Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy: A Study of the Moral Foundations of Descartes' Theory of Knowledge [Reprint 2012 ed.] 9783110910957, 9783110175387

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Marcelo de Araujo Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy

W G DE

Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie Herausgegeben von Jürgen Mittelstraß, Dominik Perler, Wolfgang Wieland

Band 58

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 2003

Scepticism, Freedom and Autonomy A Study of the Moral Foundations of Descartes' Theory of Knowledge by

Marcelo de Araujo

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 2003

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

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© Copyright 2003 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin Printed in Germany

to Eva, Raffael, Amândia, and José Cláudio

Acknowledgements This book is a revised version of my doctoral thesis, submitted to Konstanz University, Germany, on 4th February 2002. I would like to express my indebtedness to my family, for all their uncompromising support; to Michael Esfeld, who was willing to read and comment on parts of the manuscript since the very beginning of my research; to Holmer Steinfath, who read and commented on earlier versions of chapters four, five, and six; as well as to Fernando Rodrigues, for the help and encouragement since the beginning of my studies, and for the comments on different parts of the manuscript. I am also indebted to Jacob Rosenthal, Su-Yeong Kim, and Raffael Iturrizaga, whose comments and criticism often forced me to revise my own position and, sometimes, even compelled me to steer my research on to an entirely new course; not to mention Waltraud Weigel, for her unfailing assistance at Konstanz University. I am also grateful to my English proof-reader, Brian Hazlehurst, for his careful work; and to Sandro Reis and Christopher Schirmer, for their invaluable technical support. My heartiest thanks also to Dominik Perler, for his precious comments on the whole manuscript; and to Jürgen Mittelstraß, for his kindness in accepting to participate as co-examiner in my doctoral examination. Above all, I should like to record my deepest indebtedness to Peter Stemmer, my doctoral supervisor. For the kindness and competence with which he helped me at every step of my research, I am most grateful. Last but not least, I also thank CNPq, Brazilian National Scientific and Technological Development Council, for their financial support; and DAAD, Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, for a four-month scholarship at Goethe-Institut, Freiburg.

Contents INTRODUCTION

1

I: DESCARTES' THEORY OF JUDGEMENT

8

Introduction 1. Entertaining and Judging 2. Kinds of Thoughts: Ideas, Affections, and Judgements 3. Ideas: Picture-Like Thoughts and Propositions 4. Facultas Cognoscendi and Facultas Eligendi 5. Descartes' Ethics of Belief. 6. Attention Voluntarism and Scepticism Π: TWO CONCEPTS OF FREEDOM Introduction 1. Fourth Meditation: The Latin and The French Texts 2. Power of Choice and Spontaneous Assent 3 Arguments for Doxastic Voluntarism 4. Arguments for Attention Voluntarism 5. Freedom Before, and Freedom During the Action 6. The Concept of Attention 7. Scepticism and Free Will ΠΙ: SELF-DECEPTION AS A MENTAL STATE Introduction 1. Dogmatic Self-Deception: The Regulae 2. Sceptical Self-Deception: The First Meditation 3. Imposition, Suspension of Judgement, and Freedom 4. The Meaning of Imponere in The First Meditation 5. Freedom, Scepticism and Early Modern Philosophy 5.1 Montaigne 5.2 Charron 5.3 Gassendi IV: FREEDOM, AUTONOMY, AND SCEPTICISM Introduction 1. Lack of Autonomy through Manipulation

8 9 15 18 27 30 34 37 37 37 39 46 49 58 62 70 73 73 73 80 86 89 94 97 98 101 103 103 103

2. Minimal Autonomy 3. Cogito and Autonomy 4. Autonomy and Epistemic Responsibility 5. Scepticism and Character Traits V: THE SCIENCE OF GOOD LIVING Introduction 1. Interpretations of Descartes' Moral Theory 2.1 The Biographical Accident Thesis 2.2 The Lack of Sincerity Thesis 2.3 The Lack of Originality Thesis 2.4 The Identity of 'Provisional' and 'Definitive' Morals Thesis 2. Deontological Approaches to Descartes' Moral Theory 3. Moral Certainty and Metaphysical Certainty 4. Scepticism and Everyday Life 5. The Moral Way of Knowing and the Science of Good Living VI: DESCARTES ON VIRTUE ETHICS Introduction 1. Descartes' Moral Theory and Virtue Ethics 2. The Moral Maxims 3. The First Maxim: Moral Paragons 4. The Second Maxim: The Virtue of Resolution 5. The Third Maxim: The Virtue of Prudence 6. The Fourth Maxim: The Examined Life 7. The Quest for Truth and The Highest Good

108 Ill 117 124 131 131 131 132 134 137 140 142 145 151 157 163 163 163 166 167 186 191 196 199

CONCLUSION

204

BIBLIOGRAPHY

207

INDEX NOMINUM

235

INTRODUCTION Most of the time, we make a diversity of assertions about our environment and ourselves. Except for the occasions on which we are not being sincere, or in which we are, for instance, playing a role in the theatre, these assertions are also an expression of our beliefs. In stating, for example, that Paris is the capital of France, we mean that the proposition 'Paris is the capital of France' is true, and that we have towards this proposition a belief-attitude, i.e. we believe that it is actually the case that Paris is the capital of France. We often come to make statements of this kind as the result of a decision to convey some information about our environment, to answer a question, or to resume mentally some piece of information somehow stored in our memory. Statements like 'Paris is the capital of France', accordingly, may be considered things we can decide to make. But is our belief that Paris is the capital of France also something we actively make, something for which we may be held responsible? The ordinary use of language seems to point to opposite directions here. On the one hand, we can perfectly imagine, for instance, a man 'asking' his wife to believe that what he is saying is true, while she interrogates herself whether she 'should' actually believe what her husband is saying. The use of verbs like 'ask' and 'should' in this context seems to be an indication that, at least in principle, we can believe something as the result of a decision to comply with someone's request, or to do what we should do. On the other hand, we do not ordinarily say that we 'make' or that we 'perform' beliefs, but that we 'have' or that we 'hold' them. By the same token, we do not usually say that we have or hold statements, but that we make them. The extent to which our beliefs are subject to some kind of decisional procedure is a philosophical question which has been contemporarily discussed in the context of a debate, usually referred to as the 'ethics of belief. The last few decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in this question. Since approximately the end of the seventies, a great number of authors have dedicated themselves to questions relative to the nature of the relationship between our beliefs and our will, i.e. whether our beliefs are voluntary, whether we have some kind of control over them, the extent to which we may be held

2

Introduction

responsible for our beliefs, etc.1 An interesting aspect of this debate is the fact that Descartes is commonly seen as a philosopher who conceived of the relationship between beliefs and will in a quite unusual way. Because Descartes affirms in the, Meditations, in the context of his theory of judgement, that we are free to affirm or to negate ideas at will, it has been commonly argued against him that his theory entails the quite implausible thesis that we could freely determine the content of our beliefs. Indeed, according to Descartes, in situations in which we have equal evidence pro and con the truth of an idea, we should suspend judgement by neither affirming nor negating this idea. But we are still free, Descartes argues, to affirm or to negate this idea. Affirming or negating an idea in Descartes' sense is not simply a matter making a statement irrespective of our own personal attitude towards it. In affirming an idea, we commit ourselves to its truth, we believe it to be true. In like manner, when we negate an idea, we believe it to be false. Accordingly, if we could affirm or negate an idea at will, we should also be able to believe or disbelieve it at will. But this seems to be an implausible thesis, for when we have equal evidence for and con the truth of an idea, we do not decide to believe or disbelieve it, we simply suspend judgement independently of considerations as to whether we should suspend judgement or not. Against this line of criticism, a major thesis I intend to defend in the present work is that, according to Descartes, we have only an indirect control over our beliefs. We can actually come to form beliefs in a voluntary way in that we can fail to attend to relevant evidence at the moment when we make a statement. This thesis, however, is neither new nor unproblematic. It is not new because some commentators have already sought to point out the importance the concept of attention has in Descartes' theory of knowledge. And it is not unproblematic because it is unclear why a person might divert her attention from relevant evidence for the truth of a proposition ρ and, consciously, come to form the false belief that non-/?. Coming to form a belief in spite of evidence to the contrary is a clear case of self-deception. If this is so, then the thesis that we have an indirect control over our beliefs, inasmuch as we have a direct control over our attention, is, in fact, a thesis about the possibility of self-deception. But is there a place for the philosophical problem of self-deception in Descartes' theory of knowledge? The problem of self-deception, as I intend to show, plays a decisive role in Descartes' refutation of scepticism. In the First Meditation, Descartes advances some sceptical hypotheses in order to put into question our ordinary knowledge

1

1 will refer to some of these works in the first chapter.

Introduction

3

claims. But Descartes himself admits, towards the end of the First Meditation, that he still has 'far more reasons' to believe his customary opinions than to disbelieve them. For this reason, Descartes argues, he will 'deceive himself with the sceptical hypothesis according to which there possibly is an evil genius who deceives us in every knowledge claim. But Descartes also advances a straightforward reason to indulge himself in self-deception: in suspending judgement with respect to every knowledge claim, we avoid the possibility that an evil god 'imposes' anything on us. The central thesis I defend in this work is that Descartes envisaged the existence of an evil god as a threat, not only to the validity of our customary knowledge claims, but rather as a menace to our freedom. There are good reasons to assume that freedom understood in this sense, as something we would not have if it is true that we are constantly manipulated by an evil god, may be comprehended as a conception of human autonomy. Descartes endorses a sceptical attitude in the First Meditation because, like the sceptic, he assumes that we can only escape the manipulations of an evil god - and, thus, guarantee our own autonomy - in that we refrain from making any judgements at all. But, against the sceptic, Descartes also seeks to show in the Fourth Meditation that freedom, in a proper sense, does not amount to the state of indifference in which we find ourselves after the general suspension of judgement. Freedom (or autonomy), in a proper sense, consists in not accepting as true anything but clear and distinct ideas. It is only when we employ the criterion of truth based on the notions of clearness and distinctness, not following any authority other than the authority of reason, that we have freedom in its highest degree. This thesis goes against the grain of a commonly accepted view according to which the problem of scepticism for Descartes was a purely epistemologica! affair. Against this view, I purpose to show that Descartes envisaged the sceptical challenge as a moral problem. Descartes, like the sceptic, was concerned with a conception of the good life in which the notion of autonomy, understood in simple outlines as a capacity to be held responsible for one's own actions and opinions, plays an important role. But Descartes' criticism of the sceptical attitude is that a good life does not depend on the general suspension of judgement the sceptic advocates. A good life depends, among other things, on our systematic quest for truth, in our spontaneous assent to clear and distinct ideas. Because Descartes envisaged the refutation of scepticism as a moral problem, I also submit in the present work an interpretation of Descartes' moral theory which largely departs from most scholarly treatments of this theme. My thesis is that most interpretations of Descartes' moral theory have been biased by a deontological conception of ethics. In moral matters, however, Descartes was far closer to ancient moral

4

Introduction

conceptions than to modern moral theories which became current after Kant. My thesis is that Descartes defended a version of a virtues ethics theory, and that his so-called 'provisory morals' must be comprehended in eudaimonistic terms. I would like now to describe the main lines of the arguments I develop in each of the six chapters of this book. In the first chapter, I present Descartes' theory of judgement. This theory is based on the thesis that our judgements depend on the interaction of two different faculties: the understanding and the will. Through the understanding we conceive ideas, while through the will we affirm or negate them. This thesis, however, presents a number of problems which have not passed unnoticed to many critics of Descartes. Firstly, there is a problem relative to the nature of ideas. On the one hand, Descartes defines ideas as a mental image of things. But if ideas are picture-like thoughts, it is unclear how we could 'affirm' or 'negate' them. What is capable of being affirmed or negated are not pictures, but propositions. My thesis is that for Descartes ideas always have a propositional content. I try to establish this thesis by analysing some texts where Descartes discusses the relationship between language and thoughts. Another problem relative to Descartes' theory of judgement is that, according to some critics, it entails a strong version of doxastic voluntarism, i.e. the thesis that our beliefs are voluntary. This problem has been commonly pointed out in the context of the ethics of belief debate. I will examine the extent to which this line of criticism is valid in the second chapter. I conclude the first chapter with the suggestion that, if it is true that Descartes defended doxastic voluntarism, or even a more moderate version of the thesis that we have some voluntary control over our beliefs, then the sceptic could always argue to be free to form his belief at will. In the second chapter, I present Descartes' conception of freedom, which Descartes properly introduces in the Fourth Meditation. Descartes proposes two quite different conceptions of freedom. On the one hand, he defines freedom as an ability to 'go to both sides'. In this case, being free means being able to choose in an unconstrained way either of two contrary sides. On the other hand, freedom is defined as spontaneous assent to clear and distinct ideas. In this case, being free means not being able to fail to do what reason shows us to be good, or believe what reason shows us to be true. I demonstrate, firstly, that with the first definition of freedom, Descartes had in mind the socalled in utramque partem style of argumentation, which was a widespread rhetorical technique in the philosophical disputes of his time. This kind of argumentation was also commonly used by the sceptics who claimed that, because we can always argue both for and against the truth of whatever

Introduction

5

propositions, we should suspend judgement about all our knowledge claims. Secondly, I try to show, against a common line of interpretation, that neither the Meditations nor texts posterior to the Meditations support the thesis that Descartes would have committed himself to a strong form of doxastic voluntarism. My thesis is that Descartes defended, in fact, attention voluntarism, i.e. that we are free to direct our attention only to the evidence that supports the truth of a proposition, while we deliberately ignore the evidence that supports its falsity. Because we have this kind of indirect control over our beliefs, we can also avoid holding any belief at all. We can, indeed, always counterbalance the cogency of some evidence for the truth of a proposition ρ by pointing out some sceptical hypothesis which undermines the truth of p. In view of this, what Descartes argues against the sceptical attitude, is that the sceptic simply wants to stay in the state of doubt. But is this kind of reply to the problem of scepticism justified? If the sceptic prefers to remain in the state of doubt, he simply deceives himself. But if he deceives himself, then, apparently, he does not really pose a problem to our attempt to proving the possibility of knowledge. In the third chapter, I deal with the problem of self-deception in Descartes' theory of knowledge. Firstly, I examine some passages from the Regulae, where Descartes criticises the attitude of the scholastic philosophers who 'persuade themselves' that there is nothing they do not know. Then, I examine a passage from the end of the First Meditations, where Descartes, provisionally assuming a sceptical position, affirms that he will 'deceive himself with the hypothesis that there is an evil god who constantly manipulates us. While the problem of self-deception in the Regulae concerns the deliberate acquisition of a false belief, the problem of self-deception in the First Meditation concerns the deliberate avoidance of any belief at all. In both cases, however, the consequence of self-deception is the attainment of a desirable mental state. In deceiving themselves, the scholastic philosophers enjoy a feeling of selfsatisfaction resulting from the false belief that there is nothing they do not know. In like manner, in suspending judgement with respect to any knowledge claim, the sceptic puts himself in a state of 'indifference'. My thesis, then, is that in the state of indifference, because he avoids commitment to any belief at all, the sceptic can argue to be more free than the persons who hold some belief. He is more free because he is not subjected to the possible manipulations of an evil god. What Descartes must demonstrate against the sceptic, therefore, is that freedom, in a proper sense, does not involve the state of indifference in which the sceptic strives to remain. In order to show that Descartes actually envisaged the problem of scepticism in this way, I conclude the third chapter with some historical

6

Introduction

considerations on the problem of scepticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I point out some key texts by three major thinkers of that time, namely Charron, Montaigne and Gassendi, where a sceptical attitude was clearly defended as a sort of strategy to preserve our own freedom against dogmatic impositions. In the fourth chapter, I examine Descartes' second definition of freedom, namely freedom understood as spontaneous assent to clear and distinct ideas. My thesis is that, in the light of some contemporary approaches to the concept of autonomy, there are good reasons to comprehend the sceptical scenario Descartes describes, at the end of the First Meditations, as a threat to our autonomy. I draw a distinction between minimal autonomy and full autonomy. We are minimally autonomous in that we refrain from making any judgement at all and, thus, avoid the possibility of being manipulated by an evil god. We are, on the other hand, fully autonomous when we follow the criterion of truth, and assent only to clear and distinct ideas. In both cases, what is in question is an attitude of prudence against the possibility that we are manipulated, i.e. that we cannot recognise ourselves as responsible for our own actions and opinions. I try to show, then, that in the Meditations Descartes was not simply interested in demonstrating the validity of a criterion of truth based on the notions of clearness and distinctness. He was also interested in showing that we must develop a 'disposition' to employ this criterion in our quest for truth. To be sure, we can at a first moment recognise the validity of the criterion of truth, but owing to overconfidence on the authority of tradition or to the misleading influence of passions, we may at a second moment deflect our attention from the reasons which demonstrate the validity of the criterion and fail to use it. For this reason, Descartes argues that we have to persevere in our decision not to attend to these irrational factors, and to concentrate our attention only on the proof of the validity of the criterion of truth, until we have acquired the 'habit' of using it in our quest for truth. I conclude the fourth chapter with the thesis that, both in his theory of knowledge and in his moral theory, Descartes recommended the acquisition of the same 'habit', namely the 'virtue' of 'resolution.' In the fifth chapter, I submit an alternative approach to the most common readings of Descartes' moral theory. Firstly, I distinguish four main lines of interpretation in the Cartesian scholarship. The first line of interpretation argues that Descartes failed to develop a fully-fledged moral theory due to his early death. The second one sustains that Descartes was not sincere in his pronouncements on moral matters. The third one holds that Descartes did not advance any moral theory which differs in any special respect from the theories of his contemporaries. And the fourth one has it that Descartes would have

Introduction

7

realised towards the end of his life that we cannot really found, on purely rational grounds, a moral theory, so that his so-called 'provisional morals', advanced in the third part of the Discours, turned out to represent his final view on moral matters. I seek to show that these interpretations have been biased by a deontological conception of ethics, namely by the assumption that a moral theory concerns an examination of problems relative to concepts such as duties, obligations, rights, etc. Because we do not find a discussion of these concepts in Descartes' texts, many commentators have drawn the conclusion that a moral theory remained as a sort of undeveloped project in Descartes' works. I try to show, then, Descartes' contribution in this area must be examined in the context of an eudemonistic conception of ethics. Moral questions for Descartes were questions relative to the way we should live in view of the attainment of a good life. Considered in these terms, Descartes' moral theory proves to be far closer to ancient moral theories than to modern ones. A moral theory for Descartes must be comprehended, accordingly, as the 'science of good living'. In the sixth chapter, I examine the so-called 'provisional morals' of the Discours. My thesis is that, in calling it 'provisional', Descartes did not mean that it should be replaced at some time in the future by a 'definitive' moral doctrine. His morals was 'provisional' in that what counts as a good life always remains subjected to reassessment in view of some relevant information we may obtain in the future. I try to show, then, that Descartes' moral theory may be envisaged as a kind of virtue ethics. At the end of this chapter, I examine the extent to which the quest for truth is, according to Descartes, constitutive of a good life. In the light of some contemporary accounts on the problem of the good life, I seek to show that for Descartes, even if we do not dedicate our whole life to the rational quest for truth, we must anyway try to establish, on rational grounds, the extent to which our goals are really worth pursuing, i.e. whether the goals we aim at are likely to fulfil the expectation we have towards them, and whether we can expect to achieve them in view of our own personal limitations. The conclusion I seek to draw in this chapter, then, is that Descartes' theoiy of knowledge was ultimately developed in view of a conception of a good life.

