Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9780520312159

Citation preview

SCARCITY, CHOICE, AND PUBLIC POLICY IN MIDDLE AFRICA

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa DONALD ROTHCHILD and ROBERT L. CURRY, ]r.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS BERKELEY • LOS ANGELES • LONDON

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England Copyright © 1978 by T h e Regents of the University of California ISBN 0-520-03378-7 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 76-50255 Printed in the United States of America

123456789

Contents Acknowledgments PART I: 1.

PART II: 2. 3.

PART III: 4.

5. 6.

vii

INTRODUCTION Political Economy and Policy Choice in the Third World

3

SHAPING POLICY CHOICE UNDER SCARCITY Changing Institutional Resources System Goals, Decision-making Rules, and Collective Choices

37 91

IMPLEMENTING POLICY CHOICES FOR DEVELOPMENT Global Market Contacts: Bargaining Between Multinational Companies and African Governments Beyond the Nation-State: Principles of Economic Integration Policy Integration and External Action: A Minimalist Choice v

151 187 221

vi

/

Contents 7.

PART IV:

8. Index

Global Assistance for Development: Choosing an Appropriate Policy to Cope with Scarcity

267

CONCLUSION: EVALUATING THE PROSPECTS Reducing Scarcity and Expanding Choice

301 337

Acknowledgments Although frequent appeals are heard for increased interdisciplinary study and research, there is, at present, precious little material of this sort available to the serious analyst or policy maker. This volume attempts to compensate in part for this glaring lack. By uniting the disciplines of political science and economics, it seeks to probe the policy alternatives availing to African decision-makers under the difficult circumstances now prevailing. We hope that this effort will stimulate further policy-relevant research on Third World issues. In a broad-ranging work of this type, our indebtedness to colleagues, foundations, librarians, university and research institutions, and civil servants in African and non-African countries goes far beyond anything that we can properly acknowledge. We apologize at the outset to all those whose contributions are not given specific recognition here. Nevertheless, for purposes of brevity, we shall limit ourselves to mentioning only those who have played a direct and substantial role in the shaping of this work. Since we have not always accepted their advice, they can in no way be held accountable for the final result. In particular, we are deeply indebted to Larry Wade, Alexander Groth, David Laitin, Robert Lieber, Glen Gambles,

vn

viti

/

Acknowledgments

Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, Cynthia Brantley, Victor Olorunsola, Ralph Braibanti, Josephine Milburn, Claude Welch, and Edward Olson for careful and insightful comments on various chapters. Marlyn Madison, Karen Fowler, and Lako Tongun provided helpful research assistance, Mimi Dixon and Patricia Arthur gave secretarial assistance most cheerfully, and Linda Eernisse displayed commendable patience when typing (and retyping) the work in its entirety. A part of Chapter 1 was presented as an Open Lecture at the University of Ghana, Legon and was published by the Ghana Universities Press, and a part of Chapter 4 was published in the Journal of Modern African Studies (vol. 12, no. 2, J u n e 1974). We wish to thank the Registrar of the University of Ghana, Legon and the Journal editor and Cambridge University Press for permission to reuse these materials. The appendix to Chapter 1 is based on pages 69 through 73 of A Logic of Public Policy by L. L. Wade and R. L. Curry, J r . , published by the Duxbury Press. We wish to thank Duxbury for permission to use this section. Financial costs were covered by faculty research grants at the University of California, Davis. But over and above all of these forms of assistance is the steady and unwavering support we have received from our wives, Edith W. Rothchild and Dana Curry. We are taking the opportunity of dedicating our book to them in recognition of this fact. DONALD ROTHCHILD University of California, Davis and University of Ghana, Legon

R O B E R T L. C U R R Y , J R . California State University, Sacramento

CHAPTER

Political Economy and Policy Choice in theThird World Social scientists frequently appear to find themselves in a dilemma: how to remain true to the demands of their professional disciplines and how, at the same time, to identify with the needs and aspirations of the governments and peoples of Africa. As great as this conflict seems on the surface, the apparent gap between these two commitments could be reduced through altered theoretical framework. By focusing on policy analysis, both disciplinary and areal orientations can be juxtaposed, helping social scientists who are concentrating on the Third World to raise " t h e right questions."' Thomas R. Dye's remark that "policy analysis might be labeled the 'thinking man's response' to demands that social science become more 'relevant' to the problems of our society" is as applicable to non-Western as to Western countries. 2 1. Margaret L. Bates, review of Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.), National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States, in American Political Science Review 61, no. 3 (September 1967): 824. Also see Henry L. Bretton, "Political Science Field Research in Africa," Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (April 1970): 4 4 2 . 2. Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 6.

3

4

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

Clearly, one way in which social scientists could make a substantial contribution to African development is by helping decision-makers to develop policy objectives and to implement programs to attain them. Rather than assuming a neutral and value-free stance, these analysts might adopt, or at least be sensitive to, the values that could facilitate the probing of complicated issues and the proposing of alternative courses of action to persons in positions of power and responsibility. "What is needed," assert Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, "are some ways of assessing the comparative efficiency of policy alternatives and some means of formulating priorities." 3 We agree, and we view a political economy framework as an appropriate analytical tool to deal with the dynamics of social change that require the formulation and ranking of priorities and the developing and implementing of policy alternatives. In an examination of the decisional choices by public authorities in achieving political, social, and economic goals, political economy offers a useful means of inquiring into the interaction between social, political, and economic organization and process. Such an emphasis on decisional choices orients a political economy approach more toward problem-solving than toward management or maintenance.4 Policy analysis combines two critical disciplines that are central to an understanding of the process of transformation 3. Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 11. Of course, as Robert A. Packenham points out such a policy-relevant approach tends to skirt around normative questions. "Political Development Research," in Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel (eds.), Approaches to the Study of Political Science (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 179, 186-87. For the normative issues from a neoMarxist point of view, see the essays in Richard Harris, The Political Economy of Africa (New York: Wiley, 1975). 4. See the excellent review by Robert T. Golembiewski, " 'Maintenance' and 'Task' as Central Challenges in Public Administration," Public Administration Review 34, no. 2 (March/April 1974): 168-69. Also see Gary L. Wamsley and Mayer N. Zald, The Political Economy of Public Organizations (Toronto: D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. 16-22. A brief but useful discussion of the scope of political economy is in Joel Joalladebu, "Restrained or Enlarged Scope for Political-Economy?" Journal of Economic Issues 9, no. 1 (March 1975).

Political Economy

and Policy Choice

/

5

occurring throughout Africa today — political science and economics. Their interdependence is shown by the priorities set by decision-makers as well as by the problems of application they have encountered. Thus, even while placing considerable emphasis on productive efficiency, planners find themselves unable to isolate the economic factors they seek to influence from political rules and doctrines or social beliefs and habits. 5 Insensitivity to the norms, values, and practices of pastoral people may actually hamper the production of meat or undermine the establishment of viable ranching schemes; similarly, inattention to locally held social stratification patterns may make the diffusion of technological innovation extremely difficult. 6 Economic values, then, can only be effectively considered in a broader context, one which places heavy stress on both the political variable and the social-psychological environment. In emphasizing the elements of choice in relation to political and economic resources, the " n e w " political economy serves as a theoretical model for two main groups: the students of developmental processes seeking analytical insights into the efficiency of resource mobilization and allocation in the particular time-place circumstances prevailing in various states, and the decision-maker searching for means to rank priorities, develop alternative policy designs, and choose and implement a specific policy program. Political economy, therefore, performs both analytic and prescriptive functions. 7 It makes possible a fuller insight into the vital interplay between political and social process and organization, and economic practices. 5. E c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g " m a y b e d e s c r i b e d as the c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t o f a central o r g a n i z a t i o n t o i n f l u e n c e , direct, a n d , in s o m e cases, even c o n t r o l c h a n g e s in the principal e c o n o m i c variables . . . c o n s u m p t i o n , i n v e s t m e n t , s a v i n g " (and p r o d u c t i o n ) . S e e Michael P. T o d a r o , Planning Development ( N a i r o b i : O x f o r d University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 1. 6. D o n a l d R o t h c h i l d , " R e a l i s t Perspectives on A f r i c a n M o d e r n i z a t i o n , " Africa Today 2 0 , no. 4 (Fall 1 9 7 3 ) : 4 1 . A l s o see H a r o l d D . Lasswell, " T h e Policy S c i e n c e s o f D e v e l o p m e n t , " World Politics 17, n o . 2 (January 1965): 288. 7. Y e h e z k e l D r o r , " S o m e Diverse A p p r o a c h e s t o Policy A n a l y s i s : A Partial R e p l y t o T h o m a s D y e , " Policy Studies Journal 1, n o . 4 ( S u m m e r 1973): 258.

6

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

Consequently, political economy combines pure and applied social science research, and thus acquires a dual utility appealing to scholars and statesmen alike. The social scientist or decision-maker utilizing the political economy approach must be wary of a number of possible pitfalls. Later we shall specifically examine the differences in the policy processes between developed and developing societies. Suffice it for now to point out some general problems in the way of easy application of this Western-based theoretical instrument to non-Western circumstances. First, those utilizing a political economy framework must make a conscious effort to accept the existence and validity of different political cultures in which formal and informal decision rules are shaped. In this sense, it is unwise for them to minimize the variance in meanings which diverse societies give to such widely used terms as democracy, stability, freedom, equality, and efficiency. Different definitions as well as different norms, values, and practices in Third World societies will likely have a distinct impact on the decisional process (for example, the extent to which " c o m m a n d " as against "bargaining" procedures prevail). Men are obviously not malleable productive units but human beings with pronounced feelings, interests, habits, and values. As the latter impinge on policymaking, planners may become circumscribed in their capacity to implement transformation: for example, the human costs of transformed productive processes might be too great. It is therefore essential that those adopting a political economy approach view the process of change as much as possible from within a particular situation. By emphasizing the ability of leaders to maximize the goals they set for themselves, the policy analyst can go far in avoiding preconceived preferences that may hinder a rigorous and systematic assessment of policy options under the conditions operating in a particular developing society. Second, the policy analyst will enhance the effectiveness of his recommendations by avoiding deterministic thinking. All too often Western observers conceptualize change as leading in a sequential manner to a parliamentary type of democracy, while his Eastern counterpart (as distinct from the neo-Marxist theorist) superimposes a rigid form of class analysis and an inevitable

Political Economy

and Policy Choice

/

7

8

proletarian triumph on the African scene. But over and above these alien preconceptions is another, and possibly more insidious, type of determinism: namely, a self-defeating pessimism. The assumption (whether grounded on conspiracy doctrines or not) that existing international power relations foredoom an indefinite continuance of African underdevelopment does not automatically give rise to "realism." A case in point is the prediction of one scholar that few of the African countries "are capable of maintaining their current position in the international rank order; to score net gains seems to be well-nigh impossible for m a n y . ' " For African decision-makers to accept such a gloomy prognosis would be to give up the struggle for transformation before it starts. Why bother to restructure one's opportunities if the chances of altering the outcome are so restricted from the outset? By contrast, policy analysts probe given environments to find whatever opportunities, large or small, may be present. They experiment with a wide array of problem-solving initiatives, seeking thereby to enlarge choice through a more effective use of available resources. In this sense, "realism" is commitment to the potential instead of to the actual. Such futuristic orientations leave eventual outcomes undetermined and give policy formers an enhanced role in shaping their countries' relationship to their environments. Third, the policy analyst must be cautious about reaching conclusions on alternative courses of action that rest on a narrow time perspective. Yehezkel Dror's comments on public policy-making in developing countries are pertinent: "Comparison with the past," contends Dror, "is inapplicable: the preindependence period is too different in most variables, and the independence period too short.'" 0 He notes, for example, that 8. On the economic determinism in classical Marxism (as distinct from neo-Marxism), see James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971), p. 26. A statement of the more pragmatic neo-Marxist position appears in E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa (New York: Nok Publishers, 1973), pp. 13-14. 9. Henry L. Bretton, Power and Politics in Africa (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, Co., 1973), p. 19. See also Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research 8, no. 2 (1971): 88-91. 10. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p. 116.

8

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

if the change between past and present net output is insufficient to indicate a future trend, conclusions drawing upon short-term comparisions may be misleading, even fallacious. 11 Dror's point is well taken. In light of the poverty and inequalities inherited from the past, it would be a mistake to evaluate Third World performances in terms of brief postcolonial time spans. Such assessments could lead either to excessive optimism when compared with developmental experience in colonial times or to excessive pessimism when compared with future aspirations. A broader time perspective seems essential in order to minimize the gap between the desirable and the realizable. Fourth, the policy analyst focusing on Third World countries cannot usefully adopt a static theoretical orientation. The process of transformation involves dissatisfaction with the status quo as well as determination and capacity to alter the inherited order in a significant manner. Essential to this effort at revising social practices is a sense of urgency over the need for expanded options, not a limitation of vision to existing state functions and structures." In this sense, structural-functional analysis seems open to the criticism of not going far enough. Although it does enlarge our field for comparison by delineating which functions have corresponding structures in all societies, it affords us little insight into the dynamics of social change affecting all Third World countries (the broadening of the range and extent of organizational goals, international bargaining, exploitation and discrimination, pan-Africanism, regional integration, and so forth). Consequently, there would seem to be grounds for Richard Sklar's complaint that "in today's Africa, an undue emphasis on the existing state system is likely to promote a conservative outlook that cannot easily accom11. Ibid., p. 60. 12. Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 5. Subsequently Almond himself conceded that "the 'new political science' critiques of system functionalism as ideologically conservative make a useful point." "Approaches to Developmental Causation," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt (eds.), Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 7.

Political Economy and Policy Choice

/

9

modate the radical values of liberation, economic freedom, and continental unity.'" 3 And fifth, policy analysts who inadvertently fail to emphasize, or at least recognize, concerns for human betterment court futility and neglect. The realistic problem-solver must aim toward worthwhile objectives if his recommendations are to have a useful thrust — the realism of idealism. To do otherwise, and merely catalog political and economic resources for efficient utilization, would be to engage in a mechanical exercise largely devoid of constructive purpose. Such efforts could, moreover, be used by life-negating decision-makers for goals that seem unworthy of systematic research. In brief, then, the policy sciences must never lose sight of such challenges as inequality, exploitation, and arbitrariness."1 As Zambia's President Kaunda puts the matter so well: "We cannot succeed in any field, whether it be political, industrial or religious, if we fail to recognize that man is of primary importance.'" 5 It would be truly myopic to overlook the fact that the end goal for the policy sciences is man's self-fulfillment. THE UTILITY OF A COMPARATIVE POLICY APPROACH Formulated most simply, policy analysis seeks to determine what rational courses of action are open to decision-makers in light of availing societal demands and constraints. "It decides major guidelines for action directed at the future, mainly by governmental organs. These guidelines (policies) formally aim at achieving what is in the public interest 13. Richard Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration — A Radical Approach," Journal of Modern African Studies 5, no. 1 (May 1967): 4. See also Maure L. Goldschmidt, "Democratic Theory and Contemporary Political Science," Western Political Quarterly 19, no. 3 (September 1966): 11. 14. Jonathan S. Barker, "Political Science and the Real World," Taamuli 1, no. 2 (March 1971): 6-7. 15. Colin Legum (ed.), Zambia: Independence and Beyond: The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1966), p. 116. (Italics in text.)

10

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

6

by the best possible means.'" Through inquiry into real-world decision processes and outcomes, policy analysis tends to be realistic and pragmatic. It de-emphasizes the great "isms" (e.g., socialism versus capitalism) and stresses instead the fine gradations of choice that may be present in various systems. 17 What is assumed to be common to all systems is scarcity of resources and a desire on the part of individuals to improve their, or their group's, share of the output generated by using the resources. Government is left with a threefold task: (1) extracting resource contributions (taxes, national service, military duty, etc.); (2) setting priorities on the allocation of public resources among various objectives in response to demands by as well as among distinct interest groups and social classes; and (3) establishing regulations on enterprise and activities. 18 In principle, "rational" governmental policies are based on cost-benefit considerations. Where a community secures more direct and indirect advantages (over disadvantages) from pursuing a given line of activity, then the policy can be considered useful and possibly be put into effect. Whether it actually is undertaken depends on whether other competing activities are expected to produce even greater net advantages. 19 In making such calculations, the policy-maker must take into account various noneconomic factors involving social values, norms, habits, and practices as well as the more traditional economic objectives associated with productionist ends. Political economy thus seeks to combine the subjective of politics and society with the objective goals of economic growth. 20 This interdisciplinary 16. Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined, p. 12. 17. Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), pp. 3-16. 18. Larry L. Wade, The Elements of Public Policy (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1972), pp. 10-15; and Larry L. Wade and Robert L. Curry Jr., A Logic of Public Policy (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1970), chaps. 1-3. 19. We shall discuss in greater length the matter of benefit-cost situations in later chapters. For a discussion of the role of analysis in selecting from among alternatives (such as various projects that compete for community resources), see UNIDO, Guidelines for Project Evaluation (New York: United Nations, 1972), chaps. 1-3. 20. James S. Coleman, "The Resurrection of Political Economy," in Norman T. Uphoff and Warren F. Ilchman (eds.), The Political Economy

Political Economy and Policy Choice

/

11

perspective enables the policy analyst to take a broad view of the process of change in transitional societies. The analyst employing a political economy approach is in a position to cope more effectively with such complicated and multidimensional issues as the preconditions for development, political exchange, external costs, transfers of resources, and the exogenous factor in development. The future is seen in terms of a process involving the expansion of resource availability and not merely the allocation of existing resources. Such a concern for growth and experimentation cannot afford the restrictions of static or deterministic assumptions about the political economy of development. We feel that it is appropriate and useful to offer the reader a rational-choice model included as the appendix to this chapter. The model is heuristic, or nonempirical, in nature and therefore is limited to a set of logical propositions about the rational choice of public policies. Since this model contains the essence of many of the propositions on which the remainder of our volume is based, an understanding of it becomes essential to an appreciation of both our methodological approach and the substantive issues to which our main attention is directed. If political economy can be useful to scholars and statesmen alike in determining the choices open to decision-makers, what scope exists for comparative analysis? To be sure, a situational approach emphasizes the capacity of the state or region to set priorities on the utilization of scarce resources. At the same time, an analyst need not look inward to the community affected by the decisional process. As Ilchman and Uphoff contend: "Policies of different regimes can be compared over time and among countries on the basis of the comparative efficiency of different combinations of resources." 21 A comparative outlook can, to the extent that it enlarges the awareness of meaningful alternatives on the part of policy-makers, be of Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 32-34: and JohnW. Harbeson, "Modernization Theory and Modernization Policy: Toward the Creation of a Dialogue," a paper presented to the Third Session of the International Congress of Africanists, Addis Ababa, 9-19 December 1973, p. 19. 21. Ilchman and Uphoff, Political Economy of Change, p. 32.

12

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

expected to complement the decisional process at the state or regional levels. Without attempting to overplay the comparative dimension, it is important to note several ways in which it is useful in policy choice. First, a cross-national approach offers decisionmakers insights into comparable priority-ranking and policyimplementing experiences elsewhere. Policy-makers need not repeat the errors of other localities or countries; instead, the experiences of one political system can act as an example or a warning for another. Despite distinguishing political cultures and environmental circumstances, a number of similar questions confront all states. In matters of recruitment, extractions, budgeting and allocations, regulations, and relations with foreign countries and enterprises, they have much to learn from each other. Moreover, common experiences at the regional level (for example, the Lake Tahoe basin of the western United States and the Lake Victoria area of East Africa) may offer extensive scope for transnational policy analysis. To the extent that comparative policy analysis offers new insights on such issues, it goes far in fulfilling its basic problem-solving mandate. Second, institutions can be compared in terms of their ability to promote desired policies and outcomes. Such institutions, described as "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior," 22 can either make demands on the political system or convert these demands for resources and opportunities; in the latter case, governmental agencies such as the executive and legislative branches, the bureaucracy, and local administrations organize activities, determine priorities, and allocate costs and benefits. 23 By linking structures to the policy process, the political economy approach revives a flagging concern on the part of social scientists with political structures. The renewed focus on institutions reveals much about the way policies are formulated and implemented. "Institutions," says Thomas R. Dye, "may be so structured as to facilitate certain policy outcomes and to obstruct other policy outcomes. They may 22. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12. 23. Larry L. Wade and Robert L. Curry, Jr., A Logic of Public Policy, pp. 120-27.

Political Economy

and Policy Choice

/

13

give advantage to certain interests in society and withhold advantage from other interests. Certain individuals and groups may enjoy greater access to government power under one set of structural characteristics than under another set." 24 Clearly, there is much room for comparative analysis here. Such structurally based foci as federalism, legislative-executive relations, party organization, interest group strategies, and bureaucraticmilitary encounters can be examined cross-nationally for their impact on policy formulation and implementation. This approach is likely to open up some little used, b u t potentially profitable, vistas into the economizing process. Third, the outputs of different political systems may be a suitable field for comparative examination. Such outputs, according to David Easton, consist of "authoritative allocations of values or binding decisions and the actions implementing and related to them." 2 5 Regime initiatives with respect to the environment, expressed in the form of rules, regulations, decisions, or actions, embody public policies on such issues as the mobilization and allocation of resources, tax burdens, redistribution of community income, and division of labor. Outputs such as these represent the "operational profile" of the political system 26 and, notwithstanding certain limitations arising from time-place circumstances discussed below, can be usefully compared for their impact on the environment. 21 For example, a cross-national examination of the redistribution of resources from the relatively advantaged to the relatively disadvantaged parts of a polity could suggest much about the decisional efficiency of such actions. It is possible that policy-makers 24. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (n. 2 above), p. 33. 25. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 126. Also see his article, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," World Politics 9, no. 3 (April 1957): 383-400. 26. Alexander J. Groth, Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach (New York: Macmillan, 1971), p. 9. 27. "The 'environment' is regarded as the totality of the subsystems, which, with the polity (itself now being regarded as a 'subsystem') makes up the social system." B. J. Dudley, Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), p. 11.

14

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

would be in a better position to put more radical reallocative or redistributive measures into effect if they had access to the kinds of information presented by comparative data analysis. Fourth, comparisions of outcomes, as distinct from outputs, can be highly suggestive.28 Here the policy analyst is concentrating on the consequences of actions rather than the decisions themselves. With a provision in the central budget for a reallocation of resources from the advantaged to the disadvantaged sections of the country, what are the results (anticipated or unanticipated) of these measures? Some findings on the outcomes of regimes in developing countries have already come to light. For example, although the Zambian government remained faithful to its doctrine on corrective equity among the provinces of the country, it actually spent more during the course of the first-plan period in the two major line-of-rail regions, Copperbelt and Central Provinces, than in the remaining six provinces combined; thus 287.8 million Zambian kwacha was allocated to the two more industrial provinces and ZK440.4 million in fact disbursed (53 percent more than planned), while ZK260.9 million was allotted to the other six provinces and 207.4 million actually expended (21 percent less than planned). 29 Government expenditure patterns thus pointed to a noticeable gap between promise and performance with respect to redistributional objectives. Moreover, Ira Sharkansky shows that the lower-income population of the least developed countries and of the least developed of the (United States) states were both taxed disproportionately; although taxes based on retail sales and excises were easiest to collect, they were regressive in their effects, as they fell most heavily upon the poor. Such a focus on outcomes, which minimizes the importance of 28. On the distinction between outputs and outcomes, see Austin Ranney, "The Study of Policy Content: A Framework for Choice," in Austin Ranney (ed.), Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 8-9; and Ira Sharkansky, "Governmental Expenditures and Public Services in the American States," American Political Science Review 61, no. 4 (December 1967): 1074-75. 29. Donald Rothchild, "Rural-Urban Inequities and Resource Allocation in Zambia "Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 10, no. 3 (November 1972): 238-39. Also see his "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," Journal of Modern African Studies 7, no. 4 (December 1969): 689-711.

Political

Economy

and Policy

Choice

/

15

d o c t r i n e in favor of actual p e r f o r m a n c e criteria, is i m p o r t a n t f o r its ability t o d i s t i n g u i s h a c h i e v e m e n t f r o m aspiration. 3 0 A n d f i n a l l y , a c o m p a r a t i v e a p p r o a c h adds anlysis o f t h e p o l i c y p r o c e s s in a particular Richard Rose's c o m m e n t s o n the manner n a t i o n a l research e n h a n c e s t h e m e a n i n g f u l n e s s i n s i g h t f u l here. R o s e states:

p e r s p e c t i v e t o an political system. in w h i c h crosso f c o n c l u s i o n s is

The significance of social and economic conditions for public policy can be tested comparatively by positive and null hypotheses. Contrasting countries with very large and very low gross national products per capita are likely to produce predictable and positive results. These findings can be modified in important ways, however, if one studies the aggregate gross national product of a country in relation to government choice about collective goods. It is often overlooked that the total gross national product of the Republic of China, India or France is far greater than that of Norway or the Netherlands; the relationship is reversed only when one analyzes wealth on a per capita basis. 31

POLICY C O N S T R A I N T S : IDEAS, I N F O R M A T I O N , AND STRUCTURE In p r i n c i p l e , t h e n , p o l i c y analysis c o u l d b e o f great u s e t o students and statesmen concentrating o n Third World problems. Y e t in p r a c t i c e this has n o t generally b e e n the case. T h e l i m i t e d a p p l i c a t i o n m a y b e d u e t o t h e e x i s t i n g literature's f o c u s o n e x p e r i e n c e s in d e v e l o p e d capitalistic c o u n t r i e s (particularly t h e U n i t e d States). T o dwell on such culturally oriented objectives as private enterprise or p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e m o c r a c y , as d o m a n y 30. Ira Sharkansky, "Structural Correlates of Least Developed Economies: Parallels in Government Forms, Politics and Public Policies among the Least Developed Countries and the Least Developed (U.S.) States," a paper presented to the International Political Science Association, Montreal, 19-25 August, 1973, pp. 6-8. For a study of the impact of ideology upon public spending patterns, with considerable relevance for policy outcomes in developing countries, see Wade, Elements of Public Policy, pp. 32-36; and Alexander Groth and Larry Wade, "International Educational Comparisons," in Dusan Sidjanski (ed.), Political Decisionmaking Processes (Amsterdam: Elsevier Press, 1973), pp. 122-48. 31. Richard Rose, "Comparing Public Policy: An Overview," European Journal of Political Research 1, no. 1 (April 1973): 71.

