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English Pages [584] Year 1942
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Science,
Philosophy
and
Religion
SECOND SYMPOSIUM
/
.•^*
All rights reserved including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form.
CL COPYRIGHT, 1942 BY THE CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE, INC. Printed in the United States of America
The
papers included in this
for die second
volume were prepared
meeting of the Conference on Science,
Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the
Democratic
Way
of Life, which
lumbia University on September
was held at Co10 and 11, 1941.
8, 9,
Each paper represents only the opinion of the individual author. Lyman Bryson and Louis Finkelstein have served
as editors.
:
Table of Contents
PAPERS
THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE I
Democracy's Challenge to the
Scientist, Caryl P.
Hast{ins
i
COMMENTS
II
by:
Karl K. Darrow Raphael Isaacs
ig
Hugh
22
S.
14
Taylor
Democracy and the Natural
Sciences,
Karl F.
Herzfeld III
24
Some Comments on Hoagland COMMENTS BY
Science and Faith,
Hudson 53
:
Howard Chandler Robbins
41
Walter B. Cannon
43
/.
Seelye Bixler
44 46
Mar\ Graubard Kenneth V. Thimann
47 48
Leonard Wheildon
W.
J.
Eliot
Crozier
IV The Comparative Study posive
Cultivation
Margaret
49 50
D. Chappie of Culture of
Mead
COMMENTS BY Ruth F. Benedict Clyde Kluchjiohn
and the Pur-
Democratic
Values,
56
^ 72
s
: :
Contents
viii
Dorothy D. Lee Geoffrey Gorer
Gregory Bate son
V
The
Basis for Faith in
Democracy,
Max
Schoen
98
PHILOSOPHY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE
VI
Pragmatism, Rehgion and
Education, John
L.
no
Child
VII
Liberal Education and Democracy, Theodore
M.
Greene VIII
A
122
Philosophy of Democratic Defense,
Charles
Hartshorne
IX The Role
130
Law
of
a
in
Democracy, Fran\ E.
Horac]{^, Jr.
173
COMMENTS BY Huntington Cairns
186
Robert H. JacJ{son
187
Harno
187
Wiley Rutledge
188
M.
193
Albert
X
Pluralism
T.
J.
Van Hec\e
and
Democracy,
Intellectual
Alain
Locke COMMENTS by:
XI
196
Lyman Bryson
209
Erwin R. Goodenough
211
Lawrence K. FranJ^
212
Empiricism,
Religion
and
W. Morris
Democracy,
Charles 213
COMMENTS BY James H. Tufts
237
Rudolf Carnap
238
Contents
ix
Willard V. Quine Carl G.
238
Hempel
239
Herbert Martin Van Meter Ames XII
239
240
Philosophical Implications of the Prevalent Con-
ception of Democracy, Gerald B. Phelan
XIII
The
Spiritual
Basis
of
Democracy,
242
Princeton
Group
XIV Thomism
XV
251
and Democracy, Yves R. Simon
Democracy and the Rights COMMENTS by: Morris R. Cohen Curt
of
258
Man, Paul Weiss
273 285
Ducasse Charles Harts home
291
DeWitt Henry Parser
292
Ralph Barton Perry Wilbur M. Urban
1^6
J.
292
295
THE STAKE OF ART AND LITERATURE IN THE PRESERVATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC WAY OF LIFE
XVI The
Stake of Art in the Present
Crisis,
George
Boas
XVII
"The
297
Irresponsibles":
A
Comment, Douglas Bush
COMMENTS by: Hoxie N. Fairchild Harry S. V. Jones Edward K. Rand Warner G. Rice XVIII
An Approach
to the
307
331
332 334
334
Study of History, William G.
Constable
COMMENTS by: Emanuel Winternitz
336 341
Contents
X
XIX
Literature
and the Present
Crisis,
Joseph
Wood
Krutch
350
XX How Long Is XXI
Democratic Poetry,
the Emergency, MarJ^
Culture
Amos N.
the
in
Light
Van Doren of
Modern
Wilder
358
COMMENTS by: Van Wyck^ Brookj Hoxie N. Fairchild Warner G. Rice Harry S. V. Jones Edward K. Rand
373 373 375
376 377
THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF DEMOCRATIC
XXII Democratic Aspirations Ben Zion Bo\ser
in
Talmudic
IDEAS
Judaism, 382
XXIII
Democracy in the Hebrew-Christian Tradition; Old and New Testaments, Millar Burrows
XXIV
Christianity
View
399
and Democracy from the Point of
of Systematic Christian Theology, Nels
F. S. Ferre
XXV
355
413
Philosophical Foundations of Religion and De-
mocracy, William O'Meara
XXVI The
Patristic Christian
435
Ethos and Democracy, Al-
bert C. Outler
COMMENTS
446
by:
John T. McNeill
471
ADDRESSES I
The
Faith and Philosophy of Democratic Gov-
ernment, A. A. Berle, II
The Function
of
Law
Charles E. Clar\
472
Jr.
in a
Democratic Society, 480
Contents III
The
xi
and the Democratic
Artist
Way
of Life,
Walter Pack
IV
V
Democracy
in
493
Our Times, M.
The ReUgious Background
L. Wilson
506
of Democratic Ideas,
Simon Greenberg, Clarence Manion, Luther A. Weigle
517
PROGRAM Conference on Science, Philosophy and ReUgion
September
8, 9, 10,
and
11,
1941
549
Preface
THIS volume contains the papers discussed at the Second Conference
on Science, Philosophy and Religion, held at ColumSeptember 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1941. The only paper
bia University,
omitted
is
that read by
Van Wyck
Brooks, which, because of a
previous commitment, w^as published in the Yale Review, Sep-
tember, 1941.
The
addresses delivered at the evening sessions are
S. C. Northrop, which has appeared elsewhere in slightly different form. Each of the papers is printed as it was submitted in September. The 1941 Conference differed from the 1940 Conference not only with regard to the wider range of disciplines represented and the greater number of participants, but also with regard to technique. The papers of the First Symposium were individual products. The majority of papers in the Second Symposium are group papers. These fall into three types. In the first, such as that by Caryl P. Haskins, the original draft was submitted to selected members of the same discipline as the author. In the light of their criticism the original was reconsidered, and then presented at the September meetings together with the various comments. In the second, such as the paper by Hudson Hoagland, the same method was applied, but the collaborators in-
also included,
with the exception of that by F.
cluded representatives of several disciplines other than that to
which the drafter belonged. In the third, such as that by Max Schoen, the papers resulted from a series of discussions by faculty
members
of several departments at a university. Several
papers in the volume were completed too late for
comment and
adaptation before the September meetings, but were subjected to considerable discussion at the
Conference
itself.
The
general
discussion has been preserved, but due to recent events there are
no plans for its publication. In the hope that world conditions
will permit a third
Con-
Preface
xiv ference in the
autumn
of 1942, papers are
now
in the course of
preparation. These will investigate the influence of ideas
man
affairs; the basis for
on hu-
value judgments; the meaning of such
terms as "man," "human dignity," "human civilization," and "democracy"; and the theory of the cycUcal rise and decline of civilizations.
The members
of the Conference feel that their concern for the
definition of the ultimate objectives
civiHzed
life, is
present war
If the
and basic principles of
profoundly relevant to the problems of our day. is
largely ideational, the future peace
must
have secure ideational foundations. However, in order to be fective, ultimate objectives
able
human and
must be
ef-
translated in terms of avail-
material resources.
Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to
efforts to create a
world order has been man's inabiHty to apply all his intellectual and spiritual resources to the complex task. We will approach world problems blindly, unless we can create a mechanism by which scholars can, across differences of interest and training, freely exchange information. One theoretical question which must affect our consideration of immediate problems is the relationship between our period and that of "the decline of the ancient world." That is a term frequently used by historians, philosophers and other scholars, rational
is no consensus of opinion components of "the decline of the
with different connotations. There
among
scholars as to the
ancient world," the correctness of the term, or the existence of
any basic resemblance between that general period and our own.
Confusion regarding one of the most significant phenomena in
human
come from the failure of from different fields Conference will shed some light on
history has in a large measure
scholars to integrate
of study.
We
all
the
hope the 1942
known
facts
the subject.
To
understand and cope with the immediate problems of the
and varied as that needed for an appreciation of the end of the Roman Empire of the West. It has been suggested that because of its broad repre-
present, requires information at least as broad
xv
Preface sentation, the Conference
well qualified both to consider
is
means
current problems and effective ingly,
an effort
is
being
and university
college
made
meet regularly for discussion and reconstruction.
editors are deeply grateful for the assistance of the partici-
pants in the Conference program,
and
papers,
whom
Accord-
groups in various
centers, to
of various problems of peace
The
for their solution.
to create informal
this
all
who
collaborated on the
especially the original drafters or reporters, without
volume could not have appeared. The complete list program on 551-558. The editors
of participants appears in the also
wish to thank Jessica Feingold for her help in the preparaarrangement of the September
tion of this volume, as well as the
meetings.
One
criticism of the First
the editors, an error which
Symposium was is
the anonymity of
being corrected in the present
volume.
The
Editors.
I
I
CHAPTER
I
Democracy's Challenge to the
By
CARYL
P.
Scientist
RASKINS
Union College
A
YEAR AGO
we met
to discuss Science,
in relation to the democratic
world trends in the
as
we saw them
names of our various
Philosophy and ReHgion
way
then,
of
life.
We
deplored
and pledged ourselves,
disciplines, to play at least a small
part in the maintenance of democratic idealism and a cratic
way
of thought at
This year has seen significance in
world
demo-
home.
many
things take place of overwhelming
history. It has demonstrated,
among
matters, the scientific thoroughness of preparation with
other
which
war was undertaken on the part of those who initiated it. of the preliminary dust-clouds have rolled away since our meeting of last year, and the field of battle is much more clearly to be seen. It is now very evident that 1940 and 1941 were not years of unorganized or desperate, if indeed unthis
Many
provoked, aggressions,
ill
prepared or rashly undertaken.
It
war did not begin in 1939, as we perhaps thought a year ago, but with the civil war in Spain and with the invasion of China by Japan. It has become very obvious to us that the thinking and the strategy that underlie this mighty totahtarian effort date from the last century and that whole generations of minds among the very best of an intellectually great people have been brought to bear on these problems. is
clear that the
The of
attack has been well prepared, both in the broad phases
its
stupendous strategy and in the implements of warfare
Science, Philosophy
2
by which that strategy very fully occupied for
is
and Religion
be consummated. We shall be in combating and vanquish-
to
some time
ing the greatest threat of four centuries to the democratic
way
of Hfe.
Careful, unremitting thought in the basic philosophy strategy of
war and
of the warrior, even
the psychologies of the peoples
who were
more
and
careful study of
to be the instruments
in carrying out the plans, extending over very
many
years, are
which make the enemy so vitally dangerous. The immediate agent which has made possible the effecting of his plans, as we all know, has been technology and science. Perhaps the most important factors which will allow him to prolong the war will be science, and above all, the scientist, who will devise the technology of the future on the battlefield, and if the need arises, will at least preserve the peoples at home from starvation with ersatz materials, for many years to come. It is equally evident that, if science is perhaps the most powerful of all the immediate weapons of modern warfare, and scientists of the totalitarian states have therefore become in a very real sense the most important and effective exponent the broad factors
for the destruction of the democratic
way
of
life,
the scientists
of the democracies have an equal potentiality in the saving of it.
It
has become their most solemn duty to devote themselves,
for the present, to the task of
stemming the
tide of totalitarian-
ism with every energy they have, for they are a vital cog in the machinery which can insure the present survival of the democratic way, if anything can. Numbers of them are engaged in that pursuit, as we know, and yet others will undoubtedly soon be marshalled. Nothing is easier, or simpler, or, in a way, less intellectually challenging than the facing of an immediate and difficult emergency. The natural ability of human beings to call on all their powers and to work at the highest possible efficiency when confronted with a single great peril, for which a single coherent line of activity
is
the appropriate solution,
courageous facing of a danger, once
it
makes the
has arrived, almost a
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
3
We have been trained as animals to do this, through the aeons of our evolution, and it is second nature to
matter of course.
and less natural carefully to analyze the causes which have brought the danger about, and to conceive and to design modes of action whereby its recurrence may be preus. It is less easy
vented.
immediate duty of science and the and it is an easy one to undertake. Clearly, the totalitarian powers must be technologically defeated, and defeated decisively, if there is to be any democratic way of life to be served. This is a task which brooks of no delay, and it is naturally in the way of science and the scientific method to undertake it. For,
So
it is
scientists
that the present
is
clear to everyone, including themselves,
although pure science has never taken
much
account of
human
and engineering science has long recognized that developments in pure research are both intensely helpful and intensely inimical to mankind, and has realized that often enough only the very faintest line of demarcation distinguishes the two classes. reactions to the entities with
which
Engineering science has taken for
it
its
deals, applied
own
especial province the
development of both helpful and harmful things, and so occupies a position of immense practical importance in this war. But there is another side to the picture. In the years of supposed peace before 1939, what was done with the helpful and harmful technical ideas, originated and developed by science, did not primarily depend upon the scientist, but upon the policy formulated by that class of humans applicational
which, in the scientist.
were
final
analysis,
controlled the activities of the
In democratic countries, the inimical physical things
housed to gather dust, in the vague eventuality might be needed for defense against some unnamed and ill-defined aggressor. In the totalitarian states, these chemical and physical weapons were given no such ignominious treatment, but were carefully developed, and husbanded, and laid aside,
that they
when they should find nightmare on earth. It is be-
worshiped, perhaps, against the day their use in the realization of a
Science, Philosophy
4
and Religion
cause of this fundamental difference in outlook between the policy makers of totalitarian states
and those of democratic
countries, not, fundamentally, because of any difference either in the science or the scientists of these states, that
we
are
faced with a war today. Scientists, in fine, have acted essentially
group of people whose wishes they have enough, those people could never have proved effective, could never have hoped to set the world ablaze, unless they had been able to induce the scientists to work for them, to carry out to the letter their designs and aims, to bend every effort of heart and brain and will to make physically possible the realization of an insane dream of which the scientists were not the originators. This is the more ironic when one considers that, on the whole, the very scientists who have undertaken these subservient activities are, on the average, the intellectual superiors of their masters. It is evident enough that pure intellect alone is no effective tool in preserving righteousness in the world, and this fact, it must be said to his discredit, was before the war perhaps generally unrecognized as tools for another
served.
And
yet, ironically
by the average brilliant scientist. This issue carries a more imminently practical danger than we might be inclined to suspect. For there is little doubt that scientists, organized under a totalitarian system in times of
war or in preparation for war, can, over the short term, function more effectively than scientists in a democratic nation, as is true of all professions. While we believe that in this emergency the tremendous recuperative powers that inhere in any democracy through the willing services of its peoples will be sufficient to more than reclaim the margin in efficiency between democratic and totalitarian nations, the margin in another great emergency may be as much wider than it is in this as this is from the margin of 1914, and we cannot afford to give the enemy a greater advantage than we have done already. For the leaders of the totalitarian states are of rare brilliance, and they profit readily by their errors and have a diabolically, unbelievably patient, cat-like persistence in rectifying them.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
5
way of hfe Never since the last World War has the direction been more definitely pointed, nor has it been easier to follow. Until this war has been won, the supreme effort of the scientist must merely be to work harder along lines with which he is already familiar, merely to apply more rigidly disciplines and techniques in which he already has faith and which he already knows. There is little question that he will do this well, for he has done it brilliantly before, and the average scientist today is perhaps, on the whole, more able than he has ever been, and he is
The
task of science in preserving the democratic
will, for the
next few years, indeed be crystal
certainly better equipped.
and we
He
we must
clear.
will accept the challenge eagerly,
he will succeed. But with success, will inevitably come self-satisfaction, and the feeling that the old techniques of science, even with their old believe, as
limitations, are
peace.
There
scientist,
sufficient
will
to
believe, that
safeguard good in a society at
be the greatest danger, in that day, that the
convinced of the effectiveness of his handiwork and
blind to the narrowness of the field in will, let
perhaps a
the
human
for better
little
which he has labored,
smugly, return to his tasks as of old, and
events of the world take their course again,
or worse, until, perchance,
another conflagration
and its extinction claims his attention. Then, depending upon whether he has unconsciously become the tool of democratic forces or of forces which carry a menace equivalent to those of the totalitarian states, in the intervening years, he will again, briefly, become a staunch defender or an effective enemy of the way of life to which all of us are pledged. Rightthinking himself, he may unwittingly become a most powerful
arises
agent of wrong-doing. Since the rise of science as an organized and recognized discipline, scientists
have admittedly contributed
the intellectual progress of the world,
have actually guided
it
brilliantly to
and occasionally they
for brief periods. Like the theologians
and the philosophers, they have made activities possible and kingdoms accessible for all peoples, which would have remained
Science, Philosophy
6
and Religion
had they never Uved. Their record in this field may be been one of distinction. Yet, v^^here theology and sometimes philosophy have led the world in action as well as in thought on many significant and at times revolutionary occasions, science has rarely actively done so. It has not only ignored important opportunities which have fallen to it to do closed,
said to have
this,
but
The
it
has often deliberately avoided them.
reasons for this reluctance for action
deep within
lie
the philosophy of the professional scientist, and of the calling
The
majority of the "purest,"
the most intensely idealistic and the
most highly dedicated
which he has dedicated
to
scientists of the past
have emphasized the
in their minds, lay in the
two masters
as
—the
apprentice in the
his life.
way
of serving
difficulties
which,
what they considered
impossibility of at once being a faithful
world of
player on the stage of
intellectual
human
action.
achievement and a held, and I
They have
all of us have at one time or another believed that, beyond the boundaries of purely intellectual activity, interrupt the intense concentration which is required in
think that to look to
solving problems of the environment, to visualize the ultimate uses to which those solutions might be put,
was
in
some way
be unfaithful to, or to desecrate, one's calHng. By definition, science dealt with the facts of the universe. It had no concern to
for the
manner
in
which these
facts
might impinge upon mangood or evil use. That
kind, or whether they might be put to
province belonged to other groups of people, usually rather
vaguely conceived and defined.
This definition of the sphere of science with little doubt had origin in the extremely intense concentration which is neces-
its
sary for the successful solution of natural problems. Science is
a difficult
and demanding profession,
astrous temptation to scatter effort
is
to be sure,
and
dis-
often presented by the
The definition was one article many ways an effectively prohibitory,
very interest of the discipline.
and in which had more than one point of similarity with the Ten Commandments. But the fundamental difficulty of this of a prohibitory, creed,
Science, Philosophy
we
article, as
now
are
and Religion
able to see, lies in
Science may, on the one hand, disclaim
7
basic inconsistency.
its
all
interest in
human
and disavow, or attempt to disavow, most connections with them; but on the other hand, the very effort to which scientists have dedicated their lives has yielded as its most important byproduct a knowledge of physical things, which, for good or evil, cannot but have the most profound influence affairs,
on human progress. Science, again, may claim
human
terested in
human
but
affairs,
social structure as a
position
which
it
is
it
to
be disin-
support from the
receives
matter of course, and the social
accorded, and which
it
accepts,
refuse
responsibility
for
the
in the very social structure to
which
it
is
consequences
and
fabric
of the very highest importance, to
to integrating its
of
own
social
activities
better,
leadership
more
fabric,
and
to
To
activities
its
which nurtures
attempt to understand the nature of that functions
of
of
is
mutually great importance for the scientist and society.
it,
and
make no
with a view assuming the
competently,
which,
whether it wishes or no, science has had forced upon it as a consequence of its mode of operation, is to exhibit a degree of misguided intellectual negation which constitutes, perhaps, the gravest criticism which can be leveled against some practitioners of the discipline. It is noteworthy that both philosophy and religion, older and wiser disciplines than their younger sister, have clearly recognized their importance for human affairs, and to a very considerable extent for philosophy, and as a major activity for religion, have undertaken to fill the role and the obligations
of active leadership.
They have gained
inseparability of responsible conduct
a clear concept of the
and of human guidance
in
framework. They have reahzed that the acceptance of the responsibilities of leadership is the recognition of an existent condition, and a most urgent duty, not, as some scientists have believed, the egotistical assumption of powers and prerogatives not rightfully their own. Whether scientists will be able to rise above the narrow confines of the latter concept,
any
social
Science, Philosophy
8
and Religion
coming scope of their work, both and outside of the framework which they know, will be democracy's greatest challenge for the present and the to a full realization of the
inside
future.
The
realization will not
come
easily, for it will
involve
much
hardship of both a moral and an intellectual nature for many scientists, and perhaps even more practically important, it will, in
many
it is
cases,
vital for
and come
contravene the dictates of
taste.
Nevertheless,
the future of society that the appreciation come,
preparation for executing the
clearly. Further, the
which scientists will certainly be called upon to fill, must be begun now, for the training will be more difficult and demanding than anything which students of science have
new
roles
hitherto experienced.
Human
as
societies,
we
dictated in their activities
are
aware, are not primarily
all
by conscious
intellectual processes.
Yet there is no denying the continuingly increasing influence which the quality of intellect has had in this function, even within historic times. Society
itself is
aware of the survival value
which has always attached recognition given to minds of unusual
to intellect, as
world.
It is
human
common
throughout the
highly probable, to be sure, that the course of
social activities will
regulated.
witness the
brilliance
never be completely intelligently
Yet the trend toward
its
predominant direction by
among the human social fabric of today, and are the actual creators of many of its problems. Their leadership in its broad-scale activities, however, largely by their own wish, intellectual forces
unmistakable. Scientists are
is
leaders in thought of the
has been almost negligible. Yet they have provided the sinews of leadership to others less fitted than they by natural
ment
to exercise the function,
bitterly well, all too
eminently
leader of the best sort, to
the creator of the
results, as
often disastrous.
intellect of the scientist are
human
with
The
too
idealism and the
fitted to
make him
endow-
we know
make him
a
the user as well as
power which now he allows those
responsible and less high-minded to grasp. His
endowment
less fits
Science, Philosophy
him superbly
and Religion
9
to the task of properly using the facts
which he
has wrested from nature. Only training and taste are lacking,
and these
The
will be almost his duty, in future, to supply.
it
very disinterested high-mindedness and the concentra-
tion of the scientist have predisposed him, in the past, to be
the tool for
men
of
much
lesser stature. Scientists themselves
Only very recently, Professor A. V. Hill has written of the subject, in connection with the war effort, in the British scientific publication. Nature. One of the have been well aware of
this.
most powerful
factors in the deplorable situation has
carry-over into
human
priate, of
affairs,
where
an attitude which the
and inclined
it
both constrained
scientist is
to take in the face of nature
been the
eminently inappro-
is
— the
attitude of in-
and the passive acceptance, amounting often
tense respect
to
reverence, of nature, the antagonist. Scientists are inclined to forget that the
men
of affairs with
whom
they deal are not
of the stature of that omnipotent nature that they daily confront,
and are
to be dealt
with in a different fashion, involving
often the realization of the existence of
phases of behavior
more
many
motivations and
self-centered than those to
which they
are themselves accustomed. Infinite reverence in the face of
nature, infinite skepticism, coupled with a clear appreciation of
human
frailties
among men,
is
a far better rule of conduct
for the scientist.
When
the
war ends,
racies, science will
use of
its
ends successfully for the democ-
if it
have achieved a very great victory, by the
old techniques and
its
old disciplines. Scientists
may
be inclined to rest on their laurels, to shrug their shoulders,
and
to return to their
work.
If
they do
this,
they will be guilty
of a neglect that will be almost treasonable in
its
seriousness.
More, they will have missed their very greatest opportunity to be of supreme service to mankind, if they have not prepared themselves to take a very important share in the activities of readjustment and reconstruction, which will surely follow so long and exhausting a war. There will be a chance then to
remold certain aspects of human
social life
along far better
Science, Philosophy
10
and Religion
and to implement and to maintain standards and of human justice of a better sort than most societies of the world have known in a word, to make good the chance which was almost taken, but was lost for the lines, to create
of
human
equality
—
lack of suitable persistence in execution, at the close of the
That opportunity must be seized and improved this time, for it may never come again. Philosophy and religion will play their own important parts in this drama. It will require no radical departure from their
last great conflict.
basic
mode,
to enable
them
to
do
so, for
admittedly primarily concerned with the progress. But for science,
of
human
part, will
The
progress or
they have ever been
human
side of
human
which physically implements so much
human
be infinitely more
retrogression, to play properly
its
difficult.
plain necessity of this condition, in terms of the indi-
demands a clear percipiency and a wide familiand working knowledge in two very different departments of thought and action. The education which will be required to enable the scientist to be a real power in the broadest human application of his work and thought, without losing his vidual scientist, arity
creative effectiveness in his
widest, and of the
most
own
field, will necessarily
difficult character.
that the techniques of thinking in
schooled for his
own work
He
must
be of the
first realize
which he has been
rigidly
are often quite inapplicable in the
social field, in the present state of
human
social evolution.
He
must recognize the intuitive methods of operation of the practical sociologist, and must become familiar with them, if he is to open the road to his own effective idealism in human affairs. Such mastery will be intensely difficult for him, for none of the rules and techniques of precise study, which are his own working instruments, will avail him in the least here, and he must find ways and means anew. He must gain a feeling for the pulse of human society, must be able to think in terms of the hearts as well as of the heads of common man, must acquire the intimate understanding of the ways of the human social organism and the vision in human affairs of the great states-
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
ii
man. Most important of all, he must exercise this knowledge and practice of great human leadership, and at the same time must preserve his present training and ideals and outlook intact in the research and technical fields which now are his own. For, if he is to be successful, it is vital that he be at once a great scientist and a great humanist. This is a tremendous assignment for the devotees of any discipline. It may be an impossible one for all but the truly great, yet it is one which is clearly demanded by the times in which we live, and it constitutes the most ringing and the most vital challenge, poses the most difficult job which scientists, those proverbial lovers of hard tasks, have yet been called upon
in the actual capacity
to undertake.
Since the present war seems likely to be a conflict of long quite probable that the burden of the huge task which must succeed its termination, will fall upon those younger workers who are at present in the early and duration,
it is
for science,
plastic portions of their research experience, or, perhaps,
actually are
now
in schools
and
colleges.
How
who
can they best
prepare themselves in anticipation of this task?
The question
one which none can answer fully, since it has before, but there are certain salient features of a reply which appear to stand forth clearly. The scientist of the future must be formally equipped with a far wider cultural background than falls to the lot of the average is
never been answered
The practical necessity of close specialmany workers of the opportunity of any the structure into which their work must fit,
student of science today. ization has robbed
general grasp of
and has impaired the ized training
is
directive efficiency of their efforts. Special-
indispensable for the scientific worker,
be of real service in his chosen
calling. Yet, so
is
to
is
familiar only with his specialty, he will be
work, never to control
good
specialist,
and
standing generalist, exactly
a is
its
ultimate use.
To
profound, broad a
what our leading
formidable scientists
fit
if
he
long as he
only to do the
be at once a really
and deeply under-
achievement, yet
must become,
if
it
is
they are
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
12
to take full advantage of their opportunities for service,
and
to
discharge really usefully the obligations of their high calling.
who aspire to be true leaders, therefore, broad educational background in human affairs, must have a Future
scientists
as well as in those of their scientific specialties,
important that those
who
and
equally
it is
are training for formal leadership
acquire a background in the spirit and purposes of science.
More important than
formal training, scientists must have
this
acquired a viewpoint which recognizes, in the earnest attempt
understand the workings of
to
human
worthy and
affairs, as
necessary, an activity as the acquisition of technical proficiency
and all
from the
human are
understanding.
scientific
among
too prevalent affairs
beings,
of the
must be
The
present attitude, which
human world adds to their value as The young men who
radically reversed.
entering scientific fields
must come
they possess as good an understanding of
past, in addition to being competent
they have failed to potential position.
to
comprehend
Not many
task will fully succeed in
it
feel
human
humans who have used
those less worthy
of the
until
that,
society as have
their
scientific
work
in the
investigators,
the real magnitude of their
who
of those
at first, for
attempt
no more
this gigantic
or
difficult
highly dedicatory role has ever been assigned to calling.
is
complete detachment
scientists, that
men
more
of any
But no barrier has yet been thrust athwart the progress race so great that a few of the best and the most
human
earnest were not able to surmount
it.
And
once the obstacle
has been conquered by a few courageous leaders, the
have become both clear and relatively easy. The task
way will may be
huge, but the rewards in opportunity for service are indeed great. It is vital
that the reahzation of the importance
of this effort
come
been more
and urgency
quickly, for never have the tides in
human
and never has there been a more propitious opportunity for a well qualified and idealistic band of men to correct many of the ills of mankind, which are better affairs
critical,
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
13
exposed to attack at present than they have been for many decades.
A
we
year ago,
discussed the contribution to the democratic
framework of society which the basic ideaUsm of science has to make. Then we thought of the structure of science as in some measure exemplary for the structure of a democracy, at once as a model, imperfect though it was, for democratic organization, and as a continuous, if unseen, influence for democratic principles in our democratic nation. The part which we visualized for science was then a passive one. It is too late now for passive roles. The danger is too imminent, and it is the duty of science and scientists, as it is that of every other body of thinking and of feeling men, to assume a far more active position. Science has gone to the battlefield today to wage a practical fight in the manner that it understands best. That job is a relatively easy one. It only demands of the scientist the techniques and the methods and the attitudes with which he has had previous experience, for which, in fact, he has been basically trained. The issues of war are simple and clean cut, and war, above all, is the theater for direct applicational thinking, to which the engineering scientist is accustomed.
But the peace which comes
after a debilitating
war makes
wholly different demands. In those few plastic days or months or years,
when
weary world, scarce knowing that its struggle first half-heartedly, and then with increasreadjust itself to new conditions and to a new a
has ceased, seeks at
ing vigor to
scale of living, then
for
is
the time that the democratic principles
which true science and worthy
serted, can be
that religion
made
scientists stand
can be
to take eflect in telling fashion. It
and philosophy
will
do
it
work, and by manifold ex-
perience of the same kind throughout history. Science
pared to undertake a part of the thinking in at present
tion of
its
it is
as-
then
their greatest
they are ready and prepared to undertake
but
is
this
is
pre-
situation,
not equipped to initiate the effective execu-
thought
— to
take up effective warfare against the
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
14
forces of darkness
know
which are ever present
only too well
how
in our societies, that
to assert themselves with telling effect.
Science must prepare
itself
for
this
task,
first
and most
importantly in attitude, and secondly in knowledge and in-
which flow more naturally, once the first step is It must be well on its way in that preparation by the time the supreme call comes, at the end of the present conflict, yet in the meantime it must not neglect its task of tuition,
achieved.
effective defense.
This
the incomparably vast challenge of
is
which democracy flings to the scientist, and if the scientist is worthy of his steel, is true to the short but high tradition which lies behind him, he will, perhaps imperfectly, haltingly and with many errors, but courageously and ultimately effectively, somehow undoubtedly manage to meet it. the twentieth century
APPENDIX Karl K. Darrow, Bell Telephone Laboratories: I like many aspects of Dr. Haskins' paper, but
since you apwant suggestions for alterations in it, I will confine myself to these and ask you to take my praises for granted. In general, I wish that the paper were more specific. Thus I can imagine that Dr. Haskins means any one (or two or more)
parently
of several different proposals.
(a)
Does he wish
scientists to
undertake researches on
ent problems from those which they
now
differ-
what what motives should guide them? (b) Does he wish scientists to treat their problems in different ways from those which they now use? If so, what changes
problems?
me
make
in their procedures?
Does he wish
say emphatically,
sense
If so,
or,
should they (c)
elect?
scientists to I
go into
politics?
(Here,
let
use "politics," not in the derogatory
which has unluckily become attached
to
the
word
in
America, but in the noble sense of attention to the problems of the State.) If so, I think that his advice must be directed to the elder generation among them; for effective action in politics requires so much of a man's time and energy, that a young
Science, Philosophy
man
and Religion
15
engaged in building a career in science simply cannot dare
to divert the requisite
amount
into that other field.
He must
postpone this decision until the age when a man is already established, and is free to decide whether he shall continue as
become a dean or an executive, or write books for the public, or take up social service or retire. I agree that it would be well if a greater proportion of successful scientists of middle age were to emulate K. T. Compton, R. A. Millikan and Sir William Bragg in taking part in public affairs, or even to emulate Wendell Willkie in seeking high ofl&ce. It is not, however, a proposition for the young man, or for any but the already very successful older man. (d) It may, however, be contended that the young men should form, or at any rate join, organizations of scientific workers such as exist in this country and England. I have the impression that these are mainly of a strong leftist tinge. Now you may reply that I ought to go out and form an organization of a strong rightist tinge. Assume for the sake of the argument that somebody does so: we then have a fight, instead of a unification of scientists seeking ends on which all are in agreement. I am afraid that this is bound to happen. If organizations of scientists for other than strictly scientific purposes are formed, they will get all tangled up in the battle between socialism and capitalism, leftism and rightism, new-deal-ism and old-deal-ism or whatever you choose to call it. If you reply
a research scientist, or
—
that the clear vision of the scientist will abolish this battle, I
must answer
On
that in
page 13
I
my
note:
".
view you are much too optimistic. .
.
Either the scientist should control
the application of his work, or he should cease to
gether
.
.
."
Lawrence
(omitted in
final draft)
Does
this
mean
work
alto-
that Ernest
to quit building and operating cyclotrons unless Lawrence, can control every use that may thenceforward be made of all the radioactive substances it produces? That W. M. Stanley is to quit studying the tobacco mosaic virus unless W. M. Stanley can control every use that may thenceforward be made of his studies? That T. H. Morgan is
he, Ernest
is
H. Morgan can control, be sure that this will never happen, unless
to quit studying genetics unless T.
etc.
.
.
.
We may
Lawrence and Stanley and Morgan and everyone
else give
up
Science, Philosophy
i6
and Religion
science in disgust and the scientific era ceases. that
Lawrence and Stanley and Morgan
ganization of scientific workers decide
and when they
work being
to
shall quit, the
is it
when
meant an
they shall
or-
work
condition for their continuing
that the organization shall control every use
may thenceforward be made
that
Or
et al. shall let
of their researches?
This
would be unionization on the grandest scale; and if scientists were willing even to consider it, they would first have to fight out the question whether the union should be leftist or rightist. I begin to wonder whether we should regard the scientist as a
when he
scientist,
we
enters into the field of public affairs. Should
not rather regard him as an intelligent man,
laudably sets aside a part or
all
of his time
from
his former interests, in order to devote himself to
Now
entirely different?
way committed Haskins and the
I
rest will
prime or something
realize that this conference is in a
the opposite belief
to
who most
his
make out
—so
a very
I hope that Dr. good case for the
latter.
Caryl
P. Haskins:
Dr. Darrow's points are numerous and highly pointed and specific, so that I
the order in (a)
It
should like to consider them one by one, in
which he has made them.
was not
my
the types of problems
thought that scientists should alter either which they now undertake in their work
or their methods of handling them, except as scientific experi-
ence and gains in
scientific
knowledge
will continually suggest
such alterations, as they always have. The question of the distribution of scientific effort
among
the scientific fields
now
and difficult one, which this paper does not attempt to touch. For the purposes of this paper, scientific research, in the sense in which it hr- always been regarded among the foremost and most idealistic scientists, must be our ideal of scientific and technical work of the future. We may improve upon the content as our background becomes richer with succeeding generations, but it is doubtful if we can ever improve upon the spirit of work of the best available
is
a tremendously intricate
scientists.
(b) This point
is
essentially
answered under (a).
Science, Philosophy (c) Essentially, yes.
I
and Religion
believe that the ideal condition
17
would
be either to have a certain number of influential scientists actually in "politics" (in the sense of the word used by Dr. Darrow) or influential over the policies of those
whose work
lies
in
This is not to say that I would wish all, or indeed, more than a very small percentage, of scientists to be active in such fields, and, as Dr. Darrow suggests, the practical exigencies of living would require that such men would have to be mature in years and successful in careers. But I do feel very strongly that some of the idealism and some of the vision which have characterized the best of scientists, and some of their spiritual values, need very badly to be introduced into politics. These qualities are adaptable to all subject matters, and there is no reason why they cannot make as profound a change in the field of politics as they have in the field of alchemy. For this to occur, it is vastly important that all scientists, including young ones, gain a real knowledge and appreciation of the arena of statesmanship and of the atmosphere of political events which take place about them and which may limit or otherwise shape the future scope of their own lives and those of other citizens. In order to be able to present a political fields.
which they stand, few of their number who may be active in fields of statesmanship, and to lead in the development of a more appreciative citizenry, scientists must widen their cultural background, and must come to include matters quite foreign to scientific effort within the orbit of their interest and solidly appreciative front for the ideals for to
be able to
assist those
appreciation, although not necessarily within the scope of their
work, which will quite usually be impossible for younger men. (d) I had no thought, in this paper, of such organizations as the. Association of Scientific Workers, in England or in America, or for other associations of similar type. Scientists active
are typically diflScult to regiment, on other than scientific grounds, for their greatest stock-in-trade is their originality
and independence, and in general they tend to look askance on such organizations. There is no doubt that such associations can do much good, but I believe the time is not yet ripe to judge them. I had no reference to them in this paper.
Science, Philosophy
i8
and Religion
Note on comment on Page 13—
Either the scientist should control the application of his work, or he should cease to
work
altogether.
".
.
.
." .
.
This rather incautious statement was intended only to frame should in the most general terms the concept that the scientist play a part in shaping the basic motivations of the society in
which he lives, as well as furnishing the sinews for their execuspeak, tion, and was intended to represent the terminus, so to scienfor absurd obviously be would It condition. ideal an of tists, at this
time, to cease
partial control of the
unfortunate
end
work because they have only very it, but it would be equally
results of
ultimately,
if,
professional
militarism
dominate the world and scientists were to active, essentially in its service.
terminal state,
it
would
were to
become ever more
Under such
conditions, as a
certainly be less dangerous for
man-
altogether until the spirit of
kind if scientists did cease work complete militarism were under control. The situation is of course fanciful either way, because of the essential variability reof humanity and of scientists. So long as a portion of the sults of the investigative
work
of the scientist
is
constructively
work is worth while, and what portion will be used
used for the benefit of humanity, that it is
of course impossible to foretell
constructively and
what
destructively.
I
do
believe, however,
that the scientist can ultimately play a part in shifting that percentage toward the constructive side, and this is a very
important duty. I had no thought of the "unionization" matter suggested by Dr. Darrow, for I believe that every effort to control specifically the work of research scientists will and can only end in the suppression of the best research. should be much more basic than this.
The
control
Final paragraph of Dr. Harrow's letter I
believe that Dr.
Darrow
is
quite correct in his statement,
although the matter seems to me one primarily of definition. The qualities and the methods of work of the scientist have made him preeminently successful in a given field. It is a field which is more directly susceptible of the application of such
methods than most
others, primarily because in the past
it
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
19
has been readily demonstrable that these were the only approaches which would solve the problems involved. It is com-
show up "shoddy" efforts of a man in scientific and only excessively rarely has such a man ever been successful. The rewards for righteousness and the punishments for wrongdoing, as it were, are automatic and fairly immediate here, and in consequence there has been a rapid and thorough selection for able, conscientious and devoted men, and an paratively easy to fields,
prompt elimination of the unfit. It is this factor, which has made scientists the above-average able and devoted group which they are. Other fields are less fortunate, and men of lesser ability and conscientiousness are able equally
primarily,
and are not so easily selected out. This is not however, that the qualities of mind or of devotion which
to survive longer,
to say,
are necessary to the
making
of real contributions in such fields
are at base in any wise different
believe that they are the same,
from those of the scientist. I and such men exist in every
of work, including the political. In the fields of statesmanship, however, they form a fairly "dilute" culture, and reinforcement and encouragement and instruction from the field
ranks of scientists would be infinitely helpful, fore, that
we may
say, statesmen,
he
say that is
when
I
think, there-
a scientist enters the ranks of,
not changing his essential mental out-
look, nor, essentially, changing his
most fundamental methods
of attacking problems. Indeed,
he does, he loses his value
entirely.
He
is
if
merely changing his subject matter. The man, all when he works in two fields
therefore, does not change at
successively or at once. He is still a scientist, with the same primary motivations and basic techniques for which the word stands.
From
the standpoint of professional rating, of course, he
has changed.
He may
never go back to the same classification
or the same kind of a job which he previously had. But he will
continue to be exactly the same kind of a force in our society.
Raphael
Isaacs, University of
Michigan:
Professor Haskins bases his thesis on the concept that scientists can discover the answer to any problem at will (p. 2, par. 3),
and that
scientists
have the choice of discovering laws that
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
20
be "good" or "bad" for civilization. In actual practice, while hundreds of men may be working on a certain problem, manner inthe solution dawns on one or two of them in a distinguishable from "inspiration." The scientist (term not at just discover laws of all synonymous with "science") cannot will
nature that will be "good" for humanity, and toss observations back into the river, much as Kingsley's "Water Babies," if no they will lead to something wicked. The scientist has the on fall should "blame" choice in the matter. Possibly the the authority in power who orders the technologist to use discoveries of the scientist.
The
technologist
may
take chlorine
and disinfect water or wounds, or he may pour it into a bomb and drop it into the enemy's camp. Professor Raskins touches on this concept on page 3. However, scientists cannot be told by a dictator what to discover, but technologists may be ordered to use the discoveries in a certain way.
A
dictator
may
order a scientist to discover a lethal ray to kill people, but there Nevertheless, a scientist may is no guarantee that he can do it. X-rays, etc. (an accident studying while discover a lethal ray
known
as "serendipity").
human
P. 6. If
come under
the
follow "laws," then they of course
affairs
domain
of the scientist.
P. 7. Actual practice has shown that it is not feasible for a assume scientist to pursue his studies and at the same time "active leadership in human affairs." In most universities the
head of a department usually is able to engage in very mediocre on research work while he has the running of his department and compromise would Raskins his hands. Possibly Professor have the leaders of handling
human
human
present stage, because so
use the methods of science in would be rather premature at the
affairs
beings. This
little is
known
of the laws governing
of science (experiment and ob-
and the method would be of little value. It is, however, being used and to some extent and laws (legal enactments) are made changed depending on how well they control and fit in with the
human
affairs
servation)
facts.
P. 10. 1 certainly agree with Professor Raskins that the education of the scientist should be of the "widest character" (P. n),
"a far wider cultural background."
— and Religion
Science, Philosophy Science alone
(i.e.,
the
21
body of knowledge obtained by ob-
servation and experiment) may some day be a guide for human conduct, but as there is much human conduct to be guided in the meantime, science must be supplemented by other helps e.g., religion of some type,* for some years to come.
Caryl
P, Haskins:
Dr. Isaacs makes a number of points in his should like to consider individually. (a) It
is
letter,
which
I
evident that individual scientists, on the basis of would have a hard time for-
existing experimental knowledge,
mulating stated laws by which humanity should work. Such a concept would assume a far greater maturity in sociological thought than exists today. However, the same condition applied
mathematics and ancient alchemy, and the present which has eventually been evolved has been the result of the composite earnest thought and carefully recorded observations of many generations. I see no fundamental reason why this methodology of scientific people should not be applicable to matters of human affairs, with an ultimate clarification of concepts, and I believe that this can be shown to have been true in some individual cases of detail. Admittedly in ancient
beautiful codification of laws
the job
is
not one for a single generation, either of scientists or I do believe, however, that the weight of scien-
of any one else. tific
opinion should be thrown behind such an
basic scientific techniques that
we want, not
effort. It is the
the specialized
ones which have been developed in direct connection with the present
work
of the scientist. Clearly, the
proaches are not applicable in the two tists
fields,
same detailed apbut capable scien-
should be broad enough to perceive this fact and not to
attempt
it.
Many men of religion and many capable philosophers have become among the very best of scientists, as well as of public men, in just this way. I believe that the scientist, if he will withdraw only a little from his too specialized position, can do the same. believe that this has been covered in the preceding
(b)
I
•I.e.,
rules of
experiment.
conduct arrived
at
by means other than observation and
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
22
paragraph. "Laws," of course, are in any case matters of definition only. (c)
I
think that Dr. Isaacs
is
very correct, in general, in his
statement that active leadership in to a scientist's research. is
I
think
it
human
affairs is
damaging
can be demonstrated that this
all depends here, of course, on man. The answer to this is, of the only thing that is damaged is the set of special-
by no means always true, but
the individual nature of the course, that
ized particular techniques that the scientist actually uses in his laboratory work, not the basic underlying motives,
which are
wanted. The evident solution will be to have the man who is not capable of covering both fields at once (and very few are) cover them one at a time. In the course of normal evolution, the capable scientist is apt to do pure research in his earlier years, really
and then
to apply his talents in other fields as well, as
he gets
Darrow has pointed out. This probably will result in more meager and poorer research from the man as he gets older. However, it is to be noticed that, except in unusual cases, older, as Dr.
the man's research will deteriorate in any event after he has
passed middle age.
With
certain striking exceptions, experience
is done young men in their twenties and thirties, who receive wide recognition long after their peak of pro-
has indicated that the highest quality of actual research in general by
usually
ductivity has been passed.
Last paragraph in Dr. Isaacs' letter
would go considerably further than Dr. Isaacs here to exit is science which should supplement religion and philosophy in the conduct of human affairs. It cannot and should not hope to do more than this for many, I
press the opinion that
many
years,
if
ever.
The
thesis of this
paper
is
that scientists
should be actively interested in offering the assistance to ligion and philosophy which they can surely do.
Hugh
re-
S. Taylor, Princeton University: So far as it (the article by Dr. Haskins) goes, it is excellent, but I do not think it goes far enough. It stresses the undoubted need for the expansion of the social horizons of the future
Science, Philosophy scientist; that,
seems to me,
it
and Religion
is
23
only a "stage on the road."
Unless the scientist can recover some of the spiritual horizons of earlier scientists, before the materialistic scientific age that
the 19th century brought to us and out of
which the science of
the totalitarian states has produced such a dreadful spawn,
we
duty of scientists to the democratic way of life. This may not be a usual point of view of a modern scientist, but it is, I believe, an inevitable goal for which the shall fail in the fullest
scientists of the future
Caryl
must
cultivate their talents.
P. Haskins: I
am more
comment
than heartily in accord with Professor Taylor's
that the
most vital task of the scientists of tomorrow and to hold the spiritual horizons of the
will be to recapture
Lavoisiers, the Faradays, the Henrys, the Pasteurs, of another
day, or, in our
own
time, of the Curies, the Langmuirs, the
Arrheniuses, the Braggs, and of Professor Taylor himself. subject with
"way stage"
which in
this
paper deals
is
The
frankly considered as a
such an evolution and constitutes a
call
to
scientists to prepare to resist the materialistic pressures that
will
undoubtedly be brought to bear on them in the future, and temptation themselves.
to resist materialistic
:
CHAPTER
II
Democracy and the Natural By
KARL
F.
Sciences
HERZFELD
Catholic University of America
democracy and the natural sciences
THE RELATION between
is
not as close as that between democracy and the social
sciences.
That can be
man, but not with
understood because some of the
easily
natural sciences deal with
man
all,
while others deal with
Only anthro-
fundamentally concerned with these, but
pology
is
usually
numbered among the
The
not at
his social-political activities.
political
and
this
is
social sciences.
social conditions necessary for the
proper
functioning of the natural sciences have been discussed very
completely and competently by Karl K. Darrow in his article on "Interplay of Theory and Experiment in Modern Physics" in last year's symposium. The present article then will deal with the following two
problems First,
what can science do
for
democracy?
Second, what role has science played in the present
Western
crisis
of
civilization?
In discussing the
our subject
is
first
question,
it
must be emphasized
that
not what science can do for society in general,
but what
it can do for a democratic society mocracy function better. What science can give directly to democracy
34
to
is
make
its
de-
the "scientific"
Science, Philosophy
To
spirit.
understand
0£
every day work.
this,
and Religion
we must watch
course not
the scientists in their
all scientists
in their application of the scientific spirit.
25
are equally perfect
But the better ones,
can easily be seen, have the following characteristics in
as
their
work:
They know that one should not judge before a considerable amount of facts have been accumulated. They know that there are normally no shortcuts to a worth while goal, but that results can be found only after long, patient search, a search that
is
tiresome, often concerned with minutiae,
but unavoidable. a new fact is found or a new theory is announced, they accustomed never to let the new fact or theory stand by itself, but always to see how it fits into the whole mass of already known facts or theories. This means that they are not satisfied except provisionally with a lot of unrelated blocks of knowledge, but seek to coordinate them. If something new comes along, they feel that they must explore the remotest consequences of the newcomer, before they really If
are
—
accept
it.
They know this
—
that while nature
uniformity
a great
number
lies
is
uniform to a great extent,
very deep, so that a detailed explanation of
of complicated facts
is
not possible in simple
slogans.
Furthermore, the
and
scientists,
and
particularly the
mathema-
have learned, or perhaps learned again, what some of the mediaeval philosophers knew, ticians
theoretical
physicists,
to mistrust words which are not sharply defined. One of the most important tasks in teaching physics students is to train them to precision of expression. Finally, they have become sufficiently detached from their
subject that the personal side, while
still
important in the
form of ambition or the wish for personal promotion, out of scientific debate.
too
many
is
kept
years ago, controversies
still had occasionally the character of conbetween Homeric heroes, but that has gone out of
in scientific journals
troversies
Not
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
26 style
and so present day
scientists will rarely think their ad-
scoundrels or traitors, versaries in scientific controversy intellect. in lacking as consider them i£
they In connection with this
trait is
even
the almost complete absence
sciences have here the advantage over o£ wishful thinking. The hard test of reality is apt to come the humanities in that the wishful thinking is of the most very soon, and so, in science, disadvantage. In applied science, an
obvious and immediate influence his bridge buildengineer who lets wishful thinking
wreck on his hands and no alibi ing will very shortly have a be that if this scientific spirit could
Now
it
seems to
me
political decisions, it shared by the majority in their government. democratic of the greatest advantage to
In like
RepubHc presupposed something be formed when they expected poUtical decisions to
fact, it,
would be
the founders of this
such and consideration. It seems clear that unemoimpartial after must be formed a decision, to be right, sides. It is facts and arguments on all the of weighing tional can be situations difficult that further clear, from experience, patient, by only but remedied not by quick-acting panaceas,
after full debate
constant struggle. . i extent this scientific spirit is at work If we now ask to what disappointing. the answer is somewhat in our democratic Ufe, themscientists the consider Unfortunately this is so even if we •
•
several quarters that the '^The opinion has been expressed in took a if only the scientists world would be much better off larger part in governing
it.
It is
recognized that scientists have
of technical problems done outstanding work in the solution completely changed the which confront society. They have
important public health picture, are doing tritional field,
contributions.
We
the nu-
a
justly estimated, to
must
all
multiplied in the future. the other hand, in public
On
m
conservation
change in soil mention only a few such hope that these examples will be
and have wrought
that cannot yet be
work
pronouncements on matters ot
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
27
general policy, on political subjects outside their fields, the scientists have shown neither more caution, more regard for the facts, nor more impartiahty than the general public/ That
goes not only for pubhc utterances but also for active participation in politics. Painleve vv^as Minister of War in France, and
probably a good one, but
showed any
am
I
not aware that as such he
traits particularly characteristic
of a mathematician. Before 1914 scientists were often made members of the Upper House in Austria and Germany and filled their positions satisfactorily, cal
but again no influence of their science on their
behavior was noticeable.
The
actively into politics recently in
shown more enthusiasm than Perhaps
it
is
too
scientist gets in his
havior.
scientists
politi-
who have gone
England^ have, in
my
opinion,
scientific spirit in their activities.
much to own field
expect that the training that a will in general react on his be-
understand that educational psychologists say that however, the conscious effort of transfer were made, the gain for democracy would be great. I
this "transfer of training" is rather rare. If,
If
we
consider
whole, one must,
now I
the
homo
politicus
Americanus
diink, be agreeably surprised at
as
a
how much
of the spirit which the is
Founding Fathers thought essential if not based on scientific trainThe American people do still dehberate slowly and care-
still
ing.
active in the land, even
fully before
going into action.
in patent medicines, pohtical in the
American mind of
On
the other hand, the befief
and otherwise,
is
also ingrained
old.
Many trends in modern education, however, are deeply inimical to the scientific spirit. The life of all of us, scientists or non-scientists, even for the most fortunate, consists for the
most part in disagreeable out, which we must learn
imposed upon us from withperform in good spirit. In many
tasks,
to
^here is an excellent article on this whole subject by A. V. Hill of the Royal Society in Science 93, 579 (June 20, 1941). "Professor Polanyi has emphasized this in detail in one particular case (see Polanyi, "Manch. Sch. of Ex. and Soc. Studies," Oct. 1939).
M.
Science, Philosophy
28
and Religion
work seems to be mathematics and physics, are being more and more eliminated from the curriculum of secondary schools. Similarly, judging from the results, sufficient emphasis is not being placed in the secondary schools on training for critical, independent, logical thinking. Instead, our schools, disciplinary training for this kind of
neglected.
The
difficult subjects, like
secondary education, so far as
it is
not vocational, puts principal
on the verbal, i.e., it is a lawyer's and a salesman's education. There is, in American speech and American education, a high achievement as far as implications and mental associations evoked by words are concerned, but little stress on the stress
exact significance of the words.
One is
most
of the
characteristic expressions of this attitude
the popular opinion that
it
has completely done away with
morals by calling them "taboos"; that
name can change
of a
named, which
is
name
nology, however far
trick.
But to appear
has to be taken from scientific termiuse
its
may be from
the scientific spirit.
a higher level, this misuse of scientific concepts
more
The
distressing.
so, that
also
that the associations
an advertiser's or lawyer's
respectable, this
On
is,
or prove something about the thing
experiment
know
that
it
is
scientists
is
even
have proclaimed, and rightly
the basis of scientific progress.
But they
has to be carefully directed experiment, that
the handling of experiments has to be learned.
Contrariwise,
recommends have been scientist.
students line,
there
philosophical
far
from
desirable,
which
is
life,
school
which
and the
results
not astonishing to the
The scientist is not accustomed to tell his physics to make "experimentally" a short circuit in the power
although he might show them what happens in a short
circuit
on
a very small scale
experience.
He
does not
to get very close to
how
a
exists
the "experimental" attitude to
it feels.
and then
recommend
refer
them
to historical
to his chemistry students
an explosion, so that they can experience I heard of medical students being ad-
Nor have
vised to get themselves fatty degeneration of the liver before treating this disease in others.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
29
This whole question of subjecting everything without excepis bound up with the more general problem treated in the second part of this article. tion to personal experience
Finally,
method
we
new
If a
scientist or trial
find a similar lack of appreciation of scientific
in problems of government.
scale.
ments, then
process
is
to be tested
engineer will dare try
The if
usual procedure
it
by experiment, no applied immediately on an indus-
is,
first,
these go well, experiments
semitechnical scale, and only
if
laboratory
experi-
on an intermediate
these succeed, will the process
basis. The reason for this sequence is one cannot predict how an experiment will work out or it would not be an experiment. If the laboratory tests fail, there may be a loss of a few hundred dollars, while the same experiment, if tried immediately on an industrial scale, might have resulted in a loss of a hundred thousand dollars in case of failure. Only when the kinks have been ironed out in laboratory and semitechnical tests, will the final big-scale trial be under-
be tried on a production that
taken.
In the social and economic
fields, however, where experiundoubtedly also necessary, this is all too often undertaken immediately on a scale involving a hundred million
ment
is
people. II
We
my mind, has problems of Western civilization for the last 600 years, the problem of permanence and change. The reconciliation of these two seemingly contradictory principles in the external world was one of the fundamental problems of Greek philosophy. In a different field, that of the come now
to the discussion of what, to
been one of the most
difficult
human mind and
of the civilization which man has built, they form an unresolved antinomy. The problem briefly is this: There exist certain ideas and rules that are permanent; a number of fundamental philostill
sophical principles, truths of religion, the basic attitude toward
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
30 life,
the rules properly called morals, the laws that used to be
called natural laws.
On the other hand, there are many ideas and rules that change continuously: our knowledge and our views about natural science, the rules properly called manners, the prescriptions called positive laws, the mode of life as determined by the technical and economic situation. The to
difficulty consists in allocating a particular idea or rule
one of the two categories.
two groups has been represented
Historically, each of the
by persons
who
claimed for the realm they represented as
rules or ideas as possible.
understand,
swinging
While
that
is
pendulum
has often resulted in catastrophe, the
it
now
many
psychologically easy to
in one, then in the other direction.
The mediaeval
synthesis started^ to break
down
in the four-
had achieved its unity by developing particularly the "permanent group" of ideas in theology and philosophy. But it had, of course, also to assimilate a large teenth century.
number
It
of the transient things, contemporary ideas about the
upon the economic situation "new knowledge" showed these tran-
material world, a society based of feudalism.
When
the
sient accretions untenable, the
contemporary representatives of
them nevertheless
the "philosophia perennis" claimed
as
be-
longing to their system, with the result that the system as a
whole
fell
into disrepute.
Similarly, artisan
when
the feudal system
and tradesman
— the
city
fell,
dweller
was
with the
—and
rise of the
when
later the
by the official representatives of the social order that they could not accommodate themselves to the changed conditions. The result was that, in
industrial revolution took place,
it
felt
the course of several centuries, the organic order of society, in
which economics was subordinated principles, collapsed.
occasionally,
e.g.,
We
at least in theory to
see an analogous process
where the representatives of
problems of manners,
like
^Of course this historical sketch
still
moral
going on
religion claim
smoking, as matters of morals, or is
highly simplified and schematic.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
31
condemn something as immoral, like the study of medicine by women, which simply runs contrary to "hallowed national tradition" but has nothing to
of
good and
On
do with the unchangeable laws
evil.
the other hand, the representatives of change
we can with good ground such —have made the opposite, much graver intellectual level,
—and on the
call the scientists
mistake. Because
our knowledge in the field of science progresses continuously, and much of what was once firmly believed turned out to be
were enthusiastic were much more so. Similarly, because part of our behavior, that part determined by technical and economic environment, had to change, all our rules of behavior were considered as being likewise thus determined and therefore subject to change. If modern industry permits us to change to a new model of car every year, then why not wrong, nothing was
certain. If the scientists
in their claims, the popularizers
also to a
A
new model
of wife?
particularly strong
sequences
is
found
example of
in the case
this process
and
its
of legal philosophy.
To
conthe
—
Founding Fathers the existence of natural law not in the scientific, but in the moral meaning of the word was selfevident, and they considered that the Constitution could stand on a firm basis only if this natural law were generally recognized by the people. They knew also, of course, of the existence of impermanent "positive" laws and provided for their easy
—
change by simple act of Congress. In the however, legal philosophers
—partly
late
nineteenth century,
influenced by philosophic
thought, partly perhaps by what they believed to be anthropological results
—came
more and more
to regard all laws as
purely positive, enacted laws. Today, the idea of natural law in
political
science
and jurisprudence
outside of Catholic circles.
As
is
widely disregarded
a result, the State
is
often con-
sidered supreme, not subject to any higher rule, and any law is
considered justifiable.
The moral and natural
political
outcome of an
anarchy in which
attitude
we
live
is
the
which does not admit the
Science, Philosophy
32
and Religion
permanent truth* and unchangeable moral laws. Here, therefore, seems to He a task of the utmost importance for the fate of Western democracy in which the people as a existence of
whole determine
society.
The
philosopher must draw the divid-
ing line between the permanent and the changeable, the
reli-
group to be maintained as the standard and general rule under all circumstances, the latter to be adapted open-mindedly to progress and changing circumstances. Of course we do not believe that when this intellectual task is accompUshed, all strife will be eliminated. Even if theoretically the line is drawn, there are always people temperamentally unable to keep the finely adjusted balance that is necessary in all human affairs.® There vsdll always be the persons to whom all change is distasteful, the type who are shocked at the idea of moving the buffet from the place where grandmother had it, and the other group, the temperamental rebels to whom every restraint is distasteful. Nothing can be done with these groups by an intellectual argument, but they form a minority which will gain dangerous influence only if the majority has not gious-moral and the scientific-economic; the
first
learned to judge their exaggerations for what they are worth. In this paper, exist a it
right,
we
it
has been taken for granted that there does
body of ideas of unchangeable one of the aims of
cannot, in spite of
many
this
value. If
conference
is
diversities, agree
we understand
whether on these permato see
nent ideas as a necessary background for democracy. *0£ course
it was once very popular to disregard the importance of ideas and importance of behavior only. This distinction to me is silly, as silly as if one would say of a surgeon: I do not care whether he knows anatomy, provided he can operate well. As if one could operate well without knowing anatomy!
stress the
*I
believe
mainly in
the
so-called
disagreement between religion and science consists and temperamental difficulty.
this psychological
CHAPTER Some Comments on By
III
Science and Faith
HUDSON HOAGLAND Clcir\ University
DURING
met monthly at the House American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Boston
the past winter a group
of the
by the 1940 New York Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion. This informal group of twenty or thirty men, of which I was chairto discuss questions of the sort raised
man, consisted of Catholic and Protestant theologians, proand philosophers. No general statement is available from our group at this time, and the comments in
fessional scientists
this
paper
What
reflect
value,
if
only
degree to which they other scientists.
my own
reactions to our discussions.
may have inheres, however, in the may be representative of the views of
any, they
Most
of us felt at the
end of our
series
of
Boston meetings that our conferences were of value in promoting the personal meeting of diverse minds and in helping representatives of the various disciplines to understand each other's
philosophical views in terms of our backgrounds as
human
beings.
Several of the speakers at the 1940
New
York Conference
stressed the importance of religion as a necessity for effective social behavior in
our confused times.
It
was pointed
out, for
example, by Sorokin that the development of our "sensate" culture, with
its
debiHtating effect on society,
is
a direct result
of the loss of the religious faith of one's forefathers. Other
speakers at the Conference in
New 33
York urged,
either directly
Science, Philosophy
34
and Religion
or by implication, a return to the faith and discipline of neoscholasticism.
Without wishing to criticize the desirability of must, it would appear, accept them as im-
we
these aims,
possible of achievement.
served
if
we
I
believe this conference can be better
accept as given certain fundamental differences in
on the part of philosophers, theologians and sciand endeavor to stress not these differences, but rather the common grounds on which we may meet to consider a constructive program of action. It is simply a fact that many,
orientation entists,
may be
if
not most, scientists are agnostics.
is
the basis for the poor participation of scientists in the
It
this fact that
New
York Conference. It is certainly not due to any lack of concern on their part with the present world crisis. Their agnosticism is
as
deeply ingrained as
is
the religious faith of
many
of their
friends.
Knowledge
to the scientist
regarded in terms of a certain
is
degree of probabiHty that a relationship that
it
mentally.
God
is
true in the sense
can be tested by observation or acted upon experi-
We
are told that even
if
the existence of a personal
cannot be proved by any methods acceptable to science,
the probability
To many
is
none the
pragmatically worth betting on.
less
of us this probability
is
too remote to warrant
acceptance as a working hypothesis, even though
we
its
should
and despite our respect and even envy for our who disagree with us. It might be worth while to indicate why to some scientists the probability of a personal God, as it is understood by the organized religions, is not a concept which can yield for them a faith for action. The like to
more
do
so,
religious friends
following reasons are scientists
among
a
reluctantly to regard
number
that force so
themselves as agnostics.
many Our
views are often naive. Scientists, like the rest of mankind, are
and rather curious culture pattern measure made us what we are, and we may
a product of a particular that has in large
well be criticized for oversimplification of our concepts of
knowledge and
faith.
in learning to sav
A
"We
fundamental part of our discipline don't know."
To
is
say this often runs
and Religion
Science, Philosophy counter, as
35
show, to strong biological tendencies
I shall try to
to dispose of our problems in terms of satisfying configurational
meanings.
But
care."
To if
say
we
"We
know" seldom means "We don't for our hypotheses we know
don't
care too
much
view inevitably colors our and is perhaps the principal between science and religion.
that science will cease to exist. This
thinking about religious matters basis for the so-called conflict
we know is a product of the functioning of our nervous systems. Our neurosensory apparatus is itself a direct product of biological evolution. We, together with other conAll that
temporary living organisms, are here today as the resultant of inefficient process of eUmination. For every sur-
an extremely
viving species
many thousands of species have perished. For many billions of potential organisms in
every living organism
form of
the
their parents'
germ
have perished. Animals
cells
eliminated in the course of evolution are, in large measure, ones that, as
a result of genetic accidents,
have failed to develop
mechanisms to cope with the vicissitudes of their environments. All knowledge of our universe, including a knowledge of God, comes to us strained, if you will, suitable physiological
through a
series
of highly involved
central nervous system.
We
physicochemical events
and responses mediated by the
constituting sensory reception
experience not the properties of
own
objects but the properties of our
nervous systems.
We
can thus have no direct knowledge of reality beyond the
symbols that
we
systems,
it
is
all
men
others
who have
have similar nervous
impossible for some of us to accept indefinable
and unsharable ways tion,
upon with
learn to agree
similar nervous systems. Since
naturalistic
to a superior
interpretations
knowledge of God. In addiof
religious
anthropological and psychological terms
phenomena
preclude for
in
many
of us the type of faith enjoyed by others.
One
of the
most fundamental
successful organism It
that
it
characteristics of a biologically
reacts to situations as a whole.
shown experimentally that complex behavior is made up by the addition and compounding of simple
has been
not
is
Science, Philosophy
36 reflex
responses, but rather
and Religion
from the simplest embryos
on,
integrated behavior manifests itself by responses of the or-
ganism as a whole to its environment. These responses may later become individuated into analysable reflex patterns. This tendency toward a sort of gestalt response is not only fundamental to the lower organisms but is also a property of the of
reactions
intellectual
human
beings.
From
the
startle
response of a new-born infant to the appreciation of a picture or to the metaphysics of a philosopher,
integrated
way
The animal
we
are reacting in an
to configurational aspects of our environments.
enemies in the forest does so by climbdodging into a hole, or surprising its opponent from behind a rock. Such patterned configurational responses clearly have considerable biological survival value. Instincts and tropisms are examples, as indeed are also the insight and intelligence of the higher vertebrates. Religion appears to me to be a culmination of this basic tendency of organisms to react in a configurational way to situations. We must resolve conflicts and disturbing puzzles by closing some sort of configuration, and the religious urge apescaping
ing the nearest
its
tree,
pears to be a primitive tendency, possessing biological survival value, to unify our environment so that we can cope with it. This same basic urge is perhaps the source of esthetic pleasure in art and in science. Since art forms and scientific theories
are limited in their scope,
from
more
extensive satisfaction
religious interpretations of the
are especially satisfying
if
is
life.
derived
These
they can unify cosmology and views
about values in one theology.
mainspring of many
meaning of
The same
motivation
is
the
which give a basis for extrapersonal unity of belief and action. For this reason, the totalitarian faiths of the Nazis, Fascists and Communists appear to stem from the same basic biological source as does the faith of the devoutly religious man. The very name, totalitarian state,
is
social philosophies
suggestive of this.
correct, there is no necessary connection between religion and problems of good and evil. Good and evil If this
view
is
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
which
good and bad
37
organism Thus, ethics may be something quite independent of religion, although when sound ethics can be combined with the basic religious drive, as has often happened, refer to that
is
for a particular
at a particular time.
desirable social conditions are likely to follow.
On
the other
hand,
when bad
drive,
such as that behind Nazism, bad social conditions will
ethics
become combined with
a
religious
follow.
Science
is
not an adequate substitute for religion, although
the individual scientist engaged in
work which may modestly
help towards an understanding of some aspect of the universe
may men
not feel the need of a personal in other occupations. It
God
as
much
do some
as
probably not possible ever to
is
have a complete science of anything. There will always be lower level questions or upper level questions, if you prefer, that
we cannot
answer.
The
fascination
of science in
part
unending possibilities of new discoveries. No matter how cornpact a body of knowledge may be, some fresh discovery which upsets basic assumptions from which the body of knowledge was developed, may start a whole new train of orientation. This has been dramatically illustrated in the
resides in these
physical
sciences
when we way
sensory equipment by
are
of
able
new
to
extend our natural
A
instrumentation.
good
an addition to our limited inherited sensory apparatus, but since possibilities of expanding evidence are unlimited, no limitation can be put on scientific method, especially in fields of such tremendous complexity as those
instrument
involving
To
is
essentially
human
behavior.
speak personally, science
is
to
me
sum
merely the
total
of acceptable techniques for gaining evidence. These techniques
preclude authoritarian dictates and preclude ways to knowledge
transcending comprehensible and sharable procedures.
The
cedures of science are very limited, but they seem to
me
the only ways to ability in
pro-
to
be
knowledge possessing a maximum of prob-
reaching an approximation to truth.
truth itself anything that
I
Nor
is
abstract
can regard as an object of religious
Science, Philosophy
38
and Religion
When important problems confront me and I am unable to give satisfactory explanations I must reply simply that I do not know the answers. I cannot take the step which my worship.
tendencies suggest of putting faith into systems and views which seem to have no basis in reliable experiences. I
gestalt-ish.
am thus left repeatedly only with agnosticism concerning most matters dealing with problems of faith, but being a representative of an evolutionarily successful species, I find myself reacting to complex situations as a whole and responding, sometimes even adequately, in ways which are inexplicable on any scientific basis. I never expect to understand most of the things
that
value most highly— the
I
or the love
dirill
of a sunset, of a symphony,
have for certain persons. But I prefer to admit my failure to understand rather than accept explanations based on a type of evidence I cannot accept as vahd. It should be emphasized that diis failure to understand implies neither a denial of the importance of poetic, religious and other forms I
of imaginative thought, nor an assertion of the adequacy of science to reveal ultimate truth. Scientists, in general,
and
tivities
in
ideals
beHeve strongly in certain ethical accontrolling them. Empirically there is
such a thing as the good life, and one need not justify it by supernatural sanctions. The Hves of such men as Socrates, Christ and Lincoln, in contrast to Nero, Napoleon and Hitler' speak for themselves. Most agnostic scientists
hght for
are as ready
their ideals as they
be sanctioned by
God-or by
a threat to to
human
me
if
they believed
them
to'
to
science for that matter
I for stands for, because 'it is dignity and to the values and kindnesses
example, hate Nazism and
which
would be all
that
it
are the most important things in life. The history of his societies gives us grounds for value iud/ments as to what is good and bad. The degree of certainty as to the truth of these judgments can never be as great as the relatively greater but never absolute certainty we obtain from physical experiments, but it is adequate for action and we must act. To wait in the realm of human relations for the
of
man and
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
39
higher degrees o£ assurance of the exact sciences
relatively
would be impossible nonsense. Those problems of
this
of us concerned with the
Conference, whether they agree with
me
or
not on the subject of religion, doubtless share in the main
most of the same
ethical views concerning
the purposes of this Conference, this isn't it
is all
man. Perhaps
we may
share.
for
But
enough.?
The world is faced today by a conflict of two irreconcilable viewpoints. One stresses the all-importance of the state, and degrades the individual to insignificance. This viewpoint held in
common, under varying
groups in
Italy,
forms,
is
by the controlling
Germany, Japan and Russia. The other view-
point, characteristic
at
the present
time of America, Great
and her English-speaking dominions, and also of many crushed and inarticulate groups throughout Europe, upholds the dignity of the individual and regards the state merely as Britain
a vehicle for
pends for
its
its
development. Neither of these viewpoints deon a belief in any particular conception
success
God of our fathers. We cannot turn the clock back and accept the theological doctrines which once gave power to this God in the minds of men. We cannot have Him rescue us from the distorted and false gods of the dictator-controlled countries. These latter countries are powerful because they have in large measure channeled the basic religious drives of men in terms of false gods. These gods are as false to the scientist as they are to the theologian. Their development has prostituted science, philosophy and theology. In the face of this situation, the religious man and the agnostic scientist can stand together in joint opposition to the threat to their fundamental tenets of human faith. But such opposition must be made effective in terms of a program of action. At the close of the first World War many of us beHeved that the intrinsic wretchedness of nationalistic ambition had proved itself and that a League of Nations, with power to of the
would be developed. Shorton both sides of the Atlantic
enforce a sane international law, sighted
political
jealousies
Science, Philosophy
40
and Religion
and made necessary the present conflict. saw clearly in the early 1920's what the inevitable outcome would be. There is a colossal task ahead for all enlightened men; it is the task first of winning a war we are engaged in and then of insisting upon a form of federalism for the civilized world. Without the agencies of pressure groups and propaganda, such a federalism cannot be realized. There is already active in this country a movement known as "Union frustrated this plan
Many
of us
Now," aiming
at this objective.
What
better function could this
conference serve than to consider carefully a plan for promoting a federation too strong to be attacked
and capable of popular
self-government after the manner of our
ment? As
we
a group,
own
federal govern-
program of which probably most
are in a position to help a
this sort to realization. It is a
program
to
and one which, if successful, appears to hope of a decent world. The totalitarian powers have backed the democracies to the
of us can subscribe, offer the only
wall because
they have harnessed
religious drives.
vantage false
—lost
A
the
equivalent of man's
century ago democratic ideals had this ad-
now
in
large
measure in America through a
sense of security and a tarnishing of catchwords
that
were once representative of great endeavors. The power of early Christianity in large measure resided in its disregard of class, creed and nationaHsm, in bringing together in social bonds men of good will, with a faith in human dignity as well as in God. In terms of a democratic international federation, we may again imbue democracy with power of action. But for the present, we must use the vehicle of a unified nationalism to save us for these later achievements.
The
foregoing paper was kindly submitted by Dr. Finkel-
stein to a
group for
criticisms,
with the suggestion to
me
that
the paper might later be revised in the light of these criticisms.
Many
of the
comments, however, are so excellent that
I
prefer
submit them in the form they were presented rather than try substantially to modify the original paper, which would to
thus tend to obscure the discussion. Only minor modifications
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
have been made from the original
41
After the criticisms,
text.
add a few further comments. Unfortunately,
it has not been possible to include all of the criticisms that have been made. Professor Brightman, for example, made his remarks in the form of marginal notes. Henry Dennison, Denys P. Meyers, Dugald C. Jackson, Alfred C. Lane and Maxwell Savage also commented extensively and cogently on the paper, but in a form not suitable for reproduction in the limited space
I shall
The critics represent a variety of disciplines, may interest the reader to know the backgrounds
available here.
and since
it
of the commentators, their professions are included with their discussions.
The
writer,
incidentally,
is
himself
a
general
physiologist.
APPENDIX Howard Chandler Robbins In
commenting upon
{theologian): the paper,
I
shall
not attempt to criticise
the grounds of the position of religious agnosticism
which
Professor Hoagland has so lucidly stated, but merely to point
out practical
difficulties
which would have
position were to be generally accepted.
"Good and ticular
evil refer to that
organism
which
is
at a particular time."
root of totalitarian ideology.
The
to
be faced
if
the
On
pp. 36-37 he remarks, good and bad for a par-
This
relativity lies at the
totalitarians construe
good
with reference to the Reich, the State, and proceed accordingly. I do not see how the ethical distinctions and values which characterise democratic thinking can be preserved without a much wider reference. In the Hebrew-Christian tradition the reference is ultimately to the character and will of God as that will has been revealed in the Scriptures and in history. Justice is required of man, not because it is a relative good, but because, being based upon the revealed character and will of God, the requirement is absolute; mercy has the same sanctions. One may accept this revelation, one may reject it, or one may take a position of agnosticism with respect to it, but one cannot escape from the fact that belief in it is determinative of conduct. It was certainly determinative in the thought and conduct of the
and
evil
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
42
men who
in Britain
New
and Holland and in
England were
the founders of our democratic institutions. Puritanism
summed up eignty,
upon
and the
may be
theologically in the doctrine of the divine soverin that sense our
theological
whole political system is based which totalitarianism so ve-
doctrine
hemently denies. "Every great political issue always involves a theological issue." Nils Ehrenstrom goes on to remark that "all political practice and philosophy presuppose a definite faith and definite however inarticuassertions concerning God, man, the world late and unconscious these may be. In the vast and chaotic struggles of the present between political movements and ideals which fill men with glowing enthusiasms and the bitterest hate, ultimately it is problems of faith which are at stake." The democracies of the Old World and of the New stand in the Hebrew-Christian tradition. Their political traditions are based upon their religious faith. This is the pit from which they were digged, and I do not see how democracy and the freedoms which characterise it can survive here or abroad with-
—
out a strong revival of that polity-creating faith. Professor Hoagland speaks not only for himself but for
all
who
stand in the
Hebrew-Christian tradition when he says, "I hate Nazism and all that it stands for, because it is a threat to human dignity and to the values and kindnesses which to me are the most important things in life." But why are they important? Not science, but religion, has conditioned us so to regard them. Human dignity is sacred because we believe man to be made "in the image of God." Truth, justice and mercy have absolute claims because they have as their foundation, not some political or social relativity but His character as revealed by the Hebrew prophets and in Christ.
These religious insights are
to a very limited extent
susceptible to scientific exploration. But
they are essential to the democratic tution can get
away from
its
roots,
way
ties of
conscience and of general
it
I
me that No human insti-
seems to
life.
and our
rooted in the faith of their founders. that "only in such a tradition can
of
free institutions are
agree with
we have
civil liberties,
the very essence of the religious position."
Amos Wilder
guarantees of liber-
springing from
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
Walter I
are
B.
Cannon
43
{physiologist):
would agree with Dr. Hoagland that most men of science agnostics with regard to many of the points on which the-
ologians feel fairly convinced that they have full knowledge.
This does not seem
to
me, however,
so far as the general population for authoritative statements of
to
be an important matter
The world is avid an aflErmative character and the is
concerned.
men who
testimony of a relatively small number of scientific say
"we do not know"
Furthermore,
no
I
is
not impressive.
should agree with Dr. Hoagland that there
is
—
between religion and ethics at least theoretically. In fact, however, with the great mass of Europeans and Americans there is a close relation between the two. Ethical standards get their support from religious beliefs and convictions. Moreover, the religions themselves base commandments and rules on a belief in an authoritative God. Moses brought the tablets from Mt. Sinai as coming from Heaven, and Jesus enunciated the Golden Rule as the Son of God. Practically, therefore, ethics and religion are closely related. I think that many would agree that formal religion has lost a great deal of its power as a vivid and intimate experience. Hell no longer presents terror to those who do wrong, and Heaven with golden streets and continuous performance on musical instruments no longer seems rewarding. In the circumstances, the support for ethics has, I fear, fallen back largely on the limitations of the law and such habits as are instilled by essential relation
parents in their children. sirable in
human behavior
Dr. Hoagland
Of that
course, there is left
is
much
that
is
de-
out under those conditions.
calls attention to the
importance of religion as
a great unifying concept. I should like to raise the question
whether biologically and
we haven't quite as great a human beings and human a long evolution and that we
socially
unifying concept in the idea that society are the consequences of are in the process of developing
still
further. It
seems
to
me
that
concept of continuance of growth could be made a basis for ethical standards which would have the sanction of experience and social consequences. Professor S. J. Holmes of the this
University of California has
made an attempt
to
develop ethics
Science, Philosophy
44
and Religion
and Professor E. G. Conklin, formerly of Princedone likewise. I should be inclined to lay stress on the desirability of an effort to formulate statements of the essential
on
that basis,
ton, has
features
of
admirable ethical behavior, in consideration of
present circumstances, rather than paying
much
attention to the
At best that would be condemnatory, whereas the valuable contribution of the conference should be positive and constructive. It is noteworthy that the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule give directions for individual behavior. There are obviously ethical standards which are badly damaged in the behavior of nations and races toward one another. Is it not high time that an effort should be made based again on human experience and social consequences to declare the principles that should govern these inter-relations between larger groups so that there may be lasting benefits for both the groups and present war and the action of the totalitarian states.
— —
for the individuals within the groups?
I
have a suspicion that
experience which has been found beneficial in the actions of
beings toward one another may be found beneficial also between groups. Thus, the evidence that one gains virtue through service has recently been proved true in business to
human
such an extent that it is now regarded as a business principle. Conceivably nations might learn this lesson perhaps the Scandinavian nations have already learned
it
— —and
instead of going
forth to kill one another they might go forth to yield
mankind
the greatest benefits possible.
J.
Seelye Bixler {theologian)'. Professor Hoagland's statement seems to me to be admirable as a description of the start made by our Boston group of scientists, philosophers and theologians toward understanding one another's positions. I think he is right in saying that the value of the meetings for all concerned came less from the semitechthough these were nical discussions of professional subjects than from the opportunity interesting enough in themselves offered for comparing human attitudes and personal points of
—
—
view. Most of us felt that we really made a start toward finding a basis for agreement and that another year should help us to see
whether our differences were
really
fundamental.
Science, Philosophy Naturally, as a theologian
I
and Religion
find
it difficult
45
to accept all of
Professor Hoagland's statements about the relation of science
what
to religion.
For example, while
we know
a product of the functioning of our nervous systems,
it
seems
is
to
this alone.
it is
true, as
he
says, that
me that we should emphasize the fact that it is not Our nervous systems function with regard to an ex-
ternal world and what we know is a product of our nerves and what they work on. It is obvious that this external world is colored in transmission and that our knowledge of it is only probable, yet we do have means of checking our knowledge and of comparing types of probability.
My own
belief is that religion is not so
much
a "culmination
of a basic tendency of organisms to react in a configurational
way
to situations" as
it is
the culmination of a tendency of organ-
and appreciatively to what they find to be of worth in their world. Thus I would differ from him when he says that there is no necessary connection between religion and problems of good and evil. For me religion must be defined in terms of our attitudes toward good and evil. I think that the possibility of knowledge of what is good and a reasonable attitude to the source of the good is not ruled out by the fact that we lack precision in this field and have no techniques comparable to those of science. The real question, then, is whether knowledge of values and their source is possible. Here I think we have just begun to scratch the surface and are just catching isms to react
critically
a glimpse of the
Knowledge
God
way
the questions
should be formulated.
presumfrom knowledge of empirical fact, but I think one can admit the differences and still claim that its methods are a development and application of the methods of science rather of
as a reasonable object of loyalty is
ably different
than their denial.
To my mind,
therefore,
further exploration of
what
what our group needs is
just
now
is
a
involved in our personal attitudes,
knowledge hope that the entire subject and I am espe-
plus a further consideration of the limits of the term
where
non-scientific data are concerned. I
conference cially
may be
able to examine this
eager that our group, with the friendly relationship
already developed, will be able to continue
Professor Hoagland's
own
its
it
has
discussions under
capable and stimulating leadership.
Science, Philosophy
46
Makk Graubard (^biochemist): To me the significance Hoagland's paper ion of
many
of the philosophical section of Dr.
lies in its
scientists.
and Religion
value as representative of the opin-
The majority
of scientists,
cept Dr. Hoagland's definition that "Science total of acceptable
be, to religion, ethics
The Is it
who
I
believe, ac-
merely the
sum
techniques for gaining evidence," and then
out to apply this method, which
set
is
is all
they claim science to
and values.
question, "Is this a correct procedure?" presents
itself.
not rather analogous to the case of a pedantic physician views all relations between man and woman as sex because
only concerned with physiology and understands nothing and therefore terms all sentiment usually involved as superstition, ignorance or tradition? Scientists view religion in the same light. It never occurs to the scientist or the physician that perhaps before passing decision on the folly and superstition of humanity it might be better to study its behavior. Perhaps religion fills a need which has nothing to do with a desire for accurate knowledge, just as love paints the chosen one in unrealistic colors. Moreover, as observers from the outside, we know that the one in love is in no position to be realistic and critical. Is it possible that the person who finds that religious sentiment and philosophy are an excellent vehicle for his emotional attitude to man and the world does not care to check the truthfulness of each element of his creed any more than a poet cares about literal exactness of his images or similes? It is the unreality of poetry,
he
is
else,
its
imaginativeness, that heightens
not be that heightens
it
is
appeal?
its
scientists irrelevant It
seems
to
its
beauty. Similarly,
may
it
the idealism and symbolism of religion that
me
that
If
and that
is
so,
is
not the approach of
false? if
the Conference will consider these
aspects of religion and science instead of the incomprehensible (to
me and
all
other participants
I
have questioned so far)
time, some common ground may be found between the three disciplines. We would also approach the main subject, man, his needs, conduct, and past and present approaches to problems he considers important.
philosophic
subjects
The second
it
discussed
last
or social part of Dr. Hoagland's paper
is
to
me
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
equally valuable, not only for the problems
it
47
raises,
but
its di-
and simple approach. That too seems to me should be taken more seriously than last year's Conference condescended to do. Why talk abstractly about values when our life values scream at us from the front page? The approach to practical matters displayed by last year's Conference would have been most embarrassing were it not so ludicrous. What did the Conference yield by way of strengthening our much maligned and weakened faith in the democratic philosophy? What weaknesses did it uncover and what means did it suggest of rectifying them? rect
What
contribution did
cultural
it
make
in laying the foundation for a
group that would aid the country's thought and
spirit
in these critical days?