CHAPTER ONE DESCARTES' THEORY OF JUDGEMENT Introduction In our everyday lives there is a variety of types of knowledge about which we do not raise any doubt: that there are other persons in the world, that there is not an abyss just outside our door, that three plus two equal five, etc. If asked as to how these things are known, most people are likely to reply that it is simply evident that these things are true. But for all we know, is evidence a reliable indication that what is evident is also true? Could it not be the case that there is an asymmetry between evidence and truth, i.e. that what appears to us with utmost evidence may, strictly speaking, be false? Among a diversity of issues Descartes deals with in the Meditations, the problem of how evidence relates to truth is of special importance. Descartes begins the Meditations by calling everything into question, even the most evident propositions of mathematics. But after attentive inquiry he comes to the conclusion that evidence is the best, indeed the only reliable criterion of truth we possess. In what follows it is not my intention to examine every step of Descartes' argument leading to the proof that evidence - understood as clearness and distinctness - is a reliable criterion of truth. For this reason, I will not examine here, for instance, Descartes' alleged proof for the existence of God. Nor shall I attempt to present a detailed account of the cogito, Descartes' famous argument to show that he himself exists as a thinking thing independently of the existence of an evil god. My intention in this chapter is to examine a specific moment of the argumentative itinerary described in the Meditations, namely Descartes' theory of judgement. It is in the Fourth Meditation that Descartes advances his theory of judgement. In this theory he makes an important distinction between, on the one hand, the simple apprehension of a mental content and, on the other hand, the act of affirming or negating this content. Descartes characterises the act of affirming or negating a mental content as a will-dependent operation. His theory of judgement, thus, is marked by a strong volitional component. In view of this, I intend to examine, firstly, the role that the will, understood as the faculty responsible for the act of affirming and negating, plays in Descartes'

Descartes ' Theory OfJudgement

9

theory of judgement. And secondly, I intend to point out some difficulties Descartes' theory involves. These difficulties have been traditionally discussed in the context of a debate called the ethics of belief.

1. Entertaining andjudging Although Descartes' theory of judgement is properly developed in the Fourth Meditation, some important aspects of his theory were already anticipated in the Second and Third Meditations. For this reason, it would not be amiss to start our discussion by examining what is said in these texts. Towards the end of the Second Meditation Descartes advances the so-called 'piece of wax argument.' What this argument aims to establish is that it is not by means of sense perception, but through the understanding that we know that an object remains the same one throughout time. Let us suppose, for instance, that at time t\ we observe a piece of wax with a number of empirical qualities, i.e. qualities that we perceive through our sense organs. It has, then, a specific flavour, consistency, temperature, colour, odour, etc. At time t2, after it has been exposed to higher temperature, each one of its previous qualities changes. Nevertheless, we admit that it is one and the same piece of wax both at t\ and at t2. But how can we establish its identity if none of its empirical qualities remained unchanged from tx to t{l Descartes' point is that it is an error to believe that it is by means of sensual perception that numerical identity is established. What has not changed between t\ and at t2 is the fact that the object of our perception is perceived as an extended thing. But we do not directly perceive the piece of wax as an extended object, we infer it from what we immediately perceive, namely its primary qualities. We do not see or feel extension - at any rate not in the same fashion we see or feel a piece of wax with such and such specific qualities. Rather, we conceive it through the understanding (La. mens)} In our pre-philosophical attitude we generally assume that an object remains the same one throughout time, because some of its sensual properties usually remain unchanged. If the piece of wax mentioned above had not been heated between t\ and t2, we would certainly assume that it is the same object at t\ and at t2 just because its qualities did not vary. But what the piece of wax

1

AT vii, 31,1. 25. Following common usage in the Cartesian scholarship, I will use the initials 'AT' as an abbreviation for the standard edition of Descartes' complete works edited by C. Adam and P. Tannery, followed by the volume, page, and line number.

10

Descartes ' Theory Of Judgement

argument shows is that we can change every sensual property of an object, and nevertheless, in a certain sense, retain the selfsame object. We retain the selfsame object in that it remains extended throughout time. Descartes argues that both the unsophisticated plain man and the enlightened philosopher perceive one and the same piece of wax at tx and at t2. But while the former argues for the identity of the object by virtue of the sameness of sensual perception (it is the same colour, the same, odour, etc. both at t\ and at t2), the latter argues for the identity of the object by virtue of the sameness of a 'mental perception' (Lat. mente percipiturf, i.e. because the object is perceived as an extended thing both at t\ and at t2. To 'perceive something through the mind' in this case means: from what is presented to the mind through sense perception, to infer the existence of a property that cannot in itself be sensually perceived, namely being extended. Perceiving a piece of wax as the same object both at tx and at t2 is not simply entertaining something, i.e. being conscious of the presence of something with a specific quality or set of qualities.3 In the French text of the Second Meditation Descartes refers to the perception of a piece of wax as the same object both at t\ and at t2 as a kind of action: ...sa perception, ou bien l'action par laquelle on l'aperçoit...4 But what kind of action is it? This is the action of making a judgement. From the fact that we entertain a given mental content, we judge that something about the external world is the case. The problem, however, is that our ordinary language is quite misleading in this regard. We can use a verb like 'to see' either to refer to the simple apprehension of a mental content, without committing ourselves to the truth of what is apprehended, or to refer to the assumption that what is apprehended is the mental representation of something real in the external world.5 In order to make this point clearer let us consider an example Descartes proposes in the Second Meditation. Suppose we look through the window and see outside something covered with a coat and a hat. It looks like a human being in every respect, although we do not see anything but a coat and a hat. We would spontaneously say: Ί see a person outdoors wearing a coat and a hat'. But, strictly speaking, we do not see a person. What we actually see are just a coat

2

AT ix, 31, /. 19-20. Cf. 'entertain', in Oxford English Dictionary. (10) Keep or maintain in the mind; (b) Admit to consideration; receive (an idea); (11) Occupy the attention, time, etc. 4 AT ix, 24 (emphasis added). 5 AT ix, 25: ...je suis presque trompé par les termes du langage ordinaire; car nous disons que nous voyons la même cire, si on nous la présente, et non pas que nous jugeons que c 'est la même, de ce qu 'elle a même couleur et même figure... (emphasis added). 3

Descartes ' Theory OfJudgement

11

and a hat beneath which there might well be, instead of a person, a robot cleverly disguised as a real human being. From the fact that we see a hat and a coat, we immediately judge that what we actually see is a person. In the context of the Second Meditation it is still unclear whether the external world really exists or not. The proof of the external world will be offered only in the (last) Sixth Meditation. But it is nevertheless still correct to speak of the perception of a physical object in the context of the Second Meditation, provided only that 'perception', in this case, is understood as the simple fact of entertaining a mental content. 'Seeing' in this case does not mean 'judging', but simply 'thinking to see', i.e. having the presence of a mental content without assuming that what we think to see does actually correspond to something in the external world. What is questioned in the Second Meditation, therefore, is not our capacity to entertain the idea of a piece of wax, but the truth of the judgements by means of which we relate ideas to something real in the external world. In view of this, at the end of the Second Meditation, Descartes returns to an important point he had already made at the beginning of the Second Meditation: even on the supposition that there exists an evil god deceiving me in every knowledge claim, the very fact that I think cannot be put into question; and for this reason 1 can also conclude that I myself do exist. But now, Descartes argues, we can arrive at the same conclusion - that I myself exist as a thinking being - by considering the fact that we see objects: ...il peut aussi arriver que je n'aie pas même des yeux pour voir aucune chose; mais il ne se peut pas faire que lorsque je vois, ou (ce que je ne distingue plus) lorsque je pense voir, que moi qui pense ne sois quelque chose.6 When Descartes affirms here that he does not draw a distinction between 'seeing' and 'thinking to see', he means that 'seeing' in this case does not mean 'judging', but simply entertaining a mental content.7 His point, then, is 6 7

AT ix, 26 (emphasis added). Cf. AT ii, 36, I. 5-12: ...il n'y a rien qui soil entièrement en notre pouvoir que nos pensées; au moins en prenant le mot de pensée comme je fais, pour toutes les opérations de l'âme, en sorte que non seulement les médiations et les volontés, mais même les fonctions de voir, d'ouïr de se déterminer à un mouvement plutôt qu 'à autre etc., en tant qu 'elles dépendent d'elle, sont des pensées. Cf. also AT, ix, 23:...je suis le même qui sens, c'est-à-dire qui reçois et connais les choses comme par les organes des sens (...) Mais l'on me dira que ces apparences sont fausses et que je dors. Qu'il soit ainsi; toutefois, à tout le moins, il est très certain qu'il me semble que je vois, que ouïs, et que je m'échauffe; et c'est proprement ce qui en moi s'appelle sentir, et cela, pris ainsi précisément, n'est rien autre chose que penser, (emphasis added).

12

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that we are able to entertain a mental content or, what amounts to the same thing, that we can think, in spite of the sceptical doubts raised in the First Meditation. The distinction between simply entertaining a mental content and making a judgement on the basis of what is entertained, will be resumed in two different passages of Descartes' Replies to the Objections to the Meditations. In the Third Set of Replies Descartes argues that there is a distinction between, on the on hand, perceiving something and, on the other, having some kind of attitude towards the object of our perception. In order to make this point clearer Descartes considers the following example: Il est de soi très évident, que c 'est autre chose de voir un lion, et ensemble de le craindre, que de le voir seulement; et tout de même, que c 'est autre chose de voir un homme qui court, que d'assurer qu 'on le voit.9

'Fearing' and 'affirming' are examples of two different attitudes we can have towards the object of our perception. We see a lion and immediately react with the feeling of fear; in like manner we see a man run and immediately assume that it is true that a man is running. Descartes' example, however, does not make it explicit that in these two situations the verb to 'see' is being employed with two different meanings: 'judging' in the first case, and 'entertaining' a mental content in the second case. Someone who sees a lion and reacts with a feeling of fear, has already made a judgement: there is a lion before me, I can see it, and I would better run lest I should become its prey. It does not make any sense in this case to say that I fear the mental image of lion.9 The feeling of fear is related, not to my simply entertaining the idea of a lion, but to my conviction that there is a lion out there in the external world. In the second case, on the other hand, the object of perception, what is seen, is the mental image of a man who is running. The simple apprehension of this mental content, considered in itself, is not yet a judgement. But we can apprehend this mental content and immediately assume that a man is running.10 What is clear in this passage from the Third Set of Replies is that we must draw a clear-cut distinction between perceiving something and having 8

AT ix, 142 (emphasis added). There are certainly cases in which someone cannot even think about a lion without being gripped by a feeling of fear or panic. These unusual cases are not being considered here. But even in such cases we realise that there is a distinction between the object of our perception (the simple thought of a lion) and our affective reaction to it. 10 See also AT iii, 430, /. 14-16: frequenter enim animadverti, ea quae homines iudicabant ab ijs quae intelligebant dissentire.

9

Descartes ' Theory Of Judgement

13

some kind of attitude towards the object of our perception. What, however, is not immediately clear from the simple consideration of the example proposed by Descartes, is that we can hierarchize such reactions according to the kind of object of our perception. At a first moment, we simply apprehend a mental content, for example, the mental representation of a lion. At a second moment, we assume that there obtains a correspondence between our representation and the external world. We make, then, a judgement of the form 'there is a lion before me'. At a third moment, because we judge that it is true that there is a lion before us, we effectively react with the feeling of fear. Descartes resumes this problem in the Sixth Set of Replies, where he distinguishes the three degrees of sensing. In the Sixth Set of Replies, Descartes points out three different meanings the expression 'sensing something' may have. At a first level, 'sensing' means solely the stimulation that external objects cause in our sense organs. When we see, for instance, a bird in the garden, the light reflected by the bird causes some physical change in our retina, from which nerve impulses are triggered and pass through the optic nerve to the brain. Thus, at the first level seeing a bird in the garden is nothing but a physical process in our body, occasioned by the presence of a bird in the garden.11 At a second level, seeing a bird in the garden is understood as the awareness of a mental content. The difference between the first and the second levels is explained on the basis of Descartes' doctrine of the distinction between body and mind. It is not my intention, however, to examine this theme here. Descartes' point is that body and mind are so narrowly united that when, at the first level, we see a bird in the garden (when our nervous system undergoes some kind of change due to the presence of a bird in the garden), we become immediately aware of the presence of a mental content. Thus, at the second level, seeing a bird in the garden means to become conscious of the apprehension of a mental content. At this level there is not yet the assumption that what is apprehended in the mind is, actually, the mental representation of a real object in the external world.12 But at a third level, 'sensing' something is the judgement we make on the basis of what occurs at the second level.13 We apprehended a mental content and then we also immediately affirm that what we see is a bird in the garden. On the basis

11

AT vii, 437, /. 17-19: ...atque in hoc cerebri motu, qui nobis cum brutis communis est, primus senttendi gradus consistit. 12 AT vii, 437, 1. 19-23: Ex ipso vero sequitur secundus , qui ad solam coloris luminisve ex báculo reflexi perceptionem se extendit, oriturque ex eo quod mens cerebro tam intime conjunta sit, ut a motibus qui in ipsofiunt afficiatur... 13 AT vii, 437,1. 30-438,1. 1:... ideoque hie ad tertium sentiendi gradum retulerim..

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of sense impression (what happens at the second level), we make judgements about an object in the external world. These different kinds of reactions we have toward the object of our perception occur at great speed. This process occurs so quickly because of habit. At an early age, Descartes argues, we have a variety of sense impressions on the basis of which we make different judgements, many of which are false. As time goes by we correct many of our earlier judgements. But when, at a later time, as grown-up individuals, we have the same kinds of sense perception again, we do not make the same judgements as before, i.e. we do not repeat the entire process by means of which we have corrected our judgements. We simply remember the judgements we have made in the past. But this leads us to think that there is no distinction at all between simply having a sense impression and making a judgement. In order to illustrate this point, Descartes considers the following example: due to the phenomenon of refraction a stick in water appears to us as a bent object. A child who sees a stick in water is likely to judge that this object is actually bent. But upon examination the child learns that this judgement is false. At a later time, as a grown-up individual, when the person in question has a similar kind of sense impression, she will not make the same judgement again, i.e. she will not repeat every step of the examination that has enabled her to judge that the stick is upright, although it still appears to her as a bent object. She will simply remember the judgements she has made in the past when she found herself in the same circumstances.14 We save a lot of time in that we do not have to examine the things that appear to us a second time, with the same degree of attention with which we have examined them at the first time of their appearance. But the problem is that the speed at which we pass from the simple perception of a mental content to the formulation of a judgement, makes us think that there is no difference at all between them. Descartes' theory of judgement, however, is based on this fundamental distinction between apprehending a mental content and affirming that what is apprehended corresponds to something real in the external world.

14

AT vii, 438, /. 4-15: Sed in hoc tantum differentia est, quod ea quae nunc primum ob novam aliquant animadversionem judicamus, intelectui tribuamus; quae vero a prima aetate, eodem plane modo atque nunc, de iis quae sensus nostros qfßciebant judicavimus, aut etiam ratiocinando conclusimus, referamus ad sensum, quia nempe de iis tam celeriter propter consuetudinem ratiocinamur etjudicamus, aut potius judiciorum jam olim a nobis de rebus similibusfactorum recordamur, ut has operationes a simplici sensus percepitone non distinguamus.

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15

2. Kinds of thoughts: ideas, affections, and judgements In the Third Meditation, Descartes advances another important thesis related to his theory of judgement. He argues that judgements, and only judgements, are the bearers of truth and falsity.15 It is only with reference to judgements that we can say that something is true or false. In order to establish this thesis Descartes starts by proposing a sort of classification of types of thoughts we can have. Thought, in principle, is everything we are aware of. This also includes mental operations and mental states such as imaging and willing something.16 Descartes recognises, then, three different classes of thoughts: 'ideas' (Lat. ideae), 'volition or affections' (Lat. voluntates, sive affectus), and 'judgements' (Lat. judicia)xl. Ideas, he argues, are 'like images of things' (Lat. tanquam rerum imagines)}* We can have ideas, not only of real objects such as trees and stones, but also of things that do not really exist, such as winged horses, or a golden mountain. An idea can also be accompanied by different attitudes. I can for instance entertain the idea of a sunny day and simultaneously 'add' (Fr. j'ajoute)™ my desire that today is a sunny day. This would be an affective reaction to the mental representation of a sunny day. In like manner, I can entertain the same idea of a sunny day and

15

Descartes also occasionally speaks of 'materially false ideas', i.e. ideas which are false whether or not they are affirmed in a judgement. His point is that our ideas of colours, odours, sounds, and other secondary qualities are so confused, that we could not really consider them as representations of objects. In these cases, an idea might be considered false irrespective of its affirmation or negation. In this book, however, I do not intend to examine Descartes' conception of'materially false ideas'. For a detailed account of this problem see e.g. Richard Feld, 'Descartes on the material falsity of ideas', in The Philosophical Review, vol. 102, 1993, p. 309-334, and M. Wilson, 'Material falsity and objective reality', in Descartes, 1978, p. 101-119. The locus classicus for this problem is the following passage from the Third Meditation (AT vii, 43, /. 21-30): ...lumen et colores, soni, odores, sapores, calor et frigus, aliaeque tactiles qualitates, nomisi valde confuse et obscure a me cogitantur, adeo ut etiam ignorent an sint verae, vel falsae, hoc est, an ideae, quas de illis habeo, sint rerum quarundam ideae, an non rerum. Quamvis enim falsitatem proprie dictant, sive formalem, nonnisi in judiciis posset reperiti paulo ante notaverim, est tamnem profecto quaedam alia falsitas materialis in ideis, cum non rem tanquam rem repraesentant... 16 AT vii, 160, /. 7-13: Cogitationis nomine complector illud orme quod sic in nobis est, ut ejus immediate conscii simus. Ita omnes voluntatis, intellectus, imaginationis et sensuum operationes sunt cogitationes. Sed addidi immediate, ad excludenda ea quae ex iis consequuntur, ut motus voluntarius cogitationem quidem pro principio habet, sed ipse tamem non est cogitatio. 17 AT vii, 37,/. 3-12. 18 AT vii, 37, /. 3-4. 19 AT ix, 29.

