Secrets and Conspiracies (Value Inquiry Book / Ethical Theory and Practice, 372) 9004499717, 9789004499713

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Secrets and Conspiracies

Value Inquiry Book Series Founding Editor Robert Ginsberg Editor-​in-​Chief J.D. Mininger

volume 372

Ethical Theory and Practice Edited by Olli Loukola University of Helsinki, Finland

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​vibs and brill.com/etp

Secrets and Conspiracies Edited by

Olli Loukola and Leonidas Donskis

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: Spider’s net © Matti “Paappa” Muurimäki. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Loukola, Olli, editor. | Donskis, Leonidas, editor. Title: Secrets and conspiracies / edited by Olli Loukola and Leonidas Donskis. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2022] | Series: Value inquiry book series, 0929-8436 ; volume 372 | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “This collection purports to provide a sober analysis of the much debated issues and tries to develop and outline conceptual and theoretical tools to make sense of what secrets and conspiracies truly are.” – Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2021057980 (print) | LCCN 2021057981 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004499713 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004499720 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Conspiracy theories. | Conspiracies–Political aspects. | Conspiracies–Psychological aspects. Classification: LCC HV6275 .S43 2022 (print) | LCC HV6275 (ebook) | DDC 001.9/8–dc23/eng/20220119 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021057980 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021057981

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill.” See and download: brill.com/​brill-​typeface. issn 0929-​8 436 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 9971-​3 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​4 9972-​0 (e-​book) Copyright 2022 by Olli Loukola and Leonidas Donskis. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-​use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents  Preface vii  List of Tables x  Introduction 1 Olli Loukola

part 1 Secrets 1  A Secret Hidden in Plain View Lord Chesterfield’s Theory of Dissimulation 13 Cătălin Avramescu 2  Pseudo-​secrets 22 Hubert Schleichert 3  The Secret of Ideologies 39 Tõnu Viik 4  It Couldn’t Happen Here 53 Olli Loukola and Leonidas Donskis 5  Conspiracy Theories as Fiction Kafka and Sade 75 Timo Airaksinen

part 2 Conspiracies 6  Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorists 99 David Coady 7  Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited 126 Charles Pigden

vi Contents 8 Conspiracy Theories, Contempt, and Affective Governmentality 157 Ginna Husting 9 Machiavelli’s Conspiracy Games 182 Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-​Ullmann 10 A Conspiracy Theory of Unsustainable Over-​consumption The Market and Environmental Collective Action Problems 206 Christopher Stevens 11 Cunning Strategy in Cyberspace—​The Renaissance of Conspiracy 238 Saara Jantunen and Aki-​Mauri Huhtinen 12 Some Reflections on Conspiracy Rhetoric in Belarusian Political Discourses 250 Vladimir Fours Index 257

Preface The mystery in our secular-​minded age is what lacks proper phrasing, more sensitive language, or our participation in the symbolic construction of reality. The secret, for its part, refers to a missing link between the private and the public. If we take politics, in the broad sense, as the dialectical relation between the private and the public, then a secret is what makes up an important aspect of personal life, biography, or identity of a politician or a public figure without becoming available to the public. Yet this aspect, if exposed and widespread, may have crucial political implications for a person and his or her milieu. As a fact of personal life concealed from the public and available to a tiny group of adherents, family members, or no one, the secret remains a highly ambivalent phenomenon: it always functions behind the scenes, yet it can shed light on societal life. Those people in charge of the covert life of a secret and its holder would never allow anybody else to expose it, yet some hints or insignificant parts of information extracted from the context and intentionally dropped to the public can make a secret even more significant and powerful. This is how rumors come into existence. They may well be a popular response to the public perceptions of a person closely related to the existing power structure whose private life is beyond the reach of common people; yet these rumors may be manufactured and released deliberately by the powerful to divert political attention from the real stratagems of significant political actors. It suffices to recall antisemitic rumors and conspiracy theories forged in Tsarist Russia after 1905 to divert the political attention of working class people from real politics and to channel their suffering and anguish into bigotry and antisemitic hatred. Why do secrets have to be kept strictly confidential as a covert aspect of an important person’s life, without becoming part of the overt side of the person’s politics or social existence? It is because the secret distinguishes an important figure from the second-​rank ones. Nobody is interested in the secrets of those who do not have access to financial, ideological, and political power. To deprive people of their secrets means to disempower them, as exemplified in the work of twentieth-​century dystopian writers. The secret is about power in both the most inclusive and exclusive sense. The secret always reveals itself as a critical aspect of power. Power calls for a secret or at least some covert and unavailable aspects of its emergence in the world. The conspiracy theory evidently refers to the failure of a given society or culture to accept and contextualize one (or several) of its segments. At the same time, the conspiracy theory, as a response to such a failure, may well be employed by those who are perceived (by political or cultural majority) to be

viii Preface an alien and inimical segment of a given society or culture—​some marginalized or victimized groups (although this phenomenon, as a rule, may also be found in large social bodies, such as societies and their cultures). In brief, the conspiracy theory, by virtue of being a para-​theory and thus functioning at the margins of the theories of society par excellence, can never be locked solely within the frame of theoretical constructs. To show how the conspiratorial view of the universe enters the nineteenth-​and twentieth-​century world, it is necessary to enter the realm of literary fiction. Moreover, to be able to trace the ideological and moral implications of the conspiracy theory for modern consciousness, politics, and culture, we have to focus on a less attractive source of information—​a subterranean world of pathological collective hatred, the world inseparable from political intrigues and manipulations, and also from literary fakes and forgeries. Yet one more pivotal aspect of the conspiracy theory of society exists. This aspect has been aptly described by the British author and journalist David Aaronovitch. According to Aaronovitch, conspiracy theories reflect our unbearable fear of indifference of the surrounding world toward us (see Aaronovitch, 2009). Aptly describing the paradoxically comforting effect of the conspiracy theory, which in his view protects us from, to use the term coined by the London-​based American psychoanalyst Dr. Stephen Grosz, “the catastrophe of indifference,” Aaronovitch reminds us, Everyone knows Oscar Wilde’s famous dictum “There is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.” Fewer will have heard Susan Sontag’s clever development of it: “I envy paranoids. They actually feel people are paying attention to them.” If conspiracism is a projection of paranoia, it may exist in order to reassure us that we are not the totally unconsidered objects of a blind process. If Marilyn was murdered, then she did not die, as we most fear and as we most often observe, alone and ingloriously. A catastrophe occurred, but not the greater catastrophe that awaits all of us. aaronovitch, 2009, p. 308

As the phrase “nobody cares about you” sounds like a cruel verdict tantamount to proof that we are a nonperson or nonentity, we have only one tool at hand to actualize and fulfill ourselves as those who matter in this world, namely to convince the world around us that we deserve to be a target group or that we qualify for an object of conspiracy or desire to be destroyed. In a world of desperate attention-​seeking, indifference becomes a failure, if not a liability. In a way, the conspiracy theory of society bears a family resemblance to such phenomena of the age of indifference as exaggerated, politically exploited

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victimhood, martyrdom, the sensationalism of all shades in public life and politics, and scandalized grasp of reality. To crack the armor of the indifferent world trying to get at least the minimal amount of its temporary attention, we need an outbreak of collective hysteria, sex or corruption scandal, or a plausible conspiracy theory on how the world hates trying to subvert or eliminate us from within and from without. Therefore, much like tv celebrities or successful victims, the masterminds of conspiracies and conspiracy theories win exactly where people of long-​term commitment and moderate way of speaking and thinking tend to lose—​they break the ice of silence getting the attention of the world. The winner takes it all. The conspiracy theory of society appears as a crie du coeur against the wall of liquid-​modern forms of social alienation, moral indifference, political disengagement, and silence. Like self-​inflicted political martyrdom and a sense of self-​cultivated victimhood, the conspiracy theory is a desperate attempt to win the hearts and minds of a world of mechanical rhetoric and polite indifference. This is the world where nobody responds to our letters or email messages and where nobody reciprocates our efforts unless we come up with a political sensation or a plausible account of our suffering, or unless we ourselves become good empirical evidence that may support someone else’s social theory or political doctrine. This book I have co-​edited with Olli Loukola, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, appears as an attempt to cover an immense territory of political imagination, fantasies, conjectures, fears, modern uncertainties, and insecurities that we tend to describe by appending to them a generic term “conspiracy theories.” The book resulted from a seminar at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania, which marked the beginning of a larger joint undertaking by a group of Finnish, German, Lithuanian, and Romanian scholars to work on secrets, mysteries, and conspiracy theories. Thanks to Olli Loukola, the aforementioned initiative was developed into this volume with additional contributions from other colleagues working in the fields of social and moral philosophy, political theory, and history of ideas. Leonidas Donskis Bibliography Aaronovitch, David (2009). Woodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History. London: Jonathan Cape.

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Tables 9.1  The Conspirator-​Prince Game 199 11.1  Perception grabbing and binding onto information 245

Introduction Olli Loukola This collection of essays purports not only to investigate and analyze the various kinds of conspiracies and theories there are, but also to describe and analyze those phenomena that are linked to these theories. The most important of these are ‘secrets’, and therefore the first chapter of this collection is dedicated to essays on secrets and lies; on deceits and the reality hidden from knowledge or view; and concealed goals and purposes, or whatever they turn out to be. Conspiracy theories, on the other hand, seem to have become an important part of the way we picture our world and our relations and communicate between the various actors present. Conspiracy theories are surely here to stay, but how seriously are we to take them? Are we to completely discard them as being political rhetoric, purposeful misinformation, or even individual delusions, as they so often are presented? Or should we take them as serious, perhaps even scientific theories, which are able to say something meaningful and give us new knowledge of the world and human action? This is the main topic of the second part of this collection. This book offers thus a rich collection of essays written on secrets and conspiracies. It includes conceptual and theoretical analyses, philosophical and political arguments, historical snapshots and explorations, as well as analyses of concurrent empirical states of affairs, movements and maneuvers, and rhetoric. It purports to provide a sober analysis of the much-​debated issues and tries to develop and outline various conceptual and theoretical tools to make sense of what secrets and conspiracies really are.

Part 1: Secrets

The first essay in this collection, Cătălin Avramescu’s ‘A Secret Hidden in Plain View: Lord Chesterfield’s Theory of Dissimulation’ is a wonderful historical miniature, giving an inspiring insight into the purposeful use of rhetoric. It starts with a painting by William Hogarth from 1754 of a decadent banquet, most likely inspired by an electoral meeting of the Whigs. In the painting is a placard stating, “Give us our eleven days”, which refers to the Calendar Reform Act of 1751, which shortened the year 1752 by dropping eleven days. This resulted in numerous riots, as people were afraid that their lives were actually being shortened.

© Olli Loukola, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_002

2 Loukola This painting is the starting point of Avramescu’s essay, and it focuses on the art of argumentation developed by Lord Chesterfield in his correspondence, which was designed to tackle unstable social situations, such as the one described above. Behind this thinking, Avramescu traces various sources, classical ideas, and philosophical conceptions: from Machiavellism, for example, the idea that the end of social interactions is simply domination, and the best means for its achievement is flattery and lying. Further, Avramescu analyses this psychology of domination to contain elements from the theory of passions developed by the French moralists, and the epistemological background to have come from casuistry. Avramescu calls Chesterfield’s discourse a child of its time, and yet at the same time it is more than mere eccentric individual thinking, in fact it is a complete discourse in its own right. Already in his own time Chesterfield’s letters to his natural son were described by Johnson as teaching ‘the morals of a whore and the manners of a dancing master’. It surely does not take much imagination to see similar elements –​the art of pleasing, the emphasis on passions, and the disregard for science –​prevailing in our contemporary politics and public debates, as ways of conveniently concealing true intentions. Rephrasing the last sentence from Avramescu’s essay, ‘[i]‌n the end, it seems, everybody ha[s] something to conceal’, gives us the starting point for a fascinating analysis of “Pseudo-​Secrets” in the next essay by Hubert Schleichert. Schleichert analyses ‘genuine secrets’ as three-​place relations, where one actor lacks the information at stake, and the second one has it, but does not give it to the first. In contrast to this, ‘pseudo-​secrets’ are where people behave as if the question is a genuine secret, while in fact there is nobody who has that missing information. In these cases, people are simply using the wrong method: to find out a ‘genuine’ secret one has simply to turn to the person who has the information. However, to find the solution to an open problem or open question (where nobody possesses the information) one must use ordinary problem-​ solving methods, e.g. trial and error. It would be a mistake to think of such open questions as secrets, but this has become increasingly common. As Schleichert puts it, ‘[t]here seems to be some temptation to play poetic games with the secret-​veil-​and-​riddle terminology even without thinking of the implications of such a terminology’. Schleichert writes that the progress of the scientific worldview can in part be seen as the transition from pseudo-​secrets to open problems. But how do we know which questions are genuine secrets, and which are mere open problems? There are thus two kinds of ‘secrets’: answerable and non-​answerable ones. The answerable ones are either open problems (and as such are not ‘secrets’) or ones where the answer is hidden by someone (genuine secrets). It

Introduction

3

is the non-​answerable secrets that pose the problems here: if someone thinks that there is an answer, but someone is hiding it, then the secret becomes a pseudo-​secret. People often take grand existential, and metaphysical questions as secrets. Such talk, however, presupposes that they are solvable, that somebody possesses the answers, or that they can be answered, at least in principle. But is this really the case with such questions? The idea that ideologies are also things that inherently contain something hidden, something that ‘ideologized’ people are unaware of, has a central role in the analysis and critique of ideologies by Tõnu Viik in his ‘The Secret of Ideologies’. Viik discusses two intertwined assumptions: firstly, there is the psychological ‘assumption of a deceived mind’, which purports to ‘to disclose the deceptive mechanism that produces distortion in people’s perception of reality ’, and the reason for this is the ‘ability of human consciousness to be misled by social discourses that provide us with commonsensical ways of thinking and understanding the world’. Thus, the task of the critique of ideologies is to disclose this situation, to make these social groups aware of their ‘victimized positions’ (i.e. the notorious ‘false consciousness’). Secondly, this situation is thought to have been produced purposefully, as the second, ‘evil agent assumption’ states ‘that the ideological distortion of reality is produced in somebody’s interest and helps to preserve their position of power. And the task of the critique here is that of ‘identifying the benefactor of the ideological distortion.’ Viik describes the roots and presuppositions behind these two assumptions to have arisen from the Marxist critique of ideologies, i.e., the famous conviction that ideologies are sets of ideas and beliefs with the purpose of distorting reality to preserve and protect the interests of the ruling classes. After Marx, this critique was developed by theoreticians such as Karl Mannheim, Antonio Gramsci, and Louis Althusser. Viik continues by analyzing the more contemporary version of the evil agent assumption through the writings of Raymond Aron, Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault, and Richard Rorty, and the deceived mind assumption as theorized by Edmund Husserl, Louis Althusser, Leonidas Donskis, and Slavoj Žižek. Viik finishes his analyses with the important conclusion, that ‘the secret of ideologies [in fact] lies in our need to have feelings that relate to things, plots, friends, enemies, and narratives, that we “naturally” love and hate’. And more importantly, ‘[w]‌e are ourselves the benefactors of ideological distortion. We are not just the deceived, but also the deceiving agents’. In ‘It Couldn’t Happen Here’, Olli Loukola and Leonidas Donskis start from the mentality or a collective belief to be found in numerous countries and cultures. This belief is that while the rest of the world is beset with difficulties and various kinds of catastrophes and disasters, such things would never happen in their own country or culture. Loukola starts (in chapters i–​i v) by analyzing

4 Loukola the assumptions and justifications for this conviction, finding them all lacking, and continues by linking this conviction to ‘conspiracism’, the mentality of explaining conspiracies as the driving force of history, and essentially therefore as deterministic and conservative worldviews. Donskis takes up this cue and continues (in chapters v–​v i) by analyzing the culture of determinism. Donskis notes in the beginning that conspiracy theories can be found not only in the mindsets of conservatives or right-​wing thinkers, but that they are just as likely to be found in leftist discourse, as became apparent in the previous essay by Tõnu Viik. According to Donskis, modern conspiracy theory rests crucially on the assumption of societal life and human existence as based on inexorable laws. This assumption leads further to the inference that people cannot control biological or social forces and thus influence their state of affairs. As such, society is seen as a complex mechanism or machine that cannot operate except under the guidance of experts and their patrons with secret institutes and laboratories. As Donskis writes, ‘[t]‌he logical conclusion of such a theory is that contemporary science, ultimately, is a conspiracy against humanity’. All this leads to a ‘culture of destiny’, where no individual is responsible for anything; and this leaves no space for theoretical reflections or critical judgments, or moral accountability. The following essay, Timo Airaksinen’s ‘Conspiracy Theories as Fiction: Kafka and Sade’, provides us with a gateway from the essays of the first part dealing mainly with secrets, to the essays of the second chapter concentrating on philosophical work on conspiracies and theories about them. Airaksinen’s essay provides an interesting continuation with the topics of ‘it couldn’t happen here’, as well as individual victimization, already addressed by Loukola and Donskis in the previous essay, through a challenging perspective on conspiracies in works of fiction. By providing a subtle analysis of guilt and punishment Airaksinen draws conclusions on the kind of theorizing that conspiracy theories represent. He investigates the kinds of explanations they offer for the often puzzling things that happen in society, in particular in their fictional sense and usage, drawing his cues from the works of Franz Kafka and Marquis de Sade. Airaksinen writes that conspiracies are real, but conspiracy theories are fictional. Conspiracies do exist in real life but conspiracy theories are imaginary: ‘something bad ­happens to us, the normal, good and innocent people, and we explain why it happens in terms of some conspiracies by secret societies … [furthermore,] such societies are the embodiment of evil. We have good reason to be afraid. We are neither crazy nor paranoid. It is evident that we are in search of an explanation’. Thus, ‘the last explanation for the existence of conspiracy theories is that they are interesting, fantastic, and good sympathetic fiction’ with

Introduction

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their point of view is essentially that of the victim: ‘the reader can identify with the underdog, live through her fears, and experience her destiny. As such the stories will live and flourish forever’.

Part 2: Conspiracies

The fact that actual conspiracies do exist, and a great number of them can be found throughout history, cannot be doubted. Let us then continue with the idea that a conspiracy theory is just a theory, one type among many others, explaining some real and existing social events or phenomena. The difference is that conspiracy theory does so by postulating a conspiracy. Along with this, a conspiracy theorist is then someone who subscribes to such a theory. However, how we feel about conspiracy theories is altogether another issue. ‘Conspiracy theorizing’ is a label that is frequently used to denote wild fantasizing, paranoid and irrational fears, or purposeful political rhetoric. According to David Coady’s ‘Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorists’, such a way of thinking is to a certain extent the result of Karl Popper’s unfortunate and untimely definition of conspiracy theories, a stance which later accumulated into ‘an intellectual witch-​hunt’ with the result that conspiracy theories and theorists have been unnecessarily discredited. The issue here then is what kinds of theories are conspiracy theories, and what can be credibly called one? Just as importantly, whether they serve as valid or credible scientific theories? Also, is there something inherently twisted or misguided in theorizing about conspiracies that warrant the aforementioned reactions of fright and aversion, as conventional wisdom often claims? More to the point, Coady takes up the issue of whether it is irrational to be a conspiracy theorist and finds the arguments generally put forth to be unconvincing. Conspiracy theories are just theories, but not in the sense that they would be epistemically or otherwise more suspect than similar non-​conspiratorial theories. As Coady summarizes, “theory” is an epistemically neutral term, and we are justified in believing some of them and not others, and it is possible to know that some of them are true. There is nothing per se or inherent in conspiracy theories that would make them irrational, and the only way to find out if they are or not is by listening to arguments and examining the evidence, as we do with any other theories. Charles Pigden is one of those philosophers along with David Coady, who began serious philosophical investigation and theorising concerning conspiracies. In his ‘Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited’ Pigden continues along the same lines by concentrating on the ethics of belief

6 Loukola and challenging the conventional wisdom which claims that conspiracy theories and theorists just simply ought not to be believed. Pigden describes and analyses the various possible interpretations of such conspiratorial skepticism, from a potential epistemic duty that we might not have to believe or investigate conspiracy theories through to the roles of our belief-​forming strategies, and further to the potential irrationality of conspiracy theorizing. Pigden argues, based on his analyses of the different readings, that conventional wisdom is ‘deeply unwise’. Instead, he argues, that if the evidence supports conspiracy theories, then we are rationally entitled to believe in them. Furthermore, on the basis of his analysis of theorizing in general he concludes that there is no special general defect in conspiracy theories as such, and therefore we should be prepared to investigate them just like any other scientific theories. But even if conspiracy theories can be fully legitimate scientific theories, there is surely something strange about them and we should pay attention to the conventional discourse concerning them. To enquire where and why such attitudes arise. Perhaps there is some basis for the everyday distrust of conspiratorial theorizing. There is indeed a considerable number of arguments made against the credibility of conspiracy theories, and even if most of them are false, as Pigden shows, we still need to analyze the reasons for such widespread reactions. Why do we even have to justify conspiracy theories as describing and explaining credibly certain types of social phenomena, something which we normally do not need to do with other social scientific theories? The answer may be found when we focus on conspiracy theorizing as a social phenomenon that involves aspects of political idealizing and governing. Or as Ginna Husting states in ‘Once More, with Feeling: Conspiracy Theories, Contempt, and Affective Governmentality’, the question is more to do with ‘conspiracy panics’ and this involves recognizing that conspiracy discourse functions ‘not just on a cognitive register, but on an affective one as well’. More to the point, Husting claims that ‘[the] conspiratorial panic discourse is itself a form of emotional and political engagement driven by contempt and laced with anger and fear. The affect running through conspiracy panic performs discursive work, degrading and dismissing both claims and claimants’. Here Husting is not that far from the conclusions of Leonidas Donskis & Olli Loukola and Timo Airaksinen in their essays. Thus, Husting analyses conspiracy theories by looking at the way they are used in public and scientific discourse and what the purposes and goals of those are who engage and propose conspiratorial explanations for social phenomena. This is the starting point of ‘dietrological’ studies, which focus on the reasons for the widespread contemporary construction, belief, and circulation of conspiracy theories.

Introduction

7

Let us then continue with analyses of what one can achieve through the actual conspiring and construction of conspiracy theories, that is, what are the pros and cons of engaging or being drawn into conspiratorial activities. Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-​Ullmann start with historical considerations and the issue of the framework of rational action in their ‘Machiavelli’s Conspiracy Games’. Not unsurprisingly, Niccolò Machiavelli dedicated a full chapter to conspiracies in ‘The Discourses on Livy’ (1531). The goal of Holler and Klose-​Ullmann’s essay is to analyze conspiracies as games and to shed light on the conditions of their success and/​or failure. The essay aims to show that ‘conspiracy is a problem of strategic thinking and game theory is its adequate language’. Through a wonderful reconstruction of Machiavelli’s arguments, Holler and Klose-​Ullmann open up a fascinating picture with historical examples on the strategies and logic of plotting and counterplotting conspiracies. Christopher Stevens then takes a unique outlook at the topic in his ‘A Conspiracy Theory of Unsustainable Over-​Consumption: The Market and Environmental Collective Action Problems’. He examines what he calls ‘self-​ conspiracy’ or ‘auto-​conspiracy’ in a particular area of social action, that of environmental collective action. More closely, he concentrates on coordination problems, which at the general level can be outlined as public policy problems the outcomes of which are desired by no one but, nevertheless, are brought about through rational and self-​interested behavior of individual actors. He poses the central question: ‘[w]‌hy ought any business entity diminish production or any agent diminish consumption if there is little evidence supporting the belief that numbers of others sufficient for producing the desired outcome will do likewise?’ The commonly preferred solutions suggested for these kinds of collective action problems –​internalizing externalities via taxation, subsidization of preferred alternatives, or modified market solutions –​are discussed briefly and found wanting in various ways. The commonly less preferred solution, an appeal to enlightened self-​interest, is the one Stevens focuses on in his essay; and the problem involved here is put succinctly as “[w]‌hy do so many who espouse sustainable lifestyles not manifest that espousal in their consumer behaviour?” Stevens’s answer takes us to conspiracies: individuals fail to behave with their espousals because they have unwittingly conspired with others against themselves. Because of this, those reasons that would otherwise motivate individuals to behave in accordance with the espousal are rendered inaccessible. This is an original solution to well-​known environmental collective action problems, and as Stevens openly admits, it puts a strain on our intuitive grasp

8 Loukola of the concept of conspiracies. However, I strongly suggest the reader to weigh Stevens’s arguments with an open mind; it opens up new insights as to why the solutions to the contemporary environmental problems are as problematic as they are. In their essay ‘Cunning Strategy in Cyberspace –​The Renaissance of Conspiracy’ Saara Jantunen and Aki-​Mauri Huhtinen analyze conspiratorial behavior and strategies in a more contemporary framework, mainly that of social networks and media. This environment, they write, offers ‘a realm for a true Renaissance of conspiratorial thinking’. This realm is characterized simultaneously by two extremes: one extreme calls for transparency and free flow of information and democracy, and the other involves attempts to control, dominate and exploit that very same information. People are essentially ‘storytellers and mythmakers’, and it is these communally constructed narratives that make us who we are; they are fundamental to understanding our place vis-​à-​vis other people, society, and the world. Moreover, it is precisely this process that conspiracies aim to control and exploit, especially in social media. Hence, Jantunen and Huhtinen support the earlier conclusions of Timo Airaksinen and Ginna Husting, that the ‘key to conspiracy is the manipulation of emotions and consequently social behaviour’. This process –​i.e. the communication and creation of narratives in social media –​is on all occasions strategic; it always has a goal. What makes some such strategies conspiracies ‘is the intentional paradox: the conflict between reality and how it is narrated’. The question concerns the manipulation of emotions and the consequent social behavior. Jantunen and Huhtinen continue their essay by analyzing in a thought-​provoking fashion such social media phenomena as ‘reputation management’, ‘battles of narratives’ and ‘emotions operations’. They end with a discussion on war and combat as rhetorical tools. The last essay deals with the use of conspiracy rhetoric in contemporary political discourses. In ‘Some Reflections on Conspiracy Rhetoric in Belarusian Political Discourses’ Vladimir Fours uses the Belarusian political reality as his example. He offers a captivating analysis of the way conspiracy rhetorics depends on and is made credible by the structures of society. The basis of Fours’s analysis is, however, the more general description of Fernand Braudel of the three levels of social practices and their interrelations. The bottom level is ‘material life’ consisting of the routines of day-​to-​day activities, which are automatic and do not involve conscious decisions; they rely upon evidence, implicit prejudices, and cultural background knowledge. The second level is ‘economy’, the system of regular exchanges, which are transparent and rational. It is governed by ‘public openness’, namely explicit rules

Introduction

9

and procedures, and by juridical regulations known and practized by all. ‘Capitalism’ operates on the third, upper level, and consists of strong groups who ‘gain superprofits’ by inverting the rules of the market economy and securing their exclusive status through the use of irregularities and uncertainties of social interaction. This is realized through Bourdieuan symbolic power, which enables the nomination and determining of the images and meanings of social entities, and thus creates a monopolized and controlled social or public space. This operation, and the emergence of the ‘social imagery’ is best described by Fours himself: ‘The concrete geometry of interrelations between these three levels determines the specific social imaginary of a society, the imaginary which fastens like the fragments of a social world and invests institutions with their meanings’. These levels create the constitution of society, including both its ontology and its values. Consistently, everything that comes from outside this ‘reality’ is named suspicious and hostile, being considered the conspiracies of external enemies. Fours believed that this analysis is best suited to the post-​Soviet states because there the middle level, the economy, is least developed. However, looking at the current nationalistic policies and rhetoric, contemporary authoritarian regimes, and anti-​democratic political developments, the problems with the interactions between the layers of the society are surely not limited to these states alone. Thus, Fours’s ideas touch contemporary states and politics in a much more prevalent way than he thought. Composing this collection has been one of the toughest tasks of my academic career. So much so that at times with computer crashes, re-​editings, and various delays, I’ve had the nagging suspicion that in the face of all these difficulties, there must have been a conspiracy somewhere trying to stop publishing it … The most lamentable events during the preparation of this collection, however, have been the passing away of three contributors to this collection. I refer here to the sad and untimely death of Professor Vladimir Fours and sometime later that of the second editor, Professor Leonidas Donskis. Furthermore, when preparing these texts for publication in the Autumn of 2020, I received the sad news of the demise of Professor Hubert Schleichert. The passing away of these three brilliant scholars, wonderful colleagues, and dear friends was a blow which had not only a devastating personal effect on their close ones, but also left a huge gap in the academic world, especially among their students and fellow academicians. I hereby dedicate with deep respect and sadness this collection to our deceased friends, Vladimir Fours, Leonidas Donskis, and Hubert Schleichert.

pa rt 1 Secrets

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­c hapter 1

A Secret Hidden in Plain View Lord Chesterfield’s Theory of Dissimulation Cătălin Avramescu The year is 1754. The painting is by William Hogarth. It shows a decadent banquet, with fiddlers, drunks, loose women and the occasional brawl. The scene is likely inspired by an electoral meeting of the Whigs in Oxfordshire, where they decided to win three seats that Tories had held, uncontested, for almost fifty years. In the foreground, a Whig bludgeon-​man, inebriated; next to him, on the floor, a placard, probably snatched from a Tory mob, with the inscription “Give us our eleven days!” Trouble was brewing already for some years, historians have noticed,1 more specifically since the passing of the Calendar Reform Act of 1751, which shortened the year 1752 by dropping eleven days (3 September was replaced by 14 September). Riots, has been claimed, broke out as the people, afraid that their lives were shortened, claimed back the eleven days. In Bristol, apparently, the violence resulted in the loss of six lives. The man who initiated this chain of events was Lord Chesterfield, a libertine English aristocrat positioned as the ambassador to the court of France. Finding the old Julian calendar inconvenient for the dating of his foreign correspondence, he enlisted the help of a number of friends and experts to assist him draft a Bill to introduce the Gregorian calendar in Britain. His account of the introduction of the Bill in the Parliament makes it clear what sort of assembly he was facing: Every numerous assembly is mob, let the individuals who compose it be what they will. Mere reason and good sense is never to be talked to a mob; their passions, their sentiments, their senses, and their seeming interests, are alone to be applied to. Understanding they have collectively none, but they have ears and eyes, which must be flattered and seduced; and

1 See, for instance, Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714–​1760 (Oxford History of England, volume xi, Oxford, 1939), pp. 354–​355.

© Cătălin Avramescu, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_003

14 Avramescu this can only be done by eloquence, tuneful periods, graceful action, and all the various parts of oratory.2 In the history of the ideas of social order, the “mob”—​together with its ­contemporary variants such as “rabble”, “populace” or “mass”—​is one of the concepts most difficult to grasp. Unlike other collective actors such as “population”, “class” or “nation”, the mob is the incarnation of disorder. It erupts and becomes visible in the disregard of the social norm. Its description is invariably negative. It is the insertion of anarchy in the fissures of the body politic. And anarchy is something that the mind of the Enlightenment perceives increasingly as a threat to the established hierarchies. Examples were at hand: food riots in the cities, the swarms of roving beggars and vagabonds denounced by the French social reformers, or the sudden passion for financial speculation, lotteries and games sweeping Europe, of which the South Sea Bubble of 1720 was among the most famous. This perception of a fundamentally unstable social universe brought a revival of interest in a set of moral strategies that were rooted in the classical tradition of Antiquity but were re-​interpreted in the context of an anarchical modernity. This environment called for several theoretical adaptations brought about, among other reasons, by the perceived dislocation of traditional hierarchies associated with the classical and early modern disciplines of argumentation and dialogue. Both argument and dialogue require, in the age of Enlightenment and before, two elements: a (rigorous) set of rules and a sense of (social) hierarchy. It is especially the weakening of the latter that prompted a theoretical reconsideration of the conventions and principles of the former. This paper focuses, then, on the art of argumentation developed by Lord Chesterfield in his celebrated correspondence. I will argue that this art was shaped by two sources, the first being a theory of passions developed by the French moralists, one that was interpreted through the lenses of Machiavellism, and second being the science of moral casuistry. Both these threads converge in a preoccupation with dissimulation. Chesterfield himself draws attention to this complex context when he describes the difficulties of the passing the Calendar Reform Act through the House of Lords: I consulted the best lawyers and the most skilful astronomers, and we cooked up a bill for that purpose. But then my difficulty began: I was 2 Letters to His Son, cxxxv.

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to bring in this bill, which was necessarily composed of law jargon and astronomical calculations, to both which I am an utter stranger. However, it was absolutely necessary to make the House of Lords think that I knew something of the matter; and also to make them believe that they knew something of it themselves, which they do not … so I resolved to do better than speak to the purpose, and to please instead of informing them. I gave them, therefore, only an historical account of calendars, from the Egyptian down to the Gregorian, amusing them now and then with little episodes; but I was particularly attentive to the choice of my words, to the harmony and roundness of my periods, to my elocution, to my action. This succeeded, and ever will succeed; they thought I informed, because I pleased them; and many of them said that I had made the whole very clear to them; when, God knows, I had not even attempted it. The principles of this art of argumentation are covered in a series of letters written by Chesterfield for the use of his son, a future member of the Parliament. First published posthumously in 1774, these letters arose considerable interest, not all of that positive. Dr. Johnson famously complained: “they teach the morals of a whore and the manners of a dance-​master”.3 Since, the letters have become one of the accomplished examples of the epistolary style of the Enlightenment. Not much attention was directed, however, to the clarifying of the theoretical underpinnings of the moral and practical teachings of Chesterfield. There seems to be some sort of consensus as to the genre these letters should be attached to. J. R. Woodhouse, in a lecture on the history of the ­courtier’s manuals from Castiglione to Chesterfield,4 claims that Chesterfield’s correspondence should be viewed as the end of the road for this species of literature. For Paul Langford, Chesterfield’s debt to Castiglione (and implicitly to the tradition of the manuals for the courtier) is obvious.5 While I would not dispute now the main thrust of this analysis, I feel that Chesterfield’s use of Castiglione has obscured an important source of his system of ideas: Machiavellism. While the initial reception of Machiavelli’s political philosophy seems to have been rather hostile, around the middle of the 17th century the mood changes. Harrington, in his Oceana (1656) indicates 3 Boswell, Life of Johnson, i. 159. 4 See J. R. Woodhouse, From Castiglione to Chesterfield: The Decline in the Courtier’s Manual (Oxford University Press, 1991). 5 Paul Langford, The Uses of Eighteenth-​Century Politeness, in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (2002), 12: 311–​331. Cambridge University Press.

16 Avramescu Machiavelli as the “prince of the politicians”. Henry Neville, the author of Plato Redivivus (1681), describes the “divine Machiavel”. France already had Louis Machon’s Apologie pour Machiavelle (1641).6 The eighteenth century reverts to a degree of scepticism, visible in authors such as Diderot; the best-​known denunciation of Machiavelli being, of course, the Anti-​Machiavel (1740) of Frederick the Great. Despite the numerous reservations expressed by his critics, the Italian thinker remained, however, an important reference for the art of statecraft even during the Enlightenment, especially due to its association with the theories of ragione di stato.7 Chesterfield’s language is evidently marked by the vocabulary of Machiavellism and “reason of state” theories. His doctrine is, reminiscent of the writers of the 17th century, presented as a “secret” (arcana), “very useful for you to know, but which you must, with utmost care, conceal and never seem to know”.8 This is because “in the course of the world, the qualifications of a chameleon are often necessary”.9 There is also the more common metaphor of acting: “I, an old stager upon the theatre of the world”10 or the revealing of the existence of a continuous chain of subordinates that connects everybody to the Prince.11 In these circumstances, the social interactions assume an agonistic quality. Theirs end is, to put it simply, domination. This is achieved by the time-​honoured tactic of flattery, another favourite topic of the courtier’s manuals: You will easily discover every man’s prevailing vanity by observing his favourite topic of conversation; for every man talks most of what he has most a mind to be thought to excel in. Touch him but there and you will touch him to the quick.12 In addition to flattery, there is lying. Here, Chesterfield re-​joins a considerable tradition of defending lying, originally developed in the context of the 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

For the development of Machiavellism, see Felix Gilbert, “Machiavellism,” in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 3, 116–​126. The literature on the concept of “reason of state” is considerable; see, for instance, the classical work of Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsrason (Munich, 1924). Letter, 5 September 1748; see also the letter dated 19 December 1749, on the views one needs to kept secret. All references to the text of Chesterfield’s letters follow the Oxford edition edited by David Roberts. Letter, 28 February 1751. Letter, 20 December 1740. Letter, 21 August 1749. Letter, 16 October 1747.

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repression of religious minorities during the Renaissance.13 The art of providing an oblique answer is justified by Chesterfield as rooted in the distinction between (illegitimate) simulation and (legitimate) dissimulation.14 Machiavellism, however, is just one aspect of Chesterfield’s psychology of domination. In the background there is a theory of passion that is evidently inspired by the French moralists among which Chesterfield held in high regard, particularly La Bruyère and La Rochefoucauld. Another, lesser known and unacknowledged, source of Chesterfield is the French Jesuit Jean-​Baptiste Morvan de Bellegarde (1648–​1734).15 Similar to these moralists, Chesterfield also displays Stoic influences, inasmuch the purpose of the observation and discipline of passions is control over one’s self. The Classical background of this theory would be incomplete without the mentioning of the influence of the Roman orators: “You have read Quintilian, the best book in the world to form an orator; pray read Cicero De oratore; the best book in the world to finish one”.16 The theory of passions employed by Chesterfield displays two important features. The first is the emphasis on attention. In Chesterfield, attention is treated like a passion that needs to be mastered and educated. This is a twist on the classical theories on curiosity. For Locke, in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book ii, ­chapter 9), perception is often an active faculty of the mind and it is the true origin of knowledge. Without it, there would be no stirring of the soul and no ideas except those randomly generated by events, rapidly decaying in the mind. The disciplined mind, according to Chesterfield, “sees things in their true proportions”, unlike the weak mind, prey to the idols of perspective: “like the microscope, makes an elephant of a flea”. The task of the cultivation of the mind is, thus, to sharpen perception so as to discover distinctions that remain hidden to the vulgar mind: “In manners, this line is good-​breeding… in morals it divides ostentatious Puritanism from criminal relaxation; in religion, superstition from impiety… I think you have sense enough to discover the line… and 13

14 15 16

See Perez Zagorin, Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990). For an analysis of Chesterfield ideas of ethics and etiquette, see Jorge Arditi, Hegemony and Etiquette: An Exploration on the Transformation of Practice and Power in Eighteenth-​Century England, in The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1994). Letter, 8 January 1750; note the reference to Bacon’s Essays. See Charles Pullen, Lord Chesterfield and Eighteenth-​Century Appearance and Reality, in Studies in English Literature, 1500–​1900, Vol. 8, No. 3, Restoration and Eighteenth Century (Summer, 1968). Letter, 24 November 1749.

18 Avramescu learn to walk upon it”.17 Inattention is thus viewed as a species of sin and its perpetrator is declared, starkly, as unfit to live. It includes, inter alia, a discipline of the gaze. Looks discover what words often conceal.18 The second aspect of consequence of the theory of passions in the Letters of Chesterfield is the relying on a model provided by the French moralists. According to this model, passions are inter-​connected in a structure of dependencies. In other words, some passions exercise some sort of control over others; the latter can be considered as dependent in their operations on the former. For Descartes, there are only six “fundamental” passions, while the rest can be analyzed as mixtures of these.19 Chesterfield frequently reiterates this scheme in the Letters: You must look into people as well as at them. Almost all people are born with all the passions, to a certain degree; but almost every man has a prevailing one, to which the others are subordinate. Search every one for that ruling passion; pry into the recesses of his heart and observe the different workings of the same passion in different people; and when you have found the prevailing passion of every man, remember never to trust him where that passion is concerned.20 Another essential feature of the theory of moral argumentation in Chesterfield is its foundation in casuistry. It seems surprising, at first, that Chesterfield would rely on casuistry for the epistemological background of his discourse on norms, ideas and behavior. Casuistry was under constant attack during the early Enlightenment—​Pascal’s Provincial Letters (1656) are just one example of this acid criticism. Lord Chesterfield, then, is well within the sensibilities of this age when he directs his son: “Pray let no quibbles of Lawyers, no refinements of Casuists, break into the plain notions of right and wrong”. The scolding of the Casuists is combined with an equally harsh handling of Berkeley’s 17

Letter, 10 January 1749. The passages on the distinction between vices and virtues seem also inspired by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 18 Letter of 10 March 1746. On the importance of vision in the epistemology of modernity see, for instance, David Michael Levin, Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision (University of California Press, 1993). On the importance of attention in Chesterfield, see also the letter from 22 September 1749. 19 Descartes, Passions of the Soul, article 69. 20 Letter of 4 October 1746. See also the letter of 24 November 1749 (“Gain the heart, or you gain nothing”), and the letter of 19 December 1749 (“Seek first, then, for the predominant passion of the character you mean to engage and influence, and address yourself to it; but without defying or despising the inferior passions”).

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theory of matter. “Common sense”, according to Chesterfield, is, against “ingenious systems”, something “to always return”.21 There is, however, a theory of casuistic reasoning in Chesterfield, one that is ultimately influenced by the Aristotelian conception of a “practical science”. The “art of pleasing” of the English aristocrat is one that can “hardly be reduced to rules”.22 In a letter dated 19 December 1749, Chesterfield is adamant that “with regard to mankind, we must not draw general conclusions from certain particular principles, though, in the main, true ones”. This is because “we are complicated machines … we have one main spring… and an infinity of little wheels”. A source of Chesterfield’s knowledge of the science of casuistry is likely the writings of Escobar. The Spanish casuist was notorious in France, being criticized by Pascal and condemned by the parliaments of Paris, Rennes, Rouen and Bordeaux. Chesterfield mentions Escobar by name in an ambiguous context. He denounces the abuse of casuistry while at the same time praising his own casuistic skills: “I am no skilful casuist, nor subtle disputant; and yet I would undertake to justify, and qualify, the depredations of a highwayman, step by step, and so plausibly as to make many ignorant people embrace the profession, as an innocent, if not even a laudable one”.23 In this context, the theory of moral judgment appears like an upgrade of the classical, Aristotelian thesis on virtue as a middle ground between two excesses (vices), a position explained in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics. Chesterfield’s practical morality is designed to solve a more complex equation than this two-​bodies problem, to locate an elusive and unique point: “A thousand little things, not separately to be defined, conspire to form these graces, this je ne sçais quoi, that always pleases”.24 Jesuitism and Machiavellism, then, are the predictable consequences of an epistemology that emphasizes the inter-​dependency of passions and the insufficiency of a theoretical science in determining questions of practical morality. Chesterfield’s science was, ultimately, a child of its time rather than a creation of an eccentric aristocrat. What the letters of Chesterfield do not reveal was that during the speech in the Parliament, on the reform of the calendar, he was careful, when delivering his “historical account”, to keep quiet on the Popish origins of the Gregorian calendar. In a House packed with Protestant 21 22 23 24

Letter of 27 September 1748. Letter of 16 October 1747. Letter of 27 September 1748. Letter of 9 March 1748. On this concept, see Richard Scholar, The Je-​Ne-​Sais-​Quoi in Early Modern Europe: Encounters with a Certain Something (Oxford University Press, 2005).

20 Avramescu clerics, Chesterfield and his fellow Lord Macclesfield presented the new calendar and the calculation of the Easter as more as a technical, astronomical issue. They proposed the interval in September to be skipped so that the new calendar will not clash with any popular celebrations. Indeed, most of these remained unaffected by the change. The tax year, also, ran according to the Julian calendar until 1799. For the most part, the change of the calendar was imposed peacefully, and the victims of mob violence supposedly whipped by the missing eleven days were proved by later historians to be an invention.25 Hogarth’s choice of Oxfordshire, far from representing a typical slice of English opinion, was mainly a satire of what was then one of the last electoral bastions of Jacobitism. In the end, it seems, everybody had something to conceal.

Bibliography

Arditi, Jorge (1994) “Hegemony and Etiquette: An Exploration on the Transformation of Practice and Power in Eighteenth-​Century England”, in The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 2 Jun., 1994. Boswell, James (1979) The Life of Samuel Johnson. Penguin Classics. Chesterfield, The Earl of (1774) Letters to His Son. Gilbert, Felix (1973) “Machiavellism,” in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, vol. 3, pp. 116–​126. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Langford, Paul (2002) The Uses of Eighteenth-​Century Politeness, in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, pp. 311–​331. Cambridge University Press. Levin, David Michael (1993) Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision. University of California Press. Meinecke, Friedrich (1924) Die Idee der Staatsrason. München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg. Poole, Robert (1995) “Give Us Our Eleven Days!”: Calendar Reform in Eighteenth-​ Century England”, in Past & Present, No. 149 Nov., 1995. Pullen, Charles (1968) “Lord Chesterfield and Eighteenth-​Century Appearance and Reality”, in Studies in English Literature, 1500–​1900, Vol. 8, No. 3, Restoration and Eighteenth Century, Summer, 1968. Scholar, Richard (2005) The Je-​Ne-​Sais-​Quoi in Early Modern Europe: Encounters with a Certain Something. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

25

See Robert Poole, “Give Us Our Eleven Days!”: Calendar Reform in Eighteenth-​Century England, in Past & Present, No. 149 (Nov., 1995).

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Williams, Basil (1939) The Whig Supremacy, 1714–​1760. Oxford History of England, volume xi, pp. 354–​355. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Woodhouse, J. R. (1991) From Castiglione to Chesterfield: The Decline in the Courtier’s Manual. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zagorin, Perez (1990) Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

­c hapter 2

Pseudo-​secrets Hubert Schleichert 1

The Concept of Thought Pattern

Long ago Ernst Topitsch (1958) described several types of thought models or thought patterns that are often used in early (but not only early) societies as explanations for certain phenomena. Such patterns can be efficient tools in analyzing ideological or early scientific theories. Topitsch described what he called the anthropomorphic, biomorphic, technomorphic, and sociomorphic models. (The list did not claim to be complete.) These models are quite familiar from everyday life, where they are used to explain some other, not so easily understandable facts. In ancient times, e.g. causation was seen as a parallel to the more familiar behavior of revenge and retribution (for the sociomorphic model, see Kelsen 1946). Another example still in use, is the existence of evil in the world (the problem of théodicée). This is explained by analogy to a beautiful painting, which cannot consist only of bright beautiful colors, or by pointing to a craftsman, who sometimes has to work with not ideal material (technomorphic model). Although such theories about the world cannot be called ‘proper’ theories since they can hardly ever be tested (especially not falsified), they played a prominent role at the beginning of investigation into the world. But in any case, they are not completely innocent and not always helpful. While making strange phenomena look more familiar and understandable, they can give only the illusion of knowledge. When our knowledge of the world progresses, by and by the old models are dropped, without ever completely disappearing. Now, the familiar phenomenon that somebody keeps something a secret, or hides it behind a veil or curtain, is often used as another thought model, and it is the purpose of this essay to describe this thought pattern in some detail. Let us name it the “secret-​and-​veil-​pattern”. Like other thought patterns, the function of the secret-​and-​veil-​pattern is to make something unfamiliar, uncanny, disturbing, or controversial look more normal, more familiar, less problematic. The strange is made to look familiar by using a more familiar imagination and terminology. The scope of uncanny situations that eventually are handled by a secret-​and-​ veil argument is wide: That disease is deadly and not curable; that a problem is unsolvable; that in science some phenomena have no satisfactory explanation;

© Hubert Schleichert, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_004

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that some parts of a sacred religion are contradictory or simply not understandable, etc. One of the techniques to cope up with such challenges makes use of what I shall call pseudo-​secrets. 2

The Standard Form of a Secret

Once upon a time there was an ambitious guy called Ali Baba. One day, he happened to secretly observe a gang of 40 robbers approaching a mountain. Then he heard the captain shouting “Sesame open thyself”, and a door opened in the mountain and gave access to a cave full of gold and jewels. When the robbers had left the place, Ali Baba himself made use of the secret password and shouted “Sesame open thyself”, entered the cave and took out a lot of gold. Later Ali Baba killed all the robbers, and the story ends by saying that Ali Baba was the only man then who knew the secret and could make use of it, and therefore lived a happy and wealthy life. I take this story from One thousand and One Nights as a paradigm for what I shall call the standard or regular type of a secret. In a logical reconstruction, a secret is a three-​place relation. A secret is a relation between (at least) two persons, and some information. One side has the information, the other side does not have it, but would like to get it. The first side is the owner or possessor of the information, the other side is ignorant. Both, the owner and the ignorant, are supposed to be intelligent human beings. As information is something that can be communicated (by speaking or writing, etc.), the secret information in itself could be communicated and made public without problems and could be understood by the ignorant. However, the owner does not give access to the information. When we speak of a secret, we mean this complex situation. To be a secret is not an intrinsic property of information, the concept of secret does not belong to epistemology, but rather to social epistemology. The standard case of a secret is a social relation, i.e. between at least two persons. It would make little sense to call everything I do not know a secret: A secret to me is something which I do not know, while someone else knows it, but hides it from me. There is a fundamental difference between an open question (problem) and a secret. To solve an open problem, we have to use problem-​solving strategies like observation and trial-​and-​error techniques. If we look at our situation in the world from a really wide, “cosmic” perspective, this is the only adequate strategy for mankind as a whole. There is nobody outside mankind, whom men could ask questions. All we know about the world we know by our own investigations. The concept of a secret has only a later origin, when different persons

24 Schleichert had already reached different parts of knowledge and there was no unlimited exchange of knowledge. Under such conditions, a new social technique became meaningful, i.e. asking questions. In order to find out a secret, one can in addition to one’s own investigation try to get information from those who already have it, by using social procedures like begging, asking, bribing, stealing, spying, threatening, torturing. Sometimes this would be the only possibility to obtain the desired information. 3

The Concept of a Pseudo-​secret

I shall speak of a pseudo-​secret if somebody takes a question or problem as a secret, which actually is not a completely proper secret, i.e. has not all necessary conditions of a secret. The most frequent case seems to be what could be called “a secret that nobody has”. To say that something is a secret under normal conditions implies, that there exists a piece of information and there exists somebody who has the information. In the case of pseudo-​secret, this somebody does not exist. I use the term to describe the following situation. Somebody is in need of a certain piece of information, which up to now nobody could give him. Basically, this situation is simply the existence of an open problem. The situation shifts, if the person in need of the information supposes, behaves, or, finally, even believes that there must be somebody who has the information. Therefore, the person begins to look upon himself as ignorant vis-​à-​vis a secret and changes his/​her strategy. To an ignorant person, there may be some hope to find the possessor and get from him the needed information by one of the afore-​mentioned strategies. How can this happen? The ignorant person might be ignorant about the situation, or he knows the situation, but he is (partly) irrational. To give an example, the ignorant could be a person suffering from cancer and is desperately looking for help. But up to the moment nobody knows an efficient therapy. The ignorant thinks, however, there must be somebody who knows such a therapy. In such a situation a lot of people hope to find a healer, i.e. someone who has a method of healing, but makes it his private secret instead of publishing it in a medical journal. Therefore, the poor ignorant person begins a search for the still unknown person who owns the secret. From a logical point of view, it can never be proved that the hidden miraculous healer who knows the secret does not exist. Even today, when all previous experience has shown that such a miraculous healer has yet to be found,

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the ignorant person need not be impressed. Previous negative experience is a strong, but never a logically conclusive, argument. According to our supposition if there is any new therapy at all, it has not been published. It is only the healer who knows the therapy. There is no systematic method or procedure to get the secret, aside from the owner. Therefore, the ignorant person is not thoroughly irrational, but has only a very small probability for success. It seems to be easier to believe in the existence of a secret healing procedure than to accept that there is none and the case is without any hope. The use of a pseudo-​secret can aid one in passing from a completely hopeless situation to one with some hope, be it even completely nebulous. Unfortunately, the secret-​and-​veil-​pattern can also easily be used in any kind of charlatanry. One can always tell people that there is somebody who has profound or even deeper wisdom or knowledge, but makes a secret out of it. How could it be disproved?! 4

The Secrets of Nature

It was, and even is, quite usual to speak about secrets of nature. Today, we consider this to be merely a poetic metaphor. We are rather sure that nature as such is not an intelligent being that hides anything from us although she could tell us. Nature simply exists, but does not speak. Accordingly, the vocabulary of a secret, a veil, or hiding is not used in the logic of scientific discovery. To tell or to hide something can be done only by an intelligent being, be it human or superhuman. Nature is not such a being, as far as we know. But it was not always as clear as it looks today. The development of our modern worldview can in part be conceived as a process of changing the methodology from trying to find out secrets, to problem-​solving by observation, hypothesis, and empirical control. (I shall not discuss the question, if that process is completed.) As an impressive document from the period, when things still were not as clear, let me mention an interesting personality from the early 16th century, Agrippa from Nettesheim (somewhere in Germany). In 1510 he published a book, De occulta philosophia, 2nd. edition 1533. In a modern German translation (Agrippa 1982) it contains more than 600 pages. Seen from today’s angle, it is a mixture of fantastic speculations about influences and powers of all kind, religious speculations, but also questions, that in some way later became genuine problems of science. Book 3, Ch. 37 e.g. is about the human mind (soul),

26 Schleichert and how it is connected with the body. Many chapters deal with the influence of planets on human life. A lot is said about astrology, which according to modern understanding is a wrong, but a meaningful hypothesis. The decisive point, however, is Agrippa’s methodology. In fact, he has only one method, namely to quote former writers, and to take, what they report, as true. His book abounds in names and quotations, mostly from classical times; it contains not a single experiment or observation made by Agrippa himself. Agrippa’s method was only to find the literary sources, i.e. persons or books, which own, rsp. contain, the information. The summary of this kind of search for secrets, is his Occulta Philosophia. The title also indicates an inconsistency: By publishing such a book, the occult philosophy becomes open public knowledge. This is so with all books on secrets, until today. Now to Agrippa’s much better known contemporary Paracelsus who was a famous medical doctor. He wrote an enormous amount of books and essays, such that today nobody reads them, except a few historians. In his writings we sometimes encounter the term arcanum, basically again meaning something hidden, a secret. The term was used in what was formerly called “natural philosophy”, and in alchemy. Paracelsus used it to designate secret or “hidden” forces of nature that can, however, be set free under certain specific conditions, so that they can operate in an ill person. Mostly, arcanum designates simply a medicine, to be taken with the right quantity or dose like, e.g. laudanum, opium, although originally the word meant a secret. Paracelsus’ works are full of fantastic theories, combined with practical suggestions for treatment of diseases. Again what is decisive is that he explicitly rejected a consultation of old books and instead wanted to rely only on experience and a good theory about diseases. In his books, there are no quotations from authors of bygone times. If one wants to use the term secret at all, the arcana for curing patients were the doctor’s professional secrets which he was prepared partly to share with the patient, provided that a cash payment ensued. The change in terminology indicates a gradual change in methodology. An arcanum is already a kind of scientific hypothesis; it is not a secret owned by some priests of old Egypt or in the Kabbala. With Paracelsus’ medical work, the investigation began to turn away from mysterious persons who own secrets and turned to empirical observation. He seems to have been a successful doctor. It would be interesting to compare his writings and practice with those of Agrippa, both were contemporaries, and also Agrippa practiced for a shorter time as a medical doctor. In the long run, to be sure, problem solving as it is done by science, was more successful than finding out old secrets.

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The Veil of Nature

A bit later (about 1620) Francis Bacon called open questions of natural science secrets of nature (occulta naturae) and wrote that the secrets of nature will reveal themselves by harassment through experimentation rather than when they were allowed to go on their own way: Occulta naturae magis se produnt per vexationes artium, quam cum cursu suo meant. bacon 2000, part i Aphorism 98

The metaphor of torturing (vexatio) nature is interesting, because torturing is a method to find out genuine secrets, and only genuine secrets. Nature, on the other hand, cannot be tortured, so the metaphor is misleading. One may do to nature whatever one likes, she will never speak, never reveal anything. Even if we make a so-​called crucial experiment, nature does not really tell us which theory is right, which is wrong. (The term “experimentum crucis” has been introduced by F. Bacon.) In fact, Bacon made use of the old terminology of secrets, but was the first philosopher to develop a methodology for empirical research. 6

Unanswered and (Maybe) Unanswerable Questions (of Science)

In every science there are always some unsolved problems, open questions. Sometimes it has been discussed in epistemology whether there are, or could be, certain fundamental limits for scientific cognition, whether there are within science questions that are “in principle” unanswerable. Here we see the old terminology of secret, veil, and also riddle, at work again. Take Newton’s invention of classical mechanics as a prominent example. Newton’s mechanics was a decisive step forward in physics, a genuine turning point. It was one of the greatest insights or “revelations” about nature, which is admirable even today . But David Hume wrote about Newton: While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to that obscurity in which they ever did and ever will remain. hume 1778, vol. vi p. 542

28 Schleichert It is astonishing to see the great master of empiricist philosophy using the old terminology of secrets, veil, and obscurity to designate what he thought to be limits of empirical cognition. The historical background was that Newton introduced the new concept of gravitational force into physics, a force that (maybe with infinite velocity) acts at any distance through empty space. A lot of people felt totally uneasy about the new concept. What Hume called an “ultimate secret” was not some minor open question of physics, but at the centre of this science. Hume was pessimistic about the possibilities for physics to make substantial progress in explaining nature. Up to today, this pessimism regarding the force of gravitation seems to be plausible. But from a methodological point of view, it is dubious how one could describe limits of scientific knowledge at all, from within scientific methods. It seems that Hume used the old pattern and terminology of secret-​and-​veil, because he could not argue for his pessimistic view in sober, epistemological words. But when science is described as unveiling the secrets of nature, this is of course misleading. A veil is something made by man in order to hide something. Nature does not hide secrets behind veils. The situation of a scientist like Newton, and actually of all mankind, vis-​à-​vis nature is, so to say, more “absolute”. There is no hope to get insight into nature by dramatically tearing away a (man-​made!) veil behind which the ultimate truth is waiting for us. I don’t think that Hume’s use of a “secret” should be taken only as a metaphor, without any deeper content. The keyword in his statement quoted above is the “obscurity” which “will ever remain”. Hume tried to express his opinion about the possibilities and limits of scientific knowledge, but without trying to make clear what exactly should be understood by knowledge or insight, etc. How could one formulate the position that there are limits to science? The metaphor of an obscure secret seems to imply: it is as useless and futile to try to understand our (physical) world, as it is useless to find out a secret which the owner is unwilling to tell. During the second half of the 19th century, there was an intense discussion about the limits of science which paralleled the enormous progress of science. In Germany, it centred around the biologist H. Du Bois-​Reymond. (1916, see also Vidoni 1991) He listed up several problems which, as he believed, will never be solved by science. One is Newton’s gravitational force. We do not understand it and, according to Du Bois-​Reymond, will never understand it, notwithstanding the fact, that we use this concept very successfully in physics. As a scholar from Germany, he expressed it in Latin: ignoramus et ignorabimus, and coined a new term: “Welträtsel”, “riddle of the universe”. This was in 1890. The term designated 7 questions which were considered to be unanswerable by science at that time, which means definitely unanswerable: 1.The essence (nature) of matter and

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force, 2. the origin of motion and perception, 3. the origin of life and 4. the faculty of an organism to adaptation, 5. the development of sensory perception, 6. the development of human intelligence and language, and 7. the problem of free will. Some of them are still today open questions. The term “riddle” is better than “secret”, but still misleading. Normally, a riddle is given from one person to another, or, in the worst case, by a sphinx, who knows the solution. However, a riddle also is a question that should be answerable by human intelligence, combined with sufficient long effort. Du Bois-​Reymond’s “riddles of the universe” do not fit into this normal meaning of “riddle”. To sum up: There seems to be some temptation to play poetic games with the secret-​veil-​and-​riddle terminology even without thinking of the implications of such terminology. This terminology hides the fact, that we human beings have no other being to get any information from. Nobody and nothing hides anything before mankind, whatever we want to know we have to find by our own effort. There is no other way. If somebody states such a strong thesis like ignorabimus, he should give convincing arguments. In the case of proper secrets, the argument nearest to hand is: the owner keeps the secret, therefore we do not get it. In order to argue that certain secrets shall remain behind a veil forever, one could perhaps argue that a superhuman power, a god, owns the information and has decided to hold it behind a veil. It would not be easy to prove this, but within a religious world view one will perhaps simply believe it. In the case of a pseudo-​secret, this argument cannot be used seriously. How good arguments for an ignorabimus could look like, is not an easy logical problem, like with all negative existential sentences. Du Bois-​Reymond needed about 100 pages to argue for his thesis, and from a logical point of view his arguments were not really conclusive. The same objection could be put forward already against Hume’s pessimism. It is not at all clear what features a scientific insight should have in order not to “restore the ultimate secrets of nature to the obscurity” about which Hume complained. It is interesting, that for centuries Newton’s law of gravitation became the paradigm of nature’s “obscurity”, as Hume called it. Not long after Hume, Kant (1907, p. 138 footnote) analyzed the law of gravitation as something about which we can be sure that we shall never know (“erkennen”) the cause of it, but, as he insisted, at the same time gravity was not a secret, as we know it’s a law and can transfer this information easily to anybody. Kant used this argument in order to explain his view of human freedom: Freedom is well known from our moral feelings and we can speak about it understandably. The deeper, never to be investigated (“unerforschlich”) cause of freedom, however, is not known and will remain a secret.

30 Schleichert Such formulations like Hume’s and Kant’s provoke another critical question. What is missing, as soon as we have the (natural) laws e.g. of gravitation? One future day, this law could possibly be connected with, or even be deduced, from other laws, but even in that case one would remain in the scope of scientific description. Would Hume’s “obscurity of nature” be removed? No, certainly not. But is it clear at all, what was Hume longing for? Could he formulate what would be the requirements for a satisfactory explication e.g. for gravity? Again, no, certainly not. The secret remains forever. During the early days of logical positivism, some philosophers were impressed by Wittgenstein’s apodictic declaration, that there cannot be meaningful, but in principle unanswerable questions. As the Tractatus states: The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered. wittgenstein 1947, nr. 6.5; see also schlick 1978.

I have no idea, if this statement has ever been confronted with Hume’s, Kant’s, or Du Bois-​Reymond’s position about riddles of the universe. In any case, the problem disappeared from the scene. During the last century, within the huge amount of publications on the logic of scientific discovery, or scientific methodology, there seems not to have been any discussion at all about the possibility of fundamental limits to our scientific discovery of the world. But although these conceptual difficulties, the pessimist position of Hume, Kant, and Du Bois-​Reymond seem to express some deeply rooted conviction of most thinking people. The use of the thought pattern of secret-​and-​veil can be interpreted as an articulation of such a conviction. It seems to imply (or at least to indicate) that there really is a kind of deeper insight, but it will remain a secret to us, whatever the deeper reasons may be. The term “riddle” generally suggests a problem that seems close to the limits of our intellectual capacities. It seems, that everything that is logically needed to solve the riddle is already there, nobody hides anything from us, and yet we cannot find the solution. Nature, Hume, Kant, and Du Bois-​Reymond would concede, is open to us, we may investigate and experiment as much as we want, we can find and have found some laws of nature that work fantastically, and yet we “understand nothing”. It is beyond our intellectual capacities. 7

The Published Secret

In a trivial form we can find it today in many a bookshop: The shelves are full of books with titles like “The secret of the old Egyptians /​Yin and Yang /​happy life /​

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Kabbala” etc. etc. Now, if there was a secret at all, it collapsed when it was published. Writers of such books are not at all reserved about their secrets. But Ali Baba, who really possessed one, would never have agreed to the publication of a book called “The secret of Ali Baba”, because he wanted to remain in exclusive possession of his golden cave. Actually, a “public secret” is a contradiction in itself. But a secret may keep its character when what is made public is not understandable. Let us start with a skill that cannot be taught, in spite of all speaking and demonstrating. In the old fantastic book of Chuangtzu, there is a story about a craftsman who manufactured wheels, a wheelwright. About his skill he said: When I chisel a wheel, if the blows of the mallet are too gentle, the chisel slides and won’t take hold. But if they are too hard, it bites in and won’t budge. Not too gentle, not too hard—​you can get it in your hand and feel it in your mind. You can’t put it in words, and yet there’s a knack to it somehow. I can’t teach it to my son, and he can’t learn it from me. So I have gone along for seventy years and at my age I am still chiseling wheels … Chuangtzu ch.13, see watson 1968, p. 153.