This paper states the plain truth in simple language and It needs elaboration and expansion. It may also need
thought.
suggestions for the concrete role the three disciplines are to play in this struggle of democracy to survive. But
it
must be
the basis for discussion rather than those fantastic papers of-
fered last year.
Kenneth V. Thimann
{plant physiologist):
Professor Hoagland puts forward the view,
thinking scientists, that reality
because
we
we can have no
common
direct
to most knowledge of
experience only the properties of our nervous
systems.
This statement makes the usual presumption that reality is something external, to be apprehended through the senses. It seems to me, however, not at all improbable that realization, as opposed to knowledge in the Machian or sensual sense, is something internal, to be reached only by some contemplative or meditative process.
The mystic who simply
focuses his atten-
on the eternal, and claims to be able gradually to realize at least some inkling of it, may have access to a different method from that of the more extroverted scientist, who focuses his attention on the evidence of his senses. Furthermore, since many mystics have emphasized that with sufficient practice this realization can be achieved by anyone, it would not seem to be, as Professor Hoagland indicates, "unsharable." It is true that it is hard to define, and as impossible to describe to one who has not tion
Science, Philosophy
48
experienced
it
and Religion
would be impossible to man. Nevertheless, we scientists should not,
as the sensation of light
describe to a blind
in the absence of any personal experience of this sort, exclude it
in others.
For a successful mystic, this realization, though he cannot give it to anyone else, would be religion. For a scientist, similarly, his
work
takes the place of religion, although
it is
not a
kind of religion he can impart to others. It is merely that the fact of being already engaged in the search for truth takes the urgency out of the need for organized religion. The professional golf player, though his game may be much the better, has lost something of the excitement of the game which captures the enthusiasm of the amateur. In my own experience this has been very clear; as my interest in science and my understanding of it deepened, the urge for religion gradually faded away. Science, as Professor Hoagland points out, is not a substitute for religion. The mountain of facts, theories, and even the esthetically satisfying general laws which comprise science, cannot take the place of religion for a layman. But the experience of working in science to a certain extent does. This is not an experience which can be convincingly communicated to others, and the bare statement of
it
may seem
the mystic that "I and
my
just as bald as the statement of
Father are one."
Leonard Wheildon {journalist)'. Most religions embody a concept of God, a concept of the universe, and a concept of man. To me, the last of the three seems more basic than either of the other two. That is the ethical aspect, which, at one point in your paper, you deny has any connection with religion.
I
cannot conceive of a religion with-
The thesis I suggest to you is and cosmology are the dispensable aspects. It is certainly true that ethics is the common factor in comparative religions. And in the historical development of the religion with which we are most familiar, ethics is the most constant factor. Concepts of God and the universe are various and varying, but the concept of man as a responsible moral be-
out ethics, explicit or implied. that theology
ing remains relatively fixed.
On page 38 you
suggest that certain "ethical views concerning
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
49
which members of the conference may But by precluding the possibility that these shared views are religious, you force yourself to the negative conclusion that any effort to reconcile the disciplines on a religious basis is futile. If you accept my thesis that "ethical views concerning man" are the heart of religion, you (and the people who think like you) may have as much in common with religion as the various kinds of religion have with each other. It isn't quite clear to me what you mean by "ethical views." At one place (pp. 36-37) you say: "Good and evil refer to that which is good and bad for a particular organism at a particular time." Later (page 38) you say: "Empirically there is such a thing as the good life, and one need not justify it by supernatural sanctions." Yet you talk of ideals and behavior "inexplicable on any scientific basis." If the good life is indeed purely empirical, I agree with you that it has nothing to do with religion. But it seems obvious that you, like the literally God-fearing man, cherish an ideal of the good life, a concept of man, which has no empirical basis. The only rules of conduct which I would call empirical are
man"
are the only views
share.
the primitive ones of survival.
They
accommo-
are the rules of
dation to environment. But these are prudential rules, not moral ones.
and it
And most men,
like you, are moral.
They
act in terms of non-empirical ideals of
conscience, call
it
constantly think
good and
the categorical imperative,
moves men, regardless of their faith in formal more civilized men are the stronger this tendency it
This tendency,
I
suppose,
Man
is
evil.
Call
there,
and
religion.
The
it is
is
in them.
part of the urge to close
some
stomach himself merely as an organism and, therefore, by a gymnastic exercise of imagination, he makes himself something different, a creature actuated by non-empirical moral imperatives. The difference between this configuration and the cosmological ones which you reject is the fact that you can make it come true. You can simply conform to the ideal you have made for yourself. sort of configuration.
W.
J.
can't
Crozier {general physiologist):
During the past winter I have been a member of the discusupon whose talks Professor Hoagland has based his
sion group
Science, Philosophy
50
and Religion
Broadly speaking, I am in agreement with the position he outlines. In a number of minor points I should prefer slightly difJerent statements, the preference being derived from my own
article.
conception of the physiological basis for experience and "knowing."
On
page
34, for
example,
entists are forced to regard
they do so reluctantly. Gestcdt
think
should question that
many
sci-
themselves as agnostics, or that
should also regret the use of the term
connection employed on page 36 because has been taken out of its original meaning.
in
it
I
I
the
I
These are very small matters, of course, and with the broader I am in complete sympathy. One of the main things which has been impressed upon me during the discussions of the past winter is a sense of the witless futility of continual talk. Formal agreements among persons of quite different experience and occupation usually are no more than a matter of politeness or of convention with respect to words words which actually have quite difconclusions stated in Professor Hoagland's paper,
—
ferent connotations for different individuals, although this
may
not be recognized at the time. The only real basis for understanding and harmony without uniformity of views is to be
found in action. This form of union is certainly desperately needed in the society of intelligent men. It can be based upon common action, because acts have at least the quality that one need not discuss whether they have occurred. The large scale action which we all need is something in which more persons can take part than could, for example, in an international campaign for medical advance. All thoughtful persons can collaborate in a program for mental sanitation. The primary disease is Hitlerism. Psychologically it is more important to unite in action to destroy this social disease than tive
it is
to discuss the rela-
meanings of religion and science.
Eliot D, Chapple {anthropologist)'.
am
agreement with Professor Hoagland's premneeded at the present time is a constructive program for action rather than arguments as to the relative merits of science, religion and philosophy. I am not so sanguine, however, that any group of theologians, philosophers and scientists I
ise that
in complete
what
is
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
51
can work out such a program. Judging from general observaefforts of the discussion group which met at Academy of Arts and Sciences in American the House Boston, all such discussions are rendered futile by two assumptions which are held implicidy both by scientists and by theologians and philosophers. The first of these is that cosmology and religion are necessarily interrelated. The second is that problems of human relations as expressed in terms of ethics and
tion,
and from the of the
values are by definition outside the realm of scientific investi-
my
gation. In
fuse the issues
opinion, both these assumptions completely con-
and are
also incorrect.
The assumed dependence
of cosmology
and religion seems
to
be more firmly held to by scientists and philosophers than by theologians. Consequendy, much valiant effort is wasted in controversy because of the naive belief that religion disappears
cosmology
more
is
overthrown. Sophisticated theologians
phenomena
familiar with religious
who
if
a
are
are less liable to be
taken in by this assvimption. Religious
phenomena
most
are
characteristically manifested
during periods of disturbances to individuals or groups. These disturbances occur in the adjustments of individuals to one another, and they are accompanied by profound emotional disturbances. Religion consists of the techniques and symbols by which the equilibrium of individuals and groups is restored after
such disturbances. For very definite physiological reasons,
certain types of stimuli produce changes in behavior correlative emotional states.
This
ing power of religion."
most
It is
of crisis. For the student of
is
why
there
is,
and
strikingly manifested in times
human
relations, therefore, the un-
derstanding of religious phenomena involves the scientific vestigation of such crises.
It
its
in fact, a "heal-
in-
includes the analysis of the exact
changes in the relations of individuals and of their correlative emotional activities. In the larger sense, it is a physiological study.
Phenomena which we
man
affairs,
call religious
appear constantly in hu-
because the situations producing this kind of
re-
action in the organism are constandy occurring. People are born,
they marry, and they die.
loved ones.
With
They become
ill
or suffer the loss of
others, they experience changes in the activity
Science, Philosophy
52 of group are the tory,
there
life
and Religion
as a result of changes in the environment.
phenomena which,
These
since the beginning of recorded his-
have produced religious techniques to meet them, and is no possibility that they will disappear, as long as we, as
human
beings, retain our present physiological properties.
Religious experience, therefore,
is
entirely
independent of any
given set of symbols, for the symbols are only labels by which we refer to the experience. Through conditioning, the behaviors
and
their associated
bolic configuration.
emotions can become attached to any syma slight acquaintance with the diverse
Even
symbolic systems of different peoples at different times that.
The
tells
us
symbols in
fact that people often try to locate their
space and time
is entirely secondary to religious experience itThis will continue, whatever the linguistic framework by which it is symbolized. The basic problem of religion is to un-
self.
derstand the properties of a certain class of phenomena, and not
why
to try to explain
those
about
a particular set of rationalizations
phenomena have appeared.
The second assumption,
that
problems of
human
relations as
expressed in terms of ethics or values are outside the realm of scientific investigation, is equally stultifying,
reinforced by the the scientists
first.
who
The
chief reason for
and
its
is,
of course,
strength
that
is
take part actively in such discussions are
who are usually as much in the dark about problems of human relations as their religious and philosophical confreres. They are further hindered by the fact that, unlike the theologians, at least, they have never had any direct expephysical scientists
phenomena. Religious leaders, after all, make field, and they have much intuitional knowledge of the phenomena, which is not, however, expressed scientifically. The physical scientists, on the other hand, are laymen both in experience of religious phenomena and in the posrience of religious
many
observations in this
session of scientific operations to deal with them. Since they are scientists
and cannot operate
scientifically in the field of
relations, they therefore argue that science of
any
human
sort is inap-
plicable. Since they consider themselves the authorities
on
ence, they remain ignorant of the fact that science
already
operating in this tions
possess
field,
is
and that the phenomena of human
the necessary
characteristics
sci-
rela-
of functional de-
and Religion
53
for scientific procedures to be applied.
Their opinion
Science, Philosophy
pendence is
then picked up by philosophers and theologians as the clinch-
ing proof of the bankruptcy of science in this field. But even if these conclusions should be accepted by a discussion group, and the
two assumptions abandoned, the
corollary
not to formulate a program of federalism at the meetings of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, as Professor Hoagland suggests, but rather to develop a of this acceptance
is
plan of scientific investigation into democratic organization, the results of
What
which could be used
as the basis of
are the existing systems of
tries to
human
an action program.
relations in the coun-
What would be the organization of a which would be able to operate efficiently and
be federalized?
federal system
harmoniously in terms of the
realities of existing national sys-
tems of relations? What would be the precise steps by which such an organization would be put into operation? These questions will have to be answered by scientific investigation and not by a dependence upon good intentions. No matter how logical a plan may be, it will have the same fate as the League of Nations unless the logic on which it is based is the result of careful investigation and planning of the way in which human beings operate. The democratic way of life has a foundation in fact, but to my knowledge, very few of those who wish to establish it on earth can describe it objectively in such a form that an administrator could hope to set it into operation. Until this is done, and until we can define objectively the precise differences between "totalitarian" and "democratic" systems of government, we ought to agree only that we need a program of action, and bend every effort to see to it that the necessary research be accomplished.
Hudson Hoagland: It
has been pointed out by several commentators that the
ethical aspects of religion are in practice of
fundamental im-
portance, and Dr. Bixler has given an excellent definition of religion in terms of values.
of discourse,
we may be
so puzzling to agnostics.
By limiting
religion to this universe
able to escape
As Chappie
some
of the difficulties
has said, most scientists
have no operational procedures for dealing with values. His
Science, Philosophy
54
and Religion
how this gap may be bridged via the social and anthropology are interesting. Dr. Brightman has remarked that I imply that knowledge of the nervous system is in itself absolute. This implication is certainly not intended. Surely no knowledge of the nervous system could solve any of the fundamental problems of philosophy. suggestions as to sciences
The
role of the
nervous system in relation to the nature of
knowledge does seem to make absolute knowledge of Reality with a capital "R" meaningless. The properties of the nervous system determine not only the qualities of our sense data but our introspective life and higher mental processes. The ap-
also
preciation of a
symphony
not exceptions to
or the experiences of a mystic are
this.
Perhaps the reason that many agnostics share with their more common views about human values is because we are all a product of the same Hebrew-Christian culture patreligious friends
tern.
Our behavior and ideals are conditioned by we give to justify our values and
but the reasons
both theologians and plain
and
justify
scientists, rationalizations
this tradition,
ethics are, for
designed to ex-
our actions in terms of the logic of our pro-
is an and ingrained value concepts, the origins of which come from the cultural roots of our group traditions. In the realm of values, theology has given us an absolute basis for our rationalizations of ethical conduct. In the realm of cosmology, it has failed to make sense, and science has done better. The difficulty that some of us face is that these two aspects of religion dealing with cosmology and values cannot satisfactorily be separated, since man and his values are part of the cosmos and "man is a measure of all things." Concerning my statement that the history of man and his societies gives us grounds for value judgments, Mr. Henry Dennison has written as follows: "It (history) gave Nietzsche, Spengler and (perhaps) Rosenberg grounds for opposite judgments. And to Wheeler and Lindbergh? And to a significant number of Middle-Westerners? Mere assertion that we have adequate groimds for anti-Nazi action won't get us far. Precisely what
fessions. Reason, in short, does not lead, but follows. It effect,
not a cause.
It
interprets our behavior
we're trying for
is
crucial point
what can we do who don't get
is,
assertion plus-plus a rational basis. lit
.
.
.
The
up on your
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
55
own unsupported assertion that you find groiinds for action?" This criticism is similar to that so well expressed by Dr. Robbins in his discussion of relativism in the field of values. But if history has failed us as a guide to the "good life," so, too, has religion, with its revealed and absolute sanctions. Hitler, of all people, has recently called upon the world for a holy war on infidel Russia! Combatants in most wars have justified cruelty and injustice in the name of God and religion. Surely, we have not escaped these misfortunes by referring to an absolute justice
and mercy dependent on the will of God. The prayers of both sides in a conflict, the wronged and the wrongdoer, may both go sincerely to the same God. For these reasons, one must question the necessary dependence of democracy on religion, despite the important role
it
has played in the history of our
own
particular
democratic institutions.
The
suggestions of Chappie seem to be highly pertinent for
our conference,
i.e.,
"to develop a plan of scientific investigation
which could be used an active program" directed towards an ulti-
into democratic organization the results of as the basis of
mate plan of international federalization. Dr. Cannon has suggested a similar aim for our conferences. Such an investigation might clarify many matters pertaining to the realm of values, and should furnish this conference a concrete objective with the various disciplines co-operating, as they must have done at the time of our own early American ventures in Federalism.
Today
a
new
group, the social scientists, should be able to give
strong aid to any conference tackling the enormous job of
bringing post-war order out of international chaos.
If
we
lose
war because of dissension, we won't have to make any decisions, and these conferences will have been in vain. If we win it, and lose the subsequent peace, as we did the last one, through
the
our isolationist policies, these conferences will also be of
little
assume that we shall not repeat the mistakes of the past indefinitely, and that we can be of service in helping to develop an antidote to international anarchy.
use.
Let us
at least
CHAPTER The Comparative Study
IV and the
of Culture
Purposive Cultivation of Democratic Values By
MARGARET MEAD
American Museum of Natural History
OF THE pressing problems in democratic living ONEneed to develop ways of thinking together which result
either
in
the formation of slavishly
imitative
is
the
shall
not
schools
around leaders, the elimination of all individuality in an attempt to find a least common denominator of theory, or an arid individualism in which each speaks for himself alone. The Conference has made a distinct contribution to this problem in the plan for papers which we are following at this session. In order to give the fullest expression to
my
belief that
the most productive and most democratic procedure results from the orchestration of the ideas of several individual thinkers working on the same problem, rather than from the simple merging or boihng down of these ideas, I planned my paper in the hope that each of my collaborators would not merely criticise but would make a distinct contribution of his or her own to the solution of the problem as I presented it. I saw
my
task not as that of merely stating a viewpoint but as that
of stating a viewpoint evocatively.
As
I
my
hoped,
collabora-
have made distinctive contributions. I am therefore leaving their papers as they wrote them, arranging them for the greater tors
convenience of the reader in order of immediacy of the reactions to the specific points
made
in
my
paper.
I
have not
corporated their criticism or suggestions into the body of paper.
I
have, however,
made
a
few
56
final revisions in
my
in-
my
paper
Science, Philosophy
and where
I
have
felt that
and Religion
57
these alterations might have in-
comments of my collaborators had they had them, have added them as footnotes to preserve a clear record of the
fluenced the I
collaborative enterprise.
Some
slight clarification of phrasing
on points with which none of my collaborators took issue have been introduced directly into the text. The collaboration has suffered from one handicap typical of ail co-operation among anthropologists. Dr. Willard Park is "in the field" in South America and his comments have not reached us in time. This paper will confine
itself
rigorously to suggestions as to
what the comparative study of cultures can contribute to the ends to which this Conference has committed itself ^its recorded belief that "modern civiHzation can be preserved only by a recognition of the supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual human person." The Conference has set up this touchstone, and every cultural institution which it surveys or envisages must be tried and tested by it. What, then, can the comparative study of cultures signify
—
to those
who have
taken
this
firm stand,
who have
selected
would suggest several possible functions: It can demonstrate, from data on other cultures (and, by virtue of their relative simplicity and the extent to which they differ from our own culture and represent
and acclaimed
parallel
of our
this particular
standard?
I
developments rather than ancestral or divergent forms culture, particularly from primitive cultures) that
own
every culture must be seen as a whole, with
its value system as an inextricable component. It can refute and brand as unscientific, irresponsible, and dangerous the use of cross-cultural data for purposes of devaluating any given cultural system by
the demonstration that other cultures have placed different
emphases and different values on some isolated havior. Historically, those
some
who
detail of be-
are desirous of breaking
showing that some other different moral
a miscellaneous assortment of divergent practices, this
down
particular traditional value for our society have arrayed
and that other people, or indeed ourselves
period in history, regarded a given practice in a
at
light,
in
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
58
arguing that, therefore,
moral practices are limited
all
time and place and therefore lack any ultimate validity.
This mischievous and uninformed use of cultural material often mistakenly called cultural relativity, but that
what
not, for cultural relativity
it is
demands
is
is
exactly
that every item
of cultural behavior be seen as relative to the culture of which
and in that systematic setting every item has positive meaning and value. Even where items of cultural behavior, so-called cultural traits, have been so easy to identify and so alluring to the members of other cultures that they have diffused progressively borrowed by the members of different cultures in contact one with another modern social anthropology has shown how a trait which appears to be objectively the same may have markedly different meaning and function in it is
a part,
or negative
—
—
different cultural settings. therefore, that
we
shall
when we
attend
always
random, indiscriminate be
strictly
material,
The
science of culture can insist,
consider contrasting types of behavior the
to
complete system, and that
citations of cultural contrasts in detail
recognized for what they are, iconoclastic polemic
ammunition
for
agitators,
but
with no
scientific
validity.
The precise and detailed data which has been accumulated on some of these alien cultural systems provides an exercise in the appreciation of the degree to which every detail of a culture
is
interdependent with every other
detail, so that
items
of behavior which have not historically been considered to be in the
same sphere of discourse
—the way a mother handles her
baby, the attitude toward the supernatural, methods of classify-
ing relationships, the style of literary composition, the rambling scribblings of children in the sand,
toward which the all
will
power
and the type of
of the dying
is
self-control
directed
of these are systematically related to the whole.
consideration of cultural data
may
—that
Such
a
lead to a recognition of the
extent of our problem, that the system of values involves in the end the whole culture. It
one time more
difficult,
makes the problem of values
at
demonstrating the width and depth
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
59
and more exigent, in that it constitutes further documentation of the dependence of any people upon of their ramifications,
their culture
—their
on the theme
The i.e.,
that
system of values
man
does not
—a
live
sort of primitive atlas
by bread alone.
discipline of looking objectively at other cultural systems,
seeing
them
as systems
with their
own
coherent and
self-
contained ethic and not introducing into them intrusive ethical
own system, can also be used in mainwhen a group such as this Conference
considerations from our taining perspective
meets
and
attempt to lead a whole
civiliza-
the systematic inter-relationship
of dif-
to affirm a faith
to
tion in a given direction.
By
insisting
upon
warn against any planning which disregards essential components whose relevancy may not be immediately apparent to those whose eyes are directed along more special Hnes. It can provide an underpinning and groundwork for an understanding, which must ferent elements of culture, anthropology can
otherwise remain intuitive, of the importance of certain social trends, of the relevancy of certain moves. It can insist
necessity traits
of
devising
or practices
psychological-cultural
which
social
upon
equivalents
the for
thinking decides should be
altered or abolished.
As an
illustration, I
compulsory
should like to
cite
here the question of
sterilization of the unfit, seen as a
measure
to save
community the expense and social waste of a large subnormal population. Although legislation providing for such
the
sterilization has it is still
been passed in a great proportion of our
to rage about the absolute right or
measure.
states,
almost entirely uninvoked. Controversies have tended
A
wrong involved
comparative science of culture would
in such a shift
the
between the attempt to save and augment the emphasis upon the "supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual human person" and the forces within our society which seek to put the efficiency, economy, and rationale of the state above the importance of the individual. Legislation permitting any governmental body
issue to the relationship, in the year 1941,
— Science, Philosophy
6o to exercise is
still
and Religion
such a discretionary power in a region where there
such popular uncertainty and difference of opinion as
to the ethics involved will be seen as
dangerous
—at
present
and the cost of maintaining institutions for the feeble-minded as a most minimal individual tax, when seen in the light of what might be endangered by this method of their abolishing them. Such legislation, with its arbitrary character and its emphasis upon sacrificing the admittedly innocent for the sake of Society and particularly of Society's pocket opens the way for the types of state euthanasia which are preached, if not extensively practiced, as part of the Fascist dogma. But such a judgment as this would have nothing whatsoever to say about the ultimate rightness and wrongness of putting legislation of this type into full practice at some other time. It would consider as quite possible that our culture may develop a form of society in which government is so morally responsible, and so committed to the furtherance of democratic values, that the exercise of such governmental power might have no morally detrimental effect upon those who exercised it, just as the judge
—
—
who
today sentences to death a
and calculated murder
is
man
convicted of cold-blooded
not morally endangered by such an
exercise of power, since he acts as the executive of a convinced
community which regards murder
as behavior for which the presumably responsible. Among the Arapesh of New Guinea, children are valued and welcomed. Parents make every sacrifice that their children may thrive and grow, and the whole culture is oriented toward the needs of the next generation. Yet infanticide is part of the
murderer
is
standard cultural behavior. lactation taboos
on sex
If,
in spite of rigorously observed
relations until at least a year after each
child's birth, a woman bears more children than she and her husband can care for, or if the next oldest child is still sickly and needs great care, then it is the duty of the parents to put the new baby to death. Living on very poor land, with a most meager technology, infanticide is a moral act for the Arapesh. If, however, they were transplanted to more fertile land, their
and Religion
Science, Philosophy scanty supply of food crops
6i
augmented with new and more
nourishing food plants, their inadequate technology improved, infanticide
would cease
to
be compatible with the central value
on the importance of producing and practice of infanticide were abanchildren. Unless the raising changed conditions, it is probable that the doned, under these whole generous ethic of the Arapesh would undergo an alteration compelled by the incongruity between a practice no longer consistent with the exigencies of Arapesh life and the avowed Arapesh ethical ideal. The fashion in which nomadic people, who have traditionally abandoned their aged because they hindered the absolutely essential search for food, altered this practice when means of transportation, or storing food were discovered, is another instance of the way in which an item of behavior may alter its moral implications as the context alters. These are, it is true, very simple examples of simple peoples, whose ethics were necessarily adjusted to a precarious existence. But in a complex society like ours, there is as exigent a relationship between one institutional pattern and another as there is in the relationship between a nomadic culture and the food supply. It should be in their culture, the stress
the special contribution of anthropologists to identify points of inter-dependence which are in danger of being overlooked,
and
to
warn those who would give
ever they ignore vital patterns or to
meet needs which
us ethical leadership
fail
to provide
their leadership
new
will inevitably
Anthropologists can underHne the need for a
when-
patterns create.
critical re-evalua-
tion of our culture in the light of the changes resulting
from
the extraordinary advances in technology which have intro-
duced so many discordances into our way of
life
and our
value system.
An
illustration
might be taken from the relationship between
parent and child, a subject which
is
particularly crucial to the
maintenance of the type of character structure upon which any system of values depends. Leaders in ethical thinking might question the extent to which the parent has assumed moral
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
62
commands which he gives the more compatible with the trends of a
and
responsibility for the
child,
claim that
relativistic
it is
culture for the parent to abrogate his historical claims to
what
is
and what
right
wrong.
is
A
cogent case can be
know
made
for
such a position, but, before setting the stamp of approval upon
our increasingly confused system of child rearing, pause and ask:
From whence comes our
An
tance of moral responsibility?
we may
belief in the
well
impor-
examination of the child-
rearing systems of other cultures will reveal that the degree to
which parents among us assume the onus of making moral
choices and standing by
beUion, even hatred,
we
In other cultures
them
in the face of their child's re-
a special characteristic of our culture.
is
find, as standard procedure, that parents
rely upon a shared fear of the supernatural, or inculcate in their children a devastating fear of public opinion, or teach
them
that the only absolute
is
anger. It
rare,
is
however, for
parents to face their willful small children and say, "I insist
upon
because
this
I
believe
that our peculiar dedication to
it
is
right." It
moral values
is
is
very possible
specially fostered
by such a system of child rearing, and that that dedication could not survive if this system were rudely torn away. However, it is necessary to distinguish sharply between taking moral responsibihty before one's child in
condemning
his act,
and the
old-fashioned authoritarian position in which the parent said:
"You
You do mean the
are bad.
sponsibility
own code
I
not obey me." By assuming moral
re-
parent will be willing to stand by his
of ethics, that he will insist that ethical choices are
important, that he will not "spoil" his child by giving or permitting him that which he himself believes to be wrong in order to
buy peace, and
that he will not
moral concessions or tion.
The
line
trick
between
woo
the child's affection by
him by some imaginary outside
this position
of a single ethical system, ruthlessly enforced tion,
is
a difficult
one to draw. But
it is
is
left in
no doubt
upon each genera-
possible that a system of
child rearing, essentially democratic, in free to choose, but
sanc-
and the authoritarian one
which the child is left moral necessity
as to the
Science, Philosophy
more
of choice, can develop
easily
complete parental control than of a system in
if
and Religion
63
out of the older system of
we
wait for the development
which the parent has abrogated
all
sense of
moral responsibility. Unless we democratize family life it is idle to talk of democracy. We have heard much of the way in
which their
which they
children.
A
upon
a residue from an age of faith, however, powerless to transmit to comparative anthropologist who sees the
faithless ages live
a residue
are,
system of child training as an integral part of any cultural system would point out the importance of this problem and warn the ethical leader to pause and consider.
The
anthropologist must, furthermore,
take
into
account
even the special value of seeming discrepancies, infelicities, and contradictions in the culture which we are seeking to shape. Adolescent revolt against the parental values, which appears to
be a minus value in our
a nevertheless necessary
civilization,
component
might then be seen as and
of a belief in progress
an impetus to work actively for a better world.^ He should also be sure to identify obscure connections which are not immediately apparent to those is
whose vantage ground
merely a point of moral elevation inside the system they
who wished at and respect and regard for human life and hatred of cruelty might think offhand that anti-vivisection campaigns such as that conducted in the press last summer could not but make for a general and desirable hatred of cruelty, the student of culture might be able to show the way in which such campaigns actually arouse and stimulate sadistic impulses and prepare people for outrages, rather than would feign improve. Where the all
ethical leader
costs to encourage gentleness
^Scientific inquiry may appear to many to be merely an instrument for undermining established beliefs, but it may also be seen as producing a ferment out of which a far greater degree of human enlightenment will develop. On the other hand, many cultural practices which are at present viewed with complacency by ethical leaders, such as the intense emphasis upon the importance of competition, or the way in which adolescents are debarred from any meaningful participation in the community under the guise of "education," may be found to be completely incompatible with democratic goals.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
64
for gentleness.
In this
connection
it
interesting
is
that
an
elaborate anti-vivisection campaign was run in the government-
controlled press in
Germany
ficially
stimulated pogroms.
In
the contributions
all
just a short time before the of-
which
I
have sketched so
far,
the
anthropologist has played the role of placing items of culture in proportion, of relating disparate items to
whole systems, comparison of one system with another to enhance appreciation and knowledge of the way in which such systems are internally consistent and inter-related, issuing warnings and pointing out the impHcations of various changes or trends within the chaotic, heterogeneous culture which the members of the Conference seek to lead and change in the direction of greater democracy. All of these possible contributions rest utilizing the
upon
the hypothesis that cultures are systems of greater or less
degrees of coherence and integration, but that even in the most
fragmented and incoherent culture there
exists
intricate inter-dependence far in excess of that
a degree of
which
is
usually
recognized.^ This proposition cannot be demonstrated in the
space of this paper;
upon
its
final
acceptance
the willingness of the student
rests, in
from other
most
fields to
cases,
under-
take the labor and the discipline of mastering the record of at least
one simple primitive culture in
its
entirety.
authoritative position to require such an exercise
member of as one who
this
Conference, and
I
am in no from every
I
can only, therefore, speak more extreme
has undergone this discipline in the
form of being charged with the responsibility of recording entire cultures, and who has found them systematic. Anthropologists with other interests might offer a contrasting, but perhaps equally valuable contribution, by using cross-cultural data to
show
has met.
I
the universal needs of man, which every culture
feel,
however, that
we
are concerned, not with the
"Because of this intricate inter-dependence full
men
cannot
live in a culture as
of discrepancies and contradictions as our present culture without paying
very heavily in terms of isolation, impaired ability, ill-health, unhappiness and loss of
human
dignity.
— Science, Philosophy universal needs of
man which
except in so far as they set a
which
cultures
65
must somehow meet a lower limit below
minimum,
—
and survive but with the universal mankind, which is the task of culture to develop.
a culture
potentials in
and Religion
Comparison of
cannot
fall
different cultures demonstrates that
man may
low or high, that he may cast himself and that as he casts himself, so will he live, and his children after him. According to the extent we are concerned with minimums, we are tied closely to the way in which culture meets and is limited by man's basic biological set his spiritual goal
a cheap or a heroic role,
make-up. To the extent that we are concerned with maximum human development, we are concerned with what human cultures are able to make of that most precious of material, human beings, after—long after—the simple universal needs
An emphasis on needs alone confines us to an acceptance of any number of makeshifts, which pass for spiritual food and drink and which, by stressing the common solutions that mankind has reached at different times and in have been met.
different places, loses sight of the
uncommon
them may be counted the great
solutions.
religions of the
Among
world, by
which the dignity of man in his quest for spiritual values has been reinforced and enhanced. The emphasis upon cultural systems as creations of man's imagination, conforming to law but subject to any number of fortuitous events, including the
and the happy accidents of comfrom different cultures, defines the area of interaction between the anthropologist as scientist and the spiritual leaders. The leaders say: These are the values which we would foster. The anthropologist then places them in their cultural context and makes his contribution accordingly. So far, in this role for which we have been casting the anthropologist, there has been no conflict between the idea of free moral responsibiUty for the individual and the contribution of the scientist. If, however, we push the question one step further and say: "We have established the direction in which we want to move. Now you social scientists, specialists in culinsights of «piritual geniuses
binations of values
Science, Philosophy
66 ture, tell us
program
dom
how
for us!"
and Religion
You implement
to get there.
our spiritual
Have we then reached
a point at which free-
and
procedure clash? Does
of the individual will
scientific
not the implementation of a defined direction
call for control,
—
and does not control measured, calculated, definite control; control which really attains its ends by its very existence invalidate democracy, necessarily raising up some men to exercise the control and degrade all others to be its victims? You can implement loyalty to the state, or rigid conformity to law, habits of uncomplaining industry or absolute obedience to a religious functionary. This has often been done without the aid of science. Fascism is showing us how much more efficiently it can be done with scientific aid. But to implement moral
—
responsibility for the individual means, in effect, the develop-
ment
of a kind of social order within which moral responsibility
will be
developed in every child and given free flexible play This task is a far more complicated one, yet I
in the adult.
think
it is
possible.
is called upon to implement a program of greater democracy, however, it is necessary for those who invoke his help to recognize one essential difference between social science and natural science. In the natural sciences, progress has been made by the systematic exclusion of the observer, his errors, his biases, and human fallibility, from any experimental observation which was made. In the
Before the social scientist
social sciences, every effort to repeat this
with
sterility,
a
natural sciences.
performance has met
pseudo-social science hollowly imitating the
Advance
in the social sciences
the systematic inclusion of the
depends upon
human experimenter
within
the experiment, in terms of his constitution, culture, idiosyncratic
life
history,
and the
constellational
significance
which
he has for his subjects. Instead of attempting to rule these out, in which case we are confronted with a vacuum, the position of the experimenter in these various defined respects
the point of reference tion,
and only
from which we define
as his position
is
known
becomes
a field of observa-
can the
field
be known.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
This leads us to a further step in cultural
67
which
relativity,
too infrequently taken, to the realization that were the world
is
we dream
members of that new world would be from ourselves that they would no longer value it in the same terms in which we now desire it. In order to implement a spiritual future which transcends our present cultural values, we need humility to realize that we would no longer be at home in such a world; that we who have dreamed it could not live it. The very imperfections which gave impetus to our dream would unfit us for its execution. Yet cultures have no of attained,
so different
real existence outside the habituated bodies of those
them. Here, then,
is
a
involves the scientist,
It
planner, for he
is,
serve
it.
It
means
who
is
live
faced.
the executant as well as the
of necessity, a part of his culture
same time
aspirations, at the
who
dilemma which must be squarely
that he
would bend
and
its
his skill to
that implementation can never take the
form must involve direcdirection in which new
of finished blue prints of the future, but
an orientation of the culture in a under the first impetus of that direction, can, and will, take us further. It means that the student of tion,
individuals, reared
its development by and so makes his plans for an, inter-action between altered institutions and altered individuals, which will proceed slowly enough to maintain the direction which he has determined upon. He must lay his hand upon a process with a control none the less sure, none the less adjusted to everything that he knows of the processes of culture and the peculiar nature of his own culture, for all that he cannot, nay he must not, envisage the end toward which
culture realizes that culture
the individuals
he
is
who must
is
limited in
administer
it,
setting that process in motion.
For a detailed picture of the end, the future of the absolutely desirable
a finished blue print of
way
of
life,
has always
been accompanied by the ruthless manipulation of human beings in order to fit them, by the use of wrack, torture and concentration camp if necessary, to the decreed pattern. When such attempts have been merely the blind intuitive gropings
Science, Philosophy
6S
and Religion
and the power-driven, they have been sufficient upon which the democratic way of hfe is based. Implemented by science, as they could be implemented, a new hideousness is created unguessed at in the darkest torture chambers of the past. The victims of such a process become progressively more apathetic, passive and lacking in spontaneity. The leaders become progressively more paranoid. Only by devoting ourselves to a direction, not a fixed of the fanatical
to destroy all the values
development of and think the choice all important and be strong, healthy and wise in choosing, can we escape this dilemma. This conclusion may sound Uke a pronouncement on spiritual values, but it is also, I believe, a conclusion which can
goal, to a process, not a static system, to the
human
beings
who
will choose
be supported by the findings of social science. revolutions
is
replete with documentation of the
The
history of
dependence of
human executants and the inability of who dreamed and fought and guillotined for their Utopia carry it out. The comparative science of character forma-
any Utopia upon the those to
dependence of the child upon the culture mediated to it by those who handle it in infancy, and the absolute dependence, therefore, of any cultural system upon tion demonstrates the
which those
is
who
transmit
social science
it.
in appreciation of the
of every individual
is,
that
the increase
is
supreme worth and moral
human
ing the spontaneity
That
The most complete implementation
can then offer those whose aim
responsibility
person, are techniques for preserv-
and
initiative
of each
new
generation.
within a cultural frame progressively better suited to
the realization of the ideals
which they are progressively better
suited to live out and pass on, with moral impetus, to their children.
Summary I
have suggested that those students of comparative cultures
who have devoted
themselves to studying cultures as wholes,
:
and Religion
Science, Philosophy as
make
systems of dynamic equilibrium, can
69 the following
contributions
1.
Affirm and document the importance of an integrating
system of values as almost an abstract synonym for the culture as a whole.
Document
2.
the extent to which any single item of be-
when
havior has ethical significance only
seen in rela-
tionship to a whole cultural system.
Place present and proposed institutions of our culture
3.
against
the
total
cultural
Implement plans
for
scientifically
avowed democratic ends
the sort to which this Conference 4.
and
perspective
assay their relationship to the
our
altering
is
of
devoted.
present
culture,
by
recognizing the importance of including the social scientist
within his experimental material, and by recognizing
working toward defined ends we commit ourand therefore to the negation of democracy. Only by working in terms of values which are limited to defining a direction, is it possible for us to use scientific methods in the control of the process without the negation of the moral autonomy of the human spirit. that by
selves to the manipulation of persons,
APPENDIX Ruth
F. Benedict,
Dr. tivity,
Columbia University:
Mead has and made
well stated the implications of cultural relaa distinction clear
Cultural relativity, as she defines
it,
which
is
not usually made.
refers not to the great
gamut
of religious practices in the world, for instance, nor to the
many
forms of marriage current in different cultures, but to the inescapable interdependence of cultural traits one with another,
and of the individual and his
society.
Her
first
three points are
stimulating discussions of the technical problems arising from
Science, Philosophy
70
this inter-dependence,
and
I
and Religion
believe these problems to be
some
of the most important that face civilizations today.
Dr. Mead's fourth point concerning "ends" and "directions" can read with agreement, or with disagreement according to the meanings I give these words, and I imagine many other
I
readers will accept or reject her statements according to definitions
which
paragraphs article
will be completely opposite to I shall
one another. In these
define these two in the spirit of Dr. Mead's
and give the definitions which bring
me
into complete
accord with her argiiment.
We
are extremely loose in our use of the
"blue-prints."
We
do not usually use them To those who are engaged
paraging sense. civil
words "ends" and Mead's dis-
in Dr.
in such programs,
service reforms or progressive education are "ends" for
which to strive; to those in the Trade Union movement, strong and responsible organization of the workers is a "blue-print" for the future. But in Dr. Mead's terms, such activities need state; they may only be directional. The "ends" to which she has reference are such hard and fast principles as that workers and capitalists must, in any good society, be organized in opposing camps, or that the functions of the
not blueprint a future
State
must
in
Utopia be minimal, or that they must be gargancommitment is not usually put at the opposite
tuan. This latter
pole from the "directional" conviction that in a given situation the only
but Dr.
body which can cope with the
Mead
correctly opposes them.
bases any current decision
absence of alternatives;
it
tion and can adapt itself
difficulties is the State,
The
upon strong
"directional". attitude
cultural habits
and the
cue from the present situato changing conditions without tragtakes
its
edy. The "blue-print" attitude fights for the principle itself, come "hell or high water." The history of Collective Security slogans from the last war to the present
attitude.
is
another illustration of this tragic blue-print
Those who committed themselves
to the principles of
an "end" thought they had a blue-print which absolved them from inquiring into the programs of the allies with whom they proposed to associate themselves. They were the more deceived. Similarly those who espoused isolacollective security as
tionism as an "end," whether 25 years ago or now, took
it
as
an
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
absolute principle which absolved
71
them from considering the
nature of the struggle from which they isolated themselves, or the kind of threat to themselves which they refused to parry.
The dilemma upon
of our younger generation
to prepare for
war
is,
who
are
now
called
in great part, a consequence of the
mistook an immediate and relative fact There would be no talk of a "rightabout face" if we had taught them that under no circumstances could they be absolved from making a realistic assay of dangers and values. They could then have made their decision today without having to unlearn what they mistook for a principle. If we distinguish clearly between ends and directions in this fashion. Dr. Mead gives the obviously correct criterion by which we can tell when we are inadvertently working toward ends in her disparaging sense, i.e., that such activity commits us to "the manipulation of persons and hence to the negation of democ-
fact that their elders
for an absolute principle.
racy." It attempts to ordain the fluid; therefore it gets itself
outcome instead of leaving
it
involved in putting something over
on people, something which is over and above giving them the and adaptabilities on the basis of which they can themselves decide and act. Thus propaganda comes into existence with all its boomerangs. On the other hand, the criterion by which we can identify "directional" activities is that these latter either modify social institutions or educate the individual so that his power to cope adequately with any situation earning
facts
—
a living, deciding
how
to cast his vote, serving illustriously as
—
an important leader is increased. Dr. Mead's first three points seem to me to be relative and relational though no less important in comparison with this last point about ends and directions. This latter states an attitude toward cultural change which cannot be overlooked without tragedy in any free society. It states that such a society must be willing to work to spread initiative and spontaneity more widely among its members without specifying in advance the decisions and acts of these future more initiating and spontaneous citizens. In any case, these advance blue-prints will by that time be out of date, and the fact that they were raised as altars upon which to sacrifice will stultify and endanger the whole endeavor.
—
—
Science, Philosophy
72
and Religion
Clyde Kluckhohn, Harvard University: By and large, I find myself in complete and enthusiastic agreement with Dr. Mead's paper. But I should like to make one suggestion and also a rather extended commentary with one sentence of Dr. Mead's paper as a text.
My
suggestion touches matters which
Dr. Mead's paper as to raise. In
my
it
lie
outside the scope of
stands but the issue seems crucial enough
opinion, one of the great contributions which
the comparative study of cultures ought to
preservation of the democratic the techniques
own
of our
which
culture.
it
The
way
of life
is
make toward
the
the application of
has developed to the systematic study sociologists have, of course, given us
valuable information. But, in general, their canvases have been too vast and their approach neither so rigorous nor so holistic
which students of non-literate societies have perforce While Dr. Mead once referred to our culture as "chaotic and heterogeneous" I sometimes had the uncomfortable feeling that she was failing to face the existence of our differentiated (though overlapping) class and regional sub-culas that
had
to maintain.
tures.
Can we
properly speak of one "integrating system of
New
England and the Southwest, for the members and the farmers of the Middle West? Each one of us can make a rough induction on the basis of imperfect personal experience, and there are some persons whose impressionistic judgments would be of great value. But I submit that we cannot deal with these matters scientifically until these various sub-systems of our social system have been sampled in the same careful and holistic way as the social system of the Arapesh. We cannot "implement plans for altering our present culture" until we know that culture in the same detailed and coherent way which we know certain of the best described non-literate cultures. This suggestion is possibly implicit in Dr. Mead's paper, but it would seem to me important to make it explicit. Agreement that "indiscriminate citations of cultural contrasts in detail" have "no scientific validity" (p. 58) must not values" for
of the C.I.O.
lead to the proposition: denials of ultimate validity for cultural traits are fallacious in
fairly certain to
fallacious
is
me
every sense. Ensuing passages
that Dr.
Mead
here
means only
to
make
it
show how
the qualitative comparison of isolated cultural traits
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
73
taken out of their total matrix. With this any contemporary anthropologist would heartily concur. However, at the risk of stale supererogation, it
seems to
me worthwhile
to set
down
reflections arising out of this point, for the passage as
some
stands appears susceptible of unfortunate misinterpretation.
recognize that what
I
it
I
paraphrase of
shall say is in part only a
what Miss Mead has written.
One
great contribution of anthropology
some persons with some detachment from
is
that of providing
the conscious and un-
conscious emotional values of their culture. The phrase, "some detachment," must be emphasized. An individual who viewed
detachment would almost cerand unhappy. But I can prefer (i.e., feel affectively attached to) American manners while at the same time perceiving certain graces in English manners which are his social system with complete tainly be disoriented
Thus while unwilling an American and hence with no desire to ape English drawing room behaviors, I can still derive a lively pleasure from association with English people on "social" occasions. Whereas if I have no detachment, if I am utterly prolacking or
more
grossly expressed in ours.
to forget that I
vincial,
lous,
I
am
am
likely to regard English
manners
uncouth, perhaps even immoral.
shall certainly
as utterly ridicu-
With
that attitude
not get on well with the English and
I
am
I
likely
any modification of our manners in the Engany other direction. Such attitudes clearly do not make for international understanding, friendship, and co-operation. They equally make for a too rigid social structure. Anthropoto resent bitterly
lish or
logical
documents and anthropological teachings
are valuable,
therefore, in that they tend to emancipate individuals
from a
too perfervid allegiance to every item in the cultural inventory.
The person who
has been exposed to the anthropological per-
is more likely, oh the one hand, to "live and let live" both within his own society and in his dealings with members of other societies; on the other hand, he will
spective by incongruity
probably be more flexible in regard to needful changes in social to meet changed economies.
organization
The
point
is
changed
technological
structure
and
may
lack
precisely that certain cultural traits
"ultimate" validity.
What
they have, or
may
have,
is
validity
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
74
within the particular cultural system. That
is,
they have validity
within, and only within, the framework of a particular time and
which have been integrated by the accidents of history or by the necessities of time and place. Because of this integration which Dr. Mead so rightly emphasizes it may well be vicious for "social planners" to tamper with any specific "institution" because of the intricate mutual inter-dependence which other "institutions" have with it. Thus the consequences of the Prohibition Amendment extended far beyond the simple categories "drinking" and "not-drinking." The well-intentioned persons who recognized drunkenness, wasting of money on liquor, etc., as evil were right according to the prevalent value system of our culture, but they were guilty of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. They erred in their social planning because they failed to take account of the equilibrium existent between various aspects of our social organization. One cannot isolate one segment of group behavior and alter that without effects (often amazing to those place or as associated with other cultural traits
who
are unsophisticated in matters of social organization)
sorts of other realms of behavior. All of this,
all
upon
however, has
nothing to do with the "ultimate validity" of the category "free-
dom if
purchase alcoholic beverages.
to
correct,
model
mean
only that
in a certain
it
.
.
."
may be unwise
way) given
These inferences, to
remodel (or
institutionalized behaviors
re-
which
appear to be inconsistent with the generalized value system or to have
consequences which are undesirable from the .point of
view of that value system.
At some
the
same time the
cultural traits
possibility
may have
must be
freely envisaged that
"ultimate validity"
—that
essary relevance to any cultural system in any period
is,
nec-
which
is
supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual human person." To discover whether or not there are such I would take to be another prime task of the comparato preserve "the
Are there
certain cultural features
which
remain constant in those cultures which give high value
to the
tive study of cultures.
individual
—regardless of the
total structuring of the culture, re-
gardless of the juxtaposition of these features with other differ-
ing
traits.?
The answer
to this question is a purely empirical
one
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
and can be settled only by exhaustive induction.
me
appear to
to be
task
would
eminently worthwhile.
In sum, then, those
vation
75
The
who wish
to further "the purposive culti-
democratic values" ought to proceed from these
of
premises:
The
1.
very existence of a certain cultural
part of our social system
means
that
it
trait as
a working
has one kind of validity,
a determinate relationship to other cultural features. Society
i.e.,
must, therefore, not meddle with an abstracted "institution" unless the place of that "institution" in the total value system
has been carefully studied and some sound basis been reached
upon other
for prediction as to the effects of alteration
"institu-
tions."
The
2.
a priori assumption must not be
tural trait has "ultimate" validity.
That
is,
made
that any cul-
the possibility
must
be kept open, in default of evidence to the contrary, that any
given
trait
can be changed without damage to the major cul-
tural integration
(which
Perhaps the cultural are
compendently
trait
it
is
wished
to preserve unaltered).
can be safely changed only
altered, perhaps
it
if
others
can be changed only slowly
over a long period of time and in accord with careful re-education of the associated sentiments. But any assumption of ulti-
mate
validity for all parts of the social system
means
of course
defeatism. 3.
Equally, the a priori assumption that no traits have ultimate
validity
must be avoided. Rough induction suggests that the some sort of regulations over sexual conduct
biological family,
(to take only banal examples) may be needful "institutions" in any society. Some such institutions may have a kind of absolute moral superiority in so far as the maximization of the individual is
possible only so long as they exist.
I
cannot agree with Dr.
Mead when
she intimates (page 65) that the study of the universal needs of man and of the varied ways which human
beings have devised of meeting them
importance.
ment
When
she speaks of
—long
is
of
somewhat secondary
"maximum human
after the simple universal
develop-
needs have been met" is she not neglecting the evidence psychopathology has provided of the intimate connection between the ways in which basic needs are met and the typical forms of spiritual .
.
.
after
Science, Philosophy
76 and
and Religion
development? In any
intellectual
case, the
of the range of dispersion of the varied particular basic need has great value even tion
is
considered
(temporarily)
apart
We know
specific cultural contexts.
limits as to the plasticity of
documentation of meeting a
means
when from
that distribu-
the
all
at least certain
"human nature"
many
minimum
in that particular
regard. If the range for the institution meeting a certain basic
need
is
very sharply delimited that constitutes for the social
planner an important warning signal.
It
indicates
the need
for very specially careful study before attempting by legislation or "education" (or, usually, by a combination of
means)
many
to restructure that institution.
Further,
I
am
social science
slightly
more optimistic than Miss Mead
that
can be helpful with "aims" as well as with "gen-
I agree entirely that social science cannot and must not provide detailed blueprints. I follow entirely her argument that "we who have dreamed it could not live it." But I
eral direction."
think
it
is
possible that the comparative study of cultures can
indicate that certain combinations of institutions are of their
very nature inimical to a harmonious social order. careful scrutiny of the anthropological record
clues as to features of culture
may
I
think the
give valuable
which are peculiarly harmonious
seems to me altogether posmight usefully be incorporated into our culture without distortion to its major configurations. I am not bold enough to assert flatly that all of this is true. I do assert that there is enough presumptive evidence to make the trial worthwhile. If society, American society, will provide social scientists with material means even roughly comparable to those which have been given to the sciences of matter and the medical with a democratic way of sible that
some
sciences there
life. It
of these
is
every reason to believe that the skills of social
scientists could be
made
practically useful in the preservation
and improvement of the democratic order. Dr. Mead's own book "Co-operation and Competition," is perhaps the most impressive evidence that such cross-cultural comparisons would be worthwhile.
Dorothy D. Lee, Vassar College: Margaret Mead makes an excellent statement of the contribution which Anthropology can make toward a program for
Science, Philosophy the maintenance of a democratic ciety.
I
and Religion way
of life in a changing so-
my
agree substantially with what she says. However, to
thinking, she treats "the individual parate a
component
of society.
As
human person"
as too dis-
a corollary to this, she pre-
sents the paradox that social influence, sively
77
on the one hand,
is
pas-
absorbed by the individual in the form of social values;
and, on the other hand, in the form of public opinion,
is
made
the basis of his rational and calculating choices.
The
point, that the individual
first
from infancy, that
implicit in the thesis of her paper.
a course of action
disapproval,
is
is
shaped by his society
his values are the values of his society,
is
The
is
second, that choice of
calculated in accordance with fear of social
phrased concretely in the section on moral
re-
Here the author speaks of "other cultures" where parents bring up their children to choose their course of action sponsibilities.
a "devastating fear of
guided by a "fear of the supernatural," or public opinion."
Now
I
believe that there
is
no such contrast of
passive absorption of values and rational choice of action; that the basis of choice
is
neither the passive inability to step out of
one's ingrained social role, nor the calculating desire to avoid
displeasing one's social contemporaries.
It
seems
to
me
that
from
infancy each social being derives an active satisfaction from participating in the values of his society, lies at
and
that this satisfaction
the basis both of acquiring social values and of acting
according to them, choosing a course of action. I should say that fear of displeasing the supernatural, the guardian of tradi-
merely the articulation of something negative, and for is only of secondary importance as a motive for action; that it is the society's formulation of the dissatisfaction which comes with being at outs with one's predecessors. The individual gets a profound satisfaction out of acting according to tradition, the type of satisfaction which a bride in our society gets out of wearing her mother's wedding dress or using her tion, is
most people,
grandmother's spoons. In our society, only during the violently individualistic twenties
abrogated.
It
is
was
this type of satisfaction consciously
the satisfaction that comes from identifying
oneself with one's society, in this case with the past.
Again, "fear of public opinion"
may
choice; but the motivation for action
is
play a role in one's
at the
same time more
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
78 positive
and
direct,
and
less rational,
than this factor might sug-
gest. I should say that to act in accordance is
really to participate in
with
it
ciety,
contemporary
with public opinion
social value. It brings
the satisfaction of identifying oneself with present so-
and
maintain
its
motivation
is
the non-rational urge to
this identification. In
particularly
among groups who
our
own
make
or
culture, this is true,
are less educated in the individ-
our society. I may seem here to imply that the maintenance of values is impossible in a changing society, since change involves deviation and individual disparity. This is not my meaning. On the contrary, I hold that the belief that change, with all it involves, ualistic tenets of
is
good,
itself is
one of the values of our
society.
And
I
should
urge that the social scientist recognize the necessity both of individuality and of merging; that he recognize that, to maintain our values, including the value of change, the individual needs to be in direct, interactive contact with his society. In this connection, I have a minor criticism to make. The author says that in our culture the parent stands by a moral choice in the face of a child's rebellion, with the statement, "I
upon
this
rare parent
who
insist
because
I
believe
it is
don't do this," or social authority are
as to
in the last section.
how we
ing in
mind
I
"What will the neighbors much more frequent.
To my mind, Margaret Mead's most comes
right."
feel that it is a
takes this stand. Phrases such as, "Little girls
I
think she
is
say.?"
invoking
significant contribution right.
Yet
I
am
not clear
can determine the desirable direction without hav-
the goal toward
which the direction leads. Does not trial and error?
direction without a goal degenerate into
Geoffrey Gorer, Yale University: Although I am in general accord with Dr. Mead's position (pp. 57-59) that cultures must be viewed as integrated wholes, and that it is illegitimate to isolate single features for comment or contrast,
I
nevertheless feel that cross-cultural comparisons
are capable of yielding
more information and more
practical
suggestions than Dr. Mead's paper would indicate. Although the total configuration of every culture is
unique, and the unique
system of values all-pervading, yet cultures are not
illogical
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
79
conglomerates of otherwise unconnected items, nor
is
the con-
between cultures and cultural value-systems no comparisons can be assayed. The most valuable tech-
trast so absolute
that
—
nique one already developed by Dr. Mead in "Cooperation and Competition Among Thirteen Primitive Societies," would appear to be that of multiple correlation. It is possible and profitable to take one trait or complex which has been reported
from a number of
cultures, and, by the
relation, to discover
what other
traits
method
of multiple cor-
or complexes always ap-
trait or complex what others appear completely incompatible.
pear in conjunction with the
in question, I
and
should like to
suggest for future investigation seven hypotheses concerning
supreme worth and moral
the correlation between "the sponsibility of the individual traits 1.
human person" and
re-
other cultural
and complexes.
Social goals.
The concept
of the
responsibility of the individual
is
supreme worth and moral
positively correlated with the
cultural phrasing of social goals (success) as attainable by the
great majority of the population; and negatively correlated with the high valuation of social goals petitive
and exclusive;
i.e.,
which
are phrased as
com-
the phrasing, "If the other person at-
I cannot," is incompatible with a high valuation supreme worth of the individual. Furthermore, the concept of the supreme worth of the individual is positively correlated with the number of different social goals considered as equally honorific, and negatively correlated with the concept of one particular social goal as exclusively honorific. To take examples from primitive societies, a people such as the Kwoma, who will grant a man esteem if he is a good warrior, or a good hunter, or a good gardener, or a good singer, or a good musician, or a good carver, will place more emphasis on the supreme worth
tains the goal,
of the
of the individual than will peoples such as the Masai, who only esteem the good warrior, or the Ifugao, who only esteem the man of large property. Cultures with a strong emphasis on a single social goal are liable to depreciate those people
who from
temperamental or other causes are unfitted for that particular pursuit. 2.
Social structure. Except in the very simplest societies, every
culture ascribes to
some
of
its
members
positions of authority
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
8o
where they have the duty of controlling the counter-social behavior of people in the society and of planning for the prosperity of the total society or portions of it. Other things equal, the concept of the supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual
is
positively correlated with the higher propor-
tion of socially eligible people
who
participate in these responsi-
bilities. 3.
Social status. Status, positions of deference within the so-
ciety,
may be
(through birth in a particular
either ascribed
family lineage, class, caste, religious group, etc.) or achieved
(through election, competition,
etc.).
Other things equal, the
concept of the supreme worth and moral responsibility of the is positively correlated with the number of achieved and negatively correlated with the number of ascribed
individual statuses, statuses. 4.
Rights and duties.
To
the extent that rights and duties are
separately ascribed to different individuals or groups within the
population, to that extent will deference be withheld from those individuals and groups
no
rights.
who
The concept
have ascribed to them duties and
of the
sponsibility of the individual
is
social separation of social rights
women and
supreme worth and moral
re-
negatively correlated with the
and duties.
The concept of the supreme 5. worth and moral responsibility of the individual is positively correlated with the extent to which women and children are given socially significant, responsible, and esteemed roles in the life of the community. Roles of
6.
children.
Accessibility of property.
The
greater the difference in the
accessibility of property for socially equivalent persons
(e.g.,
adult males, fathers of families, old people, etc.) the greater the
tendency to depreciate the propertyless. The concept of the
supreme worth and moral responsibility of the individual is negatively correlated with contrasts in accessibility of property. 7. Knowledge. The more any type of knowledge, considered socially significant, is restricted to only a portion of the total
potential knowers, the less value
groups
who
lack this knowledge.
is
placed on individuals or
The concept
of the supreme
worth and moral responsibility of the individual
is
positively
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
correlated with the accessibility of
8i
knowledge considered
so-
cially significant. It
should be emphasized that these seven propositions are
only hypotheses, which would have to be tested against the available evidence before they could be accepted. It should also
be emphasized that undoubtedly a very great lar
hypotheses could be
set up.
number
of simi-
These hypotheses have been
constructed as a model of the potential contribution of anthro-
pology to the aims of the Conference. Given the desire of the Conference to produce a "recognition of the supreme worth
and moral responsibility of the individual human person," anthropology can show what concomitant traits and complexes have, in other human societies, been found compatible, and what incompatible, with this aim.
Gregory Bateson, Cambridge University: Let me take as focus for this comment the last item^ in Dr. Mead's summary of her paper. To the layman who has not occupied himself with the comparative study of human cultures, this recommendation may appear strange; it may appear to be an ethical or philosophical paradox, a suggestion that we discard purpose in order to achieve our purpose; it may even call to mind some of the basic aphorisms of Christianity and Taoism. Such aphorisms are familiar enough; but the layman will be a little surprised to find them coming from a scientist and all the paraphernalia of analytic thought. To other anthropologists and social scientists. Dr. Mead's recommenda-
dressed in
more
tions will be even
and perhaps more meanand "blue-prints" are an essen-
surprising,
ingless, because instrumentality
^Dr. Mead writes: ". those students who have devoted themselves to studying cultures as wholes, as systems of dynamic equilibrium, can make the following contributions: .
.
.
"4.
Implement plans
.
.
for altering our present culture
by recognizing the importance of including the social scientist within his experimental material, and by recognizing that by working towards defined ends we commit ourselves to the manipulation of persons, and therefore to the negation of democracy. Only by working in terms of values which are limited to defining a direction
is it
possible for us to use scientific
in the control of the process without the negation of the
of the
human
spirit."
(Italics hers.)
methods
moral autonomy
Science, Philosophy
82
and Religion
science sees it. tial ingredient in the whole structure of life as Likewise, to those in political life, Dr. Mead's recommendation will be strange, since they see decisions as classifiable into policy-making decisions versus executive decisions. The gov-
ernors and the scientists alike (not to mention the commercial world) see human affairs as patterned upon purpose, means
and ends, connation and satisfaction. purpose and inIf anybody doubts that we tend to regard the old consider him human, let strumentality as distinctively quip about eating and is
living.
The
creature
who
"eats to live"
human; he who "lives to eat" is coarser-grained, human; but if he just "eats and lives," without at-
the highest
but
still
tributing instrumentality or a spurious priority in time sequence to either process, he is rated only among the animals, and some, less kind, will regard him as vegetable.
—
Dr. Mead's contribution consists in this that she, fortified by comparative study of other cultures, has been able to transcend the habits of thought current in her own culture and has been able to say virtually this: "Before we apply social science to our
own
national affairs,
we must
re-examine and
means and change our habits of thought on classify beto setting, cultural our in ends. We have learnt, ends defining on go we if and 'ends' and 'means' into havior the subject of
from means and apply the social sciences as crudely instrumental means, using the recipes of science to manipulate people, we shall arrive at a totalitarian rather than a democratic
as separate
solution which she offers is that we look and "values" implicit in the means, rather than looking ahead to a blue-printed goal and thinking of this goal as justifying or not justifying manipulative means. We have to find the value of a planned act implicit in and simultaneous with the act itself, not separate from it in the sense that the act would derive its value from reference to a future
system of
life."
The
for the "direction,"
Mead's paper is, in fact, not a direct preachment about ends and means; she does not say that ends either do or do not justify the means. She is talking not direcdy about ends and means, but about the way we tend to think about ways and means, and about the dangers inherent in our
end or
goal. Dr.
habit of thought.
— (
Science, Philosophy It is specifically at this level
and Religion
that the anthropologist has
to contribute to our problems. It
common
83
factor implicit in a vast variety of
or inversely, to decide whether
most
his task to see the highest
is
human phenomena,
phenomena which appear
to be go to one South Sea community, such as the Manus, and there find that though everything that the natives do is concretely different from our own behavior, yet the underlying system of motives is rather closely comparable with our own love of caution and wealthaccumulation; or again he may go to another society such as Bali and there find that, while the outward appearance of the native religion is closely comparable with our own kneeling to pray, incense, intoned utterances punctuated by a bell, etc. the basic emotional attitudes are fundamentally different. In Balinese religion we find an approval accorded to rote, nonemotional performance of certain acts instead of the insistence upon correct emotional attitude, characteristic of Christian
similar are not intrinsically different.
He may
—
churches.
In every case the anthropologist
is
concerned not with mere
description but with a slightly higher degree of abstraction, a
wider degree of generalization. His
first
task
the meticulous
is
collection of masses of concrete observations of native life
but the next step is
is
not a mere summarizing of these data;
rather to interpret the data in an abstract language
shall
it
which
transcend and comprehend the vocabulary and notions
explicit
and implicit
in our
own
culture. It
is
not possible to
give a scientific description of a native culture in English
words; the anthropologist must devise a more abstract vocabwhich both our own and the native culture can be described. This then is the type of discipline which has enabled Dr. Mead to point out that a discrepancy a basic and fundamental discrepancy exists between "social engineering," manipulating people in order to achieve a planned blueprint society, and the ideals of democracy, the "supreme worth and moral ulary in terms of
—
responsibility of the individual flicting
—
human
person."
The two
con-
motifs have long been implicit in our culture, science
has had instrumental leanings since before the Industrial Revolution,
and emphasis upon individual worth and responsibility
Science, Philosophy
84
and Religion
even older. The threat o£ conflict between the two motifs and has only come recently, with increasing consciousness of, spread simultaneous motif and democratic emphasis upon, the is
lifeof the instrumental motif. Finally, the conflict is now a shall or-death struggle over the role which the social sciences an play in the ordering of human relationships. It is hardly
exaggeration to say that this war
this— the
role
ideologically about just
is
of the social sciences.
Are we
to reserve the
techniques and the right to manipulate people as the privilege individuals, of a few planning, goal-oriented, and power-hungry appeal? natural makes a science of instrumentality whom the to
Now
we have
that
the techniques, are we, in cold blood, going
to treat people as things?
to
do with
difficulty as well as
urgency,
Or what
are
we going
these techniques?
The problem
one of very great
is
doubly
because we, as scientists, are deeply
and it is soaked in habits of instrumental thought— those of for
whom
difficult
science
is
us, at least,
a part of life, as well as a beautiful
dignified abstraction. Let
us try to
surmount
and
this additional
source of difficulty by turning the tools of science upon this habit of instrumental thought and upon the new habit which Dr. Mead envisages— the habit which looks for "direction" and "value" in the chosen act, rather than in defined goals.
both of these habits are ways of looking at time sequences. In the old jargon of psychology, they represent different ways of apperceiving sequences of behavior, or in the newer jargon of gestalt psychology, they might both be described as habits of looking for one or another sort of con-
Clearly,
textual frame for behavior.
The problem which Dr. Mead—
who advocates a change in such habits—raises is of how habits of this abstract order are learned. This
most
is
the problem
not the simple type of question which is posed in laboratories, "under what circumstances
psychological
dog learn to salivate in response to a bell?" or, "what variables govern success in rote learning?" Our question is one degree more abstract, and, in a sense, bridges the gap
will a
between the experimental work on simple learning and the approach of the gestalt psychologists. We are asking "how does the dog acquire a habit of punctuating or apperceiving
\
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
85
the infinitely complex stream of events (including his
havior) so that this stream appears to be
made up
own
be-
of one
type of short sequences rather than another?" Or, substituting the scientist for the dog, we might ask "what circumstances determine that a given scientist will punctuate the stream of events so as to conclude that all is predetermined, while another will see the stream of events as so regular as to be susceptible of control?" Or, again,
us ask
—and—
this
on the same
question
is
level of abstraction let
very relevant to the promotion of
"what circumstances promote that specific habitwhich we call 'free-will' and those others which we call 'responsibility,' 'constructiveness,' 'energy,' 'passivity,' 'dominance,' and the rest?" For all these democracy
ual phrasing of the universe
abstract qualities, the essential stock-in-trade of the educators,
can be seen as various habits of punctuating the stream of experience so that it takes on one or another sort of coherence
and
sense.
operational
They are abstractions which begin meaning when we see them take
conceptual level
assume some on a between the statements of simple learning and to
their place
those of gestalt psychology.
We
can, for example, put our finger very
simply on the
process which leads to tragedy and disillusion whenever
decide that the "end
justifies
the
means"
men
in their efforts to
achieve either a Christian or a blue-printed heaven-on-earth.
They ignore
the fact that in social manipulation, the tools are
not hammers and screw-drivers.
A
screw-driver
ously affected when, in an emergency,
we
use
it
is
not
as a
seri-
wedge;
and a hammer's outlook on life is not affected because we sometimes use its handle as a simple lever. But in social manipulation our tools are people, and people learn, and they acquire habits which are more subtle and pervasive than the tricks which the blue-printer teaches them. With the best intentions
in
the world, he
may
train
their parents in order to eradicate
children to
some tendency
spy upon prejudicial
to the success of his blue-print, but because the children are people they will do more than learn this simple trick they
—
whole philosophy of life; future attitudes towards authority. When-
will build this experience into their it
will color all their
ever they meet certain sorts of context, they will tend to see
Science, Philosophy
86
these contexts as structured
may
blue-printer
and Religion
on an
earlier familiar pattern.
The
derive an initial advantage from the chil-
dren's tricks; but the ultimate success of his blue-print
may
be destroyed by the habits of mind which were learned with the trick. (Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the
Nazi blue-print
down
will break
for these reasons. It
is
probable that the unpleasant attitudes here referred to are envisaged as basic both to the plan itself and to the means it. The road to hell can also be paved with bad though well-intentioned people find this hard to
of achieving intentions, believe.)
We are dealing, apparently, with a sort of habit which is a by-product of the learning process. When Dr. Mead tells us that we should leave off thinking in terms of blue-prints and should instead evaluate our planned acts in terms of their immediate implicit value, she is saying that in the up-bringing and education of children, we ought to try to inculcate a sort of by-product habit rather different from that which we acquired and which we daily reinforce in ourselves in our contacts with science, politics, newspapers, and so on.
She
states perfectly clearly
that this
new
shift in
the
em-
phasis or gestalt of our thinking will be a setting forth into
We
know what manner of human we be sure that we ourselves would feel at home in the world of 1980. Dr. Mead can only tell us that if we proceed on the course which uncharted waters.
cannot
beings will result from such a course, nor can
would seem most natural, planning our applications of social science as a means of attaining a defined goal, we shall surely hit a rock. She has charted the rock for us, and advises that we embark on a course in a direction where the rock is not; but in a
new,
tion of
still
how we
uncharted direction. Her paper raises the quesare to chart this
new
direction.
Actually, science can give us something approaching a chart. I
indicated above that
terms
—
free-will,
ness, passivity,
we might
predestination,
dominance,
etc.
see a
mixed bunch of abstract
responsibility,
—as
all
of
constructive-
them descriptive of
apperceptive habits, habitual ways of looking at the stream of events of which our these habits might
own
all
behavior
be, in
some
is
a part,
and further that
sense, by-products of the
Science, Philosophy learning process. sort of chart, list
is
Our next
and Religion
task, if
clearly to get
we
are
to achieve
which
shall
some
something better than a random
We must reduce this show how each of these
of these possible habits.
classification
87
list
to a
habits
is
systematically related to the others.
We meet in common agreement that a sense of individual autonomy, a habit of mind somehow related to what I have called "free-will," is an essential of democracy, but we are still how this autonomy should be defined What, for example, is the relation between "autonomy" and compulsive negativism? The gas stations which refuse to conform to the curfew are they or are they not showing a fine democratic spirit? This sort of "negativism" is undoubtedly of the same degree of abstraction as "free-will" or "determinism"; like them it is an habitual way of apperceiving contexts, event sequences and own behavior; but it is not clear whether this negativism is a "sub-species" of individual autonomy; or is it rather some entirely different habit? Similarly, we need to know how the new habit of thought which Dr. Mead advocates is related to the others. Evidently our need is for something better than a random list of these habits of mind. We need some systematic framework or classification which shall show how each of these habits is related to the others, and such a classification might provide us with something approaching the chart we lack. not perfectly clear as to operationally.
—
Mead tells us to sail into as yet uncharted waters, adopting new habit of thought; but if we knew how this habit is related to others, we might be able to judge of the benefits Dr.
a
and dangers, the possible pitfalls of such a course. Such a chart might provide us with the answers to some of the questions which Dr. Mead raises as to how we are to judge of the "direction" and value implicit in our planned acts. You must not expect the social scientist to produce such a chart or classification at a moment's notice, like a rabbit out
—
of a hat, but
we can you
I
think
we can
take a
first
step in this direction;
suggest some of the basic themes
— upon
which the
—the cardinal points,
must be built. have noted that the sorts of habit with which we are concerned are, in some sense, by-products of the learning if
We
like
final classification
Science, Philosophy
88 processes,
and
phenomena clue.
We
it
is
and Religion
therefore natural that
we
look
first to
the
of simple learning as likely to provide us with a
are raising questions one degree
more
abstract than
those chiefly studied by the experimental psychologists, but to their laboratories that
is still
Now there
so
it
is
a
we must
it
look for our answers.
happens that in the psychological laboratories
common phenomenon
of a
somewhat higher degree
of abstraction or generality than those which the experiments are planned to elucidate. It
mental subject
is
a
commonplace
that the experi-
—whether animal or man, becomes a better sub-
ject after repeated experiments.
He
not only learns to salivate
moments, or to recite the appropriate nonsense syllables; he also, in some way, learns to learn. He not only solves the problems set him by the experimenter, where each solving is a piece of simple learning; but, more than this, he becomes more and more skilled in the solving of problems. at the appropriate
In semi-gestalt or semi-anthropomorphic phraseology, we might say that the subject is learning to orient himself to certain types of contexts, or
is
acquiring "insight" into the
contexts of problem solving. In the jargon of this paper,
may
we
say that the subject has acquired a habit of looking for
contexts and sequences of one type rather than another, a habit of "punctuating" the stream of events to give repetitions of
a certain type of meaningful sequence.
argument which we have followed has brought meet statements about gestalt and contextual structure, and we have reached the hypothesis that "learning to learn" is a synonym
The
line of
us to a point at which statements about simple learning
for the acquisition of that class of abstract habits of thought
with which
which we
this
call
paper
is
concerned; that the states of mind
dominance, by a process which we may equate
"free-will," instrumental thinking,
passivity, etc., are acquired
with "learning to learn." This hypothesis is to some extent new^
to psychologists as
papers bearing upon this problem of the relationship and simple learning are very numerous, if we include all who have worked on the concepts of transfer of learning, generalization, irradiation, reaction threshold (Hull), insight, and the like. Historically, one of the first to pose these questions was Mr. Frank (Frank, L. K., "The
Psychological
between
gestalt
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
well as to laymen, and therefore
I
must
89
digress at this point
with a more precise statement of my meaning. I must demonstrate at least my willingness to state this bridge between simple learning and gestalt in operato supply technical readers
tional terms.
Let us coin two words, "proto-learning" and "deutero-learning," to avoid the labor of defining operationally
terms in the etc.).
in
all
the other
Let us say that there are two sorts of gradient discernible continued learning. The gradient at any point on a simple
learning curve
(e.g.,
a curve of rote learning)
chiefly represents rate of proto-learning. If,
shall find that in
we
however,
will say
we
on the same
a series of similar learning experiments
we
all
(transfer of learning, generalization, etc.,
field
inflict
subject,
each successive experiment the subject has
somewhat steeper proto-learning gradient, that he learns somewhat more rapidly. This progressive change in rate of
a
proto-learning
From
this
we
will call "deutero-learning."
point
we
can easily go on to represent deutero-
whose gradient shall repreSuch a representation might be
learning graphically with a curve sent rate of deutero-learning.
obtained, for example,
by intersecting the
learning curves at some arbitrarily chosen
series
number
of proto-
of
trials,
and noting what proportion of successful responses occurred in each experiment at this point. The curve of deutero-learning would then be obtained by plotting these numbers against the serial numbers of the experiments.^ Problems of Learning," Psych. Rev., 33:329-351, 1926); and Professor Maier has recently introduced a concept of "direction" which is closely related
to
the notion of "deutero-learning."
He
says:
"direction
...
is
the force which integrates memories in a particular
manner without being "The Behavior Mechanisms Concerned
memory itself." (Maier, N. R. F., with Problem Solving," Psych. Rev., 47:43-58, 1940). If for "force" we substitute "habit," and for "memory" we substitute "experience of the stream of events," the concept of "deutero-learning" can be seen as almost synonymous with Professor Maier's concept of "direction." a
be noted that the operational definition of deutero-learning is somewhat easier than that of proto-learning. Actually, no simple learning curve represents proto-learning alone. Even within the duration of the single learning experiment we must suppose that some 'It
will
necessarily
deutero-learning will occur, and this will
make
somewhat steeper than the hypothetical gradient
the gradient at any point of "pure" proto-learning.
Science, Philosophy
90
and Religion
100
80 PER CENT '^^ CORRECT RESPONSES
ss
NUMBER OF Fig.
I.
TRIALS
Three Successive Learning Curves with the same
subject,
show^ing increase in rate of learning in successive experiments.
80
PER CENT CORRECT RESPONSES AFTER TEN
70
TRIALS
SS
±13 SERIAL
Fig.
2.
NUMBERS OF EXPERIMENTS
Deutero-learning Curve derived from the three learning
experiments in Fig.
i.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
91
In this definition of proto- and deutero-learning, one phrase
remains conspicuously vague, the phrase "a series of similar experiments." For purposes of illustration, I imagined a series of experiments in rote learning, each experiment similar to the last, except for the substitution of a new series of nonsense syllables in place of those already learned. In this example, the curve of deutero-learning represented
increasing proficiency
in the business of rote learning, and, as an experimental fact,
such increase in rote proficiency can be demonstrated.*
Apart from rote learning, it is much more difficult to define what we mean by saying that one learning context is "similar" to another, unless
we
are content to refer the matter
back to
the experimentalists by saying that learning contexts shall be
considered to be "similar" one to another whenever
shown experimentally
it
can be
that experience of learning in one con-
text does, as a matter of fact,
promote speed of learning
in
another, and asking the experimentalists to find out for us
what
sort of classification they can build
criterion.
We
may hope
that they will
hope for immediate answers
to
do
up by use of this;
but
this
we cannot
our questions, because there
way of such experimentation. Experiments in simple learning are already difficult enough to control and to perform with critical exactness, and experiments in deutero-learning are likely to prove almost impossible. There is, however, an alternative course open to us. When we equated "learning to learn" with acquiring apperceptive are very serious difficulties in the
habits, this did not exclude the possibility that such habits
might be acquired in other ways. To suggest that the only method of acquiring one of these habits is through repeated experience of learning contexts of a given kind would be logically analogous to saying that the only way to roast pig is by burning the house down. It is obvious that in human education such habits are acquired in very various ways. We are not concerned with a hypothetical isolated individual in
with an impersonal events-stream, but rather with who have complex emotional patterns of relationship with other individuals. In such a real world, the
contact
real individuals
*Hull,
C, "Mathematico-Deductive Theory
Press, 1940.
of Rote Learning," Yale Univ.
Science, Philosophy
g(i
and Religion
individual will be led to acquire or reject apperceptive habits
by the very complex phenomena of personal example, tone of voice, hostility, love, etc. Many such habits, too, will be conveyed to him, not through his own naked experience of the stream of events, for no human beings (not even scientists) are naked in this sense. The events-stream is mediated to them through language, art, technology, and other cultural media which are structured at every point by tramlines of apperceptive habit. It
therefore follows that the psychological laboratory
the only possible source of
knowledge about these
may
contrasting patterns
turn
instead
the
to
explicit in the various cultures of the
We
anthropologists.
can amplify our
habits by adding those
not
is
we
habits;
implicit
and
world studied by the list
of
these
which have been developed
obscure
in cultures
other than our own.
Most
profitably,
I
believe,
we can combine
the insights of
the experimental psychologists with those of the anthropolo-
taking
gists,
contexts
the
of
experimental learning in the
laboratory and asking of each what sort of apperceptive habit
we should expect to find associated with it; then looking around the world for human cultures in which this habit has been developed. Inversely, we may be able to get a more definite
will"
if
—more we
operational
ing context would
we
"How would we
rig the
anthropomorphic
rat
impression of his
own
The
—definition of such habits
ask about each,
classification
"What
devise in order to inculcate this habit.?"
shall
maze
or problem-box so that the
obtain a repeated and reinforced
free-will?"
of contexts
of experimental
learning
as yet very incomplete, but certain definite advances
made.** It
is
as "free-
sort of experimental learn-
is
have been
possible to classify the principal contexts of positive
^Various classifications have been devised for purposes of exposition.
Here
I follow that of Hilgard and Marquis (Hilgard, E. R. and Marquis, D. G., "Conditioning and Learning," N.Y., Appleton Century Co., 1940).
These authors subject their own classification to a brilliant critical analysis, and to this analysis I am indebted for one of the formative ideas upon which this paper is based. They insist that any learning context can be described in terms of any theory of learning, if we are willing to stretch and over-emphasize certain aspects of the context to fit onto the Pro-
— Science, Philosophy learning
distinct
(as
and Religion
93
from negative learning or inhibition,
learning not to do things) under four heads, as follows: I. Classical Pavlovian Contexts. These are characterized by a rigid time sequence in
which the conditioned stimulus
(e.g.,
buzzer) always precedes the unconditioned stimulus (e.g., meat powder) by a fixed interval of time. This rigid sequence of events
may
not altered by anything that the animal
is
do. In
these contexts, the animal learns to respond to the conditioned
stimulus with behavior
(e.g.,
which was formerly
salivation)
evoked only by the unconditioned stimulus. II.
Contexts of Instrumental Reward or Escape. These are
characterized by a sequence which depends
The unconditioned
behavior.
usually vague (e.g., the whole the animal
is
stimulus
sum
in
upon
the animal's
contexts
these
put, the problem-box) and
may be
is
which
of circumstances in
internal to
the animal (e.g., hunger). If and when, under these circumstances, the
animal performs some act within
its
behavioral
and previously selected by the experimenter lifts its leg), it is immediately rewarded. III. Contexts of Instrumental Avoidance. These are repertoire
characterized by a conditional sequence.
stimulus
is
usually definite (e.g., a
also
The unconditioned
warning buzzer) and
followed by an unpleasant experience
is
(e.g.,
(e.g., electric
unless in the interval the animal performs
some
this
shock)
selected act
(e.g., lifts leg).
IV. Contexts of Serial and Rote Learning. These are characterized by the predominant conditioned stimulus being an act of the subject.
He
learns, for
example, always to give the
conditioned response (nonsense syllable B) after he has himself uttered the conditioned stimulus (nonsense syllable A). crustean bed of the theory.
my
I
have taken this notion as a corner-stone of
thinking, substituting "apperceptive habits" for "theories of learning,"
and arguing that almost any sequence of events can be stretched and warped and punctuated to fit in with any type of apperceptive habit. (We may suppose that experimental neurosis is what happens when the subject fails to
am
achieve this assimilation.)
also indebted to Lewin's topological analysis of the contexts of reward and punishment. (Lewin, K., "A Dynamic Theory of Personality," N.Y., McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936) I
Science, Philosophy
94
and Religion
This small beginning of a classification^ will be sufficient to with which we are concerned and we can now go on to ask about the occurrence of the appropriate illustrate the principles
apperceptive habits interest
—because
among men
least
familiar
of various cultures.
—are
the
Of
Pavlovian
greatest
patterns
and the patterns of rote. It is a little hard for members of Western Civilization to believe that whole systems of behavior can be built on premises other than our own mixture of Instrumental Reward and Instrumental Avoidance. The Trobriand Islanders, however, appear to live a life whose coherence and sense is based upon looking at events through *Many people
that the contexts of experimental learning are so have no bearing upon the phenomena of the real world. Actually, expansion of this classification will give means of defining systematically many hundreds of possible contexts of learning with their associated apperceptive habits. The scheme may be expanded in the following ways:
oversimplified
a.
feel
as
to
Inclusion of contexts of negative learning (inhibition). cases in which salivation, with its meat powder, is also instrumental in obtaining the meat powder). Inclusion of the cases in which the subject is able to deduce some sort of relevance (other than the physiological) between some two or more elements in the sequence. For this to be true, the subject must have experience of contexts differing systematically one from another, e.g., contexts in which some type of change in one ele-
b. Inclusion
of
mixed types
(e.g.,
physiological relevance
c.
ment
to
constantly accompanied by a constant type of change in
is
another element. These cases can be spread out on a lattice of possibilities, according to which pair of ejements the subject sees
There are only five elements (conditioned stimulus, conditioned response, reward or punishment, and two time interas inter-related.
any pair of these may be inter-related, and of the intermay be seen by the subject as determining the other. These possibilities, multiplied for our four basic contexts,
vals), but
related pair, either
give forty-eight types. d.
The
list
of basic types
may be extended by
including those cases (not
as yet investigated in learning experiments but
personal relationships)
in
which the
common
roles of subject
in inter-
and experi-
menter are reversed. In these, the learning partner provides the initial and final elements, while some other person (or circumstance) provides the middle term. In these types, we see the buzzer and the meat powder as the behavior of a person and ask: "What does
this
person learn?"
