Scandalogy 4: Political Scandals in the Age of Populism, Partisanship, and Polarization 3031471555, 9783031471551

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André Haller Hendrik Michael Editors

Scandalogy 4 Political Scandals in the Age of Populism, Partisanship, and Polarization

Scandalogy 4

André Haller • Hendrik Michael Editors

Scandalogy 4 Political Scandals in the Age of Populism, Partisanship, and Polarization

Editors André Haller University of Applied Sciences Kufstein Kufstein, Tirol, Austria

Hendrik Michael Institute of Communication Science University of Bamberg Bamberg, Germany

ISBN 978-3-031-47155-1 ISBN 978-3-031-47156-8 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . André Haller and Hendrik Michael Part I

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Populism and Political Scandals

The Power of Performance: Celebrity Populism, Fictional Populists, and Implications for Liberal Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marijana Grbeša, Silvija Vuković, and Berto Šalaj

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Two Faces of Zoran Milanović: From Anti-Populist to Rhetorical Furious Populist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Milica Vučković and Patricija Topić

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But some Scandals Are more Scandalous than Others: A Dissent Management Analysis of Trump’s Unacceptable Access Hollywood Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Juan Pablo Cannata Part II

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Outrage, Lionization, and Resistance in a Polarized Public

Scandal and Lionization: When Corporations Speak on Socio-Political Issues in a Polarized World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W. Timothy Coombs

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Leave Olympia Alone: Reversing the Approach Toward the Parisian Salon Scandal of 1865 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Anna Kleiman

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Holding out for a Hero: The Rhetorical Battle over the National Garden of American Heroes in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Jennifer Keohane

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Contents

The Many Deaths of Domitian: Scandal and Image Destruction in Imperial Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Martijn Icks Part III

Partisanship, Scandals, and Political Culture

America’s First Sex Scandal: The Rhetorical Strategies in the Hamilton/Reynolds Affair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Jason A. Edwards and Colleen Alm The Effects of Prototypicality on Punishment of in-Party Political Leaders’ Immoral Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Annemarie S. Walter and David P. Redlawsk Forty Years of Political Scandals in Germany and Austria: Differences and Similarities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Martin R. Herbers

Introduction André Haller and Hendrik Michael

Abstract This chapter provides a brief introduction to the studies compiled in this collected volume. Additionally, it addresses how politics appears to have entered a mode of perpetual crisis and growing dysfunctionality. The rapid succession of scandals may be a symptom of this crisis, while being its catalyst at the same time. Aside from transformations of media and journalism, the chapter identifies larger socio-political trends that produce a hotbed for scandalization. These changes in political culture and society are populism, partisanship, and polarization. The introduction lays out the argument that the presence of populism, partisanship, and polarization influence scandalization processes. Thus, the aim of this collected volume is to better understand possible impacts of these phenomena on public discourse and media practices from an interdisciplinary and critical scientific perspective.

Introduction A multitude of political scandals came to public attention in recent years all across the world, involving all kinds of nepotism, sexual harassment, coercion, and abuses of power. To name just a few examples, Boris Johnson’s Partygate, the Cum-Ex affair in Germany, Donald Trump’s document scandal, or the accusations of corruption in the Austrian OVP show that political misconduct is one of the main issues in media coverage on a global scale. In this light, politics appears to have entered a mode of perpetual crisis and growing dysfunctionality. The rapid succession of scandals may be a symptom of this crisis, while being its catalyst at the same time. With respect to this very broad

A. Haller University of Applied Sciences Kufstein, Kufstein, Austria e-mail: [email protected] H. Michael (✉) Institute of Communication Science, University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_1

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diagnosis, we must first ask what defines a political scandal and how are such scandals relevant for a polity and public discourse. According to Thompson (2000), political scandals in modern post-industrial societies are mediated through journalism. The rise of social media, particularly social network sites, led to a higher number of audience-induced scandals and to a faster distribution of accusations (Burkhardt, 2018). Some scholars argue that scandal coverage is useful for democratic societies because it may repair dysfunctionalities (Hondrich, 2002), as outrage may be an instrument for societal change (Hessel, 2011). Other researchers claim that scandals and outrage are both often constructed with strategic interests by public players and may have harmful effects on societies (Kepplinger, 2018). A cause for the number of political scandals in the last decade or so can be attributed to overall transformations of media and journalism in the digital age. On the one hand, technological infrastructure and digital tools give reporters new means to investigate political scandals that deal with substantial misconduct, such as corruption and other phenomena of power abuse. On the other hand, we can observe how social media offers new means to vent emotional attacks, spark outrage, or voice public discontent. Politicians are regularly subject to such firestorms. Participatory digital publics can also create a “spill-over” effect so that the consequences of misconduct, such as sexual harassment, may incite a more substantiated discourse in the political system and in conventional journalistic mass media. However, aside from transformations of media and journalism, there are larger socio-political trends that produce a hotbed for scandalization. These changes in political culture and society are generally outlined with reference to three umbrella terms: populism, partisanship, and polarization (Baybars Hawks & Uzunoaylu, 2019; Ruzza et al., 2021). Arguably, populism and partisanship may be a significant factor for increasing polarization in society (Mudde, 2004). Populist communication tries to segregate elite players and minority groups from (constructed) homogeneous ordinary people (Mudde, 2004). Together with the advent of hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2017) this has changed modern politics. Social media in particular have become central in political communication, determining the communication strategies of a wide range of political actors (Haller, 2019; Haller & Seeber, 2020). The case of Donald Trump exemplifies that populist actors adopted these new strategies early and successfully. Such forms of communication engage users, providing possibilities for accelerated scandalization (Haller, 2020). Populists use personalized attacks, such as ad hominem arguments, to scandalize established political agents and institutions in order to destroy their reputation and frame them as a corrupt elite (Samoilenko et al., 2020; Berti & Loner, 2021). On the other hand, Wodak (2015) has pointed out that populist politics has ushered in an era of “post-shame.” Populists instrumentalize transgressions as provocations that spark public outrage but do not follow the established pattern of bearing the consequences in regard to violations of political norms and conduct. In this regard, scandal is of the essence to keep a “populist perpetuum mobile” (Wodak, 2015, p. 19) going, as an endless cycle of accusations, denial, and justifications saturates the public debate.

Introduction

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Further, one can argue that scandals are a phenomenon of partisanship because elements of scandalization offer strategic communicative instruments to sharply distinguish one’s own political camp from others and help to rally political supporters. Recent election cycles in the USA, in Turkey, or in Italy illustrate this point. Similar to the above-mentioned strategies, partisan scandalization highlights misconduct by political opponents (Martherus et al., 2021). In this context, journalists may operate as partisan actors who use “instrumental actualization” (Kepplinger, 2011) to report on politicians or non-governmental actors from different political factions by emphasizing even minor or irrelevant misconduct that happened in the past to damage their character in an attempt to manipulate public opinion. Partisan media, such as FOX News in the USA, are contributing to this as much as hyperpartisan alternative media ecosystems do (Kristoffer et al., 2019). Studies have shown that reactions to scandals and attitudes toward those who are scandalized are conditioned by partisan identity. Psychological mechanisms of selective exposure and selective perception may explain this phenomenon (Walter & Redlawsk, 2019; von Sikorski et al., 2020). The polarization of public discourse potentially increased due to the “grammar of media communication” (Altheide & Snow, 1979, p. 9). The crisis of journalism in the twenty-first century lays bare the deficits of the liberal and democratic corporatist model of media (Brüggemann et al., 2014). Journalism is clearly geared toward economic motives and media production in general follows the logic of a market society and cycles of attention management. As a result, tabloidization and infotainment become dominating modes of journalistic discourse (Otto et al., 2017). The ensuing simplification of content may involve sensational visualization and scandalizing stereotyping. Such polarizing coverage is meant to “make headlines” by scandalizing political issues and politicians alike. Yet this can lead to less nuanced representations of a political reality and can have effects on creating more cynical attitudes toward political agents and institutions (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2015). As the diversity of news sources grows online, audiences become more fragmented, contributing further to political polarization (Schulz, 2019). Younger segments of the audience use social media as a primary source for political information (Mitchell et al., 2020; Nic Newman et al., 2020). This is problematic because social media platforms engage users by trending more polarizing items, which includes issues that can be scandalized and thus create toxic debates and emotional outrage, for example, in regards to so-called “Cancel Culture” and in relation to questions of identity politics. A recent study by Marwick (2021) offers explanations for such phenomena. The study argues that members of a social network or online community attack others for violating their network’s norms. This behavior triggers moral outrage and network members send harassing messages to the target, reinforcing their adherence to the norm and signaling network membership. It is a process similar to established dynamics of scandalization in media and public forums of the past and indicates a more stable communicative invariant for these current phenomena and behaviors in online environments. Overall, we argue that the presence of populism, partisanship, and polarization has an effect on scandalization processes. Thus, the aim of this collected volume is to

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better understand possible impacts of these phenomena on public discourse and media practices from an interdisciplinary and critical scientific perspective. The collected volume compiles research presented at the International Conference in Scandalogy at the University of Bamberg. The publication includes studies from all subfields of communication studies, political communication research, as well as related disciplines and offers conceptual, empirical, and methodological contributions which reflect on political scandals and the role which media and/or communication plays therein. Therefore, our scope is international and investigates existing differences and possible commonalities in how the above phenomena affect media communication and scandalization in various countries. Sect. I focuses on populism and political scandals. First, Marijana Grbeša, Silvija Vuković, and Berto Šalaj provide a conceptualization of celebrity populism with respect to intentional self-scandalization, a prevalent populist tactic employed to disrupt established political and communication norms. Their study uses examples of populist showmen from Croatia and Serbia who assumed imaginary identities to run in elections and campaigned on strong anti-establishment sentiment, disregarded conventional political relations with voters, and utilized a campaign strategy based on controversy and self-scandalization to capture the attention of the media. Second, Patricija Topić and Milica Vučković present a case study on Croatian President Zoran Milanović. In their study they use qualitative and quantitative content analyses to investigate how the Croatian President communicated in his first 2 years in office. It was also analyzed how leading online media reported on Milanović. The paper reveals how the President used his characteristics strategically, particularly by addressing online media, to win the election. It also becomes clear that populist messages were part of his communication strategy but were used carefully. Third, Juan Pablo Cannata conducted an analysis of the Access Hollywood Tape Scandal (AHTS) which led to a major discussion during the 2015 US Presidential campaign. Cannata shows which mechanisms favor dissent. Based on Elizalde’s theory of dissent, and Girard’s mimetic theory, the author analyzes the scandal in detail. The paper also presents practical lessons for scandal and crisis management. Section II features studies that analyze phenomena of outrage, lionization, and resistance in polarized publics. First, Timothy Coombs explores the relationship between the socio-political engagement of companies and scandalization processes. He argues that corporations are increasingly perceived as political actors when social and political issues are discussed in the public. Based on case studies (Apple and Disney) he shows that missing corporate social advocacy (CSA) can be the starting point of scandals and organizational crises. An increasing polarization of sociopolitical issues creates a new environment for companies which can then lead to public scandalization and harm the companies’ reputation. Second, Anna Kleiman re-examines the socio-cultural scandal surrounding the exhibition of Olympia by Manet in the Parisian Salon of 1856. Her study analyzes the tensions of women’s appearances with visual representations of women, and their manifestation in themes as objectification and sexual violence. Kleiman argues that the scandal evoked around the exhibition of Olympia in Paris in the mid-nineteenth century is a predecessor to the socio-cultural tendency in western societies to this day, to lay

Introduction

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the responsibility of such scandals on the women that did not cause them. In this regard, Kleiman discusses social discourses around sexual violence—that echo in state institutions around the world—that still blame victims and targets rather than the assaulters and the social contexts that allow these phenomena to thrive. Third, Jennifer Keohane analyzes the relationship between public memory and scandalization through the lens of rhetoric. She argues that in a polarized and partisan society like the United States, the meaning of the past is grounds for struggle. This argument is exemplified through an analysis of the public discourse about the National Garden of American Heroes, a proposed park that would feature 244 statues of “great Americans.” Given the significance of statuary to communicate political values and its link to changing political regimes, Keohanes argues that the National Garden, even though it was never built, resulted in a scandal that has much to teach scholars about public memory, political values, and national character. Fourth, Martijn Icks contributes further to a historical analysis of scandals. His study investigates the damnatio memoriae of emperor Domitian who, Icks argues, must have been a polarizing figure because he inspired strong emotions of hatred and loyalty among the Roman elites, even after his assassination. Icks focuses on dynamics of posthumous character assassination that pose a serious challenge to historians, since they cloud our view of Domitian’s reign. On the one hand, the study provides an analysis of the scandalization concerning the emperor’s actions in the literary sources. On the other hand, Icks discusses the political instrument of defacing statues of the former emperor through which Domitian suffered yet another symbolic death. Section III addresses the relationships between partisanship, scandals, and political culture. First Jason A. Edwards and Colleen Alm offer another historical study that contextualizes our current understanding of scandals, media, and politics. Edwards and Alm investigate America’s first sex scandal, surrounding Alexander Hamilton and his public response to the scandal in the so-called “Reynolds Pamphlet.” The authors argue that there is little scholarly analysis within media history and rhetorical studies of this important historical case study, especially considering Alexander Hamilton’s importance to American political culture. Their analysis breaks down the argumentative strategies of pamphleteering, particularly of reputation pamphlets and their function in a highly partisan media system, and can be seen as the groundwork for future scholarship in the rhetorical history of the early American republic. Second, Annemarie S. Walter and David P. Redlawsk are offering findings of a between-subject survey experiment to explore the relationship between the prototypicality of politicians and the in-party evaluations of moral transgressions. Results show that political actors who are seen as prototypical leaders are less likely to be criticized and thus have a lower potential to be scandalized. The empirical findings could explain why Trump supporters became more tolerant to ethical violations than Clinton supporters after the 2016 election. Third, Martin R. Herbers conducted a comparative study on scandal reporting in the last 40 years in Germany and Austria to identify similarities and differences. He shows that theoretical elements of scandals can be found in all investigated cases and that scandal cases concern all stages of the political system. This indicates that the

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socialization function of scandals for democratic societies may apply for political journalism in both countries. However, the empirical results of the content analysis show that the journalistic culture in Germany emphasizes investigative routines, whereas political institutions serve as scandalizers in Austria. The study reveals differences of scandal reporting in both countries and can serve as a blueprint for further comparative analyses. We, the editors, are thankful to all contributors who presented live or online at Scandalogy 4 at the University of Bamberg. In particular, we like to thank the Ludwig Delp Foundation which supports Scandalogy from the very beginning in 2016. It would not have been possible to organize an international conference without the help of the foundation. The editors are very pleased about this longstanding fruitful cooperation. In this light, we also like to wish all readers interesting and stimulating insights.

References Altheide, D. L., & Snow, R. P. (1979). Media Logic. Sage. Baybars Hawks, B., & Uzunoaylu, S. (2019). Polarization, populism, and the new politics: Media and communication in a changing world. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Berti, C., & Loner, E. (2021). Character assassination as a right-wing populist communication tactic on social media: The case of Matteo Salvini in Italy. New Media & Society, 23(9), 1–22. https:// doi.org/10.1177/14614448211039222 Boukes, M., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2015). Soft news with hard consequences? Introducing a nuanced measure of soft versus hard news exposure and its relationship with political cynicism. Communication Research, 42, 701–731. https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650214537520 Brüggemann, M., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Humprecht, E., & Castro, L. (2014). Hallin and Mancini revisited: Four empirical types of Western media systems. Journal of Communication, 64, 1037–1065. Burkhardt, S. (2018). Scandals in the network society. In A. Haller, H. Michael, & M. Kraus (Eds.), Scandalogy: An interdisciplinary field (pp. 18–44). Herbert von Halem Verlag. Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system: Politics and power. Oxford University Press. Haller, A., & Seeber, L. (2020). Social-Media-Kampagnen im Europawahlkampf–Eine empirische Auswertung der Facebook-Seiten deutscher Parteien während des Wahlkampfes 2019. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), Europawahlkampf 2019 (Vol. 9, pp. 53–85). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-31472-9_2 Haller, A. (2019). Die Online-Kampagnen im Bundestagswahlkampf 2017. In C. Holtz-Bacha (Ed.), Die (Massen-)Medien im Wahlkampf (Vol. 13, pp. 49–72). Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24824-6_3 Haller, A. (2020). Populist online communication. In B. Krämer & C. Holtz-Bacha (Eds.), Perspectives on populism and the media (pp. 161–180). Nomos. https://doi.org/10.5771/ 9783845297392-161 Hessel, S. (2011). Empö-rt euch! (Streitschrift). Ullstein. Hondrich, K. O. (2002). Enthüllung und Entrüstung: Eine Phänomenologie des politischen Skandals (Vol. 2270). Kepplinger, H. M. (2018). Functional analysis or impact research–where is scandal research going? In A. Haller, H. Michael, & M. Kraus (Eds.), Scandalogy: An interdisciplinary field (pp. 16–35). Herbert von Halem Verlag.

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Kepplinger, H. M. (2011). Instrumentelle Aktualisierung. In H. M. Kepplinger (Ed.), Journalismus als Beruf (pp. 149–162). Springer VS. Kristoffer, H., Figenschou, T. U., & Frischlich, L. (2019). Key dimensions of alternative news media. Digital Journalism, 7(7), 860–869. Martherus, J. L., Martinez, A. G., Piff, P. K., & Theodoridis, A. G. (2021). Party animals? Extreme partisan polarization and dehumanization. Political Behaviour, 43, 517–540. https://doi.org/10. 1007/s11109-019-09559-4 Marwick, A. E. (2021). Morally motivated networked harassment as normative reinforcement. Social Media + Society, 7(2), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051211021378 Mitchell, A., Jurkowitz, M., Baxter Oliphant, J., & Shearer, E. (2020). Americans who mainly get their news on social media are less engaged, less knowledgeable. Pew Research Center– Journalism & Media. www.journalism.org/2020/07/30/americans-who-mainly-get-their-newson-social-media-are-less-engaged-less-knowledgeable/ Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x Nic Newman, N., Fletcher R., Schulz, A., Andı, S., & Kleis Nielsen, R. (2020). Reuters institute digital news report 2020. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism https://reutersinstitute. politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-06/DNR_2020_FINAL.pdf Otto, L., Glogger, I., & Boukes, M. (2017). The softening of journalistic political communication: A comprehensive framework model of sensationalism, soft news, infotainment, and tabloidization. Communication Theory, 27, 136–155. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12102 Ruzza, C., Berti, C., & Cossarini, P. (Eds.). (2021). The impact of populism on European institutions and civil society: Discourses, practices, and policies. Palgrave Macmillan. Samoilenko, S., Shiraev, E., Icks, M., & Keohane, J. (2020). Routledge handbook of character assassination and reputation management. Routledge. Schulz, A. (2019). Where populist citizens get the news: An investigation of news audience polarization along populist attitudes in 11 countries. Communication Monographs, 86(1), 88–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/03637751.2018.1508876 Thompson, J. B. (2000). Political scandal: Power and visibility in the media age. Polity Press. von Sikorski, C., Heiss, R., & Matthes, J. (2020). How political scandals affect the electorate. Tracing the eroding and spillover effects of scandals with a panel study. Political Psychology, 41(3), 549–568. Walter, A. S., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2019). Voters’ partisan responses to politicians’ immoral behavior. Political Psychology, 40(5), 1075–1097. Wodak, R. (2015). The Politis of fear: What right-wing discourses mean. Sage.

Part I

Populism and Political Scandals

The Power of Performance: Celebrity Populism, Fictional Populists, and Implications for Liberal Democracy Marijana Grbeša

, Silvija Vuković

, and Berto Šalaj

Abstract Relying on the innovative concept of celebrity populism, the chapter explores the cases of two parody candidates from Croatia and Serbia who assumed imaginary identities to run in elections. Enio Meštrović, aka Ričard, and Luka Maksimović, aka Ljubiša Preletačević—Beli, employed a strong anti-establishment stance, using satire and wit to voice their critique of the national political elites. Their campaign strategies, based on provocative performances and self-scandalization, garnered substantial media attention, which ultimately translated into tangible voter support. The chapter argues that Ričard’s and Beli’s controversial political success attests to the power of self-scandalization and celebrity-populist mix in contemporary politics. The chapter discusses implications that the rise of celebrity populists and parody candidates, such as Ričard and Beli, may have for liberal democracy. It concludes that the engaging power of celebrity politics, coupled with populist homogenization of the people, may energize voters, and encourage political engagement. On the other hand, celebrity populists, like other populists, call for disruption of norms, which may undermine standards of civility and democracy. Additionally, celebrity populists have a propensity to oversimplify and trivialize substantive political issues, frequently reducing politics to mere theatrical displays, deprived of adequate political competencies and void of any real political substance.

M. Grbeša (✉) Department of Strategic Communication, University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] S. Vuković Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Communication Studies and Journalism, Praha, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] B. Šalaj University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_2

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1 Introduction The absolute star of the 2021 local election in Croatia was a toothless hillbilly Ričard from the hinterland of the city of Zadar. Ričard campaigned on populist messages and won 21.85% of votes, securing his independent list Horses (Konji) seven seats in the City Council. What makes this case particularly intriguing is the fact that Ričard did not actually exist. Ričard was an imaginary parody candidate, embodied by a local performer Enio Meštrović. In 2017, Ljubiša Preletačević—Beli, another imaginary candidate, personified by a 25-year-old student Luka Maksimović, competed in Serbian presidential election. He finished the race third. Like Ričard, Beli received extensive media coverage and garnered enormous public attention throughout the campaign, which eventually translated into a relevant electoral result. This chapter provides an anatomy of these two cases. We argue that Ričard and Beli are examples of fictional populism, a particular type of celebrity populism. Celebrity populism is a novel concept, developed by Grbeša and Šalaj (2023, also Šalaj, & Grbeša, 2022) to address the specifics of a populist-celebrity mix, as opposed to the merger between celebrity sphere and pluralist (mainstream) politics. Our conceptualization of celebrity populism is grounded in two well-established concepts—populism (Grbeša & Šalaj, 2018; Hawkins et al., 2019; Mudde, 2004) and celebrity politics (Marsh et al., 2010; Street, 2004; Wheeler, 2013). In the next part of the chapter, we provide a brief overview of contemporary research on populism and present our understanding of this phenomenon. We embrace the “ideational approach” to populism (Hawkins et al., 2019), which sees populism as an ideology. Furthermore, we argue that populism should be understood as a metaideology that exists in parallel to pluralism and monism (Grbeša & Šalaj, 2018). In the third part, we present key accounts of celebrity politics and describe the typology of celebrity politicians that is relevant to our conceptualization. In the fourth part, we present the concept and typology of celebrity populism (Grbeša & Šalaj, 2023; Vuković, 2022). In the fifth part, we explain the strategy of “intentional selfscandalization” (Haller, 2015) as one of the prevalent populist tactics employed to disrupt established political and communication norms. In the sixth part, we analyze the cases of Beli and Ričard, focusing primarily on their parody, performance, and self-scandalization as attention eliciting tactics. In the final part of the chapter, we discuss the implications of the rise of celebrity populism and fictional populism for democracy. To do so, we draw on Diamond and Morlino’s (2005) differentiation between the three dimensions of the quality of democracy: procedure, content, and result.

The Power of Performance: Celebrity Populism, Fictional Populists,. . .

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2 Populism A review of contemporary literature on populism indicates that there are at least five distinct approaches to this phenomenon. The first approach defines populism as a particular form of organizing political parties, with centralization and charismatic leaders as key features (Taggart, 1995). The second approach considers populism as a tactic for mobilizing marginalized groups toward political action while expressing an anti-elite, nationalist rhetoric that celebrates the common people (Jansen, 2011). However, these two approaches are the least represented in current studies on populism. The third approach regards populism as a political-communication style, characterized by a rhetoric that appeals to the people (e.g., Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). The fourth approach views populism as a “discursive frame” that diagnoses reality as problematic due to corrupt elites and calls for righteous political mobilization to regain power (Aslanidis, 2016). Advocates of these two approaches (Aslanidis, 2016; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014) are concerned with the communicative dimension of populism. They believe that populist actors do not share enough common features to constitute a political ideology. In contrast to these approaches, a fifth approach has emerged, which conceptualizes populism as a political ideology. This “ideational approach” to populism assumes that populists always perceive politics as a conflict between two homogenous and mutually antagonistic groups—“pure people” and “corrupt elite”—and that politics should be an expression of the will of the people (Mudde, 2004). We align with the ideational approach and argue that populism can be considered a distinct political meta-ideology (Grbeša & Šalaj, 2018). Political meta-ideologies represent a broader concept than political ideologies, encompassing ideologies that share some characteristics while differing in others. Acknowledging the relevant insights on contemporary political ideologies (e.g., Freeden, 2013; Freeden et al., 2013; Vincent, 2010), Grbeša and Šalaj (2018) differentiate between three dominant political meta-ideologies: monism, pluralism, and populism. Monism is characterized by the belief in a single, absolute political truth and a single correct way of organizing political life. Any challenge to this political monopoly is deemed punishable. Fascism, communism, and religious fundamentalism are examples of monistic ideologies (Ravlić, 2013). Pluralism, on the other hand, accepts the coexistence of different, heterogeneous social groups, ideas, interests, attitudes, and values that compete for governance in a society. It encompasses a spectrum of ideologies ranging from conservatism to social democracy, which despite their differences share the belief in the legitimacy of diverse social groups (Dahl, 1989). This chapter adopts the understanding that populism is a political meta-ideology that exists alongside monism and pluralism and is characterized by two key features: a positive view of the people and a general resentment toward political elites. The systemic conflict between the people and the elites, which is central to populist

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meta-ideology, is often accompanied by a tendency to blame “dangerous others” for these crises. The specific identity of these “dangerous others” can vary depending on the ideological leanings of populist actors, with right populists targeting migrants and minorities and left populists criticizing financial institutions. Although the line between pluralism and populism can be fuzzy, the differentiation between pluralism and populism as two separate meta-ideologies is central to our conceptualization of celebrity populism, as a phenomenon that is similar but still distinct from celebrity politics.

3 Celebrity Politics Celebrity politics is a phenomenon that encompasses various aspects of the intersection between politics and celebrity culture. It generally refers to two processes: the increasing efforts of traditional politicians to connect with celebrities and adopt celebrity-like behaviors, and the participation of celebrities from non-political spheres in elections and public office. Celebrity politics is a part of a broader societal process of celebritization, understood as a multitude of societal and cultural changes associated with celebrity (Driessens, 2013). Politics, along with other fields of life, has been increasingly celebritized due to processes of “diversification,” “migration,” and “democratization” of celebrities, as defined by Driessens (2013). Diversification of celebrity means that celebrities are no longer limited to the world of entertainment or sports, but can also emerge from other social fields, including politics. Migration refers to the trend of celebrities transiting from the world of media and entertainment into other areas, while democratization suggests that anyone can rise to fame, especially in the age of social media. According to Driessens (2013, p. 641), “celebrity has become a defining feature of our mediatized societies.” This realization brings to mind the prediction made by Corner and Pels (2003, p. 8) in their influential book Restyling of Politics, a decade earlier: “the only future for political personality is that of celebrity.” In addition to celebritization as a broad societal change, Driessens (2013, p. 643) argues that this celebrity-driven change can also occur on an individual level through a process of celebrification. Celebrification transforms ordinary people or public figures into celebrities and can include a wide range of activities, such as celebrity endorsement and posing with celebrities, imitating the behavior of stars, and adopting “mannerisms, gestures and styles of popular culture” (Street, 2001, p. 191). The goal of celebrification is to strengthen the connection between politicians and citizens by borrowing from the relationship of trust and admiration associated with figures in popular culture (Street, 2001, p. 191). The idea of celebritization of politics and celebrification of individual politicians has prompted scholars to explore the relationship between the spheres of politics and celebrity, and to categorize celebrity politicians according to various typologies (e.g., West & Orman, 2003; Street, 2004; Marsh et al. (2010). These typologies offer a useful framework for understanding the complex and evolving relationship

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between politics and celebrity in contemporary society. Marsh et al.’s (2010) typology is particularly relevant for our conceptualization of celebrity populists. Based on two criteria, the sphere of origin and the nature of the relationship with the other sphere, they differentiate between five categories of celebrity politicians. A celebrity advocate is a non-political actor who wishes to influence the public agenda or advocate for a certain policy; a celebrity endorser is a non-political celebrity who endorses a candidate or a party; a politician who uses others’ celebrity is an elected politician who relies on someone else’s celebrity or fame; a celebrity politician is a celebrity from non-political sphere who becomes an elected politician; and politician celebrity is an actor whose sphere of origin is politics but who celebrifies his/her public appeal to the extent that he/she no longer exclusively belongs to the political sphere but also to the celebrity sphere.

4 Celebrity Populism The connection between celebrity politics and populism is often considered to be inherent or intuitive, given that both rely heavily on performance and style (Moffitt, 2016; Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Pels, 2003; Street, 2004, 2018). Street (2018, p. 9) even suggests that “the rise of populism draws the celebrity politician within its ambit, as well as discussion of the mediatisation and personalisation of politics more generally.” Despite this, there are still relatively few studies that explicitly address the relationship between populism and celebrity politics, with some exceptions (e.g., Alomes & Mascitelli, 2012; Bartoszewicz, 2019; Enli, 2017; Giglioli & Baldini, 2019; Grbeša & Šalaj, 2023; Schneiker, 2019; Street, 2018; Šalaj & Grbeša, 2022; Vuković, 2022; Wood et al., 2016). In contrast to established definitions of celebrity politics and the corresponding categorizations of celebrity politicians, we introduce a conceptualization of celebrity populism that emphasizes the importance of distinguishing political meta-ideologies that merge with celebrity discourse. We argue that the logic of the celebritypopulism mix differs from conventions of the celebrity-pluralism mélange and that celebrity populists should be evaluated on their own merits. Marsh et al. (2010) suggest that celebrities have the ability to energize and mobilize otherwise apathetic publics. They also argue that the electorate may be more responsive to celebrities who seek to win office if overall levels of trust in the established political system are low, and citizens turn to more unconventional alternatives or political outsiders. Celebrity politicians often play the card of such political outsiders. Wheeler (2013, p. 170) similarly argues that “the dialogue between celebrity politicians and the public has allowed for new opportunities for political participation.” He believes that the public sees celebrities as authentic political figures due to a decline in trust in the political class and the public’s greater identification with stars, owing to the celebritization of popular culture. Accordingly, distrust of mainstream political elites emerges as one of the key drivers of both populism and celebrity politics.

