Science in Negotiation: The Role of Scientific Evidence in Shaping the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 2012-2015 (Sustainable Development Goals Series) 3031181255, 9783031181252

Citation preview

Connecting the Goals

Jessica Espey

Science in Negotiation

The Role of Scientific Evidence in Shaping the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 2012-2015

Sustainable Development Goals Series

The Sustainable Development Goals Series is Springer Nature’s inaugural cross-imprint book series that addresses and supports the United Nations’ seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. The series fosters comprehensive research focused on these global targets and endeavours to address some of society’s greatest grand challenges. The SDGs are inherently multidisciplinary, and they bring people working across different fields together and working towards a common goal. In this spirit, the Sustainable Development Goals series is the first at Springer Nature to publish books under both the Springer and Palgrave Macmillan imprints, bringing the strengths of our imprints together. The Sustainable Development Goals Series is organized into eighteen subseries: one subseries based around each of the seventeen respective Sustainable Development Goals, and an eighteenth subseries, “Connecting the Goals,” which serves as a home for volumes addressing multiple goals or studying the SDGs as a whole. Each subseries is guided by an expert Subseries Advisor with years or decades of experience studying and addressing core components of their respective Goal. The SDG Series has a remit as broad as the SDGs themselves, and contributions are welcome from scientists, academics, policymakers, and researchers working in fields related to any of the seventeen goals. If you are interested in contributing a monograph or curated volume to the series, please contact the Publishers: Zachary Romano [Springer; zachary.romano@ springer.com] and Rachael Ballard [Palgrave Macmillan; rachael.ballard@ palgrave.com].

Jessica Espey

Science in Negotiation The Role of Scientific Evidence in Shaping the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, 2012-2015

Jessica Espey School of Geographical Sciences University of Bristol Bristol, UK

ISSN 2523-3084     ISSN 2523-3092 (electronic) Sustainable Development Goals Series ISBN 978-3-031-18125-2    ISBN 978-3-031-18126-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, Corrected Publication 2023 Color wheel and icons: From https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/ Copyright © 2020 United Nations. Used with the permission of the United Nations. The content of this publication has not been approved by the United Nations and does not reflect the views of the United Nations or its officials or Member States. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Between 2010 and 2015, I was deeply involved in the international negotiations for a new global development agenda. It began when I was working as a researcher with a large International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO), exploring women and children’s rights and how to advance them in policy development. The global development cooperation framework, known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), was set to expire in 2015 and discussions were rumbling amongst a small cadre of UK development professionals about what would come next and how any new agenda could help to advance specific issues. I decided to write a short opinion piece for my colleagues about what a ‘post-2015’ agenda might offer for children’s rights, health and well-being and how we could potentially use this international agenda-setting moment to advance our concerns. The piece triggered a surge of interest across the INGO and soon after I was tasked with co-authoring a ‘manifesto’ of sorts on what the INGO believed the new development agenda should look like. The report, entitled Ending Poverty in Our Generation, was the first publication of its kind from a large INGO like ours and attracted attention, not least of all from representatives in the United Nations (UN) who were deciding the modalities for a post-2015 consultation and decision-­ making process. Personally, the effects of this report and the various activities that stemmed from it were profound. In the years that followed, I found myself serving as an adviser to the President of Liberia, working for Professor Jeffrey Sachs, and directing the New York office of a global research network established by the UN Secretary General. It was a turbulent yet thrilling experience and a great insight into the machinations of global politics and policymaking. The experience also crystallised my deep research interest in processes of international policy development and understanding how different political and research inputs form political outcomes. Through my professional experience I was able to take a look ‘under the hood’ of international governance and to see first-hand how compromises were reached, wording was crafted, and decisions were made. But I never felt I had a truly comprehensive picture. How were the thousands of positions statements issued by Member States, the messages from advocates and campaigners and the policy and research papers actually being used to derive a final UN General Assembly conclusion? Concurrently I wondered about the weight of inputs. Academics and NGOs were both invited to present at various moments in the deliberations. Was one group more compelling than the other? Who were Member States really listening to? And what weight was v

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being given to the new and emerging science on the state of our planet? All of these questions prompted me to step away from the policy world and take the time to critically analyse the various dynamics at play within international governance. Some of these questions are addressed by this book, but they are the tip of an iceberg and the deeper I dig the more issues and challenges become apparent. Excitingly, these are issues I hope to research long into the future. Also motivating my professional transition from policy to academia is the state of our planet. The world is on the cusp of an environmental precipice. The institutions of global governance are more important than ever before if we are to galvanise attention to and manage dramatic climatic and ecological shifts, and yet they are in a state of disarray. The past decade in particular has seen declining UN funding, declining international aid budgets, reneging on international rights commitments and more. If we are to devise an international governance architecture that is responsive to Member State concerns, whilst also sufficiently inspiring as to motivate transnational cooperation, we need to really understand the present system and understand the power different actors have, the value of different processes and inputs and how decisions are reached. Only with this understanding can we improve upon it and hope to inspire confidence in the future in new international governance models, be they like the existing UN or no. When I started to explore the theory behind international policy processes, I was quite startled to find it was relatively thin. Whilst political science offers concepts for understanding negotiation and compromise and policy studies offer theories of policy processes, there are few if any empirical publications testing these theories with reference to the international institutions of global governance. And there are none, that I could find, attempting to explore this with reference to multiple sectors. It appeared to me, and continues to do so, that sectoral experts spoke only to their epistemic community, and few attempts were being made to tease out replicable lessons that might bridge sectoral divides and be as interesting in a journal on climate science as on public health. It is this gap in the policy and political science literatures that I hope to contribute to. I should note to the reader that there is quite a bit of terminology used interchangeably throughout this book. First are terms relating to policy processes, policy cycles and policymaking. All are intended to refer to the process by which government officials deliberate upon and eventually reach consensus on a given area of government practice. In this book, it is acknowledged that policy processes can take many different forms and are messy and complex, as discussed in Part 2. Any use of this terminology should therefore be construed as referring to the complex and oftentimes chaotic processes that accompany policy development. Two other sets of terms are used interchangeably. First, the focus of this book is the use of science and scientific evidence in policy processes, but I oftentimes refer to academics and academia as well, meaning the person or group of persons producing scientific evidence. I use the term science holistically to refer not only to the natural sciences but also social sciences, with a very wide range from those studying anthropologies to policy or criminology. People contributing written publications to these disciplines, in a university

Preface

Preface

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setting, are considered to be academics (i.e. representing academia) and are assumed to have achieved a level of academic study (a PhD or otherwise), which has equipped them with a robust understanding of research methods. This methodological training has the intention of enabling them to produce findings aligned with and in accordance with a broad scientific tradition and (assuming they follow this training and make such methods transparent) the evidence produced is referred to as science. Finally, the empirical analysis is focused on a specific process that ran under the UN General Assembly from 2012 to 2015; the post-2015 deliberation process. It was called post-2015 as 2015 was the year the MDGs would expire, and the UN and other international stakeholders were mobilizing to discuss what, if anything, would come next. At the Rio+20 Conference in Rio de Janeiro 2012, it was proposed that a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were developed to succeed the MDGs, and whilst the term met some resistance at first (from those eager to maintain a focus on social development and not environmental concerns) by 2013 the idea of there being SDGs was well accepted by the members of the Open Working Group and had become common parlance. The Post-2015 and the SDG deliberative process, therefore, refer to the same thing and are used interchangeably; the international, deliberative proceedings that ran from 2012 to 2015 to decide the new development agenda. Bristol, UK

Jessica Espey

Author’s Note

Before publication, a variation of this manuscript was submitted to the University of Bristol for the pursuit of a Doctorate of Philosophy.

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Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the immense personal and professional support offered by Professor Susan Parnell (University of Bristol). Without her encouragement, I might never have been brave enough to embark on it and dream of a full-time academic career. I can’t thank her enough. Dr Sean Fox (University of Bristol) also supervised this research and offered incredible, constructive feedback throughout, constantly helping me to streamline and focus. Professionally, I am indebted to Dr Guido Schmidt Traub who was formerly Executive Director of UNSDSN.  Over the 7 years that we worked together he was an inspiration; efficient, thorough, personable and motivating. He was always asking what we could do to improve processes, to get the best out of our people and to motivate political action. The President of UNSDSN was Professor Jeffrey Sachs; a tour de force, constantly writing, researching, encyclopaedic in his knowledge of sustainable development, and above all a fearless advocate for the world. I feel incredibly lucky to have been able to work so closely with both of these gentlemen, as well as the rest of the wonderful UNSDSN team and members of UNSDSN TReNDS. There are too many people to mention, but, suffice to say, they were all an inspiration in their own way. All my love and thanks are extended to my wonderful family, particularly my dear husband Richard Graham and our two children, Toby and Tristan, who have loved and supported me throughout this process. We have had some intense personal trials over the past few years, but they help me weather any storm and come out smiling. A final word of thanks to my dearest Granny, Christine Ross, who is nearing 100 but never stops marveling at our beautiful world. She is the ultimate inspiration, always reminding me how precious each and every little bee, bug and leaf is and finding reserves of strength through their beauty. This book is dedicated to her.

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Abstract

In 2015, world leaders agreed to a new international development agenda to focus attention and investment on pressing social, economic and environmental challenges. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is codified in 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. It is the product of 4 years of intense consultation and deliberation by the 193 Member States of the United Nations General Assembly and as such has been referred to as ‘The People’s Agenda’ (UN Secretary General 2015). The SDG process, therefore, provides a fascinating insight into contemporary processes of international policymaking within the UN and specifically within its largest deliberative body – the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Through an evaluation of the formation of the SDGs, this book explores how evidence is used to inform public policymaking across the UN and specifically what prominence is given to scientific evidence, over other evidence inputs. It contributes to a broad body of scholarship on evidence informed policymaking but adds an international dimension to this predominantly national literature. It also considers the extent to which diverse forms of evidence, most notably science, are used by different communities (with a focus on urban sustainability, health and data), thereby contributing an intersectoral perspective and advancing understanding of complex systems approaches to policy assessment. Finally, the institutional arrangements of the UNGA, as well as the organisation of non-state actors and epistemic communities, are explored to understand the influence of institutional structures upon evidence uptake. The empirical analysis finds that science has very little representation within the current institutional arrangements of the UNGA. The SDG process sought to create a more informal negotiation forum to encourage frank and open discussion of sustainable development challenges amongst Member States drawing upon a wide range of participatory inputs. These various ad hoc processes provided a platform for select scientists to provide input, but to the extent that their messages infiltrated discussions they seldom did so through these means. Rather it is the long-term socialisation of ideas, via academic journals and the engagement of scientists in epistemic communities that help to convey key academic concepts. For younger epistemic communities and issue-based coalitions, grounding key messages in science and utilizing policy intermediaries were key for effective message communication and uptake. These policy elites are actors well versed in the bureaucracy of the UN system who can help land messages with Member States and infiltrate xiii

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key processes. The framing of science is a crucial cross-cutting theme of this analysis; not the framing of certain communities’ messages, but the positioning of a wide range of evidence as science. Furthermore, there is an observable politicization of science with it positioned by negotiators and other stakeholders as a tool to help mediate tense political differences. The influence of institutional context cannot be overstated, including issues of physical access within the New York-based UN, as well as social access; knowing the right people, places and institutional entry points to engage. In spite of admirable attempts to broaden the tent, these barriers persist preventing the engagement of a wide range of stakeholders, academic and otherwise. However, the institutional innovation initiated by UNGA in the form of the OWG suggests that Members States are willing to experiment with new parallel processes to enable more discursive evidence-based dialogues which can then inform the decisions reached by the full GA membership.

Abstract

Contents

1 Why  Consider Science in International Policy?��������������������������    1 1.1 Introducing the Sectoral Analysis: Health, Urban Sustainability and Data������������������������������������������������     6 1.2 How This Book Contributes to Existing Literature����������������     7 1.3 Outline of the Book����������������������������������������������������������������     9 1.4 Key Findings ��������������������������������������������������������������������������    10 2 Scientific  Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories������������������������������������������������������������������   13 2.1 Historical Debates Over Evidence and Policy������������������������    13 2.2 How Do Evidence and Policy Intersect?��������������������������������    16 2.3 Theorising Evidence to Policy Processes ������������������������������    16 2.4 The Influence of Institutions on Evidence Uptake������������������    21 2.5 A Framework for Analysing Evidence Uptake in Multilateral Policy Processes����������������������������������������������    24 2.5.1 Representation and Access������������������������������������������   24 2.5.2 The Organisation of Epistemic Communities������������   25 2.5.3 Framing and Presentation ������������������������������������������   26 2.5.4 Temporal Dynamics: Concurrency and Prolonged Engagements��������������������������������������   26 3 Tracing  the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data���������������������������������������������   29 3.1 Outline of the Post-2015 Deliberative Process and Key Actors����������������������������������������������������������    29 3.2 An Introduction to the Debates Relating to Public Health, Urban Sustainability and Data��������������������    35 3.3 Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates��������������������������������������    37 3.3.1 Health��������������������������������������������������������������������������   37 3.3.2 Urban��������������������������������������������������������������������������   40 3.3.3 Data ����������������������������������������������������������������������������   47 3.4 Consensus-Building Processes������������������������������������������������    55 3.4.1 New Modes of Deliberation: Shared Seats ����������������   56 3.4.2 Expert Panels��������������������������������������������������������������   56 3.4.3 Thematic Dialogues����������������������������������������������������   58 3.4.4 The High-Level Panel ������������������������������������������������   59 3.4.5 High-Profile Academic Engagement��������������������������   60 3.4.6 Focus on Quantification����������������������������������������������   62 xv

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4 Influencing  Multilateral Policy Processes Through Science������   65 4.1 Representation and Access������������������������������������������������������    65 4.1.1 The Representation of Science in Formal Processes����������������������������������������������������   66 4.1.2 Access Through New Institutional Arrangements������   67 4.1.3 The (Pre)Dominance of Political Interests������������������   69 4.1.4 The Persistence of a (Northern) Policy-Elite��������������   72 4.2 The Organisation of Epistemic Communities������������������������    74 4.3 Framing ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    76 4.3.1 Evidence Over Science ����������������������������������������������   77 4.3.2 Framing Science as a Political Tool����������������������������   79 4.4 Temporal Dynamics: The Long-Term Socialisation of Ideas��������������������������������������������������������������    80 5 Conclusion:  Evolving Evidence Systems in the Institutions of Global Governance������������������������������������   83 5.1 Future Research����������������������������������������������������������������������    86 Correction to: Science in Negotiation�������������������������������������������������   C1 Annex 1: Key Informant Interviews����������������������������������������������������   87 Annex 2: The Research Methods Underpinning This Analysis ��������   89 References ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   95 Index�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   113

Contents

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Number of publications on ‘evidence-based policy‘ within five world-leading scientific journals����������������������������   5 Fig. 3.1 Consultative and political processes feeding into the 2015 SDG Summit������������������������������������������������������  31

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Examples of formal institutions and epistemic communities associated with the UNGA and formal and informal engagement mechanisms����������������  25 Table 3.1 Sample of data references in the 2030 Agenda����������������������  48

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Acronyms

ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome BMC British Medical Council BMJ British Medical Journal CA California CDP Committee on Development Policy CERN European Council for Nuclear Research CESR Centre for Economic and Social Rights CETUD Executive Council for Urban Transport in Dakar CGD Centre for Global Development CHSRF Canadian Health Services Research Foundation COP Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COP21 The 21st Conference of the Parties (or “COP”) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) COVID Coronavirus Diseases CSO Civil Society Organisation DC District of Columbia DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK DHF Dag Hammarskjold Foundation DNA Deoxyribonucleic acid DRR Disaster Risk Reduction EBM Evidence-Based Management EBP Evidence-Based Policy ECOSOC Economic and Social Council EGM Expert Group Meeting EIP Evidence Informed Policy ESRC Economic and Social Research Council EU European Union G77 Group of 77 GA General Assembly GDP Gross Domestic Profit GDPR General Data Protection Regulation GFATM Global Fund for Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria GPSDD Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data GSDR Global Sustainable Development Report HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus xxi

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HLP High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda HLPF High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development IAEG Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability ICSU International Council for Science ICT Information Communication and Technology IEAG Independent Expert Advisory Group on the Data Revolution IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IGES Institute for Global Environmental Strategies IGI IGI Global Publishers IGN Inter-Governmental Negotiation IHME Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation IIED International Institute for Environment and Development IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ISBN The International Standard Book Number ISC International Science Council ISSC International Social Science Council IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature LA Los Angeles LDC Least Developed Country LLDC Landlocked Developing Countries MA Massachusetts MDGs Millennium Development Goals MIC Middle Income Country MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology MS Member State NASA The National Aeronautics and Space Administration NCD Non-Communicable Disease NEJM The New England Journal of Medicine NGLS Non-Governmental Liaison Service NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NUA New Urban Agenda NUP National Urban Policy NY New York ODA Official Development Assistance ODI Overseas Development Institute ODW Open Data Watch OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OED Oxford English Dictionary ONE The ONE Campaign OPHI Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative OWG Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals PC Personal Communication PEPFAR The US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief RCT Randomised Control Trial RIETI Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

Acronyms

Acronyms

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SAGE SAGE Publishing SCP Sustainable Consumption and Production SDG Sustainable Development Goal UNSDSN UN Sustainable Development Solutions Networks SG UN Secretary General SIDS Small Island Development States SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights SSRN Social Science Research Network SUNY The State University of New York TB Tuberculosis TST Technical Support Team UAE United Arab Emirates UCLG United Cities and Local Governments UHC Universal Health Coverage UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAIDS UN AIDS Agency UNDESA UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs UNDG UN Development Group UNDP UN Development Programme UNESCO UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNFPA UN Population Fund UNGA UN General Assembly UNHQ UN Headquarters UNICEF UN Children’s Fund UNRISD UN Research Institute for Social Development UNSC UN Security Council UNSD UN Statistics Division UNSDSN UN Sustainable Development Solutions Networks UNSG UN Secretary General UNTST UN Technical Support Team UNTT UN Task Team on Post-2015 USA United States of America WB World Bank WHO World Health Organisation WPP World Population Prospects WRI World Resources Institute

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Why Consider Science in International Policy?

Keywords

Post-2015 · SDGs · Multilateralism · UN General Assembly · Evidence-informed policy

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was devised to provide a framework for collective action on pressing global economic, social and environmental challenges. This agenda is codified in 17 Global Goals and 169 specific targets, known as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and was ratified by the 193 Member States of the United Nations (UN) in 2015 (UN, 2015). The SDGs have been referred to as a ‘global social policy’ and a new form of global ‘governing through goals’ (Deacon, 2016, 1; Kanie & Biermann, 2017). They therefore provide a fascinating insight into processes of multilateral policymaking, in the data-rich and highly globalised context of the twenty-first century. The process through which the SDGs were developed, articulated and agreed by Member States of the UN is unique within the multilateral system. It was informed by an unprecedented consultation effort (Fukuda-Parr, 2019; Kamau et al., 2018); however, there has been no systematic evaluation of the extent to which the evidence collected and synthesised throughout these consultations, or provided through other chan-

nels, helped to shape the goals as a whole. Furthermore, although the importance of scientific evidence for global policy development has received strong endorsement and recognition from different arms of the UN1, it has a confusing place within its various structures and institutional mechanisms. Through an evaluation of the SDG process, this book attempts to get to the bottom of the knotty relationship between scientific evidence and multilateral political processes. Specifically, it explores how diverse forms of evidence, with a focus on scientific evidence, inform public policymaking within the UN General Assembly, the UN’s highest policymaking body. Other research questions include how evidence influenced the specific goals and targets that constitute the SDGs, and how different institutional arrangements and non-state actor engagements mediated the evidence-to-policy process in the development of the SDGs. Throughout, evidence is defined as a body of information which helps to illuminate a particular issue and may indicate whether a position is or is not true (OED, 2020), whilst scientific evidence is defined as ‘research/surveys, quantitative/statistical data, qualitative data, and analysis thereof’ (Strydom et al., 2010; 1), developed in See for example statements made by the UN Secretary General, the 2016 report of the UNESCO Scientific Advisory Board and guidance recently issued for countries on the importance of national science-policy interfaces (UNSG, 2021, UNESCO, 2016, UNDESA, 2021). 1 

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_1

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accordance with a broad scientific method. Although definitions of this method vary considerably, science can be broadly defined as including observation, hypothesis generation and testing, using deductive and inductive logic, the principle of parsimony and ongoing refinement (Gauch, 2003). Scientific evidence is of particular interest, given its potential to provide large-­ scale insights, often based upon representative or longitudinal surveys, and to provide clear and potentially replicable methodologies, of particular utility for transboundary problem-solving. A good example is  the studies of stratospheric ozone scientists, Molina and Rowland, which exposed the harmful effects of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in the 1970s. By highlighting the damage CFCs were doing to the Earth’s stratosphere, the international community was persuaded to agree upon 1987 Montreal Protocol which banned CFCs (Molina and Rowland, 1974; Baum, 2017). But also, as once claimed by Bertrand Russell, it has the potential to act as a ‘unifying force’ which may help people be ‘divested of local and temperamental bias’ (Russell, 1926a; xxxi). Within a multilateral context, the implication is that science may provide a platform for dialogue and information-based exchange, helping to overcome entrenched political positions and pre-existing tensions. Whilst there has been considerable attention to the uptake of evidence within national policy studies literature, there are few attempts to evaluate the extent to which evidence to policy processes play out within the international institutions of governance and how these processes may be different for different evidence types, including scientific evidence. There are even fewer studies that attempt to explore this issue across sectors, considering how different communities engage within policy processes and how their interactions might differ, even within the same institutional setting. I argue that determining the value and contribution of evidence across global policymaking processes requires a detailed understanding of global institutions. This involves interrogating

not only institutional mechanisms and processes, such as actors’ modes of engagement, but also institutional culture so as to understand repeated behaviours and participant expectations. The UNGA and its associated operations is the primary focus of this research, given its position as the most senior policy-setting body in the world. This has entailed understanding the formal institutions and processes that shape UNGA policymaking and also the various informal institutions surrounding the UNGA which guide the access and input of different non-state actors. These non-state actors most commonly engage with the UN as part of epistemic communities. Epistemic communities are coalitions with a given amount of specialist knowledge or expertise focused on a specific theme or political priority (Haas, 1992) and utilise informal engagement opportunities (such as meetings and events) to try to influence formal deliberative proceedings. Within the context of the UNGA, these epistemic communities include issue-based advocacy coalitions (like the Major Group for Children and Youth2), expert groups (like the Inter-Agency Expert Group for Child Mortality Estimation3), political interest groups (such as the Friends of Governance for Sustainable Development group4) and regional A UNGA-mandated coalition of self-organising children and youth representatives to the UN. Visit: https://www. unmgcy.org/ 3  The IAEG was formed in 2004 to share data on child mortality, improve methods for child mortality estimation, report on progress towards child survival goals and enhance country capacity to produce timely and properly assessed estimates of child mortality. Visit: https://childmortality.org/about 4  The Friends of Governance group is an informal government group created in 2011. ‘The main objective of the Friends group is to create an informal space for governments to have discussions among themselves, backed up by expert papers when requested, on issues relating to good governance and the Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD) in relation to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It builds on a rich tradition of ˜Friends of Groups” in New York which serves as a useful informal space for governments to discuss ideas and papers relating to a particular topic’ (Friend of Governance 2022; para 2). Visit: https://friendsofgovernance.org/ 2 

1  Why Consider Science in International Policy?

coalitions (such as the Group of 775). Both the formal and informal institutions through which these groups engage are a stage for contestation and negotiation, and it is only through understanding their origins, ideologies and cultures that one can discern the value afforded to different types of evidence and their impact upon political negotiation and policy development. The idea of a set of SDGs was born at the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro (UN, 2012a). The SDGs were intended to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which were set to expire in September 2015. The MDGs were a set of narrowly defined policy targets, derived from the 2000 Millennium Declaration, which attempted to articulate the world’s most pressing challenges, including eradicating poverty, reducing hunger, maternal and child mortality, preventing major diseases (e.g. AIDS) and providing education for all. As early as 2012, UN agencies were heralding the MDGs as a major success as a result of dramatic reductions in poverty, slum housing and water access (UNDP, 2012a). As such, it was proposed that they should continue, albeit in a new vein. However, critics of the MDGs highlighted their lack of attention to equity, their focus on low-income and poor countries which perpetuated a neo-colonial attitude to international cooperation and their lack of attention to environmental issues, most notably climate change (Save the Children 2010; Mawuko-Yevugah, 2010; Vandemoortele, 2018). Therefore, the set of replacement goals first proposed in Rio by the ‘The Group of 77 (G-77) was established on 15 June 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries signatories of the “Joint Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” issued at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva….Although the members of the G-77 have increased to 134 countries, the original name was retained due to its historic significance’. The G77 provides ‘the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development’ (G77 2022; paras 1-2). 5 

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Colombian government with support from the Brazilian and Mexican governments were intended to be universal, applying to all countries equally (Caballero, 2016). In addition, they would go beyond human needs and address environmental crises and economic challenges, such as rising economic inequality (UN, 2012a). The process of deciding upon these goals was also very different. While the MDGs were essentially devised by a small group of UN committees, the UN Secretary General called for an unprecedented global consultative effort to define the SDGs, including regional thematic consultations, public opinion surveys, formal and informal presentations to deliberators and so on (Fukuda-Parr, 2019; Kamau et al., 2018). The UN Development Group (UNDG) (the UN’s policy coordination body made up of representatives from 32 UN agencies) called it an attempt to have a ‘global conversation’ (UNDG, 2013; iii). The effort to harness new or additional forms of evidence to inform the post-2015 policy-­ setting process was driven by two global movements: the accountability and participatory movement, and a surge in interest in evidence-­ based policy (EBP). The idea of accountability through increased participation has gained particular traction in international governance processes over the past twenty years. The human rights movement in particular emphasises the centrality of participation for effective democratic processes (Mohammad & Farjana, 2018), whilst there are others who argue it can help improve policy effectiveness. Woods (2007), for example, argues that demonstrating effectiveness is particularly important, given the increasing responsibilities of multilateral organisations to help maintain ‘global security and economic order’ in the face of global economic crises and environmental instability (Woods, 2007; 36). Effectiveness is also important to help respond to declining confidence amongst UN’s Member States in the efficacy of the multilateral system, with more and more Member States resorting to bilateral agreements and unilateral action to help mediate international crises (e.g. Woods cites the invasion of Iraq as an example of this unilateral action). Participatory methods, in the form of dia-

1  Why Consider Science in International Policy?

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logue with civil society, are presented as a way to help improve organisational effectiveness by hearing from more stakeholders and therefore having more ideas to draw upon when designing policy responses (Woods, 2007). In this book, I am predominantly concerned with the second movement however: the trend towards evidence-based (EBP) or evidence-­ informed policy (EIP). Although evidence-based policy and practice has a long history (for example, the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws resulting in the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834; Bulmer, 1982), it has come to particular prominence in the last two decades, having been widely adopted in countries such as the UK, USA, Australia, Japan and by the European Commission6 (Sutcliffe & Court, 2005; Commission on Evidence-Based Policy XE "Evidence-based policy (EBP)" Making, 2016; Australian Government, 2009; Ichimura & Kawaguchi, 2017). Figure  1.1 illustrates the surge in interest in EBP by plotting the frequency of academic articles related to EBP from 2000 to 2020. However, to date, there has been little examination of the extent to which the emphasis on evidence-based or evidence-informed policymaking within national policy processes has influenced multilateral policymaking. Nor has there been an evaluation of how these processes play out across sectors and whether and how evidence is informing policies that can help us respond to complex, transboundary challenges. By investigating the deliberative processes that led up to the formulation and agreement of the SDGs, from 2012 to 2015  in particular, I examine the extent to which evidence, and particularly scientific evidence, shaped the global policy targets articulated in the SDGs. I also consider the extent to which UN institutional arrangements and informal engagement mechanisms affected the way evidence submitted as See for example the EC’s Scientific Advice Mechanism established in 2015: https://ec.europa.eu/info/researchand-innovation/strategy/support-policymaking/scientificsupport-eu-policies/group-chief-scientific-advisors_en [Last accessed 05/06/2020]. 6 

part of the negotiating processes was integrated into the goals and targets that were ratified in 2015. The fundamental question motivating this research is: how does scientific evidence influence multilateral policy development within the UNGA? Whilst other key questions include: How did evidence shape the goals and targets that constitute the SDGs? And how did institutional arrangements and non-state actor engagements mediate the evidence-to-policy process in the development of the SDGs? The research questions are examined through an empirical investigation of the SDG negotiation process, with a thematic focus upon three areas: public health (articulated in SDG 3), urban sustainability (articulated in SDG 11) and data and information systems (which were a cross-­ cutting theme of the dialogue). These themes enable a detailed focus upon specific concepts and how these are represented in Member States’ oral statements, in the various written documents submitted to the consultation processes, and in the outcome documents prepared by co-chairs of the negotiations, as well as the UN system. Focusing on three very diverse themes also provides a cross-sectoral perspective and acknowledges that different epistemic communities likely had different engagement experiences throughout the post-2015 process. The investigation involved process tracing through textual analysis of input and outcome documents in support of which I used archival methods to organise the research inputs. I also used key informant interviews to better understand informal modes of interaction and influence. The empirical research conducted for this book focused on the ­‘Post-­2015’ deliberation process7 which ran from 2012 to 2015, under the auspices of the UNGA.8 Within this process there were four core stages: After the set of 17 goals had been decided upon by the Open Working Group (OWG) (in 2014), the deliberation process was informally redubbed the ‘SDG negotiations’. Both Post-2015 and SDG negotiations are used interchangeably throughout this report. 8  Once the OWG had concluded upon a set of SDGs (in 2014), the process was informally renamed the SDG negotiation process. 7 

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1  Why Consider Science in International Policy? 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Fig. 1.1  Number of publications on ‘evidence-based policy‘ within five world-leading scientific journals. (Source: Authors own (2020) Total number of articles or academic commentaries using the term ‘evidence-based policy’ published within five world-leading scientific journals, as

determined by their ‘H index.’ Journals include: Nature, Science, New England Journal of Medicine, Cell, and The Lancet. Analysed from 2000 to 2019. Rank determined by Scimago: https://www.scimagojr.com/journalrank.php? order=handord=desc [Last accessed June 4, 2020])

1) The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, or Rio+20 as it became known, which took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on 20-22 June 2012. It was the third international conference on sustainable development. The outcome document, The Future We Want, included a commitment by Member States to initiate a process to develop Sustainable Development Goals to succeed the MDGs. In particular it called for an Open Working Group to deliberate on potential future goals (see 3). It also included commitments on green economy, reform of the UN Environmental Program, the necessity to establish a platform for international dialogue on sustainable development  – A High-Level Political Forum  – and much more. The outcome document was endorsed by the UNGA in July 2012 (UN, 2012b).

2) A High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons (HLP) convened by the UN Secretary-General in July 2012, culminating their work in May 2013. Their task was to put forth recommendations on new global goals for consideration by Member States and the UN Secretary General. The HLP was made up of 27 leaders from civil society, academia and government. It was chaired by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia and Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom (UN, 2013a). Their final report was entitled A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development (UN, 2013a). 3) A 30-seat Open Working Group (OWG) of the UNGA, tasked with preparing a full proposal on the format and content of potential SDGs.

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Originally imagined in Rio in 2012, the OWG was established in January 2013 by decision 67/555 (UNGA XE "UN General Assembly (UNGA)" , 2013). Although limited to thirty seats, Member States decided to use a constituency-­ based system of representation that meant seats in the OWG were shared by several countries. The OWG commenced work in March 2013 and presented its final report to the UN Secretary General in July 2014. 4) A UN General Assembly Inter-Governmental Negotiation (IGN) with 193 participating Member States that took place from January 2015 until July 2015. The final outcome document, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (which included the 17 Sustainable Development Goals), was presented at the 70th UN General Assembly in September 2015 and was approved by 193 Heads of State and Government (UN, 2015a). This book focuses on the latter two phases of the processes convened under the auspices of the UNGA – the OWG and the IGN – as these were the predominant multi-state negotiation processes mandated to deliver on the new framework. Throughout these two sets of deliberation, a vast range of organisations provided inputs: Member States, advocacy organisations, civil society groups, scientists and academic networks. As a result, at the adoption of the 2030 Agenda in September 2015, Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon referred to it as ‘a truly “We The Peoples” Agenda’. He also hailed the process that led to the creation of the SDGs as the most inclusive UN engagement exercise to ever have taken place (UN, 2015b; paras 9-11).

1.1 Introducing the Sectoral Analysis: Health, Urban Sustainability and Data Given the breadth of the SDG agenda, my empirical analysis focused on three thematic areas: public health and the debates relating to the formation of

1  Why Consider Science in International Policy?

SDG 3, urban sustainability and the debates about the necessity for an urban goal (SDG11), and data and information systems, which were a cross-cutting theme of the dialogue. These three issues were selected not only because they reflect the diversity of topics under discussion in the UNGA and were represented by distinct epistemic communities, but also because each epistemic community had very diverse experiences engaging with the institutions of the UNGA (as further discussed in Part 3). For example, the health policy community has been well-­engaged in UN global policy agendas since, at least, the formation of the MDGs in 2012 (Marten, 2018), whilst the nascent urban policy community coalesced for the first time to advocate for a standalone SDG on sustainable cities (Revi, 2020). In addition, there is a newly emerging and more methodically oriented coalition focused on the use of data and information systems to encourage a more systematic approach to the pursuit of sustainable development objectives (IEAG, 2014). Within each of these thematic areas, epistemic communities worked to advance specific concepts, ideas and objectives through formal engagement mechanisms, as well as informal means and processes, placing different emphasis upon and giving different weight to scientific evidence. SDG 3 is the standalone goal dedicated to health and well-being. It aims to ‘ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages’ and has targets related to newborn and maternal health, non-communicable and communicable diseases, mental health, substance abuse, road traffic accidents and so on (UN, 2015a). The goal was formulated by Member States with input from a vast and well-organised community of health actors. In 2013, a global thematic consultation on health in the post-2015 agenda was organised by the World Health Organisation (WHO), UNICEF, the Government of Sweden and the Government of Botswana to discuss what health concerns should be addressed by a new development agenda. Over 150,000 people participated in the consultation online (via www. worldwewant2015. org/health), whilst over 100 papers were submitted to the task team coordi-

1.1  Introducing the Sectoral Analysis: Health, Urban Sustainability and Data

nating the process, along with the inputs of 14 face-to-face meetings, which attracted over 1,600 people (McManus, 2013). A simple review of the papers submitted shows the breadth of inputs provided: from scientific actors, NGOs, lobby groups and government stakeholders (McManus, 2013; 82–100). The consultation report clearly demonstrates a history of coordinated action amongst health actors which, it concludes, enabled the health sector to lead ‘the development success of the MDG era’ (Ibid). Not only is the health sector an interesting case study because of its long history of social coordination, but because it is from medical evidence-based practice that the current EIP tendency emerged. Thus, one would expect scientific inputs to be a crucial element in global health policy formulation, an area of enquiry made all the more important and pressing by the coronavirus (COVID-19) epidemic (Richardson, 2020). Somewhat different is SDG 11, which aims to ‘Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable’ (UN, 2015a). The goal and its associated targets focus on a wide variety of themes including affordable housing, accessible transport, participatory planning, cultural heritage, disasters, access to green public spaces and so on. Unlike the health sector, urban issues were not central to the MDG process and according to a leading Indian urban planner, enjoyed little support from the UN system prior to the 2013 (Revi, 2020: personal communication (PC)). Furthermore, scientists, urban networks, NGOs and other advocates for urban issues were not organised, only mobilising in 2013 ‘after the OWG plenary [which discussed urban issues], when heads of Cities Alliance, UN Habitat, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and I met and discussed how we can mobilise all the actors and 300 cities’ (Revi, 2020: PC). The urban sector therefore provides an insight into how epistemic communities were created, emerging in response to the SDG deliberations rather than predating them. Also, important to understand and complicating the dynamic is that concurrent to the deliberations, a new ‘urban science’ was emerging ‘at a dizzying pace’ (Revi, 2016; xiii). Communities of scientists from very diverse

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sectors  – sustainability, urban planning, and so on – were brought together to provide inputs to the formulation of the goals, whilst concurrently developing new theories of sustainable urbanisation (Valencia et al., 2019). This book also considers data and information systems, which are not covered by a standalone goal, per se, but are featured throughout the 2030 Agenda in various targets and in the preamble. Paragraph 48 of the 2030 Agenda stresses that ‘quality, accessible, timely and reliable disaggregated data will be needed to help with the measurement of progress and to ensure that no one is left behind. Such data is key to decision-making’ (UN, 2015a; 48). Not only does this affirm the importance of using data to monitor progress, but also that data should be a key tool for all forms of government decision-making. Whilst there was no one clear coordinated group advocating for a focus on data and information systems throughout the SDG deliberations, various networks of actors proposed such an approach, starting with the UNSG appointed High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda which produced a preparatory report calling ‘for a data revolution for sustainable development, with a new international initiative to improve the quality of statistics and information available to citizens’ (UN, 2013a; 3). Thus, a focus on data and information systems provides an insight into how specific cross-cutting themes were advanced throughout the negotiations and, by a broader, loose-knit coalition of actors, often with very different sectoral interests.

