around Serbia. The government declared a state of emergency and initiated a massive military and police operation action – Operation Sabre – targeted at organised criminal groups. Over 11,000 people were arrested and 3560 charged with criminal offences. The JSO were disbanded after a swoop on their base by the Gendarmerie, a ‘clean’ police special unit established in September 2001. As many as 30 JSO personnel were arrested, Zvezdan Jovanovic´, its deputy commander was charged with the murder itself, while Lukovic´ was accused (and later convicted) of master-minding the plot. The remainder of the JSO were sacked or dispersed into other police units around Serbia.41 The government’s response to the Ðin
ic´ assassination had a number of important impacts on the security sector reform process in

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Serbia-Montenegro. Many of these were positive. In dissolving the JSO, Sabre removed the most dangerous challenge to the principle of civil supremacy over the Serbian security sector. It also eliminated some of the most powerful and influential criminal gangs in the country.42 The police and Army both demonstrated that they could and would do as the government commanded, even if this involved potentially bloody operations against their erstwhile fellows, and also that they could work together if necessary. In these respects Sabre represented a watershed in the country’s civil-security sector relations and visibly confirmed the reality of civil supremacy in the chain of command. However, the Ðin
ic´ assassination had a number of more negative legacies as well. Perhaps most significantly it removed Ðin
ic´ himself, at that time the country’s most committed and influential reformist politician, from the Serbian political scene. In the wake of his murder, the reform agenda he had established struggled to reassert itself with the same vigour it had promised before. The reformist DS party was defeated in the parliamentary elections of 2004, while the threat of assassination is a shadow that has continued to hang heavily over the political process in Serbia at least. Ðin
ic´’s murder and its aftermath also demonstrated that while the basic principle of civilian control over the security sector might now be in place, the democratic nature of this control was more questionable. Events leading up to the assassination had revealed the extent of partification and infighting within the security sector. Several observers – including Ðin
ic´’s own bodyguard – alleged that different organisations and actors within the intelligence agencies failed to communicate known weaknesses in the Prime Minister’s security arrangements, either through incompetence or because of their own extensive inter-service or inter-personal rivalries. Others have claimed that these failures were connected to – and ultimately motivated by – entrenched patterns of clientalism within the intelligence agencies, which in turn reflected the fierce political feuding within the ruling DOS coalition.43 In addition, and though widely supported by the Serbian public, the manner in which Sabre was conducted – particularly the huge number of arrests that were made, the suggestion of political score settling and the poor treatment of some suspects whilst they were in custody – raised uncomfortable memories of past authoritarian practices.44 The removal of Pavkovic´ and the dissolution of the JSO consolidated the principle of civilian control over the security sector in SerbiaMontenegro. However, these important fi rst steps did not eliminate the partification strategies of the old regime from civil-security sector relations in the country. Indeed, all of the country’s post-Miloševic´

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governments have continued to enlist the support of security sector actors in their own partisan political struggles, while key figures in the security sector itself have actively sought out civilian allies and protectors for their own institutional or personal interests. These practices were most vividly illustrated by the relationship between Koštunica and Pavkovic´ and between Ðin
ic´ and the Serbian police, but the practice of cultivating clientalist relationships across the civil and security sectors also continued unabated after 2003. This was apparent after the Serbian parliamentary elections of December 2003, when, after the collapse of the DOS in November, the DS was ousted from government by a weak and divided coalition led by Koštunica and the DSS.45 The following Summer saw personnel change throughout the leadership of the Serbian security sector as the new government placed trustworthy personnel in key leadership positions in the police and intelligence agencies. For example, Rade Bulatovic´ – a close Koštunica ally who had been arrested and detained during Sabre – was appointed to the position of director of the BIA. The new government also launched an investigation into the legality of Sabre itself and removed or demoted a number of key figures either involved in the operation or close to the previous government.46

Institutional and legislative changes Disagreements over the constitutional shape of the state itself have also had a negative impact on the pace of fi rst generation security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro. While these were largely resolved by the success of Montenegro’s independence bid in May 2006, their impact prior to this was severe. Specifically, they delayed or frustrated the introduction of important framework legislation for democratic civilsecurity sector relations and led to complexity, ambiguity and partification in the chain of command. This issue posed a particular problem for the defence sector because of the military’s explicit position as a federal (and from 2003 all-Union) institution. Between 2000–3, policy makers in FRJ were reluctant to adopt new federal laws that might prove only to be temporary, and during this period the federal parliament passed only one piece of civil-military legislation, the much criticised Law on the Security Services of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which introduced a limited degree of parliamentary oversight of the federal intelligence agencies.47 The multi-layered division of authority and responsibility in the federal state also led to continued complexity and confusion in the military chain of command, particularly in relation to the viability and effectiveness of the VSO mechanism. During Koštunica’s tenure as

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federal president for example (between October 2000 and March 2003), the VSO met only infrequently and irregularly, and both Ðukanovic´ (president of Montenegro until October 2002) and Milan Milutinovic´ (president of Serbia until October 2002) were reluctant to take up their seats.48 Even when the VSO did meet, it was reluctant to take tough decisions in the absence of consensus amongst the three presidents. This meant that in practice, command of the Army lay in the hands of Koštunica alone, who in the event of stalemate or inertia within the VSO was able to use his powers of presidential decree to force through decisions. In many respects, this situation simplified the chain of command over the VJ. However, it also meant that civilian control over the Army occurred in a constitutional and legal grey area, and left civil-military relations and defence reform issues particularly vulnerable to political squabbles and infighting. These problems were clearly illustrated by the events surrounding the dismissal of General Pavkovic´. First, because of the federal president’s de facto dominance in the VSO, Pavkovic´ could only be sacked if Koštunica agreed to it, whatever the wider pressures or justifications for his removal. For most of 2000–2 therefore, the General remained secure in his position because of his close relationship with the president. Second, however, once Koštunica did decide to get rid of his Chief of General Staff in March 2002, his ability to actually do so in practice was compromised by the political opportunism of his civilian opponents. Koštunica’s opponents in the DOS had been calling for Pavkovic´’s dismissal for some time. However, when he finally went to do so, they used the opportunity to try and extract further concessions from the president49 and even to try and forge an alternative relationship with Pavkovic´ and the VJ. 50 These tactics had the short term political advantage of damaging Koštunica, but in so doing undermined the FRJ’s mechanisms for civilian control over the military. As a consequence, Pavkovic´ was not fi nally dismissed until late June 2002, and then in a manner which was constitutionally contestable. 51 The creation of the State Union in 2003 offered hope that the new constitutional arrangement would provide a fi rmer basis for legislative and institutional reform. In practice however, this proved to be at least as precarious an arrangement as the FRJ and this hampered the introduction of a clear legislative framework for democratic control over the military. 52 The Army’s position as the most significant Union level institution in the country caused particular problems, meaning that any discussion about its future also involved making a clear assumption about the future status of the Union itself. The Montenegrin government remained suspicious of the Army as an institution – a direct legacy

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from its aggressive and intimidating record in the republic during the late Miloševic´ period – and residual concerns persisted amongst some pro-independence circles in Montenegro that it was the only institution which could realistically be used to preserve the State Union by force in the future. 53 Finally, some suggested that the Montenegrin political elite was hostile to Army reform for more self-interested reasons, and specifically because it threatened to raise the question of demilitarisation and reform in the Montenegrin police and DB. This in turn could have threatened the strong political control which Ðukanovic´ and his Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS) continued to exercise over them. 54 This contentious underlying political context for reform meant that defence issues often quickly became the subject of heated and bitter political discussion; not because they were necessarily contentious in and of themselves, but because of their implications for the future of the Serbia-Montenegrin relationship or for the balance of political power at the republican level. The deliberately imprecise framework for civil-military relations provided by the 2003 constitutional Charter was an example of these problems. The role of the Army itself was vague and avoided any direct reference to defending the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the State Union. This was because, for some Montenegrins at least, including such a clause would have provided a potential constitutional justification for the Army to prevent any Montenegrin secession attempt by force. 55 This ambiguity satisfied Montenegrin worries. However it did little to elucidate the military’s future role and purpose and provided an uncertain foundation for further military reform. Similarly, the constitutional Charter redefi ned the VSO mechanism so that all decisions relating to command of the military would be taken on the basis of consensus between its three members. 56 This provision prevented the abuse of the Army by the Union president and ensured that no decision relating to military issues could be made without the agreement of the Montenegrin president. However, it also raised questions about the effectiveness of the military chain of command, particularly in times of potential crisis. As Miroslav Hadžic´ observed, the 2003 constitutional Charter was an ‘incomplete, inconsistent document’ whose ‘implementation . . . depend[ed] on the political will of power holders’ in Serbia-Montenegro’. 57 In practice, such political will emerged only grudgingly, with the result that the introduction of much needed civil-military legislation to plug the gaps in the constitutional Charter was slow to emerge. For example, for much of the period between 2003–5, there was no agreed

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system between the two republics of how to fund the armed forces. In practice this meant that the Serbian government provided the vast bulk of the defence budget during this period, while soldiers posted in Montenegro (whose costs were meant to be covered by that republic) experienced significant delays in the payment of their wages. Similarly, it took until November 2004 for the parliament to approve a National Defence Strategy, and until April 2005 for the Ministry of Defence to publish its White Paper on Defence. As with the constitutional Charter, these delays were largely a result of Montenegrin concerns over the exact defi nition of the Army’s role and mission, and the implications of this for any future move towards secession. 58 Partly as a consequence of these tensions, both documents primarily functioned as vision statements and in and of themselves did not provide the detailed legislative framework required for the further consolidation of democratic civilmilitary relations. Even so, their importance should not be underestimated. For the fi rst time they provided a clear and unambiguous strategic direction for the defence reform process, and the White Paper at least went on to lay out an explicit, if somewhat general, timetable for organisational reform in the armed forces. 59 Both documents thus added a coherence to the future defence reform process that had not been present before. They also established a broad strategic framework for the introduction of more specific legislation in future. At the time of writing in early 2006, much of this – such as the Serbian Strategic Defence Review and the Draft Law on Democratic and Civilian Control of the Army60 – already existed in advanced draft form. Indeed, despite the aforementioned problems and delays, by 2006 the legislative consolidation of democratic civil-military relations in Serbia-Montenegro had begun to gather pace, with a number of important new laws and strategies in the parliamentary pipeline.61 While Montenegrin independence will almost certainly bring with it another round of legislative adaptation in the defence sector, over the long term it is likely to smooth the reform process considerably by providing a more predictable constitutional foundation against which it can be premised.62 Complexity and ambiguity in the chain of command has been less of a problem for the police and domestic intelligence agencies. As republican level organisations, their relationship to the two state entities of Serbia and Montenegro has been far clearer and less contested than that of the armed forces. Even so, the pace of legislative reform has been slow in both cases. Exceptions to this were the Law on Criminal Procedure of 2001, the Law on the BIA of July 2002, and the Directive on Police Ethics and Policing of 2003. The Law on the BIA was

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particularly significant in that it removed the former RDB from the Interior Ministry and subordinated it directly to the Serbian government. Elsewhere, however, the absence of legislation to provide a clear legal framework for reform has been a major brake on reform, particularly in relation to issues such as police accountability and organisational reform. Indeed, while the Serbian Ministry of the Interior produced a Vision Document63 in March 2003 which for the fi rst time outlined its reform priorities, it wasn’t until November 2005 that the parliament finally adopted a Law on the Police. Even then Interior Minister Dragan Jocic´ described this document as a ‘stop-gap solution’.64 The pace of legislative reform has been similarly slow in Montenegro, where it took until 2003 to produce a new Law on Criminal Procedure and until May 2005 to introduce the Law on the Police and the Law on the National Security Agency. As will be discussed below, these delays have been a result both of the deeply divided nature of the domestic political scene in Serbia-Montenegro as well as a number of continuing second generation security sector reform challenges.

Second generation security sector reform Between 2000–6, security sector reform at the political level in SerbiaMontenegro was dominated by the fundamental first generation challenges of institutional and legislative restructuring and reaffi rming civilian control over the security sector. Despite the number of outstanding and serious problems discussed above, in the main, this period saw the country make a degree of progress in these areas. Increasingly therefore, longer term questions of political and state capacity – as well as institutional adaptation to the new environment – have emerged as the most important and pressing concerns for security sector reform. These second generation security sector reform issues have been present since October 2000, and their incorporation into domestic and international reform efforts has often run parallel to, and been closely related to, fi rst generation security sector reform. As in Croatia, they relate to issues of effectiveness in policy planning and implementation; to the willingness and ability of the parliament to exercise its powers of oversight; and finally to the wider engagement of civil-society in defence and security matters. Key themes include the continuing impact of political fragmentation and division in the domestic political scene more widely; an absence of specialist (civilian) expertise on defence and security matters; continuing traditions of secrecy and exclusivity in the security sector and its bureaucracies; and the sheer

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scale of the post-Miloševic´ reform process itself, which has placed inevitable practical demands on those involved in its implementation.

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Policy planning and implementation

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Between 2000–3, defence and security policy planning and implementation processes in Serbia-Montenegro were effectively frozen by the pressing fi rst generation reform challenges of the time. For much of this period therefore little serious effort was made to move away from the norms and practices of the Miloševic´ period. This was particularly the case in the defence sector, where the whole future of the (then federal) Ministry of Defence appeared to be uncertain and where the major issues of security sector reform were dominated by basic questions of civilian control over the military. For their part, civilian politicians were too preoccupied with consolidating their own positions – both in relation to each other and to their various clients in the security sector – to devote serious energy to a long-term, strategically-driven process of reform. In the absence of clear civilian leadership, Pavkovic´ and the Army were left to their own devices, with predictably disappointing results. As a deeply conservative figure with his roots in the Miloševic´ regime, Pavkovic´, and by extension the Army leadership surrounding him, had neither the vision, motivation nor legitimacy to realistically address the complex challenges of defence reform in the FRJ.65 Pavkovic´ was also aware that any reform programme would most likely bring with it both a crackdown on corruption in the military and a war crimes reckoning, both steps that would have threatened him considerably. Reform in the Ministry of the Interior was dogged by similar challenges. Some important and notable changes were introduced over this period, including the dismissal of Markovic´, the separation of the State and Public security departments and the creation of the BIA. However, in practice these did little to change institutional values and working practices and served only to clear the ground for a more in-depth (and until 2003 unspecified) reform effort in future. The police, for example, remained highly centralised and completely integrated with the Ministry itself. This organisational structure encouraged (and indeed institutionalised) partification in the chain of command, by locating operational command responsibility for all police activities in the hands of the Interior Minister himself. Moreover, mechanisms for public accountability, internal control and transparency remained very weak in the police and almost non-existent in the RDB/BIA.66 The dismissal of Pavkovic´ and the fi nalisation of the constitutional Charter in 2002 and 2003 respectively offered hope that the reform

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logjam in the defence sector at least might at last be broken. This initial optimism appeared to be confi rmed when Boris Tadic´, a capable reformist from the DS, was appointed federal minister of defence and in March 2003 announced a 10 point plan for defence reform, which included substantial reform and modernisation in the Ministry of Defence.67 The Interior Ministry also produced its Vision Document that same month which, while not circulated for public consumption, clearly and explicitly identified the need for reform in areas such as accountability, decentralisation and capacity building.68 These fi rst signs of a new willingness to engage with security sector reform were short lived however. Ðin
ic´’s murder in March sparked a struggle for power within the DS that distracted Tadic´ particularly, a front runner for the leadership of the party, from his ministerial responsibilities. It also marked the beginning of a decline in the political influence of the DS, who in March 2004 were replaced by a minority government led by Koštunica and the DSS. This political instability, compounded in the case of the Interior Ministry by the understandable distractions caused by Sabre, prevented the government from pursuing a fi rm line on security sector reform, with one DS insider admitting that it was ‘impossible to do anything’ in the context of the ‘protracted election dynamic’.69 These delays did not derail the security sector reform process in Serbia completely and some important initiatives were introduced in this period. Perhaps the most significant of these occurred in the defence sector where, in May 2003, the Army General Staff was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. This was an important step towards consolidating civilian control over the armed forces because it clearly established the institutional supremacy of the civil sector in the defence policy making process. This was in sharp contrast to the situation in the Miloševic´ period, when the Ministry had functioned as little more than an administrative appendage of the VJ.70 Even so, a lack of clear civilian leadership on security sector reform meant that until Spring 2004 at least, second generation issues were only addressed slowly and often in a rather ad hoc manner. The confi rmation of the new Koštunicaled government in March 2004 led to a changing of the political guard and a more stable context for reform. The new defence minister – Prvoslav Davinic´ – committed himself to the spirit of Tadic´’s ten point reform programme and over the course of his tenure took forward a number of his predecessor’s stalled reform policies. These included the fi nalisation of the White Paper on Defence and some important organisational level reforms discussed below. In the Interior Ministry Dragan Jocic´ provided a degree of stability and continuity in the police reform

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process and as Minister oversaw the development of Serbia’s new Law on Police. Even so, effective policy planning and implementation in the security sector was hampered by continued political instability and institutional inefficiency. While the new Koštunica government offered greater stability than the previous period of political limbo had, it too was far from united and made up of a fractious coalition of different political parties and interests. As a minority government it was also forced to rely on the often capricious support of Miloševic´’s radical Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). This political fragmentation had two negative impacts on security sector reform. First, it meant that any vision for reform had to satisfy the priorities and interests of all members of the governing coalition. As a consequence, the government was unable to push through key reforms on sensitive issues such as the extradition of security sector personnel to the Hague quickly or easily. This did not prevent movement in these areas, but it did mean that any such steps that were taken were politically contested and had to be painfully negotiated rather than cleanly implemented.71 Second, power and authority within the government centred around multiple individual personalities and parties rather than a unified leadership or agenda. This further encouraged clientalism throughout the political system as different members of the coalition attempted to shore up their own positions by surrounding themselves with trustworthy supporters. It also led to endemic job insecurity and a high staff turnover. For example, after the change of government, Tadic´-era appointees throughout the Ministry of Defence were replaced by Davinic´-era ones. A similar ‘changing of the guard’ in the Ministry and at the highest levels of the military intelligence agencies occurred after Davinic´ himself was forced to resign after a corruption scandal in September 2005.72 The frequency of these changes was high, and had a largely negative impact on policy planning and implementation. Thus, Serbia-Montenegro had six different defence ministers and four different Chiefs of General Staff between October 2000 and December 2005. Each minister brought a slightly different set of priorities to the reform process, with the consequence that policy coherence across time was difficult to achieve.73 High staff turnover also undermined the development of expertise levels in the Ministry of Defence as new personnel replaced existing ones.74 These problems were not quite so severe in the Serbian and Montenegrin interior ministries, where in each case there was more leadership continuity. Even so, issues of clientalism, personnel change and low expertise levels remain significant challenges in both institutions.

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Ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the policy process in SerbiaMontenegro has also been intensified by the organisational structure and personnel profile of the ministries of defence and interior more widely. The Ministry of Defence for example remains an extremely large and unwieldy organisation, and the majority of its staff continue to comprise of serving military officers. Until mid-2004 it also maintained an extremely complex organisational structure with 15 different departments, many with overlapping responsibilities.75 The Serbian Ministry of the Interior is a similarly unwieldy and bureaucratic organisation, comprising of over 7700 personnel in 2002.76 In both cases there has been a tendency to employ large numbers of staff in either redundant or inappropriate capacities. For example, a 2004 OSCE report on administrative reform in the interior ministry was highly critical of over-bureaucratisation, noting that 1151 personnel were assigned to the Board and Lodging Directorate, compared to only 103 for the entire Uniform Police Directorate.77 In Montenegro, the situation is somewhat different, not least because the relatively small size of the republic has meant that its bureaucratic institutions are on a much smaller scale. Nevertheless, the organisational structure of the Montenegrin Interior Ministry remains substantively unreformed since the 1990s, and bureaucratic inefficiency and inertia has been a serious problem.78 Reform plans across all three institutions envisage major organisational restructuring and downsizing to address these problems. Certainly, the Ministry of Defence has implemented some important reforms in these areas since 2004, rationalising its organisational structure from 15 to five departments, downsizing personnel numbers and making a serious attempt at civilianisation. Even so, the impact of these reforms on the working practices and institutional culture of the defence sector has been felt only slowly. Indeed, while the government may have made significant progress in outlining the strategic goals and new institutional framework for the reform process, actually implementing change in practice has been more difficult. The Army for example has reacted with scepticism to the civilianisation of the Ministry of Defence, arguing that experienced military personnel have been replaced unnecessarily by inexperienced, unqualified civilians.79 Moreover, as will be discussed in greater depth in subsequent chapters, while the General Staff may at least in theory have been placed under the control of the Ministry, in practice the military as a whole, and the military intelligence agencies in particular, retain a significant degree of institutional autonomy in their operations. Similarly, the extent to which the top echelons of the police and BIA have been able to exercise

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uncontested internal control throughout their organisations is open to question.

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Oversight

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Problems of institutional and political fragmentation, organisational incapacity and inadequate expertise have also had a negative impact on the ability of the federal/union and republican level parliaments to oversee and scrutinise the security sector in Serbia-Montenegro. Between 2000–2, the federal parliament was largely ignored by the civilian executive as well as by the military and military intelligence agencies over which it in theory exercised oversight. For example, it was not until late 2002 that any federal minister actually agreed to testify before the parliament’s defence and security committee while on one occasion then Chief of General Staff Pavkovic´ even threatened to sue any parliamentarian who questioned the activities of the Army.80 The parliament demonstrated a more assertive approach in mid-2002 when it passed the Law on the Security Services of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On paper this was an important document, which vested parliament with some powers of oversight over the federal intelligence agencies. However, political division and infighting between different political parties prevented the provisions of the Law actually being properly implemented in practice.81 The 2003 constitutional Charter replaced the federal parliament with a new State Union Assembly made up of nominees from the Serbian and Montenegrin parliaments. This body was given some powers in relation to defence policy, including the authority to develop the Defence Strategy, adopt relevant legislation and approve the defence budget. However, its ability to actually influence defence policy in practice was extremely constrained. The State Union Assembly had no authority over the VSO for example, which in effect precluded parliamentary oversight of the military chain of command. Moreover, its powers of financial oversight were limited by the fact that the entire defence budget was derived directly from the two republics, with over 90 per cent of this coming from Serbia. To all intents and purposes therefore, the defence budget was determined by the Serbian fi nance ministry, over which the State Union Assembly had no authority.82 The Assembly was also one of the major battlegrounds for Serbian and Montenegrin disagreements over the future of the State Union. Indeed, deep disagreements between the two republics over how its members should be selected severely hampered the work of the Assembly for much of 2004–5, to the extent that it was functionally inoperative for much of this period.

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The position of the republican level parliaments has been somewhat stronger, largely because the uncertainties, disagreements and weaknesses associated with the federal/union level of government have generally been absent. Both republican parliaments have some formal powers of oversight over their respective security sectors. In Serbia for example, the Law on the Police of 2005 stipulates that the Interior Minister must keep the parliamentary Defence and Security committee regularly updated and is obliged to submit an annual report on the activities of the police. Parliament is also responsible for passing the state budget and so has a degree of control over the fi nancing of the Ministry. However – as with the State Union Assembly – the mechanism through which it is expected to actually hold the Ministry and police to account is left unclear. These weaknesses have been even more pronounced in relation to the BIA whose obligations to parliament are limited to the submission of a biannual report.83 In simple legislative terms therefore, the balance of power in the civilsecurity sector relationship in Serbia-Montenegro since 2000 has been fi rmly biased towards the executive. Even in the context of their rather limited existing powers however, the ability of all the parliaments to effectively scrutinise the activities of the security sector has been profoundly undermined by three common problems. First, the depth and bitterness of political division at all levels of government in SerbiaMontenegro has meant that it has been profoundly difficult to fashion a political consensus on any issue, including security sector reform. It has also encouraged the polarisation of political power around a variety of political parties and key personalities. In Serbia, these fault-lines have coalesced around fi rst Zoran Ðin
ic´ then Boris Tadic´ and the DS, and Koštunica and the DSS, though the picture has also been complicated by the significant influence still exercised by the radical parties. In Montenegro, Ðukanovic´’s DPS party has faced off against a collection of opposition parties centred around the pro-Union Socialist People’s Party (SNP). In parliamentary terms, this political fragmentation has encouraged the pursuit of short term political or personal advantage over and above the long term development of effective democratic politics. It has also resulted in the parliaments themselves being sidelined by the dominance of inter and intra party politics in determining the outcome of any given political issue.84 Second, all the parliaments have been hampered by capacity and expertise problems. The Serbian and Union level bodies in particular were swamped by the sheer volume of new legislation they had to approve, scrutinise and adopt after 2000. This was a consequence of the need to replace old SFRJ or Miloševic´-era legislation across all areas

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of state and society, and in the case of the State Union Assembly to provide an entirely new legislative framework for the state itself. These generic reform challenges have been particularly severe in relation to the security sector. Here, strong traditions of institutional exclusivity have discouraged many parliamentarians from taking a proactive interest in what remains a somewhat restricted and insular policy field, and contributed to a general lack of specialist expertise in defence and security matters. Parliamentarians have also lacked administrative support and facilities – such as researchers, secretaries and computers – in order to support their already demanding workloads. Since 2000, changes have taken place in all of these areas. Expertise levels have improved over time and there has been a notable international and domestic effort to develop parliamentary capacities.85 Even so, at the time of writing all of these issues remain important obstacles to the development of effective parliamentary control of the security sector at all levels.86 Finally, the parliaments’ ability to effectively oversee and scrutinise defence and security policy has been made more difficult by intransigence, secrecy and foot-dragging on the part of the security sector itself. In December 2001 for example, the then federal parliament of the FRJ passed the defence budget on the basis of a two page document provided by the Army and delivered to them late. This was despite the fact that at that time the defence budget represented fully two thirds of the entire federal purse.87 Similarly, both the police and particularly the BIA have been criticised by external observers for failing to provide parliament with sufficient access to information and personnel.88 Since 2002, the Ministry of Defence in particularly has become more open in its dealings with the civil sector in general and the parliament specifically. Nevertheless, a lack of transparency and a suspicion of external interference remain common themes for all security sector organisations in Serbia-Montenegro.

Civil society Despite attempts to suppress it, civil-society as a whole in Serbia – and particularly in Belgrade – remained dynamic and vibrant during the Miloševic´ period, as evidenced by a proliferation of social movements and numerous occasions of civil disobedience to his regime. The security sector was an exception to this rule however, and until October 2000 the military, the police and the intelligence agencies remained largely closed to external scrutiny.89 This situation changed significantly after 2000, leading to a proliferation of civil-society interest in security sector issues. In 2006 for example, there were several very active

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defence, security and foreign policy related non-governmental organisations (NGOs) located in Belgrade. These included the Centre for CivilMilitary Relations (CCMR), which provides expert research, analysis and comment on all aspects of the security sector reform process; the Atlantic Council of Serbia and Montenegro, which developed a close advisory relationship to the Davinic´-era Ministry of Defence; the G17 Institute, which established a School for Security Sector Reform aimed at developing expertise across the security sector; and the LEX group – made up of civilian experts from the NGO and academic sector – which worked closely with the Serbian Interior Ministry in drafting new legislation for the police.90 Despite these advances however, three important obstacles have continued to limit the depth and impact of NGO influence on defence and security matters in Serbia-Montenegro. First, as noted above, the military, police and intelligence agencies have been deeply suspicious of outside involvement in their affairs, an attitude that has constrained the extent to which even the best connected NGOs can actually influence policy.91 Second, the divided nature of the political scene in SerbiaMontenegro has left the NGO sector itself vulnerable to partification. At best this has led to questions over organisations’ ‘non-governmental’ status; at worst to accusations of corruption and clientalism.92 Finally, and despite the expansion of this sector after 2000, defence and security NGOs have been limited to a small group of organisations and personalities in Belgrade itself. Often they have been dependent on external (i.e. international) funding for their continued survival and the extent of their influence beyond a rather small expert circle is open to question. These deficiencies have been even more pronounced in Montenegro, where there has been a dearth of local non-governmental actors dealing with defence and security policy issues in a specialist manner.93 The critical engagement of the general public and media in defence and security matters in Serbia-Montenegro has also been limited, though this too has increased over time. For example, research conducted by CCMR between 2003–5 found that while defence and security issues are covered quite regularly by print and television media, this tended to be limited to generalised reporting of government announcements rather than in-depth analysis or discussion of the issues at hand. For their part, journalists themselves have complained that the quality of their reporting on these issues has been hampered by a lack of access to official information sources; the need to cover (and have knowledge of) a wide range of topics in addition to defence and security matters; and a lack of human and fi nancial resources devoted to these issues.94

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Perhaps most significantly of all however, Serbian and Montenegrin society has been deeply divided over some of the most fundamental questions facing the country. Key fault lines have persisted over the place of Serbia-Montenegro in Europe more widely and the palatability of the steps necessary to support further integration into European institutions; the question of Serbian responsibility for war crimes and cooperation with the ICTY; and finally the future of democratic reform in Serbia itself. The depth of these divisions were illustrated during the Serbian presidential elections of 2004, when Tomislav Nikolic´ – a hardliner from the SRS who espoused a radical nationalist agenda reminiscent of the Miloševic´ period – only narrowly lost the popular vote to reformist candidate Boris Tadic´.95 The election result demonstrated the polarisation of Serbian society in relation both to the future of the state itself and to the legacies of the past. This lack of societal consensus has both reflected and encouraged political fragmentation in the domestic political scene and indeed the security sector itself.

Conclusion Serbia-Montenegro has made progress some progress in its political level security sector reforms since 2000. Civilian control over the security sector has been established and confi rmed, at least to the extent that any remaining praetorian tendencies or elements in the Army, police and intelligence agencies have been eliminated. Important new legislation has begun to be introduced that gives direction to the reform process and provides a framework for regulating the security sector in a democratic manner. The role of the parliaments in security sector governance has developed and strengthened over time. Domestic civil society actors also contribute actively to defence and security policy matters in Serbia at least. The significance of these reforms should not be underestimated, particularly given the extremely negative legacy of the Miloševic´ period and political chaos and uncertainty that has characterised much of the period between 2000–6. Even so, a number of deeply rooted problems continue to hamper the democratic consolidation of security sector reform in SerbiaMontenegro. Thus, it was only in 2005, after years of delay and disagreement, that the most significant defence and security legislation was actually fi nalised in practice. This reflected a prolonged period of stagnation in the reform process during which time many existing problems and inefficiencies became even more entrenched, and there remains an urgent need for further legislative clarification in many areas. Equally, implementation of legislation continues to be a challenge. Capacity and

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expertise deficits undermine the effectiveness of policy planning and implementation in the ministries of defence and the interior, as well as the oversight functions of the parliaments, and the extent to which civil society can meaningfully engage in defence and security matters. Civilian control over the security sector may be in place, but this is concentrated overwhelmingly in the executive and maintained through clientalist strategies reminiscent of the Miloševic´ period. Moreover, and as subsequent chapters will illustrate in greater depth, there are also some important blind spots in the extent of this control, particularly in relation to anti-ICTY cadres in military and intelligence agencies. A continuing lack of political, societal and security sector consensus on the nature and future of the post-Miloševic´ state itself has underlain all of these problems. This contested context for reform has contributed to deep fragmentation in the domestic political scene and had a negative impact on civil-security sector relations. It has encouraged a mutually constitutive pattern of partification as actors from both civil and security sectors have sought out clients and allies in order to protect or strengthen their own institutional, personal or political interests. At the time of writing it remains to be seen whether and to what extent the Montenegrin independence vote may lead to a resolution of some of these problems. At the very least it seems likely to provide a fi rmer and more predictable environment in which the reform process can take place. It is also likely to diffuse the most contentious political disagreements over the future role of the military, and so may lift some of the inertia which has surrounded the defence reform at least since 2000. Even so, for the moment at least, democratic security sector reform in Serbia and Montenegro is still far from consolidated and remains closely linked to a far wider process of political and societal transformation.

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Notes 1 In order to avoid confusion, this book refers uses the generic term ‘Army’ to refer to the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and its various successor organisations (the Yugoslav Army, VJ, the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro, VSCG etc) except were more specificity is required. 2 James Gow, ‘Professionalisation and the Yugoslav Army’, in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds), The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 183–5. 3 Constitutional changes in 1971 and 1974 decentralised power in the SFRJ to the level of the republics and autonomous provinces. The JNA was given

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5 6

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a role equal to that of an autonomous province on the central committee of the governing League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). See James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), pp. 58–9 for further details. Anton Bebler, ‘The Yugoslav People’s Army and the fragmentation of a nation’, Military Review, August 1993, pp. 40–2; 46–7; Miroslav Hadžic´, The Yugoslav People’s Agony: The Role of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 231–2, 257, 259. Article 135, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992. Hadžic´, The Yugoslav People’s Agony, p. 243; Dimitrios Kourkordinos, ‘Constitutional law and the limits of the legal framing of DCAF: the case of Croatia and the FR Yugoslavia’, in Biljana Vankovska (ed.), Legal Framing of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector: Norms and Realities (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2001), pp. 175–7. The Army’s Counterintelligence Service (KOS) was renamed the Department of Security (UB) in 1955, though popular terminology retained the ‘KOS’ abbreviation. The UB itself was reorganised and renamed as the Military Security Service (VSB) in July 2002. In November 2003 it became the Military Security Agency (VBA). I am grateful to Bogoljub Milosavljevic´ for this point. KOS itself was the subject of a power struggle between Miloševic´ ideologues and sceptics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. James Gow, ‘Belgrade and Bosnia: an assessment of the Yugoslav military’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1993, pp. 243–6. Hadžic´, The Yugoslav People’s Agony, pp. 230–1; Robin Alison Remington, ‘The Yugoslav Army: trauma and transition’, in Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds), Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 167. Gow, ‘Belgrade and Bosnia’, pp. 243–4. James Gow, ‘The European exception: civil-military relations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (eds), Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 205–6. Budimir Babovic´, ‘Police as a tool of Miloševic´’s autocratic rule’, in Helsinki Committee, In the Triangle of State Power: Army, Police, Paramilitary units (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee, 2001), pp. 24–31. Bogoljub Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police and security services in Serbia and Montenegro: attained results or betrayed expectations’, in Philipp Fluri and Miroslav Hadžic´ (eds), Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2004), pp. 262–3. Zoran Kusovac, ‘Crime and culpability in Milosevic’s Serbia’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2000, pp. 10–13.

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15 Jens Stilhoff Sörensen, ‘War a social transformation: wealth, class, power and an illiberal economy in Serbia’, Civil Wars, 6:4 (Winter 2003), pp. 67–8. Elements of the VJ – especially its Miloševic´-appointed leadership – were also involved in corrupt practices. See Chapter 6 for more details. 16 Željko Ševic´ and Duško Bakracˇ, ‘Police reform in the republic of Montenegro’, in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe (Münster: Lit Verlag, April 2004), pp. 250–1. 17 See for example, ‘Montenegrin elite police arrested for auto theft’, RFE/RL Newsline, 17 August 2005; Boris Darmanovic, ‘Montenegrin trafficking scandal deepens’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 13 November 2003, www.iwpr.net; Hugh Griffiths and Gordana Igric, ‘Djukanovic smuggling claims persist’, ibid. 23 July 2003; Sörensen, ‘War a social transformation’, pp. 68–71. 18 ‘Pavkovic: Yugoslav Army ready to defend country’, RFE/RL Newsline, 22 September 2000. 19 Koštunica was federal president until March 2003. He became Serbian prime minister in April 2004. Ðin
ic´ was Serbian prime minister until his assassination in March 2003. 20 ‘Serbian criminals assault the state’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 2003, pp. 10–11; ‘Djindjic spin doctor spills the beans’, B92 News Archive (B92), 24 January 2005, www.b92.org. 21 At least one key DOS politician from the time has admitted that the new government was nervous of pushing too hard on security sector reform too early on for fear of a praetorian backlash. Author’s interview with Ivan Vejvoda, Executive Director, Balkan Trust for Democracy, 22 June 2004. See also, Miroslav Hadžic´, ‘Civil-military features of the FR Yugoslavia’, CCMR Research Paper, (Belgrade: Centre for Civil Military Relations, 23 August 2002), p. 2, www.ccmr-bg.org. 22 Stipe Sikavica, ‘The war-time and peace-time abuses of the Yugoslav Army’, in Helsinki Committee, In the Triangle of State Power: Army, Police, Paramilitary Units (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee, 2001), p. 18. 23 Markovic´ was later sentenced to seven year’s imprisonment for his role in the Ibar murders and 15 years as an accessory to the Stambolic´ murder. In July 2005, Milorad Lukovic´, former head of the JSO and close associate of Markovic´, recieved 40 years in jail for his involvement in the Stambolic´ murder. Controversially, the Ibar verdicts were quashed by the Serbia Supreme Court in May 2006. ‘Ibarska case gets another retrial’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 16 May 2006. 24 One source estimates that around 12,000 secret documents were removed from the RDB’s fi les during this period. Zoran Kusovac, ‘New rivals protect old guard’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 2001, p. 18. Even so, drugs with a street value of DM60 million were later discovered in RDB

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safety deposit boxes. ‘A secure drug habit’, B92 News Archive (B92), 9 March 2001. Pavkovic´ was formally indicted for war crimes by the ICTY in September 2003 and extradited to the Hague in April 2005. See ICTY, Indictment against Nebojsa Pavkovic´, Vladimir Lazarevic, Vlastimir Djordjevic and Streten Lukic, 22 September 2003; http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/ english/pav-ii031002e.htm. Army soldiers guarding Miloševic´’s home initially refused the Serbian police entry in what was later played down as a dispute over command authority during the operation. ‘Milosevic bodyguards arrested, confi rms Batic’, B92 News Archive (B92), 1 April 2001. For a comprehensive discussion of Pavkovic´’s domestic political interventions between 2000–3 see: Hadžic´, ‘Civil-military features’. Ibid. p. 5. Lukic´ was indicted by the ICTY in September 2003 and extradited in April 2005. ICTY, Indictment. ‘Army officers abandon sacked leader’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 25 June 2002. See footnote 8 on KOS. ‘Supreme Defence Council dismisses army intelligence chief’, B92 News Archive (B92), 21 March 2003; ‘Serbia Montenegro sacks 16 old guard officers’, RFE/RL Newsline, 08 August 2003. Author’s interview with Ivan Ðor
evic´, Chief of Staff of the Minister of the Interior, Republic of Serbia, 25 January 2001–1 April 2004; 21 June 2004. Both of these options were actively discussed by Serbian police reformers between 2000–3. Author’s interview, Belgrade, 26 June 2002. ‘Mutiny in police ranks over Hague arrests’, B92 News Archive (B92), 10 November 2001. The JSO was in fact taken out of the normal chain of command and subordinated directly to the cabinet and Interior Minister. Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police’, p. 263. ‘Heads roll at State Security’, B92 News Archive (B92), 14 November 2001; ‘Government quells Red Berets rebellion’, ibid. 17 November 2001; ‘No police extraditions while I’m minister: Mihajlovic´’, ibid. 27 November 2001; See also Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police’, p. 263. ‘Kostunica party deputy denies involvement in police mutiny’, B92 News Archive (B92), 16 November 2001. Senior figures in the DOS from the time also point out that a bloody showdown between different elements of the FRJ security sector risked destabilising the whole country. Author’s interviews, Belgrade, June 2002. ‘The Law on the Security Information Agency’, Republic of Serbia, 19 July 2002, BIA Website, http://www.bia.sr.gov.yu/Eng/frameset_e.html. ‘Serbia to establish corruption bureau’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 17 January 2003; ‘Secret police chief gets the boot’, B92 News Archive (B92),

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24 January 2003; ‘Appointment of Special Prosecutor for organized crime’, ibid. 6 March 2003. ‘Djindjic was ready to hand over Mladic, says Del Ponte’, B92 News Archive (AFP), 17 January 2004. The driver of the truck, Dejan Milenkovic´, was a close associate of former JSO commander Milorad Lukovic´. ‘Police: truck driver tried to kill Serbian Prime Minister’, ibid. 24 February 2003. Bojan Dimitrijevic and Daniel Sunter, ‘Serbia: Red Berets disbanded’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 27 March 2003; ‘Statement by Dusan Mihajlovic´, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 17 May 2003’, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia Website, http://www.mup.sr.gov.yu/domino/mup.nsf/index1-e. html. For more on the long term impact of Sabre see, Branka Bakic and Novak Gajic, ‘Police reform in Serbia: five years later’, CSRC Balkans Series Report 06/21 (Camberley: CSRC, May 2006), pp. 21–2. ‘Djindjic bodyguard speaks out’, B92 News Archive (Vesti) 15 March 2005; Author’s interviews, Belgrade, June 2004. Ibid. A number of senior Koštunica allies were arrested during Sabre including his Security Advisor and subsequent head of the BIA Rade Bulatovic´ as well as Aco Tomic´, the former head of KOS. Forced to rule as a minority government, the coalition was not fi nally agreed until April 2004. Formally made up of five parties, including moderate nationalists and reformists, the coalition was also reliant on Miloševic´’s radical SPS for support. These included public security chief Sretan Lukic´, Belgrade police chief Milan Obradovic´, and head of the elite Gendarmerie police unit, Goran Radosavljevic´. Articles, 7, 17 and 20, ‘Law on the Security Services of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, 3 July 2002, http://www.osce.org/documents/FRJ/2002/ 07/129_en.pdf. In practice the Law was implemented slowly and so remained ineffective. Indeed the parliamentary oversight committee that the Law called for did not actually come into being until 2005. I am grateful to Witek Nowosielski for this point. In Ðukanovic´’s case this was because he had no real stake in the VJ or its funding. Moreover as a proponent of Montenegrin independence, inertia and inefficiency at the federal level suited his political purposes. Milutinovic´ was indicted by the ICTY in May 1999 and to all practical purposes was cut out of politics by both the Serbian government and the world at large. He was eventually extradited to the Hague in January 2003. Primarily the dismissal Aco Tomic´, his close ally and head of KOS. Hadžic´, ‘Civil-military features’, p. 3. Timothy Edmunds, ‘A turning point in Yugoslavia’s civil–military relations?’, Journal of Defence Studies, 3:2 (Summer 2003), pp. 108–9.