Students who want to learn from such a master, will after a lot of frustration say, he has a secret and does not tell it to them, and does not show it to them. But the craftsman really told and showed to them everything, and left nothing hidden as a professional secret. Only, they could not understand. By an open secret I shall understand information or, mostly, pseudo-​information, that cannot be understood. The words can be printed and made public, but the meaning remains unknown, or hidden. To call it “hidden” indicates, that people readily presuppose that the text has meaning, i.e. has been formulated by intelligent beings, and only we poor average ignorant beings with our narrow (western) mind are unable to understand. In this case, the general attitude is already familiar again. The strange, uneasy case is re-​interpreted as a more familiar case. The disturbing open question is seen as solved, even if by some still unknown people. The strange, disturbing text is taken as normal text that is understood by at least some wise persons. What is out of the discussion is that a text may simply be nonsense (or e.g. some triviality). There are lots of sacred or metaphysical texts which are not understandable, and it is in many cases possible, that nobody ever understood them. It is, e.g., easy to propose something contradictory in itself and call it a secret. It is easy to say that there is a deep wisdom that cannot be spoken out, because it cannot be expressed in words at all. Texts of Taoism abound in such topics. Already the first chapter of the book Laozi (TaoTeChing) uses words like (depending

32 Schleichert on the translation) “mysterious”, “abstruse” or “secret”. The last phrase of this opening c­ hapter is: Mystery upon mystery, the gateway of the manifold secrets”. It has also been translated as “Darkness upon darkness, the gateway to all that is subtle. lau 1963, pp. 3 and 267

What shall one do with a text that on the first page tells you, that everything contained in the text is a mysterious secret? Sometimes we can find an inversion: because people are strongly convinced that a text contains extraordinary, deep wisdom, they take the text as an open secret, i.e. having a hidden meaning that is concealed behind the (understandable) text on the “surface”. In part, this is already more of an intellectual game. In part, alas, it gives a justification for a world wide, interculturally performed religious practice to recite texts that one is sure not to comprehend completely, or which have no meaning at all for the devotee. Such recitals are however justified to the believer, because he/​she is convinced that there is deep meaning in it, which necessarily is a secret of the gods. However, another possibility could be to take such texts as documents of unclear thinking, written without any responsibility towards the reader. What is not understandable could equally well be the result of an unclear mind. But this would be a non-​normal, unusual attitude, and a lot of people do not like it. The regular, familiar world does not contain meaningless sentences, whatever is said, must have meaning, in the worst case, a hidden, secret meaning. It is a benevolent, friendly interpretation, or even the devout attitude of the believer to take what is not understandable as something that in reality is understandable and even understood, however only by somebody else. To the humble reader and believer, it is a riddle or secret. 8

The Mysterious Secret behind the Veil

There are old stories of veiled statues and sanctuaries behind a curtain. Strange as it may seem, this type is closely related to the former one, the open secret. Sometimes it is unclear whether what is published is the whole story, or whether we are simply too ignorant, too narrow-​minded to understand the whole truth. The metaphor of the veil that blocks the sight to a mysterious object is old. The Jewish temple had a curtain hiding the sanctuary, and Plutarchos in ­chapter 9 of “De Iiside et Osiride” reports:

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In Sais there was a sitting statue of Athena, which they also venerate as Isis; she had an inscription saying: ‘I am everything that has been, is and will be, and no mortal has lifted my clothes’. görgemanns 2003, p. 346/​149

This story stimulated several German poets; Friedrich Schiller wrote a famous poem entitled “Das verschleierte Bild zu Sais” on the subject. A young man, says the poem, learns that behind the veil of the statue lies the truth, which is exactly what he is longing for so much: “Was ist’s, das hinter diesem Schleier sich verbirgt?” “Die Wahrheit”, ist die Antwort. “Wie”, ruft jener, “Nach Wahrheit streb ich ja allein, und diese Gerade ist es, die man mir verhüllt?” schiller 1992, p. 242

Against strong warnings the youngster tears off the veil. The poem leaves open whether he saw anything at all, or whether he indeed saw the truth. We are only told that he fell into a deep depression immediately after, and died young without telling anybody anything except a strong warning. The meaning of the story is taken to be, that there are things (or, the one truth) that man can only see or bear behind a veil. It is again the same pattern of argumentation. To comprehend the divine truth goes beyond man’s intellectual capacity, it would be even deadly to look face to face with the mysterious. Therefore the veil. The veil’s function is to calm the desperate and the skeptic: don’t despair—​the world is not without ultimate truth, it is not sheer irrational chaos, basically, man’s longing for understanding will not be futile. Only for the moment, there must be a veil to protect us. But behind the veil there is the ultimate truth. The epistemological nihilist is guided back into a more optimistic, more intimate, world view. The ever-​lasting problem of théodicée, is a case where resort to the secret-​ and-​veil strategy is often used. How can it be explained that in this world a good man has often to suffer terribly, while bad people enjoy a happy life? Only rarely does a master or philosopher openly admit that this is a basic fact of human life, without any further pleasing explanation and without any hope for recompensation in future life. Confucius was one of the rare exceptions, when he told his disciples, that a righteous man does what is his duty, while knowing quite well that the good side will usually not succeed. (Lau 1979, nr. 18.7) The usual answers, however, all make use of the divine secrets of god, which

34 Schleichert means: You need not be bewildered, don’t worry, there is a satisfactory answer, some higher intelligence right now knows it—​he will tell you the secret as soon as you can understand it! 9

The Meaning of Life and Similar Secrets

Science will never have answers to the most essential questions of life: How shall we live? What is the meaning of our existence? What is the secret of happiness?, etc. There is no hope to get answers to such questions from science; if there are answers at all, the only hope seems to be other human beings who know an answer, and are willing to let us participate in their secret. That is the reason why during all times people became seekers, searching for a master, teacher, or guru. The underlying logic seems to be simple: As these questions are so important and urgent to every single human being, there must be an answer somewhere—​someone must have it. Gotama Siddharta, the later Buddha, spent several years in the woods searching for a teacher who knows, a master who might teach him the answer. Gotama finally found his answer, not from a human master, nor by divine revelation, but through by his own thinking. But he was an extraordinary personality and became a Buddha. The rest of mankind has more limited capacities and can only hope to find a guru in a Himalayan cave, a religion, some holy texts etc. What is important here is, that people take the great existential questions as genuine secrets. In consequence, there is at least some hope, because a secret presupposes somebody who knows an answer, even if we cannot find him, or her, for the moment. To take a question as a secret means, to suppose that in principle it has been answered. In all ages, the disciples of a master, and similarly first-​year students of philosophy, believe that there is a profound secret about god, world, and life, and their master, resp. favorite professor of philosophy, possesses it. Students of all ages, from antiquity to our time, are disappointed to hear that philosophy has no secrets. There are reports about Buddha, as well as about Confucius, who both refused to answer certain metaphysical questions. The Buddha explicitly refused to answer fundamental questions about the eternity of the world or about death, because such questions are of no importance in reaching Nirvana. (Glasenapp 1980, p. 67f.) And Confucius, when asked how to serve the spirits of the deceased ancestors, said: As long as we are not able to serve the living, what use is there in asking about spirits?

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One of the disciples however insisted and asked Confucius about death. The master told him, You don’t understand life, what need is there to understand death? wilhelm 1961, nr. 11.11

The disciples, perhaps, thought that their master knew the answer to such questions, and they needed only ask him in a modest, devoted manner, so that he would tell the secret. But the great teachers of mankind never pretended to have some secret wisdom or knowledge which they kept behind a veil. It is a standard formula in both schools of thought, Buddhism and Confucianism, that the masters taught with open hands, i.e. nothing was hidden from the students and followers. There are no esoteric secrets. To expect secrets is only an attitude adopted by beginners. Confucius once told his disciples: Do you think, my disciples, that I have any concealments? I conceal nothing from you. There is nothing which I do that is not shown to you—​that is my way. lau 1979, nr. 7.24

Buddha short before his death, told his disciple Ananda: I explained my doctrine without making a difference between inner and outer side. The doctrine of the completed (=​the Buddha) has no closed fist (in which something is held back). schumann 1982, p. 279

This has always been interpreted in Buddhist schools to mean that there are no secrets in Buddhism. Registers of good books on Buddhism have an entry “secret, no” pointing to this saying. I think, it was only in order not to be too shocking, when these masters told their students, that their metaphysical questions are not urgent for the moment. They could simply have answered, that we do not know. 10

Secrets in Metaphysics

Metaphysical theories often contain considerations on objects that cannot be proved to exist in an everyday way, but are taken to exist anyway. Such objects

36 Schleichert (or pseudo-​objects?) are e.g. the predetermination of future or Kant’s famous thing-​in-​itself. Here again intellectual constructions seem appropriate which make use of secret-​and-​veil methods, be it with or without explicit use of the corresponding terminology. The thought pattern of secret-​and-​veil is fitting, because in it the assertion is central that something exists although nobody in the human community has any knowledge about this entity. To call something a secret or, even without explicit use of the term “secret”, to handle something as a secret, always implies that this something really exists. This claim might be a rather far-​reaching statement when it is obvious that this existence cannot be made sure by usual epistemological methods. The secret-​and-​veil thought pattern contains the argument that such situations, i.e. that something is kept a secret, happen even in normal life and therefore should not disturb us. I shall try to illustrate the situation by making resort to Buddhist metaphysics. It centres around the basic dogma of rebirth (although not the rebirth of an indestructible soul or ego), regulated by a kind of metaphysical moral bank account called karma. Every person acquires during his life good and bad karma, and the balance of all this finally regulates the circumstances under which the individual starts his/​her next existence, as e.g. a god, a king, millionaire, a worker in the slums of Calcutta, or as a severely disabled person in a miserable situation. This conception of morally controlled cycles of birth and death is taken to be simply a natural law. Now think of the Christian dogma of the last judgment, and more specifically the Calvinist Doctrine, according to which god’s judgment is not determined by a man’s good or bad works during his lifetime, but god arbitrarily decides who will be saved and who goes to hell and has done so since eternity. The result, however, is not known to us. A true believer should be convinced that god’s final judgment, salvation or hell, exists, and will exist, forever. Here we have a clear case of a secret. If something has been declared to be a secret, depending on whose secret it is taken to be, it might follow that it is useless to look for it, as there is no chance to find it out; and it might even become criminal or blasphemous to try to find the secret, as in the case of a state’s secret or god’s secret. It is like the secret parents hide from their children before Christmas: children are fascinated and want to know the secret, but it would severely ruin the whole festivity feelings, if children successfully tried to discover the secret. In the religious case, the sin would naturally be greater. People do not know the lord’s judgments and decisions, and they do not know how much good or bad karma a person has accumulated up to the present moment. But there is a difference: The lord’s decisions are his secret, whereas the amount of karma in Buddhism is never taken as a secret. It is seen

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as not precisely known, like many other magnitudes in this world, and it seems to be impossible to construct an instrument for measuring a person’s current karma, but no Buddhist would be shocked if a “karma-​meter” could be produced. Buddhist Karma is not a secret of a god; Buddhism does not postulate the existence of some omniscient being that has secrets like the Christian god. 11

Secrets about the Future

Is the future, especially our own personal future, a secret? The question of free will and determinism is intricate and closely related to religious dogmas. One of the initial problems is how to formulate the question in sharp and vivid pictures. The usual way is to use the old Laplace-​demon, a hypothetical demon with unlimited computational abilities. Such a demon could calculate the future in all detail if only he knew all data about the universe at one and the same moment. If this construction is accepted for a moment, the future becomes a genuine secret, although only in a hypothetical manner: If such an intelligent being, man, demon, ghost, whatsoever, existed who had the relevant computational abilities, he would know the future, and we could say that the future is his secret. We human beings do not know the future, but we could at least try or imagine asking the demon about our future, and maybe we get at least some particular answers. The whole Laplace-​idea sounds a bit too artificial. However, it is only a variant of the most common religious belief, be it Jewish, Christian, Islamic, or of any other religion. According to this belief there is the highest intelligence who knows everything: past, present, or future, to him it makes no difference. He need not run a computer, because he already knows all the results. To the religious mind, everything we do not know is a divine secret, in particular our future is his secret. It is interesting that in this respect (in my opinion independently in different cultures) the picture of a book is introduced, in which for every man the future is already written down and fixed—​what is written will remain forever. A book can even replace the original owner of any information, therefore the introduction of such a (to us closed) book of fate and destiny is another instance of the secret-​and-​veil pattern. Would it have any consequences? One could argue that it makes no difference if there is a book of life that however is not open to us, or if there was no book of life at all. From an emotional point of view, however, it might make an enormous difference if one believes that in principle all questions are already answered, and all riddles solved, although to us human beings there will remain a lot of secrets.

38 Schleichert

Bibliography

Agrippa von Nettesheim, Heinrich Cornelius (1982) Die Magischen Werke. Wien: Fourier Verlag. Bacon, F. (2000) The New Organon. Edited by L. Jardine and M. Silversthorne. Cambridge University Press. Du Bois-​Reymond, E. (1916) Über die Grenzen des Naturerkennens. Die sieben Welträtsel. Leipzig. Glasenapp, H. V. (ed.) (1980) Pfad zur Erleuchtung. Köln: Diederichs. Görgemanns et al. (transl.) (2003) Plutarch: Drei Religionsphilosophische Schriften, griech./​dt. Patmos Verlag. Hume, D. (1778) The History of England [reprint by Liberty Classics]. Kant, I. (1907) Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. Akademie-​Ausg. Bd. vi. Berlin [first published 1793]. Kelsen, H. (1946) Vergeltung und Kausalität. Den Haag. Lau, D. C. (transl.) (1963). Tao Te Ching. Hong Kong. Lau, D. C. (transl.) (1979) Confucius. The Analects. Penguin. Topitsch, E. (1958) Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik. Eine Studie zur Weltanschauungskritik. Wien: Springer. Schiller, F. (1992) Werke und Briefe. Edited by O. Dann etc., Bd. 1: Gedichte; Deutscher Klassiker Verl., Frankf./​M. Schlick, M. (1978) “Unanswerable Questions?”, Philosophical Papers, pp. 414–​420. Schumann, H. W. (1982) Der historische Buddha. Köln: Diederichs. Vidoni, F. (1991) Ignorabimus. Emil du Bois-​Reymond und die Debatte über die Grenzen wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis im 19. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang ag. Watson, B. (1968) The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press. Wilhelm, R. (1961) Kungfutse, Schulgespräche (Gia Yü). Düsseldorf: Diederichs. Wittgenstein, L. (1947) Tractatus Logico-​Philosophicus. London: Kegan.

­c hapter 3

The Secret of Ideologies Tõnu Viik We almost always assume that ideologies contain something hidden from our eye. We presume that they hold a secret that the people who have ideologically distorted minds are unaware of. Hence the main task of the analysis and critique of ideology is to reveal its secret; to disclose the deceptive mechanism that produces distortion in people’s perception of reality. The assumption behind this view is a psychological one, and it has to do with the ability of human consciousness to be misled by social discourses that provide us with commonsensical ways of thinking and understanding the world. For the sake of brevity I will call it the assumption of a deceived mind. The critique of ideology that is based on this assumption attempts to disclose the deceptive mechanism of an ideological discourse and to open the eyes of its victims. Further, it is also widely assumed that the ideological distortion of reality is produced in somebody’s interest and helps to preserve their position of power. The ideological discourse might even be purposefully designed and enforced by a group of agents who benefit from the fact that particular ways of thinking and patterns of feeling, while justifying the division of power, seem commonsensical and natural to the majority of people in a given society. I will call it the evil agent assumption. The ideological critique that is based on this assumption sees its task in identifying the benefactor of the ideological distortion. Such critique often leads to conspiracy theories, in which case the ideological secret is seen to be hidden in undercover agreements of a certain group of people seeking to secure their social and material privileges. According to this assumption, ideological discourses are devices of large-​scale social deception. 1

Marxist Framework of the Concept of Ideology

Both the deceived mind argument and the evil agent argument derive from the Marxist tradition of theorizing the phenomenon of ideology. Already in The German Ideology from 1845–​46 and in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy from 1859 Marx and Engels defined ideology as a set of ideas and beliefs that distorts the view of reality in order to preserve and protect the interests of the ruling classes (see Marx & Engels, 1970; Marx,

© Tõnu Viik, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_005

40 Viik 1971). In the 20th century the most known proponents of the Marxist concept of ideology include Karl Mannheim (1985), Antonio Gramsci (1975) and Louis Althusser (1984), and their view of ideology remains to be widely used by many social and political analysts today (see Dijk, 1998; Seliger, 1976; Thompson, 1984). This is for example how Chris Jenks sums up the function of ideologies: Successful ideological categories do not just simply enable the purposes of an elite, or a select group within a culture; more significantly they disempower the majority through mystification, ignorance, or feeling of inadequacy. Ideologies, then, generalize special and limited interests; they make the interests of some appear congruent with the interests of all. jenks, 1997, p. 73

Ideologies achieve their purpose, Jenks argues in line with Gramsci and Althusser, by generating “a practical sense of consensus”, for ideologies are designed to maintain order without applying physical force (Jenks, 1997, p. 74). This practical sense of consensus is created mainly by using ideological images: Images of the dominant classes for themselves, as ‘preservers of standards’, ‘guardians of the cultural heritage’, upholders of reason, or civilization, etc … images of the dominant class for other groups, as ‘those who know best’, ‘those with our best interest in heart’, ‘those committed to the good of all’ etc. … images of other classes as perhaps ‘less able’ and ‘in need of leadership’, and … [self-​denying] images of those classes themselves. jenks, 1997, p. 74

The deceived mind argument is explained by the power of ideas and beliefs produced by social images that have become a part of the people’s world-​views. Jenks adds that the people might not necessarily be thematically conscious of these images, rather, “these images become a cognitive style, they become part of the way that people interpret their own conditions, and thus they restrict people’s scope for conceiving alternatives” (Jenks, 1997, p. 74). This is how, within the general modern Marxist framework, ideologies serve two functions at once: (1) they protect the interests and maintain the power of elites, and (2) they passify emotional disturbances of the oppressed groups by means of imagery that makes the social disequilibrium to be viewed as the order of things themselves. It has been noticed already by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, that deceptive social images are often produced by the

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very same people who themselves belong to the elites of a society. And if ideological ideas and beliefs are seen to be produced consciously and purposefully by the elites we are indeed entitled to suspect some kind of conspiratory activity on their behalf. To be more precise, let us draw the following distinction: if the creators of ideological images are seen as producing them unconsciously they can be viewed as victims of the ideological deception on the epistemological level, even if on the practical level they are still guilty of benefitting from the situation. In this case, the ideology critique will be focused on therapeutic treatment of ignorant benefactors of ideological distortion. If however, the ideology is produced by agents who are themselves not ideologically blinded, the evil agent assumption necessarily takes a conspiratorial form. 2

Evil Agent Assumption

There have been voices claiming that the notion of ideology is scientifically useless. The first wave of the End of the Ideology thesis came in the 1950s and was proposed by Raymond Aron, Edward Shils and Daniel Bell (see Aron, 1957; Bell, 1960; Shils, 1958). They identified ideologies with large scale political world-​views, such as Communism or Nazism, and argued that in developed industrial societies there is no room for political doctrines advocating a total revolutionary change in the society anymore. Ideology is seen by these authors as something like superstition that will be overcome in the course of social enlightenment—​as Comte hoped that religious ways of thinking will be overcome by scientific progress. Later proponents of the ideology critique, partly responding to this criticism, have broadened the scope of the concept of ideology and applied it to many other fields of social and cultural activity. They have proposed that ideologies characterize not just the political life of a society as a whole, but also medical care, education, art, music, scientific research, and other fields where particular ways of organizing discourse and institutional practices legitimizes the power-​position of certain players. For example, it has been assumed that the discourse of “experts” or “professionals” serves the interests of the establishment within specific institutions and the specific field of social life. The view that ideologies are serving the interest not just of the general ruling class of the society, but the interests of the elite of almost any institutionalized group of people is perhaps most prominently presented by Pierre Bourdieu (1998). This widening of the scope of ideology critique has provoked the second wave of the End of the Ideology thesis, this time from the opposite angle. Proponents of this thesis have argued that since all discourses, including

42 Viik scientific ones, serve somebody’s interests and since all discourses produce and maintain certain power-​positions, it does not make sense to differentiate between the so-​called “disinterested” or “neutral” and ideologically distorted discourses. All regimes of truth create privileged positions and seek to sustain them as long as they are taken as valid in a society (see Foucault, 1980; Rorty, 1999). Since all discourses are ideological, it doesn’t make sense to attempt to locate a specific group of discourses that are more ideological than others. Proceeding from the standard version of ideology criticism that is based on the evil agent assumption we could argue that without conspiratorial agents we could have a world without ideological disturbances. According to Foucault and Rorty, however, this option is inconceivable, at least as long as there are any socially valid discourses in use that divide people into the experts whose knowledge is valued, and others who have to yield to their knowledge. Modern health care, or school system, for example, are inconceivable without the division between the ones who have the knowledge –​the professors, teachers, doctors, in a word: experts, and the rest. Now, do we indeed have to conclude that anybody who has some kind of socially valuable knowledge is an evil agent? In answering this question we could probably disregard the conscious evil agent assumption, for it is absurd to think that professional discourses are purposefully created with the goal of power acquisition. But if we proceed from the unconscious version of the evil agent argument and assume that experts are ignorant benefactors of their professional discourses, we will be entitled to conclude that they need to be subjected to therapeutic treatment that opens their eyes regarding their privileges. A good counterargument against the ideology critique based on the evil agent assumption both in its conspiratorial and therapeutic version, as well as against the leveling of scientific and ideological discourses, comes from Clifford Geertz. From the anthropological perspective, he argues, ideology is seen as a species of cultural symbol-​systems that serves as an “extrinsic source of information in terms of which human life can be patterned.” “Culture patterns—​religious, philosophical, aesthetic, scientific, ideological,” Geertz explains, “are ‘programs’; they provide a template or blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, much as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization of organic processes”(Geertz, 1973, p. 216). Human beings need symbolic systems for making sense of their everyday life and for orienting themselves in everyday life situations. In order for a human being to make sense of any particular circumstance, he needs to put it under the applicable symbolic model that offers him a conceptual and emotional map for this activity (Geertz, 1973, pp. 214–​215). A political life would consequently be inconceivable without ideologies: “It is through the construction

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of ideologies, schematic images of social order, that man makes himself for a better or worse a political animal” (Geertz, 1973, p. 218). However, in contrast to Foucault and Rorty, Geertz argues that the symbolic strategy of ideology differs from the symbolic strategy of science (Geertz, 1973, p. 230). It is true, he argues, that both science and ideology are symbolic structures that “… are concerned with the definition of a problematic situation; both are responses to a felt lack of needed information” (Geertz, 1973, p. 231). But if ideology gives to certain sentiments a socially validated status, social science performs a critical function by evaluating, and if necessary, undermining the beliefs and emotions that ideology has chosen to defend: Science names the structure of situations in such a way that the attitude contained toward them is one of disinterestedness. Its style is restrained, spare, resolutely analytic: by shunning the semantic devices that most effectively formulate moral sentiment, it seeks to maximize intellectual clarity. But ideology names the structure of situations in such a way that the attitude contained toward them is one of commitment. Its style is ornate, vivid, deliberately suggestive, … it seeks to motivate action. geertz, 1973, p. 231

According to Geertz ideologies exist side-​by side with scientific, religious and other symbolic systems without getting fused with them. There are, of course, instances in history when political regimes have silenced scientific reasoning, but it would be misleading to take these situations as normative prototypes for all ideological processes (Geertz, 1973, p. 232). In most cases, Geertz argues, ideological symbol-​systems are able to coexist with scientific or, when scientific knowledge is lacking, with commonsensical, symbol-​systems, and even to complement one another. In order to demonstrate this Geertz quotes Churchill after having finished the rally of isolated England: “ ‘We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills … ,’ he turned to an aide and whispered, ‘and we shall hit them over the head with soda-​water bottles, because we haven’t any guns.’ ” (Geertz, 1973, p. 232). Here, at least in Churchill’s mind, Geertz argues, what was commonsensically and scientifically correct and what was believed or desired to be the emotional mood of general English public did coexist as two distinguishable and yet complementing ways of meaning-​ making. In fact, the existence of a variety of incompatible symbol-​systems is healthy for a society. The more there is room for competing maps of social reality the smaller is the danger for an ideology to become “an orgy of autistic fantasy” (Geertz, 1973, p. 232), and the less can it potentially suppress other types

44 Viik of discourses that provide individuals with other types of social maps—​as for example religion, science, and common sense do. Different social mappings that are valid at the same time help to balance social life and provide for more nuanced ways of understanding and coping with reality. What is more, as we saw above various symbol-​systems have their distinct symbolic strategies or styles, which make them accentuate emotional motivation for action, or disinterested observation. It is true that even the latter type is structured in a way that tends to support some sort of power-​relations. A newcomer in the field of science and academy will have to learn and yield to the divisions of power that are structured by the scientific disciplines themselves. There are authors and theoretical frameworks that have to be studied, institutional rules that have to be followed, historically contingent academic fashions and collective beliefs of an academic community that need to be taken into account. Learning and mastering a scientific discipline is unimaginable without yielding oneself to these power-​related aspects of academic life. However, mastering a scientific discipline is also unimaginable if one concentrates solely on the aspects of power of a scientific discipline without paying attention to the truth-​value of its various propositions, as well as a more general rational appeal of its theoretical positions regardless of who are their proponents. Not always, but most often the structure of truth and power positions within a scientific discipline collide, i.e. yielding to power (attending to famous and recognized authors and their theories, following the rules of research and academic writing, taking into account whatever might increase the possibilities of funding) helps to find and formulate a scientific view that one considers a true and disinterested view of reality. What we need to notice is that while the power positions contained within a scientific discipline might indeed serve the interest of some academic players, they also, and perhaps predominantly, serve the scientific discipline itself as a specifically structured, communalized and institutionalized form of academic life. Regardless of which particular individuals are occupying the positions of power these positions themselves are necessary for the existence of the scientific discipline. Power positions as such are a necessary feature of the field that is organized for the corresponding activity, i.e. scientific research and the pursuit of truth. They are simply a part of the field’s structure. Here we come to a seemingly paradoxical conclusion: the institutionalized, power-​laden stucture of a discipline is one of the necessary preconditions of disinterested research within it. Now, are the nation-​state level ideologies not similar regarding their support of social and institutional structures? Cannot we argue that the power-​positions created by a nation-​state level ideological discourses stem from the very logic of the social systems themselves and protect the social institutions that

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they represent? It is true, of course, that by doing so they serve the interests of particular individuals who are occupying these positions, but they support these individuals only to the extent that they perform certain roles that are necessary for the existence of corresponding institutions. In short, ideological discourses serve primarily cultural and social systems, and they serve particular individuals only to the extent that they embody the roles that are necessary for the existence of these systems. Surely by performing this function ideologies also provide the disadvantaged groups with ideas about why it is natural that they obey the existing order. That is, ideologies help to create cultural self-​identification that corresponds to the rank of individuals in their social and cultural insitutions. However, if it is true that ideologies serve institutions and cultural systems rather than particular individuals, then it is misleading to see the secret of ideologies in vicious ­intentions of singular individuals or groups of people. Rather, the secret of ideologies has to be found in the social and symbolic function of these institutionalized forms of collective ways of life and meaning-​making. If a particular individual makes a conscious attempt to make use of an ideological discourse for his own benefit, this should indeed be regarded as an act of pretense or deception. But such an act of deception cannot be viewed as a cause of ideological distortion of reality. This would rather undermine the ideological function of the cultural institution. Consequently, in order to understand the workings of ideology and its benefactors we should rather look at the social and cultural structures of our social and cultural institutions. Any attempt of individual or collective act of deception is no more causally related to the ideological distortion of reality than a singular act of theft is causally related to the reality distortion regarding the institution of legal trade. The former cannot serve as the heuristically efficient model of explaining the cultural and institutional logic of ideologies. In other worlds, the reality distortion of the deceived minds needs to be taken as a function of cultural and social institutions, rather than the individual benefactors of their particular power-​positions. 3

The Deceived Mind Assumption

Now let us look more closely at the assumption of the deceived mind. Already Marx described the effect of ideology regarding individual minds by using the concept of “false consciousness”. This term was made famous by Sartre in the context of his search for individual freedom and his attempt to disclose the chimeras of consciousness that conceal the fact of its fundamental freedom from

46 Viik consciousness itself. Both Marx and Sartre assumed that ideologies distort our understanding of reality and our own self. In contrast to this, Geertz argued that ideological constructions should not be seen as individual chimeras, but as a communal phenomenon, namely as communally shared cognitive maps that serve the function of orienting individuals in social reality. We concluded above that the main function of ideology regarding its benefactors might not lie in the service of particular human individuals, but in the service of social institutions. And if so, the evil agent assumption has to be considered inadequate for disclosoing the secret of ideologies. But in order to deal with the deceived mind assumption we need to look more closely at the relationship of ideology to individual consciousness. To do this, let us look at the workings of human mind from the phenomenological point of view. From the phenomenological perspective we can say that human individuals make sense of things and situations, the world around them, and themselves by means of meaning-​bestowal processes. We attribute meanings to the things and situations around us, and by the same token we identify, recognize, typify and categorize them. As a consequence of this process things and situations will be recognized as (at least partly) familiar and understandable. As Edmund Husserl has argued, the process of meaning-​bestowal does not involve just a single individual and the world around her, but includes the community and the communal activity that the human subject belongs to: Each individual, as a subject of possible experiences … has his experienced things. But each individual “knows” himself to be living within the horizon of his fellow human beings, with whom he can enter into sometimes actual, sometimes potential contact, as they also can do (as he likewise knows) in actual and potential living together. He knows that he and his fellows, in their actual contact, are related to the same experienced things in such a way that each individual has different aspects, sides, perspectives, etc., of them but that in each case these are taken from the same total system of multiplicities of which each individual consciousness is constantly conscious (in the actual experience of the same thing) as the horizon of possible experience of this thing. husserl, 1970, p. 164

This communal dimension, or “horizon”, if we use Husserl’s terminology, of the meaning-​bestowing process includes typifications and linguistic categorizations that are shared in a particular linguistic and cultural community. Cultural memory and language include traditions and social habits concerning various objects and situations. A human individual becomes acquainted with these

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cultural traditions from the time of early childhood when he learns to name certain types of objects by means of linguistic categories. It is not just a single individual who calls a flat item with four wooden legs a table, but everyone in her linguistic community does. What is more, by recognizing something as a table she does not just know which name to apply to the item in front of her, but she also knows what tables are for, how they have come into existence, and in what ways people normally use them. In other words, by recognizing something as a table an individual becomes aware, even if non-​thematically and imprecisely, of the cultural history and the social function of tables in the cultural and social world that she is sharing with her fellow human beings. The communal horizon of sense-​making processes includes linguistic categories of language, but also other systems of social representations, such as communally shared beliefs, theories, ideologies, etc. As horizonal structures of meaning-​making processes they contribute to the way the things and situations are understood. In this capacity the communal horizon of sense-​making performs a similar role in the context of the working of the human mind as the cultural symbol-​systems discussed by Geertz. Geertz maintained that cultural symbol-​systems are extrinsic sources of information in terms of which human life can be patterned. In this sense they are used as “templates” or “blueprints” in the course of the meaning-​bestowal processes. Thus we can argue that from the phenomenological point of view ideology is one of the communally valid “templates” or structures of typification that plays a role in meaning-​bestowing processes of the members of a particular society. The question is how can we distinguish ideological meaning-​structures included in the communal horizon from the rest. If we look at the functioning of ideology from the point of view of sociological analysis we will proceed from the idea that ideological meaning-​structures derive from symbolic re-​enactments of certain images or social representations. The main social representations pertaining to nationalist ideology in modern nation-​states are enacted at the celebrations of independence and state anniversaries, at public performances of high state officials and at other festivities and public ceremonies. Such ideologically pregnant performances reinforce myths about a nation, its heroic history and/​or its historical victimhood, and its future ambitions; they sanctify certain material symbols and monuments, celebrate its military, artistic and economic achievements, as well as particular persons or institutions that are seen as embodiments of these achievements. By doing so certain social images will be associated with collectively enforced emotional pathways, as well as with commonly accepted symbolic and conceptual patterns. These affective, symbolic and conceptual patterns become a part of the communal horizon of a given society, and start to affect the meaning-​making processes of

48 Viik the members of the society. We need to be reminded that the same communal horizon of sense-​making plays its role in acts of reflection and thinking when an individual makes sense of himself/herself. Althusser has called the latter the process of “interpellation” whereby ideologies enable individuals to identify with certain socially valid “subject positions” and to construe their identity through them (Althusser, 1984). One of the most important ideological symbols in the case of modern nationalism is the image of the “we” of the nation. This “we” is seen as an independent agent-​like identity that has its own character, history and future plans. Benedict Anderson has argued that the distinctive way of imagining the national “we” lies mainly in two features: first, the nation is viewed as an exclusive community that is or should be sovereign, and second, this exclusive community, and especially its sovereignty, is worthy of human sacrifices (Anderson, 1991, p. 7). That is why the acts of self-​sacrifice for the sake of a nation are most highly valued in national histories and most dramatically celebrated in their public re-​enactments. The reason of the cult of death can be explained by the fact that while the acts of sacrifice might pragmatically be not the most efficient ways of contributing to national sovereignty, they provoke extremely powerful feelings about the matter at hand. A well-​functioning ideological discourse channels these powerful feelings into the feelings of sanctity of national ideals and into the feelings of emotional attachment towards the “we” of the nation. The image of the “we” in national ideologides is further supported by the images of the collective friends and collective enemies of the nation. Enemies and friends of the nation can also be found among individuals inside the national community—​friends are the ones who demonstrate devotion and emotional attachment to its social myths and who honor their sanctity, and enemies are those who can be suspected of the opposite. Leonidas Donskis has pointed out that if the collective subject is predominantly defined by concentrating on its enemies, i.e. by creating and maintaining collective images of antagonistic forces (Jews in Nazi or Nationalist ideologies, Capitalists in Communist ideologies, Cosmopolitan Intellectuals in Nationalist ideologies, etc.), then the corresponding world-​views are also more susceptive of various conspiracy theories (Donskis, 2000, pp. 61–​67). We shouldn’t think, however, that ideologies could do without negative images. As Jeffrey Alexander (2003) points out, negative images are needed for symbolic re-​enactment of social belief-​systems: In terms of narrative dynamics, only by creating antiheroes can we implot the dramatic tension between protagonist and antagonist that is transformed by Bildung or resolved by catharsis. In ritual terms, it is only

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the crystallization of evil, with all its stigmatizing and polluting potential, that makes rites of purification culturally necessary and sociologically possible. alexander, 2003, p. 110

In social consciousness the evil cannot be simply defined as the absence of good, but must be coded, narrated and embodied for the purpose of symbolic and institutional maintenance of the good. This good is, again, not the good of particular individuals, but the good of social and cultural systems that seek to make themselves natural and therefore eternal within the social imagination of a nation. Only as such they can promise stability and security for the members of the society. In spite of the fact that central ideological constructs evoke strong emotional reactions, their conceptual meaning can remain unclear or even undefinable. Slavoj Žižek (1989) defines ideological symbols as “master signifiers” that indicate things too sacred to profane by politics or scientific analysis. Even though no one knows exactly what such things as God, Nation, or Freedom mean or refer to, they express something similar to what Kant called the sensus communis or Rousseau the general will (Kant, 1987; Rousseau, 1987). As the claim “this is beautiful” cannot be understood conceptually according to Kant, but it expresses the reflective sense of communality with all other subjects, in the same way ideological symbols cannot be explained rationally or analytically, but they give raise to an emotional expectation that all others should feel the same way. Therefore, even if the ideological “master signifiers” are signifiers without the signified, they give rise to a feeling that there are others who know what the signified is. In some cases this function of conceptually understanding their meaning can be given over to certain supreme Representatives, such as Priests, Government, or National Leaders. In this case, all that an individual has to do is to trust the Representatives who are able to deal with the meaning too sacred to be dealt with by the individuals themselves. In a similar way Ernesto Laclau (1996) views ideological symbols as “floating signifiers” that refer to “impossible objects.” They do not have a determinate content, but appear as overloaded with fullness and richness of meaning. This feature enables people to use signifiers such as God, Nation, Democracy, Independence, Freedom, etc., in almost any contexts, for any activities, and in whatever purposes. In spite of being conceptually unclear, it is necessary that ideological images are taken as natural and commonsensical (see also Barthes 1972, Geertz, 1983, p. 85). A nationalist ideology, for example, succeeds if ­people believe that the social and historical world has always consisted of nations, that the nation have always had their political goals, etc. In extreme

50 Viik cases it can become natural to think that sacrifice for the sake of the master signifiers is an intrinsic aspect of reality, simply the way things normally go. We already saw above that what is demanding self-​sacrifice is not necessarily a real human conspiratorial agent (particular government officials willing to launch a war), but the emotional “logic” of ideology itself that functions as the sense-​making device at the communal horizon of the society. At the same time we also need to take notice that even though the blueprint or pathway for the deceptive effect is a collective creation, it still patterns a particular act of meaning-​formation that is carried out by a single individual. Thus it is the individual herself who either feels or does not feel the ideological enjoyment regarding the sanctity of the master signifiers, accepts their “naturalness”, and adheres to their logic of connecting things and making sense of the situations. It is hard to imagine a situation where ideology is the only symbol-​system at the communal horizon of a society. In fact there are always several competing symbol-​systems at the social horizon that can be used for the sense-​ making processes of particular individuals. Our conformist tendencies do not explain away the fact that individuals have at least some degree of choice when it comes to applying them. And there is also a choice of degree that we apply for endorsing a particular symbol-​system. Thus the ideologically distorted consciousness is not the one that is not aware of the alternatives, but the one which has no desire to give up the symbolic system that is the source of her ideological pleasure. The situation is similar to the smoker who wants to quit. His problem does not lie in the lack of knowledge about the unhealthiness of smoking, but in the pleasure that arises from not yielding to this knowledge. Thus the secret of ideologies lies in what they enable us to feel and experience rather than in how they deceive us. Or, to put it somewhat paradoxically, they enable us to experience things precisely to the extent that they deceive us. But we should remember that this deception is in our own, rather than somebody else’s making. The secret of ideologies lies in our need to have feelings relating to things, plots, friends, enemies, and narratives that we “naturally” choose to love or hate. We are ourselves the benefactors of ideological distortion. We are not just the deceived, but also the deceiving agents. Therefore, both the deceived mind assumption and the evil agent assumption have to be moderated if we look at the functioning of ideologies from the anthropological and phenomenological point of view. Ideologies tend to serve social and cultural institutions rather than particular individuals. Due to the fact that ideologies function as sense-​making devices for a given society they provide its members with an option for meaning-​bestowing processes in their everyday lives. The symbolic strategy of ideologies is such that it allows for

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particularly affective ways of sense-​making and provides therefore emotional satisfaction (ideological enjoyment) to the degree that other symbolic sense-​ making devices at the communal horizon fall far behind. This fact might make it challenging for an individual to disregard it or to adhere to the power of any other symbol-​systems for her sense-​making activities. However, if she rejects all other available lenses for the perception of reality, she herself has to be regarded as an agent who carries out an act of deception, regardless of whether the ideology at hand works for her benefit or disempowerment.

Bibliography

Alexander, J. C. (2003) The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press. Althusser, L. (1984) Essays on Ideology. London: Verso. Anderson, B. R. O. (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (rev. and extended ed.). London: Verso. Aron, R. (1957) The Opium of the Intellectuals. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday. Barthes, R. (1972) Mythologies. New York: Hill and Wang. Bell, D. (1960) The End of Ideology; on the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press. Bourdieu, P. (1998) Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. California: Stanford University Press. Dijk, T. A. V. (1998) Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage Publications. Donskis, L. (2000) The End of Ideology & Utopia?: Moral Imagination and Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century. American university studies. New York: P. Lang. Foucault, M. (1980) “Truth and Power.” In C. Gordon, ed. Power/​Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–​1977 (1st American ed.) (pp. 109–​133). New York: Pantheon Books. Geertz, C. (1973) “Ideology as a Cultural System.” In The Interpretation of Cultures; Selected Essays (pp. 193–​233). New York: Basic Books. Geertz, C. (1983) “Common Sense as a Cultural System.” In Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (pp. 73–​93). New York: Basic Books. Gramsci, A. (1975). Letters from Prison. Translated by L. Lawner. London: Cape. Husserl, E. (1970) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology; an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Northwestern University Studies in phenomenology & existential philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Jenks, C. (1997) Culture. London: Routledge. Kant, I. (1987) Critique of Judgment. Translated by W. Pluhar. Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

52 Viik Laclau, E. (1996) “The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology.” Journal of Political Ideologies, 1, 201–​220. Mannheim, K. (1985) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Marx, K. (1971) A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Edited by M. Dobb. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Marx, K., & F. Engels (1970) The German Ideology. Edited by C. J. Arthur. New York: International Publishers. Rorty, R. (1999) Philosophy and Social Hope. New York: Penguin Books. Rousseau, J. (1987) “On the Social Contract.” In D. A. Cress (transl.), Basic Political Writings (pp. 139–​227). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. Seliger, M. (1976) Ideology and Politics. London: Allen & Unwin. Shils, E. (1958) “Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectual.” The Sewanee Review, 66, 450–​480. Thompson, J. B. (1984) Studies in the Theory of Ideology. Cambridge UK: Polity Press. Žižek, S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.

­c hapter 4

It Couldn’t Happen Here Olli Loukola and Leonidas Donskis 1

The Concept of IconHah

In Finland, an attitude towards the potential and upsetting catastrophes of the world, which is that “it could not happen here” (from now on, “IconHah”), has long prevailed. The question here is of more than a mere commonplace saying; in fact, it comprises a whole-​scale mentality or ethos concerning Finland and its place in the world. A typical example of this ethos was expressed some years ago when mad cow disease (bse, “bovine spongiform encephalopathy”) broke out in the UK. In Finland, the responsible official of the Ministry of Forest and Agriculture hastened to make a public statement that there was no reason to worry in Finland; our control mechanisms were foolproof.1 Even though people in other countries needed to watch what they are eating, and be skeptical about their control systems, Finns need not concern themselves. Such a thing could never happen here.2 This is indeed a typical official Finnish response to most of the worrying incidents or calamities taking place around the rest of the world: the message is that our officials are carefully observing and surveying and controlling the world and thus conscientiously taking care of us; these things just couldn’t happen here. And this is not merely the usual stance of Finnish officials, it is also widely accepted among Finns in general. Thus we are not merely talking of official rhetoric, but a mentality reflecting most of Finland. It is a national narrative, part of Finnish national identity. For many reasons, Finland is the place where these things could never happen. This IconHah mentality has been around for some time now. In the 1980s, for instance, after the Chernobyl disaster, when public debate on the safety of nuclear power plants was raging in the Western countries, the general opinion in Finland was that we had nothing to fear. Swedes could panic as much as they like; Finns had no need for such exaggerated reactions. We do have two nuclear plants in Finland and although one consists of two Chernobyl-​type reactors, 1 For the official bulletin concerning this issue, see: http://​sta​tsra​det.fi/​ajanko​htai​sta/​tie​dott​ eet/​tied​ote/​en.jsp?oid=​230​586. 2 From now on ‘IconHah’; ‘It COuld Never HAppen Here’.

© Olli Loukola and Leonidas Donskis, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_006

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they would certainly never explode here. There was no real fear among Finns: it just could never happen here. And this mentality still prevails, since Finland is among the few countries in the West actively planning and building new nuclear plants at present. Now the question is, of course, where could such a mentality come from, what is it based on? It is not exclusively a Finnish phenomenon, since there are a number of similar ethoses to be found elsewhere. The kind of nationalism inherent in such an attitude is surely universal. Therefore the more interesting here is the background and justification for such a doctrine. On what grounds would some people or groups be entitled to claim, but most importantly, passionately believe that “it could not happen here,” while the rest of the world is beset with difficulties? In what follows, I do not, however, intend to construct any general theory of IconHah, but merely to outline some aspects of such a mentality and later in this essay, its connections with conspiracy theories (ct) in particular. Perhaps surprisingly, these two mentalities share many characteristics. 2

Potential Underlying Assumptions of IconHah

Let me start by surveying some potential social and historical explanations for the emergence and existence of a mentality like IconHah in Finland. On this basis I will later try to draw some more general conclusions concerning the nature of the phenomenon. A. The IconHah ethos seems to include a powerful collective element; as mentioned a moment ago, it is very often a kind of national narrative. One quite plausible and common historical source for proposing a privileged position for a specific group of people is unique guidance or the special care by divine powers. This is the idea of the chosen people, that is that our group, our people, or our nation has a special relationship with the deity, or in its extreme form, that we are chosen for some specific purpose, or even to act as the deity’s agent on earth. This is the kind of presumption that seems to be crucial to many religious doctrines, the best-​known being Judaism or Rastafarianism; or of nationalistic doctrines, such as were influential in Hitler’s Germany or at various historical stages in the USA as well as various other countries. Such a doctrine is not a valid account here, however, since Finns are not religious people, except for very pragmatic reasons. We have a Lutheran-​protestant state church, and over 90% of the Finnish people are members. Yet the main reason for most people for belonging to the church is that it administers some of the central events of family and community life of Finns: baptism, marriage,

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Christmas sing-​alongs, and funerals. In general, there is no belief in an active God or metaphysical powers purposefully interfering in our lives. The kind of attitude present in several other religions that “we go where God chooses to lead us” is lacking in commonplace religious thinking: Finns retort simply that there surely must be a higher force but we cannot know that. Religion is considered to be a deeply individual and voluntary issue; a genuinely private choice restricted only to one’s personal life. Finns have thus never envisioned themselves as being chosen people in any way, quite the contrary. Thus I think that we can safely conclude that Finns do not believe that it is God who protects us from the miseries and misfortunes of the world. Even though this may well be a valid explanation of the IconHah mentality in some other circumstances, the source of this particular one must be somewhere else. More generally, the idea of chosen people or divine guidance is usually expressed in these or similar terms, and the IconHah-​mentality is clearly not a central or distinct part of such conceptions. For these reasons, I will drop out this conception from what follows. B. Historical experience, common fate, or destiny is another obvious candidate for the emergence of an ethos like IconHah. After all, we are talking here about a distinctly collective mentality, an attitude that prevails within concentrated communities with long historical roots and resilient collective identities, and not just of any old associations or voluntary unions such as yacht clubs or neighborhood organizations. Such a community and its identity have their roots deep in collective conscientiousness, which is very strongly determined by shared past experiences and historical events. This seems often to be an inherent feature of the IconHah mentality. At face value, it would seem that favorable historical experiences and prosperous episodes of national triumphs would support and strengthen such mentalities: successful navigation through the catastrophes and miseries of history may be interpreted to show that we are something special. It may be that the “something that we do” is right, or that the wise choices of our community or its leaders have enabled us to survive where others have fallen. In this sense we have deserved a safe and prosperous existence in the state of IconHah. We are entitled to it because of our character, our endurance, our foresight, or any combination of such features. Unfortunately, however, Finland has a rather bad track record in this sense: living in a barren environment with cold winters from time immemorial, historical episodes of famines and diseases, not to mention the centuries of exploitation by the Swedes, constant skirmishes, and wars with the Russians, and the brutal civil war at the beginning of the 20th century. The list is endless, or at least Finns see it as such. In this sense, for instance, our Western neighbor,

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Sweden, would supposedly have a much more favorable history for the emergence of the IconHah ethos. But as is so often the case with the creation of national identities, there is no historical incident so bad, no episode so terrible, and no adversity so abysmal that it could not be interpreted favorably. This is the idea that living through the difficult ordeals of history brings with it a kind of endurance and pride in survival. In Finland, such a feeling is epitomized in the central national concept of “sisu,” which means roughly the character of having the guts to survive the hardships of life, “forcing one’s way through the grey stone” with pride and bittersweet satisfaction. It is a survival mentality, pride in having confronted and successfully tackled the catastrophes and miseries of one’s society. Enduring difficult experiences and the agonies of life may have the effect of raising one’s self-​esteem and confidence in one’s powers of survival. But this mentality underlines the ordeals of life, which of course is quite contrary to something like IconHah. “Sisu” focuses on obstacles that have been overcome, while IconHah claims that no such obstacles can or will beset us. This account of IconHah surely has an inherent logical error. The question is of a temporal consideration: if one’s nation or community has indeed successfully avoided the catastrophes of the rest of the world, there may be some grounds for supposing or hoping that these will not take place in the future either. But if one’s nation has repeatedly ploughed headlong into serious misfortunes in the past, then the hope that such things would never happen again is surely mere wishful thinking. What reason is there to believe that such things would never happen again? This surely brings out something essential in the entire ethos. We are usually well aware that there is no telling what the logic of historical events is, what it is that will spare some nations and destroy others. Even though it has always been one of the central aspirations of human societies to be able to foretell their own fate—​it is the paraphernalia of the grand folklore, novels, and operas—​neither scientists, historians, nor prophets have been able to anticipate the course of the history convincingly. At the same time, the notion that the forces of history are blind simply seems intolerable to the human mind; we just cannot live with a conviction that there is no telling of what will happen next, and that in worldly events there is no place for deserts or merits, reprimands or punishments. It seems to be part of our nature that we desperately seek for identifiable forces, power, or actors, for causes, reasons, or explanations. The interesting part here—​which I will return to later in this essay—​is that this seems to be something that is common to both IconHah mentalities and conspiracy thinking: the conviction that everything in our world has to happen for a reason. Nothing is haphazard.

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C. But before going there, a final word on the Finnish IconHah mentality. Finns are practical people in many ways and have a strong distaste for metaphysical explanations, such as gods dictating our faith or the forces of history directing our path, as I believe is evident from what was said above. Accordingly, they do not believe these reasons are effective in the face of catastrophes. On the other hand, ruling out metaphysical and theological explanations seems to leave no plausible explanation for the IconHah mentality, that is, why things would not happen here, but only a hope that this will be so. As a result, this sort of mentality seems to lead to an attitude of merely laying low, keeping one’s head down, and not doing anything that would attract unfavorable attention. The task of societal institutions then becomes that of preserving the status quo, not upsetting the existing state of affairs, and at most defending the country from outside enemies. This is easily recognizable in the attitudes of Finnish officials, such as that described above; their main task is to guard the Finns from the catastrophes coming from without. These of course are the building blocks of all conservative doctrines. An ethos like IconHah is a shared thing, a prevailing set of beliefs or convictions which often amount to a common narrative. As such it is a socio-​ psychological fact whose existence is determined by whether people actually believe in it. If this is what the Finns believe, so be it; I will not question or criticize that belief here. Of course there are various opinions of the issue, and it is up to sociological studies to determine what exactly Finns believe in. But I do not doubt that the rapid globalization of the world in recent decades, including constantly increasing and more easily accessible information about world events, expanding immigration and emigration, participation in international economic and political structures and activities, are all fatal to the IconHah type of mentality because they all clearly demonstrate the difficulty of remaining isolated from the rest of the world, merely minding one’s own business. A further interesting point is the nature of such mentalities, that is, what sorts of account they are. In general, they seem to be nihilistic or skeptical versions of what national identity consists of, in the sense that they do not attempt to articulate or outline any positive national characteristics. Moreover, they are clearly naturalistic and modernistic notions in the sense that they evade metaphysical accounts, such as divine intervention, or historical purpose. Here they purport to be realistic, secular, sober, or rational accounts. At the same time, they are collective accounts because they do not refer to any individual actions or actual undertakings. As an example, in essence, the Finnish version simply says that if Finns just go about minding their own business as usual, not interfering with the rest of the world too actively, things will take their normal

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course and nothing threatening will emerge. The undertows of conservatism and determinism are easily discernible here. As I have already suggested, there are a number of interesting points of convergence between the IconHah ethos and conspiracy theories, which at first glance do not seem obvious. These are what I will turn to next, by first outlining what conspiracy theories amount to in this connection. 3

A Brief Analysis of Actual Conspiracies (ac), Conspiracy Theories (ct), and Conspiracism (C)

In what follows, I will be treating conspiracy thinking in the same vein as the IconHah mentalities above, that is, as an ethos or collective narrative purporting to explain what is happening in the world, and what one’s place in it is. Furthermore, as I try to explain later, they amount to a full-​scale mentality like IconHah, that is, Conspiracism (C). There is no doubt that actual conspiracies (ac) have existed in human history and do exist in various forms in this world today and will do so in the future, but conspiracy theories (ct) are a breed of their own. They postulate conspiracies in the world. These may be global or local, but in general they concern groups, lodges, sororities, leagues, unions, alliances, or similar collective entities. ct s also often refer to religious, business, technological, medical, or secret societies in their postulations. The most common locus of ct s seems to be national or collective groups, often composed of shared interests or goals. For various reasons, the number of ct s has exploded during the last couple of decades. The technology efficiently facilitating this development is the Internet, since it allows new theories to be quickly created, and endlessly debated by a wider audience than ever. A conspiracy-​based website built around the death of Princess Diana, for example, sprang up within hours of the car crash that killed her in 1997. For these reasons, Wikipedia is a wonderful source to start examining the collective narratives of ct s. In Wikipedia’s entry on “conspiracy theories,”3 it is worth noting that the first category is national ct s. For instance, a “conspiracy theory typical to Germany” concerns the “termination of rocket experiments at Cuxhaven”; while “conspiracy theories peculiar to Sweden” refers to the assassination of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986. There is even one typical of 3 http://​en.wikipe​dia.org/​wiki/​Conspi​racy​_​the​ory, accessed 13.8.2007. Since the access date, the entry has changed considerably, and is in fact in a constant state of change. This is probably the entry most prone to continuous rewriting, for obvious reasons.

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Estonia, which concerns the source of political unrest in Tallinn a few years back centering on the moving of the statue of the bronze soldier.4 What is notable here is that there are no specific Lithuanian or Finnish conspiracy theories mentioned. Can we draw some kind of conclusion from this, such as that in general no conspiracy theories—​at least no major ones—​exist in these countries? And if so, why not?5 I would be inclined to suggest that at least with Finland, this probably has something to do with the existing ingrained IconHah mentality. Conspiracy theories are seldom taken very seriously as theories, because so many of them—​almost by definition—​lack readily verifiable evidence. It is truly indicatory of the whole ct mentality that in the first lines of the entry in Wikipedia, there is a note stating that: “[t]‌he neutrality of this article is disputed.” And further down, in the listing of conspiracy theories, another note forewarns the reader that “it contains alleged conspiracies that are not accepted by mainstream academics.” Therefore, in order to give a plausible picture of ct s and IconHah and their interconnection here, the distinction in the title of this chapter needs to be made clear. We are to distinguish actual, existing conspiracies (ac) from theories of conspiracies (ct), i.e., common beliefs about where exactly such undertakings or enterprises exist. We have plenty of evidence that actual conspiracies have existed; and they can be substantiated by historical evidence through proper historical research, and thus become historical facts. It is indicative that in the prevailing conspiracy literature very little attention is paid to actual conspiracies; once they are resolved in the sense that once the actual conspirators and the time are conclusively demonstrated, conspiracy theorists seem to lose their interest in them. So the question is what kinds of theories ct s in fact are. They can be said to be ‘theories’ in the very restricted common sense of the term, that is, when something has not yet been shown to be the case. When the term is taken in its scientific sense, however, this referent, “theory,” naturally raises problems. Here ct s are beliefs, assumptions, or conjectures about the existence of conspiracies, and the problem is that facts that could verify or falsify the proposed ct simply, seem to have a very ambiguous role. This role is obvious in the blurb for Conspiracy Theories6 where it is stated that “[t]‌here are the facts … and then there’s the truth.” 4 According to one such theory, the April riots of 2007 of the Russian minorities of Estonia were in fact orchestrated by the Estonian government. 5 ct s seems to be characteristically culture dependent and local phenomena, and as such a vital question concerns the reasons for this; for instance, why are ct s such a widespread phenomenon in the USA? I will try to give a partial explanation of this question later in this essay. 6 Tucket, 2007.

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It does seem, as many writers have noted, that ct s generically and typically have a suspect, who is set in advance, and this drives them further away from the control of facts. This is discernable in their methodology. The pieces of information (i.e., facts) advanced are interpreted and given meaning and relevance according to how well they fit into the proposed ct. In this sense they seem to be far from satisfying any scientific criteria.7 They are then surely not theories in the generally accepted scientific sense of the term, since it seems very difficult to find information that would corroborate or falsify them. They really are conjectures in the very literal sense that they rarely amount to much more than that. Often the only evidence acceptable to a conspiracy theorist is whatever corroborates the original thesis, the explanation of why and how this particular conspiracy exists. If existing evidence does not support the ct in question, it is rejected, if not altogether false, at least as irrelevant for this very reason. Thus the search for relevant evidence continues, except that it will rarely be found,8 because the criteria for the truth here is what is presumed all along, that is, what the ct in question originally postulates. Thus, if the scientific enterprise is conceived as the commendable and recommendable version of the general goal of understanding and explaining the world, ct s could be said to be the bungled versions of the very same enterprise, and highly susceptible ones because of the role facts are given here. This takes us to the other possible function of ct s, which according to Frank Mintz is the “belief in the primacy of conspiracies in the unfolding of history.”9 As Mintz states further, “[c]‌onspiracism serves the needs of diverse political and social groups in America and elsewhere. It identifies elites, blames them for economic and social catastrophes, and assumes that things will be better once popular action can remove them from positions of power.”10 As I see it, this kind of mentality politicizes ct s, that is, that they are often used as tools of ideology, power, and manipulation. Yet “conspiracists” seem to me to be political tools of quite a distinctive nature, because their negative or skeptical nature seems to me to make an important difference. They focus mostly on catastrophes, disasters, and calamities; they try to uncover 7

Thus the Wikipedia note above not being “accepted by mainstream academics,” also seems to be an out of place remark: they are usually not even meant to be judged by such standards. 8 An immediate parallel to this kind of thinking is naturally that concerning theological propositions. This kind of theorising is probably most compactly and illustratively put in Antony Flew’s classic short piece, “Theology & Falsification,” originally from 1950. See for instance: http://​www.step​henj​aygo​uld.org/​ctrl/​fle​w_​fa​lsif​icat​ion.html. 9 Mintz, 1985, p.199. 10 Ibid.

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manipulation and exploitation, mistreatment and neglect, private interests, and shady motives. These “conspiracist” assessments do not even focus on overt actions taken, explicit decisions made or policies established because the actual reasons and driving forces are concealed, and the only things visible are the consequences. As a result, they focus on the outcomes, and in particular on negative outcomes—​”economic and social catastrophes”—​and the actors and groups responsible for them. As a consequence, this search for responsibility quite naturally concentrates on blame. And the reason for this seems to follow from the conceptual distinction of conspiracism, that is, that the driving force behind any event is always a conspiracy, that there is something that needs to be kept hidden, and secret. To complete this vicious circle, there is surely something fishy going on, something negative taking place, which necessitates the secrecy. There is a certain degree of vacuity in conspiracist thinking. Even though Mintz in his account of conspiracism clearly has particular types of ct s in mind—​i.e., typically American ones—​I believe he is right in general in concluding that “[a]‌s such, conspiracy theories do not typify a particular epoch or ideology.” Because ct s are devoid of verifiable contents, purposefully discounting the positive actions, actual plans, or overt policies, they do not amount to full-​fledged ideologies or policy programmes. Their only ideology is that whatever happens in the world is a result of some conspiracy. Therefore conspiracism can be used for various political purposes, ranging from left to right in the political spectrum, depending on the conspiracy one sets out to expose. They remain primarily and necessarily skeptical reactions, negative searches for whoever those responsible are supposed to be, and who those are trying to suppress or hide their active roles. And with the disregard of ct s for any contrary facts, or evidence indicating otherwise, this leaves a blank space to accuse the people or groups of one’s choice of the conspiracy proposed. As a result, conspiracism might well then lead to scapegoating, or as Berlet and Lyons put it, “[c]‌onspiracism is a particular narrative form of scapegoating that frames demonized enemies as part of a vast insidious plot against the common good, while it valorizes the scapegoater as a hero for sounding the alarm.” The goal of conspiracism is naming and framing guilty ones ex post facto. It is their basic postulates and methodology, which easily enable scapegoating: firstly, they perceive that nothing in the human world happens without a cause; secondly, all the disasters of this world have resulted from conspiracies. Thirdly, they start hypothesizing about who the guilty party is, and this is often done on a precarious basis, usually by oversimplifying issues and by branding, stigmatizing, and defaming actors. Combined, fourthly, with an unshakeable belief in the secret nature of such activities, this results

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in disregarding all contrary evidence. It is this vicious circle that makes ct s perfect tools for people with goals of ideological manipulation or deliberate scapegoating. However, I do not think that all ct s are directly engaged in purposeful ideological manipulation or targeted scapegoating, since in their truest forms they are open-​ended quests for the cause of the incidents in question, trying to find out who exactly is behind those incidents. Let me now summarize the three objects of conspiracies that are easily muddled in talking about “conspiracy theories” as a general term: there are, firstly, those conspiracies that have existed in history (ac); secondly, there are theories of conspiracies, that is, conjectures or suppositions that certain states of affairs are results of actual conspiracies (ct). And thirdly, there is conspiracism, that is, the mentality of explaining conspiracies as the driving force of history (C). The last two versions (ct) & (C) are the theoretical parallels of (ac), but what their connection is, is far from clear. Both (ct) & (C) are genuine attempts to understand the world and the role of human action in it. ct s postulate that there is truth beyond facts—​however conceptually confused this may sound—​; something that scientific enquiry is unable to discover. This is the belief in conspiracism (C), that conspiracies are the driving force of history, that leads one to disregard the contrary facts, that is, those which are proposed as non-​conspirational explanations of events in the world. Thus my purpose here is to try to understand conspiracist thinking (C) as one variety of human thinking; a similar package of beliefs and hopes purporting to make sense of the world as the IconHah-​mentality does. Yet at heart, it seems to me that, just like IconHah, conspiracism too is a genuine certitude of whatever it is that directs our lives and destinies. However, for both mentalities, actual proofs or evidence play a minor role. The question is of collective convictions, which in this sense is not far from religious doctrines. But there is yet a major issue here, which I have not really discussed so far, that both links and separates the two points of view from each other, and that is determinism. Both mentalities claim that things of the world go well unless they are interfered with. 4

Conspiracism (C) and IconHah

Both C and IconHah are a form of collective ethos, and as such typically usually creations of groups that share certain vital characteristics, usually determined by historical circumstances, such as Finns. Their common deterministic element comes out through the following twist. Both points of view believe that nothing in the human world happens without a reason. Somebody always

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causes the events. Thus both mentalities contain a strongly normative deterministic element, which claims simply that one should not intervene in worldly affairs. If something bad happens, the reason is that someone has interfered in the wrong way, meddled inappropriately in mundane affairs. When this happens, we are to look for those responsible for the consequent economic, social, or natural catastrophes, and try to stop them from interfering. C focuses on who is responsible for the catastrophes, with a sort of obsessive need to find and name those to blame. IconHah, on the other hand, is a belief stating that under normal circumstances, keeping to the established ways of action, things go well and nothing bad happens. Further, and importantly, IconHah is often used as a justification for governmental authority. The central task of the authorities is to prohibit bad things from happening, to prevent interference with the traditional ways of society. And this gives us an important link connecting IconHah and C, and that is that it would seem plausible that ct s and Cs do not coexist in societies with a strong IconHah mentality. Where there is high trust in state bureaucracies, C does not seem to flourish. This seems to be the case in Finland and other Scandinavian countries, where officialdom is generally conceived as trustworthy, while in the United States the government is looked upon with skepticism and mistrust. If government officials are suspected as active partners in various kinds of conspiracies, as is the case with a number of American ct s, they surely are not actors upholding the state of IconHah—​quite the contrary. They are part of the problem. But a crucial challenge for IconHah is that when something does go wrong, as so often happens, and economic, political, or social catastrophes occur, why did they take place? If indeed it couldn’t happen here, the reason for these misfortunes has to be found somewhere else, there has to be somebody else causing them. And this is where ct s step in, by pinpointing who has caused the problem. As a result of all of this, I would be inclined to propose that there exists a temporal sequence from IconHah to C. Where IconHah fails is where ct s come into play, based on the assumption that the world is indeed governed by conspiracies. Let us return finally to the question of the nature of IconHah and ct s as explanations. ct s as well as IconHah both entertain a strong conviction that behind every event there is some identifiable human force, a power, an actor, group, or a collective, causing the phenomenon, and thus explaining it. They are accounts of human action which are strongly naturalistic and modernistic in that even though they are skeptical of scientific evidence, they avoid metaphysical elucidations. This seems to lead them almost to anthropocentrism in the sense that they are prepared to accept human action as an explanans

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for almost any event, including the natural ones. A good example of such an explanation is that suggesting that earthquakes are the results of covert military planning.11 Further, as I said earlier concerning ct s, they are nihilistic accounts of what collective (usually national) identity consists of. Nihilistic, that is, in the sense that they do not postulate positive characteristics as the normal accounts of collective identity do (such as that Finns are trustworthy, honest, nature-​loving, etc.). They are both explanations of the world, or rather worldviews, which are deterministic and conservative. IconHah is a positive one in the sense that it says that everything will go well as long as we do not interfere, and C is a negative one which says that things are going badly, because somebody interfered. In a society where IconHah is no longer believed in, Conspiracism steps in. 5

The Culture of Determinism

By no means is the conspiracy theory nurtured only by the conservative imagination, or by right-​wing hacks. However tempting it is to attach utopia to the Left, and the conspiracy theory to the Right, such a watershed would be simplistic and misleading. By no means always dwelling with the angels, the political imagination of the Left has produced conspiracy theories of its own. The left-​wing variant of the conspiracy theory ranges from the ideological myth of the capitalist world-​conspiracy against the working class and its faithful ally, the toiling and progressive intelligentsia—​the myth so aptly described by Popper—​to the theory of the American-​Israeli/​Zionist world-​conspiracy. The latter, as this pearl of wisdom goes, embodies the sole purpose of the “reactionary forces”—​to dominate the countries that are not yet completely lost for the spread and acceptance of progressive ideas or for the civilizing and enlightening mission, which is to be accomplished by “progressive countries.” The left-​ wing variant of the conspiracy theory is usually accompanied by what might be termed left-​wing antisemitism disguised as anti-​Zionism or as an anti-​ Israeli stance. Far from being exclusively the offspring of Soviet Communism, left-​wing antisemitism is a time-​honored phenomenon that dates back to such towering political theorists of the Left as Pierre-​Joseph Proudhon, Eugen Karl Dühring, and, above all, Karl Marx himself. Yet the modern version of the conspiracy theory should not be lightly reduced to antisemitism, for it rests on the assumption of inexorable laws in 11

Tuckett, 2007, pp. 62–​64.