1.2 How This Book Contributes to Existing Literature This book contributes to three domains of existing academic literature: first, a thirty-year debate on evidence-to-policy influencing processes, which in spite of its longevity has contributed little knowledge on how these processes play out within multilateral institutions and across different sectors; second, a related policy literature on institutions, which provides various analytical frameworks for understanding institutional

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1  Why Consider Science in International Policy?

arrangements but which have seldom been dence and the proponents of that evidence in applied to the unique dynamics of the UN system international organisations (Stone, 2019). In parand the international communities that engage ticular, there has been little to no consideration of with that system; third, by making a critical his- how the United Nations uses scientific evidence torical contribution to emerging literature docu- to inform Member State deliberations. This is menting the SDG negotiation process. More than particularly remarkable in the face of a resurging six  years since the goals were agreed, there are literature on institutionalism, which stresses the few comprehensive accounts of what happened role that institutions have upon decision-making in the formative phase and most provide anec- and evidence use (Parkhurt, 2017), as well as the dotal evidence (e.g. Dodds et al., 2016). This is impact of institutional evolution and reform on the first known attempt to apply a systematic these processes (Haas, 1992; Allan, 2018). analysis of how evidence shaped the outcomes of A second academic domain to which this book the negotiation process. contributes is institutionalism, specifically literaOver the past forty years, there has been grow- ture from public policy which focuses on the ing pressure amongst many governments, partic- rules and arrangements of governance (Kraft & ularly in Europe and the United States, to use Furlong, 2007). In particular, this book is conmore evidence and data to inform public policy cerned with the influence of institutions upon eviand political decision-making (Parkhurt, 2017; dence uptake and how institutional form and Davies et al., 2000). This ‘movement’ is known function can affect the types of inputs used in as evidence-based policy (EBP). Evidence-based deliberative processes, with a specific focus on policy is an approach that ‘helps people make the UNGA and the scientific evidence inputs to well-informed decisions about policies, pro- the SDG negotiations. As the institutional theogrammes, and projects by putting the best avail- rists March and Olsen argued 35 years ago, the able evidence at the heart of policy development organisation of political actors and the format of and implementation’ (Davies, 2004; 3). The their engagements will affect policy choices underlying assumption is that greater evidence (March & Olsen, 1984). A major challenge of will rationally result in more precise and effective this literature is that there is little to ‘no consenoutcomes. sus on how to conceptualise either institutions The use of evidence to inform government themselves or the process of institutional change’ policy and decision-making is not new, but (Kingston & Caballero, 2009; 1). A commonly advances in scientific methods and data-­ cited definition is that of Douglass North, for collection, particularly within public health, have whom institutions are the rules of the game in resulted in a new-founded belief amongst many society (North, 1990; 4). He sees these as distinct working in and on public policy that it is possible from organisations, which are structures which to use evidence to identify ‘what works’ (Berridge he assumes have unitary objectives. Throughout & Stanton, 1999; Lin & Gibson, 2003). Whilst this book, institutions mean both formal modes the argument has been criticised on the grounds of interaction through laws, customs or practices, that it is a ‘medical model’ that does not apply to often codified within organisations (for example, complex and oftentimes messy social problems, the carefully moderated, representative deliberaand that the scientific evidence is often politi- tion processes undertaken within the UNGA), but cised, there has been insufficient reflection on also informal institutions, which are the social how national theories of evidence to policy influ- rules that guide engagement and are usually encing translate to the realm of international unwritten (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). What policymaking (Parkhurt, 2017). As recently noted makes these social rules institutions is that there by Diane Stone in an exploration of global policy is a particular structure and they guide predictprocesses, scholars writing on EBP have tended able patterns of interaction over time (Peters, to focus on domestic institutions and more inves- 2005; Anyebe, 2017). These are particularly tigation is needed with regard to the role of evi- important for guiding the inputs of epistemic

1.3  Outline of the Book

communities (as per Haas, 1992), which have a range of manifestations from loose coalitions to more formalised and structured groups. By analysing patterns of interaction across these very different types of institution, as well as different formal and informal means of engagement, this book contributes to recent evidence-­ informed policy literature, which emphasises context and prescribes a discourse, approach or culture, rather than a definitive problem-solving procedure, when trying to use evidence to inform policy outcomes (Sutcliffe & Court, 2005; Waqa et  al., 2013; Wesselink et  al., 2014; Ward & Mowat, 2012). I examine the processes Member States and non-state actors use to categorise, manage, and convey evidence (as per Sutcliffe & Court, 2005; Nevo & Slonim-Nevo, 2011), shedding light on how institutional constructs affect the inputs used in policy processes, and ultimately how policy is designed. By analysing a multilateral process, I add a scalar dimension to the evidence-informed policy literature within public policy and political science, highlighting the unique attributes of global, multi-state policymaking.

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understanding the potential role of evidence in international policy processes to be examined through the empirical analysis. This includes a focus on representation and access, community organisation, the framing and presentation of evidence, and the influence of time, including the duration over which evidence and key conceptual ideas are presented. Part 3 presents the empirical analysis. Following an overview of the post-2015 or SDG deliberations which ran from 2012 to 2015, and a brief discussion of the different actors involved, I present the findings of the thematic analysis, relating to health, cities and data. For each case, I trace the key conceptual debates within each sector, such as the prominence of universal health coverage, the role of local governments and the meaning and implications of the widely promoted concept of a ‘data revolution’. The intention is to observe how issues emerged, which actors brought them to the fore and how they evolved within the context of the deliberations both outside of and within the formal negotiation settings. Finally, six processes are identified as the key consensus building moments throughout the three-year process. Identifying these consensus-­building processes is crucial to under1.3 Outline of the Book stand how different types of evidence are valued vis-à-vis other inputs and what mechanisms and This book proceeds as follows: the following sec- institutional arrangements facilitate the reaching tion (Part 2) defines the key concepts that inform of agreement. this analysis, most notably the concept of eviPart 4 uses the four components of the concepdence and more specifically the notion of scien- tual framework outlined at the outset to further tific evidence, produced in accordance with reflect on the processes of negotiation and conspecific methods. I also unpack theories of the testation that delivered the final outcome in policy process and their evolution over the late September 2015. Whilst the broad elements of twentieth century. The key literatures underpin- representation, access, community organisation, ning this analysis are then introduced, starting framing and time remain pertinent, the empirical with a swathe of literature from public policy analysis raises different points of emphasis than studies relating to evidence-based or evidence-­ were expected from the literature, such as the informed policymaking, which explores how and political positioning of science within the context when evidence is taken up in policy processes of the deliberations, which is not an issue that and the influence of human behaviour over these was hitherto expected. This section continues to processes. I then briefly explore complementary draw heavily on informant reflections, twinning ideas from institutionalism and human geogra- it with and testing it against the concepts that phy, relating to the sites of interaction within emerged through literature review. which policy processes are formed. At the end of Finally, in Part 5, I reflect upon the project in this review, I lay out a conceptual framework for its entirety, considering how insights gleaned

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align with and deviate from the literature within which it is situated. I also reflect upon the policy implications for the multilateral system, specifically the UNGA, if it is to grapple with future complex transboundary challenges, requiring ever more technical and scientific inputs.

1.4 Key Findings Empirical analysis of the post-2015 deliberation process has highlighted that within the context of the UNGA (the highest deliberative body within the UN system), science has little to no institutional prominence, only formally represented through one coalition, with one seat: the Science and Technology Major Group. To the extent that official mechanisms do facilitate the communication of science, it is through UN agency briefings and support papers but with differing levels of quality and ambition. The post-2015 negotiation process, which ran from 2012 to 2015 under the UNGA, sought to do two things: create a more informal negotiation forum which would steer Member States away from set political speeches towards frank and open discussion of sustainable development challenges, and to do so drawing upon a wide range of participatory inputs. Science was expected to be a cornerstone of this expanded evidence base. Whilst no formal guidance was issued on how to engage with scientists and academia, a range of parallel processes were established to try to support this process. These included the creation by the UN Secretary General of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, a global network of university and higher learning organisations tasked with providing input from the global academic community, various ad hoc consultations organised by the Major Group on Science and Technology and the invitation of academia to partake in national and thematic consultations. A crucial strategy was employed by the Co-Chairs of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development who invited in academics and other technical experts to brief the OWG on substantive issues through a series of expert, thematic panels.

1  Why Consider Science in International Policy?

A key finding of this study is that whilst these various semi-formal and timebound structures did provide platforms for select scientists to provide input and give them visibility, to the extent that their messages infiltrated discussions they seldom did so through these brief ad hoc events. Rather it was the long-term socialisation of ideas, via academic journals, and the engagement in epistemic communities such as advocacy coalitions, that helped to convey key academic concepts. For older, more established coalitions, informal engagement arrangements with UN partners and Member States enabled privileged access and helped to convey key messages and evidence inputs. For younger epistemic communities and the advocacy coalitions without a long history of engagement, situating their ideas within a scientific literature and showing the engagement and endorsement of leading academics were considered to give credibility to key messages. To encourage message-uptake, these communities engaged policy intermediaries. These intermediaries were institutional representatives from UN agencies and the members of the UN TST responsible for preparing thematic briefings for Member States. Or they were other ‘policy elites’: actors well versed in the bureaucracy of the UN system who could help land messages with Member States and infiltrate key processes, not least of all through cultivating interpersonal relationships with key negotiators. To the extent that academics engaged with these actors and mingled with them in informal coalitions and institutional structures they had success in transmitting their ideas into the deliberative process. The framing of science is a crucial cross-­ cutting theme of this analysis, not the framing of key epistemic community messages as written about by the likes of Deborah Stone (2002, 2019), but the positioning of forms of evidence as science, even when it was actually technical knowledge cultivated through practice rather than scientific study. Furthermore, there was an observable politicisation of science, with it positioned by negotiators and other stakeholders as a tool being used not just to improve policy out-

1.4  Key Findings

comes but to help mediate tense political differences and to ‘cut to the chase’. Whilst there are profound institutional barriers for non-governmental actors trying to engage with the UNGA, the institutional innovation initiated by UNGA in the form of the OWG and its troika system suggests that the Members of the UNGA are willing to experiment with new parallel processes to enable more discursive, evidence-­ based dialogues, which can then inform the

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decisions-reached by the full GA membership. This process marks a critical juncture in the history of UNGA negotiation, which looks likely to initiate more discursive and protracted deliberations on sustainable development henceforth and will hopefully create space for sustained engagement and advocacy by a wider range of stakeholders, including academics.

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Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

Keywords

Science · Knowledge · Policy cycles · Evidence-based and evidence-informed policy · Epistemic communities · Institutions · Framing

2.1 Historical Debates Over Evidence and Policy Broadly speaking, evidence is any information which supports a statement or conclusion and/or which indicates whether an opinion is true or valid (OED, 2020). Within public policy literature, the term evidence is generally used to refer to expert opinion derived from scientific study which is intended to influence the design of policy by governments or the systematic collection of insights from monitoring and evaluation of a given policy or programme (Cloete, 2009). Within the more recent evidence-based policy literature, it is commonly assumed to refer to scientific evidence, but studies exploring the uptake of evidence have found that policymakers often turn to other government sources and personal contacts before science when soliciting information for a given policy problem (Oliver & De Vocht, 2017). The use of other sources of evidence has led some academics to suggest we should rethink how we define evidence, making it more inclu-

sive of other forms of knowledge, including local knowledge, participatory research or practical insights (Schorr  & Gopbal, 2016). Most conclude, however, that evidence for policymaking should be information which explains the impact, or lack thereof, of a given intervention and helps policymakers to achieve results at scale (Centre for the Study of Social Policy, 2017). For the purposes of this book, I focus on scientific evidence as one evidence input which has received strong endorsement and recognition from different arms of the UN1 and yet has a confusing place within its various structures and institutional mechanisms (as observed by Lichem, 2015). While the deep history of ‘science’ has origins as far back as classical antiquity (Zhmud & Chernoglazov, 2008), discussions on the methods currently referred to as ‘science’ emerged in the sixteenth century with the work of Francis Bacon (1561–1626), who proposed a new approach to empirical inquiry: the ‘Novum Organum Scientiarum’. The core elements of Bacon’s approach were a simple process of reduction (listing all possible and probable known causes) and the use of inductive reasoning (rationalising down all possible outcomes to the most likely probable one). These principles stemmed from a See, for example, statements made by the UN Secretary General, the 2016 report of the UNESCO Scientific Advisory Board and guidance recently issued for countries on the importance of national science-policy interfaces (UNSG, 2021; UNESCO, 2016; UNDESA, 2021). 1 

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_2

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

body of empirical and philosophical literature and practice, such as the work of empiricists Nicolas Copernicus (1473–1543) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642). However, the challenge with this approach, and specifically inductive reasoning, is that the observed relationship between factors A and B that have led us to derive a conclusion may be accidental (Russell, 1926a).2 In the eighteenth century, David Hume sought to overcome this limitation by adding the concept of verification as critical to the generation of science, through his focus on ‘proofs’ – arguments from experience that leave no room for doubt or opposition (Hume & Millican, 2007). Bertrand Russell and co-author, Alfred North Whitehead, also stressed the importance of proof in their twentieth-century work, Principa Mathematica, which emphasised independent verifiability (i.e. that the outcome can be examined, tested and proven by the associated objective occurrences) (Whitehead & Russell, 1910). Karl Popper, a twentieth-century Austrian philosopher (1902– 1994) and a leading philosopher of science, rejected these inductivist views of proof and proposed an alternative model: empirical falsification. Falsification is the idea that a hypothesis can never be proven, but it can be falsified through decisive experiments. Simply put, experimental testing can produce positive outcomes but these are seldom decisive, whereas one counterexample which proves it to be false is definitive (Popper, 1959). Popper also held that scientific theory, and human knowledge generally, is irreducibly conjectural or hypothetical and is gener-

Russell cites J.  M. Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921) which explains that ‘having experienced A and B together frequently, we now react to A as we originally reacted to B. To make this seem rational, we say that A is a “sign” of B, and that B must really be present though out of sight. This is the principle of induction, upon which almost all science is based. And a great deal of philosophy is an attempt to make the principle seem reasonable. Whenever, owing to past experience, we react to A in the manner in which we originally reacted to B, we may say that A is a “datum” and B is “inferred”. In this sense, animals practice inference. It is clear, also, that much inference of this sort is fallacious: the conjunction of A and B in past experience may have been accidental’ (Russell, 1926a). 2 

ated by the creative imagination to solve problems that have arisen in specific historic-cultural settings. As such, any claim to knowledge needs to be understood as part of a given context (Stanford, 2018). Popper’s argument has been reinforced in recent years by a movement in human geography which emphasises geographies of knowledge or ‘epistemic geographies’, i.e. the notion that all evidence, however it is produced, is culturally embedded and created within a given social context which inevitably impacts its end form (Demerrit, 2001; Mahoney & Hulme, 2018). This contextual argument is rooted in constructivist epistemologies which consider science not to be the proving of objective, irrefutable truths but instead to be socially created within a given cultural and material context (Demeritt, 2001, 2006). The common threads linking these understandings of what constitutes scientific knowledge are rigorous observation and testing to devise the best possible result. And yet, in spite of these exhaustive debates and Russell’s promise of science as a unifying force, poor definitions of scientific evidence are common today. As Manu Saunders argues, ‘the phrase “scientific evidence” has become part of the vernacular  – thrown about like a hot potato during discussions of major environmental, health or social issues’ (Saunders, 2013; para 1). For instance, The 2030 Agenda (the final outcome document negotiated by Member States in 2015, containing the 17 SDGs) refers to the necessity to strengthen the ‘science-policy interface’ and to provide ‘a strong evidence-based instrument to support policymakers in promoting poverty eradication and sustainable development’ (UN, 2015a; para 83). But it makes no attempt to define what is meant by science and how it should be defined in relation to other forms of knowledge. In this book, scientific evidence is defined as knowledge derived from systematic enquiry which aims to follow a series of basic principles including observation, hypothesis generation and testing; the use of deductive and inductive logic and the principle of parsimony, and is subject to ongoing refinement (Gauch, 2003). As Russell noted in his 1926 seminal work, A History of

2.1  Historical Debates Over Evidence and Policy

Western Philosophy, scientific enterprises may vary considerably, but most scientists strive to use these common guiding elements, and in doing so to increase precision without compromising the certainty of results (Russell, 1926b). It is acknowledged that this science is culturally embedded, aligning with arguments around geographies of knowledge, but in the interests of brevity, the impact of cultural influences upon the formation of science and in turn their influence on policy processes is not discussed. ‘Policy’ typically refers to a priority list of issues or a deliberate plan of action to guide decisions and achieve desired outcomes, whilst policymaking is the process by which policy is devised and enacted by a government or political party (Buse et  al., 2012; Jones, 2009). Traditionally, or at least since the 1950s, the policy-­setting process has been conceptualised as a cycle, building upon systems theory in political science (Easton, 1957). The idea is that policies are developed through a logical sequence of steps, including agenda-setting (identifying specific issues and prioritising them), formulation (identifying the outcome you are trying to achieve and the relevant solution or intervention), implementation (identifying who should take responsibility and enact the policy or program) and evaluation (assessing impact and effectiveness and evaluating continuation). The idea is that following a review of program feedback and reflection by government actors, including reviewing other forms of evidence, the whole process starts again. However, over the past 40 years, this logical model of policy development has been contested (Farr et  al., 2006; Kay, 2011; Cairney, 2011), resulting in such a proliferation of ideas and concepts that today people argue that ‘policymaking’ is such a broad term that it cannot be defined by one approach (Jones et  al., 2013). Critics of the policy-cycle model highlight the reactive and pragmatic nature of political decision-­making, the fact that these processes are often not sequential but happen concurrently, and that the process is not apolitical, but significantly influenced by competing interests and values (Hallsworth et al., 2011). Others have focused on how power intersects with policymaking, dictat-

15

ing resource flows, determining how different elements are valued and defining social relationships between policymakers (Jones, 2009; Hickey & Mohan, 2004). Recent attempts to define policy have highlighted that rather than policy development being one logical cycle, it is ‘a collection of thousands of policy cycles, which interact with each other to produce much less predictable outcomes’ (Cairney, 2013; para 4). The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), is perhaps the best known attempt to define a complex interactive policy system. It emphasises other influential factors, such as beliefs, which motivate people to act, and different levels of action, referred to as ‘policy subsystems,’ which are made up of coalitions and policy-brokers deliberating over outputs and intended impacts. The concept of levels is particularly significant, given the increasing recognition in governance theory over the past 20 years that governance processes are not static and hierarchical but are often happening concurrently, with local or national discussions and debates intersecting global discussions in real time and vice versa (Bache & Flinders, 2004). For the purposes of this analysis, I focus upon the agenda setting and formulation stages of the traditional cycle, the process by which deliberators argue and present evidence to support their case, eventually coming to some sort of facilitated conclusion. The locus of the negotiation is within the UN General Assembly (the senior-­ most policymaking body in the UN); however, like Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), I also examine three thematic issues, and their associated policy subsystems, including the actors, platforms and mechanisms through which consensus on thematic issues was reached, both within and outside of the formal negotiation chamber. Whilst the engagement opportunities and processes for all three sectors were bounded by the same UNGA process and institutional format, each epistemic community is likely to have employed different organising and engagement approaches and to have engaged with scientists very differently, providing a useful insight into

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

different sectoral approaches to evidence-­ 2. A pluralistic or opportunistic model which informed policymaking. challenges assumptions about the ‘rationality of the policy process’, instead pointing out that actors operate pragmatically, dependent 2.2 How Do Evidence and Policy on the inputs and uncertainties of the time. Intersect? The use of evidence is therefore erratic and unpredictable. Although there are countless examples of science 3. A political model which argues ‘that power is informing policy over the nineteenth and twentiinfused throughout the knowledge process, eth centuries (Bullard et al., 1975; Rossiter, 1985; from generation to uptake’. When knowledge Crimmins & Finch, 2006; Picard, 2009; is produced, it often reflects the power imbalHammersely, 2013), theory relating to how this ances experienced by the author or the society process happens has evolved significantly in within which it is developed and, therefore, it recent years. Today there are three dominant is not neutral. It is also used in processes of schools of thought which consider how evidence contestation and negotiation, which means it can be used to inform policy outcomes: political is often politicised in the process (Jones, science, decision-making theory and policy stud2009; 5). ies. Political science emphasises the design of While this book does not explore evidence genevidence through classical models of social eration and how the various scientific inputs to enquiry, as fundamental to ensuring political the SDG process were devised, it does consider impact (Green, 2005). Decision-science or the political dynamics of the institutions through decision-­ making theory emphasises the pro- which evidence was presented, aligning itself cesses of deliberation and contestation through with the second and third strands of evidence to which decisions are reached, thereby highlight- policy literature described above. ing potential entry points at which evidence can be presented (Goldie et  al., 2006). Meanwhile policy studies emphasise the process of policy 2.3 Theorising Evidence formulation, with models ranging from decade-­ to Policy Processes long cycles to messy non-linear processes of coalitions weighing up evidence inputs, beliefs In 1997, Tony Blair sailed into power as the and political influences to design and advocate Prime Minister of UK with the political slogan, for interventions (Sabatier, 1988; Cairney, 2013). ‘What Matters Is What Works’ (Pemberton, The most expansive literature on evidence to 2010; 1). This was not just a nod to the political policy-­uptake stems from the field of policy stud- pragmatism of the emerging New Labour moveies referred to as Evidence-Based or Evidence-­ ment but to a new culture of evidence-based Informed Policy (EBP/EIP), which has borrowed decision-­making. In the 1990s and early 2000s heavily from the evidence-based practice move- Britain, a focus on evidence to influence policy ment which started in medical research. Jones processes was a common theme across govern(2009) summarises this broad swathe of literature ment, following signs of the success of the very succinctly in different approaches, para- evidence-­based practice movement in the UK’s phrased here: healthcare system (Tagney & Haines, 2009). A 1. A rational actor model which sees the rela- similar movement was and remains underway in tions between knowledge and policy as inher- the USA and across the European Union (e.g. US ently good, with evidence as an instrumental Government, 2017; European Commission, and neutral tool to help improve policy pro- 2015). Given the influence of these Member cesses, which is taken up using logic and States upon the UN  – many such as permanent reason. Security Council Members, paying some of the

2.3  Theorising Evidence to Policy Processes

highest financial contributions and sustaining the operational work of UN agencies such as WHO or UN Habitat (CFR, 2022; UN, 2022a)  – it is important to explore whether and how this movement impacted governance arrangements and functions within the UN, including the impact this might have had on the use and value of scientific evidence within the recent SDG negotiations. The philosophical roots of evidence-based practice date back to mid-nineteenth-century medicine, which described the rationalised, scientific exercise of prescribing medical services based on evidence (Sackett et al., 1996; Chalmers, 2005). In the early twentieth century, this notion continued and was deepened, with medical professionals relying on evidence-based practice to instill objectivity and neutrality into decision-­ making processes, improve service delivery and ensure accountability of results (Sackett et  al., 1996; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Chalmers, 2005; Baron & Haskins, 2018; Bornstein, 2012). The theory behind this approach, however, relied on a series of theoretical and practical assumptions about the inherent value of evidence in designing effective medical interventions (Chalmers, 2005). For example, certain evidence types  – namely scientific evidence  – were assumed to reflect a standard of objectivity and neutrality and were privileged at the top of a hierarchy of evidence which marginalised subjective experiences and opinions (Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016; Bowen & Zwi, 2005). Cartwright and Hardie (2012) explain that appraising the quality of data in the medical profession was based on assumptions about the trustworthiness of certain methodologies of evidence generation. Experimental trials, randomised control trials and systematic reviews were considered respected methods because they were guided by a scientific ethos aimed at pursuing objective knowledge (Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016; Barron & Haskins, 2018; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Chalmers, 2005). Therefore, the outputs were assumed to be equally respected, trustworthy and capable of driving outcomes in medical service delivery (Chalmers, 2005). This naturally evolved into the expectation that increased evidence use would

17

improve decision-making processes (Biesta, 2007; Head, 2016; Morston & Watts, 2003; Simons, 2010). In the mid-twentieth century, conservative, liberal and socialist ideologies disagreed over what should be the basis of policy and promoted different ideals for how society should evolve (Bonell et  al., 2018). Emerging from the evidence-­ based practice movement, evidence-­ based policy (EBP) arose as an effort to supplant ideology in political processes with pragmatism. The proposition was that an increase in evidence would produce reasoned decision-making, and, ultimately, better policy outcomes (Solesbury, 2001; Sutcliffe & Court, 2005). The EBP argument was based on the presumption that evidence could reliably link policy outcomes to inputs, and, in turn, policymakers would use it to redefine problems and reorder priorities towards realising policy objectives more efficiently and effectively (Bonell et al., 2018; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Head, 2016; Perl et  al., 2018; Baron & Haskins, 2018). Evidence factored into a linear problem-­ solving construct where decision-makers proposed a problem, identified knowledge gaps and used research to design a corresponding solution (Weiss, 1977: 533; Marston & Watts, 2003). Beyond defining policy problems (Cairney & Oliver, 2017), evidence soon became associated with more diverse functions, including policy planning and design (Rittel & Webber, 1973), monitoring and evaluation of policies (Chalmers, 2005; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012), scrutinising policy goals and assumptions (Gambrill, 2008; Weiss, 1977; Wesselink et al., 2014) and predicting future impacts of policies (Fforde, 2019; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012). However, as theories of evidence-based practice migrated into the policy sector, the notion of EBP inherited a set of assumptions and limitations from its predecessor, such as assuming a linear problem-solving construct, which underestimates the complexity of policy prob­ lems. As a result, many scholars began to reassess its practical utility and produced a series of critiques relating to the way evidence is produced, communicated and used in policy cycles (Rittel &

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

Webber, 1973; Weiss, 1979; Morston & Watts, 2003; Biesta, 2007; Head, 2016; Simons, 2010). Many critics have argued that scientific evidence neither helps to define nor solve the more ‘wicked’ problems in the social sector which, by definition, are more subjective and uncertain (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016). Contested definitions of ‘evidence’ in the policy sphere have led scholars to question the inherent value of evidence and the degree to which it should guide political decision-making processes (Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016; Broadbent, 2012; Weiss, 1979; Bonell et al., 2018; Bowen & Zwi, 2005; Wesselink et al., 2014). While clinical medicine had articulated definitions and classifications of evidence-quality through a hierarchy of trustworthiness, there is no such clear-cut system of evidence classification within public policy and the social sciences more generally (Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016). Critics also embraced the notion of the fallibility of evidence, recognising the integral role of human decision-­ making in defining and producing evidence in practice (Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016; Bowen & Zwi, 2005; Hammersley, 2005a, b; Epstein, 2009; Marston & Watts, 2003; Shlonsky & Mildon, 2014; Biesta, 2007; Nevo & Slonim-­ Nevo, 2011). Defining standards of legitimacy and trustworthiness, for example, requires people to articulate a preference for certain kinds of evidence over others (Bowen & Zwi, 2005; Wesselink et al., 2014). Theories of evidence-based policy rarely reflect on the possibility that actors will disagree over how the weight of influence should be distributed across inputs. They generally assume that consensus can be achieved, without considering how context and discourse factor into the politics of classifying evidence types (Culyer & Lomas, 2006; Wesselink et al., 2014). To avoid disagreement, policymakers often defer to vague, encompassing terms such as ‘good evidence’ to describe a standard of input, without articulating a clear definition of what this means (Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016; Marston & Watts, 2003; Shlonsky & Mildon, 2014). This becomes problematic, as standards of evidence-­

quality typically inform methods for evidence production. Some critics warn that this ambiguity can lead to the amalgamation of unsubstantiated and unverifiable data, resulting in poorly informed opinions (Perl et  al., 2018; Wesselink et al., 2014; Bonell et al., 2018). In summary, the evidence-based policy debate has raised important questions about standards and classifications of evidence. Whilst some have argued that there can be no legitimate hierarchy as the utility of evidence is defined by the context within which it is used, others emphasise the subjectivity of defining what is useful evidence and the likelihood of there being human bias to one or other type or method. Those taking the middle ground propose that perhaps there can be a weighted continuum, based on the degree of appropriateness within a defined context, which may enable evidence classifications to be adaptable to contextual preferences, rather than constrained to a single evidence hierarchy (Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016). Other critics of EBP recognise the diverse actors, variables and inputs in policymaking processes and argue that variability in human and institutional capacity creates a series of potential fracture points in the evidence to policy process (Epstein, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Biesta, 2007; Head, 2016; Sutcliffe & Court, 2005). These arguments suggest that the outcome of evidence use in policy decision-making is not inevitable. Rather, the potential for value creation is contingent on how knowledge flows across ‘the knowledge-policy interface’ (Jones et al., 2013). To untangle the evidence-uptake process, policy theorists have developed supply-driven and demand-driven models, which articulate rationalist and constructivist arguments respectively (Head, 2016; Nevo & Slonim-Nevo, 2011). The supply-driven model focuses on the process by which evidence enters and is communicated in the policy sphere, often portraying a linear input and output (What Works Network, 2018). Supply-driven theories delve into the human dimension of the researcher, their methodologies of evidence-production and their capacity to process and transmit their findings. Presenting or transmitting evidence entails framing and trans-

2.3  Theorising Evidence to Policy Processes

lation functions, which require researchers to be aware of and adapt to their audience’s needs and capabilities (Cairney & Oliver, 2017; Weiss, 1977; Jones et al., 2013; Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017; Weiss, 1977). A supply-driven model, therefore, places the responsibility of communication upon the researcher, arguing they must be able to translate complex evidence into simple stories through narrative and framing to capture decision-makers’ attention (Cairney & Oliver, 2017). Whilst this is undoubtedly true – research should be effectively communicated in accessible formats – these arguments place a significant burden on the academic, requiring skills that are not necessarily required of a good researcher. Furthermore, they often ignore the importance of context and access. If the researcher cannot reach the policymaker, or has no means by which to transmit their research, evidence translation becomes somewhat moot. The major limitation of the supply-driven model is that the evidence user is viewed as passive, so the focus shifts towards refining the quality of the input, suggesting the positivist empiricist notion that refining the process of evidence input will lead to better decision-making (Jones et  al., 2013; Parkhurst, 2017; Chalmers, 2005). Cartwright and Hardie (2012) argue that while the methodology of evidence-production and transmission is a critical component of the supply-driven model, it is equally necessary to consider the evidence uptake stage so as not to exacerbate the disconnect between theoretical expectations and practical utility of evidence in the policy sphere (cf. Weiss, 1977). Conversely, the demand-driven discussion focuses on the influence of human preferences upon evidence-based policymaking. Human rationality cannot be the single decision-making theory that informs evidence-based policymaking (Bornstein, 2012). Constructivists emphasise the integral role of user judgment in practice (Nevo & Slonim-Nevo, 2011; Simons, 2010; Newman, 2017; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Specifically, the contingencies surrounding evidence uptake require a more nuanced understanding of how evidence factors into the policy

19

process (Cairney, 2013; Cairney & Kwiatkowki, 2017; Wesselink et al., 2014; Druss et al., 2005; Epstein, 2009; Newman, 2017). As such, the demand-driven model places a stronger emphasis on the evidence user, recognising the circumstances associated with evidence uptake and use (Davies et al., 2000; Weiss, 1977). Behavioural psychology and neuroscience have demonstrated how emotions, unconscious drives and identities factor into human decision-­ making processes. At the micro level, Nevo and Slonim-Nevo (2011) offer theories from cognitive psychology, arguing that understanding of how humans organise and understand experience is integral to assessing the theoretical and practical role of evidence in decision-making processes. Learning processes and cultural backgrounds also play a role in influencing the political purposes, priorities and biases of evidence uptake (Newman, 2017), alongside values, political and cognitive biases, and emotions (Broadbent, 2012; Lewis, 2013; Wesselink et al., 2014; Parkhurst, 2017; Perl et al., 2018; Culyer & Lomas, 2006; Bonell et  al., 2018; Prior et  al., 2015; Sutcliffe & Court, 2005). At the heart of this constructivist argument is that we cannot assume a causal connection between a person’s capacity to understand and their likelihood to use evidence. Evidence use is inherently tied to personal preferences and beliefs, and when that evidence contradicts those beliefs it may well be cast aside (Biesta, 2007; Gambrill, 2012). Alternatively, the institutional constraints of the given political process may limit a person’s capacity to use evidence, as ‘real-­ world politics’ are fundamentally different from the ‘natural science milieu of the lab’ (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; 1). Furthermore, the realities of political discourse – complexity, contestation and polarisation  – can generate both technical and issue bias through different mechanisms (Simons, 2010; Fforde, 2019; Parkhurst, 2017). Political beliefs are likely to influence evidence uptake, both through ‘selective interpretation’ where information is selectively interpreted to exercise power, or ‘cherry-picked’ to promote or advocate for partisan priorities (Cairney, 2013; Head,

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

2016). For these reasons, Marston and Watts (2003) point to the impossibility of drawing a simple or linear relationship between evidence and policy outcomes. Three decades before Weiss had signposted these issues, he suggested that a more appropriate term to describe the transmission of evidence would be ‘seeping’ into the policy sphere, which encompasses the difficulty of measuring it systematically (Weiss, 1977). Ultimately, the assumption that evidence use is a definitive means of ‘perfecting’ policymaking is unstable, and in contrast to clinical medicine, policy problems and policy ‘solutions’ are ongoing processes – they are not definitively ‘solved’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973). New theories of EIP have thus emerged to address the need for a middle ground, which recognises the means and value of evidence use in policymaking processes. The transition to EIP in recent years reflects an expanding and more inclusive conceptualisation of the nature, purpose and use of evidence in policymaking. The term departs from the original deterministic theory of EBP and emphasises the contingencies and context through which evidence and values interact in the policy sphere (Bonell et al., 2018; Epstein, 2009; Melnyk & Newhouse, 2014). The EIP literature describes and prescribes a discourse, approach or culture, rather than a definitive problem-solving procedure (Sutcliffe & Court, 2005; Waqa et al., 2013; Wesselink et al., 2014; Ward  and Mowat, 2012; Solesbury, 2001; Head, 2016; Simons, 2010). There is no guarantee that increased evidence use will produce good research or good policy and, therefore, evidence is better regarded as informing, rather than determining, the policy process (Marston & Watts, 2003). Evidence-informed policy proposes a humbler theory of change, whereby evidence has the potential to enrich policy processes (Weiss, 1979; Nevo & Slonim-­ Nevo, 2011; Simons, 2010; Epstein, 2009; Biesta, 2007; Cairney, 2013; Wesselink et al., 2014; Morston & Watts, 2003; Head, 2016; Druss et al., 2005). To further unpack the debate on the extent to which evidence is a valuable input in policymaking, Cook (2001) describes a continuum where the ‘rational actor’ model of policy, in which the

research plays an important role in decision-­ making, is contrasted with the ‘political’ model, where evidence is just one input, paired with values and judgements, past experiences, etc., and is often not the most important or influential factor. Jones (2009) adds to this via the ‘pluralistic’ or ‘opportunistic model,’ suggesting that the incorporation of knowledge into policy processes is often opportunistic and erratic, based on pragmatic decisions in the face of uncertainty. The terms ‘evidence-influenced’ or ‘evidence-aware’ are a way of recognising the messy complexity of policy processes, and advance a more inclusive and non-hierarchical idea of ‘evidence’ that recognises the value of a diversity of sources, based on context (Epstein, 2009; Nutley et al., 2002: 2; Marston & Watts, 2003). EIP speaks more to a collective interaction between research, practice, knowledge and intervention. It recognises the complementarity between evidence and values, in that they are not incompatible nor mutually exclusive (Bonell et al., 2018; Head, 2016). Recognising that values underpin each stage of the evidence to policy process, Bowen and Zwi (2005) argue that policy actors need to be able to both understand the best course of action and decide how this should be acted upon with input from the intended beneficiaries (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017; Biesta, 2007). The major rhetorical shift here is that the evidence to policy to action cycle is client-centred, rather than evidence-­centred. This requires a more iterative relationship between client and service provider (Nevo & Slonim-Nevo, 2011). It also encourages a greater consideration of evidence framing and the necessity for coherent sectoral messaging to best engage with predominantly sectoral policy processes (Haas, 2018). This also shifts the conceptualisation of policy production to that of ‘co-­ production’  – a collective, integrated effort by local public bodies, interest groups and service users (Cairney & Oliver, 2017). Relatedly, Gambrill (2008) argues that, in addition to its epistemological claims, evidence-informed policy refers to an ‘ethic’  – a process of reflection and critical appraisal intended to empower those previously marginalised in decision-making processes to participate and ensure accountability

2.4  The Influence of Institutions on Evidence Uptake

for results. In summary, this strand of the constructivist view emphasises the processes and mechanisms required to enable knowledge exchange and privileges multi-stakeholder engagement, guided by values of openness and transparency, considering it necessary to facilitate deliberative processes. From the beginning of the EBP debate to more recent EIP arguments, we see a shift from an attempt to identify ‘objective’ inputs to decision-­ making processes to a more normative debate concerned with process and the conditions for evidence uptake. Relating to conditions is the matter of institutional context and the setting within which evidence dialogues and policy decisions take place. Much of the EIP literature alludes to the important role of institutions and yet policy scholars have been markedly silent on how different scales of institution and how different levels of international decision-making might affect EIP processes. Of particular interest in this analysis is how these processes play out in large international institutions of governance and, specifically, with the senior-most policy setting body in the world – the UNGA.

