Scholars of the Law: English Jurisprudence From Blackstone to Hart 9780814723685

Citation preview

Scholars of

the Law

S c h o l a r s

o

f t h

e

L

English Jurisprudenc

a e

from Blackston e t o Har

Richard A.

Cos

grove

New York University Press NEW Y O R K AN D L O N D O N

t

w

New York University Press New York and London Copyright © 1996 by New York University All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Cosgrove, Richard A. Scholars of the law : English jurisprudence from Blackston e to Hart / Richard A. Cosgrove. p. cm . Includes bibliographical references an d index. ISBN 0-8147-1533-8 (acid-free paper ) 1. Jurisprudence. 2 . Law—Philosophy . 3 . Law—Grea t Britain— History. I . title . KD640.C668 199 6 95-4178 2 340'. 1—dc20 CI P New York University Press books are printed on acid-fre e paper, and their binding materials are chosen for strengt h and durability . Manufactured i n the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For Loretta Rosemary Joseph Kyle Kaleigh

David Jourdan

Elizabeth Courtney

Contents

Acknowledgments x One F r o Two Sir

m J u r i s p r u d e n c e t o Lega l Philosoph y 1 William Blackstone: T h e Intersectio n

of Positivis m a n d N a t u r a l La w T h e o r y 21 Three Jeremy

Bentham: T h e Ligh t o f Utilit y 51

Four John Austin: " T h e Matte r o f J u r i s p r u d e n c e Is Positiv e Law " 89 Five Sir Six Sir Seven H.

Henry Maine: Historica l J u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d Socia l R e f o r m 119 Thomas Erskine Holland: T h e T r a n s i t i o n t o M o d e r n Academi c La w 147 L. A. Hart: La w a n d Moralit y Reconsidered 179

Eight Conclusio

n 207

Notes 217 Bibliography 239 Index 259 vn

Acknowledgments

T h i s wor k i s base d primaril y u p o n a reconsideratio n o f texts t h a t hav e l o n g serve d a s staple s o f j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l debate. T h e ne w editio n o f J o h n Austin' s The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1995 ) fro m C a m b r i d g e Univer sity Press , s o abl y edite d b y Wilfri d E . Rumble , ha s d e m o n s t r a t e d a n e w t h e c o n t i n u i n g a p p e a l o f classi c work s i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . M y scholarl y debt s a r e t h u s primaril y t o those individual s t r e a t e d i n t h e boo k w h o r e m a i n t h e giants o f lega l philosoph y i n t h e c o m m o n - l a w tradition . N e x t c o m e t h e m a n y scholar s who , lik e myself , hav e suc c u m b e d t o t h e intellectua l challeng e tha t c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f legal histor y a n d j u r i s p r u d e n ce presents . I a m gratefu l a s wel l t o t h e staff s o f t h e Bodleia n Li brary, O x f o r d , a n d especiall y t h e O x f o r d La w Librar y for thei r unfailin g courtes y a n d assistance . I n t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m a s well , o n a m o r e persona l note , fo r thei r friendship a n d hospitality , I r e c o r d m y appreciatio n t o A n n Dyke s o f O x f o r d a n d Eni d S h e p h e r d o f Fores t Hill , Oxfordshire. For thei r suggestion s i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e m a n u ix

x Acknowledgments script I woul d lik e t o t h a n k m y colleagu e a t t h e Universit y of Arizona , J . R o b e r t Vignery , a n d Richar d W . Davi s o f W a s h i n g t o n University , St . Louis . Fo r hi s perceptiv e com m e n t s o n a p a p e r d r a w n fro m thi s wor k I t h a n k J o h n O r t h o f t h e Universit y o f N o r t h Carolin a Schoo l o f Law . For financial s u p p o r t o f m y wor k I e x t e n d m y t h a n k s to th e Provost' s A u t h o r S u p p o r t F u n d a t t h e Universit y of Arizona . T w o individuals , Michae l Schalle r a n d H e l e n N a d e r , served a s h e a d o f m y d e p a r t m e n t d u r i n g t h e researc h a n d writing o f thi s boo k a n d I acknowledg e wit h t h a n k s thei r s t r o n g persona l s u p p o r t fo r m y work . I als o wis h t o r e c o r d m y specia l t h a n k s t o Patrici a Fore m a n , whos e c o m p u t e r versatilit y a n d endles s patienc e m a d e t h e m a n u s c r i p t a reality . Finally, I t h a n k m y wif e Lorett a whos e h o n o r a r y m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e W e s t e r n C o n f e r e n c e o n Britis h Studie s ha s sustained n o t onl y me , b u t m a n y o t h e r s i n t h e field o f British studies . Sinc e t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f m y las t b o o k i n 1987, m y fou r childre n (Rosemary , J o s e p h , David , a n d Beth) hav e no w p r o v i d e d m e wit h a n o t h e r g e n e r a t i o n o f family t o enric h m y lif e a n d stimulat e m y work . T h e s e g r a n d c h i l d r e n (Kyle , Kaleigh , J o u r d a n, a n d Courtney) , i n t h e B u r k e a n sense , m a k e t h e transitio n fro m g e n e r a t i o n to g e n e r a t i o n a joyful experience .

Chapter One

From Jurisprudenc e t Legal Philosoph

o

y

T h e stud y o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s a specialize d b r a n c h o f intellectual histor y ha s m a t u r e d d u r i n g t h e las t tw o de cades i n conjunctio n wit h a r e n e w e d interes t i n lega l his tory. I n a lette r t o A m e r i c a n j u r i s t Olive r W e n d e l l H o l m e s in 1880 , A . V . Dicey , soo n t o reviv e t h e Vineria n profes sorship o f Englis h la w a t O x f o r d , wrot e a b o u t t h e n u a n c e s of lega l scholarship : " A wor k o n la w may , i t seem s t o me , be c o n c e r n e d wit h an y o r al l o f t h r e e question s first W h a t is t h e law ? (practica l lawyer) , secondly W h a t o u g h t t o b e law? (Juris t o r legislator) , thirdly W h a t i s t h e histor y o f t h e law? (lega l historian)." 1 Dicey' s r u m i n a t i o n s anticipate d t h e basi c division s o f inquir y int o lega l p h e n o m e n a tha t have prevaile d fo r mos t o f t h e twentiet h century . Man y 1

2 From

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scholars hav e n o t e d t h e divorc e betwee n lega l histor y a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e b u t fe w hav e a d d r e s s e d i t i n systemati c fashion. T h e d i c h o t o m y betwee n thes e tw o area s o f lega l scholarship p r o m p t e d thi s r e c e n t assessment : "Jus t a s An glo-American lega l theor y sinc e B e n t h a m a n d Austi n ha s b e e n notoriousl y a h i s t o r i c a l — e n c o u r a g i n g eac h g e n e r a tion o f theorist s t o searc h ane w fo r universa l t r u t h u n t e m p e r e d b y t h e n e e d t o accoun t fo r historica l variatio n a n d c o n t i n g e n c y — s o to o A n g l o - A m e r i c a n lega l histor y ha s b e e n persistentl y u n t h e o r e t i c a l . " 2 T h i s situatio n ha s inevi tably divide d t h e a u d i e n c e fo r suc h scholarship . In 188 0 a s wel l Dice y o p e n e d a n articl e o n t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y stat e o f lega l philosoph y wit h t h e famou s a p h o rism: " J u r i s p r u d e n c e i s a w o r d whic h stink s i n t h e nostril s of a practicin g barrister. " Dice y t h e n elaborate d thi s prej udice: " A j u r i st is , the y constantl y find, a professo r whos e claim t o d o g m a t i z e o n la w i n g e n e r a l lie s i n t h e fac t t h a t h e ha s m a d e himsel f m a s t e r o f n o o n e lega l syste m i n particular, whils t hi s boaste d scienc e consist s i n t h e e n u n ciation o f platitude s whic h i f the y o u g h t , a s h e insists , t o be la w everywhere , c a n n o t i n fac t b e show n t o b e la w a n y w h e r e . " 3 Appraisal s o f t h e c o m m o n la w hav e usuall y focused o n t h e u n i q u e feature s g e n e r a t e d b y judicial legis lation, a d h e r e n c e t o p r e c e d e n t , a n d vocationa l t r a i n i n g a t t h e I n n s o f C o u r t . T h e respec t a c c o r d e d t o philosophica l analysis ha s alway s b e e n limited . Man y year s late r aca demic lawye r A . L . G o o d h a r t a d d e d t o thi s generalizatio n w h e n h e wrote : "Englis h jurists hav e alway s b e e n afrai d o f abstract idea s i n th e air." 4 G o o d h a r t r e f e r r e d t o t h e aver sion o f Englis h jurist s t o g r a n d philosophica l structure s t h a t characterize d t h e stereotyp e o f thei r civi l la w b r e t h -

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r e n whos e lega l h e r i t a g e derive d fro m R o m a n law . Famil iarity wit h t h e work s o f majo r Englis h jurist s show s quickly, however , t h a t civi l lawyer s hav e n e v e r hel d a mo nopoly o n abstrac t lega l t h o u g h t . T h i s divisio n betwee n jurists a n d practitioner s c o n t i n u e s t o ve x thei r respectiv e enterprises wit h littl e sig n o f r e d u c i n g t h e g a p betwee n the two ; a c e n t u r y late r R a y m o n d Cock s wrote : " M o d e r n j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s largel y u n c o n c e r n e d wit h t h e p r o b l e m s which a r e o f greates t i m p o r t a n c e t o practitioners . . . . I n so fa r a s j u r i s p r u d e n c e wa s c o n c e r n e d wit h t h e stud y o f ideas a b o u t la w i t wa s a n o d d vie w o f t h e subjec t whic h e x c l u d e d fro m consideratio n t h e idea s whic h wer e re g a r d e d a s i m p o r t a n t b y thos e w h o actuall y practice d law." 5 T h e p a t h o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e fo r mos t o f t h e past tw o centurie s ha s le d bac k t o a n assessmen t o f wha t p u r p o s e s lega l philosoph y shoul d serve . It i s t h e a r g u m e n t o f thi s b o o k t h a t m a n y o f t h e contro versies t h a t hav e bese t lega l speculatio n sinc e t h e tim e o f Sir Willia m Blackston e i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y originate d i n issue s o f motivatio n a n d a u d i e n c e , not j u s t definitio n a n d analysis . Lac k o f consensu s o n a definition o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e itsel f ha s p l a g u e d t h e disci pline. P e r h a p s t h e b r o a d e s t conceptio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e held tha t i t i s t h e ar t o f t h e g o o d a n d t h e j u s t (ars boni et aequi). T h i s definitio n ha s littl e relevanc e t o attorney s t r a i n e d i n t h e adversaria l traditio n o f t h e c o m m o n la w a n d whos e foremos t d u t y i s t o serv e t h e interest s o f a client. T h e differenc e betwee n t h e e i g h t e e n t h - a n d twenti e t h - c e n t u r y effort s t o wor k o u t t h e implication s o f thi s d i c t u m become s readil y discernibl e w h e n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e definitions o f eac h e r a a r e contrasted . O n t h e o n e h a n d ,

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for A d a m Smit h j u r i s p r u d e n c e c o n n o t e d t h e b r o a d e s t lines o f inquiry , t h e searc h fo r a synthesi s o f history , anal ysis, a n d criticis m o f law. 6 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e p r e s e n t a tive definition s fro m c o n t e m p o r a r y jurist s hav e d r a w n n a r r o w e r b o u n d a r i e s fo r j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Nei l MacCor mick, fo r e x a m p l e , ha s define d j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s "th e the oretical stud y o f a practica l subject"; 7 a n d Richar d Posne r has written : "B y j u r i s p r u d e n c e ' I m e a n t h e mos t funda mental, general , a n d theoretica l p l a n e o f analysi s o f t h e social p h e n o m e n o n calle d law . Fo r t h e mos t p a r t i t deal s with problems , a n d use s perspectives , r e m o t e fro m th e daily concern s o f lega l practitioners." 8 T h e latte r tw o definitions ech o Dice y i n th e divisio n betwee n t h e theoret ical a n d practica l element s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e . W h a t ha s clearl y h a p p e n e d ove r t h e pas t tw o centurie s is a f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e i n th e wa y jurists hav e envisione d their task . T h e b r o a d t h r u s t o f Smith' s tria d ha s give n wa y to emphasi s u p o n o n e aspec t o f hi s conceptio n o f law . T h i s ha s resulte d i n increasingl y c o m p l e x studie s a n d th e c o n s e q u e n t d i m i n u t i o n o f t h e a u d i e n c e t o whic h the y a r e a d d r e s s e d . T o cit e a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , w h e r e a s Blackston e a t t e m p t e d t o c o m p r e h e n d th e c o m m o n la w i n t h e Commentaries, th e treatis e writer s o f th e lat e Victoria n e r a wer e content t o e x a m i n e o n e b r a n c h o f th e la w i n t h e searc h for thos e rationa l principle s a s s u m e d t o characteriz e th e law tha t m a d e i t worth y o f scientifi c inquiry. 9 I n t h e 1880 s this t r e n d c u l m i n a t e d i n th e creatio n o f a n academi c lega l culture tha t b e c a m e t h e p r i m a r y p r o d u c e r a n d c o n s u m e r of lega l studie s t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f b r o a d e r socia l a n d political analysis . J u r i s p r u d e n c e b e c a m e identifie d solel y as lega l philosophy , s e p a r a t e d fro m m o r e m u n d a n e (rea d

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practical) aspect s o f t h e law . Dicey' s origina l c o m m e n t o f 1880 d e m o n s t r a t e d insight , a l t h o u g h t h e reconciliatio n between lega l t h e o r y a n d lega l practic e t h a t h e envisione d has n o t ye t materialized . I n a g e n e r a l sense , therefore , ho w jurist s hav e con ceived j u r i s p r u d e n c e , e i t h e r i n b r o a d o r n a r r o w fashion , has d e t e r m i n e d t h e c o n t e n t o f scholarship . T h e definitio n of la w i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s drive n w i d e s p r e a d speculation t h a t ha s yielde d littl e a g r e e m e n t . W h e t h e r la w merely prescribe s rule s o f c o n d u c t (th e positivis t tradition ) o r w h e t h e r la w contain s o t h e r , ofte n ethereal , element s (the n a t u r a l la w tradition ) ha s h a u n t e d Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e fo r t h e pas t tw o h u n d r e d years . T h e lon g a n d sometimes a c r i m o n i o u s d e b a t e a m o n g jurist s a b o u t ex actly wha t constitute s la w ha s sometime s serve d a s a p r o x y for o t h e r controversia l issue s tha t hav e attracte d t h e atten tion o f lega l scholar s sinc e Blackstone . T w o quotations , o n e seriou s a n d o n e satirical , illustrat e t h e diversit y o f a p p r o a c h tha t a definitio n o f la w ha s s p a w n e d . L o r d H a l d a n e , L o r d Chancello r i n 191 3 a n d certainly m o r e reflectiv e a b o u t t h e philosophica l issue s o f law t h a n mos t o f thos e w h o hav e hel d tha t office , wrote : Law, properl y s o called, whethe r civi l o r criminal , mean s essen tially thos e rule s o f conduc t whic h ar e expressl y an d publicl y laid dow n b y th e sovereig n wil l o f th e stat e an d ar e enforce d b y the sanctio n o f compulsion . Law , however , import s somethin g more tha n this . . . . I n short , i f it s ful l significanc e i s t o b e appreciated, large r conception s tha n thos e o f th e mer e lawye r are essential , conception s whic h com e t o u s fro m th e moralis t and th e sociologist , an d withou t whic h w e canno t se e full y ho w the genesi s o f la w ha s com e about. 10

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H a l d a n e neatl y synthesize d bot h th e positivis t a n d n a t u r a l law tradition s withou t a hin t o f t h e intellectua l difficultie s involved. A m o r e succinc t a n d les s favorabl e appreciatio n of Englis h la w d a t e d fro m 1909 : " T h e La w i s o u r 'Ol d Man o f th e S e a / c u m b r o u s i n p r o c e d u r e , b a r b a r o u s i n phraseology a n d — e v e n i n t h e mos t exalte d q u a r t e r s — constantly sacrificin g t h e spiri t t o t h e letter." 1 1 Suc h widely d i v e r g e n t conclusion s i n t o n e a n d substanc e sug gest t h e intens e d i s a g r e e m e n t s tha t hav e m a r k e d t h e his tory o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n ce sinc e t h e m i d d l e o f t h e eigh t e e n t h century . T h e c u s t o m a r y depictio n o f a t r i u m p h a n t positivist o r t h o d o x y , identifie d primaril y wit h jurists, doe s n o t explai n adequatel y t h e vagarie s o f j u r i s p r u d e n t i al de bate characteristi c o f academi c culture , n o r doe s i t a d d r e s s t h e realitie s o f dail y practic e w h e r e littl e tim e ca n b e allot ted t o philosophica l issue s withi n t h e law . Until recentl y intellectua l historian s hav e generall y ig n o r e d thi s a r g u m e n t despit e t h e fac t tha t g e n e r a t i o n s o f jurists hav e e n g a g e d i n it. 12 Historian s hav e p r e f e r r e d t h e relatively safe r g r o u n d o f t h e politica l a r g u m e n t t h a t ha s l u r k e d b e h i n d t h e subtletie s o f lega l analysis . Fo r e x a m p l e , historians hav e focuse d m o r e o n Blackstone' s allege d rol e as apologis t fo r t h e establishe d o r d e r o f t h e 1760 s t h a n for hi s connectio n t o t h e n a t u r a l la w tradition . T h e lif e o f J e r e m y B e n t h a m ha s intereste d primaril y thos e historian s eager t o sketc h t h e p a t h o f administrativ e r e f o r m i n Victo rian E n g l a n d , n o t thos e intereste d i n B e n t h a m a s t h e mos t e n d u r i n g o f Englis h lega l philosophers . Hi s essay s i n cen sorial (critical ) j u r i s p r u d e n c e , w h e t h e r j u d g e d successfu l o r not , hav e c o n t i n u e d t o s p u r evaluatio n fro m b o t h critic s a n d a d m i r e r s o f thi s aspec t o f hi s utilitarianism . Certainl y

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political p u r p o s e s di d pla y a majo r rol e i n B e n t h a m ' s mo tivation, fo r h e s o u g h t consciousl y t o g e n e r a t e lega l a n d political c h a n g e i n hi s day . Historians , w h o pai d scan t attention t o J o h n Austi n unti l t h e 1970s , no w cit e h i m a s often fo r hi s d e f e n s e o f existin g constitutiona l a r r a n g e m e n t s a s fo r hi s m o r e r e w a r d i n g , albei t m o r e challengin g analyses o f law . T o b e sure , t h e technica l writing s o f Ben t h a m a n d Austi n p r e s e n t a f o r b i d d i n g bod y o f work ; the y a r e n o t easil y accessible , a r e usuall y c o m p o s e d i n a styl e that obscure s r a t h e r t h a n enlightens , a n d d e m a n d special ized t r a i n i n g t h a t historian s a r e unlikel y t o c o m m a n d . T h a t historian s h a v e rarel y v e n t u r e d int o t h e c o m p l e x world o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s t h e r e f o r e n o surprise . T h e s e jurists a d d r e s s e d issue s tha t posterit y ha s t e n d e d t o ig n o r e , ye t a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e figures the y p r o v i d e acces s t o the tradition s o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Sir H e n r y Main e ha s serve d a s a m o r e congenia l Victo rian subjec t becaus e hi s rol e a s a criti c o f d e m o c r a c y m a d e h i m a substantia l figure i n t h e politica l controversie s o f hi s day, especiall y i n hi s las t year s i n t h e 1880s . T h e m o r e philosophical e l e m e n t s o f hi s wor k i n t h e critiqu e o f th e n a t u r a l la w traditio n a n d t h e benefit s o f c o m p a r a t i v e lega l analysis hav e receive d m o r e significan t discussio n fro m scholars i n o t h e r disciplines . Si r T h o m a s Erskin e H o l l a n d , despite a successfu l academi c c a r e e r a t O x f o r d , ha s fade d into a n obscurit y s o tota l tha t hi s unfamiliarit y t o histori ans i s no t a m a t t e r fo r r e p r o a c h . Yet , i n t e r m s o f hi s influence o n t h e plac e a n d c o n t e n t o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e within t h e e m e r g i n g academi c c u l t u r e o f t h e 1880s , Hol land ha s som e clai m t o attention . Finally , t h e las t o f th e jurists e x a m i n e d i n thi s book , H . L . A . H a r t , b e c a m e a n

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icon o f sort s withi n t h e field o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e; b e y o n d t h e confines o f t h e academy , however , H a r t exercise d littl e influence. T h e evaluatio n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s t o a significan t e x t e n t g o n e b y defaul t to thos e scholar s w h o alread y w o r k e d withi n it s traditions . C h a r t i n g t h e histor y o f j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l t h o u g h t p r e sents specia l obstacle s becaus e th e integratio n o f differen t issues, suc h a s t h e technica l d o c t r i n e o f tor t la w o r t h e relationship o f t h e la w i n genera l t o c o n t e m p o r a r y society , have n o necessar y connectio n t o o n e a n o t h e r : " W h e n t h e history o f academi c la w i n E n g l a n d d u r i n g t h e pas t 20 0 years come s t o b e written , t h e u n e v e n p r o g r e s s o f juris p r u d e n c e wil l for m a n i m p o r t a n t subplo t i n t h e story." 1 3 T h e specifi c issue s o f lega l philosoph y constitut e a subdis cipline wit h it s ow n l a n g u a g e a n d tasks . I n addition , t h e political implication s o f a jurist' s lega l a n d / o r constitu tional text s r e p r e s e n t a legitimat e field o f inquir y fo r t h e historian. Finally , m o r e compatibl e wit h t h e traditiona l goals o f historians , t h e politica l a n d socia l contex t t h a t p r o d u c e d t h e styl e a n d c o n t e n t o f j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l a r g u m e n t ha s serve d a s a focu s fo r historica l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h e f r a g m e n t e d n a t u r e o f thes e t h r e e e n d e a v o r s ha s cre ated a wid e bod y o f knowledge , b u t t h e n a r r o w area s o f discourse hav e p r e v e n t e d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e assessmen t o f the majo r figures w h o for m t h e nucleu s o f t h e Englis h tradition i n lega l philosophy . I t i s time, t h e r e f o r e , t o m a k e available t o o t h e r historian s t h e ric h intellectua l histor y that lega l theor y i n E n g l a n d ha s offered . T h e conjunctio n of j u r i s p r u d e n c e wit h historica l investigatio n ha s acceler ated sinc e 1970 , a n d "thu s i t ma y b e tha t m o v e m e n t s in b o t h lega l histor y a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e a r e c o n v e r g i n g

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towards a c o m m o n d o m a i n ; a n d i t ma y b e tha t t h e Anglo A m e r i c a n worl d i s a b o u t t o e x p e r i e n c e a renaissanc e o f historical j u r i s p r u d e n c e . " 1 4 Rebirt h ma y b e to o s t r o n g a word, b u t thi s doe s n o t d e t r a c t fro m t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the undertaking . Central t o thi s ques t i s th e issu e o f a u d i e n c e . Initiall y t h e i m p u l s e t o unrave l t h e mysterie s o f t h e la w le d jurist s to a d d r e s s thei r conclusion s t o th e e d u c a t e d public . T h e study o f la w serve d a s a p r o x y fo r socia l analysi s a n d offered a p r e t e x t fo r a g e n e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f society . T h i s strateg y m e t wit h varyin g d e g r e e s o f success . Black stone a n d B e n t h a m certainl y establishe d themselve s a s jurists whos e assertion s m e r i t e d seriou s consideratio n b y those w h o p o n d e r e d t h e fat e o f E n g l a n d . Austin , how ever, gaine d littl e r e p u t a t i o n i n hi s lifetime , a n d hi s influ ence ha s b e e n almos t entirel y p o s t h u m o u s . T h i s failur e s t e m m e d fro m Austin' s inabilit y t o execut e t h e sam e de sign a s hi s predecessors , no t a deviatio n fro m thei r p u r poses. I n simila r fashio n Main e h o p e d hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e would focu s attentio n on , a n d offe r solution s to , b r o a d questions o f socia l policy . T h e g r e a t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n thi s tradition o c c u r r e d i n Holland' s tim e w h e n t h e creatio n o f a s e p a r a t e lega l academi c c u l t u r e se t o u t t o serv e a nar r o w e r a u d i e n c e a n d define d it s objective s i n m o r e limite d terms. T h e resul t ma y b e see n i n t h e fac t tha t H a r t , de spite t h e significan t recognitio n h e ha s e a r n e d withi n uni versity circle s worldwide , ha s r e m a i n e d essentiall y u n k n o w n outsid e t h e fraternit y o f lega l philosophers . T h e fate o f thes e jurists m i r r o r e d t h e j u r i s p r u d e n ce the y pro d u c e d , whic h wen t fro m t h e la w a s t h e spaciou s c o n t e m plation o f t h e h u m a n conditio n t o a disciplin e (ofte n no t

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h o n o r e d withi n t h e u n d e r g r a d u a t e c u r r i c u l u m ) withi n ac ademic culture . As ha s alread y b e e n suggested , t h e spli t betwee n t h e concerns o f practitioner s a n d lega l theorist s ha s give n ris e to s e p a r a t e s p h e r e s o f intellectua l labor , eve n t h o u g h b o t h g r o u p s d e p l o r e thi s o u t c o m e a n d inveig h agains t i t r h e t o r ically. Despit e claim s o f estee m fo r t h e goal s o f j u r i s p r u dence, t h e vocationa l sid e o f lega l e d u c a t i o n ha s almos t always t r i u m p h e d i n curricula r disputes . C h a n g e s i n lega l education ove r t h e las t c e n t u r y hav e t h u s affirme d t h e dichotomy betwee n t h e essentia l p u r p o s e s o f la w a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Lega l philosoph y ha s r e m a i n e d i m p o r t a n t only t o a s h r i n k i n g a u d i e n c e withi n t h e academy ; juris p r u d e n c e ha s s u c c u m b e d t o t h e academi c vic e o f increas ing specialization . A s H a r o l d Perki n ha s written : " I n or d e r t o p r e s e r v e thei r s e p a r a t e functio n a n d existence , i t b e c a m e necessar y fo r t h e universit y discipline s t o e m p h a size thei r separatio n fro m t h e profession s the y serve d out side t h e wall s a n d also , insid e t h e walls , fro m t h e o t h e r university disciplines." 1 5 T h e separatio n o f theor y fro m practice, a n d academi c lawye r fro m practitioner , ha s fol lowed fro m t h e transitio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce a s b r o a d anal ysis t o a disciplin e inten t o n m o r e r e m o t e issue s o f publi c policy. For t h e historia n w h o seek s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e develop m e n t o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n a p p r o p r i a t e historica l context, t h e focu s o n academi c c u l t u r e c o m p l e m e n t s t h e traditional m o d e s o f i n t e r p r e t i n g lega l history . W h a t might b e t e r m e d t h e la w revie w visio n o f lega l histor y ha s assumed ( r a t h e r t h a n p r o v e d ) t h e interna l logi c o f lega l d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s a p p r o a c h t o t h e lega l histor y o f t h e

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c o m m o n la w ha s reste d primaril y o n assemblin g t h e ap p r o p r i a t e cases , reconcilin g an y difference s a m o n g t h e m , explaining awa y t h e irreconcilable , a n d d e m o n s t r a t i n g that t h e evolutio n o f lega l d o c t r i n e wa s susceptibl e t o sci entific inquiry . I n d e e d , t h e necessit y t o p r o v e la w a scienc e (and t h u s tak e a plac e withi n t h e universit y c o m m u n i t y ) was a n e n d u r i n g c o n c e r n fo r t h e nascen t c o m m u n i t y o f legal academic s o f t h e Victoria n era , fo r withou t i t thei r claim t o a plac e i n t h e a c a d e m y d i m i n i s h e d significantly . T h e philosophica l b a c k g r o u n d t o thi s attitud e p r e s u m e d that lega l m a t u r a t i o n wa s i n t e r n a l a n d rational , a n d tha t t h e judicial functio n entaile d finding t h e "right' ' answe r t o questions o f doctrine . A c c o r d i n g t o thi s t h e o r y j u d g e s f o u n d t h e law , di d n o t creat e ne w law , a n d simpl y discov e r e d t h e correc t solutio n i n t h e p e n d i n g action . Sinc e t h e 1870s thi s belie f ha s serve d a s t h e p r i m a r y f o u n d i n g m y t h that s h a p e d t h e s u b s e q u e n t p a t h o f lega l philosophy . Fo r the lega l academic s o f late-Victoria n E n g l a n d , symbolize d by H o l l a n d , t h e searc h fo r t h e "right " answe r m e a n t ra tionalizing t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e law ; t h e lif e o f t h e la w was logic . T h i s goa l t r a n s f o r m e d t h e a g e n d a o f academi c law forever . In oppositio n t o thi s e m p h a s i s o n t h e interna l d e t e r m i n a n t s o f doctrina l g r o w t h , o t h e r scholar s hav e insiste d o n the f u n d a m e n t a l rol e o f e x t e r n a l factor s i n s h a p i n g th e course o f lega l history ; a s H o l m e s p u t it , t h e lif e o f t h e la w was experience . T h e n a t u r e o f thes e outsid e influence s has varie d widely . Marxis t scholars , fo r e x a m p l e , hav e a t t e m p t e d t o analyz e t h e basi c socioeconomi c e l e m e n t s that hav e d e t e r m i n e d lega l doctrine s a n d ideas , w h e t h e r in t h e formatio n o f p r o p e r t y la w o r i n t h e plac e o f la w a s

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a for m o f socia l control . I n general , s o thi s a r g u m e n t r u n s , the dynamic s o f lega l c h a n g e m u s t b e s o u g h t i n b r o a d e r categories t h a n t h e simpl e assertio n o f lega l rationality . T h e emphasi s o n extralega l explanation s fo r lega l p h e n o m e n a ha s e c h o e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e twentiet h c e n t u r y from sociologica l j u r i s p r u d e n ce a t t h e b e g i n n i n g t o A m e r ican realis m i n t h e 1920 s a n d 1930 s a n d t h e n c e t o t h e critical lega l studie s m o v e m e n t o f t h e 1980s . Despit e fre q u e n t e x h o r t a t i o n s t o e x p a n d t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f lega l in quiry, t h e tas k ha s b e e n u n d e r t a k e n m o r e i n theor y t h a n in action . W h e n t h e integratio n o f severa l discipline s ha s o c c u r r e d successfully , t h e resul t ha s usuall y intensifie d t h e practitioner's distrus t o f academi c research . T h e esoteri c l a n g u a g e — a n d sometime s t h e c o n c l u s i o n s — o f thes e syn thetic effort s ha s b e e n successful , i f a t all , onl y wit h lega l scholars o f simila r sympathie s a n d beliefs . Despit e t h e g r e a t h o p e s fo r t h e e x p a n s i o n o f t h e law' s purvie w hel d by m a n y scholar s i n thi s century , t h e precis e rol e o f socia l a n d economi c factor s i n a n overal l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e law ha s r e m a i n e d obscure . A t h i r d majo r a p p r o a c h t o t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f lega l history ha s stresse d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f lega l traditio n i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f lega l systems . T h i s interpretiv e frame work fo r lega l history , associate d primaril y wit h Ala n Wat son, hold s tha t "th e lega l traditio n shape s t h e la w t h a t comes out : divisions , classifications , type s o f r e m e d y , scope o f rule s a n d exceptions . . . . T he i n p u t o f t h e societ y often bear s littl e relatio n t o t h e o u t p u t o f t h e lega l elite . . . . Law, t h e n , despit e it s practica l impact , i s abov e al l a n d primarily t h e c u l t u r e o f t h e lawyer s a n d especiall y o f t h e

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lawmakers. . . . Law i s largel y a u t o n o m o u s a n d n o t s h a p e d by societa l needs ; t h o u g h lega l institution s wil l no t exis t without c o r r e s p o n d i n g socia l institutions , la w evolve s from t h e lega l t r a d i t i o n . " 1 6 Watso n ha s m a d e a usefu l contribution t o lega l histor y b y hi s suggestio n t h a t t h e previous tw o a p p r o a c h e s hav e b e c o m e suc h cliche s t h a t a fresh e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m s o f lega l histor y fro m t h e perspectiv e o f a lega l traditio n wil l yiel d additiona l in sights. Watson ha s c o n t i n u e d hi s a r g u m e n t i n a n extensiv e series o f book s a n d article s tha t hav e i n c o m m o n hi s t h e m e that lega l system s "ar e n o t alway s sensitiv e t o wide r politi cal, social , a n d economi c issues." 1 7 Watso n ha s n e v e r de nied tha t la w interact s wit h o t h e r area s o f h u m a n en deavor, b u t h e ha s suggeste d t h a t it s scop e ha s n o t generally b e e n a s e x t e n d e d a s o t h e r theorie s o f lega l c h a n g e hav e held . T h e c u l t u r e o f lawyer s ha s playe d a significant rol e i n t h e n a t u r e a n d significanc e o f lega l c h a n g e . T h e influenc e o f thi s lega l c u l t u r e varie s a m o n g legal system s a n d ha s no t w o r k e d i n a precis e fashion , t h e r e b y r e q u i r i n g tha t eac h cas e b e evaluate d o n it s ow n merits. A ne w o r t h o d o x y , eclecti c i n it s searc h fo r validity , ha s arisen i n t h e las t severa l decades : " T h e r e i s a g e n e r a l s y m p a t h y wit h t h e ide a tha t yo u c a n n o t reall y u n d e r s t a n d law withou t a t t e n d i n g b o t h t o it s history , a n d t o t h e wa y i n which t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h e variou s lega l systems , a n d t h e professional c u l t u r e o f lawyers , interact s wit h w h a t may , for t h e w a n t o f a b e t t e r t e r m , b e calle d societ y g e n e r ally." 1 8 Wit h respec t t o t h e histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u -

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dence, t h e genesi s o f a n academi c j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l tradi tion i n t h e 1870 s a n d 1880 s m a r k e d t h e crucia l transitio n to it s m o d e r n state . T o e x p a n d o n t h e thesi s o f thi s book , wherea s Black stone, B e n t h a m , Austin , a n d Main e h a d specifi c a u d i e n c e s a n d p u r p o s e s , t h e n e x t jurist , H o l l a n d , certainl y n o t a figure o f c o m p a r a b l e stature , symbolize d t h e increasin g academic contex t o f lega l philosophy . T h e first fou r h a d conceived o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce a s t h e basi c scienc e o f society , o n e whos e p u r p o s e literall y kne w n o b o u n d s . Academi c legal c u l t u r e c h a n g e d t h e n a t u r e a n d inten t o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e dramatically . T h i s ne w tradition , i n it s increasingl y professional manifestations , too k t h e b r o a d conceptio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d r e d u c e d i t t o a n academi c e n t e r p r i s e . T h e r e i n c a r n a t i o n o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce i n a ne w stat e r e a c h e d its a p o g e e i n t h e plac e wo n b y H a r t i n t h e Anglo-Ameri can academi c world , a celebrit y deserve d b y H a r t b u t o f a different c h a r a c t e r t h a n tha t e a r n e d b y t h e m e m b e r s o f the earlie r tradition . T h e revolutio n i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e w r o u g h t b y academi c culture wa s disguise d b y t h e continuit y o f l a n g u a g e a n d b y t h e focu s u p o n m a n y o f t h e sam e p r o b l e m s tha t attracte d Blackstone a n d B e n t h a m . T h u s t h e r e ofte n a p p e a r s a su perficial continuit y t h a t mask s t h e d e e p e r transitio n t h a t has o c c u r r e d ove r t h e las t tw o centuries . F r o m Blackston e forward, j u r i s t s hav e a r g u e d tha t t h e mos t pressin g tas k of j u r i s p r u d e n ce wa s t h e creatio n o f a scienc e o f law , b u t they hav e r e a c h e d n o consensu s a b o u t wha t constitute d the scientifi c n a t u r e o f law . Debat e a b o u t t h e m e a n i n g o f science ha s ofte n p r e v e n t e d an y a g r e e m e n t b e y o n d o n e that t h e la w ma y b e studie d i n a wa y tha t provide s a n

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o r d e r e d bod y o f knowledge . T h e ques t fo r a scienc e o f law ha s disguise d t h e varie d dispute s thi s issu e ha s e n c o m passed. A n o t h e r t h e m e tha t ha s p e r m e a t e d j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l de bate a n d p r o v i d e d a superficia l consistenc y ha s involve d t h e endles s d e b a t e a b o u t t h e relationshi p o f moralit y t o law. T h e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y ha s s p a r k e d controversy sinc e Blackstone . N o j u r i s t ha s p r o p o s e d a literal divorc e betwee n la w a n d t h e dictate s o f morality ; most hav e a r g u e d t h a t t h e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y was methodologica l only . T h e intellectua l rigo r e x p e c t e d of lega l scienc e d e m a n d e d t h a t confusio n betwee n t h e tw o be eliminate d b y thei r c o m p l e t e divorce ; a s Si r Frederic k Pollock w r o t e i n 1882 : "I f h e [ a jurist ] feel s m o v e d t o write o n ethic s a s wel l a s o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e , h e ma y d o it separately." 1 9 O n c e again , however , t h e i n t e r m i n a b l e reviews o f thi s issu e giv e a n e r r o n e o u s picture , fo r t h e c o n c e r n s o f academician s t u r n e d thi s issu e int o s o m e t h i n g far differen t t h a n t h e polemi c B e n t h a m h a d l a u n c h e d against Blackstone . P e r h a p s t h e mos t g e n e r a l c h a n g e i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s b e e n t h e victor y o f t h e positivis t traditio n a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e o l d e r n a t u r a l la w theory , o f whic h Blackstone wa s r e g a r d e d a s t h e las t g r e a t representative . T h e d o m i n a n t lega l traditio n o f E u r o p e a n civilization , n a t u r a l la w t h e o r y hel d a m o n g o t h e r teaching s t h a t a la w in violatio n o f m o r a l n o r m s di d n o t bin d a n individual . N a t u r a l la w c o m p r i s e d thos e principle s o f h u m a n behav ior tha t derive d fro m righ t reason . T h u s a law , otherwis e passed i n a c c o r d a n c e wit h constitutiona l p r o c e d u r e s , m i g h t lac k validit y i f i t di d n o t c o n f o r m t o m o r a l stan -

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d a r d s . Englis h lega l positivism , clearl y t h e d o m i n a n t tradi tion sinc e th e tim e o f B e n t h a m , ha s insiste d "tha t la w i s p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d a s a syste m o f positiv e rule s en d o r s e d b y t h e stat e a n d a u t o n o m o u s fro m consideration s of religion , morality , o r n a t u r a l justice." 2 0 T h u s t h e m o r a l c o n t e n t o f a la w i n th e positivis t vie w h a d n o t h i n g t o d o wit h it s validity . W h a t s e e m e d a simpl e formula , t h e separation o f la w fro m morality , i n realit y ha s h a u n t e d English philosoph y sinc e Blackston e a n d B e n t h a m . Man y a j u r i st ha s struggle d unsuccessfull y t o p r o d u c e a precis e delineation o f t h e formula . Pollock , i n hi s i n a u g u r a l lec t u r e a s C o r p u s professo r o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a t O x f o r d i n 1883, s t r a d d l e d t h e issu e neatly : "Fo r J u r i s p r u d e n c e , i f i t is t o b e trul y a n d vitall y distinc t fro m t h e empirica l collec tion o f m a t t e r s o f fact , m u s t p a r t a k e o f t h e n a t u r e o f Philosophy." 2 1 H o w t o achiev e thi s goa l Polloc k di d n o t specify. T h e creatio n o f lega l science , t h e separatio n o f law fro m morality , a n d n a t u r a l la w versu s positivis m a r e topics tha t hav e supplie d continuit y t o Englis h j u r i s p r u dence; eac h g e n e r a t i o n ha s s o u g h t t o resolv e t h e m i n t e r m s o f it s ow n insights . T h e definitio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s a n academi c field has h a d tw o majo r results . I t ha s w i d e n e d t h e g a p betwee n practitioners a n d lega l academics . Whil e j u r i s p r u d e n ce n o l o n g e r stink s i n anyone' s nostrils , lega l t h e o r y stil l searche s for it s plac e withi n t h e b r o a d framewor k o f lega l culture . As Rober t S u m m e r s ha s written : "Al l t h e legitimat e gen eral objective s o f a lega l theoris t ca n b e r e d u c e d t o two : T o tr y t o advanc e t h e subjec t onesel f a n d t o i n d u c e o t h e r s to j o i n in . Sinc e la w i s i m p o r t a n t , thes e objective s a r e i m p o r t a n t . Insofa r a s the y a r e achieved , w e wil l u n d e r -

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Legal Philosophy 1

7

stand la w better , a n d , p e r h a p s , m a k e bette r us e o f it." 2 2 T h e secon d consequence , t h e n a r r o w i n g o f t h e a u d i e n c e to a c a d e m e , ha s t e n d e d t o offse t t h e first, a n d t h u s t h e contradictions o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e hav e persisted . T h e con flict betwee n t h e practica l a n d t h e contemplativ e i n t h e aims o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce ha s r e m a i n e d unresolved . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f academi c la w a s a universit y disci pline, i t m i g h t b e a r g u e d , ha s w o r s e n e d thi s situatio n sinc e t h e 1880s . T h e splinterin g o f b r o a d fields o f e n d e a v o r into n a r r o w specialtie s ha s w o r k e d agains t c o m m o n dis course withi n th e lega l c o m m u n i t y . 2 3 T h e issue s o f juris p r u d e n c e hav e acquire d a specia l l a n g u a g e tha t m a k e s t h e answers m o r e r e m o t e eve n fro m t h e t r a i n e d r e a d e r , a n d t h e vie w o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s th e spaciou s consideratio n of societ y tha t a n i m a t e d Blackston e a n d hi s i m m e d i a t e successors ha s vanished , t h e victi m o f t h a t specializatio n that scholar s p r e t e n d t o a b h o r b u t invariabl y p u r s u e i n practice. I n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f m o d e r n Englis h juris p r u d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , t h e a d v e n t o f academi c la w ha s played a s d r a m a t i c a rol e a s an y o f t h e t h r e e version s o f legal histor y discusse d earlier . T o r e t u r n t o Dicey' s tripartit e divisio n o f lega l scholar ship, thi s boo k doe s no t ai m t o p r o v i d e answer s t o thos e philosophical questions , pas t o r p r e s e n t , t h a t hav e at tracted t h e attentio n o f jurists . N o r doe s i t p r e t e n d t o chronicle, reconcile , o r explai n specifi c lega l doctrines , t h e terrain o f t h e la w reviews . N o r doe s i t p r e s u m e t o expli cate o r c a l e n d a r i n nove l m a n n e r t h e idea s o f t h e jurist s t r e a t e d i n late r chapters . It s m o r e m o d e s t p u r p o s e i s t o i n t r o d u c e historian s t o thos e jurists whos e n a m e s a r e usu ally wel l k n o w n , b u t whos e plac e i n t h e intellectua l histor y

18 From

Jurisprudence to

Legal Philosophy

of m o d e r n j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s rarel y u n d e r s t o o d . T h e trans formation o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce fro m t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t idea l of a searc h fo r t h e basi c law s tha t g o v e r n e d h u m a n societ y into a subse t o f lega l studie s fa r r e m o v e d fro m publi c c o n c e r n m a r k e d a n i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f t h e proces s t h a t historians hav e t e r m e d "professionalization. " F r o m Black stone t o H a r t , wit h interval s o f d o r m a n c y , Englis h juris p r u d e n c e ha s compile d a n enviabl e r e c o r d o f intellectua l achievement. T h i s wor k ha s rarel y gaine d t h e attentio n o f historians becaus e lega l a n d constitutiona l issue s i n th e world afte r t h e Gloriou s Revolutio n lacke d t h e politica l relevance the y h a d enjoye d i n t h e seventeent h century . T h e emphasi s o n lega l a n d constitutiona l histor y a s a ma j o r i n g r e d i e n t o f t h e Englis h pas t ha s suffere d o n tw o counts: t h e belie f t h a t t h e Gloriou s Revolutio n "settled " the constitution , a n d t h e shiftin g t r e n d s o f academi c scholarship tha t hav e e m p h a s i z e d t h e claim s o f socia l his tory i n t h e pas t fe w decades . W h a t wa s o n c e r e g a r d e d a s p e r h a p s t h e p r i m a r y rational e fo r t h e stud y o f Englis h history, th e k n o w l e d g e o f it s lega l a n d constitutiona l de velopment, ha s decline d a s it s worl d p o w e r ha s ebbed . T h e focu s o n issue s o f interes t t o historian s t o t h e exclu sion o f o t h e r s tha t fascinat e practitioner s a n d lega l philos o p h e r s i s n o t m e a n t t o sligh t t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f thos e concerns; i t i s t h e pric e pai d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t o historian s the relevanc e o f pas t a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y lega l theor y t o th e wider c u r r e n t s o f Englis h intellectua l history . A s M o r t o n Horwitz ha s written : "W e m u s t b e c o m e m o r e self-con scious a b o u t lega l historiograph y a n d t h e way s i n whic h controversies ove r politica l a n d lega l theor y influenc e le gal historica l inquiry . I t i s tim e fo r u s t o b r i d g e t h e chas m

From Jurisprudence to

Legal Philosophy 19

between lega l t h e o r y a n d lega l history." 2 4 T h i s boo k i s i n t e n d e d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e r e u n i o n o f lega l t h e o r y wit h intellectual histor y i n o r d e r tha t historian s ma y u n d e r stand bette r t h e plac e o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n academi c lega l c u l t u r e a n d i n t h e m o r e g e n e r a l c o n c e r n s o f society . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r e m i s e o f t h e wor k is , a s o t h e r s hav e recog nized, tha t " c o m m o n la w t h o u g h t c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d without takin g a lon g historica l view." 2 5 Onl y fro m thi s perspective ca n t h e g r e a t c h a n g e i n t h e p u r p o s e s o f juris p r u d e n c e gai n p r o p e r appreciation .

Chapter Two

Sir William

Blackstone

T h e Intersectio n o f Positivis and Natura l La w Theor

m

y

For m u c h o f t h e p e r i o d sinc e hi s d e a t h i n 178 0 Si r Willia m Blackstone ha s falle n int o tha t specia l categor y o f intellec tual whos e works , a l t h o u g h widel y p o p u l a r i n hi s lifetime , gradually declin e i n influenc e i n succeedin g decades . T h i s fate ha s befalle n intellectual s fro m al l discipline s a n d eras . I n t h e passag e fro m o n e g e n e r a t i o n t o a n o t h e r thei r r e p u tations h a n g increasingl y u p o n m e r e phrases , a n d thei r c o m p l e x a r g u m e n t s b e c o m e trivialized . W h e r e a s histori ans o f m o d e r n Britai n kno w o f Blackstone' s mos t famou s work, t h e Commentaries on the Laws of England, a s wel l as t h e fam e i t c o m m a n d e d , fe w i n t r e p i d scholar s hav e e x a m i n e d t h e fou r volume s i n detai l (usuall y som e 200 0 pages). Fo r historian s withou t specifi c lega l training , t h e 21

22 Sir

William Blackstone

Commentaries, o r a t leas t t h e g r e a t e r p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e m , have r e p r e s e n t e d a m o n u m e n t o f scholarshi p tha t di d n o t invite clos e scrutiny . T h e recapitulatio n o f d o c t r i n e a s i t existed i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y covere d m a n y topic s tha t tim e ha s r e n d e r e d obsolete . Despite thi s drawbac k Blackston e ha s r e m a i n e d a n in stantly recognizabl e figure, o n e w h o exercise d u n d e n i a b l e authority a n d e a r n e d a r e p u t a t i o n rivale d b y fe w a n d e x c e e d e d b y n o n e . Hi s rol e a s t h e sourc e o f lega l educa tion fo r g e n e r a t i o n s o f c o m m o n lawyer s e n s u r e d hi s p r o m i n e n c e , ye t thi s influenc e als o le d t o t h e dismissa l of hi s i m p o r t a n c e fo r Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Fo r m a n y decades Blackston e serve d a s a convenien t symbol , a n a m e to whic h ritua l obeisanc e wa s directe d b u t whos e wor k n o l o n g e r s e e m e d compelling : " T h e t h o u g h t o f Willia m Blackstone i s ofte n casuall y dismisse d i n o u r da y a s b e i n g irrelevant t o t h e systemati c stud y o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e . " l I n t h e 1980 s scholar s too k Blackston e seriousl y again , a n d his idea s a n d conclusion s hav e onc e agai n b e c o m e t h e subject o f seriou s discussion . T h i s a g e n d a wa s directe d i n p a r t t o "dispos e o f m a n y myth s create d b y B e n t h a m ' s caricature o f t h e Vineria n professor." 2 T h e reviva l o f in terest i n Blackston e i s m e r i t e d becaus e t h e grea t Com m e n t a t o r wa s t h e J a n us o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e, lookin g backward t o t h e n a t u r a l la w traditio n a n d forwar d t o lega l positivism a n d t h e beginning s o f m o d e r n Englis h juris prudence. Some jurist s a n d historian s hav e evaluate d Blackston e primarily t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r hi s a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e nat ural la w traditio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce wa s g e n u i n e o r simpl y a m a t t e r o f followin g convention . O t h e r s hav e looke d t o

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 23 h i m fo r hi s t r e a t m e n t o f specifi c doctrine s o f constitu tional la w suc h a s t h e sovereignt y o f P a r l i a m e n t o r t h e t h e o r y o f judicia l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n relatio n t o t h e rol e of t h e legislature . A fe w scholar s hav e d e b a t e d w h e t h e r Blackstone wrot e t o i n a u g u r a t e a ne w scienc e o f la w o r t o r e f o r m t h e syste m o f Englis h lega l education . Historian s have als o assesse d t h e e x t e n t t o whic h Blackston e de f e n d e d existin g lega l a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d o p p o s e d unwis e alterations i n t h e Englis h constitution , t h u s servin g a s a bulwark o f t h e statu s q u o a n d c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e compla cency o f e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y j u r i s p r u d e n c e . O v e r t h e las t d e c a d e Blackstone' s intellectua l achievement , fo r histori ans a t least , provide s a specifi c tes t o f c h a n g i n g i n t e r p r e t a tions o f H a n o v e r i a n history . T h e scholarl y goal s o f j u r i s t s a n d historian s a r e n o t mutuall y exclusive , b u t thes e b r o a d divisions h e l p t o establis h t h e settin g agains t whic h Black stone's plac e i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n ce m u s t b e j u d g e d . Blackstone wa s b o r n i n L o n d o n o n 1 0 J u l y 1723 . I n spite o f famil y tragedies , h e receive d a s t r o n g secondar y e d u c a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e effort s o f a n uncle . Hi s initia l aca d e m i c succes s le d t o matriculatio n a t P e m b r o k e College , O x f o r d , i n 1738 , w h e r e h e compile d a n enviabl e r e c o r d . H e wo n electio n a s a fello w o f Al l Soul s Colleg e i n 1743 , e a r n e d t h e bachelo r o f civi l la w d e g r e e i n 1745 , wa s calle d to t h e B a r i n 174 6 a t t h e Middl e T e m p l e , a n d eventuall y took t h e d o c t o r a t e i n civi l la w a t t h e precociou s ag e o f 27. 3 Blackstone n e v e r enjoye d an y rea l succes s a t t h e Bar , a n d h e quickl y r e t u r n e d t o t h e m o r e congenia l universit y at m o s p h e r e a t O x f o r d . H e serve d a s b u r s a r o f Al l Soul s from 174 5 t o 175 3 whil e h e n u r t u r e d m o r e ambitiou s plans. I n 175 3 Blackston e s o u g h t b u t di d n o t gai n selec -

24 Sir

William Blackstone

tion fo r t h e regiu s chai r o f civi l la w a t O x f o r d . T h i s set back o c c u r r e d becaus e o f hi s politica l view s (o r p e r h a p s his refusa l t o modif y t h e m a p p r o p r i a t e l y a t t h e behes t o f t h e D u k e o f Newcastle) , a l t h o u g h mos t universit y observ ers c o n c e d e d tha t h e offere d t h e bes t credential s a n d po tential fo r t h e post . I n t h e a f t e r m a t h o f thi s disappoint m e n t Blackston e p r e s e n t e d a serie s o f lecture s o n Englis h law a t O x f o r d , t h e b l u e p r i n t fo r t h e Commentaries late r published fro m 176 5 t o 1769 . Hi s p u r p o s e wa s politica l a s well a s scholarly , fo r Blackston e kne w tha t a beques t b y Charles V i n e r fo r a ne w chai r i n Englis h la w wa s i n t h e offing. 4 Blackstone' s calculation s pai d of f i n 175 8 w h e n h e secured electio n a s t h e first V i n e r i a n professor , t h e first professorship i n Englis h la w a t O x f o r d , a positio n h e re tained unti l hi s resignatio n i n 1766 . Hi s greates t wor k wa s accomplished i n O x f o r d b y virtu e o f hi s "grea t power s o f m i n d a n d character , a capacit y t o exercis e influenc e ove r friends a n d colleagues , a passio n fo r o r d e r a n d efficiency , a n d a n i m m e n s e capacit y fo r h a r d work , whic h gav e h i m p r e - e m i n e n c e i n t h e smal l a n d closely-kni t societ y i n whic h he f o u n d himself." 5 T h e Commentaries hav e r e m a i n e d hi s c r o w n i n g achievement . O u t s i d e t h e a c a d e m y Blackston e enjoye d a politica l ca r e e r a s well , e n t e r i n g Parliamen t a s a m e m b e r fo r H i n d o n in Wiltshir e i n 176 1 t h r o u g h t h e e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f L o r d S h e l b u r n e . I n 176 8 h e b e c a m e M.P . fo r Westbur y i n Wilt shire b y t h e p a t r o n a g e o f L o r d A b i n g d o n . 6 T h e n i n Feb r u a r y o f 177 0 Blackston e b e g a n a judicial t e n u r e wit h hi s a p p o i n t m e n t a s a justice o f t h e C o u r t o f C o m m o n Pleas ; after a brie f i n t e r l u d e a t King' s B e n c h h e r e t u r n e d t o C o m m o n Plea s unti l hi s d e a t h . Blackstone' s wor k a t t h e

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 25 Bar wa s sporadi c a n d u n r e w a r d i n g w h e n c o m p a r e d t o hi s achievements a t O x f o r d , m a k i n g hi m a majo r e x a m p l e o f the complain t t h a t academi c la w i n E n g l a n d employ s thos e who c a n n o t attai n distinctio n i n court . Hi s politica l c a r e e r was n o t distinguished , fo r Blackston e n e v e r a c q u i r e d a n i m p o r t a n t plac e i n th e H o u s e o f C o m m o n s . Hi s limite d oratorical skill s a c c o u n t e d i n p a r t fo r thi s o u t c o m e be cause hi s i n f r e q u e n t speeche s faile d t o hol d t h e attentio n of hi s colleagues . T h e significan t poin t o f thi s profile , however, wa s t h e publi c rol e Blackston e played , despit e t h e failur e t o achiev e fam e o r p o w e r i n t h e process . Unlik e o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l tradition , Blackstone participate d activel y i n t h e politica l lif e o f t h e nation; h e coul d clai m m o r e practica l politica l e x p e r i e n c e t h a n an y o f hi s successors . I f hi s politica l lif e n e v e r m a d e him a majo r force , h e wa s a t leas t p a r t o f t h e system . Much t h e sam e ca n b e sai d o f hi s judicial career . Black stone ha s n e v e r r a n k e d a m o n g thos e j u d g e s ordinaril y t h o u g h t t h e mos t abl e i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h century ; no t eve n his greates t a d m i r e r s hav e suggeste d tha t hi s judicial ten u r e c o m p a r e d i n i m p o r t a n c e t o t h a t o f L o r d Mansfield . Blackstone wa s n o t a b a d j u d g e, however , a n d o n e sympa thetic criti c o f hi s p e r f o r m a n c e o n t h e b e n c h n o t e d hi s ability t o refrai n fro m c o m m e n t i n area s b e y o n d hi s ex pertise, t h u s avoidin g a n interventio n t o hi s disadvantage . Blackstone "showe d a ver y firm g r a s p o f ever y b r a n c h which h e wa s calle d u p o n t o h a n d l e . N o p r o b l e m f o u n d h i m w a n t i n g i n anxiou s consideratio n a n d sensibl e conclu sion." 7 Ye t i t wa s clea r tha t hi s career s a s j u d ge a n d politi cian pale d i n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e fam e h e wo n a s a u t h o r o f t h e Commentaries. Blackston e enjoye d a ful l lif e o f practica l

26 Sir

William Blackstone

work, s o h e h a r d l y qualifie d a s a n impractica l d r e a m e r o f t h e academy . Before e x a m i n a t i o n o f som e issue s raise d i n t h e Commentaries, t h e historiograph y o f Blackstone' s r e p u t a t i o n m u s t b e place d i n chronologica l perspective . T h e first a n d , eve n afte r m o r e t h a n tw o centuries , t h e severes t at tack o n Blackston e c a m e a s earl y a s 177 6 w h e n J e r e m y B e n t h a m publishe d hi s Fragment on Government, whic h in t r o d u c e d wha t b e c a m e a s t a n d a r d litan y o f complaint s a b o u t t h e allege d deficiencie s o f t h e Commentaries. Ye t even a s s u b s e q u e n t jurist s graduall y a d o p t e d B e n t h a m ' s objections, t h e Commentaries enjoye d thei r greates t influ ence i n E n g l a n d a n d N o r t h Americ a fro m 177 0 t o 1830. 8 A l t h o u g h t h e practica l legac y o f t h e Commentaries neve r e r o d e d , t h e d e p r e c a t i o n o f Blackstone' s philosophica l fail u r e s b e c a m e c o m m o n b y th e tim e o f B e n t h a m ' s d e a t h i n 1832. T h i s conventiona l wisdo m prevaile d fo r t h e n e x t half century . I t fel l t o A . V . Dicey , himsel f a successo r t o Blackstone a s h o l d e r o f th e Vineria n chair , t o reasses s t h e place o f hi s predecesso r i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . T h i s task p r o v e d t h e m o r e ironi c becaus e Dice y b e g a n hi s ow n legal c a r e e r a s a n avowe d a d m i r e r o f B e n t h a m , a n d basi cally r e m a i n e d o n e t h r o u g h o u t hi s life . I n a t h o r o u g h consideratio n o f Blackston e i n 1909 , Dicey stresse d t h e literar y virtue s o f t h e Commentaries a s o p p o s e d t o t h e les s successfu l philosophica l expositio n o f t h e c o m m o n law : " T h e Commentaries liv e b y thei r style." 9 Blackstone h a d a t t e m p t e d t o e x p o u n d lega l principle s i n prose accessibl e t o la y people , a goa l tha t Dice y himsel f h a d trie d t o reac h a s well : " H e wil l r e m a i n fo r eve r t h e e m i n e n t lawyer , t h e perfec t professor , t h e c o n s u m m a t e

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 27 m a n o f letter s whos e geniu s claime d a n d vindicate d fo r English la w it s hig h a n d rightfu l plac e i n t h e nobl e litera t u r e o f E n g l a n d . " 1 0 Dicey' s effort s a t rehabilitatio n di d n o t p r o v e completel y successful , a n d B e n t h a m i t e distrus t of Blackston e persisted . A m e r i c a n j u r i s t Olive r W e n d e l l Holmes, reflectin g o n t h e intellectua l origin s o f hi s ow n book The Common Law (1881) , r e c o r d e d tha t " I thin k t h e m o v e m e n t c a m e fro m w i t h i n — f r o m t h e passionat e de m a n d tha t w h a t s o u n d e d s o arbitrar y i n Blackstone , fo r instance, shoul d giv e s o m e reasonabl e m e a n i n g — t h a t t h e law shoul d b e p r o v e d , i f i t coul d be , t o b e worth y o f t h e interes t o f a n intelligen t m a n . " 1 1 Man y lega l scholar s e x p r e s s e d a n o p i n i o n a b o u t Blackstone' s r e p u t a t i o n , b u t few offere d ne w insight s int o hi s wor k i n t h e ligh t o f c h a n g i n g j u r i s p r u d e n t i al concerns . I n 193 2 Si r Willia m H o l d s w o r t h , a n o t h e r successo r t o Blackstone i n t h e lin e o f Vineria n professors , praise d Blackstone's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e b y p o i n t i n g t o hi s e x t r a o r d i n a r y fea t o f elicitin g fro m t h e g r e a t mas s o f lega l material s a synthesi s o f Englis h la w u n e q u a l e d sinc e Bracton. 1 2 Despit e thi s ne w recognitio n of Blackstone' s contributions , it s impac t wa s lessene d be cause t h e Commentaries n o l o n g e r h a d a practica l functio n in eithe r t h e lega l syste m o r lega l e d u c a t i o n ; i t h a d b e c o m e a m u s e u m piece . Fo r t h e nex t severa l d e c a d e s scholarl y appraisals o f Blackston e a p p e a r e d infrequently , a n d hi s views o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e attracte d littl e interest . I n t h e 1980s r e n e w e d attentio n t o t h e j u r i s p r u d e n ce o f B e n t h a m inevitably m e a n t retrospectiv e c o n c e r n fo r Blackstone . M o r e seriou s researc h o n Blackstone' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e ap p e a r e d i n t h e 1980 s t h a n i n an y o t h e r d e c a d e o f t h e

28 Sir

William Blackstone

twentieth century , wit h t h e appreciativ e conclusion s o f S. F . C . Milso m a typica l e x a m p l e . 1 3 T h e o l d e r pejorativ e attitude towar d t h e Commentaries, traceabl e directl y bac k to th e t r i u m p h o f B e n t h a m i s m , ha s give n wa y t o m o r e favorable estimates . T h e majo r positiv e reappraisa l Black stone enjoye d c e n t e r e d o n hi s abilit y t o conve y a sens e that t h e c o m m o n la w stoo d a s a unifie d whole , a belie f tha t t h e la w consiste d o f relate d lega l doctrines. 1 4 I m p o r t a n t a s they are , b r o a d j u d g m e n t s o f Blackstone' s wor k d o n o t serve t o locat e h i m specificall y i n t h e genesi s o f m o d e r n English j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Fo r t h a t tas k i t i s necessar y t o re t u r n t o t h e Commentaries. For b o t h jurist s a n d historians , excep t thos e b e n t u p o n Blackstone's t r e a t m e n t o f a particula r lega l topic , t h e sec tion o f t h e Commentaries mos t relevan t t o thei r c o n c e r n s i s the i n t r o d u c t o r y essa y t o v o l u m e 1 . T h i s length y p r e l u d e reflected Blackstone' s j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l assumption s befor e h e e x a m i n e d t h e substantiv e material s o f t h e c o m m o n law . T h e sectio n wa s especiall y relevan t t o t h e establishmen t o f a j u r i s p r u d e n t i al tradition , fo r thi s philosophica l discours e b e c a m e t h e p o r t i o n o f Blackston e tha t B e n t h a m savage d in tryin g t o stak e o u t a c o n t r a r y position . Blackston e o p e n e d himsel f t o criticis m becaus e hi s l a n g u a g e vacillate d between t h e customar y a r g u m e n t s fo r lega l validit y fro m n a t u r a l law , a n d hi s anticipatio n o f late r assertion s t h a t located lega l system s onl y i n t h e positiv e la w o f a give n so ciety. W h e n Blackston e publishe d t h e Commentaries n a t u r a l law theor y stil l hel d a hallowe d plac e i n E u r o p e a n t h o u g h t , particularl y i n lega l theory . O r i g i n a t i n g i n classi cal antiquit y a n d subsequentl y i n c o r p o r a t e d int o Christia n

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 29 t h o u g h t , notabl y b y Aquinas , n a t u r a l la w d o c t r i n e hel d that a la w d e p e n d e d u p o n it s conformit y t o moralit y fo r t h e validit y i t enjoye d a n d t h e obligatio n o f o b e d i e n c e i t i m p o s e d . I t receive d it s m o d e r n expressio n fro m conti nental a u t h o r s o f t h e seventeent h c e n t u r y suc h a s H u g o Grotius a n d Samue l P u f e n d o r f w h o specialize d i n t h e la w of nations . B y d e d u c t i o n fro m n a t u r e a n d righ t reaso n that b o u n d al l people , universa l n a t u r a l la w n o r m s m i g h t be discovered . B y it s tenet s specifi c civi l o r d i n a n c e s con trary t o th e prescription s o f n a t u r a l la w wer e invali d a n d could no t c o m m a n d obedience . Pu t a n o t h e r way , a n u n j u s t la w wa s n o law . T o thi s philosophica l a n d juristic conventio n Blackston e a d h e r e d , a l t h o u g h som e critic s hav e a t t r i b u t e d a t o n e o f conformity t o Blackstone' s expression , a s i f h e fel t oblige d to p e r f o r m a m o r a l d u t y i n m a k i n g thi s h o m a g e . Som e scholars hav e s u p p o s e d tha t thi s sectio n wa s o r n a m e n t a l only, " a m e r e concessio n t o th e stylisti c o r pedagogica l conventions o f t h e age , a n d withou t substantia l intrinsi c " relation t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o r c o n t e n t o f t h e Commentaries." 1 5 If Blackston e i n t e n d e d tha t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n shoul d hav e only a decorativ e functio n h e e r r e d badly , fo r i t wa s u p o n these passage s (reall y j u s t twent y page s o r so ) tha t Ben t h a m focuse d t h e h e a r t o f hi s criticism . O t h e r scholar s have correctl y r e g a r d e d Blackstone' s affinit y fo r n a t u r a l law a s f u n d a m e n t a l t o hi s goals , a n d t h e r e f o r e intrinsi c t o an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e Commentaries. 16 6I n fact , t h e natu ral la w element s i n Blackston e d o p r o v i d e i m p o r t a n t evi d e n c e fo r ascertainin g hi s p u r p o s e s a n d wer e hardl y a n embellishment. P e r h a p s Blackstone' s mos t famou s expressio n o f n a t u -

