Security and International Relations in Central Africa: A Practitioner’s Perspective 3030895963, 9783030895969

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Security and International Relations in Central Africa A Practitioner’s Perspective a r m e l di rou

Security and International Relations in Central Africa

Armel Dirou

Security and International Relations in Central Africa A Practitioner’s Perspective

Armel Dirou London, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-89596-9 ISBN 978-3-030-89597-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the French Ministry for the Armed Forces. For safety reasons French military rules require that, in an account, only Generals and Battle Group commanding officers be mentioned by surname. All others are mentioned by their rank and first name.

To the legionnaires and mountain troopers whom I had the honour of commanding and who deserve the highest praise for their amazing cultural sensitivity, proactivity, reactivity, self-control, tenacity and resolve. All were superb fighting soldiers and also peacemakers. They belonged to the 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, the 1st Foreign Legion Engineer Regiment, the 7th Mountain Infantry Battalion, the 93rd Mountain Artillery Regiment and to my own regiment, the 4th Mountain Cavalry Regiment.

Foreword

I first met Colonel Armel Dirou when I was the UK Field Army Commander and he was serving as the Military Assistant to General Arnaud Sainte-Claire Deville, then Commandant des Forces Terrestres. General Arnaud and I were good friends and we took a Command-led approach to improving the cooperation and integration between French and UK Forces. We made good progress and Armel Dirou did much of the groundwork to bring our ideas to fruition. I admired Armel then for his wisdom, pragmatism, zest for life and firm belief in the Entente Cordiale. And I admire him now, both for his continuing work in London to bring France and the UK closer together militarily and for the creative employment of intellectual and emotional energy he has demonstrated in writing this book. I am therefore honoured to provide an introduction to Security and International Relations in Central Africa covering the valiant exploits of the Battlegroup de Boissieu in the Central African Republic in 2014. This is a book for those who care deeply about the profession of arms and want to understand the complexities of conflict in the fledging democracies of the world. Our interventions have not delivered quick victories given the intractable nature of the problems faced. Nor will they, but this should not stop us from trying to be far smarter in developing new approaches to achieve satisfactory outcomes at acceptable cost. If we are to improve, then we need to learn. It would be too easy to brush over the myriad challenges facing a commander and his battlegroup in the

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Central African Republic (CAR). Armel does not. He writes (“warts and all”) with honesty, insight and pride in those he commanded and their achievements. As a result, we learn more, to the advantage of women and men who face similar deployments, and the education of those who order and direct such operations. Anyone who has fought in Afghanistan, Iraq or Mali will recognise the challenges facing the Legionnaires and Mountain Troopers of Battlegroup de Boissieu as they worked to bring stability and security to vast areas of ungoverned and under-governed space in the Central African Republic (CAR). These are the so-called Forever Wars, operating (and often fighting) in support of weak, sovereign governments to establish peace, the rule of law and democracy. To work at the end of extended (and sometimes overextended) supply-lines with difficult communications and incomplete intelligence is never straightforward; nor is maintaining continuity of purpose with the troops that served before or come after you, or securing the support and trust of the people: “speaking not only to their minds, but also their hearts”. These challenges are then compounded by time, space and distance, when the components of the force are dispersed to provide presence across a large geographic area. Under these conditions, it takes a significant effort to concentrate force. And all while the warlords, armed groups, criminal gangs and corrupt officials who profit from chaos and disorder and fear stability work to counter progress by employing all the tools, both conventional and asymmetric, available to them. And yet, the Battlegroup de Boissieuwas ultimately successful, creating the security conditions before and after the Battle of Batangafo to allow the deployment of the United Nations (UN). Progress was hard won. It took the combined efforts of extremely well trained, experienced commanders who were prepared to make difficult decisions on limited information, and resolute, tough, highly professional, well-equipped soldiers—in this case Legionnaires and Mountain Troopers, supported by bold Airforce and Army pilots whose support is not just desirable, but often essential. You see here the value of the French combat culture. Not just iron hearts, but the power of fundamental good, the worth of responsibility and the strength of example. Success demanded absolute commitment to the Mission and perseverance to overcome difficulties. And we learn (again) that while everything in war is theoretically simple, even the simplest thing was difficult in the CAR.

FOREWORD

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We are also reminded that the ability to continue learning marks leaders apart, with the best having a unquenchable thirst for knowledge. Towards the end of the book, Armel dissects “prudence and determination”, a term that came to define his time in CAR. His analysis is well-judged with the ideas offering more than enough material for a second book, but for now I commend “Security and International Relations in Central Africa” to you. General Sir James Everard, KCB CBE Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (2017–2020)

Preface

In the French Army, Battlegroups are organised and grouped around a lead unit whose name is chosen by the commanding officer. For our Battlegroup, I decided on the name of a general who was our regiment’s commanding officer from 1956 until 1958 and who enjoyed a distinguished record in the Second World War. During the battles in the Aisne region in June 1940, he was surrounded and, by night, escaped with his horse-mounted platoon. Once they had rejoined their parent unit, he returned as he had promised to the encircled position to lead the infantry company too to safety. He was later taken as a prisoner. Held captive in Pomerania, he escaped in March 1941 to the USSR where he was imprisoned for five months before joining the Free French Forces in Great Britain. He then found himself at the heart of the events that would allow France to be present at the table of the victors. He fought with the French 2nd Armoured Division in the liberation of France. After the recapture of Alsace, Captain Alain de Boissieu finished his war in Berchtesgaden. After the war, General de Gaulle said, during a walk in Marly in 1946, to the then Major de Boissieu: “One day you must write down your memories and publish them, because it is with the testimonies of our junior officers that we teach young people what other young people did

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for France”.1 General de Boissieu published a book entitled To Fight Alongside De Gaulle thirty-five years later in 1981. My experience is neither as extensive nor indeed as impressive as his and so I have much less to say. I had the honour of meeting General de Boissieu twice and we enjoyed some long and enriching discussions. To give his name to our Battlegroup for the Regiment’s first major operation since the Algerian War was an appropriate way to honour him and celebrate his memory. This book is the story of Battlegroup de Boissieu during its operation in the Central African Republic in 2014. London, UK

Armel Dirou

1 Général de Boissieu (c.r.), Pour combattre avec de Gaulle, Plon, Paris, 1981, back page.

Translation in English is mine, and unless otherwise stated, all the following translations from French are on my own.

Acknowledgements

Beyond the acknowledgements that I have for all the soldiers who served in our Battlegroup, Security and International Relations in Central Africa would have been harder to achieve without the help of many people. I am therefore indebted to those whose support and contribution were invaluable in writing this book, and I would like to express to them my deepest gratitude. I have to mention the incredible dedication of Jon Cresswell who spent many hours polishing my English to transform my account into something publishable. In addition to his daily work as a colonel in the British Army, Jon happily undertook this additional burden because he recognised that our story should be told. I must also thank Professor David Ellery who nominated me to be a member of University College at Durham University. The starting point for this book is a series of lectures that I started to give at the Durham Global Security Institute. I would also like to extend my thanks to Professor Rob Johnson, with whom long discussions have allowed me to develop my thinking on command and decision-making processes in combat. My thanks would not be complete if I did not include all those who patiently reread my drafts and enlightened me with their questions, remarks and demands for clarification. I am thinking in particular of Sir Tom Phillips KCMG, former diplomat and former commandant of the Royal College of Defence Studies; the Right Honourable Tom Tugendhat MBE VR, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee; Jean-Pierre xv

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Lee, a partner with global law firm Mayer Brown LLP; Dr. Michael Shurkin, Senior Political Scientist at RAND; Dr. Guillaume Lasconjarias; the Reverend John Ellis QHC, Chaplain in Chief of the Royal Air Force; Professor Beatrice Heuser, Chair of International Relations at Glasgow University, and Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE, former Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, whose support was much valued and appreciated. Acknowledgement is due to the Durham University online publications as well in which some passages first appeared. Finally, I would like to conclude with a personal note. I owe a great debt to several officers from whom I received so much. Some were my instructors at the Military Academy of Saint Cyr, others were commanding officers or chiefs of operations of my regiment. Their highest level of demand has always guided me in the accomplishment of my missions and tasks. And finally, I would like to single out my Force Commander during the time discussed in the following pages, General Eric Bellot des Minières, who honoured me by giving me his full trust and a huge room for initiative in the field. As the book goes to press, I am saddened to learn of the death in action of Sergeant Maxime Blasco in Mali. A magnificent soldier, he experienced combat for the first time during the combat of M’Bali and then during the battle of Batangafo; he was recognised for his heroic actions there, even though he was at that time a Private soldier. This book is, therefore, a small part of his own great story. I cherish his memory and pay my heartfelt tribute to his wife and their son.

Contents

1

The Central African Republic

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2

Mission Preparation

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3

A Holistic Approach

19

4

Failure at M’Bali

29

5

A Raid Through the Jungle

37

6

A Town to Seize

47

7

Failed Negotiations

61

8

Ten Thousand Lives to Be Saved

73

9

Return to Calm

87

Epilogue

95

Afterthoughts

99

Conclusion

125

Annexes

129

Sources

133

Index

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About the Author

Armel Dirou Cavalry officer and mountain trooper, Colonel Armel Dirou is graduated from the Royal College of Defence Studies (London), the NATO Defense College (Rome), the Joint Staff College (Paris) and of the Military High Mountain School in Chamonix. Qualified with a Ph.D. from Paris Sorbonne University, he is Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London, Member of the Senior Common Room at University College of Durham and Fellow Reader at Paris Sorbonne University. Operationally experienced officer, he took part in different operations in the Balkans in Bosnia and in Kosovo. He carried out three combat tours in Afghanistan, and, as a Battle Group commanding officer, he led an infantry battle group in the Central African Republic. He is currently Deputy Director of Defence Strategy at the French MoD.

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Abbreviations

AK 47 AOR CAR CAS CGS CP DPKO ERC 90 FAC FACA FOMAC GOC HQ ISTAR JTAC LEGAD MINUSCA MISCA NATO NCO NGO PKM PKO POLAD

Soviet Manufactured Assault Rifle, Called Kalashnikov Area of Responsibilty Central African Republic Close Air Support Chief of the General Staff Command Post Director of Peace Keeping Operations French Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle Equipped with a 90mm Gun Forward Air Controler Central African Armed Forces Central African Multinational Force General Officer Commanding Headquarters Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance Joint Terminal Attack Controler Legal Adviser United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic International Support Mission for Central African Republic North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Commissioned Officer Non-Governmental Organisation Soviet Manufactured General Purpose Machine Gun Peace Keeping Operations Polical Adviser xxi

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ABBREVIATIONS

QRF RPG RPK UN UNSC VAB VBCI WO1 WO2

Quick Reaction Force Russian Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launcher Soviet Manufactured Light Machine Gun United Nations United Nations Security Council French Armoured Personnel Carrier French Infantry Fighting Vehicle Warrant Officer Class 1 Warrant Officer Class 2

CHAPTER 1

The Central African Republic

Situated between Cameroon to the west, Chad to the north, Sudan to the east, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville to the south, the Central African Republic is landlocked in the heart of Central Africa. The country is divided into two main areas, “the North and the Sudano-Sahelian region on the one hand, and the central and southern regions on the other”.1 Due to its geographical location, “the UbangiChari area appears very different from the rest of the continent because of this geographical isolation. It is clearly socially and culturally behind other African countries where famous kingdoms and empires flourish: Téké in Congo, Bamoun in Cameroon, Menelik in Ethiopia, Toro in Uganda, Matabele in Zimbabwe, Zulu in South Africa, Songhai, Mandingo and Mali in West Africa! Perhaps to the credit of the Ubangi-Chari, one might note that almost all of these countries have an opening to the sea, which has certainly [supported] trade and facilitated progress”.2 The whole of Central Africa, including today’s Central African Republic, has long been considered by Europeans as a land untouched 1 In Marie-Calixte Dirou, Quel est l’impact régional de l’intervention militaire française Sangaris en Centrafrique?, master essay, dir. Mr. Pascal Le Pautremat, 2018, p. 9. 2 Ibid., p. 9.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6_1

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by any human presence. In their accounts, the first explorers mentioned a vast depopulated area “so that on the planispheres of the past, the Ubangi-Chari was often represented by a white spot”.3 A very ancient frontier area, marking the transition between Black Africa and the Arab World,4 the country was isolated from the rest of the world till the eighteenth century, when it was subjected to the Arab slave trade and integrated into the Atlantic slave trade circuit. The Central African Republic was the slave reserve of the merchant lords. In 1884, the colonial conquest was met with fierce resistance from the latter, supported by the Muslim merchants of the North. Allocated to France in 1903, the territory of Ubangi-Chari was established as a colony by decree on 11 February 1906 and integrated into French Equatorial Africa in 1910. The division of what was Ubangi-Chari resulted from the colonial divisions of the Berlin Conference of 1885 and was established according to the hydrography of the country. The Central African Republic was populated around the migratory flows of the sixteenth century by “successive waves of Christian immigration, from east to west and east to south; they were caused by the decline of the Black Christian kingdoms of Gaoga (Ain-Fara) and Aloa (Ouri)5 on the border of Chad and Darfur”.6 In 1884, the territory of Ubangi-Chari experienced its first colonisation. Hardly confronted with the resistance of the Sultanates, including that of Dar-el-Kouti, “founded in the first half of the eighteenth century7 ”, the colonists used force to establish their power. Testimonies agree on the fact that violence was particularly strong in this territory during the French colonial regime. In addition to the 3 Thomas Fllichy de la Neuville (dir.), Véronique Mézin-Bourguignaud & Gregor Mathias, Centrafrique, pourquoi la Guerre? Lavauzelle, Panazol, 2014, pp. 19–20. 4 Ibid., p. 17. 5 Pierre Kalck, Histoire centrafricaine des origines à 1966, l’Harmattan, 1992, pp. 33–

51. «These kingdoms were founded on the ruins of Meroe in 350 CE. They were invaded and destroyed in 1503 and 1504 by the Muslim slave potentates of the kingdom of the Islamicised Fungs of Sennar in the Middle Nile Valley» (to be read on that topic Leclat (Jean) and Crawford (O.G.S), The Fung Kingdom of Sennar, Annals d’Ethipie, 1955, vol. N°1, pp. 157–159. 6 Thomas Fllichy de la Neuville (dir.), Véronique Mézin-Bourguignaud & Gregor Mathias, Centrafrique, pourquoi la Guerre? Lavauzelle, Panazol, 2014, p. 21. 7 Ibid., p. 15.

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exacerbated violence, the populations suffered deeply from the harshness of the concession companies. Indeed, under the decrees adopted in 1899, seventeen private companies had practically free disposal of the men and products of 50% of the territory of the colony of Ubangi-Chari, of which the state retained ownership. In 1903, European public opinion was made aware of “the horror of the methods used by colonial agents to harvest rubber on both sides of the Congo”.8 British journalist Edmund Morel9 led a campaign denouncing the violence of the various colonial regimes. France sent a commission of enquiry whose report is damning. Injust and arbitrary, the colonial regime faced several rebellions and demonstrations. Due to a lack of coordination and organisation, most of the movements are repressed with a little more violence each time to deter recidivists. Nevertheless, the situation became really better for the populace thanks to a peaceful new way of colonisation during the first half part of the twentieth century. As a result, at the time of the Second World War, the territory of Ubangi-Chari formed two battalions of riflemen made up of volunteers who committed themselves to the service of Free France. Two of them10 were awarded the distinction of Companions of the Liberation by General de Gaulle in 1941 and 1942 over the solely 1083 members this Order encompasses. The country gained independence on 13 August 1960 and signed on 15 August 1960 with France “a relatively binding defence agreement. Originally, this agreement was quadripartite, including the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) until 1972 and Chad until 1976. In 1966, a military and technical cooperation agreement with CAR complemented this first agreement, focusing on the rise of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). Since that date, CAR has invoked the assistance clause 8 Yanis Thomas, Centrafrique: un destin volé, Agone, Marseille, 2016, p. 27. 9 Marie-Calixte Dirou, Quel est l’impact régional de l’intervention militaire française

Sangaris en Centrafrique?, master essay, dir. Mr. Pascal Le Pautremat, 2018, p. 19. 10 Dominique Kosseyo, born in 1919 near Bria in Ubangi-Chari, died on 9 March 1994, is a Central African military man. An exemplary Rifle man during the Second World War in the service of Free France, he was a Companion of the Libération, Knight of the Légion d’honneur, holder of the Military Medal and the War Cross. He was the first African to be awarded the Croix de la Libération, which was personally presented to him by General de Gaulle on 14 July 1941. Georges Koudoukou, a native of Fort Crampel, now Kaga Bandoro, was decorated posthumously on 9 September 1942.

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in the event of external aggression contained in the defence agreement several times to request military aid from France”.11 Particularly shaken by the various crises it had to face, the former Ubangi-Chari has become accustomed to seeing men-at-arms acting with impunity on a regular basis. The lack of political stability since independence in 1960 has plunged the country into a chaos from which it has been unable to escape. Each new crisis, whether political, socioeconomic or military, does not leave neighbouring countries or France indifferent. The interference of many states in CAR’s internal affairs has made it possible to halt the chaos from time to time. This was the case in 1996, when three attempted mutinies within the FACA led the president, Ange-Félix Patassé, to request the intervention of France. The year 1996 is a pivotal year in the political-military life of the Central African Republic because it was the beginning of a series of crises lasting until 2013, leading to the Seleka attack on Bangui in 2013, whose consequences still heavily impact the daily life of Central Africans today. Libya intervened in May 2001, when former president André Kolingba failed in his attempted coup d’état against Ange-Félix Patassé. It is thanks to the political intervention and the military and financial support of Colonel Gaddafi that President Patassé is maintained in power. However, three years later, in March 2003, François Bozizé, supported by some Chadian armed groups, seized power in the Central African Republic. Following the 2011 election in the Central African Republic, François Bozizé only held a contested majority. To satisfy an increasingly virulent opposition and armed factions, he formed a government of national unity but never implemented the previously signed rebel peace and reintegration agreements of Libreville. Several groups joined forces within the Seleka (“Alliance” in Sango) to seek the implementation of these agreements. They took up arms again on 10 December 2012 with the capture of the town of Ndélé and made rapid progress against the regular army Central African Armed Forces whose capabilities proved to be very 11 Florent de Saint-Victor, 45 ans d’opérations militaires en RCA, CDEF/DREX- Lettre du Retex-opérations n°8, publiée le 9 décembre 2013 et consultée le 28 mai 2018, p. 1.

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limited. They seized several areas which produced income-generating raw materials. The President tried to rearm his camp and remain in power by manipulating people and bypassing or simply ignoring the Libreville agreement. This political game, in which he excelled but which his opponents had come to know and which now tired even his strongest external supporters, predictably failed. Part of the Seleka then took up arms again to oust President Bozizé from power. On 24 March 2013, one of the rebel leaders, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself President, granted himself the Ministry of Defence and intended to govern by decree until 2016, he said. He is not recognised by his African counterparts, who are calling for a transition. The Seleka attack on Bangui was well coordinated and conducted simultaneously on two axes. The rebels were determined and had nothing to lose. They were armed with a large number of 14.5 mm heavy machine guns mounted on pickup trucks and so crushed the FACA and overran the FOMAC.12 They also overwhelmed the South Africans who lost thirteen men in their attempt to breakout. The seizure of Bangui took place over a few hours and was followed by many days of looting, robbery, rape, murder and other kinds of abuses. This “raid” by the people from the North, most of whom spoke neither French nor Sango and whose unbridled behaviour broke all the rules of war, traumatised the population. This violent abuse continued until early September 2013 with peaks of extreme violence. France decided to intervene militarily in the CAR due to the risk of crimes against humanity and genocide.

12 FOMAC: The Central African Multinational Force was a non-permanent African multinational armed force under the aegis of the Economic Community of Central African States.

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Map of Africa

CHAPTER 2

Mission Preparation

The clouds were grey and low, visibility was poor and down to about four hundred metres. The rain had been falling for some hours now and had penetrated through our Goretex and combat kit as the wind blew across the Champagne countryside. The mud stuck to everything and slowed down all movement. I went from point to point to meet the exercising troops as they perfected their drills. Snipers observed what they could in the face of the weather from their concealed positions, wearing now soaking ghillie suits. I stopped and crawled in beside them to look through the sights to see the target area; there was not much to see. Continuing my inspection I joined the anti-tank platoon equipped with a missile that I knew well. The soldiers were in a waterlogged ditch. I jumped in and asked the detachment commander how he had briefed his team before looking through the optics myself to see if I could pick out the targets. The weather was pretty awful and made the surveillance and observation difficult… Next I went to the mortars. Here the section commander gave me an update on his equipment and explained his role in providing short-range fire support with the 81 mm mortar. He talked me through his drills which I asked him to repeat as I had very little experience of deploying mortars and I could tell from his expression that my apparent lack of understanding came as a surprise. Keen to both convince and reassure me, he added that he was qualified and experienced on his equipment. I reassured him of my confidence in him and his team, and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6_2

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indeed the effectiveness of their supporting fire was vital if the battlegroup as a whole was to perform at its best. It was particularly important to establish a bond with these infantrymen because they belonged to the 7th Mountain Infantry Battalion and their company had been attached to my Regiment for our forthcoming overseas tour in Africa. I needed to invest in the time to integrate them into the Battlegroup and understand the capabilities they brought with them. In March 2014 my Battlegroup was preparing to deploy to N’Djamena in Chad on Operation Sparrowhawk. The Battlegroup would comprise an infantry company, an armoured reconnaissance squadron, an engineer troop, a Joint Terminal Attack Controller team known as JTACs, and a Logistic Support squadron. After this period of internal training, the unit would be exercised and evaluated by the Army’s main tactical combat centre at Mailly-le-Camp. There, for the first few days, we fitted simulation kit and blue force tracker systems to our vehicles, weapon systems and personal equipment so that every element of the Battlegroup was represented and could be tracked and assessed by Exercise Control. The operational evaluation would begin on Sunday afternoon and the Battlegroup would have four days and nights in which to reach the high standard I wanted them to achieve. Through their ingenuity, skills and determination together with well applied and rigorous drills, the infantry company was graded 4/5 and the armoured squadron 5/5. Given that no armoured squadron had achieved this over the last two years and none were to do so for the following two years, this was a significant result which demonstrated the superb standard set by the Squadron Leader, Captain Vincent, who was determined to make his squadron the reference for others to match. He had been seriously wounded in Afghanistan a few years earlier and had not since returned to lead a combat unit. Under his command, the squadron was the very best that it could be. His leadership was a mixture of high standard, compassion and personal example. His mountain cavalry troopers held him in high regard and would follow him anywhere, making the squadron a model of professional soldiers empowered by mutual trust. While not the most talkative officer under my command, he was a marvellous tactician and his self-discipline was outstanding. I made no secret of my incredible good fortune to have such professional officers, notably the squadron commanders, warrant officers and NCOs under my command. Those who deployed overseas with other battlegroups also performed superbly and delivered remarkable results.

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Captain François-Xavier was the infantry company commander. The test exercise had been the first opportunity to work with the Battlegroup and he did well. His company proved highly proficient and achieved all their objectives. His style was different from that of Vincent but both were great officers and I was delighted to have them under my command for this forthcoming deployment to Africa. The Logistics Squadron was led by an officer who had been promoted from the ranks. Experienced, meticulous and diligent, Captain Pascal would not accept second best and constantly sought improvement. His role was to support the combat elements as far forward and as quickly as possible to ensure they had everything they needed for their fight. He was a workaholic and his squadron ran like clockwork. It was also inspiring to see how these operationally experienced commanders had prepared their young soldiers for what for many would be their first operational deployment. The majority of the senior ranks had significant experience from Afghanistan and Ivory Coast so while their troops were young, the leadership was robust and well prepared. Lieutenant Colonel Pierre, my Chief Operations Officer, was a highly intelligent officer and a former cadet of France’s top technical academy, the Ecole Polytechnique. Balanced and quick-witted, he and I saw eye to eye and he fully understood my intent. Deeply committed to and fully engaged in the preparation of our forthcoming operation, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre focused in particular on the coordination between the Battlegroup headquarters and the tactical subunits. Our regimental command post had not been deployed operationally for a number of years because the nature of the terrain in the Surobi and Kapisa valleys in Afghanistan had favoured the deployment of infantry units. There it had been essential to establish standard drills as well as respond to the unexpected. To mitigate against the lack of experience in the Command Post, he exercised all the staff cells to guarantee the effective passage of information. Information sharing in the headquarters is crucial to allow effective situation management and anticipation of future actions to avoid uncomfortable surprises. I wanted a command group based on accuracy and mutual understanding to allow situation updates to be delivered with brevity and precision. To this end, I banned the use of anglicisms which now feature in most officers’ vocabulary but often without the full understanding of their actual meaning. Indeed many soldiers might not speak any English and therefore be strangers to the US and NATO military jargon that is routinely recycled among the more senior ranks. It was my

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view that my soldiers needed to understand everything such as the orders that the Command Post was preparing so that we could be certain they would be understood by the troops on the ground. A common understanding of both the spirit and the letter of my orders was one of my operational priorities. This was demonstrated when I asked one of my signallers if he had understood the word that he had just written in the signal log and with some embarrassment he replied no. The word was rihoursol which means absolutely nothing in French. He had tried to record something which had been said by the Command Post Officer that he had not understood and so rehearsal became rihoursol. It was vital that we spoke the same language and so either we spoke in English or in French but never a mixture of the two so as to avoid confusion, misunderstanding or a lack of accuracy. This is a question of intellectual precision which is no luxury but an operational imperative. Oral expression must be as precise as our shooting in the field as vagueness opens the door to misunderstanding, leading to errors, poor decision-making and failure. This is why I insisted on the simple motto “Think simple to make things simple”; this was for two principal reasons. Firstly, I hated the long operational orders where, by the time you get to the last page, you forgot what was on the first! From my time as a Troop Commander onwards, I could not stand lengthy and verbose direction and guidance. Secondly, short orders offer the framework in which subordinates carry out their missions. This empowers them and encourages initiative. They need the spirit and the letter of their higher commander’s orders upon which they can then build their plan. Equally, in extremis or following a breakdown in communications, commanders at all levels must be able to respond appropriately and for this, they must be accustomed to taking the initiative. Successful command relationships are based on mutual trust where each level of command fulfils its role; this creates real efficiency. Of note, at the Joint Staff College, we were amazed by the brevity of General Leclerc’s orders for seizing Paris in 1944 and I was struck by our inability to do this today. Perhaps my goal was overly ambitious in this area, but I really wanted to produce short orders and thereby save time in their production, transmission and receipt. Therefore, succinctness, brevity, precision and clarity were the golden rules that I gave to my headquarters team. Once this process of training and testing was complete, each unit returned to its base location to complete its pre-deployment preparation.