16

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

Western writers, is to limit the relevance of research conclusions as far as many African or Asian observers are concerned. Similarly, Western caution and pragmatism seems out of touch with the radical trends that inevitably mark Third World conditions. Manfred Halpern contends that a modernizing state involves " a persistent capacity for coping with a permanent revolution." " Unless the public policy literature can become attuned to this ongoing transformation, it risks the stigma of irrelevancy in Third World countries (and First and Second World lands as well). The limited applicability of current policy science analyses to the developing countries becomes evident from an examination of the methods and tools of research at the disposal of the policy analyst. Not only are African-oriented analysts frequently bound by assumptions implicitly underlying much current policy research, but they are also constrained by inadequate and often unreliable data as well as an inability to relate existing data to comparable situations. In many African lands, statistics are notoriously undependable; 33 where such information is available, it is not always clear what measurements are to be applied to the data if meaningful conclusions are to be reached. For example, key indices such as the gross domestic product and the gross national product are subject to different interpretations in essentially modern and traditional economic contexts; therefore, any effort to draw comparisons between them is likely to be misleading, even erroneous. 34 These general constraints upon utilizing the burgeoning literature on policy in Third World circumstances are aug3 2 . M a n f r e d H a l p e r n , " T o w a r d F u r t h e r M o d e r n i z a t i o n o f the S t u d y of N e w N a t i o n s , " World Politics 17, no. 1 (October 1 9 6 4 ) : 177. See also the c r i t i q u e by D o n a l Cruise O ' B r i e n , " M o d e r n i z a t i o n , O r d e r a n d the E r o s i o n o f a D e m o c r a t i c I d e a l , " Journal of Development Studies 8, n o . 4 (July 1972): 351-78. 3 3 . On the a c c u r a c y a n d c o m p l e t e n e s s of c e n s u s e s in d e v e l o p i n g countries, see I. I. E k a n e m , The 1963 Nigerian Census: A Critical Appraisal ( B e n i n : E t h i o p e Publishing C o r p . , 1 9 7 2 ) , p . 2 8 . 3 4 . T h e gross n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t d i f f e r s f r o m the gross d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t in that it t a k e s indirect t a x e s a n d s u b s i d i e s as well as f a c t o r p a y m e n t s t o a n d f r o m o t h e r s t a t e s i n t o a c c o u n t . S e e the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t w o illustrated in R e p u b l i c o f K e n y a , Economic Surveys 1973 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973), pp.8-11.

Political

Economy

and Policy Choice

/

17

merited by the difficulty of having recourse to the input-outputfeedback model so basic to this approach. On the input side, the sources of demands on the regime are somewhat distinct between the more developed and the less developed countries. Whereas interest group and political party pressures for public and private goods are extensive in pluralistic Western societies, such sectors tend to be less organized and effective in the African states." Demands for change are readily apparent, to be sure, but these are as likely to emanate from bureaucratic or governmental agencies, locally based expatriate groups, multinational corporate interests, foreign donor agencies, or external powers as from the more conventional political and economic sources of the West. Moreover, interest groups frequently exhibit a greater influence over administrators than over policymakers, and this has a larger impact on the implementation than the formulation of public policy. 36 With respect to the processing of demands, further differences emerge between the situations of the more developed and the less developed states. In many of the Third World countries, governmental structures which determine priorities on public issues are notable for their brittleness and ineffectiveness, rather than for the overbearing tendencies so often attributed to them. The reasons are not hard to find. Governmental organs lack the capacity in many instances to cope effectively with the range and intensity of demands confronting them. "The most general trend that developed in the [political] sphere in these societies," states S.N. Eisenstadt, "was marked discrepancy between the demands of different groups — parties, cliques, bureaucracy, army, regional groups — and the responses and ability of the central rulers to deal with these demands." 37 35. Thomas B. Smith, "The Study of Policymaking in The Developing Nations," Policy Studies Journal 1, no. 4 (Summer 1 9 7 3 ) : 245. See also Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 65. 36. In India, where interest group claims tend to exert greater influence, it is apparent to observers that these sectors are more effective in bringing pressure to bear on administrators than on policymakers. See Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 217. 37. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change 12, no. 4 (July 1964): 350. Also see his

18

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

Failure to manage these demands leads directly to instability, lack of continuity, and what Eisenstadt depicts as "breakdowns" of modernization. The fragility of a number of structures under Third World conditions has already been indicated. Suffice it here to note the weakness of a single key institution involved in the formulation of public policy: the policy-planning structures variously associated with the national organs of the new African states. Despite the wide acceptance of a need for centralized economic action, such institutions are often unable to integrate and manage demands. Commenting on the lack of central institutional authority in developing countries for enforcing compliance with development plans, one author observes that policymakers in these states will more likely than not "constitute merely another political group competing for attention and influence in the policymaking process." 38 The ineffectiveness of these planning agencies to design and implement comprehensive programs for development, especially by comparison with such developed polities as the Soviet Union, stems largely from their difficulties over staff recruitment, reliable information, and relations with administrators and politicians. These organizations must compete with the ministries, parastatal bodies, and multinational corporations for trained persons, and given the prevailing salary structure, they often find themselves in a poor position to attract the most able personnel. Policy-making organizations are also constrained by "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 96-106. 38. Robert H. Jackson, "Planning, Politics and Administration," in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson, and John Okumu (eds.), Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 175. See also Aaron Wildavsky, "If Planning Is Everything, Maybe It's Nothing," Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1 9 7 3 ) : 146. For discussions of basic planning elements, see W. Arthur Lewis, Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy (New York and Paris: OECD, 1966), and Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967). For a focus on Africa, see UNESCO, Social Implications of Industrialization in Africa South of the Sahara (New York: United Nations, 1964).

Political Economy and Policy Choice / 19 the information at their disposal. Such information as is available to these planners, derived largely from spokesmen for interest group, subregional, partisan, and bureaucratic sources, is often sketchy and unreliable. Consequently, developmental programs based on this insufficient or misleading knowledge can be the cause of frustration and, even worse, of poor choices on developmental issues. Moreover, the relations between policymakers and bureaucrats or politicians are not necessarily harmonious. The coordination function expected of centralplanning instrumentalities may prove difficult to effect in realworld conditions. Professional administrators have not always responded positively in practice to the leads of policy-planning units; on the other hand, bureaucrats and political officials have been known to resist attempts by these agencies to expand their control. 39 The upshot is considerable institutional incapacity on the part of policy-planning organizations at just the point where their ability to offer coordinated direction to the economy seems most essential. In addition to the structural difficulties besetting policymaking organizations in developing lands are the constraints upon choice which circumscribe their capacity for effective action. Certainly a wide array of factors impinge on that maneuverability: the ability to mobilize sufficient human and material resources, to secure reliable information, to manage interest group demands, to cope with the "exogenous variable," and so forth. Something akin to a paradox of choice is apparent. Radical inclinations and solutions seemingly abound; in practice, however, administrators, and perhaps to a lesser extent policy-makers, frequently opt for incremental adjustments. Rather than starting anew to set values and objectives when dealing with social problems (the root method), those disposed toward incrementalism tend "continually [to build] out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees" (the 39. Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (n. 10 above), p. 113; and Jackson, "Planning, Politics and Administration," p. 188. Also see J a m e s S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: DifferentiationEquality-Capacity," in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 99.

20

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

40

branch method). As Colin Leys points out, many of those involved in policy analysis complain over spending only 10 percent of their time on comprehensive planning, the remaining 90 percent being left to the more mundane tasks of management and control. 41 How can one explain this seeming paradox of choice? No doubt the nature of the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism, the dimension of the problems of poverty, illiteracy, and disease, the bitterness over lingering evidences of racism and exploitation, the glaring inequalities between subregions, races, and ethnic peoples, and the general disillusionment over the rate of change all help to account for the gap between aspiration and reality. Policy-makers and administrators, intent on achieving a high level of performance as rapidly as possible, often pursue short-term options; this course of action may involve, for example, an accommodation with the international capitalistic system, not out of any preference for such connections but because of concern over the costs of severing such relationships. 42 It is largely the hostility of the inherited world environment that leaves policy analysts in the less developed countries (LDCs) with limited room for movement. To be sure, they can make some basic value decisions over international alignments, trading partners, and nationalization programs, but having once established these fundamental preferences, the environment impinges and thereby curtails subsequent choices on public policies. To a degree at least, such a combination of environmental strain and inability to cope effectively is in contrast with the experience of the rich industrialized polities of the West. Not 40. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,' " in Dennis L. Thompson (ed.), Politics, Policy and Natural Resources (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 102. Also see his book, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 178. 41. Colin Leys, "The Analysis of Planning," in Colin Leys (ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 253. 42. These alternatives are explored more fully in Donald Rothchild's, Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization (London: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1973), chap. 13.

Political Economy and Policy Choice

/

21

only are Western decision-makers induced by their values and assumptions to adopt reformist policy-making styles, but the very privileged position of their countries in the world community makes such an approach marginally acceptable — so long, that is, as prevailing conditions persist. In developing lands, however, incrementalism reduces the determination to search out and apply alternative courses of economic organization and runs counter to the prescriptions of African socialism as an "ideology of development." 43 To the extent that modern policy analysis is based on such values and assumptions, it is likely to secure only minimal acceptance from those who reject "muddling through" and insist, for sound reasons, upon a bolder experimentation associated with comprehensive planning. As for the implementation and effect of policy (outputs and outcomes), the limited usefulness of the current publicpolicy literature is readily apparent. 44 Here liberal Western social science, by its heavy stress on input agencies, seems somewhat incidental to African needs and priorities. Unlike the Marxists, who remain ever alert to the close connection between politics and economics, Western social scientists have all too often failed to pay sufficient heed to the difficulties in the way of accomplishing ends and to the consequences of policy application. The result is an overriding concern with process rather than problem-solving — a ranking of functions and goals sharply at variance with those held by leaders in the African states.45 The significant impact of interest group influence on policy application in the LDCs has already been noted. Such influence arises from interest group access to administrative 43. On the distinction between socialism as an "ethic of distribution" and as an "ideology of development," see Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 98. 44. Exceptions here are Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 143-46; and Michael Chege, "Systems Management and The Plan Implementation Process in Kenya," African Review 3, no. 4 (1973): 595-609. 45. We are grateful to David Leonard for suggesting some of the points made in this paragraph.

22

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

decision-makers and the extensive pressures for concessions to these sectors deriving from such contacts. Colin Leys has argued recently that there is a fundamental contradiction involved in decision-making caused by the way that developing or underdeveloped countries are related to the global economy. Briefly, his point is that investors from the trading-center countries transfer capital and industrial technology to the periphery rawmaterial-producing countries. In the latter, centrist-company interests are protected by a ruling elite whose policies are designed by two groups: first, the foreign investors; and second, local smaller-scale capitalists whose economic interests coincide with the multinational or international companies from abroad. Each has an interest in relatively low wages and higher prices, each an element in generating higher profits or relatively higher returns on capital. But these are inconsistent with the interest of an emerging working class whose aspirations are for improved material standards of living, or in other terms, higher wages and lower prices. In order to ensure system maintenance and stability, policies must be developed and implemented. Leys asserts that the one option open to policy-makers is to squeeze the local middle-class entrepreneurs — the local capitalist class. And here, he states, is the fundamental contradiction: smaller-scale capitalists, supporting the foreign investors, find that the burden of accommodating emerging working-class demands has been shifted to them. 46 But is this the only plausible situation? Could there not be at least two others? First, unlike the zerosum framework of Leys' discussion, policies could be designed to expand the gross economic benefits that could be used to meet new and old demands. Second, unlike the stringent nature of the neo-Marxist concept of central dominance of the periphery, policies could be designed to redistribute gross economic benefits to new demands at the expense of old ones. We are not suggesting that Leys' or other neo-Marxist points are wrong, per se. What we are saying is that situations vary, and policy-makers in some situations do not act in the interest of narrow economic groups. This, however, does not 46. Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 1964-1971 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), chaps. 7-8.

Political

Economy

and Policy Choice

/

23

rule out situations where policy reacts to broader and more community-oriented demands. In particular, the points do not offer the kind of optimism required for generating publicinterest policies. Furthermore, policy implementation in the LDCs contrasts with that taking place in the planned economies of the developed countries in the quality of policy-making, the inability to implement policies, and the difficulty of assessing the impact of policies. THE QUALITY O F POLICY-MAKING The quality of policy-making in the LDCs tends to be lower than that in the developed countries primarily because of the lack of resources at the disposal of the planning organizations. In the U.S.S.R. and the more effectively planned societies of the West, trained staffs, consultants, computer facilities, data banks, and research funds are in relatively abundant supply; in the developing countries such resources are frequently unavailable. The effect may well be very substantial. In any political system, policy-making involves decisional actions based on partial knowledge. As Dror affirms, "Decision-making in the face of uncertainty constitutes . . . a main component of prescriptive policy analysis."'" But the relative degree of information at the disposal of policy analysts may prove a decisive factor in the determination of priorities. Where data is rudimentary or nonexistent, as in many of the LDCs, policy formers are compelled to rely extensively on guesses, intuitions, ideological preferences, or hunches; by contrast, the existence of a body of reasonably accurate data in some of the developed countries enhances the capacity of their planners for more efficacious collective choices. In the more developed societies, the resource limits on organizational effectiveness are minimized, allowing the trained analysts greatly increased scope to apply the latest instruments and techniques to the solution of problems at hand. 48 Since it will take some time before the developing 47. Dror, "Some Diverse Approaches to Policy Analysis," (n. 7 above), p. 259. 48. J o y c e M. Mitchell and William C. Mitchell, Political Analysis and

24

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

countries can afford to allocate sufficient resources to achieve a high level of policy-making performance, their efforts at plan implementation and the effects of their decisions seem likely to remain comparatively costly (i.e., involving inefficient uses of scarce resources) in the years immediately ahead. Not only does the quality of policy-making in the LDCs suffer by comparison with the more developed societies, but the conditions prevailing in them make policy application a considerably greater challenge as well. We do not wish to imply very extensive abilities here on the part of developed societies. But whereas a developed country can determine a line of action with some reasonable expectation that it can be implemented, no such assumption is warranted for most of the African states. This incapacity to effect policies can be attributed to a number of aspects: the inability to cope with powerful demands, the fragility and ineffectiveness of administrative structures, the weakness of authority systems, the frailty of available conflict management instruments, and defenselessness in the face of external power manipulations. The paucity of administrative structures acts as a major constraint on the application of policies. Thus, Botswana's scarcity of human, fiscal, and material resources for administrative purposes, largely attributable to inaction on the part of colonial officials, remains an inhibiting factor with respect to developmental efforts in the 1970s. Although the central administration had been expanded from 25 officers and a resident commissioner in the colonial period to 275 equivalent ministerial posts by 1967, the civil service continues to be inadequate to deal with the expanded economic and social activities of the independence period. 4 ' In addition to these limitations on trained manpower are the fiscal constraints arising from underdevelopment. Thus the Botswana budget allocates only twelve million rand ($16,800,000) in the 1969-70 fiscal year to the bureaucracy for ordinary recurrent expenditure purposes, an amount barely adequate for any but Public Policy: An Introduction to Political Science (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 404-406. 49. Republic of Botswana, National Development Plan 1970-75 (Gaborone: Government Printer, 1970), p. 121.

Political Economy and Policy Choice

/

25

50

the most essential administrative services. Under such circumstances the most rational of plans can be rendered ineffective by ail insufficiently developed political and administrative infrastructure. To launch a sophisticated program only to see it atrophy because of ineffective implementational machinery is frustrating in the extreme, and quite possibly a misallocation of scarce resources. The politically articulate members of society may come to lose confidence in the efficacy of comprehensive planning before giving it an opportunity to organize the process of change. Finally, where policies can be implemented it becomes difficult in the developing countries to appraise the effect of these actions on the economy and the society. The problem of evaluation, substantially greater than in the more developed countries, is primarily attributable to a lack of reliable knowledge. Because feedback information is often inadequate, planning organizations find it difficult to determine the effect public measures have had in the real world. All too often policy-making agencies in developing lands find themselves isolated (often in the main urban center) from events taking place around them, unable to gauge the actual consequences of public decisions through lack of contact and communication. And if the task of securing reliable data on the effects of programs is not trying enough, it is complicated further when attempts are made to compare results with those in other countries. What is to be the basis for meaningful comparison? Political cultures, developmental objectives, institutional capacity, expenditure patterns, and so forth tend to be insufficiently comparable. Therefore the paucity of cross-national data is often matched by an inability to utilize existing information from other countries in an effective manner. CONCLUSION Decision-makers in the less developed countries are immersed in the problems of development administration. They 50. Republic of Botswana, Statistical Abstracts Central Statistics Office, 1972), Table No. 58.

1970

(Gaborone:

26

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

appear to be seeking a comprehensive framework for making rational choices on questions of public concern. Combining analytic and prescriptive insights, a political economy approach seems appropriate as a conceptual framework. It can be utilized by students and decision-makers alike to evaluate policy choice, including policies related to the costs and benefits of extracting and distributing resources; establishing regulations on enterprise and activities; and making recommendations on stimulating the growth of new resources. Nevertheless, the relevance of the current public-policy literature and the usefulness of applying such findings in the LDCs remains limited. In large part, this assessment is founded on the origins of research and application of the policy sciences in the developed countries. All too often the conceptualization that takes place outside the Third World is not relevant to the African states; it gives inadequate consideration to differences in political culture and seems frequently to rest on deterministic thinking, narrow time perspectives, static theoretical orientations, and insufficient emphases on life-affirming objectives. The genesis of the policy sciences in Western and, in terms of planning experience, Eastern circumstances also inhibits its practical application on the African continent because of the nontransferability of experiences from these highly industrialized societies. Soviet experiments with planning may have little practical utility for Chad; moreover, Western-based research, with its pluralistic and capitalistic orientation, includes assumptions, values, and goals that may well be at odds with the dynamic of transformation manifest in Africa today. In addition, the Eastonian process model applies somewhat less neatly to the interactions of the political system occurring in the Third World. At each stage sharp differences of behavior can be delineated: the sources of demand-inputs, the brittleness and ineffectiveness of governmental structures, the extent of choice open to policy-makers, the capacity to implement decisions, and the ability to appraise the consequences of policy actions. The result of this is to reduce greatly the relevance of existing public-policy research and experience to Africa's developmental efforts — at least in the period immediately ahead. If public-policy research and application has not always

Political Economy

and Policy Choice

/

27

proved meaningful to Third World experience, recourse to the more generalized comparative policy-making field has, not unexpectedly, been noticeably slower yet. Perhaps applicable in principle, a comparative public-policy overview has nonetheless exhibited serious methodological and practical drawbacks as employed in African circumstances. Not only is current statistical data unreliable and lacking in comparability, but the nature and processing of demands are so unlike those in the more developed countries that cross-national analysis can become a somewhat futile exercise. In developing countries, governments lack the capacity to put policies into effect, and where policies are implemented, the task of evaluating the consequences of these actions is difficult in the extreme. Thus the impediments to meaningful comparative analysis are high. Even so, it is not wise to lose sight of the unrealized promise (in terms of decisional efficiency) of a comparative approach between less developed areas sharing similar problems throughout the world. To the extent that a comparative overview can enhance the efficient use of resources and increase African choice, it offers students and statesmen a potentially useful instrument for b o t h analysis and prescription.

APPENDIX. AN AFRICAN COMMUNITY'S DECISION-MAKING MODEL African communities make decisions in situations of significant scarcity of resources. Some African nations are among the world's resource poorest. Not only are per capita income levels low throughout the continent, b u t their increases tend to lag as well. The gap between the rich and the poor is becoming more accentuated despite the fact that from 1950 to 1970 it has been estimated that African countries grew economically at a rate approaching 4 percent per annum. This rate is rather greater than the rates experienced by contemporary industrialized countries during their earlier stage. However, population increases in Africa have decreased the per capita growth rate below the level generally experienced in these industrialized countries.

28

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

We offer this formalized model of community decisionmaking in order t o isolate the particular decisions that a community must make. In focusing on the key issue of what to produce, we employ indifference-curve analysis, and we make three assumptions. First, we assume that a significant number of the community's population have similar patterns of taste and, consequently, preferences for benefit patterns as they relate to community output. Second, we assume that certain citizens do in fact deviate to a limited extent from the community's preferences and that others deviate from them so greatly that they are alienated from, or are violently in conflict with, both the pattern of benefits produced b y the system and the institutions and processes through which that pattern is determined. Third, we assume that the community's institutions, rules, and processes are broadly responsive to majority demands. In making these assumptions, we recognize that the manner of determining community preferences is significantly different in more developed and in less developed countries. Whereas elections, competitive parties, and interest groups contribute significantly to the setting of these community preferences in the West, the community's leadership has a wider scope for initiative in determining preferences under modern African circumstances. We begin our analysis by assuming that there are only two benefits, X and Y. In terms of these benefits, the community's satisfaction depends on the amounts of X and Y that it can acquire. In Figure 1, in which the two coordinates represent amounts of X and Y, all points on a contour line represent collections of benefits that are equally satisfying to the community, or among which it is indifferent. That is, if a given collection of benefits is represented by a point A on the graph, it can be presumed that individuals are indifferent to any choice among collection A and all other possible points or collections, B, C, D, on the same contour line I j . Other indifference curves can be drawn on the diagram, depicting other degrees of satisfaction. AH combinations on higher indifference curves are satisfying, and combinations on higher indifference curves are preferable to those on lower indifference curves. In effect, those indifference curves lying farther from the zero intercept are the more preferred ones on the indifference map. In Figure 2, all

Political Economy and Policy Choice

/

29

x

X

I -Y

o Figure 1

•Y

O Figure 2

points on indifference curve I2, such a point E, are preferred to points D, C, B, and A on I i . In Figure 2, we define units of X as public goods and Y as private goods. Public goods are collections of benefits provided by government and include a vast array of specific outputs such as, for example, research, education and public health services. Private goods are all of those outputs ranked and produced by nongovernmental entities, particularly business firms. They range from consumer products to investments. The community will wish to choose some combination of X and Y on indifference curve I2, any point on which is preferable to any point on I j . The combination of public and private goods chosen is often referred to as the "social balance." What should constitute this balance is an extremely important political question; indeed debate on the issue represents one of the major cleavages within African and other communities. The indifference curve indicates what benefits the community would like to achieve. But what the community actually can achieve is another matter. The extent to which the most preferred position, represented by the highest indifference curve (I2 in Figure 2), can be attained depends on resource endowment, technology, and social institutions. To cope with these variables, we shall describe what economists call the community's production possibilities curve. A production possibilities curve can isolate community choice in regard to what can be produced. It can conceptualize

30

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

the issue of scarcity by pointing out that only a limited amount of output can be produced, and in order for the community to reach the highest indifference curve possible, scarce community resources must be used as efficiently as possible. In deciding on tests of efficiency, the community's decision-makers can be guided toward implementing policies that determine whether production should take place through public or private enterprise, a crucial decision in regard to institutional structure. A production possibilities curve represents the alternative quantities of benefits which a community is capable of producing given the limitations of its resource base, state of technology, and institutional structure. In Figure 3, the production possibilities curve P x represents the alternative quantities of X and Y which can be produced by a given resource endowment, fully used and combined, through appropriate social and political institutions, in the most technologically productive manner. It is reasonable to assume that increasing the production of benefits will result in an increased use of resources. The production possibilities curve is concave to the original because we assume that each is produced under conditions of diminishing returns. Combinations F, B, and G are among those possible along production possibilities curve P i . The community would like, however, to produce beyond the production possibilities curves. To do so would mean more goods and services and a higher standard of living. But the curve is the boundary beyond which production cannot go, because there are no other resources from which to produce. If new natural resources are made available, or if the population becomes better skilled, more productive, or better organized, or if technology improves, the production possibilities curve can be shifted from Pi to P2, as in Figure 4. We are now in a position to bring together the community's indifference and production possibilities curves. In Figure 5, the community's indifference map includes community indifference curves Ii and I2, and production possibility map including Pi and P2. Clearly the community prefers a point on Ig, such as E, to any point on I i , such as point B. The production possibility map includes production possibility curves Pi and P2 and an unspecified number of others not

Political Economy x

and Policy Choice

/

31

x

x

shown. If the community uses all of its resources most efficiently, through the technically most productive methods at its disposal, we assume that it can reach only P j . Less than full use of its resources would limit the community to a production possibilities curve to the left of P j . But full resource use permits the community to attain the I j only at B. Production possibility curves lying to the right of P j are potential and require expanding resource endowments, technological changes, or the improvements in social institutions. If such changes take place, then the community can move transitively from the zero intercept from point B on Ii to point E on I2. This is because the community's production possibilities shifted from P j to P2. Thus the community has become "better-off" because it has become more productive. This means that the community

32

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

" c a n " make each individual "better-off." Whether this takes place depends on how equitably economic output is distributed among the community's people. Thus far we have dealt only with resource use, noting that an indifference map tells us something about what a community wants to do and that a production possibilities field tells us something about what it can do in terms of the available community resources. Money is earned by productive factors and it is spent on taxes (or direct government payments) to cover the resource costs of public production. Money is also spent on privately produced goods and services. The public and private market decisions that give rise to establishing wages (and incomes) and prices essentially determines for whom the community's production will take place. That is, the decisions are pertinent to economic distribution. We now turn our attention to the matter of money costs paid to resources used in production. In effect, in an economy based on specialization and exchange, money must be paid to resources for their services. In the private sector, prices are paid for goods, and this money is distributed to resources (or their owners) in the form of wages, salaries, rents, and profits. In the public sector, the same type of distribution takes place. When money payments are made in the form of taxes, they are paid to publicly employed resources. The term "money price-ratio line" refers to the ratio of all money prices paid for public goods to all money prices paid for private goods. This line is also called the community's budget line. We develop this line labeled B2 by assuming that the community's money income is $600 million, the price of a unit X, a public good, is $3.00, and the price of a unit of Y, a private good, is also $3.00. Figure 6 shows that, if the community should allocate all of its income on Y, it could attain 200 million units shown at point R and private spending would be 100 percent of income. The community could consume the same amount of X at point T and pay all of its income in taxes for public goods. It could also spend this income on varying proportion of X and Y. A straight line joining these points shows the alternative combinations of X and Y that the community can attain with a given money

Political Economy x

and Policy Choice

/

33

x

T

R

Figure 6

-y

•y Figure 7

income, given the prices of private and public goods. This line we refer to as its money cost ratio line, or budget line. Community's indifference curve, a production possibilities curve, and a budget line are brought together in Figure 7. This figure shows that the community can allocate resources between X and Y in order to achieve the preferred position on indifference curve I2. Combination E will give the community a higher level of satisfaction than will any other combination allowable with its resources (as shown on production possibilities curve P2), its income, and the prices of X and Y. The community maximizes its preferred position by choosing that combination of X and Y where its budget line is tangent both to the highest indifference curve it can reach and to the production possibilities curve that reflects the fullest and most productive use of all its resources. These conditions are met at point E. In terms of this example, we conclude that one half of the community's income goes to taxation while the other half is retained in the private sector. Our brief model s l is usable in the sense that it provides a conceptual basis for analyzing institutional structures and processes that a community might develop in order to decide on 51. Larry L. Wade and Robert L. Curry, Jr., A Logic of Public Policy (n. 18 above), pp. 60-73; and Thomas L. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (n. 2 above), chap. 1.

34

/

Scarcity,

Choice,

and Public

Policy

in Middle

Africa

what to produce, how to produce, and for whom to produce. The model's orientation is to rational decision-making by a community. In succeeding chapters we shall deal with particular types of decisions, kinds of decision-makers, and various decision-making rules. An understanding of them, we feel, is pertinent to an understanding of the function of a developing country's polity and economy as it strives to make rational choices.

CHAPTER

Changing Institutional Resources In the previous chapter we t o u c h e d on the i m p o r t a n c e o f institutions in the conversion o f demands into public policies. Thus an examination o f institutional mechanisms is critical to an appreciation o f the possibilities open t o Third World policy-makers to expand e c o n o m i c options. Although policy c h o i c e in middle Africa is the central subject o f this work, we think that a l o o k at the main institutions affecting the process o f choice is essential to a full understanding o f the environment in which these priorities are established. After all, priorities c a n n o t b e determined unless structures are there to organize the interactions among actors, and they c a n n o t b e c o m e realized objectives unless institutional resources exist t o put them into e f f e c t . Political, e c o n o m i c , and technological capabilities are inevitably circumscribed in m o s t countries the world over, and particularly in less developed middle Africa. S t a t e s m e n must invest substantial resources in such institutions as political parties, government, bureaucracies, armies, police, universities, parastatal organizations, cooperatives, legal codes, trade unions, corporations, legislative and judicial organs, and so f o r t h , in order to create the means for coping with environmental strains.