A
great part of the
gamut
habits associated with authority and parenthood texts of this general type.
is
of apperceptive
based on con-
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
95
Pavlovian spectacles, only slightly tinted with the hope of instrumental reward, while the life of the Balinese is sensible if
we
accept premises based
upon combining
rote
with
in-
strumental avoidance. Clearly, to the "pure" Pavlovian, only a very limited fatalism
would be possible. He would see all events as pre-ordained and he would see himself as fated only to search for omens, not able to influence the course of events able, at most, from his
—
reading of the omens, to put himself in the properly receptive state, e.g., by salivation, before the inevitable occurred. Trobriand culture is not so purely Pavlovian as this, but Dr. Lee,' analyzing Professor Malinowski's rich observations, has shown that Trobriand phrasings of purpose, cause, and effect are profoundly different from our own; and though Dr. Lee does not use the sort of classification here proposed, it appears from
Trobriand magic that these people continually exhibit a habit of thinking that to act as if a thing were so will make it so. In this sense,
we may
describe
them
as semi-Pavlovians
who
have decided that "salivation" is instrumental to obtaining "meat powder." Malinowski, for example, gives us a dramatic description of the almost physiological extremes of rage^ which the Trobriand black magician practices in his incantations, and we may take this as an illustration of the semi-Pavlovian frame of mind in contrast with the very various types of
magical procedure in other parts of the world, where, for example, the efficacy of a spell may be associated not with the intensity but with the extreme rote accuracy of the recitation.
Among
the Balinese^
'Lee, Dorothy,
"A
we
find another pattern
which con-
Primitive System of Values," ]our. Philos. of
Set.,
7:355-378, 1940. *It is
possible that semi-Pavlovian phrasings of the stream of events tend,
experiments which are their prototypes, to hinge particularly upon autonomic reactions that those vi^ho see events in these terms tend to see these reactions, which are only partially subject to voluntary control, as peculiarly effective and powerful causes of outside events. There may be some ironical logic in Pavlovian fatalism which predisposes us to believe that we can alter the course of events only by means of those behaviors which we are least able to control. like the
The
—
Balinese material collected by Dr.
been published in extenso, but a
Mead and myself
brief outline
has not yet
of the theory here sug-
Science, Philosophy
96 trasts
own and with
sharply both with our
that of the Trosuch that they learn as composed of connative sequences ending in
brianders.
The treatment
not to see
life
satisfaction,
and Religion
of children
composed of rote sequences a pattern which is to some pattern which Dr. Mead has recom-
but rather to see
it
as
inherently satisfying in themselves
extent related to
that
is
—
mended, of looking
for value in the act itself rather than regarding the act as a means to an end. There is, however, one very important difference between the Balinese pattern and
that
recommended by Dr. Mead. The
Balinese pattern
is es-
from contexts of Instrumental Avoidance; they see the world as dangerous, and themselves as avoiding, by the endless rote behavior of ritual and courtesy, the everpresent risk of faux pas. Their life is built upon fear, albeit that in general they enjoy fear. The positive value with which they endow their immediate acts, not looking for a goal, is somehow associated with this enjoyment of fear. It is the acrobat's enjoyment both of the thrill and of his own virtuosity sentially derivative
in avoiding disaster.
We
are
now,
after a
somewhat long and
technical excursion
and foreign
cultures, in a posi-
into psychological laboratories
examine Dr. Mead's proposal in somewhat more concrete terms. She advises that when we apply the social sciences we look for "direction" and "value" in our very acts, rather than orient ourselves to some blue-printed goal. She is not telling us that we ought to be like the Balinese, except in our time-orientation, and she would be the first to disparage any suggestion that fear (even enjoyed fear) should be our basis tion to
for assigning value to our acts. Rather, as
I
understand
it,
this
—
some sort of hope not looking to some far-ofi future, but still some sort of hope or optimism. In fact, we might summarize the recommended attitude by saying that basis should be
it
ought
to
be formally related to Instrumental Reward, as the is related to Instrumental Avoidance.
Balinese attitude
Such an attitude is, I believe, feasible. The Balinese attitude might be defined as a habit of rote sequences inspired by a thrilling sense of ever-imminent but indefinite danger, and I gested esis
is
available
—
cf.
Bateson, G.,
"The Frustration-Aggression Hypoth-
and Culture," Psychological Rev., 48: 350-355, 1941.
Science, Philosophy think that what Dr.
Mead
is
and Religion
97
urging us towards might be
defined in like terms, as a habit of rote sequences inspired by a thrilling sense of ever-imminent but undefined reward.
As
to the rote
component, which
is
almost certainly a neces-
sary concomitant of the peculiar time orientation advocated
by Dr. Mead, that
it
I,
personally,
would be
of accuracy
after
would welcome
it,
and
I
believe
compulsive type Anxious taking-care and
infinitely preferable to the
which we
strive.
automatic, rote caution are alternative habits which perform the
We
same function.
matically looking before
can either have the habit of auto-
we
cross the street, or the habit of
remembering to look. Of the two I prefer the automatic, and I think that, if Dr. Mead's recommendation implies carefully
an increase in rote automatism, we ought to accept it. Already, indeed, our schools are inculcating more and more automatism in such processes as reading, writing, arithmetic, and languages. As to the reward component, this, too, should not be beyond our reach. If the Balinese is kept busy and happy by a nameless, shapeless fear, not located in space or time, we might be kept on our toes by a nameless, shapeless, unlocated hope of enormous achievement. For such a hope to be effective, the achievement need scarcely be defined. All we need to be sure of is that, at any moment, achievement may be just around the corner, and, true or false, this can never be tested. We have got to be like those few artists and scientists who work with this urgent sort of inspiration, the urgency that comes from feeling that great discovery, the answer to all our problems, or
great
creation,
the
perfect
sonnet,
is
always
only
just
mother of a child who feels that, provided she pay constant enough attention, there is a real hope that her child may be that infinitely rare phenomenon, a great and happy person. beyond our reach, or
like the
CHAPTER V The
Democracy
Basis for Faith in
By
MAX SCHOEN
Carnegie Institute of Technology
SHALL begin with a definition of freedom and with a thesis about democracy in relation to human Ufe that I propose
I
defend on biological and psychological grounds. is the feeling a person has that he is safe to be himself, that he can speak as he honestly believes and act as he to
Freedom
thinks best, on condition that he insist
on the
individual to do likewise, and provided that he
willing to be he does. organization which pro-
held responsible for everything he says and
Democracy
right of eve?y is
all
form of social and defends the right of every human being and the pursuit of happiness, which means to the
is
claims, guarantees to
life,
liberty
conduct
his life in his
own
way,
if
his
way
is
that of a person
fully conscious of his responsibilities as a social being.
My his is
thesis
own
is
terms,
that this right of every is
man
to his
own
life,
on
not merely a proclaimed right, but one that
deeply rooted in the very nature of animal existence in human existence in particular. This being so,
general and of it
follows that democracy
the only
mode
of
is
communal
neither a wish nor a hope, but life
in
and which can have permanence,
which there can be peace
for whatever constitutes a
life, and life will either destroy normal course or be destroyed itself. I turn first to a consideration of the relationship of Ufe and liberty. That life is identical with liberty is implied by every-
threat to liberty, also threatens that
which obstructs
its
98
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
99
thing that the investigation of animate things reveals about
What
the nature of an organism versus that of a mechanism. the science of hfe
that an animal organism
is
is
a self-
and
self -developing
self-adjusting,
self-selecting,
acting,
us
tells
self-
experiencing body. First, a living
body, which
is
whether a body
when some
body
is
force
is is
in contrast
self-acting,
outer-determined in
dead or
alive
applied to
it.
its activities.
with a dead
We
recognize
by observing what
it
does
responses are of a sort
If its
that indicates that they are altogether determined by the ap-
plied force, then
we know
that the only resistance inertia,
trolled.
it
to
be a
lifeless
body. This means
offers to the stimulation
it
is
its
own
and its activities can, therefore, be predicted and conBut when the body acts in a manner that cannot be
completely accounted for in terms of the outer force, we know the body to be that of a living organism. For this reason, it is impossible to predict what an animal will do under a given set
we
of conditions, unless
experiences and
its
also
know
all
the facts of
present organic state.
No
its
past
two organisms
respond in exactly the same way to the same situation, nor does the same organism react twice to the same situation in precisely the same manner. Life does not duplicate itself, nor
remain stationary. Variation and modification constitute the laws of its being. Because each life is unique, and because its activities are directed from within itself, it can obey no laws other than those of its own making. Life is over when conformity to outer forces becomes the rule rather than does
it
the most rare exception.
All
life
is
then resistive just because
is
arises
from the evolutionary
the position of the animal
becomes havior
it
is
self-active.
But
a difference in the degree of the resistance, which
there
its
insistence
increases
vertebrate yields vertebrate,
in
status of the organism. is
on the
upon self-management, while
discrimination
more
The
higher
scale of life, the greater
or
intelligence.
its
be-
The
in-
readily to outer pressure than does the
and the lower vertebrate
is
more complacent
in
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
100
the face of arbitrary compulsion than is the higher mammal. Degree of resistance thus means degree of livingness. Here we may have the biological reason why we speak of some persons as having no backbone.
Furthermore, rises
as the resistance increases in intensity,
from an impulsive
to
an intelligent
level.
The
it
also
cat in the
puzzle box, the rat in the maze, engage in a mass of random movements to reach the food box. Some of the higher apes is beyond immediate conquest and acting only after a promising solution has been reached. The human creative mind solves the problem by modifying the situation to conform with its desires. So there is a progression in resistance to the outer, from overcoming it by blind chance, to conquering it by a process of deliberation. But in any case, where there is Ufe, there is resistance, with the degree of resistance shown being the sole
give evidences of thinking over the situation that
criterion of the degree of life present.
Second, an animal organism
a self-selective body. It can-
is
not accept anything and everything in
its environment on equal any particular time which needs on that occasion. Consequently, what one organism
terms. Only that it
accepts as
do
is
agreeable to
good another may
it
at
reject as harmful.
so in order to survive. Indiscriminate activity
would
upon
And it must would destroy
from without. It is but the good for itself, so that those who would treat it for its welfare can know what to do only by inquiring of the organism steadily and patiently. The animal can be directed by a knowledge of the laws of its individual being, but not dictated to as to what it must or should do. Even the grower of plants and vegetables cannot assume arbitrarily that he knows what is good for his seed, without
it,
as
activity forced
organism that can
know what
it
is
running the risk of ruining his crop. He is safe only when his procedure is based upon a study of the nature of the seed. The breeder of animals knows that he must follow the laws of genetics, even if he is to have no more than a chance of getting
what he wants. The physician knows he must follow
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
loi
the laws of health, as these operate in a particular case, in order to benefit his patient. The body takes in a variety of foods, assimilates
what
needs, and discards the rest.
it
command
cannot
the body to thrive on what
conference to be good for held to be a law of
it.
the
If
body
the body. All this applies to intellectual
dietitian
decided by
obey what is wrong and not
fails to
the law that
its life, it is
The is
is
and moral health,
as
does to physical well-being, but with the one important difference, that persistent mistreatment of the body culminates in physical extinction, while prolonged violation of the laws it
mind and behavior through regimentation produces the Hfe compared with which physical death is a blessing.
of
Third, the animal
is a self-adjusting body. It has been said an adjustment between organism and environment. This is true. But it is also a fact that, if the organism is to adjust to the environment, the environment must be adjustable
that life
is
to the organism.
That
the environment
is,
must contain the and to develop body does not conform to its
elements the organism needs to sustain in a
A
normal manner.
surroundings.
wood
It
living
them.
uses
A
itself
rock rolling downhill, or a
downstream, is an adjusting body. behaves in accordance with the conditions under which it moving. But an organism is more than an adjusting body;
bit
is
of
floating
self-adjusting, for
find out
what
is
it
good
explores
for
it
its
harmful. activity is
If it persists is
good
for
it.
will
harm
which
in an activity, It is,
it
it
it.
This means
has found to be
it
does so because that
of course, possible that the
a mistaken one, but in that case the activity
organism's choosing.
is
surroundings in order to
and what
that an organism never chooses that
It
is
good
not of the
has been forced upon
it by abnormal body seeks to destroy itself under normal conditions. If what it does turns out to be harmful, the purpose of the act was nevertheless the promotion of a
circumstances.
good.
No
The drug
It
living
addict does not persist in his evil
way with
the intention of poisoning his system; he does so because the
poison
satisfies his appetite,
but
his appetite
is
unwholesome.
Science, Philosophy
102
and Religion
However, he did not deliberately set out to cultivate that appetite. It was forced upon him by conditions he was unable to resist or of which he was ignorant. He was ill to begin with, and his drug addiction came about as a result of his attempt to adjust himself to abnormal conditions. The thief does not remain a thief for the evil there is in it, but for the good he hopes to obtain from it. The bad child is bad because of the satisfaction it derives from it. There can be but one indication whether an organism finds an act to be or not to be and that is its behavior. Whether it acts or refrains from acting, the motive is survival and not destruction. Fourth, an organism is a self-developing body. Life means growth and change, and when growth ceases, life is on the decline. And growth is a bringing forth, a reaching out, a striving for the realization of the inherent powers of a particular life. For this reason, growth cannot be dictated to, as to
desirable,
as to the direction
Whatever
it
to follow or the state
it is
can become as an actuality,
it
it
is
to reach.
possesses within
So it is but the careful nurturing of posthrough which wholesome actuaHties may be realized.
itself as a possibility.
sibihties
Such nurturing must follow the knowledge of the nature of the as yet undeveloped powers of the individual growing body. For this reason, it has been well said that "where anything is growing, one former is worth a thousand reformers." For every case that stands in need of reforming indicates thereby that the forming process has been a false one. It is only misdirection that calls for redirection, the undoing of what has been done in order
to
make
who
a
new
start.
Professional reformers
need for reforming, and they are hence the wrong persons to do it; for by assuming that the original stuff needed reshaping, they started it out on the wrong trail. Lost souls have been invariably lost by those who set out to save them, because they started out by saving that which only needed sure guiding. The only good that can be done to others is to provide them with every possible opportunity to find out what is good for themselves, are the very people
create the
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
103
and the only evidence there can be that this has been done is that there is no need for reforming. Fifth, an organism is a self-experiencing body. It is a trait life that each contact with its objective world is regand retained, and influences all subsequent experiences. The animal is an historical creature, with its past functioning in the present and the present influencing its future. Life is a flow, a stream of experiences. Even the new is recognized as
of animal istered
being
new
only because of the consciousness of
ship to the old as a development out of
new
of the old, the
But the
is
not
real,
body
its
relation-
Without the presence
but a delusion.
more than a self-experiencing. The
living
it.
is
consciously experiencing
outside world does not pour events into a passive receptacle which retains them and even uses them. What is given from the outside is modified by what is already present within. The organism therefore does creature. It
is
all. It creates them. What comes from without is but the raw stuff for the creative inner life. The world of every organism is thus of its own making. It is not the objective situation that matters so much as its meaning to a particular creature, and that meaning does not reside in the situation but in the individual mind. Hence, there are as many worlds as there are individuals in it, and what is a reality to one life is not the same sort of reality in kind or degree, or no reality at all, for another life. Experiences are, for this reason, not impressed on an organism, but expressed by it, and each experience is a manifestation of a subject, not of an object. Life is a construction, a building, a home, erected
not receive experiences at
out of the material of objective reality to suit the conveniences of a particular occupant.
For
accept with complacence a into
which
it is
to
it
will
so, will feel I
If it is
proceed to rearrange
cramped and
have thus
far
an organism cannot it by another and
built for
move and accommodate
with a prearranged order.
home
this reason,
home
itself in
accordance
forced to dwell in such a it,
and,
if it is
unable to do
frustrated.
attempted to show the identity of
life
and
Science, Philosophy
104
liberty to substantiate
Uberty
is
denied
it,
my
thesis that,
I
now
whenever and wherever
U£e will struggle to destroy the repressing
and oppressing conditions, even destruction.
and Religion
at the risk or cost of self-
wish to indicate that for man, because of
his psychological status as a self-conscious creature, liberty is
a necessity for the pursuit of happiness, the
which, as Aristotle pointed out centuries ago, of
all
human
enterprises.
To show
this
is
attainment of the final goal
common ground
of
and happiness, I shall consider one of man's enterprises, namely, work, and raise the question as to the difference between a person working joyfully and laboring grudgingly. Consider a man engaged in a game of chess, on one occasion, and, on another, hanging the window screens. In both liberty
is working, since work is but the exertion of effort directed towards the accomplishment of a set purpose. Nevertheless, working at chess is play, while working with the screens is
he
labor.
man
From
hours of strenuous concentration on chess, the
but happy. But the exertion of protecting the house against insects leaves him weary, if not also grumpy. The difference between the two occupations is not in the work done, but in that of freedom versus compulsion, which arises tired
between happiness and misery. The in self-defense; but playing chess was screens had to motive for play is inner, the work Because the a free choice. self-realizing. The player seeks to also is self-expressive and improve his game, and as he grows in skill, he is growing in happiness. So the chess player boasts of his game, but the screen hanger bemoans his lot. What, now, are the conditions that must prevail, if work is
also
the
difference
be hung
of any sort
is
to
be a source of gratification to the worker.?
I
consider the answer to this question to be crucial in arriving
between human hfe, and the pursuit of happiness, and, therefore, as revealing the fundamental nature and indispensability of democracy. There are at least five traits of work as play, each one bearing at a conclusion as regards the relationship
liberty
noble testimony to the necessity of freedom.
Science, Philosophy
One
requisite for happiness in
and Religion
work
is
105
security. In order to
be expressive in his work, the worker must be free from worry
about a
Uving. This freedom does not entail financial af-
his
fluence;
man
it
is
means no more than the assurance
wiUing
to
work, he
is
food, shelter and clothing for himself
minimum
this
that, so
certain of adequate
of security, he
is
and
long as
sufficient
and dependents. Without
a slave to
circumstances for his bare existence and
is
the accident of
unhappy. Living
it possible for the worker to center his interest doing and, therefore, also on the way he does it,
makes
security
on what he is and this is the substance of artistry. The laborer is not born, he is made; for it is not the work that is laborious, but the spirit in which it is done, namely, the feeling that the effort put forth is the price that one must pay simply to keep alive. Work under such conditions is a threat and a penalty, when it should be a privilege and a promise. Another requisite for artistic endeavor is mental and physical fitness. The worker can be interested in his work only when he is capable of turning out a product of which he can be proud.
And
it
is
aptitude that generates interest, not interest
that creates aptitude.
The
musically talented child, for instance,
spurred to continued effort by the comparative ease with
is
which
it
attains gratifying performance, while the non-gifted
discouraged by the clumsy fruits of prolonged plodding.
is
No he
matter is
how
poorly
endowed by nature some one
nevertheless best fitted for
better than for any other,
and
it
is
a person
may
be,
vocational pursuit
only in that pursuit that
he can function happily by attaining masterly control of the tools and materials of his trade. Monotony is not a quafity of
work to be done, but the result of the worker's inabiHty to make his work creative because of his lack of a natural capacity to grow in skill of performance. When this is the case, the worker is enslaved to his work, from which he endeavors to emancipate himself by reducing the working process to a dull routine.
A
third variable in
happy work
is
individual recognition.
Science, Philosophy
io6
"No more
fiendish
and Religion
punishment could be devised," wrote Wil-
liam James, "were such a thing physically possible, than that
one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we did, but if every person we met 'cut us dead,' and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent despair would ere long swell up in us, from which the crudest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might be our own plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all." The worker is first a human being and second a worker, and unless the working conditions adhere to this psychological fact, the worker cannot be happy. Industry puts the cart before the horse, and does itself a disservice by its practice of valuing the product before its producer, thereby reducing the person to the status of a machine. The consequence of this is that the work is done in the manner of a machine, without regard for the quality of the work. But when the worker is made to feel that his personality is recognized and respected, he will work consciously and conscientiously in order to maintain his respected position in the eyes of his fellow-workers his handiwork. Men do not work for power or possessions as ends in themselves. They desire the power and the possessions in order to impress themselves
by the excellence of
with themselves by calling attention to themselves. It is a blunder to suppose that labor strikes and labor unrest have their
main cause
in the desire for better pay.
gether in the interest of individual
freedom,
Men band
to-
through the
strength of group action, and they strike in order to assert this
freedom.
system
itself,
What
is
wrong with
but the abuse of
the profit system
it
to
is
not the
enslave those through
the profit is made. No worker can or does object to having his employer make a profit on his business; but he
whom
does and must object
whom human
life is
to
when money be offered for
has become the god to sacrifice.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
A
work
107
The worker he is performing is held in proper social esteem. The importance of this factor in human work has been well stated by L. P. Jacks. "Of all the factors and forces," he writes, "that make a human being what he is for good or ill, by far the most important, the most vitally influential on his mind and character, is the daily work of his vocation whatever that may be, from shoveling coals into fourth requisite for happy
must be made
dignity.
is
to feel that the function
—
a furnace to presiding over the
man
gets
no culture out of
he will get precious
little
High Court
work
impossible for the worker to find his is
of Justice. If a
work, out of his vocation, out of anything else." Now it is
his daily
cultural unless
considered to be such in the culture of the group.
fore, a vicious social habit to classify
work
into high
and low,
noble and ignoble, thereby fixing the social worth of a
being by his occupation. Because one
is
it
It is, there-
human
a physician, minister,
more deserving of
engineer or teacher, he
is
also held to be
honor and respect than
is
the barber, plumber, street cleaner
or ditch digger.
plumber than
is
A plumber may be several times a better some physician as a physician, or minister as
a minister, or professor as a professor; nevertheless, the poorer physician, minister or professor
being than
man
is
is
thus penalized for
rewarded for being a to
a
taken to be a higher
is
human
By this false standard, one doing a good job and another is
the superior plumber.
failure.
This
is
the reason for the rush
the so-called higher vocations, with the result that
promising butcher, instead of cutting steaks
wields a surgeon knife fatally,
plumbs clumsily
into
human
many
souls
skillfully,
many often
a promising plumber
from the
pulpit,
and many
mind some barbers would do as poor a job cutting hair as is done by some preachers and teachers, they would not last a month in their trade. Yet the barber is accepted socially as being in the main a utility, a tool, thereby becoming a social slave, while the minister and teacher are
a promising hair-cutter
makes
of youth in the classroom. If
a botch of cutting into the
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
io8 respected
no matter how poorly the one may
persons,
as
preach and the other teach. Fifth and
the factor of opportunity as an eswork. The worker may have security, may be vocationally well-adjusted, may receive full measure of individual recognition and may be fully conscious of the dignity of his occupation, but he will nevertheless find his work distasteful if he is oppressed by the idea that conditions will not permit him to rise above his present position, A man without the door to the future open for him is an animal at bay. An animal may have no desire to change its position; but, when pinned down so it cannot move, it will fight. Likewise, a man may show no ambition for advancement, or may there
last,
is
sential for self-expressive
even refuse to take advantage of opportunities offered him to
do
But
so.
him get
let
denied him, that he disgruntled.
human
There
in,
and he becomes
nothing perverse in
is
Nor
nature.
want something
the feeling that the opportunities are
hemmed
is
is
there anything paradoxical about
when
first
it
denied
is
denial has served to arouse our need of
and
of our freedom
may be is
is
far
he does not
as
why
the reason
own" and knows efforts,
no room
life
for
or
fails
who
is
rise
to
man
"on
by his than
is
it.
his
own the
forced into the belief that there
above. Free competition
may
is.
man
is
not only the
himself,
no matter
be.
democracy and the I have tried to general and the condi-
brief for the natural foundations of
indispensability of
show
man who
frequently an unhappy
him
his business
My
The worker
himself imprisoned in
of business, but of the business
what
freedom
is
now
that the nature of animal
tions of it is
feel
the professional
that he rises
less
"worker in industry is
but as an assertion
as a protest against its abuse.
quite satisfied, and even happy with his assignment,
but only so long
This
We
it.
not because the
us,
it,
and
restless
manifestation of
this
human
life
at
in
an end.
happiness in particular point to the fact that
only in a democracy that the
normally, because
it is
human being can
function
only a democracy which recognizes that
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
109
laws and institutions exist to serve the individual, not the individual who exists to be used by those who make the laws
and control the
The
institutions, for their
history of the
life
own
arbitrary purposes.
of humanity, as pointed out by Croce,
which "operates in every epoch now in one guise and now in another among now greater and now lesser difficulties, at times as the law-giver and the governor, at times as opposition and rebellion; just as breathing goes on so long as there is life, indoors and outdoors, on the plain and on the hills, painfully or in deep draughts." We are now in the midst of an epoch when the breath of liberty is not only heavy and painful, but appears to be in danger of complete extinction. But the breath of liberty can suffer no more than a temporary obstruction to its free flow, and it is as certain as is the continuation of life that a government by the people, of the people and for the people shall not only not perish from the earth, but that it will not, because it cannot, perish from the earth. is
in truth the story of liberty,
and
in every section of history,
CHAPTER
VI
Pragmatism, Religion and Education
By
JOHN
L.
CHILDS
Teachers College, Columbia University
one of the oldest interests of the human race. the world today, not as a mere survival from an earlier cultural period, but as a living tradition within which many of our ideal meanings and objects of devotion are en-
RELIGION .
is
It exists in
symbols,
shrined. Its paintings,
myths,
its
architecture,
its
and
its
its
literature,
holy places,
its
music,
its
holy days,
its
its
an organic part of our social heritage. This religious tradition embodies much that man has learned from all that he has done and undergone, and its pattern is too deeply woven into the texture of our spiritual culture either to be suppressed or ignored. We
heroes,
shall
its rituals
its
ethical principles are
continue to refine, to reformulate, and to re-enact this
but
tradition,
we
But religion
human beliefs
are not Hkely ever to repudiate
is
association
it
wholesale.
mode
not merely an historically rooted
and
ethical aspiration;
it
is
also a
of
body of
about the origin and nature of the world, and the origin,
nature and destiny of man. Historically, the theological beliefs
and the
social ideals of religion
indeed, this connection that
they
doubt the
theological foundation
sophical
problem
is
social
to
have been intimately associated;
considered by ideals
disintegrate.
for those
who
many
could
to be so organic
survive
The
were the
recurring philo-
thus believe that the ideal
meanings, ethical aspirations and motivations of mankind depend upon the continued acceptance of this body of religious
Science, Philosophy doctrines
show how
to
is
all
and Religion
iii
new developments
in
human
perspective and thought can be harmonized with this traditional outlook.
Pragmatism signifies a break with this conception of the problem and the purpose of philosophy. It refuses to accept the burden of apologetics, which so easily degenerates into a form of special pleading. It has faith that the human enterprise
when men have
will fare better
knowledge
learned not to subordinate
system of
to a traditional closed
ever knowledge they acquire. that morality
must, above
which
Pragmatism,
re-
to what-
holds that an ethical and
It
all,
new
but to
make them correspond
construct their beliefs so as to
spiritual religion
belief,
be faithful to the practice of
intelligence.
is
as a philosophy, therefore, has little in
common
with those tendencies in modern thought which seek to mini-
mize the importance of the developm.ent of experimental science. It believes that a method of inquiry, which has demonstrated its ability to achieve the kind of understanding which makes prediction and control possible in so many different fields, is worthy of careful study and analysis by all who are concerned to learn the character of the world in which man lives.
in
Science
is,
to
be sure, a
an environment, and
cause
it
because
is it is
its
able to
adapted to the
do
human
tool. its
But
a tool operates
work not simply
be-
organism, but primarily
adapted to the characteristics, or structures, of that
environment in which by
is
human
it
environment can
operates.
it
Only
as a tool
serve as an efficient
ing or controlling that environment.
What
is
conditioned
means
for utiliz-
holds for physical
instruments, pragmatism has had the insight to perceive, like-
wise holds for intellectual instruments, for they also are tools for
dealing with our
environment. Hence, pragmatism has
not been concerned either to eulogize or to minimize ex-
perimental science.
It
has rather sought to study the pattern of
experimental inquiry, in order to define
and
to discover
what
its
distinctive features,
they disclose about the nature of
knowl-
Science, Philosophy
112
and Religion
we
edge, and the character of the world in which
Hve,
move
a
mode
and have our being. Its
conclusion
first
of response of the
is
that experimental inquiry
human organism
to
is
environment, not
its
is in no way know. Accepting the implications of biological evolution, pragmatism also assumes that this human mind, or knowing subject, emerged without remainder from within a natural biosocial process. This feel-
the detached view of a beholding mind, which
involved in the conditions
ing, active,
human
seeks to
it
creature, having achieved through language
and communication with its fellows that degree of awareness which enables it to make ideas out of its doings and undergoings, is stimulated to try to get knowledge, when it encounters a doubtful situation a situation in which its activities are blocked because of some discordance or uncertainty. Thus,
—
doubt,
it
should be noted,
situation, which includes
and
is
is
a property of a total behavioral
environment
as
well as
organism,
not the exclusive property of the behaving creature.
Accepting without discount
analysis
this
under which experimental inquiry
arises,
of
the
conditions
the pragmatist con-
cludes that a world which generates doubt acterized by a plurality of events
manner as to uncertainty and plural in such a
pirical
account of
in a diversified,
which
all is
is a world charand processes which interact
genuine
result in situations of possibiHties.
human
conflict,
In other words, an em-
experience discloses that
man
lives
changing and contingent world, not one in
uniformly fixed, finished and certain.
This qualitatively diversified and changing world surrounds the
human
creature with conditions which both sustain and
threaten its interests. Taken as a totality, the world seems unconcerned about the welfare of the human form. It is only
through struggle and selective reactions to
its
environment that
human creature continues to live. On the human being is a product of these natural the
were there not a certain congruence between
other hand, the conditions, and, its
organic struc-
Science, Philosophy tures
and Religion
113
and functions and surrounding conditions,
could
it
neither have emerged, nor survived.
Pragmatism beheves that we should accept these characterof the world as given in experience at face value. It holds
istics
important implications for man's basic atThe mature mind, it contends, will not seek to read out as "mere appearance" those ugly, harsh and unfavorable conditions which render human existence that
they
carry
titude toward his world.
precarious. Neither will
it resort to superstition and magical win the favor of these environing affairs, for it does not assume that attributes of will and intelligence which
practices to
human
appear at the
level of experience must non-human world. Nor will other extreme and cut man oil from the natural being, and view him as an alien pilgrim in a acteristics
of the
which conspires these
life
to frustrate his every desire
and
also be charit
go
the
to
sources of his hostile world, effort.
All of
seem to the pragmatist decidedly inferior which accepts nature as man's natural home,
attitudes
to the attitude
and the scene of his experience and creative activity, and which refuses to praise or to condemn nature as a whole, the source
but which, by respect for
its actual conditions, and by proand devotion to its possibiHties, seeks to reshape it into a better abode for human beings. In any event, living in our kind of world is intrinsically an
gressive understanding
affair
of adjustment, of experiment.
It
is
the faith of prag-
matism that our experience will be both more meaningful and more sure in its power of control, if we make it deliberately experimental in present time, situations
all
of
many
its
various modes. Unfortunately, at the
of our responses to emerging novel
are not experiments
life
any significant intellectual sense, for we are prone to act on authority, or by routine habit, or by impulse, or by sheer trial and error. Pragmatism contends that there
is
in
a vast difference
kind, and behavior which
is
between behaviors of
this
consciously experimental, for
it
holds that the essence of experiment is response to the novel, or the doubtful, by an action informed by an idea, or guided
Science, Philosophy
114
and Religion
by a plan. The idea functions in a two-fold manner: through analysis of conditions, it defines and makes as precise as posbe undertaken, kind of situation which
sible the nature, or the pattern, of the action to
and
it
also projects in imagination the
will result
when
an experiment, occurs
the action
as
we check
when we put
is
we
completed. Thus,
learn
from
our expectations by what actually
the idea, or the hypothesis, to the crucial
This controlled method of experimental inquiry cannot, to be sure, guarantee that our ideas will be wisely chosen, but it does, nevertheless, provide a procedure by which we can learn from our failures as well as from our successes. It was the contribution of Peirce to discern the imphcations test of action.
of experimental activity for a reconstructed view of the nature of meaning. In describing the individual who has acquired the habits of thought associated with the practice of experimental inquiry, he affirmed:
"Whatever assertion you make
to him,
he will either understand as meaning that if a given prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a given description will result, or else he
no sense at all in what you say." He ception of meaning over into his analysis of will see
carried this cona concept
when
the conceivable
he declared: "If one can define accurately experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept would imply, one will have therein a complete definiall
tion of the concept."
For our purposes here, two features of
this
theory of mean-
ing require emphasis. First, meaning implies action. The meaning of an idea lies precisely in the occurrences which it prompts us to expect, to anticipate, to predict will take place, when the action it defines is actually performed. In other words, an idea, to be significant,
tion
which
into a design for an ac-
must be formulated
some determimeaning are distinc-
will bring about observable results in
nate situation. Hence, tions of practice of
all
some
distinctions of sort or other.
Second, the verification of the idea is by the consequences to which it leads. Without consequences that are open, public,
;
:
and Religion
Science, Philosophy observable, there can be prediction.
It is
verification.
Hence, truth impHes which
a property, not of existences, but of ideas
can be verified.
framed in the
no
115
And
form of
ideas can be verified only as they are defipite acts to be
performed under pre-
scribed conditions.
This pragmatic, or functional, test of meaning and truth has its philosophical consequences. As Professor Lewis has stated,
even if we grant that this pragmatic criterion "dictates no metaphysical theses, at least it rules out a good deal which has
been put forward under the caption, and
it
operates
as
a
principle of orientation in the search for positive conclusions."
He
further declares
dictum draws our attention to the fact that there is which is implicit in the pragmatic test: What can you point to in experience which would indicate whether this concept of yours is applicable or inapplicable in a given instance? What practically would be the test whether your conception is correct? If there are no such empirical items which would be decisive, then your concept is not a concept, but a verbalism."-*^ "Peirce's
a kind of empiricism
we
In the paragraphs that follow,
shall define three conse-
quences for our thought about religion, which seem to be volved in this pragmatic test of significance. It implies, in
which
is
wholly a
the
first place,
that this process of finding out,
the process by which
human
enterprise.
we
We
discover and test truth,
also can
is
can have knowledge only of
those affairs which disclose themselves in
and which
in-
human
experience
be reduced to questions which can be dealt
with experimentally. According to
this
pragmatic criterion, any
question which cannot be put to our environment of things and persons in the form of an action sufficiently definite to produce observable consequences significance. *C.
I.
Hence, that
is
a question devoid of intellectual
class of inquiries
Lewis, "Pragmatism and Current Thought,"
p. 239, April 24, 1930. Vol.
XXVII., No.
9.
which seeks The Journal
to find "a
of Philosophy,
Science, Philosophy
ii6 first
and Religion
cause" or "a final goal in existence" denotes inquiries
which "make assumptions that render themselves ing." As one pragmatic writer has recently said: "They
are self-defeating because in principle
or logical inference a statement
self-defeat-
no observation
drawn from observations can ever
whose subject
is
verify
the whole universe, the totality,
the scheme of things entire. Genuine problems and questions
They are always such that we can tell what would constitute evidence one way or another to make the answers to them more or less probable."^ are always specific.
The experimental methodology,
to be sure, has no authority can deny our right to speculate about matters of
by which
it
this sort,
but
it
does cut the ground from under the claim that
these speculations have the status of knowledge.
Knowledge
is
mediated through action, and hence is not to be had by revelation from on high or by immediate grasp or intuition. The pragmatic criterion implies, in the second place, that certain kinds of explanation are ruled out. It rejects the view
of those
who
method
it
hold that science is merely a method, and that as must be equally hospitable to all varieties of explanation. An empirical method is limited to empirical subjectmatters. A subject-matter, or phenomenon, is considered empirical only when it can be so determined and defined that we can draw experimental consequences from its behavior. Morris Cohen has described the error in that theory of science which holds that it is a bare, neutral method, which in, and of, itself has nothing decisive to say about what will be considered evidence, and what can be accepted as explanation. "It
is
frequently
asserted
that
the
principle
of
scientific
method cannot rule out in advance the possibility of any fact, no matter how strange or miraculous. This is true to the extent that science as a method of extending our knowledge must not that
let
accepted views prevent us from discovering
may seem
to
new
facts
contradict our previous views. Actually,
'Hook, Sidney, "John Dewey,"
p. 21 ii,
John Day, N.Y., 1939.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
117
however, certain types of explanation cannot be admitted within the body of scientific knowledge. Any attempt, for instance,
explain
to
physical
providence or disembodied principle
of
rational
phenomena spirits,
is
as
due
directly
to
incompatible with the
determinism. For the nature of these
deduce from them. The Will of Providence, for instance, will explain everything whether it happens one way or another. Hence, no experiment can possibly overthrow it. An hypothesis, however, which we cannot entities is not suflBciently determinate to enable us to
definite experimental consequences
possibly refute cannot possibly be experimentally verified.
"In thus ruling out ghostly, magical and other supernatural influences,
it
would seem
that scientific
method impoverishes
however, to remember that a world where no possibility is excluded is a world of chaos, about which no definite assertion can be made. Any world
our view of the world.
It is well,
containing some order necessarily involves the elimination of certain abstract or
minds of the
ungrounded
possibilities
such as
Finally, the pragmatic, experimental theory of a
tains
fill
the
insane."^
supremely important
ethical
principle.
meaning conAs we have
already emphasized, pragmatism accepts, without quaUfication, the view that
all
knowledge begins
achievement, not heaven-born.
lem
is
how
to
make
this
On
human
in opinion,
and
is
a
human
this basis, the critical
more than a purely personal, arbitrary Obviously, knowledge and truth can have no important something
if
prob-
process of getting knowledge affair.
status
they can be reduced to merely a matter of personal taste in
How, human
ideas.
then, can
we do
full justice to
the necessary role of
we discover, and and get whatever knowledge we enjoy, and at the same time make knowledge objective, not merely relative to the perspectives, the bUnd spots, the prejudices, and the preferences of the individual? In knowledge, as in other aspects of human experience, this kind of rampant individualism can be overcome
the
agent in this process by which
test,
'Morris R. Cohen, "Reason and Nature," Harcourt Brace and Co., 1931, pp.
158-9.
Science, Philosophy
ii8
and Religion
only as
we commit
method
of experimental inquiry, with
practices
which
ourselves to a socialized procedure.
result in the
The
on public
insistence
its
kind of empirical consequences or
evidence which can be observed and checked by other inquiries in the field, defines the attempt to socialize the procedure
by knowledge and establish belief. As such, it signifies a profoundly important development in the ethical life of the race, and is justified in resisting all efforts, no matter
which we
how
attain
well intentioned, to supplant
it
by an authoritarian, or a
purely personal, arbitrary procedure. In an important article on
meaning and truth, Professor Burtt indicates done well to repudiate the kind of individuahsm which William James contemplated in his "Will the problem of
why
the pragmatists have
He
to Beheve."
"But
we
if
this
justifies
make no believe
says: erect a theory of
meaning or
of truth
which simply
individualism, as James appears to do,
social progress in
what we happen
our thinking.
We
sit
down
we can each to
and not worrybelieve something else.
to feel like believing,
ing about the fact that other people will This attitude is the complete negation of the scientific spirit. If we ask why, the answer must be given in ethical terms. We feel that meaning and truth carry the implication of universality, that a certain social responsibility is bound up with them, that the reflective progress we desire is precisely in the direction of such responsibility, that, in short, concepts ought to mean the same thing to all minds, and that if any statement is to be called true it ought to be possible for any interested person to verify it as such. A concept may, at present, in point of fact, mean something different to you from what it does to me, but if so, we ought to find some way of interpreting
meaning
the
may,
so that
it
at present, take
may become some
a
common
possession.
assertion to be true that
I
You
take to
we ought
to devise a technique of verifica-
tion that will determine as
between these conflicting claims
be
false,
and
but
if so,
definitely refute
one or the other of them.
the very essence of the scientific attitude to postulate.
It
make
is
perhaps
this ethical
Science, Philosophy
"Once
and Religion
plausibility we may be accepted
view gains
this
that the operations that
make
on the one hand meanin nature by this
see
as establishing
ing or truth will be definitely restricted ethical consideration.
119
They must be operations such
possible the attainment of social agreement
as will
on meanings
in questions, and any operations not of this character cannot be regarded as having any relation to meaning or truth. We
on the other hand why
see
acteristics
of
scientific
empirical?
science
it
is
that certain prominent char-
method have become
Why
such.
that can be pointed out to the senses of other people
same terms
is
Because only externally observable data
as to our
own
can furnish an adequately
on the
common
Other foundations of knowledge prove are hypotheses and theories to be tentatively held? Because no matter how much they may appeal to their inventor, he must not assert them as true till he has discovered some way of establishing them as such to basis of scientific truth.
in the
end too
esoteric.
Why
the satisfaction of other inquirers."*
In conclusion,
I
shall refer to the significance of this prag-
matic interpretation of meaning and truth for democracy and education.
The importance
method and
of maintaining, unimpaired, the
the ethic of experimental activity in a democratic
society can scarcely be exaggerated.
mon man it
is
A
society in
which the com-
the ultimate locus of authority can survive only as
institutionalizes a reliable
common method by which
all
share in formulating and evaluating the controlling ideals
can
and
Thus, the empirical, public, co-operative procedures of
beliefs.
experimental inquiry are an indispensable part of the social
means of any regime which strives to achieve common and ideals without resort to imposition and coercion by
political
beliefs
external authority. In other words, the use of the experimental
method
is
a necessity, not a luxury, in a democratic society.
Understanding of
this
method, and
not biologically transmitted. attitudes,
and the
*Burtt, "Essays in
loyalties
Honor
of
loyalty to
The young
its
acquire the
bound up with
ethic, are skills,
the
the use of this
John Dewey," Henry Holt & Co., 1929, pp. 74-75.
120
Science, Philosophy
method only
as they learn
them.
and Religion
It is, therefore,
the conviction
of pragmatism that a critical need of a democratic society
is
a
common schools which will cultivate these basic attiand common loyalties in the lives of its children. Prag-
system of tudes
matic educators have labored to develop a theory and practice of education in harmony with this democratic and scientific
way of life. Today we are told by some that this ethic of the experimental way of life is merely a "secular" ethic, and, consequently, fatally
inadequate to provide the spiritual foundations for a
democratic society. Even a number of the papers read at conference
last
this
year advocated the undergirding of this "secu-
and methodology with the cosmic beliefs and faith Only as we beUeve, it was held, that the universe in its total pattern is on the side of human personality lar" ethic
of historic religion.
can the ideal of respect for the individual have the kind of grounding which is required to make the democratic movement a success. As one important means for achieving this result, it was urged that religion be made an inherent part of the program of the common schools of our country. A very important question is raised in the mind of the pragma tist educator by these suggestions. If the subject-matter of religion, including its historic outlooks and beliefs, is to be introduced into the program of the public school, under what precise conditions is it proposed that this be done? Are these beliefs and practices of religion to be given a favored position, or are they to be subjected to the same empirical procedures and tests which are applied to other aspects of the work of the school.? If it is merely proposed that the ways of life and thought of religion are to be studied in the school in exactly the same manner in which the school deals with other subjectmatters, the pragmatic educator has no ground for objection. He may well wonder, however, what sanction this proposal carries from the organized reHgious groups of our country. He may also ask how soundly based is the expectation that the outcome in personal attitude and faith, which it is held are essen-
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
121
to our democratic way of life, will actually follow from such empirical study of the doctrines and practices of historic tial
religion.
But
if
the proposal to put religion in the public school im-
important that they should be exempted from empirical study and analysis, and plies that religious beliefs are so critically
should be inculcated into the young through a process of habituation, then, both the method and the ethic of the experimental way of life are most seriously involved. Such a proposal,
even though
would seem
it
be advanced by honest, sincere minds,
to the pragmatist not to signify ethical advance,
but ethical retreat. Democracy, as he understands it, would not be strengthened, but weakened, were this movement to
change the policy of public education in our country, ceed.
to suc-
CHAPTER Liberal Education
and Democracy
THEODORE
By
VII
M.
GREENE
Princeton University
{Note: A small group in Princeton has submitted to the Conference a statement entitled "The Spiritual Basis of Democracy." I have here attempted to explore some of the educational implications of this statement. All quotations are 1.
The If
from
this statement.)
dual function of hberal education
man
is
a "spiritual being"
whose "highest good should be
defined in terms of spiritual values," the primary function of directly to man's spiritual democracy is "perhaps the best poUtical means yet found" to promote "the reaHzation in human society of certain ideals human dignity, moral responsibility and spiritual freedom" ideals without which democracy, in turn,
hberal education
development.
to contribute
is
And
if
—
—
cannot survive, an important secondary function of liberal education is to make political democracy possible by educating men for civic responsibility
and the democratic way of
life.
The
defended is that Hberal education is (a) essential to the cultural and spiritual welfare of the individual, and (b) essential to political democracy and the democratic way of life. thesis here
2.
Primary objectives of
The
liberal
education
nature of a liberal education can perhaps best be de-
fined in terms of (a) Free liberal if it
its
primary objectives.
inquiry and reflective commitment. Education
promotes free inquiry into every
field of
is
human
Science, Philosophy interest. Inquiry
truth,
an
whatever
is
its
free
when
it is
and Religion
dedicated to the search for
human import. This search human freedom and the expression,
nature or
essential condition of
123
is
at
the cognitive level, of man's responsibility as an enlightened agent.
But man as a spiritual being must also evaluate, decide and and education, to be liberal, must promote such reflective evaluation and commitment. Evaluation is reflective when it is based upon the fullest exploration of objective values and is determined by the nature of the values thus explored; commitment is reflective in proportion as it is informed and guided by reflective evaluation. Liberal education is thus equally opposed to propaganda and indiflferentism, if propaganda be defined as the attempt to precipitate unreflective commitment, and indifferentism, as a denial of objective values and of the possibility of responsible evaluation, decision and action. All truths are valued by man as a free spirit. But insights in the realm of objective value are of pecuHar importance to him because they alone can enable him to judge and act as a responsible agent. Liberal eduact,
cation values truth for
its
own
nificance to normative insights
sake, but attaches special sig-
and
to
commitment
in the light
of these insights.
(b) Scope, discipUne, and integration. Since man's total environment is highly complex and diversified, his exploration of this environment, and his activities in it and towards it, are correspondingly diverse. Education, to be liberal, must therefore be catholic in scope, acquainting die student with every
major
field
of
human
inquiry
and endeavor. The student
should be introduced to the investigations of the natural and social scientists, to man's artistic creations and to his moral and religious insights; it should encompass man's knowledge and control of nature, his social and artistic achievements and his moral and religious beliefs and aspirations.
This introduction necessarily involves training in the skills and to a comprehen-
requisite to these diversified inquiries
Science, Philosophy
124
and Religion
if a student is to come must learn the languages (mathematical, verbal, artistic, etc.) in which this heritage has been preserved and transmitted; if he is to communicate with his fellows, past and present, and participate in their activities, he must have a control of the vehicles of communication, inquiry and creation. He must also learn how to think clearly and correctly and how to explore the realms of objective values with
sion of these various activities. For
into his cultural heritage he
imaginative understanding. All these disciplines are essential to liberal education.
Since the several liberal studies have become so highly specialized,
the student should be introduced to the nature of
speciaHzed inquiry as such,
i.e.,
to the acquiring
and
testing of
evidence, the constructing and verifying of hypotheses, and the relating of fact
made aware
and theory
to
one another.
He
should also be
of the contrasting presuppositions, methods,
and
findings in the major fields of liberal study and should be able to assess these for himself in wise perspective.
One
man
of the basic functions of a liberal education
is
to enable
and spiritual myopia and to see Hfe steadily and as a whole. Those who are ignorant of the past, or who are so immersed in the past that they are unable to relate it to the present, can understand neither the past nor the present, and are thereby precluded from wise consideration of the future. The only cure for such myopia is the enlightened study of history and the acquisition of an historical perspective. Most people today are merely contemporary in their outlook; to be really modern involves interpreting the past and the present in their relation to one another and to an envisaged future. Those, in turn, whose preoccupation with some one specialized activity
to escape cultural
has kept
them
human endeavor zation. The only
largely or wholly ignorant of other fields of
from the myopia of narrow specialiis a wider orientation; a philosophical perspective must be achieved through the systematic study and evaluation of all man's major activisuffered
cure for this type of myopia
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
125
and achievements. Education is liberal if it liberates man from the provincialisms which beset him and enables him to see himself and his environment in historical and systematic perspective. It v/ill promote such cultural integration, not by dogmatic utterance or by authoritarian fiat, but by assisting the student to understand the conditions and methods of integration, to investigate the classic patterns of integration, and to appreciate the penalties of myopia and provincialism. (c) Individualism and social responsibility. Liberal education rests on the major premise that every individual is a being of intrinsic value and that his freedom and initiative must be safeguarded at every cost. The benefits which the individual derives from a liberal education are ultimate in that they require no further justification. The central purpose of liberal ties
education
ment
to enrich the life of the individual; this enrich-
is
from the liberal point of view, an end in itself. But what applies to each member of society applies to all. Hence the rights and privileges of each carry with them corresponding responsibilities to others. An education which cultivates a sense of special privilege and which fails to evoke a is,
sense of social responsibility
is
not truly
liberal.
A
liberal
edu-
cation will arouse and deepen the student's sense of his duties
towards
his fellow
men, not by indoctrination or propaganda,
but by helping him to understand man's nature being and the implications of
human
as a spiritual
dignity.
(d) Spiritual maturity. These three objectives are of the
synoptic
objective
of
maturity.
spiritual
credulous and craves absolute certainty.
An
all
A
adolescent
cal and critical and craves freedom from all restraint. grows childishness and adolescence when he comes
that nothing
much more
is
absolutely certain, but that
some
aspects
child is
is
skepti-
Man
out-
to realize
beliefs
are
reasonable than others; and that he must assume
ultimate responsibility for all his beliefs and actions, but that he can profit immeasurably from the funded knowledge of the race.
The
hall-mark of spiritual maturity
is
the ability and the
126
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
willingness itiative
to combine reflection and belief, individual and cultural perspective. Education is liberal as it
inas-
the individual to achieve spiritual maturity. The importance of liberal education for the individual and for a democratic society
sists 3.
Liberal education, so conceived,
is
essential to the spiritual
development of the individual. It alone can free him from the tyranny of provincialism, from childish credulity, and from adolescent skepticism and doubt. It alone can enable him to
come
into his cultural heritage, to share in the insights of the
race, to achieve perspective,
and
to indulge in reflective
com-
mitment. equally essential to the efiFective functioning of democFor only in proportion as the members of a society are enlightened and critical, mature and morally responsible, can that society hope to preserve the democratic way of life; only It is
racy.
thus can the democratic forms of government maintain their There is no education for democracy other than a hberal education; alternative proposals are of necessity propagandistic and therefore anti-democratic in spirit. Liberal education is as essential to democracy as is propaganda to vitality.
totali-
tarianism. In our democratic society,
and
particularly in a crisis
such as the present, liberal education
prime
Without it, eulogy of pohtical democracy 4.
necessity.
all
is not a luxury, but a mihtary effort is in vain, all
idle.
Educational institutions Schools, colleges and universities are not, of course, the only with the responsibihty of providing our
institutions entrusted
citizens with a liberal education. The home, the state and the church, to mention but three other major institutions, must each make its distinctive contribution. Without their aid, the best efforts of formal educational institutions will
be largely
ineffectual.
None
the
less,
institutions
of formal instruction
have a unique responsibility. If this responsibility is to
education should be
be discharged, Hberal and vocational
clearly
distinguished.
Since
body and
Science, Philosophy spirit,
practice
and Religion
127
and theory, means and ends, are so intimately
blended in human experience, liberal education and vocational training cannot be divorced and should not be considered in
complete
isolation.
Yet
tinguish the vocational training
from the
liberal
dis-
to
approach. Vocational
skills requisite to
designed to teach specific
is
and imperative
possible
is
it
the at-
tainment of ends which man, as a spiritual being, cannot accept as ultimate. Liberal education, in contrast, is focused
upon ends which ing
is
are of intrinsic
justifiable in
control the
means
essential because
it
human
proportion as
it
value. Vocational train-
enables the individual to
to these higher ends; liberal education clarifies
vidual to organize his
life
these ends
and enables the
is
indi-
towards their progressive realization.
would be foohsh and idle to deprecate the value of vocational training. But it would be equally foohsh and short-sighted to
It
deny the prior importance of
liberal
education for the indi-
vidual in a democratic society.
Liberal education can in all
thing depends the the
some measure be made
the educational levels and to
more
able
all
available at
types of students. Every-
upon the wisdom and skill of the teacher. But and the more advanced the student, the greater
possibiHty
for
notable
achievement
along
these
hues.
Those in charge of primary and secondary school education must provide the great bulk of our population with whatever formal liberal education they are capable of acquiring. Their contribution is of intrinsic value to each individual student and of incalculable importance to our democratic society. Scholars and teachers at the college and university levels have the responsibility not only of further enriching the individual
hves of their students but also of providing our society with disciplined and enlightened leaders. The common notion that
democracy justified
is
opposed or indifferent
either
quires leaders as
theoretically
much
or
to leadership cannot
historically.
Democracy
be re-
as totalitarian states require dictators.
But these leaders must be capable of leading by means of reflective persuasion rather than by authoritarian fiat. They
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
128
must command the confidence and respect of their constituents and justify their positions of responsibiUty by their wisdom and spiritual integrity. Such leaders can be produced only if men and women of special ability are given every opportunity throughout the educational process, and particularly at the coland university level, and thus fit themselves for lege
to cultivate
their
special aptitudes
effective leadership in
some
field of
social activity.
The
success or failure of our institutions of liberal educa-
depend in part on the administrators and faculties in on the individuals and communities to whom they must turn for financial and moral support. A school, college or university can be no better than its administration and faculty. Only if the administrative officers and the faculty are themselves aware of, and dedicated to, the objectives of a liberal education can the institution in question hope to provide its students with such an education. But bricks cannot be made without straw; no liberal educational institution can tion will
charge, in part
flourish
Many
without the support of an enlightened constituency.
a notable educational venture has
been wrecked by a
short-sighted legislature or by the lack of vision of private individuals capable of providing financial assistance.
Our many
failures
today are in part occasioned by the fact that
of our teachers, scholars
and administrators,
at all the
educational levels, are themselves unaware of the nature and implications of a liberal education.
Hence
the current educa-
nostrums and panaceas, the short cuts and substitutes, which are being advocated by professional educators in positions of authority; hence the increase of vocational training, often at the expense of liberal education; hence the narrow specialization and lack of cultural perspective in our institutions of higher learning; hence the widely prevalent doctrine
tional
of laissez faire,
i.e.,
the abnegation of educational leadership by
those in charge,
who
tutes
education.
circle,
a
liberal
cannot decide what
Here we
the blind leading the blind.
it is
that really consti-
are caught in a vicious
The
only solution
is
for the
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
129
blind gradually to improve their vision through patient and co-operative effort. But such effort on the part of teachers, scholars and administrators will not suffice. Students and parents, legislators and patrons must support these efforts v^^ith shrewd discernment and resolution, for the task in hand is so gigantic that only the utmost co-operation of all the enlightened members less
of the
community can
suffice to vitalize liberal
country sufficiently for
it
in our democratic society.
to
become
education in this
a positive force for
good
CHAPTER
A
VIII
Philosophy of Democratic Defense
By
CHARLES HARTSHORNE University of Chicago
THE ESSENCE of dcmocracy
IF self-determination, and
is
self-government, or collective
war is the attempt at group by another, then it might seem difficult to relate democracy and war, except as opposed and hostile to each other. True, the "rule of the majority" impHes some element of coercion of minorities, but what is today meant by democracy as an ideal is that even the majority is subject to certain basic rights of all the people, in power and out of power, living and yet unborn. These rights are safeguarded in constitutional agreements, written or embodied in custom, and having a better foundation in the national wisdom than the mere will of the momentary majority. This better foundation has two main aspects. There arc rights inherent in the nature of man as a rational and social animal, rights to deny which is to deny the meaning of right itself. For example, the right to seek out the truth, and to help others in the same search. Then there are rights which accrue to citizens as citizens of a given country, with its own unique the essence of
brutal coercion of one
concrete traditions. All
men
should be "free," but the concrete
devices thrf)ugh which, and the limits within which, freedom in its
various dimensions
tries
is
a right of the citizens of various coun-
vary with the countries and their histories.
Men
cannot
repudiate their pasts beyond a certain point, without intolerable internal confusion
and
loss.
Hence, when men 130
criticize political
Science, Philosophy ideas as "foreign,"
it
is
and Religion
131
not necessarily a sufficient answer to
say that, foreign or not, the question
is,
are they true or right?
For, unless the ideas really concern absolutely universal ethical
may be
a very
important question
or political principles,
it
whether or not they
the existing political habits and
ries
fit
memo-
of a country sufficiently well to be genuine possibilities for
that country. This
is
part of the
argument against aggression,
domination by a foreign power. It remains true that democracy involves an element of coercion, not only of minorities by the majority, but even of the majority by that minority, which is the actual officialdom, able to command the poUce power, at a given time. All democratic
government
is
more
or less "representative,"
and those repre-
sented are subject to potential coercion by their
own
representa-
tives.
Were the world one great democracy, there would be no problem of war as distinct from police action. As the world actually is, there is a problem of war or military force as distinct from police force. War is collective aggression, or collective self-defense, against another collectivity, whereas police action
is
collective aggression or self-defense against the
bers of the given collectivity.
compared
to police
The moral
objections to
mem-
war
as
action are like those to individual self-
defense, chiefly three: the nation acting in
its
own
defense or in
"good cause" may be weaker than the "aggressor" nation; the nation must itself decide "in its own cause" whether or not it will be the aggressor, or in the wrong, should it fight; and finally, as a result of the foregoing, self-defense between groups, as also between individuals, is not a very effective method of discouraging wrong-doing, since there will so often seem at least a chance of victory for the less just cause, and since men are a
usually able to think their cause
is
just,
or at least that their
no more so than their own. There seem, therefore, only two main remedies for the evil of war. Either we try to give war more and more the character of police action, which should mean that it will more and opponent's cause
is
Science, Philosophy
132
and Religion
more express
the interest and ethical sense of the worldand should also mean that, like ordinary police will more and more function as the potential use, the
collectivity,
action,
it
threat, of injury, rather than its infliction; or else
first
(as
one
down tion,
men
we
try
to
renounce the use of weapons altogether. The remedy points toward Umitation of national sovereignty
persuade
to
isolationist
the flag") political,
;
it
not without exaggeration, "pulling
says,
means
juridical,
the development of world organiza-
economic.
reluctant to face this implication.
Some interventionists are The other remedy points
toward the disappearance of aggressive tendencies, or their control without the use of military means, even as a last resort; it implies the ultimate conversion of a large part of mankind, if not of practically everyone, to complete "pacifism." The pacifist solution (of which more below) seems to most persons to overlook the fact that, while it takes two to make a just peace, it takes only one to make war, unless submission be invariably a tolerable alternative to resistance. True, there are
schemes of "non-violent resistance," but their practicality is doubly doubtful: first, because there is no strong reason for thinking a whole population can ever be induced to try them out (India has never been a united and military nation, and is otherwise highly untypical), and second, because it is by no means clear that they would really frustrate conquest and tyranny. (Bertrand Russell, an erstwhile advocate, says the schemes "would not work against the Nazis.") Thus, either the philosophy of democracy must include a theory of national defense, or else democracy must be admitted an impracticable ideal until the world has become one state or commonwealth. No doubt a perfect democracy is impossible so long as the world is not politically integrated, but perfection is not the immediate goal of political action, and it may be that to sacrifice such local democracy as exists on the ground that, being local, it is not worthwhile, would be to delay, not hasten, the approach of world democracy. For there might be a world tyranny, built on the ruins of the undefended democracies, and to democratize
and Religion
Science, Philosophy this
133
tyranny might be harder than to develop increasing co-
operation and finally federation between the existing democracies
and near-democracies. The very
be largely forgotten
if
control of tyranny. It
is
like to
which
democracy might all under the
the local democracies, even small ones,
which keep alive the ideal. It would seem, moreover, that self-defense, a democratic group
own members
ideal of
the political agencies were
if
any group has a right to
has. It practices
toward
its
those principles of self-determination and the
it
appeals in order to
condemn
its
foreign aggres-
Moreover, a very mild degree of democratic virtue exhibited internally is enough to make foreign attack appear in an ugly light. And even a very tyrannous regime probably has sor.
some claim ply, as in
to
be
let alone,
provided
powerful countries,
this
at least,
it
tyranny does not im-
perhaps always does,
a tendency to express itself also in foreign policy.
But
if
a democratic regime
is
consistent in defending itself
possible by international poHce action, but military efforts)
if
not, by
its
(if
own
against aggression or intolerable injustice,
it
might seem no less true that a tyrant who takes advantage of every weakness within his realm is consistent in taking advantage of foreign weaknesses also. The only objection is that, as philosophers have long ago demonstrated, the doctrine that justice
is
the will of the stronger
is
not ultimately defensible.
Everyone, with some corner of his mind, believes there are obligations other than that of the
weak
not further discuss. But
to give
way
to the
if any group has the right to self-defense against other groups, a democratic group has this right par excellence, by virtue of the principles which it practices toward its own members. It seems clear that the use of force against injustice between groups is likely to be at least as necessary as between individuals (where it is chiefly exercised indirectly, through the police). For individuals can be restrained largely by their own sense of decency, as reinforced by the approval and disapproval of those immediately around them and by the knowl-
strong. This
I
shall
I
repeat that,
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
134
edge that they can hardly fight the whole community. But large groups are comparatively cut off
from intimate contact
with other groups, the opinions of the "others" concerned are not so obvious or so easily understood, and the sense of decency, as
Niebuhr points out, is apt to be pretty well exhausted and in devotion to the group, which devo-
in personal matters
tion tends to appear in so brilhant a light that devotion to
masses of far away strangers appears pale and intermittent, a luxury
among
be cast aside in times of
virtues, to
stress.
These
disadvantages belong to group relations, not merely temporarily or accidentally or due to corrigible faults of education, but in
some degree inherently and by virtue of the nature of man. It would be a contradiction in terms for groups to be as intimate with each other as individuals can be, to understand each other easily
as
Thus,
it
and is
to
sympathize with each other as thoroughly.
dreaming
irresponsible
to
suppose that nations can
be brought to stop quarreling and fighting by the sheer power of preaching. Centuries of energetic preaching to individuals
concerning individual relations controlled by saying,
can be coerced a
"Do
at times,
man from behind and
it
still
leave
much
that has to be
or else!" Fortunately, individuals
without bodily injury,
as
by seizing
binding him. There seems no way of
equally harmlessly taking a renegade nation under control.
Economic sanctions which
really coerce
mean
actual bodily in-
jury, especially to children. It
the
must be admitted
that there are also serious difficulties in
way
war
of converting
into police action.
The formation
of larger political units, entailing sacrifice by smaller groups of
some
is not easily brought Americans are perhaps among the most hesitant to undertake such a sacrifice. Indeed, one can easily show that many important features of American policy during the past half century have had serious hampering effects upon the efforts of the world to transcend international anarchy. What
about.
of the privileges of sovereignty,
We
are the prospects that such efforts will succeed in the future?
The achievement
of a measure of world order can
come about
Science, Philosophy in one of coercion.
and Religion
two ways by voluntary federation or by :
The two methods can be
blended.
135 imperialistic
The Axis can
claim
with some truth to be a voluntary federation, even though a federation to coerce as much of the rest of the world as possible. Also the Allies, if they win, can exert a certain amount of compulsion in bringing about a federated
Europe or
per-
haps world. But even though one argues that a wholly voluntary federation is unlikely, there may yet be important differences in the
amount
of coercion involved in various pro-
grams which blend coercion and free co-operation, and immensely important differences in the extent to which the basic human rights, to which democracy is dedicated, are given a chance to
The
flourish.
League of Nations may be thought to prove that a democratic transition to a world order is imfailure of the
and that consequently we may as well accept an world order as at least no worse than the present chaos. And as the "New Order" is already, in considerable measure, in operation, why not, some ask, call a halt to the bloodshed and let the Germans do what the Allies twenty years ago failed to do? But in what sense did the League fail? The League failed at the critical points because its members had less faith in the League method than in the alternative method of independent action by each state acting in its own defense. It is this alternative method which has failed if ever anything did fail. National sovereignty has proved a hopelessly inadequate instrument to safeguard freedom and peace. Wise men knew in advance it would be so, unwise men like Hoare and Chamberlain did not. But now harsh facts have shown where wisdom lies. It is no longer abstract theory, but concrete demonstrapracticable,
imperialistic
tion, that points the
way
to the only solution, a
new
effort in
the general direction of the League, though with important
reforms.
When is
a thing
must be done sooner or
not to be practically hopeless,
it is
later, if
the future
illegitimate to conclude
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
136
cannot be done from the mere fact that the
first attempt any means obvious that the Nor is by to do it has effort of twenty years ago to advance the cause of w^orld democracy really did completely fail in comparison with what might have happened had Germany not been defeated. Germany is not yet complete master of Europe and the Atlantic Ocean; perhaps had she won the last war she would be closer to that position of mastery now, and perhaps that would have put the cause of democracy in far worse plight than it is in
that
it
failed.
fact.
Thus,
it
is
it
not a truism that a future victory of the de-
you wish to quibble, of the less undemocratic countries) can have nothing to offer. (The role of Russia will mocracies (or
be considered
if
later.)
But can democracy,
who
as such,
be victorious.? There are those democracy is im-
say that military action in the interest of
possible because military action
or anti-democratic, and
dom way tical,
which
that
is
in essence non-democratic
war
is total,
the loss of free-
involves will also be total. This seems to be a right, that democracy is impracworld is not a single state. Any destroy a democracy by force must be al-
of saying that Hitler
is
so long at least as the
power lowed
who
it
now
that wishes to to
do
so, since
defense will be self-refuting. That some
way should suppose themselves
to have faith democracy seems to argue a lack of training in political philosophy. Moreover, it is an error in principle to confuse military discipline, even though extended over much of the talk in this
in
national
life
during the period of the defensive struggle, with
law does not automatically or even usually supplant civil law as the basic and permanent law of the land. You might as well say that men must go on shooting at empty air or at their friends after their enemies have surrendered because they have acquired the habit of shooting. The Americans who fought against a king did not make their commander-in-chief a king when the war was over. The end of a war tends to bring about a drastic revulsion against military habits. (The last war was followed by a number of tyranpolitical tyranny. Martial
— Science, Philosophy
and Religion
137
nies, but chiefly in the defeated or semi-defeated countries, and these had never been particularly democratic. Furthermore,
there were
many
causes for these tyrannies besides the war.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc
may
be fallacious here as well as
was at least one quite new deelsewhere. Czechoslovakia, which mocracy, was successful, on the whole, until it was overrun. Moreover, it is not established, to say the least, that England today, in the midst of her struggle, has become an imitator of the tyranny she fights, or has in any comparable way or degree abandoned civil liberties and the basic Besides,
there
love of liberty.)
What
are the philosophical principles
relevant to
the
de-
democracy against foreign aggression? First, the principle that conflict, suffering, destruction and death, as involved in and produced by war, are not necessarily worse than, or so bad as, the more passive, but perhaps far more enduring and widespread, forms of conflict, suffering and destruction that may sometimes be the price of submission, of the decision not to fight. The alternative to a particular war may be the enslavement of a whole people, an enslavement lasting for generations, rather than for the two, or five, or seven years which are the most that a war is likely to endure. Further, it is not by any means clear that the enslavement will ever end, except through a war of liberation, which might much better and more cheaply have been a war of prevention. Tyrants may die or fall out of fense
of
favor, but there are always persons ready to
step into their
becomes dangerous to do so because of some large body of armed men ready to fight for the reinstatement of Uberal institutions. We must remember that men can be killed in other ways and worse ways than on the battlefield place, until
it
in concentration
camps, subjected to every indignity such as do not know, or through slow starvation
soldiers in general
and disease produced by economic exploitation for the benefit of the conquering nation. Nor has it been proved that the Hfe men live under such conditions will involve less spiritual degradation than the
life
of people
who
believe they are fighting for
Science, Philosophy
138
their liberties. Indeed, self-sacrifice
because
kept
is
men
if
and Religion
a generous spirit of hope, courage
alive, it will
will cherish the
probably,
if
and
not certainly, be
thought of armed rebeUion
as the
ultimate outcome. Thus, the doctrine of absolute pacifism does
not seem defensible.
The evil,
killing of a
and only
if
man
is
certainly the production of a great
a greater evil be thereby prevented, can the
kiUing be justified. But
it is
an error to suppose that kilHng
is
the greatest possible, or an absolute, evil, so that nothing could
and kiUing a man is not the creation of an absolute difference between dying and not dying, but the creation of a relative difference between dying earlier and dying later. To spend money on a new automobile rather than on charity or some public cause may very well amount in its effects to deciding that someone will die sooner than he or she would have otherwise, since the milder forms of undernourishment are common, are in good part due to poverty, and may certainly shorten life. In this and many other ways, it can be shown that the soldier is not the only one who shortens human lives. Every pacifist, unless he lives in dire poverty, shortjustify
it.
For
all
ens lives for his
The question
men
own
die,
comfort.
for the pacifist to face
is
whether the
loss in
under prolonged submission to a terribly unjust alien regime may not sometimes be a greater evil than the loss in quantity, in length of life, entailed by war. To this the pacifist no doubt answers that he sees a high quality of Ufe in the brave and loving endurance of such conditions. He is thinking chiefly of himself, I suspect, in this. Will most men, will the new generation, educated less by him than by the new quality of
life
masters, feel
much
of these noble sentiments?
(The two preceding paragraphs were partly suggested by some remarks of Professors Demos and Lee.) The doctrine that we should never fight oppression by military means is open to the reductio ad absurdum that it offers the unscrupulous a monopoly on the use of the power to take life, a power which above all others belongs, so far as it can
— Science, Philosophy
and Religion
139
be kept there, in the hands of the scrupulous. (To say be in no hands at
all, is
to forget that
men do
because they are told they have no right to
men who
are
right,
such
and
it
should
not lack a power
it,
so long as there
disregard right, or have a diflferent theory of
will
men from
any
pacifist
go
the
human
scene in the predictable future?)
bail for
the disappearance of
always wrong, then only wrongdoers will fight. group of wrongdoers combine to dictate to the rest of mankind, then the latter will divide into the stubborn passive-resisters, who can be reduced to corpses or helplessness at the will of men with weapons, and the mass of mediocre men, who being neither very good nor very bad, will certainly If to fight is
And
if
a
not join the suicide squads, but will submit.
To
insist
that
must alone be used by good men in dealing with other men, however bad, is to hold that the worst men are more open to influence by "moral" means than the average man is by the fear of death and torture and the denial of a livelihood. It is in principle however at this or that moment things may seem to be going to deliver the world to the most unscrupulously ambitious men, not for the time being, but permanently and on the "moral means," that
is,
in this usage, persuasion,
average. It may be said that a bad means can be justified by no end, however important. In that case, one could not justifiably amputate a limb to save a life. For, surely, amputation is bad. But, you say, amputation is not morally bad, whereas war is. The reply is that the moral status of war is what is in question. Nor can the matter be settled by pointing out that, in war, we will the death of other men. Submission may also doom multitudes of men to a miserable death, which war might prevent. A means is bad only if it is unadapted to attain its end or if its use prevents the attainment of some other important end. For by definition only ends count. Now to be sure, war does conflict with important ends, and, therefore, all good men are pacifists in the broad sense of trying to avoid war whenever there is a tolerable alternative. But the tragic fact seems to be
Science, Philosophy
140
that there are times
when
and Religion
the important
human ends
will fare
even worse under submission or refusal to fight than under war. There may, in the distant future, come a time when the will to aggression has so fallen into abeyance that actual war will never again
lesser of the evils confronting a na-
tion.
this
be the But the coming of
time will not necessarily be has-
tened by the spread of absolute pacifism, for the simple reason that pacifism spreads unevenly in the various countries, and its rapid growth in one country may very well stimulate the growth of aggressiveness in another, as apparently has happened during the last twenty years, which saw a perhaps unprecedented growth of pacifism in America, England, France and Norway, and a no less remarkable development of the belief in war as an inevitable and even desirable method of increasing the national power in Italy, Germany and Japan. But the effort may be made to prove that war is an inexcusably bad means because it contradicts religious ethics and metaphysics, the doctrines that love is the essence of God and the highest law for man. What, then, is love, in the ultimate metaphysical or religious sense? It can hardly be a mere mild-
ness or tameness or harmlessness of action; for in that case, there
is little
room
for the divine action in this
death and discord. But
we need
world of
such an argument ad deum. Love would seem to ciation of the feelings, needs
and
based on such appreciation.
It
injury,
not rest our objection upon
mean
interests of others, is
social
appre-
and action
realization,
taking
from any such definition, at least, it would not follow that one would never, out of love, inflict injury. For if one loves A, B and C, and if A can be prevented from kiUing or torturing B and C only by being others as seriously "as ourselves." But
threatened with loss of his
own
life,
then there
choice between A's interest and those of is
not
less true
through
become
it
all
an enforced this
the interests, including A's, have,
as one's own. What love does mean is A, one destroys or defeats a part of oneself, were, but with the sole alternative of seeing an even love,
that, in killing
as
because
is
B and C, and
Science, Philosophy larger part of oneself
doomed
and Religion
to
frustration.
141
The
religious
must deny that any such terrible enforced option can ever obtain. He must say that a God whose essence is love would not allow it. But this is claiming to see very intimately into the meaning of perfect love, by hypothesis radically superhuman, and into the possibilities of existence as such, in order pacifist
to
know whether
or not
God
(or any conceivable being) could
arrange matters that individuals
so
should never oppose themselves to the
endowed with freedom vital interests of others.
Free individuals arrange themselves, they cannot simply be arranged, even by omnipotence, in whatever sense this concept compatible with the existence of freedom in the creatures.
is
The
alternative to God's permitting tragic conflicts of the type under discussion might be a dull lack of individuality even more destructive of the things which love cherishes. A divine love which lacked the generosity to grant initiative to others might better deserve another name. This much may be conceded to pacifism, that, as a division of labor,
it
even the
is
spirit
or personal die.
perhaps well that some persons stand aside from of conflict
human
The Friends
and cultivate those supernational which must never be allowed to
interests,
are largely pacifists in this sense, that they
which it may be should be done, but which who are devoted to victory will be unlikely to do. It seems to be human nature that we can hardly act except by exaggerating the significance of our act, that we can hardly seek to mitigate the harshness of war without falling into the dogma
do
certain things
those
that victory
is
never important nor a legitimate objective.
Pacifism, or the complete rejection of military means, militarism, or the
undue
reliance
upon such means,
and
are clearly
two extremes, with the mean a discriminating or limited reUance upon military force. But these extremes with their mean are special cases of a more general philosophical contrast. Military power is control over men through physical instruments. It is the fallacy of idealism (in the bad sense) to think that intentions or ideas can do practically anything, regardless of the
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
142
An example of this conquered and disarmed peoples will rebel against machine guns, tanks and planes. This is to look to magic for salvation. Rebellion will be successful only if and when the enemy's weapons are more or less neutrahzed by opmaterial resources at their disposition. fallacy is the idea that
posing weapons, only
when
defeated, or
when
the conquerors are already half-
the conquered have been rearmed by un-
defeated aUies.
There nations
other forms of the fallacy of idealism. For
many
are
instance, there
on the
is
the attempt to decide between the warring
basis of their intentions only,
the physical factors of these intentions.
of
its
which
without regard to
will further or hinder the execution
The question
not which nation, by virtue
is
comparatively angelic character, deserves victory.
The
which nation, by virtue partly of its character and by virtue also of its geographic position and other physical features, will, in the event of victory, be the least dangerous and the most useful to humanity. To separate the question of good or bad character or intention from the question of power or ability, is to fall into hopeless confusion, as when men speak as though the recent dictatorship in Greece made that country a threat to democracy in the sense in which Germany is such a threat, or when men say that the aid of Russia against Germany compromises the British case because Russia, like Germany, is hostile to liberty. question
is
Unless there
is
a reasonable likelihood that Russia will survive
the attack with reserves
—sufficient cluttering
—military,
industrial
up the argument with
the
first efFective
and
ability alike,
Would
see tyranny
it
may be he who
blow against the one power which, is
it
overthrown
who
strikes
and
to
argue in this way really prefer to
at the cost of the lives of those trained
in liberty, rather than
who do
understand
its
liberty,
only
in intent
certainly dangerous to other peoples
the people
is
irrelevancies to see in Stalin's
record a reason for regretting that
liberty.
and psychological
for the subsequent conquest of Europe,
through the death of those but are forced to fight against
not
enemies.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
143
and in this fight are bound, even if in spite of themselves, to weaken the power of their own tyrant to wreak harm upon the world? For never forget, if there are two tyrants, and the stronger is overthrown by the relatively democratic nations in an exhausting war, this will leave the tyrant who is second in power with an unexhausted army and abundant supplies to confront victorious but weary free nations with embarrassing
demands
or even assault. It
pitiful as well as
is
dangerous that
men
should not see (fortunately the majority do see) that for the two tyrants to get into a war with each other actually strengthens rather than weakens the moral case for a war of liberation; for
it
means
that the liberation can be attained at
those peoples
less cost to
standard of liberty tyrants does not
who
—always
are the present bearers of the
provided that the stronger of the
win over the other
so easily, quickly, or
com-
pletely as to be in a position to exploit the resources of both
countries against the democracies, or, at least, to profit by the
elimination of the risk of a two-front war. In addition to
given regime
this, a
may be
tyrannical in
its
all
internal or even
its
previous external policy, and yet in a particular war in which is
between nations.
ideal of democratic behavior as tirely ethical to
to
it
involved be essentially in the right and in accord with the
defend
man
a
It
may be
en-
extend aid to such a nation, just as for the law against theft does not in the least imply that
he has never himself been a thief or a wrongdoer, or that one
must accept
And
if it
his career as
worthy of admiration or emulation.
be feared that defending the past thief against present
theft will contaminate the defender,
that a
man
some
time,
those
who
in desperate need, is
at least as
open
should be considered
it
which
is
likely
to
endure for
and instruction from Thus, all the arguments
to influence
can help him as the reverse.
except those based on false axioms of the object of political action, support the giving of such help.
action tice;
is
and
to bring if
The
object of political
about results of general welfare and of
only those
who on
all
jus-
other issues have been or are
Science, Philosophy
144
and Religion
in the right can support the right side of a given issue, then clearly the right side will find few or no supporters.
which only an unsound ideaUsm will negcharacters and locations of countries. A nation surrounded by water will have to transport troops and tanks by sea to conquer other peoples, and an off-
Among
lect
the factors
the geographical
are
continental island country will have to make long flights to any but one or two of the continental countries, whereas
bomb
power can roll its tanks and armored vehicles any direction, overwhelming small nations, or putting down rebellion in conquered nations, practically overnight, or it can subject any of the other continental powers it chooses to the a mid-continental in
bombing from nearby
devastating effects of
thus centrally situated
is
bases. If a nation
also larger than its neighbors, then,
its citizens are angels of mercy and wisdom, the only hope for justice on that particular continent is that the remaining nations should combine in self-defense, until such time as the geographically most dangerous nation has come
unless
to see that position,
it
will not
be allowed to take advantage of
and has enrolled
itself as a
(or broader) federation, in to be used as a check
may show
itself.
It
upon
is,
member
its
power
of a continental
which the power of
the states
is
the will to aggression, wherever
it
all
therefore, quite unnecessary to prove
that the situationally dangerous nation
is
abnormally greedy
or politically undeveloped in order to justify the contention that
it
should be prevented from expansion by conquest, or if it has so expanded. And if it be said that federa-
driven back
tion can only be attained, in certain cases, by force,
still,
true that the last nation able usefully to play this role
very nation which, from a mihtary view, to
usurp
can be
it.
For the chief problem
made
to accept only
is
is
most
precisely
is
it
is
the
likely to try
how
that nation
rightful degree of influence,
and mere ease of military conquest will never define right so long as right means anything, any more than a big man should be allowed to rob a small one. On the other hand, an off-continental island power might be just the one best situated to compel its
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
145
power will find it too and expensive to maintain the federation by brute force, and hence will, even though without any abnormal wisdom or nobility of character, be more or less inclined to yield the continental federation, since such a
difficult
self-control to the federation as
exert
it.
soon
as the latter
(In Asia, the lack of industrialization
is
able to
on the continent
When-
gives the one industrial nation a dangerous advantage.)
ever international affairs are discussed, without regard to such
by no means
trivial
physical factors, the decisive issues cannot
be clearly grasped.
Another example of
fallacious idealism
is
the notion that,
if
only one country were to exhibit a working democracy, the
perception that democracy can be suffice to
countries. This
news
made
undermine the influence of the is
fallacious, for
sufficiently to destroy
(i)
it
to
work, would alone
dictators in their is
own
not hard to distort
much, though indeed not
all,
of the
such an exhibition of successful democracy upon the people of another country; (2) the primary charge of dictators effect of
against democracy
is
not
its
internal inefficiency, but
inability to take care of itself in a
its
alleged
world of nations competing
for power, so that the convincing counter-demonstration
must
include successful military action; and (3) it is by no means sure that in a country in which the will to resist is side-tracked
by
isolationist
arguments
will be politically possible to
have democracy. Fear, admiration in spite of ourselves of the enemies' successes, an armament race enduring for decades, the suspicion of having deserted the it
a healthy rebirth of interest in
cause of freedom, or the knowledge that
we must
await attack
enemy, when all possible allies have been eliminated, these are not very promising conditions for the sort of democratic development in question; and the list at the discretion of the
The exhibition the world awaits is democracy defending itself at last, summoning the hardihood to renounce the enjoyments of peace, in order to show that humanity is not the helpless prey of ambitious men who love power more than they dislike war. could easily be lengthened. of
Science, Philosophy
146
quite true that those
It is
should practice
it,
and
who
that, if they
and Religion seek to defend democracy do not do so, to the utmost
that miUtary exigencies permit, they will dangerously their case,
even in their
own
eyes, as
Norman
weaken
Angell (see his
Matters") and others have pointed out. In-
"Why Freedom
deed, military efficiency is by no means always increased by the suppression of hberties.Daladier was hardly made more effective in war by the fact that he used his emergency powers to evade criticism or advice. Quite the contrary, it would appear.
The advantages
of co-operative action
are not confined to times of peace,
shows, wholly unappreciated, even in in that regime, liberty
is
and freedom of criticism and are not, as Angell the German regime. But
in the interest of military efficiency,
not of political ideals. There
is only such liberty as seems necesdemocracy at war, there should be as much liberty as is compatible with war, whether or not it is necessary to it. The burden of proof will be on the suppressors of hberty, which will have its political ground independent of war. In addition, a democracy at war will, even to win, have to ex-
sary to war. In a
hibit
not
more tell
its
democracy. sence,
it
liberty than a tyranny at war, since the latter will
soldiers
To
that they are fighting for
suppose
that,
because war
is
freedom and
coercion in es-
cannot be undertaken except by discarding
all
faith
methods of political action, is to forget that coercion employed as a means against coercion is different from coercion for the sake of exploitation, somewhat as surgery is different from torture or murder. If, again, it be objected that every nation seeks power and will exploit others if it is able to, we have merely passed from one fallacy to another, this
in non-coercive
time the fallacy of non-comparative (or inaccurately comparative) estimates. In saying that a certain nation fights for ex-
and another fights against exploitation, we are not speaking of absolutes, but of relatives, matters of degree. And ploitation
it is
not purely a question of intention, but of the complex of which will determine the use to which victory would
factors,
be put, as well
as of the actual
conformity or otherwise of the
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
147
conduct of the nation with international law and agreement. Opposite to the fallacy of idealism is that of materiaUsm, the
power of ideals. Man is neither a mere thinking mere animal; he is an animal who thinks, dreams, and has antipathies and sympathies for his fellows. To call a country invincible, because it has immense armaments and a well-organized industry and army, is to forget that armies and factory workers are men, and that what men do depends upon factors other than resources and organization. Here we may discuss a dangerous form of materialism, often exhibited by those who consider themselves idealistic, the notion that to go to war is to admit that might makes right. The error is somewhat subtle. Whoever wins will have had the might, and it seems that only the might will have enabled him to win. If man were a beast, this would be true; for the strongest (or cleverest) beast wins. But "strength" in man is complex, and includes a moral factor. Military strength rests upon exertion and sacrifice, both on the field and at home or in the factory.
neglect of the being, nor a
And
while
men
will exert themselves for
many
reasons, includ-
ing the desire to be on the winning side, the knowledge, well protected against doubts by solid evidence, that one
is
fighting
and humane government and for reasonable interests of a large part of mankind as well as of one's own country, is itself a cause of might in the military sense. Thus, war as arbiter is not equivalent to mere blind or immoral force as arbiter. The will to sacrifice and to run desperate personal risks for others is not brute force, though it produces it. The objection to war as arbiter, where a better one can be obtained, is in addition to the obvious and terrible evils of war that the increment which right makes to might under a reasonably
just
—
—
may be insufficient to decide the outcome. The ultimate solution of the problem is to
organize mankind
so that might, wrongfully used, will encounter both the sense
of right and (where that does not suffice) the might of the total
community.