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societal life and human existence, and on that of infinite manipulation with human consciousness. Hence, what might be called natural innocence and victimization: according to this attitude, people cannot in principle control biological or social forces—​on the contrary, particular individuals and even entire societies are shaped and moved by those forces. Since the world is controlled and dominated by powerful groups, clandestine international organizations, or secret agencies and their elusive experts, individuals cannot assume moral responsibility for their actions; nor can they influence or change the state of affairs. Such an attitude is characteristic of marginalized and victimized groups. It is in part characteristic of what had been called by Oscar Lewis the culture of poverty,12 but it is equally characteristic of the kind of consciousness shaped by anti-​liberal and anti-​democratic regimes. For victimized consciousness, the “Jews” usually have nothing to do with flesh-​and-​blood human beings. They serve as the most familiar and recognizable idiom of the malevolent forces of the universe. The “Jews” represent what may well be called a group target, an indispensable constituent part of the conspiratorial view of the universe. Such an idiom of evil enters the underground of modern consciousness through the popular version of Christian demonology, which is deeply grounded in peasant cultures, backward societies, or largely marginalized groups, and which may be easily assimilated to modern forms of demonology. It surfaces repeatedly in professional circles and even in public discourse, in the form of political speculations and working hypotheses or in the shape of plain demagoguery/​deliberate manipulations with mass consciousness. In the age of ideologies, a phenomenon emerges which might be termed the domestication or localization of the conspiracy theory. A new conspiratorial view of the universe comes to adjust itself to the scientific and “rational” worldview. This is to say that the idea of some small-​scale conspiracies, within the framework of a new conspiratorial view of the world, tends to replace that of a global conspiracy. The conspiracy, in the age of ideologies, is seen as a scientific or technological project, which may be carried out in the name of evil. (We can recall here, for instance, a “theory” of the spread of aids, which explained this apocalyptic disease as a consequence of Jewish physicians’ subversive activities—​ this was exactly what the Chicago commentator Steve Cokely held, describing Jewish doctors as injecting the aids virus into black babies.) Conspiracy is by no means accidental, since ideology as such comes to identify the truth with a conscious transformation of reality. In the deeper sense, ideology is always 12

See Lewis, 1996.

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“scientific.” If medieval science had to carry out experiments to disclose the disguised forces of evil, the modern scientific and technological culture can only qualify evil as something that resists being conceived of and rationally explained, as obstacles on the way to progress and the maximization of human happiness. The conspiracy theory, disguised as a scientific theory or “rational” project, tends to reappear in many ways. For instance, it makes its appearance masquerading as the global management theory. Evidently, this is just another term for what Eco, in Foucault’s Pendulum, qualifies as “synarchy,” a kind of symphonic unity of world history achieved through a series of interrelated political plots perpetuated by secret societies. These, deeply grounded in esoteric theories and mystical speculations, seek to control the course of history and, ultimately, establish a world-​republic free of monarchy and papacy. The global management theory, like its counterpart described by Eco as “synarchy,” cannot in principle be practiced other than as a scientific and technological project, whatever its guise and frame of reference. Hence, a new image or representation, in modern consciousness, of evil forces, the latter being embodied in human agencies of evil that misuse scientific knowledge and technology. No wonder that technocratic consciousness quickly associates the spread of illnesses, infections, viruses, earthquakes, and disasters with deliberate plots initiated and perpetuated by hidden expert groups, malevolent and omnipotent agencies, secret political organizations (such as the kgb or the cia), or by dangerous maniacs and mean-​ spirited scientists who possess enormous powers of expertise. Here we are in the Kafkaesque world of anguish, fear, loneliness, and isolation, the world of the cornered, scared, and suffering human individual who finds him or herself totally alienated from the mechanistic and dehumanized world. Usually associated with ignorance, backwardness, and bigotry, the conspiracy theory, though, has a sort of its highbrow cultural setting, which is deeply grounded in underground consciousness. The highbrow setting of the conspiratorial view of the world consists of non-​commercial literature and films, or even sociological theories of negative technological determinism, full of anti-​rationalist, anti-​technological, anti-​bureaucratic, and anti-​scientific resentment. Its more popular version finds a home in the “prose of everyday life,” suspense, fantasy, metafiction, postmodern, and entertainment literature. Having mentioned that, we have to stress technological determinism—​in particular, its negative version—​and technocratic consciousness as a major source of inspiration: both are likely to nourish the conspiratorial view of the world in the future, as they did so far. In technocratic visions of societal existence, society appears as a kind of complex mechanism or machine, which

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cannot operate other than under the guidance of supreme experts and their elusive masters. These are concealed in secret institutes and laboratories. Since the ultimate end of supreme experts and their patrons is to brainwash and manipulate society, they control education and mass media. Independent and critical thought has to be abolished in the long run. The logical conclusion of such a theory is that contemporary science, ultimately, is a conspiracy against humanity. By implication, every single experiment carried out in secret laboratories, virtually, is a small-​scale conspiracy. Yet this is not a sufficient explanation of what provides, in the modern world, an interpretive framework for a new conspiratorial view of the universe. The fact that this view implies a new version of maleficia (almost the same diabolic agencies, demons, fiends, and other paraphernalia of the Christian demonology) may suggest that we are witnessing the emergence of the technocratic demonology. This is the culture and consciousness of destiny, as opposed to those of freedom and choice. Nobody is responsible for anything, since the world is being shaped and moved by inexorable biological or social forces. Human helplessness and forsakenness, in the face of the malevolent forces of the world, can only be reduced by those who are in power or by those who possess the technology and (secret) information. To simplify this phenomenon by describing it in terms of the absence of the rule of law or of the traditions of liberal democracy in a given society is the last thing I would do. The conspiracy theory, victimization, and technocratic demonology are almost equally widespread in liberal-​democratic and illiberal parts of the world. What is radically different between them is the conspiratorial worldview’s sociocultural and political implications. The contemporary forms of technocratic and victimized consciousness are much more likely to be favored by what Vytautas Kavolis once termed “an encounter of political modernization with a deficiency of cultural modernity in the deeper sense”.13 Thus, the conspiracy theory becomes deeply characteristic of, and linked with, victimized social groups whose members may sincerely believe that it is they whom evil forces chose as a target. Surprisingly, it sheds new light on victimized consciousness as an inversion of political messianism. Political messianism upholds the belief in the possibility to newly shape and move world history through a single collective actor chosen for such a mission. Victimized consciousness is moved by the belief in malevolent and sinister forces of the universe—​allegedly manifesting themselves through secret and elusive human agencies—​that come to manipulate and dominate the world through 13

Kavolis, 1986, p. 138.

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their subversive activities immediately targeted at a single actor, the most vulnerable and fragile one. The principle of evil is permanently ascribed to the big and powerful, while reserving the principle of good exclusively for the small, vulnerable, and fragile. By implication, I cannot err or sin because I happen to belong to a small, vulnerable, and fragile group, or vice versa—​I can never be on the right side if I, by birth and upbringing, belong to a privileged or powerful one. This means that my human value and merit are predetermined and, subsequently, can be lightly judged by my race, gender, nationality, or class. This sort of modern barbarity, which takes all human beings as irreversibly shaped and moved by biological or social forces with no moral or intellectual choice involved, powerfully stands behind the conspiracy theory. Regrettably, modern barbarity, which deprives humanity of the sense of human fellowship and tends to replace it with the concepts of natural animosity and ever-​lasting struggle between irreconcilable groups or forces, tends to surface and extend its influence beyond underground consciousness. Far from being qualified as social pathology, it assumes its status as what is supposed to be normal and even progressive. What results from modern barbarity is the practice of the splitting of human beings, ranging from the ideological division of humanity into “us” and “them” to modern racism and blood-​and-​soil nationalism. The most militant forms of feminism and some exaggerated practices of what is called preferential treatment are also tinged with this propensity and are at risk of becoming the mere inversion of the object of their resentment. The conspiracy theory allows no room for critical self-​reflexivity and critical self-​discovery. At this point, it is a mortal enemy of moral philosophy. Whereas modern political philosophy, if properly understood, is an extension of moral philosophy, the conspiracy theory’s point of departure is the radical denial of theoretical reflection, critical judgment, and moral accountability. Instead, the conspiracy theory’s assumption is that the agencies of good and evil are established once and for all, that the only distinction between good and evil is that good is powerless and condemned to suffer endlessly, while evil is all-​powerful and solely motivated by the hunger for power. Infinite manipulation and unlimited power are the ultimate ends that motivate evil forces. The world is too naïve, vulnerable, and fragile to unmask the real masters and their dirty manipulations with which they keep that world in the darkness of ignorance, stupidity, and self-​ deception—​this is the revealing message the conspiracy theory conveys to its adherents. In his book, Moralizing Cultures, Kavolis suggests that this phenomenon is deeply rooted in a modern system of moralization, which he termed the culture of determinism. Kavolis puts it thus:

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A modern amoral culture, in the sense that it tends to eliminate the notion of individual moral responsibility without taking collective responsibility seriously, is the culture of determinism. In this culture it is assumed that individuals are shaped and moved by biological or social forces in all essentials beyond the control, or even the possibility of major choices, of individuals affected by them. The four major intellectual foci of this culture are the theory that “biology (or racial inheritance) is destiny”; the belief that the human being is and should be nothing but a utility-​calculating, pleasure-​maximizing machine; the conviction that the individual is, in currently existing societies, only a victim of the “oppressive,” “impoverished,” “devitalizing,” or “traditionally constricted” social conditions of his or her existence (without the ability to become an agent of his fate and assume responsibility for her actions); and the notion that he can be helped out of such conditions solely by the “guidance of experts” who have a “rational social policy” at their disposal, in the determination of which those who are to be helped participate merely as instruments of the experts. kavolis, 1993, p. 48

Kavolis’s concept of a modern amoral culture sheds new light on why victimized groups or societies relate to the ruling elites as patients to diagnosing and curing specialists. At the same time, it allows us a point of entry into the crucial focus: we can understand why and how victimized culture manifests itself as the culture of destiny and determinism—​in contrast to the culture of freedom and choice. This concept reveals the links between all kinds of deterministic theories, especially in the social sciences. Kavolis starts by quoting Sigmund Freud’s dictum, “Biology is destiny,” and then goes on to show other modes of discourse that speak out in favor of inexorable laws of racial inheritance, history, milieu, societal life, social organization, and so forth. A modern amoral culture denying individual responsibility and moral choice, or the culture of determinism in Kavolis’s parlance, is a system of moralization disseminated in the modern moral imagination. It is characteristic of antimodernist reactions, including racism, technocracy, and other forms of deterministic consciousness. It also includes a belief in inexorable historical laws, a phenomenon that Karl R. Popper described as historicism. It is too obvious to need emphasis that the culture and the spirit of determinism are a driving force behind totalitarian regimes; totalitarianism without deterministic consciousness would be merely a contradiction in terms. At the same time, the culture of determinism penetrates all “minor” forms of organized hatred. It appears wherever the quest for enemies is in demand.

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The culture of determinism is not only a perfect home for conspiracy theories of all shades; it is just another term for what I call modern barbarity. It might be suggested that totalitarianism and the spirit of technology are both the offspring of modern barbarity (see Kolakowski, 1990, pp. 14–​31). Deterministic consciousness passionately denies free will and moral choice. In so doing, it rejects individual reason, conscience, responsibility, and, ultimately, freedom itself. In a way, deterministic consciousness shaped the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was nothing other than deterministic consciousness that brought about such phenomena of cognitive imagination as geographical determinism and theoretical racism as an early phase of anthropology. Theoretical racism became possible when the concept of species was transformed into the concept of race and then applied to some social science and humanities disciplines. It was deterministic consciousness, too, that led quite a few scholars to assume that human beings could be classified like insects—​like bees or ants that, once they have been scientifically identified and attributed to their species, had to be locked in their communities once and for all. At the same time, deterministic consciousness brought about a phenomenon known as scientism: the idea that strict methods of scientific analysis, research strategies, or classifying practices, all borrowed from the natural sciences, could be applied successfully to the humanities and social sciences. The idea that we must write and interpret history as a constant interplay of historical laws, and that we have to deprive the concept of history of any sort of naïve references to free will, self-​determination, and freedom was the birth-​ cry of modern historical and cultural determinism. History without human presence, history where the inexorable laws and social forces manipulate and determine the lives of classes, nations, and individuals—​this is the essence of deterministic consciousness, which masquerades as revolutionary political doctrines, modern secular humanism, progressive social theories, and resistance knowledge and scholarship. At this point, we can only agree with Popper that the conspiracy theory gives the rise to what he calls historicism. Had the latter been renamed by him as historical-​cultural determinism and related to deterministic consciousness, Popper’s theory of history and also his critique of the theoretical foundations of totalitarianism would have benefited considerably.14 The philosophical and scientific implications of determinism have obviously led to more than one fallacy in epistemology and cognitive science, not to mention the distortions they have brought to the humanities and social sciences. The political and moral 14

See Popper, 1979; Popper, 1959.

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implications of the deterministic stance are no better. In denying any kind of individual accountability, responsibility, and moral reflexivity, determinism leads to something beyond good and evil—​a moral logic, which blames the victims for the crimes or wrongs committed against them. This moral logic always goes hand in hand with the conspiratorial view of the world. Moral determinism is not dissimilar to medieval Christian demonology, though. In the Middle Ages, a man who seduced a woman could easily escape the charge of adultery by blaming everything on the demonic and irresistible powers of seduction inherent in the sinful female body. The charge of the deceived woman with witchcraft and maleficium, that is, occult evil action, was still at hand and guaranteed a safe retreat for any male involved in such an affair. The propensity to blame the victim of rape or of any other crime appears as a modern echo of this age-​old moral logic, instead of something describable in clinical terms. In the twentieth century, some antisemites led by the moral logic of determinism blame the Jews for the Holocaust or deny the Holocaust, denouncing it as a forgery of international/​Jewish organizations and those Jewish writers who survived the Holocaust. This is to say that even a study of the Holocaust is perceived by antisemites as a sort of industry, as part of the intentional malevolent action of the Jews against other countries, or as a Jewish world-​ conspiracy. That same profoundly amoral type of reasoning inherent in the culture of determinism led some people in the Middle East to assert that the 11 September 2001 tragedy in the USA was the outcome of a Jewish world-​conspiracy. Yet it did not prevent some other paranoiacs, even in the USA, from insisting that the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York was planned and orchestrated by the cia. 6

Postscript, or Why It Could Not Happen Here

Kavolis’s concept of the culture of determinism provides a new explanatory framework for the reinterpretation of technocratic consciousness. Such a framework is of great importance for social philosophy and sociology, since the conspiracy theory, in the current social sciences, is a missing link in, though an obvious corollary of, a set of the phenomena of victimization, technocracy, deterministic worldview, and anti-​liberal stances in politics and culture. The starting point in theoretically reconstructing and morally evaluating the conspiratorial view of the world and its implications would be the analysis of the liberal moral culture as radically opposed to the culture of determinism. The former rests on the principles of morally committed individualism, individual

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reason and conscience (as prior and superior to anonymous decisions), individual moral responsibility, and tolerance; whereas the latter fundamentally denies the Other as the dimension of human existence and consciousness, let alone any kind of self-​reflexivity and critical self-​discovery. Yet the culture of determinism may have another side, which allows it to close ranks with technocracy, that is, the idea that the entire societal life is moved by those who possess special competencies/​power and to who ordinary citizens relate much in the same fashion as clients to experts or patients to physicians. This requires our unconditional trust in the elite or specialists who would gladly assure us that “it could not happen here.” Whatever happens elsewhere, including economic recessions, acts of terrorism, or power plant accidents, is explained away as the outcome of the lack of competence that could never be the case here. A sort of scientific and technocratic hubris, and also a blend of arrogance, self-​reliance, and optimism, the IconHah phenomenon appears as an offshoot of the conspiracy theory of society. Since we are more conscientious and efficient than others, nothing can go wrong here. The Leibnizian philosophical optimism, caricatured by Voltaire in his philosophical tale, Candide ou l’optimisme, in the character Pangloss, Candide’s mentor of philosophy, who is deeply convinced that whatever happens is for our own good that, we live in the best of all possible worlds, is therefore transformed into a sense of superiority and a sincere belief that results from it, namely, that we have a better social and moral order or a better elite or a higher moral code than other societies. If so, any sort of technical deficiency or failure to prove that can only occur as a consequence of conspiratorial action originated elsewhere. Interestingly, our disbelief that our society can err or that our elite can fail to comply with the rules of the game may come from a different source. If the IconHah is reminiscent of a naïve technocratic and rationalistic belief in a “happy iron cage” where individual initiative or lonely voice does not matter due to the unquestionable efficiency and rationality of a blueprint for a social and moral order, the opposite pole which puts into question our every failure springs from self-​victimization.15 According to this moral logic, we are small, neglected, forgotten, or otherwise abused by the big and powerful. “It could not happen here,” as was exemplified with the IconHah, reflects a sense of superiority and a feeling of the infallibility of a rational world order, yet this attitude may well be related to the belief that we are victims of history of the predominant world order. If so, we cannot assume any moral and 15

See Donskis, 2003.

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political responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, since these facts can be easily turned against our country, itself a victim of history. Those who try to put moral and political pressure on us to force us to admit the Holocaust in our respective country or any similar facts of moral insensitivity and betrayal of humanity, intend to compromise us or to tarnish our image and international reputation. As this wisdom of self-​victimization goes, we are a target of powerful and influential international/​Jewish groups. This attitude may be easily identified in Lithuania as a trace of traumatic historical experience, although it can never become an excuse for our failure to come to terms with our history. “It could not happen here” is a voice of the culture of determinism heard anywhere where there is a strong need for historical revisionism. It is a voice of the Holocaust denial in European countries, or of the concealed attempt to rehabilitate Stalinism and its crimes against humanity, which is the case in present Russia. Far from an innocent thing, this attitude manifestly exposes a profound disbelief in our spontaneous will, independent moral choices and actions, unpredictability, and, ultimately, freedom. “It could not happen here” can pave the way for our conscious abandonment of spontaneity and individual autonomy accompanied by the relegation of all powers of judgment to rational practices and technocratic elites. At the same time, it can signify the arrival of a moral logic that denies guilt and responsibility offering, instead, historical accounts of one’s injuries, political wounds, and martyrology. In both cases, freedom and moral responsibility are at the peril of becoming an empty sound. 7

Second Postscript, or Why It Could Not Happen Here under the Pandemic (by Olli Loukola)

To end this essay, important consideration needs to be addressed. At face value the current corona-​pandemic might seem to be posing a powerful contra-​argument to IConHah-​mentality. After all, it is spreading everywhere, crossing all the human-​made borders and dividers, infecting everybody independent of race, nationality, sexuality or any other characteristic of division. Surely no one can claim in such a situation, that ’it couldn’t happen here’, when clearly it is taking place everywhere and affecting every one? But if we take a closer look at the situation, it is surely not this straightforward. IConHaH-​mentality is, as we have seen, a very flexible way of thinking or ’theorising’. As noted earlier, it needs not have any clear bearing on actual events, historical episodes or scientific causation. As such the IConHaH-​mentality is

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similar with the basic forms of conspiracism in that there apparently exists no such evidence that could falsify it. Quite the contrary. Already exceptions, special cases, aberrations and deviations have been constructed against the prevalent circumstances under which all human beings appear to be vulnerable to coronavirus. These special cases range, as usual, from individual to collective level: with my lifestyle and habits I will not get corona; the members of our church are immune to the virus, our leader will protect us from being infected, or even that the whole pandemic is a fake. Any contrary information is dismissed as false, propaganda, disinformation, government plots, or purposeful manipulation, even if empirical evidence or statistics shows something completely different. Thus it seems to me that more than contradicting the IConHah-​mentality this situation shows even more convincingly that IConHah-​mentality is a genuine case of conspiracy mentality. Naturally all this would need further analysis, but I believe that the concept of IConHah already gives some important clues concerning the rather stranger reactions all over the world during the pandemic, in the forefront the negative attitudes against vaccinations.

Bibliography

Donskis, Leonidas (2003) Forms of Hatred: The Troubled Imagination in Modern Philosophy and Literature. Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi. Kavolis, Vytautas (1986) “Civilizational Paradigms in Current Sociology: Dumont vs. Eisenstadt.” Current Perspectives in Social Theory, 7, pp. 125–​140. Kavolis, Vytautas (1993) Moralizing Cultures. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Kolakowski, Leszek (1990) Modernity on Endless Trial. London & Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lewis, Oscar (1996) “The Culture of Poverty.” In Richard T. LeGates and Frederic Stout, eds. The City Reader. London & New York: Routledge, pp. 217–​224. Mintz, Frank P. (1985) The Liberty Lobby and the American Right: Race, Conspiracy, and Culture. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Popper, Karl R. (1979) The Poverty of Historicism. London & New York: Routledge. Popper, Karl R. (1959) “Prediction and Prophecy in the Social Sciences.” In Theories of History. Edited by Patrick Gardiner. New York: Free Press, pp. 276–​285. Tucket, Kate (ed.) (2007) Conspiracy Theories. Berkley: Summersdale Pub Ltd.

­c hapter 5

Conspiracy Theories as Fiction Kafka and Sade

Timo Airaksinen Guilt for what, she had no idea. Guilt is always to be assumed, maybe? Once you’re an adult. joyce carol oates: Middle Age: A Romance (2001)

∵ 1

Kafka: Guilt to Conspiracy Theory

Franz Kafka provides an elaborate account of law and justice in a seemingly absurd and even surrealistic manner in his novel The Trial and selected shorts stories such as “In a Penal Colony” and “Judgement”. Also the novel America contains some fascinating material (see cn and css). From all these sources one can collate a grand theory of law, even if it is difficult to say what it might be and what it says. Kafka is a novelist of course, not a philosopher of law, although in real life he had a law degree and he worked as a civil servant in the prevention of industrial accidents. He had first hand experience of bureaucracy, which may be reflected in his novels. I do not want to follow this lead in my interpretation and reconstruction of his views (see for instance Mairowitz and Crumb). I will adopt a different line of thought: Kafka’s approach to law and order is through and through psychological, depicting men who are deeply guilt ridden and ultimately their own executioners. They cannot handle their emerging guilt which is then conceptualized as resulting from their crimes, but those are crimes without a perpetrator or a victim, crimes without a name, crimes without witnesses; yet these crimes are serious, they are real, they are public to the extent that (almost) all people seem to know about them. Such crimes deserve a punishment and Joseph K is arrested accordingly. Only one punishment is applicable and that is violent death, by drowning, by knife, by torture. This is a male problem because women are not that much affected

© Timo Airaksinen, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_007

76 Airaksinen by guilt and crime in Kafka’s texts. Kafka’s view is impressive, even convincing, but only if one thinks that it all takes place in the guilty person’s imagination, in his head: All of the offices of the lower level law-​courts are located in the attics of city apartment houses. All of those houses seem to have law offices in their attics, as if in a person’s head, in his mind, in his consciousness. Where the high judges work is not told because it is not known, and it is not known because it cannot be known. As Heraclitus says, the human mind is so deep that no one can ever hope to reach to its bottom. The deepest sources of one’s guilt feelings are unknown, hidden in the depths of one’s subconscious mind. I agree that many different readings of Kafka about the law can be presented. His views are deeply allegorical and the reader must collect hints and statements from here and there, without much help from the author himself. However, let me offer what I see is crucial evidence for my psychological perspective. In the Ninth Chapter of The Trial, Josef K visits a cathedral in order to show it to an Italian customer of his bank. K works for the bank, but the foreigner does not arrive. K is alone in this immense, dark, and mysterious church, wandering around when he meets a priest. The priest wants to preach to him, which he does albeit very briefly. He is obviously part of the mechanism of the law, and he certainly knows K and his status as a suspected criminal. The priest and K discuss as follows: “I thank you”, said K; “but all the others who are concerned in these proceedings are prejudiced against me. They are influencing even the ­outsiders. My position is becoming more and more difficult”. “You are misinterpreting the facts of the case”, said the priest. “The verdict is not so suddenly arrived at, the proceedings only gradually merge into the verdict”. “So that’s how it is”, said K, letting his head sink. cn, p. 183

In a highly revealing manner the priest says that the sentencing is not one individual performative act; on the contrary, it is a gradual process, just like the accumulation of personal, subjective guilt is. Guilt typically accumulates and grows. And K’s use of the word “they” signifies the first step towards a conspiracy theory. Conspiracy theories play with the word “they”. They are out there ready to come and get me and hurt me. They are just them, and they are otherwise unknown. Such is the simple grammar of a conspiracy theory based on one word, “they”. But K also realizes that all the people he meets belong to the law and that means that they all are somehow against him. They all know

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about the case and they all have an opinion about it. They are part of a deadly conspiracy which K can neither control nor figure out. To return to the language of guilt, this is free floating guilt. Those people blame K in a way which is totally incomprehensible for him. But at the same time he knows that they think he is guilty and he suffers accordingly. K supports a double conspiracy theory: narrow and broad. The first contains the high judges and officials; the second contains all, or most of the people K meets. Perhaps this is typical of guilt feelings. (Taylor, 1985, pp. 134–​135.) Guilt starts like a little pang of consciousness, pretending that it has an object, motive, and cure. But then it transforms itself into something more obscure and fuzzy gradually becoming unknown and unknowable free flowing anxiety. Finally it is guilt which is certain of itself and its cause, of something which cannot have a name or identity but which demands punishment. The pain grows until one must do something to it. One has to punish himself. Others do not do it, so it must be the person himself. However, according to the correct logic of punishment, the act of punishment must come from outside, otherwise it is no true punishment. Whatever one does, one aims at one’s own good, which obviously cannot be a punishment. It is impossible to choose anything but what is best for the actor. One rank-​orders the available alternatives and then chooses the best of them, this is the logical foundation of action explanation. Therefore, if K punishes himself, that would mean that this act is his best alternative, but this is no longer punishment in the proper sense of the term. It is only a personal trick by means of which one alleviates one’s own pain. Punishment, on the contrary, is something one does not want and cannot want to happen to himself. When a convicted murderer wants to die and asks for his own execution, he creates a logical paradox: he wants a punishment which is punishment because it cannot be wanted, like death. Thus, K’s punishment, like all punishment, must come from outside; it must be externalized and alienated so that some agents realize it against the will of the victim, K in this case. In a perfectly consistent manner K accepts this logic of the law and also the second step which leads him straight into a conspiracy theory. K thinks that he is persecuted by an immense system of law and justice, whose lowest level agents are visible and real to him, but who are actually nothing but illusory and transient phantoms. They are everywhere and they multiply in a scariest of manners, but they are nothing. They are idiotic and impotent, except when they remind K of his crime and guilt. The high court and its grand judges are not to be seen anywhere. They exist, that is necessary, but they have no empirical form or content. The priest in the church tells K

78 Airaksinen that he is under a false impression and makes a crucial mistake. He tells a parable of a man who wanted to enter the law, but was stopped by a guard at the door. He never lets the man enter, and in the end, when the man is already old and dying, he tells him the crucial truth: this is your door and it is open for you only. Yet the man was not allowed to enter. According to the priest, this story explains K’s error about the law, and he provides a long interpretation of the parable for the benefit of K. But nothing definitive follows from this conversation. It is just fantastic nonsense and an apt parody of interpretative action. My impression is that K’s error, important as it might have been, is now forgotten and left without explanation. Perhaps the important point of the priest’s parable and the ensuing conversion is that it is nonsensical and inconclusive. All we learn is that the law is far away, it is infallible, infinitely mighty, and fully binding. The guard at the door is part of the law, and that is why he is under no human jurisdiction (cn, p. 227). It is said, the law is outside the human realm; it is in this sense both distant and divine; but of course it is divine in a totally atheistic sense, not related to God in any way at all. I do not deny that a theological reading is possible, but I do not want to follow that path now. K realizes that he is threatened by a conspiracy, that the law is nothing but a vast and mighty conspiracy which is set to destroy him: “There can be no doubt”—​said K; … “there can be no doubt that behind all the actions of this court of justice, that is to say in my case, behind my arrest and today’s interrogation, there is a great organization at work. An organization which not only employs corrupt wardens, stupid inspectors, and examining magistrates of whom the best that can be said is that they recognize their own limitations …” cn, p. 40

K repeats the same thing once again when he tries to defend the two wardens who first arrested him and now are in the hands of a sadistic official whipper, ready to be whipped in a cupboard. Notice that “they” have a name now, they are high officials: “ ‘I really want see them set free … for I do not in the least blame them, it is the organization that is to blame, the high officials who are to blame’ ”. (cn, p. 74) Almost until his last moment K dreams of salvation and trusts his own innocence. What has he done? He can find no reasons to accept any guilt. But the great conspiracy against him says he is guilty, so what can he do? First he is angry and frustrated, he tries to write a letter to his judges, he tries to contact them, but in the church he tells the priest that he hopes his women will defend

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and save him. He says that women have much power. This is absurd. Finally, when his two executioners come, he does not protest but goes like a lamb to his doom: the killing is done with a butcher’s knife which, as he realizes, he should have wielded himself. But he does not do it, and the executioners pierce his heart. His last feeling is that of shame. His undeniable guilt transforms itself into shame when he dies like a dog in an old quarry. The conspiracy always gets what it wants. Conspiracies are unstoppable, if you think like a conspiracy theorist. In The Trial conspiratorial elements can be found throughout the text. In the “Penal Colony”, one finds constant references to the old Commandant and his historical times where the roots of punishment still lie: “ ‘I still use the guiding plan drawn by the former Commandant’ ”, says the officer who supervises executions (css, p. 148). The current Commandant and his women do not understand the real logic of the law. The women for instance feel compassion towards the prisoners, which is totally unacceptable. They ruin everything. K should have known this fact, but he does not. From the point of view of the officer, the new Commandant and his people are conspirators. The traveler, who is the witness visiting the penal colony, seems to think that the old Commandant is a menace to be blamed of all the horrors he sees. InAmerica (cn, Chapter 8), Karl Rossmann wants a job in the Oklahoma Theatre which employs anyone who wants to go and work there. The theatre is an immense, distant, and mysterious entity towards which Carl gravitates as if by natural necessity. The theatre appears to be a benevolent entity, who knows? At the same time it is an irresistible force behind the horizon. In America, all the chapters play with and vary the ideas of accusation and guilt. Life is a continuous trial, Rossmann is going to find out. In the last chapter, when he wants the Oklahoma Theatre to hire him, he knows that he is in trouble—​and guilty—​because he has no passport and consequently no identity. But for the change they do not seem to care. Everyone is invited and everyone is chosen. In front of the recruitment office, angels are blowing their trumpets. Here is the ultimate version of Kafka’s conspiracy theories, first an encounter with angels, then the benevolent recruitment officers, and finally a long train trip into the great unknown Oklahoma. In America, no law can be found. In this sense America is free, the land of the free, although the police officers Karl happens to meet are really very threatening and obviously immensely powerful. In the end Karl is running away from the clutches of the police towards the far away Oklahoma Theatre, his assumed paradise. Can he run away from the authorities? We will never know.

80 Airaksinen 2

Kafka: The Logic of the Law

Kafka’s ideas of law and punishment have their own weird structure which somehow resembles the real European systems of law, but also make it all look surreal. Many readers have also thought that Kafka has prophesied the future of modern bureaucracy. Kafka’s readers understand what is going on. The law according to K is something with which we are familiar in some strange and surreal manner, at least in the sense that we feel that the law is turned upside down. The logic of law and punishment looks like this: 2.1 Logic Crime is inferred from guilt. Crime does not bring about guilt. K has not done anything. Thus, we cannot infer guilt from the crime, because the crime is always unknown (see Axioms). 2.2 i. ii. i ii. iv. v. 2.3 i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. v iii. ix. x. xi.

Axioms Guilt is always beyond suspicion, or to be accused is automatically to be guilty The guilty person does not know the name of his crime; the crime is unknown to the end. Guilt attracts the law, in the sense that guilt draws the law towards itself. The Law is empty; it demands respect and obedience, but that is all it says. The judges are invisible just like the law is secret. Corollaries The crime is unnameable and unknown because anything can be called a crime. One must feel, mistakenly, that one is innocent; that makes one beautiful and sensitive. It is impossible to defend oneself but one may try. The punishment is necessary and unavoidable No one is ever freed although it may be possible. The punishment is always just because it cannot be challenged. The smallest crime deserves the greatest punishment. Only one punishment exists, death. No pity or mercy exists, no compassion in the law. The punishment, death, is the revelation of the truth, and thus it liberates the victim. Punishment implies shame.

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xii. x iii. xiv.

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Crime is not an action. The law is a real and incomprehensible mystery. Certain distant legal possibilities or myths exist, of release, innocence, freedom, redemption, forgiveness.

2.4 Explanation The law is a great, infinite, nebulous, organized conspiracy that dooms K, or anyone else. 2.5 Evidence Even small, wild girls running around the corridors of an apartment house belong to the law. Many people know K’s crime as they are all fellow conspirators. He can never meet his judges, and certainly not the members of the high court, who are always hidden. The higher end of the law is secret and through its door, although it is always open, one cannot enter the law. But the Judges and the High Court exist. It is a conspiracy, as K comes to think. I cannot deal with these items one by one here, for obvious reasons. Let me, however, offer an example. The arresting officer Franz says: “See Willem, he admits that he does not know the Law, and yet he claims he is innocent”. (cn, p. 8). Willem agrees that K is not very clever. Now, the logic of the argument is impeccable, as follows: a subpoena, according to the law, has been presented; K does not know the law because no one knows the law; K cannot defend himself in any way; therefore he is guilty. It does not matter he has done nothing; such a fact is irrelevant. This seems to imply that you are guilty until proven innocent, which never happens. This again is typical of Kafka’s mirror image logic. And certainly this fits our psychological interpretation: personal guilt feelings and anxiety follow the same logic. One feels guilty until one can prove himself innocent, which is impossible. The psychology of guilt follows an opposite logic when compared to the law-​induced guilt. Kafka’s law follows the familiar logic of psychology. 2.6 Questions Who is guilty? Not everyone is guilty. Who gets arrested? Perhaps the conspiracy decides on a random basis? Anyone can be arrested on legal grounds because no one knows the law. Certainly no proof of such a theory exists. Kafka is far too skilled an artist to make it easy for his readers. Counterexamples can be found in many cases, for instance in the penal colony the simple soldier’s crime is named as disobedience, although he himself does not know it. In K’s case it seems no one knows the name of his crime; perhaps it has no name? In the penal colony the

82 Airaksinen conspiracy is not directly involved with the coming execution. Everything we have is the memory of the old regime who still rules over the proceedings. K, as a conspiracy theorist, believes that the organization called the law is persecuting him for an unknown, mysterious reason. The soldier in the penal colony, on the contrary, does not know that he is doomed, a fate which K comes to realize with perfect clarity. Different cases exist, but their logic is basically the same. Karl Rossmann is accused all the time, but he is not a conspiracy theorist. Perhaps he will be once in Oklahoma, who knows? America was never finished. Kafka’s persons are not paranoid. They really are persecuted by the law. And the law is a great conspiracy which they cannot make sense of. K refers to an organization behind the law, although he has no evidence at all. All he can see is a dark abyss, or nothing at all. Yet he refers to a conspiracy in more than one place in the novel. What else could he do? He reificates the threat and gives it some kind of form and structure. The threat does not reside in dusty attics and cramped offices. It extends beyond all limits, it exists out there in its own splendid isolation. 3

Sade: Introduction to Secret Societies

Let me make clear the structure of my argument from here on. I want to argue that Kafka shows what it means to come to believe in conspiracies, that is, to become a conspiracy theorist. His account of such a mindset is maximally convincing. Next we need to read Sade. We do it in order to find evidence for the following hypothesis: Kafka says that one can never know those malevolent agents and agencies who are after us. Sade tries to describe them, as if we knew them. I try to show that such a project is impossible, it does not make sense, it leads to results which are unconvincing. This happens to Sade too. His text may be exciting but it does not illuminate the problems of conspiracies. Sade tries to describe what cannot be described, the secret societies as conspiracies in the sense meant by conspiracy theorists. Now, some conspiracies are created by secret societies and their laws, rules, and goals. Many conspiracy theories refer to secret societies, as we can easily verify, and with good reasons. (See Barrett, 2007; Steiger, 2006; Wikipedia.) I mean by a conspiracy a secret plot by a group to achieve a criminal end. This standard definition is too narrow to be interesting. If such a criminal plot is also morally or politically subversive, the case becomes much more interesting. Of course it must be emphasized that conspiracies often are real and they exist; actually they are common. Conspiracy theories, on the contrary, are shared views which identify large scale, important, shocking, or subversive plans by

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secret groups of influential people, even if the evidence for such a conspiracy is twisted, illogical, improbable, or clearly imaginary. Conspiracies are real; conspiracy theories are fictional. Conspiracies exist in real life but conspiracy theories are imaginary. Nevertheless, conspiracy theories are truly common, think for instance of 9/​11 and the claim that cia did it by means of mini-​nukes (Airaksinen, 2009). Their variety is endless. However, I want to make four remarks: first, in this paper I use “conspiracy theory” only in its fictional sense; second, many people use “conspiracy theory” to refer to some real and existing conspiracies, of which they have a theory; third, conspiracy theories have attracted a number of psychological explanations because such theories are both so common and so illogical; and fourth, conspiracy theorists seem to apply this explanatory model again and again, until the whole world is full of conspiracies. The theory is obviously compulsively attractive. In this section of the paper I focus only at one special type of conspiracy theory, those that blame secret societies. This is another fantastically popular topic (see Barrett, 2007). Any survey of the relevant literature shows how popular the topic is. A large number of secret societies exists, part of them imaginary and the rest real, like the Free Masons. The list of books available on this topic is also impressive, as a brief look at www.Amazon.uk proves. No limit to secret societies seems to exist, even if they are secret and as such unknown. Many secret societies are surprisingly well known, which is an oxymoron of course. And then only a short step needs to be taken from such societies to conspiracy theories. Many secret societies conspire against good people and just societies. Somehow their secrecy is associated with evil. One might well speculate that it is the secrecy of these societies which allows people to accuse them of some otherwise unexplainable horrors. Perhaps the reasoning goes like this: the cause and explanation of a disaster is unknown; secret societies are unknown; therefore, secret societies are the cause of the disaster. This false logic is irresistible in real life where logical validity always is secondary to rhetorical temptations. To put it another way, a disaster has no explanation, secret societies are capable of doing anything, so they did it and are therefore responsible. When we see no explanation, we try to find an agent who might have done it. Secret societies may do anything, we just don’t know. Secret societies are ready culprits, when we start thinking in terms of conspiracy theories. This form of an argument is familiar from philosophy of religion: we cannot find any evidence which refutes the existence of God; then we say that there is no such evidence which we interpret as evidence in favor of God’s existence. In other words, if you have no negative evidence, this fact itself counts as positive evidence. We

84 Airaksinen have no evidence that secret societies did not do it, therefore we say that they possibly did it; and as there are no other possible culprits, we must agree that a secret society did it. We are discussing a fictional topic here, and that is why we may well stay within the limits of literary fiction. This allows us also to avoid the morasses of folk psychology and the Freudian analyses. I have selected the Marquis de Sade as the writer who might tell us something interesting about secret societies, as they are described in Justine, Juliette, and the 120 Days of Sodom (see bibliography). He describes a community of criminal monks in the first book, the Parisian society called the Sodality in the second book, and an isolated community of libertines in the Black Forest in the Winter in his third book. The last mentioned community lasts only 120 days and for that reason it is not a real secret society, even if it is a criminal conspiracy. They kidnap young persons and violate and kill them. The bad monks gather in their secret monastery, and this community has its more or less permanent nature, also some official structure and its sources of funding. They also kidnap women and kill them. That is supposed to be very exciting. The good news is that Justine is able to escape to tell the story of the monks’s seraglio. But the Sodality is a real, well defined society, and at the same time a conspiracy, which has its bylaws, financing, president, program, and everything that a real society needs. It is a club for some extreme libertines and their low-​life criminal associates. This sounds like a regime which is at the same time monotonous, potentially boring, certainly not very creative, and certainly shocking—​at least if the reader is not a hardened admirer of Sade. A couple of words on Sade’s style and aims is needed here. Sade has only one theme, that is libertinage and pleasant evil, or crime, as he is fond of calling it. He repeats that theme endlessly, creating some special vignettes again and again, ad infinitum, as his reader soon concludes. Some of his short stories and the book Justine are less repetitive, but both Juliette and 120 Days are both long and repetitive. Juliette has some one thousand pages. But these are no ordinary fictional narratives. They seem to contain some philosophy in the sense that Sade wants to prove a point or two, mainly atheism and the hedonistic justification of human freedom. We are here to enjoy life, and crime is the most enjoyable thing; therefore we should do it. He seems to promote a certain lifestyle and tells his reader how to do it. But at the same time he creates a text which tries to punish its reader. This is text as a test, trial, and condemnation. When his reader reads through hundreds of pages of stories of eating human excrements, he certainly not only suffers but also punishes himself, by reading about it. Sade’s text is an evil and immoral text for this very reason. But it is also delightful to realize how he writes a parody of the French tradition of fine food and gourmandism

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by making his villains eat excrement produced by young people who are fed some delicious foods. Anal love of course denies the procreative function by turning away from the vagina and lusting after the anal orifice, which means disgust, death, and waste. Sade is much more than merely boring. He is a true subversive, creative philosopher of freedom. But can we find anything of interest in the story of the Sodality? Are the lecherous monks, who harass Juliette so passionately, somehow creative and interesting persons? Perhaps they are and then it is worthwhile to look into their thinking, life and activities as secret society based conspirators. The story of the monks is quite delightful in this sense, unlike Sade’s Sodality, although it may look like a parody, a critique of something which is not quite easy to see or understand. (See Airaksinen, 1995 and Barthes, 1976.) 4

Sade: Monastery as a Secret Society and Conspiracy

Sade describes the monks and their organization as follows: You will understand more easily, Madame, if I explain how the society was organized. Prodigious funds had been poured by the Order into this obscene institution, it had been in existence for above a century, and had always been inhabited by the four richest monks, the most powerful in the Order’s hierarchy. They of the highest birth and libertinage of sufficient moment to require burial in this obscure retreat, the disclosure of whose secret was well provided against as my further explanations will cause you to see in the sequel; but let us return to the portraits. Justine, p. 566

Justine also learns that “a recalcitrant attitude will be of no purpose un this inaccessible retreat” (Justine, p. 567). The monastery has its history (more than one hundred years), its future (forever), its hidden but official status (sanctioned by the monastic Order), its budget (prodigious sums), its members’ qualifications (rich, powerful, lecherous), and so on. It is a system which works as it should. Notice also how Sade’s twisted logic works here: the richest, most noble, and most important men are also the most criminal and lecherous. Sade seems to argue that the most powerful are also the most dangerous, as if their social status would make them psychologically irresponsible hedonistic maniacs. Such a secret society is at the same time malevolent, dangerous and most difficult to reveal and stop. The system may isolate its criminal elements, make them secret that is, but it also protects them. Moreover, the monks are also

86 Airaksinen funded generously. They are at the same time hidden, protected, and encouraged. Such a policy may seem inconsistent but it may well be unavoidable, if the secret society is going to exist and flourish. Why should it flourish? Because the bad monks want it, and more of them are born all the time. They must go somewhere and now Justine has accidentally found the place where they go, a palace and heaven of criminal pleasures. The monks kidnap ladies of all ages, and the point is that they are free and capable of doing absolutely anything to those unlucky ladies. Justine describes in detail all kinds of sexual acts, or acts which are at least on the fringe areas of sexual pleasure. Nothing else seems to matter to Sade the writer or the fictional monks: pleasure and freedom exist strictly for each other and both are ruthlessly maximized. The libertines are free in two different senses. They are free of external control and risk of punishment. Nothing bad can happen to them and so they are free, or unconstrained. They are also free from guilt and that anxiety that evil deeds are supposed to bring about. They do not suffer at all. Also in this sense they are unconstrained and free. Their actions have only one limiting factor, but that is a serious constraint. They can never get full satisfaction. However hard they work, whatever they do, whatever happens to the ladies, they need to do it again. They are in the wheel of pleasure, in the sense that this wheel is free to turn around, but when it turns around, the same acts must be repeated again. This makes the monks absolutely furious and they get their revenge by torturing the ladies. But of course it does not help them at all. When we consider the monastery here as a secret society, however fictional it may be, we also see why secret societies are so fearful, even if they are secret and we do not know much about them. Such a society is a menace to its social environment as it is dedicated to everything evil, obscene, and destructive. Its members belong to the highest echelons of society; they are supposed to be good, noble, virtuous, just, and in many ways admirable paradigmatic individuals. Yet their true nature is the absolute opposite of this wishful characterization. Their nobility means baseness, and any trust on them is the gravest ­misjudgment one can imagine. In this kind of situation, even if it is hypothetical and imaginary, we can find all the elements of social fear. We must conclude that secret societies are revolting and dangerous, even if we do not know much about their secrets. They are conspiracies, but because they are fiction, we need to talk about conspiracy theories in this context. Notice, however, that the monks and their secret monastery constitute a secret society but the real conspiracy is committed by the Order, here the Benedictine Order, which allows it and organizes all this and guarantees its continued existence and functioning. In a typical manner the conspiracy is large, powerful, and intractable. Its tentacles extend far and wide, and any secret society is just

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one of its material representations. The monks are conspirators only because they are allowed to be such by the all-​mighty Order. The monks’ secret society is the content, and the Sodality is the form of secret societies in the mind of a conspiracy theorist. The monks tell us what they think, what they desire, what they do, how they talk, how they live, and what they eat. The content of the description is rich and detailed, although it is at the same time extremely repetitive and boring. It suffocates its reader who cannot consume more of the same horror again and again—​this what Sade does to his readers. However, now we know what actually happens within the walls of that nasty monastery. We have a description of the content of freedom, although Sade also calls it unfreedom, that is, being subject to the destructive laws of nature. Next the story of the Sodality provides the form, which is also the formal cause which explains some possibilities and potentialities. Even evil life needs its rules, regulations, and laws. Conspiracies are not formless, and that is why they are even more frightful. A formless conspiracy is only a tumult, chaos and a dark abyss, or in modern terms, a black hole which we cannot see because no light comes out of it. Juliette, the evil woman, comes to Paris and she is introduced by her friends to the secret society called Sodality. She walks in, is interviewed, and is then accepted as a member. She is recognized as what she is, a she-​devil. She looks at the rules and regulations of the society, which are almost like any other rules of a well functioning social body. Such rules are designed to make the society function in a predictably successful manner in the long run. The rules of Sodality may work well. But they are the rules of a society which serve the ends and goals of a lifestyle similar to that of the criminal monks in the forest monastery. Here, in Paris, the same hedonistic goals are served, but now Sade tells us what the formal rules of such a life are like. What we get here is a predictable and tedious list of norms. First, the description of the purpose of the membership in the Sodality is given thus: Deferring to the common usage, Sodality admits the serviceability of the word crime; but makes a plain declaration that in its employment thereof with reference to any kind of act of whatever sort or colour, no condemnatory or pejorative sense is ever intended. Thoroughly convinced that man is not free, and that, bound absolutely by the Laws of Nature, all men are slaves of these fundamental laws, the Sodality therefore approves and legitimates everything, and considers as its most zealous and most estimable Members those who, unhesitantly and unrepentantly, acquit themselves of the greatest number of those vigorous actions which fools in their weakness call crime. Juliette, p. 418

88 Airaksinen The Sodality has its detailed rules, 45 items. They state that all the members of the club are equal, women are admitted, atheism is strictly required, a certain minimum income is required, some not so wealthy artists and literary figures are admitted, criminals are to be protected, the president is elected by a ballot and his or her term is one month, he or she presides over assemblies which are three per week, there is a permanent committee, a treasurer and two executive secretaries are also prescribed, during the assembly all kinds of pleasures are admitted, murder can be committed only in special seraglios where prisoners are kept for this purpose, and so on. (Juliette, pp. 418 ff.) As I said, this is the formal side of a secret society which serves evil ends and presents a real threat to any decent citizen of a normal society. People should be afraid of the Sodality and its members, if they existed. And even if they did not exist, conspiracy theorists are still afraid of them, as if the threat were real. The whole idea of conspiracy theory is based on such fear. Strange things happen and people get hurt without any clear explanation. But no phenomenon is without its explanation, thus explanation must exist. You find it if you try hard enough and search everywhere. Secret societies provide the much needed explanations and hence people tend to agree that such evil societies exist and we needlessly suffer from their activities as their innocent victims. Sade in his novel Philosophy in the Bedroom, mentions and condemns all the good sodalities, such as Maternal Society and Philantropic Club, when Madame Sait-​Ange lectures to her young but willing disciple Eugenie about the unavoidable pleasures of vice and crime (p. 216). Eugenie says that her mother supports such sodalities, which is condemned by the rascals. The good and the bad sodalities aim at their opposite ends, the Parisian Sodality being a perfect formulation of a society which must be kept as a secret. Otherwise it will be destroyed along with its members. But of course it will survive because it is just a figment of imagination, a conspiratorial dream and an object of hallucinations, which are both deliriously happy and paranoically fearful. 5

The Explanation of Conspiracy Theories

We may try to explain the endless fascination of conspiracy theories in terms of some logical, social, and psychological considerations, or we may leave the topic as it is, a fact of life. Let us try anyway some possible explanations. Here is the scheme we need to explain: something bad happens to us, the normal, good and innocent people, and we explain why it happens in terms of some conspiracies by secret societies (in a wide and general sense of “society”). Such societies are the embodiment of evil. We have a good reason to be afraid. We

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are neither crazy nor paranoid. It is evident that we are in search of an explanation of an explanation (see Cody, 2006). To believe in conspiracies, in the pejorative sense of “conspiracy theory”, is never crazy but it may be paranoid. This is the case if, first, the evil things and suffering has not yet happened but is always expected to happen and, second, if the evidence for these future events is (i) twisted, idiosyncratic, and unacceptable, or (ii) the evidence is non-​existent even in the mind of the believer. A paranoid person is afraid of something which has not happened and explains it in a way which does not count as an explanation by means of evidence. Two more conditions need to be added: a paranoid person is certain that he personally is targeted as an object of harm. He is personally persecuted by some unknown forces like secret societies. And finally we recognize that no amount of persuasion may change his mind. For him no possible counterevidence may exist. He is doomed. Full-​blown paranoia is a disease of the mind, and as such not so interesting an explanation. The milder forms of paranoia are more interesting. These we can find and understand by deleting some of the last mentioned conditions in the above definition, for instance the last two. Then we get a more realistic description of the mental conditions which make some people conspiracy theorists. Perhaps the social explanations are more illuminating than the psychological ones? Many different alternatives can be found but I only present a small sample of them. Such explanations do not necessarily apply across a wide range of cases, like the paranoid explanation does. The social cases are more specific. An authoritarian person believes in and trusts a paternalistic authority who is supposed to protect him against some evil in the world. However, the person feels that he has available and acceptable evidence for the failure of the agent who was supposed to protect him. A perfect example is the case of 9/​11. The President of United States and the cia were supposed to protect the US citizens against terrorists, as had been promised many times. They had given evidence for being able to do so, and the citizens had believed, or at least they had wanted to believe it. Yet all of it was shown to be illusory in that fatal day when the Twin Towers collapsed in such a dramatic fashion. What was the explanation? cia did it, or at least they knew what was going to happen. The catastrophe was their responsibility, either directly or indirectly. Why did they do it? They wanted to promote their own obscure ends. They had something to gain from 9/​11—​that is why they did it. Who are they? Some conspiracy is mentioned but no clear answer may emerge, of course. The same story can be told of the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbour in 1941. The President knew it but

90 Airaksinen he did nothing to prevent the bombing. He had his own secret reasons. Such conspiracy theories are no personal affairs but large scale social phenomena. Think of this marvelous story. In the Second World War when the Japanese were already losing the war, they could not transport all the gold they had robbed from the conquered areas in the Far East to Japan. The US submarines had cut off the shipping lanes and the home islands were practically isolated. What to do with all that gold? The Japanese buried it in the Philippines in secret places. Then they killed the workmen and wrote the maps in cipher, so that only the chosen few could read them and get back to the buried treasures. It was said that the brother of the Emperor Hirohito was in charge of the operation in Tokyo. The gold is often called Yamashita’s gold, according to the general who organized it all. The gold may still lie where it was originally buried. The maps are gone and Japanese officers dead. To this day people in the Philippines have been trying to find the gold. Presumably the former Philippines president and strongman Ferdinand Marcos made his fortune by this gold. But you need to be careful. If you find the gold, you will be killed by the other diggers who want to rob you. The authors of a book on this theory have written a strange preface to their Gold Warriors. They say they have saved all the relevant material in secret places and ordered its release, if they get killed. No one can protect their backs by killing the authors because then and only then will the incriminating material be released and published. (Seagrave, 2003) This is a very interesting case and type of a conspiracy theory. The Japanese were conspirators against the legitimate interests of the conquered nations. The gold diggers, including the Marcos family were conspirators against the people of Philippines. And finally, the authors of the book clearly feel that there is a conspiracy against them. In fact the theory of the gold is a highly controversial one. Many are skeptical about it. Let us briefly discuss all three cases. First, the case against the Japanese is easy to understand. They were a monstrous enemy of the conquered people, truly cruel and ruthless. They were capable of any evil one may imagine. So they took all that gold and buried it deep. Then they made it all a secret. They had organized all these activities and the track leads all the way to the imperial court in Tokyo. That is where you need to go if you want to get your gold back. But nothing will be revealed anyway as the maps are secret or destroyed, people are dead or well protected by those who are in power. What is an explanation of this conspiracy theory? The explanation may be something like impotent rage and desire for revenge against the forces of evil which are now defeated but whose legacy still lingers on. President Ferdinand Marcos was a tyrant and a dictator who ruled his country for decades, with her wife Imelda whose shopping sprees for shoes and bras

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were legendary. It may feel good to know where his initial wealth came from, therefore the relevance of conspiracy theory here. The gold diggers normally end up dead, not Marcos—​why? He has his secrets of how he did it. We do not know, but something strange and fearful must have happened. He and his cronies pulled a trick which should have been impossible. Here the explanation of the relevant conspiracy theory is in terms of the combination of fear, jealousy, and perfectly simple greed. He did it, we cannot do it, that is why he did it by means of a conspiracy. The third aspect of the story of the Philippines’ gold, when the authors of the book feel threatened, may well be explained in terms of simple paranoia, as explained above. The authors think they are now crucially important people and thus their newly found enemies want to hunt them down. Who those enemies are, no one knows, nor can know. Somewhere there is a conspiracy against their innocent lives. This is indeed an example of fear as paranoia. Of course it is possible that this fear is well founded and thus we would not have a case of paranoia here. But we still have an example of a conspiracy theory, if the enemy is not known and cannot be known. This shows that also one’s well founded fear may lead one to conspiracy theories. For example, I am afraid that my shop seems to go bankrupt whatever I do, so I am afraid of my financial future. This is real fear, no doubt about it. But then I explain my fate not on the grounds of being a bad business person but by referring to the hidden influence and activities of the local Free Masons. My wellgrounded fear has made me a conspiracy theorist. What about the logical explanations of conspiracy theories? Very briefly, the following can be said. Conspiracy theory implies a failure to understand and handle the requirements of explanations. To do it is not that simple a demand. Most people cannot do it. The relevant folk-​views and -​ideas are simply inadequate and collapse under the pressure coming from the demands of everyday life and its complexities. For instance, if you do not know the conspirators and their societies, then do not use their names in you explanations. If you do not know the fact of the case, do not invent your own. If you do not know the motives of the conspirators, do not invent them and most of all, do not refer to their malevolent pleasures and stupendous enjoyment. You cannot use what you do not have. And when you infer from facts back to their causes, you better be very careful and make only probabilistic or otherwise guarded statements. For instance, you know that Marcos is wealthy beyond belief and you want to claim that he found some of the hidden gold and then killed his competitors and possibly even his collaborators. If you say all of this, you must weight your evidence for it. Marcos was a strongman and most of them know and use quite unconventional methods to become rich. It is said that Egypt’s President Hosni

92 Airaksinen Mubarak, when he unwillingly resigned in the winter of 2011, had billions of dollars safely hidden in banks all over the world. Perhaps one should resist the temptation of conspiracy theories here and simply say that this is possible and even expected and stop right there. Conspiracy theories indicate logical problems and inferential failures. Do we need to say more? Perhaps this fact is all we need here. 6

Kafka and Sade Again

Kafka’s Josef K thinks about his arrest, he talks to people, and he tries to write an appeal to his judges. He realizes that people know of his case and that they know as much as, or even more than he himself does. He tries to find the judges and the lawcourt, but he cannot. What he finds are always something called low-​level agents and actors. The real power wielders stay hidden. He also feels how the rope around his neck tightens all the time, although no concrete evidence of this or of anything else is available. Finally K concludes and states that a conspiracy against him exists. Somewhere, he suspects, a secret agency is planning his doom which he then cannot avoid. All he can see is kind of fake, illusion, and ridiculous theatre. Reality escapes his vision all the time without any reason to think that anything would change too soon. When his executioners finally come and take him away to be killed, or butchered, K does not resist. He is just ashamed. He is a sacrificial lamb. Perhaps K is a Christian, as the second to last scene in the cathedral and with the priest may indicate. Then he is a silent lamb in the end. K naturally succumbs to conspiracy theories because he is so desperate and understands next to nothing. Kafka offers an additional psychological explanation of the emergence of a conspiracy theory: shear panic and desperation. When you have no evidence, you have no theory. But K has some rudimentary evidence. At least he is arrested and he is told that his case is in the law-​courts, or his is a case in front of the law, but that is all. He panics and infers from all this that there is a malevolent agency who conspires against him, even if he had done nothing—​as we learn in the opening passage of the text of the Trial. He is desperate and bitter. Sade’s Juliette experiences no temptation towards conspiracy theories. She passes the entrance examination of the Sodality with flying colors. Now she is one of the conspirators whose motive is mere personal pleasure. What Juliette saw can exist only in one’s imagination and in bad fiction. Juliette flogs people presumably until her tennis elbow stops her. She cuts living flesh until no flesh exists. She enjoys all the hedonistic pleasures until she is deadly bored. Why

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would anyone join the Sodality? Sade invents a wholly new breed of people who harass his readers and in this sense he is a conspirator too. But in spite of its apparent, fictional realism Sade’s account of the Sodality, as well as the cruel monastic community, is as crazy as any conspiracy theories ever were. One can say that conspiracy theories may be illogical but at the same time one must realize that this entails as well that any fictional representations of the insiders of such conspiracies are crazy as well. If the monastery has already existed one hundred years and was expected to be nearly eternal, which is a kind of religious joke, Justine’s escape makes them fatally vulnerable and ultimately doomed. This also indicates why a realistic picture of a secret society is an oxymoron: when the story is told and the picture painted, the society in question is no longer secret. Sade’s answer to criticism could be that the church and their monastic orders are so powerful that nothing may hurt them. However, after Justine’s escape their story is no longer secret. In the same way we can doubt whether the Parisian Sodality could remain secret for so long. The problem with the Sodality is that it is not part of a larger conspiracy, like the monks’ monastery is. A conspiracy needs some depth if it is going to survive its victims’ wrath and vengeance. This is the obvious reason why conspiracy theorists think the conspiracies are so deep rooted and powerful. The Sodality is alone, supported only by its members. However powerful they might be as individuals, that is not going to be enough. The Sodality as a secret society is a hopelessly one-​ dimensional conspiracy. The monastery has the support of the Order, which implies real depth and power. Any conspiracy has two types of troubles which it must deflect: its external enemies and internal disturbances. The external enemies are the victims of the conspiracy, as I said above. The Sodality may be able to handle them. The internal problems are more serious: its members are criminals, libertines, rakes, and lecherous egoists—​only those types are admitted. What prevents them from attacking each other, if they so fancy? The monks are always under the control of the Order, however rich and nasty they themselves might be. But the Sodality has no such external power base and support. It must perish soon. Any conspiracy theorist understands this much and therefore says that the fiends are not only rich and powerful but also well connected. The conspiracy must be wide and deep. It extends to the top of society, all the way to the President of US, as it has been said in the case of 9/​11 (Airaksinen, 2009). In that unimaginable abyss of power and malevolence, no normal laws of responsibility may apply. The conspiracy is a safe haven. Kafka, the great writer as he is, would never explain and depict the secret agency or order which condemns K and leaves him dead in the old quarry. Sade does what is impossible to do. He actually describes what such evil societies

94 Airaksinen look like by giving a detailed account of their form and content, their actuality and potentiality, their work and norms, their life and soul. Of course it is all fictional. And when we notice how imaginary it is, we also notice how impossible it all is. We also notice how bad such fiction is. This is the last consolation to the victims of conspiracies as described by Kafka: at least the conspiracy theories can be good and interesting fiction, unlike the stories which assume the point of view of the members of such conspiracies. Conspiracy theories are interesting, no doubt about it. And they essentially represent and presuppose the victim’s angle of vision. In other words, their crucial feature is that they must be told from the point of view of the victim, which makes them still more interesting. To try to describe them from the point of view of the malevolent power wielder is a mistake. Here the reader can identify with the underdog, live through her fears, and experience her destiny. As such the stories will live and flourish forever. Thus the last explanation for the existence of conspiracy theories is that they are interesting, fantastic, and good sympathetic fiction. The best of stories live forever and this is one true genre of them.

Bibliography

Airaksinen, Timo (2009) “Conspiracy as a Dirty Secret: The Case of 9/​11”. In The Secret of Secrets, Homo Oeconomicus 26/​1, 123–​142. Airaksinen, Timo (1995) The Philosophy of the Marquis de Sade. Routledge. Barrett, David V. (2007) A Brief History of Secret Societies: An Unbiased History of Our Desire for Secret Knowledge. Carroll and Graf Publ. Barthes, Roland (1976) Sade, Fourier, Loyola. Tr. J. Miller, Jonathan Cape. Coady, David (2006), “An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories”. In D. Coady, ed. Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate, Aldershot, pp. 1–​11. Kafka, Franz (2008) The Complete Novels. Trs Willa and Edwin Muir, Vintage Books. (Abbr. cn.). Kafka, Franz (1983) The Collected Short Stories. Ed. N. H. Glazer, Penguin Books. (Abbr. css.). Mairowitz, D. Z., and R. Crumb (1993) Kafka for Beginners. Icon Books. The Marquis de Sade (1965) Justin, Philosophy in the Bedroom and Other Writings. Tr. A. Wainhouse. Grove Press. The Marquis de Sade (1966) The 120 Days of Sodom and Other Writings. Trs A. Wainhouse and R. Seaver. Grove Press. The Marquis de Sade (1968) Juliette. Tr. A. Wainhouse. Grove Press.

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Seagrave, Sterling and Peggy (2003) Gold Warriors: America’s Secret Recovery of Yamashita’s Gold. Verso. Steiger, Brad and Sherry (2006) Conspiracies and Secret Societies: The Complete Dossier. Visible Ink Press. Taylor, Gabriele (1985) Pride, Shame and Guilt. Oxford University Press. Wikipedia: List of Conspiracy Theories (accessed 22-​02-​2011). Wikipedia: Conspiracy Theory (accessed 22-​02-​2011).

pa rt 2 Conspiracies

∵

­c hapter 6

Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorists David Coady While you here do snoring lie, Open-​eyed conspiracy His time doth take.

william shakespeare, The Tempest

∵ Several authors have claimed that there are more conspiracy theories and more conspiracy theorists now than in the past, that “conspiracism” or “conspiracy thinking” is on the rise (Keeley, 2006, pp. 45–​46; Wilson, 1998, pp. 1–​2).1 Typically these authors say or imply that this situation is undesirable, and some have been moved to offer solutions to this so-​called problem (Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009, p. 203). I think this is all a mistake. If anything, there are fewer conspiracy theories and theorists now than in the past, (less conspiracism and conspiracy thinking), and it is this situation that should be deplored. Furthermore this deplorable situation has at least partly been brought about by the contemporary fashion for castigating certain people as “conspiracy theorists” and dismissing their beliefs as “conspiracy theories”, a fashion which appears to have been started by fellow-​philosopher, Sir Karl Popper. These expressions were not widely used before Popper. Popper used them pejoratively, and they have retained those pejorative connotations to this day.2

1 An earlier version of this chapter was first published in 2012 by John Wiley & Sons in the book What to Believe Now: Applying Epistemology to Contemporary Issues © 2012 David Coady. I thank Wiley-​Blackwell for permission to publish it. This began as a collaborative project with Charles Pigden. We had intended to write a joint paper which for various reasons never came to fruition. My thanks to Dr Pigden for his permission to incorporate many of his thoughts and words into the current work. I am, of course, responsible for any errors. 2 According to John Ayto (15), the expression “conspiracy theory” dates back to 1909, but only acquired its derogatory connotations in the 1960s. I have been unable to find any uses of the expression, with or without derogatory connotations, which predate Popper.