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Another prominent point of contact between celebrity culture and populism is affection. Wirz (2018, p. 1131) notes that “populist communication is inherently more emotion-eliciting than non-populist communication and therefore especially persuasive,” while Street (2018, p. 9) argues that populists tend to stimulate adoration that resembles the behavior of fans. Several scholars have pointed to the analogy between citizens and fans. They suggest that both the relationship between politics and citizens and the one between celebrities and their fans are emotional and performative in nature. Marshall (1997, p. 221), for example, notes that the loyalty for a particular music performer “parallels the sensation of blind loyalty to the particular candidate at the convention.” Van Zoonen (2005, p. 53) believes that “both fan communities and political constituencies come into being as a result of performance.” Street (2018, p. 10) argues that “the art of politics becomes the art of performance, the art of being a celebrity” and that scholars should seek tools that enable us to understand how “audiences”—“the people”—are created in the act of performance and how “passions of the citizen-fan are elicited and orchestrated.” It is plausible to assume that the type of emotion-eliciting investments in politics, typically observed in fandom, has been most intensively displayed by populists. The convergence of pop culture and politics reaches its pinnacle in situations where political reality merges with political fiction—a phenomenon astutely leveraged by numerous populist actors today. Several scholars have evidenced how fusion of political fiction and political reality affects peoples’ perceptions of and engagement with politics. Political fiction influences how people make sense of politics or discuss politics (Van Zoonen, 2005, 2007); it may affect political beliefs and attitudes of the audiences (Mulligan & Habel, 2013); it can fuel distrust in politicians, politics, and political institutions (Gierzynski, 2018); it has the capacity to influence public agenda (Boukes et al., 2022) and it can successfully merge political and fictional narratives. The latter was demonstrated in the well-known case of the Ukrainian president and former actor Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky ran for president with his populist party Servant of the People (Sluha narodu), named after the homonymous Netflix series in which Zelensky played a kind-hearted teacher who runs for president. When he announced his candidacy for President of Ukraine on YouTube and other social networks, Zelensky asserted that he would hold the presidency as a “servant of the people” in the fight against the corrupt Ukrainian political elite. In April 2019, Zelensky defeated the then President Petro Poroshenko in the second round of the presidential election, winning 73% of the vote. Similar examples of fictionalization of politics include Donald Trump’s impersonation of Avengers villain Thanos (O'Neil, 2019) in a campaign video and Boris Johnson’s (Hassan, 2019) parody of the movie Love Actually in a pro-Brexit election ad. Considering the specifics of the celebrity—populist marriage, Grbeša and Šalaj (2023) modified Marsh et al.’s (2010) typology to propose a novel definition of celebrity populists and populist celebrities. In their perspective, a celebrity populist is a celebrity who embraces populist rhetoric to run for elected office and may maintain it while in office, while a populist celebrity is a populist politician who employs diverse celebrity techniques to mobilize supporters and enhance his/her

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image. Both types of celebrity populism rely on a potent communication mix that blends the attractiveness of populist messages with the allure of celebrity culture. The main contribution of this conceptualization is that, unlike previous conceptualizations of celebrity politics, it distinguishes between populist and mainstream (pluralist) politics. Thus, combining three spheres of origin—pluralist (mainstream) politics, populist politics, and celebrity sphere—Grbeša and Šalaj (2023) generate four types of political figures: (1) political celebrities, who are mainstream politicians that use celebrity discourse to construct their celebrity persona; (2) celebrity politicians, who are celebrities from the entertainment or sports industry that run for elected office using mainstream, non-populist language; (3) populist celebrities, who are populist politicians that adopt elements of celebrity discourse to gain and/or retain public support; and (4) celebrity populists, who are celebrities that rely on populist discourse (e.g., anti-elitism, people-centeredness) to win an election and/or maintain public support. In this study, we analyze the cases of two celebrity populists: the Croatian performer Ričard and the Serbian showman Ljubiša Preletačević—Beli. Through these examples, we aim to demonstrate how performative strategies, commonly found in the celebrity sphere and pop culture, can be employed to advance populist objectives. The cases of Ričard and Beli are particularly intriguing due to the use of self-scandalization as their pivotal communication strategy.

5 Populists and Scandalization One of the main points of contact between populism and the celebrity sphere, as argued in the previous section, is the performative nature of both realms. According to Moffitt (2016), performance encompasses both communicative elements, such as discourses, written and spoken language, and stylistic elements, such as body language, outfits, and images. For the proponents of the “stylistic” approach to populism, the main concern is to comprehend “how the performances of those involved influence the relationship between the populist leader and ‘the people,’ and vice versa” (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 387). The central determinant of the populist style is the evocation of “the people,” while the dimensions of anti-establishment and “dangerous others” often emerge in populist rhetoric through the “crisis talk” (Homolar & Scholz, 2019) and “blame attributions” (Hameleers et al., 2019). Other stylistic features commonly found in populist communication include the strategic adoption of emotional appeals, as well as a high level of skill in harnessing media attention and adeptly navigating the demands of the contemporary media landscapes (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2016; Martella & Bracciale, 2022; Mazzoleni, 2008; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018; Wirz, 2018). As Mazzoleni (2008, p. 53) observes, populists are “strong personalities that perfectly

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fit the news media’s demand for the spectacular and emotional treatment of social reality, including political life.” Another prevalent aspect of populist communication, which has been steadily gaining momentum in scholarly research, is the “disruption” of the norms of traditional political communication, as argued by Sorensen (2023). These norms still revolve around “polished and rehearsed performances” (Sorensen, 2023, p. 4). In contrast, populist politicians present themselves as champions of “authentic” communication who say it “as it is.” The “disruptive communicative practices” (Sorensen, 2023) of populist politicians are best exemplified by what Moffitt and Tormey (2014, p. 392) identify as “bad manners,” and what scholars in the field of scandal studies call “intentional selfscandalization” (Haller, 2015). Both concepts essentially refer to provoking established norms of desirable political communication. According to Haller (2015), this behavior can be characterized as the “transgression of norms and values,” while Sorensen (2023) refers to it as the “performance of disruption.” Moffitt and Tormey (2014, p. 392) argue that populists tend to disregard “‘appropriate’ ways of acting in the political realm” and embrace inappropriate ways that typically include “use of slang, swearing, political incorrectness and being overly demonstrative and ‘colourful’” (p. 392). Through these strategies, populists seek to capture attention, create shock, and ultimately achieve certain political or personal objectives. In a similar vein, Haller (2015) argues that “intentional self-scandalization” serves three main goals: (1) attracting the attention of journalists and the general public, (2) generating publicity, and (3) establishing conflict and subsequently mobilizing supporters. The strategy of intentional self-scandalization has been observed in the discourse of numerous populist parties and politicians. Haller (2015) uses the case of the rightwing party Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and their discriminatory anti-immigrant communication to illustrate how transgression of norms was conducted and with what effect. Several studies have addressed the shocking communication of Donald Trump: Wahl-Jorgensen (2018) discussed Trump’s anger, Ott (2017) analyzed his impulsivity and incivility on Twitter, while Enli (2017) investigated the use of “authenticity markers” in his social media communication, such as political incorrectness and insults. Maurer et al. (2022) analyzed the communication of the German right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD), demonstrating how populists successfully instrumentalize news media and gain visibility by employing racist and insulting communication. Herkman (2018) investigated communication of the populist parties in Nordic countries. He revealed that populists, in partnership with mainstream and social media, contribute to the creation of the “neo-populist scandals.” These scandals are a form of “talk scandals,” deliberately provoked by populists who “transgress moral codes by expressing nativism, xenophobia, racism or homophobia” (Herkman, 2018, p. 349). In the next section, we present emblematic cases of the two unconventional candidates from Croatia and Serbia who successfully combined populism, celebrity cues, and self-scandalizing performance.

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6 Fictional Populists: The Cases of Ričard and Ljubiša Preletačević-Beli “I will steal, but I will also give some to you!” This satirical promise was made by Ljubiša Preletačević—Beli,1 a candidate in the 2017 Serbian presidential election (N1, 2017). “Beli” was the alter ego of Luka Maksimović, a 25-year-old Serbian student who decided to run for president after his mock-party “You haven’t tasted sarma yet”2 unexpectedly won a respectable number of seats in the municipality of Mladenovac in the 2016 local election. Preletačević—Beli finished third in the presidential race. Throughout the campaign, he received significant media coverage, including an honorable mention in The New York Times (2017). The newspaper noted that Luka Maksimović, winning 9.44% of the vote while running as a joke under the pseudonym Beli, speaks volumes about the political disaffection of Serbian citizens. Beli’s presidential campaign was marked by slogans such as “Beli—Keep it strong” and “ The poor (people) fight back.” He did not deny that he had no real political program, instead choosing to parody politicians and political reality. During the campaign, he made many satirical, exaggerated promises that were impossible to keep, such as building a seacoast in Serbia. His communication mainly relied on social media, where he shared his thoughts, video sketches, and photos. However, he also traveled around Serbia to meet with citizens. Furthermore, his performative stunts, such as arriving on a white horse to submit signatures for candidacy in the 2016 local elections and in a white limousine for the presidential election, gained strong media and public attention. A similar example of a populist anti-candidate who parodied politics by assuming an alter-ego emerged in Croatia during the 2021 local election. Enio Meštrović, a well-known Croatian local performer, assumed the fictional persona of “Ričard,” a rough and vulgar hillbilly, in his bid for the mayorship of Zadar. Although he finished third with 21.85% of the votes, his list won seven seats in the City Council, giving him significant leverage. Even after being elected to the City Council and assuming the position of the vice-president of the City Council of Zadar, Enio Meštrović continued with the Ričard performance. Meštrović had been creating and promoting the character of Ričard for several years on his YouTube channel, prior to the local election in 2021. During the local election campaign, the videos featuring Ričard gained a significant number of views and were often shared on social media. Like Beli, Ričard engaged in many performative acts, organizing several unusual and newsworthy events, such as cleaning citizens’ shoes on the street with the promise of making them “cleaner and more handsome.” He also 1

Ljubiša is a typical Serbian name. Surname Preletačević is a play on words. It refers to those who often change political parties and ideological positions for their own (political) profit. Beli means “The White.” 2 In Serbian “Sarmu probo nisi.” Sarma is a traditional Balkan meal. The phrase is an excerpt from a popular Serbian folk song: “you left, without trying sarma.”

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organized a karaoke event for his campaign rally, distributed fish to citizens, as he only eats meat, and offered coupons for a free beer redeemable only if he were to be elected as mayor. All these actions were highlighted by the main slogan of his campaign, which simply stated, “Let’s gooooo!” Beli and Ričard belong to a category of political candidates who base their campaigns on fictional identities, parody electoral processes, employ populist rhetoric, and rely on the media’s obsession with spectacle and scandal. We refer to this group of politicians as fictional populists and consider them to be a particular type of celebrity populists. They embody the essence of populist performative communication, and their controversial political success attests to the potency of the celebritypopulist mix. In the following paragraphs, we expound upon how fictional populists fit into the celebrity populism framework and analyze their performative strategies that aspire to scandalize the public. Fictional populists have mastered the art of performative politics that, according to Corner and Pels (2003, p. 10), “foregrounds the politician as an actor, whose performance on the public stage is continuously judged in terms of authenticity, honesty and ‘character’.” Luka Maksimović, aka Beli, and Enio Meštrović, aka Ričard, campaigned on populist rhetoric. They both adopted a strong anti-elitist position, mocking mainstream politics and politicians, and positioning the people and their interests against those of the corrupt and inept elites. They criticized the elites through satire, humor, and parody of national or local politics. For instance, Beli’s satirical promise to steal, but also to give to the people, epitomizes the main line of criticism directed at established political elites, who are portrayed as malevolent plunderers who rob their constituents and offer nothing in return. The celebrity aspect of celebrity populism in the case of fictional populists manifests itself primarily through fictionalization of politics, the use of satire and adoption of performative mannerism, typical of celebrities. Fictional characters are regarded as an integral part of popular culture. By assuming fictional identities, political anti-candidates establish a relationship with voters that surpasses conventional political relations; it rather resembles the relationship of the audiences with their pop-cultural heroes. As Van Zoonen (2005, pp. 63–64) argues, the relation of a fan with his object of devotion is based on “affective identification” while fandom is built on emotions, fantasy, and imagination. Fictional populists can thus be seen as the epitome of fandom-driven politics. Beli and Ričard use humor and satire, which are deeply rooted in popular culture, to parody political reality. Political satire has played a crucial role in democratic culture since the times of ancient Greece and Rome. As Young (2016, p. 3) observes, it provides a secure means for citizens to “deliver succinct criticisms of the government in a playful manner that will engage a broad audience.” He distinguishes between political satire and a broader notion of political humor, regarding political satire as a category of political humor that criticizes and questions political actors, mechanisms, and institutions. Moreover, Street (2001) argues that satire is a way in which politics becomes part of entertainment. Therefore, it has considerable potential to encourage political participation, and it is an effective way to convey a moral

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message and criticize politicians for their vices. Street (2001, p. 63) explains that politicians are often ridiculed “for their vanity and pomposity, for their craven pursuit of self-advancement, for their lack of integrity and intelligence.” Beli and Ričard use satire to criticize the corruption and greed of established politicians. As Beli argued in a BBC interview: “That is the best way to show unhappiness, with satire and humor, because the people of power do not know how to react” (BBC News, 2017). In the character of Ričard, Enio Meštrović embodies a simple man from the Dalmatian hinterland. This region and its people are often mocked for their way of life and speech, which is viewed as less sophisticated and less civilized than in urban areas. To transform into Ričard, Meštrović makes several physical and behavioral changes, including removing his artificial teeth to appear toothless, wearing a hat with Croatian red and white squares, and dressing in simple, everyday clothes. Meštrović also changes his mannerisms: he speaks louder, swears, emphasizes his dialect, and pretends to live a carefree and hedonistic lifestyle characterized by excessive wine drinking and consumption of meat. Overall, Ričard represents a crude man, similar to the American redneck stereotype. Meštrović stated that he adopts the Ričard persona to capture the attention of younger audiences who prioritize spectacle and show over substance (Index video, 2021). This is in line with the arguments about the growing importance of performance in contemporary political communication, which prioritizes style, appearance, and personality over political substance (Corner & Pels, 2003). Ričard is a satirical portrayal of an average “Balkan person” whose primary interests are centered around pleasure and excessive consumption of food and alcohol. He represents the “common man,” “one of us,” and is well-liked for his unrefined personality which contrasts with the sophisticated behavior of the elites. In Ričard’s words, people like him because he is “the people’s man, all day, every day” (Index Video, 2021). In his campaign to become a mayor, Ričard claimed that he wants to join the elite, but at the same time, he exposed their hypocritical behavior by highlighting their resemblance to himself, a person viewed as uneducated and uncivilized. As Ričard humorously states in an interview, “You are not capable, you are not a man from the people if you do not steal. If you are fair, you are a fool. If you are smart, you are a fool” (Index Video, 2021). Like Beli, Ričard promises to distribute money to the people once he becomes a mayor, but he also acknowledges that he will keep some for himself, just like any other politician. In his own words, “So nothing is going to change. We do what they have been doing for the last 30 years” (Index Video, 2021). The unique campaign strategy of the fictional populists, based on entertaining power of controversy, parody, and satire, captures the attention of the media and ensures them extensive media coverage. The media’s obsession with spectacle and scandal plays right into the hands of populist politicians, who are skilled at generating both (Mazzoleni, 2008). Beli and Ričard employed the strategy of “self-scandalization” (Haller, 2015), which works as a powerful attention-catcher. They repeatedly challenged the norms of conventional electoral competition and harshly ridiculed established political

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practices and actors. This parallels the “deliberate provocations” employed by rightwing populists (Maurer et al., 2022; Wodak, 2014). Although Beli and Ričard did not intentionally discriminate against any particular group, they used imaginary identity, controversial stunts, and provocative language to intentionally scandalize and violate norms. As Maurer et al. (2022) suggest, the main goal of such attempts is to gain visibility and to stand out from the pool of other small political players that are unknown to large portions of the public. Ričard and Beli indeed stood out from the mass of other candidates and got extraordinary media coverage: Ričard was declared an undisputed “star of the 2021 local elections” (Index Video, 2021), while Beli was a global news (BBC.com, 2017; Huffpost.com, 2017; Reuters.com, 2017). A successful performance is a shared experience between performers and their audience (Rai, 2015). The audience’s participation is important, as their acceptance and laughter help to reinforce the character’s identity and message. Ljubiša Preletačević—Beli highlighted the importance of this interplay in a BBC interview: “I am pretending to be a classic Serbian politician. I am lying to my people, and the people are reacting well. This is some acting, you know, between me and my people, so we are acting together, me and the people. I am lying to them, they are laughing” (BBC News, 2017). The fact that citizens not only engage with these performances but also vote for fictional candidates highlights a deep sense of disillusionment with established politicians. Many voters prefer imaginary candidates with no political program over mainstream politicians. They choose staged, fictional authenticity of populist performers over inauthentic reality of mainstream politics. This highlights the paradox wittily articulated by Sorensen (2023, p. 6): “Populist performances of authenticity constitute a claim to not perform—despite the performed nature of authenticity.” In the final section of this chapter, we will explore the potential implications of the rise of celebrity populism in general and fictional populists in particular.

7 Celebrity Populism and Liberal Democracy: Threat or Corrective? In this section of the chapter, we discuss the implications of the rise of celebrity populism for liberal democracy, analyzing the ways in which it can act as a corrective and/or a threat to the quality of liberal democracy. Contemporary liberal democracies are the result of the merging of two different traditions and ideas— liberal and democratic—which have been extensively studied by political scientists (e.g., MacPherson, 1977; Mounk, 2019; Ravlić, 2017; Šalaj, 2014; Zakaria, 2003). Crawford Macpherson, in his book The Life and Time of Liberal Democracy (1977), explains that this union of two traditions took place during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. These traditions had different core values. The liberal tradition emphasized individual rights and

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freedoms, pluralism, and constitutional and legal constraints on the arbitrary use of power, even in the case of the majority’s will. The democratic tradition advocated the sovereignty of the people and the equality of citizens, typically using the majoritarian principle to decide on important issues. To prevent the majority’s will from threatening the minority’s rights, the democratic principle was supplemented with the principle of mandatory protection of individual rights and freedoms. According to Macpherson, this union led to the democratization of liberalism and the liberalization of democracy. Contemporary democracies are therefore referred to as liberal or constitutional democracies, where the democratic aspect emphasizes the sovereignty and political participation of citizens, and the liberal aspect emphasizes the rule of law and the protection of individual rights and freedoms. This connection has been implemented differently in different countries, depending on existing political forces, resulting in various configurations. The history of liberal democracies can be viewed as a struggle between social and political forces to establish the domination of one tradition or another. This fight, according to Macpherson, is a driving force in the political evolution of modern societies. No model has yet been proposed by political scientists or politicians to eliminate this tension, which arises from the structure of contemporary polities. What impact does the strengthening of celebrity populism have on the quality of a liberal democracy then? Within political science, there are different approaches to analyzing the quality of liberal democracy (e.g., Buhlmann et al., 2007; Dahl, 1989; Diamond & Morlino, 2005; Munck, 2009). Diamond and Morlino (2005) differentiate three dimensions of the quality of democracy: procedure, content, and result. A high quality of procedure means that citizens have the power to evaluate whether the government respects the democratic process, which corresponds to the democratic aspect of contemporary liberal democracies. A high quality of content implies that citizens and associations enjoy extensive liberties, which matches with the liberal aspect of contemporary liberal democracies. Finally, high quality of result refers to a broadly legitimized regime that satisfies citizens’ expectations of governance, which relates to the outcomes of public policies that affect the quality of citizens’ lives in contemporary liberal democracies. Acknowledging Diamond and Morlino’s dimensions of the quality of democracy, we argue that celebrity populism will have mainly positive effects on the procedure of contemporary liberal democracies. Our argument aligns with the views of proponents of celebrity politics who argue that pop politics, understood as an amalgam of popular culture and politics, can resonate with the people in the ways that traditional politics cannot (Coleman, 2002; Street, 2003, 2004) and that celebrity politics, with its fandom logic, may represent an attractive new platform for citizen engagement (Marshall, 1997; Van Zoonen, 2005; Wheeler, 2013). Since the power of celebrities stems from “audience identification” (Marshall, 1997, p. 198), celebrity populists could give voice to groups that do not feel represented by mainstream parties and elites, mobilizing excluded sections of society and improving their political integration. Moreover, because their support is based on celebrity capital of the candidates and populist rhetoric that seeks to unite the people, celebrity

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populists could provide an ideological bridge that supports the building of crucial new coalitions across socio-economic lines, thus providing a key dynamic element in the evolution of modes of political representation. Regarding the second part, which focuses on the content dimension of contemporary liberal democracy, it is our belief that the rise of celebrity populism will have largely negative effects. Like other populist actors and options, celebrity populists have been known to use the notion and practice of popular sovereignty to violate the “checks and balances” and separation of powers that are central to liberal democracy, as argued by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012). Moreover, a significant number of populists use the notion and practice of majority rule to ignore and bypass minority rights. Additional criticism of celebrity populists’ effect on the content dimension of democracy concerns the fact that they trivialize politics and issues, undermine political processes and procedures, and ridicule electoral competition, as demonstrated in the cases of Beli and Ričard. The performative nature of celebrity populism, coupled with self-scandalization strategies that align with attention-driven media logic, diverts attention away from substantive political issues. The political ascent of imaginary candidates, fictional populists, whose political platform is reduced to a mere spectacle and anti-establishment rhetoric, is the most preposterous manifestation of celebrity populism. Fictional populists represent a contentless but potentially powerful group of political actors who fictionalize politics and combine emotions, performance, and anti-establishment rhetoric into a lucrative electoral formula. With regards to the result dimension, we remain agnostic about the influence of celebrity populism on liberal democracy. On the one hand, celebrities often lack political experience, skills, and knowledge necessary for effective governance and sound policymaking. However, on the other hand, populist movements led by celebrities could provide an alternative vision for the future. Celebrity populists may offer a means for citizens to express their concerns and participate in shaping political decision-making in more inclusive ways, particularly by enacting public policies that cater to marginalized sections of society.

8 Conclusion This chapter explores the cases of two showmen from Croatia and Serbia who assumed imaginary identities to run in elections. Enio Meštrović, aka Ričard, ran in the 2021 local election in Croatia, while Luka Maksimović, aka Ljubiša Preletačević—Beli, ran in the 2016 local election and the 2017 presidential election in Serbia. Ričard and Beli based their election campaigns on populist rhetoric, fictionalization of politics, parody, and trolling of elections. They both won a respectable number of votes, while Ričard also acquired significant formal powers in the local City Council. The cases of these Croatian and Serbian fictional populists are analyzed within the celebrity populism framework, a novel concept that distinguishes between the

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celebrification of pluralist politicians and the celebrification of populist politicians. This chapter reinforces the ideational approach to populism and argues that conceptualizing populism as a distinct meta-ideology, parallel to pluralism and monism, enables a more nuanced and insightful research of celebrity populism, with fictional populists being one, but notorious manifestation of the phenomenon. We introduce an original typology of celebrity populists and argue that performance and emotions represent a key link between the celebrity sphere and populist politics. The analysis of communication strategies of the fictional candidates reveals three main findings. First, Ričard and Beli campaigned on a strong anti-establishment sentiment, using satire and humor to articulate and augment their criticism of the elites. Second, by assuming fictional identities, Ričard’s and Beli’s relationship with voters surpassed conventional political relations, resembling more the relationship of movie stars and their fans, which is why we argue that fictional populists can be seen as the epitome of fandom-driven politics. Third, a campaign strategy based on controversy and self-scandalization captured the attention of the media and ensured them extensive media coverage. The media’s obsession with entertainment, spectacle, and scandal played into the hands of the two showmen. Visibility eventually translated into votes. Ričard’s and Beli’s controversial political success attests to the power of the celebrity-populist mix. The concluding part of the chapter discusses the implications of the rise of celebrity populism and its different types on democracy. For that, we rely on Diamond and Morlino’s (2005) three dimensions of the quality of democracy: procedure, content, and result. We argue that celebrity populism and its different manifestations will have mainly positive effects on the procedure and mainly negative effects on the content dimension. The attractiveness and engaging power of celebrity politics, coupled with populist homogenization of the people, may energize voters, and encourage political engagement in otherwise apathetic political environments. However, celebrity populists, like other populists, call for disruption of norms, which may undermine standards of civility and democracy. In addition, celebrity populists tend to simplify and trivialize substantive political issues, often reducing politics to performance, deprived of adequate political competencies, and emptied of any real political content. Fictional populists embody such fears. Finally, in terms of the result dimension, there is room for both skepticism and hope. While celebrity populists commonly lack political knowledge and skills, the attractiveness of their appeals may encourage political engagement of disinterested and traditionally excluded social groups.

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Two Faces of Zoran Milanović: From Anti-Populist to Rhetorical Furious Populist Milica Vučković

and Patricija Topić

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how easily politicians adopt a populist communication style when there is a lack of a communication strategy. Using the case of Croatian President Zoran Milanović, we first analyzed how Milanović communicated during the presidential campaign, and then how he communicated during his second year in office. We conducted a qualitative content analysis of the communication channels and techniques he used to strategically manage his character during the campaign. Furthermore, we analyzed how four leading Croatian electronic portals covered the character of Zoran Milanović during his 2019–2020 presidential campaign. Finally, using a quantitative content analysis of selected statements made by Milanović during the election campaign and in the second year of his presidency, we examined whether he used elements of populism in his communication. The results showed that Zoran Milanović strategically used his “character” with a carefully planned communication mix during the presidential campaign. He managed to turn his greatest weakness—his character—into his greatest advantage. The strategic use of various communication techniques and tactics resulted in positive media coverage of his character. However, an analysis of his statements while in office showed that once he stopped strategically managing his character, he transformed his communication into a populist style characterized by insults.

M. Vučković (✉) Department of Strategic Communication, Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] P. Topić Mazars in Croatia, Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_3

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1 Introduction Trends in Political Communication Today, the media environment is changing faster than ever before. New trends emerge from day to day and politicians who adapt to these changes and learn how to be responsive and adaptable benefit the most from them. The process of mediatization, defined as the growing influence of the media on society in general and on politics in particular, is becoming increasingly important. The rapid rise of television in recent decades and the even more rapid rise of online platforms in recent times, led to the emergence of the new “news” values: Conflict, simplification of issues, emotionalization, particularization, eventization, “horse race” electoral coverage, personalization, anti-elitism or populism, and other storytelling techniques that are readily employed by the media (Esser, 2013). Communication today is dominated by the logic of media and social media. Media logic, which refers to the process by which the media present and transmit information, the format they use, and the choices they make about “how the material is organized, the style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular behavioral characteristics, and the grammar of media communication,” (Altheide & Snow, 1979, p. 10) is becoming increasingly important. Politicians must now provide information in the real time, often without time for preparation, and journalists must produce news from hour to hour and profit from it. To attract viewers, political news must be presented attractively, and sometimes even entertainingly. During this time, new media formats for political reporting have emerged. To adapt to these changes, politicians began to use communications and marketing specialists. Consequently, the role of individual politicians grew at the expense of political parties. In the relationship between politics and the media, politics had to be reshaped. Social and political actors had to adapt to the media. This “adaptation” means an adjustment to the media’s demands for simplification of an issue, confrontation, personification, and polarization (Asp & Esaiasson, 1996, p. 81). Particular emphasis in these processes is placed on personalization which is defined as the growing importance of the individual in politics. Television in the twentieth century and new media in the twenty-first century have enforced a new style of presentation that focuses on the “tangible” personality of the candidate as opposed to abstract and complex socio-political issues (Langer, 2006; Grbeša, 2008; Poláček, 2013, pp. 16–17). In this context, Mancini and Swanson argue that: “The format of television favors personalization for formal and structural reasons. Formally, the medium favors the representation of human figures over complex institutions, such as political parties, while structurally, the medium’s commercial logic favors offering access to all candidates who can pay the cost of advertising, passing over the parties” (1996, p. 13). Leaders are now expected to be more informal and talkative, comfortable in the confessional mode, and able to reflect emotionally and be open (Langer, 2010, p. 68). For this reason, the need for personal branding and strategic management of self-presentation in politics has become even more important and necessary (Grbeša, 2004, p. 57).

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“The need for systematic and strategic communication is necessarily linked to the professionalization of communication activities at the level of availability and transparency of information and involvement of citizens, but also at the level of gaining sympathy and public support for government policies” (Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, p. 41). As Grbeša writes, the professionalization of election campaigns refers primarily to the joint use of experts from the fields of public relations, media, and marketing, who have the skills and competencies to design an election campaign strategy that meets the contemporary requirements of the media and marketing, which in turn is not available within a political party (2008, p. 33). Another phenomenon that is prevalent in contemporary political communication is populism. Although populism has been studied for decades, populism as a communication style has only recently come into the focus of many scholars (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Grbeša & Šalaj, 2018; Jost et al., 2020; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018). There are many definitions of populism, but in this chapter we rely on Jagers and Walgrave’s definition of thin populism described as “simply a strategy to mobilize support, a standard communication technique to reach out to the constituency” (2007, p. 323). In this regard, populism has no political color, it can be either left or right, and it is a political style adopted by different politicians. In the following, thin populism is understood as constantly showing closeness to the people by talking about the people, where the people can also be defined as: “(the) public,” “(the) citizen(s),” “(the) voter(s),” “(the) taxpayer(s),” “(the) resident(s),” “(the) consumer (s),” and “(the) population” (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 323). If, on the other hand, we speak of the more classical and restrictive meaning of populism, we speak of “thick populism” which consists of three elements: Reference to the people, explicit anti-establishment position, and exclusion of certain groups (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Looking at the trends of mediatization, personalization, professionalization of political marketing, and populism, we wanted to analyze these trends using the current Croatian president Zoran Milanović as an example. Zoran Milanović is one of the best known Croatian mainstream politicians who has been present in Croatian political life for more than two decades. His appearance and communication style have been the focus of media, communication, and political scientists for two decades now. In this chapter, we will compare his communication during the campaign and his presidency. The motivation for this type of research stems from the fact that Milanović built his election campaign on a negative dimension of his political image—his character. Moreover, he won the elections with this strategy despite the fact that he was not very popular when he first announced his candidacy. Furthermore, Milanović’s case is interesting because it also shows how his communication changed during the mandate. Once he stopped using his character strategically, his communication became populist, interspersed with insults and street language. Since traditional mass media, first of all television, were often accused of rendering politicians “voiceless” because journalists began to interpret and paraphrase their words, usually in a negative tone (Hallin, 1992), we also analyzed Milanović’s statements. Although these statements were taken from the traditional

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media, which means that the process of mediatization already played a role in the selection of his statements, we still consider this as direct communication. After the introductory part of this chapter where we have discussed main trends in political communication, in the following section we bring discussion about the importance of strategic communication and the role of self-presentation in the contemporary communication environment. The third section introduces our case study on Croatian President Zoran Milanović through different stages of his communication style. The fourth part of the chapter brings research design and empirical analysis. The fifth part has the results and finally last section brings discussion and conclusion.