37

38

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

It is precisely because their environmental burdens are so enormous that these leaders must necessarily set rankings and preferences in terms of their particular needs and objectives. Unlike the situation in the industrialized states of the West, these leaders find themselves confronted with a number of challenges simultaneously. Thus such critical tasks of statebuilding and state-maintenance as establishing a national identity, ensuring national survival, integrating pluralistic societies (both horizontally and vertically), creating an acceptable authority system, mobilizing and distributing economic resources efficiently, and securing freedom from external control (see Chapter 3), cannot be dealt with individually and over a lengthy period; a determined effort must be made to deal with them on the various fronts at the same time. In order to be effective in these undertakings, statesmen rely heavily on institutional resources to achieve the most desirable ordering of priorities. However, it is because the frailest of state entities must deal with the heaviest burdens (what we describe as the "capabilities paradox" in Africa) that the strain on institutional mechanisms is so great. This capabilities imbalance in turn accounts for the variety of measures utilized to shore up ineffective institutions as well as for the frequent inability of these structures to perform the function of conversion. Institutions are a major factor in the policy-making process because of the central role they play in enabling the decision elite to manage the strains emanating from the environment. In the most general sense, the institutions of state foster opportunities for public choice, increasing "an organization's ability to make effective responses to its environment and to change this environment in accordance with its needs.'"And by offering promising means for regulating and regularizing the interactions among diverse cultural and economic groups, they facilitate, among other things, the vital process of political exchange. It is as these "exchange currencies" gain acceptability and predictability that a web of relationships seem likely to evolve, with obvious stabilizing and developmental implications. 2 As Uphoff 1. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 140. 2. A discussion of the ongoing interactional process in interethnic exchange relationships appears in Donald Rothchild, Racial Bargaining in

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

39

and Ilchman note: "Political and administrative infrastructure can promote or facilitate exchange between regime and sectors, and among sectors. . . . It helps each determine more accurately prevailing 'prices' or rates of exchange for resources; it can increase the convertibility of resources, one to another, by raising the predictability of exchange or by accelerating the mobility with which resources are exchanged and used." Thus structures emerge as resources of the political system which can assist state-building by enabling the polity to endure and achieve its objectives. Nevertheless, such institutions can only fulfill their purposes if they are used with great effectiveness — by absorbing a wide range of demands on the political system. An inability to function efficiently in this respect leaves open the distinct possibility of "reversals" or "breakdowns" in the process of "modernization." 4 In addition, state-builders in Third World countries must grapple skillfully with a central problem in transferring institutions: how to make use of inherited, colonial structural resources and at the same time create a locally acceptable authority system. In the final analysis, institutions can only prove genuine resources if they are not merely acceptable to the political leaders who negotiate the terms on which independence is transferred but are also seen to be acceptable by the politically relevant strata of the population. How are essentially alien institutions to gain acceptability from Third World publics — and quickly enough to survive the traumas associated with the transfer of power to indigenous hands? Clearly, as Figure 8 suggests, the key to the persistence of institutions lies in the ability of decision elites to adapt them to new needs and circumstances. After analyzing the environment in which these Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization (London: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1 9 7 3 ) , chaps. 1, 4, 13, and his "Changing Racial Stratifications and Bargaining Styles: The Kenya Experience," Canadian Journal of African Studies 7, no. 3 ( 1 9 7 3 ) : pp. 430-31. 3. Norman T. Uphoff and Warren F. Ilchman, The Political Economy of Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p. 4 1 1 . 4. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change 12, no. 4 (July 1964): 347.

40

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle RADIATING SOURCE

1

TRANSMISSION

A R E A OF RECEPTION IMPEDANCE FACILITATION

FEEDBACK

Africa

ACCULTERATED MUTANT

r

1

^

Source: Ralph Braibanti, Administrative Reconstruction: Diffusion of the Democratic Experience (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). A more elaborate variation of this schematic diagram can also be found in "The Relevance of Political Science to the Study of Underdeveloped, Areas" in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961), p. 154.

Figure 8 structures were transferred and black Africa's reception of these colonially radiated values and institutions, it will be possible to deal generally with the ways leaders have experimented with institutional design in order to increase their capacity to make choices. THE COLONIAL ENVIRONMENT In middle Africa, the state is currently and largely the product (or by-product) of external action. Alien peoples from Europe imposed their systems, procedures, and values upon the local inhabitants, who were in no position to offer effective resistance for want of technical and organizational knowledge. During this unique but transitory phase, foreign administrators, largely unaccountable to local guidance or control, exercised a wide measure of discretion by shaping the state institutions of the future. Such discretion was enhanced by the relatively low level of modernist demands prevailing in the early years of colonial rule. Local nationalists did not make the same kinds of claims for a share of centrally controlled power or resources that were to become manifest with the approach to independence. A fluid situation prevailed in which European administrators had a fleeting opportunity to override fissiparous forces and to promote institutional linkages. Decision costs were low,

Changing Institutional Resources

/

41

and the very arbitrariness of the colonial relationship facilitated the process of state-building and institutional transfer. Before examining the efforts at structural innovation imposed on Africa by colonial officials, it is necessary to give a broad overview of the environment in which they operated. In brief, the picture that emerges in the precolonial and early colonial periods is one of subsistence economies, various and changing identities, low rates of interethnic exchange, and ineffective (and, in the white settler territories, counterproductive) attempts on the part of administrators to facilitate exchange in the colonial years. A temporary opportunity to build enduring structures was largely dissipated through inaction or illiberally conceived actions. On assuming authority in Africa, the early colonial agents generally found levels of interethnic integration more akin to Ali A. Mazrui's stage of " c o n t a c t " than to those he depicts as "compromise" or "coalescence." 5 In a number of areas, ethnic self-consciousness lacked any deep historical roots; a sense of collective unity emerged only recently among the units (for example, the Bangala of Zaire, the Ngoni of Zambia, and the Yoruba of Nigeria), and in response to the challenges posed by modernist forces in the colonial period. 6 Moreover, where cultural identities did crystalize, the interactional process varied from harmonious to highly conflictive. Thus many peoples lived side by side in a peaceful relationship, exhibiting 5. "Pluralism and National Integration," in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds.), Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 334. For reasons of space, we shall concentrate on horizontal rather than vertical integration (interclass, interrace, elitemass) in this essay. On this, also see Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London: Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Race Relations, 1970), pp. 56-65. 6. See Robert Molteno, "Cleavage and Conflict in Zambian Politics: A Study in Sectionalism," in William Tordoff (ed.), Politics in Zambia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 92-97. Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1967), pp. 31-33, and Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria, 1960-1966 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), pp. 16-17.

42

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

no long-standing antagonism or competition over land, cattle, or farming rights. In West Africa, where considerable urbanization had occurred, a substantial proportion of the population was engaged in trade. An exceptionally conflictive encounter did mark the scene in western Kenya, however. There the Abaluyia were exposed to "haphazard and unconnected" raiding activities from four "external enemies": the Luo, the Nandi, the Teso, and the Uasin Gishu Masai. "Whereas the Nandi and Masai raids were motivated by their insatiable greed for cattle," asserts Gideon S. Were, " t h e Luo and Teso ones were basically caused by the desire for l a n d . ' " For Were, the Masai and Kalenjin raids in the country to the west of the Nandi escarpment became "institutionalized activities" by the beginning of the nineteenth century and led to "attendant havoc, destruction, and loss of life, cattle, and property." 8 On their side, the Luo sought to occupy the cooler and wetter lands in central Nyanza during the nineteenth century in order to relieve growing population pressures. Bethwell A. Ogot describes this last phase of Luo migration and settlement as follows: These new lands were not acquired by the Luo through peaceful infiltration; they were all acquired by conquest. It w o u l d be misleading, however, to convey the impression that this was a planned and organized invasion of Bantu areas by Luo marauders. It was a confused and haphazard movement, with each sub-tribe acting independently. It was, to quote Evans-Pritchard again, "like a line of shunting trucks." 9

But if considerable interethnic strife marked the western Kenya scene in the period just prior to the advent of European overrule, the picture remains less than complete without a paralleling emphasis on the aspects of reciprocity and harmony (even assimilation) also evident in communal encounters. Dur7. Gideon S. Were, A History of the Abaluyia of Western Kenya (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 134. 8. Ibid., p. 137. 9. Bethwell A. Ogot, History of the Southern Luo, vol. 1 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 220. Also see the excellent account of Luo migrations in Roland Oliver, "Discernible Developments in The Interior, 1 5 0 0 - 1 8 4 0 , " in Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (eds.), History of East Africa, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 171-84.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

43

ing the nineteenth century, alliances were reported between such peoples as the Abaluyia and Luo clans in the area around Gem, 10 and Bantu-Nilotic assimilation occurred in the Rift Valley as well as in the western Kenya highlands region." The process of constant interaction and intermingling makes highly artificial (and even misleading) any account that isolates an ethnic group from its contacts with neighboring peoples. As one author comments on the complexity of ethnic group origins and compositions: Though we may for convenience classify tribes by their languages as Bantu, Nilotic, Cushitic, etc., the more we examine them, the more mixed we find their ancestries to be. A tribe emerges not by maintaining the pure blood of its ancestors, not by sedulously avoiding contact with its neighbors, but by successfully assimilating its diverse elements. . . . The history of East Africa and of its component regions is not just a collection of histories of individual tribes or groups of tribes, but a story of fusion and interaction by which all tribes and groups have been constantly altered or even transformed. 12

Thus the origins and interactions of ethnic peoples on the African scene were complex, varied, and in a state of continuous change. Where ethnic identities did exhibit self-awareness in these precolonial times, their relationships were normally peaceful, although in certain instances conflicts of interest involving force did occur. Group self-awareness was consciously and unconsciously made more poignant by the coming of the European authority system. Not only did increased economic contact foster differential rates of growth within the territories, but the various administrations further sharpened a consciousness of separate ethnic interests through policies on military recruitment, education, the amalgamation of peoples for administrative purposes, the maintenance of law and order, and the determination of district and provincial boundaries. On examining the above elements of ethnic self-awareness one cannot but be struck by their overlaps and interrelations. 10. Were, p. 134. 11. J . E. G. Sutton, "The Settlement of East Africa," in B. A. Ogot and J . A. Kiernan (eds.), Zamani: A Survey of East African History (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), p. 93. 12. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

44

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

To be sure, ethnic groups such as the Yoruba, Ibo, or Bemba became more cohesive and identifiable as a result of modernization; yet a number of these rather fluid groupings have long served as the main identities around which many people united. In a world fraught with danger and isolation, men quite naturally held tight to their traditional attachments and identified primarily with the family, clan, and ethnic collective. Loyalty and legitimacy were therefore directed inwards toward these solidarity groups rather than outwards toward the new state mechanism erected by alien outsiders. If, in the early days of colonial rule, a conflict occurred at all between ethnic identities and the integrity of the newly created administrative structures, the former generally proved the more durable as far as subjective symbols of loyalty were concerned. 13 The urge to belong to the birth-ascribed group was therefore fundamental to the phenomenon of self-identification through real or fictitious common ancestral ties.14 "Ethnicity," states George DeVos, "is a subjective sense of belonging that cannot be defined by taking external behavioral criteria alone. The basic sense of ethnicity is expressively one answer to a human social need to belong". 15 Nevertheless, certain external behavior criteria all acted to reinforce self-identification. People who spoke a different language, ate distinctive foods, dressed with special colors or styles, or displayed unique scars tended to feel themselves united to their kinship connections through a common destiny. Thus distinguishing characteristics and a sense of common history (past and future) became intertwined. The individual found his identity through group membership, but, 13. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 105-11. Also see Nelson Kasfir, "Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda," in Victor A. Olorunsola (ed.), The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1972), p. 62. 14. Gerald D. Berreman, "Race, Caste, and Other Invidious Distinctions in Social Stratification," Race 13, no. 4 (April 1972): 388. 15. George DeVos, "Social Stratification and Ethnic Pluralism: An Overview from the Perspective of Psychological Anthropology," Race 13, no. 4 (April 1972): 443.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

45

by emphasizing his membership to the part, he complicated and often weakened his ties of citizenship to the whole. And the leap from common fate to shared insecurity was short. Wherever his group seemed to be threatened politically, economically, or militarily, he was inclined to coalesce with his kinsmen in order to ensure the survival of his primary object of identification. In some circumstances, the environment placed great strains upon state-building initiatives, inhibiting the growth of viable territorial institutions capable of promoting interethnic exchange. Although the lack of " f i t " between ethnic claims and the reach of state institutions was apparent, it is nonetheless important to stress the additional difficulties in the way of national integration resulting from the colonizer's policies and actions. The initiatives of colonial administrations in some instances contributed directly to subsequent problems of fostering interethnic linkages. Various policies on "closed areas," "indirect rule," and provincial autonomy may have proved administratively convenient during the period at hand, but their long-term consequences were highly divisive. The adoption of the southern policy in the Sudan, emphasizing the building up of self-contained traditional units in the south, the gradual elimination of northern Sudanese administrators, clerks, and technicians in the southern Sudan, and the use of the English language as a "lingua franca" in that area, had the effect of encouraging separatism, not national cohesion." Similarly, the institutionalization of indirect rule in Nigeria fostered northsouth cleavages which are still in evidence today; by closing the north to Christian missionary influences, maintaining traditional authority structures in the north, and administering the two areas in separate and distinct manners, the British aggravated an already difficult integration problem. 17 Other instances — Zaire, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia — could be 16. Mohamed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1968), p. 46; and Beshir Mohammed Said, The Sudan Crossroads of Africa (London: Bodley Head, 1965), pp. 33-37. 17. See Obafemi Awolowo, The People's Republic (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 62.

46

/

Scarcity,

Choice,

and Public

Policy

in Middle

Africa

advanced to make a similar point, namely that the interethnic conflicts of the precolonial and early colonial environment were sometimes exacerbated by the establishment of colonial institutions and policies which failed to create an effective network of exchange relationships. Furthermore, differential rates of contact with Western values, practices, and technology had the effect of intensifying ethnic tensions. Western economic enterprise in Zambia has long concentrated on the line-of-rail provinces, leaving the remaining parts neglected in terms of employment opportunities, amenities, and social services. As recently as 1969, the more advantaged line-of-rail areas still accounted for 84 percent of the total number of employees and 91 percent of total earnings from employment; disparities in road building, housing materials, and electrification have also tended to vary noticeably. 18 The frustrations and feelings of group deprivation arising from these inequalities of opportunity have led to various postindependence appeals for reallocative equity. 19 Internal inequities resulting from differential developmental programs have also marked the Nigerian scene. In that country, the more rapid economic and social modernization of the south drove a wedge between this region and the separately administered northern hinterland. Of particular significance in this regard is the differential rate of educational expansion in the two areas. The educational gap, which left the north far behind its southern counterparts with respect to trained manpower resources, exacerbated fears of a rapid movement toward independence and of a monopolization of administrative positions by educated southerners in the period after independence. 20 In 18. D o n a l d R o t h c h i l d , " R u r a l - U r b a n I n e q u i t i e s a n d R e s o u r c e Alloof Commonwealth Political Studies 10, n o . 3 c a t i o n in Z a m b i a , " Journal (November 1972): 224. 19. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , Times of Zambia ( N d o l a ) , S e p t e m b e r 1, 1 9 7 1 , p . 1; a n d M o l t e n o , " C l e a v a g e a n d C o n f l i c t " (n. 6 a b o v e ) , p p . 9 2 - 9 7 . F o r a similar p r o c e s s in K e n y a , see D o n a l d R o t h c h i l d , " E t h n i c I n e q u a l i t i e s in K e n y a , " in O l o r u n s o l a ( e d . ) , Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa, p p . 2 9 8 - 3 0 3 . 2 0 . D a v i d B. A b e r n e t h y , The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d University Press, 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 2 6 5 .

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

47

Chief Awolowo's eyes, notherners "betray an inexplicable hostility and resentment towards Southerners for being too far ahead of them in Western education." 2 1 Thus Western contacts promoted disparities which in turn led to different administrative policies and programs — a process of feedback. Such an interplay of forces underlines the interactional process at hand between the social tensions of the environment and the exogenous factor of colonial rule. Neither can be fully understood in isolation from the other — a fact too often lost sight of in the literature on this topic. THE RADIATING SOURCE Given the unaccountability and technical superiority of the colonial authority, it is not surprising to find it cast in the role of innovative agent in the process of institutional transfer. Its investments in political and administrative infrastructure followed logically from a perceived need to enhance organizational capacity at the lowest possible cost. However, by making low investments in such infrastructure, colonial rulers made inadequate use of the opportunities at hand to establish effective structures for the creation of national identities, for the establishment of an acceptable authority system, for the enhancement of economic growth and development, and for the furtherance of intersectional exchange. In bringing about institutional innovation, colonial officials had substantial resources at their disposal. For one thing, they had access to knowledge, skills, and technical resources which gave them definite advantages over local elites. For another, their possession of technological and organizational power acted to widen their distance from indigenous competition, reducing local resistance to innovation and facilitating bureaucratic capacity for initiative. For still another, their cohesion and the extent of their organization resulted in relatively low decision costs, allowing them considerable freedom of action in a situation of minimal countervailing power. Thus colonial administrations had distinct advantages in 21. Awolowo, People's Republic p. 63.

48

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

building institutional resources. As noted above, their capacity for achieving innovative goals was in part a function of a "command model" operative during colonial times." In this context a command model suggests a process of extensive hierarchical control in which decision-makers exercise considerable (but not total) regulative authority over the body politic. Its bureaucratically directed societies are characterized by low levels of mass participation, elite dominance, and limited public accountability. Although control is directed from the top downward, some reciprocity between rulers and ruled is inevitable. Therefore, even in a colonial situation, limits on the discretion of administrative agencies were readily apparent. In colonial East Africa, for example, elements of reciprocity in administrator-societal relations appeared on such issues as the provision of an unofficial European majority on the Kenya legislative council, the creation of an East African federation, and the right of various racial and ethnic peoples to own land.23 A power imbalance prevailed, to be sure; nevertheless, the existence of reciprocity between bureaucrats and society ensured that power would always remain relational and dynamic, not monopolistic and static. By comparison with a bargaining model (which assumes a broader range for open conflict among decision-makers), the command process concentrates decision-making authority, thereby lowering decisional costs. In this regard, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock point out that "bargaining opportunities afforded in the political process cause the individual to invest more resources in decision-making, and, in this way, cause the attainment of 'solution' to be much more costly."" Compared with the wide array of groups engaged in 22. For a useful discussion of command processes, see J o y c e M. Mitchell and William C. Mitchell, Political Analysis and Public Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), pp. 517-24; and Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), chaps. 8 and 9. 23. These points are dealt with in Donald Rothchild, Politics of Integration: An East African Documentary (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), Part II. 24. J a m e s M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 111. Also see

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

49

a postcolonial bargaining situation, the colonial command process represented an extremely limited arena for decisionmaking. As such, the colonial command process reduced organization costs to a minimum, for only a relatively small number of participants took part in arriving at decisions. Often the nation-building concept employed by African countries at independence enlarged the number of political actors on the decision-making stage, and thereby increased decisional costs for policy-makers engaged in determining public priorities. If the radiating sources were endowed with resource and organizational superiority, the question remains as to the way they used their power to transmit new institutional mechanisms to the societies under their influence. Not only did the colonial authorities possess the power to alter the environment under their sway, but they could and did generate the collective will (i.e., directed energy) to do so. "Power," observes Karl W. Deutsch, "cannot accomplish more than a succession of random impacts on the environment, unless there is some relatively fixed goal or purpose, some decision or strategic class or sequence of decisions, by which the application of power can be guided and directed." 25 In this case, it was the colonial powers that provided the fixed purpose — and in the form of institutional transfer. By fundamentally altering traditional institutions such as chieftainship (through the inclusion of chiefs in the civil service hierarchy, the assignment of new tasks, the abolition, in certain instances, of tribute, and changes in recruitment and retention procedures), 26 and by creating and fostering (albeit unenthusiastically in certain instances) such institutions as legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, marketing boards, corporate structures, economic exchange and fiscal systems, labor unions, interest groups, armies, political parties, election systems, legal codes, universities, churches, judiciaries, and so forth, colonial administrations acted as agents of change on the African scene. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 42. 25. Deutsch, Nerves of Government (n. 1 above), p. 110. 26. Lloyd A. Fallers, Inequality: Social Stratification Reconsidered (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 50-51.

50

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

Their motives were varied and largely self-interested (the establishment of an authority system; the maintenance of "law and order"; the mobilization and allocation of human, material, and fiscal resources; the regulation of intersectional conflicts, etc.); nevertheless the effect of this ability and will to innovate was an investment in institutions which substantially endured the traumas of independence. No doubt the element of self-interest in the process of radiating a network of structures around Africa was to create future problems of institutional legitimacy. As African nationalists came to identify these European-imposed structures with alien interests and power, there was little alternative left to transformation. Tom Mboya's remarks on the necessity of altering institutional legacies is instructive in this respect: That institutional change is necessary in East Africa in order to achieve these ends is scarcely a matter for debate. Neither the traditional institutional arrangements indigenous to East Africa, the institutions inherited from colonialism, nor the strange amalgamation of the two that has occasionally emerged offers a sound institutional basis for future progress. The indigenous arrangements are too steeped in self-sufficiency and subsistence living to be constructive without modification in a modern specialized economy; and the colonial institutions were too often designed with the narrow view of maintaining law and order, or creating an economy supplementary or complementary to metropolitan needs, a necessary but certainly not a sufficient condition for progress. It has been, and indeed continues to be, necessary to modify existing institutions and to design and introduce new ones. 27

In African nationalist eyes, then, colonial institutions were tainted by their origins, functions, and purposes. Alien authorities thousands of miles from the scene had transmitted a variety of institutions by fiat and b y the radiation of their values to secure ordered and beneficial relationships with their dependencies. 28 To be sure, a strong desire existed to enjoy the 27. Tom Mboya, "The Impact of Modern Institutions on the East African," in P. H. Gulliver (ed.), Tradition and Transition in East Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 91. 28. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 435.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

51

perquisites and status of positions in these institutions; even so, unless the nationalists could themselves be allowed to become the institutional innovators, the very survival of these inherited structures would be at stake. This was an essential aspect in the struggle for national self-determination. The transmission process occurred over an extended time span. It involved a continuous effort on the part of the agent of change to create the necessary political and administrative infrastructure for viable rule. Colonial administrations superimposed institutions on the African territories which largely paralleled those found in their own countries, with varying outcomes in terms of the attainment and acceptability of goals. Colonial decision-makers put into effect economic policies and programs that weakened certain local practices in subsistence agriculture, pastoral life and customs, and trading activities. In Samir Amin's apt terms, Africa lost its autonomy and was "shaped according to foreign requirements." 2 9 By radiating outward the institutions of private enterprise, Western technology, and capitalism — money economies; large European trading companies as well as smaller, locally owned industrial, agricultural, and commerical enterprises; individual land ownership based on registered title; modern financial organizations for controlling exchange and the accumulation of wealth; and so forth — colonialism jolted those it contacted out of long-held economic practices and techniques. As a consequence, the traditional economy with its self-sufficienty, minimal levels of intersectional trade, communal life-styles, low real output and income, and limited savings was gradually transformed into a competitive, individually owned, and specialized economic and technological system linked both to the immediate territory at hand and to the world economy. 30 Not only were the large, heavily capitalized mines, ranches, and plantations geared to 29. Samir Amin, "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa— Origins and Contemporary Forms," Journal of Modern African Studies 10, no. 4 (December 1972): 511. 30. William J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 44-51; arid George H. T. Kimble, Tropical Africa, vol. 1 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), pp. 11-28.

52

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

overseas markets, but the smaller pastoralists and farmers found themselves drawn into a cash economy that looked to overseas markets as a final destination for their products. And as the level of productivity and disposable wealth increased, Africans (in particular, the privileged classes among them) became intertwined with the international economy as consumers as well as producers. This linkage process became the basis for the development of the powerful overseas wholesaling companies as well as the extensive network of retail trading outlets and subsidiary firms. Despite the inequality of the exchange, some Africans did secure European-manufactured goods in the process, causing them to become more tightly enmeshed in the modern, capitalistic economy of the West. Colonially radiated structures had tied them to the interdependent world economy created by Western Europe — and largely on Western terms. Africa could not easily return to the traditional economy and, given the prevailing international division of labor, could not gain equality of opportunity or self-determination within the imposed Western capitalistic system. "Historically," President Nyerere asserts, "Tanzania was part of the Western Bloc; this was part of colonialism and there was nothing we could do about it." 31 Africa, then, was linked to the Western-dominated system during colonial times by powerful economic, technological, and political forces beyond its control, a process which bore striking similarities with respect to economic impact throughout the region as a whole. Samir Amin notes that, although the target was the same everywhere, different variants of the system of colonial exploitation were developed. These did not depend, or [depended] only slightly, on the nationality of the coloniser. The contrast between French direct and British indirect rule, so frequent in the literature, is not very noticeable in Africa. It is true that a few differences are attributable to the nationality of the masters. British capital, being richer and more developed, and having additionally acquired the "best pieces" of land, carried out an earlier and more thorough development than French capital. Belgium, which had been forced to come to terms with the Great Powers, and had to accept the competition of foreign goods in the Congo, did not have the direct colonial monopolies which France 31. Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom University Press, 1968), p. 193.

and Socialism

(London: Oxford

Changing Institutional Resources

/

53

used and abused to her advantage. Portugal similarly agreed to share her colonies with major Anglo-American capital. 32

It was only with political independence that Africa could begin to revise and restructure these economic institutions which had so thoroughly integrated it, on disadvantageous terms, into the Western capitalistic economy. As for national integration objectives, no institutional investments were more important than those involved in the administrative process. Although the administrators were relatively few in number, their advantages in skill, information, cohesion, and degree of organization enabled them to regulate the societies from the top. These bureaucratic officials had an access to human, material, and fiscal resources that far outstripped those of competing agencies. Moreover, the need for a continuous implementation of governmental policies and programs ensured that the central state machinery would remain a stable and relatively powerful organ on the African scene. And if this capacity for policy formulation, implementation, and control did not necessarily lead administrative officials to direct their attention specifically to the tasks of national unification, the symbolic effects of their activities were often integrative in their consequences. Certainly their substantive contribution to national unity was also very real. The bureaucratic administrations, states S. N. Eisenstadt, "helped to maintain the framework of a unified polity as well as the capacity to absorb varied demands and to regulate them effectively. Not only were they important instruments for unification and centralization, but they enabled the rulers to implement continuous policy." 33 In performing state functions, these "efficient" agencies were compelled to take on a variety of economic and political responsibilities not assumed in the West, and, in doing so, created values and recurrent patterns of behavior which fostered national identity and solidarity.34 Through such activities as tax collection, road building 32. Amin "Underdevelopment and Dependence," p. 519. 33. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 110. 34. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies ( N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12.