© David Coady, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_008

100 Coady The contemporary treatment of those accused of being conspiracy theorists is an intellectualwitch-​hunt. Although those identified as “conspiracy theorists” are not literally subjected to an auto de fe, they are routinely sneered at, condescended to, or ignored. Of course some of them may deserve to be criticized or ignored (maybe even condescended to or sneered at), but there is no more justification for criticizing, ignoring, condescending to, or sneering at, people because they are conspiracy theorists than there was for punishing people because they were witches. One can denounce a witch-​hunt without defending everyone who has been accused of being a witch. To many, this analogy will seem far-​fetched. It will be objected that while there are no real witches, there are real conspiracy theorists. In fact, neither part of this claim is straightforwardly true. It all depends on how you define “witch” and on how you define “conspiracy theorist”. If a witch is understood to be a person with magical powers derived from a relationship with Satan, then it would be objectionable to be a witch, but no one ever was one. If, on other hand, a witch is understood to be a follower of a pre-​Christian matriarchal religion, then there really were witches (and still are), but it is (and always was) an unobjectionable thing to be. The expression “conspiracy theorist” works in a similar way. On some definitions, there is something wrong with being a conspiracy theorist, but no one (or hardly anyone) is a conspiracy theorist. On other definitions, there really are conspiracy theorists (perhaps a lot of them) but there is nothing wrong with being one. A definition of the first kind is suggested by Popper’s approach to the issue. Suppose we define “a conspiracy theorist” as someone who believes what Popper called “the Conspiracy Theory of Society” (Popper, 1962, p. 94 & Popper, 1972, p. 123). This is the theory that everything that happens (or at least everything big and bad that happens) is due to a successful conspiracy, i.e. that the big bad thing that happens is due to a secret plan to bring about exactly that big bad thing.3 There is no need for us to consider Popper’s arguments that the conspiracy theory of society is false. He is obviously right about this. What is not so clear is whether anyone has ever thought otherwise. Although Popper claims that the conspiracy theory of society is “very widespread” (Popper, 1972, p. 123), he offers no argument or evidence for this claim. Charles Pigden seems to be right when he says that, so far from being very widespread, the conspiracy theory of society is “a thesis that no one believes” (Pigden, 2006b, p. 20). Even if there are people who believe it, the vast majority of those castigated 3 I thank Charles Pigden for this pithy and accurate way of characterizing the conspiracy theory of society.

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as conspiracy theorists do not. For example, those who think that the Bush administration conspired to deceive the American public into believing that Saddam Hussein was involved with 9/​11 typically do not believe that every big bad thing that happens is due to a conspiracy, let alone a conspiracy to bring about that very thing. For many of them suppose that the war in Iraq (the result, in part, of Bush’s conspiracy) has led to a net decline in American power and prestige, which may or may not be a bad thing, but which is definitely not a bad thing that Bush conspired to bring about. The consequence was almost certainly the reverse of what he intended. A definition of the second kind can be found in Pigden (2006a, p. 157). According to Pigden, a conspiracy theory is just a theory—​true or false, rational or irrational, well-​confirmed or otherwise—​which explains some event or events by positing a conspiracy (not necessarily a successful one), and a conspiracy theorist is simply someone who subscribes to a conspiracy theory, understood in this way. Now there is clearly nothing wrong with being a conspiracy theorist in this sense. Indeed there would be something wrong with not being one. In order to avoid being a conspiracy theorist, in this sense, one would have to be almost completely misinformed or ignorant of both history and current affairs (not to mention a great deal of one’s immediate environment). On Pigden’s definition, so far from being non-​existent, conspiracy theorists are a dime a dozen. Indeed, most, if not all, of the self-​proclaimed foes of conspiracy theory are conspiracy theorists in this sense. After all, many events are, and are widely known to be, due to conspiracies—​coups, “disappearances”, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorist attacks, (in many cases) acts of torture, and a great deal of fraud, bribery and corruption. These things do not happen (or at least do not happen very often) without secret plans and covert actions on the part of some group. Thus anyone who believes that there are such things as coups, “disappearances”, kidnappings, assassinations, secret torture chambers, or fraud, bribery and corruption is pretty much bound to be a conspiracy theorist, in this sense. So far we have considered two conceptions of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist. On one of them, the property of being a conspiracy theorist is an unobjectionable one, which applies to (almost) everyone. On the other, it is an objectionable property, which applies to (almost) no one. In what follows I will consider attempts to find a middle way, that is a conception of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, which makes it an objectionable thing to be, and which applies to some people and not to others. In particular, I will look for a conception of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist which makes it objectionable to be a conspiracy theorist and which applies to the people who are pilloried as

102 Coady such, but not to those who pillory them. As we shall see, such conceptions are hard to come by. I have said that almost everyone is a conspiracy theorist, in Pigden’s sense. But there do seem to be some exceptions. There are, that is, people who appear to think that conspiracies never happen, that no one ever conspires to do anything, and hence that conspiracy theorists are mistaken in the same way flat earth theorists are mistaken. Conspiracy theorists, on this view, are people who believe in something which just does not exist. I think we can safely ignore this view. Even Popper is at pains to stress that conspiracies do occur (1962, p. 95 & 1972, p. 342), and most of his followers will concede the point, at least when pushed. On the face of it, that should be the end of the matter. Since conspiracies happen, it can’t be irrational to believe they happen. Hence, it can’t be irrational to be a conspiracy theorist. Yet many people accept the premise but balk at the conclusion. They agree that people conspire but insist nonetheless that conspiracy theorists are irrational, or in some other way misguided. When challenged to explain what they mean by the expression “conspiracy theorist” and what exactly is supposed to be the matter with being one, they typically respond with “Of course there are conspiracies, but …”. Much of the rest of this paper will be devoted to different ways of filling in the but-​end of this sentence. 1

Conspiracies Don’t Happen Often

Perhaps conspiracy theorists are people who fail to recognize how rarely conspiracies occur. Popper provides some support for this way of understanding who conspiracy theorists are and where they go wrong, when he claims that conspiracies are “not very frequent” (Popper, 1972, p. 342). But Popper is just wrong about this. Conspiracy is a common form of behavior throughout history and in all cultures, a point that has been established very effectively in a series of articles by Charles Pigden (2006a, 2006b, & 2007). Prior to Popper no one appears to have thought otherwise. Indeed, Popper himself does not appear strongly committed to the view that conspiracies are rare, admitting elsewhere that conspiracies are a “typical social phenomena” (1962, p. 95). In other words, they are not rare. You might think that the question of whether conspiracies are rare depends a great deal on how we define the expression “conspiracy”. But in fact it doesn’t make much difference. So far, I’ve been following Popper in thinking of a c­ onspiracy simply as a secret plan on the part of a group of people. But some people have rightly noted that not all such secret plans seem to count as conspiracies. Hence, Charles Pigden has suggested that we should add the

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requirement that the secret plan must be “morally suspect” (Pigden, 2006a, p. 157).4 I myself have come to think that a slightly different tweaking of the definition is called for. Secrecy is not enough for a collective plan to constitute a conspiracy, active deception on the part of the conspirators is required as well. Another possibility is to look at the legal concept of conspiracy and insist that no plan should count as a conspiracy unless it is a plan to do something illegal. There is no need to consider these moves in detail or adjudicate between them here. All of them narrow the extension of the word “conspiracy” somewhat, but not enough to make conspiracies rare (still less non-​existent). Very often secret plans are secret because they are plans to do something morally suspect. Very often secret plans involve deception, because deception is the only way to preserve secrecy. Very often secret plans are plans to do something illegal, because secrecy is required in order not to get caught and punished. On all definitions of conspiracy that have been seriously proposed (at least that I am aware of) conspiracies are common. Of course, terms like “common”, “rare” and “typical” are relative. Conspiracies are rare compared to some things and common compared to others. Presumably some people think conspiracies are more common than in fact they are, but they don’t seem to be the people most likely to be castigated as conspiracy theorists. Someone who believed in very few conspiracies, but believed that they are of great importance would be much more likely to attract the pejorative label “conspiracy theorist” than one who believed in more conspiracies, but considered them to be of little moment. This suggests another way of understanding what is supposed to be wrong with being a conspiracy theorist. 2

Conspiracies Tend to Be Insignificant

Several authors have suggested that conspiracy theorists go wrong, not by overstating the frequency with which conspiracies occur, but by overstating their significance when they do occur. On this view, you can believe in as many conspiracies as you like, so long as you do not believe that they are particularly important. Again, Popper provides some support for this way of understanding who conspiracy theorists are, and what is supposed to be wrong with being one. He claims that conspiracies do not “change the character of social life” and that, were they to cease “we would still be faced with fundamentally the same problems which have always faced us” (Popper, 1972, p. 342). 4 On Pigden’s account something can be morally suspect without actually being immoral.

104 Coady But Popper himself effectively admits that conspiracies can be important when he says that “Lenin’s revolution, and especially Hitler’s revolution and Hitler’s war are, I think, exceptions. These were indeed conspiracies” (Popper, 1972, p. 125). With exceptions like these it’s hard to put much faith in the rule. Just to be clear, “Lenin’s revolution” was The October Revolution, which brought the Bolsheviks to power and created the Soviet Union, “Hitler’s revolution” was the revolution which brought the Nazis to power in Germany, and “Hitler’s war” was the Second World War (or at least the European theatre of that war). All of these conspiracies have had an enormous impact on “the character of social life” in every country in the world ever since. And it’s not as if the “exceptions” Popper mentions are the only ones. Those interested in the enormous impact conspiracies have had just on the twentieth century should consult Pigden (2006b, pp. 34–​36). So, it is simply not true that we would be faced with “fundamentally the same problems” without conspiracies. 3

Conspiracies Tend to Fail

Machiavelli once said that “experience demonstrates that there have been many conspiracies, but few have been concluded successfully” (Machiavelli, Chapter 19, p. 62). In a similar vein, Popper claimed that few “conspiracies are ultimately successful. Conspirators rarely consummate their conspiracy” (Popper, 1962, p. 95). More recently, Daniel Pipes has run a similar line, claiming that “familiarity with the past shows that most conspiracies fail” (1997, p. 39). This suggests that the problem with conspiracy theorists is that they are people who postulate mainly successful conspiracies and that this is irrational. This objection is sometimes conflated with the previous one,5 but the two objections should be distinguished. A successful conspiracy can be unimportant, and a failed conspiracy can be quite momentous. The failed conspiracy by Soviet generals against Gorbachev in 1991 brought about, or at least hastened, the break up of the Soviet Union. Likewise the failed conspiracy by Richard Nixon and his associates to cover-​up a burglary at the Watergate Hotel led to his resignation. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the resignation of Richard Nixon are both, by any standards, momentous historical events. The idea that conspiracies tend to fail is very widespread and seems to be what a lot of people are getting at when they object to conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists. Conspiracy theories are often contrasted with cock-​up 5 Pipes, for example, does not clearly distinguish these objections.

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theories, with the suggestion that the latter are always, or at least typically, more plausible than the former.6 But, popular though it is, this idea is wrong in two respects. First, conspiracies and cock-​ups are not incompatible. A cock-​up is a plan or endeavor which fails through incompetence (if I am not trying to do something, I can’t cock it up). And since conspiracies are plans of a certain kind, it is perfectly possible to cock them up. Second, although conspiracies have been known to fail, there is no reason to think that they are more prone to failure than other kinds of human endeavor (such as starting a business, making oneself attractive to the opposite sex, or promoting growth in Third World countries). Indeed it’s hard to see why people would continue to conspire if the historical record really shows that the activity tends to be pointless or counter-​productive. Are conspirators particularly stupid? There seems no reason to think so. In fact the historical record shows that conspiracies are quite often successful. The conspiracy to assassinate Julius Caesar was successful, as was the conspiracy to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. So too, the coup of Thermidore which struck down the terrorist regime of Robespierre, the 18th Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte and the October Revolution of 1917. The history of the Byzantine Empire (as of Tsarist Russia) is punctuated with successful palace revolutions, most of them the products of conspiracy. Perhaps the argument is that such conspiracies are not ultimately successful, since they often have consequences that are neither intended nor wanted by the conspirators. This may be the line Popper et al. are running when they accuse conspiracy theorists of ignoring the unintended and/​or unwanted consequences of social action. But the fact that conspiracies have unintended and/​or unwanted consequences (from the point of view of the conspirators) does not entail that they are peculiarly prone to failure. For most (and perhaps all) human actions have unintended and/​or unwanted consequences (from the point of view of the actors), but that surely that does not entail that most (and perhaps all) human activity is doomed to failure. To suppose that it does would be to lose our grip on the distinction between failure and success. Is there any reason to suppose that conspiracies are more likely to fail than other things people do? Well you might argue that since secrecy is essential to

6 Bernhard Ingham, press secretary to Mrs. Thatcher, is the classical source for this contrast. “Many journalists have fallen for the conspiracy theory of government. I do assure you that they would produce more accurate work if they adhered to the cock-​up theory”. (Quoted in the Brisbane Times, 1/​9/​09.).

106 Coady most definitions of conspiracy,7 all the conspiracies I have mentioned failed, in as much as they are not secret (after all we know about them); these examples show that there are conspiracies, indeed that there are lots of them and that many of them are important, but they also show that conspiracies tend to fail, because they tend to be exposed in the end. This seems to be Pete Mandik’s reasoning when he denies that the belief that al Qaeda blew up the World Trade Center is a conspiracy theory on the ground that it isn’t a secret (Mandik, 2007, pp. 213–​214). The argument that conspiracies tend to fail, because they always or usually end up being exposed, is mistaken in two ways. First, there is no reason to believe the premise is true. Second, the conclusion does not follow from the premise. Why accept the premise that conspiracies always or usually end up being exposed? The argument is that all the conspiracies we know of are no longer secret, therefore it is reasonable to conclude that conspiracies tend not to remain secret. This is closely parallel to an argument of Berkeley’s that nothing exists without thought, because everything you can think of is (at the time in question) being thought of (Berkeley, p. 75). In both cases there is a clear selection effect operating on the available data. I can’t provide you with any examples of objects which are not being thought about, because the process of trying to find examples inevitably involves my thinking about them. Similarly, I can’t provide you with any examples of conspiracies that are still completely secret, because if they were still completely secret (and I wasn’t in on them), I wouldn’t know about them. But this does not support the claim that there are no such conspiracies, or even the claim that there aren’t very many of them. Even if it were true that conspiracies tend not to remain secret, the conclusion that they tend to fail would not follow. To suppose that it would is to interpret the secrecy required for successful conspiracy in far too strict a way; in such a way in fact that a conspiracy will count as a failure if anyone other than the conspirators ever finds out about it. But conspirators (at least the ones we know about) typically have much more limited aims than that with respect to secrecy. They want to keep their activities secret from some people (usually the targets of the conspiracy and those who might sympathize with them) for some period of time (often only until the deed they are conspiring to do has been done). Indeed many conspiracies need to be widely publicized, once the deed is done, if the conspirators are to succeed in their long-​range plans. This 7 The Oxford English Dictionary lists an archaic usage, which makes no reference to secrecy. According to it, a conspiracy is simply a “[u]‌nion or combination (of persons or things) for one end or purpose”.

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appears to be the case with the al Qaeda conspiracy to blow up the twin towers. The object of the exercise was not just to strike a blow against the Great Satan, but to publicly be seen to have done so. It was certainly the case with the conspiracy to kill Julius Caesar. Brutus and Cassius’ plans were secret up to the point where they stabbed Caesar, after which they publicized the deed far and wide (Plutarch, pp. 356–​357). It is of course possible that there are conspiracies whose success requires permanent secrecy from everyone not involved in the conspiracy. But these are not the kind of conspiracies that those who are castigated as conspiracy theorists believe in. Certainly they don’t believe in conspiracy theories of this kind that have been completely successful. They do not believe that the conspiracies they subscribe to have successfully been kept secret from everyone including them. To characterize their position in this way would be to suppose that they are straightforwardly inconsistent. And there is no reason (or at least I have never seen any reason) to suppose that even the most irrational of those who are castigated as conspiracy theorists make this mistake. 4

Governments and Government Agencies of Western Countries Don’t Conspire Often, Successfully, or Significantly

Just believing in lots of significant and/​or successful conspiracies is not usually on its own enough to get you accused of being a conspiracy theorist. A great deal depends on whom you attribute the conspiracies to. No matter how many conspiracies you believe the North Korean regime is involved in, and no matter how important and successful you believe those conspiracies are, no one is likely to call you a conspiracy theorist, unless you also think that western governments or western government agencies are involved. So perhaps the error of conspiracy theorists is that they fail to recognize that neither western governments nor their agents conspire, or that they rarely do, or that it doesn’t much matter when they do, or that they rarely achieve their aims when they do. The U.S. is the most important western government, and it is typically someone’s belief in conspiracies by American governments or American government agencies that leads him or her to be accused of being conspiracy theorist. So I will use the U.S. as a case study. Robert Anton Wilson, who is a fairly typical and widely cited conspiracy-​baiter, begins his book Everything Is Under Control: Conspiracies, Cults and Cover-​ups by citing a survey according to which 74 percent of Americans “believe that the U.S. government regularly engages in conspiratorial and clandestine operations”. He says that this statistic is significant, because it means that most Americans “now believe what only

108 Coady embittered left-​wing radicals believed a century ago” (Wilson, 1998, p. 1).8 The rest of his book is premised on the assumption that his readers are amongst the 26 percent who don’t believe the U.S. government is regularly conspiring and that no argument for this position is required. It is simply assumed that the majority of Americans have become susceptible to “strange” and “paranoid” conspiracy theories. The statistic Wilson cites is disturbing, but not for the reason he thinks. It is an indictment of the American media and of the American educational system that 26%—​over a quarter of its citizens—​appear to be unaware that their government engages in conspiratorial and clandestine operations on a regular basis. They have obviously never heard of the cia, or perhaps they think it is a fictional entity regularly used as a plot device on television. Certainly they cannot have read its mission statement, which describes its role as (amongst other things) “conducting covert action at the direction of the President”. What kind of covert action? Since it is covert, our knowledge is limited, but we do know it has included assassination and torture programs in the not too distant past, including the notorious Phoenix Program (Hersh, 1972). We also know that the cia has played a covert role in the overthrow of several democratic governments, including the government of Iran in 1953 (Weiner, pp. 81–​92), Greece in 1967 (Weiner, pp. 330–​331), and Chile in 1973 (Weiner, pp. 306–​316). But it is not just the cia. The 26% are presumably also unaware that their government lied to them about the so-​called Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which was used as a pretext to escalate the war in Vietnam, or the fact that their government regularly lied to them about the strength of the enemy throughout that conflict (Ellsberg, 2002). Moving right along (and skipping over the Menu bombings, Watergate, and the Iran-​Contra affair), it is no longer a secret that the American government regularly kidnaps terrorism suspects and sends them abroad to be tortured (Thompson & Paglen, 2006). But although this is not a secret now, it is an operation that was originally planned and conducted in secret, since it contravenes national and international laws. Does “the U.S. government regularly engage in conspiratorial and clandestine operations”? No one familiar with U.S. history could think otherwise.9 8 I doubt whether Wilson is right that a century ago only “embittered left-​wing radicals” believed that their government was engaged in regular conspiratorial and covert operations. But if he is right and the majority did have more faith then that their government was open and above-​board, then the majority was wrong and the embittered left-​wing radicals were right. 9 I do not mean to imply that the U.S. is unique or even unusual in this way.

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Conspiracy Theory and the Open Society

It is true, as I have argued elsewhere (Coady, 2006a, p. 10), that in open societies government conspiracies are likely to be both less common and less significant, and there is no question that the U.S. and other western countries are much more open than some other countries, such as North Korea. But this should not lead us to conclude that governments and government agencies of western countries don’t conspire often, successfully, or significantly, for three reasons. First, openness is a matter of degree. There is no such thing as a completely, or even highly, open society. Second, openness, such as it is, is not the exclusive province of the United States and other western societies. Some non-​ western societies seem to be more open than some western societies.10 Third, even in the most open of actually existing societies, conspiracy (including conspiracy by government) is common, important, and often successful.11 Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule describe the United States, along with Britain and France, as open societies, and deride conspiracy theorists for being unaware of “the abundant evidence that in open societies government action does not usually remain secret for very long” (2009, pp. 208–​209). What does this “abundant evidence” consist in? Sunstein and Vermeule cite two, once secret facts which have been reported in the American media: first, that the Bush administration illegally spied on American citizens without court orders,12 and second that, since September 11th, the cia has been torturing prisoners in secret “black sites”.13 These examples hardly establish that government conspiracies in America and other putatively open societies don’t remain secret very long. The article in the New York Times, which revealed the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping programme, came out approximately four years after that programme began. What is more, a careful reading of the article reveals that “[a]‌fter meeting with senior administration officials to hear their concerns, the 10

11 12 13

The 2021 Press Freedom Index, compiled by Reporters Without Borders, which ranks countries on the basis of their respect for freedom of the press, rates the United States 44th, with the UK and France coming in at 33rd and 34th, respectively. All three are behind many non-​western countries. I will not address the question of whether a completely open society in which we could be sure governments could not get away with conspiring would be desirable, since we can be sure that no actual society is or ever will be that open. James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush lets U.S. spy on callers without courts”, New York Times, Dec. 16, 2005, p. A1. Jane Mayer, “The black sites: a rare look inside the C.I.A.’s secret interrogation program” New Yorker, Aug. 13, 2007, p. 46.

110 Coady newspaper delayed publication for a year”. It has since emerged that the delay was considerably longer than that; the New York Times had the story before the 2004 presidential election.14 So, this is hardly evidence that secretive government action does not stay secret very long. On the contrary, it seems to have stayed secret for as long as the government wanted it to stay secret. Jane Mayer’s revelation of cia torture also came out long after, in fact almost six years after, the program she revealed the existence of began. You might try arguing that at least these examples constitute evidence that, in open societies such as our own, government secrets will eventually be exposed. But these examples do not support even this, much more limited, claim. As we have seen, there is an inevitable selection effect operating on our available data about conspiracies. To argue that conspiracies in Western societies will eventually be exposed, because this or that conspiracy has been exposed, is like arguing, as some criminologists have, that there is a correlation between being a criminal and having a low iq, based on the fact that prisoners tend to have low iq s. This data is inevitably drawn from a subset of criminals who may well be unrepresentative, the ones who get caught i.e. the unsuccessful ones. Similarly, to the extent that long-​term secrecy is essential to the success of conspiracies, the ones we know about will tend to be the unsuccessful ones.15 We have no reason to believe these are representative. We have seen that, at least on some readings of what it is to be a conspiracy theorist, one will be less justified in being a conspiracy theorist, the more open one’s society is. How can one tell how open one’s society is? A range of factors may be taken into consideration. All else being equal, a society will be more open, if it has little or no government censorship, if it has effective freedom of information legislation, if it has diversity of media ownership, if it has freedom of internet usage, if the public service is independent of the government and the branches of government are independent of one another, and if it is rarely in a state of war (since war is commonly used to justify closing a society’s channels of communication). One final factor bears particular attention. All else being equal, a society will be more open to the extent that “conspiracy theorist” and cognates, such as “conspiracist” are not used as terms of abuse. As we’ve seen, despite the bewildering variety of uses of these expressions, they are standardly used to deride those in western countries who believe their governments are engaged in conspiracies (or important conspiracies or successful conspiracies etc.).

14 15

https://​www.npr.org/​tran​scri​pts/​312486​719 , accessed 26/​11/​21. I have made a closely related point before (2006a, p. 5).

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This usage serves to intimidate and silence such people, whether or not their beliefs are justified, and whether or not they are true. Hence, this usage makes it less likely that government conspiracies will be exposed (or exposed in a timely manner), and more likely that the perpetrators will get away with them. Hence, there is reason to think that pejorative uses of these expressions have the effect of making societies in which they occur less open. There is a sad irony in the fact that Popper, the author of The Open Society and Its Enemies, should have started a practice (the witch-​hunt against conspiracy theorists) which has made it less likely that conspiracies will be exposed, and so made it easier for conspiracy to thrive at the expense of openness. My account of the different things people are getting at when they accuse others of being conspiracy theorists was not meant to be complete. Those interested in the variety of uses of the expressions “conspiracy theory” and “conspiracy theorist” should consult my two edited collections on the topic (Coady 2006a & 2007a). But behind the heterogeneity of uses there is a clear common thread; a person who is accused of being a conspiracy theorist believes, or is interested in investigating, something which conflicts with a view which has achieved a certain status, that of being an officially sanctioned or orthodox view in his or her society. Indeed, the expression is sometimes used of such people, even when their so-​called conspiracy theory does not involve a conspiracy (e.g. Coady, 2006b, p. 125). Understood in this way, the relationship between conspiracy theories and officialdom is like the relationship between rumors and officialdom, with the difference that rumors are defined as merely lacking official endorsement, whereas conspiracy theories, on this way of understanding them, must actually contradict some official version of events. What if we accepted a definition of “conspiracy theory” along these lines? Would that justify adopting a dismissive attitude toward conspiracy theories? No. To say that a version of events has official status should be seen as epistemically neutral. Hence, to say that a conspiracy theory by definition contradicts an official version of events, is to say nothing about whether it is true, or whether a person who believes it is justified in doing so. The expressions “conspiracy theory” and “conspiracy theorist” are the respectable modern equivalents of “heresy” and “heretic” respectively; these expressions serve to castigate and ridicule anyone who rejects or even questions orthodox or officially endorsed beliefs. 6

Conspiracy-​Baiting as Propaganda

The propagandistic nature of campaigns against conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists is at least as evident as the propagandistic nature of campaigns

112 Coady against rumors and rumor-​mongers. Both forms of propaganda serve to herd opinion, or at least “respectable opinion”, within limits set by governments and other powerful institutions. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule’s “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures”, which was published in The Journal of Political Philosophy, is a particularly clear example of this. Sunstein and Vermeule tentatively define a conspiracy theory as “an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations of powerful people, who attempt to conceal their role (at least until their aims are accomplished)” (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009, p. 205). They concede that some conspiracy theories are true (p. 206), and that some are justified (p. 207). Nonetheless, they propose to focus on the ones that are “false, harmful, and unjustified” (p. 204). Not only do they focus on such “bad conspiracy theories”, they repeatedly refer to conspiracy theories as if we could simply assume that they have some or all of these undesirable characteristics. They claim, for example, that “conspiracy theories are a subset of the larger category of false beliefs” (p. 206), and that they are a product of “crippled epistemologies” (p. 224). Hence, they not only ignore, but implicitly define out of existence, when it suits them, conspiracy theories that are true, beneficial and/​or justified. Talking about conspiracy theories as if we could just assume they are false, harmful, and unjustified, is, given their definition, tantamount to assuming that explanations which posit secretive behavior on the part of powerful people are false, harmful, and unjustified. We have already seen that, not only some, but many, such explanations are both true and justified. They may still, of course, be harmful. In the following passage, Sunstein and Vermeule explain the kinds of harm conspiracy theories can cause: [S]‌uch theories can … have pernicious effects from the government’s point of view, either by inducing unjustifiably widespread public scepticism about the government’s assertions, or by dampening public mobilization and participation in government-​led efforts, or both. sunstein and vermeule 2009, p. 220

Is there a point of view, other than that of the government, which might be worth considering, such as that of the citizen? They do not say. Nor do they consider the possibility that widespread public skepticism about the government’s assertions might be justified, or that the public might be right not to want to participate in government-​led efforts (e.g. efforts to persecute minorities, or attack foreign countries without provocation). Putting these concerns aside for the moment, what should the government do about the problem of people being unjustifiably skeptical about what it says

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and unjustifiably reluctant to do what it wants? You might have thought that the solution lies in greater openness, honesty, and accountability on the part of government. Sunstein and Vermeule adopt a somewhat different approach: Our main policy claim here is that government should engage in cognitive infiltration of the groups that produce conspiracy theories sunstein and vermeule, 2009, p. 218

In this way, government will be able to “undermine the crippled epistemology of believers by planting doubts about the theories” (p. 219). Of course, government agents cannot be entirely open about their participation in such programs; hence, Sunstein and Vermuele recommend that “government officials should participate anonymously or even with false identities” (p. 225). In other words, they recommend that government should engage in conspiracies16 in order to undermine belief in conspiracy theories. Of course, there is a danger that the targets of these proposed government conspiracies will find out about them. Sunstein and Vermuele can hardly dismiss this possibility, since, as we saw, they claim that in open societies, such as the United States, “government action does not usually remain secret for very long” (pp. 208–​209). If the targets of Sunstein and Vermuele’s proposed conspiracies were to find out about them, they would then believe even more conspiracy theories17 (albeit true ones) than they did before. This would of course be counterproductive, from government’s point of view (which is the only point of view they consider). So what should the government do in these circumstances? It’s not absolutely clear what Sunstein and Vermuele would recommend. They do say that “as a general rule, true accounts should not be undermined” (p. 206). Nonetheless, they regard it as an “interesting question” whether “it is ever appropriate to undermine true conspiracy theories” (en. 17).

16

17

Sunstein and Vermeule’s proposals constitute conspiracies on any of the definitions considered so far, and any definition that I have ever come across. The cognitive infiltration they recommend not only involves secrecy and deception, it is obviously “morally suspect”, to put it very mildly, since it involves dishonestly manipulating people’s opinions. What is more, it appears to be illegal, under statutes which prohibit the government from engaging in “covert propaganda” defined as “information which originates from the government but is unattributed and made to appear as though it came from a third party”. See http://​www.prwa​tch.org/​node/​7261, accessed 15/​8/​2021. To believe that the government is engaged in secretive and deceptive cognitive infiltration is to believe a conspiracy theory, on Sunstein and Vermuele’s own definition as well as on every other definition I have ever come across.

114 Coady There is a glaring inconsistency between Sunstein and Vermuele’s assurances that government can’t get away with secrecy in open societies like ours, and their advocacy of government secrecy (and indeed deception). I assume they don’t mean to suggest that the cognitive infiltration they recommend is doomed to failure. But mere inconsistency is the least of the worries raised by their paper. Shouldn’t we be worried by the prospect of government officials secretively and deceptively manipulating public opinion? Shouldn’t we be especially worried when an extremely powerful government official like Sunstein, recommends that government officials behave that way? Isn’t it possible that government officials might try to undermine, not just false, unjustified, and harmful conspiracy theories, but also true, justified and/​or beneficial ones? Sunstein and Vermuele are reassuring: Throughout, we assume a well-​motivated government that aims to eliminate conspiracy theories, or draw their poison, if and only if social welfare is improved by doing so. sunstein and vermeule 2009, p. 219

But why should we assume government is “well-​motivated” or that it will always seek to improve “social welfare”, rather than its own welfare? What reason can we have for abandoning the defining insight of liberal political thought, i.e. we can’t just assume that governments are well-​intentioned and will act in our interests rather than their own, especially when it comes to actions that are carried out in secret? All Sunstein and Vermuele have to say in defence of their assumption is that it is “a standard assumption in policy analysis” (p. 219). It is indeed a standard assumption of a certain kind of policy analysis, that known as “government propaganda”. 7

So What Should Be Done?

In looking at different ways of understanding what people are getting at when they accuse others of being conspiracy theorists, we have seen, that the expression “conspiracy theorist” (like its close relative “conspiracy theory”) is multiply ambiguous. What is more, reflection on each of the standard ways of understanding what it is to be a conspiracy theorist shows that there is nothing wrong with being one. In fact, in each case it is those who accuse others of being conspiracy theorists who are guilty of irrationality (or at least error). What should someone who recognizes this do about it?

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The first and most obvious response would be to stop using the expressions, and to discourage others from using them as well. The goal would be to create a world in which the expressions “conspiracy theorist”, “conspiracy theory”, “conspiracism”, and so on, would be recognized as products of an irrational and bigoted outlook. In this world, people would be as ashamed to dismiss a view on the ground that it is a conspiracy theory or a person on the ground that he or she is a conspiracy theorist, as they would be to dismiss a view on the ground that it is heretical or a person on the ground that he or she is a witch. Of course, attempts to create such a world may not be successful. We can expect them to be resisted by those who find it easier to dismiss people and their views with sound-​bites than to argue with them or consider the evidence. An alternative strategy should therefore be considered, that of retaining the expression, but without the negative connotations. The words “witch” and “queer” have both come to be used quite widely in non-​derogatory ways. In fact, these words have come to be embraced by many of the people who in the past would have been most likely to be maligned as witches or queers. Perhaps the expression “conspiracy theorist” could be transformed in a similar way. Along these lines, I have suggested (Coady, 2007b, pp. 194–​196) that it could reasonably be applied to people who have a particular interest in investigating and publicizing conspiracies (when they occur, who is responsible for them, and so on). This conception fits in well with the way we think of other kinds of theorists (e.g. number theorists) as people who have an interest in a particular field of research, rather than as people with particular kinds of beliefs. Conspiracy theorists, in this sense, serve a vitally important social function. In fact, being a conspiracy theorist, in this sense, is an important aspect of the job description of political journalists.18 Those who resist either of the strategies I have suggested so far (getting rid of the expression “conspiracy theorist”, or retaining it without the negative connotations) will point out quite rightly that some theories which are criticized as conspiracy theories and some people who are criticized as conspiracy theorists deserve to be criticized. We’ve seen that conspiracies are common, but some people presumably think they’re more common than in fact they are. We have seen that conspiracies often succeed, but some people probably think they succeed more often than in fact they do. We’ve seen that conspiracies are important, but some people may think that they’re more important than in fact they are. Finally, we’ve seen that conspiracies by governments and government 18

This is meant as normative claim. Too often political journalists do not see their role this way.

116 Coady agencies of western countries, such as the United States, are common, often successful, and often important. But some people almost certainly think they are more common, successful, and/​or important than in fact they are. All these people are making errors, and some of these errors have been arrived at irrationally. What is more, some people sometimes characterize some of these errors as “conspiracy theories” and the people who are most prone to irrationally making these errors as “conspiracy theorists”. But this use of nomenclature is extremely misleading. In the first place, we are not talking about a single form of irrationality or error here, but several, and it can only promote confusion to conflate them. In the second place, each of these forms of irrationality or error has an opposite, i.e. the irrationality or error of believing that conspiracies are rare, the irrationality or error of believing that conspiracies rarely succeed, the irrationally or error of thinking that conspiracies are unimportant, and so on. We have seen in each case that it is the latter form of irrationality or error that is most widespread and most troubling. Hence, it seems that, at least as long as the witch-​hunt against conspiracy theorists goes on, we need to popularize pejorative expressions to denote those who, in various ways, irrationally dismiss evidence of conspiracy (or evidence of its importance, or evidence of its success, and so on). To that end, I have suggested (Coady, 2007b, pp. 196–​197) popularizing the expression “coincidence theorist”, to denote those who, like Hume, are skeptical about inferences “beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory” (Hume 1966/​1748, p. 26), but who, unlike Hume, do not confine their skepticism to theoretical philosophy. Coincidence theorists are people who fail, as it were, to connect the dots, who fail to see any significance to even the most striking correlations. To give you a sense of the influence of coincidence theory on our political culture, consider the theory that terror alerts in the United States were manipulated for domestic political advantage by the Bush administration. This theory got a lot of publicity when the early Democratic Party front-​runner for the 2004 Presidential election Howard Dean publicly suggested that it might be true. He was immediately denounced as a (you guessed it) “bizarre conspiracy theorist” by President Bush’s campaign spokesman Terry Holt.19 This way of dismissing Dean and those who agreed with him was immediately picked up, amplified, and repeated uncritically by a variety of voices in the media. As a result, there was no public debate (in the conventional media at least) during that election campaign about whether

19

http://​swampl​and.blogs.time.com/​2009/​08/​20/​color-​coded-​con-​job/​, accessed 15/​ 8/​ 2021.

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this conspiracy theory was in fact true. Instead there was a debate about how much the Democratic Party’s chances in the election would be hurt by conspiracy theorists like Dean. More than one journalist called on John Kerry, the party’s eventual nominee, to denounce Dean’s conspiracy theory, which he dutifully did. Now we know that Dean’s conspiracy theory was true. Tom Ridge, former Homeland Security Secretary, has admitted that the Bush administration manipulated the system for domestic political advantage. Pointing to cases like this in which those who posited a conspiracy have been proven right and the coincidence theorists who sneered at them have been proven wrong may go some way to providing some much needed balance to our public debates. But it is a frustrating business. The conventional media silence that has followed Ridge’s admission has been almost deafening. One of the very few journalists in the conventional media to make any reference to it at all, Marc Ambinder, has said that although journalists, including himself “were very skeptical when anti-​Bush liberals insisted that what Ridge now says is true, was true. We were wrong.”20 But despite admitting that his skepticism and that of his colleagues was factually mistaken, he nonetheless insists that it was warranted, and that those who thought otherwise were unwarranted in their suspicions. The evidence on which this particular conspiracy theory was based before Ridge’s confession (for example, the number of occasions bad political news for the Bush administration was followed by a raising of the terror alert, and the regularity with which this in turn was followed by improved Republican polling) does not count. It can all safely be dismissed as coincidence. It appears that on Ambinder’s view, conspiracy theories should not be believed, or even investigated, until the conspirators themselves confess. Conspiracy-​baiters often accuse those they castigate as conspiracy theorists for believing that “There is no such thing as a coincidence” and they are of course right that there is such a thing as being too willing to postulate what Hume called “secret powers” (1966/​1748, 33) behind observed phenomena. But there is also such a thing as being too reluctant to make inferences beyond what we immediately perceive. Popularizing the expression “coincidence theorist” to denote people who make this error would go some way toward promoting rational public debate. Coincidence theorists have an irrational tendency to reject clear evidence of conspiracy, but not everyone so inclined is a coincidence theorist. Some

20

http://​www.thea​tlan​tic.com/​polit​ics/​arch​ive/​2009/​08/​dont-​cry-​for-​tom-​ridge/​23574/​, accessed 15/​8/​2021.

118 Coady people, particularly on the Left, have an irrational tendency to reject clear evidence of conspiracy for quite different reasons. I call them “institutional theorists”.21 A typical example of institutional theory at work can be found in the preface to Manufacturing Consent, where Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, anticipating the “accusation” that they are conspiracy theorists, respond pre-​emptively with the claim that they “do not offer any kind of ‘conspiracy’ hypothesis to explain mass-​media performance”. Instead, they use “a propaganda model”, which seeks to explain mass-​media performance in impersonal institutional terms, and as “largely an outcome of market forces” (Herman and Chomsky, 1989, p. xii).22 The main problem with this line of thought is that impersonal explanations in terms of institutions and market forces are not inconsistent with conspiratorial explanations. Many institutions owe their existence, at least in part, to conspiracies (think of the United States government’s debt to the conspiratorial activities of the founding fathers) and many institutions themselves regularly conspire. Indeed, many institutions do little but conspire (think of the cia or the kgb). What is more, market forces are not inconsistent with conspiracy. Indeed, as Adam Smith recognized, market forces frequently lead to conspiracy.23 More generally, institutions and impersonal social forces are not disembodied or abstract entities. They are the result, although not always the intended result, of a lot of intentional activity, much of which is conspiratorial. So, an explanation can be and often is both conspiratorial and institutional. At the root of the institutional theorists’ critique of conspiracy theorists is a concern not to offer excessively easy solutions to social problems. The worry is that conspiracy theorists encourage the idea that the road to societal improvement consists in the removal of bad people from positions of power, while ignoring the underlying structures that are the real cause of most of our problems (problems which may well include the presence of bad people in positions of power).

21 22

23

This is a deliberate echo of the concept of “institutional analysis, which is often explicitly contrasted with “conspiracy theory”. Institutional analysis of course has positive connotations, at least amongst those who practice it. Despite their attempts to assure their readers, many were not convinced. Nicholas Lemann in a review in The New Republic insisted that “Manufacturing Consent is a conspiracy theory”. (Lemann, 1989, p. 36). The truth is Manufacturing Consent does offer numerous “conspiracy hypotheses” (many of which are very plausible and some of which are obviously true). However, it is not itself a conspiracy theory. “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public” (Smith, Book i, Chapter x).

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While there is certainly something to this concern, the alternative strategy of concentrating on systematic or institutional change comes with its own dangers. First, it can be unrealistic, at least in the short term where most of us live our lives. Second, as history has often demonstrated, the new institutions may be worse than the ones they replaced. The debate between conspiracy theorists and institutional theorists is reminiscent of the debate George Orwell discussed in his essay on Charles Dickens between “moralists” and “revolutionaries”: The moralist and the revolutionary are constantly undermining one another. Marx exploded a hundred tons of dynamite beneath the moralist position, and we are still living in the echo of that tremendous crash. But already, somewhere or other, the sappers are at work and fresh dynamite is being tamped in place to blow Marx at the moon. Then Marx, or somebody like him, will come back with yet more dynamite, and so the process continues, to an end we cannot yet foresee. The central problem—​how to prevent power from being abused—​remains unsolved. Dickens, who had not the vision to see that private property is an obstructive nuisance, had the vision to see that ‘If men would behave decently the world would be decent’ is not such a platitude as it sounds. orwell, 1961, p. 48

We cannot stop power from being abused just by investigating and exposing conspiracies. But we also cannot stop power from being abused if we ignore the fact that much of that abuse is, and probably always will be, conspiratorial. 8

Conclusion

It has sometimes been suggested that conspiracy theories should be dismissed, because they are “just theories”. On this view, conspiracy theories are epistemically suspect because theories are epistemically suspect; by definition one cannot be justified in believing them and one cannot know that they are true. There is no doubt that the word “theory” is sometimes used in a dismissive way, according to which theories are contrasted with facts. On this usage “theory” is roughly synonymous with “speculative hypothesis”, but this doesn’t seem to be what people who dismiss conspiracy theories mean by the word “theory”. If it were, their objection would have nothing to do with conspiracies, and there would be no need to mention them. What is more, they would presumably adopt equally dismissive attitudes to other kinds of theories, such as scientific

120 Coady theories. Typically they don’t. Several authors have claimed that intellectuals are particularly likely to be dismissive of conspiracy theories (Clarke, 2006, p. 77; Levy, 2007, p. 181; Räikkä, 2009, p. 197). But intellectuals are not likely to be dismissive of theories just for being theories, nor think of theories as things which are by definition unjustified or as things which cannot be known to be true. On the contrary, they typically think of “theory” as an epistemically neutral term, and think that we are justified in believing some of them and that we can know that some of them are true. In this sense, theories are not contrasted with facts, because some theories are facts. A standard ploy on the part of those who deride conspiracy theories and theorists is to pick a conspiracy theory, argue that it is false and/​or that the conspiracy theorists who believe it are irrational or in some other way misguided, and conclude that what is true of this conspiracy theory and these conspiracy theorists, is true of conspiracy theories and theorists in general. This is obviously a fallacious form of argument. What needs to be shown is not that there are conspiracy theories and theorists with certain undesirable characteristics, but that there is a connection between being a conspiracy theory or theorist and these undesirable characteristics. What needs to be shown, in other words, is that the theories or theorists have the undesirable characteristics because they are conspiracy theories or theorists. Jill LeBlanc (1998, pp. 192–​194), for example, argues (in a critical thinking text book of all things) that people who believe that the United States government is conspiring to keep the public unaware of contact with alien species at Roswell, New Mexico, are committing certain identifiable reasoning fallacies. Whether or not she is right about this, she is certainly wrong when she goes on to assert without argument that these fallacies are characteristic of conspiracy theorists. This is no different from arguing that a certain foreigner is irrational and concluding from this that irrationality is characteristic of foreigners. In a similar way, Steve Clarke (2007) argues against the “controlled demolition theory” of the collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11, and simply assumes that the flaws of this particular conspiracy theory are characteristic of conspiracy theories in general. This is like assuming that the flaws of phlogiston theory (for example the fact that it is false) are characteristic of scientific theories in general. The absurdity of this species of reasoning in the case of theories about the collapse of the World Trade Center should be particularly be evident, because all theories of this event are inevitably conspiracy theories, at least on most definitions of “conspiracy theory”, including Clarke’s. After all, the World Trade Center clearly collapsed because of some conspiracy or the other. As Pigden has noted, to avoid believing a conspiracy theory in this case “you would have

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to suppose that the perpetrators assembled in the planes quite by chance and that, on a sudden, by coincidence, it struck them all as a neat idea to hijack the planes and ram them into the Twin Towers, the Whitehouse and the Pentagon, with the aid of other perpetrators who, presumably, they had never met before” (Pigden, 2006a, p. 158). When all accounts of an event are conspiracy theories, why should we assume that false and unjustified ones are characteristic of the kind, rather than (say) true and justified ones? Of course, many people will be reluctant to describe the theory which Clarke calls “the Al Qaeda Theory” as a conspiracy theory. But it’s not at all clear that they can justify their reluctance. They cannot justify it on the ground that this so-​called theory is a fact rather than a theory, for, as we have seen, being a theory is compatible with being a fact. They could try justifying their reluctance by pointing out that the Al Qaeda Theory has official status, and stipulating that this means it cannot be a conspiracy theory. But, whatever you think of this semantic move, it doesn’t give us a reason for preferring the Al Qaeda theory to the controlled demolition theory. As we have seen, to say that a theory contradicts an official version of events is to say nothing about whether it is true, or whether it should be believed. I happen to think that Clarke makes a good case against controlled demolition theory and those who believe it. But the case has nothing to do with it being a conspiracy theory or them being conspiracy theorists. They are not wrong because they believe in the existence of conspiracies, or lots of conspiracies, or important, or successful conspiracies, or because they believe in conspiracies by the United States government or its agents, or because they believe something which contradicts an official version of events. They are wrong, because they believe in something (something which in this case just happens to be a conspiracy), which is not supported by the available evidence. I am not alone in defending conspiracy theories against their critics.24 However some authors who present themselves as defenders of conspiracy theories have internalized some of the presuppositions of the conspiracy-​baiters. I will conclude with a discussion of how my position differs from theirs. Lee Basham defends conspiracy theories against many critics, but he also ends up rejecting conspiracy theories, albeit on pragmatic, rather than epistemic, grounds: A more solid ground for the rejection of conspiracy theories is simply pragmatic. There is nothing you can do. While it would be speculative (but 24

Charles Pigden is a particularly good ally in this campaign.

122 Coady reasonable) to conclude that this is why many people dismiss conspiracy theory, it is a considerable reason why we should? basham, 2006a, p. 74

In another article, Basham appeals to “the ‘get a life’ principle” (2006b, p. 104) in support of this position. But Basham surely cannot mean to dismiss all conspiracy theories on these grounds. There are often things we can do about conspiracies (depending to some extent of course on who “we” are). For example, we may be able to expose one; we may, that is, be able to persuade others that a true conspiracy theory is true. This is something good investigative journalists do for a living. But it is also something all concerned citizens should be prepared to do in cases of heinous conspiracies that they have good reason to believe in. It is possible that Basham’s pragmatic rejection of conspiracy theories is only meant to apply to the most extreme imaginable conspiracy theories, those that postulate what he calls “malevolent global conspiracies” (Basham, 2006b). These conspiracy theories postulate conspirators who are so powerful that it is impossible for anyone, who is not a co-​conspirator, to know there is a conspiracy. Now, Basham is certainly right that there is nothing one could do about malevolent global conspiracies, understood in this way. You can’t foil conspiracies if you can’t know they exist. Conspiracy theories of this kind are a form of radical skeptical hypothesis, like the Evil Demon and brain-​in-​a-​vat hypotheses that philosophers have been grappling with for centuries. Whatever you think of these hypotheses, they are not conspiracy theories as we know them. The conspirators of actual conspiracy theories, justified and unjustified, true and false, are not omnipotent. Their conspiracies can be seen through (that is what the conspiracy theorist believes herself to have done), and thwarted (that is often what the conspiracy theorist hopes to do). Hence our impotence in the face of Basham’s malevolent global conspiracies cannot be the reason many people reject conspiracy theories, because few people have heard of any such conspiracies. Even the examples of conspiracy theories, which Basham uses to illustrate his argument, do not postulate malevolent global conspiracies in the required sense. For example, Basham asks us to imagine that we are told that a group of Freemasons, or the Council of Foreign Relations, is secretly ruling the planet. The conspirators of these theories are not omnipotent beings, but flesh-​and-​blood humans, and there would inevitably be limits to their ability to keep their activities secret in the face of determined investigation. Most of the readers of this book either have, or could easily find, evidence that these theories are false.

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Juha Räikkä also defends conspiracy theories, or at least a class of conspiracy theories he calls “political conspiracy theories”, against a variety of criticisms, and concludes that “political conspiracy theories may not be much weaker than standard non-​conspiratorial explanations of political events” (Räikkä, 2009, p. 198). But this “defence” of political conspiracy theories wrongly presupposes that political conspiracy theories are weaker (albeit not necessarily by much) than their rivals. As we have seen, political conspiracy theories, like other conspiracy theories, are often much stronger than their nonconspiratorial rivals; indeed their nonconspiratorial rivals are often obviously false, while they are obviously true. It’s not clear to me what Räikkä means by describing the rivals to political conspiracy theories as “standard”, but I suspect he means something like “official”. It is quite common to contrast conspiracy theories with their official non-​conspiratorial rivals, but, as we have seen, the official version of events can be just as conspiratorial as its rivals (indeed it can be more so). When this is the case, it is the unofficial explanation that will inevitably attract the label “conspiracy theory”, with all its undeserved negative connotations. The association between conspiracy theorizing and irrationality is so deeply entrenched in our culture that when people hear that I defend conspiracy theorists and theories they often assume that I must be defending irrationality. I am not. I am defending conspiracy theorists and theories against accusations of irrationality (along with a variety of other accusations). Unfortunately, some would-​be defenders of conspiracy theorizing have embraced a form of irrationalism. This is evident in the following passage from an academic collection on conspiracy theories: … these authors treat conspiracy ideas, near and far, as discourses that construct truths in contradistinction to the (also constructed) truths of discourses of transparency. Although recognizing that those making the transparency argument often hold considerably more power than those left to suspect these claims the authors level the epistemological playing field between these truth-​asserting endeavors. west and sanders, 2003, p. 15 25

I also want to “level the epistemological playing field”. But it is misguided to think that the way to do this is by adopting the relativist position that

25

Jodi Dean (1998) seems to adopt a similar position.

124 Coady conflicting social explanations are “constructed truths”, equally valid for different communities of believers. If a conspiracy theory contradicts another theory, then at least one of the two theories is false. Nothing can be said a priori about which it is. The only way to find out is by listening to arguments and examining evidence.

Bibliography

Basham, L. (2006a) “Living with the Conspiracy”. In D. Coady, Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 61–​76. Basham, L. (2006b) “Malevolent Global Conspiracy”. In D. Coady, Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 93–​106. Clarke, S. (2006) “Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing”. In D. Coady, Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 77–​92. Clarke, S. (2007) “Conspiracy Theories and the Internet: Controlled Demolition and Arrested Development”. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 4.2, 167–​180. Coady, D., ed. (2006a) Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate. Coady, D. (2006b) “Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories”. In D. Coady, ed. Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 115–​129. Coady, D., ed. (2007a) Conspiracy Theories. Special issue of Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 4.2. Coady, D. (2007b) “Are Conspiracy Theorists Irrational?” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 4.2, 193–​204. Dean, J. (1998) Aliens in America: Conspiracy Cultures from Outerspace to Cyberspace. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ellsberg, D. (2002) Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking. Hermann, E. S. & N. Chomsky (1989) Manufacturing Consent. New York: Pantheon Books. Hersch, S. (1972) Cover-​Up. New York: Random House. Hume, D. (1966/​1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-​ Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Keeley, B. L. (2006) “Of Conspiracy Theories”. In D. Coady, Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 45–​60. LeBlanc, J. (1998) Thinking Clearly: A Guide to Critical Thinking. New York: W. W. Norton. Lemann, N. (1989) “White House Watch”. The New Republic 2–​16 January, 34–​38. Levy, N. (2007) “Radically Socialised Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories”. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, 181–​192.

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Mandik, P. (2007) “Shit Happens”. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4.2, 205–​218. Orwell, G. (1961) “Charles Dickens”. In: George Orwell: Collected Essays. London: Secker and Warburg, pp. 31–​87. Pigden, C. (2006a) “Complots of Mischief”. In D. Coady, Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 139–​166. Pigden, C. (2006b) “Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories”. In D. Coady, Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate. Pigden, C. (2007) “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom”. Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 4.2, 219–​232. Pipes, D. (1997) Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where it Came From. New York: Free Press. Plutarch (1999) Roman Lives. R. Waterfield (trans.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Popper, K. R. (1962) The Open Society and its Enemies, vol 2, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel Marx and the Aftermath, 4th ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Popper, K. R. (1972) Conjectures and Refutations, 4th ed. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Räikkä, J. (2009) “On Political Conspiracy Theories”. The Journal of Political Philosophy 17.2, 185–​201. Smith, A. (1910/​1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: Dent. Sunstein, C. R. and A. Vermeule (2009) “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures”. Journal of Political Philosophy 17, 202–​227. Thompson, A.C. and Paglen, T. (2006) Torture Taxi. Hoboken NJ: Melville House. West, H. G. and Saunders, S. (eds.) (2003) Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographics of Suspicion in the New World Order. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Wilson, R. A. (1998) Everything is Under Control: Conspiracies, Cults and Cover-​ups. New York: Harper Paperbacks.

­c hapter 7

Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited Charles Pigden 1

Political Ploys and Epistemic Principles1

The conventional wisdom about conspiracy theories is that they ought not to be believed. To call something “a conspiracy theory” is to suggest that it is intellectually suspect; to call someone “a conspiracy theorist” is to suggest that he or she is irrational, paranoid or perverse.2 Often the suggestion seems to be that conspiracy theories are not just suspect, but utterly unbelievable, too silly to deserve the effort of a serious refutation. It is a common ploy on the part of politicians to dismiss critical allegations by describing them as conspiracy theories, a tactic of which Tony Blair was a master. The idea that the invasion of Iraq was “all about oil” or that (as a leaked memo seemed to show) President Bush had seriously proposed bombing al-​Jazeera’s headquarters in Doha were both “conspiracy theories” and therefore not worth discussing.3 Blair’s comments on the bombing memo were particularly eloquent. “Look, there’s a limit to what I can say—​it’s all sub judice, … But honestly, I mean, conspiracy theories …”.4 (The matter was “sub judice” because the Attorney General, presumably at Blair’s behest, was prosecuting the people who had leaked the memo.) Blair’s tactic of using “conspiracy theory” to dismiss ideas that he did not want to discuss would only have been honest5 if he had genuinely supposed that 1 This is a revised and expanded version of my paper “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom” (2007). Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 4;2, pp 193–​204. 2 For a detailed study of this polemical tactic see Husting and Orr (2007). 3 See Coady (2006b), p. 115 for details. Blair continues to use “conspiracy theory” as a blanket term of denigration for theories that he does not like (especially those that challenge his shining moral credentials). See his autobiography, A Journey, Blair (2010), pp 381, 397, 408,454 and 459. 4 The Daily Telegraph, 28/​11/​2005. 5 I must admit to doubts about Blair’s intellectual honesty. The second of these two allegations—​that Bush seriously discussed the bombing of al-​Jazeera, a suggestion that Blair apparently opposed—​was born out by a leaked memo for which the leaker, David Keogh, has been prosecuted. It may well be that Blair wanted to issue a non-​denying denial; to dismiss the allegation without actually making the lying claim that the discussion had never

© Charles Pigden, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_009

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conspiracy theories as such ought not to be believed (except perhaps if proven up to the hilt) and it would only have been respectable if Blair’s apparent belief had been correct. Thus the tactic relies on the epistemic principle that, in general, conspiracy theories ought not to be believed (that is, that it is irrational to believe them), and indeed that they are mostly so irrational that they ought not to be discussed, except perhaps as symptoms of some ideological malaise. Thus the conventional wisdom seems to be that we have an epistemic duty not to believe (or investigate) conspiracy theories, a duty which conspiracy theorists conspicuously neglect. I shall be denying that we have any such duty, and shall be arguing on the contrary that we are rationally entitled to believe in conspiracy theories, if that is what the evidence suggests. Some conspiracy theories are sensible and some are silly, but if they are silly this is not because they are conspiracy theories but because they suffer from some specific defect —​for instance, that the conspiracies they postulate are impossible or far-​fetched. But conspiracy theories as such are not epistemologically unclean, and it is often permissible—​even obligatory—​to believe them. For sometimes the case for conspiracy can be rationally overwhelming, “proved beyond reasonable doubt”, and even when it is not, belief in a conspiracy is often a rational option. Thus my dispute with the conventional wisdom is a debate about the ethics of belief. It is common ground in this debate that it makes sense to say that we ought to believe something (that believing it is right or rationally required), or that we ought not to believe it (that believing it is wrong, a sort of crime against reason). It also makes sense to say that we are entitled to believe something (since believing it is permissible). Furthermore, all these claims can aspire to truth—​though whether they are actually true is another matter. Thus Tony Blair’s rhetoric carries some fairly heavy philosophical baggage. The point of dismissing the allegation that Bush considered

taken place. Thus he claimed that the allegation was a conspiracy theory—​which I suppose it is, though the conspiracy in question was not put into effect—​and therefore that it should be dismissed even though he was well aware that it was true. But in that case he cannot have consistently supposed that conspiracy theories as such are unbelievable, the kind of thing that rationally ought not to be believed, since the conspiracy theory he was talking about was not only true but provable on the basis of documentary evidence. Thus he may have avoided a direct lie but only by implying belief in an epistemic principle which he knew, or could have known, to be false. Interestingly, Blair simply burkes the issue in his autobiography. There is no reference to the Mirror story summarizing the leaked memo, no mention of the accusation that his friend and ally was a man whose love of freedom was such that he was willing to murder people for daring to publish stories that he did not like, and no reference to the leaker (David Keogh) who was sent to jail for revealing what a monster Blair had been consorting with.

128 Pigden bombing al-​Jazeera as a “conspiracy theory” was to suggest that we are under some sort of intellectual obligation not to believe it. But we can’t be obliged not to believe conspiracy theories unless we have epistemic obligations. However, although the idea of epistemic duties may be common ground in the context of the current dispute, it is, in fact, highly debatable. The difficulty derives from the Ought-​Implies-​Can principle (which presumably applies to the ethics of belief) combined with the idea that belief is not a voluntary business. The claim is that we cannot decide what to believe or disbelieve. When faced with certain considerations we are either moved by the evidence or we are not. Decision and choice do not enter into it. Even with practice we cannot decide, like the White Queen in Alice,6 to believe six impossible things—​ or even six possible things—​before breakfast. And it is equally impossible to decide not to believe six things before breakfast, whether the things in question are possible or not. But if Bloggs cannot help believing that agents of the Bush family detonated the Twin Towers, then it is not only pointless but actually false to suggest that he ought to believe otherwise. For you can’t have an obligation to do what you cannot do and ex hyothesi, Bloggs in incapable of disbelieving that it was Bush family agents that did the deed. Thus the whole idea of an epistemic ethic is fundamentally cock-​eyed, since it presupposes (wrongly) that we can control our beliefs. This conclusion depends on two premises: Ought-​Implies-​Can and the idea that we cannot choose to believe. I am inclined to dispute them both. Ought-​ Implies-​Can is not a logical thesis but a plausible ethical principle that holds (with restrictions) in some systems of ethics but not in others.7 It is not clear that it is has to be incorporated into a plausible ethics of belief. And though we cannot bring ourselves to believe just anything it seems to me that within limits we can often decide where to place our epistemic bets. The same thing goes for the two kinds of disbelief (both not believing and believing that not). We can sometimes choose not to believe either by ceasing to believe in a proposition or by deciding to believe its negation. Those who think otherwise sometimes counter this suggestion by producing a random thesis and challenging you to believe it.8 When you can’t, they claim victory, and if you insist that you can, their tendency is to scoff. But just because we cannot always choose to believe, 6 Carrol, Lewis (1871) Alice Through the Looking-​Glass, ch. 5: Alice laughed. “There’s no use trying”, she said: “one can’t believe impossible things”. “I daresay you haven’t had much practice”, said the Queen. “When I was your age, I always did it for half-​an-​hour a day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast”. 7 See Pigden (1990) and Pigden (2010). 8 My colleague Alan Musgrave deploys this tactic in Musgrave (2010), p. 12.

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it does not follow that we can never choose to believe, and where choice is a possibility, “oughts” are not excluded. However, though my first instinct is to challenge the premises, there is a better way of countering the argument that an epistemic ethic is a non-​starter since we cannot choose to believe. For though we cannot always choose to believe, we can often choose which belief-​ forming strategy to adopt. This was Pascal’s response to the free-​thinking gamblers who agreed that it would be good idea to believe in God (since according to the Wager Argument, this would be the best bet), but who could not quite bring themselves to do so. Perhaps you cannot choose to believe in God, Pascal concedes, but you can choose to adopt a belief-​forming strategy which is likely to bring about the desired result. If you go to church, hear masses and generally lead the life of a religious believer, the chances are that belief will follow—​ you will “make yourself stupid”.9 Other belief-​forming strategies are less mind-​ numbing. For example, you can cultivate the habit of thinking up objections to claims that you would like to be true—​a strategy that will make you less likely to confuse wishes with facts (a vice to which philosophers and politicians are peculiarly prone). Thus the best way to save an epistemic ethic is to take the deontic operators as applying, in the first instance, to belief-​forming strategies rather than beliefs. What the conventional wisdom demands is not so much that we disbelieve this conspiracy theory or that, but that we adopt the intellectual habit of discounting, dismissing and disbelieving conspiracy theories generally (indeed of “dissing” them altogether). Rather than running around trying to evaluate the evidence, the sensible strategy when confronted with conspiracy theories is to shut our eyes to their intellectual charms. I advocate the alternative strategy, that of not dismissing conspiracy theories out of hand, simply because they are conspiracy theories, but of being prepared to investigate them and even to believe them if that is what the evidence indicates. Perhaps some conspiracy theories are too way out to be worthy of investigation, but this is not because they are conspiracy theories but because the specific conspiracies that they postulate are absurd or improbable. For conspiracy theories as such are no less worthy of belief than theories of other kinds. Thus the dispute is primarily a debate about which belief-​forming strategy to adopt rather than about which claims to believe. Hence we can discuss the question sensibly as in issue in the ethics of belief, even if we grant, what seems to me to be false, that we cannot choose to believe. For even if our beliefs are not directly under our control, our belief-​forming strategies often are.

9 Quoted and discussed in Mackie, J. L. (1981), pp. 200–​203.

130 Pigden But what is the status of these epistemic “oughts”? Are they categorical imperatives (Requirements of Reason) or hypothetical imperatives pointing out the means to achieve some widely shared but intellectually optional end, such as achieving an adequate understanding of the world? I incline to the latter view, though I suspect it would be a difficult business to specify the precise ends to which a respectable epistemic “ought” prescribes the means. But whatever the precise status of epistemic “oughts”, the claim that we rationally ought to adopt a belief-​forming strategy (such as not believing in or not enquiring into conspiracy theories), would appear to presuppose that the strategy in question is conducive to truth and the avoidance of error, at least under a wide range of circumstances. Thus the rationale for the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism is that it is more likely to get it right or less likely to get it wrong than its epistemic rivals. It rests on the presumption that conspiracy theories are unlikely to be true, in fact so unlikely that they are generally not worth discussing. Indeed, it requires something stronger than the simple assumption that conspiracy theories, as such, are unlikely to be true. The space of possible theories is large; the space of true theories, small. But it would be silly to conclude from this that we ought to abstain from theorizing to avoid the risk of error (the official position of the ancient Skeptics). The fact that theories in general are more likely to be false than true does not mean that we should give up theorizing or enquiring into theories. By the same token, the fact that conspiracy theories are more likely to be false than true does not entail that we should give up conspiracy theorizing or enquiring into conspiracy theories. For that to be a sensible strategy we would have to suppose that conspiracy theories are much more likely to be false than their non-​conspiratorial rivals. And since he seems to think that we ought not to believe or enquire into conspiracy theories, that is, presumably, the opinion of Tony Blair and the pundits of the conventional wisdom who appear to agree with him. 2

What Is a Conspiracy Theory?