2.4 The Influence of Institutions on Evidence Uptake Institutions and organisational culture are common terms within EIP literature. The difference between institutions and organisations is however an important distinction. Whilst the two terms have been used synonymously in the past, today organisations are considered to be structures with unitary objectives, whilst institutions are generally viewed more broadly as the formal rules, informal customs or norms and patterns of behaviours that govern economic, political and social interaction (North, 1990; Stanford, 2014; Hodgson, 2015). Institutionalism within political science and public policy literature has a long tradition with a wide range of emphases, relating to the rules that govern political interaction, the powers conferred to different actors, unwritten norms and recurrent behaviours, as well as analytical concepts such as how to ascertain institu-

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tional change over time (Lowndes, 2010; Cairney, 2011). Whilst it is a tricky literature to pin down, and the terms used are very broadly defined, new institutionalism (which is not new but emerged in the 1970s, proposed by sociologist John Meyer) offers a broad set of analytical approaches (including historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism) that can be used to analyse the rules and norms which guide political processes (DiMaggio, 1998) and de facto offers insights into their take up of evidence. Rational choice institutionalism, for example, emphasises how individual decisions dictate actors’ engagement with institutions and provides ways of thinking about the incentives for individuals to engage (Shepsle, 2008). The problem with such an approach, as noted by March and Olson (1984) amongst others, is that this rational approach underestimates the influence that the institution may have upon the actors in question and how their inputs might be shaped by the parameters within which they are engaging. By way of example and using this logic, one may assume that non-state actors choose to engage in UN recognised ‘Major Groups’3 as they will get more recognition within UN dialogues, and in turn the evidence they present will receive more ­prominence. However, this rational choice fails to account for the fact that being part of a Major Group may constrain their ability to make unilateral arguments and/or to advocate via other informal channels. The rational choice approach also underestimates the fluidity of people’s incentives ‘Since the first United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992  – known as the Earth Summit – it was recognised that achieving sustainable development would require the active participation of all sectors of society and all types of people. Agenda 21, adopted at the Earth Summit, drew upon this sentiment and formalised nine sectors of society as the main channels through which broad participation would be facilitated in UN activities related to sustainable development. These are officially called ‘Major Groups’ and include the following sectors: ‘Women, Children and Youth, Indigenous Peoples, Non-Governmental Organisations, Local Authorities, Workers and Trade Unions, Business and Industry, Scientific and Technological Community, and Farmers.’ UN (2020) https://sustainabledevelopment. un.org/majorgroups/about (Last accessed 7 May 2020). 3 

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

as well as the often-inconsistent nature of the institutions. In the case of the Major Groups, these have been in existence since 1992 and there is an expectation that they are invited into UNGA Member State dialogues. Nonetheless, there is no binding agreement on how this should be done and the process is often inconsistent, with Major Group representatives often finding themselves purely observers to dialogues rather than active participants (Joshi, 2016). Historical institutionalism is another new institutional approach which can offer insights into patterns of change and continuity within the UN’s institutional development (Pierson, 2004; Rixen & Viola, 2016), which may in turn affect evidence and policy practices. Wendt (1995) articulated this most succinctly when he said that interactions and practices repeated over time create structures that are often reproduced. Therefore, understanding the history of evidence use and practices within the UN since its inception, and/or over the duration of a long negotiation process, can help us to understand its role and value as of the present day. Assumed within this is a sociological notion that institutions tend to be stable and change slowly over time as ideas, norms and cultures change (Klotz, 1995), as opposed to the more rational choice institutionalism that hypothesises institutional change as occurring when the institutional dynamics no longer provide benefits to the membership (Shepsle, 2008). Usefully, historical institutionalism provides analytical approaches for understanding potential stasis or change. Concepts such as path dependence, critical junctures and sequencing provide frameworks for understanding institutional dynamics over long periods of time (Rixen & Viola, 2016). Path dependence is the idea that once an institution has adopted a given approach, it can take time and be increasingly difficult for it to evolve (Mayhew, 2009). Critical junctures relate to exogenous events that interrupt stability and change the patterns of behaviour of the institution (Pierson, 2000). Finally, sequencing relates to event chains whereby actions trigger reactions and ongoing institutional evolution. It should be noted, however, that one of the major critiques of historical institutionalism is its wooliness about what con-

stitutes ‘change’ or ‘stability’ (e.g. Thelen, 2003). Rixen and Viola (2016) attempted to respond to this critique by using three principles to analyse stability and change – speed (the rate of change), scope (the extent of the difference) and depth (and the degree to which the features change). Whilst scope and depth are intuitive means of assessing change, other institutionalists have questioned the utility of speed as a barometer, pointing to long-term, slow-moving changes to narrative and culture that impact an institution over time as profoundly as more reactive, short-­ term fluctuations in policy and practice. This is particularly relevant when considering policy processes at different scales, as processes of change are likely to be particularly slow within large, bureaucratic multi-state institutions such as the UN. For example, Haas (1990) studied changing scientific ideas and their impact on the institutional system, contending that from the seventeenth century onwards, scientific ideas have permeated international politics with ‘deep constitutive effects.’ He concludes, ‘science, in short, influences the way politics is done’ (Haas, 1990; 11). Allan (2018) expands upon this argument, suggesting that scientific concepts of improvement informed the British colonial effort and were ‘transformed into the goal of economic development’ as new economic techniques were used to represent state goals in statistical terms as gross national product and, later, gross domestic product (Allan, 2018; 4). Mokyr (2016) also stresses the pivotal role of scientific evidence in shaping the dominant international paradigms on growth and industrialisation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which are reflected in our institutions of global governance. An interesting point of cross-over between this institutionalist literature and that of current EIP scholarship relates to theoretical framing. Both approaches suggest that the way science is presented or ‘framed’ is fundamental as it helps to package problems and solutions and can help to change the way people (in this case policymakers) structure and orient their thinking about a given problem.4 As noted by behavioural economists Gilad, Kaish and Loeb as early as 1984. 4 

2.4  The Influence of Institutions on Evidence Uptake

In the context of the UNGA, and for the purposes of this analysis, a consideration of the institutional literature is helpful in so far as it can provide analytical frames with which to examine the formal institutional arrangements of the General Assembly and their receptiveness to evidence inputs and actors. Formal institutional arrangements might include which Member State has which seat, how many seats per country, which country chairs proceedings, the format of the deliberation, to what external inputs are invited and the provisions made for technical support and so on. But as emphasised by the newer constructivist strand of the institutional debate, it is also important to employ a more fluid understanding of institutions and consider informal arrangements that may, in some instances, strongly influence proceedings (Cairney, 2011). Similarly, it is important to employ a pluralistic understanding of the different actors involved, including epistemic communities who are fundamental to global decision-making as part of an intricate web of state and non-state actors (Brolan & Hill, 2016). This in turn requires consideration of the informal arrangements through which epistemic communities engaged with proceedings and the extent to which there were unwritten, informal institutional norms guiding their inputs or whether their engagement was more opportunistic and ad hoc. Implicit in much of this institutionalist policy literature is the importance of the sites of interaction – the physical forums within which negotiations are conducted and interactions between stakeholders take place. In the field of human geography, the importance of location for affecting the development of knowledge has been written about extensively as the ‘geography of science’; a key argument of which is the influence particular policy contexts have in subtly shaping the production of science (Demerrit, 2001, 2006). In recent years, arguments about the importance of place for the production of knowledge have been further refined to consider not only the impact of sites of interaction but also how those sites affect knowledge co-production – what Mahony and Hulme refer to as ‘epistemic geography’. Specifically, this term refers to ‘the

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spatialities of the interactional co-production of knowledge’ (Mahony & Hulme, 2018; 1). Whilst Mahony and Hulme examine this with reference to the production of scientific knowledge relating to climate change, the same approach could be employed with reference to political outcomes – exploring how the sites of interaction between scientists, policymakers and advocates affect the knowledge that is ultimately translated into the political outcome document. For example, those who are ‘geographically privileged’ and are granted access to sites of interaction and negotiation are more likely to find their inputs being afforded credibility (Shapin, 1988; 373). They also explore the notion of the ‘field’ and the dissonance between those who accumulate their knowledge from outside exploration and those who purely crunch numbers (Ibid). This is a tension that also resonates with the political negotiation process as the divergence between the experts, invited into the proceedings to present ‘objective knowledge’ and the practitioners and advocates, eager to inject proposals rooted in human experience and participatory processes. The significance of place for the creation and transmission of knowledge is central to this analysis as it is the study of the production of shared political outcomes within a specific institutional setting  – the UN General Assembly. But it is important to also take note of the informal sites of interaction and knowledge exchange, outside of the UN corridors, and how negotiations in these arenas may influence the coherence of the epistemic communities and the messages that they share within the formal proceedings. For example, as discussed in Chap. 3, the health community organised much of their input to the post-­ 2015 deliberations through a large, UN-coordinated thematic consultation, involving many thousands of people and a series of global in-person meetings. For the urban community, however, which did not enjoy any kind of formal UN facilitation, meetings and dialogues were more opportunistic and oftentimes virtual, thereby affecting the coherence and structure of their inputs. In summary, many aspects of recent EIP theories have great potential to be applied to pro-

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

cesses within the UN, as they suggest that evidence-informed policy development is both a matter of supply-side engineering (the types of evidence presented) and a question of demand-­ side capacities and needs (e.g. education levels). Furthermore, it is strongly impacted by the surrounding ecosystem, including institutional form. Proponents of an institutional approach to EIP emphasise the importance of understanding rules and norms, which affect how evidence is sourced, analysed and circulated within the policy process (Jones et  al., 2013). The argument builds upon those of Weiss (1977) who argued that evidence uptake is an active process, in which evidence actors must navigate layers of barriers and contingencies in the evidence-policy ecosystem (Weiss, 1977), including understanding how to communicate evidence across fixed and informal institutional entities (Sutcliffe & Court, 2005; Chupein & Glennester, 2018). All of these lead us to a consideration of both the formal arrangements through which external stakeholders, including scientists and academics, were invited into official UN proceedings and the informal arrangements through which non-state actors engaged with the process, including the unwritten rules and norms which influenced how and where they provided input. It also encourages practical reflection upon what should be the institutional mechanisms and arrangements within an institution like the UN which might better encourage the uptake and combining of evidence with other political considerations (Culyer & Lomas, 2006).

2.5 A Framework for Analysing Evidence Uptake in Multilateral Policy Processes Drawing upon the EIP literature, I propose a framework for analysing the influence of scientific evidence on policy processes within the UN, using the SDGs’ formulation as a case study. I

theorise that the likelihood of scientific evidence being taken up within multilateral policy development will be influenced not only by the formal institutional parameters of the UNGA but also by the evidence culture across the institution, as well as the actions and messaging of epistemic communities seeking to influence the process. More specifically, the uptake of science can be observed and assessed through representation and access, the organisation of epistemic communities, framing and presentation, and temporal dynamics.

2.5.1 Representation and Access Representation is the activity of making citizen’s voices and opinions visible in public policy discussions (Pitkin, 1967). Pitkin differentiates between representation as acting for or standing for, i.e. acting for is the notion that in some political contexts individuals act on behalf of another individual or group such as a democratic government acting for its citizenry (as per Hobbes 1651 conceptualisation of representation in the ‘Leviathan’), whereas standing for pertains to the interests of an individual or collective being represented to another party in a deliberative forum (Pitkin, 1967). In this analysis, representation of scientific actors is considered in the sites of formal proceedings – within the parliamentary arrangements of the UNGA and its system of representative seats (such as those held by scientific actors within the Major Group on Science and Technology), scientific panel discussions convened under the auspices of the President of the General Assembly or the negotiating Co-chairs, or any other mechanism which formally invited the inputs of external, non-political stakeholders and scientific statement claims raised by Member States, as they attempt to stand for or reflect the inputs of domestic constituencies including scientists. Access is taken to refer to the opportunities non-state actors had to engage with political negotiators throughout the proceedings either independently or as part of an epistemic community. Also important are the different engagement mechanisms available for non-state actors, which might include written inputs, bilateral

2.5  A Framework for Analysing Evidence Uptake in Multilateral Policy Processes

meetings,5 oral presentations or panel discussions, and/or the transmission of research through those with strong political connections such as policy advisers within the UN Secretariat or Co-chair teams.6

2.5.2 The Organisation of Epistemic Communities A crucial consideration which draws upon arguments from both policy studies and political science is the organisation and structure of the various thematic and political coalitions engaging with proceedings and the visibility of scientific actors within these. For the purposes of this analysis, these coalitions are referred to as epistemic communities, as per Haas’ (1992) definition, namely they are coalitions of actors (not only academics and professionals but also advocates) who share a set of common characteristics, including a shared set of beliefs about a given topic’s importance, have a level of professional and technical expertise and, perhaps most importantly, share a conviction of the necessity to engage with (international) policy processes to effect positive change on their given issue. Within the specific context of a UN process, these epistemic communities can be clustered into four groups: issues-based advocacy coalitions, expert groups, political interest groups and regional coalitions (see Table  2.1). All of these are assumed to have a level of expertise and professional experience on the topic in question. Organisationally, at the one end are advocacy coalitions, ‘people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group As noted by Algers (2014), ‘During public meetings, members of NGOs have access to representatives of states and members of secretariats in corridors, in meeting rooms, and in various eating and drinking facilities at these headquarters… NGOs with formal consultative status, and also many others, have access to “diplomats” in these parliamentary headquarters that is not equaled in the capitals of the state system’ (Alger, 2014; 112). 6  Previously referred to as ‘knowledge intermediaries’ (Jones et al., 2013). 5 

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Table 2.1  Examples of formal institutions and epistemic communities associated with the UNGA and formal and informal engagement mechanisms Formal institutions and organisations UN General Assembly UN Secretariat

UN System Task Team, including various Technical Support Teamsssa

Open Working Group on Sustainable Developmenta High Level Panel of Eminent Personsa UN Agencies including UNDP, UNDESA, UNSD UN Statistical Commission and IEAG on SDG Indicators Major Groups including on Science and Technology Formal engagement mechanisms  OWG and IGN deliberations with Member States statements Statements from UN from Major Groups UN-supported national consultations Global Thematic Consultations  UN TST Briefings

Epistemic communities Issue-Based Advocacy Coalitions (like the Major Group for Children and Youth) Expert groups (like the Inter-Agency Expert Group for Child Mortality Estimation) Political interest groups such as Friends’ groups made up of supportive Member State coalitions, like the Friends of the SDGs, Friends of Cities, Friends of Water Regional negotiation blocks like the Latin American group or the Group of 77

Informal engagement mechanisms Academic journal special editions, editorials and articles

My World Consultative Process Bilateral meetings with Member States and Ambassadors Informal written submissions to individual Member States/ OWG and IGN Co-chairs Public events Member State retreats

Source: Author’s own a An institution established by the UN Secretary General, UNGA or Agencies specifically for the post-2015 deliberations (not a permanent, standing institution)

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

leaders, researchers) who share a particular belief system – i.e. a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions  – and who show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time’ (Sabatier, 1988; 139). At the other end are political power blocks like the G77 and other regional groupings, who have a set of regularised arrangements and engagement mechanisms: rotating chairs, regular meetings, shared written statements and so on (UN, 2022b). In this analysis these political power blocs are less the focus, more so the organised advocacy coalitions and expert groups who mobilised to advance specific topics and within which scientific voices were, theoretically, most prominent. One assumption I seek to interrogate is that the structure and coherence of these epistemic communities will determine the effectiveness of their input and influence in the deliberative proceedings. Specifically, the more formalised these communities become, through repeated practices and behaviours, the more influential they may be. As Haas described with regard to national epistemic communities, ‘to the extent to which an epistemic community consolidates bureaucratic power… it stands to institutional its influence and insinuate its views into broader international politics’ (Haas, 1992; 4). Within the formal arrangements of the UNGA and amongst the epistemic communities that mobilised around the proceedings, I have sought to understand the access of scientists and academics, vis-à-vis other interests and lobby groups, and how this has changed over time, specifically over the course of the deliberations from 2012 to 2015. It has been important to interrogate not only their physical access to the UN deliberations and deliberators but also the resources available to each stakeholder group, assuming that both human and financial resources may make it easier for groups to meet, coalesce, forge consensus positions and engage with key political actors and influencers (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993). Also, important to establish, where possible, are the informal institutional norms which guide the interactions of negotiators and epistemic communities, as well as political and interpersonal relationships, which can often

‘override established political procedures’ (Jones et al., 2013; 4).

2.5.3 Framing and Presentation A common theme across the policy and institutions literature is the importance of coherent, well-unified messaging or ‘framing’ within each epistemic community, using science to validate not only key arguments but also moral or emotional arguments to make the science more compelling (cf. Lewis, 2013). I analyse  the concept of framing through a critical examination of the presentation of different arguments; the expression and phraseology used in advocacy papers and evidence inputs, and whether, how and if this is taken up by Member States and reused in the deliberative chamber, made visible through transcripts and recorded statements. Related to the presentation and framing of evidence are the modes different epistemic communities and scientific actors within them may use to communicate their inputs; for example, scientists may position their research alongside common narratives, choosing to align themselves to an overarching advocacy theme, through which to subtly seep in their evidence inputs. They may also choose to present their evidence directly but spend time on evidence translation and simplification, potentially using a knowledge intermediary to help ensure it is accessible to political negotiators. Lastly, some scientists may act independently and lean solely on the rigour and weight of their evidence  – often using ­quantitative figures or graphics to highlight key outcomes and risks.

2.5.4 Temporal Dynamics: Concurrency and Prolonged Engagements Cutting across these practical elements is the concept of time. First, it is important to note the expected concurrency of events, i.e. the fact that there can be multiple activities and modes of

2.5  A Framework for Analysing Evidence Uptake in Multilateral Policy Processes

engagement running at any one given time. The concurrency of policy deliberations and the notion of multiple overlapping policy cycles have been well documented by Sabatier (1988) and Cairney (2016) amongst others. Within a multilateral forum one would expect the number of overlapping policy processes to be multiplied, with discussions happening concurrently within the halls of the international arena (the UNGA), the parallel forums and side meetings, in other international spaces, and within local and national institutions. Second is the notion of prolonged engagement, as political influencing is not assumed to be a static one-off process, but a gradual seeping of evidence and ideas into the political discourse (Jones et al., 2013). However, it is also noted that strategic inputs at opportune political moments (which play to emotions and unconscious biases) may also be effective at encouraging the uptake of key messages given the time poverty and pressure of many deliberators. And as such, effective epistemic communities and within them, knowledge actors, are expected to have engaged over a protracted period of time and across multiple concurrent policy deliberations to communicate key messages and ideas to deliberators. Implicit in each of the points above is an insight into institutional culture and the historical practices of evidence use within the institutions under consideration. Cutting across all of my analysis is an intention to understand the current evidence culture within and across the UNGA, and to do so through observation of its stasis and change, over the period of analysis (2012–2015). Institutional culture is here defined as common language (concepts and ideas, as opposed to linguistics), practices and norms (adapted from Jappie, 2019; Swidler, 1986; Foucault, 1975). In the context of the UNGA, evidence cultures are made evident through spoken language and written texts in which there are repeated phrases or ‘cycles’ of discourse (Scollon & Scollon, 2004). These cycles might be evident in speeches of the President of the General Assembly, Member States, Co-chairs and facilitators; participative institutional practices (as discussed above) and

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official documents prepared by the UN secretariat or via other technical partnerships (e.g. between Co-chairs and scientific or advisory networks). Whilst there are six official working languages of the UN, all of the post-2015 deliberative proceedings were conducted in English which in and of itself suggests a likely Anglo-centric evidence tradition. It is worth noting some inherent limitations and assumptions underpinning this framework and analysis. I have focused predominantly upon the mechanisms through which evidence is conveyed to policymakers  – the institutions and activities of epistemic communities – and not on the inputs themselves, beyond considering how they are being communicated. In considering the influence of the urban scientific community upon the formation of SDG 11, for example, I examine submission documents and written sources. I do not assess the scientific and academic quality of these sources but instead explore whether key concepts and terms from within these documents are reflected in the final negotiation text. Although valid arguments have been made on the need for better evidence hierarchies and categorisations within social science, for this analysis, I have assumed that any scientific evidence which is conveyed to the UNGA has already been through some form of formal scientific peer review, or at the very least is being proposed by scholars who have a rigorous track record of published academic work. Furthermore, my aim has been to shed light not on the practical challenges of evidence production, but on the application deficit; the notion that just because you have access to and understand evidence doesn’t mean you’ll use it and, therefore, what causes the privileging of some forms of evidence and input over others (Biesta, 2007)? Additionally, much has been written about the risk of politicising evidence (e.g. Henig, 2009) and that policy-relevant science is inherently ‘value-laden’ (Douglas, 2009; 112). While the way evidence is interpreted and communicated is always open to manipulation, I do not dwell on these arguments, as it is assumed that a multilateral process involving such a wide

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2  Scientific Evidence in Policy Processes: Concepts and Histories

variety of political actors and viewpoints will help to moderate any kind of evidence manipulation. In the proceeding sections, Chaps. 3 and 4, the above considerations are explored and tested with regard to three case study sectors: health, urban and data. For each topic, the key ideological and conceptual debates are discussed, having been identified through literature review and key

informant interview. My intention is to understand the key advocacy messages used by  each epistemic community, how evidence-informed their messages were, how they engaged with the formal proceedings, and which of their ideas and concepts were then taken-up, visible in Member State statements, written inputs, co-chair summaries or in the final OWG and IWN outcome documents.

3

Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

Keywords

Archival methods · Textual analysis · Key informant interviews · Consultations · Open Working Group · High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda · Major groups · Universal health coverage · Equity · Urban complexity · Governance · Data revolution · Data-based decision-making · Accountability · Quantification Chapter 2 of this book introduced the key literature within which this investigation is situated. Scholarship from policy studies and political science provides insights into how different communities coalesce around issues, attempt to communicate their evidence and arguments, and the potential institutional aides and barriers to this. But applying this literature to a process as broad and diverse as the SDG negotiations, within an institutional setting as large as the UNGA, is very hard. Thousands of people provided input, in one way or another, to the post-­2015 deliberations and each goal area (as well as the many topics that did not become goals) enjoyed lengthy debates both inside of and outside of the formal deliberation chambers, suggesting there is not one objective evidence to policy process which needs to be understood but instead a wide range of processes across different sectors and scales. The original version of this chapter was revised. The correction to this book is available at https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_6

To help focus this analysis and to provide an intersectoral perspective on these processes, Chap. 3 focuses on three very diverse themes of the debate; health, urban sustainability and data. I trace the key conceptual issues that were under discussion within each, noting the topics under debate and the supporters and adversaries of each. This kind of detailed thematic analysis is essential to understand the nuances of negotiations and how broad issues are translated into given words, phrases and ideas eventually featured in outcome documents. It also helps identify what, if any, were the key entry points for scientists and academics to provide their evidence. Finally, mapping the transmission of ideas and concepts also enables the identification of consensus-building processes that helped actors in each epistemic community to coalesce around priority themes and to forge political consensus on the eventual wording.

3.1 Outline of the Post-2015 Deliberative Process and Key Actors This book and the research underpinning it focuses on what is known as the ‘Post-2015’ process,1 which ran from 2012 to 2015 under the After the set of 17 goals had been decided upon by the Open Working Group (in 2014) the deliberation process was informally redubbed the ‘SDG negotiations.’ Both Post-2015 and SDG negotiations are used interchangeably throughout the text. 1 

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, Corrected Publication 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_3

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

auspices of the UNGA. While the MDGs were essentially devised by a small group of UN committees, the UN Secretary General (2013) called for something radically different with the post-­ 2015 agenda; an unprecedented global consultative effort to define the SDGs, including regional thematic consultations, public opini-on surveys, formal and informal presentations to deliberators, and so on (Fukuda-Parr, 2019; Kamau et al., 2018). The UN Development Group called it an attempt to have a ‘global conversation’ (UNDG, 2013; iii). The call for a broad, inclusive deliberation process was catalysed by the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio  +  20) which took place in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 2012. At Rio + 20 Member States called for an innovative process to determine a set of sustainable development goals, focused on the environment but also including broader socio-­ economic concerns, as detailed in the Millennium Development Goals. They also called for the creation of an ‘Open Working Group’; ‘an inclusive and transparent intergovernmental process… open to all stakeholders, with a view to developing global sustainable development goals to be agreed by the General Assembly’ (UN, 2012a; para 248). The idea of an Open Working Group was considered particularly innovative, as it attempted to move the negotiations out of a full UN General Assembly proceeding and into a smaller, more workable negotiation forum, with more space for dialogue and external stakeholder participation. The proposal was considered institutionally disruptive and, as documented by the Colombian lead negotiator to the SDGs (Paula Caballero), was initially strongly opposed to by a wide range of stakeholders (Caballero, 2016). The two most important political decision-­ making processes for the post-2015 framework shown in Fig.  3.1, from 2013 to 2015, were the Open Working Group (OWG) (top, in green) and the Intergovernmental (Member State) negotiations (IGN) (right, in yellow). All of the other processes were inputs to the negotiations or were parallel political negotiations (such as the Climate Change Negotiations at COP21, in purple).

During the OWG there were 30 seats allocated to Member States (UN, 2013c). To accommodate the large number of Member States wanting to be involved (a total of 69  – a third of all UNGA members), there was a unique system of ‘troikas’ established whereby Member States shared seats and were forced to come up with common negotiation positions (UN, 2013a, b, c, d). The OWG was not intended to come up with a definitive set of goals but to make a ‘proposal for sustainable development goals for consideration and appropriate action’ by the UN General Assembly at its 68th session in 2014 (UN, 2012a; para 248). Nevertheless, so intense was the deliberation process that once a common framework had been developed, Member States were reluctant to unravel any of it in the subsequent IGN. According to Tony Pipa, USA Special Envoy to the SDG Negotiations, ‘it was so hard to get to it [an agreement] and there were so many political compromises, to pull the thread would then unravel the whole thing’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). As a result, the latter negotiations, involving all members of the UNGA, focused more on refining targets, quantifying them where possible, specifying means of implementation, and engaging with the monitoring and evaluation process that would accompany the goals. A wide variety of mechanisms were initiated by the UN (specifically the Secretary-General, UNDP and UNDESA) to invite non-­governmental input into the negotiations, including global thematic and country consultations, statements issued in the deliberation chamber by Major Groups and invited experts, as well as open calls for evidence managed by the UN’s N ­ on-­Governmental Liaison service. It should be noted that although it was UN actors and agencies initiating these consultations, these were ad hoc processes convened specifically to inform the post-2015 deliberations. Only the participation of the Major Groups was a standing institutional arrangement. Therefore, whilst the process created multiple, new opportunities for scientific input, it also fragmented the conduits for influence. For scientists and academics, there were six formal opportunities to provide input into process;

3.1  Outline of the Post-2015 Deliberative Process and Key Actors

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Fig. 3.1  Consultative and political processes feeding into the 2015 SDG Summit. (Source: UN Foundation (2013; 1))

1. National consultation mechanisms: In advance of 2015, 88 countries organised national consultations on the countries’ SDG negotiation positions, inviting civil society, private companies and academia to provide inputs (Siddiqui et al., 2014). At least 45 lowand middle-income countries were supported to do so with seed funding from the UN system (UNDG, 2013). The UN issued guidelines to support these dialogues which expressly called for the participation of ‘academia, media, private sector, civil society and decision makers’ with the express aim of broadening ‘the analytical base for global goals’ whilst also encouraging participation, voice and agency (UNDP, 2012b; 13). The ambition espoused by the UN was that the results of these consultations would inform national deliberative positions and in doing so feed into the intergovernmental debate (Ibid). 2. Global thematic consultations: In 2012, the UN Development Group announced that it would facilitate 11 global thematic consulta-

tions on the post-2015 Agenda. The consultations would be chaired by 2 UN Agencies with support from 2 Member States. The results of the consultations would be used to ‘inform the report of the UN Secretary-­ General on the post-2015 framework’ issued in December 2013 (IISD, 2013; para 1). The 11 themes were as follows: Food and Nutrition; Conflict, Violence, Disaster; Environmental Sustainability; Energy; Inequalities; Water; Governance; Education; Population Dynamics; Health; and Growth and Employment. In each of these global consultations, academia, media, the private sector, employers and trade unions and civil society were encouraged to participate (Ibid). It is interesting to note upfront that these 11 themes do not map onto the 17 topics that would eventually become the goals, nor did they explicitly take up cross-cutting issues like data. 3. UN Academic Committees and Networks: Across multiple arms of the UN, various aca-

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

demic committees were invited to provide input to the deliberations. For example, in 2012, the Committee on Development Policy (CDP) prepared a policy note on UN Development Strategy Beyond 2015 (UNDESA, 2020a, b). The CDP is a subsidiary of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) comprised of independent expert members tasked with providing recommendations to ECOSOC on the development progress of Least Developed Countries. The UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UNSDSN) was another key academic forum: a global research network established by the UN Secretary-General in 2013 but housed outside of the UN, at Columbia University under Professor Jeffrey Sachs, with the express purpose of soliciting international academic input on the future development agenda, and subsequently supporting its implementation. The  UNSDSN network published reports and policy notes during the deliberations, disseminating them directly amongst Member States and communicating them to the UN Secretary-General (e.g. UNSDSN, 2013a, b; Nyasimi & Peake, 2015). 4. Scientific Major Group: The Scientific and Technological Major Group is a representative group under the auspices of the UNGA responsible for collating the perspectives of the scientific community and delivering statements on their behalf to Member States. It is one of 9 Major Groups established at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (see footnote 11 above). Throughout the post-2015 deliberations, this Group was chaired by The International Council for Science (now the International Science Council), which brings together 40 international scientific Unions and Associations and over 140 national and regional scientific organisations, including Academies and Research Councils. 5. OWG dialogues and scientific panels: During the course of the OWG deliberations, Co-­Chairs Ambassador Kamau of Kenya and Ambassador Korosi of Hungary invited in non-governmental experts from academia, the

UN system, and civil society to help inform deliberations. For example, at the Seventh Open Working Group Session non-­ governmental experts were invited to present to the Member States on the new science of  urbanisation, sustainable production and consumption and climate change, as well as to provide written inputs (e.g. UN, 2014b). 6. Data and statistics: Scientists and academics provided data and statistical inputs to the UN and to Member States to understand progress and setbacks on key MDG areas, with the hope these would inform design of successor goals, targets and indicators. For example, the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), at the University of Washington, helped to produce the Under 5 Mortality Statistics that were used to track MDG 4, target A (Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate) and define the scope of a new child mortality target. Whilst the UN itself did not have a formal multi-stakeholder consultation on the SDG indicator selection process (instead establishing a technical Inter-Agency and Expert Group in March 2015), the UN-affiliated UNSDSN did invite the input of academics and scientists in discussions about indicator formulation for their report Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the SDGs, which involved an 18-month consultation period and more than 500 organisations’ inputs (Schmidt-­ Traub et al., 2015). In addition to these formal institutional arrangements and means of interaction, non-­ governmental actors, including scientists and academics, utilised and employed a wide arrange of informal mechanisms and modes. Senit (2019) refers to these as ‘insider tactics’ to influence Member States’ positions and cites examples of coalitions providing comments on negotiating texts, providing relevant scientific information at strategic times in the negotiation and lobbying, both in bilateral meetings and by hosting side events at the same time as formal proceedings (Senit, 2019). The effectiveness and influence of these approaches is a point examined in Sect. 3.4.

3.1  Outline of the Post-2015 Deliberative Process and Key Actors

As a formal UNGA process, the official negotiators throughout the post-2015 process were Member States. Most of the negotiation was done by Ambassadors to the UN or their staff, or by Foreign Secretaries, but at the final SDG Summit in September 2015, 193 Heads of State and Government were present and endorsed the Agenda. Member States’ work was guided by a series of technical inputs from a special UN Task-­ Team on Post-2015 (comprised of technical leads from UN Agencies, shepherded by UNDESA), by affiliated UN Groups like the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UNSDSN), as well as Secretary General Commissioned reports, like that of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the post-2015 Agenda (HLP). Invited to the proceedings to provide formal inputs were specialist organisations like the World Health Organisation (WHO), alongside other UN agencies, large multilateral entities such as the World Bank, Global Fund for Aids, TB and Malaria (GFATM) and The President’s Emergency Fund (PEPFAR), academics (as guest speakers and via academic networks such as the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network) and philanthropists (such as the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations). Representative members of the UN’s Major Groups (formal associations for nine sectors of society to be visible in UNGA processes) were also present during the deliberations as observers to the process. Finally, the Co-Chairs of the deliberations (the Ambassadors of Hungary and Kenya during the OWG and then Kenya and Ireland during the IGN) also invited in external experts for ad hoc special sessions, including academics, advocates and practitioners.2 The dedicated UN Task Team supporting the political process was not only responsible for collating the opinions of the various agency actors but also synthesising the inputs from the global thematic and country consultations. The formaNegotiation documents including Member State statements, guest presentations, co-chair summaries, Technical Support Team briefings, and records of participants are available on the UN’s Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, specifically the pages on the post2015 negotiation: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ post2015 (Last accessed 10 June 2022) 2 

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tion of the health goal, for example, involved the broadest global consultation process of any of the SDGs: Over 150,000 people from all regions visited the consultation website (https://www.worldwewant2015.org/health). Over 100 papers were submitted by a wide range of organisations and authors, and 14 face-to-face meetings attracted over 1,600 people in places as far apart as La Paz, Dar es Salaam, Abuja, Amsterdam, New  York, Beijing, and Bangkok. (McManus, 2013; 7)

Following the compilation of all of these inputs, a draft report was prepared by the Task Team for the Global Thematic Consultation on Health in the Post-2015 Development Agenda, chaired by WHO, UNICEF and the Governments of Botswana and Sweden (McManus, 2013). The majority of those involved in the global consultation, and particularly of those submitting written inputs, were representatives from civil society groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the People’s Health Movement, Action for Global Health, Alzheimer’s Disease International, Health Poverty Action, Save the Children and many others. Out of a total of 99 written inputs received by the Task Team coordinating the consultation process, 65 were from NGOs, with the remainder from academics, Foundations, UN Agencies and bilateral donors (McManus, 2013; 82–100). Academics were however also present in the large Major Group health thematic cluster, for example, Keely Bisch from the Lancet Commission on Investing in Health was a representative. In the urban and data sectors, the consultative process was less expansive, as there was no UN-organised global thematic consultation. For urban actors, this resulted in the creation of various NGO and practitioner coalitions, such as The Global Taskforce for Local and Regional Government on Post-2015 and the ‘UrbanSDG Campaign’. The Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments established in 2013, intended to build on the contributions of local government networks to Rio + 20 and the HLP. It aimed to bring together the major international networks of local and regional governments to build a joint advocacy strategy for the Post-2015

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

Agenda and related international policy debates, push for an urban SDG’ (Parnell, 2016; 536). including the ‘Habitat III, Climate Change, disas- Key spokespeople within the coalition included ter risk reduction, and Financing for Development Dr. Cynthia Rosenzweig of the NASA Goddard processes’ (The Global Taskforce, 2016; 15). The Institute at Columbia University; Aromar Revi of UrbanSDG Campaign was also established in the Indian Institute of Human Settlements; Prof. 2013, by the Sustainable Development Solutions Eugenie Birch of University of Pennsylvania; Network, with the support of UN Habitat, UCLG, Prof. David Simon of the University of Cities Alliance, ICLEI, Metropolis, and Gothenburg; Dr. Edgar Pieterse of the University Communitas Coalition for Sustainable Cities and of Cape Town; Dr. David Satterthwaite of Regions, and was a more diverse, multi-­ International Institute for Environment and stakeholder group. Between 2013 and 2015, it Development (IIED), UK; Professor Susan attracted more than 60 institutional members and Parnell of the University of Cape Town; and Dr. more than 200 city and regional governments Debra Roberts of EThekwini Municipality, South supporters.3 The campaign aimed to bring actors Africa. All of these actors had been writing together to advocate for and design an urban extensively on urban planning and sustainability SDG, including its targets and indicators. Crucial for decades prior to the negotiations commencecontributors to the campaign were groups like ment, and contributed policy ideas rooted in the UNSDSN and Communitas who worked to bring latest urban sustainability science. together supportive Member State representaOn both health and urban topics, academics tives in New York, such as the Friends of Cities engaged in the deliberations through a wide varicoalition (including various Latin American ety of non-formal or pre-existing channels. The countries, Singapore and so on), and to provide health sector is somewhat unique in international them with useful inputs for their deliberations. policymaking within the UN due to a long, existThe contribution of this coalition effort was con- ing tradition of academic and scientific consultasiderable; ‘Even before the SDGs were finalised, tion, even before the post-2015 negotiation mayors and local leaders successfully pushed for process began (Marten, 2019). For example, as a dedicated goal to “make cities inclusive, safe noted above, many of the MDGs were routinely and resilient and sustainable” (goal 11) through monitored by external academic agencies. The the global Campaign for an Urban SDG’ (Greene UN’s inter-agency group for child mortality esti& Meixell, 2017; 1). It is important to note that mation (formed in 2004) included a technical although the Taskforce and Campaign were both advisory group comprised of leading academic initiated in 2013 and worked closely together, the scholars, experts in demography, biostatistics and Taskforce has continued long after the so on, for example, from the University of Campaign’s dissolution becoming a standing, Washington’s Institute of Health Metrics and regular platform for local government engage- Evaluation (IHME). These actors were comment in UN concerns. monly consulted on child health policy issues and A unique attribute of the UrbanSDG cam- routinely worked with agencies like UNICEF, paign was that it was not just made up of advo- amongst others. In addition, influential academic cates and city representatives. Scientists and journals like The Lancet and British Medical urban academics were also actively involved– Journal followed the progress of the post-2015 both as members of UNSDSN cities, and as a deliberations, inviting academics to provide comcore constituency in their own right – helping to mentary and inputs, for example, through a spedevelop the group’s positions and policy outputs. cial issue and subsequent commentaries, they did So much so that it has been argued the campaign a lot to draw attention to the issue of Universal provided the ‘key intellectual energy behind the Health Coverage (UHC) in the deliberations (The Lancet, 2012; Vega, 2013; Evans et  al., 2012). 3  According to the group’s website: https://urbansdg.org/ One systematic attempt to consult a cross section And seconded by Revi (2019; PC). of global health academics was conducted by the

3.2  An Introduction to the Debates Relating to Public Health, Urban Sustainability and Data

UNSDSN. Their health thematic network, which consisted of 18 world leading health practitioners and academics, actively contributed to the development of UNSDSN’s Action Agenda for Sustainable Development (released in June 2013), which included a proposal for one health goal: ‘Achieve Health and Wellbeing at All Ages’. They also prepared a paper entitled Health in the Framework of the Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDSN, 2014). The paper was open to public consultation and received over 28 organisational comments/inputs, though not exclusively from academic institutions. A similar process took place for the urban goal; in 2013, UNSDSN’s Cities thematic group, comprised of 28 leading urban academics and practitioners, prepared a report entitled Why the World Needs an Urban SDG, in partnership with UN Habitat and many of the world’s largest urban networks (UCLG, ICLEI, Metropolis, Cities Alliance). The report was listed as a key input in the UN Technical Support Team’s issue brief on cities (UN, 2013b) and resulted in UNSDSN Cities co-­ chair, Aromar Revi, being invited to speak to the Open Working Group at their seventh session in January 2014 (Revi, 2019; PC). Data was quite distinct from the other thematic areas, as it was neither a formal thematic consultative topic, nor did it have a well-defined epistemic community behind it. Rather data was a cross-cutting theme of all of the deliberations, appearing as a key priority in almost every sector and championed by a huge array of actors from civil society organisations, such as the ONE campaign, to the President of the General Assembly and representatives from the office of the Secretary General (ONE, 2015; UN News, 2015; Deputy Secretary General, 2014). Particularly prominent advocates and champions of a focus on data were the members of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda who called for a ‘data revolution’ in their 2013 report (UN, 2013a). Other proponents for a focus on data were academics and technical agencies who had written about and campaigned on the inequity of the MDGs and the necessity for more disaggregated monitoring (Vandemoortele, 2010; Fukuda-Parr, 2019;

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UNICEF, 2010; Save the Children, 2012) and research groups like ODI and UNSDSN (ODI, 2013; UNSDSN, 2013). Institutionally, a focus on data and robust monitoring systems to accompany the SDGs was supported by the UN Statistics Division: the agency responsible for collating national statistical information and supporting the development of countries’ statistical systems. As  a technical support agency, they were however minimally involved in the deliberations until the discussions on the indicators and monitoring framework commenced, from early 2015 onwards (Perucci, 2021; PC). Other, more vocal institutional advocates for a focus on data included UN thematic agencies like UNICEF who had placed equity at the heart of their post-­ 2015 campaign messaging, and UNFPA who called for improved monitoring of women’s health and reproductive concerns (Barros et  al., 2012; UNFPA, 2013).