54

/

Scarcity,

Choice,

and Public Policy

in Middle

Africa

and maintenance, preservation of public order, health care, education, regulation of trade and industry, and so forth, the bureaucracy created a s c a f f o l d i n g within w h i c h interethnic cohesion c o u l d be p r o m o t e d — or retarded (by an emphasis on local a u t o n o m y and separateness). In addition, the administrative arm also fostered national integration b y recruiting and training w h a t one author depicted as a "derivative middle class": an intermediary class consisting of clerks and technicians bridging the gap b e t w e e n the colonial elite and the A f r i c a n masses. 3S Many of these middle-level administrators were assigned to posts outside their area of origin and therefore developed a territory-wide, as opposed to a parochial, o u t l o o k . In James Coleman's estimation, the evolution of this strata of the p o p u l a t i o n marked " t h e most important contribution of the British superstructure to the c o n c e p t of Nigerian unity and to nationalism." 3 6 T w o related instrumentalities, the colonial police and the army, have made similar contributions to national integration outcomes. A s was the case w i t h the b u r e a u c r a c y , b o t h of these institutions were hierarchical, disciplined, and professional organizations. B y maintaining law and order and enforcing administrative regulations, they were vital resources in the hands of alien authorities. For a relatively small investment, these coercive agencies ensured that a considerable measure of stability w o u l d prevail. T h e colonial police, a largely selfregulated organ distinctly paramilitary in character, provided an immediate line of defense against any disorderly or violent challenges to a u t h o r i t y ; in the event of an e m e r g e n c y , these police forces were supplemented b y the army. Claude Welch's description o f the colonial army is m o s t apt: The armies of colonial Africa were, in a sense, occupying forces. Characterized by complete subordination to the administration, they carried out administration by other means — not politics by other means, as Clausewitz suggested. Limited size, active distrust 35. V. Subramaniam, "Ideology and Reality of Social Stratification in Zambia," a paper presented to the annual conference of the Canadian African Studies Association, Toronto, February 1975. 36. James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958), p. 50.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

55

b y the p o p u l a t i o n o f s o m e territories, a n d an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d internal c o n t r o l r a t h e r t h a n external i n v o l v e m e n t (leaving aside the w o r l d w a r s ) t y p i f i e d the m i l i t a r y f o r c e s o f the s u b - S a h a r a n a r e a before independence.37

Again the police and army contribution to national integration was both substantive and symbolic. The police became involved in territory-wide activities as a result of the responsibilities assigned to them for deterring and preventing crime, disturbances, and riots. Although extensive duties were allocated to local and provincial law enforcement bodies, final responsibility for public security lay with the central state machinery. An integral part of the administrative arm, the police, backed up by the military when it was necessary, was a substructure in the larger colonial command mechanism within which a web of social relations could gradually emerge. "The police represent a potentially strong force for integration if they are organized on a national basis and if their personnel receive adequate training," Christian P. Potholm concludes in a statement as true of the past as of the present. He explains his reasons for reaching such a conclusion as follows: T h e p o l i c e are an in-place o r g a n i z a t i o n serving t o link the elite at the p o l i t y ' s c e n t e r with the m a s s e s at its p e r i p h e r y . P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , t h e y r e p r e s e n t the g o v e r n m e n t , n o t only by p r o v i d i n g s o m e social stability a n d c o h e s i o n — b u t b y their very p r e s e n c e . T h e p o l i c e are likely t o b e m o s t i m p o r t a n t in areas w h e r e the s y m b o l i c c a p a b i l i t y o f the central g o v e r n m e n t is w e a k precisely b e c a u s e they are s o visible. 3 8

Certainly their role in enforcing the law against all possible violators was not lost on the ethnic minorities of Nigeria, who looked to the central police force, as opposed to the subregional 3 7 . C l a u d e Welch, " T h e R o o t s and I m p l i c a t i o n s o f Military Interv e n t i o n , " in C l a u d e E . Welch, J r . (ed.), Soldier and State in Africa (Evans t o n , 111.: N o r t h w e s t e r n University Press, 1 9 7 0 ) , p p . 8-9. A l s o see T . N. T a m u n o , The Police in Modern Nigeria, 1861-1965 ( I b a d a n : I b a d a n University Press, 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 3 8 ; a n d R o b i n L u c k h a m , The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67(Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 2 3 1 . 3 8 . Christian P. P o t h o l m , " T h e Multiple R o l e s of T h e Police as S e e n in T h e A f r i c a n C o n t e x t , " Journal of Developing Areas 3, n o . 2 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 6 9 ) : 146.

56

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

units, for an assurance of the right to full political participation in the life of the new country. 39 Furthermore, the recruitment policies pursued by these organs of imperial coercion were to some extent transethnic in principle, even if sometimes divisive in effect. The colonial authorities, who tended to enlist policemen and soldiers disproportionately from among the various ethnic sections of each territory, did nonetheless create modernly trained forces consisting of many of the peoples included in each territory. The Nigerian police force of 1931 included 1,274 Ibos in a total force of 3,794, the remainder being drawn from the various ethnic peoples throughout the land.40 Similarly, the African ranks of the Kenya police of 1930 overrepresented the Kamba (30 percent of the force) and the Kipsigis (6 percent) while underrepresenting the Kikuyu people (4 percent).41 And in the Belgian Congo army of 1892-1914, the Force Publique recruited heavily from among such peoples as the Bangala, the Zande, and the Tetela.41 Thus, even though not applying the principle 39. Colonial Office, Nigeria: Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them, Cmnd. 505 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), pp. 90-94. Also see Donald Rothchild, Safeguarding Nigeria's Minorities, reprint no. 17 (Duquesne University, Institute of African Affairs, 1964); and S. K. Panter-Brick and P. F. Dawson, " T h e Creation of New States in the Rule: N o r t h , " in S. K. Panter-Brick (ed.), Nigerian Politics and Military Prelude to the Civil War (London: Athlone Press, for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1970), p. 133. 40. Tamuno, Police in Modern Nigeria, p. 174. 41. The Kamba comprised 12 percent of the country's population, the Kipsigis, 3 percent, and the Kikuyu, 20 percent. James B. Wolf, "Asian and African Recruitment in the Kenya Police, 1920-1950," International Journal of African Historical Studies 6, no. 3 (1973): 411. Moreover, as of December 1961, statistics on African members in the Uganda police force showed an inclination to recruit such northern peoples as the Acholi (743 men) and to underrepresent such southern peoples as the Baganda (181 men). Apolo Robin Nsibambi, "Federalism in Uganda: Myth or Reality?" M. A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1966, p. 111. 42. For data on recruitment by provinces, see Thomas Turner, "Congo- Kinshasa," in Olorunsola, Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism (n. 13 above), p. 281. Of course, such recruitment policies fostered integration as long as all went smoothly; however, where disruption took place, those largely left out (the Baganda in Uganda) or those whose

Changing Institutional Resources

/

57

of proportionality to their recruitment of the different ethnic groups into the ranks of the police and army, the colonial powers aided the integration process, both symbolically and substantively, by enlisting men from around the territory, assigning them to posts outside their region of birth, and creating modernist, centralized instrumentalities which imposed an outward shell of unity upon the disparate parts. Another type of institution transmitted to Africa could boast some capacity for fostering national integration goals — the legislative organ of colonial times. Again these structures could be viewed as resources in the hands of imperial interests. Such structures enabled the external powers to permit a very limited and controlled form of local political participation to take place, thereby lending some credence to imperial claims of legitimate rule. The metropolitan powers convened legislative councils not in response to local African demands but in order "to satisfy their own principles and to obtain, in the central exercise of their power, as much local advice and opinion as could be evoked." 43 The legislative body was less a check upon central initiative than a source of advice, information, and support. The territorial assembly of Chad, for example, was described as "a thoroughly docile body" in the late 1940s, a fact borne out by its decision in 1947 to maintain the double electoral college on the grounds of local African political inexperience.44 Local acquiescence in the policies and programs of the executive councils ensured a quick and smooth passage of most legislation, making these bodies seem highly useful adjuncts of administrative power in the African context. The legislative councils affected the national integration process largely through their enactments, their presentation of territory-wide concerns, their abilities to shape societal attitudes, and their symbolic capabilities. Although disproportionately numbers were severely reduced (the Lango in Uganda) felt the effects intensely, and hence the consequences were disintegrative. 43. Margery Perham, Introduction to Joan Wheare, The Nigerian Legislative Council (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), p. vii. 44. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 1960), p. 431.

5S

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

representative in a number of cases (for example, northern Nigeria lay outside the jurisdiction of the legislative council until 1946, and in settler-dominated Northern Rhodesia, it was not until 1938 that provision was made to have "Native" interests represented by a nominated unofficial member of the legislative council) and although divisive in their concern for communal as against general interests, these organs did advance linkage politics by organizing the society for common, territorial purposes. To the extent that they debated critical societywide issues, they concentrated public attention upon the political process at the central level. And as African membership and participation in these bodies increased, learned patterns of reciprocity emerged and became accepted practice. Such political socialization, within the legislative organs as well as in the body politic more broadly, had obvious implications for territorial cohesiveness and for institutional survival once the colonial framework was dismantled. A similar story can be told with regard to other institutions radiated from the metropolitan authorities to their African dependencies — executives, judiciaries, legal codes, economic structures, and so forth. All were transmitted, by direct fiat or indirect value diffusion, primarily to serve the needs of the occupying power. Thus Elliott P. Skinner notes with respect to Conseil de notables indigènes set up at four administrative centers in Upper Volta in the 1920s: "These councils failed primarily because they turned out to be organs of the French administration and in fact functioned as such, and because their members had varied and often conflicting status." 45 Since their contribution of such institutions to nation-building aims was essentially secondary, it is not surprising that they often provided only a marginal boost to the achievement of a shared sense of nationhood and the acceptance of norms, values, and practices conducive to the management of interethnic conflicts. But before turning to the way in which these structures were received by the independent African governments, it is important to take note of one set of institutions — political parties — which do not fall neatly into the above framework. Because 45. Elliott P. Skinner, The Mossi of Upper Volta (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 165.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

59

these institutions were at times created by African nationalist leaders themselves to advance their struggle against European colonialism, they must be viewed as falling under a separate, adaptive category of part transfer, part imitation. African political parties, as Thomas Hodgkin maintains, were "essentially products of a 'colonial situation' — in the sense of a situation in which an indigenous society is politically, economically, and culturally subordinate to a dominant European group. Parties have largely been built up around this issue: they have sought in one way or another to transform or modify this relationship of subordination and dominance between Africans and Europeans." 4 6 To be sure, a number of sociopolitical organizations preceded the modernist, party-led struggle against colonial control; quasi-political commercial and trading associations date back as far as the mid-1850s in Sierra Leone, where the largely African merchant interests brought effective pressure to bear on the colonial government to widen the range and extent of their economic opportunities. 4 1 However, by the 1950s, the various quasi-political merchant associations, cultural societies, professional, cooperative, and trade union associations often passed on their explicitly partisan functions to the more broadly encompassing and nationalistic party structures. From this time forward, political parties, founded by middle-class men to wrest predominantly middle-class rights from the imperial powers, became the organizational weapons for compelling the sometimes reluctant colonial authorities to grant national self-government and independence. Thus Ahmed Sékou Touré, commenting on the Parti Démocratique de Guinée's incorporating role when spearheading the drive to compel France to hand over full power, declared, "There has not been a single factional movement. Not a single voice has been raised against the national consciousness and exigencies. . . . We approached the referendum in the most complete political unity." 4 8 Indeed, by rejecting the referendum 46. Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 21. 47. Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State (New York: Atheneum, 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 219. 4 8 . A h m e d Sékou Touré, Toward Full Re-Africanization (Paris:

60

/

Scarcity,

Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

on the French Fifth Republic constitution with a 863,346 to 21,786 vote, the Guinean people left French authorities little choice but to fulfill their pledges on independence. If African leaders took over and adapted an essentially Western institution for utilitarian purposes in their struggle against Western power, they were in part encouraged to take such a course by colonial administrative policies themselves. As James S. Coleman concludes: The really decisive factor — the precipitant — in the formation of political parties has been constitutional reform providing for (1) the devolution by the imperial government of a sufficiently meaningful and attractive measure of power to induce or to provoke nationalist leaders to convert their movements into political parties and (2) the introduction or refinement of institutions and procedures, such as an electoral system, which would make it technically possible for parties to seek power constitutionally. 4 9

Although more revolutionary-minded organizations have arisen, particularly in northern and southern Africa, and thereby have raised some qualifications as to the above description, it is no doubt generally true that African parties have evolved within the constitutional framework transferred to Africa by the colonial powers. S0 Therefore, party institutions, unlike those discussed before, can be seen to be the resultant of two sources of initiatives during the colonial period: the colonial authority (through its need for a counterpart leadership with which it Presence Africaine, 1959), p. 11. Also see S e k o u T o u r e ' s two volumes: The Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea (Conakry: Democratic Party of Guinea, n.d.). Of course, to stress the significant role of national unity is in no way to detract from the vital place of party organization in the process of securing independence. As Kwame Nkrumah has stated: "The history of colonial liberation movements shows that the first essential thing is ORGANIZATION. Some may say "unity' b u t unity presupposed organization." I Speak of Freedom (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 18. 49. James S. Coleman, "The Emergence of African Political Parties," in C. Grove Haines (ed.), Africa Today (Baltimore: J o h n s Hopkins University Press, 1955). pp. 234-35. (Italics in text.) 50. Hodgkin, African Political Parties, p. 35. Also see the Introduction to James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (eds.), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 3-4.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

61

could negotiate the terms for a transfer of power), and the African nationalist elite (through its need for an organizational instrument to wrest national independence from the hesitant colonial administration). Reciprocal needs in the particular time-place circumstances of colonialism led directly to establishment of a political structure instrumental in nature. Because the modernist African elite played a highly significant role in forming and shaping the party organizations that were to compete with the colonizers for the right to rule, it is not surprising that such structures were to prove important integrative agencies, to the extent at least that a society-wide rather than a subregional or ethnic membership was linked together behind its banners. In mobilizing a broad-based constituency, the party of national salvation necessarily was widely inclusive in its political stratagems. As far as possible all main social, economic, and political interests were brought together in these nationwide movements — to do otherwise was to court the possibility of divide-and-rule colonial tactics in the present, and serious dissension in the future. Hence the nationalist leadership took especial pains to assure that membership and positions in the party reflected the territory's ethnic population. The "mass" party, organized along branch lines, proved particularly effective in uniting the various ethnic sections behind the party spokesmen. For the time being, a sense of common purpose and destiny prevailed. Such cohesiveness (or the appearance of cohesiveness) strengthened the bargaining capacity of the nationalist elite, leaving the colonial power little alternative but to turn over the reins of state to the people's acknowledged representatives. The impact of this change on the structures radiated by the colonial innovator was enormous, and will be examined in the succeeding sections. AFRICAN IMPEDANCE AND FACILITATION Within a few years of the transfer of power, many of the institutions transmitted to Africa had undergone fundamental change. In some instances (e.g., the bureaucracy, the police, the military) the tendency was to strengthen institutional influence and functions; in others (e.g., federalism, constitutional protections, legislatures, multiparty systems, judiciaries) the trend was

62 /

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

the opposite — toward a weakening, even an abolition, of structures. Moreover, certain institutional arrangements were preserved in form but so altered in substance as to represent a transformation of values, purpose, and scope. The Westminster model, embracing an "energetic" executive among its attributes, was well adapted to meet the challenges to central authority burgeoning at the moment of decolonization; however, where this inner dynamism and flexibility of action was not accompanied by traditions of constitutionalism and behavioral restraints, there was every likelihood of a spillover of governmental activity into spheres not anticipated by the basic law. 51 How is one to account for Africa's very diverse receptions to colonially radiated values and institutions? Surely a large part of the explanation lies in the modified circumstances accompanying independence. The dismantling of the alien-imposed superstructure meant an end to colonial administrationnationalist political reciprocity and the attendant need for institutions serving these ends. Election mechanisms, multiparty systems, federalism, and constitutional safeguards proved fragile as their functional usefulness declined in the new conditions of African statehood. The new governments did not always share the Western liberal view on the end-value of political pluralism or institutionalized conflict, and, determined to reduce decision costs, were inclined to downgrade institutions that seemed to threaten them with possible delays as well as leadership crises and turnovers. Exogenous and endogenous imperatives therefore diverged about the time of decolonization, with noticeable effects on the process of institutional transference. For example, African independence, by exacerbating communal tensions over the distribution of political power and economic resources, required the 51. Donald Rothchild, "On the Application of the Westminster Model to Ghana," Centennial Review no. 4 (Fall 1960): 468-69. For a similar process in Kenya, see his "Majimbo Schemes in Kenya and Uganda," in Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno (eds.), Boston University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 294. Also see David E. Apter, Choice and The Politics of Allocation: A Developmental Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 130; and Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 324-25.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

63

adoption of more forceful mechanisms for the regulation of conflict than had hitherto seemed necessary. Moreover, the new African regimes sought to achieve more in the way of national integration than did their predecessors. "The absence of disturbances is not a sufficient indication that authority exists," observed Aristide Zolberg; "a large proportion of the population must positively acknowledge its loyalty to the regime." " No longer would the implicit assumptions of authority suffice. The independent African governments sought to mobilize explicit society-wide support for themselves and their policies and, in carrying out these objectives, required specific instruments of regulation that would make up for any inadequacy in organization or procedure for managing intense social conflicts. 53 As a consequence, the new African leadership selected out and encouraged those externally radiated institutions and values deemed to be imperative to its needs, while discouraging others felt to be dysfunctional, or downright obstructive. 54 It gave support to structures and behavior patterns that bolstered central capacity for action over any dissident challenges. Coming virtually full circle, it sought a return to the low decision costs of the immediate past. In the area of reception, three main factors facilitate the growth of structures transmitted under colonial aegis. These factors, which involve an enlargement of the institutional legacy, include historical continuity, functional roles, and elite preference. Irrespective of origins, these factors can act in certain circumstances to increase governmental capabilities of the African states as against the pressures emanating from the social environment. 52. Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 40. Also see Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 26. 53. Huntington, Political Order (n 34 above), pp. 194-96 and Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1971), p. 648. 54. Ralph Braibanti, "The Relevance of Political Science to the Study of Underdeveloped Areas," in Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961), p. 160.

64

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

Although a number of institutional changes occurred with independence, it is unwise to overlook the extent of the continuities that persisted. In this respect, it is useful to distinguish between institutional continuities as such and the values attaching to such institutions. A number of African governments have built upon the colonial legacies of international capitalism, despite their evident distaste for the values inhering in such a connection, in order to maintain access to capital, skilled cadres, technology, and markets resulting from such a relationship. Leaders in the Ivory Coast and Kenya, and to a lesser extent even some of those adopting more radical policy-making styles elsewhere on the continent, view such institutional continuities as necessary to their immediate goal of rapid economic growth. To be sure, the capitalist-oriented states do sponsor reforms of an incremental nature (i.e., Africanization, alterations in the tax laws, joint partnerships, even partial nationalization of the "commanding heights" of the economy), but they reject major structural changes in the inherited economic system so as to avoid a disruption of their valued connections with the former metropolitan power." And having once decided to achieve growth objectives on the foundation of this tie to international capitalism, these reformist-oriented governments have little alternative but to build upon this institutional resource by pursuing policies aimed at bringing further overseas investments into their countries. Thus the maintenance of economic connections with these inherited institutions leads directly to policies that in turn facilitate new capitalist investment and Western-based technology transfer — furthering their dependence on the world economy. In addition, African leaders had expanded the ability of such organs as executives and bureaucracies to formulate and implement policy." They took full advantage of the previous 55. Ann Seidman, Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), pp. 57-59; Colin Leys, "Interpreting African Underdevelopment: Reflections on the ILO Report on Employment, Incomes and Equality in Kenya," African Affairs 72, no. 289 (October 1973): 419-29; and National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968). 56. Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration,

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

65

existence of such powerful, centralized agencies of policydetermination and regulation, and their innovations lay more in the area of recruitment and task expansion than in efforts at structural revision. Commenting on the continuing influence of "statist conceptions" in the style and content of Kenyan public administration, one author remarks that "it is scarcely surprising that the authoritarian character of earlier administration has left its impact on public attitudes and is especially evident in the social esteem and high status granted to officers of the post-independent provincial administration in Kenya today." 57 With a patrimonial type of leadership, marked by the shift from parliamentary to presidential systems, political elites inevitably relied upon, and therefore reinforced, whatever constant organizational elements promoted their ability to rule. The values attaching to colonially radiated institutions also work for continuity with the past. Where institutions become accepted and desired by the politically relevant strata of the population, the public's behavior patterns frequently reflect the values associated with these structures. The Nigerian police force, committed in the mid-1960s to the support of the existing government, did not take an active part in planning the coup d'etats, as did their counterparts in Ghana. As one observer explains this phenomenon: "It is evident that despite the strains and stresses of the period October 1960-December 1965, the NPF remained faithful to the traditions inherited from its colonial past. A colonial police force, unlike the Metropolitan Police tradition, not only enforced law and order, prevented, detected and prosecuted crime but also maintained or supported the established government." 58 Similarly the universalistic criteria of merit and experience utilized by the Kenya civil service in appointing and promoting its officers is a colonially radiated value which perpetuated an inherited imbalance of p. 659; and David B. Abernethy, "Bureaucracy and Economic Development in Africa," African Review 1, no. 1 (March 1971): 93-95. 57. Goran Hyden, "Basic Civil Service Characteristics," in Goran AdminisHyden, Robert Jackson, and John Okumu (eds.), Development tration: The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 6. 58. Tamuno, Police in Modern Nigeria (n. 37 above), p. 287.

66

/

Scarcity,

Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

opportunities among the country's ethnic groups. And the interplay of institution and values was also apparent in East African elite perceptions of the role of the national legislature. In accounting for the higher status Kenyans gave to parliamentary bodies than their neighbors in Tanzania and Uganda gave in the 1960s, one observer points to " a tradition of lively and frank d e b a t e " as the critical variable. 59

Whatever a r g u m e n t s are p r o d u c e d against t w o - p a r t y states, in terms o f w a s t a g e of talent, e n c o u r a g e m e n t o f tribal or religious divisions a n d s o o n , o n e thing s h o u l d be said t o their c r e d i t : that they d o b r e e d a t r a d i t i o n of lively p a r l i a m e n t s . If the c o u n t r y then m o v e s i n t o a o n e - p a r t y state s y s t e m , this tradition m a y still survive — K e n y a is giving evidence of t h i s ! 6 0

Other instances of value and structural continuity can be cited: the autonomy and impartiality of various higher court systems, the extensive authority exercised by many district and provincial officials, and the restraints on military interventions in certain African states. Another factor facilitating an expansion of the institutional legacy is the increasing range of functional roles assigned to these structures. Such functions involve symbolic as well as substantive satisfactions; a constitution may be both symbolically significant (in terms of international respectability) and substantively significant (in terms of distributing authority among branches of government or the center and the subregions). However, it is in the material area that one has seen an enormous growth in institutional capabilities. Particularly among structures enhancing the authority of the various regimes — the bureaucracy, the military, and the police — expanded activities are quite noticeable. Not only have the public services taken on added responsibilities for defense, foreign affairs, and economic development, but they have swelled in size. In Kenya, the civil service has grown from 45,000 in 1955 to 63,000 in 1965 and 77,000 in 1 9 6 9 . " Similarly, such bureaucratically organized 5 9 . D o n a l d R o t h c h i l d , " E t h n i c Inequalities in K e n y a , " in Olorunsola, Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism, pp. 300-303. 6 0 . C l y d e S a n g e r , " T a n z a n i a ' s Presidential C o m m i s s i o n East Africa Journal 2, no. 3 ( J u n e 1 9 6 5 ) , p . 2 1 . 6 1 . H y d e n , p . 8.

Report,"

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

61

institutions as the military and police forces have frequently expanded and modernized after independence. T h e strength of the Ghana police services rose from 1 0 , 4 5 8 in 1 9 6 3 to 1 6 , 3 5 8 in 1 9 7 0 (and an establishment authorized at 1 9 , 9 0 3 for the latter y e a r ) . " And even though a buildup of the armed forces is especially evident in the countries which have undergone military coups (Uganda, Nigeria), the same trend is apparent in civilian-controlled Kenya, which established a navy and an air force to complement its much-strengthened army. 63 But over and above these critical factors of historical continuity and functional roles is that of elite preferences, and the determination to put these preferences into effect. President Kenneth Kaunda's and Julius Nyerere's attempts to institutionalize party mechanisms, and President J o m o Kenyatta's and Mobutu Sese Seko's apparent preference for ruling through the governmental apparatus rather than the party organization are all separate and distinct leadership styles of great importance in terms o f structural outcomes. 6 4 President Obote's reforms of the Uganda People's Congress Constitution in 1 9 6 8 can be interpreted as an effort on his part to consolidate his authority through an emphasis on the party's role " a s an integrating structure." 6 5 And President Leopold Senghor's unique decision, in August 1 9 7 4 , to facilitate the emergence of a new political party was prompted in part at least by a personal 62. Republic of Ghana, Statistical Year Book, 1969-70 (Accra: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1973), p. 96. 63. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan, 1966-1970 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1966), pp. 347-48. On the expansion of the Uganda army to an estimated 1 2 , 0 0 0 or 16,000 men, see Peter Enahoro, "Whither Uganda," Africa, no. 16 (December 1972), p. 13. On the rise in Nigerian forces from an estimated 1 1 , 0 0 0 at the time of the first military takeover to over 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 at the end of the civil war, see John M. Ostheimer, Nigerian Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 119-20. An even lower estimate of 8 , 0 0 0 men in the Nigerian army at the beginning of 1966 appears in Nigerian Opinion 2, no. 1 (January 1966): 2. 64. Henry Bienen, Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 80; and J o n Kraus, "On the Politics of Nationalism and Social Change in Ghana," Journal of Modern African Studies 7, no. 1 (April 1969): 116. 65. Cherry Gertzel, "Leadership and Institution Building in Uganda," African Review 2, no. 1 (June 1972): 183.

