Security and Insecurity in the Middle East [1 ed.] 9781527518339, 9781527513105

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Security and Insecurity in the Middle East

Security and Insecurity in the Middle East Edited by

Imad El-Anis, Natasha Underhill and Sahra Joharchi

Security and Insecurity in the Middle East Edited by Imad El-Anis, Natasha Underhill and Sahra Joharchi This book first published 2018 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2018 by Imad El-Anis, Natasha Underhill, Sahra Joharchi and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-1310-6 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-1310-5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ........................................................................................... vii List of Abbreviations................................................................................... ix Foreword .................................................................................................... xi Chapter One ................................................................................................. 1 Securitization in Egypt: Between Discourse and Reality Allison McManus Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 23 Rebel Intellectuals and Reconceptualising Security in the Middle East Carlotta Stegagno Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 35 Counterterrorism in Context: A Critical Assessment of Counterterrorism and the Future of Islamic State Natasha Underhill Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 53 Instability in Yemen: A Critical Analysis of Iranian Strategy in the “Proxy War” with Saudi Arabia Robert Czulda Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 77 Military Cooperation in the Gulf Cooperation Council Wojciech Grabowski Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 93 A Tacit Alliance: Iran and China in the 21st Century Sahra Joharchi Contributors ............................................................................................. 115 Index ........................................................................................................ 119

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1 The transit of crude oil and petroleum products through Bab elMandeb (2010-2014)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD—Anti-Access/Area Denial AIIB—Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank AQAP—Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQS—Al-Qaeda in Syria ASEAN—Association of South East Asian Nations AWACS—Airborne Warning and Control System BRI—Belt Road Initiative (New Silk Road) C4—Command, control, communications, computer C4I/BM—Command, control, communications, computer and intelligence battle management CIA—Central Intelligence Agency C-TPAT—Custom Trade Partnership Against Terrorism DHS—the Department of Homeland Security ECO—Economic Cooperation Organization FMF—foreign military financing GCC—Gulf Cooperation Council GDP—Gross Domestic Product IRGC—Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IS (ISIS)–Islamic State ISI–Islamic State in Iraq ISP—International Ship and Port JCPOA—Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JFS—Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham MENA—Middle East and North Africa NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NGOs—Non-governmental organisations OIC—Organization for Islamic Cooperation PSF—Peninsula Shield Force RSC—Regional Security Complex SCO—Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SNSC—Supreme National Security Council SSI—State Security Investigations THAAD—Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence

FOREWORD

This edited collection draws together a collection of research papers presented at an interdisciplinary conference organized by Nottingham Trent University’s Middle East and North Africa Research cluster in April 2016. The conference was titled “Security, Insecurity and Prospects for Peace in the Middle East and North Africa” and was held at the Nottingham Conference Centre at Nottingham Trent University. In what may be termed the ‘post-Arab Spring’ era, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is experiencing unprecedented national and transnational challenges. Conflict, instability, radicalisation and the mass displacement of people have become increasingly salient features of the political and economic landscape of the region. Middle Eastern Studies has a long tradition of examining these security issues in terms of state interests, and inter-state politics focusing primarily on ‘high politics’. There is clear value in this type of approach but this conference adopted a broader approach to examining the challenges facing both state and non-state actors in the region. The conference also considered the prospects for peace in the MENA as a whole and in its sub-regions. The papers presented at the conference analysed a range of political, economic, security, socio-cultural and environmental issues that lay at the heart of the instability the region is currently experiencing. Re-thinking issues of security and insecurity in the MENA not only allows us to explain what might have led to current instability, but also allows us to posit possible solutions to security issues, and to broad-ranging peace in the region. In doing so, the conference went beyond the concepts of security and insecurity as a standard account of perpetrator versus victim, in a state-centric and violence-centric manner, to a broader and more complex understanding of the underlying processes informing security and insecurity in the contemporary MENA. Understanding how, why, where and when instability arises in the region is perhaps more important now than at any other time in the region’s modern history. Likewise exploring the prospects for peace and the means to achieving it has clear policy implications at a time when international involvement in the region is at its most intense since the end of the Cold War. The conference brought together scholars from different fields of study to consider these issues by using varying theoretical and methodological approaches.

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The conference included researchers working in different fields including Politics, International Relations, International Political Economy, Middle Eastern Studies and History, to explore various security issues and the ways in which insecurity is experienced through discourse, conflict and the post-Arab Spring structures shaping the region. This volume presents six of the research papers presented at the conference. Each chapter included here investigates some of the most salient security-related issues in the contemporary MENA. The first chapter, titled “Securitization in Egypt: Between Discourse and Reality”, examines the nature of securitization in Egypt from 2011 to 2016. Rather than analysing Egypt’s political landscape through a “civilmilitary” lens, the relationship between state and society is conceptualised as one that is increasingly securitized through public speech establishing the state’s mandate to combat terrorism. This chapter considers a variety of domestic and international actors and interests, and examines the implications for perpetuating a sustained period of securitization. The case of Egypt demonstrates that where extraordinary measures become the norm, securitization engenders instability. Chapter two, titled “Rebel Intellectuals and Reconceptualising Security in the Middle East”, investigates whether the Arab Spring represented the decline of traditional intellectuals and the rise of a new social actor: ‘rebel intellectuals’. The chapter demonstrates that traditional intellectuals have declined in terms of their influence, whilst a new social actor has emerged as the agent of a revolutionary action that was accepted by those who had been part of the intellectual class for the last century or more. Moreover, this chapter assesses how this new social actor affects the post-Arab Spring political environment. In the third chapter, “Countering the Threat from the Islamic State”, explores the counter-terrorism strategy of key actors in the international coalition combatting ISIS. The focus on airstrikes as the core counterstrategy has not worked as well as was envisioned in eradicating the group. This chapter analyses the strategy against ISIS and puts forward recommendations as to how policies could be re-focused to make greater long-term gains against the group as its territorial control dwindles and it changes into a more conventional terrorist organisation. Chapter four continues this more traditional security focus by analyzing the internationalisation of the civil war in Yemen. Titled, “Instability in Yemen: A Critical Analysis of Iranian Strategy in the "Proxy War" with Saudi Arabia”, this chapter argues that an understanding of proxy wars, as widely accepted in International Relations and International Security Studies, applies to the current struggle in Yemen. The author argues that

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Yemen – one of the least-analysed struggles between Iran and Saudi Arabia – falls under Deutsch’s understanding of a proxy war. The main goal of this paper is to analyse this conflict from the Iranian point of view, including Tehran’s strategy towards Yemen vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Chapter five, “Military Cooperation in the Gulf Cooperation Council”, explains how the GCC’s military cooperation has evolved; the extent to which the GCC is capable of ensuring adequate security for its members; and the causes of its weakness. It concludes by offering suggestions on what needs to be done to enhance the military planning, command and training capacity of the GCC states. The main hypothesis of this chapter is that security both binds and divides. There are security concerns that integrate GCC members and there are security issues that disintegrate them. The final chapter also considers Iran as a central actor in the region’s security dynamics. Titled “A Tacit Alliance: Iran and China in the 21st Century”, this chapter uses a Holistic Constructivist approach to apply Tacit Alliance Theory to contemporary Iranian-Chinese relations. Tacit Alliance Theory offers interesting insights regarding why and how states engage with each other in cooperative ways. China and Iran’s long history of diplomacy affects the images and assumptions they hold of one another. Critical discourse analysis of Iranian and Chinese governmentendorsed media coverage of relations between the two states is used to assess the narrative of relations between these two important states with regard to the extent that relations are constructed within, and underpinned by, a tacit commitment to support for the status quo. The conference and this subsequent volume would not have been possible without the work of Nottingham Trent University’s Department of Politics and International Relations, and its MENA Research Cluster. The cluster offers established scholars, early-career researchers and postgraduate researchers the platform to develop analyses that explore the politics, international relations, society and political economy of the MENA. The cluster has rapidly expanded in scope and membership since 2013 and now draws together scholars conducting internationally recognized research on various aspects of the historical and contemporary MENA from a range of theoretical and methodological approaches. As a research group, the MENA cluster has benefitted from the financial support of Nottingham Trent University’s School of Social Sciences, the International Studies Association, the British International Studies Association, the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, the European Consortium for Political Research, and the European International Studies Association.

CHAPTER ONE SECURITIZATION IN EGYPT: BETWEEN DISCOURSE AND REALITY ALLISON MCMANUS

From Tahrir to Today Cairo is dense; a few kilometers of the city overlays years of political struggle. Tahrir Square, in the revolutionary heyday of 2011, was a literal and symbolic space to challenge the corrupt military order that had governed Egypt for decades. By 2013 mass protests, once calling for the downfall of the military regime and many times calling for democratic civilian rule, called for Muslim Brotherhood president Muhammad Morsi’s removal by any means. The Tamarod Campaign, which led to Morsi’s eventual ouster by the military, decried a persistent lack of security and an economic crisis as key concerns for his removal. The campaign (which was later criticized for its ties to the security apparatus) called for the police and military to join the side of the popular mobilization. On June 30, 2013 protesters carried officers on their shoulders. Days later, the military removed Morsi from power and suspended the constitution. By 2017 Tahrir Square gave no indication of the revolutionary fervor of only a short three years earlier. In the center of the Square flies a solitary and imposing Egyptian flag, which can be seen from any entrance; planted by the state in early 2015, it stakes the territory and affirms control. The tangible presence of the security state permeates Cairo’s revolutionary sites, indeed the entire country. How did this happen so quickly after the massive, globally-lauded uprisings to dismantle it? Did Sisi usher in a new era of authoritarianism after the democratic opening in 2011? This chapter examines the nature of securitization in Egypt from 2011 to 2016. Rather than analysing Egypt’s political landscape through a “civil-military” lens, I conceptualize the relationship between state and society as one that is increasingly securitized, particularly during an accelerated period after Sisi’s tafweed speech establishing the state’s

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mandate to combat terrorism in 2013. This chapter considers a variety of domestic and international actors and interests, and examines the implications for perpetuating a sustained period of securitization. Where, in their seminal text on security, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1997) suggest that securitization calls for extraordinary measures, the case of Egypt demonstrates that where extraordinary measures become the norm, securitization engenders instability.

Conceptualizing the Egyptian Security State Does the resurgence of the security apparatus signal the victory of counter-revolutionary forces? The uprisings of 2011 unseated more than Mubarak: in removing a top echelon of political and business elites, and in banning the National Democratic Party (NDP), the revolution upended state-society dynamics. As new (and some old) factions scrambled to gain their political footholds, power vacancies emerged and counter-revolutionary forces gained the upper hand. But, counter-revolution is not adequate to describe the processes that led to that point. Securtization did not necessarily happen in response to the revolution, rather the revolution provided a disruption that created new threats and opportunities. In many ways, securitization was an established discursive strategy in Egypt that never really left, and which revolution inadvertently accelerated. In their pivotal text, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde describe securitized issues as those which are “staged as existential threats to referent objects by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind" (Ibid., 5). The state securitizes an event, process, or phenomenon in order to justify extraordinary measures, convincing a public through a speech act of the necessity of these measures to survival (Waever 1995). Thierry Balzacq (2016) countered this perspective on the speech act, establishing a discursive practice whereby the intersubjective nature of securitization requires only agreement on the existence of the threat, regardless of its actual existence. The Egyptian case highlights a variety of threats, objects and interests that have underpinned securitizing discourses and security behaviour, and which may explain, for instance, the uneven extension of different components of the intelligence apparatus or the military’s penetration into the economy. The accumulation of wealth is not essential to the maintenance of power, but can be considered as a driving interest that inspires a securitizing discourse. The relative primacy of intra-state institutions, jockeying for authority in a state system, may also present a

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motive for securitization. In each of these cases, however, the “state” presents existential threats to its own interests. In his famous lecture series: Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault outlines the concept of security and governmentality – the ways in which the state exercises power in the governance of a population – that establish the frameworks of power articulation in a modern state and society (Foucault 2004). Foucault’s lectures are important as they call to mind the techniques of power and its institutions, rather than centre the actor as the subject of analysis. This is particularly useful here to counter a recent tendency to view developments in Egypt vis-à-vis the actions of an actor (the “Morsi” or “Sisi” regime, for instance) or through the counterrevolution/failed revolution framework. The late Samer Soliman highlights the contradictory nature of the security state ecosystem, where security institutions act as protectors not necessarily of a state, but rather of interests within it: “When the police turn a blind eye to acts of corruption committed by public officials loyal to the existing regime, they effectively contribute to the erosion of the efficacy of the state” (Soliman 2011, 56). And Mariz Tadros alludes to the very same in her analysis of civil society relations with the former State Security Investigation service (SSI): “In authoritarian regimes, the intelligence agency serves to preserve the power base of the ruling power, rather than protect the security interest of the country” (Tadros 2011, 82). Adding a consideration of the actors internal to a state and acting as securitizing agents builds on the concept of securitization to address the potential implications for regime stability; adding a consideration of governmentality highlights why a framework of analysis that considers only “revolutionary” and “counterrevolutionary” forces, or individual actors, will miss an understanding of the deep roots of the securitizing process. Finally, Egypt’s experience leading up to and after 2011 demonstrates that the perpetuation of securitization inherently does not provide security, and in fact undermines stability.

1952-2011: A (Very) Brief History of the Egyptian Security State The embeddedness of Egypt’s security forces in its society, economy and political matters is perhaps no surprise considering the pivotal beginnings of its modern statehood: after all, the establishment of Egypt as a republic began with the political ambitions of a group of military officers. The 1952 Free Officer’s revolution may have ended monarchic rule and British occupation, but it ushered in a seemingly inescapable era of

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military rule. Since the revolution, Egypt has experienced one year of governance under an elected civilian president (that under Morsi, who was ousted from power by the military). Not only did the political sphere come under the military’s jurisdiction in 1952, but with Nasser’s nationalization policies, so did the economy. As private industries were nationalized, they were de facto brought under the authority of military leaders (many of whom were unfit to manage them), in a system of state-management that would become indistinguishable from spoils-sharing (Abul Magd n.d.). Soon after the coup, the primacy of the security state in the ostensibly socialist economy was established: in August 1952, the military repressed a textile workers’ strike and referred the demonstrators to military court (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014). Over the next decades, the intifah policies under Sadat and later the liberalization that occurred under Mubarak (both at times at the behest of the International Monetary Fund) privatized the Egyptian economy, “opened” it to global trade, and imposed austerity measures. Even during periods of accelerated economic growth, poverty remained very high and on several occasions – notably in 1977 and 2008 – riots erupted in response to the price increases. Yet, high state expenditure on the military, police and other agencies involved in Egypt’s security operations persisted (Soliman 2011). The military also benefitted disproportionately in other ways: as Robert Springborg highlights, the Armed Forces expanded their role in the private economy at this time (Springborg 1989). Thus, the “liberal” policies after the 1970s, as well as the “socialist” policies of the Nasserist era, must be understood as part and parcel of Egypt’s security state: they allowed the state to siphon revenue and direct it to the military and security apparatus, while at the same time necessitating this very same apparatus to quell any uprising in response to the inequitable conditions left in their wake. However, the policies also created a competing power centre, with the “Mubarak clan” – a group of businessmen including Hosni Mubarak’s sons Gamal and Alaa – gaining in influence as they amassed wealth and power in the state NDP (Guirguis 2017). Thus, while military rule has been the defining characteristic of Egyptian governance for sixty-five years, it is not the only characteristic, and military rule has signified far more than the military’s holding of certain political positions. In 1954, Nasser also outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood. The decision was somewhat ironic, given the Free Officers’ (including the first president General Muhammad Naguib and Nasser) membership in the Society prior to the revolution, as well as the similarities in their political visions (Cook 2012). In a famous 1966 speech, Nasser joked about one

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“demand” that the Brotherhood had put forth in 1953: that women be made to wear the headscarf. The crowd responded with uproarious laughter. For Nasser, opposition to the Brotherhood was mobilized as anathema to Cairo’s liberal development, but they were not cast as the terrorist or criminal elements as they are today, as will be explored later in this chapter. Still, only a few short years after Egypt’s declared independence from British rule, Nasser created a state of exception, establishing that without a paternalistic security state (and specifically military rule) Egypt would face the harbinger of threat to its state-defined identity. The approach to the Muslim Brotherhood, and to other opposition groups, would vary under Sadat (who in turn instrumentalized them against socialist opposition) and Mubarak, who tolerated some controlled political liberalization to allow them into formal politics (Guirguis 2017; Cook 2012). But, this state of exception was codified in 1958 legislation that outlined the legal definition of emergency rule, although a state of emergency would not be formally declared until 1967 (during the ArabIsraeli War) lasting until 1980. The state of emergency was lifted then for a mere 18 months, until Sadat’s assassination by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group on October 6, 1981. Mubarak re-enacted the emergency law in the wake of his predecessor’s assassination, and it was continuously extended in multi-year periods. The emergency law is arguably the clearest marker of the Egyptian security state, outlining not only the state’s extraordinary powers, but in its very name – “emergency” – highlighting the oxymoronic nature of a sustained period of exception. The law allowed sweeping restrictions of movement, press and assembly, and established special state security emergency courts that could hold citizens indefinitely and without trial (FIDH 2001). The courts were tied to Egypt’s notorious State Security Investigations service (SSI), an arm of its police that was established in 1913 but reformulated under Nasser in 1954. The declared mandate of the SSI was to “protect Egypt,” although, as Soliman and Tadros described, their role had always been to protect the regime. In 2011, Mariz Tadros argued that the SSI had achieved “political supremacy” over the executive branch of the state, and was the institution that set the rules for participation in power sharing, whether between state bodies or between the state and civil society (Tadros 2011). The SSI was but one of the many arms of Egypt’s security apparatus, most of which remain intact and are housed under the Ministries of Defence and Interior, although with surveillance bodies found even in the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The SSI largely operated on its own jurisdiction as one of Egypt’s three major intelligence branches, along

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with the Military Intelligence (under the Ministry of Defence), and the General Intelligence, or mukhabarat, created by Nasser in 1954 and which remains under the supervision of the Presidency. All of these agencies have grown in power and size since their inceptions, with no small amount of competition for primacy among them. Thus, all of the techniques of the Egyptian security state – military occupation of seats of power, the armed forces’ control over economic matters, a controlled public sphere and neutralized opposition, an expansive police and surveillance apparatus, and a constant state of exception – endured through the Sadat and Mubarak eras, although they metamorphosed.

2011-2013: (Partial) Disruptions The masses of protesters that flooded Tahrir and other squares around the country marked, explicitly or implicitly, the rejection of all aspects of the security state. The pivotal Facebook page credited with sparking revolutionary fervour – “We Are All Khaled Said” – raised awareness about the brutal death of an educated, middle class young man at the hands of the police. The demands around the removal of Mubarak rang out as calls of “yaskut yaskut hukum al-askar”: “Down down with military rule!” Police were rejected from the square, and new forms of civilian stewardship and safety units were formed. On March 5 and 6, 2011, demonstrators stormed the SSI headquarters in Nasr City, Cairo, in Alexandria, and elsewhere. The revolutionary events extended beyond the Square and well after the 18 days that eventually brought Mubarak’s removal from power. By March 15, 2011 the SSI had been dissolved. On April 16, 2011 the regime’s NDP was dissolved by court order. Dozens of corruption cases were brought against Mubarak era officials, and others were later tried for their hand in the suppression of protests, including a (later overturned) accessory to murder conviction against Mubarak himself. New and independent media formed, as well as new associations. One young activist described to me how “taboos were broken and space was opened” for the possibility of new civil society formations; he went on to found a human rights NGO. Parliamentary elections were organized in 2011 and presidential elections in 2012. By the end of 2012, the emergency law had expired and the country had elected its first civilian president in Morsi, in an election that was, though flawed, freer than any that had been held in the country before. Yet, while the revolutionary events undoubtedly showed a rejection of the security state, from the beginning this was not a complete break, and

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certainly not a dismantling of it. Despite the dissolution of the SSI, a new security body was formed – the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), known in Egypt as amn a-dawla – and absorbed most of the former SSI officials and adopted the functions of SSI (Roddy and Greene). While the State Security Emergency Courts were formally disbanded, the use of military courts almost immediately increased. By September 2011, Human Rights Watch had estimated 12,000 civilians were tried in military courts since the revolution, more than in the prior 30 years of Mubarak’s rule (Human Rights Watch 2011). Presciently, in 2011 Tadros posited that “the political environment of fear and subjugation created by the SSI is so deeply entrenched that even if the Emergency Law was removed tomorrow, both civil society organisations [sic] and state security of¿cers would not know how to act differently” (Tadros 2011, 93). Most NGOs operated in a legal grey area during the Mubarak era, opting not to formally register as such and thus avoid regulations giving the state excessive oversight over their activities (Ibid.). True, Egyptian civil society had become emboldened after 2011, but at the same time the state continued its securitization of the public sphere, most notably in the form of Case 173. In July 2011, a fact-finding committee was established to review those NGOs operating outside of the regulatory requirements, and the DHS (the former SSI) and general intelligence collaborated in the investigation. On December 29, security services stormed the offices of several foreign-funded NGOs, and in the ensuing trial 43 NGO workers, including 19 Americans and even the son the US Transportation Secretary, were handed down sentences between one and five years in prison. For its part, the military economy continued to function relatively as it had, largely through private sector proxies and its control of land, extending into the civilian economy, though not dominating any sector (Bayaraz 2016). While several public initiatives were launched after 2011 that aimed to increase budget transparency, address the issue of Egypt’s foreign debt, and to influence 2012 negotiations around a potential IMF loan, no real disruption was seen in the military economy. This was, in part, due to obscurity of the military’s engagements to this end, as well as the symbolic and physical power of the military (Chayes 2015).

“Tafweed” and Resecuritization Thus, the institutions and techniques of the security state were established and transformed in the years leading up to the 2011 revolution, and partially disrupted in the years after, as the regime’s interests changed

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and discursive strategies were upended. Tenaciously, they remained, exposed at moments from the veneer of the state’s rhetoric of democracy and representation. But, a new discursive strategy was needed in order to re-establish a threat and re-securitize Egyptian society. Such a moment came on July 24, 2013. Magnificent in full military regalia, his dark sunglasses completing the picture of the quintessential strongman Arab dictator, then-Defence Minister General Sisi delivered a speech to the graduating class of the Alexandria Naval Academy. Sisi opened his remarks: “Today I will deliver a serious message not only for the cadets and the Armed Forces, but also for all Egyptians.” His speech then describes the honesty and trustworthiness of the military and its earnest efforts to advise former president Morsi, who (as Sisi explained) never listened, driving the country to a “dangerous cliff.” Morsi, he said, declared his intention to use violence, in the form of armed groups backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, to sow havoc among the Egyptian people protesting his rule in the street. Sisi finally called on the Egyptian people to provide the security bodies with a mandate – in Arabic a tafweed, the moniker by which the speech became known – to confront terrorism. “If violence is sought, or terrorism is sought, the military and police are authorized to confront that violence or terrorism!”

Undoubtedly, Egypt was facing an escalated security threat at the time of Sisi’s speech, in the grip of a wave of violence that began with Morsi’s ouster – that day, nine attacks were reported across Egypt, killing three security forces and injuring fifteen (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy n.d.). But, Sisi’s speech did nothing to outline a plan to combat that threat, did nothing to recognize the root causes of the attacks that were occurring across the country, and did nothing to suggest actionable policy measures – whether through the police or otherwise – to address these. Rather, the speech marked the moment where a renewed discursive strategy of securitization was established for Egypt. His speech set the parameters for the Egypt that was to be protected: that made of the “brothers and sisters” of the Army and who embrace the legitimacy and patriarchal authority of “the Church, with Al-Azhar, with the Judiciary, with the Police, with the media and even with the Egyptian public opinion.” And, it determined the threat to that Egypt: nominally the Muslim Brotherhood, but also anyone who would dare to question or challenge the unity of the army, and its representation of the people. The period that followed the speech, particularly from 2013 to late 2016 (at which point a new Parliament had completed its first session, the structure of the Muslim Brotherhood had been completely demolished,

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Donald Trump had been elected to the presidency of the United States, and a refugee crisis occupied the attention of European world leaders (see below for more on this)) saw the reformation of the strategies and techniques of securitization present since the inception of Egypt, as well as a new and more aggressive application of power through them. The military occupied new seats of power; the armed forces extended more widely and visibly its control over economic matters; the public sphere was repressed to degrees unseen for decades (perhaps ever); any form of political opposition (especially Muslim Brotherhood related, but others as well) was crushed; the police and military expanded their surveillance; and, consequently, all of the legal elements of the state of emergency were reformulated and established as norms.1 This reformation happened not as much in response to the revolutionary events from 2011 to 2013 – although in some cases they did blatantly exemplify the regime’s paranoia vis-à-vis a politically engaged public – but rather it exploited the disruptions. In the months and years following Sisi’s speech, the security state continued to employ this discursive strategy, until almost every aspect of the political, economic and social sphere had come under its control. As Laure Guirguis describes: “[i]n a few statements the president defined enemies and prohibitions, orienting in this way the actions of state agents and drawing the limits of all possible debates” (Guirguis 2017).

2013-2015: Reestablishment and Reformation of the Security State Crushing the Muslim Brotherhood and the Opposition In September 2013, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters, a court intended to litigate matters that require immediate or temporary rulings banned the Muslim Brotherhood and froze the assets of its members (El Sadany 2014). A December 25 cabinet announcement declared them a terrorist organization. Having risen from a banned group to occupying the 1

Indeed, by April 2017 the Emergency Law had been reapplied throughout Egypt. In the wake of a dual bombing on churches in Alexandria and Tanta, President Sisi called for the reenactment of the law, which saw no opposition in its approval in parliament. Despite constitutional requirements that allow only a one-time extension, the law has since been renewed throughout the country three times, as it was allowed to “expire” for mere hours before a “new” application was announced.

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highest seats of power, the Muslim Brotherhood now found itself a terrorist entity, subject to Egypt’s sweeping anti-terror laws, including lengthy periods of pre-trial detention and trial by military tribunal. The effect of the designation had a wider reaching significance, however, than the labelling of the group. The security apparatus interpreted the designation widely: membership to the Muslim Brotherhood had meant a specific status to the group, but police forces went on a rampage, arresting almost anyone with antagonistic sentiments toward the state and labelling them as Muslim Brotherhood, and therefore terrorists. In fact, after the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood, incidents of arrests of “terrorists” skyrocketed, although many of these were arrested for similar activities as were carried out during the period from 2011 to 2013 – anti-state graffiti, creating road blocks, setting off pyrotechnics, etc. From June 1, 2011 to May 31, 2013, 63 individuals were reported arrested as “terrorists”, from June 1, 2013 to May 31, 2015, this figure shot up to 15,798 (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy n.d.). The discourse securitizing political opposition extended as well beyond the Brotherhood: the April 6 Youth Movement, which had been instrumental in organizing mobilizing action leading up to and during the revolutionary events after January 2011, was banned in 2014 for “espionage” and attempting to tarnish Egypt’s image. Its co-founders, Ahmed Maher and Mohamed Adel, were sentenced to time in prison for “thuggery” for their participation in protests; though Maher was released in January 2017, his probationary conditions require that he spend every night from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. in detention for three years (Abdel Kouddous 2017).

The 2015 Parliamentary Elections Egypt’s 2015 parliamentary elections marked what Sisi had declared to be the last step in Egypt’s democratic roadmap, and which he had announced in his tafweed speech would take place “within months.” Longawaited after several delays in their organization, the elections took place in the presence of international monitors, who declared them more-or-less “free and fair.” But the trappings of procedural democracy did little to mask the forces that established the rules of power. In a brilliant March 2016 investigative report on the elections, journalist and activist Hossam Bahgat wrote about the General Intelligence’s formation of the For the Love of Egypt coalition that would dominate the elections, while the military intelligence – loyal to Sisi – would construct a new political party in the Nation’s Future (Bahgat 2016). The military

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officer’s corps was represented not only by its own party, the Protectors of the Nation, but also by the strongest presence of officers holding seats in the parliamentary body and especially disproportionate representation on leadership seats in powerful committees (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy 2017). On July 25, when representative Muhamed Anwar Sadat dared to question the wisdom of an increase to officers’ pensions, the speaker of the house Ali Abdel ‘Al cut him off, shouting that he would tolerate no affront to the armed services. His outburst was met with resounding applause from the chamber (YouTube, 2016). Thus, after its predecessor had reflected some openness to pluralism in political visions and ideologies, the current Egyptian parliament itself had become a forum for the security state, an arena where competing security bodies would vie for influence but where actual governing existed primarily to push through ever more repressive security legislation. In November 2016, after members of parliament had spent months drafting and lobbying on behalf of a new law to regulate civil society, a version of the law drafted by the security apparatus was passed in a matter of days, after it had quietly gained the signatures of more than two-thirds of parliamentarians (Okail and McManus 2016). While under the NDP scheme politics were conducted in an environment controlled by the state apparatus, the lines of power were far clearer: ironically, the dissolution of the NDP created power vacuums filled by the next-best-organized body – first the Muslim Brotherhood, and after their neutralization, the security apparatus. In the current system of competing power, each actor operated only in the hopes of securing power in the future. When asked why he added his signature to the repressive civil society draft legislation, one (supposedly liberal) MP said “[w]e get drafts all the time and we sign them, because it is always good to have friends.”