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MISSION PREPARATION

11

Whereas I had prepared my Battlegroup for desert warfare because we would operate in Chad, Niger and Mali, the Battlegroup I was relieving also had elements deployed in the Central African Republic or “CAR”, having been deployed there because of the need to reinforce the Task Force Sangaris following a significant uplift in the level of violence. The Battlegroup commander left one squadron group in N’Djamena and deployed to CAR with a mixed force of two infantry platoons; an armoured troop, his command post and the Logistic squadron. Deployed to Bouar in the west of the country, he was reinforced with a parachute infantry company and an engineer troop. He also deployed an additional armoured troop to Bangui as the Task Force Quick Reaction Force. As the situation remained volatile, it was unlikely that he would be able to return to Chad to carry out the handover, and indeed, instead of deploying to Chad in June 2014, I was directed to deploy to CAR with elements of my Battlegroup at the end of May with the remainder proceeding to N’Djamena in mid-June as planned. There was a question over the composition of the force I was to take to Bouar. The HQ in Bangui was considering changing its force laydown and whether the QRF would remain in Bangui or rejoin my command. However, when I received the order to go to Bouar, I still did not know my force structure. I was aware that I would be reinforced in theatre by a parachute company and an engineer troop, but that was all I knew until Bangui made its decision. I needed to know whether my force in CAR would comprise a mixed company of two infantry platoons and an armoured troop or a balanced group of infantry and armoured platoons. This was important as the structure would determine the selection of the commander. For the first option, an infantry commander was the natural choice but for the second it made sense to choose a cavalry officer. This was not based on regimental loyalty and I was careful to ensure a balanced approach to the decision. The operation in CAR was more attractive than the one in Chad and both captains naturally wished to be selected to go to CAR. It was clear that the decision should sit with me as I was the commanding officer of the Battlegroup and I reported my decision to the Brigade Deputy Commander. Colonel Yann was running the Brigade while the General Officer Commanding the brigade was deployed in Mali. He agreed with my position and I informed him of the likelihood that Task Force Sangaris would place the QRF troop back under my command. Until this was confirmed we had to assume the extant laydown and to this end, I directed operations staff to prepare for the

12

A. DIROU

infantry heavy option which would naturally come under the command of Captain François-Xavier. However, until I had confirmation from Bangui I preferred not to say anything to my subordinate commanders to avoid disappointment. Ten days before departure, Colonel Yann confirmed that I would deploy with my CP, logistic squadron and a mixed squadron group of two armoured troops and two infantry platoons. Based on my assessment and our previous discussion, I told him that I would deploy with Captain Vincent and that Captain Frnaçois-Xavier would command the other company group in Chad. He understood my logic and agreed. Naturally, Captain François-Xavier was disappointed and he requested an interview with me to express his disagreement with my decision. I understood his point of view and was perfectly happy to discuss the issue. Captain François-Xavier left Varces, near Grenoble, and drove through the mountains to see me. I explained my decision and he presented his view. I accepted that he was naturally disappointed, but his duty was now to deploy as ordered and he returned to Varces. Now that the situation was cleared up we could finalise the administrative details. The deployment was on track and everyone knew what was required. Nonetheless, ten days were long enough to bring some unexpected surprises. On the eve of the deployment, I received a call from Colonel Yann. He was very embarrassed and said that I had to change over the two subunit commanders following direction from the Brigade Commander in Mali. He added that this was non-negotiable. In response I questioned whether it was appropriate to make such a change one day before the start of the operation because it was not just the change of one name but a subunit command team, and their respective freight was already in transit. Colonel Yann terminated the conversation abruptly: whatever his opinion he felt he had to support the decision of the Brigade Commander. Nevertheless, I considered that this decision should have sat with me and my assessment of my tactical mission, as the Battlegroup commander. It was hard to resist the temptation of disobeying, but after calming down I called Vincent to my office and told him that I was now required to send him to Chad and would deploy to CAR with Captain François-Xavier. I gave him some of the background for this last-minute change and, for the first time in my career, I indicated that I did not agree with the order I had received. In spite of his immense disappointment, he acknowledged the order and went to brief his team and re-organise his troops as best as he could at this late stage. The next day, he oversaw the departure of the

2

MISSION PREPARATION

13

members of the two troops of his squadron that had been preparing to deploy to CAR with great dignity and discipline. I had no doubt that he would go on to complete an excellent tour of duty in Chad. For me, the key was the success of the operation and it was not the time for recrimination so I engaged with Captain François-Xavier as if nothing had happened. The landing at Bangui was an eye-opener; as we approached there were large numbers of people on the airstrip, with armed troops positioned along the runway to allow the aircraft to reach its unloading point. Daylight was fading and it was dark by the time we actually left the aircraft. The atmosphere was heavy, humid with a pungent smell of wood burning fires filling the air. We boarded trucks to reach the French camp where we were issued our helmets, body armour and the insignia of Task Force Sangaris. Once the administrative formalities were over we settled in for our first night in Central Africa. Over the next two days, we collected our freight, ammunition and prepared our weapons. I took advantage of this time in the capital to visit the various staff branch heads in the headquarters including the chief of staff who was a good friend from St Cyr. He was able to give me a full update on the Task Force’s current and future operations. He also informed me of the key elements for the theatre together with the political and tactical situation in the country and I was able to merge this with my pre-deployment reading-in about the region. The situation for each of the three Battlegroups was very different. The unit based in Bangui controlled the capital and also held a few locations outside of the city. Its main focus was the protection of centres of government and the headquarters. The unit located in Bambari was in a particularly uncomfortable situation where its ability to operate was extremely complicated. The commander’s freedom of action was completely restricted. The north western unit, based in Bouar, benefitted from an environment more conducive to taking the initiative and manoeuvring. This tactical freedom offered much greater latitude to conduct operations. Following various briefings from the Intelligence, Logistics and Civil Affairs desks, I went to see Future Plans, known as G5 to find out how the next steps were expected to unfold. It was important for me to understand how the Task Force envisaged the transition from Stabilisation to Normalisation. I was also keen to ascertain the likelihood of my unit being able to return to Chad to re-group at the end of the mission. The staff were sceptical at best, even pessimistic. Finally, I went to meet the Task Force commander, Brigadier General Soriano. We had

14

A. DIROU

known each other previously in the Plans Branch of the General Staff in Paris. He welcomed me warmly and provided a very positive view of the achievements made by my predecessor, whom I would meet up with a few hours later. It was time to leave Bangui and proceed to Bouar and our convoy departed early the following morning. The distance was around 460 km. The road was in a poor state with potholes everywhere and those travelling in the rear of the trucks were thrown all over the place. Four hours later we arrived at Bossembélé where I deployed two platoons. The village was a vital access point to the northern part of our future area of responsibility and control of this crossroads guaranteed our freedom of manoeuvre between the capital and to the north and west. After a short stop, we continued our journey through the villages of Yaloké and Bossentélé. The long hours of sitting on the steel benches wearing our body armour numbed our bodies; however, the worst part of the journey was to come after the village of Baoro. Here the metalled road ended and huge ruts punished the vehicles and their passengers. Fortunately, the weather was good so at least the track was dry and navigable. The rain would have made it a very different story. This last section of the route took us four hours and finally we arrived at our destination, the town of Bouar. We received a warm welcome from the in-place Battlegroup which was code-named Dragoon, and I met the commanding officer who was a very good friend. We had known each other during our days together in a military school prior to going to St Cyr. Colonel Damien Wallaert had done an outstanding job leading his battalion and his men had seen action in which they had acquitted themselves well. On 5 May 2014, three weeks prior to our arrival, two infantry platoons had been carrying out a reconnaissance mission in the north of the country when it came up against a mobile column of some forty fighters as they approached the village of Boguila. The French troops attempted to intercept them and they opened fire and deployed in an attempt to overrun the French company in the village. The fighting was hard with, on one side, a force armed with Kalashnikovs, RPG 7 rocket launchers and 14.5 mm heavy machine guns and, on the French side, heavy infantry weapons, Eryx anti-tanks missiles and 81 mm mortars. In the end, the French called for Close Air Support and a Mirage 2000 out of N’Djamena dropped a GBU-12 bomb. The fighting stopped at nightfall and did not resume the following day. No detailed battle damage assessment was possible, but it was clear that the adversary had sustained losses. We knew before arriving

2

MISSION PREPARATION

15

that, although the situation might appear to be calm, sudden outbreaks of violence would occur. Each element of the Battlegroup was taken in hand by its opposite number and reconnaissance on the ground provided environmental familiarisation. Damien had established excellent relations with the local authorities and the local population. This gave him a remarkable network and, as a result, his intelligence cell was very well informed. The briefings we received were factual, precise and well-structured which was the hallmark of Damien and this made the handover very easy. It is also important to highlight the achievements of the other two previous battlegroups. Battlegroup Panther had come from Gabon and was commanded by Colonel Arnaud Mettey from the 43rd Marine Infantry Battalion in Libreville (Gabon). He had faced a number of difficult situations in which he did his best to reduce the threat level and the threshold of violence. His team has worked hard and as a result, the local situation had improved considerably. Current conflicts do not conform to the framework of major combat operations such as we saw back in 1990/1991 when an international coalition restored Kuwaiti territorial integrity. Peacebuilding interventions are more limited and take place in a complex civilian-military environment. Confrontation is everywhere and has to be addressed in the round. Three elements are generally in play; the first relates to coercion, the second is stabilisation with the aim being to restore (civilian) political primacy and the third is the normalisation of a peaceful daily existence. In the case of coercion, this equates to security operations undertaken by the military and the police and so this is relatively straightforward in terms of approach albeit difficult to actually deliver on the ground; The stabilisation phase is a buffer between confrontation and peace with the aim being to reduce the threshold of violence despite the occasional spikes that might occur. This is the critical bridge for conflict resolution because of the delicate balance in which the peace process often hangs. Any positive opportunities must be exploited to the full. Sharing accurate and up-to-date situation awareness is vital in order to identify opportunities for post-conflict/post-crisis reconstruction and to continue down the path of reconciliation. Therefore, success is sought not by breaking up or destroying the adversary but by identifying and seizing opportunities to promote the peace process. The aim of military intervention is therefore to facilitate the reestablishment of peace and create the conditions for the political and diplomatic foundations for an enduring peace. The operating conditions for peace-keeping operations can almost be

16

A. DIROU

compared to a feudal environment with warlords, armed groups, rebels, criminal gangs and other violent non-state actors who must be controlled. Feudalism is not confined to the Middle Ages; it emerges when a state or political regime collapses or where no state structures exist. These circumstances lead to a world of compartmentalised control and local centres of authority where the strongest holds the levers of power. Today we no longer call this feudalism but term it as an environment of informal networks of patronage or clientelism. Sometimes it is the rallying call for self-determination that can trigger feudalism as this opposes the central power and promotes a different social order based on local, often selfserving, economic interests. The intermingling of these complex factors leads to disorder and conflict. Nation- and state-building that took Western countries many decades to achieve, indeed in some cases centuries, is now sought in weeks and months and certainly in no more than a few years. Overcoming modernday feudalism, which is deeply engrained in failed states with all its grey zones, presents a significant challenge. This is the context of the mission given to the deployed forces who must restore the rule of law. This is the reason why soldiers come to be seen as the managers of chaos. They are prepared for intervention in the worst situations where the rule of law has disappeared, where violence, crime and inhumanity have become the norm. Their capabilities, which includes the use of force, makes them suitable for the challenge. As General Krulak sets out in his “Three Block War” concept, in stabilisation operations soldiers must simultaneously fight, deliver humanitarian assistance and create the conditions for a return to normality, all within a small area. This is no small challenge and yet the smallest mistake by a junior soldier can assume strategic propositions hence the term “strategic corporal”. From chaos to calm is it possible to find a path leading to continued and enduring success in terms of stabilisation which will allow it to transition into normalisation? This was the challenge for Battlegroup de Boissieu and because my initial knowledge of my area of responsibility was limited, I converted the map into a rough diagram showing the distance between the main locations. With this image in my head, I had the basic framework of the terrain onto which I could then layer my further understanding.

2

MISSION PREPARATION

Chad

MARKOUNDA

150km 13H00

BATANGAFO

PAOUA

190 km 12H00 100 km 10H00

BOCARANGA

190 km 11H00

Cameroon

BOSSANGOA

BELOKO

BOUAR BAORO

BABOUA 104 km 04H00

460 km 11H00

BOUCA

148 km 05H00 BOSSENTELE YALOKE BOSSEMBELE

CARNOT AMADA GAZA

88 km 03H30

BANGUI BERBERATI

450 km

Author’s creation based on a handmade sketch

550 km

100 km 08H00

BOZOUM

17

CHAPTER 3

A Holistic Approach

After a week of handing over, I took over the area of responsibility at noon on 6 June 2014 and Battlegroup de Boissieu set about its mission. We needed a few additional days to be operational after having completed the recovery of the freight initially sent to N’Djamena. The timeframe for our mission was four months and took place over the period when the Task Force changed its commanding general. Brigadier General Francisco Soriano who had led the Force from 5 December 2013, now handed over to Brigadier General Eric Bellot des Minières on 17 June 2014. A change of command is a transition period during which activities always tend to slow down. That was the case for my Battlegroup a few days earlier and now so it was for the Force. However, I did not want to lose any time and wished to launch a series of operations in my area as soon as possible without waiting for fresh direction, which would probably not be radically different from that given to my predecessor. I also knew the new Force Commander, General Bellot des Minières, with whom I had worked a few years before in Paris and I knew his style and operational experience as the former commanding officer of the 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment in Afghanistan. I felt safe assuming that I could take the initiative. I divided the tasks with my chief of operations so that I could focus on defining the campaign plan. Lieutenant Colonel Pierre was leading the planning for the first operational activities and the reconnaissance © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6_3

19

20

A. DIROU

phase was now nearly complete. I quickly met with many people, officials, NGOs, mayors, catholic priests, the imam of Bouar and representatives of the Muslim community, and visited many places in order to get a clear idea of the region. I remembered a very insightful book which I had read many years ago and I wanted to mirror its spirit in my mission to deliver a safe and secure environment. Letters from Tonkin and Madagascar was written by Marshal Lyautey and published in 1920 and offered the direction that I wanted to follow. I had a particular link to Lyautey, not only because he commanded the 1st squadron of my Regiment from 1887–1893 but also because my great-grandparents knew him when they were in Morocco at the beginning of the protectorate in 1913. I grew up with the memory of Lyautey and a love of the country where my parents were also born. Even before joining my Regiment, I already had an affinity with Lyautey. When I was young, I knew his story in detail and his achievements overseas offered excellent food for thought. The Marshal was therefore a source of inspiration. Apart from defining the spirit in which I wished to operate, I had to plan all the activities I wished to conduct. To this end, I used a US approach I had observed in Afghanistan with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams organised their work around an acronym which listed all the domains they had to address to cover all aspects of national reconstruction. The acronym SWEAT MS CREG provided the handrail to achieve the outcomes I wanted to achieve. Therefore, I reflected on these eleven different domains: Sewage / Water / Electricity / Academic / Trash / Medical / Security / Communication / Religion / Economy / Government. The point was to define the “Ends” of the mission, the “Ways” I wished to employ and the “Means” to deliver my effects. With regard to the “Ends”, I considered two different stages, both short and long term, because the realistic art of the possible had to guide our actions first and foremost and make sense for soldiers if they were to embrace the concept and make progress. Consequently, I defined the centre of gravity: it was clearly the populace because it constituted the main parameter of the equation. We had to convince people, through our example and effectiveness, that they could rely on us. Only this would allow us to build something stronger in the longer term. My end state that was a long-term objective and went well beyond the period of our operational tour in Central Africa.

3

A HOLISTIC APPROACH

21

It appeared to me that I needed to situate my action within the broader scope of the strategic picture. For that, I used the motto of the country, “Unity, Dignity, and Work” because this part of my campaign plan would be shared with the local authorities and partners. It was important to speak not only to their minds but also to their hearts. I tried to anchor my thoughts in the local mindset, considering their culture was the key factor because I considered it was the only door to success. This is why our end state was: “Unity – Dignity – Work in a newfound intercommunity peace”. This gave our local interlocutors their aim. Nevertheless, this objective was some distance from a short-term view, and I chose two intermediate aims which were like goalposts in a rugby field, through which I wanted to convert the try. Bouar was the major town in the western part of the country; therefore, I formulated these goals as my tactical targets: – Make Bouar the pilot city of Central African appeasement; – Create the conditions to enhance the prosperity of Bouar, which can then extend to the country from west to east. The purpose of this plan was to bring security to the region and consequently stability that would allow the return of the Muslim population. Prosperity would improve living conditions and encourage development even though it is a long way to the top if you want to make peace.The campaign plan took a holistic view and proposed a global approach to tackle all the points we had to deal with. Instead of establishing a complicated plan with too many lines of operation, noting that eleven areas to be addressed seemed too much and risked losing my audience, I reduced the plan to five lines of operation. Each line of operation began with a letter of the city’s name, BOUAR: 1. Bien faire et faire savoir (communication) 2. Organisation Locale (santé, propreté, assainissement…) 3. U nité et lien social (respect des communautés, re-scolarisation…) 4. Autorité publique (affirmation de l’autorité publique) 5. Relance de l’économie

22

A. DIROU

In English, this translates as:

1. Do the right thing and tell people about it (communication) 2. Local organisation (health, cleanliness, sanitation…) 3. Unity and social bond (respect for communities, return to school…) 4. Public authority (restoration of police and justice) 5. Relaunch the economy On each line of operation, I defined the main areas that needed to be addressed in a multitude of tasks or actions. Therefore, I shaped the plan as followed. Line 1: 11. Establish a prefectural communication plan 12. Produce communication lines to take 13. Inform people about the public initiatives underway 14. Advertise our activities 15. Publicise at the national level Line 2: 21. Improve working conditions for NGOs 22. Improve sanitation and water flow 23. Encourage the cleanliness of the streets, roads, and their maintenance 24. Create public refuse dumps 25. Maintain collective areas 26. Create facilities for community sport 27. Establish a road infrastructure improvement project Line 3: 31. Pursue and develop the schooling of very young children 32. Identify secondary school teachers 33. Return teenagers to education 34. Provide a framework for undertaking sports

3

A HOLISTIC APPROACH

23

35. Respect for communities and religions 36. Freedom of movement 37. Recreate the community social bond Line 4: 41. Initial assessment and preparation of the prefectural project 42. Support for municipal projects 43. Support legal action and justice (a prison inter-ministerial agreement) 44. Close cooperation with the security forces 45. Cooperation with FACA (to be defined) 46. Transition to MINUSCA 47. Withdrawal of SANGARIS Line 5: 51. Keep the Cantonnier-Bangui road open 52. Increase the perception of security 53. Make Bouar’s bank more reliable 54. Help boost municipal tax revenues 55. Energy (electricity, fuel) NGO project assistance 56. Water supply improvement 57. Encourage local agriculture (FAO support) 58. Promote the local economy through free movement

Doing well

Establish a road infrastructure improvement project

26

25

24

23

22

27

15

14

13

12

14

54

Improve the working condiƟons of NGOs Improve sanitaƟon and water flow To encourage the cleanliness of the streets and its maintenance Create public dumps Maintenance of collecƟve areas Create public sport spaces

53

43

34

23

2–L

52

33

42

22

13

21

Establish a prefectural communicaƟon plan ConsƟtute elements of language Inform ciƟzens about the public acƟons iniƟated ValorisaƟon of all the acƟons undertaken To make known at the naƟonal level

41

32

12

1–D

51

31

21

11

11

5 – ecovery of economy

R

4 – ublic authority

P

3 – nity and social bond

U

2 - ocal organisaƟon

L

and communicaƟng

1–

CooperaƟon with FACA (to be defined) TransiƟon with the rise of MINUSCA SANGARIS withdrawal

45

37

36

35

Recreate the social bond

Freedom of movement

Structuring the pracƟce of sport Respect for communiƟes and religions

47

46

44

43

42

34

33

32

IniƟal assesment and preparaƟon of the prefectural project Support for municipal acƟons IncenƟves for legal acƟon (prison interministerial convenƟon) Close cooperaƟon with ISPs

58

4–P

57

47

41

56

46

27

Pursue and develop the schooling of the youngest IdenƟfy secondary school teachers Re-school teens

45

37

26

3–U

55

36

25

16

31

44

35

24

15

globale pour la ville de BOUAR et sa région NormalisaƟon for an intercommunity peace within « Unity – Dignity – Work »

Global Approach for the city of Bouar and its region

5–R

58

57

56

55

53 54

52

51

To improve adducƟon of water Encouraging local agriculture (WFO assistance) Promote local trade linked to freedom of movement

Maintaining open the road Cantonnier-Bangui Increase the feeling of security Reliability of Bouar’s Bank Help boost municipal tax revenues Energy (power, fuel) helps NGOs on project

populaƟon

Center of gravity

24 A. DIROU

3

A HOLISTIC APPROACH

25

On 16 June, I submitted this project to the prefect who reacted positively. He was enthusiastic. The principle was to provide him with a general framework so that the detailed definition of the activities to be conducted could be designed by his prefectural services. I gave him the shape and he asked his civil servants—who were in fact very few in number—to design each domain and set out the tasks they would need to undertake. Frédéric Ouagonda was a great servant of the state who was driven inspired by a deep sense of acting in the interest of the community. Everything he did was for the benefit of others, regardless of background, and it was a real pleasure to work alongside him. Although he had very few resources, he mobilised all the means at his disposal to improve the local situation. An impressive man, determined and very intelligent, he was very clear about his goal. All he needed was the support that I could offer him. We got along very well and were confident that we could succeed together. Once I had the prefect on my side, I sent a report to Sangaris HQ in Bangui in which I explained how my Battlegroup would set about its mission. Although I was responsible for all orders given to my team, I delegated the preparation of the tactical missions to my chief of operations while I dealt with political and social issues. The challenge we faced required us to work across a very wide range of tasks and, because everything was linked, it was vital to cover all the bases. Fortunately, the prosecutor in Bouar was also an excellent man; completely dedicated to his work, courageous and determined to prosecute criminals. On our side, we were also well supported by the legal and the political advisors of Sangaris Force whose contributions were crucial. These provided us with contacts within the government and enabled our action, because one of the main difficulties was to secure the attention of a government which was facing huge challenges with regard to its central region. To avoid any Bangui-centric perspective, my objective was to centralise requests addressed to the capital so that the prefect and the prosecutor would receive either the means or the official support they needed to launch their ambitious and legitimate actions to restore a peaceful environment. Indeed, I recommended that the prefect and the prosecutor sent official requests for support through their own administrative structure, while I asked LEGAD and POLAD for their mediation to engage Ministries interested in our local projects. Through this approach, the projects were communicated at the national level by two methods; first by transmitting

26

A. DIROU

the request, and second by promoting the project and focusing ministerial attention on provincial issues. The best illustration of this success was the inter-Ministerial agreement we managed to coordinate between the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Defence and Territorial Communities for regional application. Benefitting from the presence of a military police non-commissioned officer, I drew on his police and law enforcement skills to organise training for the region’s security forces, even though his chief in Bangui did not approve as this role was not a formal part of his mission. Between the spirit and the letter, I opted for spirit because “the only good strategy is total ”.1 Progressively, the police were beginning to regain some confidence and, feeling supported, returned to work. However, policing can only be effective if the proper functioning of the judicial system supports it. As with the prefect, I found common grounds with the prosecutor, Tiburce Bilongo. Caring, demanding and insightful, he used his unfailing energy to get the justice system up and running again, but one of his first matters of business was that he needed space to detain people who had been arrested. After some explaining and convincing all the project stakeholders, we managed to get an official document signed, validated by the four supervising ministers, making available to the courts the prison cells of the Central African army barracks located in Bouar. This success made it possible to demonstrate to the population that state authority was returning. Police and justice were seen once again to be functioning. Each small step contributed to the restoration of the perception of security and impunity was no longer assumed. The effects on the ground were soon apparent as villagers now felt able to take positive action against run-ofthe-mill criminals whom they could then deliver to the security forces, as was the case in the village of Galo Bouya on 1 July 2014 when fourteen Anti-Balakas were arrested. The confidence of the police and civil servants increased as they felt supported and encouraged in their difficult duty. In other areas, the prefect’s action was also significant and his constant commitment made it possible to make progress across many issues. We met regularly to exchange ideas and address the seemingly endless list of problems we had to solve. Every Thursday, we met up at the end of the afternoon for an update on our ongoing projects, to prepare the 1 Michael Shurkin, Grand Strategy is total: French Gen. André Beaufre on war in the nuclear age, https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/grand-strategy-is-total-french-genandre-beaufre-on-war-in-the-nuclear-age/.

3

A HOLISTIC APPROACH

27

next phase and look at long-term requirements. Sharing the same vision, our cooperation was excellent because the implementation of a holistic plan, covering all sectors of the administration, was an exciting challenge. Sharing our analysis on how to carry out the initiatives and notably in the coordination of all the actors, Mr Ouagonda brought together NGO representatives at regular intervals. The first meeting surprised the humanitarian workers when the prefect requested not only an account of their on-going activities but also of their long-term projects. Their surprise was quite marked when they saw me at this first meeting and the reluctance of some of them to see a soldier at this meeting was unsurprising. After briefing them on the global approach he wanted to adopt and listening to the NGOs explain their activities in his region, the prefect set out his objectives. Furthermore, he remarked that he did not need as many humanitarian organisations caring for women and children but needed greater diversity to implement his plan, especially in agricultural and energy development, water supply and road network improvement. Some humanitarians workers were upset to be questioned in this way, but the prefect was right. The NGO representatives seemed surprised to be viewed through a long-term lens as usually their activities target the urgent and immediate. The prefect explained his goal and how he wanted to achieve it. For this, he needed to coordinate all the actors. The plan provided the foundation for regional reconstruction and his energy was the cement of this ambitious project. This was made possible thanks to the concurrent tactical activities undertaken by the Battlegroup. Patrolling, observing specific areas, intervening and rescuing civilian people, the legionnaires and mountain soldiers of my Battlegroup became quickly recognised for their effectiveness and the consideration they gave to the local population. The Battlegroup’s laydown covered a huge area and the mobility of the light units allowed a wide presence across the region. Even when a presence was not possible, companies were able to move rapidly to intervene, including by helicopter if necessary. The main mission was to maintain freedom of movement on the main supply route linking Bangui to the Cameroonian border. The road between the border town of Beloko and Bangui was crucial, if not vital, for the stability of the Central African capital. All means and goods to supply Bangui came through this route, for which we were responsible for maintaining free movement. Each blockade or interruption of the movement of goods destabilised the urban population.

28

A. DIROU

Despite improving security, there was something I disliked. My command post was located in Bouar with the logistic company and the Role One medical facility. Companies were split into two subunits. The Foreign Legion parachute company was in the western part of my AOR because I wanted to be close to the commanding officer with whom I had never worked before. Two platoons led by the company’s second in command were in Beloko on the Cameroonian border, and the other two were with the company commander in Bouar, in another location close to my camp. The mountain infantry company was deployed on the same model on the eastern side: two platoons with the company’s second in command in Bossembélé and the company commander with the two remaining platoons in Bossangoa. Several aspects of this situation did not suit me. I found the Battlegroup’s organisation over-stretched and I considered that this hampered my ability to manoeuvre. In fact, more dangerously, I felt that my freedom of action was genuinely limited and, as a cavalry officer, this was a point which left me feeling deeply uncomfortable. Logistics, equipment maintenance and sustainment were far from simple because of the distances between locations. Moreover, in the event that kinetic operations were to be required, it was not certain that I would be able to generate a favourable force ratio given that I could not avoid leaving troops to guard my static laydown. Equally, my company commanders would not be able to bring their full capabilities to bear if and when this became necessary. Finally, the dispersed laydown did not match our communications capabilities. Nonetheless, I started the mission like this as I had little choice and the first results appeared quite positive.