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52 SCG’s constitutional Charter allowed for a referendum on Montenegrin independence in 2006, a clause which in practice leant the whole state a temporary quality. 53 International Crisis Group, ‘Montenegro’s independence drive’, ICG Europe Report No. 169 (Belgrade/Podgorica/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 07 December 2005), pp. 17–18. 54 Miroslav Hadžic´, ‘Civil–military features, p. 6. 55 Article 53, Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 4 February 2003. 56 Article 56, ibid. 57 Miroslav Hadžic´, ‘New constitutional position of the Army’, DCAF Working Paper No. 112 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, February 2003), p. 29. 58 ‘No support for defence plan’, Beta News Agency, 21 September 2004. 59 White Paper on Defence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, (Belgrade: Ministry of Defence of SCG, April 2005), pp. 88–94. 60 See ‘Draft law on democratic and civilian control of the SMAF’, CCMR Website, http://www.ccmr-bg.org/draft_law_eng/draft_law_3.htm. 61 These include draft laws on defence, the military, the security services, alternative service and peacekeeping. Even so, drafts of the fi rst three of these were rejected in November 2005. Danas, 23 November 2005, cited in ‘From the media, 18–24 November 2005’, CCMR Website, www. ccmr-bg.org. 62 ‘Military facing another reorganisation’, Beta Defense Bulletin, No. 32, 2 June 2006, pp. 2–3. 63 ‘Vision process for the reform of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia’, Danish Institute for Human Rights Website, http://www.humanrights.dk/. 64 ‘Serbia’s new police law: commendations and controversies’, Beta Defense Bulletin, No. 26, 1 December 2005, p. 2. 65 Characteristic of this conservatism was the VJ’s 2001 reform plan. Discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6, this sounded ambitious on paper, but in practice amounted to little more than minor restructuring. 66 Mark Downes, Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service (Belgrade: Law Enforcement Department of the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, 2004), pp. 40, 53. 67 Boris Tadic´, ‘Reform of the defense system of Serbia and Montenegro’, Statement by the Minister of Defence at the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, 21 March 2003. 68 Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, pp. 39–40. 69 Interview with Vejvoda. 70 ‘Civilian military control safeguarded with transfer to MoD’, B92 News Archive (B92), 6 May 2003. 71 The government did increase cooperation with the Hague significantly in 2005, but only after a number of bruising political battles. See for example,

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‘Radicals propose no confidence vote’, B92 News Archive (B92), 7 April 2005. ‘From the media, 28 October–3 November 2005’, CCMR Website; ‘Stankovic´ seeks dismissal of three assistant ministers’, Beta Defense Bulletin, No. 26, 1 December 2004, p. 7. See for example, ‘Defence Minister announces significant changes in the defense strategy’, ibid. p. 7. Though many also argued that this staff turnover was exactly what the Ministry needed because it removed the most conservative and counterreformist personnel. Author’s correspondence with Witek Nowosielski, UK Defence Attaché to Belgrade, 2001–5, 21 February 2006. One source suggests that 80 per cent of Ministry staff were VJ officers in 2002. Zoran Pajic, ‘Legal aspects of security sector reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, DCAF Working Paper No. 18 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, February-April 2002), p. 4. This figure included just under 2500 personnel from police special units such as the Gendarmerie. Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 95. Ibid. pp. 47–8. Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police’, pp. 253, 258–9. Author’s interview Major General Dobrosav Radovanovic´, Deputy Minister for Foreign Military Cooperation and Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of the FRJ, 20 June 2002; Interviews with senior military officers, Belgrade, June 2004. ‘Serbia and Montenegro’, in David Greenwood (ed.), Transparency and Accountability in South East European Defence (Sofia: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces & the George C. Marshall Association, 2003). Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police’, p. 266. ‘New constitutional position of the Army’, pp. 13–14, 26. The OSCE’s assessment in 2004 was that there was a ‘profound’ absence of accountability in the BIA. Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 53. For much of 2003–4 for example, the Serbian parliament’s Defence and Security Committee could not convene because of disagreements over who should chair it. A number of external donors, including the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces have provided technical and fi nancial assistance to parliamentarians in SCG. Similarly, domestic organisations such as CCMR train specialist researchers to support parliamentary work. The Union level National Assembly was disbanded after Montenegro’s successful bid for independence in 2006. Svetlana Djurdjevic´-Lukic´, ‘President’s Men’, Transitions Online, 15 March 2002.

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88 Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 67. 89 Both the G17 Institute and CCMR were active in these areas from 1997 onwards, though both were subjected to considerable state pressure for their troubles. 90 See for example, www.ccmr-bg.org; www.g17institute.com. 91 Interview with Vladan Živulovic´, President of the Atlantic Council of Serbia and Montenegro, 22 June 2004. Živulovic´ characterised the VSCG as a ‘state within a state’. 92 Authors interviews, Belgrade, June 2004; October 2004. 93 Though a number of local Montenegrin NGOs have become more involved with police reform issues since 2000. See Ševic´ and Bakracˇ, ‘Police reform’, pp. 242–3, 257–8. 94 Jocvanka Matic´, ‘Media reporting on defence and the Army’, in The Serbian and Montenegrin Public on Military Reforms – 1st Round; 7th Round (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2003, 2005). 95 Nikolic´ won 46.3 per cent of the vote to Tadic´’s 53.97 per cent.

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Part III

The organisational level

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5

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Security sector reform at the organisational level: Croatia

The Croatian security sector faced a number of common organisational level reform challenges in the aftermath of the country’s successful war of independence in 1995. These were primarily a consequence of the war experience itself, as well as the attendant demands associated with establishing the newly independent Croatian state more widely. They included a legacy of wartime rather than peacetime force structures, particularly in relation to high manpower levels; outdated, mismatched and worn out equipment stocks; a prioritisation of regime and state security over the rights of individual citizens on the part of the police and intelligence agencies; and the absence of a proper education, training and human resource management system across the security sector as a whole. Since the end of the war in 1995, and particularly since the ousting of the Tu
man regime in 2000, Croatia has made important progress in all of these areas. The most obvious legacies of the wartime period have been overcome and a clear vision for the future role and structure of the Croatian security sector has emerged. However, if these reforms are to be successfully implemented and consolidated over the long term, a number of further challenges will need to be overcome in relation to political leadership, resourcing, expertise and responsibility.

The legacy of the 1990s At the organisational level, the Croatian security sector was defi nitively shaped by their involvement in the Homeland War and the country’s concurrent process of nationalist state building. These experiences had three main impacts. First, they meant that to all intents and purposes Croatia had to build its security sector organisations from scratch in the early 1990s. This had implications for the quality and nature of both personnel and equipment across the sector as a whole. Second, they had important structural implications in the security sector itself,

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including the militarisation of the police, the maintenance of very large armed forces in proportion to the country’s size and a habit of high spending on security sector budgets. Finally, elements of the Croatian security sector in were implicated in war crimes, leading to the indictment of a number of personnel by the ICTY. The Croatian security sector was unprepared and ill equipped for the outbreak of war in 1991. In the SFRJ, the military – in the form of the JNA – was an explicitly federal organisation and individual republics such as Croatia were forbidden by law from developing their own armed forces. The same was true of the old Yugoslav intelligence agencies which were organised and controlled at the federal level. It was precisely these organisations – along with the paramilitary Serbian militias of the Krajina region – that the Croatian authorities found themselves confronting on the battlefield in the early 1990s. Even so, the republics were not entirely helpless. Both the paramilitary Yugoslav police (the milicija) and republican Territorial Defence units (TOs)1 were organised and commanded along republican lines and it was to these organisations that Croatia fi rst looked to provide the basis of a new national army as it moved towards independence in 1990. Their numbers were also bolstered by significant numbers of JNA deserters as well as diaspora Croats who returned to Croatia from abroad to fight in the war. 2 The Croatian leadership’s fi rst step was to strengthen and militarise its existing police structures. Ethnic Serbs – who had always been over represented in the police command structure – and other ‘unreliable’ policemen were forced out or resigned in a process that helped to intensify political tensions both with the federal authorities and with Croatia’s own Serbian communities. 3 The governing HDZ also organised volunteer defence units made up primarily of party members. This process was further consolidated in April 1991 with the establishment of a dedicated National Guard Corps (ZNG) to operate alongside the police. The ZNG was placed under the command of the Ministry of the Interior and included many former police officers in its ranks, but was organised along much more open military lines.4 The ZNG was founded on explicitly political criteria, with HDZ enthusiasts drawn from the party militias making up a large proportion of its initial membership. Similar changes were also initiated in the intelligence agencies. The Croatian division of the old Yugoslav-era State Security Service (SDS) was placed under republican control and renamed the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP). Most ethnic Serbs were either purged or left voluntarily and HDZ loyalists were appointed to high positions within the organisation. 5

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On the eve of full-scale war in June 1991, the Croatian armed forces consisted of around 40,000 personnel in the police, and 6–8000 in the ZNG, and it was these organisations that bore the brunt of the fighting in the early part of the confl ict. Between June and December, the Croatian authorities worked to develop and transform these existing structures into a proper army. Basic documents on the creation of a Croatian defence system were enacted in August, and a General Staff for the armed forces was established in late September. The ZNG was absorbed into the newly created Croatian Army (HV), while a programme of mass mobilisation was launched in the population at large. By the end of the year the HV proper was fully established. It consisted of some 200,000 men and was able to assume primary responsibility for the prosecution of the war against the Serbs.6 This crash programme of militarisation was successful in that it allowed Croatia to at least hold its own against the JNA and the Serbian militias that opposed it (though it would take until 1995 for the government to regain full control over all the territory they had lost). It also represented a very real break with the past and provided a clean slate for the development of the new Croatian defence and security system, largely free from the old institutional influences of the SFRJ. However, the rapidity with which the Croatian police and armed forces were established had many more negative consequences as well. Firstly, they had to be manned and equipped extremely swiftly. The police for example were forced to embark on a rapid programme of new recruitment to cope with the demands of the confl ict. In addition, ethnic Serbs had been disproportionately represented in the old Yugoslav milicija, particularly at the senior level. Large numbers of these officers either left or were forced out in response to the war or the increasing ethnic nationalism of the Croatian authorities. This further intensified the manning problem in the police, but also meant that there was a severe shortage of qualified personnel to train the huge numbers of new recruits. These circumstances had a detrimental effect on experience and expertise levels within the police as a whole. According to Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic´, for example, by 1995 as many as 70 per cent of police officers had only five years experience or less. As a consequence, the organisation as a whole suffered serious expertise deficits in relation to specialist police skills such as criminal investigation or forensics.7 The situation was little better in the newly formed HV. The JNA had been viewed with antipathy in Croatia since the early 1970s, and ethnic Croats made up a relatively small proportion of its officer corps.8 In 1991–2 therefore, there was no ready pool of experienced military officers to command and train the new army. In the main, the newly

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formed HV consisted of civilian volunteers, former police officers who transferred either directly to the military or were absorbed with the ZNG, volunteers from the Croatian diaspora, and those former JNA officers whose loyalties lay with Croatia.9 Many of the new civilian recruits had some rudimentary military experience through their involvement in the TOs. However, in the main recruitment occurred on the basis of necessity, minimum entry criteria were practically nonexistent10 and many citizens joined the HV without any prior military education or training at all. At the command level, many appointments were made on the basis of HDZ loyalty rather than professional experience or qualifications. Political and ethnic criteria rather than relevant experience or expertise were also of primary importance when it came to staffi ng the intelligence agencies. Most existing personnel simply switched political allegiance to the new regime, while ethnic Serbs and a few die-hard communists either left or were forced out to be replaced with HDZ loyalists.11 This process had three main impacts on the organisational development of the Croatian intelligence sector. First, a core of former SDS staff remained in the newly created SZUP. These were ethnic Croats and were undoubtedly loyal to the new regime. However they were influenced by the institutional culture that had developed in the SDS during the socialist period. This included a tradition of organisational secrecy and exclusivity, and a history of repressive practices towards the domestic social and political scene.12 Second, the highly partisan nature of many appointments in the intelligence agencies meant that HDZ hardliners tended to dominate these structures. Finally, and as in the police and the military, the need to fi nd new staff quickly to man the new organisations meant that newly recruited staff generally lacked specialist expertise and experience.13 The Croatian authorities also faced two serious obstacles when it came to equipping their fledgling security sector organisations. First, in response to the establishment of the ZNG in Spring 1990, the JNA had secretly transferred all heavy weaponry from Croatian TO depots to federally controlled facilities. This effectively disarmed the TOs and meant that there was no ready stock of armaments on which the police, ZNG and later the HV could draw. Second, this equipment shortage was also intensified by the imposition of an international arms embargo on Croatia by the UN in 1991. As a consequence, the government was not able to access the legitimate international arms market. Instead, what weaponry it could obtain was generally stolen, fought for or smuggled in.14 These difficult circumstances had a dual impact. They meant that for much of the war, Croatian military equipment was old,

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mismatched and sometimes in poor condition. They also forced the authorities – through the intelligence agencies and especially the Ministry of Defence’s Security Information Service (SIS) – to participate in criminal and covert networks in order to acquire armaments. By its very nature much of this activity took place surreptitiously and the scope for corruption was high.15 In spite of these problems, by 1995 the Croatian security sector – and particularly the HV – had been built into a force that was capable of taking the fight to the Serbs. This process culminated with operations Flash and Storm in May and August of that year. These joint military and police offensives defeated the remaining Serb forces in Croatia and re-established the government’s control over the territory that it had lost.16 The successes of Flash and Storm represented a transformation in the military’s circumstances from its formative years in the early 1990s. This change was made possible by the ease with which the Tu
man regime had been able to flout the international arms embargo and the tacit support and assistance by some western governments, who saw Croatian rearmament as a useful counter to Serbian aggression in the Balkans.17 Despite these operational successes on the ground however, the war had a number of more negative organisational consequences for the military, police and intelligence agencies. In the HV, the immediate and pressing demands of the conflict meant there was little time for formal military education or training. Promotions occurred either on the basis of loyalty to the HDZ or due to military successes in the field, which as in the police helped to entrench existing expertise problems. The war also isolated the Croatian army from the wider European trends in defence transformation discussed in the Chapter 2, particularly in relation to modernisation and downsizing. For example, while over the course of the war the military was reduced in size from its high point in late 1991, at 100,000 strong in 1995 it remained an extremely large organisation given the relatively small size of the Croatian state.18 It also retained a traditional force structure organised around the defence of national territory mission. This included a substantial contingent of conscript soldiers and a strong bias towards heavy armour and artillery in its arsenal. This military machine was supported by consistently high year-on-year defence budgets, but even so, much of its equipment was dated, worn out and ill-suited to peacetime roles. The war also had an important organisational impact in the police. For much of the early 1990s, they had been required to perform a dual role, comprising of two distinct and quite different imperatives: warfighting and public policing.19 The balance between these two roles

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shifted more towards policing over the course of the war as the HV began to shoulder the main burden of the fighting. Nevertheless, the Croatian police were involved in military operations throughout the conflict and by the time the war fi nished in 1995, they remained an at least partially militarised organisation. 20 This dual role had a number of negative organisational consequences in the police. In the fi rst instance, it intensified pre-existing expertise deficits because new recruits were often forced to spend their time on the front lines rather than training for or gaining experience in regular police work. It also meant that the police’s primary role focused on state security concerns (the prioritisation of the interests of state and the regime) rather than public security tasks (the protection of the life and the safety of citizens according to the rule of law). Militarisation led to an emphasis on force rather than negotiation in public policing duties, while the extreme circumstances of the war-fighting experience encouraged a tolerant approach to misconduct and the development of a strong code of silence in the organisation as a whole. 21 By the end of the war the Croatian police were still a very large organisation, at least relative to their peacetime equivalents. For example, Croatia had approximately 500 police officers per 100,000 citizens in 1999 compared to an average of 200–400 in most western democracies. They also suffered from chronic shortages of equipment and infrastructure, much of which had been destroyed or damaged over the course of the war. 22 The impact of the war was less definitive in the Croatian intelligence agencies. These organisations certainly played a key role in flouting the arms embargo and facilitating Croatia’s rearmament. However, in most aspects it was political rather than operational imperatives which drove their activities, particularly as the decade progressed. Indeed, throughout the 1990s, the intelligence agencies were utilised by the regime to spy on and intimidate its opponents, while at the same time their wartime operational successes were rather meagre. 23 This left a legacy of inter-agency rivalry and partification amongst the services themselves and reinforced their existing proclivities towards domestic political interference. Finally, the war left an important organisational legacy in the area of war crimes responsibility. The conduct of the war in Croatia was often brutal, and operations Flash and Storm were both accompanied by the mass exodus of Serb civilians from territory seized by Croatian forces. As a consequence, a number of military and police personnel – some of them very senior – were implicated in war crimes during the conflict, and subsequently indicted by the ICTY. The question of

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war crimes responsibility remains a highly sensitive one in both the security sector itself and amongst the Croatian public more widely. Nevertheless, it is an issue which goes to the heart of Croatia’s postconflict rehabilitation and remains central to those aspects of organisational level security sector reform concerned with professional responsibility. In summary, the war years bequeathed organisational reform challenges to the Croatian security sector at all levels. Its role and force structure were shaped by the experience of confl ict and by the authoritarian policies of the HDZ regime. Much of its equipment was dated or worn out. Expertise levels were low and promotions had generally occurred on the basis of either tactical success in the field or political criteria rather than professional qualifications. Corruption was rife in the police particularly, while the difficulty legacy of war crimes ran throughout the Croatian defence and security system.

Role Role change in the Croatian security sector began during the Tu
man period. This process was initially most apparent in the police, largely as a natural consequence of the creation and development of the HV proper. Between 1991–5 the army was able to assume the main responsibility for the conduct of the war, which gradually allowed the police to return to its main business of public policing. This role change was reflected by the introduction of changes to the Criminal Code in 1996, and a new Criminal Procedure Code in 1997, both of which re-emphasised the importance of the public security role. Even so, the police retained a strong bias towards state and regime security throughout the 1990s, and many of the Tu
man-era reforms were in practice halfhearted and poorly implemented. 24 It is significant for example that no new Police Law – which would have unambiguously clarified the police’s post-confl ict role change – was forthcoming during this period. Similarly, while some downsizing and restructuring did occur, by 2000 the police were still relatively oversized and retained a strong paramilitary flavour. In the rest of the Croatian security sector, the second half of the 1990s was a period of inward-looking stagnation. The role of the HV – renamed the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (OSRH) in 1996 – continued to be seen primarily in terms of territorial defence, and by 2000 its main mission and force structure had changed little from that of the wartime period. This was despite a rapidly evolving regional security environment in which the possibility of a direct military

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threat to Croatian territory had receded substantially. In the intelligence agencies, these changing circumstances encouraged an intensification of their domestic political involvement, as the Tu
man regime refocused its attention from the ‘external’ threat posed by the Serbs, to the internal one posed by the political opposition. 25 The political changes of 2000 fundamentally changed the context for organisational level security sector reform in Croatia. Under Tu
man, the repressive tendencies of the police and intelligence agencies had been encouraged and sustained by the authoritarian governance of the HDZ regime. Moreover, the HDZ’s own legitimacy in society relied to a great degree on its nationalist claims to success in defending the new Croatian state from external military aggression. It was thus in the old regime’s interests to sustain the military in its wartime form. In this context, a large military focused around the defence of national territory mission acted as a clear physical embodiment of the new Croatian state and a reminder to everyone of the central role that Tu
man and the HDZ had played in its creation. In contrast, the new authorities were committed to democratising Croatian society. Their legitimacy rested less on nationalism and more on the promise of political and economic reform and international rehabilitation. All of these changes would require organisational change in the security sector. Three other factors also contributed to a fundamental reassessment of the Croatian security sector’s role. First, the clearly declining saliency of a direct military threat to national territory forced defence planners in Croatia to ask serious questions about how the armed forces could best be reformed to address the country’s new security environment. Second, faced with the challenge of reforming the Croatian economy, and in the context of severe fiscal restrictions, one of the urgent priorities of the new government was to end the Tu
man-era tradition of massively high security sector budgets. Organisational reform in the military and elsewhere was thus a pressing priority if it was to adapt to its new fi nancial circumstances. Finally, and as Chapter 7 will discuss in greater depth, the fall of the HDZ opened Croatia more extensively to international influences. Membership of the EU and NATO in particular emerged as increasingly urgent foreign policy goals from 2000 onwards, and role evolution of the security sector became increasingly shaped by the requirements of these organisations as a result. Since 2000, role change has perhaps been most pronounced in the military. At the heart of this shift has been a reappraisal of the relevance and cost of sustaining the defence of national territory mission. Croatian defence legislation has been explicit in recognising the country’s changed

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strategic circumstances. The 2002 National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy for example both play down the significance of an external military threat to the country.26 The 2005 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) goes further, explicitly stating that ‘. . . at the moment and in the foreseeable longer term – a direct, conventional military threat to Croatia is unlikely’.27 There has also been a frank recognition that providing a unilateral defence of national territory capability would be a prohibitively expensive undertaking, particularly given the Croatian state’s extremely long borders and lack of strategic depth, and the commitment of successive governments’ to reduce Tudman-era defence budgets.28 These dilemmas have forced the Croatian authorities to think in new ways about the country’s security priorities. The importance assigned to the defence of national sovereignty and territory has not entirely disappeared. It remains the ‘fi rst mission’ of the OSRH and because of the Homeland War continues to occupy an important place in the Croatian psyche. However, there has been an increasing recognition that the nature of the threat, and the role that the armed forces should be expected to play in addressing it, has changed. Indeed, since 2000 Croatian defence documentation has increasingly highlighted the challenges posed by global and regional insecurity more widely conceived, including issues such as terrorism, organised drug and people trafficking, illegal immigration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 29 This re-evaluation of Croatia’s security circumstances has led to a shift away from the notion of unilateral territorial defence towards a broader concept of collective security, on the basis that Croatia is illequipped (both organisationally and fi nancially) to meet the ‘new’ security challenges discussed above on its own. A collective security focus instead prioritises the need for states to cooperate with each other in order to share the burden of security provision in the new environment. This has led Croatia to set particular store on developing relationships – and indeed pursuing eventual integration – with key regional security organisations such as NATO and the EU. In this context, a key new role for the Croatian military has been to contribute to the shared tasks and responsibilities of allied states and organisations. In operational terms, this new focus has entailed a new emphasis on multinational peacekeeping and crisis management missions, as well as active participation in regional confidence and security building activities. 30 Finally, the SDR also outlines an important role for the military in providing assistance to domestic civilian institutions at times of crisis or during natural disasters.

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This new thinking on security priorities has also had an impact on the police. Indeed, in several important areas their newly emergent roles converge with those of the armed forces – albeit with a greater emphasis on domestic security considerations. For example, the Programme Guidelines of the Ministry of the Interior, 2004–7 identify ‘global terrorism . . . [as] the biggest threat to . . . humankind’, and give the police – and the Special Police in particular – a key role in combating it. The police have responsibility for supervising and patrolling the state border and are the lead organisation in tackling trafficking and organised crime. In addition, several teams of Croatian police officers have been deployed in international peace support operations including in East Timor, Kosovo, Cyprus and Afghanistan. The Programme Guidelines also give them a centrally important role in dealing with natural disasters and other domestic crises as and when they occur. 31 In other respects however, the differentiation of roles between different security sector organisations in Croatia has become more pronounced. For example, the period since 1995 – and since 2000 particularly – has seen the emergence of a clearer division of responsibilities between the armed forces and intelligence agencies whose roles primarily focus on the security of the state, and the police who are responsible for the security of the citizenry. This process is part of a fundamental change from a police role based around authoritarian principles to one driven by the demands of democratic policing. 32 This emphasis on democratic policing principles is clearly visible in the Police Law of 2000. This document offers a clear vision for the future development of the Croatian police, as well as introducing the fi rst systematic and coherent legal framework for their activities since their formation. The main task of the police is identified as being to provide ‘to the citizens the protection of their fundamental constitutional rights and freedoms . . .’ (Article 2), while the Law also includes provisions which stress proportionality in the application of police power (Article 21), and which strictly mandate the circumstances under which coercion may be used (Article 54). 33 These restrictions represent a marked difference from the situation in the past, when the militarisation of the police culture led to an emphasis on the use of force in many of its activities. Reflecting upon these changes, the Ministry of the Interior has also prioritised the development of community policing strategies in both the existing uniformed force and at its police training and educational facilities. 34 A similar change of focus has been visible in the intelligence agencies. The Security Services Act of 2002 reorganised the entire sector, but had a particular impact on SZUP. This was renamed the Counter-Security

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Service (POA) and in an important step had its police powers removed. Instead, its primary task was identified as being the collection and evaluation of information on the activities of foreign intelligence agencies, individuals and groups on Croatian soil. This represented a move away from the old norms of SFRJ and Tu
man-era state security roles where its main role had been to protect the regime from domestic political threats to its authority. It thus reinforced the wider shift from state orientated to democratic policing models. The Security Services Act also clearly defi ned the roles and responsibilities of Croatia’s various other intelligence agencies. The Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) was renamed the Security Service (OA), though its role remained essentially the same: to gather intelligence abroad. The Ministry of Defence’s Security Information Service (SIS) became the Military Security Agency (VSA). Its role was also largely unchanged: to provide intelligence support to the Ministry of Defence and armed forces. 35 As this book was going to press, Croatia’s intelligence agencies were undergoing a further phase of reorganisation in line with the Security and Intelligence Services law of June 2006. This supersedes the 2002 Act, and in organisational terms, merges POA with OA to create a single civilian intelligence agency, the Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA). The SIS is likewise reorganised and renamed as the Military Security and Intelligence Agency (VSOA). In each case, the new agencies roles remain broadly unchanged from their predecessors, though the VSOA is now also authorised to operate abroad. 36 More broadly, role change in the intelligence agencies has tended to mirror wider trends in the Croatian security sector as a whole. Thus, during the war years, the main focus of HIS and SZUP were the activities of the various Yugoslav and Serbian intelligence agencies. Since 2000, their concerns have changed to more closely reflect the emergent preoccupations of the Croatian security system such as participation in anti-terrorist activities. 37 The domestic activities of the agencies have also become less overtly politically partisan and repressive than in the past in line with the changing demands of Croatia’s post-2000 governments. Even so, as Chapter 3 and the subsequent section on responsibility illustrate, the Croatian intelligence agencies have been implicated in a number of domestic political scandals since 2000, and the extent to which the 2002 reforms have been able to usher in a genuine postauthoritarian culture change in the agencies themselves has been questioned by some. 38 Indeed, it was a reflection of these concerns that there was a need for a new Security and Intelligence Agencies law in 2006 – only four years after the introduction of the original Act – and a frank

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recognition of the intelligence agencies’ failure to adapt fully to their new circumstances.

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New roles make new operational and organisational demands in the security sector itself. In Croatia, this process has had two main aspects since 2000. First, there has been an extensive programme of organisational restructuring in response to the transformation of the country’s political and security circumstances. This has particularly been the case for the military, but also for the police. Second, there has been an urgent need for organisational modernisation and re-equipment both to make up for the embedded deficiencies of the past in this respect, and also in line with the demands of the reform process more widely. Neither of these processes has been straightforward however, and both have taken place in the context of severe fi nancial constraint and considerable political tensions. The most pressing need for restructuring was in the armed forces. Only small steps were taken in relation to military reform between 1995–2000. Indeed, by 2000 the Croatian armed forces retained a force structure that was still best suited to its old territorial defence missions of the war years. At 55,000 strong, the military was very large relative to the size of the country, while as many as 24,000 of this number were conscripts. In the context of a rapidly declining defence budget – which fell from 6.084 billion Kuna or 4.4 per cent of GDP in 1998 to 3.99 billion Kuna or 2.03 per cent of GDP in 200339 – the large size of the armed forces was a problem. It meant that a disproportionate amount of the defence budget was allocated to personnel and operating costs leaving very little money left over for desperately needed investment and modernisation in other areas. Indeed, in 2002, defence minister Jozo Radoš admitted that as much as 67.9 per cent of the defence budget was allocated to personnel, 21.4 per cent to operating costs and only 10.7 per cent for all the defence sector’s other expenses such as procurement and research and development.40 These fi nancial constraints further increased the urgent need for organisational reform in the military, initially simply so the armed forces could live within their new means, but also with the longer term aim of freeing up resources for modernisation in line with their emergent new roles. This was an especially pressing issue given that much of the armed forces’ existing equipment was unreliable or inoperative and in desperate need of replacement.41 In 2002, the government was forced to introduce a number of stop-gap cost cutting measures, including a freeze on all new (non-conscript) recruitment into the military.

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These reduced personnel costs and contributed to much needed downsizing in the military. However, they also had a negative impact on the army’s ability to refresh its soldiery and by 2004, the average age of a Croatian soldier was a comparatively elderly 36 years old. The government also reduced the length of national service from ten to six months, which allowed for four smaller intakes of draftees per year and reduced the number of conscripts in the armed forces at any one time significantly.42 However, despite an almost universal recognition that effective downsizing was crucial to the future development of the military, the fi rst Racˇan government did little about it in practice. In the context of Croatia’s high unemployment rate, many in the government feared that reducing the size of the armed forces significantly would be tantamount to throwing thousands of war heroes on to the streets. The vocal opposition of groups like HVIDRA and the HDZ on the issue merely intensified the problem, and as late as the summer of 2002 there was no agreed strategy for how the downsizing programme would be implemented in practice or how those selected to be ‘downsized’ would be chosen.43 This situation began to change later in the year when Željka Antunovic´ replaced Radoš as Defence Minister. Under her more assertive leadership, downsizing in the military began to be put into practice. This occurred on the basis of voluntary redundancies, and was supported by a generous resettlement package (SPECTRA) for those who opted to leave. Between May 2002 and January 2004, the armed forces were reduced in size from 42,923 to 29,020, a substantive reduction of almost 14,000 soldiers.44 The new HDZ government of November 2003 also continued this programme with the aim of eventually bringing the size of the military down to around 18,000 personnel (including 2000 civilian support staff).45 At the time of writing the government was well on the way to meeting this goal, with figures from December 2005 putting the numerical strength of the military at 18,479 active duty servicemen and 3963 civilian support staff.46 Despite these obvious headline successes however, the downsizing process in Croatia has not been without its critics. Some have argued, for example, that the cost of the programme has been too high and created even more of a bias towards personnel in the defence budget due to the costs of resettlement. In addition, the savings achieved by the downsizing process have been distributed around the state budget as a whole rather than being ploughed back into defence, and so have done little to free up resources for future investment in modernisation.47 Others have suggested that the way the downsizing programme has been carried out – providing fi nancial rewards for those that choose

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to leave voluntarily – has encouraged only the brightest and best personnel to leave, as these were the ones most constrained by the present system and for whom life outside the military would present the best opportunities.48 While there have undoubtedly been difficulties with the policy, what is apparent is that by 2004, the Croatian government had begun to seriously address the most negative organisational legacies of the past, in the military at least. As a consequence, the military reform process in Croatia has been increasingly dominated by the challenge of restructuring the armed forces for the future. Some small steps were taken in this direction between 2000–5. The OSRH were reorganised from a system of army commands into a smaller corps structure in 2003; the HRZ had their elderly Mig-21 aircraft overhauled in 2002–3; a number of other equipment modernisation programmes were completed; while units destined for overseas deployment were gradually re-equipped to improve their interoperability with allied forces.49 Even so, by 2005 the military remained in desperate need of a more coherent and structured programme of organisational modernisation, something that was clearly recognised in the SDR of that year. This is an ambitious document that outlines a clear direction for the future development of the military, envisaging their development into a small, professionalised organisation by 2015. It aims to reduce the proportion of the defence budget spent on personnel to 50 per cent, while increasing the amount spent on procurement and modernisation. It also stresses mobility in the armed forces, aiming to structure, train and equip 40 per cent of the military’s land component ‘for deployment’. Perhaps the most significant goal of the SDR however, is the planned transformation of the armed forces into an all-volunteer force, stipulating the complete abolition of conscription by the end of the reform period. 50 As the SDR itself acknowledges, implementing all of its goals is unlikely to be straightforward. Not only will it require the development of further legislation outlining the practical detail of the reform process itslef, it will also require a sustained political and fi nancial commitment from the (civilian) government over a ten year period. By mid-2006, the fi rst part of this process was well underway. Indeed, in July of that year, the Croatian parliament fi nally passed a long awaited Long Term Development Plan for the Croatian Armed Forces, 2006–15 (LTDP), which provides a detailed strategy for the further organisational transformation of the OSRH. Whether or not the government can sustain the current momentum for defence reform remains to be seen however. Certainly, reforms put forward in the SDR and LTDP are fundamental

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enough to challenge many of the established roles and traditions of the armed forces, and so may face resistance from within the military establishment itself. 51 Their success will thus demand strong leadership and support from the highest levels of the civilian hierarchy. In addition, the SDR recognises – though it does not mandate – that in order to achieve ‘an acceptable level of interoperability and to replace obsolete, outdated combat systems’ an increase in the defence budget to over 2 per cent of GDP from the projected figure of 1.84–1.87 per cent will most likely be necessary. 52 In the past the defence budget has been seen as a ‘soft option’ for civilian politicians anxious to cut expenditure and in this context, maintaining the necessary financial commitment suggested by the SDR and LTDP over the best part of a decade may be a tall order. In the police, the challenge of restructuring has been similar in character to that of the military, if somewhat less dramatic in scale. Part of the reason for this difference is that organisational level reform in the police began much earlier, in the mid-1990s – albeit in a rather hesitant fashion. As a consequence, police transformation has taken place over a relatively extended timescale, and the process of post-conflict adaptation at least was well under way by the political changes of 2000. Even so, since 2000 the Croatian police have continued to undergo a series of important – and sometimes difficult – structural changes. During the war years, control of the police was centralised in the Interior Ministry – an arrangement that reflected the state focused orientation of their role during the SFRJ and wartime periods. This situation changed as the HV gradually assumed principal responsibility for the conduct of the war, and in 1993 the police were reorganised into 20 new administrative regions. 53 This process of decentralisation was continued and reinforced by the Police Law of 2000. This created a three tier command system for the police, comprising the Interior Ministry in Zagreb, the 20 regional administrations, and around 200 police stations at the local level. It also established a new General Police Directorate under a Chief of Police in order to take operational control of police activities, as well as to act as an institutional fi rebreak between the political appointees in the Ministry and policemen on the ground. In common with the military, the Croatian police have also struggled to manage the competing pressures of an oversized force structure, the urgent need for modernisation and – for the most part – declining year on year budgets. High manning levels have skewed the police budget heavily towards personnel costs54 and downsizing has emerged as a key strategy to address this imbalance and to free up resources for

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investment elsewhere. A significant rationalisation of police numbers did occur after 2000, with police numbers falling from around 30,000 to 20,000 in 2004. 55 These reductions were accomplished in several ways. The Ministry offered an incentive package to encourage eligible officers to take early retirement and in common with the approach adopted in the military, also operated an informal freeze on recruitment. 56 In addition, the government controversially laid off around 3700 police officers in 2001. These layoffs occurred on the basis of the new Police Law which stipulated a number of minimum conditions that serving police officers were expected to fulfil, including to ‘have completed at least the secondary level of education’; to have no criminal record; and, perhaps most ambiguously of all, ‘to be worthy of performing police tasks’. 57 Those who did not meet the required criteria were either dismissed or reassigned to new jobs in either the private sector or other government ministries. As in the military, police downsizing has been a difficult and sometimes politically contentious exercise. The ‘reassignment’ of personnel in 2001–2, for example, was accompanied by drawn out protests from the laid off police officers – many of whom were war veterans – and hostility from the HDZ opposition. Critics claimed that in practice the dismissals had occurred on arbitrary or political grounds, and the government had not done enough to fulfil its promise to reassign officers to alternative employment. 58 While a government commission subsequently dismissed these charges, the protests continued well into 2003 and further exposed the political sensitivities involved in implementing root and branch reforms in the country’s security sector. The Sanader government continued its predecessor’s policies in relation to the police, and by 2004 the overall direction of the reform process was well consolidated. Even so, at the time of writing the Croatian police remained in a state of organisational transformation and continued to face a number of serious reform challenges. Much of their equipment and infrastructure still needed to be improved and modernised, while key operational capacities required for EU accession – such as an integrated computer-based criminal intelligence system – remained under development.59 In contrast to the major restructuring that occurred in the military and police since 2000, reform in the Croatian intelligence agencies has been much less extensive. Despite the changes introduced by the 2002 Security Services Act, the agencies’ organisation, internal composition and other features largely remained unchanged from their Tu
man-era predecessors.60 Extensive personnel change did occur between 2000–1. However, as Chapter 3 illustrated, this occurred more

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as a consequence of the civilian turf wars over control of the agencies than from a considered process of professional restructuring. A consequence of this lack of reform has been stagnation within the organisations themselves, and – as the Podbevšek affair discussed elsewhere in this study demonstrates – a continuing tendency to revert to the authoritarian-era norms and practices of the past. The 2006 Security and Intelligence Agencies law does mandate a much more extensive reorganisation of the Croatian intelligence agencies, including in particular their rationalisation into only two agencies – one military, one civilian – rather than three. These reforms cut down on duplication amongst the agencies themselves, and promise to reduce the scope for political competition and organisational partification in the intelligence system more widely. Even so, at the time of writing, the practical impact of the new law was yet to be felt, and the extent to which it represents a genuine break with the past remains to be seen.