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simultaneously 'add' an assertive attitude by means of which I affirm 'today is a sunny day.' When an idea is accompanied by a desire, we have what Descartes calls an affection; when an idea is accompanied by an assertion, we have what we he calls a judgement. Affections and judgements always presuppose ideas. An idea, on the other hand, can be entertained without being accompanied by a desire or by an assertion. In view of this, we can affirm that ideas are more simple than affections and judgements. In the Third Meditation, Descartes is actually concerned with an analysis of ideas, while the analysis of judgements is postponed until the Fourth Meditation. There is not in the Meditations a detailed analysis of affections, and the reason for this is that in this work Descartes is more interested in elucidating the problem concerning the way our thoughts are related to reality. The quite different question concerning the types of affective reactions human beings can experience with respect to such and such kind of thoughts, is the subject matter of another treatise, namely the Passions de l 'Ame, published in 1649. It is not difficult to understand why a theory of judgement must be preceded by an analysis of ideas. Since ideas are more simple than judgements, they must have a precedence in the order of exposition. Indeed, Descartes' method of exposition requires that what is most simple comes first. The methodological principle according to which, in the analysis of a problem, we must, firstly, reduce the problem to its constitutive elements, and then proceed from what is more simple to what is less simple, had already been established in the Regulae and in the Discours. Ideas, considered in themselves, are neither true nor false.20 Whether we entertain the idea of a real object such as a tree or some fictional entity such as a winged horse, as long as we do not assume that what is entertained corresponds to something in the external world, it does not make any sense to speak of truth or falsity. We can entertain many different kinds of ideas, regardless of the fact that these ideas depict a real or a fictional object. Descartes' theory of ideas, however, is rather problematic. He sometimes employs the term 'idea' to refer to what we would nowadays call a 'concept', but sometimes also to refer to what we would prefer to call a 'proposition'. The

20

AT ix, 29: ...pour ce que concerne les idées, si on les considère seulement en elles-mêmes, et qu 'on ne les rapporte point à quelque autre chose, elle ne peuvent, à proprement parler, être fausses. ' In the Sixth Replies (AT vii, 438, l. 21-23), where Descartes speaks of the three 'degrees of sensing', he affirms that it is only with respect to the third degree, i.e. sensing understood as judgement, that we can properly speak of truth or falsity : Nam de primo et secundo sentiendi gradu manifestum est hic non agi, quia nulla in ipsis falsitas esse potest.

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concept of tree, for instance, is no less real than the concept of a winged worse, even though there are objects that fall under the first concept, while none falls under the second one. But concepts, considered in themselves, are neither true nor false. For this reason, considered as an equivalent of concepts, it is clear that ideas are neither true nor false. But the problem is that we cannot affirm an idea in this sense so as to make a judgement. It does not make any sense to assume that we can affirm the concept of a tree, and that the result of this operation is a judgement. What we affirm are not concepts, but propositions. Descartes, however, was well aware of his lack of precision here. He has even recognised two different levels of ambiguity in the term 'idea'. At a first level, there is the so-called act-object ambiguity. This kind of ambiguity affects not only philosophical terms, but also ordinary ones. The word 'writing', for instance, can either denote the act of writing or what is written, i.e. the result of the act of writing. Right at the beginning of the Meditations, in the Preface to the Reader, Descartes alludes to this kind of ambiguity. He warns that the word 'idea' is equivocal inasmuch as it can either mean the 'intellectual operation' (Lat. operatione intellectus) by means of which we apprehend a mental content, or 'the thing represented by this operation' (Lat. re per istam operationem repraesentata).21 The second level of ambiguity concerns the meaning of 'idea' understood as a mental content, as the represented thing. It is the second level of ambiguity involving the term 'idea' that must concern us here. On the one hand, in defining the concept of idea in the Third Meditation, Descartes affirms that only picture-like thoughts should 'properly' (Lat. proprie, Fr. proprement) be called ideas.22 Thus, strictly speaking, a thought should not be named an idea unless it presents itself as a kind of mental image. But on the other hand, in some other texts, Descartes also admits that this definition is too restrictive. In the Third Set of Replies for instance he complains that his objector understands the term 'idea' in too narrow a sense, namely only as the 'image of material things' (Lat. imagines rerum materialium).23 He argues that in the Meditations he uses the word 'idea' to signify 'whatever is immediately perceived by the mind' (Lat. omni eo quod immediate a mente percipitur).24 And in the Fifth Set of Replies he returns to the very same point, and affirms that his objector restricts the meaning of the term 'idea' to the images depicted in the imagination. He argues again, then, 21

AT vii, 8 , / . 19-25.

22

AT vii, 37, /. 3-6: Quaedam ex his tanquam rerum imagines sunt, quibus solis proprie convenit ideae nomen...

23

AT vii, 181,/. 2-3.

24

Ibid. I. 7-8.

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that he himself uses the term 'ideas' to designate, not only picture-like thoughts, but whatever object of thought: ...tu nomen ideae ad solas imagines in phantasia depictas restringís, ego vero ad id omne quod cogitatur, extendo.25 Thus, if an idea in a broader sense is whatever presents itself as the 'object of thought' (Lat. quod cogitatur), then it is clear that a proposition can be taken as an idea as much as a concept. We can sum up these considerations on the kinds of ambiguity the term 'idea' involves with the following scheme: 1. act: intellectual operation idea { 2a. strict sense: picture-like thought 2. object: represented thing { 2b. broader sense: any object of thought

But if this is so, we can ask ourselves when an idea, comprehended in a broader sense, is a concept (a picture-like thought) and when an idea is a proposition, i.e. something capable of being affirmed or negated. My own view is that an idea always has a propositional content. This thesis can be established as a consequence of Descartes' conception of language.

3. Ideas: picture-like thoughts and propositions Descartes did not ignore the distinction between concepts and propositions.26 In a letter written in the same year the Meditations were published, he overtly affirms, for instance, that there is a great difference between the idea of God and the proposition 'God exists'.27 But why, then, did he remain imprecise at this crucial point, not establishing a clear-cut distinction between propositional and non-propositional ideas in the * AT vii, 366, /. 18-21. See also AT iii, 392, /. 24 - 393, /. 2: Carje η 'appelle pas simplement du nom d'idée les images qui sont dépeintes en la fantaisie; au contraire, je ne les appelle point de ce nom, en tant qu'elles sont dépeintes en la fantaisie corporelles; mais j'appelle généralement du nom d'idée tout ce qui est dans notre esprit, lors que nous concevons une chose, de quelque manière que nous la concevons. 26 Cf. e.g. G. Nuchelmans, Judgement and Proposition: From Descartes to Kant, 1983, p. 423. 27 AT iii, 396, /. 7-15: Et il est vrai que la simple consideration d'un tel Être nous conduit si aisement à la connaissance de son existence, que c'est presque la même chose de concevoir Dieu, et de concevoir qu'il existe; mais cela n'empeche pas que l'idée que nous avons de Dieu, ou d'un être souverainement parfait, ne soit fort differente de cette proposition: Dieu existe, et que l'un ne puisse servir de moyen ou d'antecedent pour prover l'autre.

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Meditations? It seems to me that, if Descartes did not seek to draw a sharp distinction between ideas comprehended in the strict sense of picture-like thoughts and ideas as the subject of predication, it is because for him this distinction concerns two different aspects of the same thing. As a picture-like thought an idea is what we are immediately aware of when we have a thought; as a proposition an idea is the linguistic expression of this thought. The concept of 'expression' is fundamental here. According to Descartes language is the instrument by means of which we express our thoughts. A meaningful word or string of words always signify a thought.28 When we make a meaningful utterance about an object, what we actually make is to express linguistically our idea of this object.29 Strictly speaking, the idea of an object is a picture-like thought depicting this object in the imagination, it is not a proposition. But to 'express' linguistically an idea means to 'explain' to a real or to an imaginary interlocutor what the object of our thought is. It is in a letter of 1641 that Descartes clearly associates the notion of linguistically 'expressing' an idea with the notion of 'explaining' this idea.30 As a picture-like thought, an idea must be capable of being somehow mentally seen. Both in the Regulae and in the Meditations, Descartes often speaks of the 'mind's eyes' (Lat. mentis oculis) by means of which we apprehend a mental content.31 But what we see with the 'mind's eyes' remains private to ourselves. No one else can 'mentally see' my own thoughts. I can nevertheless describe them. Descartes' point is that we can always linguistically express to someone else or even to ourselves what the content of a.

AT

iv 604, /. 9-13 : Ainsi, lors qu'on apprend une langue, on joint les lettres ou la prononciation de certain mots, qui sont des choses matérielles, avec leurs significations, qui sont de pensées... See also AT vii, 160, I. 14-16 : Ideae nomine intelligo cujuslibet cogitationis formam illam, per cujus immediatam perceptionem ipsius ejusdem cogitationis conscius sum... See also Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, 1966, specially p. 3-13. 29 AT iii, 393, /. 15-19: ... nous ne saurions rien exprimer par nos paroles, lors que nous entendons ce que nous disons, que de cela même il ne soit certain que nous avons en nous l'idée de la chose qui est signifiée par nos paroles. See also AT ν, 278, /. 18-20, and AT ν, 150. 30 AT iii, 417, l. 23-27: Je n'entend pas bien la question que vous me faites, savoir si nos idées s'expriment par un simple terme; car les paroles étant de l'invention des hommes, on peut toujours se servir d'une ou de plusieurs, pour expliquer une même chose... (emphasis added). 31 AT vii, 36, /.11. See also AT vii, 64, /. 5: ...obtutum mentis convertissem. An examination of the appropriateness of this metaphor here would take us too far afield. According to E. Tugendhat, Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimung, 1979, p. 17 ff, the attempt to understand the problem of consciousness by analogy to the act of seeing, introducing what would be the quite misleading idea of 'mental eyes' (German: geistige Auge) would have misguided the western philosophy from Parmenides down to Husserl.

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our thought is. Suppose I entertain the idea of a griffin. In order to express linguistically this idea I use the word 'griffin.' But let us suppose further that the person to whom I intend to express my idea of a griffin does not know the meaning of this word. In this case I have to convey my idea by explaining to her the meaning of the word 'griffin', and I do this by formulating a proposition like 'a griffin is a mythical creature having the head and wings of an eagle and the body of a lion'. G. Nuchelmans suggests that Descartes was not interested in giving a detailed account of the distinction between concepts and propositions, because Descartes simply assumed that sometimes an idea is expressed by means of a noun and sometimes by means of a proposition.32 However, if to express linguistically an idea, as the letter of 1641 suggests, is the same as to explain the content of our thought, it is clear that whether I use a single noun (for example 'griffin') or a sequence of words forming a proposition (for example 'a griffin is a mythical creature having such and such properties'), what I explain is always expressed in the form of a proposition. If this is so, then an idea always has a prepositional content, i.e. something capable of being affirmed or denied. We can try to comprehend more clearly Descartes' point by means of an analogy that could not have occurred to him. We can compare his conception of our epistemic position with the situation of a man shut up in a room secluded from any direct contact with his external environment. The only contact he has with the external world occurs via a monitor screen. After having meditated for a while on his epistemic situation, the man in the room concludes that it is uncertain whether the things he sees on his monitor screen really correspond to things outside of the room. The only thing he is certain of is that he sees objects on his monitor screen. Even though no one else can see what he sees inside of the room, he is able to 'explain' or 'express' linguistically what he sees to a possible interlocutors outside of the room. However, when he 'expresses' or 'explains' to his virtual partner outside of the room what he sees inside of the room, he is not merely mentioning words. If he for instance hears - or thinks to hear - someone outside of the room asking him what he sees inside of the room, he might laconically answer 'griffin'. But this expression of what he sees is not just a noun, it is a proposition, something that may be true or false. As an answer to the question supposedly coming from outside, 'griffin' will be true if it really is the object the man inside of the room is seeing on his monitor screen; it will be false, on the other hand, if he is seeing something else or nothing at all. This means that even though ideas are,

32

Cf. G. Nuchelmans, op. cit. p. 43.

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strictly speaking, picture-like thoughts, they always have a prepositional content in that we can only linguistically express them by means of propositions. From the perspective of the man inside of the room these propositions are always true. He cannot ever be mistaken as to the truth of them. These propositions simply describe (or express, or explain) what he sees on his monitor screen. But because these propositions are always true from the first person point of view, they are epistemically uninteresting, i.e. they do not yet give us any information concerning how the external world really is. The truth of these propositions only become epistemically relevant when we assume that what we describe from inside of the room is also a description of what is going on outside of the room. Thus, falsity or truth in this context can only properly arise when we have a specific attitude towards our ideas, namely only when we 'affirm' them as an adequate description of the environment external to the room in which we are shut up. When Descartes in the Third Meditation affirms that ideas considered in themselves are neither true nor false, he did not only mean that picture-like entities cannot be the bearer of truth, but also that propositions which simply describe what we see with the 'mind' eyes', without reference to the external world, are true in a sense that is not epistemically relevant, and that for this reason they cannot properly be called true or false. It might be objected, however, that this interpretation seems to leave us with a further problem. To entertain an idea is, according to Descartes, the immediate apprehension of the content of a thought. It is for this reason that ideas are more simple than judgements and affections. In making a judgement or in having an affection, something other than the idea itself is 'added' to the idea. But the problem is that the linguistic expression of an idea is not as simple as the idea itself. Indeed, we can, in principle, entertain an idea without having to express it linguistically. For this reason, propositions, as the linguistic expression of ideas, cannot be identified with the ideas themselves. Propositions seem to depend on something other than ideas themselves, just in the same way an affection or a judgement do. But if this is so, if propositions cannot be identified with ideas, then we still have the problem concerning the conflict between, on the one hand, the thesis that ideas are non-propositional entities, i.e. picture-like thoughts, and on the other the thesis that ideas can be affirmed or denied. This problem, however, is only apparent. It is true that we can, at least in principle, entertain an idea, but fail to express it linguistically. Nevertheless, the relationship between ideas and their linguistic expression is not exactly like the relationship between ideas and judgements (or between ideas and affections). This point can be established on the basis of a distinction Descartes

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draws in the Sixth Meditation. There he explains the difference between 'imagination and pure understanding'.33 When we imagine for example a triangle, we see with the 'mind's eye' the image of a triangle, as though it were present before us and, 'simultaneously' (Lat. simul), we also understand that it is a figure bounded by three lines. While the mental image of a triangle is a non-propositional entity, our understanding that this imagine presents a figure bounded by three lines is clearly propositional. But the mental presentation of an image is not a more primitive phenomenon than the linguistic expression of what is presented, for we can sometimes understand that something is the case without, however, being able to associate in an unequivocal way what we understand with a mental image. Descartes considers here for example the idea of chiliagon. On the one hand, we understand the idea of a chiliagon as a polygon that has a thousand straight sides and a thousand angles, but, on the other hand, we cannot clearly and distinctly imagine a chiliagon. Our mental representation of a chiliagon - considered simply as the pictorial presentation of a geometrical figure in the imagination - does not differ in any special respect from the mental representation of a myriagon, or any other polygon with a very large number of sides. When we see a chiliagon, so to speak, with the 'mind's eyes', what we 'see' is so indefinite that we could not precisely express it linguistically. We do not 'see' with a great degree of precision whether this image that presents itself in the imagination has a thousand or, say, a thousand and three sides. Alternatively, we can entertain the idea of a chiliagon - understood as a geometrical figure that has a thousand straight lines and a thousand angles - without simultaneously having in the imagination the presentation of any sort of mental picture. An idea always has a propositional content, but this does not mean that we firstly entertain a picture-like thought, and then express it linguistically. Nor does it mean that at the moment we entertain an idea, we always simultaneously 'see' an object (as though it were before us) and understand that this object has such and such properties. These two phenomena 'mentally seeing' something and 'understanding' that something is the case are to a certain extent independent of each other. The extent to which one may occur without the occurrence of the other depends on the kind of idea we have. When we entertain the idea of a triangle we simultaneously entertain a mental image and its linguistic expression; when we entertain the idea of a chiliagon, 33

AT vii, 72, /. 4-10: Quod ut planum flat, primo examino differentiam quae est inter imaginationem et puram intellectionem. Nempe, exempli causa, cum triangulum imaginer, non tantum intelligo illud essefìguram tribus lineis comprehendam, sed simul etiam istas tres lineas tanquam praesentes acie mentis intueor, atque hoc est quod imaginari appelo.

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we entertain a proposition of the form 'a chiliagon is an object with such and such properties', but only occasionally do we also entertain the mental image of a chiliagon. And even when a mental image is associated with the idea of chiliagon, it is depicted in the imagination in a very vague way. As we can see, the nature of the relationship between ideas and their linguistic expression is quite distinct from the nature of the distinction between ideas and judgements (or between ideas and affections). In the §74 of the first part of the Principia we can find a further argument for the thesis that 'mentally seeing' something and 'understanding' that something is the case, are events that, at least to a certain extent, may occur independently of one another. In this text, Descartes argues that, for the proper use of language, we tie 'all our ideas' (Lat. conceptos omnes nostros) to words so that we can express them in linguistic terms. Then we store in the memory not only the ideas we have entertained, but also simultaneously the words we have used to express them.34 At a later time, when we recall our ideas, we entertain once more the thing represented and simultaneously its linguistic expression. Alternatively, it may also occur that, at a later time, we only entertain the words we have used to express a picture-like thought, without the simultaneous presentation of this picture-like thought in the imagination. In this case, we simply understand what is signified by these words, without a concomitant apprehension of a picture-like thought. Perhaps Descartes affirms in the Third Meditation that the word 'idea' properly denotes picture-like thoughts, because the ability to express thoughts in linguistic terms is a relatively late event in our intellectual development. Thus, to say that ideas are properly picture-like thoughts, would amount to saying that in an early phase of our intellectual development our mental life is dominated by the apprehension of picture-like thoughts. During this phase we are not yet in a position to express linguistically our ideas. But after we have mastered the proper use of language, our ideas become overwhelmingly propositional entities. So, we can make assertions without having to call to mind the picture-like thoughts associated with these assertions. Descartes' controversial statement, in the Third Meditation, that ideas are, on the one hand, like pictures of objects and, on the other, the subject of

34

AT viii, 37, /. 23-30: Et denìque, propter loquelae usum, concpetus omnes nostros verbis, quibus eos exprimimus, alligamus, nec eos nisi simul cum istis verbis memoriae mandamus. Cumque facilus postea verborum quam rerum recordemur, vix unquam ullius rei conceptiim habemus tam distinctum, ut ilium ab omni verborum conceptu separemus, cogitationesque hominumfere omnium circa verba magis quam circa res versantur...