68

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

preference for open partisan conflict (elections in Senegal are scheduled for 1978). Thus the political preferences of the elite, combined with the necessary will to promote these preferences, are a vital element in the facilitation of certain structures. If leaders uniformly sought to increase organizational competence in order to deal more effectively with the demands of the environment, they differed markedly as to the particular emphases put upon political structures and functions in their countries. Whereas the political elite facilitated the growth of institutions enhancing its ability to handle local demands, it acted simultaneously to reduce the burdens on government by resisting colonial legacies inhibiting its capacity to reach decisions, or to implement these decisions. Such a process of impedance entailed a resistance to colonial innovation to the extent that institutions were viewed as reducing central efficiency or distorting the economy in a structural manner. Institutions seen as fostering racial or class inequalities or undermining a policy of nonalignment between East and West (i.e., through links with the Western capitalist economy) or those hastily erected as limitations on majoritarian action in the terminal stages of imperial rule (i.e., constitutional limitations, subregionalism, federalism, legislative restraints, trade union autonomy, multiparty systems, and so forth) sometimes received short shrift from independent African regimes. In their determination to achieve egalitarian and social welfare objectives, many regimes have attempted to remove various aspects of discrimination in employment opportunities and business management and ownership and, in the case of the more radically inclined states, to reduce disparities in income and wealth, to control Western-based corporate power, and, wherever possible, to curb the growth of an African capitalist class before it gains firm roots. Although Western technology is generally sought for its contribution to economic progress, African leaders legitimately chafe over the extremely high direct and indirect costs involved in these transfers of production processes.66 They are therefore enacting a number of laws and 66. Surendra J. Patel, "The Technological Dependence of Developing Countries," Journal of Modern African Studies 12, no. 1 (March 1974): 9-13.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

69

regulations on the importation of technology in an effort to reduce their growing dependence on Western know-how as well as to lessen the enormous fiscal burdens occasioned by this diffusion process. In addition to these efforts to hold down the direct and indirect costs of technology transfer are the extremely high costs of inappropriate technology. Because of relatively high labor costs in Western countries, their technology has tended to be capital-intensive in nature. But when these laborsaving mechanisms are exported to the Third World, with its heavy unemployment, the results may be extremely inefficient in terms of the utilization of scarce resources. A notable example of inexpedient technology emerges from a comparison of the Chinese-assisted Urafiki (Friendship) Textile Mill and the Mwanza Mill, both of Tanzania. These mills were set up at the same time and produce similar total outputs; but whereas Urafiki — which cost one-third less to construct, is African managed, and employs three thousand workers — makes a profit, capital-intensive Mwanza, which employs one thousand people and is largely expatriate-directed, shows losses." Where technology is secured at such a heavy cost it naturally makes sense for the recipient to examine carefully, and in some cases to impede, the inflow of undesirable processes. Anxious to remove any constraints placed on their initiative by the departing colonial power, the new African governments frequently sought to consolidate their political power by redefining or abolishing what they considered to be needless or undesirable limitations on their freedom of maneuver. Not surprisingly, in the heady environment of decolonization, a number of these restraining mechanisms proved brittle and ineffective when challenged by those who had just emerged, successful, from the struggle for national independence. Even though the departing colonial authority bears a good measure of responsibility for the fragility of some of the structures so hastily erected, two types of efficiency costs enter into the African decision to diminish those aspects of the colonial legacy undercutting (or seeming to undercut) the capacity for problem-solving. 68 First, the postindependence ruling elite felt 67. Phil Raikes, "Tanzania Blazes Its Own Trail," African Development 7, no. 12 (December 1973): T15. 68. On the failure of colonial rule to provide an effective classroom

70

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

itself unduly burdened b y political institutions entailing high decision costs. The colonial authority had operated a command model until the terminal stages o f its overlordship; now the African elite perceived itself to be saddled with bargaining encumbrances never placed upon the alien authorities. And they found these limitations as irksome in their implications of distrust as in their actual constraints on the exercise of political power. Consequently, they moved soon after independence to dismantle or reduce to ineffectiveness a number o f the hastily erected structures dividing power. Such inherited institutions as federalism, bicameralism, multipartyism, and entrenched provisions o f the constitution on amendments, ethnic representation, and the status and functions o f subregional units were rendered ineffective. B y diffusing or limiting the exercise of central authority, these structural arrangements raised decision costs, thereby compelling leaders to invest greater resources in the decision-making process than they were wont to do. It was in this sense that Ahmed Sékou Touré described two-party and multiparty systems as luxuries and argued for the adoption of single-party structures in Africa: The old states which are economically and politically powerful, and socially and culturally developed can enjoy the luxury of divisions, it [a two-/or multi-party system] can only put a brake on their progress towards greater affluence. But if the young states which are politically and economically fragile, socially and culturally undeveloped were to prefer sterile division to productive unity, it would be a sign of lack of consciousness, proof that they were unable to consolidate the foundations of political and economic independence, and promote the rapid social and cultural advances of their people. In order to succeed, every collective undertaking must have unity of management, of action, of aims, one faith, one continuity, one discipline.

This was recognized from the outset in the French-speaking African states. These countries built upon the inherited unitary tradition o f metropolitan France to effect administrative and in democratic principles and practices, see Donald Rothchild, "Progress and the One- Party State," Transition 4, no. 10 (September 1963): 32. 69. Ahmed Sékou Touré, The Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea Part I (Conakry: Democratic Party of Guinea, n.d.), p. 52.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

71

budgetary practices strengthening the central political organization at the expense of the parts. And where that central authority seemed challenged (as in the case of the Sanwi secessionist movement of 1959 in the Ivory Coast), these governments moved swiftly and decisively to end any threats to national integrity. 70 It was mainly in English-speaking or multilingual Africa that a federal type of solution seemed a realizable objective. In some of these lands subregional or minority ethnic groups and leaders saw in such structural forms the possibility for meaningful protections against what Ghana's K. A. Busia described as "political tyranny, . . . the personality cult and other totalitarian phenomena that tend to become manifest." 71 During the terminal stages of colonial administration, provisions for various federal types of arrangements were inserted into the basic laws of Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroun, Kenya, and Uganda, only to be dismantled, often quickly, once the new African governments assumed full authority (the Camerounian basic law remained in effect until the 1972 referendum, however). Federalism or quasi-federalism, contended many of these leaders following independence, was accepted reluctantly in order to speed progress toward national self-rule." It was an act of expediency justified by the colonizer's penchant for divide-and-rule strategies. In insisting upon such rigid guarantees against majoritarian leadership, the Opposition, in Nkrumah's words, . . . "committed a rape on mother Ghana by forcing these Regional Assemblies upon the country." 7 3 Under such 70. Aristide R. Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 2 9 0 - 2 9 4 . 71. K. A. Busia, The Challenge of Africa (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 72-73. 72. T. J. Mboya, "The Kenya Republic," Reporter 3, no. 122 (December 18, 1964): 18. On Uganda federalism, see Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, "Uganda," in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.), National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 343-51, 370-79. For the Federal Republic of the Cameroun, see Jacques Benjamin, Les Camerounais Occidentaux: La Minorité dans un Etat Bicommunautaire (Montreal: Presse de l'Université de Montreal 1972). 73. Parliamentary Debates (Ghana), XII (November 3, 1958), col. 16.

72

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

circumstances, the postindependence governments deemed it reasonable to rectify the misdeeds of the immediate past by amending the constitution to "tone down" or abolish the subregional authorities. 74 Viewed as obstructions to strong central government and to the center's primary missions of national integration and economic development, these subregional authorities were soon jettisoned in favor of unitary systems. Africa's "energetic and impatient leaders" rejected the open conflict implicit in a bargaining relationship for the more dynamic leadership considered possible in a patrimonial ruling style.75 These new governments refused to share power with subregional authorities, in part, at least, out of recognition that an increase in decisional costs would gravely complicate the achievement of pressing objectives. As Nkrumah summarized the feelings of many contemporaries: "Just at a time when a strong government is necessary, federalism introduces an element of paralysis into the machinery of State, and slows down the process of governmental action. We cannot afford this luxury in Africa." 76 A second type of efficiency cost that gives African leaders cause to place constraints on institutions inherited from colonial times involves system credibility. Such credibility depends ultimately on the political system's ability to perform and to respond to public expectations. 77 And responsiveness is inextricably intertwined with the principle of proportionality among groups — both in political participation and in economic distribution. Where constitutional instruments tightly enclosed the sphere of majoritarian action, the legitimacy of the institutions themselves soon came into question. Thus the provisions 74. Kanu statement, East African Standard (Nairobi), April 4, 1963, p. 5. 75. R. C. Pratt, "The Future of Federalism in British Africa," Queen's Quarterly 67, no. 2 (Summer 1960): p. 200. Also see Chancellor Williams, "African Democracy and the Leadership Principle," Journal of Human Relations 8, nos. 3 & 4 (Spring and Summer, 1960): 827-28. 76. Evening News (Accra), April 19, 1961, pp. 3-4. 77. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55, no. 3 (September 1961): 501-2.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

73

on amending the basic laws of Zambia and Kenya were viewed by the ruling elite as entrenched protections for the privileged few, not valid means of safeguarding the rights of minority peoples. In explaining Zambia's decision in June 1969 to hold a referendum on ending future referendums, Kaunda said: "We could not use the same old institutions used by an imperialist and colonialist power; they could not fit. . . . The times had changed, our industrial revolution could not be carried through without that Referendum.'" 8 Likewise, leaders of the Kenya African National Union chafed under the constraints of an independence constitution that required a 75 percent vote of approval in both houses (or a two-thirds majority in a referendum if one house did not endorse the change by the requisite majority) for an amendment to take effect. In 1965, the government secured the requisite majority) in both houses to bring about the passage of the Constitution of Kenya Amendment Bill reducing the necessary majority for constitutional amendments from 75 to 65 percent. Such a change would ensure that the Kenya constitution was more representative and more respected, argued the minister for economic planning and development, Tom Mboya, and would further the chances that the fundamental law would endure "without people feeling that it is an encroachment on the will of the m a j o r i t y . " " Institutional transformation was essential, then, to assure credibility; intergroup power imbalances could not have been allowed to persist in their inherited form, for in majority eyes they constituted what Mboya described as "burdens" upon democratically oriented governmental action. 80 Efficiency costs involving decision-making and system credibility led rulers to modify — even abolish — certain colonially radiated institutional mechanisms. The consequence of 78. Take up the Challenge . . ., speeches by Dr. K. D. Kaunda to the United National Independence Party National Council, Lusaka, 7-10 November 1970 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.), p. 6. 79. House of Representatives Debates (Kenya), IV (April 20, 1965), col. 1260. 80. Loc. cit. Also see Y. P. Ghai and J. P. W. B. McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 213.

74

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

this process o f impedance was to enhance the personal authority of elites at the expense, in some instances, of institutional vigor. Such structures as legislatures, trade unions, corporations, universities, party factions, and the press often found themselves limited in terms of autonomy and freedom of action. They were denied the capacity for effective conflict behavior; for leaders sought to contain conflict to the inner sanctums of the executive rather than to regularize a direct encounter of interest groups. Kaunda, for example, found a public airing in the press of conflicts among chiefs to be "disgusting" and stated: " F r o m now on, I do not want news media to concentrate on crime, conflicts, outrage or failures as staple food for dishing out to the masses o f news consumers." 8 1 Further evidences of a closed conflict strategy in Zambia were the abhorrence shown toward factional interests within the United National Independence Party following the 1967 elections; " precautions against internal factionalism at subsequent party conferences; 8 3 the rapid rotation of high government officials; 8 " the outlawing in April 1 9 7 1 of two ethnic political groupings (the predomonantly B e m b a Committee of 2 4 and the nonB e m b a Committee of 1 4 ) ; the insistence that rival modernist elements such as the university students and the police in J u l y 1 9 7 1 , "leave things to m e " (Kaunda); 8 5 the decision in 81. Times of Zambia (Ndola), August 2, 1972, p. 1. 82. A Path for the Future, an address by Dr. Kaunda at the Opening of the Sixth General Conference of the United National Independence Party, Mulungushi, 8 May 1971, p. 10. Also see Kaunda's warning against party "deviationists" in Take up the Challenge . . ., p. 55. 83. For references to possible "stage-managing" of the 1971 Mulungushi Conference, see Sunday Times of Zambia (Ndola), May 16, 1971, p. 1. Also, the constitution of UNIP was changed at the conference to give the Central Committee great powers in nominating the secretary-general and future membership of that committee as voted on by the General Conference of the party. See Constitution of the United National Independence Party, Zambia, 1971, Art. 6(3). (Mimeo.) 84. Among those who have commented on this as an indication of Kaunda's "adroitness" in dealing with ethnic contests within his cabinet, see Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South (New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1969), p. 50. 85. Times of Zambia (Ndola), July 10, 1971, p. 1. For a description of the confrontation, see Donald Rothchild, "The Beginning of Student Unrest in Zambia," Transition , no. 4 0 (December 1971), pp. 66-74.

Changing Institutional Resources

/

75

late 1972 to implement the report on the establishment of a one-party participatory democracy; 86 and, finally, the statement in 1976 that if "Marxist" lecturers were not with him, they should keep quiet.87 With the passing of the years, the processes of Zambian decision-making have become less and less visible, with increasing power passing from cabinet hands to those of the office of president. Moreover, the trend of the times was highlighted in February 1971 by the issuance of a seven-point code of behavior which put a total ban on open political conflict, inside or outside of parliament, between cabinet ministers, ministers of state, district governors, and members of parliament. Henceforth only parliamentary backbenchers would be permitted to raise questions of policy.88 For some, this code of behavior was tantamount to a "muzzle" on the free expression of differences. Contending that those in high governmental positions "will sleep soundly for the first time in many months" (as a result of their freedom from parliamentary criticism), a correspondent for the Sunday Times of Zambia observed: No more will their every action be questioned by some MP from Mwinilunga who travels all the way to Lusaka just to present his constituents' grievances to Parliament. No more will they have to face embarassing questions from some of the most erudite Government MPs on why they allowed this or that to happen in a certain area in the remotest part of the country. It will be a bed of roses for them, to some extent. But what will it do to politics in Zambia? Is this not the death of politics in this part of the world? 89

Such fears were premature. As the student-police-UNIP confrontation of 1971 and the subsequent student demonstrations 86. Remarking on the move to a one-party state in Zambia, Dr. Kaunda said that strict discipline would be needed to ensure a more rapid achievment of national objectives. Times of Zambia (Ndola), August 4, 1972, p. 1. Also see Republic of Zambia, Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party Participatory Democracy in Zambia (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1972), pp. 52-53. 87. Weekly Review (Nairobi), no. 54 (February 23, 1976), p. 15. 88. Times of Zambia (Ndola), February 17, 1971, p. 1. 89. Sunday Times of Zambia (Ndola), February 21, 1971, p. 1. Also see Vice-President Mainza Chona's reply in Times of Zambia (Ndola), February 25, 1971, p. 4.

16

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

of 1976 revealed so clearly, conflicts among modernist interest groups remained just beneath the surface and, given adequate cause, might burst suddenly into view. Nevertheless, the code of behavior did suggest the emergence of a style of politics which attempted to delimit the boundaries of conflict in order to keep it to manageable proportions. Such an approach, utilized in East Africa as well as in Zambia, may temporarily keep interest group struggles from the public view. But it remains to be seen whether it can contain conflict over the long term, and should such conflict take place, whether regularized patterns of behavior will come to the fore enabling men to cope with their feelings of difference. Ali A. Mazrui's remarks on the functions of criticism are pertinent: African governments o f t e n go to great lengths to avert the appearance of dissension in the country and to try and eliminate every risk of serious conflict either between groups or between the state itself and some groups. What is overlooked is that there is such a thing as an artificial "absence of conflict." National integration does not consist merely in being forced to smile sweetly at each other. 9 0

The desire to reduce conflict leads not only to institutional modifications but to the elimination of structures as well. The latter process differs mainly in degree, involving a more drastic effort on the part of those in authority to root out autonomous centers around which group interests might form. Thus the casting aside of such inherited institutions as second chambers, federal types of systems, constitutional safeguards, two-party and multiparty structures, and, in some cases, legislative organs brings the effort to regulate conflict to its logical conclusion. Obviously, few leaders seriously hope for a complete exclusion of competing interests through the dismantling of these structures; what they seek is a channeling of discordant and factious behavior along controllable avenues. Federal types of arrangements carried with them the likelihood of autonomous spheres for the expression of subregionally based demands; hence the desire to eliminate the structures facilitating the input of demands into the political system. The process of impedance, 90. Ali A. Mazrui, "National Unity and the Press," People pala), November 12, 1966, p. 10.

(Kam-

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

77

then, was geared to the perceived need for centralized action and the reduction of inherited structural constraints on such action.

THE ACCULTURATED MUTANTS Since relatively high decision costs were associated with certain colonially radiated institutions, it is not surprising to find the new African governments taking steps to modify them following the transfer of power. The resulting acculturated mutants were institutions brought in line with local values — on the reduction of conflict, the maintenance of low decision costs, and the concentration of political and economic authority. The advantages of continuity were recognized, while structures were altered so as to deal with the perceived strains of the environment. Such innovations represented "the learning responses of the system". 91 Changes in the environment caused leaders to apply new institutional mechanisms to achieve the state-building goals they set for themselves. In transforming their colonial legacies, African leaders were notable in their creativity and realism. They redesigned regional-central relationships, economic institutions, election systems, and interest group and political party mechanisms and other structural arrangements in order to serve decision, integrative, and developmental ends. Thus, as colonial experiments with tensional federalism tended to break down in the years following independence, it became necessary for statesmen to find new approaches to the problem of administrative decentralization — something more along the lines of cooperative federalism. On the one hand, subregional and ethnic inequalities have remained in evidence, and the spokesmen for these units have continued to urge a decentralization of economic and political responsibilities; not only might such decentralization spread and equalize opportunity but it might infuse enthusiasm for centrally inspired developmental objectives, thereby reducing the costs of decisions, to some extent at least. On the other hand, classical, and rather legalistic, federal formulas have 91. Deutsch, Nerves of Government (n. 1 above), p. 243.

78

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

proven difficult to apply to African needs and circumstances. Consequently, the adoption of some form of African-inspired system of reconciliation seems possible in the period to come. At the moment two large African polities appear to be likely candidates for some type of federal experimentation in the future — Nigeria and the Sudan. We do not include such recently manipulated forms of decentralization as the Bantustans of South Africa in this regard, for the dominant role of the European community precludes the kind of power-sharing essential to a consociational arrangement. In Nigeria, the new nineteen-state, federal structure has come into effect and, with the expected return to civilian control in the late 1970s, will likely emerge as an important feature in the country's evolving political institutionalization. Not surprisingly, federalism is a logical response to the country's social pluralism. The independence constitution, hammered out by Nigerian leaders under the aegis of British colonial officials, reflected the main configurations of power in the country at that time. The constitution assigned the federal government exclusive power over such matters as external affairs, defense, posts, telegraphs, railways, trunk roads, and so forth; such items as census, industrial development, labor, tourism, water power, scientific research, and traffic on federal trunk roads were placed on a concurrent list; and the remainder was left to subregional initiative. The federal government possessed exclusive power to impose excise duties as well as taxes on imports and exports, corporation profits, and mining rents and royalties. Because the only subregional taxes of significance were on individual incomes, produce, and motor vehicles, the subregional treasuries were left dependent on federal grants for two-thirds of their recurrent revenues. In brief, Nigeria's independence constitution combined centralized finance and taxing authority with decentralized administrative responsibility. During 1964 and 1965 the pressures on a fragile federal arrangement grew steadily. In addition to the immediate crises over the general strike, the census counts, the federal election, and the Western Region election (with its ensuing lawlessness and disillusionment), the longer-term issues of minority ethnic representation, political corruption, the subregions' lack of fiscal independence, and the appeals of concentrated and effec-

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

79

tive leadership all worked against a smoothly operating consociational relationship. The end came abruptly in January 1966. On January 15, a group of young army officers seized power from the established politicians and turned over the authority of the state to Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi. In reaction to the Ironsi regime's attempt in early 1966 to centralize the structure of government, a follow-up coup occurred in July 1966, which accepted the need for some form of federalism as the basis of Nigerian unity. The new government, under Major-General Yakuba Gowon, responded to the challenge of Nigerian pluralism by investing the subregional military governors with the same legislative and executive powers held by the subregions before the first military coup (Decree No. 8 of 1967). Although the head of the federal military government retained broad powers to consent to decrees, Decree No. 8 went a long way toward reestablishing a federal structure in Nigeria. Further shape was given to Nigerian constitutionalism two months later when, in an effort to break up the constellations of power in the old units, the Gowon regime put another decree into effect, creating a twelve-state system. In this one move, Gowon sought to remove former fears of domination and to end the structural imblance that had long plagued the Nigerian Federation. Subsequently, General Murtala Mohammed announced a further expansion of Nigeria's twelve-state structure to nineteen; however, because of his assassination, it fell to his successor, Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo, to promulgate a decree in March 1976 putting this change into effect. Certainly it is too early to predict whether constitutional stability will result from the Federal Military Government's experiments with a federal type of government. The Constituent Assembly is yet to meet, and the conflicts over revenue allocation, division of power, intergovernmental relations, and the creation of new states remain just beneath the surface. Nevertheless, Nigerians have reasons for hope: a healthy economy, broad political experience, common aspirations, and a joint interest in constitutional stability. In light of all these assets, a move from de facto to de jure federalism may not be far off. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement on the problems of the

80

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

south Sudan, which brought an end to sixteen years of warfare between Sudanese government and Anya Nya (literally "snake venom") forces, achieved a temporary resolution of conflict through the establishment of a structure of subregional autonomy. Although southern delegates to the peace negotiations pressed for formal "federation," they utlimately accepted a locally inspired scheme devolving limited powers upon the selfgoverning Southern Region (including Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile Provinces), "In constitutional terms" declared Ralph Uwechue, "what was achieved is a kind of confederation, which is what the Sudan needs. No complete breakup, b u t n o suffocating form of unity."' 2 Under such circumstances, the quasi-federal institutions adopted in the Sudan represented a realistic innovation — both ingenious and responsible. For good and sound reasons the Addis agreement was hailed by observers as a creative example of conflict management in Africa. It eased tensions between the north and the south by providing for a decentralized system of government in the country. Although the central government retained responsibility over such areas as national defense, external affairs, currency and coinage, air and interregional river transportation, communications and telecommunications, customs and international trade, nationality and immigration, economic and social planning, and public audit, the Peoples Regional Assembly was given a broad mandate under Article II to "legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields." Furthermore, the agreement provided that southerners would be recruited into the armed forces in proportion to the populations in the subregions, and that the Peoples Armed Forces in the south would consist of a national corps composed of 12,000 officers and men, of whom 6,000 would be citizens of the Southern Region. In sociological terms, a consociational system was established, for the power of the state was distributed among various governments, each competent in a limited sphere of activities. 92. "A Fine Example," Grass Curtain 2, no. 3 (May 1972), p. 6.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

81

In fact, the agreement has represented a cautious beginning in reconciliation. President Jaafar el Nimeiry granted amnesty to all who took part in the civil war; authorized the recruitment and training of 6,000 former Anya Nya soldiers into the army, 3,000 into the police, and 2,000 into the prison administration; appointed the former Anya Nya commander, Joseph Lago, a major-general in the army; held elections to the Peoples Assembly in the Southern Region in November 1973; set up a subregional cabinet under Vice-President Abel Alier in J u b a ; and encouraged the return of most of the 200,000 refugees who had fled to neighboring countries. Nevertheless, a number of factors raise concern as to the future of power-sharing in the Sudan. On the one hand, determined elements in the north, in particular, the Muslim Brothers, continue to oppose any significant concessions to the Southern Region; on the other hand, it remains unclear whether southern leaders can gain sufficient political power and fiscal resources to ensure a sense of local fulfillment under the arrangement. Khartoum's bureaucratic inertia in expediting needed development funds has raised serious questions among southerners as to the meaning of the Addis Accord. A look at the budgetary allocations from 1973-74 to 1975-76 goes far in substantiating such misgivings. During these periods, the central contribution to the subregion has remained at approximately 5 percent, giving rise to a sense of frustration in the J u b a administration and the subregion as a whole. Nevertheless, these concerns should not be overemphasized, and there is reason to hope that a temporary institutional framework will in due course be transformed into a stable and satisfactory relationship. As for institutional experimentation in the method of electing members to parliament, a novel proposal was advanced by President Obote of Uganda as part of his grand strategy on moving to the left. His Document No. 5, described by a political analyst as one of the most challenging political experiments to have been seriously considered anywhere in A f r i c a , " " sought to encourage the process of national integration by requiring that a candidate for a seat in parliament gain the highest Africa

93. Ali A. Mazrui, Cultural Engineering and Nation-building (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 70.

in East

82

/

Scarcity,

Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

number of electoral votes in the region of his basic constituency and three regions outside the region of the basic constituency, all combined.' 4 The central purpose behind this provision was " t o produce a new brand of leadership" that would link an MP's home area to the rest of the country.' 5 The institution of the national election was made into a more forceful vehicle of interethnic exchange. "During the life of the present Parliament," Obote contended, anyone who cared to observe must have noticed that whether at District or National level, leaders, unless forced by the call of duty, have continued to do more political activities in their home areas than anywhere else in Uganda. This tendency could grow to such an extent that leaders become increasingly tied up, not to the people of Uganda as such, but to a section of the community which each leader might call " m y people." It is for this reason that new methods must be introduced for the election of the President and Members of the National Assembly. Such measures should ensure that in the case of the President the people of Uganda as a whole have an effective say in his election, and in the case of a Member of the National Assembly, a cross-section of the people in all the four Regions of Uganda should have an effective say.' 6

The modification of institutions to achieve various statebuilding goals also emerges from a related effort to create democratic one-party structures in the eastern African countries. Under Tanzanian and Zambian circumstances, such party systems are acculturated mutants which involve a transformation of existing institutions to secure the more urgently soughtafter postindependence objectives of low decision cost, national integration, and development. In these lands, the Opposition parties were not in a position to perform their functions as effective checks on majoritarian usurpation of power — and as alternative governments. All too often Opposition parties drew their support from divisive tribal or racial appeals, rather than from the submission of constructive, alternative policies. Consequently, it came as no surprise when, in January 1964, Julius 94. A. Milton Obote, Proposals for New Methods of Election Representatives of the People to Parliament (Kampala: Uganda People's Congress, 1970), pp. 20-23. • 95. Ibid., p. 6. 96. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

83

Nyerere announced the appointment of a presidential commission to consider the constitutional changes necessary to put a "democratic" one-party state into effect. Tanzania's decision to move from a de facto to a de jure single-party structure was final; all that remained for the members of the presidential commission charged with implementing this policy was to make recommendations on guaranteeing such principles as the rule of law, citizen equality, political freedom, and maximum public participation within the single-party framework.' 7 Similarly in Zambia, the appeals of a formalized one-party state structure surmounted the lingering attachment to British constitutional ties, and a restructuring process took place which led to the establishment of "participatory democracy" within a de jure single-party system. 98 In African eyes, the role of the party would have to be reformulated in order to enable ruling elites to deal more effectively with the challenges of postindependence times. Parties would have to perform unifying and mobilizing functions, not conflict-making ones. A one-party democracy, argued Mainza Chona, Zambia's vice-president, will create better conditions for economic development as well as "minimize political tensions" in the country." Through its inclusiveness, one-party advocates sought to rise above the negative aspects of factionalism. "A National Movement which is open to all — which is identified with the whole nation — has nothing to fear from the discontent of any excluded section of society, for there is then no such section.'" 00 Institutional change was necessary, therefore, to channel the strains coming from the environment into the most manageable of directions. The restructuring of the party system had a spillover effect upon other institutions as well. The Tanganyika African National Union, freed from the need to compete for the control 97. The United Republic of Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965), p. 2. 98. Republic of Zambia, Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One-Party Participatory Democracy in Zambia (Lusaka: Government Printer, 1972). 99. Times of Zambia (Ndola),July 7, 1972, p. 1. 100. Julius K. Nyerere, Democracy and the Party System (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Standard Ltd., n.d.), p. 25.