Expertise As in so many other areas, expertise levels in the Croatian security sector were deeply influenced by the experience of state building and war. The immediate demands of the war and subsequent partification of the police and the military meant that education or specialist skills were not criteria that were generally taken into consideration when recruiting and promoting soldiers and policemen.61 While some education and training programmes were introduced in the police and the military during the latter part of the 1990s these generally took place on an ad hoc basis, and in the main had little impact on future career prospects.62 By 2000 therefore, the military, police and intelligence agencies all suffered from serious expertise deficits. They also lacked any coherent personnel management system, with, according to one observer, no ‘transparent and consistent system for evaluation and promotion, making career development a subject to political reliability or personal preference of the senior officers’.63 In 2000, the challenges faced by the government in this area were formidable. In the defence sector, Croatia had no dedicated military academy and those facilities that did exist were overstretched, poorly staffed and wholly inadequate for the tasks which they were required to perform.64 The educational deficit ran throughout the Croatian defence system, and there was no ready pool of expertise within the officer corps from which to draw instructors for any new education or training initiatives. The military did incorporate a number of former JNA officers who had undertaken specialist military training, but this

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was based on old SFRJ-era precepts of self-management socialism and general peoples’ defence that were ill-suited to Croatia’s changed security circumstances. The situation was similar in the police, though here at least there was a functioning police academy. Even so specialist skills were generally lacking, and, as in the military, those officers who did have some prior education and training had gained this during the SFRJ period. A consequence of this was that the organisation had, according to Joško Moric´, a former deputy Interior Minister, ‘inherited the communist organization, mentality, and its ways of understanding police forces’.65 While some efforts were made to address this problem during the late Tu
man period – in particular by abandoning the old SFRJ and wartime ‘general practitioner’ model of policing in favour of a shift to increasing professional specialisation – the legacy of the past continued to exert a heavy influence on the police educational system.66 Despite the depth of the problem, for much of the period from 2000, the government devoted only limited attention to these issues. Political capital and financial resources were committed to more immediately pressing security sector reform priorities in areas such as organisational restructuring and the development of core defence and security legislation, while political divisions within the fi rst Racˇan coalition undermined the coherence of the government’s security sector reform agenda as a whole. The urgent need for downsizing in particular compounded the problem, and the temporary strategy of freezing recruitment into the military and police in order to save on personnel costs meant that even those cadets who did complete a programme of specialist education had no guarantee of employment, a factor which further contributed to the neglect of the education and training system in the security sector as a whole.67 In the face of these obstacles, and in the absence of sufficiently developed domestic capacities, the government made extensive use of foreign education packages. The US was particularly active in this area under the auspices of its International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, having established early contacts with the Croatian military during the late Tu
man period.68 These international contacts expanded significantly from 2000, incorporating bilateral and multilateral initiatives from a diverse range of countries. This was particularly the case with regard to the military, but also in the intelligence agencies, whose initially acute shortage of qualified personnel was at least partially overcome with the extensive assistance of countries such as the US and Germany.69

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Access to foreign military education provided the Croatian security sector with a valuable external facility for improving the skill levels of its officers. Even so, a number of persistent capacity and control problems prevented these opportunities from being exploited to their full potential. The lack of a developed human resource management system within the military meant that even when an officer received military training abroad, there was no systematic way of recognising these qualifications or linking them to job assignments or promotions. Some sources in the Croatian defence system also claimed that foreign educated students risked being seen as threats by conservative superiors and some were even sidelined for promotion when they returned to their units.70 Even so, since 2000, Croatian policy documentation has been clear that any long term solution to the education and training requirements of the security sector will ultimately have to be provided indigenously. The 2005 SDR for example recognises the importance of expertise in the military and observes that the ‘. . . lack of a consistent human resource management policy is one of the main reasons for not fully exploiting the human resource potential experiencing difficulties in meeting the demands of defence tasks’.71 Similarly, the Interior Ministry’s Programme Guidelines for 2004–7 highlight the importance of building a personnel management system ‘according to EU standards’ and reforming the police education system.72 By early 2006, Croatia had begun to implement a number of concrete reforms in these areas. These were most advanced in relation to the police, where they had been ongoing since the introduction of the Police Law in 2000. They included a reorganisation of the police educational curriculum to incorporate a greater emphasis on community policing skills such as conflict prevention and resolution, the establishment of a Department for Professional Improvement and Specialisation to encourage in-service training for existing police officers, and the introduction of a personnel record for individual officers to keep track of the courses they have taken and the skills they have acquired.73 The reform process has been more tentative in the defence sector, not least because of the time it has taken to produce a coherent vision of the future of the armed forces in the form of the SDR. Even so, by 2005 the Ministry of Defence and military General Staff had taken some important steps towards addressing the military’s education deficits. These included the abolition of redundant educational facilities such as the National Security School, the Military Diplomatic School and the Croatian Military Education Centre and their incorporation into a

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newly established Joint Education and Training Command (JETC).74 The SDR and LTDP also envisage the further development of Croatia’s military education and training capacities in line with demands of the armed forces’ newly emergent roles. They specifically mandate the improvement of all education capacities within the OSRH, the better integration of the military education system with the professional and human resource demands of the armed forces as a whole, the harmonisation of military education standards and qualifications with the (civilian) national education system more widely, and the development of closer civil-military cooperation at all levels.75 At the time of writing, the JETC was in the process of conducting a major review of its educational capacities in line with these recommendations, and further reform in these areas can be expected from 2006 onwards. Educational reform in the Croatian security sector is ongoing and it is too early to make a proper assessment of its impact on overall expertise levels. Progress has undoubtedly been made in some areas, particularly in the police where the reform process has been up and running the longest. Here, for example, the number of officers taking in-service training courses rose from approximately 600 in 2000 to 6000 in 2003.76 In the defence sector, the resolution of the downsizing question has at last created the space for a serious appraisal of the expertise question, while the SDR and LTDP both lay out a clear agenda for future reform. Even so serious expertise challenges remain at all levels and in many areas the laudable goals of policy documents like the SDR and Interior Ministry’s Programme Guidelines have yet to be implemented in practice. Perhaps most importantly, if rising expertise levels are to contribute to organisational professionalisation, then they need to be properly recognised in the promotion and career development system. The extent to which this has been the case in practice is open to question. The military for example has maintained two distinct procedures for promotion. The fi rst of these – ‘regular’ promotion – occurs in the normal way on the basis of a clear set of mandated criteria. However, the 2002 Military Service Law also makes provision for ‘extraordinary’ promotions. In practice these have taken place at the discretion of senior officers and provided ample opportunity for political partisanship and clientalist practices.77 These loopholes may well be closed by future legislation resulting from, for example, the forthcoming Study on the Professionalisation of the Armed Forces, but at present they remain an obstacle to the development of a professionalised human resource management system in the military. Similarly, as Chapter 3

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illustrated, in practice political and clientalist criteria continue to play a significant role in police promotions, whatever progress may have been made in the educational system more widely.

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Responsibility Issues of professional responsibility have posed challenges for organisational level security sector reform in Croatia. This has particularly been the case in two areas. First, in relation to the question of corruption, particularly in the police. Second, in relation to the war crimes legacy and especially the issue of cooperation with the ICTY. Under Tu
man, corruption was widespread throughout the security sector. In the defence sector, for example, fi nancial oversight was practically non-existent and large parts of the military budget were siphoned off to feather the nests of the Tu
man-era elite. Sections of the military – such as the 66th Engineering Regiment – were in effect run as private companies, while formerly state-owned housing was distributed to loyal officers for a fraction of its market value.78 The level of corruption in the Croatian defence sector was reduced significantly after 2000, due primarily to three main factors. First, the corruption problem in the military was largely an elite one and the new administration was able to eliminate many of its worst aspects through personnel change at the top of the armed forces and Ministry of Defence. Second, since 2000, the Ministry of Defence itself has made a concerted effort to introduce better internal control over its fi nances. When combined with a steady move towards greater fi nancial transparency in the defence system as a whole,79 this further reduced the scope for corruption and embezzlement. Finally, Croatia’s complicated chain of command over the armed forces has provided an additional series of checks and balances over the financial activities of the armed forces. This was illustrated by the Stupnik truck procurement affair of January 2005, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. While ultimately it was agreed that there had been no wrongdoing in the affair, it did demonstrate the presidency’s ability and willingness to keep a close eye on the fi nancial affairs of the Defence Ministry.80 During the Tu
man period, there was also extensive corruption in the police. Here, however, and in contrast to the military, the problem was widely dispersed throughout the organisation as a whole. As a consequence it has proven more pervasive and difficult to eradicate. Corruption in the Croatian police has been sustained and exacerbated by a number of factors. In particular, the SFRJ and wartime periods

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both left important legacies in this area. The Yugoslav milicija were widely recognised as being tolerant of corruption within their ranks and some elements of this attitude passed into the new Croatian policija.81 The war experience did not help matters. The initial desperate need for manpower in the police meant that recruitment criteria were relaxed and formal training was often unavailable. A consequence of this was that the normal minimal standards of integrity were not always observed, a situation that was exacerbated by the extreme circumstances of the confl ict itself. Codes of conduct were relaxed, disciplinary procedures irregularly enforced, while at the same time the often anarchic situation created by the war increased the opportunity for corrupt practices on the ground.82 The war also had an important impact on the evolution of the institutional culture within the Croatian police. The confl ict experience – in which officers often found themselves relying on each other for survival in combat situations – strengthened the ties between individual policemen and increased their reluctance to inform on each other. This ‘code of silence’ was reinforced by the generally small size of Croatian police stations at a local level. This meant that most officers knew each other personally and so were often reluctant to cooperate with disciplinary investigations into their colleagues.83 Finally, the HDZ regime under Tu
man was itself deeply corrupt and widely tolerant of corruption in the country’s police force. As such, there was little pressure on or motivation for the police to stamp out corruption in its own ranks. Indeed, to have attempted to do so might actually have threatened the fi nancial interests of the HDZ elite itself. By 2000 therefore, low level corruption in the police remained a deep seated problem that demanded governmental attention. The authorities faced two main tasks in this area. First, they needed to introduce a sound legislative basis for the punishment of corrupt officers. Second, they had to actually enforce these new rules and procedures in practice.84 Croatia’s existing legislation to regulate the police and their work – the 1996 Temporary Regulations and the 1997 Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code – did contain some anti-corruption clauses. However, these were flawed and contained numerous contradictions and loopholes. It took the introduction of the Police Law in 2000 to provide an adequately robust legal framework to address the issue seriously. The Police Law contained a number of important anti-corruption measures. These included a complaints procedure for citizens with grievances against the police and a clearly articulated disciplinary framework.85 The 2004 Programme Guidelines also prioritised the need to redraft the existing police code of ethics in line with the EU

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standard.86 Despite these advances however, these new standards have proved difficult to enforce in practice. In most cases investigations into the misconduct of police officers have been conducted by local police units and supervisors themselves, and the Office of Internal Affairs has only become involved in the most serious of cases.87 This bias has reinforced the likelihood that misconduct will go unpunished due to the police’s strong pre-existing code of silence.88 Tolerance of corruption in the Croatian police is reflective of a deeply rooted institutional culture, influenced by the legacies of war and authoritarianism. It is thus unlikely to be addressed either easily or swiftly. Even so, since 2000, a number of important measures have been introduced which lay the groundwork for future change, while over the long term reforms to police education and training practices – as well as the recruitment of a new generation of officers educated under the new system – can all be expected to improve matters further. More widely, the Croatian political system as a whole has come under intense pressure from the EU to tackle corruption as part of its accession bid. Indeed, in March 2006 the parliament passed a far reaching National Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2006–8, which, if it is implemented as envisaged will provide a far more conducive context for the implementation of specific anti-corruption measures in the police.89 The second challenge in the area of professional responsibility relates to the question of war crimes suspects. Since 2000, Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY has often been difficult, though the overall trend during this period has been towards increasing cooperation. Even so, allegations persisted throughout 2000–5 that elements of the intelligence agencies and police in particular provided covert support to ICTY indictees, in direct contravention of official government policy. As late as June 2005, for example, Carla Del Ponte, the ICTY’s chief prosecutor stated that General Ante Gotovina – a figure high on the Tribunal’s wanted list – was being protected by a highly placed network of supporters in Croatia. Earlier in the year, Del Ponte had made a number of more specific allegations against the intelligence agencies in particular. In April and May she accused ‘many’ of helping Gotovina whilst on the run, including his ‘friends’ in the OA and POA. She went on to imply that the intelligence agencies on occasion even withheld relevant material from Sanader himself.90 The Croatian media made similar allegations in May, contending that ‘any information pertaining to the Gotovina case which was sent to the state leadership was obtained by [Gotovina’s] accomplices within 24 hours’.91 These claims were denied by both Sanader and Mesic´, both of whom stressed that the police and intelligence agencies were doing everything

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in their power to catch Gotovina.92 Even so, a number of incidents came to light in early 2005 which implicated elements of the police in the runaway general’s network of protectors. In April, media reports alleged that Gotovina had fled the country in 2001 with the help of a fake passport issued by the Zagreb police. In the same month, 100 police officers from Zadar – a traditional stronghold for Gotovina’s supporters – were transferred unexpectedly to new jobs, and the chief of the Interior Ministry’s Crime Police Department was replaced. While police director Ivica Franic´ denied that this had anything to do with the Gotovina case, Del Ponte in contrast stated that the officers had been moved because they were part of the network protecting him.93 Sanader himself appeared to acknowledge that there might be a problem with some elements of the police when in late April he publicly called for ‘full discipline in the Interior Ministry’, and in July the Ministry itself launched a full scale internal investigation on the matter.94 Despite these individual cases, it seems likely that – as Mesic´ and Sanader have both been at pains to stress – the Croatian security sector as a whole has been committed to carrying out the will of the government in this area. The intelligence agencies have cooperated extensively with foreign services on the matter – most recently in relation to the eventual arrest of Gotovina in December 2005 – while the police and Interior Ministry have shown themselves willing to investigate allegations of wrongdoing within their own organisations. Nevertheless, the events of 2005 – as well as earlier incidents involving other controversial Hague indictees such as General Janko Bobetko in 2002 – suggest that at least some sections of the police and intelligence agencies have actively obstructed the government’s efforts to cooperate with the ICTY process in the past.

Conclusion Since 2000, Croatia has made important progress in its organisational level security sector reforms. Perhaps most significantly, the political and societal context for the reform effort has been transformed. In 2000, this was still very fi rmly shaped by the continuing legacy of war, compounded by five years of organisational stagnation. The Croatian security sector at this point was oversized, outdated and structured around old conflict or authoritarian-era tasks and goals. Many of the most serious of these problems have since been addressed, albeit after some delay. Security sector budgets have been reduced, downsizing and resettlement programmes have been implemented, while key defence and security legislation – in particular the Police Law of 2001 and the

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Strategic Defence Review of 2005 – has been fi nalised. These documents provide a clear vision for the future purpose, role and structure of the Croatian security and act as a roadmap for future reform efforts. The Police Law envisages a modern European police service, focused around the principles of public policing rather than state security. The SDR sets the goal of a small modern military for Croatia; all-volunteer, deployable and interoperable with allied (particularly NATO) forces. These successes have addressed the most pressing organisational impacts of the conflict and authoritarian periods in the military and police at least. In so doing they have cleared the ground for the future development of the Croatian security sector on the basis of the visions outlined in the Police Law and the SDR. However, a number of important and serious challenges remain. Future reforms will need to be adequately fi nanced, and sustained by a continued political commitment from the civilian sector if they are to succeed. Additional legislation will also be required – such as the much discussed Study on the Professionalisation of the Armed Forces – if the ambitious goals of the SDR in particular are to be implemented in practice. In all cases, progress has been less apparent in the intelligence agencies, though the introduction of the new Security and Intelligence Agencies law of 2006 suggest that this situation may fi nally be changing. The Croatian security sector also continues to struggle with a series of longer term challenges associated with organisational professionalisation. In particular, expertise levels need to be further developed and supported through an adequate system of domestic education and training. In addition, and especially in the police and intelligence agencies, much work remains to be done in order to consolidate those aspects of the reform process associated with professional responsibility. This is particularly the case in relation to police corruption and cooperation with the ICTY. In all cases, these are problems that are unlikely to be resolved swiftly, but will instead be dependent on long term value change both in the security sector itself, but also in Croatian society more widely.

Notes 1 TO units were a feature of the defence system in the SFRJ. They emerged from the Yugoslav partisan tradition and consisted of locally commanded militias made up of reservists. James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992), pp. 45–50. 2 For more on the demographic composition of the ZNG and HV at the beginning of the war see: Renéo Lukic and Jean-François Morel, ‘Croatia,

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3

4

5

6 7 8

9 10 11

12 13

14 15 16

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1990–2001’, in Albert Legault and Joel Sokolsky (eds), The Soldier and the State in the Post-Cold War Era (Kingston, Ontario: Queens Quarterly Press, 2002), pp. 174–8. The proportion of Serbs in the Croatian police in 1990 is contested. Some claim that over 70 per cent of the police in some areas were ethnic Serbs. Others dispute this figure, claiming it emerged for political purposes in order to justify ethnic purges in the police. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, ‘Challenges of policing democracies: the Croatian experience’, in Dilip K. Das and Otwin Marenin, Challenges of Policing Democracies: A World Perspective (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 2000), pp. 49–50; Wiberg and Vankovska, ibid, p. 203. Biljana Vankovska and Håkan Wiberg, Between Past and Future: CivilMilitary Relations in the Balkans (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 201–4. Ozren Žunec, ‘Democratic oversight and control over intelligence and security agencies’, in Jan A. Trapans and Philipp H. Fluri (eds), Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003), p. 382. Even so, there was a high degree of continuity between the old SDS and new SZUP, much more so than in other areas of the security sector. Wiberg and Vankovska, Between Past and Future, pp. 205–7. Kutnjak Ivkovich, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, pp. 53–4. The early 1970s saw the flowering of the nationalist political movement ‘Croatian Spring’. This was suppressed by Tito in 1971 with the support of the JNA leadership. Lukic and Morel, ‘Croatia’, pp. 174–8. One exception to this was the question of ethnicity. The HV was almost entirely ethnically Croat. Croatia’s intelligence agencies expanded as the war progressed. The military Security Information Service (SIS) and Directorate of Intelligence Affairs (ObU) were established in 1991, followed by the Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) in 1993. Žunec, ‘Democratic oversight’, pp. 382–3. Žunec, Democratic oversight’, pp. 381–2. Miroslav Tu
man, the former director of HIS, characterised his own organisation as consisting of little more than ‘a small bunch of enthusiasts and amateurs’ at the time of its creation. Miroslav Tu
man, ‘The fi rst five years of the Croatian intelligence service: 1993–8’, National Security and the Future, 2:1 (2000), p. 60. The embargo also precluded direct military training which helped to intensify the expertise deficit in the Croatian military. Marko Milivojevic, ‘Croatia’s security services’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 1994 (online version), p. 5. Elements of the army and intelligence agencies also intervened (albeit controversially) in the war in Bosnia in support of Bosnian Croat forces in 1991–5.

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17 Particular controversy surrounded the role of the US-based private military company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI). See Chapter 8 for further details. 18 This figure includes the army (HV), air force (HRZ) and navy (HRM). Tim Ripley, ‘Croatia’s strategic situation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 January 1995 (online version), pp. 2–3. By 2000 the OSRH was reduced to around 55,000 personnel. See below for further details. 19 Kutnjak Ivkovich, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, pp. 47. 20 For example, they maintained a large Special Police (SP) contingent with a war-fighting role largely analogous to the HV’s own special forces units. Norman Erik, ‘Croatia’s Special Police’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 July 1995, pp. 291–3. 21 Ivkovich, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, pp. 51. 22 Kutnjak Ivkovic´ estimates that 60 per cent of equipment and 65 per cent of police stations were destroyed during the war. Kutnjak Ivkovic´, ‘Distinct and different’, p. 26. 23 Milivojevic for example asserts that the Croatian intelligence agencies were outmanoeuvred by their more established Serbian counterparts throughout the war. Milivojevic, ‘Croatia’s security services’, 6–9. 24 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic´, ‘Distinct and different: the transformation of the Croatian police’, in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe (Münster: Lit Verlag, April 2004), pp. 32–4. 25 Žunec, ‘Democratic oversight’, pp. 384–5. 26 Tomo Radicˇevic´, ‘New security strategy, international cooperation, crisis management and national defence’, in Trapans and Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, 465–7. 27 Strategic Defence Review (Zagreb: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 2005), p. 13. 28 Ibid. p. 14. 29 Ibid. pp. 8–10. 30 Ibid. p. 14. The OSRH have participated in a number of multinational military operations since 2000. They have contributed a military police platoon to NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan on a rotational basis, and military observers to a number of UN peace support operations. Croatia has also signed a Stand-By Arrangement with the UN which commits it to have 40 military observers, 20 Staff Officers, 10 civilian policemen and seven military specialists available for deployment at any time. Annual Exchange of Information on Defence Planning 2006: Republic of Croatia (Vienna: OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, 2006), pp. 13–14. 31 Programme Guidelines for the Ministry of the Interior, 2004–7 (Zagreb: Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia, April 2004), pp. 6–8. 32 Author’s interview with Dr Irena Cajner-Mraovic´, Dean, Croatian Police Academy, 09 July 2004.

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148 33 34 35 36 37

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38

39 40

41

42

43 44 45 46

47 48 49

50 51

52 53 54

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Articles 2, 21, 54, ‘Law on Police’, Official Gazette, No. 129 (2000). Programme Guidelines, p. 9; Interview with Cajner-Mraovic´. Žunec, ‘Democratic oversight’, pp. 391–2. ‘Parliament adopts law on security-intelligence system’, Hina, 30 June 2006. See for example, ‘Govt. sets up larger working group for fight against terrorism’, Hina, 21 April 2005. Drago Hedl, ‘Watergate-style spying scandal rocks Zagreb’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 16 December 2004, www.iwpr.net. Eric Kopacˇ, ‘Economic constraints on defence reform in SEE’, Croatian International Relations Review, 8: 26/27 (2002), p. 34. Jozo Radoš, ‘Statement to the IMO-NATO Conference on Regional Stability and Cooperation: NATO, Croatia and South-Eastern Europe, Zagreb, 24–5 June 2002’, Croatian International Relations Review: Dossier, 8: 26/27 (2002), p. 14. For an excellent case study of these problems in the air force see, Žunec, ‘Croatia’s decision to abandon the upgrade of Mig-21 aircraft with the Israeli company’, Unpublished Draft Paper, 2004. All figures from Defence Policy 2004/05: Into the Alliance (Zagreb: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 2004), pp. 8, 18. The number of conscripts in the military fell from 12,041 in May 2002 to 6885 in January 2004. Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2002. Defence Policy 2004/05, p. 8. Strategic Defence Review, p. 6. These figures exclude 571 servicemen and 2141 civilians in the Ministry of Defence. Annual Exchange of Information on Defence Planning 2006, p. 10. Amadeo Watkins, ‘Military reforms see Croatia march towards NATO berth’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 25 July 2005 (online version), p. 5. Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2004. Watkins, ‘Military reforms’, pp. 1–2; Annual Exchange of Information on Defence Planning 2005: Republic of Croatia (Vienna: OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, 2005), p. 11. Strategic Defence Review, pp. 6, 19, 31, 37. The military General Staff were eventually persuaded to publicly support the document. However, the SDR was primarily drafted by civilians in the Ministry of Defence and some suggest that this has left a lasting resentment towards it amongst the military top brass. Author’s interview, Zagreb, July 2004. Strategic Defence Review, p. 37. Kutnjak Ivkovich, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, p. 59. The Interior Ministry claimed in 2004 that 75 per cent of the police budget was allocated to personnel costs. Programme Guidelines, p. 19.

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55 The exact size of the police is contested. Kutnjak Ivkovic´ cited a figure of 20,000, while various other sources close to the Interior Ministry put the number at between 19–26,000 in 2004. Kutnjak Ivkovic´, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, p. 27; Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2004. 56 Kutnjak Ivkovic´, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, p. 27. 57 Article 80, 124, ‘Law on Police’. 58 See, for example, ‘Laid off police protest in front of government building’, Hina, 06 December 2001; ‘Interior Minster urges laid-off police to discontinue hunger strike’, Hina, 27 March 2002. 59 European Commission, Opinion: On the Application of Croatia for Membership of the European Union (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2004), p. 107. 60 Žunec, ‘Democratic oversight’, pp. 396–7. 61 Wartime Defence Minister Gojko Šušak, for example, observed that ‘war experience is much more important than some diplomas’, cited in Lidija Cehulic, ‘Development of civil-military relations in Croatia’, International Issues, 10: 1 (2001), p. 127. 62 Many of the programmes took place under the guidance of the private military company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), and later through the increasing official US engagement. Kristan J. Wheaton, ‘Cultivating Croatia’s military’, NATO Review, Summer/Autumn 2000, p. 11. 63 Zvonimir Mahecˇ ic´, ‘Capacity-building and good governance in security and defence reform’, in Trapans and Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 405–6. 64 During the fi rst four years of its existence for example, the National Security School comprised of only three members of staff and had no students. ibid. p. 405. 65 J. Moric, ‘Uloga policije u demokratskom drustvu – dosezi hrvatske policije’, in J. Sintic (ed.), Uloga policije u demokratskom dustvu (Zagreb: Ministarstvo unutarnijih poslova Republike Hrvatske, 1994), p. 121, cited in Kutnjak Ivkovic´, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, p. 57. 66 Interview with Cajner Mraovic´. 67 The situation in the police was so dire by 1991 that it sparked public demonstrations by newly graduated police cadets. ‘Police cadets end protests after talks with Interior Ministry’, Hina, 13 December 2001. 68 Richard B. Liebl et al, ‘Security assistance programmes: the catalyst for transition in the Croatian military’, The DISAM Journal, Spring 2002, pp. 5–9. 69 Miroslav Tu
man, ‘The fi rst five years of the Croatian intelligence service: 1993–1993’, National Security and the Future, 2:1 2000, pp. 60–1; Marko Milivojevic, ‘Croatia’s security services’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 1994 (online version), p. 6. 70 Author’s interview, Zagreb, 06 July 2004.

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71 Strategic Defence Review, pp. 32. 72 Programme Guidelines, pp. 11–13. 73 Petar Veic and Irena Cajner Mraovic, ‘Police training and education: the Croatian perspective’, Police Practice and Research, 5:2, May 2004, pp. 137–40; Interview with Cajner Mraovic´. 74 Mahecˇ ic´, ‘Capacity-building and good governance’, p. 405. 75 Authors’ interviews, Joint Education and Training Command of the OSRH, Zagreb, January 2006. 76 Interview with Cajner Mraovic´. 77 Mahecˇ ic´, ‘Capacity-building and good governance’, 407. 78 Zoran Kusovac, ‘HDZ tests Croat coalition’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 2001, pp. 20–1; See also Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Like drunken geese in the fog: developing democratic control of armed forces in Croatia’, in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (eds), Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 182–3. 79 For example, in February 2003 the parliament adopted the Regulation on the Manner of Planning, Programming, Development and Implementation of the MoD Budget, which introduces greater regulation into the Ministry of Defence’s resource planning process. 80 ‘Mesic announces probe into purchase of army trucks, Defence Minister responds’, Hina, 8 January 2005. 81 Kutnjak Ivkovich, ‘Challenges of policing democracies’, p. 80. 82 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic´, Carl B. Klockars, Irena Cajner-Mraovic´ and Dražen Ivanušec, ‘Controlling police corruption: the Croatian perspective’, Police Practice and Research, 3:1 (2002), p. 56. 83 Ibid. pp. 64–7. 84 Ibid. pp. 58, 61. 85 Articles 6; 110–124, ‘Police Law’. 86 Programme Guidelines, p. 17. See also Articles 21; 46, The European Police Code of Ethics (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2001), available at www.coe.int. 87 Kutnjak Ivkovic´, ‘Distinct and different’, p. 28. 88 Some concrete action has been taken against corrupt policemen since 2000. 120 officers were tried and convicted on bribery and corruption charges in 2002 for example. Even so, most observers agree that these cases probably only represent the tip of the iceberg. Author’s interview, Zagreb, 7 July 2004. 89 ‘Sabor adopts anti-corruption programme for 2006–8’, Hina, 31 March 2006. 90 ‘Del Ponte persists in claims that Croatia doesn’t cooperate with ICTY – extended’, Hina, 26 April 2005; ‘Del Ponte says many help runaway gen. Gotovina – paper’, ibid. 5 May 2005. 91 ‘Sanader on media reports on govt’s action plan pertaining to Gotovina case’, ibid. 2 May 2005.

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92 See, for example, ‘Mesic: Croatian security services to inform EU of steps being taken to fi nd Gotovina’, ibid. 9 April 2005. 93 ‘Gotovina fled Croatia in 2001 with fake passport? – newspaper’, ibid. 14 April 2005; ‘Interior Ministry crime police department chief replaced’, ibid. 18 April 2005; ‘Police director: replacements in Zadar police department have nothing to do with Gotovina’, ibid. 28 April 2005; 94 ‘Croatian police chief sacked for failing to catch fugitive indictee’, RFE/RL Newsline, 20 April 2005; ‘Interior Ministry carries out internal investigation over Gotovina’, Hina, 19 July 2005.

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Security sector reform at the organisational level: Serbia and Montenegro The SFRJ and Miloševic´ periods left a number of extremely negative organisational legacies in the Army, police and intelligence agencies in Serbia-Montenegro. These included the maintenance of large, outdated and heavily militarised force structures and human resource management systems; a prioritisation of regime security and sectional institutional interests over the rights or citizens and the rule of law; the criminalisation and corruption of significant elements of the police and intelligence agencies particularly; and a legacy of war crimes and human rights abuses. Since 2000, some progress has been made in addressing these problems, particularly in relation to role re-defi nition. Nevertheless, serious organisational challenges remain across the security sector, which question the depth and extent of the current reform effort. Organisational cultures and practices have proven extremely resistant to change, with two main consequences. First, institutional conservatism has meant that where reform has occurred it has been reactive and piecemeal rather than proactive and holistic in character. Second, it has also meant that some of the most corrosive legacies of the 1990s – and particularly those associated with criminalisation and war crimes – continue to persist largely unchallenged.

The legacy of the 1990s All sections of the security sector in Serbia-Montenegro played some part in the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and all remain deeply affected by the negative organisational legacies of confl ict and authoritarianism. The Army for example was isolated from the wider European trends in post-Cold War defence reform and modernisation discussed in Chapter 2. During the communist period – and after the acrimonious split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948 – the primary mission of the JNA had been to act as the fi rst line of defence against any potential Soviet-led invasion. It was thus structured and equipped

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for the defence of national territory against a conventional military threat – with a large, conscript-based force structure and a heavy reliance on armour and artillery, all supported by consistently high defence budgets.1 In terms of force structure therefore, the JNA in 1990 did not differ substantially from its counterparts in the rest of continental Europe. However, as an independent military force rather than a member of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, the JNA was a more professionally autonomous, competent and confident organisation than any of its central and eastern European counterparts. 2 The violent dissolution of the SFRJ challenged the JNA’s traditional role and organisational structure at a fundamental level. The state it existed to defend – and to which its own institutional identity was so closely linked – disintegrated in a matter of months and it quickly found itself in a series of low level military clashes either on its own initiative or in support of local Serbian militia units. In operational terms, its early record was not a good one. It was expelled from Slovenia in 1991, initiated an arbitrary and ultimately unsuccessful campaign in Croatia later that year and by 1992 was playing an increasingly provocative and aggressive role in BiH. The war experience also led to major changes in the structure and organisation of the Army itself. In May 1992, the old JNA was dissolved, and its assets and personnel divided between the newly created FRJ (as the Yugoslav Army, VJ) and the self-styled Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (later renamed Republika Srpska) (as the Army of the Serbian Republic, VRS). 3 The 1992 division of the JNA was part of a political strategy to distance Miloševic´ and the government in Belgrade from the war in Bosnia. In one respect it was successful. The VRS – with around 67,000 soldiers – was able to pursue the war with impunity, while the VJ – the larger of the two forces at 135,000 strong – was isolated from the conflict in FRJ. Nevertheless, it is questionable how far this reorganisation represented a real break with the past. The VRS was funded and supplied from Belgrade for the duration of the Bosnian war and intelligence cooperation between the two armies was extensive.4 Moreover, while the old SFRJ-era JNA was at least in theory superseded by the newer, smaller VJ of the FRJ, many of these changes were rather superficial in practice. The VJ inherited the institutional culture and traditions of the JNA as well as much of its equipment and infrastructure. It also retained the JNA’s high standing in Serbian society and its significant autonomy within the political system of the FRJ. The one really significant difference between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ armies had little to do with the creation of the VRS, and instead concerned the Army’s ethnic composition and ideological sympathies. Indeed as a

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consequence of the voluntary departures and purges discussed in Chapter 4 and in contrast to its predecessor, the VJ was manned almost entirely by ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins and by 1992 any last vestiges of old-style ‘Yugoslavism’ amongst the senior officer corps had been largely eliminated. 5 Despite these changes however, Miloševic´ never wholly trusted the Army’s strong corporate self-identity and traditions of professional selfsufficiency, and for much of the 1990s the VJ remained out of favour in Belgrade. Instead, Miloševic´ developed alternative allies in the FRJ security sector through the cultivation of different paramilitary and militia groups and the militarisation of the Serbian police. Paramilitary organisations were a feature of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia particularly. These groups were recruited from amongst of the most radical elements of Serbian society, including criminal and football hooligan fraternities, and ethnic Serbs who had already been radicalised by their experience of war.6 Often – as was the case with Vojislav Šešelj’s Serbian Chetnik Movement (SCP) or Vuk Draškovic´’s Serbian Guard (SG) – the paramilitaries were closely linked to nationalist individuals and political parties in Belgrade. Others – such as Željko ‘Arkan’ Ražnatovic´ ’s Serbian Volunteer Guard, (SDG, popularly known as ‘Arkan’s Tigers’) and the Special Operations Unit (JSO) – were created and sustained by the Serbian Interior Ministry and Department of State Security (RDB).7 These paramilitary groups offered Miloševic´ three main advantages over regular armed forces. First, a number of organisations – such as the SDG for example – maintained close links with organised crime, and were able to exploit their connections to help the regime circumvent international sanctions and help sustain the war effort. Second, the paramilitaries could be relied upon to act with ruthless brutality against targeted civilian populations. This placed them at the forefront of ‘ethnic cleansing’ operations in both Croatia and Bosnia, where their role was to spread terror and force non-Serbs and other opponents of the regime from the territory they controlled. Finally, paramilitary groups could be used as scapegoats for the worst of the atrocities and war crimes conducted by Serbian forces during the conflict. By claiming that these excesses were driven ‘from the bottom up’ by irregular and fragmented militias, Miloševic´ and his allies perpetuated the impression of operational chaos and so evaded responsibility for their own actions and policies. Indeed, it is a mark of the success of this strategy that until the Kosovo conflict, the Army at least was able preserve its professional reputation at home in Serbia and to some degree internationally as well.8

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In reality, Belgrade exercised extensive control over the paramilitaries’ actions. The intelligence agencies particularly were instrumental in directing the activities of many of the most significant and unscrupulous paramilitary groups and throughout 1991–5 played a key role in setting the pace of the war and determining the manner of its conduct.9 In addition – and despite its carefully managed public image – the Army itself was deeply complicit in the brutalities and war crimes of the paramilitaries. Indeed, while individual Army officers may have complained regularly about the misconduct and ill-discipline of the paramilitary ‘volunteers’, in practice the operational relationship between the two was often symbiotic. The military would occupy a village and then move on. The paramilitaries followed behind, consolidating Serb control over the area through violence, looting and ethnic expulsions.10 The events of 1995 changed the FRJ’s strategic situation considerably. In May and August Serb forces were forcibly expelled from Croatian territory,11 while in November the Dayton Peace Accords ended the war in Bosnia. These developments had important implications for the security sector in FRJ, leading to the dissipation of the various paramilitary groups which had emerged during the war years. Many former paramilitaries were absorbed into police and military special units in FRJ and Republika Srpska, while others returned to the Serbian criminal underworld.12 The haphazard nature of this demobilisation left two legacies in Serbian society. First, it meant that large numbers of paramilitary fighters were dispersed into ‘peacetime’ Serbian society. Here they formed a ready – and largely untraceable – pool of potential hardmen and assassins available for hire to anyone with the means to pay for their services. Second, it cemented the relationship between elements of the security sector and organised criminal groups which has plagued Serbian politics and society ever since. The end of the war in Croatia and Bosnia also refocused Miloševic´’s attention on the question of regime consolidation at home. One of his key strategies in this respect was the militarisation, centralisation and partification of the Serbian police. The police were important to Miloševic´ for three main reasons. First, he viewed them as a more politically reliable organisation than the Army. The police chain of command was simpler than that of the VJ which allowed him to exercise direct control over its activities more easily. Serbian police culture was also more sympathetic towards Miloševic´’s nationalist authoritarianism. While the Army’s role and institutional identity had been closely linked to the preservation of the SFRJ, the police had always been an explicitly Serbian organisation and so were less strongly attached to the

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idea of the Yugoslav federation. Second, as the decade progressed, Miloševic´ came to see internal rather than external factors – and particularly the threat of popular discontent – as the most significant potential challenge to the security of his regime.13 The institutional culture and domestic focus of the police made them a more appropriate organisation to address this threat than the Army. As the Yugoslav milicija they had had a reputation for domestic repression, and so had few scruples about being used in this capacity in defence of the Miloševic´ regime. Finally, the Dayton Accords incorporated a commitment to regional arms control negotiations on the part of the FRJ. These focused primarily on the conventional military forces, and militarisation in the police was a way that Miloševic´ could sidestep this obligation.14 Miloševic´’s transformation of the Serbian police gathered pace through the early to mid-1990s. In 1991 a new Law on Internal Affairs centralised its command and organisational structure. In effect this merged the police and Interior Ministry into one centralised organisation. Operational control was concentrated into the hands of the Serbian Interior Minister and the autonomous provinces of Voijvodina and Kosovo were stripped of their policing powers. This new arrangement maximised the influence of Miloševic´ in the chain of command and exposed the police to extensive partification. The police were also heavily militarised over the same period. A new Police Academy was established in 1993 which was modelled directly on the prestigious Military Academy in Belgrade and incorporated a strong military bias into its curriculum.15 The police were issued with camouflaged, paramilitary-style uniforms and in 1995 were reorganised into a system of military ranks. Their equipment was also militarised. Police officers were armed with sub-machine guns while public order units had access to wide range of military hardware, including mortars, mines, armoured personnel carriers and helicopters.16 In order to encourage their loyalty to the regime, the police were also better paid than their military counterparts. These changes were not just limited to Serbia. In Montenegro too significant efforts were made towards police militarisation and centralisation, particularly from 1997 when relations between the two republics began to deteriorate. Here the police were reorganised and strengthened in order to defend the republic in the event of any aggressive military action by Miloševic´ and the VJ. This process reached its peak during the Kosovo crisis of 1999 when tensions between Serbia and Montenegro were at their height. At this time, the Montenegrin police were augmented by reserve forces on short term contracts and grew in size to around 17,000 personnel. They were also provided with

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direct military training by western countries such as the United States. Even so, and despite their increasing estrangement from the regime in Belgrade, the Montenegrin police and DB shared many of the more negative organisational characteristics of their Serbian counterparts. Elements of both became embroiled in corruption and organised crime during the sanctions period, and both were deeply politicised by the Ðukanovic´ regime.17 By the late 1990s therefore, the FRJ had at least three distinct and separate armed forces: the VJ, and the Serbian and Montenegrin police forces. Of these, the fi rst two were under the close control of Miloševic´. By 1998, the previously recalcitrant Army had been largely bent to his will through the appointment and promotion of Miloševic´ loyalists throughout the officer corps and particularly in the General Staff. For their part, the police were militarised, centralised and completely under the control of the regime. This underlying context of authoritarian consolidation had important implications for the conduct and consequences of the Kosovo crisis of 1998–9. The growth of popular discontent and violence in Kosovo in the late 1990s was an example of exactly the kind of internal threat to stability that worried the Miloševic´ regime the most. However, in contrast to the deteriorating situation in the SFRJ in 1991, this time he had what he considered to be reliable and appropriate security forces to deal with the problem. For much of the 1990s the Serbian police had been used as an instrument of state control and Serbian domination in Kosovo. From 1997, the repressive role of the police in the province intensified in response to sporadic attacks from the emergent Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK), and culminated in a full scale crackdown by Special Police Units (PJPs) in 1998.18 The PJP’s actions were indiscriminate and ruthless – consistently targeting Albanian civilians en mass as well as suspected UÇK fighters – and in practice served only to escalate the violence. By late 1998 the crisis had escalated into a full scale civil confl ict, whose brutality soon came to match the wars in Croatia and BiH. The VJ itself was deployed as well as heavily militarised police special forces such as the JSO and the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ). In March 1999, after the failure of peace talks between the two sides and in response to the mass internal displacement of tens of thousands of Albanian civilians, NATO launched air-strikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo. These soon escalated to include targets of strategic importance in FRJ more widely including command and control infrastructure, transport links and power stations. Faced with continued bombing, lukewarm Russian support and a deteriorating situation in the country, Miloševic´ capitulated in June, eventually withdrawing his forces into Serbia proper.

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The Kosovo conflict had a mixed impact on the security sector in FRJ. Superficially at least, its consequences were almost wholly negative. Both the VJ and the police were comprehensively defeated by NATO and forced out of a significant part of the territory of the FRJ. While the number of casualties from the conflict was relative low – Miloševic´ admitted to 462 VJ soldiers and 114 police officers killed – significant damage was done to the wider security infrastructure of the FRJ as a whole. The air force in particular was devastated, loosing the majority of its combat capable aircraft, while the Serbian security sector as a whole suffered extensive damage to its infrastructure and facilities.19 In addition, because irregular paramilitary groups had been far less widely utilised by Serbian forces than in either Croatia or BiH, 20 the regular Army and the Serbian police could not avoid responsibility for their part in the war and the war crimes that were committed as easily as they had done in Croatia and Bosnia. Even so, the experience of the Kosovo confl ict did have some more positive implications for the FRJ security sector too. This was particularly the case in relation to the VJ, for whom in general the 1990s had not been a good decade. Its performance on the battlefield had been poor and characterised by consistent defeat while at home it had seen its political influence and importance decline in relation to the police. Kosovo offered the chance of rehabilitation. Under its new loyalist command, the VJ was rapidly assigned the leading role in the prosecution of the war and thus returned to what it considered to be its rightful place at the top of the security sector hierarchy in FRJ. The NATO attacks also provided a more familiar operational and doctrinal environment than any of the previous conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. Resisting attack from an overwhelmingly superior military opponent was exactly what the scenario that the old JNA had trained for in the past, while anything less than catastrophic annihilation in the field could be portrayed as a victory against the odds. In the event the Army put its JNA-era experience to good use. The VJ was able to hold out against the most capable military machine in the world for 77 days and even then was able to withdraw in good order, with few casualties and most of its equipment intact. 21 The VJ thus emerged from the Kosovo conflict with its domestic reputation for professional competence intact. An opinion poll of the Serbian public carried out by the Centre for Political Research and Public Opinion in Belgrade in September 1999 – only a month or so after the Army’s defeat – found that 65 per cent of respondents still had ‘great’ trust in the VJ, while 21 per cent had ‘medium’ trust. The military’s reputation was further enhanced by its non-intervention in the

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political changes of October 2000, with these figures increasing to 75 per cent and 11 per cent respectively in November of that year. 22 The situation was somewhat different for the police whose existing thuggish reputation had simply been confirmed by their actions in Kosovo. Even so, as with the Army, their passivity in October 2000 was also welcomed by most Serbs, and at the very least offered the possibility of their future rehabilitation in the eyes of the general public. In the autumn of 2000 therefore, FRJ faced a number of significant organisational level security sector reform challenges. These fell into two related categories. First, there were a series of structural level issues in relation to role, force structure and professional expertise. These had remained largely unreformed since the SFRJ period, and determined by the demands of authoritarianism and territorial war fighting rather than democratisation and peace. Second, all organisations in the FRJ security sector confronted negative past legacies in relation to questions of ethics and responsibility. Here the challenges if anything went even deeper, incorporating the worst aspects of the Miloševic´ legacy and including partification, corruption and responsibility for war crimes.