CHAPTER 4

Failure at M’Bali

There was one obvious advantage with the unit’s deployment, which was that we had numerous contacts with the civilian local authorities and with MISCA units, which belonged to the African Union. Our main partner was a highly competent Cameroon battalion, and together we cooperated both in terms of information sharing and coordination on the ground. After each subunit had taken into account its immediate area of responsibility, we decided to conduct our first operation in depth to carry out a reconnaissance mission towards the village of Bodjomo on 18 June 2014. The presence of an armed group had been identified and, according to the local population, this group was responsible for dozens of deaths over the past few weeks. It was particularly mobile, attacking, killing and looting the populace. I sent two platoons under Captain François-Xavier to carry out this first reconnaissance because this village lay to the north of his camp at Bossangoa. To command this first modest operation, I sent Lieutenant Colonel Pierre with a small command team to cover the airground integration while the Battlegroup’s main command post remained in Bouar. Thus, the detachment consisted of an armoured troop, an infantry platoon, a Gazelle helicopter patrol, and a JTAC team. Given the size of the deployed force, I considered this operation was not my level of responsibility. Therefore, my operations chief left Bouar to proceed to Bossangoa. Our first mission in depth could now begin. On 18 June as the detachment reached the village the gang was surprised by our arrival © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6_4

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and fled. The village was deserted and its frightened inhabitants had taken refuge in the jungle to escape the exactions of these terrorists. While the armoured troop was securing the area, the infantry searched the village and found documents that confirmed the group’s affiliation with the military hierarchy of the Seleka. Observing the French presence, villagers came back to recount what they experienced and described thugs who had banded together in gangs, robbing, looting and frequently murdering unfortunate innocents on their route. Our doctor’s presence made it possible to treat those who had been seriously injured with machetes by the gang. The detachment was quite a distance from the Command Post, some 250 km as the crow flies, and communications were challenging. Lieutenant Colonel Pierre was able to exploit this operation to test the limits of our communications including data transmission. The test went well and we received copies of the seized documents within a few minutes. At the beginning of July 2014, atrocities resumed in the northern part of the Battlegroup’s area. The Seleka were a political and military organisation, serving the private interests of warlords who eventually gave a strong religious colour to their political claims. Strongly influenced by radical Islam, the Seleka chiefs demanded the partition of the country. To do so, they terrorised the villagers and tried to extend their influence to increase their territorial claims. At least four attacks against the population were recorded, which killed several dozen people. The information collected made it possible to identify the village of Mbali as the rear base of the armed group. Therefore, I decided to mount an operation with this village as our objective. At this time, the volume of Mbali’s armed group was estimated to be about ten men who it was assessed would seek to avoid combat with our force. For this operation, the Cameroonian MISCA battalion was to be in support. The commanding officer provided an infantry platoon and a command team. This operation was to be our first joint endeavour and the results of our close work with our Cameroonian friends looked positive. The scheme of manoeuvre was to approach the village from the west, block the exfiltration routes with half an infantry platoon at the north and the other half at the south supported by a Gazelle patrol and an armoured troop. In the second part at sunrise, the MISCA troops would move into the centre of the village to capture the terrorists. Based on our previous experience at Bodjomo, which indicated that the enemy would flee, it was vital that the blocking positions were established discreetly to maintain surprise. The operation was controlled from the main command post at Bouar located

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some 400 km away and commanded from a forward command post as we had done at Bodjomo. As the size of the deployed force remained small, I once again gave command to Lieutenant Colonel Pierre. On the afternoon of 9 July, a recently escaped detainee of Mbali’s armed group confirmed our intelligence: twelve men armed with Kalashnikovs and a PKM and whose leader was travelling by motorcycle. The latter was equipped with a satellite telephone on which he communicated in Arabic. On the evening of 9 July, Captain François-Xavier, who was in command on the ground, briefed his plan to all the participants, including the MISCA platoon. It was decided to leave Bossangoa on 10th July at 0400 hrs, to reach the outskirts of Mbali around 1300 hrs and begin to cordon off the village in the early afternoon. The departure and the first half of the move occurred without difficulty despite the poor condition of the tracks. The second half was significantly impeded by over thirty obstacles, made by cutting down trees to obstruct the track. Thanks to hard work by a Foreign Legion engineer section, the routes were opened but the movement was very slow and consequently, surprise was lost. Only ten kilometres were covered in three hours. The decision was made to find a bivouac area at around 1400 hrs while continuing to open the route. At 1600 hrs, the captain gave fresh timings to restart the mission with departure set for 2300 hrs, infiltration of the foot elements between 0100 hrs and 0500 hrs. Air support would be from 0400 hrs to 0600 hrs, after which the Gazelle patrol and a Puma would take over fire support from the air. As the logistics platoon had a kerosene tanker, the helicopters could refuel alongside the forces they were supporting, thus avoiding the long flight back to base and allowing them to remain on station for much longer. By 0130 hrs, the Command Post was in place and the infiltration began. However, while moving through giant grass, the half platoon advancing in the south came across the rebels who were established in strong defensive positions 600 meters south of the village. Surprised, they were instantly in contact as the enemy opened fire with automatic weapons. One mountain soldier was severely wounded and two others were knocked out by grenades. In the north of the village, the other half platoon had not been detected but had also identified fighters. On hearing of the casualty over the radio, this section now opened fire and overcame the enemy to their front and then re-deployed to the south of the village to reinforce their comrades who were in a difficult position. However, at night in the jungle, with obstacles and the presence of the enemy, it took almost an hour to cover 800 metres. Over this period the section

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in the south remained in contact with a determined adversary while also providing medical care to the wounded soldier using a tourniquet and morphine. He remained conscious and the two soldiers who had been knocked unconscious by the grenade strike were now back in the fight. Just after the initial engagement at 0250 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre called the Main Command Post in Bouar to report the situation. Communications were awful at this point because of a tropical thunderstorm that covered the region. Major Christophe, the logistics officer within the HQ, was on duty that night and came to wake me up. I went to the operations room and we tried to establish radio contact by different means with the forward base in Bossangoa, which was now uncontactable. We were also unable to communicate with our helicopters. We did our best to get through. I reported what I knew and inevitably they were far from happy with such scant information. Finally, Christophe got a short and very poor radio link with Major Pierre to explain the situation. From his side, Pierre was working hard trying to fix his radio difficulties in Bossangoa. He alerted the crew of the medical evacuation helicopter (MEDEVAC), which comprised two pilots, a flight engineer, two mountain commandos from my regiment, a doctor and a nurse. Due to the weather conditions, the helicopter was only able to take-off at around 0420 hrs. Nevertheless, despite worsening meteorological conditions, and operating outside of their theatre instructions, the crew took off and crossed through the storm to recover the casualty. In the meantime, the infantry platoon re-grouped and finally extracted their wounded private under fire at 0500 hrs. For three hours and carrying the casualty, they had fought off a pursuing enemy. When they reached the armoured ambulance, the rebels focused their fire against the medical team in the Red Cross vehicle. There, the nurse, a tough Warrant Officer called Jean-Pierre exposed himself under fire to get the casualty into the ambulance. Due to the close proximity of the enemy, the armoured platoon could not use its 90 mm guns. To this end, the troop commander, Warrant Officer Mickaël ordered his section to advance forward to protect the detachment. This section, mounted in soft-skinned 4 x 4 drew the fire of the enemy and thereby protected the medical evacuation. They did this without hesitation and engaged the enemy with their rifles as the ambulance withdrew. The doctor, Colonel Pierre, stabilised the casualty before loading him onto the MEDEVAC helicopter. At 0650 hrs the helicopter took off for the military hospital at Bangui airport. A short time later the Gazelle patrol arrived to provide fire support.

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The enemy situation had been considerably underestimated. Instead of a group of twelve people, the detachment faced a forty-strong group of fighters. Our force ratio was clearly not enough and our knowledge of the environment manifestly lacking. These fighters had no intention to escape, they were established in defence because they expected an attack from another irregular militia! The Cameroonian MISCA platoon protected the forward command post throughout. During the contacts, humidity hampered our night-vision equipment and denied us our technical superiority. All soldiers subsequently said that their close quarters combat training in the wet forests of France had been useful under these conditions. This also helped to avoid friendly fire casualties at night. In the end, we had a wounded soldier and even though the detachment withdrew, our consolation was that the enemy sustained greater losses; we estimated around twelve. Because the MEDEVAC helicopter had now departed for Bangui, the detachment was obliged to suspend operations, as it now had no long-range MEDEVAC asset. Therefore, given the communication limitations radio isolated, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre wisely decided to move back. Beyond being naturally frustrating, this experience reinforced my desire not only to re-organise the Battlegroup’s laydown but also to manoeuvre according to the rules of tactics and the tenets of war: economy of force, concentration of effort and freedom of action. I currently had none of the components in that trilogy. I was spread over a large area; four and a half platoons out of eight were required to guard five camps. In such conditions, I thought that I would never be able to fulfil my mission. From a personal perspective, I was over-stretched, particularly when I had to manage and solve disciplinary issues in N’Djamena… It was like a remote command. It was one thing to know what was wrong; it was another thing to put it right. To convince all my stakeholders, I increased the messaging I had already begun. I had a number of conversations with the plans officers who worked in the G5 branch. I explained my aims and the results that I hoped to achieve. They were interested and shared my views. In the meantime, I worked with the LEGAD to finalise the local prison cell project. She was an amazing and dedicated officer whose help and support were essential. The first results started to appear in my AOR. The Force Commander was not opposed to my proposals but he preferred that I delay a little because he wanted to be sure that the main supply road between Beloko, Bouar and Bangui was secure. I continued with

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my idea and worked with my Cameroonian counterpart who was a very good officer. Clever and open-minded, he was also extremely kind, and our cooperation was excellent. I helped him to protect his compound in Bouar thanks to my engineer troop, and as his battalion was deployed across my area of responsibility, we exchanged considerable information. We increased this intelligence cooperation after the failure of the Mbali operation, and this presented a united front to the rebels. We established a mutual trust based on operational effectiveness. Both our units caught criminals, seized ammunition and weapons. The local police forces felt well supported and the population was grateful to our troops for their efforts. This is what Lieutenant General Maqsood saw in Bouar when he came on 7 July to be briefed on the local situation in order to decide whether the security situation was sufficiently improved to allow the deployment of UN administration and troops in this region. He first came to my command post where I briefed him and Lieutenant Colonel Guillaume K. I also attended the briefing that Guillaume gave to the Military Advisor of the Under-Secretary-General of Peacekeeping Operations. An important point was also the tax revenues that the Central African government collected from customs duties at the Beloko border crossing point… Even though my half company was not a bank, it was the guarantor of the security of this revenue. Nevertheless, my Cameroonian partner also had a compound with two platoons at this location on the Cameroonian-Central African border. We therefore prepared to transfer this task, which further highlighted the reliability of this battalion. As soon as I could hand over this task, I could redeploy this detachment to Bouar where Captain Gabriel could finally command all his legionnaires and have a coherent force laydown. This change of location in the west would not create a hole as Cameroonian soldiers continued to maintain an international presence in Beloko. On the other hand, the move of my mountain soldiers from Bossembélé to Bossangoa, in order to redeploy this company in the north, could create a vacuum since there was no other unit to ensure a permanent presence. But, the security situation in Bossembélé was good and even though the place was a strategic crossroads between the main supply road and this axis to the north, I was not worried about withdrawing my soldiers from there. This company would just have to send regular patrols there to maintain our presence. Tensions were real in Bossongoa and I needed more manpower to help local authorities restore the State’s authority. I decided to transfer the tax mission to my Cameroonian counterpart without informing the HQ in

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Bangui. Thus, I was able to increase the number of patrols and long-range reconnaissance available to Captain Gabriel and so enhance the uncertainty and unpredictability of our actions against the terrorist groups. As security was improving, the HQ in Bangui was preparing an operation which my Battlegroup was to carry out in the northern part of our AOR. The aim was to show our presence in the area of Boguila, where a clash occurred on 5 May. Operation Vesta was being prepared when we hosted the visit of General Ract-Madoux, the Chief of the General Staff on 23 July. After briefing him in front of a map, I told General Ract-Madoux we were going to take a tour of Bouar in order to meet with the prefect, the prosecutor and to have a look at the area. As we moved towards the vehicles, General Ract-Madoux asked me why I did not wear my body armour. I replied that the security situation was safe enough and for a number of days I had done this to show the population that we felt safe. Perception is important and contributes towards improving the situation. To this end, I invited him to do the same as me. His bodyguards were aghast by my proposal and requested him to wear it. Smiling and amused, I added that it would change nothing for me. General Ract-Madoux chose to trust me and left his body armour. The visit went very well and Bouar was seen through a new lens of safety and security. After lunch, we flew quickly to Beloko to show CGS where the two platoons were on the border and their proximity to their Cameroonian counterparts. This visit showed the positive results that the Battlegroup was beginning to have; but a question that the general asked me aside at the end of lunch really surprised me: “Do you want to change the company commanders?” he asked. He referred to the order I had received the eve of my departure from France to the Central African Republic when I had to replace Captain Vincent by Captain François-Xavier. General Ract-Madoux knew Vincent very well because of his injuries from Afghanistan and his case was closely followed by the highest echelons of the Army to see whether he would recover his physical aptitude to lead a combat unit. Looking him straight in the eye, I told him I wouldn’t, first because of the material disorder and general confusion it would create, but also because Vincent was not familiar with the area, and, last but not least, because I wanted to remain loyal to my brigade commander, even if that meant obeying orders I didn’t necessarily agree with. This last reason seemed to me to be the most important. The discussion stopped there and CGS pursued meeting with troops before leaving and flying back to Bangui. Vincent

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remained in N’Djamena where he continued to demonstrate outstanding leadership on what was a thankless task. After CGS had left the country, I reported to the Force Commander that I was ready to concentrate my companies on Bouar and Bossangoa. MISCA units and then MINUSCA units would hold the key points on the ground and with a mobile battle group; I could intervene with greater agility and force. I just needed his agreement to do so. This laydown would facilitate Operation Vesta as I would have much greater freedom of manoeuvre. His concern was the security of the tax money, which could not be neglected due to its importance to the government. I said I understood his concerns but I had already transferred this task to my Cameroonian partner who was carrying out it well. Money transfers were still carried out safely and the revenue supply had not been interrupted. No one in Bangui had noticed any change therefore we could move on to the next step. He agreed. Explaining to the local authorities the purpose of the redeployment, each company concentrated its troops on a single site. That meant we saved more than fifty per cent of the force which had been previously consumed by force protection. It also allowed more time to rest and recover from the harsh conditions. This was the best thing we could do from a tactical point of view and this soon became very clear. Bangui was in turmoil because the Seleka seemed to be preparing to attack the capital. On 18 July I received the order to send a forward command post and a company group to Damara, two hours north-east of Bangui with the task of blocking an eventual rebels’ raid towards the capital. The rest of the Battlegroup was on alert at six hours’ notice to move. Thanks to our geographic reorganisation, we were able to perform this operation, codenamed Mercury. I entrusted the command to my operations centre manager, Major Stéphane. He had deployed to Central Africa six months before with the 27th Mountain Infantry Battalion, where he had served as an intelligence officer. As a result, he knew the area inside out and his experience was particularly valuable to us, not only due to the very short preparation phase but also throughout our stay in the vicinity. He deployed to protect Bangui with a detachment made up of two infantry platoons, an armoured troop and a JTAC team.

CHAPTER 5

A Raid Through the Jungle

Having sent a detachment to Damara, we continued to plan Operation Vesta in order to deal with the increasing rebel activity in the northern part of our area. The objective was again to be in the region of Mbali, but on 30 July a major incident occurred in Batangafo as the detachment in Damara begun to move back to Bouar. The Congolese company of MISCA was under pressure from local Seleka who threatened and harassed the local population. The Congolese soldiers did their best to protect the civilians and defend the local administration despite their limited number of troops compared to the rebels. Unfortunately, the situation degenerated further when the rebels killed three MISCA soldiers, wounded four of them and murdered a further thirty local people, including women and children. At 1715 hrs HQ called me to raise our alert state. The Sangaris Force then decided to intervene as a show of solidarity towards MISCA and demonstrate its resolve to the Seleka. Looking at the situation, I first assessed the enemy strength. Surprisingly, the assessment in Batangafo two weeks earlier had been around two hundred and fifty fighters when we were preparing for an operation in Mbali. Now the assessment of the enemy had reduced to around a hundred men. I asked HQ the reason for such a difference, but their answer didn’t really convince me. I asked for more information on the situation and requested an intelligence detachment to reinforce the Battlegroup. The

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answer I received was that an ISTAR section would be deployed alongside me but not placed under my command, even though this was putting effective coordination at risk. Another concern was communications. In Bouar I had a first-class communications platform in the VAB Venus. This armoured command vehicle hosted five permanent and direct radio channels anywhere in less than five minutes, but the crew and the vehicle were only put at my disposal and not actually under my command. As a result, I was unable to deploy the asset into the field as the Task Force HQ feared that it might become a casualty and so this superb enabler which was designed for advanced operations in the field had to remain with my rear base in Bouar. The only long-range communication links I would have would be satellite phones…. Needless to say, the signallers were far from happy to be left in the rear rather than deploying forward where they could make a real difference to the operation. Therefore, I decided to leave behind my logistic officer, Major Christophe, as with permanent radio contact with Bangui, he would be able to represent our requirements and guarantee our logistic support. Even though I trusted his unrelenting persistence, such a remote operation was far from comfortable, but the urgency of the situation meant that I had no time to find a better solution. I did not like this separation of operational command and tactical control which I felt risked creating further frictions in an already complicated operation, but we now had to focus on planning the operation. Incidentally, my main error was that I did not want to bother Brigadier General Bellot des Minières with such concerns. Now however was not the time to fight with the staff but to focus on planning the operation. Two difficulties stood out and dominated my thinking. Because of the unexpected launch of the operation and the revised operating area in the “central corridor”, just to the east of my area of responsibility, we had not conducted any ground or logistic analysis. These two areas were essential because I would be operating some distance from my bases. However, right now the first orders needed to be given to start moving as soon as possible. At 1730 hrs a movement order was released and the companies ceased their current operations immediately to prepare redeployment for the emergency tasking. The assembly point for Operation Vesta towards Batangafo was to be our camp in Bossangoa. The detachment in Damara left their location and moved north. The main part of the Battlegroup left Bouar at 2200 hrs and moved east leaving a platoon to protect the camp.

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The tracks were in a very poor condition and the weather was particularly unfavourable. The heavy rain made it difficult to move because the vehicles slipped on the mud and went from pothole to pothole which wore down the people and the equipment. Darkness added to the difficulty for the drivers. On 31 July 2014 at around 0300 hrs, elements of the first detachment arrived in Bossangoa. Later that night, elements of the second detachment reached Bossembélé and continued towards Bossangoa. The Battlegroup’s assembly at this forward base took twentytwo hours to cover the four hundred and fifty kilometres. Just one minor accident happened during the night between two trucks when a driver fell asleep. To save time and to be mentally prepared to assess the situation and give orders, I followed the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Pierre who suggested that I fly forward by helicopter to get to Bossongoa as quickly as possible. I left at 2100 hrs and was there within the hour. Without delay, we installed our mosquito nets by a wall for a broken night marked by the arrival of successive detachments. Ready by the early hours of the next morning, we started to plan the operation analysing maps and aerial photographs. We received a warning order from Bangui at 0900 hrs. We were to reach the city of Bouca by 1st August and to advance towards Batangafo where the Battlegroup was to be in place by 5th August. The Battlegroup was to comprise: – A foreign legion parachute company with three infantry platoons and a command platoon; – A mountain mixed company with two infantry platoons, an armoured troop, and a command platoon; – A helicopter flight with two Gazelle equipped with HOT missiles, a Puma armed with a 20 mm gun (callsign Puma Pirate), a Puma with an embarked mountain commando sniper, a MEDEVAC Puma and a Fennec from the Air Force. Captain Vianney, a helicopter pilot, was sent to be the liaison officer; – A combat camera team had already been attached to the battalion for two months and their members followed us everywhere. Led by Lieutenant Camille, the cameraman was Warrant Officer Fabien and the photographer, Corporal Olivier. After exchanging views by radio with the chief of staff of the HQ, Colonel Cédric, I explained the general progress of the operation to him. He

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stated that the seizure of Batangafo had to align with an important meeting that Brigadier General Bellot des Minières was to have with the Seleka’s leaders on 5th August. The arrival in this town had to emphasise the resolve of our Force Commander during his meeting with Seleka General Zoundeiko in Bambari. The outline of the different phases of this action began to come together. Nonetheless, I was still thinking about logistics and the problems of the terrain which gave me significant concern. An aerial reconnaissance of the difficult sectors of the route was decided upon and Staff Sergeant Ghennadi, the Troop staff sergeant of the foreign legion engineers, left Bossangoa at 1430 hrs in the Fennec. At 1500 hrs the orders were issued. The Battlegroup was to advance to contact towards the city of Bouca which would include a river crossing at a time when the water table was in flood. The orders we received stated that the ISTAR group was to be sent ahead to recce the line of advance and screen Bouca where it was assessed there was a significant force of Anti-Balakas.1 It had to be escorted and protected by an infantry platoon. Due to the command structure, I added to this detachment the second in command of the mountain company, Captain Christophe, who was an excellent officer. A former non-commissioned officer in a Leclerc tank regiment, he commissioned as an officer after attending the All Arms Officers’ Academy. He was reliable and proactive; this is why I wanted him in the lead to provide me with information as the ISTAR group was not under my command. They left Bossangoa towards Bouca, and the operation started although all the Battlegroup still did not reach this forward base. A radio call from Captain Christophe reported a major difficulty for his detachment roughly 25 or 30 km west of Bouca, because the vehicles could not cross a steep defile made impassable by the torrential rain that was falling across the region. I called Lieutenant Paul of the Engineers and sent him to join Captain Christophe to find a way to make the track practicable. Thirty minutes later, orders were given to his legionnaires and just after the return of Staff Sergeant Ghennadi from his reconnaissance, his troop deployed at 1700 hrs towards this place in the middle of nowhere where the conditions could threaten the success of the operation. At 2000 hrs, the last detachment which had left Bouar the evening before, now arrived in Bossangoa. However, the logistic squadron and the last armoured troops did not arrive until 2030 hrs. They were very 1 Anti-Balakas were the other main armed group but far less organised than the Seleka against whom they were opposed.

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tired and soaked through and so I questioned whether I would be able to launch the main body that night. A powerful storm had struck the Bossangoa region hard and the rain inundated the ground, making any movement risky. I asked the HQ to postpone the start by twenty-four hours. After this request was accepted Pierre immediately informed the company commanders that the new H - hour would be 0400 hrs on 2 August. The companies could now get some rest and have more time to prepare themselves. Meanwhile, the engineer troop had reached the ISTAR group’s infantry escort at 2115 hrs in Béboguila while the ISTAR troops themselves had actually managed to cross the obstacle with their light vehicles and so continued on task leaving behind their escort. Indeed, it could benefit from this opportunity to collect more information on Bouca. 1 August was devoted to the maintenance of equipment and tactical rehearsals. We also used this additional day to check all the coordination measures. The hot weather that day allowed the ground to dry out a little bit which would make the tracks easier to drive. The following day, reveille was at 0200 hrs and departure was at 0400 hrs as scheduled. Operation Vesta had already begun and it was now time for the main part of the Battlegroup to start deploying. I was still feeling not very comfortable because I was still thinking about the two points which were of concern to me: logistics and terrain, both interconnected. Among the trucks of the logistic squadron, there were three which weighed over 26 tons. Indeed, owing to the distance from any French forward operating bases or combat outposts, it was necessary to deploy with two fuel trucks, one of diesel for the vehicles and another of kerosene to refuel the helicopters as far forward as possible in order to maximise their time on station. The third vehicle was a TRM 10,000 that weighed 32 tons and transported the Battlegroup’s four-day supply of food and water. We had to go through the jungle with this convoy and cross bridges with unknown weight-bearing tolerance. It was particularly preoccupying to be dependent on this route which was no more than a dirt track with makeshift and precarious bridges, frequent sharp bends and steep gradients. Whatever happened, it would be an arduous march. The convoy started out and moved towards Bouca. The ERC90 were in the lead with the mountain company, followed by the legionnaires’ company behind which became my tactical HQ. The logistic company brought up the rear. I could envisage all the obstacles which could jeopardise our move and cost time, especially as I had already lost one day owing to the weather. As we were moving very slowly I stopped and got

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out and went down to have a look at the bridge where the vehicles were crossing one by one. Suddenly, in front of me, I saw a VAB fall into a gap after the bridge decking collapsed under the front axle of the armoured personnel carrier. All the legionnaires got out of the vehicle extremely rapidly and with cables linked it with the VAB just behind. As a result of this rapid response, the VAB was rescued and towed off the bridge. While the legionnaires were fixing the bridge by cutting down trees to make fresh planks, other vehicles tried without success to bypass the bridge by wading the river. The squadron sergeant major, WO1 Philippe, was a very tough and energetic soldier. Leading his legionnaires, he pulled out all the stops and one hour later, the decking was temporarily repaired, and the move could start again. Then, I watched the crossing of the fuel trucks whose wheels protruded over the edge of the bridge. This was hardly reassuring. Nonetheless, the drivers’ skill was quite superb. The rations truck did not manage to cross because the deck broke again under its weight. The main part of the Battlegroup continued the move to Bouca while Captain Pascal was obliged to move back to Bossangoa with all his logistic trucks, except the tankers which were already on the far side of this very fragile bridge. There, he was to transfer as much food and water as possible in his other trucks in order to rejoin us. His challenge was significant, and his team performed very well. Despite these setbacks and the loss of our immediate logistic support, we had to continue with our mission. A short time later, one of the ERC90 broke down. Its fuel tank had become defective due to a combination of advanced age and the quality of the diesel. We were forced to tow it back to the rear and then back to Bossangoa. At that moment, I thought of the now infamous fragile bridge that it would have to be towed back over. The mission began in a complicated way whereas we had not yet met any adversaries. We continued our journey eastward until we reached the engineer troop waiting for the convoy to support the crossing of a fairly steep slope which, despite the hot weather of the day, was still muddy and very slippery. However, the legionnaires had worked very hard the previous night under a monsoon and to restore the practicability of the route. They filled the potholes with timber and stone. At the top, one of their VAB was ready with its winch to tow any vehicle that could not make it up the slope. One after another, the vehicles surged forward, zigzagging on the mud and crossed the obstacle.