Giulio Regeni: All Eyes on the Egyptian Intelligence In anticipation of the anniversary of the uprisings, in the days leading up to January 25, 2016 police were present everywhere in downtown Cairo. That day, Giulio Regeni, a 28-year-old Italian in Cairo to study labour movements, left his apartment to meet a friend for a party. As the hours passed and Regeni failed to arrive, his friend grew concerned, calling around to see if the Cambridge doctoral student had checked in with anyone else. As the hours turned to days, concern mushroomed into alarm. A full-scale international campaign was launched to locate Regeni, with the Italian government demanding answers. Tragically, on February 3, the

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young man’s body was found on the Cairo-Alexandria highway, brutally battered and disfigured. Investigations began into the murder and severely (though temporarily) strained Italian-Egyptian relations as it became clear that Regeni had been apprehended into police custody on the day he went missing. The fact that Regeni was ever picked up and the fact that either he was not immediately recognized as a student or was still thought to be a threat, reveal the extent to which the Egyptian intelligence services were operating (and continue to operate) in the country. Even if Regeni had been apprehended by chance, the later media narratives constructed about his activities in the country, particularly regarding his exact whereabouts and the individuals with whom he spoke during his research, revealed that he was undoubtedly under surveillance. By all accounts, the vicious marks that were carved into his body and the brutality of his torture were also characteristic of the SSI that had been disbanded years earlier. Where police had blatantly beaten Khaled Said to death in the street, the clear torture of a foreign national – a student, no less – by the security apparatus marked an escalation, a message that the intelligence services could operate without bounds and with impunity. That Regeni was killed and his body so casually deposited by the side of the road, even bearing clear marks of torture, also demonstrated a lack of coherence within the regime. As tensions mounted between Rome and Cairo, Italy pulled its ambassador; desperate to resolve the case, the Egyptians first tried to claim that Regeni had been killed in a homosexual encounter gone wrong, that he was a spy, and finally, they claimed to have identified his murderers, who they shot in an extrajudicial execution. Clearly, Regeni’s murder had caused massive international and domestic headaches for the regime, raising the question of how the police (especially DHS, who were the last to have allegedly been in custody of Regeni), could have been so careless. One (largely discredited) theory is that Regeni’s murder was the result of turf wars between the intelligence bodies – whether or not this is true, it clearly shows how a lack of coherent intelligence coordination and intelligence bodies operating without bounds, resulted in not only the tragic death of a bright, innocent, young man, but also undermined the state’s legitimacy on the international stage.

The Egyptian Military and Mother’s Milk On September 3, 2016 the Egyptian armed forces published a statement declaring that they would be, in coordination with the Ministry of Supply, providing infant formula to pharmacies at a discounted rate.

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The entry into the formula market came after spontaneous protests erupted when mothers faced a shortage of the formula, tied to the dollar crisis Egypt was facing at the time. The shortage, the statement explained, was the result of “greedy traders” and the military would intervene (Spokesman of the Egyptian Armed Forces 2016). Not only present in the infant formula market, the Egyptian military had taken an increasingly visible role in the economy by late 2016. At this time, I heard several anecdotes that suggested coercive measures on the part of the military to take over businesses, including the interruption of power to factories as a means of blackmail. Publicly, at a conference in November 2016, President Sisi said that the military comprised 1-1.5% of the Egypt’s GDP, a figure which did not include its private ventures, which, according to a report in the independent media outlet Mada Masr, had expanded to include healthcare, roads, education, electricity, energy and fish farming, among others (Attalah and Hamama 2016). While many analysts have highlighted the fact that the Egyptian military’s economic ventures are not necessarily out of the norm, they reveal how the securitization of the economy is intrinsically tied to the military’s activities. This intervention into the formula market was later justified not only as a necessary measure to ensure security for mothers and their babies, but tied to the military’s overall intervention into the economy as a measure of security for all of Egypt. Sisi referenced the armed forces’ omnipresent economic activity as a sign of its ability to deploy anywhere in the country “within six hours” in a September 2016 speech.

Case 173: “War” on Civil Society Case 173, never closed after the sentencing of the NGO workers in the highly-publicized trial, again reared its head after the tafweed speech, along with other legal and policing techniques employed to curtail freedom of association, all in the name of ensuring security. In September 2014, in the absence of a seated parliament at the time, Sisi signed into law amendments to the penal code that the receipt of foreign funding “with the intention to harm national security” would be punishable by life in prison. The action followed threats from the Ministry of Social Solidarity that it would be tightening its grip on civil society by seeking to more closely follow strict regulations regarding registration of NGOs, particularly that requiring examination of their sources of funding. By March 2016, notices of summons to appear for investigations related to Case 173 were issued to two of the main non-governmental organizations

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in Egypt that worked on human rights issues: the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies and Nazra for Feminist Studies; an urgent memorandum circulated among civil society mentioned 37 organizations that could potentially be affected by the case and investigations. The reopening of Case 173 and the actions of the state, which have only escalated since and have seen the shuttering of the Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and the freezing of funds of prominent activists like Hossam Bahgat and Gamal Eid, clearly demonstrates the state’s securitization of civil society. Along the same lines, the Egyptian parliament passed the aforementioned law stipulating new restrictions on freedom of association. By early 2017, most civil society actors were living in fear of, at best, losing their jobs and life’s work or, at worst, life imprisonment. Ironically, the Egyptian government has justified the crackdown as a means of ensuring security, either of the institutions it seeks to prosecute (by encouraging them to become compliant with the law) or of society at large. The charges for which Negad el-Borai, a human rights lawyer, was being investigated included “deliberately spreading false information with the purpose of harming public order” after he submitted draft legislation to the parliament that would criminalize torture (Okail and El Sadany 2016).

A New State of Emergency The processes and modes of securitization described here occurred, in many cases, outside of Egypt’s legal frameworks, however, the period after 2013 also saw legislation that increasingly facilitated the very same conditions present under the emergency law that had been allowed to expire in the wake of the 2011 uprising. Notably, in North Sinai, where Islamic State militants continued to carry out attacks against the state in an ongoing insurgency, the emergency law was put in place in October 2014, and renewed consistently in three-month periods after that time. Even in the rest of Egypt, shortly after the tafweed speech, legal mechanisms reappeared to recreate the conditions of the emergency law. A restrictive anti-protest law was put into place in November 2013 that placed strict regulations on assembly, stipulated severe oversight from the Ministry of Interior, and outlined harsh penalties. By some counts tens of thousands have since been arrested under this law (U.S. Department of State 2017). New counter-terrorism measures were repeatedly proposed, implemented under Sisi in the absence of a parliament, and then passed with little discussion once parliament was seated (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy 2017). These laws criminalize reporting figures other

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than the governments and provide overly broad definitional language for what constitutes a terrorist entity, allowing the state legal justification for crackdown not only on potential terrorist threats, but also on nonviolent opposition and the media (El Sadany 2015). The aforementioned changes to the Penal Code and the NGO law have also severely restricted freedom of association. Thus, the “emergency law” that had been in place for decades was indeed reformulated in a codified system that no longer claimed its extraordinary nature. In legal terms, through a series of decrees and legislation, the extraordinary became the norm.

A Global Securitizing Turn Egypt’s escalated securitization after 2013, and the securitized environment that was developed up to 2011, cannot be understood in isolation from global events, particularly a securitizing turn after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the War on Terror that ensued, and a renewed securitization of relations after the rise of the Islamic State. The 9/11 attacks, the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and a global manhunt for Al Qaeda operatives set the stage for the United States’ (and its allies’) engagement in the Middle East from 2001 to 2011. In Egypt, the Central Intelligence Agency collaborated with its Egyptian counterparts, whom then-CIA Director A.B. Krongard described as “our friends in Arab cultures” to establish “black sites” where suspected terrorists were rendered extraordinarily and presumably tortured with the same notoriously brutal mark of the SSI that Regeni’s body bore (Mayer 2007). After the 2011 uprisings, the United States’ position on Egypt to some degree mirrored the changes that were occurring in the country, albeit on a delayed timeline, and not necessarily because of them. President Barack Obama, who had addressed the threat of Islamist extremist violence in Cairo in a 2009 speech, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hesitated at first to embrace the revolutionary events that were occurring. The desire to “lead from behind” that would become a hallmark of Obama’s foreign policy doctrine was salient. The United States recognized the parliamentary and presidential elections after 2011 that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power (elections that were observed by US monitors) and continued to support the Egyptian leadership, though making strong statements on human rights issues. Of course, the United States’ support for “our friend” Egypt is most obviously seen in the hefty foreign military financing (FMF) package that provides Egypt around $1.3 billion annually for military equipment and

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training. Despite any changes in the political reality on the ground, in only one instance was aid suspended: when, in August 2013, then-Field Marshal Sisi oversaw what Human Rights Watch described as “one of the most bloody incidents of mass unlawful killings of largely peaceful protesters in recent history” (Human Rights Watch 2014). But by early 2015, the bilateral relationship had, by all appearances, returned to business-as-usual. In a National Security Council memorandum, the US executive branch announced its intentions to resume the delivery of materiel held in the wake of the Rabaa massacre, although it outlined some changes to the funding package for future years, including the elimination of a cash flow financing package that allowed the Egyptians to buy weapons on credit (National Security Council Press Office 2015). While the State Department and members of Congress still made statements of concern regarding Egypt’s human rights record, particularly the failure to overturn the sentences of the US-funded NGO workers, noticeably higherlevel security delegations travelled to Cairo. In May 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry met with President Sisi. The State Department read-out of the meeting described Kerry’s praise of Egypt’s efforts in advancing the peace process with Israel (what Kerry viewed as a cornerstone of his efforts during his tenure as Secretary), as well as his declaration of the “importance of Egypt's role as a regional partner and [reiteration of] U.S. commitment to help Egypt fight terrorism, increase economic growth, strengthen democratic institutions and bolster regional security” (State Department Office of the Spokesperson 2016). These four objectives highlight the renewed warmth in the US position, which must be understood as a response to its interests in a newlysecuritized framework in the Middle East after the advancement of the Islamic State, rather than any real reform or embrace of shared values under Sisi. Indeed, if 2011 provided a momentary honeymoon period where Western politicians and mass media applauded what were characterized at the time as youthful revolutions clamouring for democracy and freedom from authoritarianism, by 2014 the tone had changed. The deterioration of the situation in Syria had become a thorn in the side of the Obama administration, and the rise of the Islamic State shone a most brutal light on the failures of the policies toward the region in achieving any semblance of either security and stability or freedom and democracy. The cruel and, at times, genocidal actions of the Islamic State, the ongoing attacks on Western targets, and the mass of refugees that plagued even the best-intentioned European policy-makers all shifted the balance of policy

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toward the region to countering terrorism, rather than supporting revolutionary agents in their quest to establish burgeoning democracy. For, while the violent and repressive securitization of Egypt’s society, politics and economy under Sisi’s presidency may not have appealed to the United States, his ability to prevent a slide into all out chaos, and particularly his control over a vast and powerful military, did. Rather than confront a strongman, the United States chose to placate him. Slowly but surely economic support funding that was earmarked to finance programmes related to capacity-building and democratic governance was slashed, as its obligation became next to impossible under ever-more restrictive conditions on civil society. Foreign military financing, however, remained untouched, even despite government reports that detailed egregious flaws in its oversight (United States Government Accountability Office 2016). Although it was not declared publicly by US policymakers, the United States’ continued support through the FMF package also revealed fears about its waning influence on a world stage, both in terms of its geopolitical primacy and the continued growth of its military industry. Particularly as Egypt pursued a strategy of diversification of its weapons supply, turning to France, Germany, Great Britain, and (especially concerning to US officials) Russia, to buy weapons, US Congress felt an immense pressure to continue its high levels of FMF. A particular outlook came to pervade the view of FMF in Washington: “if we don’t provide these weapons, someone else will.” Thus, even by the time of the US presidential elections in late 2016, the US relationship with Egypt had itself become securitized, revolving almost solely around considerations of countering terror in country and acting as a regional bulwark against the spread of conflict and ensuing refugee crisis that had been seen in Libya, Syria and Iraq.

The Irony of a Constant Security Paradigm At the beginning of 2017, by all appearances, it seemed the entire world was ready to place its bets on the securitization of the Egyptian state to deliver stability. President Donald Trump lauded Sisi – the first world leader to call and offer his congratulations on his election – and draft legislation was proposed in the US Congress to reinstate cash flow financing. German President Angela Merkel, feeling pressure in the leadup to presidential elections to address the refugee crisis, appeared ready to strike a deal with Sisi to facilitate the return of any potential refugees. The International Monetary Fund had inked a multi-billion-dollar loan conditioned

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on austerity measures and the float of the pound that had taken place the previous October. But, the irony of the facade of stability is that in fact, the very processes of securitization contribute to greater instability the longer they are in place: because securitization requires the constant presence of threat, it inspires anxiety (Schuilenberg 2015). In the case of Egypt since 2013, this is particularly seen in the competition between the branches of the security state and in the breakdown in power articulation between society and state. In North Sinai, to take a most direct and extreme example, the extreme securitization has done little to quell the insurgency that still rages there. The military has largely conducted its campaign with force alone; they conduct sweeping airstrikes and land operations that often wreak as much havoc as the militants' own campaigns, employing "slash and burn" techniques that can harm civilians and destroy local economies. Thousands have been driven from their homes in areas where the military operates or in the areas along the border with Gaza, where the military created a buffer zone. The emergency law in place since October 2014 greatly restricts mobility into and around the province, and puts in place difficult curfews. At best, the state in North Sinai is absent, and at worst, it is directly responsible for the misery of daily life. This creates an environment whereby, even in the case of a potential success in combating the Islamic State, the local population holds a view of the state that may range between scepticism and outright hatred. This particularly is detrimental as it may indeed fuel radicalization, certainly undermines efforts to provide intelligence and collaborate in the eradication of insurgency, and erodes the social contract necessary for stability. Indeed, by late 2017 despite years of waging counter-terror efforts, the local Islamic State branch “Wilayat Sinai” may have taken a hit, but al-Qaeda has reasserted its presence, armed militias loosely backed by the state have been shown to carry out extrajudicial killings, local tribes have declared their intention to take up arms, and the province saw the deadliest attack in the history of Egypt, when unnamed actors killed over 300 worshiping at a local mosque. North Sinai, while it undoubtedly has a unique history vis-à-vis the state, particularly given that for years it was a part of Israel, a fact that seems to continue to cause mistrust between the Egyptian government and society and the local Bedouins, provides a very relevant case study for the potential throughout the rest of Egypt. The province demonstrates the security state at its least bound by legal, political, economic or social constraints – and yet North Sinai remains perhaps the least stable area in the country.

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The potential for instability runs deep in Egyptian society today. The dissolution of the NDP and its replacement with networks beholden to the security apparatus means that the parliament functions either as a rubber stamp or a theatre for interplay between state agencies. It makes little pretence to represent the will of constituents, and votes are not even publicly tallied. While local council elections have been long anticipated, the current control over the political sphere suggests these would reproduce the dynamics seen in parliament. In the lead-up to presidential elections this year, even the most marginal of challengers has faced outright detention. Effectively, citizens have no formal political channels for representation or communication with the state – engagement with national governance (and vice versa) is based almost solely on interaction with security bodies. Similarly, in its securitization of civil society, the state limits a functioning civil society to act as mediator between society and state. The security state again cuts off a channel of communication and articulation between power and populace, relying even more heavily on the intelligence apparatus to determine and address grievances. This is particularly concerning during a period of economic crisis, where civil society is essential to distribute goods and services, act as a watchdog and offer policy critiques and alternatives. At the same time, the tension and incompetence shown in the security agencies, in part facilitated by the disruptions of 2011, were laid bare in the Regeni scandal, both to an international and domestic audience. The scandal showed how ill-equipped the Egyptian security agencies were at identifying real threats, and also how incompetent at managing the crisis and international diplomacy after the fact. And the military’s very visible extension into the economy also creates new vulnerabilities. The mothers’ protests of September 2016 took place in front of the state-owned Egyptian Pharmaceutical Trading Company. Whether or not the military is taking the coercive measures that I heard rumours of in September 2016, if the military fails to continue to provide low-cost goods, the next protests may hold them directly culpable. Indeed, in a tweet, Gamal Eid, the Director of the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, stated that if the Egyptian military insists on acting as an economic player, then it would be treated like one (Eid 2016). Finally, these activities, once legally and politically justified as a state of exception, have become norms codified in law and exercised in the techniques and strategies of the security state. In sum, the securitization of the political, social, economic and legal spheres has not only continued and been reformed since 2011, but its persistence has only served to fuel

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instability, as securitization-as-norm inherently requires the very insecurity upon which it establishes its discourse. Despite this, the international community continues its support, predicated on the notion of Egypt’s friendship and partnership in the fight against terror, and that it is “too big to fail” in the model of Syria or Libya. While this conclusion paints a dark picture for Egypt, it is not a predestined one. The disruptions from 2011 to 2013 were in no way fated to bring about the resurgence of the security state nor the escalated measures taken in the name of securitization, rather this was the work of actors exploiting these disruptions. To this end, Egypt is not doomed to cycles of instability and constant re-securitization. There are many inside the country and in the international diasporic community, and in solidarity with them that continue to struggle to disrupt these cycles, to forge new openings and seek possibilities for governing strategies and techniques that consider the best interest of the Egyptian citizenry and thus, in the democratic and representative ideal, for all of Egypt.

References Abdel Kouddous, Sharif. 2017. "Trump is Just Fine with Harsh Repression in Egypt." The Nation. February 1. https://www.thenation.com/article/trump-is-just-fine-with-harshrepression-in-egypt/ Abul Magd, Zainab. n.d. "The Army and the Economy in Egypt." Midan Masr. http://www.midanmasr.com/en/article.aspx?ArticleID=222# Alexander, Anne and Mostafa Bassiouny. 2014. Bread, Freedom, Social Justice: Workers and the Egyptian Revolution. London: Zed Books. Attalah, Lina and Mohamed Hamama. 2016. "The Armed Forces and business: Economic expansion in the last 12 months." Mada Masr. September 9. http://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/09/09/feature/economy/the-armedforces-and-business-economic-expansion-in-the-last-12-months/ Bahgat, Hossam. 2016. "Anatomy of an election." Mada Masr. March 14. http://www.madamasr.com/en/2016/03/14/feature/politics/anatomy-ofan-election/ Balzacq, Thierry. 2016. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context." European Journal of International Relations Vol. 11, No. 2: 171- 201. Bayaraz, Abdel-Fattah. 2016. ""This Land is Their Land": Egypt's Military and the Economy." Jadaliyya.com. January 25.

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http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/23671/%E2%80%9Cthis-landis-their-land%E2%80%9D_egypt%E2%80%99s-military-and-the Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde. 1997. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Denver, CO: Lynne Reiner. Chayes, Sarah. 2015. Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Cook, Steven. 2012. The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square. New York: Oxford University Press. Eid, Gamal. 2016. Twitter.com. September 3. https://twitter.com/gamaleid/status/772020343649275904 El Sadany, Mai. 2014. "The Courts for Urgent Matters: Legislation from the Bench." TIMEP.org. July 15. https://timep.org/commentary/courtsurgent-matters-legislation-bench/ —. 2015. "Yet Another Terrorism Law." TIMEP. July 6. https://timep.org/commentary/yet-another-terrorism-law/ El-Sisi, Abdel Fattah. 2013. "Speech during The Graduation Ceremony of the Naval Academy." Alexandria, July 24. https://www.facebook.com/Egy.Army.Spox/posts/346300132167642 FIDH. 2001. "The Emergency Law in Egypt." FIDH.com. 11 17. https://www.fidh.org/en/region/north-africa-middle-east/egypt/THEEMERGENCY-LAW-IN-EGYPT Foucault, Michel. 2004. Sécurité, territoire, population: Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978. Paris: Gallimard. Guirguis, Laure. 2017. Copts and the Security State. Stanford: Stanford Univeristy Press. Human Rights Watch. 2014. "All According to Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt." HRW.org. August 12. https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/rabamassacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt —. 2011. "Egypt: Retry or Free 12,000 After Unfair Military Trials." Human Rights Watch. September 20. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/10/egypt-retry-or-free-12000-afterunfair-military-trials Mayer, Jane. 2007. "The Black Sites." The New Yorker, August 13. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/08/13/the-black-sites National Security Council Press Office. 2015. On-the-record Comment on Egypt. March 31. Okail, Nancy and Allison McManus. 2016. "Egypt Is Cracking Down on NGOs When It Needs Them Most." Lawfare. November 16. https://www.lawfareblog.com/egypt-cracking-down-ngos-when-itneeds-them-most

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Okail, Nancy and Mai El Sadany. 2016. "Today’s Crackdown on Egyptian Civil Society: An Eerie Reminder of 2012." Lawfare. March 8. https://www.lawfareblog.com/todays-crackdown-egyptian-civilsociety-eerie-reminder-2012 Roddy, Jay and Jacob Greene. Unpublished. "Old Faces, Same Places: Lack of Reform in Interior Ministry." TIMEP.org. Schuilenberg, Marc. 2015. The Securitization of Society. New York : NYU Press. Soliman, Samer. 2011. The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt under Mubarak. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Spokesman of the Egyptian Armed Forces. 2016. Statement. September 3. https://www.facebook.com/Egy.Army.Spox/posts/889559114508405 Springborg, Robert. 1989. Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. State Department Office of the Spokesperson. 2016. Secretary Kerry's Meeting with President al-Sisi. May 18. Tadros, Mariz. 2011. "The securitisation of civil society: a case study of NGO-State Security Investigations (SSI) relations in Egypt." Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 11, No. 1: 79 - 103. Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. 2017. "Egypt Parliament Watch: Session One Report." TIMEP. January 9. https://timep.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/EPW_Session-1_Jan-Sept-2016-Report.pdf —. n.d. Egypt Security Watch. www.timep.org/esw. U.S. Department of State. 2017. "Egypt 2016 Human Rights Report." Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265706.pdf United States Government Accountability Office. 2016. "U.S. Government Should Strengthen End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for Egypt." GAO.gov. April. http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676503.pdf Waever, Ole. 1995. "Securitization and Desecuritization." In On Security, by Ronnie D. Lipschutz. New York: Columbia University Press. Youtube. 2016. Ε΍ΩΎδϟ΍ έϮϧ΃ ΪϤΤϣ ΐ΋ΎϨϟ΍ ΚϳΪΣ ΪϨϋ ϱήμϤϟ΍ ϥΎϤϟήΒϟ΍ βϴ΋έ ΐπϏ" . 25 ".ΔΤϠδϤϟ΍ Ε΍ϮϘϟ΍ ΕΎηΎόϣ ϦϋJuly . https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p1pTaoTFNYc .

CHAPTER TWO REBEL INTELLECTUALS AND RECONCEPTUALISING SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST CARLOTTA STEGAGNO

Introduction This chapter investigates whether the Arab Spring represented the decline of traditional intellectuals and the rise of a new social actor that can be identified as constituted by ‘rebel intellectuals’. The goal is to demonstrate that traditional intellectuals have declined in terms of their influence, whilst a new social actor has emerged as the agent of a revolutionary action that was – historically speaking – accepted by those who had been part of the intellectual class for the last century or more. Moreover, this chapter assesses how this new social actor affects the postArab Spring political environment. In the first part of the chapter following an historical perspective, I will apply Antonio Gramsci's ideas on intellectuals expressed in “Gli Intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura” to the Middle Eastern context in order to show how and why the figure of the traditional intellectual has slowly faded from the Arab public sphere. This will help to shed light on three essential points of this work: 1) the different categories of intellectuals present in the Middle East both in the past and in the present; 2) the evolution of the figure of the intellectual in the Middle Eastern context; and 3) the reasons that led to the deterioration and depauperation of the Arab cultural and public spheres. Subsequently, in the second part of the chapter, I will identify and describe the protagonist of the Arab Spring as a new emerging social actor or a new category of intellectual, that differs significantly from the traditional intellectual. I will define this new social actor as a ‘rebel intellectual’, focusing furthermore on how his/her action had affected the political climate before and during the Arab Spring.

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To pursue these objectives, this chapter applies Gramsci's categorization of intellectuals as expressed in 'Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura' (Gramsci 1971) to the Middle Eastern context. In his essay on intellectuals the Italian Marxist set up a categorization of intellectuals, defining them by the social function they played in their society. Thus, he classified the intellectual into five categories: organic, traditional, ecclesiastic, rural, and urban. Here I will show how all five types of intellectuals are present in the Middle Eastern setting to play their function concurrently within their social fields. This will allow us to develop a better understanding of the reasons why the figure of the traditional intellectual has slowly faded from the Arab public sphere. Accordingly, an historical perspective will be applied to analyse the major historical events that have occurred in the Middle East from the 1970s onwards. In this way, we have prepared the theoretical and historical background for introducing the rising rebel intellectual in the Arab Spring context. This new figure will be defined by using Gramsci and Edward Said’s notions on intellectuals expressed in ‘Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della Cultura’ and in ‘The Representation of intellectuals – The 1993 Reith Lectures’, respectively. Furthermore, I will apply Hanna Arendt’s ideas expressed in her 1963 essay ‘On revolution’ to illustrate the revolutionary context in which the rebel intellectual plays his/her role and function.