2 Strategic Communication and Self-Presentation Many political marketing experts point out that candidates must take care of their self-presentation if they want to be successful. Their most important asset in the process of self-presentation is their political image (De Landtsheer et al., 2008, p. 218). The elements that make up an image are usually manifested through integrated communication processes that include public relations, marketing, advertising, and generally careful planning of the communication mix to create a positive image (Kesić, 2003, p. 103). Thus, strategy means tactical decisions based on the perceived advantages and disadvantages of a particular party or candidate in the eyes of potential voters in the context of elections (Šiber, 2003, p. 83). Then, “the candidate adapts his image to the existing needs and positions himself on the political market” (Šiber, 2003, p. 23). In doing so, they use strategic communication management to (re)create their political image (Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, p. 40). Strategic communication management or political impression management, described as a political marketing technique used by political actors when they want to gain more political power, implies that politicians and political parties can control the impression they make on the public (De Landtsheer et al., 2008, p. 218). The use of strategic communication has become a necessity in today’s media landscape. As a result, politicians use various techniques to create a desirable image during election campaigns (Šimunjak et al., 2017, p. 541). Some of these are highlighted in Šimunjak et al.’s (2017) study of different communication techniques used online: (1) highlighting one’s own skills and competencies (Bjerling, 2012), (2) making it personal by revealing details of one’s personal and private life (Holtz-Bacha, 2004), (3) using colloquial everyday language (Van Zoonen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000, pp. 54–55), (4) attacking opponents and going negative (Edelman, 1988), and (5) continued highlighting of certain topics (Druckman et al., 2004, p. 1183). In this context, we add another category, (6) populism, as a populist style of communication is used more and more to attract voters, especially thin populism that implies constant and persistent talk and references to “the people.” As Moffitt and Tormey say, “if it’s true that the effect of the mediatization of the political equates to a

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simplification of political discourse, its reduction to neat us-versus-them antagonisms and sound-bite solutions,” and we believe this to be the case, “then this is a milieu in which we can expect populism to flourish as a prominent and effective political style among others” (2014, p. 387). Another conception of populism that we find particularly relevant for today and specifically for our study is angry populism. Wahl-Jorgensen brings this definition saying that “angry populism—embodied by Trump—is based on rhetoric that seeks broad appeal through the deliberate expression of anger” (2018, p. 1). Analyzing 137 US newspaper articles that mentioned the word anger during the period of Barack Obama’s and Donald Trump’s inaugurations and the day after, WahlJorgensen found that 90 articles were published during the period of Trump’s inauguration, while 47 articles that included the word anger were published during the period of Obama’s inauguration. These numbers already clearly show a shift toward an emotional regime of “angry populism” represented by media discourse after Trump’s inauguration. Furthermore, Moffitt explains that negative emotions such as anger, rage, and fear are among the most important components of populist mobilization (Moffitt, 2016). However, he also points out that sometimes humor, irony, sarcasm, and cynicism are used to destabilize information spaces. Irony and sarcasm, defined as “an implicit, ambiguous statement in which the literal meaning is not the intended meaning of the speaker (Gonawela et al., 2018),” can sometimes be funny, but when they are accompanied by attacks and insults at the same time and are common in public communication, they can certainly destabilize information spaces. Populist political style often employs performative strategies (Moffitt, 2016; Önnerfors, 2020; Wodak, 2015). Some of the main features of these strategies are (a) appeals to “the people” versus “the elites”; (b) bad manners, and (c) rhetoric of constant crisis (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014, p. 382). What Moffitt and Tormey refer to as bad manners is particularly relevant and interesting in the Croatian context. They include among bad manners the use of slang, swearing, political incorrectness, and an overly demonstrative and “colorful” demeanor in contrast to the “high” behaviors of rigor, rationality, composure, and technocratic language (2014, p. 392). In the following sections, we will elaborate on the extent to which Milanović used these techniques during the campaign for the presidential election but also after his electoral victory. In terms of communication channels, Šimunjak et al. (2017) distinguish two levels of strategic image management. The first level, direct strategic image management, refers to political image management techniques applied to communication on social network sites since communication on social network sites is inherently direct, which means that it is not mediated in this context. Although content moderation processes should be considered on digital platforms, we still perceive social media communication as direct because as soon as you visit the official profiles of a politician or a party, you can see their direct messages. However, at the second level of strategic communication management, it is considered that traditional media is still an important source from which voters receive information about political candidates. Therefore, the authors talk about indirect, that is, mediatized strategic image management, which is the image created by media

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releases and mediatized statements of politicians. These statements can be filtered, taken out of context, and shaped by the intervention of journalists. By analyzing the way the media writes about politicians, it is possible to gain insight into the image politicians are trying to create and the image the media is trying to create. Sometimes the mediatized image does not necessarily correspond to the image that candidates originally wanted to achieve (Šimunjak et al., 2017, p. 544). In the context of postcommunist societies such as Croatia, the style of journalistic reporting is described as commentary rather than reporting, implying that there is a high degree of media interventionism (Šimunjak, 2014, p. 206). This is a paradigm described as a “mediacentric style of political journalism in which journalists and the media increasingly become news creators, at the expense of politicians or other social actors” (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014, pp. 217–219).

3 A Case Study in Context: Four Phases of Zoran Milanović’s Political Image Zoran Milanović is a mainstream Croatian politician who has been present in our political life since the early 2000s. He is currently the President of the Republic and is in his third year in office. Prior to that, he served one term as Prime Minister from 2011 to 2015. He was also the leader of Croatia’s leading left-wing party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), from 2007 to 2016. After his term as Prime Minister, he left politics, but not for long, as he returned to run for president. Since entering politics, he has been in the public eye, as a young, ambitious, and promising left-wing politician. He became a well-known public figure in 2007, when he was elected president of the SDP. From that moment until today, four phases of his political image can be distinguished, which overlapped with different stages of his professional career. In the first phase, during the election year 2007, Milanović had an extremely positive political image. In the second phase, during the prime minister’s term, the negative dimension of Milanović’s political image emerged, revealing his heavy character. In the third phase, during the campaign for the 2019 and early 2020 presidential elections, his image is again mostly positive, while in the fourth phase, during the presidential term, it becomes extremely negative again, this time showing that his character is not only heavy but sometimes even dangerous. In the first phase of Milanović’s image, he was perceived as an intelligent and eloquent family man, with ambitions and political will to lead the country that was groaning with problems, from the corruption that could be found at every corner, to the terrible economic situation and many unresolved post-war issues. The honeymoon did not last long, however, as he showed a different dimension to his character soon after taking office as prime minister. His communication style during this period was characterized as arrogant, insulting, confrontational, and argumentative (Lalić & Grbeša, 2015, p. 47). He was often criticized for his “arrogant and sarcastic tone, as well as the disparaging and often insulting content of his statements”

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(Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, p. 42). The prime minister’s peculiar communication style, his distance from the citizens, and the poor economic results of the Croatian government contributed to the record low rating received by any government in Croatian history (Lalić & Grbeša, 2015, p. 47). According to the results of the survey conducted by the Ipsos Puls agency, the average rating of the Government in November 2014 was 2.1. Compared to the party’s rating of 30% in 2007, when Milanović had just taken over the leadership of the SDP, during the Kukuriku coalition, the popularity of the Social Democratic Party in November 2014 almost halved with a rating of 17.5% (ibid.). Milanović and the SDP did not recover from their unpopularity and lost the 2015 parliamentary elections as well as the 2016 early elections. The wrong strategy Milanović pursued in the campaign this time, flirting with right-wing voters, left him without the votes of left-wing voters, who preferred to stay home on election day rather than vote for him. Although Milanović was re-elected SDP leader, he left politics after the electoral defeat in mid-2016, working for a short time as a consultant, before returning to politics in June 2019, when he announced that he would run as the Social Democratic Party’s candidate for president in the 2019–20 elections. This official announcement marks the beginning of the third phase of his political and communication image. The details of the third and fourth phases of his image are discussed in the empirical section of this chapter.

4 Empirical Analysis In this part of the analysis, we aimed to examine Zoran Milanović’s communication during the presidential campaign and during his time in the presidential office. In doing so, we sought to answer three research questions: RQ1: How did Zoran Milanović strategically manage his character in the 2019–2020 presidential campaign? In this context, we also proposed a sub-research question: SRQ1: How did the most popular online portals report on Milanović’s character during the campaign? Second, we analyzed whether he used a populist communication style during the campaign and also during the presidency. The related research questions are as follows: RQ2: Was Milanović’s communication during the presidential campaign populist? RQ3: How did Milanović communicate during the second year of his presidency? Was his communication populist? To answer these questions, we conducted a qualitative and quantitative content analysis. The qualitative content analysis was conducted on Milanović’s official communication channels that were active during the presidential campaign in order to answer the first research question. To answer the first sub-research question, quantitative content analysis was conducted on 90 articles published on online portals during the election campaign. To answer the second and third question,

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Table 1 Sample and period Research questions RQ1: How did Zoran Milanović strategically manage his character in the 2019–2020 presidential campaign? SRQ1: How did the most popular online portals report about Milanović’s character during the campaign? RQ2: Was Milanović’s communication during the presidential campaign populist? RQ3: How did Milanović communicate during the second year of his presidency? Was his communication populist?

Method Qualitative content analysis Quantitative content analysis

Sample Different communication channels (official web page, official social media channels. . .) 90 articles published on the most popular Croatian news portals

Quantitative content analysis

67 statements derived from the news articles

Quantitative content analysis

36 statements derived from the news articles in which he attacks someone

Period June 2020— January 2021 (presidential campaign) June 2020— January 2021 (presidential campaign) June 2020— January 2021 (presidential campaign) January 2021— December 2021 (second year in presidential office)

content analysis was conducted on 67 Milanović’s statements during the election campaign and 37 statements from the second year of his presidency (Table 1). To answer the first research question, we analyzed the content of various communication channels used in Milanović’s campaign, including official websites, official social media profiles, traditional media, outdoor campaigns, and other channels used for communication and marketing purposes. To answer the first sub-question, articles published on four leading news portals in Croatia—Vecernji. hr, Jutarnji.hr, Index.hr, and Tportal.hr—were analyzed. The subject of the analysis were all articles that contained the keywords “Zoran Milanović” and “character.” The selection left 90 articles for content analysis. The coding sheet in this part of research consisted of three main questions: where was the article published, in which week of the campaign, and what was the tone of the article toward Milanović’s character (positive, negative, neutral). To answer the second research question, 67 statements made by Milanović during the election campaign period were analyzed. The statements were derived from the sample of the previously selected 90 articles. In these statements we were looking at the three main elements of populism: populism refers to the people, represents antiestablishment ideas, and simultaneously excludes certain populations (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 322). We coded each statement for the presence or absence of references to the people, the presence of anti-elitist ideas and mentions of “dangerous others” or categories that should be excluded. To answer the third research question, we analyzed 36 selected social media posts and statements published in mainstream media in which Milanović attacks someone or something. Statements were derived from the articles that contained word “attack”

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and “President Milanović,” from the same portals as in the previous sample, but this time including Tportal.hr., another portal with great readership. Moreover, most of the statements included in our sample could also be found in the article published on Tportal.hr. in which Milanović’s attacks in 2022 were listed.1 Milanović’s communication is perceived as very negative, insulting, rude, and inappropriate, especially considering the position he holds. This is also the perception of many Croatian communication specialists, academics, and journalists. To demonstrate this with some headlines: “Whether Milanović was right or not, his communication is over the line”2; “Milanović has difficulty with self-control and it is not difficult to imagine him dealing physically with someone”3; “Professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences: Milanović’s communication in literature is defined as angry populism.”4 For this reason we selected for the analysis only statements in which he already attacks someone, as our intention was to look at specific characteristics of his communication style. Following, the coding book applied to answer the third research question consisted of 13 exclusive categories. The categories were divided into four parts related to attacks, populism, emotions, and stylistic figures. Our first classification began by looking for negative statements in which he confronts someone. These confrontations were coded as attacks on other people, groups, institutions, media, and policy attacks, as we wanted to distinguish between different targets of Milanović’s attacks. Similarly, Gonawela Andre et al. (2018, p. 305), in their analysis of the presence of populism in tweets by different politicians, coded those tweets as confrontations that were negative, antagonistic, and used rhetorical figures such as hyperboles and oxymorons. Another category adopted from the work of Gonawela et al. is insults, which we define as “an attack specifically on the characteristics of a person or a group rather than on a policy or position they support” (2018, pp. 306–307). Next, we examined the aforementioned three main elements of populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007, p. 322).

Brkulj, V. (2021) ‘[VIDEO] Milanović je u 2021. ‘častio’ sve i svakoga: Prisjetite se tko su bili politički beskućnik, eskort dama, provincijalni hejter, herojski zec, udbaški druker, Superhik, premijerov batler. . .’, tportal.hr, December 28. Available at: https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/ zoran-milanovic-predsjednik-uvrede-u-2021-foto-20211228 (Accessed: September 14, 2022). 2 N1 Hrvatska (2022) ‘N1 komentar: Bio Milanović u pravu ili ne, komunikacija je prevršila svaku mjeru’, n1info.hr, October 25. Available at: https://n1info.hr/n1-komentar/n1-komentarmilanoviceva-komunikacija-prevrsila-je-svaku-mjeru/ (Accessed: September 14, 2022). 3 Kišiček, G. (2022) ‘Velika analiza stručnjakinje: “Milanović se teško kontrolira i nije teško zamisliti...’“, dnevnik.hr, April 22. Available at: https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/jesmo-lidotaknuli-dno-politicke-i-govornicke-kulture%2D%2D-720804.html (Accessed: September 26, 2022). 4 Novilist.hr. (2021) ‘Profesorica s Fakulteta političkih znanosti: ‘Milanovićeva komunikacija u literaturi se definira kao bijesni populizam’’, novilist.hr, December 27. Available at: https://www. novilist.hr/novosti/hrvatska/profesorica-s-fakulteta-politickih-znanosti-milanovicevakomunikacija-u-literaturi-se-definira-kao-bijesni-populizam/ (Accessed: September 17, 2022). 1

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We also analyzed Milanović’s statements for the presence or absence of certain stylistic figures such as sarcasm, irony, or mockery. In addition, we coded his statements for the presence of humor to determine whether he used positive emotions, namely, humor, or whether he predominantly used irony and sarcasm, which are considered negative strategies that can negatively affect society in general, as they lead to cynicism and apathy. Another commonly used communication technique is labelling or name-calling. Labelling has been defined as “the attaching of a descriptive adjective or invective to a person or group” (ibid). Among the many labels Donald Trump has given to dozens of people, one of the most famous is “crooked” for Hillary Clinton. Further, according to the IPA, name-calling occurs when “the propagandist invokes hatred or fear by attaching unattractive labels ‘to those individuals, groups, nations, races, policies, practices, beliefs and ideals which he would have us condemn and reject’” (Sproule, 2001, p. 136). We also analyzed how frequently negative emotional appeals appeared in the statements, particularly anger, fear, and anxiety. Since populist communication style is often associated with anger (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018) we wanted to see if Milanović’s statements could be related to the concept of angry populism. To sum up, quantitative content analysis was conducted by using three different codebooks. First codebook was designed to analyze 90 news articles to answer first sub-RQ. It consisted of three categories and 12 values: (1) where was the article published (1. Vecernji.hr, 2. Jutarnji.hr, 3. Index.hr, or 4. Tportal.hr), (2) in which week of the campaign (1. First week, 2. Second week, 3. Third week, or 4. Fourth week), and (3) what was the tone of the article toward Milanović’s character (1. Positive, 2. Negative, 3. Neutral, or 4. Hard to tell). The second codebook was designed to analyze 67 statements derived from news articles and it contained three categories: presence or absence of references to the people, the presence of antielitist ideas and mentions of “dangerous others” or categories that should be excluded. We used binary codes “yes” or “no,” to detect the presence or absence of populist cues in Milanović’s statements. The third codebook consisted of 13 categories designed to analyze Milanović’s communication in the second year in the office. The codebook was applied on 36 statements derived from the news articles in which he attacks someone. Binary codes “yes” and “no” were used to code different elements of Milanović’s communication. The categories were divided into four parts. The first part was related to attacks where we had four exclusive categories: (1) attacks on other people, (2) on institutions, (3) media, and (4) policy attacks. In the second part of the codebook we proposed three questions about the presence or absence of three different populist cues: (1) references to the people, (2) anti-elitist ideas, and (3) mentions of “dangerous others.” The third part contained categories that had to reveal if (1) emotions of anger and/or (2) anxiety were present in his statements. Further, four categories related to stylistic figures and propaganda techniques were included in the codebook: (1) presence of mockery, irony, or sarcasm in the statement, (2) presence of humor in the statement, (3) presence of propaganda technique name calling, and (4) presence of insults.

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A pilot analysis was conducted for the third codebook on 20 randomly chosen statements. The results of pilot analysis pointed that two categories originally included in the codebook are not relevant for the researched sample. Following, these two categories: presence of emotions of enthusiasm and presence of nationalistic references were excluded from the codebook. Furthermore, to test the validity in terms of accuracy in coding, an intercoder reliability test was conducted for all three samples and codebooks. Reliability or “reproducibility” refers to the idea that different people should be able to code the text in the same way, using the same coding book (Weber, 1990, p. 17). The intercoder reliability test was conducted by using the Holsti method for agreement (1969) on 30 articles (out of 90), 20 statements (out of 67), and on the 18 statements for the third codebook (out of 36 statements). The results for the first codebook showed the average reliability score of 0.96 with a variance in reliability across categories ranging from 0.90 to 1.00. Results of the second test showed the average reliability of 0.88 with a variance in reliability across categories ranging from 0.80 to 1.00. Agreement between coders in the third codebook was varying between 0.77 and 1.00, with an average score of 0.91.

5 Results In the first part of this section, we present the results of the analysis of the communication channels and techniques used to strategically manage Zoran Milanović’s character in the presidential campaign. The second part attempts to answer how Croatian online news portals reported on Milanović’s character during the election campaign. The third part looks at the elements of populism in Milanović’s communication during the election campaign and in the second year of his presidential term.

5.1

Strategic Communication of Zoran Milanović

Channels and Tactics The results of the qualitative content analysis of the different channels Milanović used during the election campaign showed that he used almost all available channels to spread his messages: Television, radio, print media, online portals, outdoor spaces (city lights, jumbo posters), and social media. Although he also used traditional advertising channels, given the variety of online platforms used in the campaign, it can be said that Milanović ran a digital

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presidential campaign. He had two official websites (www.zoranmilanovic.hr and www.normalno.hr) and official profiles on Flickr, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. He used them in different intensity and for different purposes, but he was aware of the possibilities and tools that social network sites offer. All of his channels included the campaign’s logo and visual identity with the slogan: “Normal” or “President with Character.” The consistent use of the slogans and logo was a testament to the professionalism of the campaign. With incumbent President Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, who was his main opponent, losing credibility with her own communication failures and with the burden of HDZ5 affairs on her back, Milanović built his advantage by focusing on Grabar-Kitarović’s weakness. Moreover, Grabar-Kitarović’s general slogan “because Croatia knows” did not help her, but it did help Milanović look even more “characterful.” Milanović’s official campaign website included all key campaign messages, visual identity, but also a blog with 50 texts published during the campaign. In addition to strategic character management, Milanović used this blog as a public relations tool, mainly to convey information about the campaign and, in this sense, to mirror traditional offline promotion strategies. Content and visual identity were consistent across all channels, including social media. Milanović’s campaign invested most of its campaign funds in online advertising (Izbori.hr., 2020). His main social media platform was Facebook, where he also announced that he would run for president. During the campaign he published 331 posts on Facebook compared to 142 posts on Instagram. How consistent he remained with “staying on-message” is illustrated by the fact that he mentioned the word “character” 145 times in his Facebook posts and 20 times on his Instagram account. The results of the analysis of the communication channels used in Zoran Milanović’s presidential campaign support the thesis that politicians increasingly turn to campaigns on social network sites and use them for self-promotion, emphasizing their qualifications and achievements (Svensson, 2012, pp. 183–185). Milanović used his social network sites to manage his political image by (1) highlighting selected statements in interviews to discredit his main opponent Grabar Kitarović and her party, the HDZ, but also to (2) control what image of him is projected by the media by publishing content that can positively influence his political image. Considering that the word “character” appears in all communication channels and published content, it can be said that Milanović, by constantly repeating this word, set the theme of the election—do you have character or not—alluding to the “lack of character” of other presidential candidates, especially the main opponent Grabar— Kitarović.

5

(HDZ stands for The Croatian Democratic Union, a major center-right political party in Croatia).

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“Staying on-Message” The results of the qualitative content analysis also showed that the most frequently used technique of strategic character management in Milanović’s presidential campaign was the constant highlighting of certain issues. With this technique, Milanović tried to distinguish himself from other candidates and send positive signals about himself. The predominant themes were: (1) character as a key characteristic of the president and a true leader, (2) the unfavorable atmosphere in Croatian society at the social, economic, and moral levels caused by the deep-rooted corruption of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and its members, and (3) the degradation of the president’s function. The constant highlighting of the aforementioned issues was often used in combination with the technique of attacking the opponent, for example, Milanović wrote in his announcements, referring to the incumbent president and his main opponent Grabar-Kitarović: “We have a president without character, a president without identity and qualities, a president who puts us in bad company and shames us.” Using the technique of emphasizing his own virtues, abilities, and successes, Milanović tried to present himself in the best possible light by emphasizing the importance of experience and knowledge as his main advantages.

5.2

Media Reporting about Milanović’s Character

In this part of the analysis, we conducted a quantitative analysis of news articles published on the four leading Croatian news portals, Vecernji.hr, Jutarnji.hr, Index. hr, and Tportal.hr, during the election campaign, from the day Milanović announced his candidacy on June 17, 2019, until the second round of the election on January 4, 2020. These four online portals were selected based on their readership. Tportal. hr. and Index.hr. are independent Internet portals published only in electronic form, while Vecernji.hr. and Jutarnji.hr. are offshoots of the most popular Croatian daily newspapers, Večernji list and Jutarnji list. The analysis included articles about the character of Zoran Milanović’s character that explicitly contained the keywords “Zoran Milanović” and “character.” Ads and visitor comments were not included in the analysis. The final sample included 90 articles. The results of the analysis showed that the predominant tone of the articles reporting on Milanović’s character was positive, present in 58%, of the articles, while a negative tone was present in 28% of the articles studied and 14% of the articles were neutral. The results also showed the trend in the general tone of the articles (Graph 1). In the first month after the announcement of Milanović’s presidential candidacy, the difference between the positive and negative tone in media coverage was only 4%, with 16% of articles being neutral. Toward the end of the election campaign, the difference between positive and negative tone became much larger, with 25% of articles being positive and 11% negative. In addition to the trend

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45 40 35 30

Neutral tone Positive tone

25 Negative tone 20

15 10

Total number of analyzed articles Linear (Neutral tone)

5

Linear (Positive tone)

0

Linear (Negative tone)

Graph 1 Tendency of the general tone in the media coverage of the analyzed articles on four leading electronic portals during Milanović’s presidential election campaign in 2019

in the general tone of media coverage of Milanović’s character, the analysis also revealed that his character was the focus of attention especially in the last month of the campaign, December and the first days of January, when almost 50% of all articles mentioning the character were published. Another 30% of all articles in which the word character appears were published in the first month of the campaign in June and July. The articles with a predominantly neutral tone about Milanović’s character were mainly polls, short news items, and articles in which positive and negative tones were equally represented. Since Zoran Milanović’s character was most often portrayed as something that should be controlled, articles with a positive tone usually referred to him “managing to control his character” or that “he has shown a high degree of self-control.” The category with positive tone also coded articles in which, for example, someone publicly supported Milanović. Looking at Milanović’s own statements about his character, it is clear that he was aware that his character was simultaneously his Achilles’ heel, but also his greatest asset. More than once he said that he had a “damn” character: “For six months I have been speaking clearly and loudly, without compromise, with this damn character, completely honest, unlike the person I am competing with,”6 or (2) “I will fight until my last breath. I have had Polšak Palatinuš, V. (2020) ‘Grabar Kitarović i Milanović više od dva sata vadili kosture iz ormara, od Bandića preko Sanadera do Lozančića. Složili se samo oko jedne stvari – Srbije’, tportal.hr, January 3. Available at: https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/uzivo-grabar-kitarovicstigla-na-suceljavanje-sve-je-spremno-za-konacni-obracun-foto-20200103 (Accessed: July 24, 2020). 6

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more important positions, that’s the truth, but I am the same. I have knowledge, experience and my damn character.”7 The negative tone in media coverage about Zoran Milanović’s character was most present when writing about his tenure as Prime Minister and the so-called “Zoranisms.” This is a term coined by Croatian journalists to refer to Zoran Milanović’s statements, which provoked divided reactions among the Croatian public. Journalist and Index.hr. columnist Gordan Duhaček once wrote that Milanović “is too convinced that everything that comes out of his mouth is pure gold, so there is a term ‘Zoranism’ for his babbling and non-sequiturs.”8 The negative dimension in the coverage of Milanović’s character was often present in two other contexts: (1) when it came to his failure to curb his “quarrelsome” nature: “The SDP presidential candidate and former prime minister is known for his difficult nature and quarrelsome temperament. (. . .) Milanović promotes himself as a ‘president with character’, but at the head of the armed forces and as a co-creator of foreign policy, it is not very desirable to have an arrogant hothead,”9 and (2) when media coverage would convey mostly negative statements of Milanović’s political opponents, such as the one made by the President of Croatian Parliament at that time, Gordan Jandroković: “A president with character is such that he is mocked even in Prnjavor.”10 In the third part of the analysis, we wanted to investigate whether the main elements of populism are present in Milanović’s statements—references to the people, anti-elitism (attacks on the establishment), and mention of dangerous others. We also examined whether Milanović uses insults in his statements. The results of the quantitative content analysis of 67 Milanović statements extracted from the sample of 90 articles about his character showed that he referred to the people in 35 out of 67 statements studied (52%). Six times he referred to people using the word folks (in Croatian narod), seven times as citizens, two times as voters, and as many as 20 times by the word people (ljudi). Nineteen times he attacked the establishment, mainly the Croatian Democratic Party (HDZ), and 11 times he attacked other candidates, mainly Kolinda Grabar Kitarović (in 10 statements). He did not mention “dangerous others” even once, and he did not insult anyone in his statements. Based on these results, we can conclude that Milanović’s communication strategy was to

Index.hr. (2020) ‘Milanović: Datum izbora je sramota, puno ljudi neće glasati jer će kuhati sarmu’, index.hr, November 15. Available at: https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/milanovic-datum-izboraje-sramota-puno-ljudi-nece-glasati-jer-ce-kuhati-sarmu/2132447.aspx (Accessed: July 24, 2020). 8 Index.hr. (2020) ‘Imamo 11 predsjedničkih kandidata. Ovo su njihovi plusevi i minusi’, index.hr, December 14. Available at: https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/imamo-11-predsjednickihkandidata-ovo-su-njihovi-plusevi-i-minusi/2139094.aspx (Accessed: July 24, 2020). 9 Indeks.hr. (2020) ‘Koji predsjednički kandidat vam je najočajniji?’, index.hr, July 14. Available at: https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/koji-predsjednicki-kandidat-vam-jenajocajniji/2099565.aspx (Accessed: July 24, 2020). 10 Romić, T. (2019) ‘Predsjednik s karakterom je takav da mu se rugaju čak i u Prnjavoru’, vecernji. hr, December 16. Available at: https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/predsjednik-s-karakterom-je-takavda-mu-se-rugaju-cak-i-u-prnjavoru-1366717 (Accessed: July 24, 2020). 7

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some extent characterized by thin populism, as he obviously referred to the “people” (ljudi) frequently in order to get closer to his voters. Here we see the elements of Jagers and Walgrave’s definition mentioned above, who describe “thin populism” as “simply a strategy to mobilize support, a standard communication technique to reach out to the constituency” (2007, p. 323). In summary, Milanović’s communication during the presidential campaign was well organized and carefully strategically managed. He used almost all available channels and techniques to cultivate his image and turn his greatest weakness, his character, into his greatest advantage. Media coverage of his character showed that his communication strategy had positive effects, as articles about his character just before election day were mostly positive. Content analysis of his statements showed that some elements of populism were present in his campaign, but that they were also carefully managed, making sure that everyone knew that populism was not his thing. On one occasion he said “There is no trust in the judiciary in Croatia, people (ljudi) are exposed to violence, we have been observing this for 30 years. As head of state, I will do the following: without populism, I will point out problems and injustice. . .”.11

5.3

Fourth Phase: Milanović’s Image during his Second Year in the Presidential Office