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Now, another difficulty awaited us when we arrived at around 1700 hrs on the western bank of the River FAFA, which was in flood. I was doubtful about our ability to cross a flooding river tactically and quickly. The ferry consisted of nothing at all, just a basic barge whose bilges were full of water and yet floated miraculously. It was capable of taking one or two vehicles at a time. It was used by civilians to cross as either as pedestrians or with vehicles with the help of poles. The duration of a round trip was between thirty and forty minutes. Given the conditions of the banks and the ferry, I decided to cross the river the day after, in daylight starting very early in the morning. The engineer troops had already carried out a reconnaissance and the command post prepared the order for this operation during which the whole force would be vulnerable. On the far bank, the ISTAR group was operating in a screen and could warn us if a threat emerged. The companies prepared to spend the night on the home bank of the river, taking force protection measures. Lieutenant Paul explained how the Battlegroup would proceed to cross the river on each side of which he would position an engineer VAB that would accelerate the crossing speed with its winch. Paul did a superb job during the operation because he was both Sapper Troop Commander and Battlegoup Engineer in my command post. He responsed outsandingly to the challenge of leading his legionnaires while simultaneously councelling the Command Post on the use of engineers and planning for the next phase. At 2100 hrs during a radio call with Bangui, we received the order to cross the river as soon as possible because according to intelligence the Seleka were preparing a raid towards Bouca. Company commanders were called and orders modified while allowing time for the engineers to set up on both sides of the river. Considering the conditions of the crossing, we pointed out to the staff that we did not have any life jackets for this night action, which I thought was fraught with risk. About twenty vests were delivered to us by Puma helicopter, which took the opportunity to also deliver two HOT missiles and redeploy the crew of the ERC 90, who was forced to go back earlier in the day. Considering the mission and the opponent in front of us, three more rifles were always good to have. However, the pilot refused to land at night in the area that the helicopter pilot in my CP had prepared for him. He believed that the safety conditions were not right and that the roof of a nearby hut might fly away. He therefore decided to land elsewhere in a place that seemed more suitable to him although he did not know the area. He very quickly

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set down the three mountain soldiers, the two missiles and the life jackets and then departed leaving the men and the cargo in the night. However, late in the afternoon, three VABs had got stuck in the mud at this location because the ground was so loose... which happened again when it became necessary to recover the three soldiers and the equipment. As the crossing began it was also necessary to recover these vehicles that were stuck in the mud. The crossing that had started at 2300 hrs was slow due to the poor conditions. In addition to the condition of the ferry, the banks were damaged by the strong current. The boarding phase of the vehicles was therefore very delicate. Soldiers removed their body armour to wear a lifejacket albeit half of the first company had already crossed without one. During the crossing, several things occurred. The vehicle responsible for recovering them had also got stuck in the mud and an ERC 90 got stuck on the far bank, the cable connecting the winch to the ferry broke. All these complications did not make the crossing particularly easy. We could make a round trip in about 10 minutes with our system, and the engineers worked hard all night to get us across with no break at all and no rotation possible. Each legionnaire sapper had a defined task and everybody was needed to complete this arduous task. Their third section had been left in Bouar for force protection and was much missed during this phase. The fatigue was really beginning to be felt in the troop, but the sappers’ conduct was beyond reproach. One NCO had an accident falling off his armoured vehicle, but he continued to carry out his mission and command his legionnaires. We completed the first phase of the crossing at around 1100 hrs on 3 August, then the engineer legionnaires took a break of three to four hours before resuming the crossing of the logistic squadron. We finished the crossing by around 1900 hrs but had to leave some important assets on the home bank such as the fuel tankers which could not cross because of their weight. I reported this situation by radio to the HQ in Bangui and highlighted that I had no immediate solution. The HQ directed me to empty the diesel and then send the trucks across. This I felt I could not do without polluting the river which was the last thing we needed to be seen to do and so this was not the answer. I was not too worried about the aviation tanker because we would need to refuel the helicopters and the weight of this truck would then match the ferry’s capability. However, I could not find a neat solution for the diesel. Therefore, I left these two trucks on the home bank of the river, and this also required a Force

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Protection detail to be left with them. On that day, in Bouca, the weather was very wet and both companies carried out a cordon and search operation around the city in order to obtain information, seize weapons and ammunition and to contribute to the restoration of state authority. We met with the Cameroonian detachment there and we assessed the local atmosphere which was one of a lack of security and fear. On 3rd August, the command post was reinforced by a major, two NCOs and two legionnaires from the 1st Foreign Legion regiment and the 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. They were more than welcome and were a huge help. Thanks to them, I could leave an anchor CP in Bouca to coordinate the logistics that we would need. I gave the orders to continue the cordon and search of Bouca until the morning of 4 August. I thought we were going to have a quiet night. It was anything but.

CHAPTER 6

A Town to Seize

At 1700 hrs, during a long conversation over the radio with the Force HQ, we received the order to seize the city of Batangafo on the fourth instead of the fifth because the weather forecast predicted better conditions for that day. It was decided, that as we needed air support, the Battlegroup would need to leave Bouca that night. I was doubtful over the reliability of the forecast given that the meteorological services in theatre were very limited. The window of opportunity was estimated as being between 0900 and 1200 hrs. Batangafo was one hundred kilometres from Bouca. One of my contacts in Bangui asked me how long I thought it would take us to reach the objective. Based on the weather conditions and the tracks we had used before, I estimated around ten hours. He responded that the aerial photographs showed the track to be in a good condition and we would need only eight hours. I did not respond but did not agree with his terrain analysis. I requested a radio call with Brigadier General Bellot des Minières in order to share my views and understanding of the situation with him. During our conversation, I asked for confirmation that I was to secure the city because I considered the force ratios as being unfavourable for offensive action. We were 1 against 1.6 whereas, doctrinally, we should be 3 against 1. After a frank exchange, the Force Commander confirmed the seizure of Batangafo and concluded our discussion with the words: “Armel, with prudence and determination”. I simply replied, “Yes Sir!” Despite his guidance coming © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6_6

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across as an oxymoron, I had no time to waste; I had to issue new orders bearing in mind the Commander’s direction. Everybody in the Command Post understood the outcome of my conversation with the GOC and immediately started to think about the revised plan. I called both company commanders to warn them that we had to modify the scheme of manoeuvre and would leave Bouca that night to seize Batangafo on the fourth. Both captains looked at me straight in the eyes and told me that the adversary outnumbered our Battlegroup. They asked if we should just focus on the enemy rather than seizing the city. My answer was quick, dry and direct: our mission was to seize the city regardless of the enemy’s strength. All commanders know that look. They see it in the eyes of their staffs and their men when things are really bad and when even the most confident staff officer and the toughest soldier want holding up, and they turn where they should turn for support – to their commander (…) He feels very much alone.1

I shared their doubts, but I hoped they could not see this. Lieutenant Colonel Pierre and I re-examined the aerial photographs and refreshed our view based on the analysis of the captains. An hour later, at 1900 hrs we sent out new orders. Captain Gabriel would open the road with his legionnaires, supported by the mountain company. The CP would be between both subunits. The scheme of manoeuvre would see that the mountain company take up contact with the adversary and bypass the initial barrier and establish a foothold at the southern entrance of the city to deliver a start line to the legionnaire company which was to seize the western part of the town. We would start out at 2125 hrs. Lieutenant Paul would escort the logistic company, which has completed its crossing in that afternoon. Indeed, when the troop went to withdraw, three VABs became stuck in the mud because of the very loose and wet ground. The legionnaire engineers spent further hours trying to extract these vehicles and it was 2200 hrs before they reached the logistics squadron. The troop had not slept following their departure from Bossangoa and Paul requested a delay of one hour so that his legionnaires could eat and rest a little. I postponed their departure until 2300 hrs. The night was pitch black as we moved 1 Field Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory, PAN books, London, 2009, p. 80.

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slowly along the broken track without lights. The potholes and ruts were deep; the mud made it difficult for the vehicles to gain traction vehicles as they slid and bounced on the uneven surface which shook the occupants. It goes without saying that each member of the Battlegroup that travelled that route will testify that the track was in no way as smooth as the air photo might have suggested. The engineer troop continued to encounter difficulties as some of the bridge decking broke under one of their VABs which then became stuck between two steel beams. Paul had no choice but to stop and recover this vehicle. In complete darkness, the legionnaires dismounted in silence and set about finding a solution. Following a quick assessment, they deployed a towing cable and pulled the VAB clear. The roar of the engines broke the silence of the night and while this risked compromising the move, at least the legionnaires managed to get their vehicles moving again. They set off and bypassed the bridge by wading through the river, hoping that their vehicles would not get stuck. While they succeeded, their luck ran out a little further on when two vehicles got stuck in the mud and the troop lost more time. Indeed, after the passage of the whole Battlegroup, the track was in an extremely poor condition. For the lead elements, the journey was still difficult and demanding with fatigue beginning to take its toll because no one had slept since the start. The advance to contact had turned into a 200 km raid through the jungle without a break. The troops were impressive, and I admired their resilience. They remained alert and ready to react at all times. At 0820 hrs on 4 August, a few kilometres from the village of Bolom, Captain Gabriel was forced to call a halt due to a broken-down vehicle. As a result, Captain François-Xavier took the lead followed by my forward command post which included the Operations Officer who would coordinate our manoeuvre with the ISTAR detachment. The logistic squadron and the engineer troop finally reached the Battlegroup in the village of Bolom at around 0930 hrs. It had taken us twelve hours to complete the journey between Bouca and Batangafo. At 0920 hrs the intelligence group observed the block at the southern entry point to Batangafo and reported around ten gunmen present. I went forward to speak to Captain François-Xavier to find out why he had stopped. He briefed me he was waiting for Close Air Support (CAS) that was inbound from N’Djamena. I told him that this was not Afghanistan with a wealth of aircraft to provide air support and we needed to press on to keep to time. Before leaving Bossangoa my forward air controller had prepared the Fire

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Support plan and estimated our requirements for CAS. These requests were sent up to Force HQ and were set out on the Air Tasking Order. Hence I told the company commander to press on. At around 0930 hrs, the mountain soldiers began their tactical advance to contact towards the southern entrance to the city.

The intelligence group’s assets had detected elements of an ambush which had been set and this information was immediately passed to the lead company. Due to the thick vegetation, it was very difficult to get effective eyes on from the ground. Fortunately, Task Force Sangaris had a reconnaissance aircraft, a Piper type plane which had been nicknamed “Sangaris Aircraft” by the local population; its call sign was Yoda. The pilot was in radio contact with the ISTAR commander and we used his Rover terminal to view the live feed from his sensors. It was unfortunate that my forward air controller was not in direct radio communication with this airborne “forward air controller”. This would have proved much more effective. Nevertheless, thanks to the reconnaissance aircraft and its eye in the sky, we could see a large number of rebels moving through the bush along the track and who stopped several times to set an ambush. Shortly afterwards, groups of three to four armed fighters were observed at the blocking position. They re-grouped and moved off to the south. At the same time, shooting broke out and a group of rebels was observed by Yoda moving to the east. A significant engagement had started, and the lead ERC 90

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had been targeted by a large number of RPG 7 rockets. The armoured vehicle’s driver was incredibly skilful and avoided the rockets through a series of rapid sharp manoeuvres, while his commander and gunner tried to return fire. The track caught fire while all our weapon systems now engaged. Thanks to the Rover terminal we could observe a column of rebels moving quickly through the jungle which ran to the south. The ambush was over three hundred metres in depth and the company was completely fixed on the track. Due to the two-metre-high grass and the dense vegetation, the company could not go off the track without risking getting its vehicles stuck or becoming mixed up with the rebels. Captain FrançoisXavier and his whole company were now in contact. Fire came from both sides of the track and it was difficult to locate the enemy. Armoured personal carriers were hit by bullets; an ERC 90 crew lost their personal equipment which had been strapped onto the side of the turret. The Command Post told Captain Gabriel to be prepared to move forward on orders. The CAS fighters coming from N’Djamena in Chad were also due on station. The aircrafts had been deployed to Chad to support Operation Barkhane, which was France’s main overseas operation and was commanded by Major General Jean-Pierre Palasset. It had now been six weeks since the new aircrews had arrived at Kosseï airbase in N’Djamena. Fast jets had been deployed to the area since the start of Operation Serval in Mali back in January 2013. At the end of that same year, they began to conduct missions over the Central African Republic. The flight time to get to this theatre of operations was much shorter than the transit to Mali. It took no more than fifty minutes instead of the two hours needed for Mali. The Air Detachment was composed of about one hundred men and women. This included Rafale crews (pilots and navigators), intelligence personnel, clerks and the engineers. They all knew each other well because for the past eighteen months, they had been deployed to N’Djamena on average twice a year. Their two-month operational deployment was almost over and their return to France was expected around 15th August where their families were waiting for them to enjoy the end of the summer holidays. Their tour had been pretty quiet so far although the situation could change very quickly. They calmly carried out their operational tasks: reconnaissance flights over Mali or in the Central African Republic, a few CAS missions for the benefit of the ground forces and some training

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over Chad. They flew about twice a week. Each flight needed a five-hour preparation time. An hour and a half before the scheduled take-off time, the crews gathered for the pre-flight briefing. The intelligence cell briefed on the latest developments in Central Africa and any changes to the rules of engagement, operational instructions, country overflight authorisation and legal restrictions for the use of their sensors and weapons. Then, the flight leader would give the flight brief reminding the crews of what they had to do if different situations occurred, from the event of being engaged or in extremis if they had to eject. The purpose of this forty-five minutes brief was not so much to reteach tactics, techniques and procedures which were well known, but just to ensure they were at the forefront of each of the crew’s mind. If things went wrong in flight, the few seconds saved by this mental update could be crucial. At the end of the briefing, they took their equipment, water, food, binoculars, night-vision aides, if required, an electronic tablet containing maps of the area of interest, money, a 9 mm pistol and magazines, a satellite phone, a life beacon equipped with a GPS to name the bulk of the items that must find a place in the small cockpit. Each of them might be vital depending on the situation. Finally, heavily loaded, they moved to their aircraft and took them over from the ground crew. The chief aircraft maintenance listed the latest updates on the aircrafts and the crews married up with their planes where the engineers and weapon specialists waited. The engineer is the last person they talk to as they are strapped in and they check the aircraft is good to go, once the engines have been started. The weapon specialists have mounted the bombs under the wings and loaded the cannon magazine. Operational deployments are the culmination of their work. A jet squadron is a great team, any weak links can jeopardise the whole mission. The pilots are the final part of a long line of specialists. As they flew out of N’Djamena on 4 August 2014, the crews thought they would be there for surveillance purpose and at most be conducting a show of force. A ground force detachment had issued a request for air support two days earlier. Their mission required them to drive in convoy on a narrow dirt track flanked on both sides by a dense forest. The presence of two Rafale above would give them a view of the road several kilometers ahead as well as a striking power if the enemy was encountered.

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Harnessed and ready, the pilots started their engines and moved forward slowly; the two Rafale fighters moved along the taxiway and stopped at the beginning of the runway. Thanks to the air conditioning the temperature inside the cockpits remains mild. The control tower gave them clearance for take-off and the planes left the base and headed into the Chadian sky. Approaching the area of operations, they tried to contact the ground-based forward air controller, Staff Sergeant Eric. The radio link was particularly poor and, on several occasions, Eric failed to establish communications with the Rafales. However, the Piper type plane pilot had been deployed in Chad four months earlier and knew the crews and their procedures. He monitored the UHF frequencies of Staff Sergeant Eric and saw the problem that the forward air controller was having and switched his radio frequency to contact the fighters. He called the Rafales on the common air-to-air frequency to let them know that the JTAC was trying to establish communications. He also described the ground and gave a tactical update. The Rafale crews immediately understood that the Battlegroup had a hard fight on its hands. On the ground, Staff Sergeant Eric had a lot to do against a determined enemy. The company was facing a storm of fire at very close range. All the members of the JTAC team were in action. Even Eric had to use his personal weapon at close range while controlling both Rafales. The Piper plane pilot supported him by providing enemy descriptions and designating targets hidden in the jungle

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to the Rafale crews. The dialogue between the forward air controllers and the Rafales was surprisingly calm despite the tension on the ground. In their headsets, the aircrew could hear small arms fire in the background of the voice of Eric which focused their determination to delivering effective CAS under very difficult conditions due to the vegetation that hampered their observation and due to the close proximity of the enemy to our own troops. The Piper plane pilot was operating at a different flight level and, because the situation was getting worse, he continued to provide information to the fighters. Now, however, the weather was beginning to deteriorate at his flight level and he asked the Rafale flight if he could descend by a thousand feet, which was agreed. Meanwhile Eric asked the command post for clearance to fire, which alarmed the aircrew given the proximity of our own troops. Still monitoring the situation on the ground, The Piper plane pilot reported that the lead armoured vehicles were in deep trouble and were effectively surrounded. Furthermore, he was uncertain whether the vehicle crews knew this. At 0955 hrs, after a few minutes of confusion, the piper plane pilot passed the grids of enemy threat to the Rafale crews so that they could get positive identification. At 0957 hrs, Eric sent an engagement request to the fighters. This message describes the objective to be hit, its exact location and the positions of friendly troops. In only three minutes, the Rafale had received the request, located the target to be attacked, identified the positions of the Battlegroup and figured out their attack heading. At 1000 hrs, the fighters requested to be “cleared hot” and were receiving clearance from Staff Sergeant Eric; the Rafales attacked with a GBU 12. The Piper type plane pilot reported the effects; the bomb had landed to the south-east of the target and had little impact due to the density of the vegetation. The intelligence group continued to observe the enemy’s movement and sent new target grids to the east of the track. The Piper type plane pilot passed these data to the Rafales while on the ground Eric was receiving the information from the Battlegroup command post. Throughout this time the battle continued. As the Piper type plane was proving to be so pivotal, a request was made to extend his time on task. After a quick calculation, he reported that he could remain for a further forty minutes. At 1009 hrs, Staff Sergeant Eric requested to be cleared in once again. The Piper type plane described the target to the fighters, but due to the fact that the enemy had gone firm and was now hidden under the trees, it became harder to locate and strike the rebels. There were also more clouds which were making it more difficult for the aircraft. At

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1014 hrs, Eric sent another engagement message to the Rafales for the second aircraft to strike this time. A few minutes later, the crew tried to engage but this attempt to drop a GBU 12 was aborted because of the dense low cloud layer. The Piper type plane had now reached his fuel limit to get back to Bangui and left the area. His support had been invaluable. The Rafale crews were surprised because dropping a bomb was normally enough to demonstrate our capability and determination to the enemy, and yet the battle continued to be as fierce as before. On the track, the infantrymen, sheltered by the VABs, engaged when they could due to the enemy being concealed by the vegetation. Some mountain soldiers advanced into the jungle to close with their attackers and break into their position. The firefight continued and all three platoons were fixed on the ground by a determined enemy which was looking to break into our defensive laydown. Eric still had a communication link with the Rafales and requested a gun strafe as the proximity of our own troops to the target now precluded the use of bombs. Staff Sergeant Eric sent his new engagement request, described the targets but the pilots struggled to identify them. Cloud cover was now significant, and it was impossible to identify the forward line of our own troops, either at the eastern or at the western side of the track. However, we needed support as we could not manoeuvre around the enemy or use mortars which would have presented the same risks as a bomb. The JTAC talked the Rafales onto their objectives until the targets had been identified. The flight leader, understood from the short periods of radio silence, that the situation on the ground was urgent. “Are you going or are we going?” he asked his wingman, “It’s going to be close”, the pilot thought. A glance at his head-up display system indicated that the attack heading that the JTAC had requested would be difficult to achieve. “At worst, I could overshoot a little and save a few degrees” he thought. His wingman did not answer, he and his navigator were absorbed in their task. Without talking to each other, they knew the troops on the ground needed them, but they had to do things in order. Missing a step might save a few seconds, but in event of mistake, it would cost much more as they would have to restart the attack. It was therefore vital to keep a clear head and not act in haste. They thought they had to keep a cool head and not give in to haste. The pilot put the wings back flat on heading 105 degrees for a few moments and turned left to align his jet with the objective. “In hot, attack heading 095!” he announced to the JTAC. “Cleared hot”, Eric

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replied instantly. Thoughts jostled in pilot’s head: heading, speed, select firing mode, speed, safety selection, speed, heading. He switched on the master arm, his last firing safety action. “The pod is closed” announced his navigator. He knew that she was fully focused on her tasks. Behind him in the cockpit, she ran through her procedures silently, telling him only what was essential: Speed, heading, distance, speed, sight, distance. His right index finger was approaching the trigger. All it took was one pressure for twenty shells to come out of the gun in half a second. He double checked one last time that the Master Arm was switched on, 500 knots, everything was fine. The target was 2000 m away. Line of sight, 511 knots, now and 30 mm shells were delivered in support of the ground troops. Both aircraft performed two gun-runs each and due to the desperate nature of the battle, they had to attack four times along the same heading which is not a standard procedure as this increases the risk of being shot from the ground. Nevertheless, the crews, analysing the situation, vegetation and cloud cover that exceeded 4 Octas, and the intensity of the fighting, considered that they could not act otherwise and decided to take the risk because their support would eventually make the difference between success and failure. Even though the Seleka did not have air-defence assets, they had 14.5 mm machine guns and the risk of being shot down existed. Once complete they had to leave to refuel and the two Rafales flew back towards Chad.

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In accordance with our planned use of air assets, the helicopters arrived in the area at around 1130 hrs. The close-range fight was still on-going. The helicopter crews had been listening to the radio frequencies of the ground units and their supporting aircraft during their flight between Bossangoa and Batangafo. As a result, they understood the situation and were up to date. Moreover, the armed Puma was welcomed by several RPG volleys that fortunately missed but not by much. The command post only realised that the helicopters had arrived after they opened fire as they had not checked in; having been so focused on the ground situation they immediately started working with the JTAC. Despite flying at a lower altitude, the armed Puma’s crew had difficulty acquiring the targets. The gunner, in the rear, did his best to identify friend from foe among the vegetation. Following the target indication given by Staff Sergeant Eric, the gunner opened fire with his 20 mm cannon in support of the ground troops. The Puma was soon out of ammunition, having fired seven hundred and eighty rounds. The nature of the ground meant that we were unable to overrun the enemy, I ordered the company to break contact and re-establish itself in a more favourable position. The CAS missions had produced some positive effects and the rebels seemed to have been more impressed by helicopters rather than planes. This was the feeling that I got when I later met my opponents and received confirmation of this from their comments. One of the mountain commandos of my regiment was on board a Puma with his sniper rifle and while Pirate was suppressing the rebels who had ambushed the lead company, he shot a motorcycle, killing the rider. His passenger was Colonel Moussa, the rebel leader in Batangafo, who was then realised how close he had come to being killed. During this phase of the air support plan, Captain Gabriel gave orders to his support platoon to bring the 81 mm mortars into action and start adjusting onto the blocking position at the southern entrance of Batangafo. I wanted to increase our surface fires to facilitate the withdrawal of the lead company. Once the helicopters had completed their fire support missions, they landed close to the CP where we had the kerosene tanker ready to refuel them. With the sky clear of aircraft, the mortar section could now engage. With a strong Russian accent, the legionnaire sergeant gave his orders and once cleared, he started to engage with 81 mm shells, mixing high explosive with smoke. On this, the company started its move and withdrew approximately two thousand metres to create a gap with the enemy. Once all force elements had pulled back, I launched the Gazelle helicopters to

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carry out a reconnaissance and look for possible reinforcements coming from Kabo in the north or from Kaga Bandoro in the west. Both helicopters took off around 1400 hrs and disappeared rapidly from our sight behind the trees. While we were re-setting our laydown south of Batangafo, I decided to delay our next move. Miraculously, after almost five hours of intensive fighting, the Battlegroup had not taken any casualties whereas we had inflicted casualties on the enemy. I delayed our move towards Batangafo because the men needed a break for food and rest. I tasked Lieutenant Colonel Pierre to update Bangui on the situation and our next moves. The HQ was not content and required us to move immediately. Pierre stated that I had no intention of losing people as a result of a premature and reckless move. One-third of the Battlegroup was not under armour. This was because our unit had come from Chad where the Battlegroup for Operation Sparrowhawk was a light one equipped with trucks (VLRA), light 4 × 4 (VLTT P4) and ERC 90. My own command post was equipped with P4 and VLRA, both without protection. I was conscious of the strategic consequences that unnecessary losses might have on the credibility of the Force Commander. If the Seleka were able to message that they had inflicted heavy losses on Task Force Sangaris, or indeed the French Army, they would increase their political leverage on the national stage. All my decisions were set in the context of the consequences my orders could have for the general officer commanding Task Force Sangaris. I was not going to change my plan as the commander in the field and exercising the prerogative of the man on the frontline or on the spot. For a while, my mind was flooded with questions. How should we restart the operation? What was the mindset of our adversary now? Where was he?

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At 1500 hrs, the Gazelle reconnaissance commander, Captain Romain, reported that he had observed two vehicles proceeding towards Batangafo from Kabo, carrying around forty heavily armed fighters. Without hesitation, I ordered him to engage both vehicles which were clearly bringing in reinforcements and would impact on our force ratios. The leader described the target and the effects he was able to deliver. I simply replied: “Fire”, to which he acknowledged: “Roger”. The Gazelles took up their firing positions at tree height and engaged one HOT missile each. They were just under four thousand metres from their targets; seventeen seconds later both vehicles exploded and the rebel fighters were destroyed. The helicopters returned to the CP to refuel and rearm. We were able to do this thanks to the delivery we had received two nights ago in the mud during the river crossing… At around 1700 hrs, I called Bangui and requested to speak with the General. I updated him on the engagement of the morning and the targeting that we had just completed. He told me to enter the city that day and to move now. He concluded with: “Davaï, davaï2 Armel! But with prudence and determination”.

2 byctpo byctpo, means: “fast, fast” in Russian. This expression is often used in the Foreign Legion.

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By that time the Rafales were back in N’Djamena. The daily afternoon briefing at 1730 hrs was very focused as the crews debriefed their mission. Given the situation, the flight programme had been completely overtaken by the day’s events. The training missions for the following day were cancelled and the ground crews were getting the third aircraft ready to respond to further CAS requests from Batangafo.

CHAPTER 7

Failed Negotiations

During the radio conversation I had with HQ, I had received the phone number of Colonel Moussa who was said to be one of the rebel leaders in Batangafo. After several attempts, I managed to get through to him and told him I was going to enter the city with the Battlegroup. I proposed that we meet at the barrier that had been the trigger point of the ambush.

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After quite a long discussion, we agreed to meet at 1900 hrs at this location to enter the city together. I thought this would be a good way to show the international authority of Task Force Sangaris. Orders were given quickly to move forward again with the aim being to seize the western part of the city under the cover of darkness, with the legionnaires in the first echelon. The lead company started to move forward with caution, my vehicle was just behind that of Captain Gabriel. The ambient light was decreasing and all we heard was the noise of our engines against the silence of the jungle. All the crews were silent and focused on their immediate surroundings. Everybody was ready to react instantly in the case of attack. After a long raid and a very tense day, the mountain troops and the legionnaires were still prepared for action. The threat remained high because the adversary had sufficient numbers to prevent us from entering the city again. Captain Henry, who was platoon leader, reached the barrier and stopped there just before 1900 hrs. Nobody was there and so we waited. No one showed up at the barrier, so at 1930 hrs I ordered Captain Gabriel to resume his advance to seize the western part of the city. In front, Captain Henry moved forward into the night which had now become very dark. Reaching the crossroads, nicknamed Alpha 10, at around 2000 hrs he saw armed men and quickly took defensive measures, posting one section facing west, another facing north-east and the third section securing the rear to the south. Supported by his legionnaires who were ready to back him up if needed, he stepped towards the men facing him. Colonel Moussa, leaving his five Kalashnikov-equipped bodyguards, presented himself with his hands up in the air, announcing that he was unarmed. The platoon commander asked him to lower his hands and greeted him. After they shook hands, a dialogue began; the tension was palpable and in front of Henry’s platoon, there were about forty very well-armed fighters. Meanwhile, the rest of the company seized the area that the legionnaires were to control, and the platoons then took up their battle positions by night.