Middle Eastern Intellectuals Until the Decline of Arab Nationalism Historically, the first category of intellectuals that appeared in the Middle Eastern context is that of the ecclesiastic intellectual. Antonio Gramsci defines them as those 'who for a long phase of history (which is partly characterised by this very monopoly) held a monopoly of a number of important services: religious ideology, morality, justice, charity, good works' (Gramsci 1971, 15). We can therefore define the ulama (Islamic Clergy) as the ecclesiastic intellectual. As Muhammad Qasim Zaman points out, the 'boundaries between “religious” and “secular” learning were less clearly delineated in premodern Islam than they have been in the modern world, and those recognized as ulama sometimes made significant contributions to fields of knowledge lying well beyond the aforementioned areas' (Zaman 2013, 574). The ulama still maintained their monopoly over religious ideology, but they began to lose their monopoly over education at the end of the 19th century, when a new category of intellectuals appeared. The influence of Western civilization had a significant impact upon the history of Islam and of the Middle East as a whole. The ulama faced major

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challenges in all Muslim societies since the 19th century, and amongst the most significant was the onset of European colonial rule, which in many cases, spelled the end of Muslim political authority. Colonialism brought new institutions not just in the judicial realm but also, among others, in that of education. A new generation of Muslims began to be educated in modern institutions of Western learning (Ibid., 576). Thus, in the general framework of the Nahda – the Arab cultural renaissance of the 19th and 20th centuries – a new Arab civil society developed within the Ottoman Empire due to the increasing European political activity in the Middle East. From the end of the 19th century some Arab thinkers started to develop their own critical perceptions of the social, economic and political issues in their societies giving life to new ideologies such as Pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism. This, at a cultural level, led to the introduction of new political concepts. A modern political vocabulary arose: words such as nation-state (watan), nationalism (qawmiyya) and socialism (ishtirakiyya) became part of the Arab political debate. These European terms underwent a process of translation and adaptation to the Middle Eastern context through which they came to acquire new meanings, partially different from the original ones, that we may label as being uniquely “Arab”. This new set of ideas spread and forever transformed the Middle Eastern cultural scene and, at the same time, contributed to the development of a new Arab public sphere. Part of this debate took place thanks to new journals – such as alHilal or al-Muqtataf – which appeared in the region during that period. Political thinkers such as Butrus al-Bustani, Shibli Shummayyil and Salamah Musa, in different books and articles, put forward modern and secular ideas for the first time in modern Arab history. After being in contact with the liberal and constitutional ideas of Western thinkers and after a new revision of their own Arab history and philosophy, they were able to formulate a new way of thinking which created the ideological foundation for the modernization of Arab society upon a secular basis. Three different generations of Arab intellectuals can be identified whose main aim was to further political and cultural development in Arab society. Their assessment is strongly linked with their own historical context. The first generation of Arab intellectuals pursued constitutional reform inside the Ottoman Empire: Butrus al-Bustani (1819-1883) is one of the main figures of this early reformism. The second generation of intellectuals rose between the two World Wars: political thinkers such as Sati al-Husri (1880-1968), considered by Cleveland (1971) as the father of Pan-Arabism, tried to achieve Arab independence and unity, at first from the Ottoman Empire and then against Western colonialism. In the 1950s,

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the goals of political activism changed. The slogans became more radical and the ideologies, such as Arab nationalism and Arab socialism, merged with various political agendas giving birth to substantial political programmes. Michel 'Aflaq (1910-1989), the founder and main ideologue of the Syrian Ba'th Party, can be pointed to as one of the main representatives of the third generation of Arab intellectuals. All these generations of intellectuals can be included in Gramsci's category of traditional intellectuals who '[thus] put themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group' (Gramsci 1992, 7). Traditional intellectuals, in other words, see themselves, and are seen by others, as largely 'independent of the contemporary dominant group' (Ransome 1992, 189). However, in the modern Middle East we can also identify two further types of intellectuals: the organic and the rural. Gramsci describes the organic intellectuals as those who speak for the interest of a specific class, and who are connected to power. To be precise, in Gramsci's words the organic intellectuals are those who 'every new class creates alongside itself and elaborates upon in the course of its development' (Gramsci 1992, 6). In order to apply this idea to Middle Eastern society we have to take under consideration what Mohammad A. Bamyeh says in his Introduction to 'Intellectuals and Civil Society in the Middle East': '[f]irst, while the organic intellectual may be a product of a social group, he may also be understood as a producer of such a group. Second, organic intellectual activity may be traced to the intellectual demands of complex everyday life. Third, the organic intellectual tends to have a nuanced connection to 'high culture' which he regards as a vehicle for his own social programme rather than as its own fetish. And fourth, the effectiveness of the organic intellectual is related to his ability to transform reality even as he claims to preserve it' (Bamyeh 2010, 9-10). According to this, we can say that Gramsci's organic intellectuals contributed to creating the social fabric of Middle Eastern civil society, constituting one of the pillars around which the society is built. They represent one of the sources of knowledge in its wider sense, comprehending also technical knowledge, because, as Gramsci says: 'every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and awareness to its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields' (Gramsci 1992). Another type of intellectual, categorised by Gramsci, and pertinent to the Middle Eastern context is the rural intellectual: 'intellectuals of the rural type are for the most part ''traditional'', that is they are linked to the

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social mass of the country people and the town (particularly small-town) petite bourgeoisie, not as yet elaborated and set in motion by the capitalism system' (Gramsci 1992, 14). Michel 'Aflaq can be cited as one of the spokespersons of this category. One may dispute this as he is remembered as a typical exponent of the Damascene middle-class and Syrian urban intelligentsia. However, since capitalism had not fully developed in the Middle East one should consider the close ties that town and country enjoyed at this point in history, this type of intellectual acted as a conduit between the mass peasantry and local and national government. According to Gramsci, this function is also played by the political party: '[t]he political party, for all groups, is precisely the mechanism which carries out in civil society the same function as the state executes, only more synthetically and over a larger scale, in political society. In other words, it is responsible for merging together the organic intellectuals of a given group – those dominant at the time – and the traditional intellectuals. The party carries out this function in strict dependence on its basic function, which is to elaborate its own component parts […] and of turning them into qualified political intellectuals, leaders [dirigenti] and organisers of all the activities and functions inherent in the organic development of an integral society, both civil and political' (Ibid., 15). This process occurred in the Middle East during the rise of Ba'athism and Nasserism in the 1950s and 1960s. The Ba'ath Party of Syria and the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt, can be taken as the main examples of this process. These political parties become the main vehicles by which the ideologies of Arab socialism and Arab nationalism formulated by intellectuals such as 'Aflaq were spread. As a result, the ideas of Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism developed from their initial incarnations as formulated in the previous decades, were absorbed by the Pan-Arabist political movement who utilized these ideologies in conjunction with their own political agendas. This subsequently gave birth to concrete political programmes, perhaps best exemplified by the union of Egypt and Syria as the United Arab Republic in 1958. As a result of this process the Arab intellectuals, both traditional and organic, were absorbed into the ranks of those political parties. What followed, as envisioned by Gramsci, was the metamorphosis of the traditional and organic intellectual into the political intellectual. Moreover, this led to the erosion of their role in affecting party policy. Up until this point, the Arab nationalist movement and the Ba'ath Party in Syria and Iraq had been envisioned to be instruments for modernisation and economic justice. However, the Party and its ideas were soon appropriated by the military elements within the parties and soon degraded into populist movements characterised by empty slogans coined

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in order to justify personal political agendas. At the same time in Egypt, Arab socialism became little more than a pretext for dictatorship.

Middle Eastern Intellectuals Since the Decline of Arab Nationalism From the 1970s onwards, Arab culture seems to have become more insular, having exhausted the revolutionary drive that in the previous decades had paved the way for the ideologies of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. Consequently, a number of authoritarian regimes arose within the region and the Arab public sphere underwent a downsizing process. The evolution of political ideas was severely weakened. In Syria, for instance, the censorship of the cultural opposition, the endemic patronage and the ruralisation of the Ba'ath Party, the Syrian state and civil society caused the intellectual depauperation of the public sphere. Furthermore, it also encouraged the installation and institutionalization of predatory regimes in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Libya characterised by authoritarian repression of dissent enforced by unbridled and burgeoning police and intelligence services. This in turn was enabled by corruption at every level of state apparatus, greatly damaging the civil society as well as the social and cultural fabric of these states. Events within the Middle East further brought about the deterioration of the Arab public sphere. At the broader regional level, one may observe the intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Lebanese civil war (depriving the region of one of its main cultural hubs), the 1979 Iranian Revolution along with the growing economic influence of the Gulf States, all as having contributed to the deterioration of the secular Arab public sphere and to the fading of traditional intellectuals. From then on, Abu-Rabi’ points out 'the relationship between knowledge and power or the intelligentsia and the state in the Arab world is marked, on the whole, by severe tension and a rejection of the role of the intellectual in the decision-making process. Intellectuals are treated as suspects and are subjects of fear by the political authorities (Abu-Rabi’ 2004, 56). Moreover, 'one important phenomenon in the relationship between knowledge and politics is the prison experience of a large number of influential Arab thinkers' (ibid.). For these reasons, the Arab intellectuals who have lived between brutal state repression and a growing Islamic orthodoxy had to choose either exile (where they lost touch with the lived reality of their society) or being co-opted by their governments. Those who refused and continued to be an active part of the Arab society had to face threats, detention and even death, as for instance Samir Kassir, the noted Lebanese journalist assassinated in Beirut in 2005.

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Envisioning a Rebel Intellectual Who is a rebel? From a lexical point of view a rebel is he/she '[who] refuse[s] to obey the government or ruler; [who] oppose[s] authority' (Oxford Dictionary 2007). Albert Camus wrote in 1951 that a rebel is ‘[a] man who says no, but whose refusal does not imply a renunciation. He is also a man who says yes; from the moment he makes his first gesture of rebellion’ (Camus 1951, 19). By consequence, a rebel is the main actor (or character) of a revolution. In order to analyse in-depth, the notion of rebel and how it applies to the people who went out to the Arab streets and squares in 2010-2011 it should be necessary to clarify first what modern revolutions mean. In On Revolution Hanna Arendt explained that ‘the word revolutionary can be applied only to revolutions whose aim is freedom […] Crucial, then to any understandings of revolutions in the modern age is that the idea of freedom and the experience of a new beginning should coincide’ (Arendt 1963, 22). And that ‘the actual content of freedom […] is participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm’ (Ibid., 23). The other characteristic of revolutions is ‘the notion of irresistibility, namely that it is beyond human power to arrest it’ (Ibid., 24). Because of this, modern revolutions are connected to freedom and the notion of irresistibility, and a rebel is a person who fights for freedom and is forced to do so through an urgency. The rebel intellectual is someone who turns ideas into actions, who takes a stand against the status quo. If, therefore, modern revolutions are connected to freedom and the notion of irresistibility, and a rebel is a person who fights for freedom out of a sense of great urgency, then what distinguishes a rebel from other figures of the political opposition is the rebellious spirit ‘which seems so manifest in certain strictly religious movements in the modern age, always ended in some Great Awakening or revivalism’ (Ibid., 27). A ‘great awakening’ is certainly an apt description of what occurred in the Arab streets and squares in 2010-2011. In order to better explain and describe the rise of the rebel intellectual in the Arab Spring context one would do well to adopt Gramsci's treatise on intellectuals. Namely, Gramsci's idea that “[a]ll men are intellectuals, [one could therefore say:] but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals'' (Gramsci 1992, 9). In distinguishing between intellectuals and non-intellectuals, Gramsci refers to the social function, or rather, to the role that the individual-intellectual plays within his/her society. By applying this idea to the Middle Eastern context, one may argue that Gramsci's theory can be inverted and that those people that went into the streets calling for justice, human dignity, freedom, democracy and so on,

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played the function inherent to the traditional intellectuals without being them. Now, to shed light on the meaning of the concept of the rebel intellectual, and on what distinguishes a rebel intellectual from a traditional intellectual, we should recall Edward Said's definition of intellectuals: 'the intellectual is an individual endowed with a faculty of representing, embodying, articulating a message, a view, an attitude, philosophy or opinion [...] And this role has an edge to it, and cannot be played without a sense of being someone whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma (rather than to produce them) to be someone who cannot easily be co-opted by governments or corporations, and whose raison d'etre is to represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten [or swept under the rug] (Said 1996, 11). The intellectual does so on the basis of universal principles: that all human beings are entitled to expect decent standards of behaviour concerning freedom and justice from worldly powers or nations' (Ibid.). Moreover, the Palestinian-American literary theorist linked revolutions to intellectuals saying that ‘there has been no major revolution in modern history without intellectuals; conversely there has been no major counter-revolutionary movement without intellectuals. Intellectuals have been the fathers and the mothers of movements’ (Ibid., 27).

A Rebel Intellectual in the Arab Streets In the first part of this chapter we investigated how and why the traditional intellectual slowly faded from the Arab public sphere. One might therefore have expected the eruption of mass protests in the Arab squares and streets in 2010-2011 to have restored the position of the traditional intellectual. However, they were not active participants in the organisation and execution of the popular demonstrations that took place in this period, although able to provide meaningful insight into events as they unfolded. Instead the Arab Spring elevated a new intellectual protagonist to the fore. As Cavatorta and Pace point out through ‘the Arab protests since December 2010 there have been economic as well as political reasons which remained hidden for a long time and that eventually drove so many young people, who were assumed to be depoliticized, to overcome their fear of the brutal and long-standing regimes and go out into the streets en masse to demand social justice, dignity and real freedom’ (Cavatorta and Pace 2012, 128). For De Smet (De Smet 2016, 1-2) their ‘unexpected and unpredicted actions of protests reinvigorated mass emancipatory politics throughout the Middle East and

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the world at large […] Through Aljazeera and other (social) media outlets the uprising was literally projected into the living rooms of the global community, offering a powerful, contemporary example of a genuine popular revolution […] the revolutionary movements in the Middle East functioned as a salient reminder of the possibility of a spontaneous popular mass movement in the twenty-first century.’ It is also noteworthy to underline Susanne Kassab’s ideas on this point: '[m]ost Arabs, including intellectuals, would agree that the recent uprisings have profoundly changed the realities they have known for decades since the independence of their states. These upheavals have been perceived by many Arabs as a watershed in the post-independence era that heightened their awareness of a historical turn [...] The historical character of the moment and the emergence of a youth capable of leading such a change, which they themselves were unable to bring about, have forced them to acknowledge the coming of a new generation of critics and rebels' (Kassab 2014, 8). This crucial and critical historical juncture is the birthplace of the new figure of the rebel intellectual. This new generation of rebel intellectuals who belong to different social and economic strata of Middle Eastern society has similarly been defined by the Syrian writer and human rights activist Michel Kilo as 'opposition intellectuals' who are 'intellectuals deprived of access to the wider public, silenced and persecuted, and both witnesses and victims of a state repression' (Kassab 2014, 15). The rebel intellectual category is made of ‘many young people, who were assumed to be de-politicized’, and who overcame ‘their fear of the brutal and longstanding regimes and go out into the streets en masse to demand social justice, dignity and real freedom’ (Cavatorta and Pace 2012, 128). However, one must not perceive the traditional Arab intellectuals' relevance and influence as having been exhausted by this point. The slogans shouted in the Arab squares in 2011 borrowed from those that were coined during the 2000 Damascus Spring and partially from the 2005 Lebanese Independence Intifada. These two events that occurred in the years after Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power, can be read as an early indication of the Arab Spring a decade later. These first opposition movements were prompted by the easing of authoritarianism and repression over Syrian society during the early months of al-Assad’s presidency. McHugo states 'there was a trickle of liberalising measures. These include the release of political prisoners of all persuasions, the granting of government licences for new, independent newspapers, the encouragement of an atmosphere of discussion and debate in which the government could be criticised and the establishment of civil society groups aimed at working for human rights and related goals' (McHugo

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2014, 206). Within this new framework writers and intellectuals such as Michel Kilo, Burhan Ghalioun and Sadiq Jalal al-Azm issued manifestos calling for democratic change and the awakening of society such as the Communiqué of the 99 Intellectuals. This was followed by a new wave of political activism, prompted in the main by intellectuals: the 'Manifesto of the Thousand' of 2000, and the 'Damascus declaration for Democratic National Change' of 2005 are key documents, which had, by calling for a process of change, sown the seeds of revolution within the wider Arab psyche. In particular, the Damascus declaration requested the realisation of 'the comprehensive and equitable national dialogue among all the components and social, political, and economic groups of the Syrian people; […] encourage initiatives for the return of society to politics, […] restore to the people their interest in public affairs, and activate civil society; […] call for the election of a Constituent Assembly that draws up a new Constitution for the country' (Damascus Declaration for Democratic National Change 2005). Therefore, when the Syrian uprising erupted in March 2011 a number of the former members of the Damascus Spring such as Michel Kilo, Burhan Ghalioun and Hussein al-Awadat joined the opposition, establishing opposition groups and platforms including the 'Syrian National Council' and the 'National Coordination Body for Democratic Change'. Their aim was to gather the fragmented political opposition in order to develop and coordinate action against the Syrian regime, echoing the demands laid out during the Damascus Spring. Furthermore, as Bamyeh writes 'the revolution seems to be experimenting with their own intellectual language, and none seem to be based on prior knowledge of any intellectual system outside of that provided by customary civic ethics. The fact that an intellectual like Burhan Ghalioun appeared as a consensus candidate to represent the Syrian revolution was not because the revolution was caused by his thought, but because his earlier democratic credentials seemed so well fitting for the discourse of the revolution underway' (Bamyeh 2014, 4). One can then further deduce that the rebel intellectuals despite being the driving force behind the movements in the region, not only acknowledged their intellectual forbears but actively sought their guidance and leadership in order to further their cause. This further adds weight to the argument concerning the influence and importance of the 2000 and 2005 intellectual actions, as off the back of those initiatives their authors enjoyed a high level of cachet amongst the new rebel intellectuals.

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Conclusion In summary, this chapter has postulated that the traditional intellectuals’ partial disappearance from the Middle East’s historical and political context along with the deterioration and depauperation of the Arab public sphere led to the formulation of a new intellectual and political actor. This actor differed from the traditional intellectuals regarding their social background and cultural education. With the eruption of the Arab Spring this new type of intellectual, defined and described here as a 'rebel intellectual', was brought to the fore. They thus became the active agents of the revolutionary action that occurred in the Middle East in 2010-2011. The rebel intellectual constituted the rank and file of the protesters, took the initiative in the struggle against the police state and the authoritarian regimes that had ruled the region over the course of the previous five decades. They played the active role in the Arab streets and squares giving a physical and numerically impressive presence to the mass protests. However, the ideals and demands shouted in the Arab streets and squares were, one must acknowledge, developed by the traditional intellectuals in the years preceding the Arab Spring. We can therefore conclude by saying that within the Arab Spring, two distinct types of intellectuals have played a leading role during this period in different ways. The traditional intellectuals who prepared the ground during the years preceding the Arab Spring then, as the movement reached its peak, lent their intellectual support by aiding in the coordination, development and empowerment of the political opposition. This in conjunction with the rebel intellectual’s actions on the ground gave rise to perhaps the most potent protest movement in recent history which has already had far reaching effects both within the Middle East and farther afield.

References Abu-Rabi‘, Ibrahim M. 2004. Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in post-1967 Arab intellectual history. London: Pluto Press. Arendt, Hanna. 1963. On Revolution. Penguin: London. Bamyeh, Mohammad A. 2010. Intellectuals and Civil Society in the Middle East: Liberalism, modernity and political discourse. London: Tauris Academic Studies. Camus, Albert. 2000. The Rebel: An Essay on a Man in Revolt, Trans. Anthony Bower. 7th ed. London: Penguin Books. Cavatorta, Francesco and Michelle Pace. 2012. “The Arab Uprisings in

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Theoretical Perspective: An Introduction.” Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2: 125-138. Cleveland, William L. 1971. The Making of Arab Nationalism: Ottomanism and Arabism in the life and thought of Sati al-Husri. Princeton, New York: Princeton University Press. Damascus declaration for Democratic National Change. 2005. http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis1/syriablog/2005/11/damascus-declaration-in-english.html De Smet, Brecht. 2016. Gramsci on Tahrir. London: Pluto Press. Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura. Roma: Editori Riuniti. —. 1971. Selection from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publisher. 11th printing 1992. Kassab, Susanne. 2014. “Critics and Rebels: Older Arab Intellectuals Reflect on the Uprising.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1: 8-27. McHugo, John. 2014. Syria: From the Great War to Civil War. London: Saqi Books. Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus. 2007. Edited by Sara Hawker and Maurice Waite. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ransome, Paul. 1992. Antonio Gramsci: A New Introduction. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Said, Edward. 1996. Representations of the Intellectual. The 1993 Reith Lectures. New York: Vintage Book. Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2013. 'Ulama'. In The Princeton Encyclopaedia of Islamic Political Thought, edited by Gerhard Bowering. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER THREE COUNTERTERRORISM IN CONTEXT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAMIC STATE NATASHA UNDERHILL

Introduction Counterterrorism in the context of both approaches to and application of has been a core feature of international relations, especially since the events of 9/11 made terrorism a truly global issue. In this regard, the aim of this chapter is twofold. The first section aims to address counterterrorism in context while also focusing on the approaches to counterterrorism. This section will use the work of Jason Rineheart as a basis for contextual analysis while challenging some of the more nuanced arguments in relation to bilateralism and global governance within the field of counterterrorism, as well as addressing the soft and hard power debate in regard to a successful counterterrorism campaign. The second section then aims to focus the application of counterterrorism to the case of Islamic State in order to assess which elements have been successful and which have been detrimental to the evolution of modern counterterrorism policies. It will also provide an assessment of the current situation and ways forward to prevent the resurgence of Islamic State and other extremist groups within the Middle East and North Africa.

Counterterrorism in Context Counterterrorism is an extremely difficult concept not only to define but to apply in real practical terms. This has been the case for decades, long before the quagmire that developed in the post-9/11 era. Since then

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the idea of war as a counterterrorism tool in the guise of a ‘War on Terrorism’ has forever changed how terrorism is addressed, especially in the Western world. Adding to the confusion is the debate that exists between the use of hard and soft power approaches to counterterrorism. In terms of modern counterterrorism, the majority of the literature is spilt between the choice between either classical or modern counterterrorism. This harsh divide has resulted in an often-fragmented understanding of the process and a lack of clarity of the ways in which counterterrorism policies and procedures can and should be implemented. According to Wilkinson (2006, 203) there is no universally applicable counterterrorism policy, as is the case with the definition of terrorism itself, and thus every conflict that involves terrorism is unique in terms of its characteristics. If this is indeed the case, it can be argued that every act of terrorism therefore would need a specified and individualistic counterterrorism policy to be developed and applied if the threat is to be effectively addressed. In order to understand the process of counterterrorism, it is necessary to first define it and put it into context. According to the US Army Field Manual (2006, 4), counterterrorism is defined as operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt, and respond to terrorism. This definition, although basic, gives an insight into the complexities of understanding counterterrorism. Including deterrence, pre-emption and responses to terrorism within the definition of counterterrorism makes this a very broad one which can be both beneficial and extremely dangerous at the same time in that the act of counterterrorism would involve bringing all aspects of a nation’s powers together (both domestic and international) (Rinehart 2010). This can often weaken those who are carrying out the counterterrorism process, spreading their resources too thin while not fully addressing the root cause of the terrorist threat. If this definition were to be taken in the literal sense it could be argued that it encourages a ‘whatever is needed, whatever it takes’ approach to counterterrorism which in essence would allow the counter-terrorism policies and their application in practice to be as ruthless, violent and excessive as deemed fit by those carrying it out, resulting in a way around accountability in the fight against the bigger evil – the terrorists. Additionally, counterterrorism operations are often subject to change in accordance to the nature of the threat being faced. This is especially true in terms of international terrorism which is extremely adaptive and fluid in nature thus requiring a counterterrorism policy that is just as adaptive and fluid. According to Rineheart, ‘terrorism is a tactic that cannot be entirely eradicated, steps can be taken to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat organizations that use terrorism […] as such, policy prescriptions for

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addressing threats emanating from groups like Islamic State will look entirely different according to the political context, the current threat environment, and, of course, the government conducting the counterterrorism operations’ (ibid.). In this regard, then groups such as Islamic State are deemed to be incorrigible and thus no government can realistically negotiate a political settlement with such a group, therefore, hard power approaches are deemed to be a more fitting way to effectively deal with the threat. Taking the USA as an example, the Department of State has had a traditional stance of having a ‘no concessions counterterrorism policy’ (Morris 2005, 7-13). This position emerged early in the context of international terrorism, however post-9/11 counterterrorism had evolved into a more lethal form of asymmetric warfare, thus changing this focus on no concessions. These changes have blurred the line between policy and operations as well as reinforcing the fact that counterterrorism has become an all-encompassing approach (Rinehart 2010). As noted earlier, in this modern context there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach to counterterrorism or in other words there needs to be differing counterterrorism strategies developed and applied to individual terrorist organisations making creating and understanding counterterrorism even more difficult. This means that in the current climate, the ability to successfully isolate and weaken terrorist organisations has become even more difficult.

The Evolution of Counterterrorism in the ‘Modern’ Context Counterterrorism is in a constant state of flux and the policies and processes involved are ever evolving. It has been argued that the current wave of international terrorism began arguably on July 22, 1968, when three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked a commercial passenger flight from Rome to Tel Aviv. According to Hoffman, this act of terrorism represented at least three novelties. First, it was one of the first hijackings where the objective was primarily political, and the target was specifically chosen for its symbolism. Second, the hijacking was intended to influence a wider audience, rather than for personal criminal gain or for escape by simply redirecting a flight for transport. In addition, it was the first time a terrorist organization began operating regularly at the international level, leaving its home turf to attack citizens of a foreign country who, in many cases, had nothing to do with their struggle in order to promote their political cause before an international audience (Hoffman 2006, 63-80). Rineheart expands on this evolution further, noting that ‘over time the nature of

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international terrorism changed and so too did counterterrorism […] It appeared that terrorists were no longer taking people hostage or hijacking airplanes as the primary tactic to achieve their goals. These tactics offered diminishing returns and no success in achieving the terrorists’ primary political objectives’ (Ibid.). This has become even more evident in the post-9/11 content of terrorism whereby the methods have become more basic and violent with the increased use of tactics such as suicide terrorism which introduced the intention of achieving at least enough limited strategic success to keep the group in the spotlight and garnering international attention. Since the peak of terrorism carried out by groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, who were seen as being masters of the suicide bombing strategy, groups such as al-Qaeda changed their direction and moved to targeting the West, specifically the USA. The aim was now to inflict mass casualties which propelled terrorism into the realm of being an act of ‘lethal and indiscriminate form of warfare’ that took on a distinctive religious motivation (Ibid.). Following the 9/11 attacks, the need for an evolved counterterrorism strategy became even more apparent. According to Boyle, ‘the development of counterterrorism as a model of warfare is new to the postSeptember 11 era’ (Boyle 2010, 342). This is mirrored in the title given to the campaign against al-Qaeda – The War on Terror. Coupled with the introduction of unmanned drones as a core method of counterterrorism, the way in which governments dealt with terrorists has forever changed and possibly not for the better. Rineheart argues that ‘the changes in the nature of counterterrorism raises a larger question of the nature of power in modern counterterrorism operations. If counterterrorism is indeed an allencompassing approach requiring all aspects of a nation’s power, then it is important to understand both the hard and soft power options of counterterrorism’ (Rinehart 2010). Firstly, however, it is important to address the approaches to counterterrorism that dominate the modern international system – bilateralism and global governance.

Approaches to Counterterrorism: Bilateralism and Global Governance Bilateralism in the Context of Counterterrorism – A Practical Option? The creation of a globally focused counterterrorism operation has been and remains to be a challenging process. By the nature of the threat of terrorism, counterterrorism efforts in the global context tend to challenge

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state sovereignty as they require that changes to domestic policy as well as foreign policy are made in order to adequately address the threat. These globally focused counterterrorism operations have essentially blurred the lines between the domestic and the international in many areas including highly sensitive issues including intelligence sharing, immigration policy development and border security. In an increasingly globalised world, interdependence and interconnectedness has changed the ways in which states understand the concept of sovereignty and the ways in which they are willing to protect this. According to Krasner, there are four core features of sovereignty that need to be considered. Firstly, when a state enjoys international legal sovereignty, it is recognised by other states as a legal entity. Secondly, Westphalian sovereignty establishes a state’s territorial boundary and asserts that the state has sole control over legitimate behaviour within its territory. Thirdly, interdependent sovereignty means that the state has the ability to control movements across its borders. Finally, domestic sovereignty or autonomy asserts that the state and its rulers have the capacity to make policy and control developments within their jurisdictional territory. Essentially what this means is that sovereignty is linked to the notion that states are independent and autonomous from each other and it is this feature of the modern international system through which policy development and interactions take place often making cooperation a difficult thing to achieve. In an increasingly globalised world, however, the degree to which states can remain completely autonomous has been challenged. This independent stance has been challenged even further by the shared threat from terrorism. According to Biswas (2009, 4), balancing security, interdependence and sovereignty is particularly challenging due to the fact that security-related issues such as countering terrorism are seen as being particularly relevant to the immediate interests of the state. The events of 9/11 resulted in the securitisation of relationships between states to a degree not seen since the Cold War. Jervis (1978, 167214) notes that given the anarchic structure of the international system constant mistrust and uncertainty about the motivations of others perpetuates insecurity among states. This rationale, though now dated, still stands and if anything has become more relevant in the post-9/11 world. In order to try to achieve a coherent level of global governance and global cooperation institutions such as the UN were developed to act as a mechanism to constrain the behaviour of the dominant global powers such as the USA and Russia but this is not often successful (Barry and Brat 2009, 63-89). The USA, for example, completely bypassed the UN in its decision to proceed with the invasion of Iraq as part of its global war on

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terror (GWOT). This GWOT that emerged post-9/11 further re-structured the international security agenda. It enabled the USA to convince its allies to follow in its path to the creation of a new global security model. One of the most significant aspects of this was the threatening and forceful stance taken by President George W. Bush who famously declared that ‘either you are with us or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush 2001). This placed a lot of countries, even some of the closest allies of the US, into a precarious situation. They either agreed with and supported the policies implemented by the USA or were open to targeting by the USA as a possible terrorist ally. This form of forceful cooperation always has its limits and impacts negatively on the idea of global governance and multilateral and bilateral relationships. Additionally, through its Regional Strategic Initiative, and its ‘Anti-Terror Assistance Programs’ the USA has encouraged countries to adhere to its counter-terror norms through the use of tools such as the provision of financial aid and training (Perl 2007, 24). Rees notes that although the power of the USA has harnessed other countries to its counter-terrorism priorities, its unilateralism and the controversial nature of its policies have provoked a backlash which has impacted on its stance as world superpower. Many of the policies engineered by the Bush Administration have been repudiated and condemned by the wider-international community and this has been even more of an issue since President Trump has taken over from a more liberal and globally focused Barack Obama. Trump apparently wants to isolate the USA, making it more insular and dominant as a global power. At the same time, he wants to project US power and dominance especially in the realm of counterterrorism and the fight against Islamic State. Interestingly though, even with his overly aggressive stance on the US position of the as being the world power, he is willing to portray his administration as being a cooperative one with those countries who agree with his policies. This is especially relevant to the relationship between the USA and UK. Rees notes that much of this cooperation, however, this remains quite informal and opportunistic. It relies on the ability of the USA to forge personal relationships between the security authorities of each side (Rees 2014, 452-459). This leads to the concept of regional governance in the context of counterterrorism. Bilateral cooperation in relation to counterterrorism policy development and implementation is a feature that cannot be overstated in relation to its significance in the ongoing campaign against a weakened IS. The longstanding relationships that have been developed over time are key to the success of counterterrorism policies and need to be enhanced in order to present a united front and a continued successful approach to preventing a

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resurgence of IS in the coming months and years. However, since 9/11 and especially since the election of Donald Trump as President, the USA has often dismissed bilateralism in favour of an overly aggressive unilateral stance. According to Rees the USA has played a unique role in encouraging other countries to enter into bilateral cooperation situations through coercion or force. In this context, bilateralism has been at the heart of counter-terrorism cooperation, which reflects a self-interested approach to international relations and global governance whereby countries share information in threats and challenges within a cooperative system of sharing (ibid). This approach has been, and remains in the majority of cases, a core feature of the global fight against terrorism. There have been some issues, however, facing the success of this more multilateral, cooperative approach, again especially since Trump’s presidency in regards to the USA taking the lead in the global fight against terrorism. As a result of his more insular and isolationist approach to international relations, bilateralism was pushed to the background in favour of a more dominant and unilateral approach.