So what is a conspiracy theory? In my book a conspiracy theory is simply a theory which posits a conspiracy—​that is a secret plan on the part of some group to influence events by partly secret means. The conspiracy does not have to be successful for the theory to count as a conspiracy theory nor do the plans of the conspirators have to stay secret. A conspiracy does not cease to be a conspiracy if it fails to achieve its objectives. Hence, a theory which postulates a conspiracy does not cease to be a conspiracy theory if the conspiracy that it postulates has failed to achieve its alleged objectives. If we

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explain some event as due, in part, to a conspiracy, we do not have to assume that the plotters conspired to bring about that very event since the best-​laid plans of mice and conspirators gang aft agley. The conspiracy to burglarize the Democratic Party offices in the Watergate Building was a conspiracy to burglarize the Democratic Party offices and get away with it, not a conspiracy to burglarize the Democratic Party offices and get caught. The idea was to help the President, not to bring about his downfall. The idea of the cover-​up was to conceal the White House’s complicity in the affair not to involve the President in a criminal conspiracy that would ultimately force him to resign just one jump ahead of a House vote for impeachment. Thus the cock-​up theory of history—​the idea that much of history is to be explained in terms of cock-​ ups of some kind—​is not incompatible with the thesis that some historical events are also due to conspiracies. If you are not trying to do something you can’t cock it up, and sometimes the schemes that historical actors manage to cock up have been planned and partly executed in secret. Failed conspiracies have had a major impact on history: witness not only Watergate but the disastrous attempt by the Communist old guard to halt or reverse Gorbachev’s reforms by kidnapping and coercing him, a conspiracy which led to the collapse of Communism, the very reverse of what the conspirators intended. Both Watergate and the Gorbachev kidnapping were cock-​ups on a truly epic scale but they were both also due to conspiracies. (See Pigden (1995/​2006a) where this point is argued at length.) Although a conspiracy theory requires a secret plan, the alleged plan does not have to stay secret for the theory to count as a conspiracy theory. Since a conspiracy does not cease to be a conspiracy if the secret plot subsequently becomes public, a conspiracy theory does not cease to be a conspiracy theory if what were once secret plans have ceased to be secret. When Brutus and Cassius plotted to murder Caesar, they did so in secret since a public plot would have been foiled. But once the deed was done, they gloried very publicly in the fulfillment of their hitherto secret plans: Brutus: Stoop, Romans, stoop, And let us bathe our hands in Caesar’s blood Up to the elbows, and besmear our swords: Then walk we forth, even to the market-​place, And, waving our red weapons o’er our heads, Let’s all cry ‘Peace, freedom and liberty!’10 10 Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, iii.i. Shakespeare is dramatizing real-​life events.

132 Pigden This rather gory piece of political theatre did not falsify the claim that Brutus, Cassius and their confederates had conspired to stab Caesar. Hence the theory that they had done so did not cease to be a conspiracy theory once it had been bloodily and publicly confirmed. Finally, a theory, in my book, is a more or less organized body of propositions designed to explain some alleged facts. Theories can be true or false, sensible or silly, and when they are sufficiently well-​confirmed, they can rise to the dignity of knowledge. Indeed in common parlance we can even talk about proving theories, though this is a usage that would shock true Popperians. Thus to call something a theory is not to suggest that it is tentative, speculative or unproven, (though many theories are, of course, tentative, speculative or unproven). Hence to say that a theory has been proven is not to suggest that it has ceased to be a theory. True theories and false theories, well-​confirmed theories and decisively refuted theories are all of them, nonetheless theories. So much for my definition, which (please note) does not, by itself entail that conspiracy theories either are or are not irrational. But once this definition is combined with some obvious facts, we arrive at some interesting conclusions. 3

If You are Not a Conspiracy Theorist, Then You Are an Idiot

If a conspiracy theory is simply a theory which posits a conspiracy, then every politically and historically literate person is a big-​time conspiracy theorist, since every such person subscribes to a vast range of conspiracy theories. That is, historically literate people believe organized bodies of propositions that explain alleged facts by positing conspiracies. For there are many facts which admit of no non-​conspiratorial explanation and many conspiracy theories that are sufficiently well-​established to qualify as knowledge. This affords us a deductive argument for the claim that it is not irrational to believe in some conspiracy theories, an argument that proceeds from premises that it is difficult to rationally deny:

Argument A a) A conspiracy theory is a theory which explains some event or events as due in part to a conspiracy, that is, to a secret plan to influence events by partly secret means. b) Every historically and politically literate person employs the strategy of sometimes believing (and sometimes being prepared to believe) conspiracy theories.

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c) It is not irrational to employ a belief-​forming strategy that every historically and politically literate person employs. Therefore d) It is not irrational to employ the strategy of sometimes believing (and sometimes being prepared to believe) conspiracy theories.

Premise a) is simply a neutral non-​question-​begging definition of a conspiracy theory—​that is, a definition that has not been carefully rigged so as to make conspiracy theories come out as irrational. I defer the defense of premise b) to §4, but it depends upon the fairly obvious fact that both history and the nightly news are choc-​a-​bloc with conspiracies, many of them proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Thus anyone who does not believe that history and the nightly news have been systematically faked, believes in a huge number of conspiracy theories and is, therefore, a big-​time conspiracy theorist. And if you do believe that history and the nightly news have been systematically faked, this presupposes a massive and malevolent conspiracy to deceive us all. Hence my proof that you, dear Reader, are conspiracy theorist, whether you realize it or not: Argument B Premise i: Unless you believe that the reports of history books and the nightly news are largely false, you are a conspiracy theorist (since history and the nightly news are choc-​a-​bloc-​with conspiracies). Premise ii: If you do believe that the reports of history books and the nightly news are largely false, you are a conspiracy theorist (since you presumably believe that somebody has conspired to fake them). Conclusion: You are a conspiracy theorist.11 The only people not impaled on the horns of this dilemma are idiots in the Greek sense of the word—​people who take so slight an interest in public affairs that they have no opinion as to whether history and the nightly news have been systematically falsified or not. Hence my subheading: if you are not a conspiracy theorist, then you are an idiot. Of course you can be a conspiracy theorist and still be an idiot in either the Greek or the modern senses of the word, but the only way to avoid being a conspiracy theorist of some kind is to wrap yourself in a such thick shroud of ignorance and insensibility, as to render yourself incapable of political thought or action. At any rate, my dilemma

11

See Coady (2007), p. 193, who is stating a bit more formally an argument that I develop in Pigden (2006b).

134 Pigden vindicates premise b) of Argument A. Every historically and politically literate person believes and is prepared to believe some conspiracy theories, since both history and the nightly news present many conspiracy theories as facts and others as reasonable hypotheses. You can’t be a politically or historically literate person unless you think that although history and the nightly news may have been distorted, they have not been systematically faked, that is, that they are reasonably reliable. So every historically and politically literate person believes that some of the conspiracies reported by history and the nightly news are real, and thus that the corresponding conspiracy theories are true. It is therefore a condition of being a politically and historically literate person that you accept some conspiracy theories. This vindicates Premise b) of Argument A, namely that every historically and politically literate person employs the strategy of sometimes believing (and sometimes being prepared to believe) conspiracy theories of some kind. What about Premise c)—​that it is not irrational to employ a belief-​forming strategy that every historically and politically literate person employs? It seems to me that this is difficult to deny. No doubt there are some strategies employed by many historically and politically literate people that are genuinely irrational. But though it is possible for a strategy employed by many historically and politically literate people to be irrational, it is surely absurd to suppose that a strategy that they all employ (and must employ to retain their titles to historical and political literacy) is an irrational strategy. Thus premises a), b) and c) deliver the conclusion d)—​that it is not irrational to employ the strategy of sometimes believing (and sometimes being prepared to believe) conspiracy theories. Let me stress again that Argument A is deductively valid. If the premises are true then the conclusion is true too. So if you reject the conclusion as false you must reject one of the premises. But b) and c) seem pretty safe. Given my definition of a conspiracy theory, history and the nightly news are both replete with conspiracy theories. Thus you can only avoid being a conspiracy theorist by either systematically disbelieving both history and the nightly news or by ignoring them altogether (and thereby lapsing into political idiocy). Neither of these is an option for the historically and politically literate person, hence all historically politically and literate people are conspiracy theorists. To suppose that c) is false is to suppose there are things which every historically and politically literate person does which no rational person ought to do, that is that every historically and politically literate person is irrational. I take a dim view of our intellectual elites, but even I don’t suppose that irrationality is as quite as ubiquitous as that! This means that the only premise that is at all problematic is premise a) which simply defines a conspiracy theory as a theory which

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posits a conspiracy. I have already argued for this definition in §2 and I shall defend it further in §§5 and 6. All I shall say now is that even those who employ “conspiracy theory” as a term of intellectual abuse often seem to be using this definition in practice. What is the criterion for a theory to count as a conspiracy theory according to politicians and polemicists such as Blair? Usually it is enough that it a theory that posits a conspiracy (though the pundits of the conventional wisdom tend only to apply the term to theories they find inconvenient). Thus we have a deductive argument from hard-​to-​deny premises to the conclusion that it is not irrational to adopt the strategy of sometimes believing in conspiracy theories. And this contradicts the conventional wisdom, which seems to suggest that it is. Indeed we can go further. There is a deductive argument from premises that are likewise difficult to deny to a much stronger conclusion, namely that the opposite strategy, suggested (though not consistently followed) by the pundits of the conventional wisdom—​the strategy of systematically doubting, disbelieving and refusing to investigate conspiracy theories simply because they are conspiracy theories—​is, itself, irrational.









Argument C a) Many conspiracy theories (as I have defined them) are not only true but importantly true (the kind of thing that the citizen of a democratic country needs to know about) [Premise to be established in §3.] b) The strategy of systematically doubting, disbelieving and refusing to investigate conspiracy theories simply because they are conspiracy theories would inhibit us from believing or investigating conspiracy theories. [Premise—​an obvious point that needs no argument.] c) Therefore the strategy of systematically doubting, disbelieving and refusing to investigate conspiracy theories simply because they are conspiracy theories would inhibit us from believing or investigating some theories that are not only true but importantly true. [From premises a) and b)] d) A belief-​forming strategy that would inhibit us from believing or investigating theories that are not only true but importantly true is irrational. [Premise: I take it that some such principle as this like this would be part of any plausible ethics of belief.] e) The belief-​forming strategy of systematically doubting, disbelieving and refusing to investigate conspiracy theories simply because they are conspiracy theories is irrational. [From c) and d) resting on premises a) b) and d).]

136 Pigden This argument too is deductively valid: if the premises are true the conclusion must be true too. But the only controversial premise is premise a). Hence if premise a) is true, it is not just rational, on occasion, to investigate and believe in conspiracy theories—​it is irrational to follow the opposite strategy, the strategy, recommended by the conventional wisdom, of systematically doubting, disbelieving and refusing to investigate theories which posit conspiracies. So is premise a) correct? Are there conspiracy theories that are not only true but importantly true? The answer is obviously yes. 4

History Is Not Bunk

It is difficult, if not impossible, to mount a coup without conspiring, a point that is evident to all. Hence anyone who believes there are such things as coups must subscribe to a set of conspiracy theories however vague. Although some assassinations are due to “lone gunmen”, many are group efforts, and the efforts of those groups are usually planned in secret. (Had the plans of Brutus and Cassius been public, Caesar could have avoided the Senate House or arrested the potential murderers before they struck.) Thus anyone who knows anything about the Ides of March or the assassinations of Arch-​Duke Franz Ferdinand or Tsar Alexander ii is bound to subscribe to a conspiracy theory, and hence to be a conspiracy theorist. But coups and assassinations are not even the half of it. Disappearances are usually conspiratorial affairs, since if you want to disappear someone, you had better not let them know when you are coming. Of course, it can add to the fun if you let your victims know, in a general way, that somebody is out to get them (and many goons indulge this pleasure with threatening phone calls and other such “warnings”), but if you are a member of a goon squad, it is a good idea to conceal your identity as well as your precise plans. And if you are organizing a campaign of disappearances, it as well to keep your activities secret. After all, picking up your political opponents and having them jailed, tortured or executed is generally regarded as not quite nice, particularly on the part of Presidents and Prime Ministers. And you can never be quite sure that some tedious do-​gooder from the International Criminal Court won’t catch up with you in the end. Much the same considerations apply if you plan to clean up the city by butchering the local street kids, a strategy that has been pursued in the past in Guatemala,12 Brazil13 and 12 13

See Amnesty International http://​www.amne​sty.org/​en/​libr​ary/​asset/​A MR34/​024/​1992/​ en/​51979​676-​edc2-​11dd-​a95b-​fd9a6​17f0​28f/​amr​3402​4199​2en.html. See Amnesty International http://​www.amne​sty.org/​en/​libr​ary/​asset/​ACT31/​002/​1992/​ en/​11451​09d-​ed9d-​11dd-​9ad7-​350fb​2522​bdb/​act​3100​2199​2en.pdf.

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Honduras.14 Indeed, mass killings generally are often planned and partly executed in secret, the Holocaust being the supreme example, though one might also cite Stalin’s purges. It is strange to suppose the massacre of millions of people could be not only planned but largely executed in secret, but that is the way it was. Hannah Arendt, a Jewish activist with a passionate interest in politics, and as well informed as private person was likely to be, did not hear about “Auschwitz” (by which, I presume she means the Nazi extermination program generally) until 1943, and did not regard it as a proven fact until six months later.15 If, like Chiang Kai-​shek in 1927,16 you want to massacre your erstwhile Communist allies with the aid of the local gangsters, then it is best not to publicize your plans. If, like the “Young Marshal”, Zhang Xueliang, in X’ian 1937,17 you plan to kidnap the Head of State with a view to coercing him into changing his policy, you had better not let him know in advance, and the operation had better be begun in secret to maximize the chance of success. Even at the everyday level of democratic politics, conspiracies are not uncommon. If my party leader is trailing in the polls and I am planning a leadership “spill”, I had best not let her know until I have a substantial number of mp s behind me. There is usually a good deal of secret plotting and furtive feeling out of potential supporters before a leadership challenge erupts into the open. In many countries it is not unknown for politicians and state officials to take bribes and misappropriate pubic funds. For obvious reasons, these activities are usually planned and executed in secret. Thus if you believe in such things you must be a conspiracy theorist of sorts, even if you are hazy about the details. Even in the small change of commercial life, conspiracies abound, a point acknowledged by Adam Smith, whose belief in the invisible hand of the market did not entail skepticism about the invisible hands of individual conspirators: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices”.18 “Masters too sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this [actual] rate. These are always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution”.19 But I need not belabor a point that I have argued at length elsewhere.20 History and the nightly news (not to mention 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

http://​www.hrea.org/​lists/​child-​rig​hts/​mar​kup/​msg00​138.html. See Hannah Arendt, “What Remains? The Language Remains” in Baehr ed. (2000), p. 13. See Fenby (2003), ch. 9. See Fenby (2003), pp. 1–​18. Smith (1981) An Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, p. 135. Ibid. 84. See Coady ed. (2006), pp. 17–​18, 34–​38, 157–​160 & 161–​162.

138 Pigden common sense) all tell the same tale—​people often conspire. Hence there is no reason to think that theories which postulate conspiracies are much more likely to be false than theories which explain the same events without the aid of conspiracies. Indeed there are many events for which there is no sane non-​ conspiratorial explanation. The Young Marshal’s men did not individually decide ­without prior consultation to kidnap Chiang that day at X’ian in 1937, and if Mary, Queen of Scots, did not conspire to murder Lord Darnley at Kirk o’ Fields in 1567, then somebody else did. This suggests three conclusions: i) If conspiracy theories are theories which posit conspiracies, then the epistemic principle that, conspiracy theories as such ought not to be believed or even investigated is absurd. It only makes sense on the assumption that conspiracy theories are much more likely to be false than their non-​ conspiratorial rivals and this assumption is false. The ploy of dismissing critical allegations as conspiracy theories is not intellectually respectable, whatever the conventional wisdom may say. If I manage to convince the learned and the semi-​learned worlds of this (not just academics, but journalists and the punditocracy) I shall not have lived in vain. For the idea that conspiracy theories as such are intellectually suspect helps conspirators, quite literally, to get away with murder (of which killing people in an unjust war is an instance). If George Bush did seriously propose the bombing of al-​Jazeera, then the former President of the United States is the kind of man who was prepared to murder journalists for putting out news stories that he happened to dislike. And if there is evidence of this, which apparently there is, then it ought to be investigated. An epistemic principle that can help shield a politician from such an investigation is not merely ridiculous (though it is, of course ridiculous)—​it’s a threat to the common weal. But important as this is, there are more interesting points to note. Brian Keeley (1999) contends that certain sorts of conspiracy theories ought not to be believed, not just because they are unlikely, but because to believe them would be to commit a sort of epistemic suicide. Following C. A. J. Coady, he argues that much of what we know, we know on the basis of testimony. If testimony is not largely reliable then we know virtually nothing. To suppose that testimony is largely unreliable is to suppose that we know virtually nothing, and this is something that we rationally ought not to believe. Keeley then goes on to claim that many conspiracy theories—​at least many that are castigated as such—​require such a large amount of lying by so many people that they call testimony itself into question. To believe them is to suppose that testimony is

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largely unreliable and this is something that we ought not to believe. Therefore there are many conspiracy theories that we ought not to believe and the conventional wisdom is not so silly after all. This argument has two premises—​a) the epistemic principle that we ought not to believe a thesis which requires such extensive lying as to call testimony into question, and b) the factual claim that many conspiracy theories require so much coordinated lying by so many people as to do precisely that. The first is dubious, the second false. But what I want to argue now is that the boot is on the other foot. There are better reasons of essentially the same kind for rejecting the epistemic principle that by and large we ought not believe or even investigate conspiracy theories. ii) History, as we know it, both from documentary evidence and the best historians, is choc-​a-​bloc with conspiracies. Thus if conspiracy theories are theories which posit conspiracies, then to accept the conventional wisdom and adopt the principle that we ought not believe or investigate conspiracy theories would lead to the conclusion that history is bunk, that much of what we thought we knew is not only unbelievable, but not worth investigating. Much of recorded history would dissolve into a blur of inexplicable events, indeed events we should not even try to explain. To adopt this principle would be to commit historical suicide or at least self-​mutilation, to make large chunks of history unbelievable and hence unknowable, since knowledge requires belief. It would maim, if not destroy, history as an intellectual discipline. But it is not rational to adopt an epistemic principle with such catastrophic consequences. Therefore it is not rational to suppose that we should not believe or even investigate conspiracy theories. Perhaps it is worth stressing just how catastrophic this principle would be, if consistently practiced. (In fact nobody does this—​rather people like Blair apply it in a haphazard way when it happens to suit their political purposes.) We would be entitled to believe that large quantities of gunpowder were discovered in the cellars of parliament in 1605, but not that Guy Fawkes and his confederates put it there, for that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that Lord Darnley died, but not that anybody killed him, since all the available explanations are conspiracy theories. We could accept that the “Rightist-​Trotskyite Bloc” was put on trial in 1938, but we could not allow ourselves to believe that they were either guilty or innocent, since both beliefs entail a conspiracy. (If they were guilty then there was a treasonable conspiracy of spies and wreckers at the heart of the Soviet State. If they were innocent,

140 Pigden there was a tyrannical conspiracy on the part of Stalin and others to fabricate the appearance of conspiracy.) We could notice that a lot of communists were massacred in China in 1927, but we could not rationally suppose that Chiang and his Green Gang associates had conspired to kill them, for that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that World War ii took place, but not that the Nazis conspired to wage it since that would be a conspiracy theory. (Good news for some of the Nuremburg defendants!) We could accept that the Holocaust occurred but not that anyone, Hitler included, conspired to bring it about. Moreover we would not even be allowed to investigate these questions, since any answer we came up with would be something we were not entitled to believe. If the conventional wisdom is correct, and we ought not to believe conspiracy theories, then history is bunk, since it is largely unbelievable, the kind of thing that we are rationally required not to believe. But history is not bunk—​much of it merits belief, and that includes the many conspiracy theories of which we have ample evidence. Thus the conventional wisdom is wrong and conspiracy theories need not be rejected simply because they are conspiracy theories.21 What about my third conclusion? This concerns political crimes and current events, the recent rather than the remote past. iii) Most political crimes—​from disappearances and illegal bombing campaigns down to breaking peaceniks’ noses or burglarizing the campaign headquarters of the opposition party22—​are the products of conspiracy. Thus if conspiracy theories are theories which posit conspiracies, then if we adopted the principle that we should not believe and should not investigate conspiracy theories, we could not hold anyone responsible 21

22

Here’s an exercise for the reader. Get a second-​hand copy of Fenby (2003) or Chang and Halliday, (2005). Then cut out all the references to actions planned and partly executed in secret. My guess is that you would have, in effect, a much shorter book, and that the parts which remained would be disjointed and unintelligible. That would be the history of 20th Century China without conspiracy. The Nixon administration was responsible for three of the above and probably connived at disappearances, at least in foreign parts (as Kissinger certainly did under Ford). But oddly enough, what brought the Nixon administration down was the Watergate Burglary and the ensuing cover-​up, perhaps the least heinous of its many political crimes. For the illegal bombing campaign (“anything that flies, anything that moves”), see Shawcross (1986). For beating up peaceniks and burglarizing the opposition headquarters see Summers (2000). On May 5th 1971, Nixon endorsed Haldeman’s suggestion that they organize some “thugs” from the Teamsters Union to “beat the shit out of these people [the peaceniks] .. and smash some noses”. Abbie Hoffman’s nose was duly smashed. See Summers (2000), pp. 356–​357.

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for such crimes. For to do so would be to accept some conspiracy theory or other. This would be an epistemic disaster, since our understanding of the political scene would dissolve in a mist of skepticism broken by islands of obvious fact. (We could believe in the dead bodies but not that anyone had conspired to kill them; believe in the missing money, but not in the felonious theft.) And it would a political disaster, since it would confer immunity on political criminals of all sorts, from the perpetrators of genocide down to bribe-​taking congressmen. (We could not punish people for crimes that we were not entitled to believe in or investigate.) Thus it would be both politically and epistemically irrational to adopt the strategy of not believing in and not investigating conspiracy theories. So the conventional wisdom is wrong, and it is not the case that we ought not to believe and ought not to investigate conspiracy theories. When it comes to conspiracy theories we are within our rights as rational beings not only to investigate them, but actually to believe in them, if that is what the evidence suggests. Again it is worth stressing just how catastrophic the strategy of conspiratorial skepticism would be if, instead of using it from time to time to time to rubbish allegations that we find inconvenient, we actually used it consistently. To begin with the political world would be largely unintelligible. We would be officially debarred from understanding coups, or the crimes of terrorists as intentional actions, since in both cases the intentions behind the overt acts are formulated in secret. Hence they cannot be understood as intentional acts without resorting to conspiracy. We could all acknowledge that the bombs had gone off but we could not suppose that someone had planted them, since that would be a conspiracy theory. We could accept that two planes had hit the Twin Towers but we could not allow ourselves to suppose they had been hijacked and deliberately crashed, since that could not have happened without a conspiracy. The nightly news would be bobbing with islands of unintelligibility, since we would be officially debarred from understanding any action involving secret plans. (I defy anyone to make sense of recent events in Iraq without taking account of the orgy of plotting that undoubtedly goes on. Death squads don’t advertise their plans, neither do guerillas, gangsters, terrorists or devious politicians.) We would be allowed to understand natural phenomena and open actions, openly arrived at. And we might even treat ourselves to unintended consequences provided these did not involve secret plotting. But we would be officially blind to covert actions and secret plans. This would not quite be epistemic suicide, since there are some events within the political sphere that we would be officially allowed to understand. But to adopt the strategy of conspiratorial

142 Pigden skepticism would be the epistemic equivalent of self-​mutilation, and hence, not a rational thing to do. Epistemically disastrous as conspiratorial skepticism would be, its political consequences would be catastrophic. For when it comes to conspiracy we would be both officially blind and officially incurious. Under this regime, Woodward and Bernstein would not have been allowed to investigate Watergate, and even if they had, nobody would have been rationally entitled to believe their results. Nixon would have gotten away with his crimes. For if conspiracy theories were taboo, there could be no question of impeaching the President for “high crimes and misdemeanors”, since most of those high crimes and misdemeanors were planned and executed in secret. The career of an investigative journalist like Seymour Hersh would stand condemned as one long exercise in irrationality since investigative journalism largely consists of investigating conspiracies and exposing them to the public gaze. If it is irrational to check out conspiracy theories, then the investigative part is a crime against reason, and if it is irrational to believe them, then the journalistic part is a crime against reason too, since it often consists in writing up conspiracy theories so as to encourage belief in the reader. The strategy of systematically disbelieving conspiracy theories would not just be bad for the democratic public—​it would also be bad for historical agents. According to Chang and Halliday, in the last phases of the Chinese civil war, two of Chiang’s leading generals, Hu Tsung-​nan and Wei “a Hundred Victories” Li-​huang, were in fact Communist agents who betrayed their troops to the enemy.23 Chiang made the mistake of trusting them (or at least of not distrusting them more than anyone else) but if the conspiracy skeptics were right, this would have been the correct thing to do since to believe in their treachery would have been to buy in to a conspiracy theory. (The alternative non-​conspiratorial theory would have been that their spectacular defeats were simply due to military incompetence, admittedly a common failing on the part Chiang’s generals.) Machiavelli advises his prince “not to be too concerned about conspiracies”, but this is not because conspiracies are non-​existent or even rare (on the contrary “experience demonstrates” that conspiracies are common) but because, if the prince is neither despised nor hated, they are unlikely to succeed. And of course the wise prince takes pains not be despised or hated.24 A prince who systematically discounted conspiracy theories would be naked to the schemes of his conspiratorial enemies. Henry v committed no

23 24

Chang and Halliday (2005), pp. 312–​323. Machiavelli (2005) The Prince, pp. 62–​65.

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epistemic crime when he believed the conspiracy theory suggested by the Earl of March, and foiled Lord Cambridge’s plans to murder him at Southampton in 1415.25 Indeed it would have been disastrous to have done otherwise. One of the biggest problems with human rights abuses is impunity. Because the goons and their masters can usually get away with murder or (or worse26) they have no compelling reason to cease and desist. But since most human rights abuses are the products of conspiracy, if we adopted the strategy of neither investigating nor believing conspiracy theories, impunity would become rationally sacrosanct. We could not investigate human rights abuses since, for the most part, this involves investigating conspiracy theories, and even if we could, we could not condemn their perpetrators, since to do that we would have to accept a conspiracy theory. Conspiratorial skepticism would provide the torturers and killers with a charter of impunity since it would become an epistemic no-​no to shine a light into the dark places where they commit their crimes. Terrorists too would be immune from investigation, let alone conviction, since their crimes are usually planned in secret. More generally, it is a platitude of liberal democracy that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. At least part of what this means is that we must beware of power-​hungry politicians conspiring to deprive us of our liberties. But if we were not allowed to investigate conspiracy theories then our vigilance would be confined to the public actions of politicians rather than their secret plans. We would have become officially blind to some of the most serious threats to liberty. And even if we somehow discovered such a conspiracy we would not be allowed to act on that discovery, since we could not act on a theory we had debarred ourselves from believing. According to Edmund Burke, “There is no safety for ­honest men except by believing all possible evil of evil men”.27 But if the conventional wisdom is correct, we should not believe in the evil of evil men unless that evil is out in the open! Thus if you hate the freedoms of a democratic society, you should cultivate the opinion that conspiracy theories are unbelievable. Conversely, if you want to strike a blow for liberty (or if you want to be able to see the threats to liberty in order to be capable of striking a blow for it) this is a thesis you that should reject.

25 26

27

See Shakespeare, Henry v, ii.ii and Mortimer (2010), p. 206. Shakespeare omits to mention that Henry was tipped off by the Earl of March, the principal beneficiary of the plot. For example, disappearing pregnant women and allowing them to give birth in prison before murdering them (sometimes by tossing them out of planes over the Atlantic) and then adopting out their children to childless members of the Security Services—​an Argentine specialty during the “Dirty War”. Burke (1992), p. 33.

144 Pigden 5

What Then Does the Conspiracy-​Skeptic Mean?

If I am right, the conventional wisdom on conspiracy theories is not just misguided, but utterly absurd. For it implies an epistemic principle that flies in the face of history and would be politically catastrophic if put into practice. It would blind us to the machinations of torturers and scheming politicians, and would convert a large part of the political realm into a chaos of incoherent effects whose causes were beyond the reach of rational enquiry. But my conclusions only follow given an important proviso—​that conspiracy theories are theories which posit conspiracies (which was why I was careful to put it into italics). This is the antecedent of theses i), ii) and iii) and a premise in Arguments A, B and C. But perhaps the pundits of the conventional wisdom mean something else by “conspiracy theory” when they dismiss such theories as irrational? If he aspires to pragmatic consistency Tony Blair had better mean something else. For at the very period when he was dismissing conspiracy theories as not worth refuting, the foreign policy of the United Kingdom was officially based on not one but three distinct conspiracy theories (in the sense outlined above) one true, and two false:

i) That the events of 9/​11 were due, in part, to a conspiracy on the part of al-​Qaeda (which was itself in league with the Taliban). ii) That the regime of Saddam Hussein was in cahoots with al-​Qaeda, making him in some sense an accessory to the events of 9/​11.28 iii) That the regime of Saddam Hussein had successfully conspired to evade the UN inspectors and had acquired (or retained) weapons of mass destruction and was perhaps on the way (via the acquisition of yellowcake from Niger) to gaining a nuclear capability, thus making the regime a clear and present danger both to the UK and the US.29

Thus it was presumably Blair’s opinion that these conspiracy theories were not just permissible but rationally required. Blair’s suggestion on the 18th of March, 28

29

The Prime Minister: […] Secondly, to my hon. Friend, yes, I do support what the President said [that Iraq has aided, trained and harboured terrorists, including operatives of al-​ Qaeda]. Do not be in any doubt at all—​Iraq has been supporting terrorist groups. Hansard 18/​3/​03. Prime Minister We are now just four days into this conflict. It is worth restating our central objectives. They are to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and to ensure that Iraq is disarmed of all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, but in achieving these objectives we have also embraced other considerations …, Hansard 24/​3/​05. This, of course presupposes that Saddam had weapons programs worth disarming and that they were sufficiently dangerous to make war a necessity.

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2003 that his “honorable friend”, the mp Lynne Richards should “not be in any doubt at all” that “Iraq ha[d]‌been supporting terrorist groups”30 suggests that she would have been making some kind of mistake had she thought otherwise. So what does he mean, and what do the pundits who agree with him mean, when they state or imply that conspiracy theories ought not to be believed? Not that theories that posit conspiracies ought not to be believed, since they themselves are prepared to posit theories of precisely this kind, for instance about the conspiratorial goings-​on of al-​Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Perhaps Blair can be restored to consistency, if we reinterpret “conspiracy theory” as a theory which posits a conspiracy, but also meets some other condition, X. One suggestion, current in the literature, is that a conspiracy theory is a theory which not only posits a conspiracy but also contradicts the official view, suggesting evil deeds by government officials or government agencies. The idea is that we are rationally required not to believe theories like that. It is all right to believe in conspiracies provided that they are consistent with received opinion, or provided that they don’t involve wrong-​doing by government officials. (Thus it was wrong to believe that the Gang of Four, were conspiring to persecute innocent Party members before they fell from power, but permissible to believe it afterwards once the Party line had changed. Luckily for China, Deng Xiaoping and his confederates sinned against reason by believing in the conspiracy before it became the official view and acted on that belief by taking steps to frustrate this unbelievable conspiracy!) Is this modified principle any better than its predecessor? Not much. It is true that one of the conspiracy theories on which British foreign policy relied comes out as believable according to the revised principle. We can believe without irrationality that the events of 9/​11 were due to a conspiracy on the part of al-​Qaeda, since al-​Qaeda is not a government agency, whilst the theory that al-​Qaeda did it, is in fact, the received view. But what about the other two theories? Here we hit a problem. The revised principle says that we should not believe conspiracy theories which contradict the official view and which posit evil deeds on the part of government personnel. But in Iraq the theory that Saddam was in cahoots with al-​Qaeda was both inconsistent with the official view (which proclaimed that Saddam was innocent) and posited evil deeds on the part of the Head of State (since Saddam professed hostility to non-​state terrorism). Thus in Iraq it was a conspiracy theory in the revised sense. Not so in Britain, because in Britain this theory was the official view and because 30

Hansard 18/​3/​03.

146 Pigden the theory itself had nothing much to say about the actions of the British Government (of which Saddam was not a member). Thus it was permissible to believe the theory in Britain but rationally wrong to believe it in Iraq. The same goes for the third conspiracy theory on which Blair’s policy rested—​that Saddam had successfully conspired to acquire wmd s. In London it was believable but in Baghdad it was not. An epistemic principle which forbids a theory in Baghdad but allows it in London leaves something to be desired, but at least it saves Blair from the threat of pragmatic inconsistency since, as a London resident, he was rationally entitled to believe the theories on which his foreign policy depended. Nevertheless the revised strategy would be an intellectual and political disaster if put into practice. Suppose we reinterpret “conspiracy theory” along the lines suggested. The conventional wisdom metamorphoses into the claim that we should not believe or investigate conspiracy theories involving evil plots by government agents if this contradicts official opinion. But this can be given a relativistic or an absolute reading: either that you should not believe theories which depict evil conspiracies involving your own government which are inconsistent with the official view in your own country, or that that you should not believe theories which depict evil conspiracies involving any government and which are inconsistent with the official opinion anywhere. On the relativistic reading, this principle permits some people to believe theories that it forbids to others, though those who are forbidden to believe may have better evidence for the theory than those who are allowed to accept it. For what it effectively means is that you are not allowed to believe in evil conspiracies perpetrated by associates of your own government but only in evil conspiracies perpetrated by other governments elsewhere. We must be local skeptics even though we are allowed to be international believers. If people all around you are being disappeared by Death Squads and you are tempted (despite the President’s denials) to suspect government complicity, the revised epistemic principle insists that you resist this temptation, even though people on the other side of the world, who don’t have access to your evidence, are quite at liberty to believe it! The strategy might not be historically disastrous, since you would be allowed to believe in conspiracy theories about the dark doings of previous governments, so long as they were consistent with the official view. But in many countries it would render current events unintelligible, since in many countries evil conspiracies on the part of government members dominate the political scene. (This is par for the course in authoritarian and totalitarian societies and is not unknown even in countries which approximate democracy.) And in rendering the populace politically blind the strategy would render them politically impotent.

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You can’t even begin to solve a problem if you have to shut your eyes to its existence. The absolute version of this strategy would be slightly less bizarre but even more catastrophic. It would be less bizarre since what is rational to believe would not vary from place to place. But it would be more catastrophic since it would debar us from believing in evil conspiracies on the part of governments anywhere, if those theories were inconsistent with some official view. Bad news for Amnesty International, bad news for their clients the world over as they are imprisoned, beaten, murdered and tortured, since you can’t write letters on behalf of people whose problems you are not allowed to believe in. But I need not spill any more ink denouncing a strategy that nobody seriously advocates. For the concept of a conspiracy theory as it is commonly employed is clearly a chauvinist construct. It is not to be understood in terms of governments generally, but in terms of Western governments, and recent Western governments at that. When people say or imply that conspiracy theories ought not to be believed, they don’t just mean that we should not believe theories that postulate conspiracies. Nor do they mean that we should not believe theories which run counter to some official view and which posit evil schemes on the part of some government or other. For they themselves are often eager to trumpet such theories. (Witness Blair and Bush, both officially conspiracy-​skeptics, who based, or claimed to base, their foreign policies on the three conspiracy theories listed above.) What they actually mean (in so far as they have a coherent idea) is that we should not believe theories which postulate evil schemes on the part of recent or contemporary Western governments (or government agencies) and which run counter to the current orthodoxy in the relevant Western countries. (This still allows a distressing degree of relativism. In Europe, as of 2005 or 2006, you could believe that American agents kidnapped terrorism suspects with a view to having them tortured in foreign parts, since that was consistent with received opinion, but in America it was wrong to do so, since the “torture” bit of this story was officially played down or denied.) Thus you can believe that Saddam had successfully conspired to acquire nuclear weapons since the chief conspirator in this particular drama was not a member of a Western government. And you can believe that members of the Reagan administration conspired to evade the Boland Amendment by selling arms to Iran to finance the Contras, since the existence of this conspiracy is currently consistent with official opinion. But you must not believe that Bush considered bombing al-​Jazeera (let alone that the earlier bombings of al-​Jazeera offices were intentional) for that theory involves evil schemes on the part of a recent Western leader and contradicts the official view, which is that this allegation is “outlandish” (bbc News 22/​11/​05). Thus we can restore

148 Pigden Bush and Blair to pragmatic consistency (along with their allies in the punditocracy) by giving a chauvinistic reading to the concept of a conspiracy theory. In effect, the strategy they suggest is that of not believing and not investigating theories which posit evil schemes on the part of Western governments or Western government agents and which contradict official opinion as it is currently understood. Their conspiracy theories are not like this. Is this a sensible belief-​forming strategy? Obviously not. An epistemic strategy should maximize the chances of truth and minimize the chances of error. But if this strategy had been pursued in the past, many politically important truths would never have come to light. A hypothesis counts as a conspiracy theory in this sense if it a) postulates evil schemes on the part of government members and b) is inconsistent with the official view (where the governments in question are Western governments). Thus there are many theories which are not conspiracy theories now, though they were conspiracy theories in the past: the theory that the Kennedy administration conspired to overthrow Diem, the theory that creep conspired to burglarize the Democratic headquarters in the Watergate building and that Nixon conspired to cover it up; the theory that Nixon conspired with the Mob to have peaceniks beaten up; the theory that Nixon and Kissinger conspired to overthrow Allende and connived at the subsequent murders and brutalities; the theory that members of the Reagan administration conspired to sell arms to Iran in order to fund the Contras; and the theory that suspected terrorists were kidnapped and tortured at the behest of the Bush administration31—​all these theories were once inconsistent with official opinion, though nowadays official opinion has managed to catch up with the facts (except perhaps in America where official opinion is still a bit iffy about “extraordinary rendition”, though it is widely accepted elsewhere). Thus it would have been an epistemic mistake to have adopted this strategy in the past. More importantly, it would have been a political mistake. If these activities had gone unnoticed, there would have been no check on the abuse of Presidential power, which would probably have gone on to worse excesses. The price of liberty is eternal vigilance. The revised strategy would have sent us to sleep. Thus the conventional wisdom has proved to be unwise. On any of the readings of “conspiracy theory” that I have been able to come up with, it is not the case that we should neither believe nor investigate conspiracy theories. If you 31

I trust nobody objects to this litany of American examples. It is just that I am well acquainted with recent American history (which is of peculiar importance to the world) but am less so with that of other countries. I suspect that similarly discreditable tales could be told about other Western democracies.

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wish to vindicate the conventional wisdom, you must do two things. First you must give interpretation of the term “conspiracy theory” with roughly the right extension. (Most of the theories castigated as conspiracy theories must qualify as such, and most of the conspiracy-​postulating theories that conspiracy skeptics believe in must not.) You must then show that on this interpretation, the strategy of neither investigating nor believing conspiracy theories makes epistemic sense. Until this is done, the idea that conspiracy theories as such are intellectually suspect is a superstition that can be safely dismissed. 6

Victory by Definition? the Case of David Aaronovitch

That is roughly where I left things in 2007 when I finished the first version of this paper. But since then, an apologist for the conventional wisdom has arisen who has managed to come up with a definition that does indeed make it irrational to believe in conspiracy theories—​at least as defined by him. But his definition has an unfortunate consequence. It turns out that many of his paradigm conspiracy theories are not really conspiracy theories in his sense of the term. In his recent book Voodoo Histories, David Aaronovitch, begins by admitting that “if a conspiracy is defined as two or more people getting together to plot an illegal, secret or immoral action then we can all agree that there are plenty of conspiracies”. And, of course, if a conspiracy theory is defined as theory which posits a conspiracy then “we can all agree” that plenty of conspiracies are true, and hence rationally believable. Since he does not care for this conclusion, Aaronovitch redefines the notion of a conspiracy theory. For him a “better definition of a conspiracy theory might be the attribution of deliberate agency to something that is more likely to be accidental or unintended … the attribution of secret action to one party that might more reasonably be explained as the less covert and less complicated action of another. So a conspiracy theory is the unnecessary assumption of conspiracy where other explanations are more plausible”.32 This definition is a little lacking in conceptual crispness, but, simplifying somewhat, it boils down to this: a conspiracy theory is a theory which explains some events as due to a conspiracy when it is not reasonable to suppose that they are really due to a conspiracy. In other words it as theory which employs a conspiracy to explain events which are best explained by non-​conspiratorial causes. Call a theory which posits a conspiracy a simple conspiracy 32

Aaronvitch (2011).

150 Pigden theory and a conspiracy theory in Aaronovitch’s sense an A1-​conspiracy theory. (The “A”, of course, stands for Aaronovitch: as for the “1”, we will get to it by and by.) Obviously all A1-​conspiracy theories are simple conspiracy theories but not all simple conspiracies are A1-​conspiracy theories. Aaronovitch himself admits as much when he concedes that ‘we can all agree that there are plenty of conspiracies’ and hence, presumably, that there are plenty of simple conspiracy theories that it is rational to believe. Thus it is sometimes rational to believe in simple conspiracy theories though it is never rational to believe in A1-​conspiracy theories. For Aaronovitch defines them (in part) as conspiracy theories that it is not rational to believe. But odd at it may seem, many of the conspiracy theories discussed in Aaronovitch’s book fail to comply with his own definition, a fact of which he seems to be oblivious. This is not because it is reasonable to believe them (since I agree with Aaronovitch that most of them are false), but because the events in question are best explained by rival conspiracies—​a point that Aaronovitch himself is at pains to prove. The reason it is irrational to believe these theories is not that the events that they explain were not caused by conspiracies—​the reason it is irrational to believe them is that the events that they explain were caused by different conspiracies. Thus we are not choosing between conspiracies and contingencies but between one conspiracy theory and another. But according to Aaronovitch’s slanted definition, a theory only counts as A1-​conspiracy theory if it explains some events as due to a conspiracy when they ought to be explained by non-​conspiratorial causes. But this entails that many of the theories that he discusses do not count as conspiracy theories in the sense that he defines. Consider, for example, the case of the Zinoviev Letter, which Aaronovitch discusses in the Introduction. This was a forged communication, allegedly from Grigori Zinoviev, whose publication in the Daily Mail supposedly scuppered the reelection of Ramsay McDonald’s Labour Government in 1924 by suggesting that the Labour Party was unduly close to the Bolsheviks. Here the fact to be explained is the publication of the Zinoviev Letter. There are two explanations, one false the other true. The false explanation is that the letter was forged by mi6 and leaked by high-​ranking intelligence officers who wanted to bring Labour down. The true explanation is that the Letter was concocted by a group of White Russian anti-​Communists operating out of Latvia, who wanted to sabotage the recent treaties between Britain and the young Soviet Union; that the Letter was passed on to mi6; and that it was leaked to the Daily Mail by junior intelligence officers who wanted to bring Labour down. Both theories explain the Letter as due in part to a conspiracy (one of them to two conspiracies) and both therefore are conspiracy theories in the simple sense of

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the term. The reason why it is not reasonable to accept the first theory is not because the Letter wrote itself or because it somehow leaked itself to the Daily Mail (which is what would have been required for there to be no conspiracy) but because it is reasonable to believe the alternative conspiracy theory which is based on the careful research of the historian Gill Bennett. Or consider the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, featured in Chapter 1. Here the fact to be explained is the publication of the Protocols. There are two explanations, one false the other true. The false explanation is that the Protocols were the genuine transcripts of a meeting of influential Jews, recording their wicked schemes to take over the world, transcripts which had somehow found their way into the public domain. The true explanation is that they were concocted by a group of Tsarist anti-​semites associated with the Okhrana, and that they were disseminated with a view to fostering antisemitic sentiment (in which endeavor they were a horrific success). Both theories explain the Protocols as due, in part, to a conspiracy and both are therefore conspiracy theories in the simple sense of the term. The reason why it is not reasonable to accept the first theory is not because the Protocols forged themselves (or because they were the products of a “lone forger”) but because it is reasonable to believe the alternative conspiracy theory that they were forged and disseminated by a bunch of anti-​semitic conspirators. Or consider the Moscow Show Trials and, in particular, the Trial of the Anti-​Soviet Trotskyite Center (aka the Trial of the Seventeen), starring Pyatakov and Radek as the chief defendants, which is the theme of Chapter 2. Here what needs to be explained is the trial itself and the abject confessions of the star defendants. Here again there are two explanations, one false and the other true. The false theory is that Radek and Pyatakov really were at the head of a massive conspiracy of spies, saboteurs and wreckers which had mercifully been detected by the vigilance of the nkvd. The true theory is that they were the victims of a massive conspiracy to frame and defame those Old Bolsheviks who might perhaps have posed a threat to Stalin, and that the false confessions were extracted by bullying, torture, threats and lying promises.33 The reason why it is not reasonable to accept the first theory is not because the defendants spontaneously decided to confess to non-​existent crimes, but because it is reasonable to believe the alternative conspiracy theory that they were the victims of a massive and murderous frame-​up. Of course, the conspiracy theory that really exercises Aaronovitch is the theory of the 9/​11 Truthers that the Twin Towers and wtc 7 fell as a result of controlled demolition perpetrated by 33

However we should not waste too much sympathy on the defendants, given Pyatakov’s role in the Trial of the Social Revolutionaries fifteen years earlier and Radek’s readiness, even when not under much pressure, to betray his former comrades such as Blyumkin.

152 Pigden persons unknown (but presumably associated with the US Government). Here what needs to be explained is the collapse of the buildings. And here again there are at least two explanations, one supposedly false and the other true. The false theory is that the Towers did not fall because they were hit by planes and that wtc 7 did not fall because of flaming office furnishings, but that all three fell because of explosive charges laid in advance and timed to go off after the planes hit. Truthers don’t necessarily deny that the planes were hijacked by a conspiracy of al-​Qaeda operatives, but they usually suggest that people associated with the Government connived at their schemes, allowing them to proceed unhindered. The true theory (in Aaronovitch’s opinion) is that the successful al-​Qaeda conspiracy to hijack the planes and crash them into the Towers suffices to explain the catastrophe. The reason why it is not reasonable to accept the first theory (if indeed it is not reasonable) is not because these massive buildings collapsed because of structural defects or because a bunch of bored passengers spontaneously decided to hijack the planes and ram them into Twin Towers for a suicidal lark, but because it is reasonable to believe the alternative conspiracy theory, namely that al-​Qaeda did it. Aaronovitch defines a conspiracy theory as a theory which explains some events as due to a conspiracy when it is not reasonable to suppose that they are really due to a conspiracy. But if we accept this definition, it follows that that none of the theories that I have listed should count as a conspiracy theory. For though the theories themselves may be false, there is good reason to suppose not that the events in question were due to non-​conspiratorial causes, but that they were actually caused by some other conspiracy. Here’s a logical parallel. Suppose you want to uphold the thesis that all Muslims are terrorists. Unfortunately if “Muslim” is defined in the ordinary way as a believer in Islam, then “we can all agree” that there are millions of Muslims who are not terrorists—​indeed, we must agree to this on pain of obvious falsehood. No worries. You simply redefine a “Muslim” as a believer in Islam who is also terrorist. This guarantees the truth of “All Muslims are terrorists” so long as “Muslim” is understood in this modified sense. However, in a sudden rush of blood to the head, you add to your definition a further clause which states that nobody counts as a Muslim unless he is also beardless. Thus to say that somebody is a Muslim according to this new definition is to say that he is a beardless terrorist who subscribes to Islam. But his means that many of your paradigms of Islamic terrorism such Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-​Zawahiri no longer qualify as Muslims according to your revised definition, since both sported spectacular beards. From a logical point of view Aaronovitch’s tactics are no better than this, though morally speaking, they are a lot less obnoxious.

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Now the reason I bang on about this not just to make fun of Aaronovitch’s logical shortcomings (after all, the poor fellow is only a leading columnist for The Times, so perhaps he can’t be expected to know any better) but because his examples raise a serious issue. The general drift of the conventional wisdom is to trash conspiracy theories as due to a defective style of thinking. People tend to get it wrong because they have an irrational tendency to posit conspiracies where there are no conspiracies. We then get a good deal of sneering, disguised as dispassionate diagnosis of why people are prone to this intellectual malaise. But if some conspiracy theories are rational and if the rational alternative to a false conspiracy is often not a no-​conspiracy theory but a true conspiracy theory, then this isn’t going to wash. People don’t just believe in conspiracy theories because they are prone to some syndrome of conspiracy-​thinking—​ they often believe them because the theories themselves are rational and even correct, and even when the theories are not, people may well believe in them because, for whatever reason, they have pitched upon the wrong conspiracy. The idea that there is an irrational syndrome which provides a general explanation of why people subscribe to conspiracy theories is a diagnosis in search of a disease, or, more properly, a shoddy ad hominem disguised as a diagnosis. Can we extricate Aaronovitch from the logical hole that he has managed to dig for himself? His project was to construct a definition to underwrite his evident belief that conspiracy theories are somehow irrational. The problem is that the definition he constructs excludes some of his own paradigms, implying that despite their obviously conspiratorial character, the theories in question aren’t conspiracy theories after all. Let’s fix the problem before evaluating the project. Instead of defining a conspiracy theory as “the unnecessary assumption of conspiracy where other explanations are more plausible” he should define it as “the unnecessary assumption of a particular conspiracy where other explanations—​including explanations involving conspiracies—​ are more plausible”. Thus a conspiracy theory becomes a theory which explains some events as due to a conspiracy when it is not reasonable to suppose that they are due to that conspiracy. Or in other words, a conspiracy theory is a simple conspiracy theory that it is irrational to believe. Call conspiracy theories in this sense A2 conspiracy theories, since we are modifying Aaronovitch’s original definition. Then we have what might be called the Aaronovitch thesis, namely that that it is irrational to believe A2 conspiracy theories, or in other words that it is irrational to believe conspiracy theories that it is irrational to believe. As Horatio said when confronted with a similar tautology, “There needs no ghost, my lord, come from the grave/​To tell us this”34—​nor for that 34 Shakespeare, Hamlet, i.iv.

154 Pigden matter a popular history book by Aaronovitch full of interesting examples that are slightly beside the point. To return to our parallel, it is as if somebody tried to uphold the claim that all Muslims are terrorists by redefining “Muslim” as a believer in Islam who is also terrorist, but this time without adding that dreadful faux pas about not having a beard. Does this definition provide any support the conventional wisdom that conspiracy theories are irrational and ought not to be believed? In one sense no, but in another sense yes. Let us distinguish between the cw or Conventional Wisdom thesis that it is (always or usually) irrational to believe conspiracy theories and the Aaronovitch thesis that it is irrational to believe A2 conspiracy theories, or in other words that it irrational to believe conspiracy theories that it is irrational to believe. Unless the cw thesis is to be interpreted as tautological, the first is contingent and the second analytic. Thus the first does not follow from the second, since you cannot derive contingencies from analytic truths. The point becomes clear once we realize that the Aaronovitch thesis is quite compatible with the negation of the cw thesis. Even the most paranoid conspiracy theorist—​the kind of person who wears a tin foil hat to prevent the evil Martians from messing with his brains—​can cheerfully accept that it is irrational to believe conspiracy theories that it is irrational believe whilst vehemently insisting that there are many conspiracy theories that it is rational to believe. Since the negation of the cw thesis is compatible with the Aaronovitch thesis, you can’t derive the one from the other. And since the Aaronovitch thesis is an empty tautology, it does not make the cw thesis the least bit more likely. You can’t derive the conclusion that a thesis is probable from a premise that is entirely analytic. Thus Aaronovitch’s definition provides no rational argument for the conventional wisdom. At least it can only do so if the cw thesis itself is converted into an empty tautology, in which “conspiracy theory” is defined as conspiracy theory that it is not rational to believe. Thus if the pundits of the conventional wisdom don’t want to be trumpeting a tautology they had best reject his definition. For it provides no support for any substantive claim. No rational support perhaps—​but this is not to say that it cannot be rhetorically useful. Suppose you are an aspiring pundit trying to make a name for yourself in the mainstream media by doing down inconvenient conspiracy theories. You can score a sequence of dialectical victories by using one definition to defend the conventional wisdom and another to attack your opponents. Suppose that you are defending the cw thesis that it is irrational to believe in conspiracy theories, and some tiresome pedant points out that that there are many conspiracy theories have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. You can cheerfully concede the point, helpfully explaining that by “conspiracy theory” you mean, inter alia, a theory that it is not rational to believe,

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and that, though the theories in question are eminently believable, in your book, at least, they don’t count as conspiracy theories. All you meant to say when defending the cw thesis was that it not rational to believe irrational conspiracy theories, and surely, friends, we can all agree on that? (Of course you had better not put it quite as bluntly as that or the subterfuge will be a bit too obvious.) Then, when that pedant has gone away, you can argue against the next conspiracy theorist that comes along, a) that since their theory posits a conspiracy it is therefore a conspiracy theory, and b) that since, by the cw thesis, it is irrational to believe in conspiracy theories, it follows that theirs is a theory that it is irrational to believe. The beauty of this procedure is that there is no need to discuss the merits of the theory. No need to address the evidence, no need to discuss delicate considerations of plausibility that might be embarrassing to the powers that be! The fact that it is a conspiracy theory suffices to damn it. Thus Aaronovitch’s definition tends to grease a fallacious slide from “X is a theory which posits a conspiracy” via “X is a conspiracy theory” to the conclusion that “X is irrational (and ought not to be investigated or believed)”. This is a style of argument that cannot be validated by adding an intervening premise that is both true and non-​tautologous. (And even if you did add the tautologous premise, it still wouldn’t be any help.) It lends aid and comfort to sophistical politicians such as Tony Blair, leaving theories that deserve to be investigated in a limbo of supposed irrationality. It may be that Aaronovitch would not mind about this since he is rather more tolerant of Tony Blair than I am inclined to be. But then, when it comes to detecting sophistries, whether his own or other peoples, Aaronovitch is not a man to be relied on.

Bibliography

Aaronovitch, David (2011) Voodoo Histories. Kindle edition. Vintage Digital. Baehr, Peter ed (2000) The Portable Hannah Arendt. Harmondsworth: Penguin. bbc News, Tuesday, 22 November (2005) http://​news.bbc.co.uk/​2/​hi/​uk_​n​ews/​polit​ ics/​4459​296.stm. Blair, Tony (2010) A Journey. London: Hutchinson. Burke, Edmund (1992) Further Reflections on the Revolution in France, edited by Ritchie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Carrol, Lewis (1871) Through the Looking-​Glass, and What Alice Found There, Adelaide etext version, http://​etext.libr​ary.adela​ide.edu.au/​c/​carrol​l_​l/​look​ing/​look​ing,html. Chang, Jung and Halliday, Jon (2005) Mao: the Unknown Story. London: Jonathan Cape. Coady, C.A.J (1994) Testimony, a Philosophical Study, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

156 Pigden Coady, David ed. (2006a) Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate. London: Ashgate. Coady, David ed. (2006b) “Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories”. In Coady (2006a), pp. 115–​128. Coady, David (2007) “Are Conspiracy Theories Irrational?” Episteme: A Journal of social Epistemology, 4;2, pp 193–​204. Fenby, Jonathan (2003) Generalissimo; Chiang Kai-​Shek and the China he Lost. London: Free Press. Husting, Ginna and Martin Orr (2007) “Dangerous Machinery: ‘Conspiracy Theorist’ as a Transpersonal Strategy of Exclusion”. Symbolic Interaction, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 127–​150. Keeley Brian L. (1999) “Of Conspiracy Theories”. The Journal of Philosophy, 96 (3): 109–​ 126, reprinted in Coady ed. (2006), pp. 45–​60. Machiavelli, Niccolo (2005) The Prince, translated by Bondanella. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mackie, J. L. (1981) The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 200–​203. Mortimer, Ian (2010) 1415: Henry V’s Year of Glory. London: Vintage. Musgrave, Alan (2010) Secualr Sermons. Dunedin: Otago University Press. Pigden, Charles (1990) “Ought-​Implies-​Can: Luther, Erasmus and R. M. Hare”, Sophia, vol. 29, no.1, pp. 2–​30. Pigden, Charles (1995) “Popper Revisited or What is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?” The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 25, no. 1. pp. 3–​34. Pigden, Charles (2006a) “Popper Revisited or What is Wrong With Conspiracy Theories?” ch. 3 of Coady, David ed. Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate. London: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 17–​47 (slightly revised version of Pigden (1995)). Pigden, Charles (2006b) “Complots of Mischief” ch. 12 of Coady, David ed. Conspiracy Theories: the Philosophical Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 139–​166. Pigden, Charles (2007) “Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom”. Episteme: A Journal of social Epistemology, 4;2, pp 193–​204. Pigden, Charles (2010) “On the Triviality of Hume’s Law: a Reply to Gerhard Schurz” in Pigden, Charles R ed. Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’. Houndmills: Palgrave, Macmillan, pp. 217–​238. Shawcross, William (1986) Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia. London: Hogarth Press. Smith, Adam (1981) An Inquiry into the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, vol. 1, edited by Campbell, Skinner and Todd. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Summers, Anthony (2000) The Arrogance of Power: the Secret World of Richard Nixon. London: Gollancz.

­c hapter 8

Conspiracy Theories, Contempt, and Affective Governmentality Ginna Husting When people ask me about my work, I often explain that I study media and conspiracy theories, and the ensuing conversation unfolds in a strikingly uniform way.1 Last week during an appointment, a dermatologist asked me about my academic specialty; I brought up conspiracy theories, and he immediately launched into a conversation about jfk. He asked if I had seen the 1992 jama articles reviewing the medical data on the assassination (I hadn’t), and told me about a conspiracy theory running through the medical profession, “which just goes to show,” he said, “that even really intelligent, educated people believe in these things!” He then launched into a kind of “test” to see which conspiracy theories I knew best. He said he hears them almost every day; most of his clients are “the real middle American public,” (I think he meant “the working class,” which accounts for most of his clientele), and he is stunned by the things they tell him. He even said he’s actually baited patients a couple of times—​just to see if he can construct a theory too extreme even for his most “paranoid” clients. He’s never yet succeeded, he said. We spent an extra 10 post-​biopsy minutes of his packed schedule talking about conspiracy theorists; his nurse fluttered behind him, unable to interrupt but anxious about the passing of time. One of the oddest and most predictable parts of this conversation is this: I wasn’t able to get him to understand what it is I study: people’s anxieties about conspiracy theorists, and the way the term carries a rhetorical punch, lumping any claimant into the category of wingnuts. When I told him that I’m interested in the rhetorical force and cultural politics of the phrase, he simply returned to his list of prominent theories. “Have you heard of the Bilderburger?” people will ask. “Or the new Strauss-​Kahn paranoia that the French are making up?” This story provides an apt entry point into my concern about conspiracy theories: that even “smart, educated people” find it hard to “go meta” and think about cultural uses of the phrase and the discourse of anxiety about 1 Reprinted by permission of Rowman and Littlefield, All Rights Reserved. Citation to original: Husting, Ginna (2018) “Governing with Feeling: Conspiracy Theories, Contempt, and Affective Governance” in Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously, Rowman and Littlefield.

© Ginna Husting, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_010

158 Husting the conspiracy theorists among us. Investment in the problem is so deep that interlocutors can very rarely bracket it for a moment and ask how a phrase like “conspiracy theorist” might be part of a cultural politics sculpting the limits of what we can reasonably say, think, feel, and know. To do this bracketing is not to suggest that Elvis lives, or that aliens shot jfk; it is however to suggest that each knowledge claim must be taken on its own terms and evaluated without binding it to a sloppy category of “kooky” conspiracy theories. Jack Bratich is right to point out the fuzziness of the phrase: its openness as a category “closely approximates that of the ‘terrorist’ (the whatever enemy)” (Bratich, 2008, p. 12). In this paper, then, I trouble some key analytical moves in the burgeoning field of conspiracy studies, and explore alternative approaches which link it to two strands of current social theorizing—​governmentality and the politics of affect. First, I go “meta” to ask how the production of knowledge about knowledge itself becomes a form of politics. Here I follow Bratich’s work on conspiracy theories as part of neoliberal governmentality, understanding public anxiety over conspiracy theories to be one instance of a set of “series of prevention strategies for dissent” (p. 12) in neoliberal political economies. Second, I show how a fuller analysis of conspiracy theory discourse requires developing the cultural politics of contempt, or the notion of affective governmentality (Ahmed, 2004b; Illouz, 2007; Ferguson, 2010). Here I sidestep the contentious “affective vs. emotional” politics debate (Barnett, 2008; Pain, 2009; Vrasti, 2011), taking a largely agnostic, post-​structuralist approach as I link conspiracy panics the political functions of emotion. I argue that current struggles over the use of the phrase conspiracy theory work in and through a politics of contempt. I use Arendt’s theorization of political action to argue that the emotionality of U.S. conspiracy panic discourse effectively polices the boundaries of what is sayable, knowable, thinkable, and perhaps “feelable,” from the unsayable/‌​‌unknowable/‌​‌unthinkable; from the patently ridiculous, pathological, and emotionally suspect. Such abject kinds of knowing place the knower out of bounds of reasonable politics, and for Arendt, violate the conditions on which political action must rest. The argument will have three parts; first an overview of current studies of conspiracy theories; second, an exploration of conspiracy panics as a form of emotionalized governmentality; and third, an exploration of the functions and effects of contempt in conspiracy panic discourse. 1

The Trouble with Conspiracy Studies: Asking One Set of Questions, Foreclosing Another

Since Richard Hofstadter (1964), a rich scholarship has grown on conspiracy theorizing. Husting and Orr (2007) show exponential growth in popular news

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coverage of the phrase “conspiracy theorist” over the past twenty years, with scholarly publications on conspiracy theories following just behind (Bratich, 2008). The scholarship of conspiracy theories is rich and cross-​disciplinary, ranging from political science and neuropsychology to cultural and literary studies.2 This new field tends to approach the study of conspiracy theories in three ways: classification, explanation, and risk assessment of their effects. Much of the work embraces at least two of these approaches. For example, Clarke (2002), Keeley (1999), Dentith 2014, and others in philosophy classify most conspiracy claims as a form of unwarranted knowledge claim that can be dismissed a priori (that is, without seriously listening to or considering the claim and claimant). Basham (2001) and Pigden (1995; 2007) contest this conclusion, arguing inter alia that no form of knowledge claim should be deemed “dismissable” before it is considered. By far the largest area of current work is the study of the hidden causes behind constructing, believing in, and circulating conspiracy theories. This dietrological work constitutes the dominant form of commentary among academics (Bratich, 2008) but also prevails among journalists and political bloggers. Such analyses ask why such theories are propagating now (usually citing the increase in media uses of the term over the past 20 years, and the first appearance of the term in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1997—​Knight (2002) as evidence of the rise of the problem). Answers range from the increasing deluge of digital information and the easy spread of rumor on the internet to increases in global governance and forms of capital which are confusing to everyday citizens. Finally, a whole swathe of this literature points to the characteristics of certain groups which are associated with “conspiracy thinking”—​in U.S. conspiracy discourse, these consist of people in the Middle East, citizens of nondemocratic, non-​Western nations, and communities of color in the United States. Some of this literature is racist and nationalist—​positing the tribal mind of the Arab other as one which cannot grasp how democracy works. But much of this literature, when not overtly racist, is patronizing—​ a form of “these people aren’t crazy, just ignorant and backward given their history of oppression,” (Goertzel, 1994; Simmons & Parsons, 2005). Some is not—​witness, for example, Kelman’s study of the reasonableness of African American stories framing the failure of the levee in New Orleans as intentional on the part of the Army Corps of Engineers (2009). His analysis demonstrates a history of intentional forms of sabotage from white government and corporate actors in taking, polluting, and weakening residential areas inhabited 2 While the field is already too wide to give a proper synopsis of it here, good summaries and critiques abound, not least among them papers in this volume.