30 Sir

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ral la w theor y c a m e i n t h e followin g passage : " T h i s la w o f n a t u r e , bein g co-eva l wit h m a n k i n d a n d dictate d b y G o d himself, i s o f cours e s u p e r i o r i n obligatio n t o an y o t h e r . I t is b i n d i n g al l ove r t h e globe , i n al l countries , a n d a t al l times: n o h u m a n law s a r e o f an y validity , i f c o n t r a r y t o this; a n d suc h o f t h e m a s a r e vali d deriv e al l thei r force , a n d al l thei r authority , mediatel y o r immediately , fro m this original." 1 7 Blackston e a d d e d t o thi s t e s t a m e n t b y stating: " U p o n thes e tw o foundations , t h e la w o f n a t u r e a n d t h e la w o f revelation , d e p e n d al l h u m a n laws ; t h a t i s to say , n o h u m a n law s shoul d b e suffere d t o contradic t these." 1 8 Reaffirmatio n b y positiv e la w di d n o t m a k e n a t u ral right s an y s t r o n g e r , fo r the y d e p e n d e d o n n a t u r a l la w m a n d a t e . Whil e thes e statement s see m clear , i t shoul d b e n o t e d tha t Blackston e modifie d t h e m b y als o suggestin g that o n m a n y issue s n e i t h e r revelatio n n o r n a t u r a l la w p r o v i d e d guidance . T h i s lef t t h e individua l a t libert y o n these indifferen t points , b u t societ y f o u n d i t necessar y t o place restraint s o n action s t h r o u g h positiv e enactments . If Blackston e h a d s t o p p e d wit h thes e p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , confusion a b o u t hi s rea l p u r p o s e s m i g h t n e v e r hav e arisen. N o soone r h a d Blackston e proclaime d himsel f a fol lower o f n a t u r a l la w t h a n h e b e g a n t o us e t h e l a n g u a g e o f the la w i n a fa r differen t m a n n e r . I n hi s definitio n o f t h e severa l area s o f positiv e law , fo r e x a m p l e , Blackston e wrote: "Municipa l law , t h u s u n d e r s t o o d , i s p r o p e r l y de fined t o b e ' a rul e o f civi l c o n d u c t prescribe d b y t h e su p r e m e p o w e r i n a state , c o m m a n d i n g wha t i s righ t a n d prohibiting wha t i s wrong. ' " 1 9 I f Blackston e subscribe d only t o n a t u r a l la w ideas , t h e n thi s passag e containe d sen -

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 31 timents n o t ordinaril y associate d wit h him . Blackston e elaborated: " F o r legislature , a s wa s befor e observed , i s t h e greatest ac t o f superiorit y tha t ca n b e exercise d b y o n e being ove r a n o t h e r . W h e r e f o r e i t i s requisit e t o t h e ver y essence o f a law , tha t i t b e m a d e b y t h e s u p r e m e p o w e r . Sovereignty a n d legislatur e a r e i n d e e d convertibl e t e r m s ; o n e c a n n o t subsis t withou t t h e o t h e r . " 2 0 T h e s e assertion s fit m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l y int o t h e positivis t traditio n t h a t has ofte n m a d e Blackston e a particula r target . Blackston e reiterated Hobbes' s c o n t e n t i o n tha t t h e basi c e l e m e n t o f law wa s f o u n d i n t h e c o m m a n d o f a sovereign, 2 1 fo r la w always p r e s u p p o s e d som e s u p e r i o r w h o m a d e it . Lega l positivism ha s defie d precis e definition ; a historian , i n trying t o pi n d o w n a particula r concept , m i g h t c o m p a r e its ambiguitie s t o t h e p r o t r a c t e d battle s tha t hav e r a g e d a r o u n d suc h w o r d s a s gentr y o r class . Lega l positivis m ha s r e m a i n e d elusiv e becaus e scholar s hav e place d to o heav y a b u r d e n o n t h e p h r a s e , askin g i t t o describ e to o m a n y different issues . It s m a n y m e a n i n g s woul d b e to o difficul t to e n u m e r a t e , a l t h o u g h cor e belief s woul d e m p h a s i z e t h e legal analysi s o f t h e empirica l fact s o f a lega l syste m a n d stress la w a s a specie s o f c o m m a n d ; speculatio n a b o u t t h e ultimate n a t u r e o f la w woul d b e simpl y irrelevant . T h u s within t h e purvie w o f a fe w page s Blackston e h a d neatl y e n c a p s u l a t e d bot h t h e n a t u r a l la w a n d positivis t tradition s of j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Blackston e h a d struc k a n e a t balanc e between t h e mysteriou s a n d t h e scientifi c d i m e n s i o n s o f t h e c o m m o n law. 2 2 With respec t t o sovereignty , a stapl e o f discussion s a b o u t constitutiona l law , Blackston e wrote : "B y t h e sover eign p o w e r . . . i s m e a n t t h e m a k i n g o f laws ; fo r w h e r e v e r

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that p o w e r resides , al l o t h e r s m u s t c o n f o r m to , a n d b e directed b y it , whateve r a p p e a r a n c e t h e o u t w a r d for m a n d administration o f th e g o v e r n m e n t ma y p u t o n . " 2 3 T h e d o c t r i n e wa s essentia l t o Blackstone , fo r withou t i t t h e constitution h a d n o m e a n i n g . 2 4 Blackston e place d parlia m e n t a r y sovereignt y withi n t h e triumvirat e o f king , lord s a n d c o m m o n s ; " H e r e t h e n i s lodge d t h e sovereignt y o f t h e Britis h constitution ; a n d l o d g e d a s beneficiall y a s i s possible fo r society . Fo r i n n o o t h e r s h a p e coul d w e b e s o certain o f finding th e t h r e e grea t qualitie s o f g o v e r n m e n t so wel l a n d s o happil y u n i t e d . " 2 5 F r o m suc h a passage , t o his critics , c a m e t h e Blackston e w h o s u p p o r t e d t h e statu s q u o uncriticall y a n d symbolize d resistanc e t o lega l r e f o r m . A l t h o u g h sovereignt y m e a n t absolut e p o w e r a n d wa s vested i n Parliament , Blackston e a r g u e d tha t thi s a u t h o r ity coul d no t b e exercise d arbitrarily , a n d t h u s i t e n h a n c e d r a t h e r t h a n t h r e a t e n e d civi l liberty. 2 6 T h e simultaneou s e m b r a c e o f n a t u r a l la w a n d positivis t lega l theor y p r o d u c e d t h e Blackston e capabl e o f exciting , widel y d i v e r g e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s b y late r scholars . T h e differen t intellectua l task s o f lega l analysi s a n d history hav e le d t o differen t e m p h a s e s b y eac h disciplin e w h e n i t c a m e t o estimatin g Blackstone' s significance . O n e i m p o r t a n t d e b a t e a m o n g jurist s ha s revolve d a r o u n d t h e a p p a r e n t contradictio n betwee n t h e l a n g u a g e o f Hobbes ian positiv e la w e m p l o y e d b y Blackston e a n d tha t o f tradi tional n a t u r a l theor y la w a s righ t reaso n base d u p o n n o r mative m o r a l postulates. 2 7 W h e r e Blackstone' s ultimat e intellectual allegianc e la y i s capable o f n o definitiv e answe r because h e lef t suc h mixe d signals ; t h e bes t conclusio n may wel l b e tha t h e believe d sincerel y i n b o t h tradition s

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 33 a n d , unlik e late r scholars , sa w n o necessar y d i c h o t o m y between t h e m . O n e e x a m p l e , Blackstone' s a t t e m p t t o m a k e reaso n t h e h e a r t o f t h e c o m m o n law , m u s t suffice . Was reaso n a reflectio n o f God' s o r d e r fo r t h e univers e o r was r e a s o n a n a t u r a l principl e o f t h e c o m m o n la w t h a t p r o d u c e d u n d e r l y i n g s y m m e t r y b e n e a t h it s historica l de v e l o p m e n t ? Blackston e clearl y p r e f e r r e d t o r e g a r d reaso n as experientia l r a t h e r t h a n deductive : " T h e c o n t e n t o f l a w — t h e custo m receive d a s la w i n E n g l a n d — w a s a n his torical artifact . B u t historica l p e d i g r e e di d n o t alon e de t e r m i n e whic h custom s wer e receive d a s c o m m o n law , a n d the m o r e g e n e r a l ethica l base s o f h u m a n la w e n s u r e d tha t n o t h i n g 'contrar y t o reason ' woul d b e allowe d a s law." 2 8 As a resul t o f thi s stanc e Blackston e believe d tha t t h e "conclusions o f reaso n coul d b e derive d fro m experi e n c e . " 2 9 T h u s Blackston e m a n a g e d t o c o m b i n e bot h m o d e s o f a r g u m e n t i n pressin g hi s conclusion s a b o u t th e laws o f E n g l a n d . O n t h e issu e o f t h e relevanc e o f n a t u r a l la w t h e o r y t o t h e Commentaries, J o h n Finni s ha s a r g u e d persuasivel y t h a t this philosophica l s t r u c t u r e wa s crucia l t o Blackstone' s in tentions a n d m e t h o d o l o g y . 3 0 Finni s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e alleged absolut e divid e betwee n n a t u r a l la w a n d positivis t j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n Blackston e di d n o t exist . Blackston e c o m b i n e d t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e tw o tradition s i n a wa y t h a t has p e r m i t t e d s u b s e q u e n t partisan s t o stres s o n e o r t h e o t h e r , b u t Blackston e n e v e r s e p a r a t e d t h e tw o i n hi s con ception o f t h e Commentaries. A simila r a p p r o a c h t o Black stone c a m e i n t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g identi cal, m o r a l obligatio n a n d lega l validit y wer e t r e a t e d b y Blackstone a s topic s tha t p e r m i t t e d bot h n a t u r a l la w a n d

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positivist ideas : "Blackston e doe s find a wa y i n hi s Commentaries t o explai n tha t m e n ' s moral obligatio n t o obe y posi tive law s arise s fro m t h e conformit y o f thes e law s t o natu ral ones , a n d als o t h a t thei r legal validit y finds it s sourc e i n t h e sovereign' s will." 3 1 T h i s emphasi s o n t h e separatio n o f law fro m morality , usuall y r e g a r d e d a s a majo r d o c t r i n e of lega l positivism , m a d e Blackston e n o t t h e e n d o f a philosophical era , b u t m o r e o f a b r i d g e t o m o d e r n lega l philosophy. H e recognize d withou t difficult y t h e distinc tion betwee n act s tha t wer e evi l i n themselve s (an d b o u n d by conscience ) a n d thos e tha t wer e morall y n e u t r a l b u t prohibited b y positiv e law . A s h a r p divisio n betwee n t h e Blackstone p o r t r a y e d a s t h e las t gas p o f archai c n a t u r a l law theor y a n d hi s positivis t critic s n o l o n g e r seem s tena ble, fo r h e "sough t t o unit e j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d c o m m o n law practic e int o o n e framework. 3 2 Historian s a n d jurist s have ofte n p r e f e r r e d schem a tha t make s generalizatio n possible. Individual s a r e l u m p e d t o g e t h e r i n school s o r m o v e m e n t s , ofte n wit h littl e r e g a r d fo r t h e difference s that s e p a r a t e d a j u r i s t fro m c o n t e m p o r a r y peers . I n thi s sense, therefore , Blackston e c a n n o t b e easil y categorized . W h a t m i g h t t h e historia n conclud e fro m t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e philosophica l foundation s o f t h e Commentaries'? Blackstone ha s enjoye d a restoratio n o f r e p u t a t i o n pre cisely becaus e a clos e r e a d i n g o f t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e Commentaries ha s p r o d u c e d a m o r e c o m p l e x a u t h o r , o n e w h o ha s c o n t i n u e d t o pos e differen t p r o b l e m s fo r schol ars. Fo r e x a m p l e , t h e wa y i n whic h Blackston e classifie d English la w ha s le d t o som e stres s o n t h e rol e playe d b y civil la w i n p r o v i d i n g Blackston e wit h a m o d e l fo r thi s task: " H e wa s a t t e m p t i n g t o achiev e successfull y w h a t oth -

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 35 ers h a d trie d t o d o b u t failed . T h i s wa s t o c o m b i n e tw o m e t h o d o l o g i e s b y lookin g a t Englis h la w i n a R o m a n wa y in o r d e r t o p r o v e tha t i t wa s a logica l s t r u c t u r e . " 3 3 T h e old caricatur e o f Blackston e a s a superficia l scribble r n o l o n g e r prevails ; a t h i n k e r o f intellectua l complexit y ha s replaced t h e unsophisticate d C o m m e n t a t o r w h o lan guished i n relativ e obscurit y t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . Whil e m a n y topic s t r e a t e d b y Black stone n o l o n g e r hav e an y rea l interes t fo r historians , hi s legal philosoph y continue s t o r e p a y consideration . I t i s n o lack o f scholarl y c o u r a g e t o a r g u e t h a t severa l r e a d i n g s o f Blackstone's i n t r o d u c t i o n r e m a i n possible . T h e stud y o f t h e c o m m o n la w a s a fit subjec t fo r r e a s o n e d expositio n rescued t h e la w fro m t h e technica l work s t h a t t h e publi c s h u n n e d : "Fo r hi s c o n t e m p o r a r y r e a d e r s , m o r e o v e r , Blackstone's organizatio n a n d conceptualizatio n o f t h e system o f la w i n E n g l a n d p r o v e d a revelation , a s t h e Commentaries wa s f o u n d t o hav e furnishe d reaso n a n d e r u d i tion w h e r e confusio n a n d technicalit y h i t h e r t o ob t a i n e d . " 3 4 I n thi s sense , t h e r e f o r e , Blackston e s o u g h t t o reveal t h e rationa l principle s t h a t woul d m a k e t h e la w a scienc e simila r t o o t h e r subject s o f e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y inquiry. Withi n thi s f r a m e w o r k b o t h lega l a n d philosophi cal motive s wer e a t work . Hi s positio n a t t h e intersectio n of t h e tw o majo r c o m p e t i n g lega l tradition s wil l lon g in spire discussion , b u t Blackstone' s positio n a m o n g t h e great jurist s i s no w m o r e secur e t h a n wa s t h e cas e fo r generations. A n o t h e r issu e o f interes t t o historian s wa s Blackstone' s discussion o f t h e sovereignt y o f P a r l i a m e n t . Hi s insistenc e o n s t r o n g g o v e r n m e n t i n a well-ordere d stat e le d t o hi s

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deserved r e p u t a t i o n a s t h e foremos t i n t e r p r e t e r o f thi s constitutional d o c t r i n e i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. 3 5 Black stone ha s r e m a i n e d t h e o n e authorit y w h o assesse d cor rectly t h e political/constitutiona l d e v e l o p m e n t s afte r t h e Glorious Revolution , a n d hi s explanatio n i n t h e Commentaries correctl y identifie d t h e shift s i n politica l p o w e r tha t followed i n t h e wak e o f 1688 . Blackstone' s t r e a t m e n t wa s m o r e descriptiv e t h a n analytical, 3 6 ye t a s n o o t h e r write r before h i m h e focuse d attentio n o n t h e shiftin g n a t u r e of constitutiona l theor y b y t h e m i d d l e o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h century. T h e c h a n g i n g n a t u r e o f historiographica l de bates a b o u t t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y ha s challenge d som e of Blackstone' s conclusions , a s wil l b e discusse d later , al t h o u g h h e r e m a i n s a usefu l b a r o m e t e r fo r historian s o n political t r e n d s . Recently a n o t h e r d i m e n s i o n o f Blackston e o n parlia m e n t a r y sovereignt y ha s significantl y shifte d t h e i n t e r p r e tation o f hi s work . I n hi s i n a u g u r a l lectur e a s Vineria n professor i n 1758 , Blackston e h a d stresse d t h a t m e m b e r s of P a r l i a m e n t wer e t h e " g u a r d i a n s o f t h e constitution " w h o m a d e , r e p e a l e d , a n d i n t e r p r e t e d Englis h laws. 37 B y checking d a n g e r o u s innovation s a n d a d o p t i n g sensibl e i m p r o v e m e n t s , the y t r a n s m i t t e d a n d a m e n d e d t h e consti tution fo r t h e benefi t o f society . T h e scienc e o f legislation , Blackstone proclaimed , wa s "th e nobles t a n d mos t diffi cult" o f an y occupation. 3 8 I n p o n d e r i n g t h e implication s of a scienc e o f legislation , Blackston e r e g a r d e d P a r l i a m e n t as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f c h a n g e — t h e questio n was , fo r bette r o r fo r worse ? David L i e b e r m a n ha s e m p h a s i z e d th e i m p o r t a n c e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g Blackstone' s attitud e towar d legislation .

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 37 Blackstone, n o les s t h a n hi s grea t criti c B e n t h a m , pro p o u n d e d a theor y o f scientifi c legislation . Par t o f t h e p u r pose o f t h e Commentaries wa s t o sho w t o c o n t e m p o r a r y a n d future legislator s tha t t h e safes t p a t h t o legislativ e wisdo m led t o a n acceptanc e o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l principle s o f c o m m o n law : "Enablin g Englis h legislator s t o bette r in form themselve s o f t h e c o m m o n la w wa s t h u s m a d e ex plicit a s a centra l objectiv e fo r legislativ e scienc e i n En g l a n d . " 3 9 Despit e B e n t h a m ' s late r c a n a r d s t o t h e contrary , Blackstone possesse d a practica l theor y o f legislatio n tha t gave c o h e r e n c e t o t h e Commentaries: "I t wa s vita l t o exhibi t E n g l a n d ' s histori c syste m o f la w a s a genuinel y rationa l a n d coherentl y o r g a n i z e d syste m i n o r d e r f u r t h e r t o re veal t h e pas t d a m a g e tha t resulte d fro m u n i n f o r m e d legis lative modification s a n d i n o r d e r t o disclos e th e lega l s t r u c t u r e o n whic h responsibl e lawmakin g m i g h t i n f u t u r e o c c u r . " 4 0 Blackston e r e s p o n d e d t o t h e common-la w tradi tion tha t truste d judicia l legislatio n i n p r e f e r e n c e t o legis lative e n a c t m e n t . L i e b e r m a n ' s accoun t o f Blackston e o n the ar t a n d scienc e o f legislatio n serve s a s a usefu l b r i d g e that connect s wha t jurists hav e studie d profitabl y i n Black stone's c a r e e r wit h t h e issue s tha t historian s hav e f o u n d most interesting . Of al l t h e issue s historian s hav e studie d i n relatio n t Blackstone's j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e mos t significan t ha s b e e the m a n n e r i n whic h t h e Commentaries acte d a s a p r o p t justify existin g institutions , e n c o u r a g i n g a complacenc with c o n t e m p o r a r y societ y tha t discourage d r e f o r m . I this scenari o Blackstone' s wor k flattered th e mid-eigh t e e n t h - c e n t u r y worl d a n d c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e self-satisfac tion tha t characterize d Englis h politica l a n d socia l atti

o n o y n -

38 Sir

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tudes a t tha t time . O n e e x a m p l e o f thi s familia r complain t against Blackston e c h a r g e d tha t "h e h a d b y hi s lecture s e n d e a r e d himsel f t o thos e wit h favor s t o besto w b y dis playing a spiri t o f subservienc e or , shoul d w e say , b y play ing u p t o t h e prejudice s o f thos e i n p o w e r . " 4 1 T h e origina l of thi s allegatio n cam e fro m B e n t h a m a s earl y a s 177 6 w h e n h e calle d Blackston e "Mr . Ever y t h i n g a s i t shoul d be." 4 2 C h r o u s t a r g u e d a s wel l t h a t Blackstone' s "sol e aim " in t h e Commentaries wa s t o prais e constitutiona l a r r a n g e m e n t s t o a societ y p r e d i s p o s e d t o accep t hi s flattering reflections. 4 3 A n o t h e r vie w o n Blackstone' s p u r p o r t e d goal wa s tha t hi s boo k wa s "th e p r o d u c t o f a m a n w h o believed i n certai n socia l a n d m o r a l values , a n d w h o em ployed al l t h e idea s h e f o u n d a r o u n d him , t o convinc e himself a n d t o p e r s u a d e hi s r e a d e r s tha t Englis h law , em b o d y i n g thos e values , wa s entitle d t o r e v e r e n c e a n d sup p o r t . " 4 4 T h i s view , r e d o l e n t o f B e n t h a m ' s origina l criti cism, ha s n o t r e t a i n e d t h e s u p p o r t o f s u b s e q u e n t critic s who hav e rejecte d i t a s simplistic . A m o r e sophisticate d repetitio n o f thi s attac k o n Black stone ha s c o m e fro m D u n c a n K e n n e d y , a majo r figure i n t h e scholarl y m o v e m e n t k n o w n a s critica l lega l studies . T h i s divers e schoo l o f lega l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n has , lik e earlie r a p p r o a c h e s suc h a s sociologica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d real ism, s o u g h t t o increas e th e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f la w a n d lega l structures t h r o u g h utilizatio n o f o t h e r disciplines : t o vie w t h e la w fro m outsid e t h e lega l c u l t u r e a s wel l a s fro m t h e inside. I n hi s length y examinatio n o f t h e Commentaries, therefore, K e n n e d y stresse d certai n feature s t h a t sup p o r t e d t h e statu s q u o . Fo r example , t h e Commentaries served "a s a relativel y eas y objec t fo r t h e m e t h o d o f dis -

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 39 covering h i d d e n politica l intention s b e n e a t h t h e surfac e of lega l exposition." 4 5 Blackston e justifie d t h e h e g e m o n i c activity o f t h e stat e becaus e "th e lega l t h o u g h t denie s o r mediates wit h a bia s t o w a r d t h e existin g socia l o r economi c o r d e r . I t assert s t h a t w e hav e o v e r c o m e t h e f u n d a m e n t a l contradiction t h r o u g h o u r existin g practices." 4 6 A n d finally K e n n e d y c o n c l u d e d : " H e [Blackstone ] h a d accom plished t h e tas k o f legitimation , i n t h e fac e o f t h e clai m that t h e institutiona l syste m wa s i n c o h e r e n t , b y d e m o n strating t h a t t h e r e wa s n o contradictio n i n t h e existenc e o f s e p a r a t e court s o f la w a n d equity." 4 7 K e n n e d y ' s stud y has gaine d acclai m a s a showpiec e o f critica l lega l studie s m e t h o d o l o g y , a n d a s such , ha s reasserte d t h e c u s t o m a r y p o r t r a i t o f Blackston e a s a n apologis t fo r t h e societ y i n which h e lived . T w o issue s affec t thi s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Blackston e a n d his a t t i t u d e towar d hi s ow n society . H . L . A . H a r t a g r e e d that t h e n a t u r a l la w j u r i s p r u d e n ce o f Blackston e resulte d in a n uncritica l acceptanc e o f lega l institution s becaus e i t stifled criticis m o f existin g law. 4 8 Agains t thi s view , how ever, m u c h evidenc e t o t h e c o n t r a r y ma y b e p r e s e n t e d . While Blackston e certainl y di d accep t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l validity o f t h e lega l institution s wit h whic h h e wa s familiar , this di d n o t m e a n tha t h e accepte d t h e e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e without reservations . Blackston e possesse d a r e v e r e n c e fo r t h e Englis h constitution , fo r i t e m b o d i e d b o t h t h e antiq uity o f t h e la w a n d t h e continuit y o f constitutiona l experi ence. Fo r e x a m p l e , Blackston e q u e s t i o n e d t h e e x t e n t t o which t h e d e a t h penalt y p e r m e a t e d t h e crimina l c o d e o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d suggeste d tha t it s allege d de t e r r e n t effec t h a d n o justification i n reality. 4 9 O n a n o t h e r

40 Sir

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topic Blackston e criticize d th e g a m e laws , a majo r c o r n e r stone o f t h e aristocrati c privilege s tha t Blackston e ostensi bly s o u g h t t o protect. 5 0 Blackston e als o criticize d som e elements o f t h e politica l system , a l t h o u g h wit h "restraine d censure," a s J. C . D . Clar k ha s written , callin g fo r c h a n g e s in th e electora l process , a n d o p p o s i n g lenienc y t h r o u g h i n d e m n i t y act s towar d religiou s dissenters. 5 1 O n e a r g u m e n t ha s asserte d t h a t Blackston e " p r o m o t e d r e f o r m b y rescuing t h e c o m m o n la w fro m ancien t Lati n roll s a n d r e p o r t s a n d b y e x p o s i n g i t i n compac t r e a d a b l e for m t o the vie w o f d e f e n d e r s a n d r e f o r m e r s alike." 5 2 W h e t h e r i n s u p p o r t o f o r oppositio n t o t h e institution s o f hi s day , Blackstone ca n h a r d l y b e t e r m e d complacent . Finally , i n less significan t areas , a s i n hi s wor k fo r O x f o r d Universit y Press, Blackston e p r o v e d himsel f a n a d e p t r e f o r m e r , re vealing a m a n o f practica l busines s sens e wit h n o h i n t o f blind acceptanc e o f t h e statu s q u o . 5 3 T h u s t h e imag e o f a Blackstone w h o symbolize d a n uncritica l optimis m a b o u t his ow n e r a ha s c o m e u n d e r fire fro m severa l directions . T h e h e g e m o n i c Blackston e sketche d b y K e n n e d y raise s t h e o t h e r majo r issu e a b o u t t h e jurist's attitud e towar d hi s own era . Historian s woul d b e scandalized , fo r e x a m p l e , a t how littl e historica l contex t K e n n e d y a d d u c e d i n s u p p o r t of hi s contentions . T h i s failin g wa s trul y ironi c becaus e the critica l lega l studie s m o v e m e n t ha s e m p h a s i z e d a t great lengt h t h e d e g r e e t o whic h t h e la w m u s t b e studie d in it s historica l setting . N e i t h e r politic s n o r socia l s t r u c t u r e was considere d i n an y detai l b y K e n n e d y ; i n d e e d i t m i g h t be a r g u e d t h a t K e n n e d y ' s wor k neatl y illustrate s exactl y those e r r o r s tha t h e s o u g h t t o c o u n t e r . N o r di d K e n n e d y consider t h e circumstance s o f Blackstone' s persona l his -

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 41 tory i n s u p p o r t o f hi s a r g u m e n t . T h i s mos t r e c e n t a t t e m p t to sustai n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Blackston e a s a legalisti c c a m p followe r ha s b e e n t e r m e d a n "astonishin g e r r o r " a n d fa r to o simplisti c i n it s searc h fo r ideologica l motiva tion: "Lega l structures , includin g t h e s t r u c t u r e o f lega l treatises, hav e a s t r o n g cultura l c o m p o n e n t whic h ca n b e u n c o v e r e d onl y b y historica l e x a m i n a t i o n . " 5 4 I n addition , J . W . Cairn s ha s m a d e t h e p o i n t t h a t th e Commentaries "may ove r al l hav e h a d t h e effec t o f legitimatin g t h e com m o n la w i n t h e wa y K e n n e d y suggests ; b u t i t doe s n o t seem t o m e tha t i t necessaril y follow s tha t Blackston e intended t h e m t o hav e t h a t effec t a n d tha t h e chos e hi s organizational schem e wit h tha t e n d i n view." 5 5 K e n n e d y has suffere d m o r t a l criticism s o f hi s p r i m a r y thesis , a ne w version o f t h e o l d e r vie w tha t Blackston e wa s littl e m o r e t h a n a n apologis t fo r wha t h e kne w best. 5 6 Blackstone' s work doe s not , ala s fo r t h e m o d e r n historian , fit neatl y into classification s suc h a s ol d Whig , ne w T o r y , o r hege monist, t h e usua l categorie s int o whic h scholar s tr y t o force it . Directly relate d t o t h e issu e o f Blackstone' s conserva tism wa s hi s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f histor y itself . Hi s g r a s p o f t h e pas t wa s imperfec t t o sa y t h e least , a n d b o t h a d m i r e r s a n d critic s hav e f o u n d i t eas y t o cit e e x a m p l e s w h e r e Blackstone c a m e t o e r r o n e o u s conclusion s wit h seriou s consequences. T h e connectio n betwee n Blackstone' s be liefs a b o u t histor y a n d establishe d institution s wa s e x a m ined i n a scholarl y e x c h a n g e tha t focuse d o n hi s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t e r m "feudal " a n d it s connectio n t o t h e constitutional positio n o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y aristoc racy. T h i s a p p a r e n t l y a r c a n e subjec t h a d b r o a d e r implica -

42 Sir

William Blacks tone

tions fo r t h e d e b a t e a b o u t Blackstone' s intentions . R o b e r t Willman c o n t e n d e d tha t Blackstone' s historica l descrip tion o f feuda l societ y w o r k e d a s a rationalizatio n fo r t h e preservation o f t h e aristocracy' s constitutiona l rol e i n t h e 1760s. 57 Cairn s a r g u e d i n rebutta l tha t Blackstone' s com m i t m e n t t o t h e c o m m o n la w a s a fundamentall y Englis h legal syste m wa s complet e a n d tha t "Blackstone' s accoun t of t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f feudalis m a n d it s relationshi p t o t h e ancient constitutio n ha s littl e i f a n y t h i n g t o d o wit h a desire t o stres s t h e continuit y o f Englis h la w i n o r d e r t o protect t h e positio n o f t h e aristocracy." 5 8 T h e resul t o f this otherwis e m i n o r disput e h e l p e d clarif y t h e i m p o r tance o f Blackstone' s historica l visio n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of hi s j u r i s p r u d e n ce a n d wha t h e i n t e n d e d t o accomplis h by hi s lega l writings . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e Commentaries r e q u i r e s explanatio n in historica l contex t i n o r d e r t o a p p r e c i a t e Blackstone' s intellectual a p p r o a c h . Blackston e wa s a n institutiona l writer w h o s o u g h t t o m a k e th e la w accessibl e t o t h e e d u cated classes. 59 B e g i n n i n g wit h J u s t i n i a n , lega l analysi s h a d c o n c e n t r a t e d o n classificatio n t o b r i n g o r d e r t o lega l systems tha t b e c a m e eve r m o r e c o m p l e x a n d detailed . Blackstone accepte d thi s task , whic h wa s complicate d b y t h e e m e r g e n c e o f natio n state s i n E u r o p e tha t d e m a n d e d some rational e fo r nationa l a u t o n o m y t h r o u g h u n i q u e le gal institutions. 6 0 Hi s expositio n o f t h e c o m m o n la w a s the u n i q u e la w o f t h e Englis h p e o p l e wa s "typica l o f t h e institutional g e n r e o f lega l literature." 6 1 T h e institutiona l a p p r o a c h t o t h e c o m m o n la w p e r m i t t e d Blackston e t o a r r a n g e hi s lega l material s i n t h e for m h e believe d mos t conducive t o t h e genera l a u d i e n c e h e sought .

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 43 Blackstone too k a s hi s p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e t h e notio n o f prescriptive rights , wit h e m p h a s i s o n thos e right s t h a t h e believed derive d thei r validit y fro m continuit y wit h Anglo Saxon society . I n hi s historica l outloo k Blackston e sub scribed t o t h e theor y o f t h e N o r m a n Yoke , whic h hel d that origina l Anglo-Saxo n fre e institution s h a d falle n u n d e r t h e contro l o f N o r m a n feudalis m a t t h e tim e o f t h e C o n q u e s t . I n t e r v e n i n g centurie s h a d b r o u g h t t h e g r a d u a l e m a n c i p a t i o n o f Anglo-Saxo n la w fro m N o r m a n c o r r u p tion. 6 2 Constitutiona l histor y h a d c o m p r i s e d primaril y t h e struggle t o restor e t h e ancien t libertie s tha t t h e N o r m a n C o n q u e s t h a d e r o d e d . N o d o u b t hi s r e a d e r s f o u n d thi s version o f constitutiona l histor y congenial , a n d i t help s t o account fo r t h e sycophanti c r e p u t a t i o n tha t ha s d o g g e d h i m : "Blackston e a r g u e d i n effec t t h a t tim e a n d t h e p r o cesses o f histor y a r e t h e onl y test s o f t r u e utility , a n d h e believed tha t tim e a n d histor y h a d give n t o t h e Englis h c o m m o n law , a s lon g befor e i t h a d give n t o R o m a n law , a p r o m i n e n t positio n i n vie w o f it s p e r m a n e n t l y utilitaria n a n d easil y adjustabl e c h a r a c t e r . " 6 3 T h u s t h e institutiona l perspective, u n d e r s t o o d i n it s p r o p e r setting , fostere d a n attitude o f complaisanc e tha t critic s hav e f o u n d infuriat ing: "I t i s w o r th n o t i n g t h a t institutiona l writer s i n g e n e r a l d o n o t see k t o criticiz e a n d t o sugges t r e f o r m s i n t h e la w they e x p o u n d . T h e i r significanc e lie s i n thei r e x p o u n d i n g a whol e syste m o f la w a s a unifie d nationa l law . I n thi s Blackstone i s n o different." 6 4 T h e rescu e o f t h e c o m m o n law fro m medieva l obscurit y i n o r d e r t o explai n it s vitalit y a n d meri t t o a n e d u c a t e d a u d i e n c e i n a universit y settin g vindicated t h e institutiona l a p p r o a c h becaus e i t alon e gav e to Blackston e t h e material s fo r success .

44 Sir

William Blackstone

A n o t h e r featur e o f Blackstone' s wor k wa s it s s t r o n g academic e l e m e n t . Blackston e h a d gaine d t h e clarit y o f organization tha t distinguishe d t h e Commentaries b y refin ing i t t h r o u g h successiv e lectur e series . T h e novelt y o f lectures o n Englis h la w a t O x f o r d m u s t b e stressed , fo r only civi l la w h a d h i t h e r t o b e e n d e e m e d worth y o f aca demic study . I n n o v a t i o n m a r k e d t h e plan s Blackston e de vised t o reac h t h e e d u c a t e d publi c a s wel l a s t o m a k e English la w a suitabl e subjec t fo r universit y teaching . In d e e d Blackston e calle d himsel f a n "academica l ex p o u n d e r , " a n d t h e essentiall y academi c t o n e o f t h e Commentaries ha s a d d e d t o th e confusio n i n it s assessments. 6 5 T h e stud y o f t h e c o m m o n law , Blackston e state d i n hi s i n a u g u r a l lecture , wa s " p r o p e r l y a n d regularl y academi cal." 6 6 T h e ai m o f t h e lecture s wa s "t o se t fort h a system atic expositio n o f Englis h la w fo r teachin g p u r p o s e s . " 6 7 Reform o f t h e c o m m o n la w coul d occu r onl y w h e n tha t law wa s accessible ; o n e coul d no t r e f o r m t h e u n k n o w n . T h e offerin g o f la w a s a subjec t a t th e universitie s woul d aid r e c r u i t m e n t o f sociall y correc t candidate s fo r t h e la w because Blackston e woul d maintai n it s socia l integrit y b y m a k i n g a universit y educatio n a prerequisite : " T h e Stud y of la w a t t h e universitie s woul d recrui t t h e righ t p e o p l e for th e B a r . " 6 8 A t t h e leve l o f bot h t h e universit y a n d t h e nation , Blackston e a t t e m p t e d t o dea l wit h practica l problems. Hi s targe t a u d i e n c e existe d outsid e a s wel l a s inside t h e universit y environs , a n d i t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g tha t his conclusion s hav e excite d suc h disparat e reactions . T h e final issu e tha t historian s d e b a t e a n d t o whic h Blackstone's Commentaries hav e som e relevanc e i s th e char acterization o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y itself . Afte r decade s

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 45 of s l u m b e r i n g i n N a m i e r i t e peace , a n d frequentl y de scribed a s devoi d o f excitin g politica l a n d constitutiona l d e v e l o p m e n t s especiall y afte r t h e upheaval s o f t h e seven t e e n t h century , t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y ha s b e c o m e t h e c e n t e r o f r e n e w e d interest , s p a r k e d primaril y b y t h e con troversial these s o f J . C . D . Clark. 6 9 Whil e hi s conclusion s have t o u c h e d m a n y differen t issues , p e r h a p s t h e mos t f u n d a m e n t a l alteratio n t h a t Clar k p r o p o s e d wa s hi s insis tence u p o n continuit y r a t h e r t h a n c h a n g e i n t h e p e r i o d from t h e Gloriou s Revolutio n t o t h e passag e o f t h e firs t r e f o r m act . Clar k se t fort h a serie s o f a r g u m e n t s a t o d d s with t h e prevailin g convention s tha t characterize d histori cal researc h o n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y : "M y ai m t h r o u g h o u t ha s bee n t o re-integrat e religio n int o a n historica l vision whic h ha s b e e n almos t wholl y positivist ; t o discar d economic r e d u c t i o n i s m ; t o e m p h a s i z e t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f politics i n socia l history ; a n d t o a r g u e agains t t h e familia r picture o f e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E n g l a n d a s t h e er a o f b o u r geois individualis m b y showin g t h e persistenc e o f t h e an cien r e g i m e unti l 1828—32 , a n d t h e a u t o n o m o u s i m p o r tance o f religio n a n d politic s i n it s final d e m i s e . " 7 0 Suc h familiar l a n d m a r k s a s 176 0 a s t h e star t o f " m o d e r n " Brit ain a n d t h e industria l revolutio n hav e falle n victi m t o Clark's witty , provocativ e style . Hi s attack s o n traditiona l schools o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d thei r conclusion s t h o u g h t m o r e o r les s sacrosanc t a g e n e r a t i o n ag o hav e r e o p e n e d evaluation o f o l d e r issues . Hi s iconoclasti c view s hav e d r a w n substantia l criticism , t o whic h Clar k ha s replie d forcefully. 7 1 W h a t doe s t h e lif e a n d wor k o f Blackston e contribute , if anything , t o thi s controvers y a b o u t revisionis m i n t h e

46 Sir

William Blackstone

history o f H a n o v e r i a n E n g l a n d ? Blackstone , o f course , did n o t pla y a majo r rol e i n politics , s o evidenc e c o n n e c t e d to hi m coul d n o t b e decisive . However , Blackstone' s lac k of sympath y fo r al l non-Anglican s lend s s u p p o r t t o Clark' s emphasis o n t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f religio n i n dail y life . Black stone's essentia l a p p r o v a l o f existin g institution s a n d t h e t r e n d s o f constitutiona l g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t als o len d indi rect s u p p o r t t o Clark' s a r g u m e n t s . B u t Blackstone' s cri tique o f som e existin g lega l a r r a n g e m e n t s showe d t h a t hi s optimism h a d limits , a n d tha t r e f o r m m u s t prevai l ove r continuity o n certai n issues . Blackston e als o e n d o r s e d quickly thos e decision s b y Chie f Justic e Mansfiel d tha t c h a n g e d s o m e aspect s o f t h e la w betwee n 175 6 a n d 178 8 a n d i n t h e proces s p r o v i d e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n s fo r t h e m o d e r n b r a n c h e s o f la w suc h a s tort s a n d contracts : "Black stone, t h e s u p p o s e d d e f e n d e r o f al l accepte d lega l tradi tion, almos t immediatel y u p o n thei r a p p e a r a n c e a n d eve n after h e h a d p r e p a r e d hi s origina l lectures , i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e m int o hi s C o m m e n t a r i e s . " 7 2 I n t h e e n d , ironically , Blackstone's mos t i m p o r t a n t rol e wa s probabl y a s foi l fo r J e r e m y B e n t h a m , w h o wa s trul y dedicate d t o t h e transfor mation o f Englis h society : "I f t h e r e wa s t o b e r e f o r m a t all, a statemen t o f t h e actua l positio n o f t h e la w wa s essen tial; a n d i t i s a m u s i n g t o realiz e tha t B e n t h a m secure d hi s first rea l glimps e o f t h e n e e d fo r r e f o r m fro m Blackstone' s lectures a n d Blackstone' s b o o k . " 7 3 Blackston e h e l p e d es tablish a p e r c e p t i o n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e tha t e n c o u r a g e d a c o m p r e h e n s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n o f society' s p r o b l e m s wit h a view towar d thei r r e m e d y . O n balance , i n brief , t h e en d u r i n g effec t o f t h e Commentaries le d i n t h e directio n o f change.

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 47 If, afte r 1707 , t h e Britis h natio n wa s invented , i n t h e a r g u m e n t o f L i n d a Colley, 7 4 t h e Commentaries playe d a role i n thi s proces s a s well . A l t h o u g h Colle y di d n o t focu s specifically o n t h e patrioti c p r i d e Britis h citizen s fel t fo r their constitutio n (indeed , n e i t h e r Blackston e n o r Ben t h a m figured i n h e r analysis) , t h e s t a t e m e n t o f constitu tional glor y b y Blackston e receive d suc h a p p r o v a l p r e cisely becaus e i t reinforce d a c c u m u l a t i n g idea s a b o u t national identity . T h e creatio n o f a unifie d lega l p e r c e p tion, c o m b i n e d wit h t h e diversit y o f lega l a r r a n g e m e n t s symbolized b y t h e continuit y o f t h e Scottis h lega l system , c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e proces s o f nationa l definition . I n thi s context, t h e r e f o r e , Blackston e j o i n e d a d y n a m i c intellec tual proces s a n d wa s n o t a n apologis t fo r t h e statu s q u o . By d r a w i n g u p o n t h e h e r i t a g e o f t h e Gloriou s Revolutio n a n d anticipatin g t h e glorificatio n o f th e constitutio n s o f r e q u e n t i n t h e Victoria n era , Blackston e occupie d a posi tion i n t h e histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e to o c o m p l e x to fit neatl y int o classificator y scheme s base d o n late r scholarly concerns . Given hi s dialectica l positio n i n respec t t o a j u r i s p r u dential tradition , Blackston e i n d e e d face d i n tw o direc tions. Hi s allusion s t o t h e n a t u r a l la w traditio n m a r k e d h i m a s t h e las t i n a l o n g lin e o f jurists t o d o s o befor e t h e ascendancy o f lega l positivism . I n a n o t h e r sense , however , Blackstone aide d i n t h e initiatio n o f a mos t i m p o r t a n t function o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e tha t stretche d fa r int o t h e fu ture. T h i s issu e c o n c e r n e d t h e a u d i e n c e fo r w h o m Black stone wrote . O n o n e h a n d , j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s no w consid e r e d a theoretica l aspec t o f t h e stud y o f law. 7 5 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y j u r i s p r u d e n c e wa s

48 Sir

William Blackstone

a m u c h b r o a d e r discipline , dealin g wit h al l element s o f society's problems ; i t di d no t focu s narrowl y u p o n specifi cally lega l issues . T h e Commentaries p r o v i d e d a b l u e p r i n t for bot h continuit y a n d c h a n g e ; thei r scop e wa s spacious , their a u d i e n c e wa s th e e d u c a t e d elite , a n d the y wer e de signed t o p r o v o k e discussion , a s the y di d s o successfully , for the y " o v e r s h a d o w e d al l o t h e r c o n t e m p o r a r y lega l writ ing." 7 6 A d a m Smit h wa s a n o t h e r intellectua l w h o recog nized t h e b r o a d rol e tha t j u r i s p r u d e n ce shoul d pla y i n t h e discussion o f publi c policy , a l t h o u g h politica l e c o n o m y eventually b e c a m e t h e n a m e fo r hi s b r a n d o f socia l investi gation. Blackstone' s effort s t o sustai n j u r i s p r u d e n ce a s t h e discipline o f publi c discours e wer e c r o w n e d wit h success , even i f m a n y o f hi s successor s dedicate d themselve s t o effacing hi s work . Even a s h e w o r k e d t o m a k e j u r i s p r u d e n c e a topi c fi t for publi c discussion , Blackston e a t t e m p t e d t o begi n a revolution i n lega l educatio n b y m a k i n g i t a p a r t o f univer sity e x p e r i e n c e . T h e Commentaries di d b e c o m e a stapl e o f this e n d e a v o r , b u t th e lega l educationa l structure , wit h responsibilities spli t betwee n t h e universitie s a n d t h e I n n s of C o u r t , r e m a i n e d th e same . I n thi s sens e Blackston e failed. Eventuall y h e resigne d t h e Vineria n chai r i n frus tration a t O x f o r d ' s failur e t o h e e d hi s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for change s i n t h e la w c u r r i c u l u m . 7 7 T h i s failur e wa s ben eficial t o t h e e x t e n t tha t i t di d no t sidetrac k j u r i s p r u d e n c e into th e restricte d a r e n a o f academi c debate . T h e plac e o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s t h e p r e f e r r e d m e d i u m o f publi c dis course, th e p r e m i e r socia l scienc e o f th e e i g h t e e n t h cen tury, wa s assured. 7 8 Blackston e c o n t r i b u t e d t o definin g the b o u n d a r i e s o f j u r i s p r u d e n t i al t h o u g h t fo r severa l gen -

The Intersection of Positivism and Natural Law Theory 49 erations; h e too k t h e t o r t u r e d maz e o f Englis h la w a n d t u r n e d i t int o a subjec t worth y o f genera l discussion , o n e that e x a m i n e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f societ y i n b r o a d fashion . In t h e d e c a d e s tha t followed , th e ide a tha t j u r i s p r u d e n c e p r o v i d e d t h e bes t vehicl e fo r socia l analysi s woul d entic e even Blackstone' s severes t critics . I n t h e histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , Blackstone' s positio n a s f o u n d e r of thi s traditio n wil l r e m a i n a n h o n o r e d one .

Chapter Three

Jeremy Bentham T h e Ligh t o f Utilit y

J e r e m y B e n t h a m too k g r e a t pain s t o e m p h a s i z e hi s differ ences wit h Blackstone . B e n t h a m p o r t r a y e d himsel f a s t h e great advocat e o f lega l positivis m i n oppositio n t o t h e n a t u r a l la w a s s u m p t i o n s o f Blackstone . H . L . A . H a r t ha s described t h e salien t trait s o f B e n t h a m ' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e that m a r k hi s radica l d e p a r t u r e fro m existin g traditions : His imperativ e theor y o f la w accordin g t o whic h law s ar e th e explicit o r taci t command s an d prohibitions , standardl y sup ported b y coerciv e sanctions , issue d b y a sovereig n legislato r o r legislative bod y o r thei r subordinates , an d th e permission s t o act o r refrai n fro m actin g issuin g fro m thes e sam e sources . Th e second o f thes e tw o mai n feature s o f Bentham' s though t i s hi s view tha t la w ha s n o necessar y o r conceptua l connectio n wit h 51

52 Jeremy

Bentham

morality, although , a s h e clearl y saw , ther e ar e man y importan t and ofte n comple x contingen t connection s betwee n them. 1 Until recentl y B e n t h a m ' s clai m t o hav e m a d e a s h a r p b r e a k wit h Blackston e ha s wo n wid e acceptance , a n d tha t fact, c o m b i n e d wit h B e n t h a m ' s ascendancy , wa s chiefl y responsible fo r consignin g Blackston e t o obscurity : "Ben t h a m ' s d e n u n c i a t i o n o f t h e Commentaries place d Black stone's a d m i r e r s o n t h e defensiv e eve r after." 2 N o d o u b t this o u t c o m e resulte d i n p a r t fro m B e n t h a m ' s master y of invective , a n d i n p a r t fro m t h e fac t tha t t h e elderl y Blackstone di d n o t deig n t o notic e t h e attack s o f a n u p start critic , m u c h les s repl y t o t h e m . Eve n t h e stronges t partisans o f B e n t h a m hav e c o n c e d e d tha t m u c h o f hi s criticism directe d a t Blackston e wa s misplaced , fo r "i t be came a sor t o f obsession , whic h cause d hi m t o d e s c e n d t o abuse whic h wa s u n w o r t h y o f h i m . " 3 I n spit e o f Ben t h a m ' s efforts , mos t historian s o f t h e relationshi p hav e acknowledged t h a t B e n t h a m , despit e hi s implacabl e hos tility, c o m b i n e d relentles s criticis m wit h passage s o f prais e that b e c a m e a s famou s a s som e o f hi s barbs . I f B e n t h a m t h o u g h t Blackston e t h e e n e m y whos e r e p u t a t i o n h e h a d to destroy , B e n t h a m als o c o n c e d e d tha t Blackston e h a d t a u g h t " J u r i s p r u d e n c e t o spea k t h e l a n g u a g e o f th e Scholar a n d t h e G e n t l e m a n . " 4 T h e question s tha t no w seem mos t a p p r o p r i a t e a b o u t t h e intellectua l relationshi p between t h e tw o m e n are : wha t wa s t h e substanc e o f Ben tham's objections , a n d , m o r e importantly , wer e B e n t h a m a n d Blackston e a s differen t i n lega l philosoph y a s Ben t h a m love d t o assert ? B e n t h a m wa s b o r n i n 174 8 int o a p r o s p e r o u s famil y

The Light of Utility 53 a n d earl y displaye d equa l m e a s u r e s o f intellectua l precoc ity a n d eccentricity . Hi s master y o f l a n g u a g e s a n d earl y academic excellenc e le d hi m t o matriculat e a t O x f o r d i n 1763 i n o r d e r t o stud y law , fo r hi s fathe r h a r b o r e d hig h h o p e s fo r hi s son' s succes s a t t h e bar . A s a n u n d e r g r a d u ate B e n t h a m listene d t o Blackstone' s lecture s p r i o r t o t h e publication o f t h e Commentaries a n d wa s no t i m p r e s s e d . B e n t h a m ' s incisiv e m i n d f o u n d Blackstone' s a r g u m e n t s misleading, illogical , a n d , worse , s o c o m p l a c e n t a b o u t t h e state o f t h e la w tha t t h e d e m a n d i n g tas k o f r e f o r m woul d be foreve r p o s t p o n e d . B e n t h a m m a d e la w t h e focu s o f hi s early studie s a n d eventuall y wa s calle d t o t h e b a r i n 1769 . As a practitione r B e n t h a m gaine d n o succes s a t all , settlin g o n e cas e o u t o f c o u r t a n d losin g a n o t h e r becaus e o f hi s ignorance o f a precedent ; th e experienc e m a d e hi m th e m o r e certai n tha t hi s talen t fo r t h e la w woul d b e bes t realized outsid e t h e c o u r t r o o m . 5 B e n t h a m n e v e r m a r r i e d , a n d a l t h o u g h ofte n s u r r o u n d e d b y friend s a n d a d m i r e r s , h e spen t mos t o f hi s lif e i n private , i f n o t i n seclusion . His g r e a t scheme s t o acquir e publi c influenc e lik e t h e P a n o p t i c o n fo r priso n r e f o r m c a m e t o n a u g h t , a n d h e never acquire d th e reputatio n i n Englan d h e sough t i n his lifetime . I n d e e d , B e n t h a m gaine d g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e a b r o a d , particularl y wit h r e f e r e n c e t o hi s scheme s fo r written constitution s a n d codification . Hi s c o m p r e h e n s i v e strategy fo r la w r e f o r m a t h o m e n e v e r c a m e t o fruition , a l t h o u g h significan t instance s o f la w r e f o r m di d originat e in hi s suggestions . I n Britai n a t leas t hi s greates t influence , such a s i t was , o c c u r r e d afte r hi s d e a t h i n 1832 , no t d u r i n g his lifetime . Previous consideration s o f B e n t h a m ' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e

54 Jeremy

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have c o n c e n t r a t e d o n fou r majo r work s a n d t h e histor y o f each shed s ligh t o n t h e n a t u r e o f B e n t h a m ' s contributions . B e n t h a m wrot e copiousl y t h r o u g h o u t hi s life , ye t mos t o f what h e p r o d u c e d r e m a i n e d u n p u b l i s h e d . F o r a n individ ual w h o s o u g h t a rol e i n t h e formulatio n o f publi c policy , B e n t h a m h a d t h e u n h a p p y habi t o f flitting fro m topi c t o topic, n e v e r quit e finishing hi s intellectua l projects . T o this da y a veritabl e B e n t h a m industr y ha s c o n t i n u e d t o m a k e ne w discoverie s a m o n g t h e m a n u s c r i p t s a t t h e Uni versity o f L o n d o n . T h e increase d e m p h a s i s o n a n d prais e fo r B e n t h a m ' s work a s a j u r i s t stand s i n contras t t o th e statu s o f hi s r e p u t a t i o n a m o n g historians . A s Marti n W e i n e r ha s sug gested pertinently , i t ha s b e c o m e a curiou s situatio n t h a t B e n t h a m ' s wor k ha s d r a w n increasin g criticis m fro m his torians, particularl y i n t h e wa y tha t B e n t h a m ' s scheme s constituted a n e x p a n s i o n o f stat e control. 6 T h e recen t explication, i n d e e d justification , o f B e n t h a m ' s P a n o p t i c o n scheme b y J a n et Semple , w h e n d u e r e g a r d i s g r a n t e d fo r t h e socia l a n d politica l assumption s o f a pas t age , stil l strikes t h e r e a d e r a s a scar y e x p e r i m e n t i n socia l engi n e e r i n g . 7 B e n t h a m value d benevolen t g o v e r n m e n t i n most case s m o r e highl y t h a n liberty , a n d s o hi s n a m e b e c a m e linke d t o t h e growt h o f g o v e r n m e n t i n t h e nine t e e n t h century . I f historian s hav e faile d t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e f u n d a m e n t a l n a t u r e o f B e n t h a m ' s contributio n t o m o d e r n English j u r i s p r u d e n c e, i t i s also t h e cas e tha t lega l philoso p h e r s hav e p o n d e r e d B e n t h a m ' s wor k wit h scan t r e g a r d for historica l context , a n d hav e writte n a b o u t hi s wor k a s if i t wer e devoi d o f socia l o r politica l consequences . F r o m a historica l perspective , o n e m i g h t questio n t h e

The Light of Utility 55 influence o f B e n t h a m w h e n m a n y o f hi s idea s n e v e r wer e exposed t o publi c scrutiny . T h e publicatio n o f ne w stud ies, base d primaril y o n previousl y u n p u b l i s h e d B e n t h a m manuscripts, ha s n o t materiall y t r a n s f o r m e d t h e outline s of hi s lif e a n d work . T h e s e work s have , a t best , h e l p e d sor t o u t t h e c h r o n o l o g y a n d intellectua l linkage s i n B e n t h a m ' s juristic excursions . Scholarl y r u m m a g i n g i n t h e atti c o f B e n t h a m ' s intellec t ma y h e l p i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f hi s ideas b u t c a n n o t ai d i n t h e evaluatio n o f w h e t h e r the y m a t t e r e d i n hi s ow n day . T h e paradoxica l behavio r o f B e n t h a m , a p e r s o n w h o h u n g e r e d fo r publi c acclai m b u t would n o t e n t e r int o publi c discourse , ha s r e m a i n e d j u s t o n e o f t h e m a n y quirk s o f hi s lif e b e y o n d satisfactor y explanation. B e n t h a m firs t attacke d Blackston e i n 177 6 i n A Fragment on Government, whic h h e publishe d anonymously . B e n t h a m describe d t h e publi c receptio n o f thi s initia l es say a s highl y favorable , eve n writin g i n a n 182 8 tex t tha t t h e Fragment h a d cause d a "sensation, " ye t t h e Commentaries went t h r o u g h editio n afte r edition , whil e A Fragment on Government di d n o t reac h a secon d editio n unti l forty seven year s later , i n 1823 . T h i s circumstanc e indicate d clearly tha t t h e d e m a n d fo r B e n t h a m ' s criticis m o f Black stone wa s n o t exactl y o v e r p o w e r i n g . M u c h o f t h e waspis h t o n e i n t h e Fragment ma y b e a t t r i b u t e d t o B e n t h a m ' s y o u t h a n d t h e desir e fo r notoriet y i n attackin g a m o r e famou s figure. I n t h e p e r i o d 1 7 7 4 - 7 6 B e n t h a m w o r k e d o n a n additional critiqu e o f Blackstone , A Comment on the Commentaries, whic h wa s i n fac t n e v e r publishe d i n hi s lifetim e because h e a p p a r e n t l y wishe d t o m o v e awa y fro m th e essentially negativ e tas k o f criticizin g Blackston e towar d

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the m o r e positiv e goa l o f constructin g a j u r i s p r u d e n ce o f his own . I n 178 2 B e n t h a m c o m p l e t e d a wor k no w k n o w n as Of Laws in General, b u t thi s to o r e m a i n e d u n p u b l i s h e d . Not unti l 178 9 di d B e n t h a m actuall y offe r t o t h e publi c the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. B e n t h a m m o v e d t o o t h e r projects , a n d th e c o m p r e h e n s i v e statement o f hi s j u r i s p r u d e n ce r e m a i n e d unfinishe d a t hi s d e a t h decade s later . O f th e B e n t h a m i t e canon , t h e r e f o r e , only tw o o f th e majo r work s o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e eve r ap p e a r e d i n hi s lifetime , a n d o n e wa s publishe d anony mously. T h e s e tw o h a d limite d succes s a t best. 8 T h e o t h e r two work s ca n hav e exercise d n o c o n t e m p o r a r y influence , for the y wer e n o t publishe d unti l t h e twentiet h century . T h e i n d i c t m e n t B e n t h a m b r o u g h t agains t Blackston e has r e s o n a t e d ove r t h e las t tw o centuries . A typica l verdic t c o n c l u d e d tha t B e n t h a m h a d e x p o s e d t h e "disma l defi ciencies a n d s h o d d y p e r f o r m a n c e " o f Blackston e i n t h e Commentaries.9 I n A Fragment on Government B e n t h a m p r e sented t h e essential s o f wha t h e f o u n d objectionabl e i n Blackstone's analysi s o f law . O n e majo r issu e wa s Black stone's attitud e t o w a r d la w r e f o r m , whic h B e n t h a m de scribed a s "obsequiou s quietism, " b u t which , a s discusse d in th e las t c h a p t e r , di d no t accor d wit h Blackstone' s t r u e ideas i n som e areas. 1 0 B e n t h a m accuse d Blackston e o f linguistic imprecisio n becaus e t h e C o m m e n t a t o r use d allu sion a n d m e t a p h o r t o p o r t r a y t h e law , wherea s B e n t h a m asserted tha t onl y t h e l a n g u a g e o f scienc e coul d succee d as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f lega l analysis . Blackston e wrot e ap provingly o f lega l fictions, b u t B e n t h a m a r g u e d tha t thei r usefulness t o t h e la w h a d lon g d i s a p p e a r e d , a n d the y wer e now a n " e n c r o a c h m e n t o r i m p o s t u r e . " 1 1 W h e r e Black -

The Light of Utility 57 stone favore d judicia l legislatio n a s t h e stronges t charac teristic o f t h e c o m m o n law , B e n t h a m r e g a r d e d thi s a s a n u s u r p a t i o n o f t h e legislativ e functio n a n d a c h a r a d e o r "miserable sophistry." 1 2 O n thi s issu e a recen t assessmen t has c o n c l u d e d : " B e n t h a m ' s hostilit y t o Blackston e seem s to hav e b e e n r o o t e d les s i n d i s a g r e e m e n t s ove r substantiv e policies t h a n i n Blackstone' s forensicall y effectiv e defens e of a gradualis t a p p r o a c h t o lega l r e f o r m tha t p r e f e r r e d c o m m o n la w interstitia l lawmakin g t o sweepin g statutor y c h a n g e a n d tha t e m p h a s i z e d bot h t h e capacit y o f t h e com m o n la w t o r e f o r m a n d t h e hig h incidenc e o f legislativ e miscarriage." 1 3 Finally , B e n t h a m d e n o u n c e d Blackstone' s assertion o f a natural-right s t h e o r y (convenientl y over looking thos e passage s w h e r e Blackston e h a d articulate d a positivist a r g u m e n t ) a n d eventuall y delivere d t h e m e m o rable j i be tha t n a t u r a l la w theor y wa s " n o n s e n s e o n stilts. " I n conclusion , B e n t h a m wrot e t h a t Blackstone' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e yielde d n o t h i n g : ex nihilo nihil sequitur. 14 I n t e r m s o f intellectua l a p p r o a c h B e n t h a m di d every t h i n g possibl e t o stres s t h e difference s tha t divide d h i m from hi s q u a r r y . T h i s pos e ha s p r o v e d hollow , fo r Ben t h a m ' s a t t e m p t t o establis h hi s credential s a s a critica l j u rist involve d semanti c trick s o f t h e variet y h e a t t r i b u t e d t o Blackstone. B y e x a g g e r a t i n g t h e d i s a g r e e m e n t betwee n t h e m a n d c o n c e n t r a t i n g hi s attack s primaril y o n severa l pages o f Blackstone' s i n t r o d u c t i o n , B e n t h a m b e c a m e a formidable antagonis t b y t h e kee n focu s h e b r o u g h t t o hi s rhetoric. I n t h e process , however , h e i g n o r e d Blackstone' s stated p u r p o s e o f teachin g t h e law : " T h u s m a n y o f Ben t h a m ' s arrow s mis s thei r m a r k . " 1 5 W h e n al l t h e polemica l fireworks wer e over , a n d a s scholar s hav e scrutinize d t h e

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claims o f B e n t h a m m o r e carefully , t h e similaritie s o f t h e two jurists clai m t h e attentio n o f posterit y m o r e t h a n thei r differences. A s L i e b e r m a n ha s c o n c l u d e d , B e n t h a m effec tively distorte d th e t r u t h w h e n h e p o r t r a y e d himsel f a s a solitary r e f o r m e r "i n a lega l settin g o f e n t r e n c h e d compla cency, insularit y a n d obsequiousness." 1 6 B e n t h a m u s e d Blackstone a s a foi l t o stres s t h e ( u n t r u e ) innovation s o f his ow n work . B e n t h a m , i n fact , di d n o t stan d alon e a s a critic o f a n e n t r e n c h e d establishmen t excep t i n hi s ow n m i n d . Despit e B e n t h a m ' s protestation s t o t h e contrary , t h e tw o a u t h o r s h a d m o r e i n c o m m o n t h a n t h e surfac e disparities B e n t h a m trie d s o h a r d t o suggest . T h e issue s tha t p r o m p t thi s conclusio n a r e m a n y . Ben tham's r e p u t a t i o n a s a r e f o r m e r m u s t b e carefull y quali fied, fo r h e rarel y j o i n e d i n publi c d e b a t e a n d hi s politi cally radica l view s r e m a i n e d largel y a m a t t e r o f privat e belief. B e n t h a m displaye d a hesitanc y (o r p e r h a p s coward ice) a b o u t t h e expressio n o f hi s view s tha t belie d t h e no tion o f a n o u t s p o k e n advocat e fo r c h a n g e . I f a s a n g u i n e view o f hi s ow n da y wa s t h e criterion , t h e n t h e fac t t h a t B e n t h a m , n o t Blackstone , wrot e t h e followin g wa s note worthy: " I n e e d scarc e r e m i n d t h e r e a d e r ho w happil y thi s alternate stat e o f authority a n d submissio n i s exemplifie d a m o n g ourselves." 1 7 B e n t h a m ' s clai m tha t Blackston e be lieved i n t h e perfectio n o f t h e Britis h constitutio n wa s a d e b a t i n g poin t o f shee r invention. 1 8 B e n t h a m use d Black stone i n m a n y instance s a s a stra w m a n , a convenien t target fo r a y o u n g m a n anxiou s t o m a k e a n impression . P e r h a p s t h e mos t ludicrou s e x a m p l e o f B e n t h a m ' s cam paign t o m a k e a m a r k a t Blackstone' s e x p e n s e wa s hi s criticism o f t h e latter' s us e o f language . I n lin e wit h t h e

The Light of Utility 59 c o n c e r n s tha t hav e characterize d t h e t r i u m p h a n t linguisti c e m p h a s e s o f twentieth-centur y Englis h philosophy , som e scholars hav e praise d B e n t h a m fo r hi s attentio n t o t h e m e a n i n g o f l a n g u a g e . H a r t , fo r e x a m p l e , ha s writte n t h a t B e n t h a m "believe d t h a t t h e relatio n o f l a n g u a g e a n d s o of t h o u g h t t o t h e worl d i s radicall y m i s u n d e r s t o o d i f w e conceive o f sentence s a s c o m p o u n d e d o u t o f w o r d s whic h simply n a m e o r stan d fo r element s o f realit y a n d t h u s as h a v i n g m e a n i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f sententia l f o r m s . " 1 9 B e n t h a m u n d e r s t o o d tha t m a n y difficultie s o f analysi s s t e m m e d fro m l a n g u a g e barriers , particularl y i n t h e ar chaic l a n g u a g e o f t h e law . L a n g u a g e h a d t h e capacit y t o elucidate o r mislead , a n d B e n t h a m t h o u g h t i t necessar y t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e relationshi p a m o n g language , t h e rea l world, a n d h u m a n beliefs. 2 0 L a n g u a g e , lik e t h e law , live d by fictions, a n d B e n t h a m r e g a r d e d p a r t o f hi s missio n t o r e m o v e t h e distortion s o f l a n g u a g e b y cleansin g imprecis e usages fro m t h e provinc e o f t h e law : "Hi s p o i n t i s tha t a t r u e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f thes e idea s [duty , power , etc. ] in volves g r a s p i n g t h e m a s a kin d o f linguisti c s h o r t h a n d fo r entities a n d p h e n o m e n a whic h hav e a concret e exis tence." 2 1 B e n t h a m ' s c o n c e r n fo r l a n g u a g e ma y b e readil y c o n c e d e d ; t h e issu e r e m a i n s w h e t h e r desig n eve r b e c a m e reality i n B e n t h a m ' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e. "I f clarit y i n l a n g u a g e was t h e ke y t o t h e p r o g r e s s o f science, " i t ha s b e e n a r g u e d , " t h e n i t wa s i n c u m b e n t u p o n B e n t h a m t o sugges t way s i n which it s terminolog y m i g h t b e i m p r o v e d . " 2 2 B e n t h a m may hav e u n d e r s t o o d t h e p r o b l e m , b u t h e certainl y di d not suppl y t h e answer . T h e linkin g o f B e n t h a m t o clarit y o f l a n g u a g e r e m a i n s a ba d j o ke t o scholars . B e n t h a m invente d hi s ow n vocabu -