The Role of Global Governance in Counter-Terrorism: Reality or Illusion? The GWOT has had a significant impact on the way in which the global community view international security. The process of global governance is an invaluable tool in the continued fight against terrorism. Global governance is a phenomenon that provides rules, norms and institutions that are, in theory, supposed to aid in the creation of a more unified world. According to Woods, ‘at the conceptual level global governance is a structure that is predicated on tolerance and a willingness to recognise and manage differences and reconcile self to other, and us to them. It is assumed to be a process in which all international actors have equal opportunities to participate in transnational networks, institution building, norm entrepreneurship, regime creation and the management of global change’ (Woods 1999, 39-61). However, in reality, global governance actually assumes that there is a power politics dimension to the global system and that this largely reflects the interests and preferences of the great powers first and foremost. According to Makinda (2010, 4358), international institutions are those that create the rules, functions, practices and limitations on the global community in relation to a number of key areas including international law, diplomacy and religion as well as security. Even though institutions such as the UN and NATO exist to provide the above, the USA in the post 9/11 world has increasingly acted

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unilaterally providing the rationale that it cannot be constrained by the norms and standards sets by these institutions as they are limiting its ability to carry out its GWOT. The dangers associated with this unilateral activity is that it can actually serve to weaken international norms and the institutions created to protect which in turn can play into the hands of the very terrorist organisations that we are trying to fight against. It is extremely important to note that counterterrorism measures if not properly conceived, developed and carried out can in fact facilitate the emergence of more terrorism and in turn create a never-ending cycle of terrorism and counterterrorism. Building on this, Huntington argued that ‘[t]he West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political and economic values’ (Huntington 1993, 40). This in turn promotes an unbalanced system whereby the dominant states benefit the most and the weaker are forced to often simply agree and follow. Rees argues that governance in counter-terrorism through institutions such as the UN is extremely difficult to implement owing to the very real diversity of views within the organisation. This means that universal agreement over such issues as counterterrorism has been notable by its absence within the UN framework. This has therefore resulted in a limited ability to shape international behaviour (Reese 2014, 452-459). It has not all been negative, however, and the UN has often heralded successful resolutions in relation to counter-terrorism governance. There have been 16 conventions and protocols passed and implemented that reflect attempts to address some of the principal features of terrorism since the 1970s through the UN system, including international agreements against the hijacking of commercial aircraft, prohibition of hostage-taking, the suppression of bombings, the protection of nuclear materials and efforts to counter terrorist-financing (Ibid.). An additional strength of the UN is that it is able to interact with more legitimacy in the eyes of the international community with a broad range of international regulatory bodies to oversee the development of global security measures. The term legitimacy here is key as many view a unilaterally-acting USA as a threat not as an ally and this can lead to challenges and an overall backlash to its approaches to counterterrorism. However, as noted by Rees, ‘even within the West there has been disagreement over the UN’s relative importance. While European governments have been all too aware of the deficiencies of the UN, they have remained committed to the principle of multilateralism’ (Ibid.). By contrast, the USA has believed that it must be capable of acting even when others remain passive (Daalder and Lisay

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2005). President Bush regarded the UN as being weak or ‘having failed the test’ in relation to its decision on the invasion of Iraq and demanded that it should not get in America’s way (Ibid.). What, then, are the implications for the blatant disregard of international norms and institutions in relation to global governance and the continued global fight against terrorism? Makinda states that ‘without norms and institutions there would be no sense of order, security and justice […] If the most powerful state does not want to be constrained by international norms and institutions, global governance is seriously undermined, and the war on terror loses purpose except as a demonstration of allegiance to the US’ (Makinda 2010, 52-53). This essentially makes other states feel inadequate and in a position of coerced agreement in areas of global governance where they may not feel confident or compliant thus triggering possibly aggressive responses to the USA. In addition, the USA in taking such a defiant stance is undermining its ‘claims to be responsible manager of global affairs […] and is also indirectly threatening certainty, stability and order in international society because its actions might encourage aspiring great powers to emulate it’ (Ibid.). What the USA needs to consider is that global governance actually has more capacity to address the most threatening issues facing the world including terrorism and the factors that can give rise to it such as poverty, lack of education and state failure. Where then does, regional governance sit in the ongoing fight against terrorism? This then leads back to the question of whether hard or soft power is more effective as a counterterrorism tool or if a combination of both is the key to a successful counterterrorism campaign.

The Key to Successful Counterterrorism: Hard or Soft Power? Existing research on counterterrorism tends to structure debates around two approaches: the war (or military) model and the criminal justice model (Rinehart 2010). Schmid argues that ‘the war model tends to frame the struggle against terrorism in military terms of an enemy-centric war where the armed forces of a state are primarily in charge of developing counterterrorism strategy. On the other hand, the criminal justice model champions the rule of law and democratic values which prevail in Western democracies. Doing so puts restrictions on the government and thereby risks reducing the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. While democracies tend to champion democratic ideals and the preservation of civil liberties, their attempts to combat terrorism forcefully have continually tested the boundaries of the criminal justice model’ (Wilkinson

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and Schmid 2006, 197-221). This trend in thinking has permeated counterterrorism discussions over the last decade especially, with many noting that the hard power approach is the only way to truly decimate terrorist organisations and prevent them from gaining territory and expanding their campaigns. The hard or direct approach mainly involves the use of tactics such as drone strikes, increased intelligence operations and the use of special forces. This approach, however, does not fully address the root causes of terrorism and can in fact worsen the situation by providing propaganda for terrorist organisations who use such events as civilian casualties as a means to place blame on external actors thus justifying their cause. Islamic State, for example, became masters at this approach, leading one of the most successful propaganda campaigns of any terrorist organisation in modern history resulting in global support for the group. This is where, it is argued, the soft power approach is more effective. The soft power approach consists of elements such as capacity building, economic development, and counter-radicalisation focusing on the underlying causes that allow terrorism to thrive (Rinehart 2010). These approaches, coupled with other facts such as democracy promotion and nation-building can be extremely effective at addressing the root causes but do not in and of themselves effectively deal with the active terrorist organisations. Within the realm of soft power, the process of counter-radicalisation has come to the forefront as being one of the most significant ways to address the spread of terrorism. Rineheart (Ibid.) notes that terrorist radicalization and de-radicalization should be viewed as a complex process consisting of a variety of interdependent push- and pull-factors and triggering events that drive people into and out of terrorism. Others contend that social networks and group dynamics better explain how individuals are violently radicalized. This is not as clear cut as it seems, however, as theories of radicalisation have proved difficult in explaining fully why certain individuals decide to join terrorist organisations, especially since those that choose to give their support come from a multitude of ethnic, socioeconomic, political and religious backgrounds (Horgan 2005). Additionally, theories of counter-radicalisation also are lacking in that they are extremely difficult to measure in terms of success from a counterterrorism perspective. This is due to the fact that ‘such programs essentially amount to increased community engagement that requires community leaders to target and mentor individuals who are presumably susceptible to terrorism recruitment. Yet it is difficult to prove that they would have turned to terrorism in the first place, and, more importantly, that they will not engage in terrorism afterwards’ (Rinehart

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2010). In fact, according to Robert Jervis, “there is little reason to think that we could deal with them (root causes of terrorism) effectively […] we cannot point to solid evidence that doing so would make much difference” (Jervis 2005, 43). If this is to be believed, it may then be more effective from a counterterrorism perspective to deem terrorists to be rational actors, not crazed fanatics, who choose the tactic of terrorism, not as a means to a quick fix but as a strategic choice to pursue their political objectives (Bjorgo 2005). This would then allow the possibility of readdressing the current ways in which we view terrorists and thus re-strategize our approaches to dealing with the threat emanating from them. In the context of the ongoing fight against IS, it is apparent that the hard power approach has dominated the counterterrorism policy which, it is argued here, is not the most efficient nor effective way to deal with any terrorist threat in the long run. It may indeed have short term successes like we are currently seeing but it does not address the underlying root causes that facilitated the emergence of such groups in the first place. It can in fact result in even more support for such groups, as was witnessed in both Syria and Iraq as well as globally in countries as varied as the UK, France and Germany to Australia, Nigeria and Indonesia. This is why it is argued here that any effective counterterrorism policy must take a more holistic approach and combine elements of both at the same time. There can be no ‘one first and one second’ application of policies, there needs to be a simultaneous use of both hard and soft measures in order to both gain the trust of the people, prevent any further recruitment as well as dealing directly through the use of force with the active terrorist group. In order to assess the success of the current hard power dominated counterterrorist campaign, the following section will provide a brief critical analysis of the fight against IS, putting into context the main methods used and how successful they have been.

Counterterrorism in Practice: The Case of Islamic State Since 9/11 global military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been tasked with developing and implementing significant counterterrorism policies with the aim of halting the spread of extremist terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and more recently IS, a task that has proven much harder than expected. Since the emergence of IS, and specifically since 2014 and the taking of Mosul by the group, it became the greatest concern in the realm of terrorism in the global context. The ideology, rhetoric, and long-term goals of IS are similar to al-Qaeda’s, and the two groups were once formally allied but IS has surely supplanted al-

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Qaeda as the greatest jihadist threat in modern terrorist history (Cronin 2015). At its peak, IS had 30,000 fighters, held significant swathes of territory in both Iraq and Syria, was able to maintain extensive military capabilities, control lines of communication, command infrastructure, fund itself, and engage in sophisticated military operations outside of its socalled caliphate (Ibid.). Herein lay a problem, as the West was using the same counterterrorism approaches and methods that it had on al-Qaeda, assuming that since it had been a success against one group it should surely be a success against the other. This was not to be the case. One of the main problems facing the West, specifically the USA who once again took a lead on the campaign against IS, was that it was too slow to adapt its policies to deal with this new threat. As noted by Cronin (Ibid.), ‘in Syria, U.S. counterterrorism has mostly prioritised the bombing of al Qaeda affiliates, which has given an edge to Islamic State and has also provided the Assad regime with the opportunity to crush U.S.-allied moderate Syrian rebels. In Iraq, Washington continues to rely on a form of counterinsurgency, depending on the central government in Baghdad to regain its lost legitimacy, unite the country, and build indigenous forces to defeat ISIS. These approaches were developed to meet a different threat, and they have been overtaken by events. What’s needed now is a strategy of “offensive containment”: a combination of limited military tactics and a broad diplomatic strategy to halt ISIS’ expansion, isolate the group, and degrade its capabilities’. Due to the fact that the origins, aims, motivations and objectives of IS differed markedly from those of al-Qaeda, it soon became apparent that the counterterrorism strategies that were developed to eradicate al-Qaeda would no longer be effective against this new threat. One of the main differences was the targeting of the head of the organisation. Osama bin Laden was the prime target for the al-Qaeda counterterrorism campaign, the focus being that once the head of the organisation was removed then organisation itself could no longer survive. This proved in some ways to be correct, with the removal of Bin Laden came the fragmentation and failings of the group. However, it soon became apparent that IS was not going to fall into the same trap. In fact, ‘simply killing the leaders of Islamic State would not cripple the organization. They govern a functioning pseudo-state with a complex administrative structure. At the top of the military command is the emirate, which consists of Baghdadi and two deputies, both of whom formerly served as generals in the Saddam-era Iraqi army: Abu Ali al-Anbari, who controls ISIS’ operations in Syria, and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, who controls operations in Iraq’ (Ibid.).

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Another major difference between the groups comes from the application of violence and the morality of the use of terrorism as a method of gaining support. For al-Qaeda, its religious arguments and messages of altruism aimed at uniting the global Muslim community through a disdain for the Western world, placing the blame for the ills of the Middle East on the actions of the West, specifically the USA. AlQaeda’s leaders attempted to depict themselves as moral figures who were able to legitimise the use of extreme violence. However, their overly zealous religious application at times resulted in a backlash and loss of support for a group who were seen to be almost ‘backwards’ and overly zealous in their limiting of freedoms to their followers. As a result, deradicalisation programmes were able to address the disjoint between ‘what al Qaeda offered and what most young people are really interested in, encouraging militants to reintegrate into society, where their more prosaic hopes and desires might be fulfilled more readily’ (Cronin 2015). The counterterrorism policy that has the best long-term chance of truly defeating IS is one based on offensive containment: combining a limited military campaign with a major diplomatic and economic effort to weaken IS and align the interests of the many countries that are threatened by the group’s advance (Ibid.). The air strike campaign has been successful in limiting the movement of IS and disrupting its attacks, cutting off its supplies of weapons, and ammunition thus weakening the group’s capabilities to carry out attacks. This is not in and of itself a complete success, however. It has indeed limited its capability on the ground in Iraq and Syria yet globally the support for the group seems to be continuing. The ideology and the draw of the caliphate has meant that Europe especially has been the target to an ever-increasing spate of terrorist attacks carried out by small cells of supporters of IS. This ties back to the hard versus soft power approach to counterterrorism. The case of the Syrian civil war is a prime example of this quandary of balance between hard and soft approaches. According to Byman, Syria is both a counterterrorism success and a counterterrorism failure in that almost a decade since the unrest within Syria spiralled into an all-out civil war the threat from IS, although lessened significantly, has not yet been completely removed (Bryman 2017). Syria also illustrates how jihadists thrive on civil wars in the Muslim world, wars which allow new terrorist groups to be created or allow existing ones to get stronger. ‘The wars provide a cause for recruiting, and they make the (surviving) members deadlier by giving them hard-won combat experience. Wars often allow groups considerable freedom of action’ (Ibid.). Islamic State, for example, was able to capitalise on the chaos caused by the civil war in Syria, taking

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over massive swathes of territory in where the Syrian regime had little to no reach. They then established themselves as an alternative to the state, providing essential service such as education, healthcare and, for the Syrian population possibly most important of all, security. Counterterrorism cooperation within the Western world did in fact improve, especially so under the leadership of President Obama. One of the biggest errors in judgements regarding the situation in Syria, however, was the fact that the USA at first ‘neglected the Syrian conflict but then tried to build a broad coalition against the Islamic State without devising a broader policy toward the Syrian conflict as a whole’ (Ibid). In this context, the West and again specifically the USA, has time and time again performed extremely poorly on one key counterterrorism task: building up local allies. This has been the case since the Bush era and the initiation of the War on Terrorism. The Trump Administration has now magnified this problem once again providing space for grievances to grow among the populations of the Middle East and in turn providing support for extremist groups who challenge the USA and use its errors in judgement and action as a means of propaganda. In fact, as noted by Byman, ‘[d]espite years of training and billions of dollars, Iraqi forces fled much smaller and lightly armed Islamic State forces when the latter swept through the west of the country in 2014. U.S. efforts to build up moderate Syrian opposition forces mostly met with failure. As a result, the United States relied on Syrian Kurds and otherwise supported forces that could fight but could not govern with broad popular support. Such training is a political as well as technical task, but the United States often uses it as a way of acting while avoiding hard political decisions - Syria was not Iraq, Iraq was not Afghanistan, and the next conflict involving global terrorist groups will be a different one entirely. But if the United States can learn the above lessons, it might do better the next time around—or at least avoid doing far worse’ (Ibid.). Where do we stand then in the fight against IS?

Conclusion: Lessons Learned and the Future of IS Over the last five years specifically, terrorism in the global context has become much more decentralised and unpredictable in nature. The result has been that terrorism has become much harder to detect and has in turn become more resilient to counterterrorism measures. Groups such as IS and al-Qaeda have become masters in exploiting indigenous grievances that allow them to build support bases that facilitate their rapid expansion and re-emergence. With the increased instability in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen the level of underground support for

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these groups has allowed them to sustain their campaigns and carry out increasingly violent attacks across the region. Despite the fact that IS has been all but expelled from Syria and Iraq it continues to pose a significant threat that cannot be dismissed. This threat comes in the form of its ideology which has been extremely potent in its appeal globally. As noted by Gunaratna, by 2018 terrorism was characterised by ‘attacks mounted by politico-religious, ethnic-political and left/right wing groups’ (Gunaratna 2018). In addition, there was a growing focus on the threat emanating from radicalised portions of migrant and diaspora communities that were directly involved in terrorist attacks carried out across Europe and America. Even though the base of IS in Iraq and Syria may not exist as it once had, its affiliates continue to carry out ever more violent attacks against ‘military, diplomatic, political and economic targets’, focusing on populated locations for large-scale impact, with suicide attacks as the preferred tactic (Ibid.). It has become increasingly difficult not just to deal with these events but to build intelligence and to try to pre-empt attacks from happening. Gunaratna outlines what he terms the three generations of global terrorist movements that have emerged since 9/11. The first, or ‘Global Jihad 1.0’ emerged after 9/11 with the rise of al-Qaeda. The second generation, or ‘Global Jihad 2.0’ emerged after al-Baghdadi declared a caliphate and announced the formation of IS on 29th June 2014. Finally, the third generation or ‘Global Jihad 3.0’ represents the global expansion of IS outside of Iraq and Syria becoming a truly global terrorist organisation (Ibid.). Additionally, Gunaratna argues that there are three trends that are likely to define the global terrorism landscape. The first, is the fact that IS is transforming itself from a caliphate-building entity to a global terrorist movement. It is reinventing itself and seeking to expand globally in both the cyber and physical space. The second aspect is that IS is decentralising itself, shifting its centre of gravity from Iraq and Syria to places such as Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Finally, al-Qaeda affiliates in Syria are almost certain to capitalise on the vacuum left by IS and exploit the fragile and unstable situation in post-IS Syria (Ibid). Al-Qaeda in Syria (AQS) known as Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham (JFS) has created a coalition headed by the former AQS commander Abu Mohammed Al-Jukani, and has to date almost 20,000 fighters (Lister 2017). It is likely that Afghanistan, Yemen and certain African countries could emerge as territorial strongholds for Islamic State fighters and members (Clarke and Amarasingham 2017). Dominant actors in Afghanistan and Yemen including al-Qaeda, the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have reportedly close to 35,000 Afghan .

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Taliban, with 700 IS fighters are based mostly in eastern and north-eastern Afghanistan (Mashal 2017). Similarly, the ongoing conflict in Yemen has created sufficient recruits for AQAP and IS, reaching almost 4000 fighters (Blake 2017). These numbers are staggering, going far beyond IS’ estimated 30,000 fighters. If not addressed soon these groups are no doubt going to be the newest threat to both regional and international stability. 2017 was a year of great achievement for anti-IS coalitions forces, with the terror group being militarily defeated in Iraq and Syria and its so-called caliphate destroyed. Furthermore, many of its top leaders, commanders and fighters have been killed (Gunaratna 2018). It has also been deprived of its major sources of revenue from seized oil fields and illegal taxes (Barnard 2018). However, the threat from IS is not over as its core has not surrendered or conceded defeat, as a result its fighters could go to ground in remote pockets of Iraq and Syria to engage in guerrilla warfare. This would be a detrimental blow to the counterterrorism campaign as it means the group has space to regroup, retrain and re-emerge in the coming months and years. Essentially, the ability of IS to stage a comeback should not be underestimated and in order to prevent its re-emergence it is imperative that the international community ‘address the underlying conditions that facilitated the rise of IS, al-Qaeda and other militant groups in Iraq and Syria, and the issues that give sustenance to other terrorist and militant groups like the Taliban and Boko Haram in other theatres of conflict’ (Gunaratna 2018). Gunaratna makes the argument that ‘the international community must demonstrate strong political will to cooperate and collaborate not only in fighting terrorism but also in resolving the root causes of terrorism – rather than engage in geo-politics, need to take necessary measures to counter the emerging phase of Islamic State and al-Qaeda’ (Ibid.). This is entirely true and what cannot happen now is that the West assumes that since IS is out of sight it must be out of mind. Lessons must be learned from the counterterrorism campaigns carried out against alQaeda and groups such as the Taliban that have since re-emerged. Also, the ideology of groups such as IS is the main threat and this exists long after the members of the group on the ground have been killed. Any further counterterrorism campaign against IS and other extremist groups must therefore be a holistic one, combing both hard and soft power as methods to address both the threat of terrorism as well as the root causes that facilitate its emergence. For now, the West needs to capitalise on the losses that IS has faced and use this as a means of propaganda to destroy its ideology, weaken its appeal and then negate the support given to the group globally.

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References Barry, Donald and Brat Duane. 2009. “Defence Against Help: Explaining Canada-US Security Relations.” American Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1: 63-89. Biswas, Bidisha. 2009. “Bilateral Cooperation and Bounded Sovereignty in Counter-terrorism Efforts.” Border Policy Research Institute Working Paper No. 5: 4. Bjorgo, Tore (Ed.). 2005. The Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward. New York: Routledge. Blake, Andrew. 2017. “Islamic State in Yemen has doubled in size since 2016: Pentagon.” Washington Times, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/dec/21/islamic-stateyemne-has-doubled-size/ Boyle, Michael. 2010. “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?” International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2: 342. Busby, Morris. 2005. “U.S. Counterterrorism Policy in the 1980s and the Priorities for the 1990s.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 13, No. 1: 7-13. Byman, Daniel L. 2017. “6 Counterterrorism Lessons from the Syrian Civil War”. Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/02/27/6-counterterrorism-lessons-from-the-syrian-civilwar/ Clarke, Colin P. and Amarnath Amarasingham. 2017. “Where Do ISIS Fighters Go When the Caliphate Falls?” The Atlantic https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/isis-foreignfighter-jihad-syria-iraq/518313/ Cronin, Audrey K. 2015. “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group - Why Counterterrorism Won’t Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat.” Foreign Affairs March/April https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terroristgroup Daalder, Ivo and James Lisay. 2005. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy. New Jeresy: John Wiley and Sons. Gunaratna, Rohan. 2018. “Global Threat Forecast.” RSIS Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 10, No. 1. Hoffman, Bruce. 2006. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. Horgan, John. 2005. The Psychology of Terrorism. New York: Routledge. Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. “The Clash of Civilizations." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3: 40.

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Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2: 167-214. —. 2005. American Foreign Policy in a New Era. New York: Routledge. Lister, Charles. 2017. “Al-Qaeda Is Starting to Swallow the Syrian Opposition.” Foreign Policy March 15 http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/15/al-qaeda-is-swallowing-thesyrian-opposition/ Makinda, Samuel M. 2010. “Global Governance and Terrorism.” Global Peace and Security, Vol. 15, No. 1: 43-58. Mashal, Mujib. 2017. “In the Tangled Afghan War a Thin Line of Defence Against ISIS.” New York Times December 27 http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/25/world/asia/eastern-afghanistanisis.html Rees, Wyn. 2014. “Counter-Terrorism.” In Sperling, James (ed.) Handbook of Governance and Security. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Rineheart, Jason. 2010. “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency.” Perspectives On Terrorism, Vol. 4, No. 5, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122 US Army Field Manual. 2006. Schmid, Alex P. 2006. “Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 2: 197-221 Wilkinson, Paul. 2006. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. New York: Routledge. Woods, Ngaire. 1999. “Good Governance in International Organisations.” Global Governance, Vol. 5, No. 1: 39-61.

CHAPTER FOUR INSTABILITY IN YEMEN: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN STRATEGY IN THE "PROXY WAR" WITH SAUDI ARABIA1 ROBERT CZULDA

“We can today see that our revolution is implemented to Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq” —Ali Akbar Nategh-Nuri (Head of the Office of Inspection of the House of the Supreme Leader) (Anon 2015)

Introduction Due to a variety of factors, including mutual hostility, the perception of threats, and diverging interests (mainly ideological, religious, political and geostrategic), Iran and Saudi Arabia have had a long history of conflict both under military and political auspices across the MENA region. Those activities can be defined as proxy wars/proxy conflicts and can be seen in Iraq, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, as well as in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon. According to Karl Deutsch, a proxy war can be defined as “an international conflict between two foreign powers, fought out on the soil of a third country, disguised as agatia conflict over an internal issue of the country and using some of that country’s manpower, resources and territory as a means of achieving preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies” (Hanf 2015, 180). Alternatively, William Safire (see: D’Agati 2013, 19) defines it as a “great-power hostility expressed through client states.” This phenomenon witnessed between Tehran and Riyadh can be described as a deliberately fuelled conflict between rivalling powers 1

Funding note: this work was supported by the NCN – Poland [grant number No. 2016/21/D/HS5/03791].

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executed through a third party – either a sovereign state or a non-state actor – in order to avoid a direct confrontation that could generate costs disproportionate to the desired benefits. Both parties are taking care not to escalate the tension to a level that would provoke a full-scale war. In this context, this chapter argues that such an understanding of a proxy war, as widely accepted in International Relations and International Security Studies, applies to the current struggle in Yemen, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is involved directly in the conflict to a certain extent. This is argued here even though one of the usual principles of proxy war theory is that a country does not commit its own forces to the third country. This involvement is, however, relatively limited (particularly on the ground). In essence, the House of Saud’s goal is foremost to assist local forces in achieving aims which are in strategic accordance with Riyadh’s agenda (which also includes goals vis-à-vis Iran). Saudi Arabia prefers to play a supportive role in the conflict rather than to be a game player with its own forces in a long-term engagement. Yemen is certainly an arena of a proxy war for Iran, a country most likely not directly involved on a large scale but rather supporting local forces with its own resources in order to achieve its goals and interests, also vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. The author argues that Yemen – one of the least-analysed struggles between Iran and Saudi Arabia – falls under Deutsch’s understanding of a proxy war. The main goal of this paper is to analyse this conflict from the Iranian point of view, including Tehran’s strategy towards Yemen vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Such an opinion is shared, for example, by Ray Takeyh, who claimed that the conflict in Yemen brought bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia to a level of “a new Cold War” (Takeyh 2015a). This conflict, its meaning and its ramifications, cannot be fully understood without the proper Iranian-Saudi context, which also has been extensively analysed in the literature (see: Sadeghi and Ahmadian 2011; Chubin and Tripp 2014; Keynoush 2016; Mabon 2016; Wehret et al. 2009). Briefly speaking, these countries have been two major regional competitors since at least the early 1980s. Saudi Arabia sees itself as a regional power, a guardian of Islam (including of the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina) and a protector of Arabs, including against Iran – a Shia-dominated country with a Persian majority. Iran also sees itself as a regional power and a guardian of Islam and of oppressed people in the Middle East. The Tehran-led Shia offensive, or what Mohammad Fahad al-Harthi calls Iranian “imperialist designs” (al-Harthi 2015), in combination with Iran’s ambiguous nuclear programme, prompted the Saudi monarch Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud to urge the United States in 2009 to “cut off the head of the snake” by launching a military operation against Iran (Ehteshami and Zweiri 2011, 147).

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The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani promised that improving bilateral relations with Persian Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, would be a top priority of his foreign policy. Despite this pledge, tensions in the context of bilateral relations have not been fully removed. The Saudi Prince and former Director of Intelligence, Turki bin Faisal al-Saud, openly criticized Iran by saying that Tehran’s “game of hegemony toward the Arab countries is not acceptable” (Erlanger 2013). According to Faisal Abualhassan, Saudi Arabia’s “plan foresees stability and prosperity for the nearly 360 million citizens of the 22 Arab states between the Sahara and the Gulf, while the Iranian plan foresees the creation of 22 Syrias, overseen via paramilitary proxies by Tehran” (Abualhassan 2015). Bilateral relations have definitely not been improved by events such as a reported serious harassment incident in Saudi Arabia, which prompted Iran to suspend pilgrimages to Mecca in April 2015 (Matthiesen 2015, 126-139; Marschall 2003, 45-61), and by the execution of Shia Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr in January 2016, which resulted in the ransacking of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. After this, Riyadh announced it would cut diplomatic ties with Iran and refused to play in Iran during the 2016 AFC Champions League. Iran accused Saudi Arabia of “deliberately” targeting its embassy in Yemen, which was hit in an air raid in January 2016, and barred Saudi citizens from a pilgrimage in 2016.