160 Husting primarily by African Americans in Louisiana. Under such conditions, stories about the levee and flooding become not “crazy” but legitimate attempts to understand a confusing and difficult phenomenon. Done well, the dietrological approach to conspiracy theorization reveals some of more troubling aspects of globalized political economies and its inequalities. But because it tends to psychologize the subjects of its analysis, it misses the political work being done on a larger scale by increasing popular discourse about the rise of conspiracy theories. According to Jack Bratich the category of conspiracy theorists/​theories has emerged as a threat to liberal democracy in the United States and elsewhere. Following Satanic day cares (cite), rap music, and immigrants, conspiracy theories have now become the focus of moral concern, public indignation, academic and political analysis. Conspiracy theory discourse displays fetishized, certainly ritualized, disputes over what is and is not a conspiracy theory, what is or is not “delusional,” and why so many people seem to be swept up by them. Conspiracy theorists, for example, are pathological (“loony”), childlike (will believe anything—​Keller, 2011b), naïve, paranoid (Hofstadter, 1964). Simultaneously, though, conspiracy theorists are persuasive, and seem logical and coherent, which makes them dangerous to the rest of us—​we may be “taken in” by their seductive skepticism and magical thinking (Pipes, 1997). This narrative of conspiracy theories and their dangers is continually rearticulated in left, right, and center popular political discourse. The proliferation of anxious stories in popular culture over the dangers of conspiracy theories does certain kinds of political work. It calls into being a particular kind of other—​the conspiracy theorist, who believes in “Roswell” and the Kennedy conspiracies, but who all the same is often difficult to identify, since the theory itself looks reasonable on its surface. Ultimately, conspiracy discourse, like other moral panics, works toward reaffirming for an anxious public the value of political norms of openness, trust in democracy, faith in the transparency of government and corporate politics. Such boundary maintenance and social unification may be critically important in an age of staggeringly large-​scale organizations and inequities of access to power and resources. 2

Conspiracy Theories, Rationality’s Limits, and Governmentality

As Bratich points out, if conspiracy discourse is a moralized discourse, it is also exemplary of neoliberal governmentality. Central to Foucault’s work on modernity is the means by which subjects are governed. By government

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Foucault is famously not necessarily or primarily referring to the state; instead, governmentality’s referent hearkens back to older usages of “govern”—​as in guiding or governing one’s behavior, governing ones’ self or one’s child or a household (Foucault, 2010, p. 48). Unmoored from the state, governmentality is the “conduct of conduct,” or a form of “government from a distance,” in which knowledges, rationalities, procedures, beliefs, and “best” practices (from statistical analysis of a population to techniques for positive thinking) govern a population by creating subjects who govern themselves. Said differently, neoliberalism has particular practices, working definitions, and values that define rationality in particular ways, and link it to the practice of democracy and the activities of citizen/​subjects; “rationalities of rule are specific ways of thinking about how to govern at particular times and places. [They] are discursive; they propose strategies, suggest reforms, identify problems, recommend solutions and constitute a series of suppositions, instructions and assumptions which are encapsulated in discourses and knowledges that guide, advise and inform our ways of being in the world” (Campbell, 2010, p. 36). To understand any political culture, then, we want to look at how it defines truth versus falsehood, and reasonable versus unreasonable thought. We must look at how certain discourses, organizations, experts, and programs construct “fields of possibility” for what counts as fact, truth, reason, reasonable political thought, action, and speech. What particular notions/​practices govern the reasonable limits of (what is defined as) freedom in any particular moment? What Vrasti says for liberalism here goes for neoliberalism in particular; [It] is not limited to providing a simple guarantee of liberties (freedom of the market, of private property, of speech) that exist independently of governmental practice. Quite on the contrary: liberalism organizes the conditions under which individuals could and should exercise these liberties. In this sense freedom is not … the (negative) right of individuals to confront power, but the positive effect of governmental action. lemke, 2010, p. 35

Liberalism creates certain kinds of freedom (and not others) through which liberal subjects are constructed; they are in turn expected to manage their freedoms wisely and well. But as Lemke notes, “in the very same production of freedom, liberalism also endangers the freedom it constitutes. It is precisely the ‘free play of forces inside liberal forms of government that threatens these liberties and necessitates new interventions to ‘protect’ or ‘stabilize’ them”

162 Husting (Lemke, 2009, pp. 46–​47). One of the signal violations of a conspiracy theorist is that s/​he does not govern her reason well, something which requires the classification, monitoring, and analysis of conspiracy theories. If what counts as citizenship in a neoliberal political economy is bound up with the exercise of freedom (Bratich, 2008)—​freedom to, for example, decide in what consists the good life, or the rational exercise of deliberation in “the public sphere”—​then Foucault asks us to recognize the following as effects of neoliberal governmentality: citizens; the freedom they exercise in acting, questioning, thinking about politics; the limits of rational inquiry into the honesty of political and journalistic authorities, also into the fairness and transparency of political and economic power. Approached this way, conspiracy theory discourse in fact serves to construct, circulate, and enact a “well-​tempered” citizen in liberal politics who is vigilant but not obsessive about the state and its power. Thus much popular discourse on conspiracy theorizing attempts to gauge its distance from sane, reasonable discourse; a recent post about conspiracy theories in Democratic Underground, a prominent liberal online site spurred a long, heated debate about conspiracy theories, with finely detailed arguments and definitions. One can see the challenge in the following attempt to mediate among disputants: “[the previous [poster] provided one definition (or explanation) of ‘conspiracy theory’—​of course, it isn’t the only possible one. It is true both of conspiracy theories … —​and many conjectures that turn out to be true, that they are constructed from bits and pieces of evidence. That doesn’t mean that ct is indistinguishable from conjecture in general …” This post exemplifies the responsibilized citizen’s calculation and cautious measurement of the distance between reasonable skepticism and paranoia. This kind of work is ongoing; a simple search of the phrase “conspiracy theory” in the online community Democratic Underground, for example, returns 696,000 hits. While the significance of this may be difficult to gauge, the site itself has 172,000 members; moreover, conspiracy discourse has become so common that members now routinely joke-​worry about posts and comments being moved to the “conspiracy dungeon.” The dungeon is slang for removal of posts that violate a key rule on the website—​no conspiracy theorizing. The Dungeon was developed after a raft of conspiratorial conjecture over the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami: “Do not quote or link to ‘conspiracy theory’ websites, except in our September 11 forum, which is the only forum on Democratic Underground where we permit members to debate highly speculative conspiracy theories. A reasonable person should be able to identify a conspiracy theory website without much difficulty.” Conspiracy discourses like the ones quoted above both specify that conspiracy theories are “kooky” (in the words of Democratic Underground’s

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administrators), easy to identify in their fringeness, and persuasive and dangerous. Thus, conspiracy panics are governmentalized to the extent that they embody discourses (news, blogs, conversations, Congressional hearings, political advertisements) and practices (e.g. the U.S. State Department’s 2005–​ 2007 webpage on “How to Identify Misinformation,” posted during the Bush Administration) that sculpt the field of possibilities for freedom and the well-​tempered citizen. A whole host of popular political knowledges about pluralism, democracy, and actual forms of civil society structure the fields of ­possibility governing citizenship. The existence of a “well-​ordered” American civil society and political culture requires the self-​regulation or control of suspicion, to take care that it does not go ‘too far.’ An example comes from the case of Cynthia McKinney, an American politician, who was drubbed in the press for a statement she made to Congress but reread on Pacifica News one year after 9/​11. McKinney said: We know there were numerous warnings of the events to come on September 11 … Those engaged in unusual stock trades immediately before September 11 knew enough to make millions of dollars from United and American airlines, certain insurance and brokerage firms’ stocks. What did the Administration know, and when did it know it about the events of September 11? Who else knew and why did they not warn the innocent people of New York who were needlessly murdered? She became a conspiracy theorist célèbre in U.S. mainstream news almost immediately afterward; U.S. dailies and npr covered the story by reporting on reactions to the statements calling her disgusting, loony, and dangerous. The Washington Post, among a host of other newspapers, quoted Carlyle spokesperson (Eilperin, 2002) asking: “Did she say these things while standing on a grassy knoll in Roswell, New Mexico?” A prominent fellow democratic politician, Zell Miller, repeatedly called her “loony,” describing her as “dangerous and irresponsible.” Journalists widely repeated these descriptors, which point to the meanings circulating through the condensed symbol “conspiracy theorist” (McKinney, 2002. McKinney’s case is one to examine with care; she made no assertions, but she did ask suggestive questions in 2002, when such questions were “unaskable” in the United States. President Bush’s spokesman Scott McLellan attacked McKinney, saying “The American people know the facts, and they dismiss such ludicrous, baseless views. The fact that she questions the president’s legitimacy shows a partisan mind-​set beyond all reason” (Eilperin, 2002, p. A6). That he understood McKinney to be “beyond all reason”

164 Husting illuminates how species of knowledge are marked as senseless. Notice that McKinney made a particular claim (that there were warnings in advance about the attack), and asked two questions about timing and profit. She did not claim that the Bush Administration let it happen, although it can easily be read as within the implied scope of her question. But also within the scope of those questions was one that charged the Bush Administration with incompetence, and pointed to a larger problem with free speech. In her statement, McKinney (2002) asked “Authorities tell us that the world changed on September11. … Elected officials must censor themselves or be censured by the media. Citizens now report behavior of suspicious-​looking people to the police. Laws now exist that erode our civil liberties.” But not until 2006 would the mainstream press confirm that in fact, the Bush Administration had forewarnings of the imminent possibility of Al Qaeda attack. In 2006 the news broke in major ­mainstream U.S. papers that the cia had, prior to 9/​11, identified the threat, “consisting of communications, intercepts and other top-​secret intelligence showing the increasing likelihood that al-​Qaeda would soon attack the United States” (Draper, 2006). The cia had reported these both to Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld and to Secretary of State C. Rice, but was ignored (Draper, 2006). In 2002, making such claims and asking for independent inquiry was evidence of political distemper; McKinney became paranoid, beyond reason, and “dangerous.” Only when “lihop” and “mihop” (“Let it Happen on Purpose” and “Made it Happen on Purpose”-​two widely shared theories about the complicity of the Bush Administration in 9/​11) questions and claims in public culture had been securely identified as crazy—​in 2006—​did problems of information and communication surface in the mainstream press. This example illustrates that conspiracy panic is about the production and marking of “danger,” which Foucault posited not as something outside a liberal political economy, but something essential to the ongoing production of it; “liberalism nurtures danger, it subjects danger to an economic calculus … it must never fix security, since the striving of securing and the danger of insecurity are complementary aspects of liberal governmentality” (Lemke, 2009, p. 46). Instead of an absolute abjuration of that which is dangerous, then, governmentalized political culture has a sphere of reasonability, circumscribed by the boundaries of the well-​tempered citizen; “The apparatuses of security do not draw an absolute borderline between the permitted and the prohibited, but specify an optimal middle within a spectrum of variations” (Lemke, 2009, p. 47). The McKinney coverage reveals some of the boundaries constructed when we hear the phrase “conspiracy theory” or “theorist” invoked. The term works to separate those who think “rationally,” reasonable citizens/​thinkers, from paranoid, irrational, or delusional ones; and in fact this is the stated

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goal of those concerned with conspiracy discourse—​that conspiracy theories muddy the liberal public sphere with “dangerous” theories. Gary Webb’s case provides another striking example of the label in action. Webb, a journalist for the San Jose Mercury News, published a three-​part story on the link between the cia, Nicaraguan Contras, and cocaine transportation into California. Webb’s exposé, highly documented with primary sources, showed that CIA-​ backed Nicaraguan Contra fighters repeatedly used cia planes to transport cocaine into the United States. In the next year, Webb’s series was repeatedly vilified in the U.S. news as the story of a mentally unstable conspiracy theorist. Webb had done a large amount of painstaking research to substantiate his claims both of drug-​running (profits went back to Contras in Nicaragua) and awareness within the cia that this was happening (Webb, 1998). But in his story, through posing questions, he suggested that further links might exist, for which he did not have data. Webb led readers to these questions, but did not pose or answer them himself. Webb was flayed in the press; fired; and issued anonymous death threats because of his founded claims as well as for claims falsely attributed to him. For example, with regard to his meticulously supported claims, the New York Times castigated him as an unreasonable journalist (New York Times 1997): There was little hard evidence to support these claims. Even so, the series was suggestively titled ‘Dark Alliance: The Story Behind the Crack Explosion’… The series was reported by the paper’s investigative specialist, Gary Webb, who failed to include available evidence contradicting the assertion of C.I.A. complicity. In another of its 32 condemnatory stories on Webb, the New York Times reported gossip that the board of the Northern California chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists met and discussed stripping Gary Webb of his 1996 Journalist of the Year award; the article complained that “Mr. Webb’s series of news articles, Dark Alliance … continues to echo among journalists, nine months after the series was published … the series overstated its provocative findings and omitted important details … [a member said] “I think it’s clear that a lot of people came out feeling dispirited and troubled, …” You could hear a lot of people saying, “I know if I did something like Gary did, I’d be out the door.” pbs’ Front Line reported the story again several years ago with a piece entitled “Cocaine, Conspiracy Theories and the cia in Central America” (Golden, 1996). This story reiterated false claims; “In 1996 the agency was accused of being a crack dealer … Amongst Webb’s fundamental problems was his implication

166 Husting that the cia lit the crack cocaine fuse. It was conspiracy theory: a neat presentation of reality that simply didn’t jibe with real life. Webb later agreed in an interview that there is no hard evidence that the cia as an institution or any of its agent-​employees carried out or profited from drug trafficking” (Delaval, 2003). In fact, Webb never accused the cia of being anything like a “drug dealer.” Moreover, the cia itself had confirmed that drug-​running was happening with cia planes, and with the knowledge of some of the cia (Schou, 2006). His evidence was meticulous, and vindicated later (Schou, 2006; Fenster, 1999), but he was attacked precisely for not having evidence (see Golden 1996) and for creating conspiracy stories about drug running. The conspiracy panic around Webb worked not by evaluating, or disproving his evidence, but by derision. According to the dominant conspiracy discourse, Webb made preposterous claims (accused cia of being a drug dealer) and should have been immediately fired (“I’d be out the door.”). Moreover, news stories with titles such as the following attack his character as well as his story; “A Barracuda Tries to Eat the Messenger” (Barris, 1996), “The Web Gary Spun” (Shepard, 1997), “Arresting Talker” (Flynn, 196), “Credibility and America’s Fourth Estate” (Tampa Tribune, 1996), “An Imaginary Conspiracy” (Lane, 1996), “Conspiracism, Who’s at Fault for the Distrust?” (Parry and Parry, 1997), and “Dirty Hands and Finger of Guilt.” The reception of Webb’s exposé illuminates the problem of stepping outside the bounds of ‘reasonable’ skepticism of governmental and corporate agents. Questioning too much, as Gary Webb did in “Dark Alliance,” met with widespread public defamatory response, most of it centering on the supposed illogic of arguments and the paranoia or psychosis of the arguer. Even academics can fall into the trap of making strange claims while trying to cordon off conspiracism from “reasonable” thought. Vincent (2006, p. 45), for example, in a provocative essay on conspiracy theory writes; “those who resort to them identify in this way who does what and why they do it, for the strength of paranoiac thought lies in its perfect coherence: it does not leave any space for error, failure or ambiguity. Conspiracy theories give meaning to occurrences, to equivocal or dramatic situations. They are attempts to find a narrative for the contradictions and transformations that are animating the world. This is most certainly a way to make them more intelligible by making it possible to reduce the tension arising out of the pressure exerted by reality.” While this may be true, it is as true of what usually counts as “non-​paranoiac thought”—​decades of media research document the failure of journalists (let alone nonprofessionals) to allow for ambiguity, failure, or error (Hallin, 1986; Reeves and Campbell, 1994; Altheide, 2002; Gans, 2003; Zelizer and Allen, 2011; will not begin to scrape the surface of this literature). And this is precisely one of the uses of governmentality to understand conspiracy discourse;

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it helps us problematize the “unmarked” positions we take for granted as clear, appropriately skeptical, as part of the way that structures of thought are governed. But the next step in developing a theory of conspiracy panics and their political work is to recognize that conspiracy discourse functions not just on a cognitive register, but an affective one as well. It is to this problem that we now turn. 3

Governing with Feeling: Conspiracy Theory Discourse as Affective Cultural Politics

While the label “conspiracy theorist” ostensibly names a public voice characterized by unreason and inadequate standards of evidence ((Hofstadter, 1965; Pipes, 1997), it gains its force through emotional resonance rather than purely through a critique of someone’s logic, data, or ability to reason. While I remain agnostic on the debate over affect as biological, pre-​representational, or innate (causally prior to the cultural or social self—​Massumi, 2002; Clough, 2007; Thrift, 2007), I use affect as a synonym for emotion here because of the way that feelings catalyze us, throwing us into motion; they are forms of energy that entrain other feelings/​thoughts/​judgments. That is, without positing affect as somehow prior to or more essentially human than selfhood or sociality, we can maintain that “the accumulation of affective value shapes the surfaces of bodies and worlds” (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 124), configuring meaning and the realm of the permissible, appropriate forms of political action and talk. The affective register in Webb’s case exemplifies the political work of contempt. Few critics examined or double-​checked Webb’s sources (Schou, 2006); instead, mainstream journalists and governmental agencies damned him via psychopathology and scorn. Top U.S. newspapers repeatedly accused Webb of claiming that the cia set up a crack ring in Los Angeles in order to attack African Americans. In the same stories he was then lambasted for having no evidence to support the claim. Since Webb never made such a charge there is some irony in accusing a journalist of failure to provide evidence for a claim s/​he never made. This irony was compounded by Webb’s loss of his job, the failure of other major newspapers to hire him, and his eventual suicide. This last has particular relevance since prior to Dark Alliance Webb himself was a contemner of conspiracy; If we had met five years ago, you wouldn’t have found a more staunch defender of the newspaper industry than me … I was winning awards, getting raises, lecturing college classes, appearing on tv shows, and

168 Husting judging journalism contests. So how could I possibly agree with people like Noam Chomsky and Ben Bagdikian, who were claiming the system didn’t work, that it was steered by powerful special interests and corporations, and existed to protect the power elite? In Webb’s case, the phrase “conspiracy theorist” did more than challenge the soundness of evidence and reasoning through reasoned, evidence-​based inquiry. It circulated on an affective register, displaying contempt for his personhood (and stuck to him after repeated firings and frustrated job applications). The charge “conspiracy theorist” is in fact a form of what symbolic interactionists call “identity spoilage”—​talk or action that sullies and tarnishes the self as well as the specific content of the self’s action (Husting and Orr 2007). In public discourse, as Webb’s case shows, conspiracy theorists are often framed as untrustable and thereby dangerous, both because of their illogic and because of their excess of emotion. As a poster on Democratic Underground put it, “The conspiracy theories are as thick as locusts some days … and just as much of a plague. The attraction of a conspiracy theory is, who can prove it wrong? Which is another way of saying they contribute much heat and little light. Conspiracy theories appeal to emotions, not to facts and evidence.”3 Underlying much conspiracy panic is a quasi-​Cartesian fear of emotional excess overwhelming reason and creating socio-​pathological disorder and paranoia; to engage in conspiracy theorizing is to step out of the sphere of reason and logic, and enter the terrain of the emotional and the psychotic. Conspiracy panic discourse is itself a form of emotional and political engagement driven by contempt and laced with anger and fear. The affect running through conspiracy panic performs discursive work, degrading and dismissing both claims and claimants. It polices or manages the boundaries of reasonable political doubt, delineating a relatively uncorrupted democratic sphere in an age of increasing economic inequality and massive concentration of political and cultural power in the hands of corporate, governmental, and increasingly nongovernmental organizations (Sassen, 2006). A trend in the new work on affect and emotion is to think about the relation of both to place, culture, and political life; but only just now is governmentality being linked to emotion (Ohnuma, 2008; Campbell, 2010; Vrasti, 2011). Much of this work has either focused on “affect” in general (Chaput, 2010), or on specific forms of affect/​emotion, such as happiness (Ahmed, 2004b), shame (Ferguson, 3 Democratic Underground 2004 “Anyone notice that disruptors.” http://​www.democr​atic​unde​ rgro​und.com/​disc​uss/​dubo​ard.php?az=​show_​m​esg&forum=​104&topic​_​id=​2721​473&mesg​ _​id=​2721​473.

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2010), anger (Pain, 2009) and hatred (Kuntsman, 2010). Little work specifically examines contempt, and none of it links contempt with governmentality. Disgust has received far more attention (Nussbaum, 2004, 2010; Miller, 1997). Both Miller and Nussbaum focus on the destructiveness of disgust, noting that both disgust and contempt are bound up with the maintenance of social hierarchy in a culture. But while Miller proscribes disgust in the public sphere, he recuperates contempt as vital to the persistence of democracy in the face of rigid social hierarchies. In this he agrees with Bell (2005) and Mason (2003), who also attempt to normatively ground contempt as a justified, warranted, and useful emotion that can be used to resist oppression in interpersonal relationships. These scholars roughly agree on the nature of contempt; for all of them, contempt is an intertwining of affective and cognitive elements, roughly synonymous with derision, scorn, and judgment of another’s worthlessness. Bell (2005) has perhaps the most complete definition of contempt as a “negatively and comparatively regarding or attending to someone who has not fully lived up to an interpersonal standard that the person extending contempt thinks is important. This form of regard constitutes a psychological withdrawal from the object of contempt” (p. 84). Contempt means that the very existence of the other is in fact valueless or close thereto. These scholars share the understanding that contempt is both a fully social and extreme emotion that regulates the boundaries between acceptable and reprehensible, unforgivable actions. Contempt demeans not just one or several qualities about another, but constitutes a judgment tout court in which the other, as a whole and in every particular, is a failure (Miller, 1997; Mason, 2003). Contempt is constructed in and through relations and interaction; we have contempt for humans, and perhaps other animals, but it is an emotion reserved for the animate world. We do not hold in contempt a rock, or a living room. Even as contempt is a judgment of the other it debases the other, and is precisely only useful when it is witnessed interpersonally—​we do not hold a rock in contempt because a rock, or other rocks, cannot recognize their devaluation. In this way, and especially in popular and political culture, contempt is a performative emotion—​the expressing of it in public effects the movement of another to a status that is both beneath the contemner’s and unworthy of attention or recognition as fully human. Contempt, focused on selves rather than acts, creates an irreparable distance between the contemned and the contemner (Bell, 2005); it cuts off the contemned from community. When we perform contempt in public, we emotionally push people from the realm of belonging, toleration, and worthiness of interaction. They fall from the state of being recognized by us—​of being worthy even of attention or consideration.

170 Husting To earn contempt is to be marked as un-​reasonable, as unworthy of rational interaction. In that way to hold another in contempt is to hold his/​her humanness in abeyance, to radically decouple him/​her from what Hannah Arendt would call our life in common. Arendt is a good theorist for the emotional politics of conspiracy theory; her conceptualization of agonistic political action is not inhospitable to Foucauldian inflections (Honig, 1995; Allen, 2002; Braun, 2007; Blencowe, 2010). Political action and speech for Arendt are bound up with the performance or ongoing creation of the self and the world we have in common; political action is bound to performance and thereby to emotion. How does contempt work in such a politics? To answer this question we must recognize how Arendt theorizes political action. She resurrects ancient Greek conceptions of politics, defining political speech and action as that which makes us most fully human. We continuously recreate ourselves through the act of speaking and acting in concert (cooperatively or competitively) with others. For Arendt, much of identity is, as Bonnie Honig would say, constative—​given to us through our work and labor, with few parameters for variation, play, or experimentation (Arendt, 1998 [1958]). But as political selves we can continually become what we are not yet—​we are less bound to the requirements and ends of work, which determine and focus the “what” of us, our activity, thoughts, and behavior. For Arendt, then, a democratic political space is an agonistic one, where we can come together to argue, fight, agree, act and speak in common with one another. Under those conditions we do not know what we will say or do, or what others will say or do—​there is a spontaneity to political action. Through political action (which includes speech) we can create and perform new selves through interaction with others. Unlike Habermasian conceptions of a normatively prescribed public sphere, in which speech should be civil (Honig, 1995), Arendt’s analysis asserts that very little in the range of speech and action can be proscribed. A rowdy public (Husting, 1995) is what Arendt had in mind, where allowing for improvised action and interaction help us create the world and its meanings. Arendt distinguishes between this realm and the administrative, bureaucratic spaces of the state and political management, which is marked by conformity, rule-​boundedness, and simple management. In contrast, the sphere of concerted action in public is performative—​it is a theatre for the improvised selves which we call into being even as we take action and speak with others. Making possible this model of democratic political action are two qualities of life in public: natality and plurality. They are sine qua non for Arendtian agonistic democracy. Life in public happens through plurality, in which we are seen and heard by others in a context where we can, through action and

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speech, affect material and symbolic conditions (Arendt, 1998 [1958], p. 57). Life in public arises whenever people engage each other through the agonistic confrontation of identities, opinions, and differences. Indeed, for Arendt the only way we can think for ourselves is through encounters with others, which transforms opinion into thought. Arendt argues that thinking requires a form of “interior” plurality, in which we use the dialogic process of thinking from more than one perspective (our own) to examine our beliefs and actions. As Gordon writes (2002, p. 137), Even one’s own identity, not only in the sense of what one is, but also who one is, is contingent upon how others interpret one’s words and deeds. Arendt goes so far as to suggest that even ‘the great forces of intimate life—​the passions of the heart, the thought of the mind, the delights of the senses—​lead an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, as it were, into a shape to fit them for public appearance. Notice here that Arendt deliberately allows room in public life for passion, delight, and emotionality in general, and these are tied to becoming human. For Arendt being seen and heard by others is requisite both to construction of the world in common and of the self interwoven with it. But natality shows us most clearly the damage done when conspiracy discourse catapults selves from the ongoing process of world-​making in common. Natality, carrying as it does the resonances of birth and newness, is ourcapacity to continually re-​ construct and renegotiate our world in concert with others who are in political contest with us. Through my ability to talk or act in new ways I create who I am; I participate in what can only be a collective, if profoundly conflictual, process of crafting the world. Arendt writes that The human being who has lost his place in a community, his political status in the struggle of his time, and the legal personality which makes his actions and part of his destiny a consistent whole, is left with those qualities which usually can become articulate only in the sphere of private life and must remain unqualified, mere existence in all matters of public concern … mere existence. … arendt, 1951, p. 301

To permanently exclude others from this process is to enact a form of violence that in turn forecloses the spaces of democracy. It erodes the condition of plurality, or the inclusion of maximal differences in play in world-​making.

172 Husting We can now spell out the political functions of the label “conspiracy theorist/​theorizing” in relation to plurality and natality. Contempt runs through it, and contempt is a radical excision of the so-​labeled from the community of interlocutors who, even as they profoundly disagree with one another, must interact, recognize, and speak across difference. Contempt separates the contemned from the ability to be seen and heard; it end-​runs around any utterance or action another might make. Once the label “conspiracy theory” sticks to someone, it impugns their intellectual and moral competence and relieves hearers from the need to consider the validity of her or his claims. It robs the contemned of the capacity to re-​negotiate our world in concert with others. Webb’s and McKinney’s cases show this, but so do banal invocations of contempt via the phrase conspiracy theorist in mainstream news, the political blogosphere, and even in sports news. Democratic Underground, the liberal/​ democratic online site quoted earlier, is particularly interesting in this regard since conspiracy theorizing is a frequent topic both among posters and among commenters. The phrase, when it shows up in this site, often leads to lengthy and heated but sophisticated about the nature of conspiracy theories and the label as a form of dismissal. Once the phrase is invoked, it tends to provoke sustained argument between those who claim conspiracy theorists are irrational and emotional, and those who claim that the label is a slur that blurs the distinction between reasonable questions about possible conspiracies and absurd claims. Such discussions tend to produce definitions, clearly labeled axioms, analyses of logical fallacies, and lists of reasonable vs. unreasonable claims. The nature and detailed reasoning and argumentation in these discussions illuminates an anxiety over the nature of truth and how it can be distinguished from conspiracy theory. As Bratich points out, part of a governmentalized public sphere is continual reaffirmation of boundaries between what is rational and what is not. In one thread, for example, a commenter writes: “When I want to evaluate a theory, ‘conspiracy’ or otherwise, I look for the emotionalism employed in its service.”4 In another thread, a commenter interjects the following into a debate gone hostile; If we can stop arguing [about] the “real” definition (of conspiracy theory) for a second, stop arguing semantics and think more mathematically, let’s take two definitions: 1. A more strict definition that includes

4 Democratic Underground 2008 “Emotionalism.” http://​www.democr​atic​unde​rgro​und.com/​ disc​uss/​dubo​ard.php?az=​show_​m​esg&forum=​125&topic​_​id=​66024&mesg​_​id=​66243.

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only theorists who are espousing loony, unsubstantiated, and off-​the-​wall conspiracy theories 2. A looser definition that lumps careful, substance-​ oriented, rational theorists together with the loony ones. Definition (1) is a strict subset of definition (2).5 Thread titles often reflect the contempt, anger, and defensiveness: “The Troof is Out There;” “Fun with Tin Foil” “Paranoid Shift or By Their Fruits You Shall Know Them,” “Soylent Green is People,” and “Why You Conspiracy Theorist, You.” Ironically, perhaps, some of these, like “Paranoid Shift” or “Why You” were in fact created by posters who embrace the label “conspiracy theorist. But vitriol twines through the interactions on many of these posts. In an argument over 9/​11 and the Pentagon’s damage, one commenter indicates “I don’t know what happened …”6 In response, another commenter says: “And they were able to jigger up the crime scene in only a few minutes and so well that it fooled hundreds of investigators from other agencies?” and another enjoins: “right. You are being sophomorically stupid. And juvenile.” The affect running through conspiracy theory discourse suggests anything but a well-​tempered set of citizens; it is an ill-​tempered exchange, with animated emoticons smirking, derisively dancing, and vomiting in responses to others’ comments. This is by no means limited to the Left: since conspiracy theorizing comes from the fringe, Right and Centrist analyses also posit the problem as extremists at the crazy edges of the political spectrum (Bratich calls this “fusion paranoia” among those concerned with conspiracy theories). A case in point comes from Bill Keller, former New York Times ceo, who has built a reputation for attacking Julian Assange and Wikileaks (Keller was responsible for the Times’s failure to cover some of the Wikileaks, and attacked both Wikileaks and Assange repeatedly; Kurtz, 2011). Keller’s recent New York Times Magazine piece on Assange (2011a) seethes with contempt. Keller attacks Wikileaks both directly and indirectly as a “conspiracy theorist,” and the epithet is nested in a chain of signifiers through which affect circulates (Ahmed, 2004a). Assange is “eccentric,” “coy about his secret stash,” “manipulative and volatile,” disheveled, like a bag lady,” unwashed,” and “arrogant.” Descriptors become vivified through contempt, which binds them together, and links them to Assange’s

5 Democratic Underground 2009 Comment in “A Consideration of Anti-​Conspiracy Theorists “http://​www.democr​atic​unde​rgro​und.com/​disc​uss/​dubo​ard.php?az=​view_​all&addr​ess=​125​ x249​167#249​355. 6 Democratic Underground. “Conspiracy Theory Question.” http://​www.democr​atic​unde​rgro​ und.com/​disc​uss/​dubo​ard.php?az=​view_​all&addr​ess=​125x84​694.

174 Husting selfhood, rather than to discrete acts. Contempt transfers across circuits, from one kind of quality and personhood to another. It is through such usage that “conspiracy theorist” becomes a condensed assemblage of characteristics, through which contemptuous affect both circulates and intensifies the discourse. In Keller’s piece, Assange, who “smells like he hadn’t bathed in days,” endlessly spins “bombast and dark conspiracy theories,” and is childish: “he had a bit of Peter Pan in him. One night, when … walking down the street after dinner, Assange suddenly started skipping ahead of the group … Then, just as suddenly, Assange stopped …” Assange is “paranoid,” “imperious,” “derelict,” “crazy” and “boastful” (Keller, 2011a). One might point out that this set of descriptions, rich as it is, comes from one single story. However, its impact is disproportionately high for a single article, written as it was by the former chief executive of the most prestigious daily paper in the United States—​the “newspaper of record.” Its linkage makes visible a set of emotions and judgments tacit in the phrase “conspiracy theorist.” While of course not all of the emotions and descriptions Keller mobilizes are at play in each invocation of “conspiracy theorist,” Keller taps a whole range of non-​accidental meanings or “sticky associations” (Ahmed, 2004a)—​sticky in that they bind characteristics to one another in a chain of negative signification. Childishness is to homeless scrounger as unclean body is to paranoiac and pompous narcissist is to Wikileaks. The chain of associations is glued together by contempt, which jumps from one association or quality to the others. Conspiracy panics, then, like “conspiracy theories” (or that which is so labeled) are full of emotionality, and we can do more than simply say that e­ motions like contempt are tools with by which politics get done. Conspiracy theory discourse both mobilizes and is mobilized by a cultural politics of affect; it proliferates across micro-​discourses on and offline, in official and unofficial spaces, governing what we say and how we feel about what we say. Some of the best evidence for this is the rise of the disclaimer “I’m not a conspiracy theorist but …” which has become a regular feature in popular political culture (Husting and Orr, 2007); a Google search for it in 2011 returns about 182,000 hits. As with most disclaimers, this one functions to distance the utterer from a category that can spoil not just the intended claim, but the personhood of the claimant as well. In Mary Douglas’s terms, such categories are dirty, or ritually polluted. Disclaimers like “I’m not a conspiracy theorist, but …” function to inoculate or distance ourselves from that which can spoil our speech/​actions, but also our personhood. Once conferred, the identity permanently removes us from the possibility of political speech and action, and forms of human becoming/​self-​production. Fear of the accusation leads most

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of us come to govern our own thoughts and speech to ensure we are not so labeled. When we cannot avoid it, the result is shame, as Keller (2011b) illuminates in a recent anti-​conspiracy theory article; “[Mark] Fenster, a law professor and author of ‘Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture,’ says a sense of conspiracy is ‘almost an instinctive response to strange events.’ ‘I admit I was a little drawn to the D.S.K. [Dominique Strauss-​Kahn7] plot at first,’ Fenster told me. ‘Then I heard Nina Totenberg explain the case on npr, and I was ashamed of myself.’ ” Fenster exhibits what most of us experience: shame at the possibility of fitting into the category. The affective politics of conspiracy discourse is such that many of us—​good governmentalized subjects—​continually manage, reflect on, and monitor ourselves to ensure that we do not come to “fit the label.” Bratich (2008, p. 140) highlights precisely the encouragement of this governmentalized strategy by the State Department in its online site “How to Identify Misinformation; ‘it is important to note the state’s preferred orientation of detection techniques: of the people by the people. Peer-​to-​peer suspicion …’8 quickly identifies the dangerous theorist among us, but it also turns us into self-​managers as we evaluate how far our thoughts are from conspiracy theorizing, and as we try to avoid being shamefully stuck with the condensed assemblage of the label. Conspiracy panics fuse not just ‘reason and politics in a way that promotes the technology of citizen subjectification’ but ‘emotion’ as well. Both affect and ‘reason’ must become part of the ethos of the self, a work of the self on the self … [panics] are not just about making people reasonable, but making reason [and, we add, contempt] a people’s enterprise” (Bratich, 2008, p. 46). This emotionalized form of governmentality fits with recent work on the emotional construction of neoliberal economic selfhood and behavior. As Vrasti and Illouz elucidate, neoliberal political economy is the outcome of the long 20th century reconfiguration of subjects and lifeworlds by which emotional life is reconstructed through “the metaphors and rationality of economics” (Illouz, 2008, quoted in Vrasti, 2011). While conspiracy theory discourse does not directly work on the “entrepreneurial self,” we can expect that popular political culture would be recrafted slowly over the same period and through the same technologies, practices, and values that govern that self and its culture. These technologies replace solidarity-​based political action based with 7 Dominique Strauss-​Kahn was, in 2011, managing director of the International Monetary Fund; he was accused of sexually assaulting a housekeeper who entered his New York hotel. 8 http://​www.amer​ica.gov/​st/​pubs-​engl​ish/​2005/​July/​200​5072​7143​122a​tlah​tnev​el0.‌4629​833 .html).

176 Husting individualized, tightly managed skepticism that largely evaluates and corrects potential spinoffs into “crackpot” theories. 4

Conclusion

This paper has shown how conspiracy panics bring into being, sustain, and continually renew neoliberal politics through contestation across a proliferating series of micro-​contexts. Contests over conspiracy theories concern the well-​tempered reasonability and proper skepticism needed for citizens to govern themselves. Such contests, are part of a host of similar capillary forms of knowledge production about healthy and unhealthy styles of thought and critique. Together they are part of the practices and discourses that govern ­neoliberal political economies. The circulation of knowledge, argument, and emotion provides the boundaries needed to define an integrated population (an “us”). It also provides potential outsiders and resistance to the well-​tempered nature of the managed citizen; it creates boundary contests needed for the continuing process of responsibilized regulation of the self and the public. We regulate ourselves by regulating, judging, and contemning others, and keeping our own thoughts and styles of reason and emotion clear. Thus do endless disputes over reason, falsehood, and conspiracy theory become the networked sites of ongoing performance of a regime of truth and the maintenance of a neoliberal “consensus state” and global politics. Conclusions often aspire to, at the very least, hints and suggestions of what could be called a call for a different world, or form of scholarship. Here I will do something like both and neither. I suggest one potential avenue for further work on the emotional work of conspiracy panics, and one way of rethinking contempt by combining Arendt and Foucault. First, I want to suggest that the emotional registers on which conspiracy panics work have not been even close to exhausted in the preceding analysis. Hume is especially useful here in considering the multivalent affect ­produced by conspiracy theory discourse and expression. One aspect of contempt that modern analyses have overlooked, but which Hume recognized, is its self-​ reflexivity. Since, as we have established, relationality is sine qua non for contempt, we can consider the effects that labeling someone a conspiracy theorist has for the labeler. For Hume, contempt elevates the self in regard to its scorned object; it creates positive self-​feeling and evaluation simultaneously with its debasement of the other and all of the other’s characteristics. Conspiracy theory sets in motion positive as well as negative feelings; even as contempt cuts the other from the space of community or interaction, it

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elevates the contemning self, which also does the work of responsibilizing the well-​tempered citizen subject, and makes “feelable” his worthiness and the worthiness of the sphere expunged of “loonies.” The feeling of superiority, of well-​temperedness in contrast to “the loonies” (as in “YOU’RE A BUNCH OF USELESS BLOODY LOONIES!”9), moves inward, even as it can produce a host of other emotions including anger, shame, fear in the contemned. Conspiracy theory, then, sets into play cascades of emotionality, working on both the contemner and contemned. Theorizing such cascades of emotionality with regard to conspiracy theory discourse and related panics may be a productive line of inquiry. Second, this paper has argued that conspiracy theories work according not just to a dominant logic, but as part of something like a dominant structure of feeling in neoliberalism. I suspect that conspiracy theory is but one node of an increasingly important set of governmentalized emotions; contempt in particular is increasingly important to the current age across and within nation-​ states, global class formations, regimes of expertise, and political associations. But I will not assert, although I suspect, that contempt is problematic (if for no other reason than because it is so corrosive to forms of “counterknowledges”—​(Bratich, 2008). Given the “dynamic interplay between freedom, security & fear that Foucault sees as constitutive for liberalism” (Lemke, 2010, p. 33), I am wary of falling into the trap of what Lemke terms “the normative fixation on specifying criteria for legitimacy and consensus.” But Arendt’s formulation of political action now stands us in good stead, since it provides some ground for critiquing contempt as a cultural dominant while avoiding the pitfalls of a project that imagines freedom from or outside of power relations. Arendt’s notions of natality and plurality allow for space within neoliberalism for responsibilized citizens to resist forms of governmentalized emotionality like “caring,” (Vrasti, 2011), hate (Kuntsman, 2010), and the endless pursuit and measurement of happiness (Ahmed, 2004a). With natality and plurality it is not that we escape from power relations, or that fields of possible action, thought, and knowledge are not shaped and structured for and with us, but that we have room to act unpredictably, to suspend some of the rules of emotion/​rationality operating in governmentalized publics. Arendt, following Plato, argues that “Wherever you go, you will be a polis.” Our performances in those places where we speak and act with and against others may be the spaces of micro-​resistance; spaces where we slip sideways in the webbing of governmentality (while never getting “out”). As Vrasti points out, such forms of resistant reason and emotion can politicize 9 Democractic Underground 2009. Comment in thread “Soylent Green is Made out of People!”

178 Husting “everyday life through a skeptical attitude towards affective regimes and normalizing injunction” that interpellate us. Refusing the condensed assemblage of “conspiracy theory” contempt and fear may suggest one small way that counterknowledges and counterpublics allow for resistance; they “can serve as a preliminary/​preparatory stage for meaningful and effective collective action. To act and live in common we must first explore the subjective complicities that tie us to neoliberal capital and learn to go beyond them” (Vrasti, 2011).

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­c hapter 9

Machiavelli’s Conspiracy Games Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-​Ullmann I must say in general on this occasion that conspiracies and assassinations are not too common any longer in the world. Princes can rest easy on that score. These crimes have passed out of fashion, … frederick of prussia (1981 [1740], 121f.) in his Anti-​Machiavel

∵ 1

Some Strange Loops1

Trivially, not all games are a source of pleasure and fun, however, to discuss and analyze conspiracy in the form of a game might be considered as truly Machiavellian.2 In fact, in his Discorsi, Machiavelli dedicated a full chapter to the discussion of conspiracy. This does not seem to come as a surprise if we share the common, but rather questionable (and unjustified) view that ranks Machiavelli as master of cruelties and betrayals. However, the remarkable analytical and historical depth of his discussion might trigger second thoughts. In this paper, we will try to clarify some of the strategic relationships inherent to the subject of conspiracy, but also relevant for Machiavelli’s treatment of it. It mainly draws from the material of Chapter vi of Book iii of Machiavelli’s Discourses entitled “Of Conspiracies.” This chapter summarizes most of what can be found on conspiracies in The Prince and the History of Florence, although 1 This is an extended version of a paper published as “Manfred J. Holler, On Machiavelli’s Conspiracy Paradoxes, Homo Oeconomicus 28(4), 2011, 549–​569.” The selected material is reprinted with the permission of the publisher of the Journal, accedo Verlag, Munich. The authors also use material published in Holler (2007, 2009) and Holler and Klose-​Ullmann (2008). An earlier version has been published as “Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-​ Ullmann, Machiavelli’s Conspiracy Games Revisited, Munich Social Science Review, New Series, Volume 2/​2019, 33–​58.” 2 Shakespeare was perhaps the first who propagated this term to label malicious and insidious behavior to a wider audience. See Act iii, Scene 1, of his The Merry Wives of Windsor and Act iii, Scene ii, of his The Third Part of Henry the Sixth.

© Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-​U llmann, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_011

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Chapter xix of the former and the Eighth Book of the latter contain treasures. Some of the material will be quoted below. Machiavelli (Discourses 329) starts his lecture on conspiracy with a somewhat paradoxical observation: On the one hand, “history teaches us that many more princes have lost their lives and their states by conspiracies than by open war,” and, on the other hand, conspiracies, “though so often attempted, yet they so rarely attain the desired object.” The answer to this riddle is that conspiracies are ubiquitous but very often fail because preparation and execution were inadequate, the executors were incompetent or unlucky, and the situation was not what it was considered to be. Economists would call these failures a social waste. Machiavelli (Discourses 329) promises that he will treat the subject at length, and endeavor not to omit any point that may be useful to the one or the other … so that princes may learn to guard against such dangers, and that subjects may less rashly engage in them, and learn rather to live contentedly under such a government as Fate may have assigned to them. What is the goal of this project—​to reduce the social waste of unsuccessful conspiracies or to reduce the inclination of the people to revolt if they are unhappy with their prince? It seems that Machiavelli is especially concerned about those high-​ranking conspirators who “almost [themselves] king[s]‌… blinded by the ambition of dominion, they are equally blind in the conduct of the conspiracy, for if their villainy were directed by prudence, they could not possibly fail of success” (Discourses 333). It seems quite paradoxical that Machiavelli’s analysis sharpens the tools of both sides of the conspiracy game. Potential conspirators will learn when there is a chance of success and how to increase this chance. The princes are told how to reduce this chance. In the equilibrium we would see successful conspiracies only, triggered in situations that the princes could not avoid. The chance to face such situations can be minimized, and this might be Machiavelli’s message, if the prince is “loved by the people,” if he installs good laws and submits himself to these laws. Given this interpretation, however, it seems rather paradoxical to assume that Machiavelli was interested in the social waste of unsuccessful conspiracy and therefore tried to teach “economic rationality” to the agents of both sides, which he did. He developed a rational theory of conspiracy that follows the pattern of a cost-​benefit analysis—​with the qualification that expected benefits are likely to be zero, if benefits are standardized such that zero is

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the minimum, and costs “converge to infinity,” in case that the conspiracy is expected to fail. Of course, the value of infinity is ill defined. There is still another puzzle involved: “… conspiracies have generally been set on foot by the great, or the friends of the prince; and of these, as many have been prompted to it by an excess of benefits as by an excess of wrongs” (Discourses 333). Plots are generally organized by “great men of the state, or those on terms of familiar intercourse with the prince” (Discourses 332). There are strong arguments why only those agents can stage a successful conspiracy who are close to the prince, and why, as history shows, those who conspire enjoy generous benefits from this closeness. “A prince, then, who wishes to guard against conspiracies should fear those on whom he has heaped benefits quite as much, and even more, than those whom he has wronged; for the latter lack the convenient opportunities which the former have in abundance” (Discourses 333). It appears that princely benefits to close friends do not prevent conspiracies since this group of people can expect to achieve success. However, probabilities that capture expectations are not given, but subject to the interaction of the agents involved. To some extent the forming of expectations boils down to a game theoretical problem but, as we will see below, this does not guarantee that there is a satisfactory solution to it. Non-​uniqueness of equilibria is ubiquitous and a source of uncertainty even for rational agents. Moreover, the set of agents, those who participate in the conspiracy and those who counteract it, is often subject to the course of the game itself. Why did Machiavelli develop such a theory if not for demonstrating that the prince can avoid conspiracies if potential conspirators are rational enough to accept the benefits which a rational prince offers to them, given the risks involved? Was this another step towards his demystification of power and politics or did he want to demonstrate to the reader how skilled and capable he was in political reasoning?3 We will come back to this issue in the concluding Section 6 of this paper. Section 2 deals with Machiavelli’s treatment of strategies of the 3 Note, however, unlike the Il Principe, the Discorsi (that contains the chapter “Of Conspiracies”) is not dedicated to a prince but to two friends: Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai. Machiavelli is very explicit about this dedication and explains: “I give some proof of gratitude, although I may seem to have departed from the ordinary usage of writers, who generally dedicate their works to some prince; and, blinded by ambition or avarice, praise him for all the virtuous qualities he has not, instead of censuring him for his real vices, whilst I, to avoid this fault, do not address myself to such as are princes, but to those who by their infinite good qualities are worthy to be such; not to those who could load me with honors, rank, and wealth, but rather to those who have the desire to do so, but have not the power. For to judge rightly, men should esteem rather those who are, and not those who can be generous; and those who would know how to govern states, rather than those who have the right to govern, but lack the knowledge” (Discourses 91f). In 1522, Buondelmonti participated in

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conspirators while Section 3 contains advice to the prince on how to counteract the threat of conspiracies. In section 4, the conditions and effects of the staging of conspiracy as a means of the prince to gain power is analyzed. Section 5 presents a rather simple game theoretical model of the conspiracy problem and a corresponding analysis. It illustrates and analyzes the relationships between the conspirator and the prince and demonstrates the complexity of this relationship even in the very simplified setting of a 2-​by-​2 matrix game. This section is meant to be both an illustration and an experiment of Machiavellian thinking using a modern language: game theory. The message is: conspiracy is a problem of strategic thinking and game theory is its adequate language. Some readers may interpret the use of formal game theory as truly Machiavellian. Indeed we think that this “strange loop”4 may introduce some readers to game theory who so far succeeded to circumvent this method and thereby, and this is our contention, suffered non-​negligible losses. In any case this project of ours was meant to be a temptation, perhaps a trap, but not a cruelty. So let us start the game and think about the strategies of the conspirators, on the one hand, and the prince, on the other. Note that game theory defines strategies as “plans of action.” 2

The Conspirator’s Strategies

Machiavelli identifies three phases of danger for the conspirators that, if specified, constitute a complete strategy: the plotting, the execution of the plot, and the period after the plot was carried out. If the plot is formed by a single person, then, of course, the “first of the dangers” is avoided. In addition, the project can be postponed or put to rest without major costs or risks. This could be a great advantage when its success does not look very promising, especially if the situation has changed. Many such plots never leave the state of planning and rejection: They are secret and remain secret. Machiavelli notes that it is not uncommon to find men who form such projects (the mere purpose involving neither danger nor punishment), but few carry them into effect; and of those who do, very few or none escape being killed in the the conspiracy against the Medici which, however, failed. He fled to France and served King François i until he could return after the expulsion of the Medici in 1527. 4 This term was used by Hofstadter (1980) to characterize self-​referential systems. A “game of strategies,” like chess, is such a self-​referential system if player 1 assumes that player 2 thinks about what player 1 is thinking, and vice versa.

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execution of their designs, and therefore but few are willing to incur such certain death. Discourses 332

Since the conspirator is in general not able to structure the minutes immediately following the execution in a constructive way, single assassins are likely to lose their lives even when they succeed in killing the tyrant. One-​person plots are somewhat degenerated cases of conspiracies. They lack the elements of communication, coordination and trust that characterize non-​degenerate cases and often cause them to fail. However, as Machiavelli demonstrates, successful multi-​person conspiracies are designed such that they simulate one-​person plots. The one-​person plot is therefore a model case. But only plots that involve a number of persons necessitate a conspiracy proper and imply problems of coordination and perhaps communication as well. Machiavelli distinguishes between two arrangements of conspiracy proper: the two-​person plot and the multi-​person plot. The two-​person plot has the disadvantage that possible actions are constrained by numerical capacity and shortage of means. However, compared to a plot that involves more than two persons, it offers a series of advantages. If there are more than two persons involved then, according to Machiavelli, most successful strategies either reduce the situation to a two-​person plot or, if possible, even to a one-​person plot. Indeed, in casesof more than one agent, most conspiracies fail because of denunciation and not because of lack of means or occasions. Machiavelli states: Denunciation is the consequence of treachery or of want of prudence on the part of those to whom you confide your designs; and treachery is so common that you cannot safely impart your project to any but such of your most trusted friends as are willing to risk their lives for your sake, or to such other malcontents as are equally desirous of the prince’s ruin. However, men are very apt to deceive themselves as to the degree of attachment and devotion which others have for them, and there are no means of ascertaining this except by actual experience; but experience in such matters is of the utmost danger. And even if you should have tested the fidelity of your friends on other occasions of danger, yet you cannot conclude from that that they will be equally true to you on an occasion that presents infinitely greater dangers than any other. Discourses 334

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In other words, there is no adequate test for co-​conspirators; the only test is the conspiracy itself. But is this a test? Alternatively, a potential conspirator could collect information, but, of course, the willingness and competence of others who conspire is limited and information is lacking or likely to be biased. Indirect or flawedevidence can be deceptive and change the situation to the disadvantage of the conspirator. As Machiavelli observed: “If you attempt to measure a man’s good faith by the discontent which he manifests towards the prince, you will be easily deceived, for by the very fact of communicating to him your designs, you give him the means of putting an end to his discontent” by passing on valuable information to the prince and thus improving his or her lot. “It is thus that so many conspiracies have been revealed and crushed in their incipient stage; so that it may be regarded almost as a miracle when so important a secret is preserved by a number of conspirators for any length of time” (Discourses 334). Machiavelli is even more explicit about the dilemma of trust and the problem of betrayal in his Il Principe: … for he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take any associates except such as he believes to be malcontents; and so soon as you divulge your plans to a malcontent, you furnish him the means wherewith to ­procure satisfaction. For by denouncing it he may hope to derive great advantages for himself, seeing that such a course will insure him those advantages, whilst the other is full of doubts and dangers. He must indeed be a very rare friend of yours, or an inveterate enemy of the prince, to observe good faith and not to betray you. Prince 61

However, conspiracy might fail by sheer imprudence. Needless to say that disclosure from a lack of prudence increases with the number of conspirators involved and with the time of preparation that elapses. Machiavelli reports the following incidence: The day before he was to have killed Nero, Scevinus, one of the conspirators, made his testament; he ordered his freedman Melichius to sharpen an old, rusty poniard, enfranchised all his slaves and distributed money amongst them, and had bandages made for tying up wounds. Melichius surmised from these various acts what was going on, and denounced it to Nero. Scevinus was arrested, and with him Natales, another conspirator, with whom he had been seen to converse secretly for a length of time. As their depositions respecting that conversation did not agree, they were

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forced to confess the truth, and thus the conspiracy was discovered to the ruin of all that were implicated. Discourses 335

Of course, Scevinus’ preparations were of utmost imprudence, however, if Natales, the second conspirator, had not been identified, Scevinus could still have made up a story and finding out the truth would have been impossible. In fact, it was in Scevinus’ interest to make up a story which explained his preparations conclusively without any reference to a conspiracy. Competent conspirators should prepare an alternative story and such a story can be powerful as the conspiracy against Hieronymus, King of Syracuse, demonstrates: Theodorus, one of the conspirators, having been arrested, concealed with the utmost firmness the names of the other conspirators, and charged the matter upon the friends of the king; and, on the other hand, all the other conspirators had such confidence in the courage of Theodorus, that not one of them left Syracuse, or betrayed the least sign of fear. Discourses 335; with reference to Titus Livius

Applying the theory of rational decision making or, more specifically, game theoretical reasoning could reveal to us that for Theodorus it does not take much courage for his strategy chosen but rather requires the insight that if he confesses or names a conspirator who knows about the plot, the book will be thrown at him. (Those books can be very painful.) As long as none of the other conspirators was identified the situation had the structure of a one-​man plot in its planning stage—​and if the conspirator is lucky the prince will not be serious about the project, perhaps even qualify the conspirator as victim of madness. It is a most promising strategy to keep a multi-​person conspiracy in this stage until its execution. Therefore, a multi-​ person conspiracy necessitates immediate action that leaves no loophole for free-​riding or even betrayal. Machiavelli illustrates the implementation of such a policy by the example of Nelematus, who, unable to bear the tyranny of Aristotimus, tyrant of Epirus, assembled in his house a number of friends and relatives, and urged them to liberate their country from the yoke of the tyrant. Some of them asked for time to consider the matter, whereupon Nelematus made his slaves close the door of his house, and then said to those he had called together, ‘You must either go now and carry this plot into execution, or I shall hand you all over as prisoners to Aristotimus.’ Moved by these words, they took the

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oath demanded of them, and immediately went and carried the plot of Nelematus successfully into execution. Discourses 336

The example demonstrates that Nelematus did not only rely on the speed of execution but also on the double-​binding power of treachery. Those who can betray can also be betrayed. Often it is only a question who is the first mover; Nelematus grabbed the first-​mover advantage. However, if possible, a conspirator should confide his secret project to one person only even when it involves a larger number of conspirators. One person, whose fidelity he has thoroughly tested for a long time, and who is animated by the same desire as himself … is much more easily found than many … and then, even if he were to attempt to betray you, there is some chance of your being able to defend yourself, which you cannot when there are many conspirators. Discourses 337

With one partner only and no written word there is still a chance to go free, when accused for conspiracy. Machiavelli observes … that you may talk freely with one man about everything, for unless you have committed yourself in writing the ‘yes’ of one man is worth as much as the ‘no’ of another; and therefore one should guard most carefully against writing, as against a dangerous rock, for nothing will convict you quicker than your own handwriting.” Discourses 337

A handwritten message can transgress the bounds of a private communication between two persons and make it public. What could have been merely one man’s word against another’s becomes a potential threat when it is written down. But handwritten notes can also be a means to bind the fellow conspirators in the case of multi-​person conspiracy. Alternatively, an illegal action, like jointly robbing a state treasure, could be a binding pre-​commitment for a conspiracy and avoiding betrayal.5

5 Bolle and Breitmoser (2009) give a game theoretical analysis of such self-​binding mechanisms that may even transform a victim of kidnapping into a “partner in crime” of the kidnappers.

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In summary, Machiavelli identifies two risks: in communicating a plot to any one individual: the first, lest he should denounce you voluntarily; the second, lest he should denounce you, being himself arrested on suspicion, or from some indications, and being convicted and forced to it by the torture. But there are means of escaping both these dangers: the first, by denial and by alleging personal hatred to have prompted the accusation; and the other, by denying the charge, and alleging that your accuser was constrained by the force of torture to tell lies. But the most prudent course is not to communicate the plot to any one, and to act in accordance with the above-​cited examples; and if you cannot avoid drawing someone into your confidence, then to let it be not more than one, for in that case the danger is much less than if you confide in many. Discourses 338

3

The Counter-​Plot of the Prince

There are numerous examples of the glory and the pomp of the prince as well as his royal or divine position and reputation stopping conspirators from putting their daggers in his breast. Sometimes the kindness or the beauty of the prince also prevents a successful execution of the plot.6 However, history shows that this pattern, appealing to sheer properties of personality and position, does not always work and the prince is well-​advised to develop an ex-​ante strategy. In Machiavelli’s writings, we find substantial material that could help the prince discourage conspirators if he feels that glory, pomp, reputation, and divinity may not be sufficient to protect his life and position. Of course, thinking about on-​the-​spot solutions, the corresponding strategies of the prince to counter a plot are generally defined by the action the conspirators take. Typically, conspiracy is a sequential game that sees the prince as a second mover when it comes to the execution. Often, however, conspiracies are triggered off by the prince himself and, in fact, he is the first mover in this game. Of course, poor policy could invite conspiracy, but sometimes the princely invitation to plot is even more specific. 6 Giovan Battista, the designated murderer of Lorenzo de’ Medici in what became the conspiracy of the Pazzi, “was filled with admiration for Lorenzo, having found him to all appearances quite a different man from what had been presented to him; and he judged him to be gentle and wise” (History: 372).

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In the extreme, a conspiracy can begin when the tyrant threatens to take away the fortune or the life of persons close to him. The deadly plot against Emperor Commodus, reported in the Discourses (339), illustrates the second case: He … had amongst his nearest friends and intimates Letus and Electus, two captains of the Prætorian soldiers; he also had Marcia as his favorite concubine. As these three had on several occasions reproved him for the excesses with which he had stained his own dignity and that of the Empire, he resolved to have them killed, and wrote a list of the names of Marcia, Letus, and Electus, and of some other persons, whom he wanted killed the following night. Having placed this list under his pillow, he went to the bath; a favorite child of his, who was playing in the chamber and on the bed, found this list, and on going out with it in his hand was met by Marcia, who took the list from the child. Having read it, she immediately sent for Letus and Electus, and when these three had thus become aware of the danger that threatened them, they resolved to forestall the Emperor, and without losing any time they killed Commodus the following night. This case demonstrates that “the necessity which admits of no delay” produces here the same effect as the means employed by Nelematus described above. It also reveals how a prince can provoke a conspiracy. This could be a profitable strategy, if the prince is aware of it—​as we see below—​, but it can be a deadly one as in the case of Commodus. Of course, if a prince wants to avoid a conspiracy then he should never design a situation in which the agent has only two alternatives: to perish or to fight. However, this can only be a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one if conspiracy should be avoided. The sequential structure of the execution of a conspiracy suggests that a high degree of unsteadiness in the daily routine of the prince might be a good protection. Given the constraints of secret communications, conspirators have in general great difficulties to adapt to changing conditions or even to revise their plans. The standard example for the latter is the conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici.7 Plans were made that, in April 1478, the two should be killed at a dinner with Cardinal San Giorgio. While the two

7 The Eighth Book of Machiavelli’s History of Florence, is dedicated to the description of this plot (see History: 371ff). The Discourses (340f) contain a summary.

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Medici and the Cardinal attended mass in the cathedral the rumor spread that Giuliano would not come to the dinner. Plans had to be changed and it was decided to commit the murder in the church. Not only did this alienate Giovan Battista, a competent conspirator who was assigned to kill Lorenzo, such that the roles had to be redistributed, but it led to a series of mistakes. Giuliano was killed by Francesco Pazzi as planned, but because of the incompetence of Antonio da Volterra who was supposed to replace Giovan Battista, Lorenzo was able to defend himself and got away only slightly wounded. Not only did he become Lorenzo Magnifico and govern Florence with almost dictatorial power until his death in 1492, but he also had the means to go ruthlessly after those conspirators, who were not already killed during the execution of the plot—​ like Francecso Salviati, the Archbishop of Pisa—​, and erase the Pazzi family from the Florence scenery. In fact, when the conspirators tried to gain control over the government the people of Florence, rather unexpectedly, rallied to the Medici. This proves that investing in the love of the people, as Machiavelli repeatedly pointed out, can be a very efficient means to counter conspiracy: “… of all the perils that follow the execution of a conspiracy, none is more certain and none more to be feared than the attachment of the people to the prince that has been killed. There is no remedy against this, for the conspirators can never secure themselves against a whole people” (Discourses 345). Since the Pazzi conspiracy was supported by Pope Sixtus iv a two-​year war with the papacy followed placing a very heavy burden on the City of Florence. But Florence and the Medici survived and both had a brilliant future. Perhaps it should be noted that Lorenzo’s son Giovanni ended as Pope Leo x. Giulio, the natural son of Lorenzo’s murdered brother Giuliano, followed him in the papacy as Pope Clement vii,8 not to mention the fact that members of the Medici family became Grand Dukes of Tuscany and mothers to French kings. However, we should emphasize that the support of the people of Florence on the day of the Pazzi conspiracy was decisive for the career of the Medici. Not only did Lorenzo survive, but his position was immensely strengthened by the unsuccessful conspiracy. Machiavelli concludes “… conspiracies rarely succeed, and often cause the ruin of those who set them on foot, whilst those against whom they were aimed are only the more aggrandized thereby” (History 368). The latter effect was definitively true in the case of Lorenzo and the Medici.

8 In fact, Leo xwas followed by a “German Pope” with the name of Hadrian vi, born at Utrecht and teacher of Emperor Karl v. However, he managed to survive this difficult situation for hardly a year.

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It seems that a prince who has the love of the people is relatively well protected if conspirators are rational and think about their lives and fate after execution. … on the side of the conspirator there is nothing but fear, jealousy, and apprehension of punishment; whilst the prince has on his side the majesty of sovereignty, the laws, the support of his friends and of the government, which protect him. And if to all this be added the popular good will, it seems impossible that any one should be rash enough to attempt a conspiracy against him. For ordinarily a conspirator has cause for apprehension only before the execution of his evil purpose; but in this case, having the people for his enemies, he has also to fear the consequences after the commission of the crime, and can look nowhere for a refuge. Prince 61

To gain the love of the people can, however, be very costly and reduce the resources of the prince considerably, and there can be trade-​offs which do not allow to fully use this potential. This was the problem most of the Roman Emperors faced; where in other principalities the prince had to contend only with the ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people, the Roman Emperors had to meet a third difficulty, in having to bear with the cruelty and cupidity of the soldiers, which were so great that they caused the ruin of many, because of the difficulty of satisfying at the same time both the soldiers and the people; for the people love quiet, and for that reason they revere princes who are modest, whilst the soldiers love a prince of military spirit, and who is cruel, haughty, and rapacious. And these qualities the prince must practise upon the people, so as to enable him to increase the pay of the soldiers, and to satisfy their avarice and cruelty. Prince 63

Quite a few Roman Emperors were installed, exploited and, in the end, even murdered by the soldiers that were meant to protect them. They did not, in contrast to the Medici, succeed in activating the love of the people for protection. The Medici case also demonstrates the difficulties of conspiring against a multitude of people. As noticed by Machiavelli, … to strike two blows of this kind at the same instant and in different places is impracticable, and to attempt to do so at different moments of

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time would certainly result in the one’s preventing the other. So that, if it is imprudent, rash, and doubtful to conspire against a single prince, it amounts to folly to do so against two at the same time. Discourses 342

As a consequence, sharing power looks like a very promising device to decrease the potential of conspiracy. From here, it seems straightforward to argue in favor of the republic, or at least for the creation of a parliament.9 However, as Machiavelli observed, conspiracies against the state are less dangerous for those engaged in them than plots against the life of the sovereign. … In the conduct of the plot the danger is very slight, for a citizen may aspire to supreme power without manifesting his intentions to anyone; and if nothing interferes with his plans, he may carry them through successfully, or if they are thwarted by some law, he may await a more favourable moment, and attempt it by another way.” This applies to a republic that is already partially corrupted, “for in one not yet tainted by corruption such thoughts could never enter the mind of any citizen. Discourses 345

To conspire against a republic bears less risk than conspiring against a prince, unless one does not, like Catilina, fight too hard for a hopeless case.10 If a successful conspiracy is obstructed by a multitude of targets to be conspired against, the multitude and anonymity of potential conspirators can also be a good protection for the prince, especially if the prince can avoid putting too much pressure on a single individual or a smaller group.

9

10

Machiavelli observes: “Amongst the well-​organized and well-​governed kingdoms of our time is that of France, which has a great many excellent institutions that secure the liberty and safety of the king. The most important of these is the Parliament, and its authority” (Prince 62). This case, the Catilinarian conspiracy, was reported by Sallust (86–​34 bc) and referred to by Machiavelli (Discourse 346): “Everybody has read the account written by Sallust of the conspiracy of 846, and knows that, after it was discovered, Catiline not only stayed in Rome, but actually went to the Senate, and said insulting things to the Senate and the Consul; so great was the respect in which Rome held the citizens. And even after his departure from Rome, and when he was already with the army, Lentulus and the others would not have been seized if letters in their own handwriting had not been found, which manifestly convicted them.” See also Frederick of Prussia (1981[1740], 101f) who refers to Catiline.