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At the same time, the company belonging to Captain François-Xavier was engaged in the western part of the area to be secured. In the same way, he entered the city without opposition. His infantry platoons and the armoured troops also took up their battle positions after some reconnaissance in the dark to secure their immediate environment. The place was deserted, the houses abandoned and only the sound of the wind in the trees represented any form of activity. I went forward between the two companies to establish a link, on this small plateau, with the Congolese captain of the MISCA. His relief and joy at seeing us arrive was a pleasure to see. Indeed, for five days he had been threatened by the Seleka and his protection mission had become almost impossible as he was completely outnumbered. I got out of my vehicle and went to meet him, shaking his hand warmly. The last hours, he told me, had seemed endless as they waited for the arrival of Task Force Sangaris. I enquired about him and his men and finally asked him about his laydown, where the Seleka were and how he could contact them. He confirmed, what my chief of operations, intelligence officer and I had thought. The Seleka [il me semble que tu emploies plus souvent le pluriel sans “s”] were a little over three hundred strong in Batangafo where they spread fear and terror. He showed me on a map his analysis of the situation and where the Seleka barracks were located. Then I asked him to call the Seleka’s leader and set an appointment to meet him. He said “yes” and added we would have to go over

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to the agreed meeting place. He felt under real pressure, so I told him first to call them and then to tell them to be here at 2100 hrs. It was important to show the Seleka that we represented authority and we were not going to come to them. After this phone call, I left his command post in a small house, to meet with the local NGOs. Many of them were located not far from the MISCA command post and it was easy to find them. They seemed relieved and happy to welcome me. Only the head of one NGO was not warm and did not seem happy to see us. While courteous, he nonetheless maintained a certain distance and it was not possible to discuss the situation with him nor gain his impressions or feelings. After these meetings, it was time to return to the command post of the Congolese company. There was a huge crowd all around the building as ten thousand displaced people had come to take refuge for several days with the Congolese soldiers, thinking they would escape the rebels’ abuse. The atmosphere was noisy, the tension high and a pungent smell of wood fire filled the air. This smell reminded me of Bangui where we had arrived a few weeks earlier. We stood under the narrow canopy of the building, alongside the outer yellow wall which was lit by a bright light and boasted several bullet impacts from the attack they had faced on 30 July. Suddenly, there was silence and the civilians froze. Armed men appeared preceded in front by three figures who came to meet me. To my great surprise, I saw a fourth one at their side, who was my chief of operations! Indeed, while Captain Henry was talking with Colonel Moussa at crossroads Alpha 10, his company commander had called Lieutenant Colonel Pierre to inform him of this first meeting. Pierre was on site when the Congolese captain had contacted Colonel Moussa to schedule the meeting at 2100 hrs. Pierre had therefore decided to accompany the Seleka leaders to our meeting. A few days after the end of the operation, he admitted to me that he felt a little lonely during this march I was witnessing, surrounded by well-equipped rebels….. The leaders joined me under the canopy. Just before they closed in, I wondered whether I should shake their hands. The question of whether to shake or not to shake hands with these criminals suddenly arose in my mind. I could not lose time in such a reflection and I decided to shake, and not only to shake their hands but to crush them as strongly I could to impress upon them my leadership over the situation. When they were close enough, I reached out with my hand; they did the same to shake it, and I crushed theirs. Surprised, each of them seemed to drop his shoulders, indicating the pain he must have felt. They seemed

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feverish and while I had very few of my soldiers around me, unlike them, their fear seemed clear at the time. The tension was palpable. They were of medium height, around 1.70 m, and I used my greater size to signify my moral ascendency. Body language is crucial because in such a situation with such criminals and fighters, we had to shape the discussion through our physical presence. They had to sense our determination supported by strength and firmness. They already tested our resolve during the day, and this was no doubt why the hands of Colonel Moussa were shaking. Only Moussa spoke because the two others did not seem to speak French; they solely communicated in Arabic, which Moussa sometimes translated for the purpose of our discussion. I explained to Moussa that we had come to implement the confidence measures that his leaders had signed some months ago and that they needed to put down their weapons. I added that the Seleka could not parade through the city like a regular military force as they did not represent the authority of the government. Only the national police and armed forces were authorised to carry weapons. I told him that either they applied these rules, or they left the city. As he responded and tried to justify their posture, I was distracted by the battledress he was wearing because it looked like a child’s costume with printed drawings of tanks and tracked combat vehicles. I felt like smiling but it would have been inappropriate! I swept away these distractions and focused my attention on his words which were difficult to understand. Indeed, under pressure from our presence and the crowd’s stare, his French was awful, and I realised that negotiating in my mother tongue increased my power in this position. Despite being tired by a long and demanding operation which had started three days before, I did not need out much effort to find the right words, formulation and enunciation whereas my interlocutor was obviously struggling. I played with words and silence, and this seemed to disturb Moussa and increase his embarrassment. Then he asked me to leave the city, and to which I replied that my mission was to seize and control the city in order to re-establish government authority. He angrily said that this was his home, here in Central Africa, and he could do what he wanted. I maintained my position and repeated my demand for him to lay down his arms and respect the national government. Finally, he told me that he did not control all his fighters and could not contact them immediately to give them new orders, so he requested a new appointment to carry on our negotiation the following day. He also requested that I withdraw the platoon that was on Alpha 10. I set the appointment

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for 1000 hrs on 5 August under the palaver tree and told him that the platoon would move off Alpha 10 but only by 200 m to the south. It was not a withdrawal, but only a means to take the pressure off him. After this discussion, Moussa and his men left the venue, joined their escort and disappeared in the night. During that time, the empty school was chosen as a good location to host the command post. I went there and the close protection was provided by the legionnaires of the engineer troop. It was now around 2200 hrs. The companies had taken up their positions and organised their local defence. This night was supposed to be the first real one, since the start of the operation, during which legionnaires and mountain troopers could get some rest. Around 2230 hrs the rain started to fall and became very heavy for many hours. I thought about the men that were protecting us, but not for long because I was exhausted, and I fell asleep very quickly even though I was grateful to them for their vigilance and protection.

The night was quiet and in the early morning, the rising sun began to heat the day. The weather was fortunately very good. Both companies were preparing for the second phase of the operation. Gabriel and his legionnaires were carrying out foot patrols to gauge the threat level for their advance into the other side of the city. François-Xavier and his mountain troopers conducted similar tasks to improve their understanding of the area that we had seized the day before. The situation was calm, and

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we did not plan on any air support because our interlocutors requested a clear sky if we wanted to have discussions. The jets were ready to scramble on very short notice from N’Djamena and our helicopter flight was only twenty minutes away. After a very demanding first phase, this day was an opportunity for the engineer troop to get some rest and conduct essential maintenance on their vehicles and equipment. By protecting the command post, they could still meet their own requirements. Suddenly, the doctor was called because a sergeant from the sappers was bleeding profusely from the nose. He had taken a blow to the head during the river crossing and fell from his VAB but went back to work without telling anyone. However, he was clearly weaker now and demands of a long night raid and engagement had increased his exhaustion. Unable to control the bleeding, we were forced to evacuate him which was a shame as he had performed outstandingly so far. A corporal took over the lead of this engineer section. Just before 1000 hrs I went to the palaver tree where the mayor of the city was already present. Colonel Moussa and his two acolytes arrived a few minutes later for our appointment. We started talking and I repeated the reasons for our presence. It was important to the Central African Republic that all parties respected the confidence-building measures and that the interim government was able to exercise its authority over the entire territory. There were to be no exceptions. If the Seleka had disagreements or a different political vision from that of the central government, violence was not the appropriate means to achieve their ends. The confrontation could only be political. They were therefore required to lay down their weapons by storing them in the armouries of their barracks and cease parading around the city wearing military battledress as they did not belong to the government’s defence and security forces. He wanted to implement in Batangafo a situation similar to Bambari where the Seleka obtained the agreement to support the security operation. This was not acceptable because only the government provides security. The discussion took the form of a mouse running around a wheel. Colonel Moussa just produced a series of irrelevant points with little meaning until I told him the Seleka had to leave the city if they did not want to apply the confidence measures. In accordance with the guidance that I received for this negotiation, I stated that General Zoundeiko had agreed to these points with my commander and so they would be enforced.

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The Battlegroup had to seize the city of Batangafo to mark the minds of the people and to show the Seleka that they could not act with impunity. However, due to the fight with the Seleka troops prior to this meeting, they did not seem very willing to engage with our Force commander. The discussions were not fruitful because the Seleka considered the force ratio was still in their favour despite their losses on 4 August where we assessed that they had between sixty and heighty fighters killed. From a tactical point of view, my battlegroup was isolated and out on a limb in terms of the overall Sangaris force laydown. Any ground reinforcement would take time and would require troops to be withdrawn either from Bambari, where the situation for the 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment was very tense, or from Bangui, where the 16th Bataillon de chasseurs controlled the capital. This would inevitably weaken the ability of one of the two units to operate. The Seleka wanted to put maximum pressure on Sangaris in order to degrade its credibility. They remained unyielding and rejected all the proposals made by General Bellot des Minières because they were genuinely aggrieved by their losses of 4 August. As a result of the battlegroup entering Batangafo, they considered that we had penetrated into their territory without consent and their aim was clearly to push us back. I was unable to contact my chief because after his key leader engagement he flew back to Bangui whereas Moussa could reach his chief by cell phone. He directly got General Zoundeiko on the phone and, even though we did not understand the Sango language, it was obvious that the discussion between them was noisy and enflamed. His chief was not happy with the situation. After his phone call, Moussa became more uptight and the discussion became more tense. He punctuated almost all his sentences with religious imprecations whereas before the phone call he did not do that. Then, he started to tell us he was a passenger on a motorcycle on 4 August during the fight and, close to the barrier, his driver was shot, the motorbike destroyed, and he was lucky to be alive. He was very animated which, combined with his very poor French, made him very difficult to understand. Indeed, one of my mountain commandos was the man that had taken the shot from the Puma. It was true, Moussa was a survivor of these first engagements between the Seleka and the Battlegroup and this event seemed to reactivate his aggressiveness. The immediate goal was to try and calm his sudden anger and restart our discussions. Patiently, we listened to him carefully and asked him questions to get more detail on the Seleka’s intents. The aim was to restore

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his composure and get him to reconnect with his partners with whom he had stopped having exchanges since the phone call. As these two men seemed to be extremely influential, it was imperative to gain their consent and therefore to restart their internal chats. Progressively, Moussa came around and began asking questions of his acolytes. I had hoped to have restored the dynamic, but the strength of the phone call was clearly still there. I needed to get past this and make progress until Moussa said, after more than three hours of negotiations, that he was not high enough in his hierarchy to take the decision to lay down their arms, return to barracks or to leave the city. More than three hours for nothing…. I asked him who was able to make such a decision because I needed to meet with him. His chief had to come from Kabo, around forty kilometres north of Batangafo. I specified that he should come with a reduced escort and with only one vehicle. If he did not comply with these conditions, I would consider his move as a hostile reinforcement and I would destroy the convoy with my helicopters as we had done the day before against their second echelon. Moussa acknowledged and we set the next appointment for 1600 hrs at the same place, under the palaver tree.

We left the venue and went back to the command post where I met with my chief of operations. I told Pierre that we needed to make our CP lighter and to prepare for a possible emergency move. Pierre gathered his

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officers and gave quick orders and explained the situation to everyone. Signallers prepared their equipment and identified the sets that we could manage without for a time. In the meantime, Gabriel’s legionnaires were waiting for the order to start their move into the eastern part of the city and the mountain company of François-Xavier was carrying out its patrols and preparing to control all the western part of Batangafo as the legionnaires would move to the east. These three hours went quickly, and we went again to the palaver tree; this time I took my intelligence officer, my bodyguard and my driver. Due to the increasing tension, we also deployed troops in overwatch who would be ready to intervene and extract us if necessary. We arrived a few minutes before 1600 hrs but nobody was there. A long wait began without any news from our interlocutors, but we knew their commander had already arrived from Kabo. At 1645 hrs Pierre called me on radio and asked me to come back urgently to the CP. He had something critical to show me. Captain Marc, the intelligence officer and WO2 Frédéric who was my bodyguard, remained while I left with my driver, Paul, who was a staff corporal with twenty years’ experience. On arrival at the CP Pierre briefed me that the Seleka were taking up battle positions around our troops. They were led by Colonel Moussa, his two assistants and a new face which our soldiers had not seen before. The boss from Kabo was there… Many thoughts and reflections crossed into my mind. I reiterated to Pierre the requirement to be able to leave the school at very short notice. It was imperative for me to find the best way to recover initiative and regain my freedom of action. I was constrained by these negotiations and my adversary knew very well that I wanted to seize the whole city of Batangafo, and not just its western side. Paul drove me back to the negotiation venue where our interlocutors had finally arrived. Marc told them I had been waiting for them a long time and I was coming back soon. I removed my helmet, shook hands with the chief and took a seat in front of him. Moussa spoke directly saying they would not change their minds. I looked at the chief and I told him what I already explained to Moussa about the confidencebuilding measures. All they had to do was lay down their arms, return to their barracks and not operate in the city in military uniform. “We won’t change our minds” he said. Then I asked, “Do you confirm that you are not going to change your minds?”. “Yes, we won’t change our minds” he replied. One should not be afraid of the failure of a negotiation because

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the intrinsic weakness of a negotiator is to want to succeed in the negotiation at all costs. It is therefore advisable not to give in on important points even if it means breaking off the discussion if it becomes sterile. Therefore, I stood up, put my helmet on, and said: “Gentlemen, there is little more that we can say to each other. Goodbye”. These were my last words to them, and I turned my back on them and left the venue. Marc and Frédéric told me our interlocutors were dumbstruck and did not expect this behaviour from us at all. They were really surprised by our reaction and our decision to end the discussion so abruptly. Their looks showed their confusion in the face of an unforeseen situation. Even though I was looking to regain the initiative, this one was only the first spark, and I had to exploit their sudden unbalance. I moved quickly to the CP thanks to Paul and called General Bellot des Minières to report the failure of negotiations due to the Seleka’s refusal to implement the confidence-building measures. The discussion was not very long, however. The General told me that my mission was to protect the civilian population. I decided to carry out an area defence of the western part of Batangafo. There was a small plateau that would provide good tactical positions and I considered that the change of mission could provide the recovery of my freedom of action. Regaining the initiative, I could surprise my opponent and create advantage for the Battlegroup. Some good Marshal Foch readers would argue that a surprise can only be done through an offensive movement. However, if it is definitely true in a total war, in stabilisation, conditions and environment are quite different. Preferring to be pragmatic rather than dogmatic, it seemed to me that that risk was affordable. While my force commander was talking on the radio, I told Pierre that we would conduct a positional defence, and I reminded him of the definition of that mission which consists of holding a position without any intention to withdraw or a time-limit to the duration. It came instinctively and Pierre, my chief of operations, immediately understood the orders that he needed to give without delay. The General concluded our conversation, for the third time, with these words: “Armel, with prudence and determination”. Even before I have finished the radio call, Pierre gave the order to move the command post, and everybody worked hard to respond to this emergency. As soon as the radio call was ended, all the vehicles left the school to proceed to the new location that was close to the command post of the Congolese company in the middle of the plateau.

CHAPTER 8

Ten Thousand Lives to Be Saved

Both companies reacted very quickly and François-Xavier, who had anticipated his next move and started to dispatch his platoons, promptly stopped his initial move. Gabriel was waiting for the order to seize the eastern part of the city and his legionnaires were ready to go forward. Surprisingly, instead of the “Go” to carry out the mission they had prepared, they received a totally different order. From a tactical point of view, it was important to surprise the Seleka and regain the initiative. The tactical option we took needed to achieve multiple effects and avoid negative impacts on Task Force Sangaris. The adversary had to be prevented from becoming stronger militarily and politically after the impending clash. The seizure of the eastern part of Batangafo was feasible but appeared to me to be too risky in terms of consequences for Sangaris. Because of my lack of force protection with so many non-armoured vehicles, I considered the risk to be too great for the force commander. Indeed, we would be handing the adversary a strategic communication gift if he was able to inflict significant losses on my Battlegroup. Even if the Seleka would not gain anything from a tactical perspective, the fact that they were able to kill a number of French soldiers would give them credibility and would reinforce political clout regionally. Therefore, I assessed that my Force Commander risked losing significant political and strategic influence. Moreover, I needed to preserve my potential due to the force ratio not being in our favour at all, I had not wished to increase © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6_8

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our numerical inferiority. Nonetheless, this weakness could be rebalanced through surprise. This was also going to surprise my company commanders because I had not been able to warn them of a potential change of mission. The succession of events, radio calls with and reports to the Force HQ, and finally this rapid combat estimate meant that they had not been able to foresee this revised next phase of combat. They were now going to establish a positional defence to protect around ten thousand displaced civilians. From focusing on their initial task they showed great intellectual agility and excellent leadership skills by adapting instantly to the new situation. Over the radio, François-Xavier gave his new orders that were perfectly well understood and applied by his platoon commanders. The command post was just arriving when the first armoured vehicles of his company took position.

Because of the radical change of mission, Lieutenant Laurent modified his route and suddenly realised that as a result, he had avoided an ambush into which his platoon would have fallen if he had carried out his first task as initially planned. Barely arrived with his armoured platoon on the new location, he faced the first wave of assault that the Seleka decided to launch against our force. The rebels attacked in sizable numbers just

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seconds after his platoon’s arrival and he opened fire. The mountain soldiers secured their positions. As they had established their positions in haste, they prioritised their tasks in order to create a minimum of force protection. Some started to dig battle positions as quickly as they could while others guaranteed their protection by observing and engaging the enemy. Undaunted, they pushed their adversary’s first assaults back with determination. They were a bit surprised to be fighting so close to the civilian population; firstly, because our defensive perimeter was quite small and secondly, because they took up their battle positions where they could despite the presence of the displaced people. This proximity and the risk of collateral damage made the mission much more difficult for the commanders and each individual soldier. The legionnaires were also in an uncomfortable situation because instead of moving eastwards they were directly opposed by the adversary who opened fire as soon as their accomplices attacked on the plateau. Captain Gabriel gave orders to proceed to the defensive perimeter that his company was to hold. At the time of his move, only two combat platoons and his command platoon were able to begin their advance to reach the battalion’s planned defensive position. Captain Henry’s platoon was under enemy crossfire. Fixed on its battle position from both left and right, this force element was the focus of the enemy’s attention, but as such, it was able to facilitate the movement of the rest of the company. The exchange of fire and the intensity of the battle increased furiously, and I took the radio and called the Force HQ in Bangui. The message was very short and because of the deafening sound of the battle I had to shout: “We are surrounded. I am consolidating my laydown and I’ll call back later with more information”. In the operations room in Bangui, the radio was put on general loudspeaker and this message was heard by everybody there.

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As the Seleka tried to gain a foothold on the plateau, the platoon there resisted the machine-gun fire that was engaged against it. Henry, who was an experienced platoon commander, kept calm and led his men with a calm and determined leadership. As soon as the negotiations failed and the orders were given, I asked my forward air controller to request air support from the Rafales. He was in contact with them. Staff Sergeant Eric had already performed outstandingly and was preparing to perform again. Both fighters were already in transit when Eric requested their support, and they arrived very quickly over the combat area. Weather conditions were not ideal for the pilots because of cloud cover, visibility was therefore difficult for close air support. The battle on the ground was as fierce as it had been on the night of the ambush. The din of the battlefield was becoming very loud and it was difficult to hear the radio. Nonetheless, Eric described the situation to the jets and identified for them the first target which would allow Henry’s platoon to withdraw safely and establish itself on the defensive perimeter. Once the jets identified the crossroads from where the main enemy fire against Henry’s platoon was coming, they acquired their target and turned quickly to the north to take their attack heading. They chose a west–east heading to have the best “eyes on” their target with the sunset behind them. Once on their axis around 90° they called Eric to tell him they were on track and aligned with their objective. Eric made a final assessment to remind them

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of our platoon’s position and cleared them “hot”. One of the Rafales then “tipped in” to attack. The pilot concentrated on his task, his breathing was very loud and the pressure intense because of the limited visibility, the close proximity of the two sides and the proximity of so many civilians. Thoughts jostled in the pilot’s head: heading, speed, select firing mode, speed, safety selection, speed, heading. He switched on the master arm, his last pre-firing action. The ground avoidance indicator bar went up in his heads-up display and as he pulled the trigger to engage his 30 mm shells he picked out muzzle flashes of the 90 mm canon of an ERC that was holding back an assault on its position by rebels coming from the north. Fire poured in from both ground and air but the adversary showed an incredible determination. Despite the gun run by the jets, the platoon was still fixed to its position and could not extract from there to proceed to the Battlegroup’s defensive position. Due to the strong pressure exerted by the enemy, we ordered another air strike and this time, the Rafale would drop a GBU12 bomb. The cloud cover had become denser and visibility was now almost impossible from the overhead and so the jets had to rely exclusively on the JTAC. Eric took his time to send the crews the engagement CAS brief. The few seconds that he waited to get acknowledgement seemed very long. Down at the bottom of the plateau, Henry and his legionnaires were still fighting hard against a fanatical adversary. The jets came back guided by Eric and when the pilot was ready, he dropped his bomb that glided in with its typical whistle until the strike on its target that was the crossroads with the nicknumber A10. The explosion was astonishingly loud and suddenly, the fire from the left of Henry’s platoon ceased. The rebels there had been neutralised and they lost a significant amount of ammunition and in particular a number of RPG7 rockets. The platoon could now start its movement to insert itself in the Battlegroup laydown. Nonetheless, the enemy was still ferociously engaged on its right-hand side and overwhelming the legionnaires with a heavy weight of fire. Despite that, Henry successfully broke contact without loss. However, when one of his squads reached its TRM 2000 truck, the engine would not start. The driver then tilted the cab forward to access the engine and find out what was wrong. Although he was under fire, the legionnaire did not allow himself to be distracted. Attempts to start the engine were unsuccessful. Not understanding the problem, he grabbed a hammer and struck the engine, which started instantly. The section was then able to leave the area and rejoin its platoon. The sun had now disappeared, and darkness was beginning to take over. Seleka

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were still attempting to seize the plateau and launching attacks against us throughout the full 360°. There was a gap in our defensive perimeter and Henry’s platoon was moved to fill it so that we now had all our arcs fully covered. On the western side, the mountain company and the engineer troop faced down several rebel attacks with small arms and RPG7 rockets. The enemy were looking to break into our perimeter to overwhelm us with their numbers. Nevertheless, both companies and the other force elements held their battle positions. During a lull in the battle, the legionnaire snipers reported they had in their sight a group of fighters sheltered in battle trenches. They prepared to engage but we needed to be sure that they were hostile. I called the Congolese captain and asked him whether all his soldiers were wearing their helmets because by night, this would help us confirm identification. Very few minutes later, the snipers then reported their targets were wearing helmets. Thanks to this high level of professionalism, the legionnaires avoided a blue on blue. This incident was just finished while rebels started again to intensify their attacks. Seleka decided to focus their efforts on the eastern side of the Battle Group. At the south-east, Warrant Officer Class One Philippe faced ferocious pressure. This very experienced legionnaire was an outstanding leader whose calm determination remained unaffected by the chaotic situation. Even though his platoon was in the logistic role and therefore did not get the same fire power as a combat infantry platoon, he held his position and pushed the adversary back relentlessly. All of our soldiers showed great fire discipline, observing their respective arcs and even though they were under fire, they let their comrades shoot the rebels if these were not in their own arc of fire. Each one strictly respected these rules, and this gave us additional effectiveness in the fight by limiting our ammunition consumption. The pressure reduced on the western side and was increasing on the eastern one when the enemy started to engage us with their 80 mm mortars. Thanks to a night-vision asset, a soldier detected somebody using a cell phone in the middle of the civilian displaced people. The man stood up and was definitely speaking on his phone. As he reported what he had observed, the soldier realised that the individual was a rebel hiding among the civilians and controlling the mortar rounds! Indeed, during the period of time that he was under observation, two mortar bombs were engaged against Warrant Officer class 2 Laurent’s platoon, and this guy was clearly adjusting the fall of shot.

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As soon as this information was reported, a signaller was sent to switch off the relay antenna that was inside our perimeter. However, the rebel was lost from view when he sat down and was hidden by the crowd. A few minutes later, he was seen standing up again, but suddenly an illuminating round from their mortar provoked a wave of panic among the displaced people. Some soldiers ran out to try to catch him, but he was able to use this chaotic situation to escape as there were now ten thousand civilians running everywhere, overwhelmed by panic. They began to try to get into our fighting positions while some teenagers armed with machetes attacked women to rob them of the very few things that they had for their own children. The situation was getting worse because we now had to fight the rebels who did not let up in their attacks and simultaneously deal with the multitude of panicking refugees. This sudden change created a real risk of collateral damage. Fortunately, the two NCOs who were in charge of civilmilitary cooperations found a man who spoke French and Sango to pass very simple messages with a loudspeaker towards the people. The naval petty officer, who was with us and ironically so far from the ocean here in the middle of the African Continent, provided some short sentences which were translated. The population was told to go back to their tents and to lie flat until the end of the battle. The people went back to their camp under fire and remained there until the first light of the next day. After that rush of adrenaline, we were still in contact and my main concern was the very effective mortar fire of our adversaries. Their advance on the slope and through the vegetation to reach the plateau where the Battlegroup was installed, was supported by a rolling barrage of mortar bombs. The rounds were getting closer and closer, but the platoon remained, holding their positions in spite of the danger and engaging the oncoming enemy. Nevertheless, a bomb impacted beside a legionnaire who was wounded. Struck by shrapnel he was knocked out by the explosion and flung backwards. In such a situation, under fire, the best medicine before caring for the wounded is to win the fire fight. This is why the legionnaire closest to him jumped to seize the machine gun in order to use it and to suppress the assaulting rebels to enable the rescue. He too, however, was wounded by a bullet as he picked up the weapon. Calling for help they were immediately supported by their friends who immediately increased their rate of fire to cover the double extraction from the firing line. Warrant Officer class 2 Laurent had in a few moments two wounded legionnaires to deal with and a firefight to control. Under significant pressure, he calmly managed the situation he

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faced under fire. After receiving the report and the emergency request, his company commander sent the medical team to evacuate both legionnaires. The doctor, Captain Guillaume, was very young and this was his first overseas deployment. He was entirely focused on his medical task to provide lifesaving aid and stabilise the two wounded legionnaires and paid no attention to the battle all around him. He trusted in the protection given by the legionnaires and in turn they trusted him to look after them if they became a casualty.

This reciprocity is made possible not only in the Foreign Legion but across the French Army because of the high professionalism of our soldierdoctors. Doctors are not only military because they wear a uniform, but also real soldiers because they share the daily life of the troops in garrisons, in training and at war. This mutual trust is hugely important for both sides, above all in crisis situations. Knowledge of one another creates mutual trust and when this relationship is battle-tested, both parties work in the certainty that each will play his part to make the other’s work possible. After having provided lifesaving aid, the Captain-Doctor appeared close to the command post where the armoured ambulance stopped. He was joined by Colonel-Doctor Pierre who simultaneously was treating a Congolese soldier who was wounded in the arm. Together they prepared the medical evacuation brief for the helicopter’s medical team.