3.2 An Introduction to the Debates Relating to Public Health, Urban Sustainability and Data To focus the empirical analysis, whilst also providing an inter-sectoral perspective, I examine three specific themes of the post-2015 debate: public health, urban sustainability and the role of data. Issues relating to each of these themes were advocated for by very diverse epistemic communities (as discussed in Sect. 3.2), each with ­different approaches to UN engagement, the use of scientific evidence, and message communications. Examining each in some detail helps us to understand the nature of the political debates, the role of external inputs in those political discussions, the influence of epistemic communities including non-state actors outside of the formal proceedings, and the position of science within these groups. As noted above, health was one of the most keenly debated topics of the post-2015 agenda. As core theme of the MDGs (occupying 3 out of the 8 goals), it was clear from the outset that it would be a prominent theme in the deliberations.

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

Core themes under consideration included the continuation of the MDG health objectives, health equity, universal health coverage, non-­ communicable diseases and much more. The WHO, as the largest UN Agency, was central to the health dialogue, both organising discussions and providing technical resources and inputs. But so too were non-governmental organisations who had mobilised into a relatively coherent epistemic community during the MDGs. As noted above, in 2013, a global thematic consultation on health in the post-2015 agenda was organised by the World Health Organisation, UNICEF, the Government of Sweden and the Government of Botswana, to discuss what health concerns should be addressed by a new development agenda. Thousands of people participated through a range of different mediums, with good representation from scientific actors, NGOs, lobby groups and government stakeholders (McManus, 2013; 82–100). The summary consultation report serves to highlight a long history of coordinated action amongst health actors which, it concludes, enabled the health sector to lead ‘the development success of the MDG era’ (Ibid). In and of itself this makes the health sector an interesting case study for tracing the impact of different forms of evidence upon international deliberative processes, but it is also from health-oriented evidence-­based practice that the current EIP tendency emerged. Thus, one would expect scientific inputs to be a crucial element in global health policy formulation. At the outset of the post-2015 deliberations, the urban sector was markedly different to health. Whilst the position of slum dwellers had been recognised in the MDGs (target 7.D), little else was said about different dynamics between urban and rural locations, nor about the role of local governments in supporting sustainable development. The context of the discussion was also considerably different from the early 2000s when the MDGs were being discussed. As of 2013, 3.8 billion people (53% of the global population as of that time) were living in urban environments, up from 2.8 billion a decade earlier (World Bank, 2022a, b). For urbanists, a goal on urban dynamics was not only about servicing the specific needs of this growing population but about capi-

talising on a unique urban opportunity, to make cities a remedy to world crises: If only we put them in better positions to respond to the challenges of our age, optimizing resources and harnessing the potentialities of the future. This is the ‘good’, people-centred city, one that is capable of integrating the tangible and more intangible aspects of prosperity- in the process shedding the inefficient, unsustainable forms and functionalities of the previous century or so – the city of the 21st century. (UN Habitat 2013, v)

Whilst these were admirable objectives, realising them within a deeply contested and nationally-­led deliberation process would be challenging without a well-coordinated epistemic community with clear asks and messaging. Unfortunately, in 2012/13, the urban sector was beset by a weak and underfunded UN agency; as of 2013, UN Habitat was one of the most poorly resourced UN Agencies with no operational capacity (Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, 2013). Furthermore, unlike health, the sector did not have an organised epistemic community. Whilst there were many urban networks in existence coordinating local government actors (such as UCLG, ICLEI, Cities Alliance), in 2013 they were not working in regular partnership, nor had they sought to engage the various other urban academic and policy actors. Most important, perhaps, were the communities of scientists from very diverse sectors – sustainability, urban planning, health – who were developing new theories of sustainable urbanisation (Valencia et  al., 2019). According to Anthony Townsend of New York University, this was tantamount to a new ‘urban science’, which had resulted in ‘more than a dozen new labs, departments and schools [being] launched with a common purpose – to pursue deeply quantitative and computational approaches to understanding the city’ (Townsend, 2015). Townsend cites examples such as New York University’s Center for Urban Science and Progress, MIT’s SENSEable City Laboratory, and ETH Zurich’s Future Cities Laboratory in Singapore, whilst also pointing out that many more disciples also became engaged in discussions on future urban form, inclusivity and sustainability at this time (Edwards, 2016). In order to align these diverse actors, in 2012/13, various innovative new organisations and coali-

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

tions were formed, including Communitas, UNSDSN Cities thematic network, UCLG’s Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, and the Urban SDG Campaign. Whilst the overarching objective of these informal institutional networks was to secure a dedicated urban goal, other key topics under debate included the right to the city, the urbanisation of poverty and new forms of decentralised governance. This book also considers data and information systems, which are not covered by a standalone goal, per se, but are featured throughout the 2030 Agenda in various targets and in the preamble. Paragraph 48 stresses that ‘quality, accessible, timely and reliable disaggregated data will be needed to help with the measurement of progress and to ensure that no one is left behind. Such data is key to decision-making’ (UN, 2015a; 48). Not only does this affirm the importance of using data to monitor progress, but also that data should be a key tool for all forms of government decision-­ making. Whilst there was no one coordinated group advocating for a focus on data and information systems throughout the SDG deliberations, various networks of actors proposed such an approach, starting with the UNSG appointed High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post2015 Agenda which produced a preparatory report calling ‘for a data revolution for sustainable development, with a new international initiative to improve the quality of statistics and information available to citizens’ (UN, 2013a; 3). Thus, a focus on data and information systems provides an insight into how scientific methods informed the deliberations, even if not advanced by a dedicated formal or institutional network. It is also interesting to explore how a method evolved into a standalone conceptual concern, with a relatively coordinated coalition of stakeholders behind it.

3.3 Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates Within each of the three focus sectors, there were deep, technical debates about the inputs and outcomes that the SDGs should measure, as well as the function and form of specific goals and tar-

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gets themselves. The following section summarises the key conceptual debates within each community and on each theme, highlighting the scientific, political and advocacy arguments put forward in support of specific outcomes and explaining the eventual conclusion within each domain. Thereafter this book explores the processes of compromise and consensus-building that helped to deliver the final results, as well as which actors and communities lost out in the political negotiations.

3.3.1 Health At the outset of the post-2015 deliberations in 2012, there were two broad approaches being put forward for the construction of the health goal. The first emphasised a systems approach, calling for universal health coverage. The second expanded upon the MDG method, identifying specific outcomes and health conditions that warranted focused political attention and investment.

3.3.1.1 Universal Health Coverage and Rights-Based Approaches Perhaps the most pervasive systems-based argument made during the SDG deliberations was the necessity to focus on universal health coverage (UHC), defined as universal access to and affordability of health services. The movement for global UHC had been growing in the run-up to the SDG negotiations. In 2012 the UN passed a Resolution on UHC (A/RES/67/81), with unanimous support, which called for ‘Governments to urgently and significantly scale up efforts to accelerate the transition towards universal access to affordable and quality health-care services’ (UN, 2012c; para 8).This followed a WHO health report on UHC and health systems financing released in 2010 (WHO, 2010), the Mexico City Political Declaration on UHC adopted earlier in 2012 and the Bangkok Statement on UHC in January 2012. These events resulted in an ‘impressive momentum behind the need to accelerate action towards UHC as a strategy for improving health and ameliorating inequalities

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

in health’ (Vega, 2013; para 6) and consequently, from the outset of the negotiations in 2012, UHC was a core theme and a strong contender for the title of the overarching goal (Brolan & Hill, 2016). In most of the documents prepared by the UN and WHO prior to 2013, UHC is identified as a problem of access to financing and ensuring Member States develop ‘financing systems to ensure that all people can use health services, while being protected against financial hardship associated with paying for them’ (WHO, 2010, ix). However, over the course of the SDG deliberations, alternative conceptualisations emerged, such as that from Ng et al. (2014), which identified three composite parts to UHC: coverage, financial projection and equity, which, they argued, all needed explicit consideration and monitoring. Whilst many Member State statements made during the OWG deliberations pledged their support for UHC, there were very different interpretations of what this actually meant. For example, whilst Australia, Netherlands and the UK included mention of UHC in their statement (noting that ‘universal access to health care can help break the cycle of poverty’, Governments of Australia, 2013; para 3), they particularly advocated for a focus on equality of opportunity, with attention to gender and disability (Governments of Australia et al. 2013). For other OECD countries like Germany, France and Switzerland and the G77 group, UHC was a priority, but the emphasis was on the financing and infrastructure that would facilitate universal coverage (Governments of Germany, 2013; Government of South Africa, 2013). At the heart of the UHC campaign was the argument that access to health care is a human right. As expressed in the UN Declaration on UHC (2012), it is the ‘right of every human being to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ without discrimination’ (UN, 2012c; 2). The WHO (2012) was a key proponent of this argument, calling for greater recognition of ‘the need to focus on means as well as ends’ such as ‘health as a human right; health equity; equality of opportunity’

(WHO 2012; 2). The rights-based approach was mirrored in the subsequent UN TST briefing which called for a ‘human rights-based approach to health’ (UNTST, 2013a, b; 6). The right to health was explicitly supported by the EU and its Member States in a joint statement to the OWG fourth session, in which they called for the integration of ‘human rights and equity, gender equality and women’s empowerment, solidarity, governance and accountability…’ which would underpin ‘EU values of solidarity for equitable and universal coverage of quality health services’ (EU 2013; 2). This was reinforced in a number of individual Member State statements (Governments of Montenegro, 2013; Governments of Argentina, 2013). However, retrospective academic studies, such as that conducted by Brolan et al. (2015), concluded that the right to health, though widely recognised, was largely side-lined in the debate. According to key informants who participated in the deliberations between 2012 and 2013, human rights was deeply contentious, and ‘a potential ‘fault line’ (‘where the cracks are going to open’ [Iv1575]) to post-­ 2015 decision-making consensus’. Other informants noted that ‘some nations … are allergic to the term ‘human rights’. They feel… it is the Western countries beating them around the head, trying to impose Western cultures on them[Iv4172]’ (Brolan et  al., 2015; 5). In an effort to find compromise much of the rights, language was therefore dropped in favour of a focus on universal access and specific health outcomes. Related to arguments about human rights and universal access to healthcare is the topic of equity. A major critique of the MDGs was their lack of attention to equity (Vandemoortele, 2010). As highlighted by Save the Children, UNICEF, ODI, WHO and others, inequitable societies were more likely to have unhealthier populations and worse mortality outcomes (Mulholland, 2008; UNICEF, 2010; Save the Children, 2010), as the poorest and most vulnerable get left behind and the richest suffer from the health outcomes associated with excess (NCDs, addictions, etc.) (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). This resulted in a spotlight upon equity and

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

ensuring ‘no one was left behind’ (UN, 2015a; preamble). For some, attention to equity seemed to compromise a focus on UHC (Gwatkin & Ergo, 2011). What was required therefore was a conscious commitment to equitable roll out of services, what Gwatkin and Ergo (2011) named ‘progressive universalism’. D’Ambruoso (2013) reiterated this in an article for the Major Group Thematic Cluster on Health a few years later, calling for a move away from a context and country-­ specific angle, or a focus on health financing, towards considering UHC in terms of structural inequalities. A number of academics provided propositions on how to frame an equitable health systems goal and target, for example, focusing on effective coverage and the need, use and quality of health system coverage (Ng et al., 2014) or a target based on ‘proportional reduction of absolute inequality’ (Hosseinpoor et  al., 2015; 591). Alternatively by first  focusing on increasing coverage and decreasing economic barriers to access amongst the most disadvantaged groups, as per examples from Brazil and Mexico (Rodney & Hill, 2014). Focusing on the most marginalised first was also proposed by the International Federation of Medical Students and the Major Group of Children and Youth (2013) who particularly highlighted the need to end user fees and explicitly agree to tackle access for groups like those with disabilities. For some Member States, health practitioners and advocates, the focus on universal health coverage and rights was too broad. Instead, they wanted to capitalise on widespread country support for the MDGs and go further, setting more ambitious but still specific and quantifiable goals and targets.

3.3.1.2 The MDG+ Agenda and Outcome-Focused Arguments At the outset of the deliberations in 2012, a common theme in both academic literature and NGO inputs was the importance of going the last mile: finishing the MDG agenda and ensuring the equitable attainment of the goals (Kenny et al., 2012; Save the Children, 2010). For academics like

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Kenny et  al. this meant focusing on specific means of implementation that would catalyse rapid progress on the MDGs, such as encouraging ‘the pharmaceutical industry to make essential drugs more widely available and affordable by all who need them in developing countries’ and monitoring this through indicators like ‘% vital drugs available at generic/no cost’ (Kenny et al., 2012; 10). In 2013 during the OWG discussions this was reiterated by a number of Member States, including the Republic of Zambia on behalf of the G77 who noted that it was urgent that the international community focus on the infrastructure required to achieve existing and new goals, focusing on ‘quality of healthcare for all with increased technological transfer and implementation’ (Government of Zambia 2013; 2). For NGO actors, such as Save the Children (who were the first international NGO to release a position paper on the post-2015 agenda), the emphasis was on fulfilling the MDGs and going further with zero targets for absolute poverty, preventable child and maternal deaths. Under the health goal, they also recommended secondary targets for UHC and the social determinants of health (Save the Children, 2012). The HLP reinforced the importance of building on the MDGs, saying it ‘would be a mistake to simply tear up the MDGs and start from scratch….. [we need to] finish the job that the MDGs started’ (UN, 2013a; i). Like Save the Children, a key recommendation was therefore to include zero goals for those issues being carried over from the MDGs, including poverty, preventable maternal and child deaths, hunger and access to drinking water (UN, 2013a). To which end, the HLP and a number of NGO actors and Member States were keen to have a health goal or goals that would enable them to pinpoint specific diseases they were seeking to eradicate or health outcomes they wanted to achieve, such as an end to preventable child deaths. For other NGOs as well as some Member States, like Korea, non-communicable diseases (NCDs) were a key health outcome that needed to be added to an expanded MDG agenda. According to Professor Jeffrey Sachs, special

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

adviser to the Secretary General on the MDGs at the time of the negotiation, a ‘key challenge [of the negotiation] included adding targets around non-communicable diseases (as opposed to the communicable disease focus of the MDGs) and wellbeing as a crucial part of health….’ (Sachs, 2021; PC). Indeed, during course of the fourth OWG meeting, Member States highlighted the importance of preventative measures for NCDs such as reducing exposure to tobacco, preventing unhealthy diets and harmful use of alcohol, and promoting physical activity (Various statements at OWG4, 2013). A final key issue promoted by many Member States and heavily contested by others was women’s health, specifically sexual and reproductive health and rights. The EU Member State statement, for example, stressed that ‘health systems should pay special attention to gender equality, women’s needs and rights, including combating gender-based violence’ (EU 2013; para 3). NGOs also took this position calling for ‘access to the continuum of health services, including universal access to sexual and reproductive health services, including family planning’ (Major Group Health Cluster, 2013; para 1). The G77 also supported the promotion of family planning and reproductive health services, albeit from a more instrumental argument related to economic growth and ensuring the demographic dividend (Government of Zambia and the G77, 2013). Opponents to a strong focus on SRHR and rights language included countries like Malta and Iran who asked for country autonomy and specificity to decide the appropriate wording and related target (Governments of Malta and Iran, 2013). Whilst there was a wide array of topics discussed as potential targets under the health goal, the key ideological divide related to whether the goal should be disease and outcome oriented or more about services and supply-side issues. Those in favour of UHC as the goal stressed its ability to capture wider rights and equity concerns, whilst those pushing specific outcomes claimed such an approach allowed for more specificity and quantification, which would in turn encourage evidence-based approaches to implementation. At end of the fourth OWG session the

Co-Chairs concluded that there were two camps amongst Member States, with two alternate goals. One camp in favour of ‘maximising healthy lives’, with a focus on specific health outcomes, including tackling specific diseases and NCDs and equity, and another in favour of ‘universal health coverage for all citizens at every stage of life’. The latter would include a focus on equitable access to quality basic health services, and rights-based approaches to health promotion, prevention, treatment, as well as financial risk protection (OWG Co-Chairs, 2013b; 1). Whilst the debate was divisive and often ideological, the arguments put forth were relatively coherent and were backed up by extensive academic and practitioner input. This was quite unlike the urban sector which did not have the benefit of a global thematic consultation or a long-history of social mobilisation to lean upon.

3.3.2 Urban Whilst issues relating to urban sustainability did not benefit from a formal, UN-led consultative process, there was nevertheless a multi-­ stakeholder coalition of urban scientists, practitioners, supportive Member States and local government representatives engaged in the deliberations from the outset, via platforms such as the UrbanSDG Campaign and Global Taskforce for Local and Regional Governments. Whilst the priorities and messaging of these two and many other urban coalitions and networks varied, the common rallying cry was the necessity for a standalone SDG on cities and urban issues. As of 2013, there had been a series of SDG proposals already issued by groups like the UNSDSN, the HLP and The Global Compact Network (UNSDSN, 2012; UN, 2013a; UNGC, 2013). Whilst each proposal underscored ‘the importance of cities and urban development… they differ markedly in how they propose to address urban issues in the design of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’ (UNSDSN 2013a, b). The High-Level Panel, for example, acknowledged that the world was urbanising and that urban conditions, like urban poverty, required

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

different approaches to rural poverty, for example. But, they argued, a dedicated focus on urban issues would come at the expense of a more broad, geographic approach to the post-2015 agenda. Instead the HLP argued that a geographic focus could be achieved by ‘disaggregating data by place, and giving local authorities a bigger role in setting priorities, executing plans, monitoring results and engaging with local firms and communities’ (UN, 2013a, b, c, d; 17). Similar arguments were put forward over the course of the OWG deliberations by Member States like Norway, Denmark and Ireland, who said that urban concerns were cross-cutting, requiring an ‘integrated approach’ across housing, health, sanitation and so on (Governments of Norway et al. 2013). However, proponents of a dedicated urban goal countered that such a goal would focus attention on urban challenges, mobilise urban actors around practical problem solving, address specific challenges of urban poverty, promote integrated infrastructure design, promote efficient spatial planning and concentration, as well as resilience to climate change and disasters (UNSDSN, 2013a, b). Underneath this overarching debate were a range of more nuanced arguments relating to urban services, vulnerabilities and governance, which were used both to refute the necessity for a goal and to support it. First was an interest in continuing the MDG agenda, which focused on slum dwellers, and going further to provide for other specific urban needs; second was a rights-­ based approach to urban well-being; third was a call to move away from the sectoral discussion towards a greater understanding of complexity and the interdependence of social, economic and environmental systems; and fourth was an eagerness for governments to acknowledge the need for new forms of multi-scalar governance (Revi, 2019; PC, Pipa, 2021; PC, Cardama, 2022; PC).

3.3.2.1 Continuing the MDG Agenda: Fulfilling Basic Urban Needs Target 7.D of the Millennium Development Goals, the predecessor framework to the SDGs, focused on improving the lives of 100 million slum dwellers worldwide (World Bank 2002).

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Coming into the post-2015 negotiations, it was therefore a widely accepted priority for a large number of Member States. A more ambitious goal on improving slum conditions was also considered a highly achievable ambition, as the MDG target had been ‘reached’ before the 2020 timeline, in spite of rapidly growing numbers of people living in slums and informal settlements worldwide (UN, 2014a, b). For those Member States who supported a continuation of the MDG approach (e.g. Governments of Australia, The Netherlands and UK, 2014a, b), a focus on slum dwelling was a core part of tackling poverty and vulnerability. As noted in the 2014 EU OWG-7 Statement, ‘urgent action is needed to avoid soaring levels of poverty and the increase of slum dwellers living in deprived housing conditions with lack of basic services like water, sanitation, durable housing, sufficient living area, access to education, energy or security of tenure’ (EU, 2014; 1). Maintaining a focus on slums was also supported by many low-income and least developed countries who likewise affirmed their commitment to upgrade slum developments, subject to the ongoing support of the international development and finance community. As expressed by Nepal during their statement (in partnership with Fiji and Benin) in support of a focus on urbanisation and slum development, ‘all commitments of bilateral ODA to the LDCs must be met without delay’ (Governments of Nepal, 2014; 2). For a number of middle-income countries, however, particularly those in Latin America, a narrow focus on slum upgrading was overly simplistic and the corresponding call for more ODA too reductionist a form of intervention. As noted by Brazil and Nicaragua ‘we should not oversimplify urban issues affecting developing countries…. legalizing land tenure, solving the challenges of urban informal settlements and providing housing for the disenfranchised in a manner that integrates them with the city’s goods, services and mobility providers, are goals that not only represent high financial costs for developing countries, but also demand complex policy planning and political mediation at the local, regional and national level’ (Governments of Brazil and Nicaragua, 2014; 3). Other MIC coun-

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

tries emphasised the importance of informal settlements not just being seen as an indication of poverty but symptomatic of many other global governance challenges. For these actors, the necessity for a dedicated goal on urban issues was clear, with targets that would capture not only slum reduction but also ‘governance, water and sanitation, energy, transportation, chemicals, disaster risk reduction and sustainable consumption and production’ (Governments of Cyprus, Singapore, UAE, 2013; 3). Another common priority amongst Member States, reiterated throughout the OWG and IGN proceedings, as well as in the HLP report, was the importance of investing in infrastructure, as a driver of economic growth and transformation (te Velde 2013). This point was made most forcefully by members of the G77, including India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, who emphasised that the entire sustainable urbanisation agenda should be treated ‘holistically with an overarching focus on infrastructure development’ (Governments of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 2014; 1). A key component of this city infrastructure agenda was investment in sustainable, public transportation, which needed ‘to be prioritised – in both new as well as old urban settlements’ (Governments of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, 2014; 2). In a statement by Nepal, associating with Fiji and Benin on behalf of the Group of 77, China and LDCs respectively, it was stated that ‘the issue of sustainable transport should be given priority as a central tenet in the goal of developing sustainable cities and in the process of SDGs and the post-­2015 development agenda’ (Nepal, 2014; 2). Even for middle- and high-income countries, a focus on transportation and movement of people and goods was identified as ‘a central element in the quest for the achievement of sustainable development’ (Serbia, 2014; 3). Particularly important was ‘transportation which does not contribute to the degradation of the environment’, and as such there were a number of proposals for a focus on multi-modal transport systems and public mass transit (Ibid). For high-income countries like the USA, Canada and Israel transport was identified as a crucial strategy for increasing access to job opportunities

and public services, but it was noted that ‘transport is a cross-cutting issue affecting rural and urban alike’ and therefore not appropriate for a standalone target or goal (Governments of US, Canada, Israel, 2013; 3).

3.3.2.2 Rights-Based Arguments As noted under the discussion on health, a key theme of the entire SDG negotiation was a focus on equity. Learning lessons from the pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals, which had often prioritised interventions for the near poor at the expense of the most disadvantaged (Vandemoortele, 2010), the discussions included a strong emphasis on ‘leaving no one behind’ (HLP 2013; UN, 2015a). For the urban goal, it was noted that urban environments often see much more acute economic inequalities which are often masked by aggregated national data (Bartlett et  al., 2013). Furthermore, cities face unique equity challenges relating to housing and service provision, not least of all for the 1 billion urban people living in slum conditions. Rectifying this would require inclusive strategies that focus on means not just ends, and ensuring communities are included in implementation (Bartlett et al., 2013). The necessity to focus on urban inequalities was stressed by local authorities through the Global Taskforce in their written inputs to the seventh OWG session. They particularly ­emphasised the need to improve urban inequalities through equal rights to assets, including land tenure (also noted by Joan Clos, Executive Director of UN Habitat in his presentation to Member States at OWG 7, 2014), and by ensuring more inclusive economic opportunities for young people and those in the informal sector (Global Taskforce of Local and Regional Governments, 2013). Communitas, a multi-stakeholder initiative advocating for an SDG on Cities and Human Settlements, called for social protection and public credit schemes to support the urban poor and level inequalities (Mahendra, 2014). Meanwhile groups like The Partnership on Sustainable Low Carbon Transport (SLoCaT) advocated for a focus on sustainable, inclusive transport systems to support urban livelihoods and equal job oppor-

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

tunities (SloCat, 2013). The Major Group on Women and Children also campaigned for a focus on their communities, stressing the differentiated experiences of people in urban environments and the necessity to better involve women in ‘public decision making associated with planning and strengthening infrastructure, basic services and fostering equitable economic growth in large, mid and small size communities and towns’ (Huairou Commission 2014; para 6). For others advocating for a focus on equitable approaches, it was less about the practicalities of such an approach and more about the fundamental concept: the right for all to live in a fair and accessible, co-created city. ‘The Right to the City’ was not a new concept, having been first articulated by the sociologist Henri Lefebvre in 1968. Lefebvre described it as an attempt to reclaim the city as a co-created space (Lefebvre, 1968): creating a habitat for people and life, fostering social interactions and culture, instead of promoting market interests and commodification. Importantly, it is about empowering residents and not designing urban landscapes purely on the basis of market incentives. During the SDG (and subsequent Habitat III negotiations), the term was revitalised, identified as a new paradigm that sought to tackle complex urban social challenges whilst also focusing on empowering residents, providing political opportunities and promoting urban culture (Habitat III, 2016, p. 24). In 2011, UCLG’s World Council had provisionally adopted A New Global Charter-Agenda for Human Rights in the City, committing to work with cities to make them more ‘democratic and solidarity-based through dialogue with citizens’ (IISD, 2014; para 5). In 2013, the UNSDSN cities network capitalised on this and flagged the relevance of the concept for the post-2015 agenda, noting that it was about crafting an agenda that would do more than provide access to urban resources, but enable residents to ‘change ourselves by changing the city’ (Revi & Rosenzweig, 2013; 8). The Right to the City concept gained force throughout 2014, culminating in the creation of the Global Platform for the Right to the City, a civil society initiative established at the International Meeting on the Right

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to the City, in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in November 2014 (IISD, 2014). The paradigm was deeply contentious however, as it borrowed from human rights frameworks as well as certain countries’ conceptualisations of the right to safe and healthy habitats which were not shared by all. For example, Belgium, Kenya and New Zealand cited examples of community land trusts which they had used to democratically manage urban zones. Colombia talked about legislation to redistribute ‘socially created land value’ and Brazil cited the 2001 City Statute, a law regulating urban policy and ensuring that the Right to the City has legal value (IISD, 2014). For some critics, the term was associated with the political-left, having its origins in Marxist political geography and having been used as a political slogan by protestors during the financial crisis (Harvey, 2008). For others, it raised questions about why this particular right should be singled out when so many other human rights were not spelt out in the Agenda, as well as raising questions about how to ‘codify it in regulation and other constitutional documents’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). Ultimately the concept was sidelined by Member States, as even amongst those who were supportive it was unclear how they might express and action such a goal (Cardama, 2022; PC).

3.3.2.3 Acknowledging Urban Complexity A major theme in urban academic literature published during the period was the necessity to move away from narrow depictions of urban problems (e.g. slums and poverty) and instead to consider urbanisation as a process and a system contributing to other systems (Solecki, et  al., 2013; Simon, 2014). A large number of informants stressed the significance of this literature and framing for the urban goal deliberations (Revi, 2019; PC, Birch, 2021; PC, Watts, 2021; PC, Cardama, 2022; PC). Simply summarised, critics of the MDG approach (with its focus on slums) pointed out that this narrow framing ‘misses the target of urban development and, more broadly, the target of development and human development altogether’, that is, to improve the human condition and socio-­economic

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

systems (Cohen, 2014; 261). Narrow intervention-­ based approaches were not reaching the ‘underlying urbanization processes and contexts, but rather…. [were addressing] symptoms of problems’ (Solecki et al., 2013; 12). A number of academics therefore argued that what was required was a shift to a systems view, which would encourage horizontal (or cross-sectoral) intervention, as opposed sector-siloed approaches (Roderick, 2013), encouraging targets to be relational, flexible and sensitive to exogenous processes (Cohen, 2014; Parnell et  al., 2016). In practice, this would mean moving away from interventions like bed-nets and basic service supply to thinking about the drivers and enablers of equality, empowerment, democracy and social protection within cities. Using the example of the slum target, this would mean not just focusing on improving housing but people’s income generation opportunities, employment and how to foster the productive side of urban life (Cohen 2014). Ultimately urban academics called for governments to recognise urbanisation as an object of study in and of itself and for interventions to consider drivers of empowering processes rather than just looking at crude problems and outcomes (Solecki et al., 2013). In the lead up to the SDGs, this integrative approach reaffirmed the value of a place-based, rather than sectoral approach to the SDGs and specifically the need for an urban goal that could draw attention to complex, overlapping processes. One such set of processes that was growing in prominence in the early 2000s was how urbanisation intersects with climate risk and resilience (Tidball & Krasny, 2007). This literature examined emerging cases of urban climate change exposure, how to develop urban frameworks for managing urban climate risks, how to engage communities in building resilience. As a result, urban resilience was a key recurring theme of academic inputs during the negotiation period and was eventually recognised in the final wording of SDG 11, which includes targets on disasters planning and preparedness (11.5 and 11.b) (UN, 2015a). As early as 2013, the UNSDSN expert network prepared an input paper on the

urban opportunity for the High-Level Panel. The paper (which according to one anonymous informant received considerable attention from HLP members and other Member States) noted that climate change was the predominant global environmental threat and therefore was of crucial importance for cities and future city planning. It also pointed out that with increasing data it was more and more possible to determine current and future climate hazards, presenting an opportunity for cities to better plan their resilience (Revi & Rosenzweig, 2013; 30). In 2013, David Satterthwaite of IIED, a leading urbanist scholar, and his colleagues called for the new framework to focus on identifying potential risks from disasters and acting to reduce them particularly in urban areas. This should include adaptation of buildings, infrastructure and services (Satterthwaite et al., 2013). A compelling case to focus on urban resilience was also made by Professor Harriet Bulkeley during her intervention at the Open Working Group session on sustainable cities in January 2014, where she argued that climate justice should be at the heart of any response, particularly in urban environments (Bulkeley, 2014). Another topic which highlighted the necessity for an urban systems approach was urban poverty. In a paper produced by ODI in 2014, it was noted that whilst there was a net decline in global poverty during the MDG period (Ravallion et  al., 2008), urban poverty had increased by 50 million people (Lucci, 2014). By 2030, some estimates even indicated that 40 per cent of urban residents would live on less than $1 per day, and that over 50 per cent of urban residents would live on less than $2 per day (Ferre et  al., 2010). This was consistent with the view that whilst urbanisation can foster economic growth and productive labour opportunities, the very process of urbanisation needs to be carefully managed ‘in order to avoid new urban poverty problems’ (Lucci, 2014; 8). In the 2013 note prepared for the HLP, the UNSDSN Cities network asserted that any poverty measure within the post2015 framework would need to be adapted for urban areas: the ‘$1/per day capita poverty line (and its adjustment to $1.25) is not an appropriate

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

indicator of urban poverty as it does not account for non-food costs needs incurred by citizens in cities’ (Revi & Rosenzweig, 2013; 17). To reduce urban poverty, a more holistic approach was going to be needed; to end slum formation, increase productivity and improve livelihoods, and ensure universal access to basic services, including essential urban services like public transportation and ICT (Revi & Rosenzweig, 2013; Wratten, 1995). Lucci and Bhatkal (2014) seconded this approach noting that poverty lines based on the cost of basic needs tended to underestimate the higher cost of housing, transport and other services in urban areas.

3.3.2.4 New Forms of Governance The final and most contentious area of discussion pertaining to the urban goal related to governance. A key argument in academic literature, but also within the statements of local authorities and practitioners, was the necessity for greater devolution and the empowerment of local state actors. Inputs repeatedly stressed that local authorities would be on the front lines of the sustainable development challenge and indeed the UN Secretary General, Ban-Ki Moon, noted to the High-Level Panel in 2012 that ‘our struggle for global sustainability will be won or lost in cities’ (UN, 2012a, b, c; para 10). Various stakeholders therefore argued that it was necessary to ensure that local authorities had the capacity and resources required to localise and implement whatever global agenda was agreed. The global thematic dialogue on local implementation of the goals in 2014, facilitated by UN Habitat, UNDP and the Global Taskforce, consistently highlighted that ‘effective decentralisation and subsidiarity [should] form the basis of development in almost all the countries consulted. However, the devolution of power should be accompanied by an appropriate environment that allows local and regional governments to fulfil their responsibilities’ (UNDG, 2014; 4). In the urban academic literature, devolution was stressed as a mechanism for strengthening vertical policy integration relating to the goals (Rivera, 2013). Achieving devolution would require more consultation with local actors on policy design and roll out. In doing so ‘cities like

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Bogota and Medellin could become key drivers of transformation’ and sustainable development beyond the national government’s efforts (Ibid). In their paper to the HLP, the UNSDSN Cities Network noted the need to move from ‘government’ to ‘governance, decentralisation, and democratisation of response to growing complexities of urbanization’ (Revi & Rosenzweig, 2013). The UNSDSN Cities network argued that the complexity of modern sustainability challenges and their intersection with issues of urbanisation would necessitate more consultative forms of management, as well as delegation of authority and increased allocation of resource to local actors to enable the transformations required, for example local governments would be at the forefront of incentivising households and companies to make swift energy transitions (UNSDSN, 2013a, b). Whilst some countries supported such an approach, having themselves decentralised administrations,4 others proposed more cautious language on local capacities and empowerment, showing a reluctance to cede national authority to local governments and/or to specify policies that they considered to be a national prerogative. An example of this is ­provided by the Australia, Netherlands and UK troika who emphasised that ‘city governance should be integrated with other levels of governance’ (Governments of Australia et  al., 2013). The example serves to demonstrate that, however compelling the evidence, Member States were often reluctant to support policies that would have dramatic implications for their domestic structures of governance (Revi, 2019; PC). Another  related but less contentious argument, concerned multi-stakeholder participation. Whilst a number of Member States acknowledged the importance of working collaboratively with ‘the private sector, civil society, local authorities, as well as networks of cities’ to support problem-solving (Governments of US, Canada, Israel, 2013; 1), for UN Habitat, UCLG and the Global Taskforce a focus on inclusivity Such as France, Germany and Switzerland who called for increased local capacities and authority (Governments of France, 2014) 4 

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

and participation in any discussion of sustainable urbanisation was of paramount importance (Saiz, 2021; PC). For these groups, it was not just about the participation of different urban stakeholders in a consultative or advisory capacity, but as a fundamental part of the future national and local governance structures. For example, in their 2012 post-2015 statement, UN Habitat stressed the importance of all urban residents being able to vote in  local elections and using participatory approaches to encourage and facilitate their participation (UN Habitat, 2012). The importance of civic engagement in political processes was recognised by the HLP in their report which included a specific target (10c) ‘to increase political participation and civic engagement at all levels’ (HLP, 2013). It was also advanced by a number of foundations and international investors such as the OECD, Rockefeller and Ford Foundations. In a 2013 New  York roundtable convened on the role of foundations in the 2015 agenda, a speaker from the OECD concluded that too often urban development had been predicated on discrete project interventions based on technical decisions (Grady 2014). Getting to the heart of urban challenges required more inclusive governance, with a multi-sectoral approach and, according to the speaker, a multi-stakeholder strategy, which would create space for the private sector, civil society and communities, foundations, local authorities and other actors to work together and with government agencies for a more inclusive response (Grady 2014). Achieving this would require stronger social accountability mechanisms, greater national and local government transparency, more accessible data and information systems, and gender equality in governance (OECD, 2013). The language on multi-­ stakeholder engagement proved more popular and less contentious amongst Member States than that on decentralisation and ultimately won out, with SDG 11 including reference to inclusivity in the goal title, as well as in 4 of the targets, for example, SDG target 11.3: ‘By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainable urbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated and sustainable human settlement planning and management in all countries’ (UN, 2015a).