“Without populism” was one of Milanović’s election promises. We tried to find out whether he kept this promise by examining his statements during the second year of his term. His communication during the presidential term is often described as contentious and far below the standards associated with the office of the president. A very obvious and widely recognized feature of his communication has been the constant attacks on literally everyone and everything. This was one of the main reasons why in this part of the analysis we only considered statements in which he was already attacking someone. We wanted to examine in more detail what strategies are contained in these statements and whether he uses elements of populism. The quantitative analysis of 36 statements showed that he referred to the people in more than 66% of the statements studied (Table 2). He rarely mentioned “dangerous others,” doing so in only four statements, while anti-establishment messages or contrasting people with elites were present in 16% of the statements studied. This suggests that populism in this case was again defined only as thin populism. However, in a deeper analysis, we find he may not have used the main elements of

Jutarnji.hr. (2019) ‘VIDEO: ZORAN MILANOVIĆ U TVORNICI ODRŽAO PRVI PREDIZBORNI SKUP ‘Moj karakter nekad satire moja leđa kao mlinski kamen, ali bez karaktera nema ničega’‘, jutarnji.hr, November 9. Available at: https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/ video-zoran-milanovic-u-tvornici-odrzao-prvi-predizborni-skup-moj-karakter-nekad-satire-mojaleda-kao-mlinski-kamen-ali-bez-karaktera-nema-nicega-9592531 (Accessed: September 16, 2022). 11

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Table 2 Results of the quantitative content analysis of Milanović’s statements

Communication strategies and techniques Populism

Attacks

Stylistic figures Propaganda techniques Emotional appeals

Categories References to people Dangerous others Contrasting people with elites (antielitism and anti-establishment messages) Individuals/character Policy attacks Institutions Media Mockery, irony, sarcasm Humor Name calling/labeling Insults Anger Anxiety/fear

In office— year 2021 (N = 36) % 66.66 11.11 22.22

94.44 63.88 61.11 19.44 83.33 30.55 88.88 88.88 88.88 9

Election campaign—years 2019–2020 (N = 67) % 52.23 0 28.35

16.43

0

populism in his communication, but he definitely used communication strategies and techniques that are often used by populists. The first of these techniques is attacks. In our sample, Milanović attacked everyone and everything. The target of his attacks were individuals, in 94% of the studied statements, institutions in 61% of the studied statements, and attacks on specific policies in 63% of the statements. In 19% of the statements examined, he attacked the media, and these attacks were mainly directed at the public media, Croatian Radiotelevision, which he accused of serving Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković. As for the emotions studied, anger and fear, it appears that anger was present in 94% of the statements studied. Fear and anxiety were present in 25% of all statements studied. It is also interesting to note that he used the stylistic devices of irony (mockery and sarcasm) very frequently (in 83% of the 36 statements studied). Another stylistic device, but also a propaganda technique, name-calling or labeling, occurred in 89% of the statements studied. He always insulted and labeled with the intention of offending someone. Some examples of the use of name-calling and insults for various groups of people, such as politicians, writers, journalists, political scientists, etc., are the following: Gordan Jandroković, Speaker of the Croatian Parliament—Njonjo, multi-purpose sycophant, confused, security illiterate fićfirić’, little Gogo, butler of the Prime Minister; Vedrana Rudan, writer—semi-literate, vulgar scribble; Žarko Puhovski, political analyst—Udba’s traitor (druker); Vladimir Šeks—Čingli Lingi Superhik Sova Šeks; Boris Dežulović, columnist—Ragnar for poor people, provincial hater; Prime Minister Andrej Plenković—Plenkošenko, creeping state boa

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constrictor (puzajući državni udav), proven heroic rabbit, communist offspring; Minister Banožić—cigarette butt, little Bane, criminal, walking incident, Gabika’s buddy, corrupted lunatic, Pokemon collector; Dejan Jović, political scientist and member of the SDSS party—Pupovac’s escort, insignificant informer (sitni doušnik), Minister Grlić Radman—cheeky hypocrite who changes clothes faster than Batman, Spiderman, and Superman combined; Dalija Orešković i Marijana Puljak, members of parliament—wailing old ladies (narikače). As mentioned earlier, when referring to the people, he used different words, such as citizens, Croats, people, voters, or citizens of Croatia, as in the following example: Nothing new, Plenković was scared. Proven heroic rabbit. This morning he was heroic and threatened to impeach the President of the Republic, and now he hides behind the Bridge (political party Most). Obviously, he does not give a single answer to the questions I asked him, to the questions to which the citizens of Croatia are also looking for answers. . . .12

These examples and results show that Milanović’s communication after coming to power is completely different from his communication during the presidential campaign. During the campaign, his communication was strategic, he stuck to his message, used all available channels and techniques, and carefully avoided populism. Although he attacked his opponents, especially the incumbent president Kolinda Grabar Kitarović, he was careful not to cross the line, attacking his opponents in 16% of the statements studied during the election campaign (N = 67). He never used insults, and in half of his statements he referred to “people.” During his tenure, Milanović’s communication changed significantly in the studied period. He started to attack everything and everyone, used street language, name calling, and insults. He often referred to “people.” Another important feature of his communication is the emotional appeal of anger, which was present in almost all the studied statements. Milanović was angry at someone or something in most of his statements.

6 Discussion and Conclusion With this research we have tried to answer three main research questions and one sub-research question. In the empirical part of the chapter, we decided to conduct the analysis on the case of the incumbent Croatian President Zoran Milanović. Milanović was particularly interesting for the study of several trends in political communication: mediatization, strategic communication management, personalization and self-mediatization, and populism. As one of the long-time mainstream

Jutarnji.hr. (2021) ‘Milanović: Dokazani herojski zec jutros se junačio, a sad se skriva iza Mosta. Nema dovoljno žetona. . .’, jutarnji.hr, March 29. Available at: https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/ hrvatska/milanovic-dokazani-herojski-zec-jutros-se-junacio-a-sad-se-skriva-iza-mosta-nemadovoljno-zetona-15061786 (Accessed: September 14, 2022).

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politicians in Croatia, whose communication style and public image changed several times, we wanted to find out how he communicated during the presidential campaign and while in office.

6.1

The Strategy Worked!: Milanović Won!

We then conducted a qualitative and quantitative content analysis to answer the first research and sub-research question: How did Zoran Milanović strategically manage his character during the 2019–2020 presidential campaign? And how did the most popular online portals report on Milanović’s character during the campaign? The results of this part of the analysis show that Milanović successfully managed his character by using various communication channels and techniques. In terms of channels, he relied heavily on online platforms, websites, and social media, but also on traditional media and other available marketing channels (e.g., posters). On all of the channels, the campaign’s visual identity was strongly present with the campaign’s logo and slogans. The content of his messages was created with the goal of turning his greatest weakness—his character—into his greatest asset. He used his character to portray himself as a suitable political actor for the presidency. To achieve this, he used strategic communication management techniques, such as emphasizing his own abilities and virtues, attacking his opponent, and maintaining and highlighting certain themes. In his media appearances, he was always calm, “managing his character,” staying on point, and repeating themes that were important to him. That Milanović was aware of the need for systematic and strategic communication is best seen by comparing his attitude toward the field of public relations during his tenure as prime minister and during his presidential campaign. At an extraordinary press conference on March 18, 2013 (Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, p. 44), Milanović openly said “that he did not care too much about the practice of public relations: ‘They even wrote something for me on paper, but I never read that. Not because they do not do their job well, but because I do not believe in such things’” (Grbeša-Zenzerović, 2014, p. 42). However, almost 7 years later, before the second presidential debate ahead of the second round of presidential elections, Zoran Milanović is reading “the papers” with his election headquarters spokesman, Nikola Jelić, in the photo published in a Facebook post on January 2, 2020. Furthermore, the answer to the related sub-research question would be that most popular Croatian news portals reported positively on Milanović’s character, which was a big change from the way they reported on his character when he was prime minister, when they even coined the term “Zoranisms” for his statements. Accordingly, his mediatized image was very similar to what he wanted to achieve with his self-representation. With the second research question, we wanted to find out whether there were traces of populism in his communication during the election campaign. The results of the content analysis of 67 statements in which we examined references to people, references to dangerous others, and anti-elitism and anti-establishment messages

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showed that the so-called thin populism was present in his communication to some extent, as half of his statements contained references to people. Another element of populism, anti-establishment messages, was present in 28% of all statements studied, while references to dangerous others did not appear in his statements. The results also showed that he used attacks very carefully and never insulted anyone.

6.2

Angry Populism: Riding on Insults through the Second Year of the Presidency

Finally, the third research question was: how did Milanović communicate during the second year of his presidency? Was his communication populist? Everyone was curious about how Milanović would communicate and behave if he won the elections. We did not have to wait long to see his new/old face: argumentative, insulting, populist, over the top in every way. Since his communication was already described as negative and often aggressive, we subsequently decided to analyze statements in which he attacks someone or something. The results showed that there are traces of populism in his communication, as he referred to the people in more than 66% of the statements studied. Other elements of populism such as dangerous others and anti-elitism were rarely present. However, in the sample studied, he used many other communication strategies that are also associated with populism. Primarily, these are the emotional appeal of anger, sarcasm, and the propaganda technique of name-calling. In combination with allusions to the people, anger, sarcasm, and irony, followed by the propaganda technique name-calling and insults, makes Milanović’s communication populist. With his sarcastic tone, mockery, and irony, he wants to appear as a fan and close to the people. He does so by often referring to them as “the people.” However, when he uses name-calling and insults so often, he usually crosses the line and communicates completely inappropriately for a state president. The results of the opinion polls conducted among Croatian citizens for Nova TV in February 2022 showed that after 2 years in office, the president’s communication style received a score of 2.9 from the citizens surveyed. Interestingly, younger voters liked his communication style better than older voters (Nova Tv/IPSOS/ February 2022./600/ +,-4%). In summary, Milanović’s current communication style is based on a performative style that manifests itself in scandalous insults to everyone. Although Milanović entertained the nation for a while with his political style based on rude, bombastic, and angry, but often creative insults, his communication drenched in anger, cynicism, and mockery can have far-reaching consequences, as such negative communication can lead to corrosive cynicism and apathy among citizens. Moreover, as Gil and Brea point out, it can also lead to polarization: “threatening and selfcongratulatory humor that triggers collective emotional shockwaves and becomes an aggressive, irreverent weapon to discredit and ridicule the opponents while rallying large audiences in highly polarized scenarios” (Gil & Brea, 2021). Although

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he has tried to justify his style as something necessary to be heard, saying that even his mother does not like how he communicates,13 but that he just has to use that style for everyone to hear him, in our opinion, this is just a lousy attempt to present himself as a fighter for the truth, a fighter against injustice and the corrupt HDZ government. With this strategy, he simply wants to attract all those who are not satisfied with HDZ and all those who do not like Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković. According to the results of the latest Crobarometer that pool is big, because 63% of all respondents surveyed said that they do not support the work of the government. Zoran Milanović’s communication pattern in his 2019–2020 presidential campaign differed significantly from the communication pattern that characterized his tenure as prime minister mandate, and the current presidential mandate. Milanović has shown that he can keep his character under control, even during elections when there is high intensity, but he still has not shown that he can keep his character and communication style under control in the long run. On the contrary, his communication during the presidential term has further deteriorated compared to that during the prime ministerial term, as he has entered the realm of angry populism and selfscandalization. Future research should focus more on studying populism and self-scandalization among mainstream politicians who are present in political life for a longer time. Zoran Milanović in this context can serve as an excellent case study also for future research designs which should include discourse analysis and focus specifically on emotional dimension of communication, role of anger, use of sarcasm, and irony in communication. Followed with the analysis of non-verbal communication, we believe new insights into the phenomenon of angry populism and self-scandalization could be gained.

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13 Vecernji.hr. (2022) ‘Milanović otkrio što njegova majka misli o tome kako komunicira: Mogu je razumijeti, ali . . .’, vecernji.hr, May 1. Available at: https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/milanovicotkrio-sto-njegova-majka-misli-o-tome-kako-komunicira-mogu-je-razumijeti-ali-1583072 (Accessed: September 16, 2022).

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But some Scandals Are more Scandalous than Others: A Dissent Management Analysis of Trump’s Unacceptable Access Hollywood Comments Juan Pablo Cannata

Abstract The rise of new right-wing populism presents a challenge as the continual violation of established social values can be profitable for the transgressor. The discourse of anti-politics or opposition to political correctness produces a deliberate employment of provocation and scandal for strategic purposes. This paradox requires clarification. The article examines the mechanisms of consensus and dissent through the 2016 Trump Access Hollywood Tape Scandal (AHTS) as a “public discourse scandal.” The research approach adopts the perspective of the accused to enhance the understanding of populism and scandal. This viewpoint utilizes a theory of dissent management (Elizalde, 2009, 2017) and René Girard’s sacrificial victim theory (1986, 2006) to distinguish more clearly between scandals and other types of dissent. It also allows for a more precise description and understanding of the characteristics and mechanisms of such events. Following a detailed case presentation, the study analyzes how Trump’s campaign handled the scandal, blocked dissent, and survived allegations and criticism. It identifies individual and contextual factors while highlighting the advantages and disadvantages for Trump. Additionally, the chapter discusses the implications for the quality of public discourse.

This research was financed by the European Union, through the Project TED2021-130876B-I00: LA CIBERSEGURIDAD EN LOS PROCESOS ELECTORALES. GARANTÍAS FRENTE A LA DESINFORMACIÓN Y OTROS DESÓRDENES INFORMATIVOS EN PLATAFORMAS (Agencia Estatal de Investigación, Kingdom of Spain). J. P. Cannata (✉) School of Communications at Universidad Austral, Buenos Aires, Argentina School of Communications Sciences at Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_4

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1 New Right-Wing Populism Challenges Scandalogy Although Scandalogy has become a consolidated field of study in recent years (Haller et al., 2018), there are still important questions that need to be clarified, especially when the social position of the accused is taken into account. In this regard, Weeber (2009) postulates the need to lay sociological foundations that go beyond empirical details to give Scandalogy greater depth. Thus, he emphasizes the importance of going further than factual accounts to explain the mechanisms and characteristics of scandal. The context of new right-wing populism (e.g., Trump in the USA, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Johnson in the United Kingdom, Vox in Spain, Milei in Argentina) presents a particular problem: constant discursive transgression of accepted social values generates a gain for the transgressor. A strategic use of provocation and scandal is produced by the discourse of anti-politics or the confrontation with political correctness. In this regard, populism and polarization raise a new set of questions and potential for confusion. At first glance, for example, the 2016 US presidential campaign has been full of scandals. But to paraphrase Orwell’s masterful formula about equality, some scandals are more scandalous than others. Right-wing populism poses a challenge for scandalogists, because in a first approach there is a disposition to understand opposite social situations as scandals, and therefore the terminological ambiguity also includes a difficulty to establish an adequate assessment of the phenomenon and, from the perspective of scandal management, an adequate defensive response. While it is evident that controversies and polemics of varying degrees continue to proliferate in public discourse, sometimes the logic of discursive exchange is no more transcendent than the optics and tactics surrounding a given issue. At other times, it creates a stir without structurally attacking the reputation or moral identity of the transgressor. Therefore, from the perspective of the accused, it is not a good theoretical solution to label as a scandal, situations of dissent that involve such different risks for the defendant and require very divergent responses. For example, a situation that can be used strategically by the accused to rally his supporters or a process with a lot of public noise but very low risk for the accused cannot seriously affect his reputation, but these are frequently described as scandals. In this sense, the perspectives of the management of dissent (Elizalde, 2017) and the management of scandal present the need to give different labels to different situations of dissent of different gravity, with reference to the social position of the accused. This article, then, aims to deepen our understanding of populism and scandal by analyzing the mechanisms of consensus and dissent through the 2016 Access Hollywood Tape Scandal (AHTS), also known as “Pussygate,” assuming the position of the accused. To achieve this purpose, the following research questions are proposed: How can we differentiate between the scandal and other types of dissent? In the case of AHTS, which mechanisms trigger dissent, and which mitigate public

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criticism to deactivate the destructive threat of scandal? What lessons can be drawn from this case as insights for scandal management? To answer these questions, we will first distinguish theoretically between public outrage and actual risk as a determining element to recognize a scandal, through the proposals of Scandalogy, Luciano Elizalde’s theory of dissent, and René Girard’s mimetic theory. Then, the critical elements of the AHTS will be analyzed in detail and the mechanisms of that case will be described. And, finally, the results of the case study will be discussed to draw lessons for scandal management.

2 Scandal, Public Outrage, and Reputational Risk Part of the confusion and difficulty in reaching consensus in the field of interdisciplinary scandal research lies in the polysemy of the term, which continues to be associated in a general way with diffuse attributes of broad outrage in numerous studies (Eko, 2019). This focus on outrage is fundamental but incomplete. Entman addressed the problem that scandals are not always triggered by serious transgressions, for example, major cases of corruption do not trigger broad societal revulsion and, as a result, there is weak incentive for institutional change. On the other hand, transgressions in the private sphere that are of little importance to the public interest trigger indignation. With his work, he consolidated the constructionist view of scandal (Entman, 2012), so that it was established that scandals are processes characterized by reception, that is, they are “processes of communication” (Burkhardt, 2018). That is why Thompson rightly explains that there is no scandal without a scandalized response (2000, p. 132) and, for there to be a scandalized response, a transgression in the material world is not necessary, nor is an accusation or the visibilization of a transgression sufficient: it is enough that the receiver “believes” that there was a transgression and that he/she reacts with effervescent indignation to that perception/belief. So, it could be said that there is a scandal when there are people offended. Without the aggrieved, despite there being a transgression—even a very serious one—and an accusation, there is no scandal. Esser and Hartung have defined it as “intense public communication about a real or imagined defect that is by consensus condemned, and that meets universal indignation or outrage” (2004, p. 1041). In this sense, it is reasonable that numerous analyses that focus on the action of the media (both as accusers, in investigative journalism, and in the reporting they do), emphasize the triad of transgression-visibilization-indignation to characterize the scandal, considering outrage as a sufficient condition to configure a scandal. However, if we consider indignation as a sufficient condition for defining a given phenomenon as a scandal, the confusion of populism breaks in. In many utterances, we see transgression, broad visibility, and widespread indignation, but to the advantage of the accused. Herkman (2018) has chosen to call this phenomenon the neo-populist scandal and Haller—analyzing how journalists react to scandals that

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are intentionally produced by politicians—named it “intentional self-scandalization” (2015, p. 447). This process overlooks a point of fundamental importance, that is, a consequence of the “universal indignation” pointed out by Esser and Hartung. From the outset, John B. Thompson has pointed out that “scandals are struggles over symbolic power in which reputation and trust are at stake. Scandals do not necessarily destroy reputation and undermine trust, but they have the capacity to do so” (2000, p. 245, original in italic). Risk assessment is better perceived when the social position of the accused is assumed. And polarized political contexts are particularly revealing of how this dynamic works. In the logic of populism, the transgressive provocation that triggers widespread indignation and is perceived by the media system as a scandal may in fact only generate indignation in the subsystem that opposes the candidate. As polarization divides society into two subsystems of values that are antagonistic in many respects, what is outrageous to one subsystem may produce indifference or even celebration in the other. This is often seen in sports: a player’s unsportsmanlike behavior may be strongly disapproved of by his rivals but celebrated by his fans, in a value system that emphasizes identity, strength, and combativeness and undervalues fair play. Thus, as is particularly evident in populist provocations, outrage does not always affect the reputation of the accused in a way that is relevant to the accused. In the context of a polarized system, it is necessary to clarify that a scandal endangers the reputation of the accused in his own subsystem of relevance, that is, it structurally threatens his position in his structure of power relations. A given social situation of dissent should be defined as a scandal when the accused is structurally at risk in his moral identity and in his stakeholder structure. This peril can be operationalized in a clear way: a scandal exists when indignation is universal, that is, when the coalition supporting the accused breaks down, when his own partisans or allies criticize or reject him.1 As Twombly points out in his definition: “A political scandal is any event or exhibition of behavior by any candidate, elected official, appointed official, or political party officer that advances a personal agenda (sexual, monetary, or related to the maintenance of power) that could, if known by the public, bring harm to their public position” (Twombly, 2019, p. 7). For example, Dziuda and Howell (2021) found that polarization encourages scandals. In contrast, Von Sikorski and Kubin (2021) explain that polarization reduces scandals. In fact, both studies support the same conclusion. The former refers to “partisan scandals”, that is, accusations coming from only one party in a polarized structure, which often do not even harm the accused. The latter distinguish between scandals and media conflict over misconduct or scandalous media

1 In this proposal, every scandal is a crisis for the accused. While recognizing the value of the concept of “scansis” (Coombs & Tachkova, 2018) for analyzing corporate scandals, in public discourse scandals that focus on the person committing a discursive transgression, every scandal is a crisis.

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coverage.2 The confusion of terms creates many problems. In my view, if the risk to the accused is not included in the concept, the strength of its heuristic content is diluted.

3 Theoretical Framework: Dissent Management and Mechanisms 3.1

Differentiated Situations of Dissent

The approach of this research is inscribed in a theory of dissent management (Elizalde, 2009, 2017) that is grounded in a sociology of communication. This perspective offers a clearer distinction between scandals and other situations of dissent. It therefore allows for a more precise definition of the characteristics and mechanisms of scandal. Elizalde defines dissent as a “decision modification device” (Elizalde, 2022, p. 16), that is, a pressure mechanism that causes a social actor to change its behavior based on the influence of dissent. Dissent can block or mobilize. Dissent and consensus function as the axis on which communication management operates. The spiral of dissent leads to crisis and destabilization, and the spiral of consensus leads to institutional legitimization. Dissent and consensus are experienced in a given social situation. In situations of consensus, coordination, and cooperation flow; but in situations of dissent, cooperation is blocked by the lack of coordination or by the non-cooperative or confrontational intentions of some of the participants. From the perspective of dissent management, Elizalde argues that in the current conditions of plurality and incentives for criticism and public complaint, it is convenient to go beyond the dichotomous binomial “crisis/non-crisis” to define problems as differentiated situations of dissent. In this sense, he proposes a gradual model that distinguishes two main situations: those of “confrontation” and “confusion.” In the former, the agents direct their actions with the intention of causing damage and obtaining certain resources. On the other hand, in the second, the participants attack or disagree, but there is no will to confront. According to the severity and characteristics of the social situations, Elizalde elaborates a dissent curve in which scandal—as a superlative emotional dissent that structurally endangers the social position of the accused—is the most serious. 2

Von Sikorski and Kubin (2021) point out the difference between a political scandal and a media conflict about misconduct. As media increasingly reports about politics in a scandalizing manner, it is more frequent that the tone of media coverage represents more the newsroom than the public response. Authors explain that frequently just “some media outlets reported about these comments and actions in a scandalizing way” (p. 47) and other outlets with a different editorial line do not consider it scandalous. Therefore, there is a conflict between moral paradigms, which is expressed in a media conflict about the moral or immoral nature of a behavior or action.

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This graduation of situations of dissent offers two heuristic possibilities: a sociological understanding of scandal, by integrating it into a matrix that makes it possible to establish operational differences with other forms of dissent; and the possibility of explaining how a potential scandal can be deactivated and transformed into another form of less unstable and damaging dissent, offering a working key for the management of crisis communication and public discourse. In this way, it is possible to identify, in a given dissent situation, the mechanisms that activate dissent—generating an escalation—and those that block dissent, generating a pacification or mitigating the severity of the dissent situation. For example, if the scandal process is fully developed, the player loses his position in his field of power relations. On the other hand, if dissent-blocking mechanisms are activated in the face of a potential scandal, it may develop into another form of dissent, such as a strategic conflict or a value debate. In the conflict, interests are at stake, and in the controversy, certain values are being contested, but in neither case is the structural position of the defendant at risk. Applied to an election campaign, in one case one participates in the contests and confrontations of the campaign and can win or lose voting intentions. In the other case, it is a question of continuing the campaign or abandoning the candidacy.

3.2

Scapegoat Mechanism and Unanimous Accusation

Scandal is a particular situation of dissent because transgressions activate moral outrage. This kind of outrage is generated by an affront to the ethos of the community, to its collective conscience. In the multicultural societies of the twenty-first century, however, several collective consciences operate simultaneously through activist groups, movements, and tribes. There are different official value paradigms that coexist as the norm of different subsystems. In this way, Jacobsson and Löfmarck (2008) show that scandals not only confirm established values by sanctioning transgressions, but also constitute a social ritual that drives the public discussion of values. The ritual dimension of scandal allows enriching the discussion with the theoretical contributions of René Girard’s cultural anthropology (Cannata, 2015). Although mentioned a few times, René Girard’s (Girard, 1986, 2012; Girard et al., 2006) mimetic theory has not been systematically incorporated into the study of political or media scandals. The central point of his contribution lies in the recognition of both the process of scandal activation (transgression—accusation—escalation) and the process of scandal resolution or blocking. In Girard’s view, scandal appears when a situation of “all against one” or “unanimous accusation” is configured. Universal criticism constitutes the ideal conditions for the execution of the scapegoat mechanism, that is, the elimination— material or symbolic—of the unanimously accused and the unitary regeneration of the community: in the all-against-one, when the unity is eliminated, the unity of the all is recreated (Girard, 2012, p. 24). The scapegoat functions as a pharmakos for the

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social tensions activated by the transgression (Girard et al., 2006, pp. 160–162). Catharsis channels social violence toward the accused-scapegoat and defuses the tensions of unrestrained indignation. Thus, for Girard, a scandal can have two trajectories: it ends through the mechanism of the scapegoat (the expulsion or elimination of the accused) or through the transformation of the all-against-one situation into a many-against-many situation. When unanimity is broken, the pressure of emotional outrage against the position of the accused is interrupted. Looking at these elements from a scandal management perspective, the risk to the offender in a scandal situation increases as new actors become attackers and the accusing coalition expands. In turn, scandal survival occurs when the offender expands its core consensus (especially not to lose supporters) and blocks dissent, that is, when the accusers stop speaking out in the public conversation. The prosecutors expand by pressuring the accused and the institutional bodies—decisionmakers—on which the defendant’s social position depends; and the accused seeks to expand his consensus toward allies who defend his position, with the goal of blocking the lynching process and turning it into a strategic dispute. As will be seen below, in the AHTS, Donald Trump, once his inflammatory statements are published by the Washington Post, enters into an escalation of dissent that pushes him to abandon his candidacy, but he achieves a core of resistance from which he manages to block the pressure to resign. On the other hand, Billy Bush did not manage to resist the unanimity of the accusations and was fired from his program on NBC.

3.3

Public Discourse Scandal: Toward a New Definition

Following Ekström and Johansson’s theory (2008), AHTS can be typified as a “talk scandal,” that is, a scandal triggered by statements or speech acts that can be made in public or also in private, but are then introduced into the public sphere. Talk scandals—here renamed as “public discourse scandals”—pose a particular problem for Scandalogy: the disproportion between the act—a statement—and its consequences, often a media earthquake and the risk of destroying the reputation and career of the offender. “Despite the existing theorization of talk scandals, there is limited empirical research on the actual realizations, recontextualizations, and general dynamics of talk scandals as mediatized discourse events” (Patrona, 2019, p. 1). Ekström and Johansson, in describing the evolution of the “talk scandal” concept, address the new populist scenario: “In recent years, we have seen many examples of scandalous utterances of political leaders circulated in the media. Among the most well-known are Donald Trump’s lewd and sexist talk about women, recorded backstage and published during the presidential election campaign of 2016. The talk was defended by Trump as ‘locker room talk’. [. . .] In recent years, political populism has, however, contributed to a destabilization of political culture and discourse in

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several Western democracies, with implications for the performance of political styles and the politics of trust” (Ekström & Johansson, 2019, p. 186). Drawing on theories and results of interdisciplinary scandal research and following Elizalde’s and Girard’s insights, for the purposes of this discussion I would like to offer a more specific definition of public discourse scandal that could resolve the paradox of the strategic use of transgression by right-wing populist politicians: a public discourse scandal is a communication process that occurs in a given social (sub)system when its structure of moral expectations is ruptured by the visibility of a discursive transgression that triggers moral outrage and threatens the position of the accused in that (sub)system. As already mentioned, from an operational point of view, unanimous denunciation occurs when the accused’s own people criticize him, when the accused’s coalition breaks down. That is why polarization encourages dissent, but not necessarily scandal. In the context of polarization, coalitions are very strong and in-group solidarity is very resistant to external attacks.

4 Access Hollywood Tapes Scandal: An “October Surprise” for the Ages3 Despite its unprecedented nature, the AHTS has not attracted sustained scholarly attention (Bostdorff, 2022). Its brutality offers a unique opportunity to study the survival mechanisms: “never before had the mass public been exposed to content in which a presidential candidate’s own words expressed such graphic, lewd, and abusive language about women” (Rhodes et al., 2020, p. 1). Scandals are social phenomena that depend on complex context, social conditions, and different actors’ performances. This proposal is a step forward in the description of the case with respect to the previous partial approaches of the academy or the press. But, at the same time, it aims to identify key mechanisms that explain the evolution of the chain of events that led to the deactivation of the scandal.

4.1

Events

At 4:05 p.m. on October 7, 2016, during the final stages of the United States presidential campaign, the Washington Post published an article that included a video of then-Republican candidate Donald Trump having an “extremely lewd conversation about women” (according to the headline of the article) in 2005 with Billy Bush, co-host of the NBC Universal television show Access Hollywood. It was the most viewed article in the history of the Post’s website (Farhi, 2016). 3

This wording is inspired by Alberta (2019).