Role The political changes of October 2000 heralded significant role change across the FRJ security sector. In the case of the Army, new momentum was added to a process that had already begun during the 1990s, albeit extremely tentatively and with few practical consequences. In 1996 the Supreme Defence Council (VSO) had passed a vision document entitled Model of the Yugoslav Army 21. This envisaged ‘the transformation of the Yugoslav Army into a modern, well-equipped organization in the model of and in accordance with the standards of modern armies’. 23 However, the plan contained little in the way of specifics, while in the political climate of the time the military was a far lower priority for development than the police. In practice therefore, the 1996 plan came to nothing. A more substantive attempt at revising the role of the Army occurred in August 2000, with the adoption of a new Military Doctrine. However, this too was far from revolutionary in character. At heart it retained the Army’s traditional commitment to territorial defence and continued to provide a doctrinal justification for its large and outdated SFRJ-era force structure. 24 It was not only after October 2000 that the military began to seriously countenance the need for role change and reform. The fall of Miloševic´ and the growing stability of the Western Balkan region more generally meant that the Army’s old defence of national territory mission

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appeared increasingly obsolete. This changing geo-strategic situation provided the context for the Army’s new thinking in this area. However, initially at least, the motivation for change occurred less from a proactive reassessment of the future role of the VJ, and more a from a passive response to mounting political and fi nancial pressures. Indeed, the Army’s own inherent institutional conservatism, coupled with the active opposition of senior officers who were directly threatened by any reform process, 25 meant that for much of 2000–3, the VJ was slow to grasp the full implications of its new circumstances. In particular, it continued the Miloševic´-era practice of pro-Serb meddling in the immediate region. The Army for example continued to provide fi nancial support to the VRS until December 2002 while the military intelligence agencies played a key role in organising and financing Serbian paramilitary organisations in Kosovo. 26 Nevertheless, throughout this period it became increasingly clear to most observers – including many in the VJ itself – that the existing military status quo was unsustainable. The most important reason for this was financial. For most of the Miloševic´ period, defence spending in the FRJ had been maintained at over 8 per cent of GDP. In contrast, the defence budget for 2001 was 4.6 per cent of GDP, falling to 3.3 per cent in 2004. 27 The impact of these spending cuts on the military was severe. In September 2002 for example, the VJ claimed that it had already spent 98 per cent of its budget for the fiscal year, and announced that it would have to send around a quarter of its troops home every weekend to save on food rations, while in April 2003 the air force was forced to ground all of its Mig-29 fighter aircraft for the foreseeable future due to a lack of funds. 28 In 2004, almost 80 per cent of the defence budget was allocated towards personnel and maintenance costs, leaving only 20 per cent for all other expenses including procurement and research and development. These problems were exacerbated by poor housing conditions, salaries and living standards for servicemen, and – with an average age of 41 in the officer corps – a rapidly aging demographic profile and top heavy rank structure. 29 These factors meant that by early 2003, the need for serious reform – beginning with a root and branch reassessment of what the armed forces role actually was in the new environment – was extremely pressing, and recognised as such by many in the FRJ defence establishment. The creation of State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) in February 2003 provided a starting point for this reassessment. The new constitutional Charter reconstituted the VJ as the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro (VSCG), but was deliberately short on further specifics, stating only that the armed forces’ role was to ‘defend Serbia

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and Montenegro in line with the constitutional Charter and the principles of international law that regulate the use of force’. 30 Even so, senior figures within the Army made several statements around this time which indicated the evolution of the military’s thinking on this issue. For example, in November 2002, Chief of Staff General Branko Krga stated that the goal of the reform process was to create smaller, better equipped and more mobile armed forces, capable of participating in international peace and humanitarian operations, anti-terrorist actions and responding to natural disasters. 31 These priorities were mirrored and taken forward by a new reformist defence minister, Boris Tadic´, who in March 2003 outlined a ten point plan for defence reform. This also made reference to the development of smaller, deployable armed forces that would explicitly operate in the context of a close and deepening relationship with NATO and EU countries and armed forces. 32 Even so, it was not until the fi nalisation of core defence documentation – specifically a National Defence Strategy, approved by parliament in 2004 and the Ministry of Defence’s 2005 Defence White Paper – that a clearly elucidated, officially sanctioned vision of the Army’s new roles emerged. The Defence White Paper was particularly illuminating. It began with an explicit recognition of the country’s changed security circumstances, observing that external military challenges, risks and threats to the State Union ‘have been considerably reduced’. Instead, it prioritised internal security and non-military issues as the most pressing security challenges faced by Serbia-Montenegro. These included specifically: the potential for armed rebellion; terrorism (identified as ‘the greatest and most widespread security threat’); national and religious extremism; organised crime and corruption; and natural disasters. 33 In this context, the Army was identified as ‘the principle state controlled force responsible for the security’ of Serbia-Montenegro. As might be expected, it remained tasked with defending the vital interests of the State Union, including the defence of national territory. However, this task was supplemented by an emphasis on a number of new roles. These included the ability to respond effectively to the non-military security challenges identified above, and the ability to participate in peacekeeping operations with the aim of making ‘a positive contribution . . . regional and global security’. 34 These emergent new roles and missions represent an ambitious future for the Army that would bring it increasingly into line with armed forces elsewhere in Europe. However, even if implemented as envisaged they also entail a number of potential risks and difficulties. The peacekeeping role for example would build on the old JNA’s positive

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traditions in this area, 35 help to ‘normalise’ external perceptions of the post-Miloševic´ armed forces and could act as an important foreign policy tool for building relations with the West. However, deploying and sustaining significant numbers of troops abroad is expensive, probably prohibitively so given the Army’s fi nancial troubles since 2000. Belgrade’s difficult relationship with the ICTY is also a significant obstacle in this respect, and many potential peacekeeping partners have been wary of cooperating too closely with a military that remains associated with war crimes. In practice therefore, the Army’s contribution to multinational peacekeeping operations since 2000 has been limited to a small number of military observers and medical personnel. Proposals to contribute larger numbers of troops to the peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Afghanistan in 2003–4 foundered in the face of political division, resource constraints and international scepticism. Similarly, the Army’s ‘anti-terrorist’ role developed primarily in response to the sometimes violent actions of ethnic Albanian secessionist groups in South Serbia and – in the context of responses to 9/11 – is reflective of defence reform trends in Europe and the world. Nevertheless, this mission remains potentially problematic given the JNA/VJ’s chequered history in this area during the 1990s and the already crowded nature of the Serbian security sector more widely. The political changes of October 2000 also challenged the role of the Serbian police. During the SFRJ and Miloševic´ periods, the police had functioned as the partisan defenders of the state and authoritarian regime – on occasion against the Serbian public themselves. They were widely regarded as repressive, arbitrary and corrupt, and were deeply unpopular in Serbian society at large. As a consequence, democratic police reform emerged as an early priority for the new DOS government. In this context, some important changes in police behaviour did occur reasonably swiftly after October 2000. Indeed, the change in the nature of the governing regime in Belgrade had an inevitable impact on the police themselves. While Serbia certainly did not become a democracy on 5 October 2000, it did have a government that was at least sympathetic to the goals of democratisation – even if their implementation in practice left a lot to be desired. This had three almost immediate implications for the police. First, they found themselves working with, and were sometimes now commanded by, figures from the Miloševic´-era opposition. These were often exactly the people whom the old regime and the police themselves had viewed as enemies of the state for much of the 1990s. This radically new set of relationships forced practical, day to day cooperation between the police and the new political elite and in so doing encouraged

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familiarity and sometimes respect between formerly antagonistic groups and individuals. 36 A second and related point was that unlike either the Army or some of the Interior Ministry’s special units, the regular Serbian police had no tradition of acting as autonomous political actors within Serbian society. As a consequence, while the advent of the new government may have had little initial impact on the institutional culture of the police and the day to day behaviour of individual police officers, it did mean that the police as an institution were simply not used for the same kind of blatantly repressive political ends as they had been under Miloševic´. The new government also moved quickly to remove the worst elements of the old regime from the police command, retiring nine out of 13 Miloševic´-era police generals, and hundreds more senior officers. 37 Finally, the FRJ’s new, warmer relations with the international community opened the formerly insular police institution to a whole range of new contacts and reform assistance programmes from organisations such as the OSCE. A more formal and legislatively rooted change in the role of the Serbian police was much slower to emerge however, despite the fact that this issue lay at the heart of the new government’s reform programme. Before coming to power, the DOS – whose leading figures had often been at the sharp end of police repression under Miloševic´ – had been highly critical of the police as an institution, and in the run up to the political changes of October 2000, had been vocal in calling for their reform. 38 In practice, this initial momentum for reform soon dissipated in the partisan and clientalist atmosphere of civil-security sector relations in FRJ. The pressing need for reform in other areas of Serbian society such as the economy, meant that once civilian control over the security sector had been established, the question of police reform slipped quickly down the new government’s political agenda. In addition, after years of authoritarian consolidation, the negative aspects of police culture in Serbia were deeply ingrained, and not susceptible to quick or easy fi xes. Even so, and in contrast to the situation in the Army, police reform in Serbia at least took place at a republican level, and so in the context of an agreed and consolidated political community. This made the process less susceptible to the kinds of political bandwagoning that so dogged similar efforts in the defence sector. Indeed, since 2000, the broad contours for police reform in Serbia have become clear. Certainly, the preparatory work for this process began early on, albeit at a sometimes painfully slow pace. In October 2001 the OSCE published two influential papers on police reform in Serbia, the Monk and Slater reports. 39 These documents had an important impact on the

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thinking of police reformers in Belgrade. Broadly they called for the police to be reformed from a state security organisation into a public service, including specifically its demilitarisation and decentralisation. That Autumn, the government established an advisory body on Interior Ministry reform with the assistance of the Danish Centre for Human Rights, which in April 2003 produced a Vision Document for reform. This priortised the creation of a professional, accountable police force, whose main mission would be ‘law enforcement, protection of rights and liberties of the citizenry and efficient crime control’.40 Over the course of this period, the government also introduced several new laws and directives aimed at regulating the formerly arbitrary powers of the police, including the 2001 Law on Criminal Procedure and the 2003 Directive on Police Ethics and Policing.41 Finally, in November 2005, the Serbian parliament passed a new Law on the Police, which clearly outlined the role of the Serbian police as being ‘to provide support to the rule of law in a democratic society’. The law also included explicit provisions on demilitarisation, respect for human rights and police accountability.42 Role change in the Serbian Interior Ministry and police also had an impact on the Serbian intelligence agencies. The most important step in this respect was the 2002 Law on the Security Information Agency. One of the central features of this document was that it introduced a clear institutional and legislative separation between the state and public security spheres in Serbia. This was an important change. It explicitly removed the BIA from involvement in public policing matters and in so doing abolished some of its most significant authoritarian-era roles and responsibilities – at least on paper. Instead the BIA was assigned to carry ‘out tasks relating to the security of the Republic of Serbia’, specifically threats to the constitutional order, ‘the acquisition, processing and analysis of security-intelligence information’, and ‘other responsibilities determined by law’.43 While still potentially rather broad and open to abuse, this defi nition was important because it clearly outlined the extent of the agency’s powers for the fi rst time, as well as explicitly subordinated its activities to the rule of law. In practice, the BIA did begin to shift away from some of its old regime defence roles after 2002. BIA director Rade Bulatovic´ gave some indication of this change in his 2005 end of year report, where he noted that the prospect of terrorism, including Islamist extremism, had emerged as the most pressing priority for his organisation. This statement indicated that the emergent operational priorities of the agency were increasingly similar to their counterparts elsewhere in Europe.44 The BIA has also been diligent in conforming to the (albeit rather

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modest) demands of parliamentary oversight that the 2002 reforms demand.45 Even so, old habits and practices undoubtedly remain. The police for example lack their own information gathering capacities and so are still often forced to rely on the BIA for criminal intelligence.46 This situation draws the agency back into public policing by default. Similarly, by early 2006 Serbia still had no law regulating access to the agency’s secret files. This undermined claims that the BIA was fully ‘democratised’ and for many Serbs was uncomfortably reminiscent of the secrecy and impunity of the authoritarian period.47 By 2006, the situation in the military intelligence agencies was similarly ambiguous. Between 2000–2, there was little indication that ‘KOS’ in particular had changed its ways. Its Miloševic´-era chief, General Aco Tomic´, retained his position after October 2000, and in the partisan spirit of the time, developed a close clientalist relationship with President Koštunica. In addition, the agency was involved in a number of domestic political scandals during this period, including the controversial arrest and detention of General Momèilo Perišic´, a former VJ Chief of General Staff and then Serbian Vice President, on a charge of spying in March 2002.48 They were also believed by many to have been responsible for protecting key ICTY fugitive Ratko Mladic´ until Spring 2002 at least. Since 2002, the military intelligence agencies have undoubtedly been brought under somewhat closer control. The Law on the Security Services of FRJ of July 2002 introduced a measure of parliamentary control over their activities, all official military support for Mladic´ was withdrawn in March 2002, and Tomic´ himself was dismissed in the wake of the assassination of Zoran Ðin
ic´ in March 2003. The services were also reorganised and renamed in November that year. Even so, most observers believe that KOS/VBA particularly – and certainly elements within it – has been slow to change. At the very least it retains a reputation for autonomy within the military change of command and some suspect that sections of the organisation have continued to offer covert support to Mladic´.49 The Montenegrin police and security service have also undergone a role change since 2000. Indeed, both the Montenegrin Law on the Police and Law on the National Security Agency of May 2005 are explicit in recognising that these organisations now function according to democratic principles, with the aim of upholding the rights and liberties of individual citizens. However, these changes have been less dramatic than in Serbia for two main reasons. First, because the police and security service in Montenegro were never used in quite such a blatantly repressive manner as their counterparts in Serbia during the Miloševic´ period, the extent of the transformation required of them has been less

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dramatic. Second, and conversely, because there were no major political changes in Montenegro after October 2000, the depth of change asked of the police has also been less. In addition, perhaps even more so than in Serbia, there remains a significant gap between the legislative theory and operational practice of democratic policing in Montenegro. Indeed, many critics allege that elements of both the police and security service continue to be used in a blatantly partisan manner to support the Ðukanovic´ regime and as well as to harass and intimidate its opponents. 50 Montenegro’s independence vote of May 2006 will undoubtedly lead to further role change in the country’s security sector. Perhaps most significantly, the government in Podgorica faces the task of establishing a new national Army. Montenegro stands to inherit all those elements of the armed forces which are located on its territory, and indeed established its own defence ministry shortly after declaring independence. Even so, at the time of writing, it remained to be seen just what kind of military force Montenegro will be able to sustain. As Amadeo Watkins notes, it is unlikely that the government will be able to finance ‘any significant force structure in a real military sense’, and initial reforms are likely to be aimed at reducing excess (and unaffordable) military capacity rather than developing it further. What is clear is that the Montenegrin government has prioritised eventual NATO and EU membership as its most important foreign policy keystones objectives, and any subsequent reforms in this area are likely to be heavily influenced by the accession demands of these organisations. 51

Force structure Changes in force structure have generally only slowly followed role change in the Serbian and Montenegrin security sectors. This is a common theme across the Army, police and intelligence agencies. To a large degree it reflects the political disagreements and institutional conservatism and obstructionism that have characterised the security sector reform process as a whole. However, it is also a consequence of the sheer scale of the task at hand: restructuring and reforming institutions whose authoritarian-era habits and structures are deeply embedded is an inevitably difficult process, particularly in the context of severe financial austerity. The Army posed perhaps the most formidable challenge in this respect. In October 2000, the VJ was, by common agreement, oversized and much of its equipment obsolescent or war damaged. The new Military Doctrine of August 2000 did little to recognise, let alone address, the depth of these problems. In practice it took the fall of the Miloševic´,

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and the reality of the falling defence budgets, to force the Army General Staff to consider – albeit extremely tentatively – how they could survive within their new, much reduced means. In October and December 2001 the VSO announced a series of programmes aimed at restructuring the VJ. These were developed wholly within the VJ General Staff without any reference to either the Ministry of Defence or the civilian sector more widely. They included a plan to sell off some of the VJ’s substantial real-estate holdings; a change in the Army’s configuration that would concentrate land forces into six corps and disband three armylevel headquarters, one divisional-level headquarters and a number of units; a plan to integrate the air force, air defence and navy commands into a unified General Staff and to transform the air force, air defence and navy each into a corps; a reduction in the size of the Army to around 65,000 by 2005; and a reduction in the conscription period from 12 to 9 months. 52 Despite these apparently positive steps however, these downsizing and restructuring plans were largely superficial in nature and simply removed those parts of the Army that had already atrophied. Similarly, the decision to reduce the length of the conscription period was taken for short term economic reasons and not tied to any broader vision of the practical requirements of the Army’s roles. 53 For its part, the General Staff struggled to come up with a coherent and fi nancially sustainable reform plan in the absence of clear strategic direction from the Ministry of Defence. In November 2002 for example, the VJ’s new Chief of the General Staff, Branko Krga, publicly admitted that long term military reform would be extremely difficult without an agreed national security strategy, defence doctrine and reform plan. 54 Instead, by its own admission, for much of the period between 2001–5, the Army was forced into taking a ‘tactical’ rather than ‘strategic’ approach to restructuring: responding to its immediate problems and financial constraints through ad hoc restructuring rather than proactively driving a more holistic process of reform. 55 Tadic´’s ten point plan of March 2003 was the fi rst clear sign of a strategically-orientated, civilian-driven approach to military reform in Serbia-Montenegro. However, the political upheaval and uncertainty brought about by Ðin
ic´’s murder that same month made strong civilian leadership on the military reform issue difficult and hindered the implementation of Tadic´’s plans for much of 2003. Even so, in Spring 2004, Tadic´’s replacement as defence minister, Prvoslav Davinic´, committed himself to the spirit of his predecessor’s reform programme, and over the course of 2004–5 the Ministry of Defence went on to flesh out these initial plans considerably, culminating in the publication of the

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Defence White Paper in April 2005. This document envisaged a three stage plan for reform to take the Army to 2010. It specifically aimed to increase the proportion of all-volunteer personnel in the military as part of a ‘general trend’ towards full professionalisation; withdraw obsolescent equipment and selectively replace it with new materiel; reduce the overall size of the military; and reorganise the Army’s force structure into rapid response, main defence and territorial forces, with the former comprising of professional, well-equipped and mobile units able to participate in multinational peacekeeping operations. 56 At the time of writing in early 2006, and in the wake of the Montenegrin independence referendum, Serbia was also in the process of formulating a full and comprehensive Strategic Defence Review (SDR) with the aim of providing a fi rmer and more detailed foundation for future military reform. 57 As in Croatia, downsizing has emerged as a key reform strategy in the defence sector because it appears to offer at least part of a solution to the Army’s fi nancial woes. In cutting back on manpower, the hope is that resources will be freed up for modernisation while at the same time providing an opportunity to further professionalise the remaining personnel. To this end, the Ministry of Defence introduced two related programmes to support this process in 2004. The fi rst of these was the Programme for Resettlement of Redundant Personnel (PRISMA) which aims to retrain and resettle former soldiers. Established with the fi nancial support of the UK government, PRISMA envisages a gradual reduction in the number of VSCG personnel from around 77,000 in 2004 to 50,000 in 2010 – and provides a package of technical and fi nancial measures to support this process. 58 The second initiative in this area was the Defence Reform Fund of May 2004. This was to draw on money raised by the sale of the Army’s extensive real estate holdings in order to address the military’s current housing crisis and help fi nance the resettlement costs of the downsizing programme. 59 Some practical progress in reducing the size of the armed forces and de-emphasising conscription was also made in 2004–6. For example, at least 9300 personnel were ‘downsized’ in 2005 alone while in October that year the length of the National Service period was reduced from nine to six months.60 Nevertheless, there have been a number of serious concerns about the Army’s proposed programme of military reform. While documents such as the Defence Strategy and Defence White Paper are undoubtedly important fi rst steps, they remain primarily vision statements and are short on the specifics of policy implementation. At the time of writing in early 2006, there was also a pressing need for additional legislation

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and documentation – such as a new Military Doctrine and the forthcoming Serbian SDR – to provide a more practically applicable framework for the reform process. Even with suitable legislation in place however, military reform in Serbia particularly is unlikely to be either easy or straightforward. As the Croatian experience demonstrates, the socio-economic costs of downsizing are likely to be high. Unemployment in Serbia was as high as 19 per cent in March 2006,61 a figure which is likely to test even the government’s most ambitious targets for resettlement through the PRISMA programme. Certainly, the downsizing process has not always run smoothly in practice. In May 2005 for example, sacked defence staff blocked the Belgrade to Niš motorway in protest at the nonpayment of their severance pay.62 Moreover, genuinely professionalised volunteer soldiers cost much more than conscripts to both train and pay. As currently structured, the government spends one of the lowest amounts per soldier of any state in Europe. In 2005 the Ministry of Defence estimated this to be only US$5000–6500 per head, compared to US$9781 in Croatia, US$15,146 in the Czech Republic and an average amongst the ‘old’ NATO members of US $103,511.63 Increasing the proportion of professionalised soldiers is thus likely to place even more of a strain on the already overstretched defence budget. In theory the Defence Reform Fund offers the potential to meet at least some of the costs of resettlement at least. However, the Fund has been plagued by allegations of serious corruption and mismanagement from its inception. It also quickly became embroiled in the Serbia/Montenegro debate, with each republic claiming that any surplus military property belonged to them and not the Army (or indeed the State Union). As a consequence, by mid 2006, very little if any money from the Fund actually had actually been directed towards reform.64 Finally, the extent to which the Army itself is genuinely committed to reform remains an open question. Publicly at least the General Staff have been tentatively supportive of the process since the dismissal of Pavkovic´, recognising that military professionalisation and modernisation offer a path out of the isolation and humiliation of the 1990s. Likewise, for a younger generation of officers, professionalisation and potential membership of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) offer the hope of a brighter future and a more fulfi lling career.65 Nevertheless, serious reform inevitably endangers the jobs and livelihoods of many thousands of military personnel and at least passive resistance to change is likely.66 Reform will also require a deep attitudinal shift in the Army itself – particularly in relation to the legacy of the war years – and will threaten its institutional autonomy and traditions of exclusive

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control over its own internal affairs. How far these challenges will actually impact on restructuring is uncertain. However, at the very least they indicate some of the serious obstacles reformers will have to overcome if their plans are to be successful, and suggest that implementing change in practice is likely to be a long term and difficult process. The implementation of reform has also been slow in the police. A number of steps were taken in this area after 2000, culminating in the publication of the Police Law in November 2005. However, as with the military, these generally took place in an ad hoc, sporadic and rather uncoordinated manner. They included the creation of several new departments and units – including the Gendarmerie special police unit and the Department for Organised Crime Suppression – and the disbandment or demilitarisation of others – specifically the JSO which was broken up after the assassination of Prime Minister Ðin
ic´, and the PJPs which were either absorbed into the Gendarmerie or integrated into regional police directorates and re-tasked with search and rescue missions.67 The federal Ministry of the Interior was dissolved with the creation of the State Union in 2003, and the fi rst steps were taken towards the creation of a new Border Police Service in both republics to replace the military in this role.68 In addition, multi-ethnic police units (specifically incorporating ethnic Albanians who had previously been absent from the police force) were introduced in South Serbia; a new community policing programme was piloted in five municipalities; while the period from 2000 saw a significant increase in the proportion of women in the force (over 3000 by 2004).69 The importance of these reforms should not be underestimated, particularly given the depth and extent of the authoritarian legacy in the Serbian police. The disbandment of the JSO and the restructuring of the PJPs addressed some of the most corrosive influences of the Miloševic´ period. The new Gendarmerie is widely regarded as a professional and effective organisation, under clear civilian control, and has proved itself as such in response to ethnic instability in South Serbia and in the aftermath of the Ðin
ic´ assassination. The introduction of multiethnic policing units in the three troubled South Serbian municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medve
a was a constructive and forward looking move on the part of the Serbian government, while efforts to modernise the police force itself function as genuine fi rst steps towards the creation of democratic police force in Serbia. More widely, public perceptions of the work and conduct of the police in Serbia do genuinely appear to have changed for the better since 2000. Indeed, survey data published in a 2004 report by the OSCE suggested that most Serbs

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viewed the police as being ‘somewhere half-way between the “old police” of the nineties and an ideal police model’.70 Nevertheless, these reforms do not yet represent a genuine transformation of the Serbian police. For example, while the Gendarmerie undoubtedly has its strengths it remains a large and highly militarised organisation in relation to both its force structure and organisational ethos.71 There is nothing inherently undemocratic about this arrangement and EU states such as France and Italy also both retain substantial paramilitary police units. However, the chequered history of paramilitary units in Serbia does perhaps make this arrangement potentially more problematic than elsewhere, particularly given the significant number of personnel from ‘compromised’ organisations such as the JSO that have been absorbed within it.72 For its part, the OSCE expressed concern that the militarised character of the Gendarmerie remains incompatible with the largely civil nature of its work and has recommended that its heavy military equipment at least should be transferred elsewhere.73 Similarly, while the introduction of multi-ethnic police units in South Serbia has broadly been welcomed, critics allege that they have been viewed with suspicion by the ‘regular’ police, and in operational terms have been sidelined in favour of ‘traditional’ units, and the Gendarmerie particularly.74 Indeed, away from the specific initiatives and special cases mentioned above, the police in Serbia have changed only slowly. Community policing initiatives have been rudimentary at best and the police as a whole remain a centralised, bureaucratic and state-orientated organisation, largely unaccountable to the citizens that they are meant to serve.75 This situation applies at least as much to the BIA as it does to the police. The Law on the Security Information Agency of 2002 may have introduced some important structural changes to the RDB – not least its name change and its institutional separation from the Interior Ministry and the public policing sector – but its impact on the organisation itself was minimal. The new Police Law of November 2005 does at last provide a clear vision for the development of the Serbian police and to some extent at least a practical framework for reform. It also incorporates a number of specific measures aimed at transforming the Serbian Police. These include changes relating to the demilitarisation of police ranks as well as to police uniforms, weaponry and special purpose equipment. It also establishes a new position of Director of Police to act as a buffer between the political direction of the Interior Minister and the operation command of the police.76 Even so, at the time of writing, the organisational impact of the Police Law had yet to be properly felt,

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while its full implementation was likely to be further delayed by the need to bring pre-existing legislation into line with the new law’s provisions. In Montenegro, the extent to which political rhetoric on police reform has been matched by reality has if anything been even more limited than in Serbia. Probably the most significant change in the structure and organisation of the Montenegrin police occurred in the wake of the Kosovo conflict and the October 2000 events. As many as 10,000 of the special (i.e. reserve) police officers who had been mobilised in response to the potential threat posed by the VJ were stood down. This reduced the size of the police force in Montenergo to an estimated 4650 officers, including 769 border guards.77 Subsequent to this initial process of downsizing however, further change has been limited. Indeed, the police in Montenegro continue to function at least in part as a mechanism for protecting the current political elite. What reform initiatives have taken place – including the demilitarisation of police uniforms, the commissioning of public perception surveys on the police, and a proposal to pilot a community policing project – have been either provisional or largely cosmetic in nature and had little practical impact on police practices, policies and procedures.78

Expertise The problem of security sector expertise in Serbia differs from the situation in Croatia. Both the Army and the Serbian police trace their institutional roots directly back to their SFRJ predecessors and neither has had to build up a personnel and educational infrastructure from scratch. Neither suffered from the same kind of absolute ‘expertise deficit’ as their Croatian counterparts therefore. Even so, since 2000 both have faced a series of significant expertise challenges. These have particularly concerned the adaptation of established (and generally conservative) structures to the new political, organisational and geostrategic environment, and the need to introduce a more transparent and merit-based personnel management system across the security sector in Serbia-Montenegro. The JNA and even the VJ for were widely perceived to be the most professionalised of all of the armed forces in the postcommunist region, at least in the sense of having the appropriate organisation, expertise and professional competence to fulfil its roles. Indeed, this institutional professionalisation was one of the main reasons why Miloševic´ took so long to establish his personal control over the Army. In 2000, the VJ had a well-established military education system that provided officer

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training up to command and staff level as well as opportunities for postgraduate study. Even so, by 2000 this was increasingly outdated and oversized. In common with organisational emphasis in the military more widely, it continued to focus on the defence of national territory doctrines of the Cold War-era and made few concessions to FRJ’s new security circumstances.79 Similarly, while the personnel management system within the JNA was well-developed and at least in part merit-based, Miloševic´’s personnel policies had introduced a much greater degree of partification into the process. As in Croatia, the Army maintained two systems for promotion – a professionalised, merit-based one and a more discretionary ‘extraordinary’ route. So for example, while in 2004 the Army did provide job descriptions for all military posts, and while many officers were often promoted on the basis of experience and qualifications, in practice there was little predictability in the promotions system and much scope for abuse. Indeed, writing in 2002, Miroslav Hadžic´ observed that this ‘discretionary right regarding personnel’ was widespread and had developed into ‘the essence of every authority’ in the Army’.80 These practices were even more pronounced in the two military intelligence agencies, both of which had always traditionally valued ideological factors as well as professional attributes in their recruitment and promotion procedures. A second consequence of partification in the military promotions system was the development of a top-heavy officer corps across the Army as a whole. Indeed, because so many officers were promoted according to political or clientalist criteria during the 1990s, rather than on the basis of merit and according to the practical needs of the Army, the military incorporated a very high proportion of middle and senior ranking officers. In 2000 for example, almost 42 per cent of the officers in the VJ were Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels or Generals.81 This had two negative impacts in the Army’s personnel system. First, it resulted in a high proportion of older officers in the defence system, many of whom were inadequately qualified for their jobs. Second, it led to a systemic blockage in the promotions system for promising young officers, leading some of the ‘brightest and best’ of the younger generation to leave the Army to pursue more promising careers elsewhere. The Serbian police faced their own set of problems in relation to human resource management and expertise. As with the military, they also had a well-established education and training infrastructure. This included a Police High School, a Police College and – from 1993 – a prestigious and well-funded Police Academy. Even so, in October 2000, the police education system faced a number of deeply rooted challenges

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and problems. In particular, it was heavily militarised and focused around authoritarian rather than democratic policing principles. The influential Monk report of July 2001 identified a number of specific problems throughout the system. These included a ‘heavy emphasis on martial arts and weapons handling’; a concentration on theoretical study over practical experience; a lack of management training for senior police officers; and a complete absence of ethical and human rights training in the curriculum.82 In addition, much of the police’s existing education and training infrastructure was badly damaged during the NATO bombing of 1999 and in urgent need of modernisation or repair. Career advancement in the Serbian police was also based on merit and experience – at least in theory. However, in common with the Army, patronage and partification were present throughout the personnel system and there was very little, if any, formal career development in the police force as a whole.83 The situation with the Montenegrin police was different again, and in some ways more analogous to the Croatian experience. Because of the large growth in police numbers that had occurred in the late 1990s, much of the Montenegrin force was relatively inexperienced and lacked specialist training. Indeed, the Monk report estimated that as much as 80 per cent of the Montenegrin police had as little as 3–8 years of service in 2001. Moreover, while Montenegro retained a police high school for students between the ages of 14–17/18, higher educational facilities were almost completely lacking. Merit-based personnel and career development systems in the Montenegrin police were similarly under-developed, with partification and clientalism apparent throughout the organisation. Since 2000, Serbia-Montenegro has made some hesitant progress in recognising these problems. Certainly, defence and security documentation in both the military and police sectors has prioritised educational reform and the modernisation of human resource management systems. For example, the 2005 Defence White Paper called for ‘the implementation of [personnel management] standards that are in effect in modern armed forces’.84 While short on specifics, it did include explicit commitments to reform the Army’s personnel structure and decrease the overall age of the officer corps by 2010. It also envisaged a modernisation of the military education system with ‘the purpose of ensuring the quantity and quality of staff required for defence purposes and enabling them for participation in peacekeeping operations’.85 Reforming education and training has also been part of the security sector reform agenda for the Serbian police. At the time of writing, the Serbian parliament had yet to pass its long awaited Law on Police Education. However, the

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Interior Ministry did give several public indications of its priorities between 2002–5. These included plans to amalgamate the existing Police College and Police Academy into a single unified Police Faculty, as well as the modernisation of the police curriculum as a whole.86 Some of these proposed reforms have translated into practical policy, but in most respects real progress has been tentative. The military educational establishment has remained deeply resistant to change for example. Attempts to modernise the curriculum have generally been met with suspicion, military academics have been wary or incapable of introducing new subjects, and the Military Academy itself is still widely regarded as a bastion of ‘old-style’ thinking on military matters including the reform process itself. Indeed, even by late 2005 some critics still viewed the military education system primarily as a mechanism for entrenching the military’s existing institutional conservatism into a new generation of officers rather than inculcating professional expertise.87 Moreover, while the overall size of the officer corps was reduced from 11,253 in 2000 to 9672 in 2004, the proportion of middle to senior ranking officers (Lieutenant Colonel and above) actually increased to 46.4 per cent. This suggests that where downsizing has taken place, it has been concentrated amongst exactly those younger officers who represent the professional future of the Army.88 Those officers who have left have tended to do so because of poor conditions in the military, because opportunities for advancement remain limited, and because of better job prospects elsewhere. The Army has also struggled to recruit new personnel for similar reasons. These problems are indicative of a wider organisational crisis in the military as a whole, and unless the twin issues of recruitment and retention are properly addressed over time, the proposed professionalisation of the organisation is unlikely to be successful. By mid-2006, the picture in the Serbian police was somewhat more positive than in the Army, though a number of serious expertise challenges remained throughout the organisation. For example, some notable practical changes were implemented in the police education and training system. The Police Academy reviewed its curriculum between 2002–3 leading to a cessation of military-style subjects and the introduction of more practically orientated courses. These changes occurred with the extensive assistance of the OSCE, whose Law Enforcement Department in Belgrade identified police education and training as one of its six priority areas of activity. The Serbian police also benefitted more directly from OSCE assistance in this area. The OSCE established an Advanced Police Training Centre in Belgrade in September 2002,

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and large numbers of officers attended OSCE-run courses on modern policing methods and specialist subjects such as forensics.89 For their part, the lack of domestic infrastructure meant that the Montenegrin police were largely dependent on Serbia, the OSCE or other international assistance for higher police education and training between 2000–6. The Serbian police have made less progress in relation to modernising their human resource and career management systems however. Indeed, and while the new Police Law of 2005 envisages an extensive modernisation of the ranking and promotion structure for the police, most observers considered that old practices – including clientalism and partification – remain endemic in the organisation.90 Since 2000, the police as a whole have also suffered from two other important problems in relation to expertise. First, the SFRJ and Miloševic´-era concentration on militarised, state-orientated policing has meant that there has been a general absence of specialist (police) skills in areas such as crowd control, information technology and forensic analysis. Second, the police have struggled both to attract new recruits into the force and to retain existing skilled personnel.91 These recruitment and retention problems have been a consequence of the relatively poor pay and conditions offered by a police career, and of the low opinion that much of the Serbian public still hold of the police organisation as a whole.

Responsibility Issues of professional responsibility have presented some of the most deeply rooted and persistent security sector reform challenges in SerbiaMontenegro. As in Croatia, these have fallen into two main areas. First, in relation to questions of corruption and criminalisation, particularly in the police but also in key areas of the defence sector as well. Second, in relation to the war crimes legacy and the issue of cooperation with the ICTY. During the Miloševic´ period, the extent and character of corruption in the security sector differed between the army, police and intelligence agencies. In the Army, the professional ethos of the officer corps meant that many personnel remained resistant to corruption. However, the almost complete lack of transparency in the defence budget, the Army’s own traditions of institutional autonomy, and the size of the potential profits to be made meant that the opportunities for fi nancial abuse were legion. These ranged from relatively petty incidents of embezzlement and profiteering amongst the military rank and file to far more serious corruption at some of the more senior ranks. General Pavkovic´ for

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example was widely believed to have profited extensively from his stint as Chief of General Staff and was implicated in a number of serious financial scandals. These included such diverse activities as tobacco and petrol smuggling, corrupt procurement deals and the (mis)use of Army facilities and personnel for personal gain.92 The government made some attempt to introduce greater fi nancial transparency into the defence budget and so reduce the scope for corruption after the dismissal of Pavkovic´. However, opportunities for illicit profit in the Army remained myriad and most observers believe that corrupt practices continue to penetrate the defence sector throughout. Indeed, the extent and depth of this problem was demonstrated clearly in Autumn 2005 when Defence Minister Davinic´ – previously one of the most respected figures in the government of the time – and several of his closest colleagues were forced to resign after their involvement in a series of massive defence procurement scandals.93 Allegations of corruption and criminalisation have also plagued the Serbian and Montenegrin police and intelligence agencies. All of these organisations were deeply and deliberately corrupted during the Miloševic´ period. The war effort was supported through smuggling and conducted by criminal gangs with the sanction of the state itself. The Miloševic´ elite profited extensively from these criminal connections and was deeply criminalised itself. The cooperation of the police and RDB was vital to the success of these state-run criminal enterprises and many officers were co-opted into organised crime.94 Small scale corruption amongst police officers was also widely accepted as a means of supplanting poverty-line salaries. This situation was mirrored in Montenegro, where the ruling regime was also deeply implicated in a wide variety of criminal activity. By October 2000 therefore, large elements of the police and intelligence agencies in both Serbia and Montenegro were either actively involved in criminality and corruption, or at the very least tolerant of it amongst their colleagues. From 2000, the government in Serbia identified the decriminalisation of the police as one of the most important elements of its security sector reform programme, and between 2000–6 took a number of concrete steps to address the issue. It established an Organised Crime Directorate and Anti-Corruption Council soon after coming to power and in July 2002 – in what many considered to be tacit recognition of the endemic corruption of the police – introduced the Special Authorities in Fighting Organised Crime and Corruption Bill. Based on Italian anti-mafia legislation, this introduced a special prosecutor’s office for organised crime, a witness protection scheme and more power for undercover investigations.95 These steps had some impact, at least in relation to the

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most blatant criminal activities of the old regime. In 2002 for example, the Ministry of the Interior was able to claim that the ‘grey’ oil marked had been ‘eliminated to a great extent’ while the circulation of illegal cigarettes had declined considerably.96 Moreover, in the wake of the Ðin
ic´ assassination, operation Sabre explicitly and successfully targeted some of the worst and most powerful organisations in the state-criminal nexus.97 Nevertheless, the extent to which criminality and corruption has been substantially reduced in the Serbian security sector remains open to question. Internal control and disciplinary mechanisms in the police for example remain weak, unreliable and inconsistently enforced. Where concrete steps have been taken to root out corruption, these have often been initiated from the ‘top-down’ and have struggled to overcome local obstructionism and the ‘code of silence’ between individual police officers.98 Police salaries remain low and the practice of raising additional income through petty corruption is still widely tolerated. The political changes of October 2000, the (delayed) removal of its Miloševic´-era commanders and the dissolution of the JSO all had a positive impact on levels of criminalisation and corruption in the RDB/ BIA, and since 2002, the fight against organised crime has actually emerged as one of the organisation’s most significant rhetorical tasks.99 Even so, given the RDB’s indisputably close involvement with the criminal fraternity during the Miloševic´ period, it seems far fetched to assume that all traces of this legacy have been eradicated. This is particularly so given the ‘spring cleaning’ or the organisation’s records which occurred during the fi nal months of Rade Markovic´’s tenure as RDB director in late 2000, limited post-Miloševic´ personnel change in the organisation as a whole, and its continuing reluctance to allow access to its fi les.100 The extent of corruption and criminality in Serbian politics and society more widely has also made tackling these issues in the security sector difficult. While elite corruption and criminality has undoubtedly reduced since the rampant abuses of the Miloševic´ period, the strong linkages between the political and criminal spheres in Serbian society were never wholly eradicated after October 2000, or even after Sabre in 2003. Indeed, since 2000, there have been numerous allegations of serious corruption in the government, as well as accusations of a sometimes less than helpful official approach towards anti-corruption measures.101 This situation has been even more pronounced in Montenegro where some of the most senior members of the Ðukanovic´ regime – as well as the police and security service themselves – have been implicated in criminal profiteering.102 The wider judicial system in both republics

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is also widely regarded as corrupt and barely functional, and even where measures against organised crime have been enforced by the police, the successful prosecution of offenders has often foundered in the courts.103 Finally, the sheer scale of the task involved in tackling corruption and criminalisation in the Serbian and Montenegrin security sector has on occasion come close to overwhelming the reform effort. Tolerance of police corruption is deeply rooted in police culture; organised crime groups are extremely well connected and well organised (indeed sometimes ‘better equipped than the state’ according to the OSCE);104 while moving against them has been fraught with personal danger for the individuals concerned. Indeed, while new legislation such as the National Anti-Corruption Strategy may begin to make some in-roads into the problem, real progress on the issue in the security sector is only likely to occur over the long term. Even then, this is likely to be largely dependent on the wider progress in suppressing corruption and criminalisation in Serbian and Montenegrin society as a whole. As in Croatia, the second challenge in the area of professional responsibility in the security sector in Serbia-Montenegro relates to the question of war crimes suspects. Since 2000, Belgrade’s relationship with the ICTY has been characterised by mutual suspicion and distrust, interspersed by occasional flurries of cooperation. Relations did begin to improve in 2005 when a number of high ranking indictees – including General Pavkovic´ and police General Sreten Lukic´ – were arrested (or persuaded to give themselves up) and sent for trial in the Hague. Even so, throughout this period, the government’s relations with the ICTY were soured by continuing disagreements over the fugitive former VRS general, Ratko Mladic´. Mladic´ – who was indicted for his allegedly leading role in the 1995 Srbrenica massacre – had been on the run from the Hague since he was indicted in July 1995. At the time of writing in mid 2006, he had still not been caught. Allegations of the Army’s complicity in Mladic´’s evasion of arrest have been legion. Many suspect it of actively sheltering him, particularly during the last years of the Miloševic´ regime and the fi rst two years of the DOS government. Indeed, according to some sources at least, the VJ went so far as to assign a dedicated special forces unit to protect him between July 1999 and March 2002.105 At the very least Mladic´ continued to receive his military pension as late as November 2005.106 Certainly, the Hague Tribunal’s Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte – amongst others –has consistently claimed that Mladic´ received military protection of one sort or another even after 2002, if not ‘officially’ then at least from ‘anti-Hague’ cadres within it, and particularly

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from within the military intelligence agencies.107 For its part, the Army and Ministry of Defence have always denied knowledge of Mladic´’s whereabouts, though they have tacitly recognised that cadres within the military have collaborated with the fugitive general in the past at least. What is beyond doubt is that the anti-Hague lobby in Serbia and in the military has been strong and influential. In December 2005, for example, Serbia’s war crimes prosecutor Vladimir Vukcˇevic´ stated that highly placed networks were communicating and providing logistical support to Mladic´. The following month, the military intelligence agencies admitted in a report to the Supreme Defence Council that the Mladic´ ‘occasionally stayed in military facilities until June 2002’, while SCG foreign minister Vuk Draškovic´ claimed that Miloševic´ sympathisers were directly hampering the government’s efforts to arrest him. In May 2006, Draškovic´ publicly accused renegade elements within the intelligence agencies of protecting the fugitive general.108 Moreover, even if they have not actively been protecting Mladic´, what is clear is that significant sections of the military – as well as the Serbian police and intelligence agencies and many civilian politicians and policy makers – remain deeply hostile to the ICTY process as a whole. Even if this institutional resistance does not translate into direct support for ICTY fugitives, it does suggest that the process of addressing the negative legacies of the 1990s in the security sector in Serbia particularly is likely to be an extremely long and difficult undertaking.