A final, prominent debate relating to urban governance was that of the urban-rural nexus. For predominantly rural Member States (like Bangladesh), advocacy networks (like Communitas), and UN Habitat, the post-2015 framework needed to effectively consider territorial cohesion and urban-rural linkages (UN Habitat, 2012). As noted by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN, ‘if we cannot develop our rural areas, [and] generate opportunities there, it will not be possible to achieve or maintain sustainable cities’ (Government of Bangladesh, 2014; 2). The key argument being that rural opportunities were needed to slow down mass urbanisation, as without which the scale of migration would be unmanageable for city governments and would necessarily result in insecure, informal living and livelihoods. For advocacy groups like Communitas, as well as for the Major Groups, pursuing a territorial approach to development was not one issue but a principle that the post-2015 framework, and any urban goal, should commit to address (Major Groups, 2014). This would require that any place-­based targets consider multiple sectors at once, be implemented by multiple stakeholders, and be structured by governance systems that involve the collaboration of local and regional authorities and stakeholders (IFAD, 2015; 4). It was noted that effective territorial policies were particularly crucial for managing urban sprawl (Rudd, 2014), protecting surrounding urban ecosystems (Cardama, 2014), and to ensure sustainable food production and availability (Birch, 2014). UN Habitat argued that new national urban policies were required that would coordinate ministerial and sectoral efforts at different levels of government for sustainable urban development, territorial cohesion and urban-rural linkages (UN Habitat, 2013). Whilst few other groups stressed National Urban Policies as a solution to the territoriality debate during the SDG negotiations, the concept was very prominent in the subsequent Habitat III negotiations in late 2015 and 2016, resulting in NUPs being a major recommendation of the Habitat outcome document (UN, 2015b).

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

But whilst many advocacy groups saw urban-­ rural issues as central to a holistic urban goal, some Member States saw this as a reason not to have an urban goal at all. The US, Israel and Canada statement at OWG 7 explicitly argued that doing so would ‘reinforce an artificial or static understanding of the rural-urban divide’ and would oversimplify complex demographic trends (Governments of US, Israel and Canada, 2013; 3; Government of Pakistan, 2014). Ultimately, the urban goal was included but with an accompanying target focused on urban, peri-­ urban and rural planning: ‘11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning’ (UN, 2015a). The urban debates charted above make plain the constant interplay of ideas being raised by Member States within the negotiation chamber and epistemic communities outside of it. Whilst much of the discussion (e.g. the dialogues on governance) was inherently political and Member States showed limited receptiveness to academic and practitioner arguments, in other domains the debate seemed to draw heavily upon the themes bubbling up in the academic literature. Urban resilience, for example, was a strong theme of urban academic studies at the time, which highlighted urban complexity and system interdependence. The concept was also well articulated in the OWG discussions, by academics like Harriet Bulkeley and academic-practitioner, Aromar Revi, who were invited to OWG 7 to present arguments on the case for an urban goal (Bulkeley, 2021; PC, Revi, 2021; PC). Finally, the topic appealed to Member State interest in infrastructure. The confluence of compelling science and Member State interest was fortunate and ultimately resulted in a target on urban resilience and DRR under Goal 11, though how the urban epistemic communities engaging with the process managed to communicate these ideas to the deliberators (beyond the two brief OWG presentations) and propose wording for the eventual target is unclear. The urban and health discussions also serve to demonstrate that the issues discussed within the negotiation chamber were not the product of a

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clear, systematic distillation or review of evidence. Whilst their processes were very different, for both sectors the topics appear to have been raised through a mix of domestic political interests, UN technical advice, practitioner and academic advocacy, and a certain amount of opportunism on the part of the different stakeholders. How these loose discussion topics eventually emerged into a set of coherent goals and targets, through processes of advocacy, collaboration and consensus building, is the focus of the subsequent discussion in Sect. 3.4.

3.3.3 Data Whilst it was not the subject of a whole goal area, data was a common recurring theme throughout the post-2015 dialogues. The final outcome document, the 2030 Agenda, includes 17 references to data across its 35 pages (the same number as that of cities, which also has 17 mentions), highlighting the prominence of this issue (see Table 3.1). The focus on data was driven by a diversity of stakeholders, each with very different motivations. Whilst for some a focus on data was in response to the failings of the MDGs, for example the use of aggregated statistics that concealed inequities, for others it was about having more information to inform policy and decision-­making, or about having more, detailed and transparent information with which to monitor progress and/or hold governments to account. In general, there was a concern that there was insufficient data to guide the new development agenda and what data was available was subject to acute time lags and underinvestment (Schmidt-Traub et al., 2015). In UNSDSN’s 2015 report, Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for the SDGs, it was noted that MDG data had been ‘spotty and produced infrequently with long lags’ (Schmidt-Traub et al., 2015; 4). Broadly defined, the two sets of arguments pertaining to the role of data in the post-2015 agenda can be summarised as technocratic and rights based. Both were advanced by a mix of Member States, UN agency representatives, academics and practitioners. Technocratic arguments included the necessity for more, better

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quality data to improve programme and policy effectiveness, and to enable monitoring and Table 3.1  Sample of data references in the 2030 Agenda ‘48. Indicators are being developed to assist this work. Quality, accessible, timely and reliable disaggregated data will be needed to help with the measurement of progress and to ensure that no one is left behind. Such data is key to decision-making. Data and information from existing reporting mechanisms should be used where possible. We agree to intensify our efforts to strengthen statistical capacities in developing countries, particularly African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small island developing States and middle-income countries. We are committed to developing broader measures of progress to complement gross domestic product (GDP). … 57. We recognise that baseline data for several of the targets remain unavailable, and we call for increased support for strengthening data collection and capacity building in Member States, to develop national and global baselines where they do not yet exist. We commit to addressing this gap in data collection so as to better inform the measurement of progress, in particular for those targets below which do not have clear numerical targets. Data, monitoring and accountability Target 17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts Target 17.19 By 2030, build on existing initiatives to develop measurements of progress on sustainable development that complement gross domestic product, and support statistical capacity-building in developing countries 74. Follow-up and review processes at all levels will be guided by the following principles: …. g. They will be rigorous and based on evidence, informed by country-led evaluations and data which is high-quality, accessible, timely, reliable and disaggregated by income, sex, age, race, ethnicity, migration status, disability and geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts. h. They will require enhanced capacity-building support for developing countries, including the strengthening of national data systems and evaluation programs, particularly in African countries, LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs and middle-income countries. …. (continued)

Table 3.1 (continued) 75. The Goals and targets will be followed-up and reviewed using a set of global indicators. These will be complemented by indicators at the regional and national levels which will be developed by Member States, in addition to the outcomes of work undertaken for the development of the baselines for those targets where national and global baseline data does not yet exist. The global indicator framework, to be developed by the Inter Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators, will be agreed by the UN Statistical Commission by March 2016 and adopted thereafter by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, in line with existing mandates. This framework will be simple yet robust, address all SDGs and targets including for means of implementation, and preserve the political balance, integration and ambition contained therein. 76. We will support developing countries, particularly African countries, LDCs, SIDS and LLDCs, in strengthening the capacity of national statistical offices and data systems to ensure access to high-quality, timely, reliable and disaggregated data. We will promote transparent and accountable scaling-up of appropriate public-private cooperation to exploit the contribution to be made by a wide range of data, including earth observation and geo-spatial information, while ensuring national ownership in supporting and tracking progress. Source: Adapted from UN (2015a, b, c)

review of performance (e.g. UNSDSN 2015). Complementing and augmenting these ­arguments was a call for a data revolution: an exponential increase in data for sustainable development, generated through new technologies and partnerships with third-party actors, including the private sector (IAEG, 2014). Counter arguments (albeit sometimes used in tandem) were rooted in rights dialogues and related to using data to address inequalities in service access and coverage, as well to ensure the transparency and accountability of government (e.g. Vandemoortele, 2010). Undercutting these arguments was a small but vocal opposition, led mainly by human rights groups like the Centre for Economic and Social Rights and academics such as Saikiko Fukuda-­ Parr at the New School, who warned that the focus on data (quantitative information in particular) was potentially dangerous as it risked concealing important political decisions such as whose voice counts (CESR, 2015; Broome &

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

Quirk, 2015; Fukuda-Parr & McNeil, 2015). The politicisation of the data discussion is neatly summarised by Fukuda-Parr and McNeil who did a retrospective study of the indicator-setting process accompanying the SDGs and noted that ‘numbers lay claim to objectivity and obscure the underlying theories and values behind why the particular measurement tool was selected among alternatives’ (Fukuda-Parr & McNeil, 2019; 8).

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based policy arguments were also rooted in notions of e-governance and new public management theory (Dunleavy et al., 2005). Whilst the paradigm of new public management is very broad, a common element is a focus on output-­ based performance and measurement as opposed to tracking inputs (Schedler & Proeller, 2005), with an underlying accounting logic (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2005). In the health sector, this might mean an emphasis on service delivery, user 3.3.3.1 Technocratic Arguments uptake and well-being outcomes, as opposed to A common discourse throughout the SDG delib- merely looking at investments and supplies. erations was the necessity to strengthen evidence In the political dialogues, the HLP brought in policy processes, building upon the national data-informed policy to the fore, by placing a EBP movements of the 1990s to early 2000s (dis- strong emphasis on the importance of promoting cussed in Chap. 2). The implicit assumption in ‘technical data and information in decision supgovernment statements was that more evidence port systems’ in their 2013 report (UN, 2013a, b, in the hands of policymakers would improve pol- c, d; 6). Similarly, UNSDSN stressed ‘the imporicy design and ultimately deliver results, with tance of well-defined indicators and the need for little to no reflection upon the other contributing better statistical data systems …. to support manfactors or influences which may affect this pro- agement efforts aimed at achieving the goals’ cess. Within the context of the deliberations, dis- (UNSDSN, 2013a, b; 27). Member States, precussion about evidence informing policy tended dominantly from Europe nations such as Italy, towards an emphasis on data, or more specifically Spain and Turkey, picked up on the argument and data-driven policymaking: the notion that more continued to champion it in the OWG, for examdata and greater use of ICT would ‘result in bet- ple, stating that ‘advanced statistical capacity … ter policies’ as they would be designed based on will support decision making processes’, better data analysis. Data-driven policy would also ‘cre- enabling governments to design policies and ate legitimacy’ (van Veenstra & Kotterink, 2017; investments (Governments of Italy, Spain and 101). It would do this by using quantitative Turkey, 2013; 1). approaches to add more ‘aggregative and sysRelated to but somewhat distinct from the diatemic weight to evidential claims’ (Langford & logue on data-informed policy development, was Fukuda-Parr, 2012). Implicit in this argument a call for a robust, data-based follow-up and was an emphasis on quantitative data that was review process to accompany the new framereadily scalable and could easily be translated work. The idea was for the UN to provide some into an indicator against which to measure kind of ‘global platform for reporting and review’ progress. which would use data to inform the discussion The idea of data-based decision-making had (Governments of Cyprus, Singapore and UAE, been gaining traction in the early 2000s within 2013). This proposal was rooted in the conclupolicy and management literature, including that sion of the Rio + 20 Summit which had called for from management consultancies. In 2012, for a High-level Political Forum (HLPF) to succeed example, Mo Ibrahim (founder of the Mo Ibrahim the Commission on Sustainable Development, Foundation and Celtel), writing for McKinsey with a mandate to support ‘follow up on the and Company, professed that ‘the best way to implementation of sustainable development’ improve government is to improve government’s including by providing ‘a dynamic platform for ability to manage risk and produce results. This regular dialogue, and for stocktaking’, by could be achieved by a shift toward data-based strengthening the science-policy interface, and policy making’ (Ibrahim, 2012; para 3). Data-­ by encouraging enhanced ‘evidence-based

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

decision-­making at all levels’ (UN, 2012a, b, c; para 84). Central to any discussion of evidence-based decision-making and follow-up and review was a discussion about the use of data to support tracking of the new agenda. From 2013 onwards, numerous proposals were set forth by UN agencies, Member States and international policy outfits about a set of (predominantly quantitative) indicators that would accompany the framework of goals and targets, and serve as a monitoring tool which could also be discussed at global, regional and national annual review meetings (UNTST, 2013a, b; Schmidt-Traub et  al., 2015, Nguyen, 2015). The proposed indicator framework and the associated emphasis on data in the follow-up and review mechanism were in large part a response to data-related criticisms of the MDGs, which included limited availability and reliability of data (Sachs, 2012), poor indicator construction (Easterly, 2009; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2013) and poor data standardisation, preventing comparability (Poku & Whitman, 2011). Groups like the UNSDSN (2013a, b) called for the international community to heed the lessons from the MDGs including ‘the importance of well-defined indicators and the need for better statistical data systems to track progress towards the international goals’ (UNSDSN, 2013a, b; vii). Whilst a focus on indicators was welcomed by most Member States, some academics and NGO groups warned that it was a very narrow interpretation of how to facilitate an evidence-based discussion, which sidelined other forms of qualitative and participative evidence and risked concealing important political decisions (CESR, 2015; Broome & Quirk, 2015). According to Kate Higgins, who coordinated the post-2015 Data Test, Member States did not really listen to NGOs concerns in this regard; not because they had an active dislike of their proposals but because they had ‘a complete lack of exposure to knowing other kinds of data existed’ like citizen-­ generated data (Higgins, 2021; PC). The UN’s working group on monitoring and indicators was particularly influential in promoting the indicator discussion. Created by the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN

Development Agenda in 2013, the working group’s aim was to initiate thinking about the challenges of designing an appropriate monitoring framework for the post-2015 agenda. In 2013, they published their recommendations report including a call for ‘a broad-based technical but inclusive monitoring group, and for a succinct annual report for the public on progress and challenges’ (UN System Task Team, 2013; vi). They also stressed the role of The Inter-Agency and Expert Group on MDG Indicators which had been ‘critical for the coordination, credibility and sustainability of global monitoring and reporting and should be maintained in some form post-­ 2015’. Such a group would be well placed to advise on the creation of a set of ‘well-defined, objectively measurable indicators that can be used to track progress across countries and be aggregated to represent regional and global trends’ (Ibid). In response to this call, as well a widespread concern that the process of deciding indicators needed to be technical and set apart from the political negotiations (Schweinfest, 2022; PC), in March 2015, at its 46th session, the United Nations Statistical Commission created the Inter-agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs). The IEAG-SDG was composed of Member States with regional and international agencies as observers. The IAEG-SDGs was tasked to develop a global indicator framework to accompany the goals and targets articulated in the intergovernmental agreement. Interestingly, the IAEG-SDG did not allow for the regular participation of any non-governmental organisations, academics or technical experts, outside of those within UN agencies (UNDESA, 2015). This is in spite of the UN monitoring group report recommending an ‘inclusive monitoring group’, and UNSDSN showing the interest and value of academic and scientific inputs through their indicator report which had received more than 500 organisational inputs during its 18-month consultation period (Schmidt-Traub et al., 2015). A final, concurrent argument being made to advance a data-based approach within the new agenda was the power and potential of new technology and specifically the offer of a ‘data revo-

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

lution’. In their 2013 report, the HLP called for ‘a data revolution for sustainable development, with a new international initiative to improve the quality of statistics and information available to citizens’ (UN, 2013a, b, c, d; iii). This data revolution should ‘take advantage of new technology, crowd sourcing, and improved connectivity to empower people with information on the progress towards the targets’ (Ibid). The Director of the UN Statistics Division seconded this technology-­ oriented definition referring to it as a ‘product of technological possibilities and changes’ (Schweinfest, 2021; PC). But whilst the HLP and others explained this revolution in terms of new technologies and citizen’s engagement, others suggested it was about improving the quality and availability of official statistics (Sweden, 2013; Demombynes and Sandefur, 2014) and/or about greater data disaggregation (Governments of Australia, Netherlands and UK, 2014a, b). As one informant noted, the data revolution was a ‘buzz word which meant a lot. It meant science. It meant evidence. It meant things had to change. It carried a lot of things with it. It was the sexy term’ (Badiee, 2021; PC). The very diverse understanding and utilisation of the term resulted in an urgent call by Ambassador David Roet of Israel at the 6th Open Working Group for ‘more substantive discussions with scholars, leading institutions, and colleagues about what a “data revolution” could really entail’ (Governments of US, Canada, Israel, 2013; 3). Partly in response to this call, in 2014 the UN Secretary General appointed an Independent Expert Advisory Group on the Data Revolution (IEAG), comprised of leading academics, data scientists, private data and technology companies and so on. Their mandate was to ‘advise the Secretary General on the data revolution and its implications’ (IAEG, 2014). The group’s final report (A World That Counts) concluded that ‘Governments, companies, researchers and citizen groups are in a ferment of experimentation, innovation and adaptation to the new world of data, a world in which data are bigger, faster and more detailed than ever before. This is the data revolution’ (IAEG, 2014; 2). The report made clear that the data revolution is being

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advanced by new technologies and as such is being led, in large part, by the private sector (IAEG, 2014). Government and private data partnerships will therefore be central to the post-2015 framework. Whilst many saw the emphasis on new technologies as an opportunity to bring in capacity and resourcing from large data companies like Google and Esri (and indeed a new multi-­ stakeholder Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data was launched in response), others expressed concern that these partnerships would only provide ‘digital breadcrumbs’ that were still so nascent and partial that they should not distract from investments in core statistical capacities and government data systems (Alkire & Samman, 2014;1; Espey et  al., 2015a, b). Similarly, academics from the Centre for Global Development cautioned that a focus on more data could obviate more fundamental, systemic issues with collecting data, including ‘a lack of stable funding for national statistical systems, minimal checks and balances to ensure that the data are accurate and timely, and the dominance of donor data priorities over national priorities’ (CGD, 2014; xi). A focus on data would only be impactful if there was also a concurrent redesign of accountability relationships to ensure all ‘data clients’ (including citizens) could benefit from data improvements (Sandefur & Glassman, 2015). In spite of these concerns, the concept of the SDG data revolution quickly gained support from a broad stakeholder coalition who helped to champion it throughout the deliberations. According to Shaida Badiee, formerly Director of the Statistics Division at the World Bank, ‘in my career I’ve never seen a more coordinated group… the stars were lined up. [We] had strong civil society organisations like UNSDSN, ODW, Data2X and then GPSDD. And then we had very strong officials like World Bank and UNSD…. It is one of the success stories of having an open and inclusive government process. A government plus plus process to organise and categorise SDGs’ (Badiee, 2021; PC). Interestingly Badiee directly attributes the open deliberative process with providing the space and opportunity for this

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

strong multi-stakeholder coalition to form in support of the data revolution concept, which they used as a platform for advancing whatever data concerns they had. For Badiee, who is now director of Open Data Watch, this platform provided a space to advocate for open data and data access; ‘not just data for the elite but data for all’ (Badiee, 2021; PC).

3.3.3.2 Rights-Based Arguments A range of other arguments were made during this time in support of a focus on data but from a very different starting point. A key argument made by academics, technical agencies and practitioners between 2010 and 2013 was the inequity of the MDGs and the concern that the focus on aggregate goals and targets was leaving many of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable behind (Vandemoortele, 2010). Studies by Save the Children and UNICEF, for example, highlighted the inequity of the child survival MDGs which were encouraging governments to race to meet the goal with interventions amongst the urban and near-poor, who were easiest to reach (UNICEF, 2010; Save the Children and Family for Every Child, 2012; Save the Children, 2013). Academics like Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) and technical agencies like the WHO went even further, arguing it was not just about inequitable approaches to the roll out of services and interventions but structural inequalities that were compromising the attainment of the predecessor goals. A 2006 World Health Organisation (2006) study, for example, highlighted that the probability of a man dying between the ages of 15 and 60 was ‘smaller in countries where there is less inequity, and higher in countries with greater inequity, with a probability of just 8.2% in Sweden rising to 48.5% in the Russian Federation and to 84.5% in Lesotho’ (Vandermoortele, 2010; 2). As such attention to issues of inequality, inequity and ensuring ‘no one was left behind’ needed to be a key theme of the deliberations. One proposal for how to encourage a more equitable approach to the design of future goals and targets was through data: specifically disaggregating performance on goals and targets by different social groups and only considering the

targets met as and when all of the groups have achieved it. This technical strategy was neatly captured by the advocacy slogan ‘Leave No One Behind’, which was first coined by the High-­ Level Panel. Save the Children (2012) was one of the first to recommend this approach, insisting that the new framework must ‘monitor the pace of change for all groups for all goals’ (Save the Children, 2012). The notion was subsequently adopted by the members of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons, championed by international think tanks (e.g. Watkins, 2013), and then promoted by a huge number of CSO groups through campaigns, reports and public events (e.g. IISD, 2013; German 2014; Wang et  al., 2015). The HLP proposed a series of core data disaggregations including ‘gender, geography, income and disability’ (UN, 2013a, b, c, d; 23). At the Sixth and Eighth Open Working Group meetings, a number of Member States voiced their support for such an approach, calling for improvements in statistical capacity to ‘support decision making processes for the sake of horizontal and vertical equity’ (Governments of Italy, Spain, Turkey, 2013; Governments of Sweden, Korea, Poland and Romania, 2014). At the ninth OWG meeting the Major Groups and many Member States went even further – calling for disaggregated data for all targets according to ‘by income quintiles, disability, age, gender, ethnic and religious group and other situations faced by the most at risk and marginalised taking into account national contexts’ (Major Groups, 2014; 6). During this time a number of rights-based groups attempted to fuse the equity, data disaggregation and data revolution conversations calling for a ‘disability data revolution’ and a ‘gender data revolution’ (Mitra, 2013; Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2014). The implication was that both issues needed more attention, more disaggregated data was required, and new technologies and partnerships were one means by which to get it. According to one informant, these arguments gained strength over the course of the proceedings and more and more people started to consider ‘the role of data for understanding peoples lived realities and using data as part of solution’ (Lucas, 2021; PC).

3.3  Tracing the Key Conceptual Debates

Accountability was another powerful theme of the post-2015 deliberations which frequently reverted back to a discussion about data. NGOs, in particular, were strong proponents of a focus on accountability from early in the discussions – calling for governments to being transparent about their activities and progress through publicly available data (Save the Children, 2012; 7). For the Major Groups this could be achieved through a focus on open data policies and open access to information rules (Co-Chair Meeting with Major Groups 2013), chiming with arguments made by the Open Government Partnership launched in 2011 and including 77 country members (https://www.opengovpartnership.org/). According to one informant, much of the attention to data was ‘made possible on the heels of a 15-year endeavour focused on open data and open government, and necessity for governments to release data’ (Lucas, 2021; PC). The UK-based development think tank, ODI, also stressed the importance of capitalising upon and ‘building on open data and freedom of information movements around the world’ to change the power dynamic between governments, citizens and the private sector (Stuart et al., 2015; 7). The Government of Sweden attempted to tie the openness and accountability argument back to discussions about the data revolution by suggesting this was a good way in which to harness new technologies, for example encouraging citizen feedback through mobile phones and geo-­ mapping of development projects (Sweden, 2013). The common thread across all of these arguments was that citizens needed more opportunities to engage with government and hold them to account, and that open data coupled with new accessible technologies may be one means by which to facilitate this. Underlining the idea of citizen accountability mechanisms was the idea of data being a human right, specifically, the argument that people have a right to be involved in the gathering of information that pertains to them. This right-based argument was particularly used by NGO and advocacy groups such as the Major Group on Indigenous People and ARTICLE 19. In 2013, 332 non-­ governmental organisations put forward a Joint

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Statement on Human Rights which stressed that timely and disaggregated data should be used to make visible inequalities and to increase accountability, with data disaggregations ‘defined by rights-holders’ (Joint Statement on Human Rights, 2013; 3). The Major Group on Indigenous People stretched this argument further, to apply not only to data but to broader forms of knowledge. In particular, they highlighted a ‘disconnect between policymakers, technical experts, and Indigenous and local communities with regard to generating, sharing and utilizing scientific knowledge’ (Borrero, 2013) and called for more inclusive forms of knowledge curation and information sharing across governments. Interestingly, very few Member States used this rights-based argument to advance a focus on data, bar noting that fulfilling human rights obligations in the 2030 agenda would involve giving people ‘a voice and access to information’ (Australia, The Netherlands and the UK, 2013). This chimes with broader academic findings in the health and urban spaces which suggest human rights as a lexicon was deliberately sidelined in the debate (Brolan et al., 2015). One heavily contested argument made during the deliberations was the necessity to have more data to promote accountability between countries and to support cross-country international monitoring. The idea was that with more transparent progress tracking countries could hold each other to account on the 17 SDGs. For many this would be the great merit of the follow-up and review forum. In a recommendations paper prepared for the UN, Jose Ocampo (an academic at Columbia University of Chair of the UN’s Committee on Development policy) said ‘it is essential that such monitoring exercises should feed into the first dimension of accountability – answerability – and lead governments to explain and justify their performance in fulfilling their international commitments’ (Ocampo, 2015). For many, the indicators were the key mechanism through which to do this. Indeed, the UNSD Director, said statisticians actively fought to be in the SDG deliberations so the goals could become a ‘fully functional accountability framework’ (Schweinfest, 2022; PC).

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

For the G77 using data to foster cross-country accountability or ‘answerability’ was concerning. First, the argument coopted the language of accountability and made it less about national accountability  – governments openness and responsiveness to their citizens – and more about cross-country comparison. For many low- and middle-income countries, this prompted concerns that ‘the new goals could provide an excuse for new avenues of conditionality and paternalistic finger-wagging from rich countries’ (McDonald, 2015; para 2). Indeed, the argument ‘was mostly pushed by OECD-type donor countries’ (Schweinfest, 2021; PC). Furthermore, as noted in academic literature, the challenge with such an approach was that it would inevitably disadvantage low-income countries, ‘imposing one-size-fits-all targets to countries with vastly different starting points and resources’ (Fukuda-­ Parr & McNeill, 2013; 15). In response the G77 hit back, declaring ‘declared that there was no place for ‘monitoring and accountability’ in the post-2015 context, preferring the more anodyne ‘follow-up and review’ (Donald, 2015; para 2). Second, there was concern that using a global indicator framework for cross-country monitoring would be reductionist: ‘while quantification is the key strength of global goals, it also involves simplification, reification and abstraction’ (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014; 105). If abstracted targets and their indicators were used to monitor countries progress, there was a strong chance that rapid progress in other domains would be concealed, as had oftentimes been the case under the MDGs (Fukuda-Parr et  al., 2013). The final wording on the global accountability mechanism was somewhat confused. Agenda 2030 recommended a ‘follow-up and review’ platform, as opposed to an accountability mechanism, which emphasised that the primary responsibility for monitoring progress lay with national governments. However, to support ‘accountability to our citizens’ it would provide for systematic reviews at various levels (UN, 2015a, para 47). Indicators would ‘assist this work’, providing data to assess progress and to inform decision-making (UN,

2015a, para 48). These indicators would be based upon national official data sources, wherever possible, and to support that developing countries would benefit from capacity-building support (UN, 2015a; para 74). But an annual progress report would still go ahead, based on the global indicator framework, coordinated by the UN system. It would not rank countries or provide country-­by-country comparative analysis, instead providing an overview of goal-based trends and progress across regions (see, e.g. UN, 2016a). In summary, data was a prominent theme of the negotiation process. It featured in discussions about accountability, monitoring and/or followup and review, policy development, capacity-­ ­ development, and the opportunity for non-governmental partnerships. Member States seemed excited to capitalise on the power and potential of new technologies and the ‘data revolution’ but were unsure exactly how best to do so. Furthermore, the focus on indicators straight-­ jacketed much of the discussion into one focused on data for monitoring purposes, as opposed to the potential role of open data for citizen engagement and state-citizen accountability. ­ Groups’ arguments often overlapped, and many rights-­oriented Member States and NGOs jumped on the ‘data revolution’ bandwagon to help raise attention to their specific concern. Ultimately technocratic or managerial arguments won out, predominantly but not exclusively pushed by UN agencies, European governments and a range of international think tanks. They stressed the role of data for national data-based policymaking, to enable disaggregated monitoring and support equitable policy development, and as a means to bring in the private sector and new technologies, capitalising on the ‘data revolution’. Nonetheless, important gains were made by the G77 and China in the dialogue on follow-up and review. It was agreed multilevel reporting was important and indicators could facilitate dialogues, but the primary arena for discussions on performance and review of data would be national and/or regional; international ‘answerability’ was out.

3.4  Consensus-Building Processes

3.4 Consensus-Building Processes In 2012–2013, at the outset of the SDG negotiation, the various camps debating health and the potential for an urban goal seemed miles apart. Meanwhile arguments for a focus on data were inconsistent and being advanced by very disparate actors. The role of scientific actors within the different epistemic communities was far from uniform, and whilst some key advocacy messages were rooted in science others seemed less so. Before exploring the implications of this conceptual tracing for our understanding of the role and use of science, it is useful to take note of the modes and mechanisms which helped to foster the eventual consensus. It is also important to consider the extent to which the mechanisms identified and cited by informants were actively promoting a science-based approach to the deliberations. The final health goal attempted to reach political compromise by focusing on ‘ensuring healthy lives’, continuing the MDG objectives related to maternal and child health, AIDS, TB and malaria, whilst also broadening out to a more holistic, life-course approach, which also focused on the social and environmental determinants of health. Whilst UHC was included, it was downgraded from a theme of the overarching goal to a target, sidestepping any political implications this might have for free healthcare and financing. Whilst some stakeholders considered the end goal a strong political compromise, others considered there to be too many targets and a lack of specificity; ‘Putting all of the [health] issues together felt like an entire SDG agenda to us. How were we going to focus on anything else outside of health? And how would we really make progress?’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). For all of the urban stakeholders interviewed, securing the inclusion of SDG 11 on sustainable cities and human settlements was considered a major win. They had overcome various Member State arguments about the cross-cutting nature of geographic challenges and had managed to

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secure wording which recognised issues of urban informality, inclusivity and resilience. The compromise had been the loss of all wording relating to productivity and livelihoods, which recognised cities as the modern engines of global growth, and the muting of language pertaining to rights as well as governance, specifically issues of decentralisation. As Cardama puts it, ‘I think it’s quite a human SDG… it considers access to services and equity. I’m quite proud of that…. But however [the goal] was not complete the moment there was no productivity there’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). Agenda 2030, the final outcome document, had a strong emphasis on data in multiple different ways and means. The language was predominantly about data for management, about harnessing new technologies, and greater disaggregation to support the commitment to leave no one behind, but important points had been made in the OWG and full UNGA chamber about its utility for domestic and citizen accountability, in support of transparent governance, and with respect for individual data rights. The G77 had also won a major victory in ensuring data was not explicitly used for international comparative monitoring and answerability. In September 2015 goals pertaining to healthy lives, sustainable cities and various commitments to data and the data revolution were signed off by 193 Member States (resolution A/RES/70/1), in spite of persistent questions and limitations. The final agenda was presented as ‘a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity’ which would be implemented by ‘all countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership’ (UN, 2015a; para 1). So how did decision-makers get to this point? What were the processes and inputs that helped to change and align Member State opinion? A systematic review of documents submitted to the process, as well as insights from key informant interviews, suggests that there were six key processes which helped to establish ‘unanimous agreement’ with the outcome document wording, thereby forging ‘consensus’ in each area (Susskind, 1999; 6). By identifying these processes, the intention is to tease out (and

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

thus enable reform, critique, reuse of) the different elements that have come to make up the science policy interface for complex systems deliberations.

like women’s healthcare and sexual and reproductive services. As one informant noted ‘had troikas not existed Iran and Vatican might not have spoken to Sweden on SRHR.  They had spent months getting used to these configura3.4.1 New Modes of Deliberation: tions’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). It also encouraged Shared Seats pre-negotiation amongst broader groups of Member States, as evidenced by the coalition The first process noted by a number of key infor- statement on sexual and reproductive rights mants was the OWG itself: a deliberation process issued by 24 countries (Uruguay, 2013). commissioned by the UN General Assembly (see Reflecting on the unique modalities of the OWG, decision 67/555  – A/67/L.48/rev.1) but distinct US negotiator Tony Pipa remarked ‘I often wonfrom it to avoid the complexity and bureaucracy der if we would have gotten to the goals and tarof a 193-Member State dialogue. Establishing a gets we had if it had been a full general parallel negotiation process was an entirely new assembly-based process’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). approach. According to the co-chair, Csaba Not only were the country coalitions unique but Korosi, the ‘OWG tried to do something very far the fact that countries were collaborating irrespecfrom typical UN exercise’ (Korosi, 2021; PC). tive of size and without concern about the broader The OWG, originally envisaged at Rio  +  20 positions of their regional blocks. For Paula and proposed by the Colombians with support Caballero, a Colombian negotiator and one of the from the Mexicans and Brazilians, was intended instigators of the OWG proposal at the Rio + 20 to be a small negotiation forum consisting of 30 conference, agreeing a negotiation forum that Member States, but so popular was the topic and forced countries to work outside of their regional so high the demand amongst countries to partici- blocks was a huge achievement but one that was pate that in the end a total of 69 Member States hard fought. At Rio + 20, the G77 had been parwere forced to share the 30 seats. This necessi- ticularly opposed to such a model as we were asktated that seat-sharing countries (like Iran, Japan ing them ‘to come out as small countries, not as a and Nepal or Bangladesh, Republic of Korea and block with such muscle’ (Caballero, 2021; PC). In Saudi Arabia) deliberate and pre-determine com- the end, it was a very ‘radical’ and ‘weird’ model mon positions before attending. This pre-­ that brought disruption to UN General Assembly negotiation amongst often-strange bedfellows processes and enabled a more innovative and open enabled much negotiation to take place outside of debate (Caballero, 2021; PC). the chamber and to help forge unusual alliances. According to Aromar Revi, a leading Indian urbanist, very involved in the negotiations over 3.4.2 Expert Panels SDG 11, ‘the troika system was crucial as Member States who would normally not have sat Another innovation under the OWG was the use together were forced to…. [it] allowed a lot of of expert panels. According to various inforthings to happen that wouldn’t have happened’ mants, under the auspices of a normal UNGA (Revi, 2019; PC). Another urban stakeholder session ‘science was “not really” considered’ referred to as a ‘Copernican revolution… with (Bulkeley, 2021; PC). Even dedicated scientific breathtaking collaboration’ between unlikely committees like the Committee on Development partners (Cardama, 2022; PC). She went on to Policy (CDP) which reports into ECOSOC  did cite collaborations between Turkey, Singapore not have much influence. According to long-­ and the UAE on a range of urban issues. standing member of the CDP, Saikiko Fukuda-­ In the context of the health deliberation, troika Parr, ‘I don’t think we [academics] have much alliances between groups like Iran and Japan impact or role on the UNGA’ (Fukuda-Parr helped to facilitate discussion on difficult issues 2021). Furthermore, informants noted that the

3.4  Consensus-Building Processes

institutional form of the UNGA, which is ‘huge and multifaceted’, makes it incredibly hard for academics and scientists to engage as ‘they don’t know where to start’ (Bulkeley, 2021; PC). The OWG attempted to do something different to foster evidence-informed dialogue. When it was first proposed at the Rio + 20 conference, Colombia and Brazil called for an ‘evidence-­ based process, calling on expertise from countries….and experts in different thematic areas’ (Caballero, 2021; PC). The Co-Chairs from Kenya and Hungary took this call for evidence to heart, ‘creating a space to listen to the experts’ (Caballero, 2021; PC). They did this not just by encouraging the submission of written inputs from different constituencies but by initiating a series of panels in the mornings before OWG deliberations. Scientists and academics, but also programmatic, industry and technical leaders, were invited to provide testimonials and present evidence to the deliberators. According to Caballero, ‘from the word go [it] was a very gentle but intense educational process’ (Caballero, 2021; PC, seconded by Cardama, 202; PC 2). The educational element was stressed by Ambassador Korosi, co-chair of the OWG, who remarked that the greatest benefit of these opening science-­ based panel discussions was that they were seen as benign and informative; ‘You don’t have to take it or vote for it. You don’t have to draft it. Just listen. This rather easy-going perception helped some countries I think. [They] Started thinking our objective was not to impose an idea but to try and create a common knowledge base’ (Korosi, 2021; PC). This approach enabled negotiators to take a step back from the usual frenzy of intergovernmental negotiation, to ‘stop and listen and understand and read’ (Caballero, 2021; PC). According to the Director of Policy at the UN Foundation the OWG’s approach was ‘totally different [from past practice]. It was orders of magnitude better, with regards to use of evidence’ (Pham, 2021; PC). However, it should be noted that whilst these were often referred to as ‘scientific panels’, many of the participants were not from academia. Of the four keynote and expert presentations to the OWG on health for example, three were from UN agen-

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cies (WHO twice and UNFPA), two from academia (Hans Rosling and Paulina Makinwa-­Adebusoye of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research) and one was from a philanthropic organisation (Jeanette Vega of the Rockefeller Foundation), suggesting that practitioner expertise was considered equal if not more valuable than evidence from research institutes. There was a similar line-up at OWG session 7 when cities were discussed. Opening presentations were provided by Dr. Joan Clos (Executive Director of UN Habitat), Ms. Adriana de Almeida Lobo (Executive Director of CTS Embarq), Professor Harriet Bulkeley (Durham University) and Dr. Lewis Fulton (University of California), as well as Mr. Aromar Revi (Director of the Indian Institute for Human Settlements) and Dr. Ousmane Thiam (President of CETUD Dakar): in total 4 practitioners and 2 academics. As a result, Cardama (2022; PC) referred to the OWG dialogues as ‘not science based but knowledge-based’. Whilst a number of informants cited the importance of these expert inputs, and Member States were very complimentary about the sessions in the UNGA Chamber (e.g. Saudi Arabia, 2013), informants also pointed out that the amount of information presented could be overwhelming: ‘sometimes it’s difficult for negotiators to keep track of all the information that is available, read it and digest it. This is especially so for smaller delegations’ (Caballero, 2021; PC). And, as such, a longer time should have been provided for reflection and deliberation upon the evidence. Another criticism levelled at the panels was that they were too brief and not sufficient to constitute meaningful engagement with scientists and academics; the ‘UN approach currently is to invite some US academic and think that they’ve “engaged with science”, but they’re not thinking about long term implementation’ (Melamed, 2021; PC). The key takeaway for all informants was that these expert panels provided some space for the deliberators to pause, reflect and consider evidence, before presenting national or regional positions. The presentations may not have fundamentally changed minds, but they opened the

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door for more informed and constructive dialogue and placed a wide range of additional issues on the table, forcing ‘a more comprehensive outcome’ (Muffuh, 2021; PC).