It will
then more and more be taken for granted
that nothing can be obtained by arbitrary force, apart
from
Science, Philosophy
148 right,
and more and more nations
and Religion will present their claims or
demands. The whose efficacy the pacifist praises, or the just arrangements of economic matters, will have their best chance to yield desired results when it is clear that mere force can no longer successfully be used by parts of the world community against other parts, no matter to what end, but only by the community against any parts which defy its rules of action. Generous offers to bandits in an anarchic society may their votes rather than their threats or their
means of moral
suasion,
only help to transform the bandits into the tyrannical rulers
and enslavers
of
all
men. Christian love did not originate
in
the midst of anarchy, and the problems of such anarchy are not
The Roman Empire was
discussed in the Gospels. international
poUce force of which
definite way, so
much
as to
stricted the liberties of the
dream
men were
of at the time,
conquered peoples
the only
able,
any
in
and
chiefly in
it
re-
ways
which seemed necessary in order to exercise its irreplaceable function. To go a second mile with a centurion was not to submit to a system of slavery which otherwise might have been avoided. Today, on the contrary, there is a definite dream of a federated Europe and world, and there is, I beheve, a definite preference among the majority of nations and the majority of individuals as to which peoples, governments and poHtical systems should, and which should not, assume the lead in realizing this
dream.
has ever been decided
It
may be questioned
—even
implicitly
—in
if
any such issue
the pure pacifist
sense by any great philosopher or any great prophet, although
good many minor prophets who would so decide Bertrand Russell, the only great philosopher ever to have advocated pacifism, regards it as inapplicable today. there are a
it.
to the contrast between the neglect of physical and the neglect of psychological and moral factors, is that between the undue emphasis upon national self-interest and the undue reliance upon international altruism. Both interventionists and non-interventionists frequently speak as though
Related
factors
a country could not conceivably fight, except solely in
its
own
Science, Philosophy interest.
The corresponding
and Religion
assertion
149
concerning
vidual, that all his motives reduce to self-interest,
the is
indi-
familiar.
This doctrine has been refuted, although the crucial phase of too little known. It can be shown that it is from interest in the interests of others as truly as one can act from interest in one's own interests. Both self-interest and altruism involve two levels of interest, the difference between which is so far from fanciful or speculative that the two may be separated by a time interval of months, years, or even centuries. There is always the interest felt and the refutation
is
possible to act
satisfied at the
we
moment
without the
live
of action or decision and, except
least
concern for the future, there
is
when
always
some interest which is expected to be felt and satisfied at some future time. Now, while the temporally earlier interest belongs to the individual whose motivation is being considered, the subsequent interest, "in" whose eventual satisfaction the also
individual
now
is
interested,
may
be either a future feeling of
which that individual looks forward to experiencing as his own, or a feeling of interest attributed expectantly to others, to posterity, for example one's children after one's own death, or one's fellow countrymen, whose liberties one hopes to buy through perhaps losing one's life. Only by confusing the two temporally distinct phases of interest has it ever been interest,
possible to
truism.
An
make
plausible the denial of the possibility of al-
expected future happiness of others gives the
self-
happiness now, but so does the expected future happiness of the self give the self-happiness
pectation
is
be by altering the the self
own
is
now, and
solely in the present, so that
future
if
the altruistic ex-
shown to be really selfish, then it can only meaning of selfish to read: the true aim of
thereby
is
as impossible as
genuine interest in one's
genuine interest in anyone
else's
Without arguments which lead logically to this reductio ad absurdum the self-interest theory will be unable to present any arguments worthy of the name, except such as prove merely that self-interest is usually more or less predominant future.
among
motives.
Science, Philosophy
150
Now,
in a similar way,
it
and Religion
can be shown that,
if
individuals
ever really act for the sake of their country, they can also,
though perhaps much less frequently, act for the sake of other and hence countries, which depend upon the motives of individuals, will themselves not be governed by self-interest as their sole and absolute law, though nations are perhaps far countries,
more
limited in their possibilities for generous
individuals. It should be an empirical
and
relative
far the interest in the interests of other nations
function in national decisions.
No
nation
is
to be so influenced
matter
how
can actually
actually totally un-
influenced by sympathies for other peoples.
ought
action than
And
ethically
it
whatever extent action in the interest of other nations can be effective without sacrifice of equally important interests in the nation's own welfare. We ought to be willing to mold our actions with some reference to
to the welfare of Europe, even beyond the extent to which it can be proved that this will redound to our national advantage.
To make
self-interest absolute, means that national sovereignty can never suffer any diminution in favor of world integration, and is, in effect, to admit the very principle of irresponsibiHty, which the declared foes of democracy profess. If we can only
serve our
and
own
nation, then that nation to us
Such idolatry
is
God
almighty
becomes those who are trying to check the ravages of the same disease elsewhere. However, it is true that each nation must be modest as to its ability to discern what is to the interest of other nations. Meddlesome good-will can be harmful in private affairs, and surely it could be so in international ones. But it is an abuse of this
all-good.
truism to declare that
more
ill
we Americans,
for example, have
no
insight into the true welfare of the Dutch, the Belgians,
the Chinese, than have the conquerors or military enemies of these peoples. For, after all, supposing the Nazis or the Japanese have leisure honestly to inquire into these matters,
and
have a sincere opinion as to them,
we
could
still
set
our opinion
on the ground that the Dutch, the Belgians and the Chinese are entitled to have their own views of their own against theirs
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
151
view of their attackand it does not appear that the "New Order" in either Europe or Asia is welcome to those upon whom it is being imposed. And in any case, while no man is so wise or good that he can ascribe infaUibility to his own view of the true welfare interests taken at least as seriously as the ers,
of others,
it
does not follow that
men
all
or incapable of wisdom, and that the
bad or mediocre
men
to settle things
badness or mediocrity.
The
are equally capable
good man should allow
by force to
vicious claim to
suit their
own
superhuman
in-
desperate measure than that of
sight can be escaped
by a
less
declaring that those
who
apparently are not even trying to
execute disinterested justice, but something admittedly very different, are as likely to
be wise and benevolent
At what point must a democratic nation attack upon a foreign nation is a threat to cause to which
it
is
committed.?
What
as ourselves.
consider that an itself or
to
some
are the principles by
which "intervention" may be justified.? How far is a nation independent of and without obligations to the larger whole of which it is a part, the world of nations? It is a philosophical axiom that the nature of the whole affects the nature of its parts.
A man
cannot be any sort of
man
he pleases, regardless
and neither can a nation. The question is, how far does this dependence go? In particular, one might ask, when is a local war not a local war, but in its implications a world war? Again, when is murder a merely private affair, and when does it concern all citizens? The two cases are, indeed, very different, but the analogy between them is scarcely a mere fancy. Perhaps the following generalizations are valid. A war is more than merely local in proportion as one or more of these conditions are realized: (a) the implied or not improbable outcome of the war is a radical shift in the control of the oceans, in the identity and nature of the dominant sea powers; (b) the war is calculated to establish of the sort of society in which he lives,
a precedent of
world-wide influence as to the chances of sucworld is economically interdepend-
cessful aggression; (c) the
ent;
(d) the communication of information about the causes
Science, Philosophy
152
and Religion
and progress of the war is sufficiently extensive so that the peoples of neutral nations will live through the affair with such vividness that their political conceptions will be poweraffected,
fully
their
sympathies
vitally
aroused,
the
face
of
things intimately changed for them; (e) one of the contestants is likely, in case of victory, to have the will and the power to
do
far
more than
the other to
promote rather than retard
development of world-democracy, the spread of selfgovernment, national and international, as devoted to the basic human rights, [(e) has been added as a result of suggestions by Professors Weiss, Demos and Lee. It sums up and completes the
the preceding principles.] It
is
the task of isolationists to dis-
pute these principles, or to show, in terms of recent history and the geographic and other facts, that they do not apply to the present case
seem,
—a task
also, that
which some will not envy them. It would no American can have the right to judge the
possibilities of isolation
without considering the
effect,
appar-
and wholly unfortunate, of American creditor and tariff policies in stimulating the growth of international antagonisms. Examples of (b) will occur to anyone reflecting upon the past decade. As to (a) it should be self-evident that the seas are not, as some appear unconsciously to suppose, politically neutral by a law of nature or Act of God. And as to ently powerful
(d)
its
importance appears to be overlooked by some of the
There is at least some degree of conflict between non-participation in international action and the free and full use of the radio and press, which makes events in other countries, no matter how distant, vie with or even surpass home affairs in interest and familiarity. It is even apparent that degrees of spiritual isolation, under such circumstances, will have a tendency to be correlated with sluggishness of imagination or insensitivity, or lack of knowledge of foreign countries so complete as to deprive the news of the sense of
ablest of isolationists.
reality. It is
have to
thus apparent that a policy of non-participation will
rely particularly
even though there
upon persons with such
may be some whose
spiritual
deficiencies,
independence
I
Science, Philosophy of world affairs
is
due rather
and Religion
to the fact that,
153
though their through
sympathies are broad, their patriotism, interpreted
is so intense as to keep all other concerns under control. Yet, though some noble and gifted souls will come under this last category, on the whole, there will be some degree or other of interventionism which will be required, if the more imaginative, informed and sensitive citizens
an
isolationist theory,
rigidly
embodied in the national pohcy. must be some degree of interventionism
are to have their conceptions
And
similarly, there
which
is
required because of the interdependence of the world
in respect to
economic
factors, sea
power, and the effect of
precedent in the violation of international agreements. Finally, it is
obvious that there will be some degree of interventionism
which action
will exaggerate the extent to at
a
given
which the world
is,
for
moment, one system. There seems no
philosophical justification for the idea that every nation
is al-
ways equally concerned with every other in whatever occurs. Such absolutes do not apply to human action. Accordingly, to give an example to an otherwise fearfully vague proposition, a philosopher should be willing to give a fair hearing to the
idea that a nation might have sufficient grounds for naval participation in a given war, yet not, at the
moment
at least, suffi-
grounds for participation in land operations, except in whatever degree, which might be minor, they were a necessary part of naval tactics. In other words, if military men are able to
cient
discern a relatively sharp distinction between a complete "shooting war" and the use of naval ships and planes to estab-
freedom of the seas for the immediate future, a philosopher need not quarrel with this distinction on some supposed ground that one is either in or not in a given war. It is precisely such lish
simple alternatives that philosophy might well teach us to suseven if recent history had not shown how far from simple the definition of "war," even of "shooting war," may be.
pect,
(e) there are many fallacies to be not do, for example, to demonstrate that both sides in the contest have committed what appear to be serious
In applying principle
avoided.
It will
Science, Philosophy
154
offenses against world democracy,
there
is
nothing
much
to
and Religion and from
this to infer that
choose between them. This
is
doubly
between two great evils may one infinite itself be a very great difference (in mathematics may be infinitely greater than another), and (2) some of the evils charged against one side may be evils which there is no reason to think the other side would correct, and which, therefore, are largely irrelevant to die issue. Example, British refusal to grant freedom to India; by contrast there is good reafallacious, for (i)
the difference
son to think Britain would correct the present oppression of the conquered European countries, but no such reason to think a victorious
Germany would
correct
it.
Another example of an
irrelevant or at least inconclusive charge
is
that the "have"
nations by that fact alone are sinners against the "have-not" nations.
To make
the charge relevant
it
must be shown
to be
probable that the have-nots will be more generous, should they by victory become the "haves," to an extent great enough to justify the terrible evils of
war. For
we cannot have
the world
torn up every Uttle while merely so that unjust privileges can
be shifted from one group to another. All groups tend to lose
by such a process. And to correct the essential evil of unjust distribution, the primary necessity is a change in economic policy, in tariffs, for example, and pohtical changes only so far as
required to bring this about.
A common
confusion
between considerations which
is
will
be relevant to the peace discussions after the war, and those
which are relevant to discussion of the question: Whose victory ought to precede such discussions? It is pathetically or tragically inept to argue about rights and wrongs, without inquiring into the question
:
Which
side, if
it
wins, will tolerate
something like a reasonable discussion of right and wrong, and which side will act with no appreciable regard to such discussion?
An
important principle, corollary to (e),
is that no national however great, can constitute a claim to trample upon most of the world in the process of rectifying such griev-
grievances,
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
155
(The hundreds of milUons of Chinese, the hundreds of miUions of Europeans and Russians and South Africans and South Americans, and perhaps Hindus, are not rightfully to be delivered to the new conqueror simply because some part ances.
and a
of one
half
hundred miUion Germans and ItaUans and
Japanese think that certain of their
own
troubles will be thereby
alleviated. Such an argument simply lacks proportion. Hence, all sound reasons for considering Germany an unjustly treated and unfortunate country (there are such reasons) do not affect the main issue, which is that dozens of countries have by that country just been treated as having no rights worth mention-
and further countries are being threatened with similar treatment. A nation which puts itself so far in the wrong can have its own wrong rectified only after the wrongs it has itself freshly committed have been put a stop to, and partially ing,
undone.)
The
foregoing does not
that peace aims should not
means rather that such discusshould be distinguished from discussion of the question:
be discussed during a war. sion
mean
Whose
victory
is
It
likely to give the better
peace aims a chance
of realization?
Of course, there are make good use of
those
who
say that neither side in a
war
and hence one should try to produce a stalemate. This means, if one is realistic, that one should try to ruin a good part of the world for a long time to come. A condition in which both sides are ready to quit, without either having attained the power to impose its major aims, would probably be a condition of hopeless exhaustion on both sides, of dire ruin. Men fight to win, as history shows, and they
will
victory,
quit without winning only under very stances.
The
British quit in their
exceptional
circum-
two wars with us because
our "victory" was not over them, or a threat to them, but merely demonstrated that retention of the colonies, as such, would cost more than it was worth. The nations today are
much more desperately important, surGermans can be convinced that they have some
fighting for something vival. (If the
Science, Philosophy
156
and Religion them
survival in defeat, this will help to induce
good chance of
any case the Nazis can be given no such assurance of personal survival as a government. If one could give such a guarantee, vi^ould it be right to do so ? In any case the Allies are committed on the point. So the thing will have to surrender, but in
to be fought out until either the Germans, or at least the Nazis, cannot go on, or until neither side can go on. The second outcome will mean the greater general ruin, with no guarantee
that there will be better peace terms.
For who
strength and courage to organize Europe }
we so wise and The question
will
be
left
We Americans
?
with
Are
so ambitious?)
of whether,
and when, and how
far, to inter-
vene should not be decided without some regard to the possibility of curtailing the
sufferings of multitudes of people by
shortening the war and freeing the oppressed
much
sooner
than they could otherwise be freed, perhaps thereby saving
them from widespread
starvation
and epidemics. There are
who
urge non-intervention in the interest of ending the war through a negotiated peace, in a situation which those, indeed,
makes side.
with the victory of the relatively unjust one might hesitate to contribute to the continuing
this identical
Now
of the fight,
if
the threatened oppression were sharply
curely localized (assuming that
it
ever can be in the
and
se-
modern
world), but where victory for the oppressor means control of a vast area, with confinement even to that area highly problematic, then lives,
it is to be remarked that, if liberty is ever worth then the removal of an indefinitely vast threat to Hberty
worth
many
removal requires. The question can the war be shortened, but how can defeat of the oppressors be hastened. To deny this is in prin-
is
as
then becomes, not ciple to
renounce
lives as the
how
liberty.
i
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
157
APPENDIX A
A
Miniature Reading List
A. N. Whitehead, "Adventures of Ideas," The Macmillan Company. R. B. Perry, "Shall Not Perish from the Earth," Vanguard Press. Norman Angell, "Why Freedom Matters," Penguin Books. Herbert Agar, G. A. Borgese, and others, "The City of Man: A Declaration on
World Democracy," The Viking Press. for Rough Waters," Doubleday Doran.
Waldo Frank, "Chart
APPENDIX B Metaphysical Foundations of Democracy historical evidence that democracy derives, in part from a metaphysical premise, the belief in a God Who loves all men, and Who wishes all to love Him in return. Greek democracy was slave-owning, hence not in the full sense a democracy. But the Hebrews and Christians saw in
There
at
is
least,
the relation of
God
to
man
a
common
factor in
To
human
beings
and Being inconceivably superior. Yet the least of men can worship God, and feel that he is precious to God. The greatest of thoughts is the one none can think and yet all can think. And this thought, so far from being irrelevant to lesser thoughts, is the sum of any meanings such lesser thoughts can have, with infinitely more
more
significant than all the differences.
wisest of
men God
is
the greatest
a mystery, a
Men
are equal before God, not because they are of God, but because all are valued by Him for their own sakes and not merely as means to the value of others. God is the ultimate concrete unity of all values, and every man, so far as he has love, is an "image" of this unity, worthy
besides.
no value
to
of respect accordingly.
There are two
difficulties
in
way of such a religious many good and wise men
the
interpretation of democracy. First,
today seem unable to believe in God. Yet they are able to
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
158 believe in
and defend democracy. They cannot be rejected from
of the democratically faithful, since it is only democratic to respect the honesty of their attitude toward religion. Atheists also are precious to God, is the religious
the
company
version of such tolerance. are w^ays of conceiving
The second
God, and our
are inimical to democracy.
The
difl&culty is that there
relation to
Him, which
God is the Supreme God depends in no way
idea that
Power upon which all depend, while upon others, makes God the absolute non-democrat, the ruler
joy
is never ruled, the one who gives but cannot receive sorrow, the wholly non-mutual or non-social Being.
who
or
Also, the notion that God's will
whom He
imply that those to
is
absolute
may be taken
to
has revealed Himself are in
men how they shall behave. In a God is on their side are claiming absoluteness for a relative human cause. That good and wise men sometimes do not believe in God is due, I believe, primarily to the fact that many theologians a position to dictate to other
who
war, those
feel
have harbored intolerable misconceptions of the nature of God, misconceptions which atheists have rightly judged unacceptable. What more natural than that men should drag
God down to their own level, even while supposing that they exalt Him? The fact that some men make a profession of interpreting God is not a guarantee that human fallibility has away from them. I shall not here attempt to argue, but do wish to state, my conviction that God, as philosophy and theology are at last coming to interpret Him, can be made eminently credible to any man of intelligence and good-will,
fallen I
or, at the
very
theologies
The second that
God
sponsor of
least,
can be
made
far less incredible
than older
made Him. is
all
difficulty
in relating
democracy
to religion is
conceived rather as a supertyrant, the lesser tyrannies than as the superdemocrat, the
usually
inspiration of democracy; or again, that
God
as the absolute,
imparts to His believers an absolutistic attitude which con-
with the
democratic tolerance and answer is that God is to be conceived as "loving" in a more genuine sense than any tyrant-conception understands, and that the absoluteness of God, so far as He
flicts
mutuality.
relativity essential to
Now my
J
Science, Philosophy absolute,
is
incommunicable
is
and Religion as
159
such to even His most
faithful believers.
Let us take the second point first. If absolute means inthere is no way in v^^hich an absolute being can impart
fallible,
absolute knowledge of himself to men. Revelation as
from God into all
human
too
is
divine, but as received by
men, above
language, a most imperfect instrument,
human. Neither the Romanist attempt
belief in the infallibility of the church,
it is
coming all
put
human,
to justify the
nor the early Protestant
attempt, apparently revived by Barthianism, to justify belief the
in
corollary
infallibility
from
of
belief in
the
Scriptures,
seems a
convincing
God. Some men may know the nature
of God better than others; but it does not follow that any man knows that nature in any aspect or implication beyond possibility of error. It
is,
I
the Protestant churches are solutistic claims
believe, well for
much
less
democracy that
inclined to such ab-
than formerly. (Some churches, indeed, for
example the Jewish, never have claimed infallibility.) The supposition that one's own group cannot be wrong on this or that matter, is a good recipe for bringing out the natural arrogance of human beings, and concrete illustrations would be easy to give.
As
from the tyrant conception to a genGod, this is made possible by the discovery that we need not choose between a merely absolute, "impassive," independent being, and a merely relative and dependent one, but that God may be conceived to have both an absolute and a relative aspect, in such fashion that He is not cut off from social, that is, mutual, relations, relations to give and take, and in the proper sense, of love. In discussing pacifism, we have defined "love" to mean taking the interto the transition
uinely social conception of
ests
of others into one's
own
sphere of interest.
that, if there are, as in fact is the case, discords ests,
It
follows
among
inter-
then such discords will, through love, become discords
it might be God. But theologians and philosophers are coming to see that the proper meaning of such terms as perfect or absolute is a very delicate matter. There is need for exact definition of the conceivable varieties of
within the loving Being, and this contradicts, held, the "perfection" of
Science, Philosophy
i6o
and Religion
perfection in order to see which,
if
any, of these can con-
function in the combination, "perfect love." Until or unless this is done, the notion of divine love must be regarded as intellectually irresponsible and equivocal. Nor is the sistently
importance of the matter for democratic defense limited to its relevance to the pacifist issue. To act energetically for an ideal in the tragic issue of war is doubly difficult, if one is forced to choose between an atheistic conception of the universe as, in
its
foundations, neutral to value and ideals, and
a theistic conception
which
of evil. In either case one
is
implicitly denies the very existence really saying that,
from the ultimate
or cosmic point of view, our efforts are meaningless.
same whether one
It is all
the
says that our efforts contribute nothing to
existence because existence as a whole
is
blind to values, or
whether one says that our efforts contribute nothing because God is perfect without our efforts, and because the perfect plus the imperfect cannot be more than the perfect alone. Thus, the denial of divine perfection and the assertion of a perfection so absolute that it cannot be increased come to the same thing for our action, the same denial that we can add an iota of value to the cosmic and everlasting. "Perfect" seems to mean the finished, made to the end. But God is the primordial or unmade Being, so he is not literally finished. What then? Well, we may say that God is "complete" in the sense that He lacks nothing He would be better by possessing, that He has as much value as possible. This means not only that nothing we do will matter, since all possible value is in any case eternally actualized, but it implies that "as much value as possible" is itself possible. This is not self-evidently valid. "As great a number as possible," is a meaningless expression, as mathematicians have proved. Why may not "as great a value as possible" be likewise meaningless? In that case, either there
is
no perfect God, or His perfection must be otherwise
defined.
There is an alternative mode of definition, which is very old, but whose accurate analysis is recent. This takes "perfect" to
mean, "superior
to all other beings,
whether actual or conceivopen whether or
able," the definition to be construed as leaving
not the "perfect"
is
such that
it
can never be superior to
itself;
Science, Philosophy whether, that
"itself"
is,
in
and Religion
an improved
"other" being. In other words, the "perfect" rivalled
by others than
rivalled. It is the
itself,
or
concerned, improve upon his
rivalled-by-others
may have two
is
would be an which is un-
that
unrivalled unless
champion whose record
than that of any competitor, but is
is
state
i6i
it
be
self-
will always be better
who may, so far as "perfection" own record. Moreover, the unaspects, in
one of which
incapable of self-rivalry, but in the other of which
it
it is
could sur-
The first aspect would poswhat we may call static or absolute perfection, the second what we may call dynamic or relative perfection, but both would be literally in accord with the definition of "perfect" as meaning "better than all others than self." In still other words, "perfect" is what "Supreme Being" becomes, if we take it to mean supreme in comparison with all possible as well as actual beings other than self, but allow at the same time that the surpasser of all others may yet, in some aspect, but not in all aspass itself and so increase in value. sess
pects, surpass itself.
Static perfection
is
"completeness"
—that
to
which nothing
could be added. Dynamic perfection involves no deficiency as
measured by any being other than the perfect, but it would admit additions as self-measured. Hence, if there is an aspect of dynamic perfection in God, our human efforts may determine some part of the increment which the divine value received from moment to moment for in respect to this aspect, God would not be immutable, though He would be strictly immutable in any aspects in which He possessed static perfection. Moreover, that God was not in all aspects statically perfect might be due, not to any defect in Him, but to the self-contradictory nature of an absolute maximum in certain aspects of
—
value as such.
Applying all this to our problem of "perfect love," it might be possible to give good reasons for believing that there is a cosmic love, which is statically perfect in the completeness with which it embraces, and the goodness with which it responds
to,
but which
the de facto universe forming the object of the love, is
dynamically perfect in that the
ment additions
of
new
moment
to
mo-
creatures to the universe enriches the
content, and so the beauty and joy, of the love.
To
love
all
that
— Science, Philosophy
ifn.
and Religion
both times anything existent overlooked; yet there is a different "all" each time. There are many trends in philosophy and theology today (for example, the philosophy of Whitehead) which support the eidsts
now, and
later to love all that exists then, is at
equally to love all that exists, since in neither case
is
—
view that such a doctrine is free of self-contradictions ^whatever mig^t appear at first glance and that it removes contradictions that have worried metaphysicians and others for long
—
centuries.
A
love static-and-dynamic in
within
its
own
sometimes the
its
perfection could include
content such conflicts of interest as render war lesser evil than refusal or failure of the
wronged
party to resist by force of arms. This completes our critique of
which seems
pacifism,
to evade rather than face the tragedy of
existence.
There
is
another way in which recent metaphysical results
can help democracy through the
difficult
times ahead.
The two
great errors in political thought are abstract individualism and abstract collectivism.
Man
does not
live to
equally, he docs not live merely to give
other a certain character or status.
The
What
himself alone, but
some human group or then does he live for?
good of the greatest number? But the final end must be concrete, the good of individuals, for only the individual is actual. How can the many individuals constitute one good which includes the value of each and every one of them, assigning to each his true place? For whom is the sum of ingreatest
dividual values
itself
a realized value?
There have been two attempts to answer leaving aside attempts to ignore or dismiss
this question
it.
(a) Some have held that human groups, such as nations, or perhaps humanity as a whole, are genuine organic individuals. This involves three difficulties: the evidence for it is not generally
found convincing;
it
tends to reinstate individualism on
the national level, since humanity is not a very concrete object of perception and devotion to most people, and it is in practice only a form of abstract collectivism. As to the last point, my
meaning
is that the national unity does not perceptibly include anything like the concrete fullness of the individual, but rather
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
163
life which can be made public and These are the less individual and intimate and subtle aspects of the man. Thus, the national unity lacks
only those aspects of his politically effective.
concreteness.
(b) Religion has held that, since
we
are
all
created by
God
and valued by Him, we must all contribute to some total value in the divine experience. Thus, the greatest good of the greatest number would be something concrete, a sum which was no mere sum, and yet really did include the many individual values. But the religious answer was partly nullified by being generally held in a relatively abstract or one-sided form. God was not, in fact, usually and distinctly thought of as the actual inclusive unity of values, but rather as the exclusive supreme value, cause indeed of each lesser value but not contributed to or in part constituted by
it.
God was
thought of as behind or wholly
"above" the world, not as a concrete organic unity of the world. Thus, each man felt himself related by a sort of mysterious vertical line to this mysterious "above." He was not effectively related to
God
the
life,
we are all memmembers of the body or
horizontally, by the truth that
bers one of another because
we
are
of Deity. Only the church
all
was
said,
none too convinc-
such an organic unity, and the church was something abstract and selective; it did not include all of those
ingly, to be
"neighbors" to
whom
Jesus said
we have
obligations. Attention
was further diverted from the concrete by an abstract notion of immortality.
The harmful effects of abstract conceptions in religion can be seen in two examples. There is the tendency to restrict the application of religious ethics to the non-political sphere, polthe authorities, whose power "derives from man. This combines the tyrant conception of the King of kings, subject, like those under Him, to no influence from below; and the notion that men, as they concretely are and live, are of secondary importance, since, being itics
being
God" God
left to
rather than
—
contaminated by the Fall, nothing much is to be expected of them, save in individual and isolated cases which must be unimportant politically. Whatever the truth expressed in the saying,
"My kingdom
is
not of this world"
may
be,
it
had
better,
Science, Philosophy
\
for the sake of both the church
somewhat and
ethics
Then ally a
and Religion and humanity, be sought in a
different conception of the relation of politics to religion.
there
is
the tendency in
all
churches, but
made
doctrine in at least one church, that whatever
is
virtu-
harmful,
one might almost say inconvenient, for the church is vicious to be slandered and attacked wherever it may with impunity be so treated, and whatever is convenient for the church is to be praised and supported, even though its name be Franco, and its crimes and incompetence be better established than its
and
merits. This
is due to an abstract conception of the immanence one visible church, as compared to His immanence elsewhere, together with an unmistakable influence of the tyrant conception of Deity.
of
God
in
The new concepts of perfection, along with other recent metaphysical discoveries second to those of no period, now
make it possible to show that there is no force in the old arguments against seeing in God the actual unity of all, to whose value, bound together by love, every individual literally contributes. Therewith the vicious errors of abstract individualism, abstract collectivism, and abstract theism, are shown to be avoidable, without any resort to "pantheism," which, as the term was understood by earlier theologians, was also an abstract or
new situation in pure metaphysics is an immense opportunity for the spiritual life of man, an opportunity, however, which will have to be made available by one-sided doctrine. This
writers, preachers,
and others better able to reach mankind than professional philosophers can do. No doubt, too, men will always differ in their ability to conceive God without resort to oversimplifying abstractions. But the way is technically open
and men
will
no longer need
to be misled
by metaphysical
experts.
In regard to the widespread notion that democracy, being allied
with the
method and with empiricism, must be upon metaphysics, certain distinctions Metaphysics is not a general method for investigatscientific
hmdered by any are in order.
mg
reliance
problems, competitive with the empirical method. Metais the study of the necessary aspects of being, and of nothing else. All contingent being is outside the province of physics
Science, Philosophy
and Religion God
metaphysics. All individual beings except
165
are contingent,
and so are all specific kinds of beings. There is even a side of God's nature that is contingent, the side which is relatively, not absolutely, perfect. Metaphysics does only two things, it describes the necessary aspect of the one and only necessary being, including the requirement that this being have some non-necessary aspects or other, and it describes what all contingent beings have in
common
(for these
common
features are necessary)
and what distinguishes them generically from the necessary being, even in its contingent aspects. This leaves for the empirical method all that science actually deals with or, if it is clearheaded, can ever wish to deal with. It leaves all contingent truths,
including
studies,
which
all
quantitative
tary to be sure, of the divine life in
Further, the metaphysical
reason and
human
its
method
democratic as the empirical in
human
laws,
collectively are building
its
non-metaphysical
to
up a
picture, fragmen-
contingent contents.
is,
in
sphere.
proper sphere, as
its
Both use the
common
experience, both are in the broadest
sense "empirical" (or based on experience) and "rational." But
while science relies on experiences of the contingent details of the world, as disclosed in visual and tactual sensations, meta-
physics interprets the generic and essential factors in experience,
such as the sense of value, the sense of unity or purpose with others, the sense of belonging to a whole, inclusive of valuefor-self
and of value -for-others.
Metaphysics and science are entirely compatible so long as metaphysicians and scientists avoid the intellectual imperialism of trying to "take over" the
domain
physics conflicts with democracy only
of the other.
when
it
And
metawith
allies itself
which, however, as I have suggested, does not logically follow from any metaphysical doctrine; or when it arrives (illegitimately) at the tyrant conception of God;
ecclesiastical absolutism,
or
when
it
follows an esoteric
historical learning,
which
method leaning
in reality has
no
heavily on minute
essential role to play
in the logical interpretation of those depths of experience
which
are our awareness of being so far as necessary; or finally,
when
the metaphysician yields to the temptation, to be
met with
everywhere in the intellectual life, to overestimate the validity of his own arguments as compared to those of others.
Science, Philosophy
i66
and Religion
Scientificism, or the attempt to banish metaphysics, has the
unfortunate for democracy, that even contingent truth
result,
meaning, and no ideal is safe from skeptical measure which is not in the same sense or exclusively relative. Metaphysics, which shows that it
loses intelligible
denial.
The
relative requires a
is necessary that accidents, some accidents or other, should happen, also shows to what, in the last analysis, they happen, and
for
which they become
objective, everlasting facts. It gives
scientific truth a dignity it
could not otherwise have, namely,
the dignity of describing portions of the history of the cosmic
Being.
which
Similarly, is
metaphysics
the measure of
all
indicates
the
absolute
value,
relative values, as well as the super-
which is the integrated ever-growing sum of them all. Without metaphysics, we must admit that we have no objective intelligible standard by reference to which we can decide between conflicting human ideals, including Hitler's ideal of ruthrelativity,
power. The rational answer to Hitler is a metaphysical one, namely, that his ideal does not lend itself to the construction of an adequate metaphysics. The cosmic Being cannot possibly less
be egoistic; for all beings must be dear to the inclusive Being by virtue of this inclusiveness. The will to power is not ultimate,
or, if
cause
it is
you
prefer, love is the ultimate
form of power be-
the only conceivably cosmic form.
putes of metaphysicians,
I
With
all
believe that in the end the
fective basis of self-criticism
man
the dis-
most
ef-
can have, the best weapon
against overindulgence in merely personal preferences and prejudices, as against those of others, the final resort of a democratic attitude,
"Can
is
to force oneself to
this principle of
make
the experiment of asking:
mine reasonably generalize
itself into a metaphysics, in competition with the other possible principles.?"
The
trouble with a merely empirical argument for an ideal
is
empiricism, the preference for factual truth over error, like every value judgment, must rest at last that, since the trust in
upon something which
is
not contingent, but
the whole contingent and relative world. therefore, simply begs the question. as an ideal are already
committed
to
is presupposed by Such an argument,
Those who accept science something which some
men
reject. It is all very well, again, to say that, since ideals are
rationally demonstrable,
we
not should be tolerant; on the contrary,
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
167
is rationally demonstrable we should impose our own preference on others. What is needed is a metaphysical basis, at least for the principle of tolerance. This basis is that none of us is God, and yet there is a God. Without
say some, since nothing try to
its
positive part, this proposition does not justify tolerance or
modesty;
no God, what is truth itself or goodness as the Nazis say? It is metaphysics own limits and the place and significance
for, if there is
human
but a
prejudice
—
which explains both
its
of science; whereas
more
science can explain neither itself nor
ground of alternano alternative. True, Hitler uses the word "God," but he gives no evidence of using it responsibly. He is so illiterate theologically and metaphysically as apparently to see no great difference between the Deity and himself; or at least, his followers are allowed to that non-contingent basis of contingency, that
tives to
which there
can, of course, be
The proper answer, I suggest, more reasonable metaphysics and religion for
think of the matter in this light. is
to substitute a
this
of
unreasonable one, not to issue blanket denials of the value
all
metaphysics and
all
theology.
Democracy and science are indeed allied, but they have the same metaphysical root, the sense
it
because
is
of deity.
The
only "ground of induction" anyone has been able to think of
the super-inductive
is
and Whitehead,
that suggested by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz
knowledge of the divine unity of
all
things.
worth studying, and men are brothers, for the same reason God. Democracy and science devoloped together, as men began to substitute the concrete and social conception of
The world
is
—
God
for the abstract tyrant conception, or for a miscellaneous
polytheism.
It
was the overcoming of polytheism, and the
achievement of a moderate degree of concreteness in theology, as achieved
in Aquinas,
in
some ways
more
still
in
Bruno,
Spinoza and Leibnitz, that made science possible. Democracy, however, needs the
full
God. In Whitehead, first
concreteness of the social conception of
this concreteness is
made
available for the
From
time in a really great system of philosophy.
forth stinct,
men
will not have to live democratically merely
but will be able to relate their instinct to
ground.
A
sound instinct might be better than
a
its
hence-
by
in-
ultimate
bad theory of
Science, Philosophy
i68
and Religion
the ground, but a sound instinct and a sound theory best of
would be
all.^
APPENDIX C Comments Comments upon
the
first
draft of this paper have
been
re-
ceived from Professors Paul Weiss, Otis Lee, Raphael Demos, A. E. Murphy, A. C. Garnett and Oliver Martin. The two last
mentioned expressed agreement with the entire argument. Professor Murphy felt in "complete agreement with the moral and political philosophy," but not with the theological doctrines. Professors Demos and Weiss thought the theological doctrines were of doubtful relevance, and as a result, I have removed them to an appendix, and also have tried to point out some of the ways in which they are relevant to the defense of democracy. I might add that many citizens in every democracy are religious, and that for them there is bound to be some psychological relevance, at least, of religious questions to political
questions.
As a result of convincing criticisms by Professor Weiss and remark of Professor Martin's, the explanation of democracy contained on page one of the original paper has been drastically revised. I wish here to endorse the account of democracy given in Professor Weiss's own paper presented to this conference, and to add some valuable statements by Professor Demos. "I should define democracy as involving two things: government by the people, and government by reason. The first rea
^The
metaphysical
doctrine
of
God
referred
to
may
be
the last chapter of A. N. Whitehead's "Process and Reality"
millan
found in (The Mac-
Company, 1929), or expounded
in greater detail and with more marshal the evidence in the present author's "Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism." (Willett, Clark & Co., 1941. The second chapter of this book discusses the method of metaphysics.) An early approximation is Fechner's "Zend-Avesta." Pardy analogous views will be found in many recent writings of philosophers and theologians, for effort to
example, E. S. Brightman's "Problem of God," W. P. Montague's "Ways of Things," and J. E. Boodin's "God." On the relations of science and metaphysics see Whitehead's "Science and the Modern World" and
"The Function
of Reason."
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
169
quirement excludes Plato's government by philosophers; the second excludes Hitler's type of government with its 99% majorities. Now government by reason, in turn, involves two things: (i) government in accordance with the right (of justice), which is a principle of reason; (2) government by persuasion, which is a method of reason / is more important than 2; justice is the primary end of democracy, not abstention from force." Professor Demos also suggests, as an "argument for intervention," that "democracy is based on Platonic rationalism; the realistic doctrine of universal and eternal values, common to all humanity. ... In short, the right is neither personal nor racial, nor tribal." The six critics appeared to agree that absolute pacifism is not a sound doctrine. Nor did any defend "isolation." But Professors Lee and Demos thought my arguments against pacifism in.
sufficient.
absolute
Demos
.
.
argues that "the taking of
evil, for it is
human
the taking of physical
life is
life; it is,
not an
therefore,
not a matter of spiritual values (a view differing from and yet with Socrates' statement that it is not survival which is good, but honorable and just survival)." Lee questions the com-
parallel
patibility of love (the definition of
with
"God evil
and
anxious that
which he does not discuss)
we
should avoid claiming that with us" in a war. He suggests "(a) that there is moral in the world great enough to merit destruction; and (b) killing,
is
is
that human judgment is fallible." Then "(a) man at least does not automatically violate the precepts of religion in killing his fellows;
and (b) he does not arrogate
He may
to himself the attributes
war because of faith that he is right, rather than because he knows the enemy is wrong. Democracy needs a metaphysical or theological basis, and the lack of one in the modern world has been its weakness, but if theology of divinity.
enter a
.
is
.
.
invoked in behalf of wars, they will increase rather than di-
minish."
My comments Omniscient
is
would be
on
that he himself
as follows:
his side does not
is
knowledge
if
he
is
says the
clear-headed,
omniscient, even as to the attitude of om-
niscience on the point at issue. able
The man who
mean,
He means
that even the survey of
he has faith or prob-
all
creation
would not
Science, Philosophy
170
and Religion
furnish any reason in his enemy's behalf (so far as his deserving of victory is concerned) as good as the reasons in his own be-
This does not mean that God sees all the claims and rights of the two sides as any man does, but only that on the single crude question, whose victory is, on the whole, preferable. God is believed to agree with the claimant. As to love, Lee says that a man is a moral being, and hence not analogous to an arm half.
which one may
feel forced to
with oppression, conquest or a case of either
—
or.
Not
amputate. But the man threatened slavery, is also a moral being. It's
only does love justify the principle of
least sacrifice in case of conflicting interests,
but without love
would be meaningless, since, if we did not love our enemies, their claims would seem to us, not less than ours, but nothing at all. I do not see that one has to say the enemy is the principle
so non-moral that he ought to die as valueless or worse. One need only say that he is less deserving of continued life than are those he threatens (perhaps much of mankind), deserving either of death or of being forced to live on a low level. It is man as moral that will be injured, whether one fights or does not fight. Professor Weiss thinks the arguments for intervention are not sufficiently philosophical. I am sure they could be more so.
He
also suggests that those
"who
believe they are fighting for
found only in England and in the United States. Now I am glad to have a chance to remark that, of course, I regard the better part of the entire world as fighting in one sense or another for liberty as threatened by the Axis. But I cannot admit at all, on the other hand, that to the same their liberties" are not to be
degree the Germans believe or
make
a decent pretense of be-
lieving that they are fighting for liberty or "the
"No one kind."
I
good and true." around the cry to enslave themselves or manknow of no student of recent events in Germany who rallies
would endorse this statement as applied to the Nazis without much more severe qualifications than would be required if it were applied to the British or the Norwegians. Nietzsche (and Thrasymachus) have surely not lacked vocal followers in the Third Reich, and one reporter remarked that he could talk to Nazis for hours and never encounter an ethical idea. They have boasted of their freedom from such "prejudices and inhibitions."
And
the boast
is
not merely
idle.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
171
Professor Lee feels that, as a matter of principle, one must either intervene or stay out, though, as a matter of strategy, he
agrees with the paper that one might be justified in partial participation.
He
also thinks the issue
must be taken
as essentially
whether or not the war has a vital relation to the extension of world democracy. I agree, and suggest that the issue is simple, and that it is the existence of a new type of slave-state which proposes and, for all we can know, would be able (barring American intervention) to extend itself by force indefinitely, and thereby establish something like the extreme opposite of world democracy. I close by quoting in entirety a statement by Professor Garnett, offered "in full agreement" with the paper, as an alternasimple, and that this simple issue
tive, terse
is
formulation.
"Democracy
is
the application to politics of the principle of
equality of rights. This principle principle of the equality of
all
is
a corollary of the religious
men
before God, as children of
the one Heavenly Father.
To
physical support, but
widely maintained either as a
is
the naturalist
lacks this meta-
it
self-
evident ethical insight or as a postulate or principle justified by experience.
"Rights imply obligations and obligations imply responsibilities.
But responsibilities are
vidual.
entailed
man
relative to the capacity of the indi-
become modified by the capacity to bear the responsibilities; and equality of rights means that every
Thus
rights
has rights relevant to his capacity to
fulfill
his obligations.
Rights and duties are also relevant to station. But the principle of equality of rights
means
that differences of station should be
designed so as to secure to each person, as far as possible, the full rights relevant to his capacities.
intellectual
and moral
The
as well as physical.
relevant capacities are
Thus
crime, revealing
moral incapacity, involves relevant surrender of rights, and justifies the use of force by the state in the maintenance of rights.
And
political structure
does not depart from the demo-
cratic principle of equality of rights
of differing moral
and
when
it
takes cognizance
intellectual capacity of individuals
and
groups. But equality of rights involves equality of opportunity to develop capacities
and therefore constantly tends
to eliminate
Science, Philosophy
172
and Religion
deficiencies in those capacities that are relevant to general political rights.
"The aries.
principle of equality
The
within the state rights,
not limited by national bound-
is
logical corollary of a democratic political structure is
therefore
the
recognition of equality of
and therefore of opportunities,
as
between
states, limited
only by the relevance of rights to the capacity to bear the entailed responsibilities.
This may
justify the
temporary keeping
of certain states or territories in a condition of political depend-
ency and of others in enforced disarmament, but
it
does not
abrogate the right of the people of such states and territories to equality of opportunity. In so far as an international political is lacking, it is an imfounded on the democratic principle to seek to erect such a structure. The extension of law to any field of human behavior hitherto in a state of chaos and conflict is a restriction upon the wrongdoer but an extension of liberty
structure to secure the rights of nations
plicit obligation of states
to the rightdoer.
sary to enforce
does not exist
The
use of such
law where it but is needed,
minimum
exists, is
the democratic state to exercise
of force as
is
founded."
necesit
therefore not only a right of if it
pleases, but an obligation
implicit in the fundamental ethical principle
mocracy
is
and extend law where
on which de-
I
CHAPTER The Role By
of
Law
FRANK
E.
IX
in a
Democracy
HORACK,
Indiana University School of
SO-CALLED advancc of civilization, THE century inspired confidence and
JR.
Lmw
which
in
the
last
optimism, seems to have led us to confusion and despair. Indeed, this meeting reflects our misgivings concerning the future of democracy and
its
institutions.
The
last
century neither questioned nor examined
its
phi-
was confident that science had conquered the external world, and that law and government were natural and unchanging phenomena which insured order and security. The century had hardly ended, however, before the old philosophies and religions were challenged, the decalogue of science tumbled on its own head, and the order which government and law was supposed to have established broke into open chaos. Our day is the product of this confusion and insecurity. Philosophy and religion find hard going in a mechanistic society. Science discovers that the world is more complicated and its own answers less certain. Law and government face a fundamental challenge to their authority. Swinburne's exultalosophy or religion;
tion, all
"Glory to
it
man
things," seems an
in the highest: for
empty
boast.
Man
Our plan
is
the master of
for
government,
morality and education has failed to create a glorious era.
Despairingly religion
we
inivestigate
suggestions
for
and philosophy, some demand a return 173
reform. to
In
the old
Science, Philosophy
174
and Religion
deny the need for reHgion, and a few want a streamHned version of the old moraUty. Science, too, has had its troubles. Dr. Hooton demands a hohday for science, hoping to escape the nightmares of a
virtues; others
machine age by a return
we can
only
let
to the simple Hfe.
the pace of science continue
future will be better than the past. Others
Some
suggest that
and hope that the
demand
all
speed
ahead, in the hope that redoubled scientific effort will remedy few urge that science be the ills that science has produced.
A
turned on
man
himself, in the
hope that eugenics can produce
a super-race.
Law and government
repeat the story. Unable internally or
meet the uncertainties of finance, demands of human relations, law and government face demands for reform and new philosophies. Harding's plea for "normalcy" and the return to the simple government of Jackson appeal to many. Others want a redefinition of old principles in the light of the new complex society. Still others, abandoning hope for democratic pro-
externally to cope with force,
or provide adequately the simpler
cedure, see security in the surface comfort of dictatorship.
For good or ill, when confusion is rife, "law" has an attracand thus to law, more than to another institution, men turn for certainty and order. Consequently, the legal
tive ring;
system primarily will be responsible for the type of order that will continue in the
law
is
A
future.
proper understanding of the
therefore a prerequisite to any complete discussion of
the democratic system.
Law
is
only social order enforced by government.
presses the political
can make
life
oppressive or
racy, the function of
Law
and philosophical ideas of law
it is
can
make
life free.
to guarantee order
a
Law
ex-
people. It
In a democ-
and
justice.
can preserve order without justice or dispense justice without order. But without both order and justice the demo-
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
175
worship and
cratic ideals of free ballot, free speech, free
fair
cannot be achieved.
trial
In addition to law, society establishes other orders and in-
Thus, habit and custom, religion and morahty, and all contribute to the ordering of man's life. But in times of confusion, recourse is sought with increasing frequency to the authority of that law which society can enforce through the agencies of government. Thus, the growth stitutions.
the "laws" of science
of the law today
is
but a counterpart of uncertainty and
dis-
order.
The desire of confused minds for certainty tends to overemphasize the authoritarian quality of the law. The ability to change the law promptly and in an orderly fashion is an equally important attribute. This quahty of the law lawless
own
is
well illustrated by our
The men who founded
history.
this
own
colonial
nation were considered
—certainly by the English, and to a large extent by their
brethren in the colonies. Yet, with independence won,
they embarked
upon
the establishment of an extensive and
complicated legal order.
How
could lawless
men
place so pro-
found a reliance in the law? It was because their rebellion was not against the law itself, but against the consequences which a particular law produced. They fully understood that the system of law could fashion a society in terms of their desires.
And
this they
own
proceeded to do.
In establishing a representative democracy within the frame-
work
of a
Constitution,
certain concepts of political
insure to
them
the
colonists
sought to crystallize
freedom which they believed would government and the
the rights of representative
derivative rights of free worship, free speech, free assemblage
For them, democracy was a method and not a was the procedure necessary to make their society work the way they wanted it to work. It must be the same for
and
fair trial.
condition.
us.
Any
It
attempt to crystaUize our society in terms of the rustic
agronomy of our
forefathers
would be
as
undemocratic
as the
Science, Philosophy
1^6
attempts of George
III
to
and Religion
impose a decadent English
class
system on the robust new world. Thus, if we are to have a democracy, the law must meet the
needs of the people today
—the
needs for a
sufficient moral,
an adequate economic life, and for an orderly and free political life. The law in a democracy cannot be absolute, unchanging and inflexible. There must always be some play in the machinery. This flexibility exists in ethical
and
religious
life,
for
democracy more than in any other system of law. This is beis made by popular participation in government. Law and government are closely twined. Government is the formal machinery for making, enforcing and deciding the law. Legislators, executives, administrators and judges provide the army of officials which make law work. The operation is government; the result is law. The law itself springs from numerous origins. From customs and experience and the long record of decided cases comes the common law the inexhaustible well of principles for courts to apply. Superior to all other law is the law of the Constitution. Within its framework, the statutes and judicial a
cause law
—
decisions determine the minutiae of
its
apphcation to particular
cases.
In a democracy, most of lawmaking
is
entrusted to legisla-
Thus, the people, through their representatives, determine the character of the law and social control. Formally, through elected representatives, and informally, through trade, labor, rehgious and civic associations and through lobbyists, the American people have participated in determining the policy of the law. Precedent to enactment, scientists, economists and tures.
specialists in every field
assist
legislative
committees in pre-
paring accurate legislation, properly adjusted to the needs of society. After controversies and compromise, both in committee and before the legislature, the resulting statutes are
need for change. The forces of condemands for too risky and too radical experimentation. Forces of change tend to overcome the fairly representative of the
servativism tend to modify the
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
177
the common law its excessive stabiHty. Thus, legislative law, though in constant flux, tends to follow an orderly pattern and have a predictability of its own. During the process of legislation, law is but a social datum and may be changed and altered as a scientist would vary his inertia that gives to
formula. After it
it
has received the approval of the legislature,
acquires sovereign authority, and administration must en-
force
and courts must apply
it
it.
with certainty and authority, for
by those
who must
abide by
it,
At if
there
it must speak could be questioned
this stage, it
would be no order, but poHceman and the
only chaos. Thus, the principal job of the
judge
is
to
enforce the law and decide
The
legislative direction.
simple, for no legislature can foresee
human polate
it
process, of course, all
according to the is
not quite
this
the ramifications of
conduct, and so the judge must to some extent extrafrom the known to the unknown and gage as best he
can society's intent. In recent years there has been
much
controversy over the
character of the judge's function. Within the constitutional and
—
framework, judges must decide cases but where which legislation has not filled, the judge must be a lawmaker. He must, as Cardozo has said, act "as the interpreter for the community of its sense of law and order, must supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonize ." Thus, the court that serves the law results with justice. best recognizes that rules of law which were once adequate and proper for a remote society must be abandoned for rules more appropriate to the established customs of the court's own day. The law the judges decide must, to quote Sir William Holdsworth, hit "the golden mean between too much flexibihty and too much rigidity, for it must give to the legal system the rigidity which it must have if it is to possess a definite body of principles, and the flexibihty which it must have if it is to adapt itself to the needs of a changing society." legislative
there are gaps
.
It is
.
the exercise of this delicate function that has excited
controversy. In particular cases judges have found past prec-
Science, Philosophy
178
and Religion
edents inapplicable when others would disagree. Thus, some assert that judges wield the undemocratic power to make the to the people's wishes. Others suggest that the law may depend on the judge's disposition, his heritage, or his poHtical philosophy. In short, the judge
law contrary state of the
social
and certainty to the law where meaning is often esoteric and intent uncertain. Thus, particular decisions occasionally seem arbitrary and unexpected. charged with giving both
must walk
The
flexibility
in the uncertain land of words,
true significance of the judicial process
only in terms of
its
total operation.
The
is
measurable
public generally, and
the legal profession particularly, expect certainty in the settle-
ment
of disputes. Thus, in deciding cases, judges tend to favor
the social
demand
for certainty
and leave
to
legislators
the
responsibiHty for change and growth.
no contradiction in this dual aspect of the legal Holdsworth said, the golden mean between stability and change. But, in searching for certainty, the law cannot escape the necessity for keeping abreast of the needs of society. To meet this need, we have in the past century expanded the so-called administrative process as the third important branch of the law. There has been so much misunder-
There
is
order. It gives, as
standing concerning
its
operation that a brief excursion into
its
mysteries seems justified.
The enforcement
of the
law has always been considered an
mowas beyond
executive function, and because of the independence of narchial position in earlier societies, administration
popular control. Strong-headed executives could defy
legisla-
and weak executives nullified legislative policy, even under democratic systems. But these deficiencies would not have caused a change if the increasing complexity of society had not required some agency through which legislation could be constantly amplified, amended and enforced. The creation of administrative agencies with limited power and with responsibility to the legislature was therefore an extive direction
tension
of,
rather than a curtailment of, the rule of law.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
The
179
great contribution of the administrative process has been
the introduction of
new methods
of law enforcement so that,
must obey the mandate and imprisonments which were adequate in a simple society are no longer effective, when the payment of a fine avoids compliance with the law and permits profitable but to a large degree, all persons in society
of the law. Fines
dangerous practices to continue unsuppressed.
It
advanta-
is
geous, for example, to pay an occasional $100 fine rather than install the costly
equipment necessary
for the sanitary produc-
tion of pure food.
The
introduction of preventive justice through administra-
tion tends to insure that those society
of
will
abide by
who
under the protection
live
Administration has used
laws.
its
increasingly the aids of science, psychology aids in
and economics
law enforcement. For example, although a
absorbed as a normal business expense, convicted of selling impure milk,
is
if
a
fine
milk company,
required to advertise that
by signs on its wagons, the temptation for violation tempered by the risk to profits.
fact
New
as
may be
is
sanctions for law enforcement require extensive and
courageous experimentation. Public opinion, the basic sanction in a democracy, has
been too long neglected. Can law and
psychology join to apply
it
effectively
against particular in-
dividuals? Punishment should be a last resort, not a It
first
move.
tends to destroy rather than advance democratic unity.
II
administration and
Legislation, tools
by which government seeks
society can exist. Legislature can
can enforce
it,
and courts can
adjudication to create
make
are
only
the
an order in which
the law, administrators
try cases,
but only people, so
long as our society prevails, can decide what the content of the
law will be. Thus, the nub of the question, the role of law in a democracy,
must be the
desire of the public to participate in
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
i8o
lawmaking, and the ability and the desire of the people to preserve law and government on a democratic basis. The failure of popular participation in the functions of government, except perhaps in the smallest communities, has been a deplorable defect of the past generation. This weakness challenges the democratic system. of remedying the defect will
A
more
recourse to law as a
means
toward totalitarianism than toward democracy. Democracy cannot be maintained by law or fiat. It can result only from the desire of the people for the freedoms implicit in democracy. So long as the conservatism of man produces a general apathy toward new conditions, the law can do little. It cannot outrun a cautious and diffident society. We cannot glory in the past, if we are to likely turn us
preserve the present and create the future.
Ours is not the world of Hegel or Kant, nor of John Watt, Whitney, the Wright brothers or Marconi, nor the world of Adam Smith or Karl Marx, nor the world of Jefferson or Eli
Lincoln or Wilson. Indeed a passing part. We cannot
it
is
not our world.
insist that
We
the freedoms
play but
we know
be the freedoms of tomorrow unless we are prepared to ourselves and our children to the only freedom that those in other lands know— the freedom of death. shall
condemn
In 1775,
Thomas Paine warned the thinking a thing wrong
habit of not
colonists
gives
it
that "a long a
superficial
appearance of right." In his tract "Common Sense," he inspired the colonists to reexamine the world around them and ask themselves the perplexing question, "What is Freedom.?"
He
gave them courage to find
new
concepts of freedom and to act forcefully for their achievement. The same challenge is as
We have our old freedoms—they are written down Constitution—but do they free our people or our society? Half a century ago, men were certain that the Constitution
vital today.
in the
guaranteed, in the name of freedom of contract, that every person could sell his services at any price, assume
work
as
any risk, and he wished. This freedom imposed on long hours, unconscionable risks, and paupers'
many hours
working men
as
— and Religion
Science, Philosophy pay.
Our
Constitution did not guarantee the freedom from
was only because we had not thought was plausible to argue that it was right.
starving. It
that
it
i8i
it
wrong,
This wrong thinking arose because the Constitution makers were not bothered with problems of economic freedom. The young nation was rich in resources. It was situated in an economy which required little investment, other than physical labor, to reap some wealth and a reasonable hope of economic independence. That society is gone. Constitutional guarantees, diligence, industry and capacity no longer are rewarded with economic independence, or even security, in the face of an erratic economic cycle. Individual effort is today insufficient.
Man, the
animal that he
social
has sought, through asso-
is,
men, the freedoms he could not achieve alone. If he associated himself in corporate form he frequently became an economic hero; if he joined a co-operative or union he was a threat to our institutions; but whether his status was lauded or deplored, he acted in the only way he could collectively. So pronounced was the movement, that as early as 1919 even the liberal Holmes observed, "The whole colciation with his fellow
lectivist
tendency seems to be underrating or forgetting the
safeguards in
day and
still
bills
are
of rights that
worth fighting
had for.
be fought for in their
to .
.
."
Was Holmes
right.?
Each individual sacrificed a portion of his individual freedom because it gave him more of what he wanted. In this process
men
new strength, but they also sustained unexpected The man who fought for unionism, only to discover the demands of union tribute stood between him and
acquired
losses.
that
available jobs,
doms
must ask himself whether the
collective free-
between government cannot stand
are as valuable as he thought. In this struggle
the individual and the group, law and
They must be in the thick Under law and government we
idly by.
of
it.
are trying to run a highly
urbanized, complex social machine with a loose knit poUtical
To compromise we have enacted a
engine designed in a simple agrarian century.
our
new problems with
our old solutions
Science, Philosophy
i82
and Religion
mass of legislation. We outlaw competition on the one hand and demand it with the other. We give labor strength to defend itself against capital and permit it to turn its new power to the injury of the individual laborer. We enact zoning laws, but do not clear slums or ehminate outmoded industries, for fear of destroying already decadent wealth. We sponsor pubUc welfare legislation and let industries abandon factories and strand whole communities, leaving economic and social desolation rising from the unhappy grave. Bentham's biting comment bespeaks our need for new vision and new principles:
"Adding
to the
dom enough
for
mass
in the
Augean
stable, every
—every ox that ever was put
river in the cleansing of
it
in
it;
ox had wis-
employ a
to
required, not the muscle, but the
genius of a Hercules."
The
it now must freedom from the bondage of its own Frankenstein. Many of our freedoms and some of our institutions will not survive the present world revolution. There must be new
genius of our society has built the machine;
create
freedoms,
The
new
liberties,
new institutions to take their place. The answers will be controversial.
patterns are not clear.
Ours
is
not the simple task of statute making.
create a constitution as flexible, as exalted,
and
as
We
must
fundamental
as our present one.
Ill If we possess the freedom of thought necessary to new and uncertain concepts, then we will focus our
consider inquiries
chiefly upon two issues: (i) international pohtical and economic freedom, and (2) domestic economic freedom. Grade school geography is meaningless in the twentieth century. Machines have taken significance from time and space.
The provinciahsm
they
protected
is
gone
too.
We
cannot
escape participation in the rebuilding which must follow the present world struggle.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
183
once established democratic structures in countries that that that did not possess democratic ideas. We know now assist in now must We peace. lasting a build alone will not that system poUtical a and structure economic formulating an
We
will
do for the world what the Constitution did for the Amer-
ican colonies.
Freedom at home will remain dependent upon world freedom; but the job at home is only partially finished. The poHtical freedoms have protected man from government but not from for ecothe economic system. New constitutional principles generation. this of contribution the nomic democracy must be controlled. First, the credit system must be democratically property. of concepts legal our to Credit is intimately related agrarian immobile an in formulated But property concepts were today Property land. meant English society when property
means
chiefly
promises,
intangibles,
and the prediction of
property future profits. The declining importance of physical The old structure. tax our is best illustrated by the change in an provide taxes Transaction property taxes are insufficient. ever increasing source of public finance. Physical property ownership has lost poHtical significance, but
the
control of
power which even government cannot
its
economic and
credit
resist.
has created
When
private
society and credit extension ceased a decade ago, the order of attempt to an the security of government were threatened. In money with meet the challenge, our government experimented spending. mild credit regulation, and government control,
These devices have proved control of credit.
entirely inadequate for the public
Can we not
set forth
more
equitable,
more
the needs of effective principles for credit control founded on
democratic society? for Second, our economic system has not devised means adequate distribution of consumable goods. While a constituplan for tion neither could nor should set fordi a particular
achieving a
more
effective
distributive
system,
it
should, as
and an elaboration of our present guarantees of freedom
Science, Philosophy
184
and Religion
equality, formulate a broad declaration from which legislatures can construct specific legislation.
Third, our present Constitution, as a result of bitter comartificial boundaries between the states and
promise, has set
the nation. Continuing litigation over the state
commerce
effectively
meaning
concept in a generation where business and industry
and state economic must be a reexamination of the government and the states and in character
industry.
The
of inter-
demonstrates the incapacity of isolation
is
this
national
impossible. There between the federal effects on commerce and is
relation its
recent trade barrier
movement
is
but a surface
manifestation of a deep rooted defect in governmental organization.
Fourth, the growth of large industrial and economic units, the growing segregation of farm, labor and industrial groups, and the concentration of industries into regions independent of territorial Hnes, requires the reconsideration of political representation based on the simple territorial concepts of the 19th century. Informally, group interests are represented in the policy making function of legislation through lobbyists, trade associations
and
may be that the informahty of strength rather than weakness to our legislative system. But the issue is so fundamental to both our institutes. It
this representation gives
and our economic life that structure of our present representative political
A
new
inquiries
democracy are
into
the
justified.
myriad of other broad and basic principles, all necessary democratic system wherein a majority
to the preservation of a
can achieve the social order they desire widiout destroying the freedoms and liberties of themselves and of the minorities,
flood readily to mind.
We
must have our old freedoms, but
they must be reaHties and not historical memories. New freedoms are essential. Is not the solution a new constitutional
convention? Congress, already burdened with the necessary
day to day problems of government, through legislation the broad outHnes
The Supreme
Court, although
it
is
unhkely to produce
of a
new
social order.
has vaHantly exercised
its
Science, Philosophy
power
and Religion
185
keep the Constitution up to date, cannot assume the new framework of government. A constitutional convention should best represent our modern concept of the integration of law, science, religion and phito
creative responsibiUty for a
losophy.
Today we recognize more than
are not separate bodies of
can
realize
knowledge.
the fruition of
its
own
ever before that these
No
one of them alone without the co-
efforts
operation of others.
A
constitutional convention,
composed not only of
the great
and
political leaders but the great scholars, great scientists,
great philosophers of our generation, could
match
in
fore-
and authority the Jeffersons, the Madisons, the Hamiland the Masons of our first convention. Kettering of Ohio, Landis and Compton of Massachusetts, Hoover and sight tons,
Rutledge of Iowa, Jackson of New York, of Oregon, Beard of Connecticut. could be extended indefinitely. There is no paucity
Sinclair of California,
Black of Alabama,
The
list
McNary
of great leaders today.
A
constitutional
citizen
convention
participation
convention
in
the
made no change
would stimulate nation-wide
process at
all
of government. in
the
the
If
Constitution,
it
would still be of great service. Democracy permits all of the people to participate in determining the kind of society they want and insures their ability to change it. Democracy is popularly controlled experimentalism applied to law and government. To keep our democracy, we must be receptive to change and experiment. Upon the conclusion of this war, we must be prepared to create new freedoms and new liberties large enough to support a permanent peace. Let us reecho the words of Richard Henry Lee: "Let
this
happy day give birth
to an
American republic! Let
her rise not to devastate and conquer but to reestablish the reign of peace and law.
The
eyes of Europe are
us to prepare an asylum where the happy the persecuted repose."
upon
may
us, she invites
find solace,
and
Science, Philosophy
i86
and Religion
APPENDIX Huntington Cairns, United I. It
appears to
me
States Treasury Department:
that, before discussing the role of
law in
would be wise to determine as precisely as may be the form of democracy under consideration. It is possible that the role of law is the same in all forms of democracy, but, if so, that point should be made and supported. For example, in the form of democracy represented by the New England town meeting, the role of law would seem to be the formulation (or description, if you believe that law is the effect rather than the cause) of relatively simple social behavior patterns. The town meeting might decide that to permit cattle to run at large in the village is disadvantageous to the members of the meeting, and an ordinance is therefore passed prohibiting it. The role of a democracy,
it
law in such a situation appears to be the formulation of rules which at least the majority will accept. In contrast with the New England town meeting, the lawmaking process in the republican form of democracy is not direcdy operated by those immediately affected by the formulated rules, but rather by the representatives of groups which are sometimes the majority and sometimes the minority. Is the role of law any different in such a case? The aim of the rule may certainly be more complex. For example, the rule may merely be the instrument by which it is intended to transform a laissez-faire economy into a controlled
economy. However, is its of a rule adopted in the role it
is
New
essentially different in the different
forms of democracy, those differences were explicitly set forth. essential difference between the role of law in a de-
would be helpful 2.
from the role England town meeting.? If the
role essentially different
The
mocracy, and
if
its role in other forms of political organization, ought also to be specified. Did the rules of the English common law in non-democratic periods of English history have a different function than in democratic periods? The rules, it will be remembered, in both kinds of periods were often the same. On page 176, Professor Horack states that the "flexibility" of law "exists in a democracy more than in any other system of
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
187
more to the nature of law in a However, it is possible that the bearing on the function of law in a
law." This observation goes
democracy than
to its role.
may have
proposition
democracy, and
I feel,
tion. Personally, I
port
it.
In fact,
it
a
for that reason, that
it
needs substantia-
am
unable to think of any evidence to supmight be aigued that the flexibility of the de-
one undesirable aspect of that form of govme that law in a dictatorship is "absolute, unchanging and inflexible." Is it not true that the English common law during non-democratic periods, such as that of Henry VIII, was as flexible as in democratic periods? 3. I think it would be helpful if Professor Horack would state what he means by "the law" since it is a word of many crees of dictators
ernment.
is
does not appear to
It
connotations. 4.
Professor
Horack suggests
the calling of "a
new
Constitu-
Convention" for the establishment of a new Constitution to establish "new freedoms'" which, he states, are "essential." Professor Horack indicates that by the new freedoms he means democratic control of the credit system; adequate distribution of consumable goods; a new relationship between the Federal Government and the states; perhaps a modification of political representation based on territoriality. Those proposals appear to me to be political rather than legal, but, assuming they fall within the scope of the paper, it is not clear why they cannot be realized under the present Constitution. tional
Robert H. Jackson, Supreme Court of the United States: I have read Frank Horack's paper on the role of law mocracy.
but
I
It isn't
doubt
if
Constitutional
doubt
if
in detail
there is
the solution of our present difficulties
Convention, is
better
as
I
J.
Professor
is
a
it,
new
Horack suggests. I Improvement
the necessity for basic changes.
made by
legislation,
yet exhausted that resource as a
Albert
in a de-
easy to find points of disagreement with
Harno, College
know Mr. Horack
of
and certainly we have not of improvement.
method
Law, University
very well, and
I
of Illinois:
also
know
his views. I
find myself quite in agreement with him.
There is one point I should wish him to reconsider. On page he makes this statement, "A recourse to law as a means of
180,
Science, Philosophy
i88
and Religion
remedying the defect will more likely turn us toward totalitarianism than toward democracy." This view appears also in other parts of his paper. It is my view that law and the resort to law are basic to a free society. When a people gets away from being governed by law and from a willingness to submit to law, then it is likely to travel the route toward totalitarianism.
Wiley Rutledge, United
States Court of Appeals:
Certain of Professor Horack's assumptions on factual observations must be accepted. We have come, in our struggle to achieve
democracy, not from certainty, but from hope, faith and confidence in the future to doubt and distress bordering despair. There is in us an unwanted lethargy. We are divided between our wants and hopes and our fears. We hold emotionally to old certainties and chances which we know, but refuse to acknowledge are ghosts of the dead. We reach out for new ones which
we
think
them
may
take their places, but
for fear they
may
we
are afraid to grasp
displace the old ones.
We
are divided
American heart. We want England to win. Yet many of us want no hand in helping her to do so, and few want to do this with both hands and both feet. We want all the comforts and gadgets of machine production. But we also want all the in our
freedoms of pioneer or agrarian society. We grab the gadgets and try to assert the freedoms which went out when they came in. We want local self-government and national old age and unemployment security. We want guns, and planes, and tanks, and ships and we also want the unqualified right to strike. We want to keep what we have; yet we don't want to fight to keep it. In short, there's division and conflict in our national soul. The first problem, therefore, is not that of law, as an institu-
—
all, as Horack says, that is but a works out the ideals of its spirit. It is rather one of creating or recreating in the national heart a hope to replace its present despair, a confidence to overcome its doubt. That is a problem of the statesman-priest. For the great-
tion of social control; for after tool by
which a
society
est of statesmen is the greatest of priests to his people. He approaches divinity in his power to bring hope from despair, confidence from doubt; assurance from uncertainty in short, the
—
sense that
life is
worth living and fighting to
live.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
189
People need this more than they need democracy as we have it. They need an it or any other nation has known thought and their ideal, a goal, a direction, which colors all have this, they If surely. but perhaps, feeling— subconsciously,
known
and believe
it
or
some
of
it
can be achieved, they can survive
But any temporary tyranny. The task is essentially religious. do they as in it, fail when the organized institutions of religion they spread thin the spiritual diet of the people, and the only a greater soul of the nation, as of its men, becomes sick, in the leader like Lincoln can restore their souls and lead them thempaths of righteousness, the ways of right feeling within
when
selves
and toward the universe.
view, therefore, the first task of government, which is renew or inseparable from law but not the same thing, is to That is themselves. create the faith of the people in itself and In
my
easier to point out than to It is
do or
to blue-print.
partly a matter of statesmanly preaching.
Men must
be
moved by the spoken ideal, the vision stated. The fire of faith million, when it burns flashes from one heart to a hundred unlighted or only smolbut all, brightly from a fuel hidden in opens up when we hearts our of otherness dering in most. The each wants for what of merely not together, think speak and malice fades himself, but of what all want for each other. The brings them people his away when the leader, not the driver, of all
in unison to think
and
feel the
a common cause and hope. But preaching is dangerous,
thoughts and aspirations of
if it is
only that. Better not be
up to see than have vision turned mirage. Works must government follow, and confirm, faith. And in this, law and life they democratic In part. testing the says, have, as Horack people. Only are the only institutions which belong to all the lifted
through them can each there is no democracy.
man
have his
say.
And
if
he has none,
government says, the eternal problem of law and of tradition and future, and past of adjustment right the is this change, of precedent and breaking from it. Ordinarily,
As Horack
means adding new rooms to the old house. Occasionally, and perhaps now or soon, it means building a new one. No government in history, democratic or otherwise, has had imposed upon
190
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
it the strains of ours and others of our time. That's because none ever existed before in a neon-lighted, chromium-plated age, to borrow the characterization of a recent high school graduate.
and external dangers have come simultaneously, and the old structures of law and government have been too simple and too slight to meet them. Some nations have junked their old machines, and tried to build new, stream-lined cars. Others have only tinkered with the jalopies. We've tinkered, Internal
but we've
also
made
substantial repairs.
Horack now suggests
should turn the old car in and get a
new
that we one. But apparently he
doesn't want
it stream-lined. He wants one which will look like the old car, but run a lot better. Not so fast and so far as the Hitler model— one with more and better brakes.
so
much body and
so little
power
as Mussolini's
Not one with product of '40
and
'41, nor one that creaks along like John Bull's. He'd cut out the single seats, or reduce them to a minimum, and put in more
compartments. There would be no private facilities— or few— but there'd not be such a jam in the end of the car in the morning.
He's right that many, perhaps most, of the old individual freedoms are gone. That's especially true of the economic ones. The man unorganized today is lost— that way. And what he has to say, what he thinks, what he believes, does not count too much except at the ballot box. Free speech doesn't mean just a chance to talk to yourself, after going to bed or while wander-
mg
alone along the street.
others.
The man
It
means
in the street hasn't
a chance to be heard by
many chances
to talk over
the radio; there's only one Rochester. With only the rarest exceptions, one is listened to today, either by groups of which he's a member or affiliate, or by groups because he has acquired place or power in other organized institutions. Try talking on the street corner anywhere but Jersey City, without a mayor's permit. Individualistic democracy, as we have
known
large, has
gone
It
ically, culturally,
quite
comp
went because we organized
by and econom-
it,
ourselves,
educationally, philanthropically, almost
etely, as
men
in groups, not just as
if
not
men. The orcome through government. It came in spite of It. Witness Sherman-of '94, not '62. Government stepped in only to provide the legal forms of incorporation, and later to ganization didn't
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
191
encourage the formation of unions to counteract and check them. All this Horack recognizes. And he recognizes the basic consequences. Individual freedoms those of men as unorganized units— are passing. Group freedoms are replacing them. These, and the freedoms of the individual within the group, are the freedoms of the future. freedoms may be. If It's time, therefore, to think what these within they are alternated too much, whether for the group or
—
it (I
speak
now
of the significant that are
groups, though those important), there can be no
real,
and
especially the
intellectual also
are
economic basically
no new democracy. But
if
the
can find a real place within his essential groups, and if those groups can find a real place within the community, we can maintain a democratic structure one essentially the individual
man
—
opposite of totalitarian organization.
The
individual will stand,
not alone as the pioneer, but also not with everyone as the pupand pet of the state. The group will stand, not as a mere loose governof master the as not also but unimportant aggregation,
ment and
all
the people.
Those of us who
ideas and ideals of Rousseau,
Thomas
are devoted to the
Jefferson,
Adam
Smith,
and a later namesake, may not like this kind of democracy. But have to live with, if we it's what we've created and it's what we machines, as we will. multiply to and with work continue to Furthermore, it's better than any form of totalitarianism yet devised.
Horack points out the basic fact, but he does not consider some of its problems. For instance, can we have "one big union"? Is industrial unionism, in this view, a threat to democratic institutions?
How
about two big parties, and only two?
some of our biggest corporations? These are questions which the democrat of the future must face. We've hardly begun to deal with them. Horack is right, too, that government must be reorganized guarantee the to control the new institutions adequately and to
What
of
freedoms. Just when or how cannot be blue-printed. He throws out illustrative suggestions— credit, distribution of goods, federal-state relations. In the latter two respects, I agree
new
with his views. No one yet knows the answer to better distribution, whether
192
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
he be Adam-Smithite, public spender but not
communist or what
not.
socialist, socialist,
We
don't want absolutely equal distribution. That's both impossible and totalitarian. But we want
better distribution.
How? Horack
doesn't say, nor of course do I agree. It must be had, un-
But he believes it can be had, and less the whole productive system is .
must be democratically the future
is
to be
to crack up.
controlled. Certainly,
one of
credit.
But credit
is
if
He
says credit
the system of
essentially debt.
Does he contemplate indefinite perpetuation of a system based on private debt? Going as far as he does in other respects,
there not be
minded
that
some
other, better
we can
visualize
may
way? Have we become so creditno democratic society not built
on debt? Whether so or not, need we exclude consideration of other possibilities? Might not debt be restricted or reserved for
public financing, perhaps also that of the larger institutions of social security, devising some other means of private consumption? Perhaps debt, like the poor, will be always with us Cer-
tainly, It will
be for a time yet unknown. And democratic confor a period of transition, however far distant or longcontmued, must be regarded as essential. But if a system of adequate distribution of consumable goods trol
can be devised be always upon a basis of consumption against future earnings?
must
As
It
to federal-state relations, I think
Horack is looking into believe he's right. Forty-eight agencies of economic control, over and above the only one capable of orthe far future, but
I
ganizing and making the system work. They can, eventually but clog It. Federation has its values for preserving democracy. Overdoing it destroys the system. In my view, it would be worth trying a federated system with longer and fewer units than we now have. New England, the Central States (N.Y., ^'"''"^' ^°"^^"'^"' ju\ru< Mich.), ^^--i'i""'^ Middle West, Southwest,
C^^t^^l (Ohio, Ind., Northwest, Rocky Mountain, Facific-or some such regional arrangement. There are economic as well as other differences III.,
still reflected in these regional lines But they are hardly important as between states withm a single region. Savings in state government costs, uniformity of law and of its administration, everything, in fact, but tradition and state pride argues for such a change, and soon
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
But
I
suspect
it
will not
come.
If necessity requires,
193 the Fed-
and exercise the powers the states have had in a simpler age. That is the easier way, the more gradual and less perceptible one, and psychologically the more accepted and acceptable one. The states are shrinking and will continue to shrink. Mass production and distribution have dictated that. But that they can be wiped out or reorganized in some such manner as has been suggested is eral
Government
will continue to take over
hardly possible within the visible future. I think, therefore, that Horack's suggestion of a constituhighly desirable, but highly impractical. have a part in one, and it is an honor to be his suggested participants, though here again
tional convention It
would be fun
included
is
to
among
Horack has nodded. But it will not be. Other things more disruptive may come. This is too sensible to do so. Finally, before we solve these problems, we have the more immediate one of keeping a world in which they can be solved, consistently with creating and maintaining the democracy of the future. But Horack did not deal with that. Neither shall I, except to say that tion for
we
should use the present period of prepara-
what may come, and,
if
it
comes, the future one of
active war, to lay the foundation, in part at least, for
the things
which must and
M. T. Van Hecke, School
of
will
come
some of
afterward.
Law, The University of North Carolina:
myself in general agreement with what Professor Horack says. But most of it, for the purposes of your conference, is too descriptive and trite and not sufficiently provocative. I
find
Instead,
I
wish Mr. Horack had considered such questions
as the following:
(i)
To what
extent
is
the role of law in a democracy essen-
law under a monarchy or a dicand method of the law will differ, but will not its fundamental role be the same, namely, that of an instrument to effectuate the policies of the dominant group (2) Is not the legal profession an undemocratic institution.? Superficially, it might appear that the answer is "no," for, theo-
tially different
from the
role of
tatorship? Perhaps the content
Science, Philosophy
194
and Religion
may select his own attorney. But are community served when those in the lower income brackets must go without legal service, save from retically,
every individual
the best interests of the
ambulance chasers and legal aid clinics, and when the bar as a whole places client-caretaking and the furtherance of private interests above the public welfare? If, as Mr. Horack correctly states, the law in a democracy must meet the current needs of the people, will not the bar have to change its functions and status to approximate those of a public agency? (3) Are not our courts undemocratic institutions? Superficially, again the answer is "no," for, theoretically, they are open to all, the parties are represented by their own counsel, the judges and prosecutors are usually publicly elected, and the right of trial by jury
is
zealously safeguarded. But, save for ex-
ceptional instances, the judicial personnel
is
less
competent
than the upper third of the bar and in most courts, is confined to the role of an umpire between warring contenders. And the adversary system of
trial
puts a
premium upon
the tactics of
concealment, trick and surprise. Does not the furtherance of the role of law in a democracy require that the public law of-
be recruited from the best elements of the legal and second, empowered to function effectively as judicial administrators? The new federal rules, with their provisions for discovery and pre-trial sifting of the issues, go a long ficers, first,
profession,
way
in the latter direction.
Horack is at his best when dealing with legislation. wish he had spoken more definitively of the use of law as a creative force in society as distinguished from a restrictive or regulatory control. Just here is where law can contribute most. Yet law schools and the bar have directed their interests mainly toward adjudication. The primary impetus toward creating a better way of- life through law has come from outside the legal profession, and only a handful of legislators and specially trained draftsmen and administrators have been available to furnish the necessary techniques. Mr. Horack's case book on (4) Mr.
But
I
"Legislation" will help to develop a bar capable of helping in this creative process. fields as
The
gains of the last forty years in such
workmen's compensation,
relations point the way.
health, housing
and labor
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
195
Professor Horack: Indeed,
it
seems to
me
that the
comments
are fulfilling
expectations, that an outline of the general problem elicit
the specification of
paper
itself
many
ideas
which would make the
too long and too detailed for elaboration.
interested in the reaction of
own
I
most of the commenters
the idea of a constitutional convention.
well our
my
would
I
think
it
am
very
resisting
illustrates
uncertainty about the type of government and
law we wish, and thus we take the easier course of hoping that we will achieve what we wish by day to day rationalizations and adjustments.
CHAPTER X Pluralism and Intellectual
By
Democracy
ALAIN LOCKE
Howard
University
WHEN
WILLIAM JAMES inaugurated his all-out campaign though radical empiricism and pragmatism were his shield and buckler, his trusty right-arm sword, we should remember, was plurahsm. He even went so far as to hint, in a way that his generation was not prepared to understand, at a vital connection between pluralism and democracy. Today, in our present culture crisis, it is both against intellectual absolutism,
timely to recall
ponder over In the
this,
and important,
several reasons,
to
come forward again
in
for
it.
first
place, absolutism
new and formidable
guise,
has
social
and
political
with their associated intellectual tyrannies
dogmatism and uniformitarian
universality.
of
We
forms of
it,
authoritarian
are warrantably
alarmed to see these vigorous, new secular absolutisms added to the older, waning metaphysical and doctrinal ones to which
we had become somewhat
inured and from which, through and the scientific spirit, we acquired some degree of immunity. Though alarmed, we do not always reahze the extent to which these modern Frankensteins are the spawn of the older absolutistic breeds, or the degree to which they are inherent strains, so to speak, in the germ plasm of our science
culture.
In the second place, in the zeal of culture defense, in the effort to bring
about the rapprochement of a united front, 196
we
— Science, Philosophy
do not always stop
and Religion
to envisage the
197
danger and inconsistency
of a fresh crisis uniformitarianism of our own. There exists, fortunately, a sounder sibihty
of a
and more permanent
alternative, the pos-
type of agreement such as
pluralistic base.
Agreement
of this
would, accordingly, provide a
may stem from
common denominator
flexible,
a
type
more democratic nexus,
a unity in diversity rather than another counter-uniformitarian-
ism.
Third, we should realize that the cure radical empiricism proposed for intellectual absolutism was stultified when it, itself,
became
arbitrary
and dogmatic. With
behaviorism, positivism, and what not
—
its
it fell
later variants
increasingly into
the hands of the empirical monists, who, in the cause of scien-
squeezed values and ideals out completely in a Not all the recalcitrance, therefore, was on the side of those disciplines and doctrines, which, being concerned with the vital interests of "value" as contrasted with "fact," are after all functionally vital in our intellectual tific
objectivity,
fanatical cult of "fact."
and tradition. Today, we are more ready to recognize them and concede these value considerations a place, though not necessarily to recognize or condone them in the arbitrary and life
authoritarian guise they
dicating
some
of
its
still
too often assume.
encouraging to see empiricism abformer arbitrary hardness and toning down
In this connection,
it
is
toward the more traditional value disciplines. This is a wise and potentially profitable concession on the part of science to the elder sisters, philosophy and religion, especially if it can be made the quid pro quo of their renunciation, in turn, of their dogmatic absolutisms. The adits
intransigent attitudes
mirable paper of Professor Morris, prepared ference, does just this,
I
think,
for
this
by redefining a more
con-
liberal
and humane empiricism, which not only recognizes "values," but provides, on the basis of sound reservations as to the basic primacy of factual knowledge, for reconcilable supplementations of our knowledge of fact by value interpretations and even by value systems and creeds. This reverses the previous
Science, Philosophy
198
and Religion
tactic of empiricists to deny any validity to values and so to create a hopeless divide betw^een the sciences of fact and the
Here again, in this more liberal empiricism, plurahsm, and particularly value pluraHsm, has a sound and broadly acceptable basis of rapprochement to offer. Such rapvalue disciplines.
prochement being one of the main objectives as well as one of the crucial problems of this conference, it is perhaps relevant to propose the consideration of pluralism as a working base and solution for this problem. This would be all the more justified if it
could be shown that plurahsm was a proper and
congenial rationale for intellectual democracy. James, pluraHstically tempered, did not take the position, it is interesting to note, which many of his followers have taken. He did propose giving up for good and all the "game of
metaphysics" and the "false" and categorical rationahzing of values, but he did not advocate sterilizing the "will to believe" or abandoning the search for pragmatic sanctions for our values. As Horace Kallen aptly states it, "James insisted that each event of experience must be acknowledged for what it appears to be, and heard for its own claims. To neither doubt nor behef, datum nor preference, term nor relation, value nor fact, did he concede superiority over the others ... He pointed out to the rationahst the co-ordinate presence in experience
much more than reason; he called the monist's attention to the world's diversity; the plurahst's to its unity. said to the materiahst: You shall not shut your eyes to the immaterial; of so
He
You shall take cognizance also of the nona rationahst without unreason; an empiricist v/ithout prejudice. His empiricism was radical, preferring correctness to consistency, truth to logic."^ I do not quote for to the spirituahst:
spiritual.