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lary, n e v e r s p a r e d a n extr a clause , a n d i n genera l wrot e i n a styl e s o d e n s e tha t i t i s stil l s o m e t h i n g o f a miracl e that anybod y m a k e s a n y t h i n g o f hi s n i g h t m a r i s h prose . A sympathetic criti c ha s written : " B e n t h a m ma y n o t b e t h e clearest writer , a n d i n hi s desir e t o creat e a ne w scienc e o f morals h e coul d multipl y ne w w o r d s a n d categorie s i n a way ver y difficul t t o follow." 2 3 T h i s excuse s B e n t h a m to o easily, fo r h e p r o m i s e d h e woul d r e m e d y t h e l a n g u a g e p r o b l e m . B e n t h a m ' s abus e o f t h e Englis h l a n g u a g e make s him p e r h a p s t h e mos t f o r b i d d i n g a u t h o r i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h century. H e eventuall y decide d tha t convolute d sentenc e s t r u c t u r e woul d i m p r o v e clarity , t h a t sentence s shoul d contain onl y o n e majo r idea , a n d tha t qualifyin g clause s should r e p e a t t h a t ide a ove r a n d ove r again. 2 4 T h e mos t succinct, a n d d a m n i n g , accoun t o f B e n t h a m ' s styl e ha s called i t "prolix , repetitive , ful l o f obscur e device s a n d conceits o f style , a n d t h e a r g u m e n t s a r e m a d e needlessl y difficult b y a superfluit y o f s u b o r d i n a t e clause s a n d nu m e r o u s inversions." 2 5 Eve n a n a d m i r e r suc h a s Sempl e t e r m e d part s o f B e n t h a m ' s writing s "repetitions , slovenly , a n d verbose ; a t time s the y d e s c e n d int o t u r g i d circumlo cutions tha t def y m e a n i n g . " 2 6 I n sum , therefore , fo r Ben t h a m t o complai n a b o u t Blackstone' s styl e a m o u n t e d t o a c o m m o n for m o f intellectua l hypocrisy . O t h e r instance s o f B e n t h a m ' s capacit y fo r self-delusio n or hi s p e n c h a n t fo r e x a g g e r a t i n g hi s difference s wit h Blackstone exis t i n som e profusion . Fo r e x a m p l e , o n t h e question o f t h e sanctit y o f p r o p e r t y rights , B e n t h a m dis missed wit h c o n t e m p t Blackstone' s a r g u m e n t s fo r t h e nat ural righ t o f privat e p r o p e r t y : "Bu t wha t hi s utilitarianis m took awa y i n theory , i t gav e bac k i n practice , p r o v i d i n g

The Light of Utility 61 an extraordinaril y s t r o n g defens e o f privat e p r o p e r t y . " 2 7 Decades ag o Boorsti n c o n c l u d e d t h a t B e n t h a m , "despit e all hi s rigorousness , a n d despit e al l t h e criticis m o f t h e Commentaries, . . . p r e s u p p o s e d a schem e o f socia l value s a n d a concep t o f p r o p e r t y whic h wer e h a r d l y distinguish able fro m Blackstone's." 2 8 W h e t h e r Blackston e a r g u e d from n a t u r a l la w o r w h e t h e r B e n t h a m d e p e n d e d u p o n t h e principl e o f utility , t h e resul t wa s t h e same : a n accep tance o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h century' s e m p h a s i s o n p r o p e r t y a s a f u n d a m e n t a l pilla r o f t h e constitution . O n a n o t h e r topi c Davi d L i e b e r m a n ha s trace d i n pre cise detai l ho w B e n t h a m c a m e t o maturit y i n a n intellec tual a t m o s p h e r e tha t anticipate d hi s ow n conclusion s a b o u t t h e relativ e merit s o f statutor y versu s j u d g e - m a d e law. Hi s ow n p r e f e r e n c e fo r legislativ e s u p r e m a c y ove r t h e traditio n o f judicial decision s wa s clear , b u t h e wa s n o t alone i n thi s choice . B e n t h a m trie d consistentl y t o leav e t h e impressio n tha t onl y h e h a d devise d plan s fo r substan tial r e f o r m : " F r o m thi s perspective , no t t h e leas t o f Ben t h a m ' s c o u p s i n legislativ e t h e o r y wa s hi s succes s i n cov e r i n g hi s historica l t r a c k s — i n convincin g hi s followers , along wit h s o m a n y late r c o m m e n t a t o r s . " 2 9 I n thi s vie w B e n t h a m o p e r a t e d i n a n intellectua l milie u s o latitudinar ian tha t hi s late r claim s fo r originalit y c a n n o t b e substanti ated. B e n t h a m wa s n e v e r t h e lon e voic e i n t h e wildernes s that f o r m e d a majo r p a r t o f hi s self-proclaime d image . O n politica l issue s B e n t h a m a n d Blackston e s h a r e d po sitions tha t belie d B e n t h a m ' s claim s o f thei r u n a l t e r a b l opposition. O n o n e subjec t t h e tw o jurist s a g r e e d whole h e a r t e d l y — t h e i r oppositio n t o A m e r i c a n i n d e p e n d e n c e I n d e e d , B e n t h a m t h o u g h t Blackston e wa s d a n g e r o u s be

e . -

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cause hi s idea s h a d h e l p e d f o m e n t seditio n i n N o r t h America. 3 0 B e n t h a m ' s appraisa l o f Blackston e a s a politi cal radica l stoo d i n surprisin g contras t t o hi s usua l depic tion o f t h e C o m m e n t a t o r a s hopelessl y m i r e d i n t h e opti mism B e n t h a m detested . Finally , a conclusio n tha t B e n t h a m woul d n o d o u b t hav e h a t e d i n vie w o f hi s imag e of himsel f a s a radical : " B e n t h a m i t e r e f o r m wa s saf e fro m t h e viewpoin t o f t h e establishment . T h e maste r h a d h a d n o truc k wit h n a t u r a l rights . T h e r e wer e n o right s o f m a n outside t h e law . B e n t h a m i s m e n h a n c e d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e established institutions." 3 1 B e n t h a m h a d glorie d i n t h e role o f r e f o r m e r : " B e n t h a m r e g a r d e d hi s attac k o n C o m m o n La w a s fallin g i n t h e grea t E n l i g h t e n m e n t traditio n of rationa l challeng e o f establishe d institutions." 3 2 T h i s conservative p o r t r a i t resemble d r e m a r k a b l y tha t o f Black stone tha t B e n t h a m h a d d e n o u n c e d s o virulentl y a s a y o u n g m a n . Give n t h e lac k o f d e m o n s t r a b l e politica l activ ity, B e n t h a m ' s vie w o f himsel f a s a radica l alternativ e t o t h e socia l o r d e r a p p e a r s j u s t a n o t h e r i n a lon g lin e o f delusions tha t define d hi s self-image . Beyond thes e specifi c issues , o n e crucia l e l e m e n t tie d B e n t h a m t o Blackston e i n c o m m o n e n d e a v o r . W h a t e v e r else o n e m i g h t conclud e a b o u t B e n t h a m ' s g r a n d i o s e a n d p e r h a p s eve n crackpo t schemes , t h r o u g h o u t hi s lif e juris p r u d e n c e playe d t h e ke y p a r t i n al l hi s plan s fo r r e f o r m . His goal s p r e s u p p o s e d a t h o r o u g h familiarit y wit h t h e law, a n d hi s objectiv e wa s f u n d a m e n t a l socia l c h a n g e : " H e b e c a m e a j u r i s t becaus e h e believed , wit h a lon g lin e o f earlier thinkers , tha t la w a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e p r o v i d e d t h e key t o politic s a n d socia l relation s a n d t o t h e solutio n o f their p r o b l e m s . " 3 3 A s i n t h e cas e o f Blackstone , B e n t h a m

The Light of Utility 63 a i m e d hi s j u r i s p r u d e n ce a t a g e n e r a l a u d i e n c e o f e d u c a t e d r e a d e r s (whe n h e publishe d hi s work , tha t is) , s o tha t his r e a d e r s m i g h t c o n t e m p l a t e t h e consequence s o f hi s a r g u m e n t s a n d ac t accordingly . I n c o m m o n wit h Black stone, B e n t h a m believe d tha t j u r i s p r u d e n c e constitute d the p r o p e r vehicl e fo r t h e discussio n o f publi c policy : "I n B e n t h a m ' s theory , la w play s t h e socia l rol e t h a t H u m e assigns t o p r o p e r t y . It s tas k i s t o la y t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f society, t o constitute a p e o p l e . " 3 4 Onl y t h e master y o f juris prudence permitte d th e reade r t o examin e th e broa d questions o f socia l a n d politica l r e f o r m : " H e [ B e n t h a m ] m a d e i t clea r t h a t i n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e syste m o f idea s such a s hi s ow n n o singl e politica l concep t suc h a s liberty , sovereignty, o r eve n politica l societ y coul d b e adequatel y u n d e r s t o o d i n isolatio n fro m t h e we b o f reciproca l rela tionships o f c o m m a n d a n d o b e d i e n c e b i n d i n g m e n to g e t h e r i n an y socia l g r o u p . " 3 5 B o t h Blackston e a n d Ben t h a m believe d tha t j u r i s p r u d e n c e wa s t h e disciplin e mos t conducive t o t h e d e b a t e o n publi c polic y t o whic h eac h wished t o contribute . T h e a r g u m e n t s m i g h t differ , b u t t h e e n t e r p r i s e r e m a i n e d identical . T h e startin g poin t fo r a revie w o f B e n t h a m ' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s c o n t i n u e d t o focu s o n it s f o u n d a t i o n , t h e princi ple o f utility . Historian s hav e g r o w n accustome d t o r e g a r d B e n t h a m a s a n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y figure, especiall y w h e n his n a m e d o m i n a t e d controversie s suc h a s wh y t h e Victo rian stat e d e v e l o p e d a s i t did , o r t h e exac t rol e hi s belief s played i n g u i d i n g t h e wor k o f thos e describe d a s Ben thamites afte r 1832 . Rarel y hav e the y w o r r i e d a b o u t t h e philosophical f o u n d a t i o n s u p o n whic h B e n t h a m con structed hi s edific e o f r e f o r m . B e n t h a m wa s n o t h i n g i f n o t

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consistent, n o t t o sa y obsessive , a n d hi s explanation s o f t h e principl e o f utilit y d a t e fro m hi s first publication s i n t h e 1770s . B e n t h a m ' s c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e utilit y principl e should b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h e contex t o f o t h e r Enlighten m e n t a t t e m p t s t o discove r t h e la w o r law s tha t g o v e r n e d society, a s Isaa c N e w t o n h a d establishe d thos e t h a t gov e r n e d th e physica l universe : "I t wa s B e n t h a m ' s a d a p t a t i o n of t h e technique s a n d principle s o f n a t u r a l scienc e t o t h e study o f t h e la w whic h wa s t o d r a w h i m t o tak e a stan d o n o t h e r socia l issues." 3 6 B y relianc e o n t h e principl e o f util ity B e n t h a m h o p e d t o creat e a socia l scienc e a n a l o g o u s t o Newtonian physica l science . F r o m Eli e Halev y o n w a r d scholar s hav e e m p h a s i z e d this d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o hav e t h e d o c t r i n e o f utilit y ac t a s t h e first a n d universa l principle , itsel f b e y o n d empirica l proof , by whic h al l h u m a n action s coul d b e calculated : "Give n a science o f t h e m i n d a n d a scienc e o f societ y whic h exhibi t t h e qualitie s bot h o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l a n d o f t h e exac t sciences a n a l o g o u s t o t h e physic s o f N e w t o n , shoul d i t n o t be possibl e t o f o u n d o n thes e ne w discipline s a m o r a l a n d legal theor y whic h woul d b e scientific—th e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e universa l practica l science?" 3 7 O r p u t a n o t h e r way , B e n t h a m " s o u g h t r a t h e r t h e perfectio n o f a n e o - N e w t o n ian socia l physics." 3 8 T h e resul t wa s a s follows : Though base d o n empirica l premises , Bentham' s utilitaria n ju risprudence followe d a natural-scienc e mode l o f legislatio n an d judgment an d aspire d t o a wholl y quantitativ e an d value-fre e conception o f society—o r rathe r a societ y whos e value s wer e calculable an d divorce d fro m question s o f practica l reaso n an d judgment. Bentha m displaye d th e characteristi c Enlightenmen t scorn fo r 'prejudice ' an d 'interest ' a s wel l a s 'natura l rights' —

The Light of Utility 65 categories o f jurisprudence whic h ha d becom e factor s o f theo retical psycholog y an d target s o f 'philosophy ' an d h e i n effec t proposed t o establish a social scienc e i n term s tha t wer e no t onl y empirical bu t also , in a radica l sense , nominalist. 39 B e n t h a m t h o u g h t o f himsel f i n thes e terms , s o t h e New tonian m o d e l ha s n o t bee n i m p o s e d b y late r historian s contrary t o hi s ow n self-image. 4 0 Finally , B e n t h a m " r e p r e sented i n E n g l a n d t h e spiri t t h a t possesse d F r a n c e i n t h e late e i g h t e e n t h century , t h e u r g e t o r e m a k e th e worl d a c c o r d i n g t o a rationa l p a t t e r n . " 4 1 A s a result , B e n t h a m "aimed t o b e th e N e w t o n o f t h e m o r a l world , a n d hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e wa s centra l t o thi s u n d e r t a k i n g . " 4 2 T h u s , whatever t h e effect s o f hi s wor k i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h century , t h e basi c premise s o f hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e w e r e a n c h o r e d securely i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h century . W h e n scholar s hav e rejecte d t h e N e w t o n i a n m o d e l a s the d o m i n a n t influenc e o n B e n t h a m , som e o t h e r scientifi c s t a n d a r d ha s replace d it . G e r a l d Postema , fo r e x a m p l e , has a r g u e d tha t i t wa s Carolu s Linnaeus , t h e famou s eigh t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Swedis h botanist , w h o supplie d t h e scien tific impuls e fo r B e n t h a m ' s conclusions . B e n t h a m ' s vas t classificatory scheme s wer e base d o n a biologica l m o d e l : " B e n t h a m ' s ide a o f t h e sel f i s t h a t o f a rationall y self directed individual , p r u d e n t l y adjustin g hi s action s a n d plans t o t h e realitie s o f hi s e n v i r o n m e n t , b u t alway s think ing a n d j u d g i n g fo r himself." 4 3 T h e principl e o f utility , therefore, "wa s m e a n t t o serv e a s t h e r e f o r m e r ' s g u i d e w h e n a t t e m p t i n g t o rationaliz e h u m a n relationship s a n d r e d u c e t h e a r e a o f conflic t the y no w involved , a d o c t r i n e designed t o g u i d e a m a n toward s hi s alway s b e h a v i n g i n

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that objectiv e a n d i m p e r s o n a l fashio n i n whic h h e i s dis posed t o conside r t h e interest s o f thos e w h o 'ar e perfec t strangers' t o h i m . " 4 4 T h a t B e n t h a m d e n o u n c e d Black stone fo r hi s unscientifi c l a n g u a g e a n d m e t h o d o l o g y wa s not surprising , a n d t h a t B e n t h a m wen t f u r t h e r t o criticiz e t h e c o m m o n la w itsel f fo r it s unscientifi c base s shoul d occasion littl e w o n d e r . Lega l r e f o r m wa s crucia l t o Ben t h a m becaus e i n it s absenc e t h e ancient , unscientifi c aber rations o f t h e la w wer e p e r p e t u a t e d . Clea r rule s o f publi c conduct, a s o p p o s e d t o t h e fictions a n d u n t r u t h s o f t h e c o m m o n law , f o r m e d t h e onl y reasonabl e basi s fo r a lega l system. 4 5 I n t h e fou r majo r work s o n la w B e n t h a m constantl y stressed t h e centralit y o f t h e principl e o f utilit y t o hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e . I n A Fragment on Government B e n t h a m ar g u e d tha t utilit y e x t e n d e d t o al l m e n a n d t o al l societies , so i t woul d serv e an y c o u n t r y wit h equa l benefit . I n hi s discussion o f lega l obligatio n B e n t h a m asserte d t h a t t h e greatest h a p p i n e s s o r greates t felicit y principl e furnishe d t h e "sol e a n d all-sufficien t r e a s o n " a n d di d n o t d e p e n d u p o n an y h i g h e r reason . Resolution s o f lega l dispute s should a d h e r e t o thi s guide , fo r i t woul d resolv e mos t o f t h e m a n d m a k e t h e g r o u n d s o f d i s a g r e e m e n t cleare r w h e n a solutio n coul d n o t b e f o u n d . Onl y t h e principl e of utility , "accuratel y a p p r e h e n d e d a n d steadil y applied, " could direc t a n individua l t h r o u g h t h e difficul t p r o b l e m s with whic h t h e la w m u s t deal. 4 6 I n t h e Comment on the Commentaries B e n t h a m wrot e t h a t "th e Principl e o f utilit y once a d o p t e d a s t h e g o v e r n i n g principle , admit s o f n o rival, admit s n o t eve n o f a n associate, " a n d it s validit y could b e p r o v e d b y empirica l observation , a l t h o u g h Ben -

The Light of Utility 67 t h a m offere d n o e x a m p l e s i n s u p p o r t o f thi s assertion. 4 7 I n Of Laws in General B e n t h a m specifie d tha t " t h e c o m m o n e n d o f al l law s a s prescribe d b y t h e principl e o f utilit y i s the p r o m o t i o n o f t h e publi c g o o d . " 4 8 T h e p u r s u i t o f plea sure a n d t h e avoidanc e o f pai n r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t r u e g u i d e to h u m a n actions , wer e i n fac t t h e "sovereig n masters " o f behavior, a n d shoul d d e t e r m i n e t h e c o n t e n t o f law. 4 9 Onl y t h e principl e o f utilit y coul d suppl y a rational , objectiv e basis fo r t h e evaluatio n o f h u m a n c o n d u c t . T h e mos t consisten t explicatio n o f t h e utilit y principl e c a m e i n The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) . I n i t B e n t h a m declare d tha t t h e principl e o f utilit y p r o v i d e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f hi s work , a n d h e define d i t a s tha t principle "whic h a p p r o v e s o r d i s a p p r o v e s o f ever y actio n whatsoever, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t e n d e n c y whic h i t a p p e a r s t o have t o a u g m e n t o r diminis h t h e h a p p i n e s s o f t h e part y whose interes t i s i n question : or , wha t i s t h e sam e t h i n g i n o t h e r words , t o p r o m o t e o r t o o p p o s e tha t happiness . I say o f ever y actio n whatsoever ; a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t onl y o f every actio n o f a privat e individual , b u t o f ever y m e a s u r e of g o v e r n m e n t . " 5 0 B e n t h a m t h e n e x p l a i n e d t h e concep t of utility : "B y utilit y i s m e a n t t h a t p r o p e r t y i n an y object , whereby i t t e n d s t o p r o d u c e benefit , a d v a n t a g e , pleasure , good, o r happiness , (al l thi s i n t h e p r e s e n t cas e come s t o t h e s a m e thing ) o r (wha t come s agai n t o t h e s a m e thing ) to p r e v e n t t h e h a p p e n i n g o f mischief , pain , evil , o r u n h a p p i n e s s t o t h e part y whos e interes t i s c o n s i d e r e d; i f tha t party b e t h e c o m m u n i t y i n general , t h e n t h e h a p p i n e s s of t h e c o m m u n i t y : I f a particula r individual , t h e n th e h a p p i n e s s o f t h a t individual." 5 1 F o r t h e n e x t t h r e e h u n d r e d page s B e n t h a m relentlessl y a t t e m p t e d t o buil d a sys -

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tematic analysi s o f la w u p o n hi s initia l definitions , a n d even hi s tabl e o f content s r a n t o twent y pages . T h e first six c h a p t e r s i n particula r a t t e m p t e d t o establis h t h e princi ple o f utilit y b e y o n d question . Sympatheti c i n t e r p r e t e r s of B e n t h a m hav e acknowledge d tha t hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e , b e y o n d al l t h e verbiage , d e p e n d e d o n t h e principl e o f utility: "I t i s . . . clea r tha t h e m a i n t a i n e d steadfastl y t h r o u g h o u t hi s c a r e e r t h e absolut e sovereignt y o f t h e principle o f utility." 5 2 Postem a c o n c l u d e d eve n m o r e deci sively tha t " B e n t h a m , fro m t h e ver y outse t o f hi s career , was c o m m i t t e d t o t h e principl e o f utilit y a s t h e sovereig n decision principle i n t h e area s o f practica l life , includin g adjudication." 5 3 B e n t h a m ' s writings , publishe d a n d u n published, a n d t h e circumstance s o f hi s lif e s u p p o r t e d thi s j u d g m e n t withou t qualification . At thi s point , however , t h e historia n w h o seek s t o u n d e r s t a n d th e origin s o f t h e m o d e r n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n tial traditio n m i g h t wel l ask : W h a t h a p p e n s t o B e n t h a m w h e n t h e principl e o f utilit y i s rejected ? B e n t h a m ' s mech anistic a p p r o a c h t o h u m a n behavio r ha s suffere d funda m e n t a l r e p u d i a t i o n b y t h e discipline s o f b o t h histor y a n d psychology. B e n t h a m believe d tha t theoretica l decisions , based o n rationa l assessments , characterize d ever y action , a n d t h e n tha t actio n wa s u n d e r t a k e n i n a forma l way . T h i s account , i n retrospect , strike s t h e m o d e r n r e a d e r a s oversimplified, misleading , a n d a highl y suspec t descrip tion o f ho w rea l p e o p l e ac t i n t h e rea l world. 5 4 B e n t h a m ' s conclusions t e n d no w t o attrac t m o r e scor n t h a n respect : "This aspec t o f B e n t h a m ' s wor k doe s n o t m e r i t seriou s consideration today . M o d e r n psycholog y ha s ye t t o find a reliable m e a n s o f objectivel y quantifyin g pleasur e o r pain .

The Light of Utility 69 Certainly thi s deficienc y seriousl y u n d e r m i n e s B e n t h a m ' s utilitarian f o u n d a t i o n fo r law." 5 5 A sympatheti c inter p r e t e r o f B e n t h a m suc h a s Sempl e ha s c o n c e d e d tha t t h e assertion tha t h u m a n being s wer e rationa l i n action , n o t affected b y irrationa l impulses , seem s "naive , oversimple , a n d a b e r r a n t , lackin g a t r u e insigh t int o t h e h u m a n psy che o r a t r u e compassio n fo r t h e casualtie s o f society." 5 6 Recent defense s o f B e n t h a m hav e c o n t a i n e d som e in teresting assertion s o n t h e questio n o f utility . Pau l Kell y wrote i n justificatio n o f utilitaria n theor y a b o u t "Ben t h a m ' s a d o p t i o n o f h e d o n i s m a s t h e basi s o f hi s psycholog ical theory , whic h i s simila r t o hi s justification o f t h e prin ciple o f utilit y a s t h e sol e criterio n o f m o r a l j u d g m e n t . " 5 7 I n a simila r vei n Dinwidd y a r g u e d tha t B e n t h a m "recog nized a n d explicitl y stated , tha t t h e principl e o f utilit y wa s a postulat e o f whic h t h e t r u t h coul d no t b e proved. How ever, h e di d se t o u t t o devis e a theor y o f moral s whic h accorded with th e observabl e fact s o f h u m a n n a t u r e (a s h e saw them) , a n d whic h di d n o t n e e d an y r e c o u r s e t o con cepts tha t wer e religiou s o r mysterious." 5 8 T h e s e contenti ons, wit h thei r e m p h a s i s o n t h e relationshi p betwee n util ity a n d morality , m u s t b e r e m e m b e r e d w h e n se t agains t t h e fac t tha t B e n t h a m ' s lega l r e p u t a t i o n wa s f o u n d e d o n the separatio n o f la w fro m morality . Suffic e i t t o sa y tha t his principl e o f utilit y ha s b e c o m e f r a u g h t wit h difficultie s of ever y sort , a n d tha t thi s m u s t b e a r u p o n an y assessmen t of hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Criticism o f B e n t h a m ha s focuse d frequentl y o n hi philosophical e r r o r s . Fo r e x a m p l e , a s n o t e d i n t h e previ ous p a r a g r a p h , t h e p e n c h a n t fo r definitio n m e a n t tha B e n t h a m a s s u m e d wha t h e shoul d hav e p r o v e d . B y thi

s t s

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m e t h o d B e n t h a m p u s h e d t h e ostensibl y objectiv e m a t h e matical calculu s i n t h e directio n h e wished . O n e criti c o f this philosophica l m a n e u v e r ha s observed : " T h e utilitari ans, B e n t h a m foremos t a m o n g t h e m , w h o believe d tha t we desir e pleasan t thing s o n accoun t o f thei r pleasantness , a n d ( m o r e strangely ) tha t p l e a s u r e a n d pai n ca n b e mea s u r e d , woul d hav e d o n e wel l t o as k themselve s j u s t wha t pleasure a n d pai n a r e . " 5 9 T h e relianc e o n t h e principl e o f utility "involve d B e n t h a m i n t h e famousl y d u b i o u s e n t e r prise o f articulatin g a m e c h a n i s m fo r m e a s u r i n g h a p p i ness a n d projectin g a strictl y consequentialis t accoun t o f t h e m o r a l c o n t e n t o f h u m a n actions." 6 0 I n addition , Ben t h a m wa s guilt y o f philosophica l reductionis m a s well , fo r h e place d a substantia l b u r d e n o n t h e principl e o f utility , that i t coul d provid e a n answe r t o al l t h e difficultie s o f h u m a n conduct . T h a t th e principl e coul d n o t sustai n thi s b u r d e n soo n b e c a m e obvious : "Becaus e i t wa s derive d strictly fro m o n e principle , i t necessaril y i g n o r e d m a n y complexities i n motives , m a n y difference s i n d e g r e e s o f guilt a n d d a n g e r , m a n y socia l a n d individua l interest s fo r which a les s clean-cu t syste m lef t r o o m . Despit e hi s e m phasis o n t h e variet y o f h u m a n life , t h e possibilit y tha t even t h e mos t detaile d analysi s coul d n o t completel y ac c o u n t fo r actua l h u m a n condition s di d no t worr y Ben t h a m . " 6 1 B e n t h a m len t himsel f t o eas y caricatur e becaus e his stres s o n p r e m e d i t a t e d calculatio n i g n o r e d s o m a n y o f t h e customary , emotiona l a n d irrationa l facet s o f life . N o t for n o t h i n g di d t h e w o r d B e n t h a m i t e b e c o m e synony m o u s wit h a cold , unfeelin g a p p r o a c h t o h u m a n problems , celebrated i n literatur e a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y caricature . O t h e r critic s hav e f o u n d i n B e n t h a m a visio n o f societ y

The Light of Utility 71 in whic h hi s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e lega l syste m wa s vitiate d by t h e rigidit y h e d e m o n s t r a t e d . A l t h o u g h h e p r o p o s e d t o construct t h e basi c b l u e p r i n t fo r t h e r e f o r m a t i o n o f soci ety, hi s m e a n s , t h e principl e o f utility , p r o v e d i n a d e q u a t e to thi s task : " B e n t h a m ' s majo r weaknesse s a s a t h i n k e r w e r e t h e spongines s o f t h e utilit y principl e i n hi s h a n d s a s a g u i d e t o policy , hi s lac k o f interes t i n positiv e o r empiri cal analysis , a n d hi s excessive , i f characteristicall y m o d e r n , belief i n t h e plasticit y o f h u m a n n a t u r e a n d h u m a n insti tutions." 6 2 M o r e specifically , t h e principl e o f utilit y of fered littl e t o j u r i s p r u d e n ce itself : "I t i s or o u g h t t o b e t h e business o f lega l philosoph y no t onl y t o conside r wha t la w is a n d wh y t h e r e shoul d b e la w b u t t o plac e la w i n it s p r o p e r perspective . . . . B e n t h a m ' s principl e o f utilit y ha s n o t h i n g o f valu e t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e first tw o o f thes e questions a n d tha t i n t h e cas e o f t h e t h i r d , tha t o f t h e perspective, i t i s positivel y misleading." 6 3 T h e close d na t u r e o f B e n t h a m ' s m i n d , hi s d e t a c h m e n t fro m o r d i n a r y affairs, hi s refusa l t o conside r wor k o t h e r t h a n hi s own , i n t h e e n d defeate d hi s a t t e m p t s t o gai n a majo r plac e i n t h e councils o f hi s ow n day . "I t i s a s if, " o n e criti c ha s written , "very earl y i n hi s life , h e h a d c o m m i t t e d himsel f t o a system o f t h o u g h t whic h h e h a d f o u n d entirel y p e r s u a sive, totall y c o m p r e h e n s i v e , a n d , n o t t h e leas t o f it s merits , uniquely his . Becaus e t h a t syste m was , fo r him , s o u n p r o b lematic, s o evidentl y t r u e a n d sufficien t fo r al l p u r p o s e s , h e fel t littl e n e e d , i n hi s publi c presentation s o f it , t o tak e special n o t e o f eithe r hi s forebear s o r hi s c o n t e m p o r a r ies." 6 4 I n vie w o f thes e difficulties , t h e historia n ma y wel l w o n d e r ho w a n d wh y B e n t h a m eve r attracte d an y publi c attention a t all . T h e r e f o r m e r w h o w a n t e d t o c h a n g e t h e

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world wa s i n realit y s o impractica l tha t hi s majo r publi c plan, t h e Panopticon , n e v e r r e a c h e d fruition . O n e answe r t o question s a b o u t B e n t h a m ' s influenc e lie s in t h e intensit y h e b r o u g h t t o hi s lega l writings , a virtu e intimately c o n n e c t e d t o t h e defect s readil y recognizabl e i n his work . T h e constan t refrai n tha t h e h a d u n l o c k e d t h e secrets o f t h e la w a n d tha t h e h a d u n c o v e r e d t h e o n e principle capabl e o f g e n e r a t i n g effectiv e lega l r e f o r m gav e to B e n t h a m a focu s t h a t o t h e r s lacked : " B e n t h a m wa s par excellence a m a n d o m i n a t e d b y o n e ide a a n d thi s wa s t h e secret o f hi s succes s a s a n influentia l t h i n k e r . " 6 5 Hi s re lentless insistenc e o n t h e inclusiv e n a t u r e o f t h e principl e of utility , it s abilit y t o furnis h r e m e d i e s fo r t h e defect s o f t h e law , sustaine d B e n t h a m t h r o u g h t h e m a n y disappoint m e n t s tha t p l a g u e d hi s effort s t o find publi c acceptanc e c o m m e n s u r a t e wit h t h e significanc e o f hi s conclusion . O v e r t h e cours e o f hi s lon g lif e a n d t h r o u g h t h o u s a n d s o f pages o f detaile d analysis , B e n t h a m neve r los t sigh t o f t h e o n e ide a tha t h e h a d u s e d s o forcefull y t o s e p a r a t e himsel f from hi s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . T h e essentia l p a r t o f thi s lega l science, t h e principl e fro m whic h h e n e v e r deviated , fired B e n t h a m wit h suc h e n t h u s i a s m tha t h e n e v e r wavere d from p u r s u i n g it s t r i u m p h . 6 6 B e n t h a m als o acquire d a r e p u t a t i o n , t o whic h h e wa s p e r h a p s no t full y entitled , fro m t h e labor s o f hi s disciples , especially J a m e s a n d J o h n Stuar t Mill . Hi s follower s p e r p e t u a t e d t h e fam e o f t h e master , a n d s o hi s n a m e ac q u i r e d a r e n o w n b e y o n d hi s actua l accomplishments : " B e n t h a m , dirigiste t h a t h e was , wa s al l hi s lif e flattered b y the t h o u g h t o f a b a n d o f disciples , b e a r i n g hi s liver y a n d s p r e a d i n g hi s ideas , a n d i n spit e o f thei r difference s h e

The Light of Utility 73 liked t o sa y h e wa s t h e spiritua l fathe r o f J a m e s Mil l a n d R i c a r d o . " 6 7 Hi s r e p e a t e d affirmatio n o f th e greates t h a p piness fo r t h e greates t n u m b e r gav e t o B e n t h a m a celeb rity tha t b e c a m e seductive ; a p h r a s e s o w i d e s p r e a d m u s t surely hav e h a d i m p o r t a n t consequences . B e n t h a m ' s in fluence, onc e take n fo r g r a n t e d , i n fac t o p e r a t e d withi n b o u n d a r i e s t h a t hav e le d recen t historian s t o restric t t h e e x t e n t o f t h a t influenc e dramatically : " P e r h a p s i t wa s inev itable tha t B e n t h a m ' s r e p u t a t i o n ha s b e e n m a d e b y hi s fellow intellectual s a n d onl y indirectl y b y n i n e t e e n t h - c e n tury politicians , fo r i t is , b y a n d large , t h e intellectua l a n d r e f o r m e r w h o ha s r e a d a n d writte n a b o u t h i m . " 6 8 I n t e r m s o f t h e intellectua l histor y o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century , especially a s initiall y delineate d b y Dicey , B e n t h a m ' s plac e b e c a m e e x a g g e r a t e d t o suc h a d e g r e e tha t onl y a c e n t u r y later ha s i t b e e n r e d u c e d t o a m o r e sustainabl e level . I n Law and Public Opinion, publishe d i n 1905 , Dice y offere d a m o d e l o f la w r e f o r m fo r t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y tha t e m p h a s i z e d B e n t h a m a s a fertil e sourc e o f t h e c h a n g e s Dicey a d m i r e d i n tha t p e r i o d . 6 9 T h i s wor k b e c a m e t h e starting poin t fo r s u b s e q u e n t a t t e m p t s t o i n t e r p r e t variou s aspects o f Victoria n intellectua l history , a n d lon g exer cised a n influenc e tha t misle d a s m u c h a s e n l i g h t e n e d . W h a t e v e r enviabl e r e p u t a t i o n Dice y e a r n e d a s a constitu tional scholar , hi s wor k i n histor y n e v e r r e a c h e d a c o m p a rable level . If t h e principl e o f utilit y wa s reall y a juristic c o n j u r i n g trick tha t faile d utterl y t o b r i n g a b o u t a lega l Utopia , Ben t h a m di d b e q u e a t h a lega l legacy—i f n o t a s g r a n d i o s e a s h e w i s h e d — t h a t i n fac t h a d p r o f o u n d consequences . Hi s contribution consiste d o f a knac k fo r raisin g issue s that ,

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whatever t h e merit s o f hi s ow n answers , hav e d o m i n a t e d t h e las t tw o centurie s o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e. Fo r e x a m ple, B e n t h a m , despit e som e o f Blackstone' s us e o f simila r l a n g u a g e o n occasion , ha s prevaile d wit h respec t t o t h e c o m m a n d o r imperativ e theor y o f law. 7 0 Briefl y stated , t h e c o m m a n d theor y o f la w hold s tha t al l law s a r e expres sions o f t h e wil l o f t h e lawgiver , eithe r c o m m a n d s t o d o s o m e t h i n g o r prohibition s t o desis t fro m a particula r act. 7 1 T h e c o m m a n d t h e o r y ha s r e m a i n e d a crucia l postulat e o f legal positivis m i n tha t al l law s a r e hel d t o hav e thei r origin i n h u m a n agenc y withou t r e f e r e n c e t o a n e x t e r n a l system o f morality . B e n t h a m ' s formulatio n ha s occasione d constant c o m m e n t a r y sinc e hi s d e a t h , a n d ha s kep t hi s n a m e a m o n g t h e leader s o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . A s i s characteristic o f B e n t h a m ' s analysi s i n o t h e r areas , t h e c o m m a n d t h e o r y o f la w ha s c o m e t o b e viewe d a s a littl e too pat , to o simplisti c t o p r o v i d e entirel y satisfactor y an swers t o t h e c o m p l e x question s s u r r o u n d i n g law . T h e re newal o f interes t i n B e n t h a m ' s lega l theory , g e n e r a t e d especially b y t h e publicatio n o f Of Laws in General (1970) , has b r o u g h t B e n t h a m ful l circle . H e enjoy s a n attentio n that h e n e v e r gaine d i n hi s lifetime . Sympatheti c critic s have c o n c e d e d tha t B e n t h a m ' s obsessio n wit h t h e princi ple o f utilit y cause d hi s plan s fo r a c o m p r e h e n s i v e juris p r u d e n c e t o fai l miserably . Hi s e n d u r i n g legac y t o Englis h legal philosoph y ha s c o m e fro m hi s contribution s t o m o r e specialized topic s o f juristic debate . It i s no w clear , fo r e x a m p l e , t h a t B e n t h a m , becaus e h e n e v e r publishe d hi s view s full y i n hi s lifetime , b e c a m e identified wit h t h e c o m m a n d theor y o f la w i n a wa y tha t did a n injustic e t o t h e m o r e sophisticate d idea s h e held .

The Light of Utility 75 H . L . A . H a r t le d t h e wa y i n tryin g t o recove r a B e n t h a m w h o wa s hi s ow n wors t e n e m y b y virtu e o f hi s stylisti c problems. 7 2 B e n t h a m a p p a r e n t l y di d n o t hold , goin g against t h e l o n g traditio n o f Englis h lega l positivism , t h a t all law s m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s coercive . H e di d asser t t h a t permissive e l e m e n t s als o characteriz e basi c type s o f law. 7 3 Despite t h e stereotyp e o f B e n t h a m ' s vie w o f la w a s a c r u d e species o f c o m m a n d , H a r t a r g u e d t h a t "i t i s plai n t h a t t h e p o w e r o f i m p e r a t i o n a s define d b y B e n t h a m i s a n a p t description o f legislativ e powers , b o t h o f t h e sovereig n lawmaking bod y a n d o f s u b o r d i n a t e lawmakin g agencies , at leas t w h e r e t h e legislatio n create s lega l dutie s backe d b y sanctions." 7 4 T h e h i t h e r t o u n s u s p e c t e d a p p e a l o f Ben t h a m ' s definitio n o f la w ha s r e t u r n e d hi m t o t h e c e n t e r o f interest i n t h e historica l u n f o l d i n g o f lega l ideas . T h e recovery o f B e n t h a m ' s s h a r p e r insight s ha s h e l p e d t o clar ify o t h e r issue s t r e a t e d b y h i m a s wel l a s revis e t h e ap praisal o f hi s relation s wit h hi s intellectua l successors . T h e c o m m a n d t h e o r y o f la w a n d t h e r e c e n t discussion s of B e n t h a m ' s articulatio n o f hi s definitio n lea d directl y t o his view s o n t h e sovereignt y o f Parliament . O n e iron y o f B e n t h a m ' s c a r e e r wa s t h e similarit y o f hi s analysi s t o t h a t of hi s g r e a t antagonist , Blackstone . A s n o t e d earlier , Blackstone h a d elaborate d a theor y o f p a r l i a m e n t a r y sov ereignty tha t B e n t h a m f o u n d congenial , especiall y i n hi s long battl e t o secur e t h e righ t t o buil d t h e P a n o p t i c o n . 7 5 I n thi s are a a s well , r e c e n t scholarshi p ha s discovere d a m o r e practica l B e n t h a m t h a n t h e r e f o r m e r w h o trie d t o p e d d l e t h e principl e o f utilit y al l hi s life . T h e earlie r ver sion o f B e n t h a m o n sovereignt y stresse d hi s conceptio n of t h e d o c t r i n e a s "tota l a n d illimitable," 7 6 a n d thi s ide a

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s t e m m e d fro m hi s oft-asserte d belie f t h a t t h e onl y t r u e law wa s statutor y a n d judicia l legislatio n r e p r e s e n t e d a p r i m a r y evi l o f t h e c o m m o n law . O n c e again , however , H a r t ha s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t B e n t h a m considere d t h e possi bility o f lega l limitation s o n sovereignt y a n d t h e divisio n of sovereig n power s a c c o r d i n g t o prescribe d lega l rules. 7 7 A c c o r d i n g t o thi s ne w view , B e n t h a m recognize d tha t t h e "exercise o f sovereignt y 'b y rule ' i n a non-autocrati c m a n n e r r e q u i r e d it s divisio n int o legislativ e a n d executiv e power; a n d , mos t i m p o r t a n t o f all , b y acknowledgin g t h e possible e x i s t e n c e — p e r h a p s eve n p r o b a b l e i n mos t cases—of a p o w e r a n t e r i o r t o tha t o f t h e sovereign : t h e power o r righ t t o inves t d e t e r m i n a t e p e r s o n s wit h t h e s u p r e m e p o w e r itself." 7 8 T h e d o c t r i n e o f sovereignt y a s t h u s describe d b e c a m e m o r e flexible a n d les s a u t h o r i t a r ian t h a n t h e usua l depictio n o f B e n t h a m i t e idea s tha t h a d b e c o m e customary. 7 9 Fo r t h e historian , however , t h e i m p o r t a n t poin t i s n o t necessaril y wha t constitute d Ben tham's rea l view s a s derive d fro m u n p u b l i s h e d m a n u scripts; t h e significanc e o f B e n t h a m o n sovereignt y i s wha t people believe d h e t a u g h t , eve n i f tha t ha s subsequentl y p r o v e n e r r o n e o u s . I n t h e cas e o f H a r t , hi s discussio n o f a sophisticated B e n t h a m len t s u p p o r t t o hi s ow n j u r i s p r u dence, a n d w h e t h e r B e n t h a m wa s trul y t h e H a r t i a n fore r u n n e r o r n o t r e m a i n s a n o p e n question . O n t h e specifi c questio n o f la w r e f o r m B e n t h a m ad h e r e d tenaciousl y t o t h e solutio n o f codification . O n e rea son fo r B e n t h a m ' s lifelon g dedicatio n t o t h e caus e o f codi fication wa s hi s belie f tha t a logica l a r r a n g e m e n t o f t h e laws, intelligibl e t o la y people , woul d diminis h t h e rol e of j u d g e s , barristers , a n d solicitors . Codificatio n woul d

The Light of Utility 77 identify thos e law s tha t r e q u i r e d abolitio n a n d woul d p r e sent t h e o p p o r t u n i t y fo r t h e passag e o f ne w laws. 80 W h e r e Blackstone h a d see n t h e c o m m o n la w a s t h e e p i t o m e o f reason, B e n t h a m f o u n d a bewildering , o b s c u r e system , replete wit h p r o c e d u r a l technicalities , l a n g u a g e tha t con cealed m e a n i n g , a n d a m a z e o f intricacie s t h a t p e r m i t t e d t h e lawyer s t o carr y o n thei r nefariou s activitie s b e y o n d public scrutiny . T h e chie f abus e c a m e fro m t h e ancien t role playe d i n t h e la w b y lega l fictions, a practic e tha t infuriated B e n t h a m abov e al l else : " T h i n g s wer e blatantl y falsely described , straightforwar d falsehood s wer e ac cepted i n c o u r t a n d n o t allowe d t o b e t r a v e r s e d . " 8 1 Ben t h a m c o n d e m n e d lawyer s w h o utilize d a l a n g u a g e tha t only t h e initiate d coul d u n d e r s t a n d , a l t h o u g h h e i n v e n t e d his ow n l a n g u a g e w h e n i t suite d hi s p u r p o s e . B e n t h a m d e n o u n c e d t h e sophistrie s o f t h e lega l professio n i n thi s fashion: " T h e y ca n n o m o r e spea k a t thei r eas e withou t a fiction i n thei r m o u t h s , t h a n D e m o s t h e n e s withou t peb bles. Suc h i s t h e p o w e r o f professiona l prejudic e t o de p r a v e t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y fee d u p o n u n t r u t h , a s t h e T u r k s d o u p o n o p i u m , a t first fro m choic e a n d wit h thei r eyes o p e n , afterward s b y habit , til l a t lengt h the y los e al l s h a m e , avo w i t fo r w h a t i t is , a n d swallo w i t wit h greedi ness, n o t b e a r i n g t o b e withou t it." 8 2 B e n t h a m a b h o r r e d t h e artifice s o f t h e lawyer' s t r a d e , s o hostil e t o settin g t h e law u p o n a scientifi c basis . A s H a r t h a d written : " H e wa s horrified b y thes e things , b u t eve n m o r e horrifie d b y t h e ease wit h whic h Englis h lawyer s swallowe d a n d p r o p a gated t h e e n e r v a t i n g superstitio n t h a t thes e abuse s wer e n a t u r a l a n d inevitable , s o tha t onl y a visionar y woul d d r e a m o f thei r radica l r e f o r m . " 8 3 O f cours e thes e charge s

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did n o t originat e wit h B e n t h a m , fo r the y h a d lon g serve d as s t a n d a r d far e fo r complaint s a b o u t t h e lega l profession . So literall y di d B e n t h a m tak e thes e accusation s tha t onl y wholesale r e f o r m i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a c o d e coul d restor e integrity t o t h e lega l system . T h e r e d u c t i o n o f lega l chao s t o o r d e r fascinate d Ben t h a m , fo r t h e g r a n d schem e wa s a for m o f e n t e r p r i s e tha t i n t r i g u e d h i m t h r o u g h o u t hi s life . Fo r som e si x d e c a d e s B e n t h a m w o r k e d o n a Pannomion o r c o m p r e h e n s i v e lega l code t h a t woul d b r i n g o r d e r a n d simplicit y t o t h e disorga nized mas s o f t h e histori c c o m m o n law . T h i s a t t e m p t t o create a descriptio n o f t h e la w i n al l it s b r a n c h e s , despit e B e n t h a m ' s attentio n t o i t a t differen t time s i n hi s life , wa s left unfinishe d a t hi s d e a t h . 8 4 Codificatio n entaile d t h e "conversion o f j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l o r j u d g e - m a d e ' la w (i.e . c o m m o n law ) int o enacte d o r statut e law." 8 5 T h i s proces s would reflec t B e n t h a m ' s belie f tha t al l la w shoul d b e m a d e by t h e legislatur e t o e n s u r e it s validity . Codificatio n woul d certify tha t la w existe d a s a functio n o f t h e wil l o f t h e sovereign authority : "It s authenticit y shoul d b e indisput ably establishe d t h r o u g h it s e m a n a t i n g fro m t h e onl y vali d source o f la w i n t h e c o m m u n i t y . " 8 6 Fo r al l hi s goo d inten tions B e n t h a m di d n o t c o m e clos e t o finishing a workabl e code fo r t h e c o m m o n law : " H e lef t m a n y o d d segment s o f codes, outlines , a n d unfinishe d drafts . N o n e o f t h e m h a d t h e essential s o f a workabl e code ; thei r classification s wer e complicated a n d impractical , a n d the y wer e ful l o f sweep ing generalizations." 8 7 Blackston e wa s n e v e r completel y u n d o n e , fo r t h e c o m m o n la w prevaile d i n spit e o f Ben t h a m ' s strictures , a n d bot h m e n h a d s o u g h t a uniformit y

The Light of Utility 79 in t h e la w tha t simpl y di d no t exist . L o b b a n ha s e m p h a sized tha t t h e c o m m o n la w h a d originate d a s a lega l syste m b e n t u p o n p r o v i d i n g remedies , a n d n e i t h e r Blackston e n o r B e n t h a m wer e p r e p a r e d t o fac e thi s fact. 88 Scheme s for codificatio n a p p e a r e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e n i n e t e e n t h cen tury unti l t h e J u d i c a t u r e Act s o f 187 3 a n d 187 5 r e o r g a nized jurisdiction , b u t t h e spiri t o f codificatio n n e v e r p r e vailed. B e n t h a m h a d faile d t o accomplis h ye t a n o t h e r e l e m e n t o f t h e a g e n d a h e h a d p u r s u e d fo r mos t o f hi s life . O f al l t h e lega l issue s i n a u g u r a t e d b y B e n t h a m , n o n e has h a d g r e a t e r impac t t h a n hi s m a n d a t e tha t lega l analy sis m u s t s e p a r a t e la w fro m morality , t h e la w a s i t i s m u s t be distinguishe d fro m t h e la w a s i t o u g h t t o be . A s H a r t has written , " I n lega l theor y B e n t h a m ' s s h a r p severanc e in t h e Fragment betwee n la w a s i t i s a n d la w a s i t o u g h t t o be a n d hi s insistenc e t h a t t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f a lega l syste m a r e p r o p e r l y describe d i n t h e morall y n e u t r a l t e r m s o f a g e n e r a l habi t o f obedienc e o p e n e d t h e lon g positivis t tradition i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . " 8 9 T h i s q u o t a t i o n ex presses p e r h a p s t h e mos t conventiona l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e. T h e is/ough t dichot omy i n lega l theor y ha s s p u r r e d g e n e r a t i o n s o f reflectio n u p o n thi s p r o b l e m . B y t h e 1870 s a n d 1880 s "th e separa tion o f la w fro m moral s e x t e n d e d als o t o t h e separatio n o f law fro m o t h e r 'non-legal ' o r 'extra-legal ' factors." 9 0 T h e formal o r "analytic " m o d e i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e h a d tri u m p h e d , derivin g it s intellectua l e n e r g y fro m t h e origina l B e n t h a m i t e axiom . But , a s thi s c h a p t e r suggests , t h e g r e a t divide i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e di d n o t c o m e wit h t h e B l a c k s t o n e - B e n t h a m confrontatio n a s H a r t a r g u e d . T h e

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t u r n i n g poin t i n t h e m o d e r n histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e c a m e later , a n d fo r reason s basicall y u n a n t i c i p a t e d by eithe r Blackston e o r B e n t h a m . T h e initia l resul t o f t h e insistenc e u p o n t h e separatio n of la w a n d moralit y wa s a fronta l assaul t o n t h e n a t u r a l law traditio n tha t B e n t h a m h a d f o u n d s o appallin g i n Blackstone: " H e f o u n d himsel f oblige d t o d o battl e wit h those (suc h a s Blackstone ) w h o d e c l a r e d t h e existenc e o f 'natural law ' o r 'natura l r i g h t s ' — m e n wit h w h o m h e oth erwise h a d m u c h i n c o m m o n — b e c a u s e the y t e n d e d t o s u b m e r g e thi s vita l a n d c o m p l e x subjec t i n cloud s o f con fusion a n d wishfu l t h i n k i n g . " 9 1 O n e m i g h t ask , however , w h e t h e r B e n t h a m ' s a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e principl e o f utilit y merely substitute d o n e for m o f m o r a l principl e fo r an o t h e r a n d replicate d t h e s h o d d y m e t h o d o l o g y tha t h e h a d d e n o u n c e d i n hi s adversaries . I n wha t sens e wa s la w t o b e divorced fro m morality ? T h e attac k o n n a t u r a l la w fol lowed t h e strateg y o f e n h a n c i n g legislativ e p o w e r a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e c o m m o n law : "Statut e la w did , i n t e r m s o f form, c o r r e s p o n d m u c h m o r e closel y t h a n c o m m o n la w t o his ide a o f w h a t la w ought t o b e . " 9 2 B e n t h a m ' s c o n c e r n with wha t th e la w o u g h t t o be , o f course , s o u n d e d suspi ciously lik e t h e theorizin g tha t h e h a d use d a s e x a m p l e s o f t h e lac k o f logica l rigo r i n n a t u r a l la w a d h e r e n t s . T h u s t h e famous f o r m u l a o n t h e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y played a tactica l rol e i n t h e b r o a d e r c a m p a i g n agains t t h e c o m m o n law : " B e n t h a m o p p o s e d n a t u r a l la w becaus e h e wished t o k e e p j u d g i n g distinc t fro m legislatin g a n d n o t in o r d e r t o s e p a r a t e la w fro m morality." 9 3 Successor s t o B e n t h a m seize d u p o n thi s prescriptio n a n d t u r n e d i t int o

The Light of Utility 81 a verba l talisma n tha t affecte d Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e thereafter. A n u m b e r o f B e n t h a m ' s critic s hav e p o i n t e d o u t tha t h e simply substitute d t h e principl e o f utilit y fo r traditiona l n a t u r a l la w t h e o r y i n tryin g t o ascertai n t h e p r o p e r stat e of relation s a m o n g individual s i n society . Utilit y fo r Ben t h a m wa s "genuinel y wha t t h e n a t u r a l la w p r e t e n d e d t o b e — t h e f o u n d a t i o n fo r b o t h moralit y a n d legislation." 9 4 T h e a t t e m p t t o d e d u c e rule s o f la w fro m t h e principl e o f utility establishe d a specificall y B e n t h a m i t e n a t u r a l law. 9 5 By e m p l o y i n g t h e principl e o f utilit y t o serv e a s t h e basi s for hi s conclusion s a b o u t b o t h la w a n d morality , B e n t h a m c o m m i t t e d t h e logica l fallac y tha t h e h a d d e n o u n c e d i n others. 9 6 Becaus e t h e consequence s o f t h e principl e o f utility coul d n o t b e empiricall y d e m o n s t r a t e d an y m o r e specifically t h a n n a t u r a l law , i t r e m a i n e d a for m o f m o r a l code n o t easil y distinguishabl e fro m n a t u r a l law. 9 7 I n th e long r u n , t h e r e f o r e , B e n t h a m "wa s m o r e t h a n willin g t o m a k e t h e sam e sor t o f j u d g e m e n ts t h a t n a t u r a l la w theo rists m a d e , t o declar e som e positiv e law s goo d a n d o t h e r s bad a c c o r d i n g t o a s t a n d a r d outsid e t h e m . " 9 8 T h u s t h e claim fo r B e n t h a m ' s originalit y m u s t b e m e a s u r e d agains t t h e sens e tha t h e merel y r e p e a t e d t h e mistake s o f hi s o p p o n e n t s . B u t i f B e n t h a m h a d e r r e d , t h e consequence s certainly p r o v e d fertile . T h e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y m u s t b e u n d e r stood, t h e r e f o r e , a s a n analytica l tool , a n o t h e r perspective , that originate d i n B e n t h a m ' s c o n c e r n fo r a scienc e o f law . T h e p h r a s e h a d a restricte d d o m a i n becaus e clearl y la w a n d moralit y h a d alway s intersected . Law s prescribe d al l

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m a n n e r o f m o r a l imperative s a n d prohibition s a n d hav e c o n t i n u e d t o d o so . T h e is/ough t dichotom y o p e n e d u p alternative a v e n u e s o f analysis , b u t i n t h e proces s i t starte d a n a r r o w i n g o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e ' s purvie w tha t ha s ulti mately altere d it s essentia l character . T h e positivis t tradi tion fro m B e n t h a m o n w a r d ha s s h a r p e n e d analysi s o f t h e law a t t h e e x p e n s e o f limitin g t h e topic s i t c o n s i d e r e d . B e n t h a m di d n o t i n t e n d thi s consequence , ye t i t wa s a result fo r whic h h e m u s t tak e responsibility . O n thes e issue s crucia l t o hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e , B e n t h a m p r o v i d e d significan t topic s fo r discussio n b u t n e v e r m a n aged t o m a k e t h e m i n s t r u m e n t s fo r t h e r e f o r m o f Englis h society. T h e principl e o f utilit y n e v e r b e c a m e t h e funda m e n t a l axi s u p o n whic h al l la w d e p e n d e d . T h e g r a n d schemes a t whic h B e n t h a m labore d al l hi s lif e n e v e r c a m e to fruition , n o r wer e hi s theoretica l premise s eve r ac cepted t o a m e a n i n g f u l d e g r e e . Hi s plan s fo r t h e restruc t u r i n g o f t h e lega l syste m faile d i n t h e first instanc e be cause h e n e v e r c o m p l e t e d t h e cod e o n whic h h e h a d w o r k e d intermittentl y t h r o u g h o u t hi s life : "Ye t thi s ex t r a o r d i n a r y m a n w h o invente d t h e w o r d 'codification / w h o wa s it s lifelon g advocate , a n d w h o t h o u g h t s o highl y of hi s ow n m e t h o d s , neve r go t withi n m e a s u r a b l e distanc e of c o m p l e t i n g a draft , a n d hi s a t t e m p t s see m t o sho w t h a t if h e h a d c o m p l e t e d o n e it s over-grea t particularit y a n d probably it s lengt h woul d hav e m a d e i t hopeles s fro m a practical poin t o f view." 9 9 I n short , B e n t h a m di d n o t real ize t h e tota l r e f o r m o f Englis h societ y t o whic h h e aspired . It wa s a crue l iron y fo r B e n t h a m tha t h e di d hav e a substantial impac t o n Englis h law , b u t thi s c a m e i n t h e i n c r e m e n t a l fashio n tha t h e loathe d becaus e i t r e s e m b l e d

The Light of Utility 83 all to o closel y t h e half-hearte d effort s h e h a d alway s de n o u n c e d i n Blackstone . B e n t h a m ' s contribution s t o t h e c o m m o n la w wer e conspicuou s a n d a legac y i n whic h an y r e f o r m e r coul d tak e p r i d e : " A m o n g t h e c h a n g e s whic h accorded wit h hi s idea s a n d whic h hav e b e e n ascribe d a t least i n p a r t t o hi s inspiration , o n e ca n cit e t h e replace m e n t o f fee s b y salarie s i n court s o f law , t h e simplificatio n of t h e la w o f evidence , t h e establishmen t o f count y court s throughout th e countr y t o expedit e th e administratio n o f justice, a n d t h e mitigatio n o f t h e p e n a l law. " 10 ° N e v e r t h e less, thes e r e f o r m s lacke d t h e totalit y t h a t B e n t h a m ' s vi sion o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i m p o s e d u p o n him . H e h a d alway s d e s i r e d t h e c o m p l e t e destructio n o f Blackstone , b u t i t be c a m e partia l a t best ; t h u s t h e historia n ma y j u d g e Ben t h a m agains t hi s ow n s t a n d a r d s , a n d b y thi s n o r m h e never acquire d tha t i m p o s i n g influenc e t h a t h e h a d de sired. Wit h t h e essentia l failur e o f t h e plan s fo r lega l r e f o r m , t h e b l u e p r i n t fo r politica l influenc e f o u n d e r e d as well . T h e questio n o f B e n t h a m i t e influenc e i n t h e Victoria n era, particularl y o n t h e g r o w t h o f t h e centra l administra tion, ha s i n t r i g u e d historian s fo r severa l decades . T h e consideration o f B e n t h a m ' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e p e r m i t s t h e conclusion t h a t i f i t faile d a s a g e n e r a l scienc e o f society , t h e n inevitabl y t h e politica l consequence s h e desire d n e v e r materialized either . I n t h e m o r e specifi c a r e a o f govern m e n t r e f o r m , S . E . Fine r offere d a m o d e l t o explai n t h e c o m p l e x wa y i n whic h t h e idea s o f a n individua l hav e a n impact, wit h B e n t h a m a s t h e specifi c e x a m p l e o f diffusio n t h r o u g h irradiation , suscitation , a n d p e r m e a t i o n . 1 0 1 T h i s m o d e l ha s w o r k e d well , b u t i t m i g h t b e redefine d int o

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categories o f p r i m a r y , secondary , a n d tertiar y i m p o r tance: " T h e r e a r e thos e w h o a r e rationall y p e r s u a d e d b y r e a d i n g t h e work s o f t h e leadin g t h i n k e r s o f a particula r school. B u t the y a r e probabl y o u t n u m b e r e d b y thos e who , without g r a p p l i n g wit h t h e recondit e literature , merel y a d o p t t h e vocabular y a s i t i s p u r v e y e d b y a h o r d e o f les s original publicists." 1 0 2 B e n t h a m ' s rol e a s a catalys t i n spe cific historica l processe s ha s d i m i n i s h e d a s historian s hav e shown a n increasin g reluctanc e t o accep t earlie r claim s fo r his extensiv e influence . A s H e l e n B e y n o n ha s written , t h e r e wa s littl e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e betwee n wha t B e n t h a m w a n t e d a n d wha t actuall y t r a n s p i r e d i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h century. 1 0 3 I n t h e a r g u m e n t b y A n t h o n y B r u n d a g e , eve n the avowe d agent s o f B e n t h a m i t e c h a n g e rarel y followe d t h e master' s idea s t o an y substantia l d e g r e e , a n d the y a s often directl y o p p o s e d wha t B e n t h a m h a d p r o p o s e d . 1 0 4 For b e t t e r o r worse , B e n t h a m ha s b e c o m e f o d d e r fo r academic discussion , achievin g a n i m p o r t a n c e h e n e v e r gained i n life , fo r c h a m p i o n s stil l enlis t i n hi s cause. 1 0 5 W h e r e B e n t h a m faile d i n t h e g r a n d desig n fo r t h e trans formation o f society , h e di d succee d i n b e c o m i n g t h e cen tral figure o f t h e Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n t i al traditio n a s i t ha s flourished i n t h e academi c world . In o n e respect , however , eve n academic s hav e t r e a t e d B e n t h a m unkindly . Man y jurists i n t h e pas t di d n o t credi t B e n t h a m wit h t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e analyti c tradition , yielding tha t positio n t o J o h n Austin , hi s chie f discipl e i n matters o f lega l philosophy . T h i s mistake n assessmen t o f t h e relationshi p betwee n B e n t h a m a n d Austi n ha s tw o explanations. T h e first involve d t h e c r a m p e d m a n n e r i n which Austi n i n t e r p r e t e d b o t h t h e topic s fo r consideratio n

The Light of Utility 85 a n d t h e doctrine s B e n t h a m e s p o u s e d : " T h e n a r r o w i n g o f t h e focu s o f attentio n i s illustrate d b y t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y d i s p l a c e m e n t o f B e n t h a m b y Austi n a s 'th e F a t h e r o f En glish J u r i s p r u d e n c e ,' a m i s j u d g m e n t tha t say s m u c h a b o u t t h e limitation s o f Englis h academi c la w d u r i n g t h e firs t half o f thi s century. " 10 6 A c c u s t o m e d t o a restricte d defi nition o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e , Victoria n jurist s naturall y (an d erroneously) looke d t o Austi n fo r intellectua l g u i d a n c e . "Austin ma y hav e b e e n recognize d a s t h e fathe r o f juris p r u d e n c e , b u t i t wa s reall y t h e bastar d chil d o f Ben t h a m . " 10 7 T h e secon d e x p l a n a t i o n derive s fro m Austin' s p r o m i n e n c e i n t h e late r p a r t o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century , whic h t e n d e d t o obscur e B e n t h a m ' s plac e i n t h e p a n t h e o n o f English j u r i s p r u d e n c e. T h e heyda y o f Austi n i n t h e 1870 s a n d 1880 s p u s h e d B e n t h a m int o a subsidiar y rol e fro m which hi s r e p u t a t i o n ha s onl y recentl y escaped . Mos t lega l scholars i n t h e p e r i o d 1870—195 0 a s s u m e d tha t Austi n had expande d u p o n th e blueprin t draw n b y Bentham , a n d t h a t analyti c j u r i s p r u d e n c e resulte d primaril y fro m Austin's v e n t u r e s b e y o n d t h e issue s a d d r e s s e d b y Ben t h a m . T h i s conclusio n wa s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e w h e n o n e re calls t h a t t h e rehabilitatio n o f B e n t h a m ' s r e p u t a t i o n ha s depended u p o n unpublishe d manuscript s unknow n t o previous jurists . Austi n i n fac t r e d u c e d B e n t h a m ' s t h o u g h t t o a m o r e rigi d system , gainin g i n analysi s wha t he los t i n b r e a d t h . O n subject s lik e la w a s c o m m a n d , sov ereignty, a n d t h e separatio n o f la w a n d morality , Austi n took t h e B e n t h a m i t e legac y a n d n a r r o w e d it s scope . A s H a r t wrote : "Fo r lik e Austin' s theory , B e n t h a m ' s i s a n imperative theor y o f la w i n whic h th e centra l concept s a r e

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those o f sovereig n a n d c o m m a n d , a n d t h e definition s o f both sovereig n a n d c o m m a n d a r e a t first sigh t ver y simila r in t h e tw o a u t h o r s . B u t B e n t h a m e x p o u n d s thes e idea s with fa r g r e a t e r subtlet y a n d flexibility t h a n Austi n a n d illuminates aspect s o f la w largel y neglecte d b y h i m . " l 0 8 M u c h o f wha t b e c a m e analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n ce originate d in t h e difference s betwee n teache r a n d s t u d e n t ; i t di d n o t evolve i n a straigh t lin e b e g i n n i n g wit h Austin . I n t h e final analysis , Blackston e a n d B e n t h a m , thos e p e r p e t u a l antagonists , wer e linke d b y thei r c o m m o n at tempt t o provid e a genera l theor y o f jurisprudenc e a s a proxy fo r sweepin g consideratio n o f socia l issues . I n t h e long r u n t h e f o r m e r suffere d fro m neglec t a n d t h e latte r from t h e contractio n o f hi s origina l concerns : "Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e b e c a m e t h e m o n o p o l y o f lega l craftsme n c o m p e t e n t a n d knowledgeabl e b u t devoi d o f greatnes s because the y t h o u g h t increasingl y tha t lega l scienc e coul d be divorce d fro m lega l theory , tha t t h e la w a s i t i s a n d t h e law a s i t o u g h t t o b e wer e tw o world s entirel y s e p a r a t e from eac h o t h e r a n d tha t th e lawyer' s c o n c e r n wa s onl y with t h e f o r m e r . " 1 0 9 B e n t h a m ' s e m p h a s i s o n legislatio n resulted i n increasingl y microscopi c e x a m i n a t i o n o f lega l issues: The legislato r acte d indirectly ; h e establishe d th e framewor k o f security throug h law , a framewor k whos e valu e wa s judge d initially b y th e libert y eac h perso n ha d t o pursu e hi s ow n plea sures s o lon g a s h e di d no t har m th e interest s o f others . A t th e level o f th e civi l law , th e legislato r secure d right s t o property , prevented interference , simplifie d title s an d judicia l proceed ings, an d enhance d competitivenes s i n commercia l transactions . At th e leve l o f th e crimina l law , h e secure d th e individua l

The Light of Utility 87 against crim e wit h a rationa l crimina l cod e an d a stron g an d effective polic e forc e an d judiciary. A t th e leve l of constitutiona l law, th e legislato r aime d t o provid e securit y agains t misrule. 110 T h i s t e n d e n c y towar d legislativ e activis m t u r n e d Ben t h a m i t e j u r i s p r u d e n ce int o a n objec t o f academi c c o n c e r n for it s theoretica l valu e only . B e n t h a m ' s lega l t h e o r y ha s t r i u m p h e d i n E n g l a n d b u t i n a v e n u e , t h e academi c world , too limite d fo r hi s loft y d r e a m s . B e n t h a m fostere d t h e tradition o f analyti c j u r i s p r u d e n ce i n E n g l a n d b u t thi s fel l far s h o r t o f hi s desig n fo r success .