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predication, has not passed unnoticed in the Cartesian scholarship.35 D. Perler, for instance, argues that, in fact, it is not so problematic that Descartes has not established a precise distinction between propositional and a non-propositional ideas. And the reason for this is that the distinction between a propositional and a non-propositional idea is just a matter of degree.36 We can perceive an object with more or less precision. When we are not interested in the properties of an object, we perceive it in non-propositional terms. In this case, D. Perler argues, we can describe our perception by formulating something like Ί am thinking about x'. On the other hand, when, for the sake of precision, we are interested in the properties of an object, we can describe our perception by formulating something like Ί think that χ is F.' In this case our perception is supposed to have a propositional structure because it involves the proposition 'x is F'. It seems to me, however, that the distinction between propositional and non-propositional is too fundamental to be analysed solely in terms of degrees. Whether I describe my perception as Ί am thinking about x' or Ί think that χ is F', what is described has a propositional structure, regardless of the fact that in the second case we convey more information about χ than in the first case. What characterises the propositional content of an idea, as I have tried to show, is not the degree of precision with which a mental content is presented. An idea always has a propositional structure because it can always be linguistically expressed. A pressing problem related to the lack of a precise distinction between nonpropositional and propositional ideas in the Third Meditation is posed by M. Wilson.37 She correctly argues that propositions may be true or false quite independently of their being affirmed or negated. This otherwise trivial thesis is stated against Descartes' thesis that ideas - or to be more exact, the propositional content of ideas - considered in themselves, are neither true nor false. As we have seen, for Descartes truth or falsity arises only when ideas are affirmed or negated in the form of a judgement. But it seems to me that we do not necessarily have to ascribe to Descartes commitment to these two flagrantly conflicting theses, namely that ideas have a propositional content and that the proper bearers of truth are not ideas, but judgements. I have tried to show 35

Cf. e.g. D. Perler, Repräsentation bei Descartes, 1996; M. Wilson, 'Judgement, ideas, thought', in Descartes, 1978, p. 141 ff.; D. Rosentahl, 'Will and the theory ofjudgement', in (ed.) A. Rorty, Essays on Descartes' Meditations, 1986, p. 409-10; H. Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in Descartes's Meditations, 1970, p. 128131; E. M. Curley, 'Descartes, Spinoza and the ethics of belief debate', 1975, p. 170 ff. Op. cit. p. 261: Zwischen einer nicht-propositionalen und einer proposittonalen Idee besteht kein prinzipieller, sondern eher ein gradueller Unterschied. 37 Op. dt., p. 14'lff.

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above, with the analogy of the man shut up in a room, that we can draw a distinction between epistemically uninteresting propositions and epistemically interesting propositions. The former simply describe what the man privately perceives in the interior of his closed room, while the latter describe something about his external environment. Epistemically uninteresting propositions always have a structure like: Ί am (mentally) seeing x' or Ί am (mentally) seeing that χ is F \ In a certain sense, they are always true. But because they are incorrigibly true, and fail to convey any information about the external world, they are not epistemically interesting. An epistemically interesting proposition, on the other hand, has the form: '3x' or 'x is F'. They do not describe our internal states, but something about the external world. Thus, in the Méditations, Descartes seeks to elucidate the conditions under which we are entitled to pass from the first to the second kind of propositions: Epistemically Uninteresting

Epistemically Interesting

I am (mentally) seeing χ

3x

I am (mentally) seeing that χ is F

χ is F

As is well known, for Descartes, the passage from an epistemologically uninteresting proposition to an epistemologically interesting one, is valid only when what is 'mentally seen' is seen in a clear and distinct way. Only in these circumstances are we entitled to affirm that our description of something that remains private to ourselves coincides with a description about something external to ourselves. It is only in the context of an affirmation of this kind that we can properly speak of the truth or falsity of a proposition, i.e. speak of truth in a way that is relevant to our knowledge of the external world. This distinction between epistemically interesting propositions and epistemically uninteresting propositions is similar to a distinction Descartes himself draws in the §10 of the first part of the Principia. There he rebuts the objection that the 'proposition' p\ ego cogito, ego sum could not be taken as the first true proposition of his system, for this proposition presupposes the truth of another proposition, namely p2 'it is impossible that that which thinks should not exist.' Descartes does not deny that we cannot know p\ without knowing p2. But since p2 does not by itself provide any information about something that exists, Descartes argues that it is not worth mentioning p2 among the true propositions, which we can discover by employing his method of

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investigation.38 Propositions like p2 belong to a class of propositions Descartes calls 'simple natures' or 'common notions'. To this class also belong, for instance, the non-contradiction principle along with some general notions such as 'existence', 'extension', 'thought', etc.39 Propositions of the form Ί am (mentally) seeing x' or Ί am (mentally) seeing that χ is F', on the other hand, belong to a class of propositions that simply describe our internal states. But, nevertheless, both classes of propositions are on a par with each other in that their truth is not epistemically interesting or, as Descartes says in the Principles with reference to propositions like p2, in that they should not be counted among the propositions related to our knowledge of the external world.40 From what we have seen thus far it must be clear why Descartes affirms that it is only with respect to judgements that we can properly speak of truth and falsity. A judgement presupposes two elements: an idea and an act of affirmation. I have tried to show that the first element, being propositional, is capable of being affirmed or denied. But even though ideas have a propositional content, they are not properly the bearer of truth, for they do not say anything about the external world, but only about our internal states. In the Third Meditation, Descartes is concerned with developing an analysis of ideas. His intention is to show that by analysing our idea of God, it is also possible to establish that God exists, and that God is no deceiver. But the proof of God's veracity leaves us with an unsolved problem: if God is no deceiver, why do we so often make false judgements?41 In order to deal with this problem, Descartes turns his attention in the Fourth Meditation to the second element of 38

AT viii, 8, /. 8-16: Atque ubi dixi hanc propositionem, ego cogito, ergo sum, esse onmium primam et certissimam, quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat, non ideo negavi quin ante ipsam scire oporteat, quid sit cogitatio, quid existentia, quid certitudo; item, quod fieri non possit, ut id quod cogitet non existât, et talia; sed quia hae sunt simplicissemae notiones, et quae solae nullius rei existentis notitiam praebent, idcirco non censui esse numerandas. " AT x, 419, /. 22-29: Hue etiam referendae sunt communes illae notiones, quae sunt veluti vincula quaedam ad alias naturas simplices inter se conjungendas, et quorum evidentia nititur quidquid ratiocinando concludimus. Hae scilicet: quae sunt eadem uni tertio, sunt eadem inter se; item, quae ad idem tertium eodem modo referri non possunt, aliquid etiam inter se habent divesum, etc. 40 The French translation reads:.. .je η 'ai pas jugé qu 'elles dussent être mises ici en compte. 41 AT vii, 54, /. 4-10: Nec ullum de hac re dubium superesset, nisi inde sequi videretur, me igitur errare nunquam posse; nam si quodeunque in me est, a Deo habeo, nec ullam ille mihi dederit errandi faculatem, non videor posse unquam errare. Atque ita prorsus, quamdiu de Deo tantum cogito, totusque in eum me converto, nullam erroris aut falsitatis causam deprehendo; sed, postmodum ad me reversus, experior me tomen irmumeris erroribus esse obnoxium...

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judgements, namely the act of affirmation or negation by means of which we transform ideas into judgements.

4. Facultas cognoscendi and facultas eligendi The two elements of judgement - idea and affirmation - are related to two different faculties: the understanding and the will. Descartes refers to the understanding as the 'faculty of knowing' (Lat. facúltate cognoscendi) whereas the will is referred to as the 'faculty of choosing' or simply 'free will' (Lat. facúltate eligendi / arbitrii liberiate). Through the understanding we perceive ideas, and through the will we affirm or negate them. We are in error when we affirm an idea that does not really correspond to reality (or, alternatively, when we negate an idea that actually corresponds to reality). Descartes' point is that neither the understanding nor the will alone can be the cause of error. The problem of error, he argues, arises as a result of an 'interaction' between understanding and the will: ...adverto illos a duabus causis simul concurrentibus dependere, nempe a facúltate cognoscendi quœ in me est, et a facúltate eligendi, sive ab arbitrii liberiate, hoc est ab intellectu et simul a volúntate

But why should we seek the cause of error in the interaction between the understanding and the will rather than in some sort of defect in them? Even granted that the problem of error only properly arises when we affirm, through the will, ideas perceived in the understanding, it might well be the case that it is owing to some kind of imperfection either in the understanding or in the will (or in both of them), that we are prone to epistemic error. What makes the problem of error an important issue for Descartes in the Meditations, is the fact that he assumes, as a consequence of God's veracity, that neither the understanding nor the will are faulty when they are considered independently of each other. Considered on their own, Descartes argues, they cannot be blamed as the cause of error. Thus, let us examine Descartes' analysis of these faculties, firstly by turning to his conception of understanding and then to his conception of will. Descartes characterises the understanding as the faculty of apprehending ideas.43 There are two kinds of limitations to which this faculty is subjected:

42

AT vii, 56, /. 11-15.

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the first one is intrinsic to the understanding itself, while the second is extrinsic to it. The extrinsic limitation consists of the fact that we cannot apprehend all ideas capable of being apprehended. There simply are an infinity of ideas that will never appear in my understanding.44 But, as Descartes himself admits, there is no reason at all to expect, as a consequence of God's veracity, that God should have granted us with an omniscient understanding like his own.45 The fact that we do not possess an all-apprehending understanding is not by itself some proof of an inherent imperfection in this faculty, for it simply happens that we cannot entertain all ideas capable of being entertained. Since for Descartes to perceive an idea consists in 'seeing' a mental object with the 'mind's eyes', we can understand his argument here with the analogy of vision. Just as there are many physical objects we will never see, so there are many ideas that will never be apprehended in our understanding. But the fact that we cannot see all physical objects capable of being observed does not represent some kind of imperfection in our visual capacity. It simply occurs that we are not in a position to see every existing physical object. Because we do not have the power of ubiquity we are by no means impaired in our visual capacity. This analogy also allows us to comprehend that, on the other hand, there is an intrinsic limitation to which the understanding is subjected. Indeed, just as there are plenty of physical objects (for example very distant or microscopic ones) we cannot see as a direct consequence of some intrinsic limitation of our visual capacity, so there are ideas we cannot entertain, because they simply escape the limits of human understanding. In this regard, Descartes compares the understanding with other faculties, such as memory and imagination, which, in us, are 'quite limited' (Lat. valde finitam / tenuem et circumscriptam).46 But in whatever sense we comprehend the limits of human understanding, Descartes emphasises that this limitation alone cannot be the cause of error. We can be in error only with respect to the things that are true or false. Through the understanding, we simply entertain ideas, while the

43

AT vii, 56, /. 15-16: Nam per solum intellectum percipio tantum ideas de quibus judicium ferre possum... The French text reads slightly differently: Car par l'entendement seul je η 'assure ni nie aucune chose, mais je conçois seulement les idées des choses, que je puis assurer or nier. 44 AT vii, 56, /. 18-20: quamvis enim innumerae fortasse res existant, quorum idae nullae in me sunt, non tamen proprie illisprivatus, sed negative tantum destitutus... 45 AT vii, 56,1. 21-23: ...quia nempe rationem nullam possum afferre, quaprobemDeum mihi majorem quam dederit cognoscendifacultatem dare debuisse... 46 AT vii, 57,/. 4 and/. 10.

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enactment of a false judgement requires more than the sheer apprehension of a mental content. It also requires an act of the will. Descartes argues that there is no reason at all to complain that we are not endowed with a greater or more perfect free will. Unlike the understanding, the will is not subjected to any intrinsic limitation. Having a free will is just a matter of being able to choose a course of action to the detriment of another course of action. For this reason, we could not have a greater or more perfect free will, for it is already as great as it can be.47 Descartes goes as far as to maintain that free will is the human faculty that best bears witness to the resemblance between human beings and God.48 True, given the intrinsic limits of human understanding, we cannot ever expect to comprehend the designs of divine will, i.e. to comprehend why God wills what he wills. Nevertheless, considered simply as a faculty of choosing, neither God's nor human beings' will could be improved or diminished in any relevant sense. The fact that we sometimes make irrational choices is not some proof that the human 'faculty of choosing' is in itself imperfect, or subjected to some intrinsic kind of limitation. If, for example, the only available means for a person to recover from an ailment consisted of taking a certain medicine, and if this person really wanted to be cured, then it would be irrational for this person not to take the medicine in question. But in being irrational in her choice she does not diminish her free will. Another person who, in the same circumstances, decided to take the medicine, would be more rational, but would not for this reason possess a greater or more perfect free will. While the understanding can be characterised in terms of degrees (its performance can be assessed as better or worse in this or that circumstance, it can be more or less powerful in these or those intelligent beings), free will is an all-or-nothing affair. As Descartes

47

AT vii, 56, /. 27-30: Nec vero etiam queri possum, quod non satis amplam et perfectam voluntatem, sive arbitrii libertatem, a Deo acceperim; nam sane nullis illam limitibus circumcribi experior. 48 AT vii, 57, /. 11 -15 : Sola est voluntas, sive arbitrii libertas, quam tantam in me experior, ut nullius majoris ideam apprehendam; adeo ut illa praecipue sit rottone cujus imaginem quondam et similitudinem Dei me referre intelligo. See also AT xi, 445, /. 18-23 : Car il n'y a que les seules actions qui dépendent de ce libre arbitre, pour lesquelles nous puissions avec raison être loués ou blâmés; et il nous rends en quelque façon semblable à Dieu, en nous faisant maître de nous mêmes... ; AT v, 159: In eo igitur major est voluntas intellectu et Deo similior, AT ii, 628, /. 6-9 :... Dieu nous a donnés une volonté qui n'a pas de bornes. Et c'est principalement à cause de cette volonté infinie qui est en nous qu'on peut dire qu 'il nous a crées à son image.

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puts it, the nature of the will is such that we could not take anything away from it without completely destroying it.49 But if the will cannot be improved in any relevant sense, indeed, if human free will is not worse than divine will, then it cannot be the cause of error. Thus, Descartes' point is that the cause of error must be sought in the interaction between the understanding and the will. In principle, we are free to affirm or negate whatever ideas are presented in the understanding. Thus, we make a false cognitive judgement when we affirm an idea that is not clearly and distinctly perceived. But it is up to us, Descartes argues, to refrain from making a judgement when the idea apprehended in the understanding does not fulfil the criterion of truth. Descartes medicine for the avoidance of error, therefore, consists in the resolution to suspend judgement whenever the content of our perception is not clearly and distinctly apprehended. Descartes' conception of judgement, along with his recommended therapy against epistemic error, however, raise a number of difficulties that have not passed unnoticed to most critics of Descartes. In the remaining sections of this chapter I would like to point out these problems involving Descartes' theory of judgement.

5. Descartes ' ethics of belief Descartes' conception of epistemic error seems to entail the thesis that error is always voluntary. But this thesis is clearly absurd, for in inquiring into the causes of epistemic error, we are not usually interested in understanding the possibility of self-deception, but in understanding how we turn out to be mistaken in our cognitive judgements, even though we manifestly do not want to. However, we would have to accept the thesis that error is always voluntaiy, if we accept without qualification the thesis that we can affirm or negate at will whatever ideas are apprehended in the understanding. In order to see this problem more clearly, we must examine what it means to affirm or to negate an idea. We can make here a distinction between a weak and a strong sense of 'affirming' or 'negating' an idea. The weak sense consists in the simple utterance, whether to oneself or to someone else, of a proposition. In a weak 49

AT ix, 48: Je n'ai pas aussi sujet à me plaindre, de ce qu'il m'ait donné une volonté plus étendue que l'entendement, puisque, la volonté ne consistant qu'en une seule chose, et son sujet étant comme indivisible, il me semble que sa nature est telle qu 'on ne lui saurait rien ôter sans la détruire...

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sense, it is not problematic to assume that we can affirm or negate whatever ideas we entertain. I can for example affirm the proposition 'the moon is made of cheese' or 'two and two equal five' by simply deciding to affirm these propositions. I call it affirmation in a weak sense because, in this case, I affirm a proposition without really committing myself to its truth, or without being sincere in my utterance. But it is clear that when Descartes speaks of affirming or negating a proposition in the Meditations, he is not interested in this weak sense of affirmation. Indeed, considered in a weak sense, the affirmation of an idea could never be the cause of error. If I affirm that the moon is made of cheese or that two and two equal five, without really committing myself to the truth of these propositions, or without being sincere in my statement, I am incurring in no error at all. I can perfectly affirm these things - perhaps out of insincerity, or as an actor on top of the stage - even though I know they are manifestly false. But when Descartes claims that we have to be cautions in the affirmation or negation of an idea as a condition for the avoidance of error, he understands affirmation or negation in a stronger sense. To affirm or to negate an idea in a strong sense does not amount to simply uttering a proposition, it also involves a commitment to the truth of what is affirmed or negated. To commit oneself to the truth of an utterance in this way means to believe what is being uttered.50 Accordingly, making a judgement implies believing that what is judged to be true is actually true. To be in error, then, means to believe something false. Descartes' point is that since we can affirm or negate an idea at will, we can avoid error (we can avoid false beliefs) by refraining from affirming ideas that do not satisfy the criterion of truth. But the problem - as many of Descartes' critics have pointed out - is that if we had this power of affirming or negating a given mental content at will, we would also be able to believe or fail to believe at will whatever ideas were apprehended in the understanding. Once I have considered, for example, the proposition '2+2=5', I should be able to decide to believe it or not. The question concerning the extent to which - or whether at all - we have some kind of voluntary control over our beliefs, has traditionally been discussed in the context of a debate, usually referred to as the ethics of belief.51 In this debate the thesis according to which we can believe a proposition at will, i.e. believe something as the result of a decision to believe, is usually called doxastic voluntarism. Well-known defenders of doxastic voluntarism Cf. e.g. J. V. Buroker, 'Arnauld on judging and the will', 1996, p. 6: When one affirms, one commits oneself to the truth of the proposition; when one denies, one commits oneself to its falsity. See also E. M. Curley, 'Descartes, Spinoza and the ethics of belief, 1975. 51 See e.g. (ed.) G. McCarthy, 'The Ethics of Belief Debate', 1986.