He
was
complete agreement, because I think we have come to the point where we can and must go beyond this somewhat anarchic pluralism and relativism to a more systematic relativism. This becomes possible as we are able to discover through objective comparison of basic human values certain basic
equivalences
^"William James and Henri Bergson," pp. 10-11.
Science, Philosophy
among them, which we may
and Religion
warrantably
call
199
"functional con-
outmoded catestants" to take scientifically the place of our However, the "universals." goricals and our banned arbitrary values invahdate to intend not present point is that James did creeds abolish to or categoricals in his attack on absolutes and dogma. Nor was he intent on deepening the divide in assailing
between science, philosophy and religion: on the contrary, he was hoping for a new rapprochement and unity among diem, metaonce philosophy and religion had renounced absolutist its dogmatisms. seen, such rapprochement possible? As we have already concessions. make only if empiricists and rationahsts both provide, Further, these concessions must be comparable, and
physics and Is
workable base of contact. From either side this And lest the concession proposed for the value
in addition, a is
difficult.
disciplines
seem unequal or unduly
great, let us
make note
of
from the point the fact that it is a very considerable concession, the scientific of view of orthodox empiricism, to concede The materiahsm. monism of mechanism, determinism and makes for values, scientific point of view, by making a place complementary obviously the concession of plurahsm. In a should make concession, the value discipHnes, it seems to me, asks that they the concession of relativism. Frankly, this absolutes, not as values or even as preferred
dethrone their
values, but nonetheless as arbitrary universals,
whether they be
forms of the
state or society,"
"sole
ways of
salvation," "perfect
interpretation. Difficult or self evident intellectual systems of value systems, once as this may be for our various traditional with one another, they do so, they thereby not only make peace
but
make
also
an honorable peace widi science. For, auto-
interpretations of matically in so doing, they cease to be rival of science to function the is it which reality that objective versions of monopoHstic or explain, and analyze, measure is, similarly, the busiit which experience, and nature
human
ness of social science to record
Such
value pluralism, with
and
its
describe.
corollary of relativity, admit-
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
200
tedly entails initial losses for the traditional claims and prestige of our value systems. But it also holds out to them an effective
pax romana of values,
and more permanent
greater
v/ith
eventual gains. It calls, in the first place, for a resolving or at
an abatement of the chronic internecine conflict of competing absolutes, now so hopelessly snared in mutual contradictoriness. Not that there must be, in consequence of this
least
view, an anarchy or a complete downfall of values, but rather that there should be only relative and functional rightness, with no throne or absolute sovereignty in dispute. relativistic
To
intelligent partisans, especially those
who
can come within
hailing distance of Royce's principle of "loyalty to loyalty," such value reciprocity might be acceptable and welcome. As we shall see later, this principle has vital relevance to the
question of a democracy
of values,
which
basically
whole entails
value tolerance.
There would also be as a further possibiHty of such value relativism a more objective confirmation of many basic human values, and on a basis of proof approximating scientific validity. For if once this broader relativistic approach could discover beneath the expected culture differentials of time and place such functional "universals" as actually may be there, these common-denominator values would stand out as pragmatically
confirmed by
common human
experience.
Either
their
ob-
servable generality or their comparatively established equiva-
lence
would give them
status far
beyond any "universals" merely
asserted by orthodox dogmatisms. justification
would then not be
cepted scientific criterion of proof
human
And
the standard of value
so very different
—confirmable
from the
ac-
invariability in
and most prized "universals" would reappear, clothed with a newly acquired vitality and a pragmatic vaHdity of general concurrence. So confirmed, they would be more widely acceptable and more objectively justified than would ever be possible either by the arbitrary fiat concrete
experience. After an apparent downfall
temporary banishment,
many
of our
of belief or the brittle criterion of logical consistency. Para-
/
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
201
doxically enough, then, the pluraHstic approach to values opens
the
way
to a universaHty
and
objectivity for
them quite beyond demands
the reach of the a priori assertions and dogmatic
which characterize
More toward
their rational
and orthodox promulgations.
important, however, than what this view contributes a
realistic
understanding of values, are the clues
it
and consistent way of holding and advocating them. It is here that a basic connection between pluralism and intellectual democracy becomes evident. In the pluralistic frame of reference value dogmatism is outlawed. A consistent application of this invalidation would sever the offers for a
more
practical
trunk nerves of bigotry or arbitrary orthodoxy line,
all
along the
applying to religious, ideological and cultural as well as
and social values. Value profession or adherence would need to be critical and selective and tentative (in the sense that science is tentative) and revisionist in procedure rather than dogmatic, final and en bloc. One can to political
on
that basis
visualize
the
difference by
saying that with any articles of
would need independent scrutiny and justification and would stand, fall or be revised, be accepted, rejected or qualified accordingly. Fundamentalism of the "all or none" or "this goes with it" varieties could neither be demanded, expected nor tolerated. Value assertion would thus faith,
each
article
be a tolerant assertion of preference, not an intolerant insistence
on agreement or finality. Value disciplines would take on the tentative and revisionist procedure of natural science. Now such a rationale is needed for the effective implementation of the practical corollaries of value pluralism
and value
—tolerance
and one might add, as a sturdier intellectual base for democracy. We know, of course, that we cannot get tolerance from a fanatic or reciprocity from a fundamentalist of any stripe, religious, philosophical, cultural, political or ideological. But what is often overlooked is that we cannot, soundly and safely at least, preach liberalism and at the same time abet and condone bigotry, condemn uniformitarianism and placate orthodoxy, promote tolerance and harbor the reciprocity,
Science, Philosophy
202
seeds of intolerance.
and Religion
suggest that our duty to democracy on
I
the plane of ideas, especially in time of
of just this problem and
crisis, is
some consideration
of
the analysis possible
its
solution.
In this connection that
we
are for the
at the core of
may
that this tions of
it is
necessary to recall an earlier statement
most part unaware of the
many
latent absolutism
and of the
of our traditional loyalties,
fact
very well condition current concepts and sanc-
democracy. The fundamentalist lineage of "hundred
per-centism," for
all
only too obvious.
It is a
its
ancient and sacrosanct derivation, heritage and carry-over
from
is
religious
dogmatism and extends its blind sectarian loyalties to the secular order. So hoary and traditional is it that one marvels that it could still be a typical and acceptable norm of patriotism, Equally obvious
political or cultural.
the secular
dogma
of
"my
is
the absolutist loyalty of
country, right or wrong." Such
instances confront us with the paradox of democratic loyalties
conceived,
absolutistically
dogmatically
democratically practiced. Far too
much
sanctioned
and undemo-
of our present
and practice is cast in the mold of such blind and en bloc rationalization, with too many of our citizens the best of democrats for the worst of reasons mere conformity. Apart from the theoretical absolutistic taint, it should be disconcerting to ponder that by the same token, if transported, these citizens would be "perfect" Nazis and the cratic creed
loyalty
—
best of totalitarians.
—
come to less obvious instances our democratic tolerwhose uniqueness and quantity we can boast with some warrant, seems on close scrutiny qualitatively weak and unstable. It is uncritical because propagated on too emotional and too abstract a basis. Not being anchored in any definite But
ance
to
—of
intellectual base,
challenge.
Some
indifference
and
quainted with
when
it is
is
too easily set aside in time of stress and
tolerance only in name, for
laissez faire rationalized.
how
it
may blow away
We
are
it
all
is
simply
sadly ac-
in time of crisis or
challenged by self-interest, and
how under
break
stress
we
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
203
all, unreasonably biased in favor of "our be the mores, ideas, faiths or merely "our
find ourselves, after
own," whether
it
crowd." This
a sure sign that value bigotry
is
deep-rooted there.
Under
is
the surface of such
some unreconstructed dogmatisms
lie,
somehow frail
still
tolerance
the latent source of the
emerging intolerance. This is apt to happen to any attitude lacking the stamina of deep intellectual conviction, that has been nurtured on abstract sentiment, and that has not been buttressed by an objective conception of one's own values and loyalties.
Democratic professions to the contrary, there is a reason for shallow tolerance, this grudging and fickle reciprocity, this blind and fanatical loyalty persisting in our social beall this
Democracy has promulgated these virtues and ideals and habits of thought has not implemented them successfully. First, they have been based on moral abstractions, with vague sentimental sanctions as "virtues" and "ideals," since, on the whole, idealistic liberalism and good-will havior.
zealously, but as attitudes
humanitarianism have nursed our democratic tradition. Rarely have these attitudes been connected sensibly with self-interest
bound up with
toward one's been the case, a sturdier tolerance and a readier reciprocity would have ensued, and with them a more enlightened type of social loyalty.
or realistically
own
position and
But
a
its
values.
more enlightened
a perspective turned
Had
this
loyalty involves of necessity a less
bigoted national and cultural tradition. Democratic liberalism, generation and by its and philosophical tradiof democracy too closely to author-
limited both by the viewpoint of
its
close affiliation with doctrinal religious tions,
modeled
its
itarian patterns,
rationale
and made
a creed of democratic
principles.
For wide acceptance or easy assent it condoned or compromised with too much dogmatism and orthodoxy. Outmoded scientifically and ideologically today, this dogmatism is the refuge of too much provincialism, intolerance and prejudice to be a healthy, expanding contemporary base for democracy. Our democratic values require an equally liberal but also a
Science, Philosophy
204
and Religion
more scientific and realistic rationale today. This is why we presume to suggest pluralism as a more appropriate and effective
democratic rationale.
We
must
own particular institutions and own specific values, and we could were desirable, uproot our own traditions and
live in
terms of our
mores, assert and cherish our not,
even
loyalties.
if it
But that
is
no
justification for identifying
them en
bloc with an ideal like democracy, as though they were a perfect
concept itself. So the minds from such hypostasizing, from its provincial limitations and dogmatic bias, is by way of a relativism which reveals our values in proper objective perspective with other sets of values. Through this we may arrive at some clearer recognition of the basic unity or correspondence of our values with those of other men, however dissimilar they may appear on the surface or however differently they may be systematized and sanctioned. Discriminating objective comparison of this sort, using the same yardstick, can alone give us proper social and cultural scale and perspective. Toward
set of architectural specifications for the
only
way
this
end, value pluralism has a point of view able to
of freeing our
lift
us
and ethnocentric predicaments which are This should temper our loyalties involved. without exception intelligence tolerance and scotch the potential fanatiwith and lurk under blind loyalty and which otherwise cism and bigotry dogmatic faith in our values. We can then take on our particular value systems with temperate and enlightened attachment, and can be sectarian without provincialism and loyal
out of the egocentric
without intolerance. Since the relativist point of view focuses in an immediately
own group no rare and distant principle, but has, once in-
transformed relationship and attitude toward one's values,
it
stated,
practical progressive
has
is
applicability
more chances thus of becoming
to
everyday
life.
It
Most importhe form that
habitual.
—
it breaks down the worship of dangerous identification of the symbol with the value, which is the prime psychological root of the fallacies and errors we
tantly perhaps,
— Science, Philosophy
have been discussing.
We
and Religion
might pose
205
an between the symbol and form of its loyalty and the essence and objective of that loyalty. Such critical insight, for example, would enlightened value loyalty that
it is
it
as the acid test for
able to distinguish
recognize a real basic similarity or functional equivalence in other values, even difference. superficial
when cloaked
in
considerable superficial
Nor, on the other hand, would it credit any merely conformity with real loyalty. And so, the viewpoint
equips us not only to tolerate difference but enables us to bridge divergence by recognizing commonality wherever present. In social practice this
is
no
scholastic virtue;
it
has high practical
premium upon equivalence not upon identity, calls for co-operation rather than for conformity and promotes reciprocity instead of factional antagonism. Authoritarianism, dogmatism and bigotry just cannot take root and grow in such intellectual soil. Finally, we may assess the possible gains under this more consequences for democratic
living, since
it
puts the
pragmatic and progressive rationale for democratic thought
and action
briefly
under two heads: what these fresh and
stimulating sanctions promise internally for democracy on the national front
and what they require externally on the interwhat is vaguely all too vaguely
—
national front in terms of styled world democracy.
For democracy in its internal aspects, much of pluralism's would consist in a more practical implementation of the traditional democratic values, but there would also be some new sanctions and emphases. So far, of course, as these things can be intellectually implemented, new support would un-
gains
questionably be given to the enlargement of the democratic life,
and quite
correction of
its
as
importantly,
some concern taken
aberrations and abuses.
particular impetus needs to be given
On
for
the
the corrective side,
toward the liberalizing
more effective proand integration of minority and non-conformist groups,
of democracy's tradition of tolerance, to tection
for the protection of the
majority
itself
against illiberaUsm,
bigotry and cultural conceit, and toward the tempering of the
Science, Philosophy
2o6
quality of patriotism tioiis,
the
put
already
and sub-group
campaign special
"cultural pluralism"
and Religion
for
loyalties.
As
to
new
sanc-
re-vamping of democracy has
the
emphasis on what is currently styled a proposed liberal rationale for our
as
national democracy. This indeed
but a corollary of the
is
and pluralism under discussion. Under it, much can be done toward the more effective bridging of the divergencies of institutional life and traditions which, though sometimes conceived as peculiarly characteristic of American society, are rapidly becoming typical of all cosmopolitan modern society. These principles call for promoting respect for diflarger
relativism
ference, for safeguarding respect for the individual, thus pre-
venting the submergence of the individual in enforced conformity, and for the promotion of
commonaUty over and above
such differences. Finally, more on the intellectual tional motivation
is
side, addi-
generated for the reinforcement of
traditional democratic freedoms, but
most
all
the
particularly for the
freedom of the mind. For it is in the field of social thinking that freedom of the mind can be most practically established, and no more direct path to that exists than through the promotion of an unbiased scientific conception of the place of the national culture in the world.
For democracy
and However, the world crisis poses the issues clearly enough. Democracy has encountered a fighting antithesis, and has awakened from considerable lethargy and decadence to a sharpened realization of its own basic values. This should lead ultimately to a clarified view of its in
its
external aspects both the situation
the prospects are less clear.
The crisis holds also the potential gain understanding on the part of democracy of
ultimate objectives. of
more
its
own
realistic
shortcomings,
antithesis as well as
its
since
if
political
totalitarianism
enemy,
it
must
is
its
moral
fight internally
to purge its own culture of the totaHtarian qualities of dogmatism, absolutism and tyranny, latent and actual. Yet as a nation we are vague about world democracy and none too well equipped for its prosecution. It was our intel-
— Science, Philosophy
and Religion
207
lectual unpreparedness as a nation for thinking consistently in
any such terms which stultified our initiative in the peace of 1918 and our participation in the germinal efforts of a democratic world order under the League of Nations plan, or should we say concept, since the plan minimized it so seriously? Today
we
again,
stand aghast before a self-created dilemma of an
impracticable national provinciality of isolationism and a vague idea of a world order
made
pattern of our own. There
over presumably on an enlarged
we
on identifying forms and culture values of its becoming a presumptuous, even though well-intentioned idealistic uniformitarianism. Should this be is
danger,
such a cause arbitrarily with our
if
own
insist
institutional
the case, then only a force crusade for democratic uniformi-
tarianism
is
in prospect, for that could never
come about by
force of persuasion.
here that the defective perspective of our patriotism and
It is
our culture values reveals
seriously limiting character. This
its
intellectually the greatest single obstacle to
is
way
any extension of
on an international scale. Surely here the need for the insight and practical sanity of the pluralistic viewpoint is clear. There is a reasonable chance of success to the extent we can disengage the objectives of democracy from the particular institutional forms by which we practice it, and can pierce through to common denominators of equivalent the democratic
of
life
objectives.
The
problems of the peace, should it will be the discovery of the necessary common denominators and the basic equivalences involved in a democratic world order or democracy on a world scale. I do not hazard to guess at them; but certain specificalie
intellectual core of the
in our control
tions
may be
and leadership,
stated
which
they are to be successful.
I
A
believe they will have to meet,
if
reasonable democratic peace (like
no other peace before it) must integrate victors and vanquished and justly. With no shadow of cultural superiority, it must respectfully protect the cultural values and institutional forms and traditions of a vast congeries of peoples and races
alike,
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
2o8
European, Asiatic, African, American, Australasian. Somehow cultural pluralism may yield a touchstone for such thinking. Direct participational representation of all considerable groups must be provided for, although how imperialism is to concede this
almost beyond immediate imagining. That most ab-
is
our secular concepts, the autonomous, sacrosanct
solutistic of all
character of national sovereignty,
Daring
abridged.
voluntarily
worked out
if
must
surely be modified
reciprocities
have
will
to
and be
the basic traditional democratic freedoms are
ever to be transposed to world practice, not to mention the
complicated reconstruction of economic reciprocity will tical
demand
One
life
which consistent
suspects that the prac-
exigencies of world reconstruction will force
issues to solution
from the
come
the
mechanisms
in
many
of these
practical side, leaving us intellectuals
changes ex post facto. Out of the
to rationalize the
yet
in this field.
crisis
may
and ways that we have not had courage to think of forced
extension
of
democratic
values
since the days of democracy's early eighteenth century con-
ception,
sumed
when
was
it
naively, but perhaps very correctly as-
that to have validity at
all
democracy must have world
vogue.
What
intellectuals
cratic
way
some
sort of realistic
more
service
of life
is
can do for the extension of the demoto discipline
our thinking
critically into
world-mindedness. Broadening pur cultural values and tempering our orthodoxies is of infinitely to
enlarged democracy than direct praise and
advocacy of democracy
itself. For until broadened by relativism and reconstructed accordingly, our current democratic traditions and practice are not ready for world-wide application. Considerable political and cultural dogmatism, in the form of culture bias, nation worship, and racism, still stands in the way and must first be invalidated and abandoned. In sum, if we refuse to orient ourselves courageously and intelligently to a universe of peoples and cultures, and continue to base our prime values on fractional segments of nation, race, sect,
or particular types of institutional culture,
there
is
indeed
Science, Philosophy little
or
no hope
for a stable
cratic or otherwise.
and Religion
world order of any kind
Even when the segment
is
209
—demo-
itself a
demo-
expansion to world proportions will not necessarily create a world democracy. The democratic mind needs clarifying for the better guidance of the democratic will. cratic order, its
But fortunately, the same correctives needed for the sound maintenance of democracy are also the most promising basis for its expansion. The hostile forces both within and without are of the same type, and stem from absolutism of one sort
The initial suggestion of a vital connection between democracy and pluralism arose from the rather more apparent connection between absolutism and monism. But so destructive has pluralism been of the closed system thinking on which absolutist values and authoritarian dogmatisms thrive that it has proved itself no mere logical antithesis but their specific intellectual antidote. In the present crisis democracy needs the support of the most effective rationale available for the justification and defense of its characteristic values. While we should not be stampeded into pluralism merely by the present emergency, it is nonetheless our handiest intellectual weapon against the totalitarian challenge, but if, as we have seen, it or another.
can also
make
fied
a constructive contribution to the internal forti-
it is even more permanently and should on that score be doubly welcomed.
fication of
democracy, then
justi-
APPENDIX Lyman
Bryson:
am
with this paper, on all of its chief admire the conciseness and clarity with which it states so much that is a propos of the deliberations of this Conference. My comments are only notes added in the hope that they are what Professor Locke himself might have said in I
points,
heartily in accord
and
I
a longer discussion.
More could be made, weening desire
I
believe, of the dangers of the over-
for personal integration that fails to take into
Science, Philosophy
210
and Religion
account the fact that the personality,
some ways better By this I mean that
also, is in
off for the practice of a judicious pluralism.
we have a natural tendency toward an agglutination of values. we are loyal to one set of institutions, such as what we call "democracy," we are uncomfortable unless we assert that the other values, to which we may also be loyal, such as what we
If
call
"Christianity," are necessary to democracy.
ference meetings
we have heard many
can exist only in a Christian
At our Con-
assertions that
democracy and all
state, in spite of history
contemporary facts to the contrary. We are not content to say that democracy and the Christian-Judaic tradition are highly sympathetic with each other, or useful to each other. They must be, each to the other, sine qua non. Professor Locke might have pointed out that within each single pattern of loyalties an organic diversity may make not for weakness but for flexibility and strength. The author might also have pointed out, as was perhaps implied in some of the things he did have space for, that unity be-
comes the more desirable
as the issues rise in the levels of
Thus, roughly, we need not agree on how freedom should be used but we would still agree that it was a value to be supremely prized. We might agree on the importance of exercising political suffrage but disagree in our use of it. And still above this, we might argue about freedom but agree that values,
generality.
to be desirable, must contribute to the strength and dignity of men. The value that has been repeatedly called the chief good of democratic peoples, the supreme worth of the individual, is just such a value of the highest possible generality and we are dogmatic in our assertion of it. Diversity does not have the same utility on all levels but, one must add, an authoritarian determination of the levels on which diversity can be permitted is a very effective enslavement. I would have enjoyed a discus-
sion of this point in the paper. I
could wish, also, that there had been more space to consider
the importance of diversity, or plural systems of values, in relation to social change. It
formation,
when
diversity
of greatest importance. It
change with
less cost
is is is
when most
a culture
is
difficult to
undergoing trans-
maintain, that
true, I think, that pluralistic
and more
eflSciency,
it is
groups
whenever environ-
i
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
211
ment makes change
rationally desirable, than do any other kinds one of the strongest arguments in favor of democratic procedures in all forms of social decision.
of groups. This
Erwin
R.
is
Goodenough:
The Conference was
originally called together to see what and theologians could do to unite the more abstract thought and thinkers of the present in defending democracy. We were alarmed at what we had seen happen to our ideas (and our kind) in Russia, Italy and Germany, and we met to defend our way of life and thought and to strengthen the organization of society which makes such life and thought scientists, philosophers,
possible.
This paper
is
one of the few which seemed to me presented That philosophy which
in the original spirit of our meeting.
recognizes the conflict of various suggested ultimates and axioms
and the complete inadequacy of our data
to select
between them
(as witnessed by the inability of reasoning philosophers of dif-
ferent schools to convince each other by reasoning); that philos-
ophy which tries to take the very conflict as its starting point and develop a modus vivendi out of it, is called pluralism. It is satisfactory to no one, or to very few, as an ultimate philosophy. Certainly Professor Locke is peering behind and beyond it as steadily, as wistfully, as any idealist. He proposes it, and I enthusiastically support it, precisely for what it is a way of uniting for action in a world of conflict and ignorance. It is a typically American philosophy, or at least Anglo-Saxon, and it is not coincidence that it is best understood in the countries most bitterly opposed to totalitarianism. Over and again the various absolutist philosophies suggested in the Conference have shown that once in power they would be dangerously like the closed systems (at least in being closed), which we want to oppress. Here is genuinely the philosophy of democracy not a very brilliant philosophy, as democracy itself is not a very brilliant form of organizing society, but still the philosophy which made democratic arguments, from those in the village store to those in the Senate, possible. I am sure that if we go on to discuss more practical problems at next year's meeting, our discussion will be based, tacitly if not otherwise, upon the wise principles
—
—
Science, Philosophy
212
Professor Locke has set forth.
I
discussion of practical problems
and Religion
am
still
more
sure that
not thus based,
is
it
if
our
will get
nowhere.
Lawrence K. Frank: In emphasizing the need for pluralistic understanding, this paper has pointed to an exceedingly important problem that will face the post- World War. If we look forward to the consort of world order in which the peoples of and religions can participate, we will need a pluralistic understanding and a broader, more sympathetic approach to many of the exigent questions of human welfare and social order; otherwise a parochial devotion to our own metaphysics and religious convictions, however precious to us, will inevitably hamper us in any attempt to achieve world order and peace in concert with peoples whose cultural traditions and beliefs are so radically different from our own. In pleading for a relativistic approach to our own values and to those of other peoples and in calling for a recognition of
struction of
some
different cultures
equivalents in cultures rather than
Locke has contributed something sideration of
all
demanding
identity. Dr.
that merits the careful con-
those participating in this conference.
such understanding,
we
are
more than
liable to
Without
continue the
same dogmatic intolerance that has so long blighted Western European culture and blinded us to the values and virtues which other peoples, often with longer and richer historical pasts than we, cherish as their
way
of
life.
CHAPTER
XI
Empiricism, Religion, and Democracy
By
CHARLES W. MORRIS University of Chicago
I.
AUGUSTE coMTE oncc remarked that the ultimate
conflict
would be between positivism and scholasticism. The scholastics, or at least some who speak in their name, seem to be willing to force the issue into these terms. The more intemperate among them wish to ascribe the disloca-
in philosophy
contemporary culture to the spread of the empirical temper of mind; the more diplomatic wish to limit empiricism to the sphere of science in order to supplement it by the higher tions of
truth
of
a
metaphysical philosophy.
boldly accept this challenge.
It is
The
empiricist
should
not enough that he limit his
formulation and confirmation of scientific statements in the special fields of science. He must question the analyses of contemporary culture with which he is confronted and in terms of which he is damned; he must attack the metaphysical super-structure which his opponents graft upon the edifice he so laboriously and cautiously erects; he must show that there is a way (or ways) of life a rich, dynamic, satisfying life compatible with his attitude; he must deny that his opponents have a monopoly on the defense of the religious and cultural traditions of man; he must see to it that his own attitude clothes itself with esthetic, religious and political symbols adequate to serve in the enhancement and activity to the
—
—
direction of
The
life.
empiricist
is
not merely faced with opposing forces of 213
Science, Philosophy
214
and Religion
own
great magnitude; he remains his
He
worst enemy.
has so
discipHned himself in the control by observation of the state-
ments he permits himself that he has become
modes
all
distrustful of
of expression other than the scientific. Ill-adapted
himself to such modes of expression, frequently lacking in imagination and non-scientific forms of sensitivity, he has not
merely himself failed to round out his
own
but he has
life,
often seemed to belittle, to restrain, to frustrate those forms of
human
activity in the arts
and
religions which, in a purified
form, he should encourage and release.
It is
a serious question
whether the empiricist can arise to the contemporary challenge and opportunity. The opportunity is his. There are large groups
among
of persons
the
youth,
religionists, the scientists,
older religious and political symbols physical sanction in
—have
workers, the
the
and the technologists
— claiming
artists,
for
whom
the
the
a special meta-
lost their force. If there
is
confusion
contemporary culture, there are also deep sources of energy,
frustrated
new
aspirations,
beginnings,
movements hovering
on the verge of consummation, untapped sources of heroism. If the empiricist can overcome his own frustrations, and develop or encourage others to develop a clear program for living, he may
rally these forces for a
powerful, integrated, and per-
haps successful opposition to the counter-Enlightenment and counter-Reformation which threatens to spread over niankind. 2.
Empiricism,
attitude,
the
is
when
expressed as a theory rather than as an
a theory of
meaning.
Greek medical schools down
From
its
early formulations in
to the present
it
has stated
its
case in terms of the theory of signs.
Roughly
theory that the reference of signs
either to such objects as
is
stated,
it
is
the
have been observed or to objects with properties which are a combination of properties of observed objects; and that "knowl-
edge"
is
a
term applied
to statements to the degree that there
observable evidence that what the statements affirm
is
is
in fact
the case. Newton's formulation in the "Principles of Natural
Knowledge"
of the last
two Rules of Reasoning
in Philosophy
Science, Philosophy states
approximately
the
meaning and knowledge "Rule
III.
The
and Religion
empiricist
position
215
that
referential
are a function of observation:
qualities of bodies,
which admit neither
in-
tension nor remission of degrees, and which are found to beall bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever. "Rule IV. In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions collected by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accurate,
long to
or liable to exceptions."
This liberal
is
more would give, but I think it contemper and method which empiricism
a liberal formulation of the empiricist position,
than
many
forms to the
empiricists
scientific
has professedly attempted to express. So formulated, empiricism
does not assert that a person can only refer to or
know an
object or situation which he personally can inspect;
it
does
not equate the limits of direct personal experience with the
meaning and knowledge. Statements about moon, the center of the earth, another person's toothache, the world before and after man, the genesis of experience, issue from the mouths of many scientists, and any variety of empiricism which would prohibit such statelimits of referential
the other side of the
ments, or claim that they are not knowledge, simply breaks
with the
scientific
rest his case
to
usage of signs.
on the claim
The
empiricist
had
better
that such references in science ascribe
the objects referred to only properties and combinations
of properties that have been found in directly observed ob-
and that such statements are to be admitted as knowledge only to the degree that there is empirically controlled evidence of objects having the properties ascribed to them. It jects,
was
a blind alley in the history of empiricism to say that a
person only "means" his
own
observes.
For
scientific
(or other persons') future "sen-
"knows" what he himself directly method rests on a socially funded body
sations," or that a person only
Science, Philosophy
2i6
of observations, and
it
and Religion
admits as evidence in particular infer-
ences the use of indirect evidence, provided the techniques involved in such indirect evidence are themselves capable of direct observational control: the testimony of other persons,
the use of telescope
and microscope, the evidence of photo-
used to confirm statements about happenings which a particular individual could not observe, since the rehability of testimony, telescope, microscope, and photo-
graphic plates are
graphic plate
is
all
capable in other cases of being directly con-
trolled.
Liberal as this version of empiricism
is, it
has,
when
general-
meaning, plenty of sting: it rules out the conception of a metaphysical philosophy proceeding by other methods than the method of science and obtaining more accurate or "fundamental" knowledge than that gained by science. It limits cosmology to the cosmos as presented by science, and it takes away the presumptuous claim of any statement about the world to be exempt from change as
ized as a theory of
new
all
referential
evidence accumulates.
to the question as to
how
We
will return at a later
moment
the empiricist interprets the claim of
certain metaphysicians to a super-scientific knowledge. 3.
So
far
we have
ing of signs
form
this
—
dealt with only
one aspect of the function-
the referential function; in so far as signs per-
function
we
them rejerors. That there are known; thus in the Hellenistic
shall call
other functions has long been
period Philodemus distinguished between the referential and
"emotive" functions of signs in words that could be
lifted
out
of contemporary discussion; and long before his time, Aristotle
had assigned to poetry and rhetoric sentences which were not statements. three additional functions of signs sive,
—the
the
We
investigation shall
of
distinguish
formative, the expres-
—
and the motivational and in so far as signs perform these we shall call them formors, expressors, and motiva-
functions tors.
A self:
formor
is
a sign
which
exhibits the
case-endings and parentheses
form of discourse
show what
it-
signs are to be
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
217
joined together, a certain set of letters presents the
rhyme
structure of the sonnet, a mathematical formula shows an interrelation
between mathematical symbols. The formor
as
formor
simply exhibits or determines a certain sign combination, and it
arises
from the need
show the inter-relations of signs when Whatever functions as a formor
to
a plurality of signs are used.
may
of course function also as a referor, an expressor, or a
must not be confused.
motivator, but the functions themselves
An
expressor
is
a sign
whose usage
normally accompanied
is
by a certain state of the user; under these circumstances the sign is said to express this state. Certain cries express pain; types
certain
of
usage
linguistic
who
schizophrenia; a person
mechanics expresses
express
the
condition
continually talks about
his interest in
modern
physics.
of
quantum Whether
we need not depends in part upon how the term "sign" is used. Nor is it important to note that all signs are expressors to some degree. But it must not be overlooked that when a sign which functions as an expressor is also a referor, the referential function and the expressive function must be distinguished, even in the case where what is expressed is also what is referred to. The music I play may express my sorrow, and it expressors are also referors
all
answer;
may but or
a
question
it
direct
my
some other
character.
A
more
attention
need not do
it
is
explicitly to this very sorrow,
and whether or not
so;
referential oflSce,
sign
which
for
it
some members
of a
forms a relatively constant referential function
among
different users in
verse situation also
A
motivator
is
may
a sign
or users of the sign. the attitude of the
its
its
community
may
this
expressive per-
vary widely
expressive function; and the con-
whose function
is
A motto is put above worker
to influence the user
the desk to determine
at the desk; a prayer
command
is
is
given to in-
uttered to secure the
co-operative behavior of others; an evaluation
which
performs
obtain.
fluence oneself or a deity; a
as to
it
retains
still
may be made
so
induce a particular attitude in oneself or others. That acts as a motivator
may
also
perform
referential,
forma-
Science, Philosophy
2i8
and Religion
and expressive functions, but, as the previous discussion makes clear, here, too, these functions should not be confused. tive,
Nevertheless, tion
cannot be ignored that the motivational func-
it
(and the expressive function, for that matter)
is
itself
often influenced by the adequate or inadequate performance of the other functions. I
The
motivational efficacy of a sign which
interest in another person
use to inculcate an
how convincingly I mand to practice jumping up there
may depend on
my own;
express this interest as
a
com-
in the air until one can stay
would not normally be followed by the desired
practice,
unless beUef could be induced in the statement that practice
can attain the result in question. In terms of these distinctions instances of linguistic
performed.
We
is
then analyze various
to discover the functions
can classify types of discourse in the same
terms: discourse tion
we can
communication
is
scientific in so far as the referential func-
performed, logico-mathematical in so far as the forma-
tive function
is
performed, esthetic in so far as the expressive
function dominates, motivational in so far as the signs operate as
motivators. All actual Hnguistic communication of course
displays
all
of these functions, so that, for example, a statement
of a scientist differs only in the degree to which the various
functions are present
from
a statement that
one "ought"
a certain thing. Nevertheless this matter of the degree to
to do which
the various functions are performed is of basic importance, and the functions which are performed are themselves functions which differ in kind and not in degree.
Though this discussion of the functioning of signs ignores many matters of detail, it suffices for our present purpose of understanding religious and ing to our main problem physician to his 4.
The
sharply;
political symbols.
we must attempt
meta-
lair.
issue in regard to metaphysics is it
But before turn-
to track the
may
at least
be stated
necessary, in analyzing the discourse of the meta-
physician, to admit referors
which transcend the empiricist's (and so make a distinc-
criterion of referential meaningfulness
Science, Philosophy tion
between metaphysical and
edge), or
is
it
and Religion
scientific
219
statements and knowl-
possible to analyze this discourse in terms of
referors of the type admitted by science, formors, expressors,
and motivators? The answer
is
by no means so sharp, partly
because of the question of the permissible limit of reference within empiricism and partly because the empiricist can pro-
ceed only by analyzing singly examples of metaphysical
dis-
course which are claimed to transcend analysis in terms of his
own
scientific
theory of signs. But a discussion of these two
points in turn can at least proceed far
enough
to allow a
moral
be drawn.
to
Let us approach the first point by an imaginative example. Imagine a community of men living on a cell in the blood stream of one of us, but so small that we have no evidence, direct or indirect, of their existence. Imagine further that they themselves are provided with scientific instruments of the
we
use, and possess a method of science and a body of knowledge comparable to ours. One of the bolder of these thinkers proposes the hypothesis that the world they inhabit is a Great Man. Is this hypothesis admissible on scientific grounds or is it to be laughed down by the Minute Empiricists on the ground that it is "metaphysical"? We Macroscopic Empiricists would at least seem to have to favor the hypothesis! But then why at our own level cannot a similar
types
scientific
we
hypothesis be raised: namely, that
Man,
the whole of our
known
portion of the Great Blood Stream?
how
are parts of a Great
universe being perhaps but a
And
if this
is
admissible,
rule out any metaphysical statement, for certainly
many
conceptions of the gods (say the Greek gods) seem modest speculation by comparison.
The the
liberal empiricist I
Minute Empiricists
have championed would side with
in asserting that the hypothesis
empirically meaningful since
Great
Man would
the
properties
ascribed
to
was the
be properties drawn from objects that had
been observed; he would merely say that in terms of the evidence available to them this hypothesis was too poorly con-
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
220
firmed to have a place in their system of
he might hope that their
knowledge;
scientific
Newton might remind them
to
hold
generahzations from observation, "notwithstanding any contrary hypothesis that may be imagined," until they had more
fast to
data
better to confirm or refute their generaliza-
upon which
tions.
The
the consequence
empiricist draws
that
many
of the
statements called metaphysical are empirically meaningful but so speculative because of absence of empirical evidence that they are not now to be taken seriously by science. Such statements are not empirically meaningless but simply not admissible to the existing corpus of scientific knowledge. By the same token they are not a rival kind of statement or knowledge.
Other kinds of utterances called metaphysical further
metaphysical referors.
good
utterances
When
confusion the is
the
will
empiricist
confusion
of
demand finds
formers
in
with
Aristotle says that the virtues are intrinsically
or that nothing can both be red
time, or cally
One
distinctions.
when Kant
and not red
at the
same
states that the good-will alone is intrinsi-
good, the empiricist will suspect that these utterances are
definitions
masquerading
as
genuine knowledge,
i.e.,
are for-
which simply explicate the structure of Aristotle's and Kant's language. There is ground to believe that this confusion is the major confusion of metaphysics, though it occasionally occurs in science as well. Another often
mers
("analytical" in nature)
noted confusion
ment about
is
signs
that of levels of discourse, so that a stateis
As
linguistic objects.
confused with a statement about nonPeirce suggests, characterizations of meta-
physics as the science of "being as being" illustrate this confusion, for
it
would seem (employing our terminology and not
Peirce's) that the
term "being"
ever any other sign denotes
denotata of
all
is
other referors)
about being would
fall
simply used to denote what-
(i.e.,
it
—and
designates the class of in
this
case
statements
within the theory of signs and not be
superior in knowledge to any other scientific statement.
Still
Science, Philosophy
another confusion
is
and Religion
caused by failing to
221
make important
dis-
tinctions witiiin the theory of signs itself. It does not follow
from the
fact that a sign signifies that
The terms
thing.
"centaur," "Apollo,"
are so used that one tell
it is
a centaur or Apollo
—and yet there may be no actual object which meets
the
exactly
"circle," for instance,
in possession of empirical criteria to
is
of any given object whether or not
or a circle
must denote some-
it
and
criteria.
To
that
say
Apollo,
centaurs,
circles
"subsist" or have "transempirical reality" or belong to the "intelligible
world,"
is
then simply a confused way of saying that
the corresponding terms are signs.
Platonic doctrine of "Ideas"
is
It is difficult to
see that the
anything more than such a con-
fusion.
The
is further complicated by the introduction and motivational factors found in works often presented as "metaphysical." Many, if not all, of the historically important philosophers have approved of one way of life rather than another, and have attempted to persuade others to
situation
of the expressive
share this approval. It pressors
And
often difficult to distinguish the ex-
is
and the motivators in
since, as
we have
for their efficacy
upon
the philosopher
is
their discourse
from the referors. dependent
seen, motivators are often
a belief in the truth of certain references,
tempted
to claim that his preferences are
by statements which are "absolutely true" and which, accordingly, are beyond the probabilism inherent in legitimated
scientific statements;
it
is
this
temptation which makes him
extremely susceptible to confusions of referors and formors,
and of various
levels of discourse.
is no rival to science knowledge. It is in this sense that the logical positivists spoke of metaphysics as "meaningless," i.e., as not exhibiting a class of referors distinct from those admitted by the empiricist's criterion. It turned out that use of the word "meaningless" was unfortunate because of its own high expressive and motivational character. Hence it is
If this analysis is correct,
and no repository of a
metaphysics
super-scientific
better to claim that metaphysical discourse
is
not a unique
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
222
type o£ statement or reference, and that the appearance that is so is a confusion resulting from the masquerading of
it
formors, expressors, and motivators in statemental form. This confusion is objectionable, not because any of these functions are objectionable, but precisely because the confusion of functions,
when
detected by a
mind, miHtates against the
critical
adequate performance of the various functions themselves. Unless the philosopher is to be classed Wixh the propagandist, he must, out of his very concern for science and art and morality, free himself
from the confusion of metaphysics. The
death of metaphysics
is
not the death of philosophy; but the
philosophy which remains
is
and purified philosophy
a mature
and not the child of confusion.
The adequacy by
its
must be tested and utterances pre-
of this analysis of metaphysics
application to particular doctrines
sented as instances of metaphysics. This
an empirical theory
is
and not a dogma. an open one suggests as
as to the nature of metaphysical discourse
But the
fact that the issue
is
at least
a moral that the significant issues life
are not to be
and
institutions of
made dependent upon
human
metaphysics, and that
the claim of any particular metaphysician to have the answer to
human
suspicion. religion 5.
destiny in his hands
How,
and
to
is
be looked upon with
then, does the empiricist approach the field of
social action?
In "Man's Search for the
Good
Life,"
A. E. Haydon char-
acterizes religion in the following terms:
"Any religion, as the social search of man for the satisfactions that make life complete, always finds expression historically in a three-fold complex of ideal, technique, and world view. The ideal consists of those values visualized as the perfect fulfill-
ment
of socially approved desires.
The technique includes the The world view
authorized means of securing those values.
orients the value quest to the forces of the extrahuman environment. These three phases are an integral unity. They constitute
the body of a religion. The moves through successive
living soul
which uses the body and new em-
ages, continually creating
Science, Philosophy bodiments,
is
and Religion
the socially channeled drive of
human
223 desires for-
ever hungrily hoping for the realization of the unattained." (p. 89)
This analysis of religion seems to be confirmed by an analysis of religious discourse. Religious language is charged with ex-
which indicate approval by an individual or group of supreme goals of life rather than others; rich in motivators which aim to induce a certain way of
pressors
individuals of certain it is
life
believed to lead to the attainment of the preferred goal;
and
it
contains statements about the world which are felt to
and the recommended techniques. one example among others that a religion need not rest on mythology or on a system of metaphysics; yet it is true and later Buddhism is no exception that religions have normally called mythology and metaphysics to their aid. The reason for this is not difficult to see. Mythology, in common with religious and metaphysical discourse, contains signs functioning in all the ways we have characterized, but its unique feature is found in the dominance of expressors which embody in an esthetic, and hence vividly apprehensible, form certain approved or disapproved values by exhibiting them as characteristics of imagined persons. The myths of justify
Early
the approved goal
Buddhism
is
—
—
Apollo, of Dionysus, of
Buddha present
to
the imagination
and actions which the devotees of the Apollonian, Dionysian, and Buddhistic religions wish to realize in their own lives. Mythology comes to the aid of the religious quest by furnishing examples of the type of life which the religious techniques aim to induce. The
individuals with the characteristic attitudes
temptation for religion to
from the attempt
to give a
jurisdiction over alternative
call
metaphysics to
way
of
life
ways of
strengthen the motivational appeal of
with
its
stress
on
its
aid,
arises
absolute validity and
life
—and
its
thus again to
symbols.
Buddhism
self-sufficiency, utilized in its later
develop-
ment an idealistic metaphysics; Christianity with its focus upon love, utilized a realistic and transcendental metaphysics to establish the existence of the appropriate
Beloved.
From
Science, Philosophy
224 their
own
side,
and Religion
most systems of metaphysics have functioned
within the context of a rehgious attitude which they, however imphcitly, serve to justify: Plato and Aristotle are the philosophical expression of the Apollonian facet of tion, Spinoza's
metaphysics
is
Greek
civiliza-
explicitly set in the context of a
Kant has not been inaptly called the Whatever the use made by of mythology and metaphysics, it remains true that seen empirically, is a way of life directed to indior socially approved goals, and that religious discourse,
quest for salvation, philosopher religion religion,
vidually
of
while utilizing
Protestantism.
all
types of signs,
is
predominantly motiva-
tional.
The signs,
empiricist, is
ingless,"
if
equipped with an adequate theory of is "mean-
not driven to assert that religious discourse
and need not find himself in opposition
religious quest.
He
will, it is true, as in the case of
to
the
metaphysics,
deny that religion gives a super-scientific (or super-empirical) knowledge of the world or human nature, and he will attempt to unscramble the confusions that religion has encountered in its present unholy alliance with metaphysics. In doing this he need not deny that religious terms may be referors; indeed such terms as "Apollo" are as meaningful as "centaur" or even as "horse." But he will insist that the referential aspect of religious terms be not confused with their expressive and motivational character, and that whether a referentially meaningful term does or does not denote something must be determined within the framework of the empirical criterion of knowledge. He can even admit that there is a scientific aspect to controversies over alternative ways of life: how possible a proposed way of life is in the light of knowledge of human nature, the
commitments to various types of indiwhat historical factors seem at a given time to favor one way of life rather than another, what consequences to the individual and society will ensue if a specific relation of religious
viduals
and
societies,
orientation of insist that
life is adopted. Nevertheless the empiricist will an element of choice remains, that religion is not
Science, Philosophy science,
and Religion
and that the rehgious use of symbols
should not for the good of religion scientific usage.
The
empiricist
must
itself
225 is
not
—and —the
pretend to be
in the nature of the case
admit the human need of orientation which underlies the religious quest, for in one way or another, whatever terms he may use or avoid, this problem is also his problem. He can even
and hope that his analysis may help to liberate the energy and the courage needed for the elaboration of expressive and feel
motivational symbols adequate to the orientational needs of
contemporary men. Though he may balk at some of the terms, there is nothing in his position which would prevent him from accepting the essential truth of these (unpubUshed) words by H. N. Wieman:
The way must be cleared for the prophet to see the stark God, undimmed and undistorted by old imaginative
reality of
constructions which once were myths but are so no longer.
The
empirical reality of
God must
be set forth in abstract
propositions which can meet the test of truth.
We
repeat, these
abstract propositions are never sufficient for religious living.
But the prophet by means of them may have new and vital myths.
his vision
suffi-
ciently cleared to develop
The contemporary crisis of religion has two important For many persons, though not for all, the traditional symbols of religion have lost much of their power. These sym-
6.
aspects.
bols
had hnked
their fate
with the question
as
to the truth
or falsity of certain statements about the universe.
Some
these statements were subject to empirical confirmation,
of
and
with the development of science came to be regarded as false or highly improbable. Others which claimed to be "metaphysical" were tarnished by the conflicts of systems of meta-
and by the growing conviction among scientifically trained minds that something was wrong with metaphysics itself. The result in both cases was that the motivational efficacy of the symbols was weakened as the truth of the references of these symbols, upon which their character of motivators had in part depended, became questionable. physics,
Science, Philosophy
226
and Religion
A
corresponding loss of appeal arose in the fact that the traditional religious symbols no longer expressed for many people the goals which they were in fact seeking or even wanted to seek. Just as many later Greeks no longer saw in the image of Apollo the reflection of themselves or of their ideal of so did
many Western Europeans
fail to
man,
find an adequate repre-
sentation of themselves or their aspirations in, say, the image
Some of those who did cHng to the Christ ideal began doubt the adequacy of the inherited religious techniques for reaching this ideal, and were confused by the relation of these techniques to those which a new society and a new science of Christ. to
had put at their disposal. Since the power of a motivational symbol depends upon the acceptance of the goal with which it is linked and a belief in the efficacy of the techniques proposed to reach the goal, the power of the inherited religious symbols weakened with fluctuations in the goal and with the development of new techniques. It is this situation which presents the problem for contemporary religion. For those to whom the historical religions are adequate the problem is not acute. Those who believe that the symbols of these religions can be restored to power at least have a direction given to their lives by a clear-cut task. But for many others the problem of a total orientation of their personalities is a pressing problem, and can only be met by drastic measures: in one way or another they must evolve a new religious attitude. New expressors, new motivators must be developed; the problem is where and how. The acceptance of the empirical attitude does not itself answer this problem, but it at least shows the possibility of an answer, and specifies some of the conditions which an answer must meet. As to the possibiHty of an answer, it is sufficient to instance again the religious power which scientifically-minded anti-metaphysical early Buddhism obtained. If one such way of life could be formulated, there is no reason why other ways, working within the same limitations, cannot be developed. There is nothing in the empiricist's attitude as such which need deny or hinder
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
227
the development of signs of high expressive and motivational
power. At the same time signs such power
if
v^^iil
not, to
an empiricist, have
they claim a type of reference which observation
does not support or
if
under analysis
their
pretended reference
To
turns out to rest on a confusion of linguistic usages. empiricist a
This
new
religion
must be compatible with
not to say that science or empiricism
is
hgious. Empiricism
is
the
science. is
re-
itself
and science
a theory of knowledge,
as
language to referors and such formers as function within scientific reference. In science the expressive such
restricts
its
and motivational functioning of
minimum;
even though the empirical religion
though present,
signs,
in religion such functioning
which has
scientist
is
will
at a
is
at a
maximum. And
be congenial to a
a place for his activity, that in itself will not
determine uniquely the choice of a religion: he could conexample, a Buddhist or an Apollonian.
sistently be, for It lies
turns out,
I
believe, that the heart of the religious
in the determination of
For
allegiance.
if
goal of this path
a religion is
to
what type of man is
become
essentially a
is
problem
to be given
path of
life,
a certain type of person.
the
The
path will vary with the choice as to the type of person given
The great religions of the world have varied with The basic question religion poses to the inWhat type of person do you wish to become? The
preference.
these choices.
dividual
is:
only within limits arbitrary, for it will be influenced by the nature of the person making the choice and by the community in which the chooser lives. But a choice it remains. choice
is
The
result of the choices
will
determine the religion or the reHgions of contemporary
man— and
which countless individuals make
will in turn exercise its influence
have in an
as yet
on future man.
I
unpublished book, "Paths of Life," tried to
analyze the present situation, to speak in favor of what
I call
Maitreyan man, and to show a type of expressive and motivational symbols which can give this image of man leverage upon the orientation of contemporary
Maitreya
is
life.
This proposed religion of
not, however, our present interest. I
have only
Science, Philosophy
228 wished
and Religion
problem of reUgion when envisaged within and to express my conviction that the heart of the contemporary problem of religion is to make clear what type of person is to be accepted as ideal. This has not been done adequately by the existing traditional religions or by humanist or pragmatist. If it can be done boldly, clearly, and convincingly enough, new and distinctive religious atto focus the
the context of empiricism,
titudes
may
yet supply initiative
and direction
to
contemporary
men and women. I
hope
not by
I
its
made
have
it
sufficiently clear that
mere existence or acceptance
but also sufficiently clear that struction, that
it
sets limits
and that by clearing
tion,
it
empiricism does
constitute a religion;
does permit religious recon-
upon the form of such reconstrucaway confusion and ornament it
allows the religious quest to stand forth in
all its
intensity
and
insistence. 7.
Religious motivators are directed to the total integration
and orientation of the personaHty; numerous other motivators function with respect to less comprehensive goals. The injunctions of law, of morality, of each of the technical arts (such as medicine or engineering), and of pohtical creeds, aim to induce
certain
modes
of practice felt to be efficacious in the realization
of specific goals.
We
will limit our consideration to the type of symbols which function in poHtical creeds, distinguishing (as in the case of art and esthetics, and of religion and the
study of religion) the symbols which aim to organize a social the terms by which the social scientist attempts
community and
to understand such symbols.
The terms by which the Marxian to bring about a new mode of
or the Fascist or the
Nazi aims
social
or
organization,
the terms by which the American American community, are the type of motivators which we have in mind. colonist organized the
A
motivator,
we have
seen, involves a goal to be reached,
a technique proposed to reach
it,
and a use of words designed and the mode of be-
to inculcate the acceptance of the goal
havior which the adoption of the technique requires.
The
Science, Philosophy parent will
who
is
and Religion
229
trying to get his resisting child to eat oatmeal
appeal to
(or
aim
to
an interest in "growing
create)
strong" or getting "curly locks"; he will clothe the goal in
and express (convincingly
attractive terms
if
he can) the
at-
tractiveness he finds in the goal; he will try to convince the
young barbarian
that oatmeal
use linguistic forms fective
is
the
way
to this goal;
(commands, "shoulds," and the
The among
in releasing behavior.
of
efficacy
the
he will
like)
ef-
motivator
others upon the expressive depends upon many factors, and referential aspects of the signs involved. If the person ad-
dressed does not share the goal, desirability of this goal
if
the conviction as to the
cannot be convincingly expressed, or
if
cannot be induced that the means proposed are the best means available to reach the goal, the motivator remains belief
inefficacious.
the
to
The main symbols
organization of a
means community, are motivators
of political creeds, as
social
highly expressive in quality, and are supported by statements
which claim to be true accounts of human nature, of present and historical social situations, and of the necessity of employing certain techniques to reach the end in question. Thus the Marxist symbolism expresses an identification with the interest of certain
types of persons, depicts difficulties in the
existing social organization, develops an elaborate interpretation of
the
human
make convincing
history to
course of this
future
a prediction as to
argues
history,
that
only
techniques can succeed under present conditions
certain
—with
the
purpose of uniting the persons appealed to in a course of cooperative action designed to reorganize the social structure. If the goal is not accepted, or the supporting statements are not believed, or
if
there
is
doubt
as to the
means proposed,
the Marxist symbols lose their efficacy.
The
rise of the
nature
its
efficacy has
is
Nazi
political
symbolism has been so recent, "Mein Kampf," and
so well illustrated in Hitler's
its
been so great that
it
is
a peculiarly significant
case for consideration.
Germany
after the First
World War had undergone
frustra-
Science, Philosophy
230 tions
which
prepared
the
soil
and Religion for
aggression.
Economic
conditions were precarious; national pride was wounded; the multiplication of political parties, itself an indication of inof opinion, had bogged down the parliamentary procedure; there was no dominant ideal or sense of direction to compensate people— especially young people—for existing deprivations. The main force which had served to furnish such ideals and direction was Marxist ideology and organization. Hitler responded with uncanny insight to the ternal differences
Rejecting the Marxist leadership (the
realities of this situation.
reasons ship
we
will not analyze),
would need
^
he saw that an alternative leaderand a counter organization,
v
a counter ideology
and he succeeded in supplying both. Through emphasis upon the symbol of the "nation" he at the same time rallied the distinctive forces of German culture and weakened the international orientation of the Marxist; "socialism" was the term used to capture the existing movement of the workers; the emphasis upon the "folk" served to justify the subordination of the individual to the life of the social whole; the myth of the "Aryan race" as the sole bearer of the high achievements of mankind was used to justify the program in historical terms
and
who
to validate the use of force against the "inferior" peoples
stood in the
way
of this dominance; the "aristocratic"
principle of nature preserving through struggle the "stronger"
be the "German" principle of the leader chosen by the people and henceforth personally responsible for carrying out the destiny of his people; individuals
and
parliamentarism
societies
was
was claimed
condemned
as
to
hostile
leadership; the intimation of a divine mission
to
responsible
which
God had
conferred upon the people through the chosen leader utilized
and moral emotions; the growing youth movement was captured by being provided the opportunity for extroverted physical activity and by being offered a dramatic cause needing heroic and self-sacrificing devotion. Hitler had seen the power of the spoken word; he diagnosed correctly the existing frustrated demands for emotionalized religious
^
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
231
he saw the importance of the constant reiteration of few impassioned slogans; he addressed himself directly to the young people and the workers, instead of to the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie from which he believed no decisive action was possible; he created as did Mohammed before the "believers and the fighters" necessary to carry his crusade to power. Here, "writ large," is exhibited the process by which one set of highly efficacious motivators came into being, and the way in which their functioning is inter-related with the expressive and the referential aspect of symbols. Hitler spoke with conviction and exemplified his convictions in his life. All the agencies of persuasion and force were employed to establish activity;
a
—
—
beUef in the truth of the statements used to buttress his rhetorical appeals.
He
formulate a way of
life
of
was aware that his problem was to which would enlist underlying energies
men. In the beginning he
of hfe, while ligious
— so
carefully insisted that this
more than economic, was
political
way
and not
that the existing religions could be utilized
re-
and
not antagonized. But as power was gained, the way of life he formulated became more and more imperious and insatiable; it progressively took on the character of a religious attitude hostile to all other
the ancient
ways of
Mohammedan
life. It
became
a
modern
pattern of salvation, and
version of its
crusade
dominate the earth a contemporary "holy war." 8. The rise and the power of this ideology and supporting organization is fraught with significance for alternative ways to
of
life.
Hitler, in expressing in
"Mein Kampf"
his
own
motiva-
view that any proposed alternative must adopt his tactics: "Political parties are inclined towards compromises, views of life never. Political parties count on opponents, views of life proclaim their infallibility. ... A view of life, filled with infernal intolerance, will be broken only by a new idea that is driven forward by a similar spirit, is fought for with the strongest will, but is pure and genuine throughout," Does such a counter idea exist, pure and genuine throughtion, generalizes the
out?
And
need
it
be
filled
with infernal intolerance.? Can a
Science, Philosophy
232
and Religion
Mohammedan pattern of salvation be met only by a stronger Mohammed? Is action unnerved unless it is based upon statements
felt to
in such a
As
be infallible?
Is
the empirical attitude unsettling
world condition and democratic procedure impotent?
regards empiricism, the situation
is
what we
similar to
found in the case of religious symbols: the empiricist can analyze and disentangle the functions performed by poHtical
The
symbols.
anthropologist has, for example, questioned the
objective reference of the term "race," particular. Sign-analysis can
make
and "Aryan race" in under
clear the conditions
which the Nazi symbols have gained their power, the goals they express, and the essentially motivational character of their appeal. It can make clear the human need for esthetic, political, and religious symbols outside the sphere of scientific reference. It can even suggest certain general conditions which symbols adequate for the performance of these needs must meet. But empiricism and the theory of signs cannot as such determine a way of life or create the symbols in which a way of life expresses and directs itself. Does democracy and its symbols gain clarification and strength through such analysis or are they weakened in the very process ? Is the "positivist" the friend of democracy or really the hidden enemy within its midst? First as to the term "democracy" itself. This term, in common
—
with other symbols of
political creeds, has a
marked
expressive
and motivational character. For many persons today this term has lost much of its efficacy. This is in part due to an unclarity as to what the term refers to and an unclarity as to what goal it is
as
intended to express.
The Germans
describe their society
democratic and the Russians theirs; some persons identify
economy, or with parliamentary democracy is a moral ideal for society and not a description of an existing state. In such a situation the continued use of the term is even open to ques-
democracy with the government; others a
tion;
it
is
understandable that some persons feel that
tinued usage to goals
capitalist
insist
—like
the term 'God'
and means. In any
—blocks
case, if the
realistic
term
is
its
con-
thinking as
used, a choice
»
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
233
and explanation of usage is required. I shall choose for this discussion the usage which makes democracy an ideal which some existing societies approximate but do not reach. A democratic society is envisaged as the ideal of a society which (i) is directed to the maximum development of each of its members; (2) beUeves that this development requires the voluntary participation of the individual in determining the future de-
velopment of the
society;
(3)
sees to
and
receives the material, intellectual, for his or her
commits
development and
itself to
that each individual
it
needed and (4)
cultural resources
social participation,
changes reached through the method
social
made decisions formed in the light of an accurate knowledge of the factors generating any specific problem. Democracy on this usage is thus a "dream" of a multiform, diversified, flexible, co-operative society, and a political way of socially
of hfe accepted for
must,
its
realization. In
it
ferences
and must take
if
its
concern for the
in-
consistent, be attentive to individual dif-
dividual
positive
action to provide the best
condition possible for the development of the individual; in
method
its
it
commits itself knowledge
tion of scientific
which look
its
it is
members sworn
in terms of its
at
encouragement and
to the
utiliza-
in the satisfaction of the interests
any time actually have; in its total outany social changes made
to the acceptance of
approved method provided that they in turn this method. A democratic society
permit the continuance of has as
and
its
as its
goal the enhancement of the
method
the intelligent participation of I
shall
life
of the individual,
the continual reconstruction of itself through
not here argue
how
its
members.
far
this
interpretation of the
term "democracy" corresponds with historical usage, though I should be willing to argue that it does correspond with a persistent phase of the American tradition. This analysis at least helps to sharpen the problem. For it makes clear that the commitment to democracy is a commitment to a goal and a method, and not to a set of metaphysical or religious dogmas, nor to the truth of certain statements about
human
nature or
Science, Philosophy
234
social systems.
and Religion
There can be no opposition of democracy and
the extension of science, since democracy needs the best scien-
knowledge it can obtain, and since its own method inmethod of science. Democracy is not a religion
tific
corporates the
and can
tolerate differences of religion in so far as they operate
within the framework of
its
social ideal;
it
can tolerate poHtical
and moral differences of opinion as to any existing institution as long as the steps taken to change the social structure accept its goal and proceed by its method.
American
society has at least taken steps in the direction of
ideal. What chance has it of surviving in totalitarianism? Its inevitable anti-totaliworld of rampant a
the democratic social
tarian complexity certainly puts
struggle for
it
at disadvantages. In a
which has simplified
society
bare
its
be-
suppressed differences of outlook, harnessed every seg-
liefs,
ment life
dominance a
of
its life
attains
itself
for
to a highly emotionalized
impressive power. struggle,
has
A
and intolerant way of
democratic society, girding
an uneasy conscience in using the
methods which the very condition of the struggle requires. It is in danger of confusing its own need of integration and leadership with the totalitarian type of integration and leadership which it repudiates. This is the major internal danger which the American development will witness. The danger can be mitigated
if it
be realized that certain forms of social
control and social change are essential for the carrying out of the democratic ideal
itself.
differences requires that
The
all
very utilization of individual
individuals be provided with the
which intelligent choice requires. We shall go much farther than we have gone in giving our people economic security, decent living conditions,
basic
resources
certainly have to to
longer vacations, opportunity to work, adequate the use of leisure time, better medical care,
facilities
for
and a more varied
and dramatic existence. Special interests will suffer in this process, and will resist; they will label every such advance, and every necessary extension of delegated leadership, as "sociaHstic" or "totahtarian."
Yet the
fact remains that diverse
i
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
235
common soil of the forest, and a men and women have in common,
trees are alike rooted in the
common meeting
of needs
need not imply an
insensitivity to individual differences
a regimentation of all phases of the cultural
nor
Democracy
life.
must provide the common
soil, but it need not reduce all its one form. There is indeed today too much standardization of action and opinion, drab uniformity, paralyz-
human
trees to
ing fear, tedious routine in American
there
life;
is
a need of
more American form of life is to maintain its appeal over its competitors. Given a clarification of its aims and methods, the courageous and concrete carrying out into practice of the implications of its ideals, the development of symbols adequate to express and protect its aspirations, the realization that positive action to make available to men and women the resources upon which their development depends is part of the democratic anti-totalitarian ideal, and the American society may yet harness its vast strength to meet the internal and external ordeals which it is destined to face. 9. In conclusion, I would like to return for a moment to empiricism and the empiricist. I hope I have made it clear that I do not regard the empiricist as the unique guardian of freer
imagination,
honest emotion,
if
bolder
thought,
greater
flexibility,
the
democracy, or empiricism
itself
as
uniquely implying a par-
ticular religion or social organization.
that the empiricist's attitude,
if
Yet
it
does seem to
me
taken liberally enough and
if
supported by an adequate theory of signs, has certain important
make
contemporary culture. Negatively the underbrush which realistic meeting of the contemporary issues of social life; positively it can elucidate the funcsymbols scientific and non-scientific perform, lay the ground for the creation of symbols to
contributions to
to
empiricist's attitude helps to clean out the
obscures the
and which
religious tions
—
—
and so help perform adequately those functions. The in science
fact that the empiricist
does not lose his drive through recognition that
the results of science at any time are only probable to later change, at least suggests that
and subject
some persons could
orient
Science, Philosophy
236
and Religion
that
and political life in the same spirit and in forms would bring them into no emotional or doctrinal con-
flict
with science. Since the motivational
their religious
efficacy
of symbols
which conflict or seem to conflict with scientific knowledge is weakened for those who have been touched by the scientific spirit, it would seem desirable that religious and political reconstruction avoid this conflict; conflict
can be avoided.
The
it is
important to see that
empiricist himself as a
this
human
being needs this reconstruction, just as a society accepting the
democratic method needs the results and methods of science
with which
Beyond in
it
this
is
allied.
empiricism as such does not go. Reconstruction
the arts, the
religions,
the
social
activity of artists, prophets, statesmen,
structure
demands
demands the the co-opera-
tion of youth, the workers, the scientist, the technologist, the
churches, the schools. Diversities of philosophy, of outlook, of
experimentation, of personality indicate vitality in a land
striv-
ing to be democratic; these diversities become weakening only if
the
struggle
and tension they involve
is
not carried on
democratically within the democratic process, to be resolved
where resolution is desirable or possible, to be in any case enjoyed and tolerated. Diversity of individuals acting within a uniformly accepted method: such unity in diversity
is
the
democratic alternative to the totalitarian unification which a democratic society in principle
rejects.
APPENDIX I
am
grateful to Professors
Van Meter Ames, Rudolf Carnap,
Carl G. Hempel, Herbert Martin, Oliver Martin,
Max
Otto,
T. V. Smith, James H. Tufts, and W. V. Quine for penetrating and often extended analyses of this paper. Apart from certain suggested changes which were incorporated in the text itself,
may be raised. Carnap, Hempel, and Quine expressed doubts as to the nature of formers in relation to referors, and the suitability of the the following points
Science, Philosophy terminology used.
seem
The
to be the place to
and Religion
237
issues are complex, and this does not attempt their settlement. The theory of
from being in a satisfactory condition, and its deone of the major tasks and responsibilities of the empiricist. I would only say that for present purposes it seemed necessary and sufficient to stress the diversity of functions encountered in sign processes, to indicate that an empirical treatment of these functions is possible, and to show that once the functions are distinguished, empiricism is compatible with the development of expressive and motivational symbols adequate to the problems of contemporary culture. Ames thought this semiotical analysis valuable as an approach to religion; Otto states that "I see in that kind of approach no hope of solving a real problem in contemporary life which is at the same time a problem of great importance." signs
is
far
velopment
is
A second
difference arose in the desirability of using the term
"religious" to characterize a path of
life.
The
pragmatists Ames,
Herbert Martin, and Tufts raised no objections; Carnap expressed doubts, while Hempel and Quine found it definitely objectionable.
TuFTs:
I
am
in
sympathy with the general position (i)
that, as I
think Kant conclusively showed, the older type of metaphysics
modern mind is method and achievements of modern science that both ethics (my own field) and religion must build on foundations which at least are not undermined by scientific results or opposed to the general method of observation, critical dealt with "analytic judgments"; (2) that the so far impressed by the
interpretation,
and tentative conclusions subject
to
revision
in the light of further knowledge; (3) that the heart of religion as of morality is not found in theories as to "being as
—
—
such" or in such facts as the natural sciences deal with, but rather, as the great religious leaders have held, in "doing justly, loving mercy, walking humbly," in loving God (ideal of per-
—
fection) and neighbor, in the "three that abide faith, hope, and love." As Morris puts it, the factor of choice is fundamental, and no "scientific" procedure can eliminate this factor from
the moral or religious experience. If
the language of semantics helps anyone to see this
more
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
238 clearly,
then
all
the better.
I
did not reach
my own
views by this
became convinced some forty years ago that ethics could not longer be based on older methods and sought a method that would build on distinctively moral facts and their route.
I
I regarded this as "scientific," but not as eliminating the importance of choice and other specific moral factors. I think the religious problem is similar; it should base upon
interpretation.
but upon facts of the distinctively religious experience
facts,
of
first
all.
I agree whole-heartedly with the chief idea that our attitude should find suitable symbols so that it would become effective also in the non-theoretical field. The most important
Carnap:
problem
know
is,
of course,
how
to find suitable symbols.
a solution to this problem.
.
.
do not
I
.
is one of the essential points: choice of a There and a certain type of person as goal. is here a practical problem of terminology: is it advisable to use the term "religion" for our own attitude.? If the term is understood in the wide sense as in the ms. it does, of course, apply to our attitude too. The alternative seems to be this: shall we use the term in this wider sense and then say that we have a religion different from the traditional ones, and one without theology; or shall we prefer to use the term in the narrower traditional sense and then say that we have no religion? I personally feel still somewhat uneasy in applying the term to myself. I suppose that that is a consequence of the cultural situation in which we lived in Europe where the antagonism between our efforts and the influence of the Catholic church was
agree that this
I
"path of
life,"
.
particularly strong. In this country the situation
ent because of the less doctrinary nature of organizations; that
may perhaps
is
.
.
quite differ-
many
religious
lead to greater tolerance toward
the term "religion."
With
Quine:
the
main idea
of the paper
— the desirability of work— agree.
ing out a code of values suited to the scientific temper
But
I
hesitate to apply the
word
I
"religion" to such a code.
Can't an individual's code of values, his projected "path of
be
fittingly
now
spoken of
that there are
as his ethics? It has struck
me
life,"
before
two cardinal methods, one favored by the
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
conservatives in religion and the other by their brethren, for
making
239 more
liberal
the rest of us religious: conversion and
definition.
Hempel:
I
am
inclined to think that there
is
one definite
differ-
ence between (i) what most people would find acceptable as a religion and (2) a "mere" system of goals and of techniques for their attainment.
This difference
is
that almost any type of re-
ligion seems to involve, as the very foundation of the goals
may
it
which are taken, by the faithful, as expression of genuine knowledge. In fact, the term "to believe" means something like "to consider as true" and its use should, therefore, strictly speaking, be reserved for sentences with cognitive meaning. Just this quasi-cognitive connotation of the term "belief" seems to be rather important in religion. But just here the criticism set forth in the paper applies: Those beliefs do not have, in the typical cases, a referential function; they express no knowledge and would have to be amputated according to empiricist standards. What would be left is a system of goals and techniques but would that be acceptable to most people as a religion? And can one therefore say without danger of being misunderstood that empiricism is compatible with religion and that for many persons the problem of a total orientation of their personalities can be met (and ought to be met) only by developing a new religious attitude.? set up, certain characteristic "beliefs"
—
Morris:
I grant the significance of the issues. I can only say that (i) contemporary work in the comparative study of religion makes it inadvisable to identify religion with adherence to a body of
metaphysical doctrines, (2) a number of psychologists of religion now stress the orientational function of religion for the individual and the group, and (3) the use of the term "religion" for
new
paths of
life
helps to sharpen the opposition to older
traditional religions.
Professor Herbert Martin raises an interesting point: The idea of the kind of person one wishes to be mary.
We do not first clear the
The concept
tables
is
not pri-
and frame the ideal person.
arises in and through experience. The ideal person an accompaniment or consequent of those values that yield the highest and most satisfactory individual and social life.
is
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
240
As
become translated into the most desires to become. The gradually changing and becoming concept.
a continuing result, these values
concept of the kind of person one ideal self I
is
thus a
do not deny
his contentions.
as does any ideal.
An
ideal to
An
ideal personality functions
which one gives allegiance
arises
an expressor of operative interests and as a motivator inducing behavior in the direction of their realization. One of the devices by which men have expressed their actual interests and attempted to give integration to their forming selves is in the creation of the symbolism for the various gods; the traits given to these gods have differed in a particular context;
it
acts as
with different personalities and different social organizations. This device still seems to me, shorn of its metaphysical trappings, to be of value, though the ideal types of man presented in the great historic religions do not answer to the way of life, the problems, the aspirations of many contemporary persons. I think it is important to consider explicitly what type of person is to be given our special allegiance, and to build a symbolism expressive of this choice and efficacious in stimulating us to adopt the way of life which this choice involves. Contemporary humanism seems to me to be weak through its failure to do this; it is not sufficient to talk of "mankind" or to glorify scientific method. of Ames' communication reads as follows: "While Charles Morris will be thanked for extending empiricism beyond its customary connotation, perhaps he is too ready to assume that empiricism is the only method of knowledge. If this were so, Platonic doctrine would have to be explained as he explains it, as a confusion between statements about signs and statements about non-linguistic objects, or something of the sort. The Platonizing religionist of tradition, however, will say it is truer to recognize another method, famil-
The concluding paragraph
iar especially in the
phenomena
of conversion; a
method
in-
volving the metaphysics repudiated by empiricism. Such a per-
son would hold that genuine religion is impossible without an epistemology rooted in metaphysics. Moreover, the attempt to justify an empirical religion, while it may not be addressed to people
who
are content with orthodox religion, will be regarded
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
241
by them as an effort to weaken their position. It is sanguine to expect any increment in the expressive and motivating power of non-metaphysical symbols to propitiate those who rely on religion for a guarantee concerning ultimate reality and man's relation to it. No extension of empiricism can include the thing indispensable to them: a sense of absolute certainty."
"Why can't one be both an When science and metaphysics
Similarly, Oliver Martin writes:
empiricist
and
a metaphysician?
conflict, one or the other is overstepping its bounds. some metaDoesn't democracy imply some world view? physical ideas? (For example, the possibility of democracy im.
.
plies that all 'good' has not
Morris:
I
serves for
them
if
.
many persons
will
remain unsatis-
which seeks no metaphysical super-strucscientific knowledge. Such a super-structure life
symbols by seeming to invalidate all other paths not being in accord with the "nature of things." But to increase the motivational efficacy of
portraying a path of of life as
.
.
been realized.)"
have no doubt but that
with a way of ture raised above fied
.
life,
such super-structures do in fact rest upon confusions of
various types of sign-functioning (and such a confusion
I
find
example given by Oliver Martin), they will lose their efficacy to persons aware of this confusion. And my concern was to show that such persons still can be concerned with choices as to a path of life, and with symbols to express and in the
make
efficacious the life they
problems and available In conclusion
may
I
choose to
scientific
underline
live in the light of their
knowledge.
my
conviction that in the
analysis the acceptance or rejection of
democracy (or
last
totali-
upon upon the preference for a certain type of person. The language of democracy is expressive of this allegiance and motivational to the development of such persons. Hence the crucial importance of making as clear as possible the kind of person we wish to be and the kind of person we wish the social process to produce. In the end I do not see any other basis for judging societies and institutions tarianism) as a
method
of social procedure rests in fact not
a specific metaphysics or theology but
except in terms of the ideal person to giance.
I
whom we
give our
alle-
CHAPTER
XII
Philosophical Implications of the Prevalent
Conception of Democracy By
GERALD
Pontifical Institute of
B.
PHELAN
Mediaeval Siudies, Toronto
TIMES of prosperity and comparative peace, discussions
INabout or less of
democracy and the democratic way of life were more confined to academic circles the classroom, meetings
—
conventions
philosophers,
people at large,
which
it
was taken
of
political
scientists.
Among
for granted that a social system
fosters freedom, proclaims equality of opportunity for
every citizen, opens wide the field for individual initiative,
and counts upon a spirit of tolerance and friendly co-operation to smooth out difficulties and to solve the practical problems incidental to communal life, provided all that one could reasonably expect from any organization of society, and, indeed, could scarcely be improved upon. The evident success of American democracy, despite numerous conflicts, abuses and injustices, in building up a nation of prosperous, progressive and, on the whole, satisfied people, was generally taken as a complete justification of the democratic principle itself, and a vindication of the democratic form of government as distinguished from or opposed to any and every form of social and political organization. By the pragmatic test, the democratic way of fife appeared to justify itself from every point of view.
Within recent years, however, certain policies and movements adopted or promoted by some groups in the name of democracy (I refer to such issues as The New Deal, the case 242
Science, Philosophy of the the
and Religion
243
Supreme Court and
last
decade)
other groups
as
the industrial and labor disputes of have been condemned and repudiated by undemocratic. Nevertheless, while national
and international affairs were running more or less smoothly and no major disturbance of the accustomed order of things threatened to upset the normal current of democratic life, the philosophical principles upon which the democratic system was based remained unscrutinized and unexamined, except by the few, mostly philosophers and professors of political science.
Not
until totalitarian dictators challenged the very principle
of democracy, repudiated the whole
body of
social
and
political
conceptions which the "democratic" nations proclaimed, and, in the case of
more than one European country, abolished demby force of arms, did those who hitherto and unquestioningly led, the demofeel called upon to examine its philosophical
ocratic institutions
had accepted cratic
way
of
uncritically, life,
foundations and to vindicate the principle of democracy
itself.
must have been a startling discovery to many sincere advocates of democracy to realize that, as M. Maritain has well said, the atheistic and naturalistic form which Jean Jacques Rousseau gave to the democratic principle "is the type of democracy which for almost two centuries now has prevailed in the ideologies of Western peoples."^ Rousseau has been dead for a long while now, and it would, no doubt, seem preposterous to regard the influence of his It
thought
as a preponderant factor in the formation of contemporary ideas on social and political life. Yet, it is his conception of freedom, his notion of equality, his theory of law,
have molded modern thinking about democracy and have shaped the contemporary conception of the democratic way of life. Re-echoed,
his doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, that
restated,
adapted to
new
conditions and elaborated to
fit
the
needs of the changing times by German romanticists, French socialists and English and American liberals, it is Rousseau's interpretation of
democracy which
^Maritain, Jacques, "Scholasticism
and
a
Politics,"
thousand writers since London, 1940,
p. 93.
Science, Philosophy
244
and Religion
day have wittingly or unwittingly propounded. If we wish the democratic way of life as a concrete sociohistorical phenomenon, and not as some theoretically possible
his
to discuss
form
of the democratic principle,
it is
this tradition of thought,
emanating from Rousseau, that we must envisage. Recently we have had a spate of books and pamphlets, articles and speeches in defense of democracy, and the vast majority of those which
I
have read reiterate commonly accepted formulas
about the rights of man, the of
all
men and
liberties of the citizen, the equality
the will of the people,
whose matrix may
readily
be found in Le Contrat Social.^ This conception of democracy postulates that man is born free, not merely that man has by nature a free will, through the use of which he may achieve his full freedom; but that the man's existence at birth is one of absolute and sovereign independence. Submission to the authority of any other human being, obedience to any man, therefore, violates the very essence of Hberty. Such was the condition state or condition of
liberty
man
of
was
in the full dignity of his primitive state, before society
established.
Consequent upon and
ception of freedom
is
based upon the fallacy
men are among men
all
parallel
to
this
con-
the other postulate of strict social equality
because
that,
all
men
are equally
men,
equal men. Physical and intellectual inequalities obviously exist; but because
all
human
beings are
equally free, there can be no question of inequality of status,
no
special privilege for
Yet,
men must
any
live
^t may not be out of place
class or
order of men.
together in some sort of society, and remark here
that, in discussing the philosophnot concerned with practical problems of democratic administration, the question of representative government, the ical
to
implications of these formulas,
I
am
methods
of election and appointment to office, the organization of the various functions of government or any of the techniques of practical politics. The fact that there may be defects in a system of government, or abuses in the actual
conduct of political affairs, raises the very practical question (with which I am not at present dealing) of the correction of the methods and techniques of the system and the curbing of corrupt politicians. Those are problems of a different
from the question of the philosophical implications of the prevalent conception of democracy and their metaphysical, social and ethical consequences.
sort
Science, Philosophy implies law which they may not society
to
and Religion
245
which men must submit and order
disturb.
A
throng of isolated individuals,
each absolutely equal to the other and
all
completely indepen-
from any natural form of submission to any of their fellow men, does not constitute a social or political community. If freedom and equality are understood in the absolute and univocal sense and I repeat that the prevalent interpretation of the principle of democracy so understands them then it is plain that, whatever device be adopted to explain and justify the social and political life of men (Rousseau, as is well known, adopts the device of a Social Contract, to which I shall refer in a moment), it will always remain true that society, by its very nature, involves a restriction of liberty and contrariates the absolute independence of the individuals who compose it. Society, therefore, is not a natural means of fostering freedom and developing the citizen to the full stature of human perdent, free
—
—
sonality;
it
an
is
artificial
men
institution devised to enable
who, by nature are isolated individuals, to live a common life. In a word, with such conceptions of liberty and equality, it is impossible to reconcile the ancient Greek, and the constant Christian, notion of
man
as naturally destined for the society
of his fellows. course, one may say with Rousseau, that man exercises freedom by entering into society. For, according to the
Of his
theory of the Social Contract, a pact dividuals in virtue of
themselves and is
which
all their
all
is
made among
free in-
the associates freely surrender
rights to the
community. Thus, society
born, not of nature, but of the will of man. But hberty
not
lost.
human
man
does not submit himself to any
ject,
henceforth, to the whole social body, but no
superior.
He
has no
man
himself, since his will
is
being.
He man
is is
subhis
above him. He obeys nobody but mystically absorbed in the General
Will begotten of the social pact or contract
made with
other sovereignly independent individuals.
It
Will
is
In surrendering himself to the whole community,
is
this
all
the
General
—the will of the people, mythically conceived by Rousseau
— Science, Philosophy
246
and Religion
immanent within the social body community and governs all its members. It
as a sort of divine spirit
that rules the
the source of
all
law, for law
the will of the people. conditions, is,
it
is
By
is
a majority of votes, cast
under proper
possible to ascertain the General Will (which
sum
of course, not merely the
cordance therewith.
It is
total
of individual wills,
and frame the law
in ac-
thus that the sovereign people
make
but the will of the social body
itself)
no man but only
the laws and, because they are subject to
own
is
nothing but the expression of
to
General Will of the whole social body, preserve their liberty intact. This conception of sovereignty residing exclusively and absolutely in the their
people,
is,
will as absorbed within the
of course, essential to a theory in
which
society
is
not a natural institution but the product of the will of the people; but
it is
utterly
man
opposed
to every philosophical doctrine
and absolute sovereignty Author of nature, from Whom the relative sovereignty of states and nations derives. The implications of the principles of democracy interpreted in the Rousseauist manner have been strikingly noted by a recent writer in respect to the concepts of authority and power. "Democracy conceived in the manner of Rousseau," he says, "suppresses authority and preserves power. To declare that authority resides in the whole multitude as in its. proper subject and without being able to emerge from it and to exist in such and such responsible men, this is but a trick permitting irresponsible mechanisms to exercise power over men without having authority over them democracies of the
which regards
as naturally social
as an attribute of the
.
.
.
—
.
,
.
Rousseauist type not only grant the State
all
the usurpations
of power, but they tend towards these very usurpations.
The
ruin of authority and of the principle of authority
benefit of
of justice
—to
.
.
.
the
power without authority, without the foundations and law and without the Hmit^s consummated in
the totalitarian State."^ 'Maritain, op.
cit.,
pp. 93-95.
— Science, Philosophy
Many
ardent
defenders
of
and Religion
democracy,
who
247 repeat
the
formulas about Hberty, equaHty and the sovereign people, are
unaware of these implications and consequences of the prevaRousseauist conception of democracy, and would, no doubt, repudiate the philosophical principles and postulates upon which it rests. Such persons are primarily interested in preserving those truly human values which all men cherish lent
personal voice
freedom, justice for
in public
affairs
all
without discrimination, a
and friendly co-operation among
all
body politic. The philosophical aspects of the problem of democracy do not enter into their consideration. But the present crisis of democracy has forced reflection upon all who would rationally vindicate the democratic way of life. Many others, and among them, not a few of those who write about democracy, are well aware of the naturalistic and secular
members
of the
characteristics of the prevailing interpretation of democracy,
and they are quite content, or even enthusiastic, to accept and promote them. Such persons, however, cannot reasonably quarrel with totalitarian dictators for drawing the conclusions and implementing the consequences of Rousseau's substitution of power for democracy, of his doctrines of the General Will and of the sovereignty of the people, unless they are prepared to accept the only other logical alternative, an anarchy of unrestricted individual liberties conflicting with one another without any means of putting order into the chaos of individualistic confusion.
For democracy, conceived after the fashion of Rousseau, ought logically to issue, and has, historically, issued in one or both of two extremes. One is the attempt to estabUsh society on the basis of complete individual autonomy and, in the sacred
name
of liberty, to abolish
all
authority.
The
other
which comes from regarding the individual will of each citizen as transfigured, in some mysterious, mystical, inexplicable manner, into the General Will, is
totalitarian
dictatorship,
the sovereign will of the people. In the
first
case there will be
neither authority nor power; in the second case there will be
— and Religion
Science, Philosophy
248
power without
authority,
might
be right and the rule of
will
force prevail.