The Role of Yemen in Saudi and Iranian Geopolitical Calculations This political, ideological, religious and military struggle between these two ambitious regional powers has several points of convergence, including in Syria, Iraq and earlier in Bahrain, where in 2011 the House of Saud led the GCC coalition in crushing a Tehran-supported social movement against the government. The military operation in Bahrain clearly showed that the Saudi regime was trying to keep all zones of chaos and destabilization at arm’s length from its borders. Therefore, one of the most important, maybe even the most important (due to its direct proximity to the Saudi border), sources of turmoil is an ongoing conflict in Yemen, which had for many decades been considered in Saudi Arabia’s “backyard”, a sphere in which Riyadh had exclusive influence. In 1990, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) were merged into the Republic of Yemen with Ali Abdullah Saleh as President. However, violence and sectarian divisions (Yemen’s population is approximately 55% Sunni and 45% Shia, not to mention the tribal Gordian Knot) remained part of this

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country’s reality. Yemen still struggled with severe problems, including social and economic woes as well as security threats such as those emanating from the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). For Saudi Arabia, Yemen is a significant priority, despite the fact that this country, with a current population of approximately 25 million citizens, is one of the driest, poorest and least developed countries in the world. The main driver of Riyadh’s interaction and interest in Yemen is its geographical location – it is located at the bottom of the Arabian Peninsula and as previously mentioned is in Saudi Arabia’s “backyard”. To paraphrase Winston Churchill’s famous phrase regarding the Balkans and Europe: Yemen is the “soft underbelly” of the Saudi Kingdom. On the one hand, the House of does not want Yemen to be too strong and united since such an entity would be immune to Riyadh’s pressure and interference. For example, during the Yemeni civil war in 1994, Saudi Arabia supported southern forces against the central government, which supported Iraq in 1990. As a punishment for supporting Saddam Hussein, Riyadh expelled approximately one million Yemeni workers. Despite some diplomatic talks, several armed clashes occurred, including in July 1998 on the island of Duwaima, which was claimed by both countries. A border agreement was ultimately signed in 2000, yet Yemen was still considered by Riyadh as a “younger brother” with many Yemenis accusing Saudi Arabia of preventing major international oil companies from investing in the country. In this context, it is easier to believe that a dying King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud told his sons to “keep Yemen weak” (Habeeb 2012, 207 and 215). However, at the same time, Saudi Arabia cannot allow Yemen to fall into any further instability. Any form of significant instability, including large numbers of refugees (mainly young, uneducated, unemployed and frustrated men) and the threat posed by Jihadists challenging the authorities, can easily strike the House of Saud directly or at least serve as an inspiration for anti-governmental groups in Saudi Arabia (including AQAP, which in recent years was largely neutralized by Saudi security forces, or the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, which feels alienated and discriminated against). The best illustration of the real strength of those Muslim radicals is a series of terrorist attacks carried out in Yemen, including that perpetrated against the USS Cole destroyer in 2000 and the French MV Limburg oil tanker in 2002. Riyadh cannot allow such groups, which pose a threat to the Kingdom, to act either in Saudi Arabia or in neighbouring countries. Yemen, a hub for radicals, is an indispensable partner for Saudi Arabia in various counterterrorism operations. The best illustration of Riyadh’s concerns is the ongoing

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construction of a fence along the border (1,458 kilometres long in total). Secondly, control over Yemen gives Riyadh control over the Bab-elMandeb Strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea or – in a larger perspective – the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean. For Iran, Yemen is also visibly significant, however, to a lesser extent than for Saudi Arabia. Thus, it is not surprising that Tehran’s interactions with Yemen (or the two Yemens before the 1990 unification) are much more limited. Prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran had modest yet positive relations with Yemen. During the 1960s, the Shah of Iran supported the royalist forces in North Yemen (along with Jordan and Saudi Arabia) against the republicans, who were assisted by Egypt and, indirectly, the Soviet Union. From the Iranian perspective, it was not only a geopolitical struggle between Iran and Nasser’s Egypt, but it also had a security dimension – the Shah was afraid of Egypt’s influence on small Arab countries in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. This also applied to Yemen and the Bab-el-Mandeb, which was a critical transit route to carry Iranian oil from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea. The Shah also supported Oman during the Dhofar Rebellion (1962-1976) which was fuelled by assistance from South Yemen, at that time ruled by a Marxist-Leninist government. Later, however, despite glaring ideological differences, the Islamic Republic became closer to South Yemen which, along with Syria, supported Iran against Iraq, while North Yemen was more favourable of the Saddam regime. Although South Yemen was “poor and could not provide Iran with material assistance”, its geopolitical location “was precious to Tehran, which wanted to carry out attacks in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and harry maritime traffic in the Red Sea. Most weapons acquired by Iraq passed through the Bab el-Mandeb, as well as a significant part of the oil extracted in Saudi Arabia. South Yemen thus became a pawn in the regional exchequer, allowing Iran to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia” (Razoux 2015, 110). After the unification in 1990, Iran maintained a relatively low-profile, yet positive relations with Yemen, despite the fact that the country was run by Saleh – the former North Yemeni President and long-time ally of Saddam Hussein, Iran’s arch-enemy. From a security point of view, Tehran’s first line of defence lies within the country (i.e., traditional state security, which includes its citizens and infrastructure, but also the security of the regime: the survival of the Islamic Republic). Iran’s second line of defence is its “near abroad” – the Persian Gulf, the eastern domain (Pakistan and, especially, an unstable Afghanistan), the north (the Caucasus) and the western domain (Iraq and,

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to lesser degree, Turkey). Yemen is not directly linked with Iran’s core security, but a strong position in this country, just like in Syria and Lebanon, provides Iran with the opportunity of expanding its influence in the region. This helps to increase its national prestige and, most importantly, its national power, which is – according to some International Relations schools of thought (especially realism and neorealism) – the most important key to a state’s security and survival. Furthermore, from the Iranian point of view, Tehran’s strong position, as well as that of its allies in Yemen, could curb the power of AQAP and thus that of all Sunni radicals in Yemen. Such groups also pose a threat to Iranian national security. At the same time, a firm stronghold in Yemen weakens Iran’s enemies – in this case specifically its rival Saudi Arabia, which can be outflanked by Tehran. With such a development, Iran could contain Saudi’s political, military, ideological and religious expansion, including that of the Salafi movement, which is considered to be a threat and challenge from the perspectives of both Iran and the broader Shia community. What is more, the House of Saud could no longer see itself as a secure regional power. In a worst-case scenario for Riyadh, Iran could even deploy its troops, missiles and fighters to Yemen (to find a point of comparison, it is like the Soviet Union installing nuclear warheads in Cuba in the 1960s in order to control the “soft underbelly” of the United States). Such an idea has already been officially raised in Iran (November 2016) when Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, commander of the Iranian Navy, said that in the future, “overseas” naval bases might be required. He mentioned both Yemen and Syria in this context (“Nero e Darya e arti” 2016). Such deployments would increase Iran’s prestige, but would also serve Iranian naval military doctrine. At the same time, it would give Iran the opportunity to push other countries out of Yemen – for example, the United States, a supporter of President Abd-Rabbuh Manṣour Al-Hadi (since 2012). In early 2015, Al-Hadi was forced to leave Sana’a and escape to Saudi Arabia. Control over the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait would give Iran the chance to check the Saudis and Americans, who would no longer have the luxury of entering the Red Sea without any concerns. The reported attack by an anti-ship missile on the USS Mason destroyer in October 2016 off the coast of Yemen serves as a good illustration of such a scenario. Tehran’s strategy in Yemen also applies to Israel – another of Iran’s arch-enemies. If Tehran, which has been developing A2/AD (AntiAccess/Area Denial) capabilities in recent years, controlled the Bab-elMandeb strait, Israel would be unable to safely leave the Red Sea. Israeli submarines would not be able to easily enter the Arabian Sea and strike

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Iranian nuclear facilities. At the same time, it would hamper the unrestricted access of Djibouti – an important ally of the United States and Israel. Moreover, Iran would be in control of two of the world’s strategic choke-points: the Ormuz Strait and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. It would also threaten the SuMed oil pipeline, which connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. In this context it can be argued that the country controlling these two straits also controls world trade between Europe and Asia, as well as oil exports from the Middle East. The looming threat of a temporary blockade, not only of the Ormuz Strait but also of the Bab-elMandeb Strait, causing in consequence serious repercussions for the global economy, would without a doubt increase Iran’s deterrence capabilities. The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait is of great economic and strategic importance. Around four to five million barrels of oil pass through this narrow area (40 kilometres at its widest point, divided by the Perim island) every day. Therefore, it is no surprise that fierce fights took place near the Bab-elMandeb Strait in January 2017. Saudi Arabia used artillery shelling and deployed aircraft and tanks. A pivotal tool of the Saudi-Iranian struggle in Yemen are the Houthis (also known as Ansar Allah). Members of a Zaidi2 Shia political-religiousmilitary group, they appeared in the early 1990s in response to the emergence of Riyadh-inspired (and most likely funded) Salafi groups in Yemen, mainly in Saada Province (Zweiri 2016, 12). Yemen, a country already being torn apart by internal violence, anachronistic tribal relations and inherent instability for decades, witnessed another armed struggle in 2004 when government security forces clashed with the Houthis. In 2009, Saudi-supported Yemeni forces initiated a new major offensive against Shia insurgents who had reached the outskirts of Sana’a. Saudi aircraft bombed various targets, while Saudi naval forces blocked Yemen’s northwest coastline in order to prevent the potential smuggling of weapons to the Houthis. Many members, including the group’s founder Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi (accused by the authorities of anti-governmental violence), were killed. This armed involvement by Saudi Arabia, the first since the 1991 war against Iraq, was highly criticized in Iran, which accused Riyadh of prolonging the conflict, harming Islamic unity and even of “state Wahhabi terrorism” (Salmoni et al. 2010, 267). A low-intensity 2

In the 1960s, Saudi Arabia supported the Zaidi imamate in its fight against “Egyptian-backed Arab nationalists, republicans and anti-establishment tribal forces” (Salisbury, P. 2015: 3; see also: Salmoni, B. A., B. Loidolt and M. Wells. 2010).

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Figure 1: The transit of crude oil and petroleum products through Bab el-Mandeb (2010-2014)

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=20932)

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conflict continued – thousands were either killed or injured. Many actual or alleged supporters were arrested or persecuted and hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced. Several clashes, some with Saudi security forces, were reported. In one of them, the border region of Jabal al-Dukham (in southwest Saudi Arabia) was temporarily controlled by Yemeni insurgents. Riyadh used heavy forces, including helicopters, combat jets and artillery. This was the starting point for an open military clash between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. In 2011 Yemen became affected by the Arab Spring. Just like in many other Arab countries, people protested against the poor economic situation and high unemployment. They also wanted more political freedom. As a result, in early 2012, President Saleh was forced to flee, choosing to move to Saudi Arabia. The new Yemeni government was unable to consolidate the country, including the Houthi rebels whose power had increased from being concentrated mainly in Saada Province, where they had initially emerged, to the national level. The government’s weakness was a window of opportunity for them and in September 2014, Houthi fighters successfully assaulted Sana’a. In October, the city port of Al-Hudaydah fell. After the resignation of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi (January 2015), the Houthi dissolved the parliament and declared themselves to be in full control of power by February. The Supreme Revolutionary Committee, led by Mohammad Ali al-Houthi, was put in charge. While this development was welcomed in Tehran, Riyadh suspended its aid to Yemen. The Houthis were either unable or unwilling to achieve certain binding peace agreements and so give legitimacy to their rule. Political and sectarian divisions became much stronger and very soon, violence erupted. In March 2015, fierce clashes began between the Houthis (supported by allied tribal fighters and troops loyal to former President Saleh) and government forces (supported by tribal fighters and some elements of AQAP). Due to Yemen’s aforementioned significance, Saudi Arabia did not want to leave the country under the control of the Houthis and most likely also, however indirectly, Iran. In late March 2016, under the codename “Decisive Storm”, Saudi Arabia and its allies (including some members of the GCC) initiated a military intervention. The moment chosen for this was not random – the Houthis and Saleh’s troops were advancing rapidly towards Aden, which was under the control of Yemeni troops and militias loyal to Hadi. Forces led by Riyadh imposed a naval and air blockade. Airstrikes were targeted against military bases, depots and even against Sana’a International Airport in order to prevent an aeroplane belonging to the Iranian Red Crescent Society from landing in Yemen. The same

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happened to the port city of Al-Hudaydah. Many civilian casualties were (and still are at the time of writing) being reported, since heavy bombardments against targets in Yemen have been continuous without any political or military breakthrough. This bloody deadlock produced severe consequences. Firstly, it has worsened the ongoing humanitarian and social situation of Yemen and its citizens. Secondly, from a political point of view, it has strained the already tense relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Even Iranian politicians associated with the moderate camp are taking a perspicuous approach to this issue. For example, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, considered a moderate who avoids provocative and strict statements, said resolutely in October 2016 that the people of Yemen were under “vicious bombardment by aggressors” (“Ummidwarem mardom” 2016). Such an approach was earlier taken by hard-liner Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), after a meeting with members of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee from Yemen. In October 2015, he said that Saudi operations in Yemen are an “obvious example of war crimes”. He mentioned indiscriminate attacks on populated areas, schools and hospitals, and the “inhumane blockade of the Yemeni people” which has – according to Shamkhani – the aim of genocide against the “brave nation of Yemen” (“Shamkhani: Mohasera” 2015). Finally, the conflict also worsened an already massive Shia-Sunni split. Long before the latest stage of this struggle, this division was visible, a key example being when the Houthis proposed that Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani (Shia) from Iraq be a mediator in a political deadlock between them and the Yemeni authorities in late 2009. Saudi cleric Mohammad alArifi (Sunni) a preacher at the Al-Bawardi Mosque in Riyadh, said that alSistani is “a great sinner and infidel from a remote corner of Iraq” (“Saudi Cleric” 2009). An example of worsening sectarian divisions are attacks on religious shrines – including suicide bombings perpetrated in Sana’a by the Islamic State on Shia mosques in March 2015 (142 killed, 351 injured) and September 2015 (29 killed, number of wounded unknown). In December 2014, AQAP tried to assassinate Iranian ambassador Seyyed Hassan Nam in a car bomb explosion. Earlier, in January 2014, the Iranian trade attaché in Yemen Ali Asghar Assadi was shot dead. In July 2013, an Iranian embassy staff member, Nour Ahmad Nikbakht, was kidnapped and held hostage for two years. On the other hand, in August 2016, “Asharq al-Awsat” accused Iran of plotting to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Iraq, Thamer al-Sabhan (Asharq al-Awsat 2016).

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Iran’s Involvement in Yemen It is highly plausible that the political and military victories of the Houthis in Yemen would not have been possible without some kind of assistance from Iran, considered by some Arab states in the Persian Gulf to be an aggressive country that wants to export the Islamic revolution and establish a Shia empire in as many places in the Middle East as possible. Opinions on Iran’s involvement in Yemen are, however, divided. Both Yemeni and Saudi authorities have accused Iran of providing such assistance several times. For example, in February 2016, Saudi Major General Ahmed al-Asiri, spokesperson for a coalition operation in Yemen, said that there was evidence of “individuals carry[ing] Lebanese passports” – most likely Iran-supported operatives of Hizbollah (Al-Qalisi 2016). Saudi media even broadcast a video of a “Hizbollah operative, identified in the reports as Abu Saleh Al Libnani, speaking with a Lebanese accent and giving tactical military training to a group of Yemeni fighters alleged to be Houthis in a tent at an undisclosed location in Yemen” (Ibid.). Earlier, in March 2015, the Saudi Ambassador in the United States, Adel al-Jubeir (reportedly a target of Iranian assassins in 2011) claimed that Hizbollah was present in Yemen and that the Iranians were “providing weapons, training and advisers to the Houthis” (Wahab 2015). While in 2010 (according to Wikileaks) US officials doubted that Iran was heavily backing the Ansar Allah or using it to wage a “proxy war” against Saudi Arabia (Salisbury 2015, 7). In April 2015, the State Department’s principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Gerald Feierstein said at the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing that “Iran provides financial support, weapons, training and intelligence to Houthis” in order to “expand its influence in Yemen and threaten Saudi and Gulf Arab interests” (Wong 2015). During Saleh’s time, in December 2009, Yemeni Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi urged Tehran to stop “religious circles and groups in Iran” from “providing aid to the Houthis” (“Yemeni FM” 2009). Iran’s stand on its involvement in Yemen is very clear. In his interview in October 2016, Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, a senior military advisor to the Supreme Leader, strongly denied any Iranian military presence, including advisors in Yemen. He said that Iran is only providing humanitarian aid and political support. According to Firouzabadi, who retired in June 2016 from the position of Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Yemen was attacked by Saudi Arabia, who destroyed it, imposed a blockade that harmed innocent civilians, supported Sunni Jihadists (including those from Al-Qaeda) and sent “mercenaries” from various countries to crush popular uprisings (“Be Felestin va Ghaza”

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2016). In November 2016, Hojjat ol Eslam Ali Saidi, who serves as the Supreme Leader’s representative to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), denied any Iranian military presence in Yemen and the existence of any plan for such a deployment. He added that the Yemenis, including Ansar Allah, have their own capabilities to face “the ruthless crimes of the Saudi regime” (“Majrai e judai az” 2016). Similarly, Salah al-Sammad – a senior politician from the Houthi movement – denied that Iran had provided any arms, but added that Iranian backing was part of a shared vision in “confronting the American project” (Bayoumy and Ghobari 2014). According to Salisbury (2015, 6), Hussein Badreddin alHouthi borrowed “heavily from Iran’s revolutionary principles”. It is rumoured that after leaving Yemen in the late 1980s, he went to Syria and even to Iran. If this is true, then it is highly likely that he was to some degree not only influenced by Iranian political and religious ideology, but also trained by Iranian intelligence. It is difficult not to notice that his strong anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiments, as well as his vocal criticism of President Saleh for allowing the United States to interfere in Yemeni internal issues, were coherent with Iran’s agenda. Iran’s official stance on the Yemeni crisis is that Tehran is offering only “humanitarian support for the oppressed Yemeni nation” (“Boroujerdi: Himayat” 2016). Iran is openly supporting the Houthis, considered by Iranian officials as an honest voice in Yemeni society, a brave group fighting against tyranny and evil supported and inspired by foreign enemies. For example, in early December 2014, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, Deputy Commander of the IRGC, praised Ansar Allah and compared it to Hizbollah in Lebanon, which serves as a role model for every revolutionary militia. Salami labelled Ansar Allah as a great power strong enough to join the fight against the West and to be an important contributor to the Islamic Revolution, which will soon re-capture “Islamic lands from Western powers” (“Ansarullah Yemen hamanand” 2014). After a few days, a message was sent in the opposite direction with the Houthis officially praising Iran for being a leader of the “axis of resistance against global arrogance led by America and Israel” and also called for closer cooperation (“Ansarullah Yemen: Iran mehwar” 2014). The ideological resemblance of Iran, Hizbollah and Ansar Allah is striking – an official motto of this movement, sometimes shouted in public, is “Death to America, death to Israel, victory for Islam”. Thus, it is not surprising that during various demonstrations, the Houthis have carried pictures of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Their ideological inspiration is obvious.

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Iran’s political support of the Houthis is understandable – apart from religious reasons (Iran has a historical relationship with Zaydi communities), its struggle against the central government, supported by “evil, arrogant forces”, fits perfectly into Tehran’s narrative and geostrategic agenda. Iran is declaring its fervent assistance to all groups fighting for freedom and social, religious and political equality and this is – at least officially – the ultimate goal of Ansar Allah. Moreover, Iran is presenting itself – both to its own citizens and the world (particularly the Muslim community) – as a grand protector of oppressed people, from Palestinians humiliated by the “Zionist regime” and Syrian innocents attacked by “takfiris, to Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky and his associates, who are the subjects of “massacre and genocide” by the Nigerian military and authorities. Iran is also loudly voicing its support of Rohingya Muslims persecuted by the government of Myanmar. As the Supreme Leader has stated, the Islamic Republic has a duty to protect all of the oppressed and hates “all those who attack defenceless people, civilians, kill women and children, and destroy their homes” (“Bayanat dar didari” 2015). Of course, at the same time, such support allows Iran to accomplish several of the geostrategic goals presented above, which are less overtly mentioned by Iranian officials in public. It applies to decreasing the political and military power and the influence of Saudi Arabia and the United States, halting Israel’s freedom of movement and thus limiting its strike capabilities against Iran in case of war and increasing its own deterrence capabilities by creating the potential threat of a simultaneous blockade of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. It is highly likely that Iran’s support of the Houthis is not limited to moral, humanitarian and political support, as is officially claimed. First of all, this is not the case in both Iraq and Syria, where Iran is directly involved with money, military equipment and soldiers (both regular units and international units led by Iranian commanders). In 1948, “Life” magazine published an interesting article in which an official from the US State Department compared the Soviet Union’s expansion policy to “a man walking down a corridor in a hotel, trying every door. When he finds one that is open he walks in” (“Will There Be War” 1948, 36). The Iranian approach is similar – if doors are open and a room is interesting, Tehran tries to go inside and arrange it according to its own needs and means, especially if it strengthens the Shia camp over the Sunnis. There is no rational reason to assume that it would be any different in Yemen (of course, the scale and type of involvement might vary depending on capabilities, needs and the situation). Secondly, more direct support would be coherent with the abovementioned ideological, political and geostrategic agenda of Iran and its ambitions. Without direct involvement,

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Iran would be left as an observer with no power to shape the political and military landscape of Yemen according to its own needs and perceptions, while its enemies – including Saudi Arabia and the United States – are already present there. Such a conscious abandonment and resignation from meddling in Yemen would have no strategic logic. Thirdly, there are some indicators to assume that some kind of assistance more solid than that of humanitarian aid and political support is being carried out in Yemen by Iran, which already has some naval forces in the Gulf of Aden (with two main goals: strategic, i.e. naval diplomacy; and operational, i.e. protecting the sea lines from pirates). According to a UN report, Iran has been supplying the Houthis in Yemen since at least 2009 (Landry 2015). In October 2009, the government of Yemen announced that it had intercepted an Iranian ship transporting arms and equipment to the rebels. The state-controlled media claimed that the Houthis had been trained in various camps run by Iranian instructors, located across the Red Sea in Eritrea. Another alleged incident of Iran’s direct involvement is the Jihan 1 ship, which was seized by Yemeni forces in 2013. According to Yemeni officials, it had Iranian weapons on-board, including 122mm shells, Striela-2M (9M32M) surface-to-air short-range missiles, RPG-7s, Iranian-made night vision goggles, “artillery systems that track land and navy targets 40km away”, and ammunition and explosives (Bayoumy and Ghobari 2014). Iran has strongly denied any connection with Jihan 1. However, this information cannot be either confirmed or rebuffed. The same applies to a series of further interceptions of alleged Iranian ships carrying arms in the Gulf of Aden (mainly heavy shells, grenade launchers, assault rifles and ammo) and alleged missile attacks on the USS Mason destroyer and USS Ponce amphibious transport dock in October 2016. Iran was accused, but strongly rejected any responsibility. Additionally, US resources acknowledged the fact that the origin of the missiles and their types are unknown (Iran’s C-802 are believed to have been used, although it must be remembered that these missiles are also in service in Yemen). Although they claim that even if “the al Houthi-Saleh forces were able to fire the older C-801s that were originally installed on Yemeni missile boats, the use of ground-based radar systems in the attacks against the USS Mason would indicate technical support from Iran or Hezbollah” (Bucala et al. 2016), it cannot be ruled out that those systems were used by Yemeni troops loyal to Saleh or were not used at all (eventually, all of the missiles missed). However, such an attack – even if not orchestrated or inspired by Tehran – serves Iran’s objectives to some degree by putting real military pressure on the United States and Saudi

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Arabia. The same can be said of two other unclear events. Firstly, in October 2016, the HSV-2 Swift was reportedly attacked. The Houthis claimed responsibility and stated that a ship was capsized. In January 2017, three suicide boats attacked a Saudi frigate off the western coast of Yemen (according to the Houthis, the explosion was caused by a guided missile). Hizbollah, formally declared by the GCC as a terrorist organization,3 denied any direct involvement in Yemen. However, although this group is mainly engaged in Syria, while other units remain based in Lebanon to put constant pressure on Israel, it is likely that some instructors and liaison officers have been deployed into Yemen to assist the Houthis and shape the situation on the ground in favour of the Iran-led “axis of resistance”. Information about some of Hizbollah’s involvement was distributed by several Middle Eastern media outlets, including pan-Arab Asharq alAwsat and Lebanese al-Mustaqbal (Soffer 2015). In December 2016, AlArabiya English– based on official information provided by Yemeni officials – wrote that “Yemeni armed forces have captured a large number of militants including Iranian experts and Hezbollah members” (“Iran and Hezbollah prisoners” 2016). According to Ahmed Obaid, an analyst and retired Yemeni military officer in Aden, Hizbollah was “the main engineer of rebuilding relations between the Houthi rebels and Saleh” (Al-Qalisi 2016). It is very plausible that agents were deployed from the special unit known as Al-Quds, which is part of the IRGC. This unit is responsible for all of Iran’s clandestine operations overseas – including in Syria and Yemen. There are some sources claiming that Al-Quds has “a few hundred” military personnel in Yemen training Houthi fighters (Bayoumy and Ghobari 2015). Surprisingly, this report was officially confirmed by an Iranian official, and still is available online. In May 2015, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, Deputy Commander of Al-Quds, revealed that the “defenders of Yemen have been trained under the banner of the Islamic Republic” (“Sardar Qaani: Doshmanan” 2015). At the same time, Iran is believed to be providing the Houthis with the Al-Maseera satellite channel which broadcasts from Beirut’s southern suburbs, controlled by Hizbollah. Another interesting element of this puzzle is an appointment made in March 2015. A former commander of Iran’s Law Enforcement Forces, Brigadier General Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, was selected for the 3

“The GCC states consider Hizbollah militias’ practices in the Council’s states and their terrorist and subversive acts being carried out in Syria, Yemen and Iraq contradict moral and humanitarian values and principles and the international law and pose a threat to Arab national security” said GCC Secretary General Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani (Wood, J. 2016).

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position of Senior Advisor for Security Affairs to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, and was responsible for “providing humanitarian relief” on behalf of the Yemeni people (“Sardar Ahmadi Moghaddam” 2015). However, the scale of Iran’s direct involvement in Yemen should not be exaggerated. If it exists, it must be much smaller than in Iraq and Syria, where thousands of both Iranian soldiers and Shia militias loyal to Tehran operate. In Yemen, Iran is definitely not a spiritus movens. The Houthis are the main driving force, that emerged and developed without Iranian help. According to Mahjoob Zweiri, the main factor which helped Ansar Allah to grow significantly was a vicious campaign from President Saleh, who “unleashed its media inspired accusations against all the Zaydis rather than focusing on the Houthis alone” and created several local militias which later allied themselves with the Houthis (Zweiri 2016, 14). It is estimated that in 2005, the group’s strength was between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters, while in 2009 it grew to between 2,000 and 10,000 fighters. According to Ahmed al-Bahri, they had up to 120,000 followers around 2010, made up of both armed fighters and civilian supporters (“Letter dated 20 February 2015”, 21). By 2014, Ansar Allah had had many opportunities to gain valuable experience in many skirmishes with Yemeni and Saudi troops. Weapons were looted from various military and government facilities (this applies not only to small arms, but also to vehicles or even tanks captured from the 310th Armoured Brigade). Those facts have been confirmed by the UN Security Council (Ibid., 22). Another premise for claiming that Iran’s involvement is rather limited and secondary are reports stating that Tehran tried to discourage the Houthis from taking Sana’a (Watkins et al. 2015). They did not comply, and Iran had no real power to influence them. Of course, one might note that it would be virtually impossible for local guerrillas to assault and capture a capital city protected by the regular army. Notwithstanding, Gareth Porter (2015) rightly points out that the alliance with former President Saleh was a major factor allowing the Houthis to take Sana’a in September 2014: “it was all carefully choreographed by Saleh. The Houthis were able to take one Yemeni military facility after another without a fight and enter the capital easily.” It is no coincidence that Sana’a fell despite roughly 100,000 troops deployed in the city, including the relatively elite Republican Guard. Thanks to this cooperation, several tribes loyal to Saleh signed truce agreements with the Houthis, while soldiers still under his control either passively observed Ansar Allah’s progress or supported it directly. Iranian assistance, if any, was most likely of secondary significance.

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Whatever the scale of Iran’s involvement in Yemen, various developments in this country are coherent with Tehran’s interests. After capturing Sana’a in September 2014, the Houthis rejected a proposal on sharing power and forced President Hadi to resign. It was a great victory for Iran, since Hadi was an important ally of both the United States and Saudi Arabia (as it was already mentioned, he fled from Yemen to Saudi Arabia). Both Washington and Riyadh lost a major pawn in this chess game. As a result, classified documents related to the CIA’s operations in Yemen were captured by pro-Iranian militias. Moreover, the loss “of the intelligence networks, in addition to the escalating conflict, contributed to the Obama administration’s decision to halt drone strikes in Yemen for two months, to vacate the US Embassy in Sana and to evacuate US special operations and intelligence teams from a Yemeni air base” (Bennett and al-Alayaa 2015). More importantly, Iran became a power controlling four regional capitals – Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sana’a.