Chapter Four

John Austin "The Matte r o f Jurisprudenc e I

s

Positive Law "

If J e r e my B e n t h a m , i n o n e guis e o r a n o t h e r , i s well k n o w n to historians , J o h n Austin , hi s mos t famou s discipl e i n t h e field o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e , ha s l a n g u i s h e d i n obscurit y unti l recently. T h i s indifferenc e ha s b e e n u n d e s e r v e d becaus e Austin a t o n e tim e exercise d considerabl e influence , a n d h e wa s "th e mos t trul y e r u d i t e j u r i s t o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . " l A n individua l o f decidedl y m o d e s t r e p u t a t i o n in hi s lifetime , Austi n enjoye d a p o s t h u m o u s v o g u e tha t m a d e h i m t h e leadin g figure i n lat e Victoria n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . B y t h e 1880 s thi s brie f ascendanc y h a d alread y c o m e u n d e r attack , a n d hi s r e p u t a t i o n l a n g u i s h e d i n t h e limbo o f a r c a n e footnote s unti l t h e publicatio n o f H . L . A . Hart's The Concept of Law i n 196 1 r e s t o r e d hi s respectabil 89

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ity a s a jurist whos e wor k repai d clos e study . No t unti l th e 1980s di d Austi n becom e th e subjec t o f majo r descriptiv e and analytica l studie s tha t hav e place d hi m no t onl y i n th e history o f Englis h jurisprudence , bu t als o i n th e broa d context o f Victoria n intellectua l history. 2 T h e origin s an d doctrines o f Austinia n jurisprudenc e ar e centra l t o a proper understandin g o f th e Englis h jurisprudentia l tra dition becaus e o f th e necessit y t o fix accuratel y hi s rela tionship t o Bentham , an d t o delineat e ho w hi s ow n teach ings change d meanin g i n th e hand s o f succeedin g jurists . T h e majo r influenc e o n th e first generatio n o f th e aca demic la w professoriat e o f th e 1880s , Austin' s writing s o n jurisprudence ha s ultimatel y exercise d a fascinatio n fo r later jurists tha t woul d hav e astounde d th e author . John Austi n wa s bor n i n 179 0 an d nothin g remarkabl e is know n abou t hi m unti l h e obtaine d a commissio n i n th e army durin g th e Napoleoni c wars . Hi s caree r a s a n office r did no t ear n distinction , s o h e lef t th e servic e i n searc h o f another pat h t o fam e an d achievement . Thi s se t a patter n of hig h ambitio n bu t littl e accomplishmen t tha t dogge d Austin fo r th e remainde r o f hi s life . H e di d no t achiev e the fam e an d fortun e tha t h e sought , an d eve r afte r wa s "haunted wit h a sens e o f guil t an d worthlessnes s fo r no t living u p t o hi s ow n exactin g standards." 3 H e turne d t o the stud y o f la w an d wa s calle d t o th e ba r i n 1818 , but , like Bentham , Austi n foun d hi s experience s i n practic e profoundly distressing . Hi s fe w cour t appearance s wer e disastrous, hi s caree r foundered , an d eventuall y h e qui t the ba r i n 182 5 withou t appreciabl e success . I n th e mean time Austi n ha d me t Bentha m i n 181 9 i n London , an d already familia r wit h hi s writings , h e succumbe d rapidl y

" The Matter of Jurisprudence Is Positive Law" 91 to th e char m o f th e age d maste r an d joine d th e inne r circle o f Bentham' s confidants . Austi n an d hi s wif e Sara h moved t o a hous e i n Westminste r an d becam e neighbor s of Bentha m an d Jame s Mill . Austin' s attentio n fel l u p o n jurisprudence, th e subjec t t o whic h Bentha m ha d devote d so muc h tim e an d abou t whic h h e ha d writte n s o prolifi cally. A s tol d i n chapte r 3 , Bentham' s divers e interest s prevented hi m fro m accomplishin g al l h e intende d i n le gal theory , s o Austi n soo n becam e th e hei r apparen t charged wit h carryin g o n th e wor k o f hi s elderl y mentor . In a lette r t o Bentha m shortl y befor e hi s marriage , Austi n accepted thi s role : " I hav e lon g revere d you , an d m y d e e p conviction o f th e importanc e o f you r doctrine s ha s lon g inflamed m e wit h a n earnes t desir e t o se e the m widel y diffused an d generall y embraced ; I shal l fee l n o violen t desire fo r an y othe r objec t tha n tha t o f disseminatin g your doctrines." 4 I n 182 6 Austin' s ow n intellectua l goal s altered dramaticall y u p o n hi s appointmen t a s th e inaugu ral professo r o f jurisprudence a t th e newl y founde d Uni versity o f London . Austin devote d himsel f completel y t o th e preparatio n for hi s academi c career . H e journeye d t o Bon n i n 182 6 for tw o year s o f stud y a t th e universit y an d th e opportu nity t o mee t wit h it s famou s la w faculty . T h e carefu l stud y of civi l la w provide d Austi n wit h a perspectiv e tha t helpe d ease hi m ou t o f Bentham' s shado w an d gav e Austi n idea s that distance d hi m fro m Bentham. 5 Hi s familiarit y wit h Roman la w an d contemporar y civi l law , s o unlik e th e typi cal insularit y o f th e Englis h bar , ha s earne d hi m th e mod ern accolad e a s th e "firs t grea t lawye r i n Englan d sinc e Bracton t o b e wel l acquainte d with , an d influence d by ,

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continental doctrine." 6 Whil e i n German y h e prepare d the lecture s tha t h e hope d woul d establis h hi s reputatio n as wel l a s enlighte n hi s students . T h e Germa n interlud e helped star t Austi n i n a directio n tha t woul d sav e hi m from th e slavis h imitatio n o f Bentham' s jurisprudence. A t the sam e time , however , Austi n retaine d th e Benthamit e mission o f transformin g th e worl d an d contributin g t o human betterment. 7 Once agai n hi s hope s fo r succes s wer e dashed , fo r hi s university lecture s undertake n i n th e fal l o f 1829 , afte r a year's dela y becaus e o f hi s diffidence, wer e a n unmitigate d debacle. Detaile d t o a fault , ultimatel y borin g i n th e ex treme t o undergraduates , an d marre d b y th e nervou s de meanor o f th e lecturer , hi s classroo m presentation s turned a n enthusiasti c ban d o f student s int o a despairin g few: "Austi n though t i t a dut y t o b e a s dr y a s Bentham , and discharge d tha t dut y scrupulously . T h e audience s dwindled, an d th e salary , derive d fro m th e fees , dwindle d with it . Austin , a poo r man , coul d no t g o o n discoursin g gratuitously t o empt y benches , an d gav e hi s las t lectur e i n 1832." 8 Whe n Austi n offere d hi s secon d serie s o f lecture s in 1830 , no t on e studen t too k u p th e challenge . Thi s fiasco, alon g wit h lecture s a t th e Inne r T e m p l e tha t me t with a n equall y tepi d reception , cause d Austi n t o resig n his chair : "H e wa s s o scarre d b y disappointmen t an d hu miliation tha t hencefort h h e refuse d eve n t o conside r per manent residenc e i n London , a s i t wa s th e scen e o f to o many memories." 9 Austin's persona l lif e starte d o n a slid e fro m whic h i t never recovered . Afte r a stin t a s a la w commissione r o n Malta fro m 183 6 t o 1838 , Austi n neve r enjoye d gainfu l

" The Matter of Jurisprudence Is

Positive Law' 9 93

e m p l o y m e n t fo r t h e res t o f hi s life . T h e Austin s live d a b r o a d fo r e x t e n d e d periods , usuall y i n G e r m a n y , w h e r e Sarah Austi n m a n a g e d t o ek e o u t a livin g a s a translator . T h e y r e t u r n e d t o E n g l a n d i n 184 8 b u t stil l refuse d t o liv e in L o n d o n , t h e scen e o f hi s greates t d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . O n e assessment o f Austin' s lif e ha s c o n c l u d e d : "Austi n wa s p o o r , hi s constitutio n wa s weak , h e wa s a failur e a s a teacher o f law , t h e merit s o f hi s writing s w e r e u n r e c o g nized b y al l b u t a few , a n d , w h e n h e died , h e wa s almos t u n k n o w n a m o n g s t lawyers." 1 0 A m o r e recen t i n t e r p r e t a tion ha s reinforce d thi s gloom y litan y o f t h e persona l a n d professiona l d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s Austi n e n d u r e d : " J o h n Austin i m p r e s s e d a smal l g r o u p o f c o n t e m p o r a r i e s b y hi s highly origina l idea s a n d s t r o n g opinions , b u t h e faile d t o live u p t o hi s p r o m i s e a n d publishe d s o littl e t h a t h e r e g a r d e d himsel f a s a failure , a n d h e die d a n e m b i t t e r e d m a n wit h n o a p p r e h e n s i o n tha t hi s n a m e woul d live." 1 1 At hi s d e a t h i n 185 9 Austi n s e e m e d a mos t unlikel y candi d a t e fo r inclusio n i n t h e p a n t h e o n o f Englis h j u r i s p r u dence. Few intellectual s ca n hav e enjoye d s o r e m a r k a b l e a p o s t h u m o u s shif t i n f o r t u n e t h a n Austin , a n d t h e credi t for thi s w e n t t o hi s wif e Sarah , surel y o n e o f t h e m o r e notable Victoria n wive s i n t h e p r o m o t i o n o f a h u s b a n d ' s r e p u t a t i o n . Fo r mos t o f t h e m a r r i a g e S a r a h h a d supplie d t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d s t r e n g t h (a s wel l a s t h e income ) that h a d s u p p o r t e d Austi n i n hi s tribulations . Lif e wit h J o h n Austi n h a d alway s b e e n a trial , fo r h e c o m p o u n d e d his fecklessnes s wit h f r e q u e n t bout s o f h y p o c h o n d r i a , hi s bitterness a t frustrate d h o p e s m a t c h e d onl y b y hi s melan cholia. I n 183 2 Austi n h a d publishe d hi s mos t significan t

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work, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, a n d whil e t h e boo k h a d receive d a n u m b e r o f favorabl e reviews, 1 2 i t h a d n o t achieve d t h e recognitio n o r financial succes s tha t its a u t h o r h a d envisioned : "A s L o r d M e l b o u r n e wa s t o say, Austin' s Province of Jurisprudence Determined (whic h consisted o f som e o f t h e lecture s Austi n h a d r e a d t o hi s class), wa s 'th e dulles t boo k h e h a d eve r r e a d ' — a n d thi s from s o m e o n e w h o r e a d theologica l book s a s a p a s t i m e . " 1 3 Its relevanc e t o o n g o i n g debate s a b o u t la w a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e h a d w a n e d graduall y becaus e Austi n h a d faile d t o publish t h e s u b s e q u e n t v o l u m e o n whic h h e labore d al l hi s life b u t n e v e r finished. Sara h Austi n d e t e r m i n e d t h a t h e r h u s b a n d ' s idea s shoul d no t di e wit h him , a n d sh e s u p e r vised t h e republicatio n o f The Province of Jurisprudence Determined i n 1861 . Sh e t h e n compile d a n d publishe d t h r o u g h h e r reconstructio n o f note s lef t b y h e r h u s b a n d t h e Lectures on Jurisprudence i n 1863 . T h i s wa s not , how ever, t h e grea t wor k u p o n whic h Austi n labore d fo r de cades b u t n e v e r published . T h e Lectures r e p r e s e n t t h e t h o u g h t o f Austi n i n 1832 ; h e s p e n t t h e r e m a i n d e r o f hi s life i n vai n a t t e m p t s a t carryin g hi s wor k forward . A s Sarah Austi n wrote : "I t seem s h a r d l y necessar y t o r e p e a t , (yet I c a n n o t r e p e a t to o often ) tha t thi s boo k show s n o t what t h e A u t h o r h a d d o n e , b u t wha t h e i n t e n d e d t o do , a n d i n som e d e g r e e wha t h e wa s capabl e o f d o i n g . " 1 4 A new g e n e r a t i o n o f jurist s a n d la w student s discovere d i n Austin a discussio n o f lega l issue s t h a t s e e m e d ne w a n d exciting, a n d hi s fam e wa s assured . Hi s scholarl y r e p u t a tion ha s w a x e d a n d w a n e d sinc e t h e 1860s , b u t i t ha s never slippe d bac k int o tha t obscurit y fo r whic h Austi n seemed destine d i n 1859 .

The Matter of Jurisprudence Is

Positive Law" 95

In t u r n i n g t o t h e issue s discusse d i n thes e tw o majo r works, t h e historia n shoul d kno w t h a t Austi n suffere d from a sever e cas e o f Benthamitis ; t h a t is , thes e work s a r e dense, overl y technica l i n m a n y respects , a n d writte n i n that convolute d styl e s o distressingl y reminiscen t o f Ben t h a m himself . H e a i m e d a t a verba l precisio n tha t bor d e r e d o n t h e obsessive , ye t afte r lavishin g s o m u c h atten tion o n hi s writing , "i t wa s stilte d a n d p e d a n t i c . " 1 5 T h e s e books d o n o t entic e t h e r e a d e r a s m u c h a s p r e s e n t a challenge, fo r a schola r m u s t really posses s a c o m m i t m e n t to j u r i s p r u d e n ce befor e e n t e r i n g t h e f o r b i d d i n g worl d o f analytical j u r i s p r u d e n c e . N o d o u b t literar y deficiencie s h a d c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e initia l failur e o f The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, a n d t h e Lectures di d n o t d e m o n strate m u c h i m p r o v e m e n t . I f Austin' s wor k faile d t o at tract t h e wid e a u d i e n c e h e h a d h o p e d for , stylisti c p r o b lems alon e woul d hav e a c c o u n t e d fo r hi s lac k o f success . T h e provinc e o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e , Austi n asserted , wa s positive law , o r la w se t b y politica l superior s t o politica l inferiors. 1 6 Positiv e la w wa s actuall y i n us e a n d it s m o r a l c o n t e n t di d n o t affec t t h e fac t tha t i t wa s t h e p r o p e r subject o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e . 1 7 Law , p r o p e r l y perceived , Aus tin define d a s a specie s o f c o m m a n d . Positiv e la w alon e was t h e fit topi c o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce fo r a n a l y s i s — n o t divin e law, n o r law s o f morality , n o r law s m e t a p h o r i c a l o r figurative. O t h e r basi c concept s o f positiv e la w include d sover eignty, sanction , a n d habitua l obedience . W h e n p u t to g e t h e r , t h e r e f o r e , la w wa s a specie s o f c o m m a n d b y a s u p e r i o r o r sovereign , w h o wa s i n t h e habi t o f receivin g obedience, t o a n inferior , t o whic h disobedienc e woul d result i n a sanction . T h i s definitio n woul d fre e positiv e

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law, thu s limite d i n it s scope , fro m confusio n wit h th e moral postulate s a s expresse d i n natura l la w theory . Aus tin mad e explici t th e necessit y t o separat e la w fro m moral ity i n orde r fo r jurisprudenc e t o exten d pas t th e ol d de bates an d t o pu t la w o n a scientifi c basis . Rule s o f huma n conduct, suc h a s thos e tha t mandate d som e for m o f ap propriate behavior , coul d no t qualif y a s la w becaus e the y lacked th e necessar y component s o f la w itself . Austin' s objective "wa s nothin g les s tha n t o elucidat e th e basi c con cepts o f jurisprudenc e an d th e structur e o f a lega l system. 18 Austin relie d heavil y o n th e principl e o f utility , whic h he tende d t o identif y wit h th e law s o f Go d o r divin e law . N o parado x dramatize s a s wel l th e comple x histor y o f th e recurring issu e o f th e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y in Englis h lega l philosophy ; n o soone r ha s a n individua l proclaimed th e absolut e requiremen t tha t la w mus t neve r be confuse d wit h moralit y i n lega l analysi s tha n tha t sam e individual propose s som e alternativ e religiou s o r mora l criterion t o ac t a s a lega l standard : "Accordin g t o th e theory o f utility , th e measur e o r tes t o f huma n conduc t i s the la w se t by Go d t o hi s huma n creatures . T h e command s which h e ha s no t revealed , w e mus t constru e b y the princi ple o f utility : b y th e probabl e effect s o f ou r conduc t o n that genera l happines s o r goo d whic h i s th e final caus e o r purpose o f th e goo d an d wis e lawgive r i n al l hi s law s and commandments." 1 9 Utilit y an d religio n wer e identica l (this fro m th e autho r wh o ha d earlie r argue d tha t la w an d morality mus t neve r meet) : "Go d himsel f wa s a Bentham ite." 20 Austi n credite d Bentha m wit h "clearnes s an d accu racy" i n explicatin g th e principl e o f utility , an d wit h bein g

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Positive Law" 97

"the firs t o f al l p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o ha s viewe d i t fro m ever y aspect, a n d ha s fitte d i t fo r practice." 2 1 Austi n e n u n c i a t e d t h e imperativ e t h e o r y o f la w t h a t b e c a m e hi s mos t famou s legacy a n d c o m b i n e d i t wit h utilit y t o giv e hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e it s power . In The Province of Jurisprudence Determined Austi n pre sented hi s a r g u m e n t s i n si x lectures . Hi s p u r p o s e i n th e first wa s t o defin e hi s t e r m s i n a wa y tha t woul d identif y laws, p r o p e r l y s o called , a n d rul e o u t thos e entitie s tha t too ofte n m a s q u e r a d e d a s la w a n d create d confusio n i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . T h i s wa s accomplishe d b y a t h o r o u g h ex amination o f l a n g u a g e . Laws , t h e r e f o r e , wer e a specie s o f c o m m a n d , a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f c o m m a n d wa s crucial , "since i t i s t h e key t o t h e science s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d morals." 2 2 Lecture s 2 , 3 , a n d 4 e x a m i n e d t h e principl e o f utility i n o r d e r t o specif y it s i m p o r t a n c e fo r j u r i s p r u d e n c e . T h e carefu l m a n n e r i n whic h Austi n lai d d o w n defini tions, constructe d hi s a r g u m e n t , a n d t h e n a t t e m p t e d t o forestall objection s recalle d i n som e respect s t h e scholasti c a p p r o a c h exemplifie d bes t b y Aquinas . I n lectur e 5 Austi n dealt wit h thos e law s tha t di d n o t m e e t t h e criteri a t o b e called law ; suc h e x h o r t a t i o n s w e r e n o t law s becaus e th e sanction aros e fro m g e n e r a l o p i n i o n only. 2 3 Finally , i n lecture 6 , Austi n focuse d hi s attentio n o n t r u e laws , thos e that qualifie d b y virtu e o f t h e e m p h a s i s o n c o m m a n d . T h i s lectur e i s almos t a s lon g a s t h e o t h e r five c o m b i n e d a n d r e p r e s e n t e d t h e c a p s t o n e t o Austin' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e . His t h o r o u g h linguisti c analysi s o f majo r idea s m a k e fo r slow r e a d i n g , ye t i t r e m a i n e d t h e h e a r t o f hi s a p p r o a c h t o law. Afte r al l thi s c o n c e n t r a t e d c o n t e m p l a t i o n ostensibl y in t h e n a m e o f r e s h a p i n g society , t h e r e a d e r i s left withou t

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any distinc t impressio n o f ho w thi s shoul d work . Austin' s examples demonstrate d eve n les s practicalit y tha n Ben tham, an d thi s help s explai n wh y th e wor k initiall y re ceived suc h a n indifferen t reception . I n a n Englan d ex cited b y th e refor m bil l o f 183 2 an d devote d t o materia l progress, Austin' s Province ha d littl e relevance . In th e lon g run , however , Austin' s allegianc e t o th e principle o f utilit y ha s turne d ou t t o b e fa r mor e comple x than originall y thought , an d hi s acceptanc e prove d condi tional i n hi s late r life . Fo r tha t reaso n th e issu e provide s a neat stud y i n th e wa y tha t Austi n bot h accepte d an d devi ated fro m Benthamit e jurisprudence . A s indicate d i n th e previous paragraph , man y o f th e earl y page s o f The Province of JurisprudenceDetermined endorse d utilit y a s th e onl y appropriate "foundatio n fo r th e mora l an d politica l sci ences." 2 4 Thi s circumstanc e len t credibilit y t o th e conven tional argumen t tha t Bentha m an d Austi n constitute d in terchangeable part s o f th e sam e intellectua l heritage . Austin, whil e acceptin g utilit y initiall y a s th e basi s o f hi s jurisprudence, eventuall y cam e t o a different vie w becaus e he becam e disenchante d wit h th e elaborat e calculu s tha t Bentham constructed . Whil e Bentha m worke d ou t a t great lengt h al l th e variable s i n th e pleasur e an d pai n calculus an d gav e specifi c attentio n t o it s theoretica l valid ity, Austi n "instea d sneer s . . . a t th e competin g principle s and devote s muc h tim e t o minimizin g th e detaile d calcula tions require d b y emphasizin g th e exten t t o whic h ther e may b e relianc e o n maxim s an d rules." 25 Eve n mor e perti nent t o understandin g Austi n o n utilit y wa s th e repudia tion (o r a t leas t a significan t downgradin g o f it s impor tance) afte r th e publicatio n o f The Province of Jurisprudence

" The Matter of Jurisprudence Is Positive Law" 99 Determined. T h e trus t i n rationa l calculatio n gav e wa y t o a belief i n customar y politica l arrangement s an d emotiona l ties a s th e base s o f a lega l system . Bese t b y prolonge d bouts o f depressio n tha t cripple d hi s intentions , Austi n never publishe d th e comprehensiv e wor k tha t woul d hav e made thi s transitio n plain , an d thi s contribute d t o th e sense o f futilit y tha t marke d th e late r par t o f hi s life : "I t must hav e bee n a terribl e thin g fo r hi m t o realiz e tha t hi s early confidenc e ha d bee n unfounde d an d tha t h e ha d sacrificed decade s o f though t an d labou r t o a scienc e o f jurisprudence whos e foundation s h e no w recognize d t o be feeble." 2 6 Ironically , th e Austi n wh o represente d ana lytical jurisprudence t o subsequen t generation s woul d no t have regarde d tha t designatio n a s accurat e i n hi s ow n case. T h e discussio n o f Austi n an d th e evolvin g natur e o f his commitmen t t o th e principl e o f utilit y ha s introduce d perhaps th e mos t crucia l issu e fo r th e historian : ho w th e changing natur e o f hi s relationshi p t o Bentham' s teach ings affecte d th e late r cours e o f Englis h jurisprudence . Despite th e tendenc y o f earlie r generation s t o lum p th e two m e n together , th e recen t wav e o f scholarshi p ha s emphasized rightl y th e disagreement s tha t separate d them, especiall y thei r "fundamentall y differen t attitude s towards th e c o m m o n law , an d differen t aspiration s fo r their work." 2 7 Originall y Austi n ha d committe d himsel f dramatically t o th e attainmen t o f Benthamit e objectives : "Austin humbl y offere d t o sacrific e worldl y opportunitie s to Bentham' s cause." 2 8 T h e bond s o f utilitarianis m tha t tied th e tw o jurists togethe r i n c o m m o n intellectua l enter prise predominated , a t leas t i n th e beginning , ove r th e

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relatively mino r question s o n whic h the y disagreed : "Th e significance o f th e relationshi p tha t Joh n Austi n devel oped wit h [James ] Mil l an d Bentha m i s difficul t t o exag gerate. T o begi n with , thei r idea s strongl y influence d th e spectacles throug h whic h Austi n sa w muc h o f th e world." 2 9 Austi n possesse d to o independen t an d inquisi tive a min d t o settl e simpl y fo r th e rol e o f pupil , however , and graduall y difference s betwee n th e tw o me n appeared , a rar e p h e n o m e n o n fo r Bentham , wh o di d no t welcom e dissent fro m o r eve n discussio n o f hi s ideas : acceptanc e was wha t h e required . For example , a s pointe d ou t earlier , Austi n retaine d a religiou s basi s fo r hi s utilitarianism , wherea s Bentha m rejected an y hin t o f supernatura l ethic s i n hi s expositio n of th e principl e o f utility. 30 T h e tw o me n ha d share d th e agnosticism c o m m o n i n th e circl e o f Bentham' s disciples . Gradually Austi n change d hi s religiou s convictions : "B y the tim e h e gav e th e lecture s o n jurisprudenc e h e com bined a theologica l positio n wit h hi s politica l views ; soo n afterwards hi s daughte r denie d h e wa s a n atheis t an d attributed t o hi m a belie f i n th e importanc e o f religio n a s a sourc e o f morality." 31 Thi s affinit y fo r religiou s precept s permeated hi s attempt s t o modif y hi s ow n formul a fo r the separatio n o f la w an d morality . Thi s propensit y kep t Austin fro m becomin g simpl y a Benthamit e clone : "Aus tin's us e o f Divin e la w als o clearl y differentiate d hi s ethica l theories fro m eithe r Bentham' s o r J . S . Mill's." 32 Thi s recognition ha s helpe d th e argumen t tha t th e suppose d antitheses betwee n natura l la w adherent s lik e Blackston e and analytica l jurist s lik e Austi n hav e bee n exaggerated , and tha t th e similaritie s betwee n thes e tw o me n ar e mor e

" The Matter of JurisprudenceIs Positive Law 9' 101 important tha n thei r differences . Austin' s wor k mus t b e seen i n bot h it s Blackstonia n an d Benthamit e origins. 3 3 I n the contex t o f Englis h jurisprudence , Bentha m an d Aus tin carve d ou t separat e position s fo r themselves , an d th e tendency t o regar d the m a s identica l doe s a disservic e to both . On th e subjec t o f la w i n general , whateve r disagree ments existe d o n particula r points , Austi n clun g t o th e belief tha t Bentha m ha d mad e outstandin g contributions . For thi s reaso n th e ter m "analytica l jurisprudence " ha s usually encompasse d th e wor k o f bot h men , althoug h i t does scan t justic e t o th e contribution s o f either ; i t ha s value no w onl y a s a historica l term , no t on e german e generally t o philosoph y o r jurisprudence. Analytica l juris prudence too k it s nam e fro m th e emphasi s o f bot h men , but especiall y Austin , o n th e primar y tas k o f analyzin g legal concept s prio r t o th e examinatio n o f an y othe r face t of a lega l system . Bentham' s stres s o n prope r definition s and hi s inventio n o f languag e t o accomplis h tha t tas k tended t o portra y th e analytica l schoo l a s to o rigorousl y deductive an d therefor e incapabl e o f breakin g awa y fro m the close d syste m h e ha d created . Whethe r Austin' s juris prudence owe d mor e t o inductiv e o r deductiv e premise s has attracte d muc h attention. 3 4 W . L . Moriso n ha s argue d strongly fo r a n inductiv e Austin : "I n th e manne r i n whic h Austin combine d a determinedl y empirica l approac h t o law wit h a vie w tha t i t coul d b e analyze d b y mean s o f traditional logic , w e se e Austin' s endurin g contributio n to jurisprudence." 3 5 I n Austi n "th e definitio n l a w i s a command o f th e sovereign ' i s presented . . . not a s a logica l postulate fro m whic h substantiv e proportion s o f la w ca n

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be analyticall y d e d u c e d b u t r a t h e r a s a c o n n o t a t i o n o f t h e word l a w ' i n t e r m s o f empirica l facts." 3 6 A n o t h e r versio n of thi s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ha s hel d tha t Austi n a s s u m e d "tha t all knowledg e i s ultimatel y derive d fro m observatio n a n d e x p e r i e n c e . " 3 7 Despit e t h e surfac e similaritie s tha t u n i t e d B e n t h a m a n d Austin , thei r difference s no w see m t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t fo r t h e elaboratio n o f t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l tradition. Austi n eventuall y wen t hi s ow n philosophica l way, wit h i m p o r t a n t consequence s fo r t h e s u b s e q u e n t his tory o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e . T h e c o m p a r i s o n o f B e n t h a m a n d Austi n o n ke y issue s makes plai n tha t a l t h o u g h t h e subject s u n d e r discussio n were e x p r e s s e d i n m u c h t h e sam e language , t h e conclu sions r e a c h e d wer e dissimilar . O n e cas e i n p o i n t wa s t h e c o m m a n d theor y o f law , i n whic h Austi n define d la w a s t h e c o m m a n d o f t h e sovereign , a n d hel d tha t onl y thos e rules tha t p r o c e e d e d fro m t h e wil l o f t h e sovereig n de served t h e titl e o f law . Austi n di d n o t trea t t h e psychologi cal issue s tha t s u r r o u n d e d t h e notio n o f c o m m a n d a s full y as B e n t h a m , a l t h o u g h Austi n wa s sensitiv e t o t h e variou s forms o f c o n d u c t tha t t h e w o r d " c o m m a n d " entailed. 3 8 H e ma y wel l hav e subscribe d t o a n empirica l t h e o r y o f legal analysis , b u t fo r intellectua l histor y i t wa s t h e Austi n w h o stresse d definitio n o f lega l issue s w h o b e c a m e o f cru cial i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e nex t g e n e r a t i o n o f lega l scholars . His successors , howeve r m u c h i n e r r o r , r e g a r d e d Austi n as t h e f o u n d e r o f a theoretica l j u r i s p r u d e n ce t h a t di d n o t d e p e n d u p o n empirica l research . Par t o f t h e responsibilit y for thi s attitud e wa s d u e t o J o h n Stuar t Mill , whos e lengthy revie w articl e i n t h e Edinburgh Review i n 186 3 b r o u g h t Austin' s n a m e bac k int o t h e publi c eye . Mil l

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stressed Austin' s facilit y i n t h e t r a i n i n g o f precis e t h o u g h t a n d hi s skil l i n t h e analysi s o f lega l concepts. 3 9 Mil l ac k n o w l e d g e d B e n t h a m ' s rol e a s a t e a c h e r b u t a r g u e d tha t w h e r e B e n t h a m wishe d t o demolish , Austin , b y virtu e o f his c o n c e r n fo r establishin g t h e base s o f la w b y p r o p e r definition, trie d t o construc t a syste m o f k n o w l e d g e b y deductive m e a n s . F r e d e r i c H a r r i s o n gav e a n o t h e r articu lation o f thi s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n 1878 , praisin g Austi n a s t h e j u r i s t i n w h o m "Englis h la w f o u n d t h e first clea r concep tion o f a n abstrac t j u r i s p r u d e n c e ; tha t is , a methodica l e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l l a n g u a g e o f law." 4 0 I n thi s view Austi n h a d alread y b e c o m e simpl y a n analys t o f fun d a m e n t a l lega l idea s withou t an y wide r r a n g e o f interests . W h e t h e r thi s p o r t r a y a l r e p r e s e n t e d t h e t r u e Austi n be c a m e irrelevant , for , i n fact , thi s Austi n b e c a m e e n s h r i n e d in t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l tradition . Si r Frederic k Polloc k i n 1872, fo r e x a m p l e , b e g a n t h e proces s o f m a k i n g thi s Aus tin t h e targe t fo r academi c lawyers : "I t wil l b e m y ai m t o show tha t thi s definitio n [Austin' s la w a s c o m m a n d ] i f exclusively insiste d on , e r r s b y elevatin g wha t i s a t mos t o n e characteristi c o f la w int o it s essence ; tha t contrawise , by losin g sigh t o f wha t i s reall y a n essentia l constituent , i t n a r r o w s t h e p r o p e r scop e o f la w a n d t e n d s t o a n unsatis factory vie w o f it s o p e r a t i o n ; a n d tha t b y p u t t i n g forwar d t h e arbitrar y a n d s u p p r e s s i n g t h e necessar y aspec t o f leg islation i t seriousl y obscure s t h e organi c relatio n o f la w to t h e c o m m u n i t y . " 4 1 T h e conventiona l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Austin a s a j u r i st p r e o c c u p i e d wit h lega l definition s a t t h e e x p e n s e o f empirica l d a t a wa s complete . A simila r situatio n aros e wit h respec t t o t h e Austi n w h o was a d a m a n t i n hi s insistenc e u p o n a legall y u n f e t t e r e d

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sovereign. I f suc h a sovereig n authorit y di d n o t exist , t h e n laws wer e essentiall y useles s fo r t h e regulatio n o f h u m a n conduct, a n d withou t t h e p o w e r o f e n f o r c e m e n t t h e gen eral h a p p i n e s s s o u g h t b y th e principl e o f utilit y coul d n o t be realized. 4 2 Specifi c focu s o n sovereignt y le d Austi n t o define t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f hi s analysi s narrowly , fo r h e t h o u g h t t h e p u r p o s e o f constitutiona l la w wa s t o identif y t h e wielde r o f sovereig n power . Austi n asserte d tha t sov ereignty di d n o t resid e i n t h e customar y triumvirat e o f crown, lords , a n d c o m m o n s , b u t r a t h e r i n t h e crown , lords, a n d t h e electorat e a s r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e com mons. 4 3 Austi n a s t h e e x p o n e n t o f a n unlimite d lega l sov ereignty ha s b e c o m e a cliche , b u t sovereignt y di d e m b o d y a f u n d a m e n t a l concep t h e s o u g h t t o establis h b e y o n d d o u b t . Hi s discussio n o f sovereignt y ha s r e m a i n e d a stapl e of d e b a t e a b o u t constitutiona l law , a n d t h e difficult y o f locating sovereignt y withi n th e legal/politica l f r a m e w o r k has fuele d a r g u m e n t s sinc e hi s d e a t h . As wit h t h e definitio n o f la w a s c o m m a n d , Austi n o n sovereignty i n t h e e n d differe d i n significan t way s fro m B e n t h a m . B e n t h a m h a d a d h e r e d t o t h e traditiona l vie w o f sovereignty, wherea s Austi n h a d m a d e clea r hi s desir e t o take accoun t o f politica l realities . Austi n accepte d t h a t sovereignty, t o b e meaningful , coul d n o t hav e an y lega l limits o n it s exercise . B e n t h a m too k t h e vie w tha t s u p r e m e legislative p o w e r might , i n fact , b e subjec t t o rule s govern ing t h e o p e r a t i o n o f tha t power : "I t i s o n e o f t h e ironie s of t h e histor y o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e t h a t B e n t h a m i n devel o p i n g hi s accoun t o f t h e Sovereign' s legislativ e power s came t o a d o p t view s a t varianc e wit h t h e doctrine s b o t h o f Blackstone, t h e targe t o f hi s fiercest criticism , a n d J o h n

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Austin, hi s chie f discipl e a m o n g j u r i s t s . " 4 4 O n c e m o r e , therefore, t h e l u m p i n g t o g e t h e r o f m a s t e r a n d pupi l ob scures t h e wa y i n whic h B e n t h a m a n d Austi n ultimatel y staked o u t differen t positions . S u b s e q u e n t c o m m e n t a r y place d t h e Austinia n analysi s of sovereignt y i n a n intellectua l categor y fa r r e m o v e d from hi s origina l intentions . F r e d e r i c H a r r i s o n c o n c e d e d that Austin' s relentlessl y logica l p r o c e d u r e wa s vali d onl y to t h e e x t e n t tha t t h e r e a d e r accepte d t h e origina l a s s u m p tions; b u t e x a m i n e d "a s a g e n e r a l propositio n o f h u m a n society, withou t t h e prefixe d qualifications , i n a w o r d , t r e a t e d a s a philosophica l principle , i t [Austin' s d o c t r i n e o f sovereignty] i s quit e assailabl e a n d n o t ver y intelligible." 4 5 Dissatisfaction wit h hi s e x p l a n a t i o n o f sovereignt y le d Austin t o b e c o m e a favorit e stra w m a n fo r t h e academi c jurists o f t h e 1880s , a n d w h a t Austi n wrot e a s o p p o s e d t o what hi s critic s claime d t h a t h e wrot e h e l p e d t o creat e a n Austin a t o d d s wit h hi s origina l doctrines . Austi n wa s invariably p o r t r a y e d a s a theoreticia n whos e view s o n sov ereignty h a d n o basi s i n t h e rea l world ; t h e t r u t h wa s tha t his las t work s t r e a t e d c o n t e m p o r a r y t h e m e s i n politic s a n d constitutiona l a r r a n g e m e n t s t o a n e x t e n t g r e a t e r t h a n most o f hi s critics . T h e s e late r depiction s " m u s t n o t b e uncritically identifie d wit h t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f subse q u e n t j u r i s t s . " 4 6 I n thi s m a n n e r t h e Austi n w h o die d i n 1859 b e c a m e distinc t fro m t h e individua l whos e n a m e played suc h a centra l p a r t i n j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l discussio n after t h e p o s t h u m o u s a p p e a r a n c e o f hi s book s i n 186 1 a n d 1863 . O n a n o t h e r issue , c o n t e m p o r a r y politics , Austin' s rela tionship t o B e n t h a m affecte d Austin' s r e p u t a t i o n a m o n g

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succeeding jurists. Bentham' s politica l view s certainl y var ied ove r th e cours e o f hi s lon g life , bu t i n brie f outlin e Bentham eventuall y (a t wha t precis e poin t scholar s o f Bentham stil l disagree) 4 7 becam e convince d tha t hi s hope s for th e rol e o f legislator s i n th e refor m o f Englis h societ y along th e line s h e advocate d wer e d o o m e d becaus e legisla tors cooperate d wit h th e lawyer s an d judges i n sustainin g the illusion s an d failure s o f th e c o m m o n law . A s a resul t Bentham committe d himsel f t o politica l democrac y i n or der t o facilitat e th e wholesal e change s tha t Englan d re quired, particularl y a n en d t o traditiona l aristocrati c dom ination o f th e politica l world . Jus t a s th e argumen t fro m tradition faile d t o justif y lega l institution s an d practice s when measure d agains t th e principl e o f utility , s o Ben tham believe d tha t th e argumen t fro m histor y wa s a fal lacy tha t permeate d al l Englis h society , an d it s dir e influ ence mus t b e destroyed . T h e circumstance s o f Austin' s lif e turne d hi m agains t these tenet s o f Bentham' s politica l faith . Austi n graduall y became mor e conservative , abandonin g th e Benthamit e creed tha t ha d originall y s o excite d hi s enthusiasm , wit h the resul t tha t hi s politica l belief s eventuall y diametricall y opposed thos e o f hi s mentor . Austi n als o turne d fro m the refor m o f th e la w tha t ha d preoccupie d Bentha m s o totally. 48 T h e conservatis m o f hi s politica l conviction s too k many year s t o mature , an d i t wa s no t unti l hi s A Plea for the Constitution (1859 ) tha t hi s complet e abandonmen t o f Benthamite politic s becam e apparent . I n tha t final politi cal testamen t h e rejecte d utilitarianis m an d adopte d th e argument fro m traditio n a s th e justificatio n fo r politica l order. 4 9 Austi n hel d tha t th e ordinar y citize n wa s incapa -

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ble o f actin g u p o n t h e dictate s o f utility ; onl y t h e h e r e d i tary elit e wa s full y capabl e o f d o i n g so. 5 0 Austi n e m p h a sized t h e decidedl y u n B e n t h a m i t e notio n tha t c u s t o m a r y allegiance a n d constitutiona l s e n t i m e n t p r o v i d e d t h e basi s of t h e politica l o r d e r : " H e coul d n o l o n g e r u p h o l d t h e principle affirme d i n The Province of Jurisprudence t h a t t h e b o n d o u g h t t o b e base d o n rationa l appreciatio n o f t h e s u p e r i o r k n o w l e d g e o f thos e w h o enjoye d politica l a u t h o r ity." 5 1 S o s t r o n g wa s t h e e n d o r s e m e n t o f t h e aristocrati c principle a s t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f societ y tha t "i t involve d a defense o f aristocrati c p o w e r t h a t woul d hav e a r o u s e d either J e r e m y B e n t h a m o r J a m e s Mil l fro m t h e slumber s of d e a t h , i f tha t wer e possible." 5 2 N o t onl y di d Austi n b r e a k decisivel y wit h B e n t h a m i t e politics , t h e differenc e p r o v i d e d ye t a n o t h e r e x a m p l e o f wh y t h e conventiona l linking o f t h e tw o m e n n o l o n g e r carrie s conviction . O f al l t h e ke y idea s elaborate d b y Austin , n o n e ha s h a d suc h a formidabl e impac t t h a n hi s assertio n t h a t t h e separation o f la w fro m moralit y constitute d t h e necessar y prerequisite fo r j u r i s p r u d e n t i al analysis . T h a t Austi n him self di d n o t ac t rigidl y o n hi s ow n suggestio n m u s t b e distinguished fro m t h e p o w e r t h a t thi s formul a acquire d as a t e c h n i q u e fo r u n d e r t a k i n g lega l studies . I n t h e latte r p a r t o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century , s o m a n y jurist s accepte d this aspec t o f Austinia n j u r i s p r u d e n c e tha t t h e enuncia tion o f it s i m p o r t a n c e b e c a m e s o m e t h i n g o f a platitude , an incantatio n t h a t to o ofte n s u p p r e s s e d alternativ e ave n u e s o f e x p l o r a t i o n i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e. T h e precis e d i m e n sions o f Austin' s m a n d a t e stil l form s a centra l e l e m e n t o f d e b a t e i n m o d e r n lega l theory , s o Austi n wil l c o n t i n u e t o attract scholarl y attention . F r o m t h e tim e o f Blackstone ,

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n o o t h e r p h r a s e ha s g e n e r a t e d s o m u c h effor t fro m schol ars o f t h e law . In t h e histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e , however , thi s issue ha s h a d a curiou s fate . Firs t o f all , n o c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e analytica l t r a d i t i o n — n e i t h e r B e n t h a m n o r Austi n n o r any o f thei r successors—eve r too k literall y t h e c o m m a n d to separat e la w fro m moralit y eve n a s the y p l e d g e d intel lectual allegianc e t o t h e principle . Jurist s u n d e r s t o o d tha t this axio m wa s a n analytica l too l a t best , b u t n o o n e coul d i n t e n d seriousl y tha t la w m u s t b e divorce d fro m morality , for i t wa s p a t e n t t h a t la w a n d moralit y intersecte d o n every level . T o speculat e meaningfull y a b o u t la w de m a n d e d consideratio n o f al l m a n n e r o f m o r a l principles , for la w i m p o s e d al l sort s o f m o r a l obligation s a n d itsel f was suffuse d wit h m o r a l precepts . T h u s t h e separatio n o f law a n d moralit y t u r n e d int o a sloga n tha t too k o n a lif e of it s own , whil e thos e wh o p r e a c h e d t h e d o c t r i n e pai d little o r n o attentio n t o t h e practica l difficultie s i t raised : "Not o n e o f t h e earl y positivis t jurists eve r d i s e n g a g e d t h e idea o f la w fro m t h e notio n o f t h e e n d s o f la w successfully . T h e y al l begi n b y a n n o u n c i n g tha t la w a n d moral s a r e tw o distinct subjects , tha t la w i s simpl y a c o m m a n d . B u t withi n t h e sam e treatis e the y dea l wit h t h e e n d s o r p u r p o s e s o f law." 5 3 Fo r t h e histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e t h e issu e is n o t t h e validit y o f t h e formul a itself ; t h e essentia l con clusion i s tha t i n o n e wa y o r t h e o t h e r jurists hav e violate d its c o n t e n t b y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e origina l principl e t o sui t their ow n objectives . In t h e g e n e r a t i o n afte r Austin , a t a tim e w h e n Austi n gained recognitio n a s t h e f o u n d e r o f a scienc e o f law , some jurist s recognize d specificall y tha t t h e separatio n o f

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law fro m moralit y wa s a practica l a n d theoretica l impossi bility. S h e l d o n Amos , i n a wor k entitle d The Science of Law, paid tribut e t o Austi n a s t h e " t r u e f o u n d e r o f t h e Scienc e of Law " b u t criticize d h i m fo r t h e "laboriou s a n d almos t painful anxiety " t h a t s u r r o u n d e d hi s effort s t o giv e t h e "region o f la w a scientifi c c h a r a c t e r wholl y peculia r a n d distinct." 5 4 L a t e r Si r Frederic k Polloc k d e n i e d categori cally tha t t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f la w fro m moralit y wa s possible : " T h e r e a s o n o f thi s ( u n d u l y neglecte d b y som e m o d e r n s for t h e sak e o f a merel y verba l o r illusiv e exactness ) i s tha t in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e la w b o t h b y legislativ e a n d b y judicial processe s a p p e a l i s constantl y m a d e t o ethica l rea son a n d t h e m o r a l j u d g e m e n t o f t h e c o m m u n i t y . " 5 5 I n o r d e r t o escap e s o m e o f t h e m o r e t r o u b l i n g aspect s o f Austin's teaching , j u r i s ts scramble d fo r a m e a n s t o r e u n i t e law a n d moralit y withou t forfeitin g t h e clai m t o a scientifi c jurisprudence. For thi s r e a s o n publi c o p i n i o n l o o m e d larg e a s a unify ing facto r becaus e thi s extralega l forc e len t t h e s u p p o r t o f morality t o t h e lega l system . R . M . P a n k h u r s t resolve d t h e Austinia n is/ough t d i l e m m a b y assertin g tha t moralit y changes ove r time , a n d tha t eventuall y t h e la w catche s u p by statutor y c h a n g e ; thi s was , h e believed , p a r t o f t h e c o n t i n u o u s interactio n b y whic h la w evolved. 5 6 B . R . Wis e e x p a n d e d o n thi s point , a r g u i n g t h a t " j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s also closel y c o n n e c t e d wit h m o r a l progress , becaus e La w m a r k s t h e stag e o f m o r a l g r o w t h , b y givin g a p e r m a n e n t form t o t h e m o r a l idea s alread y evolved." 5 7 Publi c o p i n i o n restored i n practic e t h e m o r a l b a c k b o n e t o la w tha t Austi n h a d theoreticall y r e m o v e d fro m t h e stud y o f t h e law . I f law di d n o t e x p r e s s t h e m o r a l sentiment s o f society , t h e n

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the la w ha d n o mean s t o comman d obedience. 5 8 N o Victo rian jurist woul d endors e thi s latte r assertion . Even mor e persuasiv e a s t o th e ritua l natur e o f th e invocation o f th e separatio n o f la w an d moralit y i s th e evidence tha t Austi n himsel f ha d n o intentio n o f a litera l application o f th e undoubtedl y rigi d demarcatio n betwee n the tw o spheres . T h e respec t give n t o th e principl e o f utility an d th e concer n fo r divin e la w i n relatio n t o a legal syste m affor d substantia l evidenc e i n suppor t o f th e contention tha t Austi n neve r too k hi s ow n dictu m to o seriously. T h e historica l significanc e o f Austin' s declara tion havin g pu t th e issu e i n suc h star k term s ha s nothin g to d o wit h th e succes s o f th e idea l itself ; instead , th e tru e importance come s fro m th e differen t line s o f inquir y i t inaugurated. Austi n contribute d unwittingl y t o thi s crucia l divergence o f purpose . H e place d s o muc h emphasi s o n the expositio n o f languag e tha t h e neve r stressed , a s ha d Bentham, th e scienc e o f legislatio n an d it s impact . Hi s failure t o produc e th e syntheti c wor k abou t whic h h e brooded fo r muc h o f hi s late r lif e lef t a distorte d pictur e of hi s ow n ideas. 5 9 T h e theoretica l separatio n o f la w fro m morality ha d th e long-ter m effec t o f directin g lega l philos ophy int o mor e restricte d channel s consisten t wit h th e creation o f a n academi c culture . A s a resul t o f thi s unin tended consequenc e jurisprudence' s domai n wa s nar rowed a s well . N o matte r wha t j u d g m e nt on e ma y mak e abou t Austin' s ultimate intellectua l succes s o r wha t difference s separate d him fro m Bentham , th e tw o me n share d th e goa l o f mak ing jurisprudence th e primar y vehicl e fo r socia l improve ment. I n thi s Austi n share d th e reverenc e fo r jurispru -

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d e n c e a s t h e mos t effectiv e too l fo r t h e p r o g r e s s o f societ y with Blackston e a s well . I n spit e o f t h e usua l p l a c e m e n t o f Blackstone a t o n e e n d o f t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i al s p e c t r u m a n d B e n t h a m a n d Austi n a t t h e o t h e r , t h e t h r e e jurists a g r e e d that j u r i s p r u d e n ce r e p r e s e n t e d t h e highes t for m o f socia l c o m m e n t a r y . Austi n believe d t h a t lega l analysi s a n d mo rality were , i n fact , inseparabl e a n d f o r m e d p a r t o f a vast intellectua l project. 6 0 O n e schola r ha s c o n c l u d e d t h a t Austin "advocate d a r e m a r k a b l y b r o a d a p p r o a c h fo r hi s time a n d place." 6 1 A l e n g t h i e r assessmen t i n t h e sam e vei n h a d m a d e clea r t h e wide r visio n t h a t a n i m a t e d Austin : The moder n lega l min d wit h it s reluctance t o relate an y analysi s of th e la w t o topics suc h a s theology, find s i t difficult t o conceiv e of Austi n a s a ma n whos e primar y concer n wa s no t wit h th e minute analysi s o f lega l terms , bu t rathe r wit h thei r relationshi p to other element s i n a univers e dominate d b y a particula r visio n of Go d an d th e state . T h e fac t tha t Austi n wen t t o such extrem e lengths t o sho w wha t wa s properl y calle d la w shoul d no t dra w our attentio n awa y fro m hi s great concer n wit h non-lega l issues ; the thing s tha t wer e not properl y calle d la w alway s fascinate d him. I n brie f h e appeare d t o integrat e th e lega l an d th e non legal int o a large r understandin g o f huma n existence . Late r analysts wit h thei r concer n fo r th e concept s o f sovereignt y an d command woul d surel y hav e struc k Austin' s contemporarie s a s having a mos t curiou s obsessio n wit h th e les s adventuresom e elements o f hi s lectures . The y ignore d hi s ques t t o explai n man's plac e i n th e universe. 62 J u r i s p r u d e n c e r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t i n s t r u m e n t fo r h u m a n i s tic inquir y uniquel y suite d fo r socia l analysi s becaus e i e m b r a c e d al l o t h e r disciplines . Despit e t h e b r e a d t h o f hi vision, t h e Austi n w h o e x e r t e d grea t influenc e afte r hi

t s s

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d e a t h was , i n fact , t h e lega l p h i l o s o p h e r r e m e m b e r e d fo r a constricte d visio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce w h o himsel f b e c a m e t h e subjec t o f increasingl y n a r r o w investigation. 6 3 I t wa s p e r h a p s t h e final traged y o f Austin' s lif e tha t t h e r e d u c tionist p o r t r a i t prevailed : " N o t onl y a r e law s onl y meta phorically s o called , suc h a s t h e laws ' o f n a t u r e , obviousl y n o t i n t h e pictur e . . . b u t t h e la w o f G o d , t h e la w o f n a t u r e , t h e la w o f morality , a r e als o outsid e t h e r a n g e of Austin' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t o g e t h e r wit h wha t a r e merel y called laws ' b y wa y o f a n analogy , suc h a s t h e law s o f goo d society, o r o f chess." 6 4 A n o t h e r contributio n t o t h e m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Aus tinian t h o u g h t wa s t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f hi s wor k b y vari ous constituencie s tha t use d p a r t o f i t take n o u t o f contex t to justif y thei r views . T h i s p r u n i n g o f hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e m a d e Austi n a respecte d authorit y a n d a targe t wit h equa l ease. Fo r e x a m p l e , th e dictu m o f la w a s c o m m a n d h a d g r e a t e r attractio n fo r t h e crimina l b a r t h a n fo r thos e en gaged i n civi l litigation. 6 5 Austin' s theor y p r o v e d attractiv e to practitioner s becaus e "i t wa s itsel f a n expressio n o f ideas a b o u t law s alread y highl y congenia l t o t h e b e n c h a n d t h e profession . T h e ide a tha t vali d la w i s s o m e t h i n g originally lai d d o w n b y t h e legislatur e a n d t h e courts , tha t this la w consist s essentiall y o f rules , tha t a s h a r p lin e ca n a n d shoul d b e d r a w n betwee n t h e la w a s i t i s a n d t h e la w as i t o u g h t t o b e a r e al l idea s tha t wer e alread y highl y congenial t o Englis h j u d g es a n d lawyer s i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . " 6 6 T h i s " t r i u m p h a n t Austinianism" 6 7 clearl y gained a n ascendanc y i n som e area s o f t h e lega l establish m e n t , b u t no t i n all . As a n objec t o f academi c stud y Austin' s influenc e wa s

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pervasive b u t n o t e n d u r i n g . T h e p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f his j u r i s p r u d e n c e stil l occasion s f r e q u e n t l e a r n e d com m e n t a r y : "I t i s a m a t t e r o f d i s p u t e w h e t h e r w e shoul d view Austi n a s a waywar d chil d settin g m o d e r n j u r i s p r u d e n c e o n a steril e a n d confuse d p a t h , o r r a t h e r a s t h e s p o k e s m a n fo r a positivis m philosophicall y c o m e o f a g e . " 6 8 T h a t Austi n b e c a m e a h o t topi c o f academi c de bate p r o v e d t h e p o i n t tha t hi s a t t e m p t t o follo w i n t h e tradition o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s t h e b r o a d e s t o f intellectua l v e n t u r e s h a d failed . Lef t t o t h e dissectio n o f academi c critics, Austin' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e a p p e a r e d m o r e limite d i n scope t h a n h e h a d d e s i r e d : " F o r w h e r e a s B e n t h a m wa s celebrated a s t h e g r e a t r e f o r m e r a n d codifier , t h e p r i n c e of t h e P a n n o m i o n , Austi n wa s t o b e see n a s a n e d u c a t i o n alist a n d expositor , w h o h a d n o desir e t o t r a n s f o r m t h e substantive lega l o r d e r , b u t w h o wa s e n g a g e d i n a defini tional a n d j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l exercise." 6 9 T h e academi c a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f Austi n coincide d wit h t h e p o s t h u m o u s reviva l o f hi s writings . Betwee n 186 1 a n d 1880 Austi n enjoye d a g r e a t vogu e i n t h e rapidl y evolvin g world o f academi c law , b u t t h e r e a f t e r h e c a m e u n d e r increasing criticism . Hi s eclips e di d n o t necessaril y p r e clude a c o n t i n u a t i o n o f hi s influence , a l t h o u g h i t di d m e a n that i t live d o n i n a s u b t e r r a n e a n fashio n tha t ultimatel y clouded m a n y o f t h e issue s h e h a d raised . T h e a p p e a l o f Austin fo r academi c lawyer s h a d originate d i n t h e p r o m ise o f a scientifi c j u r i s p r u d e n c e . I n t u r n thi s m a d e fo r a m o r e accessibl e subjec t fo r universit y la w students , a n d Austin b e c a m e a favorit e topi c fo r e x a m i n e r s . 7 0 F o r la w faculties a s well , Austi n b e c a m e a symbo l o f academi c trendiness, fo r hi s wor k b e c a m e t h e subjec t o f l e a r n e d

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glosses an d explications . T h e prestig e o f scienc e mad e hi s work attractiv e becaus e Austin' s devotio n t o firs t princi ples seeme d t o provid e th e foundation s fo r a scientifi c jurisprudence. 7 1 Afte r 188 0 th e premise s o f analytica l ju risprudence, a t leas t a s interprete d i n academi c circles , came unde r increasin g attack , s o tha t b y 1914 , a t leas t fo r academic lawyers , man y o f Austin' s majo r doctrine s ha d suffered wholesal e rejection . A s W . W . Bucklan d wrot e o f Austin: "H e wa s a religion ; toda y h e seem s t o b e regarde d rather a s a disease." 72 T h e vagarie s o f academi c la w ha d brought Austin' s reputatio n t o a low point . This reversa l o f fortun e illustrate d th e ambivalen t na ture o f th e Austinia n legacy : wha t appeare d stronges t i n Austin t o som e jurists arouse d th e sharpes t criticis m fro m others. Fo r example , th e strengt h o f th e Austinia n analy sis ha d seeme d t o b e it s emphasi s o n th e clarit y o f funda mental concept s an d th e requiremen t t o defin e carefull y what th e stud y o f jurisprudence entailed . Afte r 188 0 thes e presumed virtue s turne d int o liabilitie s o n th e groun d tha t Austinian jurisprudence ha d prove d stati c an d tha t i t pai d too littl e attentio n t o th e historica l source s o f law . Frederi c Maitland, th e greates t o f lega l historians , reflecte d thi s attitude i n hi s belie f tha t "J.A . = 0 . " 7 3 I n a n er a o f vigor ous imperia l expansion , Austin' s conclusion s remaine d "culture-bound," excellen t fo r th e analysi s o f contempo rary Englis h societ y bu t no t applicabl e t o othe r societie s and cultures. 7 4 Thi s critiqu e o f Austi n fo r hi s lac k o f historical perspectiv e reinforce d th e imag e o f a jurist s o determined u p o n hi s definition s tha t h e ha d provide d n o empirical evidenc e t o suppor t hi s conclusions . Leadin g academicians eventuall y rejecte d Austinianis m fo r it s lac k

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of vision : "Hi s stati c a n d unhistorica l d e d u c t i o n s wer e tellingly ridicule d b y Maine , Bryc e a n d Pollock." 7 5 Onl y Dicey r e t a i n e d an y s t r o n g fait h tha t Austi n h a d m a d e positive contributions. 7 6 Advances i n lega l history , especiall y e m p h a s i s o n t h e tracing o f doctrina l evolution , m a d e Austi n les s compel ling; t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d o f lega l stud y p i o n e e r e d b y Sir H e n r y Main e t r a n s f o r m e d Austin' s analytica l m e t h o d ology int o a seemingl y obsolet e t e c h n i q u e withou t lastin g consequences. Si r Willia m Markby , a n origina l Austinian , m a d e a g a m e effor t a t d e f e n d i n g Austi n agains t Maine' s criticism, b u t eve n h e h a d t o c o n c e d e t h a t Austi n coul d n o t b e p r o t e c t e d agains t c h a r g e s o f lega l provincialism. 7 7 W h e r e Austi n h a d a r g u e d , fo r e x a m p l e , t h a t t h e custom ary la w o f primitiv e societie s coul d n o t constitut e a lega l system becaus e n o sovereig n existe d t o enforc e t h e law , a critic lik e Polloc k reverse d Austi n b y writin g t h a t "la w i s e n f o r c e d b y t h e Stat e becaus e i t i s law , i t i s n o t la w merel y because t h e Stat e enforce s it." 7 8 I n o n e sentenc e Polloc k h a d inverte d a basi c p r e m i s e o f Austinia n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . I n fairnes s t o Austin , late r scholar s hav e n o t f o u n d Pol lock's criticis m s o useful . Ala n Watso n ha s offere d a de fense o f Austin' s teaching s o n t h e validit y o f c u s t o m a r y l a w — t h a t recognitio n o f c u s t o m a r y la w b y a c o u r t a m o u n t s t o a c o m m a n d o f t h e s o v e r e i g n — w h i c h ha s re stored Austin' s r e p u t a t i o n o n t h e subject. 7 9 A t t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , nevertheless , t h e impac t o f Maine's wor k h a d t u r n e d t h e leader s o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e int o causti c critic s o f Austin . Austin's r e p u t a t i o n suffere d a s wel l because , inevitably , reassessments o f Austi n r e m a r k e d o n t h e inconsistenc y o f

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his messag e t o s e p a r a t e la w a n d moralit y a n d hi s failur e t o m a k e goo d o n hi s p r o m i s e t o d o so : "Austin' s second , third, a n d f o u r t h lecture s a p p e a r t o m e t o hav e n o busi ness w h e r e the y are . T h e y a r e n o t j u r i s p r u d e n c e a t all , b u t ethic s o u t o f place." 8 0 Polloc k a d d e d t o thi s i n d i c t m e n t by suggestin g tha t Austi n wa s reall y guilt y o f a n a t u r a l la w a p p r o a c h , a n d "eve n r e g a r d e d i t [analyti c j u r i s p r u d e n c e ] as d e a d a n d b u r i e d b y hi s time." 8 1 Pollock' s dismissa l o f Austin wa s typica l o f academi c lawyers : " A d o g m a t i c utili tarian, wit h n o sens e o f histor y a n d smal l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Englis h o r i n d e e d o f an y law." 8 2 T h e dismissa l o f Aus tin b y academi c critic s accelerate d t h e proces s w h e r e b y Austin serve d primaril y a s t h e w h i p p i n g bo y o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Oversimplifie d j u d g m e n t s p o r t e n d e d a half c e n t u r y ( 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 5 0 ) o f scholarl y exil e fo r Austi n before hi s wor k e a r n e d seriou s reconsideration . T h e practic e o f usin g Austin' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e onl y fo r the scorin g o f scholarl y point s a d d e d t o hi s r e p u t a t i o n a s a j u r i st wit h a b a d cas e o f t u n n e l vision . T h e rea l p r o b l e m lay wit h t h e critics , a n d no t wit h Austin : " T h o s e , . . . w h o took a particula r interes t i n Austin' s a p p r o a c h fro m t h e time w h e n hi s wor k wa s publishe d unti l t h e mi d twentiet h century generall y faile d t o interes t themselve s i n Austi n from thi s poin t o f vie w becaus e the y h a d n o b r o a d philo sophical o r logica l interests." 8 3 O r p u t m o r e succinctly : "Austin n a r r o w e d d o w n B e n t h a m a n d Austin' s follower s n a r r o w e d d o w n Austin." 8 4 T h e stereotyp e o f Austi n a s too confused , to o prolix , a n d to o deductiv e s e e m e d t o t r i u m p h . Man y intellectual s hav e e n d u r e d t h e fat e o f hav ing thei r idea s trivialize d a n d t h e n havin g thei r wor k cari c a t u r e d t o suppl y quotation s t o late r scholar s w h o neve r

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r e t u r n t o e x a m i n e t h e origina l writings . A s a result , fo r half a c e n t u r y Austin' s successor s n e v e r u n d e r s t o o d hi s work: " W h a t e m e r g e s i s thei r lac k o f interes t in , o r dis a g r e e m e n t with , w h a t w e r e g a r d a s mos t valuabl e i n Aus tin: t h e a t t e m p t t o r e p r e s e n t la w a s c o n c e r n e d wit h event s which a r e empirica l i n t h e sens e o f bein g o p e n t o o r d i n a r y observation a n d ye t constitut e a scientifi c field o f stud y which ca n b e p r e s e n t e d systematicall y b y t h e m e t h o d s o f traditional logic." 8 5 T h e reviva l o f interes t i n Austi n i n t h e las t tw o decade s has eliminate d m u c h o f thi s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; R u m b l e has p r o v i d e d a j u d i c i o us perspectiv e o n Austin' s achieve ments: " T h e s e accomplishment s reflecte d hi s r a r e abilit y for conceptua l clarification , hi s intoleranc e o f cant , hi s sense o f realism , a n d hi s c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e g o o d o f soci ety a s h e u n d e r s t o o d it." 8 6 Hi s c o m m i t m e n t t o us e juris p r u d e n c e t o foste r socia l benefit s place d h i m squarel y i n the Englis h tradition . Hi s s h o r t c o m i n g s i n historica l u n d e r s t a n d i n g pave d t h e wa y fo r t h e n e x t majo r figure w h o u n d e r t o o k t o i n t e r p r e t societ y t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m o f jurisprudence.