There have been several attempts, groups of
striking instances in recent years,
attempted.
The Germans
tried
it
when
before
tervention of Lenin. In both cases
must. After those
posite
extreme
failures, the
Rousseauist
of
it
it
was
Hitler
the reins of government; the Russians tried
it
among
certain
system without either authority or power. There are
social
two
particularly
gain support for the Utopian idea of a
socialists, to
it
actually
took over
before the in-
failed miserably, as fail
Germans swung
to the op-
democracy,
totalitarian
the
and the Russians turned to the Communistic system. However much these political movements may have been shaped by Hegelian absolutism, Marxian socialism and numerous other influences, the Rousseauist conception of democracy is at their root. statolatry of the Hitler regime;
totalitarian
Once
sociolatry
of
the
so-called
the principle of the General Will of the sovereign
people becomes the source of law, and the
wrong, the door
not a far cry from
mon
open
is
to the
norm
of right and
most complete tyranny.
It is
conception of the com-
this position to the
conscience of the people embodied in the people's party
and eventually incarnated people, the dictator.
He
is
in the person of the leader of the
man
the law-giver and, as such, "is a
in every respect extraordinary in the state. If he should be
extraordinary by genius he personifies the nation.
His
is
not
will,
less
because
so it
by his work." is
He
the incarnation
of the General Will, mystically conceived as the enlivening spirit of this "political
pantheism,"
the ultimate criterion of right
is
the will of the people,
and wrong, and the law
pressing the highest destiny of the nation.
A
ex-
strange perver-
sion of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of the Second
Person of the Blessed Trinity wherein the God-man, The Christ, is replaced by the man-god, the Dictator!
These totalitarian consequences flow with inexorable logic with the concrete logic of historical events as well as with
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
thought
the speculative logic of consistent
249
—from the principles
of democracy advocated by the vast majority of philosophers
and pohtical tions."
among our own
even
scientists
which we have come
the nations
They
are the principles of a false
ultimate logical outcome
is
people and
among
to call the "democratic na-
humanism, and
their
either totalitarianism or anarchy.
"Beneath the actual conflict between 'totalitarianism' and 'debetween this set of temporal interests and that, mocracy' there is a greater, subtler conflict going on, the nineteen.
.
.
between the Christian and false-humanist
centuries-old struggle
views of
being
now come
life
to a cataclysmic crisis.
two
the
spiritual,
are
sides
This struggle,
not clearly defined and
coterminous with the sides in the visible temporal struggle.
To
.
.
.
war may be necessary; but it will victory and those two victories do
defeat totalitarianism in
be a complete
sterile
.
.
.
not necessarily go together."* Until such time as a philosophy of democracy
elaborated, based
is
upon
true conceptions of
the nature of man, of the liberty of the
proportionate equality
among men,
human
person, of
of the role of the
human
of the absolute sovereignty of
person in
affairs of
God and
the relative sovereignty of rulers, of legitimate au-
thority
public
and of power
life,
in the service of authority,
it
be
will
impossible philosophically to defend democracy and the democratic
way
of
life
against the advocates of totalitarian dictator-
ship or the promoters of anarchy.
Fortunately, there are in this country a
who
number
of thinkers
have set themselves to the task of developing a
new
philosophy of democracy, in which those precious and truly
human goods active
of freedom, justice, co-operation, friendship
participation
in
the
affairs
of
government,
and
may be
soHdly and rationally estabHshed against both the tyranny of totaUtarianism and the anarchy of chaotic individualism.* *Attwater, Donald,
Not
"The 'War' behind the War," The Commonweal, Vol.
xxxiv, n.14, July 25, 1941, p. 322.
"See the note ed.
cit.
on
p.
117 of Maritain, Jacques, "Scholasticism and Politics,"
250
Science, Philosophy
a few of those thinkers are
and Religion
members
of this conference, and
their contributions to the discussion of the
problems of
social
philosophy should pave the way for a saner outlook on the
whole question of the philosophical cratic
way of
life.
justification of the
demo-
CHAPTER The
XIII
Spiritual Basis of
Democracy
BY J.
DOUGLAS BROWN, Department THEODORE M. GREENE,
of Economics, Princeton University
Department of Philosophy,
Princeton University
H. HARBISON, Department of History, Princeton University WHITNEY J. OATES, Department of Classics, Princeton University HENRY NORRIS RUSSELL, Department of Astronomy, E.
Princeton University
HUGH
S.
TAYLOR, Department
GEORGE
F.
THOMAS,
of Chemistry, Princeton University
Department
of Religious Thought,
Princeton University
JOHN
A.
MACKAY,
President, Princeton Theological Seminary
>^ Democratic institutions and cultural activities rest upon man, while a part of nature, is a spiritual being and that his highest good should be defined in terms of spiritual values. The major problem which confronts us at this time, therefore, is not merely the defense of democracy and its culture, but a deeper understanding of and commitment to the spiritual conception of man upon which democracy 1.
the assumption that
is
based. 2.
Spiritual life
selves at
of the
our
and
its
we
experience them in our-
They
are not identical with any
laws, as
best, are distinctive.
phenomena and laws
of nature described by the natural
and whatever description of them the natural sciences may be capable of giving cannot affect their reality and their sciences;
value. 3. The human spirit, of course, is dependent to an undetermined extent upon the natural processes of the body and its environment. But, though it is thus conditioned by bio-
251
Science, Philosophy
252
and Religion
and physical processes it cannot be identified with them and can be fully understood only by means of distinctive methods and categories suitable to its distinctive nature. 4. The human spirit is that which distinguishes man from the lower animals. It makes possible the activity by which man, seeking to transcend his limitations, relates himself to the higher order of spiritual life and ultimate values upon which he depends. Thus, spiritual activity is directed towards an ideal, objective reality; though the spirit is individual, it is oriented towards a reality which is super-individual. logical
5.
This spiritual activity involves appreciation of the
in-
and persons. Whereas the lower animal appropriates and uses things and persons to satisfy its own needs, man is capable of acknowledging and affirming their worth in themselves. 6. Morality, in the full meaning of the term, depends upon this appreciation of intrinsic worth. Moral action is action determined by principle rather than impulse. This principle must be broader than mere enlightened self-interest. Useful as such self-interest may be in restraining acts harmful to the individual and his fellows, morality also requires concern for trinsic values of things
the welfare of others for their
own
sakes.
Democracy presupposes moral concern of this kind on the part of the citizens. A democracy whose citizens are unwilling 7.
to seek the interest of others as they seek their
no sense of
a
common
good. Thus, democracy
own is
can have
meaningless
without the kind of moral responsibility which spiritual beings alone acknowledge. 8.
The
capacity
of
man
to
relate
himself to an ultimate
source of meaning and worth and to value things and persons
worth is thus essential to a true conception There have been, however, different ideas about the ultimate source of meaning and worth and the for their intrinsic
of the
human
spirit.
practical implications of
thought are
the
it. The two major which have dominated Western and contemplative conception
man's relation to
conceptions of the spiritual
life
intellectual
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
253
derived primarily from the Greeks and the Hebraic-Christian moral and religious conception. 9.
The
first
truth, beauty,
of these lays stress
and the good
as
upon
the contemplation of
absolute values.
It
identifies
with reverence for these values as constituting a higher order of reality. It tends to conceive of the moral life in terms of inner and outer harmony and to subordinate it religion
to contemplation. Its primary aim is the elevation of human life through contemplation of the ideal and imitation of it in noble character and institutions. This conception, which derives from
Platonism, has often been combined with the mystical conception of union with the infinite, ineffable Being behind and beyond all finite things. In this case, contemplation of values becomes secondary to identification with the divine Source of values. On the basis of a pantheistic view of nature as inclusive of the human spirit and its values, the spiritual life may be conceived somewhat differently. Identification with nature, through contemplation of her laws and action in accordance with them, has seemed to many philosophers, scientists and poets, from the Stoics onwards, to be the highest wisdom. 10. But though contemplation of ultimate reality and its values and submission to natural laws are an invaluable part of the spiritual
life,
essence of that
they are inadequate
life.
high significance
when
Contemplation of values
when
conceived as the loses
much
of
its
these are not related to the purposes
of a divine spiritual Being. Mystical union with the ineffable
may
lead to a depreciation of the individual
and moral spiritually
activity. Life in
adequate only
if
and
his rational
accordance with nature would be nature were a self-sufficient and
beneficent system and possessed supreme religious and moral
worth in itself. 11. For these and other reasons, the Hebraic-Christian moral and religious conception of the spiritual life is superior to the contemplative-mystical conception. In contemplation of value, mystical union and identification with nature alike, the source
Science, Philosophy
254 of
meaning and value
unaided
and Religion
impersonal, and
is
with
effort establish relationship
man must by it.
on the other hand, the Divine
Christian conception,
ceived in personal terms. Man's relationship with possible by an antecedent act of revelation
reaches love.
down
to
man
man
in grace,
Moreover, since
God
and since His purpose
task
is
God
on His
con-
is
made
is
God
part.
responds in gratitude and
conceived primarily as moral
is
will,
his
In the Hebraic-
fulfilled in
is
human
man's
life,
not simply to contemplate ultimate reality and value,
but to act in harmony with God's purpose for
human
life
and
Thus, intellectual and aesthetic contemplation is subordinated to practical moral action, and the values of both contemplation and action are so related to the all-embracing purposes of the Divine Spirit as to attain the deepest possible meaning.
history.
The claims of the contemplative and mystical concephowever, should be recognized as valid and important when they are taken as aspects of this religious and moral 12.
tion,
The contemplative
conception.
rational faculty of culture.
The
man and
mystical
at
life
Ufe
'•ightly
emphasizes
the higher values of the its
best explores
the
life
of
deeper levels
of the soul, from which fruitful insight and action as well as a sense of unity with
all
life,
may come. And
reverence for
wonder of upon nature at
the order of nature deepens man's sense of the
common
things and his grateful dependence
every turn.
The contemplative
Hfe has the further value of
enlarging the horizon of religion and morality.
symbolic representation of
God
as
It
terpreted in a naively anthropomorphic manner,
devotion to the moral purpose of
and 13.
prevents the
personal from being in-
and
it
saves
God from becoming narrow
and culture. Both the contemplative-mystical and the moral-religious
hostile to reason
conceptions of
modern
man
as
a spiritual being are superior to the
naturalistic view,
which
exalts
man by
himself or as a
part of nature. Naturalism denies both man's relation to an
order of ultimate values and his dependence upon a cosmic
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
255
thus divorces him from the moral and which he belongs and upon which he depends for strength and direction. It encourages him to determine his ends for himself as a completely autonomous being, without any norm above his own interests and desires, individual and collective. As a result, it leads inevitably to pride and spiritual
Power.
It
spiritual order to
The individual, having nothing higher than himself worship or serve, worships himself, his reason, his culture,
egoism. to
or his race.
Many who
hold to this naturalistic view in democratic unaware of the dangers in their position. Influenced by the last remnants of philosophical Idealism, romantic Transcendentalism, or religious Theism in our day, they 14.
countries are
act as
if
they
still
which they have
believed in the spiritual conception of intellectually repudiated.
They
try to
man
main-
man, while paying homage an essentially materialistic philosophy according to which man is simply a highly developed animal. They are loyal to tain their feeling for the dignity of to
and culture, but by their theory they deny the spiritual nature of man and his values upon which it has been built. In short, they are living off the spiritual capital which has come down to them from their classical and religious heritage, while at the same time they ignore that heritage itself as antiquated and false. their democratic society
15.
Since this contradiction will prove to be intellectually
and teachers must recover and reaffirm man and his good which we have derived from Greek and Hebraic-Christian sources. If they fail to do this, not only religious reverence and moral responsibility, but also the scholarly activities with which they intolerable, scholars
the spiritual conception of
are directly concerned, will be gravely endangered. Already,
under
totalitarian regimes,
and
to a lesser extent in the de-
mocracies, these activities are being undermined. 16.
Totalitarianism
is
the historical result of the weakening
of the
Greek and Hebraic-Christian
scribed.
As awareness
traditions
we have
de-
of an objective moral and spiritual order
has
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
256
grown dim, other "orders" have captured men's imagina-
tions
:
a "classical" economic order in which individual or group
is identified with public good; a Marxian determinism which conceives of both individual and society
self-interest
primarily in terms of economic interest; and finally, a national or racial
dynamism which recognizes no
laws whatever, whether
which therefore sponsible will.
creates
When
spiritual, its
objective universal
moral, or
own "new
economic, and
order" by acts of
irre-
nations and societies which have sub-
spiritual ends have been weakened or by the decline of economic opportunity and security, they have turned to new gods of class, state and race. The "folkish organism" of totalitarian political philosophy is both outcome and indictment of the materiaUstic "economic
stituted material for
shattered
organization" of
much
of
Western society. The spread of toworld can be checked only by a
talitarianism throughout the
democracy which has recovered that living belief in the obmoral and spiritual order which is its deepest source of strength. Democracy is not an end in itself, to be attained by any means, as are the totalitarian Utopias. Rather, it is a means, perhaps the best political means yet found, to an end. This end
jective
is
the realization in
human
society of certain ideals
—human
—
moral responsibility, spiritual freedom which have their historic roots in Greece and Palestine, their sanction in a moral and spiritual order which transcends history. These ideals may in the past have been preserved to a limited extent without democracy. But democracy cannot survive without them. dignity,
17. If scholars, teachers, writers
and
religious leaders
do not
succeed in arousing the minds and hearts of the democratic peoples to a living faith in the spiritual nature of man, the
democracy by military and political action is not primarily two different forms of government, but two different conceptions of human life, which are opposed in the life and death struggle of our day. Scholars must therefore do what it is so difficult for them to do in our direct defense of
bound
to
fail. It is
and Religion
Science, Philosophy "liberal" culture:
can act only
if
they must act as well as think. But they
they will
sues of the spiritual tific
demonstration
when
257
make up
and moral is
minds on the great iswhich logical and scien-
their
life
impossible.
in
They have
a
special
re-
one half of the world, to see that in the other half men reflect before they act. But they must also learn to commit themselves. For if commitment without reflection means fanaticism in action, reflection without commitment means a paralysis of all action. That way lies sponsibility,
fanatical loyalties rule
the death of democratic society
and
its
culture.
CHAPTER XIV Thomism and Democracy By
YVES
Notre
THIS
PAPER
is
R.
Dame
SIMON
University
intended to examine some aspects of the
Thomas which can contribute to the improvement of our ideas on the problem of democracy. In order to have our point of view clearly specified, let us make two teaching of St.
preliminary remarks:
A
discussion on
Thomism and democracy might have
the
would be the works of St.
character of an historical investigation; the question
to disentangle, from many texts scattered in Thomas, what he actually thought about the democratic regime such as he knew it. Now, if Thomism enjoys, as we believe it does, a vitality which is not by any means confined within the limits of St. Thomas's short life, it should be possible to give a Thomistic treatment of the problem of de-
mocracy such
as
it
appears to
us.
The
latter point of
view
will
prevail in this study.
Correspondingly, what a pure essence abstracted historical reality that
we understand by democracy from
we have
historical contingencies,
in
mind when we
tion such terms as the totalitarian state
is
not
but the
set in opposi-
and the democratic
society.
The Common Good As
is
whole
well
known, the idea of common good dominates the philosophy of St. Thomas. This philosophy
political
258
Science, Philosophy rests
on a
realistic
sum
to a
259
conception of the social body, that
society enjoys a reality of
duced
and Religion
its
own, a
reality that
of individual realities.
object of political activity, the
The good which
common
good,
is
that
is,
cannot be is
re-
the
not reducible
mere sum of individual accomplishments; it is the perfection, the good, of the whole as such, the perfect cooperation of men in their corporate life and in their collective action. Accordingly, political power cannot be exercised for the private good of a master or for the particular welfare of any group to a
within the
state.
perfect living politic.
the
The
only legitimate purpose of politics
and acting together of
parts of the
all
is
the
body
Every idea of exploitation of other men for the sake of in power is radically excluded by the very object of
men
political activity.
In this connection,
it
may be observed
that the
struggle
movement with more con-
against the totalitarian state gives the democratic
an exceptional opportunity to devote
itself,
sistency than ever before, to the actual ciple of the
common
triumph of the prin-
good. This view refers directly to the
recent evolution of the party system.
It
has often been claimed
upon which the operation based, impHes a permanent threat
modern
that the party system,
of
democracies
against the
common
is
good.
If
the political personnel
is
organized in parties,
which ceaselessly compete for power, is it not to be feared that the power of the state will be constantly utilized for the welfare of this and that party, and never for the welfare of the whole community? The threat is undeniably real and permanent, and the whole question is to have it permanently held in check by a system of opposite forces. When the forces intended to insure the prevailing of the common good happen to decline, and leave unopposed the unavoidable tendency of the parties to substitute their the community,
we know
own
prosperity for the welfare of
democracy is doomed. The people become discouraged and exhausted by continual strife, raise a clamor for unity and deliver themselves to the Fiihrer, in whom they believe the unity of the state to be embodied. They that
Science, Philosophy
26o blindly take
that any
for granted
it
unity gives the principle of the to
triumph because
The
it
and Religion restoration of
forcible
common good
a better chance
ends the disorderly conflict of parties.
very expression "totaHtarian state" seems to imply that
the whole of the nation will be set to
work
whole of
for the
the nation.
Here
lies
the great deception.
clear that the ticular
name,
nothing
else
is
totalitarian
It
now become may be
has
system, whatever
essentially a party system.
The Fuhrer
entirely
par-
its is
really
than the leader of a party. Far from doing away
with the concept of party, the totalitarian state gives this concept an unprecedented sway, for as much as it is based on the forcible identification of the party with the whole of the This violent identification gives a legal character to the
state.
exploitation of the national
pointed leaders
and succeeded
The
who in
that any check be put
on the
The one -party system
it
all
It
gang of
self-ap-
is
constitutionally
radically at variance
impossible
devouring imperialism of the
the
most
system, the kind of party system which
most
a
having a number of people believe they were. regime makes
totalitarian
party.
community by
declared one day that they were the state,
with the
form of party bound to be the
radical is
common
good.
can be reasonably hoped that the present struggle against
the totalitarian states will refashion the democratic
and develop
common
in
good.
it
a
renewed adherence
The democratic
movement
to the principle of the
peoples, in so far as the necessi-
and expediencies of the fight cause them to become better aware of the character of their adversaries, are bound to acquire a better awareness of their own principles as well. The same struggle that compels them to realize better the nature of the totalitarian state as a system of exploitation, compels them to realize more clearly the essence of democracy as a government for the people, for the whole of the people, for the common good of the people. ties
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
Authority and
261
Autonomy
Because of the emphasis that the Thomist school lays on authority, many people hold it to be self-evident that the political philosophy of St. Thomas is wholly incompatible with any kind of democratic a
But the declaration of such two unwarranted assump-
spirit.
involves
radical incompatibility
tions: first, that the principle of authority conflicts essentially
with the doctrine of democracy; second, that the Thomistic notion of authority leaves no room for the aspiration toward
which unquestionably lies at the core of the democratic movement. The arbitrary character of the first assumption is
liberty
suggested by the fact that several democratic regimes have achieved forms of leadership worthy of mention
among
the
most successful and typical embodiments of the idea of authority. That the second assumption is unwarranted, can be best evidenced by an analysis of the functions, forms and instruments of authority. I.
often happens that the authority of a superior has to
It
provide for accomplishments which, under perfect conditions, would be left to the initiative of the subject. De jure, the pursuit of the personal
Now,
number
a
good
is
a matter of personal government.
of people are unable to achieve self-govern-
ment, because of some deficiency, which may be either regular and normal (as in children), or abnormal and exceptional (as in the feebleminded). Similarly,
community to fulfill
its
(let
it
may happen
that a small
us say, a city or a corporation) proves unable
proper task and attain
guidance from without.
Then
its
proper end without some
the authority of a higher social
unit (ordinarily, the state) assumes the administrative duties that the
community under consideration cannot
carry out by
itself.
Such in
a function of authority, important
any way be considered as
result
from the essence of
though
it
essential. Its necessity
man
is,
cannot
does not
or from the essence of society;
Science, Philosophy
262
and Religion
rather results from the insufficient development of the powers of man, from their accidental disablement, or from the social immaturity of a group. Whenever the intervention of authority is made necessary only by the inability to effect it
self-government, the function of authority
is
not essential, but
substitutional. 2.
The
essential function of authority
tude toward
common
its
on the ground of through
common
its
good.
very notion, that
action.
The
is
to direct the multi-
The common good
unity of
it
implies,
has to be pursued
common
action
must be
assured by some steady principle. This principle cannot be
unanimity, for unanimity in practical matters
often casual
is
and always precarious. Steadiness in the unity of action de-
mands
that, in case of
tion, that
disagreement,
all
observe a single direc-
submit themselves to some authority.
is,
Furthermore, even under ideal circumstances, where perfect enhghtenment and perfect virtue would secure a unanimous acknowledgment of that which is required by the common good, it would still be necessary that the tendency toward the common good be embodied in a center of activity whose proper
common
wholly natural, indeed, that toward particular goods. Unless there is in society a steady principle of activity whose proper good is not any particular good, but the common good of the social whole as such, common life will be disrupted by the very plurality and the very particularity of the goods aimed at by the parts of the social whole. It is to be carefully noted that, whereas the substitutional function of authority is always connected with some deficiency object be the
what
in
is
man
any
It is
essential function does not result
from from the very nature of the multitude engaged in the pursuit of a common
or society,
evil, fall,
social
good.
particular should tend
its
or deficiency, but
being as a
accomplishment. 3.
Let us
be said to
now
try to
conflict
determine in what sense authority can
with the aspiration toward
liberty.
This
question, which proves exceedingly confused and really un-
^
— and Religion
Science, Philosophy
263
answerable so long as the functions of authority remain unanalysed, acquires a very definite
and
essential
functions
are
meaning when
substitutional
distinguished from each
clearly
other. It is
quite clear that the substitutional function of authority
conflicts
with the claim for
liberty.
Those who
to substitutional authority are subjected to
it
are subjected
in so far as they
cannot govern themselves, that is, in so far as they caimot behave as free men (or free societies). Any increase of their
freedom implies a decrease of
their
subjection.
Here the
achievement of liberty has the character of an emancipation and consists in doing away with the need of external guidance. Yet, the antinomy between liberty and
function of authority authority, provided
has
make
to
it
the
substitutional
not an insoluble one. Substitutional be true to its nature and proper duty, is
things ready for
mistakes and accidents;
its
own
disappearance.
The
not merely to spare children main purpose is to have youths
purpose of parental authority its
is
become adult they may be behave well without external guidance. The
so well trained that by the time they
able
fully
to
substitutional function of authority 4.
Within the
limits of
its
is
a pedagogical function.
essential function, authority does
It may well happen that those in charge of authority use their power for the sake of some
not conflict with liberty. private good, or for
some misconceived and
good. In that case their power
is
illusory
common
no longer genuine authority,
but has become tyranny. So long as authority remains true to the common good, it can but foster the liberty of man and that of society.
The more
effectively society
action and directed toward viduals
and
its
is
common
unified in
its
common
good, the better indi-
society itself are protected against the wants, the
doubts, the hesitations, the failures and the disorders which constitute the 5.
main
obstacles to liberty.
In order that the character of authority be exactly under-
stood,
it
is
indispensable to have the principle of authority
necessity of a direction of the social
whole toward
its
common
Science, Philosophy
264
good
—supplemented
by
the
and Religion of
principle
principle can be formulated as follows:
be satisfactorily achieved by the
autonomy.
Wherever
initiative of the individual or
that of small social units, the fulfillment of that task
be
left to
This
a task can
must
the initiative of the individual or to that of small
social units.
The
principle of
autonomy
is
deeply rooted in
Thomistic metaphysics. The metaphysics of St. Thomas contrasts sharply with those metaphysical and religious systems which imply that the power of God is best exalted by depriving creatures of any real power, any real Ufe, any real liberty. Ac-
cording to
St.
evidence of
its
Thomas, the Divine Power perfection
—rules
—and
this is the best
indefectibly a universe full of
reality, full of casuality, full of life, full of liberty.
God way
The
of the Uving. that
enables
God
him
God
perfect ruler rules society in the
is
the
same
His strength government, to respect and fos-
rules the world: suaviter et fortiter.
to be
mild in
his
ter multifarious initiatives. In this connection,
served that the statement of
Thomas
Jefferson,
it
may be
"The
ob-
best gov-
ernment is that which governs least," can be interpreted in two ways. It may mean that political government is a necessary evil that must be limited as far as possible. This would imply a failure to recognize the wholly natural character of political
government and
its
intrinsic goodness.
On
the other hand, the
statement of Jefferson can be interpreted as meaning that the
government is that which performs directly as few tasks and leaves as many tasks as possible to the initiative of the individual and to that of particular societies. The latter interpretation would entirely agree with the Thomistic conception of autonomy. 6. Concerning the forms of authority, let us first recall St. Thomas's definitions of the dominion of freedom and of the dominion of servitude. A free man is not subject to government, except for his own welfare and for the common welfare. When the end of the dominion is the private welfare of the master, the one over whom dominion is exercised is a slave. best
as possible,
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
Thus, servitude
defined as the aUenation o£
is
for the profit of those
Our
who
265
human
effort
exercise power.
common good make it government is, according to St. dominion of freedom, and that it cannot become
previous
remarks about the
sufficiently clear that pohtical
Thomas, a a dominion
of servitude without
degenerating into lawless
tyraimy.
Let us mention, in the second place, the opposition between despotic and political regimes. Whereas the opposition between the dominions of freedom and of servitude is concerned with the end pursued by the dominion of man over man, the opposition between the despotic regime and the political regime is concerned with the way power is exercised. 7.
In short, a regime
when
the subject is granted he receives, despotic when he is denied such a power of resistance. Considering whether the government of a political society should always be a po-
some power of
litical
is
political
resisting the orders
regime in the above-defined sense,
not say that a despotic government is
the case with a
servitude. is
On
government that
not despotic
is
called political,
tion, fits better the
community.
pedient,
its
St.
Thomas would
necessarily corrupt, as
exercises a
dominion of
the other hand, the very fact that the regime that
where authority admits of litical
is
means
legal checks
clearly that a
and of some
regime
distribu-
proper aims and characteristics of the poIf a
expediency
despotic government ever proves exis
an evidence of
political
immaturity
or decadence. 8.
Serious
consideration,
instruments of authority. authority with coercion is
particularly
is
finally,
The
should
be given
to
very misleading. Because authority
conspicuous
when
its
decrees
are
enforced
through actual coercion, many people lose sight of the fact in
most
the
rather current identification of
cases, the decrees of authority are regularly
that,
applied
through a process of persuasion. It can even be said that an authority which is no longer able to use persuasion as its regu-
266
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
instrument has utterly
lar
to coercive
On
lost its power; a continual appeal measures proves impossible.
Thomas makes some remarks on the deep tendencies of his pohtical philosophy. Many theorists would believe that the only possible the subject of coercion, St.
which shed much
light
effect of coercion
is to assure the security of honest people at the cost of the liberty of people who misuse their liberty. But
St.
Thomas, on the
keen understanding of the psybetween habit and voluntariness, points
basis of a
chological relationship
out another and more elevated function of coercion. When it paves the way to the voluntary execution of
properly used,
good
actions by generating
sound habits and removing many supreme accomwhich coercion must aim, is its becoming unneces-
obstacles to the practice of virtue. Thus, the
plishment at
and its giving place to a process of virtuous persuasion. Here we must allude to the very special character that coer-
sary
cive procedures have acquired in totalitarian organizations. Until recently, coercive instruments used by societies were al-
most exclusively of etc.).
a physical nature
Psychical coercion was
mosdy
a
(confinement, beatings,
matter of laboratory ex-
periments (hypnotic suggestion, etc.). The systematic use of psychical procedures to compel masses of people is one of the most radical and bewildering novelties of our time, and few persons have understood what a tremendous qualitative
change takes place, when intensive propaganda, such as that carried out by totalitarian parties and states, is substituted for moderate propaganda. Moderate propaganda is a process of persuasion, aiming at the generation of certain dispositions in the free will of men; intensive propaganda is a process of psychical coercion which attacks the very sources of freedom and voluntariness. Nothing can be more sharply opposed to the Thomistic ideal of a wise coercion paving the way to a virtuous persuasion than this inner destruction of the freedom of
man
that the
propaganda.
totaHtarian regime carries out through
its
K
'
— Science, Philosophy
Human
and Religion
267
Equality
It is currently taken for granted that any kind of equalitarianism is utterly uncongenial to the philosophy of St. Thomas. This is surely an oversimplified and confusing view. As a matter of fact, there are some forms of equality that Thomism entirely rejects; some forms of equahty that it does not reject, without, however, demanding them; some forms of
equality that I.
it
demands
absolutely.
The Thomistic conception
consequently
it
of society
is
excludes every conception of
hierarchical,
human
and
equality
which would prove incompatible with the essence of hierarchy. It
should be observed that the hierarchical structure of society
does not proceed from the principle of authority alone, but
from the combination of the principle of authority with the principle of autonomy. A hierarchical order implies an assertion of autonomy as well as a recognition of authority. This can be best evidenced by a consideration of the state planned by Rousseau, in which no particular society is tolerated, lest the absolutism of the general will might be held in check. People anxious to see real liberty actually guaranteed could not to
understand
that, despite
some
fail
fallacious appearances, this
is
form of authoritarianism ever dreamt of. In its ideal type, the Rousseauistic state does not admit of any hierarchical construction; but it consists merely of a crowd of individuals whom no particular organization protects against the all devouring power of the state. It is hardly necessary to remark that the totalitarian regimes of today materialize, to an unprecedented extent, the Rousseauistic idea of a community whose supremacy does not admit of any check by the autonomous organization of particular societies. Were the totalitarian system capable of a complete realization, there would be no distribution of authority at all, but only one leader assisted by purely instrumental characters. Hierarchy would disappear entirely and some kind of equaUty would be enjoyed the
most
radical
Science, Philosophy
268
with only one exception
—by
a
and Religion
crowd of people devoid of
liberty.
on the one hand,
If it is true,
quires
some
possible
greatest
among
leadership;
those
if it is
amount
who
of
that every
true,
common
action re-
on the other hand,
initiative
should
are subject to authority,
it
be
that the
preserved
follows that the
most common interests must be taken care of by one supreme and central organization, and that more particular interests must be taken care of by subordinate organizations, until we reach the sphere of personal happiness where the individual is sovereign. The relationship between that which is more common and that which is more particular gives birth to a hierarchy of power. This hierarchy is as natural and good in its essence as liberty and authority. 2.
Thomism
is
ready to acknowledge, without the slightest
powers of men. Thomas, inequality in intelligence, physical will-power and virtue, is something basically normal
reluctancy, any inequality observable in the
According strength,
and good.
to St.
On
point,
this
Thomism
is
decidedly at variance
with the philosophies and theologies which account for these inequalities by
some
original catastrophe,
whether original
sin
or some fundamental disturbance in the order of society. There
no question that many inequalities among men actually refrom physical mishappenings or from moral faults. But it is clear that the interpretation, both theoretical and is
sult either
practical, of the fact of
human
cording as inequality
depicted as totally due to
is
inequality differs greatly, ac-
or as
evil,
fundamentally due to the nature of things and the order of creation. 3.
The
question of the equality of opportunities must be
stated with a particular care. Let us say that in societies
constitution dignities are status.
is
more
People
chance to
predominantly
rise
or less permanently
who were born up
whose and
aristocratic, social functions
in
bound up with
a lower status have
to a higher function,
social little
whatever may be their
personal merit, whereas persons born in a higher social status
,
.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
269
have a good chance to exercise a higher function, even if they are not especially qualified by their personal abiUties. A typical example of an aristocratic constitution is afforded by the miHtary organization of the old monarchies, where eldest sons of noble families were destined to be army officers, while plebeians were
bound
remain privates or non-commissioned between permanent status and social function is essentially uncongenial to the spirit of democracy. The democratic state has removed all legal obstacles officers.
to
Such
to
a legal connection
and has systematically foswhich would favor the actual realization
the equaHty of opportunities
tered
all
institutions
of such an equality.
seems to us that Thomistic politics admits both of aristoand of equalitarian constitutions, provided that neither aristocratism nor equalitarianism assume the character of absolute and unbalanced principles. An absolute equality of personal opportunities would imply an individualistic atomizaIt
cratic
tion of societies that Thomism rightly condemns. It would imply the suppression of hereditary property and a com-
munistic organization of education.
An
absolutely aristocratic
would conflict with distributive justice and hamper the common good by narrowing exceedingly the possibility of
constitution
appointing the best qualified persons to the higher functions.
Whether
the aristocratic principle or the equalitarian principle
should be given particular emphasis seems to be a matter of historical expediency.
must be
however, that the equalitarian principle enby the fact that it is connected with the essential requirement that authority should belong to the most able one. An aristocratic constitution can be justified on It
said,
joys a privileged situation
the ground of historical conditions; a constitution that favors the promotion of personal merit agrees better with a demand which is not historical, but essential, the demand that authority be entrusted to the people most qualified to exercise it. It is remarkable that in his outline of the regime he thinks to be
the best, St.
Thomas
is
more
positive about universal eligibility
Science, Philosophy
270
than about universal electorship. principle that principle that
He would
not state as a
should be electors, but he does state as a
all all
and Religion
should be eligible for
office,
any restriction on
tending to decrease the chances that the best one
eligibility
will be selected.
we consider, finally, the very essence of man, Thomism most equalitarian philosophy that has ever been conceived. The metaphysical notion of species, which implies that all members of one species are one in essence, lies at the basis of all Thomistic speculation on man and his destiny. The racialistic idea, that there is greater distance between higher and lower human races than between lower races of men and higher species of animals, appears to a Thomist as a monstrous ab4. If
the
is
surdity
—an
because
it
absurdity that St.
never occurred
equalitarianism St.
Thomas
his
never refuted explicitly
mind. This metaphysical
may seem inconspicuous to those who know The reason why St, Thomas
only from the outside.
does not emphasize
it
in explicit statements
is
that
all
his
an obvious way as to make exstatements superfluous. As a matter of fact, the principle
philosophy implies plicit
Thomas
to
in such
it
of the essential equality of in essence
—
rationalistic
core of
men — the
principle of their unity
could not be questioned so long as the
realistic
conception of universal essences, which
Thomism, was not
itself
put into question.
lies at
Were
it
and the
not
because of nominalist and idealist philosophies, which assert that universal natures are but general words, or general pat-
would never have been necesThomas, is one and the same in all men, and that the natural law, which is embodied in human nature, endows all men with the same inescapable duties and the same inaHenable rights. terns constructed by the
sary to point out that
To
conclude,
let
mind,
human
it
nature, for St.
us point out the significance of the very
fact that the relationship
the philosophy of St.
between the democratic
Thomas was thought
to
ideal
and
be worth
dis-
cussing in such a conference as ours. Both in the order of positive sciences
and
in the order of ethical disciplines, great
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
271
bring about reconsiderations of principles. To by personal experience, aware of the astounding fecundity of Thomism, it seems that the endeavor to build up a Thomistic interpretation of democracy may well open a new crises regularly
those
who
era in the
The
are,
development of
great question
political thought.
to
is
determine under what conditions
such an endeavor can be successfully carried out, in
more
specific terms,
evidence
its
or, to put it under what conditions Thomism can
fecundity in the particular field constituted by our
and social problems. In this connection, I would emphasize the fact that political philosophy is by far the least developed part of the philosophy of St. Thomas. Besides theology, which is, of course, his main concern, the great achievements of St. Thomas are found in logic, metaphysics, rational psychology and general ethics. When we leave these privileged fields, and investigate disciplines, such as politics or the philosophy of sciences, to which St. Thomas devoted
political
less time, a
which are they
may
very striking
phenomenon
takes place.
The
texts
our topic, however valuable be, do not prove so fecund as certain expositions directly
relevant to
whose relevance seems only
indirect or even remote.
For
in-
an epistemologist were intending to build up a Thomistic interpretation of contemporary physics, I should stance,
if
him to collect and study as carefully as possible all paswhere St. Thomas explains his ideas on the system of sciences. But I should ascribe a much greater importance to the task of going deeply into the supreme theories of the Thomistic metaphysics of knowledge, such as the theories on the relationship between objects and things, objects and ideas, entia rationis and real entities, etc. Similarly, the political writings of St. Thomas, however valuable they may be, will not shed so much light on our poHtical problems as will some great theories that St. Thomas (and his commentators) developed mostly in psychological, metaphysical and ethical conadvise sages
texts.
With
particular reference to the
problem of democracy,
I
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
272
should say that the most enhghtening teaching of St. Thomas is not found in any of his poUtical writings, but in the psychological, ethical, metaphysical and theological treatises where he de-
with great thoroughness and unmatched accuracy, sublime theory of hberty. Whoever has understood the
velops, his
ideas of St. indifference,
Thomas on a
liberty as
an active and dominating
super-determined power, a mastery enjoyed
by rational beings, on the ground of
their rational nature itself,
over the means that lead to their ends; whoever has understood that liberty means, for St. Thomas, an absolute perfection,
which increases and does not decrease when
it
rids itself of its
imperfections (such as indecision, perplexity, and, most of
all,
power of falling away from the end) whoever has understood the meaning of the Thomistic thesis that liberty is an attribute of the divine nature, a divine name, should conthe dreadful
;
clude that the general philosophy of
philosophy of poHtical liberty that radical.
Yet,
disentangling
the
Thomas's metaphysics remains, be achieved.
is
St.
Thomas
involves a
both very orderly and very
political
implications
to a large extent, a task
of still
St.
to
CHAPTER XV Democracy and the Rights
Man"
PAUL WEISS
By
Mawr
Bryn
*An
of
earlier draft of this
College
paper was sent to a number of philos-
ophers for comment and criticism. Professors Morris R. Cohen, Curt J. Ducasse, Charles Harts home, Ralph Barton Perry and
Wilbur M. Urban expressed themselves as being in substantial agreement with the views there formulated. The first three, however, stated that they approved primarily, not as philos-
common sense men. Comments by these and other philosophers, with occasional asides by the author, form the appendix of the present paper. I should li\e to ta\e this occasion to than\ Professors Edgar S. Brightman, Louis Finf^elstein, K. Laurence Stapleton and Roger H. Wells for their helpful suggestions. ophers, but as liberals, citizens or
1.
The
object
is
is to understand and evaluate. Its open the most universal and pertidiscern, in terms of which diverse ex-
task of philosophy to bring into the
nent truths possible to istents, practices
and
beliefs are to
be judged.
Its
function
is
neither to attack nor to defend, to apologize nor to propa-
gandize for any limited custom, transient fact or local ideal. It is its duty resolutely to oppose what is false and evil, and boldly to support the true and good, and
this, irrespective
of
where they are found. 2.
Unfortunately, philosophers have too often fallen short of
the ideals of true philosophy. Again and again they have per273
Science, Philosophy
274
and Religion
verted their subject and themselves by urging as true, inescapable or noble
what was only
partial, transient or local. Plato
and
Aristotle endorsed the attitudes of Greek aristocracy, Aristotle
Aquinas and Hobbes form of government. "proved" that monarchy was revolution, creed and reform has had Almost every war, state, its opposing philosophers, devoting their energies to the task of showing that these embodied absolute truths and perfect
and
Aquinas
approved
of
slavery,
the ideal
ideals in all their pristine glory. 3.
Today we
are surrounded by philosophic apologists for
and
religions of the day, for current totalitarianisms
the science
and democracies, by philosophic positivists and anti-positivists, by philosophic Thomists and anti-Thomists, by philosophic Anglophiles and Anglophobes. But surely truth is not so limited that some one of these has caught the whole of it. To say that no one of them alone has the whole truth does not, of course, mean that they are all on the same level, equally good and true, or even that they are equally able to approach whatever ideal goals there are. It means that we ought not, as philosophers, prejudge our issues, making the truth follow the contours of the heart's desire. It means that we must free ourselves from the preconceptions which characterize the established schools, which hem in the limited methods of limited disciplines, and which lie at the roots of creedal and political programs. Only if we do this have we the right to speak as philosophers and hope to attain the position where we can claim to judge correctly and afresh just what is worthy of respect, improvement and support in this world of ours. 4.
The
mocracy dent
greatest service that philosophy can render to a deis
how
it. Philosophy ought to make an established democracy attains, and how
to be honest with far
evi-
far
what is desirable, stable, flexible, unified and universal, capable of making and enabling men to be men to the full. This can be done most effectively in two stages. In the first, where the philosopher works primarily alone, he distinguishes the basic and vital strands of human existence, and it falls
short of
Science, Philosophy
what
and Religion
275
them deserves encouragement, protection and where the philosopher works together with and in partial dependence on others, he examines the state of affairs that actually prevails and suggests how it is to be modified in accordance with what the first analysis disindicates
in
extension. In the second,
closes. 5. It is
the object of the second session of the Conference on
and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life to obtain representative statements of the meaning of democracy by students of the different discipHnes. To conform to that purpose we must, for the present, restrict ourselves to the first of our two philosophic tasks. We must content ourselves with offering to workers in other fields conclusions which they, in their own way, can integrate with our results. In return we ought to obtain from them the Science, Philosophy
products of their present correlative investigations, and be in a position to perform a similar integration with their products that they perform with ours
our tasks.
If this
—an essential part of the
can be done,
we
second of
should be able to obtain
(what antecedently seemed incredibly difficult, if not impossible), an example of corporate thinking on the part of a host of workers in many different fields, having as its upshot the formulation of a definitive statement of what democracy is, what it ought to be and what it can accomplish. 6.
Men
are
members
of a single species.
They
are persons,
They members of families, societies and states. Each one of these modes of existence has its own value, deserving full help, protection and encouragement. The ideal program for mankind is one which concerns itself with every one of them, and makes they have friends and they engage in specialized activities. are
possible their preservation
and enhancement
to the greatest pos-
sible degree. 7.
Men
are
members of the same species, or in current biologimembers of the same "family." This fact,
cal terminology, are
supported by the investigations of biologists, physiologists, anthropologists and psychologists, is confirmed by philosophic
Science, Philosophy
276
inquiries into the nature of speech
and Religion and mind. All men, despite
countless diversities in background, disposition and achievement, belong to one natural group, a fact which compels one to
and nationalism so far as these involve the supposition that some men have a natural destiny, right or
reject theories of racism
duty not characteristic of the others. All
men
are equally entitled to that
which enables them
to
exercise the functions characteristic of beings of their kind.
Each man must be recognized to be equally deserving of human shelter and food, of an opportunity to grow, feel, think and know, and of protection against injury, disease and unnecessary pain.
Some
of these rights,
tion against disease, enable
them
e.g.,
species; others, e.g., the right to adequate
tection against unnecessary pain, enable
most
beneficial
to
to
food or to protec-
to be living
members
human
them
themselves and the
to act in the
rest.
the right of every
characteristic of
men
man
to
live
way
Together these
guarantee what might be termed the principle of equality,"
of their
shelter or pro-
and
act
"human in
ways
alone.
Occasionally a denial of some of these rights seems justified.
Punishment must,
at times,
be prescribed. But the reason can-
made to suffer are beings whose physiognomy or rhythm differs from the rest. To justify the punishment one must show that they provide the most satisfactory or just remedy against those who deprive others of their right to live as men. The denial of these rights in specific cases must, in short, be defended as a means by which these very rights can be more successfully and universally not be that the individuals
color,
affirmed.
The acknowledgment
of the principle of
"human
equality"
does not presuppose the existence of any one particular form of
government. Dictatorships have at times explicitly accepted it; democracies have at times implicitly rejected it. It is compatible with monarchy and communism, with nationalism and internationalism. But if by democracy one means a way of life open to all the people, then this is an essential part of a demo-
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
277
cratic creed.
A
true
but assure
it,
while a true anti-democracy will not only deny
it
it
but prevent
democracy realization.
its
will,
however, not only affirm
Such democracies and
anti-
To
democracies are in complete and irreconcilable opposition.
embrace the former but not to oppose the latter, to oppose the latter but not to defend the former, is to be but partially right, opponents of the false and evil or defenders of the true and good, but not yet both together. Until
we
we
are both
are not
yet true democrats, whole-heartedly supporting the principle
of
human 8.
is
equality.
Each man
is
a unique being, with a value
all
own.
his
not merely one of a kind, a unit in a multitude, one
cupies a position in space not occupied by another, contains matter which another does not.
He
is
He
who ocor who
also a person, a
responsible, conscious being, possessing an internal nature
and
value no other has.
Each person is unique and undupHcatible. He has a dignity and worth intrinsically as important and as deserving of respect as any other.
To
"personal equality."
It is to
affirm this
is
to affirm the principle of
recognize that each
man
is
no more
and no less a person than any other, that each is an ultimate and final source of decision and responsibility, the last court of appeal as to what is to be believed and cherished. A person has the power and the right to worship, enjoy, judge and believe, by himself and on his own responsibility. Each has a right to a free trial and a right to have his needs, desires and individual predilections given equal consideration with those of any other. He is a being to be judged in terms of what he is as well as by what he does. These rights are denied
when men
are forced to submit, without possibihty of re-
ply, to the decisions of others as to
what
is
But makes men
right or wrong.
these very rights are endorsed when, whatever
aware of what they are and what they ought
to
decide,
is
publicly encouraged.
The
what a demand. They should not compel any-
principle of "personal equality" sets a hmit to
state or society
ought
to
Science, Philosophy
278
and Religion
view the person or individual decisions of another as his own, or to delegate to another his privilege to decide where truth and goodness lie. But the principle also indicates what a just and adequate state ought to do. It should encourage those enterprises and institutions educational, communal, literary and religious which help men become more aware of what it is to be a person and what a person ought to do. The principle of "personal equality" has been affirmed by lords of the manor, capitalists, slave-holders and anarchists. But one must not only affirm but promote its realization, and firmly oppose all attempts to deny, blur or oppose it. Only then can one claim to be an active democrat, with a vital faith in the native dignity of every man. 9. No one can realize all his potencies alone, unaided. To be fully human we need the encouragement and support, the sympathy and help of others. A man must be recognized to have the right to come in contact with, and to form lasting and intimate associations with any others. Friends penetrate beneath the outward forms of one another. To deny to any man the right to make a friend of another, no
one
to
more precious than
—
—
matter what his color, tradition or
and direction of
his
growth.
To
faith, is to limit the
be free to
make
range
friends as the
no one can rightfully proscribe. To what may be termed the principle of
spirit inclines is a privilege
admit
this
is
to accept
"free kinship," the right to cut across
all
established barriers
custom and convention to the person of another, no matter what his role or function, and to care for him for his own sake. The principle of "free kinship" is perhaps the most novel and of
modern democratic creed. Men have, been willing and ready to subscribe to the thesis that all were equal as humans and as persons, but have hesitated to admit that they all had an equal right to form intimate and lasting associations with others, irrespective of their differences in position, background or religion. But if the principle of "free kinship" is not actively and effectively supintermittent item in the in 'the past, occasionally
and Religion
Science, Philosophy ported,
men
will
"Tj^
not be able fully to enjoy and profit from
contact with the endless variety which that degree, be so
To promote
much
less rich
free kinship,
is man, and and developed.
nothing perhaps
will,
to
so effective as
is
the encouragement of games, sports, festivals, assemblies and
work, in which a multitude can freely participate and which they can use as occasions for acting together, for discerning
and appreciating individual flavors, and for the formation of lasting friendships. So far as this is true, the promotion of these must be one of the aims of a true democracy, concerned with providing
all
men
with the opportunity to be
fully
men. 10.
To know men
intimately and well
it is
with them. The knowledge of what actual association.
are like,
is
a
most readily obtained through continual It is this which the family provides. It is in the men come most readily to know what others are
knowledge which family that
desirable to live
men
is
and need. It is in the family that men usually obtain that ready and honest sympathy and reproof, that direct experience and education in human affairs, which is so essential to their growth and welfare. The responsibility and position which men have in their families limits the demands which the larger social whole has a right to impose, a fact which is recognized in the economic and social exemptions occasionally allowed to heads of families. But there is as yet no clear pohcy as to whether and how punishment for crimes and reward for work should be adjusted to the fact that a
man
is
not only a public being but a
member
of a
family as well.
The effect of punishment on the individual should be weighed against the effect that it has on the dependent and innocent members of his family.
One
should take account of the
degree to which the incarceration of a malefactor works hardship as
on those he
leaves behind. If he has a
well as on others, his incarceration
desirable.
But where the family begins
bad
effect
on them
may prove eminently to suffer undeservedly.
Science, Philosophy
28o
and Religion
be minimized. Similarly, reward for work and services ought to vary in accordance with the punishment or
the extent to
members
its
results should
which others depend on
it.
of a family have accepted, as their
The
responsible
own, obligations
of the greatest benefit to society, and so far as they carry these
punishments should be minimized and their rewards
out, their
increased.
The family, hke the person, must be granted independence and internal freedom, so far as that is consistent with the growth and well-being of its members and the rest. To recognize this is to affirm the principle of "familial autonomy," to acknowledge that each family is an ultimate cell in which men perform indispensable functions valuable to all. To be willing to embrace this principle is to be ready to oppose attempts to disrupt the family, attempts to prevent
its
functioning as a
source of experience and value, or attempts to
tinuance
difficult
or impossible.
make
encourage
It is to
its
its
con-
solidarity,
independence and continuation, so far as these are consistent with the fact that each dependent member of a family is an actual person now and may be an independent and responsible head of a new family eventually. II. The personality of a man is his person made manifest; his private nature exhibited in a public matter. Each man comes into the
a
open with
common and
a stress
and meaning
all his
own, tinging
public content in individual and unpredictable
ways.
The he
is
personality of a
man
is
most
effectively expressed
pursuing an activity in which he
is
then that he exhibits and re-structures pletely
and
to the best advantage.
—hobbies
Some
when
most concerned. It is his nature most comof these activities are
and amusements of various kinds; some of them are of fundamental importance for the continuation and improvement of man useful and public work, science, philosophy and art. The first should be permitted and within limits encouraged; the second should be encouraged and within Hmits publicly supported. Leisure is a time of preparation for good idle
—
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
281
and needed work; work is a time of preparation for desired and necessary leisure. A man is most a man when he is able to express his ability and individuality in both, and it is of value to all that he should. All men lose when some are deprived of the opportunity of using their talents in the best and most congenial possible ways. Each man must be accorded an equal right to choose and pursue any vocation open to the others. The place of each should be determined, not on the basis of race, creed, color or wealth, but on merit alone. No man must be antecedently prevented from occupying any position in the society or the state, and none must be antecedently proscribed from exhibiting his personality in and through his work, so far as that is consistent with the performance of his duties. All
men must
be granted an "equality of opportunity" to ex-
hibit their ability
and
No one can, of course, in and public need, be guaranteed either
individuality.
the face of competition
the privilege of continuing in his chosen
work
or of attaining
the position he seeks. But a democratic and effective organization will not only
minimize but resolutely withstand
all
at-
tempts to harden or increase the difficulties that now prevent certain groups of men from occupying the positions or expressing their personalities as others can and do.
A
group of men, with different roles and from different families, who adopt and work together in terms of common standards and ideals constitute a social group or society. A social group is a limited society to which one belongs voluntarily or by election; a society is a social group to which one belongs by the fact of birth and the gradual adoption of established practices. The standards and ideals of both social groups and societies are sometimes more or less explicitly expressed in taboos and injunctions, but for the most part they are unaccented but omnipresent elements in the traditions, customs, language, arts or graces which its members adopt. Each individual is born into a society and spends most of his life within it. That society, and the limited social groups to 12.
Science, Philosophy
282
and Religion
which he subsequently adheres, are part of a single great community of which all men are potentially members. A member of an actual social group or society may fail to treat others outside his group as human, to respect their possessions or to evaluate their lives, feelings, thoughts, activities or environment as he should or as they do. But to the degree that he has similar needs and must satisfy them in similar ways in the same world, he is potentially a member of the same community with them. He is, however, not actually a member of it so long as he fails to make use of those standards which would enable him to live in harmony with them. There are good social groups and bad ones, social groups which injure their members and those which help them grow. Most of them, even the best, are undemocratic in spirit and in practice, denying on extraneous grounds, privileges, opportunities and rights to various members, and excluding certain groups of individuals from membership in them. Yet these groups can be tolerated and even encouraged in somewhat the same way as the family is, provided only that, like the family, they actually function to produce better members for the society in which they are, and for the eventual great community which is the ultimate place of all. Though social groups must be free to determine their own membership or to engage, within limits, in the most divergent activities, no such freedom can be granted to a society. A society should embrace all men and accord all the opportunity to assume any function in it, according to their inclinations and merits.
Any
antecedent stratification or limitation runs counter
to the fact that all
men
require and deserve the benefit to be
derived from a free and active participation in the activities
which the society makes available. These activities are best promoted by free discussion, vocally or in print, and by equal educational opportunities, for these enable men to know and appreciate diversities in temperament, opinion, need and desire, and to learn the nature of the values which are the concern of all, the techniques of social adjustment, and the existence and
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
283
importance of majority and minority claims. All these are corollaries from what might be termed the principle of "social
freedom," the right of each
meaning count
man
to
make
in the whole, so far as that
his presence
is
and
consistent with
the exercise of a similar right by the others as well.
Unfortunately, there are of social freedom grants
men who
them
suppose that the principle
the privilege of denying
it
and
other rights, undisturbed. But the acceptance of these rights
must be understood to prohibit all attempts to void them. There must be Hmits to the freedom accorded speech, the press, to what is urged or dogmatically affirmed. Otherwise the society will succeed in nothing so much as in nourishing and making possible the success of those concerned with destroying it.
The
foregoing is perhaps the most controversial of all the which beset discussions on democracy. It seems to violate what some have termed the essence of the democratic view, the right to affirm and criticize anything, or the faith in the
issues
native
wisdom
of
man
to Hsten,
without injury, to any doctrine and criticism, however, are
or proposal whatsoever. Affirmation
neither absolute goods nor perfect means; native
wisdom
is
neither infallible nor a perfect protection against the false or
The most literate and vocal nation in the world found education, discussion, criticism and native wisdom no safeguard against the eventual conquest by those whose main concern was to make impossible the principles which allowed insidious.
them
to flourish.
We
need more than education or reasoned
discourse to counteract the influence of propaganda, caricature and willful distortion. If we are not to give up the use of
reason and honest dealing in the effort to combat what is undemocratic in spirit or effect, we must prevent the growth of the forces that
make
for the destruction of that spirit.
No
one
can reasonably expect to promote tolerance by granting immunity to intolerance. Tolerance demands respect for all forms in
which the good appears;
evil.
it
does not
demand
indiflerence to
Science, Philosophy
284
and Religion
To acknowledge a right is to acknowledge a duty to extend and preserve it; to be free to exercise a right is to be constrained to oppose its abuse. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are no more important than other forms of freedom, and so far as they are employed, not as means for investigating and educating, but for making life brutish or unbearable, they must be restrained. A faith in democracy does not mean a blind extension of the principle of tolerance, to cover no matter what abuse, or a faith in the ability of men to withstand any attack, no matter what the device. A positive and dynamic democracy holds on to some things and rejects others; it fights against all attempts to deny or limit the principles on which it rests. The
13.
foregoing
principles
equality, free kinship, familial
and
tunity to
social
freedom
—human
equality,
personal
autonomy, equality of oppor-
—and the rights they assure—the right
food and shelter, growth, health and reason, to conscience
and
responsibility, to private
social intercourse
and
worship and moral decision, to and freedom, to
leisure, to familial life
and sympathy, to education, inquiry, religious instrucand work, and to the means to become members of a single all-inclusive community together define what has been termed
justice
tion
—
the "democratic ciples states
way
of
life." It is
conceivable that these prin-
and rights might be endorsed and even supported by which are non-democratic in structure or operation; it is
true that democracies have at times ignored or even rejected
some
of them. So far as this
latter
which are
is
true, it
is
the former and not the
truly democratic in spirit.
A state is a society whose members habitually obey the laws and injunctions formulated by a governmental body. The primary function of the state is to assure, extend and protect the principles and rights which are necessary for the full growth and prosperity of all. A democratic state is one in which the persistent attempt is made to attain these ends through universal suffrage, open political discussion, frequent elections, secret ballots and a representative and parliamentary govern-
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
285
on the supposition that there is no better judge meaning and importance of concrete proposals and their relation to principles and rights, than common mankind, deciding freely and without fear. A democratic state should endorse, protect and extend the principles and rights which define the democratic way of life. If it does only one of these, it is a democracy at its minimum. If it does all three, it is a democracy at its maximum, the kind of democracy that alone can claim whole-hearted allegiance. Only such a democracy can serve as an efficient instrument for the achievement of the ultimate all-embracing community, where each man can be a free, happy and complete individual, living and working in harmony with his fellow man. ment.
It rests
of the
APPENDIX Morris R. Cohen: This paper is an eloquent plea cies with which I heartily agree.
and liberal polime, however, to desire of the author and
for tolerant It
follow the contours of the heart's
seems
to
other liberals like myself, rather than the cautions referred to in sections i to 3. If philosophy be the most general attainable knowledge, a philosophy of democracy should be an attempt to derive what we define as democratic policies, from wider general principles, or at least establish an inner connection between them. This, it seems to me, the paper fails to do.
Paul Weiss: As is evident from
sections 4 and 5, it is the intent of the present paper to isolate the basic truths which are pertinent to
the understanding and evaluation of democracy, and to present
from the preconceptions and prewould be desirable, as Professor Cohen suggests, to relate those notions to more general ones and to one another. It is doubtful, however, whether this would them, so
far as possible, free
dilections of the author.
It
be consonant with the purpose of the present conference, it could be done properly in short space, and whether it would allow philosophers of widely divergent views to rec-
whether
ognize their
common
ground.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
286
The
own
author's
philosophic views have been sketched at
a previous session of the conference; the connection
between
those views and those expressed in the present paper are, I think, fairly evident. But the foregoing paper is being submitted both to those who do and those who do not accept the author's philosophy, nor see fies
the
how
it
substantiates and clari-
meaning and value of democracy.
Morris R. Cohen:
To it
be sure the paper attempts to do this in section 7 when belong to one argue that the fact that "all men
tries to
.
natural group
.
.
compels one to
.
reject
.
.
theories of racism
and nationalism so far as these involve the supposition that some men have a natural destiny, right or duty not characteristic of others." I have no hesitation in calling this a clear case of the fallacy of non sequitur. The fact that a number of people have something in common does not deny differences of aptitude, functions, rights that
mammals,
brates,
denies
things.
I
for
and duties any more than the
fishes,
and birds
their
different
one
reject
many
all
fact
belong to the family of verte-
aptitudes
in
regard
of the exaggerated
to
many
claims of
racism and nationalism on empirical grounds and on account of certain ethical and political preferences. But the falsities
cannot be refuted and the truth established merely on the general
ground that
all
human
beings form a family.
If
the matter
becomes obvious that differences between groups of human beings as well as between individuals are real and by no means always irrelevant to their is
argued on empirical grounds,
it
proper function, "natural destiny, right or duty."
The question
then becomes a complicated one as to which differences of aptitude are relevant to the opportunities which should be ac-
corded to different groups of individuals.
A
father or
mother
has different rights and duties than a son or daughter, and a
group of people living on a world's highway, such as the Suez or Panama Canal, have different duties to the rest of mankind than those who live on an out of the way island. The problems which a heterogeneous society thus presents are not solved by blank egalitarianism.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
287
Paul Weiss:
Men
and function. These are not "always and duties. We ought to avoid a "blank egalitarianism" which denies the important respects in which men differ from one another. But we must also not forget that there is a common human nature, entraining common rights and duties. It is the latter alone, I should think, which is the philosopher's proper concern. The former must be aflSrmed, but the specific questions it raises must be dealt with politically by the politically wise. differ in aptitude
irrelevant" to their rights
Morris R. Cohen:
men
All
are not in fact equal in their aptitudes or in their
and equality of opportunity under different conit is balanced by other principles and made definite in given situations, it is a mere intelligence,
ditions
is
a very vague concept. Unless
rhetorical phrase.
Paul Weiss:
The
affirmation of a
common
nature, rights
and duties makes
possible an extension of acts of sympathy, justice and mercy to
men we
have never seen.
It
makes
possible an intellectual op-
position to the basic principles which doctrines of racism and nationalism. serves,
it is
in politics.
not of
much
But since
it
now
sustain prevailing
As Professor Cohen ob-
use in helping decide a specific issue helps resolve other equally vexatious
and more basic problems,
it
is
to
that extent
more than a
rhetorical flourish.
Morris R. Cohen: Criminals are not the only ones
who
are deprived of the
open to everyone else. Typhoid Mary is deprived of her freedom to attend public functions or to pursue her occupation as a cook because of her misfortune rather than because of any fault. In brief, the principle of human equality is by itself of rights
little
value in determining proper policies. Consider, for in-
stance, the question of
whether we should change our immi-
gration laws so as to allow the millions of starving Chinese to enter this country. sale
It
can be shown that to do this in a wholethe American standard of living.
manner would depress
Science, Philosophy
288
Have
the
and Religion
Americans a right to maintain a higher standard of men and w^omen of other countries? If so, not only
living than
the principle of equality, but the right of every receive adequate food, goes by the board.
We
human being
to
could, by greatly
reducing our standards of living, raise to some extent those prevailing in many regions of the world. But not only would
by the vast majority of Americans, it by no means certain or demonstrable that they are wrong in thus maintaining a higher standard for themselves and for their children than for others. We are not obliged to love our neighthis proposal be rejected is
and children
bor, his wife
as ourselves, our
own
wives and
children.
Paul Weiss: These points have
also
Henry Parker, and they
are
with his criticism. But for right to love
is
been raised by Professor DeWitt commented on below in connection the moment it may be noted that a
not to be confounded with an obligation to love.
Democracy presupposes the former, not the
latter.
Morris R. Cohen: I am not denying that the principle of equality has some application; but the important thing is to determine where and when, and not to set it up in its abstract nakedness when it becomes a merely rhetorical expression.
Paul Weiss: It is
the task of politics to determine where and
principle of equality
is
to be applied.
But the
when
the
fact that these are
important and difficult questions should not obscure the fact that the formulation of universal rights has its own value and helps
make
possible correct political decisions.
Morris R. Cohen: Similar criticism can be applied to set
up
in this
paper as
if
all
the other principles
they were axiomatic.
Paul Weiss:
The axiomatic fact that
resolution.
character of a statement
there are
still
more
is
not affected by the
specialized problems awaiting
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
289
Morris R. Cohen: "Free kinship," the right to form friends would be a most form of tyranny if there were not also the right of
horrible
natural aversion, the right to refuse to be friends with those
who
are antipathetic to us. Free friendship
preferences for some and rejection of others.
not have to be friends with everyone
who
game any more than with everyone who
means I
selection,
cannot and do
attends a baseball
participates in an elec-
tion for President of the United States.
Paul Weiss:
A
right
The acknowledgment of the right of compel one to be friends with anyone.
not a duty.
is
free kinship does not
Morris R. Cohen:
The
right to choose any vocation
put aside
if
there
is
room
open
to others has to
for only 600 teachers
be
and 1000 apply
and show themselves to be fit. Four hundred of them have to do something else. Not every girl who wants to go on the stage and become a prima donna can be employed, even if she has talent. Who is to be selected is a serious problem, and what to do with those who cannot be employed in what they are most fitted for and most anxious to do, is a still more difficult problem, on which the abstract principles of this paper do not throw very helpful light.
Paul Weiss: The right
to choose
and pursue a vocation
is,
as
was observed
be determined on the basis of merit. No one obviously can be guaranteed the privilege of continuing in his earlier, to
chosen work or of attaining the position he seeks.
Morris R. Cohen: This paper touches on but does not adequately deal with the problem of the dependents of one who is punished for any crime. But if the dependents of a man are not to be punished for the sins or crimes of the one on whom they are dependent, should they be rewarded for the virtues of the one on whom they are dependent.? If we allow the latter, as we do, a philosopher might well ask, why not the former.?
Science, Philosophy
290
and Religion
Paul Weiss: Reward, like all that is good, ought to be spread; punishment, like all that is evil, ought to be confined, Morris R. Cohen:
The breakdown is shown in
rights
in
practice
of
all
principles
of
abstract
the author's statement in section 12 that
man
has a right "to make his presence and meaning count whole so far as that is consistent with the exercise of a similar right by the others as well." Here the crucial question is which rights are similar, and what rights must take precedence over other rights. Without considering the latter we do not get very far.
each
in the
Paul Weiss:
Common
rights should have precedence over particular
One common
limited ones. so far as
the
its
and
right takes precedence over another
denial precludes the attainability of that other to
full.
Morris R. Cohen: This does not dispose of the argument that the mass of the people are not in a position (because of inadequate knowledge) to decide freely and without fear.
Paul Weiss: Free and fearless decision
is
not exclusively nor always a
function of knowledge. Intellectuals do not decide more freely
and
fearlessly
than others. Free and fearless decisions occur
where the basic human rights have been acknowledged and supported. as a rule in societies
Morris R. Cohen: Let me repeat. paper.
They
are
I
agree with the
my own
main conclusions of
preferences. But
I fail
to find in
it
this
any
To repeat these principles may strengthen the faith of those who believe in them, but it does not add much illumination or explain why these principles philosophy
of
democracy.
do not work in practice. This paper justifies restraints on freedom of speech and of the press when they are used to make life "brutish and un-
Science, Philosophy (to others). This
bearable"
and Religion
means
291 democratic
that not the
principle of freedom, but the traditionally aristocratic principle
or standard of the
ness
to
is
life
maintained on philosophic principles, discussion than
is
and unbearabledemocracy is to be
that avoids brutishness
be the deciding principle. Yet here accorded to
if
this deserves
more
critical
it.
Paul Weiss: I
think the question here
largely
is
difference
an
verbal. It is not
meaning of democracy that between a good and a brutish life.
essential part of the
it
ignore the
Morris R. Cohen: In the end, democracy
is
identified not
with the abstract
which admittedly may be effectively an enlightened monarchy or aristocracy, but
principles of this paper,
recognized in
with certain
methods, universal suffrage, frequent and parliamentary government, which coexit with the failure to recognize the fore-
political
elections, secret ballot,
may
admittedly
going principles.
Paul Weiss: Democracy has two facets: government. The former is Philosophically the former latter.
a
way
of life
and a form of
the end, the latter the means.
more important,
politically the
But we should have both.
Professor Curt I
is
it is
J.
Ducasse:
have read with interest Professor Weiss' paper.
I
find
my-
sympathy with many or most of the opinions he expresses. This attitude on my part, however, is a personal rather self in
than a professional one; that
is,
it
is
dictated by
my
personal
inclinations as a citizen, rather than by any facts or principles
known
to
me
in
my
technical capacity as a philosopher. I be-
lieve that similarly Professor Weiss,
or not,
is
whether he
is
aware of
it
in fact speaking not for philosophy but for himself
(and for those who happen to feel as he does). I believe he has succeeded pretty well in formulating the principal things most American citizens instinctively and often inarticulately long for and mean by "democracy," whether or not this term be
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
292
or
historically
etymologically
or
the
technically
most
ap-
propriate one to describe these things.
Paul Weiss: I am glad to have Professor Ducasse's confirmation that the paper succeeds in "formulating the principal things most American citizens instinctively and often inarticulately long for and
'democracy.' "
mean by
men
I
hope, however,
it
formulates
vv'hat
and mean, for this is what a philosophic account of human rights must reveal. All men, I should hold, long for the true and the good, and the most that philosophy can do is to make evident just what it is that is needed and other
also long for
desired.
Morris R. Cohen:
on these things themon the word "democracy" which nowadays is being too often used to induce people to adopt, without examining them, the most diverse proposals. I
believe attention should be centered
selves rather than
Charles Hartshorne: I have read and re-read Dr. Weiss' paper. It seems very good and suitable for the purpose. It is perhaps
common what
is
sense rather than philosophy, but then that
to
me
chiefly
may be
needed.
Paul Weiss:
Common
sense and philosophy are not opposed.
They
are
dogmatic to the systematic, the vague to
related as the inarticulate to the articulate, the
the critical, the discontinuous to
the clarified.
DeWitt Henry Parker: I
have twice read Professor Weiss' vigorous
the Bill of Rights with
with its general agreement which
much
spirit, there are I
intelligible
stitutions.
version of
might record. is
not primary,
and defensible only in terms of
historical in-
Philosophically viewed, the concept of right
but
new
While I am in sympathy certain major points of dis-
interest.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
293
Paul Weiss: Historical institutions themselves require a justification. This, I
should think,
is
most
effectively
the nature of fundamental
men
concern
human
provided by an account of rights
and
duties,
and the
have shown for them.
DeWitt Henry Parker: Taken
abstractly,
as
Professor Weiss has stated them,
all
from which even he would
these "rights" lead to consequences
if they were resolutely applied. I, for one, from them. Desire and love I understand as primary concepts, but rights, even the most "sacred," I do not understand, except with relation to what Professor Weiss calls
believe,
recoil,
I
would
recoil
conditions, "partial, transient or local."
Paul Weiss:
A
fundamental right
is
a claim
each has against
all
the
and the need they have to preserve and improve it, A basic desire and a basic love accordingly entrain basic rights to desire and to love. others, because of the nature they share,
DeWitt Henry Parker: do not think one can condemn anything by calling it much that was truer and more excellent perhaps then than in our era, yet Weiss' approach is of that century, and has the limitations of that approach. For example, I do not know what to do with the "right to food and shelter." How much food and shelter.? As much as anybody else's? Communism? And in return for how much and what kind of labor or as a gift? The AmeriI
"eighteenth century," for there was
—
can
workman
latter twice as
more times
as
much as a German worker;
receives twice as
much as a much as a Hindu.
British worker; the
the
German
ten or
Well, what then: unrestricted
immigration into America, Australia, Canada?
Paul Weiss: This same point was raised by Professor Cohen above. It is much however seems clear. We must try to raise the standards of others; to do this, we need not support unrestricted competition or immigration. Competition and immigration should be allowed only so far as they are serious and difficult. This
Science, Philosophy
294
and Religion
compatible with the retention and achievement of the highest possible goals. We risk lowering our standards in helping others and risk excluding others in raising our standards.
The
dynamic one. We must continually put up barriers solution and take them down, balancing the possibility of retaining goods achieved, with the possibility of making them more widely available. It would be folly to attempt the one and neglect the other, but sometimes one must be slighted and sometimes the other. is
a
DeWitt Henry Parker: Again: I rather liked what Weiss said about "free kinship," but wonder how far he would push it. Would he approve intermarriage between definitely recognized races? For myself, I
doubt
that.
Paul Weiss: This same point was raised by Professor Edgar S. Brightman. men have the right, though not necessarily the inclination, privilege or opportunity to marry into other stocks. All
DeWitt Henry Parker: was not a little astonished that Professor Weiss would freedom of speech. I think he is entirely wrong in his reference to Germany. Was he ever there during the Weimar republic? (Yes. P.W.) If he had been, I don't believe he would think that by limiting Nazi propaganda that poor republic would have been preserved. Nothing could have preserved it. I
limit
Paul Weiss: It
is
not the
Weimar
republic that one regrets losing, but
the democracy that might have been, had the Nazis been effectively suppressed.
DeWitt Henry Parker: And if he thinks that by means
of any kind of intolerance, even intolerance of intolerance, intolerance can be prevented, I believe he is mistaken. Hate stems from repression; let it talk itself out.
Paul Weiss: Hate
is
too powerful and destructive to allow
it
to talk itself
and Religion
Science, Philosophy out.
As
a rule
it first
works havoc before
it
295
exhausts
itself in
speech.
DeWitt Henry Parker: In section 12, Professor Weiss says,
must be
determine their
free to
within limits in the most divergent can be granted a society.
"Though
social
own membership activities,
groups
or to engage
no such freedom
A society should embrace all men
.
.
."
Here again, I would ask a question, in order to test the scope and absoluteness of this principle: would Professor Weiss deny the right of a society to restrict the number and quality of immigrants? (No. P.W.) Might not the denial of such a right lead eventually to that worst of
all
possible worlds, an Esperanto
we
erect barriers, how can we achieve cultural homogeneity on the one hand and cultural
(Yes. P.W.) Unless
society?
variety
on the other hand?
Paul Weiss:
Some
must be erected, though none should be They must be put up and taken down in the light of the incipient losses to which both the excluded and the excluding individuals are being subjected, and the possible gains which such losses make possible. barriers
arbitrary or permanent.
DeWitt Henry Parker: They do not face the ultimate and man's tragic destiny. They seek to separate the universal from the particular, but that All moralists tend to be timid.
inferences.
They ignore
conflict
cannot be done.
Paul Weiss:
An
examination of the nature of
human
rights provides
an
excellent illustration of the inseparable union of the particular
and universal.
It
would be
regrettable
if
it
obscured the fact
that these rights are not always acknowledged,
affirmation
and that their and defense have cost countless precious lives.
Ralph Barton Perry: I
have read with
dissent
from
much
interest Paul Weiss' paper.
I
do not
his statement about democracy, but suggest that
he deal further with two questions: i. democracy or an "evaluation" (to use his
Is
this
an analysis of (I should
own word)?
Science, Philosophy
296 think
is
it
both. P.W.)
what
precisely
is
If
it
is,
and Religion as
I
suspect, an evaluation,
the writer's standard of evaluation?
standard of evaluation
(The and
that of the greatest possible use
is
unity of all man's powers. P.W.) 2. Is there no connection between the moral or social democracy here expounded, and what is commonly called political democracy.? (The former justified the latter; the latter is the most effective means for preserving and promoting the former. P.W.)
Wilbur M. Urban: have read the paper with interest and with some care and I agree with it in practically every respect. The only point at which I was disposed to raise any question I
find that
is
in connection
with the implication that appears once or twice ideals of democracy involves the
knowledge of these
that the
obligation of fighting for them.
To
be sure, there
gestion as to what the nature of that fighting
view
that just as the ideals
is
may
is
be.
no sug-
My own
and values of democracy can be
furthered only through securing the free acknowledgment of
men, so also the only intelligent way in which to fight for them is by other ideals. I recognize no responsibility to fight for them in any other way. I find the general position very well and clearly stated.
Paul Weiss: This If
is
similar to the point raised by Professor Parker, above.
human
equal
lives
were not
opportunity
to
at
make
stake and their
if
power
all
felt,
had an nothing else
ideals
perhaps would be necessary, in order to have the best prevail, but to confront one ideal with another. But where ideals are distorted or dismissed and where there is a drive to brutalize
and injure, it would be wrong to refuse to support the neglected goods with all one's energy. This does not necessitate a belief in the efficacy or desirability of war. The ends of democracy can be peacefully attained if there is a sufficiently widespread appreciation of what it means, a willingness to recognize how far any existent scheme, including our own, falls short of or stands opposed to it, and a perpetual readiness to act so as to minimize the distance and to eradicate the causes of the opposition.
CHAPTER XVI The
Stake of Art in the Present Crisis
By
GEORGE BOAS
The Johns Hopkins
University
AM ASSUMING
that the present crisis is the danger that demoforms of government are in a state of obsolescence, and I that consequently the freedom which they grant to their citicratic
zens
may
disappear and servitude take
government
is
supposed
its
For democratic freedom of its citi-
place.
to guarantee the
zens.
"Freedom," however, is a respective term. It stands for itself and acquires meaning only in relation to certain ends. These ends, graduates of colleges will need no reminder, are that from which one wishes to be free and that for which one wishes to be free. This is, of course, one of the most shop-worn cliches of elementary courses in ethics. The freedom in which the founders of this republic were interested was largely freedom from something. It was freedom from the government of George III. What political and ethical philosophy they had in common is not easy, is perhaps not possible to discover. Jefferson, to be sure, had certain ideas which if developed might seem to indicate a belief in the inherent goodness of man, which would bear noble fruit once the restraints of government were removed. Thomas Paine also, and no doubt Patrick Henry, had more or less nebulous visions of the human soul ennobled by liberty. But in general the revolutionists were fighting, not for any philosophical connothing by
297
Science, Philosophy
298
and Religion
cepts, but for a very concrete end, namely, political
autonomy
for the Colonies.
The
Constitution of the United States bears ample evidence
of the desire of the revolutionists to
than a political philosophy.
It
form
a
government rather
formulates one of the most
government in the modern world; its checks and balances seem as if contrived in a spirit of suspicion of man's goodness rather than in a spirit of faith. So little did its rigid systems of
framers trust
human
benevolence, that the very representatives
whose sake the government presumably existed, were restrained by a court which was to be selected as a non-representative body. Life, liberty and the pursuit of hapof the people, for
may have been thought of by Jeflerson as inalienable when Washington transmitted the Constitution to
piness
but
rights,
Congress in
1787,
it
remembered
will be
that he wrote,
"Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest,"
and he admitted
later in his letter,
"It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which must be reserved."
It
was not
until the first ten
the Constitution took
upon
amendments were
itself
passed, that
the safeguarding of any spe-
cific liberties.
The question
rights must be surrendered and what answer clearly today as it was in 1787. Most of us agree that freedom of speech should never be abrogated, but all of us have been somewhat impatient at its abuse and, I venture to say, have intimated, in mutterings illconcealed, certain limitations which ought to be made to it. If we felt that freedom of speech would eventuate in overt acts against the regime which permits it, there is some question as
reserved
to
how
is
of
what
as difficult to
seriously
we
should protect
said about the other rights
it.
which the
Much Bill of
the
same could be
Rights guarantees.
Science, Philosophy
We
believe in
That
is
them
all,
but
and Religion
we do
after all
admit
299 their abuse.
of course a paradoxical situation.
The paradox is attenuated, but not resolved, by the feeling which we all share that a man who is properly educated will have at least enough good taste, if nothing else, not to abuse his various liberties. Current history has shown that this feeling is by no means justified. Every anti-democratic regime now in existence, including the Russian, has been built on the ruins of democracy and has been made possible by the abuse of the rights which democracies have granted to all their citizens. The question naturally arises of the fundamental weakness in the democratic order which makes this possible. The answer requires,
I
believe,
no elaborate
investigation.
A
modern
de-
always a government of Hmited powers. As the Constitution leaves to the individual states all powers not dele-
mocracy
is
gated to the federal government, so any democratic regime leaves to the individual citizen,
of
all
its
from
powers, the powers which
whom it
in theory
it
derives
does not specifically as-
sume. The sovereign, as we all learn in grammar school, is supposed to be the People, who voluntarily give up some of their powers to others who represent them. The People in theory are not supposed to be governed by anyone other than themselves. Consequently they never have adequate means of protection from internal enemies, for after all, one never knows
when
become the spokesman for the majority. may seem to be necessary, but a democrat them to be an evil. What is wanted is as few
a crank will
Social restraints thus will always feel
impediments to the natural expression of human souls as possible. Presumably it is impossible to maintain that such expression could be itself bad. From the more simple-minded versions of progressive pedagogy to the apologies for competitive
economics, this
principle
will
be found.
It
is
the
Rousseau of "Emile"—but not of the "Social Contract"— speaking.
When and
spokesmen
artist in society,
for
democracy discuss the place of
art
they will be found to express something
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
300
similarly naive.
fellows,
it
The
painter, the poet, the architect,
maintained, must be free,
is
Now
if
their
and
arts
their
are
to
no way of telling what an unnamed spokesman for an idea means by it, but there are standards of flourishing, according to which the arts have flourished in all sorts of regimes. For that matter, pictorial art reached, according to some standards, a very high level 25,000 years ago in the valley of the Vezere. What form of government CroMagnon man enjoyed, we have no way of knowing, but at least we may suspect that it was not a democracy. Egypt in the third millennium B. C, Greece under Pericles, Rome under Augustus, the He de France under Louis IX and Blanche of Castille, Florence under Lorenzo the Magnificent, England under EHzabeth, France under Louis XIV, were scarcely democratic, yet artists flourished, if by "flourished" we mean "produced works of art which are still intensely admired today." What freedom they had did not come from the political regime under which they lived. One of the greatest artists of all times, J. S. Bach, had as his patrons such petty rulers as the Duke of Weimar and the Duke of Coethen, and was constantly badgered by the town councillors of Leipzig. Are we to believe that his music would have been even greater had he lived under Rutherford B. Hayes in the United States of America? The one conclusion that can be drawn from the history of the arts is that flourish.
there
is,
to be sure,
the political organization of society
when The
is
irrelevant to them, except
the state forbids their practice.
point
is
that
we simply do
not
know
the conditions un-
der which the arts flourish. Countries which have been great in music, like
Germany, have
at
the very
moment
of their
musical greatness been pitiful in painting. Others like
the
English have kept up a literary tradition and allowed their
music to grow almost
silent.
Others, like the France of the
nineteenth century and the Italian states of the fifteenth, have
—as
—
one can measure such things equally great in had nothing in common. For that matter France, from 1 800-1900, had a continuous been
far as
painting, while their social organization
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
history of great achievement in painting variety of social organizations.
301
and went through a countries, Hke
Some democratic
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, the
United States, have produced little art during the last century which could measure up to the productions of non-democratic countries. If democracy means something political, then one might conclude that the arts have nothing at stake in the present crisis. The fact that contemporary German and Italian art beneath contempt,
is
is
not refutation of
this.
Gogol, Pushkin,
Dostoievski, Tolstoi lived under a despotism which was just as great.
Nor
has anyone ever attempted to maintain that the
royal masters of El Greco, Velazquez,
and Goya were noted
democrats.
Not
only do
arts flourish,
which they
we not know the conditions under which the we do not even know whether a society in
but
flourish
wither away. For
it
is is
any better off than one in which they possible to think of a society in which
the members were engaged in economic pursuits and warmaking, keeping the body aHve, procreating their kind Hke beasts, and fighting off their enemies. In fact, in Plato's "Reall
would be very little of what we think of as the and yet Plato was neither a fool nor a tyrannophile. For that matter, we can take examples from our own day, examples of societies in which the arts, though they exist in some form, to be sure, are not on that account the main contribution to civihzation. We had best omit American art from our discussion, since the fever of chauvinism which has raised secondrate painters to the heights, makes any objective evaluation impossible. But everyone will admit that life in Norway and Sweden and Denmark in the last fifty years has been socially pretty healthy. Yet artistically they have not been sterile, to public" there arts,
be sure, but at the best deficient. is
the dissatisfied person? Is
it
Is it
possible that the artist
possible that in a society in
which everyone was well adjusted and well integrated, as we use the term today, would disappear? A third thing of which we are profoundly ignorant,
artists,
is
why
Science, Philosophy
302
people write, paint, ings. is
One
make
and Religion want
sculpture and
to build build-
of the pet theories of certain philosophers of art
that the arts are a
form
of self-expression.
have we, beyond verbal usage, which
But what evidence the assumption
justifies
of unexpressed selves lying hidden beneath the corporeal shell?
A
self, as
It is
as
is something which man which he comes into the world.
Josiah Royce used to insist,
achieves, not something with
our hope to build up a
self
out of our sufferings as well
our pleasures, out of the persistent conflict between our
and our ideals, between our will and our reason, between our capacities and our aspirations. A man who has reached maturity might be expected to have some feeling that his self was not part of his original constitution, but rather the main problem of his life, something he had to build, if he was fortunate, out of all his experiences, lest he die a tangle of unrealized velleities. It is not therefore unreasonable to assume that artists are frequently people who, having a sense of their incompleteness, strive through their art for self-integration. "Frequently," I say, for any psychologist who is not comappetites
mitted to some pet theory will grant that their
problems
in various ways.