3.4.3 Thematic Dialogues A process cited by many informants and evidenced in the translation of ideas (from input documents into the final 2030 Agenda) is the influence of the thematic consultations, specifically the UN-led health consultation. The consultation process took place over 7  months, from September 2012 to March 2013, culminating in a High-Level Dialogue on Health in the Post-2015 Development Agenda, which took place in Gaborone, Botswana, in March 2013. As previously noted, the consultation outcome was given particularly weight by Member States as over ‘150,000 people from all regions visited the consultation website (www.worldwewant2015.org/ health). Over 100 papers were submitted by a wide range of organisations and authors, and 14 face-to-face meetings attracted over 1,600 people in places as far apart as La Paz, Dar es Salaam, Abuja, Amsterdam, New  York, Beijing, and Bangkok’ (McManus, 2013). Whilst many health advocates and stakeholders submitted individual inputs to the process, highlighting priority issues like child survival, equity, SRHR, ageing (Save the Children, 2012; HelpAge et al., 2013), by the end of the global thematic consultation in March 2013 a consensus seemed to have emerged around an overarching goal focusing on ‘healthy lives’. According to Lancet Editor, Richard Horton, ‘the proposal [was] a surprise move away from the concept of UHC, which many had seen as the clear candidate for the role of overarching health goal’ (Horton, 2013; para 5). According to interviews conducted by Brolan and Hill (2016; 515), such a goal was however considered ‘more summative’ than a goal focused on UHC alone, ‘with greater potential to incorporate the social determinants of health’. Many stakeholders also thought it more encompassing of issues like equity, maternal health, SRHR, water and sanitation (Brolan & Hill, 2016; 519).

The final report of the thematic consultation ultimately recommended a goal on ‘maximizing healthy lives’, which should incorporate efforts to (a) accelerate progress on MDGs, (b) reduce the burden of major NCDs, and (c) ensure universal health coverage and access. This specific health goal would then seek to attain a broader development goal of ‘sustainable well-being for all’ which would recognise health as a critical contributor to, and outcome of, sustainable development and human well-being (McManus, 2013). UHC was an important component part but was ultimately not the headline goal most NGOs would be lobbying for. Instead the goal called for a holistic, life-course approach to people’s health which not only focused on access and coverage to healthcare but disease promotion and prevention, as well as specific growing health concerns such as non-communicable diseases (McManus, 2013). This language was carried forward by a number of Member States in the subsequent deliberations who cited specific wording from the thematic report: calling for a health goal which takes a ‘holistic life course approach’ addressing ‘issues of health promotion and disease prevention (NCDs, mental illness, violence)’ (Poland & Romania, 2013). For the urban and data communities, there was not an equivalent UN-organised thematic consultation and outcome document for delegations to draw upon. The result was that the urban community, at least, spontaneously organised their own dialogues and collective statements to help promote and keep attention on the goal. For example UNSDSN, as convenor of the UrbanSDG Campaign, invited international Mayors and urban practitioners to more than 5 large-scale, high-profile events between 2013 and 2014, including a Special Symposium organised at the Vatican with the Pontifical Academy of Sciences (https://urbansdg.org/calendar-­of-­events/). This event was cited by one informant as a decisive moment; ‘we saw by the turn out of Mayors how important they thought it [sustainability] was’. He also noted the ‘straight forward politics of it’; as a large-scale high-profile event that would bring home ‘to their citizens that they were doing stuff on climate and sustainability’ (Watts, 2021;

3.4  Consensus-Building Processes

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PC). Likewise, the Global Taskforce organised a HLP was established by the UN Secretary series of high-profile events with Member State General in July 2012 and was asked to provide a and Mayoral representation, such as the first set of recommendations on the agenda, to Sustainable Cities Days organised by UCLG, help inform the negotiations under the OWG and UN-Habitat and the Friends of Sustainable Cities IGN. Although not a part of the official intergovfrom 11 to 13 December 2013. Concurrently ernmental negotiation under the auspices of the smaller political or advocacy outfits like UNGA, the HLP report was considered by many Communitas organised closed door workshops a significant input to the governmental debate with Member States; ‘before the OWG met in which was often cited by negotiators (e.g. that January (2013) we organised a big meeting Bangladesh at the fourth OWG session, 2013). (it was December) on top floor of UN (an EGM) Lead-author, Homi Kharas, was also invited to and we invited one Member State per troika and present the report to the OWG at its fourth seswe commissioned one paper per area that had to sion on 17–19 June 2013. be in the [urban] SDG… equity / services / terriAt the OWG’s fourth session in May 2013, torial urban linkages’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). health had been actively discussed with emerging Cardama concluded that ‘without [such] consensus around the topics of ‘universal health efforts,…[the goal] wouldn’t have happened’ as coverage; equitable access to quality basic health they were formative in bringing the epistemic services; health promotion, prevention, treatcommunity together, agreeing common mes- ment, and financial risk protection’. There was sages, and coordinating political outreach also consensus on the need for one overarching (Cardama, 2022; PC). Similarly, Guido Schmidt-­ universal health goal (OWG Co-Chairs 2013). Traub, Executive Director of UNSDSN during The HLP report, released later that month, reafthe deliberations, remembered that non-­firmed the call for one all-encompassing health governmental ‘urban goal inputs were quite deci- goal. They proposed a goal focused on ‘ensuring sive. Not something any Member State healthy lives’ with a particular attention to the particularly pushed’ (Schmidt-Traub, 2021; PC). challenges identified by the MDGs (such as preWhilst others did remember the influence of sup- ventable child health), whilst adding a focus on portive Member States and the Friends of Cities non-communicable diseases (UN, 2013a). A coalition in particular (Cardama, 2022; PC, Revi, notable absence was language or a target focused 2019; PC, Tuts, 2021; PC), a common point of on UHC. As noted by the UN System Task Team, emphasis was the influence of the informal urban the HLP report did not ‘provide targets for unicoalitions who prepared statements and wording versal health coverage and NCD risks, or explicand through informal dialogues ended up shaping itly address health determinants  – areas which the exact phrasing of SDG 11. The contribution found significant support in the health consultaof these inputs is well summarised in the UN tion process’ (UNTST, 2013a, b; 7). TST Issues Brief on Sustainable Cities and This resulted in critique from a few diverse Human Settlements issued to the OWG in 2013 quarters; academics like Brolan and Hill com(UNTST, 2013a, b). mented that the ‘marginalization [of UHC] seemed conceptually disabling: UHC was not authoritatively positioned within the agenda set 3.4.4 The High-Level Panel by the High-Level Panel for ensuing Member State (and other inter-related) global health goal The release of the report of the High-Level Panel discussion’ (Brolan & Hill, 2016; 516). Other of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 agenda in critiques related to the HLP’s tackling of health May 2013 (UN, 2013a) was noted by a number of rights: distinguishing between universal rights informants as formative for the agenda, and its and what it deemed other ‘fundamental’ rights, influence is clearly visible in replicated phrases such as SRHR which marked an ‘an illogical in the final Agenda 2030 outcome document. The privileging of one …element of the right to health

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

over all others’ (Forman et  al., 2015; 802). Furthermore, it sparked a renewed wave of advocacy from non-governmental actors, amongst others, calling for the intergovernmental negotiations to pay more attention to UHC and the associated equity and financing dimensions (e.g. Brearley et al., 2013, see also Children and Youth Major Group, 2013). Whilst the subsequent inclusion of UHC as a target in the OWG proposal cannot be exclusively attributed to this NGO action, various informants did note that NGOs were crucial in keeping issues like UHC on the table (Melamed, 2021; PC). The HLP was similarly mobilising for the urban community; whilst the final report did not include a goal on cities and urban environments, there had been a lengthy discussion amongst the Panel on the topic (as highlighted in the outcome statement from the Monrovia meeting and in the HLP background paper written by Revi & Rosenzweig, 2013). Furthermore, opportunity to provide input to the OWG and counter the proposals put forward by the HLP helped UNSDSN mobilise a wide range of urban stakeholders, including influential urban networks (UN-Habitat, UCLG, Cities Alliance, ICLEI and Metropolis), to prepare a common position statement on ‘Why the World Needs an Urban SDG’ (UNSDSN, 2013b). In this way, the HLP report was not only influential because it was commissioned by the UN Secretary General and had high-level political engagement, including Heads of State, but because it prompted subsequent debates and helped advocates to focus their energies on underserved topics. Indeed, for other topics such as sustainable production and consumption, the HLP process was seen as a seminal negotiation ground which helped to secure some intergovernmental agreement before even entering the OWG negotiations; ‘Minister Maria Angela Holguin of Colombia … got invited to do presentation on SCP in Monrovia to make a big bang and we got information and graphs from everyone [research institutes and think tanks like]… WRI/IUCN etc. I think that helped to change the view’ on the importance of this issue (Caballero, 2021; PC). As already discussed (in Sect. 3.4.3), the HLP was also fundamentally important for raising the

importance of data and more specifically, promoting term the ‘data revolution’. According to Kate Higgins, then author of the post-2015 Data Test, ‘the HLP was absolutely critical’; it coined the term ‘data revolution’ and through the IEAG on the Data Revolution helped instigate the formation of the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data, which widened the tent from experts to practitioners and gave the data revolution some sustainability (Higgins, 2021; PC). The influence of the HLP’s data focus and its data revolution proposal is evident in the use of the term ‘data revolution’ in the UN Secretary General’s subsequent report, published in December 2013. A Life of Dignity for All specifically called for ‘Member States… [to] benefit from the insights of a set of illuminating reports’, including that of the HLP which ‘called for major transformative economic and institutional shifts: a new global partnership and a data revolution for monitoring progress and strengthening accountability’ (UNSG, 2013; para 14).

3.4.5 High-Profile Academic Engagement Within the context of the health debates, there is one academic and scientific engagement process which was frequently referred to by key informants as having influenced the framing of the health policy discussions. It is not any of the formal mechanisms  – the UN’s official Expert Group Meeting on Science and the SDGs (March 2013) or the Major Group on Science and Technology – but instead the very public discussion on the post-2015 framework which played out in academic journals such as The Lancet, outside of the UN’s formal consultative space. According to John McArthur (Senior Fellow at Brookings and formerly Deputy Director of the Millennium Project), the health sector was somewhat unique in having applied scientific discussions on global goals within their academic publications, long before the SDG negotiations even started. He claims that the ‘first academic reference to MDGs was in the Lancet around time of Monterrey Conference [in 2002]’ and that

3.4  Consensus-Building Processes

subsequently ‘debates on MDGs were getting hashed out in The Lancet and The BMJ’ (McArthur, 2013; PC). Building on this scientific engagement with the MDGs, between 2012 and 2015, The Lancet health journal published more than 111 discussion pieces on or including reference to the post-2015/SDG agenda, as well as 30 editorials, 61 review articles and 16 research articles.5 Richard Horton, Lancet Editor in Chief, was particularly active and forthcoming with his opinions, commending a focus on UHC in the future health goal in editorials in 2012, but then later sympathising with other commentators who dismissed the goal for failing to ‘address the determinants of health’, as well as being ‘difficult to measure and compare across countries, and.. only an indirect indicator of health status’ (Horton 2012, 2013). According to Sachs ‘Richard Horton…. was an important voice’ (Sachs, 2021; PC). Likewise, McArthur notes that ‘Richard Horton as an editor played a major role in having a premier journal have an editorial stance [on the agenda]’ (MccArthur, 2021; PC). According to Sachs (2021; PC), many of ‘the major scientific journals (Nature, Science, Lancet, NEJM, BMJ, etc.) play a key role [in UN health policy debates], but generally their information is channeled through experts, who then process it for diplomats’ (Sachs, 2021; PC). Textual analysis reaffirms this, as references to The Lancet, British Medical Journal, Nature and others are frequent in the UN’s Technical Support Papers provided as input to the OWG (a total of 77 references to academic journal articles, books or opinions across the 29 TST Issue Briefs), but the journals or their contributors are not explicitly cited anywhere in the transcripts of the political discussions with the OWG or IGN.  Indeed, the role of the UN Technical Support Team as a knowledge filter and academic intermediary was stressed by another informant who noted that UN Secretariats ‘play a huge role in helping to translate that [scientific papers and academics inputs] for delegations’ (Caballero, 2021; PC). Discussion on the post-2015 process was less common, if largely invisible, in urban journals Statistics from The Lancet website as of January, 2022.

5 

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from the period. In 2013 and 2014, a small handful of academic papers came out relating to the place of urbanisation in the future development agenda, but they were not published in academic journals but as working papers by think tanks and networks like UNSDSN, IIED and ODI (e.g. Satterthwaite et  al., 2013; Revi & Rosenzweig, 2013; Lucci, 2014). However, stakeholders were keen to emphasise that urban academics were proactive in engaging with the deliberations through other means, most notably through the UrbanSDG Campaign community. Stakeholders referred to the campaign as having a ‘strong knowledge base’, being informed by inputs ‘from people with academic clout’ (Cardama, 2022; PC) and being composed of both ‘advocates and academics’ (Birch, 2021; PC). The participation of specific academics and institutions was noted in more than five informants’ remarks, including actors from The New School, the University of Pennsylvania, University of Cape Town, IIED, Columbia University, University of Durham, amongst others. The value of their engagement was that advocacy messages and written inputs were ‘evidence-based’ from the outset and that academic grounding helped to make the Campaign’s inputs more compelling; we were mobilising people that ‘the General Assembly could not not listen to’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). Data-related arguments were made in a wide range of academic journals over the MDG period and in the run up to 2015. High-profile academics like Saikiko Fukuda-Parr from the New School, Sabina Alkire from Oxford University, Jan Vandemoortele, the former head of the poverty group at UNDP and chief economist at UNICEF, amongst others, published pieces highlighting the problems of aggregate monitoring of targets and limited disaggregation (Langford & Fukuda-­ Parr, 2012; Mitra, 2013; Alkire & Samman, 2014; Fukuda-Parr et al.; 2014; Vandemoortele, 2014). Meanwhile, a raft of health-related publications had highlighted the inequity of the MDG approach for child survival (Bryce et  al., 2005; Gwatkin, 2005; Black et al., 2010). Whilst none of these pieces or authors were directly cited by Member States in the OWG or IGN transcripts, their influence in shaping the topics under discus-

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3  Tracing the SDG Deliberation Process: A Focus on Health, Cities and Data

sion is discernible in the various advocacy pieces of the time. Save the Children and UNICEF, for example, made strong calls for a focus on equity, grounding their reports and messaging in the arguments of health academics (Save the Children, 2010, 2012; UNICEF, 2010). A number of informants also cited the influence of Homi Kharas, an academic at the Brookings Institute, who had been the behind-the-scenes author of the HLP report and used his influence to encourage a focus on data (Melamed, 2021; PC, Pham, 2021; PC, Pipa, 2021; PC). According to Badiee, formerly director of the WB Statistics Division, ‘Homi Kharas was an old colleague and so he came to Eric and myself for help and we had numerous meetings and discussions about the indicators… and how to write some parts of the HLP report on data’ (Badiee, 2021; PC). Interestingly Pipa, the US negotiator, remarked that the influence of academics ‘like Homi’ felt really original in a UNGA-led process: ‘When we went into the UN I do think I underestimated the extent to which having an academic kick off negotiations (like Homi) was so unusual’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). What is clear across all of these sectors is that whilst academic arguments were infrequently cited in the deliberation chamber, many of their key arguments were reemployed by advocates and Member States to help frame the topics under discussion, the language of the debate, and to ground key arguments in a body of evidence. Select academics did engage directly in the Chamber, like Homi Kharas, Jeffrey Sachs and Harriet Bulkeley, and their engagement was a change from past practice, but most academic concepts and ideas were transmitted through publications and then knowledge intermediaries: advocates or technical agencies.

3.4.6 Focus on Quantification Whilst there are few references to scientific articles or quotes from scientific actors visible in Member State statements, a recurring theme throughout the deliberations was the importance of quantification: ensuring targets are monitor-

able and measurable and that there is robust data to enable monitoring of the agenda. For many the focus on quantifiable goals and targets was a key strategy through which consensus was formed, as it forced people to narrow down and focus on outcomes (Lucas, 2021; PC, Pipa, 2021; PC, Badiee, 2021; PC). Quantifiable goals and targets was a core priority for the US delegation. According to the US lead negotiator in the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Tony Pipa, ‘precision was a big thing for us… We were looking for disease specific quantitative targets’ to drive action (Pipa, 2021; PC). The importance of having quantifiable targets, backed up by good indicators and data systems, was stressed by four of the OWG panel presenters during OWG4, including Dr. Asamoa-Baah of the WHO and Professor Hans Rosling of Gapminder. It was also a core theme in the HLP report presented at the same OWG session, which included the specific call for a ‘data revolution’. The HLP emphasised the importance of better data and statistics to ‘help governments track progress and make sure their decisions are evidence-based; they can also strengthen accountability’ (HLP, 2013; 24). For many stakeholders, this emphasis on quantifiable targets and good data systems was an effort to pursue a more ‘evidence-based’ or ‘scientific’ approach. According to Pipa, the USA wanted the SDGs to reflect a ‘quasi-scientific approach…. wanted disease specificity, evidence to drive decision-making and to measure our impact and cost effectiveness’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). He also stressed that the targets with the most specificity and precise metrics provide an indication ‘that there was a lot of negotiation and engagement with scientific community suggestions’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). In support of this, McArthur notes that data-oriented research groups like the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) were crucial; ‘IHME was material in informing people’s thinking. Data machinery that they’ve built over time is a major contribution’ to promoting metrics-based policy development (McArthur, 2021; PC). Schweinfest, Director of the UN Statistics Division, also recognised the

3.4  Consensus-Building Processes

focus on data as part of a broader mission to promote a scientific approach and to encourage engagement with scientific actors, though he also stressed its limitations; ‘Data is part of science, but there are other scientific entry points for sure’ (Schweinfest, 2021; PC). Fukuda-Parr says this narrow, quantitative approach to evidence-based policymaking may actually have compromised the space for scientific input as it only empowered certain types of knowledge and actors [who she later refers to as international development professionals] ‘who have mastery of that kind of information and knowledge’. In doing so, it was actively ‘undermining other kinds of scientific input’ including qualitative or participatory studies and ‘Voices of the Poor kind of input’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2021; PC). Others contend that the focus on quantification was not a reflection of a scientific approach per se but at the heart of a goal-based agenda; the ‘point of SDGs is quantification. It is in their DNA’ (Melamed, 2021; PC). Or that the emphasis on data was less about a scientific approach to implementation and more about having tools for accountability, so donors could better track their investments and outcomes (Fukuda-Parr, 2015), or so that citizens have the data to hold policymakers to account (Bowen et al., 2017). Whatever its unintentional or deleterious effects, what is clear is that a strong focus on quantification emerged from multiple, diverse camps concurrently, helping to unify the dialogue on the formation of the health and urban goals, and secure a strong focus on indicators and data partnerships to support the goals. In summary, the thematic analysis has highlighted six key processes that were crucial to the securing of consensus on the 17 SDGs, including the goals on health (SDG 3), urban sustainability (SDG 11) and the cross-cutting theme of data (including targets 17.18 and 17.19). These include new negotiation modalities, in the form of the OWG and its system of shared seats which forced unusual political alliances. The OWG’s expert panel presentations were also significant. Whilst they may not have fundamentally changed Member State positions, key informant insights and textual analysis make clear that they facili-

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tated a more iterative and evidence-based dialogue. The thematic dialogues (organised by the UN system, but also by informal coalitions like the UrbanSDGCampaign) were crucial for both health and urban stakeholders, helping to coordinate common messages and bring coherence to their communities. Whilst health had a long history of social engagement with the UN and a wide number of organised networks, expert and advocacy groups, there were a vast number of stakeholders to coordinate and the formal UN-led thematic consultation gave them a focal point for their inputs. The HLP’s report had an observable impact upon the deliberative process, when their recommendations came out in the early stages of the OWG. They introduced key terms which carried into the final Agenda like the ‘data revolution’, but through their omission of certain issues, they also helped mobilise epistemic communities who then fought more proactively for the ­inclusion of their topics (UHC and urban in particular) in the OWG and IGN deliberations. Particularly interesting for this study is the important role played by a number of high-­profile academics and academic publications in helping to frame key topics featured in the debate. Whilst they may not have been explicitly cited in Member State statements, references to academic literature in many NGO and UN papers suggest they helped to frame many issues put on the table, whilst select high-profile academics used their positions to help mobilise their communities (as per Aromar Revi and Cynthia Rosenzweig convening the UrbanSDG Campaign and Richard Horton writing extensively on the SDGs in the Lancet). Finally, quantification was used by negotiators and a number of advocacy coalitions to try and ensure a focused and monitorable set of goals. For many, this was about ensuring data for management purposes, but for others it provided an entry point to ensure the goals and their accompanying targets were rooted in the latest information and were informed by experts. In the health community, in particular, this approach helped to bring in experts from the IHME and a number of statisticians to decide upon realistic benchmarks and targets for certain health outcomes.

4

Influencing Multilateral Policy Processes Through Science

Keywords

4.1 Representation and Access

Representation · Politics · Framing · Access · Informal negotiation · Epistemic communities · Socialisation of ideas

In the case studies discussed above, and cutting across informant remarks, was a common emphasis on the importance of the institutional setting for the discussions and access by scientists to the sites of interaction: the physical forums within which negotiations take place, both formal and informal. Informants remarked on to the exclusionary nature of the formal UNGA deliberation process for scientists and academics, referring not to the interest and enthusiasm of Member States themselves but the procedural format of a UNGA deliberation and the weakness of existing consultative channels. Informants commended the innovation of the post-2015 deliberative processes however (the OWG, consultations and so on) and whilst challenges persist, they noticed an increased appetite on multiple fronts for meaningful engagement in within and outside of the official forum of the Member State negotiation. In response to challenges identified they referred to informal coalition building and informal engagement mechanisms: ways of creating space and place for scientists to engage with Member States outside of the chamber.

In Part II of this book, I theorised that the influence of science on multilateral negotiation could be understood through 4 criteria: representation and access, the organisation of epistemic communities, framing and temporal dynamics. The empirical analysis presented above reveals several theoretical and practical insights that augment these criteria, which are here explored in order to better explain the influence of scientific evidence in multilateral policy development, for example, under representation and access the space afforded by new institutional arrangements was a recurrent theme of the interviews. Meanwhile each epistemic community demonstrated highly diverse influencing and engagement approaches, suggesting that the modalities of engagement for nonstate actors are wholly contingent on the structure and coherence of their community.

The original version of this chapter was revised. The correction to this book is available at https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_6

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 , Corrected Publication 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_4

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Related to the question of stakeholders’ physical representation are questions pertaining to voice, agency and authority. Recognising that a seat in the room does not necessarily ensure space to express one’s views or that those perspectives are listened to, one must also consider whose voice counts and whose opinions are predominant? Cutting across this analysis was an emphasis on the pre-eminence of domestic politics over the collective interests of other stakeholders. Also prominent was a strong emphasis on the role and influence of other entities in the chamber, namely, the technicians, policy-support staff and UN agencies facilitating briefings and consultations behind the scenes.

4.1.1 The Representation of Science in Formal Processes As noted at the outset of this study, the UNGA is first and foremost a political negotiation forum. It is the highest organ of the UN system, and de facto the multilateral system, and operates on the basis of each of the 193 Member States having an equal say and an equal vote. As such ‘science is not in the DNA’ of UNGA process, concluded Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed, formerly post-2015 Special Adviser (Mohammad, 2021; PC). However, all informants, without exception, stressed that more scientific input was required to equip deliberators with the information they need to make informed and complex decisions on an ever-increasing array of transboundary challenges. Cardama summarised the problem succinctly as ‘everyone wants it in the room, but the science dialogues is [still] in parallel. It’s not integrated… who is the chief science adviser to the UNGA? Who is the science board? It’s not institutionalised and structured’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). Informants pointed to three formal, existing mechanisms as entry points for scientific information: the Major Group on Science and Technology, the Global Sustainable Development Report and the relatively new UN Scientific Advisory Board. As described in Sect. 2.4, the Major Group is a representative coalition of

actors invited to participate in (but not vote) in select UNGA proceedings that has been in existence since the 1992 Earth Summit. Today, the Major Group on Science and Technology is co-­ chaired by the International Science Council (ISC) together with the World Federation of Engineering Organisations. Its mandate is to solicit and gather input from subject matter experts to support policy implementation and to provide written inputs. As noted in the 2012 Rio  +  20 outcome document, The Future We Want, the Major Groups were expected to play an active role in the post-2015 deliberations, contributing to decision-making and subsequent planning and implementation (UN, 2012a, b). However, over the course of the OWG deliberations, the Science and Technology Major Group made very few interventions. They made one short collective statement, in conjunction with other Major Groups, at the first OWG session (which called for the SDGs ‘to address planetary boundaries, as identified by science’– Kantrow, 2013; para 7), two statements on oceans and biodiversity at OWG 8, a series of interventions at OWG 11, particularly relating to climate change, and general recommendations on the coherence of targets at OWG 12. This was a total of seven interventions across all of the OWG proceedings. UNDESA, the International Council for Science (ICSU) and International Social Science Council (ISSC) also organised an Expert Group Meeting on Science and the SDGs in March 2013, as an opportunity for the scientific community to discuss among itself how science can best inform the SDG process, and for the scientific community to initiate a dialogue with the policymakers (UNDESA et al., 2013). However, this event was not cited in any of the Co-Chairs summaries, nor was it mentioned by any key informant. By comparison, at OWG session 12, just one meeting, the Women’s Major Group issued 12 statements to the Co-Chairs and Member States, and their input was reflected in the Co-Chairs’ OWG12 Summary of the Morning Hearings (OWG Co-Chairs, 2014a, b). The inputs summarised above suggests that the Science Major Group was not nearly as active or as visible as other major groups. One infor-

4.1  Representation and Access

mant, Professor Susan Parnell, also noted that whilst she was invited to participate in proceedings by the Science Major Group, she ‘ended up in New York… and didn’t know what was going on, didn’t have an institutional map or know how things were going to come together’ (Parnell, 2021; PC), suggesting even this formal mechanism was difficult to penetrate and engage with. Professor Harriet Bulkeley also noted this. She remarked that most academics did not know how to engage with the UNGA and ‘where to start’. She also noted that ‘UNGA side events and networking opportunities around these processes [were] very limited and highly policed…’ and as such ‘a lot of meaningful interaction is serendipitous’ (Bulkeley, 2021; PC). Similarly, Professor Genie Birch noted that for scientists and academics ‘most of the engagement [with the UNGA] is informal advocacy  – chance meetings. Outsider parallel event’ (Birch, 2021; PC). A parallel consideration is that this formal avenue for scientific input is a representative mechanism, associated with the people p­ roducing the evidence, not the evidence itself. As such scientists are afforded the same position as various demographic groups: women, children, those with disabilities. But science is not a demographic. It is a method or approach and confining it to a representative channel misses the opportunity to use it as a cross-cutting foundation or input to discussion. Indeed in 1992, Agenda 21 had explicitly called for governments to strengthen ‘science and technology advice to the highest levels of the United Nations…. in order to ensure the inclusion of science and technology know-how in sustainable development policies and strategies’ (UN, 1992) and yet 20 years later, from 2012 to 2015, the only standing arrangement for scientific advisory input directly in the negotiation chamber was through one observer seat. Three other formal mechanisms for scientific input were briefly cited, by one informant each; the Committee on Development Policy (CDP) which is formally under ECOSOC but which was created to provide academic input on the UN on sustainable development policy issues, the Global Sustainable Development Report which since Rio  +  20 has been intended to provide science

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inputs to the annual High-Level Political Forum and the UN’s Scientific Advisory Board established in September 2013 (UNESCO, 2016). Interestingly the CDP was not cited anywhere in the OWG and IGN input documents, and according to a long-standing member of the group it had no input into the UNGA process (Fukuda Parr, 2021; PC). In the case of the GSDR, the UNGA confirmed its role as a science synthesis report and input to the annual HLPF on sustainable development through GA resolution A/ RES/67/290 of 9 July 2013. In this resolution, however, Member States asked the forum, in 2014, ‘to consider the scope and methodology of a global sustainable development report, based on a proposal of the Secretary-General, reflecting the views and recommendations of Member States, and relevant United Nations entities...’ (UN, 2013d; para 20). This request resulted in Member States and 53 UN organisations making proposals on the scope and methodology of the report. The views expressed were summarised in Secretary- General’s report E/2014/87 of June 2014. And in June 2014, a prototype GSDR was prepared by the Secretariat (UN, 2016b). All of this context serves to demonstrate that in spite of there being a recognition of the need for a formal science synthesis report into annual sustainable development discussions (in this case under the HLPF, not the UNGA itself), the nature of the report was not confirmed until late 2014 and with insufficient time for such a report to be developed to inform deliberations on the post-­ 2015 framework itself. Likewise, with regard to the UN’s Scientific Advisory Board, with their first meeting only taking place in January 2014 and the second in December 2014, it was too late for their input to inform the OWG deliberations or the specifics of the subsequent IGN.  Furthermore, the recommendations of the Scientific Advisory Board do not consider the role of science within UNGA processes.