84

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

of the executive or legislative branches, built an element of conflict into the election process by providing that two candidates, selected by district and national party organs, would run for positions in the National Assembly in the various constituencies. Although a considerable turnover of personnel did occur with successive elections under this new one-party voting system, the extent to which it had an integrative or mobilizational impact remained less than clear. Thus despite the apparent concentration of power in central party hands, two political scientists, when analyzing the 1970 general election, stressed the public's continuing tendency to choose a local patron who would do the most for his constituents in the way of securing resources from government. The Tanzanian member of parliament was still regarded as a delegate of the people, and the. government as an indispensable patron with a monopoly of control over resources. 101 In addition, although less dramatically, the one-party state structure also affected interest groups, trade unions, the press, the civil service and military establishment, youth's and women's brigades, universities, and the legal system. In the large, the move to a de jure single-party structure presaged a general effort on the part of the leaders to reduce decision costs and to tighten central control over all aspects of life in the country. Not only was their role to be changed to ensure the fulfillment of the government's state-building purposes, b u t these interests were to be regulated and incorporated to preclude divisive tendencies. Soon after independence, authorities in Guinea and Mali replaced the coordinating structures for youth affairs with a new administrative apparatus under the control of a government ministry. 102 And in Ghana, the 101. Goran Hyden and Colin Leys, "Elections and Politics in SingleParty Systems: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania," British Journal of Political Science (1972): 419. Also see Lionel Cliffe (ed.), One Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General Elections (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), Part III; and Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, expanded edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), chap. 12. 102. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in SingleParty African States," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 209, 213.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

85

Nkrumah regime took active measures to place restrictions on the labor movement's autonomous sphere of activity. Thus the popular secretary-general of the Trades Union Congress, J o h n K. Tettegah, was downgraded in 1962, and Kwaw Ampah, a man more subservient to CPP wishes, was appointed over him in the capacity of TUC national secretary. Subsequently the Nkrumah government acted to reduce the number of national unions from sixteen to ten and to increase the authority of the chief labor officer to certify unions, upon the advice of the minister of labor, as exclusive bargaining agents. 103 The oneparty structure recognized the necessity of participation but sought to direct public energies toward politically sanctioned outlets. Groups that selfishly competed in the marketplace for special interests were considered destructive of the general good — and properly channeled and regulated. 104 Although the single-party structure generally entails a tightening of control over the society at large, it has, in African circumstances, accommodated the creation of new institutional forms allowing for an input of interest group demands into the political system. In the Ivory Coast, for example, demonstrations by students and unemployed youths in 1968 and 1969 led directly to a presidential decision to engage in formal dialogues, first with students and middle-level cadres and then with such occupation groups as transporters, tenants, and so forth. In 1969, President Houphouet-Boigny held thirty-three dialogue sessions which resulted in a variety of marginal reforms affecting rates of indigenization of posts, land distribution, salary increases, and the cost of urban rentals. The successful nature of these encounters also led to governmental recognition of more than forty of these interest group organizations, thereby enabling urban and transethnic associations to gain a special means of access to the country's policy-makers. Michael A. Cohen notes the extent to which these interest group encounters with the president represented a genuine form of structural mutation in 103. Ukandi Godwin Damachi, The Role of Trade Unions in the Development Process (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 50-56. 104. See an editorial in the Nationalist (Dar es Salaam), November 4, 1970, p. 4, for a typical expression of resentment toward group (in this case, staff association) efforts to advance particular interests as against those of the community as a whole.

86

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

the following observation: "While the dialogue process contained many traditional African symbols, it more importantly represented a break with the past: Groups were recognized and represented in nonethnic interest terms. The secretary-general of the tenants union spoke for the city-wide union which had branches in each of the eight major quarters." 105 In a dynamic and changing environment, then, these novel institutional forms represented an important resource for solving a number of the problems of political and economic development. In the economic sphere, Tanzania's attempts to eliminate structural distortions in the inherited economy led to the generation of new institutional arrangements aimed at bringing together the egalitarian, socialist, and self-reliant policies of the Nyerere administration. Following the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, a number of large corporate enterprises in the banking, insurance, wholesale trade, and foodprocessing fields were nationalized by the government and, over time, land farmed privately on the basis of ninety-nine-year leases was nationalized by government action. Thus in 1973, fifty individually or corporately owned farms on the southern slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro were taken over by the government, with compensation for equipment, animals, and housing, for use by extended families and cooperative groups. 106 In place of the colonially radiated instruments of private enterprise, a number of new structural organs emerged — parastatal organizations, cooperatives, a State Trading Corporation, and so forth. Perhaps no economic instrument is more expressive of modern Tanzania's innovative spirit than the Ujamaa Village. In a description of the trend in recent times as "away from extended family production and social unity, and towards the development of a class system in the rural areas," 107 Ujamaa 105. Michael A. Cohen, "Urban Policy and the Decline of the Machine: Cross-Ethnic Politics in the Ivory Coast,' Journal of Developing Areas 8, no. 2 (January 1974): 231. Also see his book, Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa: A Study of the Ivory Coast (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), chaps. 5 and 6. 106. Judith Listowel, "Nyerere Socialism Comes to Kilimanjaro," Times (London), November 13, 1 9 7 3 , p. 9. 107. The United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969-30th June, 1974, vol. I (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 26.

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

87

Vijijini is depicted as a means of reversing this process of disaggregation: By building on the principles of the traditional extended family system, with its emphasis on co-operation and mutual respect and responsibility, a society will be built in which all members have equal rights and equal opportunities, when there is no exploitation of man by man, and where all have a gradually increasing level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury. The objective is to farm the village land collectively with modern techniques of production, and share the proceeds according to the work contributed.' 0 8

By consciously reconciling the principles of the traditional extended-family system with modern farming techniques, Tanzanians have created an important example of an acculturated mutant in the economic sphere.

CONCLUSION The transformation of African political structures has largely been in response to the ruling elite's determination to utilize institutions as resources for coping with such problems as national integration and economic development. Colonial administrators, lacking a sense of urgency regarding these goals, used the power at their disposal to widen the arena of social interaction without doing enough to foster the learned patterns of relationship necessary for broad participation in the economic and political institutions newly transmitted to Africa. For example, in attempting to control interethnic conflict and at the same time minimize the costs of overrule, colonial officials radiated structures to the African territories oriented more toward control than toward the promotion of intersectional exchange. Even though interethnic contacts may be said to have increased in colonial times, low institutional invest108. Ibid. In 1973, one observer estimated that Tanzania had nearly 5 , 0 0 0 Ujamaa Villages or collective settlements in operation. G. L. Cunningham, "Peasants and Rural Development in Tanzania," Africa Today 20, no. 4 (Fall 1973): 17. Concern over the accuracy of such estimates appears in Jonathan S. Barker, "Ujamaa in Cash-Crop Areas of Tanzania: Some Problems and Reflections," Journal of African Studies 1, no. 4 (Winter 1 9 7 4 ) : pp. 4 4 1 - 4 2 .

88

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

ments did entail something of a lost opportunity for the furtherance of group practices of compromise and reconciliation. The colonial officers acted as agents of innovation in transmitting structures, values, and technology to Africa. Their capacity to induce institutional change was enhanced by the resources and organization at their disposal. By imposing a bureaucratic "command m o d e l " upon the territories under their control, these colonial officials were, as a consequence of their situation of low decisional costs, in a position to take effective action in radiating additional structural arrangements abroad. The colonial administrators used this power to transmit a variety of supportive structures: legislative councils, universities, trade unions, corporations, political parties, elections, and so forth. The impact of these efforts, in terms of economic development and national integration goals, was varied, but nonetheless significant. Both goals received a psychological as well as a material boost from such central governmental instrumentalities as the bureaucracy, the police, and the military. Yet even though transethnic in principle, these colonially radiated institutions were sometimes divisive in their effects, for they heightened the struggle over political power and the allocation of resources among communal interests. Whether by fiat or value diffusion, institutions were transmitted by colonial administrators to Africa to enhance their capacity for extraction and efficient rule. Colonially radiated structures were essentially resources at the disposal of administrative elites; even so, such origins neither precluded reciprocity between rulers and ruled nor the possibility of transformation, and subsequent legitimation. Later, in the circumstances surrounding the transfer of power to African hands, it was only natural that institutional legacies would be modified or eliminated to further the ends of the new political elite. Consequently, those externally radiated institutions bolstering the center's capacity for action were strengthened (a process of facilitation) while those thwarting effective leadership were downgraded or terminated (a process of impedance). Considerable structural continuity did in fact remain in evidence, and the adjustments that were made in the way of local recruitment

Changing Institutional

Resources

/

89

or task expansion acted mainly to augment the basic position which these colonially radiated institutions held in the life of these countries. Where the inherited institutions became the cause of high decision costs following decolonization, however, the political elite acted to reduce these perceived burdens, either by closing them out or by transforming them in a fundamental manner. The new leaders quickly knocked dbwn some of the legacies erected in the final days of colonial rule (federalism, subregionalism, certain entrenched provisions in the constitutions, second chambers). Such structures impeded effective decisional capacity and control and raised doubts about the credibility of the economic and political system; in addition, they increased the burdens on leaders by creating autonomous centers around which sectional interests might form and engage in conflictive behavior. Hence, a process of resistance to colonial innovation emerged following decolonization, which led ultimately, in some instances, to an abolition of these sources of economic distortion and constraint upon centralized action. The high decision costs of certain colonially radiated institutions also contributed to the African effort to transform them in a basic manner. Where an abolition of structures proved impractical, the alternative course of action was to create acculturated mutants. As African leaders changed economic patterns, party systems, election mechanisms, intergovernmental relations, interest group access, and bureaucratic values to bring them in line with new attitudes and objectives, these policy makers emerged as the new agents of innovation. A striking example of innovation in the economic sphere was the creation of Ujamaa Villages — an experiment which explicitly sought to bring together the principles of the traditional family system and modern farming techniques. Moreover, at times structural forms were kept intact while being altered fundamentally in substance. Thus one-party state structures and electoral mechanisms preserved, even encouraged, participation and choice, but they made demands more manageable by concentrating political authority and reducing the dimensions of conflict; a conscious effort was made to go from the controlling of

90

/

Scarcity,

Choice,

and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

interethnic encounters to the promotion of exchange relationships. Although it is too early to appraise the outcome of African innovations in this regard, a movement toward a learned pattern of interrelationships among such groups would certainly represent a positive unfolding in the dialectical interaction between institutions and social forces.

CHAPTER

^

System Goals, Decision-making Rules, and Collective Choices Our previous chapters focus on a political economy approach to decision-making by public authorities. In deciding on public policies, these offipials make use of changing institutional resources in order to cope with resource scarcity. It is now appropriate to turn to the patterns of choice within the context of such scarcity. A number of questions will be raised: What collective goals can be identified generally as common to the African scene? What factors (information, values, beliefs, analytic capacity, and bureaucratic organization) condition governmental decision-making? What decision rules have leaders set for themselves in determining choices? What types of strategy of choice have different leadership elites arrived at in mobilizing and allocating scarce resources? And finally, what are the effects of the selection of these strategies? In our view, desirable choices are those that expand alternatives: they provide relatively more resources, and they lead to the allocation of given resources efficiently and to the distribution of output equitably. We recognize that situations might arise wherein these desirable ends are, to some extent at least, mutually exclusive. Our analysis keeps in mind the necessity of making trade-off choices among these ends. 91

92

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

The particular factors in each society that condition governmental decision-making and apply decision-making rules cause varying patterns of choice to emerge. Such patterns of choice entail different consequences. Thus, as shown here and more fully in the concluding chapter, each of these strategies of choice can be expected to involve a different calculation of costs and benefits when determining the appropriate mix of system goals: see, in particular, Figures 16 and 17. IDENTIFYING SYSTEM GOALS: THE ROLE OF THE STATE We perceive the state as an action agency geared to coping with tasks which the people pose for it through the vehicle of a leadership elite. It engages in purposeful behavior aimed at furthering systemic "self-determination.'" Self-determination encompasses both economic and poltical dimensions. The former includes the expansion, efficient allocation, and equitable distribution of resources. The latter involves an increase in political innovativeness to achieve systemic goals. "If we define the core area of politics as the area of enforceable decisions or, more accurately, of all decisions backed by some combination of a significant probability of enforcement," remarks Karl W. Deutsch, "then politics becomes the method par excellence for securing preferential treatment for messages and commands and for the reallocation of human or material resources. Politics thus appears as a major instrument for either retarding or accelerating social learning and innovation." 2 Viewing the state as a goal-securing and problem-solving mechanism, how is one to evaluate its achievements? We rate the performance of states primarily in terms of their ability to set realizable goals as well as to select the alternatives that will achieve these multiple goals at the lowest possible cost. 3 As for the first task, a distinguished Zambian has stressed the critical 1. Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 250. 2. Ibid., p. 254. 3. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1971), p. 36.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

93

need to select goals imaginatively and realistically. "Leaders," writes Foreign Minister Vernon J . Mwaanga, "must have a clear perception of what constitutes progress, they must embody an element of rationality in their behaviour, they must have an appreciation of priorities and above all must have integrity which transcends mere rhetoric and sloganeering." 4 In addition to great skill in goal formulation, leaders must display considerable capacity in fulfilling these tasks. Systemic performance (i.e., the ability to achieve goals in an efficient manner) provides the basis for regime legitimacy and stability. It is the central challenge encountered by all African statesmen and planners — irrespective of the particular policy-making style they have adopted. Thus Knud Erik Svendsen's remark that "the worst enemy of a socialist policy in any African country is bad economic performance" applies to capitalist-oriented and socialist-oriented states alike. 5 In the remainder of this section, we concentrate on the first aspect of collective (or state) problem-solving — the task of formulating acceptable system goals. It is evident that certain critical tasks of state building and maintenance are common to the African states as a whole; our problem is to deduce these tasks from general experience. A measure of assistance is given us by the efforts of some members of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council to identify the six "crises" of political development which "may be met in different sequences but all of which must be successfully dealt with for a society to become a modern nationstate.'" According to these analysts, a state must cope with the following list of "critical system-development problems or crises" in the process of modernizing: (1) the identity crisis: the achievement of a common sense of territorial identity; (2) the legitimacy crisis: the need to arrive at a consensus on the valid 4. Vernon J. Mwaanga, "Zambia Heads for the Big Poll," Sunday Times of Zambia (Ndola), October 14, 1973, p. 7. 5. Quoted in William Tordoff and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Left and the Super-Left in Tanzania," Journal of Modern African Studies 10, no. 3 (October 1972): 439. 6. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 63. (Our italics.)

94

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

exercise of authority by political elites and structures; (3) the penetration crisis: the securing of an effective central governmental presence throughout the territory under control; (4) the participation crisis: the channeling of various public demands for inclusion in the decision-making process into legitimate institutional outlets; (5) the integration crisis: the establishment of a coherent system of interactional relationships among the many groups and interests making up the society; and (6) the distribution crisis: the ability of political elites to reconcile the demands for particular goods and services with collective needs for economic growth, resource mobilization, and collective goods (for example, national defense or pollution abatement) that are available to all members of the community. 7 This listing represents a useful delineation of certain problems at hand. .However, it seems less than complete and not always balanced in the way that issues are emphasized. It enumerates modernization tasks, but it does not compile the broader challenges and objectives implicit in systemic selfdetermination — particularly from an African point of view. Whereas the categories assume the survival of the state, African leaders (especially those whose countries border on the white states of southern Africa, as well as Kenya and Tanzania, which lie adjacent to President Idi Amin's Uganda, Ghana with respect to the Volta Region, and Ethiopia with regard to Eritrea) remain profoundly anxious over the question of territorial integrity. Moreover, the categories take little or no account of the exogenous variable, when African spokesmen evince great concern over continuing evidences of external control (i.e., neocolonialism). 8 In general, the political modernization ap7. Ibid., pp. 63-67; James S. Coleman, "Modernization: Political Aspects," International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968), pp. 395-402; Anthony H. Rweyemamu, "Some Reflection on Contemporary African Political Institutions and their Capacity to Generate Socio-Economic Development," African Review 1, no. 2 (September 1971): 33-34; and Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 110-11, 136-37, 187, 279-81. 8. In subsequent writings, however, some modernization analysts have shown great subtlety in discussing exogenous causation in developmental episodes. See Gabriel A. Almond, "Approaches to Developmental

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

95

proach can be said to suffer grievously from a Western-based ethnocentrism. As Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky argue: Modernization assumes transformation from a traditional to a modern state, but it gives little indication how this journey may be achieved; it is static, not dynamic. It assumes a dichotomy between traditional and modern without considering the stages in between and patterns of behavior that may even prevent modernization taking place as worthy of discussion in their own right. It equates modernization with Westernization, and current Western society as the ultimate goal for development of other nations. . . . Worst of all modernization theory was culture-bound, seeing economic growth not only as the most important aim, but stipulating that its attainment was irrevocably intertwined with Western organizational forms and values. 9

Nevertheless, modernization theory presents a guide to our immediate concern with setting system goals in most African circumstances. Regarding modifications, Lucian Pye's suggestion on collapsing categories is worth recording. Pye remarks that integration relates popular political activity to governmental performance, thereby offering an "effective and compatible solution of both the penetration and the participation crises.'" 0 Furthermore, we note the need for two additional categories: ensuring the survival of the nation as constituted at independence; and securing freedom from external control. Although both variables relate to the international environment, they differ significantly in that the first refers primarily to possible threats against territorial integrity (for example, South Africa vis-à-vis Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique), while the second applies to the political, economic, and social penetration of political systems." Postindependence Third World countries Causation," in Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J . Mundt, Crisis, Choice and Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), pp. 28-30. 9. Naomi Caiden and Aaron Wildavsky, Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries (New York: J o h n Wiley, 1974), pp. 27-28. 10. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, p. 65. 11. " A penetrated political system," states J a m e s N. Rosenau, "is one in which nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on

96

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

are often fragile in both geo-specific and task-specific terms. The low capabilities of such states expose them to various external manipulations and influences. However, it is in the political, economic, and social (not the military) spheres that the greatest of their number are vulnerable to continuing outside pressures. No doubt this sensitivity to the prevailing threat of the international environment explains the skepticism and suspicion of the leaders of poorer countries toward such seemingly supportive activities as multinational corporate investment and foreign aid. At least one other major modification seems necessary in terms of our immediate purposes: to recognize explicitly the need to expand economic and social opportunities throughout Africa. To b^ sure, the concept of distribution subsumes a category on mobilizing resources within it. Even so, we regard the enhancement of economic and social capacity to be a challenge of such pressing magnitude as to require full and equal recognition along with the allocative process. An effective and equity-oriented distribution mechanism obviously means little unless it is buttressed by an ability to produce. And even then, the aggregate demands on productiveness are so staggering as to defy easy assumptions about the future. Thus the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization reported that, given a continuation of current population trends, the demand for grain in the developing countries will rise from 600 million tons in 1970 to 900 million tons in 1985. The implications of this situation are enormous, for the FAO report estimates that over time the LDCs will have shortages of 85 million tons, a measurement which could easily prove to be on the short side in the event of serious crop failures (such as in the Sahelian area of West Africa during the early 1970s). In order to make up for this 10 percent gap in their needs, the LDCs will have to increase imports — valued, at current prices, at some $17 billion per annum. 12 The solution to this insufficiency of grain in the LDCs, argued the FAO report, is to increase the amount of behalf of its goals." "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 65. 12. New York Times, June 3, 1974, p. 2.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

91

grain raised in these countries. But this only underscores the critical link between productivity and allocation, a connection which we feel deserves explicit recognition when a list of system goals is formulated. The crises and problems of political development can now be reformulated into system goals as modified by the above additions and substitutions. To this end, the following collective tasks seem paramount: (1) ensuring systemic survival: maintaining the capacity for collective action; (2) establishing a national identity: fostering an awareness of common ties on the part of the inhabitants of a territorial unit; (3) integrating societies: facilitating the growth of community-wide interaction and exchange, primarily through an expansion of central institutions and activities; (4) creating an acceptable authority system: acquiring public acceptance of an authoritative and effective legal and political structure; (5) mobilizing and distributing resources efficiently: increasing productive capacity and sharing the output equitably among the members of the community; (6) securing freedom from external control: reducing economic, political, and social dependence on any external actor or set of actors so as to maximize a country's capacity for achieving its collective purposes. In achieving these collective tasks, decision-makers in each state play a critical role in the determination of priorities. The tasks outlined above are burdensome in themselves, and the fact that they occur simultaneously in the LDCs places a heavy "load" on policy-makers in these countries. 13 By definition, underdevelopment means an overburdening situation, one in which the claims on the system outpace the capacity of institutions to absorb legitimate demands. In an environment of strain brought on by this capabilities imbalance, choice becomes formidable. Since different opportunity costs (the costs of forgoing another benefit or set of benefits) are involved, the choice as to priorities necessarily entails broad and important implications for patterns of production and consumption in the society 13. James S. Coleman, "The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-Capacity," in Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 86.

98

/

Scarcity,

Choice,

and Public Policy

in Middle

Africa

as a whole. An understanding of the decision process, then, requires that considerable attention be given to the preferences and predispositions of those engaged in policy-making. And this leads to a wider issue, which we now turn to; namely, the factors conditioning choice. 14

DECISION-MAKING F A C T O R S : T H E P U R S U I T O F SYSTEM GOALS We recognize that choice does not take place in a vacuum. In real-life behavior, choice cannot fully conform to a "rationalchoice" model where a unified and purposeful actor calculates the costs and benefits of each course of action as it arises. Instead, "rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints.'" 5 As a consequence, an understanding of the process by which policy-makers select and order alternatives requires that some attention be paid to the factors constricting and conditioning decision-making. In choosing among alternative courses of action, it is necessary not to minimize the importance of the political elite's "perception of interests" or the manner in which it "articulat[es] specific values.'" 6 But if the political actors remain at center stage in the decision process, it is nonetheless important to recognize the extent to which their maneuverability is circumscribed. The policy analyst therefore gains a useful perspective on the broader process of decision-making by paying heed simultaneously to the conditioning factors as well as to the alternatives at hand. What, then, are the main limitations in the real world upon a model of rational choice as set out in the appendix to Chapter 1? Leaving aside the important but highly variegated area of personal predilections and prefer14. L. L. Wade and R. L. Curry, J r . , A Logic of Public Policy (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1 9 7 0 ) , p. 3 5 . Also see David Feldman, " T h e E c o n o m i c s of Ideology," in Colin Leys (ed.), Politics and Change in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 9 1 , 9 6 . 15. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision and Co., 1 9 7 1 ) , p. 3 0 . (Italics deleted.) 16. Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 13.

(Boston: Little, Brown ( L o n d o n : Steven &: Sons,

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

99

ences, the decision process is influenced by five general factors: information, values, belief systems, analytic capacity, and bureaucratic organization. Each of these will be examined briefly below. Information. Where policy-makers are unable to secure sufficient and reliable information, their evaluation of the costs and the benefits of pursuing various lines of action will be limited and will involve a degree of risk and uncertainty. 1 7 In many African countries, basic data are scanty, and few qualified analysts are available to make use of what data do exist. In the absence of reliable data on human and physical resources, climates, agriculture, industry, and so forth, it is difficult in the extreme for analysts to arrive at realistic and creative policies. 18 The inputs simply do not exist on which to base the most desirable output policies. Paradoxically, those who suffer least in terms of information resources are most aware of the need for improved information systems. Thus Kenya's Mwai Kibaki, the minister for finance and economic planning, told a seminar of government finance officers from all ministries of the need for increased data on which to base decisions." And if such data were imperative in the maximizing of comprehensive planning objectives, they were equally important in the attaining of day-to-day administrative aims. The complications arising from inadequate information in carrying on ordinary administrative activities are apparent from a reading of David K. Leonard's description of Kenya's (relatively efficient) bureaucracy. He writes, "In several ministries the central filing system is no longer adequate to the demands being made upon it, and senior civil servants are resorting to informal communication, personal files, and private searches for lost documents in order to meet their information needs. It is not uncommon for letters from one civil servant to another to receive delayed replies — or no answer at all." 20 And 17. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 39-41. 18. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (Scranton: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p. 116. 19. East African Standard (Nairobi), April 13, 1973, p. 9. 20. David K. Leonard "Communications and Déconcentration," in Goran Hyden, Robert Jackson, and John Okumu (eds.), Development

100

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

what is known about relatively developed Kenya is an indication of even greater problems in some of the less developed countries which lack the technical and manpower resources readily available in that country. Even so, Kenya's information needs are likely to mount rapidly as industrialization occurs in years to come. 21 Unlike their predecessors, industrial societies are complex and fragile; they require a high degree of information in order to function effectively. Hence, the more progress Kenya achieves in fulfilling its firmly established goal of enhanced productiveness the more urgent its need for knowledge is likely to be. And any failure to secure the necessary information will have increasingly grave consequences for efficient decision-making and plan implementation. Values. By their ability to set basic policy directions, collective values constitute an important aspect in the decision process. They are distinguishable from system goals in the following manner: "Values," observes Talcott Parsons "are . . . deliberately defined at a level of generality higher than that of goals — they are directions of action rather than specific objectives, the latter depending on the particular character of the situation in which the system is placed as well as on its values and its structure as a system." 2 2 By channeling actions along certain lines, socially shared values can act to inhibit rational choice-making. A look at some of the key values held by African opinion-formers reveals large discontinuities. Widely shared values on equity (in regard to taxation, education, incomes, employment, management, business ownership, and so forth) come into conflict with other, strong commitments on the need for rapid economic growth. 23 Administration: The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 101. 21. David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 42. Also see Robert C. North and Richard Lagerstrom, War and Domination: A Theory of Lateral Pressure (New York: General Learning Press, 1971), p. 2. Given weak bureaucracies in many of the African states, high information could become terribly costly, leading, in certain circumstances, to immobilisme. 22. Quoted in Seymour M. Lipset, The First New Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1967), p. 4. 23. For a discussion of this conflict of values with respect to

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

101

Populist values on participation, recruitment, and distribution are at cross-purposes with entrenched elitist values and practices. Gaps between subregional claims and system integrity as well as between the values of legal sovereignty and genuine independence are as striking as they are commonplace. The cumulative effect of these discontinuities is to place policy-makers at a difficult vantage point. They must simultaneously balance such needs as equity, economic growth, participation, elite incentive, subregional opportunity, central integrity, legal sovereignty, and full independence." In an environment frequently higher on demands and expectations than on fiscal, material, and trained manpower resources, it becomes difficult in the extreme for them to establish meaningful and acceptable value priorities. And to the extent that decision elites engage in a process of value trade-off, the ambiguity of direction that may result adds considerably to the tasks of rational choice-making. Belief Systems. Many strong (and often persuasive) appeals have been made to systematize and act on Africa's body of shared beliefs. In a well-known statement on the subject, Frantz Fanon pointed to an absence of ideology as the "great danger" threatening Africa; 25 inspired by this argument, Maina Kagombe went on to contend that "an ideology is necessary to create a frame of reference and a common denominator of beliefs and values with which to carry on the political and social revolution vital for all African peoples."" African ideologies are sought after, then, because of their (assumed) capacity to Africanization policies, see Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity," American Political Science Review 64, no. 3 (September 1970): 737-53. 24. Ira Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spending (Indianapolis: Bobbs, Merrill, 1969), p. 11. 25. Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution, trans, by Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1969), p. 186. For a rejection of the notion that ideologies are indispensable to African self-fulfillment, see B. D. G. Folson, "Ideology and African Politics," Transition 8, no. 6 (1973): 17. 26. Maina Kagombe, "Revolutionary Theory and Models for Guerrilla Action in the Non-Liberated Territories of Africa," Pan-African Journal 4, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 9.