Conclusions There is no doubt that Yemen is an arena of a proxy war between two regional and ambitious powers – Saudi Arabia and Iran. For both countries, although much more so for Riyadh than Tehran, Yemen has strategic significance. Iran’s direct involvement in Yemen is very plausible, although relatively small. In the Yemeni conflict, other than in Syria and especially Iraq, Iran is not a creator of any reality on the ground but a silent band-wagoner using the Houthi’s accomplishments to support its own agenda. It is highly likely that Iran will not increase its direct involvement in the near future. There are three main reasons to support such a prediction. First of all, from the perspective of Iran and its goals, Yemen is of secondary significance – it is less important than Iraq, the first line of Iran’s security abroad, and Syria, which serves as Iran’s bridgehead to the Levant and as a geopolitical trampoline between Tehran, Damascus and Beirut, offering opportunities to put pressure on Israel. Secondly, Iran is not a world superpower, and thus has very limited potential – its military, economic, diplomatic and cultural means are relatively modest. In other words, Iran cannot afford extensive and simultaneous engagement in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Also, it would be difficult due to the naval and aerial blockade carried out by Saudi Arabia on Yemeni airfields and ports. Thirdly, the Houthis are not a passive tool in Iranian hands – they grew in strength independently, without significant Iranian assistance. Ansar Allah’s victories, including the capture of Sana’a in 2014, were possible thanks more to an alliance with former President Saleh than one with

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Tehran. At the time of writing, they still prefer to be self-sufficient rather than be reliant on, and therefore controlled by Iran. If they accept too much of Iran’s help, they would become dependent like Bashar al-Assad in Syria, whose military forces are now secondary to Iran-controlled militias. It is important to note that Ansar Allah has its own agenda and that becoming an anti-Saudi weapon used by Iran is not on its list. Although the Houthis have finally been stopped in their advance, the conflict in Yemen is far from over. Neither Tehran nor Riyadh will surrender – Iran’s pressure on Yemen is of particular significance, especially now that the United States has been increasing its political and military presence in Asia at the expense of involvement in other regions, including the Middle East. The foreign and security policy of President Donald Trump is somewhat unclear and will remain such in the near future. This “post-American” phase (Takeyh 2015b) is increasing Riyadh’s uncertainty and giving Iran a better strategic position. The House of Saud must already be aware that it cannot win in either Syria or Yemen. Iran cannot win in Yemen either – it is highly unlikely that the Houthis will be able to control both Sana’a and Aden, let alone govern the whole country, especially without significant financial support from international partners. Not only can Iran not replace Saudi Arabia in the role of generous sponsor, but it must also be remembered that Ansar Allah’s ambitions are relatively limited. For Iran, however, this deadlock is not a bad scenario at all – to accomplish some strategic and tactical goals, it is sufficient to stir the Yemeni pot in order to put constant pressure on the tenuous Saudi Arabia, which always needs to be concerned about its security. The only losers, again, will be the citizens of Yemen, whose faith and wellbeing is not important to anybody.

References Abualhassan, Faisal. 2015. “Saudi-led coalition is not driven by sectarianism.” Al Jazeera, April 20. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/04/saudi-led-coalitiondriven-sectarianism-150419090418485.html Anon. 2015. “Inqelab-e ma be yaman, soriye, lobnan o Iraq sadir shodeh/hizabullah harkat e zibai anjam mi dahad” (“We have extended our revolution to Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq/Hizbullah will perform good activities”). ISNA, February 1 2015. “Ansarullah Yemen hamanand hizbullah lobnan ast/nigah tehdeed amez be iran dar royai qodrathai nizami ham nist” (“The Ansar Allah Yemen is

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like the Hizbullah of Lebanon/The military power is not capable of threatening Iran”). Defa Press, December 6 2014. http://www.defapress.ir/Fa/News/35605. “Ansarullah Yemen: Iran mehwar moqawemat islami alayhe istakbar e jahani ra hidayat mi konad” (Ansar Allah Yemen: Iran leads the Islamic resistance axis to fight with global arrogance”). FARS News, December 16 2014. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930925000162. Al-Harthi, Mohammad Fahad. 2015. “Iran’s outdated political ideals.” Arab News, April 15. Accessed April 25, 2015. http://www.arabnews.com/columns/news/732816. Al-Qalisi, Mohammed. 2016. “Yemen demands action over Hizbollah aid to rebels.” The National, February 25. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/yemen-demands-actionover-hizbollah-aid-to-rebels#page2. Asharq al-Awsat. 2016. “Iran Plots to Assassinate Saudi Ambassador to Iraq.” Ashraq Al-Awsat, August 21. http://english.aawsat.com/2016/08/article55356829/iran-plotsassassinate-saudi-ambassador-iraq. Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. 1984. “The Strategy of War by Proxy.” Cooperation and Conflict, No. 19: 263-273. “Ba Felestin va Ghaza mostashar ferestadim” (“We have sent advisors to Palestine and Gaza”). Fars News Agency, October 16 2016. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950723000259. “Bayanat dar didari jamii az farmandhan o karkanan jamhori islami Iran” (“Remarks during the meeting with military commanders and staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran”). Khamenei.ir, April 19 2015. http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=29472. Bayoumy, Yara and Mohammed Ghobari. 2014. “Iranian support seen as crucial for Yemen's Houthis.” Reuters, December 15. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-houthis-iran-insightidUSKBN0JT17A20141215. Bennett, Brian and Zaid al-Alayaa. 2015. “Iran-backed rebels loot Yemen files about U.S. spy operations.” Los Angeles Times, March 25. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-intelligence-yemen20150325-story.html. “Boroujerdi: Himayat e Iran az mehwar maqawemat bar asas qanon e asasi anjam mi shawad” (“Boroujerdi: Iranian aid to resistance axis would be based on fundamental law”). IRNA, December 26 2016. http://www.irna.ir/fa/News/82362356.

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Bucala, Paul, Marie Donovan, Emily Estelle, Christopher Harmer and Caitlin Shayda Pendleton. 2016. “Iranian involvement in missile attacks on the USS Mason.” AEI Critical Threats, October 19. http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/iranian-involvement-missileattacks-uss-mason-october-19-2016. Chubin, Shahram and Charles Tripp. 2014. Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order. Abingdon-New York: Routledge. D’Agati, Philip. 2013. The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games: A Soviet-American Surrogate War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Mahjoob Zweiri. 2011. Iran’s Foreign Policy. From Khatami to Ahmadinejad. Reading: Ithaca Press. Erlanger, Steven. 2013. “Saudi Prince Criticizes Obama Administration, Citing Indecision in Mideast.” The New York Times, December 15. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/world/middleeast/saudi-princeaccuses-obama-of-indecision-on-middle-east.html. Habeeb, William Mark. 2012. The Middle East in Turmoil: Conflict, Revolution, and Change. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. Hanf, Theodor. 2010. Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation. London: I.B. Tauris. http://www.isna.ir/news/93111206588/-ϕ΍ήϋ-ϭ-ϥΎϨΒϟ-ϪϳέϮγ-ϦϤϳ-ϪΑ-Ύϣ-ΏϼϘϧ΍ ΕΎ̯ήΣ-ௌ-ΏΰΣ-ϩΪη-έΩΎλ. “Iran and Hezbollah prisoners captured by Yemeni army.” Al Arabiya English, December 16 2016. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2016/12/16/Iran-andHezbollah-prisoners-captured-by-Yemeni-army.html. Keynoush, Banafsheh. 2016. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Friends or Foes? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Landry, Carole. 2015. “Iran arming Yemen’s Huthi Rebels Since 2009: UN report.” Yahoo! News, April 30. https://www.yahoo.com/news/iran-arming-yemens-huthi-rebels-since2009-un-202936346.html. “Letter dated 20 February 2015 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014) addressed to the President of the Security Council.” United Nations Security Council, February 20 2015. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D274E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_125.pdf.Loveman, Chris. 2002. “Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention.” Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 3: 37–41. Mabon, Simon. 2016. Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East. London-New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

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“Majrai e judai az sitad e kol wa darkhast e seh bare az rehbari/beh filisten o ghazzeh mostashar faristadem (“The story of leaving General Staff and the request from the leadership/We have sent a counsellor to Palestine and Gaza …”). FARS News, November 15 2016. http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950723000259. Marschall, Christin. 2003. Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami. Abingdon: Routledge. Matthiesen, Toby. 2015. The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism. New York: Cambridge University Press. “Nero e Darya e artish amaniyat shumal e aqyanos e Hind ra tameen karde/ besh az 3 hizar kashti o naftkash ra az khalij e Aden obor dadeem” (“Naval forces have established security in the north of the Indian Ocean/We have surpassed more than three thousand ships and crude cargos from the Gulf of Aden”). Tasnim News Agency, November 26 2016. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1395/09/06/1250415/-̵ϭήϴϧ -ζ̰Θϔϧ-ϭ-̶Θθ̯-έ΍ΰϫ-3-ί΍-ζϴΑ-ϩΩή̯-ϦϴϣΎΗ-΍έ-ΪϨϫ-αϮϧΎϴϗ΍-ϝΎϤη-ΖϴϨϣ΍-ζΗέ΍-̶ϳΎϳέΩ ϢϳΩ΍Ω-έϮΒϋ-ϥΪϋ-ΞϴϠΧ-ί΍-΍έ. Porter, Gareth. 2015. “Houthi arms bonanza came from Saleh, not Iran.” Middle East Eye, April 23. http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/houthi-arms-bonanza-camesaleh-not-iran-1224808066 Razoux, Pierre. 2015. The Iran-Iraq War. London: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press. Sadeghi, Hossein and Hassan Ahmadian. 2011. “Iran-Saudi Relations: Past Pattern, Future Outlook.” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1: 115-148. Salisbury, Peter. 2015. “Yemen and the Saudi-Iran ‘Cold War’.” London: Chatham House. Salmoni, Barak, Bryce Loidolt and Madeleine Wells. 2010. Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen. The Huthi Phenomenon. Santa Monica (CA): RAND Corporation. “Sardar Ahmadi Moghaddam mushavir-e ali raes-e sitad-e kol nirohai mosalleh shod” (“Commander Ahmadi Moghaddam has been appointed as senior advisor to the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces.”) MEHR News, March 11 2015. http://www.mehrnews.com/news/2516410/-̶ϟΎϋ-έϭΎθϣ-ϡΪϘϣ-̵ΪϤΣ΍-έ΍Ωήγ Ϊη-΢Ϡδϣ-̵Ύϫϭήϴϧ-Ϟ̯ΩΎΘγ-βϴ΋έ. “Sardar Qaani: Doshmanan harif e mobarezan yamani nistand” (“Commander Qaani: The enemies are not opponents of Yemeni fighters”). Mashregh News, May 23 2015.

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http://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/419987/-ϒϳήΣ-ϥΎϨϤηΩ-̶ϧ΁Ύϗ-έ΍Ωήγ ΪϨΘδϴϧ-̶ϨϤϳ-ϥ΍ίέΎΒϣ. “Saudi Cleric Muhammad al-Arifi Vilifies Shiites, Calling Iraqi Ayatollah Sistani “an Infidel”. MEMRI TV, December 10 2009. https://www.memri.org/tv/saudi-cleric-muhammad-al-arifi-vilifiesshiites-calling-iraqi-ayatollah-sistani-infidel. “Shamkhani: Mohasera ghair e insani yaman misdaq bariz jinayat jangi ast” (“Shamkhni: The inhuman strike of Yemen is an obvious example of military aggression”). Alef, October 6 2015. http://alef.ir/vdcepo8wwjh8ooi.b9bj.html?29txt. Soffer, Ari. 2015. “Hezbollah Backing Houthi Rebels in Yemen, According to Reports.” Arutz Sheva, April 12. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/193896. Takeyh, Ray. 2015 (a). “The New Saudi Foreign Policy.” Council on Foreign Relations, April 15. http://www.cfr.org/saudi-arabia/newsaudi-foreign-policy/p36456. Takeyh, Ray. 2015 (b). “In Yemen Strikes, Signs of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy Shift.” The Wall Street Journal, April 1. http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/04/01/in-yemen-strikes-signs-ofsaudi-arabias-foreign-policy-shift. “Ummidwarem mardom e yaman, soria, Iraq az shar motajawezan e taroristaha rihai yaband” (“We are optimistic that the people of Yemen, Syria and Iraq will get relief from the evils of their aggressors and from terrorists”). Tasnim News Agency, October 12 2016. https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1395/07/21/1210658/-ϡέ΍ϭΪϴϣ΍ ΪϨΑΎϳ-̶ϳΎϫέ-Ύϫ-ΖδϳέϭήΗ-ϭ-ϥ΍ίϭΎΠΘϣ-ήη-ί΍-ϕ΍ήϋ-ϭ-ϪϳέϮγ-ϦϤϳ-ϡΩήϣ. Wahab, Siraj. 2015. “Hezbollah ‘operating in Yemen’ with Houthis.” Arab News, March 28. http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/724391. Watkins, Ali, Ryan Grim, and Akbar Shahid Ahmed. 2015. “Iran Warned Houthis Against Yemen Takeover.” The Huffington Post, April 20. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/20/iran-houthisyemen_n_7101456.html. Wehrey, Frederic, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell and Robert A. Guffey. 2009. Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam. Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. “Will There Be War? Washington Planners Study Means to Prevent One – or Win it if Russian Aggression Continues.” Life, March 29, 1948. Wood, J. 2016. “GCC declares Hizbollah a terrorist group”, The National. March 2. http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/gcc-declareshizbollah-a-terrorist-group

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Wong, Kristina. 2015. “US to Iran: Stop sending weapons to Yemen.” The Hill, April 15. http://thehill.com/policy/defense/238947-us-official-toiran-stop-sending-weapons-to-the-houthis. “Yemeni FM: Iran Must Curb Groups Aiding Huthi Rebels.” Naharnet, December 13. http://www.naharnet.com/domino/tn/NewsDesk.nsf/MiddleEast/560D6 BD248902E2DC225768B005434A3?OpenDocument. Zweiri, Mahjoob. 2016. “Iran and Political Dynamism in the Arab World: The Case of Yemen.” Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1: 418.

CHAPTER FIVE MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL WOJCIECH GRABOWSKI

Introduction If the power of a state would only depend on advanced military equipment then the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) could be seen as being amongst the most powerful in the world. In 2015 the GCC states spent over $114 billion on military expenditures despite falling oil prices (Anon 2015). These states have not only maintained, but also have increased their massive military expenses in recent years. The main causes of the recent spike in military spending include: the signing of the Iranian nuclear deal in 2015, involvement of the GCC states in the US-led coalition conducting air strikes on the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist organization, military engagement in Yemen, Syria and Iraq (perceived as proxy wars with Iran), and the US retreat from the region. Besides the rising threats in the region, the reason for the GCC states’ upward trend in military spending is that they see technology as a counterbalance to the disadvantages stemming from their small populations (which are significantly smaller than their neighbours). The only exception is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which more than doubled its number of troops from 100,000 in 1990 to 227,000 in 2015, but also these capacities are limited if we compare the Saudi and Iranian populations – 31 million to 78 million, respectively (UN 2015). The aim of this chapter is to provide answers to the following questions: how has the GCC’s military cooperation evolved? Is the GCC capable of ensuring adequate security for its members? What are the causes of its weakness and what needs to be done to enhance the military planning, command and training capacity of the GCC? The main hypothesis of this chapter is that security both binds and divides. There are

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security concerns that integrate GCC states (i.e. those threatening regime survival) and there are security issues that disintegrate them (i.e. different threat perceptions). The former includes Iran’s revolution (1979), the IranIraq war (1980-1988) that led to establishment of the military wing of the GCC – the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), and the Iraq-Kuwait war (1990) that harmonized the key security policies of GCC states (e.g. approval to host US forces). The latter includes Oman’s engagement in negotiations between Iran and the West regarding the Iranian nuclear programme (other GCC states were opposed to any talks with Iran), Qatari support for the Muslim Brotherhood (perceived as a threat by other GCC members), and support for different sides of the proxy wars in Syria, Yemen and Iraq.

Security and Regional Security Complexes There is a close correlation between regionalism and conflict. When a conflict appears, and a threat to state security increases, so does the will of broad defence cooperation. An environment of threat leads to a state policy directed at reducing security risks by relying not only on diplomacy or pre-emptive measures but also on defence alliances. Therefore, security threats create a background for regional cooperation and this was the case of the cooperation between the six member-states in the Persian Gulf. The security threats which appeared at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s include: x the anti-monarchical revolution in Ethiopia 1974-75 x the Iranian revolution 19791 x the Soviet-Afghan war 1979-1989 (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2007, 275) x the Iraq-Iran war 1980-1988 x the coup in Bahrain 1981 (failed, supported by Iran) x embracing communism as a national ideology until 1987 Naturally Iran and Iraq, in these circumstances, were perceived by the Arab Gulf states as a threat so they were not invited to take part in GCC structures (Dargin 2011, 232-233). These states were at war and led an offensive policy for power in the region. Each of these two states was more powerful than any of the Arab Gulf states. In order to increase their 1 Iran called for the overthrow of infidel Persian Gulf dynasties and started to advocate in favour of the marginalized Shiite populations in the Gulf states inflaming popular dissatisfaction in the Arab Gulf states similar to that in Iran.

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defence and military capabilities they decided to join forces and established the GCC on May 25, 1981. The leaders of the six-member states sought to establish a joint mechanism of collective security which is a form of cooperation promoted by neorealist thought. This theory claims that collective security is a system in which an attack against one member will be treated as an attack against all of them (casus foederis). Moreover, their representatives state that the system is based on institutions that create an alliance which should play a pre-emptive role towards potential aggressors. But neorealists also say that collective security ends when the threat is eliminated so it has a limited time-frame. Long-term cooperation is typical for regimes defined as a set of principles and procedures that determine the actors’ behaviour. Regimes serve collective interests that also reflect the interests of every member state (Almotairy 2011, 13-14). Also, very important to our theoretical considerations is the notion of the regional security complex (RSC) developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever from the Copenhagen School. In 1983 a RSC was defined as a group of countries that possess a degree of security interdependence which leads them to establish themselves as a linked aggregation to differentiate them from surrounding security regions. Their security problems cannot be analysed or resolved independently of one another (Buzan 1983, 106). After fifteen years, Buzan and Waever (1998) reformulated the above definition of RSC to highlight the role of different actors: “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 44-48). The Persian Gulf is such a regional security sub-complex. It was formed after Britain’s withdrawal from the area in 1971. Before the GCC was formed in 1981 there was an attempt to build a regional security complex which would include Iran and Iraq. In November 1976, the foreign ministers of all eight Persian Gulf states met in Muscat (Oman) to create a joint security and defence policy for the Gulf region. The idea which united all of them was their common objection to the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union in the region. Despite pre-existing disagreements regarding the nature of a potential unified regional alliance, the major blow was the Islamic Revolution in Iran which changed the goals of this state and destroyed the ambitious plans of all eight state actors (Smolansky and Smolansky 1991, 198-201). Building a collective security apparatus ran into incompatibility and was placed on the backburner by the GCC for a long time. Today all Persian Gulf states interact with each other in security matters more than with those outside of the complex (except with the

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USA). In security matters they are interdependent, and interdependence between a group of states is a sine qua non condition of the RSC theory. This dependence is essential to establish a linked unity and to distinguish this (sub)region from other security regions (Mirhosseini and Rasoulisaniabadi 2015, 119-120). The structure of the system has historically been tripolar where Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were able to extend their influence over other members of the system in the past. However, they have never been able to control the others’ policies (Gause 2010, 6). Currently only two states – Iran and Saudi Arabia – remain on the battleground following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the latter’s lapse into failure. Currently, Iraq seeks domestic security and stability rather than to play a regional power role in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia clearly responded to the threat posed by the Iranian Revolution and established an anti-Iranian bloc with its closest neighbours to secure its own interests in the region. The USA belongs to the GCC-camp with its naval presence in Bahrain, land forces in Kuwait, and air bases in Qatar, Oman and the UAE, while Iran is traditionally opposed to the involvement of American power in regional affairs. According to Gregory Gause (2007, 199), Gulf threat perceptions are driven by two categories of threats: power capabilities (states in the region will act to balance a more powerful neighbour – balance of power politics) and domestic security and the stability of the ruling elites emanating from abroad (a rival state encouraging domestic opponents, meddling in domestic affairs of a state). The Persian Gulf has witnessed a zero-sum game where the increase in the security of one state leads to the insecurity of others. This is partly a result of the involvement of big powers (historically, the Portuguese, British and Americans) in the security arrangements of the region (Soltaninejad 2012, 125-126). A turbulent shock for the whole Middle East was the “Arab Spring,” a revolutionary wave of demonstrations that has brought changes in the policies of the major players in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia confirmed its position as the leader in the GCC and plays the role of the chief of the counterrevolution to contain the “Arab Spring” and sustain the status quo in the sub-region. Qatar, which aspires to be a regional leader through its media dominance in the Arab world, began to play a very active role by playing the role of mediator in regional conflicts, investing in companies, buildings and football teams in Europe. However, when combining all the elements of power (military capabilities, population and territory), this micro-state has a long way to go to play the role of a real leader. Iran has sustained its protector role by supporting revolutionary movements and trying to minimise the influence of external powers by criticizing

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interventions such as the 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya (Soltaninejad 2012, 131).

The Development of Military Cooperation in the GCC By establishing the GCC on May 25, 1981 their leaders wished to reaffirm that the security and stability of the Persian Gulf are the responsibilities of its people and countries. The GCC leaders clearly stated that they are not building a military bloc (like NATO) against any specific power. During the Abu Dhabi summit in 1981, the GCC leaders stated that it was a defensive measure against potential domestic instability and against foreign intervention. In the beginning, security issues were not a dominant interest of the GCC leaders. This changed in December 1981 when the coup attempt in Bahrain took place. This was the first direct threat to the security of one of the GCC members even if the Iran-Iraq war and the Islamic Revolution began before the coup. Regime survival was placed on the agenda of the member states and soon after the first major GCC security conference was held on February 24, 1982. The principle that the smaller states of the Gulf should be defended from more powerful neighbours became fundamental for their collective defence a few years later (Alajmi 2014, 47-49). But ideas alone would not have been sufficient to defend the six Arab Gulf states. In 1983 the GCC held its first joint military manoeuvers called “Peninsula Shield.” These exercises became annual manoeuvers. This was the spark for the establishment of a joint GCC strike force called the “Peninsula Shield Force” (PSF) whose central command was headed by a Saudi general. The main goal of this force was to respond to threats to the territorial integrity of the GCC states and to intervene in cases of internal unrest. Also, a US air defence system with AWACS planes was established in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE. The system was used in 1984 when Iran attacked Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers and when Iranian planes were approaching the Saudi coast. The system allowed Saudi F-15s to shoot down Iranian planes in Saudi air space (Pasha 2015, 90-91). Indeed, US military forces and equipment became a permanent element of the Arab states’ security system. The reason for the increase in Saudi-US relations was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The PSF faced its most significant challenge and a very real test of its ability to defend GCC member states. But this confrontation resembled a fight between David and Goliath. The strength of this military wing of the GCC was just 10,000 soldiers while the Iraqi army consisted of one million

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soldiers and 850,000 reservists, making it the world’s fourth largest army (Knight 2005, 20). Saudi King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud decided to invite American troops to protect the Kingdom from the potential threat from Iraq (Operation Desert Shield). During the 11th summit of the GCC held in Doha in December 1990 the “Doha Declaration” was issued. In this document the leaders of the GCC states recognized their inability to defend themselves and to deter the Iraqi aggression. The statement called for the establishment of new security and defence arrangements capable of ensuring security for its members. It was suggested that if the external support in ensuring the Arab Gulf states’ security passed the test, why not rely on US guarantees for regional defence. Especially since the US took up the so-called “federated defence” approach to Middle East regional security which meant that stabilizing the Middle East required permanent attention and investment from the US (Alterman and Hicks 2015, 1). However, Saudi Arabia and Oman expressed the hope that the PSF in the future would emerge as a competent force which would be able to contribute to regional conflicts (Koch 2011, 27). Defence cooperation between the GCC states further intensified after December 2000 when the GCC Joint Defence Agreement was signed. The agreement provided a framework for regular joint exercises of all kinds of forces and coordination in the field of the military industries. The GCC members also accepted a collective defence principle which stated that any aggression against a member state would be considered as an aggression against all the GCC states (casus foederis). The six states were also obliged to provide military assistance to help each other. The Agreement also established a Joint Defence Council and a Military Committee to supervise cooperation. As a result, the first phase of a joint air defence command and control system named Belt of Cooperation (Hizam AlTaawun) was established in 2001. However, as the Director of the Gulf Research Center Foundation in Geneva, Christian Koch (2011, 28-29) writes: “[e]ach state continues to maintain full control over its security and defense policy and acts almost exclusively according to its national interests and national strategy. The hope that the agreement could one day lead to a unified defense policy with a unified central command therefore remains a distant objective.” Further vital decisions in the area of security were made during the 34th summit of the GCC held in Kuwait City on 10-11 December 2013. The GCC capabilities were increased through the setting up of the PSF unified structure and by increasing the manpower to 100,000. The unified military command, one for all kinds of forces, was established with its headquarters in

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Saudi Arabia. To make this defence system fully integrated, the GCC states must work to achieve full interoperability. This will be difficult to reach because each country will need to resign part of its authority over its military and unify their equipment, command and control systems, as well as the standards of training and education of their soldiers (Guzansky 2014, 644). This task will be difficult to accomplish because every state has different equipment, control systems and command structures. The PSF still does not have extensive combat experience which impacts its professionalism, especially in contrast to the other regional armies in Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan and Iran (Saidy 2014, 2). In recent years, the PSF has gained some battlefield experience. PSF troops were deployed to Bahrain during the attempted uprising in 2011 (against US government recommendations). However, this intervention showed the lack of cohesion among the GCC states, particularly the “all for one, one for all” concept, as Qatar and Oman did not take part in that operation. The same year, the UAE and Qatar were involved in the political intervention in Libya. In 2014, the GCC states actively contributed to operation “Inherent Resolve” against the ISIL, and finally Saudi Arabia mobilized its partners, including the GCC countries (except Oman and Kuwait), to push back the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. Additionally, the Arab League has endorsed a proposal to create a Joint Arab Force in which the GCC states take part. There are no doubts that the military capabilities of the GCC are still insufficient to provide security to its members from any external attack while the regional environment is becoming more hostile. Billions of dollars spent on military expenditures do not guarantee the GCC states’ security. Political differences on external security issues still stand in the way of deeper military integration. Kuwait advocates a non-aligned stance because of its proximity to Iran and Iraq, and its vulnerability to a potential threat from their side. This attitude influences Kuwait’s readiness for military integration. The opposite stance is represented by Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said who maintains very close relations with the USA allowing it to use Omani facilities despite Oman’s proximity to Iran. Reaching a consensus on similar matters might be impossible.

Threats to and Limitations of Military Cooperation in the GCC A paradox is the fact that in the Charter of the GCC there is no mention of the guarantee of security to its members even though this was important from its foundation. Indeed, in the beginning the GCC focused

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on strengthening economic, cultural and political cooperation and it was feared that highlighting security and defence cooperation could provoke Iran and Iraq to perceive the new alliance as a military bloc against them. This might partly explain why security and defence cooperation between GCC member states failed (Kelleher and Dombrowski 2015, 171). Meanwhile, the environment remained hostile since the GCC was founded: the Iraq-Kuwait War (1990), the invasion by Iran of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb (1992), conflict in Iraq (2003), civil wars in Syria (2011- ) and Yemen (2011- ), uprising in Bahrain (2011), Iran’s nuclear programme, the Muslim Brotherhood’s involvement in the Persian Gulf and the emergence of the ISIL. Further conflicts appeared in recent decades encouraging the evolution of GCC military cooperation. However, there are still significant deficiencies. After more than three decades, the coordination of security cooperation and its results remain meagre and below public expectations (Legrenzi 2011, 73-75). Primarily, the security community has not been integrated on both strategic and operational levels which means that common threat perception and force structure with high interoperability have not yet occurred. The GCC leaders fear a strong military elite and their possible involvement in politics. In case of any conflict between political and military elites there is a risk that the monarchies could be ousted by a military coup. Yet by keeping the armed forces separate, the training and coordination of the military has a negative effect on their overall strength (Quinlivan 1999, 131-165). As a result, the GCC member states have not built a collective security system so far and have based their security mostly on the United States. This basically remains a vital obstacle between Iran and the GCC states on the way to building a secure community but also represents an attitude to safeguard their own national security. US involvement in the region indicates that the GCC states are unable to exercise sovereignty by themselves. Another obstacle is the lack of a supranational authority and institutions which could provide the organization more sovereignty and political independence, and unresolved issues that prevent closer security cooperation such as border tensions between GCC states. A supranational authority could enforce or implement high-level decisions which often are not currently implemented, or resolve inter-state and dynastic rivalries emanating from a fear of Saudi hegemony or dependency on external guarantors. Therefore, it is political considerations that prevent the GCC from a deeper military cooperation because the individual states rely on different arms suppliers and maintain diplomatic contacts with external powers

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which seems an easier way to achieve external security than establishing a centralized command like the one in NATO. The five smaller GCC states are not ready to give Saudi Arabia a leading role in its structures because they are afraid that they will be dominated by the Saudi state (Legrenzi 2011, 77). Kuwait, Oman and the UAE insisted on a solution based on the condition that when the PSF enters a member’s territory, the command structures transfer from Saudi Arabia to the host country (Legrenzi 2006, 11). Defence cooperation in the Middle East is also very difficult because the threats and challenges for national and regional security are very complex. There are threats posed by state and non-state actors, which lead to asymmetric warfare, by missile forces, internal conflicts and insurgencies, by terrorist movements, arms races, proliferation of nuclear weapon and so on. The causes of each of these threats and challenges are very multidimensional so that defence cooperation needs to be led in many ways simultaneously.