Chapter Five

Sir Henry

Maine

Historical Jurisprudenc e a n Social R e f o r

d

m

Blackstone, B e n t h a m , a n d Austin , t h o u g h frequentl y t h o u g h t o f a s s o o p p o s e d t o o n e a n o t h e r o n m a n y crucia l issues, s h a r e d t h e belie f tha t lega l speculatio n serve d a s an i m p o r t a n t m e d i u m fo r extensiv e socia l a n d politica l theorizing. T h e stud y o f Si r H e n r y Main e a n d historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e introduces , s o i t i s usuall y a r g u e d , a n o t h e r significant e x a m p l e o f t h e diversit y o f law' s e m p i r e . T h e conventional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Maine' s relationshi p t o hi s l e a r n e d predecessor s ha s a r g u e d t h a t a n u n b r i d g e a b l e chasm s e p a r a t e d t h e radicall y differen t a p p r o a c h e s o f nat ural la w a n d o f analytica l a n d historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . T h i s assessmen t specifie d a relativel y simpl e proces s b y which Main e criticize d Blackston e fo r hi s relianc e o n 119

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m o r a l a r g u m e n t s , a n d B e n t h a m a n d Austi n fo r thei r lac k of historica l perspectiv e i n reflection s u p o n t h e n a t u r e of law . Fo r e x a m p l e , w h e r e Austi n s o u g h t t h e universa l elements o f a lega l system , Main e insiste d o n t h e contin gent a n d d i s c o r d a n t i n t h e historica l d e v e l o p m e n t o f lega l systems. I n addition , mos t critic s hav e a r g u e d , Main e re j e c t e d B e n t h a m ' s relianc e o n t h e principl e o f utilit y t o t h e same d e g r e e tha t h e attacke d Blackstone' s connectio n wit h n a t u r a l la w theory . T h e conjunctio n o f t h e tw o r e m a r k a b l e book s o n juris p r u d e n c e publishe d i n 1861 , t h e reissu e o f Austin' s The Province of Jurisprudence Determined a n d Maine' s Ancient Law, a p p e a r e d a t t h e e n d o f o n e e r a a n d t h e o p e n i n g of a n o t h e r . T h e s e tw o pillar s o f Victoria n j u r i s p r u d e n c e , Austin a n d Maine , t h e n c o m p e t e d fo r d o m i n a n c e , wit h Austin initiall y victoriou s becaus e Main e p r o d u c e d fe w disciples. I n t h e vie w o f som e scholars , w h a t s e p a r a t e d Maine fro m Austi n fa r o u t w e i g h e d t h e a s s u m p t i o n s a n d conclusions the y s h a r e d . W h e t h e r thi s assessmen t retain s its validit y i s a p r i m a r y concer n o f thi s c h a p t e r . T h e criticism s a d v a n c e d b y Main e rapidl y b e c a m e stoc k a r g u m e n t s agains t analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Main e in sisted tha t Austi n h a d e r r e d fundamentall y i n t h e asser tion o f t h e "allege d inapplicabilit y o f hi s conceptio n o f a positive la w a n d sovereignt y t o primitiv e lega l systems." l For t h e lac k o f thes e idea s Austi n h a d d e n i e d tha t custom ary la w m e r i t e d t h e n a m e o f la w a t all . Main e a r g u e d tha t any lega l syste m shoul d b e u n d e r s t o o d onl y i n it s concret e expression a s s h a p e d b y t h e ful l r a n g e o f extralega l ele m e n t s i n society : " F r o m thi s perspectiv e t h e Austinia n search fo r lega l form s a n d t h e d r y calculation s o f Ben -

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thamite utilitarianis m h a d p a i n t e d a fals e pictur e t h a t di d not ge t a t t h e rea l stuf f o f socia l life." 2 Main e f u r t h e r suggested tha t t h e elaborat e complexitie s o f Austin' s at t e m p t t o dea l wit h lega l issue s "to o frequentl y sacrifice d the d e e p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e actua l lega l a r r a n g e m e n t s o f divers e societie s fo r m e r e logica l s y m m e t r y . " 3 Could ever y society' s lega l affair s b e r e d u c e d t o a singl e set o f definition s tha t indicate d w h e t h e r o r n o t i t consti t u t e d a lega l system ? Main e di d n o t thin k so , fo r "la w wa s the p r o d u c t o f tim e a n d place , a n d t h e theorie s o f Ben t h a m a n d Austi n wer e themselve s p r o d u c t s o f particula r 'limited' historica l circumstances." 4 I n t h e e n d , t h e r e f o r e , Maine hel d t h a t Austi n r e m a i n e d t r a p p e d i n t h e socia l e n v i r o n m e n t tha t h e inhabited : "Hi s conception s o f a pos itive la w a n d sovereignt y a r e c u l t u r e - b o u n d . Despit e thei r high d e g r e e o f validit y fo r c o n t e m p o r a r y W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n societies , the y a r e inapplicabl e t o primitiv e societie s in g e n e r a l a n d I n d i a n village s i n p a r t i c u l a r . " 5 T h u s , whil e B e n t h a m a n d Austi n h a d searche d fo r t h e universa l i n fixed lega l systems , thei r effort s h a d faile d dismally ; som e new effor t t o c a p t u r e t h e essenc e o f la w wa s r e q u i r e d . T h i s accoun t o f t h e gul f tha t s e p a r a t e d Main e fro m hi s juristic predecessor s derive d largel y fro m Si r Pau l Vino gradoff, i n 190 3 a successo r t o Main e i n th e C o r p u s chai r of j u r i s p r u d e n c e a t O x f o r d . P e r h a p s t h e j u r i s t w h o re m a i n e d mos t loya l t o t h e tenet s o f historica l j u r i s p r u dence, V i n o g r a d o f f clearl y fel t oblige d t o sustai n Maine' s r e p u t a t i o n a s c h a n g i n g scholarl y fashio n t h r e a t e n e d t o m a k e hi s wor k obsolet e or , eve n worse , irrelevant . I t ha s even b e e n suggested , r a t h e r uncharitably , tha t Vinogra doff "virtuall y live d of f hi s [Maine's ] intellectua l capital." 6

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In hi s inaugura l lectur e Vinogradof f emphasize d ho w th e originality o f Maine' s historica l jurisprudenc e ha d op posed th e allege d abstrac t structur e o f analytica l jurispru dence. Althoug h Main e ha d acknowledge d th e contribu tions o f Bentha m an d Austin , Main e wa s "unabl e t o follo w the lea d o f thes e thinker s an d clearl y mark s th e dividin g line betwee n thei r conception s an d hi s own . Thei r mod e of investigatio n i s to o abstrac t fo r him." 7 Vinogradof f believed tha t th e mor e intellectua l distanc e h e coul d plac e between Main e an d th e analytica l jurists , th e bette r fo r the former . N o doub t Vinogradoff , whos e scholarl y wor k focused o n medieva l Englis h history , als o though t h e would benefi t i f other s believe d tha t h e remaine d faithfu l to Maine' s teachings . Several moder n studie s o f Maine' s jurisprudence hav e reiterated tha t i t rejecte d th e basi c conclusion s o f analyti cal jurisprudence . Kennet h Boc k asserte d tha t Maine' s "critical poin t o f departur e i s . . . t o b e foun d i n hi s sens e of th e inadequac y o f Austinia n analyti c jurisprudence an d Benthamite utilitarianis m i n th e stud y o f la w an d politica l economy." 8 Late r example s o f thi s interpretatio n tha t re inforced th e difference s betwee n Main e an d hi s predeces sors calle d th e former' s endurin g contributio n t o lega l theory hi s dissen t fro m positivism. 9 B y citin g onl y Maine' s unflattering reference s withou t balancin g the m wit h hi s more sympatheti c comment s b y Maine , scholar s hav e lef t a distorte d pictur e o f hi s intellectua l relationshi p t o earlie r jurists. Moder n reassessment s o f Maine' s majo r work s have contende d tha t hi s view s change d ove r time , an d tha t his reactio n t o previou s jurisprudence wa s mor e comple x

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t h a n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n V i n o g r a d o f f h a d originall y of fered i n 1903 . T h i s venerabl e traditio n o f s e p a r a t i n g Main e fro m o t h e r Britis h j u r i s ts ha s n o t prevaile d becaus e scholars , i n r e t u r n i n g t o t h e origina l writings , discovere d tha t t h e ol d classification o f Victoria n jurist s int o s e p a r a t e school s wa s n o l o n g e r valid . G e o r g e Feaver , t h e m o d e r n b i o g r a p h e r of Maine , n o t e d t h a t Main e a n d Austi n s h a r e d i m p o r t a n t philosophical positions , especiall y t h e n e e d fo r a scientifi c a p p r o a c h t o law. 1 0 Pete r Stei n wen t f u r t h e r , c o n c l u d i n g that "Maine' s attitud e t o B e n t h a m a n d Austi n wa s some times equivocal." 1 1 T h e lates t c o m p r e h e n s i v e revie w o f Maine's j u r i s p r u d e n c e u n d e r s c o r e d t h e c h a n g i n g n a t u r e of hi s beliefs . I n a n u m b e r o f instance s R a y m o n d Cock s stressed tha t Maine , criticism s notwithstanding , graduall y revealed "ne w respec t fo r t h e analytica l achievement s o f B e n t h a m a n d Austin, " a n d Cock s a r g u e d tha t Main e "wa s not unequivocall y se t u p o n t h e destructio n o f utilitaria n j u r i s p r u d e n c e . " 1 2 Wilfri d R u m b l e ha s c a p p e d thi s revisio n by showin g t h a t "th e n a t u r e a n d significanc e o f t h e differ ences betwee n Austi n a n d Main e a r e bes t u n d e r s t o o d against t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f thei r similarities. " 1 3 I n t h e ligh t of thi s ne w e m p h a s i s o n t h e issue s t h a t b r o u g h t Main e into a Victoria n consensus , t h e continuit y o f Victoria n j u r i s p r u d e n c e t h r o u g h t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f Ancient Law ha s become mor e apparent . Maine, b o r n i n 1822 , wa s t h e onl y figure i n t h e juris p r u d e n t i a l traditio n t o hav e significan t C a m b r i d g e associ ations, fo r al l t h e o t h e r s w e r e i n o n e wa y o r a n o t h e r O x f o r d m e n . H e compile d a brillian t academi c r e c o r d a s

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a C a m b r i d g e u n d e r g r a d u a t e a n d secure d a p p o i n t m e n t a t t h e ag e o f 2 5 t o t h e Regiu s professorshi p o f civi l la w a t hi s alma m a t e r . H e resigne d thi s positio n i n 1854 , t u r n i n g to politica l j o u r n a l i s m , w h e r e h e espouse d a consistentl y conservative viewpoint . Afte r t h e publicatio n o f Ancient Law i n 186 1 h e serve d a s lega l advise r t o t h e g o v e r n o r general's counci l i n India , w h e r e h e spen t mos t o f t h e 1860s. H e r e t u r n e d t o E n g l a n d t o tak e t h e C o r p u s chai r of j u r i s p r u d e n ce a t O x f o r d i n 1869 ; h e serve d i n t h a t pos t until 1878 , w h e n h e wa s electe d maste r o f Trinit y Hall , C a m b r i d g e . I n 1887 , o n e yea r befor e hi s d e a t h , h e be came Whewel l professo r o f internationa l la w a t C a m bridge. Lik e Blackston e befor e him , Main e c o m b i n e d no table publi c servic e wit h academi c h o n o r s , fashionin g a career tha t m a d e h i m a p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r o f t h e Victo rian intellectua l aristocracy . Maine publishe d fou r o t h e r majo r book s afte r t h e ap p e a r a n c e of Ancient Law i n 1861 , b u t n o n e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e stud y o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce n o r attracte d t h e sam e d e g r e e of scholarl y attentio n a s t h e initia l work. 1 4 Ancient Law, rightly, ha s alway s b e e n r e g a r d e d a s Maine' s masterpiece , t h e boo k tha t establishe d hi s r e p u t a t i o n a n d elaborate d historical j u r i s p r u d e n c e mos t fully . Late r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Ancient Law m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e contex t o f thos e intellectuals w h o hav e suffere d t h e r e d u c t i o n o f thei r c o m p l e x idea s t o o n e formul a t h a t distort s or , a t best , simplifies t h e a r g u m e n t . Main e wa s n o exceptio n t o thi s process, fo r late r scholar s m a d e t h e p h r a s e "fro m statu s to contract " hi s t r a d e m a r k . I n p o i n t o f fact , thi s f a m o u s expression di d n o t eve n m a k e it s a p p e a r a n c e unti l Main e h a d s p e n t som e 16 0 page s i n t h e exploratio n o f o t h e r

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t h e m e s . N o r di d t h e p r o n o u n c e m e n t o f socia l p r o g r e s s involving t h e m o v e m e n t fro m statu s t o contract , o r t h e decline o f statu s g r o u p s a n d thei r r e p l a c e m e n t b y t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f individua l responsibility , eve n r e p r e s e n t t h e h e a r t o f t h e book. 1 5 A s Cock s ha s p o i n t e d out , onc e Maine h a d i n t r o d u c e d thi s p h r a s e , h e m a d e n o effor t t o d e v e l o p i t i n a systemati c m a n n e r . 1 6 R e a d e r s familia r wit h Ancient Law wil l recal l tha t Main e gav e m o r e attentio n t o J e a n - J a c q u e s Roussea u o n t h e stat e o f n a t u r e a n d t o t h e long histor y o f n a t u r a l la w theor y t h a n t o th e elaboratio n of t h e from-status-to-contrac t t h e m e : "Main e sa w himsel f as a fighter agains t p u r e abstraction s a n d a priori a s s u m p tions, suc h a s t h e stat e o f n a t u r e a n d t h e la w o f n a t u r e . " 1 7 Maine r e g a r d e d Roussea u a s hi s p r i m a r y target , fo r t h e state o f n a t u r e r e p r e s e n t e d exactl y t h e sor t o f notio n t h a t destroyed necessar y empirica l historica l investigation. 1 8 Maine, i n fact , r a n g e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e past , lookin g espe cially a t R o m a n law , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f equit y i n lega l systems, a n d eve n America' s Declaratio n o f I n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e wid e variet y o f topic s t r e a t e d b y Main e sug gested t h e b r o a d purvie w o f hi s concerns . Wit h respec t t o t h e histor y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , Ancient Law t r a n s c e n d s simplisti c sloganeering . T h e p h r a s e "fro m statu s t o contract " acquire d cul t s t a n d i n g becaus e i t p r o v i d e d a succinc t allusio n t o com plex lega l p h e n o m e n a . I t wa s additionall y a n ac t o f fait h i n inevitable p r o g r e s s a n d t h u s serve d t o buttres s Victoria n assumptions. Finally , t h e p h r a s e c a m e t o b e i n t e r p r e t e d a s o n e for m o f a sociall y scientifi c la w tha t m i g h t fulfil l t h e intellectual ques t fo r suc h certainties . Fo r Maine , however , it m e a n t t h e transitio n "fro m a n earl y p h a s e o f family -

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based ascriptiv e statu s i n t h e la w o f p e r s o n s t o o n e i n which persona l relation s wer e d e e m e d t o reflec t t h e fre e a g r e e m e n t o f contractin g individuals." 1 9 I n late r work s Maine lef t thi s p h r a s e u n a m e n d e d a n d n e v e r s o u g h t t o elaborate t h e mos t famou s o f hi s insights . Beyond it s specifi c conclusions , Ancient Law p i o n e e r e d t h e concep t o f historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . O r d i n a r i l y a t thi s point a definitio n o f historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e woul d b e i n o r d e r becaus e differen t scholar s a p p r o p r i a t e d t h e t e r m for differen t p u r p o s e s . T h i s ha s p r o v e d difficul t becaus e Maine himsel f di d n o t defin e hi s usag e n o r wa s Cock s abl e to p e r f o r m t h e tas k o n hi s b e h a l f : "I t ha s n o t e n a b l e d us t o discove r a definitio n o f historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . " 2 0 Maine a p p a r e n t l y too k som e element s o f hi s concep t fro m G e r m a n jurist s suc h a s Friedric h vo n Savigny , a l t h o u g h n o t a s m u c h a s V i n o g r a d o f f h a d believed : "Lik e Savigny , Maine wa s c o n c e r n e d fundamentall y wit h reconciling , po litically a s wel l a s intellectually , la w a n d society ; a n d h e rejected t h e B e n t h a m i t e a n d Austinia n notio n o f la w a s simple c o m m a n d a n d obligation." 2 1 Citatio n o f G e r m a n jurists, a n d eve n b o r r o w i n g fro m t h e m , certainl y in creased d u r i n g t h e cours e o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century , b u t this ofte n c a m e t o b e a scholarl y sleigh t o f h a n d , d e m o n strating a juristically correc t attitud e r a t h e r t h a n t r u e in tellectual e x c h a n g e . Main e d r e w u p o n variou s source s i n an eclecti c fashio n withou t relyin g to o heavil y o n an y o n e influence. Becaus e h e n e v e r explaine d satisfactoril y t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e p h r a s e s o closel y associate d wit h hi s n a m e , h e lef t s u b s e q u e n t scholar s fre e t o defin e i t a s the y pleased, o r t o us e i t a s a n invocatio n t o s u p p o r t conclu sions o f thei r own . Main e h a d written : "Bu t t h e w a r n i n g

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can n e v e r b e to o ofte n r e p e a t e d , t h a t t h e g r a n d sourc e o f mistake i n question s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s t h e impressio n that thos e reason s whic h actuat e u s a t t h e p r e s e n t mo m e n t , i n t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f a n existin g institution , h a v e necessarily a n y t h i n g i n c o m m o n wit h t h e s e n t i m e n t i n which t h e institutio n o r i g i n a t e d . " 2 2 I f historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e m e a n t onl y t h a t t h e la w m u s t b e studie d i n it s historical d i m e n s i o n , t h e n i t woul d hav e a m o u n t e d t o littl e m o r e t h a n cant . Certainl y M a i n e wa s n o t t h e first t o d r a w this e l e m e n t a r y conclusion . I f Main e h a d a m o r e p e r c e p tive insigh t a b o u t t h e relatio n o f histor y t o law , h e k e p t i t to himself . Maine u s e d historica l j u r i s p r u d e n ce a s a vehicl e fo r t h e expression o f hi s t h o u g h t o n t h e g e n e r a l socia l conditio n of c o n t e m p o r a r y E n g l a n d . Hi s b o o k wa s entitle d Ancient Law, b u t t h e lesson s derive d fro m hi s stud y o f pas t la w h a d direc t applicatio n t o hi s ow n world : One elementar y precautio n i s t o remembe r tha t al l account s o f progress involve , a t leas t implicitly , som e characterizatio n o f stagnation, retrogression , an d decline ; and , perhap s a slightl y less obviou s point , theorie s o f progres s ar e on e ver y effectiv e form o f socia l o r cultura l criticis m i n tha t the y ar e attempt s to endo w wit h som e kin d o f scientifi c o r mora l authorit y th e discrimination o f thos e curren t socia l an d cultura l develop ments tha t ar e welcom e fro m thos e tha t ar e not. 23 Maine m a d e hi s point s o f socia l c o m m e n t a r y i n Ancient Law, b u t it s fam e b e c a m e assure d w h e n t h e boo k gaine d recognition a s a seriou s wor k o f scholarship . W h a t historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e c a m e t o m e a n fo r t h e scholarly c o m m u n i t y wa s t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d : "th e

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recognition o f similaritie s betwee n t h e practice s a n d be liefs o f c o n t e m p o r a r y primitiv e o r barbari c people s a n d those r e c o r d e d i n t h e pas t histor y o f civilization." 2 4 Al t h o u g h Main e di d n o t inven t thi s influentia l idea , h e gav e it a legitimac y i n Ancient Law tha t i t h a d n o t previousl y enjoyed a n d offere d a too l fo r f u r t h e r analysis . T h e com parative m e t h o d soo n b e c a m e t h e r o t e explanatio n i n m a n y fledgling discipline s o f Victoria n E n g l a n d . " I n t h e 1860s a n d 70 s t h e m a p o f l e a r n i n g seemed , t o m a n y m e m bers o f t h e e d u c a t e d clas s i n E n g l a n d , a b o u t t o b e re d r a w n i n a n exhiliratingl y c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d c o h e r e n t way," i t ha s b e e n a r g u e d , a n d "th e effusio n o f reference s . . . p o i n t e d t o a self-conscious , excite d sens e o f directio n a n d c o m m o n p u r p o s e a t w o r k . " 2 5 Relianc e o n t h e com parative m e t h o d b e c a m e a n academi c p h e n o m e n o n , a t r e n d y ide a whos e implication s Main e n e v e r e x p l o r e d i n systematic fashion. 2 6 I n t h e e n d i t b e c a m e a ritua l p h r a s e to whic h academi c obeisanc e wa s paid , a n obligator y foot note b y whic h a n individua l pai d scholarl y dues . W h a t Main e t h o u g h t h e h a d accomplishe d b y e m p h a s i s on t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d c a n n o t b e describe d wit h p r e cision, fo r h e ma y wel l hav e h a d severa l objective s i n view . A r g u m e n t s a b o u t wha t h e m e a n t b y t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d ma y revea l m o r e a b o u t posterit y t h a n a b o u t Maine. Fo r e x a m p l e , Main e a n d t h e comparativ e m e t h o d affected t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f imperia l duties , especiall y t h e necessity o f g o v e r n i n g divers e customar y societie s s o fa r r e m o v e d fro m Englis h experience : "Sinc e Britai n wa s obliged t o m a k e law s fo r societie s scattere d acros s t h e face o f t h e e a r t h , Main e t h o u g h t i t u n d e n i a b l e tha t hi s a p p r o a c h offere d t h e a d v a n t a g e o f flexibility." 27 A n o t h e r

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contention wa s tha t Main e believe d t h a t h e h a d p r o v i d e d a ke y t o unloc k m a n y o f th e mysterie s tha t c o n f o u n d e d scholars: "Psychologicall y speaking , h e seem s t o hav e re garded th e Comparativ e Metho d a s th e foundatio n o f a great ne w scienc e r a t h e r t h a n a s a las t r e s o r t . " 2 8 A s fa r a s its impac t o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e wa s c o n c e r n e d , t h e c o m p a r a tive m e t h o d p r o v i d e d t h e "perfec t stic k wit h whic h t o beat t h e Utilitarian s fo r t h e widel y sense d failur e o f thei r 'abstract' m e t h o d . " 2 9 Becaus e Main e lef t suc h a n a m b i g u ous heritage , al l o f thes e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s hav e som e sup p o r t i n t h e availabl e evidence , t h o u g h n o t sufficien t t o establish an y o n e o f t h e m absolutely . W h a t e v e r difficultie s Main e b e q u e a t h e d wit h t h e com parative m e t h o d , t h e impac t o n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n ce wa s clear a n d i m m e d i a t e . O n e specifi c illustratio n o f Maine' s convoluted legac y e m e r g e d i n t h e wor k o f Si r Frederic k Pollock. A l t h o u g h h e h a r b o r e d d o u b t s a b o u t s o m e aspect s of Maine' s work , Polloc k e n d o r s e d enthusiasticall y Maine' s utilization o f t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d . 3 0 I n c o m m o n wit h Maine a n d hi s ow n c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , Polloc k n e v e r define d exactly wha t h e m e a n t b y th e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d . H e used t h e t e r m fo r t h e mos t p a r t i n a generi c sense , a s a universal m e t h o d o l o g y vali d fo r al l disciplines . A t o t h e r times h e e q u a t e d t h e p h r a s e wit h historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e bes t vehicl e fo r t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f lega l history . O n some occasion s Polloc k use d th e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d t o e m p h a s i z e t h e valu e o f R o m a n law . A c q u a i n t a n c e wit h i t was essentia l becaus e c o m p a r i s o n wit h t h e c o m m o n la w gave a n i m p r o v e d knowledg e o f Englis h law . Polloc k char acterized Maine' s wor k i n thi s way : "A t o n e master-strok e h e forge d a ne w a n d lastin g b o n d betwee n law , history ,

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and anthropology . Jurisprudenc e itsel f ha s becom e a study o f th e livin g growt h o f huma n societ y throug h al l it s stages, an d i t i s n o longe r possibl e fo r la w t o b e deal t wit h as a collectio n o f rules." 31 Maine' s comparativ e method , like hi s phras e "fro m statu s t o contract, " permeate d th e c o m m o n discours e o f academi c culture ; i t becam e a shib boleth s o pervasiv e tha t i t turne d int o a distinctiv e featur e of Victoria n academi c culture . I t eventuall y "represente d a flexing o f academi c muscle s i n dange r perhap s o f pe dantic cram p o r antiquaria n irrelevance." 32 I n jurispru dence especiall y th e vogu e fo r comparativ e la w di d no t lead t o th e scholarl y result s promised . Fo r al l th e prais e o f that methodology , fe w jurist s actuall y attempted t o follo w the prescription ; Main e popularize d th e phrase , bu t h e did no t foun d a schoo l tha t produce d significan t results . Within jurisprudenc e th e comparativ e metho d remaine d an ideal . T h e difficultie s i n tryin g t o fit Main e properl y int o hi s intellectual contex t di d no t en d there . Jame s Bryce , Re gius professo r o f civi l la w a t Oxfor d fro m 187 0 t o 1893 , attempted t o distinguis h betwee n th e comparativ e metho d and th e separat e disciplin e o f history . Fo r Bryc e th e com parative metho d mean t th e habi t o f investigatio n "whic h collects rule s an d institution s foun d i n ever y develope d legal system , o r mos t o f them , [and ] note s thei r similaritie s or differences." 3 3 T h e scienc e o f histor y wa s no t a s me chanical, fo r i t ha d t o dea l wit h th e contingencie s o f th e human experience . Si r Willia m Holdswort h though t tha t Maine's influenc e wa s th e greate r precisel y becaus e th e combination o f compariso n an d histor y accounte d fo r th e great stride s i n th e writin g o f lega l histor y a t th e en d o f

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t h e Victoria n era. 3 4 T h e fac t r e m a i n s , however , tha t t h e significant scholarshi p i n lega l histor y i n thi s p e r i o d wa s weighted heavil y t o w a r d t h e histor y o f Englis h law . I t wa s n o t c o m p a r a t i v e i n an y m e a n i n g f u l sense . T h e e x t e n t o f Maine' s specifi c influenc e ha s r e m a i n e d difficult t o assess , fo r h e wa s frequentl y cite d a n d ye t lef t few follower s t o carr y o n hi s work . Al l m a n n e r o f scholar s invoked hi s n a m e , b u t the y di d s o i n s u p p o r t o f widel y d i s p a r a t e intellectua l enterprises . Main e coul d h a r d l y have sympathize d wit h mos t o f t h e wor k ostensibl y p e r f o r m e d u n d e r hi s inspiration . T h e conclusio n t h a t "th e e x t e n t a n d p r o f u n d i t y o f Maine' s influenc e a m o n g t h e intellectuals woul d b e h a r d t o e x a g g e r a t e " 3 5 i s surel y cor rect. Maine' s u n d o u b t e d statur e ha s r e m a i n e d u n d i m i n ished eve n t h o u g h hi s wor k quickl y fade d int o obscurit y after t h e academi c fa d o f t h e c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d h a d r u n it s course . Maine' s plac e i n t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l tradi tion ha s puzzle d late r g e n e r a t i o n s becaus e h e ha s s e e m e d so o u t o f step , s o fa r afiel d fro m t h e c o n c e r n s o f hi s predecessors. T h e relationshi p t o earlie r jurists , particu larly B e n t h a m a n d Austin , hold s t h e ke y t o s o m e aspect s of fitting Main e int o hi s a p p r o p r i a t e plac e i n t h e histor y of Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Maine's origina l ambiguit y t o w a r d t h e analytica l jurist s makes i t difficul t t o describ e hi s attitude , a n d t h e p r o b l e m is m a d e eve n m o r e c o m p l e x b y t h e wa y i n whic h hi s ow n views c h a n g e d ove r time . A s Main e gre w o l d e r h e altere d his p e r c e p t i o n o f himsel f a s primaril y a criti c o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d graduall y c a m e t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e ques tions pose d a n d t h e answer s offere d b y B e n t h a m a n d Austin. Fo r e x a m p l e , Main e eventuall y a c k n o w l e d g e d tha t

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t h e principl e o f utility , originall y a n objec t o f hi s scorn , offered a powerfu l w e a p o n fo r t h e critiqu e o f existin g legal a r r a n g e m e n t s . 3 6 T h e felicifi c calculu s p r e s e n t e d a stumbling bloc k becaus e Main e c o n t i n u e d t o believ e t h a t it merel y substitute d o n e m o r a l s t a n d a r d fo r a n o t h e r , t h u s clouding t h e issue s tha t j u r i s p r u d e n ce s o u g h t t o clarify. 37 I n addition , Main e hesitate d t o accep t a s a basi s fo r politi cal r e f o r m t h e principl e o f utility , i n whic h h e sa w valu e as a n i n s t r u m e n t o f lega l r e f o r m . 3 8 H e wishe d t o e x t e n d t h e insight s o f t h e analytica l jurists b y investin g thei r wor k with ne w perspectives. 3 9 Main e di d no t r e p u d i a t e utilitar ian j u r i s p r u d e n c e, fo r h e wishe d t o t u r n it s conclusion s i n m o r e p r o d u c t i v e directions . O n th e definitio n o f la w offere d b y B e n t h a m a n d Aus tin, Main e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e notio n o f la w a s t h e c o m m a n d of a legislato r di d n o t accuratel y p o r t r a y t h e situatio n i n past societies , n o r di d i t e x h a u s t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o p e r ties o f law . Main e wa s "suspicious " o f t h e utilitaria n a r g u m e n t t h a t la w a s c o m m a n d r e p r e s e n t e d t h e onl y t r u e f o r m of law. 40 H e d e f e n d e d t h e validit y o f customar y la w a s a legal syste m suitabl e fo r t h e societ y i n whic h i t existed . T h e absenc e o f legislation , o r positiv e law , di d no t m a k e such a societ y an y les s responsiv e t o t h e m a n d a t e s o f cus t o m a r y law . Main e c o n t e n d e d tha t t o d e n y t h e t e r m "law " to thes e customar y lega l rule s simpl y reflecte d t h e unhis torical aspect s o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e , a l t h o u g h h e c o n c e d e d tha t B e n t h a m a n d Austi n describe d accuratel y t h e stat e o f Englis h la w a s i t existe d w h e n the y wrote . Maine believe d tha t t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f customar y lega l systems m a d e i t possibl e t o explai n th e c o m m o n la w wit h g r e a t e r sophistication : "Instea d o f t h i n k i n g i n t e r m s o f

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either c o m m a n d s o r r e d - r o b e d j u d g e s , t h e s t u d e n t s o f legal theor y h a d t o defin e la w a s a face t o f c u l t u r e . " 4 1 T h e analytical jurist s h a d n o t e r r e d a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f law ; they h a d define d i t i n to o restrictiv e a fashio n a n d w i t h o u t d u e r e g a r d fo r t h e historica l circumstance s tha t affecte d c o n t e m p o r a r y law . Main e wishe d t o buil d o n a n d e x p a n d t h e insight s o f t h e utilitarians , n o t t o rejec t t h e m becaus e they h a d n o t h i n g t o offe r j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Maine followe d t h e sam e lin e i n d e a l i n g wit h t h e issu e of sovereignty . H e believe d tha t B e n t h a m a n d Austin , while n o t totall y w r o n g , h a d no t e x p l o r e d t h e subjec t i n all it s complexity . I n hi s first consideratio n o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e publishe d i n 1855 , fo r e x a m p l e , Main e ex a m i n e d t h e a r g u m e n t tha t sovereignt y consiste d essen tially o f t h e coerciv e p o w e r o f a s u p e r i o r a u t h o r i t y t o c o m m a n d habitua l o b e d i e n c e fro m t h e bul k o f society. 42 For hi m t h e d e b a t e o n sovereignt y h a d wide r r e p e r c u s sions t h a n simpl y o n t h e domesti c s p h e r e , fo r i t affecte d international la w a s well . I f t h e Austinia n definitio n o f sovereignty wer e g r a n t e d , p r e s u m a b l y internationa l la w could n o t exis t i n an y significan t sens e becaus e i t lacke d t h e necessar y sovereig n t o enforc e it s rules . Main e t h o u g h t thi s a n essentiall y foolis h conclusion . Maine p r e f e r r e d a m o r e spaciou s a p p r o a c h t o t h e p r o b lem o f w h a t m i g h t b e t e r m e d law . Whil e h e a d m i r e d t h e acute focu s o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e , h e a r g u e d tha t i t r e q u i r e d a g r e a t e r appreciatio n o f historica l context , a n d that i t d i s r e g a r d e d m a n y area s o f h u m a n c o n d u c t tha t h a d to b e take n int o accoun t fo r a t r u e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f law : "Abstraction i n Austin' s h a n d s als o i g n o r e d t h e historica l a n t e c e d e n t s a n d circumstance s u n d e r whic h coerciv e sov -

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ereign power , onc e established , c a m e t o b e exercise d o r m o d e r a t e d or , i n fact , exclude d fro m certai n area s o f action. Opinions , beliefs , sentiments , superstitions , idea s of al l k i n d — i n s h o r t t h e historica l c u l t u r e i n whic h sover eignty aros e a n d f u n c t i o n e d — w e r e omitte d fro m consid e r a t i o n . " 4 3 T h e notio n o f territoria l sovereignt y s o essen tial t o t h e Austinia n analysi s " h a d n o applicatio n t o vas t areas o f h u m a n society." 4 4 Becaus e i t di d n o t posses s t h e cultural c o m p o n e n t Main e d e e m e d vital , analytica l juris p r u d e n c e faile d t o delive r t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e scienc e o f law tha t i t h a d p r o m i s e d . T h e sam e p a t t e r n e m e r g e d fro m Maine' s consideratio n of sovereignt y a s h a d o c c u r r e d wit h la w a s c o m m a n d . After m a k i n g t r e n c h a n t criticism s tha t woul d ultimatel y b e c o m e s t a n d a r d appraisal s o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e , Maine recognize d tha t B e n t h a m a n d Austi n h a d consider able merit , particularl y i n t h e remorseles s applicatio n o f logic. Fo r Maine , however , logi c wa s n o t everythin g i n dealing wit h t h e law ; hi s critiqu e ma y wel l hav e i n t e n d e d to cautio n enthusiasti c follower s o f Austi n tha t failur e t o account fo r o t h e r factor s i n a lega l syste m m i g h t vitiat e a n analysis. 4 5 I f onl y e n f o r c e m e n t wa s discusse d wit h respec t to sovereignty , t h e n to o m a n y o t h e r i m p o r t a n t factor s were omitted . I n internationa l law , fo r e x a m p l e , " W h a t we hav e t o notic e is , tha t t h e f o u n d e r s o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law, t h o u g h the y di d n o t creat e a sanction , create d a law abiding s e n t i m e n t . " 4 6 I n t e r n a t i o n a l la w constitute d a vali d system o f la w despit e t h e absenc e o f certai n aspect s o f Austin's definition . A nonlega l entit y suc h a s s e n t i m e n t was ever y bi t a s crucia l t o la w a s t h e forma l categorie s defined b y t h e analytica l jurists . T h u s Main e di d n o t de -

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stroy t h e analytica l tradition ; r a t h e r , h e a t t e m p t e d t o teas e o u t it s implication s a n d e x p a n d thos e point s tha t B e n t h a m a n d Austi n h a d rightl y e m p h a s i z e d . A b o u t t h e relatio n o f la w t o morality , t h e c o n g r u e n c e of Maine' s conclusion s wit h thos e o f B e n t h a m a n d Austi n was eve n m o r e p r o n o u n c e d . Main e h a d a s littl e patienc e as e i t h e r o f hi s analytica l predecessor s wit h t h e lon g tradi tion o f n a t u r a l la w theory . T h e c o n c e p t o f n a t u r a l la w h a d n o historica l justification , i t reste d u p o n a f o u n d a t i o n o f imprecise l a n g u a g e , a n d i t coul d suppl y n o empirica l evi d e n c e fo r it s t r u t h . Main e a t t r i b u t e d som e o f t h e mos t pernicious idea s i n lega l a n d politica l t h e o r y t o t h e balefu l influence o f n a t u r a l law. 4 7 Fo r Main e t h e grea t villai n wa s Rousseau, w h o h a d t u r n e d n a t u r a l la w concept s u p s i d e d o w n b y d e d u c i n g secula r politica l conclusion s fro m m o r a l premises . T h e Swis s p h i l o s o p h e r h a d w o r s e n e d m a t t e r s b y invokin g t h e mythica l stat e o f n a t u r e , hi s pri vate n a t u r a l law , t o s u p p o r t hi s ide a o f politica l society . Maine d e v o t e d substantia l spac e a n d e n e r g y t o hi s critiqu e of Rousseau , a n d a s Cock s ha s correctl y stressed , i n Ancient Law Main e d e v o t e d hi s s h a r p e s t criticism s t o n a t u r a l law a n d gav e fa r les s attentio n t o aspersion s o n t h e utilitar ian jurists. 4 8 Main e di d n o t a d d r e s s t h e separatio n o f la w a n d moralit y a s specificall y a s hi s analytica l predecessors , b u t h e a g r e e d wit h t h e principle , fo r h e als o d e n o u n c e d t h e b l e n d i n g o f w h a t t h e la w i s a n d w h a t i t o u g h t t o b e that i s s o characteristi c o f n a t u r a l law. 4 9 O n thi s point , t h e r e f o r e , Main e s u p p o r t e d enthusiasticall y a majo r p r e m i s e o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Yet, a s wit h hi s utilitaria n predecessors , Main e als o u r g e d t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f la w a n d moralit y a n d t h e n t u r n e d

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a r o u n d a n d p r o m p t l y injecte d m o r a l c o n c e r n s int o hi s j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Maine' s attitud e towar d t h e la w a n d moral ity issu e reinforce d t h e habi t o f substitutin g m o r a l consid erations int o lega l writings . I n t h e sam e fashio n t h a t Blackstone h a d utilize d n a t u r a l la w tenets , B e n t h a m t h e principle o f utility , a n d Austi n t h e m a n d a t e o f revelation , Maine t u r n e d hi s a r g u m e n t s int o m o r a l imperatives . T h u s the s i g n a t u r e p h r a s e o f "fro m statu s t o contract " b e c a m e "not merel y a n historica l t r u t h ('hitherto' ) b u t a m o r a l polarity, whic h n o f u t u r e socia l d e v e l o p m e n t coul d cancel ; a distinctio n betwee n tw o m o r a l a s wel l a s socia l worlds : custom se t agains t analysi s a n d intellectua l energy , tradi tion agains t expediency , d e p e n d e n c e agains t self-reliance , superstitious fea r agains t m u t u a l t r u s t . " 5 0 Main e coul d not resis t t h e t e m p t a t i o n tha t h a d als o seduce d hi s p r e d e cessors. T h i s a g r e e m e n t o n t h e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y led t o a m o r e substantia l accor d o n t h e necessit y t o m a k e legal stud y a scientifi c e n d e a v o r fo r t h e p u r p o s e o f placin g j u r i s p r u d e n c e o n a m o r e secur e intellectua l basis . T h e multifaceted Victoria n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f scienc e gav e ris e to m a n y sense s o f t h e word , a n d t o a n e n d u r i n g d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p r o p e r conceptio n o f la w a s a science. 5 1 Main e r e g a r d e d hi s researc h a n d reflection s a s specificall y e m p i r ical, wit h t h e histor y o f societie s p r o v i d i n g t h e sourc e o f his e x p e r i m e n t a l evidence . I n t h e Victoria n e r a fe w jurist s troubled themselve s a b o u t a precis e definitio n o f science , a n d practic e generall y a l t e r n a t e d betwee n t h e o r d e r l y ac quisition o f knowledg e a n d a stric t imitatio n o f o n e o f th e scientific disciplines . Maine' s work , particularl y w h e n h e discussed idea s o f progress , len t itsel f t o biologica l analo -

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gies, eve n t h o u g h Main e himsel f t h o u g h t o f geolog y a s p r o v i d i n g t h e scientifi c m o d e l h e wishe d t o a p p r o x i m a t e . T h e layerin g o f t h e earth' s crus t s e e m e d t o Main e analo gous t o t h e m a n y level s o f c o m m o n la w create d ove r t h e centuries. 5 2 Main e recognize d t h e utilitaria n jurist s a s hi s f o r e r u n n e r s i n thi s p u r s u i t o f scientifi c law , a n d "ma y wel l have c o n c l u d e d t h a t hi s ne w a p p r o a c h wa s essentia l fo r realizing t h e unfulfille d p r o m i s e o f t h e 'stric t scientifi c process' initiate d b y B e n t h a m a n d A u s t i n . " 5 3 I n thi s are a Maine onc e agai n t h o u g h t o f hi s wor k a s essentiall y com p l e m e n t a r y t o t h a t o f hi s scholarl y forebears , n o t a s a radical rejectio n o f thei r contributions . Finally, t h e m i x e d n a t u r e o f Maine' s relationshi p t o t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l h e r i t a g e materialize d i n t h e evolutio n o f his politica l beliefs . W h e r e B e n t h a m b e c a m e m o r e politi cally radica l a s h e aged , t h e opposit e wa s t r u e o f Austin , a n d Main e followe d t h e latter' s e x a m p l e . T h e publicatio n of Popular Government i n 1885 , hi s mos t avowedl y politica l book, e x p r e s s e d a n u n c o m p r o m i s i n g hostilit y towar d m a n y o f t h e politica l t r e n d s affectin g t h e worl d o f t h e lat e Victorians. I n it s implacabl e aversio n t o t h e radica l drif t of politics , Maine' s Popular Government resemble d Austin' s A Plea for the Constitution. Main e eve n q u o t e d approvingl y t h e w o r d s o f disillusionmen t writte n earlie r b y Austi n a s an e x a m p l e o f politica l d i s e n c h a n t m e n t cause d b y t h e fail u r e o f r e f o r m . 5 4 Bot h work s exhibite d a s t r o n g commit m e n t t o politica l conservatis m a s u n d e r s t o o d i n eac h era ; Maine cite d Austi n ("th e farthes t r e b o u n d o f a powerfu l m i n d fro m t h e peculia r philosophica l Radicalis m o f t h e i m m e d i a t e pupil s o f J e r e m y B e n t h a m " ) 5 5 i n s u p p o r t o f his critiqu e o f t h e m a r c h towar d politica l d e m o c r a c y i n

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G r e a t Britain . Main e disagree d wit h B e n t h a m primaril y o n t h e subjec t o f legislation . B e n t h a m h a d r e g a r d e d t h e legislator a s t h e ke y t o hi s plan s fo r r e f o r m ; Main e looke d with t r e p i d a t i o n a t t h e increasin g v o l u m e o f legislativ e activity b y 1885 , a n d wa s pessimisti c a b o u t t h e result s o f this frenzy. 5 6 Politica l event s o f Maine' s lifetim e h a d calle d into questio n politica l idea s suc h a s t h e virtue s o f limite d g o v e r n m e n t t h a t Main e h a d hel d sinc e youth . A s hi s vari ous politica l allegiance s c a m e u n d e r increasin g criticism , Maine r e t r e a t e d t o a politic s o f nostalgi a tha t rejecte d t h e direction o f m o d e r n politics. 57 T h e t h e m e s o f a lifetim e persisted int o ol d age , w h e r e i n Popular Government Main e still fel t compelle d t o questio n t h e legacie s o f Roussea u and Bentham . Maine d e n o u n c e d strongl y t h e a d v e n t o f politica l de mocracy r o u n d e d of f b y t h e R e f o r m Ac t o f 1884 , a n d i t i s this attac k fo r whic h Popular Government i s no w chiefl y r e m e m b e r e d . M a i n e o p p o s e d t h e extensio n o f t h e fran chise i n t h e belie f t h a t universa l m a n h o o d suffrag e woul d lead ultimatel y t o politica l disaster . H e d e n o u n c e d t h e fatalistic acceptanc e o f th e inevitabilit y o f d e m o c r a c y a s c o n t r a r y t o t h e r e c o r d o f failur e i n d e m o c r a t i c experi ments. 5 8 Historica l j u r i s p r u d e n ce enable d Main e t o "clai m empirical evidenc e base d o n stric t s c h o l a r s h i p — a verifi able pas t a n d p r e s e n t " i n hi s rejectio n o f politica l a r g u m e n t s base d o n t h e certaint y o f progress. 5 9 H e believe d i n n a t u r a l elite s a n d p r o t e s t e d agains t t h e t e n d e n c y t o en shrine politica l equalit y a t t h e e x p e n s e o f liberty. 6 0 Fo r Maine, politica l p r o g r e s s wa s r a r e , f r a u g h t wit h al l m a n n e r o f peril s a n d n o t nearl y a s fas t o r f r e q u e n t a s t h e p r o p o n e n t s o f politica l d e m o c r a c y wishe d t o believe . I n

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the e n d , fro m a decidedl y differen t r o u t e , Main e h a d e m b r a c e d a politica l cree d consisten t wit h Austin' s earlie r jeremiads. T h e a p p a r e n t p a r a d o x o f t h e Main e w h o criticize d a n d the Main e w h o a d m i r e d analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e disap p e a r s w h e n t h e c h r o n o l o g y o f hi s wor k i s e x a m i n e d . I n 1855 Maine' s initia l discussio n o f Austi n o n sovereignt y was mos t r e m a r k a b l e fo r t h e attentio n pai d t o a j u r i s t whose n a m e h a d al l b u t vanishe d fro m publi c vie w b y tha t time. B y t h e tim e o f Ancient Law i n 1861 , Main e h a d b e c o m e m o r e ambivalen t a b o u t analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e . In Lectures on the Early History of Institutions i n 1875 , afte r years o f servic e i n India , Main e h a d b e c o m e m o r e forth right i n hi s acceptanc e o f it s s t r o n g points. 6 1 B y t h e e n d of hi s lif e Maine' s politic s b r o u g h t a s t r o n g identificatio n with Austin' s late r politica l fears . T h u s Maine' s reconcilia tion t o B e n t h a m a n d Austi n wa s a logica l progressio n w h e n viewe d i n t h e contex t o f hi s p e r s o n a l a n d politica l e x p e r i e n c e . Maine' s participatio n i n t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l tradition shoul d n o l o n g e r c o m e a s a surprise . In t h e e n d , w h e n t h e intricat e maz e o f s u p p o r t a n d criticism h a d e x h a u s t e d t h e possibl e p e r m u t a t i o n s o f rela tionship, o n e fac t r e m a i n e d p r e d o m i n a n t : Main e h a d con ceived hi s j u r i s p r u d e n t i al task s wit h t h e sam e b r o a d visio n that h a d d r i v e n Blackstone , B e n t h a m , a n d Austin . T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f historica l perspective s t o p r o b l e m s o f la w p e r m i t t e d Main e t o a d v a n c e o p i n i o n s a b o u t t h e g e n e r a l evolution o f society : " T h e historica l m e t h o d whic h Main e practiced r e q u i r e d fo r it s logica l validatio n t h e typicall y positivist a s s u m p t i o n o f g e n e r a l law s o f socia l develop m e n t . " 6 2 Main e s h a r e d wit h hi s predecessor s t h e belie f i n

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j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e disciplin e i n whic h t o a d d r e s s t h e e d u c a t e d public . I n Maine' s cas e t h e explana tion o f p r o g r e s s "ma y b e predicte d wit h suc h certaint y a s may b e f o u n d i n an y scientifi c law." 6 3 Fo r Maine , a s fo r t h e others , j u r i s p r u d e n ce p r o v i d e d t h e bes t m e d i u m fo r a general c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e stat e o f society : "Maine' s wor k provides a ver y forcefu l r e m i n d e r tha t j u r i s p r u d e n c e in volves m u c h m o r e t h a n lega l philosoph y wit h o r withou t reference t o socia l facts." 6 4 Maine' s j u r i s p r u d e n ce trie d t o i m p a r t politica l wisdo m a s wel l a s e x a m i n e lega l theory . His signatur e p h r a s e , fro m statu s t o contract , gaine d w i d e s p r e a d fam e becaus e i t b e c a m e a cod e fo r a politica l v i e w p o i n t — " a distinc t politica l t h e o r y fo r Maine , a n d o n e which gav e hi s belie f i n laissez-fair e f r e e d o m a n ai r o f historical inevitability." 6 5 Maine' s R e d e lectur e i n 187 5 o n India " r e p r e s e n t s t h e convictio n o f a n I n d i a n policy m a k e r a s m u c h a s t h e c r e d o o f a n academi c historian." 6 6 T h e politica l p u r p o s e a n d c o n t e n t o f Maine' s j u r i s p r u d e n c e place d h i m squarel y o n t h e trai l blaze d b y hi s juris tic predecessors . Ancient Law a t t e m p t e d t o a d d r e s s t h e jurist, t h e lawyer , a n d t h e e d u c a t e d public , th e b r o a d a u d i e n c e tha t Black stone, B e n t h a m , a n d Austi n h a d a t t e m p t e d t o reac h i n o r d e r t o gai n s u p p o r t fo r thei r scheme s o f socia l a n d political reconstruction. 6 7 B e n t h a m h a d faile d becaus e h e lacked t h e personalit y t o e n t e r t h e worl d o f publi c affairs . Austin h a d no t d r a w n a substantia l r e a d e r s h i p becaus e hi s style h a d p r o v e d to o c u m b e r s o m e . Main e faile d becaus e his a r g u m e n t s p r o v e d to o a r c a n e a n d hi s late r work s di d not reflec t t h e belief s o f a majorit y o f hi s r e a d e r s ; t h e "blatantly ideologica l cast" 6 8 o f hi s writing s p r e v e n t e d a n

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a p p e a l t o a b r o a d e r s p e c t r u m o f t h e Victoria n e d u c a t e d public: Ancient Law i s a complex wor k partl y because , t o spea k i n Victo rian terms , i t was one i n which , a s alway s i n Maine , Benthamit e rigour an d optimis m wer e hel d i n equipois e wit h a Whiggis h sense o f th e necessar y slownes s o f chang e an d th e inescapabilit y of learnin g b y experience , th e persistenc e o f th e pas t an d th e importance o f th e ripenes s o f time , an d th e relativ e valu e i n their da y o f institution s an d way s o f thinkin g whic h a mor e advanced ag e woul d find useles s or pernicious. 69 Maine followe d i n t h e lin e o f thos e jurists w h o m a d e juris p r u d e n c e a crucia l vehicl e fo r discussio n o f lega l a n d so cial t h e o r y a i m e d a t a g e n e r a l a u d i e n c e . O f t h e fou r individual s c o n s i d e r e d s o far , especiall y i n t h e contex t o f academi c discussio n ove r t h e pas t t h r e e decades, Maine' s legac y ha s falle n farthes t fro m t h e con cerns o f lega l scholarship . T h e lesse r positio n h e no w occupies i n t h e galler y o f Victoria n intellectual s ha s re sulted i n larg e m e a s u r e fro m t h e fac t tha t hi s wor k a s a n t h r o p o l o g i s t a n d historia n di d n o t surviv e late r scrutin y in t h e ag e o f academi c specialization . T h e conventiona l view tha t Main e wa s o u t o f ste p wit h analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e p r e v e n t e d h i m fro m obtainin g t h e attentio n tha t h e d e s e r v e d a s a speculativ e jurist. Hi s r e p u t a t i o n suffere d a s his wor k increasingl y b e c a m e t h e provinc e o f academi cians. Bot h Si r Frederic k Polloc k a n d Frederic k Maitland , impressive scholar s i n thei r ow n r i g h t i n t h e g e n e r a t i o n after Maine , h a d significan t reservation s a b o u t Maine' s accuracy a n d perspective . Pollock , despit e t h e effusiv e na t u r e o f hi s publishe d appraisal s afte r Maine' s d e a t h , i n

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later lif e wrot e privatel y abou t th e "od d results " obtaine d from rereadin g Ancient Law, an d th e "lapse s i n detail " tha t marred Maine' s work : "H e wa s certainl y n o medievalist . I don't thin k h e ha s a chanc e o f it." 70 Maitlan d wa s fre quently trouble d b y th e error s tha t permeate d Maine' s books: "Yo u spok e o f Maine . Well , I alway s tal k o f hi m with reluctance , fo r o n th e fe w occasion s o n whic h I sought t o verif y hi s statement s o f fac t I cam e t o th e con clusion tha t h e truste d muc h t o a memory tha t playe d hi m tricks an d rarel y looke d bac k a t a boo k h e ha d onc e read." 71 Maine' s historica l jurisprudenc e ha d to o muc h jurisprudence an d insufficien t histor y fo r Maitland . T h e rejection i n larg e measur e o f Maine' s wor k b y th e suc ceeding generatio n create d a n academi c legac y i n whic h Maine occupie d a lesse r plac e i n th e histor y o f Englis h jurisprudence. In par t thi s occurre d becaus e Main e enliste d n o disci ples othe r tha n Vinogradoff , no r di d a schoo l for m t o take hi s sid e i n scholarl y battle s an d carr y forwar d hi s work. A s eve n hi s admirer s bega n t o entertai n doubt s about th e efficac y o f hi s work , Main e passe d int o th e second ran k o f intellectuals , a consignment fro m whic h h e has neve r full y escaped . I n spit e o f this , Main e continue d to exercis e som e influence ; h e attracte d th e sympath y an d admiration o f suc h divers e figures a s Pollock , Harol d Laski, an d th e America n Justic e Olive r Wendel l Holmes . This tri o agree d tha t whateve r hi s failings , Main e ha d possessed th e geniu s t o inspir e other s ("impartin g a fer ment," Holme s calle d it) 7 2 t o examin e jurisprudence fro m a differen t angle . Polloc k recorde d tha t "th e impuls e given b y Main e t o it s intelligen t stud y i n Englan d an d

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A m e r i c a ca n h a r d l y b e o v e r r a t e d . " 7 3 I n addition , lik e Blackstone, Main e possesse d t h e gif t o f luci d writing . Ancient Law ma y stil l b e r e a d wit h p l e a s u r e eve n i f t h e r e a d e r is unfamilia r wit h it s a r g u m e n t s . W h e r e B e n t h a m a n d Austin intimidate d r e a d e r s wit h esoteri c vocabularie s a n d rigid classificator y regimes , M a i n e ha s r e m a i n e d a literar y delight, a j u r i st w h o ma y b e r e a d withou t t r e p i d a t i o n . T h i s quality wa s crucia l t o realiz e t h e d r e a m o f a j u r i s p r u d e n c e that spok e t o t h e g e n e r a l public . I f Main e fel l short , i t wa s not fo r lac k o f style . I n t h e e n d , however , M a i n e di d s h a r e wit h late r jurist s o n e effec t deleteriou s t o t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l legacy . I n c o m m o n wit h hi s forebears , M a i n e n a r r o w e d significantl y the p e r c e p t i o n o f thos e individual s w h o h a d p r e c e d e d him. A l t h o u g h hi s attitud e towar d Austin , fo r e x a m p l e , was n o t intentionall y hostile , i t i s no w clea r t h a t o n severa l i m p o r t a n t topic s h e a t t r i b u t e d t o Austi n view s t h a t Austi n h a d n o t held , a n d t h a t thi s "ma y als o hav e influence d t h e t e n d e n c y o f a n u m b e r o f s u b s e q u e n t jurist s t o misinter p r e t A u s t i n . " 7 4 A s Cock s c o n c l u d e d : "Maine' s failur e t o p r o v i d e a convincin g synthesi s o f law , histor y a n d philoso p h y — e v e n o f philosoph y i n t h e for m o f t h e scientifi c analysis o f h i s t o r y — h a d a ver y significan t legac y fo r En glish lega l t h o u g h t . I t e n c o u r a g e d a m o r e restricte d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f wha t m a d e fo r lega l study ; a n d i t limite d the scop e o f suc h claim s a s coul d b e m a d e tha t t h e lega l past c o n t a i n e d lessons ' whic h coul d b e use d directl y t o i m p r o v e m o d e r n la w a n d s t a n d a r d s o f lega l practice." 7 5 Maine t h u s a d v a n c e d tha t proces s b y which , eve n a s h e proclaimed t h e mos t c o m p r e h e n s i v e aim s fo r hi s ow n j u r i s p r u d e n c e , hi s accoun t o f hi s predecessor s p r e s e n t e d

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t h e m i n a fashio n tha t ultimatel y restricte d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f thei r wor k passe d d o w n t o posterity . T h e o l d e r depictio n o f Maine' s historica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e as a mutuall y exclusiv e alternativ e to , a n d critiqu e of , analytical j u r i s p r u d e n c e n o l o n g e r give s a n accurat e pic t u r e o f thei r relationship . N e a t p a t t e r n s a r e r a r e i n intel lectual history , a n d t h e traditiona l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n wa s terri bly misleadin g a b o u t t h e connectio n betwee n Main e a n d his tw o analytica l p r e c u r s o r s . Main e wa s n o t a n a b e r r a t i o n from t h e t r i u m p h a n t utilitarianis m o f Victoria n j u r i s p r u d e n c e ; h e wa s p a r t o f t h e sam e e n t e r p r i s e , albei t wit h different m e t h o d s a n d conclusions : "Lik e B e n t h a m a n d Austin h e wa s c o n c e r n e d wit h d e v e l o p i n g a 'scientific ' ap p r o a c h t o la w t h r o u g h genera l j u r i s p r u d e n c e ; lik e Austi n h e wa s primaril y c o n c e r n e d wit h t h e 4s ' r a t h e r t h a n t h e ' o u g h t ' — p e r h a p s fo r politica l a s wel l a s 'scientific ' rea sons; a s wit h b o t h o f t h e m th e analysi s o f wha t Hohfiel d called ' f u n d a m e n t a l lega l conceptions ' wa s centra l t o hi s concerns; lik e Austi n h e r e g a r d e d R o m a n la w a s t h e ex e m p l a r o f lega l t h o u g h t i n m a t u r e systems." 7 6 Despit e t h e misleadin g assertion s o f som e late r scholar s suc h a s Vinogradoff, Main e di d n o t i g n o r e hi s intellectua l ante cedents. Wit h respec t t o B e n t h a m a n d Austin : Maine make s clea r hi s indebtednes s t o bot h thes e thinkers , whose idea s wer e i n importan t respect s th e poin t o f departur e for hi s own complementar y method s o f historica l an d compara tive inquiry . I n Maine' s view , Jeremy Bentha m wa s essentiall y a law reformer ; an d John Austin' s consumin g interes t i n th e pre cise analysis of contemporar y lega l terminolog y wa s preliminar y to a large r theoretica l enterpris e aime d a t a comprehensiv e

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delineation o f th e condition s requisit e i n a forma l accoun t o f the lega l syste m o f a moder n state. 77 T h e earlie r wor k b y hi s analytica l predecessor s h a d lacke d Maine's c o n c e r n fo r historica l d e v e l o p m e n t : "Admittedly , Maine wa s o p e n i n hi s e n t h u s i a s m fo r t h e m e t h o d s o f th e utilitarian jurist s i n s o fa r a s the y a t leas t a t t e m p t e d a n analysis o f la w whic h explicitl y relate d practica l m a t t e r s t o a g e n e r a l theor y o f law ; h e a d m i r e d thei r clarity . B u t h e could n e v e r se e himsel f a s o n e o f thei r n u m b e r becaus e o f their failur e t o i n t e g r a t e historica l informatio n a n d a cor rect u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h u m a n n a t u r e int o thei r writing s on lega l c h a n g e . " 7 8 T h i s omissio n di d not , however , b r e a k the intellectua l link s betwee n Main e a n d t h e analytica l tra dition. As earl y a s 186 1 J a m e s Fitzjame s S t e p h e n recognize d t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y n a t u r e o f thi s c o m m o n e n d e a v o r i n a comparative boo k revie w o f Ancient Law a n d The Province of Jurisprudence Determined: " T h o u g h analysi s i s t h e mai n p u r p o s e o f t h e o n e a n d histor y o f t h e o t h e r , eac h (an d especially Mr . Austin ) recognize s t h e necessit y t o hi s ow n inquiries o f t h e lin e o f t h o u g h t whic h h e doe s n o t p u r sue." 7 9 W h a t b o u n d Main e t o t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i al traditio n far e x c e e d e d tha t whic h s e p a r a t e d h i m . 8 0 Eve n a s Main e a d d e d hi s persona l contributio n t o thi s heritage , t h e trans formation o f t h e traditio n wa s f o r e s h a d o w e d befor e Maine's d e a t h ; thi s shif t woul d eventuall y s h a p e Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e int o a disciplin e significantl y differen t fro m that Blackstone , B e n t h a m , Austin , a n d Main e h a d envi sioned.

Chapter Six

Sir Thomas

Erskine

Holland

T h e Transitio n t o Moder Academic La

n

w

T h e centra l positio n occupie d b y Si r T h o m a s Erskin e Hol land i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f m o d e r n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e may occasio n s o m e surprise . N o t onl y ha s Holland' s r e p u tation decline d t o t h e poin t o f absolut e neglec t (indeed , i t h a d suffere d precipitousl y i n hi s ow n lifetime) , h e wa s p e r h a p s t h e leas t wel l k n o w n o f t h e O x f o r d la w profes soriate t h a t i n c l u d e d Si r Willia m A n s o n , J a m e s Bryce , A. V . Dicey , a n d Si r Frederic k Pollock . T h i s g r o u p at t e m p t e d collectivel y t o plac e Englis h la w a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e o n a scientifi c basis , primaril y a l o n g t h e line s first e n u n c i a t e d b y B e n t h a m a n d Austin . Unlik e t h e majorit y of hi s O x f o r d colleagues , H o l l a n d h a d n o c a r e e r i n publi c service a n d n o publi c f o r u m o t h e r t h a n t h a t p r o v i d e d b y 147

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the occasiona l lette r t o The Times. H e spen t mos t o f hi s professorial caree r i n p r o v i d i n g a framewor k fo r m o d e r n international law , t h e majo r principle s o f whic h H o l l a n d discovered i n B e n t h a m i t e utilit y r a t h e r t h a n t h e n a t u r a l law tradition . Hi s sol e contributio n t o lega l philosoph y c a m e i n 188 0 wit h t h e publicatio n o f The Elements of Jurisprudence, whic h c o n t i n u e d int o a t h i r t e e n t h editio n i n 1924, tw o year s befor e th e a u t h o r ' s d e a t h . A b o u t thi s lone work , however , o n e c o n t e m p o r a r y wrot e t h a t i t wa s " p e r h a p s t h e mos t successfu l boo k o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e eve r w r i t t e n . " l B e y o n d tha t o n e significan t wor k H o l l a n d di d not v e n t u r e , fo r hi s attentio n t o j u r i s p r u d e n ce t h e r e a f t e r seems t o hav e b e e n sporadi c a t best . The Elements of Jurisprudence, lon g consigne d t o obscurity , h a r d l y seem s suffi cient no w t o meri t a plac e i n t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l c a n o n ; yet i t i s a r g u a b l e tha t H o l l a n d , n o les s t h a n B e n t h a m , Austin, o r Maine , ha s s h a p e d t h e intellectua l c o n t o u r s of Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e fo r t h e las t century . H o l l a n d r e p r e s e n t e d tha t g e n e r a t i o n o f scholar s w h o define d t h e analytical traditio n fo r posterit y a n d acte d symbolicall y t o t r a n s f o r m t h e cours e o f Englis h lega l t h o u g h t . H o l l a n d di d n o t see m t o m e r i t substantia l publi c recog nition i n hi s lifetime , s o t h e detail s o f hi s c a r e e r r e m a i n sketchy. Professo r F . H . Lawso n lef t a characterizatio n that di d n o t p r e s e n t H o l l a n d a s a n attractiv e figure: "rig orous, dogmatic , intolerant , a n d h a r d t o b u d g e fro m an y position tha t h e h a d alread y take n u p . " 2 Obituarie s i n t h e Law Quarterly Review gav e t h e impressio n o f a magisteria l presence, no t a n individual . O n e notic e stresse d t h e "se r e n e confidence " tha t le d hi m t o c h a n g e t h e Elements in frequently i n it s m a n y edition s a n d t o i g n o r e mos t con -

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 149 t e m p o r a r y critique s o f hi s a r g u m e n t s . 3 T h e description s of H o l l a n d a s a n aloo f individual , a t leas t i n p a r t , require s some qualification , fo r hi s professoria l styl e di d n o t neces sarily reflec t t h e i n n e r m a n . H o l l a n d wa s b o r n i n 1835 , a t t e n d e d M a g d a l e n College , O x f o r d , a n d t h e r e a f t e r n e v e r straye d fa r fro m a n aca demic e n v i r o n m e n t . Calle d t o t h e b a r i n 186 3 a t Lincoln' s I n n , h e late r too k t h e bachelor' s d e g r e e i n civi l la w i n 187 1 a n d t h e d o c t o r a t e i n civi l la w i n 187 6 a t O x f o r d . I n t h e m e a n t i m e h e h a d secure d electio n i n 187 4 t o t h e Chichel e professorship o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l La w a n d Diplomac y a t O x ford, a positio n h e hel d unti l hi s r e t i r e m e n t i n 1910 . Hol land wa s k n i g h t e d i n 191 7 i n recognitio n o f hi s contribu tions t o t h e academi c stud y o f internationa l la w a n d fo r his service s t o t h e g o v e r n m e n t i n t h e elaboratio n o f nava l prize law . O t h e r t h a n r e a p t h e h o n o r s o f a n academi c career a n d hi s k n i g h t h o o d , H o l l a n d labore d i n relativ e obscurity c o m p a r e d t o hi s m o r e p r o m i n e n t colleague s such a s A n s o n a n d Bryce , w h o hel d seat s i n Parliament . While t h e evidenc e i s certainl y n o t conclusive , H o l l a n d a p p e a r s t o hav e suffere d fro m frustrate d ambitio n a s a result o f t h e lac k o f publi c recognition . Bryc e onc e wrot e that H o l l a n d possesse d t h e "sens e o f n o t havin g h a d one' s d u e " a n d tha t thi s m a d e hi m " m o r e self-assertive." 4 T h e professorial dignit y tha t hi s friend s n o t e d a s hi s mos t com pelling qualit y h a d a differen t origi n t h a n earlie r writer s have believed . T h a t H o l l a n d raise d p e d a n t r y t o a fine ar t a n d t h e r e b y e x a s p e r a t e d hi s colleague s a n d c o n t r i b u t e d t o hi s failur e to gai n g r e a t e r publi c recognitio n seem s al l to o a p p a r e n t . For e x a m p l e , i n 190 7 A . V . Dicey , a l t h o u g h a frien d o f

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Holland's sinc e u n d e r g r a d u a t e day s i n t h e 1850s , hesi tated t o r e c o m m e n d H o l l a n d fo r a cours e o f lecture s a t H a r v a r d La w School : " I hav e n o d o u b t o f hi s k n o w l e d g e b u t hi s excessiv e insistenc e o n point s o f for m n o t only , I think, cause s a goo d dea l o f vexatio n b u t i s als o I t h i n k c o n n e c t e d wit h t h e m u c h d e e p e r defec t o f inabilit y t o pay sufficien t d e f e r e n c e t o t h e o p i n i o n o f o t h e r s . " 5 Hi s c o n c e r n fo r p r o c e d u r a l subtletie s le d H o l l a n d int o o n e quixotic battl e afte r a n o t h e r i n universit y politics . Dice y once r e c o r d e d wit h incredulit y Holland' s r e m a r k a b l e ab sorption i n hi s ow n littl e world : "A t t h e mos t critica l stag e of t h e [Lloy d G e o r g e ] B u d g e t debate , H o l l a n d coul d in terest himsel f i n n o t h i n g b u t a n a m e n d m e n t i e i n t h e [University] Statutes , whic h c h a n g e d t h e titl e o f t h e Pro fessorship o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law , & relieve d an y f u t u r e professor fro m bein g r e q u i r e d t o teac h Privat e I n t e r n a tional Law . A s n o h u m a n bein g ha s eve r m a d e thi s de m a n d , I c a n n o t se e wh y w e shoul d r e m o v e a n imaginar y peril." 6 T h i s academi c fastidiousnes s especiall y prevalen t in Holland' s late r year s di d n o t alway s characteriz e h i m ; as Bryc e onc e observed : " H e [Holland ] r e p r e s e n t s t o u s i n t h e Britis h A c a d e m y [t o whic h H o l l a n d h a d b e e n electe d in 1902 ] t h e a c m e o f captiousl y n a g g i n g persistency . How ever o n e o u g h t t o attribut e i t t o morosa senectus: n o t t h u s was h e i n hi s y o u n g days." 7 Lawson' s depictio n o f a pro fessor p e d a n t i c t o a faul t ha s alway s seeme d a p p r o p r i a t e because i t followe d fro m t h e tactfu l s t a t e m e n t i n t h e Law Quarterly Review tha t Holland' s O x f o r d crusade s " m a d e h i m a well-know n figure i n Universit y politics , b u t the y generally r a n g e d h i m o n t h e losin g side , fo r legislators , i n the Universit y a s elsewhere , t e n d t o b e i m p a t i e n t o f t h e

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 151 points whic h s e e m e d t o h i m i m p o r t a n t . " 8 Ye t t h e pictur e is o v e r d r a w n . T h e issue s t h a t n e e d e x a m i n a t i o n a r e Holland' s n a r r o w vision a n d t h e inevitabl e c h a n g e s t h a t a c c o m p a n i e d a l o n g career. O t h e r evidenc e suggest s t h a t H o l l a n d wa s n o t t h e e p i t o m e o f pettines s suggeste d b y t h e abov e testimony . Despite t h e myopi c viewpoin t H o l l a n d exhibite d o n occa sion, Dice y r e g a r d e d h i m a s secon d onl y t o Bryc e a m o n g his friend s i n academi c law . W h e n the y wer e u n d e r g r a d u ates i n 185 8 Dice y h a d p r o p o s e d H o l l a n d fo r m e m b e r s h i p in t h e Ol d Mortalit y society , a short-live d organizatio n o f clever O x f o r d s t u d e n t s o f t h e day. 9 Late r Dice y desig n a t e d H o l l a n d a n d Bryce , i n t h e even t o f Dicey' s s u d d e n d e a t h , t o g o t h r o u g h hi s p a p e r s a n d d e t e r m i n e i f a n y t h i n g should b e publishe d p o s t h u m o u s l y . 1 0 H o l l a n d clearl y h a d some r e d e e m i n g trait s t h a t inspire d suc h trus t a n d af fection ove r a lon g p e r i o d o f time . Brierly , fo r e x a m p l e , wrote o f t h e "rea l kindlines s whic h la y b e h i n d hi s sligh t reserve o f m a n n e r . " 1 1 I t seem s eviden t tha t H o l l a n d , r a t h e r forma l i n t h e discharg e o f hi s professoria l duties , possessed a w a r m e r sid e t h a t surface d i n m o r e intimat e contact. P e r h a p s t h e bes t evidenc e fo r thi s h u m a n e aspec t o f Holland's c h a r a c t e r a p p e a r e d i n a lette r t o professo r Mel ville Madiso n Bigelo w o f t h e Bosto n Universit y La w School, a t t h a t tim e a schola r o f som e r e p u t e i n medieva l English lega l history . I n r e s p o n s e t o t h e tragi c d e a t h o f Bigelow's son , H o l l a n d offere d t h e consolatio n o f o n e w h o h a d e x p e r i e n c e d t h e s a m e sorrow : " T h e new s o f y o u r sa d loss ha s j u s t r e a c h e d m e a n d fills m e wit h sorro w a n d sympathy. I ca n wel l e n t e r int o y o u r feelings , h a v i n g my -

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self, t h o u g h afte r p r o l o n g e d suspense , h a d t o reconcil e myself t o t h e convictio n tha t m y y o u n g e r so n h a d b e e n lost a t sea." 1 2 T h e advic e H o l l a n d r e n d e r e d o n tha t occa sion stresse d tha t Bigelow' s academi c wor k woul d p r o v i d e t h e "bes t s u p p o r t a n d a n o d y n e " fo r t h e los s h e h a d en dured. A n o t h e r issu e tha t illuminate d Holland' s personalit y d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f hi s professorshi p wa s t h e desirabl e balance betwee n teachin g a n d researc h a s t h e ancien t uni versities increasingl y e m b r a c e d t h e creatio n o f ne w knowl e d g e a s a professiona l ideal . H o l l a n d a r g u e d t h r o u g h o u t that t h e professor s shoul d b e a r a significan t p r o p o r t i o n o f teaching responsibilities. 1 3 H o l l a n d , p e r h a p s influence d i n p a r t b y hi s ow n m o d e s t publicatio n r e c o r d afte r 1880 , s o u g h t t o p r o v i d e b o t h qualit y a n d quantit y t o u n d e r g r a d uate lega l studies. 1 4 T o som e extent , therefore , t h e de scription o f H o l l a n d a s relentlessl y professoria l ha s exag g e r a t e d som e o f hi s m o r e obviou s shortcomings . T h a t h e took universit y affair s to o seriously , withou t a sens e o f p r o p o r t i o n , seem s al l to o clear . Ye t h e h a d a m o r e p e r s o n able side , especiall y i n hi s c h a m p i o n i n g o f u n d e r g r a d u a t e instruction, tha t belie d th e imag e o f t h e reserve d profes sor. I n t h e ag e w h e n t h e professio n o f la w teachin g b e g a n , H o l l a n d f o u n d i t difficul t t o a d a p t t o it s ne w d e m a n d s , c a u g h t a s h e wa s betwee n t h e claim s o f teachin g a n d re search. I n tha t tryin g situation , however , h e p r o v e d t h e crucial p e r s o n i n t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e awa y fro m it s publi c polic y root s a n d towar d t h e academic discours e i t became . M o r e t h a n an y o t h e r indi vidual H o l l a n d symbolize d t h e synthesi s o f t h e analytica l tradition wit h t h e ne w academi c c u l t u r e o f t h e lat e Victo -

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 153 rian p e r i o d . I n t h e 1920 s h e gre w frai l a n d los t m u c h o f his sight , b u t eve n t h e ravage s o f ol d ag e coul d n o t k e e p h i m fro m being , o f al l t h e O x f o r d la w professoriate , t h e "typical academi c scholar." 1 5 Hi s personificatio n o f t h e new c u l t u r e o f academi c la w m a d e h i m t h e perfec t vehicl e for takin g t h e B e n t h a m i t e tradition , a s modifie d b y Austi n a n d Maine , int o u n c h a r t e d a n d p e r h a p s disastrou s direc tions. T h e initia l e x a m p l e s o f Holland' s scholarshi p fel l squarely withi n t h e scop e o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e r e i g n i n g positio n o f whic h wa s reinforce d b y t h e g r o w i n g academic p r o m i n e n c e o f Austi n i n t h e 1860 s a n d 1870s . H o l l a n d wrot e originall y u n d e r t h e influenc e o f Austi n a s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e ne w academi c t r e n d , i n additio n t o t h e search fo r scientifi c la w tha t characterize d t h e latte r hal f of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . T h e first fruit s o f Holland' s quest a p p e a r e d i n hi s advocac y o f codification , "Ben t h a m ' s g r e a t p a n a c e a , " 1 6 a s a solutio n t o t h e habitua l com plaints a b o u t t h e lac k o f desig n i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e c o m m o n law . Prio r t o t h e p r e e m p t i o n b y t h e J u d i c a t u r e Acts o f 187 3 a n d 1875 , t h e possibilit y o f a rea l rationaliza tion o f Englis h la w acte d a s a s p u r t o practica l a n d aca d e m i c ambition s fo r t h e g e n e r a t i o n tha t woul d reac h p r o fessional maturit y i n t h e 1880s . A n earl y articl e o n codificatio n tha t H o l l a n d p r o d u c e d in 186 7 containe d bot h t h e insight s a n d misconstruction s that p e r m i t t e d h i m t o s h a p e s o significantl y t h e j u r i s p r u dential legac y b e q u e a t h e d t o hi m b y B e n t h a m a n d Austin . H o l l a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d specificall y t h a t hi s p r o m o t i o n o f codification reste d o n t h e n e e d fo r scientifi c legislation , "which wa s initiate d b y t h e writing s o f Mr . B e n t h a m a n d

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by th e lecture s o f hi s distinguishe d follower , Mr . Aus tin." 17 Afte r a revie w o f th e uneve n result s o f th e lon g campaign fo r la w refor m sinc e Lor d Brougham' s speec h in 1828 , Hollan d discusse d th e variou s objection s t o a scheme fo r codification , especiall y th e charg e tha t a cod e would remov e th e flexibility lon g hel d t o exemplif y th e virtues o f th e c o m m o n law . T h e advantage s Hollan d pro posed include d a greate r publi c familiarit y wit h th e law , better trainin g o f lawyers , an d th e facilitatio n o f legisla tion. I n orde r t o accomplis h rea l codification , Hollan d argued, th e la w mus t underg o a proces s o f expurgatio n o f antiquated statutes , a siftin g o f th e la w t o identif y genera l principles, an d the n wha t remaine d coul d b e pu t int o th e form o f a digest . T h e las t stage s o f th e procedur e woul d require consolidatio n o r th e synthesi s o f th e la w int o a n organic whole ; complet e consolidatio n woul d lea d t o codi fication; an d finally revisio n woul d allo w th e cod e t o change i n respons e t o ne w condition s a s wel l a s t o pre serve th e benefit s alread y attained. 18 Give n th e debate s o f the 1860 s fo r o r agains t codification , Hollan d offere d littl e that wa s ne w o r strikin g t o thi s continuin g controversy . T h e mos t interestin g statemen t i n th e articl e cam e i n Holland's representatio n o f Bentha m a s "perhap s th e greatest theoretica l juris t wh o ha s eve r lived." 19 Thi s wa s surely a mos t curiou s wa y t o describ e th e individua l wh o had devote d mos t o f hi s life , whateve r els e on e think s o f his efforts , t o th e practica l improvemen t o f society . I n addition, a s ha s bee n seen , th e work s tha t bes t illustrate d Bentham's lega l theor y wer e a t thi s tim e eithe r unknow n or littl e notice d b y posterity . Bentham' s plac e i n lega l the ory ha s remaine d secure , bu t i t i s wort h notin g Holland' s

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 155 e m p h a s i s o n t h e speculativ e e l e m e n t s o f B e n t h a m ' s work . Holland's stres s o n B e n t h a m a s a lega l theoris t anticipate d t h e divorc e t h a t H o l l a n d woul d m a k e late r betwee n t h e o r y a n d practic e i n j u r i s p r u d e n c e , a separatio n inimica l t o B e n t h a m ' s intentions . " H o l l a n d n o t e d tha t wha t B e n t h a m h a d calle d censoria l j u r i s p r u d e n c e , criticis m o f la w a s i t was wit h a vie w t o it s a m e n d m e n t , b e l o n g e d t o t h e a r t o f legislation, a n d n o t t o j u r i s p r u d e n c e . " 2 0 I n o t h e r words , H o l l a n d alread y r e g a r d e d j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s primaril y a topic o f academi c interest , w h e r e a s B e n t h a m viewe d hi s doctrines a s essentia l to , a n d worth y o f discussio n by , a n e n l i g h t e n e d public . T h i s n a r r o w estimat e o f B e n t h a m ' s influence wa s e c h o e d i n 187 0 w h e n H o l l a n d publishe d hi s Essays Upon the Form of the Law. H e r e H o l l a n d state d tha t t h e cas e fo r codificatio n d e p e n d e d a s m u c h u p o n c h a n g e s in t h e for m o f t h e la w a s u p o n r e f o r m o f substantiv e elements. 2 1 H o l l a n d h a d fastene d u p o n t h e t a x o n o m y o f t h e la w a s m o r e intellectuall y stimulatin g t h a n it s substan tive elements . Hi s focu s o n t h e forma l aspect s o f t h e lega l system a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e doctrine s tha t affecte d societ y most directl y starte d H o l l a n d o n t h e r o a d tha t le d ulti mately t o t h e conclusion s a d v a n c e d i n hi s majo r contribu tion t o Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . The Elements of Jurisprudence toda y ha s t h e a p p e a r a n c e of a m u s e u m p i e c e — s o m a n y edition s i n Holland' s life time a n d ye t n o n e afte r hi s d e a t h . T o e x a m i n e i t no w t r a n s p o r t s t h e r e a d e r int o a pas t e r a wit h intellectua l con cerns n e v e r t o b e revived . T h e wor k di d n o t b e c o m e a classic treatis e tha t survive d t h e d e a t h o f t h e a u t h o r int o a n o t h e r ag e wit h a ne w e d i t o r a n d a fres h g e n e r a t i o n o f law students . W h e n H o l l a n d died , t h e boo k d i e d wit h him .