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include authors such as Pascal, W. Clifford, and W. James.52 Doxastic voluntarism has also been scathingly criticised over the last decades. In an influential paper, Bernard Williams, for instance, has advanced some pressing arguments against the idea that we could believe something at will.53 He argues, for example, that it is proper of beliefs that they aim at truth. To believe ρ is the same as to believe that ρ is true. If we could believe ρ at will, then we would also have to be able to decide to believe it independently of its being true or false. We should, then, be able to make utterances, like Ί believe that p, but ρ is not true.' But this assertion is clearly irrational, for if a person holds a belief, she means that what she believes is actually true. In assuming that we could believe something at will, we would be denying this elementary fact about beliefs, namely that they aim at truth. B. Williams' paper was followed by a spate of other texts developing the idea that doxastic voluntarism is untenable. Owing to the position he defends in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes has also frequently been viewed in the context of this discussion as a typical supporter of doxastic voluntarism.54 But some authors, on the other hand, while attributing to Descartes commitment to doxastic voluntarism, also seek to make a distinction between a strong and a milder version of the thesis that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. The strong version consists basically of the idea that we could simply decide to have this or that belief, in the same way we can decide, for instance, to drink tea instead of coffee. This would be a case of direct control over our beliefs. A more moderate version of this thesis, on the other hand, says that we do have voluntary control over our beliefs, but this control is only indirect. We can decide to have this or that belief inasmuch as we can direct our attention to some evidence that supports the belief we want to have, at the same time we voluntarily ignore all evidence against the beliefs we do not want to have. Murray Clarke, for instance, distinguishes 'doxastic voluntarism' from 'attention voluntarism'. He argues in favour of the latter, but against the plausibility of the former.55 Doxastic voluntarism is false because beliefs are

52

Pascal, Pensées-, W. James, 'Will to believe', 1897; W. Clifford, 'The ethics of belief, 1886. B. Williams, 'Deciding to believe', 1973. The classical supporter of the thesis that belief is involuntary is Hume. But in more recent times, as far as I am concerned, the only author who resumed this thesis prior to B. Williams' paper was H. H. Price, in his lecture 'The freedom of assent in Descartes and Hume', in Belief, 1969, p. 221-239, and in the previous paper 'Belief and will', in Aristotelian Society, Supplement. 28, 1954, p. 1-26. 54 See e.g. P. Markie, Descartes ' Gambit, 1986. 55 M. Clarke, 'Doxastic voluntarism and forced belief, in Philosophical Studies, vol. 50, 1986, p. 44: We can direct our attention away from evidence we wish to reject, concentrate on positive evidence, and in this way influence our belief acquisition procedures: attention 53

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not the result of a choice. Rather, they are 'forced' on us whether or not we want them. Yet, he argues, we still have some control over the belief acquisition process, for when we examine a given subject matter, we can concentrate our attention on some piece of evidence while we ignore other relevant evidence. True, this kind of control of our beliefs, as Clarke points out, is irrational, but it is anyway within our power to direct our attention away from relevant evidence so as to have only the beliefs we want to have. In the light of the distinction between 'doxastic voluntarism' and 'attention voluntarism', Clarke also seeks to criticise Descartes' description of the role our will plays in the acquisition of new beliefs. As a result of the theory defended in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes would have clearly committed himself to doxastic voluntarism. As he puts it: The whole Cartesian project of suspending belief, of radical hyperbolic scepticism, depends on our being able to choose our beliefs. (...) The Cartesian intemalism program depends vitally on the doxastic voluntarist thesis being, at least in rough outlines, accurate.56

My own view is that the distinction between 'doxastic voluntarism' and 'attention voluntarism' is correct. In normal circumstances, we cannot just bring ourselves to believe this or that proposition, at any rate not in the same way we can decide to perform this or that action. But, on the other hand, we can, at least to a certain extent, fail to be unbiased in the examination of a problem, inasmuch as we can decide to attend only to the evidence that favours a belief we want to hold. The conceptual distinction between 'doxastic voluntarism' and 'attention voluntarism' has also been defended by other authors, such as H. H. Price and R. Hoyler, even though they do not employ this terminology.57 However, the thesis defended by most of these authors, according to which Descartes would have committed himself to doxastic

voluntarism is true. We cannot, however, choose our beliefs once these indirect procedures are completed. 56 Clarke's thesis that Cartesian doxastic voluntarism results from the theory Descartes presents in the Fourth Meditation is stated right at the beginning of his paper. 57 R. Hoyler, 'Belief and will revisited', in Dialogue, vol. 22, 1983, p. 274: Many who have recently discussed belief and will have invoked the distinction between direct and indirect influences of the will. A direct influence is understood simply as choosing to believe or disbelieve a certain proposition - what has been called belief. By contrast, indirect influence is more a matter of choosing to act or to direct one's attention in a certain way or submit oneself to certain strong influences...·, and H. H. Price, 'Belief and will', in Aristotelian Society, Supplement. 28, 1954, p. 1-26.

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voluntarism, is false. The kind of control over our beliefs discussed in the Meditations involves attention voluntarism, and not doxastic voluntarism.

6. Attention voluntarism and scepticism It is a well-known fact that to counter the sceptical challenge is one of Descartes' overt objectives in the Meditations. But if Descartes really committed himself to doxastic voluntarism, or even only to attention voluntarism, could he be justified in his claim to have refuted the sceptic? Descartes himself points out, both in the Synopsis of the Meditations and in the First Meditation, that it is 'with freedom' (Fr. avec liberté) that he intends to call into doubt all his previous cognitive assumption.58 And in the first part of the Principia, he asserts that, because we have a free will, we can refrain from believing whatever we recognise to be doubtful.59 But if we can doubt everything 'with freedom', or if we are free to believe or disbelieve doubtful propositions at will, could not the sceptic simply argue against Descartes, that he can insist on his own freedom to doubt as a way to reassure his sceptical position? If Descartes actually committed himself to doxastic voluntarism, then the possibility to doubt at will becomes a pressing problem for him. Against the arguments brought forward in the Meditations, the sceptic could always reply that, just as we are free to determine the content of our beliefs at will, so we are free to avoid any belief at all. Being a sceptic, then, would be less a matter of having compelling arguments against the possibility of knowledge than of simply wanting to stay in the state of doubt. But even supposing that Descartes did not commit himself to such a strong version of doxastic voluntarism, but only to attention voluntarism, he has to face a similar problem. According to attention voluntarism we are free to direct away our attention from relevant evidence supporting a proposition we do not want to believe, while we concentrate our attention solely on the evidence backing a proposition we do 58

AT ix, 13: ...je m'appliquerai sérieuseument et avec liberté à defruire généralement toutes mes anciennes opinions', and AT ix, 9: Dans la seconde dure plus qu'il ne faut, et qu 'elle fait employer à délibérer le temps qui est requis pour agir, elle estfort mauvaise.

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epistemic balance itself can appear to us as something better or worse than the sides we are faced with. If we consider the state of epistemic balance as something in itself bad, we can arbitrarily ignore one of the sides by considering only the advantages of the other side (and also the advantages of not being in the state of epistemic balance itself), and thus determine ourselves to act.53 Alternatively, we can regard the state of epistemic balance as something in itself good, inasmuch as we give ourselves time to inquire further into the reasons we have to be in this state.54 This having been said, let us examine now what happens during the time an action is being performed. While an action is being performed, Descartes argues, freedom involves neither the first nor the second kind of indifference. Freedom in this case consists solely in the spontaneity with which we perform the action that has appeared to us as something good. As Descartes puts it: Libertas autem spedata in actionibus voluntatis, eo ipso tempore quo eliciuntur, nullam indifferentiam, nec primo nec secundo modo sumptam, involvit; quia quod sit, non potest manere insectum, quandoquidem sit. Sed consistit in sola operandi facilitate; atque tunc liberum, & spontaneum, & voluntariumplane idem sunt.55

During the accomplishment of an action, we are not indifferent any more, i.e. we are not divided between two contrary sides, for in this case we have already embraced one of the sides to the detriment of the other. And we follow one side because, at the moment of the choice, it somehow appeared to us as something good. But we can recognise something as good with more or less 53

Cf. e.g. F. Pironet, 'The notion of non velie in Buridan's ethics', in (ed.) J. M. Thijssen and J. Zupko, The Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy of John Buridan, 2001, p. 204: ...the agent cannot stay in such a passive state for very long, unless, of course he is an ass. This state is only provisional because even if the intellect is unable to rationally determine •which is the greater good, it can always judge that it is not good to remain in this state, and so it willjudge that making an irrational choice or arbitrary choice (by playing dice or by other means) is the greater good. Even if Buridan does not explicitly give this answer, it seems to follow from his theory of will. 34 Cf. e.g. J. Zupko, 'Freedom of choice in Buridan's moral philosophy', in Medieval Studies, vol. 57, 1995, p. 93: Thus, if the will is faced with conflicting appearances concerning its object (i.e. if it feels both agreement and disagreement in it), the act of deferring in order to consider the matter further will appear to it as good. Both J. Zupko and F, Pironet refer to several passages where Buridan clearly defends the view that a choice is always a choice for something we consider good, so that we cannot ever choose something bad qua bad. A further similarity between Descartes and Buridan in this regard is the distinction Buridan draws between the freedom of the will 'before accepting or rejecting an object' (Lat. ante obiecti acceptationem vel refutationem) and freedom of the will 'once a full inquiry has been made' (Lat. inquisitione facta plenari). Cf. J. Zupko op. cit. p. 90, p. n. 45. 55 AT iv, 174, /. 26 - 175, /. 2.

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clarity. If it is recognised to be good with utmost clarity, then we act with utmost spontaneity. In this case, we are free even though we are not indifferent at all.56 It is the second definition of freedom offered in the Fourth Meditation that is at issue here: we are free, therefore, not because we can go to both sides, but because in following one side to the detriment of the other, our action is determined by the perception of a clear and distinct idea. It now becomes clearer why the letter of 1645 does not represent a departure from Descartes' earlier pronouncements of the problem of freedom: we have, actually, a 'positive power of self-determination', but only before an action is elicited. We can have good reasons to perform a certain action, but nevertheless fail perform it, because before the accomplishment of this action we may turn our attention away from the reasons in virtue of which we consider the performance of this action good.57 But can we now employ a similar argument to explain, not so much the possibility of irrational action, but of irrational belief?

6. The concept of attention Descartes' account of the way we come to act irrationally also explains how we come to form irrational beliefs. The explanation is the same in both cases because, for Descartes, beliefs also involve the performance of a certain action, namely the act of assenting. When we perceive an idea in a clear and distinct way, we always assent to its truth. Just as we cannot, for example, fail to start a diet as long as we consider it good to start a diet, so we cannot fail to assent to the truth of an idea as long as we perceive it in a clear and distinct way. During the time ρ is perceived as a clear and distinct proposition, we just cannot fail to make the judgement by means of which we affirm that ρ is true. But it is up to us to direct our attention solely at ρ or not. Governing our own attention is, at least to some extent, within voluntary control, it is something we can do or fail to do.58 There is, however, an important difference between the act of assenting to the truth of a clear and distinct proposition and the 56

Cf. Fourth Meditation (AT vii, 58, /. 10-13): ... nam si semper quid verum et bonum sit clare viderem, nunquam de eo quod esset judicandum vel eligendum deliberarem; atque ita, quamvis plane liber, nunquam tamem indifferens esse possem 57 Cf. e.g. B. Williston, 'Akrasia and the Passions in Descartes', in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 7,1999, p. 41£f. 58 Cf. e.g. AT, xi, 361, /. 9-12: Ainsi, quand on veut arrêter son attention à considérer quelque temps un même objet, cette volonté retient la glande pendant ce temps-là penchée vers un même côté.

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performance of an action we recognise to be good. The perception of a clear and distinct idea involves a greater effort of attention. We cannot perceive an idea in a clear and distinct way unless our attention is solely focused on the content of our perception. The concept of evidence, thus, involves the concept of attention. The thesis that the concept of attention is constitutive of the concept of clearness and distinctness, as many commentators have already pointed out, is stated in a diversity of texts by Descartes.59 In the Regulae, for instance, Descartes argues that an intuition (the mental operation by means of which we have a clear and distinct idea)60 always presupposes the activity of an 'attentive mind.'61 Descartes compares the act of intuiting with the act of seeing.62 When we intuit an idea, he argues, it is as though we were seeing 'with attention' a

5

' Cf. e.g. U. Nolte, Philosophische Exertìtten bei Descartes, 1995, p. 91: Auchfâr Descartes' intuitives, introspektives Denkens ist die Anspannung der Aufmerksamkeit zentral. Vom Maße dieser Anspannung hängt die Klarheit und Deutlichkeit der Erkenntnis ab. Cf. also A. Kemmerling, 'Die Bezweifelbarkeit der eigenen Existenz', in (ed.) A. Kemmerling and Hans-Peter Schütt, Descartes Nachgedacht, 1996, p. 103: Aber pro Bewußtseinsakt gibt es immer höchstens einen einzigen Gedanken, der im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit steht. Und nur der eine Gedanke, der im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit steht, kann jene höchste Evidenz zur Geltung bringen, die innerhalb des betreffenden Bewußtseinsakts alle Gedanken ausblendet. And G. Rodis-Lewis, L'individualité selon Descartes, p. 178: la multiplicité des textes cartésiens qui évoquent le rôle de l'attention met bien davantage en lumière son importance dans l'activité mentale: loin de se réduire comme les autres facultés à un ensemble de qualités et de propriétés reçues passivement par l'esprit, c'est elle qui en règle l'usage et dirige aussi bien l'effort d'intellection pure qui abouti à l'évidence, que les fonctions psycho-physiologiques contribuant à nous y conduire ou à nous en detoumer. 60 Cf. e.g. AT χ, 368, /. 21-26: Ita unusquisque animo potest intueri, se exitire, se cogitare, triangulum terminari tribus lineis tantum, globum unica superficie, et sirmla, quae longe plura sunt quam plerique animadvertunt, quoniam ad tam facilia mentem convertere dedignantur. 61 AT χ, 368, /. 13-17: Per intuitimi intelligo, (...) mentis purae et attentae tam facilem distinctumque conceptum, ut de eo, quod intelligimus, nulla prorsus dubitatio relinquatur. Cf. also Principes: AT ix, (b), 44: ...la connaissance sur laquelle on peut établir jugement indubitable doit être non seulement claire mais aussi distincte. J'appelle claire celle qui est présente et manifeste à un esprit attentif . 62 Cf. e.g. AT χ, 369, /. 1-10: Caeterum ne qui forte moveantur vocis intuitus novo usu, aliarumque, quas eodem modo in sequentibus cagar a vulgari significatione removere, hic generaliter admoneo, me non plane cogitare, quomodo quaeque vocabula his ultimis temporibus fuerint in scholis usurpata, quia difflcillium foret ijsdem nominibus uti, et penitus diversa sentire; sed me tantum advertere, quid singula verba Latine significent, ut, quoties propria desuní, illa transférant ad meum sensum, quae mihi videntur aptissima. See also AT χ, 400, I. 24-26: Et quidem, quomodo mentis intuitu sit utendum, vel ex ipsa oculorum comparatione cognoscimus; AT vii, 36, /. 11-12: ...etiam in iis quae me puto mentis oculis quam evidentissime intueri.

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mental object with the 'mind's eyes'. But it is important to notice that what characterises the act of seeing something 'with attention' (whether it is a mental or physical object) is not in itself the performance of an action different from the act of seeing. In order to perform an activity with attention, it is necessary that, during the performance of this action, we think only on what we are doing. To see for example a film 'with attention' does not mean to perform two different activities at a time, namely 'seeing a film' on the one hand, and 'directing our attention to what is seen' on the other. We see a film with attention when we think only of what is being seen, leaving out of consideration, for example, what we are going to do tomorrow, what is happening in our environment while we see the film, etc.63 Accordingly, when we have a clear and distinct idea, this idea does not appear in the mind mingled with other ideas; it appears as though it were 'pure' in the mind.64 It is for this reason that, in the Principles, Descartes affirms that an idea is 'distinct' inasmuch as it is perceived in the mind in isolation from other ideas.65 It is not difficult to realise, then, that seeing something with attention for a long period of time is more difficult than seeing something without attention. In seeing something with attention we have to make an effort to leave out of consideration everything other than the object of our perception.66 Descartes' point is that the perception of a clear and distinct idea involves a similar narrowing of our perceptual field: when we have a clear and distinct idea we consider it for a brief period of time in isolation from other ideas. And as long as this idea is thus considered, we just cannot fail to assume that it is true. In view of this, we can now understand in which sense the distinction between freedom before and freedom during the performance of an action, is also relevant to the thesis that, absolutely speaking, we can always avoid assent to

63

Cf. H. Alexander, 'Paying heed', in Mind, 1953, p. 518: ...to say that I was attending to what I was doing, whether it be reading or playing tennis, is just to say that 1 was not thinking about anything else at the time. Cf. also A. White, Attention, 1964, p. 5 ff. 64 In defining the concept of 'intuition' in the Regulae Descartes also speaks of the perception 'of a pure and attentive mind' (Lat. mentis purae et attentae). 65 AT ix, (b), 44: ... consiste à considérer, juger, examiner toutes choses, et ne s'obliger ny attacher à aucune, mais demeurer à soy libre, universel, ouvert et present a tout. ,73

In order to understand why, according to Charron, we remain free in that we 'neither attach to nor abide by' (Fr. ne s'obliger ny attacher ) any opinion at all, it would be helpful to attend to the role that the idea of 'ignorance' had in the sixteenth century. Initially, this idea was chiefly debated in the context of theological disputes. E. Rice, for instance, argues that since the publication of Nicholas of Cusa's De Docta Ignorantia, acknowledgement of one's own ignorance had been envisaged as a condition for the achievement of divine grace.74 Once we had recognised that we do not really know the things we usually claim to know, and our minds have become devoid of all opinions, we would be ready to receive divine revelation. But the idea of ignorance gradually lost its immediate theological implications, and became more and more associated with a sceptical attitude towards the dominant philosophical tradition. In Charron's Sagesse we still find both attitudes towards the idea that we do not really know anything at all. On the one hand, he endorses the theological principle, according to which, in order to prepare ourselves to divine revelation, we should turn our mind, so to speak, into a 'blank sheet'

73

De la Sagesse, p. 386 (emphasis added). It is important to notice here that Charron, unlike Descartes, does not define 'judgement' as the affirmation of a proposition or idea, but as the simple examination of the evidence con and pro the truth of a given claim. Cf. Sagesse, p. 386: Par juger nous η 'entendons pas résoudre, affirmer, determiner; cecy seroit contraire au second qui est ne s'obliger à rien; mais c'est examiner, peser, balancer les raisons et contreraisons de toutes parts, le poids et mérité d'icelles, et ainsi quester la vérité '. 74 E. Rice, The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom, 1973, ρ.186: Since Petrarch's essay On His Own Ignorance and Nicholas of Cusa's De Docta Ignorantia, the notion of ignorance had played an important part in the development of the idea of wisdom Used in the framework of a religious philosophy emphasising illumination and grace, it enforced, as in Cusa, a reassertion of the transcendence of wisdom and its inaccessibility to the unaided reason. But it could serve a very different purpose. When the idea of ignorance, understood now as a general intellectual skepticism, was combined an assertion of the autonomous power of the will, it became a lever by which wisdom was transferred from the weaker to the stronger faculty, from intellect to will.

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(Fr. carte blanche).75 But, on the other hand, he also insists, in line with Academic scepticism, that recognition of the 'human condition of plain ignorance' (Fr. condition humaine pleine d'ignorance) is a way to 'maintain' our own freedom: ...se maintenir à soy et en liberté, hoc liberiores et solutiores sumus, qui a nobis integra judicandi potestas manet C 'est garder modestie et recognoistre de bonne foy la condition humaine pleine d'ignorance faiblesse, incertitude76

This conception of freedom, resulting from the awareness of our own ignorance, is not the same as 'free will', i.e. a simple power of choice. What is at issue here, as some commentators have noticed, is a conception of human autonomy. E. Rice, for instance, calls it 'inner secret integrity' or 'intellectual liberty'.77 And in his examination of Charron's moral thought, R. Kogel argues that, in the Sagesse, Charron was chiefly concerned with a program for the establishment of the 'moral autonomy of man.'78 Charron himself calls this conception of human autonomy a 'superior freedom (Fr. liberté seigneusriale). And it is through 'suspension of judgement and resolution' (Fr. sursceance d 'arrest et resolution)79 that we achieve this 'superior freedom' :

75

De la Sagesse: La théologie (...) nous enseigne que pour bien preparer nostre ame à Dieu, et à l'impression de saint esprit, il la faut vuider, nettoyer, despoiller, et mettre à nud de toute opinion, creance, affection; la rendre comme une carte blanche... 76 Sagesse, p. 387 (emphasis added). The same passage from Cicero's Académica reappears in a slightly different form in the second edition of the Sagesse, p. 404: Mais aux sages, modestes, retenus, c'est au rebours la plus seure assiete, le plus heureux état de l'esprit, qui par ce moyen se tient ferme, droit, rassis, inflexible, tousjours libre et à soy: hoc liberiores et solutiores sumus, quia intégra nobis judicandi potestas manet 77 E. Rice op. cit. 189-190: In short, because the intellect cannot know the truth wisdom demands a universal liberty equivalent to a universal relativism, an inner secret integrity equivalent to universal skepticism; and \ il\He will conclude that the nature of wisdom is based on these characteristics of the soul; that the weakness of the intellect determines the first component of wisdom, complete intellectual liberty, a liberty defined as tolerant and universal scepticism.. See also p. 190: For Charron it has become an ironical and serene intellectual liberty, rooted in an acceptance of human ignorance. 78 Renée Kogel, 'Charron's moral thought', in Pierre Charron, 1972, p. 64: Charron not only posed the idea of the moral autonomy of man, he also substantiated it with a fully developed rationale and a program for its realization. 79 Cf. 'surseance', in Dictionnaire de L'Académie Française (1694): Delay, suspension, temps pendant lequel une affaire est sursise. And 'arrêt', in Dictionnaire de L'Académie Française (1798): Jugement d'une Cour, d'une Justice souveraine, par lequel une question défait ou de droit est décidée.