Strengths and Opportunities of Military Cooperation in the GCC Some experts say that US support for the GCC states is essential to ensure them security. Michael Knights from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy pointed out three defensive areas in which the GCC has made strides, with US support (Knights 2013, X): 1. Internal security, civil defence and critical infrastructure protection. The first and the third area are highly proficient while the second is still in need of improvement. The GCC states reached a high level in dealing with tasks like counterterrorism, border security or industrial security. The GCC states see security risks in the large expatriate populations and sizable Shiite communities. The GCC states have embraced international security standards such as the Custom Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT),2 the US

2

Programme in which Customs and Borders are protected throughout the supply chain, beginning at the point of origin (including manufacturer, supplier or vender) through a point of distribution to the destination. Members of this programme agree to implement certain security procedures throughout their supply chains to protect them from terrorist infiltration and other illegal activities.

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Safe Port Act of 20063 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISP Code). 4 There also appeared critical infrastructure agencies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE which secure ports, terminals, industrial cities, and pipelines. In urban areas, street surveillance and plate scanning technologies are in use. However, with regards to internal security cooperation, deep concern among the GCC members pertains to sovereignty, particularly for the smaller states. During the 33rd session of the GCC Supreme Council in December 2012 the Sakhir Declaration was approved. The Sakhir Declaration called for: “[t]he principle of joint collective security through the development of military capabilities and self-development of each of the GCC states and the commitment to promote the development of the Common Defense System” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain 2016). The declaration also called for the extradition of individuals accused of conducting activities that undermine the security of the state as well as allowing member states to seek aid from other GCC states to counter uprisings (Tamimi 2014). However, even though the Emir of Kuwait signed the GCC Security Treaty, it has never been ratified by the Kuwaiti Parliament. The Kuwait National Assembly rejected the Pact arguing that it violated constitutional laws. If the treaty is to enter into force it must be ratified by all members. The Kuwaiti inability to ratify the treaty remains a vital obstacle in the way of building a unified approach to address internal security issues. Indeed, in the last three decades, common security coordination on internal threats has rarely taken place at the GCC level. Bilateral cooperation to tackle domestic security challenges has been more common (Kelleher and Dombrowski 2015, 171). 2. Shared early warning and integrated air and missile defence. Missile and radar systems in the GCC states are among the most advanced in the world simply because they are provided by the USA. These systems provide security to the US/GCC forces and bases in the region with regards to Iran having the largest ballistic missile capabilities (according to the Iran country profile from the 3

This act calls states for the establishment of standards and equipment to scan all imported containers entering US ports for radiation. 4 Regulations which enhance the security of ship transport from terrorism which include regulations of access to the ship and its critical areas, control of passengers and their luggage and so on.

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Nuclear Threat Initiative), which are able to strike deployed US forces, allies and partners in the Middle East. The GCC states are aware of the missile threat posed by Iran but also by non-state actors like the Houthi rebels in Yemen who have carried out shortrange ballistic missile attacks against Arab Gulf forces engaged in military operations along the Saudi-Yemen border. That is why the US provides the GCC states with three kinds of interception systems: a) high altitude systems such as the Terminal HighAltitude Area Defence (THAAD) system; b) mid-altitude systems such as the Standard Missile (SM-3); and c) low-altitude PAC-3 and other Patriot missile units. But to increase the capabilities of the missile defence system, a more collective attitude between member states is needed. One possible idea is to build a common defence operations centre which could receive all the data from various national sensors to provide a real-time picture of ballistic missile launches. Then this information could be sent to each country’s command headquarters to support missile defence engagements (DeBiaso 2016, 93). 3. Exclusive economic zones, territorial water and harbour defence. Key economic points such as Qatari Ras Laffin port (the main site for the production of liquefied natural gas) are protected by dense sensor networks and patrolling forces. Additionally, vital economic sites have been deployed in swimmer detection, aerial drone, radar and acoustic technologies. All these measures are supposed to minimize the risk of sabotage, terrorism or military intervention. The coastal defence of the GCC states is highly proficient but this defence needs to be taken in territorial waters, including the Exclusive Economic Zones. Surveillance patrols and marine police need to be extended to the coast of Somalia and the Red Sea where pirates pose a threat to regional tankers. The GCC are already equipped with naval special forces with high speed interceptor boats and helicopters to patrol economic zones and borders. Offshore vessels are equipped with very effective offensive weapons systems such as lightweight precision missiles and robotic stabilized canons. The GCC states have the most advanced weapons and military systems such as aerial refuelling tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, land-based missile defences and radars. While Iran is limited by capital, sanctions and its industrial base, the GCC states have spent six to seven times more on their military forces than Iran over the

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past two decades. The GCC states are the world’s largest military consumers of military imports. They spend nearly a third of their budgets to purchase weapons and military hardware. But this might change in the near future, as UN sanctions on arms transfers to Iran are lifted and if Russia or China agree to provide Iran with advanced arms (Cordesman 2015, 4-5). Russia already lifted a ban on the supply of the S-300 air-defence missile system to Iran maintaining that UN Security Council Resolution 1929 only forbids the transfer of offensive weapons. However, the question is whether Iran can afford such expensive military expenditures. Despite billions of dollars spent by the GCC states every year on military expenses there is still a lot to do to enhance the military planning, command and training capacity of the GCC. Anthony Cordesman (2012, 1-4) from the Center for Strategic and International Studies clearly indicates the security areas to improve: 1. Planning and interoperability – there is a need to set up a planning staff within the GCC that will be responsible for the key tasks and that will report the GCC military condition to its delegates. A similar method is used by NATO. The Defence Planning Committee would examine each member’s current forces and plan what should be changed to improve capability, interoperability, communications, intelligence systems and so on. 2. Command, control, communications, computer (C4) and intelligence (I), battle management (BM) – the GCC needs to integrate C4I/BM command systems in several areas to develop intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. This will influence the speed of reaction to threats in real time, including missiles, naval attacks or terrorist activity. The different warning systems in the GCC states have to be integrated, both those on the ground and in the air. An integrated maritime surveillance system must be created as well as a Joint Intelligence Center, especially with regards to counter-terrorism. 3. Building joint training and exercise capacity – there is not much large-scale training that simulates real combat; joint training is also limited. There is a need to create a commission of civilian and military staff that would survey the training facilities and methods and look for ways to improve joint and common training. But beyond all these measures which must be taken simultaneously, all Gulf states should work on strengthening the trust between each other and ease existing tensions through a Conference of Security and Cooperation,

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similar to that established in Europe in 1972. Christian Koch and Christian Hanelt claim that high-level political dialogue should include negotiations on important political topics (wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and so on) but also economic and environmental issues (like in Europe). Invitation to participate in this conference should also go to Yemen and Iraq. The conference should be moderated by a state without a colonial past in the region, without economic interests in the Gulf, and that is neutral yet influential, like Germany or Japan. There are also two regional mediators which could be considered in the mediation processes – Oman and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Without diplomatic engagement and talks there will be no political solutions and agreements, so this initiative should be pursued (Hanelt and Koch 2015, 5-7). The question whether Saudi Arabia and Iran are ready for negotiations seems to be rhetorical. Last but not least, a condition for any successful defence cooperation and security in the region is a “mature security community.” In such a community, any military conflicts between its members are prohibited and no state is authorized to impose its hegemony on any other. While the states of this sub-regional community are under threat (whether potential, direct, or imagined) and in permanent rivalry, maturity in the Gulf will not be reached and the joint defence system and common security strategy within the GCC will not work (Binhuwaidin 2015, 6-7).

Conclusion Despite internal divisions and rivalry, the GCC member states are aware that they are stronger and safer together than apart. It was mentioned when the GCC was created in 1981 that Gulf security is best ensured by the region’s states working collaboratively (Daring 2011, 246247). This condition might be fulfilled through achieving the interoperability of the military forces of all the member states and embedding military cooperation. The first matter means the integration of military hardware while the second concerns mutual trust, equality and reducing reliance on external support. In terms of interoperability, the Arab Gulf states have achieved more than in the “soft integration” field, where political ambitions seem to stand above security concerns. GCC security in the forthcoming years will be determined by the threat from Iran, terrorist attacks, and the situation in Yemen and Iraq (direct neighbours of the GCC states). These threats will not disappear in the short-term. The results of recent conflicts will have significant impacts on GCC unity in the future. If the Muslim Brotherhood offshoot in Yemen,

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the Al-Islah party, gains power, for example, then vital differences might appear between the GCC states. Similarly, different visions for Syria and Libya, where GCC states are involved, might bring disunity in the GCC ranks. War with the ISIL might bring different consequences for the GCC states. This terrorist threat will rather strengthen GCC cohesion because the organization is against monarchical rulers, tribal legitimacy, or investment in the current state system. Most probably, the GCC states will undertake common operations against a territory where the threat emanates from and cooperate in intelligence sharing and security forces (Martini et al. 2016, 32-35). The question about the PSF is still vital. Will this force be developed beyond a symbol or will national forces remain the dominant elements of state security? GCC unity and deployment of the PSF into regional conflicts surely will have vital impacts on the answer here. Similar uncertainty pertains to the consequences of the departure of US forces from the Persian Gulf. Gulf Arab states will have to replace the United States as the balancer of Iranian power. Since the Iranian nuclear deal was reached in 2015 the policy of interventionism started to be led by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. All these changes which have appeared in the past two years or so will have a vital impact on the military cooperation of GCC states and because of its complexity, military integration will not be easy to achieve.

References Alajmi Z. 2015. “Gulf Military Cooperation: Tangible gains or limited results”. In: Abdullah, J. (ed.). Gulf Cooperation Council’s Challenges and Prospects, Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies. Almotairy S. 2011. “The Gulf Cooperation Council and the challenges of establishing an integrated capability for upholding security”. MA Thesis. Available from: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/5677/11Jun_Almotairy. pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y Alterman, Jon. and Katheleen Hicks (eds.). 2015. Federated Defence in the Middle East. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Anon. 2015. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1988-2015. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available from: https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex

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Binhuwaidin, Mohamed. 2015. “Essential Threats to the Security of the GCC Countries in the Post Arab Spring Era.” Digest of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1: 6-7. Buzan, Barry. 1983. People, States, and Fear: The national security problem in international relations. London: Wheatsheaf Books. Buzan, Barry and Ole Weaver. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structures of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cordesman, Anthony H. and K.R. Al-Rodhan. 2007. Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War. London: Preager Security International. Cordesman, Anthony H. 2012. Moving Towards Unity: Expanding the role of the GCC in Gulf security. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available from: http://csis.org/files/publication/121224_GCC_and_New_Challenges_G ulf_Security.pdf Cordesman, Anthony H. 2015. Military Spending and Arms Sales in the Gulf: How the Arab Gulf States now dominate the changes in the military balance. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Available from: https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/public ation/150428_military_spending.pdf Dargin, Justin. 2011. Desert Dreams: The quest for Arab integration from the Arab revolt to the Gulf Cooperation Council, Dordrecht: Republic of Letters. DeBiaso, Peppino. 2016. “Missile Defense and the GCC: Strengthening deterrence through a new framework.” Harvard International Review. Vol. 37, No. 3: 89-93. Gause, Gregory. 2007. “Threats and Threat Perception in the Persian Gulf Region.” Middle East Policy, Vol.14, No. 2: doi: 10.1111/j.14754967.2007.00302.x. Gause, Gregory. 2010. The International Relations of the Persian Gulf. Cambridge: University Cambridge Press. Guzansky, Yoel. 2014. “Defense Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf: The Peninsula Shield Force Put to the Test.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 50, No. 4. doi: 10.1080/00263206.2014.901219. Hanelt, Christian and Christian Koch. 2015. “A Gulf CSC Could Bring Peace and Greater Security to the Middle East.” Spotlight Europe, No. 2: 1-7. Kelleher, Catherine McArdle and Peter Dombrowski. 2015. Regional Missile Defense from a Global Perspective. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Knights, Michael. 2005. Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the birth of modern U.S. military power, Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press. Knights, Michael. 2013. “Rising to Iran’s Challenge: GCC military capability and U.S. security cooperation.” Policy Focus, No. 127: 1-37. Koch, Christian. 2011. “The GCC as a Regional Security Organization.” In: Konrad-Adenauer Stifttung International Reports. No. 11: 23-35. Legrenzi, Matteo. 2006. “The Peninsula Shield Force: End of a symbol?” Insight, No. 3. Legrenzi Matteo. 2011. The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, security and economic coordination in a changing Middle East. New York: I.B. Tauris. Martini, Jeffrey, Becca Wasser, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Daniel Egel and Cordaye Ogletree. 2016. The Outlook for Arab Gulf Cooperation. Washington, DC: RAND Corporation. Available from: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1429.html Mirhosseini, Seyed Mohsen and Elham Rasoulisaniabadi. 2015. “The Milestones of the Persian Gulf Security Developments.” Sociology and Anthropology. Vol. 3, No. 2: 116-121. Pasha, A. K. 2015. “The Gulf Cooperation Council: A regional approach to peace, security and development.” In Dennis Rumley and Timothy Doyle (eds.). Indian Ocean Regionalism, New York: Routledge. Quinlivan, James T. 1999. “Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in The Middle East.” International Security, Vol. 24, No.2: 131-165. Saidy, Brahim. 2014. “GCC’s Defense Cooperation Moving Towards Unity.” Philadelphia Papers. No. 6. Smolansky, Oles M. and Bettie M. Smolansky. 1991. The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence. Durham: Duke University Press. Soltaninejad, Mohammad. 2012. “The Security of the Persian Gulf After the Arab Revolutions.” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs. Vol. 3. No. 2: 119-142. Tamimi, Jumana A. 2014. “GCC Security Pact Divides Kuwait.” Gulf News. Available from: http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/ gcc-security-pact-divides-kuwait-1.1297430 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Bahrain. 2016. “The Sakhir Declaration.” Available from: http://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=8029&language=en-US UN. 2015. World Population Prospects. New York: UN. Available from: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/World_Population_201 5_Wallchart.pdf

CHAPTER SIX A TACIT ALLIANCE: IRAN AND CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY SAHRA JOHARCHI

Introduction The nature of the relationship between China and Iran has been the source of much debate within the academic and security arena, specifically in relation to potential regional and international impacts (Shariatinia 2010, 1). Whilst some of the debates taking place are influenced by the residual concerns spawned from the China Threat theory, much is more greatly influenced by the status of Iran as a pariah, or rogue state. A considerable amount of this discourse is framed by external perceptions, and considerations of the impact, expectations and concerns of third parties, rather than pursuing a greater understanding of the Chinese-Iranian relationship itself. One such example of this preoccupation with the impact of the relationship rather than its construction, is the idea of there being the pursuit of a strategic relationship. In traditional security terms, a strategic relationship is the alliance, or coalition, of powers against a common enemy or threat (Kay 2015, 185). In the contemporary era, the foreign policies of these two states, whilst underpinned by common driving factors, are related to economic development and perceptions of status. They have specific (if not divergent, then, mutually dis-effectual) international and foreign policy interests. Iran has been developing its nuclear programme, much to the discomfort and protestation of the dominant powers that are the USA and leading European states (Patrikarakos 2012). In the contemporary era, we can also see the influence of this relationship, under the Obama presidency, with the crucial role that China played in orchestrating and facilitating the Vienna Accords which underpinned the negotiations between Iran, Europe and the USA, on the former’s nuclear activities, leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). There is much debate over the ongoing success of this

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agreement because of President Trump’s rescinding of US acceptance of the deal in May 2018. It should be noted, however, that what is significant for this discussion is not the final outcome of the US-Iranian battle of wills but rather, its underpinning motivations. This agreement is significant in terms of what it suggests about Iranian-Chinese relations, and the amity present which led to China setting the groundwork for Iran’s re-integration into the global economy, as a result of the easing of economic sanctions. This support by China brings in a consideration of pragmatic interests of both states with regard to their foreign policy articulations and economic development agendas. As such it is necessary, within this context to consider the relevance of China’s Belt-Road Initiative (BRI) initiative, which offers a vital lens through which to understand Iranian-Chinese relations in the 21st Century. A more robust and comprehensive analysis and explanation of the specific nuances of the Iranian-Chinese relationship is needed, and this is the focus of this chapter. The material base of interaction will first be addressed. This relates to interactions between the two based on trade, energy and mutual strategic interests. Whilst, as stated above, in traditional security terms the two powers have not formed a strategic coalition, their relationship has been strategically constructed to fulfil specific interests and compliment general aims, as will be discussed below. These concrete interactions will be referred to as the ‘tangible’ base of their relationship and will be discussed within the framework of international processes and developments, or international pressures, which will be shown to define and dictate its presentation and representation. Moving on from this, the tacit nature of this relationship will then be analysed to understand the rhetorical, or hyperbole creation and maintenance of Iranian-Chinese relations in the absence of a formal alliance. A Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of official Iranian and Chinese statements and news reports identifies this construction of a narrative of friendship, historical shared experiences and cooperation between the two powers. This, in turn, constructs a condition of trust in the absence of formal, internationally binding agreements.

Traditional Silk Road Relations The new silk road project, strap lined as the BRI, forms one of the underlying commitments of Xi Jinping’s presidency. This initiative may still be relatively early in its development, however, the viability of this vision is manifest in the emergence of a concrete trade and development corridor. Its potential to become embedded in non-neo-liberal institutional

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frameworks such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) raises many questions. Some scholars prefer to focus on how this initiative can be explored to better understand China’s commitment and execution of a more pro-active foreign policy approach. In contrast, there are others who focus more on the potential to safeguard against this, and explore what impact the BRI will have on China and its allies – perhaps this approach signifies the return of the China Threat theory to foreign policy analysis. It is important to highlight that the BRI, just as was the case with the original Silk Roads network, does not belong solely to China. It is a system of trade which predicates joint guardianship, governance and maintenance – interdependent as it is. The proposed new belt road is a reflection, or resurrection, of the original trading routes which put the Asian continent at the centre of internationalisation, the forefather of globalisation. As such it has specific implications for the original guardians of this ancient and advanced system (Joharchi 2016, 2). Whilst the impact and potential it has for regional neighbours is well articulated, particularly with regard to Central, South and South-East Asia, through who’s waterways 25% of global trade passes, it also has significance for state and non-state actors further afield, such as in the MENA, home of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The New Belt-Road Initiative In analysing Iranian-Chinese relations in the 21st century, the BRI is useful as it has been a key visionary enterprise of mutual interest, following its launch by Xi Jinping in 2013, seeking to create a new trade corridor (Summers 2015) and, arguably, develop China’s national branding (and thus its soft power). In preparation for this China launched China Central TV in 2009 – an Arabic language international station to promote a positive image of Chinese culture in the MENA (Wai-Yip 2014, 19). China and Russia have also been developing cooperation in relation to the integration of Asia by way of multifarious networks of high speed railways, pipelines, superhighways and ports, with Chinese corporations heavily involved with infrastructure deals across the Eurasian landmass. Investing close a trillion dollars with the intended yield of over $2.5 trillion across over 40 countries (Shaoxian 2015). State-owned enterprises are also being encouraged to invest in regional infrastructure projects, which is also seeing the revival of traditional craftmanship to promote authentic brands and to promote Chana’s ‘going global’ interests (Xiansi 2014). Obviously, there are issues and criticisms

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aplenty with regard to China’s methods and the underpinning concern regarding China’s practice of ensuring stronger exports than its trading partners. However, it is also worth noting that there appears to be a genuine interest in overcoming such differences. This is due to the recognition of the BRI as a key potential source of developmental progress, at multiple levels, as well as the promotion of greater economic ties and greater harmony between members (Wong 2015, 5). In line with this, the implementation of the BRI vision predicates interlocking security guarantees, in liberal terms, due to its integrative and interdependent nature. There have already been discussions between China and India regarding the security of borders which are of concern to the latter, and have, on occasion, resulted in war (Stanzel 2015). This initiative is important in particular with regard to Iranian-Chinese relations and the convergence of their interests in creating a Eurasian economic bloc which, for Iran, will facilitate access to key markets and diplomatic opportunities, especially in light of the relaxing of economic sanctions, and Iran’s bid to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and gain greater presence in central Asia. To turn the discussion to Iran, the significance of the BRI is clear. Iran is a key geo-strategic node of the project, which seeks to run through the north of the country to access the open seas (Orgeta 2016). This opportunity underpins Iranian interests on several levels, which have been enhanced by its distancing from Hamas and promotion of its hard and soft power and diplomacy parallel to Western failures in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria (Joharchi 2016, 4). Iran is invested in the BRI plan and the connected AIIB and SCO security structures which offer a reprieve from its immediate, hostile, neighbourhood. The BRI can be seen to offer a rearticulation of non-Western progress and success, as it builds on an ancient model of internationalisation which can enable greater access to, and engagement with globalisation, which many of the states along the route have traditionally been considered to be at the mercy of. As well as access to trade, this route offers vital opportunities for investment and development, and the promotion of more comprehensive security commitments through interdependence and recognition of Iran as a significant regional power. This has potential to increase investment in the state as a result of the JCPOA as Western firms clamber to invest following the 2016 lifting of economic sanctions (Korybko 2015). Central Asia is also home to the ‘stan’ states which share cultural and historical ‘kinship’ commonalties with Iran, and so can be used to develop the latter’s soft power and help raise its profile positively.

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The New Silk Road also seeks to develop pipeline opportunities and routes which represent a key market for Iranian energy exports, again providing the opportunity to reap much needed economic rewards which can be invested at home to increase societal legitimacy of the fractious polity and ease societal tensions caused by insecure and threadbare living standards (Luft 2014, 14). Indeed, a dominant argument relating to nuclear-inspired UN economic sanctions against Iran, was that they would not work: that Iran would not buckle to international pressure to curtail its activities and increase its transparency (Joharchi 2014, 5). However, this was the outcome of the Vienna P5+1 accords, which concluded in 2015, mediated by China. It is worth considering the influence that the BRI carrot played in Iran’s decision to finally come to the table and negotiate. The lifting of sanctions would enable greater, and smoother, activity within the BRI project, as a greater number of firms and banks would be able to access Iranian markets, and vice versa.

Convergent Tangible Interests China is officially the biggest market for Iranian exports, receiving 23.37% of total exports. Imports from China account for 19.57% of total Iranian imports (ISNA, 2010). This makes Iranian-Chinese trade a valuable and strategic concern for the former which is still recovering from the extensive and crippling UN-authorised sanctions (Naji 2016, 1). The injection of capital gained from bilateral trade agreements is vital also for the continued domestic legitimacy of Iran, which is struggling to maintain its growing urban population and skilled workforce (Amuzegar 2014, 20). This is also important for its regional power projection as an influential power, which can offset the pressure of challenger states such as Saudi Arabia and Israel as well as competitor states such as Turkey. China is also able to corner a market not already dominated by Western firms: developing a testing ground for low-end manufactured goods and medium-technology machinery previously identified as low quality compared to Western alternatives. Of all the non-hydrocarbon goods, the greatest market is that of automobiles with China being Iran’s biggest net supplier of cars and car parts. Alongside this, Iran is also reliant on China for infrastructure development and maintenance – relying on imports for its rail and subway services as well as household goods such as TVs, computers and phones. It is clear, however, that there is a trade disparity here with China importing low cost goods and exporting high value items, putting Iran at a disadvantage and in a somewhat dependant relationship with China as a

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source of infrastructure development and vital consumer goods (Shariatinia 2015). The development of non-hydrocarbon trade between the two has been a keen interest of Iran since 2011 when international sanctions began to shrink the latter’s economy and trade options. The diversification of trade goods is part of a wider societal legitimacy programme of job creation and development in Iran, which suffers from a growing urban, educated and/or skilled youth workforce with few employment opportunities. China in contrast boasts both existing and developing ties with numerous countries in the Middle East (Davidson 2010, 2) and Asia as well as economic blocs such as the European Union (EU Trade 2015). The need for such diversification in this respect then is a far less crucial or political issue. However, China needs hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon-products, for which it is willing to adapt its trade preferences (Garver 2006, 279).

The Hydrocarbon Dynamic In the energy sector, the intricacies of Iranian-Chinese trade and the political economy dimensions of their relationship are, arguably, most obvious. China is a developing nation and, as such has an almost insatiable need for energy as the world’s second largest consumer of hydrocarbons. With a growing GDP, which has grown an average of 8-10% per year for much of the past 25 years, its hydrocarbon demands in the long-term are forecast to continue to increase (Chinability 2015). A significant fulfilment of its needs come from Iran. China’s energy needs are well-documented, and as it develops so too do domestic expectations regarding living standards, welfare, private transportation, consumer goods and leisure activities. The increased demand for cars alone in China has increased as bicycles and motorcycles are replaced – due in part to the greater affordability of cars as a result of China’s membership in the WTO and increased domestic manufacturing (Luft 2009). Iran in turn, although less developed, has a rapidly growing population and poor infrastructure that has yet to recover from the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. Iran is also seeking to reduce its own reliance on its key natural resources, which requires industrial development. Iran is also home to the second largest hydrocarbon reserves in the MENA; due to UN and US sanctions, however, customers have been in short supply (Burman, 2009:120). As such, there exists an oil-for-goods exchange between the two with China paying for its energy through, goods, and knowledge and technology transfers (Harold and Nader 2012, 22). Whilst there is an array of small, private Chinese businesses in Iran, a significant amount of the Chinese

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companies present are connected to joint projects such as building and maintaining hydrocarbon refineries, transport systems, paper mills and telecommunications installations. Here we can see that energy commodities are tied, in the case of Iran, to societal needs and welfare. China and Iran also co-operate on the development of Iran’s numerous hydrocarbon fields and so the capacity to access greater resources – for which the latter lacks the important know-how. Chinese national companies such as Sinopec, Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Chinese National Off-shore Oil Corp (CNOOC) are some of the top firms with Iranian counterparts. Nigec is involved in the development of Iranian fields at Yadarvar, Masjid-e Suleiman and Kashan oil fields, which produce a key income for Iran and key energy needs for China in a mutually beneficial trade relationship as China seeks to secure its access to these resources. In 2004, 2009 and 2011 Chinese state-run enterprises signed billion-dollar deals with Iran LNG for the exclusive right to extract and import hydrocarbons from the Yadavaran, north Azadegan and south Pars energy fields. This interest in energy accumulation and access is also prevalent in wider regional interests of the development of pipelines to compete with Western and Russian-sourced energy transportation lines across the region. Such endeavours emphasise non-disrupted transportation of Iranian hydrocarbons to Chinese markets rather than a regional initiative for greater interdependence and stability. However, the latter narrative is used to sell the cooperative efforts of the two powers. For China, it is also important to consider the fact that all of its hydrocarbon imports, regardless of seller, have to pass through potential maritime choke points such as the Straits of Hormuz. As such, the issue of energy is not just a trade or development concern for China and its trade partners but also one of regional security and stability.

The Military and Technological Transfer Dynamic The hydrocarbon interests that are shared between the two states also transfers into the military and technological transfer nodes of interaction. This is an area highly speculated over in contemporary literature and can be seen to form security and stability interests. The energy agreements highlighted above, granting China almost exclusive rights to Iranian energy fields, are part of a wider commitment of the former to protect its energy security, a key national interest (Dorraj and Currier 2008, 1). This can also be seen to be a strategic move on the part of Iran, following the Stutnex cyber-attack on its nuclear facilities, which were believed to have been supported by the USA (Langer 2013, 5). Iran is also sensitive to

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Israeli rhetoric and calls for military strikes against the regime. This is a particularly sensitive issue in 2018, as Israel played a substantial role in raising US concerns over Iranian commitments to the JCPOA, and, arguably, its desire to withdraw from the deal. A significant degree of military interaction, therefore, does overlap with the aforementioned energy sector in relation to the acquisition of nuclear technology and so will not be repeated. What is noteworthy is that this infiltrates the regional and domestic arenas. This is a result of the number of third party states, such as Turkey and Pakistan, that are involved in pipeline propositions and oil field developments. This also covers issues of military cooperation and safe transportation of goods through the straits of Hormuz. In a snapshot, with regard to this dynamic, China assisted Iran with training and technical support. It has also shared technology and maintenance information on missile construction and development that includes the building of a missile factory. To address this further, is to note that the powers have collaborated on various projects from the development of surface-to-air missiles and fast track missiles, through to radar systems and combat aircraft. To avoid international scrutiny, particularly from the USA and European states, China even went as far in the 1980s as to utilise North Korea, as a form of ‘black knight’. In this respect goods were traded via the third party in an attempt to cover the extent of assistance (Hinckley 1990, 1), though cooperation, as noted earlier, can be traced back to the Iran-Iraq war). These weapons were then used by Iran to ensure its control of the Straits of Hormuz. This assistance continued into the 1990s, by way of continued development and maintenance of military hardware, despite an overall decline in military cooperation. In the contemporary era, one of the biggest concerns of the international community has been with the extent to which China has (or had) been supporting Iran with its nuclear project. These concerns centred around whether or not China, or Chinese companies, had been selling nuclear weapons technology to Iran. It was not secret that Iran was developing nuclear energy capabilities, as part of its domestic development agenda, which can be traced back to the time of the Shah. What was less clear was whether this ran parallel to a commitment to the acquisition of weapons grade technology. Nuclear cooperation between the two powers began, formally, in the 1980s with China’s agreement to provide four nuclear reactors and to help build a fourth research reactor at Bushehr. Cooperation in weapons grade technology ceased officially in the early 1990s when a covert agreement was discovered, and so international pressure applied to China to withdraw (Delpech 2006). However, suspicions of continued covert assistance abounded.