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For if the great men of a state, who are in familiar intercourse with the prince, succumb under the many difficulties of which we have spoken, it is natural that these difficulties should be infinitely increased for the others. And therefore those who know themselves to be weak avoid them, for where men’s lives and fortunes are at stake they are not all insane; and when they have cause for hating a prince, they content themselves with cursing and vilifying him, and wait until someone more powerful and of higher position than themselves shall avenge them. Discourses 332f

Indeed “those who know themselves to be weak … are not all insane,” on the contrary, they might be called “rational.” They view themselves as members of a large group as defined in Mancur Olson’s seminal book The Logic of Collective Action (1965): The group does not contain a member whose potential and interest are strong enough to organize a conspiracy, irrespective of what the other members do, given the difficulties of execution and the draconic punishment in case of failure. In principle, the prince can feel safe, even if there are many enemies, as long as there is no pioneer conspirator strong and interested enough to take the lead as the rest will “… wait until someone more powerful and of higher position than themselves shall avenge them,” as observed above. Large groups are generally not self-​organizing and membership remains dormant if the group does not offer selective incentives that cover membership costs. Membership costs can be extremely high in conspiracy. There is an additional element that may prevent actions against the prince even when the group of potential conspirators is small and they know of each other. Each of them might hope that the other will do the dangerous job, to avoid risk of failure, on the one hand, and to qualify for a position of power in post-​conspiracy times (if it was successful), on the other.11 He who holds the dagger is hardly ever invited to become the murdered tyrant’s successor. As a consequence, the prince should choose a policy that does not polarize the opposition such that small groups can form. However, if he cannot avoid polarization then it can be safer to have several opponents which compete with each other than a single rival who is strong and motivated enough to organize a conspiracy. If a prince cannot crush such a rival, then he better creates a second one.

11

The strategic problem can be represented as Volunteer’s Dilemma; “non-​volunteering” is a likely outcome. See Diekmann (1985).

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But as Machiavelli notes, “princes cannot always escape assassination when prompted by a resolute and determinate spirit; for any man who himself despises death can always inflict it upon others” (Prince 66). However, he also demonstrates that the prince has means to reduce the odds of conspirators and to get them interested in other more promising targets. 4

What if a Prince Conspires?

Of course, the prince can use conspiracy as a means to strengthen his position. This is the general experience we observe in the relationship of one prince to another; it found its ultimate incarnation in the idea and practice of secret diplomacy.12 Cases are abundant and many are household knowledge. Perhaps less prominent are cases that show a prince who conspires against one of his ministers or generals following Machiavelli’s advice that “princes should devolve all matters of responsibility upon others, and take upon themselves only those of grace” (Prince 62). The range of this strategy reaches from the obfuscation policy of democratic governments, which thereby hope to be re-​elected,13 to the prince sacrificing a confidant to gain the support of the people. “Having conquered the Romagna,” Cesare Borgia, called the Duke, found it under the control of a number of impotent petty tyrants, who had devoted themselves more to plundering their subjects than to governing them properly, and encouraging discord and disorder amongst them rather than peace and union; so that this province was infested by brigands, torn by quarrels, and given over to every sort of violence. He saw at once that, to restore order amongst the inhabitants and obedience to the sovereign, it was necessary to establish a good and vigorous government there. And for this purpose he appointed as governor of that province Don Ramiro d’Orco, a man of cruelty, but at the same time of 12

13

In his Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century, Karl Marx (1969 [1856/​57], 86) colorfully describes how England, from 1700, the date of the Anglo-​Swedish Defensive Treaty, to 1719, was continually “assisting Russia and waging war against Sweden, either by secret intrigue or open force, although the treaty was never rescinded nor war ever declared.” England betrayed her allies to serve the interests of Imperial Russia and her own hopes for large benefits out of a flourishing Russian trade. This is the theme of a volume edited by Breton et al. (2007) on The Economics of Transparency in Politics.

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great energy, to whom he gave plenary power. In a very short time D’Orco reduced the province to peace and order, thereby gaining for him the highest reputation. After a while the Duke found such excessive exercise of authority no longer necessary or expedient, for he feared that it might render himself odious. He therefore established a civil tribunal in the heart of the province, under an excellent president, where every city should have its own advocate. And having observed that the past rigor of Ramiro had engendered some hatred, he wished to show to the people, for the purpose of removing that feeling from their minds, and to win their entire confidence, that, if any cruelties had been practised, they had not originated with him, but had resulted altogether from the harsh nature of his minister. He therefore took occasion to have Messer Ramiro put to death, and his body, cut into two parts, exposed in the market-​ place of Cesena one morning, with a block of wood and a bloody cutlass left beside him. The horror of this spectacle caused the people to remain for a time stupefied and satisfied. Prince 25

This story not only tells us how a prince may establish the law and bring order, and to get rid of a possible rival and potential conspirator, but also how to satisfy the people who had to suffer in this process of transformation. Once the prince is aware that the conspiracy game is sequential and he or she14 is likely to have the first move, the prince can try to initiate a conspiracy and disclose it, punish the conspirators and gain the respect of his or her enemies and the admiration of the people—​and a good excuse why the government is not as successful as it should be. Staging a conspiracy, however, is not always without risk even for the prince, especially if it should serve as a litmus test for the support of confidants. Dion of Syracuse … by way of testing the fidelity of someone whom he suspected ordered Callippus, in whom he had entire confidence, to pretend to be conspiring against him … Callippus, being able to conspire

14

We should not forget such eminent princely women as Catharina Sforza, Lady of Imola and Countess of Forli, also discussed by Machiavelli (Discourses 345), and Isabella d’Este. The latter substituted her husband Francesco ii, Marquess of Mantua, as regent during many years of his absence and it was her who achieved that Mantua was promoted into a duchy in 1530. Both had decisive encounters with Cesare Borgia, Machiavelli’s model hero of Il Principe.

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with impunity against Dion, plotted so well that he deprived him of his state and his life. Discourses 349

It seems safer for a prince just to pretend that there is a plot, assign the responsibility to some people he or she wants to get rid of, and then let justice prevail. It might be difficult to prove that the suspect is a conspirator, but more often it is impossible to prove for a suspect that he is not. The veil of secrecy is asymmetric and, in the end, it is in favor with the powerful. There are numerous examples that testify this fact, and the powerful often make use of it. No wonder, that if a prince discovers a plot, “… and he punishes the conspirators with death, it will always be believed that it was an invention of the prince to satisfy his cruelty and avarice with the blood and possessions of those whom he had put to death” (Discourses 347). Machiavelli offers an advice to princes or republics against whom conspiracies may have been formed. If they discover that a conspiracy exists against them, they must, before punishing its authors, endeavor carefully to know its nature and extent,—​to weigh and measure well the means of the conspirators, and their own strength. And if they find it powerful and alarming, they must not expose it until they have provided themselves with sufficient force to crush it, as otherwise they will only hasten their own destruction. Discourses 347

The following section illustrates Machiavelli’s conspiracy reasoning and its strategic implications. As game theory is the language created to represent strategic relationships between decision makers, it seems to be appropriate to apply it here and check whether it contributes to the interpretation of Machiavelli’s text. What follows can also be understood as an experiment. 5

The Conspirator-​Prince Game

This above quote is of interest in many ways: First, it mentions republics, and second it is explicitly meant as an advice. However, as pointed out by Machiavelli, the conditions and effects of conspiracy are hardly ever as clear-​ cut as in the situation just described. Even if we assume that the conspirators and the prince are rational decision makers—​a condition that is in general inappropriate especially if one of the parties is a collectivity—​, the strategic

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situation can be rather complex. This can be demonstrated by a simple 2-​by-​ 2 matrix game that connects the decisions of the conspirator and the prince under the assumption of imperfect information. We assume that the players know their strategies and payoffs as well as the strategies and payoffs of the other party. And we assume that both players know that the other player has this information, and both players know that the other player knows that players have this information, and so on. Of course, this is a hardly acceptable ­simplification, but as we will see there is enough leeway for a “missing determinism.” Let us proceed. A rational conspirator i will initiate a plot if the expected utility from plotting is at least as large as the expected utility from not plotting. r ui(successful plotting) +​(1-​r) ui (plot and fail) ≥ ui(not plotting)

(1)

Since r is the probability that i’s plot is successful, condition (1) assumes that the expected utility hypothesis works. In general, a plot falls into one of the two categories: successful plot with a possibility to take the prince’s position or to install an arrangement which comes close to it; and failure which can imply all kinds of cruel punishments or related losses. It seems plausible to assume that i’s preference order will be such that he prefers the outcome “successful plotting” to “not plotting” and “not plotting” to “plot and fail.” Thus condition (1) contains a decision problem. Let’s assume conspirator i can evaluate the utilities (payoffs) such that they can be expressed as cardinal measures so that the multiplication assumed in (1) can work. But does the conspirator know r? Probability r could be given by “nature,” or depend on the policy of the prince, on the behavior, number and competence of fellow conspirators. Machiavelli gives a series of factors that could influence r and proposes a set of tools to reduce it. The probability r may even depend on i’s payoff. table 9.1 The Conspirator-​Prince Game

Prince j

Conspirator i

Strategies

Control

Not control

plot not plot

(a, α) (c, γ)

(b, β) (d, δ)

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We can illustrate such a possible relationship by the two-​person game in Table 9.1. Here i is the conspirator and j is the prince. It is assumed that neither i nor j can observe the strategy choice of the other, i.e. the game is a case of imperfect information. This assumption seems quite plausible when it comes to conspiracy. For the payoffs of the two players we assume that conditions b > a, b> d, c > a, c > d and hold.15 We assume that both players know their payoffs but also the payoffs of the other party. This looks like a heroic assumption but Machiavelli convincingly argues that conspirators are close to the prince. Moreover, when it comes to prominent issues, such as power and death, then at least the ordinal values should be common knowledge. The following analysis, however, assumes that the expected utility hypothesis applies, which allows for multiplying utilities and probabilities, and thus presupposes that utilities are cardinal. However, we abstain from the assumption that utilities are interpersonally comparable: We cannot tell whether the prince is happier than the conspirator, or whether the reverse holds, although in some situations a conclusion seems to be straightforward. Given these specifications, Table 9.1 represents the payoff matrix of a two-​ by-​two game of complete, but imperfect information. None of the two players has a dominant strategy. Thus, what is good choice for player i depends on the strategy choice of j, and vice versa, i.e. Table 9.1 represents a non-​degenerated strategic situation. Should a game theorist describe the expected outcome then he falls back on choices that imply a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a pair of strategies such that none of the two players can get a higher payoff by choosing an alternative strategy, given the strategy of the other player.16 Obviously, no such pair of pure strategies exists in the game of Table 9.1 (which describes an “inspection game”17). However, if we assume that i and j choose strategies “plot” and “control” with probabilities p and q, respectively, then the (p*, q*) defines a Nash equilibrium if p* and q* satisfy the following conditions:

15 16 17

p∗ =

δ−γ α − β − γ +δ

(2)

These conditions guarantee that both Nash equilibrium and maximin solution are in mixed-​strategies (see Holler, 1990). This is the definition of a Nash equilibrium. In his doctoral thesis, John Nash (1951) has given the proof that for every finite game such an equilibrium exists: either in pure or in mixed strategies. See Andreozzi (2002, 2004) for literature and further analysis.

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q∗ =

d −b a −b −c +d

(3)

If conspirator i chooses p* then the prince j is indifferent between “control” and “not control” and, of course, any p that mixes the two. The corresponding property applies to q*. Thus, neither i nor j is motivated to deviate from p* and q*. The trouble with this equilibrium is that, given q*, why should i select p*, and why should j select q* if i chooses p*, or if j assumes that i chooses p*? The Nash equilibrium (p*,q*) is weak, i.e. if the conspirator deviates from p*, then, of course, his payoffs will not increase, given q*, as (p*,q*) is an equilibrium, but neither will his payoffs decrease. The same applies if the prince deviates from q*, given the conspirator chooses p*. Why should a player choose a Nash equilibrium strategy if he expects the other player to choose a Nash equilibrium strategy? There are still other incentive problems with the Nash equilibrium. For instance, if the benefits of a successful plot increase (i.e. such that payoff b increases), equation (2) implies that this has no impact on the equilibrium behavior, p*, of the conspirator (although it seems plausible to expect that plotting becomes more likely). Although the conspirator will not change his behavior, equation (3) tells us that the prince will increase, q*, the probability of control that characterizes the Nash equilibrium. If q* remained the same, then the conspirator would clearly prefer “plot” to “not plot”: This is not consistent with an equilibrium, because q* 0 , the probability of control will decrease if a decreases. This should reduce 1-​r, the probability of “plot and fail.” It seems there is a trade-​off between 1-​r and ui(plot and fail) which is not captured by condition (1). There are perhaps doubts about whether the mixed-​strategy Nash equilibrium is an adequate instrument to analyze the game in Table 9.1. For a game-​ theoretically trained reader it is straightforward that the maximin solution of this game implies the probabilities

p =

d −c a − b − c +d

(4)

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δ −β α −β − γ + δ

(5)

Moreover, the reader can check that the payoffs of the players that concur with the maximin solution and the Nash equilibrium are identical, i.e. the game is “unprofitable.”18 Since ∂p° / ∂a > 0 , an increase of punishment (i.e. a decrease of a) will result in a reduction of p° so that “plotting” becomes less likely. This seems to be a plausible reaction. However, if we apply maximin to the prince then we see that an increase of the benefits of detecting a plot, α, will decrease his inclination to control. Note that ∂q° / ∂α < 0 . This appears to be less likely if we follow Machiavelli’s reasoning. 6

The Machiavelli Conspiracy

From Machiavelli’s analysis follow four closely neighboring categories: successful conspiracy, unsuccessful conspiracy, staged conspiracy, and pretended conspiracy. They are characterized by an active proposition of conspiracy. But there are also passive and counterfactual versions of conspiracy: The possible victim imagines that there is a conspiracy and even reacts on this imagination although there is none.19 Machiavelli did not elaborate on the passive version of conspiracy. If his analysis was meant to advise the conspirators and the prince then this omission is plausible. There is hardly anything to learn from it for “people of action.” At the outset of this paper we raised the question why did Machiavelli write so extensively on conspiracy. Is it for the purpose of teaching the prince and his rivals to behave efficiently? Does he want to make sure that those who are virtuous, whether conspirators or princes, are successful and thereby improve the “selection of the fittest” and thus contribute 18 19

See Holler (1990) for these results and their interpretation as well as Holler and Klose-​ Ullmann (2008) for an application to Wallenstein’s power problem. During World War i, there was the belief among English of a “fifth column,” comprised of local civilians, mainly French or Belgian, who were eager to help the Germans make the English hurry to Dunkirk and leave the continent. This provoked a soldier of the London Regiment (Queen Victoria′s Rifles) gun down a manifestly innocent old lady in Calais “in the belief that the Germans must be masters of disguise as well as of mobile warfare” and a group of Belgian farm laborers was shot in the field: they “were accused of mowing grass ‘in the formation of an arrow’ to guide Stuka pilots to British troop formations” (Ferguson 2006, 28). Every British soldier knew of the fifth column, however, to the Germans it was unknown. For further details, see Glyn Prysor (2005).

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to the general welfare of mankind? Or is the Il Principe simply a “handbook for those who would acquire or increase their political power” (Gauss, 1952, p. 8) and the extensive treatment of conspiracy in the Discorsi is a concomitant paper that was merely intended to demonstrate the competence of its author? Machiavelli was intoxicated by the pleasure of thinking and writing, of delving into his own experience as high ranking Secretary to the Second Chancery of the Republic of Florence and special envoy to the King of France, to Rome and even to Emperor Maximilian, on the one hand, and avictim of conspiracy, on the other. During his lifetime Machiavelli was repeatedly accused of conspiracy. When, in 1512, the conspiracy of Pietropaolo Boscoli and Agostino Capponi against the lives of Giuliano and Lorenzo de’ Medici was discovered, Machiavelli was … suspected of participation in this conspiracy, he was shut up in the prison of the Bargello, and had there to suffer the torture, the executioner having subjected him six times to the strappado. He was also kept for some days shackled, as we must presume from his writing that he had ‘jesses’ on his legs; it being well known that that word signifies the leather straps that hold one of the claws of the falcons. detmold, 1882, p. xxviii

Obviously, Machiavelli was not involved in this conspiracy. Detmold (1882, p. xxviii) concludes that the firm denial of Machiavelli under the pangs of torture ought certainly, with so honest and fearless a mind as his, to be taken for the truth, and should acquit him, not only of an unpatriotic act, but also of an act of folly in being one of a numerous body of conspirators, which folly no writer has ever exposed with greater clearness and more conclusive force of argument than himself. But there is a certain spiritual conspiracy in Machiavelli’s writing. The language is very plain but people over the centuries have been seduced, again and again, to give highly controversial interpretations, many of which were not beneficial to Machiavelli’s reputation. A careful reader of his writing will find that Machiavelli was a moral person: To him a murder is a murder even if the murderer is Romulus, the founding hero of Rome. He does not subscribe to an ethics which postulates “that the reason of state cannot be reduced to

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ordinary moral deliberation” (Bok, 1982, p. 173).20 However, he proposes all kinds of cruel policies for those who want to gain power and keep it, including conspiracy. He convincingly argues that in most cases these cruelties are necessary and cannot be avoided. Because they cannot be avoided they might be justified by their success, however, in Machiavelli’s view this does not imply that they are inherently good.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Timo Airaksinen, Mann Chell and Leonidas Donskis for helpful comments.

Bibliography

Andreozzi, L. (2002) “Oscillations in the Enforcement of Law: An Evolutionary Analysis.” Homo Oeconomicus 18: 403–​428. Andreozzi, L. (2004) “Rewarding Policemen Increases Crime: Another Surprising Result from the Inspection Game.” Public Choice 121: 69–​82. Bok, S. (1982) Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation. New York: Pantheon Press. Bolle, F. and Y. Breitmoser (2009) “The Strategic Use of Secrets: Doubts About a Proposal of Schelling.” In T. Airaksinen and M. J. Holler, eds. The Secrets of Secrets (Special issue of Homo Oeconomicus 26: 79–​96). Munich: Accedo Verlag. Breton, A., G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, and R. Wintrobe, eds. (2007) The Economics of Transparency in Politics (Villa Colombella Papers). Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Detmold, Chr. E. (1882) “The Life of Machiavelli.” In Chr. E. Detmold (1882), Vol. 1, pp. xv–​x li. Diekmann, A. (1985) “Volunteer’s Dilemma.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 29: 605–​610. Frederick of Prussia (1981 [1740]) The Refutation of Machiavelli’s Prince or Anti-​Machiavel. Introduction, translation and notes by P. Sonnino. Athens: Ohio University Press. Ferguson, N. (2006) “A ‘Miracle of Deliverance’?” The New York Review of Books 53: 26–​29.

20

To Sissela Bok (1982, p. 173), the “reason of the state” concept implies that “… rulers may be justified when they lie, cheat, break promises, or even torture in order to further their state’s welfare. And secrecy regarding such acts was often thought to be of the highest importance in furthering the designs of the state.” It is the “reason of state” that “… legitimates action on behalf of a state that would be immoral for private individuals.”

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Gauss, C. (1952) Introduction to the Mentor Edition of Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince. New York: Mentor Books. Hofstadter, D. R. (1980) Gödel, Escher, Bach: An External Golden Braid. New York: Vintage Books. Holler, M. J. (1990) “The Unprofitability of Mixed-​strategy Equilibria in Two-​person Games: A Second Folk-​theorem.” Economics Letters 32: 319–​323. Holler, M. J. (2007) “The Machiavelli Program and the Dirty Hands Problem.” In P. Baake and R. Borck, eds. Public Economics and Public Choice: Contributions in Honor of Charles B. Blankart. Berlin et al.: Springer, pp. 39–​62. Holler, M. J. (2009) “Niccolò Machiavelli on Power.” In M. Baurmann and B. Lahno, eds. Perspectives in Moral Science. Contributions from Philosophy, Economics, and Politics in Honour of Hartmut Kliemt. Frankfurt: Frankfurt School Verlag, pp. 335–​354; republished in L. Donskis, ed. (2011) Niccolò Machiavelli: History, Power, and Virtue, Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi. Holler, M. J. (2011) “On Machiavelli’s Conspiracy Paradoxes.” Homo Oeconomicus 28, 2011: 549–​569. Holler, M. J. and B. Klose-​Ullmann (2008) “Wallenstein’s Power Problem and Its Consequences.” AUCO Czech Economic Review 2: 197–​218. Machiavelli, N. (1531) “Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius.” In Chr. E. Detmold (1882), Vol. 2: 93–​431 (quoted as Discourses). Machiavelli, N. (1532) “The Prince.” In Chr. E. Detmold (1882), Vol. 2: 1–​88 (quoted as Prince). Machiavelli, N. (1532) “History of Florence.” In Chr. E. Detmold (1882), Vol. 1: 3–​420 (quoted as History). Marx, K. (1969 [1856/​57]) Secret Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century and The Story of the Life of Lord Palmerston. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Nash, J. F. (1951) “Non-​cooperative Games.” Annals of Mathematics 54: 286–​295. Olson, M. Jr. (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Prysor, G. (2005) “The ‘Fifth Column’ and the British Experience of Retreat, 1940.” War in History 12: 418–​447.

­c hapter 10

A Conspiracy Theory of Unsustainable Over-​consumption

The Market and Environmental Collective Action Problems Christopher Stevens 1

Introduction

There is now a small but well-​established body of published philosophical research on conspiracy theories.1 A main aim has been to analyze their structure in an effort to determine the veracity of claims made about the extent to which belief in their truth is warranted. The results of this work have been sufficiently successful to spur some to bring them to bear on issues one might have thought not within their purview, such as issues in the philosophy of religion.2 In the light of an upshot of the work of Brian L. Keeley, I contribute to the project of extending those results by bringing them to bear on the consideration of a major environmental collective action problem (“cap”).3 I consider its principal cause and a possible strategy for its resolution. In the process, I introduce a novel form of conspiracy—​self-​conspiracy or perhaps better “auto-​conspiracy.” Though prima facie self-​contradictory, the notion of auto-​conspiracy is on reflection not so, and is, further, a concept that may offer insight into the nature of conspiracy itself. After discussing cap s in general and the particular cap that concerns me (section 2), I discuss common and uncommon responses to it (section 3). I then describe what I term the “consummate conspiracy” and discuss its role in hampering the efficacy of one of the uncommon but more hopeful responses; that is, I offer a conspiracy theory (section 4). Last, I bring a result of Keeley’s work to bear on an assessment of the veracity of that theory (section 5). The

1 Coady, David, ed. (2006) Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Ashgate: Burlington, VT. Special Issue of Episteme, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2007). 2 Keeley, Brian L. (2007) “God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory.” Episteme, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 135–​149. 3 The upshot is a conclusion reached in Keeley, Brian L., “Of Conspiracy Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 96, No. 3 (1999), pp. 109–​126; also pertinent is Keeley, “God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory,” op. cit.

© Christopher Stevens, 2022 | DOI:10.1163/9789004499720_012

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assessment’s outcome is this: we ought to take the possibility of this conspiracy theory’s being true with more seriousness than we would otherwise be inclined to grant it. The upshot is that thinking along these lines opens an inroad to solving a pressing environmental problem that concerns us all. 2

The Sustainability Aim as a Collective Action Problem

cap s, sometimes referred to as “coordination problems,” are a particularly recalcitrant type of public policy problem. The recalcitrance stems from the paradoxical nature of their essential characterizing feature: a cap is a state of affairs likely to produce an outcome that will be brought about by the rational self-​interested behavior of individuals comprising a group but that is nevertheless desired by none of them.4 Such states of affairs are of course problematic in the sense that their outcome is undesired. But they are more deeply problematic in terms of the difficulties involved in resolving them. I am concerned with the cap that stands in the way of reaching the following aim: reducing the degree of business entities’ ecologically unsustainable production activity (or reducing the degree of individuals’ unsustainable consumptive activity driving this production) so that, concerned as we are to secure the well-​being of future generations via sufficient environmental provision and as members of the resultant more sustainable society, we are collectively better off. Put simply and in the form of a question, the problem is this: “Why ought any business entity diminish production or any agent diminish consumption if there is little evidence supporting the belief that numbers of others sufficient for producing the desired outcome will do likewise?” The rational response is that one ought not diminish the unsustainable activity, for, as far as one is aware, doing so brings no rewards. Put less simply but more carefully, the problem of reaching this sustainability aim involves a cap for the following reason [call this reason “R”]: [R]‌: (i) Without some means for successfully instilling belief in the individual consumer (or in the individuals having power of decision for a business entity) such that he is thereby made confident that the activity of his cohorts is sufficiently coordinated to render his sustainable

4 The classic work is Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, originally published 1965.

208 Stevens behavior part of an effective long-​term solution to the problem of sustainability, and (ii) without some means for transforming his conception of his unsustainable activity into activity that runs against rather than serves his immediate or short-​term rational self-​interest, then (iii) his answering a plea for sustainable behavior will not be seen by him to be to his self-​interested advantage. And the converse is true as well,5 as of course then are their contraposed versions,6 the salient one of which is this: if there is such a means making him confident or if there is such a means transforming his conception of his immediate self-​interest, then he will see his sustainable behavior as being to his self-​ interested advantage.7 I now consider those two different kinds of means for potential resolution of the cap. 3

Common and Uncommon Responses to This Collective Action Problem

The most often-​mentioned solutions to this collective action problem about consumption and sustainability are these: internalizing externalities via taxation, subsidization of preferred alternatives, modified market solutions, and an appeal to enlightened self-​interest. The latter, however, is discussed merely in passing when discussed at all, despite well-​known drawbacks of the others. That is, discussion centers on means of the kind mentioned in R-​(i). These type-​(i) proposals are intended to promote or guarantee coordination. The sanction solution—​e.g., carbon tax imposition—​would guarantee it by rendering the polluter’s tax expense for polluting greater than expenditures required for bringing pollution under control through retrofitting or the construction of new facilities using newer and cleaner technologies. The 5 The converse being ((iii) only if (i) and (ii)). 6 For those needing a logic refresher: the contraposition of “if p then q” is “if ~q then ~p.” 7 That is, if ~(i) or ~(ii), then ~(iii).

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subsidization solution would promote it by shifting the burden of expense for retrofitting or new construction from the producer to the consumer, via funds provided by government, funds the ultimate source of which is tax revenues. Modified market solutions—​e.g., cap and trade—​would guarantee it by means of the cap imposed on total polluting emissions. These three versions of type-​ (i) solution have to do with supply rather than demand, and for simplicity’s sake have been chosen so as to deal with merely one sort of unsustainable practice, namely, contribution to the increased likelihood of global warming through greenhouse gas emission. All three have drawbacks. Modified market solutions suffer the drawback had by nearly any artificial manipulation of the market in that manipulation can render markets inefficient. Here the market is rendered less efficient, in part, due to the added cost of ongoing emissions monitoring performed by the state. Furthermore, as a secondary party, the state has less incentive than would a market player to monitor in a cost-​efficient manner. In short, implementation is expensive. Sanction solutions suffer the drawback of their legislation being held hostage to political climate. It is difficult to pass tax law that burdens large segments of the manufacturing sector at the potential expense of national competitiveness in global markets and potential harm to gdp. Subsidization solutions suffer versions of both drawbacks mentioned. They offer a means to bypass market mechanisms that would otherwise put a stop to monies pouring into tech research beyond the point of the reasonable possibility of that research yielding a payoff. This is bad not only because monies go to waste, but also because those wasted financial resources could have been directed toward the exploration of other technologies. They cost taxpayers money, which is not always a bad thing but is a bad thing when governments are running at a sizable deficit. And even if these difficulties with subsidies were mitigated to a degree sufficient to render their implementation relatively unproblematic, their legislation is difficult, as subsidy bills threaten a status quo that has earned its place through market success. Another class of potential type-​(i) solution—​the class comprised of solutions dealing with demand rather than supply—​is a taxonomic reality but not a live option. This is because constraints on consumer activity not only compromise the market but can too easily be seen—​and probably legitimately so—​as a threat to fundamental liberties in states having property rights central to the conception of the good life enshrined in their founding documents. The right to own property, if conceived as it should be against the background of an explicit concern for citizen welfare, is suggestive of a tacit right to the unfettered acquisition of property. Despite their drawbacks, type-​(i) solutions are nearly universally thought superior to solutions of the type mentioned in R-​(ii). Recall that type-​(ii)

210 Stevens solutions involve a transformation of the consumer’s conception of his unsustainable activity from activity serving his self interest to activity that does not serve and instead runs against that interest. Assume for the moment that such a transformation is in fact in his best interest; this would be so, for instance, were a materially simpler life a better life, provided minimum needs are met, and the time and energy regained were spent on valuable endeavors.8 When this transformation occurs, self-​interest can be said to be “enlightened” in the sense that it is a more informed or reflective or thoughtful agent—​an enlightened agent—​who then conceives of his prior self-​interested preference as having been, unbeknownst to him at the time, a preference that did not further and instead frustrated what he now recognizes to be his actual interest. Hence the term “enlightened self-​interest.” Solutions involving enlightened self-​interest are commonly thought inferior to type-​(i) solutions because their implementation purportedly requires paternalistic government interference with the most basic of liberties, namely, one’s pursuing the good life as he understands it, provided his doing so not interfere with others doing likewise. To guide the formation of preferences—​whether of an enlightened sort or not—​is to usurp this liberty and thereby violate what many conceive of as the most sacrosanct part of a citizen’s conception of himself, or so the story goes.9 The topics of perfectionist or natural law moral theory and perfectionist political philosophy, which can involve a sophisticated questioning of the ultimate consistency and coherence of that story, are pertinent to thinking about environmental problems and are interesting in their own right.10 But discussion of them is not necessary here, for it is a mistake to think that type-​(ii) solutions require paternalistic interference. 8 9

10

See Elgin, Duane (1981) Voluntary Simplicity: Toward a Way of Life that is Outwardly Simple, Inwardly Rich. New York: Morrow; Laszlo, Erwin (1989) The Inner Limits of Mankind: Heretical Reflections on Today’s Values, Culture and Politics .London: Oneworld. This is descriptively true, but whether agents ought to conceive of their own conceptions of the good as sacrosanct—​or whether the state ought to do so—​is a trickier matter than might at first appear. This is because it is difficult to fill out the otherwise vague notion of a common good without contravening an idea at the heart of liberalism conceived this way, namely, the idea that well-​being is satisfied present preference no matter the preference. Moral and political perfectionists disagree with those advocating this brand of liberalism. See Wall, Steven (1998) Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint. New York: Cambridge University Press; Sher, George (1997) Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See my “Perfectionist Liberalism, Natural Law Jurisprudence, and the Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law,” in Gasparski, Wojchiech and Olli Loukola, eds. (2011) Environmental Political Philosophy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 51–​98.

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The question pertinent to the issue of the implementation of type-​(ii) solutions is not “How ought government bring about enlightened self-​interest?” but “Why do so many who espouse sustainable lifestyles not manifest that espousal in their consumer behavior?” That is, the former question is redundant, because, given the ubiquity and prominence of serious discussion of environmental problems today, most already espouse the sustainable lifestyle. To the extent that we can conceive of ourselves as living sustainably while remaining on par socially with our fellows, we are, or most of us are, willing to make the attempt.11 Two things need to be said about this. First, the criticism against type-​(ii) solutions to the effect that the active alteration of citizen preferences is paternalistic and so contrary to tenets of liberal democracy is misguided because the preferences, being already espoused, need not be instilled. Second, the answer to the latter question—​“ Why do so many who espouse sustainable lifestyles not manifest that espousal in their consumer behavior?”—​is likely to be, or so I claim, the following: an individual belonging to this group fails to behave in accord with his espousal because he has, in terms of features of his psychology, unwittingly conspired, together with other members of the group, against himself, such that reasons which would otherwise motivate him to behave in accord with his espousal are thereby rendered inaccessible to him. Of note here are the following oddities: conspiratorial behavior that is unwitting, and one’s (somehow) conspiring against oneself. Of both I will have much to say below, including a kind of apologetics for them. Finally, being about reasons and action, this matter would seem to fall within the purview of the philosophical subdiscipline of practical rationality, a branch of both ethics and theory of action, but to my knowledge it is undiscussed in that literature.12 4

The Consummate Conspiracy

The notion of one’s conspiring against oneself—​i.e., the notion of auto-​conspiracy—​and the notion that a perpetrator might perpetrate unwittingly, both put a strain on our intuitive grasp of the concept of conspiracy. I am painfully aware of the strain I am putting on the concept. The idea of a conspiracy of one would seem a confusion or impossibility, since conspiration 11 12

See Lichtenberg, Judith (1996) “Consuming Because Others Consume,” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 22, pp. 273–​297. An overview of issues and sampling of work from the subdiscipline is presented in Millgram, Elijah, ed. (2001) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: mit Press.

212 Stevens requires at least two conspirators. And the idea of a conspiracy in which the conspiracy’s perpetrator is also the conspiracy’s target would seem to stretch the concept beyond recognition. But there is, I think, less need to be concerned by these oddities than at first appears. I say this for two reasons. First, though in significant respects an auto-​conspiracy (or so I will claim), the conspiracy that concerns me gains part of its conspiratorial force (the force that is suffered by each who is worse off for it) by means of the existence of others who are also worse off for it but who, in being themselves also auto-​ conspirators, help build the size of the group of the fooled. They thereby lend added credence to the official or obvious story (about our failure to live in accord with our espousal) which an explanation in terms of conspiracy—​ i.e., a conspiracy theory—​would contravene. Therefore, though appropriately considered an auto-​conspiracy—​again, or so I will claim—​it is a conspiracy not entirely self-​made. Second, criteria for application of the concept other than those that the idea of auto-​conspiracy fails to meet are not only met but are met maximally. Such criteria fall out of a definition of either “conspiracy” or “conspiracy theory,” of which there are a number available. Brian L. Keeley offers one that is as true to our intuitions about the concept of conspiracy as is any of the best of them. What he refers to as a “bare-​bones” definition is this: “A conspiracy theory is a proposed explanation of some historical event…in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons—​the conspirators—​acting in secret.”13 To this he adds an observation about a central feature of conspiracy theories that marks them out from theories of most other kinds—​this feature, which I will leave un-​named and undescribed for now, will be crucial to my argument. And he adds to the basic definition five refinements, two of which are salient for my purposes. One makes clear the nefarious nature of conspirators’ intentions or, as I will construe it, the (a) moral badness of the state of affairs a successful conspiracy produces. The other is a refinement of the description of the nature of the explanation a conspiracy theory offers: the explanation is one that (b) “…runs counter to some received, official, or ‘obvious’ account.”14 Here are the basic elements of the conspiracy together with reference to the type-​(ii) solution that connects the conspiracy to the cap about sustainability (to facilitate reference to it later in the essay, the coupling of (1) +​(2) has been dubbed “cct” for “candidate conspiracy theory”):

13 14

Keeley, “Of Conspiracy Theories,” op. cit., p. 116. Ibid., pp. 116–​117.

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[cct]: (1) We would have a higher degree of well-​being15 were we to have a preference for living sustainably (i.e., living ‘simply’) and were that preference satisfied; but (2) due to a striking feature of our own minds, plus detrimental effects of an otherwise beneficial market economy, we fail to realize this higher degree of well-​being because we come to have what may be called “embodied beliefs” that support consumer-​oriented lifestyles, such that pro-​sustainability beliefs explicitly espoused but inconsistent with those embodied fail to effect action. Features we have thus far got that meet those of the definition are these: a historical event (widespread failure to live in accord with our espoused sustainability aims), a proposed explanation of that event or state of affairs (in terms of mechanisms of belief and volition), and the moral badness of that state of affairs (the unrealized increase in well-​being). Though justification of (1) is necessary for convincingly establishing the significance of the failure mentioned in (2), if it is indeed a failure, I will focus on (2) rather than (1). I would like to have made at least a piecemeal attempt along the way to show that (1) is true, so as to motivate sufficient interest in (2) for taking consideration of the latter seriously. But there is a fundamental difficulty hampering this attempt’s success. Withhold bewilderment or disbelief and assume that I am correct to think that what is described in (2) may reasonably be thought conspiratorial in nature. The conspiracy leads to the failure by rendering a particular set of welfare-​conducive espoused beliefs inert with regard to their power to move us—​i.e., by its concealing the truth of (1) from us.16 So an attempt to show (1) true is doomed from the outset, unless the conspiracy has already been neutralized or at least convincingly revealed

15 16

For accuracy’s sake, the following can be inserted at this point in the sentence: ‘all else remaining equal but the existence and satisfaction of the following preferences and the inexistence of preferences inconsistent with them.’ For were we to recognize the truth of (1), we would aim more seriously to change our lives toward material simplicity. This is one among other ways of accounting for what renders those beliefs volitionally inert. Some may prefer other ways, as this one implies denial of the existence of akrasia or weakness of the will.

214 Stevens to exist. That is, to successfully argue that (1) is true may require arguing also that we find it difficult to acknowledge or fully appreciate this fact due to (2), but to argue that (2) is true—​and, again, assuming (2) to be a description of a conspiracy—​is to offer a conspiracy theory. For reasons I will discuss below in section 4.1, merely offering this conspiracy theory for consideration will be insufficient, given the conspiracy’s unique qualities, for convincing most of even the weak claim that it is, minimally, a candidate for serious consideration as a theory that might be true. I consider my task, then, to be not merely to present and clarify the workings of the theory but to provide the most convincing reasons I can muster in favor of that weak claim—​the claim, that is, in favor of our giving the theory serious consideration. By “serious consideration” I mean consideration that involves not merely maintaining the presence of (2) before our minds but also more actively exploring it. We might do this, for instance, via the pursuit of new life experiences intentionally designed to provide opportunities for confirming instances that would give us reason to believe (2) likely to be true. I begin with a clarification of cct (section 4.1). I then give reasons to believe that (2) is descriptive of something fittingly termed a conspiracy (section 4.2). With clarification and apologetics out of the way, I offer reasons in section 5 for giving (2), and cct, serious consideration of the active sort I mention above. 4.1 Clarification of cct I mean by “embodied belief” one that is a member of the set of beliefs that functions largely to constitute an agent’s worldview.17 These beliefs are embodied in the sense that they are made tangible in the form of behavior reflective of them. By “worldview” I mean the overall perspective from which an agent comes to understand or conceive of the causes and value of goings-​on in the world. An embodied belief may be explicitly espoused, but it need not be; not all of us, and perhaps very few of us, actively reflect upon the beliefs we would need to ascribe to ourselves were we to explain our actions. And an espoused belief might not be embodied; an agent may want to be someone different from who he now is, and he may feel a tension between, on the one hand, desires that now motivate his action and the beliefs which support them, and, on the other, the espoused beliefs that provide reasons for becoming what he wants to be. Tension arises from an inconsistency in his motivational agenda.

17

I have borrowed the distinction between embodied and espoused beliefs from Guy Claxton. See Claxton, Guy (1994) “Involuntary Simplicity: Changing Dysfunctional Habits of Consumption.” Environmental Values, Vol. 3, pp. 71–​78.

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This is a bad thing for him, if the person he wants to become would enjoy a greater degree of well-​being. Put another way, difficulties arise for an agent when his cognitive states are such that the action required for the realization of his proclaimed ends is systematically foiled, by the effects of those states upon his volitional capacities, to the detriment of a significant part of his well-​being. The classic instance is the drug addict, who is, it might be said, “of two minds”: his immediate state of desire vacillates between one for the high the drug provides and another for the health and peace of mind which freedom from the pull of the desire for the drug would afford. At a mental iteration upward, at some psychological distance from the affective pull that either of those desires might have when its competitor is to his immediate awareness nonexistent or nearly so, his state is not one of relief, despite his awareness of being in a position beyond the power of that affective pull. This is because knowledge of the conflict, knowledge that one is in this way divided against oneself, ushers not relief into one’s psyche but trepidation and despair. Thus the addict finds himself having been unwittingly conscripted into a kind of psychological drama. The drama depicts a no-​ win situation the insidiousness of which he now gazes upon as mere audience member. He despairs to find himself in a near-​inextricable position in that he plays both the role of perpetrator and helpless dupe. cct has features analogous to ones appearing in the description of the addict’s predicament, though cct involves consumers rather than drug addicts, and involves what might be called an “addiction to comfort” rather than one to drugs. The addiction to drugs is psycho-​physical in that it involves not only a psychological component but a chemical dependence. Yet the psychological component is strong in both. Supporting his claims by citing Xenos’ work on the modern manifestation of scarcity, Claxton tells us that the comfort-​addict’s “…view of the world embodies a nest of assumptions that link together identity, preference and material comfort in such a way that denial of preference is experienced as a mortal blow to personal efficacy, and discomfort is experienced as a threat to physical survival… .”18 There is no doubt a bit of hyperbole to be found in that claim, but there is also a kernel of truth. Claxton continues: “[I]‌ndividual consumerism has become a cornerstone of modern Northern/​Western identity, so that living in a spiral of escalating affluence is no longer experienced as a fortunate option, but as a matter of absolute necessity. This belief installs consumption at the heart of human identity… The idea of not being able to continue to consume in the style, and at the rate, that 18

Ibid., p. 74. See Xenos, Nicholas. (1989) Scarcity and Modernity. New York: Routledge.

216 Stevens has been prescribed, therefore, can only be experienced as loss, sacrifice and threat, because the perceptual apparatus has been programmed to see that way.”19 The source of the programming is, on the standard story, a combination of the persuasive power of pervasive marketing campaigns in free market economies and the all to human desire for equal social status amongst one’s peers.20 That desire may be based on the moral emotion of shame but is surely aimed at fulfilling one of the basic needs of psychologically-​complex social creatures like us. The crux of the analogy between drug addict and comfort-​addict is that entrenched beliefs or, more precisely, entrenched desires plus their supporting beliefs, can outweigh in terms of volitional power other beliefs and desires that are espoused, that are inconsistent with those entrenched, and that would lead to a higher degree of well-​being were they somehow acted upon. For the drug addict things are bad, but for the comfort-​addict things are, surprisingly, in a significant sense worse. Here the analogy between drug addict and comfort-​addict breaks down. The drug addict who psychologically ascends to that vantage point beyond both the very real pull of the drug and the more fantastical hope of freedom has knowledge that he is divided against himself. He is aware of his own motivational agenda, and its inconsistencies are a horror. While being horrified is not a good thing, the drug addict at least knows where he stands. He is aware of his predicament. The comfort-​addict, however, is in a significant sense even less lucky, in that he is likely to be unaware of his predicament due to what Claxton, following Stolzenberg, refers to as a “trap”: “[C]‌ertain crucial systems of embodied beliefs constitute traps, in the sense that they set, invisibly, a person’s motivational agenda, and bias perception against their own detection.”21 In Stolzenberg’s words, a trap is … a closed system of attitudes, beliefs, and habits of thought for which one can give an objective demonstration that certain of the beliefs are incorrect and that certain of the attitudes and habits of thought prevent this from being recognized.22

19 20 21 22

Claxton, “Involuntary Simplicity,” ibid., p. 75 (emphasis in original). See Lichtenberg, op. cit. Claxton, op. cit., p. 71. Stolzenberg, Gabriel (1984) “Can an Inquiry into the Foundations of Mathematics Tell Us Anything Interesting About Mind?” in Paul Watzlawick, ed. (1984) The Invented Reality: How Do We Know What We Believe We Know? New York: Norton. pp. 257–​308; quoted passage p. 260.

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The key features of a trap are, then, these: incorrect belief, objective demonstration, and prevention of recognition. For the comfort-​addict who espouses material simplicity, those general features are instantiated as follows. 4.1.1 Incorrect Belief The incorrect belief, which will be implicit, is this: consumer acquisition, energy use, and so on at the scale prescribed by prevailing social mores is a necessary constituent of happiness.23 4.1.2 Objective Demonstration The objective demonstration may include this, amongst others: the well-​publicized claim, supported by numerous sociological studies, showing that after basic needs are met, per capita income increase (and the increase in consumer activity associated with it) does not correlate with increased well-​being.24 More likely though, given general lack of citizen interest in such claims, the demonstration would consist of careful discussion about life experiences, felt meaningfulness, and a circumscription of the nature of those experiences which have yielded the latter to high degree.25 4.1.3 Prevention of Recognition Cause of the failure of recognition, the third of the trap’s three main features, is more complicated. The cause is this: a system of attitudes, beliefs, and habits of thought that is (i) brought about via a combination of the persuasive power of marketing campaigns 23

24

25

The notion of implicit belief is not an easy one. Part of the literature in epistemology, in action theory, and in practical rationality is devoted to it. For our purposes it is sufficient to conceive of implicit belief counterfactually: a belief is implicit if it is not explicitly held but would be part of a convincing explanation of some particular agent behavior in terms of a belief and desire model of rational action. This claim is such a fixture of empirical happiness research that Rafael Di Tella and Robert MacCulloch refer to it as a “stylized fact.” For those unfamiliar with that social scientific term, it refers to a finding so consistent across multiple (but necessarily probabilistic) studies that it is commonly presented as known to be true with 100% reliability, i.e., known to be true to a degree of belief beyond that which social scientific studies by their very nature warrant. See their “Happiness Adaptation to Income Beyond ‘Basic Needs’,” in Ed Diener, Daniel Kahneman, and John Helliwell, eds. (2010) International Differences in Well-​Being. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 217–​246. In thinking carefully and systematically about the nature of such experiences, one might look, at least at the outset, to Alexander Maslow’s well-​known hierarchy of needs, or to Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s well-​known concept of flow, or, if one is particularly scholarly-​ minded, to Aristotle’s ethics and in particular his discussion of friendship.

218 Stevens in free market economies, the desire for equal social status amongst one’s peers, simple conditioning against inconvenience, and the widespread tendency to eschew perceived eccentricity; which is (ii) closed (in a sense to be clarified); and that (iii) in being closed renders unlikely one’s recognition that the incorrect belief (i.e., the belief that consumer acquisition at the scale prescribed by prevailing social mores is necessary for happiness) is indeed incorrect. More simply, a particular (and closed) subset of his belief system prevents the comfort-​addict from coming to recognize—​in a particular sense of “recognize”—​that participation in a spiraling escalation of consumer acquisition will not bring him happiness. Terms to be clarified, then, are “closed” and “recognize.” 4.1.3.1 Recognition By “recognize” I mean not mere acknowledgement; the comfort-​addict may readily state an intention to actively renounce what has up to that point been his predominantly consumerist outlook. And in fact this is precisely what has been done by the agents here in question, i.e., those who explicitly espouse the sustainable or materially simple lifestyle but fail to behave in accord with the voiced espousal. This includes most of us. Despite the espousal we shirk buying the smaller home, foregoing the heater in favor of extra layers of clothing, foregoing purchase of a second family car, etc. In general, we shirk materially downsizing or using less energy if doing so is felt to create an inconvenience or a potentially troubling disparity in perceived social status between ourselves and our peers. Claxton offers an insight particularly helpful in getting at what would be involved in fully recognizing—​rather than merely acknowledging—​that participation in a spiraling escalation of consumer acquisition will not bring happiness: [A]‌ny espousal of ‘voluntary simplicity’ is doomed if it is overlaid on an embodied belief system to which it is antithetical. [It is doomed if] the underlying addiction is not treated… How can one…experience the value of simplicity, when one’s experience itself is the product of a belief in the necessity of luxury?26 26

Claxton, ibid., p. 76 (my emphasis). The original passage appears in the context of a discussion of means for encouraging others toward adopting the materially simple life rather than one about an agent’s own espousal of simplicity. I have cut away those parts not relevant to my discussion. The thrust of Claxton’s passage has not been altered in the process.

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To understand the relevance of the gist of this to thinking carefully about the nature of recognition, keep in mind the rough semantic equivalence of “preference” and “desire,” and recall part (1) of cct: “we would have a higher degree of well-​being were we to have a preference for living a materially simple life and were that preference satisfied.” The gist, then, of Claxton’s insight as I construe it, is this: for the belief that (1) is true to give rise to action—​for the belief to be volitionally potent—​the concomitant desires must be effective—​effective in the sense of their having an emotive or affective force giving them priority for satisfaction, above others with which they are inconsistent, in the agent’s desire-​ranking.27 Given pertinent facts about human psychology generally and, in particular, the overriding role that our past experience plays in desire formation, rendering the relevant desires effective involves more than mere acknowledgment of the truth of (1). It will involve, rather, active reconditioning of the associated desires. It will involve at least neutralizing the affective force of present (consumer-​oriented) desires so that the felt experience of living simply is not merely the felt experience of inconvenience, deprivation, or worry about an unendurable potential social ostracism. 4.1.3.2 Closure By “closed” is meant an analog of what mathematicians mean by the concept of closure under an operation. A set or system is closed under an operation if performance of the operation on any set member yields a member of the set. The pertinent set is the system of beliefs, attitudes, and habits of thought brought about as described in (i)28—​i.e., those that are the mark of the consumer outlook. This outlook is a shared principal component of the worldview of most in the developed countries, despite other non-​negligible regional differences in outlook owing to divergence in language, history, and other aspects of cultural tradition. The pertinent notion of operation is a broad one. We operate on the set of beliefs by such means as these: inference (which creates new beliefs); the addition of data had via experience (which also creates new beliefs); confirmation or disconfirmation of existing beliefs; and confirmation or disconfirmation of candidate beliefs that have been generated via inference either from existing 27

I have implied that an inconsistency among an agent’s desires is possible, though later in this section I discuss a consistency constraint on belief systems. Those ideas are not incompatible, since beliefs are not desires, and one may have a desire such that the desire is unsupported by a belief that one ought to fulfill the desire. Only if all desires implied beliefs in favor of their fulfillment would inconsistent desires imply inconsistent beliefs. 28 See section 4.1.3.

220 Stevens beliefs or from a collection of beliefs had via experiential data plus old beliefs. These operations are nothing more than part of a taxonomy of deductive and inductive methods of reasoning, including empirical confirmation, together with the obvious fact that we have access via our senses to a physical world. More importantly, though beliefs are the target of the operation, change in belief has an impact on the attitudes and habits of thought that are the other types of thing of which the set or system consists. For a set consisting of such members as these, the analog of the mathematician’s concept of closure is weaker: the set is closed if any and all new candidate members produced via the operation must not be inconsistent with established members.29 (The notion is weaker in that beliefs, unlike mathematical objects, need not map onto themselves under closure but need only be consistent.) In an important sense the mechanism bringing about closure here is modification of the operation. For example, attempts to disconfirm existing beliefs—​one of the modes of operation mentioned above—​falls away under closure, because a disconfirmation of an existing belief produces the negation of that belief, which produces not merely an inconsistency but a contradiction. All systems of belief are closed in the minimal sense that they are consistent and offer what might be called a “closed door” (or one fit with variable grades of tightness in its jamb) to candidate members whose inclusion would generate an inconsistency.30 The nearer to the core of the system is the threatened belief, the more tightly will the door be found to fit within its frame.31 When a system is closed in a less minimal sense, the door is more difficult to open. When the system is closed in the strongest sense, the door might be said to

29

30

31

The concept of closure I use here is different from what goes by the name of ‘epistemic closure’ in the epistemology literature. See, e.g., Dretske, Fred, “Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment?” in Steup, Matthias and Ernest Sosa, eds. (2005) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 13–​26. There are a number of ways to think about the requirement of lack of inconsistency. One is that any collection of beliefs meriting application of the term “system” must, in virtue of the meaning of “system,” not include any feature that undermines such a basic kind of unity as logical consistency. Another, due to advocates of the view known as “coherentism” in epistemology, is that consistency is but one feature of three or more—​and the weakest of them—​that a set of beliefs must meet for any of its members to be epistemically justified. Other standard candidate features include cohesiveness (the relation of mutual support among beliefs), comprehensiveness, and simplicity. A useful analog of this point with regard to issues in the philosophy of science is developed in great detail in Lakatos, Imre, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs,” in Lakatos, Imre and Alan Musgrave, eds. (1970) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 91–​195.

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have been boarded over or entirely removed and replaced with materials so as to cover any former trace of its existence. 4.1.3.3 Closure Prevents Recognition We like to imagine that we are, without exception, open-​minded to beliefs inconsistent with our own, if only because knowledge requires that our beliefs be true, and determination of likelihood of truth requires at least that we entertain competing claims that others find good reason to believe more likely to be true than our own. But as Stolzenberg warns, “[s]‌omehow, by a process that may be quite complex, [some beliefs] become so thoroughly woven into the very fabric of what we take to be our web of reality that it no longer seems possible to adopt a standpoint from which the question of their correctness may be entertained seriously as a ‘mere’ hypothesis.”32 The state of affairs Stolzenberg describes can take at least two different forms. What could be conceived of merely as a hypothesis from the point of view of an agent who feels unthreatened by it, can be perceived as an imminent threat with potentially catastrophic upshot by one whose core beliefs would be undermined were he to accept it as true. The candidate belief—​the proposition that one of the agent’s own beliefs is false—​is the hypothesis. Note that this form requires the agent’s perceiving the candidate belief as having an undermining potential. Or, in the second form, what could be conceived of merely as a hypothesis from the point of view of an agent who is eager to test even his most cherished core beliefs, can be perceived by someone less eager as so alien to the topic of the discourse in which it has arisen that it need not be taken seriously as a candidate belief at all. This form requires the agent’s perceiving the candidate belief as so alien as to not be worth taking seriously as a threat to his belief system. Note that this second form, in contrast to the first, not only does not require the agent’s perceiving the candidate belief as having undermining potential, but rather precludes his doing so. That is, it requires his perceiving the candidate belief as being without any undermining potential whatsoever. The candidate belief is considered to be, so to speak, “crazy.” Its legitimacy is denied outright. When the possible legitimacy of the “crazy” belief is presented with persistence or vehemence to the denier, ad hominem remarks may ensue. It is the second form that concerns us. What has happened is that the belief system has become strongly closed. How and why does this happen? If we realize that, as mentioned above, knowledge requires that our beliefs be true, 32

Stolzenberg, ibid., p. 261.

222 Stevens and determination of likelihood of truth requires at least that we entertain competing claims that others find good reason to believe more likely to be true than our own, then why would we allow our belief systems to become strongly closed? Allowing them to become so is self-​defeating, given their very purpose, namely, the purpose of tracking truth. This is not an easy question. But the answer, I think, lies in the contribution that desires make to our volitional capacity or, in other words, the role desires play, alongside beliefs, as part of our motivational apparatus. Recall that according to Stolzenberg, rather than some beliefs themselves preventing recognition of the incorrect belief, “attitudes and habits of thought prevent this from being recognized.” So beliefs per se are not at the heart of the matter. It is, for instance, surely an attitude rather than a careful consideration of reasons that leads to the denier’s denial, for he adamantly refuses to give reasons their due consideration. In his formulation of Stolzenberg’s notion of the trap, Claxton isolates these attitudes as ones having to do with agent motivation: “[C]‌rucial systems of embodied beliefs constitute traps, in the sense that they invisibly set a person’s motivational agenda, and bias perception against their own detection.”33 Given Claxton’s mentioning “beliefs,” it might be thought that either the emphasis I have placed on desires is incorrect or my citing Claxton in this context is misguided. But neither is so. Claxton’s formulation is consistent with my emphasis. Recognizing the lack of inconsistency is instructive. It is easiest to discern the lack by focusing on the role that the notion of invisibility plays in the formulation. The person’s motivational agenda operates invisibly, rather than visibly, in the following sense: he judges the candidate belief not solely (or not even) on the forthright (or visible) basis of reasons for and against it, but mainly, and unwittingly (and so “invisibly”), on the basis of its fit or lack of fit with desires that are associated with beliefs he already holds. That his motivational agenda rather than well-​reasoned deliberation is the principal determinant of his behavior is unbeknownst to him. So embodied beliefs of this sort invisibly set a person’s motivational agenda, then, in the sense that the person has come to have a motivational agenda at odds with the one he would claim himself to have; he is unaware that his motivational agenda is no longer the tracking of truth but, rather, the maintenance of his currently-​held belief system. An embodied belief of the sort Claxton describes in the passage above, then, is not merely a belief that forms part of an agent’s worldview. It is also one so strongly enmeshed with presently-​held desires that it has become effectively 33

Claxton, op. cit., p. 71.

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immune to rational criticism. Like embodied beliefs in general, embodied beliefs of this sort are an essential part of the motivational apparatus that drives the actions which define the agent as the individual he takes himself to be. But because such embodied beliefs are in this way enmeshed with presently-​held desires, and because desires have an affective component, an attack on such a belief can be felt to be an attack against the agent’s viability—​i.e., an attack on his viability as an agent. Such attacks are not merely challenges to the veracity of a belief, despite their seeming to be so from the challenger’s perspective and their being ostensibly treated as such by the denier. It is no wonder that ad hominems so easily follow in the wake of one’s pressing a “crazy” candidate belief upon the denier. Most importantly, embodied beliefs of this sort, in Claxton’s words, “bias perception against their own detection.”34 This is so in the sense that challenges to them are, as per the denier’s modus operandi, denied the legitimacy they would have to be afforded were they to be taken seriously as the well-​ reasoned challenges that they in some cases actually are. Such an embodied belief is unlike other beliefs in that it is immune to questioning. Challenges to it are challenges to “the way things are.” One cannot detect a belief if, as can be seen from an external point of view, it is not a mere belief and is instead constitutive of the very orientation from which the enterprise of detection is carried out. 4.2 Auto-​conspiracy as Bona Fide Conspiracy Call embodied beliefs of the special sort just discussed “intractable embodied beliefs.” Intractable embodied beliefs play a central role in what I have dubbed “auto-​conspiracy.” At the close of section 3, I posed the following question in an effort to formulate my first pass at a description of the conspiracy: “Why do so many who espouse sustainable lifestyles not manifest that espousal in their consumer behavior?” I claimed the answer likely to be this: “An individual belonging to this group fails to behave in accord with his espousal because he has, in terms of features of his psychology, unwittingly conspired, together with other members of the group, against himself, such that reasons which would otherwise motivate him to behave in accord with his espousal are thereby rendered inaccessible to him.” He could be motivated by reasons provided by sociological studies of the kind I mentioned, or more likely by those provided via careful reflection on the 34

Ibid., p. 71.

224 Stevens experiences that have afforded him the deepest satisfaction thus far in life.35 These reasons are rendered inaccessible to him, as ones having the power to move him to action, because correlative desires of sufficient affective power to render the reasons volitionally potent are themselves unavailable to him. Their availability is precluded by his having pro-​consumerist desires with greater affective power. That much is familiar and not difficult to accept: deep-​seated desire brought about via long-​term conditioning wins out over espoused aims whose fulfillment is inconsistent with the satisfaction of the desire. But we have added an unfamiliar and more interesting component to this familiarity: the implicit belief which that pro-​consumerist desire supports (the belief that consumer acquisition, energy use, and so on at the scale prescribed by prevailing social mores is a necessary constituent of happiness) is also inaccessible to him. This is because the conglomeration of the belief and other beliefs with closely-​related content is a belief system which is closed. These beliefs are intractable embodied beliefs. There is thus a crucial difference between the general workings of intractable embodied belief discussed earlier and the specific case of its workings in the context of the sustainability issue. In the former, challenges to the denier arise from an external source, and they are explicit. There is a challenger and there is another, the denier, who denies the legitimacy of the challenge. Here these are one and the same. The source of the challenge or hypothesis—​the hypothesis being the espoused pro-​sustainability belief—​is the very same agent with the intractable embodied belief—​the belief that consumer acquisition, etc., is a necessary constituent of happiness. The challenger is the denier. Because of this identification, the nature of each of the two, denier and challenger, is complex, as are the natures of both the challenge and the denial. In cases for which the identification holds, and unlike cases for which it does not, neither is the confrontational nature of the challenge explicit, nor does the denier win the confrontation by default. I discuss these in turn. 4.2.1 Lack of Explicitness of Confrontation The confrontational nature of the challenge is not explicit because a challenge, to be explicitly confrontational, must be directed at an opponent who would react to it and react strongly, but the would-​be denier or opponent—​ the intractable embodied belief itself—​has no voice. Given the bizarre nature of this “opponent,” we may choose to forswear the term, along with the term 35

There is no question-​begging occurring here, as these will undoubtedly be non-​material: friendship, love, knowledge, appreciation of nature’s beauty, self-​set life goals reached, and so on.

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“denier,” in descriptions of such cases. To keep matters simple, I will avoid the addition of new terms and will instead retain them, relying on context to make the meaning clear. The opponent, then, is without a voice. The opponent is working secretly or, as it were, behind the scenes relative to the challenger’s purview. That is, the comfort-​addict—​who is challenger when espousing his pro-​sustainability belief—​is not merely unaware of what drives his overconsumption but is furthermore not capable of that awareness because his intractable embodied belief-​set, in being closed, is in ways I have discussed inaccessible to him. It is in fact this very aspect of the sustainability-​espousing comfort-​addict’s predicament—​i.e., intractable embodied beliefs working behind the scenes or secretly and to detrimental result—​that first caught my attention as something at least quasi-​conspiratorial. To forestall a minor potential objection, it is worth noting that not only is the nature of the opponent bizarre. So is the nature of the challenger. The espouser’s unawareness of the opponent might appear to undermine his status as challenger and thereby render the term “challenger” inapt in much the same way as “opponent” and “denier” might be thought rendered inapt. Yet there is a very real challenge and struggle taking place. The comfort-​addict who espouses the materially simple life struggles to live that life but mostly fails. And in his attempts to renew his commitment to the espousal, he each time challenges himself anew. So despite the bizarreness of the terms as they appear in the description of his predicament, they accurately capture some of its important features. 4.2.2 Confrontation Not Won by Default In cases for which the identification of challenger and denier holds, the denier does not win the confrontation by default. The denier beats the challenge not because he refuses to oppose it by denying its legitimacy, as in more typical cases of intractable embodied belief, but because the outcome of the contest between his pro-​consumerist desire and his desire for material simplicity is decided by the greater affective strength of the former. That is, his intractable embodied belief actively opposes his espousal and thereby renders the espousal volitionally impotent. 4.2.3 Three Steps to Auto-​conspiracy Despite these differences between the typical and less typical kinds of case of intractable embodied belief, instances of both types yield a self-​defeating result. In the typical case there is clear-​cut challenger and opponent, with the latter taking himself to have successfully neutralized claims of the former,

226 Stevens though he has done so via mechanisms unknown to him, mechanisms which have in fact yielded a result that is detrimental to his presumed or self-​proclaimed aim of determination of the truth. In the less typical case there is a fuzzy distinction between the challenger and opponent in that the functions which cases of intractable embodied belief typically reserve for different persons manifest themselves in a single individual. But the comfort-​addict, too, has acted against his own best interest in that it is his own intractable embodied belief-​set that prevents him from realizing an aim he himself espouses. And if clause (1) of cct is true, then he has done himself an even greater harm in living a life of lesser well-​being. But has he in any intelligible sense conspired against himself? I believe that he has. I will now explain why I believe this. At the outset of section 4, in an effort to formulate my second pass at a description of the conspiracy, I posed cct, the latter two-​thirds (here labeled (2a) and (2b)) of which I claimed is a description of something that can reasonably be considered conspiratorial in nature: “(1) We would have a higher degree of well-​being were we to have a preference for living the materially simple life and were that preference satisfied. But (2a) due to a striking feature of our own minds, plus detrimental effects of an otherwise beneficial market economy, we fail to realize this higher degree of well-​being. (2b) We fail to do so because we come to have embodied beliefs that support consumer-​oriented lifestyles, such that pro-​sustainability beliefs explicitly espoused but inconsistent with those embodied fail to effect action.” The discussion thus far has brought us to a point where the initially puzzling features of cct can be dispelled. The striking feature of our own minds is their capacity to form intractable embodied beliefs or, using Stolzenberg’s term, traps. The detrimental effects of a market economy are those we suffer due to our beliefs and desires being conditioned through advertising and immersion in a culture whose ethos is a product of prevalent and persuasive marketing campaigns that target our social insecurities, heighten our sensitivity to inconvenience, and promote a fascination with novelty. We are conditioned to overconsumption and preoccupation with material goods at the expense of goods with non-​quantifiable but enduring value. Some of these are friendship, love, knowledge, and the satisfaction of attaining long-​term non-​material aims requiring energy, time, and dedication. Last, the cause of the failure—​pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief—​has occupied the bulk of my discussion, as it is the most complex and least easily comprehensible component of cct. So I have discussed the self-​defeating nature of intractable embodied belief in detail, both as it manifests itself generally and in its particular manifestation as part of the problem of overconsumption.