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That same day, the FBI reported that it had evidence that Russian hackers were trying to interfere in the American election, and Wikileaks published thousands of emails from Clinton campaign chairman. It was what is called in American political jargon: “the October surprise” (Cohen, 2017). The talking was about Trump’s relationship with women and the statements in the video were in reference to Arianne Zucker, an actress and model who was waiting for them at the entrance of the NBC studios: “I better use some Tic Tacs just in case I start kissing her. You know I’m automatically attracted to beautiful. I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. Grab them by the pussy. You can do anything.” According to Woodward, “the Access Hollywood tape was a political earthquake” and “the Russia story essentially disappeared” (2018, p. 44). On his side, Trump issued a brief statement to the Post: “This was locker-room banter, a private conversation that took place many years ago. Bill Clinton has said far worse to me on the golf course—not even close. I apologize if anyone was offended” (Fahrenthold, 2016). The reaction to the news was widespread and explosive criticism. Hillary Clinton’s response was immediate on Twitter: “This is horrific. We cannot allow this man to become president.” In the Republican Party, numerous key figures, such as Mike Pence (vice presidential candidate), Mitch McConnell (Senate Majority Leader), Reince Priebus (head of the Republican National Committee), disapproved of the statements. In addition, John McCain (former presidential candidate) and Paul Ryan (Speaker in Congress) withdrew their support for the campaign. Former presidential candidate and former governor of Massachusetts Mitt Romney was harsh on Twitter; Jeb Bush, former governor of Florida, indicated that they were reprehensible statements, John Kasich, governor of Ohio, said it was indefensible; Arnold Schwarzenegger, former governor of California, indicated that for the first time he would not vote for the Republican Party and former president George W. Bush announced the same. Even a group of referents asked him to withdraw his candidacy. By October 11, nearly a third of Republican senators had declared that they would not vote for Trump. For his part, in the early hours of October 7–8 Trump posted a video on Facebook in which he: (1) apologizes; (2) indicates that dealing with the American people has changed him and therefore those statements do not represent who he is; (3) renews his commitment to the American people; (4) denounces a media distraction campaign and attacks Hillary Clinton of covering up Bill Clinton’s abuses and mistreating victims. Facing pressure to abandon the campaign and especially supported by Steve Bannon, on October 8, Trump reinforced his position with a tweet: “The media and establishment want me out of the race so badly—I WILL NEVER DROP OUT OF THE RACE, WILL NEVER LET MY SUPPORTERS DOWN! #MAGA.” On the same day, Melania Trump released an official statement: “The words my husband used are unacceptable and offensive to me. This does not represent the man that I know. He has the heart and mind of a leader. I hope people will accept his

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apology, as I have, and focus on the important issues facing our nation and the world.” Trump also gave an interview to Monica Langley of the Wall Street Journal to declare that there was “zero chance” he would quit the race: “I never, ever give up. The support I’m getting is unbelievable, because Hillary Clinton is a horribly flawed candidate.” A few moments later, Trump called Robert Costa at the Washington Post, reiterating his refusal to quit the race: “I’ve been here before, I’ll tell ya, in life. I understand life and how you make it through. You go through things. I’ve been through many. It’s called life” (Yahoo News Staff, 2017). On October 9, two hours before the second presidential debate, Trump appeared at a press conference with three women who had accused Bill Clinton of “sexual misconduct.” Later, during the debate, he was questioned about the recording. His response indicated that it was “locker room talk” and then he rehearsed an apology: “I’m not proud of it. I apologize to my family. I apologize to the American people.” His performance in the debate proved to be a turning point in the unfolding scandal. During those days, a campaign launched on Twitter on Friday 7 by the writer Kelly Oxford spread on social networks: “Women: tweet me your first assaults. They aren’t just statistics.” The tweet went viral, with hundreds of thousands of replies and a reach of 30 million impressions. For their part, numerous athletes dismissed the comment as “locker room talk” in a new wave of criticism. The hashtag #NotInMyLockerRoom went viral. “Two days after the Access Hollywood release, polls showed Clinton 11 points ahead among likely voters—46% to 35%—but her lead had shrunk slightly to 9 points after the debate, even though most viewers thought Clinton had won. More telling, Trump supporters who still backed him went from 67% after the story broke to 74% after the debate. Pence congratulated Trump, and the Republican Party affirmed its ongoing coordination with his campaign” (Bostdorff, 2022). In the days that followed, numerous allegations of sexual harassment or abuse against Donald Trump surfaced (Diaz, 2016). The behavior described in the Access Hollywood tape is now being pointed out as his actual past behavior, not just locker room talk, but actual facts. Trump has vehemently denied the accounts on multiple occasions. Trump was particularly forceful in speeches in Florida on October 13 and in Greensboro on October 14. At Greensboro speech, he called “Crooked Hillary” on four occasions. At the first mention of his opponent, the crowd began shouting, “Lock her up!” Trump smiled and responded, “Tell you what—for what she’s done—, they should lock her up.” He next jumped to how conspiracy was at work, since the accusations were nothing more than “lies being pushed by the media and the Clinton campaign to. . . keep their grip on our country. They are all false. . . All 100% totally and completely fabricated. Never met this person, these people, I don’t know who they are.” Meanwhile, Billy Bush resigned from his NBC television show on October 17, days after apologizing: “It’s no excuse, but this happened eleven years ago. I was younger, less mature, and acted foolishly in playing along. I’m very sorry.”

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AHTS as Public Discourse Scandal

By the definition offered above, the Access Hollywood incident does indeed meet the criteria to be categorized as a public discourse scandal. (a) Discursive Transgression The transgression is an oral statement caught on tape. Controversial statements made carelessly or inadvertently before or after a recorded communication, which are recorded but not intended to be made public, are often referred to as a “hot mic.” (b) Structure of Expectations of Morality: Respect for Women Respect for women, especially in matters of sexuality, is an agenda that has become increasingly important. At the time of the case, there were already #NiUnaMenos (Luengo, 2018) and the SlutWalk; and then we were in the prehistory of the #MeToo movement. The relevance of the issue is not the exclusive monopoly of a party or a social sector, but, in terms of moral values, it represents a universal and contemporary ethos. In this sense, Rhodes et al. explain that their “results indicate that, even in extremely polarized times, voters will punish candidates who flagrantly violate prevailing gendered norms” (2020, p. 2). The community’s morality is flagrantly and brutally broken, that is, there is a transgression of values, even to the extent of justifying sexual assault. But there is also a transgression of the linguistic register expected of a president by the ostensible vulgarity, which leads the Post to characterize him as “extremely lewd.” This second element contributes significantly to the outrage. (c) Moral Outrage Most authors note that scandal is associated with moral outrage (Markovits & Silverstein, 1988; Canel & Sanders, 2006; Nyhan, 2015; Haller et al., 2021). Moral outrage is expressed not only in the fact of widespread public condemnation, but also in the emotional tone. For example, the use of the term “sickening”: the BBC’s US special correspondent, Katty Kay, wrote on October 9, 2016, “There’s a violence in the phrases ‘grab ‘em by the pussy’ and ‘you can do anything’ that any victim of abuse would recognize and that most women would find sickening.” In her campaign memoir, Clinton recalled that hearing the Trump tape was “literally sickening” (Yahoo News Staff, 2017); and House Speaker Paul Ryan said, “I’m sickened by what I heard today.” The semantic field expressing outrage continues: degrading women (Jeb Bush), indefensible (John Kasich); “Donald’s comments were vulgar, egregious, and impossible to justify” (Marco Rubio), “these comments are disturbing” (Ted Cruz). (d) Visibility and Intense Media Coverage As NBC was working to produce a news story to publicize the statement, a leak gave the Post the opportunity. The reporter who broke the story went on to win a Pulitzer Prize. The NBC production went after this content because of recent rumors

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about statements in the Access Hollywood interviews, stemming from a sexist comment by Trump about Alicia Machado, a former Miss Universe (Stelter, 2016). Once the video was released, the controversy garnered massive media attention: “measures suggest that the aftermath of the AHT release is an example of a ‘media storm’“ (Rhodes et al., 2020, p. 15). According to Rhodes et al., “on October 8, stories concerning the AHT appeared on the front page of America’s leading newspapers, including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Boston Globe” (2020, p. 7). They also report that “the homepages of CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC all featured headlines on their homepages about the October 8 recording” (2020, p. 15). Following Washington Post reporter Paul Farhi, the original story “proved to be the most concurrently viewed article in the history of The Post’s website; more than 100,000 people read it simultaneously at one point on Friday. The interest was so heavy that it briefly crashed the servers of the newspaper’s internal tracking system” (Farhi, 2016). Finally, local polling in the days following the release of the recording showed near-universal awareness of the tape. The AHT controversy ranked as the fourth most recognized story in the history of the NBC/WSJ poll (Hook, 2016). (e) Threatens the Position of the Accused at His (Sub)system The perception of risk is objective and public from the beginning. First of all, the approach comes from Donald Trump’s own team and from the calls received by Priebus—the head of the National Committee—during the weekend, up to the point where a campaign was launched to create a new pair of candidates and Trump had to confront the referents of his own party. This threat reaches its climax in the second presidential debate.

5 Surviving the Scandal: Contextual Mechanisms and Strategic Responses The methodology for identifying mechanisms makes it possible to point to both contextual variables and the events and episodes of the process to explain the outcomes. In this sense, from the point of view of the defendant, “contextual intelligence” (Gregory & Willis, 2022) is central, which is the ability to read the possibilities of action in a given context of institutional and political interaction and, in turn, the ability to intervene strategically through public actions, private negotiations, judicial actions, and public discourse (Elizalde, 2009). For example, Benoit (2017) develops a rhetorical critical approach to Donald and Melania Trump’s defensive statements. His perspective—the Image Repair Theory—focuses on public discourse, specifically on the effectiveness of the mortification strategy, that is, the ability to “admit responsibility and ask for forgiveness” (Benoit, 2017, p. 247). Although this aspect is important, in this case it is notorious

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for being insufficient for a full understanding of the process, as Benoit himself takes into account when mentioning the impact that the FBI revelation had on Hillary Clinton or the logic proper to the American electoral system that distinguishes between the popular vote and the electoral college. From what has been said above, it is possible to add key elements such as the polarization mechanism or Trump’s discursive immunity due to his positioning against the establishment and political correctness. Below, an analysis of consensus and dissent mechanisms is developed to delve deeper into the elements that help explain the chain of events and Trump’s survival of the scandal.

5.1

Fostering Dissent Mechanisms

The main mechanism of dissent is the transgression itself, which is the origin of the scandal. But gradually, the escalation of dissent is fed by other mechanisms that drive the wave of dissent to press for the execution of an exemplary sanction. (a) Opponents Attack In the logic of the scandal and the campaign, the traditional media function as Trump’s opponents, deploying an intensely critical coverage that configures a “media hunt” (Allern & Pollack, 2012). The attack was immediately joined by Democratic Party leaders, led by Hillary Clinton, who posted on Twitter: “This is appalling. We cannot allow this man to be president.” Feminist collectives and social referents from the world of entertainment joined the attack with force. The process of dissent was so powerful that social networks had an indirect function of resonating the political and social system. From the beginning, however, Trump’s supporters defied the critical unanimity in social media. (b) Allies Attack The attack of the opponents is logical and expected in an electoral campaign, but the conspiracy of the allies themselves is the main mechanism of dissent that leads, through the feeling of unanimous accusation, to the climax of the scandal that configures the “all against one” social situation. The collapse of one’s own coalition, as has been said, is one of the definitive elements for recognizing a scandal and for ascertaining a real threat to the position of the accused in his system. At first, the attacks were private: there were phone calls to the Republican party committee for the withdrawal of the candidacy. The wave of indignation then hits those who had distanced themselves from Trump from the beginning: that is, former presidential candidates Mitt Romney and John McCain, ex-Governor Jeb Bush. The day after the Post’s revelation, with the scandal on the front pages of newspapers and on the airwaves, Carly Fiorina—a candidate in the primaries—claimed on Twitter that Trump should leave the campaign and be replaced on the ballot by Mike Pence (currently vice-presidential candidate). Privately, preparations were being made for

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former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to join Pence on the ticket. A wave of criticism followed the party leadership, ranging from disassociation to demands to drop out. This was the climax of the AHTS dissent, which began to subside as Trump made it through the second debate alive. Meanwhile, the campaign’s efforts at financial support had been in a state of stalemate. (c) A Critical Response in the Social Media: Kelly Oxford’s Viral Tweet. The most significant episode on social media generated a strong social perception of the seriousness of the problem of sexual misconduct. It called for more accountability for Trump’s words. “Canadian author Kelly Oxford asked women to share their stories of sexual assault on Twitter, which received over 1 million replies. Oxford’s tweet was a precursor to the #MeToo hashtag that also received over 1 million tweets and became the label of the current movement to end all forms of abuse against women” (Blumell & Huemmer, 2019, p. 12). (d) Sexual Misconduct Allegations Following the infamous video, fifteen women accused Trump of sexual misconduct (Bostdorff, 2022). This escalation mechanism challenged the “actions” vs “words” frame that had been installed in the previous press conference leading up to the second debate.

5.2

Blocking Dissent Mechanisms

Complex situations such as scandals evolve in the interplay of social conditions and agents’ interventions and decisions. The main mechanisms at work in the AHTS to mitigate dissent are described below. (a) Zero-Sum Game and the General Election Context The context of the general election creates a containment in favor of Trump, because legally there was no institutional authority of the party that could expel him: the decision to drop out or to continue was up to him. In addition, the logic of the campaign in a bipartisan system dictates that the opponent’s loss is one’s gain, so the counterattack not only blocks the opponent, but becomes one’s gain. According to Meraz, this logic operated in the Trump-Clinton rivalry because “Hillary Clinton was plagued by a series of scandals,” and “studies have revealed that these scandals set the Twitter agenda for many conservative networked publics, who used these scandals to create a narrative of her unsuitability for office” (Meraz, 2019, p. 60). Her weakness as an accuser comes from also being an accused. And her weakness becomes Trump’s strength by the effect of the zero-sum game. (b) The Polarization Shield and the Paradox: More Dissent, Fewer Scandals Page (2020) noted that Trump was protected by the potency of his assemblage. This is one of the characteristic effects of polarization: a very strong endogroup

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solidarity. For example, in a humorous video, Trump’s supporters say they will vote for him no matter what. “They consider locker room talk to be a valid argument, but they don’t recognize themselves using that kind of language” (Page, 2020). In this way, polarization is a defensive shield. At the same time, the dynamic is paradoxical, because the in-group solidarity also creates a greater critical intensity of the opponents. Thus, the unconditional support of the group itself is a mechanism that mitigates scandals, and the permanent attack of the opposing group is a mechanism that incites dissent. (c) Trump Prior Positioning and What Supporters Expect Trump’s previous positioning provided an immune system because his supporters already admitted to sexist attitudes in his profile. His positioning included some ability to defend against charges of sexism, and there was a tolerance for sexism among his supporters. Obviously, this incident was on a different scale of severity, but the previous positioning was a resource for managing dissent. In other words, Bostdorff argues that “Trump’s sexist performances likely contributed to his success” (2022), because he could manage sexual assault accusations that would have destroyed the chances of other candidates. His argument is that “Trump’s projection of a primitive, white, working-class masculinity conveyed credibility for his supporters” (Bostdorff, 2022). Warf, for his part, points out that “the tape of Trump bragging about groping women revealed nothing new other than the existence of the tape. Everyone, including the people that voted for him, knows that he is like this. Many men, both inside and outside locker rooms, are also like this, especially men in power (such as disgraced Fox News heavyweight and Trump adviser Roger Ailes). It’s part of the arena of consent and resistance of pop culture. It is power, and the election of Trump suggests that his performance of this kind of power is aspirational” (Warf, 2020, pp. 20–21). Finally, Traister postulates the same assessment: “Yes, the tape on which Trump is caught joking about grabbing women by the pussy seems to describe acts of sexual assault, but the language is not so far off from the scads of examples of Trump’s disparagement of women that everyone in his party has already heard. In Howard Stern appearances and interviews on television and in magazines, Trump has repeatedly and energetically referred to women as pigs and dogs and pieces of ass, has rated them on a scale of one to ten, described those who breastfeed and pee and gain weight as “disgusting,“ bragged about not changing diapers, and suggested that ‘putting a wife to work is a very dangerous thing’“ (Traister, 2016). (d) Multiple Apologies and Repentance Rituals Trump has been involved in various scandals, but AHTS is one of the few he has had to apologize for (Neven, 2019, p. 59). He did so with increasing engagement. The first intervention in the Post article was a non-apology apology: “if anyone was offended.” Then, in the Facebook video, the apology seemed more sincere and uncomfortable, which is something expected in an apology. Finally, in the second

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debate, he also started his interventions with another apology: “Yes, I am very embarrassed by it and I hate it.” (e) Trump’s Ability to Perform His Own Defense and Determination to Counterattack Trump’s personality attributes, his long television experience, and his decisiveness in dealing with the backlash were determining factors in his effective counterattack, especially in social media, in the press conference with Bill Clinton’s female accusers, and in the second presidential debate. To manage the scandal, he played a role in line with his own personal style: for example, “in June 2015, The New York Times published an article entitled ‘The 337 People, Places and Things Donald Trump Has Insulted on Twitter: A Complete List.’ Among the attacks thenpresidential candidate Trump launched at opponents and critics, we find such slurs as ‘a disaster candidate’ (aimed at Mitt Romney), a ‘total embarrassment to himself and his family’ (Jeb Bush), a ‘waste of time’ (Bernie Sanders) and ‘FAILED ALL OVER THE WORLD’ (Hillary Clinton)” (Samoilenko et al., 2019, p. 1). A key factor was Trump’s uncanny ability to defend himself and call the women who accused him of sexual assault liars in the wake of the AHTS revelations, as well as the “lock her up” tirade he delivered at the Florida rally, inciting and inciting his supporters. (f) Hillary Clinton’s Weak Positioning “Clinton would face several additional scandals as fake news disseminators sought to paint a picture of her as corrupt and untrustworthy to the electorate. Clinton was accused of deleting 33,000 emails from her private server after being given the FBI subpoena from the Trump campaign” (Meraz, 2019, p. 60). Revelations produced in the days following the AHTS outburst related to this FBI investigation and Wikileaks gave a credibility boost to the Trumpian counterattack on Hillary Clinton’s corruption.4 (g) Reputation and Celebrity Status Reputation is a mechanism of consent because it works as a resource of credibility and confidence (Elizalde, 2009, p. 131). In Trump’s case, reputation is associated with his status as a public and media celebrity. In this logic, he is a master of distraction, seemingly diverting the public’s attention away from whatever accusation may be hurled at him, in part, through skillful use of social media. Twombly has argued that “an individual’s status as a pop culture icon” generates more attention

“Eleven days before the vote, Comey notified Congress that he was reopening the investigation into Clinton’s email server specifically with respect to the emails on Weiner’s laptop. Just two days before the election, Comey announced that the investigation into the new emails found on Weiner’s laptop was now closed, and that the emails were either duplicates of ones the FBI had already uncovered or were not classified. In the end, Hillary Clinton herself and numerous other postelection analyses, including the report of the FBI Inspector General, argued that these actions by Comey likely had an impact on the outcome of the 2016 presidential election” (Twombly, 2019, p. 88). 4

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and more forgiveness for politically related bad behavior. “Trump himself notes this both on the now famous Access Hollywood tape and in his campaign statement about shooting people in the middle of 5th Avenue and not losing any support” (Twombly, 2019, p. 115). According to Twombly, no Republican presidential pre-candidate could have survived the scandals that Trump went through. “Part of that is due in large part to Trump’s pre-existing status as a pop culture icon” (Twombly, 2019, p. 127). (h) Killing Bill Clinton’s Reputation From the outset, Trump’s strategy had shifted focus over continually pointing fingers at Bill Clinton, creating an even-handed dualism. The three main attacks were: – Initial statement for the Post: “Bill Clinton has said far worse to me on the golf course—not even close.” – Statement on the October 8 Facebook video: “I’ve said some foolish things, but there’s a big difference between the words and actions of other people. Bill Clinton has actually abused women, and Hillary has bullied, attacked, shamed and intimidated his victims.” – During the press conference prior to the second debate, Juanita Broaddrick outlined: “Actions speak louder than words. Mr. Trump may have said some bad words, but Bill Clinton raped me and Hillary Clinton threatened me.” And, during the debate, Trump said: “If you look at Bill Clinton, far worse. Mine are words and his was action. . . There’s never been anybody in the history of politics in this nation who’s been so abusive to women.” This had the effect of focusing the debate on the political campaign and on the voices of politics. “As a result, simplifying the debate to mostly two sides meant that other important contributors, such as the women who came forward are given less prominence in news coverage” (Blumell & Huemmer, 2019, p. 14). Besides, “rightleaning media used Bill Clinton as one of many tactics for downplaying the severity of Donald Trump’s comments. This approach also served to reinforce their argument that ‘all men do it’” (Blumell & Huemmer, 2019, p. 13). (i) Mitigation: Reframing Strategy From a discursive point of view, Trump used the device of “reframing” (Lakoff, 2014), in an attempt to mitigate the seriousness of the statements. – “Locker room talk” framing Trump softened the seriousness of the situation by referring to the tape as “locker room talk.” In the aftermath, according to Blumell and Huemmer, nearly all news coverage included the term. “Downplaying the incident as locker room talk builds on the myth that ‘boys will be boys’ and their mischief is both inevitable and innocuous. Prominent Trump surrogates were clear to emphasize that point, like Rudy Guiliani’s comment to CNN’s Jake Tapper, ‘men at times talk like that’ (quoted in State of the Union, 9 October 2016)” (Blumell & Huemmer, 2019, p. 9). Ten days after the

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Access Hollywood incident, Melania Trump used her own version of this frame in a CNN interview, referring to the situation as “boys talk.” – “Actions vs words” framing As noted, the “actions vs words” framing was used in the Facebook statement, and then by Juanita Broaddrick and by Trump on the night of the second debate. Blumell and Huemmer explained that Fox News also promoted this frame: “In terms of traditional right-leaning media, Fox News chose different strategies: Avoid the subject by having little coverage, distract the audience by discussing Bill Clinton, and dismiss the severity of the tape. These strategies are summarized by the following statement made by Sean Hannity on 10 October 2016, ‘I asked you, why would the words of Donald Trump mean more than the actions of Bill and the smearing by Bill and Hillary?”’ (2019, p. 10). – “Renewal of personal identity” frame In the Facebook apology video, Trump presented himself as a new man, transformed by the contact with the people. It is a sort of spiritual renewal of personal identity. His words were: “Anyone who knows me, knows these words don’t reflect who I am. [. . .] I’ve traveled the country talking about change for America. But my travels have also changed me.” (j) Defense of Allies The defense of allies is a key mechanism to block the unanimous accusation that pushes for the exemplary execution of the scapegoat. In this case, two different situations are examined: the meeting in which the Trump team decided how to respond to the release of the video, and the general social situation. In the first case, the central figure was Steve Bannon, who stood firm in the face of doubts and pressure from all sides. As told by several sources, his commitment to support Trump from the first moment of internal discussions was crucial (Woodward, 2018, p. 46). Publicly, Trump’s team maintained its loyalty to the candidate, first Giuliani in several interviews on Sunday 9 and then Conway with publications on social networks. For its part, Braitbart.com continued to publish pro-Trump news and fed a narrative for its supporters (Klein, 2016). Melania Trump made a public statement rejecting the allegations as a first step, in order to then reinforce support for her husband. Finally, the four women who participated in the press conference that preceded the second debate were very important in giving Trump a credibility boost. On the other hand, the supporters who gathered at Trump Tower—which Trump went out to greet on Saturday—and who supported him on the social media—which Trump invoked as support against the Republican Party establishment—maintained, even at the moment of greatest pressure, a core of resistance that always made it possible to contest the destructive logic of unanimous repudiation. Some distanced themselves in order to regain legitimacy and then continue to defend the campaign, following the same Trump strategy of apologizing and then counterattacking.

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(k) Time Lapse Mechanism The mechanism of the passing of time works with two variables. News coverage follows the rhythm of new events, and it is very difficult for it to sustain an issue on the agenda when others emerge with the capacity to compete for visibility. On the other hand, the passing of time creates a moderating effect of intense emotions that, by their very nature, cannot be solidified in a climax. The problem continues, the public debate continues, but the extreme stress that called for the exemplary sanction of scapegoating disappears. In this case, the climax lasted until Monday, when the media interest changed scale, although there were some aftershocks, such as accusations of sexual misconduct or rumors that new videos with inflammatory statements might be released.

6 Discussion and Final Considerations In this chapter, the AHTS has been analyzed from the perspective of the management of dissent and the identification of mechanisms. This perspective offers specific criteria for overcoming a frequent theoretical ambiguity and for being able to distinguish between the scandal and other similar, but structurally different, forms of dissent from the point of view of the accused. Recognizing the situation of scandal with its own characteristics, based on an amplified reading of the opportunities and constraints of the context, is a necessary insight to correctly guide strategic decisionmaking for scandal management. The richness of this case study invites further examination of this and other similar cases in order to provide empirical support for the study of public discourse scandals, especially from the angle of the public position of the accused. In plural and polarized societies, all political actors will, at a certain point in time, be accused of discursive transgressions of values. This case also allowed us to highlight some dynamics of polarization processes with a particular reference to right-wing populism. It is possible to point out the difference between scandal—as a process of emotional dissent that jeopardizes the social position of the accused—and the strategic use of provocation and scandalization, as the promotion of a certain kind of news coverage, a certain kind of accusation, or a certain kind of controlled transgression in order to generate a favorable effect. Regarding the AHTS, it is worth noting that although Trump succeeded in surviving the scandal, it is necessary to overcome a superficial evaluation that judges his response only by the fact that he subsequently won the election, especially considering that he won the Electoral College but lost the popular vote. Social complexity demands prudence and an academic commitment to developing analyses that are commensurate with that complexity. In this sense, the detailed analysis of the case leaves lessons and questions. One clear lesson is the need to offer a response proportionate to the impact of the

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transgression: Trump managed to orchestrate a massive response to an apocalyptic scandal. As seen, he deployed a cascading strategy with a determination that even led him to insistently declare, “Nobody has more respect for women than I do.” Instead, Billy Bush offered only a few apologies and was forced to resign his position. Thus, the AHTS raises the question of apology’s effectiveness. The case evidence shows that when the transgression is highly inflammatory, apologies are not accepted as a reparative mechanism and do not by themselves prevent the execution of the scapegoating mechanism. Instead, apologies appear to be a mechanism that enables allies who share the values of the offended community to redeem the transgressor and re-engage in public defense. One might even say that it is a toll that the transgressor must pay in order to regain his or her adherence to the community’s official values and therefore be able to continue to participate in the public conversation. In cases of high emotional voltage, apologies are a first step to ease the pain, but they are not enough to sew up the wound of outrage. In Trump’s case, the next steps were self-defense, mitigation by reframing the situation, and counterattack. Finally, apologies play an ally maintenance function. The allies make it a condition of remaining in the coalition that the transgressor apologize and show signs of remorse: at the AHTS is required by the Trump team, demanded by Mike Pence, and needed by most GOP candidates. Without an acknowledgment of wrongdoing and an apology from the wrongdoer, allies have no room to expose themselves without being swept away by the radioactivity of outrage. In this regard, apologies create the safe ground for a sustainable public position against the onslaught of opponents. Structural logics that transcend the decisions of individual actors also shape the development of dissent. Polarization and the institutional system—the institutional situation of general elections and its rules of operation—functioned as “containers” for the Trump coalition because they are based on a structure of hard interests and emotional commitments that are more resistant to symbolic transgressions. In some cases, polarization can function as an antifragile process, that is, criticism of the opposing coalition increases the group’s solidarity and strengthens its commitment to its own values (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2007). Moreover, the overlap of scandals created a competition for media agendas that favored the displacement of the AHTS from the center of public attention. Further research on populism should work on these agenda-setting dynamics. In this case, for example, a paradoxical complicity of the accusatory media system in prioritizing the logic of political competition over the problem of social justice has been pointed out: “The Access Hollywood tape was ultimately a political not social justice and human rights scandal. These results ultimately point to the press’ complicity in rape culture acceptance by heavily relying on direct quotes that promoted rape culture, while failing to add context to the problems of rape culture” (Blumell & Huemmer, 2019, p. 14). Lastly, although Trump ultimately won the 2016 election, according to Rhodes et al. AHTS reduced public support for him (2020, p. 1). It also shaped the feminist

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movement’s relationship with the Trump administration from the beginning. The Women’s March emerged as a project inherently opposed to Trump. This confrontation with a rising agenda systematically created problems for Trump’s positioning management. In 2017, for example, a group of women’s advocates in Washington, D.C., took to the streets near the White House and the National Mall and played the now infamous “Access Hollywood” footage on a loop for 12 hours on a large projector (Havens, 2017). Their goal was to make a statement about the importance of not forgetting the kind of person Trump was, and the lower standards that have developed for politicians since the 2016 campaign. Case study findings are context-dependent and therefore require future empirical corroboration. In this way, other similar studies can be used to test whether the mechanisms identified can be replicated in other cases and whether they have the same effectiveness or, on the contrary, it is necessary to correct the description of their functioning. A usual way to take advantage of emerging categories in qualitative studies is to take them as a basis for future quantitative studies to test or adjust their scope and representativeness. In this sense, a peculiar element of this case is the possibility of reproducing Trump’s conditions of histrionics and egotism to handle the accusations. The performative dimension of the candidate is hardly to be found in other actors. This must be considered when assessing the results. As this case study depends on a particular context, the results should not be automatically transferred to other contexts; research in other cultural environments and with other types of public figures is necessary for the recommendations to gain validity. Nevertheless, the relevance of the case offers orientations for future research. In the first place, on the conditions of execution of the mechanism of unanimous accusation and scapegoating, but also the functioning of apologies and the possibilities of counterattack strategies. Mimetic theory and the theory of dissenting situations open ways to further deepen both the understanding and the management of public discourse scandals.

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Part II

Outrage, Lionization, and Resistance in a Polarized Public

Scandal and Lionization: When Corporations Speak on Socio-Political Issues in a Polarized World W. Timothy Coombs

Abstract Stakeholders expect corporations to address socio-political issues. The socio-political issues create affective polarization, when partisans dislike and distrust one another. Crusaders willingly address socio-political issues because it is who the corporation is. Conformists feel compelled by stakeholders to address the sociopolitical issues. Polarizing socio-political issues create a duality in scandalization. Corporations can be both lionized and scandalized for the same position on a sociopolitical issue. Disney’s involvement in the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” is used to illustrate this duality in scandalization. Moreover, the case illustrates how corporations can be scandalized for silence on socio-political issues. Stakeholders view the situation as a scandal because the corporation’s silence is viewed as cowardly. The chapter considers the implications of polarization around socio-political issues on how we conceptualize and evaluate the scandalization of corporations.