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L'autre point de cette liberté seigneuriale d'esprit est une indifference de goust, et surseance d'arrest et resolution, par laquelle le sage considérant froidement et sans passion toutes choses, comme dit est, ne s'aheurte, ne jure, ne se lie, ou s'oblige à aucune...80

There are many other passages in the Sagesse where Charron clearly recommends a sceptical stance as a means to attain 'indifference' and, thus, preserve our own freedom.81 But we can already see that Charron proposes in his De la Sagesse precisely the kind of attitude Descartes will later criticise in the Meditations. For Descartes, the state of indifference resulting from general suspension of judgement represents only the 'lowest degree of freedom'. A superior conception of freedom, closer to the ideal of human autonomy, consists of spontaneous assent to clear and distinct ideas. Let me now conclude this chapter with a brief reference to another author, Gassendi, who advocated a kind of scepticism similar to the sceptical attitude that had already been proposed by Montaigne and Charron before him.

5.3 Gassendi Gassendi, as the author of the Fifth Set of Replies to the Meditations, was a direct interlocutor of Descartes. In the Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversus Aristoteleos, written about fifteen years before the publication of Descartes' Meditations, Gassendi makes a criticism of Aristotelian philosophy. His point is that Aristotelism had become so rooted in the philosophical discussions of his time, that people were not able to think for themselves any more. In view of this, Gassendi sought to establish what he called 'philosophical freedom',82 which he also considered the most important point of his philosophy.83 He

80

De la Sagesse, p. 399 (emphasis added). Cf. op. cit. p. 303: C'est assez dit de cette parfaite liberté dujugement, establie de ces trois pieces, juger de tout, ne juger rien, estre universal. See also p. 325-6: Voyci donc la premiere liberté d'esprit, surseance et arrest du jugement (...) C'est à peu près, et en quelque sens Γataraxia de pyrrhoniens, la neutralité et indifference des academicies (...) la magnanimité d'Aristote. 82 See e.g. O. Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi: Nominalisme, Matérialisme et Métaphysique, 1971, p. 33: Cette liberté est avant tout revendiquée contre l'esclavage, la 'tyrannie ' d'Aristote à laquelle se soumettent les Scolastiques, enfermés volonttairement dans la 'prison' péripatéticienne... 83 Opera Omnia, iii, 113a: Cum illa porro animi libertas sit quovis auro pretiosior: cum omnia naturae ductu sic tendant in libertatem, ut et omnia animantia, et plaeraeque res inanimae illudPoetae occinant, liberiate opus est..

81

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suggests, then, quoting the same passage from Cicero's Académica to which Montaigne and Charron had already referred, that we should seek that kind of freedom resulting from Pyrrhonic artaraxia. Quamobrem non consurgimus, contendimusque ad hanc libertatem, ex qua vera ilia Pyrrhoneorum Ataraxia consequitur! Ille sane generosior, qui, hoc liberiores, inquit, et solutiores sumus, quod integra nobis est judicandi potestas...84

It is, again, questionable whether Pyrrho actually envisaged ataraxia as a means to preserve our freedom. But it is anyway clear that many sixteenth and seventeenth authors employed sceptical arguments, both from Academic and Pyrrhonic traditions, in contexts where they were interested in showing that a sceptical attitude was a sort of tool to guarantee our 'intellectual freedom' in the face of dogmatic impositions. As we can see, these passages from Montaigne, Charron and Gassendi show that the kind of scepticism I have described in this chapter is not a philosophical invention designed to fit my own interpretation of Descartes' sceptical arguments in the First Meditation. This kind of scepticism was seriously defended by major sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thinkers as a form to preserve our 'intellectual freedom'. In the next chapter, I will advance some arguments in order to show that this conception of freedom may be comprehended as a conception of human autonomy.

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Opera Omnia, iii, 113b.

CHAPTER FOUR FREEDOM, AUTONOMY, AND SCEPTICISM Introduction In this chapter, I will firstly focus on some contemporary accounts on the concept of autonomy. My thesis is that Descartes' conception of freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas may actually be comprehended as a conception of human autonomy. I will draw a distinction between minimal autonomy and full autonomy. We are minimally autonomous when we suspend judgement and, thus, avoid the possibility of being manipulated by an evil genius. We are maximally autonomous, on the other hand, when our beliefs are formed in accordance with the criterion of truth. It is only when we employ the criterion of truth, not following any authority other than the authority of reason, that we may be really held responsible for our beliefs. The kind of responsibility we have for our beliefs is usually referred to in the contemporary epistemological debate as 'epistemic responsibility'. I intend to show, then, that the notion of 'epistemic responsibility' plays an important role in Descartes' Meditations. My thesis is that most commentators have failed to notice that, in the Meditations, Descartes was interested, not only in establishing a valid criterion, but also in pointing out the character traits in virtue of which we are disposed to form our beliefs in a responsible way. Finally, I intend to show that a traditional line of interpretation, according to which Descartes' scepticism, differently from ancient scepticism, would be a purely epistemological affair, is false. Both Descartes and the sceptic were concerned with a conception of the good life in which we could recognise ourselves as autonomous agents, i.e. as truly responsible for our beliefs and our actions.

I. Lack of autonomy through manipulation In the previous chapter, I have shown that, by suspending judgement, we avoid the possibility that our freedom is curtailed by the 'impositions' of a deceiving god. But it could be objected that we are free whether or not we

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suspend judgement. Even considering that, possibly, an evil god constantly deceives us, we are nevertheless free to control our attention: we can concentrate our attention on our ordinary opinions while we ignore the sceptical hypothesis, and then feel compelled to accept that they are really true. Or we can instead focus our attention on some sceptical arguments, suspending our judgement, for a moment, as to the truth of our ordinary opinions. It is up to us to decide which propositions we want to attend to. The existence of an evil god would certainly make all our habitual knowledge claims groundless, but it does not, for the same reason, seem to threat our freedom of choice. If this is so, then it is unclear in which sense suspension of judgement might contribute to the preservation of our freedom. We have already seen that in the Fourth Meditation Descartes presents two different concepts of freedom: freedom as a power of self-determination to one of two contrary sides, and freedom as spontaneous assent to clear and distinct ideas. But it is not yet clear what freedom in the second sense means. My own view is that freedom in the second sense must be comprehended as a conception of human autonomy. The objection formulated above is valid only with respect to the first conception of freedom, but not with respect to the second. We can, actually, freely decide which propositions we want to attend to, and the existence of an evil god does not make us less free in this regard.1 But in one important respect the existence of an evil god makes us less free. We are less free in the sense that, if there exists an evil god, we cannot recognise the opinions we ordinarily hold as really ours. We recognise, at most, a strong inclination to believe that our ordinary opinions are true, but we cannot recognise ourselves as responsible for the opinions we have. Naturally, in a very unproblematic sense it is undeniable that our opinions are our opinions, full stop. But when we speak of our opinions we often also mean the way by means of which we arrive at them. It is one thing, for instance, to believe something because under hypnosis we are induced to believe it; and it is a quite different thing to believe something because, as a result of careful examination of the evidence available, we come to believe it. In both cases we hold a certain belief, but this belief is said to be ours in slightly different ways: in the first case, it is ours simply because we are the holder of the belief, while, in the second case, it is ours because we are also responsible for the formation of our belief, i.e. this belief does not simply befall us. To say that we are

1

One similar argument is defended by G. Strawson, 'The brain in the vat as free agent', in Freedom and Belief, 1986, p. 320-322. See also Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume, and Kant, 1992, p. 207 for a similar point.

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'responsible' for the formation of our belief, means to say that, at the moment when the belief was formed, we were not under the influence of someone else's will.2 Should there be an evil god, then our beliefs would be our beliefs only in the first sense of ours, but not in the second, because we could not recognise ourselves as really responsible for the beliefs we hold. The possibility that our beliefs do not originate from the consideration of reasons, but from the external influence of an evil god, would also represent a threat to our freedom, i.e. freedom understood as the capacity to be moved by our own reason and not by someone or something external to ourselves. The distinction between these two conceptions of freedom, namely the conception of freedom as a simple power of choice (the conception at issue in the objection with which I have begun this chapter) and the conception of freedom as the capacity to be moved through the examination of reasons, have deserved much attention in the contemporary philosophical debate, thanks to an influential paper by Isaiah Berlin, where he draws a distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' liberty.3 My own view is that this is precisely the distinction at issue in the Fourth Meditation, where Descartes speaks of two distinct concepts of freedom: freedom as a power of choice, and freedom as spontaneous assent to clear and distinct ideas. According to Berlin, 'negative liberty' consists in the capacity to determine ourselves to a course of action without external constraint. It is called 'negative' because what matters here is the absence of external obstacles at the moment when we perform a certain action. 'Positive freedom', on the other hand, is more than the mere power of choice. It also involves the capacity to determine ourselves to a course of action through the consideration of evidence. As Berlin puts it: The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not by causes which affect me as it were, from outside.4 2

Cf. C. Taylor 'The sources of authenticity', in The Ethics of Authenticity, 1991, p. 25: The ethics of authenticity is something relatively new and peculiar to modern culture. Born at the end of the eighteenth century, it builds on earlier forms of individualism, such as the individualism of disengaged rationality, pioneered by Descartes, where the demand is that each person think self-responsibly for him- or herself... Cf. also R. Lindley, in Autonomy, 1986, p. 48-9. 3 1. Berlin, Two concepts of liberty, 1958. I. Berlin affirms on p. 6 that he will not make any distinction between 'liberty' and 'freedom'. 4 Op. cit. p. 16.

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The notion of liberty contained in it is not the 'negative' conception of a field without obstacle, a vacuum in which I can do as I please, but the notion of selfdirection or self-control.5

If there were an evil genius, we would have only 'negative' liberty, but not 'positive liberty'. We would not be, to use a formulation suggested by Berlin, 'an instrument of our own', but an instrument of an evil genius. Now, freedom (or liberty) understood in the latter sense, as something we would not have in case we were not in a position to recognise ourselves as responsible for our own actions and opinions, is sometimes referred to in the contemporary philosophical literature as 'autonomy'. J. Feinberg, for instance, comprehends the concept of autonomy as a congeries of different virtues, among which there lies the virtue of authenticity. What he affirms of a person lacking this virtue resembles Descartes' description of the situation in which we find ourselves at the end of the First Meditation. Descartes sustains, on the one hand, that he cannot fail to believe his ordinary opinions, but he acknowledges, on the other, that the only rationale he is in a position to offer is that they are 'very probable'. In referring to the inauthentic person, J. Feinberg makes a similar point: To the degree to which a person is autonomous he is not merely the mouthpiece of other persons or forces. Rather his tastes, opinions, ideals, goals, values, and preferences are all authentically his. (...) The inauthentic person (...) can construct no rationale for his beliefs other than that they are the beliefs held by those to whom he responds (if he even knows who they are), and can give no reason for thinking that their beliefs (like those of some reasonably selected authority) might be correct.6

It seems to me that, on the basis of this statement, it would not be implausible to assume that Descartes would envisage the existence of an evil god as a real threat to our autonomy. At the end of the First Meditation, just before recommending general suspension of judgement, Descartes' position, to employ here the terminology suggested by J. Feinberg, is quite similar to the position of an 'inauthentic' person, for he does not know whether his ordinary opinions are 'authentically his'. He does not know whether his judgements are not in fact made owing to the influence of other 'persons' or 'forces'. The 5

Ibid. p. 29. J. Feinberg, 'Autonomy', in (ed.) J. Christman, The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, 1989, p. 32. 6

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'forces' at issue here may be construed as the influence of an evil god, whereas the 'persons' could be taken as designating the 'reasonably selected authority' of tradition. The authority of tradition renders our ordinary opinions very 'probable' (in Descartes' sense of 'probable'), but, nevertheless, we are not ourselves in a position to affirm that this tradition 'might be correct'. A similar account of the concept of autonomy is also offered by G. Dworkin. He argues that it is our autonomy that is threatened when we suspect that we are 'deceived' or 'manipulated' by someone: Just as a person may feel used, may feel that he is an instrument of another's will, when his freedom is interfered with, so he may feel when he is deceived or manipulated or tempted. His actions while in one sense his, he did them, are in another sense attributable to another. It is his autonomy which is threatened.7

Once more the concept of autonomy is characterised in a way that makes it reminiscent of a problem Descartes faces towards the end of the First Meditation. After critical reflection, Descartes concludes that, possibly, he is just an 'instrument of another's will', for it may be the case that an evil god 'manipulates' his thoughts, in such a way that he is constantly 'deceived' in his judgements. The deception and manipulation of an evil god, therefore, would represent a danger to our autonomy. If there is an evil god, then our ordinary opinions, while in a certain sense obviously ours, in another relevant sense are 'attributable' to someone else, for we do not really know if we are not being manipulated when we make the judgements by means of which we arrive at those opinions. We can, then, avoid manipulation and deception in that we suspend judgement. It is only in the Second Meditation, with the discovery of the true proposition I think, I am, that the general suspension of judgement makes room for a belief we can regard as authentically ours. But before turning to Descartes' so-called cogito argument, I would like to examine a possible objection which might be raised against the thesis that the suspension of judgement proposed in the First Meditation is a means to guarantee our autonomy.

7

G. Dworkin, 'The concept of autonomy', in (ed.) J. Christman, The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, 1989, p. 60. Cf. also J. Rudinow, 'Manipulation', m Ethics, 1978, p. 347, who associates manipulation with loss of autonomy.

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There are good reasons to assume that the conception of freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas, discussed in the Fourth Meditation, may be comprehended as a conception of human autonomy. But, at first glance, this thesis seems to entail a problem: it might be objected that if we comprehend the second definition of freedom of the Fourth Meditation (freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas) as a conception of autonomy, then this kind of freedom could not be at issue in the First Meditation. Indeed, if in order to preserve our autonomy at the end of the First Meditation, we must 'obstinately' keep in mind some sceptical hypotheses until we are able to suspend judgement, then we do not have any more what the second definition of freedom of the Fourth Meditation presupposes, namely: the perception of clear and distinct ideas. The state of irresolution arising out of the suspension of judgement is characterised precisely by the absence of clear and distinct reasons impelling us more to one side than to the other one. In the state of indifference we have what Descartes calls 'the lowest degree of freedom'. It is important to notice, however, that the mere suspension of judgement guarantees only a 'minimal' level of autonomy. I call it minimal in the sense that we avoid the risk of not being the real author of our opinions, of not being autonomous, by giving up any opinion at all. Descartes defines the second conception of freedom in the Fourth Meditation in terms of degrees: the more a clear and distinct perception impels us to one side, the freer we are.8 A maximum of evidence, then, entails a maximum of freedom. According to the second definition of freedom, therefore, we can be more or less free. We are maximally free when we do not have any choice other than accepting the truth of a clear and distinct idea. But if there is a maximum of freedom, there must also be a minimum thereof. We are, then, minimally free when we suspend judgement due to the absence of clear and distinct ideas.9 In both cases,

8

AT vii, 57, /. 29 - 58, /. 3: ...quo magis in unampropendeo, srve quia rationem veri et boni in ea evidenter intelligo, sive quia Deus intima cogitationis meae ita disponit, tanto liberius illam eligo. The text French here reads as follows: ...d'autant plus que je penche vers l'un, soit que je connaisse évidemment que le bien et le vrai s'y rencontrent, soit que Dieu dispose ainsi l'intérieur de ma pensée, d'autant plus librement j'en fais choix et je l'embrasse. 9 Failure to comprehend the distinction between freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas, and freedom as indifference, has led, for instance, W. van Reijen ('Freiheit und Moral in der Philosophie Descartes", in Zeitschriftför Philosophie, vol. 29, 1975, p. 134) to affirm that it is the suspension of judgement that constitutes for Descartes the highest form of human freedom: In der Urteilsenthatung sieht Descartes denn auch die höchste Form

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freedom may be understood as a conception of autonomy, for both assent to a clear and distinct perception and suspension of judgement aim at avoidance of deception or any other kind of external interference in the enactment of our judgements. In the First Meditation Descartes recommends that we suspend judgement, even as regards clear and distinct perceptions, in order to avoid the possibility that an evil god imposes anything on us. But in the Third and Fourth Meditations, after having already proved that God is no deceiver, Descartes makes it clear that assent to clear and distinct ideas constitutes, in fact, the best way to avoid deception.10 Nevertheless, even considering that God is no deceiver, the possibility of deception is still present, for the influence of the passions or reckless acceptance of preconceived opinions, could easily lead us into making false judgements. For this reason, Descartes recommends in the Fourth Meditation that we do not make any judgement, unless we have a clear and distinct perception. Since the concept of freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas is characterised in terms of degrees, the concept of autonomy - if it is to be identified with such a conception of freedom - must be comprehended, too, in terms of degrees. Thus, in the context of the First Meditation, we are minimally autonomous in the sense that we avoid deception by deliberately suspending judgement. And in the context of the Fourth Meditation, on the other hand, we are maximally autonomous when we avoid deception by spontaneously assenting to ideas clearly and distinctly perceived. In the Fourth Meditation Descartes opposes the concept of freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas to the concept of freedom as indifference. Freedom as indifference, Descartes argues, consists simply in the power to choose one of two contrary sides when we are not impelled more to one side than to the other side.11 Indifference is comprehended as the lowest degree of

menschlicher Freiheit realisiert. This statement clearly contradicts Descartes' point in the Fourth Meditation. Descartes explicitly affirms that, in the state of indifference, we have only the lowest degree of freedom. 10 AT vii, 52, 1. 6-9: Ex quibus satis patet ilium fallacem esse non posse; omnem enim fraudem et deceptionem a defectu aliquo pendere, lunúne naturali manifestum est, and AT vii, 53, /. 23-29: In primis enim agnosco fieri non posse ut ille me unquam fallai; in omni enim fallacia vel deceptione aliquid imperfectionis reperitur; et quamvis posse fatare, nonnullum esse videatur acuminis aut potentiae argumentum, proculdubio velie fallere, vel malitiam vel imbecillitatem testatur, nec proinde in Deum cadit. 11 AT vii, 58, /. 5-8: Indifferentia autem illa, quam experior, cum nulla me ratio in unam partem magis quam in alteram impellit, est infimus gradus libertatis... Cf. also AT vii, 191, /. 21-24: ...ex magna luce in intellectu magna consequuta estpropensio in volúntate, atque ita tanto magis sponte et libere illud credidi, quanto minus fui ad istud ipsum indifferens.