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T h e significanc e o f Elements, however , wa s tie d t o t h r e e questions crucia l fo r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a tion i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e tha t H o l l a n d symbolized . T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f Holland' s wor k ca n bes t b e assesse d from t h e answer s t o t h e followin g questions : wh y di d Elements exercis e suc h w i d e s p r e a d influenc e fo r s o long , wh y did i t fad e int o obscurit y s o quickly , a n d w h a t wer e it s consequences fo r t h e f u t u r e o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e ? T o ascertai n t h e answer s i t i s necessar y t o r e t u r n t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f Elements, a n d t o som e e x t e n t t o a n appreci ation o f it s a r g u m e n t s . I n t h e prefac e t o Elements H o l l a n d wrot e a b o u t hi s tw o great predecessors , B e n t h a m a n d Austin , a n d a l t h o u g h h e m a d e i t eviden t ho w m u c h h e a d m i r e d thei r work , h e believed i t hi s d u t y t o rectif y a n d clarif y w h e r e necessar y in t h e continuatio n o f thei r aims . B y 188 0 t h e cul t o f Austin i n academi c la w circle s h a d a b o u t r u n it s course , s o t h e us e o f Austi n a s a convenien t targe t h a d alread y be c o m e a s t a n d a r d e l e m e n t o f scholarl y writin g o n j u r i s p r u dence. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H o l l a n d wrote, reflecte d Austin' s gif t fo r analysi s strugglin g wit h "intractable a n d rarel y h a n d l e d material." 2 2 T o Austi n especially, "mos t E n g l i s h m e n a r e i n d e b t e d fo r suc h idea s as the y posses s o f lega l m e t h o d . " 2 3 Austi n p r e s e n t e d t h e material h e e x a m i n e d i n a m a n n e r s o forcefu l tha t t h e r e a d e r coul d n o t forge t it s lessons . After thi s hig h prais e fo r Austi n a n d t h e analytica l tra dition c a m e t h e w a r n i n g s a b o u t it s defects . A m o n g t h e p r o b l e m s H o l l a n d n o t e d wer e t h e f r a g m e n t a r y n a t u r e o f t h e analysis , t h e labore d literar y style , a n d t h e digression s to suc h topic s a s utilitarianis m a n d codification . Austi n

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 157 h a d straye d to o fa r fro m t h e p r o p e r d o m a i n o f t h e law , H o l l a n d c h a r g e d , a n d bot h h e a n d B e n t h a m wer e "singu larly unsystematic." 2 4 H o l l a n d sa w himsel f se t firmly along t h e p a t h o f B e n t h a m a n d Austin , b u t thei r wor k n e e d e d i m p r o v e m e n t b y d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f thei r e r r o r s i n e m p h a s i s a n d analysis . H o l l a n d rejecte d t h e validit y o f n a t u r a l la w theory , c o n t e m p t u o u s l y dismissin g " ' N a t u r recht' whic h ma y b e describe d a s J u r i s p r u d e n c e i n t h e A i r ' / ' 2 5 W h a t e v e r criticism s H o l l a n d m i g h t hav e o f t h e positivist h e r i t a g e i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e , h e woul d n o t lead t h e c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n . T h e first c h a p t e r o f Elements a t t e m p t e d t o defin e la w a n d t o "se t fort h a n d explai n thos e comparativel y fe w a n d simple idea s whic h u n d e r l i e t h e infinit e variet y o f lega l rules." 2 6 T h i s latte r goa l place d H o l l a n d squarel y i n t h e m i d d l e o f t h e a p p r o a c h t o j u r i s p r u d e n ce k n o w n a s classi cal o r forma l theory . T h e classica l theorist s a s s u m e d tha t t h e c o m m o n law , despit e it s surfac e diversit y o r eve n chaos, ultimatel y reste d u p o n internall y consisten t princi ples tha t r e p r e s e n t e d t h e rationa l a r r a n g e m e n t o f lega l categories. 2 7 Holland' s aim , t h e r e f o r e , wa s t o a p p r e h e n d a n d t o p r e s e n t thos e principle s t h a t s h a p e d t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e c o m m o n law , a n d t o explicat e ho w thos e lega l rule s related t o o n e a n o t h e r . A s H o l l a n d onc e wrot e t o Olive r W e n d e l l Holmes , h e rejoice d tha t "suc h a scientifi c j u r i s t as yoursel f i s i n a positio n n o t onl y t o tal k about , b u t t o create, lega l principles." 2 8 T h e discover y o f thes e elemen tary postulate s b e c a m e t h e specia l vocatio n o f t h e O x f o r d professoriate, w h e t h e r A n s o n , Dicey , H o l l a n d , o r Pollock . T h a t suc h f u n d a m e n t a l axiom s o f t h e lega l syste m existe d at al l wa s take n a s a m a t t e r o f faith , n o t d e m o n s t r a t e d

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empirically. T h e basi c rationalit y o f t h e la w h a d t o exist , o r els e al l claim s t o stud y a n d t o teac h la w a s a scienc e would f o u n d e r . Becaus e o f thi s imperative , "developin g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d internall y consisten t s t r u c t u r e o f lega l categories wa s a central , i f n o t t h e centra l objectiv e o f classical lega l t h o u g h t . " 2 9 T h i s p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f specu lative o u t c o m e s e n s u r e d tha t H o l l a n d woul d find hi s prized principle s b y restrictin g t h e scop e o f hi s quest . W h e n H o l l a n d e x a m i n e d law , h e define d i t a s t h e "for mal scienc e o f positiv e law, " a p h r a s e tha t r e s o n a t e d wit h ideas d r a w n fro m hi s analytica l forebears . T h i s definitio n p e r m i t t e d h i m t o n a r r o w t h e focu s o f hi s inquiry . J u r i s p r u d e n c e wa s "no t t h e materia l scienc e o f thos e p o r t i o n s of t h e la w whic h variou s nation s hav e i n c o m m o n , " b u t a formal scienc e d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e existin g positiv e law s of a singl e country. 3 0 H o l l a n d wen t eve n f u r t h e r i n lim iting t h e philosophica l perspective , writin g t h a t "th e t e r m J u r i s p r u d e n c e i s wrongl y applie d t o actua l system s o f law , or t o c u r r e n t view s o f law , o r t o suggestion s fo r it s a m e n d m e n t , b u t i s t h e n a m e o f a science . T h i s scienc e i s a for mal, o r analytical , r a t h e r t h a n a materia l o n e . I t i s t h e science o f actual , o r positive , law." 3 1 T h e forma l scienc e of j u r i s p r u d e n ce wa s differentiate d fro m t h e b r o a d e r field of morality , wit h whic h i t shoul d hav e n o relationship . H o l l a n d wa s a d a m a n t i n r u l i n g o u t fo r consideratio n "di gressions a n d polemic s u p o n question s lyin g wholl y out side o f it s a p p r o p r i a t e province." 3 2 H o l l a n d fit perfectl y Morison's descriptio n o f t h e typ e o f successo r w h o altere d the Austinia n legac y a n d ho w i t wen t awry ; a lega l schola r with littl e interes t i n t h e philosophica l spring s o f Austin' s thinking. 3 3 I n t h e proces s o f decidin g t h e p r o p e r b o u n d -

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 159 aries o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e , H o l l a n d r e m o v e d fro m it s stud y the b r o a d societa l visio n s o characteristi c o f B e n t h a m . H o l l a n d define d a law , i n t h e p r o p e r sens e o f t h e t e r m , as " a g e n e r a l r u l e o f h u m a n action , takin g cognisanc e only o f e x t e r n a l acts , e n f o r c e d b y a d e t e r m i n a t e authority , which a u t h o r i t y i s h u m a n , a n d , a m o n g h u m a n authorities , is tha t whic h i s p a r a m o u n t i n a politica l society." 3 4 Hol land's us e o f t h e w o r d i n t h e previou s q u o t a t i o n ha s re m a i n e d a r e m a r k a b l e featur e onl y o f Elements, fo r i t sug gests ho w m a n y topic s H o l l a n d e x c l u d e d fro m hi s purview. Hi s relianc e o n t h e Austinia n l a n g u a g e o f sover eignty fo r t h e validit y o f la w focuse d o n o n e aspec t o f Austin's work , b u t h e use d i t a s serenel y a s i f Maine' s critique h a d n e v e r a p p e a r e d . I t followe d fro m Holland' s a r g u m e n t t h a t la w i n it s p r o p e r sens e coul d n o t exis t p r i o r to t h e formatio n o f a state ; c u s t o m a r y la w m i g h t a m o u n t to prescribe d rule s o f c o n d u c t b u t coul d n o t trul y consti tute law . "I t wil l b e sufficien t t o r e m a r k , " h e wrote , "tha t until t h e Stat e i s constitute d t h e r e ca n b e n o law , i n t h e strict sens e o f t h e t e r m . " 3 5 O n c e agai n H o l l a n d faile d t o p r o v i d e a n a d e q u a t e analysi s o f t h e stat e a n d sovereignt y because h e conceive d thes e t e r m s i n to o n a r r o w a fashion ; his accoun t " h a d c o m e t o b e m o r e a n d m o r e generall y r e g a r d e d a s a n over-simplificatio n o f t h e fact s whic h ca n n o l o n g e r b e usefull y applie d t o t h e c o m p l e x s t r u c t u r e o f m o d e r n States." 3 6 O n thi s issue , a s wit h s o m a n y others , H o l l a n d h a d t h e effec t o f limitin g t h e r a n g e o f discussio n instead o f e x p a n d i n g it . T h e sam e a r g u m e n t e x t e n d s t o H o l l a n d ' s wor k o n in ternational law , a n extensio n o f t h e conclusion s h e d r e w in Elements. I f la w derive d fro m t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a state ,

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international la w b e c a m e la w onl y b y courtesy . Becaus e international la w wa s " u n s u p p o r t e d b y t h e authorit y o f a State," 3 7 i t di d n o t c o m m a n d recognitio n a s la w i n t h e t r u e sense . H o l l a n d calle d internationa l la w t h e "vanishin g point o f J u r i s p r u d e n c e ; sinc e i t lack s an y arbite r o f dis 8 p u t e d questions , save public opinion ."38 I n t e r n a t i o n a l la w was la w b y analog y becaus e i t r e p r e s e n t e d onl y t h e m o r a l c o d e o f nations. 3 9 Give n thi s conceptio n o f hi s subject , Holland's r e p u t a t i o n wa s base d o n hi s master y o f detail , n o t t h e theoretica l exploratio n o f internationa l la w itself . H o l l a n d wrestle d wit h th e implication s o f Austinia n the ory fo r internationa l la w mos t o f hi s lif e withou t eve r resolving t h e m i n a persuasiv e m a n n e r . I n t h e e n d Holland' s passio n fo r classificatio n als o h a d an inhibitin g effec t o n j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l debate . T h e em phasis o n locatin g t h e ultimat e rationalit y o f t h e c o m m o n law cause d H o l l a n d t o rel y o n a n artificia l categorization . T h e "logica l precision " o f Elements stirre d criticis m be cause i t di d violenc e t o t h e actua l s t r u c t u r e o f Englis h law. 4 0 T h e c o m m o n la w h a d d e v e l o p e d ove r t h e centurie s without r e g i m e n t a t i o n , s o Holland' s a t t e m p t t o impos e a theoretical s t r u c t u r e woul d b e artificial. 41 T h e rigidit y s o characteristic o f Elements i n t h e e n d di d n o t stimulat e de bate s o m u c h a s clos e it , a n d i t wa s h e r e t h a t hi s personal ity a p p e a r e d t o affec t t h e n a t u r e o f hi s academi c work . H o l l a n d wen t fro m editio n t o edition , confiden t i n hi s conclusions, a n d barel y d e i g n i n g t o acknowledg e t h e m o u n t i n g dissatisfactio n wit h hi s p r o n o u n c e m e n t s . It i s no w possibl e t o answe r th e question s originall y posed a b o u t t h e influenc e o f The Elements of Jurisprudence. Its a p p e a l e x t e n d e d t o b o t h la w teacher s a n d la w students .

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 161 O n it s a p p e a r a n c e Elements e a r n e d hig h prais e (usuall y from o t h e r academics ) a s t h e definitiv e e m b o d i m e n t o f what lega l scienc e wa s a s s u m e d t o m e a n : " H o l l a n d m o v e d remorselessly forwar d fro m o n e propositio n t o a n o t h e r , starting fro m t h e n a t u r e o f t h e la w a s a whol e a n d g r a d u ally u n f o l d i n g t h e variou s lega l question s i n g r e a t e r a n d g r e a t e r detail." 4 2 H o l l a n d trie d t o p r o v i d e a g r a m m a r o f t h e law , carefull y distinguishe d fro m w h a t la w actuall y existed. W h a t late r scholar s d e n o u n c e d a s excessivel y for mal, Holland' s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s r e g a r d e d a s p r o f o u n d l y illuminating. Fo r e x a m p l e , Si r Frederic k Polloc k com m e n t e d i n a n 188 2 lecture : "I t woul d no t b e to o m u c h t o say tha t Professo r Holland' s Elements of Jurisprudence i s th e first wor k o f p u r e scientifi c j u r i s p r u d e n c e . . . tha t is , o f t h e g e n e r a l scienc e o f la w distinctl y s e p a r a t e d fro m t h e ethical p a r t o f politics." 4 3 Polloc k als o praise d Holland' s style tha t i m p r o v e d considerabl y o n t h e t o r t u r e d l a n g u a g e of Austin : "Professo r Holland' s i s concis e withou t a b r u p t ness, flowing withou t tediousness , a n d distinc t withou t wearisome repetitions." 4 4 Elements expresse d precisel y those a s s u m p t i o n s o f t h e professoriate , particularl y a b o u t the existenc e o f f u n d a m e n t a l principle s a t t h e h e a r t o f the c o m m o n law , a n d t h u s m a d e certai n it s succes s a s a n academic e n d e a v o r : "I t wa s i n d e e d o n e o f a n u m b e r o f books whic h a p p e a r e d i n O x f o r d i n t h e eightie s whic h m a d e sens e o f Englis h law , a n d showe d tha t i t coul d b e h a n d l e d a s intelligibl y a n d a s rationall y a s t h e G e r m a n jurists wer e d o i n g fo r t h e m o d e r n i z e d for m o f R o m a n la w still o p e r a t i n g i n thei r ow n c o u n t r y . " 4 5 I t g a t h e r e d grea t prestige withi n t h e a c a d e m y a t h o m e a n d a b r o a d b u t pre cious littl e i n t h e wide r world. 4 6 I n t h e e x p a n d i n g worl d o f

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academic la w thi s achievemen t wa s sufficient , a n d H o l l a n d rested o n hi s laurel s fo r t h e r e m a i n d e r o f hi s career . Holland's b o o k als o flourished becaus e o f it s utilit y fo r law students . N o t onl y di d i t provid e a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e seriou s stud y o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e, i t als o functione d wel l as a las t revie w o f t h e la w p r i o r t o examinations. 4 7 I t served t h e s t u d e n t a t b o t h e n d s o f a n academi c career , especially afte r t h e wor k h a d g a i n e d professoria l ap proval. "A n intelligen t s t u d e n t could , w h e n h e h a d finished r e a d i n g t h e book, " Lawso n c o n c l u d e d , "hav e h a d n o d o u b t wha t la w wa s a b o u t ; a n d that , a t a tim e w h e n h e was expecte d t o r e a d j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s a n i n t r o d u c t i o n t o law a n d not , a s now , a s t h e crow n o f hi s academi c experi ence, wa s o f n o smal l service." 4 8 Students , whateve r thei r individual reaction , h a d t o e n g a g e thi s tex t t h a t thei r teachers e m b r a c e d s o enthusiasticall y les t the y fai l t o k e e p abreast o f scholarl y fashion . H o l l a n d wa s t h e first benefi ciary o f t h e p e n c h a n t fo r academi c t r e n d s t h a t accompa nied t h e ne w facult y culture . T h e d r a m a t i c eclips e o f H o l l a n d i n t h e worl d o f juris p r u d e n c e o c c u r r e d a s a resul t o f severa l differen t devel o p m e n t s . H o l l a n d , h a v i n g writte n a n e n o r m o u s l y success ful work , simpl y a b a n d o n e d t h e subjec t a n d n e v e r r e t u r n e d . Afte r 188 0 h e devote d himsel f primaril y t o t h e study o f internationa l law , a field h e h a d j u s t a r g u e d di d n o t a m o u n t t o la w a t all . Whil e h e eventuall y acquire d a substantial r e p u t a t i o n i n thi s are a a n d h e l p e d t o s h a p e it s m o d e r n evolution , n o n e o f hi s publication s g a i n e d t h e status o f Elements. An y scholarl y treatis e age s inevitably , a n d withou t Holland' s attentio n t o o t h e r wor k i n t h e field, such a s t h e discussio n o f sociologica l j u r i s p r u d e n ce i n t h e

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 163 U n i t e d States , hi s boo k b e c a m e d a t e d . A s t h e r e p u t a t i o n of Austi n decline d p r i o r t o 1914 , Holland' s work , despit e its professe d differences , s h a r e d i n t h e g r o w i n g disdain . Even H o l l a n d no w suffere d fro m d e n u n c i a t i o n a s to o general i n a p p r o a c h , a s o p p o s e d t o t h e specialize d studie s that academi c lawyer s a d m i r e d a n d p r o d u c e d . A l t h o u g h H o l l a n d p r o s p e r e d a s a resul t o f t h e profes sionalization o f la w teachin g a t t h e universities , hi s typi cality a s a n academi c actuall y h a r m e d t h e l o n g - t e r m pros pects o f hi s work . W h e r e a s hi s colleague s a t O x f o r d gained s o m e m e a s u r e o f publi c recognition , hi s contribu tions t o nava l priz e la w a n d o t h e r aspect s o f internationa l law confirme d hi s s t a n d i n g a s a n academi c a u t h o r i t y wit h n o o t h e r a u d i e n c e . Hi s letter s t o The Times to o ofte n re vealed hi s p e d a n t i c sid e a n d h u r t hi s stature. 4 9 T h a t trait , c o m b i n e d wit h hi s reluctanc e t o e n g a g e critics , r e n d e r e d his a r g u m e n t s ineffective . T h i s defec t cause d H o l m e s t o r e m a r k tha t H o l l a n d coul d n o t sting , Holmes' s s h o r t h a n d for a t h i n k e r incapabl e o f writin g a b o u t f u n d a m e n t a l as sumptions. 5 0 H o l l a n d fel l victi m t o t h e p r i m e characteris tic o f academi c c u l t u r e i n t h e twentiet h c e n t u r y : t h e r a p i d c h a n g e i n intellectua l fashion . Finally, t h e r e p u t a t i o n o f Elements w a n e d becaus e it s u n d e r l y i n g premise s b e c a m e a s obsolet e a s t h e e r a the y e m b o d i e d . H o l l a n d believe d t h a t a n e n l i g h t e n e d a n d e d u cated publi c o p i n i o n supplie d t h e necessar y m o r a l stan d a r d s fo r t h e functionin g o f t h e Englis h lega l system . T h i s c o n c e r n o f H o l l a n d a n d o t h e r Victoria n jurist s h a d s h a p e d t h e r e s p o n s e t o criticism s o f thei r a p p r o a c h t o private law : publi c o p i n i o n supplie d t h e m o r a l sanctio n that positiv e la w coul d n o t provide , a n d t h u s m o r a l p r e -

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cepts acte d a s law s b y analog y withou t violatio n o f t h e positivist tradition. 5 1 I n r e s p o n d i n g t o Holmes' s f a m o u s p a t h o f t h e la w article , H o l l a n d wrot e t h a t " I a m especiall y glad tha t yo u m a k e i t quit e clea r t h e la w i s differentiate d from moralit y b y t h e publi c forc e whic h lie s b e h i n d t h e decisions o f t h e C o u r t s . " 5 2 Publi c o p i n i o n r e p r e s e n t e d t h e alternative forc e tha t gav e backin g t o t h e prescription s o f private law . A s consensu s (i f o n e h a d eve r existed ) i n Victorian publi c o p i n i o n d i s a p p e a r e d , i t b e c a m e a b s u r d t o explain t h e practica l w o r k i n g o f t h e lega l syste m i n suc h naive terms . T h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f lat e Victoria n societ y d u r i n g a n d afte r t h e 1880 s m a d e t h e singl e s t a n d a r d o f m i d d l e clas s o p i n i o n woefull y i n a d e q u a t e t o a c c o u n t fo r legal p h e n o m e n a . T h e sam e p r o b l e m s d o g g e d Holland' s a t t e m p t t o defin e international la w a s a syste m o f rule s whos e e n f o r c e m e n t came fro m t h e m o r a l opinio n o f t h e c o m m u n i t y o f na tions. N o t onl y di d thi s a d h e r e to o slavishl y t o t h e origina l Austinian d o c t r i n e tha t t r u e la w coul d exis t onl y w h e n backed b y t h e authorit y o f a sovereig n state , i t b r o u g h t H o l l a n d mos t o f t h e wa y bac k t o n a t u r a l la w theory , w h e r e obligation derive d fro m m o r a l imperatives . F r o m Ben t h a m o n w a r d t h e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y h a d r e m a i n e d a specifi c ai m o f positivism , b u t H o l l a n d a p p a r ently sa w n o contradictio n betwee n hi s j u r i s p r u d e n ce a n d his theor y o f internationa l law . T h e circularit y o f Hol land's t h o u g h t lessene d it s a p p e a l a n d accelerate d it s los s of r e p u t a t i o n . With respec t t o hi s impac t o n t h e s u b s e q u e n t histor y o f English j u r i s p r u d e n c e , H o l l a n d ha s playe d a major , i f u n a c k n o w l e d g e d , role . P e r h a p s m o r e t h a n an y o t h e r sin -

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 165 gle wor k i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e , Holland' s Elements re d u c e d t h e scop e o f philosophica l inquir y a n d t u r n e d juris p r u d e n c e i n w a r d a s a n academi c discipline , takin g i t awa y from b r o a d e r publi c polic y discussions . T h e g r e a t prac titioners o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e h a d i n c o m m o n t h e conviction t h a t thei r e n t e r p r i s e m u s t b e a i m e d a t a n e d u cated public . W h a t e v e r t h e d e g r e e o f d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g jurists, j u r i s p r u d e n ce i m p o s e d u p o n t h e write r th e obligation t o investigat e t h e subjec t i n it s b r o a d e s t context . Holland's conceptualizatio n o f t h e analytica l traditio n t r a n s f o r m e d t h e b r o a d swee p o f B e n t h a m i t e speculatio n into a m e r e pickin g a t t h e desiccate d skeleto n o f positivis t j u r i s p r u d e n c e . T h e p o s t h u m o u s t r i u m p h o f Austinia n j u r i s p r u d e n c e , i n t h e h a n d s o f H o l l a n d , "le d t o it s a t r o p h y ing, n o t becaus e o f it s logica l o r empirica l p r o b l e m s b u t because t h e a s s u m p t i o n s whic h h a d u n d e r p i n n e d it s suc cess cease d t o h o l d . " 5 3 Analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e retaine d its plac e a s t h e p r i m a r y m e t h o d o l o g y fo r lega l philosoph y in E n g l a n d , b u t eve n t h e r e t h e influenc e o f H o l l a n d le d t o a l o n g p e r i o d o f sterility . T h u s H o l l a n d too k t h e fecun d legac y o f analytica l juris p r u d e n c e a n d place d intellectua l limit s o n it s doctrines : "Since H o l l a n d p r o p o s e d t o us e t h e t e r m 'analytical ' a s equivalent t o 'formal' , t h e effec t o f hi s notion s o n t h e ideas o f hi s r e a d e r s c o n c e r n i n g wha t analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e wa s i n B e n t h a m ' s a n d Austin' s h a n d s wa s i n th e highest d e g r e e u n f o r t u n a t e . " 5 4 Intellectua l leader s i n ev ery discipline , o f course , hav e h a d t o e n d u r e t h e w o r k o f p o p u l a r i z e r s or , eve n worse , t h e s y m p a t h y o f critic s w h o distort eve n a s the y e n d o r s e : "Holland' s tex t applie d clas sical lega l scholarship' s e n t h u s i a s m fo r systemization , con -

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ceptualization a n d expositio n i n a m a n n e r whic h wa s dog matic, n a r r o w a n d p e d a n t i c . " 5 5 T h i s latte r descriptio n m e t neatly, however , t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e nascen t professio n o f academic lawyers . Afte r th e J u d i c a t u r e Act s o f 187 3 a n d 1875, th e m a r k e t fo r treatise s explainin g a n d rationalizin g t h e stat e o f t h e la w increase d substantially . Lega l r e f o r m led t o t h e discover y o f principles , n o t t h e reverse. 5 6 A s S u g a r m a n als o c o n c l u d e d : " I n o t h e r words , fo r Dicey , Bryce, Pollock , A n s o n , Holland , S a l m o n d a n d o t h e r classi cal la w dons , thei r desire d professiona l legitimac y i n t h e eyes o f sceptica l universitie s a n d a largel y hostil e profes sion r e q u i r e d t h e assertio n o f a specia l bod y o f expertis e which jurist s m o n o p o l i z e d . " 5 7 I f H o l l a n d p r o v e d o n e vil lain o f thi s scenario , h e h a d plent y o f s u p p o r t fro m hi s academic peers . T h e conjunctio n o f academi c la w wit h j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l speculatio n b e c a m e a n y t h i n g b u t provi dential. Equally a s i m p o r t a n t , therefore , i n t h e restrictio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e ' s d o m a i n wa s t h e g r e a t alteratio n i n univer sity lif e no w recognize d a s academi c professionalizatio n c o n c u r r e n t wit h t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f m o d e r n disciplines . H a r o l d Perki n ha s m a d e t h e concep t o f professionalis m t h e majo r e l e m e n t i n i n t e r p r e t i n g Britis h histor y ove r t h e last century. 5 8 La w wa s n o s t r a n g e r t o thi s process , a n d H o l l a n d symbolize d severa l manifestation s o f thi s ten dency. T h e w o r d "professional " ha s b e c o m e s o elasti c t h a t any a t t e m p t a t unequivoca l definitio n m u s t fail ; but , i n t h e contex t o f t h e lat e Victoria n university , i t h a d severa l connotations crucia l t o t h e directio n o f academi c law . O n e certainly entaile d t h e establishmen t o f t h e la w c u r r i c u l u m securely withi n t h e university. 5 9 La w h a d suffere d fro m

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 167 its ambivalen t rol e a s b o t h vocationa l t r a i n i n g a n d t h e humanistic c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f philosophica l questions . A s various discipline s p r o f f e r e d a g e n d a s fo r universit y re form, H o l l a n d a n d t h e o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e O x f o r d la w professoriate r e s p o n d e d wit h a p r o g r a m o f thei r own : " T o c o n t i n u e t o limi t t h e bul k o f instructio n t o Blackston e a n d J u s t i n i a n wa s a n a n a c h r o n i s m . A s t r o n g lobb y insiste d that t h e teachin g o f la w a t universit y o u g h t t o b e base d o n g e n e r a l principle s r a t h e r t h a n t h e r o t e l e a r n i n g o f boundless detail." 6 0 H o l l a n d ' s Elements suite d thi s p u r p o s e perfectly b y virtu e o f it s sever e r e d u c t i o n i s m . F o r t h e la w professoriate, alas , r e f o r m o f t h e la w c u r r i c u l u m t o attrac t m o r e a n d b e t t e r s t u d e n t s di d n o t succeed , a s Bryc e con c e d e d i n hi s valedictor y lectur e i n 189 3 a s regiu s professo r of civi l law , whic h c a m e t o symboliz e t h e d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s of thos e w h o h a d h o p e d t o m a k e la w a centra l featur e o f u n d e r g r a d u a t e education. 6 1 La w m a d e som e i n r o a d s int o the traditiona l d o m i n a n c e o f t h e classics , b u t n o t e n o u g h to m a k e a majo r difference . A m o r e g e n e r a l proces s i n whic h H o l l a n d a n d hi s col leagues participate d wa s t h e establishmen t o f universit y teaching a s a s e p a r a t e profession. 6 2 T h r o u g h o u t t h e nine t e e n t h c e n t u r y universit y teaching , onc e characterize d b y indolence a n d sinecure , wa s t r a n s f o r m e d b y t h e G e r m a n university m o d e l a n d t h e missionar y impuls e o f educa tional optimism . T h i s proces s m e a n t n o t onl y a ques t fo r g r e a t e r statu s a n d m o r e equitabl e c o m p e n s a t i o n , i t als o raised question s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d p u r p o s e o f t h e university i n nationa l life. 63 T h e tas k o f e d u c a t i n g t h e national elit e wa s n o l o n g e r a sufficien t incentive . Fo r t h e legal academics , professiona l a d v a n c e m e n t suggeste d a n

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emphasis o n research , fo r t h e creatio n o f ne w k n o w l e d g e b e c a m e r e g a r d e d a s o n e tes t ( a m o n g m a n y others ) o f aca demic success : "A s t h e colleg e t u t o r s b e c a m e professiona l academics, researc h ideal s w e r e necessar y t o differentiat e their c a r e e r fro m t h a t o f schoolmasters." 6 4 Professional ization affecte d ever y d i m e n s i o n o f universit y life , a n d legal academic s a t t e m p t e d t o sta y abreas t o f thi s d y n a m i c process: " T h e professionalizatio n o f academi c lif e wa s t h e c h a n g e mos t ofte n n o t e d b y observer s a t t h e time , a n d h i g h b r o w circle s generall y favoure d t h e c h a n g e s . " 6 5 T h e research idea l hel d o u t t h e p r o m i s e o f a g o l d e n ag e fo r legal academic s i n thei r desir e t o plac e j u r i s p r u d e n ce o n a scientific footing . F r o m t h e 1880 s o n w a r d a t O x f o r d t h e la w facult y m a d e n u m e r o u s contribution s t o t h e realizatio n o f thi s ne w re search ideal . Man y o f thei r works , however , deal t wit h s e p a r a t e b r a n c h e s o f t h e la w suc h a s tort s a n d contrac t b u t rarely wit h subject s o f a b r o a d e r scope . T h e r e s e a r c h m o d e l doubtles s h e l p e d i n t h e creatio n o f a ne w lega l literature t h a t m a r k e d a substantia l i m p r o v e m e n t ove r it s predecessors. La w s h a r e d t h e t r i u m p h o f t h e researc h ideal wit h t h e o t h e r universit y disciplines : " O p e r a t i n g wit h t h e forc e o f a n ideology , t h e idea l o f ne w k n o w l e d g e eventually p u s h e d al l b r a n c h e s o f l e a r n i n g t o ne w level s of a c h i e v e m e n t . " 6 6 T h e additio n o f researc h d e g r e e s suc h as t h e B.Litt . a n d t h e B.Sc . i n 189 5 a t O x f o r d showe d t h e new respec t t h a t t h e w o r d " r e s e a r c h " c o m m a n d e d . 6 7 T h e a w a r d i n g o f researc h fellowship s reinforce d thi s proces s by passin g o n scholarl y obligation s t o students . T h e cycl e of professionalizatio n wa s no w complete . H o l l a n d wa s n o t a forcefu l advocat e o f t h e ne w researc h ideal , i n p a r t

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 169 p e r h a p s becaus e hi s publicatio n r e c o r d pale d i n c o m p a r i son t o som e o f hi s colleagues . H e f o u g h t som e o f hi s academic battle s t o retai n a balanc e betwee n teachin g a n d research responsibilities , but , a s wit h hi s o t h e r universit y goals, i n t h e e n d h e a d m i t t e d defeat . Fo r H o l l a n d , a s fo r m a n y others , t h e researc h m o d e l eventuall y t r i u m p h e d : " T h e acceptanc e o f r e s e a r c h ideal s p r o v e d t o b e t h e onl y satisfactory rational e fo r o v e r c o m i n g t h e p r o b l e m o f 'teaching d r u d g e r y ' fo r d o n s w h o viewe d academi c wor k as thei r profession." 6 8 M o r e o v e r , professiona l r e p u t a t i o n by t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y b e c a m e m e a s u r a b l e primaril y in t e r m s o f r e s e a r c h ; publicatio n h a d b e c o m e t h e r o a d t o a d v a n c e m e n t a n d academi c recognition . As a practica l m a t t e r , academi c professionalizatio n m e a n t a n identificatio n wit h t h e prestig e o f science . L o n g before H o l l a n d ' s Elements, t h e cal l t o establis h la w o n a scientific basi s h a d a n impac t o n academi c law. 6 9 Par t o f t h e p r o b l e m fo r H o l l a n d a n d hi s p e e r s wa s thei r genera l lack o f familiarit y wit h scienc e itself , s o t h e w o r d "science " rarely b e c a m e m o r e t h a n a talisma n t o h i d e t h e difficultie s that p l a g u e d t h e e n d e a v o r . T h e standardizatio n o f lega l k n o w l e d g e d e m a n d e d forma l m e t h o d o l o g y , les t persona l discretion betra y a n unscholarl y a p p r o a c h . 7 0 T h e scientifi c m e t h o d als o applie d t o t h e organizatio n a n d dissemina tion o f knowledge , n o t j u s t it s creation. 7 1 T h e invocatio n of scienc e b e c a m e t h e rallyin g cr y fo r thos e academi c law yers w h o wishe d t o secur e a g r e a t e r statu s fo r thei r work . Professionalization als o i m p o s e d t h e obligatio n t o serv e t h e publi c b y provisio n o f a m o r e satisfactor y lega l syste m t h r o u g h organizatio n a n d explanatio n o f lega l principles . T o m e e t thi s r e q u i r e m e n t m e a n t a n inevitabl e focu s o n

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specific issue s t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f la w i n a wide r setting . T h e e m b r a c e o f professionalis m resulte d i n "th e e n o r m o u s bod y o f lega l scholarship , t h e ris e o f a professoriat e devoted largel y t o p r o d u c i n g it , t h e g r a d u a l formalizatio n of lega l e d u c a t i o n i n a universit y setting , w h e r e i t wa s progressively divorce d fro m practica l applicabilit y a n d dignified wit h t h e titl e o f lega l science." 7 2 T h e resul t wa s a s e p a r a t e lega l c u l t u r e tha t devise d it s ow n interna l m a n dates. I f t h e ne w academi c la w h a d actuall y serve d th e public a s envisioned , it s fat e woul d hav e bee n fa r differ ent. Ultimatel y i t fel l victi m t o t h e d e m a n d s o f t h e acad emy a t t h e e x p e n s e o f it s o t h e r self-proclaime d missions . T h e mos t obviou s e x a m p l e o f t h e professionalizatio n o f academic la w wa s t h e f o u n d i n g o f t h e Law Quarterly Review in 1884. 7 3 Periodical s aime d a t a n a u d i e n c e wit h a specifi c interest i n t h e la w h a d existe d fo r ove r hal f a century , b u t these wer e usuall y vocationa l i n orientatio n a n d withou t the intellectua l rigo r d e m a n d e d b y academi c lawyers. 7 4 T h e resolutio n t o t h e p r o b l e m la y i n t h e l a u n c h i n g o f a j o u r n a l tha t woul d m e e t t h e n e e d s o f academi c lawyers , including a n outle t fo r scholarship , servic e t o prac titioners, a n d , i t wa s h o p e d , g u i d a n c e t o t h e judiciary. 7 5 T h e Law Quarterly Review wa s b e g u n a t a m e e t i n g i n Si r William Markby' s r o o m s a t Al l Soul s College , wit h A n s o n , Dicey, H o l l a n d , a n d Polloc k i n a t t e n d a n c e . 7 6 Polloc k cred ited H o l l a n d wit h p r o v i d i n g th e intellectua l l e a d e r s h i p o f the project , whil e Markb y m a n a g e d t h e busines s affair s o f the ne w v e n t u r e . Polloc k recalle d t h a t t h e Law Quarterly Review a i m e d a t t h e " p r o m o t i o n o f lega l scienc e withou t neglect o f practice , a n d devote d chiefl y t o t h e C o m m o n Law b u t n o t d i s r e g a r d i n g comparativ e study." 7 7 F r o m th e

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 171 outset t h e ne w j o u r n al woul d e m b o d y th e desir e fo r scien tific la w tha t Holland' s Elements exemplified . T h e periodi cal succeede d b e y o n d t h e wildes t d r e a m s o f it s p r o p o nents, leadin g shortl y thereafte r t o t h e Harvard Law Review a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t proliferatio n o f academi c la w reviews t h r o u g h o u t c o m m o n - l a w jurisdictions . I t ha s se t a s t a n d a r d o f lega l scholarshi p equale d b y fe w a n d sur passed b y n o n e . It woul d see m churlis h t o decr y t h e i m p o s i n g scholarl y r e c o r d o f t h e Law Quarterly Review, b u t t h e fac t r e m a i n s t h a t it s a c h i e v e m e n t wa s s e c u r e d a t t h e pric e o f increasin g specialization. T h e a d v e n t o f j o u r n a l s i n t h e twentiet h c e n t u r y d e v o t e d t o a particula r field withi n t h e la w ha s r e p r e s e n t e d t h e logica l c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e f o u n d e r s ' u n derlying a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t professionalization . La w re views quickl y c a m e t o specializ e i n technica l article s wel l b e y o n d t h e layperson , a n d the y advocate d d e n s e a r g u m e n t a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e clea r c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f ideas. 7 8 Scholarl y expertis e b e c a m e define d i n increasingl y specialized area s a n d wa s m e a s u r e d b y publication , s o aca demic respectabilit y e x p a n d e d t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e n a r row fields t h a t e m e r g e d . T h i s proces s wa s certainl y n o t u n i q u e t o law , fo r m a n y o t h e r disciplines , includin g his tory, e x p e r i e n c e d t h e sam e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e scientifi c na t u r e o f it s inquiry , e l a b o r a t e d t h e researc h ideal , a n d h a d a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e s a m e outcomes. 7 9 T h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e English Historical Review i n 1886 , fo r e x a m p l e , aros e from t h e sam e professiona l c o n c e r n s t h a t le d t o t h e Law Quarterly Review. I n eac h cas e t h e resul t wa s t h a t academic s looked i n w a r d t o thei r ow n disciplines , w h e r e scholar s t e n d e d t o writ e fo r o n e a n o t h e r . 8 0 Fo r e x a m p l e , t h e En-

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glish Historical Review r e m a i n e d a t o n e t h o u s a n d subscrib ers fo r t h e n e x t fort y years , a m o n u m e n t t o t h e profes sional idea l wit h n o concession s t o t h e a m a t e u r historia n or genera l public. 8 1 T h e d e m a n d s o f professiona l a c h i e v e m e n t facilitate d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e invisibl e college , "tha t n e t w o r k o f informal relationship s a n d persona l acquaintanc e whic h links academi c m e n , a n d particularl y r e s e a r c h e r s i n th e same disciplin e b u t differen t institutions." 8 2 R a n g i n g from collaboratio n t o t h e polit e e x c h a n g e o f offprints , such friendship s d o m i n a t e d A n g l o - A m e r i c a n j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n t h e e r a o f professionalization. 8 3 O t h e r innova tions suc h a s publishin g projects , conferences , a n d schol arly societie s m a r k e d t h e "twi n p h e n o m e n a o f professionalisation a n d specialisatio n s o characteristi c o f later n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y intellectua l d e v e l o p m e n t s . " 8 4 Such professiona l activitie s illustrate d t h e d i l e m m a o f t h e academic lega l culture , fo r "th e m o r e i t succeede d i n es tablishing itsel f a s a desirabl e f o r m o f professiona l p r e p a ration, t h e m o r e i t t e n d e d t o los e it s liberal ' c h a r a c t e r . " 8 5 H o l l a n d wa s b u t a bi t playe r i n thes e d r a m a t i c t r e n d s in academi c law , a n d h e di d n o t eve n cultivat e scholarl y connections a s s o m e o f hi s colleague s did . Ye t n o singl e career epitomize d t h e consequence s o f professionalizatio n as di d Holland's . W h e r e onc e j u r i s p r u d e n c e h a d ad dressed t h e e d u c a t e d public , Holland' s Elements of Jurisprudence s o u g h t primaril y t h e a p p r o v a l o f hi s l e a r n e d peers i n t h e academy . A s Moriso n ha s writte n o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n g e n e r a l d u r i n g Holland' s ascendancy , i t "was t u r n i n g i n w a r d u p o n la w a n d losin g t h e vita l a n d c o n t i n u i n g inspiratio n fo r i t whic h c a m e fro m t h e d e t e r -

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 173 mination t o u n d e r s t a n d lega l p h e n o m e n a o n t h e basi s o f a g e n e r a l philosoph y o f t h e worl d i n g e n e r a l a n d t h e fields of socia l science s withi n it." 8 6 T h e generalis t h a d onc e typified t h e s t u d e n t o f law , t h e mid-Victoria n m a n o f let ters i n Maine' s image , b u t t h e ne w professiona l j u r i s t s did n o t accep t t h e responsibilit y thi s typ e suggested . T h e transition t o issue s o f interes t onl y t o a n academi c audi ence h e l p e d se t t h e a g e n d a o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e fo r nearly a c e n t u r y . B y s h a r p e n i n g t h e focu s o f t h e law , H o l l a n d a n d hi s colleague s h a d n a r r o w e d it . T h u s w h e n i t c a m e t o creatin g a publi c rol e fo r t h e academic lawyer s a n d establishin g credential s fo r a sub stantial influenc e o n policy , H o l l a n d a n d hi s g e n e r a t i o n failed signall y t o gai n thi s objective . T h e historica l devel o p m e n t o f t h e c o m m o n la w h a d o c c u r r e d almos t exclu sively t h r o u g h t h e practica l t r a i n i n g o f a p p r e n t i c e s h i p , with littl e c o n t r i b u t i o n fro m t h e universities . Par t o f Blackstone's i m p o r t a n c e h a d d e r i v e d fro m hi s cal l fo r a n academic stud y o f Englis h law . I n hi s i n a u g u r a l lectur e a s V i n e r i a n professo r i n 1883 , Dice y t h o u g h t i t worthwhil e to p o n d e r t h e questio n o f w h e t h e r Englis h la w coul d b e t a u g h t a t t h e universitie s a t all. 87 T h e tensio n betwee n t h e practical a n d t h e theoretica l aspect s o f t h e c o m m o n la w has p r o v e d impossibl e fo r academi c lawyer s t o overcome . As P . S . Atiya h ha s writte n recently : " I wil l star t wit h t h e fairly uncontroversia l suggestio n tha t Englis h lawyer s a r e n o t onl y m o r e incline d t o t h e p r a g m a t i c a n d s o m e w h a t hostile t o t h e theoretica l a p p r o a c h , b u t positivel y glor y in thei r p r e f e r e n c e . " 8 8 T h i s attitud e t r o u b l e d academi c lawyers n o t onl y becaus e i t challenge d t h e validit y o f thei r labors, b u t als o becaus e m a n y o f t h e academic s too k thi s

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characteristic t o b e a m o n g th e glorie s o f t h e c o m m o n law , happily fa r r e m o v e d fro m th e etherea l speculation s o f continental theorists . T h e d o u b t s a b o u t lega l t h e o r y hav e persisted: In th e common la w "theory'' i s typically thought o f as somethin g set apar t fro m th e centra l concern s o f lega l scholar s o r prac titioners. "Lega l theory " i s a distinct subject , a n intellectua l com partment relativel y isolate d fro m othe r lega l studies . Theor y itself i s contraste d wit h "practice " an d ofte n looke d upo n wit h some suspicio n b y thos e wh o se e themselve s a s concerne d wit h the realitie s o f professiona l lega l practice , o r wit h problem s o f practical refor m o r doctrina l exegesis. 89 Academic lawyer s hav e h a d n o b o d y t o blam e b u t t h e m selves fo r thi s stat e o f affair s sinc e Holland' s era . Not onl y di d t h e academi c lawyer s fai l t o wi n t h e battl e between theor y a n d practice , a s i t t u r n e d o u t t h e cam paign fo r lega l studie s o n a scientifi c basi s di d n o t hav e t h e revolutionar y consequence s the y anticipated . O n e rea son fo r thi s resul t s t e m m e d fro m t h e n a t u r e o f t h e educa tional missio n t h e universitie s h a d u n d e r t a k e n . O n e effec t of t h e cal l t o academi c seriousnes s a n d scholarl y rigo r was t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f student s fo r professiona l success. 9 0 Instead o f s p e a r h e a d i n g a radica l alteratio n i n lega l e d u cation, H o l l a n d a n d hi s colleague s wer e force d t o con clude sadl y tha t t h e bes t student s stil l r e a d classic s o r history befor e takin g thei r lega l educatio n a t t h e I n n s o f C o u r t . R e f o r m e d academi c la w stil l coul d n o t attrac t t h e best students ; t h e universitie s supplie d n e i t h e r t h e re sources n o r t h e incentiv e fo r t h e victor y o f t h e academi c lawyers. 9 1 I n addition , t h e revolutio n f o u n d e r e d becaus e

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 175 t h e c h a n g e s i n la w teachin g h a d u n a n t i c i p a t e d conserva tive results : " T h e p a r a d o x o f late r n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y uni versity r e f o r m wa s tha t t h e e n d o w m e n t o f researc h a n d 'scientific' stud y coul d actuall y reinforc e t h e existin g cur r i c u l u m a n d abstrac t i t f u r t h e r fro m m o d e r n society." 9 2 N o n e o f t h e academi c lawyer s recognize d i n tim e tha t scientific la w di d n o t necessaril y h e r a l d a ne w ag e o f lega l enlightenment. T h e bes t evidenc e fo r t h e failur e o f t h e lega l academic s c a m e fro m H o l l a n d himself . I n a lette r t o H o l m e s i n 189 1 h e wrote : "I t i s r e f r e s h i n g t o find lega l studie s s p o k e n o f with e n t h u s i a s m a n d respect . T h e la w professor s a r e i n this c o u n t r y a feebl e folk . T h e professio n i n L o n d o n sneers a t u s a s impractical , whil e o u r academica l col leagues pit y u s a s n a r r o w - m i n d e d Philistines . T h e r e a r e some sign s o f b e t t e r day s i n stor e fo r us , b u t t h e c h a n g e of o p i n i o n i s slo w i n c o m i n g . " 9 3 F o r H o l l a n d t h e b e t t e r days n e v e r quit e materialized . A c a d e m i c la w h a d n o w h e r e to t u r n b u t towar d c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f it s limite d horizons . T h i s proces s accente d it s s u p p o r t o f existin g conditions ; t h e relationshi p o f t h e academi c lawye r t o t h e j u d i c i a r y c h a n g e d fro m instructio n t o a p p r o b a t i o n . T h e ultimat e result wa s t h a t "th e earl y lega l a c a d e m i c s — M a i n e , Bryce , Dicey, A n s o n , a n d Polloc k a t O x f o r d a n d Maitlan d a t C a m b r i d g e — d i d n o t p r o d u c e seriou s successors . T h o s e w h o c a m e afte r sa w thei r rol e a s rationalizin g t h e w o r d s o f t h e j u d g es r a t h e r t h a n q u e s t i o n i n g t h e m . " 9 4 T h e abortiv e c o u p agains t traditiona l lega l a r r a n g e m e n t s lef t t h e aca d e m i c lawyer s o f t h e p e r i o d 1 9 0 0 - 5 0 t o defin e j u r i s p r u d e n c e a s essentiall y glosse s u p o n H o l l a n d , a n intellectua l prison fro m whic h fe w escaped . N e i t h e r lega l histor y n o r

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j u r i s p r u d e n c e flourished. Historian s a n d lawyer s d r e w f u r t h e r a p a r t i n thei r e n d e a v o r s ; a n d lega l t h e o r y wa s t r a p p e d withi n t h e b o u n d a r i e s H o l l a n d h a d d r a w n . Writ ings o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e wer e eithe r esoteri c o r p e d e s t r i a n , focused almos t exclusivel y o n t h e academi c aspect s o f ana lytical j u r i s p r u d e n c e , a n d resistan t t o an y r e t u r n t o t h e conception o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce a s a f u n d a m e n t a l p a r t o f so cial analysis : " T h e m o d e r n universit y n o l o n g e r possesse d a c o m m o n intellectua l language . Instea d eac h specialize d academic disciplin e ha s it s ow n l a n g u a g e tha t i s intelligibl e in a substantia l sens e onl y t o it s ow n practitioners." 9 5 I n t h e cas e o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e, t h e resul t b e c a m e lega l inquir y that "ha s c o n t r i b u t e d littl e t o art , lif e o r law." 9 6 N o t unti l t h e professorshi p o f H . L . A . H a r t wa s t h e r e a significan t a t t e m p t t o escap e fro m t h e legac y tha t H o l l a n d sym bolized. T h e positio n o f t h e lega l academic , define d i n t h e 1880s, ha s r e m a i n e d basicall y u n c h a n g e d i n it s ancillar y role t o t h e lega l system . Regulatio n o f lega l e d u c a t i o n ha s e l u d e d t h e universities : "Eve n toda y t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n Britain t o c o m p a r e wit h t h e powerfu l professiona l la w schools i n t h e U n i t e d States . Lega l e d u c a t i o n was , a n d essentially stil l is , u n d e r t h e contro l n o t o f t h e universit y b u t o f t h e professio n whic h wa s d o m i n a t e d b y thos e i n practice r a t h e r t h a n i n academi c life." 9 7 T h e p o i n t i s n o t w h e t h e r thi s resul t ha s b e e n fo r t h e bette r o r t h e worse , b u t t h a t i t ha s s h a p e d t h e j u r i s p r u d e n c e t h a t academic s have p r o d u c e d . "I t i s not , I think, " Atiya h ha s written , " u n r e a s o n a b l e t o sugges t tha t i n t h e Englis h lega l syste m t h e schola r o r t e a c h e r i s a p e r s o n wit h a decidedl y inferio r status. W e a r e s o use d t o thi s disparit y o f statu s i n E n g l a n d

The Transition to Modern Academic Law 177 that i t usuall y passe s withou t c o m m e n t , a n d t e n d s t o b e r e g a r d e d a s p a r t o f t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r o f things." 9 8 T h u s t h e definitio n o f a n academi c lega l c u l t u r e di d no t liv e u p to t h e expectation s o f t h e professor s o f t h e 1880s . A s Collini ha s writte n o f t h e divid e betwee n j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d t h e b r o a d c u l t u r e o f lat e Victoria n E n g l a n d : " T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f lega l e d u c a t i o n i n t h e lat e n i n e t e e n t h cen tury, whic h p r o m i s e d a t first t o h e l p b r i d g e thi s gulf , c a m e eventually t o driv e a d e e p e r w e d g e betwee n th e lega l a n d t h e wide r intellectua l worlds." 9 9 W h e r e the y h a d h o p e d t o e m u l a t e t h e influenc e o f a Blackston e o r a B e n t h a m , the y f o u n d tha t thei r h e r a l d e d ne w a p p r o a c h e s t o lega l stud y satisfied academi c t r e n d i n e s s b u t n o t t h e g e n e r a l public : " T h e direc t a n d i m m e d i a t e influenc e o f t h e classica l la w d o n s ove r t h e lega l professio n wa s relativel y slight . T h e vast majorit y o f lawyer s c o n t i n u e d t o lear n thei r la w be yond r a t h e r t h a n withi n t h e academy . T h e ancien t preju dices agains t t h e academi c lawye r see m t o hav e sur vived." 1 0 0 H o l l a n d enjoye d considerabl e success , b u t thi s was f r a m e d b y t h e n a t u r e o f academi c la w itself . The Elements of Jurisprudence, t h e classi c e x a m p l e o f Englis h ana lytical j u r i s p r u d e n c e, h a d t h e u n i n t e n d e d c o n s e q u e n c e o f virtually e x h a u s t i n g t h e potentia l o f tha t schoo l a n d r e n d e r i n g i t incapabl e o f sustainin g it s f o r m e r creativity : Holland's jurisprudence wa s in a crucial respec t a very impover ished versio n o f th e theor y whic h Bentha m ha d develope d a century before . Fo r Bentha m th e purpos e o f jurisprudence ha d been th e refor m o f th e existin g law ; Hollan d exclude d thi s notion altogethe r fro m it s subject-matter : h e elevate d logica l analysis, th e instrumen t t o thi s end , int o th e en d itself . Thi s produced a jurisprudence whic h wa s avowedl y apolitical—on e

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which ha d developed , vi a Austin , fro m Bentham' s methodol ogy, bu t whic h ha d rejecte d hi s critica l utilitarianis m an d th e demands fo r refor m whic h tha t implied. 101 T h e resul t o f t h e effort s o f lega l academician s wa s delete rious, fo r i t fostere d a n intellectua l g h e t t o tha t stifle d at t e m p t s t o r e t u r n t o t h e earlie r issue s o f Englis h j u r i s p r u dence. T h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce wa s complete , for ne w academi c discipline s stake d claim s fo r t h e scien tific stud y o f society. 102 B y t h e t u r n o f t h e twentiet h cen tury, t h e eclips e o f j u r i s p r u d e n ce a s b r o a d socia l i n t e r p r e tation wa s full y realized .

Chapter Seven

H. L.

A.