Conclusion Since 2000, Serbia-Montenegro has made some progress in its organisational level security sector reforms. 2004–5 in particular saw the fi nalisation of important new vision documents – including the Defence Strategy and Defence White Paper – as well as the fi nalisation of key framework legislation such as the Serbian and Montenegrin laws on the Police. These were important and positive steps. In addition to other new legislation – such as the 2002 Law on the Security Information Agency – they provide an emergent vision – albeit sometimes incomplete or flawed – of the future organisational development of the Serbian and Montenegrin security sectors and thus act as a roadmap for future reform efforts. In terms of content, they broadly mirror defence and police reform processes elsewhere in Europe. The Army is envisaged as a smaller, more mobile, force, operating in the context of PfP and with a greater emphasis on all-volunteer soldiers. The police and intelligence agencies are to undergo (or at least continue) a transformation into

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accountable and professionalised organisations focused around democratic rather than authoritarian principles. Even so, organisational level security sector reform in SerbiaMontenegro continues to face a number of serious and deep-rooted challenges. Since 2000, the reform process as a whole has been characterised by inertia, conservatism and obstructionism and all of the key framework documents discussed above are short on the specifics of policy implementation. While more practically-orientated programmes such as PRISMA have begun to have an impact in areas such as downsizing, there remains an urgent need for additional follow-up legislation and initiatives to translate broad vision statements into reform reality. In the defence sector and intelligence agencies, and until 2005 at least, what restructuring did take place occurred more as a passive response to changing circumstances (particularly financial circumstances) than from a clear strategic vision for reform. The situation was more positive in the police, if only because the nature of the policing task made it inherently more responsive to changes in the wider political environment than the military. The strategic and legislative groundwork for restructuring is now being laid in Serbia and Montenegro. Even so, the political and fi nancial context for reform remains uncertain, and if reform is to be successfully implemented it will require a fi rm and sustained commitment from the civilian sector. More widely, the legacies of the 1990s run extremely deeply in Serbian and Montenegrin society, and in the security sector particularly. Even if proposed restructuring plans are successful, the Army, police and intelligence agencies will all continue to face difficult reform challenges in relation to issues of professional expertise and responsibility. These problems will require profound changes in institutional cultures if they are to be properly addressed. This will only take place in the long term and is likely to be reflective of and largely dependent on similar changes in society more widely.

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Notes 1 From the late 1960s this role was rooted in the doctrine of All-Peoples’ Defence. Drawing on the partisan experience of the Second World War, the aim of this strategy was to deter a foreign invader by making any subsequent occupation as costly as possible through a drawn out guerrilla campaign. The Army’s role was to initially delay the invasion force, then to support the guerrilla action. Adam Roberts, Nations in arms: the theory and practice of territorial defence (London: Chatto and Windus, 1977).

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2 James Gow, ‘Professionalisation and the Yugoslav Army’, in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds), The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 183–6. 3 Milan Vego, ‘The Yugoslav ground forces’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1993, pp. 250–1. 4 ‘Yugoslav army supplied and paid Krajina Serb army: witness’, B92 News Archive (AFP), 29 October 2002; James Gow, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (London: C. Hurst & Co. 2003), pp. 59–60. 5 Anton A. Bebler, ‘The Yugoslav People’s Army and the fragmentation of a nation’, Military Review, August 2003, pp. 44–5; 51. 6 Miloš Vasic´ and Filip Švarm, ‘Paramilitary formations in Serbia: 1990– 2000’, in Helsinki Committee, In the Triangle of State Power: Army, Police, Paramilitary units (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee, 2001), pp. 40–7. 7 For more on Serbian paramilitary groups see Gow, The Serbian Project, pp. 79–85. 8 Ibid. p. 79. 9 See for example, James Gow, ‘Belgrade and Bosnia – an assessment of the Yugoslav military’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1993, pp. 243–6. 10 Vasic´ and Švarm, ‘Paramilitary formations’, p. 49. 11 See Chapter 5. 12 For example, the ‘Scorpians’ paramilitary unit – made infamous when a videotape of their participation in the 1995 Srebrenca video was aired on Serbian television in 2005 – were transferred to the Serbian Interior Ministry as reserves for the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit in March 1999. ‘Scorpians were part of Serbian Interior Ministry anti-terrorist units’, Hina, 7 June 2005. 13 Budimir Babovic´, ‘Police as a tool of Miloševic´’s autocratic rule’, in Helsinki Committee, In the Triangle of State Power, pp. 30–1. 14 Babovic´, ‘Police as a tool’, p. 31; See, Annex 1B, Article IV, The Dayton Peace Agreement, 21 November 1995. 15 Budimir Babovic´, ‘On police reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia’, DCAF Working Paper No. 10 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, April 2002), p. 30. 16 Babovic´, ‘On police reform’, p. 14; Bogoljub Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police and security services in Serbia and Montenegro: attained results or betrayed expectations’, in Philipp Fluri and Miroslav Hadžic´ (eds), Sourcebook on Security Sector Reform (Belgrade: Centre for Civil–Military Relations, 2004), pp. 252–3. 17 Jens Stilhoff Sörensen, ‘War a social transformation: wealth, class, power and an illiberal economy in Serbia’, Civil Wars, 6:4 (Winter 2003), pp. 67–8.

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18 At the height of the conflict, as many as thirty to forty thousand Serbian police were deployed in the province. 19 For a full discussion of effects of the NATO attacks on VJ infrastructure see Aleksandar Radic, ‘Modernisation of the Yugoslav Army’, CCMR: Word of Experts, 18 November 2002, www.ccmr-bg.org. 20 Some Serbian paramilitary formations were active in Kosovo in 1998–9, though on a smaller scale than in Croatia and Bosnia. Even then, they were generally incorporated into the official chain of command as special police units. Vasic´ and Švarm, ‘Paramilitary formations’, p, 52. 21 Tim Ripley, ‘Kosovo: a bomb damage assessment’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 1999. 22 Milorad Timotic´, ‘Public opinion on security and defence issues in Serbia and Montenegro’, in Marie Vlachová (ed.), The Public Image of Defence and the Military in Central and Eastern Europe (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003), pp. 206; 208. 23 Stipe Sikavica, ‘The war-time and peace-time abuses of the Yugoslav Army’, in Helsinki Committee, In the Triangle of State Power, pp. 15– 16. 24 Gow, ‘Professionalisation’, pp. 189–90. 25 In particular, any reform threatened to expose Chief of General Staff Nebojša Pavkovic´ and his cronies to criminal indictment for corruption or war crimes. 26 Particularly the so-called ‘Mitrovica bridgewatchers’. 27 Estimated figures for 1996–2000. IISS, The Military Balance, 1997–8 to 2001–2 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997– 2001). 2004 figure from, White Paper on Defence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, (Belgrade: Ministry of Defence of SCG, April 2005), p. 43. 28 ‘Yugoslav Army to send troops home to save food rations’, RFE/RL Newsline, 24 September 2002; ‘Getting the Mig-29s back in the air’, Beta Defense Bulletin, No. 28, 2 February 2006. 29 White Paper on Defence, pp. 33–4, 45. 30 Article 55, Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, February 2003. 31 Branko Krga, ‘Yugoslav Army Reform: Achievements’, in Miroslav Hadžic´ (ed.), Armed Forces Reform – Experiences and Challenges (Belgrade: Centre for Civil-Military Relations, 2003), pp. 66–7. 32 Boris Tadic´, ‘Reform of the defence system of Serbia and Montenegro’, Statement by the Minister of Defence at the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, Belgrade, 21 March 2003. 33 White Paper on Defence, pp. 13–14. 34 Ibid. pp. 57–62 35 Prior to the 1990s, the JNA was an active participant in UN peacekeeping activities, contributing troops to operations in Sinai, Yemen and Congo amongst others.

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36 Authors’ interview with Ivan Bender, OSCE Mission to FRJ, Belgrade, 20 June 2002. Bender was a member of the student opposition group Otpor during the Miloševic´ period. After October 2000 he found himself working closely with the police in South Serbia where he was Chief of Staff to Deputy Prime Minister Cˇovic´ who had responsibility for the region. 37 Brank Bakic and Novak Gajic, ‘Police reform in Serbia: five years later’, CSRC Balkans Series Report 06/21 (Camberley: CSRC, May 2006), p. 4. 38 Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police’, pp. 253–4. 39 Richard Monk, Study on policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: OSCE Mission to the FRY, 2001); John Slater, Report on the human rights, ethics and standards of the police in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, (Belgrade: OSCE Mission to the FRY, 2001). 40 ‘Vision process for the reform of the Ministry of Interior of Serbia’, Danish Institute for Human Rights Website, http://www.humanrights. dk/. 41 Milosavljevic´, ‘Reform of the police’, pp. 257–8. 42 Some independent experts have criticised the human rights provisions in the new law, arguing that they contained too many potential loopholes. ‘Serbia’s new police law: commendations and controversies’, Beta Defense Bulletin, No. 26, 1 December 2005, p. 2. 43 Article 2, Law on the Security Information Agency, Republic of Serbia, 19 July 2002, BIA Website, http://www.bia.sr.gov.yu/Eng/ frameset_e.html 44 Though the question of Islamist terrorism in the Serbian context is primarily rooted in domestic security pre-occupations, and particularly issues of ethnic Albanian radicalism in Kosovo and South Serbia. 45 Saša Jankovic´, ‘Democratic control of intelligence-security services in Serbia’, CCMR Word of Experts, 15 February 2006, p. 5. www. ccmr-bg.org. 46 Mark Downes, Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service (Belgrade: Law Enforcement Department of the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, 2004), pp. 66–7. 47 ‘From the media, 16–22 December 2005’, CCMR Website, www. ccmr-bg.org. 48 International Crisis Group, ‘Serbia: military intervention threatens democratic reform’, ICG Balkans Briefi ng (Belgrade/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 28 March 2002). 49 See section on Responsibility below. 50 See for example: Boris Darmanovic, ‘Montenegrin trafficking scandal deepens’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 13 November 2003, www.iwpr.net. Though the independence referen-

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53 54 55 56 57

58

59

60

61 62 63

64

65 66

67

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dum of May 2006 was widely considered to have been conducted in a free and fair manner. ‘European parliament, state department welcome democratic atmosphere of Montenegro referendum’, Hina, 22 May 2006. Amadeo Watkins, ‘New Montenegro and regional stability’, CSRC Balkans Series Report 06/26 (Camberley: CSRC, June 2006), pp. 5–6. Miroslav Hadžic´, ‘Civil-military features of the FR Yugoslavia’, CCMR Research Paper, (Belgrade: Centre for Civil–Military Relations, 23 August 2002), pp. 6–7. Ibid. pp. 6–7. Krga, ‘Yugoslav Army Reform’, p. 66. Author’s interview with Lt. Gen. Branko Krga, Chief of the General Staff of the VSCG, Belgrade, 23 June 2004. White Paper on Defence, pp. 88–94 The SDR was adopted by the Defence Minister’s management board on 7 July 2006. It was due to be discussed by parliament in September that year. It is envisaged that this latter figure will incorporate 33,000 professionals and 17,000 conscripts. Tobias Pietz, ‘Demobilizing and retraining for the future: the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro’, Bonn International Center for Conversion Brief 31 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, July 2005), pp. 15, 26–9. Author’s interview with Pavle Jankovic´, Assistant Minister for Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence of SCG, 23 June 2004; Pietz, ‘Demobilizing and retraining’, p. 27. ‘Life after the military cull’, B92 News Archive (B92), 19 October 2005; ‘Military obligation shortened again’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 10 October 2005. ‘Unemployment almost 20 per cent’, B92 News Archive (FoNet), 8 March 2006. ‘Sacked defence staff block roads’, B92 News Archive (B92), 11 May 2005. Timothy Edmunds, ‘NATO’s New Members’, Survival, 45(3) Autumn 2003, p. 158; Pietz, ‘Demobilizing and retraining’, p. 16; Watkins, ‘PfP integration’, p. 18. Though the appointment of a new fund director in January 2006 might change matters. For an indication of some of the Fund’s problems see, ‘From the media, 17–23 December 2004’, CCMR Website. Author’s interviews with serving military officers, Belgrade, June 2004. A serving Colonel interviewed by the author in June 2004 characterised the reform process as ‘total anarchy’ and the reformers as ‘criminals’, noting that ‘all we [in the Army] can do is be angry and frustrated’. Information on Security Situation on the Territory of the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade: Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, July 2002), p. 5; Milosavljevic´, ‘Police reform’, p. 256.

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68 Montenegro took over their border from the VSCG at the end of 2003. At the time of writing the changeover had still not occurred in Serbia, mainly due to resource problems. On the border police see Bakic and Gajic, ‘Police reform in Serbia’, pp. 23–6. 69 Milosavljevic´, ‘Police reform’, p. 256. 70 Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 26. See also Marijana Trivunovic´, ‘Police reform in Serbia’, in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe (Münster: Lit Verlag, April 2004), p. 281. 71 Amadeo Watkins, ‘Serb special forces prepare for overseas deployment’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 November 2003 (online version), pp. 5–6. 72 This is particularly the case with regard to the Gendarmerie’s own elite anti-terrorist units, which have a high proportion of former JSO personnel. In April 2004 for example, off-duty Gendarmerie officers – several of whom were former members of the JSO – were disciplined for offering public support to the accused during the Ðin
ic´ assassination trial. ‘Former “Red Berets” officers attend Djindjic trial’, B92 News Archive (B92), 20 April 2004; ‘Police minister plays dumb over Red Berets display’, B92 News Archive (B92), 23 April 2004. 73 Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 23. 74 Gordon Peake, Policing the Peace: Police Reform Experiences in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia (London: Saferworld, January 2004), pp. 31–8. On ethnic composition in the Serbian police more generally see, Trivunovic´, ‘Police reform in Serbia’, pp. 274–5. 75 Trivunovic´, ‘Police reform in Serbia’, p. 277. 76 ‘Serbia’s new police law’, p. 2. 77 Željko Ševic´ and Duško Bakracˇ, ‘Police reform in the republic of Montenegro’, in Caparini and Marenin, Transforming Police, pp. 249–50. 78 Ševic´ and Bakracˇ, ‘Police reform’, pp. 260–1. 79 Author’s interview with Colonel Milan Mijalkovski, Desk Chief for Security Protection, Military Academy, Belgrade, 21 June 2002. 80 Hadžic´, ‘Civil-military features’, p. 5. 81 Data provided by the General Staff of the VSCG and cited in Pietz, ‘Demobilizing and retraining’, p. 43. 82 Monk, Study on policing, pp. 44–9. 83 Ibid. p. 43. 84 White Paper on Defence, p. 36. 85 Ibid. p. 38. 86 Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, pp. 33–6. 87 Author’s interviews, Bristol, December 2005. 88 Data provided by the General Staff of the VSCG and cited in Pietz, ‘Demobilizing and retraining’, pp. 42–6. 89 OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, Annual Report of the Mission’s Activities in 2004 (Belgrade: OSCE, 2004), p. 7. An estimated 25

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91 92

93

94

95 96 97 98 99 100 101

102

103 104 105

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per cent of all Serbian patrol officers had attended some from of OSCE training by 2002. Trivunovic´, ‘Police reform in Serbia’, p. 278. In 2004 for example, the OSCE identified an ‘immediate need’ to review human resource management procedures in the Serbian police. Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 49. Ibid. pp. 47–9. See for example, Daniel Sunter, ‘Yugoslav generals to resist army reform’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 31 January 2003. Davinic´ was accused of complicity in a deal to purchase 296 million Euros worth of largely superfluous military equipment at inflated prices from the company, Mile Dragic´. He was also implicated in a highly dubious 45 million Euro deal to rent access to a military surveillance satellite and the illegal allocation of military apartments. A poll conducted in Serbia in 2001 found that 76 per cent of those surveyed believed the police to be ‘much’ or ‘very much’ corrupt. Babovic´, ‘On police reform’, pp. 18. ‘Honesty costs’, B92 News Archive (B92), 21 June 2002; ‘Special measures adopted to tackle organised crime’, ibid. 24 July 2002. Information on Security Situation, pp. 5–6. Ševic´ and Bakraec´, ‘Police reform’, pp. 21–2. See for example, ‘Senior police “hindered investigation” ’ B92 News Archive (B92), 10 Aug 2005; Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 29. ‘Sphere of activity and organizational structure’, BIA Website, http:// www.bia.sr.gov.yu/Eng/frameset_e.html. See for example, ‘Secure drug habit’, B92 News Archive (B92), 9 March 2001; Milosavljevic´, ‘Police reform’, p. 262. A senior figure in the VBA (KOS) for example complained ‘how can I fight corruption when I have to fight the government’. Author’s interview, Belgrade, 23 June 2004. See also, ‘Corruption chief accuses government of manipulation’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 27 July 2003. Allegations of corruption and criminality amongst the Montenegrin elite have been legion. Indeed, Prime Minister Milo Ðukanovic´ himself was placed under investigation by the Italian police in 2002 for his alleged involvement in a cigarette smuggling ring. See for example, Julia Geshakova, ‘Not a crook’, RFE/RL Balkan Report, 18 July 2003; Nedjelko Rudovic, ‘Montenegro: trafficking probe furore’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 24 December 2004; ‘Djukanovic’s modest assets’ B92 News Archive (B92), 15 September 2005. See for example, ‘Djindjic condemns judiciary’s conduct’, ibid. 27 February 2003. Downes, Police Reform in Serbia, p. 65. ‘Mladic without Yugoslav Army security’, B92 News Archive (B92), 26 March 2002; ‘Former Serbian interior minister says Mladic enjoyed military protection until 2002’, Hina, 30 June 2005, www.hina.hr.

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106 ‘Serbian minister says Mladic received pension until November’, RFE/RL Newsline, 4 January 2006; ‘Government “knows where Mladic is” ’, B92 News Archive (B92), 10 June 2005; ‘Government denies Mladic negotiations report’, ibid. 10 June 2005. A number of shootings and apparent ‘suicides’ in military barracks in 2004–5 were also rumoured to be connected with the Mladic´ case. See for example, Daniel Sunter, ‘Army reform: biting the bullet’, Transitions Online, 26 November 2004. 107 See for example, ‘Mladic, Karadzic crossing SCG-Bosnia border says EU official’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 24 February 2004; ‘Karadzic and Mladic in Serbia’, B92 News Archive (SRNA, Beta), 9 February 2005; ‘Mladic hiding in military barracks’, B92 News Archive (FoNet), 4 January 2006. 108 ‘From the media, 23–9 December 2005’, CCMR Website; ‘Army of Serbia and Montenegro admits having harboured Mladic’, Hina, 1 February 2006; ‘Foreign minister blames Miloševic´ allies for protecting war crimes suspects’, RFE/RL Newsline, 4 January 2006; ‘Serbia and Montenegro’s foreign minister says security services are protecting Mladic’, RFE/RL Newsline, 15 May 2006.

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Part IV

The international level

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7

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Security sector reform at the international level: Croatia

International factors have played a key role in influencing both the nature and the direction of Croatia’s security sector reform process since 2000. Security assistance programmes to the country have been extensive, and have helped to shape the normative and technical criteria against which security sector reform has been premised. Croatia has also been subject to a range of pre-conditionality pressures in its bid for membership of the EU and NATO. In common with security assistance programmes – which they often parallel – these have had an important influence over both normative and technical aspects of the reform process. They have also created a link between Croatia’s foreign policy goals and progress in domestic security sector reform which has helped to push the issue up the civilian political agenda. Finally, while the use of direct conditionality to explicitly encourage security sector reform has been limited, it has played an important indirect role in relation to Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY. In this respect it has been able to influence specific pressure points identified by international actors, but has had a more limited impact on the reform process as a whole.

Security assistance Since 2000, Croatia has received external security sector reform assistance from three distinct, though sometimes related, international sources. First, from the non-governmental sector, including private military contractors such as Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and NGO’s such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Second, from a variety of individual country donors. Finally, from international organisations such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE. For much of the 1990s, the overt provision of security assistance to Croatia was restricted. The UN imposed an arms embargo on the

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country in 1991, which forbad any direct contribution to the war effort, including military training, while the authoritarian nature of the Tu
man regime meant that many states and organisations were reluctant to engage too openly with the country. Despite these obstacles, Croatia did receive substantial security assistance from a number of external sources during the Tu
man period, and particularly from the US and Germany. Initially, many of these programmes were indirect. In the US’s case they took place in cooperation with MPRI. While not an official arm of the US government, MPRI staff were drawn primarily from the ranks of retired US military personnel, and the company enjoyed official State Department support and approval for its Croatian activities. MPRI’s official licence was granted on the basis that there would be no tactical component to its training, and that it would not violate the UN arms embargo. The company’s work with Croatia thus consisted of a series of programmes from 1994 aimed at encouraging democratic transition in the area of defence.1 Sponsoring a private company to carry out these activities provided an opportunity for the US government to indirectly engage with Croatia at time when it was politically difficult to do so overtly. This bolstered the US’s implicit support for Croatia in the face of what was seen to be the aggressive and regionally destabilising activities of Miloševic´’s Yugoslavia. 2 Nevertheless, serious concerns were raised about the suitability of using a private military company such as MPRI for these tasks. In particular, critics suggested that the Croatian armed forces’ operational successes in 1995 were a direct consequence of covert MPRI training, in apparent contravention of the terms of its official license. Certainly, Markica Rebic´, a former head of the Croatian Army’s Security Information Service (SIS), claimed in 2001 that the CIA and Pentagon ‘closely supervised’ preparations for Flash and Storm in a manner which belied the apparent restrictions the US government had placed on MPRI. 3 Many also questioned the suitability of using former military officers as the primary conduit for assistance in issues of democratisation in the authoritarian context of Tu
man-era Croatia, as well as the democratic accountability and transparency of MPRI itself, and the quality of its training programmes.4 German security assistance initiatives to Croatia date back to 1990 and include close cooperation with the fledgling Croatian intelligence agencies. 5 The Croatian National Security Office (UNS) for example was modelled on the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), while according to some sources the Germans provided staff training to their Croatian counterparts and even shared intelligence with them.6 Germany’s close relationship with Croatia was rooted in the

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close historical ties between the two countries and Germany had been the first EU country to recognise Croatian independence in December 1991. Even so, these connections were regarded with considerable unease by some of Germany’s allies in NATO and the EU and many of its activities were conducted covertly. The end of the war in 1995 led to a loosening of the arms embargo and provided the opportunity for more open international assistance to Croatia’s security sector reforms. The OSCE established a mission to Croatia in 1996, and amongst other initiatives set up a Police Affairs Unit with the aim of supporting the democratisation of the Croatian police. The unit was tasked with providing direct advice to the Croatian Interior Ministry on police reform and also with facilitating coordination between the growing number of bilateral police assistance initiatives from countries such as Germany and Hungary. In the defence sector, MPRI’s activities were increasingly supplanted by official US government assistance through its International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme and from October 1999 its Foreign Military Finance (FMF) grants scheme. Direct US military training assistance to Croatia rose from $65,000 in 1995 to $500,000 in 2000, while other countries such as the UK, Germany and France also introduced or expanded their own security assistance programmes.7 These activities were aimed at encouraging democratic control over the armed forces and preparing the ground for Croatia’s application to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Similarly, the intelligence agencies developed increasingly close cooperation with their western and regional counterparts in areas of shared operational interest such as regional stability, international terrorism and organised crime.8 Despite the growth in the number and extent of these security assistance activities, their influence between 1995–2000 was ultimately limited. Internationally, donors were still reluctant to engage too extensively with the authoritarian Tu
man regime. Croatia was excluded from PfP for example (despite applying to join in May 1997) and was not invited to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. Domestically, the impact of those assistance programmes aimed at encouraging democratic security sector reform was severely restricted by the undemocratic context of the wider Croatian political system. The political changes of 2000 opened the way for a massive expansion in external security sector reform assistance programmes to Croatia. At a bilateral level there was a major increase in the breadth and depth of existing initiatives.9 These included the provision of external education and training programmes, with Croatian military and

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police students being placed on language and professional education courses across the US and Europe; the sponsorship of in-country seminars and workshops on issues such as democratic control of armed forces or democratic policing methods; the participation of Croatian forces in joint military exercises with allied countries; and the use of professional consultants to work directly with the Croatian authorities on key issues of reform. These included both one off visits by external consultants – such as a team from the UK Ministry of Defence who conducted an extensive audit of their Croatian counterparts in 2002 – as well as the placement of experts in long term advisory roles in the defence and security bureaucracies themselves.10 The OSCE also took advantage of the opportunities offered by the new political climate in Croatia to expand its police assistance activities and strengthen its pre-existing contacts with the Interior Ministry. Indeed, from 2000, the OSCE was an important actor in the Croatian police reform process, providing technical advice on the reform process itself as well as organising seminars and workshops on issues such as human resource management, regional and international police cooperation and community policing.11 In addition, as a member of the OSCE, Croatia was obliged to participate in the organisation’s confidence building initiatives, including the Vienna Document process which aims to encourage regional transparency in defence planning. As part of this process, the Ministry of Defence produced a detailed, publicly available document on its future defence strategy. This had the additional benefit of focusing the Ministry’s attention on defence reform and encouraging a more systematic and transparent approach to the defence planning process.12 Croatia’s relations with NATO and the EU were also transformed. Both organisations had been engaged in Croatia during the Tu
man period, albeit in a limited capacity. The EU for example provided over ^300 million in aid to the country between 1991–2000, though this was targeted primarily at humanitarian relief during the war years, and post-confl ict reconstruction and refugee return subsequently, rather than specifically at security sector reform. It also established the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in June 1999 in order to encourage and support democratisation and economic development in the region. For its part, NATO established a South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) with the aim of promoting regional stability in 1999, though the depth of its engagement with Croatia remained limited. The scope and ambition of these initiatives – and their direct input into the Croatian security sector reform process – increased massively from 2000. These changes were facilitated by the high priority that each of Croatia’s

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post-Tu
man governments assigned to both EU and NATO membership, as well as the ever closer contacts that developed as a result of the twin accession processes themselves. As might be expected, NATO’s security assistance programmes to Croatia focused primarily on the defence sector. Since 2000, they have taken largely under the auspices of the PfP (which Croatia joined in May 2000), including its more explicitly targeted Planning and Review Process (PARP); Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) and Membership Action Plan (MAP) initiatives. Through PfP, PARP, the IPP and the MAP, Croatia engaged in a number of cooperative activities aimed at meeting the criteria for eventual accession to NATO and encouraging further defence reforms. For example, Croatia’s MAP functions as a framework within which defence reform can be targeted, planned and implemented with the ultimate goal of full conformity to NATO standards on the part of the participant state. In practice, this has concentrated on areas in which it is believed that Croatia is able to make a particular contribution to Alliance operations, including military police engineering, de-mining, NBC, medical and helicopter units as well as the development of an infantry battalion that can be deployed abroad.13 As with the OSCE’s initiatives, these programmes have had a dual impact on the Croatian defence reform. They have contributed directly to the development of capacity in the Defence Ministry and armed forces through the provision of external expert technical advice, assistance and so on. However, they have also had an indirect impact, obliging (and motivating) Croatian policy makers to engage in a more systematic and transparent defence planning process. In addition, the NATO accession process has provided multiple opportunities for day to day contact, cooperation and consultation between the civilian and military personnel from the Croatian defence sector and their NATO and PfP counterparts. Croatia opened a permanent mission at NATO HQ in Brussels in 2001 for example, while the Croatian armed forces have taken in numerous joint exercises with their NATO counterparts.14 These contacts and activities have provided Croatian personnel with direct experience of NATO practices at both planning and operational levels and encouraged the greater penetration of Alliance norms and values in key areas of the Croatian defence system.15 EU assistance programmes have had a broader remit than those of NATO, covering a range of sectors from agriculture to the judiciary. Even so, they have also had an important impact on security sector reform issues, particularly in relation to the modernisation and development of the police and border guards. Croatia’s relationship with the

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EU has been rooted in the Stabilisation and Association process for South Eastern Europe (SAP). Launched in November 2000, the SAP aims to stabilise the western Balkans through political and economic development, leading eventually to EU membership for the countries of the region. Against this background, security assistance has taken place in the context of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Croatia and the EU. The SAA – signed in October 2001 – provides a framework through which aspirant member states can be assisted towards the goal of EU membership. Each SAA is tailored to the individual circumstances of each country, but broadly consists of a series of formal mechanisms and agreed benchmarks which allow the EU to work with each country to bring them closer to the standards which apply in the EU.16 Croatia’s SAA incorporates a number of specific goals with relevance for security sector reform and include an extensive series of provisions relating to justice and home affairs. These include issues ranging from the effectiveness and efficiency of institutions such as the police and border guards to cooperation in fighting corruption.17 The EU has also provided direct assistance to Croatia’s security sector reform process through its Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme. CARDS has underpinned the objectives of Croatia’s SAA through the provision of fi nancial support to the reform process. As with the SAA, CARDS funding has covered a range of different reform areas. Those that have related specifically to security sector reform include its modernisation of justice, policing, anti-organised crime and integrated border management strands. The fi nancial allocations to these areas under the programme have been substantial, totalling ^43 million between 2002–4.18 Specific projects have included the reconstruction of war damaged police stations in Eastern Slavonia, a ^1.2 million project to upgrade Croatia’s customs services and a 500,000 initiative aimed at modernising the border police.19 Since January 2005, Croatia has also been able to access the EU’s Phare pre-accession fi nancial assistance programme. Aimed at helping candidate states to meet the EU’s membership acquis, 20 Phare is likely to release even more funding for security sector reform related projects. External assistance programmes have had an important impact on the security sector reform process in Croatia. Technical advice and assistance programmes have provided Croatian reformers with access to an external pool of specialist expertise that has lessoned the negative effects of the country’s own defence and security expertise deficits. 21 Access to foreign education and training programmes has gone some way towards making up for Croatia’s domestic shortcomings in these

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areas, albeit on a relatively small scale given the scale of the problem. Programmes such as CARDS have directly fi nanced restructuring and modernisation efforts while participation in initiatives such as the MAP, SAA and the OSCE’s confidence building measures have imposed discipline and focused minds in defence and security planning processes. Finally, the integration of Croatian personnel into NATO and EU bureaucratic structures and the participation of Croatian security sector organisations in joint exercises with allied states have helped to spread NATO and EU norms and operational practices into the security sector itself. Despite these successes however, not all security assistance programmes to Croatia have been entirely problem free. One common difficulty has been the tendency for external actors to propose models for reform that are insufficiently suited to Croatia’s specific national circumstances. In the early days of the reform process for example, the US model was often presented as an archetype for Croatian defence restructuring. As a consequence, the General Staff and Ministry of Defence were organised into large structures of eight departments each. These were modelled on the Pentagon and were widely considered to be unwieldy, over-complex and ill-suited to Croatia’s much more limited requirements. 22 The risk of inappropriate external imposition has been less of an issue in recent years, though as the following section will discuss, the prioritisation of externally-driven targets above domestic needs does remain an issue on occasion. In general however, since 2000 external security assistance donors have become more sophisticated and responsive to local needs. This is particularly the case in relation to the MAP and SAA processes, both of which were developed in close cooperation with local actors. In addition, domestically, Croatian security sector reformers have also become more discriminating ‘consumers’ of external assistance as over time their own expertise and experience levels have increased. Another difficulty has concerned the depth and breadth of the impact of security assistance programmes themselves. A criticism levelled at some initiatives is that they have tended to target the same group of – generally English speaking – Croatians and so have limited their impact by ‘preaching to the converted’. The extent to which they have been able to target and influence the more change-resistant sections of the Croatian security sector – such as middle ranking officers in the military or police – is less certain. Similar concerns relate to the participation of Croatian personnel in foreign education and training programmes, in the permanent missions to NATO and the EU or even on multinational operations and exercises. If these activities are to have a

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genuine impact on the wider reform process, then their impact needs to ‘trickle down’ into the Croatian security sector more widely. In the past, this has not always been the case. Foreign educated military or police officers have at times been underutilised, or even, according to some sources, actively discriminated against. 23 Personnel assigned to Brussels have tended to remain there over the long term and so have not been regularly ‘recycled’ back into the domestic system. Similarly, those military units assigned to multinational operations or joint exercise abroad have often been drawn from elite or specialist sections of the armed forces. 24 This again has reduced the extent to which the impact of these experiences have been able to spread beyond select cadres. This situation is undoubtedly improving. By 2004, for example, a number of senior figures in both the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Ministry had received specialist education or training abroad. 25 Moreover, if present reform plans for the armed forces go ahead as planned, then the proportion of the armed forces that are available to be deployed in multinational capacities is likely to increase significantly. Even so, the impact of these changes remains uneven both within and between different elements of the Croatian security sector, and important sections of the local policy and practitioner community remain sceptical about the value and influence of many international assistance programmes.26

Pre-conditionality EU and NATO pre-conditionality criteria have also had an important impact on the security sector reform process in Croatia. At the time of the political changes in early 2000, Croatia remained on the sidelines of these organisations’ accession and integration processes. While the EU had established its SAP programme for the countries of the former Yugoslavia in 1999, any closer political relationship with Croatia was unlikely while the Tu
man regime remained in power. Relations with NATO were also conducted at arms length, despite Croatia being incorporated into the SEEI Initiative in 1999. The Croatian government had applied for membership of PfP in May 1997, but was only actually admitted to the programme in May 2000, shortly after the ousting of the HDZ. There were two main reasons for the frosty nature of CroatiaEU and Croatia-NATO relations. Domestically, the Tu
man regime remained hostile to any external interference in its (especially political) affairs and broadly suspicious of NATO and EU motives. For their part, NATO and EU countries were reluctant to engage too closely with

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Croatia, both because of the authoritarian nature of the government in Zagreb as well as its often obstructionist policy towards implementation of the Dayton agreement and open hostility towards the ICTY. 27 The political changes of 2000 altered the underlying foundations of these relationships dramatically. The new Racˇan coalition placed closer integration with European and Euroatlantic institutions at the centre of its new reform agenda, and identified accession to NATO and the EU as its most important long term foreign policy goal. Internationally, both NATO and the EU saw the new political situation in Croatia as presenting an unprecedented opportunity to support and encourage democratisation (and by implication stability and security) in the western Balkan region. 28 By and large, these domestic and international policy imperatives remained consistent after 2000. Even the re-election of the HDZ in November 2003 failed to dent the Euro enthusiasm of the Croatian political elite. 29 Indeed, despite taking an often sceptical position on these questions whilst in opposition – and despite some continued resistance amongst the HDZ grassroots – once in power the Sanader government wholeheartedly embraced the integrationist agenda of its predecessor. Croatia’s post-Tu
man governments have assigned a high priority to NATO and particularly EU membership for two main reasons. In practical terms, the EU offers real economic and political advantages for a country still mired in the economic doldrums, while NATO membership would provide a clear solution to Croatia’s security dilemmas through its Article V security guarantee and its principles of collective defence. Both EU and NATO membership are important for symbolic reasons as well. Since the collapse of the SFRJ, Croatia has selfconsciously identified itself, culturally and politically, as part of the western European mainstream rather than ‘the Balkans’. This differentiation dates back to pre-Yugoslav days, when much of the country was under the suzerainty of the Austro-Hungarian empire rather than the Ottomans, and plays an important part in Croatia’s post-independence national identity. It also functions as a political strategy through which the government can portray the country as a historic component of western European civilisation and a natural candidate for membership of European institutions. 30 This supportive domestic and international context meant that Croatia moved swiftly from the margins of the EU and NATO enlargement processes in 2000 to a genuine candidate for full membership of both organisations in 2006. Croatian-EU relations during this period were marked by a series of landmark agreements and milestones. Negotiations for an SAA began in Autumn 2000 and an agreement

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was finalised in October the following year. The government formally applied for EU membership in February 2003 and Croatia was confi rmed as a candidate country by the European Council in June 2004. In February 2005 the SAA entered into force and in October of that year the country was fi nally invited to begin formal accession negotiations with the EU. 31 Croatia’s relations with NATO followed a similarly integrationist path over the same period. It became a member of PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in May 2000 and an associate member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly later that month. Croatia established its permanent mission to NATO Headquarters in February 2001 and joined the MAP programme in May 2002. 32 Since then, cooperation has deepened even further, though at the time of writing Croatia had not yet been invited to join the Alliance. These evolving relationships with the EU and NATO have had an important influence on security sector reform in Croatia, acting – through programmes such as the SAA and the MAP – as a series of pre-conditionality mechanisms that the country has had to meet if it is to move closer to its ultimate objective of full membership of these organisations. These pre-conditionality criteria have provided an explicit normative and technical framework against which the Croatian reform process has been premised. Broadly this has focused around the twin aims of democratisation in civil-military relations and organisational modernisation in the security sector itself. Pre-conditionality has also raised the political stakes involved in security sector reform. It has created an explicit linkage between the key goal of European integration – a centrepiece of all the post-Tu
man governments’ foreign policies – and the implementation of change in the security sector, a policy sphere which in 2000 at least was politically unfashionable and a rather low political priority. As a consequence of NATO and EU preconditionality, the Croatian security sector has found itself, almost by accident, at the vanguard of an integrationist process whose implications are far wider than defence and security issues narrowly defi ned. In the defence sector, pre-conditionality incentives have been centrally important to shaping the direction of the reform process since 2000. The 2005 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the 2006 Long Term Development Plan for the Croatian Armed Forces, for example, are both explicit in recognising the central role that NATO requirements have made in shaping their recommendations. Similarly, the development of a peacekeeping capacity in the armed forces has been justified by the Croatian Foreign Ministry in terms that directly relate to the country’s NATO accession bid. It argues that participation in

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peacekeeping operations not only demonstrates Croatia’s desire to international peace and security in a concrete manner, but also that it is a capability that NATO values from its members, and that it publicly illustrates the government’s willingness to support the goals of the Alliance, even though it is not yet a member. 33 These justifications meet Croatia’s responsibilities under the PfP Framework Document and are tailored to support its NATO accession bid more widely. Similarly, the Army General Staff’s 2006 review of its military education system occurred in large part as a consequence of the need to meet its obligations under the MAP process. 34 The demands of EU pre-conditionality have also had an impact on the reform process in the police. Croatia’s SAA established minimum standards expected of the police in line with the EU’s membership acquis in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, and for the border police at least, those of the Schengen agreement. These related to areas such as legislative development, the rule of law and institutional effectiveness and efficiency in relation to combating transnational challenges such as organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. 35 As in the defence sector, EU pre-conditionality in these areas has helped to set the normative and technical agenda for the reform process and encouraged the implementation of policies – such as the establishment of anticorruption measures in the police – that might otherwise have remained low on the political agenda. Despite the apparently successful use of pre-conditionality by NATO and the EU to encourage security sector reform in Croatia since 2000, the strategy has not been entirely without problems. Some in Croatia have argued that the decision on whether or not the country will achieve the desired outcome of NATO and EU membership may ultimately be made according to political rather than technical criteria, whatever the specific demands of the MAP and the SAA may be. They suggest, for example, that Croatia’s 2005 invitation to begin membership negotiations with the EU had less to do with the country’s technical achievements with regard to its SAA criteria, than with a political trade off over Turkish membership prospects. 36 Policymakers in Zagreb have also expressed some unease over Croatia’s inclusion with Albania and Macedonia in the Adriatic Charter group of countries for its NATO membership bid. They fear that for political reasons, NATO might be reluctant to offer membership to one of the Adriatic Charter states without also doing so for the others. 37 This could pose a problem for Croatia given that it is widely perceived to have made significantly better technical progress in its defence reforms than either Albania or Macedonia.