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freedom because it results from a sort of deficiency in our knowledge.12 We have freedom of indifference only when we do not know which side to follow. But the power of choice we have during the state of indifference, (unlike freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas), is not defined in terms of degrees. Freedom considered as a power of choice implies that we are either absolutely free or not free at all.13 For this reason, Descartes goes so far as to affirm that freedom considered as a simple power of choice is the human characteristic that most perfectly bears witness to the resemblance between human beings and God.14 But it does not mean that the lowest degree of freedom and the lowest degree of autonomy are equal. Both of them are, actually, defined in terms of the state of indifference in which we find ourselves when our choice is not determined either by external constraint, or by an evident perception. But if power of choice and minimal autonomy were the same thing, then there would be no point in insisting on the idea of preserving our autonomy against the impositions of an evil genius, for we would be minimally autonomous (we would have a power of choice) whether or not there existed an evil genius. Descartes' point is that we can be free, but, nevertheless, 'use' our free will 'badly'. Being minimally autonomous is not just a matter of having a free will, but of 'acting correctly' when no clear and distinct perceptions are available. In the Fourth Meditation Descartes affirms that, during the state of indifference, we can freely determine ourselves to pursue whichever course of action. If the action in question consists in making a judgement, there are three different possibilities: we can make an affirmative judgement, we can make a negative one, or we can suspend judgement. We

12

AT ix, 46: ... fait plutôt paraître un défaut dans la connaissance, qu 'une perfection dans la volonté. 13 AT ix, 48: ... la volonté, ne consistant qu'en une seule chose, et son sujet étant comme indivisible, il semble que sa nature est telle qu 'on ne lui saurait rien ôter sans la détruire. 14 AT ix, 45: ...c'est elle principalement qui me fait connaître que je porte l'image et la ressemblance de Dieu'. See also AT ν, 159: In eo igitur major est voluntas intellectu et Deo similior, and AT ii, 628, 3-9: Le désir que chacun a d'avoir toutes les perfections qu 'il peut concevoir, et par conséquent toutes celles que nous croyons être en Dieu, vient de ce que Dieu nous a donnés une volonté qui n'a point de bornes. Et c'est principalement à cause de cette volonté infinie qui est en nous qu 'on peut dire qu 'il nous a crées à son image (emphasis added). See also AT xi, 445, /. 18-23: Car il n'y a que les seules actions qui dépendent de ce libre arbitre, pour lesquelles nous puissions avec raison être loué ou blâmé, et il nous rend en quelque façon semblables à Dieu, en nous faisant maître de nous mêmes, pourvu que nous ne perdions point par lâcheté les droits qu 'il nous donne.

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'use' our free will 'badly', i.e. we do not 'act correctly', when we do not suspend judgement.15 Minimal autonomy, therefore, does not equal free will, because we have to be free in order to be autonomous. Being minimally autonomous is not the same as simply possessing a free will, for we may possess a free will, but, nevertheless, use it badly. We use our free will badly when, in the absence of clear and distinct ideas, we fail to suspend judgement. The relationship between the concept of minimal autonomy and the concept of freedom (understood as a power of choice) is not one of identity, but of dependence: we have to be free in order to be autonomous, but we can act freely and fail to be autonomous. This happens when we do not suspend judgement in the state of indifference.16 If this is so, then we can ask ourselves how Descartes describes, in the Meditations, the passage from minimal autonomy to a higher level thereof. This passage occurs, firstly, in the in the Second Meditation, with the discovery of the first true proposition I think, I am, i.e. a belief we recognise as authentically ours, and later, in the Third and Fourth Meditations, with the discovery that God is no deceiver.

3. Cogito and autonomy In the context of the First Meditation, it is still unclear if there can ever be an opinion with respect to which we can raise no doubt as to whether we are its real author or not. Descartes' point is that even though our predicament is such that we cannot ever know anything with certainty, we can at any rate preserve our autonomy by not permitting that we be manipulated or deceived. However, suspension of judgement does not constitute for Descartes a sort of resigned ignorance. Suspension of judgement must be accompanied by attentive reflection. Descartes' objective in the Meditations is, afìer all, to investigate whether or not there is something we can be certain of. For this 15

AT, vii, 60, I. 6-10: Atque in hoc liberi arbitrii non recto usu privatio ilia inest quae formam erroris constttuit: privatio, inquam, inest in ipsa operatione, quatenus a me procedit, sed non in/acuiate quam a Deo accept, nec etiam in operatione quatenus ab ilio depende!. 16 Cf. R. Young, 'Autonomy and the "inner self", in (ed.) J. Christman, op. cit., p. 78: One must be free to be autonomous, but one can be free and still lack autonomy because it is, for instance, possible freely but mindlessly to mimic the states, opinions, ideals, goals, principles, values, and preferences of others. So freedom is necessary for autonomy but not sufficient. At least this much more is needed: that a person's choice actually be expressive of his or her individual preferences, aspirations, and so on.

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reason, while we are irresolute in our judgements, it is expected that we constantly reflect on the tenability of the reasons by consideration of which we have decided to suspend judgement. These different attitudes we may have in the state of indifference - resigned ignorance or attentive reflection - are essential to comprehend Descartes' criticism of scepticism. Descartes' own position concerning our attitude in the state of indifference becomes clearer at the beginning of the Second Meditation, with the discovery that we are the authentic 'author' of our thoughts, even on the supposition that there is an evil god. In the Second Meditation Descartes recalls the sceptical arguments he had previously proposed in the First Meditation. He poses, then, the following question concerning what could reasonably be expected in the face of those sceptical doubts: Quid autem nunc, ubi suppone deceptorem aiiquem potentissimum, et, si fas dicere, malignum, data opera in omnibus, quantum potuit, me delusisse?17

est

His answer is preceded by a meaningful, albeit quite short, methodological remark: Attendo, cogito, revolvo.n Descartes' point here is that he does not simply 'attend' to those arguments, he also has an additional attitude towards them. He refers to this attitude through the verb revolvo. The French translation gives us an indication as to the meaning of this verb: je passe et repasse toutes ces choses en mon esprit. This means that once we have put ourselves into the state of doubt, we should not content ourselves with the satisfaction resulting from the conviction that we are not being manipulated or deceived. We have also to 'revolve' those sceptical arguments in our minds, so as to investigate if there is not something that we may, after all, authentically attribute to ourselves. I call it a methodological remark because it corresponds to the last 'precept' of Descartes' method exposed in the Discours. According to this precept, once a difficulty has been identified, we must perform as many enumerations and reviews as possible.19 Descartes makes this review at the outset of the Second Meditation with the explicit aim of finding something that can surely be 'attributed' to ourselves, in spite of the doubts he had advanced in the First Meditation. But what, without risk of deception, can be 17

AT vii, 26,/. 24-26. AT vii, 27,/. 1. 19 AT vi, 19, /. 3-6: Et le dernier , de faire partout des dénombrements entiers, et des revues si générales, que je fusse assuré de ne rien omettre. Cf. also AT 387, /. 10-13. For a thorough account of the employment of the methodological principle 'enumeration' in ths Meditations, see D. Flage and C. Bonnen, Descartes and Method: Search for a Method in the Meditations, 1999, p. 40-3 et passim. 18

si x, of A

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authentically attributed to ourselves? The first hypothesis in this regard concerns the possession of physical attributes. But Descartes promptly discharges this hypothesis on the basis of the sceptical doubts of the First Meditation. It may after all be the case that an evil genius just gives us a very strong disposition to believe (falsely) that the thoughts representing such things as arms, hands, bodies, etc. correspond to real things, without this being actually the case. For this reason, the possession of physical predicates is not yet something we can be really certain of. The second hypothesis concerns the possession of mental predicates. In this case, even considering the sceptical arguments brought forward in the First Meditation, we cannot deny that we possess such attributes. To have mental predicates means to have different kinds of thoughts. We cannot deny that we do have different kinds of thoughts, even though it is still unclear if the thoughts we have actually correspond to something real. The very fact that we think cannot be denied. For this reason, Descartes concludes that he himself exists, and that this is the only thing we can be truly assured of: Cogitare? Hic inverno: cogitatio est; haec sola a me divelli nequit. Ego sum, ego 20 existo; certum est.

Thought, in the words of the French text corresponding to this passage, is the only 'attribute' (Fr. attribut) that cannot be 'detached' from ourselves. It cannot be detached from ourselves because we recognise ourselves as the authentic 'author' of our thoughts. Naturally, we can be mistaken as to the truth of our thoughts, since we do not yet know if it is not the case that an evil god constantly deceives us whenever we make a knowledge claim. But the very fact that we have thoughts cannot be denied. Later, in the Second Meditation, once more in accordance with the last precept of the Discours, Descartes 'enumerates' what it means to have thoughts. To have thoughts means to doubt, to conceive, to affirm, to will, etc.21 In all these mental activities we can recognise ourselves as the 'author' of our thoughts, at least as long as we perform these mental activities. But, inasmuch as we recognise ourselves as the authentic 'author' of our thoughts, we can also immediately 'infer', without

AT vii, 27, I. 7-9. The French text reads as follows: Un autre est de penser; et je trouve ici que la pensée est un attribut qui m'appartient. Elle seule ne peut être détachée de moi, je suis, j'existe (emphasis added). 21 AT vii, 28, I. 20-22: Sed quid igitur sum? Res cogitans. Quid est hoc? Nempe dubitans. intelligens, affirmons, negans, volens, nolens, imaginons quoque, et sentiens.

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risk of deception, that we ourselves exist.22 Thus, the proposition Ego sum, ego existo can be considered true in spite of the sceptical doubts raised in the First Meditation. This is a belief, therefore, we can consider as truly ours. In an earlier passage of the Second Meditation, Descartes clearly establishes the first true proposition I think, I am in connection with the idea that he is the 'author' of his own thoughts. Descartes asks what could be affirmed with certainty in the face of the sceptical arguments of the First Meditation. Could it not be the case for instance, that an evil god 'puts into' (Lat. immittit) our minds the thoughts we have? He discards this possibility by posing a fiirther question, namely why couldn't we ourselves be the 'author' of our thoughts? Quare vero hoc putem, cum forsan ipsemet illarum author esse possim?23 In the French text this sentence is rendered not by a question, but by an assertion: peut-être je suis capable de les produire de moi-même. It is interesting to notice that the immediately subsequent sentence, in a certain sense, could be regarded as the first occurrence of the proposition Ego sum, ego existo. But it still presents itself in an interrogative way: Nunquid ergo saltern ego aliquid sum?2A This sentence cannot be taken as the first occurrence of the cogito, because it is still unclear whether or not we are the real 'author' of our thoughts. Descartes then reviews the sceptical arguments he had considered in the First Meditation. What emerges from this review is the fact that we can recognise ourselves as the 'authors' of our thoughts, even on the supposition that there is an evil god who wants to deceives us the whole of the time. But when we recognise ourselves as being the real 'author' of our thoughts, what we are doing, in fact, is to recognise that we ourselves exist inasmuch as we have thoughts or, what amounts to the same thing, inasmuch as we think. Hence the conclusion: Ego sum, ego existo,2S This famous argument, by means of which Descartes intends to have inferred his own existence from the fact that he thinks, has been the object of much discussion ever since the publication of the Meditations. The brief account I have offered of this argument here is far from being exhaustive. But I think it is nonetheless appropriate for the purpose of my inquiry. Descartes' 22

Cf. AT iii, 247, /. 1 - 248, /. 4: Vous m'avez obligé de m'avertir du passage de saint Augustin, auquel mon Je pense, donc je suis a quelque rapport (...) Et c'est une chose qui de soi est si simple et si naturelles à inférer, qu 'on est, de ce qu 'on doute, qu 'elle aurait pu tomber sous la plume de qui que ce soit (emphasis added). 23 AT vii, 24, /. 23-24 (emphasis added). Cf. also AT vii, 44, /. 9-10: Quibus profecto non est necesse ut aliquem authorem a me dtversum assignent.. 24 AT vii, 24, /. 24-25 (emphasis added). 25 AT vii, 25, /. 12.

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discovery, in the Second Meditation, that he can regard himself as the real 'author' of his thoughts without risk of deception or manipulation, coincides with the attainment of the first true proposition (Ego sum, ego existo), after the suspension of judgement recommended in the First Meditation. In believing this proposition, we are, in a certain sense, more autonomous, for this is a belief we know to be authentically ours. In the First Meditation, Descartes calls into question his ordinary opinions by concentrating his attention on sceptical doubts. As long as he considers those ordinary opinions and the sceptical doubts simultaneously, he remains irresolute. When he affirms, in the Second Meditation, Attendo,

cogito,

revolvo, he means by revolvo that his attention will now simultaneously focus on the evil god hypothesis, and not on his ordinary opinions as a whole, but on some specific beliefs, of which his ordinary opinions, considered as a whole, are composed. He then 'enumerates' some of these beliefs by simultaneously confronting them with the evil god hypothesis. As a result of this methodological procedure, he comes to the conclusion that the proposition Ego sum, ego existo is true, even considering the evil god hypothesis. It is clear that, while he revolves in his mind his ordinary opinions in the light of the sceptical doubts, the state of irresolution remains. Descartes' criticism of scepticism in this regard is that the sceptic simply -wants to remain in the state of irresolution, without methodically revolving in his mind the arguments by consideration of which he became irresolute. In the Discours, for instance, before announcing the maxims of his so-called provisional moral, Descartes concedes that the precepts of his method will inevitably force him to remain, for a certain time, irresolute in his judgements.26 But he also affirms that he will not remain irresolute in the same way the sceptics are supposed to be irresolute, for his own intent is to achieve true knowledge.27 Descartes' claim against the sceptic in this context is that the state of irresolution should be provisional. In a letter of 1643 to Voetius, Descartes returns to this point, and

26

AT vi, 22, /. 23-27: ...afin que je ne demeurasse point irrésolu en mes actions, pendent que la raison m'obligerait de l'être en mes jugements (...), je me formai une morale par provision... (emphasis added). 27 AT vi, 29, 1. 1-4: Non que j'imitasse pour cela les Sceptiques, qui ne doutent que pour douter, et affectent d'être toujours irrésolus: car, au contraire, tout mon dessein ne tendait qu'a m'assurer... In the Latin translation of the Discours, published in 1646 and revised by Descartes, there is no mention to the idea that the sceptics 'pretend' (Fr. affectent) to be irresolute, but that 'they do not seek anything except the very uncertainty', cf. AT vi, 556: Nec lamen in eo Scepticos imitabar, qui dubitant tantum ut dubitent, et praeter ìncertitudinem ipsam nihil quaerunt. Nam contra totus in eo eram ut aliquid certi reperirem.

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affirms that the sceptic does not make proper use of his reason.28 The sceptic does not conclude from the fact that he thinks that he himself exists, because once he has put himself in the state of doubt, he does not make a proper use of his reason. He simply dwells on the thought that he will preserve his autonomy by not permitting that an evil genius 'imposes' anything on him. The sceptic may be justified in preserving his autonomy by doubting everything. To be sure, if it is the human predicament that we cannot ever know anything with certainty, we can, anyway, minimally preserve our autonomy by avoiding manipulation and deception. But, even while we are irresolute in our judgements, we can make a proper use of our reason by constantly reviewing and enumerating the very arguments that suggest the inescapability of our predicament. If the sceptic acted like this, he would be able - as Descartes was in the Second Meditation - to recognise himself as the real author of his thoughts, and then become immediately assured that at least the proposition Ego sum, ego existo is true without risk of manipulation and deception. In this case, in recognising himself as the real 'author' of his actions and opinions, the sceptic would be even more autonomous than he is by simply suspending judgement. Indeed, if preservation of our own autonomy is the motivation behind suspension of judgement, then, while we are irresolute, it would be rational to inquire into the very reasons we have to be in the state in which we find ourselves. After attentive examination, we may for example discover that autonomy, while in itself important, is still comprehended in the First Meditation in a somewhat unclear way. What the subsequent Meditations show is that, since God is no deceiver, we are properly autonomous, not when we avoid commitment with any opinion at all, but when we willingly subject ourselves to the 'order' and 'law' God has created. We are autonomous in that we impose on ourselves a rule (the rule of truth based on clear and distinct ideas), and refuse to subject ourselves to any authority other than the authority of reason.

28

AT viii (b), 165, /. 11 - 166, /. 6: ...negatis unumquemque, ex eo quod cogitet, recte posse concludere existera: vultis enim Scepticum inde tantum concludere, sibi videri existere, tanquam si quis ratione utens, quantumvis sit Scepticus, sibi videri possit existere, quin simul intelligat se revera existere, quandoquidem id sibi videtur. Atque ita negatis propositionem qua nulla unquam evidentior in ulla scientia esse potest (emphasis added). Cf. also AT vi, 32,1. 18-23: Et remarquant que cette vérité: je pense, donc je suis, était si ferme et si assurée, que toutes les plus extravagantes suppositions des sceptiques η 'étaient pas capables de l'ébranler, je jugeai que je pouvais recevoir, sans scrupule, pour le premier principe de la philosophie, queje cherchais.

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4. Autonomy and epistemic responsibility The term 'autonomy', as well as its cognates in other European languages, was introduced into philosophy thanks to the work of Kant.29 His intention, in simple outlines, was to designate the capacity we have to 'impose' a rational law upon ourselves, and to act in accordance with this law.30 In the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, he defines the autonomy of the will in the following terms: Autonomie des Willens ist die Beschaffenheit des Willens, dadurch derselbe ihm selbst (unabhängig von aller Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände des Willens) ein Gesetz ist.31

It is in the context of his moral philosophy that Kant discusses the concept of autonomy. His thesis is that a truly rational agent is bound only to rational principles. Such a rational agent, who does not commit himself to any kind of authority other than the authority of reason, is said to be autonomous. It is not my purpose here, however, to give a detailed account of Kant's conception of autonomy. My intention is, rather, to call attention to this characterisation of the concept of autonomy as a capacity of self-determination through a selfgiven law. This is, in fact, the basic idea involved in the etymology of the word 'autonomy': we are autonomous when we obey a rational law which we have imposed upon ourselves. According to Kant, obedience to a self-given law does not represent a restraint on our freedom. Quite the contrary, he affirms in Die Metaphysik der Sitten that a person proves his 'freedom in the highest degree' precisely when he is unable to resist the call of duty: Der Mensch (...) beweißt eben damit seine Freiheit im höchsten Grade, daß er der Stimme der Pflicht nicht widerstehen kannn.32 Some authors have pointed out that this association Kant establishes between, on the one hand, obedience to a self-given law, and 'freedom in its highest degree' on the other, was influenced by Rousseau's conception of freedom, according to which we are free when we obey a law we have imposed upon ourselves. In a well-known passage of his Contrat Social, 29

Cf. e.g. R. Pohlmann, 'Autonomie', in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 1995, vol. 1, 707ff. See also M. Forschner, Gesetz und Freiheit: Zum Problem der Autonomie bei Kant, 1974. 30 Cf. J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 1998, 483 ff. See also T. E. Hill 'The Kantian conception of autonomy', in (ed.) J. Christman, op. cit., p. 91-108. 31 Op. cit., p. 440 (Prussian Academy edition). 32 Op. cit., p. 511 (Prussian Academy edition). Cf. also H. Frankfurt, 'Autonomy, necessity, and love', p. 130, n. 1.