Hart

Law an d Moralit y Reconsidere

d

In t h e first hal f o f t h e twentiet h century , a s t h e g e n e r a t i o n of academi c lawyer s a t O x f o r d w h o h a d m a t u r e d i n t h e 1880s eventuall y r e t i r e d , thei r successor s f o u n d littl e r o o m fo r creativity . T h e p a t h s int o whic h H o l l a n d h a d t u r n e d j u r i s p r u d e n c e no w r e q u i r e d l e a r n e d c o m m e n t a r ies o n previou s writing s withou t c o n c e r n fo r t h e disci pline's potential , a n d certainl y fa r r e m o v e d fro m t h e cen sorial rol e tha t B e n t h a m h a d define d fo r himself . Scholar s such a s J o h n W . S a l m o n d , Pau l Vinogradoff , Willia m H o l d s w o r t h , a n d C a r l e t o n Alle n e a r n e d soli d r e p u t a t i o n s , a n d thei r career s d o n o t deserv e cavalie r dismissal . Ye t it m u s t b e sai d t h a t thei r j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s n e v e r b e e n mistaken, i n qualit y o r focus , fo r tha t o f thei r m o r e fa 179

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m o u s predecessors . H o l d s w o r t h , fo r e x a m p l e , s p e n t m u c h of hi s lif e o n hi s m o n u m e n t a l History of English Law, whic h r e a c h e d seventee n volume s w h e n i t wa s c o m p l e t e d b y oth ers i n 197 2 m o r e t h a n a q u a r t e r c e n t u r y afte r hi s d e a t h in 1944 . Hi s contribution s t o j u r i s p r u d e n c e wer e sparse , except fo r hi s interestin g appraisal s o f earlie r figures. I n t h e 1920 s thi s situatio n c o n t r i b u t e d t o a substantia l dimi n u t i o n o f respec t fo r Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e ; i n 192 2 A m e r i c a n j u r i s t Rosco e P o u n d p e n n e d a scathin g assess m e n t o f t h e O x f o r d la w faculty , callin g H o l d s w o r t h "ver y m e d i o c r e " a n d t e r m i n g t h e j u r i s p r u d e n ce a s "ol d lin e ana lytical-historical. I t ha s n o relatio n t o a n y t h i n g existent." l J u r i s p r u d e n c e a s t h e disciplin e t o i n t e r p r e t socia l p h e n o m e n a h a d c o m e t o res t o n n a r r o w foundations . At t h e e n d o f t h e d e c a d e t h e potentia l o f t h e analytica l tradition a p p e a r e d a t t h e poin t o f exhaustion , a n d "b y t h e late 1920s , i f n o t before , t h e r e wer e clea r sign s o f crisis." 2 Part o f t h e p r o b l e m resulte d fro m t h e self-absorptio n tha t characterized a j u r i s p r u d e n ce cu t of f fro m t h e philosophi cal root s i n a u g u r a t e d b y B e n t h a m : " J u r i s p r u d e n c e i n t h e universities h a d b e c o m e a r o u t i n e r e a d i n g a n d r e - r e a d i n g of a c a n o n o f text s a n d text-books . Exceptin g a h a n d f u l o f brilliant exceptions , t h e subjec t wa s m o r i b u n d . " 3 Sociolog ical j u r i s p r u d e n ce i n t h e U n i t e d State s a r o u s e d littl e b u t intellectual scor n i n E n g l a n d . T h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i al f e r m e n t k n o w n collectivel y a s realis m i n t h e 1930 s suffere d mas sive disdai n i n Englis h academi c circles . Analytica l juris p r u d e n c e , p r o t e c t e d b y t h e prejudic e o f decades , s e e m e d to hav e r e a c h e d a n intellectua l d e a d e n d . By 195 0 t h e rol e fo r t h e academi c lawye r o f c o m m e n t a tor o n legislatio n a n d o n d e c i d e d case s h a d b e c o m e wel l

Law and Morality Reconsidered 181 established a t t h e e x p e n s e o f b r o a d e r concerns : "This , t h o u g h parasiti c o n practice , i s nonetheles s t h e u n m i s t a k able, u n c h a l l e n g e d provinc e o f academi c law." 4 T h e origi nal p u r p o s e t o offe r socia l c o m m e n t a r y o r eve n t o u n cover t h e principle s e m b e d d e d i n t h e c o m m o n la w h a d given wa y t o t h e l e a r n e d glos s o n a particula r aspec t o f the la w usually , t h o u g h no t always , o f littl e interes t t o th e judiciary o r t h e bar . T h e a t t e m p t t o m a k e academi c la w t h e arbite r o f t h e lega l syste m h a d failed , a n d t h e statu s o f t h e academi c lawye r l a n g u i s h e d : The blam e tha t i s usually pu t o n Austi n an d hi s mor e mediocr e successors an d interpreter s should , rather , fal l o n Polloc k an d his less distinguished follower s an d imitators , wh o subordinate d their origina l notio n o f la w a s somethin g independen t o f judi cial decisions t o their recognitio n o f th e socia l and, i n som e case s no doubt , th e intellectua l superiorit y o f counse l an d judges , and therefor e contente d themselve s wit h publishin g studen t textbooks whic h di d thei r bes t t o expoun d an d simplif y th e wisdom lodge d injudicia l decisions. 5 H a r o l d Laski , fo r e x a m p l e , describe d H o l d s w o r t h a s look ing a s i f h e w a n t e d t o t h r o w himsel f p r o s t r a t e befor e a law lord . T h e los s o f t h e censoria l functio n h a d o t h e r consequences a s well . J u r i s p r u d e n c e h a d los t it s plac e i n t h e la w c u r r i c u l u m a n d littl e professiona l interes t wa s ap p a r e n t : " J u r i s p r u d e n c e i n Britai n wa s scarcel y a n excitin g a n d b u r g e o n i n g field o f e n q u i r y . " 6 Focu s r e m a i n e d o n those practica l subject s u p o n whic h practic e woul d de p e n d . I n t o thi s worl d o f d i m i n i s h e d expectation s i n 1952 , however, c a m e H . L . A . H a r t b y virtu e o f hi s electio n t o the C o r p u s chai r o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a t O x f o r d . Hi s selec -

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tion r e s t o r e d vitalit y a n d excitemen t t o Englis h j u r i s p r u dence. H e r b e r t H a r t wa s b o r n i n 190 7 a n d a t t e n d e d N e w Col lege, O x f o r d , w h e r e h e e a r n e d a firs t i n classic s i n 1929 . T h r e e year s late r h e wa s calle d t o t h e b a r a n d s p e n t t h e n e x t eigh t year s i n successfu l practic e a s a C h a n c e r y bar rister i n highl y technica l area s o f t h e la w suc h a s taxatio n a n d trusts . I n 194 0 h e bega n servic e fo r t h e d u r a t i o n o f W o r l d W a r I I a s a civilia n m e m b e r o f militar y intelligence . At t h e cessatio n o f hostilitie s h e r e t u r n e d t o Ne w Colleg e as fello w a n d t u t o r i n philosophy . I n 195 2 h e wo n electio n to t h e C o r p u s chai r a n d hel d tha t pos t unti l 1968 . Fo r t h e next fou r year s h e wa s senio r researc h fello w a t Universit y College, a n d t h e n b e c a m e t h e principa l o f Brasenos e Col lege fro m 197 2 unti l hi s r e t i r e m e n t i n 1978. 7 I n retire m e n t H a r t c o n t i n u e d hi s scholarl y writing , particularl y hi s extensive writing s o n th e j u r i s p r u d e n c e o f J e r e m y Ben t h a m . H a r t r e m a i n e d a centra l pilla r o f t h e B e n t h a m in dustry tha t flourished i n t h e 1970 s a n d 1980 s unti l hi s d e a t h i n 1992 . A l t h o u g h hi s academi c caree r h a d b e e n highl y p r o d u c tive, H a r t wil l alway s b e identifie d wit h o n e book , The Concept of Law (1961) , a wor k t h a t wil l u n d o u b t e d l y r a n k as t h e mos t influentia l o n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n ce publishe d in t h e twentiet h century. 8 MacCormic k ha s describe d i t correctly a s a "wor k o f internationa l e m i n e n c e whic h eve n its stronges t critic s hav e acknowledge d a s a masterpiec e w o r t h a t leas t t h e c o m p l i m e n t o f carefu l refutation." 9 F r o m it s initia l a p p e a r a n c e The Concept of Law attracte d attention becaus e o f it s avowe d a t t e m p t t o r e t u r n t o basi c questions o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d p e r h a p s provid e ne w an -

Law and Morality Reconsidered 183 swers afte r t h e lon g p e r i o d o f intellectua l d o r m a n c y . T h e book wa s a n academi c lawyer' s d r e a m , fo r i t t o u c h e d u p o n f u n d a m e n t a l issue s i n a f o r t h r i g h t fashion , a n d it s eco nomical, eve n sparse , styl e invite d clos e r e a d i n g . H a r t ' s book rapidl y b e c a m e t h e c e n t e r o f p r o t r a c t e d analysi s a n d discussion (whic h c o n t i n u e s t o t h e present) , mos t o f i t i n t h e for m o f la w revie w article s i n al l c o m m o n - l a w jurisdic tions. A r o u s i n g interes t g r e a t e r t h a n an y o t h e r w o r k o n English j u r i s p r u d e n c e i n thi s century , i t revive d t h e sopo rific field a t a singl e stroke . H a r t establishe d a s t a n d i n g i n legal philosoph y tha t eclipse d thos e predecessor s whos e work fel l mainl y i n thi s c e n t u r y : " H . L . A . H a r t , m o r e t h a n p e r h a p s an y o t h e r theoris t i n t h e 20t h c e n t u r y , ha s defined a n d clarifie d t h e debate s ove r m a n y o f t h e majo r issues i n c o n t e m p o r a r y lega l p h i l o s o p h y . " 1 0 Fo r t h r e e de cades, despit e extensiv e critique s a n d t h e wor k o f o t h e r jurists suc h a s Ronal d Dworkin , The Concept of Law ha s exercised a h e g e m o n y rarel y accomplishe d i n an y aca d e m i c field. The Concept of Law derive d p a r t o f it s succes s fro m H a r t ' s decisio n t o i g n o r e t h e a c c u m u l a t e d d e t r i t u s o f t h e analytical traditio n a s i t h a d d e v e l o p e d historically . Refus ing t o b e b o u n d b y t h e n a r r o w confine s t h a t w e r e t h e legacy o f H o l l a n d a n d hi s successors , h e bypasse d H o l l a n d a n d o t h e r jurists w h o h a d serve d a s t h e pilo t fish o f analyt ical j u r i s p r u d e n c e , a n d r e t u r n e d t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f b o t h B e n t h a m a n d Austin . Fo r historian s i n 196 1 Ben t h a m r e t a i n e d significanc e onl y a s t h e p r o g e n i t o r o f t h e academic controvers y a b o u t t h e m a n n e r i n whic h hi s idea s on legislatio n h a d acte d t o s p u r g o v e r n m e n t reforms . T h e a n t e c e d e n t s o f t h e welfar e state , t h o u g h t i n 196 1 t o b e t h e

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culmination o f Victoria n r e f o r m m o v e m e n t s , h a d s p u r r e d a d e b a t e i n 195 8 a n d 196 0 b y Olive r M a c D o n a g h a n d H e n r y Parri s i n t h e page s o f t h e Historical Journal T h e " N i n e t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Revolutio n i n G o v e r n m e n t " discus sion kep t B e n t h a m ' s n a m e befor e historians , b u t rarel y did thi s attentio n includ e an y r e f e r e n c e t o hi s s t a t u r e a s a jurist. H a r t ' s work , a t t h e m i n i m u m , d e m o n s t r a t e d tha t B e n t h a m a m o u n t e d t o m u c h m o r e i n intellectua l histor y t h a n t h e eminence grise o f t h e welfar e state . Since 191 4 Austi n h a d c o n t i n u e d i n t h e rol e o f stra w m a n fo r academi c lawyers . Hi s wor k serve d primaril y a s a convenient c o r p u s o f idea s agains t whic h t o teac h becaus e his doctrine s wer e k n o w n almos t exclusivel y t h r o u g h de piction b y u n s y m p a t h e t i c critic s suc h a s Pollock . Reconsid erations o f Austi n h a d virtuall y d i s a p p e a r e d , a n d hi s sta tus a s toke n targe t o b s c u r e d t h e primac y o f B e n t h a m i n t h e formatio n o f t h e analytica l tradition . H a r t reverse d this c u s t o m a r y d e n i g r a t i o n , a n d despit e hi s ow n t r e n c h a n t criticisms acknowledge d tha t Austi n h a d aske d t h e righ t questions eve n i f h e h a d give n t h e w r o n g answers . H a r t gave t h e wor k o f bot h B e n t h a m a n d Austi n a respec t tha t the tw o jurist s h a d n o t enjoye d fo r decades . H e free d t h e m fro m t h e ritua l c o n d e m n a t i o n t h a t h a d b e e n thei r lot a n d r e s t o r e d t h e m t o th e p r o m i n e n c e the y d e s e r v e d . H a r t b e g a n The Concept of Law b y n o t i n g tha t la w a s a discipline suffere d fro m t h e seemingl y insolubl e p r o b l e m that jurist s coul d n o t eve n a g r e e o n a basi c definitio n o f their subject ; thi s circumstanc e le d t o t h e diffus e n a t u r e of lega l speculation . I n hi s first c h a p t e r s H a r t d r e w ne w definitions fro m a critica l r e a d i n g o f B e n t h a m a n d Austi n to serv e a s tool s fo r t h e resolutio n o f knott y question s suc h

Law and Morality Reconsidered 185 as t h e n a t u r e o f c o m m a n d . H a r t actuall y r e a d B e n t h a m a n d Austi n instea d o f wha t late r jurists h a d writte n a b o u t t h e m a n d w h a t thei r j u r i s p r u d e n ce m e a n t ; t h e resul t was , at leas t fo r Austin , t h a t "bot h Austin' s philosoph y a n d his specifi c t h e o r y o f la w w e r e squarel y e x a m i n e d a n d perceptively assessed , whil e m a n y aspect s o f t h e Austinia n m y t h whic h h a d d e v e l o p e d wer e dissecte d a n d at tacked." 1 1 W h e r e H a r t f o u n d Austi n wanting , h e state d his difference s i n a t o n e tha t indicate d t r u e respec t fo r t h e long-neglecte d jurist . H a r t no w b e c a m e t h e p r i m a r y m e d i u m fo r disseminatio n o f Austin' s work , a n d hi s ac c o u n t di d n o t initiall y a r o u s e opposition. 1 2 W h e t h e r H a r t ' s r e a d i n g o f Austi n wa s correc t ha s r e m a i n e d o p e n to d e b a t e ; Moles , fo r e x a m p l e , ha s a r g u e d tha t H a r t ' s version o f Austi n " b o r e littl e r e s e m b l a n c e t o t h e rea l t h i n g . " 1 3 T h i s issu e ha s n o t b e e n resolved , b u t t h e centra l fact t h a t H a r t b r o u g h t b o t h B e n t h a m a n d Austi n i n t h e original bac k int o t h e m a i n s t r e a m o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s b e y o nd dispute . I n hi s e x a m i n a t i o n o f Austi n o n sovereignty , fo r e x a m ple, H a r t f o u n d h i m o n t h e righ t trac k b u t to o simplisti c in hi s analysis . H a r t a r g u e d t h a t tw o e l e m e n t s o f Austin' s a r g u m e n t r e q u i r e d specia l attention . T h e first c o n c e r n e d Austin's ide a o f a habi t o f o b e d i e n c e a n d wha t exactl y thi s m e a n t . T h e secon d wa s t h e notio n o f c o n t i n u i t y — " t h e continuity o f t h e a u t h o r i t y t o m a k e la w possesse d b y a succession o f differen t legislators , a n d t h e persistence o f laws l o n g afte r thei r m a k e r a n d thos e w h o r e n d e r e d h i m habitual o b e d i e n c e hav e p e r i s h e d . " 1 4 T h o u g h h e di d n o t p u r s u e t h e p o i n t i n historica l detail , H a r t s o u g h t a n expla nation tha t woul d hol d fo r Austin' s e r a a s wel l a s fo r hi s

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own. F o r h i m a d o c t r i n e o f sovereignt y m u s t p r o p o u n d f u n d a m e n t a l qualitie s tha t define d a lega l syste m a n d were n o t b o u n d b y t h e condition s o f a specifi c age . I n t h e e n d , t h e r e f o r e , H a r t wrot e tha t sovereignt y "involve s t h e substitution, fo r t h e to o simpl e notio n o f habit s o f obedi ence t o a sovereig n person , o f t h e notio n o f currentl y accepted f u n d a m e n t a l rule s specifyin g a clas s o r lin e o f p e r s o n s whos e w o r d i s t o constitut e a s t a n d a r d o f behav iour fo r t h e society , i.e . w h o hav e t h e right t o legislate." 1 5 Austin di d n o t n e e d refutation , b u t r a t h e r explicatio n a n d refinement . After th e revie w o f t h e difficultie s tha t B e n t h a m a n d Austin h a d no t resolved , i n t h e secon d hal f o f t h e boo k H a r t focuse d m o r e specificall y o n hi s ow n conclusion s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f law , whic h m i g h t b e s u m m a r i z e d i n his concentratio n o n t h e concep t o f a lega l syste m r a t h e r t h a n law . T h i s focu s discusse d t h e rol e tha t lega l rule s played i n a g e n e r a l syste m o f law . O n thi s topi c t h e r e wer e m a n y antecedents , notabl y t h e skepticis m a b o u t lega l rule s characteristic o f A m e r i c a n realis m i n t h e 1930s . Austi n h a d a r g u e d tha t la w wa s a specie s o f c o m m a n d , b u t H a r t indicated tha t thi s wa s clearl y u n t r u e , fo r n o t ever y lega l rule entaile d a c o m m a n d o r prohibition . I n thi s contex t H a r t use d t h e m e t a p h o r o f t h e g u n m a n ' s versio n o f com m a n d t o illustrat e t h e failing s o f Austin' s analysis . Austi n h a d viewe d la w onl y a s a specie s o f coercion , wherea s la w h a d o t h e r variation s o f obligation . I n p e r h a p s hi s mos t famou s p h r a s e , H a r t postulate d a rule o f recognitio n tha t acte d a s t h e i n s t r u m e n t fo r t h e identification o f a vali d law . H a r t explaine d tha t a lega l

Law and Morality Reconsidered 187 system wa s c o m p o s e d o f p r i m a r y rule s o f lega l obligatio n a n d secondar y rule s tha t r e g u l a t e d c h a n g e a n d continuit y in t h e la w itself. 16 H e sa w t h e u n i o n o f p r i m a r y a n d sec o n d a r y rules , wit h t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g rul e o f recognition , as constitutin g t h e essenc e o f a lega l system , a l t h o u g h h e a d m i t t e d t h a t hi s analysi s coul d n o t p r o v i d e a n answe r t o every questio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e . P r i m a r y rule s i m p o s e d duties u p o n t h e citizen , a n d secondar y rule s c o n f e r r e d p o w e r a n d e x p l a i n e d t h e way s b y whic h authorit y m i g h t be altered. 1 7 Whil e thi s distinctio n betwee n p r i m a r y a n d secondary rule s ha s receive d f r e q u e n t criticis m becaus e H a r t himsel f n e v e r resolve d ambiguitie s i n thei r applica tion, i t succeede d i n b e c o m i n g a foca l poin t fo r subse q u e n t discussion . I n short , H a r t disagree d wit h t h e Ben t h a m / A u s t i n d o c t r i n e tha t lega l rule s necessaril y h a d sanctions t o m a k e t h e m effective. 1 8 H a r t e m p h a s i z e d t h a t lega l obligatio n wa s n o t s o m u c h a m a t t e r o f coercio n a s o f socia l consensus . T h i s assertio n applied t o thos e official s w h o o p e r a t e d t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s legal syste m a s wel l a s thos e citizen s w h o obeye d t h e la w without responsibilit y fo r it s e n f o r c e m e n t . H a r t a t t e m p t e d to analyz e a lega l syste m fro m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f a n indi vidual responsibl e fo r t h e exercis e o f a u t h o r i t y instea d o f t h e m o r e traditiona l positio n o f a n e u t r a l observe r stand ing a p a r t fro m t h e system. 1 9 Usin g thi s a p p r o a c h H a r t r e i n t e r p r e t e d t h e t h e m e s t h a t h a d r e s o n a t e d i n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e fro m t h e tim e o f Blackstone : sovereignty , law a s c o m m a n d , a n d t h e necessit y t o s e p a r a t e la w fro m morality. T h e historian' s confidenc e i n H a r t ' s analysi s would b e g r e a t e r i f h e h a d cite d actua l instance s o f lega l

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controversy t o illustrat e hi s points , b u t h e di d n o t includ e such evidence . T h u s The Concept of Law wa s trul y a n ex t e n d e d essa y i n lega l theory . I n t h e constructio n o f hi s j u r i s p r u d e n ce H a r t a d d e d t o its a p p e a l b y t h e realizatio n o f a cherishe d goa l fo r mos t academics: t h e synthesi s o f differen t discipline s t o p r o v i d e new insight s int o issue s o f lon g standing . H a r t achieve d this r e m a r k a b l e fea t b y d r a w i n g u p o n hi s t r a i n i n g i n phi losophy, abette d b y t h e t h e n r e i g n i n g academi c o r t h o d o x y of linguisti c analysis , a n d u n i t i n g t h e m t o focu s o n lan g u a g e p r o b l e m s i n h e r e n t i n lega l analysis . H e h a d re h e a r s e d thi s m e t h o d o l o g y i n p e r h a p s t h e mos t significan t of hi s earl y publication s w h e n h e h a d e x a m i n e d t h e p r o b lems associate d wit h t h e definitio n o f a w o r d suc h a s "right" s o ofte n use d i n differen t sense s b y jurists. 2 0 I n t h e a t t e m p t t o escap e fro m t h e malais e tha t e n v e l o p e d English j u r i s p r u d e n c e , H a r t relie d o n t h e philosophica l discussion o f l a n g u a g e b y suc h leadin g figures a s L u d w i g Wittgenstein, w h o d o m i n a t e d linguisti c analysi s i n t h e 1950s. Wittgenstein , w h o publishe d ver y littl e d u r i n g hi s lifetime, h a d a r g u e d tha t p r o b l e m s i n philosoph y w e r e chiefly linguistic ; t h e r e f o r e o n e m u s t begi n wit h consider ation o f language' s s t r u c t u r e a n d theory . Colleague s o f H a r t a t O x f o r d , notabl y t h e p h i l o s o p h e r J o h n L . Austin , h a d followe d Wittgenstein' s lea d i n m a k i n g l a n g u a g e t h e central focu s o f Englis h philosophy . I n lookin g t o philoso phy fo r s u p p o r t i n hi s lega l analysis , H a r t coul d justif y passing ove r m o r e recen t jurist s a s irrelevan t t o hi s con cerns a n d hi s r e t u r n t o t h e basic s p r o p o s e d originall y b y B e n t h a m a n d Austin . T h e s e two , H a r t c o n c l u d e d , h a d a t least c o n f r o n t e d t h e relationshi p betwee n la w a n d Ian -

Law and Morality Reconsidered 189 g u a g e realistically , eve n i f h e coul d n o t a g r e e wit h mos t o f their results . A s H a r t wrot e a b o u t t h e difficult y o f perceiv ing thes e connections : " I a t leas t coul d n o t se e ho w m u c h of thi s wa s visibl e i n t h e work s o f o u r predecessor s unti l I was t a u g h t ho w t o loo k b y m y [philosophy ] c o n t e m p o r a r ies." 2 1 H a r t h a d discovere d t h e i n s t r u m e n t wit h whic h t o reassess t h e legac y o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . W h e n H a r t publishe d The Concept of Law, t h e r e f o r e , p a r t o f it s a p p e a l aros e fro m hi s e x a m i n a t i o n o f j u r i s p r u dential issue s t h r o u g h t h e applicatio n o f linguisti c analy sis. T h a t lawyer s a n d j u r i s t s coul d n o t a g r e e o n a satisfac tory definitio n o f la w m a d e i t possibl e fo r H a r t t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n l a n g u a g e a s t h e ke y e l e m e n t i n revivin g substantial d e b a t e o n t h e issue s o f lega l philosoph y wit h respect t o t h e la w a n d moralit y issue . H a r t s o u g h t t o re solve t r o u b l i n g question s t h r o u g h e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e dif f e r e n t m e a n i n g s a w o r d m i g h t convey , a s i n hi s explana tion o f t h e variou s m e a n i n g s a n imperativ e m i g h t hav e a n d it s relatio n t o t h e Austinia n m o d e l o f la w a s com m a n d . 2 2 H a r t r e m e d i e d t h e peculia r stat e o f affair s i n which t h e field o f lega l philosoph y h a d forgotte n t h a t t h e discipline d e p e n d e d u p o n a m a r r i a g e o f it s tw o c o m p o nents: "Lawyer s h a d s t o p p e d b e i n g intereste d i n philoso phy, p h i l o s o p h e r s i n law." 2 3 H a r t ' s j u n c t i o n o f linguisti c philosophy wit h lega l analysi s p r o d u c e d a synthesi s t h a t revived interes t i n t h e g r a n d traditio n o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . H a r t s o u g h t t o m a k e l a n g u a g e t h e too l fo r acces s to t h e technica l l a n g u a g e o f t h e la w t h a t ofte n baffle d laypeople. 2 4 T h e resul t wa s a H a r t i a n t h e o r y o f la w heav ily i n d e b t e d t o t h e philosoph y o f o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e . T h i s e m p h a s i s ha s b e e n s u m m a r i z e d i n t h e followin g m a n n e r :

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Law i s essentiall y an d irreducibly , thoug h no t only , linguistic . Laws ar e formulate d an d promulgate d i n words . Lega l act s and decision s involv e articulat e though t an d publi c utterance — often als o publi c argument . A complicate d conceptua l frame work an d indee d a larg e an d partl y specialize d vocabular y i s essential t o th e structurin g o f th e wid e rang e o f practice s an d activities whic h constitut e a lega l order . Henc e th e understand ing o f la w require s elucidatio n an d analysi s o f th e comple x conceptual framewor k involved. 25 P e r h a p s m o r e t h a n an y o t h e r aspec t o f The Concept of Law, Hart's us e o f linguisti c analysi s p r o v i d e d t h e dramaticall y innovative a p p r o a c h tha t gav e t h e boo k m u c h o f it s grea t impact. H a r t h a d hi t t h e academi c j a c k p o t i n t h e sens e that The Concept of Law soo n b e c a m e t h e boo k tha t d o m i n a t e d discussio n a m o n g thos e intereste d i n lega l phi losophy. A m o n g o t h e r conclusion s tha t m a r k e d The Concept of Law a s a specia l contributio n t o j u r i s p r u d e n ce wa s H a r t ' s a r g u m e n t tha t B e n t h a m h a d b e e n especiall y a t t u n e d t o t h e crucia l relationshi p betwee n la w a n d l a n g u a g e . H a r t corrected t h e traditiona l vie w tha t h a d credite d Austi n as t h e f o u n d e r o f analytica l j u r i s p r u d e n c e a n d r e s t o r e d B e n t h a m t o t h e h o n o r h e deserved . T h i s revisio n o f t h e historical r e c o r d t h a t aros e fro m t h e insight s offere d b y linguistic philosoph y gav e H a r t t h e abilit y t o se t Austi n i n p r o p e r perspective . I n t h e lon g r u n , therefore , H a r t ' s synthesis o f t h e analytica l traditio n wit h t h e m o d e r n em phasis o n t h e philosoph y o f l a n g u a g e t o for m a distinctiv e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f lega l philosoph y constitute d hi s foremos t contribution. 2 6 H a r t ' s u n i q u e positio n a s a n ico n o f lega l philosophy a n d hi s claim s o n posterit y hav e reste d o n t h e

Law and Morality Reconsidered 191 r e u n i o n o f t h e tw o discipline s whos e p a t h s h a d d i v e r g e d : "By hi s ingeniou s applicatio n a n d a d a p t a t i o n o f suc h de velopments Har t sharpene d method s o f jurisprudentia l analysis, illuminate d n u m e r o u s o u t s t a n d i n g issues , a n d m a d e i t possibl e t o rais e a wid e r a n g e o f ne w p r o b l e m s . " 2 7 I n t h e proces s H a r t b r o u g h t t h e histor y o f Englis h juris p r u d e n c e ful l cycl e b y t h e vindicatio n o f B e n t h a m ' s achievements a n d a r e t u r n t o f u n d a m e n t a l issue s tha t h a d o r i g i n a t e d i n t h e B l a c k s t o n e - B e n t h a m era . Fe w scholar s have m a n a g e d t o r e s t o r e t h e credibilit y o f a formerl y g r e a t field o n c e i t h a d b e e n discredited , ye t H a r t p e r f o r m e d thi s difficul t task : " H a r t certainl y succeede d i n r e g e n e r a t i n g e x c i t e m e n t a n d interes t i n it . H e di d so , n o t by a b a n d o n i n g traditiona l area s o f conceptua l stud y a s t h e A m e r i c a n realist s di d i n t h e La w School s o f t h e U S A in t h e 1930s , b u t b y re-definin g a n d r e - e x a m i n i n g t h e traditional question s i n t h e styl e a n d spiri t o f t h e ne w p h i l o s o p h y . " 2 8 B y d a r i n g t o b r e a k wit h hi s i m m e d i a t e predecessors H a r t h a d rejecte d i n h e r i t e d assumptions , a n d m a d e a successfu l r e t u r n t o basi c issues . H a r t ' s allianc e o f linguisti c analysi s wit h t h e rediscover y of B e n t h a m (i n t h e j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l sense ) h a d it s ow n irony. B e n t h a m , w h o a b u s e d t h e Englis h l a n g u a g e consis tently t h r o u g h hi s prolix , virtuall y u n r e a d a b l e prose , h a r d l y seem s a n a p t m o d e l u p o n w h o m t o bas e t h e virtue s of clarit y i n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f m e a n i n g i n l a n g u a g e . T h e tirades agains t obfuscatio n i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e la w l a u n c h e d b y B e n t h a m see m almos t comica l give n t h e in vention o f j a r g on s o f r e q u e n t i n hi s writings . Yet , i n spit e of t h e obviou s obstacle s B e n t h a m p r e s e n t e d , H a r t f o u n d in linguisti c analysi s a ti e t h a t m a d e eve n B e n t h a m valu -

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able t o lega l philosophy : "Thi s i s bes t see n i f i t i s appreci ated ho w B e n t h a m ' s analysi s o f power s make s contac t wit h certain i m p o r t a n t t h e m e s o f m o d e r n linguisti c philoso p h y . " 2 9 T h r o u g h t h e focu s o n B e n t h a m ' s essentia l doc trines, s t r i p p e d o f thei r verba l pretensions , H a r t discov e r e d a n individua l (eve n m o r e t h a n Austin ) w h o h a d identified t h e f u n d a m e n t a l issue s affectin g t h e analysi s o f law. B y takin g B e n t h a m seriousl y H a r t r e g a r d e d "Ben tham's t h o u g h t n o t a s t h e venerabl e p r o d u c t o f a pas t master's m i n d t o b e displaye d a s a scholastic , historica l decoration o n one' s intellectua l mantelpiece , n o r a s t h e last w o r d o n t h e n a t u r e o f law , b u t a s a serie s o f challeng ing insight s t o struggl e with." 3 0 H a r t ' s bol d synthesi s r e h a bilitated B e n t h a m (i n t h e eye s o f m a n y , b u t n o t all ) a n d p r o v i d e d a majo r ste p forwar d i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g dialogu e of Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Since Blackstone , p e r h a p s t h e mos t persisten t issu e i n the Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l tradition , a s thi s wor k ha s at t e m p t e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e , ha s b e e n t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e relationship betwee n la w a n d morality . T h e s e s p h e r e s o f c o n d u c t a n d c o n t e m p l a t i o n , ofte n r e g a r d e d a s mutuall y exclusive categories , hav e h a d a s c h e c k e r e d a r e c o r d a s t h e vagarie s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e itself . T h o s e w h o hav e in sisted o n t h e necessit y t o s e p a r a t e la w fro m morality , ini tially i n reactio n t o Blackstone , hav e i n practic e f o u n d some m e a n s b y whic h t o accoun t fo r thei r constan t inter action. T o sustai n a n analysi s o f la w withou t som e hin t of m o r a l connectio n ha s p r o v e d impossible . Blackston e specifically e n d o r s e d t h e relationship , a n d thi s p r o v i d e d t h e p r e t e x t fo r som e o f B e n t h a m ' s mos t vituperativ e at tacks. Fo r B e n t h a m t h e principl e o f utilit y functione d a s

Law and Morality Reconsidered 193 t h e m o r a l t o u c h s t o n e u p o n whic h t o construc t hi s j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l edifice , a n d fo r Austi n "'law' , 'morality ' a n d 'ethics' wer e n o t s e p a r a t e 'things' , b u t s e p a r a t e perspec tives o n t h e sam e thing , tha t i s , — h u m a n activity." 3 1 Maine a n d H o l l a n d , i n thei r ow n ways , pai d h o m a g e t o t h e distinctio n betwee n la w a s i t i s a n d la w a s i t o u g h t t o be, b u t thi s constitute d p a r t o f t h e cul t o f la w a s scienc e that t r i u m p h e d i n t h e secon d hal f o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h cen tury. W h e t h e r t h e separatio n o f la w fro m moralit y wa s a n elaborate h o a x o r a fruitfu l wa y t o a p p r o a c h t h e stud y o f law r e m a i n e d u n r e s o l v e d . H a r t , w h o reiterate d thi s analytica l traditio n s o bril liantly, c o n t i n u e d t h e b l u r r i n g o f t h e line s betwee n la w a n d moralit y a n d ye t r e p e a t e d t h a t lega l obligatio n dif fered fro m m o r a l obligatio n a n d tha t t h e lega l syste m m u s t enforc e onl y lega l obligations . A t t h e sam e tim e h e held tha t la w a n d moralit y a r e "relate d socia l p h e n o m e n a " that affec t t h e behavio r o f individuals. 3 2 T h r e e d e c a d e s after t h e publicatio n o f The Concept of Law, c o m m e n t a r i e s o n H a r t hav e increasingl y stresse d hi s connection s with , b u t n o t hi s e n d o r s e m e n t of , t h e n a t u r a l la w tradition . A c c o r d i n g t o o n e r e c e n t assessment , " H a r t i a n la w is n a t u ral law." 3 3 Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n ce ha s c o m e ful l cycl e w h e n H a r t , originall y haile d a s t h e fulfillmen t o f Englis h lega l positivism a n d a s a n a d m i r e r o f B e n t h a m , i n r e t r o s p e c t may b e r e g a r d e d a s r e t u r n i n g t o a t leas t som e o f Black stone's assumptions . Eve n i f thi s conclusio n ma y b e ac cepted onl y wit h substantia l reservations , H a r t ' s view s merit additiona l consideration . T h e a p p a r e n t inconsistenc y i n H a r t ' s lega l philosoph y d i s a p p e a r s u n d e r close r scrutiny . I n t h e first place , H a r t

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followed hi s predecessor s i n r e g a r d i n g t h e distinctio n be tween la w a n d moralit y a s a n analytica l tool , n o t a s a fact d e m o n s t r a b l e b y historica l e x a m p l e . Whil e t h e verba l distinction ha s a n i m p o r t a n t plac e i n an y accoun t o f En glish j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e formul a ha s alway s w o r k e d onl y on a theoretica l level , neve r t o b e accepte d a s a descriptio n of ho w societ y ha s actuall y o p e r a t e d . W h a t i s m o r e , H a r t himself ha s n e v e r d e n i g r a t e d t h e n a t u r a l la w tradition ; even t h o u g h h e disagree s wit h som e o f it s majo r premises , h e ha s n e v e r t r e a t e d i t wit h t h e automati c condescensio n characteristic o f H o l l a n d a n d hi s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . H a r t took n a t u r a l la w j u r i s p r u d e n ce seriousl y a n d f o u n d "tha t t h e r e i s m u c h i n n a t u r a l la w t h e o r y whic h an y philosophi cally defensibl e theor y o f la w m u s t include." 3 4 Finally , H a r t ha s h a d t o fac e t h e d i l e m m a t h a t confront s thos e w h o a t t e m p t intellectua l synthesi s o n a g r a n d scale . C o m m e n t a t o r s hav e e x a m i n e d hi s wor k i n microscopi c detail , a n d p r o p o n e n t s o f o t h e r lega l theorie s hav e invariabl y decried H a r t ' s failur e t o a d h e r e t o wha t the y r e g a r d a s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d o g m a s . Glosse s u p o n The Concept of Law have focuse d frequentl y u p o n t h e e x t e n t t o whic h t h e book c o n c u r r e d wit h o r d e p a r t e d fro m particula r doc trines. H a r t ha s g o n e hi s ow n way , a n d hi s t r e a t m e n t o f law a n d moralit y ha s cause d varyin g reactions . O n e criticis m o f H a r t , fo r e x a m p l e , a r g u e s tha t h e ha s paid insufficien t h e e d t o t h e venerabl e injunctio n t h a t law fo r conceptua l p u r p o s e s m u s t b e k e p t s e p a r a t e fro m morality. T h i s critiqu e ha s applie d specificall y t o H a r t ' s division o f a lega l syste m int o set s o f p r i m a r y a n d second ary rules , a n d t o a n a c c o m p a n y i n g rul e o f recognitio n t h a t regulates t h e proces s o f c o n t i n u i n g lega l c h a n g e . I n H a r t ' s

Law and Morality Reconsidered 195 work, t h e obligatio n t o observ e t h e form s fo r lega l a m e n d m e n t , a s o p p o s e d t o arbitrar y action , rest s u p o n t h e no tion o f a n interna l morality . O b e d i e n c e t o t h e prescribe d rules o f recognitio n b y thos e responsibl e fo r g o v e r n i n g r e p r e s e n t e d a n interna l m o r a l imperative . H a r t ha s t h u s b e e n inconsisten t becaus e h e ha s u p h e l d t h e basi c positiv ist a r g u m e n t fo r t h e separatio n o f la w a n d morality , a n d yet ha s specifie d t h a t certai n element s o f an y lega l syste m m u s t res t o n m o r a l ideas. 3 5 I n retrospect , t h e r e f o r e , hi s d e b a t e wit h L o n Fulle r a b o u t t h e i n n e r moralit y o f la w doe s n o t no w see m t o r e p r e s e n t t h e y a w n i n g gul f betwee n t h e tw o scholar s a s i t once did . Fulle r define d thi s i n n e r moralit y a s essentia l t o t h e visio n o f a lega l system : "Certainl y t h e r e ca n b e n o rational g r o u n d fo r assertin g t h a t a m a n ca n hav e a m o r a l obligation t o obe y a lega l rul e tha t doe s n o t exist , o r i s kept secre t fro m him , o r t h a t c a m e int o existenc e onl y after h e h a d acted , o r wa s unintelligible , o r wa s contra dicted b y a n o t h e r r u l e o f t h e sam e system , o r c o m m a n d e d t h e impossible , o r c h a n g e d ever y m i n u t e . " 3 6 T h e Fuller H a r t position s showe d ho w difficul t i n practic e i t h a d b e c o m e t o h o n o r t h e positivis t c o m m a n d m e n t a b o u t t h e separation o f la w a n d morality . B u t i t i s onl y fai r t o a d d tha t H a r t recognize d rightl y that lega l analysi s di d n o t fit int o n e a t c o m p a r t m e n t s sub s u m e d u n d e r mutuall y exclusiv e slogans . T h e complexit y of a lega l syste m p r e c l u d e d suc h simplisti c choices : "In d e e d , a s H a r t frankl y acknowledge s a t t h e e n d o f hi s boo k (C.L. ch . 9 p p . 2 0 6 - 7 ) t h e ultimat e basi s fo r a d h e r i n g t o t h e positivis t thesi s o f t h e conceptua l differentiatio n o f law a n d moral s i s itsel f a m o r a l r e a s o n . " 3 7 T o hi s credi t

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H a r t di d n o t p e r m i t semanti c rigidit y t o c u r b t h e fertilit y of hi s intellec t o r t o restric t u n d u l y t h e provinc e o f hi s inquiries. Hi s willingnes s t o e x a m i n e sympatheticall y t h e n a t u r a l la w tradition , fo r e x a m p l e , ha s receive d thi s expla nation: " H e ha s trie d t o establis h som e kin d o f r a p p r o c h e m e n t wit h t h e n a t u r a l la w tradition , i n hi s a t t e m p t s t o extract a cor e o f t r u t h fro m theorie s o f n a t u r a l law." 3 8 H a r t c o n c l u d e d tha t t h e separatio n o f la w a n d moralit y i s a means , n o t a n e n d , a n d lega l t h e o r y m u s t n o t allo w thi s doctrine t o i m p e d e speculatio n w h e r e w a r r a n t e d . O t h e r critic s hav e c h a r g e d H a r t wit h to o g r e a t a resis tance t o t h e allur e o f n a t u r a l la w theory . T h e y hav e trie d without succes s t o p o r t r a y h i m a s a n u n r e p e n t a n t positiv ist whos e wor k suffere d fro m it s failur e t o r e t u r n com pletely t o t h e n a t u r a l la w tradition . I n thi s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n H a r t r e m a i n e d to o c o m m i t t e d t o t h e attitude s o f lega l positivism, t h u s payin g to o littl e attentio n t o t h e complex ity o f lega l p h e n o m e n a a n d t h e insight s p r o v i d e d b y natu ral la w theory. 3 9 H a r t attracte d glosse s i n g r e a t profusion , a n d t h e pric e pai d fo r academi c fam e wa s a m i n u t e scru tiny tha t fe w scholar s eve r receive . T h e a t t e m p t t o stat e a theory o f la w base d o n a synthesi s o f t h e positivis t a n d n a t u r a l la w tradition s a n d a r e t u r n t o B e n t h a m ' s question s gave a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o jurist s o f ever y viewpoin t t o d e b a t e H a r t ' s wor k i n i m m e n s e detail . I n hi s las t majo r contribution , a postscrip t t o t h e secon d edition o f The Concept of Law (1994) , H a r t r e s p o n d e d t o some o f t h e criticism s o f hi s a r g u m e n t s , especiall y thos e offered b y hi s successo r a t O x f o r d , t h e A m e r i c a n j u r i s t Ronald Dworkin . H a r t n o t e d t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f t h e re sponse t o t h e origina l wor k a s a stimulu s t o lega l t h e o r y

Law and Morality Reconsidered 197 o n b o t h side s o f t h e Atlantic , a l t h o u g h lega l t h e o r y ha s sometimes b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d a s a waive r o f t h e responsibil ity t o p r e s e n t empirica l evidence . H a r t d i s c h a r g e d thi s obligation wit h a civilit y to o ofte n r a r e i n academi c ex changes, a n d h e readil y c o n c e d e d tha t element s o f t h e original a r g u m e n t r e q u i r e d clarificatio n o r eve n conces sions t o critics . I n t h e e n d , however , H a r t stoo d b y t h e basics o f t h e origina l work , especiall y t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t j u d g e s a r e ofte n calle d u p o n t o m a k e ne w law , n o m a t t e r what r h e t o r i c i s e m p l o y ed t o disguis e thi s fact . T h e r e a d e r of t h e postscript , however , woul d find i t difficult t o u n d e r stand wha t al l t h e fus s wa s about . T h e issue s discusse d a p p e a r s o fa r r e m o v e d fro m o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e t h a t even attorney s m i g h t find t h e d e b a t e arcane . H a r t di d n o t e x t e n d hi s w o r k i n an y d e g r e e t h a t woul d b r o a d e n t h e a p p e a l o r m a k e t h e a r g u m e n t s relevan t t o a wide r au dience. Regardless o f t h e controvers y t h a t swirle d (an d contin ues t o swirl ) a r o u n d H a r t ' s work , hi s c a r e e r ha s d e m o n strated t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y impac t t h a t t h e a c a d e m y no w has h a d i n s h a p i n g t h e cours e o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e . I t ha s r e p r e s e n t e d t h e fulfillmen t o f t h e d r e a m s o f t h e profes soriate tha t m a t u r e d i n t h e 1880s , a n d ye t t h e victor y ha s in certai n respect s p r o v e n hollow . I n n o sens e shoul d thi s conclusion b e take n a s a d e n i g r a t i o n o f H a r t ' s achieve m e n t , b u t r a t h e r a s a c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e n a t u r e o f aca d e m i c la w a n d it s divorc e fro m t h e b r o a d e r tradition s of j u r i s p r u d e n c e t o whic h b o t h Blackston e a n d B e n t h a m b e l o n g e d . Eve n H a r t , whos e s t a t u r e ha s e n d u r e d a g e n e r ation o f la w revie w evaluations , ha s d r a w n t h e followin g c o m m e n t : " B e h i n d b o t h A m e r i c a n Lega l Realis m a n d t h e

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movement t o broade n th e stud y o f la w i n thi s countr y lie s the simpl e truis m tha t th e stud y o f rule s alon e i s no t enough fo r th e understandin g o f law . T o dat e Oxonia n legal philosophy , largel y becaus e i t has take n to o muc h fo r granted th e criteri a o f relevanc e o f Austinia n analytica l jurisprudence, ha s contribute d almos t nothin g t o th e sys tematic an d persisten t exploratio n o f th e implication s o f this truism." 40 T h e mos t frequen t dissent s fro m Hart' s approach hav e fixed o n th e proble m that , n o matte r ho w elegant th e analysis , th e relevanc e t o ho w mos t o f societ y conceives o f a lega l syste m i s sli m becaus e fe w actua l ex amples ar e give n i n suppor t o f th e argument. 4 1 Eve n Hart's stronges t admirer s woul d hav e t o admi t tha t hi s influence ha s no t extende d fa r beyon d th e academy . While Har t remain s secur e i n hi s positio n a s th e majo r English juris t o f thi s century , thi s ha s no t brough t hi m wider fame . A t th e cente r o f discussio n abou t jurispru dence fo r ove r thre e decades , Har t neve r gaine d recogni tion a s a publi c intellectua l no r i s i t eas y t o discern , fo r al l the interes t i n lega l system s h e engendered , significan t impact o n th e Englis h lega l syste m itself . T h e bes t exampl e o f Hart' s relativ e lac k o f influenc e came i n th e consequence s o f hi s participatio n i n a n ex tended publi c exchang e wit h Lor d Devlin , a j u d ge o f sub stantial reputation , i n th e wak e o f th e Wolfende n commit tee repor t o f 195 7 tha t recommende d decriminalizatio n of homosexua l practice s betwee n consentin g adult s i n pri vate. Devli n had , i n fact , give n evidenc e i n favo r o f th e Committee recommendatio n befor e it s publication . Tha t testimony notwithstanding , i n 195 8 Devli n delivere d a lec ture o n jurisprudence t o th e Britis h Academ y i n whic h h e

Law and Morality Reconsidered 199 a d v a n c e d t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t us e o f t h e crimina l la w t o enforce m o r a l s t a n d a r d s r e p r e s e n t e d a legitimat e exercis e of stat e authority . Devli n c o m p a r e d m o r a l devianc e t o treason a n d suggeste d t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d t h e obli gation t o p r o t e c t societ y fro m t h e f o r m e r a s m u c h a s t h e latter. I n justificatio n o f thi s thesi s Devli n p u t fort h t h e hypothesis t h a t societ y woul d disintegrat e i f a c o m m o n b o n d o f m o r a l belief s w e r e n o t enforce d b y t h e law : " B u t if societ y ha s t h e r i g h t t o m a k e a j u d g e m e nt a n d ha s i t o n t h e basi s tha t a recognize d moralit y i s a s necessar y t o society as , say , a recognize d g o v e r n m e n t , t h e n societ y ma y use t h e la w t o p r e s e r v e moralit y i n t h e sam e wa y a s i t uses i t t o safeguar d a n y t h i n g els e tha t i s essentia l t o it s existence." 4 2 T h i s r e a s o n i n g soo n b e c a m e k n o w n a s t h e "disintegration" theory , u n c o n t a m i n a t e d a s i t wa s b y an y specific e x a m p l e . Devlin' s a r g u m e n t p r o m p t e d a publi c reply fro m H a r t . After p r e l i m i n a r y d e b a t e wit h Devli n i n periodicals , H a r t publishe d Law, Liberty, and Morality i n 196 3 t o ad dress specificall y t h e hallowe d issu e o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f law fro m morality . H a r t c o n c e d e d tha t la w h a d alway s b e e n influence d b y morals , b u t h e d e n i e d t h a t thi s rol e was a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y context : " W h a t i s crucial t o t h e d i s p u t e i n it s m o d e r n f o r m i s t he significanc e to b e attache d t o t h e historica l fac t tha t certai n c o n d u c t , n o m a t t e r what , i s p r o h i b i t e d b y a positiv e morality . T h e utilitarian [ H a r t ] d e n i e s t h a t thi s ha s an y significanc e suf ficient t o justif y it s e n f o r c e m e n t ; hi s o p p o n e n t [Devlin ] asserts tha t i t h a s . " 4 3 Despit e t h e attentio n o f b o t h partie s to t h e a s s u m p t i o n s o f lega l theory , H a r t score d hi s strong est poin t w h e n h e n o t e d tha t n o empirica l evidenc e sup -

200 H.

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ported th e allegatio n tha t conflic t ove r mora l standard s d o o m e d a society : "N o evidenc e i s produce d t o sho w tha t deviation fro m accepte d sexua l morality , eve n b y adult s i n private, i s somethin g which , lik e treason , threaten s th e existence o f society . N o reputabl e historia n ha s main tained thi s thesis , an d ther e i s indee d muc h evidenc e against it." 44 Althoug h Devli n publishe d a collectio n o f essays i n 196 5 i n repl y t o Hart , th e verdic t a m o n g lega l academics wa s tha t Har t ha d mad e hi s cas e mor e convinc ingly: "Many , however , perhap s eve n most , thin k tha t Hart carrie d th e da y inasmuc h a s Devli n faile d t o mee t hi s challenge t o produc e har d empirica l evidenc e t o sho w tha t the erosio n o f a society' s dominan t moralit y place s tha t society i n dange r o f collapse." 45 I n summarie s o f th e Hart-Devlin exchange , on e los t sigh t o f th e fac t tha t Dev lin, b y virtu e o f hi s sea t o n th e bench , migh t accomplis h more o f practica l substance . As regard s it s impac t o n a publi c program , o f course , the crucia l poin t wa s tha t th e Wolfende n Committe e ha d proclaimed it s guidin g principl e befor e Har t entere d th e lists agains t Devlin . Howeve r valuable , Hart' s comment s occurred afte r th e publi c polic y decisio n ha d alread y bee n made an d thu s ha d n o influenc e o n th e origina l choice . Hart's participatio n di d no t contribut e t o th e broa d dis cussion o f socia l policy ; rather , i t followe d i n th e after math o f th e committee' s recommendation . T i m e ha s di minished th e relevanc e o f th e Hart-Devli n controversy , and on e criti c ha s writte n tha t i t wa s fortunatel y no t a source o f publi c polic y bu t represente d academi c theoriz ing i n impractica l form : " I conclud e b y proposin g tha t the Hart-Devli n debate , i n prescindin g fro m stron g an d

Law and Morality Reconsidered 201 substantial philosophizin g a b o u t h u m a n well-being , a n d in p r e s c i n d i n g fro m t h e actual , concret e habit s o f particu lar lega l culture s a n d traditions , i s vacuous , pedantic , a n d instructive onl y insofa r a s i t teache s u s ho w n o t t o c o n d u c t m o r a l discourse." 4 6 T h i r t y year s late r t h e r e r e m a i n s a majestically b a r o q u e a u r a a r o u n d a n a r g u m e n t c o n d u c t e d on a sophisticate d philosophica l leve l withou t r e f e r e n c e t o real situations , especiall y w h e n t h e evidenc e fo r t h e us e o f t h e crimina l la w t o i m p r o v e m o r a l s t a n d a r d s a b o u n d s . 4 7 I n t h e e n d , t h e r e f o r e , H a r t ' s r e p u t a t i o n rarel y e x t e n d e d outside t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e academy . A n o t h e r r e m a r k a b l e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e proces s b y whic h academic c u l t u r e ha s affecte d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e ma y b e see n i n t h e scholarl y r e c e p t i o n o f The Concept of Law. H a r t ' s selectio n a s C o r p u s professo r a n t e d a t e d b y n i n e year s t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e wor k t h a t m a d e hi s r e p u t a t i o n . Hi s a p p o i n t m e n t i n 195 2 wa s o n t h e basis o f potential , n o t accomplishment . O n e m i g h t a r g u e that thi s r e p r e s e n t e d r e m a r k a b l e prescienc e o n t h e p a r t of t h e elector s w h o chos e s o wisely , give n t h e distinctio n that H a r t u n d o u b t e d l y attained . O n e m i g h t als o suggest , however, tha t hi s academi c positio n c o n f e r r e d substantia l prestige i n a d v a n c e o f The Concept of Law a n d e n s u r e d t h a t t h e b o o k woul d c o m m a n d w i d e s p r e a d attention . T h u s i t has b e e n n o t e d t h a t H a r t ' s majo r w o r k "woul d doubtles s not hav e h a d s o g r e a t a n influenc e h a d i t n o t b e e n writte n by t h e Professo r o f J u r i s p r u d e n c e a t t h e Universit y o f O x f o r d . T h a t i s n o t s o m u c h a fac t a b o u t H a r t a n d t h e n a t u r e o f t h e boo k b u t a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e Britis h university syste m a n d Britis h society." 4 8 C a m p b e l l ha s ex p l o r e d carefull y ho w t h e wor k o f H a r t ' s pupil s (especiall y

202 H.

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J o s e p h Ra z a n d Nei l MacCormick ) hav e h e l p e d t o sustai n the r e p u t a t i o n o f t h e master . T h e tracin g o f t h e populari zation o f The Concept of Law, a p a r t fro m t h e merit s o f it s a r g u m e n t , showe d ho w t h e externa l factor s o f academi c culture h e l p e d t o m a k e i t t h e famou s treatis e i t became. 4 9 T h i s perceptiv e observatio n t o u c h e d t h e sensitiv e a r e a o f academic t r e n d i n e s s a n d t h e peculia r wa y i n whic h aca demic r e p u t a t i o n s a r e secured . T h e c h a n g i n g n a t u r e o f academic j u r i s p r u d e n ce ha s m a d e t h e wa y a boo k gain s it s stature a legitimat e concern . One's initia l assumption , o f course , i s tha t a boo k gain s influence becaus e i t treat s a n i m p o r t a n t subjec t withi n a discipline, o n e tha t excite s t h e interes t o f a wid e audience . Yet book s t h a t a r e acclaime d a s influentia l j u s t a s ofte n d r a w critica l review s fro m o t h e r specialist s i n a field, a n d often a r e j u d g e d s o e r r o n e o u s tha t a n e u t r a l observe r might wel l w o n d e r wha t th e fus s i s al l about . T h e recep tion o f th e boo k i s s t r u c t u r ed b y wha t o t h e r e x p e r t s prais e o r criticiz e a b o u t t h e work . Historian s m i g h t wel l reflec t on t h e m a n y hostil e c o m m e n t a r i e s directe d agains t E . P . T h o m p s o n ' s The Making of the English Working Class (1963) , a boo k t h a t ha s als o exercise d a g r e a t influenc e b o t h insid e a n d outsid e it s discipline . Regardles s o f t h e shortcoming s attributed t o a book , i t acquire s influenc e precisel y be cause o t h e r scholar s b e c o m e parasiti c of f it . O n e m i g h t speculate, fo r e x a m p l e , o n ho w m a n y t e n u r e article s The Concept of Law s p a w n e d o n b o t h side s o f t h e Atlantic . Many academic s find a particula r wor k easie r t o teac h against, a n d s o the y refe r t o i t m o r e ofte n t h a n thos e whose conclusion s the y e n d o r s e . T h e a r g u m e n t s i n The Concept of Law hav e p r o v i d e d t h e basi s fo r literall y h u n -

Law and Morality Reconsidered 203 d r e d s o f scholarl y d i s c u s s i o n s — a n d recentl y fo r book s a n d symposia , t h e ultimat e hallmark s o f academi c recog nition: " T h e r e a r e i n t e r m i n a b l e article s o n H a r t a n d Dworkin b u t the y a r e cast , fo r t h e mos t part , i n t h e com m e n t a r y m o d e . T h e y tid y u p bit s o f t h e a r g u m e n t ; the y rarely pos e question s whic h giv e o t h e r scholar s s o m e t h i n g to g o o u t a n d find o u t a b o u t . " 5 0 I n certai n respects , t h e n , H a r t b e c a m e t h e p r i s o n e r o f lesse r scholar s e a g e r t o de fine a n d exploi t hi s positio n a s a n academi c s u p e r s t a r . T h i s proces s ma y a d d t o o r subtrac t fro m t h e stud y o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e , b u t it s i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e evolutio n o f t h e discipline itsel f c a n n o t b e i g n o r e d . I n addition , C a m p b e l l ha s a r g u e d t h a t t h e influenc e o f The Concept of Law ha s actuall y n o t b e e n nearl y s o g r e a t a s it a p p e a r e d becaus e it s plac e a s a n "excitin g w o r k " cause d it t o acquir e a d e g r e e o f i m p o r t a n c e i t di d n o t merit . H e asserte d t h a t it s s t a n d i n g "ha s b e e n e x a g g e r a t e d a n d magnified b y t h e a d o p t i o n o f hi s a p p r o a c h a s s o m e t h i n g of a n o r t h o d o x y b y t h e self-style d O x f o r d Schoo l o f J u r i s p r u d e n c e . " 5 1 H a r t b e c a m e accepte d a s t h e o n e t r u e wa y to d o lega l philosophy . T h e s u p r e m a c y o f H a r t ' s wor k over t h r e e d e c a d e s ha s d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e e x t e n t t o whic h t h e a s s u m p t i o n s o f academi c c u l t u r e hav e prevaile d fro m within i n t h e c o n t i n u i n g evaluatio n o f t h e book . Fe w crit ics a t p r e s e n t woul d d e f e n d al l o r eve n majo r point s o f H a r t ' s book , ye t i t retain s a r e p u t a t i o n i n t h e field afte r m a n y scholar s hav e a c k n o w l e d g e d it s shortcomings . A s a factor i n t h e historica l u n f o l d i n g o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , t h e peculia r fashion s o f academi c cul ture mus t b e noted . Every academi c field i n t h e twentiet h c e n t u r y ha s h a d

204 H.

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to wrestl e wit h t h e distinctio n betwee n tha t q u e s t i o n i n g attitude withou t whic h legitimat e inquir y vanishes , a n d the e m b r a c e o f fashionabl e t r e n d s tha t priz e provocativ e conclusions a t t h e e x p e n s e o f m o r e j u d i c i o us b u t les s "ex citing" writings . I n t h e U n i t e d State s o n e m i g h t cit e t h e successive m o v e m e n t s o f sociologica l j u r i s p r u d e n ce befor e W o r l d W a r I , realis m i n t h e 1930s , a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y critical lega l studies . Al l hav e invoke d t h e simila r r h e t o r i c of b r o a d e n i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f la w b y proclaimin g a n a g e n d a base d o n extralega l insights . I n retrospect , how ever, despit e t h e self-describe d innovation s o f eac h era , each t r e n d ha s t h e distinc t ai r o f playin g t h e academi c g a m e a t it s worst . H a r t clearl y wishe d t o m a k e hi s wor k synthetic, n o t revisionis t i n t h e t r e n d y sens e o f t h e acad emy. I t shoul d b e clea r tha t h e di d n o t see k t h e rol e o f academic icon , b u t i n som e respect s h a d tha t positio n i m p o s e d u p o n h i m b y virtu e o f hi s professorshi p a t Ox ford a n d b y t h e effort s o f individual s o f lesse r a t t a i n m e n t . H a r t rarel y availe d himsel f o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o answe r critics, a n d w h e n h e ha s chose n t o d o so , a s i n hi s p o s t h u m o u s postscript , hi s m a n n e r wa s unfailingl y courteous ; h e eschewe d t h e polemic s t h a t to o ofte n a d o r n academi c debate. T h e r e a d e r m i g h t wel l conclud e tha t thi s wor k itself reflect s t h e academi c c u l t u r e tha t ha s b e e n s o im p o r t a n t t o t h e analysi s offere d h e r e . T h e influenc e o f H a r t , s o symboli c o f academi c law , m u s t b e see n i n t h e long perspectiv e o f d e v e l o p m e n t s sinc e t h e 1880s . I n a tribute t o H a r t recently , R u t h Gaviso n wrote : " T h u s H a r t has m o r e t h a n e a r n e d th e r a r e c o m p l i m e n t that , h a d w e not h a d hi s p r e s e n c e a n d contribution , t h e field woul d n o t hav e looke d t h e same." 5 2 T h i s verdic t wa s certainl y

Law and Morality Reconsidered 205 m e r i t e d , b u t i t indicate d a t leas t a s m u c h a b o u t t h e evolv ing n a t u r e o f t h e field itsel f a s i t di d a b o u t t h e plac e o f H a r t withi n it . Hart's r e p u t a t i o n , whateve r reservation s individua l crit ics ma y have , seem s secur e despit e t h e t h r e a t s o f hi s posi tion b e c o m i n g outflanke d o n t h e lef t b y critica l lega l stud ies o r fro m t h e r i g h t b y t h e renaissanc e o f n a t u r a l la w theory. A t o n e level , t h e r e f o r e , t h e u n p a r a l l e l e d enthusi asm fo r H a r t ' s wor k signale d a g r e a t e r attentio n t o juris p r u d e n c e a n d t h e goal s i t m i g h t seek . T r u e , t h e a u d i e n c e for hi s writin g ha s d i m i n i s h e d , fo r it s increasingl y aca demic t o n e ha s r e m o v e d i t fro m g e n e r a l discours e a b o u t public policy . A n y assessmen t o f H a r t m u s t recogniz e hi s r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f thi s f u n d a m e n t a l alteratio n i n t h e juris p r u d e n t i a l traditio n sinc e t h e 1880s , t h e r e t u r n t o Ben t h a m n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g . H a r t d e c l a r e d i n The Concept of Law that hi s p u r p o s e include d a wis h "t o f u r t h e r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f law , coercion , a n d moralit y a s differen t b u t related socia l p h e n o m e n a . " 5 3 Hi s a t t e m p t a t a sociolog y o f law wa s p e r h a p s t h e weakes t p a r t o f hi s book ; a r e a d e r would b e h a r d presse d t o u n d e r s t a n d ho w a rea l societ y o p e r a t e s afte r s t u d y i n g H a r t . T h e resul t h a d b e e n wel l described: " T h e d e e p complicitie s betwee n professiona l a n d academi c conception s o f la w p r o d u c e d a n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e tha t wa s peculiarl y c o n s t r a i n e d , o n e tha t p r o t e c t e d la w fro m significan t e n g a g e m e n t wit h politica l a n d socia l issues." 5 4 Whil e thi s proces s fro m 188 0 o n ha s h a d a politica l d i m e n s i o n , t h e d e m a n d s o f academi c lega l culture hav e s h a p e d t h e cours e o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e even m o r e substantially . H a r t r e t u r n e d intellectua l sophisticatio n t o j u r i s p r u -

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d e n c e a n d r e s t o r e d t h e disciplin e t o a n h o n o r e d positio n within t h e academy . T h i s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t m u s t b e tem p e r e d , however , b y t h e c o n t i n u e d drif t awa y fro m juris p r u d e n c e a s a n a p p r o p r i a t e vehicl e fo r t h e discussio n o f c o n t e m p o r a r y publi c issues . Eve n afte r H a r t ' s a t t e m p t t o restore j u r i s p r u d e n c e t o a discussio n o f socia l issues , thi s effort m u s t stil l b e j u d g e d a failure . B y b e c o m i n g a n or thodoxy, The Concept of Law "ha s circumscribe d j u r i s p r u dential discussion." 5 5 O t h e r academi c discipline s hav e en d u r e d a varian t o f thi s d e v e l o p m e n t ove r t h e las t century , b u t j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s suffere d mos t becaus e it s m o d e r n origins wit h Blackston e h a d offere d suc h splendi d h o p e s for it s i m p o r t a n t rol e i n intellectua l discussion . Academi c c u l t u r e ha s s h a p e d t h e directio n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e m o r e , p e r h a p s , t h a n an y o t h e r singl e factor . T o m a k e j u r i s p r u d e n c e a subjec t o f publi c d e b a t e clearl y r e q u i r e s specia l qualities, ye t i t m i g h t b e a r g u e d that , give n t h e specia l place o f t h e c o m m o n la w i n t h e nation' s history , n o topi c is m o r e vita l t o Englis h society . T o u n d e r s t a n d t h e pas t goals a n d contribution s o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n ce i s to p e r ceive a s wel l t h e c h a n g e d n a t u r e o f it s rol e sinc e t h e 1880s .