Some,
human
peace in self-subjection, in self-humiliation, in others find
it
only in self-assertion.
beings solve
to over-simplify, find sacrifice,
whereas
One might imagine
that
any underlying philosophy to democracy, it is that each type of human being has a right to self-integration, a right to achieve the kind of self which will give him the most satisfaction. It assumes, and here it may well be wrong, that if
there
society
is
is
best off
when
the variety of
human
beings
is
fully
developed and that such development can exist without harmful conflict. I say that it may well be wrong, because I am not is any way for human beings The members of the Continental
convinced that there gether in peace.
to live to-
Congress,
however, could scarcely have been expected to be of that mind. They were for the most part men whose reUgious and philosophic background, as well as their political allegiance, were
very similar. Religious and racial conflicts, though they existed
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
303
in the latter part of the eighteenth century,
were not a major problem in the Colonies. It was easier for men at that time to think in terms of a fundamental human nature. It is
social
The
truth may very well be that at present a philosopher would do better to think in terms of societies rather than in terms of Society, and that
not so easy for
social
and
welding
us.
political
together into a harmonious organism will
societies
conflicts which cannot be resolved. something which is vital and stimulating. It is also, to be sure, disgusting. But some human beings have to hate something or someone, if only to keep up their own selfrespect. Psychiatrists may conceivably be able to discover eliminable causes of hate and to indicate the kind of society in which these causes would be absent. Certainly no one has done so as yet, and a group as serious as this one ought to be
inevitably
about
bring
Hatred, after
all, is
willing to face the possibility of social tragedy.
In any event, the social order which has considered this problem most seriously has been the democratic, and within the limits of governmental self-interest, some of the benevolent
The
despotisms.
government
loses
very existence of a representative form of all sense if one does not recognize the
legitimacy of various and conflicting interests which can only
be settled through compromise. can
fall
No
democrat,
if
he
is
earnest,
victim to the "philosophical pathos," to use a term of
He must be willing to and that they all have
Professor Lovejoy, of the term "unity."
grant that
human
desires are varied
theoretically a right to be fulfilled. This
is
at
any rate the cor-
be modified according to the exigencies of the material world. rect attitude to
The
take;
it
will
concerned in the spread of this atHis interests are involved just to the extent by which he differs from the norm. If he is a writer, he may wish to express novel and heterodox thoughts. They can be expressed in artist is particularly
titude.
if they are so heterodox and novel that government thinks they are harmless. In a democracy, if he can find a pubUsher or has the money to pubUsh his own
a totalitarian state only
the
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
304
works, his ideas
may not
may even be
only be printed, they
re-
no governmental esthetics to the prescriptions of which he must conform. There is at present in the United States a semi-official esthetics which
viewed.
he
If
a painter, there
is
is
appears to prescribe some degree of conformity to the tech-
nique and, curiously enough, even subject-matter of Mexican
How
muralists.
now. to
It is
we have no way
influential this is
quite possible that in a few years the
wonder
that the
depressing as our interesting,
of
pubhc
knowing
will
begin
American scene could ever have been so
official
however,
subsidies, painters are
painters represent
it
as being.
More
government not on the whole discouraged from paintthe fact that in spite of
is
ing their country in as unappetizing a fashion as they choose. It
on the part of an
takes a high degree of self-confidence
patron to patronize
artists
who
art
him as a tattered deGerman, Itahan and Russian
represent
It seems unhkely that have the same privilege. I have not seen any Fascist art in recent years; Russian art, at least that which has come to America, looks like the paintings which used to be exhibited
generate. artists
at the
National
Academy between
1910
and
1920.
The
titles
of
the canvases were not of course identical.
The most prominent art of
criticism
democratic countries
times asserted by
critics
the thirteenth century
purpose which
who
all
we should
which
that
is
it
is
directed against the
lacks direction. It
is
some-
follow this line that in Europe in
art
was inspired by
try to
a singleness of
reproduce today.
One
thing
which these men forget is that the arts of which they speak were used by the Church for a very definite purpose; that purpose was not the purpose of the artist except accidentally. Nothing is known of the satisfaction which was derived by the artists themselves from their art. But in the absence of evidence we have no right to assume that they were depressed by the restrictions which hemmed them in. For over a hundred years now artists have been divided into two groups, those who work according to tradition, take orders for specific works of art prescribed in detail by the patrons, are in fact artisans, and
Science, Philosophy
who produce
those
modes
works of
305
art freely, devise their
own
and take a chance on selHng them or not. purpose to appraise the works of either group,
of expression,
not
It is
their
and Religion
my
one beheves that the paintings of such men as Renoir, Cezanne, the Post-Impressionists, to name only a few, have contributed more to civihzation than the works of Bouguereau, Puech, and Carolus-Duran, one will also be forced to believe that only a social regime in which freedom of artistry is possible is healthful for art. The latter group were as gifted technically as the former; what made them different sprang precisely from their refusal to conform to an esthetic tradition prescribed by the state. The Second Empire was as interested in art as the but
if
Church of the thirteenth century. As a matter of fact, which we shall not discuss, it was probably more interested. One has only to read the speeches of the various Ministers of Fine Arts
under Napoleon ready to give the
III,
to see
The
artist.
how much results are
guidance the state was good evidence of what
direction will do for art.
Direction
may
take at least one of two forms:
it
may be
which have subject matter, or it may be direction of technique. For instance, in the Second Empire, the official critics found little fault with Courbet's direction of subject matter, in arts
technique; they objected to his ugly subject-matter
wood-choppers, and the laid
certain
Many
restrictions
artists
dictated
would be
like.
on
Hitler,
style
as
— peasants,
on the other hand, has well as
subject
matter.
perfectly willing to have their subjects
—witness the response to governmental and other comand architecture—but would
petitions for paintings, sculpture,
reserve the right to treat the subjects as they see
fit.
After
all,
when an editor asks a writer to review a given book in a given number of words, he is restricting the artist's freedom, and when he rejects the review because it does not bring out what he believes to be the important features of the book, he stricts
it
still
further.
Few,
if
any, artists
re-
demand complete
Ucense. It is
true that in the 1830's the Rudolphs, Schaunards,
and
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
3o6
Marcels established a type of
mind which Boheme was not with-
the public
artist in
has not yet died out. But even the Vie de
out
its
conventions, one of which was esthetic sincerity. Never-
from the
frivolity of artists in opera and novel, it contemporary artist recognizes his place in society and understands that like the business man, the professional man, the laborer and the capitalist, his first duty is to
theless aside
safe to say that the
is
hve in a community of other human beings who have their rights and duties to perform. I do not mean to say by these words that there is something called "society" and that outside it is something called "art" and that the latter owes something to the former. On the contrary, art is an integral part of society, like science or business or education or any other human activity.
To
integrate
which
ideal
know
human
the ideal,
we
shall
step towards realizing
present
interests into
an harmonious whole
demands
integration of
that
human
is
an
But unless we
will never be completely realized.
never be able even to take the
first
Whatever the past may have been, the the chief problem of the state be the
it.
interests.
One may
assume,
as
certain
communists do, that some of these interests will always be in a state of war, in which case integration will come about by suppression. Or one may assume that, though a residue of conflict
will always exist, a
one may assume that
modus
ideally
vivendi can be formulated.
human
and with mutual on the whole has a
living together in peace
tion last
is
that the artist
two kinds of
state than in the first,
him
to the
plough and that
son, he will rejoice in his service. is,
whether the
respect.
if
My
conten-
better chance in the
though
that the rulers even in the first kind will to harness
Or
beings can be educated into
it is
make
he
is
very likely
every attempt
one kind of perof person he
Whatever kind
self-assertive or self-abnegating type, his
chances
which recognizes the legitimacy of different types than in one which refuses to do so. This paper makes no attempt to define the nature of either art or artist. It frankly admits that works of art are multivalent
will be better in a society
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
and that
artists
pursue their work for a variety of reasons.
does not deny that in a non-democratic
may
flourish
307
and leave works which
will
It
and artists be greatly admired by state, art
that strange judge of greatness, posterity. It merely insists that in a democratic state there
is
a greater tolerance of diversity, a
greater willingness, at least in principle, to harmonize conflicts, a greater artists
freedom
who
to seek novel
and unpopular ends. Those
agree to the desirability of such a state of affairs will
democracy is high; those who do not, no more reason why they should struggle to preserve a democratic order than to destroy it. Those of us who have lived long enough have observed artists of no mean capacity working for its elimination in all sincerity. They have not worked for the destruction of art; they have worked for the destruction of art different from their own. see that their stake in will see
CHAPTER "The
Irresponsibles":
By
XVII
A
Comment
DOUGLAS BUSH
Harvard University
LAST YEAR, in an article^ which caused unusual reverberations, J Mr. Archibald MacLeish charged contemporary American scholars with utter failure to rise to the defense of culture in
these hideous times.
While the new barbarian invasions were
inundating Europe, destroying freedom and the civilization
we
by which anxiously,
hve, scholar-moles were continuing, placidly or
antiquarian
their
burrowings. Although everyone
has read and remembers the article,
much
as I
I
should like to quote as
can from Mr. MacLeish's account of the reasons for
the silence of scholars as they witnessed the destruction of their heritage.
The
chief reason, he found, was not lack of courage or lack wisdom, but "the organization of the intellectual life of our time." "Specifically," says Mr. MacLeish, "I think it is this: that intellectual responsibility has been divided in our time and
of
by division destroyed. The men of intellectual duty, those who should have been responsible for action, have divided them-
—the
scholars
and the
writers.
Neither of these accepts responsibility for the
common
culture
selves into
or for
its
two
castes,
two
cults
defense.
"There was a time a century ago, two centuries ago, when practiced these professions would have accepted without an instant's hesitation. A century responsibility such
men who
^"The Irresponsibles," The Nation, May
308
i8, 1940.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
309
ago the professions of the writer and the scholar were united
man of letters, and the man of was responsible in everything that touched the mind. He was a man of wholeness of purpose, of singleness of intention, a single intellectual champion, admittedly responsible for the defense of the inherited tradition, avowedly partisan in the single profession of the letters
of
Where
practice.
its
those
who
practice these several pro-
world and the creative world between them in irresponsible and neutral states, the man of letters inhabited both learning and the world of letters hke an empire. today
fessions
divide
.
"The his
.
irresponsibility of the scholar
the scientist all
.
learned
the
upon whose laboratory
work. The scholar in
is
the irresponsibility of
insulation he has patterned
letters has
made
himself as in-
different to values, as careless of significance, as bored with
meanings as the chemist. He is a refugee from consequences, an exile from the responsibilities of moral choice. His words of praise are the laboratory words objectivity, detachment, dispassion. His pride is to be scientific, neuter, skeptical, detached superior to final judgment or absolute belief. In his capacity as scholar the modern scholar does not occupy the present. In his capacity as scholar he loves the word but only the word which entails no judgments, involves no decisions,
—
—
—
accomplishes no actions. "It
is
.
.
.
not for nothing that the modern scholar invented the
Ph.D. thesis
as his principal contribution to hterary form.
Ph.D. thesis
is
the perfect image of his world.
for the sake of
doing work
—perfectly
laborious, perfectly irresponsible.
best and worst
It is
The
work done
conscientious, perfectly
The modern
scholar at his
—
both these things perfectly conscientious, laborious, and competent: perfectly irresponsible for the saving of his world. He remembers how in the Civil Wars in England the scholars, devoted only to their proper tasks, founded is
He remembers how through other wars and other dangers the scholars kept the lamp of learning
the Royal Society.
lighted.
He
does not consider that the scholars then did other
Science, Philosophy
310
and Religion
lamp wicks. He does not consider and can be greater. He has his work to do. He has his book to finish. He hopes the war will not destroy the manuscripts he works with. He is the pure, things as well as trim the
either that the dangers change
the perfect type of irresponsibility the fire could not burn
—the man who acts as though
him because he has no
business with the
He
knows, because he cannot help but know, reading his papers, talking to his friends he knows this fire has consumed the books, the spirit, everything he lives by, in other countries. He knows this, but he will not know. It's not his business. Whose business is it then? He will not answer even that. He fire.
—
work
has his
to do.
He
has his
book
to finish."
In other times one might pause to question
some
of Mr.
MacLeish's assertions, but probably most scholars, whatever they might say in self-defense or whatever the degree of their
own
sinfulness,
modern
dictment. a large
would admit
scholarship I
that
sufficiently
may remark
that
I
the
justifies
said
audience at a meeting of the
general
direction
such an earnest
of in-
somewhat similar things to Modern Language Associa-
though doubdess some growls did not reach my many endorsements did. In regard to the division of labor and the estrangement of scholars and writers, I wrote a magazine article a decade ago, in relatively less serious days, under the title of "Pale-Eyed Priests and Happy Journalists," and a more recent article on another aspect of the same theme. I mention such obscure items, not because anybody has any reason to be acquainted with them, but simply as concrete evidence that, far from having a scholar's prejudice against Mr. MacLeish's general attitude, I have in no small measure shared tion, and,
ears, a great
it.
While
heartily subscribing then to the principle that scholars
as a race
should be concerned with positive and present values, may feel that Mr. MacLeish's perspective is not quite
a scholar
the same as his own, and I should like to comment upon his view of the immediate situation and then upon the timeless problems of learning, literature and life. In the first place, it is
Science, Philosophy
not at
all
and Religion
311
what Mr. MacLeish would have had us do
clear
during recent years to help maintain or restore in Germany the
traditional
distinguished
of civilization.
ideals
German
When,
for
example, a
student of English literature writes to
an acquaintance in America that long-suffering Germany must at last
just
defend
itself
what American
against the ruthless Poles, one scholars could have
done
wonders
to prevent or
kind of outlook. In spite of an apparently great faith of the written word, Mr. MacLeish does not indicate how even the tongues of angels could have touched minds publicly and hermetically sealed. If the Modern Lan-
alter that
in the
power
guage Association and other groups of scholars had published
condemning tyranny and aggression, or condemnmodern statesmanship which permitted the rise of such forces; or if all the individual members of those associations resolutions
ing
can be imagined
most passionate and eloquent European culture, such efforts
as printing the
pleas for the preservation of
would have had as much effect as a resolution against cigarettes and alcohol from a provincial W.C.T.U., or a defense of culture presented
by a group of mediaeval
scholars
to
Attila.
If
and writers had risen up years ago to protest against American repudiation of the League of Nations, then something might have been accompHshed. Mr. MacLeish was dealing with the period before the present war, when, he thought, ideas could still have had power, but he also pictured the scholar, after the outbreak of war, sitting on the sidelines and finishing his book. At least during the last two years scholars have in a notable degree been giving money, time and effort of all kinds to national and local agencies engaged in
American
scholars
helping the cause of civilization against its enemies. However, to come to the more general problems, no one
would deny the
fact,
or
the
serious
consequences,
of
the
division between scholars and writers. But when Mr. MacLeish seems to imply that all scholars in their writings ought to be philosophizing about the state of the world, one can only shudder at the thought of such a possibiHty. And one may
Science, Philosophy
312
and Religion
among undergraduate and graduate students those most incHned to philosophize at large are quite often those whose inadequate knowledge and undisciplined minds least warrant such attempts. The young editors of college observe that
who
are
papers freely
avow
that they
understanding of world
affairs,
more intelligent and indeed of everything else,
possess a far
than their studious and cloistered instructors.
up the world is more or less many mature writers and journalists. A for tidying
understandable,
if
A
similar capacity
tacitly
admitted by
scholar's
caution
is
not altogether blameless.
Mr. MacLeish suggests that the division between scholars and writers, narrowly considered, may have improved the quality of both scholarship and writing. I think it has greatly injured both. Of course, a good deal of flat and barren scholarship is inevitable, when there are so many laborers and when the academic world puts an unfortunately high premium upon pubhcation; an American university would not have considered Socrates for an assistant professorship. But Mr. MacLeish would not wish American writing to be judged by its machinemade products, and the best American scholarship is of the same kind and quality as the best scholarship anywhere. If the division between scholar and writer is wider in America than it has been in Europe, some reasons are equally obvious and old. Mr. MacLeish sketches an ideal portrait of the "man of letters" of the nineteenth or the eighteenth century, who was both scholar and writer, but he does not observe that a type which has always flourished in Europe, a type which in modern times embraced men from Anatole France to Balfour and Haldane, has never at any time had numerous representatives here. The Mayflower and its successors did not bring over many men who embodied or cherished the Renaissance ideal of the versatile amateur; instead, they brought men eager to labor in their "calling." The professional and technical zeal and energy which enabled such men to organize a new and vast country could never look kindly
upon
cultivated amateur-
ism. It has not been merely laboratory science
and German
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
313
example that have made American scholarship so often dry and flavorless. Much American w^riting is no less professional, no less lacking in traditional flavor and urbanity. One may, for instance, compare The New Statesman and The Spectator with the corresponding journals in America; the latter have plenty of intelligence and vigor, but they seldom remind us that the world and its culture are older than last week. Although the modern world has had, in diminishing numbers, its "men of letters," the division between scholars and writers goes back much farther than Mr. MacLeish imphes. There were "pure scholars" in ancient Greece and Rome, and there have been ever since; indeed, if there had not been, our cultural legacy would be a thing of shreds and patches. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were doubtless the golden age of the modern world, when learning and letters were most closely wedded, when Erasmus was the supreme journalist, when Montaigne nourished his original mind on Plutarch and Seneca, when a busy lawyer and statesman surveyed, in splendid prose, the whole realm of knowledge from biology to poetry, when such a seriously scientific psychologist-divine as Robert Burton, unlike modern psychologists, wrote the greatest of bedside books. But even in those centuries there was a division between scholar and writer. The original sum of universal knowledge, which an ancient or a mediaeval man could master, had already grown beyond the grasp of any individual, and specialists were at work on everything from the reconstruction of classical texts to the exploration of magnetic force and the motions of the heart. It was then that Dr. Harvey remarked that Bacon wrote philosophy like a Lord Chancellor. The real problem of the century of genius, however, was not in the mere increasing mass or even the increasing variety of knowledge, but in its changing character, direction and assumptions. From Plato and Cicero down to Milton, men in the central humanistic tradition had sought knowledge for the sake of wisdom; the knowledge they possessed was unified and inspired by the quest of truth, which was at once divine
Science, Philosophy
314
and
practical.
But the
and Religion
tide of scientific inquiry
and
scientific
skepticism had also been rising ever since the time of Plato
and Cicero, and reached century. It brought a
its
first
flood
new emphasis on
in
the
seventeenth
physical law, a
new
uncertainty of belief in old facts and concepts, a newly grounded
repudiation of the traditional picture of a divine world created
and governed
for
man
by a providential Father. This
dis-
and naturalism received its boldest expression, of course, from Hobbes. And when the reaction against such a view of man and the world reached its height integrating materialism
in the romantic poets, in their effort to restore spiritual values,
they no longer, like the poets of the Renaissance, stood securely
on the
universal
souls, or
among
of an unbroken Christian and were individuals groping in their own
authority
classical tradition; they
the disjecta
membra
of the past, for private
That has been, on the whole, the predicament of the artist up to our own time. In recent years most respectable writers found Marxist dogma much more and personal
solutions.
inspiring than the
Christian,
but there have been signs of
faihng satisfaction in that. Meanwhile, in the universities the
growth of knowledge had found its appropriate symbols in the vast enlargement of plants and curricula, in the erection of so many lath-and-plaster annexes around the shrine of wisdom that it was difficult to remember that a shrine was there at
all.
But it would be unwise to attempt a survey of culture in a few pages, and instead, we might approach some of the central problems through one man whose career exemplifies them, that is, John Milton, who appears, honoris causa, in Mr. MacLeish's article. I choose Milton because he is a familiar name, because he
may be
called the last great English representative
of traditional Christian
he has for the
first
humanism, and because
in
our age
time ceased to influence poets and has been
cast into outer darkness
by our most advanced
literary critics.
In connection with Milton and those several problems, one
may
also risk
some observations on the theory and
practice of
Science, Philosophy
modern space
315
Mr. MacLeish, while devoting the bulk of
writers.
scholars,
to
and Religion
includes
irresponsibility, so that
writers
in
his
arraignment
his
of
even an owHsh scholar, whose knowl-
edge of their ways is much less intimate and intelligent, may, Mr. MacLeish so far as he goes, do a little to
in agreeing with
put the case in an historical setting. first place, Milton strove unceasingly from childhood master the whole body of useful knowledge and thereby himself to address and lead his fellows. After seven years
In the to fit
Cambridge, he was able to retire to his father's house and spend six more years in fiercely voracious study of philosophy,
at
history,
everything.
Like
all
serious
Renaissance
poets,
he
dreamed of writing the great modern heroic poem, and that ambition required, among other things, "industrious and select reading, steady observation, insight into
all
seemly and gen-
erous arts and affairs." Yet in spite of his vast knowledge,
Milton apologizes again and again for writing
he has completed the the
modern
writing,
writer,
full circle of his
who must
live,
at
all
before
private studies. Well,
or thinks he must
live,
by
cannot ordinarily devote himself to study on the
Miltonic scale, but one rarely perceives the slightest inclination to is
equal
even among those whose economic security Whereas English writers,
do
so,
to,
or far beyond, Milton's.
whom
Americans so readily brand as "derivative," have often knowledge of their cultural past, American writers, they are educated, succeed pretty well in conceahng all
a scholarly if
evidence of the In
many
fact.
They appear
quarters there
of tradition;
is
to live
wholly in the present.
a nervous fear of anything suggestive
we must have originality at all costs. It has been many contemporary American writers seem to
observed that
have no philosophic roots or resources; so long
as
up
to
report what they see and
but
when
feel,
that faculty has spent
The common
all
is
itself,
well,
they can a
point,
they are empty husks.
attitude seems to be, in the words of a novelist once quoted by Arnold Bennett: "I know enough. I don't read books, I write 'em." Not to heap up proofs of the state
Science, Philosophy
3i6 of learning
among modern
best example volatile
is
and Religion
writers
and
critics,
perhaps the
the fact that for a quarter of a century the
Mr. Ezra Pound has been regarded
as a giant of eru-
dition; in the nineteenth or any earlier century that legend
would not have lasted a month. The burden of Mr. MacLeish's charge against that they consider tive lenses,
their function
it
what they
decision and action. In for art's sake.
That
and
see
objectivity, like scholars',
is
is
more
theory of art for to
solidly
art's
is
feel,
without comment; their
an escape from responsibility for familiar words, they practice art
the verdict of a distinguished writer,
not of a jaundiced scholar.
up
writers
merely to record, as sensi-
sake
is
It
may be emphasized
that the
quite modern, that from
the early nineteenth century
all
serious art
based on the beUef, the only conceivable
Homer
had been
belief,
that
the function of art was didactic. Milton, of course, hke the
long line of artists whose conscious heir he was, held that view with a special and exalted intensity; he had before him always the ideal of the poet-priest whose works are doctrinal and exemplary to a nation. We may say, to be sure, that that ideal is quite impossible now. But one may hesitate to label as naive the authors of Greece and Rome, and Dante (whose name, if not his message, has become a highbrow shibboleth),
and the most iconoclastic writer would hardly say that they do not still make a tremendous imaginative, emotional and ethical appeal to the most sophisticated modern reader. What is
more, they make that appeal not merely to the sophisticated.
In condemning recent writers for evading responsibility, Mr.
MacLeish did not take account of the band who have been conscientiously piping songs of social significance, and who have been oddly self-conscious about their inauguration of socalled "public poetry." Such an effort to regain a lost leadership, though scarcely novel, may be commended. At the same time, one remembers that, while the long didactic tradition of the past addressed all educated men, these recent poets, in unburdening their social conscience, have in general been
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
317
group of other writers of the same flourish and become "movements" by taking in one another's washing. One wonders sometimes how many proletarian intellectuals are really intimate enough with the workers to write a piece like Tennyson's "Northern Farmer." What is perhaps the most familiar fact of Milton's career is the one most directly concerned with Mr. MacLeish's thesis. With the heroic poem still unwritten, Milton turned aside, to give twenty of his best years to the cause of religious, civil and political liberty. It meant a great sacrifice, including intelligible only to a small
vintage and milieu.
They
the loss of his sight, but
it
was
also a fulfilment of his life-
long desire to be a leader of men, to be,
he had said with
as
youthful ardor, an oracle of nations. Here again Milton a
is
only
conspicuous upholder of a long and great tradition, the
who
is first of all a citizen. For the enough to recall Aeschylus, whose epitaph recorded that he had fought at Marathon, but said nothing of his dramas. For Rome, there was Cicero, one of the chief molders of the mediaeval and Renaissance mind, the great example of the philosopher in politics, and a phi-
tradition of the artist
of Greece
writers
losopher
who
fell
it
is
a victim, like Seneca, to
power.
And
for
Ages there was Dante, who suffered so much for his public activity. In Milton's own age and country most writers had some kind of public or non-literary occupation; indeed, most of them, for political or financial reasons, had more or less experience of prison. Milton's own life was in the Middle
danger
at the Restoration. It
is
only since the romantic age that
the writer has been content to be a writer and nothing else.
Then
arose
the notion of the artist in his ivory
superior being above the joys and sorrows of the
man.
upon
And it
in our time that unhealthy idea
scorns the comfortable bourgeoisie. All this
Moreover, Milton, the fervent
a
common
had superimposed
the idea of the writer as an inevitable
the traditional view of the artist as a
tower,
is
leftist
who
very far from
man among men.
idealist
and champion of
Science, Philosophy
3i8
experienced a disillusionment as great in
liberty,
impact
and Religion
as the twentieth-century
man
has
felt.
its
personal
Only the reading
of his own passionate language gives one a sense of his infinite hopes of an immediate and complete reformation in England and, through England, in the world. Those hopes sustained
many setbacks, throughout his public career. But the Restoration was the final and overwhelming blow, the ruin of his life's work. If Milton had been made of different stuff, he might have relapsed into sullen or querulous defeatism. Indeed he could write some of the most pessimistic lines in him, in spite of
English literature:
"Truth
shall retire
Bestuck with slanderous darts, and works of Faith Rarely be found. So shall the World go on.
To good
malignant, to bad
men
Under her own weight groaning, Appear of respiration to the just
And Yet the
vengeance to the wicked
man who had
surrender to despair.
benign. till
the day
." ,
.
that vision of the future
The
collapse of his
dream
would not
of public liberty
only reinforced the religious and ethical creed he had always held. Milton has been claimed as an ancestor by irresponsible libertarians,
loves liberty
but he himself always maintained that one
must
first
who
be wise and good. His dynamic con-
ception of Christian liberty, which freed the regenerate
man
and made him, under Christ, the pilot of his own ship, was both Christian and classical. For Milton, as for the contemporary Cambridge Platonists, and
from external
for
restraints
the long line
spirit
of
man was
of Christian humanists
before
the candle of the Lord;
them, the
they conceived
of right reason, the divine faculty of the moral judgment and the moral will, as fused with the light of revelation. These
and ethics kept men like Milton determinism on the one hand and from the mechanistic determinism of Hobbes on the other. So Milton, when he had lost his faith in men and movements, came back principles of rational faith
from
Calvinistic
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
to his old anchorage, the strength of the
soul a
—but
now
new depth
That
is
the
with a
theme of
discipHned individual
new understanding
of belief in his
319
of man's weakness,
humble obedience to the divine will. three late and long poems, which the
modern critic and poet find emotionally and artistically dead. Whereas the humanitarian is accustomed to think in large terms of the mass of mankind and of outward panaceas, Milton perceives, with the saddened clarity of age, that the only real reformation of the world must begin with the inward ref-
ormation of the individual. of
all
pubHc and private
ills
To is
those for
whom
the source
economic, such ideas
are,
of
course, childish nonsense.
Thus, the humbled Milton,
though far from disowning saw and attacked that intellectual pride and selfsufficiency in which many recent thinkers have seen the fundamental cause of the present state of man's outer and inner reason,
world.
One
conspicuous
illustration,
a
scientific
parallel
to
found in Milton's changing attitude toward the Baconian faith and Baconian optimism, which as much as anything have nourished that pride and self-sufficiency. When he delivered his valedictory at Cambridge, Milton exulted in a Baconian vision of man as the potential conqueror of nature; in the tract on education he stressed science far more than most humanists had; and he glorified Galileo, without suspecting that the study of things might come to supersede the study of right and wrong. Yet the earnest Christian and Platonist was more typical of himself when he expUcitly ranked scientific knowledge below the knowledge of God and the true end of human life. Experience only deepened his sense of that distinction, and in "Paradise Lost" he insists that science, knowledge of the external universe, does not and cannot illuminate the moral problems of everyday life. He is saying what Dr. Johnson was to say a century later when he complained of the excessive emphasis Milton had given to science in his educational tract: "Prudence and Justice are virtues, and excellences, of all times and of all places; we are his political experience,
is
Science, Philosophy
320
perpetually moralists, but
A
later
and Religion
we are geometricians only by chance." when he dreams of a world regen-
Baconian, Shelley,
erated through love in the soul of man, cannot help associat-
ing that inward victory with the scientific conquest of nature
and material progress. In the poem of the older and wiser man is expelled from his earthly paradise, and yet, if he has learned the Christian and rational virtues, he has a Milton,
paradise within him, happier
upon
the inward
far.
In that urgent concentration
springs of conduct,
upon
the individual's
and ethical life, Milton is at one with all Christian humanists, from Petrarch to Matthew Arnold. And in maintaining the supremacy of such aims and motives, they had in general been more or less hostile to the claims of science. Throughout the nineteenth century, of course, the great writers were proclaiming the hollowness of the faith in scientific progress which had captured the world's imagination and energy, and in various ways were trying to reaffirm religious and ethical values. Their reward, from twentieth-century writers, was a monotonous round of scornful epithets like "uncritical" and "hypocritical." Meanwhile, these same twentieth-century writers were showing their critical intelligence and spiritual insight by welcoming every rabbit produced from the scientific or psychological hat. Such writers could, though, realize that the civilization created by the gospel of scientific progress had left a vacuum somewhere. Literature reflected the plight of men who, unable spiritual
to
worship the popular idols or to acquiesce in the
spiritual
upon.
had,
apathy,
What had
right reason
unlike
Milton,
nothing
to
common fall
back
behaviorism or the unconscious to do with
and the divine dignity of the soul? The chief
gods of literature in English in the past twenty-five years have been D. H. Lawrence, Joyce and T. S. Eliot. Lawrence, along with a feverish power over words, had only one idea, to escape from civilization to the open spaces where flesh flesh. Joyce's later
what
his
earlier
is
work proved, by a reductio ad absurdum, work had suggested, spiritual bankruptcy
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
321
finding an escapist opiate in crossword puzzles. Mr. Eliot, like
many
disillusioned romantics of the nineteenth century, reached
was not clearly grasped until he made an explicit announcement and then there were pained outcries from all the young liberals whom he had led up the garden. Since Mr. Eliot retired from active leadership a religious solution, but that fact
—
movement, no recognizable successor has ap-
of the literary
peared; and certainly few important writers, least of
all
in
America, have taken Mr. Eliot's road out of the waste land. Mr. MacLeish affirms that "the time we live in has produced
more
An
writers than any but the very greatest ages."
first-rate
ignorant scholar would like to share that happy conviction,
when he reads the stateMr. MacLeish means destined for permanence. However, prophecies are idle, and the scholar may content himself by asking whether the common creed and methods of modern American literature are, if we may judge from the literary history of the past, likely to give it a high rank in the future. The "important" novelists and dramatists have largely devoted themselves to the sage and serious doctrine of promiscuity. The biographers and journalists have shown that all great men, dead or living, have clay feet. And so on. That impulse is not new, to be sure, but he
is
more
— that
ment
nor
is
is,
likely to
by
if
rub his eyes
"first-rate"
astringent skepticism wholly undesirable, but
it
may be
whole from moral values and moconcentrated its gaze upon the unciviHzed and Perhaps endless pictures of spiritual squalor and
said that never until recent decades has literature as a
emancipated tives,
so thoroughly
itself
or so
pathological.
human animal, can be defended kind of inverted idealism (and would it be profane to remember that that is the kind that pays?), yet one does not recall much great literature from Homer and the disease, of the habits of the
as springing
Bible
from
onward
in
a
which the
artist's
vision
of expression so consciously crude. first-rate
It is
writer that he does not see
is
so limited, his
surely the
man
mark
mode of the
as a beast, or as a
god, but as both. However, in the country of the blind the
Science, Philosophy
322 one-eyed
man
is
king.
as
If,
and Religion
some
say, the rising generations
and moral
of youth have been infected with cynicism
color-
bhndness, the virus did not come from the literary scholars;
supphed any antidote may be postponed for the moment. At any rate, balancing most modern literature against that of the previous twenty-five hundred years, the scholar may prefer to drink from older and deeper wells. He may, for instance, think of Milton's approach to his the question whether they
—"by
devout prayer to that eternal Spirit, who can utterance and knowledge, and sends out his seraphim, with the hallowed fire of his altar, to touch and
writing
enrich with
all
purify the lips of It is
perhaps a
whom
he pleases." though
tactical error,
it
has been a deliberate
one, to attach these topics and remarks to Milton, who, as
I
been so completely ignored or vehemently damned by modern poets and critics of any pretensions to intelligence. The reasons they give are, in brief, that Milton was a man said, has
of coarse sensibility, a style of heavily inflexible
and an like
intellect
Donne
put in
this
a poet also
be
form: that confused and paralyzed moderns are
ill
has
at ease in the
human
artificiality,
wedded to a crude theology, whereas all the modern virtues. The case might company
reason, though
whose
of a poet
much
tried,
is
faith in
invincible,
God and
whereas they
can relax quite comfortably with the disillusioned, skeptical,
Donne. It is just the attitude which might be expected from writers who have, in the main, been content to be
realistic
mirrors rather than beacon-lights of their age.
Modern
writers
have not, in the old sense, earned the right to leadership, and they have not held a position of leadership, except among scattered coteries. Milton, the
most learned and
poets, believed that poetry lectuals;
most
self-conscious artist
and the
active
publicist
among
the older English
was written
for
men, not
for intel-
"Paradise Lost" sold well, even in the age of the
The works of the nineteenth-century poets sold by tens of thousands, and had a strong hold upon the general public; their successors, wrapped in exclusiveness, have Restoration.
Science, Philosophy
had no such hold Tennyson and the
at
all.
Of
and Religion would
course, they
323 reply that
rest sold their poetic birthright for a
pot
of message, but they themselves generally insist that they have
an important message
too.
So the repudiation of Milton among
many symptoms of the modern The modern mind— and by that I mean the writers who constitute "the movement," who provide the inarticulate with the correct opinions — the modern mind has repudiated other and more recent writers who affirm a positive faith in the intellectuals
is
only one of
malaise.
and exacting ideals. It has not for some time been proper to read George Meredith, the apostle of strenuous and inspired sanity, or Henry James, the fastidious guardian of civilized taste and tradition, or Joseph Conrad, the upholder positive values
of simple courage
and
fidelity
—while
the
kingdom
of fiction
has been divided between Joyce and Proust, the historians of decay.
The dethronement more than
meant something manner and matter; it has meant
of Milton, then, has
dislike of his
the repudiation of a great central tradition, and the acceptance, in the
still
timely language of Aristophanes, of the god Whirl
or Flux. Milton's religious
and
insistence
ethical order in
upon the moral will, upon a man and the world, upon active
maintenance, was a seventeenth-century and Christian version of classical humanism. We may have outgrown the particular terms and conditions in which Milton
responsibility for
its
saw the problems (though one need not be too hasty in assuming that), yet he as much as any author might seem to supply the heroic impulse and direction that we need, not least in his grand and inspiring recovery from defeatism and despair.
deeply
Mr. MacLeish, who
moved
is
hardly unsophisticated,
is
so
and humanistic phrase Irving Babbitt urged the exer-
as to use the Miltonic
"moral choice." When the late cise of an atrophied faculty, the tribe of writers, who knew their psychology, greeted him with unanimous jeers. Babbitt's name does not occur in Mr. MacLeish's article, though he surely displayed the large grasp of the
"man
of letters."
With
Science, Philosophy
324
and Religion
and angular protuberances, Babbitt did humane values and responsibilities, and he was damned by many scholars as well as writers; I may in candor include my youthful, unscholarly and unregenerate
all
his
concavities
possess a strong sense of
self.
Today we are all concerned about home, and the creation of
values at
the preservation of right a
world in which those
values shall prevail. Leaving out of account the merely cynical
we may discern among men of active good will one small group and one large one. The former includes those whose desire for unity, order and authority has led them back to the church. If that group is still small, it has at least had enough notable spokesmen to have changed the spiritual climate a good deal; because of them, it has even become fashionable to profess something more than sophomoric atheism. The second, a larger and more miscellaneous group, would include those who doubt the efficacy of visions of individual or international recovery based on purely secular and economic considerations, and yet do not quite know how to restore for themselves or others an acceptable religion which goes deeper than well-meaning humanitarianism. I have no saving formula to offer, but for scholars, especially the tribe of literary scholars which Mr. MacLeish has chiefly in mind, there is a great task and duty. If we cannot, like Milton, write tracts on hberty of which all Europe talks from side to side, and if we cannot, hke Voltaire, rally multitudes with the cry "Ecrasez I'injdmel" we can cultivate our garden. I do not mean research, though the neglect of that would in the long run be fatal, and I do not mean the writing of defenses of culture, the neglect of which would not, I think, be fatal. or indifferent, at least
do mean the educating of the next generations of citizens and writers, educating them, in Miltonic language, so "that they may not, in a dangerous fit of the commonwealth, be
I
such poor, shaken, uncertain reeds, of such a tottering conscience,
as
many
of our late counsellors have lately
themselves, but steadfast pillars of the state."
shown
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
325
Theorizing about the function of art and the place of the
may seem remote from most of us, but we good deal to do with artists in the making, even if they generally rise on the stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things. And we did not need the war to call
artist in society
teachers have a
us to the task of education, for the need of a crusade has
been obvious for many
we
we
years. If
survey the educational
what has been going on in the artistic world, the superseding of old and central traditions by new and spurious gospels. We have in the United States certainly the most elaborate and expensive educational system in the world, and probably, in proportion to the machinery, the most ineffectual, though the same fatty degeneration has been at work in other countries too. It is scene,
find a close parallel to
ineffectual, or worse, because in recent
decades
it
has been
more and more completely controlled by the well-organized and ill-educated army of professors of education. Their sociopsychological,
logical,
and generally progressive and cheaply
have steadily undermined old standards of intellectual and ethical discipline. An eminent figure among utilitarian notions
educationists recently declared, with reverent solemnity:
"Two
thousand years ago, by the shores of Galilee, we were taught to give the people what they want." One cannot trust oneself to
comment on
this
new
beatitude.
The
results of the
new
education are partly symbolized in the classic anecdote of the
young woman who was asked
history.
in clay
"Oh
and once in sand."
sure that
A
friend
if
she could teach
yes," she replied brightly, "I've
it is, I
of
may
to
it
EngUsh
twice, once
be apocryphal, and
If that
cite a tale of
mine happened
had
I
am
not
unquestionable authenticity. pass
the
school his young
daughter attended and he observed with surprise that, although it was recess, the children were lying about in a state of complete limpness, ignoring
vided for recreation;
nomenon, the
when
later
child said, in
all
all
the varied apparatus pro-
he asked about
this
hard during school hours that when recess
odd phe-
we play so comes we just want
innocence, "Well,
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
326 But
to rest."
I
need not rehearse
illustrations of familiar facts
of experience.
Custodians of the humanities have not been
guiltless.
The
young sheep may or may not have been hungry, but they have too often been given the husks of hterary history and professional scholarship.
The
ing has been promptly
spiritual
filled w^ith
vacuum
left
by such teach-
various kinds of sociological
gas, so that the aforesaid sheep,
"swoln with wind, and the rank mist they draw, Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread."
And we
humanities have looked on with So now we have to do more than carry on education, we have to reestablish it. And when, for years, the minds of administrators and students have been so far demoralized, we cannot expect that a campaign for intellectual and moral discipline can quickly stiiflen and elevate the prevailing habits of slackness and illiteracy, habits which, of course, have had their corrupting effect upon college as well as upon primary and secondary education. The last quarter of a century, then, has brought chaos into teachers
of
the
largely inactive contempt.
education as well as into the
arts, for
education, like the arts,
has, for the first time in wholesale fashion,
the aims and traditions of tionist's
about
way
arts
many
centuries.
of preserving democracy
and
letters
—
is
—he
been cut loose from
The modern educamuch care
does not
a general lowering
and relaxing of
educational standards, the substitution, for rich, solid, and exacting subject-matter, of the nebulous study of civics. Yet
from the
early
Middle Ages up
to fairly recent times, every
phase of English culture, every kind of English
literature, has
been more or less strongly affected by classical thought and literature and by the Bible. Throughout its long life, the classical tradition has been inspired by two great ideas, the idea of order and the idea of liberty. In Tudor England, from Sir Thomas Elyot to Hooker, Christian humanism was a bulwark of settled order. In the seventeenth century it was
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
but
still,
it
was
Thus Hobbes,
also, in
men
327
like Milton, a revolutionary force.
champion of absolutism and something like the totahtarian state, repeatedly denounced the republican ideals derived from ancient history. "I think I may truly say," Hobbes declares, "there was never anything so dearly bought as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues." In such times the classics were not an the
obsolete literary luxury.
We
accustomed nowadays to talk of the terrible commodern world and the modern soul that we come to regard our simple selves as terribly complex too. As a matter of fact, it is hard to discern in the modern world or in ourselves any essential problem which has not existed since civilization began. No act of aggression can altogether surprise those who know Thucydides' account of the appearance of Athenian ships at the little island of Melos. No analysis of are so
plexity of the
tyranny
is
a surprise to those
humble ourselves
who know
sufficiently to
read the
Plato's. If classics,
we could
with some-
thing of the spirit of Erasmus or Montaigne or Milton, then
we might
And
after
research
find ourselves absorbing
what would
still
be wisdom.
such an intellectual and spiritual bath, perhaps our
would look
less
—as
important
Tennyson,
through a telescope, said that a view of the
after
gazing
stars altered one's
feeling about the county families. I
but
am I
not going to embark upon any defense of the
classics,
should like to recall the quality of the old faith by
quoting two or three out of thousands of witnesses. The is that sturdy Tudor humanist, Roger Ascham:
first
"These books be not many, nor long, nor rude in speech, nor in matter; but next the majesty of God's holy word, most worthy for a man, the lover of learning and honesty, to spend his life in. Yea, I have heard worthy Mr. Cheke many times say: I would have a good student pass and journey through all authors both Greek and Latin. But he that will dwell in these few books only; first, in God's holy Bible, and then join with it TuUy in Latin, Plato, Aristode, Xenophon,
mean
Science, Philosophy
328 Isocrates,
excellent If
and Demosthenes man."
and Religion
in Greek,
must needs prove an
such faith seems to have only the charm of naivete,
we may
Chatham, who, in the eighteenth century, writes thus about Homer and Virgil to his nephew at Cambridge: hesitate to ascribe that quality to the great Earl of
"I
hope you
and love those authors
taste
particularly.
You
cannot read them too much: they are not only the two greatest poets, but they contain the finest lessons for your age to imbibe: lessons
of honour,
command in I
courage, disinterestedness, love of truth,
of temper, gentleness of behaviour, humanity,
one word, virtue in
should like to enrich
its
and
true signification."
this discourse,
and further blunt the
charge of naivete, by adding a passage from Santayana on the
and discipline, but I have quoted it so often pubHc that I must, reluctantly, forego it this time. Instead, as a memorable reminder of what we have gained in exchange for the old outlook, of the educational atmosphere in which we now live, I may quote a bit from a recent study of education: classical tradition
in
"In comparisons for the two sexes and for Twin-City and non-Twin-City schools, comparisons which do not distinguish Catholic, Scandinavian, and independent schools, the advantage shuttles somewhat irregularly between the two main groups. For example, men from Twin-City public schools are found to be superior to men from Twin-City private schools, while men from non-Twin-City private schools are superior to men from non-Twin-City women from Twin-City private
from Twin-City public
public
schools.
Contrariwise,
women women from non-Twinwomen from non-Twin-City
schools are superior to
schools, while
City public schools are superior to
private schools. These differences for Twin-City and non-Twin-
City students of each sex counteract each other
when
data for
Twin-City and non-Twin-City groups are merged." only say, with The New Yorker, "Then merge them." cannot and should not hope for any general return to the
One can
We
Science, Philosophy old classical curriculum, though
world when that ceases to but we do not sufficiently
and Religion
it
329
be a bad day for the few in every generation,
will
attract a
realize that in
many
parts of the
country the modern foreign languages have pretty well vanished
from the
schools, and that even English is going. English must now be the medium for the teaching of the humanities, and if we do not do something, it will soon be a deformed branch of sociology. Perhaps the first and best thing we can do is to take stock of ourselves. We certainly cannot go on our accustomed and complacent way in the literature
belief that English at least is
likely
to
and these
stress
things,
Many
matter.
or
however important,
the
history
scholar
of ideas,
are not the root of the
rather than scholars,
critics
and they
perception and the subtleties of semantics. But
critical
not think our salvation arid scholar insight,
to
is
would hardly deny
do
I
among them. The most
the prime necessity of critical it
measure of snob appeal, of second-hand dog-
matism, and of supposedly is
be found
stress
but he might urge that the current gospel has in
a considerable
What
The middle-aged
secure.
history,
of the younger generation of teachers pride them-
on being
selves
is
literary
even worse,
scientific
seems
it
at
but rather cloudy jargon.
bottom
a
new
version of
Paterian aestheticism, an aestheticism divorced from the con-
cern with moral ideas which Pater himself had. able high-brow criticism
with the manner and
is
Much
fashion-
preoccupied with technical
medium
of communication, while
detail, it
has
been more or less indifferent to the value of what is communicated; the be-all and end-all of Hterature is the heightening of O sacred word! "awareness." The eflFect of such doctrines and attitudes upon immature students can be deplorable. The traditional aim of the teaching of literature has not been
—
—
knowledge of literary and intellectual history or the mere heightening of awareness. In antiquity, in the Middle Ages, in the Renaissance and later times, it meant, for one thing, a rigorous training in rhetoric, and much fuzzy writing and thinking might be prevented if we had it still; one may either a
Science, Philosophy
330 think that
its
fulfilled by basic But the fundamental education was religious, ethical and
function
not altogether
is
may
English, however useful that
motive
of
and Religion
traditional
be.
one may utter a platitude usually reserved for Commencement Day, the aim and the justification of literature have always been, and must be, the ennobling and enrichment of the whole being. For all readers, and especially young ones, that comes about first through response to the presentation of character. Greek boys were brought up on Homer because Homer was a guide to life, a mirror of noble actors and actions. Roman boys studied Virgil and others for the same reason. The Christian humanists of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance combined the classics with Christian books because the two together filled the needs of homo sapiens. From Homer to Plutarch, the ancients provided an array of great men, whose conduct could be emulated, and whose expressed civic. If
We
wisdom could be absorbed.
who
should hate to guess the pro-
moved, as Sir Philip Sidney was moved, by the heroic example of Aeneas and the rest. And we may wonder if the modern undergraduate is too sophisticated and too socially minded to understand, say, "Lord Jim" or "The Heart of Midlothian." If I have here neglected the Bible and religion, which were the heart and soul of traditional Christian humanism, it is partly because I am not qualified to preach and partly because most of us, both teachers and students, at the present time are perhaps better able to digest half a loaf than a whole one; and portion of our students
the classical tradition, to
make them worth
century
is
if it
are
cannot save souls, can at
saving.
I
least
help
do not mean that the twentieth
the sixteenth, or the
first,
or the fifth century B.C.,
or that professors should forsake the rostrum for the pulpit.
But we have commonly been so afraid that our young charges would regard us as emissaries of the Y.M.C.A. that we have stuck to the other extreme.
We
cannot afford to neglect
was more need of precision habits and expression, but we might try to be less business, for there never
hoti's
in mental like sales-
and Religion
Science, Philosophy )
men
in
an
intellectual
shop and more
of the humanities. So far as
331
like dedicated guardians
my knowledge
of cultural history
do not decline until they have ceased to be humane. We live by admiration, hope and love and laughter and not by literary history, or even the ultra-violet rays of literary criticism, still less by the economic and sociological elements in hterature. And whatever external causes goes, the humanities
—
—
*
contributed to the decay of the old humanistic discipline, the
'
main cause was the cooling of its exponents' own inward fire. That process was usually accompanied by a shift from the ethical ideal of pedagogy either to apathetic routine or to pure scholarship. And now, as always, the best agent of revival, the best propaganda for the humanities, is, as many of us have the happiness to remember, an individual teacher who is humane.
APPENDIX HoxiE N. Fairchild, Hunter College: I have read Professor Bush's paper with great interest and with almost complete approval of the first twenty pages. His
diagnosis of the disease strikes
symposium on "The
as perfectly accurate. In a
Cooper Union
last
expressed similar views more briefly and clumsily.
fall, I
The sure,
me
Irresponsibles" held at
strong emphasis on Milton troubles
he
is
me
a
little.
To be
"the last great English representative of traditional I see more disharmony between his humanism than Professor Bush recognizes.
Christian humanism," but Christianity and his
In personal temper and in theology, Milton has a good deal of that
proud sense of human
cause the tragedy of like
of
him
is
modern
self-sufficiency
intellectual life.
T.
which was
to
S. Eliot's dis-
extravagant and bigoted, but not without a
rational foundation. I
much better than his remtwenty pages lead straight to the conclusion that
like Professor Bush's diagnosis
edy. His
first
intellectual life needs a basis of supernatural religion. But on page 326 he avoids the implications of his own argument and
Science, Philosophy
332
and Religion
devotes the remainder of the paper to glorifying a classical
humanism from which as
the specifically religious element, even
The
appears in Milton, seems to have dropped out.
it
Bible
remains only as a "classic." The tradition which he praises is a lofty one, but it has not proved sufficient for the needs of
To
the
human
the
super-humanities would merely be moving back to an
spirit.
revive the humanities without reviving
earlier stage of the process
The experiment
which has
has been tried, and
led to the present chaos.
has failed.
it
It will fail
Homer and
again unless the scholar looks through
Virgil to
God. Douglas Bush: I
appreciate Professor Fairchild's partial endorsement and
comment because
venture a
I
think
we
are less far apart than
he does. His reference to Milton seems to
me
to reflect a con-
ventional misapprehension. Surely the whole burden of the old and disillusioned poet's major works
is
a repudiation
and
arraignment of "that proud sense of human self-sufficiency" and an earnest plea for faithful and humble obedience to the divine will.
Secondly, say that
I
do not understand how Professor Fairchild can
leave the Bible "only as a
I
since
'classic',''
I
repeatedly emphasized the primacy of religion in the tradition
of
Renaissance humanism.
stressed the classical side,
it
If
in
my
was partly because
last I
have
main
pages
I
did not feel
and partly because the majority of. teachers modern world are better able to digest than a whole one. If the classical tradition cannot it can at least make them worth saving.
qualified to preach
and students half a loaf
save souls,
H,
S,
in the
V, Jones, University of
Illinois:
Since responsibility has
many
references,
it
is
unlikely that
any thoughtful or active man is quite irresponsible. Will he not be responsible to some pattern of thought or ideal of action? Particularly, with the stringency and objectivity of the scientific method, with the fine candor of the fixed scientific gaze, there goes not only a responsibility but a discipline,
which, whatever their limitations, have proved more exacting, austere, than the moral, humanistic, and religious dis-
more
Science, Philosophy ciplines of our time.
active
and Religion
333
For some time now, science has been the
and curious morality, the unfolding religion of the Western World. It has done more than
larger part of the
humanism
or the church to shape the
the older moral or religious types. mystics, and our holy
army
It
modern equivalents has
its
and
ascetics
of authentic martyrs
is
of its
no-w re-
company of devoted men. Physics now^ comprehends metaphysics, and
cruited chiefly from the impressively large scientific
we appear
to have developed
scientific versions of religious
modes or tropes of consciousness. As to "the writer," since there "writers,"
is
no "writer," but only
can scarcely generalize with confidence; but
I
I
have sometimes thought that our more curious novelists and poets have known something of the wonder and even the disciplines of the scientist and the saint by trying very bravely to see things as they are, to penetrate the penetralia of
human
consciousness, and to forge an idiom suitable to their purposes.
I
cannot think of them, at their best, as responsible
only to some attractive form of irresponsibility or as loyal to
open mind because,
the in
it
but a draught.
as has
It is
been remarked, there
is
nothing
unfair to both the scientists and "the
writers" to think of the one as chiefly a counter-irritant to
the other.
And
yet
the
scientist
and "the writer" of
scientific
per-
suasion seem responsible chiefly to materials and methods and
By their methods would test whatever is intuitive and traditional, even though intuitions and traditions do not easily lend themselves to such testing. The Christian humanist, on the other hand, instrumentally to live within the present.
they
wisdom long since defined as the science of human and divine trusts his insights and enters heritage of culture. The critical opposition today, as
seeking that things both into his
see it, is not between responsibles and irresponsibles, but between a factitious order and an honest confusion. Neither the one side nor the other recognizes the authority of a
I
traditional culture or a humanistic discipline. state
is
The
implements materials and methods to very His singleness of view, his ready exclusion of
tist,
totalitarian
the scientific state and the totalitarian, like the sciendefinite ends. all
that
is
ir-
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
334
relevant to his purpose, give
To
his
"new
which man
which
order,"
is
made
him is
concentration and strength.
really
an inverted order, in
for the state, not the state for
man, the
democracies oppose not an old and accredited discipline, but confused responsibilities to God and man. Unlike the totalitarian states, they have not even an idolatry in lieu of a religion. Politically,
they lack the ardor, the passion of those
with an eye single to their cause, and their responsibilities are disarranged and inarticulate. Our confusions, which in the free-for-all twenties were delightfully riotous, a feast of fools, are now in the grey light of a new day very critical and dangerous. If our war is to be a holy war, and that should be the war, we shall have to set the integrity of humanism over against a mere mechanism and method, an inner totalitarianism, what Matthew Arnold called only
legitimate
Christian
what Jacques Maritain calls an integral, humanism, over against the naive externalism of
a study of perfection, a theocentric
the totalitarian states, a religion over against an idolatry. Our task is to arrange, to grade and order, to integrate our scattered responsibilities. This, as Arnold would say, is an "inner operation." For the projection into the state of the inner order of the spirit, we have the authority of Plato, for
and confused
the destruction of the spirit
brute force of the state
which giveth
we have
life
by the external
the authority of Hider.
escape the confusion of responsibilities which
is
To
neither Pla-
which may in effect be democratic, we must make our choice between an order which is factitious and one which is integral and real. tonic nor Hitlerian, but
Edward K. Rand, Harvard
University:
Mr. Bush implicitly advocates a return to the Classics of Greece and Rome and to moral and religious training as a part of education. That is the crux of the whole matter, and I subscribe to every word of the argument. I
believe
Warner G.
Rice, University of Michigan: Years of friendship with Stuart Sherman, Paul Elmer More, and Irving Babbitt, and years spent teaching Milton and Matthew Arnold, dispose me to agree cordially with Professor The importance of a continuing dediBush's main thesis. .
.
.
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
335
—and
the difficulty
cation to the "ethical ideal of pedagogy" of such a dedication
—can
scarcely, in
my
opinion, be over-
emphasized. Within fifty years the center of gravity in American education has moved from the humanities to the sciences, then from the sciences to the social sciences, and lately from the social sciences to social service.
Meanwhile
a depreciation
of moral values has been going on, with a kind of Gresham's
law of ethics operating
may
It
be that
checked until
effectively
ing.
At
are
now
all
drive out good.
other kinds of inflation, cannot be
has run
it
many people know what perhaps necessary,
make bad money
to
this, like
its
wrong.
is
to reflect that
we
It
course is
—even
though
discouraging, but
learn best through suffer-
events humanitarianism, naturalism, and relativism
in
the ascendant, and their dreadful consequences
seem manifest.
The
effort of criticism, scholarship
used to teach, upon: and it
making us
and inquiry, as Arnold
may well provide us with fresh ideas to work may be that inspired writers will succeed in
vitally
aware of a saving gospel. Like Professor Bush,
however, I find a larger hope in the humane teacher. His task is enormous: for because of the present state of education he must reorganize
much
of
its
pattern before he can
become
His task is to restore a sense for moral values, and to show what moral values mean in connection with contemporary issues. The historical approach to philosophy and the sociological approach to literature will not help him much here; nor will the classics and John Milton be sufficient. He must be boldly and widely learned; yet erudition is not his chief business. His chief business is to make young men and women wise, good, and sharply intelligent about the world they live in. This may seem to critics of Professor Bush a vague ideal; but if, with all its vagueness, it were widely held and its really effective.
implications followed out,
than our feet are
now
we
upon.
should be treading a safer path
CHAPTER
An
Approach By
to the
WILLIAM
Museum
MY OWN
G.
XVIII Study of History
CONSTABLE
of Fine Arts, Boston
CONCERN with history during the
last
twenty years
more has mainly been in connection with the arts, particularly the art of painting; and in the course of my work, or
one of the things that has increasingly impressed (and deis the little thought and attention that has been given to the relation between various forms of men's activity. pressed) me,
That there are other kinds of history than political history has become more and more recognized, it is true. Not only do
we have
histories
of
law,
economics,
philosophy,
religion,
literature, the drama, the plastic arts, and so on, in increasing
numbers, each cultivating more and more intensively fields which become more and more narrow, but also every historian throws side glances at activities outside those which form his
main theme. Occasionally, even, every kind of
from one
human
effort
a single eye tries to record
during an epoch, leaping frantically
which have no running through the same period of time.
to another of a series of sequences,
clear connection save
Yet, as compared with history as written in the nineteenth
am
century,
I
Log
King
for
torian to see ticular
inclined to think that Stork. all
interest.
The tendency
for each specialist his-
other forms of activity in terms of his par-
we are suffering from economic, and other forms of interpretation of represent all other forms of activity as
Therefore,
religious, political, legal
history,
we have exchanged King is
which tend
to
336
and Religion
Science, Philosophy inspired and
molded by
the one with
337
which the historian
is
primarily concerned. Characteristic of such an approach was
by an eminent French scholar in
a lecture recently delivered
connection with an exhibition of art in France under the Third Republic. Taking political events in sequence, he sought to
connect with each of them, as artistic
consequences, literary
happenings, and surprised at the
a close correspondence,
difficulty of
and
finding
found himself manufacturing a
series
of ingenious but unconvincing similarities in order to maintain his thesis of the influence of politics
upon
the arts.
It is,
however, wholly good that recognition should be growing so that even the specialist historian must take cognizance of other than his own. Ideally, this cognizance could be extended to produce equal degrees of competence in the study of every type of history. Practically, the mass of material fields
for study
Few
is
so vast, that
of us are
Rome, wrote what
of
no one student can hope
Mommsens, who still
is
as a
a
to master
it.
parergon to his history
standard work on
Roman
coinage. Moreover, temperamental conditions limit the range of subjects which any one man can effectively study. But if
genuine progress history,
how
of
I
suggest
is
made
to be
that a vital
various kinds of
need
human
in the writing is
much more
and study of
intensive study
activity are connected. If a
conception of such relations can at least be
adumbrated, so
that it forms the background to even the most highly specialized piece of investigation, the whole view of a period will be far
better balanced, while
in the general
the place of the particular study
scheme of things can be more accurately appre-
ciated.
Study and formulation of such relations
is
not,
I
think, be-
yond the scope of ordinary human form a special branch of historical studies, a field for those who have the synoptic view, and the capacity for using and bringing into relation the results of researches of more limited scope. Such an approach to history would not displace or discredit present methods or specialized approach, but would
capacity. It can, in itself,
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
338
supplement and enrich them, and make interpretation of their more fruitful. Tentatively, this kind of specialization in generalization (if it may be so called), is already being attempted. It calls, however, for the cooperation and collaboration of specialists of other types, and this implies some form of elastic organization in which this cooperation can center. results
Fortunately, such organizations are in existence, although not as
yet very active, in the
shape of advanced seminars and
research institutes of the type of
Dumbarton Oaks. Through
them, the pooHng of specialized work in narrow areas can be
brought together and utilized in working on the problem of relations
As
between different
illustrations
of
fields of historical
study.
my thesis, I may outHne one or two my own field of art history. Certainly,
typical problems in one of the most important events in the history of mankind is the rise of Christianity. Yet to establish any clear and direct connection between the arts, and religious, philosophical or political events, is very difficult. In the western world, early Christian art mainly took over the forms of late Roman art, both in sculpture and painting, and even adapted late classic iconography to Christian uses. Because the artists lacked the technical skill of their pagan predecessors, or contemporaries,
early Christian art in the
expression of a
new
West
is
decadent, rather than the
energy. In the East, also, late classic forms
were utilized by Christian artists, but here other forces were at work, which after a phase of vivid naturalism inspired by late classic art, were ultimately to produce the grandly abstract art we call Byzantine, with its main centers in the Near East. Several points may be noted here. A superficial one, which hardly needs mention,
is
that activity in the arts
demands a
reasonable stabiHty in society and a certain level of economic prosperity.
Thus
the transfer of the Imperial throne to
stantinople naturally helped to
make
the
Near East
Con-
a center
of artistic production, while in the West, political confusion
and economic disaster forbade estabhshment of the necessary basis, and favored an art which mainly imitated and degraded
Science, Philosophy
A
earlier forms.
much more important
art of the Early Christian era
hieratic
form of
parallel
with
and Religion
339 is
why
the
should have taken the abstract,
greatest period.
its
religious,
question
and
social
One
notable fact
is
a
developments, in
political
which increasingly elaborate organization was the rule, with growing rigidity, and greater centralization of authority. But the parallel remains only a parallel, and not an explanation. Any attempt to connect the form taken by the arts with
The
specified religious, pohtical, etc., events, ends in failure.
regime even is not an exception, as might be thought, but an external event which certainly limited the
iconoclastic
artist's
means
he had to Byzantine activity, I
of
mind
of expression, but did not materially affect
we
say. If
and
art,
to explain the parallel
suggest that
what
are to find causes for the character of
we have
with other kinds of
to predicate a general
tendency
in the Byzantine world, a general inclination towards,
and readiness manifested
to accept formulas,
itself
in
many
dogma, and
different fields,
authority,
which
among them
the
arts.
Take
a second great event in
the activity of the
Here
again,
sophic,
and
of Byzantine
if
we
human
human history, that change in known as the Renaissance.
spirit
try to correlate political,
artistic events, there is art,
economic, philo-
As
confusion.
in the case
and economic conditions were provided by the development
the necessary social
for the arts to be practised,
of the Renaissance despots. This, however,
and drink are necessary
is
the equivalent
man, though no explanation is given thereby of the cause of his greatness. So the amazing activity in the arts which marked fifteenth and sixteenth century Italy, is not to be put in terms of inspiration from the Medici, the Sforza, the Gonzaga, and their like. Years ago, the fashion was to speak of it as due to a rediscovery of classic art and literature, brought about by the emigration of scholars from Constantinople, after the conquest of saying that food
of that city by
the Turks.
Modern
to a great
investigation has
made
such a view completely untenable. Renaissance art was in
full
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
340
fell, while its spirit had been manihundred years earlier, in such an artist as Giotto; while classic art and literature had not been forgotten or ignored during the Middle Ages. What becomes increasingly
flower before Constantinople
more than
fest
a
evident, as the material
is
studied,
is
that in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, a new orientation of men's minds was becoming estabUshed, in which faith and authority played a smaller part than reason and scientific investigation; a change which tended increasingly to make, in men's minds, individual
man
From
the central figure of the Universe.
sprang
all
the
diverse
phenomena which
The place of classic art and serve, not so much as an inspiration, but as measuring-rod of achievement. Looked at Renaissance.
similarities
economic, religious,
in
this
change,
characterize
the
was to touchstone and
literature
a
in
political,
this
and
way, the
artistic
ac-
tivities
become
one
cause or another as effect. That these activities in-
as
any attempt to consider
explicable, without
is true; but such interaction was secondary and subsidiary to the major change that inspired them all. This view helps to explain another element in the situation; that the Renaissance outlook or spirit makes its appearance
fluenced each other,
earher in the arts than in other nature,
is
more
fields.
The
artist,
by his very
susceptible to changes in fundamental
than other people; so that in his to be manifested early.
me had
work
tempo
these changes are apt
As an eminent banker once remarked,
we
should study art exhibitions barometer of deep seated ecomore closely; they are the best
"If
people like
sense
nomic changes." This anticipation in the works of other fields In
its
is
artists
of happenings in
well seen in the case of the French Revolution.
earlier stages, the
Revolution was largely inspired by the
idea of the "Return to Nature," as
expounded
in certain of
mean
return to the
Rousseau's writings; and Nature came to
aims and methods of
classic
Rome. But
years
before
appeared on the scene, with their
the
David conscious naturalism and
regular neo-classic painters of the type of Jacques-Louis
Science, Philosophy conscious appeal to
Roman
art as
and Religion an
ideal,
341
naturalism and the
use of classic motives was modifying the full fledged rococo of the time of Louis
XV
under Napoleon. Here again, inspired the
art, is a
XVI, with its which flourished
into the style of Louis
anticipation of the full fledged
"Empire" to
style
argue that the Revolution
misconception.
The
leaven of ideas that
were to create the Revolution on its political and economic side, was already strongly at work about the middle of the century; and found early expression in the arts. Subsequent political and social events further modified artists' methods; but the fundamental change had begun before they operated. One more example may be briefly cited, drawn from our own times. Surprise has often been expressed that the war of 1914— 1918 had so little apparent effect upon the arts. In fact, the instabihty of social and political life, the confusion and compromise in religious, philosophic and economic thought, and the loss of standards of judgment, which have marked the world since 1914, are due to causes which found expression in the arts as early as 1905, with the work of the Fatives, the Futurists, the Cubists, and other less important groups. The World War in the arts was in being years before the armed forces were engaged. From these illustrations, it will be seen that my main concern is a plea for more profound and systematic investigation of the major movements in human ideas and conceptions, primarily those which are metaphysical in character, to be attained through collated and coordinated study of their expression in various fields. Only so, I suggest, can be arrived at an understanding of the historical cause and effect, and clear our minds of the idea that one set of human motives, political, economic or what not, rules the world.
APPENDIX Emanuel Winternitz, Metropolitan Museum, New Mr. Constable's excellent paper points
at
Yort{:
an open
wound
of
Science, Philosophy
342
and Religion
up of learning into numerous parts more and more connection with each other. The
science today, the breaking
which
lose
specialists to
different tongues
talk
and when they congregate
put together the pieces of the dispersed
does not reach unto heaven.
He who
reality, the
histors like Jakob Burckhardt in, let us say, the brary,
must wander from the department
tower
looks today for poly-
Widener
Li-
of history of Greece to
those of history of Italy, of architecture, of religion, and those of esthetics
and philosophy of
history, to
enumerate only a
few. Interest in physiognomy leads likewise to as
many
de-
partments as history of science, philosophy, anatomy, psychology, and the fine arts, to say the very least. In the libraries of the great humanists the arrangement
was according
to persons
rather than to the special lines of learning.
This specialization in subjects of learning, however, is only one side of a feature of our whole civilization and touches increasingly nearly
all
fields
creation, regarded as the
of
human
domain
Even artistic most individual ex-
activity.
of the
pression of the full personality, seems subjected to overspecialization.
One who
no easy going
has gained a
name
as watercolorist, will find
for his first oil paintings,
much
less for sculp-
might be caused by commercial reasons, but these again, founded upon habits of the buyer, are merely symptoms of the underlying tendency towards specialization. This specialization, however, caused by the multiplicity and the refinement of modern working techniques, is inevitable tures. This, of course,
and, within reasonable limits, useful. This
is
true for history
Mr. Constable is absolutely right; no life of a scholar, though it should come to seventy years, would be long and abundant enough to handle with equal skill various techniques
also.
research such as iconographic, archaeological, linguistic methods, or to specialize with the same intensity in the history of religion, music, and architecture, even if only one restricted period is concerned. Cases like that of Albert Schweitzer remain consoling but rare exceptions. of
Division of labor in fact-finding science and particularly history,
however
seldom Mr. Constable enumerates some of would distinguish two types of such lapses:
inevitable, implies pitfalls. It leads not
to methodological lapses.
them admirably.
I
Science, Philosophy a)
The
and Religion
isolation of the special field,
spective of the whole.
As Father
with the
Paissy, in
343 loss of per-
Book VI,
c. I of "the Karamazovs," remarks to Aljosha about the learned of
who
have become a great power, especially in the "But they have only analysed the parts and overlooked the whole, and indeed their blindness is marvellous." this
world
last century:
b) Even bigger fallacies threaten the specialist who, feeling
uncomfortable within the narrow boundaries of his field, strives to link it with the whole of which it is a part. Here he is easily
tempted
methods, developed by the particular necesbeyond their scope. It is what Kant called the extravagant use of method. As far as history is concerned, Mr. Constable enumerates its economic, religious, political, etc., interpretations. But there is also the extravagant use of methods as the psychoanalytical and the pragmatic to apply
sities of his field, to topics
human conduct, which envisage the world run by one single mainspring, the libido, or the sense of practical interest, and what not. It is the schools of thought rather than their originators, which fall prey to these interpretation of
of
men
as
perils. In all these cases, as also in the materialistic interpreta-
tion of history, one valuable observation field
with special methods,
is
made
in a
special
inflated to a universal explana-
it
human action. We may call Max Weber's term "departmental patriotism." One of the most striking cases of "departmental patriotism"
is
found in modern psychology, namely,
tion of the course of history or of
by
in the
rat-experiments for the exploration of the
employment of
human mind,
as
though the mental life of man would not set problems of its own. One wonders whether man is not the forgotten man of psychology. This state of psychology seems the more remarkable, as the turning-point
is
already visible.
Gordon W. Allport
American Psychological Association, in 1939, on "The Psychologists' Frame of Reference", sounds the alarm and calls for a more synoptic method. Surveying the in his address before the
changing interests of the psychologists for the last 50 years and combing the psychological journals for this period, he finds, since 1888, a decline of studies on "Understanding the Single Case" (in its individual complexity) from 16% to 6%; on the other hand, an increase of the use of animal subjects
Science, Philosophy
344
and Religion
from 3.5% to 15%, and of the employment of statistical aids from 2.5% to 43%. AUport invites reconsideration as to whether "the problems framed with the rats are of the same order as the problems envisaged for human kind". And looking back at the 19th century psychologists with their synoptic view of men's mental life, he warns his fellow psychologists that "preoccupied with minutiae, we are losing perspective". This paper
is
a notable piece out of the history of science, significant
beyond the realm of psychology.
far
A
particular case
specialization
of
history into various branches each of line
of
human
activity.
Constable's paper. lines.?
How
Of what kind
is
the
splitting
which deals with
Here we come
to
up of
a single
the heart of Mr.
between these between the various And how ought we to arrange our
to study the relation
are the "relations"
branches of one civilization? respective statements to
make them
reliable.?
Struggling for
problem of the interactions between the history of music and the fine arts, I am not too optimistic. There are certain periods where we believe we discern vaguely a common pattern in all the manifestations of artistic creation. But there are other times when music follows its own course, its own self-established traditions, remarkably unperturbed by "outside" events, and no common denominator with the other years with the
arts It
is
apparent, unless
may be
we
turn to the Zeitgeist.
permissible to distinguish three levels on which
those activities in fact are linked together by the historians:
a) Only the facts belonging to the same section of history, as
f.i.,
the history of the fine arts, are linked together. This
leads to the lapse criticized and complained of with full right
by Mr. Constable: The "outside"
facts,
let
us say religious
But the evolution from Michelangelo to Borromini remains incomprehensible without reference to the Counter Reformation. b) Suppose the specialist historian takes "outside" events, like the Counter Reformation, as factors in the picture: But where are the limits, since, indeed, writing history is essentially events, are ignored.
systematic
selection?
What
other
facts
gression from Michelangelo to Borromini? ologically,
is
influenced
And
the nature of this "influence"?
the
pro-
what, method-
What kind
of
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
345
we
hear so often,
scientific correlation is involved in statements
such
"Without Luther, Bach would not have been what he
as,
was?" c) There
is,
finally, the outlet
which Mr. Constable suggests
in his three illustrations. It is the recurrence to the spirit of the
period as
common denominator
of
its
"manifestations",
f.i.,
mind". This is acceptable, within certain limitations: We must remember that the "Byzantine mind" is merely the simplified condensation of the real thoughts and feelings, habits and inclinations of the men of this epoch, and "Byzantine
the
we must
not proclaim this "mind" as a universal cause of
its
"manifestations". These manifestations are not the outcome of the of
mind, but they are the mind,
or, at least,
what we know
it.
The tie between historic events is not the same strict line which was drawn by the classic mechanics between cause and effect. It is rather a line
leading through the brains of
men
and, what makes the matter even more complex, not only
through the brains of definite men, personalities, but of
mass. (The latter
men is
known
to us as historic
anonymous phenomena as
perceptible to us only as an
particularly true of such
which Mr. Constable chiefly refers These brains are tinged and busy, to various degrees, with all concerns of their contemporary civilization, with the religious, artistic, economic, and political events and tendencies in their interlacement, a texture to be split up later into the distinct fields of the specialist historians. Thus, the concept of the "mind of the epoch" constitutes a heuristic hypothesis, a compass for the use of historic investigation, its truth in any given instance, dependent on the facts to be found. To construct, however, such a "mind" as real cause for its "manifestations," would lead into the limitless field of speculations ad libitum, where everything might be proven, because nothing can be proven. What is the "Spirit of France", a generally accepted and frequently used term, as seen from Vichy or in the light of Vichy? What is explained by interpolating between Michelangelo and Borromini "the Baroque mind"? This is the theme of philosophical speculations, though I would not deny that they, f.i., the various the art-style of an epoch to in
his
illustrations.)
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
346
on the coagency between ideal and real factors in might serve as valuable heuristic hypotheses for the
theories history,
historian.
They appear like comets. Our superabundance and diflEerentiation of techniques of fact-finding, grouping, and speculating does not favor the synoptic genius. It is a time devoted rather to the pigeonhole than to the whole of experience. Universal sages like Alberti or Leibnitz who embraced the whole orbit of contemporary learning, not in philosophic meditation only, but as expert craftsmen in the physical and moral disciplines, seem nearly unimaginable today. The same is true of Carl Gustav Carus, not further back than the middle of the 19th century. But as we look at the flow of Western thought since early Greek philosophy, miraculously constant and continuous, in spite of sporadic interruptions, there seems to exist something like a breathingPolyhistors cannot be bred.
time with
rhythm
its
in the course of
human
thinking: periods of material-
collecting are succeeded by periods of digestion
So, in history, after
attempts
of
new accumulations
synoptic
interpretation
and synopsis.
of facts, there appear
of
civilization,
such as
Greek Civilization", "The Time of Constantine the Great", and "The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy", or Max Dworzak's "Kunst als GeistesJakob
Burckhardt's
"History
of
—
geschichte".
ments
And
in science generally, after decisive develop-
in the special sciences
men
turn up
encyclopaedic gift like James and
endowed with the The refreshing
Bergson.
repercussion of these synoptics on the insulated branches and their ossified terminologies
that
what
is
the realm of things.
talking a
is
enormous. They show once again is not so in
separated in the realm of the books,
new
Looking
at things
from new angles and
language, they thaw the frozen terminologies
and breach the departmental
walls.
They
are the counterpoise
against the tendencies to overspecialization.
The same also
is
true of the study of history, in particular.
Here
the special branches and the synoptic view cannot get
on without each other in the long run. They are dependent on each other. Their relation is of the same kind, it seems to me, as that between counterpoint and harmony. One can focus either on the single melodic lines, their whence and whither,
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
347
and fall, their strength and rhythm; or one may conon the cross-section, that is, the chord in which they meet. Only both views together do justice to the net-work as it is. In this sense, Mr. Constable's excellent suggestions invite acceptance and furtherance. their rise
centrate
Conversations of learned history, while history
is
men
about the right way of writing
shaking the very foundations of learn-
seem somewhat anachronistic, unless they discuss this Mr. Constable's problem, specialized vs. synoptic study of man's activities in history, can and, I feel, must be approached in its bearing upon the democratic way of life. ing,
peril also.
This bearing
is
to
be found in the educational aspect of special-
ization in science generally and in history particularly. It has been said before that the division of labor which permeates our whole cultural life involves a peril to democratic education. But as far as I can see, there have been fewer suggestions made than this good cause would deserve. In our
system of education specialization is represented by professional training, the synoptic view by humanistic education. The first predominates, very
much
at the expense of humanistic learn-
ing and teaching. But only the latter
is
fitted to
from generation
to generation the values
in the course of
Western
potential
me
members
hand down
shaped and stored
Civilization, to rear individuals as
of a democratic
community. This seems to
the heart and the crux of the educational problem of our
time. Facing the danger of internal disintegration through the
human race by the very achievements of through the growth of the mob, people outside tradition, greedy for amusement and open to mass-hypnosis; through the decline of traditional values; and, finally, through the overspecialization of knowledge and craftsmanship, we ought to ask anew the question which has worried intellectual leaders since Plato: How can character be taught? From my restricted point of view, absorbed with the study of overrefinement of the
civilization itself;
the arts and their social implications,
I
venture to suggest two
instruments of character-building, both of which seem handy
and
suitable to counteract the perils of overspecialization:
One
is
art education. It
lectual trends,
and serve
may
as a
reintegrate the
doorway
numerous
intel-
to a history of civilization;
Science, Philosophy
348 it
may
and Religion
explain the wealth of artistic forms as expressions of past
culture and so further the aims of humanistic education;
it
may
develop insight into the meaning of form as an equilibrium of all
the parts, and into the act of artistic creation as the liberty of
making
rules
which then the creator himself has got
to obey;
it
doing this promote respect for and understanding of other minds. It is, last but not least, a pleasant way of learning, and the American Fine Arts museum a ready and, as the past few years have splendidly shown, a most attractive instrument. In Shelley's words: "The imagination is the great instrument of
may,
in
moral good."
The
other means of "teaching" character
those historic figures
who embodied
learning or creating. Its advantage
manities
man
is
no quick and simple
is
is
to
make
familiar
the synoptic genius in
obvious: teaching the hu-
job; but the
image of
a great
appeals easily to the ordinary imagination, just as morals
are taught better by examples than by moral philosophy. are,
no doubt, many great
figures
who
There
find grace before the de-
bunkers as well as the worshippers. There is, f.i., the man who gave the University of Virginia its spirit and its body, basing both on the classic concept of measure and balance. No myth can better serve the ends of pedagogy than the vision of Jeffer-
dome of Monticello, observing through workmen who were embodying his plans for
son standing on the
his
telescope the
the
home
of democratic education.
These seem field of
way
to
.
of the possible
of studying history, and to fructify
acter-building. ".
me some
.
ways
to realize, in the
education, Mr. Constable's postulate for a
As Milton
it
more synoptic
for the sake of char-
says in his "Letter
on Education":
then will be required a special reinforcement of constant
and sound endoctrinating to set them right and firm, instructing them more amply in the knowledge of virtue and the hatred Being perfect in the knowledge of personal duty, of vice. .
.
.
may then begin To sum up:
they
(1)1 agree
fully
the study of economics."
with Mr. Constable's excellent critique of the and his pos-
perils of overspecialization in the study of history,
tulate for a
more synoptic treatment.
(2) His suggestions for the establishment of clearing houses
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
349
or any other form of organized cooperation between specialist historians for the exchange of their views
and findings, should
receive wholehearted support. Methodical investigation of the intellectual
and moral organization of men in the various epochs is important and still not sufficiently cultivated.
of civilizations
(3) More attention should be given to the bearing of overspecialization in science on the educational problem of today.
CHAPTER XIX Literature
and the Present
By JOSEPH
Crisis
WOOD KRUTCH
Columbia University
IT
IS
OBVIOUS that literature, like the other arts, has
tion to fact, to philosophy, to moraUty,
It is
and
some
rela-
to social welfare.
almost equally obvious that most attempts to define that
relation
end
in
to his detriment
some absurdity which the artist either accepts or, like the romantics and the aesthetes, scorn-
fully rejects.
The problem,
or perhaps
I
should say the dilemma,
same whether one undertakes
the
to
is
much
examine the relation of
literature to fact or its relation to philosophy or social welfare.
two extreme positions are represented by on the one hand and by the proponent of "pure imagination" on the other. But scientific naturalism produces a mongrel cross between fiction and sociological treatise which has the virtues of neither the one nor the other. On the other hand the artist who denies all responsibility to In the
case the
first
the "scientific naturalist"
fact
be
ends by producing nothing except rococo fantasy. Or, to Zola nor James Branch Cabell succeeded in
specific, neither
writing novels of
first
importance.
one considers the relation of the artist to abstract morality one finds, similarly, that though it is easy to state the two extreme positions, it is difficult if not impossible to state an If
alternative others.
one which will avoid the obvious
The
neo-classicists of the English
accepted the doctrine of poetic justice 350
fallacies of the
eighteenth century
(i.e.,
the theory that
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
351
must be perfectly moral in the sense that it must illustrate the working of the moral law as the moral law was understood) and the result was that they produced works of literature
The aesthetes, revolting against such proclaim the absolute independence of art from morality with the result that their works are sickly monwooden
unreadability.
absurdity,
strosities.
To facts
conclude from
merely that literature must regard
this
but not be a slave to
literalness, or that literature
must
be moral without being pedantically so, is not to conclude anything very helpful. It is too much Uke saying, "Be bold, be evermore bold, but be not too bold."
The
classical
world was of course aware of the problem.
Plato (at least in the "Republic") assumes that art
is
merely
means by which the teaching of the philosopher and the moralist may be propagated, but art then admittedly becomes a subordinate activity regarded with suspicion and expected a
to disappear as society reaches perfection.
This aspect of Plato's
thinking may, however, well be contrasted with the conception
found in
(also
madman—a
his
writings)
of
the
poet as inspired
conception which embodies a recognition of the
fact that the artist, instead of being his betters, pursues
merely a spokesman for
ends and employs means which are not
identical with those of the teacher or the preacher and, indeed,
are not to be understood by them.
thinking, Aristotle recognizes the
explain
how
it
may be
Somewhat in Hne with such autonomy of art and tries to
morally and socially useful without
appearing to aim directly at such utiHty.
tempts to explain of tragedy, that
purge
how
its
evil passions
Modern
this
may be by
And
Aristotle at-
suggesting, in the case
function is not to preach morality but to by giving them a ritual expression.
psychological theories of the function of art are
and the Freudian purge sometimes thought of as identical with the Aristotelian catharsis. But psychological theories of art, which tend to represent art as essentially fantasy and dream, are resisted plainly related to Aristotle's theory,
is
Science, Philosophy
352 by those
and
who
has
insist that it
happens that
and Religion
some
closer relation to reality;
minor controversy rages at the present moment over the question whether or not poetry is to be regarded as "cognitive," that is to say, as a form of knowledge rather than as a form of dream, concerned with things as they really are rather than merely with things as an individual consciousness would like them to be. The choice of a metaphysical term to describe the essential characteristic of poetry is in line with a contemporary fashion which has made metaphysics again popular, but the question at issue is one so
it
permanently
There
is,
a
at issue.
however, one point upon which psychologist and
metaphysician would probably agree.
It is also an important one and one which, if agreed upon by this conference also, might produce some illumination on at least an elementary level of the subject. This point is that the artist, whether concerned with knowledge or with fantasy, is at least concerned with either in some unique manner. He is not a psychiatrist
filling psychiatric prescription
structing fables
philosophers or moralists.
The
a divine
madman embodies
ways are
likely to
It
is
suffer
and not a moralist merely con-
designed to point morals supplied him by old conception of the artist as
a recognition of the fact that his
be mysterious even, perhaps, to himself.
pretty generally agreed that artistic if
it
is
narrowly sectarian.
A
work
is
likely to
Seventh-Day-Adventist
might conceivably write great poetry, but it is difficult to conceive of a great poem whose principal effect was to present the doctrine of the Seventh-Day-Adventist creed. But one may go much further than that. What a great work of art teaches cannot be any merely philosophical, religious, or scientific doctrine because it must do much more than that, because as soon as it becomes possible to state in abstract terms the "lesson" of a work of art then the work of art becomes supererogatory. It is important only if it manages to go beyond any formulation which the scientist or the philosopher can make. Professor Garrod once said, "The trouble with a didactic poem
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
353
you cannot learn anything from it." A didactic work what is already known. A real poem teaches something hitherto unknown and often something which cannot be known in any other way. and decadence are, in part at least, the exas, Aestheticism
is
that
can, in other words, teach only
perated protest of the
artist against
the attempt to
make him
mere servant of the scientist, the philosopher, or the He insists upon being recognized as the discoverer
a
moralist.
of truth,
not merely as the propagator of it; as one who in his own way knows things which the philosopher does not yet know, as presiding over a
his
He
methods.
realm which can be investigated only by
insists
of the fact that the
other words
in
artist, in
so far as
he
upon is
a recognition
really
an
artist, is
"inspired."