102 / Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa inspire the action consequences desired by decision elites. Such systematized sets of ideas, whether implicitly or explicitly formulated, are viewed as an asset in giving purpose and continuity to state-building activities. They compensate in part for the fragility of institutions, they provide a base for regime legitimacy, they act as guidelines to choice, and they assist policymakers in mobilizing and allocating resources. 27 In Ethiopia, the m o t t o of "Ethiopia Tikdem," which puts the interest of the people before those of the individual, attempts to rally mass support for the new regime as well as for its program of socialism. In brief, ideologies, by constructing a particular view of reality, can be a major factor in conditioning decisionmaking — influencing the manner in which goals are specified, resources assembled, policies determined, and programs implemented. Thus, Ethiopia's program of "Zemetcha," the national work campaign for development through cooperation, seeks to mobilize a staff of 56,000 people to "carry the torch of knowledge to the masses in rural areas living in utter darkness." 2 8 But if ideologies are resources at the disposal of decisionmakers, 29 they also act at times to thwart the selection of optimal choices. They present a particular view of reality — not necessarily a rational one. "Ideology arises, not by applying truths to real problems, but by uniting universal theory (which may or may not have relevance for real problems) and concrete practice (which may or may not be determined by the truths)." 3 0 In doing so, ideology twists the facts as necessary to conform to its view of the world. Such a discrepancy between fact and reality gives rise to "incorrect learning feedback." 31 27. On the substantial but not conclusive evidence of a correlation between ideology and action consequences, see Alexander J. Groth, Major Ideologies (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 11-17. 28. Ethiopia Herald (Addis Ababa), December 23, 1975, pp. 1,2,4. 29. For one observer, an ideology is a "non-material 'currency' " which may be substituted where regimes lack readily distributable amounts of goods and services to purchase behavior. See John R. Nellis, A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 14. 30. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 29. 31. Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined, p. 107.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices / 103 Decision-makers are unable to secure reliable information on which to make efficient policy calculations, causing a gap to emerge between theory and practice; the end product of this distortion of reality could be a legitimacy crisis — that is, unless the situation is corrected by a return to an accurate interpretation of the facts. In any case, to the extent that belief systems twist reality, they can be said to complicate and encumber rational choice processes. Analytic Capacity. In thé section above on information as a conditioning factor in decision-making, we noted Mwai Kibaki's reference to the need for increased data as a means of improving politico-economic calculations. Greater budgetary information would help, he contended, to introduce modern management techniques, facilitate financial control, enable planners to come to more desirable decisions, and provide parliament with the facts for debate." "As we become more effective in linking objectives to expenditures," he asserted, "we will begin to challenge the pattern of expenditure which has been uncritically accepted in the past." 3 3 Increased knowledge and the analytic skills to make efficient use of that knowledge thus became inextricably linked to one another. A failure in either, direction would entail severe limitations on the achievement of system goals — at least in terms of the lowest possible costs. By analytic skills in policy-making, we mean the capacity to make effective use of whatever technology is necessary to set collective tasks, establish value priorities, determine costs and benefits of alternative lines of action, execute policies, evaluate the impact of policies, and redesign policies on the basis of learning feedback. As the decisional process gains in efficiency, and as policy analysts develop improved strategies for realizing the best possible alternative in a given context, they will bring a high level of analytic capacity to the problem at hand. Anything less than this will necessarily be short of true rational choice. Bureaucratic Organization. Finally, optimal policy-making is constrained by the bureaucratic environment in which analysts must operate. They are not free to determine lines of action as they wish, that is, to set rational policies in terms of 32. East African 33. Ibid.

Standard

(Nairobi), April 13, 1973, p. 9.

104

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

the most efficient calculation of costs and benefits availing. Instead, they must engage in a ceaseless process of bargaining and conciliation to establish programs that are minimally satisfactory to the group as a whole. And outward appearances of harmony and consensus notwithstanding, these factional struggles can be both bitter and productive of less than desirable consequences. Bureaucratic organizations in fact only thinly conceal deep divisions based on agency interest, status, subregion, ethnic identity, ideological commitment, and policymaking style. As Fritz Morstein Marx puts the matter so well: "In this internal process . . . idea battles idea without imposition of control. The value of agreement among the participants is reduced to minimal operational necessity, to the need for hammering out proposed solutions." 34 Even if bureaucratic organizations are at times deeply divided and conflictive, this does not in itself explain why the organizational actors are reduced to minimal operational requirements. It is not conflict as such but the need to reconcile diverse interests which explains such bureaucratic behavior. As the decision-making group is enlarged in size, collective agreement becomes more difficult and, therefore, bargaining activities become increasingly necessary. "To establish a group agreement or organization will nonetheless always tend to be more difficult the larger the size of the group, for the larger the group the more difficult it will be to locate and organize even a subset of the group, and those in the subset will have an incentive to continue bargaining with the others in the group until the burden is widely shared, thereby adding to the expense of bargaining." 35 Not only is the bargaining process an organizational cost but it helps to explain the acceptance of policies that are minimally satisfactory in nature. And in addition to the costs of expanding the decision group there are the questions of participant equity; the bargaining process cannot ensure that all 34. F. M. Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 89. 35. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 46.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

105

actors have equal access to the deliberative group, are equally persuasive or equally able to define which options are most relevant to organization purposes. 36 Hence bureaucratic behavior structures the way in which organization priorities and perceptions become accepted, thereby acting itself as a major constraint on optimal decision-making. No doubt some additional factors could well be deserving of the attention given to the five major constraints on rational choice discussed above. Such aspects as drive and energy, time horizons, equipment, expectations, and external pressures all come immediately to mind. However, the overriding point seems clear: in light of the conditioning factors already examined, a frontal assault upon system goals cannot automatically be anticipated — no matter how logical or urgent these collective tasks may be. Rather, the decision process is limited by a number of factors which, when taken together, go far in showing why in real-life situations it can be extremely difficult to maximize the values widely held in the society.

DECISION-MAKING RULES AND SYSTEM GOALS Before looking at decision outputs and outcomes in Africa, it is necessary to describe briefly some of the procedures that frequently predetermine public-policy decisions. A full appreciation of these guides to collective action, or decision rules, indicates in advance the kinds of policy outputs for which leaders are likely to opt. To exemplify this phenomenon at the individual level, a person whose guides to decision lead him or her to live by community political "rules" is predisposed to work through the existing system to effect desired policy changes; by contrast, a person whose guides to action are based primarily on a universal moral value may be more disposed toward working outside the political system in order to transform public policy. Thus the procedures for choice can 36. Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, "Introduction," in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter (eds.), Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), pp. 27-28.

106

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

37

"dominate the decisions made." As a consequence, decision rules are a central part of the larger process of decision-making and must be identified and comprehended before the strategies for goal maximization are analyzed. Decision rules are evident at all major stages in the decision process: the assemblage of information, the specification of the problem, the determination of problem-solving alternatives, the choice of alternatives, and the implementation of the chosen policy. 38 At this point, the primary concern is with the determination of the alternative courses of action and the selection of a problem-solving strategy from among these options. There are decision rules for the various steps in the decision process, and a distinction can be drawn as to formal rules (constitutions, laws, etc.) 39 and informal rules (the rules of thumb). In addition, there are differences between behavioral and normative decision rules. Whereas behavioral rules apply to standard operating procedures, normative rules are a critical aspect in the procedures of choice-making "in both the sense of trying to improve performances and judging values in relation to each other." 4 0 We recognize that in real-world contexts these different types of rules often overlap one another, but nonetheless we find them useful in a heuristic sense. Let us look more closely at decision rules in terms of the behavioral-normative distinction. A wide array of normative (and behavioral) guides to policy exist, but we concentrate on rules that we see as central to such key political economy goals as the efficient mobilization and allocation of resources, and trade-offs between them. In adopting a strategy on setting 37. Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 113. Joseph D. Cooper's description of decision-rules as "govern [ing] final selection of an alternative" seems even stronger on this question. The Art of Decisionmaking (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), p. 58. 38. Max D. Richards and Paul S. Greenlaw, Management Decision Making (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), pp. 27, 30. 39. Robert L. Curry, Jr., and Larry Wade, A Theory of Political Exchange (Englewood Cliffs.N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 35-36; and Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (n. 3 above), passim. 40. Warren F. Ilchman, "Decision Rules and Decision Roles," African Review 2, no. 2 (1972): 237.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

107

priorities between an expansion of resources and an equal distribution of the resulting output among individuals, we note that some useful procedures for choice-making can be appropriated from the general corpus of economic analysis in this regard. In particular, a decision-maker must not forgo the opportunity of choosing an option that carries a more favorable net benefit than those resulting from other opportunities. But this guide to policy is incomplete unless heed is paid to another possible decision rule — the "Pareto O p t i m u m . " The Pareto Optimum would justify a change only if no individuals were made worse off by the change and that some individuals were better off because of it.41 But is the test of Pareto's construction sufficient in regard to equity considerations? E. J . Mishan, among others, cautions that this is not necessarily the case: Any adopted criterion of a cost-benefit analysis, that is, requires inter alia that all benefits exceed costs, and therefore can be vindicated by a social judgement that an economic rearrangement which can make everyone better off is an economic improvement. The reader's attention is drawn to the fact that such a judgement does not require that everyone is actually made better off, or even that nobody is actually worse off. The likelihood — which, in practice, is a virtual certainty — that some people, occasionally most people, will be worse off by introducing the investment project in question is tacitly acknowledged. A project that is adjudged feasible by reference to a cost-benefit analysis is, therefore, quite consistent with an economic arrangement that makes the rich richer and the poor poorer. It is also consistent with manifest inequity, for an enterprise that is an attractive proposition by the lights of a costbenefit calculation may be one that offers opportunities for greater profits and pleasure to one group, in the pursuit of which substantial damages and suffering may be endured by other groups. In order, then, for a mooted enterprise to be socially approved, it is not enough that the outcome of an ideal cost-benefit analysis is positive. It must also be shown that the resulting distributional changes are not regressive, and no gross inequities are perpetrated.

The policy-maker's problem, then, is to select an appropriate set of criteria as choice-making guides for using the community's scarce resources in a way that would tend to 41. Buchanan and Tullock, p. 172. 42. E. J . Mishan, Economics for Social Decisions ger, 1973), p. 13.

(New York: Prae-

108

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

maximize collective values on the output of goods and services and their distribution. The key to appropriate policy is not that the new institutional structures resemble a preconceived set of "acceptable" ones. Rather, it is whether these institutions and processes can adequately measure up to an appropriate set of criteria. Change that facilitates resource expansion, allocative efficiency, and equity in distribution is what matters. The particular structures and processes that come about " o u g h t " to facilitate these goals, and that is their test. Efficiency in the mobilization and allocation of resources is also affected by normative (as well as behavioral) decision rules regarding the extent of participant consent necessary to establish policies. Clearly the manner in which resources will be expended is affected by the organizational procedures on reaching agreements. Because a rule of unanimity usually involves an overinvestment-of decision-making resources, societies adopt procedures that reduce interdependence costs to the minimum consonant with their needs and expectations. 43 "Since decision-making costs increase as the group grows larger, and since there seems to be no reason to expect that external costs will decrease, the total costs expected to arise from collective organization of activity, under any given rules for legislative decision-making, will tend to be higher in large groups than in small groups." 4 4 Consequently, if a unanimity rule is likely to prove exceedingly costly, some other rule of collective agreement which involves a lower investment of resources is essential: one-person, simple majority, or some alternative formula, such as three-fifths, two-thirds, three-fourths, and so forth. Each of these procedures entails different consequences for the use of resources. As William A. Niskanen, Jr., demonstrates so effectively in one social context, a change in the decisionmaking rule from simple majority to two-thirds consent, results in somewhat less public services generally, but, paradoxically, also improves the relative position of lower-income groups. Under a nonprogressive but proportionate tax system, the low and middle groups will receive slightly lower net benefits, and 43. Buchanan and Tullock, pp. 110, 213. 44. Ibid., pp. 216-17.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

109

the economically advantaged group will now obtain distinctly higher net benefits inasmuch as the marginal costs to pay for public (indivisible) goods are greater among the poor than among the rich. 45 Hence the shift in agreement rules directly affects distributive outcomes. We turn now to behavioral decision rules. Although the final selection of alternatives is left to the decision-maker (or makers), it is assumed that these rules facilitate the proper choosing of alternatives, thereby maximizing goal achievement at the lowest possible decision-making cost. Not only do these behavioral rules establish the necessary procedures for making and implementing policies, but they aid th^ process of choice by setting priorities in advance. "The objective," states Ilchman, "is to improve performance, to minimize the negative consequences to values from action." 4 6 With respect to mobilizational and distributive objectives, the number of guides to policy are so extensive that a few instances suffice. Basic principles for these procedural rules of thumb as laid down by Richard M. Cyert and James G. March are that they avoid uncertainty, that the rules be maintained, and that simple rules be used. 41 In conformity with these basic principles, Albert O. Hirschman sets a number of procedures for choice-making which seek to maximize productionist ends. Among Hirschman's many decision rules are the following: "Since we necessarily underestimate our creativity, it is desirable that we underestimate to a roughly similar extent the difficulties of the tasks we face so as to be tricked by these two offsetting underestimates into undertaking tasks that we can, but otherwise would not dare, tackle" (the principle of the Hiding Hand); ". . . adding a highly technical dimension to a project will be useful in giving it some protection from political interference"; "the risk of excess capacity is lowest when the project's output is widely spread as an input over many sectors (and regions) or when output goes overwhelmingly to final mass 45. W. A. Niskanen, Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 169-186, 222. 46. Ilchman, "Decision Rules and Decision Roles," p. 236. 47. Cyert and March, Behavioral Theory of the Firm, p. 102.

110

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

consumption demand; and the risk is the bigger the greater is the concentration of the project's output on a few final consumers or on a few cells of the interindustry matrix." The annual budgetary process, an important aspect in both mobilizing and distributing resources, is replete with behavioral decision rules. For Aaron Wildavsky, decision rules are aids in calculating how much to ask for, deciding how much to recommend, and determining how much to give; in their role as guides to action, they assist budget officials by reducing complexity and uncertainty. 49 Perhaps the most widely accepted rule of budgetary practice around the world is the "incremental" one. Accordingly, most of an agency's current budget (and also its development budget) are the products of past decisions; if an item remains substantially unaltered, it will probably be repeated in the following year's budget, with adjustments made for inflation. 50 This practice is precisely what we found in Zambia. There, despite a commitment to a full-scale restructuring of the economy, the ministries were, in practice, much influenced by previous budgetary allocations when establishing the next year's expenditure patterns. Nevertheless, the prior year's performance was also a critical factor in allocating new funds for developmental purposes. In interviews with public officials in 1971, it became evident that housing funds tended to be distributed in large amounts to those districts which made full use of the previous year's distributions. The more they used, the more they received; districts that were slow to utilize their funds because of administrative inefficiency were penalized when the following year's review occurred. 51 Thus two guides to policy — incrementalism and performance — operated side by side and contributed significantly to Zambia's real-life budgetary choices. 48. Albert O. Hirschman, Development Projects Observed (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 13, 54, 73, 88. 49. Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp., 6-12. Also see Otto A. Davis, M. A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review 60, no. 3 (September 1966): 529-47. 50. Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, pp. 13-16. 51. See Donald Rothchild, "Rural-Urban Inequities and Resource

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

111

The adoption of incremental decision rules can also be understood with respect to the environment in which the budgetary process occurs. In many African countries there is a severe shortage of trained accountants and administrators, faulty systems for classifying budget accounts, inadequate accounting practices, and insufficient means of control. "Because all budgetary systems are limited by deficiencies of discipline in formulating and executing a budget," observes Albert Waterston, "the achievement of these goals [developing appropriate information on the public sector transactions and improving the efficiency of budget management technique and procedure] is a precondition to effective budgeting."" There is neither the manpower nor the organization for a careful examination of each item of the budget on an annual basis. Hence, in a large number of situations, incrementalist decision rules seem likely to continue indefinitely as a matter of course. Similarly, other rules of budgeting are being utilized which reflect policy-making requirements on simplicity and flexibility. For example, rather than insisting on the achievement of optimum objectives, the decision elites in many African states seek merely to satisfy and suffice. 53 Moreover, incremental types of calculations are evident in two additional guides to policy: the "base" and "fair share." Whereas the base involves an expectation that agency programs will normally be continued at existing levels of expenditure, the fair share "means not only the base an agency has established but also the expectation that it will receive some proportion of funds, if any, which are to be increased over or decreased below the base of the various governmental agencies." 54 In brief, then, budgetary procedures more often than not represent continuation of past practices of improvisation, limited objectives, and marginal adjustments. Claims to rationality Allocation in Zambia," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 10, no. 3 ( 1 9 7 2 ) : 2 3 7 - 3 8 . 52. Albert Waterston, Development Planning: Lessons of Experience (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 2 4 3 - 4 4 . 53. Referred to in Ilchman, "Decision Rules and Decision Roles," p. 2 3 9 , as "to 'satisfice.' " 54. Wildavsky, Politics of the Budgetary Process, p. 17.

112

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

notwithstanding, their actual practices come closer to "muddling through" than to well-planned input-output analysis. Such incrementalist decision rules are of enormous consequence, for they act to circumscribe the efforts of policy-makers intent on a fundamental restructuring of African political and economic institutions. PATTERNS OF CHOICE: SPECIFYING GOALS AND STRATEGIES OF CHOICE If decision rules could predetermine optimum choices in every instance, the determination of policy by elites would become unnecessary. Real-world problems arise which necessitate decisions because the performance of administrative agencies does not meet system goals or because the objectives themselves are inappropriate. 55 Since systemic goals are multiple in nature, choice-making inevitably involves the difficult task of setting priorities among goals. Decision rules can facilitate choice where the alternatives of action are already known and the priorities firmly established, but choice-making becomes inescapable where policy-makers must form judgments as to the relative importance of the goals of the system. At heart, then, choice-making involves the setting of goal priorities and subpriorities. Although the range of choice open to African policy-makers may be limited by lack of productive resources and by such factors as information and management deficiencies as well as structural and cultural dependencies, we nonetheless see a dimension existing for the determination of collective actions. In brief, we recognize that environmental conditions go far in defining the choice as to policies, but, even within these limits, we see scope for political actors to influence the state's decision on regulating multinational corporations (MNCs), rates of Africanization, adoption of labor intensive techniques for production, diversification of economic and military assistance, and so forth. The current variances in policy outputs and outcomes among African states cannot be explained by environmental differences alone and therefore must 55. Richards and Greenlaw, Management Decision Making (n. 38 above), p. 29; and Simon, Administrative Behavior (n. 17 above), p. 39.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

113

be attributed, in part at least, to the policy preferences of leaders. Differing "clusters" of choice are apparent for five of the six strategies for achieving system goals. In the sixth case, ensuring survival, the states adopting a transformation strategy evidenced the least commitment to the maintenance of national sovereignty when the alternative of continental African federation was in the offing (see Table 1). Even though Table 1 shows the three strategies (or series of decisions) to be significantly different on the policies to be pursued in maximizing most of the system goals, we plan to emphasize the choices made with respect to goals five and six above — mobilizing and distributing resources efficiently, and securing freedom from external control. An eclectic (six-goal) approach would no doubt produce different, and equally valid, criteria for differentiating choice patterns, stressing, as noted above, such important categories as political party organization, central-subregional relations, leadership patterns, or ideological commitments." But our overall concentration on the political economy elements at hand seems useful. In so concentrating, we take into account the international as well as the domestic ramifications of policy, and we focus thereby on what we feel to be perhaps the most critical aspects of choice availing in developing Africa at this juncture. In accord with the political economy approach, we see three basic strategies manifested under current circumstances: accommodation, reorganization, and transformation. To be sure, as indicated in the classification scheme presented in Table 1, very real overlaps are found among these lines of decision; yet their general characteristics seem sufficiently different to deserve separate attention. We concentrate here upon strategies of choice and leave an assessment of their costs and benefits mainly to the concluding chapter. 56. On the need for an eclectic approach, see Immanuel Wallerstein, "Left and Right in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 9, no. 1 (May 1971): 9. In subsequent writings, however, Wallerstein has come to stress the area of political-economic choice almost exclusively. See his article, "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy," African Studies Review 17, no. 1 (April 1974): 9-23.

t i

s o •a S? «3 M2 go ¿ s *

e£

2

T3

S § «S '3 C rt nj G XIa JS bç bp X5 U S IH bo g 'g •M c '3 E c +o-» e S S" C «I bo T3 "I "S M >0 t» bo C "S '13 G '3g c0

-Ci E?

a

so ço %* ¿••a S ,> V 4ä-» "bi> c G 3 (A

0 Ë Ë 00 Vi C u C „ < tu rt 0 G u +'O -» >. u VI ci e C u T3 XI bo rt «is •M "H,

S ta •c a0 < G a S a XI bp S 2

C O rt C C9 bo g

2

X3 «1

• bo "ou

aj VI

U >

VI bo S JS .2 bo V 'S 'o "oaj 'G T3 VI bo g •Z 2 S rt u T3 -S5 C 2 S - "2 à_ Í g « u M c3 s C a j 5 ^ s-2 s 2 •s w ^ S I I u — a I P h Z o s S-.S

£§

128

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

produce, and motor vehicles, leaving the subregional treasuries dependent on federal grants for two-thirds of their recurrent revenues. The relations between Nigerian governments at and within each level were strained over the states' lack of financial independence and over the allocation of federally collected revenues. It seems likely that future increases in property and personal income taxes as well as increased payments under the distributable pool arrangement would have narrowed the gap between revenues and expenditures. However, federal unwillingness to make major concessions on this question remained evident to the end. 84 The refusal of federal officials to allocate any further revenue to the subregions contributed directly to interunit conflicts over both principles and interests. Distribution of federally collected revenues was based on the two principles of derivation and need. Derivation was favored from the inception of genuine federalism in 1954 until the implementation of the Raisman Commission recommendations in 1958. At that time, it was the eastern regional government, not its more affluent partners, which urged the Raisman Commission to support the principle of subregional need. The commission compromised between these two principles, applying derivation to revenues whose source could be estimated with some degree of accuracy, and applying need to the remaining revenues; henceforth the latter were to be allocated by means of a distributable pool arrangement. Subregional attitudes changed with the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the east. From then on, eastern government spokesmen campaigned with increasing vigor to be permitted to retain revenues raised in the area. The government of eastern Nigeria submitted a memorandum on revenue allocation to the 1964 fiscal review commissioner stating that the system of revenue allocation then operating had proved "extremely unreasonable, unfair and inequitable" and 84. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Fiscal Review Commission, by K. J. Binns, Commissioner (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1965), p. 11; Adebayo Adedeji, Nigerian Federal Finance (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1969), chap. 6; and T. O. Ilugbuhi, "The Future of Government Revenue in Nigeria," Nigerian Opinion 4, no. 4-6 (April-June 1968): 331-33.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

]

129

that all revenue from royalties and rents on mineral oil should be returned to the unit of origin.85 Two years later, at the resumed conference on the Nigerian constitution, the eastern regional government maintained that "the Central Authority shall have no fiscal or taxing powers. All fiscal or taxing powers shall be vested in the Regions." 86 Implementing a revenue allocation system based largely on the principle of need rather than derivation has always seemed compelling. The attitudes expressed by the magazine Nigerian Opinion on this issue are widely held: The main criterion for revenue allocation was the derivation principle which since 1952 has been a constant and endless source of friction. It intensified inter-regional rivalry and antagonism. Most important, resource allocation was not related to needs and the most needy region was invariably also the region that received least under a system of revenue allocation based primarily on derivation. 87

Even so, it has proved extremely difficult to put the revenue allocation principle of need into effect in a reorganizational polity such as Nigeria. With the military coups of 1966, the new regime gained an excellent opportunity for decisive action in constitutional matters. It used its new position to create the twelve-state (later nineteen) federal system,88 thereby reducing the autonomy of the old subregional governments. However, it did not act swiftly to make any serious modification in the principle of derivation, as reportedly recommended by the commission under the chairmanship of Chief I. O. Dina in 1968. 89 The result of the federal military government's recon85. Binns, Report of the Fiscal Review Commission, p. 13. 86. The Ad Hoc Conference on the Nigerian Constitution (Enugu: Government Printer, 1966), p. 85. 87. Vol. 2, no. 2 (February 1966), p. 20. 88. In February 1976, General Murtala Muhammed, Nigeria's head of state, announced plans to create seven additional states. Moreover, all nineteen states were to be given new names in order to erase old memories and attachments. 89. The Dina report, never published, is said to have proposed that the oil-producing regions should derive 10 percent, rather than 50 percent, of royalties and rents. The Dina report's recommendations were subsequently rejected in 1969 by the Nigerian finance commissioners who contended that the Dina commission had "exceeded its powers and

130

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

Table 4 POPULATION AND REVENUE ALLOCATION IN NIGERIA, 1973

State North-Western North-Central Kano North-Eastern Benue-Plateau Kwara Lagos Western Mid-Western East-Central South-Eastern Rivers Nigeria

1973 census (provisional figures in millions)

1974-75 Federal allocation (millions Nigerian currency)

Revenue allocation per person

8.5 6.8 10.9 15.4 5.2 4.6 2.5 8.9 3.2 8.1 3.4 2.2 79.9

34.9 29.1 34.9 41.7 30.1 23.9 20.7 47.4 139.9 58.3 28.1 101.1 590.1

4.1 4.3 3.2 2.7 5.8 5.2 8.3 5.2 43.7 7.2 8.3 46.0 7.4

SOURCE: Africa Confidential

15, no. 10 (May 27, 1974): 5.

ciliation strategy was a status quo stance at a time when the inequities and inadequacies in interunit allocations continued to worsen. As shown in Table 4, the oil-producing Mid-Western and Rivers states were heavily favored under the revenue allocation system then being administered. But the disparities caused by this formula led to new dissatisfactions in intergovernmental relationships. For example, the New Nigerian, published in the less-advantaged north, observed that the revenue allocation system then in effect "threaten [ed] to create a new imbalance" since "allocation to individual states reveal [ed] wide disparities because the derivation principle puts the 'oil states' at an enhanced advantage." 90 To some extent these dissatisfactions were dealt with by the military government in 1974 when a new revenue allocation formula was announced; this formula deemphasized the derivation principle by allocating money to state governments, 50 percent on the basis of population and 50 percent on the basis of equality. Such a revision of priorities ignored its terms of reference." Africa 1 9 7 4 ) : 6. 9 0 . Ibid., pp. 5-6.

Confidential

15, n o . 10 (May 17,

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

131

goes far toward promoting the interests of the non-oilproducing states, and n o doubt it will be closely scrutinized by any future Constituent Assembly. Another important area of pragmatism on the part of those states adopting a reorganization strategy is their policy on the nationalization of the "commanding heights" of the economy. These states are more inclined to pursue nationalization policies than their critics are prepared to acknowledge. In Zaire, Gecamines, the state corporation, had produced 51 percent and 32 percent of all budgetary resources in 1970 and 1971, respectively; 91 the following year, President Mobutu Sese Seko announced a further extension of the public domain to include plantations, livestock, and a 50 percent ownership in the remaining mining companies. 92 Kenya acquired a 51.4 percent shareholding in East African Power and Lighting Co. Ltd., a 50 percent shareholding in the Mombasa Oil Refinery, and a 60 percent shareholding in two new banks formed from the assets of the National and Grindlays Bank in Kenya. 93 As of April 1, 1973, the Nigerian government acquired a 35 percent equity in Shell-BP and several other oil-producing firms, rising to a majority holding by 1982. 94 Perhaps the most thoroughgoing program of nationalization among the reorganization polities was carried out by the Zambian government. In the period from 1968 to 1970, President Kaunda announced a sweeping series of economic reforms, which included the partial or total nationalization of such fields as mining, transportation, contracting, insurance, and so forth. 95 By 1971, the Kaunda 91. Alan Rake, "Waiting for the Copper Dividends," African Development 7, no. 6 (June 1973): Z5. 92. West Africa, December 10, 1973, p. 1719. 93. Rothchild, Racial Bargaining, p. 437. 94. West Africa, June 18, 1973, p. 818. 95. Zambia's program of state participation in business activities is outlined in three addresses by Dr. K. D. Kaunda: Republic of Zambia, Zambia's Economic Revolution, Mulungushi, April 19, 1968 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.); Republic of Zambia, Towards Complete Independence, Matero, August 11, 1969 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.); and This Completes Economic Reforms: "Now Zambia Is Ours," Mulungushi, November 10, 1970 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services, n.d.).