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Nonetheless, the Battlegroup was still fighting, and Laurent’s platoon faced the enemy’s main effort with a storm of fire. Thanks to the reports of his legionnaires, the platoon commander identified the mortar position. Staff Sergeant Eric suggested that we use our Gazelle attack helicopter that was equipped with HOT missiles. This platform was indeed the most appropriate to neutralise the target in an urban setting. Eric then sent a brief to the crew and described the target that was now being illuminated by an infrared target designator. Once the crew acquired the target, a short exchange between Eric and the commander confirmed that they had identified the right one. The Gazelle was overflying the western part of the town and we were able to observe the missile’s trajectory until impact. Seleka continued to launch attacks against the Battlegroup but they ceased firing on the western part to focus on the eastern side of the defensive perimeter. However, they were no longer supported by mortars and the pressure on Laurent’s legionnaires platoon was reduced. As the situation began to calm down, the medical evacuation helicopter was called in to collect the wounded and evacuate them to the field hospital in Bangui. Silence suddenly took hold and there was no more shooting, but just the sound of a dark night which was broken by the noise of the MEDEVAC helicopter landing close to the command post. A young female doctor captain jumped from the Puma and met with her colleagues. Guillaume and Pierre gave her the patient handover briefs and the legionnaires and mountain troopers carried the stretchers into the helicopter’s fuselage. They walked slowly while the rotor blades turned, and hot air blew out from the machine’s turbines. The time it had taken to land, link up, pick up the wounded and take-off again had seemed like an eternity, so much so that I could not wait to see the helicopter take-off again and cease to be a target for the enemy. I was relieved when it headed back to Bangui where the three wounded were going to be treated by the surgical team. As the casualty evacuation was ongoing, the armed Puma, whose callsign was Pirate, watched over the plateau to provide suppression with its 20 mm gun in case the MEDEVAC helicopter was engaged. After some harassing actions, the night settled down around midnight. The entire Battlegroup remained alert and stood to, ready to resume fighting at any moment to repel any further assaults. The chain of command had been remarkable in both its leadership and combat skills. My chief of operations, Lieutenant Colonel Pierre had conducted the different actions calmly and with intellectual accuracy, both company commanders, Captains Gabriel and François-Xavier, led their respective

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units with clarity and by example; the platoon commanders were also tough and courageous. This is the reason why the troops fought with such aggressiveness and with such a high level of morale during these most intense moments. As the sun rose, the rebels started to return to their battle positions. The reports coming from both companies described the same situation. I interpreted this posture as hostile, but I did not need to order the companies to be ready to fight. Gabriel and François-Xavier already reported that they were ready. Nonetheless, as the adversary had not yet opened fire, I could not give the order to strike him. I called therefore the HQ in Bangui to request authorisation to engage as I considered the enemy’s attitude to be hostile. To my mind, this hostility gave us the right to open fire, but the chief of staff denied me this request explaining that the Seleka were now scared of us and were just in their trenches for protection. First, I laughed when I listened to this explanation because they had been far from scared at the night during their numerous assaults, and I tried to convince Cédric to let me take the initiative. I told him I did not want to be surprised again as we had been the day before when they were taking up fighting positions instead of taking part in the negotiations. Not only did he not change his mind but he forbade me to open fire first. Nevertheless, he proved to be right and the following events of 6th August confirmed his analysis. On 5 August, General Bellot des Minières flew to meet Seleka leaders outside Bangui. He was greeted frostily. When he arrived with his close protection team, they were surrounded by a hundred armed fighters, over equipped with AK47s, RPK light machine guns, RPG 7 launchers and even AGS 17 grenade launchers! Because of their losses the day before during their giant ambush, he walked into a very icy atmosphere arrived despite the humidity. The discussions were very tense, but the Force Commander warned them to respect and apply the confidence measures they had agreed to a few months ago. He was forced to endure the ranting and raving of his interlocutors. However, after this long night for everybody in Batangafo and in Bangui, the behaviour of Seleka leaders had radically changed and they now requested to meet with General Bellot des Minières on 6 August. Their embarrassment was now immense whereas the Force Commander was calm, and this reinforced his authority over them. His troops had won a hard confrontation whereas the Seleka had believed itself to be the strongest. When he arrived at the meeting, General

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Zoundeiko had lost his self-confidence and his arrogance; his hands were shaking and he felt a huge pressure on his shoulders. He came to ask General Bellot des Minières to reduce the pressure on his troops in Batangafo. This is the reason why I received the order to open a medical corridor through my defensive position to allow the Seleka to move their wounded to the hospital on the west of the plateau. We switched on the mobile phone mast so that the adversary could communicate with their leadership as such a measure could contribute to reducing the tension and aid dialogue. Then I met a doctor from an NGO who had worked in this area for quite a long time. He knew the rebel leaders and he met me to ask permission to cross my position. Naturally I supported the plan for a medical corridor but I expressed two conditions: – the men carrying the wounded on their stretchers were to be unarmed; – dialogue, exchanges and communication could only take place by voice. Cell phones and radios were forbidden because I did not want them sending back information on my battle positions due to our shallow defensive perimeter.

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It was just a question of force protection for my Battle Group. I was open to all proposals, but these two conditions were non-negotiable. The doctor would be the leader of the evacuation towards the hospital, but he wanted to keep his radio. When he came for the first time to discuss this with me, I ordered him to switch it off and I explained that, because I could not be sure of what he was saying in a language I did not understand, I could not allow him to use his radio. He was surprisingly stubborn and wanted to keep using it to coordinate his medical evacuation. I ignored his insistence and he tried to make me feel guilty by telling me that the Seleka were going to be very angry and that it was outrageous that I was not helping the wounded. I replied that his obstinacy was the only obstacle to the opening of this humanitarian corridor and that my primary mission was to come to the aid of the terrorised population and to ensure the protection of my battalion. I offered a compromise. I accepted to open my tactical laydown but he had to offer something in return by complying with my security constraints. He did not agree. He was quite distant, and I was intrigued by his attitude and did not trust him at all. It was one of these intuitions we cannot explain. In this situation, I preferred to trust my instinct rather than trust someone I did not know. He had been stubborn, and I had remained firm on my conditions. Finally, the corridor was not opened and they had to bypass the Battlegroup’s combat positions to carry their wounded to the hospital. The HQ was fully aware of the situation and they regretted this doctor did not understand what was a fair deal. The discussions were still ongoing in Bangui between General des Minières and the Seleka. The main purpose was to find a way to reduce the tension. Around 1600 hrs, I received the order to leave the town within the hour to reach the village of Bolom a few miles south of Batangafo. I had to redeploy the Battlegroup far enough to reduce the pressure and yet close enough to intervene to support MISCA or the local population. I called the Congolese captain to explain the evolution of the situation and how we would now proceed. We were going to keep in contact by phone in order to have regular daily communications and to ensure that I retained situational awareness after our departure. He was to resume patrolling throughout the town, including on the eastern side, in order to restore the legitimacy of his mission in support of the local authorities. He fully understood the reason for the Battlegroup’s withdrawal and felt reassured. He knew that Sangaris was there to provide him with any support that he might need as we had just done over these

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two past days. At 1700 hrs we started to move. The town was silent and each of us was on his guard because we could take nothing for granted. We were not safe from further attacks and my Force Protection concerns remained the same. One-third of the Battlegroup was not under armour and so I was in a hurry to leave this place given our vulnerable situation. We reached Bolom, which had been deserted for many days, and we took up a position to guarantee our protection. That night it rained heavily and we found ourselves flooded. We completed our full installation there on 7 August using the daylight to significantly improve our positions. The HQ decided to send us a reinforcement company with armoured personal carrier (VAB). This company was sent from the Battlegroup which operated in Bangui and Captain Pierre was tasked with this mission because his unit belonged to the 7th Mountain Infantry Battalion. It was thought the common culture would make the integration of his company within our Battlegroup easier. This was a wise move as Pierre knew all my infantry officers. The Battlegroup now had three combat subgroups, a logistic squadron and an Army aviation helicopter subgroup. We had all means to intervene with force in Batangafo if necessary and clearly this newly arrived company would be my break-in force with its armoured vehicles.

CHAPTER 9

Return to Calm

The logistic squadron entered Batangafo with the Battlegroup on the evening of 4 August. Nevertheless, it had been necessary to send it back to Bossangoa, our nearest forward post, to fill the trucks with food, water and other supplies. Indeed, because of the broken bridge encountered at the beginning of the operation, and the subsequent radical change to the logistic laydown, the Battlegroup needed to be resupplied. The main body of the Battlegroup left Bouar with four days of supply in each vehicle and with our trucks we just could carry an additional four days’ worth of food and water. With regard to the track conditions and the state of the river, our logistic unit required two days to go back to Bossongoa, to reload the trucks and two other days to return to Batangafo. That meant that the squadron could just provide four days of supply at a time. The security conditions were not good on the morning of 5 August when they left the town with the aim of being back by 8 August. They did a great job supporting the Battlegroup and our withdrawal from Batangafo made our logistic resupply much easier. Because the situation had been getting worse from early August, the Planning Joint Headquarters in Paris decided to reinforce Sangaris Force with two Air Force helicopters coming from Operation Barkhane in Chad. These two helicopters, a Caracal and an armed Puma, flew to Bangui airport where they joined the Army aviation detachment on the late afternoon of 6 August. They were immediately committed the day after their arrival and carried out an © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6_9

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important mission for the Battlegroup when they delivered two tons of ammunition, except for 90 mm shells for our turret gun. On a daily basis, we maintained telephone contact with our Congolese friends who were now patrolling in the town once more, having recovered their legitimacy and therefore their authority. The situation had calmed down and the Seleka went back to their barracks and kept a low profile. Normal life seemed about to resume but I knew that it would still take time. Nevertheless, on 7 August, just one day after leaving Batangafo and a few hours after the ammunition delivery, we received a visit of our Force Commander and his chief of staff. This came as a surprise as we had not been warned. The Battlegroup was happy to welcome General Bellot des Minières and much appreciated his encouragements and congratulations for the work done so far. Nonetheless, beyond this apparent tactical success, he stressed the huge amount of work that Sangaris still had to do to achieve its goals which were to create the security conditions to allow the UN mission to operate safely and effectively. The mountain troopers and legionnaires were proud to be visited by the Task Force Commander, especially as some of the legionnaires had served under the General when he was the commanding officer of the 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. Lunch was from individual ration packs but miraculously enhanced with Puyloubier red wine which the General had kindly brought to us and some amazingly tasty home-made sausages offered by Cédric, the chief of staff. These small gestures meant a lot to us as they not only brought additional flavour to the food but they created a mutual bond through a shared meal. They stayed with us for a few hours and then returned to Bangui. The tension was decreasing but we remained on a high state of alert. The Congolese MISCA company carried out its missions in the town without any difficulty and the Cameroonian detachments within the region confirmed the radical change of atmosphere. Moreover, they reported what was happening in the medical centres around the town where many wounded rebels had been brought in a very bad way. Due to this restored atmosphere of calm, the Battlegroup received the order to finally move back to Bouca1 on 10 August. This time, there was no rush. The weather was good and we would move by daylight. The first company that left Bolom was the one that had come to us as a 1 Map from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/41/Un-central-afr ican-republic.png.

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reinforcement. Pierre had done an excellent job in the few days that he had been with us and it was now time for him and his men to go back to Bangui. The Battlegroup moved discreetly while remaining ready to react and everyone remained on their guard and focused on the mission. Arriving in Bouca we met with the small Foreign Legion team that we had left behind as our logistic support relay. They were all airborne or former airborne legionnaires. They had coordinated resupply by air through the Air Force onto the town’s airfield to resupply the companies. This team was led by Major Xavier and his deputy was a Warrant Officer Class Two, originally from South Korea. Thanks to them, the task of the logistic squadron had been made much easier by shortening the resupply route and avoiding long hours on difficult tracks. The chief of logistics, Lieutenant Colonel Christophe, who had remained in Bouar as our reach-back node for the whole operation as our communications had been limited and he did an outstanding job. He coordinated all our resupply requests and thanks to his bird eye view and his understanding of the ongoing operation despite the distance, he never lost sight of our needs. Once back in Bouca we still maintained our daily contact with the Congolese company in Batangafo where things remained positive. It came as some surprise when an independent investigation team from the UN Security Council came to ask me questions over the battle which the Battlegroup had waged in Batangafo. They were four or five team members and the team leader was a retired colonel from the Royal Air Force of Morocco. We welcomed them and offered them tea. We spoke together in French and I was delighted to be able to tell the team leader that I knew a little bit about his country, as the native land of my parents who raised me in the love of Morocco. He said they had come from Batangafo where they had investigated the combat which had taken place whereupon he asked a series of specific questions that I was unable to answer. I replied that it was not possible to provide this information and he needed to engage with the headquarters in Bangui as my mission was still ongoing and there was still a requirement for operational secrecy. Nevertheless, I said in Spanish to his colleague, a Spanish lady who was in charge of humanitarian questions, that the Battlegroup was successful in its mission to protect the population and the refugees. I stressed the point that no civillians had been killed or injured and the reason for this was down to the highest levels of professionalism of my mountain troopers and legionnaires who acted proportionally, whereas the Seleka facing them had engaged in indiscriminate violence. She agreed with this

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point and noted that the Battlegroup had performed very well in shielding the locals. It was indeed our mission and it was much appreciated that independent investigators from the United Nations Security Council had witnessed that as our battle had been one between a legitimate use of force and the non-discriminating violence used by the adversary. After around an hour with us, the team left Bouca and crossed the flooding River Fafa to proceed to Bossongoa and then on to Bangui. The Battlegroup stayed in Bouca for eight days in an atmosphere which was very different than the one we had felt when we passed through this small town during our earlier trip. Infantry and cavalry units patrolled all around the district and the legion engineers destroyed many weapons and ammunition that were collected. The daily radio or phone conversations with the Congolese company in Batangafo confirmed that the situation remained peaceful and MISCA exerted its authority without further obstacles or difficulties. The Cameroonian Battlegroup was a very good source of information because it was deployed throughout the region with a number of platoons deployed forward. Its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Guillaume K, was a very good friend and we exchanged a lot of information. Our situational awareness was highly effective because our intelligence sharing allowed us to assess the appropriate threat level in our various areas of responsibilities, in particular in places where I did not have any soldiers deployed and where he had detachments. The consequences of the engagements in Batangafo impacted across the whole region and now the Cameroonians could move safely without any more attacks from the Seleka. Our analysis was then confirmed by other sources of information that we kept in touch with at all levels. The HQ in Bangui considered that the effect on the ground had been achieved and the Battlegroup could return to its previous mission to rebuild the western part of the country. Thus, came the time to leave Bouca and to go back to Bossongoa. We split the Battlegroup into two detachments. The first one led by Pierre, encompassed the mountain subgroup and a part of the logistic squadron. They left Bouca in the early morning of 17 August while the second detachment of the legionnaires, under my command, left Bouca for the last time on 19 August. We spent two days in Bossongoa in order to re-service our equipment and to rest and prepare for the last leg of the journey to go back to our base location in Bouar. While our area was calm, tension was rising in Bangui when the Seleka undertook a foolish and almost insane attack against the French Battlegroup whose mission was to keep

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order in the capital. While some VBCI armoured personal carriers were carrying out a blocking action in some streets of Bangui, the Seleka decided to try to overrun the French company there. Despite the warnings of the French soldiers the rebels took no notice and continued to run towards the positions of the French soldiers who opened fire to push back successive assaults. For the second time in the same month, the Seleka suffered significant losses. Indeed, after having lost three hundred fighters in Batangafo, they lost around a hundred and fifty men in Bangui. This last event broke the political and military organisation of the Seleka, whose unity was now critically undermined. As a political actor they were critically compromised as internal disputes took hold. The Battlegroup was now back at its base locations of Bouar and Bossongoa. It was good to meet with the prefect Frédéric Ouagonda and the prosecutor Tiburce Bilongo, and we were pleased to hear their positive comments of our three-week mission of which they knew a significant amount of detail. Indeed, during the battle of Batangafo, they received daily phone calls from people living in the town. However, our return to Bouar coincided with the deployment of the UN’s administration. The landscape was significantly changing because the UN presence now increased and this meant that the Battlegroup could redeploy. The UN regional director was a Franco-Senegalese lady named Yasmine Thiam. We worked together and shared all the information I had together with my perception of the ongoing peace process in which the prefect and the prosecutor were involved. Together, we evaluated the progress made not only in terms of security and stability but also in terms of social care, schooling and the restoration of normal civilian life. I told her which lines of development the prefect wanted to pursue and those where he would need strong support from her administration. The UN considered the security conditions were suitable to begin its deployment in CAR from the West to the East; Bouar was therefore the first step in this process. Battlegroup de Boissieu had completed its mission and because of this change in the operational situation, we received the order to go back to N’Djamena in Chad, from where the rest of the unit was carrying out missions in both Niger and Mali. To prepare for this move, we first needed to concentrate all the troops and prepared to move our two companies. The legionnaires were to proceed to Bossongoa and the mountain troopers were to come to Bouar. We made this change in over eight days and we undertook a lot of maintenance on our equipment. Due to combat in the north of CAR, we could not move to Chad directly as

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our presence would be seen as an escalation. To this end, the heavier part of the Battlegroup would move to Bangui with our ERC 90 armoured reconnaissance vehicles. They would be airlifted to N’Djamena while the rest of the unit would move by road through Cameroon. Christophe organised the whole logistic manoeuvre that was far from simple. He did it perfectly and delivered a great result. As we needed a lot of manpower to maintain the equipment and take down temporary infrastructures, we could not be present in the field as much as we wanted. Nevertheless, the military presence was still high in the region thanks to the Cameroonian Battle Group. Guillaume, their commanding officer, put out more patrols to cover our withdrawal. Our cooperation was sincere and effective until the very end of our operational tour and had contributed, without doubt, to our success in the western part of the country. Although we were now looking to the other mission within our deployment, we continued our action in the field until the last minute and it was important to carry out our peacebuilding efforts. Before leaving Bouar, the Central African State’s authority needed to be reinforced. Different activities supported this effort in early September. On the fifth of the month, we organised a short ceremony with the security forces in our compound with the prefect and the prosecutor. In late August some outlaws were caught, and we seized their pickup and two motorcycles which were in very poor condition. Three young mechanics of the Battlegroup set to work restoring the car and we gave it to the Gendarmerie in Bouar, thus we transformed a brigand’s vehicle into a police car! Thanks to our contacts in Bangui, we were able to find some stickers that were used to mark the vehicles of the French Gendarmerie where on mission in the Central African Republic. The car, rebuilt and cleaned, now had “GENDARMERIE” on each door. We were happy to give them the car and the two motorcycles which would increase their mobility within their area of responsibility. On 11 September 2014, the Minister of State for Defence of the Central African Republic, Mr Aristide Sokambi, and Sangaris Force commander, Brigadier General Eric Bellot des Minières, visited Bouar. A few weeks before the official handover of Battlegroup de Boissieu to the Bangladeshi contingent of MINUSCA, the military and civilian authorities came to observe the economic and administrative improvements in the town. Located on the main supply road, the axis through which all goods from Cameroon to Bangui transited, the town of Bouar had become emblematic of the security progress in the West of the Central African Republic. It was therefore natural that Mr. Sokambi chose this city

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for his first official trip. The local Prefect reported the clear progress made in security due to the close cooperation between the international forces and the local authorities. Mrs. Yasmine Thiam, head of the MINUSCA office in Bouar, praised the “coordination between all the actors in support of all Central Africans”, a coordination which made it possible to have a comprehensive understanding of the resolution of the crisis in the West of the Central African Republic in the long term. Thanks to the “efforts made with great courage, tenacity and neutrality by the Sangaris force, not only in Bouar, but also in the regions, even the outlying ones”, the head of the MINUSCA office in Bouar affirmed the willingness of the United Nations mission to take over the torch from the Sangaris force to consolidate peace. General Eric Bellot des Minières welcomed “the improvement of the situation in Bouar due to the combined efforts of Battlegroup de Boissieu and their partners such as the prefect, the prosecutor, the Police and Gendarmerie of Bouar, international organisations and NGOs”. It was therefore now possible to redeploy Sangaris Force and hand over to MINUSCA. A Bangladeshi Battlegroup was to relieve us in place and its command team arrived on 16 September to carry out a reconnaissance and to meet the main actors. Thereafter, an initial light detachment arrived before the main part of the battalion. We spent some days together for a handover period which was concluded by a ceremony in our compound on 19 September. The French flag was lowered and the UN one was raised to the top of the mast. General Bellot des Minières was there with Major General Tumenta from Cameroon, who was appointed in July by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as the Force Commander of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). The French ambassador in Central Africa also attended the ceremony as did Mr Aristide Sokambi, the Minister of State for Defence. As the Bangladeshi unit took over, we focused our attention on departure. I met with the prefect and then with the prosecutor to take my leave and, above all, to thank them for the extraordinary cross-cultural experience I had enjoyed with them, they had proved to be two outstanding servants of their country. I concluded these visits with a visit to Mrs Yasmine Thiam at the UN. Even though the country itself had so much more to do in order to stabilise its security situation and deliver stability and prosperity, I left CAR with a sense of accomplishment. The battalion had achieved its mission and I did not have that sense of incompleteness that

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I had felt after my three operational tours in Afghanistan. Gabriel and his legionnaires were called to Bangui and so left Bossongoa to reinforce the security in the capital; Paul and his Foreign Legion engineers went to Bangui as well for other tasks until the end of their own tour. We left Bouar by night, at 0400 hrs on 23 September. The convoy started in the silence of the night and crossed the city one last time. We crossed the border into Cameroon at Cantonnier. There we met a French officer who was serving as mentor to the Cameroonian Army. He welcomed us and led the convoy to our next stop in Ngoundéré. We were officially welcomed there by the governor of the province and spent the night in military facilities. Then we left this city to proceed to Moundou in Chad where we were to spend the night at the airport. We crossed the Chado-Cameroonian border between Touboro and Koutré where a Chadian lieutenant awaited us to escort the convoy to N’Djamena. Arriving in Moundou we entered the airport and stopped in some buildings that were under construction. Some hours after our installation, Major General Palasset, the General Officer Commanding Operation Barkhane, arrived by plane directly from N’Djamena. He wanted to welcome and congratulate the Battlegroup for its results in the Central African Republic and for having achieved so much in combat. I gathered the men and presented them to the General. His words were warm and we spent the evening together and had dinner. He used this opportunity to speak to the mountain troopers whose mindset and spirit he knew well as his origins were also into the mountain brigade. Everybody slept in Moundou and the next day we were in N’Djamena. It was a real pleasure to finally meet with the “other half” of the Battle Group. We now had another task, more administrative but still important. We had to close down Operation Sparrowhawk which would then be integrated into Operation Barkhane. At the same time, we also had to prepare for the end of our mission and our relief in place. We left N’Djamena on 17 October to fly to Senegal where we were going to spend two days of decompression. There, we were able to relax and had a number of short briefings to prepare our minds for the return to normality. By 20 October we were back in France and in our garrisons in Gap and Grenoble. The mission was formally over. Another one was waiting for us as in January 2015, France was struck by a series of terror attacks. During this first year of Operation Sentinelle, the Regiment was committed to the security of our country; this time on our national soil and once more faithful to the motto of our Regiment, “Ever Ready, Ever Willing”.

Epilogue

Western countries wage wars to reach peace whereas, today in these various protracted stabilisation’s conflicts, their adversaries conduct war as a long-term business, indeed even as a way of life. These latter have genuine interests in endless conflicts through which they increase their wealth and power. The first confrontation on the field is therefore cultural, philosophical and political before being physical. We should then keep in mind that such a military intervention can last a while and will be quickly perceived by media as a bogged down commitment. Given that, it seems there are more risks than advantages to contribute to the international effort for peace. Nonetheless, many people are wondering which interests has a country to intervene like France does in Africa. Why does she do that? History is a legacy, geography is a reality. We cannot consider these questions only through the prism of France as a former colonial power. Such an approach would be definitely limited and much too narrow in its focus. For sure, the links between some African countries and France come from their common past and history, but they cannot be reduced through this single focus. Indeed, it is necessary to take into account a real diversity of parameters before asserting, as some do, that France is acting as a neo-colonialist country. Others think that France is pursuing on this continent a hidden, Machiavellian agenda. As every country in the world, France has interests that she needs to protect and defend in many ways and areas. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6

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However, thirty years ago, a radical change appeared in French foreign policy towards African countries. The starting point was a consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall. French President François Mitterrand gave an important speech at the 16th Conference of Heads of State of France and Africa in La Baule, on the western coast of France on 20 June 1990. During the solemn opening session, the French President laid the foundations for a new relationship and established the framework that were to be implemented in order for Africa to reach the status of a mature continent of truly independent and democratic countries. In departure from precedent policy that did not pay attention to the non-democratic tenets of the regimes, France, in the wake of the demise of the Soviet bloc, wanted to change her line. Indeed, the threats that were seen on the energy supplies and raw materials no longer seemed to exist. President Mitterrand thought it was time to initiate a process of democratisation and announced that France would henceforth, in determining her financial support and development aid, examine compliance with this new framework for implementing democracy and a multiparty system in many of these autocratic regimes. He then concluded that “there will be normal French aid to African countries, but it is obvious that this aid will be more lukewarm towards those who behave in an authoritarian manner, and more enthusiastic towards those who take step towards democratization with courage”.1 He finished by assuring his African audience of France’s continuing commitment: “[If the] people of Africa [were] left in perdition on the edge of history’s path, it is the whole of humanity for whom the knell would ring out (…) You must have confidence in your ability to build a space in line with your interests and we will help you to do so. You must have confidence, ladies and gentlemen, in freedom. It must not be seen as a hidden enemy, ready to kill those who choose it. She will be (…) your best friend”.2 One year later, at the summit of Francophonie at Lomé, the French President added: “Many African countries have embarked on a broad movement of democratic reform. I am confident that each will be able to independently determine the appropriate modalities and pace as soon as

1 François Mitterrand, discours de La Baule, www.elysee.fr, p. 6. 2 François Mitterrand, discours de La Baule, www.elysee.fr, p. 7.

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the direction is taken”.3 Nevertheless, if such a process has been implemented and the multiparty system is now well widespread in Africa, it is not quite the same for democracy. While some leaders organised this change in name, they highjacked the electoral processes in the 1990s. Additionally, many in the local populations did not vote for a competent representative, but followed tribal or clan loyalties. In this fragile situation, freedom through security, stability and prosperity remains a legitimate but challenging objective for this continent. France promotes these political tenets and supports those who adhere to them and want to defend them. In Central African Republic, French troops came on call, solely rescued a population in life danger, and prevented a genocide. No more, no less, and Battle Group de Boissieu played its role, a crucial one, in this country saving ten thousand lives in Batangafo, and many others everywhere in its area of responsibility.