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

T w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y historian s o f la w a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e have altere d dramaticall y t h e a p p r o a c h t o thei r craft . T h e d o c u m e n t a t i o n o f doctrina l evolutio n ha s give n wa y t o increased sophisticatio n a b o u t t h e m a n y influence s t h a t affect t h e stud y o f la w i n it s historica l contexts . I n c r e a s e d e m p h a s i s o n t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f a wid e r a n g e o f extralega l factors a d d e d usefu l perspective s fro m area s suc h a s eco nomics, politics , a n d sociology . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t thes e additions t o traditiona l lega l analysi s p r o v i d e d ne w alter natives, lega l histor y sinc e 196 0 ha s reasserte d it s clai m a s a f u n d a m e n t a l field o f historica l inquir y a s wel l a s a n i m p o r t a n t adjunc t t o t h e ne w socia l history . T h i s transfor mation ha s h a d a n u n e v e n impact , fo r eve n t h e e m p h a s e s 207

208 Conclusion of t h e ne w socia l histor y hav e n o t resulte d i n majo r revi sions o f t h e wa y i n whic h t h e o r d i n a r y citize n experience s t h e lega l syste m o n a dail y basis . Focu s o n t h e rarefie d p l a n e o f lega l theor y simpl y ha s n o t attracte d a larg e audience. O n e r e c e n t assessmen t o f thi s p h e n o m e n o n ha s noted: Legal histor y remain s terr a incognit a t o th e ordinar y reade r o f history an d i s shunne d b y th e averag e historian . Ther e i s littl e legal histor y i n ou r textbook s o r ou r classrooms . Th e reaso n fo r indifference t o lega l histor y canno t b e th e inheren t dullnes s o r mystery o f lega l institutions , law s and litigation . The y affec t th e world w e liv e i n profoundly , fill th e mornin g new s programs , and dail y shap e ou r expectation s o f others ' conduct . O n televi sion, court s an d lawyer s appea r regularly . Lega l histor y shoul d be ver y popular , bu t quit e th e revers e i s true. 1 T h e impac t o f a lega l syste m u p o n t h e individua l a n d t h e way t h a t individua l r e g a r d s t h e c u l t u r e o f legalit y reveal s m u c h a b o u t t h e condition s o f dail y existence . I n t h e specifi c instanc e o f m o d e r n Britis h history , sev eral factor s i n t h e twentiet h c e n t u r y hav e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e declin e o f lega l history' s claims . F o r e m o s t i s t h e perva sive b r o m i d e t h a t t h e event s o f t h e Gloriou s Revolutio n i n 1688 a n d it s a f t e r m a t h s o m e h o w "settled " t h e constitutio n for t h e n e x t t h r e e centuries . Lega l a n d constitutiona l his tory wer e rarel y distinguished , a n d t h e putativ e e n d o f constitutional histor y implie d t h e e n d o f lega l histor y a s well. T h e m a n n e r i n whic h m o d e r n b r a n c h e s o f t h e com m o n la w suc h a s tort s ha s influence d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a commercia l societ y ha s rarel y receive d attention . I n addition, t h e los s o f g r e a t p o w e r statu s b y G r e a t Britai n

Conclusion 209 has n o d o u b t m a d e t h e stud y o f it s lega l histor y les s com pelling t h a n i n t h e e r a o f Victoria n glory , w h e n globa l s u p r e m a c y gav e t o t h e topi c a n intellectua l h e g e m o n y i t n o l o n g e r enjoys . Finally , t h e inwar d t u r n o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e fro m socia l analysi s t o lega l theor y sinc e t h e 1880 s gave t o t h e subjec t a f o r b i d d i n g facad e tha t ha s m a d e scholars fro m outsid e t h e disciplin e war y o f m e e t i n g it s challenges. Academic s h a d t h e m o r e m o d e s t goal s o f es tablishing a r e p u t a t i o n a n d seekin g publication , s o t h a t c h a n g i n g t h e worl d o r eve n one' s disciplin e n o l o n g e r wa s foremost. O v e r t h e pas t century , t h e r e f o r e , Englis h lega l a n d constitutiona l history , whic h h a d r e i g n e d s u p r e m e , has d i m i n i s h e d i n prestig e a s o t h e r subset s o f historica l inquiry hav e s u p e r s e d e d it . O t h e r scholar s hav e h i n t e d a t thi s transitio n i n ap p r o a c h tha t altere d t h e p u r p o s e s o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e. T w i n ing, fo r instance , ha s written : Subsequent development s ca n b e broadl y interprete d i n term s of a Maine-lik e hypothesis : betwee n 185 0 an d 195 0 th e move ment o f academi c la w i n Englan d wa s a progressiv e narrowin g of genera l jurisprudence , broadl y conceived , t o particula r ex pository jurisprudence , concerne d almos t exclusivel y wit h th e exposition an d analysi s an d applicatio n o f Englis h lega l doc trine. Thi s wa s illustrate d no t onl y b y th e conten t an d scop e o f the professiona l examination s an d th e rise o f th e expositor y textbook, bu t als o by th e histor y o f taugh t jurisprudence i n tha t period. Bentha m wa s side-lined ; th e follower s o f Austi n use d him selectivel y an d develope d a narrowe r an d mor e particula r conception o f analytica l jurisprudence; an d Main e wa s margin alized. Lik e Maine' s gran d hypotheses , thi s i s vulnerable t o par ticularistic attac k a s bein g simplifie d an d over-generalized . Bu t

210 Conclusion it contain s a cor e o f trut h sufficien t t o provid e a plausibl e an d coherent stor y abou t Englis h academi c la w ove r a hundre d years. Genera l jurisprudenc e an d lega l science , a s thes e wer e variously interprete d b y Bentham , Austi n an d Maine , neve r took roo t i n England—fo r fairl y obviou s reasons. 2 T h i s wor k ha s a g r e e d substantiall y wit h Twining' s inter pretation, b u t t h e 1880 s see m a m u c h safe r p e r i o d t o delineate t h e impac t o f academi c lega l culture , a m i n o r quibble a t best . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l a r g u m e n t a b o u t t h e course o f m o d e r n Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e retain s it s appeal. T h e f o u n d a t i o n o f a j u r i s p r u d e n t i a l traditio n i n aca demic c u l t u r e ha s p r o v i d e d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o revis e it s history-of-ideas ancestry . T h e mos t r e c e n t a t t e m p t t o pro vide a ne w i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f lega l histor y i n g e n e r a l ha s a p p e a r e d i n Ala n Watson' s c o n c e r n fo r t h e effect s o f a legal traditio n tha t "t o a m a r k e d d e g r e e , i s i n d e p e n d e n t of social , political , a n d economi c factors." 3 T h i s self-con tained lawyers ' c u l t u r e ha s looke d inward , wit h fe w influ ences p e r m i t t e d t o alte r professiona l perspectives . Wit h respect t o j u r i s p r u d e n c e, thi s a r g u m e n t suggest s t h a t lega l philosophy itself , i n it s academi c guise , ha s sinc e t h e 1880 s also a d h e r e d t o a n interna l tradition , especiall y i f Watson' s a r g u m e n t i s accepted , tha t is , "th e ver y powerfu l rol e that t h e lega l c u l t u r e itsel f ha s o n la w m a k i n g . " 4 T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a n academi c lega l cultur e ha s b e e n t h e most i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t o f lega l philosoph y d u r i n g t h e pas t century . Fo r j u r i s p r u d e n c e t h e consequence s o f this proces s hav e include d a n increase d abstraction , a re luctance t o se t la w i n it s o r d i n a r y context , a n d a n a r r o w specialization tha t ha s s e p a r a t e d it s purvie w eve r m o r e

Conclusion 211 remotely fro m t h e c o n c e r n s o f lawyers . Withi n academi c c u l t u r e j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s b e c o m e a n a u t o n o m o u s disci pline, d r i v e n b y academi c c o n c e r n s i n whic h t h e valu e o f speculation i s d e t e r m i n e d b y intellectua l elites . Scholarl y battles ove r issue s fa r r e m o v e d fro m t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f o r d i n a r y citizen s hav e a d d e d t o t h e etherea l a t m o s p h e r e that p e r v a d e s j u r i s p r u d e n c e . Ever y scholarl y disciplin e has t o s o m e e x t e n t falle n victi m t o thi s failing , b u t thi s conclusion reinforce s t h e p o i n t t h a t t h e m o d e r n universit y has s p a w n e d a u n i q u e culture , o n e whos e implication s m u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e writin g o f a particula r disci pline's intellectua l history . Whil e teachin g obligation s stil l stress t h e idea l o f a libera l e d u c a t i o n , wit h e m p h a s i s u p o n a b r o a d a c q u a i n t a n c e wit h a n academicall y define d field, t h e researc h dutie s o f t h e professoriat e ma y resul t i n focu s u p o n t h e esoteric a o f a give n subject . C o m p l a i n t s a b o u t this t r e n d i n m o d e r n academi c lif e hav e surface d r e g u larly, b u t seldo m hav e suc h lamentation s specifie d t h e consequences fo r t h e disciplin e involved . Scholars o f Englis h j u r i s p r u d e n c e hav e t e n d e d t o e m brace, a s H a r t ' s c a r e e r d e m o n s t r a t e d , t h e academi c cul t u r e o f t h e la w i n it s m o d e r n guise . T h i s j u d g m e n t i s n o t a c o n d e m n a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r a wa y t o accoun t fo r t h e p a t h o n whic h j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s e m b a r k e d sinc e t h e 1880s . I n o t h e r words , j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s followe d t h e interna l dictates o f academi c c u l t u r e a s m u c h a s o r m o r e t h a n t h e search fo r t h e n a t u r e o f law . I n t e r e s t i n lega l t h e o r y ha s s u p p l a n t e d consideratio n o f wha t lawyer s actuall y d o . J u r i s p r u d e n t i a l speculatio n ha s n e v e r falle n int o neat , m u t u ally exclusiv e categorie s o f motivation ; ye t t h e increase d d o m i n a n c e o f academi c influence s o n j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s a

212 Conclusion relatively m o d e r n p h e n o m e n o n . Professoria l elite s no w o p e r a t e i n t h e real m o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e m u c h a s Watson' s legal elite s d e t e r m i n e d c h a n g e withou t r e f e r e n c e t o out side influences. 5 T h e rol e o f t h e j u r i s t a s socia l criti c ha s c o n t i n u e d t o diminish , a s evidenc e a b o u t t h e attitude s o f t h e judiciary ha s indicated . Academi c discussio n ha s littl e influence o n t h e la w lords , w h o r e m a i n distinctl y insulate d from thi s q u a r t e r . 6 T h e achievemen t o f professiona l statu s for t h e lega l academi c b r o u g h t intellectua l s t r e n g t h b u t little c o m m e n s u r a t e politica l o r socia l influence. 7 J u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s c r e a t e d a n academi c c u l t u r e o f it s ow n w h e r e , to p a r a p h r a s e Watson , i t follow s it s interna l value s wit h scant impac t outsid e it s b o u n d a r i e s a n d fre e fro m societa l pressures. 8 Lega l dialogu e rarel y attract s t h e g e n e r a l p u b lic an y longer , n o r i s i t s u p p o s e d to , fo r t h e conventiona l form o f discours e addresse s o t h e r academics . W h a t juris p r u d e n c e ha s gaine d i n precision , i t ha s los t i n t e r m s o f it s target a u d i e n c e . Historians rel y frequentl y o n suc h categorie s a s hig h a n d lo w c u l t u r e t o explai n t h e n u a n c e s o f l e a r n e d a n d p o p u l a r beliefs . I n t h e contex t o f thi s distinction , j u r i s p r u d e n c e ha s b e c o m e t h e hig h c u l t u r e o f t h e lega l system , accessible t o fe w a n d b e y o n d t h e interes t o f mos t m e m b e r s of t h e bar . Lega l system s a r e describe d i n e x t e n d e d meta p h o r s t h a t ofte n invok e F r e n c h a n t h r o p o l o g y o r t h e lan g u a g e o f d e c o n s t r u c t i o n t o m a k e thei r point . I f a lega l system c a n n o t hav e post-somethin g i n it s analysis , t h e n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m u s t loo k fo r a n o t h e r for m o f sophisticate d language. F r o m Holmes' s us e o f t h e la w a s viewe d b y a b a d m a n t o H a r t ' s famou s utilizatio n o f t h e g u n m a n , o r even t o a fas t driver, 9 m e t a p h o r s a b o u t t h e la w hav e

Conclusion 213 a b o u n d e d . A d d i n enticin g w o r d s a n d p h r a s e s lik e bricolage10 a n d p a l m tre e justice, 1 1 a n d t h e hig h c u l t u r e o f j u r i s p r u d e n c e i s e x t e n d e d . T h e r e is , o f course , n o t h i n g u n t o w a r d a b o u t suc h theorizin g a s lon g a s it s theoretica l role i s full y recognized . W h a t m i g h t b e m a d e , fo r e x a m p l e , o f a fancifu l com parison o f a lega l syste m t o t h e scen e a t a Britis h footbal l match i n t h e P r e m i e r Division ? Becaus e t h e spectator s would o u t n u m b e r t h e participants , thi s woul d surel y ac c o u n t fo r t h e truis m tha t mos t citizen s rarel y b e c o m e en twined i n t h e intricacie s o f t h e lega l system . Mos t individu als s p e n d thei r live s i n blissfu l isolatio n fro m t h e lega l system, n e v e r involve d b e y o n d a simpl e wil l o r t h e o d d traffic ticket . T h e referee , w h o c o m m a n d s habitua l obedi ence, i s aide d i n t h e exercis e o f a u t h o r i t y b y t h e linesmen . T h i s a u t h o r i t y i s discretionar y a n d no t t o b e applie d me chanically, fo r t h e us e o f t h e a d v a n t a g e rul e help s t o main tain m a t c h contro l a n d m a k e t h e pla y m o r e pleasin g t o t h e crowd . Seriou s crimina l behavio r merit s a s e n d i n g of f (or p e r h a p s s e n d i n g to , a s wit h prison) , b u t statu s offense s may b e overlooked , a s i n t h e cas e o f t h e four-ste p r u l e o n t h e p a r t o f t h e g o a l k e e p e r . Socce r i s g o v e r n e d b y rules , seventeen i n all , r a t h e r sli m w h e n c o m p a r e d t o t h e thic k rulebooks fo r o t h e r sports . M a n y scholar s i n t h e twentiet h century, includin g H a r t , hav e p u t rule s a t t h e c e n t e r o f a legal system . T h e footbal l m e t a p h o r m i g h t i n som e smal l way h e l p t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e crimina l law , b u t surel y i s o f little h e l p i n civi l matters . T h a t thi s m e t a p h o r i s inexac t may b e readil y c o n c e d e d , b u t t h e us e o f m e t a p h o r i c a l l a n g u a g e t o describ e wha t individual s e x p e r i e n c e directl y m u s t surel y fai l a s a m a t t e r o f logic . Academi c fascinatio n

214 Conclusion with lega l theor y perpetuate s th e divisio n tha t ha s arise n between publi c an d academi c discourse . Wherea s prac titioners carr y o n th e dail y toi l o f th e law , secur e i n a distinctive cultur e o f thei r own , jurists contemplat e issue s that seemingl y hav e littl e connectio n wit h th e practica l world o f th e law . Speculatio n abou t la w an d lega l theor y has cease d t o for m a par t o f genera l intellectua l cultur e and i s usuall y restricte d t o a smal l coteri e o f academi c specialists. Som e individual s ma y mov e betwee n bot h worlds, a s di d th e Victoria n jurist Si r Frederic k Polloc k o r the contemporar y Richar d Posner , bu t thi s facilit y ha s become a rarity. T h e specializatio n o f lega l philosoph y ha s acquired th e statu s o f hig h culture , a s hav e man y othe r academic disciplines , an d i n th e proces s ha s faile d t o com municate it s idea s t o thos e outsid e it s ow n caste. 12 It ma y b e th e case , o f course , tha t jurisprudenc e i n its moder n for m shoul d concer n onl y th e few , tha t it s appropriate rol e encompasse s onl y thos e philosophica l is sues tha t practitioner s rarel y hav e th e opportunit y t o pon der. If , however , th e en d resul t o f suc h musing s assert s that "th e essenc e o f la w i s tha t i t ha s n o essence," 1 3 thos e outside th e academ y ma y wel l wonde r abou t th e purpose s of jurisprudence . Thi s narro w conceptio n o f jurispru dence's plac e withi n th e boundarie s o f academi c cultur e has triumphe d a t th e expens e o f it s previou s rol e a s a primary sourc e o f socia l commentary . Wha t Watso n ha s termed th e "failur e o f th e lega l imagination " ha s robbe d English jurisprudence o f tha t vita l dedicatio n t o educatin g the publi c tha t produce d Blackston e an d Bentha m a s wel l as Austi n an d Maine. 1 4 Fo r th e centur y afte r Blackstone , jurisprudence enjoye d a primar y plac e i n Englis h intellec -

Conclusion 215 tual life : "O n th e fac e o f it , onl y politica l econom y coul d seem t o riva l jurisprudenc e a s a n establishe d 'mora l sci ence' b y th e middl e o f th e nineteent h century , and , mor e broadly, n o othe r for m o f enquir y reste d u p o n s o en trenched an d powerfu l a basi s a s tha t provide d b y th e social an d intellectua l positio n o f th e law." 15 Sinc e th e 1880s, i n th e nam e o f intensiv e lega l analysis , Englis h jurisprudence ha s define d itsel f i n suc h a narro w fashio n that eve n th e wor k o f Har t di d no t provid e a fres h start . With th e en d o f hi s career , academi c la w i n Englan d stands a t a crossroads ; onl y a restoratio n o f th e idea l o f jurisprudence a s a stud y o f th e plac e o f la w i n Englis h society wil l provid e a catalys t fo r a retur n t o it s forme r glory.

Notes

Notes to Chapter One 1. Alber t Ven n Dice y to Oliver Wendel l Holmes , 1 9 January 1880 , Oliver Wendel l Holme s Papers , Harvar d La w Schoo l Library , Cam bridge, Mass. 2. Morto n J. Horwitz , "History and Theory," 1825 . 3. Alber t Venn Dicey , "Jurisprudence," 382 . 4. A . L. Goodhart, English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law, 12. 5. Raymon d Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 39 . 6. Knu d Haakonssen , The Science of a Legislator, 1—2 . 7. Nei l MacCormick, H. L. A. Hart, 1. 8. Richar d Posner , The Problems of Jurisprudence,xi . 9. A . W. B. Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History, 307 . 10. Richar d Burdo n Haldane , "Higher Nationality : A Study in Law and Ethics, " 401-2. 11. W . Durna n t o Le o Maxse , 1 4 December 1909 , Le o Maxs e Pa pers, West Sussex County Recor d Office , Chichester , U.K . 12. Recen t exception s t o thi s generalizatio n includ e Davi d Lieber man, The Province of Legislation Determined, an d Michae l Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence, 1760—1850. 13. Willia m Twining, "Academic Law and Lega l Philosophy," 556. 14. Geoffre y Samuel , "Science, Law and History, " 1. 15. Harol d Perkin , The Rise of Professional Society, 395 . 16. Ala n Watson, The Evolution of Law,117—9. 17. Ala n Watson, "Legal Change," 1134 .

277

218 Notes

to Chapter One

18. A . W. B. Simpson, "Legal Education an d Lega l History," 111 . 19. Si r Frederick Pollock , "The Methods of Jurisprudence," 38 . 20. Davi d Millon, "Positivism in the Historiography of the Common Law," 670. 21. Si r Frederick Pollock , English Opportunities and Duties, 30 . 22. Rober t S . Summers , Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, 268. 23. Perkin , The Rise of Professional Society, 395—96 . 24. Horwitz , "History and Theory," 1835 . 25. Roge r Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence,22 . Notes to Chapter Two 1. Joh n U . Lewis, "Blackstone's Definition o f Law," 336. 2. Michae l Lobban, "Blackstone and th e Science of Law," 312. 3. Davi d Lockmiller, Sir William Blackstone, 5-28 . 4. J . L. Barton, "Legal Studies," 601. 5. Luc y S. Sutherland, "Willia m Blackston e and th e Legal Chairs at Oxford," 230 . 6. Garet h Jones, "Introduction," xix. 7. H . G. Hanbury, "Blackstone as a Judge," 27. 8. Denni s R. Nolan, "Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic," 731-68. 9. A . V. Dicey, "Blackstone's Commentaries," 674. 10. Ibid. , 307. 11. Olive r Wendell Holme s t o Harold Laski , 1 June 1922 , in Mar k DeWolfe Howe , ed., Holmes-Laski Letters, I , 329. 12. Si r Willia m S . Holdsworth , "Som e Aspect s o f Blackston e an d His Commentaries," 284 . 13. S . F . C . Milsom , "Th e Natur e o f Blackstone' s Achievement, " especially 12 . 14. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850, 18 . 15. Joh n N . Finnis, "Blackstone's Theoretical Intentions, " 163—64 . 16. Se e Daniel Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law, 50. 17. Si r Willia m Blackstone , Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1,41. 18. Ibid. , I, 42. 19. Ibid. , 1,44 . 20. Ibid. , 1,46 .

Notes to Chapter Two 219 21. Pau l Lucas, "Ex Parte Sir William Blackstone," 158 . 22. Donal d R . Kelley, The Human Measure, 183 . 23. Blackstone , Commentaries, I , 49. 24. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850, 29 . 25. Blackstone , Commentaries, I , 49. 26. Rober t P . Burns, "Blackstone' s Theor y o f th e 'Absolute' Right s of Property," 84. 27. Josep h W . McKnight, "Blackstone, Quasi-Jurisprudent," 402 . 28. Lieberman , The Province of Legislation Determined, 45 . 29. Boorstin , Mysterious Science of the Law, 121. 30. Finnis , "Blackstone's Theoretical Intentions, " 163-83 . 31. Lewis , "Blackstone' s Definitio n o f Law, " 347 . Emphasi s i n th e original. 32. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850, 12 . 33. Lobban , "Blackstone and th e Science of Law," 321. 34. Lieberman , The Province of Legislation Determined, 35 . 35. H . T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property, 141 . 36. Ruper t Cross , "The Firs t Two Vinerian Professors, " 613 . 37. Si r William Blackstone, A Discourse on the Study of the Law, 205. 38. Ibid. , 205-6. 39. Lieberman , The Province of Legislation Determined, 63 . 40. Davi d Lieberman, "Blackstone' s Science of Legislation," 141 . 41. Anton-Herma n Chroust , "Blackstone Revisited," 28. 42. Jerem y Bentham , A Fragment on Government, 407. 43. Chroust , "Blackstone Revisited," 34. 44. Boorstin , Mysterious Science of the Law, 187—88. 45. Dunca n Kennedy , "Th e Structur e o f Blackstone' s Commentar ies," 211. 46. Ibid. , 217. 47. Ibid. , 255. 48. H . L. A. Hart, "Blackstone's Use of the Law of Nature," 169 . 49. Cross , "The Firs t Two Vinerian Professors, " 617 . 50. H . G. Hanbury, The Vinerian Chair and Legal Education, 37 . 51. J . C. D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832, 204 . 52. Lockmiller , Blackstone, 167 . 53. I . G. Philip, William Blackstone and the Refor.i of the Oxford University Press, passim . 54. Ala n Watson , "Th e Structur e o f Blackstone' s Commentaries, " 795.

220 Notes

to Chapter Two

55. Joh n W . Cairns , "Blackstone , a n Englis h Institutist, " 351 . Em phasis in the original. 56. Se e Watson , "Th e Structur e o f Blackstone' s Commentaries, " 802, n. 29, where other defects i n Kennedy's article were enumerated . 57. Rober t Willman , "Blackston e an d th e 'Theoretica l Perfection ' of English La w in the Reign of Charles II," 68-69 . 58. Joh n W . Cairns, "Blackstone , th e Ancient Constitution an d th e Feudal Law," 717. 59. A . W. B. Simpson, Legal Theory and Legal History, 296 . 60. Cairns , "Blackstone, an English Institutist, " 321. 61. Ibid. , 357. 62. R . J. Smith, The Gothic Bequest, 91 . 63. Kendal l L . Vick , "Si r Willia m Blackstone' s Commentarie s o n the Laws of England," 79. 64. Cairns , "Blackstone, an English Institutist, " 353. 65. I . G . Doolittle , "Si r Willia m Blackston e an d Hi s Commentaries," 101. 66. Blackstone , A Discourse on the Study of Law, 220. 67. Watson , "Th e Structur e o f Blackstone' s Commentaries, " 810 ; see also H. G. Hanbury, "Blackstone in Retrospect," 321. 68. Pau l Lucas , "Blackston e an d th e Refor m o f th e Lega l Profes sion," 460. 69. J . C . D. Clark, Revolution and Rebellion and English Society 1688— 1832. 70. Clark , English Society 1688-1832, ix-x . 71. Se e Joann a Innes , "Jonatha n Clark , Socia l Histor y an d En gland's 'Ancien Regime', " 165-200 ; an d th e reply, J. C . D. Clark, "O n Hitting the Buffers," 195-207 . See also the fall 198 9 number of Albion: James E . Bradley , "Th e Anglica n Pulpit , th e Socia l Order , an d th e Resurgence o f Toryism durin g th e America n Revolution, " 361-88 ; John Money , "Provincialis m an d th e Englis h 'Ancie n Regime, ' " 389 425; John A . Phillips, "The Social Calculus," 426-49; and the response by Clark, "England's Ancien Regime as a Confessional State, " 450-74. 72. Julia n S . Waterman, "Mansfiel d an d Blackstone' s Commentar ies," 558. 73. Ibid. , 557. 74. Lind a Colley , Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, a t p . 52 , where th e autho r comment s o n th e rol e playe d b y Parliamen t a s a primary institutional element of the new British nation .

Notes to Chapter Three 221 75. Willia m Twining, Theories of Evidence, vii . 76. Lieberman , The Province of Legislation Determined, 31 . 77. Barton , "Legal Studies," p. 603. 78. Lieberman , "Blackstone' s Science of Legislation," 118 . Notes to Chapter Three 1. H . L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham, 17—18 . 2. Richar d Posner , "Blackston e an d Bentham, " 570 ; se e als o Lob ban, "Blackstone and th e Science of Law," 312. 3. Si r William Holdsworth , "Gibbon, Blackstone and Bentham, " 52. 4. Bentham , A Fragment on Government, 394 , 413. 5. Shirle y Letwin, The Pursuit of Certainty, 131 . 6. Marti n Wiener, "The Unlove d State, " 298. 7. Jane t Semple, Bentham's Prison, especiall y 152-55 . 8. Fo r example , "Th e Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation afte r man y delay s appeare d i n 1789 . I t di d not , however , attract publi c attention t o any great extent." Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, 75 . 9. Chroust , "Blackstone Revisited," 34. 10. Bentham , A Fragment on Government, 498 . 11. Ibid. , 441. 12. Jerem y Bentham , A Comment on the Commentaries, 200 . 13. Posner , "Blackstone and Bentham, " 596. 14. Bentham , A Comment on the Commentaries, 11 . 15. Hanbury , The Vinerian Chair and Legal Education, 23 . 16. Lieberman , The Province of Legislation Determined, 286—87 . 17. Bentham , A Fragment on Government, 433 . 18. Gertrud e Himmelfarb , "Bentha m versu s Blackstone," 99. Bentham took the phrase "everything is now as it should be" and applied it to Blackstone's general attitude; it referred onl y to the law of heresy . 19. Hart , Essays on Bentham, 10 . 20. Twining , Theories of Evidence, 62 . 21. M . H. James, "Bentham an d th e Individuation o f Laws," 359. 22. Jame s E. Crimmins, Secular Utilitarianism, 46 . 23. Thoma s Home , Property Rights and Poverty, 146 . 24. Letwin , The Pursuit of Certainty, 155 . 25. Willia m Thomas, The Philosophic Radicals, 146 . 26. Semple , Bentham's Prison, 14 .

222 Notes

to Chapter Three

27. Home , Property Rights and Poverty, 160 . 28. Thomas , The Philosophic Radicals, 23 . 29. Lieberman , "Blackstone's Science of Legislation," 149 . 30. Himmelfarb , "Bentha m versu s Blackstone," 101-3 . 31. Joh n V . Orth, "Jeremy Bentham, " 715. 32. Gerald Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 313 . 33. L . J. Hume , Bentham and Bureaucracy, 57 . 34. Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 160 . Emphasis in the original. 35. Dougla s Long, Bentham on Liberty, 92 . 36. Crimmins , Secular Utilitarianism, 23 . 37. Halevy , The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, 6 . 38. Long , Bentham on Liberty, 164 . 39. Kelley , The Human Measure, 225 . 40. Jame s Steintrager, Bentham, 12 . 41. Letwin , The Pursuit of Certainty, 5 . 42. Phili p Schofield , "Jerem y Bentha m an d Nineteenth-Centur y English Jurisprudence," 58 . 43. Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 167 . 44. D . J. Manning , The Mind of JeremyBentham, 5 . 45. Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 295 . 46. Bentham , A Fragment on Government, 416, 446-48, 482, 491. 47. Bentham , A Comment on the Commentaries, 27—28 . 48. Jerem y Bentham , Of Laws in General, 32 . 49. Jerem y Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1 . 50. Ibid. , 3. 51. Ibid . 52. Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 403. 53. Ibid. , 441. Emphasis in the original. 54. Marti n J. Packer, "Hermeneutic Inquir y in the Study of Huma n Conduct," 1085 . 55. Marti n Sicker , "Jerem y Bentha m o n La w and Jurisprudence, " 282. 56. Semple , Bentham's Prison, 62 . 57. Pau l Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice, 19 . 58. Joh n R . Dinwiddy, Bentham, 21 . Emphasis in the original. 59. Joh n Plamenatz , The English Utilitarians, 168 . 60. Lieberman , The Province of Legislation Determined, 231 .

Notes to Chapter Three 223 61. Letwin , The Pursuit of Certainty, 173 . 62. Posner , "Blackstone and Bentham, " 600. 63. A.J . M. Milne, "Bentham's Principle of Utility and Legal Philosophy," 285. 64. Gertrud e Himmelfarb , "O n Reading Bentham Seriously, " 180 . 65. Ruper t Cross , "Blackston e v . Bentham, " 527 ; se e als o Si r William S. Holdsworth, "Blackstone, " 239. 66. Himmelfarb , "Bentha m versus Blackstone," 109 . 67. Thomas , The Philosophic Radicals, 452—53 . 68. Manning , The Mind of JeremyBentham, 111 . 69. Richar d A. Cosgrove, The Rule of Law, 181-90. 70. P . S . Atiya h an d Rober t S . Summers , Form and Substance in A nglo-A merican Law, 223. 71. H . L. A. Hart, "Bentham and the Demystificaiton o f the Law," 4. 72. Atiya h an d Summers , Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law, 244. 73. Davi d Lyons , In the Interest of the Governed, vii . 74. H . L . A. Hart, "Bentha m o n Lega l Powers, " 806 . 75. Semple , Bentham's Prison, 247 . 76. Gertrud e Himmelfarb , "Th e Haunte d Hous e o f Jeremy Ben tham," 78 . 77. H . L. A. Hart, "Introduction, " 1-16 . 78. J . H . Burns , "Bentha m o n Sovereignty, " 404—5. 79. Frederic k Rosen , Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy, 44. 80. Plamenatz , The English Utilitarians, 65 . 81. Ros s Harrison, Bentham, 24 . 82. Bentham , A Comment on the Commentaries, 58 . 83. Hart , "Bentha m an d th e Demystificatio n o f th e Law, " 7. 84. Lieberman , The Province of Legislation Determined, 219 . 85. Joh n R . Dinwiddy , "Bentham' s Transitio n t o Politica l Radical ism, 1809-10, " 688 . 86. Dinwiddy , Bentham, 59 . 87. Letwin , The Pursuit of Certainty, 177 . 88. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850, 222 . 89. H . L . A . Hart , "Bentha m an d th e Unite d State s o f America, " 547. 90. Atiya h an d Summers , Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law, 242.

224 Notes

to Chapter Four

91. Lyons , In the Interest of the Governed, 1 . 92. Dinwiddy , Bentham, 56 . Emphasis i n th e original . 93. Shirle y Letwin , "Justice , Authority an d Jurisprudence," 412 . 94. Ibid . 95. H . F . Jolowicz, Lectures on Jurisprudence, 101 . 96. Milne , "Bentham' s Principl e o f Utilit y an d Lega l Philosophy, " 275. 97. Sicker , "Bentha m o n La w and Jurisprudence," 284 . 98. Letwin , The Pursuit of Certainty, 142 . 99. H . G. Jolowicz, "Wa s Bentham a Lawyer?" 11-12 . 100. Dinwiddy , Bentham, 117 . 101. S . E . Finer , "Th e Transmissio n o f Benthamit e Idea s 1820 — 1850," 11-32 . 102. Thomas , The Philosophic Radicals, 447 . 103. Hele n Beynon , "Might y Bentham, " 69 . 104. Anthon y Brundage , England's "Prussian Minister," 2-3. 105. Stephe n Conway , "Bentha m an d th e Nineteenth-Centur y Revolution i n Government, " 72 : "Th e primar y ai m o f thi s essa y i s to argue th e cas e fo r considerin g th e idea s o f Jerem y Bentha m a s a n important influence. " 106. Twining , "Academi c La w and Lega l Philosophy, " 559 . 107. Schofield , "Jerem y Bentha m an d Nineteenth-Centur y Englis h Jurisprudence," 85 . 108. Hart , Essays on Bentham, 108; se e als o Lyons , In the Interest of the Governed, 1 , 107 ; and Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 327 . 109. W . Friedmann, "Bentha m an d Moder n Lega l Thought," 234 . 110. Frederic k Rosen , "Th e Origi n o f Libera l Utilitarianism, " 61 . Notes to Chapter Four 1. R . C. van Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors, 99 . 2. Se e W . L . Morison , John Austin (1982) ; Pohlman , Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Utilitarian Jurisprudence (1984) ; Lott e an d Josep h Hamburger, Troubled Lives (1985); Wilfri d E . Rumble , The Thought of John Austin (1985); Robert N. Moles, Definition and Theory in Legal Theory (1987); and Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850 (1991). 3. Lott e and Joseph Hamburger , Contemplating Adultery, 32-33 .

Notes to Chapter Four 225 4. Quote d i n ibid., 48. 5. Fo r th e importanc e o f thi s Germa n sojourn , se e th e recen t dis cussion i n Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850, 227-34. 6. Va n Caenegem, Judges, Legislators and Professors, 99 . 7. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Contemplating Adultery, 47 . 8. Lesli e Stephen , The English Utilitarians, III , 318 . Abou t th e fail ure o f th e lecture r an d th e lectures , on e audito r wrote : "Hi s privat e conversation wa s as overbearing an d ill-tempere d a s were hi s lectures . He seemed t o say: 'If you don't agree with me, you must be the biggest fool tha t eve r was. ' " The studen t an d ol d reporte r wa s Richard Davi s Craig. See Courtney Kenny , "What an Old Reporte r Told Me, " 355. 9. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Troubled Lives, 61 . 10. Si r William S. Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law, 256. 11. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Troubled Lives, x . 12. Wilfri d E . Rumble , "Nineteent h Centur y Perception s o f Joh n Austin: A Study o f th e Review s o f The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 1832-1865," pape r presente d a t the Pacifi c Coas t Branc h meet ing of the American Historica l Association, Hawaii , August 1991 . 13. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Contemplating Adultery, 65 . 14. Joh n Austin , Lectures on Jurisprudence,IV—V . 15. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Contemplating Adultery, 55 . 16. Joh n Austin , The Province of JurisprudenceDetermined, 9 . 17. Jolowicz , Lectures on Jurisprudence, 3 . 18. Rumble , The Thought of John Austin, 1. 19. Austin , The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 104 . 20. Joh n V . Orth, "Castin g the Priests Out of the Temple," 239 . I n Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850, Lobba n ha s argue d (at 246) that Austi n o n utilit y was irrelevant t o Austin's jurisprudence, "for the y show fundamentally differen t methodologie s and attitudes to the tas k h e wa s engage d in. " Thi s conclusio n abou t wha t Austi n in tended ignore s th e considerabl e spac e Austi n devote d t o utilit y an d how he attempted, originally at least, to make the principle of utility as much a foundation o f hi s jurisprudence a s Bentham ha d don e fo r hi s work. See also S. E. Stumpf, "Austin' s Theory of the Separation o f Law and Morals, " 148 . 21. Austin , The Province of JurisprudenceDetermined, 113 . 22. Ibid. , 13 . 23. Ibid. , 143 .

226 Notes

to Chapter Four

24. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Troubled Lives, 182 . 25. Morison, John Austin, 6S. 26. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Troubled Lives, 191 . 27. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850, 223 . 28. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Troubled Lives, 10 . 29. Rumble , The Thought of JohnAustin, 16. 30. Wilfri d E . Rumble, "Divin e Law, Utilitarian Ethics , and Positiv ist Jurisprudence," 147 . 31. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Troubled Lives, 170 . 32. Rumble , "Divine Law, Utilitarian Ethics , and Positivis t Jurisprudence," 147 . 33. Lobban , "Blackston e an d th e Scienc e o f Law, " 335 ; Vick , "Si r William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England," 88. 34. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850, 225-26. 35. Morison , John Austin, 141. 36. W . L. Morison, "Some Myth about Positivism, " 230. 37. Wilfri d E . Rumble , "Th e Lega l Positivis m o f Joh n Austin, " 1004. 38. Stumpf , "Austin' s Theor y o f th e Separatio n o f La w an d Mor als," 120. 39. Joh n Stuar t Mill , "Austin on Jurisprudence," 439, 445. 40. Harrison , "The English School of Jurisprudence," 478 . 41. Si r Frederick Pollock , "Law and Command," 191 . 42. Rumble , "Divine Law, Utilitarian Ethics , and Positivis t Jurisprudence," 173 . 43. Geoffre y Marshall , Constitutional Theory, 6 . 44. Hart , Essays on Bentham, 222-23 . 45. Harrison , "The English School of Jurisprudence," 492 . 46. Rumble , "Divine Law, Utilitarian Ethics , and Positivis t Jurisprudence," 180 . 47. Se e Dinwiddy , "Bentham' s Transitio n t o Politica l Radicalism , 1809-10," 683-700. 48. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760—1850, 14 . 49. Eir a Ruben, "John Austin's Political Pamphlets 1824-1859, " 38. 50. Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 327—28 ; se e also Stefa n Collini , Public Moralists, 260 : "A s Sarah Austi n recalle d o f her husband' s relation s wit h Bentham : 'M y husban d use d vainl y t o

Notes to Chapter Four 227 represent t o him tha t th e ignorance and wrongheadednes s o f the peo ple were fully a s dangerous t o good governmen t a s the "sinister inter ests" of the governing classes.' " 51. Hamburge r an d Hamburger , Troubled Lives, 181. 52. Rumble , The Thought ofJohn Austin, 193. 53. Stumpf , "Austin' s Theor y o f th e Separatio n o f La w an d Mor als," 145 . 54. Sheldo n Amos , The Science of Law, 4. 55. Si r Frederick Pollock , A First Book of Jurisprudence,33 . 56. R . M. Pankhurst, "The Study of Jurisprudence," 749 . 57. B . R. Wise, Outlines of Jurisprudence,5 . 58. Richar d A . Cosgrove , "Th e Receptio n o f Analyti c Jurispru dence," 55-56. 59. Schofield , "Jerem y Bentha m an d Nineteenth-Centur y Englis h Jurisprudence," 65 . 60. Rober t N . Moles, "Law and Morality—Ho w t o Do Things wit h Confusion," 29 . 61. Wilfri d E . Rumble, "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics," 144 . 62. Raymon d Cocks , Foundations of the Modern Bar, 49. 63. Collini , Public Moralists, 259 . Collin i doe s no t includ e Austi n among hi s public moralists: "H e did no t attemp t t o present hi s special study a s bearin g directl y upo n th e absorbin g cultura l an d politica l issues o f th e day , no r di d h e deplo y an y o f th e seductiv e art s o f th e reviewer an d essayist. " Th e wor d "directly " i s operative her e becaus e Austin's purpose wa s certainly t o address fundamenta l socia l questions through jurisprudence. 64. Joh n M . Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory, 314 . 65. Joh n E . Stannard, "A Tale of Four Codes," 293. 66. Atiya h an d Summers , Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law, 404 . 67. Orth , "Casting the Priests Out of the Temple," 236. 68. Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 330 . 69. Lobban , Common Law and English Jurisprudence 1760-1850, 223 . 70. F . H . Lawson , The Oxford Law School 1850-1965, 214 ; se e als o Stefan Collini , Donal d Winch , and John W . Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics, 341 : Austi n "ha d examinatio n greatnes s thrus t upo n hi m retrospectively a s a resul t o f th e growt h o f lega l educatio n and , no t

228 Notes

to Chapter Five

altogether paradoxically , a s a result of having been taken a s the repre sentative of the ancien regime by Maine when launching his methodological revolution." I n addition, see Collini, Public Moralists, 258 , 267. 71. Cosgrove , "The Receptio n of Analytic Jurisprudence," 49 . 72. W . W. Buckland, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence, 2 . 73. Frederi c W . Maitlan d t o Si r Frederic k Pollock , 4 Decembe r 1899, in C. H. S. Fifoot, ed., The Letters of Frederic William Maitland, 253 . 74. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 133. 75. Davi d Sugarman, "'A Hatred o f Disorder,' " 46. 76. Alber t Ven n Dicey , Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities?, 26 . 77. Si r William Markby , "Analytical Jurisprudence," 618, 628-29 . 78. Pollock , A First Book of Jurisprudence,29 . 79. Watson , The Evolution of Law, 57-58; an d "Th e Evolutio n o f Law: Continued," 560 : "Customar y system s of la w are ver y muc h dis guised t o borrow fro m a mature, detailed syste m in writing even when the latte r i s constructed o n ver y differen t line s an d wa s credite d fo r very different social , economic and politica l conditions. " 80. Si r Frederick Pollock , Oxford Lectures, 17 . 81. Morison, John Austin, 136. 82. C . H. S. Fifoot, Pollock and Maitland, 13 . 83. Morison , John Austin, 147. 84. Twining , "Academi c La w and Lega l Philosophy, " 558 . See also Sugarman, " 'A Hatre d o f Disorder, ' " 46 : "Wha t happene d t o Ben tham wa s also to befall Austin . Frien d an d fo e alik e tended t o narro w his ideas." 85. Morison , John A ustin, 178. 86. Rumble , The Thought of JohnAustin, 220 . Notes to Chapter Five 1. Rumble , "John Austin and Hi s Nineteenth Centur y Critics," 129 . 2. Kennet h E . Bock, "Comparison o f Histories," 232. 3. Georg e Feaver , From Status to Contract, 27 . 4. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 2 . 5. Rumble , "John Austin and Hi s Nineteenth Centur y Critics," 133 . 6. Collini , Winch, and Burrow , That Noble Science of Politics, 210 . 7. Si r Paul Vinogradoff, "Th e Teaching of Sir Henry Maine, " 121 .

Notes to Chapter Five 229 8. Bock , "Comparison o f Histories," 237. 9. S . G. Utz, "Maine's Ancient Law and Lega l Theory," 848. See also 827, 848, 850. 10. Feaver , From Status to Contract, 45. 11. Pete r Stein, Legal Evolution, 122 . 12. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 102, 111 . 13. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 119. 14. Thes e othe r work s were: Village Communities (1871) ; Lectures on the Early History of Institutions (1875) ; Dissertations on Early Law and Custom (1883); and Popular Government (1885). 15. Si r Henry Maine , Ancient Law, 165-70. 16. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 60—61 . 17. Stein , Legal Evolution, 87 . 18. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 122. 19. Georg e Feaver, "Victorian Value s of Maine," 37. 20. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 149. 21. Kelley , The Human Measure, 266 . 22. Maine , Ancient Law, 183. 23. Collini , Public Moralists, 272 . 24. Joh n W . Burrow, Evolution and Society, 11 . 25. Collini , Winch, and Burrow , That Noble Science of Politics, 209 . 26. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 203; Stein , Legal Evolution, 91 , pointe d out that Maine' s own comparisons "were limited." 27. Feaver , From Status to Contract ,153. 28. Burrow , Evolution and Society, 155 . 29. Collini , Winch, and Burrow , That Noble Science of Politics, 211 . 30. Pollock , English Opportunities and Duties in the Historical and Comparative Study of Law, 7-8; "Si r Henr y Main e and Hi s Work," 270-71 ; and "Si r Henry Main e as a Jurist," 104 . 31. Pollock , "Maine and Hi s Work," 271. 32. Collini , Winch, and Burrow , That Noble Science of Politics, 214 . 33. Jame s Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, II , 619. 34. Si r Willia m Holdsworth , The Historians of Anglo-American Law, 81. 35. Collini , Winch, and Burrow , That Noble Science of Politics, 210 . 36. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 84. 37. Maine , Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, 368 .

230 Notes

to Chapter Five

38. Feaver , From Status to Contract, 61 . 39. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 137. 40. Stein , Legal Evolution, 122 . 41. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 64 . 42. Si r Henr y Maine , "Th e Conceptio n o f Sovereignt y an d It s Im portance in International Law," 26-45. 43. Bock , "Comparison of Histories," 239-40 . 44. Feaver , From Status to Contract, 27 . 45. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 122. 46. Maine , Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, 51 . 47. Maine , Ancient Law, 73. 48. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 73-75. 49. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 122-23, an d Collini , Public Moralists, 273 . Main e resemble d Bentha m and Austi n i n th e wa y h e embrace d mora l argument s eve n a s h e denounced the m i n theory . Collin i especiall y emphasize s th e mora l qualities that Main e used to explain th e history of progressive societies. 50. Joh n W . Burrow , "Henr y Main e an d Mid-Victoria n Idea s o f Progress," 56-57. 51. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 14-19. 52. Stein , Legal Evolution, 88 . 53. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 129. 54. Maine , Popular Government, 171 . 55. Ibid. , 77. 56. N . Pilling , "Th e Conservatis m o f Si r Henr y Maine, " 111 ; Maine, Popular Government, 157—58 . 57. Georg e Feaver , "Th e Politica l Attitude s o f Si r Henr y Maine, " 300-301; Collini , Public Moralists, 272 . 58. Maine , Popular Government, 92 . 59. Hug h Tulloch,/am£5 Bryce's American Commonwealth, 116 . 60. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 11. 61. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 120-21. 62. Burrow , Evolution and Society, 164 . 63. Raymon d Cocks , "Maine, Progress and Theory," 72. 64. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 210 ; Collini, Public Moralists, 274 . 65. Bria n Smith, "Maine's Concept of Progress," 412.

Notes to Chapter Six 231 66. Feaver , From Status to Contract, 153 . 67. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 53. Fo r othe r evidenc e abou t Maine' s projected audience , see also 2, 4, 37, 62-63, 76 , 108 , 120 , and 210-13 . 68. Collini , Public Moralists, 276-77 . 69. Burrow , "Maine and Mid-Victoria n Idea s of Progress," 63. 70. Si r Frederick Polloc k to Frederick Maitland , 28 December 190 0 and 2 6 October 1902 , Frederic k Maitlan d Papers , Cambridg e Univer sity Library, Cambridge, England . 71. Maitlan d t o Pollock , 2 1 January 1901 , i n Fifoot , ed. , Letters of Maitland, 222 ; se e als o Richar d A . Cosgrove , Our Lady the Common Law, 169. 72. Holme s t o Pollock, 4 March 1888 , in Howe , ed., Holmes-Pollock Letters, II , 31. 73. Pollock , "Sir Henry Main e and Hi s Work," 271. 74. Rumble , "Joh n Austi n an d Hi s Nineteent h Centur y Critics, " 148. 75. Cocks , Sir Henry Maine, 146. 76. Willia m Twining, "Main e and Lega l Education," 215. 77. Feaver , "Victorian Value s of Maine," 41. 78. Cocks , "Maine, Progress and Theory, " 75. 79. Quotatio n fro m Jame s Fitzjame s Stephe n cite d i n Rumble , "John Austi n and Hi s Nineteenth Centur y Critics, " 148 . 80. Se e Cocks, Sir Henry Maine, 101-2, 111 , 119. Notes to Chapter Six 1. J . L . Brierly, "Sir Thomas Erskine Holland," 476. 2. Lawson , The Oxford Law School, 1850-1965, 75 . See also R. F. V. Heuston, Essays on Constitutional Law, 4—5. 3. Brierly , "Holland," 477. 4. Jame s Bryc e t o A . V . Dicey, 2 8 January 1917 , James Bryc e Pa pers, Bodleian Library , Oxford . 5. Dice y to Bryce, 24 June 1907 , Bryce Papers. 6. Dice y to Bryce, 1 6 January 1910 , Bryce Papers. 7. Bryc e to Dicey, 25 March 1918 , Bryce Papers . 8. Brierly , "Holland," 475. 9. Minut e book, Ol d Mortalit y Club , Ms . Top. Oxon . d. 242 , f . 42, Bodleian Library, Oxford . 10. Dice y to Bryce, 9 December 1884 , Bryce Papers .

232 Notes

to Chapter Six

11. Brierly , "Holland," 477. 12. Si r Thoma s Erskin e Hollan d t o Melvill e Madiso n Bigelow , 1 5 April 1898 , Melvill e Madiso n Bigelo w Papers , Bosto n Universit y Li brary, Boston, Mass. 13. Dice y to Bryce, 27 May 1902 , Bryce Papers. 14. Bryc e t o Holland , n.d. , 1910 , i n Si r Willia m S . Holdsworth , Professor Sir Thomas Erskine Holland 1835-1926, 3 . 15. Maria n Bryc e t o A . Lawrenc e Lowell , 1 3 April 1922 , A . Law rence Lowel l Papers , Harvar d Universit y Archives , Cambridge, Mass. ; Sir Frederick Pollock , "Our Jubilee," 6. 16. Si r William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, XI, 316. 17. Si r Thomas Erskine Holland, "Codification," 349 . 18. Ibid. , 372-76. 19. Ibid. , 347. 20. Schofield , "Jerem y Bentha m an d Nineteenth-Centur y Englis h Jurisprudence," 73 . 21. Si r Thomas Erskine Holland, Essays Upon the Form of the Law, 13. 22. Si r Thomas Erskine Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence,vii . 23. Ibid. , vi-vii. 24. Ibid. , vii. 25. Ibid. , viii. 26. Ibid. , 1. 27. Davi d Sugarman , "Lega l Theory , th e Commo n La w Min d an d the Making of the Textbook Tradition," 26. 28. Hollan d t o Holmes, 21 March 1888 , Holmes Papers . 29. Gregor y S . Alexander , "Th e Transformatio n o f Trust s a s a Legal Category , 1800-1914, " 306 . Th e emphasi s o n identificatio n o f basic principle s provide d th e "foundin g myth" o f academi c law , th e "noble dream" common t o academic disciplines that would justify thei r existence. Fo r a specifi c instanc e o f a foundin g myth , th e issu e o f objectivity i n historica l inquir y i n th e Unite d States , se e Peter Novick , That Noble Dream. 30. Holland , Elements of Jurisprudence,9 . 31. Ibid. , 12-13 . 32. Ibid. , 26. 33. Morison, John Austin, b. 34. Holland , Elements of Jurisprudence,41 . 35. Ibid. , 52. 36. Brierly , "Holland," 477.

Notes to Chapter Six 233 37. Si r Thomas Erskin e Holland , Lectures on International Law, 6 . 38. Holland , Elements of Jurisprudence, 386 . Emphasis in the original. 39. Ibid. , 135 . 40. Arthu r Tilley , "Professo r Holland' s 'Jurisprudence ' an d Codi fication," 51 . 41. Postema , Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 10 . 42. Lawson , Oxford Law School, lb. 43. Si r Frederick Pollock , History of the Science of Politics, 63 . 44. Si r Frederick Pollock , Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, 9 . 45. Lawson , Oxford Law School, 75 . 46. Goodhart , English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law, 42. 47. Pollock , Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, 7 ; se e als o James E . Herget, American Jurisprudence 1870—1970, 91 . 48. Lawson , Oxford Law School, 75 . 49. A . Pearce Higgins, "Sir Thomas Erskine Holland, " 471. 50. Holme s to Harold Laski , 4 January 1925 , in Howe , ed., HolmesLaski Letters, II , 692. 51. Cosgrove , "The Reception of Analytical Jurisprudence," 54—55. 52. Hollan d t o Holmes, 25 February 1897 , Holmes Papers . 53. R . B. M. Cotterrell, "English Conceptions of the Role of Theory in Legal Analysis," 689. 54. Morison , John Austin, 152. 55. Sugarman , "Legal Theory," 44. 56. CoUini, Public Moralists, 282 . 57. Sugarman , "Lega l Theory," 44. 58. Perkin , The Rise of Professional Society. 59. Fo r th e specific s o f thi s process, especially th e establishment o f an Honour s School in jurisprudence, se e Collini, Public Moralists, 267 . 60. Pete r R. H. Slee, Learning and Liberal Education, 87 . 61. Bria n Abel-Smit h an d Rober t Stevens , Lawyers and the Courts, 166. 62. Sheldo n Rothblatt , The Revolution of the Dons, 227 ; Arthu r En gel, "Emerging Concepts of the Academic Profession a t Oxford 1800 — 1854," 322-28. 63. Thi s development als o had th e important consequenc e of making th e stat e "th e chie f employe r o f intellectuals , especiall y throug h institutions o f highe r learning. " Se e Collini , Public Moralists, 37 ; an d T. R. Gourvish, "The Rise of the Professions," 13-35 . 64. Arthu r Engel , From Clergyman to Don, 271 .

234 Notes

to Chapter Six

65. Thoma s W. Heyck, The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian England, 183. 66. Sheldo n Rothblatt , Tradition and Change in English Liberal Education, 168. 67. Engel , From Clergyman to Don, 265 . 68. Ibid. , 272. 69. Cosgrove , Our Lady the Common Law, 28-33. 70. Richar d L . Abel, "The Rise of Professionalism," 87 . 71. Rothblatt , Revolution of the Dons, 175 . 72. Abel , "The Ris e of Professionalism," 87 . 73. Learne d journals led the list of professional criteri a for academ ics—later cam e suc h measure s a s "associations , standardize d trainin g in esoteri c skills , leading t o certification an d controlle d acces s to prac tice, heightened status , autonomy." Se e Novick, That Noble Dream, 47 48. 74. Simpson , Legal Theory and Legal History, 303 . Pollock wrot e tha t the law was "still sadly lacking in instruments both of exposition and of criticism." Se e "Our Jubilee," 5 . Bryce ha d writte n t o Holme s i n 187 9 that "n o respectabl e magazin e devote d t o jurisprudence o f la w can b e kept alive. " Bryc e t o Holmes , 2 6 July 1879 , Holme s Papers . Se e als o Richard A. Cosgrove, "Victorian Lega l Periodicals," 21—25, and "Law, " 11-21. 75. Collin i ha s liste d th e debu t o f learne d journals t o illustrate th e appearance o f moder n academi c discipline s i n England : Mind, 1876 ; Law Quarterly Review, 1884; English Historical Review, 1886; Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1887 ; Classical Review, 1887; an d th e Economic Journal, 1891 . Collin i als o conclude d tha t "th e establishmen t o f suc h specialized publication s usuall y reflected (perhap s i t always does) what one migh t cal l 'suppl y push ' rathe r tha n 'deman d pull' : th e dynami c came fro m thos e wh o wishe d t o writ e i n a mor e specialize d idio m a t least as much as from thos e who wished to have such material to read." Collini, Public Moralists, 213 . 76. Luc y Markby , Memoirs of Sir William Markby, K.C.LE. By His Wife, 77 ; Holdsworth, Holland, 2 . 77. Pollock , "Our Jubilee," 6. 78. Nei l Duxbury , "Deconstruction , Histor y an d th e Use s of Lega l Theory," 167 . 79. Se e Phili p Abrams , The Origins of British Sociology, 1834—1914; Collini, Winch , an d Burrow , That Noble Science of Politics; Rosemar y

Notes to Chapter Six 235 Jann, The Art and Science of Victorian History; an d Georg e W . Stocking, Victorian Anthropology. 80. O n th e subjec t o f audience , Novic k ha s written : "Pre-profes sional wor k wa s directed outward , t o th e genera l readin g public . Pro fessional historica l wor k wa s increasingly , thoug h unlik e othe r disci plines, neve r exclusively , directe d t o colleagues. " Th e ne w cultur e o f academic la w soo n dispense d wit h th e attemp t t o reac h th e educate d public. 81. Anthon y Brundage , The People's Historian, 117 . 82. A . H . Halse y an d M . A . Trow , The British Academics, 362 ; se e also Philippa Levine , The Amateur and the Professional, 36 . 83. Cosgrove , Our Lady the Common Law, 2—5 . 84. Levine , The Amateur and the Professional, 59 . 85. Collini , Public Moralists, 268 . 86. Morison, John Austin, 151. 87. Dicey , Can English Law Be Taught at the Universities'? 88. P . S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 3 . 89. Cotterrell , "English Conceptions of the Role of Theory," 681. 90. Pete r Allen, "A Victorian Intellectua l Elite, " 122 . 91. Holdsworth , Holland, 3 . 92. Christophe r Harvie , The Lights of Liberalism, 213 . Reb a Soffe r has made the same point about the history curriculum a t the Oxbridg e universities. Althoug h th e methodolog y o f history , particularl y th e emphasis on archival research, was new, the purpose of inculcating the lessons o f histor y remaine d th e same : servic e t o natio n an d empire . See Reba N. Soffer, Discipline and Power, 118 . 93. Hollan d t o Holmes, 8 November 1891 , Holmes Papers . 94. Rober t Stevens, Law and Politics, 194 . 95. Pete r Scott, The Crisis of the University, 67 . 96. P . Goodrich , "Revie w o f Roge r Cotterrell , The Politics of Jurisprudence," 148 . 97. Scott , The Crisis of the University, 69 . 98. Atiyah , Pragmatism and Theory in English Law, 35. 99. Collini , Public Moralists, 306 . 100. Sugarman , "Legal Theory," 53. 101. Schofield , "Jerem y Bentha m an d Nineteenth-Centur y Englis h Jurisprudence," 74—75. 102. Kelley , The Human Measure, 278 .

236 Notes

to Chapter Seven Notes to Chapter Seven

1. Rosco e Poun d t o Feli x Frankfurter , 6 June 1922 , Feli x Frank furter Papers , Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 2. Cotterrell , "Englis h Conception s o f th e Rol e of Theory i n Lega l Analysis," 689. 3. MacCormick , H. L. A. Hart, 18. 4. W . T. Murphy and Simo n Roberts, "Introduction," 677 . 5. Geoffre y Wilson , "English Lega l Scholarship," 843. 6. Coli n A. Campbell, "The Career of the Concept," 2. 7. Biographica l detail s o n Hart' s lif e ar e take n fro m MacCormick , Hart; and fro m Michae l Martin, The Legal Philosophy of H. L. A. Hart. 8. Kelly , Short History of Western Legal Theory, 403 , describe s The Concept of Law: "Neither ver y lon g no r ver y elaborate , i t provoke d a n immense literatur e an d mus t b e reckoned , whateve r fault s ma y b e found wit h it , one o f th e semina l works of twentieth-century jurisprudence." 9. MacCormick , Hart, 3. Fo r Hart' s centra l plac e i n Englis h jurisprudence, se e als o Twining , "Academi c La w an d Lega l Philosophy, " 557. 10. Adijar e Oledasu , "H. L. A. Hart on Legal Obligation," 152 . 11. Morison , Austin, 178. 12. Rober t N . Moles, "The Declin e and Fal l of Dworkin's Empire, " 111. 13. Ibid. , 96. 14. H . L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 50. Emphasis in the original. 15. Ibid. , 61. Emphasis in the original. 16. Ibid. , 77-96. 17. Campbell , "The Career of the Concept," 9-10 . 18. Oledasu , "H. L. A. Hart on Legal Obligation," 156 . 19. Martin , The Legal Philosophy of H. L. A. Hart, 6. 20. H . L. A. Hart, "Definition an d Theory i n Jurisprudence." 21. Ibid. , 60. 22. Hart , The Concept of Law, 18-25. 23. MacCormick,//art , 12 . 24. R . Birmingham , "Hart' s Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence Again," 789. 25. MacCormick , Hart, 12. 26. Phili p Milton , "H . L . A . Hart : Jurisprudenc e an d Linguisti c Philosophy," 751.

Notes to Chapter Seven 237 27. P . M. S. Hacker, "Hart' s Philosoph y o f Law, " 2; see also Martin Krygier, "The Concept of Law and Socia l Theory," 155 . 28. MacCormick , Hart, 19. 29. Hart , "Bentham o n Legal Powers," 820. 30. J . Raz , "Hart on Mora l Rights and Lega l Duties," 123-24 . 31. Moles , Definition and Rule in Legal Theory, 15 . 32. K . A. Warner, "Th e Concept of Legal Obligation an d th e Separation o f La w an d Morality, " 69 ; se e als o Aida n O'Neill , "Th e Lega l Philosophies of H. L. A. Hart," 32. 33. Danie l W . Skubik, At the Intersection of Legality and Morality, 187 . Emphasis in the original. 34. Willia m C . Starr , "La w an d Moralit y i n H . L . A . Hart' s Lega l Philosophy," 675. 35. Keit h Lovin , "H. L. A. Hart and th e Moralit y of Law," 131 . 36. Lo n Fuller , The Morality of Law, 40. 37. MacCormick , Hart, 24-25. 38. Twining , "Academi c Law and Lega l Philosophy," 58. 39. J . W . Va n Doren , "Theorie s o f Professor s H . L . A . Har t an d Ronald Dworkin, " 307. 40. Twining , "Academic Law and Lega l Philosophy," 571. 41. Moles , "The Declin e and Fal l of Dworkin's Empire," 81. 42. Patric k Devlin , The Enforcement of Morals, 11 . 43. H . L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality, 23-24 . 44. Ibid. , 50. 45. Rober t P. George, "Social Cohesion and th e Legal Enforcemen t of Morals," 30. 46. R . Hittinger, "Th e Hart-Devli n Debat e Revisited," 53. 47. Se e Stefa n Petrow , "Th e Lega l Enforcemen t o f Moralit y i n Late-Victorian an d Edwardia n England, " 59-74 . 48. Zeno n Bankowski , "Review of Leith and Ingram , eds., The Jurisprudence of Orthodoxy," 118 . 49. Campbell , "The Career of the Concept," 22. 50. Murph y and Roberts , "Introduction," 683 . 51. Campbell , "The Career of the Concept," 21. 52. Rut h Gavison , ed., Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy, 1 . 53. Hart , The Concept of Law, vii . 54. Pete r Fitzpatrick , "Th e Abstract s an d Brie f Chronicle s o f th e Times," 28. 55. Campbell , "Th e Career of the Concept," 24.

238 Notes

to Chapter Eight Notes to Chapter Eight

1. Pete r Charle s Hoffer , "Text , Translation , Context , Conversa tion," 410. 2. Twining , "Maine and Legal Education," 215-16 . 3. Ala n Watson, Failures of the Legal Imagination, 107 . 4. Watson , "The Evolution of Law: Continued," 569; see also idem, "Legal Change: Sources of Law and Lega l Culture," 1154 . 5. Watson , "The Evolutio n of Law: Continued," 569. 6. Ala n Paterson , The Law Lords, 14—15 , 34; Cotterrell , The Politics of Jurisprudence,221 . 7. Willia m C . Lubenow , "Th e Universities , th e Professions , an d British Societ y i n th e Nineteent h Century, " pape r delivere d a t th e Western Conferenc e o n Britis h Studies , Boulder , Colorado , Octobe r 1992, 25. 8. Ala n Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, 71 . 9. Roge r Shiner, Norm and Nature, 44-46. 10. N . E. H. Hull, "Networks and Bricolage, " 317-19 . 11. Wilfri d J . Waluchow , "Hart , Lega l Rule s an d Pal m Tre e Jus tice," 41-70. 12. Pe r kin, The Rise of Professional Society, 397 . 13. Nei l Duxbury , "Post-Moder n Jurisprudenc e an d It s Discon tents," 591. 14. Watson , Failures of the Legal Imagination, 124 . 15. Collini , Public Moralists, 254 .

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Index

Abingdon, Lord, 24, 26 214; biographical details, 52-53; All Souls College, 23 use of language, 58-60. See also American Revolution, 60-61 Comment on the Commentaries; FragAmos, Sheldon, 109 ment on Government; Introduction to Ancient Law, 120 , 124-27, 135, 140, the Principles of Morals and Legisla142-43, 145. See also Maine, Sir tion; Of Laws in General; Panopticon Henry Beynon, Helen, 84 Anson, Sir William, 147, 149, 157, Bigelow, Melville Madison, 151-52 166,170 Blackstone, Sir William, 3, 6, 9, 14Aquinas, Thomas, 97 18, 21-49, 56-58, 66, 74-75, 78, Atiyah, P. S., 173, 176 80,83, 100 , 107, 111, 119, 139, Austin, John, 2, 7, 9, 14, 84-86, 89143, 145, 187, 192, 206, 214; bio117,119-123,131-37,139-40, graphical details, 23-25; conserva144-45, 153, 156-57, 159, 161, tism of, 37-42; political and judicial 183-89, 209-10, 214; biographical career of, 24-26; versus Bentham, details, 90-93. See also Lectures on 51—52, 60-62. See also CommentarJurisprudence; Plea for the Constitu- ies on the Laws of England tion; Province of JurisprudenceDeterBock, Kenneth, 122 mined Boorstin, Daniel, 61 Austin, John L., 188 Brierly,J. L., 151 Austin, Sarah, 91,93-94 Brundage, Anthony, 84 Bryce, James, 115, 130, 147, 149-51, 166-67 Bentham, Jeremy, 2, 6, 9, 14-16, 26Buckland, W. W., 114 27, 38, 46, 51-87, 89-90, 96, 99108, 110-11, 116, 119-23, 131-40, 144-45, 153, 157, 164, 179-80, Cairns, J. W., 41-42 182, 188, 190-93, 205, 209-10, Campbell, Colin M., 201 259

260 Index Goodhart, Arthur L., 2 Clark, J. C. D., 40, 45-46 Cocks, Raymond, 3,123, 125,135, 143 Grotius, Hugo, 29 Codification, 76-79, 153-54 Haldane, Lord, 5-6 Colley, Linda, 47 Halevy, Elie, 64 Collini, Stefan, 177 Harrison, Frederic, 103, 105 Command theory of law, 74—75, 95Hart, H. L. A., 7-8, 9, 14, 18, 39, 58, 96, 102-3, 132-33 Comment on the Commentaries, 55, 66.75-77,85, 176 , 179-206,211-13, 215; biographical details, 182-83. See also Bentham, Jeremy Commentaries on the Laws of England,See also Concept of Law; Law, Liberty, and Morality 21-22, 24-25, 28-36, 47-48, 53; as Harvard Law Review, 17 1 justification of existing institutions, 37-39, 44, 46. See also Blackstone, Historical jurisprudence, 119—21, 124-31,142-45 Sir William History of English Law, 180 . See also Common Law, 27. See also Holmes, OliHoldsworth, Sir William ver Wendell Concept of Law,82, 182-98, 201-3, Holdsworth, Sir William, 27, 130, 179—81. See also History of English 205-6. See also Hart, H. L. A. Law Holland, Sir Thomas Erskine, 7, 9, Devlin, Lord, 199-201 11, 14, 147-78, 183, 193; biographiDicey, Albert Venn, 1-2, 4-5, 17 , 26, cal details, 147-52. See also Ele73, 115, 147, 149-51, 157, 170, 173. See also Law and Public Opinion ments of Jurisprudence;Essays Upon the Form of the Law Dinwiddy, John R., 69 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 1, 11, 27, Dworkin, Ronald, 183, 196, 203 142, 164, 175, 212. See also ComElements of Jurisprudence,148 , 156—65 ,mon Law 167, 169-70, 172, 177. See also Hol- Horwitz, Morton, 18 land, Sir Thomas Erskine English Historical Review, 171—7 2 Inner Temple, 92 Essays Upon the Form of the Law, 155Inns . of Court, 2, 174 See also Holland, Sir Thomas ErInternational law, Holland on, 162 — skine 64 Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 56, 67-68. See also Feaver, George, 123 Bentham, Jeremy Finer, S. E., 83 Finnis, John, 33 Fragment on Government, 26, 55—56,Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 , 79, 153,166 66. See also Bentham, Jeremy Jurisprudence: definitions of, 3—4, Fuller, Lon, 195 158-59; and legal history, 8, 20711; and practitioners, 9-10; purGavison, Ruth, 204 pose of, 4-5, 18-19, 47-49, 62-63, Glorious Revolution, 18, 45, 208

Index 261 86-87, 110-13, 139-41, 175-78, 214-15 Justinian, 42, 167 Kelly, Paul, 69 Kennedy, Duncan, 38-40

Moles, Robert, 185 Morison, W. L., 101, 158, 172 Natural law jurisprudence, 15-16 , 28-31,33-34 Newton, Isaac, 64—65 Norman yoke, 43

Laski, Harold, 142, 181 Law, Liberty, and Morality, 199 . See Of alsoLaws in General, 56, 67, 74. See also Bentham, Jeremy Hart, H. L. A. Law and Public Opinion, 73 . See also Pankhurst, R. M., 109 Dicey, Albert Venn Law Quarterly Review, 148 , 150, 170 —Panopticon, 54, 72. See also Bentham, Jeremy 72 Parliamentary sovereignty, 35-36, Lawson, F. H., 148, 162 Lectures on the Early History of Institu-75-76, 104-5, 133-35 tions, 139 . See also Maine, Sir HenryParris, Henry, 184 Lectures on Jurisprudence, 94-95. SeePerkin, Harold, 10 , 166 Plea for the Constitution, 106 . See also also Austin, John Austin, John Legal history, 1-2, 10-14 Pollock, Sir Frederick, 15-16, 109, Lieberman, David, 36-37, 58, 61 115-16, 129, 141-42, 147, 157, Linnaeus, Carolus, 65 161, 166, 170, 184,214 Lobban, Michael, 79 Popular Government, 137 . See also Maine, Sir Henry MacCormick, Neil, 4, 202 Positivism, 15,30-33, 113 MacDonagh, Oliver, 184 Posner, Richard, 4, 214 Maine, Sir Henry, 7, 9, 14, 115, 11945, 153, 209-10, 214; biographical Postema, Gerald, 65 details, 121-24; relation to BenPound, Roscoe, 180 tham and Austin, 119-23. See Principle of utility, 63-73, 96-100, also Ancient Law; Historical juris- 131-32,192-93 prudence; Lectures on the Early HistProfessionalization o f academic law, ory of Institutions; Popular Gov167-76 ernment Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Maitland, Frederic, 114, 141-42 94-95, 97-99, 107, 120, 145. See Making of the English Working Class, also Austin, John 202. Pufendorf, Samuel , 29 Mansfield, Lord, 25, 46 Markby, Sir William, 115, 170 Raz, Joseph, 202 Middle Temple, 23 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 125, 135, 13 8 Mill, James, 72-73, 91, 100, 107 Mill, John Stuart, 72, 100, 102 Savigny, Friedrich von, 126 Semple, Janet, 54, 60, 69 Milsom, S. F. C, 28

262 Index Separation of law from morality,79— 82, 107-10, 135-37 Shelburne, Lord, 24 Smith, Adam, 48 Stein, Peter, 123 Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, 145 Summers, Robert, 16 Thompson, Edward P., 202 Twining, William, 209-10

Vinerian professorship of English law, 24, 26-27 Vinogradoff, Sir Paul, 121-23, 126, 142,144,179 Watson, Alan, 12-13, 115, 211-12, 214 Weiner, Martin, 54 Willman, Robert, 42 Wise, B. R., 109