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Rousseau affirms that: l'obéissance à la loi qu'on s'est prescrite est liberté.33 Now, even considering the enormous differences which distinguished their respective philosophical projects, it seems to me that this elementary comprehension of the concept of freedom or autonomy as obedience to a selfgiven law, present both in Rousseau's political theory, and in Kant's moral thought, was also an essential component of Descartes' epistemology. In a letter of 1640, for instance, Descartes defines what he understands by 'science' (Lat. scientiam) in terms of an ability to 'discover by oneself everything that may be examined on rational grounds. He affirms, then, that only a person who has acquired 'science' through the exercise of his own reason should be properly called αυτάρκης·. The occurrence of the Greek word αυτάρκη? in this context is noteworthy, for it is etymologically similar to the word 'autonomous'. The basic idea here is that an αυτάρκη? person - just like an autonomous person - is able to 'rule' or to 'govern' herself in the discovery of truth without having to rely on any authority other than the authority of reason. As Descartes puts it: Per scientiam vero, peritiam quaestiones omnes resolvendi, atque adeo inveniendi propria industria illud omne quod ab humano ingenio in ea scientia potest inviniri; quam qui habet, non sane multum aliena desiderai, atque adeo valde proprie αυτάρκη? appellator.34

Descartes' definition of freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas involves this basic sense of autonomy in that, when we act upon the rule of truth, we obey a rule we have given to ourselves. In following this rule we can be assured that there is no kind of authority operating on our will other than the authority of reason. Just as Kant associates the 'highest degree of freedom' (German: Freiheit im höchsten Grade) with the incapacity of 'resisting' the call of duty, so Descartes, on the one hand, opposes freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas to the 'lowest degree of freedom' (Fr. le plus bas dégrée de la liberté)35, and on the other, maintains that a higher degree of freedom

Rousseau, Contrat Social, livre 1, chap. 8. T. E. Hill, op. cit. p. 94, affirms that Kant's debt to Rousseau has not passed unnoticed in the Kantian scholarship. And C. Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, p. 28, affirms that Rousseau's conception of freedom in this context is what Kant will later denominate autonomy. 34 AT iii, 722, /. 13 - 723, I. 2. For another passage where Descartes defines what he understands by 'science', see AT iii, 65, /. 5-8. 35 AT ix, 46. See also AT ix, 149: ...d'une grande clarté qui était en mon entendement, a suivi une grande inclination en ma volonté, et ainsi je me suis porté à croire avec d'autant plus de liberté, que je me suis trouvé avec moins d'indifférence.

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consists precisely in not being able to resist assent to clear and distinct ideas.36 In both cases, the concept of freedom is associated, not with a power of choice, as usually happens, but with the incapacity to act in disagreement with a rational norm we have given to ourselves. But it could be objected here that we cannot really compare Descartes' conception of freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas with Kant's conception of autonomy, because there is a fundamental difference here: while Kant discusses the concept of autonomy in the context of his moral theory, Descartes, on the other hand, introduces the concept of freedom as assent to clear and distinct ideas in the context of his epistemology. The concept of freedom or autonomy plays an important role in the context of a moral theory, because people may be ascribed some kind of responsibility for the actions they perform or fail to perform. In order to justify the comparison between Kant's conception of autonomy with Descartes' conception of freedom, it would, therefore, be necessary to show that, in the context of a theory of knowledge, too, we can ascribe people some kind of responsibility for the beliefs they hold or fail to hold. But as we have already seen, both in the twelfth rule of the Regulae and in the Fourth Meditation Descartes recognises that, because we are free, we may be held responsible for the cognitive judgements we make. In the Fourth Meditation, for instance, he affirms that in situations in which we do not have the compelling evidence of a clear and distinct idea, we 'act correctly' (Lat. recte agere) if we suspend judgement.37 On the other hand, if we decide to make a judgement, even though we do not have proper evidence to, we do 'not correctly use our free will.' 38 If our beliefs are formed as a result of a decision to employ the criterion of truth, then they are formed in a sort of responsible way. And if, on the other hand, our beliefs do not result from the employment of the rule of truth, then they are formed in a sort of irresponsible way. In this case, we 'will not be exempt from guilt' (Lat. non... culpa carebo), even if our

36

Cf. AT vii, 58, /. 10-13: ...si semper quid verum et bonum sit clare videram, nunquam de eo quod esset judicandum vel eligendum deliberarem; atque ita, quamis plane liber, nunquam tamen indifferens esse possem 37 AT vii, 59, /. 28-30: Cum autem quid verum sit non satis clare et distincte percipio, si quidem a judicio ferendo abstineam, clarum est me recte agere, et non falli, (emphasis added). 38 AT vii, 59, /. 30-31: Sed si vel affìrmem vel negem, tunc liberiate arbitrii non recte utor... See also AT viii (a), 19, /. 7-10: Quod autem in errores incidamus, defectus quidem est in nostra actione sive in usu libertatis, sed non in nostra natura, utpote quae eadem est, cum non recte, quam cum recte judicamus (emphasis added).

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beliefs happen to be true.39 To be in error in this case does not mean to hold a false belief, but to form a true belief in a sort of irresponsible way, i.e. in a way that, only accidentally, would lead us to truth. The kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs, by opposition to the (moral) responsibility we have for our actions, is sometimes referred to, in the contemporary epistemological debate, as 'epistemic responsibility'.40 H. Kornblith, for instance, argues that, even though we cannot freely adopt this or that belief, we are free to perform actions which may affect the process by means of which we arrive at our beliefs. We are free, for example, to adopt different methods of investigation, or to attend to different pieces of evidence. As a result of these actions, we come to form a belief which would be different, if we had acted otherwise, i.e. if we had employed a different method or attended to some different evidence. But the reasons in virtue of which we adopt a certain method of investigation to the detriment of another, or attend to a certain evidence to the detriment of another, are ultimately related to certain character traits which dispose us to act in a certain way. We are, nevertheless, free in that it is within our power to develop certain dispositions to act in such a way that we are likelier to form true beliefs. For this reason, just as the actions we customarily perform are representative of our 'moral' character or dispositions, so the beliefs we hold are representative of certain 'intellectual' character or dispositions we have. H. Kornblith summarises this point in the following way: Although it is clearly true that beliefs are not freely chosen, the actions which an agent freely chooses to perform may well affect the process by which his beliefs are arrived at, and thus his beliefs themselves. It is thus that we may assess an agent, or an agent's character, by examining the process responsible for the presence of his beliefs just as we may evaluate an agent, or his character, by examining the etiology of his actions. Actions which are the product of malice display a morally bad character, beliefs which are the product of epistemically irresponsible action display an epistemically bad character.41

39

AT vii, 60, /. 2-3:...si vero alteram amplectar, casu quidem incidan in veritatem, sed non ideo culpa carebo. The French version adduces here a sentence that does not appear in the Latin text: ...et d'user mal mon libre arbitre... (AT ix, 47). 40 Cf. e.g. L. Code, Epistemic Responsibility, 1987; J. Greco, 'Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief, in Synthese, vol. 85, 1990, p. 245-77; J. A. Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, 1993; and J. T. Stevenson, On doxastic responsibility', in (ed.) Κ. Lehrer, Analysis and Metaphysics, 1975, p. 229-253. 41 H. Kornblith, 'Justified belief and epistemically responsible action', in The Philosophical Review, 1983, p. 38.

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A problem which has not yet deserved due attention in the Cartesian scholarship, concerns precisely the character traits which, according to Descartes, we are expected to have in order to make true judgements and avoid error. In the Meditations, Descartes is not interested in simply establishing a criterion of truth. He also insists that we should be 'resolute' in the decision to employ this criterion as a means to avoid error. To use the contemporary terminology suggested by H. Kornblith in the passage quoted above, we can say that Descartes' main intention is that we develop an 'epistemically good character'. We can, actually, follow step by step the arguments that prove the validity of the criterion of truth. But afterwards, due to the influence of the passions or overconfidence on the authority of tradition, it is also possible that we deviate our attention from the reasons in virtue of which we recognise that the criterion of truth is valid. For this reason, Descartes affirms, in the Fourth Meditation, that we should compensate the instability of our attention by repeatedly reflecting on the reasons which establish the validity of the criterion, until we have acquired the 'habit' of suspending judgement whenever we do not have clear and distinct ideas.42 In the Second Set of Replies, Descartes returns to this point and exhorts the reader to 'accustom himself (Lat. assuescant) to distinguishing what is clearly known from what is obscure.43 And later, in his correspondence with Elisabeth, this idea is restated with almost the same words it had been formulated four years before in the Fourth Meditation. Descartes once more emphasises that it is not enough that we possess a valid criterion of truth, it is also important that we acquire the 'habit' of judging well. And we develop this habit by constantly attending to the reasons which prove the validity of the criterion of truth. Let me quote this passage at full length: Au reste, j'ai dit ci-dessus qu'autre la connaissance de la vérité, l'habitude est aussi requise pour être toujours disposé à bien juger. Car, d'autant que nous ne pouvons être continuellement attentifs à une même chose, quelque claire et évidente

AT vii, 61, /. 27 — 62, /. 7: Ac praeterea, etiam ut non possim ab erroribus abstinere priori ilio modo qui pendei ab evidenti eorum omnium percepitone de quibus est deliberandum, possum tarnen ilio altero qui pendei ab eo tantum, quod recorder, quoties de rei ventate non liquet, a judicio ferendo esse abstinendum; nam, quamvis earn in me infirmitatem esse experiar, ut non possim semper uni et eidem cognitioni defìxus inhaerere, possum tarnen attenta et saepius iterata meditatione efficere, ut ejusdem, quoties usus exiget, recorder, atque ita habitum quemdam non errandi acquiram. 43 AT vii, 164, /. 7-8: ...in Mediiationibus meis recensui, ea quae clare cognoscuntur ab obscuris distìnguere assuescant... Cf. also AT χ, 400, /. 13-25: Oportet ingenij aciem ad res mínimas et maxime faciles totam convertere, atque in Ulis diutius immorali, donec assuescamus veritatem distincte et perspicue intueri.

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qu'aient été les raisons qui nous ont persuadé ci-devant quelque vérité, nous pouvons, par après, être détournés de la croire par fausse apparences, si ce η 'est que par une langue et fréquente méditation, nous l'ayons tellement imprimé en notre esprit, qu 'elle soit tournée en habitude. Et en ce sens on a raison, dans l'Ecole, de dire que les vertus sont des habitudes...44

According to Descartes, the 'habit' of making true judgements through the application of the rule of truth is also a kind of 'virtue'. In the Meditations, this kind of virtue is called 'resolution'.45 Resolution consists in the disposition to act in accordance with our best reasons to act, not permitting that the authority of tradition or the misleading influence of certain passions induce us to act otherwise. In the Discours, Descartes had already emphasised the importance the virtue of resolution has in our quest for truth. In the second part of this work, he compares the rules of his method with the laws of a state. His point is that a good state is one in which there is only a couple of rules, but which are 'strictly observed' by its citizens. In like manner, he argues, our knowledge is well grounded if it results from the application of a small set of methodical rules, but which, too, are 'strictly observed' by the knowing subject. He proposes, then, that in our quest for truth we observe only four 'precepts', which should be followed with a 'firm and constant resolution.'46 The comparison between social and methodical rules in this context is not a simple rhetorical manoeuvre. For Descartes, the search for truth is also related to a moral attitude, characterised as a disposition to act in consonance with certain character traits, i.e. character traits which are the same both in the context of our ordinary lives and in the context of a philosophical inquiry. We know that, around 1623, Descartes was working on a short treatise called Studium Bonae Mentis. From this treatise there remain only a few fragments. But they show that, in his early works, Descartes was already concerned with 44

AT iv, 295,/. 22 - 294,/. 3. AT ix, 49: ...s'il ne m'a pas donné la vertu de ne pointfaillir, (...) il a au moins laissé en ma puissance l'autre moyen, qui est de retenir fermement la résolution de ne jamais donner mon jugement sur les choses dont la vérité ne m'est pas clairement connue. 46 AT vi, 18, /. 8-15: Et comme la multitude des lois fournit souvent des excuses aux vices, en sorte qu'un État est bien mieux réglé lorsque, n'en avant que fort peu, elles y sont fort étroitement observée; ainsi, au lieu de ce grand nombre de préceptes dont la logique est composée, je crus que j'aurais assez des quatre suivants, pourvu que je prise une ferme et constante résolution de ne manquer pas une seule fois à les observer. See also AT vi, 40, /. 30 - 41,1. 7. (fifth part of the Discours): Je suis toujours demeuré ferme en la résolution que j'avais prise de ne supposer aucun autre principe que celui dontje viens de me servir pour démontrer l'existence de Dieu et de l'âme, et de ne recevoir aucune chose pour vraie qui ne me semblât plus claire et plus certaine que n'avaient fait auparavant les démonstrations des géomètres... 45

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the employment of moral concepts in the context of his theory of knowledge. In commenting on the remaining fragments of the Studium Bonae Mentis, Baillet affirms that Descartes' intention was to establish a kind of 'science with virtue' (FT. la science avec la vertu). As he puts it: Un autre ouvrage latin, que M. Descartes avait poussé assez loin, et dont il nous reste un ample fragment, est celui de l Etude du Bon Sens, ou de l'Art de bien comprendre, qu'il avait intitulé STUDIUM BONAE MENTIS. Ce sont des considérations sur le désir que nous avons de savoir, sur les sciences, sur les dispositions de l'esprit pour apprendre, sur l'ordre qu'on doit garder pour acquérir la sagesse, c 'est-à-dire la science avec la vertu, en joignant les fonctions de la volonté avec celles de l'entendement.*1

Here we already find reference to themes which will constantly reappear in Descartes' later works, namely the problem concerning the relationship between the understanding and the will, and the problem concerning the 'dispositions' we are supposed to have in order to make science. In another fragment, Descartes divides the sciences into three general groups and ranks philosophy under the group he calls 'cardinal sciences' (Fr. sciences cardinales).4* The occurrence of the term 'cardinal' in this context is noteworthy. In his commentary to the extant fragments of Descartes' short treatise, J. Sirven points out that this term is borrowed from the moral theory of medieval thinkers, such as S. Ambrosius and T. Aquinas.49 This would be an indication, he argues, that, for Descartes, moral and epistemological questions were closely interrelated. The relationship between moral and theoretical matters in Descartes' works has not passed unnoticed in the Cartesian scholarship. Cottingham, for instance, calls attention to an analogy between the 'Cartesian account of knowledge' and the 'ethical sphere'.50 P.

47

AT χ, 191, fragment 1. AT χ, 202, fragment 5: Il divisait les sciences en trois classes: (en marge : STUD. BON. MENT. Artici. 4) les premières, qu 'il appelait sciences cardinales, sont les plus générales, qui se déduisent des principes les plus simples et les plus connus parmi le commun des hommes. 49 J. Sirven, Les Années d'Apprentissage de Descaries (1596-1628), 1928, p. 294-295: Il est intéressant de remarquer, dans la désignation de la première classe des sciences, l'emploi d'un terme emprunté à la morale. Les vertus cardinale, en effet, sont les vertus principales (...) Une pareille appellation, qui parait venir de saint Ambroise et remonte jusq'au platonisme, avait été généralement acceptée par les Pères de l'Eglise, et saint Thomas... 50 Cottingham, 'Partiality and the virtues', p. 72ÊF. See also M. Gueroult, Descartes selon l'ordre des Raisons, vol. 2, 1968, p. 263: Il est incontestable qu'il y a une certaine distinction entre l'ordre du bien et celui du vrai. Mais cette distinction ne suppose

48

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Guenancia has even suggested that Descartes' theory of knowledge may be conceived as the 'objectification of a moral attitude.'51 And, more recently, this idea was resumed by V. Morgan, who argues that, according to Descartes, both moral and epistemologica! theories would be centred on the subject.52 It seems to me, however, that the problem of the relationship between epistemology and morals in Descartes' philosophy has not yet been adequately examined. And the reason for this is that most commentators have failed to recognise the important role the problem of scepticism plays in the context of Descartes' moral theoiy. Indeed, if the refutation of scepticism is traditionally considered a fundamental question in Descartes' theory of knowledge, and if there is a close relationship between moral and theoretical matters in Descartes' work, then, at least in principle, it would be reasonable to presume that the problem of scepticism would also be relevant in the context of Descartes' moral theory. In the next section of this chapter, I intend to point out some reasons for a tendency in the Cartesian scholarship not to include an examination of the problem of scepticism in the analysis of Descartes' moral theory. Against this tendency, I purpose to show that Descartes envisaged the refutation of scepticism mainly as a moral problem, and not as a purely epistemologica! affair.

J. Scepticism and character traits The importance the refutation of scepticism might have in Descartes' moral theory is a theme which has not yet deserved much attention in Cartesian scholarship, because it has been frequently assumed that, with Descartes, the problem of scepticism acquires an entirely new form. Cartesian scepticism would have been motivated by reasons quite different from the reasons underlying the kind of scepticism defended in antiquity by philosophers such as Pyrrho of Elis and later by Sextus Empiricus. This thesis was clearly formulated, for instance, by M. Burnyeat, who argues in an influential paper that, given the moral character of the ancient scepticism, we cannot really compare Descartes and the ancient sceptics. While the ancient sceptics were ultimately concerned with the quest for a good life, Descartes was solely

nullement leur dissociation. ; A. Levi, The French Moralists, p. 290ff.; and G. Herbst, Wissenschaft und Moral bei Descartes, (doctoral dissertation), Heidelberg, 1985, p. 57ff. 51 P. Guenancia, Descartes, 1986, p. 154. 52 V. Morgan, Foundations of Cartesian Ethics, 1994, p. 100.

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interested in epistemological questions.53 This would explain, for example, why the so-called problem of the external never occurred to the ancient sceptics. This problem was unknown to the ancient sceptics, not because they were not as radical as Descartes, to the point of extending their doubts even to the existence of the external world, but because they were concerned with the attainment of a good life. Putting into question the existence of the external world, the world in which they actually lived, would render their doctrine completely senseless. The very notion of 'external world' should be used here with caution, for the ancient sceptics did not understand it in Cartesian terms, i.e. as external to the mind, but in more commonsensical terms as external to the person.54 In view of this, Burnyeat seeks to emphasise the practical character of Pyrrhonian scepticism, as opposed to the purely epistemological character of Cartesian scepticism. As he puts it: He