132

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

administration had assumed control over eighty major or minor business firms. The costs of compensation involved in taking over the copper mines gives some insight into the fiscal burdens brought on by a restructuring of the economy. The cost of purchasing 51 percent of the shares of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines is K125 million, and the amount of the Roan Consolidated Mines shares comes to K84 million.' 6 Payment is being made from future dividends, covering a twelve-year period in the case of NCCM and an eight-year period for RCM. Yet the nationalization of major industries in these countries should not be interpreted as a rejection of foreign capital investment. As the background note to Dr. Kaunda's Mulungushi address of 1968 explained, the measures announced in the president's speech fell "far short of nationalisation as conventionally known.'" 7 Rather than precluding foreign investment, nationalization, pragmatically applied, may facilitate external participation by removing many of the uncertainties associated with investment in Third World countries. Surely all of the states adopting a reorganization strategy have gone far, some contend too far, in reaching accommodations with international capitalism. A dramatic case in point is the agreement on the nationalization of the Zambian mining industry. In exchange for continued operation of the industry, the mining companies or their local subsidiaries were paid compensation for the value of the shares acquired (through the medium of Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation Limited 6% Guaranteed Dollar bonds),' 8 permitted to remain as minority shareholders and, to the extent called on to do so, to contribute from funds not subject to Zambian exchange control a 36 3/4 percent share of the capital finance for the development of existing or new mining ventures, and granted contracts to undertake management, consultancy, and marketing services. Such arrangements for provision of services, set up for a minimum of five years, gave management handsome rewards for minimal risks. In making such concessions to investor demands, the government was 96. 97. 98. with over

Times of Zambia (Ndola) Business Review, June 25, 1971, p. 2. Zambia's Economic Revolution, p. V. In 1973, the Zambian government redeemed the ZIMCO bonds ZK114m. Eurodollar and other loans.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

133

emphasizing economic stability at a possible price in reallocative equity. Finally, in keeping with their reformist posture, the states adopting a reorganization strategy have generally, taken strong foreign policy positions on issues of nonalignment and panAfricanism. On questions of colonialism or white racism, there is little to differentiate their policies from those put forth by the states adopting a transformationalist strategy. However, in other areas, perhaps as a consequence of their intimate ties with the world economic system, one can detect a note of caution. Using Kenya as a prime example of pragmatism in foreign affairs matters, one can start with the words of the former minister of foreign affairs himself to illustrate the country's "low profile" stance." Thus Dr. Njoroge Mungai asserted: "The Government does not set for itself hastily exaggerated objectives in foreign policy which are unrealistic and incapable of being fulfilled. Political fulmination and adoption of extreme policies which are later abandoned or withdrawn or reversed by force of circumstances is not Kenya Government practice in foreign policy." 100 In line with this cautious approach, Mungai outlined the four tenets on which his country's external policy is based: nonalignment; support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; promotion of African unity, independence, and cooperation; and disarmament. Kenya, in other words, does not seek a radical restructuring of the world order, but seeks rather the more limited objectives of advancing her "national interest" through the promotion of trade, economic assistance, foreign investment, links with neighboring countries through the East African Community, and the securing of her territorial integrity. 101 To be sure, Kenya did pay a substantive cost when forbidding commercial dealings in South 99. John J. Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy," African Review 3, no. 2 (June 1973): 263. On this, Foreign Minister N. Mungai declared: "Kenya today enjoys a position of international esteem and importance because of the pragmatic policies that have been followed under dynamic leadership. Avoiding emotional reactions to given situations, Kenya has placed the welfare of her people above dogmatic ideologies," Daily Nation (Nairobi), December 12, 1973, p. XVI. 100. East African Standard (Nairobi), December 13, 1971, p. 6. 101. On Kenya's role in forging East African Community links, see

134

/

Scarcity,

Choice,

and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

African goods as well as exports to the Union in the mid-1960s. Particularly hard hit by this action was the Magadi Soda Company, which had exported one-half of its total sales of soda ash (110,899 tons) to South Africa in the 1962-63 fiscal year. As a result of the boycott, the Magadi plant worked in 1965 at 40 percent of capacity and its African staff was cut from 4 0 5 to 240. 102 Moreover, Dr. Mungai can validly claim "never [to have] minced words" on such critical issues as Rhodesia, apartheid, Portuguese fascism, Namibia, the sale of arms to South Africa, sovereignty over natural resources, disarmament, and "sea-bed questions." Even so, these are not stances that challenge the basic international order that Kenya seeks to remain a part of; rather, a strong stand on these issues is easily reconciled with (and even furthers) a pragmatic diplomatic policy. Thus on the central question of nonalignment itself, one able observer has commented on the country's decidedly cautious contacts with the Eastern bloc countries. "Although she maintains smooth diplomatic relations with East Europe and the People's Republic of China," declares J o h n J . Okumu, "she has consistently been very reluctant to receive substantial economic or technical assistance from these countries." 103 Okumu's conclusion pretty well sums up the basic feature explaining foreign policy pragmatism in all of the reorganization states: "Thus if the general pattern of external private and public capital inflows is in part an indicator of the general ideological preference of Kenya's governing elite, then Western capitalism has a lot to do with its pragmatic orientation to the practice of non-alignment. Kenya's position seems to be that it is possible to be economically aligned but ideologically non-committed on cold-war issues."""' The Transformation Strategy. In contrast to the strategies of accommodation and reorganization, the transformation strategy has at its essence a commitment to break the inherited pattern of structural dependency and to reconvert the society Donald Rothchild, Politics of Integration: An East African Documentary (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1 9 6 8 ) . 102. Reporter (Nairobi), December 3, 1965, p. 17. 103. East African Standard (Nairobi), December 13, 1971, p. 6. 104. Okumu, "Some Thoughts on Kenya's Foreign Policy," p. 2 8 9 .

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

135

to certain traditional ideas, values, and life-styles. As noted above, the difference between the states using a transformation strategy (Tanzania, Guinea, and Somalia, and newly independent Angola and Mozambique) and the others, however, does not lie in the objective economic and social welfare conditions currently prevailing. For instance, the lack of product diversification and proportion of physicians to the population as a whole in the states tending to use a transformation strategy are not unlike many of the states adopting an accommodation strategy. And in the category of below-average earnings per head Tanzania ($74 per head in 1969) is in a group with such states as Mali ($85), Guinea ($77), Ethiopia ($62), Benin ($71), Upper Volta ($50), Niger ($95), Chad ($78), Rwanda ($45), Burundi ($53), Somalia ($62), Uganda ($96), Malawi ($69), Lesotho ($75), and others. 105 Thus the states adopting a transformation strategy are unique not in their environmental circumstances but in their determination to end their dependency on the Western-dominated economic system. They abhor the competitiveness and acquisitiveness that they view as inherent in a capitalist life-style and wish to substitute in its stead a "communocratic" tradition, one which emphasizes collective living and social solidarity. 106 While specifically rejecting such concepts as the class struggle, transformationalist spokesmen find certain Marxist theories attractive precisely because they carry with them a rejection of Western capitalism on the one hand and a collectivist inspiration on the other. As Brian Crozier remarks with respect to Guinea's president, Sekou Toure: "Marxism has contracted an emotional and intellectual marriage within him to a dimly felt awareness of African communal 105. By contrast the states with above average earnings per head of population shows Senegal ($225); Ivory Coast ( $ 3 0 4 ) ; Gabon ( $ 5 5 0 ) ; Congo (Brazzaville) ( $ 2 0 1 ) ; Zaire ( $ 2 8 0 ) ; Ghana ($288); Kenya ( $ 1 2 7 ) ; Sierra Leone ( $ 1 7 7 ) ; Zambia ( $ 3 4 5 ) ; and so forth. Timothy Curtin, "Africa and The European C o m m o n Market," Africa: South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1974), pp. 53-55; and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1972 (New York: United Nations, 1973), Table 187. 106. L. Gray Cowan, "Guinea," in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.) African One-Party States (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 193. Also see Sekou Toure, The Doctrine and Methods of the Democratic Party of Guinea, Part I (Conakry: Democratic Party of Guinea, n.d.), p. 51.

136

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

107

traditions." Sékou Touré, the inspiration leader par excellence, makes extensive use of ideology in an effort to overcome the contaminations of the past and to forge a new Guinean man. Even though the transformationalist states came to independence with environmental constraints basically similar to those in the other countries (and most particularly the less advantaged ones), they do differ from the more prosperous reorganization-oriented states in certain critical ways. These divergencies help to explain some variances in policy-making styles that would otherwise be difficult to account for. Trade statistics, albeit partial in nature, show Zambia to be more dependent on exports and imports to the nine European Common Market countries than is its neighbor, Tanzania (see Table 5). And because Zambians consider their country to be more dependent and intertwined with the world economy than its more rural and agriculturally based neighbor, they are more cautious in redefining their relationship to the multinational corporations in their midst. In addition, such caution carries with it an implicit acceptance of an element of privilege for the modern sector during the transition toward extensive equalization. Thus Zambia's strategy of reorganization, geared to local needs and conditions, is less drastic in its objectives, costs, and regulations than that assumed in Tanzania. The Zambian doctrine of reorganization has entailed a heavy emphasis on Zambianization and nationalization (total as well as partial) in the industrial sector and on the establishment of small industries and workshops; large-scale expenditure on marketing and storage facilities, feeder roads, and social services; and the encouragement of cooperative societies and credit unions in the rural areas. Yet Zambia's inevitable reliance on the production of copper for export rather than agriculture as the mainstay of 107. Quoted in Cowan, "Guinea," p. 189. Also see Ali A. Mazrui, "The Soldier, the Socialist, and the Soul of Development: Amin and Nyerere in Comparative Perspective," a paper presented to the Conference on "Dependence and Development in Africa," Ottawa, February 16-18, 1973, pp. 19-22. On President Syaad Barre's assertion of "scientific socialism," see Philippe Decraene, "Somalia Goes It Alone," Manchester Guardian Weekly 112, no. 15 (April 12, 1975): 13.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

137

Table 5 PERCENTAGE OF ZAMBIAN AND TANZANIAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS FROM THE EEC 1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

Average

Imports: Zambia Tanzania

45.39 41.79

45.05 41.74

42.94 38.24

45.18 34.32

42.34 28.79

44.18 36.98

Exports: Zambia Tanzania

60.58 40.78

57.78 37.80

53.11 38.01

47.55 35.17

46.34 33.43

53.07 37.04

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade Annual 1968-72 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1973).

national revenues tends to make the system reformist rather than revolutionary. By contrast, Tanzania, with lower levels of industralization and urbanization, is less dependent on the Western capitalist world in terms of economic activity. Other environmental factors enabling the Tanzanian leadership to implement, in part at least, a transformation strategy include the unity of the Tanzanian people behind their leaders (attributable largely to the success of the Tanzanian African National Union in mobilizing the people in the struggle against British colonial rule), the country's assured access to world commerce, and its relative insulation from Rhodesian and South African power. In principle at least, the transformation model involves a complete rejection of exploitative and humiliating links to the capitalist (and once the colonialist) economy. Under current conditions of poverty and national weakness, argues Tanzania's president, Julius K. Nyerere, socialism is the "only rational choice" in the African countries. 108 "In practice," contends Nyerere, "Third World nations cannot become developed capitalist societies without surrendering the reality of their freedom and without accepting a degree of inequality between their citizens which would deny the moral validity of our independence struggle." 109 Why does capitalism entail a loss of freedom for countries in the Third World? Nyerere answers this 108. Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 382. 109. Ibid., p. 381.

and

Development

(London:

138

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

query by observing that "Third World capitalism would have no choice except to co-operate with external capitalism, as a very junior partner." 110 Development through capitalism would mean a reliance on foreign money, skill, and enterprise; decisions would be made externally on such important questions as taxation, plant location, production priorities, and employment opportunities. Countries such as Tanzania would, as a consequence, remain structurally dependent on the former colonial power (or alliance of powers), losing the value of independence in the process. The alternative model of development, socialism, would surmount many of these difficulties by severing its ties with international capitalism. The vital point is that the basis of socialist organization is the meeting of people's needs, not the making of profit. The decision to devote the nation's resources to the production of one thing rather than another is made in the light of what is needed, not what is most profitable. Furthermore, such decisions are made by the people through their responsible institutions — their own government, their own industrial corporations, their own commercial institutions. They are not made by a small group of capitalists, either local or foreign — and the question of foreign domination through economic ownership is thus excluded. 111

Although Nyerere does not deny that an African state adopting a socialist model of development will encounter difficulties along the way, he does deny that any of these problems (exploitative management contracts, inherited structural linkages, dynamism of capitalist initiative and techniques) are inherent for socialism. Socialism, then, is the prime means at the disposal of Third World countries for transforming their societies in an egalitarian, self-reliant, indigenously manned and controlled, and productive direction. As noted above, Nyerere places a high priority on expanding productivity within a socialist context (the GDP increased by 5 percent in 1972 — 4 percent in 1971 — at constant prices);" 2 however, social welfare and "equity" objectives always receive at least an equal emphasis in his formulation of 110. Ibid., p. 384. 111. Ibid., pp. 388-89. 112. Edwin Mtei, "Third Plan: Call for Increased Investment and Productivity," African Development 7, no. 12 (December 1973): T27.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

139

developmental programs. Thus in contrast with the growthoriented states, transformationalist Tanzania stresses simultaneous multiple goals: social equality, Ujamaa (familyhood), selfreliance, economic and social transformation, and African economic integration. 113 Nyerere is willing, if necessary, to accept a slowing in the rate of economic expansion in order to assure a broad sharing of increased opportunity among the populace at large as well as freedom from the hold that Western capitalism might otherwise exercise. Nyerere maintains that a policy of economic self-reliance produces genuine progress, 114 not a distorted type of growth which benefits the bourgeosie alone: Despite our great need for economic development, it is not the only thing our people and our nation need. We do need it. We need it because only when we increase the amount of wealth we produce in Tanzania will there be any chance of the mass of our people living decent lives, free from the threat of hunger, or want of clothing, and free from ignorance, or disease. But we also need other things too. We need to live harmoniously among ourselves; we need to safeguard our society, we need to respect ourselves and deserve the respect of others. These things are equally important.115 [Our italics.]

President Nyerere seeks a transformation of the rural areas, the establishment of Ujamaa villages, the de-emphasis of urban privilege and wealth, a complete overhaul of the educational system, and a variety of puritanical measures aimed at eliminating luxury and ostentation. He and his supporters ridicule what they describe as "perverse growth," namely, economic expansion on African soil which benefits international capitalism more than the local economy of the developing state. 116 113. The United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969-30th June, 1974, vol. I (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 1. 114. Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 272. 115. Ibid., p. 199. 116. Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development," Journal of Modern African Studies 6, no. 2 (August 1968): 150-51. Also see Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Range of Choice" in Michael F. Lofchie (ed.), The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 28-29.

140

/

Scarcity,

Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

Yet even while rejecting industrial development based essentially on foreign initiative, Tanzanians continue to welcome foreign capital and skills that are willingly contributed toward fulfilling the government's objectives of building a socialist economy. Thus of the total development expenditure of Sh 800 million spent in 1971-72, Sh 330 million (or 41 percent) were foreign in origin. 111 Not only does the private sector remain of critical importance in such areas as housing and road transport and construction, but foreign private and public shareholding is still evident in a variety of National Development Corporation activities.118 With regard to the goal of securing freedom from external control, a strategy of socialist self-reliance creates a number of foreign policy options. Nyerere's commitment to self-reliance springs in part from his doubts about attracting sufficient foreign resources for rapid industrialization. Quite apart from the problems of unacceptable political conditions which possible donors have tried to attach to capital assistance, and which have caused us to receive less than we at one time hoped, there are hard facts to be faced about the amount of international aid likely to be available. . . . In terms of goods, aid has decreased — and there is no sign that this trend will suddenly change. There is no choice for us. We shall be thankful for any outside assistance we receive, but we must not expect it. The only people we can rely upon are ourselves."'

Self-reliance increases foreign policy options by reducing a sense of urgency over foreign aid. A country pursuing such a line of action accepts whatever is offered generously and fits with local needs, but it does not gear its development efforts to the liberality of other countries. In addition, a lack of economic dependency enabled Tanzania to take radical and socialistoriented stances on foreign policy issues, to champion nonalignment, and to take militant pan-African positions. In 1966, for example, the Tanzanian government broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain over her handling of the Rhodesian 117. Mtei, "Third Plan," p. T 2 7 . 118. See Issa G. Shivji, "Tanzania - The Silent Class Struggle," in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania, vol. 2 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), pp. 304-30. 119. Freedom and Socialism, pp. 166-67.

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

141

crisis. Tanzania felt it necessary to take an uncompromising position on NIBMAR ("no independence before majority African rule"), because it feared the possibility of a British sellout to the minority European community in Rhodesia. But the severing of relations with the former metropolitan country was not without costs. Although Tanzanians could not make an overall assessment of the economic costs of this action, they did note that the freezing of a loan of £7.5 million had created difficulties in fulfilling the Development Plan. Moreover, the refusal to bow to West German pressures to bar the opening of an East German consulate general's office in Dar es Salaam in 1964 led to a unilateral termination of a West German training and aid agreement. For Nyerere the choice was again clear: "We could either accept dictation from West Germany and continue to receive economic aid until the next time we proposed to do something they did not like, or we could maintain our policies and lose the aid immediately." 120 The Tanzanians were in a position to select the latter alternative because the strategy of socialist self-reliance had already reduced the costs of external dependence to a low level; self-reliance had expanded policy options by playing down the role of foreign economic participation at the outset. Of course, each strategy — accommodation, reorganization, and transformation — entails different trade-offs (see Figures 16 and 17, p. 323). Nyerere is keenly aware of the fact that a radical domestic and foreign policy stance inevitably involves costs in terms of external investments, skills, initiative, and markets. Foreign investment declined from a proposed 78 percent during the first five-year plan to a mere 31 percent of the reduced total — a drop largely attributed to Tanzania's then somewhat hesitant moves toward a socialist orientation. 121 In addition, an emphasis on equity may well incur costs with respect to urban industrialization and rapid economic growth. But the alternative strategies, with their reliance on international capitalist initiative, seem morally repugnant to the transformationalists for reasons of equity, dignity, 120. Ibid., p. 190. 121. Phil Raikes, "Tanzania Blazes Its Own Trail," African ment 7, no. 12 (December 1973): T i l .

Develop-

142

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle

Africa

and self-determination. On the other hand, the accommodationalists and the reorganizationalists feel they have no alternative but to maintain close linkages with the external capitalist economy. Nevertheless, whereas the accommodationalists, such as Togo, Botswana, and Burundi, are too weak to bargain meaningfully with the international environment, the states adopting a reorganization strategy can set certain conditions on the relationship. In the larger perspective, to be sure, the reorganizationalists are structurally dependent on international capitalism; even so, they are in a position to modify some of the most irritating and demeaning aspects of their relationship through the enactment of measures of regulation, progressive taxation, and participation (i.e., partial or total nationalization). Being more central to the world economy, and therefore having more capital and skills at their disposal as well as greater access to international markets, the reorganizationalists are at the best vantage point to demand concessions from powerful states as well as transnational actors such as the multinational corporations. But irrespective of these concessions, the exchange remains an unequal one, and the African political system, which preserves its ties with the world capitalistic economy in order to maximize its economic advantages, shapes its choice on a variety of basic internal and external issues to adjust to the demands of international actors. Hence an intimate relationship with international capitalism involves certain intended and unintended consequences which need n o t be assumed by the states adopting a strategy of socialist self-reliance.

GOALS, RULES, AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE TO COPE WITH SCARCITY The appendix to Chapter 1 indicated that a community's capacity to produce items is limited by the scarcity of resources and by the state of industrial technology. The production possibility frontier is a depiction of the more complicated reality posed against each society in its quest to reach some "more preferred" situation — an indifference curve positioned farther from the zero-intercept. That is, transitive preferences mean that the society will attempt to reach the highest attain-

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices / 143 able community indifference curve. Scarcity in Africa is an imposing problem; its dimensions require effective policies to cope with the persistent pressures that scarcity puts on African decision-makers and their peoples. A political economy approach to analyzing rules, procedures, and national goals cannot overlook the fundamental necessity to make economic choices because of scarcities of physical resources as well as other elements required to produce goods and services. Producing and distributing outputs are key factors in attaining the system goals posited in the previous chapters. In this regard, an extremely poor country finds it more difficult to bear the consequences of inefficiency than one possessing more ample capabilities. Clearly, poorer countries lack the same margin for error: they cannot afford the same level of misuse in the allocation of scarce productive factors to investment and consumption. In effect, equitable distribution and efficient productive processes are necessary to enhance the standards of material well-being of the society at large. Resources must be allocated to purposes which maximize the greatest possible good — that is, to where they lead to outputs of items that the community feels are most important or necessary. Resources must be used efficiently so as to increase the availability of the items desired or needed by people. When relatively poor countries make mistakes in resource allocations, their peoples have to pay very high "opportunity costs." By opportunity cost we mean that in order to produce a quantity of one consumable (X) the cost is the lost opportunity to produce a quantity of an alternative product (Y). And if resources are inefficiently used to produce (X), more of (Y) will be forgone to consumers. Wasted or misused resources do not lead to the maximum production of items that people require — perhaps desperately. Since people can consume more items in a richer (albeit somewhat inefficient) country, waste may be more tolerable. However, many African countries presently are among the world's lowest per capita income earners. As producers and consumers of material goods and services, their main economic difficulties derive from limited utilizable resources and productive technology. This economic frailty gives rise to low per capita incomes and low levels of per capita output. For

144

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

example, fifteen African countries (all classified above as adopting accommodation or transformation strategies) have per capita incomes so low that the United Nations depicts them as among the twenty-five least developed of the developing countries. Only the crudest of estimates exist on recent levels of national income and gross domestic product. The data show, for example, that in 1970 Botswana's national income approximated $50 million (gross domestic product was $55 million, and between 1970 and 1973, each measure seems likely to have grown by about $5 million). On the basis of current population estimates, the 1973 level of national income would indicate a per capita income of some $90 to $100 annually. The classification of least developed is based on United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 2768 (XXVI), and the African countries so described include Botswana as well as Burundi, Chad, Dahomey (Benin), Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Upper Volta. Although the above-mentioned are the poorest of African countries, all states on the continent face situations of resource scarcity. The following chapters focus on three major policy options for coping with resource limitations. The first is more effective bargaining with multinational corporations. Such a process seeks to improve the terms on which African host countries grant concessions to foreign-based corporations. The power and flexibility of the companies indeed makes this a difficult task. Yet an overly pessimistic view in this respect can lead African governments to assume that they have fewer bargaining advantages than they actually have. There is some sign that bargaining can be an effective way to acquire added resources for development; for example, technology more appropriate to African resource endowments, improved revenuecollection potentials for the governments, better financial agreements with respect to foreign-exchange acquisitions; 122 and more favorable climates for local income and formal employment opportunities for Africans. 123 In the concluding 122. See, for example, Robert L. Curry, Jr., "Problems in Exportbased Public Revenue Collections in Zambia and Liberia," Journal of World Trade Law 9, no. 6 (November/December 1975): 678-90. 123. It has been argued that African governments have become improved bargainers. See F. E. Banks, "Multinational Firms in African

Goals, Rules, and Collective Choices

/

145

chapter we shall develop the concept of asymmetrical bargaining, applying it to relations between producer cartels and global consumers as well as between multinatioAal companies and African host countries. The second policy option involves improved methods of economic cooperation or integration. The newly formed Economic Community of West African states employs a minimalist strategy to secure cooperation/among member states on matters of mutual interest and on issues for which there are reasonable chances for success. The Lomé agreement is another aspect of a more minimalist approach to cooperation on a program of limited objectives. 124 An important aspect of the agreement is to make increased financial resources available to African nations. And the third of our three options — which by no means exhausts the range of strategies for resource expansion — deals with foreign economic assistance which is appropriate to economic development but which avoids the extremes of economic dependency. 125 Each of the three policy options is designed to increase the E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t , " Journal of World Trade Law 9 , n o . 3 ( M a y / J u n e 1 9 7 5 ) : 3 4 7 - 5 4 . T h i s d o e s n o t imply that m o r e effective bargaining is n o t n e e d e d , a n d w e feel that i m p r o v e m e n t s in bargaining t e r m s are p o s s i b l e . S e e our " O n E c o n o m i c Bargaining b e t w e e n A f r i c a n G o v e r n m e n t s a n d Multinational C o m p a n i e s , " Journal of Modern African Studies 12, no. 2 ( J u n e 1 9 7 4 ) : 1 7 3 - 9 0 . T h e o d o r e M o r a n m a k e s the p o i n t that bargaining terms are n o t m a d e strictly b y o m n i p o t e n t multinational giants or single decision-makers called " h o s t c o u n t r i e s . " In m a n y cases they are condit i o n e d b y elements of the international environment — international market f a c t o r s a n d dimensions of foreign e c o n o m i c p o l i c y . S e e his Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 7 5 ) . 1 2 4 . It has b e e n argued that the L o m é a g r e e m e n t is a new stage in relations b e t w e e n the E E C a n d the nations t h a t are to be the beneficiaries to the agreement's provisions, including the m e m b e r s of the Y a o u n d e a n d A r u s h a g r o u p s . T h e L o m é arrangement presents new innovations on trade a n d e x p o r t earning provisions, industrial c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d stabilization of c o m m o d i t y e x p o r t earnings. S e e A l f r e d S . F r i e d e b e r g , " T h e L o m é Agreem e n t : C o - o p e r a t i o n R a t h e r than C o n f r o n t a t i o n , " Journal of World Trade Law 9 , n o . 6 ( N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 5 ) : 6 9 1 - 7 0 0 . 1 2 5 . See Paul S t r e e t e n , Aid to Africa: A Policy Outline for the 1970's, (New Y o r k , Praeger: 1 9 7 2 ) ; and J a c o b M e e r m a n , " T h e E f f e c t i v e ness of Foreign A i d , " Journal of Modern African Studies 10, n o . 2 ( J u l y 1972): 290-94.

146

/

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa

income and resource level available to African states. As such, each is an effort designed to move a community to a conceptually higher level of satisfaction; that is, from indifference curve I i to I2, as in the appendix to the first chapter. This is permitted by an expansion in production possibilities (Pi to P2), and added income (to B2), as shown in the appendix. In effect, more resources and income are required because of policy options undertaken within dependency situations. Our focus is on what can be done within such constraints, as well as what can be done about them. 126 Given this focus, our effort is pertinent to those situations where policy-makers on the continent act on behalf of African people, but not to those where a decision-making elite acts in its own economic, political, and social interests while ignoring the plight of people generally. 127 However, we feel that this is essentially an African matter, and we agree with the contention that the responsibility for new policy directions rests with African leaders. 1 " 126. For an analysis of the need to continue refining dependency theory for policy purposes, see Patrick J . McGowan, "Economic Performance and Economic Dependence in Black Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 14, no. 1 (March 1 9 7 6 ) : 25-40. 127. For example, the expansion of MNCs has been seen as essentially fitting the interests of foreign-home and African-host country elites in economic class terms. See Richard L. Sklar, "Postimperialism: A Class Analysis of Multinational Corporate Expansion," Comparative Politics 9, no. 1 (October 1 9 7 6 ) : 75-92. 128. See G. K. Helleiner, "Beyond Growth Rates and Planned Volumes — Planning for Africa in the 197 0s,"Journal of Modem African Studies 10, no. 3 (October 1 9 7 2 ) : 356.

•G.

O

« o C >tM