Many countries around the globe are experiencing greater polarization, groups are divided (Castle & Stepp, 2021). Social issues are anchors for much of this polarization because these types of issues encourage people to take sides (Coombs & Holladay, 2018). Interestingly, people tend to blame the government for the polarization and are turning to corporations to help solve the problem (Gingiss, 2019). Furthermore, people now expect corporations to address social issues (Edelman, 2023). In fact, people punish corporations for being silent on issues but also punish corporations for speaking on social issues as well as showing appreciation for the corporate stances (Austin et al., 2019). That punishment often comes in the form of efforts to scandalize the corporation’s behavior. This chapter explores how the polarized environment surrounding social issues creates a unique dynamic for polarization. Corporations become political actors when taking a stance on social issues. By exploring how scandalization emerges when corporations engage with social issues, we gain insights into how polarization

W. T. Coombs (✉) Centre for Crisis and Risk Communications, Bloomington, IL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_5

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requires us to elaborate upon the scandalization process. The chapter begins by exploring the new environment that demands corporations engage with social issues and the nature of polarization itself. The focus then shifts to implications of polarization on scandalization followed by two extended examples to illustrate the scandalization of corporations engaging or not engaging with social issues.

1 The New Environment for Corporations It may seem odd to include corporations in the discussion of politics but corporations have been political actors for decades. Moreover, van der Meer and Jonkman (2021) observed, “corporations are increasingly pressured to speak out and take a stance on social issues to engage with their environment and renew their social license to operate (SLO) in a context characterized by political divides” (p. 1). Essentially their position is that corporations are now political because they expected to address social issues. Various polls support how globally stakeholders expect organizations to address social issues. The most recent example being data from the 2023 Trust Barometer from Edelman (Edelman, 2023). Social issues have a moral focus and affect people in a society directly or indirectly. Social issues are naturally divisive as people quickly take sides (Coombs & Holladay, 2018). Examples of social issues include immigration, reproductive rights, and LGBTQ+ issues. When organizations take stands of social issues, it is considered as corporate social advocacy (CSA) (Dodd & Supa, 2014). Moreover, social media adds to the pressure to take a stand on social issues. Stakeholders use social media to alert others when a corporation is neglecting to discuss social issues and pressure the corporations to speak up (Coombs & Holladay, 2018). Many academic articles have linked the social issue polling data to an increased need for CSA (e.g. Rim et al., 2020). The problem is a surface reading of the polling data makes it appear as though CSA is a logical and simple alternative for corporate managers. The reality of addressing social issues is complex and challenging. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the new environment for corporations. Stakeholders want corporations to speak out on social issues but they really want corporations to reflect their position on the social issues. As van der Meer and Jonkman (2021) noted, “More and more examples can be observed where corporations publicly speak out in support for one stance, with the danger to contradict certain other stakeholders” (p. 8). Social issues have sides, hence, when a position is taken that position will be opposed by some and supported by others. The polarizing nature of social issues is why corporations have avoided them (Coombs & Holladay, 2018). Unfortunately, avoidance is no longer an option. Corporate communicators understand taking a stand on an issue will result in support and opposition. If we look further at the polling data, stakeholders do not want corporations to address political issues. However, social issues are regularly politicized meaning they are viewed through the lens of politics. Consider how immigration, reproductive rights, and LGBTQ+ issues all have a political element. It is more accurate to

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Fig. 1 The new environment for corporations

Fig. 2 The polarization process

refer to social issues as socio-political issues because every social issue has been politicized (Coombs & Holladay, 2018). It becomes clear how complicated and problematic CSA really is. Yes, stakeholders want corporations to take a position on social issues, but those positions will alienate some and the positions will be viewed as political to some degree. The communicative situation becomes even more complex when we layer in the growing polarization being experienced globally.

2 Polarization: Refining its Meaning Political scientists have noted that polarization is on the rise around the globe (Castle & Stepp, 2021; Lee et al., 2018; Ohme, 2021). Generally, we know polarization is a split between two or more sides—people disagree about an issue and take various sides of the issue. Polarization has many forms but the one most salient for the discussion in this chapter is affective polarization. Affective polarization reflects how much partisans distrust and dislike the other side (Castle & Stepp, 2021). To appreciate affective polarization, we need to understand what partisans are and the process of polarization. Political scientists identify three groups when exploring polarization: political elites, partisans, and constituents. Political elites are the politicians and party leaders. Polarization can spread from political elites to partisans and then from partisans to constituents. Figure 2 illustrates the polarization process. Political elites set the agenda for the party. Affective polarization was first documented among the political elites. Partisans are those who strongly identify

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with a party, the strong supporters of a party. Political science research has documented affected polarization among partisans as well (Druckman et al., 2021). Constituents are your average voters, what we often refer to as the general public. Research has yet to document that affective polarization has reached the constituent level.

2.1

Corporations and Polarizations

We can conceptualize corporate stakeholders as being composed of issue managers, partisans, and constituents for social issues. The issue managers are the leaders who are pushing a specific side of an issue. Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and more generally advocacy groups are common issue managers. Consider how Greenpeace pushes concerns over the treatment of workers in the apparel industry as an example of an issue manager (Coombs, 2014). The stakeholders who strongly support a side of social issues are partisans while the other stakeholders are constituents. Customers are a common stakeholder group that is central to social issues. Some customers are political and purchase to reward or punish corporations (Balsiger, 2010). These political consumers are partisans. Other customers are simply constituents with no strong feelings about the social issue but might “vote” by buying one brand or avoiding another brand. Similar to the political science study of voters, research into corporate stakeholders suggests polarization is a problem but has yet to permeate the constituent level of stakeholders. In fact, many people feel that corporations might be able to reduce societal polarization (USC, 2022). The key takeaway is that corporations do face polarized stakeholders when they choose to engage social issues. For social issues, corporations may be pressured (primarily through social media) to take a stand on a social issue. An example would be the pressure for corporations to take a stand (and action) following the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. The issue managers and the partisans will be ones applying the social media pressure. Activist groups (issue managers) are skilled at utilizing social media pressure to create grassroots support. The partisan constituents are the potential grassroots supporters who can be mobilized to pressure an organization to act. The pressure is increased if the constituents join the call and tell the corporation to take action (Coombs & Holladay, 2018). Polarization can inform the scandalization process.

2.2

Polarization and Corporate Scandalization

Entman (2012) argues for a social construction perspective on scandals. This means the same action can be considered a scandal at times but at other times not be a scandal. A politician being involved in an extramarital affair might be a scandal or might not be a scandal. Some behavior is not automatically a scandal, people need to

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interpret it as a scandal. Similarly corporate leadership being involved in discrimination might be a scandal or might not be a scandal. Scandalization is built around a moral violation. Some action is defined as a violation of specific morals (Nicols, 1997). The moral violation evokes the need for punishment—those involved in the scandal should suffer for their actions (Grebe, 2012). Media attention is required to create awareness of and frame a situation as a scandal (Entman, 2012). Corporate scandalization can be viewed as the “public exposure of immoral and unethical behavior toward stakeholders, which in tune lead to public blaming and shaming” (Coombs et al., 2018, p. 178). Scandalization has important ramifications for corporations. When a corporation’s behavior is constructed to be a scandal, the social evaluations of the organization suffer. Social evaluations are how stakeholders perceive an organization (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). Reputation is probably the most widely researched form of social evaluation (Pollock et al., 2019). Corporations spend a great deal of time and effort cultivating favorable social evaluations. Favorable social evaluations are critical assets because they do translate into financial benefits (Bundy et al., 2017). We have long known that stakeholders are not monolithic in how they view organizations. We talk about corporate reputation knowing it is an aggregate and that stakeholders can hold different and even conflicting social evaluations. For instance, a corporation’s efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can be praised by some stakeholders while condemned by other stakeholders (Zavyalova et al., 2017). Greenhouse gas emissions is one example of how actions designed to bolster corporate social responsibility can be embraced by some stakeholders and contested by others (e.g., Font, Font et al., 2017). CSA has been marked by division since its conception. Dodd and Supa (2014) noted taking a stand on a social issue will upset some stakeholders. Moreover, CSA is an extension of the older concept of corporate advocacy. Corporate advocacy is about speaking out on any issue. Corporate advocacy has always drawn critics who disagreed with the corporation’s position on an issue and/or thought corporations should not speak on issues (Heath, 1980; Sethi, 1978). The increasing polarization among stakeholders makes the split reactions among stakeholders even more acute. This, in turn, has implications for the scandalization process and provides a twist upon Entman’s (2012) articulation of scandals. Now the same action can be both a scandal and lionize simultaneously—both a moral violation and action to emulate. Corporation stances and actions on socio-political issues possess a duality. For those who support the corporation’s position, the stand can be lionized because it reflects their values. For those who oppose the corporation’s position, the stand can be scandalized because it violates their morals. Figure 3 is a visual representation of the duality of corporate stances on socio-political issues. For example, when Dick’s Sporting Goods began to remove the selling of guns from many of its stores in 2019, some stakeholders lionized the effort as showing a concern for the gun violence in the USA while others deemed it scandalous for denying people the right to bear arms. The next section provides extended examples of cases to illustrate the effects of socio-political issues and polarization on scandalization.

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Fig. 3 Duality of social issue stances

3 Corporations Engaging Socio-Political Issues and Reactions As noted earlier, corporations are increasingly under pressure to engage with sociopolitical issues by taking stands on those issues. Two clear dynamics emerge when examining how corporations engage with socio-political issues. First, a corporation can be a crusader. A crusader is dedicated to addressing one or more socio-political issues. Crusaders willingly engage in socio-political issues and are the first to take stands on emerging socio-political issues. Both Patagonia and Apple have acted as crusaders. Patagonia focuses on environmental issues while Apple fights for social justice issues. Second, a corporation can be a conformist. Conformists feel compelled by stakeholder pressure to take a stand on socio-political issues. There is a hesitancy to engage with socio-political issues and conformists take stands far later than do crusaders. Consider how some many corporations felt the need to take a stand on social justice issues during the height of the Black Lives Matters movement in the USA. Two extended examples are used to illustrate how crusader and conformist corporations face slightly different but complicated scandalization processes.

3.1

Apple: A Crusader for LGBTQ+ Rights

Apple, under the leadership of Tim Cook, has been a strong advocate for LGBTQ+ rights. This includes actions to oppose state and Federal actions Apple deems as hostile toward the LGBTQ+ community. In 2015, the state of Indiana in the USA created the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The measure allowed smaller businesses to refuse services to LGBTQ+ couples simply based on sexual orientation that did not fit with the values of those running the business. The focus was on businesses being allowed to withhold services for same-sex marriages on personal

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grounds. If business owners did not believe in same-sex marriage, they could refuse service to same-sex couples. Apple was among the first to condemn the measure and call for a repeal of the act. Apple actions were lionized by LGBTQ+ advocacy groups. Apple was applauded for standing up for the LGBTQ+ community. Cook would later be given an award for this support of the LGBTQ+ community (Adday, 2015). Various conservative groups, including the Ethics and Public Policy Center, tried to scandalize Apple claiming it was against the free exercise clause of the first amendment and acting in an immoral manner by discriminating against people of faith (Anderson, 2015; Sanders, 2015). The conservative groups argued people were being coerced into undermining marriage by being forced to help with weddings that were not between a man and a woman (Anderson, 2015). Apple was linked to an immoral act and various digital platforms were used to make people aware of Apple’s actions—there was an attempt to scandalize Apple’s opposition to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Apple’s crusader efforts demonstrate how the polarization generated by sociopolitical issues can create both scandalization and lionization for the same action. Those who support the corporation’s position on the socio-political issue will lionize it. Those who oppose the corporation’s position on the socio-political issue will try to scandalize it.

3.2

Disney: A Conformist for LGBTQ+ Rights

In 2021, a bill was proposed in the state of Florida that involved the socio-political issue of LGBTQ+ rights. The bill was titled “the Parental Rights in Education” but was also known as the “Don’t Say Gay Bill.” The bill sought to focus on how the legislature decided what was age appropriate for classroom instruction. The idea was parents, through the legislators, had more control over the topic that would be discussed in school. The controversial provision was to prohibit the discussion of sexual orientation or gender identity from kindergarten through third grade with the option to extend the prohibition to additional grades. Supporters praised the bill for preventing the sexualization of children, keeping inappropriate topics out of the classroom, and giving parents more control over educational content. Critics argued the bill is discriminatory and silenced LGBTQ+ students and parents (Papaycik, 2022). Disney is perhaps the highest profile corporation in Florida. Disney World is a massive complex Disney operates near Orlando. Disney world attracts millions of tourists and their money to Florida and is a major source of employment within the state. Disney’s involvement with the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” serves to illustrate how various factions will scandalize the positions a corporation takes on a socio-political issue after having been silent on the issue—the conformist.

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When the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” was first being introduced and discussed, Disney was publicly silent on it. The silence was reflected in the Disney CEO, Bob Chapek, not making any public statements about the bill. As context, prior to this bill, Disney had been viewed as progressive on LGBTQ+ rights. Disney was an early supporter of medical benefits for same-sex partners and held “Gay Days” at its theme parks since the 1990s. Disney was boycotted by conservative groups from 1997 to 2005 because of the same-sex partner benefits (French, 2005). Many Disney fans and employees expected the corporation to take a public stand against the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” as an extension of the corporation’s support for LGBTQ+ issues. The failure of Disney’s support to materialize resulted in some stakeholders seeking to scandalize the failure to speak. Those stakeholders included Disney employees as well as LGBTQ+ advocacy groups. These stakeholders expressed a sense of betrayal from Disney and a failure of the moral values that had come to be appreciated from Disney—support for LGBTQ+ rights (Abad-Santos, 2022). Part of the scandalization effort was the presentation of an Open Letter by Disney Employees that was promoted in digital media and covered by the traditional media. Here is a part of the letter: Our community will not sit silently while TWDC fails in its obligations to advocate for employees it claims to support with ‘unwavering commitment’, profits off our labor, and boasts of record profits it has used to fund politicians who legislate unsafe schools for our youth. The ongoing attempts to placate the LGBTQIA+ community with subpar representation in the content produced and donations to well-meaning organizations are simply not enough (Disney, 2022).

This part of the letter identifies the moral violation as Disney failed in its claims to support the LGBTQ+ community while exploiting this community for its own gains. The Disney employees promised action in the letter if Disney did not begin speaking out against the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” and ending financial support for Florida politicians supporting the legislation. “Due to the lack of compassion and advocacy, TWDC’s LGBTQIA+ community and their allies are determined to take a stand via multiple direct actions, including both virtual and in-person protests—the first of which will take place on Tuesday, March 15th” (Disney, 2022). Many employees did follow through on the action by walking off the job for short periods of time (Smith, 2022). The failure to speak up on the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” was being defined as a scandal by many stakeholders. CEO Chapek stated Disney officials had been working behind the scenes to achieve a better outcome and that the company was still supportive of LGBTQ+ rights. But this response was labeled as “tone deaf” during a time when organizations are expected to speak out on important socio-political issues. He even claimed corporate statements did little to change political outcomes. CEO Chapek then apologized to employees: “You needed me to be a stronger ally in the fight for equal rights and I let you down. I am sorry” (BBC, 2022). It should be noted that the non-statement is likely to draw potential scandalization but not lionization. A non-statement is a sign of quiescence. Why praise a corporation for simply not opposing your position?

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Following the apology and the public protest by employees, Disney began to speak out against the “Don’t Say Gay Bill.” When the bill was passed, Disney stated: “Our goal as a company is for this law to be repealed by the legislature or struck down in the courts, and we remain committed to supporting the national and state organizations working to achieve that” (Johnson, 2022). After demonstrating its support, Disney received some muted support of the LGBTQ+ advocacy groups and LGBTQ+ employees. However, these allies were now critical of Disney’s late entry into the issue discussion but no longer tried to actively scandalize Disney’s response (Abad-Santos, 2022). By shifting course, Disney indicated the company reaffirmed its support for LGBTQ+ rights, an element of its reputation Disney had been cultivating for years (Johnson, 2022). Disney was no longer being portrayed as hypocritical and exploitative of the LGBTQ+ community. The view changed from considering Disney’s actions as scandalous to simply disappointment. However, Disney’s now vocal opposition to “Don’t Say Gay Bill” triggered a backlash from conservatives. This included politicians and a segment of the Disney workforce. Conservative politicians used the negative label “woke” to refer to Disney. Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, the primary force behind the “Don’t Say Gay Bill,” spearheaded the attack on Disney: “When that company has very high up people talking about injecting pansexualism into programing for young kids, it’s wrong. Walt Disney would not want that. And so get back to the mission. Do what you did great. That’s why people love the company, and you’ve lost your way. Maybe this will be the wakeup call that they need to get back on track” (Comins, 2022). Disney was perceived to be acting scandalously because its opposition to the bill seemed to the supported immoral behavior. DeSantis has maintained schools had been grooming children and seeking to create pansexualism. The “Don’t Say Gay Bill” would help to block these immoral practices. The claim was that Disney leadership had lost its way—had become immoral. DeSantis was trying to scandalize Disney’s opposition to the bill. DeSantis pressed further by punishing Disney for its opposition. He said, “I am not comfortable having one company with their own government and special privileges, when that company has pledged itself to attacking the parents in my state” (Comins, 2022). DeSantis then pushed through legislation to strip Disney of its special status for the Reedy Creek Improvement District which was created in 1967 and gave Disney control over the area and exempted the land from Florida land use regulations. Disney has broad control over the area including construction permitting and building codes (Barzso, 2022). DeSantis was part of a group of conservative politicians seeking to scandalize Disney’s opposition to the “Don’t Say Gay Bill.” Conservative Disney employees were upset by the switch in response as well. They published and promoted their own open letter in digital media and the open letter garnered traditional media coverage too. The letter noted, “The company’s evolving response to the so-called ‘Don’t Say Gay’ legislation in Florida has left many of us wondering what place we have in a company actively promoting a political agenda so far removed from our own. TWDC leadership frequently communicates its commitment to creating an inclusive workplace where cast members

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feel comfortable sharing their perspectives and being their authentic selves at work. That is not our workplace experience” (Pratt, 2022). The conservative employees also argued hypocrisy by Disney and a moral failure—behavior that could be considered scandalous. Disney was not being inclusive because its actions were alienating and harming the conservative employees. “Over the last few weeks, we have watched as our leadership has expressed their condemnation for laws and policies we support. We have watched as our colleagues, convinced that no one in the company could possibly disagree with them and grow increasingly aggressive in their demands. They insist that TWDC take a strong stance on not only this issue but other legislation and openly advocate for the punishment of employees who disagree with them” (Pratt, 2022). The conservative employees indicated they were being oppressed by the new Disney response. Disney’s experience with the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” illustrated the efforts to scandalize corporations who do not speak on an issue and what happens once the conformist corporation does speak on the issue. Pressured by the efforts to scandalize its silence thereby generating negative publicity and reputational harm, Disney did speak against the bill. However, Disney’s stance was not lionized by its former critics. Instead, the former critics were still upset Disney was slow to take a stand. However, the supporters of the “Don’t Say Gay Bill” were quick to try to scandalize Disney’s position on the issue. Disney was labeled as anti-parent in an effort to inflict negative publicity and reputational damage on the corporation. Moreover, politicians punished Disney for saying it would work to overturn the bill by stripping Disney of special rights the state of Florida had granted the corporation for some 50 years. The case illustrates how not speaking and then speaking on a socio-political issue can instigate efforts by opposing sides to both scandalize the corporation. His process can be called a scandalization cascade.

3.3

Summary

The extended case examples illustrate the duality of scandalization with a context of polarizing socio-political issues. LGBTQ+ rights have been identified as a polarizing socio-political issue (USC, 2022). The idea of scandalization becomes rooted in partisanship. It is a matter of a scandal for whom and about what. A corporation’s position is fodder for scandalization for those opposing that position while potentially evoking lionization by those sharing that position. Such is the duality of scandalization in a polarized environment. Moreover, not speaking about an issue can be a source of scandalization by one side of the issue while speaking on an issue can be used as a source of scandalization by another side of the issue. The opposite actions of taking a stand and not taking a stand can create a cascade of scandalization efforts.

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4 Discussion Whether they like it or not, corporate managers increasingly find themselves taking stands and actions on socio-political issues. Some corporations choose to be crusaders by leading on socio-political issues while other corporations reluctantly join the discussion as conformists due to the pressure of stakeholder expectations to speak. Taking a stance on a socio-political issue is complicated because of the polarized environment which envelopes these issues. The corporate stance on a socio-political issue will win support from some and opposition from others. The polarized environment of socio-political issues creates a unique dynamic for scandalization. Crusading corporations take stands early on socio-political issues. These stands are likely to produce both scandalization from opponents and lionization from supporters. There will be a duality to the scandalization process. The duality of scandalization due to polarization emerges is two forms. First the same stance on a socio-political issue can be both scandalized and lionized. Taking a stand on a sociopolitical issue can result in some constituents lionizing and corporations and others scandalizing the corporate actions. Second, silence can scandalized by those expecting corporations to take a stand on a socio-political issue. Constituents can seek to scandalize corporations that do not speak out on particular socio-political issues. These corporations are scandalized for their cowardly behavior and lack of social responsibility. Conforming corporations are initially silent on a particular socio-political issue but critics will seek to scandalize the silence and for the corporations to take a stand. Scandalization efforts create pressure by threatening the social evaluation assets of the corporation. Once the conforming corporation takes a stand, the criticism will reside from one side, but the opposing side will now try to scandalize the corporation’s position. Former enemies go silent while a formerly silent element of stakeholders become antagonistic toward the corporation. Conforming corporations are likely to face a cascading scandalization effect as different sides of the issue seek to scandalize what the corporation is not or is saying about the socio-political issue. Sometimes it appears corporations must decide which side of an issue to support— who they want to lionize them and who they want to scandalize them. Polarization represents a distinct complicating element for understanding the scandalization process. It helps us to understand how an action be both scandalized and lionized and how inaction can become scandalized. Future research involving scandalization needs to consider how polarization is affecting the scandalization process. Polarization creates new conditions for scandalization because scandalization and lionization for an action are possible as the different sides of socio-political issues have polarized (opposing) views of an action. Future research needs to explore the effects of polarization around socio-political issues on corporate communicators. Corporate managers cope with socio-political issues on a regular basis because concerns about environment, social, and governance (ESG) and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) have become politicized—are now socio-political issues.

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Research needs to explore the effect of polarization and scandalization on the behaviors of corporate communicators. Has the scandalization around socio-political made corporate communicators less likely to engage in socio-political issues? Are corporate communicators less willing to report ESG and DEI efforts for fear those actions will be scandalized? Are corporate managers finding new ways to talk about ESG and DEI in order to avoid scandalization for their positions? Moreover, scandalization can be part of the effort to move a corporation from silence to taking a stand on a socio-political issue. That stance can then be the subject of scandalization creating a cascade effect. The increased pressure on corporations to speak on socio-political issues is one arena in which we can view and analyze the way polarization affects scandalization. Research needs to explore if not responding to pressure to communicate on a socio-political issue is more damaging to social evaluations than taking a stand on the issue and facing scandalization as a form of backlash for that position. Currently the assumption is that staking a stand is preferable to silence but is that really true or under what conditions might it be true or false? Furthermore, what are the effects of being a conforming corporation? We need to explore how taking a stand after first being silent affects social evaluations. Do those who were forcing the stance then support the corporation and if so, under what conditions? Do the negative consequences of those who scandalize the organization for the stance outweigh the benefits of the support from those urging the corporation to take a stand? What factors influence the decision to remain silent or to take a stand on a socio-political issue? We need much more research on this idea of the cascading scandalization effect. What we do know is that polarization has changed the way corporate behaviors are scandalized creating a much more complex environment for corporate communicators.

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Leave Olympia Alone: Reversing the Approach Toward the Parisian Salon Scandal of 1865 Anna Kleiman

Abstract This study re-examines the socio-cultural scandal surrounding the exhibition of Manet’s Olympia in the Parisian Salon of 1865, byshifting the spotlight away from the painting toward the outraged Parisian viewers. Using the argument of scandalogists (research of scandals), that scandal is usually perceived as a result, when it is more of a scandalization process (Coombs & Holladay, 2020, p. 144). By means of close reading, I decipher the destructive responses toward the painting, of both critics and viewers of the time as well as of art historians in the 1980s , who's studies reached a canonical status in the art history discipline. Lighting aesthetic judgement of nude genre painting as camouflage of violent power, I conclude by inquiring into the phenomenon of sexual harassment and sexual assault in the public sphere and into the blaming of its targets as an expression and perpetuation of men’s domination over the public sphere.

1 Introduction The Parisian Salon of 1865 was of a particularly high profile, due to its exhibition of Eduard Manet’s Olympia. The painting portrays a woman, painted after the impressionist painter Victorine Meurent, who was Manet’s favorite model and is depicted in several of his paintings. The characters’ name suggests an occupation as a Parisian sex worker (Clark, 1980, p. 86), Olympia is depicted as lying on a bed, naked apart from some jewelry, a pair of delicate shoes, and a flower in her hair. Beside her a black servant, painted after Laure, family name unknown, is depicted handing her flowers. At her feet is a black cat, with an arched back and fur standing on end. The painting was reviewed in journals and print media as many as eighty times (Clark, 1984, p. 18). Eugénie de Montijo, the Empress and wife of Napoleon the Third, hit the painting with her fan (Burchell, 1971, p. 97). Outraged visitors struck A. Kleiman (✉) Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_6

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the canvas with their walking sticks and umbrellas (Courthion, 1962, p. 76). Salon visitors gathered in front of the painting, whistling and catcalling, until police officers were hired to protect the painting (Laran & Le Bas, 1912, p. 24; Fried, 1996, p. 308). One critic referred to Olympia as a “victim of Parisian Lynch law” (Ravenel, 1984, p. 139). In his memoir on Eduard Manet, his friend and journalist Antonine Proust wrote that “[i]f Olympia’s canvas wasn’t destroyed completely, it was due to the precautions taken by the Salon administration” (1913, p. 47, author’s translation). He referred to what Bernheimer described as the Salon’s response to “this apparent affront to [the bourgeois public’s] morality,” namely, rehanging the painting “high up out of its retaliatory reach” (1989, p. 256). The scandal surrounding Olympia’s exhibition has troubled scholars ever since, who attempted to decipher the many destructive responses of its viewers from varied perspectives. Such scholars turn to the painting and the manner of its exhibition when looking for the reasons this scandal has erupted and unfolded as it did, placing the body and/or sexuality of the painted character of Olympia at the center of analysis. In this study, I criticize such close reading of nude genre paintings and suggest another, perhaps even an opposing approach to elucidating the source of the scandal. Precisely, I propose shifting the spotlight away from the painting and toward the Parisian public, on the scale from the petit bourgeoisie to the Empress herself, and their norms that were clearly undermined. Many scholars have tried to pinpoint what it exactly was about the painting and the three depicted figures that provoked such social and cultural outrage in mid-nineteenth century Paris. Two canonical texts on the scandal, discussed at length below, are Timothy James Clark’s chapter on Olympia in The Painting of Modern Life (1984), and Charles Bernheimer’s article “Figuration of a Scandal” (1989). I chose those texts over countless others because of their canonical status in the discipline of art history. These are the texts usually chosen to be taught in introductions to modern art in universities around the world. Nonetheless, I argue that these texts, dating from the 1980s, maintain a misogynistic tradition that started with the painting’s many critics and abusers in 1865. Moreover, this tradition persisted to present day, and through the indisiplinary prism we can learn a lot about the way this tradition manifests in present day narrratives. In the following part, I present central methods and concepts I use to examine the socio-cultural unfolding of the scandal. I suggest using tools of Scandalogy— research of scandals—as a starting point, to shift the spotlight away from the painted Olympia and her body toward the Parisian bourgeois public and their norms. Secondly, I draw on Annie Hill’s concept of Rape Logic, that she defines as “a discursive and visual ideology that attached sexual desire and consent to a woman’s appearance” (2016, p. 24). The third part is dedicated to the research tendency to turn to the painting when looking for the reasons of the outrage. I do that by means of a close reading of two canonical texts mentioned above that analyze the scandal. In the fourth part I examine the scandal and the two texts through Bourdieu’s theory on taste judgement and Nead’s (1979) re-formalizing thereof from a gender perspective, as a practice of class identification. I conclude by inquiring into the phenomenon of sexual violence in the public sphere and the blaming of its targets, as a similar de-humanizing tool of reaffirming patriarchal power.

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2 Methods and Concepts Prima facie, there is no human victim involved in this particular scandal. There are the men and women of nineteenth-century France, the visitors of the Parisian Salon. There is a man painter and there is an object: a framed canvas covered with oil paint. When looking at the documented scandal and its academic interpretations, however, it seems to me that Olympia—the painted figure—is repeatedly the one held responsible for ostensible “mistakes” of the painter. What is more, the painted Olympia is also the one whose body and sexuality are placed at the center of the canonical texts from the late twentieth century that analyze the scandal critically, trying to untangle the possible reasons for why the painting was perceived so negatively. This scandal, as I shall argue, acts as one of the predecessors for the ways in which women are deemed responsible for scandals they did not cause, a tendency still prevalent today. Although violence toward a human being and violence toward a painted canvas are categorically different phenomena, this scandal exposes an entangled, interrelated relationship between the two, which I aim to explore further. Scandalogy is an emerging discipline that serves as the methodological departure point of this study, to decipher the destructive public responses toward Manet’s Olympia more accurately. Although interdisciplinary in essence, it is dominated by political scientists and media researchers. Scandals taking place in the fields of art and visual culture are traditionally examined using reception theories. Here, I specifically draw on the argument that our tendency is to “often think of scandal as an outcome, [while] in reality, a scandal is more a [. . .] scandalization process” (Coombs & Holladay, 2020, p. 144). This view suggests that “the actual misconduct [. . .] is of secondary relevance” (Verbalyte, 2018, p. 68). According to Clark, the depiction of Olympia’s body displaces her from the sublimated imagery of the nude genre, where her appearance could be perceived as an aesthetic form, and instead anchors the image in the social world and its hierarchies that it shares with its contemporaries (1984, p. 88; p. 92). Bernheimer focuses on gender from a psychoanalytical perspective, and addresses Olympia’s confrontational gaze directed at the bourgeois viewer of the time, as the main feature provoking the scandal. He argues that Olympia’s gaze lends her depiction of personhood, specifically sexual subjecthood, confronting the bourgeois Parisian men that look at her as full-fledged lechers. I interpret Olympia’s gaze in much the same way: precisely when read together with the cat’s direct look at the viewer while it arches its back (a hostile gesture, a sign of being threatened), Olympia’s gaze reverses the power relations of looking and being looked at, as if the viewer had infiltrated a space where they were not invited and were caught by the gazes of its rightful inhabitants. Nevertheless, we part as Bernheimer and Clark point at several features of the painting in their search of the triggers of the scandalous responses, all surrounding the particular depiction of Olympia's body, and the level of its genre conventionality.