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With the puzzling nature of those features dispelled, we are now in a position for me to make good on my promise to provide reasons for thinking CTT-​ (2a) and CTT-​(2b) descriptive of a bona fide conspiracy. I proceed in three steps, with the third being, I believe, decisive. Step One. Recall Keeley’s bare bones definition of “conspiracy theory,” recall one of the slight refinements he makes to it, and recall the features we have thus far got that meet those of the slightly refined definition. “A conspiracy theory,” says Keeley, “is a proposed explanation of some historical event…in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons—​the conspirators—​acting in secret.”36 The refinement salient at this point is that the conspirators’ intentions are nefarious or, as I will construe the refinement, the state of affairs a successful conspiracy produces are morally bad. Features of cct meeting the slightly-​refined definition are these: a historical event (widespread failure to live in accord with our espoused sustainability aims), a proposed explanation of that event or state of affairs (pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief and detrimental effects of the free market), and the moral badness of that state of affairs (the unrealized increase in well-​being). Step Two. I have characterized the workings of pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief and its effect upon us as amounting to our “unwittingly conspiring against ourselves.” Implicit in that idea are the following oddities: the idea of a conspiracy with but a single perpetrator, of a perpetrator perpetrating unwittingly, and of the conspiracy’s perpetrator being also the conspiracy’s target. The oddness of all three can be dispelled with reflection on a single bipartite fact: due to the very nature of the workings of intractable embodied belief, those workings are inaccessible to the agent who suffers their effect, and yet he is the source of that effect. There is thus a duality to this agent who is strictly speaking a single individual. This duality can dispel much of the oddness. Before discussing the dispelling of the three oddities via the duality, it is important to recognize that, though for the purposes of exposition I have characterized intractable embodied beliefs as inaccessible to the agent, they are not inaccessible in an absolute sense. Accessibility is possible though difficult. If that were not so, I would not have written this essay, for my goal of convincingly exposing the conspiracy to those who suffer its force would then be unattainable. With regard to the first oddity, in the sense that the agent has not succeeded in discovering the proximal source of his failure to live in accord with his pro-​sustainability espousal, he is what in legal parlance might be termed an 36

Keeley, “Of Conspiracy Theories,” op. cit., p. 116.

228 Stevens “accessory.” This is not true of conspiracies in general, since for most who suffer their ill effects the cause of those effects is not proximal. The point is that the agent is complicit in the failure; we thus have one candidate conspirator, though not a perpetrator, since he does not have knowledge of the deed. He is the victim who should have known better. And yet the agent is also the failure’s source; we thus have another candidate conspirator. He is the perpetrator. Two aspects of a single individual come together to create the predicament. And a corollary of this line of thinking helps us to meet a further feature of the slightly-​refined definition. Though proximity of the predicament’s source (intractable embodied belief) and manifest gravity of the matters at stake tell in favor of a presumption that the agent should have known better, he is nevertheless unaware of the workings of his intractable embodied belief. Those workings are invisible to him, much as the workings of a more typical kind of conspiracy are a secret kept from those outside the conspirators’ circle. The crux is this: in his having created the principal cause of the predicament and in his negligent failing to locate the predicament’s source, a source of which he is unaware, the agent has in an understandable but admittedly weak sense conspired against himself. With regard to the second oddity, he perpetrates unwittingly insofar as the intractable embodied belief, which is the source of the predicament and is his, works unbeknownst to him. With regard to the third oddity, because this duality is a duality of a single person, and because one aspect of that person is the source of the predicament and the other aspect of that person—​the espousing aspect—​bears the brunt of the predicament, the conspiracy’s perpetrator is in this sense also the conspiracy’s target. Step Three. Given the conceptual stretches of step two, the mitigation of oddness achieved there will probably be seen by most as providing at best a weak reason to believe the failure a reasonable candidate for bona fide conspiracy. Step two may have done little more than mollify those with serious misgivings about my main claim. Step three, however, provides much stronger reasons: criteria for application of the concept of conspiracy theory other than those which my explanation of the failure does not strongly meet are not only met but are met maximally. The idea is that meeting these other criteria maximally more than compensates for the weakness of the reasons discussed so far. The criteria are three in number and consist of one already mentioned and two further refinements that Keeley adds to his basic definition. One criterion is a central feature of conspiracy theories that marks them out from theories of most other kinds. This is the feature all conspiracy theories share of the object of investigation’s having an ability to thwart attempts at being successfully investigated. The criterion already mentioned is the moral badness of the state of

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affairs a successful conspiracy produces. The third criterion is a refinement of the description of the nature of the explanation a conspiracy theory offers: the explanation is one that “…runs counter to some received, official, or ‘obvious’ account.”37 I will discuss the criteria in reverse order. Running Counter to the “Obvious”/​Official/​Received Account of an Event. The extent to which we perceive a conspiratorial account of an event as running counter to the received one is a function of more than the semantic content of the two accounts. It is a function also of their prima facie believability. If, as is the case for the more interesting conspiracy theories, neither account is prima facie easy to accept, then despite their being incompatible in terms of semantic content, they may not run counter to each other with respect to believability. But if we hold any belief about events external to our minds as being true, then surely we hold true the belief that our minds (or better our belief-​forming processes and the sense apparatus that feeds them) are at least sometimes epistemically reliable. In fact, many of us believe them to be epistemically reliable with respect to what nearly all will agree are the more important objects of knowledge. But the idea of intractable embodied belief at the heart of cct implies that there are some very important objects of knowledge for which this does not hold: cct implies that we do not know even our own minds. Whatever the official, received, or “obvious” account of our failure to live in accord with our pro-​sustainability espousal, no conspiracy theory of the failure could run more counter to it in terms of believability than does cct, since cct contravenes the most basic of epistemic assumptions. It contravenes the assumption that we are each an expert at knowing what is in our own mind. The Moral Badness of the State of Affairs the Conspiracy Produces. The negative impact of most conspiracies is isolated. The impact is strongest at the time when the immoral deed is done. A conspiracy may be a cover-​up alone, and since cover-​ups are longer lasting than single deeds, their negative impacts are not as isolated in time. But given finite investigative resources, cover-​ups too have ending points. Or a conspiracy may involve both deed and cover-​up. Whether merely deed, cover-​up, or both, most conspiracies have a single event as target. With time’s passage, the force of the negative impact of any such conspiracy wanes. This is not so for the candidate conspiracy cct describes. The longer an agent suffers the failure due to his pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief, the greater the quantity of well-​being he forfeits. There is no temporal point of impact, no discrete point at which the moral badness

37

Ibid., pp. 116–​117.

230 Stevens is greatest. When the conspiracy remains to the agent forever undiscovered, losses accumulate across an entire life. Furthermore, lifetime losses ascribed to a single person can be multiplied by the number of such persons who exist. Wrongful death may create the greatest of all moral disvalues, and so as a kind it surely trumps the kind of loss of value cct implies. But wrongful death of nearly whole populations is not common in human history, whereas comfort-​addiction of nearly whole populations is a common feature of the developed countries. The discussion of moral badness so far may be enough to show that the candidate conspiracy cct describes produces a degree of moral badness probably greater than that producible by any other conceivable conspiracy except others having a similar mechanism of belief, desire, and volition at their core. I am, however, unable to think of any but drug addiction, and it is not nearly so widespread nor will it ever be. The Prime Essential Feature of Conspiracy Theories and Its Maximal Case. The conspiracy cct describes, if it is one, is consummate in the sense that it exhibits, to probably the greatest degree possible, a feature of conspiracy theories differentiating them from theories of nearly all other types. Considering conspiracy theories from the point of view of investigation into their veracity, this is the feature all conspiracy theories share of the object of investigation’s having the ability and motive to thwart attempts at being successfully investigated. Consider the more typical type of conspiracy, i.e., the type not involving the self-​deception at the core of cct. Conspirators have an overwhelming interest in the outcome of any investigation into their activities. To the extent which a conspirator has access to information about those doing the investigating, he is to that extent better able to foil attempts at discovery. Now consider an investigation into cct. If one conspires against oneself, and provided that that idea is ultimately determined to be intelligible, then the object of investigation—namely, one’s pro-consumerist conspiratorial self—undoubtedly has an interest in the investigation’s outcome. He wants it foiled. The main idea structuring the claim that cct exhibits the feature maximally is this: degree of strength of reasons necessary for taking absence of evidence of some conspiracy as evidence of the conspiracy’s absence is directly proportional to the degree of ability of the object of investigation to foil attempts at being found out. So if the investigative object’s ability to deceive is high, then investigators ought to take absence of evidence of the conspiracy’s existence as reliable evidence of the conspiracy theory’s falsity only to the extent that other epistemic grounds support the negative finding. Given the unparalleled access one has to one’s own mental states, in terms of both the determination or production of their content and the assessment of their veracity, the degree

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of ability of this particular object of investigation to foil attempts at being found out is supreme, with the exception of god, if he exists. The upshot for anyone’s attempted determination of the veracity of cct with respect to himself considered as over-​consumptive agent, then, is that evidence of absence has very little if any probative force. This point brings us to the topic of section 5. 5

Keeley’s Work Applied to the Consummate Conspiracy

Keeley mentions that his early work on the epistemology of conspiracy theories centered on a hopeful exploration of the following question: “…can we identify a class of conspiracy theories—​I call them ‘unwarranted conspiracy theories’ (uct s)—​that [are] by definition incredible?”38 His studied conclusion was that “[t]‌here is no principled way of distinguishing, a priori, the two classes from one another…. As a result, contrary to being able to reject conspiracy theories out of hand, prior to any investigation, we ought to adopt an agnostic attitude with respect to conspiratorial claims.”39 Or, as he makes clear, we should do so at least initially: “As time passes and investigation ensues, we will generally come to lump the given theory in either with the Watergates (the credible) or with the faked-​lunar-​landings (the incredible).”40 In other words, as evidence trickles in or the evidential trail thins or dries up completely, our initial agnosticism changes, and this change culminates in acceptance or dismissal. We may ultimately dismiss a weakly-​supported conspiracy theory the acceptance of which commits us to belief in massive coordination to prevent information leaks or globally undermines our confidence in institutions necessary for democracy, maintenance of law and order, and continued survival of the rights and privileges we enjoy (e.g., the 9/​11 Truth Movement’s conspiracy theory of controlled demolition and Executive Branch involvement). Or we may come to accept a theory (Watergate). But this analysis is unfortunately inapplicable to cct. The reason is that an agent’s intractable embodied belief prevents him from taking seriously the claim that he is conspiring against himself. He rejects the claim not because it is unsupported by reasons—​it may be presented to him along with what others take to be arguably very good supporting reasons. Rather, he rejects the claim because the pro-​consumerist implicit belief that cct imputes to him 38 39 40

Keeley, “God as the Ultimate Conspiracy Theory,” op. cit., p. 137. Ibid., p. 137. Ibid., pp. 137–​138.

232 Stevens is constitutive of the very worldview from which he would assess the truth of cct. His situation—​which is our situation too—​can be poignantly put: one may come to realize that one’s initial denial of the plausibility of cct may be due to cct in fact being true. In other words, if cct is true, then given the self-​deceptive nature of intractable embodied belief, one would expect an agent with pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief to find cct incredible. Neither the trickling in of evidence nor the evidential stream’s drying up will affect the comfort-​addict’s assessment of the warranted assertability of cct. Evidence simply does not matter. Of more help in formulating a response to cct is Keeley’s conclusion that we should initially be agnostic with respect to any conspiratorial claim with which we are confronted. We then ought not do as the agent I have mentioned above has done; we ought not from the outset deny cct’s plausibility. We should initially be cct agnostics. We might consider the adoption of that initial agnostic attitude a principle by which to approach conspiracy theories. There is a second principle I believe ought to be adopted in response to cct: the well-​known precautionary principle. There is debate as to precisely what form the principle ought best be thought to take, but there is an undisputed central idea. In the context of the making of a decision whether or not to perform some action that would safeguard (or endanger) something of value, and provided limited knowledge of the extent of the correlative danger, strength of the justificatory ground for action (or inaction) is directly proportional to the thing’s value. So if something is of great value, then one has good reason to act so as to protect it, despite one’s lack of knowledge of the probability of the occurrence of, or extent of, the harm that might ensue were one not to have so acted. We ought to adopt this principle in our assessment of cct because cct implies a great harm is being done to something of tremendous value to us, namely, our own well-​being. Combining the two principles yields the following result. Agnosticism about cct blocks the denial of the plausibility of cct—​a denial that would, in turn, have prevented responding to cct with the precautionary principle. (This is because responding to cct with the precautionary principle requires acceptance of cct as at least plausible.) Because cct implies that a great harm is being done to something of tremendous value to us, the precautionary principle applies: in deciding whether or not to act so as to avoid the potential harm, we ought to act. That is—​and this is the crux—​we ought to act so as to try to determine whether or not cct is true. For if we were to find that cct is true—​i.e., if we were to have admitted to ourselves that we are comfort-​addicts and were to have done so in a way

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that requires thoroughgoing acceptance of that finding—​then we would have dismantled the pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief that is the cause of the harm. This is so because it is not possible for one to accept the anti-​ overconsumerist finding without one’s dismantling of that pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief; an intractable embodied belief-​set is closed, recall, in the sense that operations on the set must yield beliefs consistent with set members. Furthermore, intractable embodied belief can prevent one’s taking seriously claims inconsistent with beliefs forming the set’s core. Such claims may be denied credibility in the sense that they are construed as “crazy” or simply unintelligible. One cannot sincerely accept the finding that cct is true while simultaneously rejecting cct’s intelligibility. This analysis of a requirement on the acceptance of cct as true suggests a requirement on any earnest attempt to determine whether or not cct is in fact true. The attempt must include a means to somehow open, at least temporarily, that closed belief-​set. As discussed in 4.1.3 (see the subheadings “Recognition” and “Closure Prevents Recognition”), a thorough account of the nature of pro-​consumerist intractable embodied beliefs includes reflection on the pro-​consumerist desires with which they are enmeshed. The phenomenon of intractable embodied belief has to do not merely with our beliefs but with the volitional mechanism in which they play a role. This is especially so with regard to intractable embodied beliefs having to do with consumerism, which is itself so closely connected with the desire-​related affective capacities via comfort, social pressures, and the many and varied forms they take in the developed countries. In an unbiased determination, then, one must not merely examine cct intellectually, since mere intellectual examination will likely leave the desires unaffected. One must instead test cct empirically. One might do this oneself (rather than gather human subjects, etc., and perform a sociological study) by living in a materially simple way for periods of a quantity and duration sufficient for being reasonably thought constitutive of a fair test. But given the strong affective component of pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief, there is a crucial caveat: any earnest attempt to determine the truth value of cct will require a disciplined effort to neutralize the entrenched pro-​consumerist desire that would profoundly bias one’s empirical testing of cct treated as hypothesis. Failure to neutralize the affective force of presently-​held (pro-​consumerist) desires while performing such an experiment will likely result in the reduction of the felt experience of living in a materially simple way to the felt experience of inconvenience, deprivation, or worry about an unendurable potential social ostracism. One cannot access whatever value there may be in the experience of simple living if one is conditioned in such a way that the baseline for

234 Stevens comfort is the one taken for granted as correct in the developed countries. One might neutralize the affective force of those desires by reconditioning oneself through repeated periods spent in circumstances that render the satisfaction of those desires very difficult or impossible. In such circumstances, one naturally searches for other means to satisfy those desires or searches for alternative and satisfiable desires to take their place. But it is important to remember that the materially simple life is valuable not so much in virtue of the value of simplicity itself but in virtue of the time, energy, and resources regained for the pursuit of goods with non-​quantifiable but enduring value, such as friendship, love, knowledge, appreciation of the arts, and the satisfaction of attaining long-​term non-​material aims requiring energy, time, and dedication. This adds complexity to the difficulties of performing the empirical test because the realization of any and all these goods requires regular and ongoing efforts not possible for an agent performing the experiment across a patchwork of periods. Fairly performing the test, then, amounts to the adoption of a lifestyle complete in itself and very different from the consumer-​oriented one to which most of us have grown accustomed. Unfortunately, carrying out this type of experiment is not feasible for most. We have mainstream jobs, sizable debts, and long-​term commitments that are in a variety of ways inconsistent with performing the experiment. The most realistic solution is, I think, to live one or more carefully-​selected and positive pieces of the experiment such that those pieces are integrated into our lives as they are presently lived. By “positive” I mean those parts of the experiment having to do with non-​material goods. The agent should select some good for realization. In the enthusiasm generated by attempting to realize that good, he may come naturally to pare commitments to his consumerist lifestyle so as to free up time, energy, and resources to aid in the realization. Key to the successful performance of this version of the experiment is one’s choice of good. One should choose a good that he intrinsically cares about. That is, the good should be one that the agent cares about as an end rather than merely a means. The realization of a good that he does care about in this way will undoubtedly have great instrumental value for him as an object of pleasure. But it should be a good that he cares about in terms of the maintenance of its integrity as the thing it is. It should be a good that he would like to see survive in perpetuity or for as long as is possible given its nature. Whether the good be knowledge of a particular sort, appreciation of a particular art form, or something else, he should, in a word, love it.41 41

See Frankfurt, Harry (2004) The Reasons of Love, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; (2006) Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right, Stanford: Stanford University

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235

Conclusion

This analysis of cct suggests that, contrary to current widespread opinion, the cap about consumption and sustainability discussed in sections 2 and 3 might be successfully dealt with by means of enlightened self-​interest. The enlightened self-​interest approach has more promise than typically thought. This is a welcome result because the more widely-​accepted suggestions for dealing with the cap—​nearly all of which in one or another way undermine market efficiency—​are in the estimation of many, including some who have fought for them, either not being properly implemented, not being implemented on a sufficiently large scale, or not yielding the results hoped for. Furthermore, if cct is true, then the lack of interest in enlightened self-​interest approaches can be explained in a way that does not refer to any potential drawback of cct: the uninterested may be comfort-​addicts unwittingly biased against such approaches due to their own pro-​consumerist intractable embodied belief. That is a suspiciously tidy explanation which may nevertheless be true. Conceiving of the principal cause of the cap about consumption and sustainability as an auto-​conspiracy may help us respond to it with a higher probability of success than competing responses. This is because conceiving of the cause as a failing of individuals to know what is in their own best interest provides a response with motivational force inbuilt. We naturally want to do whatever is in our own best interest, provided that we can see it as such. Performance of the empirical experiment on cct gives us access to the truth that the materially simple life rich in non-​material goods is a life of greater felt meaningfulness than the lifestyle to which most of us are accustomed, if that is indeed a truth. Even prior to performing the experiment, most of us would admit that it is one. And so we are willing to espouse it, all the while not living it. If the belief that a materially simple life rich in nonmaterial goods yields greater felt meaningfulness is one we already hold, then the fact that we do not tend to live in accord with that belief is exceedingly more bizarre than our not living in accord with our pro-​sustainability espousals, since the sustainability aim is held hostage to the problem of collective action. It has been my aim here to locate and explain the most elusive and intractable part of the cause of this bizarreness. If living a materially simple life rich in non-​material goods is not only in our immediate best interest but also promotes long-​term sustainability, then

Press; (1988) “The Importance of What We Care About,” in Frankfurt, Harry (1988) The Importance of What We Care About. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 80–​94.

236 Stevens this is all to the good. But because we can take great pleasure in having lived lives that promote the existence of an ecologically-​sound natural world for future generations, even the sustainability by-​product is in one’s interest. It is not nearly so strongly in one’s interest, though, for none of us has strong reason to believe that the sustainability aim will be reached. In contrast, since one’s future is largely in one’s own hands, each of us can with much greater confidence believe the goal of realization of his beloved good attainable, as long as that good is carefully chosen so as to be loved enough to generate sufficient enthusiasm for the goal so as to neutralize the affective power of our entrenched pro-​consumerist desire.

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Laszlo, Erwin (1989) The Inner Limits of Mankind: Heretical Reflections on Today’s Values, Culture and Politics. London: Oneworld. Lichtenberg, Judith (1996) “Consuming Because Others Consume,” Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 22, pp. 273–​297. Millgram, Elijah ed. (2001) Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: mit Press. Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Raz, Joseph (1986) The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sher, George (1997) Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stevens, Christopher (2011) “Perfectionist Liberalism, Natural Law Jurisprudence, and the Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law,” in Gasparski, Wojchiech and Olli Loukola, eds. (2011) Environmental Political Philosophy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, pp. 51–​98. Stolzenberg, Gabriel (1984) “Can an Inquiry into the Foundations of Mathematics Tell Us Anything Interesting About Mind?” in Paul Watzlawick, ed. (1984) The Invented Reality: How Do We Know What We Believe We Know? New York: Norton. pp. 257–​308. Wall, Steven (1998) Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint. New York: Cambridge University Press. Xenos, Nicholas (1989) Scarcity and Modernity. New York: Routledge.

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Cunning Strategy in Cyberspace—​ The Renaissance of Conspiracy Saara Jantunen and Aki-​Mauri Huhtinen 1 Introduction WikiLeaks and social media, such as Facebook, are changing the nature of information. The rise of social media is creating a comeback of not only propaganda, but of conspiracies and conspiracy theories. Secret agents are not necessarily foreign agents hacking into your system or spies who have infiltrated the organization from within. They may be ordinary (young) men or women, who exploit the complex nature of social networking. The status of social networks is undefined and in many cases unclear. Some organizations encourage the use of, for example, Facebook, as an effort to promote ‘transparency’. At the same time, the use of social media is under constant control. Social media merge work and personal life and encourage a particular type of narcissistic social behavior. People are eager to present not only flattering photos of themselves, but their work information to their social network and contacts. Facebook profiles function as reputation management and have replaced business cards. The problem arises when the ‘strategic corporals’ enter the network. A single soldier may make his organization extremely vulnerable (as was demonstrated by WikiLeaks and Bradley Manning), and at the same time, a single person may exploit social networks like never before. This behavior is an invitation to exploitation. Eden Abergil, a former Israeli soldier, posted pictures on Facebook of herself posing next to bound and blindfolded Palestinian detainees. Similar pictures were taken by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib and then leaked into the press. In 2010, a security consultant managed to collect information from nearly 300 members of the national security community by creating a false profile—​and using pictures of an attractive female. The same has been done by Hizbollah, who gathered information through an agent, who pretended to be an Israeli girl named Reut Zuckerman. She was friended by more than 200 reserve and active personnel, who trusted her to be safe because of multiple mutual friends (Waterman, 2010). The psychological need to belong and to share experiences determines our virtual behavior. In social media the inexperienced, careless, and narcissistic meet the cunning

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and sophisticated professionals, and it is extremely difficult to control their behavior from the outside. Human beings are storytellers and mythology makers. Myths, understood properly as grand, communally shared narratives, are fundamental in understanding ourselves and our predicament as mortal, sexed beings. Myths and narratives are how we place ourselves against the framework of the cosmos and imagine our place within the vast stage of creation. Narrative reconstruction is an attempt to reconstitute and repair identity between the body, the self, and the world (Riessman, 2008, p. 57; also Armitage, 2003). This is the process that conspiracies attempt to exploit, as this type of strategic planning is necessary for reaching the desired end state. What makes strategy a conspiracy is the intentional paradox: the conflict between reality and how it is narrated. In this, the role of cyberspace is paramount. The public broadcast of different public identities and narratives allows the new forms and practices of conspiring to evolve. Information warfare increasingly resembles reputation management in the ‘Battle of Narratives’, making information operations essentially narratives. 2

The Clash of Transparency, Democracy, and Conspiracy

The obscurity of cyberspace and the complex nature of social media make them a natural source and environment for conspiracy. In the media, the internet is constantly discussed in the context of threat, which stems from anonymity, exposure, and loss of control—​all ideal for the purposes of cunning. Corporations and government agencies release their social media guidelines, and the only common trend between them seems to be their different approaches to cyber etiquette. Transparency and free flow of information are encouraged to make “governments more accountable”, says U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). However, this statement quickly became a source of amusement due to the WikiLeaks scandal and the American state leadership’s response to it. When Clinton responded to the leaks by referring to them as “attacks” (Neuman, 2010), she demonstrated the gap between reality and politics: that transparency is not, in fact, an intrinsic value, but something that should be dictated by the government, on its own terms. The internet has indeed increased transparency and given a voice to the average user: a frustrated soldier in Iraq or a disappointed client are both equally empowered by the opportunity to be heard. WikiLeaks and the attacks by the Anonymous are an attempt to demonstrate the power of transparency

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as a new international policy. The conflict between the activists and the traditionalists originates from the different understandings of democracy. Whereas some see democracy as the right to know the truth about the political reality their representatives are involved in, some argue that democratically elected governments have the right to control the flow of information, and see democracy as handing over certain rights for the representative to use. The clash of these interpretations contributes to the need for conspiracies. Can we trust a government when they first tell us they have killed Osama Bin Laden and his wife, who resisted their capture violently? A day later, when it is announced that Bin Laden was, in fact, unarmed, and that his wife, after all, was only wounded, do we accept this as new information, or do we react to the change of scheme with a protest and with a feeling that, in fact, our right to information has been violated? In situations like these, the boundaries between logic and emotions become blurry. In conspiracy theories, simple narratives are typically used to reinforce the audience’s belief system. Conspiracy theories contain narrative gaps that the audience has to fill in order to make sense of the presented reality. They are both a psychological response to uncertainty, as well as a cunning strategy that aims to evoke it. This is how conspiracy theories are born—​planned by the actor, but given birth by the audience. When communication and action conflict with narratives, people need to determine their emotional stance towards the narrative. This results in conspiracy theory and will, in turn, give the actor more space to operate. Conspiracy means diverting. Our claim is that conspiracy is ultimately mediated by the paradox between the actor’s communication and action: very rarely phenomena labeled as ‘true’ are undisputedly so, and seldom the action presented as ‘good’ is that uncomplicated. The intolerance towards paradox is fundamental in the Western society that traditionally values rationality and logic. In political language this has been realized in the successful shortcuts of populist rhetoric, which, instead of being analytical, presents a simplified interpretation of social reality. In military discourse this is realized by strategic communication, produced by trained officials in press briefings that illustrate military action with charts, geographic data, and descriptions of operational art. The virtue of political or strategic communication is not in being comprehensive, but in mediating an ideology, an image, or a message. In political discourse, objectivity or impartiality is rarely expected. Instead, the discourses are approached as narratives that demand analysis: the very starting point to their interpretation is the assumption that the real narrative is hidden and to be speculated. Narratives are built around the assumption that they will be subject to debate. The art of

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conspiracy is in the skill of exploiting the debate that can only be influenced, but never controlled. People have a low tolerance for paradox. Political narratives are full of metaphors and analogies that reveal the paradox, but which the audience interprets in line with the Grand Narrative: phrases such as “bombing the village to save it”, concepts such as ‘peace enforcement’, and war labeled as “humanitarian operations” are all based on the expectation that the audience shares the Western ideology of advancement and humanitarianism. Terminology and metaphors like these are the blueprint of conspiracy, which are constructed around recognized and also subconscious ideologies. “Society is represented and conceived rather than perceived” Malrieu (2002, p. 24) argues. When discourses fit the evaluations of ideology, narratives gain coherence. “Ideologies can no longer simply be understood as strategies of justification, but have to be understood as the result of empathetic relations to realities to which social actors can only gain access through the media” (Malrieu, 2002, p. 33). Ideology, as a system of representation, is the key factor that operates in the background of action and practice. Ideology is thus the foundation of strategy and therefore also of conspiracy. The harmony of ideology and its verbalization are the prerequisite for effective, influential narratives (Malrieu, 2002, p. 30). 3

Some Logos, Pathos, and Ethos: The Narrative Conspiracy of Reputation Management and Emotion Operations

Conspiracy is typically presented as a form of strategy closely linked to sensemaking and framing. Conspiracy theories contain the idea of concrete action and its aim: in addition to being processes, they have an end state. Just like framing, a conspiracy or a conspiracy theory may actualize as a narrative, but it also aims to influence power relations. Strategy is not something that people have, but something that people do, don’t do, could do, or wish to do. We are moving from the epistemological and technological understanding to the phronetic world understanding. This means more practical wisdom and tacit knowledge, cunning intelligence, or ‘metis’, which combines flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, and other skills and experience acquired over years. Metis and pronesis are the attributes of a ‘streetsmart’ person with an understanding of the world (Golsorkhi, 2010, p. 37). This ‘comprehensive approach’ of information operations depends not only on the cognitive qualities of the audience, but recognizes the power of emotion.

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Narratives can be seen as a chain of happenings that leads from a situation to another and typically contains tellability, eventfulness, and certain unpredictability, among other features (Schmid, 2010). These features, combined with certain gaps in the narration, are the foundation for all strategy. One of these strategies is conspiracy and conspiracy theories. Strategic communication and conspiracy theories have the same structures and patterns. The ultimate aim of them both is to deliver a reputation. In military discourse this process is known as the ‘Battle of Narratives’, an information operation that exploits emotions by attempting to win the ‘hearts and minds’. 3.1 Reputation Management New technologies and media influence communication strategies. The increasing possibilities of interaction and outreach in social media challenge perception management. According to Aula & Heinonen (2011) the rise of social media forces companies to reassess their relationship to and attitude towards the media. Reputation can and must be managed, but it cannot be entirely controlled. Sustainable and good business culture and clear motivations are the foundation of a good reputation. The same rule now applies to all forms of warfare, too. The constant presence of the media and the risk of information leaks require constant legitimation of action. This is done by emphasizing compliance with the Geneva Conventions, human rights, right to privacy, national legislation, etc. It can thus be said that perception management has turned into reputation management, which is executed through strategic communication and results in a battle of narratives in the social (and other) media. Non-​commercial actors, such as the military, also recognize the importance of narratives in leadership and reputation management. The Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy (US Joint Forces Command, 2010), states that The battle is not merely to push aside, defeat or gain superiority over the enemy’s narrative; it is to completely supplant it. In fact, upon our winning the battle of the narrative, the enemy narrative doesn’t just diminish in appeal or followership, it becomes irrelevant. Leadership models in the 90s and the first decade of the 21st century have focused on ‘knowledge leadership’. However, new technologies, such as social media, exploit emotion as a weapon. Information leadership is still topical, but ineffective without the practice of emotion operations.

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3.2 Emotion Operations On February 9, 2012 the Finnish tabloid Iltalehti published a headline: “Three bombs on a single day—​c onspiracy?”. The three bombs in question were the news about the closing down of a number of military garrisons, about the sacking of about a thousand employees in the Nokia factory, and about the plans to merge Finnish municipalities, all causing fears of unemployment, loss of services and the deterioration of the rural centers of population. The emotional impact of the news day is what linked it to conspiracy theories. The extensive and simultaneous emotional impact of the news made people question the motivations behind the decision to release the news on the same day. A good conspiracy requires extensive knowledge of people’s fears and perceptions. We all have areas within ourselves we are not familiar with. Infesting these areas with fears and threats creates an ethos of self-​censorship. Setting the boundaries of the ‘self’ always requires the presence of ‘the other’, and ‘the other’ is the construct the conspiracies uphold. Answering the question “why do we need social media and what for” helps us understand modern communication. Emails, chatrooms, and online photo galleries can do what Facebook does, but what Facebook has added to this is social behavior: social media creates social phenomena. The users of social media have the temptation to measure their worth in the number of contacts and tend to view other people as more successful and attractive than themselves. At the same time, the social media appeals to narcissistic personalities. In social media, information and status are the same things, and both are to be made public. Unlike certain other media, social media causes addiction as well as feelings of guilt and pressure: people feel guilty for not accepting friend requests on Facebook, and the fear of being ‘left out’ keeps people connected (Edinburgh Napier, 2011). The idea of ‘online loneliness’ scares people, because that loneliness is public. Contacts become objects and online profiles turn into calculated reputation management. The users have the pressure to “produce something” about themselves (bbc, 16 February 2011). Because emotions steer social behavior, social media are a resource for information operations. Information operations turn into emotion operations, which combine information technology, strategic communication, and social behavior. The concept is not new, but for a long time leadership models have focused on information, logic, and knowledge, whereas social aspects have been largely ignored. However, warfare is social behavior. With modern technologies, people are always the weakest link, the “human factor”. What ties the use of emotions to espionage is social media. As a strategy, emotion operations are experiencing a new renaissance in the form of

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social espionage and reputation management. In the postmodern world, the roles and representations of emotions and also sexuality are emphasized (Herkman, 2007). This creates opportunities for social conspiracies that target the ‘strategic corporal’. For example, military personnel is made available to anyone through social media, unlike back in the days when they were kept away from tv cameras and from giving unauthorized statements. Social media reaches people who cannot necessarily be reached through traditional media. The key to conspiracy is the manipulation of emotions and consequently social behavior. In social media, contacts are part of public/​social identity. The problem here is that one may never know who really is behind the alluring online profile, and one becomes connected to larger and larger networks by every contact confirmed. The impact of people’s tendency to react with emotion first and logic second, is multiplied by the speed and reach of the al media. This enables the practice of certain forms of intelligence and espionage. Emotions have always been prey to psychological operations: perception management aims to reinforce and influence the sense of collective identity and the experience of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’. However, users of social media have the need to express individuality. The below table presents the steps of perception management. If a person is susceptible to personality or identity problems, perception management becomes easier. People who are dependent, passive, or aggressive are vulnerable in the face of emotional triggers. Self-​centeredness, self-​seeking and emotional instability increases the need for emotional stimuli. These features not only steer face-​to-​face-​encounters, but also determine behavior in social media. The steps presented above are the foundation of strategy as social and discursive practice. In the narratives of strategic communication, as well as in the al media, the gap between truth and perception, expectation and realization are outcomes of the above practices. Emotions are manipulated through narrative meaning-​making. Cyberspace and social media operate as a two-​bladed sword. Conspiracy is part of their structure and construction, but people will always promote their own interests first, which creates confusion in terms of roles. Cyberspace has created an endless need for control and management, because not only the enemy and the audience, but also the actors operating on our own side have to be controlled. What responds to this need is strategic communication, the function of which is to produce and spread the same framework narrative to all—​both ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is, ultimately, the conspiracy. We can see this process categorized as perception grabbing and binding onto information in the following matrix (see Table 11.1).

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Cunning Strategy in Cyberspace table 11.1 Perception grabbing and binding onto information

Steps of cunning Attention grabbing

When you look, people will look Perception Keep the grabbing clue on the move and it becomes unrevisable Cognition Reinforce grabbing prior knowledge Emotion grabbing

Anticipate and fulfill the needs of the audience

A large move Lowered hides the perception small move Conceal the clue within its origin Repeat generated expectations

People will lower their guard once they think the danger is over Replace the Diversify the clue (truth) constitution and with deception, facets of the clue or vice versa

Expect the expected behavior to realize Reveal the Conceal the truth when it clue within the is expected to untruthfulness be false

Support all information sources of the audience Deception is continuous

3.3 On War and Combat as Rhetorical Tools The use of specific words creates specific emotions. According to Timo Airaksinen (2011), one must therefore differentiate between combat, war, and struggle (in the general sense of the word). A person struggles constantly, even against oneself, but taking up combat is an entirely different matter. Another point worth noticing is that it is possible to fight without a war. War is a special way of organizing combat, or at least the threat of combat. Let us think about the Cold War, which was a war without battles. War can exist without combat; combat can exist without war. A military may win numerous battles, even all of them it participates in, as the USA in Vietnam, but still the state the military represents loses the war. Winning the battle and losing the war is not a paradox. According to Airaksinen, war and combat must be separated as accurately as possible. A good example of combat that has a mysterious relationship with the war, is Afghanistan in 2011 (Airaksinen, 2011). The nature of this struggle is very

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unclear. Like Frank Furedi argues in his book Invitation to Terror (2008), terrorism is such an unclear and difficult concept that the ‘War on Terror’ is transforming into the concept of ‘the Long War’. This semantic transition includes a long-​running message. The war in question is long, perhaps endless, and therefore something that can be seen as a normal state. Terrorism is only a method and waging war against a method has proved impossible. The adequate term would be ‘war against terrorists’. But who are they? Even better a question is what is war? Is there a war in Afghanistan? Is Finland at war? If there is a war in Afghanistan, why are Europeans there as peacekeepers? If there is no war, people live their normal lives. War breaks out, then peace arrives, and with peace things become normal again. But how is it really? Is rhetoric once again separate(-​d) from the actual state of affairs? Peace as the normal state may only be a manner of speaking and a phrase required by civilized discussion. Perhaps war is the normal state and peace is the exception to it; combat is of course an entirely different concept. How sensible really is the people’s wish for peace? Countries such as the United States are constantly preparing for continuous war. Should this be understood as a desire for peace? The very attempt to define and verbalize combat contains the attempt to propagandize the way into a conspiracy. The interpretation of the language of rules, norms, and legislation in the declarations of war or peace is never unproblematic. This language keeps the back door open for conspiracy. In strategically constructed narratives battle does not equal war, or the war to battle. 4

Conclusion: Diffusion and Disappearance

The so-​called “diffused audience” (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 14) refers to the situation where it is not possible to analyze or profile the target audience in a given situation. In cyberspace this means that decision-​making is based on automated surveillance of both online and offline behavior. These surveillance technologies ‘screen out’ the normal but bring into focus unusual behavior (ibid., p. 15) The figure of the “unknown terrorist” is ethically problematic: if a person’s behavior resembles the pattern characteristic to, for example, terrorists in the recent past, does that make the person a terrorist-​to-​be? In this case the response before the event can never be a responsible response (ibid., p. 15). Diffused war is a new paradigm of war, in which the mediatization of war diffuses the causal relations between action and effect, creating greater uncertainty for policymakers in the conduct of war. (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 3). Today both the sphere of policy and the sphere of business operate under the laws of marketing. Politicians cannot go without political advertising

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promoting them and their policies as trademarks. In the case of war, propaganda campaigns are crucial to gain public support (Strazzanti, 2009). The combination of massive information flows, social media, narratives, diffused audience, and the ‘strategy of cunning’ have started the renaissance of conspiracies. Mikko Hyppönen, chief research officer of cybersecurity corporation FSecure, stated that cybersecurity has always been about the interaction between individuals (2011). Cyberspace has no borders or boundaries, which makes the threats global. Whereas people are rarely physically threatened by someone abroad, in cyberspace this is possible. According to Hyppönen, people’s beliefs are the reason for their risk-​taking, for example, in social media. They may believe they’re the customers of Facebook, but instead, the conspiracy is that they are in fact the product itself, sold and marketed to the enterprizes. When it comes to computer viruses, they no longer focus on destruction, but have a conspiratory function in observing and manipulating computers until the user types in wanted information (Hyppönen, 2011). The aim may be to make money, which has, according to Hyppönen, led to the use of “ransom viruses”, where the infected computer files are encrypted and, if the user pays the ransom, finally de-​encrypted and returned to use. Social media, as well as cyberspace, allow the exploitation of the Troyan horse concept, which has become the model for human behavior in many aspects of social life. If we act in the Troyan spirit, we are living in a conspiracy where our beliefs and the facts no longer meet. Mika Mannermaa (2008) refers to this polarization of social constructions with the concept of “ubiquitous society”: everyone is present everywhere, all the time. The Big Brother is replaced by us, who are observing and controlling our physical and virtual environments. Conspiracy and paranoia are the pillars of the information society. To some, this aquarium represents safety, and to others it appears as a source of angst. Our past is stored online and our virtual footprints construe an identity that we cannot entirely control. The free will of the individual is driven by the global (conspiratory) networks, which remain unseen. The safer the world becomes, the more we fear. The more we have information, the more we are driven by paranoia. The essential questions that we, as citizens, should ask ourselves when we ponder the possibility of a conspiracy, are: Truth: Can we trust the suffering (or any other extreme sensation or emotion) the pictures and narratives convey? (Media seeks sensation and simplifies messages.)

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Ethics: How do the pictures and narratives make us feel? How should we feel? (Should we feel empathy by default?) Repetition: How often should suffering (or any other extreme sensation or emotion) be displayed, and in which media? (Digitality duplicates and alters the context.) Benefit: Of whose interest are the pictures or narratives—​ or their absence? The evolution of malicious behavior as well as a military strategy can be seen as parallel conspiratory processes that disappear from the sight, rely on the cunning, and inspire each other. On the battlefield we aim to develop precise, unmanned (information) technologies to exploit the user instead of causing physical destruction. The question here is that if we have to choose between being conspired against or being openly confronted with aggression, what do we choose? Bibliography Airaksinen, Timo (2011) “Turvallisuudesta ja sodan etiikasta.” In J. Tuominen, ed. 2011. Nuoret, arvot ja maanpuolustus. Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu. Johtamisen ja sotilaspedagogiikan laitos. Julkaisusarja 2, pp. 16–​39. Airaksinen, Timo (2009) “Conspiracy as a Dirty Secret: The Case of 9/​11”. The Secret of Secrets. Homo Oeconomicus, Volume 26, Number 1 (2009). München: Accedo Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 123–​142. Armitage, John (2003) “Militarized Bodies: An Introduction”. Body & Society, vol. 9; 1, pp. 1–​12. Aula, Pekka & Jouni Heinonen (2011) Maineen uusi aalto. Helsinki: Talentum. bbc (2011) “Facebook ‘friends’ cause stress, research finds”. bbc, 16 February, 2011. Available: http://​www.bbc.co.uk/​news/​uk-​scotl​and-​edinbu​rgh-​east-​fife1​2479​660 [30 Jan 2011]. Caton, Jeffrey L., John H. Greenmyer, Jeffrey L. Groh, & William O. Waddell (2010) Information as Power. An Anthology of Selected United States Army War College Student Papers. Volume 5. Information in Warfare Group, U.S. Army War College. Council on Foreign Relations (2010) “Clinton’s Speech on Internet Freedom, January 2010” [Online] Available: http://​www.cfr.org/​publ​icat​ion/​21253/​clintons_​spe​ech _​on_​i​nter​net_​free​dom_​jan uary_​ 2010.html [30 Jan 2011]. Edinburgh Napier (2011) “Facebook stress linked to number of ‘friends’ ”. Available: http://​www.nap​ier.ac.uk/​media/​Pages/​News​Deta​ils.aspx?New​sID=​187 [30 Jan 2011].

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Fenster, Mark (1999) Conspiracy Theories. Secrecy and Power in American Culture. University of Minnesota Press. Golsorkhi, Damon, Linda Rouleau, David Seidl, Eero Vaara (2010) Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as Practice. Cambridge University Press. Herkman, Juha (2007) Kriittinen mediakasvatus. Tampere: Vastapaino. Hoskins, Andrew, Ben O’Loughlin (2010) War and Media. The Emergence of Diffused War. Polity Press. Hyppönen, Mikko (2011) Lecture in the TEKES seminar 11 May 2011 at Tieteiden Talo, Helsinki. Malrieu, Jean-​Pierre (2002) Evaluative Semantics: Cognition, Language, and Ideology. London: Routledge. Mannermaa, Mika (2008) Jokuveli. Elämä ja vaikuttaminen ubiikkiyhteiskunnassa. Helsinki: WsoyPro. Neuman, Scott (2010) “Clinton: WikiLeaks ‘Tear At Fabric’ Of Government”. npr, 29 November. Available: http://​www.npr.org/​2010/​11/​29/​131668​950/​whi​teho​use-​aims -​to-​limit-​wikile​aks-​dam​age [10 March 2011]. Riessman, Catherine Kohler (2008) Narrative Methods for the Human Science. Sage Publications. Schmid, Wolf (2010) Narratology. Translated by Alexander Starritt. Berlin: de Gryuter. Strazzanti, Laura (2009) Did the Media Sell War as a Product? The Case of Iraq War 2001–​ 2003. München: Martin Meidenbauer Verlagsbuchhandlung. US Joint Forces Command (2010) Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy. Available: http://​www.carli​sle.army.mil/​D IME/​ ­docume​nts/​Strate​gic%20Co​mmun​icat​ion%20H​andb​ook%20Ver%203%20-​%20J​ une%202​010%20JF​C OM.pdf. Waterman, Shaun (2010) “Fictitious femme fatale fooled cybersecurity”. The Washington Times, 18 July. Available: http://​www.wash​ingt​onti​mes.com/​news/​ 2010/​jul/​18/​fic​titi​ous-​femme-​fatal​efoo​led-​cybers​ecur​ity [10 March 2011].

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Some Reflections on Conspiracy Rhetoric in Belarusian Political Discourses Vladimir Fours A traveler visiting Belarus will be certainly impressed by the paranoiac motives in the official political discourse which suggests a vision of the malefic offscreen forces plotting against the small independent state which successfully goes its own way of development. Through public speeches of officials and by the news and analytical programs of the state-​controlled mass-​media, naïve Belarusian citizens are informed about the wires in world politics. The central spring of the world evil is evidently the only superpower that is seeking to establish its uncontestable dominance over the total world. The current processes of globalization are interpreted as nothing but the latest version of the old American strategy of eliminating the historical alternatives, which was represented, in particular, in the struggle against the Soviet Union and has resulted in its destruction. That cunning strategy is now as before aimed at the seizure of resources and the enslavement of populations. According to the official political discourse, the independent politics pursued by the Belarusian state and supported by the absolute majority of the Belarusian population engender exasperation of the dark forces which answer by introducing sanctions on the fictitious pretext of absence of democracy and human rights violation. The official world topography of conspiracies against sovereign Belarus was recently enriched due to the “eastern threat”: the Kremlin politicians who betray the fraternal proximity of the Russian and Belarusian peoples are seeking to damage the Belarusian sovereignty or even to annex Belarus. But I don’t intend to reduce my paper to one more denunciation of the “last dictatorship in the center of Europe”. The conspiracy rhetoric is not less typical to the political language of the Belarusian democratic opposition which is certain of the hidden malefic reasons in all and every activity of the Belarusian state. The “dictatorial regime” is attributed to wage war against its own people: even exercising the general societal functions, it is accused of the astute enslaving the Belarusian people. Thus the fact that challenges our interpretative and explanatory tools is the constitutive character of the conspiracy rhetoric in the Belarusian political

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discourses. The trivial explanation in the spirit of a “black-​white transitology” might be like this: this is a developmental disease of a transitional society that has not yet reached the level of transparency typical for the societies based on the principles of the free market and liberal democracy. I would like to outline an alternative explanation based on the following assumption: the hidden dimensions are constitutive for any form of social life, and these dimensions may well be mobilized and are actually mobilized in politics. In Fernand Braudel’s analysis of the economic and social life in the 15th to 18th centuries (Braudel, 1992) I find a good foothold for the conceptual outline capable of disclosing the multilevel organization of social practices. Braudel identified three different levels, that is “material life”, “market economy” and “capitalism”. The bottom level, “material life”, refers to all that which has entered into the very human body through the long centuries of the previous history, that is that side of life in which humankind is involved in even without having an account on it, that is the ensembles of actions which proceed as if automatically so that their accomplishing doesn’t imply conscious decisions. In short, “material life” consists of the routines of day-​to-​day activities. The middle level, “economy”, relates to the market as a system of regular—​transparent and rational—​exchanges. This level extends from a small retail business to fair activity and exchanges. And the upper level, “capitalism” develops on the basis of the market economy, it belongs to the brilliant, sophisticated but very narrow stratum, dealing in particular with the far trade. Capitalism is the area of free maneuver; it makes use of the rules of the market economy but inverts them to its own interest. Capitalism gains superprofits through managing uncertainties, it normally implies playing a double game and collusions among a few partners. It would be of course incorrect to apply this Braudel’s model of the economic and social life of the “ancient regime” to our contemporary societies; the fundamental changes of modernization should be taken into account: the market deeply transformed the material life, the capitalism became industrial and then informational, and so on. Nevertheless, I believe it’s reasonable to use Braudel’s model as a starting point for the abstract three-​level scheme of social life which is receptive to its hidden dimensions, be it implicit or deliberately concealed. In this scheme, the rational transparency of practices is related only to the middle level. The “rational transparency” means here not only reflexive control but also: organizing significance of the rules of an open and fair game among strangers (maybe also the relevance of the universalistic moral consciousness), availability of the explicit (or even codified) procedures, juridical regulation and the public openness.

252 Fours Below this level of the rational social exchanges extends the level of the everyday practices which are guided by the pre-​reflexive practical consciousness. Such consciousness relies upon pieces of evidence, implicit prejudices, background cultural knowledge. The incontestable self-​evidence of the everyday Doxa is generated and maintained by the reiterative practices: the habitualized structures of social fields determine the schemes of perception and valuation and are naturalized by them. The top level is represented by the speculative practices which imply possessing extraordinary resources, allocative or authoritative. The extraordinary strong players are oriented to securing their exclusive status through the use of irregularities and uncertainties in social interactions. I mean here not only inexterminable gaps and loopholes in the legal regulation but also the very alterability and ambiguity of social meanings engendered by the increasing complexity of the social world we live in now. The speculative practices typically make use of the symbolic power in Bourdieu’s sense (Bourdieu, 1991), that is of the power of nominating, of determining the real meaning of social things, in particular, through mass-​mediated images. Thus, according to the above scheme, the layer of rationality and transparency in social practices is embounded both from below (by the prejudices, by the background consent, by routines of the reiterative practices) and from above (by the “magic” of superprofits, by the collusions among strong players, by the speculative play upon uncertainties). I would like to emphasize that the dynamic interrelations exist not only between the middle and the upper levels (the speculative practices apparently speak the language of the transparent social exchanges actually tempering and inverting it in its own logic) but between the bottom and the middle levels as well. The horse sense and the everyday understanding suggest to play with the publicly recognized social meanings, to invest them with private connotations, with, so to say, private “use value”. So there is the public façade of social life and there is the real life which possesses the ontological and value priorities. The concrete geometry of interrelations between these three levels determines the specific social imaginary of a society, the imaginary which fastens like the fragments of a social world and invests institutions with their meanings. Needless to argue that social imaginary has nothing to do with fantasies and voluntary fictions; it is a constitutive element of social practices which organizes individuals’ self-​understanding and their hold on reality. Relying upon the work of, first of all, Cornelius Castoriadis (Castoriadis, 1987) and Charles Taylor (Taylor, 2004), we can specify here some features of the social imaginary. It is the engaged practical understanding, which embraces not only the people’s near social environment but the total social world as well.

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It is represented in the symbolic systems and endues institutions with its peculiar meaning. It works as “invisible cement”, which holds together a large scale community of human beings. The social imaginary as a shared practical understanding is “both factual and normative; that is, we have a sense of how things usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they ought to go” (Taylor, 2004, p. 23). The social imaginary in any society is multidimensional and heterogeneous so we should rather speak about social imaginaries (in plural). Of course, I present here not a theory but just a conceptual outline facilitating to understand secrets and conspiracies as a substantial element in any contemporary form of social life. This three-​level model seems to be especially appropriate in the post-​Soviet contexts where the middle layer of social practices is relatively underdeveloped and open to the distorting influences from below and from above. Let’s now, being equipped with this scheme, return to Belarus. Here the obvious monopolist on the level of speculative social practices is the authoritarian state which has established total control not only over the political field but also over the economic and the mass-​media fields. The extraordinary concentration of resources makes the Belarusian state capable of modeling the layer of transparent social interactions, that is of an open and fair play. It’s very symptomatical that one of the key idioms in the official political discourse is the specifically understood “fairness”. So, my first explanatory thesis is that the Belarusian state has built the imagined space of fair public interactions. This space is characterized by the specific closeness and self-​sufficiency correlated with the unlimited territorial sovereignty. As a result, everything that comes from abroad uncontrolled (be it influence of the international organizations or transnational social flows) and everything that emerges uncontrolled within Belarus (be it civic initiatives, non-​governmental associations or political parties) is automatically ascribed a veiled hostile meaning. The patterns of “fairness” implanted by the state imply “extruding into a conspiracy” of all that can not be inscribed into the official model of public life. That official model suggests a functionally differentiated and coherent space of the republican virtues and social characters, that is of the morally invested social roles, such as “little people”, a “patriotic enterpriser”, a “selfless official”, and, of course, “the President”. The relationships of love and concern between the “little people” and “the President” are fundamental for that model. The specificity of the Belarusian “fairness” is that it doesn’t imply neither moral universalism nor juridical objectivity: according to the official treating, the rules of the games can be easily changed by the sovereign according to the

254 Fours will of the Belarusian people whose only legal representative and executer is obviously the President. That public space of “fairness’ is imposed by the state through its repressive and ideological apparatuses (in Althusserian terms (Althusser, 1971)), but, of course, the matter can’t be reduced to an unlimited manipulation and modeling. My second explanatory thesis is: this peculiar public space of “fairness” is supported by the reiterative economies of everyday life. The background tacit consent which organizes the bottom, grass-​roots layer of social practices includes in Belarus the people’s compliance with authoritarianism. Sincere devotion to political authoritarianism seems to be a rare extreme, while rather typical is double consciousness and double moral of the public and private life. Supporting the official public life by their affective and moral investments into the “protective cocoon” of the paternalistic state, common people live their lives not being engaged in politics. The public-​political meanings are monopolized by the state, still there remains enough space for individual, familial, corporate and other “private” projects of a happy life. Of course, the all-​embracing state regulation occludes the private initiatives, but those impediments can be circumvented. I mean here not only corruption but rather instability and conventional character of the public meanings: the latter are neither principally unconditional nor universal. A human who in her/​his everyday life accepts the official labels of social things at their face-​value is a “social dope” not-​adapted to real life. Just the hidden private connotations of the official meanings are really valid; intertwining they form the layer of the “shadow sociality”. There reigns the social mummery, I mean not so much an interested calculation but rather an instinctively pursued double-​entry: the officially prescripted roles are played with certain affective investments and, simultaneously, with a cynical distancing, so here we confront a paradoxical juxtaposing of sincerity and cynicism. Thus we find in Belarus a peculiar space of the “fair” public life which is imposed by the authoritarian state and tacitly maintained by the reiterative everyday practices guided by the double consciousness. To conclude our reconstruction, we should take into account two important characteristics of this sphere of “fairness”. First, it is circumscribed by the geographic borders of the Belarusian state. The basis of “fairness” is state patriotism whose sense in the Belarusian case is not so much love of the country but rather a dedication to the unconditional sovereignty of the Belarusian state and recognition of holiness and untouchability of its home affairs. The second important characteristic is a specific configuration of interrelations between the three levels of social practices. The middle layer of the transparent social interactions does

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not only actively shaped by the layers of speculations and of the reiterative everyday practices but also appear to be comprehensive and embracing the “whole Belarusian society”. Both the cunning of the official symbolic strategies and the “shadow sociality” remain concealed, publicly invisible. Thus we find in Belarus societal totalization of the sphere of “fairness”, of the transparent, responsible, rational practices. It naturally follows from this situation that everything which is extraneous to this totalized sphere of “fairness” is identified as the conspiracies of the external enemies of the independent Belarusian state and of their domestic agents and associates. The conspiracies are the constitutive element not just in the official propaganda but in the Belarusian “social cosmology”. The official social imaginary which shapes the life of the majority of the population is articulated in such a way that it includes the constitutive opposition of “our own world” of the fair social interactions and human happiness on the one hand and of the suspicious and hostile external world on the other. Ironically, the conspiracy theory which is approved by the democratic opposition in Belarus is nothing but a simple inversion of that official social cosmology. The sphere of the principal “fairness” is placed outside Belarus (“all ­civilized world”) while the official Belarusian reality (“the dictatorship”) is totally hostile and deceitful. The social weakness of that theory is determined, first of all, by the extremely scarce resources available for the oppositional speculative practices and, secondly, by the faint relevance of the abstract liberal values to the values of everyday life. I believe that the three-​level model of social practices can be effectively applied also to other post-​Soviet countries, we just need to specify the configuration of these three layers accordingly. For example, while in Belarus we confront the case of a strong authoritarian state, in Ukraine we find another case, that of a clan and corporate democracy. Secrets and conspiracies are not extruded outwardly, they are a constitutive element in the domestic political life. Accordingly, the public scandals concerning exposure of the mercenary tribal privatization of politics are so typical in Ukraine. The obsceneness of the public scandals is ambivalent: on the one hand, it impels to hide out, extrudes corporate collusions into the shadow but, on the other, it reaffirms the popular social ontology of the double life. And to conclude: I believe it’s possible to carefully generalize the proposed three-​level scheme and to apply it beyond the post-​Soviet region. Having this perspective in mind, I would like to summarize some general statements. (1) Secrets and conspiracies are quite real elements of contemporary social practices; they rely, generally speaking, on the hidden and indefinite social meanings. The new world disorder of globalization and the “virtualization” of

256 Fours social life, which means a certain priority of the mediated images over “reality”, provide us with new forms and dimensions of uncertainty in the social world and thus give an additional place for secrets and conspiracies. (2) However these, regardless of how numerous they are, can have only partial influence, even if they have total ambitions and claims. I would like to emphasize the liberating effect of the idea of world disorder: it implies that there is not and principally cannot be any center of control over the world course of events; the unintended consequences of any attempt to establish such control overbalance the gains. An efficient world conspiracy is a paranoia. (3) I suggest again the three-​level scheme of social practices as an interpretative and analytical tool; it is presumed that the practically effective conspiracies generally imply the resonance of the hidden meanings in the bottom and top levels. (4) It seems to be reasonable to distinguish two ideal types of the conspirological social cosmology: the exogenous and the endogenous. In the first type, the hidden dimensions of social life are publicly erased, the middle layer of the transparent social interactions is societally totalized and the spring of the conspiracy is projected outside (be it the “USA” or the “world terrorism”). In the second type, the local conspiracies are an element of the intrasocietal dynamics under the condition of the internal heterogeneity of the society and the absence of the societally shared value horizon.

Bibliography

Althusser, L. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses”. In Lenin and Philosophy, New Left Books, pp. 127–​186. Bourdieu, P. (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. Harvard University Press. Braudel, F. (1992) Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–​18th Century, Vol. 1: The Structure of Everyday Life. University of California Press. Castoriadis, C. (1987) The Imaginary Institution of Society. mit Press. Taylor, Ch. (2004) Modern Social Imaginaries. Duke University Press.

Index Aaronovitch, David viii, ix, 149–​155 affective governmentality vi, 6, 157, 158 affective politics of conspiracy discourse 175 Ahmed, Sara 158, 167, 168, 173, 174, 177, 178 anarchy 14 anti-​Cikommunists 150 anti-​semites 151 Arendt, Hannah 137, 155, 158, 170, 171, 176–​180 authority 63, 89, 194, 197 authoritarianism 254 auto-​conspiracy 7, 206, 211, 212, 223, 225, 235 Basham, Lee 159, 178, 121–​122, 124 belief-​forming strategy 6, 129, 130, 133–​135, 148, 229 Berkeley, George 18, 106 Bratich, Jack 158–​160, 162, 172, 173, 175, 177, 178 Braudel, Fernand 8, 251, 256 Buddhism 35–​37 Carrol, Lewis 128, 155 casuistry 2, 14, 18–​19 Chomsky, Noam 118, 124, 168 choosing to believe 128, 129 Clarke, Steve 119–​121, 124, 159, 179 Coady, David 5, 109, 111, 115, 116, 126, 133, 137, 206 cock-​up 104, 105, 131 coincidence 116, 117, 121 collective action problem 7, 206–​208, 235 communal horizon 47, 48, 50, 51 conservatism 4, 57, 58, 63 consciousness viii, 3, 39, 45, 46, 49, 50, 65–​ 72, 76, 77, 251, 252, 254 conspiracism viii, 4, 58, 61, 62, 64, 74, 99, 115, 166 conspiracy/-ies 4, 5, 7–​9, 58, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 71, 77–​79, 81–​84, 86–89, 90–​94, 100–​107, 109–​111, 113, 115–​123, 127, 129–​147, 149–153, 155, 159, 160, 167, 172, 182–​198, 200, 202–​204, 206, 211–​214, 223, 226–​230, 239–​244, 246–​247, 250, 253, 255, 256 conspiracy panics 6, 158, 163, 167, 174–​176

conspiracy skeptics 142, 146, 147, 149 conspiracy theory/​-​ies vii–​ix, 1, 4–​7, 39, 48, 54, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 70, 76, 79, 81–​83, 86, 88, 90–​94, 99, 104, 107, 108, 111–​117, 119–​123, 126–​130, 132–​151, 153–​155, 157–​ 160, 162, 165, 166, 168, 172–​178, 179–​181, 206, 212, 227–​232, 238, 240–​243 conspiracy thinking 56, 58, 99, 159 contempt 6, 157, 158, 167–​170, 172–​178, 180, 181 conventional wisdom 5, 6, 126, 127, 129, 130, 135, 136, 138–​141, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 153, 154 cultural politics of affect 158, 174 deceived mind assumption /​argument 3, 39, 40, 45, 46, 50 determinism 4, 37, 58, 62, 64, 66, 68–​73 Donskis, Leonidas 3, 4, 6, 48 emotions 8, 43, 168, 174, 177, 240, 242–​245 enlightened self-​interest 7, 208, 210, 211, 235 ethics of belief 5, 127–​129, 135 evil agent assumption /​argument 3, 39, 41, 42, 46, 50 expected utility 199, 200 Foucault, Michel 3, 42, 43, 51, 66, 160–​162, 164, 176, 177 game theory 7, 185, 198 government(s) 49, 50, 59, 63, 74, 105, 107–​ 115, 118, 120, 121, 145–​150, 152, 159, 160, 161, 183, 192, 193, 209–​211, 239, 240, 253 governmentality 158, 160–​162, 164, 166, 168, 169, 175, 177, 179 guilt 4, 41, 61, 73, 75–​81, 86, 114, 139, 243 history 4, 5, 15, 43, 47, 48, 55–​60, 62, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 85, 101, 102, 105, 108, 119, 131, 133, 134, 137, 139, 140, 144, 148, 154, 159, 183, 184, 190–​192, 196, 219, 230, 251 human rights 143, 242, 250 Hume, David 27–​30, 116, 117, 176 Husting, Ginna 6, 8, 126, 158, 168, 170, 174

258 Index identity spoilage 168 ideological images 40, 41, 49 ignoramus et ignorabimus 28 impossible things (before breakfast) 128 impunity 143, 198 information operations 239, 241, 243 institutions 9, 41, 44, 45–​47, 49, 50, 57, 85, 112, 118, 119, 166, 194, 231, 252, 253, 256 intractable embodied belief 223, 224 It Could Not Happen Here (IConHah) 53–​ 59, 62–​64, 72–​74 Kafka, Franz 4, 66, 75, 76, 79–​82, 92–​94 Keeley, Brian L. 99, 138, 159, 206, 212, 227, 228, 231, 232 law 4, 14, 15, 29, 30, 36, 164, 246 legal 45, 81, 103, 109, 113, 140, 149, 171, 189, 227, 252, 254 Lemke, Thomas 161, 164, 177 levels of social practices 8, 254 liberal democracy 67, 143, 160, 211, 251 Loukola, Olli 3, 4, 6 Machiavelli, Niccolo 2, 7, 14–​17, 19, 104, 142, 182–​188, 190–​192, 194, 196–​200, 202–​204 Manipulation viii, 8, 60–​62, 65, 68, 74, 209, 244 Marx, Karl 3, 39, 40, 45, 46, 119, 196 Free Masons 83, 91, 122 meaning-​bestowal /​ sense-​making 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 241 mentality 3, 4, 53–​60, 62, 63, 73, 74 Nash equilibrium 200–​202 natality 170–​172, 177, 178 neoliberal/​-​ism 158, 160–​162, 175–​178 Nussbaum, Martha, 169 open question 2, 23, 27–​29, 31 open society, the 109, 111 Ought-​Implies-​Can Principle 128 Pascal’s Wager 129 passions 2, 13, 14, 17–​19, 54, 70, 79, 80, 171 Pigden, Charles 5, 6, 99, 101–​104, 120–​121, 131, 159 Pipes, Daniel 104, 160, 167 plurality 170–​172, 177 Popper, Sir Karl R. 5, 64, 69, 70, 99, 100, 102–​ 105, 111, 132

power vii, 3, 9, 25, 29, 39–​42, 44, 45, 48, 51, 53–​56, 60, 63, 65–​68, 71–​73, 79, 85, 86, 90, 92–​94, 100, 101, 104, 112, 114, 117, 118, 122, 123, 143–​145, 148, 155, 160–​162, 168, 175, 177–​180, 184, 185, 188, 189, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 202–​205, 207, 213, 215–​217, 224, 236, 239, 241, 248, 249, 250, 252, 256 propaganda 74, 112–​114, 118, 238, 247, 255 pseudo-​secret 3, 23–​25, 29 psychological operations 244 punishment 4, 56, 75, 77, 79, 80, 86, 185, 193, 195, 199, 201, 202 Räikkä, Juha 120, 123 rational conspirator 199 Reason (of State) 16, 203, 204 Sade, Marquis de 82, 84–​88, 92, 93 secrecy 1–​4, 61, 83, 103, 105–​107, 110, 113, 114, 137, 198, 204 secret(s) 16, 22–​37, 39, 45, 46, 50, 58, 61, 65–​67, 80–​93, 100–​103, 106–​110, 112–​ 114, 117, 122, 130–​132, 136, 137, 140–​143, 149, 164, 173, 185, 187, 189, 191, 196, 203–​205, 212, 225, 227, 228, 238, 239, 253, 255, 256 secret societies 4, 58, 66, 82–​84, 86–​89, 93 secrets of nature 25, 27–​29 Smith, Adam 118, 137 social imaginary 9, 252, 253, 255 strategy/​-​ies vi, 6, 7, 8, 14, 23, 24, 33, 43, 44, 50, 70, 115, 119, 129, 130, 132–​136, 141–​143, 146–​149, 158, 161, 175, 184–​186, 188, 190, 191, 196, 199–​201, 206, 239, 241, 242, 250–​255 Sunstein, Cass R. 99, 109, 112–​114 symbolic power 9, 252 symbolic systems 42, 43, 50, 253 technological determinism 66 Vermeule, Adrian 99, 109, 112–​114 victimization 4, 65, 67, 71–​73 Vrasti, Wanda 158, 161, 168, 175, 177, 178 warfare 202, 239, 242, 243 Webb, Gary 165–​168, 172, 177 Zinoviev Letter 150