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These concerns have been reinforced – at least in relation to NATO – by the fact that its criteria for membership are in actual fact rather vague, comprising of such potentially amorphous and ambiguous principles as ‘democratic control of armed forces’. The implication here is that in practice the threat of pre-conditionality is a hollow one because in the fi nal analysis membership invitations are only partially made on the grounds of success in meeting these criteria. This has not been so much of an issue in Croatia since 2000, because successive governments have largely bought into the promises of the pre-conditionality process. However, it does suggest that the impact of the strategy on security sector reform may begin to lose strength if either of the country’s membership bids are consistently unsuccessful in the future. Finally, there is a danger that pre-conditionality encourages a focus on meeting specific targets rather than encouraging a more holistic and comprehensive approach to security sector reform. For example, Croatia has concentrated its military professionalisation efforts on specific (generally elite) cadres and units within the armed forces in order to address what it sees as NATO’s requirements and preferences in these areas. However, in so doing it has largely papered over the deeper and more pressing need for reform in areas such as human resource management. This strategy risks developing limited showcase capabilities that in themselves add little to Croatia’s national defence capabilities short of preparing the ground for potential NATO accession. 38

Direct conditionality Since 2000, the explicit use of direct conditionality to encourage security sector reform in Croatia has been limited. However, it has played a role in the country’s evolving relationship with the ICTY. This is an issue that is of great significance to the wider post-conflict rehabilitation of Croatian society, and to the security sector more narrowly. A number of sometimes very senior personnel from the Croatian police and armed forces were implicated in war crimes between 1991–5 and subsequently indicted by the Hague Tribunal, while since 2000, elements of the security sector have been accused of obstructing the work of the ICTY. Coming to terms with this most sensitive legacy of the wartime period therefore remains at the heart of the successful transformation of the Croatian security sector. In the absence of a proper resolution of this issue, the depth of democratic and professional reform in the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies will always remain open to question. Croatia’s often tense relationship with the Hague Tribunal has also been the most significant stumbling block in its EU and NATO

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membership bids. While in practice the vigour with which this agenda has been pursued differs between different NATO and EU countries, both organisations have identified full cooperation with the ICTY as a minimum criteria for Croatian accession. Croatia’s relationship with the Hague Tribunal has never been entirely comfortable. During the Tu
man period, the government adopted a law on cooperation with the ICTY. However, in practice its generally obstructionist policies in this area were one of the main reasons for its exclusion from institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA), as well as PfP and EU initiatives such as the Phare programme. 39 The 2000 elections provided a new context for Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY, and the new government was keen to demonstrate a renewed commitment to cooperation and to meeting its obligations under the Dayton peace agreement for BiH. At this time, it was clear to many in Croatia that a more constructive engagement with the ICTY and the international community more widely over the legacy of the war years would assist Croatian entry into a number of international organisations and smooth the ground for its wider integration efforts. This more cooperative stance was quick to bear fruit both with regard to PfP membership and the invitation to open negotiations for an SAA with the EU in 2000, and also in relation to swift membership of other organisations such as the WTO and CEFTA.40 Between January 2000 and late 2002, Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY was characterised by cautious cooperation, informed by continuing hostility towards the Hague amongst the veteran’s groups and the HDZ. The government transferred Mladen ‘Tuta’ Naletilic´ – a key ICTY indictee – to the Hague in March 2000, and reached an agreement with the Tribunal that lower and middle ranking war crimes suspects would be tried in Croatia. However, in September 2002, the ICTY formally requested the arrest and transfer of 83 year old Croatian general Janko Bobetko for his alleged role in the killing of Serb civilians in the so-called Medak Pocket in 1993. Bobetko – at that time the highest ranking Croatian to be indicted by the Hague – refused to recognise the Tribunal’s demand. In so doing he was publicly supported by the Racˇan government, which declared it would ‘defend Bobetko from unjustified indictment by all legal, political and diplomatic means’, and launched an appeal against the ruling both at the Hague and in the Croatian constitutional court.41 The move sparked a series of bruising encounters with the international community and saw the imposition of direct conditionality on Croatia for the fi rst time since the Tu
man period.

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Throughout September and October 2002, Croatia was subject to intense pressure from Western countries and institutions over the issue. The UK blocked ratification of Croatia’s SAA with the EU, originally scheduled for November, while both NATO and the EU explicitly and formally warned the government that its actions had jeopardised its twin accession bids.42 In response – and after the failure of its legal appeals in both the ICTY and at home – in late October the government backed down and agreed to arrest and transfer Bobetko. However, soon afterwards the general was taken seriously ill and given a government assurance that he would not be transferred while hospitalised. A medical team from the Hague later ruled that Bobetko was indeed too ill to stand trial and he died three months later in April 2003.43 Direct conditionality played a significant role in influencing Croatia during the Bobetko affair. Throughout 2002, discussion in Croatian policy circles was dominated by the damage that the incident had done to the country’s NATO and EU membership bids, and this was an important factor in the government’s eventual climb down.44 Even so, the tough line taken by western states in relation to Bobetko conspicuously failed to transform the nature of Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY. Indeed, soon afterwards the government was embroiled in a second damaging row with the international community over the arrest and transfer of another former army general and nationalist icon of the Homeland War, Ante Gotovina. Publicly indicted by the Hague in July 2001, Gotovina went into hiding soon afterwards.45 International pressure on the government to apprehend and extradite the general mounted throughout 2003 and the Gotovina issue emerged as one of the key challenges facing the new Sanader government after its elections in November of that year. The US was unequivocal in stating that it would not support Croatia’s NATO membership bid until the runaway general was in the Hague. The EU also made it clear that further evidence of Croatian cooperation with the ICTY was necessary before membership negotiations could begin, and went so far as to suspend the beginning of accession talks over the issue in March 2005.46 The Sanader government’s dilemma over Gotovina was far from straightforward however, despite the importance of his arrest to the fulfilment of the central two objectives of its foreign policy platform: membership of NATO and the EU. First, as with Bobetko, support for the general – and hostility towards the Hague – remained high amongst substantial sections of the Croatian population. A survey conducted by the Zagreb daily Jutarnji list in March 2005 for example found that 54.4 per cent of respondents opposed the extradition of Gotovina to the Hague. 81.4 per cent said they considered him a war hero and 84.8

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per cent said they would not report him to the police if they spotted him on the street.47 Moreover, after his indictment in 2001, Gotovina and his supporters managed to develop a vocal and well organised support network, centred around the veterans’ organisations. These publicly campaigned against the ICTY and were quick to publicise and politicise any government moves towards closer cooperation with the Tribunal.48 These factors made it politically difficult for the Sander government to act against Gotovina, particularly given that whilst in opposition the HDZ itself had loudly exploited the issue in order to undermine the Racˇan coalition. Popular discontent over the pressure Croatia has come under over the ICTY issue has also had an impact on the public’s attitude towards European integration more widely. Polls conducted in 2005 for example demonstrated a significant public cooling towards both NATO and the EU (with as much as 44 per cent of the population against EU membership according to the daily Vecˇerniji list) while many Croatians expressed irritation that their leaders’ reassurances on the issue were apparently questioned by the international community.49 As a consequence, the Sanader government was forced to walk a political tightrope over the ICTY issue: promoting European integration as the centrepiece of its foreign policy on the one hand, while still remaining sensitive to the concerns of its more sceptical nationalist constituencies at home. The second problem faced by the government over Gotovina was more practical, and concerned their capacity to actually apprehend him in practice. Throughout the affair, Croatian policy makers insisted that they did not know where Gotovina was hiding or indeed whether he was even in Croatia at all. While these claims were treated with scepticism in some quarters, 50 the latter at least was later confi rmed when Gotovina was eventually arrested in the Canary Islands in December 2005. In addition, and as Chapter 5 discussed in greater depth, many suspected that Gotovina was protected by high placed networks within the police and intelligence agencies, and by sections of the Croatian political elite themselves. 51 According to this view, the government may have had trouble identifying the whereabouts of the runaway general even if it had wanted to, either because it was being frustrated by his clandestine allies or because it did not trust its own intelligence agencies to do its bidding when ordered. Despite these problems, Croatia’s relationship with the ICTY since 2000 has been generally characterised by increasing cooperation, accompanied by continuing suspicion and hostility on the part of key interest groups such as the judiciary and the police. For example, a domestic court successfully prosecuted the high profile war crimes

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indictee General Mirko Norac in March 2003, and in April 2004 the European Commission’s Opinion on the Application of Croatia for Membership of the European Union, stated that cooperation with the Tribunal had ‘improved significantly’. 52 The government also adopted a visibly more robust approach to the Gotovina question in February 2005, publicly issuing a warrant to the intelligence agencies, police and state prosecutor’s office that instructed all three to apply ‘maximum measures and activities necessary’ to apprehend the general. 53 In April of that year, and in the wake of the EU’s decision to postpone Croatia’s membership negotiations, these measures were followed by a six point Action Plan aimed at further improving relations with the ICTY, and incorporating such measures as the enhancement of border controls and a public relations campaign. 54 Gotovina himself was fi nally arrested in December 2005. These actions began to pay off in October 2005. Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY Carla Del Ponte declared that Croatia was fully cooperating with the Hague Tribunal, whilst the EU announced that it would fi nally begin the country’s delayed accession negotiations. 55 Even so, the capacity of direct conditionality to influence attitudes in Croatia above and beyond specific issues or crisis points remains open to question. Bobetko ultimately remained in Croatia until his death, while it took five years of intense pressure and diplomacy before Gotovina was fi nally apprehended. A number of incidents throughout the 2000–5 period illustrated that attitudinal change at the top of the political hierarchy – that segment of society most directly affected by direct conditionality – was not always easily or swiftly followed by a corresponding change amongst other, more recalcitrant sections of society. In November 2002 for example, the willingness of the country’s own judiciary to prosecute lower level war crimes suspects was called into question when a judge acquitted eight suspects on the basis that there was no evidence against them: a verdict labelled a ‘complete outrage’ by an independent human rights group monitoring the trial. Similarly, in September 2005, elements of the police and judiciary were accused of at best bureaucratic inefficiency and at worst active compliance in allowing two domestically convicted war criminals and former policemen – Munib Suljic´ and Igor Mikola – to abscond after their guilty verdict was announced. 56 While the impact of these incidents was tempered somewhat by a number of notably successful domestic prosecutions, they are important indicators of the complexity of the war crimes issue in Croatian society. Addressing this issue will require long term attitudinal and institutional change in the organisations concerned and it is unlikely

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that this is something that can be externally imposed through direct conditionality.

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Conclusion International factors have had an important influence on security sector reform in Croatia since 2000. In particular, the significance that each of Croatia’s post-Tu
man governments assigned to NATO and EU membership set the underlying context of the reform process. This renewed spirit of international engagement opened the way for a substantial increase in the number, breadth and depth of security assistance programmes. These have had three main impacts. First, they have influenced the nature of the reform process itself, broadly encouraging its development along the lines of NATO and EU norms. Second, through initiatives such as the EU’s CARDS programme, they have provided external funding for reform and restructuring. Finally, expert advice and assistance have helped to make up for Croatia’s own deficits in these areas and shortcut the domestic learning process with regard to the reforms. NATO and EU pre-conditionality criteria have also had an important influence on Croatian security sector reform. They have helped to establish and consolidate a normative framework for the process and, in the case of the armed forces particularly, have had a clear influence on the nature of the organisational reforms themselves. Moreover, by establishing an explicit connection between reform in the security sector and NATO and EU accession, pre-conditionality has increased the domestic political significance of the reform process and focused attention on an otherwise unfashionable policy sphere. Finally, direct conditionality has played a role in forcing Croatian compliance on specific issues such as the arrest of Generals Bobetko and Gotovina. The Croatian experience also exposes some key limitations in the international community’s involvement in promoting security sector reform, however. Perhaps most significantly, while external assistance and pressure proved able to shape the nature and direction of the reform process, it was not able to initiate it in the fi rst place. Croatia was engaged in a number of external security sector reform initiatives under Tu
man, yet security sector reform prior to 2000 moved extremely slowly and it took the advent of a new government genuinely committed to democratisation and European integration for the incentives and disincentives offered by external actors to come into their own. In addition, by their very nature, both pre- and direct conditionality encourage the reform process on the basis of externally prioritsed criteria. The

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Croatian experience demonstrates that this can risk encouraging a rather instrumentalist approach to reform, focused primarily around meeting external targets rather than tackling the underlying problems of the security sector in an integrated manner. Finally, external strategies to encourage security sector reform (whether through assistance or conditionality) can impact disproportionately on those sections of the recipient society already won over to the reform process, while more recalcitrant elements remain ignored or unaffected.

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Notes 1 MPRI Website, European activities section, www.mpri.com/subchannels/ int_europe.html. 2 Another interpretation of the US/MPRI/Croatia relationship is that it was part of a deal between Tu
man and the US government over Croatian activities in Bosnia. According to this argument, Croatia was offered concrete (albeit indirect) military assistance through MPRI in return for abandoning its support for the Croatian Herzeg-Bosna and accepting the Croat-Muslim federation instead. Biljana Vankovska, ‘Privatisation of security and security sector reform in Croatia’, in Damian Lilly and Michael von Tangen Page (eds), Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatisation of Security (London: International Alert, 2002), p. 70. 3 Narodni List (Zadar), 2 August 2001, cited in Renéo Lukic and JeanFrançois Morel, ‘Croatia, 1990–2001’, in Albert Legault and Joel Sokolsky (eds), The Soldier and the State in the Post-Cold War Era (Kingston, Ontario: Queens Quarterly Press, 2002), p. 183. 4 Vankovska, ‘Privatisation of security’, pp. 77–8. 5 One observer has gone so far as to identify the German/Croatian relationship in the early 1990s as a ‘. . . de facto alliance . . .’. Marko Milivojevic, ‘Croatia’s intelligence services’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 1994 (online edition), p. 6. 6 Ibid. p. 6. Other Western intelligence agencies – particularly the CIA – were also alleged to have shared intelligence with the Croatians during the war years. 7 Kristan J. Wheaton, ‘Cultivating Croatia’s military’, NATO Review (Summer/Autumn 2000), p. 11. 8 Miroslav Tu
man, ‘The fi rst five years of the Croatian intelligence service: 1993–1998’, National Security and the Future, 2:1 (2000), p. 58. 9 Though direct US military assistance to Croatia was temporarily curtailed in 2004 after the government’s refusal to sign a bilateral agreement on non-extradition of US nationals to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 10 Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2002; July 2004.

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11 Author’s interview with Dan Peterson, Senior Police Affairs Advisor, OSCE Mission to the Republic of Croatia, 7 July 2004. 12 See, for example: Annual Exchange of Information on Defence Planning 2005: Republic of Croatia (Vienna: OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, 2005), http://www.morh.hr/katalog/documents/OSCE-FINAL_ENG.pdf. 13 Author’s interview with Dr Dragan Lozancˇ ic´, Head, Department of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 11 July 2002; Amadeo Watkins, ‘PfP Integration: Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro’, CSRC Balkans Series Report 04/5 (Camberley: CSRC, April 2004), pp. 5–6. 14 See for example: Mission of the Republic of Croatia to NATO, http://nato. mfa.hr/; ‘Croatia to participate in NATO exercise’, Hina, 24 January 2005. 15 Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2004. 16 ‘From regional approach to the Stabilisation and Association process’, European Union Website, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/ sap/sap_process.htm#sap_agreement. 17 Articles 75–80, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Croatia’, Official Journal of the European Union (28 January 2005). 18 European Commission Country Strategy Paper for Croatia, 2002–6: CARDS, p. 66, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/croatia/pdf/sp02_ 06.pdf. NB. Money aimed at integrated border management was regionally targeted. 19 ‘CARDS: case studies’, European Union Website, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enlargement/cards/case_studies_en.htm#cro. 20 The term acquis communautaire refers to the total body of EU law accumlated so far. Prospective member states are expected to harmonise their own domestic arrangements in line with the acquis prior to membership of the EU. 21 In the words of one senior figure in the Interior Ministry, external assistance has meant that ‘we have to spend less energy on reform and make fewer mistakes’. Author’s interview with Dr Irena Cajner-Mraovic´, Head of Croatian Police Academy, 9 July 2004. 22 This structure was rationalised to a more manageable four departments in 2003. 23 Author’s interview, Zagreb, 6 July 2004. 24 Amadeo Watkins, ‘Military reforms see Croatia march towards NATO berth’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 25 July 2005 (online version), pp. 1–3. 25 For example, Pjer Šimunovic´, the Foreign Ministry’s National Coordinator for NATO in 2004–6, had a Masters in War Studies from King’s College London, while Brigadier Željko Cepanec, head of the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Policy and Planning Department in 2004 had attended the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany and the Naval

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Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2004. In June 2005 for example, Croatian soldiers were prevented from participating in a joint military exercise in the US because of political disagreements over their deployment abroad. ‘Parliament debates government’s draft decision on 2005 military exercises’, Hina, 9 June 2005. Alex J. Bellamy, ‘ “Like drunken geese in the fog”: developing democratic control of armed forces in Croatia’, in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster (eds), Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 189. See for example, ‘The declaration of the Zagreb summit’, EU Website, 24 November 2000, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/see/statement. htm; ‘South East European Initiative’, NATO Website, November 2001, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/seei.htm. Though the Gotovina affair – discussed below – did have a major impact on public opinion. Active popular support for EU membership fell from a high of 79.4 per cent in July 2002 to only 39 per cent at the height of the Gotovina controversy in August 2005. Drago Hedl, ‘Croats’ Euro enthusiasm cools’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 16 March 2005, www.iwpr.net; ‘Croats cooling toward the EU’, RFE/RL Newsline, 31 August 2005. See for example, Foreign Minister Tonino Picula in his speech to NATO foreign ministers on Croatia’s accession to PfP in May 2000, where he couched the importance of the moment in terms of civilisational values. Tonino Picula, ‘Opening statement’, NATO Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Florence, 24–5 May 2000, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/ s000525f.htm. ‘Relations with Croatia: key events’, EU Website, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/enlargement/croatia/key_events.htm. ‘Milestones in Croatia-NATO relations’, Mission of the Republic of Croatia to NATO, http://nato.mfa.hr/. Author’s interview with Zoran Milanovic´, Head of Department for International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zagreb, 9 July 2002. Author’s interviews, Joint Education and Training Command of the Croatian Armed Forces, January 2006. Articles 75, 80, ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement’. ‘Neven Mimica: What it takes to enter’, Transitions Online, 28 October 2005, www.tol.cz. Author’s interviews, Zagreb, July 2005. Signed in 2003, the Atlantic Charter is a US initiative designed to support the NATO membership bids of Croatia, Albania and Macedonia. ‘A revolution in civil-military affairs: the professionalisation of Croatia’s armed forces’, in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey (eds), The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe:

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49 50 51

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Building Professional Armed Forces (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002), pp. 180–1. Bellamy, ‘Like drunken geese in the fog’, p. 189. Croatia joined the WTO in November 2000 and CEFTA in March 2003. ‘Croatian government refuses to hand over war crimes suspect’; ‘As Prime Minister equates aging general’s actions with “struggle for independence”, RFE/RL Newsline, 24 September 2002; ‘Croatia seeks to challenge the indictment of General Bobetko’, RFE/RL Newsline, 30 September 2002. ‘EU calls on Croatia to cooperate with the Hague’, RFE/RL Newsline, 1 October 2002; ‘NATO calls on Croatia to extradite general Bobetko’, RFE/RL Newsline, 3 October 2002; ‘Croatian president says general Bobetko should go to the Hague’, RFE/RL Newsline, 16 October 2002. ‘Controversial Croatian general hospitalized’, RFE/RL Newsline, 14 November 2002; ‘Croatian prime minister defends his “humanitarian gesture” ’, RFE/RL Newsline, 15 November 2002; ‘Hague doctors rule Croatian general unfit for trial’, RFE/RL Newsline, 3 February 2003. Author’s interview with Veselko Grubicˇ ic´, Croatian Mission to NATO; Mario Horvatic´, Croatian Mission to NATO, London 28 October 2002. See Chapter 5 for allegations of police and security service collaboration in his disappearance. ‘US says will not support Croatia’s membership bid until Gotovina is in the Hague’, Hina, 11 June 2005; ‘Croatia and the EU: no Gotovina, no cash’, Transitions Online, 21 March 2005. Drago Hedl, ‘Sanader isolated as EU dream crumbles’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 16 March 2005. See for example, Drago Hedl, ‘Croatia: Gotovina campaign growing’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Balkan Crisis Report, 21 January 2003. Also see General Gotovina’s own website at www.antegotovina. com. ‘Croats cooling towards the EU’, RFE/RL Newsline, 31 August 2005; Author’s interviews, Zagreb, 10 March 2005. See for example, ‘Sanader on media reports on govt’s action plan pertaining to Gotovina case’, Hina, 2 May 2005. See for example, Amadeo Watkins, ‘Croatia at a crossroads: the EU/ICTY debate’, CSRC Balkans Series Report 05/15 (Camberley: CSRC, March 2005), p. 3. European Commission, Opinion: On the Application of Croatia for Membership of the European Union (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2004), pp. 30–1. Drago Hedl, ‘Croatia gets tough in hunt for Gotovina’, 11 February 2005, p. 1. ‘Mesic: implementation of gov’t Action Plan to change situation between Croatia and ICTY’, Hina, 28 April 2005.

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55 ‘Del Ponte confi rms Croatia’s full compliance with Tribunal’; ‘EU task force recommends start of Croatia’s entry talks’, Hina, 3 October 2005. 56 ‘Controversial Croatian judge frees eight after war crimes acquittal’, RFE/ RL Newsline, 25 November 2002; Tena Erceg, ‘War criminals: escaping through a loophole’, Transitions Online, 3 October 2005.

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8

Security sector reform at the international level: Serbia and Montenegro After an initially slow start, international security assistance programmes to Serbia-Montenegro have multiplied in their number, scope and ambition since 2000. However, the breadth and depth of their influence has been more limited than in Croatia. While they have helped to influence the normative and technical criteria against which security sector reform has taken place – particularly in relation to the police – they have also struggled to penetrate deeply ingrained, and often deeply conservative, organisational cultures. The government in Belgrade has also been subject to a range of pre-conditionality pressures in its efforts to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. Again, these have helped to shape the normative and technical aspects of the reform process and had an important influence on the character and content of new defence and security strategy documentation and legislation. Even so, the degree of political consensus on the question of Euroatlantic integration has been far weaker than in Croatia and as a consequence, pre-conditionality criteria have not had the same motivating effect on policy implementation. Finally, direct conditionality has played a key role in relation to Serbia-Montenegro’s evolving relationship with the Hague Tribunal, with important implications for security sector reform. In this respect, and in common with the Croatian experience, it has been able to influence specific problem areas identified by international actors. However, it has had a more limited impact on the reform process as a whole.

Security assistance As in Croatia, security assistance to Serbia-Montenegro has been provided from three distinct, though sometimes inter-related sources. First, from the non-governmental sector, including a wider variety of different expert and advocacy groups. Second, on a bilateral basis from

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individual states. Finally, from international organisations such as the OSCE, UNDP and latterly NATO. Between 2000–2, international assistance to security sector reform in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ) was much less extensive than in Croatia. This was particularly the case with regard to initiatives in the defence sector, for four main reasons. The fi rst of these was the continuation of General Nebojša Pavkovic´ in his position as Chief of General Staff. Pavkovic´ was widely perceived to be a compromised figure; implicated in war crimes and a product of the old Miloševic´ regime. Close cooperation with a VJ still commanded by him, and under only questionable civilian control, was out of the question for many Western actors. A second and related obstacle was the question of relations with the ICTY. This was an especially significant problem given that many accused the Army itself of actively protecting some of the most wanted fugitives. A third stumbling block was the question of FRJ’s (non-)compliance with the Dayton Accords of 1995, again particularly in relation to the issue of war crimes suspects, but also with regard to the continuing fi nancial and organisational contacts between the VJ and the VRS. Finally, between 2000–4 the government in Belgrade pursued an ultimately unsuccessful case against eight NATO member countries in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for their bombing of the country in 1999.1 This further problematised relations with the states concerned and made close cooperation with NATO difficult. The provision of ‘official’ defence assistance to FRJ was thus an extremely sensitive political issue in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Miloševic´. In this context, the fi rst security cooperation and assistance programmes targeted at the country’s defence sector tended to originate in the non-governmental sector. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) for example became extensively involved in the security sector reform process early on, establishing contacts, relationships and activities that persisted throughout 2000–6. 2 These included organising (and funding) seminars, conferences and workshops, targeted across the security sector, and focusing on issues such as democratic control of armed forces; providing expert advice and assistance to policy makers; and supporting (often fi nancially) the activities of local defence and security NGOs. A number of other NGO’s also became involved in defence and security sector reform assistance to Serbia-Montenegro after 2000. These included the Danish Centre for Human Rights which worked closely with the Serbian Interior Ministry on developing its 2003 Vision Statement on reform; the Club of Madrid, which provided expert advice and assistance on defence

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reform and democratisation issues; as well as numerous other organisations including – amongst others – Saferworld, the Bonn International Centre for Conversion, and the Centre for European Security Studies at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands. 3 Three other important international actors that engaged with security sector reform issues in FRJ early on were the OSCE, the UNDP and the EU.4 The self-consciously impartial and inclusive nature of the former two organisations made engagement with Belgrade and its defence sector politically less difficult than for some other international actors, and for bilateral actors who were able to use these two organisations as ‘surrogates’ for some projects. 5 Even then, between 2000–2 the OSCE concentrated mainly on the less contentious and more politically accessible issue of police reform. For its part, EU assistance programmes to Serbia-Montenegro took place in the context of the EU’s 1999 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and its Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) of November 2000. These activities aimed to encourage democratisation and economic development in the region as a whole, and did not incorporate specific defence reform assistance programmes to any great degree. The OSCE established an office in Belgrade in January 2001. It initially identified four major foci for its activities: the rule of law; democratisation; media development; and law enforcement. It was thus closely involved with the question of police reform from the very beginning of its mission. In February 2001 it appointed two police consultants – Richard Monk and John Slater – to carry out studies on the future of police reform in the country. Based on extensive official access and collaboration, the conclusions of the Monk and Slater reports were accepted by the federal and republican interior ministries in FRJ and established the broad parameters for subsequent police reform. These consisted of six priority areas for the reform process: police education and development; accountability and internal control; organised crime; forensics; border policing; and community policing.6 From 2001, the OSCE provided direct assistance in all of these areas through a wide variety of activities. These included the provision of expert advice and practical assistance in the implementation of reform, running training programmes and seminars at all levels of the policing system, monitoring the progress of the reform process, and coordinating the range of international assistance to the police reform process.7 The OSCE also played an important role in the troubled region of South Serbia and was instrumental in the establishment of the multi-ethnic police force, community policing and small arms and light weapons control initiatives there.8 Since 2000, these OSCE programmes have

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had a demonstrable impact on police reform in Serbia particularly. OSCE advice helped to shape key legislation such as the 2005 Law on the Police, for example, and also played a significant role in setting the agenda for the Interior Ministry’s reform priorities more generally conceived.9 Elsewhere, OSCE assistance has had an important impact on defence reform and civil-military relations through its democratisation department. Initiatives such as its parliamentary support programme have aimed to develop specialist expertise and capacity amongst parliamentarians in all three of Serbia and Montenegro’s parliaments for example, while OSCE experts have also offered advice on the drafting of new defence and security legislation. UNDP engagement with security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro began in 2001. Initially, this focused on a specifically ‘post-conflict’ set of priorities, including programmes such as small arms and light weapons control and refugee return. From 2002, the UNDP expanded its activities to increasingly incorporate a wider set of longer term development objectives such as ‘democratic governance’. This led to a more explicit involvement in security sector reform, including the provision of financial and expert assistance. In April 2002 for example, the UNDP organised a number of seminars and produced a report on military conversion at the request of the government in Belgrade.10 After Boris Tadic´ became defence minister in March 2003, it was also invited to provide a senior ‘in house’ advisor (in fact a retired British Army General) to help with the restructuring plan for the Ministry of Defence itself. FRJ’s relationship with the EU was also transformed by the political changes of October 2000. However, this occurred on a more mutually uncertain basis than was the case with Croatia at the same time. For its part, the EU remained cautious in its approach to Belgrade. A perceived legacy of Serbian war responsibility, the related issue of cooperation with the ICTY, disagreements over the Kosovo question and uncertainties over the future of the Yugoslav federation itself meant that EU policy towards FRJ was characterised as much by political armtwisting and conditionality as it was by assistance. In the case of FRJ, a weaker political and societal consensus on the question of European integration meant that EU relations did not assume quite the same foreign policy importance as they did in Croatia. Indeed, it was not until October 2005 that the government in Belgrade was fi nally invited to begin negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. Even so, the extent and depth of EU assistance programmes to Serbia-Montenegro gathered pace significantly from 2000. Initially

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these initiatives occurred mainly under the auspices of the Stability Pact and the SAP and through the fi nancial mechanism of the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme. CARDS funding to Serbia-Montenegro covered a range of different reform areas between 2000–6. However, two funding strands – Justice and Home Affairs and Integrated Border Management – had a direct relevance for security sector reform. The fi nancial allocations to these areas under the programme were substantial, totalling ^44.7 million to Serbia and ^9 million to Montenegro between 2002–4. Specific projects included the provision of training and the Serbian criminal and border police, and the purchase of specialist police equipment in areas such as forensics.11 The extent and nature of external security assistance to SerbiaMontenegro increased more generally from 2002. The extradition of Miloševic´ to the Hague in June 2001, the dismissal of General Pavkovic´ in June 2002 and progress on some of the key areas of Dayton compliance – including an end to fi nancial subsidy of the VRS – indicated genuine changes on the ground in FRJ, made the political climate more conducive for cooperation and opened the possibility of more direct assistance in the area of military reform. In September 2002, the British embassy in Belgrade was designated as the official NATO Contact Point in Serbia-Montenegro and took on the tasks of the in-country coordination of NATO activities there;12 in April that year the government officially announced its intention to apply for membership of the PfP programme; while in May, NATO officials held a private meeting with representatives of the Serbia-Montenegrin defence sector – including figures from the highest level of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, VJ General Staff and federal presidency – to discuss ‘cooperation and partnership’.13 These activities intensified between 2003–6. In addition to the UNDP initiative mentioned above, the UK and Greek governments were also invited to provide senior ‘in-house’ military advisors to the Ministry of Defence in Belgrade in 2003. Other NATO countries also launched their own bilateral or multilateral activities in relation to defence reform during this period. In 2005 for example, and amongst multiple other similar international initiatives, both Denmark and Belgium sent working groups from their own Ministries of Defence to provide assistance and advice on defence sector reform issues. In January 2006, the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic signed a cooperation agreement in order to share experiences of the defence reform process.14 Other bilateral activities have included the placement of Serbian and Montenegrin students in military education and training programmes

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abroad and the participation of actors from across the security sector in externally sponsored or organised seminars, conferences and workshops on security sector reform issues. Individual countries have also provided direct financial assistance. The UK, Norway and the Netherlands for example have all contributed substantial funds in support of the Ministry of Defence’s PRISMA resettlement programme.15 NATO itself made a visible effort to step up cooperation with SerbiaMontenegro through its South East European Initiative (SEEI). NATO advisory and consultation teams made multiple visits to Belgrade between 2002–6 to discuss defence reform and cooperation, while regional initiatives such as the South East European Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP) provided opportunities for substantive collaboration between the government in Belgrade and NATO/PfP members on issues such as information sharing, border management and preparing for PfP and closer integration with NATO. By November 2005 cooperation had deepened to the extent that the State Union parliament was able to approve an agreement allowing the easy transit of NATO forces across its territory, an extraordinary development given NATO forces had bombed Belgrade only six years before.16 Even so, despite these increasingly close relations, the extent of defence assistance offered by NATO was ultimately limited by the fact that SerbiaMontenegro remained outside PfP during this period. External security assistance programmes to Serbia and Montenegro have thus proliferated since 2000. They have made a number of important contributions to the security sector reform process as a whole. Perhaps most significantly, and in conjunction with the preconditionaity criteria discussed below, they have helped to shape the normative and technical agenda against which the reform process has been premised. Indeed, while there have been differences in detail, all security assistance programmes to Serbia-Montenegro have emphasised a common set of themes in relation to the security sector reform agenda. These have broadly focused around the issues of democratisation, effectiveness and efficiency and organisational modernisation already identified in Chapter 2. In so doing they have reinforced a clear normative message of what reform in the military and the police should look like. Indeed, it is remarkable how closely new defence and security legislation in Serbia and Montenegro – including particularly the police laws, Defence Strategy and White Paper on Defence – utilises the language and concepts of the international donor community, in relation to, for example, issues such as parliamentary control, community policing, or the development of rapid reaction capabilities in the armed forces. External assistance programmes have also made a substantive

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contribution to the reform process itself, providing funding and technical expertise in support of a wide range of initiatives and organisations, ranging from police training and education, to the resettlement of former soldiers and the fi nancial survival of the local NGO sector. Despite these notable contributions however, external assistance to security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro has also faced problems in terms of both effectiveness and impact. First, the sheer number of international donors – and indeed domestic recipients – involved in the process has meant that some duplication and competition in the security sector reform ‘market’ has been inevitable. In one respect, this has been a relatively benign problem, with a limited impact on the domestic security sector reform process itself. The fi nancial costs of duplication have been borne primarily by donors rather than recipients, while multiple initiatives from different external actors have exposed local reformers to a range of different options, models and experience. While this has often been frustrating for the external donors concerned – the presence of three international advisors (provided by the UNDP, UK and Greece) to the Ministry of Defence in 2004 for example led to a degree of redundancy in at least two of the positions – it has not been inherently detrimental to the reform process itself. In other areas, the impact of duplication and competition has been more obviously negative. Perhaps most significantly, a clear internal/ external distinction between the donors and recipients of security assistance has sometimes been hard to distinguish. For example, the pool of international financial donors for security sector reform projects in Serbia-Montenegro is relatively small. At the same time however, there are often multiple actors– both local and international – wanting to run security sector reform initiatives and needing funding to do so. This has meant that local NGOs have sometimes been forced to compete directly with their international equivalents for the same funding to run similar kinds of projects. In some respects, and for some organisations, this situation has had a positive impact, encouraging the development of local NGO capacities and capabilities in order to compete more equally on the international funding market. For others, the effect of this international competition has been less constructive. International NGO’s have generally been better funded and better organised than their Serbian and Montenegrin counterparts – as well as more familiar with funding application procedures – and have often been more successful in competing for money as a result. This in turn has undermined the development of local NGO capacities by channelling a proportion of available international fi nancial support towards other international rather than domestic actors.17

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Another problem with external security assistance to SerbiaMontenegro has concerned the breadth and depth of the impact of the assistance programmes themselves. In particular, security assistance funding has often been targeted at discrete initiatives and projects, with a focus on producing deliverable and measurable outcomes. This has meant that while projects may have been successful on their own narrow terms, their overall effect on security sector reform as a whole has been more difficult to assess. For example, after 2000 international actors organised numerous seminars and workshops aimed at developing expertise and capacity amongst parliamentarians on the defence and security committees. However, these were sometimes uncoordinated with each other, repetitive in nature and content, and not consolidated by follow-up initiatives – all significant problems given the already extensive demands that parliamentarians in Serbia-Montenegro faced on their time.18 This has not been a universal problem, as the sustained nature of OSCE engagement with Serbian police reform clearly demonstrates. However, it has been characteristic of a significant number of external initiatives, particularly those that have taken place on a short term or one-off consultancy basis. In addition, while security assistance programmes have undoubtedly had an impact on some of the most visible and obvious aspects of security sector reform – for example on the tone and content of new defence and security documentation or the introduction of initiatives such as Serbia’s community policing pilot schemes – the extent to which they have been able to influence the underlying dynamics of the reform process is less clear. The UNDP’s placement of an ‘in house’ advisor in the Ministry of Defence is a good example of an initiative aimed at capacity building and long term reform assistance rather than a short term, one off consultancy project. It also had some notable successes. The advisor played a key role in facilitating the rationalisation of departments in the Ministry of Defence in 2004 and was instrumental in establishing the idea of the Defence Reform fund. Even so, the long term impact of the initiative is less certain. Critics complained that the UNDP was viewed as a ‘cash cow’ by many local actors, that it had little experience in security sector reform itself, that its work was largely uncoordinated with other external agencies, and that any uncomfortable advice it gave was easily ignored or sidelined.19 Indeed, by its own admission, the extent to which the UNDP was able to play a constructive advisory role in practice was limited by organisational incapacity, institutional resistance and political fragmentation within the Ministry of Defence and defence sector more widely. 20

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The UNDP experience demonstrates both the opportunities offered by – and the limitations of – external assistance programmes to security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro. The UNDP was able to influence and encourage those areas of the reform process where a local impetus for change had already developed. However, it struggled to actually initiate change itself and had little impact on the systemic weaknesses and obstacles that underlay the inertia in defence reform process as a whole. Similarly, while the OSCE has exerted an important influence in key areas of the Serbian police reform process, this again has tended to be in those areas – such as legislative reform or police training and education – where there has either been a degree of preexisting domestic momentum for change or where there has been an obvious capacity gap that can be filled from outside. It has had much more difficulty in influencing the underlying structural obstacles and ingrained institutional cultures that have made organisational reform in the Serbian and Montenegrin police such a long and difficult process. Both UNDP and OSCE assistance programmes have taken place in the context of much wider package of measures whose overall impact will most likely only be felt over the long term. However, what is clear is that the influence external assistance programmes can exert over the security sector reform process in Serbia-Montenegro has been intimately bound up with – and ultimately determined by – the systemic constraints of the domestic reform environment.