The
practical conclusions to be
such a subject as "the
artist
drawn
in connection with
and the present national
crisis"
or in connection with the broader subject of this conference are two. First, artists, real
in the past,
will
it
have to be taken for granted that many
or fancied, will continue to be, as they have been
sometimes rebeUious, perverse and generally un-
by profession are more frequently merely mad than they are divinely so. Second, that in so far as artists can, nevertheless, in the long run, also perform a manageable. For
artists
valuable social function,
it
will not
be because they agree to
become deliberate propagandists teaching what the philosopher and the scientist hand down to them for embellishment but because, working in their own fashion, they have made discoveries and reached truths which somehow harmonize with those of abstract thinkers.
To
say this
that the artist
Much It is
is
not by any means to take the romantic view
is
always necessarily a rebel and a dissident.
great Hterature has been in the broadest sense orthodox.
quite possible that
we
are approaching a period of unity.
But the most valuable unity is not achieved when the artist abandons his own function and belief in the validity of his
354
Science, Philosophy
own
processes. It
him
to conclusions
is
achieved
and Religion
when
his
own
which reinforce those of
processes lead
others.
He may
and should be familiar with these other conclusions. To be so may help him in his own work. But he nevertheless remains to some extent autonomous.
—
CHAPTER XX
How
Long
By
Is
the Emergency?
MARK VAN DOREN Columbia University
AN
EMERGENCY Called fofth the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, but what was and is the crisis which intellectuals are being asked to face? I assume that it is not one which they can settle in a meeting, or even understand overnight. Events have already proceeded to the point where it is unlikely that any congregation of scholars and writers will have the ear of the world for months or years to come. Machines are riding mankind as never before, and with an idiot concentration, a deviHsh delight, such as will not per-
/Y
mit for the
moment
the relatively small voice of reason. If
the Conference could decide to
mount one
of these machines
the one which the "democracies" are opposing to that of the "dictatorships" (I use quotation
purifying)
known
—and
assist
with
its
marks because both terms need
way
driving in every practical
members, then the emergency might be treated in terms of the time immediately ahead. But I do not assume that the Conference will so decide. For such a decision would mean the temporary abandonment of "pure" talk and to its several
"pure" research in the interest of a military victory to be won at the earliest possible moment. This in my opinion would be
worth while, and may
in fact
become
necessary;
we
not begin to conceive the extent of the practical effort
have to put forth, even for the
The immediate emergency,
minimum purpose
in other words, 355
is
for
still
we
do
shall
of defense.
me
tragically
— Science, Philosophy
356 simple. Yet
and Religion
do not expect the Conference to agree that there can do about it. Failing that agreement, what other emergency can be defined and faced? There is one which we have faced for a long time without acutely reahzing it, and which nothing but panic makes us reahze now. It is the emergency which consists of our not knowing what we mean when we use the words man, human, and humane. Not that there has ever been a ready answer to the immemorial question. What is man? But there have been times when the question was taken with a degree of seriousness sufficient to guarantee that all thought was directed to its answer as an end. And when that was the case, the question itself fell into place under the larger one, What is truth? Or, What is the world really hke? What is I
anything
is
it
the truth about the world, not as a scientist sees
poet sees
it,
not as a philosopher sees
but as any
it,
man might
see
put together, as ideally he
Even not so
a partial
much
to
answer
it if
it,
it,
not as a
not as a priest sees
he were
all
of those things
is?
to the question
would help us now
decide which of the currently contending
none of them is at all, demanded. For these programs are limited to the future, whereas the truth about man and the world is always present. Eternity is more hke the present than it is like either the future or the past, and literature knows this if the other arts and the sciences do not. But they know it, too; or they have known it; and the truth is that literature itself has in recent centuries moved farther and farther away from the knowledge. The necessity now is that all the arts and
programs
most human,
is
as to see that
at least in the large sense that
sciences should recover
is
it.
This cannot be done quickly. to destroy
one
is
What
cannot be rebuilt in a day.
said to be seeking
is
it
The
tomorrow; poetry cannot which by its current does not even remember; and science should not be
once begin to reveal the
showing
it
which every-
not around the corner; philosophy
will not establish a subject matter at
has taken centuries religion
human
treasure
Science, Philosophy
expected to temper
itself
and Religion
357
over a week-end. But the knowl-
edge must be recovered. And toward more than lip-service to unity while
this
end there must be
the disciplines continue
where finally of course there will b^ no discipline at all. There is only one center for discipline, and that is our definition of man in the world which eternally their rush into that darkness
The definition is so difficult that may be gHb answers and premature
the chief danger ahead
is.
formulas. Doubtless
we
do not want formulas at all, or even answers if they do not promote further questions, elucidating the ineradicable ironies of existence.
Nor
catastrophes will
nesian
War
will
any sensible person suppose that no more to mankind; there was the Pelopon-
happen
after Greece's great century.
have a job to do, and time. It
is
to
bring
that one part of us it
is
it
But meanwhile we as well as at any
now
back to their source in namely our reason. And of the disciplines have a direct responall
which
to insist that all
can be done questions is
relevant,
the matter. What literature lacks, what religion lacks, what science lacks, what philosophy lacks, is one and the same thing; and all may be sound again when it is repossessed. sibility in
CHAPTER XXI Democratic Culture in the Light
of
Modern Poetry By AMOS N. WILDER Andover Newton Theological School
POINT at which the study of contemporary Uterature can THE in best contribute to the purposes of the Conference is
abihty to identify the deeper
on the one hand, and
ture,
ills
its
and
its
foes of democratic cul-
elements of soundness on the
other, as they appear in this Uterature. In the course of such
an assessment there are various points at which the role of science, philosophy and religion appear, so that occasion arises to note both the beneficent and harmful aspects of their influence; an influence that can be called harmful, indeed, only
where these great pursuits are untrue odds with each other.
We
shall confine ourselves here
to themselves or are at
mainly to poetry. This form
of literature, in view of the depth and subtlety of
its
appre-
hensions and observations, offers an indispensable index to the spiritual attitudes
and trends of a given culture.* Moreover,
much contemporary and when taken in
poetry
is
concerned with
social
themes,
conjunction with current criticism oflers
us a sensitive analysis of cultural realities and choices. It is true also that in imaginative literature the science, philosophy
and
religion of a given period
may sometimes
find a meeting-
place that they cannot find at other levels.
When we *This theme
speak of modern poetry today there is
brought out effectively as regards
paper.
358
art also in
is
consider-
Mr. Constable's
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
359
able agreement as to
what we mean. The hne is drawn someEngland and this country are concerned, and the names of D. H. Lawrence, the later Yeats, Ezra Pound, T. S. Ehot and Hart Crane mark the type. To their names may be added those of Robinson Jefifers, Conrad where
in the twenties, as far as
Aiken, Archibald
MacLeish, Allen Tate, Wallace Stevens, Horace Gregory, W. H. Auden, Stephen Spender, C. Day Lewis, Louis MacNeice, and many others, to indicate the
new many volumes
variety of expression of the is
evident in the
the
multipUcation
of
phase. of
At present
its
vitaHty
new
poetry published, in magazines, and the constant
poetry
emergence of new poets of marked talent Hke Muriel Rukeyser, Delmore Schwarz and Dylan Thomas. There have been many efforts to define what such poets have in common over against the poetry that preceded it. The differences are far
more than
a matter of externals. Probably the
most
satisfactory
explanation points to the changed temper and sensibility of the
"modern man," who has been immediately exposed forces of our time.
These
are, notably: the
advanced
to
the
effects of
secularization, the solvent action of scientific rationalism
upon
old patterns and assumptions, the extension to wide circles of
Marx and Freud, together with the experience World War and its aftermath, and the consequent collapse of many illusions, and finally the social-cultural situation, increasingly manifest, consequent upon the extension of the influence of
of the
first
technology and the cumulative and motivation.
Some
effects of capitalist
of these factors, of course, had been at
procedures
work
for a
long time, and had affected poetry in similar ways, particularly in France; and the new poets have recognized their forerunners in
the French
Symbohst
writers. Indeed,
it
can be pointed
out by a kind of negative demonstration that even the worst limitations of the traditional school against
which these poets
revolted were due to certain of these factors. It was, namely, the Philistinism and social pressure of the late Victorian and
Georgian periods that drove
artists
increasingly into a false
Science, Philosophy
360
and Religion
and artificial position. The new poets have not themselves been able to escape the esotericism almost inevitable in a society whose tastes are mediocre or worse, but theirs has been a conscious and deliberate one. The fact is, they have had to find their solution not only in an inartistic culture increasingly debauched by Kitsch and all manner of moronic pabulum in print, movie and radio but now at length clearly in one whose basic assumptions and common language have been
—
—
deeply disintegrated.
may be made
Protest
against
our
of
identification
the
"modern" poets and the representative significance assigned them. There are, of course, poets of great distinction living and writing today, or recently, who have not broken so abruptly with pre-war poetry. Bridges,
Masefield
aspects of the
but
it
It
may be claimed
for Frost, Wylie, Millay,
and others that they mirror
modern
consciousness.
We
significant
shall recur to this,
can hardly be claimed for such poets that they speak
from or
to the particular tensions that characterize
crisis.
After
poets"
is
all,
the representative
significance
our cultural
of the
"new
best vindicated by pointing to the general agreement
of their outlook and concern with those of the leading socioloscientists,
historians
gists,
political
today.
The same cannot be
and students of culture
said for the traditionalist poets.
Attention has often been called to the alleged negation and demoralization of modern literature and art. This topic apfirst meeting of the Conference, Brooks and Professor Sorokin. NothMr. those of
peared in papers read at the notably in
ing
is
more important
for the purposes of this statement than
deahng with modern poetry does bear the marks of to discriminate judiciously in
this
theme.
cultural
Much
disorder.
Maritain has spoken elsewhere of the unmistakable marks of the devil on contemporary literature. It will be necessary to insist on the healthful elements that are entangled with the morbid and the destructive. For the present, let us admit the latter and inquire as to their cause. We have in mind the irrationalism and blasphemy of D. H. Lawrence, the moods
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
361
which "The Waste Land," "Gerontion," and "The Hollow of T. S. Eliot became the representative expression, the somber prophecy of Yeat's "Second Coming," the plunge into the irrational and the personal fate of Hart Crane, the cultural mirror in Pound's "Mauberley" and MacLeish's "Hamlet," and the extreme social verdict in Auden and some of the Marxist poets. We do not accept the view that the despair and nihilism of the "Waste Land period" was a momentary phase of post-war disillusionment. The poetry reviews and pubhshers are still giving us an abundance of poetry marked by similar tragic relativism in outlook and similar wide departures in for
Men"
form. This literary expression
is that not of a decade but of Mr. Constable points out in his paper that the art of painting from 1905 on was prophetic of the dilemmas of culture that appeared more clearly in society
a continuing cultural crisis,
several decades later.
We
shall first lay
emphasis on the
of affairs in recent poetry. It
and
these artists and poets
is
social causes for this state
evident that in dealing with
their constituency,
we
are dealing
with a relatively novel type of man, the product, namely, of a
world without
roots. It
is
not only that
many
of these writers
and expose the conflicts in modern society and the insecure and artificial character of the life of massman today. But, like all of us to some extent, they are themselves the unconscious exhibits of what our spiritually rootless existence does to men. Particular strata of modern society are characterized by de-personalization and anonymity as a result of our social arrangements and the resultant tensions, whether actually deal with
in the megalopolitan or industrial or sophisticate groups.
One
can point to three areas where modern Hfe has sundered the roots, the organic unities,
which are
essential for
normal and
healthy personality and society. These are (i) the organic unity
between man and the (2)
or
more
generally,
man and
nature;
stable family, whether as partner or child; between the individual and his local community
dividual to the
and
soil,
that organic unity represented by the relation of the in-
(3) that
Science, Philosophy
362
and Religion
or clan or neighborhood. All of these are in
necessary
for
the
psychological
some degree
and health of the depersonalized and exposed
security
and without them he is and stresses that lead to marked degrees of dissociation and unreality. But the same social forces that break down these organic unities act in other ways to lay special loads on the individual. The actual insecurity and conflict of modern life press on the psychological insecurity; the false rewards and values and the febrile dissipations easily allure those whose guardian patterns of life are broken; the seductions of mass psychosis work easily on those whose personal orbit is
individual, to strains
restricted to the vanishing point.
We
shall
illustrate
these
but
influences
first
we mention
several factors that have entered into conjunction with to further the havoc.
Modern
them
analysis of social forces in con-
war and more bitter,
junction with the spectacle of two generations of
depression has bred disillusion, a disillusion as
Mr. Van
ideahsm.
Wyck
The
all
the
Brooks has shown, because of the foregoing
influences of scientific rationaUsm in stripping
older religious and ethical sanctions of their authority has gone
forward
at
an accelerating pace. In our time
it
has been in the
domain of psychology that the shock has been most deeply felt. Changed views of the self have left their mark clearly on modern literature. Partly as a result of this, the artists and poets have been encouraged to explore the dangerous depths of the irrational, and there to find a pseudo-religion satisfying to
the barrenness
of
modern
life,
so
deprived of
ritual,
a
pseudo-religion fraught with peril to social order. Illustrations of these outcomes may be briefly suggested. D. H. Lawrence suggests to us the recoil of sensitive men of our time from the machine and from a society so mechanized
as to
have
He
postulated a culture
all its
functions should be
lost its roots in the earth.
in the best sense primitive, because
and processes of nature. In its name he attacked not only mechanism, but also rationalism. He testifies
wedded
to the cycles
to the suffocation of man's instinctive
life
today, particularly
Science, Philosophy in
social
its
and Religion
363
expression. In protest against the
tendency to
overestimate his concern with sexual factors he exclaimed:
"What
ails
He saw
me
is
rather the repression of
modern
this as general in
my
We
societal instinct."
may
also mention Robinson Jeflers here as one who continually attacks the inversion and corruption of civilized man, and extols the deep,
health-giving relations of
The
life
of Yeats
recoil of sensitive
perceived that
it
man
living.
with his cosmic environment.
a particularly striking
is
men away from
would devastate
deliberately ignored
scientific
example of the rationaHsm.
after a given initiation
it
He
and he and built up
his imaginative life
it. Remarkably enough, rather than plunge into an unexamined mysticism, he then spent his Ufe organizing his own symbolic "science," designed to cover all
high fortifications against
experience.
Among
other things he elaborated a philosophy
of history which in
its
characterization of cycles and in
its
diagnosis of the present phase resembled that of Spengler and,
indeed,
the
one outHned for
conference
this
Sorokin. Ezra Pound's thought illustrates our points particularly: (i)
modern
life is
by Professor at two
summary
devoid of
ritual, a
theme
taken up in EHot's work; (2) the acquisitive instinct, usura, has blasted the natural vitaHty and creativity of man. The work of Eliot supports what we have said at many points: the crassness of
modern
types, the nostalgia for older
magnitude and ritual, the suffocation today. But we note particularly in this poet
cultures that possessed
of the spiritual
life
evidence for the deeper maladies of modern
among
life,
especially
the sophisticated and reflective: the loss of accepted
norms, the
relativity of values,
the tormenting ambiguity of
advanced and to the ultimate mysteries that partakes of horror. These same phases of modern experience appear in MacLeish's "Hamlet," in Conrad Aiken's earher work described as "the melody of chaos," and in much choice, especially moral choice; and, as a result of the
secularization of
work
life,
a reaction to death
of surreaUst inspiration
W. H. Auden and many
down
to the present hour.
others confirm the
theme that
Science, Philosophy
364
and Religion
contemporary poetry has passed its verdict on the social order and presents its hurts and costs with sardonic and withering force. The insights from Marx are combined with those from recent psychology so that we have the emergence of a school of poets thoroughly versed in, and exploiting, the scientific outlook and consciously hostile to the spiritual and ethical traditions of the past so far as they are entangled in
modern
capitalist society.
The
total picture of this literature
that are so akin to
it
and of the modern
arts
has led to illuminating generalizations
by historians of culture. Orthodox religious interpreters, whether Jewish, Protestant or Catholic, emphasize the negation and
demoralization revealed there, and draw the moral that modern has
society
apostasized
from the church or the Jewish or
Christian tradition and so reached the present nadir of cultural
and poUtical disorder. Berdiaefl's book, "The End of Our Time," may be taken as a moderate statement of this thesis. From the Renaissance on, through the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, modern man has been making a vast experiment in secularity and humanism, and he is now learning,
when man
or should be, that
"human image
loses
God
from modern writers and
illustrates
he loses himself, the
or identity," and runs on madness. Berdiaeff
such an analysis was presented before
One segment of Conference by Pro-
artists.
this
Hoxie N. Fairchild in his paper, "Some Historical InReHgion and Poetry."^ Professor Fairchild argues the English Romantic poets represent an advanced stage lapse into subjectivity, self-sufficiency and mystical pan-
fessor
terrelations of
that
of a
theism encouraged by Protestantism, particularly in eenth century form.
door
to
these
It is
traits
by
eight-
its
implied that Protestantism opens the its
original
irrationalism
and
indi-
vidualism.
The
best
known
"Axel's Castle," by ^"Science, Philosophy
study of the origins of
Edmund
and Religion:
modern
poetry,
Wilson, traces the contemporary
A
Symposium,"
New
York, 1941, pp. 49^.
Science, Philosophy situation, featured particularly
by
and Religion
365
Proust and Joyce, to on the French Symbolist movement by their alien and hostile setting. Wilson sees a relation between SymboHsm and the earHer general Romantic movement, but is concerned with social and economic causes, Eliot,
the subjectivity and isolation forced
not religious ones. Certainly neither the
first nor the second France can be assigned to the evil effects of Protestantism, and yet Professor Fairchild Hnks up very closely English Romanticism with what he calls the deliquescence of Protestantism.
wave of Romanticism
in
Certainly the relations of a religious tradition to literature are
more complex than appears
here.
The emergence
of a
magnificent series of figures like Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley and Keats results from the cumulation and cross-
many
factors. Apart from the general conditions and education, and the ripeness of the techniques of a given art and its actual relation to the public, there are two main factors whose marriage produces significant
fertilization of
of
taste,
artistic
curiosity
expression: a basic religious tradition,
the type of
man
it
known
rather in
has produced than in the particular in-
forms or doctrines or their state of vitality at the secondly, an historical movement of some genand power. In the English Romantic poets we have the
stitutional
moment, and, erality
union of the Protestant type, characterized by a dynamic personalism, with the general Romantic is
Wordsworth. The
not, first of his
view of
all,
his particular
man
movement. The test case of Wordsworth are
significant features
form of nature mysticism, but
that underlies
—
it
i.e.,
man's moral nature
and the mysterious greatness that inheres in him; and, secondly, a point strongly emphasized by Whitehead his revolt against the scientific epistemology of his day. It was the basic Protestant Christian temper of this son of Lake District free-holders
—
that enabled him, moreover, to find his balance in the over-
whelming forces of the French Revolution, and from it with a juster estimate than that of Burke.
to
emerge
Science, Philosophy
366
A
similar scrutiny
and Religion
would show the
and power of
persistence
the Protestant or prophetic tradition in such figures as Melville,
Emerson and Whitman. Our
however,
object in this parenthesis,
not to assess individuals but to show that any over-
is
simple dogmatic indictment of post-Renaissance culture and literature
is
very precarious.
This bears immediately upon our next concern, namely, recognition of the sound and hopeful elements in contemporary poetry, those indicative of the survival values in democracy
and of resources first
in
religious traditions.
its
nificant for,
One can
point here
output of traditional poetry,
to the continuing
and representative
large
of,
and values
a guarantee of the persistence of older patterns
the midst of an age of change.
It is
sig-
still
groups of readers, in
true that the loyalties here
expressed sometimes appear to be Unked with privilege or
with a the
static
conception of Ufe.
social
alert
often found in left.
One can
modern
poetry,
One
point, secondly, to
and compassion and not only on the extreme
point also to the supplanting of sentimentalism
by an empirical approach in of trained
One can
responsibility
the
criticism,
modern
much modern work: and realism
intelligence
can register the claim that
the evidence
in the best sense.
we have even
in the poetry of
negation today not cynicism, in the main, but the tragic sense,
which
is
a different thing
and which
testifies to
courage rather
man
artist.
than abandonment on the part of the
Anglo-Catholic that even the
indicates
critic
or the
blasphemy
extreme moderns
in the
an unsuccessful repression of the
rather than real apostasy.
He
Christian frame of reference as
Auden seem
to
be far
An
(Brother Every), moreover, has stated
adds, "Such
we
find in the
less sinister,
like
Lawrence
Christian
faith
distortions
of a
work
of
W. H.
because they betray them-
and indicate suspense rather than bitterness." A recent writer in dealing with the supreme test case of today, James Joyce, has insisted on the ambivalence of his selves at every point
attitude both to his
own
religious
tradition
in
the
Roman
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
367
Church and
to the EngHsh language itself.^ Even such a brief accounting suggests that credit for the positive values in democratic culture today should be divided between the religious
and the humanist
traditions,
of this culture
bilities
must
and responsibiUty for the liaon all the religious traditions
rest
on the secularizing tendencies. we must also draw attention to the rapidly growing volume of poetry that deals specifically with the democratic hope and the American dream.^ as well as
At
this point
"Until recently the most effective affirmation of a social pro-
gram has been
that of the Marxist poets. Both in this country England since the early thirties the most vigorous younger poets have found a cause productive of passionate utterance and aspiration in the idea of social revolution. The outlook and
and
in
affiliation of these writers
ment with
younger disciples are
their
and
has evolved as a result of disenchant-
Soviet Russia and for other reasons, but they and still
speaking powerfully for justice
fraternity, if not for liberty.
Mr. Selden Rodman has pre-
The Marxist movement
sented the situation as follows:
in
poetry had the merit of widening the field of the poet's interest. It
tended, however, to be intolerant and doctrinaire. Gradually
the poets concerned with society have of social
they say,
come
to
speak in terms
democracy rather than of communism. Democracy, must be made meaningful for all of us. On what tradi-
tion, then,
can such poets build?
On
the tradition of Jefiferson
optimism of Whitman and the humility of Sandburg. It must conserve the Marxist emphasis on the sacredness of labor and renew the revolutionary core of Christianity. The poet must speak with clarity and he must speak out of a first-hand knowledge of the life of men and at some point have an active part in it. "Put beside this the view affirmed repeatedly by Archibald MacLeish in his poetry and his verse plays for radio and in his
and Lincoln,
says
Rodman, on
the
A Magazine of Verse, March 1941, pp. 370-373. Joyce expressed in this article by a writer who can hardly be classed as a modernist will interest readers of Mr. Van Wyck Brooks' paper. ^Thornton Wilder in Poetry,
The judgments on
The of
paragraphs that follow are quoted from an article of the author, "Voices Social Action, May 15, 1941, pp. 21-24.
Our Day,"
Science, Philosophy
368
and Religion
must be a responsible citizen. He and not a private speech. He must be conversant with the issues and choices of his generation. 'What a people can become is the accomplishment in act of what a addresses.
must use
The
poet, he says,
a public
people can conceive.
What
the people of a nation can conceive
and their poets can make actual to them and thus possible.' Mr. MacLeish is particularly concerned with the spiritual mobilization of democracy today for its test against fascism. One may wonder whether he draws the lines of conflict deeply enough, but his view of the poet's task is instructive. "One could make a good sized anthology of the poems recently written that deal with the American hope and the American tradition. These poets are not writing patriotic jingles. It is the theme of the best of them that this nation is still only in an early stage of its achievement of an ordered liberty. The American people is a very young people indeed: about as old, perhaps, as the English people was in the reign of King John when oligarchy was in its infancy. The picture of England between 1066 and 1215 was no more and no less inspiring than the picture of America between 1776 and 1941. You are at present chiefly occupied upon destroying the old oligarchic system, just as the English were occupied in 1215 in destroying the Norman-French despotic system. Before you lies the future with the positive task of creating democracy. "Our poets recognize what a long and costly initiation the country must go through. They realize at what a cost America is
what
their artists
—
will fulfil its promises.
They
are clairvoyant as to the inchoate
how weak
with its unSuch an analysis as we have here made is indicated in the work of the young poet Muriel Rukeyser. Her poem, 'The Soul and Body of John Brown,' is an attempt to portray the long ordeal of democracy and to offer a symbol for the invincible urge to liberty that works in it. She affixes to the poem the words of Joel, 'Multitudes, multitudes in the valley of decision!' John Brown after his execution takes on mythical proportions to haunt and scourge the nation as a voice for liberty: 'a streaming meteor in the blackened air a fanatic beacon of fierceness.' Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dry bones is also used to suggest a nation character of our present society, disciplined appetites and
—
its
immanent
it
is
conflicts.
— Science, Philosophy
and Religion
369
awaiting resurrection. Employing the allusive methods of modern verse, Miss Rukeyser suggests the judgments that fall upon those nations that
The
trial
wind
stifle
freedom:
of heroes follows their execution.
of nations with
new
rain,
new
The
striding
lightning,
down Brown wanted freedom. Could not
destroyed in magnificent noon shining straight the fiery pines.
himself be free until
more grace reached
Allen Tate in
a corroded world.
The Mediterranean and
in
Our
guilt his
Aeneas
in
own.
Washing-
ton pictures the whole American quest in terms of Aeneas' search for the site where he should found his
Rome
new
city,
the
completed. MacLeish's survey of the successive phases of the American promise from the voyage to be, a quest not yet
of
Columbus down
is
a tale of repeated frustration, and yet always offering
to the present time,
America Was Promises,
hopes. "Never were there promises as now," but
it is
new
imperative
that today they be grasped. John Ciardi in his recent first volume, writes a moving letter to his immigrant mother. She found her America; despite steerage and slums it was "all good." But he in a later decade can promise her nothing:
There is no hailing yet of the hoped-for land. Only the enormous, wheeling, imperative sea. And the high example of the earlier coming In the poem Continent's Edge, he reflects that with the western sea reached, adventure must turn inward.
Genevieve Taggard likewise notes where advance can come:
These triumphant hills have stood Waiting for human magnitude;
They have seen Only the humble and
the mean.
Awkward women weeding
.
.
.
rows;
Children brandishing at crows.
Men
building barns,
In cankered solitude.
men
cutting
wood
Science, Philosophy
370
To
and Religion
turn to conclusions: the most significant
evidences a radical disorder and a major
and points
culture
modern poetry
crisis in
to particular causes for this
democratic situation as
immanent constructive forces that give grounds for good deal of less significant writing evidences various
well as to
hope.
A
forms of traditional idealism, social prophecy or religious faith. As far as the role of science proper is concerned, poetry merely it has challenged and unsettled moral and social patterns, and furnished the basis for technological changes that have had their own unsettling effects in the social balance. But since no truth is ultimately harmful there is no occasion here for an indictment of science. As far as philosophy is concerned we can first distinguish science outside its bounds and masquerading as philosophy.
dramatizes our recognition that traditional
From
the
time of Wordsworth down, poetry has
major contribution
correcting the
in
made
a
narrowly empirical or
Our modern poetry evidences the harm done by pseudo-science in impugning the intuitive or rationalistic tests of reality.
integral approach to reality,
and
it
vigorously affirms this ap-
proach in various ways. The spiritual chaos of the modern
world most eloquently exhibited in its imaginative literature, offers a particular claim on philosophy today, namely, that it elaborate a world view based on ancient and modern experience, persuasive
ground
for the
enough
many
to re-establish at least a rallying
tentatives towards order
which are now
isolated.
With regard
to
religion
and
our conclusions are as follows:*
tests reveal the fact that the Both sociological depersonalization, the loss of both age is main malady of our the person, the of lack of the conthe function and the sense cultural, and for responsibility ditions, both social-economic and freedom. Attention to the truly indicative and representative poetry of the age demonstrates this over and over. Indeed, *See
"The
literary
Spiritual Aspects of the
last chapter; also, "Personality
ture,
New
Poetry," Harper, 1940, especially the
and the Protestant Tradition": Southworth Lec-
Andover Newton Theological School, 1940.
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
much
the hall-mark of
of
modern
literature
371 dissociation,
is
either in the person of the writer or in his central preoccupations: witness Crane, O'Neill, EHot, Jeflers, Joyce. This evidence could be confirmed by scrutiny of other contemporary arts. As Berdiaefl says, man today has lost his image or "form," both physical and rational, and futurist and abstract painting
perfectly illustrate this by their parcelhng out
and fragmentaand persons. the character of the malady indicates the cause and
tion of the forms of things
Now
the cure.
As
concerned suspicion
far
as
religion
mediately cast on
all
those forms of
is
it
is
im-
that lack in emphasis
on the person. The trend
to depersonalization, to anonymity, mass-man, to acquiescence in or to the cult of the dangerous powers of the irrational this has been encouraged by certain types of religion, and it has correspond-
to the outlook of
—
ingly called forth these types.
indulge
all
Such
religions
are those that
too easily the desire of the multitudes to avoid
personal choice, personal responsibility, personal
act,
personal
existence. All this includes evasive types of mysticism, ritualism,
pietism, emotionalism;
the unconscious,
all
all cults
of the irrational, exploitings of
escapes into subpersonal levels of private
intoxication or mass excitement;
all
nature cults, theosophies
we need
or distorted borrowings of oriental patterns. But
add
also
religious
the suspect character of traditions.
desiccated and
The
many forms
Puritan tradition in
to
of our best
its
warped forms has prepared many
sometimes of the
ills
which modern Protestant society manifests. The moral severity, asceticism and other-worldliness which once were organic aspects of a towering and glorious positive faith, have become a tangled residue of inhibition and psychic disorder in those areas where the original mighty impulse has departed. The same can be said for some aspects of the Jewish tradition. Cathohc piety, on its side, where its living impulse is absent, leaves its votaries to a degree exempt and unclaimed by the Christian challenge to the heart and the will. The spiritual disarray of the modern world as evidenced
in
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
372
renewal of the Jewish-
literature, therefore calls for the
its
most emphatically which the challenge to the moral will and the inmost redoubts of the self are most inescapable. This means Christian tradition in those aspects that are
personal, in
prophetic
the
known
in
its
tradition,
the
Christian
classical
great renewers.
It is
our
thesis,
tradition
as
moreover, that
American society that are not Jewish or Catholic, the patterns in which this can most effectively be done are those of the Reformation. For the Anglo-Saxon world in the main received its characteristic temper and mold from this historic spiritual revolution of the sixteenth century. Even the apostates and blasphemers in modern English and American literature manifest in unmistakable ways the sub-soil of Calvinist Christianity in their type and outlook. This is the pit from which we were digged. Here is where our springs may be uncovered. Even those groups that trace from other traditions have been deeply influenced by it. Andre Siegfried reminded us how striking to an outsider are the American traits drawn from this background.
for those elements in
We
are not suggesting a renewal of Puritanism or Calvinism
bad sense sometimes given to these terms. Nor are we unmindful of the unhappy political compromises made by the reformers from the earhest phases of the great separation. But we are calling attention to the original moment of the Reformation, the reassertion of Christian personalism and the prophetic tradition by Luther, and the majestic moral dimensions of existence recovered by both Luther and Calvin. In effect, to return to Luther is to return to Paul. The common stigma of irrationaHsm applied to Luther is just so far valid
in the
as
it
is
To
valid in the case of Paul.
confuse the responsible
humanism and subone of the recurrent misunder-
personalism of the reformers with the jectivism of the Renaissance
standings in
all
CathoHc
But the return
is
analysis of
to the prophetic
modern
culture.
tradition in the
tion does not exclude corresponding re-emphasis
of Jewish and Catholic leaders.
Along whatever
Reforma-
on the part lines,
such
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
373
rediscovery of the religious sanctions for free and responsible personality
a
is
common
task in the present cultural disorder of
our democracies.
APPENDIX Van Wyck Brooks: Now, regarding the papers by Mr. Wilder and Mark Van Doren, I am deeply in agreement with Mr. Wilder's paper, as I was with
his
pects of the
profoundly interesting book, "The Spiritual As-
New
Poetry."
I
only feel that he takes a
hard some of the poets he speaks to express a
it
cycle;
to
and
I
me
little
too
distinctly
also feel that
many of these problems. I do not bemodern mind is as far astray as it thinks
solve
lieve that the sensitive as
who seem
decade and not a cultural
good sense would it is,
of,
has been sophisticated into being,
ceptance of sophistry,
—and
I
—
by its willing acthink people would find them-
on much firmer ground if they really followed their noses, and their hearts. All the sages of all the races and all the ages have agreed on certain root ideas, and it is the business of grown men to identify their minds with these ideas. We still have Moses and the prophets; and we have no excuse if we do not listen to them. (To the prophets I add the classics.) Regarding man himself and his values, I think that most modern talk about relativity, etc., is mere sophistical chatter. I am fully in agreement with Mr. Van Doren about eternal selves
their consciences
values. I
.
.
.
have a feeling that a great poet
of these
now would
simply cut most
Gordian knots.
HoxiE N. Fairchild: clear and use"The Spiritual Aspects of the New Poetry." To answer his comments on my little contribution to the 1940 symposium would not be of much value to the present conference. Anyone interested in our friendly debate may compare his volume with my own "Religious Trends in English Poetry." Probably the real basis of
Mr. Wilder has presented us with an admirably
ful restatement of the
our disagreement
is
main
ideas of his book,
a radical difference of religious temper.
Science, Philosophy
374
and Religion
"The main malady of our age," he asserts, "is depersonalizaThe remedy, then, is the most highly personalized form
tion."
— the
of religion
great prophetic tradition of the Reformation
as represented by vin.
Luther and in somewhat lower degree by Cal-
cordially agree with the diagnosis, but
I
the cure.
Our
our vain attempt to
live
by a
sceptical as to
self-sufficient, individualistic, sub-
conception of personality which
jectivist
am
sense of personality has dwindled as a result of
fruit of the Protestant tradition.
is
demonstrably the
The same weakness
is
inherent
democracy, which lacks any real conception of an organic wholeness existing for the sake of its parts. Catholic individualin our
ism has
this quality of disciplined life
within a communal pat-
tern.
Though I admire Luther and Calvin less warmly than does Mr. Wilder, I grant that they would be astonished at the ultimate results of their teachings. But there is something in Protestantism which is much older and stronger than the official theology of the Reformation. I doubt the wisdom of trying to struggle back through the muddled centuries to a theoretically "pure" Protestantism which almost every modern Protestant would reject with horror. We know what the process has been.
Why
begin
it all
over
again.''
Mr. Wilder writes: "To confuse the responsible personalism of the reformers with the humanism and subjectivism of the Renaissance is one of the recurrent misunderstandings in all Catholic analysis of modern culture." But this confusion was not invented by Catholic analysts. It is simply a fact which lies open to anyone's observation. No historian of sixteenth century English literature has failed to emphasize the inter-weaving of Renaissance and Reformation as a main feature of his period. The relationship, based on deep-lying psychological bonds, has continued to our own times, and I see no more chance of dissolving it than of separating the theology of Luther from the long tradition of increasingly sentimentalized Protestantism
between him and Dr. Fosdick. not to deny the great and often beneficent contributions which Protestantism has given to modern civilization. Nor is it to deny that Catholicism has also fallen short of its own highest aims. The sympathy of too many Roman Catho-
which
To
lies
say
all this is
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
375
Fascism is a tragic perversion of the true Catholic ideal. Fascism is a planned society which tramples upon the individlies for
ual soul; the Catholic
individual soul
is
Church
is
a planned society to
infinitely precious. I
which the
merely believe that
attainment of the Catholic ideal would restore the
lost
full
concept
more valid and potent way than would be achieved by an attempt to reform the consequences of the Reformation. of personal dignity in a
Warner G. Rice: One of the observations
suggested by Professor Wilder's paper (and by others submitted by members of the Conference) is that the approach to science, philosophy, and religion is nowadays very largely perhaps too largely historical. As a practicing scholar, I am aware how necessary history is; but I have learned, too, that history often tells us no more than the bare story of Humpty-Dumpty, with its conclusion describing the impotence of all the king's horses and all the king's men; when what we chiefly need to know is how to put Humpty together again. I take it that the concern of the Conference, like the concern of the poet, is not simply with diagnosis; that something more needs to be done than to say, "Thou ailest here, and here;" that a philosophy with positive affirmations which can be spread abroad and put to work is necessary if our present condition is to be bettered. Whether philosophers and poets can leaven the lump of the humanity we know may be doubtful; but surely
—
—
they will never be content to serve simply as indices of culture.
How
far,
indeed, contemporary poets are actually indices of
our contemporary culture seems to me a debatable question. Since many of them are remote both from tradition and from the common life of their own times, it is hard to see how they represent anything but themselves. Moreover, ature perhaps as often as literature follows
life
life.
follows
The
liter-
point
is
gone a long way; some of the surrealist painters have taken the most extraordinary pains to insure their own spontaneity, and poets have become almost equally self-conscious. So, though men in general may have cause to feel that they are tumbleweeds rolling aimlessly about in a desert before the winds of chance, Mr. Eliot's poems are that sophistication in
modern
art has
Science, Philosophy
376
and Religion
so feel. From one point of view, men in America have for a century felt as rootless as they feel now — partly because they have been, beyond other men, often uprooted. And in the proximate future, scarcely evidence that they
indeed,
it
do
can be argued that
they must expect to live in a world where change (as Professor Whitehead brilliantly argues) will become more and more swift, and where roots of some kinds will therefore be liabilities rather than assets. It seems to me doubtful whether the unities mentioned by Professor Wilder e.g., the unity between man and the soil, between man and the stable family, between man and the clan are, in the terms in which we now under-
—
—
stand them, ultimately necessary. Possibly our relation to nature
more esthetic on the one on the other; and that our relation to the family and the clan will be adjusted and readjusted (not necessarily for the worse) under the pressure of a changing social and economic expediency. Mores are likely to change with astonishing rapidity; and man will find himself comfortable only as he adjusts himself to these changes. But peace and will
become
steadily less spiritual, but
hand, and more
scientific
inner security are another matter; here the question values, of ethics. Professor Wilder,
if I
is
of final
understand him aright,
—
is to be answered for us partly because of our background of Calvinist Christianity by a return to the
thinks this question
—
Christian personalism and the prophetic tradition of the Protestant Reformation.
I
am
not so sure as he
is
that a return to
Luther is a return to Paul; and in any case I should prefer to the example of Luther the example of those Renaissance humanists who understood Plato and Aristotle as well as they understood the New Testament.
H.
S.
V. Jones: Is there
not some danger that the cultural and literary quesmay be prejudiced by employing such terms as
tions at issue
"the
Marks
of the Devil," "the Morbid," "the Destructive".?
In contemporary poetry
we
find a notable enlargement of
poetic experience as a result of a poetic apprehension of
new
knowledge. The evolution of poetry may be working toward a larger synthesis on comprehension. Since science
is
partly responsible for the
"changed temper
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
and
sensibility of the
377
'modern man'," should we consider further
the relation of poetry to science?
In this connection I might venture to recall a very familiar passage in Wordsworth's Preface to the second edition of "The Lyrical Ballads": "If the labors of
men
impressions which there
no more than
steps of the
man
we
maon our condition and in the
of science should ever create any
terial revolution, direct or indirect,
habitually receive, the Poet will sleep
at present;
he will be ready
to follow the
of science, not only in those general indirect
but he will be at his side, carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself." Has not this prophecy in a sense been fulfilled? I found very interesting Mr. Wilder's acute remarks about de-personalizing forces in our modern civilization. If this is a trend of democracy as we know it, we may note an ironic contrast between the individual of the democratic ideal and the "mass-man" of the democratic realization. However, shall we recover personality more fully by a return to the Reformation faith and discipline or by turning to the account of self-knowledge all that modern psychology has to teach us? I would not, of course, maintain that a complete self-knowledge can come from modern psychology.
effects,
Edward K. Rand: The paper by Dr. Wilder and valuable material, but
I
of course contains
doubt
of the religious sanctions will
method
of religious reform, in
stable organizations like the
if
amount
my
most interesting
his search for a rediscovery to
much. The
surest
opinion, will proceed from
Synagogue and the Catholic Church.
A. N. Wilder: I
find myself in agreement with almost
of Professor Jones' queries, (i)
moral judgments on aspects of up to Mr. Brooks!
leave the question it is
only so far justified, in
evidence, and
it
my
all
the implications
As to the propriety of emphatic modern poetry, I could perhaps I
view, as
will say, it
however, that
can be supported by
should be accompanied by due appreciation.
Our concern with literature here is not only or strictly literary. (2) The role of science in creating the modern temper and sen-
Science, Philosophy
378 sibility
may
and Religion
well deserve a larger place than
have given
I
it.
Professor Jones beautifully characterizes contemporary poetry
enlargement of poetic experience as new knowledge." When he says that poetry "may be working toward a larger synthesis or comprehension," he seems to me to be describing the promise as representing "a notable
a result of a poetic apprehension of
I
see in the
work
of
some poets
like
Auden, where there
is
synthesis of religious, scientific and social data. (3) One of the most relevant and pressing areas for the modern man and artist is
that of psychology,
that of sociology
it is
and
I
believe that both in this area and in
difficult for
and empirically. It Jewish groups seem
to act freely
and
liberal
that
I
believe
it
possible for
is
to
them
our main religious traditions because the liberal Protestant
me
to
be least inhibited here
to deal significantly
with the
modern world, but not until they have renewed themselves at their sources. Thus I can hardly agree with Professor Rand who points rather to the more highly organized and authoritative religious bodies. I am interested that Mr. Van Doren alludes to the immediate emergency, though he acknowledges that the Conference is not likely to agree there is anything it can do about it. I share his regret in this, but even a beginning of contact and the discovery
of perhaps a larger consensus as to values than
would contribute toward national mediate emergency grows more pressing. possible,
In pointing to the question of the doctrine of to
me
to indicate the center at
was thought
clarity as the
Man
im-
he seems
which thinking and re-thinking
is most imperative. In approaching the center in terms of "the world which eternally is" and of "reason," it seems to me he is everlastingly right. Yet these terms are ambiguous or even antipathetic to many today who, though they may agree in the main, see their own cherished approaches to truth placed in question by them. It seems to me, therefore, that one of our most pressing tasks is to understand the contemporary distrust of these conceptions, often evident in literature, and to restore confidence in them by redefinition, and persuasiveness of lit-
erary statement.
This also bears on Mr. Brooks' welcomed comment. I warmly respond to his confidence that contemporary relativism and
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
379
negation in literature are often only on the surface, or voiced by unrepresentative sophisticates. The over-simple schematic in-
dictment of the whole modern world fails to take account of the magnificent evidence of courage and incorruptibility we find about us in
all
all classes.
But
it
still
seems to
me
that social
conditions, and the large scale character of the readjustment
which the world is now going through, occasion hurts and conwhich are very widespread and destructive. In particular they are leading people away from the historic wisdoms he fusions
refers to.
They
Thus many
are exposed to undemocratic persuasions.
are temporarily at least unable to "follow their noses, their
consciences and their hearts."
They
are bitterly indisposed to
Moses and the prophets and the classics, and this accounts for the more somber coloring I read into or out of con-
listen to
temporary literature. I am always extremely interested in, and grateful for. Professor Fairchild's judgments in this field of religion and literature. It seems to me that the historical issue raised, i.e., as to the relation of the Renaissance and the Reformation, is one that historians could profitably elucidate farther, historians, that
is,
who
have some realization of religious values. Fortunately a fairer picture is being given today by secular historians both of the Puritans and of Catholic movements. believe that Professor Fairchild misunderstands my thought one point. I do not deplore the inter-weaving of Renaissance and Reformation elements in art and literature and general culture. Milton was the greater poet because there converged in him both these forces. But I do say that from the moral and religious point of view the Reformation produced a superior type of person and of person-in-community, quite different from the I
at
moral type produced by the Renaissance. The Christian man in Luther's celebrated formula, which he took from the New Testament, was not only the "free lord over all things" but also "servant of
all
and subject
to everyone." Calvin sharply applied
community relations. This Reformation type could take on enrichment from the Renaissance tradition, but it was under no necessity whatever to fall into an un-Christian self-sufficiency. There has been a long tradition of those that did not. Professor Bush in his remarks insisted on
the same responsibility to man's
Science, Philosophy
380
and Religion
this as regards Milton the man. The fact that in Milton's treatise on Christian doctrine important ancient doctrines of the Church are called in question is no cause for scandal or proof of selfsufl&ciency in a derogatory sense. Throughout Protestant theology and ethics down to the present day the question is not
that of orthodoxy but that of truth.
regard to Professor Rice's comment,
With
I
present.
The
and the
poets are not only indices of the present, they are
the unrecognized legislators of the future. (Incidentally
how
not see
Professor Rice can hold that the
insulated from the present age.
most exposed,
as
of the time. It
is
would
To
grounded
list
are
who
are
are just the ones
are not, to the forces
we
find in our
the
in
most
significant poets
the following: (i) Re-Catholization (T. S.
prophetic
Muriel Rukeyser). There the
can-
suggest very briefly the religio-cultural
Eliot, Claudel); (2) a synthesis of
ism,
I
"new poets"
not a matter of sophistication but of sensitive-
choices for the future that I
They
many academic groups
ness and locus.) today,
we
agree that
are concerned with the future as well as with the past
is
modern
science with social-
tradition
(W. H. Auden,
hardly any other real option. For
bottom has dropped out from under the romantic or bour-
geois traditions and their poets, and classical humanism, best
represented perhaps by Valery, can adorn but not shape the future.
The second
most promising one
alternative, that suggested by
Auden,
is
the
for such a time as this because, while being
rooted in our religious tradition (note Auden's interest in Pascal, empirical and
realist. Professor Rice's appeal humanists who understood Plato and Aristotle as well as they understood the New Testament," is in line with Professor Bush's paper. Let us by all means value the classical tradition. But let us be clear as to the difference between the Biblical and the classical traditions. The former has to do with the ultimate issues of life and its renewal, personal and social. There is no reason to set Hellenist against Hebraist. But there are after all the questions of depth and of power. In conclusion, I would like to recur to the remarks which I added to my paper at the time of the discussion. No important cultural renewal is ever possible without reference to a signifi-
Luther, etc.),
it is
to the "Renaissance
cant past. Literary criticism
is
talking a great deal today about
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
381
what
it calls the "usable past." This means the available body myth or symbol of general popular significance which can be drawn on for significant artistic creation and communication.
of
In the larger field of cultural or spiritual renewal this kind of resource is of even greater significance. Potent cultural symbols
must be found
—a range of relevant and dynamic myth—deeply
memories of men, if any effective be generated for the re-shaping of life. Every people has such inflammable elements in its make-up, in its charresident in the souls and
power
is
to
acter-structure.
Without recourse
deeply quickened.
Now my
claim
to is
them no
society can be
that the Biblical, Calvinist
American people such body of potential spiritual and ethical resource. This tradition has been overlaid by secularization, but it manifests itself in many ways, often in oblique and disguised ways. I called attention in my remarks to some of the evidences of it in contempotradition represents for vast strata of the
a
rary literature.
The
conclusion
is
that any recovery of the pro-
phetic, the Christian personalist, tradition
among
us will have
to take account of this character-structure of a large part of
people, in fact will wish to take account of
it.
our
CHAPTER
XXII
Democratic Aspirations in Talmudic Judaism
BEN ZION BOKSER
By
Forest Hills Jewish Center
TALMUD THE close to seven
supplement to the Bible, summarizing
a
is
centuries of Jewish cultural creativity, in
and social institutions. A and molded by individuals of different social strata and different periods in history must necessarily vary in the levels of its social and religious vision and its the fields of religion, ethics, law
literature so vast in scope
quality.
ethical
varieties
of
Our
Talmud. It which have
is
a
task,
however,
philosophy
social
is
which
not to survey
all
the
presented
in
the
are
and values functional significance for the problems of our rather to delineate those attitudes
democracy.
The Talmudic conception deriving
its
destiny.
The
character
from
mankind
common
that of a unity,
is
origin
and a common
Bible which traces the origins of the
race to a single person It is
of
basic elements of this doctrine are already enun-
ciated in the
image.
a
in the
who was formed by God
Talmud, however,
"Why
in
human own
His
that this doctrine reaches
did the creator form
all life from Talmud, and the reply is, "That the families of mankind shall not lord one over the other with the claim of being sprung from superior stock that all men, saints and sinners alike, may recognize their its
fullest maturity.
a single ancestor?" inquired the
.
common
kinship in the collective
Sanhedrin 8:4) 382
human
family."
.
.
(Tosefta
Science, Philosophy
Human
behavior
may be
and Religion
infinitely varied,
but
383
human
nature
which underhes it, is essentially the same. Man is a creature of earth and at the same time a child of God, infused with the divine spirit. Appraised in moral categories, all people are
endowed with
the tendency to see in their
own
persons
the ultimate ends of their being and the tendency to seek
transcendent ends toward which their contributing instruments.
good and
evil,
Out
which thus
own
persons are but
two tendencies flow
of these
reside, in varying measure, to
be
equipment one Talmudic maxim
sure, in every individual as part of his indigenous
If you but probe sufficiently, you will discover that "even the greatest of sinners" abounds in good deeds as a pomegranate abounds in seeds.
for
life.
advises,
On the other hand, the greatest of saints have moral imperfection. (Sanhedrin loia) All human so to say, cut from the same cloth and there are
(Erubin 19a)
their share of
beings are,
no absolute
distinctions
between them.
This doctrine of equality does not assert that individuals
"A man," the Talmud explains, "strikes from one die and they are all alike. The Holy One, blessed be He, however, strikes every person from the die of the first man, but no one resembles another." (Sanhedrin 38a) Their uniquenesses are mental as well as physical and they all duplicate one another.
many
coins
have a special function to fulfill in the reaUzation of the cosmic purpose. A person thus has a right to feel that "the universe was created for his sake," for he has a unique role to play in it, and the cosmic scheme would be incomplete without him.
The
specific role that one's particular faculties enable
to play
is
immaterial.
Humble
or exalted,
all roles
him
are equally
invaluable to the fulfillments of history. In the words of a
Talmudic bor
is
His
also
the field;
am a creature of God and my neighmy work is in the city and his is in to my work and he rises early to his. my work, so I cannot excel in his work.
illustration, "I
I
creature;
rise early
As he cannot excel in But you may be tempted small things!'
We
to say,
'I
do great things and he
have learnt that
it
matters not whether one
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
384
much
does
or
little,
only he directs his heart to serve the
if
divine purpose." (Berakot 17a)
Deriving from is
this
conception of man's place in the universe
the sense of the supreme sanctity of
who
all
human
life.
"He
destroys one person has dealt a blow at the entire universe
and, similarly, he
who makes
livable for
life
one person has
sustained the whole universe." (Mishnah Sanhedrin 4:5) All law, civil and religious, has for its purpose the promotion of
human
life
and,
absolute and
when to
is
it
maxim, "The Sabbath is Sabbath;" and what was to all other law.
ceases to serve that end,
it
becomes
To quote a good Talmudic made for man and not man for the
be superseded.
(Yoma
true for the Sabbath applied Ukewise
85b)
greater to serve
It is
human
hfe,
one Talmudist expounded, than to pre-occupy oneself with divine communion. (Shabbat 127a) The sanctity of life is intrinsic to the individual person and is
not a derivative of national origin, religious affiliation, or status. As one Talmudist generalized, "Heaven and
social
earth,
or
I call
woman,
every
to witness,
whether
it
be an
Israelite or
pagan,
man
slave or maidservant, according to the work of
human
being doth the Holy Spirit rest upon him."
A pagan conforming to the precepts was declared the equal of a high priest in Israel. (Abodah Zarah 3a) This moral law, defined in the seven Noahite commandments, stressed the promotion of justice and prohibited idolatry, immorality, cruelty to animals, theft, murder and blasphemy. Non-Jews residing in Jewish communities were to share in all the beneficences which the Jewish community held out to its own members. Jews were ordained to sustain their needy, to visit their sick and to (Yalkut on Judges 4:1)
of the moral law
bury their dead. (Gittin 6ia)
Nor was political,
citizen office.
is
a person's
worth
a derivative of his status,
social or cultural. In the sight of
the equal of the person
(Tanhuma on Deuteronomy
who 29:9)
God
the
whether
humble
occupies the highest
The Talmud
did not
outlaw slavery, which was an integral part of ancient economy,
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
385
it sought to limit its degrading aspects. Already Biblical law had declared a Hebrew slave free after a seven-year period of service. Talmudic legislation continued to extend the solici-
but
tude on behalf of the slave's welfare. The slave was to live at the same level of comfort as was enjoyed by his master. "Do not eat fine bread and give black bread to your servant; do
not sleep on cushions and have him sleep on straw." So exacting was the Talmud in its defense of the slave's dignity that it became a proverbial expression, "Whosoever buys a Hebrew slave,
buys a master unto himself." (Kiddushin 20a) Indeed,
was really a workman who had temporarily whose dignity and rights remained intact. And the Talmud condemned the man who was willing to accept personal bondage as a solution to his economic problem; for man was meant to serve only God and to recognize no other master beside Him. (Baba Kamma ii6b, Kiddushin 22b) the
Hebrew
slave
sold his services, but
But the Talmud includes equally
telling expressions of solici-
He was not to be exposed (Niddah 47a) One Talmudist shared his meat and wine with his slave, explaining, "Did not He that made me in the womb make him also?" (Yerushalmi, Baba Kamma 6c) It was an old principle which the Pharisees had estabhshed that "slaves, unHke the ox or the ass, are human beings with minds and wills of their own." (Mishnah Yadaim
tude on behalf of the pagan to ridicule or humihation.
slave.
47)
The Talmud Creative labor,
speaks repeatedly of the dignity of free labor. no matter how humble, is always honorable
form of divine worship, for it contributes to the maintenance and development of civilization. (Nedarin 49b, Abot runs de Rabbi Nathan II 21) "Flay dead cattle on a highway," I am a great priest, a am 'I not say "and proverb, a Talmudic man and it is beneath my dignity.'" (Pesahim 113a, Baba Batra parent owes his iioa) One of the responsibiUties which every
and
is
a
son
is
to teach
him
a trade. (Kiddushin 29a)
The
Talmudists.
academic work was a labor of love pursued various handicrafts remuneration, which offered no themselves, because their
Science, Philosophy
386
and Religion
farming and commerce to earn a livelihood. Among them were shoemakers, tailors, bakers, woodcutters, a night watchman and even a grave digger. Even he who had endangered social security in the comas well as
mission of crime has not forfeited his inherent worth as a
The Talmud ordained with great emphasis that every person charged with the violation of some law be given a
person.
fair trial
and before the law
whether
a king or a pauper.
all
were
One
of
litigants
was not to came in
the other
be a swaying of the juror-judges. (Shebuot
Particularly in criminal cases did the tect the
be scrupulously equal,
two
when
appear in court in expensive robes tatters, lest there
to
accused against a miscarriage of
Talmud justice.
seek to pro-
Circumstantial
evidence, however convincing, was not acceptable.
Sanhedrin 8:3) At
least
counsel for defense.
from
guilty
members as not to
to
(Tosefta
one of the judges was to act
The
juror-judges
not guilty, but not vice versa.
of the court were
first
to
as his
could reverse a vote
announce
The younger their vote, so
be influenced by the actions of their seniors. Whereas
in civil cases a majority of
one was
sufiicient to establish guilt,
two was required. Even when he was found guilty, a man had not
in criminal cases a majority of
to the
human
brotherhood.
The
lost his link
larger ends of safeguarding the
community might require his extermination, but whatever punishment was inflicted upon him had to be humanized by a persistent love
and not brutahzed by vengeance. (Sanhedrin
Talmudists advocated the abolition of capital punishment and it was agreed that any court that inflicts capital punishment once every seven years had exhibited
43a, 45a) Certain
brutality.
(Mishnah, Makkot
i
:io)
The execution even
of the
most violent criminal is a cosmic tragedy. For he, too, was formed in the divine image and had been endowed with infinite possibihties for good. (Mishnah Sanhedrin 6:5, Sanhedrin 46b)
In the hierarchy of Jewish values the knowledge and practice
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
was not He was of men, .
.
.
387
Torah represented
of the
to
the apex, but the master of the Torah hold himself aloof from or superior to other men. to be "modest, humble ... to make himself beloved to
to be gracious in his relations
judge
"To show
even with subordinates according to his deeds." (Derek Eres Zuta I)
man
become like the carcass turn away in disgust." 11) The true master of Torah will be inspired by a greater learning and piety not to aggrandize himself over others or to detach himself from the pride in one's learning
from which (Abot de Rabbi Nathan Ch.
of a dead beast
all
to
is
men
common people and cultivate his virtues in the privacy of his own home, but to teach and lead the common people to a nobler way of life. He who has insights that can broaden the horizons of his neighbor's
them spirit,
is
robbing
his
life
and does not communicate
neighbor of his due. The
like the gifts of substances, are
gifts
of the
a trust to be
shared
with others. (Sanhedrin 91b)
Throughout Talmudic
domRomans
times, the Jews lived under the
ination of foreign imperialisms; in Palestine under the
and
in
Whether a
under
Babylonia
a free Jewish
the
Parthians
and
neo-Persians.
commonwealth would have developed
democratic representative government,
we do
not know. But autonomy which the
within the framework of the limited
Jews enjoyed, they did develop certain democratic institutions. The most important instrument of Jewish autonomy was Jewish civil and religious law, and the Talmud developed the theory that the ultimate sanction of all law is the consent of the people who are to be governed by it. For the Talmud, of course, all authority, including the authority behind the makers and interpreters of law, flowed from the divine source which manifests
itself in
every form of
endowed with free must give its assent to
is
will
and
human
every legal institution that
moral claims over him. Judges and to
them.
Any
decree which
is
it
is
to
have
must not enact
legislators
decrees unless a majority of the people find
form
But man
leadership.
unrestrained conscience
his
possible to con-
resisted
by
a
popular
and Religion
Science, Philosophy
388
majority has, ipso facto, lost
its
and been rendered
validity
Talmud even traced the authority of the Bible itself not so much to its divine source as to the consent of the people who fully agreed to live by it. (Abodah Zarah obsolete. Indeed, the
Shabbat 88a)
36a,
Social stability frequently calls for disciplined behavior. In
the field of social and religious conduct the
upon
individuals to
conform
Talmud
called
to the majority decisions of the
who interpreted Jewish law. In the however, the individual remained essentially
duly constituted authorities field of opinion,
and speak
free to believe
in accordance with the dictates of
his
own
conscience. Indeed, there has never been formulated
an
official
creed in Israel as a criterion of loyalty to the mandates
of Jewish
life.
defending
its
And
moved
eventually be
Eduyot
even in law, the minority could continue
position in the
As
to
hope
that
reconsider
its
the majority might judgment. (Mishnah
it, majorities and minorities words of the living God." They both represent aspects of truth and are equally precious. The Talmudists, themselves, preserved all dissident opinions which developed in their discussions and even recorded them side by side with the majority opinions which became authoritative law. (Erubin 1
:5)
the Talmudists put
are equally "the
13b)
The Talmudists developed stituted
town
councils
a system of democratically con-
which were charged with the administra-
tion of local municipahties. All those residing in a
community
for a year or over enjoyed the right to participate in the elec-
tion of the seven
town
town
councillors.
The
functions of these
councils were far-reaching, including the supervision of
economic, religious, educational and philanthropic the people.
which the
On
activities of
important issues town meetings were held in
will of the people could be ascertained
(Megillah 27a) Certain local
officials
more
directly.
were, of course, appointed
by the head of the Jewish community, the patriarch in Palestine and the exilarch in Babylonia. But the most important requirement in all such appointments was that they meet with
Science, Philosophy the public approval. In the
and Religion
389
words of the Talmud,
"We must
not appoint a leader over the community without first consulting them, as it is said, 'See, the Lord hath called by name Bezalel, the son of Uri.'
(Exodus 35:30) The Holy One, Blessed
be He, asked Moses,
Bezalel acceptable to you?'
'Is
he
He
'Sovereign of the universe,
if
much more
said to him, 'Nevertheless
so to me!'
consult the people.
The
God .'
.
.
"
is
replied,
acceptable to Thee,
how
go and
(Berakot 55a)
social process frequently brings individuals into a posi-
where they
power over the lives of others. In Talmudic Judaism, it then becomes the task of the community to develop such instruments of social control as will rationalize that power with moderation and tion
exercise
the social theory of
justice.
The Talmudists
declared individual property rights
as subject to their consistency it is
with the public welfare.
to serve the public interest, these rights
When
may be modified
or suspended altogether. (Jebamot 89b) Acting on this prin-
Talmudic legislation regulated wages and hours of labor, commodity prices and rates of profit. (Baba Batra 8b) It was similarly the task of the community to provide other facilities for promoting the public welfare, such as public baths, comciple,
petent medical services and adequate educational
facilities for
on an elementary level. The poor had a claim upon the community for support in proportion to their accustomed standard of living. The more affluent individuals were to share their possessions with them, as members of a family circle were obligated to share with their own kin. (Tanhuma Shemot ed. Buber, p. 43a) To place the administration of poor relief on a more efficient and respectable basis, it was eventually institutionalized. Begging from door to door was discouraged. Indigent townsmen were given a weekly allowance for food and clothing. Transients received their allowance daily. Ready food was also kept available to cope with immediate needs. For the poor traveler and the homeless, public inns were frequently built on the highroads. All these facihties were maintained from the proceeds
all,
at least
Science, Philosophy
390
and Religion
of a general tax to which
all residents of a community conPeah 4:8-13, Berakot 58b) Perhaps the most interesting form of poor relief, from a modern standpoint, is a pubhc works project for the assistance of the unemployed.
tributed. (Tosefta
The
details of the project
have been preserved by Josephus, was instituted in Talmudic times: "So when the people saw that the workmen were unemployed who were above 18,000 and that they, receiving no wages, were in want so they persuaded him (King Agrippa) to rebuild the eastern cloisters ... he denied the petitioners their request in the matter, but he did not obstruct them when they desired the ." (Antiquities XX, city might be paved with white stone. but
it
.
.
.
.
.
97)
The same concern for the values of humanitarianism and democracy appears in the Talmudic legislation bearing on the various aspects of family the individual
man
life.
pleted through matrimony.
out
joy,
The Talmud
their
without blessing and without good.
He
He
"The unmarried person
in the full sense of the term; as
and female created
does not regard
as a self-sufficient personality.
it
is
He
is
is
com-
lives
with-
not a
man
said (Gen. 5:2), 'male
them, and blessed them and called
name man.'" (Jebamot
62b, 63a)
Happiness in married life involves many compromises, but these must be assumed in freedom. They should not be imposed through constraint from any external source. In the words of the Babylonian teacher Rab, "A man is forbidden to give his minor daughter in marriage without her consent.
He must
wait until she grows up and says,
'I wish to marry he did give her in marriage as a minor, she could protest the marriage on reaching maturity and have it annulled without divorce. The man's choice, too, should be voluntary and an expression of considered choice.
so
and
so.' "
(Kiddushin 41a)
If
"A man should not marry a woman without knowing her, lest he subsequently discover blemishes in her and come to hate her." (Kiddushin 41a) As
the
more dominant partner
in
the
family
circle,
the
Science, Philosophy
husband was exhorted
and Religion
to treat his wife
391
with tenderness and
sympathetic understanding. "Whoever loves his wife as himself
and honors her more than himself ...
to
him may be
applied the verse (Job 5:24), 'Thou shalt know that thy tent is in peace.' " (Jebamot 62b) Before the children, father and
mother were equals. They were both to be accorded the very same devotion and respect. (Kiddushin 30b)
The Talmud regards divorce as "Whoever divorces the
tragedies.
altar sheds tears
'And
this
on her
behalf, as
the greatest of
all
domestic
wife of his youth, even the it is
written (Mai. 2:13, 14)
again ye do; ye cover the altar of the Lord with
because the Lord hath been witness between thee and the wife of thy youth, against whom thou hast dealt treacherously.' " (Gittin 90b) There are occasions, however, when husband and wife cannot harmonize their natures and irreconcilable differences develop between them. The Talmud tears
.
.
.
then sanctions divorce, as preferable to a hfe of continuing bitterness
and
distress.
Divorce could be achieved upon the considered request of either party. Theoretically, it was always the husband who severed the marriage ties and not the wife. But the wife could sue for divorce and,
if
the request seemed warranted, the court
forced the unwihing husband to divorce her.
Among
the
cir-
cumstances warranting such action by the court, the Talmud lists the husband's impotence, failure of proper support, denial of conjugal rights, contraction of a loathsome illness or en-
gaging in a repugnant occupation. (Mishnah, Ketubot 5:6, 7:9, divorced woman 10, 77a, Nedarim 11:12, Arakin 5:6) The contract, which marriage was protected by the Ketubah or maintenance. provided a financial settlement for her
For the Talmudists, children are the noblest fulfillment of married hfe. For it is man's elemental duty to the continuity of hfe to bring children into the world and to raise them properly. (Jebamot 63b, Kiddushin 29a, ff) Nevertheless, where conception was likely to prove dangerous to the mother, birth control was
recommended. In the words
of the
Talmud, "Three
Science, Philosophy
392 types of
women
and Religion
should employ an absorbent to prevent con-
woman and a nursing mother; minor lest pregnancy prove fatal, a pregnant woman lest she have an abortion and a nursing mother because of the danger to her young infant." (Tosefta Niddah 2:6, Jebamot ception: a minor, a pregnant
a
12b)
The Talmud
offers
children. Parents
detailed
must
treat
advice
all
on how
to
bring up
children equally and avoid
any display of favoritism between them which can only lead to jealousy and family discord. (Shabbat lob) Parents must not over-indulge their children, which is the surest road to character depravity. Thus, the Talmudists blame the depraved character of Absalom who led a revolt against King David,
pampered youth. (Genesis Rabbah i) But no less harmful. The Talmud cites the case of a child who committed suicide after some petty misdeed because he was in mortal fear of his father. (Gittin 6b, Semahot 2:6) his father, to his
excessive severity
The Talmud
is
ordains a profound respect which children
to their parents.
Even he who begs from door
to
door
is
owe com-
mitted to provide for the sustenance of his needy parents. But the proper respect due parents is not merely a matter of material help.
The
and consideration Talmudic illustration, "There was a person who fed his father on fat poultry. Once his father asked him, 'My son, where do you get all this?' To which his son replied, 'Old man, eat and be quiet, for dogs eat and are intangibles of tenderness
are equally important.
quiet.'
Though he
To
cite a
fed his father fat poultry, such a person
Gehinnom." (Yerushalmi, Peah 1:1) Perhaps the most significant triumph for democracy in Talmudic Judaism was the development of a system of free, universal education. The Jewish school system began with higher rather than elementary education. The most important institution of higher education was the Sanhedrin itself and the hierarchy of various lower courts, which functioned under its supervision. Their deliberations were made accessible will inherit
Science, Philosophy to
advanced
students
who were
and Religion preparing
393
themselves
for
ordination and they were even permitted to participate in the discussions. Witnessing the conflicts of personaHties, the play
minds and the manipulation of dialectic by which the Torah supplementation was evolved represented a vivid and unfor-
of
gettable
educational experience. In addition, the leaders of
and rabbinic Judaism conducted formal instruction schools. Some of these schools were particularly schools of Shammai and Hillel were continued famous. even after their founders were gone. Akiba's school, which was finally conducted at B'nai Brak, is said to have had an enrollment of 12,000 students, like a modern metropoHtan university. In early times these schools charged tuition fees which were
Pharisaic in their
own The
payable upon admission to each lecture. And many made great sacrifices to attend, frequently working their way through is vividly illustrated in the famous story of Hillel's struggle for an education. Hillel spent half his daily earnings for admission to the lectures in the academy of Shemaya and
school. This
One winter day, being out of work, he could not pay the necessary admission charge and the doorkeeper refused to admit him. Determined not to miss the session, he climbed upon the roof and listened to the discussion through
Abtalyon.
the sky-light.
On
the following morning, the
room was darker
than usual and, looking up at the skylight, they saw the figure of a human body. Hillel had been snowed under. Fortunately, the discovery had been made in time and Hillel was saved.
(Yoma
35b) This admission fee was abolished after the deTemple and higher education became wholly
struction of the
free. In addition, lectures
were
facilitated attendance for those
oflfered in the
who had
during the day. (Pesahim 72b) Elementary education was originally in time it:
it
in office in
work
left
evening which for a
to the
hveHhood home, but
As the Talmud relates not for Joshua ben Gemala (high priest who was the latter part of the first century), the Torah
this, too,
"Were
to
was
institutionalized.
would have been forgotten
in Israel. In antiquity every father
Science, Philosophy
394 taught his
own
them were thus
child. left
and Religion
Those who were without
fathers to teach
without education. Later on, schools were
estabhshed in Jerusalem to which the children were to be sent from all over the country. But these, too, were inadequate.
Thereupon, they established regional schools to which youths of r6 or 17 were admitted. But it was soon apparent that adolescents could not
first
begin to subject themselves to school
discipline. Finally, therefore, local
schools were instituted in
each city and town and children were enrolled at the age of six or seven." Classes were generally conducted in the synagogue buildings, though they were frequently transferred to the outdoors. There were, according to the Talmud, 394 schools in Jerusalem before its destruction by the Romans in 70 C.E. (Ketubot 105a) The curriculum concentrated on Biblical literature, Midrash and, later on, the Mishnah also. The Pharisees and rabbis were equally devoted to educating the general public. Their formal lectures in the schools were generally open to lay auditors. In addition, they utilized the synagogue service which brought out large numbers, as an opportunity for educational work. The liturgy itself, which was eventually recited thrice daily by every Jew, was an affirmation of the fundamental beliefs of Judaism. Readings from the Torah, with appropriate elucidations in the Aramaic vernacular, had been made an integral part of the synagogue ritual ever since the days of the Sopherim. Four times weekly, Saturday morning and afternoon, Monday and Thursday, as well as on all feasts and hohdays, and on the new moon, the
Jewish
laity
Under
thus listened to Scripture lessons.
the inspiration of the synagogue, smaller groups of
people formed into individual study circles meeting at con-
week days or some other branch
venient hours on
the Sabbath for the study of
of Jewish tradition. This was enhanced with the introduction of the popular sermon on Friday evening and Saturday morning (Gittin 38b, Yerushalmi, Sotah i :4) and there were special sermons before
Scriptures or later
;
each holiday.
Science, Philosophy
Some
and Religion
395
of the rabbis were not particularly gifted with elo-
quence and
it,
therefore,
became customary
for
an additional
functionary, the orator-commentator, to attach himself to the
academy and synagogue alike this rabbi would first communicate his message to the commentator who then made that the theme of his oration before the public. The synagogues in every community, in addition to providing for religious
rabbi. In
worship, the
also
functioned
as
popular
universities,
diffusing
knowledge of the Torah among the common people.
The
sanctity of
human
life
implied for the Talmudists a
community. For each society, unique contribution to the fulfillments of history. The Talmudists speak of Israel as being particularly creative in the field of religion, whereas other peoples achieved comsimilar concern for the national too,
makes
its
parable distinction in other fields, in the arts and sciences.
(Megillah 9b, Ekah Rabba 2.17, ed. Wilna, 1897) There were some who spoke with admiration of Roman law, of the Roman system of public markets, bridges and baths. (Shabbat 93b, Genesis Rabba 9, on 1:31) The collective welfare of all humanity contingent upon the welfare of every individual people is and the sacrificial cult of the second Temple in Jerusalem included, during the Feast of Tabernacles, 70 offerings invoking
God's aid for each of the 70 nations of the world. (Sukkah 55b) The aberration of human sin will occasionally drive groups others. Thus in Talmudic times, the from the oppression of Roman imperialism. The Talmudists decried this oppression and encouraged their people's resistance to it. They denounced the Jewish tax farmer as a reprobate and robber, because he collaborated with the Roman system of extortion and oppression. Deceiving the Roman tax-collector they put on a par with deceiving a pirate, for Rome had no moral right to the country which she had occupied by force. (Mishnah, Nedoarim 3:4) The Pharisaic ostracism of the pubHcan, which was but another name for the Jewish tax-collector, was not, as has freto seek
Jews
dominion over
suffered
heavily
quently been interpreted, an expression of self-righteousness.
Science, Philosophy
396
and Religion
was the reaction of liberty-loving men against those who, a consideration, were willing to make themselves the partners of an aUen imperialism in the plunder and oppression
It
for
own
of their
At
people.
same
the
time, the Talmudists guarded against transmut-
ing the temporary historical struggles of their people against various
imperialist
oppressor-states
against other nations.
about the vanquished Egyptians as silencing
when is
hatreds
who drowned
in a vain pursuit of the fleeing Israelites.
God
enduring
into
The Talmudists spoke with compassion in the Red Sea Thus, they describe
an angelic chorus which chanted hallelujahs
the Egyptian hosts
met
how
perishing in the sea;
their disaster.
"My handiwork
dare you sing in rejoicing!" (San-
hedrin 39b)
Even
in the face of the tragedy inflicted
upon
their people
by the Romans, the Talmudists sought to avoid hatred. Individual
spoke sharply in denunciation of
teachers
Roman
tyranny. But their collective reactions as summarized, for instance,
in
the liturgy of that day,
is
dedicated not to the
denunciation of Rome, but to Jewish self-criticism. "It cause of our sins that is
we have been banished from our
is
be-
land,"
the principal motif in the liturgical reaction to the national
disaster.
And
the
way
of redemption toward which they were
taught to strive was moral regeneration in their inner personal
and the interpenetration of the same ideals of among all mankind. In time, the strife of nations, like the strife of individuals, will come to an end in the discovery of their universal interdependence. (Mishpatim
and
social lives
a loftier morality
Tanhuma
12)
Israel's
cry of justice will be vindicated in a
when
"kingdom of wickedness" shall form "one fellowship to do the divine will with a perfect heart." (From the liturgy of the New Year, composed by Abba Areka d. 247) But the Talmudic conception of man implied a reciprocal responsibiUty from individual men and nations to the collective
universal fulfillment
pass
away and
all
the
mankind
human community. For
join to
the fulfillment of the larger organism
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
397
dependent upon the integrated functioning of its constituent parts. The unique gifts of energy, substance or spirit with which an individual is endowed must all be directed to larger human service. As one Talmudist interprets it, the second commandment ordains not alone repose on the seventh day of the week, but also creative labor on the six days. "For is it not written, 'Six days shalt thou do thy work and on the seventh day shalt thou rest,' " (Abot de Rabbi Nathan II ch. 21, p. 22b, ed. Schechter) The Talmud denounced asceticism, even when religiously motivated, as sinful, for it withdrew essential
is
creative energies
An
individual
from the
who
of his neighbor's
tasks of civilizations. (Taanit iia)
has insights that can broaden the horizons life
and does not communicate them has
robbed him with others. (Sanhedrin 91b)
of his due, for all gifts are a trust to
The responsibilities of service rest The Talmud called upon the Jews
be shared
similarly
on every
society.
to share
with the
rest of
where they believed mankind field of religion and the they had distinguished themselves, Exodus 19:2), (Mekilta on morahty. According to the Midrash not in the desert and the in the Torah was originally revealed were meant teachings its land of Israel, in order to suggest that their achievements in the field
for
all
mankind and not
for a particular people exclusively.
Implementing the ideal of its mission, the Judaism of the early Talmudic period proselytized extensively throughout the pagan world. Judaism became, in the words of Professor George Foote Moore, "the first great missionary religion of ("Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era," Cambridge, 1927, I, 324) Because it conceded salvation even to those who were outside its fellowship, Jewish missionaries did not seek only formal conversions. the Mediterranean world."
With equal diligence, they sought to make what were known to the Romans as tnetuentes or "God fearing men," sympathizers of Judaism who, while not conforming to the Jewish
ceremonial discipline, would yet order their lives by Jewish ideals of personal and social morahty. Through this dissemina-
Science, Philosophy
398
and Religion
tion of the unique values in Jewish tradition, the Jewish people were to meet their responsibilities to the larger human community of which they recognized themselves to be a part.
The Talmud
does not offer us a blue print for the specific
tasks of social reconstruction which
the
Talmudic conception
logic,
is
mocracy.
of
man,
we
face in our day.
But
carried to the fullness of
its
a
conspicuous contribution to the ideology of de-
It
holds forth the vision of free
each pursuing
its
men
in free societies,
unique destiny, sharing in the
fruits of all
people's achievements and offering the best in itself to the
common
service of all
mankind.
CHAPTER
XXIII
Democracy in the Hebrew-Christian Tradition; Old and New Testaments By
MILLAR BURROWS Yale University
DISCUSSING the relation of the Hebrew-Christian tradition
INto
the ideal
and practice of democracy
it
is
necessary at
the outset to distinguish between political and social democracy.
As regards
political
democracy, the extent to which
be found in the Bible
it
may
largely a matter of definition. If
by democracy we mean "government of the people by the people and for the people," in the form of majority rule by the ballot, is
then the Bible knows nothing of
it.
Public acclamation as a means of committing the people to a proposal is
is
not
not democracy;
uncommon it
is
Old Testament, but
that
distinctly a matter of voting Ja.
The
in the
congregation of Israel was assembled, for example, to ratify the covenant at Sinai.
The
covenant,
itself,
however, was not
it was given for the great the directions So 24:7). ceremony of accepting the law at Ebal and Gerizim provide that the people shall merely hear the curses pronounced and
a result of public deliberation or committee-work;
by divine
say,
fiat
(Exodus
"Amen" (Deuteronomy
27:11-26).
The account
of Joshua's
execution of these directions does not mention even this formal acceptance by the people (Joshua 8:30-35). Greater prominence is given to the part played by the people in ratifying the covenant of Shechem, but here, too, it is limited to a pledge to obey the Lord (Joshua 24:16-28). At Ezra's great assembly
399
Science, Philosophy
400
and Religion
"Amen, Amen," when Ezra blesses the Lord, (Nehemiah 8:6). The popular acclamation of a king is similar. When the new king is proclaimed, the people shout, "Long live the king" (i Samuel 10:24, etc.), but this no more implies a free choice of a ruler than it does in a modern monarchy. the people cry,
before he reads the law
In
clear that the Hebrew ideal was not democracy The days when "there was no king in Israel,"
all this it is
but theocracy.
when
"every
man
were regarded but
as a
time
did that which was good in his
own
eyes,"
in retrospect, not as a time of hateful anarchy,
when God
spiritual nostalgia the
ruled His people directly.
Jew
gogue, "Restore our judges as as at the beginning;
With deep
of later times prayed in the synaat the first,
remove from us
grief
and our counsellors and suffering; reign
Thou over us, O Lord, Thou alone" (Shemoneh Esreh 11). The judges were "saviors" (Nehemiah 9:27), sent by the Lord to deliver
His people, and under the monarchy the king was
the Lord's anointed, not the people's choice.
Even
the
first
kings were not, at least in theory, chosen by the people, but
were designated by the sacred lot (i Samuel 10:17—24) or by secret anointing at the hands of a prophet (i Samuel 10:1; 16:13), '^"^j lik^ ^^^ judges who preceded them, they were especially endowed for their work by the spirit of the Lord (i Samuel 11:6; 16-13). Even later, when the principle of hereditary succession came to be recognized, the king was still revered as God's anointed, or even as God's son (2 Samuel 7:14; I Chronicles 17:13; 22:10; 28:6; Psalm 2:7). At the same
some part By what mechanism it was exercised is not clear, but in the case of David it is stated explicitly that the men of Judah anointed him as their king (2 Samuel 2:4), and later the elders of Israel came to Hebron, made a league with him, and anointed him as their king, making him the accepted ruler of all the tribes (2 Samuel 5:1-5). The principle time
it
is
clear that popular choice actually played
in the choice of the kings.
of responsibility for the welfare of the people
is
strikingly
expressed in 2 Samuel 5:12, "David perceived that the Lord
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
401
had established him king over Israel, and that He had exalted his kingdom for His people Israel's sake." Whether the Hebrews ever went so far as to deify their kings, after the manner of other ancient Oriental peoples, is uncertain. Attempts by some of the kings or their courtiers to cultivate this conception seem not unlikely, but the evidence for a cult of the king at Jerusalem certain
is
is
not conclusive.
that the religion of the prophets
What
is
and the writers
Old Testament had no place for such ideas or practices; them there was only one God and no man could be more than His chosen agent. At the same time, from the reign of
of the for
Saul on, the instrument of God's rule over Israel was His anointed, the king.
dom
of Judah
is
And from Solomon
on, so far as the king-
concerned, the succession of kings was de-
termined by heredity. Both in history, while the kingdom endured, and in the hope of the future, after the destruction
kingdom by
it was taken for granted would be a son of David. As for the kingdom of Israel, where one revolution followed another and no dynasty held the throne for more than three or four generations, the anointing of Jeroboam by Ahijah (i Kings ii:29ff), and the anointing of Jehu by a messenger of Elijah (2 Kings 9:1—13), show that in the north it was still held
of the
the Babylonians,
that the Lord's anointed
God to reject one king another His choice to by the hand of a or dynasty and southern kingdom, howprophet. From the point of view of the kingdom were rebels against ever, all the kings of the northern against the Lord Himself. the house of David, and therefore the natural monarchy as and Even so the acceptance of the God was hardly unaniinevitable form of government under mous or whole-hearted. One suspects that at times it was hardly more than an official theory, with little influence on the possible, as in the days of Samuel, for
transfer
working conceptions and actual practice of the nation. The old spirit of independence and rebellion, exemplified by the frequent murmurings and even open revolts against the leadership of Moses and Joshua, never died out of Israel.
Science, Philosophy
402
and Religion
we
In no other ancient people whose fortunes
through centuries
was the democratic
The
vitality of Israelite
dent
when we compare
democratic tradition the Israelites
against the Egyptians, Assyrians, Israelites
can follow
tradition so persistent. especially evi-
is
with their neighbors. Over
and even the Greeks, the
almost always have the advantage. Only during the
heyday of the Athenian republic, if at all, was this situation reversed. In the time of the Judges there was a tribal and clan organization, formed around a central sanctuary. Each family was ruled by its head. The tribal chieftain undoubtedly exercised a considerable amount of influence, but he was so unimportant, relatively speaking, that scarcely a single
such a chieftain has been handed
down
to
us.
name
When
of the
Israehtes looked for a leader against a dangerous foe, or for
a wise arbiter in inter-tribal disputes, they tribal
seldom chose a
head. Instead they often selected humble persons Uke
Ehud, Barak, and Gideon, or even an adventurer In selecting their
first
king they picked out a
like Jephthah.
member
of one
of the smallest clans of the smallest tribe, Benjamin.
The Judges were
able to exercise authority only as long as
emergency persisted and they could a following. Saul was very much like them in a sense of
attract
and hold
this respect.
He
achieved a greater degree of national consciousness and unity
than his predecessors, but in the end he peevishly complained
none of his followers was even sorry for him (i Samuel Even after the magnificent reign of Solomon, when
that
22:6-8).
Rehoboam
treated with disdain a delegation
of the
people
seeking a reduction of their taxes, the ancient cry rang out,
"To your
tents,
O
Israel!" (i
Kings
12:16).
After the division of the kingdom, the sense of personal and tribal
Israel fifty
independence was so strong in the northern kingdom of that every effort to found a dynasty failed. As late as
years before the final catastrophe of 722 B. C., inscriptions
show
that the country
lines.
In the southern
Land" {am
was
still
organized along
kingdom
tribal
and clan
of Judah the "People of the
ha-arets) never relinquished their right to confirm
Science, Philosophy
and Religion
403
new king or to remove one who was unRecent studies have shown that the am ha-arets
the appointment of a satisfactory.
was an
indefinite
body composed of the representatives of the
clans of Judah, each representative probably being a a leading family. Before the
member
end of the kingdom of Judah
it
of
had
apparently become a kind of council of the nobles.
In the Bible
itself
there
anti-monarchic tendency. a
king
is
When
his
recorded
abundant evidence of a distinctly refusal of Gideon to be made
is
The
with
manifest approval
Abimelech,
son
(Judges
8:23).
more ambition and less Shechem, Jotham shouted from with
modesty, was made king at Mt. Gerizim his fable of the trees and their king, which expresses anything but devotion to monarchy (Judges