4.1.2 Access Through New Institutional Arrangements In spite of the limited space for UNGA-mandated engagement of scientists and academics in the

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negotiations, informants were keen to emphasise that the post-2015 process marked a step change in past practice and was much more open to academic engagement than other UNGA sessions. The reason being that the unique and temporary institutional arrangements created for the deliberations (in particular, the OWG) created space, both for the facilitators to organise impromptu scientific inputs, and for epistemic communities to create engagement opportunities with Member States in and around the proceedings over the course of the protracted deliberations. Maruxa Cardama of Communitas emphasised the significance of a meeting she and colleagues convened just before the OWG deliberations started ‘on the top floor of UN and we invited one Member State per troika and we commissioned one paper per area that had to be in the [urban] SDG’. She considered it a decisive moment in the campaign for an urban goal as it was early in the process and the informal mixing enabled Member States both to socialise as representatives of their newly created troikas, whilst also providing an opportunity for them to get to know ‘key knowledge figures’. It showed Member States that ‘there is a community’ that they could turn to for technical input and advice (Cardama, 2022; PC). Similarly Tony Pipa, a US Government lead negotiator, recollected the significance of the ‘the private retreat processes that happened through UN Foundation with WRI’, both as it was a useful opportunity for the presentation of science but also as it gave Member States an opportunity ‘to build relationships with people outside of formal arena… and that helps you try to start to build levels of trust and understanding so you can go back to your delegation and explain perspectives, and gives opportunity to identify points of consensus and collaboration. That was really valuable’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). In a similar frame, others emphasised the importance of the facilitated consultation process, which too was a break with past practice. Although these were limited in number, and scientists and academics were only modestly represented in the health consultation here studied, other technical experts were present, and it is clear from the outcome report that the Gaborone

health dialogue that diverse evidence inputs were used to inform the discussion (McManus, 2013). Furthermore, the in-person consultation meeting provided a space for informal mixing of Member State representatives and technical experts. According to urbanist, Aromar Revi, so crucial were the semi-formal negotiation spaces which enabled more fluid mixing of stakeholders that there were perhaps even ‘more useful than science itself’ (Revi, 2021; PC). Similarly, other informants noted that without the OWG troika system and the various forms of innovative consultation, the outcome could have been much less ambitious and very different indeed (Revi, 2021; PC, Pipa, 2021; PC, Fukuda Parr, 2021; PC). The significance of these informal structures has implications for ones understanding of the UN. First, it is often suggested that the UN has institutional inertia or path dependence: a topic particularly studied with reference to the UN Security Council (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). It is claimed that its size and entrenched historical roots prevent innovation and indeed, the fact that the Major Group is still the only standing UNGA science interface, more than 20  years after the Earth Summit, does imply strong resistance to changing practice within the UNGA as well. But as the OWG has served to demonstrate, Member States do recognise the limitations of the cumbersome GA format, and with strong political leadership (as was the case with Colombia, Mexico and Brazil at Rio + 20) and supportive political facilitators they are willing to adapt, innovate and disrupt past practice (aligning with Hirschmann, 2021). The Open Working Group, in particular, could be considered a critical juncture in UNGA history, as per the concept expounded in the literature of historical institutionalism. It forced a sudden change in past practice with profound effects. As documented by Paula Caballero, the Colombian negotiator, so crucial was the OWG that she considers it the ‘bedrock of what became the SDGs’ and uses terms such as ‘transformative’ and ‘revolutionary’ to describe its impact (Caballero, 2016; 139). The format of the OWG was particularly innovative in that it forced Member States away from traditional negotiating

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structures (such as the European block or G77) and into new-formed troikas with countries from very different regions and income groups. It also created space for ‘active participation not just by all countries, but by all major stakeholders’, both through the panels and co-chair dialogues with non-governmental actors, but also by extending out the deliberations over a period of 14 months and in doing so creating space for parallel informal convenings (Caballero, 2016; 139). Second, one can not underestimate the importance and influence of informal negotiation spaces: roundtables, retreats, workshops, where much pre-deliberation was done. As noted by Badiee in the context of the data discussions (2022; PC), indirect engagements such as these, both with Member States and with policy intermediaries (she cited Homi Kharas, Jeffrey Sachs and the UN Statistics Division), were crucial for influencing: ‘through individuals and small opportunities’ (Badiee, 2021; PC). These forums gave non-governmental actors, including scientists, a ‘latitude of freedom to express interests and ideas and ideologies’ to Member States (Korosi, 2021; PC), without the strictures usually imposed by providing set statements in a negotiation chamber. These informal spaces were equally, if not more, important for the transmission and advancement of ideas than written inputs provided to the process, which were plentiful they could oftentimes ‘be overwhelming’ (Caballero, 2021; PC). Understanding their format and dynamics is therefore crucial for a full understanding of negotiation spaces, how ideas move between policymaking sites (Peck, 2011), and the incentives that enable and constrain political behaviour (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

4.1.3 The (Pre)Dominance of Political Interests The UNGA is often referred to as the world’s Parliament (UN, 2016a). Its primary objective is to be the highest, most representative deliberative forum in the world, but at the heart of that is its mission to ‘represent political interest and seek solutions along those interests’ (Korosi, 2021;

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PC). In the context of the SDG negotiations, this meant attempting to make the goals evidence based, whilst recognising that ‘scientific advice had to be measured against political feasibility’ (Korosi, reported by IISD, 2014). Almost all of the informants noted this tension, using language that referred to ‘compromises’, ‘underlying interests’, ‘political interests under technocratic cover’ or the ‘persistence of geopolitical interests’. According to one informant, whilst there was a concerted and welcome effort to bring in new inputs and sources of evidence, ‘at the end of the day it is about geopolitical balancing …. And therefore sometimes countries take positions that don’t align with science but instead [consider] how they align with one another’ (Muffuh, 2021; PC). As co-chair Ambassador Korosi concluded ‘all geopolitical interests were there [in the chamber]; our task was to keep them at bay as much as possible’ so there could be a good evidence-­based discussion (Korosi, 2021; PC). But above and beyond the dominance of geopolitical concerns was the political nature of the deliberation format whereby the only entities fully entitled to speak were the Member States and all others were invited guests. In such a context, for any science-based input to have impact it needed a political champion to give it currency in the deliberations: ‘While external inputs were important and influential they often weren’t consequential, unless there were Member States or coalitions who believed them to be so and were willing to champion them’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). A practical example of the pre-eminence of domestic and geopolitics cited by a number of people was the fight over UHC language in the title of the health goal. Whilst the US Government, under the Obama administration, was overtly in support of a goal on UHC (which chimed with domestic efforts on the Affordable Care Act), and it had been strongly promoted by many in the health academic community, it could not be implied in the goal heading because of ‘US Politics’ and the ongoing domestic tensions about the affordability and relevance of universal health insurance (McArthur, 2021; PC, Pipa, 2021; PC). Making the health goal in any way about this topic would immediately alienate a large number of

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Republicans who would not support the final 2030 agenda (Ibid). Relatedly others stressed that the goal headings were first and foremost a communication of political aspirations, not really the place for any kind of scientific or evidence-based assertions, and as such they needed to be non-­partisan and unifying. Welch (2021) pointed out that with regard to ‘getting to zero, ending preventable deaths, ending HIV / TB / Malaria’, it was widely acknowledged it was ‘not really possible, but people couldn’t retreat from aspirational language’. It was a political commitment. Similarly, Pipa points out that once there was a commitment to ‘end poverty’, governments also had to ‘promise to end health objectives’ and disease focused targets would best enable the fulfilment of that kind of commitment (Pipa, 2021; PC). Whilst the visibility of domestic political interests made some informants cynical as to the impact of any kinds of science or external ­evidence on UNGA processes (‘It’s really all just politics’, Melamed, 2021; PC), other informants stressed that there was a clear role and contribution for external evidence inputs, particularly at the target and indicator level, actively encouraged through new consultative practices and outreach, which ultimately enriched the final agenda (Korosi, 2021; PC, Sachs, 2021; PC, Schmidt-­ Traub, 2021; PC, Mohammed, 2021; PC, see also Dodds et  al., 2016). Furthermore, knowledge actors were crucial to making the political goals work, that is, ensuring that political aspirations were translated into targets that were devised with an expert community, were sufficiently ambitious, and could feasibly be implemented. A good example of this is provided by the debates on the urban goal. Whilst the urban community fought hard to have a focus on productivity and economic opportunities under the urban goal (see, e.g. UNSDSN’s proposal for a goal on ‘inclusive, productive and resilience cities’ released in 2013), it was ultimately excluded ‘because of [domestic political] tensions between capital cities and national governments’ (Revi, 2019; PC). These tensions included a reluctance by national governments to empower local government leaders and recognise them as the organising centres

of the economy and agents of innovation and economic growth. However other forms of political ‘horse-trading’ meant the urban goal absorbed the resilience issues instead (Cardama, 2022; PC; Revi, 2019; PC). Disaster risk communities had been arguing for this to be its own standalone goal, but when Member States objected to that it was instead merged into the urban goal on the basis that it was largely about infrastructure and the built environment. It was also a theme many urbanists had strongly emphasised. As Cardama puts it, whilst many academics were pro a strong focus on urban resilience and had actively called for it, it really ‘landed on us’ due to political horse-trading. She went on to clarify that it ‘makes a lot of sense and wasn’t negative. On the contrary…’ it encouraged the urban community to work more closely with DRR stakeholders, to consult with DRR experts and think concretely about practical proposals for resilience targets and indicators (Cardama, 2022; PC). Through this example we see the influence of the non-­ political technical communities in the raising and framing of issues, but also the ultimate control of the Member States who were responsible for structuring the topics according to political interests and concerns. Thereafter, experts were reengaged to make sense of the political arrangement of the goals and targets. Whilst most informants noted that political interests and horse-trading of issues is an expected part of any intergovernmental dialogue, a number of informants raised concern about more subtle forms of political influencing, which often shaped supposedly technical discussions. In particular, informants highlighted the discussion over the indicators, which are ‘seemingly neutral but have deep effects on re-­conceptualizing norms and shaping behavior that are not always visible, articulated, or benign’ (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019; 7). The implication is not that political interests were bad, per se, but that specific political interests and influences were being exerted over some parts of the process without an open, frank discussion and with distortive effects. This was particularly the case when the indicator discussion was moved into a supposedly technical forum: the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on

4.1  Representation and Access

the SDG Indicators, which consisted of national statistics and representatives of UN Agencies, with NGOs invited only as observers. The influence of politics over the indicator discussion was even noted by the Director of the UN Statistics Division who observed that it is ‘hard to be neutral in the political processes. I often feel like the UNSC is being contaminated by engaging with the politics’ (Schweinfest, 2021; PC). Whilst the indicator formulation process, which ran from 2015 to 2017 and was moved out of the UNGA (see UN, 2017), is not a formal part of this empirical analysis, it is nonetheless useful to note the general concern raised about the politicisation of seemingly technocratic discussions. In a retrospective study of the SDG indicator-­ setting process, Fukuda-Parr and McNeill (2019) observed that the choice of indicators was as important as goal-setting in defining new norms and the over-reliance on quantitative measures of progress could ‘distort the meaning of social norms, create perverse incentives, frame hegemonic discourses and disrupt power structures’ (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019; 7). They point to academics like Broome and Quirk (2015) who have suggested that the peril of indicators is that by translating words to numbers they obscure the underlying theories and assumptions and often, even unwittingly, cause the goal to be reinterpreted. They may also often (as a result of limited data availability) over-simplify the issue at hand. A good example is provided by the SDG on sustainable production and consumption (SDG 14). For many NGOs and CSOs, the goal on SCP was fundamentally about reform of the global productive economic system, to expose and redress gross inequalities and unsustainable production patterns (as per the 10  Year Framework of Programmes on SCP established in 2012 at Rio + 20- UN, 2012a). But what ended up in the final SCP indicator list was far more benign than the goal had implied. For example, Target 12.2 aims to ‘achieve the sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources’, but the corresponding indicators are two measures of material footprint (2022c, 2015a). Material

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footprint per GDP provides a measure of biomass, fossil fuels, metal ores and non-metal ores usage, but it is provided without a corresponding target for reduced / appropriate levels of consumption, nor is there a measure of any other natural resource exploitation. Similar examples are evident in the health debates. The debates about UHC were fundamentally about universal access for all to affordable, if not free, healthcare. But in the process of translating this rights-based objective into a target and indicator, it was quite deliberately narrowed. The eventual target (SDG 3.8) aims to ‘Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all’. Whilst UHC is still referenced, it is severely qualified, changing to a measure of affordable access, with no sense of what relative affordability is in each country. It is narrowed further still in the set of accompanying indicators which attempt to monitor UHC through measures of essential healthcare coverage and household health expenditure (UN, 2017). Again, there is no sense of appropriate rates of coverage, or what might constitute a fair and equitable level of household health expenditure in different contexts, which seems a far cry from the initial goal of universal care. Another challenge levelled at the indicator discussion was that by moving it into a technical forum it implied a ‘claim to scientific authority’ which may have prevented some Member States from fully interrogating the choices being made and the underlying data upon which they relied (Broome & Quirk, 2015), thereby allowing political choices about the monitoring and implementation of the goals to be made without adequate discussion. The ‘symbolic power’ of claiming something is technical and scientific is a point also flagged by Stone (2019), which may prevent national policymakers from feeling equipped to engage in such debates. Fukuda Parr and McNeill conclude that ‘in a field like development which is marked by contestations over alternative strategies and policy approaches, the choice of indica-

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tors and targets in global goals becomes a critical political issue’ (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019; 7). And in the spirit of a democratic political process, even the most technical of discussions should be open to full dialogue and debate.

4.1.4 The Persistence of a (Northern) Policy-Elite The SDG consultation process was the largest consultative process every employed by the UN.  Whilst this was a clear attempt to have a ‘global conversation’, filtering and interpreting these inputs was not a neutral process. UN agencies and the UN Technical Support Team (TST) had to sort and synthesise the input from the consultations and that from UN agencies into digestible briefings for Member States. Whilst informants like Francesca Perucci, of the UN Statistics Division, stressed the importance of this function, others thought it gave the UN agencies too much power: ‘I feel like, throughout the process, that agencies were playing a big role. Bigger than I would have liked’ (Perruci, 2021; PC). An editorial in the Lancet in 2013 raised the same concern with reference to the health thematic consultation. The editorial questioned whether the consultation, which took place over only 4  months, was really ‘sufficient time to communicate the process and garner responses from communities beyond the “policy elite”’ (The Lancet, 2013). The idea of there being a small group of professionals, from within the UN and external to it, that dominated the curation of evidence and had a disproportionate influence over proceedings was noted by a few informants. Saikiko Fukuda Parr argues that these ‘international development professionals’ determine ‘what kind of analysis counts and what does not’ (Fukuda Parr, 2021; PC). She singled out Jeff Sachs, Bill Gates and other data actors, outside of the formal structures of the UN, who actively tried to ‘push the MDG+ Agenda…[which is] a technocratic plus agenda’ (Fukuda Parr, 2021; PC). Tony Pipa from the US Government alluded to this influence with regard to the Gates Foundation, with particular reference to the health goal. He noted that, as ‘such a

large investor, they were a shadow Member State in some respects’ exerting huge influence over the negotiation process, through informal ways and means (Pipa, 2021; PC). Whilst many of these professionals were in think tanks and policy institutions outside of government and the UN system, many were also within. UN Agencies and the Post-2015 Task Team (and its subordinate technical support teams, writing the thematic briefings) were regularly invited to speak in proceedings and to prepare written inputs. In total, 57 UN agencies participated in the OWG proceedings and 29 thematic briefing papers were prepared for Member States by UN agencies, as part of the Technical Support Team (UN, 2014b). A representative from the Gates Foundation particularly remembered that ‘most of the technical experts [in the proceedings] were from technical UN agencies’ (Welch, 2021; PC). The influence of the TST briefings cannot be overstated. According to OWG co-chair Ambassador Korosi, the TST briefings were used ‘as raw material to produce co-chair summaries which were shared with MS’ (Korosi, 2021; PC), and it was these summaries that were fundamental for crafting the final outcome document from the OWG. The thematic briefings were also commonly cited as a primary source of evidence for deliberators. This was noted by the Deputy Secretary General, then Special Adviser on the Post-2015 process, who noted that the ‘TST had a crucial ownership role. Pushing within the system…[They] bridged a lot of UN institutional politics… Also playing a role engaging with Member States’ (Mohammed, 2021; PC). Six informants emphasised the crucial role of the UN agencies and the input they had through the TST briefings. Professor Genie Birch (2021; PC) says engaging with these agencies was a key ‘influencing route’ for scientific actors as it was the agencies that distilled science-­ based learning into political inputs (Birch, 2021; PC, Welch, 2021; PC, Schweinfest, 2021; PC, Sachs, 2021; PC). In the context of the urban discussion, many noted that these expert intermediaries were vital to the successful inclusion of an urban goal, acting as translators, taking the expert inputs of scientists and urban academics and translating that

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into specific asks for the policymakers and nego- importance of these international think tanks and tiators. According to Maruxa Cardama who expert groups (such as the World Resources directed Communitas, a small purposely created Institute – WRI) for facilitating parallel dialogues NGO focused on shaping the urban negotiations: outside of the formal negotiation: ‘When we ‘We were listening to the people with the knowl- arrived at the point when very different difficult edge – Genie [Birch] and Cynthia [Rosenzweig] – issues [were] on table they organised very useful and were then helping with translation between morning discussions or retreats. They helped us policy content and politics. If a few of us were in gamification type of exercise, putting issues on not there doing that translation we would not table and approaching from different angles until have been able to tell Member States what we it turned out [they] could be digested and weren’t wanted in the SDG’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). that contentious’ (Korosi, 2022; PC). Cardama went on to explain that you needed the For some informants, the presence of these policy experts to help guide the process and intermediaries reflected ‘a massive flaw in the explain to the [urban] community what ‘an inter- system’ which undermined the whole consultagovernmental fight would take’ and ‘the rules of tive process, as evidence-inputs ultimately ‘rest the game’ (Cardama, 2022; PC). This view was on a few political operators’ (Cardama, 2022; seconded by academic, Professor Harriet PC). Others suggested that the influence of interBulkeley who had presented to the OWG at their national development professionals (including seventh meeting. She noted that the strong push specialists from UN agencies) was by no means for the urban SDG was ‘centred around a few key surprising, given their in-depth knowledge and people, including Aro (Aromar Revi), Sue (Susan mastery of a very complex bureaucratic system Parnell)…. A few people who have been on this (as noted by Sachs, 2021, who was himself listed journey on where cities should lie for a long time. as one such professional). Professor Susan And had strong visibility in countries in global Parnell, who attended the OWG as part of the scisouth’ (Bulkeley, 2021; PC). These people were ence Major Group delegation, and also engaged both academics and practitioners, but most in the UrbanSDG Campaign, noted that ‘if you importantly they understood the complexity of don’t understand the system and where you have the multilateral system. Professor Birch referred to insert evidence and information, you will never to groups like UN Habitat, UNSDSN and land an argument, no matter how well substantiCommunitas as ‘bridges’ between the experts ated’ and as such these intermediaries were vital and the political system (Birch, 2021; PC). (Parnell, 2021; PC). And indeed, this chimes with Similarly, Kate Higgins, who had led the Post-­ much recent EIP literature which has stressed the 2015 Data Test, remarked that the focus on data barriers to evidence uptake including evidence throughout the negotiations was due to select providers not engaging at opportune political ‘data communities and actors [who] were very moments, the verbosity of technical and acacompetent, experienced and motivated. They demic inputs, and the lack of actionable recomwere competent enough to navigate the system so mendations in many technical papers that this theme continued to be oxygenated’. She (Hammersley, 2005b), which thereby justifies the went on to list people based at ODI, UNSDSN, use of such intermediaries (Bednarek et  al., Open Data Watch, UN Foundation and others: all 2016). Claire Melamed, lead author of the non-governmental, technical entities specialising Independent Expert Advisory Group on the data in understanding and following inter-­revolution, strongly stressed the policy ‘irrelegovernmental processes. The co-chair of the vance’ of many of the ‘expert’ inputs received. OWG Ambassador Korosi noted the involvement She remarked that it was ‘quite rare that [acaof similar groups of actors  – from WRI, demic input] really had an actionable focus… It’s UNSDSN, as well as specialist expert groups like the people who filter those academic inputs CERN and Sevi (on water) – who provided ‘the through their policy expertise [that help you] bulk of non-UN based knowledge input into the identify what is most relevant’ (Melamed, 2021; process’ (Korosi, 2022; PC). He also stressed the PC). Likewise, Guido Schmidt-Traub observed

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that there were ‘very few scientists who put forward operational recommendations’ and as such there was an important role for knowledge intermediaries (Schmidt-Traub, 2021; PC). This finding is not unexpected, as studies by Kuus (2014) and Hoppe et al. (2013) show similar intermediaries playing a crucial role in other multilateral bureaucracies such as the EU and COP process. And there is an extensive literature on the role of ‘research brokers’ at the national level (Greenhalgh et al. 2016), as well as formal guidance on how to formalise these roles issued by the Government of Canada and the UK (CHSRF, 2001; DEFRA, 2006). According to Kuus, in her analysis of the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy under the EU, ‘in practice… the documents drafted, phrases coined and contacts made are shaped by a relatively small group of policymaking officials’ (Kuss, 2014; 126). And whilst they may not dictate specific outcomes or focus areas, the processes through which they shepherd policy development are a crucial part of the institutional context and can determine the nature of the outcome (Ibid). Given the influence of these policy intermediaries, two informants expressed concern about their geographic representativeness: more specifically the fact that many if not most are based in the global North. Commonly cited individuals were from UN agencies like UNDESA, UNDP and UNICEF, as well as think tanks and technical networks like WRI, ODI, UNSDSN, Brookings, CERN (the European Organisation for Nuclear Research) and Centre for Global Development. Rockefeller, Gates and the Hewlett Foundations were also cited as key facilitators of dialogues and discussions. Whilst there were exceptions, like UN Habitat (Nairobi) and Cepei (Bogota), most of these groups are headquartered in Washington, London, New York and San Francisco, suggesting a strong Northern ‘geographical privilege’ (Mahony & Hulme, 2018; Shapin, 1988). Institutions like UNSDSN attempted to broaden the basis of their inputs by drawing upon a global academic network. Likewise, the UN agencies conducted internal, global consultations which informed many of their inputs, but the concentration of Northern advisory institutions and policy

groups suggests these groups enjoy an ease of access to global policy processes which many other countries’ think tanks and policy institutions do not. This reaffirms Mahony and Hulme’s (2018) argument about the ‘the uneven geographies of scientific authority’ which they have studied with reference to climate negotiation, but seemingly also applies within the full UNGA (Mahony & Hulme, 2018, 396). The uneven representation of actors in the proceedings emphasises the importance of understanding the human composition and institutional values of the guiding technical, Secretariat and affiliated international agencies, as well as the closely engaged think tanks and knowledge networks. As noted by Haas, it is ‘these actors [that] carry in their heads the values that shape the issues contained in their briefing papers’ (Haas, 1990; 6) and through the very act of synthesising evidence they are ‘translating competing societal values and preferences into policy solutions’ (Cairney & Oliver, 2017; 2).

4.2 The Organisation of Epistemic Communities At the outset of this analysis, it was presumed that the organisation of the different epistemic communities engaging with the political discussions, and the influence of scientific actors within these communities, would dictate their level of effectiveness. And indeed, the empirical analysis has gleaned a wide range of insights into the health, urban and data-related constituencies and their organisational processes, and also exposed considerable divergence in their compositions and structures. At the one end of a continuum of coordination and organisation is the health epistemic community: a huge and multi-pronged global coalition of actors working to improve public health outcomes. As the UN-led global thematic consultation on health served to demonstrate, there is an extremely wide range of actors, from NGOs and public health agencies, to academics and global health agency representatives, many of whom are engaged within issue-specific networks on equity, NCDs and so on. Whilst there is not one central

4.2  The Organisation of Epistemic Communities

nervous system or operational framework structuring ongoing input from the whole broad health community, there is a history of coordinated, international activism, which meant that many health stakeholders were eager to engage in the consultative process and were aware of the value of this level of multilateral engagement. As noted by the global thematic consultation report, this multi-stakeholder engagement and support was fundamental to ‘the development success of the MDG era’ (McManus, 2013; 82). This history of engagement also meant the health community was afforded official status within the UN-led consultation process: through a funded, global public consultation with 14 face-to-face meetings and a coordinating Task Team. They were also recognised within the UNGA proceedings through the creation of a Major Group Thematic Cluster on Health who were invited by the OWG Co-Chairs to meet with and provide written inputs to OWG deliberators.1 Health academics and technicians were clearly active within the various consultative processes as evident in the strong and substantiated language on equity. The Health Thematic consultation report, for example, cites WHO technical papers on the ‘Measurement of trends and equity in coverage of health interventions in the context of universal health coverage’ and inputs from the Global Network on Health Equity, comprised largely of academicians (McManus, 2013). In another example, Lucia D’Ambruoso, a health academic from Umeå University, Sweden, encouraged the Major Group Thematic Cluster on Health to move away from a context and country-­ specific angle, or a focus on health financing, towards considering UHC in terms of structural inequalities which they duly did in their statement to OWG 4 (D’Ambruoso, 2013; Major Group, 2013). Whilst all these actors were not organised in one formalised health consortium, or fixed strucDetails of the Major Group Thematic Cluster on Health are available on the UN’s Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, including summary statements from Co-Chair meetings: https://sustainabledevelopment.un. org/index.php?page=view&type=9502&menu=1565 &nr=6 [Last accessed 5/5/22] 1 

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ture, they shared rules and norms about the value of network engagement, the utility of the post-­ 2015 process and a shared belief in the necessity to use this policy process to advance health outcomes. Furthermore, the stability of their engagement over the course of the MDG period and throughout the post-2015 deliberation resulted in the UN facilitators ‘institutionalising’ their engagement with the process. Aligning with constructivist views of institutionalism (such as Hay, 2004), one might therefore consider the health epistemic community a form of informal institution. Quite different was the urban epistemic community. A number of informants were keen to emphasise that in spite of there being a long academic and practical traditional in urban planning, as well as a number of global local government networks, at the outset of the post-2015 deliberations the community was dispersed and unstructured. Urban issues had not been central to the MDG process and enjoyed little support from the UN system (Revi, 2019; PC). Relatedly, scientists, urban networks, NGOs and other advocates for urban issues were not organised, only mobilising in 2013 ‘after the OWG plenary [which discussed urban issues], when heads of Cities Alliance, UN Habitat, UCLG and I met and discussed how we can mobilise all the actors and 300 cities’ (Revi, 2019; PC). The 2015 process (and specifically OWG 7) was therefore seminal as a rallying moment around which a coherent community could form. The key mechanisms for this, discussed above, were The Global Taskforce for Local and Regional Government on Post-­ 2015, which aimed to represent local government leaders and their interests, and the UrbanSDG Campaign, which was a multi-stakeholder coalition. Established by two academic-practitioners, under the auspices of the UNSDSN, the UrbanSDG Campaign was from the outset well populated with academicians who provided ‘key intellectual energy’ (Parnell, 2016; 536). These academics met at dialogues convened by the Campaign but also at a series of concurrent discussions on the idea of a new ‘urban science’ (the process for which is well summarised in Acuto et  al., 2018). Whilst Cardama and others noted

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that the Campaign was a new coalition of actors, who were crafting messages from the latest urban sustainability science in real time, they attempted to make up for this lack of organisational history by communicating evidence-informed messages at strategic political moments (Cardama, 2022; PC). Particularly crucial were the policy brokers or translators, discussed above, who helped the Campaign land key messages with deliberators, meeting with Member States, Co-Chairs and other UN stakeholders to convey messages personally over the course of the deliberations (Birch, 2021; PC, Rudd et al., 2018). The urban experience has two implications for our understanding of epistemic communities: first it shows the importance of a political opportunity or entry point within the multilateral system around which to mobilise key stakeholders, although the subsequent disbanding of the UrbanSDG Campaign in 2016 does suggest a temporality associated with this kind of opportunistic coalition building. Furthermore, it suggests that where there is not a clear history of mobilisation and multilateral engagement, and the topic in question is not sufficiently recognised by the convening institution (i.e. the UN not facilitating an urban thematic consultation), then the communication of key ideas and advocacy messages is contingent upon targeted engagement with political actors, through high-level interpersonal relationships and connections. Informants were also keen to stress that messages were evidence-­informed, repeatedly noting the input received from urban academics. The implication was that by grounding their messages in the latest academic evidence, their community became more credible and that policymakers were more likely to see them as expert advisers, rather than advocates. Finally, the third epistemic community here examined relates to the theme of data. As discussed in Part III, data was quite distinct from the other thematic areas, as it was neither a formal thematic consultative topic, nor did it have a consistent well-defined community behind it. Rather data was a cross-cutting theme of all of the deliberations, appearing as a key priority in almost every sector and championed by a huge array of actors from civil society organisations, to the

President of the General Assembly and UN Secretary General. Particularly influential for a spotlight on data and promoting the concept of a ‘data revolution’ was the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda. Meanwhile a wide range of academic publications from the MDG era and early deliberative period called for a focus on data to rectify inequities in goal and target setting. Organisationally, UN agencies like the UN Statistics Division and UNICEF were crucial advocates, calling for greater investment in data and information systems, particularly in low-income countries (Perucci, 2021; PC, Schweinfest, 2021; PC). Whilst some of the key informants alluded to the influence of a small coalition of actors and individual personalities in helping to galvanise the discussion, the community was largely dispersed: a loose form coalition of supporters rather than a coherent community. One might expect this lack of organisational coherence to have hampered the centrality of the theme in the discussion, but counter-intuitively data remained front and centre, advanced less by specific data activists and more by sectoral actors concerned with equity and disaggregated monitoring. It was  also  promoted by  Member States concerned with accountability and/or an evidence-based approach to the design of the goals and targets, as well as the excitement and potential of new private-­ sector partnerships. Where arguments were made in favour of disaggregated monitoring, these were often rooted in academic studies (as per the academic references cited in UNICEF and Save the Children’s post-2015 reports, for example) and as such academic voices found currency in the debate helping to justify and substantiate particular approaches, even without a coherent advocacy coalition.

4.3 Framing Aligning with recent EIP literature that focuses on evidence production, I find framing to be a crucial consideration in the evidence to policy transmission process. This involves the reconceptualisation of evidence so as to appeal to policymakers needs

4.3 Framing

and interests (as extensively documented by Cairney & Oliver, 2017, Pearce et  al., 2018, amongst others) and the blending of ‘empirical information and emotive appeals’ (True et  al., 2007; 161). Undoubtedly this was an important consideration for scientists, advocates and other influencers across all of the epistemic communities engaged in the post-2015 deliberations as their ambition was to maximise political uptake of their inputs. An important strategy in this regard was framing the concern in such a way as to make it feel holistic, cross-sectoral and strategic to all of the other SDG areas. Ambassador Korosi noted that those NGOs able to achieve this had a much more profound impact than discreet interest groups only speaking to one narrow issue (Korosi, 2021; PC). The UrbanSDG campaign is a powerful example of this: a coalition of diverse actors concerned with air quality, transport, urban health, local governance and much more, who all aligned under the overarching ambition of securing an urban goal. Similarly, the ‘data revolution’, as a concept, was a powerful way of framing a wide range of datarelated challenges and potential opportunities, which played to many Member States’ interest in new technology and partnerships. Perhaps more interesting than the framing of sectoral concerns, which has already been extensively written about (Cairney & Oliver, 2017; Sohn, 2018; Stone, 2002), are findings from this research that suggest there are two more considerations with regard to framing which relate not to the repackaging of evidence for policy purposes, but to the kinds of evidence used as the source material and the assumptions made about its inherent political value. First is the packaging of multiple forms of evidence under the guise of scientific inputs, and second, the values prescribed to science within the context of a political process and its assumed role in political mediation.

4.3.1 Evidence Over Science In 2013, at a meeting of the OWG Co-Chairs with the Major Groups, Ambassador Korosi remarked that the SDGs must be understood as a

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partnership between policy and science (Major Groups, 2013). However, in nearly all of the many texts submitted to the negotiations as well as spoken remarks, the dominant term used to refer to technical, researched information is not science so much as ‘evidence’ or ‘expertise’ (see, e.g. Co-Chair remarks, 2013). As noted by Professor Harriet Bulkeley, a presenter to the OWG in session 7, ‘academic knowledge didn’t matter so much’ (Bulkeley, 2021; PC). Whilst policymakers like to claim the process was science-­based, it was really more about showing a long, rich body of evidence to back up arguments. Professor Sachs seconded this point when highlighting some of the most influential voices in the global health policy debate: ‘Richard Horton, Paul Farmer, Peter Piot, Michel Kazatchkine, Michel Sidibe, Dean Jamison, Harold Varmus, Vikram Patel, and several others in global health policy were all important voices…. the Gates Foundation was very important as well’ (Sachs, 2021; PC). Whilst many of these are scientists and academics, some are doctors, Horton is an editor, Sidibe is a politician (the former Minister of Health in Mali before becoming head of UNAIDS) and Gates is a philanthropic organisation, showing that technical knowledge (from programmes and practice) was considered to be of equal value. Similarly, when discussing the composition of the UN Secretary-­ General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group on the Data Revolution, which provided input to the GA deliberations, Claire Melamed remarked that ‘most people in the room made the running as they had technical expertise’, not necessarily scientific training (Melamed, 2021; PC). Other informants reiterated the importance of expert input from a wide group of stakeholders, for example, Pipa (2021; PC) said that the quantitative targets within the final set ‘reflect a lot of input from the scientific community, or from a globally accepted community of experts’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). Similarly, Caballero (2021; PC) referred to the OWG process as a ‘science-based, [pause] evidence-driven process if there ever was one’. What is interesting about both sets of remarks is that although they first refer to the scientific community and the process being science-­

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based, they both paused and redefined their definitions calling them ‘experts’ and the process ‘evidence-driven’, allowing for a broader conceptualisation of what constituted legitimate evidence. This finding aligns with other EIP and health science studies which ultimately conclude that ‘scientists and policy makers have different views of what constitutes evidence’, and that policymakers’ ‘levels of evidence’ may range ­ from ‘any information that establishes a fact or gives reason for believing in something’ to ‘available body of facts or information indicating a belief or proposition is true or valid” (Choi et al., 2005; 633). As Cairney concludes, ‘in EBM (evidence-­based medicine), RCTs and systematic review may represent the “gold standard” but, in communities of civil servants seeking research, or professions focused more on everyday practice, they may only have limited influence, because, for example, the research does not relate directly to the problem as defined by the policymakers’ (Cairney, 2016; 73). Different understandings of what constitutes legitimate evidence raises the question of whether meaningful cooperation between scientists and policymakers within UN processes requires first, a clear common understanding of evidence types and hierarchies: differentiating between knowledge that is accumulated through professional experience and practice, and knowledge that is acquired through systematic investigation (as per the recommendations of Dobrow et  al., 2006; 1816). As noted in Part II, evidence hierarchies are strongly contested in EIP literature as some authors emphasise that the utility of evidence is dependent on context and that hierarchies are subject to human bias. Whilst both arguments are undoubtedly true, in this case the context is incredibly specific – the UN General Assembly – and whilst any sense of hierarchy may indeed be subjective, a cataloguing of different evidence types seems a prudent way to structure and systematise academic inputs (aligning with similarly recommendations from Parkhurst & Abeysinghe, 2016). Relatedly, it seems particularly important to differentiate between different scales of evidence: that which is based upon in-depth qualita-

tive study of a given community for example versus large-scale transnational evidence. Throughout the OWG and in the various thematic consultation processes, it is notable that academics were often invited to speak alongside NGO representatives with little discussion about the foundations for their inputs. That is not to say that one approach to evidence curation is more valid than the other necessarily (and, indeed, international evidence may not be relevant for local policy conditions – Cairney, 2016; 73) but, in a global multi-country forum like the UNGA where policy considers transboundary challenges, differentiation should be made between multi-country studies and highly individualised experiential evidence which may not provide transferable insights. The ambiguities around what constitutes legitimate evidence, do not negate the fact that many constituencies did meaningfully engage with very credible scientists and academics. Indeed, in the health sector debates about the MDGs and subsequently aspects of the SDGs were ‘getting hashed out in the Lancet and BMJ, which had applied science debates on the goals’ (McArthur, 2021; PC). Indeed, a number of key informants stressed the long tradition of scientific engagement in public health (including via the WHO and World Health Assembly) which helped to shape the final outcome (Schmidt-Traub, 2021; PC), though it was noted this sector was ‘probably the exception rather than the rule’ (McArthur, 2021; PC). Some countries also took the call for more scientific input very seriously and went so far as to bring scientific advisers into their negotiation delegations. For example, the Hungarian delegation brought in a chief scientific adviser, Janos Zlinsky (of Europe’s Regional Environmental Centre), who was ‘the spirit, soul and conscience of the process. Always reminding us if we were on the wrong path’ (Korosi, 2021; PC). Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed, then Special Adviser on the Post-­ 2015 Framework, remarked that ‘countries used their own scientific entities differently’ and that there was no one-size fits all approach (Mohammed, 2021; PC).

4.4  Temporal Dynamics: The Long-Term Socialisation of Ideas

4.3.2 Framing Science as a Political Tool

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and not just ‘talk about political positions’ (Schmidt-Traub, 2021; PC). Science was seen as a means ‘to bridge stakeholders, who are A crucial point of emphasis raised by informants entrenched in their belief and dogma’ and to across sectors was the value of scientific evidence ‘build stronger constituencies’ (Higgins, 2021; as a ‘powerful tool for cutting through politics’ PC). To which end the OWG used science ‘to cut (Higgins, 2021; PC) and ‘depoliticising the to the chase……to shortlist and to boil it [issues] debate’ (Schmidt-Traub, 2021; PC). In this way down’ to the final goals, targets and indicators’ science was framed as a negotiation tactic (an (Mohammed, 2021; PC). argument recently made by Cohen, Dreyfus and Whilst one informant noted that science is not others with regard to the climate negotiations; neutral and ‘can be used for any argument’ Columbia University, 2021). It was thought to do (Cardama, 2022; PC), the vast majority did not this first, by facilitating a neutral, educational dis- reflect upon the origins of the evidence being cussion amongst decision-makers, where they presented nor did they question its methodologireflected upon empirical evidence with no lead- cal foundations. The implicit assumption being ing agenda: ‘from the word go was a very gentle that any evidence presented to the deliberators but intense educational process’ (Caballero, would have already been reviewed and vetted, 2021). Ambassador Korosi noted that ‘two thirds and that that was sufficient to consider it a valid, of [the OWG’s] time was devoted to creating a neutral input to help inform the discussions. The common knowledge base’ and doing this through challenge with this is, of course, that science is a ‘benign process’ of inviting ‘scientists and always the product of a social community and knowledge-based institutions to offer informa- without adequate consideration of its fundamention’. The ambition of the Co-Chairs was to offer tal ideologies it risks guiding the discussion evidence without suggesting any particular towards a particular conviction or privileging response or approach: ‘[We said] you don’t have certain forms of knowledge over others. Whilst to take it or vote for it. You don’t have to draft it. there were some policy intermediaries (disJust listen’ (Korosi, 2021; PC). They attribute cussed above) helping to sift through and synthethis method to helping to build trust and confi- sise the evidence being discussed, most notably dence in the OWG deliberation process (Korosi, the UN TST and the UN-affiliated UNSDSN, 2021; PC). But others also cited parallel pro- there was no formal mechanism for critical cesses outside of the chamber which had the reflection upon the quality, or perhaps more same effect. Pipa felt that the private retreats importantly, the origins of the science being disorganised by the UN Foundation and WRI were cussed, undermining its ability to be a neutral very helpful, both for bringing in ‘credible scien- mechanism around which to forge consensus. tific bodies who could put… analysis on the table This aligns with Fukuda Parr and McNeil’s argufor MSs to chew over’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). He sec- ments with regard to the politicisation of data onded Korosi’s perspective that these evidence-­ and the introduction of political biases by the informed discussions helped to build trust and back door (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019). If understanding, both through the dialogue and science is to be presented in political forums as a through the informality of the discussion which mediatory tool, then it seems essential that a provided an opportunity ‘to build relationships transparent process be devised for authenticating with people outside of the formal arena’ (Ibid). and laying bare the metadata for each piece of Second, in the spirit of the critical rationalist evidence presented: by whom it was devised, tradition, science was presented as a neutral, irre- where, with what funding? Thereby exposing the futable input, which would enable politicians to potential biases and social norms within which move away from normative ideas (Higgins, 2021) the science was created.