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Looking at these texts, it appears they look at the scandal as a certain outcome of the painting’s characteristics, especially the representation of Olympia and her body, which are thus designated as the cause of the outrage. However, when looking at the scandal as a process of scandalization—a “social mechanism of setting and maintaining boundaries between right and wrong” (Kepplinger, 2020, p. 17), “rather than [. . .] an automatic reaction to the violation of norms” (Coombs & Holladay, 2020, p. 147)—the shift in the research perspective can follow: What social norms, ideas, and beliefs of Parisian bourgeois society were so brutally undermined that they collectively inflicted violence on Olympia? I read Clark’s and Bernheimer’s canonical texts through the contemporary concept of rape logic, as delineated by Annie Hill: Rape logic is a discursive and visual ideology that attaches sexual desire and consent to a woman’s appearance; how a woman appears is claimed to communicate messages that men discern through looking. . . . [It] regards men’s acts of sexual violence as involuntary, instinctive, or reasonable and depicts women’s appearance as agentic, investing it with the power to communicate desire and direct conduct. (2016, pp. 24-25)

Hill then quotes John Berger’s Ways of Seeing: “A woman’s presence expresses her own attitude toward herself, and defines what can and cannot be done to her. [. . .] Presence for a woman is so intrinsic to her person that men tend to think of it as an almost physical emanation” (2008, p. 46). According to Hill’s definition, Rape logic frames the visibility of women—their mere presence, the possibility of them to be looked at—as the primary cause of their objectification. Rape logic is echoed in Berger’s address to ways women are precepted (“[their] gestures, voice, opinions, expressions, clothes, choice of surroundings, taste” (ibid) in paintings. Women’s appearances are thus culturally read as the “desire to appear as an object of desire before men” (Hill, 2016, p. 27). Not only consent, but active desire, agentic sexual power that is exerted upon their passive viewers, are attached to appearances of women. Thereby, it is possible to see how the appearance of a corporal, living woman, unmediated by a painting, is culturally read as a representation itself, and vice versa.1

The idea that “real” femininity can be read as representational is present across several disciplines. See, for example, Joan Rivière, in “Womanliness as a Masquerade,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 9, 303–313,1929, takes on a psychoanalytical approach; Judith Butler in “Imitation and Gender Insubordination”, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, edited by Abelove et al., New York and London: Routledge, 1993, develops the idea within queer studies; another notable interdisciplinary work is by Lucy Irigaray, This Sex which is not One, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985. 1

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3 Analysis and Critique Of course, nude paintings are by no means corporeal women. Yet, Bernheimer notes that nudes “put women on display for the pleasure of a spectator, presumed to be male. [Their] naked body becomes nude insofar as it is seen as an erotic object offered to the man’s gaze” (1989, p. 58). Nudes are depictions of the womanly appearance of the model, separated from her subjecthood and transposed into an inanimate object. The essential purpose of the painted canvas is to appear, to be looked at. Therefore, it can be mobilized in the service of rape logic, in the sense that the depicted woman is understood in terms of the purpose of bringing about visual pleasure, as a painting and, to borrow Laura Mulvey’s terminology, as a to-belooked-at femininity (1975, p. 11). This entanglement justifies the study of scandals within the domain of art and visual culture using interdisciplinary methods. From this perspective, when taking into account Clark’s argument on Olympia’s sexual subjectivity (1984, p. 132), as well as Bernheimer’s argument of her subjective gaze (1989, p. 259), the deviation from nude painting''s conventions seems all the more jarring. Not only does Olympia look at the viewer in a confrontational manner that reverses power relations, but she does so while reclining naked on a bed, a traditional composition suggesting a commodity is being offered to the viewer. If that is not enough, her gaze also undermines the very purpose of “her” as a visual figure in a painting to begin with, to be exhibited, looked at, and judged as a cultural product in the Parisian Salon, the most prestigious institution of higher art of the time.

3.1

Critique on Clark’s Analysis

In “Olympia’s Choice,” Clark shows how Olympia is referred to in terms that are similar to actual sex workers present in public space, rather than as they are represented in art and literature. He points to critiques referring to the character as someone who might be easily spotted in specific Parisian streets that are known to be inhabited by lower class sex workers. His analysis points to immense difference between perceptions of the courtesan, a category of prostitutes that was expected to float “above or below” class and money, while Olympia, he continues, “seems to occupy a quite determinate place in the Parisian Class system” (1984, pp. 87–88). Clark offers corroborating sources about prostitution of the time, cast as a modern and dark phenomenon that occupies public space, reflects the decline of society, and symbolizes the dark side of Modern Paris and modernity at large. I find several points in Clark’s analysis problematic. To begin, Clark’s research question is at stake. He asks: “What was it then, that [the critics] believed they saw and thought improper?” (1984, p. 89). This way, he positions the source of the scandal in the body of the character of Olympia. Although his analysis of the “catalogue of insults” brings him to conclude that they had “nothing to say about

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her” (1984, 99), he nevertheless proceeds to answer his question by the close analysis of Olympia’s bodily depiction. Following various points brought up by the critics, Clark puts the main subject of the painting as he sees it, that is, “Olympia’s beauty, her sexual power, and how that relates to her body being female” (1984, p. 131), under the microscope, attempting to recognize the things the public “saw” in the painting “and thought improper” (1984, p. 89): The anger needs explaining [. . .] I shall first point to the way the body is addressed to the viewer in Olympia, and then go on to talk of the body’s “incorrectness,” as a thing drawn and painted; from there I shall move to the particular marks of sex upon it, and how they are handled; and finally, to the way the body is inscribed in paint (1984, pp. 131-132).

When Clark describes the supposed “incorrectness” of the painted body, he mainly repeats the nineteenth-century gore description of a woman’s body subjected to violence, rather than reconsider his alleged “incorrectness,” anatomically or with regards to perspective. Clark also mobilizes a somewhat flattened psychoanalytical approach to make sense of the anger, justifying it as a result: “These are signs of panic and incomprehension in the critics, but they have some basis in the way Olympia’s body is actually drawn” (1984, p. 134). His description of the way she is drawn, which has little to do with the argued “incorrectness” of her body, focuses on details in fragmented body parts and is impossible to read without following his gaze. For instance, he defines some body parts as “declarative” and thus “demand to be looked at” (1984, p. 134–135). He provides a highly detailed account of Olympia’s chest as his eyes linger there (ibid); describing her tight necklace, he repeats and affirms the dissection of Olympia’s body (1984, p. 135); and he finishes with a metaphor of uncalled-for violence: “The body is in part tied down by drawing, held in place quite harshly” (ibid). He proceeds to argue several related points: On the one hand, Olympia’s body is laid out to be scanned. It is sexualized and accessible to the viewer, fitting the genre conventions. Her face, on the other hand, is particular and recognizable. It does not fit the genre conventions, expected to be depicted as an abstraction of feminine beauty. Although he points to the critics’ treatment of Olympia’s hands as unworthy to focus on, he simultaneously justifies them in a Freudian key as anxious responses to erect phalli: “[Her hand] failed to enact the lack of the phallus, (which is not to say it quite signified the opposite)” (1984, p. 135). He reads the fringes of the shawl as a displacement of her pubic hair, which arguably signifies uncontrolled, animalistic sexuality. In this way, Clark insists on putting Olympia’s sexuality as well as unproven so-called bodily incorrectness and ambiguity at the center of his analysis. Clark’s argument about Olympia’s hair, which requires a concentrated look to distinguish from its background, I find of particular interest: When Olympia’s hair below the flower goes unnoticed, Clark says, her face looks sharper and more masculine, “but once noticed, the flat, cutout face is suddenly surrounded and rounded by the [...] hair; the flower converts from a plain silhouette into an object which rests in the hair beneath; the head is softened, the hair is unpinned; this body

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has abundance after all, it has a familiar sex. [. . .] Once it is seen, this happens, but in 1865 it was not seen” (1984, p. 137). Clark’s gaze apparently has the power to turn Olympia into a familiar depiction of femininity after all. She becomes easy to digest as a convention-abiding nude at last. Although it is not intuitive, he reveals how little effect the particularity of Olympia’s face has on him due to his ability to see her hair. It is suggested between the lines that if only the critics in 1865 had been able to see her hair as Clark, then maybe they would not have felt as threatened. They could have seen what a great nude Olympia could be, how easily she could be perceived as “an object of somebody else’s desire” (1984, p. 131). Maybe they would not need to be so harsh in their critique and violence. Furthermore, Clark’s informed gaze fixes not only the “ugliness” or “masculinity” of the face to which the critics took such offense, but also some of the “mistakes” of Manet’s flattening technique, turning the flat silhouette of the flower into a voluminous object. Unlike the critics of the time, Clark is not threatened by this depiction, because he is able to turn an educated, confident gaze on Olympia’s hair and treat her as any other conventional nude, a worthy aesthetic and sexual object. Clark positions himself next to the angry critiques of the mid-nineteenth-century, as if he is standing nonchalantly and perceptively next to them as they lose their temper.

3.2

Critique on Bernheimer’s Analysis

Like Clark, Bernheimer also follows a selection of critics and refers to the painting in search of the reasons for their anger. His starting point is a Freudian sense of “lack” that he recognizes in some of the critiques: a motif of “absence, negativity, lack, and decay” (1989, p. 258). Bernheimer turns to the painting in search of this lack. While his general argument about how painting both invites and exposes the “production of woman as fetish object in patriarchal consumer society” (1989, p. 256) holds water, there are several problems in his text that I would like to point out. Firstly, Bernheimer’s metaphors are filled with a violent aspect echoing some of Clark’s: “Olympia is at once mutilated and whole, her bodily parts at once dislocated and fused” (1989, p. 260); she is “decapitated by the ribbon around her neck” (1989, p. 266). Secondly, what he finds instead of a lack is rather an overwhelming presence of sexual symbols. Following Clark, he points to Olympia’s flexed hand and fingers, which hide the vulva but symbolize penises, and the shawl as a displacement of her pubic hair, hinting at a wild, “animalistic” sexuality (1989, p. 269). The cat symbolizes both a vulva and an erection (1989, pp. 270–271). The bouquet of flowers carried by the servant, symbolizes a vulva as well. The presence of a black servant serves both as a displacement of Olympia’s supposedly animalistic, uncontrolled sexuality and a symbol of womanhood as slavery (1989, p. 274). Even Olympia’s gaze is said to resemble pornographic photographs in which women “stare out at the viewer in a direct, uninflected manner” (1989, p. 273). However, the gaze of the model depicted in the photograph he is referring to from

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Gerald Needham’s article is not direct or uninflected, but rather a sideways gaze with a noticeable grin, not reminiscent of Olympia’s gaze but more of traditional nude paintings (Needham, 1972, p. 86). For Bernheimer, all these displacements of Olympia’s sexuality expose the dynamics by which women’s appearances are fetishized, which are usually hidden in the finished cultural product of the conventional nude. Their presence in the painting, he writes, evokes a castration anxiety that stands in the core of the heated responses to the painting. Bernheimer states that the Freudian psychoanalysis of the responses to Olympia is not enough to make sense of the scandal (1989, p. 269). Still, it seems to be enough for him to speculate that the viewers noticed the numerous vulvas and phalli surrounding the painting: “Aren’t those fingers like penises, and didn’t Freud maintain that a multiplication of penis symbols signifies castration?” (1989, p. 268); “Its perplexing representation stimulates an unconscious anxiety” (1989, p. 269). He thus turns back to the nineteenth-century critiques, illuminating them as defensive de-threatening, eventually disproving their argued lack. The comments on Olympia’s alleged sexual identity are therefore ultimately validated. He finds so easily what it was in the painting that made the critics see her as scandalously non-feminine. For Bernheimer, Olympia is “defined pointedly by her sexuality” (1989, p. 263). Although offering complex points about the visual dynamics of prostitution, Bernheimer’s reading results in a fetishization of Olympia, of her body, and of her surroundings. Her apparent subjectivity is a “desiring” one, suggesting that even if a level of subjecthood could be attributed to her, it is already occupied with desiring the viewer (1989, p. 263). He even points to the responses that refer to her as a corpse as sexualizing her, a point he does not elaborate on (1989, pp. 265–266). His arguments circle back to the critics he focuses on and shed an understanding light on their anger. The scandal is thus ultimately justified: there are plenty of ambiguous and incoherent sexual signs in the painting, and a psychoanalytical approach is de facto enough for Bernheimer to answer, unintentionally, Clark’s research question: all those phalli and vulvas are exactly what the critics saw and thought improper. Bernheimer’s reading thus falls into the fetishization processes he aims to expose.

3.3

Other Readings

Other readings of Olympia do exist. Caroline Van Eck notably expands on the argument on Olympia’s subjecthood as follows: [Olympia] renders any unreflected, spontaneous projection of desire by the male viewer impossible because in his way of looking at the spectator, conscious and clearly full of her own thoughts and ideas, she refuses to be reduced to a passive object of desire. [. . .] they appear to be aware of being viewed [...]:while on display for other viewers. [. . .] Manet's subjects are conscious of the presence and actions of these others. (2015, p. 422; author’s emphasis)

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The consciousness that was suggested both by Clark and Bernheimer is described here as engaged with itself: it is not desiring the viewer, nor is it necessarily a sign of sexuality to begin with. If anything, in my eyes, Olympia seems impatient and condescending toward the viewer. I propose viewing Clark’s and Bernheimer’s analyses as practices of taste judgement. Pierre Bourdieu has argued in his Distinctions (1979) that the judgement of taste on cultural products is an exercise of class distinctions. Parallel to the class hierarchy of individuals stands a hierarchy of products and consumption, which in turn constructs consumers and their place in social hierarchies. The appreciation of high culture and the condemnation of low forms of culture is a practice of classed self-reaffirmation and of renunciation of lower classes: The objects endowed with the greatest distinctive power are those which most clearly attest the quality of the appropriation, and therefore the quality of their owner, [. . .] which therefore appear as the surest indications of the quality of the person. What is at stake here is indeed “personality,” i.e. the quality of the person, which is affirmed in the capacity to appropriate an object of quality. (1979, p. 271)

A “sacred frontier” is therefore set between the legitimate culture that the educated class can appreciate, through the knowledge and cultural capital to which their class has access via upbringing and education (1979, p. 6). The frontier is policed by means of, amongst other things, the aesthetic judgement of paintings. It is not so much the painting itself that is at stake in this form of critique, but rather the viewers’ and critics’ class. When reading the scandal through this prism, it becomes evident that the cultural product discussed is the means rather than the object of criticism. The critics’ real object of interest is the affiliation with higher social status, which makes possible for one to differentiate between “appropriate” art and venal representation. Olympia’s scandal did not take place within intellectual circles only. It was precisely the violent “lynch” mob, as Ravenel called it (1996, p. 139), of Salon visitors—from the Empress herself to the lower bourgeoisie visiting the Salon on Sundays free of charge—which has made the scandal so prominent in the cultural and academic landscape to this day. Clark and Bernheimer rightly show how even most of the professional criticism of the painting couldn’t formulate a worthy artistic review of Olympia (Clark, 1984, pp. 92–93; Bernheimer, 1989, p. 259). Reading through the prism of Bourdieu’s work, including oneself in the same group with the intellectuals discussing Olympia and its place within the French avant-garde was accessible for all Salon visitors. They have done so even when they perhaps did not fully master the aesthetics codes of the time deciding whether a nude painting was either good or bad. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that “it has become an established critical tactic in the 1860s to detect the contemporary, even the bourgeois, courtesan beneath the skin of a Venus” in Salon reviews, as Clark writes (1984, p. 86). This distinction practice is similar, he points out, to calling the difference between low-class prostitutes and high-class courtesans or “chaste women” (1984, pp. 101–102).

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4 Critique of Close Reading of Nudes I suggest looking at visual analysis of nude paintings as a tool for portraying oneself as an educated and elegant consumer, who is consciously not falling for the masquerade of modern femininity. Lynda Nead, in her book The Female Nude (1995), argues that high art is perceived in the discipline of art history to be the tool that transforms the naked body into an abstract nude, “from a perception of unformed, corporeal matter,” which may pose a threat, “to the recognition of unity and constraint” (p. 14). Therefore, the female body symbolizes the pinnacle of high culture as a whole, in that it demonstrates its transitional power: [I]f art is defined as the conversion of matter into form, imagine how much greater the triumph for art is if it is the female body that is transformed—pure nature transmuted, through the forms of art, into pure culture. The female nude, then, is not simply one subject among others, one form among many, it is the subject, the form. [. . .] it is a paradigm of the transforming effects of legitimate high culture (1995, p. 18; p. 85; original emphasis).

In this sense, the distinction between a well-executed nude and a badly executed nude is the strongest indicator of taste—and therefore—of class. Nead argues that feminine appearances are put on a scale by which they are to be judged, in which two extremes are opposed by the social class of their consumers: On the one hand, there is the fine-art female nude as a symbol of the pure, disinterested, functionless gaze and of the female body transubstantiated; and, on the other hand, we have the images of pornography, the realm of the profane and mass culture [. . .] Between these two extremes lies a range of cultural distinctions and a sacred frontier which is drawn and redrawn along the lines of competing definitions of acceptability and unacceptability. (1995, p. 85)

One of the factors by which the socio-cultural distinction of works across the scale is decided is where and how the image is seen" (1995, p. 86). Nead’s reformulation of Bourdieu’s theory through a gender prism allows for a deeper understanding of the power dynamics in the Salon scandal. The exhibition of Olympia in the prestigious Parisian Salon, now read through Bourdieu’s theory, undermined the bourgeoisie’s practice of classifying art works, the women depicted in them, and ultimately themselves, positioning themselves as the high-class masters of the visible lingo of high art and feminine appearance alike. The presence of Olympia in the Salon undermined the sacredness of the cultural space and its ability to transubstantiate matter into spirit, on both levels: from paint to art, and from woman’s body to pleasing form. The display of the painting in the Salon space must have felt as an act of blasphemy to the very process of classification, the transgression of a frontier that upholds the sacredness of the space, and its inhabitants, their class hierarchies, and their properties. The disgust expressed toward Olympia can be therefore seen as an expression of the viewers’ aspirations to belong to the social elite, whose taste in and judgement on representations of femininity are based on knowledge available to them, rather than as a critique that has to do with the qualities of Manet’s work.

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From this perspective, the seemingly opposing negative and very few positive responses to Olympia may not be as oppositional as they seem. Emile Zola’s positive critique of Olympia ought to be mentioned here, as it participates in the same system of class identification. As Bernheimer pointed out (1989, p. 264), Zola praised the painting from a formalist approach, looking at the depicted humans, a cat, and objects as abstract patches of color, which would make Olympia a masterpiece (Zola, 1970, pp. 110–111). He argued for Manet to be ahead of his time in this sense, misunderstood by the outraged masses of the time. Unlike the critics that mock the painting, and unlike the barbaric Salon visitors that attack it, Zola recognizes its value without feeling threatened. Reading through Bourdieu, Zola is distancing himself here from both uneducated laypersons and conventional critics, and reaffirms his own connoisseurship. Crucially, the readings of Clark and Bernheimer can be understood in a similar vein. The meaning that ‘high class’ holds here consists of an academic analysis of the social and art-historical contexts of the painting, aiming to shed critical light on the scandal. Clark’s analysis of Olympia’s face and hair expresses the ability of a sophisticated gaze to see her as a conventional non-scandalous nude (1984). Bernheimer explains how the reactions are only too understandable when considering all the anxiety-evoking vaginas and phalli. Both put forth an analysis that the art critics from the mid-nineteenth-century have apparently failed to provide. “Objects [. . .] are not objective in the ordinary sense of the word,” writes Bourdieu, “i.e., independent of the interest and tastes of those who perceive them, and they do not impose the self-evidence of a universal, unanimously approved meaning” (1979, p. 100). No additional analysis of Olympia’s painted body will provide the one meaning that can be pointed to as the ultimate source of the outraged responses. The public reactions to the painting are a symptom of a deeper, more complex set of unstable hierarchies, which cannot be said to originate in the painting in any way. When looking closer into the scale of representations of the women’s bodies as proposed by Nead (1995), it becomes clear that neither the two extremes nor the range between them allow for a woman to be represented as her own person, just as an entity affording sexual and/or aesthetic pleasure. Olympia brought in a code that mid-nineteenth-century society did not have the visual and discursive skills to decipher. The character simply does not fit Nead’s scale. For mid-nineteenth-century society allowed for no social or artistic category for a woman who is both human and has a body. When a woman is represented with a consciousness, as Van Eck claims Olympia is (2015), the social hierarchies of the viewers are undermined: their entitlement to access to any woman’s representation, the a priori fact of ownership by the viewer. This is the scandal figured: the frustrated sexist and classicist expectations of men’s ownership over women’s bodies in general, specifically their socially normalized entitlement for receiving undisturbed sexual pleasure in the Parisian Salon, the space that validates art as high culture. The scandal is a result of undermined power. Imagine how embarrassing it is for power to be undermined by a painting, quite literally an inanimate object supposed to be the emblem of high art, the emblem

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of sexuality disciplined and owned, a depiction of a naked prostitute. Therefore, power, through its holders and upholders, responded violently and sexually—and by doing so exposed itself as well as its inherent violence, which otherwise remains disguised as intellectual aesthetic judgement. It also exposes how deeply this entitlement is naturalized and normalized. This applies not only to the nineteenthcentury Parisian society, but also to that of England and the USA of the 1980s, Clark’s and Bernheimer’s time and places; the common denominator here would be Western modern capitalist societies.

5 Discussion: Sexist Violence One might conclude here that I argue against the visual analysis of nudes, and one would not be far from right in that respect. Linda Nochlin, in her article “The Imaginary Orient” (1989) argues that orientalism as a genre, though still sometimes claimed to be a-political, is a de facto concealing of the ideology of the Western-European colonialism and white supremacy. The same is true regarding Nude genre paintings: as a genre, it is highly dependent on its concealment as a-political pieces of art that merely represent formal beauty and meaning. Discussing nude genre paintings in terms of their aesthetic quality without re-evaluating its political use, inevitably means practicing this very ideology, in this case - the intertwined, patriarchal and capitalist notions that women's bodies are to be consumed by men, physically and visually, mediated by art or not. Such reading - of both 1865 and 1980's - fail to point to the quite basic perception of feminine appearances under such ideology. In other words, the painting was attacked because the idea that a woman can be represented - and therefore exist - with her own thoughts and ideas, not merely for the (obscene or high cultured) pleasure of viewers - is unforgivable. Reading the painting without examining, to paraphrase Nochlin, the patriarchal, colonial and capitalist power structures in which the painting came into being, will eventually reaffirm the same de-humanizing ideologies (1989, p. 34). 1989198. This can also explain the recurring pattern in the nineteenth-century critique of Olympia that positions the depicted white woman in particular streets and areas in Paris (Clark, 1984, pp. 87–88). Her positioning in real public spaces that are associated with sex workers is the bourgeoisie’s attempt to take control over the subject they have created themselves. Unable to do so within the frame of aesthetic judgement, they had to shift their object of critique into another familiar frame, where they can continue expressing ownership of her. They first humanized the painted character of Olympia, and then de-humanized her as an act of condemnation of the “profane” as well as their simultaneous self-classification as masters of judgement and enlightenment. The effect is therefore reversed: the more the critics and the public are losing their temper over Olympia, the more the motivation to undermine existing categories can grow for whomever is exposed to their banter. The stronger the backlash, the further

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their cries echo—the more women are exposed to this very possibility. This form of exercising power does not yield the desired effect of policing and reinforcing unrealistic categories: women see, hear, and learn about the possibility of undermining power. In practice, the exposure to the scandal creates a choice for women. I wish to reflect more on the catcalls, whistles, and other forms of sexual harassment that were addressed to Olympia. These types of harassment by strangers in public spheres were criminalized in Western-European and North-American countries in the last three decades, and the struggle to socially and culturally de-normalize them is carried out to this very day. In the mid- and late nineteenthcentury Western Europe, these interactions were not necessarily perceived as part of a larger continuum of sexual violence but rather as annoyances and impertinences (Walkowitz 1998, p. 10). Paris of the time was in the infancy stage of an urban, capitalist society, due to Haussmann’s modernizing renovations of the city. One of the most notable aspects of Haussmann’s project was the centrality of public spaces organizing interpersonal dynamics, a sense of self among individuals, and the perception of the urban landscape (Thomas, 2006, p. 35). The arising of the idea of leisure, along with the somewhat sudden mass-participation of women in the “ritual structures of pleasure and vision” and their claim to the newly designed public spaces have reframed street harassment as a wide social phenomenon (ibid, p. 37). Sadly, it is still prominent across cultures and borders today. Orit Kamir, a jurist who wrote the law for the prevention of sexual harassment in Israel, has raised an important point: Sexual harassment is a (relatively light) form of sexual terrorism, that is used (in its vast majority) by men against women, as an expression and perpetuation of men’s domination over women. Therefore, to understand the harm caused by sexual harassment, one ought not to examine every specific case isolated from the whole social context. The mere pinch of the buttocks, the feeling-up of breasts, or the whisper of a sexual invitation in the victim’s ears, seemingly isn’t severe. Only when understanding that they serve as constant (sexual) reminders for women that they are inferior, submitted, discriminated against and vulnerable, is when the severity of sexual harassment is revealed. (2007, p. 433; authors translation). When looking at the double movement of the Salon scandal—the humanization of Olympia in order to de-humanize her on familiar grounds—the parallels to the sexual harassment of women in the public space become evident. Sexual harassment serves as a reminder for their targets that they are always sexually dominated by men; that they, their bodies, and their appearance are wholly in the service of men. When present in public spheres, women’s appearances are pointed at, mostly in retrospect, as the agentic initiator of the harassment. Rape logic, echoed in courts, institutions, and discourses, deems women’s appearances and visible behaviors as active display, as spectacle, an act of showing to be seen and to be reacted to. When sexually harassed, a woman’s subjecthood is canceled out. Women are not necessarily perceived, initially on a subconscious level, as sexual objects by the harassers; nevertheless, they are degraded to the level of 'object' in the reaffirmation of patriarchal power. Catcalling and whistling should be understood as

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acts of blasphemy: attacks both on the human subject of the specific woman harassed, but also on the possibility of women, visibly recognizable as women (appearing as they may) to hold human subjecthood. If insulting and abusing the cultural product in the center of the Salon scandal of 1865 serves here as the means of class identification rather than the object of criticism, it should be parallelly understood that sexual violence in the public sphere has nothing to do with the specific appearances of its targets, and everything to do with the assaulter/harasser and his attempt to be perceived as bigger and stronger. It is an actively de-humanizing act, the outcome of which is the upholding of patriarchal power in the public sphere, and the limiting of women’s freedoms, autonomy, and sense of safety. Therefore, looking into the appearances of the targets of sexual violence should be seen as a second de-humanization act, reaffirming patriarchal power.

6 Conclusion This study re-examines the scandal surrounding the exhibition of Eduard Manet’s Olympia in the Parisian Salon of 1865. Reading scandals as scandalization processes rather than a direct reaction towards a misconduct of sorts, I have criticized Clark’s and Bernheimer’s canonical studies of the scandal, for eventually pointing to the inanimate target of violence – the painted character of Olympia - as the initiator of the scandal. Through Bourdieu’s theory on the judgement of taste, I have repositioned the critiques of 1865 and of the 1980’s as self-reaffirmation of holding a high social status, the people thereof are said to understand artistic quality, precisely that of Nudes. I have argued that the scale of feminine representation, from high art to obscene pornography, excludes the possibility of women to be represented as having “their own thoughts and ideas" (Van Eck, 2015, p. 422). The idea of an existence of such woman was perceived as offensive in a society that has allows no space for a woman to exist without providing pleasure, visual or physical, to a masculine gaze. I framed the outrage as a double movement towards Olympia: As aesthetic judgement was not enough to dominate the painting/character, the critics have humanized Olympia – in order to de-humanize her. This is the reason that this scandal reeks of sexist violence: Olympia is a painted character that was treated like a live “bad” woman, and punished accordingly. The concept of Rape logic and the the scandalogist argument allowed to parallel the sexist violence towards Olympia and its academic interpretations with the discursive patriarchal tendency of blaming targets of sexual harassment and assault, focusing on their appearance and visible behavior. Looking for the reason for violence in the appearance of its targets (be they painted or live) is a second act of dehumanization and cannot possibly unearth any more truths regarding the nature of the incident.