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As an original signatory of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, Iran remains adamant that its development is for peaceful, domestic purposes only, in order to reduce its reliance on imported refined oil (Iran exports crude oil but has a limited refinery capacity). Iran also posits that in order to become a ‘developed’ country it must harness ‘developed’ technologies and so reduce its reliance on its primary energy source. Conversely, China is also a developing state, though with a growing significant power status and, as such, is under pressure to bend to normative commitments to fulfil the role of a responsible power. This is tied to its regional policies in Asia to avoid fears and mistrust from its neighbours vis-a-vis its rise and influence, but also internationally in-line with its relations with the USA and Europe. China is adamant that it has not assisted in Iranian development of nuclear weapons capabilities. It is also vocal in its support of the right of Iran, and any other state for that matter, to develop nuclear energy. This support is expressed due to its anti-hegemonic constitution, which sets multi-polar regionalism above hegemonic dominance and external actor influence on domestic policies and interests. This claim to non-assistance was also supported by China’s mediation of the JCPOA in 2015 which also reinforced its commitment to activities in line with the responsible power rhetoric levelled against it. This appears to have been a coup de grace for the rising power as it has been instrumental in bringing the concerned parties to the table and mediating between them during international negotiations which at the time of writing have resulted in a resolution to Iran’s nuclear question (Scott 2015). This role has provided kudos to China’s diplomatic skills and has helped to increase the potential for significant economic benefit as an unsanctioned Iran creates greater trade and exchange opportunities between the two. It also provides a greater sense of regional peace and stability with regard to the commitment of officially binding international agreements between Iran and the West. Furthermore, it eases pressure on China to explain its bilateral relations with Iran.

Pragmatic Drivers of Iranian-Chinese Relations For both China and Iran, development is crucial for their respective ambitions to be recognised in the international arena on a level playing field with the currently dominant international actors. China first tried, under Mao Zedong (1949-1976), to develop at an accelerated rate within the framework of a Communist manifesto, highly influenced by Stalinist Russia (Kemanade 2009, 8). The death of Mao and the rise of Deng Xiaoping (1978-89) coupled with the failure of initiatives such as the

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Cultural Revolution and the numerous five-year plans surrounding it, led to the development of a new system. The Chinese state was restructured into a ‘“Harmonious” combination of capitalist development and sustained Communist-State apparatus’ (Wu and Lansdowne 2009: 1). This merging between East and West, between Cold War era first- and second-world ideologies, represents ‘the interaction between emulation of the West and resistance to its intrusion in modernising endeavours’ (Xudong and Junxiang 2009, 1). The liberalisation of the market did not run parallel to the liberalisation of the government. The latter maintained its socialist order and ideals in separation from capitalist and economic reforms. Regardless, the twin-peaked system resulted in China rising to a position of recognition, a significant member of the global economy and a member of the World Trade Organization (joined in 1999). This drive to develop is not new, but rather one of the few lasting themes throughout China’s history (ibid, 48). The capitalist development and market economy has been the push and pull of China and its commitments to trade relations with a staggering array of actors in Asia, North and South America, the MENA and Europe. Increased trade has brought with it significantly improved diplomatic relations. China thus promoted its ‘five principles of coexistence’ (Garver 2006): a commitment to the fostering of trust, respect, cooperation and equality with its Asian neighbours in the interests of a harmonious order. Regional initiatives, such as ASEAN, have been established and supported by China, which has sought to operate on a basis of consensus between nations to address security and developmental needs and concerns (Beeson 2004: 33). China, as a rising power, committed to an accelerated rate of development is naturally a significant consumer of resources, specifically hydrocarbons. It is also a late arrival to the international scene where existing powers already have the market monopoly in and between many states. China needs hydrocarbons, resources and fresh, un-monopolised markets. Iran in turn, following the 1979 revolution and the 1980–88 Gulf War, was left with a crippled economy and feelings of resentment for the United States and Europe. Afrasiabi and Maleki (2003) recognise Iran’s foreign policy as deriving from two sources, its turbulent regional environment and its faction-ridden polity, in the run-up to 9/11. The attack on the World Trade Centre changed the global security landscape. It also highlighted the increased role that Iran had been playing since 1990 as a mediator and crisis manager (ibid, 257). Reflecting China’s harmonious world policy, but in no apparent way influenced by it, Iran has sought to develop diplomatic ties with regional powers and to actively promote

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regional security initiatives. These have included several ceasefire agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994; the general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord and protocol on mutual understanding in 1997; the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), of which Mohammad Khatami was a chairman in the late 1990s (ibid, 258); and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). There are also growing pressures and security concerns for Iran regarding the freshwater resources that it shares with Afghanistan. This could certainly explain Iran’s interest in mediating the peaceful settlement of governance issues between the United States and Afghanistan following the US invasion after 9/11. In this respect Iran’s focus is very much Eastfacing. However, there has recently been a significant shift in Iranian foreign policy towards a balancing of East and West. Iran has cultivated relations with China (as well as Russia and India) for economic and political coverage that cannot be found in the West and to counterbalance the threat of Western sanctions (ibid, 51) as a result of fears over its nuclear energy policy. In order to maintain and sustain domestic growth in the 21st century, energy security has become a priority for Beijing, due to its unavoidable dependence on the Middle East for hydrocarbons (as the region holds over 50 per cent of the world’s proven reserves, with Iran possessing 10 per cent of the global share). The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act in 1996 also created an economic vacuum as Western companies were prohibited from sizeable investments in the Iranian hydrocarbons industry. This provided an opportunity for Chinese firms to secure hydrocarbon imports and assist in the development of its hydrocarbons infrastructure through investments, as they faced less competition within Iran in comparison with other nations. In developing relations with Iran, China achieves influence and presence in what is arguably one of the most important geo-strategic and economic regions in the world. It also supports China’s commitment to peaceful and productive (as well as profitable) ties with all major powers and regions. Both Chinese and Iranian policies are anti-hegemonic in character. Rather than seeking to align with the dominant superpower, both states prefer the maintenance of a non-threatening international system of regions and regional powers concerned with their own interest areas. China specifically sees this as the most conducive system for its economic growth (Swaine 2010, 2). In line with mutual foreign policy interests and developmental directions, China and Iran have engaged in significant hydrocarbon trade deals, as noted earlier. Iran has also received investment in the infrastructure, energy and technology sectors. It is also a vibrant and

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thirsty market for imported machinery and crafts. The high level of traffic in goods and knowhow between the two states is conducted by public and private sector firms alike and though China appears to be giving more than it is receiving, there are positive impacts of these corporate activities on the home economy. This includes the maintenance and development of Chinese economic prowess and economic security, as it has the stable monopoly of Iranian markets as well as a testing ground for the development of new products and the improvement of existing ones (Downs and Maloney 2011). Iran in turn receives much needed foreign direct investment, technological knowhow and an injection of life into its stagnating economy. Factors within these frameworks form the pragmatic basis of Iranian-Chinese relations and so drive the need for a normative understanding and risk reduction in the absence of a formal alliance. As they are to a degree economically intertwined and interdependent there is the pragmatic and strategic need to construct a condition of trust, benefit, and expectation vis-a vis cooperative projects, transfers and exchanges. This forms the material base – the tangible economic reality of Iranian-Chinese relations, upon which a normatively constructed Tacit Alliance can be developed. The development of this Tacit Alliance is reliant on the saleability of these material interests on the marketing of compatibilities to legitimize and promote exchanges, cooperation and overall relations. This is achieved in a particular way across two levels – the physical and the rhetorical. At the physical level all of the above material, or concrete interests produce a cyclical structure of self-fulfilling prophecy. The two states engage with one another because they are already engaged with one another – they have clear common interest’s vis-a-vis security and constitutional imperatives as well as each having markets/sectors/resources that the other needs. At the rhetorical level, an alliance is created de facto: the material interests are wrapped with a discursive narrative of amenability and confidence, which is both constructed by and constructs the positivity of the interactions that they defend. In this respect, they are building trust and reducing risk with the creation of normative influences on expectations and responses which in turn impacts the predictability of the actions of the other. This creation is evident in official discourse practices supported and enacted by the governing parties of both states as discussed below.

Construction of Iran-China Relations in the 21st Century Whilst it is clear to see that there are material interests which underpin cooperative efforts and interest between Iran and China, the nature of this chapter is also to consider the extent to which they are discursively

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embedded with a set discursive framework which seeks to construct trust and confidence. This has a connotation of securitisation theory as the assessment of the extent to which relations between the two powers are politicised and so not deemed an area of fear, threat or conflict. This necessitates an assessment of the discursive practices selected for analysis and the extent to which articulations of identity construct objects within the rhetoric. As such, the focus is on how ‘the discourse construct[s] a Tacit Alliance?’ The ‘how’ here is emphasised as understanding the presence or absence of a Tacit Alliance necessarily involves the ways in which this is done. China shows a predisposition for the use of rhetoric relating to friendship, diplomacy and exchanges with references to partnership and regional initiatives and security being the least utilised expressions of association. In comparison Iran prefers to highlight expressions of cooperation, relations and positives, with dialogue and trust being the least utilised rhetorical tools. Reports of China’s exchanges and cooperative endeavours with Iran vis-a-vis the creation of the AIIB are also framed within China’s domestic policy of encouraging peaceful development and its responsibility to pursue a peaceful environment in which to continue to develop. Chinese foreign policy in this regard is a kind of strategy – from straplines of a harmonious world to its peaceful rise, regional peace, stability and security. This also is influenced by the domestic securitisation of Xinjiang Province which, conflated or otherwise, constitutes a significant influence on China’s anti-terrorism policy. Iran on the other hand is the weaker partner in the respect that it is predominantly seen, externally, as a pariah state and as a regional nonArab, non-Sunni outcast. Like China, it wishes to regain its standing as a significant and influential regional power. Unlike China it has yet to make any meaningful progress – due to regional tensions with Arab neighbours and general international concerns over its Israeli rhetoric and nuclear programme. In keeping with these issues as well as the importance of its anti-hegemonic national and foreign policies and its theocratic governance structure, the expression of the relationship can be seen to be of greater utility. In order to maintain and legitimise the power of the narrative being enforced to construct an environment of trust and confidence – a tacit alliance – the Iranian government must do several things. First, as a theocracy it must defend its collusion with a secular, communist state. Second it must defend its cooperation with the same state which is rising and which, according to much Asian and Western discourse, has delusions of hegemony through the recreation of a tributary system. It must also offset concerns of China’s highly complex interdependence with the USA

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and, to a lesser degree, Western European states – the big and little Satans of the international system. From this it is possible to identify that these factors correlate positively with the emphasis placed on the enforcement of the expression framework. What Iran does through its media is construct a narrative which highlights above all else, the normative facet of Iranian-Chinese relations, dedicated to the construction of amenability. Rhetoric highlighting partnership, friendship, various different forms of relations and references to history (historical relations and shared historical experiences) all collude to legitimise a relationship on the grounds of affiliation, commonality and tradition. Media attention and government recognition is given to the anniversary of relations, and the representation of Asia as the centre of modernity and internationalisation prior to the onset of imperialism and globalisation. Iran recognised China’s national humiliation day with references to the same history and within its own anti-hegemonic rhetoric, thus creating a non-cultural kinship, which highlights the lack of past conflict or significant tension between the two powers. Each state has the same driving force of discursively justifying their relations to their civic audience and promoting their commitment to the same with regard to their political audience (each other). The difference is the ways in which they pursue these aims, where they lay emphasis, which is rooted not in their pragmatic development or maintenance of the relationship but in their own constructions of their wider national and foreign policy formations.

Regional Cooperation Additional regional interests centre around physical and ideological security (in particular in relation to the threat of terrorism) but also, and arguably predominantly, economic security. The SCO is a Eurasian regional organisation, created in 1996 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is based on a treaty of deepening military trust and thus reducing the influence of liberal democracies in the member states (Summers 2015). The SCO is underpinned by the commitment to non-intervention in domestic affairs and thus the safeguarding of sovereignty, territory and domestic stability, while promoting good neighbourliness and friendly cooperation (ibid). Over time, this organisation has grown in aim and scope, with the construction and promotion of regional programmes relating to key infrastructure systems such as transportation, telecoms, energy, security and banking. This is an Asian regional organisation, which is set up not so much to resolve disputes but rather to promote cooperation between members and promote their development. It also was

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established to promote regional trade relations and, above all, to safeguard security. The main security concerns identified are as follows: separatism, extremism and terrorism, and drug trafficking. Considering its proximity to the MENA and the predominance of Muslim communities this has gained much weight in the post-9/11 era, though the organisation is careful not to transform into a military bloc, instead largely concentrating on energy projects. In 2007, Iran was invited as a dialogue partner to the SCO and in 2016 sought full member status (Almeidi 2015). This has given Iran a greater pro-active presence in the central Asian region, which provides opportunities with regard to energy projects and wider non-hydrocarbon trade potentials. This fits with Iran’s foreign policy commitments of increasing regional alliances and collective security. It is also attractive to Iran with regard to its potential ability to sway political power and exert influence internationally, an important factor for Iran and its pariah status vis-a-vis Western powers and organisations (Saremi 2015). In pursuit of greater economic cooperation, the SCO has also launched an initiative for a new banking system to offset the dominance of the current international banking system and thus create new areas of economic growth and political influence. The AIIB, currently being established with its base in Beijing, has both China and Iran as two of its 35 founding members (Shaoxian 2015). The involvement of Iran is both geo-strategic and political. It is true that Iran’s main security concerns lay within its immediate vicinity, however, due to the impacts and pervasiveness of globalisation and international trade, economic progress and security are highly interdependent. Iran’s role in the AIIB forms part of its wider commitment to improving its international image – assisted also by the recently concluded nuclear negotiations. This also has an influence domestically with regard to a populace that has been suffering from sanctions. The growth in relative size of the younger generations which do not remember first-hand the Iranian revolution or previous external interventions (Ortega 2015). Assisted by greater technological and telecommunications access, this upcoming generation is ever more conscious of disparities between itself and other, more modern and developed societies. The AIIB will be a forum for the pooling of funds to invest in infrastructure projects for poorer countries. In this way, it is similar to the World Bank and IMF, though without the structural adjustment stipulations that are often seen as unfair and progress-stifling (Young 2015).

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Conclusion Iran and China interact on multiple levels relating to trade, development and security – both domestically and regionally. Taken together they form a political economy backdrop for cooperation. All their interactions have a significant economic dimension: be it investment or hydrocarbons for trade practices. In the contemporary era of the liberal world order both are at the mercy of globalisation and dominant international norms such as human rights expectations. Both are outsiders, to varying degrees of the dominant international ‘club’. Each state also conversely has similar foreign and domestic policy interests with regard to the meta-narratives that they construct to articulate programmes of development of a state that was previously amongst the most developed. As has been identified, Iranian-Chinese relations are significant in all economic sectors relating to trade, military cooperation, technological transfers, investment and infrastructure projects, and issues of peace and stability in which these can take place. China is heavily reliant on Iran for its crude oil imports and refined oil exports – but not exclusively so as it does have other, significant suppliers – it also sees in Iran an accessible market free of dominant Western giants which is a source of trade but also a testing ground for their brands. Iran in turn sees in China a back door into the global economy and a vital source of trade but also of development and modernity in terms of infrastructure development and technological transfer. These are hard, material interests that form the basis of their relations. There is also a parallel benefit for the development and maintenance of Iranian-Chinese relations, which is tied to domestic policy interests of stability, security and legitimacy. Each has an interest in greater regional cooperation and engagement which will reap economic and diplomatic rewards, as well as boosting regional stability and offsetting Western dominance, which is also a key foreign policy motivation. In this respect, they certainly have the basis for a formal alliance, especially as China is heavily involved in the development of Iranian hydrocarbon fields and Iran potentially has an interest in the Muslim dominant Xinjiang province of China, which forms a specific domestic and regional security concern with the rise of radical Islamist organisations post-9/11. The material base and the discursive practices highlighted then mirror a formal alliance vis-a-vis shared interests, economic dependence or independency and security interests. However, the security concerns expressed are set within the political economy field rather than traditional, hard power military interests and as such affect the viability of a

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traditional alliance. International pressures are also a key component of the lack of a formal alliance as each state has its own, pragmatic agenda and, for China. Especially, a formal alliance with a pariah state would significantly affect its ‘responsible power’ commitments and agenda. What is evident, however, is the construction of an informal commitment of each towards the other, in the absence of a formal agreement. Support, cooperation and promotion of ties are endorsed and accepted within the discursive, rhetorical, and hermeneutic domain of norms and valuecreation and maintenance. The relationship also impacts at the regional level as Iran is a key node of the New Silk Road initiative and a founding member of the AIIB. These initiatives are aimed at strengthening FDI and developing the infrastructure of member states. They are also opportunities for greater integration into the global economy. In the case of the AIIB, it can be seen to be an attempt to offset the influence of dominant liberal institutions which have the ability, due to their emphasis on liberalisation and democratisation, to compromise state stability. These initiatives also seek to develop and strengthen regional security with regard to development, of course, and purchasing parity, but also as it relates to issues such as terrorism, crime and corruption. As such it can be noted that the political economy of Iranian-Chinese relations also has a very real international dimension. These issues influence and are influenced by the political economy of the two states and their overarching foreign and domestic policy goals and concerns. The creation of the AIIB and the potential of the BRI draws the Asian region closer to the Middle East in economic and developmental terms and can offer significant challenges to the dominance of the current liberal system which puts these two regions at the mercy of globalisation rather than as active participants within it. The New Silk Road venture also brings them closer together economically as well as culturally and technologically as trade routes historically have transported so much more than mere goods and services. With the removal of sanctions and Iran’s key position with this trade route will it become, once again, a Western outpost as European and American firms rush to its unfettered market, or will it retain its anti-hegemonic constitution? This is a question that needs to be asked, but one that should be asked with an understanding of the dynamics of Iranian-Chinese relations. This much more comprehensive analysis of the growing role of both Iran and China in the coming years must necessarily include an appreciation of the nature of the Tacit Alliance within which they relate to and interact with one another. The ways in which this alliance influences their joint and individual policies at the

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national and regional levels, as well as their responses to Western discourse at the international level, must also be understood. The Iranian-Chinese relationship is an interesting one, not least because of the lack of significant research dedicated to it, despite the two parties playing key roles in the current global political economy. China is a rising power with an insatiable need for energy, new markets and investment, while Iran is a state rich in hydrocarbon reserves. Yet, though its foreign policy goals are similar to those of China’s, it is considered a pariah state, mistrusted by regional neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, and viewed with suspicion and as a potential threat by the USA due to divergent, and arguably incompatible ideologies. It will be interesting in the coming years to see how such dynamics may evolve following not only the JCPOA, particularly in light of Trump’s withdrawal from it.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Robert Czulda is a specialist in international security; Iran and the Middle East, Assistant Professor at the University of Lodz, Poland. He has received several awards including the Alumni of the Young Leaders Dialogue of the US Department of State (2010-2011) and a Fulbright Senior Award (2017-2018). Robert has held various academic posts including as a Visiting Researcher at the University of Maryland, United States and Visiting Lecturer at several universities in Iran, Brazil, Indonesia, Ireland, Lithuania, Turkey and Slovakia, as well as the National Cheng-chi University in Taipei. Robert is also a freelance defence journalist and contributor to IHS Jane’s and “Military Technology”. Robert travels to Iran regularly. Imad El-Anis Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University and the author of several books including Jordan and the United States: The Political Economy of Trade and Economic Reform in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2011), A New A-Z of International Relations Theory (I.B. Tauris, 2015), and International Political Economy in the 21st Century: contemporary Issues and Analyses, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2017). Dr El-Anis holds a BA (Hons) in International Relations and Global Politics (Nottingham Trent University), MA in International Political Economy (University of Sheffield) and a PhD in International Political Economy (Nottingham Trent University). His research focuses on various aspects of the international relations of the Middle East and North Africa including: trade policies; international institutions; resource scarcity; nuclear technology proliferation; revolutionary change; and crisis management. Wojciech Grabowski is Assistant Professor in the Political Science Institute at Gdansk University. He is an author of the monograph “Muslim fundamentalism in the Middle East” and co-editor of two post-conference books: “Muslim and Arab World in International Relations”. He has authored many articles covering the Persian Gulf in International Relations and has organized many conferences on Middle Eastern topics. He was a Visiting Researcher at Qatar University, King Faisal Foundation (Saudi Arabia), Alamah Tabatabai University (Iran), Jawaharlal Nehru University

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Contributors

(India) as well as in the National University of Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest (Romania). He was executor of the Polish Foreign Ministry Project on “Studies on the Contemporary Poland and Central Europe”, NATO project on “the perseverance of terrorism: focus on leaders, and European Union project on terrorism and civil rights. Sahra Joharchi is Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University. She holds a BA (Hons) International Relations, an MA in International Relations and a PhD in International Relations. Sahra’s research interests include the following areas: the international relations of the MENA; MENA-Asia relations; International Political Economy; trust, risk and security in Iranian foreign relations; cognitive foreign policy; and Iranian and Chinese foreign policy. Her PhD research focuses on the Political Economy of Iranian foreign policy and the ways in which discourse is utilized to construct both positive and negative relations with other states. Sahra has presented papers at various conferences, is a member of ISA, BISA ECPR, Nottingham Trent University’s MENA cluster research events, and BRISMES. Sahra has published articles in the Maghreb Review and China in the World. Allison McManus is the Research Director at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy in Washington, D.C. She has worked as an independent researcher and writer in the United States and Morocco. She is a co-editor of Jadaliyya e-zine’s Maghreb page. She has been published in Jadaliyya, The National (Abu Dhabi), Foreign Affairs, and Courrier International (France), as well as by The University of California Press. Ms. McManus holds a Master of Arts in Global and International Studies from the University of California, Santa Barbara and a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and French from Tufts University Carlotta Stegagno received her doctorate form University of Genoa, Department of Political Science. Her recent publications include MƯšƯl ҵAflaq’s Thought between Nationalism and Socialism, (Oriente Moderno, 2017) and Syria: From Arab Nationalism to Civil War (Tetide, 2017). Her research interests include Middle Eastern Contemporary and Modern History, Middle Eastern studies and International Relations. She is currently works as independent researcher for different charities and NGOs

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Natasha Underhill is Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University, with teaching responsibilities on the BA (Hons) International Relations and MA International Relations, teaching modules at all levels. Natasha is module leader for International Relations in Context and is involved in a number of BA and MA modules, including in the following areas: International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy, International Security, International Relations of the Middle East and South Asia, The International Relations of the Middle East and South Asia, International Terrorism, State Failure, and Insurgency/Counter-Insurgency. Natasha is the author of several works, most recently Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency: Calculating the risk of state failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

INDEX

A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) 58, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi 63, Aden 57, 61, 66-67, 70 Afghanistan 15, 48-50, 53, 57, 103 Aflaq, Michel 26-27, 116, Al Libnani, Abu Saleh 63, 66-69 Al-Arabiya English (newspaper) 67 al-Arifi, Mohammad 62 al-Asiri, Ahmed 63 Al-Azm, Sadiq Jalal 32 Al-Bawardi Mosque 62 Al-Hadi, Abd-Rabbuh Manৢour (Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi) 58, 61 Al-Houthi, Mohammad Ali 64 Al-Hudaydah (city) 61-62 Al-Husri, Sati 25 al-Jubeir, Adel 63 al-Mustaqbal (newspaper) 67 al-Nimr, Sheikh Nimr Baqir 55 al-Sabhan, Thamer 62 al-Sammad, Salah 64 al-Saud, Turki bin Faisal 55 al-Sistani, Ali 62 Arab Nationalism 24-28 Arab Socialism 26-28 Arab Spring xi-xii, 23-24, 30-31, 33, 61, 80, Arabian Sea 57-58 Asharq al-Awsat (newspaper) 62, 67 Assad, Bashar 12, 31, 46 Assadi, Ali Asghar 62 Ba’ath Party 27-28 Ba’athism 27 Bab-el-Mandeb 57-59 Baghdad 46, 49, 69 Bahrain 53, 55, 78, 80-81, 83-84, 86 Beirut 28, 67, 69

BRI (Belt Road Initiative) 94-97, 109 Burhan, Ghalioum 32 Bustani, Butrus 25 China xiii, 88, 93-96. 98-110 Churchill, Winston 56 CIA 15 Damascus 31-32, 69 Decisive Storm (operation) 61 Dhofar Rebellion 57 Djibouti 59 Donald Trump 9, 17, 41, 70 Duwaima (island) 56 Egypt xii, 1-20, 27-28, 49, 57, 83 Feierstein, Gerald 63 Firouzabadi, Hassan 63 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) xiii, 55, 61, 67, 77-90 Gulf of Aden 57, 66 Habibollah Sayyari 58 Hizbollah (Hezbollah) 38, 63-64, 67 House Foreign Affairs Committee (US) 63, Houthis (Ansar Allah) 59, 61-70 HSV-2 “Swift”67 Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi 59, 64 Hussein, Saddam 56-57 Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz 56 Ibrahim Zakzaky 65 Indian Ocean 57 Iran xii-xiii, 51, 54-55, 57-59, 61-70, 77-81, 83-84, 86-90, 93-110 Iranian Red Crescent Society 61 Iraq 15, 17, 27-28, 39, 43, 45-51, 53, 55-57, 59, 62, 65-69, 77-84, 89, 96, 98, 100 IRGC 64 Ishtirakiyya 25

120 Israel 5, 16, 18, 28, 58-59, 64-65, 67, 69, 83, 97, 100, 105, 110 Jabal al-Dukham (region) 61 Jihan 1 (ship) 66 Kassir, Samir 27 Khamenei, Ali 64 Lebanon 54, 58, 64, 67, 96 Mediterranean Sea 57, 59 Moghaddam, Esmail Ahmadi 67-68 Musa, Salamah 25 MV “Limburg”56 Nahda 25 Nasrallah, Hassan 64 Nasser, Gamal Abdul 4-6, 57 Nasserism 27 Nategh-Nuri, Ali Akbar 53 Nikbakht, Nour Ahmad 62 Obama, Barack 15-16 40 48 69 93 Organic intellectuals 26-27 Ormuz Strait 59 Pakistan 48-49, 53, 57, 100, 117 Pan-Arabism 25 Pan-Islamism 25 Peninsula Shield Force 78’ 81 People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) 55, 57 Perim (island) 32, 59 Persian Gulf 55, 57, 63, 65, 78-81, 84, 90 Proxy war xii-xiii, 53-54. 63, 69, 77-78 Qaani, Esmail 67 Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 49-50, 56, 58, 61-62 Qawmiyya 25 Red Sea 57-59, 65-66, 87 Regional Security Complex 78-79 Riyadh 53-59, 61-62, 69-70 Rohingya Muslims 65 Rouhani, Hassan 55, 62 Rural intellectuals 24, 26

Index Saada Province 59, 61 Said, Edward 24, 30 Saidi, Ali 64 Salami, Hossein p64 Saleh, Ali Abdullah 55, 57, 61, 6364, 66-69 Sana’a 58-59, 61-62, 68-70 Saudi Arabia xii-xiii, 53-59, 61-63, 65, 69-70, 77, 80, 82-83, 85, 8990, 97, 110 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) 96, 106-107 Seyyed Hassan Nam 62 Shamkhani, Ali 62 Shummayyil, Shibli 25 Soviet Union 57-58, 65, 79 SuMed oil pipeline 59 Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) 62 Syria 16-7, 20, 26-28, 31-32, 45-50, 53, 55, 57-58, 64-65, 67-70, 7778, 83-84, 89, 96, 116 Tehran xiii, 53-55, 57-58, 61, 63-66, 68-70 Turkey 58, 83, 97, 100, 115 Ulama 24 UN Security Council 68, 88 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 77, 80-81, 83, 85, 90 United States 9, 15, 17, 48, 54, 58, 63-66, 69-70, 79, 84, 90, 102103, 115, 116 USS “Cole” 56 USS “Mason”58, 66 USS “Ponce” 66 Washington DC 16-67, 46 Watan 25 Yemen Pxii-xiii, 48-50, 53-59, 6170, 77-78, 83-84, 87, 89, 96 Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) 55, 57