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4.4 Temporal Dynamics: The Long-Term Socialisation of Ideas Whilst scientific evidence was rarely explicit in the language and speeches of the negotiations, it is clear than within the field of public health particularly the scientific community has played a crucial, long-term role seeding ideas and concepts which found themselves in the agenda. McArthur cited the example of non-­communicable diseases which he said became a growing concern, spurred on by a rich body of ‘academic literature such as the Global Burden of Disease report and IHME [Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation] annual publications’ (McArthur, 2021; PC). He concluded that whilst the ‘political diplomatic corps might not “lean towards science when there are other political toxins in the building” over time, “waves of science infiltrate the discussions”’ (McArthur, 2021; PC). Pipa asserted the influence of science forcefully, noting that the very concept of sustainable development itself is the ‘byproduct of scientific thinking as [it] has to do with understanding interlinkages between one particular outcome / sector / issue and others and how that relies on progress or is undermined by other parts of the agenda. That was part of the influence of the scientific community’ (Pipa, 2021; PC). The key point here is that many scientific concepts were seeded amongst policymakers over time, thereby enabling conceptual seepage. Fukuda Parr referred to this as generating a ‘discourse’ (Fukuda Parr, 2021; PC), whilst Sachs referred to this as a ‘socialisation’ of ideas (Sachs, 2021; PC). For Sachs the idea of socialisation is not just about the presentation of the scientific evidence itself, but about it being conveyed in such a way as to enable advocates to pick it up and use it to underpin their ‘years of effort’ (Sachs, 2021; PC). Whilst some would argue this is about the transmission of broad ideas (Jones et al., 2014b), there were many more complex notions that also found their way into the final agenda such as medically informed, quantitative targets relating to mortality and NCDs, suggesting that the complexity of the information is not in and of itself

the issue, so much as the sustained advocacy and engagement on it. Welch reaffirmed this point noting that ‘if you got scientific evidence in early, for example through OWG process, then it would be used. But if you didn’t get evidence in through OWG it was very hard to get it discussed later on’ (Welch, 2021; PC). The idea of long-term socialisation of technical and academic ideas chimes with recent EIP literature which notes that political influencing is not assumed to be a static one-off process, but a gradual seeping of evidence and ideas into the political discourse (Jones et al., 2013), as well as with historical institutionalism that suggests the time ideas have to permeate is central (Rixen & Viola, 2016). But going even further, this raises questions as to the long-term impact of scientific ideas upon political discourse (as per Haas 1990 and Mokyr, 2016). Haas and Mokyr take a long view of the infiltration of scientific ideas into economic and global governance concepts over the past century but even a review of language over the 4 years of the deliberation shows an increasing tendency towards using certain academic concepts in general discussion. An analysis of Member State statements through the OWG and IGN shows terms such as equity and data disaggregation increased in prominence as the deliberations progressed suggesting that at least in part, these ideas had become common currency, were reflected across a range of sectoral discussions and that in doing so ‘science… influences the way politics is done’ (Haas, 1990; 11). Having a long time for engagement was cited by a number of informants as a crucial successful ingredient of the post-2015 process. Running from 2012 to 2015, the deliberation process was considerably longer than most UNGA processes. As Nelson Muffuh observed ‘often MS processes are very compressed. [We have an] SG report, consultation and outcome in a few months. With this one [process] we had financing process, HLP, thematic consultations, SG’s report and negotiation on outcome document… over a couple of years’ (Muffuh, 2021; PC). As such there was time for repeated engagement between stakeholders and more sustained or persistent advocacy. In support of this, Professor Birch notes

4.4  Temporal Dynamics: The Long-Term Socialisation of Ideas

that it was possible to do a ‘tremendous amount of advocacy as the process was so prolonged’ (Birch, 2021; PC). In Part IV, I have teased out the implications of the empirical analysis for our understanding of EIP arrangements at the multilateral level. Whilst the theoretical considerations identified ­following the literature review hold fast (see Sect. 2.5), several practical insights have changed the emphasis within these points. In the case of representation, for example, key informants stressed that this was not just about different constituencies’ access to the negotiation chamber, but about how their arguments are represented by knowledge intermediaries both within the formal UN system (i.e. Members of the UNTST) and outside of it (i.e. New York

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based advocates with a level of expertise on the workings of the UNGA and UN system). Similarly framing is affirmed as a crucial consideration, but in addition to the framing of epistemic community messages is the overarching presentation of a broad range of input as science. The implication made by key informants is that this was a deliberate strategy, to present external inputs as ‘neutral’ and devoid of political agenda, so as to encourage a wider discussion and depoliticise the debate. The implications of this are that science is still viewed by many across the UN as the product of rational logic, and that there is little active reflection upon the way science (and other inputs to the political process) are themselves created.

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Conclusion: Evolving Evidence Systems in the Institutions of Global Governance

Keywords

Coalitions · Influencing · Forms of organisation · Framing · Evidence translation · Conceptual seepage

Scientific evidence played a minor role in the formal deliberations on the SDGs. Formal institutional mechanisms available for science engagement with the UNGA are weak, including the Science and Technology Major Group and associated ad-hoc consultations. |There is no schema or formal guidance for categorising, structuring and presenting scientific inputs to Member States. However, in the absence of formalised guidance, Member States have exploited the space created through innovative deliberative processes to make room for science inputs (such as the OWG thematic and expert panels) and have actively engaged with scientific networks and actors outside of the chamber (through retreats, public events and so on). Optimistically, the OWG looks to be a critical juncture in UNGA institutional process, which has changed the way in which multilateral agreements under the UNGA can be negotiated. Forcing Member States to share seats and challenging traditional negotiating blocks have opened the doors for other, more

dynamic negotiation formats, which in turn should create space for more external inputs. External stakeholders operating outside of formal processes played a highly significant role during the SDG negotiations. The epistemic communities here discussed range from informal, advocacy coalitions with common themes and priorities, but only ad hoc organisational structures (such as the data community as of 2012–2015), to more organised, if temporary coalitions (such as the urban SDG campaign), with standing, regular modes of engagement and coordination, collective outputs and shared expertise. Finally, there are the more formalised community arrangements, as in the health sector where there are a wide number of standing issue-­ based health coalitions. The coherence of the health community was recognised by the UN in the sponsored and facilitated thematic consultation process, implying there is an expectation, and even an informal institutional norm, associated with their participation in sustainable development policymaking. It is important to note that the organisation of the communities is however a continuum. These are not discreet categories but often bleed into each other. Scientists played a crucial role in shaping the key messages of epistemic communities via two key mechanisms. First, by their messages and ideas ‘seeping’ into the discourse over a long-­ term process of socialization (as per Jones, 2009

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_5

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and others). For public health, the MDG-related and academic discourse on UHC, equity and NCDs was so prominent that it permeated most advocacy and NGO inputs, visible in the references in their submissions and in the language of their statements. It was also highly visible in the report of the Thematic Consultation on Health and various statements from the Health Major Group. Eminent academic publications and personalities did much to catalyse the academic approach to the public health debate, but so too did the expertise of practitioners and public health officials, from UN agencies including the WHO, whose technical knowledge was afforded equivalent status. Another important and highly effective strategy, was grounding key messages in academic literature and/or showing their strong academic support, before then engaging in high-level targeted advocacy with Member States, facilitated by knowledge and policy brokers. For the nascent urban science community, scientific inputs were fielded directly from academicians and experts recruited into the UrbanSDG Campaign’s ranks. These academics played a pivotal role in crystallising arguments and key messages in real time, which were then communicated to policymakers and negotiators through intermediaries with detailed understanding of the UN system. The empirical findings weave together the arguments of various different EIP scholars, suggesting that it is not an either-or approach to influencing but a mix of methods and approaches, holy contingent on the level of organisation and history of the relevant epistemic community. Overall, it is clear that the engagement of the scientific community was not limited to one formalised process or opportunity. Scientists found ways and means to engage with Member States through a range of mechanisms and engagement opportunities. It is therefore more useful and pertinent to consider an ecosystem view of the policy process where evidence, politics and values are interacting at various levels concurrently, including in processes of goal setting, technical data discussions and target trading (Sutcliffe & Court, 2005).

It would be misleading to suggest that the expert knowledge discussed here is ‘science’ in any pure sense. Whilst much external input was rooted in academic literature and arguments, much of the evidence presented to Member States was also generated by UN technicians and specialist practitioners. For most policymakers the priority is policy relevance, not necessarily the methodical rigour with which that evidence was produced (see Cairney & Oliver, 2017), though various stakeholders did note that a clear connection to academia and grounding in academic literature gave their messages more credibility amongst Member States. There are implications from this for both policymakers and academics. First, as noted by a range of academic informants, policymakers need to be clearer on their policy priorities and where they need evidence to help inform their debates. Sharper delineation of pressing concerns can help those preparing evidence to better tailor their findings to the specific policy challenge. But as noted by a large number of policy informants, scientists also need to be more responsive to policy processes and informed on the appropriate entry points. These are concerns that have been highlighted by a number of EIP scholars (see Newman, 2017), but which continue to persist and have very practical implications. As Deputy Secretary General Amina Mohammed neatly summarised, we need a ‘rebirthing of science,’ so that the scientific inputs received are policy relevant and useful for the UN system (Mohammad, 2021; PC), whilst concurrently the UN needs to institutionalise more regular and transparent mechanisms for scientific input. To open the door to science, there will be an important and prominent role for scientific networks and intermediaries like the Major Group and the UNSDSN, who need to help academic institutions better understand the political context and navigate the oftentimes bewildering opportunities for input. Yet domestic and geopolitical interests can dominate and oftentimes trump even the most compelling scientific priorities and there are clear power imbalances that affect the translation and filtering of evidence. Policy intermediaries and a narrow global policy elite continue to exert con-

5  Conclusion: Evolving Evidence Systems in the Institutions of Global Governance

siderable influence over UNGA proceedings, as they understand and can navigate the complex bureaucracy. With this knowledge they are able to bring issues to Member States’ attention, both through timely events and interpersonal connections. Whilst their research translation function can be strategic and useful, it suggests the UNGA needs to do even more to make its processes of consultation and engagement more open to diverse global stakeholders. The post-2015 thematic consultations were a commendable first step, which particularly helped to shape the global health debates and final health goal, but other more transparent and institutionalised processes are required if the UN is to move away from its dependence upon an ‘informed-few’. All of this serves to reinforce the irrelevance of the rational actor model of evidence-based policy, within the UNGA at least. Scientific evidence is just one input, paired with values and judgements, past experiences and so on (Cook, 2001). More often than not, it is not the most important or influential factor. Furthermore, as argued by Jones (2009), I found the incorporation of knowledge into policy processes to be frequently opportunistic and erratic based on pragmatic decisions in the face of uncertainty. Theoretically, my research contributes to and builds upon the EIP literature but pushes it further, using empirical study of a multilateral process to test the relevance of these theories at the international level. In doing so it shows the importance of different forms of epistemic community mobilisation and the influencing avenues available to them, contingent upon their degree of organisation. My research has also identified two particular forms of influencing linked to this capacity that appear most pertinent in multilateral settings. First the concept of ideological and conceptual seepage and, second, the notion of strategic placement. The former is the purview of well-established epistemic communities with strong academic connections and platforms, and the latter the necessary approach of newer coalitions, who are often drawing upon emerging sciences. The negotiation sites are identified as important in so far as the formal procedural setting of the UNGA was found to be exclusionary

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to scientists, but by extending the duration of the deliberative process and creating alternative deliberative formats, this was somewhat overcome as scientists and academics were able to find creative ways to engage with policymakers through side meetings, workshops and retreats. From a policy perspective, the implications of this analysis are particularly pertinent. The UN is in the midst of a major reform effort led by Secretary General Antonio Guterres who has called for both structural and cultural change since the beginning of this term of office (UN, 2018). A critical priority, in that regard, is to address the prominence and presentation of science in UNGA deliberations and to have an open candid discussion with Member States about the value and limitations of such inputs. This would involve making transparent the processes of science synthesis and consolidation, before evidence is presented to deliberators. As made plain by many EIP scholars, scientific evidence is not immune from biases and, as with all inputs to a political deliberation, it is inherently value laden. Even seemingly technocratic discussions about data have political implications at such a high level and the process of synthesising and shortlisting evidence is in and of itself inherently political (Fukuda-Parr & McNeill, 2019). Future presidents of the UNGA, working with the office of the Secretary General and supportive UN agencies, could consider improved mechanisms for vetting and cataloguing scientific input and making plain its authenticity, authors and origins before it is presented to UNGA members. Whilst the establishment of an annual GSDR and a UN Scientific Advisory Board is to be welcomed, their impact upon UNGA processes is still unclear. Also unclear is how they are managing the compilation and synthesis of scientific knowledge in the reports they prepare for Member States. The UN Scientific Advisory Board may be best placed to consider a hierarchy of evidence presented to the UNGA. This is not intended to imply a value judgement on the evidence itself but instead establish a set of criteria that consider its relevance for an international process, namely its transferability, scale, methodological rigour and so

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5  Conclusion: Evolving Evidence Systems in the Institutions of Global Governance

on. Qualitative, individualised insights are crucial and their relatability can often make all the difference in changing public and Member State opinion, but for transboundary problem-­solving, the UNGA needs to draw upon large-­scale studies which can to help elaborate transboundary insights and de facto potential solutions. My research has shown that the current EIP literature falls short of explaining the complex forms of organisation that affect the very diverse groups of stakeholders engaging with the multilateral system. The epistemic communities studied were found to place a strong emphasis on scientific evidence, often alongside practitioner input, which provided the conceptual foundations for their arguments. Framing their message as evidence-informed and guided by academics was seen to give a sense of legitimacy to community arguments. Science-based messages were also used to help depoliticise discussions about the given topic and create a more open dialogue amongst Member States. The role of key individuals as policy intermediaries is a theme throughout, with many of the same cast of characters name checked by multiple informants.

5.1 Future Research The role of individuals as policy-brokers is an area that merits further study, so as to better understand the values and assumptions they imposed upon communities’ inputs, in the process of translating them for decision-makers. This requires consideration of behavioural psychology and social institutionalism so as to understand the unconscious biases that factor into decision-making processes (Kahneman, 2011; Lewis, 2013). For instance, are these policy-­brokers more inclined to absorb and pass on evidence that feels familiar and/or is in alignment with a mainstream academic position? Are they more likely to absorb evidence presented as a narrative, rather than as statistical information? And how does their own academic training influence value judgements?

Whilst acknowledging that all of my analysis was conducted on English sources, there is a clear predominance of English materials submitted to UNGA deliberative process. The implications of this need further unpacking, as it may imply a hegemony of English-speaking advocates and experts engaging with UN political processes. Important to consider are the institutional arrangements and unwritten norms which may prevent non-English speakers from engaging in and feeling valued in UN processes (an argument hinted at by Kawashima, 2021), as well as the implications of this for those producing knowledge and science outside of the Western world. From a policy perspective, such insights may help the UN system to encourage different linguistic inputs and forms of science communication, through more inclusive, consultative processes. Finally, another interesting theme meriting further enquiry is the long history of evidence use across the broad UN system, and how the system’s legal and institutional history may have affected its format, effectiveness and adaptability today. Future research questions might include: The place of evidence in the UN’s founding Charter and institutional arrangements? And an examination of the evolving mandates given to different arms of the UN over time to produce and curate evidence. Another importance determinant of UN activity is funding and where that funding comes from. Where research project funds are made available by a particular Member State, do their values and expectations affect how that research and evidence generation is conducted? Finally, a systematic examination of evidence terms and classifications across the UN is also required to better understand what constitutes legitimate evidence, ranging from documentary evidence used in treaty negotiation to scientific evidence prepared by the likes of the IPCC.  Excitingly, examining the long history of evidence use across the UN would help to contextualise and further clarify the potential long-­term impact of the disruptive post-2015 process.

Correction to: Science in Negotiation Jessica Espey

Correction to: J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­031-­18126-­9 Chapter 3 The original version of this chapter was published with incorrect spelling for Nelson Muffuh on page 58. Now, the spelling has been updated in the chapter. Chapter 4 The original version of this chapter was published with incorrect spelling for Nelson Muffuh on pages 69 and 80. Now, the spelling has been updated in the chapter. Annex 1 The original version of this annex was published with incorrect spelling for Nelson Muffuh on page 87. Now, the spelling has been updated in the annex.

The updated original version of this book can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­031-­18126-­9_3 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­031-­18126-­9_4 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­031-­18126-­9 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_6

C1

Annex 1: Key Informant Interviews

Badiee, S. (2021, November 9) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Birch, G. (2021, March 31) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Bulkeley, H. (2021, April 19) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Cardama, M. (2022, March 31) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Caballero, P. (2021, April 8) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Higgins, K. (2021, March 29) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Korosi, C. (2021, April 26) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Fukuda-Parr, S. (2021, April 6) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Lucas, S., (2021, December 12) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. McArthur, J. (2021, April 19) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Melamed, C. (2021, April 12) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online].

Mohammed, A. (2021, March 30) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Muffuh, N. (2021, April 15) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Parnell, S. (2021, March 31) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Perucci, F. (2021, December 7) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Pham, M-T. (2021, April 16) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Pipa, T. (2021, November 12) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Revi, A. (2019, December 12) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Roberts, D. (2021, April 8) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Sachs. J. (2021, November 12) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Saiz, E. (2021, April 13) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Schweinfest, S. (2021, April 12) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online].

The original version of this chapter was revised. The correction to this book is available at https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9_6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, Corrected Publication 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9

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Schmidt-Traub, G. (2021, March 30) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Tuts, R. (2021, March 29) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Watts, M. (2021, March 23) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online].

Annex 1: Key Informant Interviews

Welch, C. (2021, November 24) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. Zeitz, P. (2021, April 1) Personal Communication. Interview by Author [Online]. *And additional four key informant interviews were conducted in March and April 2021 but at the interviewees’ request they are not identified.

 nnex 2: The Research Methods Underpinning This A Analysis

Across science and technology studies and policy and political science literature, there is a wealth of national case study documentation exploring evidence to policy processes (see, e.g. WHO’s EVIPNet, 2022; Cairney, 2017; Parkhurst, 2017; Onwujekwe et al., 2015). But there is little analysis of how these processes play out in the multilateral system. Exceptions include Stone’s writing on ‘science diplomacy’ and the creation of ‘international knowledge networks’ (2019) and Littoz-Monnet’s (2017) study of science production within global institutions, like the World Bank. Both books are ripe with examples of international science advisory units and other institutional arrangements, but neither employ a systematic empirical approach to observe how these groups and other science stakeholders engage with a specific multilateral policy process or negotiation, nor do they offer cross-sectoral, comparative insights. This study aims to add a new empirical contribution to existing literature by using process tracing, including archival research and key informant interviews, to analyse the evidence to policy process under the UNGA, made evident through the post-2015 deliberations. It does so with a specific thematic focus on three areas which were central to the debate: health policy (SDG 3), urban planning (SDG 11) and the cross-cutting theme of data. Process tracing is defined as the systematic examination of a particular process, here a political event, through careful assessment of diagnostic evidence, ‘analysed in light of research

questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator’ (Collier, 2011; 823; see also Beach, 2022). A core aspect of this approach has been careful compilation of material and understanding of the various processes at play within the UNGA to ensure a strong foundation for process tracing (as recommended by Mahoney 2010). This has been done through literature compilation and arrangement, using archival methods. Then, drawing upon the literature review, I have identified key concepts and themes which I have translated into hypothesise and tested through analysis of political statements and key informant interviews. These two stages are further discussed below. The methodological objectives of this approach have been to identify novel political processes and to describe them, and to evaluate my starting hypotheses and potentially uncover new hypotheses for investigation (Collier, 2011). The first stage of my empirical research involved the collection of a wide range of documentation, literature review, and textual analysis, to identify common topics and themes within each sectoral debate. External stakeholders and the epistemic communities to which they belonged each had different ways of providing input, for example, the health community coalesced around a UN-led global thematic consultation and submitted their inputs, for the most part, through this process, where they were synthesised and produced into a summative health report (McManus, 2013). For the urban community, inputs were provided through a wide range of channels as there was no one formal process,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, Corrected Publication 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9

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making document identification all the trickier. For example, collective statements were frequently issued by the Global Taskforce for Local and Regional Governments and by the UrbanSDG Campaign. Some urban inputs were submitted to the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), discussed below, who collated external stakeholder inputs in advance of OWG and IGN sessions, but the list of docs they provided was far from exhaustive. Meanwhile individual agencies and groups (like Communitas and IIES) prepared briefing papers and reports which they presented informally at side events and parallel, informal retreats. I began the literature collection process with the identification of all formal and informal documents submitted to the SDG negotiation proceedings (the OWG and IGN) over the period 2012–2015 and made available online by the UN Secretariat or the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) on the UN’s sustainable development knowledge platform (https://sdgs.un. org/). Additional online searches were then conducted to locate literature not submitted to the formal process, but specifically relating to the post-2015 process, and including relevant terms (post-2015 / SDGs / post MDGs / global development framework etc). In addition to these online searches, further documentation was identified through key informant interviews with senior UN officials and Member State representatives engaged in the official proceedings, such as the OWG Co-Chairs and Professor Jeffrey Sachs (UN Secretary-General Special Adviser) (Korosi 2021, PC; Sachs 2021, PC). Drawing upon Scott (1990), key criteria for identifying documents were as follows: • ‘Authenticity: is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? • Credibility: is the evidence free from error or distortion? • Representativeness: is the evidence typical of its kind, and if not, is the extent of the untypicality known? • Meaning: is the evidence clear and comprehensible? (Scott, 1990;6)’

Once online searches seemed exhausted and no more inputs could be found, documentation was processed using archival methods. The first step was to codify documents according to who submitted it (e.g. scientific groups, advocacy organisations and member states). I also codified the type of document presented (e.g. a policy brief, advocacy statement and scientific paper). I found that differentiation of document sources was important not only to understand the submitting stakeholder’s intentions and means of engagement, but also to decipher underlying meaning. For example, Thompson et  al. (2013) argue that State-prepared documents provide a large amount of contextual information which can be essential to understanding a given moment in time. They cite the United Kingdom (UK) government policy documents drawn up when London bid to host the 2012 Olympics, which drew upon a 100-year old narrative of the East of London as an area of ‘squalor’, in need of regeneration (Thompson et al., 2013). In my research, I noted a distinct difference between documents prepared by advocacy coalitions and non-governmental stakeholders early in the process (2012/3), which were longer, had more complex arguments and referencing, and their later submissions, which were shorter and more direct requests for a focus on priority concerns. The implication being that inputs prepared at the beginning of the process assumed Member States had more time for reflection, whilst later in the negotiation when meetings were more frequent and there was more time pressure, advocacy documents had to be more simplistic and direct. Another example is provided by Member State statements. When reviewing these it was important to reflect upon their roles and commitments under the MDGs, to ascertain what was meant by key terms. For example, the G77 regularly talked about accountability as a practice of being responsive to their citizens, whilst for donor countries like the UK accountability was often used to refer to transparent donor-recipient financial arrangements, which was a strong emphasis and expectation of donor countries under the MDGs.

Annex 2: The Research Methods Underpinning This Analysis

For each case study, I identified key concepts and terms drawing upon Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Grounded Theory is an approach whereby preconceived ideas and concepts are not used, but instead theories emerge through primary research (such as the textual analysis and interviews used to inform this analysis). The primary research inputs were coded as information was collected (according to the key topics discussed, repeated terms and phrases, stakeholders identified and so on) allowing dominant concepts to emerge through theoretical saturation. Once these concepts had emerged, I was then able to develop hypotheses relating to the extent scientific ideas, concepts and terms were carried into the various iterations of the formal outcome documents and the relative weight of scientific inputs versus other sources. These were then tested through a secondary review of Member State oral statements, Co-chair summaries and outcome documents. It is important to note a number of inherent limitations with textual analysis of this kind. First, as my only native and working language is English, I have only reviewed English language documents. The dependence on monolingual sources in a multilingual policy space is a notable limitation as the UN has six official working languages in which documents are made available (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish). Working only in English has likely therefore biased the analysis towards only English-speaking stakeholder and scientific evidence inputs. It is notable however, and an issue requiring redress, that in spite of their being six official languages nearly all of the negotiation and inputs documents to the post-2015 process, made available on the UN’s various websites, including stakeholder submissions, are published in English (as was made apparent through the process of archiving source materials). Second, although I use Grounded Theory and methods to deduce key concepts I cannot claim an entirely objective approach was pursued. As noted by Charmaz (2000), analysis is performed within a given social reality and set of interactions, and therefore my own preconceived ideas and notions affected the patterns identified. For

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example, having been deeply involved in the deliberations over the urban goal (SDG 11), as discussed under ‘Positionality’ below, it is likely that I was more attentive to references to specific urban groups and stakeholders whom I knew well. Furthermore, having worked predominantly on social well-being over my career, it is possible that I was more attentive to recurrent themes or ideas relating to social outcomes (such as equity) over environmental or economic themes. Third, analyses of documentation alone can obfuscate context as documentation may give little to no sense of how the document was presented and why. Documents are part of a chain of action, and we can only shed light on the social reality of the time if they are placed in context and triangulated with other methods (Bryman, 2015; 561). Hence though key informant interviews, I attempted to discern as much contextual information as possible for the key documents and evidence inputs. Complementing the textual analysis was a series of informant interviews: defined as ‘guided conversations’ in which the researcher listens carefully ‘so as to hear the meaning’ of what is being conveyed (Rubin & Rubin, 1995:7). A key benefit of the interviews was that I was able to engage with stakeholders active in the deliberations at the time, and through their accounts was able to understand different views and experiences of the process. The objective was to ensure that the SDG deliberation process was not presented as an objective reality that we just have to try and comprehend retrospectively. Instead I wanted to understand it as part of a series of dialogues and exchanges defined by the stakeholders and participants and remembered and understood differently for all of the parties involved. Each stakeholder’s account was therefore equally important, providing alternative views and understandings of how the process evolved (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). Thirty-one key informant interviews were conducted for this analysis between December 2019 and February 2022, with the majority having been conducted between February and April 2021 (see Annex 1 for a complete list of informants). Three final interviews were conducted in

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Annex 2: The Research Methods Underpinning This Analysis

early 2022 following 7 months of maternity leave. Although it was originally expected that these interviews would take place in person and in situ (at UN headquarters in New York, during two SDG-related proceedings, the High-Level Political Forum in July 2021 and the UN General Assembly in September 2021), COVID-19 prevented international travel and face-to-face interaction. Moving to an entirely virtual interview process did raise some unique methodological challenges (as noted by Hicks et  al., 2021), but positively, it has enabled the inclusion of a broader range of respondents than perhaps initially anticipated: those who may not have been in New York for these events and/or were fundamental to the deliberation process, but are no longer engaged with UN processes. As discussed under ‘Positionality’ below, I also have the unique benefit of being acquainted with many of the key informants already, having worked alongside them during the SDG deliberations. This considerably eased online communication and enabled a more natural conversation, in spite of it taking place virtually. With a relatively small sample, it was hard to ensure representativeness and equal weight across the three focus sectors. It also proved quite difficult to contact a number of negotiators from the time (2012–2015), as they had changed positions or left New York, for example, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN and the Kenyan co-­ facilitator of the OWG, both of whom I tried to contact over extended periods of time to no avail. Fortunately, I was able to contact other facilitators / Co-Chairs and other Mission representatives, as well as official documentation from the Permanent Missions, which helped to provide additional detail and regional perspectives. The semi-structured interview format was open-ended, but followed a guiding script, with a common introduction and set of opening questions and then tailored questions specific to the role and expertise of each informant. A guiding script was found to be helpful to direct the conversation and ensure minimal ambiguity in language and phraseology. Furthermore, given that a number of the interviewees were high-level political and academic figures, I only had one, rela-

tively brief (1 hour) interview with them, and it was important to unearth as much information from the conversations as possible. Using guiding questions can raise the risk of ‘leading’ an interview, but I chose to follow the very practical guidance of Rapley (2004) who argues that the interview is an interactional event. It is the product of a dialogue and the interviewer cannot ‘taint knowledge’ if it is the product of the given interview circumstances. In other words, the history I have uncovered is only being recorded because I am facilitating the interview and does not exist ‘in some pure form apart from the circumstances of its production’ (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002; 15). Having only one interaction with many of the interviewees compromised my ability to test my ideas and emerging concepts repeatedly with the same respondent. For example, I was unable to test whether the same priority concepts and issues (like UHC or equity) were identified in an initial interview and then again in a second discussion, following a chance for further reflection. The ambition of such an exercise is to ascertain ‘meaning saturation’, in which the definition of specific terms and concepts becomes evident through repetition (Gaskell, 2000; 39). However, most terminology was also used in written submissions and recorded statements providing an alternative source of evidence against which to test ideas and concepts. Another concern was that respondents omitted crucial details or provided an account as they perceived it, through a distorted lens, which I had limited time to unpick and perhaps fully understand (significant risks flagged by Becker & Geer, 1957). However, this was considered less concerning as each stakeholder’s account offers an equally valid understanding of the process as they experienced it. With regard to the research practices employed, all of the interviews were conducted on MS Teams and the majority were recorded via the same platform. Written consent forms were sent to all of the stakeholders which were signed in advance of the meeting. Permission was also sought to retain interviewees’ contact details, in compliance with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation law (GDPR). Whilst 27 of

Annex 2: The Research Methods Underpinning This Analysis

the informants were willing to be fully ‘on the record’, with their names and inputs featured in this thesis, 4 informants asked that their inputs be anonymous and be used predominantly as contextual information. Their insights are not directly cited in the document and were instead just used to identify recurrent themes.

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advisors to President Sirlef to develop ideas which featured heavily in the HLP report (UN, 2013a). Meanwhile at the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (UNSDSN), together with Professor Jeffrey Sachs and Dr. Guido Schmidt-Traub, I authored inputs for the Open Working Group Members and Co-Chairs (see, e.g. UNSDSN, 2013a, b, 2014). Positionality  A very important point to note and Whilst some researchers may argue that my consideration for any reader of this book is my experiences are just part of the contextual backposition vis-à-vis the SDG deliberation process. drop for my research (Gubrium & Holstein, From 2010 to 2015, I was actively involved in 2002), I have sought to be more purposeful in developing policy guidance on the new global assessing the impact of these experiences upon development agenda. My first role in this regard this enquiry. In particular, I have drawn on auto-­ was at Save the Children, where I co-authored the ethnography (Ellis, 2004) and the literature of co-­ first international civil society manifesto on the production (Jasanoff, 2004, Bremer & Meisch, new development agenda (Ending Poverty in Our 2017, Hemstroem et  al., 2021) to tease out the Generation) (Save the Children 2012). implications of these experiences for my research Subsequent to this, I was an adviser to the design, textual analysis and for my stakeholder President within the Government of Liberia. interactions. President Sirleaf was co-chair of the High-Level Auto-ethnography is the process of describing Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda: and analysing personal experiences in order to the first UN-appointed group to put forward rec- understand a given context and/or event (Ellis, ommendations on the process. Finally, from 2014 2004; Ellis et  al., 2010). Whilst a common to 2020, I was Associate Director of the UN method is to write a narrative of one’s experiSustainable Development Solutions Network: an ences, and use this as a basis of analysis, I did not expert network established by the UN Secretary-­ do that. Instead, I constructed a set of starting General to provide scientific and expert inputs to hypotheses based on my experiences and twinned the post-2015 deliberations. For much of the them with hypotheses deduced from secondary period of this study (2014–2016), I lived in the literature. These were then tested, as described greater New  York area and was informally below, before embarking on the formal empirical immersed in the workings of and activities around analysis for this research. the SDG process. Coproduction adds to the literature of autoethnography. It not only recognises the experience These positions have given me in-depth of the individual but considers it fundamental to knowledge of the political processes under study, the research, as knowledge is inseparable from have helped me to identify relevant documenta- the natural and societal process within which it tion and have given me privileged access to nego- was created (Hemstroem & Polk, 2021). Certain tiators. Although these things have been highly proponents of co-production also stress that advantageous to this overall project, I am con- knowledge is not static but a reality in constant scious that pre-existing assumptions and personal development (Jasanoff, 2004). The inference of experiences may have coloured my perspective. all this is that having been involved in the process Furthermore, I was not just an observer of the under study is not a hindrance, rather it has process. In various ways, I was an active partici- helped me to co-produce with other stakeholders pant in the negotiations – researching and com- a particular set of insights or knowledge which municating with Member States to promote one we have collectively refined over the period of or other element of the SDG agenda. Whilst with study. This approach made the use of key inforthe Government of Liberia, I worked with other mant interview particularly important, as it

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Annex 2: The Research Methods Underpinning This Analysis

enabled me to ascertain different histories, to test my hypotheses, and to construct a shared set of insights. Practically speaking, I employed a number of active measures to expose and manage for my underlying assumptions. These included the following: • Testing research hypotheses: At the outset of this research, I prepared an initial set of research hypotheses, based personal experience of the process, as well as preliminary literature review. These related to the institutional significance of science in the UNGA, the presence of informal norms guiding stakeholder interaction, the significance of personal networks. These were discussed extensively with supervisors and former colleagues (such as Aromar Revi of the IIHS, Jeffrey Sachs of UNSDSN) in the first year of my research to see their validity and relevance for other people actively working with and within the UN system. Hypotheses were iterated upon (in conjunction with my literature review) until a final set of considerations were identified (as detailed in Part 3;1). These were then examined through the textual analysis of stakeholder inputs and outcome documents, as well as the key informant interviews. Revised insights are provided in Part 4. • Triangulatingtextual analysis: The textual analysis aimed to expose common themes, concepts and ideas that appeared in multiple stakeholder documents, so as to understand the core debates for each sector and epistemic community. Repeated phrases and terms were coded so as to identify their evolution from initial input documents into the final outcome document: The 2030 Agenda. Whilst I had some sense of the key debates relating to urban sustainability and data, having been

involved in the negotiations on both topics, I tried actively not to assume the significance of given issues and instead analysed and discuss (in Part 3; c) only those concepts and terms which were repeatedly raised (by four or more stakeholders) within the written literature and oral transcripts. It is worth noting that I was not involved in the health negotiations from 2012 to 2015, and therefore the concerns raised above did not apply to that analysis. • Careful management of stakeholder interactions: A benefit, but also a challenge, of this research is that I had pre-existing relationships with many of the key informants. This gave me unique and high-level access to informants but also raised a number of concerns about potential interviewer bias (Chandler & Munday, 2011). To manage this, I used a consistent guiding script to commence interviews and a core set of common questions, although latter questions were tailored to the interviewee’s particular position and expertise. Furthermore, I took notes throughout the interviews but also recorded the interviews via MS Teams (with all interviewees’ consent) so I could transcribe, cross-check and verify all of my notes and observations. Methodologically, this book aims to contribute useful empirical insights on policy processes based upon process tracing, archival methods, textual analysis and key informant interviews. By applying these methods to a specific international deliberative process, it complements national case studies of EIP. Meanwhile, careful process tracing of a specific intergovernmental negotiation adds a layer of empirical analysis currently missing from the limited literature on international science networks and science diplomacy (as per Stone, 2019).

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Index

A Access, 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 19, 23–27, 37–43, 45, 48, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 65–74, 81, 93, 94 Accountability, 3, 17, 20, 38, 46, 48, 51, 53–55, 60, 62, 63, 76, 90 Archival methods, 4, 89, 90, 94 C Coalitions, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 25, 26, 32–34, 36–37, 40, 51, 52, 56, 59, 63, 65, 66, 69, 74–77, 83, 85, 90 Conceptual seepage, 80, 85 Consultations, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 23, 25, 30–36, 40, 45, 50, 58, 59, 63, 65, 66, 68, 72, 74–76, 78, 80, 83–85, 89 D Data revolution, 7, 9, 35, 37, 48, 50–55, 60, 62, 63, 73, 76, 77 E Epistemic communities, 2, 4, 6–10, 15, 23–29, 35, 36, 47, 55, 59, 63, 68, 74–77, 81, 83–86, 89, 94 Equity, 3, 35, 36, 38–40, 42, 52, 55, 58–60, 62, 74–76, 80, 84, 91, 92 Evidence-based policy (EBP), 3–5, 8, 13, 16–18, 20, 21, 49, 85 Evidence-informed policy (EIP), 4, 7, 9, 16, 20–24, 36, 73, 76, 78, 80, 81, 84–86, 94 Evidence translation, 19, 26 F Forms of organisation, 86 Framing, 9, 10, 18, 19, 22, 26, 43, 60, 70, 76–79, 81, 86

G Governance, 2, 3, 8, 15, 17, 21, 22, 31, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45–47, 55, 77, 80 H High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 (HLP), 5, 33, 39–42, 44–46, 49, 51, 52, 59, 60, 62, 63, 80, 93 I Influencing, 7, 8, 19, 27, 69, 70, 72, 80, 84, 85 Informal negotiation, 10, 69 Institutions, 2, 3, 6–8, 16, 21–27, 35, 51, 61, 72, 74–76, 79, 84, 89 K Key informant interviews, 4, 28, 55, 88–91, 93, 94 Knowledge, 2, 7, 10, 13–18, 20, 21, 23, 25–27, 33, 53, 57, 61–63, 68, 70, 73, 74, 77–79, 81, 84–86, 89, 90, 92, 93 M Major Groups, 2, 10, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 43, 46, 52, 53, 60, 66–68, 73, 75, 77, 83, 84 O Open Working Group (OWG), 4–7, 10, 11, 25, 28, 30, 32, 33, 35, 38–42, 44, 47, 49, 51, 52, 55–57, 59–63, 65–68, 72, 73, 75, 77–80, 83, 90, 92, 93 P Policy cycles, 15, 17, 27 Politics, 18, 19, 22, 26, 58, 66, 69–73, 79, 80, 84

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Espey, Science in Negotiation, Sustainable Development Goals Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18126-9

113

Index

114 Post-2015, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 23, 25, 27, 29–39, 41–44, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 58–61, 65–68, 72, 73, 75–78, 80, 85, 86, 89–91, 93 Q Quantification, 40, 54, 62, 63 R Representation, 6, 9, 24, 25, 36, 59, 65–74, 81 S Science, 1–11, 13–16, 18, 19, 21–27, 29, 32, 34–36, 47, 51, 55–58, 60, 61, 63, 66–70, 73, 75–81, 83–86, 89, 94

Socialisation of ideas, 10 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 1, 3–9, 14, 16, 17, 24, 25, 27, 29–63, 66, 68, 69, 71–73, 77, 78, 83, 89–93 T Textual analysis, 4, 61, 63, 89, 91, 93, 94 U UN General Assembly (UNGA), 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 21–27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 55–57, 59, 65–71, 74, 75, 78, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 89, 92, 94 Universal Health Coverage (UHC), 9, 34, 36–40, 55, 58–61, 63, 69, 71, 75, 84, 92 Urban complexity, 47