3 François Mitterrand, discours de Lomé, www.elysee.fr, pp. 1–2.

Afterthoughts

Veiled Victories in Modern War Reflecting on the conflicts in which the international community has been engaged over the last 15 years, one might lose hope in the possibility of their resolution. But there are nonetheless good reasons to hold on to hope, because difficult situations in the field of conflict can offer significant opportunities which the international community should seize. Contrary to some assertions, and mindful that a military response should not be the only one, the troops deployed by Western countries enable the creation of conditions necessary for reconstruction and peacebuilding. Effective diplomacy and, above all, political will are necessary to seize and exploit appropriately the propitious opportunities these conditions induce. If we consider exploitation as the seizing of the opportunity presented by a favourable situation to take the necessary measures to gain the most disruptive advantage over one’s enemy, thereby forcing his submission: is this still achievable against a generally elusive enemy? In this chapter, I analyse the battle of Batangafo as an example of a veiled victory. From the battle of Alasai in March 2009 in Afghanistan to the battle of Batangafo in August 2015 in the Central African Republic or in the Saharan strip since 2012, the units of the French army led highintensity fighting without being engaged in conflicts comparable to “total war”. After a decade of intervention in PKO marked by a long presence in the Balkans during the 1990s, the 2000s were characterised by the © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6

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direct experience of combat for a young professional army and by the rediscovery of and re-engagement with irregular warfare. The nature of war, in the sense that it is an extension of a political purpose, has not changed or modified in essence in its practice on the ground. Indeed, it is the character of war that has profoundly evolved rather than its nature. Hence armed forces have been engaging for many years in the resolution of conflicts that are quite different from selfevident wars, the latter having a readily identifiable enemy and a clear-cut front line. In such cases, how does one turn such an opportune situation to one’s advantage? In contemporary conflicts with strict rules of engagement, the limited aspect of war, the imperative of proportionality of methods and of the use of military means, together with the lack of respect for the principle of “jus in bello” by non-state actors, such conflicts do not appear to lend themselves to final resolution. Hence, the salient question is: are there still situations where the breakup of the opposing formations can be exploited to the point where the enemy’s organisation is completely routed and consequently neutralised? Does such exploitative action feature in the vocabulary of today’s peacekeepers? Furthermore, is it operative only at the tactical level or does it also apply to the strategic level? It is evident that, in the case of stabilisation operations, such exploitative action encompasses more than a military role: it extends to that of development actors. A point of essential significance emerging here is the demand for the full spectrum of operational actors, ranging from pre-conflict to post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. This chapter will argue that forms of war have changed in recent years; this being so, it both poses the central question of whether true enduring and decisive victory is still possible in contemporary conflicts, and makes the attendant point that, should the response be positive, then such victory remains indiscernible to key stakeholders, including development actors and political leaders, and most of all, the wider public, even though it can offer the potential for political effect of strategic significance. Forms of war have changed. The evolution of war has created asymmetries that seem to make enduring victory impossible today. The nature of war does not change, neither in its violence, susceptibility to chance, nor in its triggers and motivations. There will always be friction in any action that involves people and their movement. Despite the most modern means of prosecuting war, the fog of war will persist because it results from the unpredictability of the adversary and from only partial possession

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of the elements necessary for crucial decision-making. “The perception that modern warfare has become too dangerous and destructive to be left free to follow its own course”4 implies the need to implement extensive rules to limit it as much as possible. The Treaty of Vienna in 1815 was a first step in that direction; so too was the creation of the League of Nations and subsequently that of the United Nations, with its clear aim of restricting, if not preventing, mass losses in armed conflict. Political leaders wanted, then, to regulate wars: limiting their extent and impact, where it was not possible to avoid them altogether. If the nature of war does not change, then why does its character evolve? The character of war is a reflection of societies and their context; its influences, therefore, are political, economic and social. On the political front, when it comes to the resolution of a conflict, only nation states seem to offer accommodation to the benefit of smaller non-state actors from transnational networks, some of which are coalitions of protest and anger—as well as greed. The bankruptcy of states such as the CAR has encouraged the greed of armed groups for the seizure and control of the wealth that abounds in such a country.5 Thus, either by acquiring financial resources through their own efforts or by benefiting from substantial subsidies from external bodies to structure themselves around common or compatible causes, many terrorist organisations and armed groups combine in a nebulous manner; the interactions and rivalries of which fluctuate according to particular objectives and special interests. At the social level, the impetus to power is underpinned by nationalistic, cultural and religious motivation. Extensive and rich in symbols and symbolic meaning, such motivation stimulates the fanaticism of those groups whose ardour in combat is considerable. Moreover, the fighters in these groups seek to merge into the civilian population so as to use it as a human shield, in order to prevent or at least limit the strike capability of opposing regular troops. Furthermore, social networks and the media generally constitute broadcasting instruments of considerable effect in relation to collateral damage, they are keenly employed for instantaneous associated communications. Playing upon Western sensitivities,

4 Vincent Desportes, Comprendre la guerre, Economica, Paris, 2001, p. 147. 5 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations : An Introduction to Strategic

History, Routledge, New York, 2003, 392 p.

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and despite their own crimes and brutal attacks, they are adept at both promptly denouncing resultant civilian casualties and claiming imaginary and deceitful losses within the ranks of their adversary. All these aspects are well-known and might appear self-evident, but it is nonetheless important to highlight the consequences that such a situation implies for regular troops. While on the one hand “the exorbitant increase in the capabilities to exert physical violence has led to the imposition of the most extreme restrictions”6 on conventional national forces, on the other hand, the opposing non-state unconventional forces generally fight without any consideration for moral or ethical principles or rules. This inevitably makes defeating such an enemy an extremely demanding task, requiring complex coordination of the military response with political, developmental and other actors. The pressure, therefore, placed on the shoulders of the regular troops is intense, because they have to deal with the demands of combat within a framework of restrictions and norms that translates into additional operational constraints which their adversaries do not have to face. All this points to an inherent asymmetry of approach. These conditions increase the difficulty faced by the deployed contingent members and consequently require them to be tough, thoroughly trained, politically sensitive and well-led, and to be fully aware of the need for close coordination with local government representatives, NGOs and others. The notion of the “strategic corporal” remains wholly applicable because the slightest error committed by a soldier can be pinpointed and ascribed almost instantaneously, thus ruining the more general positive effect produced across the field of operations. Indeed, poorly educated individuals have to apply and display extremely sharp judgement and incredible self-control. The demand on them is not only to do their duty, but to do it consistently well in deteriorating and dangerous situations. In such cases, their excellence must be both recognised and highlighted. It follows, then, that a situation of asymmetrical engagement does not render non-state actors, de facto, the weakest party. These irregular actors create in fact a range of asymmetries of which they take advantage directly because they are free of considerations and constraints relating to the principle of “jus in bello” and hence act according to their own rules. Thus, while non-state actors face an asymmetry in terms of equipment, one might equally assert that asymmetries confront mandated troops, too:

6 Lucien Poirier, Stratégie intégrale et guerre limitée, in Stratégique, ISC web site.

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relating to the approach to armed conflict and the psychology of combat precisely owing to their respect for and adherence to the rule of international law and norms. This diverse compendium of asymmetries represents the difficulties at the very heart of stabilisation operations. Is it possible to have a clear view and assessment of a crisis to enable its resolution? Current conflicts are not conducted in the framework of “total war”, as were the operations undertaken by the international coalition in Iraq in 1990–1991. Peacebuilding interventions are more limited and more complex in their undertaking owing to the entanglement of civilian and military issues. The field of confrontation is everywhere and needs to be addressed at the global level. Three phases are generally in play: the first relates to coercion, the second deals with stabilisation with its aim of restoring pre-eminence to the political leaders, and the third provides for the normalisation of daily life accompanied by a peaceful environment. In the case of coercion, the main purpose is “war” and this is relatively clear, albeit this is not necessarily easy to realise. The stabilisation phase must be a buffer step between violence and peace. Its purpose is to reduce the threshold of violence as a descending curve despite the occasional appearance of peaks of violence or combative engagement. This phase is critical for the resolution of crises and conflicts because the very delicacy and volatility of situations can either degrade or enhance the peace process. Any favourable situation or set of circumstances have to be fully apparent and appreciated, particularly by civilian peace-keepers, so that they might take advantage of each and every positive element of them. Sharing the most accurate situational awareness in terms of opportunities for postconflict/post-crisis reconstruction is vital to anchor the process on the right path. Thus, the aim in terms of securing success is not in essence the disintegration of the adversary or his complete destruction, rather it is to identify and seize opportunities to promote the peace-making process. The inherent logic of military intervention is, therefore, to facilitate the establishment of peace: to create the circumstances favourable to a political and diplomatic process which lays the foundation of enduring peace. The deployment conditions associated with PKO can be compared to some degree to a feudal environment. Warlords, armed groups, rebels, criminal gangs and syndicates and other violent non-state actors are elements of a widely spread prey to be gripped—and dispatched. Feudalism is not a characteristic of the Middle Ages alone; it emerges and comes to the fore when a state or political regime collapses or where

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no state structures exist. It “would reproduce in a far more counterbalanced form the developments of troubled times, a world of parcellised sovereignties, of considerably more autarchic regions, of local centres of authority”.7 Where this is so, the law of the strongest presumes a request for the protection of the most powerful local leader. Today, this parcelling of society is no longer called feudalism, rather an environment of informal networks of patronage or clientilism. Sometimes, the rallying cry of selfdetermination can be the trigger for the implementation of feudalism which contests the central power and advocates a different social contract based on local self-serving and economic interests. The entanglement of all these complex operative factors creates considerable disorder on the field of engagement and conflict. What took Western countries many decades, indeed several centuries in some cases, in terms of nation- and state-building, is now demanded within weeks and months, certainly no longer than a handful of years. To overcome contemporary feudalism deeply anchored within failed states, together with its “grey zones”, presents a demanding challenge. This is the duty levied on the deployed forces, who must restore the rule of law. This is the reason why soldiers are genuinely managers of chaos. They are taught and trained for intervention in the worst situations: where the rule of law has disappeared; where violence, crime and inhumanity have become norms. Their strength and “legitimate violence as authorised by the state” which they represent, prompt them to carry out very arduous and strenuous tasks. As General Krulak explained in his “Three Block War” concept, in stabilisation operations, military personnel must at one and the same time, and in an enclosed area, carry out combat or warfighting operations, provide humanitarian aid and create the conditions for the restoration of a normal, peaceful life. No small performance! However, the smallest mistake made by a simple soldier can assume strategic dimensions; this is why General Krulak coined the term “the strategic corporal” so as to highlight the importance of the tasks performed by military troops. From chaos to calm: is it possible to find a path leading to continued success in the stabilisation of a country which will serve to launch it firmly into the normalisation phase? Experience indicates that operational successes are not enough to solve crises. Many of the violent 7 Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism and Capitalist Civilisation, Verso, London-New York, 2003, p. 162.

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contacts are skirmishes, of which some can be intensive and can last a few hours. Except for the ambush in the Uzbin Valley in August 2008, French soldiers had, up to that juncture, been successful in their kinetic confrontations, enjoying many tactical successes. Even though conflict situations are getting better, a solution to many of them has not been found because the adversaries have not been sufficiently weakened to be forced to surrender. Indeed, while the tactical success is a positive result that contributes to the generation of a more favourable position vis-à-vis the adversary, it nonetheless does not produce definitive effect. On the contrary, and although the notion is inextricably linked to the Napoleonic concept of “the decisive battle”,8 and while, furthermore, the conflictual environment is very different nowadays, we can still define victory as a major achievement that produces a decisive result which provides for a positive, strategic change for the resolution of a conflict or crisis. In fact, when the opponent becomes stronger and feels surer of himself, he tries to control a territorial advantage and starts to challenge by means of dissymmetric warfare in order to highlight his capabilities so as to be considered a credible alternative source and centre of power. In such circumstances, his vulnerability increases and offers an opportunity to put him under severe pressure. The difference between a tactical success and outright victory is not the intensity of the fight, but its consequences. While Marshal Foch considered a battle as decisive if the adversary was no longer able to reconstitute his strength and capacity, he overlooked the political aspects of this concept. The impact of the consequences of a decisive battle plays out at the strategic level and yields political opportunities to be seized. Within the framework of “total war”, a decisive battle could be defined as one that allows for an end to the conflict because the enemy is exhausted and unable to generate sufficient capacity to continue prosecution of the war. As for contemporary conflicts, we might consider a decisive battle as one of which the product is the opening up of immediate strategic possibilities with the potential to influence profoundly the course of events in an enduring fashion. A comparable favourable situation could occur through the accumulation of an indeterminate number of tactical successes which would need to be built up over a long period for it to trigger the same effects. 8 To read on this topic in Béatrice Heuser, Penser la Stratégie de l’Antiquité à nos jours, Picard, Paris, 2013, pp. 114–122.

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In Algeria (1956–1962) the French armed forces were successful from the tactical point of view: rebels were defeated in the field—but the international environment and the political situation gave the strategic advantage to the Algerian fighters. Despite the tactical superiority, France was not able to secure the strategic initiative. This conflict, characterised by irregular warfare, illustrates the point that the accumulation of tactical successes might well be achieved, but without this resulting in the resolution of the conflict because other crucial conditions for this were not satisfied, despite having exhausted the foe. A crucial point is that international politics and the contemporary Zeitgeist trumped comprehensive and decisive military success. For right or for wrong, Algeria had become an impossible war to defend in an era of anti-colonialism, just as the Suez War in the 1950s was a serious misreading by the British and the French of the contemporary mood and of where real power lay (Washington, not Paris or London …). This underscores the ineluctable fact that the political outcome of a military campaign is of primary significance: it is why there has to be effective diplomatic and development activity and engagement alongside military action. Such activity has to shape and colour the wider context in which military action is viewed and judged by the international community—from which justification for such military action stands or falls. The strategic lessons learnt from this post-colonial war should help us to have a better understanding and approach to address the crises and conflicts the International Community has to deal with nowadays. It is very difficult for the overall international effort to raise its game given all these factors, and the priority needs to do so in a way which bolsters the local authority we are trying to help. But that said, given all these operative elements, are victories still possible today? Despite a hostile environment, general disorder, violations of the rule of law, evasive adversaries, decisive battles can occur and victory can remain achievable. Equally such a victory can remain veiled owing to its complex working-out. Protracted conflicts by definition need a lot of time to be resolved and their very duration can mark, as a result of weariness, key milestones; notwithstanding the fact that individual confrontations can constitute real tipping points. In such cases the tactical level steals a march on the superior one; and its consequences change the strategic perspective. An illustration of such a situation is this Battle of Batangafoin the CAR that occurred on 4–6 August 2014. On 30 July 2014, thirty civilians were

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murdered by the Selekas who also killed three Congolese soldiers of the African Union (AU) force in Batangafo.9 The French force, Sangaris, whose mission was to assist and support the MISCA10 had to react swiftly in order to provide both help to the AU green berets and care to the civilians. The French general, as the commanding officer, gave the order to seize the city of Batangafo in order to restore calm and to ensure the implementation of the confidence-building measures by Seleka, which their commanders had signed. After a trek through the jungle lasting two nights, a reduced French Battlegroup arrived at the southern entry point of the city of Batangafo in the early morning of 4 August. The forward company fell into a huge ambush supported by an impressive volley of shots from RPG-7 anti-tank rockets. This was no longer a matter of harassment assuming the form of asymmetrical confrontation, but rather of a dissymmetrical confrontation in terms of equipment, but with a strength ratio that was unfavourable to the French contingent. It was obvious that the adversary had no other intention but to inflict significant losses on this battalion. Well-commanded and well-controlled, the opposing forces manoeuvred liked Western troops and implemented the same tactical procedures. This battle exemplified the “hardening” of the adversaries of peacekeeping troops in Africa. The Seleka troops were very well trained and experienced. The violence of the fighting and the constant search for elusive manoeuvre highlighted the fierce will of the aggressors. They set up their ambushes as taught and learned in Western military training schools. The French battalion, after restoring its laydown on a favourable line of the terrain, and sending two attack helicopters to strike the adversary’s second echelon, succeeded in entering the town in the early evening. After a meeting with the leaders of the town’s NGOs, there were talks with local Seleka leaders who led their side of the combat. After a short discussion arrangements were made for the next morning to start negotiations for the implementation of confidence-building measures.

9 Congolese soldiers from the Democratic Republic of Congo. 10 Mission Internationale de Soutien à la Centrafrique (MISCA): International Support

Mission for Central African Republic.

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On 5 August Seleka interlocutors offered nothing during the discussions, reckoning and interpreting as a weakness the willpower of negotiations on the part of Sangaris representative. Despite being faced with strict requirements in accordance with international agreements, the Seleka interlocutors refused to implement the texts their leaders themselves had signed. Given the worsening situation, and instead of seizing the eastern part of the city as planned, the French battalion changed its orders and, so as to take the initiative, set up a positional defence on the western plateau of the city. Surprised by this unexpected decision, Selakas improvised an attack. From 6 p.m. until midnight the French soldiers pushed back successive and unceasing waves of assault by an enemy who pressed on, supported by mortar fire. It was also necessary for the French contingent to manage the presence of 10,000 displaced people who were within the Sangaris narrow defensive perimeter. None of these were killed or wounded despite the intensity of the fighting and their immediate proximity to the armed clashes. In addition to the high quality of the French troops—composed of mountain forces and legionnaires—the battalion benefitted from two factors which offered them superiority: night-vision assets and a subgroup of attack helicopters providing air-to-ground fire support together with the beneficial action of two Rafale combat aircraft. In the early morning of 6 August, the French Battlegroup suffered the wounding of two legionnaire paratroopers, but it had already inflicted heavy losses on its opponents: roughly 300 neutralised fighters. The momentum and psychological dynamic of Seleka had been truly broken. What seemed at the time a tactical success proved to be more: it ultimately became a victory. The outcome of this operation was determined by the French force commander, who had an important meeting with the Seleka commander on 5 August. The commander, Brigadier Bellot des Minières, had a triple objective: first, he wanted to thwart his opponent’s plans; second, he had to provide immediate support to the MISCA contingent, and third, he wanted to offer a show of force to persuade Seleka to implement across the whole country the agreed confidence-building measures, and to convince them that they could not act with impunity. As he was operating in a stabilisation phase, the general adopted an indirect strategy to force his adversary to lay down his arms. “The highest realisation in warfare is to attack the enemy’s plan”11 ; for this reason, he wanted to 11 Derek M. C. Yuen, Deciphering Sun Tzu, in Comparative Strategy, vol. 17, 2008, p. 184.

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coordinate his meeting with ground action. Showing force to deter was the goal; to reduce the level of violence bearing in mind that “subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence”.12 Although the aim of the Battlegroup was to enter into Batangafo to coincide with this high-level meeting, the weather conditions for providing the possibility of air support forced the Battlegroup to seize the city on 4 August, one day earlier. This engagement complicated the talks the French commander was to have with his Seleka interlocutors, who refused to make any concessions owing to the continuing military engagement in Batangafo. Hence, while immediate deterrence failed, the operation ordered by General Bellot des Minières was successful not only at the tactical level, but at the strategic one as well. Indeed the failure of negotiations at both levels, tactical and strategic, on 5 August, instead of reinforcing the Seleka opponents, magnified their uncertainty. Sangaris seized the tactical initiative in Batangafo by adopting a defensive posture, while the Seleka lost their temper and decided upon a violent attack against the defensive perimeter adopted by the French battle group. The consequences of this were dramatically severe for the Seleka who lost approximately 85% of their garrison. A few days after the fighting an independent team from the UN Security Council investigated and interviewed the protagonists. These investigators noted and stressed the full success of the operation in terms of providing protection and care to civilians, none of whom was killed or injured during the battle. One could be tempted to consider this battle and this victory as a flash in the pan since the consequences were not readily discernible. However, this defeat of the Seleka profoundly disrupted “their [highest] command, sowing doubt and dissention”13 in their internal organisation. The outcome of this battle, in which the Seleka loss of life was considerable, alongside the failure of an attempted insurgency in Bangui in late August, remarkably countered by Colonel Leurs’ battalion by inflicting losses of 150 personnel on the Seleka, deeply undermined their political as well as their military organisation, and who, contrary to their demands before these events, no longer called for the partition of the country. As the French force commander said, when after a four-month mission the

12 Ibid., p. 184. 13 Derek M. C. Yuen, Deciphering Sun Tzu, in Comparative Strategy, vol. 17, 2008,

p. 186.

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Battlegroup left the CAR and moved to Chad, “in Batangafo (…) the heavy losses (…) will have left no doubt about Sangaris’s determination to act to protect the civilian population and in total solidarity with the international forces. Our opponents emerged knocked out militarily and politically”.14 The French field army commander also highlighted these facts, emphasising “a decisive success for regional security”,15 while yet another general referred to “a real strategic turning point in the crisis”.16 The French force commander was successful in his attempt to thwart the plan of his adversary. His intention was not to fight, but effectively to deter any hawkish intent so as to restore a peaceful and safe environment. His opponent badly analysed the range of situations and underestimated the French troops’ determination: indeed, the Seleka battle damage assessment revealed their own internal divisions. “Thus, one who excels at warfare first establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated whilst not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the enemy (…). The victorious army first realises the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights … and then seeks victory”.17 Furthermore, the events in Bangui on 20 August 2014, two weeks later, led Seleka leaders to suffer additional heavy losses when they foolishly attacked another French battle group. The combination of these losses laid the foundation for the reinforcement of governmental authority. Thanks to this victory, and the outstanding action and self-control of the French battalion in Bangui, the French force commander was strategically successful in attacking “the enemy’s plan”. The achievement of a victory in stabilisation operations is very tricky because the aim is not to complete the destruction of the adversary or to exacerbate the existing discord by causing his disintegration. Peacebuilding is inevitably met by spasms of violence as it progresses towards the normalisation of life. Securing full advantage from such a victory constitutes a stark challenge because the situation needs associated and simultaneous mobilisation of many means and the commitment to tackle

14 Ordre du jour n°8 of Sangaris Force Commander, 19 September 2014. 15 Ordre du jour n°13 of French Commander Field Army, 26 November 2014. 16 Ordre du jour n°8 of 27th Mountain Infantry Brigade Commander, 4 July 2015. 17 Sun Tzu, Ralph D. Sawyer (trans.), The Art of War, Westview Press, Boulder, 2003,

p. 184.

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the issue. In addition, open-mindedness and patience are required of each stakeholder. So, the central question is how to seize opportunities to take advantage of the shortcomings of the adversary. This responsibility sits at the strategic level with an implied civilian lead with authority over all the relevant actors. Equally, if “the main purpose of this kind of [irregular] war [fare] is to obtain the dispassionate destruction of the enemy, as the drop of water eventually hollows out the stone, so it takes patience and perseverance”,18 peacebuilding and reconstruction need time and the same virtues. A protracted conflict cannot be resolved in an instant, and as a Red Cross official has stated, the situation in the CAR will improve progressively thanks to the French intervention.19 Moreover, it must be borne in mind that, in Western countries, all administrative work is done by a large number of civil servants, which is not the case where Western forces and personnel operate. Therefore, it looks a bit peremptory to assert that peacebuilding in the CAR is already a failure because of the persistence of criminality and violence. Active, fiery embers need to be kept under surveillance for a long time before they finally extinguish. Moreover, the rebels do not have the support of the population, and this very fact provides the basis on which reconstruction and peace are possible. The literature of peacebuilding too often ignores the military aspects of the global process for conflict and crisis resolution. It displays a negative view about what the military can do: it is too often seen merely as a tool for providing security, whereas it can contribute in a holistic way to the peace-making process. Indeed, peacekeeping operations are fraught with internal challenges as well as external ones. For example, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations in the CAR, as already referred to, are seen as having failed because of “a failure to profit from periods of stability”.20 However, the inherent assumption here is that peace can only be built on broadly based stability. Such an interpretation risks failure to take into consideration the importance of seizing and exploiting opportunities that emerge after decisive battles: of seizing and consolidating the 18 Jean-Frédéric Auguste Le Mière de Corvey, Des partisans et des corps irréguliers, Paris, Anselin, 1823, p. 103. 19 Interview with a Red Cross Official under Chatham House Rules, 21 February 2014. 20 Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard, Making Sense of the Central African

Republic, Zed Books, London, 2015.

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ground created out of military success and victory. In other words, these “micromoments” of potential stability which emerge from the wake of battle are too often not sufficiently acknowledged, even recognised. When people learn history, when they listen to the media or read newspapers, they feel that events are framed by clear dates of starting and finishing, whereas contemporary war does not have a clinical end. Facts are so deeply and tightly intricate in conflict, that nothing can have surgical precision at the end. Extinguishing embers and soothing hate need a long-term perspective because conflict can never be hermetically sealed. The problem is that, while peace-building necessarily rests on stabilisation and peacekeeping operations, the “business” of peace appears to be regarded only in developmental terms instead of including military considerations as well. Greater mutual knowledge and understanding are necessary to be truly effective. Furthermore, powerful normative assumptions dominate the framework of what military operations can and should do, and what development practitioners consider appropriate. This has significant consequences for how decisive battles are framed. In many ways, the culture of peacebuilding does not help how to respond to victories in that the majority of peacebuilding operations are built on negotiated settlement rather than outright victory—thus missing a strategic trick when such a victory offers itself. These windows of opportunity have to be seized for serving as the impetus and basis of comprehensive and enduring stability. Victory is, then, much more than a military success: the crucial point is that a victory is strategic. Resolution of conflict has to be the result of a political process subject to rigorous scrutiny; this offers the greatest chance of securing a resolution that endures. The necessary pillars must be put in place to build the architecture—structures, procedures and processes—as the prerequisites for a future stable state. The nature, characteristics and circumstances relating to contemporary conflicts demonstrate clearly that lasting, comprehensive success cannot be achieved at the tactical level, only at the strategic level. This particular situation implies an accurate and acute “situational awareness” at the political level, so as to take full advantage as soon as possible of the opportunities presented by significant military progress. If many people find the peacebuilding process too slow and too drawn out, then perhaps the international community should, as a minimum, persuade the failed states concerned, or otherwise apply pressure on them, to accept strong tutelage from the UN in order to rebuild themselves.

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Just as the international community did in Cambodia in 1992–1993 with the United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC), it might be appropriate to establish a UN-based authority to head up certain states in order to lead these countries to and along the “right path”. Such engagement might take the form of instruction and mentoring or basic support and encouragement delivered by specialists and experts, whereby local existing and future elites are developed and offered structures to facilitate sound governance for their countries. It is true also to stress how difficult this is, and how condescending it can appear to such “tutelage states”. The corollary of this is not to set military and civilian factors and considerations against each other in the peacebuilding process, precisely because they are complementary. Military engagement creates the conditions necessary for civilian actors to pursue successfully their agenda. Once the resultant normalisation is firmly established, then the military may leave the scene. Moreover, such an authority could enhance the administrative agility and the decision-making process required to exploit any appropriate opportunities, with a view to avoiding the inevitable unwieldy cross-government/national structures and obstructions. More flexible and broader in scope, this might in addition act more offensively in the information domain than its opponents. As regards the mandate for such intervention, the representative of the international community would require specific autonomy that offers due scope to operate proactively by seizing the initiative where necessary. The Dutch “3D approach” offers an important point from which it would be wise to draw inspiration in terms of command and control. The joint deployment of a general and a diplomat at the head of a deployed contingent21 allows for working in close collaboration which in turn leads to a sharpened responsiveness on the ground for exploiting favourable situations as they emerge—because “to confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done and when there is nobody else to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must, then, be prepared to become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better [and indeed cheaper] to entrust civilian

21 i.e.: Dutch Task Force Uruzgan in Afghanistan where general Middendorp led the military operations and the diplomat Joep Wijnands led the Provincial Reconstruction Team (February 2009–August 2009).

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tasks to civilians”.22 A critical rider here is that the civilians concerned must be fully aware of the military dimension of the wider context and its spectrum of considerations, ramifications and imperatives. Sustained, broadly based (i.e. across society in general) stability and improving inclusive prosperity are the acid tests of justification for military intervention. A further imperative is careful consideration of and comprehensive planning for the post-conflict phase of operations; indeed, associated objectives should inform the very conduct of the military operational phase. Hence there needs to be an integrated, dynamic whole. Since “war is a continuation of politics by other means”,23 war ultimately must be resolved through politics because that resolution will only endure if it is the result of this process, not otherwise. Political resolution is a prerequisite for strategic-level legitimacy; authority for action flows from this legitimacy. For this legitimacy to be sustained, it requires continuing scrutiny and evaluation, enabled by an acceptable and effective level of transparency. Mere cessation of hostilities is not in itself a resolution of conflict, that is why the prompt and sustained exploitation of veiled victories is crucial because “When that my care could not withhold thy riots / What wilt thou do, when riot is thy care / O, thou wilt be a wilderness again”.24

With Prudence and Determination While risk-taking is crucial in strategy, it cannot be done recklessly. How, therefore, should the acceptance (indeed, the active assumption) of risk be articulated with “prudence and determination?” These two words have been resounding in my mind for more than five years and I believe, finally, that I have understood the depth of the conclusion we came to in three radio calls with the General Officer Commanding of Task Force Sangaris. When the time came to write this account, I first thought of using the word “caution” to translate the French expression prudence. Upon reflection though, I felt that “caution” (the careful thinking and lack of hurry in which one purposely engages in the face of risk or danger)

22 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Praeger Security International, Westport, 1984, p. 88. 23 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University, Princeton, 1976, p. 69. 24 William Shakespeare, Henry IV , London, 1842, p. 21.