Pre-conditionality Pre-conditionality criteria have also played an important role in influencing the security sector reform process in Serbia-Montenegro. However, Belgrade’s ambitions for integration into the main European and Euroatlantic institutions have been circumscribed by continuing international reservations over the country’s war legacy, and a suspicion of the whole idea of conditional European integration amongst important sections of Serbian society. Since 2000, Serbia-Montenegro’s integrationist goals have been more modest than those of Croatia, and the influence of pre-conditionality criteria has been consequently less extensive. Under Miloševic´, FRJ’s relations with the major European and international institutions were extremely poor, and throughout this period it was largely excluded from their outreach and integration programmes. FRJ began to emerge from this international isolation after 2000. It

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joined the United Nations and the OSCE in November 2000 and was admitted to the Council of Europe in April 2003. In October 2005 it was invited to begin negotiations for an SAA with EU. The prospect of closer integration with western institutions has thus emerged as a real possibility – and a growing policy priority – for the governments in Belgrade and Podgorica. Even so, this political prioritisation of European integration was relatively slow to emerge, primarily because of the continuing political legacies of the Miloševic´ period, the extent of the country’s pariah status during the 1990s, and the NATO bombing of 1999. Partly as a result of these influences, all of Serbia and Montenegro’s post-Miloševic´ governments have included strong nationalist elements and – to varying degrees – have remained suspicious of Western policies and motivations, particularly in relation to the ICTY. Indeed, it was only in April 2002 that the government fi nally announced its intention to apply to join NATO’s PfP programme. This was in contrast to most other states in the Western Balkans for whom PfP membership had been a key foreign policy priority since the 1990s. 21 This political reticence towards European integration has reflected a wider ambiguity towards the West in Serbian and Montenegrin society as a whole. For example, a public opinion survey conducted by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in Belgrade (CCMR) in 2003 found that 59.7 (Serbia) and 65.1 (Montenegro) per cent of respondents supported the idea of PfP membership. While these figures were broadly positive, they still represent a somewhat fragmented societal consensus on the prospect of integration. The same survey also found that despite this general support for membership, only 27.9 (Serbia) and 54.3 per cent (Montenegro) of respondents actually had confidence in the PfP programme itself. However, attitudes to NATO itself were much more negative. Only 28 (Serbia) and 36.9 (Montenegro) per cent of respondents believed that the country should joint NATO, while 49.2 and 39.7 per cent were actively hostile to the idea. 22 Subsequent rounds of the survey (in 2004 and 2005) showed a marked increase in Serbian support for joining PfP (over 70 per cent in April 2005). There was also a small increase in the number of respondents who supported the idea of NATO membership, but again at just over 35 per cent in Serbia, these remained in a clear minority in the population at large. In Montenegro, support for NATO membership actually fell during this period, to just under 30 per cent in April 2005. 23 Political and societal attitudes to the EU in Serbia-Montenegro have been generally more positive, with opinion poll data suggesting that over 70 per cent of respondents in Serbia supported membership of the EU in 2005. 24 Again, however, this figure hides some important ambi-

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guities. As Judy Batt observes, there is an important distinction to be made here between those respondents who support the idea of EU membership in principle, those who support the EU for pragmatic reasons associated with the opportunities it offers for economic development, and support for the practical steps necessary to meet EU preconditionality criteria in practice. This discrepancy has been most pronounced in relation to cooperation with the ICTY. While this has been identified as a non-negotiable requirement for closer integration by the EU, only 44 per cent of those who supported EU membership also supported the extradition of key ICTY indictee Ratko Mladic´ to the Hague. 25 These fragmented societal attitudes towards European and Euroatlantic integration have been reflected at a political level in SerbiaMontenegro. This has had a number of implications for the utility and effectiveness of pre-conditionality in influencing the security sector reform process. Perhaps most significantly, because the political consensus on the desirability of integration has been weaker, the question of prospective EU and NATO accession has not attained quite the same dominant foreign policy position as it has elsewhere in the Western Balkans. As a consequence, the linkage between NATO and EU pre-conditionality, domestic foreign policy goals and security sector reform – so visible in Croatia from 2000 – has not been present at anything like the same degree in Serbia-Montenegro. 26 Specifically, it has not provided the same motivation for politicians to risk political capital in pushing through uncomfortable security sector reform policies in the name of a wider integrationist foreign policy agenda. The absence of a strong societal consensus on the desirability of integration has also made policy makers less willing to implement difficult preconditionality demands, such as cooperation with the ICTY, because to do so could potentially risk alienating large sections of the electorate and gifting support to more obstructionist political opponents. Even so, European integration has emerged as an increasingly important feature of Serbian and Montenegrin foreign policy since the beginning of 2002. The 2005 Defence White Paper for example places the goal of PfP – though significantly not NATO – membership at the heart of the defence reform effort from its opening preamble onwards. There are a number of reasons for this. At the very least, closer cooperation and formalised association with the main European institutions would represent a symbolic break with the past and provide important external validation of the increasing stability of the region. Closer involvement with EU and NATO outreach programmes would also open the door to more extensive fi nancial assistance to the reform process. In

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August 2005 for example, official US sources estimated that admission to PfP could unlock as much as $80 million of direct fi nancial assistance towards the ‘modernisation . . . reform and training of the Army’. 27 Similar fi nancial benefits are likely to accrue from successful progress in the SAA negotiations with the EU, particularly in relation to areas such as the development and modernisation of the new border police force. In addition, with the exception of BiH, all of Serbia-Montenegro’s neighbours are either full NATO members, have been formally invited to join the Alliance, or are members of PfP. This situation has reinforced Belgrade’s perceptions of geo-strategic isolation and placed further pressure on the government to engage more seriously with the preconditionality demands of NATO and the EU. Indeed, there has been a strong perception amongst many policy makers in Belgrade – reflected in the latest defence and security documentation – that association with NATO and the EU – even short of full membership – would link Serbia and Montenegro more closely into pan-European collective security frameworks, and in so doing contribute to the security and stability of the country as a whole. 28 As a consequence, and despite the obstacles discussed above, the increasing importance of the integrationist agenda has contributed to some of the most important reforms that the country has implemented since 2000. For example, pressure from Brussels for Serbia and Montenegro to remain united as a single international entity for the purposes of EU negotiations was perhaps the most important factor in the creation of the State Union in February 2003.29 The pre-conditionality demands of both NATO and the EU have also incorporated issues closely linked to security sector reform. For example, NATO has identified a number of clear, non-negotiable steps that the government in Belgrade must take if it is to join the PfP programme. These have included or continue to include: an end to the Army’s links with the VRS; conformity to all aspects of the Dayton accords; personnel change within the military to remove those figures most closely associated with the Miloševic´ regime or implicated in war crimes; the withdrawal of the governments’ law suit against NATO; compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo; and full cooperation with the ICTY. 30 These requirements have broadly mirrored the priorities of the EU as well: democratisation in the armed forces and police, effectiveness and efficiency in relation to border controls, and cooperation with the Hague. The government in Belgrade has taken steps in all of these areas since 2000. At the beginning of March 2002, they ended all official fi nancial aid to the VRS, while in December the federal parliament ratified the

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Dayton peace accords. 31 Moreover, a dawning realisation that Pavkovic´’s continuation as Chief of the General Staff would always be an insurmountable obstacle to PfP membership was a key contributory facto in Koštunica’s decision to instigate his removal between March and July 2002. It is no coincidence that Koštunica’s fi rst unsuccessful attempt to dismiss Pavkovic´ occurred during the 25 March meeting of the VSO when membership of the PfP was fi rst officially suggested. 32 Between 2003–5, the government made significant progress in almost all the reform areas prioritised by NATO and the EU, including increasing its cooperation with the ICTY. For example a number of important figures – including Pavkovic´ himself and police general Sreten Lukic´ were transferred to the Hague – leading chief Hague prosecutor Carla Del Ponte to state in September that year that she was ‘very pleased’ with the level of cooperation from Belgrade. 33 These steps were all justified explicitly in the context of NATO and EU pre-conditionality demands. 34 As a consequence, Belgrade was able to begin negotiations with the EU for an SAA in October 2005, while relations with NATO warmed considerably. However, the use of pre-conditionality to encourage security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro has not been without problems. Most obviously, at the time of writing and despite the clear improvement in relations discussed above, by mid 2006 the country was still not a member of PfP, primarily because of continuing disputes over the arrest and extradition of General Ratko Mladic´, discussed below. Indeed, in May that year, the EU actually suspended its SAA negotiations with Belgrade over the Mladic´ issue. 35 In addition, each of the preconditionality demands that the government has acted on has involved questions of great political sensitivity, particularly given the fragmented nature of societal views on the prospect of closer European integration and the steps necessary to achieve it. The fact that the government has moved on a number of these demands, but has received little in the way of formal recognition in return has been a cause of continuing frustration amongst policy makers in Belgrade. This has been felt particularly acute in relation to the issue PfP conditionality, which many believe has been applied unduly harshly to Serbia-Montenegro. 36 Pre-conditionality criteria are likely to continue to have an influence over the security sector reform process in Serbia-Montenegro. At the time of writing, Serbia and Montenegro remained closely engaged in the PfP process, while ongoing SAA negotiations will identify extensive reforms and changes that will be necessary to bring it closer to common EU standards in relation to democratisation, the rule of law and border control. As in Croatia, these processes will lock Serbia and Montenegro

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into a pre-conditionality framework for some time to come. Even so, for pre-conditionality to be effective it requires the realistic prospect of ‘reward’ in exchange for compliance from the recipient government. The danger is that policy makers in Belgrade – or indeed the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro themselves – may decide that the long promised benefits of integration are ultimately chimeric, and not worth the short term political costs of compliance.

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Direct conditionality Since 2000, security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro has been inextricably linked to the problem of war crimes and cooperation with the ICTY. This issue goes to the heart of the question of Serbian culpability for atrocities committed during the Yugoslav confl ict and in Kosovo, and the ability of the post-Miloševic´ state to acknowledge responsibility for these actions where appropriate. Coming to terms with this issue is thus central to the country’s attempts to move beyond the legacies of the Miloševic´ period, consolidate its process of democratisation and normalise relations with its neighbours. The war crimes legacy and the question of cooperation with the ICTY goes far beyond the confi nes of the security sector alone and is ultimately connected to wider processes of post-conflict transformation in politics and society as a whole, especially in Serbia. Even so, the shadow of the Hague Tribunal looms especially large in the security sector, and in the military particularly. Elements of both the Army and Serbian police were implicated in some of the worst atrocities of the 1990s, and a number of – now former, though previously often very senior – military and police personnel have been indicted and/or convicted of war crimes by the ICTY. This issue is of central importance to the security sector reform process, for three main reasons. First, because properly acknowledging and moving beyond the negative legacies of the past is of crucial importance to those elements of postconflict reform associated with professional responsibility. 37 Second, because sections of the Army have been accused of sheltering war crimes suspects, with or without the knowledge of the civilian authorities and properly addressing this issue would help to consolidate democratic and civilian control over the armed forces. 38 Finally, because cooperation with the ICTY is a prerequisite for PfP membership, as well as the development of closer relations with the EU, with all the potential benefits for security sector reform discussed above. Even so, since 2000 the issue of Hague cooperation has been a persistent and consistent sticking point in Serbia-Montenegro’s relations

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with the international community. Whatever the attractions of potential membership of PfP and other Western institutions, and whatever progress has been made in relation to the pre-conditionality demands identified above, Belgrade’s relations with the ICTY have generally been characterised by mutual suspicion and at times open hostility. This has particularly been the case with regard to disputes over the arrest and transfer of former VRS Chief of General Staff and key Hague indictee General Ratko Mladic´. 39 As a consequence, and as in Croatia, cooperation with the ICTY has been the one issue connected to security sector reform that has proven problematic enough for international actors to resort to the use of direct conditionality. Direct conditionality has had a number of apparent successes in forcing Belgrade to comply with ICTY demands since 2000. It was fi rst used to put pressure on the FRJ authorities to arrest Miloševic´ in 2001 and then to subsequently transfer him to the Hague. This took place after both the US and EU had made the delivery of a substantial aid package – amounting to $1.28 billion in grants and loans – conditional on his extradition to the Hague.40 The US government again took action in March the following year on the grounds that the government in Belgrade was stalling in fulfilling its obligations to the Hague, suspending all fi nancial aid to FRJ. Shortly afterwards the federal parliament passed a new law on cooperation with the ICTY and publicly called on 23 indicted war crimes suspects to turn themselves in by a set date. Five indictees – including former Army Chief of General Staff Dragoljub Ojdanic´ – did so within the deadline and government issued arrest warrants for the remaining 18. As a consequence of these moves, the US released $40 million in aid to the FRJ on 21 May 2002.41 Serbia-Montenegro has also been subject to several further rounds of direct conditionality in order to try and force compliance with the Hague. In January 2003 the US called for the government in Belgrade to arrest Mladic´ and other indicted war crimes suspects by 31 March 2003 or face a cessation of US aid (though the deadline was later extended to 15 June 2003 in the wake of the Ðin
ic´ assassination). This deadline sparked a more robust approach to war crimes suspects in Serbia-Montenegro, culminating in the arrest of Hague indictee and former Army officer Veselin Šljivancˇanin on 12 June 2003.42 In Autumn 2004 another round of US threats led to the arrest and extradition of Ljubiša Beara – a former VRS officer implicated in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995 – and rumours of an attempt by Serbian anti-terrorist police to arrest Mladic´ himself.43 However, in a familiar pattern, cooperation tailed off soon afterwards and in early 2005 both the EU and the US redoubled their efforts

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on the issue. In January that year the US froze fi nancial aid to the country while the EU imposed a deadline of the end of March for the government in Belgrade to complete all of its obligations to the ICTY or risk a negative outcome in its Feasibility Study for accession.44 Again, these actions appear to have hit home in Belgrade, leading to 14 ‘voluntary’ surrenders of war crimes suspects by the end of March, and to the extradition of General Pavkovic´ to the Hague on 25 April 2005. In April Serbia and Montenegro received a positive Feasibility Study from the EU and in June the US resumed aid to Serbia.45 Even so, Mladic´ remained at large throughout 2005 and the government again came under renewed international pressure later that year.46 This time it was the EU which led the way, threatening to suspend negotiations on the SAA unless Mladic´ was delivered to the Hague. In response the Belgrade authorities entered another feverish round of activity. A number of alleged Mladic´ helpers were identified and arrested, partial details of the Army’s role in protecting him until mid2002 were made public and the government agreed to open its archives to greater scrutiny from the Hague.47 In the event however, Mladic´ was not apprehended and the EU suspended its negotiations with Belgrade May 2006. The manner in which direct conditionality has been applied to SerbiaMontenegro since 2000 aptly demonstrates both the strengths and limitations of the strategy. Direct conditionality has been visibly effective in pushing the Belgrade authorities to take explicitly mandated steps, such as the arrest of specific ICTY indictees. However, it has manifestly failed to force a consistent habit of cooperation. Despite instances of forced compliance the wider pattern of relations between Serbia-Montenegro and the ICTY since 2000 has been characterised by obfuscation, backsliding and creative non-compliance by the government in Belgrade. There are three main reasons for the failure of direct conditionality to encourage lasting change. First, international donors have not always united in their application of direct conditionality. The EU in particular has accused of being ‘soft’ on the issue and so undermining more robust US efforts in this area.48 For example, in March 2004, the US froze a $100 million aid package to Serbia-Montenegro because of the government’s non-compliance with the ICTY. In stark contrast, the EU actually released ^279 million of new CARDS funding that same month. This ambiguity was a reflection of the different foreign policy strategies of the various international actors involved, with the EU being generally more sceptical about the utility of direct conditionality to promote political change than the US. Even so, it had the effect of sending mixed

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messages to Belgrade and providing ‘get out clauses’ for some of the more recalcitrant elements there.49 This problem was compounded by a lack of clear agreement within both NATO and the EU on how robustly to apply conditionality criteria. Second, direct conditionality is a relatively crude tool. It aims to force compliance through the application of punitive measures against the target state’s government. However, this assumes the existence of a unified civilian authority with the uncontested ability to implement conditionality demands. In fact, as Chapters 4 and 6 demonstrated, since 2000 the government of Serbia-Montenegro has often been weak and deeply fragmented. The assassination of Prime Minister Ðin
ic´ in March 2003 illustrated the potential perils of moving against powerful and unscrupulous security sector actors in an environment of only weak or partial civilian control. While civilian control over the security sector has undoubtedly been consolidated since Ðin
ic´’s murder, at the time of writing its unconditional implementation in Serbia-Montenegro remains problematic, particularly given the still fragmented organisational nature of the security sector itself. So for example, while the Army General Staff may be under clear civilian control, questions remain over the extent to which they are able to exercise complete internal control over the armed forces as a whole. This is particularly the case with regard to those informal power structures within the military – specifically influential cadres of (often retired) anti-Hague officers and rogue elements within the intelligence agencies – that have most often been accused of aiding and abetting ICTY fugitives. 50 More widely, individual politicians in each of the Serbia-Montenegro’s post-Miloševic´ governments have generally been dependent on fractious alliances and coalitions for their own political authority and survival. This has made it difficult for the government to act in a decisive and uncontested manner in relation to contentious conditionality demands. In April 2005 for example, the arrest of police general Lukic´ led to a vote of no confidence in the minority Koštunica government. 51 The government survived on this occasion. However the incident clearly demonstrated the fragility of executive authority in Belgrade and its potential vulnerability to political attacks by the anti-Hague lobby. A fi nal and related problem with direct conditionality is that it can only ever be realistically targeted at specific policy demands. For it to work it requires a measurable, deliverable outcome. However, as previous chapters have argued, long term security sector reform is likely to be dependent on wider changes in politics and society as a whole, as well as within the security sector itself. This is particularly the case with regard to the war legacy. There has not yet been any broad public

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or political recognition of the responsibility that the Serbs and Serbia may hold for the war itself – and certainly not for many of the atrocities perpetrated during its course. As a consequence, perceptions of the war remain coloured by the nationalism of the 1990s. The ICTY remains deeply unpopular, and there is a widespread perception that the whole process is discriminatory and anti-Serb. 52 This societal context underlies the current political fragmentation in Serbia particularly, and makes it even more difficult to push through reform in these sensitive areas. For this situation to change, there will need to be a much longer-term attitudinal shift at all levels of Serbian society. By their very nature, these changes will be long term and difficult to measure, and they are unlikely to be imposed from outside through the use of direct conditionality.

Conclusion International factors have been of central importance to the security sector reform process in Serbia-Montenegro since 2000. After a slow start, security assistance programmes to the country have had some important successes. This has particularly been the case with regard to police reform. Here external assistance from actors such as the OSCE has helped to shape the agenda of the reform process and – through direct technical and fi nancial assistance programmes in areas such as training and education – has had a very real impact on the modernisation and development of the police. Security assistance programmes to the defence sector have developed more slowly. However, even here the normative and technical parameters of the emergent reform process have increasingly reflected the wider norms of pan-European defence transformation. Pre-conditionality too has played a role in this respect, though Serbia-Montenegro’s more troubled and distant relationship with organisations such as NATO and the EU has meant that its impact has been necessarily more limited than elsewhere in the region. Finally, direct conditionality has played a demonstrable role in encouraging policy makers in Belgrade to take explicitly mandated steps such as the extradition of war crimes indictees to the Hague. Even so, the influence of international factors on security sector reform in Serbia-Montenegro has also had clear limitations. While security assistance programmes and pre-conditionality criteria may have helped to establish the broad parameters of the reform process they have not been able to dictate them. In all cases the underlying dynamic of reform has been shaped by domestic factors. Even where security assistance programmes have been most extensive – in the

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Serbian police for example – they have struggled to influence the structural and attitudinal factors that have formed the most persistent obstacles to reform. Similarly, the impact of pre-conditionality criteria on the reform process has been constrained by the lack of a clear political and societal consensus on the desirability of the incentives on offer – or at least on the pre-conditionality steps necessary to achieve them. Finally, the impact of direct conditionality has been limited to specific pressure points identified and prioritised by the international community. It has been far less effective in influencing the nature and direction of the transformation process as a whole.

Notes 1 The case was eventually thrown out in December 2004 after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that FRJ was not a member of the United Nations in 1999 and so lay outside of the Court’s jurisdiction. 2 DCAF is an international foundation established and funded by the Swiss government rather than a ‘non-governmental’ organisation per se. 3 For more information see the following websites: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, www.dcaf.ch; Danish Centre for Human Rights, www.humanrights.dk; Club of Madrid, www.clubmadrid. org; Saferworld, www.saferworld.org.uk; Bonn International Centre for Conversion, www.bicc.de; CESS at Groningen, http://odur.let.rug.nl/cess/. 4 FRJ itself joined the UN on 1 November 2000 and the OSCE on 10 November 2000. 5 I am grateful to Witek Nowoseilski for this point. 6 OSCE, ‘Assisting Police Reform in FRY: Ensuring a Coordinated Approach’, Report produced for Vienna Conference on Policing, 9–10 October 2002, available at www.osce.org/sam. See also, Richard Monk, Study on policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Belgrade: OSCE Mission to the FRY, 2001); John Slater, Report on the human rights, ethics and standards of the police in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, (Belgrade: OSCE Mission to the FRY, 2001). 7 Mark Downes, Police Reform in Serbia: Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police Service (Belgrade: OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro, 2004), pp. 73–6. 8 Author’s interview with Milan Sturgis, South Serbia Elections Project Coordinator, OSCE Mission to FRJ, 20 June 2002; Downes, Police Reform, pp. 70–2. 9 The Monk and Slater reports mentioned above are widely recognised to have established the broad parameters for subsequent police reform in Serbia for example. 10 UNDP, Fact Finding Mission for Military Conversion as an Element of Security Sector Reform: Final Report (Belgrade: UNDP, April 2002).

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11 ‘Cards Annual Programme for Serbia 2002, 2003, 2004’; ‘Cards Annual Programme for Montenegro, 2002, 2003, 2004’ European Union Website, http://europa.eu.int/comm /enlargement/cards/publications_en.htm. NB. Money aimed at integrated border management was regionally targeted. Funding to Montenegro included more general good governance and institutional building activities. 12 The UK was succeeded in this role by Norway in September 2004. 13 ‘Yugoslav- and NATO Officials Meet in Secret’, RFE/RL Newsline, 14 May 2002. 14 ‘International cooperation department’, Website of the SCG Ministry of Defence, www.mod.gov.yu. 15 UK funding for resettlement and training in Serbia and Montenegro amounted to ^450,000 per year. The Netherlands provided funding amounting to ^700,000 in support of a new training facility in Niš. Tobias Pietz, ‘Demobilizing and retraining for the future: the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro’, Bonn International Center for Conversion Brief 31 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, July 2005), p. 28. 16 ‘NATO agreement ratified’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 4 November 2005. 17 Miroslav Hadžic´, ‘Security sector reform in Serbia and Montenegro: a recipient’s perspective’, Paper presented to the Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 30 November 2005. Hadžic´ cites an example in which his NGO, the Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR), lost out to an international competitor in a funding bid to run a workshop on civil-military relations. In practice the winning bidder was ill-equipped to run the project and later attempted to sub-contract the work to CCMR itself. 18 Witek Nowsielski, ‘Security sector reform in Serbia and Montenegro: a donor’s perspective’, Paper presented to the Department of Politics, University of Bristol, 30 November 2005. 19 Author’s interviews’, Belgrade, June 2004. 20 Author’s interview with Graham Hollands, UNDP Special Advisor to the Ministry of Defence of SCG, 22 June 2004. 21 ‘Yugoslavia seeks membership of Partnership for Peace’, RFE/RL Newsline, 26 April 2002. 22 Milorad Timotic´, ‘Security threats’, in CCMR, The Serbian and Montenegrin Public on Reform of the Army, Round 1 (May–July 2003), pp. 26–7, www.ccmr-bg.org. 23 Milorad Timotic´, ‘Citizens’ expectations of military reform’, CCMR, The Serbian and Montenegrin Public on Reform of the Army, Round 7 (April 2005), www.ccmr-bg.org. 24 Srbobran Brankovic, ‘EU na srpskom politickom jelovniku’, Evropsk Forum 1, 2005, p. 1, cited in Judy Batt, The Question of Serbia, Challiot Paper No. 81 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, August 2005), p. 66.

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25 Batt goes on to cite Srbobran Brankovic´ in identifying four broad approaches to the EU in Serbia. These comprise of Euro-enthusiasts (22 per cent); Euro-realists (35 per cent); Euro-sceptics (29 per cent) and Europhobes (13 per cent). Batt, The Question of Serbia, pp. 66–7. 26 Though at the time of writing, the newly independent Montenegrin state looked set to pursue an extremely pro-integrationist foreign policy strategy. 27 ‘US seeks military bases in Serbia’, B92 News Archive (B92), 12 August 2005. 28 This argument is made strongly in the 2005 Defence White Paper. White Paper on Defence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, (Belgrade: Ministry of Defence of SCG, April 2005), pp. 10–12. 29 This led some wags to christen the new state ‘Solania’ after Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief who strongarmed Belgrade and Podgorica into the agreement. ‘Solana “satisfied” with the adoption of charter’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 05 February 2003. 30 Author’s interviews, Belgrade, June 2002. 31 ‘Yugoslav Army to cut off military aid to Bosnian Serb Army’, RFE/RL Newsline, 8 February 2002; ‘Yugoslavia approves the Dayton Agreement’, RFE/RL Newsline, 18 December 2002. 32 ‘Yugoslav Army chief’s fate to be determined’; ‘. . . And Yugoslavia’s leaders suggest joining Partnership for Peace’, RFE/RL Newsline, 26 March 2002. 33 ‘Hague prosecutor praises Serbia’, RFE/RL Newsline, 30 September 2005. 34 See for example, ‘Ljajic: we are all hostages’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 3 January 2005. 35 ‘EU suspends talks with Serbia and Montenegro’, RFE/RL Newsline, 4 May 2006. 36 Long standing PfP members include the staunchly authoritarian states of Belarus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Croatia too was given an invitation to join the programme as early as May 2000, despite its own outstanding disagreements with the ICTY. 37 Discussed in Chapter 6. 38 Discussed in Chapter 4. 39 ‘No Hague, no Partnership for Peace’, B92 News Archive (Beta), 4 February 2005; ‘EU talks may be halted’, B92 News Archive (EUPolitix.com), 19 January 2006. 40 ‘Wednesday deadline to secure US attendance’, B92 News Archive (B92), 25 June 2001. 41 ‘Yugoslav parliament passes controversial Hague law’, RFE/RL Newsline, 12 April 2002; ‘Belgrade gives war criminals deadline’, ibid. 18 April 2002; ‘Yugoslav court issues arrest warrant for war criminals’, ibid. 9 May 2002; ‘US lifts aid freeze on Yugoslavia’, ibid. 22 May 2002. 42 ‘US calls for strict cooperation with the war crimes tribunal’, ibid. 3 January 2003; ‘Serbian police arrest war crimes suspect amid violent clashes’, ibid. 12 June 2003.

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43 Sasha Grubanovic, ‘Serbia: Hague honeymoon?’, Transitions online, 7 October 2004, www.tol.cz. 44 ‘When are sanctions not sanctions?’, B92 News Archive (B92), 20 January 2005; ‘Brussels confi rms March deadline’, ibid. 20 January 2005. 45 ‘Imposing conditions “brings results”, B92 News Archive (B92), 10 March 2005; ‘Pavkovic´ extradicted’, ibid. 25 April 2005; ‘Positive feasibility study received’, ibid. 12 April 2005; ‘US resumes aid to Serbia’, RFE/RL Newsline, 8 June 2005. 46 This was particularly the case after the successful capture of Croatian fugitive Ante Gotovina in December 2005. Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus noted in February 2006 that: ‘After Gotovina’s arrest, everything short of the same in the case of Ratko Mladic´ is not enough for the EU. Since we are juxtaposed to Croatia in that respect, everything that falls short of what Croatia has accomplished is not enough’. ‘Serbian deputy prime minister says negotiations with EU must be salvaged’, ibid. 7 February 2006. 47 Igor Jovanovic, ‘ICTY: getting serious’, Transitions Online, 6 February 2006; ‘Serbia to open archives for ICTY scrutiny’, RFE/RL Newsline, 27 January 2006. 48 Author’s interview with James Lyon, Director, Serbia Project, International Crisis Group, 18 June 2002; International Crisis Group, ‘Belgrade’s lagging reform: cause for international concern’, ICG Balkans Report No. 126 (Belgrade and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 7 March 2002), pp. 4–9. 49 ‘Dinkic unconcerned over US funds freeze’, ibid. 1 April 2004. 50 Jovanovic, ‘ICTY; ‘New threats, same demands by Tribunal’, B92 News Archive (B92), 7 February 2006. 51 ‘Radicals propose no confidence vote’, B92 News Archive (B92), 7 April 2005. 52 Watkins, ‘PfP Integration’, p. 13.

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Part V

Conclusion

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Conclusion: security sector reform in comparative context

This book has used the examples of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro to examine the theory and practice of security sector reform in transforming societies, and its wider relationship with normative international policy. The experiences of these two states demonstrate both the utility and relevance of the security sector reform concept as well as some of the major problems and limitations inherent in its utilisation. In 2000, and despite some important differences in scale and context, both Croatia and FRJ faced a series of common security sector reform challenges. These fell into two related categories. First, a number of specific ‘legacy’ reforms that were necessary to address the most negative aspects of the conflict and authoritarian periods. At the political level these were dominated by the need to establish and consolidate civilian control over armed forces, police and intelligence agencies that had been deeply politicised under the old regimes. At the organisational level they related to the need to tackle the direct impacts of confl ict and especially the continued primacy of war time roles, budgets and force structures, as well as the persistent legacy of war crimes. The security sectors of both states were also faced with the related challenge of rehabilitation at the international level, including particularly the need to cooperate fully with ICTY in the Hague. Second, both states faced a series of longer term challenges relating to the wider transformation of their security sectors. At the political level, these were mainly concerned with efforts to democratise the nature of security sector governance. At the organisational level they related to the need to further reform the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies to make them more effective and efficient in their new peacetime roles. At the international level they were dominated by the prospect of closer integration with the EU and NATO, and the emergent need to meet the pre-conditionality criteria of these organisations.

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The specificities of reform

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The security sector reform experiences of Croatia and SerbiaMontenegro between 2000–6 were in many respects quite different, and demonstrate the importance of recognising national and historic specificities in comparative analysis. At the political level, Croatia made substantial progress in democratising its civil-security sector relations. In Serbia-Montenegro the process was more problematic and at the time of writing many pressing issues of political level security sector reform were still in progress or yet to be fully consolidated. At the organisational level, Croatia was able to elucidate a clear vision for the future transformation of its security sector early on and by 2006 had implemented – or was in the process of implementing – a number of important reforms. Serbia-Montenegro was much slower to develop an uncontested vision for the organisational development of its security sector. Even by 2006 this had only emerged in the broadest of terms. As a consequence, only modest steps were taken to actually implement security sector reform at the organisational level. Where these did occur they tended to be the result of a passive response to changing circumstances rather than a proactive programme of reform. Similarly, at the international level Croatia developed a clear and largely uncontested1 view of its foreign policy priorities early on. These included an explicit commitment to closer European integration with a view to eventual EU and NATO membership. In Serbia-Montenegro the issue of European integration – and particularly relations with NATO – was far more contested. The leverage that international actors were able to exert over its security sector reforms was thus more limited, and occasionally more coercive in nature. There were four main reasons for this divergence. First, in contrast to Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia began the post-confl ict transformation of its security sector in the mid-1990s. While this progressed only slowly until 2000 it did establish the broad parameters for future reform and had an important practical impact in the police particularly. Indeed, by 2000 the transformation of the Croatian police was already well underway. There was a general acceptance of the need to move from a conflict-era, militarised police force to a public policing model and important organisational reforms had taken place. Experiences were different in the armed forces and intelligence agencies, both of which were characterised by organisational stagnation and increasing partification during this period. Even so, by the time of the democratic changes of 2000, some of the initial groundwork for security sector reform in Croatia had already been done. This was demonstrated by

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the relative swiftness with which new defence and security legislation was introduced. The new Law on the Police was passed in 2000, reflecting the progress that had already been made in that sector, while by the end of 2002 a whole raft of important further legislation had been fi nalised. Serious problems and delays remained in all these areas. However, the contrast with Serbia-Montenegro in the same period – where very little substantive legislation was introduced until 2004 at least – is marked. Second, the Croatian security sector was largely created from scratch in the early 1990s. This brought with it a number of problems. It meant that during the early years of the war, the army, police and intelligence agencies were ill-equipped and inadequately trained. These are legacy issues that have continued to impact on the development and reform of the security sector in Croatia. However, these circumstances also offered one important advantage as well. Specifically they minimised the extent and depth of socialist-era influence in the security sector as a whole. While this did not exactly provide a ‘clean slate’ for reform – the police and intelligence agencies particularly inherited some of the more objectionable habits of their socialist predecessors while the Tu
man-era bequeathed its own set of negative institutional legacies – it did provide an important break with the past and lessened the potential for ideologically-based security sector obstructionism. In contrast, Serbia-Montenegro inherited its armed forces, police and intelligence agencies almost unchanged from the SFRJ. This meant that it did not suffer from the same kind of organisational weaknesses in its security sector as the Croatians during the war. However it also bequeathed a series of serious obstacles to security sector reform. These included a history of institutional exclusivity, outdated thinking and ideological conservatism in the Army particularly, together with a wider reticence towards organisational reform in the security sector as a whole. These factors encouraged passive – and sometimes active – resistance on the part of the security sector itself and contributed significantly to delay and inertia in Serbia-Montenegro’s organisational level security sector reforms. A third difference between the two countries’ security sector reform experiences between 2000–6 related to the wider political and societal context in which they took place. While the war years of the 1990s were deeply traumatic for the Croatian state, economy and society, they were not entirely negative in their impact. Croatia ultimately won its nationalist war for independence. By the end of 1995 it was a fully independent state with full control over almost all of its claimed sovereign territory. This created a stable and internally legitimate political

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community within which reform could take place in the form of the Croatian state itself. 2 This in turn provided a stable framework against which the reforms themselves could be predicated. The situation was different in Serbia-Montenegro. While the fall of Miloševic´ in October 2000 removed one of the most negative and destabilising influences in the Western Balkan region, it did not fi nalise the underlying process of the Yugoslav dissolution. Even leaving aside the vexed question of Kosovo, the FRJ itself was fatally undermined by disputes between Serbia and Montenegro over the future of the federation. Its successor from 2003 – the State Union – was equally flawed. Continued disagreements between its two component state entities meant that the Union level of government was constitutionally ambiguous and barely functioned in practice. Montenegro’s constitutional right to hold an independence referendum in 2006 also lent a suggestion of impermanence to the Union arrangement as a whole, confi rmed when the Montenegro voted for full independence in May that year. This constitutional ambiguity had a limited impact on the Serbian and Montenegrin police and domestic intelligence agencies, whose chain of command was located at a republic rather than a Union level. However, it deeply affected the military. In particular, the question of military reform was inextricably linked to the future of the Union itself. This meant that military reform issues were quickly conflated with constitutional reform issues and hence easily politicised. It also meant that throughout 2000–6 there was no clear and predictable political community within which to premise the military reform process as a whole. Finally, in Croatia the internal consensus on the legitimacy of the state itself was to a large extent mirrored by a broad political consensus on the nature and direction of the reform process itself. This was not immediately obvious in 2000. The aftermath of the HDZ’s electoral defeat was marked by concerns over the steps that the most radical nationalists – including those within the military and intelligence agencies – might be prepared to take to frustrate or constrain the reform process. The Racˇan coalition(s) which succeeded the HDZ were weak, politically fragmented and vulnerable to the populist obstructionism of the nationalist opposition, while political and constitutional tensions between the government and presidency were severe and dehabilitating. Finally, while being broadly supportive of the idea of European integration significant elements of Croatian society remained cautious in their approach to the West, and to NATO in particular. Even so, the broad parameters of Croatia’s post-Tu
man reform agenda remained consistent from 2000 and no major political actor in Croatian society seriously questioned the wisdom of either

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democratisation or Europeanisation. After coming to power in November 2003, the formerly antagonistic HDZ party was at least as vigorous as its predecessor in its pursuit of political reform and European integration. This underlying consensus on the future development of the Croatian state as a whole was reflected in a general consensus regarding the overall direction of security sector reform, though the details of its implementation were often contested. For the armed forces this meant the development of a smaller, more flexible and more professionalised force structure that would be interoperable with potential NATO partners and under clear democratic control. For the police it meant a shift from the state orientated practices of the past to more democratic public policing models. In Serbia-Montenegro, the domestic political scene was also characterised by political and societal fragmentation between 2000–6. However, this differed from the Croatian experience in both its depth and severity. In particular, the legacy of the past proved far more divisive. By most interpretations the 1990s were an extremely negative period for the FRJ and for Serbia. Its military forces were defeated on the battlefield and implicated in war crimes; its political elite were corrupted and criminalised; economic decline saw the living standards of the general population plummet; and the FRJ itself was almost completely isolated internationally. Croatia shared many of these characteristics for much of the 1990s. However it was also united by a common nationalist legitimacy born of its successful struggle for independence. This legacy was never seriously questioned or contested by either the Croatian political elite or society more widely. It thus provided an underlying foundation of common values on which to base the future political development of the Croatian state. There was no such agreement on how to interpret and respond to the negative legacies of the 1990s in Serbia-Montenegro. The manner and aftermath of the political changes in October 2000 did not help matters. Miloševic´ himself was deposed at this time and his political cronies were sidelined from government. Even so, the consolidation of the DOS victory was as much the result of a negotiated transfer of power as a revolutionary transformation in the nature of FRJ politics. Key elements and figures from the old regime were left in place and political change was not accompanied by any real exposition or recognition of the crimes and misdemeanours of the previous decade. As a consequence, while a broad commitment to democratic reform lay at the heart of each of Serbia-Montenegro’s post-Miloševic´ governments, this was tempered by the continued influence of radical nationalist groups and ideologies in the domestic political system.

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The fractures and divisions in Serbian politics particularly have thus been much more serious than in Croatia, leading to inertia and disagreement in security sector reform. The absence of consensus on the legacies of the past has made it difficult to fashion coherent reform policies for the future. Sensitive issues such as cooperation with the ICTY have been politically divisive and unpopular in society at large. Moreover, the continued influence of radical nationalist groups has meant that even basic questions over the nature and extent of democratisation, or the desirability of closer integration with the EU (let alone NATO), have been the subject of heated and ongoing political dispute. No one party has ever been strong enough to govern without the support of a – generally eclectic and often antagonistic – coalition. This in turn has constrained the ability of policy makers to implement determinedly reformist policies in both the security sector and elsewhere. Even so, and despite these very real differences, the security sector reform experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro between 2000–6 were also characterised by some important similarities. While some of these are specific to the Western Balkan or at least European context, many also have a wider generic relevance for the concept of security sector reform more broadly applied.

The political level In both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro the principle – if not always the practice – of civilian control over the security sector was established early on. In both cases, this built on the earlier traditions of civilian control established during the authoritarian period(s). In the Croatian case these arrangements were quickly consolidated and shown to be demonstrably effective when president Mesic´ dismissed those serving generals who had publicly questioned the government’s cooperation with the ICTY. While hardliners in the police and intelligence agencies undoubtedly provided assistance to fugitive war crimes indictees in defiance of official government policy throughout 2000–6, these actions were conducted by relatively isolated rogue elements as a whole and were not reflective of a more systemic disobedience to civilian authority within the security sector as a whole. 3 At no point did they seriously threaten the underlying principle of civilian control over the security sector in Croatia. In FRJ the consolidation of civilian control was a longer and more difficult process. All elements of the FRJ security sector publicly recognised the authority of the new DOS government in October 2000. However, the negotiated nature of the post-Miloševic´ transfer of power

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meant that this apparently willing subordination was in some respects conditional. It was as much a result of personal (and while they lasted mutually beneficial) alliances and agreements between key civilian and security sector actors as any unqualified recognition of the principle of civilian ‘control’ per se. As a result, while the new government was generally able to exercise its authority in the security sector, it had tread carefully when doing so. The limits of its control were demonstrated tragically in March 2003 when elements of the Special Operations Unit (JSO) assassinated Prime Minister Ðin
ic´. Even so, the period between 2000–3 was generally characterised by the steady consolidation of civilian authority in Serbia-Montenegro’s civil-security sector relationships. In particular, the government’s decisive actions after the Ðin
ic´ murder demonstrated the extent to which civilian control in the security sector was becoming a reality. As in Croatia, elements of the security sector – and the Army particularly – continued to provide illicit assistance to fugitive war criminals throughout 2000–6. However, after official Army support for Mladic´ was withdrawn in Spring 2002 this became an issue of increasingly isolated resistance from specific groups of hardliners, rather than systemic disobedience on the part of the military as a whole. Certainly, from mid2003 onwards the underlying principle of civilian control over the Serbia-Montenegro security sector was not seriously in doubt. There were also a number of common themes in the democratisation of civil-security sector relations in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, though for reasons that have already been discussed, the former generally had more success in this area than the latter. In Croatia, the basic mechanisms for democratic governance in the security sector were established by mid-2002. New defence and security legislation was introduced which established the powers and responsibilities of various actors in the chain of command, parliament was charged with providing oversight of defence and security policy and civil society was increasingly engaged in the reform process. The implementation of these ‘fi rst generation’ reforms was not entirely straightforward. Divisions and rivalries between the government and presidency, and between different political parties, led to confusion and duplication in the chain of command, and to delay in the reform process more widely. Nevertheless, by mid-2002 the institutional foundations for the democratic governance of the security sector in Croatia were established. In Serbia-Montenegro, this process was much more problematic. In particular, uncertainties over the future of the state itself together with bitter political divisions in the civilian sector led to delays in the development and introduction of important new defence and security

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legislation. Even so, the institutional foundations for the democratic governance of the security sector were also largely in place by mid2002. These included a clearly defined and civilian dominated – though in practice rather ambiguous – chain of command and the establishment of a key role for parliament in the civil-security sector relationship. Despite this progress in establishing an underlying framework for democratic civil-security sector relations, both Croatia and SerbiaMontenegro found it more difficult to consolidate these reforms in practice, for three main reasons. First, habits of partification and clientalism within the defence and security systems of both countries proved remarkably resilient. In each case – though particularly in Serbia-Montenegro – the fragmented nature of the domestic political scene encouraged civilian politicians to seek allies in the security sector and vice versa. This led to high levels of politically-driven personnel turnover in the defence and security bureaucracies as well as in the security sector itself. On occasion – as with the 2004 Podbevšek affair in Croatia or the Perišic´ spying row of 2002 in FRJ – it also resulted in direct security sector involvement in domestic political disputes. Second, capacity problems hampered the effective implementation of democratic procedures for policy planning and implementation in the defence and security sphere. In both countries, the appropriate human, fi nancial and infrastructural resources to support the democratic governance of the security sector were either nonexistent or insufficiently developed. Croatia particularly made some progress in addressing these deficits through 2000–6. Even so, they remain an important impediment to the consolidation of democratic reforms in both states. A third and related theme has been the continued dominance of the executive branch in civil-security sector relations. The parliaments in both countries struggled to assert their authority in defence and security matters, while – with a few exceptions – civilsociety actors have remained similarly marginalised. In addition to these specific observations, the experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro since 2000 suggest a number of wider conclusions that have a generic relevance for the security sector reform concept as a whole. First, security sector reform at the political level is a dependent rather than an independent factor in any process of post-conflict and/or postauthoritarian change. To be viable it requires a window of opportunity in the form of a wider process of societal transformation. This was clearly demonstrated by the limited progress that Croatia made in its political level security sector reforms between 1995–2000, despite significant ‘democracy assistance’ from international actors such as MPRI

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and the US, and a declared foreign policy goal of closer integration with NATO. Second, the legitimacy and coherence of the wider political community matters in security sector reform. A consolidated political community provides a clear framework against which to premise the normative objectives of security sector reform. If the political community is weak or contested then these fault lines are likely to be reflected in the reform process itself, with a consequently negative impact on its viability and effectiveness. Third, the basic challenge of civilian control over the security sector is a potentially defi nitive factor during the early stages of political transformation. At this time, the traditional view of the military (and/or police and intelligence agencies) as a potentially praetorian or proactively partisan actor in domestic politics is likely to be valid. While civilian control is weak or ambiguous, security sector actors can pose a genuine and very real threat to change, as demonstrated by the JSO’s actions in Serbia-Montenegro in March 2003. In both countries, securing civilian control over the security sector – whether through clear institutional subordination in the chain of command or conditional negotiation with a view to institutional subordination in the future – was an early priority for the post-authoritarian governments. The need to establish civilian control over the security sector at an early stage in the transformation process is only indirectly related to any wider goals of democratisation. In the early days of the process it is much more about the consolidation of the power and authority of the new political order. Fourth, once civilian control has been established and consolidated, the role of the security sector – and of security sector reform – in any process of transformation reduces in significance. In Croatia and SerbiaMontenegro the political importance attached to security sector reform issues declined noticeably once the basic principle of civilian control had been confi rmed. In both cases, other challenges of transformation – such as economic reform for example – quickly emerged as more pressing issues on the domestic political agenda instead. At this stage, reform in security sector becomes increasingly relational to wider processes of change in politics and society as a whole rather than a decisive factor in and of itself. Any major problems of civil-security sector relations that do occur are also likely to be increasingly civilian rather than security sector driven, if only because the principle of consolidated civilian control inevitably leads to civilian dominance in day to day practice of this relationship. There will always be specific challenges of transformation that relate to the security sector – or its component organisations –

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alone. In addition, external policies such as pre-conditionality can raise the political profile of security sector reform again. In general however, once a certain threshold of control has been reached, the further transformation of civil-security sector relations will tend to reflect and be dependent on similar processes of political change in (civilian) society more widely. Fifth, some aspects of security sector reform are more amenable to ‘top down’, centrally driven reform initiatives than others. While it was not always an easy process, the new governments of both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro were both able to implement some of their most important security sector reforms relatively swiftly once an elite political consensus on the need to do so had been reached. This was particularly the case in relation to the establishment of an institutional and legislative framework for democratic civil-security sector relations, and to some extent the practical implementation of this framework in practice. Other areas of security sector reform are likely to be much more drawn out in nature, requiring long term institutional capacity building in areas such as expertise or value change amongst security sector personnel. These changes are difficult to force from above, no matter how committed and united political elites may be with regard to the goals of the reform process. In some cases – as with value change for example – real reform may only be realistic on a generational timescale, as resistant personnel are gradually replaced by fresh cadres who have been educated and trained under the new socio-political circumstances. Even then, it is likely to be dependent on and relational to the continued success (or not) of democratic consolidation in politics and society more widely. A fi nal point is that organisational fragmentation and the proliferation of special units in the security sector can lead to blind spots in an otherwise consolidated system of civilian control. The multiple intelligence agencies and special units in both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro proved particularly resistant to change for example. The internally focused and often politically driven nature of their work made them especially useful (and indeed potentially threatening) to the authoritarian regimes of both states. As a consequence, they were generally the most heavily politicised and hard-line elements of the entire security sector, and hence more suspicious of reform than their counterparts elsewhere. It was often precisely these units that were charged with the most controversial and notorious tasks of the authoritarian and/or conflict periods – including ‘ethnic cleansing’ and the development of links with organised crime – and so most threatened by any process of reform or retrospective accountability. Some of them were also trained

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for tasks such as assassination or had access to a wider range of sensitive information that could potentially be used for the purposes of blackmail. On occasion this meant that reformers were reluctant to push through change for fear of a hostile backlash. The elite nature of these groups also meant that they tended to develop strong and exclusivist institutional cultures and traditions, which again could make them especially resistant to externally driven reform initiatives. Finally, many of these organisations fell outside normal chains of command in both the military and the police, leading to important gaps of internal control within the security sector itself. These factors have a generic relevance beyond the specific experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. They suggest that ‘rogue’ behaviour in the security sector during transformation will be most likely amongst particular kinds of elite, exclusivist or special units, and that the proliferation of these units in their existing form may threaten the process of reform. As a consequence, the internal consolidation of command authority within the security sector itself, including a rationalisation in the number of different organisational centres of power, will most likely be a key requirement for the successful confi rmation of civilian control over the security sector as a whole.

The organisational level Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro also shared a number of commonalities in their experiences of security sector reform at the organisational level. Perhaps the most striking of these was that the discourse – if not the practice – of organisational reform has been remarkably similar in both countries. For the police and domestic intelligence agencies this incorporated a shift in emphasis from state-orientated to public policing methods. For the armed forces it comprised of a shift away from traditional roles focused around the defence of national territory from external threat to a series of ‘new’ missions, including peacekeeping, combating terrorism and providing military assistance to the civilian authorities during crises and natural disasters. These role changes also had a number of common implications for organisational level security sector reform. For the police they suggested a reform programme based around the principles of democratic policing. For the armed forces they implied a move away from the large, conscript-based forces of the past towards smaller, more flexible and more professionalised force structures. In Croatia, these strategic visions for security sector reform emerged quite soon after the political changes of 2000. This was particularly

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the case with regard to the police who received a clear legislative roadmap for reform in the Law on the Police of 2000. While it took until 2005 for a similarly vision statement to emerge for the armed forces in the shape of the Strategic Defence Review, by 2002 there was a broad consensus on the future direction of the defence reform process, if not the details, and a number of substantive reform policies has been implemented. This process was much more tortuous in SerbiaMontenegro, where for reasons discussed above the detailed elucidation of new security sector roles was still ongoing in early 2006. Even so, and as in Croatia, the basic parameters of the envisaged reform were in place relatively early on. Indeed, a common set of themes – later reflected in official documentation such as the Serbian and Montenegrin Laws on Police and the Defence White Paper – were visible from at least 2001 for the police, and from early 2003 for the military, even if they were not codified in formal legislation. There was also a key distinction between the two countries’ policies in this area however. Croatian defence and security documentation gave clear primacy to the twin foreign policy goals of EU and NATO integration. Organisational level security sector reform was envisaged very explicitly in this context, in the framework of the specific accession demands of these two organisations. A commitment to European integration was also present in Serbia-Montenegro, but it was more cautious and discriminatory in nature. So for example, membership of the EU and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme were both assigned a high priority but the goal of NATO accession was noticeably absent from both the 2004 Defence Strategy and the 2005 Defence White Paper. A second common theme of Croatian and Serbia-Montenegro experiences at the organisational level concerns the difficulties both states had in translating declaratory policy – even if this was codified in legislation – into policy implementation and organisational change on the ground. This problem had three main aspects in both states. First, while a consensus may have been built around the overall goals of the reform process, the practical steps and financial commitment required to turn these into reality were often more contentious. In Croatia for example, the need to downsize the armed forces was widely recognised from 2000 onwards. In practice it took until at least 2003 for any real progress to be made in this respect. This was because of the extreme political sensitivity of the matter together with a lack of fi rm civilian leadership, organisational resistance within the military itself; and the potential fi nancial costs of the reform itself. Similarly, in Serbia-Montenegro, defence reform initiatives such as the PRISMA

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resettlement programme and the Defence Reform Fund struggled to make practical headway in the face of political indifference, organisational resistance, corruption and economic constraint. Second, while organisational level reform initiatives may have had an impact in areas such as force structure, organisation and equipment, both countries found it more difficult to change ingrained organisational behaviours and values, particularly those associated with professional responsibility. In Croatia for example, demilitarisation of the police was an early reform priority. At one level this was easily accomplished. The most obviously militarised elements of the police were either disbanded or absorbed into the armed forces proper, while the main tasks of the police were refocused on public rather than state security. However, the organisational culture of the police as a whole was much slower to respond to these changes, and many old confl ictera practices – such as a toleration of corruption and a continued tradition of organisational exclusivity – continued to persist into 2006. Similarly, while Serbia-Montenegro introduced a number of forwardlooking police reform initiatives – including the community policing pilot schemes or the multi-ethnic police force for South Serbia for example – their overall impact on the culture and ethos of the police as a whole has been much more limited. Finally, Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro faced a number of deeply embedded challenges to security sector reform that were simply not amenable to quick or easy solutions, no matter how committed policy makers may have been to tackling them. In Croatia, the ‘expertise deficit’ in the police and armed forces is only ever likely to be addressed over time, through the long term development of appropriate skills, expertise and experience amongst security sector personnel. Similarly, the development of new approaches – more appropriate to the new roles – in the educational and training curricula of Serbia-Montenegro’s military and police academies will be dependent on the development of the requisite knowledge and skill sets amongst established teaching staff. Again, these capacities cannot be forced into being through government dictat but have to develop over time. In both countries, economic constraints also imposed genuine limitations on the scope and ambition of reform. As with the political level, the two countries’ experiences of security sector reform at the organisational level since 2000 suggest a number of conclusions that have a generic relevance for the concept as a whole. First, the broad parameters for security sector reform have become increasingly generic, at least within the European context, and at least

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in terms of the rhetoric of reform. Indeed, it was no coincidence that the discourses of reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro were so similar. They also paralleled a far wider set of trends in Europe as a whole.4 This increasingly pan-European security sector reform agenda is closely associated with – and has been promoted through – the twin processes of EU and NATO accession. It incorporates a shared notion of the changing nature of security. This downplays the significance of the prospect of an external military threat to the state, and instead prioritises a new set of challenges that are general sub-state and/or transnational in nature. It also comprises of a particular vision of what ‘professionalisation’ should mean for both military and the police. For the military this generally means a shift to more deployable forces that will be interoperable with allied states. For the police it envisages a move towards public rather than state-orientated policing methods, coupled with a concurrent process of demilitarisation and decentralisation. The organisational implications of these changes for the military and domestic intelligence agencies are less clear cut, though role change here has tended to reflect the changing preoccupations of the security agenda more widely, particularly with regard to newly emphasised security threats such as terrorism and organised crime. In all cases it requires the development of the specialist skills and capacities necessary to address the challenges of the ‘new’ security environment. Second, despite the increasing prevalence of this common agenda(s) in the discourse on security sector reform, its implementation in practice can be problematic and contested. There are two main reasons for this. First, individual national circumstances and experiences may challenge the underlying assumptions of the reform agenda. For example, the recent experience of territorial conflict in the Western Balkans meant that both countries were reluctant to entirely downplay the defence of national territory mission. Second, in any process of security sector reform there is likely to be significant resistance to the development of new roles within the security sector itself. This will stem from the inherent conservatism of large institutions that have developed traditions – embedded in their education and training systems as well as the practical career experiences of individual personnel – of fulfi lling their old roles in a particular way. Resistance and creative noncompliance can also be expected from those personnel who will be most adversely affected by the reforms – for example by job cuts or the need to retrain. A third and related point is that organisational professionalisation in the security sector is expensive. Downsizing may lead to a slimmed down force structure, better suited to new roles, but it will also

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incorporate a number of inevitable costs. These include the financial costs of resettlement and retraining programmes, but also the human, socio-economic and political costs of mass redundancy. Similarly, raising skill levels and developing expertise amongst security sector personnel – both of which are prerequisites for the organisational professionalisation proscribed by the security sector reform agenda – requires significant investment in individual personnel. The need to recruit and retain ‘professionalised’ personnel in competitive domestic job markets also reinforces these pressures by necessitating the introduction of more attractive salaries and career development prospects. In addition, training and equipping security sector organisations for their new missions involves substantial investment in new equipment and infrastructure, particularly in the armed forces. Even then, the balance between the demands of the new roles and those of pre-existing ones may be difficult to sustain and may lead to organisational tensions, contradictions and inequalities within the security sector itself. Finally, it is noticeable that police reform was generally quicker and less painful than defence or intelligence reform in both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, at least in terms of organisational restructuring. The domestically-orientated nature of police roles means that they are particularly sensitive to changes in the wider societies of which they are a part. They are also generally less likely than the armed forces to have played an autonomous political role within the state and society in the past. Political change is thus likely to have a swift and inevitable impact on the operational activities of the police, if not on their embedded institutional culture, habits and traditions. It will have a clear difference to the kind of tasks that the police are asked to perform and the manner in which they are expected to do them. In contrast, the main operational activities of the military and intelligence agencies are more isolated from the domestic arena. Role change and restructuring within these organisations is therefore likely to be less responsive to changing domestic circumstances, and hence require a more proactive approach to reform from the civilian government. 5

The international level The international level of security sector reform was extremely significant in both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro between 2000–6. There were two factors which came together to make this possible. First, democratisation and stabilisation in the Western Balkans was viewed by many in Europe and the US – as a central component of European stability and security more widely. This raised the international profile

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of transformation in region, and prompted external donors to commit political and fi nancial resources to all aspects of the process, including security sector reform. One of the most important reasons for the high degree of international involvement in security sector reform in the two countries was therefore externally driven, and premised on precisely the kinds of development and security linkages that were discussed in Chapter 2. Even so international engagement in this area was to a large degree conditional. In particular, the difficult question of cooperation with the ICTY remained a persistent brake on the willingness of certain international actors to become involved with both countries, and especially with Serbia-Montenegro. External motives for engagement were also paralleled domestically. The broad goal of closer European integration emerged as a foreign policy priority for both states soon after the political changes of 2000, though with varying degrees of commitment and vigour. In Croatia this agenda was clearly informed by the prospect of potential membership of NATO and the EU at some point in the future. It joined the PfP programme in 2000, entered NATO’s MAP process in 2001 and began discussions on an SAA with the EU that same year. In 2005 it was invited to begin formal negotiations on accession to the EU. In Serbia-Montenegro, this process of engagement was more drawn out and politically contentious. Not only was its international pariah status under Miloševic´ much greater than that of Croatia under Tu
man, but it had also been in direct military confl ict with NATO during the Kosovo crisis of 1999. These factors contributed to a lasting legacy of mutual suspicion between Serbia and NATO particularly. Nevertheless, in general, relations between the government in Belgrade and the international community warmed considerably between 2000–6 and while it remained outside the PfP programme during this period, it was invited to begin negotiations for an SAA with the EU in late 2005. There were common reasons for the emergence of the integrationist agenda in both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro after 2000, though their intensity differed considerably between the two countries. In both cases there was an important symbolic element to the process. Acceptance into the European mainstream would represent a clear break with the past and a very public recognition of both states’ post-confl ict and post-authoritarian rehabilitation. It was hoped that this in turn would lead to a ‘normalisation’ in their international image, with important economic knock-on effects in areas such as outside investment and tourism. Closer association with the EU particularly would also bring concrete economic benefits in terms of access to EU funding and

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markets. It was also believed that integration would contribute to the security of both states by incorporating them to varying degrees within the common security architecture of Europe as a whole. The international level impacted on security sector reform in the two countries in similar ways, though again with differing degrees of intensity. The enthusiasm, with which Croatia embraced the integrationist agenda, together with the generally more sympathetic way in which it was viewed by the international community, meant that it received extensive external assistance with its security sector reforms from 2000 onwards. Its early engagement in programmes such as the MAP and the SAA also exposed it to detailed pre-conditionality criteria in the early days of its reforms. These external influences helped to shape the normative agenda for the reform process as a whole and had a clear impact on the nature of the reforms themselves. SerbiaMontenegro’s more troubled relationship with the international community meant that external security assistance programmes were slower to develop. Its exclusion from initiatives such as the PfP also meant that the pre-conditionality criteria to which it was subject were less nuanced than in Croatia. Even so, over the course of 2000–6 external factors played an increasingly important role in establishing the broad normative parameters of the reform process as well as influencing the technical nature of their implementation in practice. Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro were subject to more coercively orientated measures at the international level as well. In both cases direct conditionality was either utilised or threatened to encourage compliance with the ICTY. On occasion this was able to produce specific results such as the arrest and extradition of specifically identified individuals. However, its capacity to impact on the overall nature and direction of security sector reform as a whole was much more limited. Indeed, in both countries the underlying dynamics of this process remained remarkably unaffected by the fluctuating intensity of externally imposed direct conditionality. Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro’s experiences of security sector reform at the international level since 2000 suggest five conclusions of more generic relevance. First, externally driven security sector reform initiatives are most likely to have an impact when the domestic momentum for reform is already in place. If the domestic environment is not sympathetic towards the overall aims of the reform then international initiatives are likely to be either sidelined or ignored. Punitive policies such as direct conditionality may be able to force action on specific, easily identifiable and measurable pressure points. However, they cannot create a domestic constituency for reform in

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and of themselves, and without this constituency long term reform will be unsustainable. Second, donor policies can have a significant impact on security sector reform in recipient states if the domestic environment is receptive. Specifically, they can influence the normative goals of the reform process as well as many of the technical details of policy implementation, through technical advice and assistance or the application of preconditionality criteria. Pre-conditionality can also prioritise specific issues within the domestic political agenda as a whole by creating explicit linkages between particular reforms and wider foreign policy goals and priorities. However, external factors will have far less of an impact on those elements of security sector reform associated with changing organisational habits, traditions and cultures. These are often deeply embedded through historical experience, past personnel policies and education and training systems. Reform in these areas is thus only ever likely to take place over the long term, in response to personnel change in the security sector itself and to wider processes of transformation in politics and society as a whole.6 These are areas in which externally driven security sector reform policies are only ever likely to have a limited and superficial impact. Third, in most cases, the relationship between donor and recipient at the international level of security sector reform does not consist of a simple binary interaction between two unitary entities. There are often multiple external donors, for example, each with their own priorities, agendas and reform strategies. Coordinating their activities can be extremely difficult, even in the context of closely integrated international organisations such as NATO. In addition, the ‘recipient’ of conditionality is not always a monolithic state entity with uncontested authority of its own polity. The government as a whole may be unable or unwilling to implement change in its security sector, either for fear of a backlash or because it has not yet consolidated its own mechanisms for civilian control; individual politicians may be unable to force through the required reform because of their own political weakness; while security sector commanders may be constrained in what they can realistically achieve because of the fragmented nature of internal authority within the security sector itself. In each case, these obstacles can lead to delay, obfuscation or even a simple inability to implement conditionality demands. A fourth and related point is that the capacity of conditionality (in both its forms) to influence reform is closely linked to the value assigned by the recipient to the policy goal to which it is linked, balanced against

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the costs of non-compliance. At one level this observation simply reflects the underlying logic against which all conditionality is predicated: the bigger the carrot offered (or stick wielded) by the donor, the bigger the motivation will be for the recipient to comply. However, if political authority in the recipient state is fragmented, then this equation becomes much more complex and nuanced. Under these circumstances the referent object of conditionality emerges as a key consideration. In the context of most conditionality policies, this is generally assumed to be a unitary state entity, represented by a centralised government that makes foreign policy decisions on the basis of cost benefit calculation of national interest. However, in fragmented political communities this is not always the case. If the government is divided, then there may be no clear agreement on what the ‘national interest’ of the state actually is. Individual politicians or policy makers may be forced to make quite different calculations of interest in the face of external conditionality demands. These may relate to their own political survival or that of their government, or even in the most extreme cases to their personal safety or that of their families. Under these circumstances, donors need to be realistic about the costs of compliance, and honest in recognising where they will fall most heavily. Broadly however, if there is a significant disparity between the interests of the conditionality referent and those with the power to implement policy change, then the ability of either pre- or direct conditionality to encourage or coerce reform will be severely constrained. Finally, conditionality is a relatively crude tool. One of its underlying premises is that both donor and recipient are able to clearly assess both compliance and non-compliance. It thus requires specific and measurable policy end points. Donors must therefore identify proxies for complex and long term processes such as ‘democratisation’ or indeed ‘security sector reform’, or instead single out individual areas as being significant enough to warrant special attention. However, the reductionist nature of this approach can lead to problems in application. The chosen proxies may be inadequate indicators of transformation in all its depth and so be of limited practical value over the long term. Recipients may be tempted into a ‘box ticking’ approach to reform, driven by the short term need to meet specific conditionality requirements rather than a holistic assessment of the overall demands of the reform process. At worst, the overzealous prioritisation of specific conditionality demands can lead donors to lose sight of wider processes of transformation, and in so doing result in inappropriate, ineffective or even counterproductive policies.

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Between 2000–6, both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro made important progress in all areas of their security sector reforms. At the political level, civilian control over the security sector was established, and to varying degrees steps were taken to democratise the nature of this control. At the organisational level, the broad parameters for future reform were put in place, while at the international level the extent and depth of international involvement in security sector reform increased greatly. The significance of these changes should not be underestimated given the extremely negative set of legacies that both countries inherited from the 1990s. Croatian progress in all of these areas increasingly outstripped that of Serbia-Montenegro, to the point where the two countries’ circumstances had diverged considerably by 2006. This was indicative of Croatia’s overall development towards consolidated democracy during this period and reflected in its position on the cusp of both EU and NATO membership. Serbia-Montenegro faced a deeper set of challenges at all levels, and correspondingly had much greater difficulty in conceptualising and implementing its security sector reforms. Even so, a number of embedded challenges remain for both countries. These particularly relate to issues of ‘second generation’ security sector reform at the political level and also to long term value change in the security sector itself. The experiences of Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro demonstrate the extent to which security sector reform is an important part of any process of post-confl ict and post-authoritarian transformation. In particular, predatory or dysfunctional security sector actors that are not under civilian control can use their unique organisational capacities to disrupt or derail wider processes of political change. However, security sector reform cannot occur in isolation from these wider changes and it is to a large degree dependent on them for its own success. In this respect, it is important to recognise the explicitly normative nature of the security sector reform concept, particularly in the Western Balkan context. It is not simply a neutral or technical term concerned with effectiveness and efficiency in the police, armed forces and intelligence agencies, or even just their placement under civilian control. It is instead a process of normative policy adaptation closely associated with ideas of democratisation and Europeanisation. For this normative agenda to take root, it requires a broadly sympathetic domestic political and societal context. This is not something that can be forced from the outside, and while international actors can play an important role in shaping the nature and character of security sector reform once the

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domestic momentum for change is in place, they cannot create this momentum by themselves.

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Notes 1 While some in the HDZ remained fiercely anti-European, once in government their views were successfully marginalised by its pro-European wing. 2 Of course, those who might have contested this legitimacy – the Croatian Serbs – were either forced out or voluntarily departed the country after operations Flash and Storm in 1995. In this respect, Croatia’s internal legitimacy was a product of an (at times violent and coercive) process of ethnic as well as political consolidation. 3 Though as will be discussed below large sections of the armed forces, police and intelligence agencies – as well as the Croatian population more widely – do remain passively hostile to the ICTY process. 4 Timothy Edmunds, ‘What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe’, International Affairs, 82 (5 November 2006). 5 In Serbia-Montenegro this distinction was reinforced by the fact that the police were republican rather than state level organisations and so did not suffer from the same kinds of problems associated with the legitimacy and future of the federation/state union as the military. 6 This conclusion also suggests that the international level of security sector reform is likely to be more significant in those societies – such as Croatia – which have recently created their security sectors from scratch, than in those – such as Serbia-Montenegro – with long established institutions and traditions in this area.

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Index

Note: ‘n.’ after a page reference indicates the number of a note on that page. Adriatic Charter see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Antunovic´, Željka 60, 63, 68–9, 133 Arkan see Ražnatovic´, Željko ‘Arkan’ Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro (VSCG) 166–70, 174–5 Defence Reform Fund 168, 220, 249 downsizing 168–9 General Staff 103 Military Intelligence Agency (VBA) 86, 165, 180, 112n.7 peacekeeping 162 PRISMA 168–9, 218, 248–9 and Ratko Mladic´ 179, 243 role of 160–2 see also Yugoslav Army (VJ) Army of the Republika Srbska (VRS) 84, 153, 160, 179, 214, 217, 224–5 Association of Invalids of the Patriotic War (HVIDRA) 63 see also Croatian Armed Forces (OSRH)

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Atlantic Council of Serbia and Montenegro 109 Bayley, David 23 Beara, Ljubiša 227 Beetham, David 33 Bellamy, Alex 22 Bittner, Egon 23 Bobetko, Janko 144, 203–4 Bonn International Centre for Conversion 41, 215 Bulatovic´, Momir 88 Bulatovic´, Rade 97, 164 Busiša, Dražen 60 Carothers, Thomas 9 Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) and Croatia 203 Centre for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) 109, 222 Centre for European Security Studies 215 Centre for Political Research and Public Opinion 158 chain of command Croatia 59–60, 141, 243–4 Serbia and Montenegro 97–100, 243–4

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Chanaa, Jane 17 civilian control definition of 27–31 and democracy 27–34 civil society 33–4 Croatia 73–5 Serbia and Montenegro 108–10 Club of Madrid 214 Collier, Paul 20 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) see European Union (EU) conditionality definitions of 43 conscription Croatia 69 constitution of Croatia (1990) 54–5, 58 amendments to 58–9 Cooper, Neil 20 Cottey, Andrew 37 Counter Intelligence Agency (POA) see intelligence agencies Croatian Armed Forces (OSRH) 7, 127–9, 132–5, 139–41 as the Croatian Army (HV) 56 creation of 122–7 downsizing 132–4 General Staff 69–70, 197 Joint Education and Training Command (JETC) 140 Long Term Development Plan 2006–15 134–5, 140, 200 Military Service Law 140 peacekeeping 129–30, 200–1 role 129 SPECTRA 133 veterans’ associations 63–5, 205 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 6, 53–8, 60–1, 63–4, 122, 128, 133, 142, 198–9

Index Sanader government 64, 69, 133, 136, 199, 241 Croatian Intelligence Services (HIS) see intelligence agencies Croatian National Guard (ZNG) 55, 122–4 Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) 60, 65 Cvrtila, Vlatko 74 Danish Cenre for Human Rights 164, 214 Davinic´, Prvoslav 103–4, 167, 177 Dayton Accords 4, 155–6, 199–200, 214, 217 Defence and National Security Committee (VONS) 55 Defence Diplomacy 18, 40 Defence Reform Fund see Ministry of Defence Del Ponte, Carla 143–4, 179, 206, 225 Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) 6, 90–3, 97, 241–3 Democratic Party (DS) 90, 96–7, 103–4, 107 Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) 90, 97, 103–4, 107 Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS) 88, 99, 107 Democratic Peace 22 democratic policing in Croatia 130–1 definition of 34–5 departification definition of 30–1 Ðin
ic´, Zoran 90, 92–3, 103, 107 murder of 95–6, 165, 167, 170, 227, 229, 243 direct conditionality 43 Draškovic´, Vuk 91, 154, 180 Duffield, Mark 9, 21

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Index

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Ðukanovic´, Milo 88–9, 98, 99, 107, 166, 178 Edmonds, Martin 16–17 European Union (EU) 5, 40–2, 252–4 and Croatia 129, 193–8, 198–202, 202–5, 216–17 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) 196–7 Phare programme 196, 203 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 193, 196–7, 199–201, 203–4, 252–3 and Serbia and Montenegro 161, 222–6, 226 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) 217, 288 Feasibility Study 228 Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 216, 222, 224–5, 288, 252–3 Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 196, 198, 215, 217 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 194–5, 215 Finer, Samuel 16 Flash 125, 126–7, 192 Foreign Military Finance (FMF) 193 Forster, Anthony 37 G17 Institute 109 Gellner, Ernest 33 Gendarmerie see Police (Serbia)

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Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 41, 191, 214–15 good governance 19 Gotovina, Ante 64, 143–4, 204–6 arrest of 205 Hadžic´, Miroslav 99, 173 Hague Tribunal see International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Herman, Michael 24 Homeland War (Croatia) 53–4, 64, 74 impact on the security sector 121–7 human security 19 Huntington, Samuel 8, 23 intelligence agencies 23–4, 246–7 Croatia 126, 130–2, 136–7, 143 Counter Intelligence Agency (POA) 61, 65–6, 131, 143 creation of 122–7, 124 Croatian Intelligence Services (HIS) 56, 62, 73–4 Military Security Agency (VSA) 131 Military Security and Intelligence Agency (VSOA) 131 National Security Office (UNS) 55–6, 192 Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA) 131 Security and Intelligence Systems Law (2006) 68, 17, 131–2, 137 Security Information Service (SIS) 56, 60, 125, 131, 192

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Security Service (OA) 131, 143 Security Services Act (2002) 60–1, 68, 71, 130–1, 136–7 Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP) 122, 124, 130–1 Serbia and Montenegro 96, 155, 164–5, 177–8 Law on the National Security Agency, Montenegro (2005) 101, 165 Law on the Security Information Agency 95, 164–5, 171 Law on the Security Services of the FRJ 97, 106, 165 military Department of Security (KOS) 86, 92–3, 165, 180, 112n.7 Military Intelligence Agency (VBA) 86, 165, 180, 112n.7 Security Information Agency, Serbia (BIA) 95, 97, 100–1, 102, 107–8, 164–5, 171, 178 Security Service, Montenegro (DB) 88–9, 99, 157 State Security Service, Serbia (RDB) 87–8, 91–92, 94–5, 102, 154, 171, 177–8 International Alert 41 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 214 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 5, 42, 63–5, 202–7, 253 and Croatia 60–1, 62, 143–4, 199

and Serbia-Montenegro 179–80, 214, 216, 222–6, 226–30, 242 see also Hague Tribunal International Military Education and Training programme (IMET) 138, 193 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 40 Ivkovic´, Sanja Kutnjak 123 Janowitz, Morris 23 Jocic´, Dragan 101, 103–4 Joint National Security Committee (SONS) 55 Kosovo crisis (1999) 157–9, 174 Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) 157 Koštunica, Vojislav 90, 92–3, 97–8, 103–4, 107, 165, 225, 229 Krga, Branko 161, 167 Kusovac, Zoran 62 Lasswell, Harold 23 Law on the National Security Agency, Montenegro (2005) see intelligence agencies Law on the Security Information Agency see intelligence agencies Law on the Security Services of the FRJ see intelligence agencies Legija see Lukovic´, Milorad ‘Legija’ Levy, Marion 16 LEX Group 109 Linz Alfred 33 Luckham, Robin 26, 28 Lukic´, Sreten 92, 179, 225, 229

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Index

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Lukovic´, Milorad ‘Legija’ 90, 93, 95 Marenin, Otwin 25 Markovic´, Radomir 91–2, 94, 178 media, the Croatia 74 Serbia and Montenegro 109 Membership Action Plan (MAP) see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Mesic´, Stipe 59–61, 62, 69–70, 143–4, 242 Mihajlovic´, Dušan 94 Mikola, Igor 206 Milic´evic´, Miša 95 Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) 191–3, 244–5 Military Security Agency (VSA) see intelligence agencies Military Security and Intelligence Agency (VSOA) see intelligence agencies Miloševic´, Slobodan arrest and extradition 92, 93, 217, 227 fall of 6, 90–1 control of the security sector 85–8, 154–7, 172 Milutanovic´, Milan 98 Ministry of Defence Croatia 66–70, 141, 197–8 SPECTRA 133 Strategic Defence Review 129, 134–5, 139–40, 144–5, 200, 248 Serbia and Montenegro 102–6, 167–8, 217, 220 Defence Reform Fund 168, 220, 249 PRISMA 168–9, 218, 248–9 Strategic Defence Review, Serbia 168–9

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White Paper on Defence, Serbia and Montenegro (2005) 100, 161, 167–8, 174, 218, 223, 248 Ministry of the Interior Croatia 66–8, 70, 72, 144 Office of Internal Affairs 142–3 Programme Guidelines 2004–7 130, 139–40, 142–3 see also Police (Croatia) Montenegro 105, 156–7 see also Police (Montenegro) Serbia 102–6, 156, 164, 170–1, 214, 216 Law on Internal Affairs (1991) 156 Vision Document (2003) 164, 214 see also Police (Serbia) Mladic´, Ratko 165, 179–80, 223, 225, 227–8, 243 Monk, Richard 163–4 215 Montenegro independence referendum 4 Moric´, Joško 138 National Anti-Corruption Strategy, Croatia (2006) 143 National Defence and Security Strategy, Croatia 129 National Defence Strategy, Serbia and Montenegro (2004) 100, 161, 168, 218, 248 National Security Office (UNS) see intelligence agencies Naletilic´, Mladen ‘Tuta’ 203 Norac, Mirko 63, 206 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 5, 36, 41–2, 252–4

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264

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Adriatic Charter 201 and Croatia 129, 193–8, 198–202, 202–5 Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) 195 Membership Action Plan (MAP) 195, 197, 200–1, 252–3 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 193, 195, 198, 200–1, 203, 252–3 Planning and Review Process (PARP) 195 NATO Parliamentary Assembly 200 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 41 and Serbia and Montenegro 161, 169, 214, 217–18, 222–6 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 169, 217, 222, 224–5, 226–7, 248, 252–3 transit agreement 218 South East European Cooperation Steering Group (SEEGROUP) 218 South East European Initiative (SEEI) 194, 198, 218 Neild, Rachel 34 Nikolic´, Tomislav 110 Ojdanic´, Dragoljub 87, 227 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 40 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 40, 163, 170–1, 175–6, 179 and Croatia 193–4 and Serbia and Montenegro 215–16, 220–1, 222 Monk and Slater reports 163–4, 215

Paris, Roland 23 parliament Croatia 70–3, 134 Committee for Internal Policy and National Security (UPNS) 71–2 Council for the Supervision of the Security Services (VNSS) 71–2, 74 Serbia and Montenegro 100, 100–6, 218 Serbia 107 Defence and Security Committee 107 Montenegro 107 Partnership for Peace (PfP) see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Pavkovic´, Nebojša 90, 102, 176–7, 214, 228 dismissal of 92–3 98, 169, 179, 217, 225 Perišic´ Momcˇilo 91, 165, 244 Petrovic´, Goran 94 Phare programme see European Union (EU) Planning and Review Process (PARP) see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Podbevšek, Joško 61, 65–6, 72, 137, 244 Police (Croatia) 7, 135–6, 140–4, 251 creation of 122–7 Criminal Code 126 Criminal Procedure Code (1997) 127, 142 militarisation 125–6 and the OSCE 193–4 peacekeeping 130 Police Law (2000) 130, 135–6, 142, 144–5, 239, 248 Special Police 130 see also Ministry of the Interior

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Index Police (Montenegro) 88–9, 99, 156–7, 165–6, 172, 174, 176, 178–9 Kosovo crisis (1991) 156 Law on the Police (2005) 101, 104, 165, 248 see also Ministry of the Interior Police (Serbia) 7, 87–8, 102, 155–6, 170–2, 173–6, 177–8, 251 Border Police Service 170 decriminalisation 177–9 Department for Organised Crime Suppression 170 Directive on Police Ethics and Policing (2003) 164 Gendarmerie 95, 170–1 and the Kosovo crisis (1999) 157–9 Law on Criminal Procedure (2001) 164 Law on Internal Affairs (1991) 156 Law on the Police (2005) 101, 107, 164, 170–2, 216, 218, 248 militarisation 156 multi-ethnic police force 170–1, 215 role 162–4 Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ) 157 Special Police Units (PJPs) 157, 170 Vision Document (2003) 164 see also Ministry of the Interior praetorianism 28–9 pre-conditionality 43 PRISMA see Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro professionalisation 37–40 Pugh, Michael 20

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Racˇan, Ivica 53 government of 59–60, 62, 65–6, 69–70, 133, 199, 240 Radoš, Jozo 60, 65, 69, 132 Ražnatovic´, Željko ‘Arkan’ 154 Rebic´, Markica 192 Red Berets see Special Operations Unit (JSO) resettlement and retraining see PRISMA; SPECTRA Roncˇevic´, Berislav 69–70 Sabre 95–7, 103, 178 Saferworld 41, 215 Sanader, Ivo 60–1, 70, 143–4 government of 64, 69, 204–5 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 41, 169 Security and Intelligence Systems Law (2006) Croatia see intelligence agencies security assistance 42–3 Security Information Agency, Serbia (BIA) see intelligence agencies Security Information Service (SIS) see intelligence agencies security sector civil control of 27–31 definition of 2, 18, 22–5 democratic governance of 31–4 Security sector reform definition of 25–7 first generation 29–31 professionalisation of 37–40 second generation 29, 31–4 Security Service, Montenegro (DB) see intelligence agencies Security Services Act (2002), Croatia see intelligence agencies Serbia and Montenegro, State Union of 98–9, 107–8, 160, 169, 224, 240 constitutional Charter (2003) 99–100

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Serbian Chetnik Movement (SCP) 154 Serbian Guard (SG) 154 Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 87, 110 Serbian Renewal Party (SPO) 91 Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG) 154 Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (SZUP) see intelligence agencies Šešelj, Vojislav 154 Slater, John 163–4, 215 Šljivancˇanin, Veselin 227 Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) 104 Socialist Peoples’ Party, Montenegro (SNP) 107 South Serbia 162, 170 South East European Initiative (SEEI) see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Special Operations Unit (JSO) 87, 93–7, 154, 157, 170, 178, 245 murder of Ðin
ic´ 95–6, 243 mutiny of 94 see also Red Berets SPECTRA see Croatian Armed Forces (OSRH) Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SEE) see European Union (EU) Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) see European Union (EU) Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe see European Union (EU) Stambolic´, Ivan 91 State Security Service, Serbia (RDB) see intelligence agencies

Stepan, Juan 33 Stepetic´, Petar 60 Storm 125, 126–7, 192 Strategic Defence Review, Croatia see Ministry of Defence Strategic Defence Review see Ministry of Defence Stupnik 69, 141 Sulkic´, Munib 206 Supreme Defence Council (VSO) 86, 93, 97–9, 106, 159, 225 Šušak, Gojko 54–5 Tadic´, Boris 103–4, 110, 161, 216 Third Wave, the 8 threat perceptions in Europe 36 Tomic´, Aco 93, 165 Tu
man, Franjo 61–2, 128, 142 control of the security sector 53–8 death of 6 United Nations 40, 124 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Serbia and Montenegro 214–16, 219–21 University of Zagreb 73 Defendology 73 veterans’ associations 63–4, 133, 136 Vukcˇevic´, Vladimir 180 White Paper on Defence, Serbia and Montenegro (2005) see Ministry of Defence World Bank 40 Word Trade Organisation (WTO) and Croatia 203 Yugoslav Army (VJ) 7, 84, 98–9, 108, 166–7, 172–3, 176–7, 214, 217

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creation of 86–7, 153–4 Department of Security (KOS) 86, 92–3, 165, 180, 112n.7 General Staff 167, 217, 229 and the Kosovo crisis (1999) 157–9 Military Doctrine (2000) 159, 166 Model of the Yugoslav Army 21 (1996) 159 and Ratko Mladic´ 179, 243 role of 159–62 see also Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro (VSCG)

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Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of (FRY) constitution 86 Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of (SFRJ) constitution (1974) 86 dissolution of 3–4, 153–4 role of the army in 84–6 Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) 56, 84–5, 122, 123, 158, 172–3 and the dissolution of the FRJ 152–3 Žunec, Ozren 73–4

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