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did not do full justice to the situation we faced in which instantaneous and seemingly instinctive decisions were required. Rather than avoiding risk or danger, we had to manage and confront them. The meaning of the word “prudence” in English seems more apt as it embraces a philosophical dimension and encompasses the ability to make discerning choices. And so “prudence” it became. After briefly rejoicing at this semantic clarification, I started to reflect upon the reasons that had contributed to the positive outcome of our operation. Most accidents are the result of a succession of actions or conditions that lead to catastrophe. The analysis model developed by Professor James Reason of Manchester University helps us understand why accidents occur and stresses the complexity of cause-and-effect relationships. This model goes beyond the immediate circumstances of the accident and carefully examines the preconditions for the event. Therefore, I wondered whether we could analyse success through Reason’s model in order to understand the favourable sequence of actions and conditions that took place in Batangafo. To what extent did success occur due to an alignment of all the “layers” along the same axis, thereby creating a pathway to success? Identifying which “aligned plates” or factors, were pertinent to this explanation was challenging, and I was unable to draw a chart or build a model that would work as an ex post facto validation. Neverthless what I was able to do was to read a number of works on history and philosophy, and attentively listen to friends, students and academics with whom I discussed our experiences. The progressive discovery of a “data bank” of ancient Greek concepts led to three explanations that seemed to answer my questions. These are concepts which I believe structure leadership today and constitute its general framework beyond aura, charisma and exemplarity. Mètis, Phronesis and Kairos are this combination. It seems to me, applying these concepts to all levels of responsibility, the success of our operation and our wider mission in the Central African Republic can be found. Mètis was a divinity that represented cunning intelligence, metamorphosis and surprise.25 She married Zeus and was Athena’s mother. Mètis in ancient Greek is “defined as a form of intelligence and thought; a means of understanding that involves a complex, but very coherent set 25 Jean-Vincent Holeindre, La Ruse et la Force, une autre histoire de la stratégie, Perrin, Paris, 2017, p. 44.

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of mental attitudes, intellectual behaviours that combine flair, wisdom, foresight, flexibility of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, diverse talents and long experience. It applies to changing, disconcerting and ambiguous realities which do not lend themselves to precise measurement, nor to exact calculation, or rigorous reasoning”.26 It is a strategy for relating to others and one’s own environment based on the cunning use of intelligence. It is classically associated with the Homeric Odysseus who resorts to Mètis when Achilles uses pure strength. In a high stakes context, it coheres reasoning faculties, individual skills and decision-making capacity.27 It consists of a compressed and rapid integration of information, which through knowledge and experience and induced by fear or pressure, generates a developed sense of intuition. Characterised by practical experience of extreme situations, the Mètis stimulates the mind to find solutions to the problem encountered. It energises the mind, which is entirely focused on the end state: the success of the mission and in doing this it drives action. Mètis offers additional intuition because it encourages empathy and develops the intuitive faculty to put oneself in the place of others, to perceive what they feel. Inciting empathy, it nourishes cunning and hides one’s will from the opponent using the opponent’s own weaknesses and flaws in strategy. Therefore, when General Bellot des Minières took the decision to launch Operation Vesta and seize the town of Batangafo, his order was not the result of the rationale of a general staff but of his personal intuition, which was then implemented by his headquarters and Battlegroup de Boissieu. To counter the Seleka activity, he launched his only available unit and by doing so he accepted that he was exposing his position in the west of the country. Considering the volume of the opposing force, the risk taken was significant. In the same way, the decision to abandon the negotiations at Batangafo in the late afternoon of 5 August 2014 caught the adversary by surprise, first by the cessation of dialogue and then by the execution of an unforeseen manoeuvre. These two situations highlight the fact that Mètis resides in the intuition of the leader and that the manoeuvre it inspires is by essence a risky, total and irreversible gamble. Conversely, surprise has a delaying effect on the competition of

26 Ibid., p. 20. 27 François Jullien, Traité de l’efficacité, Livre de Poche, Paris, 2002, 240 p.

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wills. Mètis allows the relevant party to either conserve or regain the initiative, which is the source of a military commander’s freedom of action. In my case, given the configuration of this operation and not having had the luxury of advanced warning, Mètis allowed a reversal of the situation to the benefit of the Sangaris Force through the situational intelligence of the company commanders and platoon commanders. Mètis is an individual quality that must be cultivated through education and training by encouraging historical analysis to which ethnological and sociological knowledge must be added. Indeed, intellectual training informs and educates the decision-maker’s ability to understand difficult situations. Knowledge is not acquired so that its possessor may reproduce and apply past solutions to contemporary situations. It is about developing one’s analytical abilities in order to correctly apprehend and understand an event in its holistic environment. Prior practice and intellectual exercise allow, in the face of crisis, rapid analysis and instantaneous decisions suitable to the urgency of the moment. What may appear to be an instinctive decision at the time is, in fact, an extremely rapid intellectual process, fuelled by the accumulation of professional experience and extensive knowledge. “The true school of command is therefore general culture”.28 This quotation, set on a footbridge linking two buildings of the military high school at Saint-Cyr-l’Ecole and which I discovered when I entered this institution in 1987, revealed its depth during this intense operation. Indeed, knowledge is central because “through it, thought becomes ordered and identifies the critical elements, discarding nonessential detail, and bringing wider implications and constraints to the fore”.29 Moreover, the teaching of military history is important because it offers to “the power of the mind (…) a diversity that cannot be found in the exclusive practice of the profession”.30 It is therefore not a question of being ready for past wars, but of exercising one’s mind and developing the agility to respond to future challenges and conflicts. In the same way, practice must remain a permanent preoccupation of training because it is practice which, through the almost automatic mastery of the technique, frees the mind to focus on the appropriate

28 Capitaine Charles de Gaulle, Vers l’Armée de métier, in Le Fil de l’Epée et autres écrits, Plon, Paris, 1990, p. 322. 29 Ibid., p. 322. 30 Ibid., p. 323.

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decision. It is through practice that commanders will be able, at the appropriate time, to demonstrate their Mètis, because through this clarity they will detect a flaw in the adversary, the key importance of a situation or a technical factor. Henry Bernstein said that “intuition is intelligence that is guilty of speeding”. Indeed, thanks to knowledge and practice, experienced and educated leaders have resources to address critical situations. “Rapid cognition known as ‘Thin slicing’ refers to the ability of our unconscious to find patterns in situations and behavior based on very narrow slices of experience”.31 In certain circumstances, we do not have time for implementing in-depth reasoning methodologies or lengthy processes. The inspiration of the leader can produce the right course of action because “our unconscious thinking is no different from our conscious thinking: in both areas, we are able to develop our rapid decision making with training and experience”.32 Another important parameter, Phronesis,33 also influences the decisionmaking process of the Mètis. As an Aristotelian concept, found in Nicomachean Ethics, Phronesis presents prudence as a cardinal virtue that confers on the decision-maker the ability to take risks. It is therefore a practical wisdom based on experience acquired through professional practice. Prudence does not make it possible to flee from danger out of fear, but to evaluate all the risks so as to eliminate the most excessive ones and choose to take those which, once adapted to one’s means, to the conditions of the mission and to the adversary should make it possible to achieve the goal. Prudence is an equilibrium from which it is possible to choose options; it is anticipation and preparation of action because once in action there is no longer equilibrium. This wisdom in terms of judgement and decision-making in extreme situations comes from the alchemy of empirical knowledge, derived from experience, and theoretical knowledge, derived from study and reading. In fact, Prudence is a condition that develops, nourishes and endures because decision-makers cannot apply universal rules to the resolution of the problems they encounter. It is the ability of a leader to discern what is good for the force under their command and the fulfilment of the mission. In an emergency, the

31 Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Back Bay Books, New York, 2005, 234 p. 32 Ibid., p. 170. 33 ϕρ o´ νησ ις in ancient Greek.

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leader must instantly have a global understanding of the situation and not be overwhelmed or distracted by secondary aspects even if the leader, in apprehending the problem, must have the capacity to absorb parameters, not all of which may be directly visible. “Pericles and people like him are prudent men in that they possess the faculty of seeing what is good for themselves and what is good for man in general”.34 Prudence is a matter of action; in this, it is deeply practical and involves an element of intuitive reasoning. Indeed, while theoretical study nourishes reflection enriched by personal experience, the level of study is by no means the culmination or quintessence of knowledge. Indeed, “the unproven words and opinions of people of experience (…) are just as worthy of attention as those based on demonstrations, for experience has given them an exercised view which enables them to see things correctly”.35 Decision-making will therefore be based, not merely on the leader’s thinking, but also on the ability to take into account the vision and perceptions of subordinates. Prudence therefore appears to be made up of a secure and informed judgement, one that the leader reaches with integrity. Also, far from being a source of indecision or paralysis, prudence is ultimately insight and skill. It in no way excludes the audacity of taking the risks necessary for the success of the mission; far from being ignorant of it, the leader is fully aware of the danger. This balance between intuitive reasoning, intelligence, judgement and prudence must guide all those who aspire to command, because it is that balance which leads to wisdom and which should be viewed as “the most complete form of knowledge”.36 Wisdom is not passive, timid or pusillanimous; it is dynamic. Moreover, Phronésis is based on the initiative that gives the leader the freedom to undertake and to adapt the orders received to the situation. Differences of appreciation and indeed, occasional divergences, between the Bangui headquarters and my local vision were not only normal but inevitable because of the distances involved. This notwithstanding, the Chief of Staff did not seek to curtail my freedom of action or autonomy because he trusted me, which is the keystone of the organisation of any command. Delegation should provide each level of command the margin of initiative it needs to achieve the objective assigned to it. This requires

34 Aristote, Ethique à Nicomaque, Livre VI, chapitre 7, p. 134. 35 Aristote, Ethique à Nicomaque, Livre VI, chapitre 7, p. 142. 36 Aristote, Ethique à Nicomaque, Livre VI, chapitre 7, p. 136.

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great strength of character: while it takes courage and determination to take a weighty decision without referring to your leader, it takes strength and trust to give your subordinates a real margin of initiative. A sense of initiative, therefore, is an essential quality of the leader, as it allows every opportunity to fulfil the mission to be seized. It is based on the mutual knowledge and trust that must exist between all levels of command and is made possible by concise orders, detailing the spirit of the mission and coordination measures more than the letter. Finally, it is based on creativity that opens up immense fields of possibility and increases the unpredictability that adversary will be faced with. Therefore, free from a procedural straitjacket and far from a long and tedious list of tasks to accomplish, Mètis and Phronésis put decision-makers in the mindset from where they may reach out for Kairos. In crisis or war, time is both crucial and critical. The speed of reaction conditions the outcome because a late decision can worsen the situation. Kairos, the winged Greek god, who must be caught by his lock of hair as he passes, is the very expression of opportunity. Making a decision at the right moment is central to gaining or retaining the advantage. This is what T. E. Lawrence calls the “Kingfisher moment ”,37 that precise point in time when the bird in flight intersects the surface of the water to seize its prey. In combat or in crisis, Kairos is the moment when a decision is made to take an action, the tactical implementation of which irrevocably decides the success or failure of the action. This moment, which by definition is crucial as it conditions the outcome of a situation, is when the commander not only takes all the risks but, by the very fact of deciding, removes some of them by taking action. When it occurs and given the urgency of the situation, the immediacy of the decision-making means that Kairos is limited in time. Either you catch it or you miss it. However, its consequences and implications are long term in that its effects will continue and change the future through their political and other repercussions. Kairos has therefore to be understood in its dynamic relationship with Chronos, the long-term backcloth for any action. Thus, it is also based on the unpredictability and timeliness of a context to be seized. It also plays on the inability of the opponent to imagine and therefore anticipate a reaction. If cunning is a force multiplier, then Kairos is the decisive moment when the situation conforms to the wishes of the

37 Rob Johnson, Lawrence of Arabia on War, Osprey, Oxford, 2020, p. 74.

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decider. During the negotiations on 5 August 2014, the key moment in the late afternoon was the Selekas’ refusal to lay down their arms. Because they showed cunning by positioning their fighters around my companies to be ready to attack if Gabriel’s company had moved to seize the eastern part of the town, they felt themselves to be in a stronger position than me. Indeed, they were because I had had the naivety not to keep in mind that their movements would not stop during our negotiation. Fortunately, and thanks to our intelligence section, Pierre was able to inform me of the evolving tactical situation. Therefore, our firm and assertive response surprised them. The Seleka chiefs were so taken aback by this decision that they could not comprehend it. They had not imagined such a scenario, even though I had not ruled out any options. All I had to do was to make an instant choice and physically demonstrate my will by ending the fruitless discussions and suddenly getting up and putting my helmet back on, while they remained unbalanced by a reaction they had not anticipated or even imagined. “In war circumstances do not wait”,38 Thucydides says. It is important for any leader not to miss this furtive moment to avoid two words that characterise too many failures: “too late!”. Taking responsibility through timely, partly improvised decisions is the decision-maker’s encounter with destiny. The will and the sanctity of the mission to be fulfilled nourish the decision-maker’s determination and sharpen the intelligence to seize the opportune moment. “In the face of the enemy, the choice of speed is essential. We must be able to decide before him and if it is possible to act a second time before his opponent reacts”.39 This is why, the sudden change of orders constituted the second immediate action that seems to have deeply disturbed our opponents. They did not expect us to adopt a positional defence and then we already acted two times before they did something. As mentioned by Vegetius in his treatise on military art, “surprise can change sides at any time. But surprise is a fundamental element of warfare that annihilates the force of the enemy”.40 However, Kairos is the opposite of hubris because it is based on a full awareness 38 Quoted by Sabine Willem-Auverlot, in Le risque dans la stratégie – Le kairos chez Thucydide. 39 Michel Goya, Sous le feu, La mort comme hypothèse de travail, Tallandier, col. Texto, Paris, 2019, p. 179. 40 Jean-Vincent Holeindre, La Ruse et la Force, une autre histoire de la stratégie, Perrin, Paris, 2017, p. 170.

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of danger, a fair assessment of one’s opponent and a perfect knowledge of one’s own weaknesses. It thus allows calculated risk-taking, a guarantee of success or even exploitation. “The man of the kairos knows how to adapt to the complexity of the world (…) he is an engineer of the opportunity”.41 When Moltke the Elder wrote: “Kein Operationsplan reicht mit einiger Sicherheit über das erste Zusammentreffen mit der feindlichen Hauptmacht hinaus ”42 the approximate translation in French was: “in war, no plan survives contact ”. Some people extended this interpretation, suggesting that at war the plan is the first victim of that initial gunshot. I disagree with such an assertion even though I appreciate its humour and I would rather say that in war the first victim is the idiot who did not plan effectively. Inevitably the unprepared leader will not have prepared his mind and drilled it to be reactive and prompt. Launching an immediate and unexpected action, achieving surprise through audacity and sowing, if not disorder at least uncertainty and unbalancing in the adversary, cannot be done ex abrupto. “Knowledge is power”, opined Sir Francis Bacon and it is a question of adaptation too. Some would say innovation but in fact the point is to understand the adversary and to adapt yourself. “For Polybius, Scipio is the archetype of a good strategist, prudent and daring at the same time, he was able to draw inspiration from Hannibal’s impressive ‘science of command’ to win Rome”.43 Whatever the domain, military or economic, seizing the opportunity requires experience, knowledge, hard training, hard work, and finally, wisdom. For me as a leader, “Prudence and determination” now holds a deeper meaning that reveals its strength and wealth. Knowledge is a longstanding and never-ending quest that is absolutely rewarding and fascinating to acquire.

41 Jean-Vincent Holeindre, La Ruse et la Force, une autre histoire de la stratégie, Perrin, Paris, 2017, p. 70. 42 Über Strategie (1871), in Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, H.13 (1890), quoted in Milit¯ arische Werke, Band 2, Teil 2. Mittler & Sohn Berlin 1900. The English translation is: “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force”, and a paraphrase is: “no plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force”. 43 Jean-Vincent Holeindre, La Ruse et la Force, une autre histoire de la stratégie, Perrin, Paris, 2017, pp. 141–142.

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Command is not the implementation of procedures; command is not about being the most courageous among your peer group, command first consists of developing the intellectual skills so as to take the boldest decision at a decisive point in a crisis. Then, intellectual courage, mutual trust, bravery, valour, gallantry, calmness under pressure and interest in subordinates reinforce the competences of a charismatic leader. This is an endless and constant work. It seems that such an assessment can be applied across many areas and not only in wartime. For me, a wonderful example in the civilian sphere was Captain Chesley (“Sully”) Sullenburger, who on 15 January 2009 when facing an emergency situation, instead of implementing compulsory procedures and flying to an airport, elected to glide his Airbus onto the surface of the Hudson River. In a very short period of time (thirtyeight critical seconds) and despite a noisy cockpit buzzing with all types of alarms, he mobilised all of his knowledge, experience and intuition to make a hugely improbable decision which undoubtedly saved the lives of all onboard his aircraft. As mentioned previously, his decision was irreversible and would be rewarded by success or sanctioned by irreparable tragedy. On that day, saving hundred fifty-five lives, he displayed Mètis, Phronésis and Kairos. It was while watching the film that celebrates this extraordinary accomplishment that I had the idea to analyse the combats of my Battlegroup through Reason’s model. Even though I have not been able to apply this model or to build another one to explain our success, it dawned on me that these three antic Greek concepts aptly described what “Sully” and my Battlegroup underwent. This is the reason why I place my trust in human intelligence born of experience: artificial intelligence will never offer instantaneous decision-making in the face of a permanently evolving crisis situation.44

44 To be read on this topic Ghislain Réty, Plaidoyer pour l’intuition en gestion de crise, in Les Cahiers de la Revue de la Défense Nationale – Un monde en turbulence, Regards du CHEM – 68 e session, pp. 297–315.

Conclusion

The difficulty in stabilisation is that a military unit is not sent to wage war but to carry out a visible and deterrent mission. The operation is therefore made more difficult because there is no initial cunning in the mission that is to be fulfilled. In case of clash, only counter-cunning can be used because the initial intent is always seen. Moreover, the aim is not “victory” in the classic military sense of the term as the aim is not to defeat an opponent but to bring about reconciliation. The armed forces act in support of the local institutions and seek to restore the authority of the State. “These are conflicts without major battles where indicators of progress often replace flags planted in settlements on the map as the markers of progress towards mission success. Apart from the problem of deciding the metrics of process and risk of choosing what is quantifiable on the ground and risks being subjective, these metrics become the measures of achievement and as such they become the aim of the mission. You no longer win battles, you achieve conditions which are sometimes delinked from tactical reality.”45 This is perhaps one of the reasons why when a victory emerges, it is surprisingly difficult to exploit it. This mission has been a most sprightly affair. Mutual trust was a pivotal factor that led to success and highlighted the paradox of the need to centralise command while at the same time, delegating the right level 45 Michel, Goya Sous le feu, La mort comme hypothèse de travail, Tallandier, col. Texto,

Paris, 2019, p. 179.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6

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CONCLUSION

of initiative to the subordinates. Whatever the level or the precision of knowledge, and the information manoeuvre we can sustain thanks to data sharing tools, perception of the situation is different by actors depending on their people’s place in the command structure and whether they are in the field in direct contact or in the rear within the headquarters. A key element of success is initiative, and initiative is to obey the orders, including those we have not received. It is fuelled by intuition and sometimes improvisation. However, it is important to have learned to obey well in order to know when you can adapt or change the orders to address an evolving or a changed situation. Trust, and definitely not the longscrew-driver, underpinned the whole chain of command from the General Officer Commanding the Force to the private soldier in contact with the enemy. The second factor of this success was the human intelligence shown at each level of responsibility. This victory has been the result of demanding training, drills, cultural understanding, environmental experience, openmindedness and a culture of adaptability to respond to unforeseen situations. Indeed, “on a journey with Wellington, he and the Duke passed the time by guessing what kind of country they would find on the other side of each hill on the way. When Croker expressed surprise at Wellington’s success in forecasting it, the latter replied: “Why, I have spent all my life in trying to guess what was at the other side of the hill””.46 In crisis, leaders must always be looking for what is behind the hill. They will constantly need to decide under conditions of uncertainty because they cannot wait to discover all the facts. They have to make their decision on time and more so, at the right moment, to seize the Kairos. They have to rely on their own intuition to make emergency quick decision that a computer can never achieve. Whereas artificial intelligence will undoubtedly play a significant role in the strategic decision-making process, where the pace work is slow and far from emergency, it would be counter-productive to believe that such a technical support could enlighten a decision that needs to be made instantly in the face of a permanently changing situation. Seeking to make decisions through mathematical formula and data analysis only leads the decision-maker to avoid making a decision for want of all the facts. A leader must assume their responsibilities and embrace this

46 B.H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill. Germany’s Generals. Their Rise and Fall, with Their Own Account of Military Events 1939–1945, London, Cassel, 1948, p. 7.

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uncertainty which characterises his environment, otherwise their decision will be too late. Finally, prudence proved to be a journey of discovery of the difference between security and safety. Security tries to create an environment in which dangers are excluded or at least reduced as much as possible. No risks no threats. In this context, the principle of caution dominates everything, creating paralysis and rigidity as nothing can take place if there is the slightest risk. Safety is the way of managing risks and threats to define the best course of action with regard to our strengths and weaknesses. Security looks static whereas safety appears dynamic. Through security we try to create a world without danger while, through safety, we accept the challenge of the reality and we turn to action and endeavour. A challenge that was exactly what our brigade commander said when he learned the name of our Battlegroup before deployment. He just said a short but meaningful comment: “You’re going to have to live up to that!” Each member of Battlegroup de Boissieu can be proud of having achieved the mission they received that was to create the safe conditions to allow the deployment of UN troops and administration. The legionnaires and mountain troopers were up to the task because by their nurture they are brave and it seemed to me important to celebrate these unsung heroes whose story had not been told until now. They can genuinely take pride in having excelled in combat and succeeded in their mission impossible: Ten thousand lives saved.

Annexes

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6

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Index

A Afghanistan, x, 8, 9, 19, 20, 35, 49, 94, 99 Africa, 8, 79, 96 African Union, 29, 107 Alasai, 99 Algeria, 106 Anti-Balakas, 26, 40

B Bacon, Sir Francis, 122 Bambari, 13, 40, 67, 68 Bangui, 5, 11, 13, 14, 23, 25, 27, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47, 55, 58, 59, 64, 68, 75, 81, 82, 84, 87–92, 94, 109, 110 Ban Ki-moon, 93 Baoro, 14 Batangafo, x, 37–39, 47–49, 57–59, 61, 63, 67–71, 73, 82–85, 87–91, 99, 106, 109, 115, 116 Béboguila, 41

Bellot des Minières, 19, 38, 40, 47, 68, 71, 82, 83, 88, 92, 93, 108, 109, 116 Beloko, 27, 28, 33, 34 Bernstein, Henry, 118 Bilongo, Tiburce, 26, 91 Bodjomo, 29, 30 Boguila, 14, 35 Bolom, 49, 84, 85, 88 Bossangoa, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 48, 57, 87 Bossembélé, 14, 28, 34 Bossentélé, 14 Bossongoa, 34, 90, 91, 94 Bouar, 11, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28–30, 32–38, 44, 89, 91, 92, 94 Bouca, 39–43, 45, 47–49, 88–90 Bozizé, François, 4 C Cambodia, 113 Cameroon, 92–94 Cantonnier, 23, 94

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 A. Dirou, Security and International Relations in Central Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89597-6

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INDEX

Central Africa, 13, 20, 36, 52, 65, 93 Central African Armed Forces, 4 Central African Republic (CAR), ix, x, 5, 11, 12, 35, 51, 67, 91–94, 99, 101, 106, 110, 111, 115 Chad, 8, 11, 13, 51, 56, 58, 87, 91, 94, 110 Champagne, 7 Croker, 126

D Damara, 36–38 de Boissieu, ix, x, xiii, 16, 19, 91–93, 116, 127 De Gaulle, xiii Djotodia, Michel, 5 Dragoon, 14

F FACA, 23 Fafa, 43, 90 FAO, 23 Foch, Marshal, 105 France, ix, 5, 33, 35, 94, 96, 106

G Gabon, 15 Galo Bouya, 26 Gap, 94 Grenoble, 12, 94

H Hannibal, 122 Hudson, 123

I Iraq, x, 103 Ivory Coast, 9

K Kabo, 58, 59, 69, 70 Kaga Bandoro, 58 Kapisa, 9 Koutré, 94 Krulak, 16, 104

L La Baule, 96 Leclerc, 10 Leurs, 109 Libreville, 5 Lomé, 96 Lyautey, Marshal, 20

M Madagascar, 20 Mailly-le-Camp, 8 Mali, x, 11, 12, 51, 91 Manchester, 115 Maqsood, 34 Mbali, 30, 31, 34, 37 M’BM’Bali, 29 Mettey, Arnaud, 15 MINUSCA, 23, 36, 93 MISCA, 29–31, 33, 36, 37, 63, 84, 88, 90, 107 Mitterrand, François, 96 Moltke, 122 Morocco, 20, 89 Moundou, 94 Moussa, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70

N Ndélé, 4 N’Djamena, 8, 11, 19, 33, 36, 49, 51, 60, 67, 91, 92, 94 Ngoundéré, 94 Niger, 11, 91

INDEX

O Operation Barkhane, 51, 87, 94 Operation Sentinelle, 94 Operation Serval, 51 Operation Sparrowhawk, 8, 58, 94 Operation Vesta, 35–38, 41, 116 Ouagonda, Frédéric, 25, 27, 91

P Palasset, Jean-Pierre, 51, 94 Panther, 15 Paris, 10, 14, 19, 87 Polybius, 122

R Ract-Madoux, 35 Reason, James, 115 Rome, 122

S Saint-Cyr-l’Ecole, 117 Sainte-Claire Deville, Arnaud, ix Sangaris, 11, 13, 23, 25, 37, 50, 58, 62, 63, 68, 73, 87, 88, 92, 93, 108, 114 Scipio, 122 Seleka, 4, 30, 36, 37, 40, 43, 58, 63, 65, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 81, 82, 84, 88, 90, 91, 107–109, 116, 121 Senegal, 94 Sokambi, Aristide, 92, 93 Soriano, 13, 19

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South Korea, 89 St Cyr, 13, 14 Sullenburger, 123 Surobi, 9 T Thiam, Yasmine, 91, 93 Thucydides, 121 Tonkin, 20 Touboro, 94 Tumenta, 93 U United Nations (UN), x, 34, 88–91, 93, 109, 112, 127 US, 20 Uzbin, 105 V Varces, 12 Vegetius, 121 Vienna, 101 W Wellington, 126 Y Yaloké, 14 Z Zoundeiko, 40, 67, 68, 83