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References Berger, J. (2008). Ways of seeing. Penguin books. Bernheimer, C. (1989). Manet’s Olympia: The figuration of scandal. Poetics Today, 10(2), 255–277. Bourdieu, P. (1979). Distinctions: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Routledge. Burchell, S. C. (1971). Imperial masquerade: The Paris of Napoleon III. Atheneum. Clark, T. J. (1980). Preliminaries to a possible treatment of “Olympia” in 1865. Screen, 21(1), 18–42. Clark, T. J. (1984). The painting of modern life: Paris in the art of Manet and his followers. Princeton University Press. Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2020). How scandals varies by industry: The effect of industry culture on Scandalization of behaviors. In A. Haller & H. Michael (Eds.), Scandalogy 2: Cultures of scandals–scandals in culture (pp. 144–161). Herbert von Halem Verlag. Courthion, P. (1962). Edouard Manet. HN Abrams. Van Eck, C. (2015). Works of art that refuse to behave: Agency, excess, and material presence in Canova and Manet. New Literary History, 46(3), 409–434. Fried, M. (1996). Manet’s modernism or, the face of painting in the 1860s. University of Chicago Press. Hill, A. (2016). SlutWalk as perifeminist response to rape logic: The politics of reclaiming a name. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, 13(1), 23–39. Kamir, O. (2007). “Hafeminizem Habilti Mugbal shel Catharine Mackinnon” [The unlimited feminism of Catherine Mackinnon]. In N. Yair, T. El’or, O. Lubin, H. Naveh, & T. AmielHauzer (Eds.), Drachim Lechashiva Feministit–Mavo Lelimudei Migdar: Mikra’a[paths to feminist thought–introduction to gender studies: An anthology] (pp. 393–450). Open University. Kepplinger, H. M. (2020). Functional analysis or impact research–where is scandal research going? In A. Haller & H. Michael (Eds.), Scandalogy 2: Cultures of scandals–scandals in culture (pp. 16–35). Halem. Laran, J., & Le Bas, G. (1912). Edouard Manet. Heinemann. Mulvey, L. (1975). Visual pleasure and narrative cinema. Screen, 16, 6–18. Nead, L. (1995). The female nude: Art, obscenity, and sexuality. Routledge. Needham, G. (1972). Manet, “Olympia” and pornographic photography. In L. Nochlin & T. B. Hess (Eds.), Woman as sex object: Studies in erotic art 1730-1970: ARTnews annual (Vol. 38, pp. 80–89). Nochlin, L. (1989). The politics of vision: Essays on nineteenth-century art and society. Harper & Row. Proust, A., & Digitized by Birgham Young University. (1913). Edouard Manet: Souvenirs. Écrits D’amateurs et D’artistes. Retrieved July 5, 2022, from https://archive.org/details/ edouardmanetsouv00prou/page/n7/mode/2up Ravenel, J. Salon de 1865. L'Epoque, 7 June. Quoted as translated in Fried, M. (1996). Manet's Modernism, or: The Face of Painting in the 1860s. University of Chicago Press. Thomas, G. M. (2006). Women in public: The display of femininity in the parks of Paris. In A. D’Souza & T. McDonough (Eds.), The invisible Flâneuse? Gender, public space, and visual culture in nineteenth-century Paris (pp. 32–48). Manchester University Press. Verbalyte, M. (2018). Deconstruction of the emotional logic of political scandal. In H. Michael, A. Haller, & M. Kraus (Eds.), Scandalogy: An interdisciplinary field (pp. 1–30). Herbert von Halem. Walkowitz, J. R. (1998). Going public: Shopping, street harassment, and streetwalking in late Victorian London. Representations, 62, 1–30. Zola, E., & Ehrard, A. (1970). Écrits sur l’art. Garniier-Flammarion.

Holding out for a Hero: The Rhetorical Battle over the National Garden of American Heroes in the United States Jennifer Keohane

Abstract Scandals do not occur solely when sexual misdeed, financial corruption, or political abuses of power are exposed. In a polarized and partisan society like the United States, the meaning of the past is grounds for struggle. Removing statues of a government or person is a form of character attack called “erasing.” In the wake of the removal of statues to Confederate generals, former President Trump announced the creation of the “National Garden of American Heroes.” Introduced at a speech delivered at Mount Rushmore, itself a weighty political symbol, the garden would feature 244 statues “of the greatest Americans to ever live.” Given the significance of statuary to communicate political values and its link to changing political regimes, this paper analyzes the debate surrounding the proposed garden. Even though it was never built, the resulting scandal has much to teach scholars about public memory, political values, and national character.

1 Introduction Standing in front of Mount Rushmore on July Fourth, 2020, President Trump declared that “There could be no better place to celebrate America’s independence than beneath this magnificent, incredible, majestic mountain and monument to the greatest Americans who ever lived” (Remarks, 2020). In his typical bombastic style, characterized by strings of adjectives, Trump affirmed the importance of both the exceptional Americans who built the country and the statues and monuments that honor those founders. “I am here as your President,” he continued, “to proclaim before the country and before the world: This monument will never be desecrated, these heroes will never be defaced, their legacy will never, ever be destroyed, their achievements will never be forgotten, and Mount Rushmore will stand forever as an eternal tribute to our forefathers and to our freedom” (Remarks, 2020). In many ways, Trump’s July Fourth address was unremarkable. After all, presidents J. Keohane (✉) Yale Gordon College of Arts and Sciences, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_7

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frequently use the occasion of the Fourth of July to extol the national character for its courageous vote to separate from the crown in 1776. On the other hand, much about this particular address transgressed political norms. For one, celebrating American character in front of such a visible example of the exploitation and genocide of American Indians is, to say the least, problematic. Indeed, an 1868 treaty had granted the land on which Mount Rushmore sits in the Black Hills to the Lakota people in perpetuity before the government revoked the declaration upon the discovery of gold in the area. Mount Rushmore remains a potent example of promises unfulfilled. Additionally, Trump’s Mount Rushmore address also waded into divisive and controversial issues common to his presidency but not typical for presidential holiday addresses. Railing against “cancel culture,” Trump vowed to protect the “miraculous story” that was American history (Remarks, 2020). And, he promised to safeguard the very statues that tell portions of that story. To do so, he announced “the creation of a new monument to the giants of our past.” “I am,” he averred, “signing an executive order to establish the National Garden of American Heroes, a vast outdoor park that will feature the statues of the greatest Americans to ever live” (Remarks, 2020). The day before this address, Trump signed such an executive order demanding a task force begin planning for the garden. Such rhetoric and action seemed designed to outrage the political left, a hallmark of both Trump’s approach to speechmaking and the entrenched political polarization in the United States. And outrage the political left it did. The address and the executive order prompted outcry from historians, writers, and journalists. This was primarily because there seemed little rhyme or reason as to who would be included in this garden and why. While the original order (Executive Order, 2020) included only 31 statues, an amended executive order, released mere days before Joe Biden assumed the presidency, included 244 names (Executive Order, 2021). Those names were eclectic, including classic American greats like Frederick Douglass, Susan B. Anthony, and John Adams. It also included celebrities such as basketball player Kobe Bryant, filmmaker Alfred Hitchcock (who was born in the United Kingdom but became a US citizen), football coach Vince Lombardi, and Jeopardy host Alex Trebek (born in Canada, but also secured US citizenship). Other names were likely to be unfamiliar to most American citizens, such as August Tolton, the first Black Catholic Priest in the United States. Still others have been roundly discredited, such as Christopher Columbus, who was neither American nor ever actually set foot on the soil that is now the United States—yet did initiate an Atlantic slave trade and wipe out thousands of indigenous people. Still others, an opinion piece in Salon (Stevens, 2021) called “self owns,” or people who would have hated being included on this list including philosopher Hannah Arendt, whose most famous work “On the Origins of Totalitarianism,” describes the banal face of evil. Historians and political commentators called this list “weird,” “bizzaro,” “unhinged,” “tone deaf,” “whiplash-inducing,” and akin to “Stalin’s Russia” (Dessem, 2021; Stevens, 2021; Miranda, 2021; Alberti, 2021). The Garden will never be built, as President Biden revoked the executive orders after taking office, and it seems likely that Trump knew at the time of his announcement that the Garden would never come to fruition. So, why go to the trouble to

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propose it and wield the bureaucracy of the presidency to support it? This paper identifies the importance of battles over interpretations of history as a key locus of political scandalization. I introduce “memory scandals” as a hermeneutic to understand the rhetorical battle waged over the National Garden of American Heroes. I argue that the Garden provided means to struggle over the interpretation of the country’s history and the very nature of history itself. For Trump and his allies, rhetoric supporting the Garden asserted a singular truth with a Capital T to be found in history while attributing political motivation to other historical narratives. The Garden’s opponents primarily sought to label the maneuvers Trump used, an unmasking tactic that has largely failed to effectively undermine Trump’s brand of antagonism. I offer this argument to unite scholarship on character assassination, political scandals, and public memory rhetorics. From here, this chapter will next provide a framework for understanding memory scandals. Drawing on insights from three fields of inquiry which include scandalogy, public memory, and character assassination, I show that memory scandals prompt an exploration of how opposing publics battle over the interpretation of history. Then, I analyze how Trump’s trolling rhetoric crafts a memory scandal frame designed to antagonize his opponents. Next, I analyze the largely ineffective responses to his rhetoric before providing conclusions. The concluding section reflects on the role of memory scandals in a polarized democratic society and the lingering implications of Trump’s rhetorical style of trolling.

2 Memory Scandals and Memorial Churn in the Time of Trump Scandals are integral to how culture is publicly practiced. They occur in all societies and time periods throughout history (Haller & Michael, 2020). To paraphrase John B. Thompson’s (2000, p. 13) now classic definition, a scandal is an action or event in which known social transgressions elicit public response. Scholarship on scandals classifies them into several types. Whether a scandal occurs at the level of finances, sex, or power, a common denominator is that a person is accused of transgressing social norms (Ekström & Johansson, 2008, p. 62). To Thompson’s (2000) original typology, I add the concept of a memory scandal. While memory scandals are indeed tied up with power and can implicate finances, they centrally surround the appropriate interpretation of history. Norm transgression is not sufficient to stoke a scandal. Transgressions must also be met with publicity that frames the event as a scandal (Entman, 2012, p. 4). As Robert M. Entman (2012, p. 28) shows, a presidential scandal frame entails (1) a behavior defined as a threat to the proper functioning of society; (2) the attribution of this behavior or misdeed to a presidential or political actor; (3) public condemnation from legitimate public actors; and (4) a widely demanded remedy. Yet, not all scandals emerge when private events are made public, as Ekström and Johansson

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(2008, p. 61) note when introducing talk scandals. In today’s mediated climate, many scandals emerge from plain utterances. Since public memory is just that— public and collectively shared—memory scandals are most frequently a subset of talk scandals. As Entman’s (2012, p. 7) work shows, scandals erupt in conjunction with battles among political elites and journalists who circulate competing frames about what happened, to whom, and why. Entman’s approach matches W. Timothy Coombs’s and Sherry J. Holladay’s (2021, p. 4) social constructionist perspective that notes that scandals are not self-evident, but instead are perceived as such when an actor defines a behavior as scandalous and is successful in publicizing the scandal frame, generating negative public reaction. The reaction to the National Garden of American Heroes suggests that leftist academics and commentators were indeed scandalized, but also, as we will see, Trump’s rhetoric, grounded in trolling, clearly sought this exact response to rally his base amidst deep polarization. Building on these foundations, more recent scholarship suggests that the twentyfirst century is an age of pervasive scandalization catalyzed by the deep intertwinement of digital media in all forms of our social and institutional lives (Haller, Michael, & Seeber, 2020, p. 2). With this in mind, some scholars posit the twentyfirst century is a post-scandal society, given that scandals do not always lead to negative outcomes like political resignations or other forms of accountability (von Sikorski & Kubin, 2021, p. 45). Political polarization, fomented by high-choice media environments wherein viewers seek out news that confirms their own personal beliefs, generates debates about whether transgressions even are scandals. Christian von Sikorski and Emily Kubin (2021, p. 52) proffer the “dwindling effects hypothesis” wherein media environments with a lot of choice and in politically polarized societies means that political norm transgression is less likely to lead to a full-blown scandal. The conclusion of this essay will reflect on the role of political norm transgression in Trump’s rhetoric and as it relates to memory scandals. A social constructionist perspective on scandal and a deep attention to the cultural context aligns with the precepts of rhetorical inquiry, which asks how speakers persuade audiences in particular contexts. Rather than merely seek to classify the National Garden of American Heroes as a scandal based on some objective measure, I instead ask how the rhetoric surrounding the Garden evidences a scandal frame. Moreover, I seek to identify what rhetorically constitutes a memory scandal frame in a battle over historical interpretation. Public memory, an interdisciplinary scholarly field, posits the power of the past to define citizenship and social priorities. Rhetorical critics who study public memory investigate memory texts or memory places for clues to what narratives about the past they circulate and what those narratives mean for social priorities and communities today (Blair et al., 2010). Memory places include museums or memorials which identify prominent figures and events from the past and tender interpretations of their significance. Memory texts comprise school textbooks or artistic expression like the musical Hamilton which disseminate messages about the past and its key figures. Either in the form of places or texts, broadly conceived, these rhetorical acts have persuasive power.

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So powerful are the messages emanating from historical interpretation that scholars of character assassination have identified memory erasing as a form of character attack used in political struggle. Such an attack can occur in the form of defacing statues or monuments or taking them down (as is happening across the United States and in post-communist societies). It can also involve literally erasing formerly trusted advisors or allies from paintings, photographs, or textbooks when they fall out of favor with the ruling regime (Shiraev et al., 2022, p. 24). This is a significant form of character attack as once removed from the public memory, an individual’s reputation will suffer or fade into obscurity. These types of attacks (to use the word attack does not imply that they are misguided or illegitimate—the term is morally neutral) are becoming more common in the twenty-first century United States. As Erika Doss (2008, p. 7–8) writes, “contemporary modes of commemoration are visibly marked by conflict, rupture, and loss: by a recognition among diverse publics that memorials have the power to stir things up as much as they may smooth them out.” Scholarship on public memory has recognized a churn in the memorial landscape of the United States, goaded by a need to reckon with the legacy of slavery and other modes of state-sanctioned violence amidst the growing diversity of the US populace (Aden, 2015). Amid nationwide debates over the 1619 Project, which asserts the centrality of slavery to the country’s founding, and the removal of statues to Confederate soldiers, rhetorical scholars have catalogued an incredible array of strategies that are diversifying and problematizing commemoration across the country. From tagging Confederate statues with graffiti to demanding their removal and reckoning with the rhetoric that remains on the empty plinths (Maxson, 2020; Sanchez & Moore, 2015), publics demand more inclusive commemoration. To put it in terms Thompson (2000, p. 16) might use, the values and norms that underlie public commemoration are currently being contested. The Monument Lab’s, 2021 Monument Audit underscores what rhetorical scholars have long pointed out—that American public memory is remarkably white and in the preponderance of monuments to the Confederacy, anti-Black. As they note, only five of the top fifty memorialized figures are Black or indigenous, and only three are women. Thus, as public memory churns in the United States, publics ask what stories are being told, to what end, and for whom? I argue that the National Garden of American Heroes is a response to just such a memorial churn, and it is rhetorically calibrated to appeal to Trump’s audience. This brief introduction to scandalogy, public memory, and character assassination helps sketch the outlines of memory scandals and their characteristics. It also sets the stage for why the battle over the National Garden of American Heroes has scholarly import as a prime example of a memory scandal. Memory scandals currently occur in the context of what I term “memorial churn” that is occurring in the United States and in other countries as well. In the next section, I analyze Trump’s rhetoric on the Garden.

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3 The Cold War Troll: Trump’s Case for the National Garden of American Heroes Over the course of two executive orders and his July Fourth address, Trump made the case for the National Garden of American Heroes. I argue that Trump applied a scandal frame based in a rhetorical style of trolling in these texts. This rhetorical form, which I will introduce in short order, allowed him to antagonize his opponents, provoke outrage by situating the battle over American character in the context of cancel culture, and define the American character allegedly objectively via a retelling of historical truth. Trump identified a clear enemy in his scandal frame. It was leftists seeking to change norms of historical remembrance, and he condemned them for failing to uphold the American character. While Entman (2012) notes that the media and elites typically craft and circulate scandal frames, it should come as no surprise given Trump’s love of attention that he himself would use such a frame. In so doing, Trump used the rhetorical style of trolling. The term “troll” initially referred to a disruptive form of online antagonism that is often done anonymously and trumpets the power of free expression (Phillips, 2016, p. 2, 8). Yet, as Hedwig Lieback (2019, p. 11) notes, these behaviors exist in contemporary political communication. In his terms, trolling in political communication “focus[es] more on provoking outrage, establishing itself as speaking from an outside position to counter an allegedly totalitarian opponent, and to trigger political sensitivities of their opponents and thus cause outrage on the ‘other side’” (see also Davisson & Donovan, 2019, p. 515). Although not exclusively used in the service of right-wing populism, trolling and the affordances of digital media more generally aggregate voices in a manner well-suited to supporting populist discourse (Howard, 2022, p. 237; Lieback, 2019, p. 15). While other scholars of trolling have identified it as a personality type, and others have imputed psychological motives to trolls, I cannot claim to know what Trump is thinking or whether he was serious in proposing the National Garden—rhetorical criticism does not give the critic these tools. Instead, I will show how his rhetoric has features typically used by trolls. Indeed, Trump’s rhetoric included these components: a symbolic frame based in antagonism and outrage and an allegedly objective tone to tell the story of American history. Taken together, it seems clear Trump wanted to raise a memory scandal with this project and that the rhetoric of trolling is well-suited to accomplishing these ends. First, the entire announcement of the Garden was grounded in antagonism toward Trump’s political opponents. Rather than announcing the building of a new monument to unite the American public, Trump offered this project as harsh corrective for those allegedly misunderstanding the power and messages of US history. As rhetoricians and scholars of character assassination have shown, one way to ensure compliance is to fearmonger, other, and generally dehumanize opponents (Shiraev et al., 2022, p. 82). Trump was clear in defining his opponents: “In our schools, our newsrooms, even our corporate boardrooms, there is a new far-left fascism that demands absolute allegiance” (Remarks, 2020). The language of demanding

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allegiance evokes Soviet communism—a traditional foil to the American lifestyle’s freedom-centric focus. It also recasts fascism as a tool of the left. “Make no mistake: this left-wing cultural revolution is designed to overthrow the American revolution,” he continued (Remarks, 2020). Again, the language of cultural revolution evokes the specter of communism. Trump also specifically defined what he saw as the components of that cultural revolution—desecrating and taking down statues. “Our nation is witnessing a merciless campaign to wipe out our history, defame our heroes, erase our values, and indoctrinate our children. Angry mobs are trying to tear down statues of our Founders, deface our most scared memorials, and unleash a wave of violent crime in our cities.” Trump defined the enemy as the angry mob. This definition is also implicitly racialized as it situated this mob in cities. Trump repeatedly used the idea of the city or the “inner city” to demonize Blackness (Massie, 2016; Woods & Schertzer, 2022). If these were the enemies that sought to harm the American way of life (the “them”), who were “we”? Unsurprisingly, Trump constituted his audience as patriotic Americans who took pride in the history of their country. “Every American family should cheer with delight. And every American patriot should be filled with joy, because each of you lives in the most magnificent country in the history of the world,” he commanded (Remarks, 2020), describing the events of 1776. Mentioning the year 1776 several times throughout the speech countered the rising prominence of the 1619 Project, a New York Times investigation that stipulated the centrality of the slave trade to American identity. It would have been a rousing call to an audience that saw themselves as patriotic Americans, seeking to celebrate the founding of the greatest nation in the history of the world. Trump contextualized the controversy over American history in “cancel culture,” a phrase to provoke outrage among his target audience. “One of their political weapons is ‘Cancel Culture’—driving people from their jobs, shaming dissenters, and demanding total submission from anyone who disagrees,” Trump (Remarks, 2020) explained. Cast in the language of freedom, a common foil for cancel culture, he continued to invoke the specter of communism. “This is the very definition of totalitarianism, and it is completely alien to our culture and our values, and it has absolutely no place in the United States of America,” he argued, defining what he saw as the tenets of American culture. Lieback (2019, p. 11) notes that continual references to freedom of speech, branding opposition as totalitarian, is common among trolls who profess to be sharing a suppressed truth. Toward the middle of the speech, in a series of repetitive clauses, Trump identified what he saw as American principles, which included “free and open debate, not speech codes and cancel culture” (Remarks, 2020). Another aspect of Trump’s vision of American character was hegemonic masculinity. Gendered notions of dominance and success are also common in online trolling behavior (Phillips, 2016, p. 8). This maneuver seemed designed to provoke outrage. “They think the American people are weak and soft and submissive,” Trump argued (Remarks, 2020), relying on us versus them language. He contrasted this feminized categorization with a hypermasculine ethos. “The American people are strong and proud, and they will not allow our country, and all of its values,

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history, and culture to be taken from them.” Trump also described the American people as “firm and unwavering” (Remarks, 2020). For Trump, then, this controversy over history was not a matter of differences of interpretation or questions over what American history ought to be used for. It was an all-out battle that required strength and vigilance. Trump couched this view of history in gendered language that affirmed the masculinity of true patriots over feminized communist sympathizers. He called masculine patriots to stand up and fight for their vision of history. Second and finally, Trump spoke as though he were the sole possessor of historical truth. Speaking in objective tones about alleged fact allows trolls to position themselves as emotionally stable and distanced masterminds (Lieback, 2019, p. 16). In Trump’s vision, some people possessed historical truth, and others did not. That historical truth was meant to be celebrated, not criticized, or used to spur serious conversations about problematic legacies. Trump reinterpreted the legacy of various US presidents who have complicated pasts. He narrated the stories of the presidents whose faces are carved into Mount Rushmore—Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Teddy Roosevelt. “Today, we will set history and history’s records straight,” he said to introduce this section of the speech (Remarks, 2020). “Tonight, I will tell you, and most importantly, the youth of our nation, the true stories of these great, great men” (Remarks, 2020). Casting himself in the role of a teacher, Trump explained, “Lincoln won the Civil War; he issued the Emancipation Proclamation; he led the passage of the 13th amendment, abolishing slavery for all time—and ultimately, his determination to preserve our nation and our union cost him his life” (Remarks, 2020). A vastly simplified narrative, Trump excised portions of the narrative that might undermine hero worship of Lincoln, such as the parts where despite his opposition to slavery, he voiced ideals that Black Americans ought not be equal to whites. He repeated this pattern with the remaining three presidents on the rock face. Trump had messages about the rest of the American story too. The latter portion of his speech was a seemingly random list of things of which Americans should be proud of. While Trump’s tone was hagiographic, his language was simple and matter of fact. Indeed, despite being framed by sentiments such as “Above all, our children, from every community, must be taught that to be American is to inherit the spirit of the most adventurous and confident people ever to walk the face of the Earth,” phrasing that would appear anathema to any serious teacher of American history, when Trump presented his interpretation of history, he did so in simple list form. “We gave the world the poetry of Walt Whitman, the stories of Mark Twain, the songs of Irving Berlin, the voice of Ella Fitzgerald, the style of Frank Sinatra, the comedy of Bob Hope, the power of the Saturn V rocket, the toughness of the Ford F-150, and the awesome might of the American aircraft carriers” (Remarks, 2020). My point is not that these are not things worth celebrating, although I have written about the problematic nature of defining American identity as entrepreneurship before (Keohane, 2018). Instead, Trump’s random appeals to pride assimilated his audience into a pre-defined American identity based in capitalist innovation and artistic skill. This long list suggested that to criticize any aspect of the American story (by suggesting that the Founding Fathers left a problematic entrenchment of

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institutional slavery in important documents, for instance) would undermine the entire American ethos and project. Moreover, it emphasized a patriarchal American benevolence in asserting “we give” the world innovative gifts. All told, Trump used trolling rhetoric in the South Dakota speech that suggested a desire to foment a memory scandal over American history. He used deeply antagonistic language that crafted enemies in the never-ending work of historical interpretations and set them against his definition of what American character entailed. He then claimed to be telling the truth of American history as he offered simplified narratives of so-called American giants. As his speech concluded, the random list of things that Americans should revere became the call for the National Garden of American Heroes. The speech did not identify the statues that Trump had listed in the Executive Order, but the message was clear: “We will teach our children to know that they live in a land of legends, that nothing can stop them, and that no one can hold them down” (Remarks, 2020).

4 I Beg your Garden?: Answering Trump’s Advocacy The Garden did not get as much attention as some of Trump’s other political stunts— which could potentially be explained as part of a slow holiday weekend news cycle, eclipsed by a fraught presidential campaign. Nonetheless, his scandal frame did spur a negative reaction from leftist commentators who took his bait. As this section will show, responses to the Garden largely used a rhetorical strategy of labeling, which sought to unmask Trump’s rhetorical maneuvers. The Garden’s opponents grounded their responses in historical and cultural nuance, avoiding Trump’s antagonism. As a result, it is perhaps unsurprising that this did not truly spiral into a public relations nightmare for the Trump presidency, as the Garden’s opponents failed to generate clickbait-style outrage. First, commentators labeled the Garden as a last-ditch attempt to win a culture war as the 2020 election approached. An editorial from cultural critic Dionne (2020, p. A19) in the Washington Post pointed to the context of the pandemic that continued to rage alongside widespread unemployment. “Trump has decided that what he can give white middle-class voters whose support he desperately needs to win back is—a culture war.” Dionne called the Mount Rushmore speech “vile” and noted that Trump was playing up already dangerous patterns of division in the United States. Thus, Dionne labeled Trump’s strategy as an attempt to undermine its power. Pundits and writers also labeled Trump’s rhetorical strategies as troll maneuvers. The LA Times headlined an op-ed about the Garden “Trump trolls us on his way out the door.” The list of figures “reads like a farcical troll,” the op-ed comments. Author Carolina A. Miranda (2021) noted that the announcement of the Garden was fitting given that the Trump administration “has relentlessly trolled the world of culture” such as by trying to eliminate funding for the National Endowment for the Arts. Accordingly, Trump would “troll it some more” by issuing this announcement.

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Miranda used the term presumably to note how the idea for the Garden was grounded in disruption and sought to generate clickbait, common goals of Internet trolls (Phillips, 2016, p. 6). Commentators also labeled the Garden’s composition as racist. “He will,” Dionne (2020, p. A19) noted in the Washington Post, “use the classic methods of racist politicians to tie a resurgent movement for racial equality to ‘a wave of violent crime’ and efforts to ‘destroy’ our ‘very civilization.’” Dionne sought to unmask Trump’s dog whistle racism (see Stuckey, 2021). Miranda (2021), cultural writer for the LA Times, noted that underlying all of Trump’s limited activity in the cultural arena “is a narrative that keeps getting repeated—about culture that is worthwhile and culture that isn’t, about what is American and what is not. The Trump administration has framed the American narrative as one that belongs almost exclusively to white men.” Cataloguing the cultural creators—architects, artists, and the like— included in the expanded list of 244 statues, Miranda (2021) explained that these were traditional designers who promoted classical European artistic styles. Others pointed out that Trump’s heroes were overwhelmingly men—73% in fact (Alberti, 2021). While he was wise enough to not include any Confederate generals—a flashpoint of the current memorial churn—there were few people of color. Trump included no Asian Americans, for instance. Another favored tactic of those refuting the Garden was marching through the included figures and pointing out obvious flaws with their legacies. Some they called “self owns” to refer to figures who likely would have found the Trump presidency odious. These included Hannah Arendt, as previously mentioned (Stevens, 2021). Edward R. Murrow also made this list, which, as Salon writer Ashlie Stevens (2021) points out, is a “self-own” given that Murrow was an esteemed journalist, whereas Trump continually declared the media the enemy of the people. Other problematic inclusions include Muhammad Ali, whose Muslim faith would prevent a full-body statue of him from being built (Stevens, 2021). Matthew Dessem’s list in Slate pointed out that despite the lack of Confederate generals, many figures on the list were quite problematic. For instance, Herbert Henry Dow, founder of Dow Chemical, has a “noxious legacy” that included napalm and Agent Orange in Vietnam and tax evasion. Moreover, George P. Mitchell, father of fracking, is responsible for much environmental degradation. Sam Walton, founder of Walmart, ran mom-andpop stores out of business while paying poverty wages (Dessem, 2021). Other commentators used the media attention generated by the Garden to critique its founding assumptions while seeking to nuance a conversation about the role of historical statues in the United States. Historian Michael Beschloss posted on Twitter, now X, in January 2021 that the very idea of the Garden was antithetical to a democratic public. “No President has any business dictating to citizens who our historical heroes should be. This is not Stalin’s Russia” (Bechloss (2021). Thus, Beschloss attempted to turn Trump’s rhetoric, which cast those bringing down statues as totalitarian, on its head. Alexis Coe, also a historian, critiqued Trump’s wholesale preference to protect statues by creating a distinction between the founders and supporters of the Confederate cause. “The American Revolution and the Founding Fathers are not the same as the Civil War and the Confederates,” she wrote

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in the Washington Post in 2020. “The vast majority of Confederates will be forgotten because they made no major, lasting contributions to human society. Their accomplishment began and ended with fighting to own people whom they could exploit and abuse at their discretion,” Coe (2020) continued. She then went on to advocate for repurposing Trump’s Garden. Instead of a random assortment of statues placed “forlornly” in a garden, she suggested using such an opportunity to place statues that have been taken down in a museum. “There they would be displayed alongside labels and panel texts offering context crafted by experts, drawing on documentary evidence found in archives” (Coe, 2020). Only then, she concluded, “we might be able to honestly say that, yes, indeed, we can actually learn something from monuments.” Likewise, she countered the argument that without these statues, Americans will forget their history, arguing that most statues include at most ten lines of background information. These arguments drew upon the exigence created by the memory scandal to offer another way forward for historical interpretation. In sum, those who responded to the Garden of American Heroes in a critical fashion attempted to unmask Trump’s scandal frame. The problem was, in unmasking the scandal frame, they perpetuated the scandal and allowed it to remain in front of the public eye. Yet, the polarized climate of media coverage likely would not allow them to stay silent. In response, they labeled his antagonism as trolling, and they refuted the legacies of figures Trump included. Moreover, they reminded readers that his rhetoric, cast in the fear of violent mobs, was a racist dog whistle. They used nuanced arguments to reframe the scandal and offer alternate interpretations of how to live with American history in a productive and inclusive fashion. While it is true that the Garden was never built (Biden revoked the executive orders without a word, a move that inspired a wave of “cancel culture” accusations across the Conservative Twitter, now X, space), Trump certainly played to his base in reigniting cultural division. Ultimately, though, few conservative commentators jumped to defend the idea of the Garden, indicating that, to use Entman’s words, elite motivation to keep this scandal going was low.

5 Where Have all the Good Men Gone: Conclusions This paper introduces the idea of a memory scandal—a subset of talk scandals wherein the question of how to interpret and use a country’s history comes to the fore. Such a scandal may be generated by the common character assassination tactic of memory erasing. In the case of the Garden, however, Trump seemed more interested in resurrecting the memory of figures he saw to be American heroes than erasing others. He certainly assassinated the characters of his opponents, however. The remainder of the chapter will reflect on the rising incidence of memory scandals, implications for democratic society, and the long-term resonance of Trump’s trolling rhetoric. Scandals depend, at least in part, on norm transgressions that are either made public or publicly uttered. As many scholars have identified, the fact that norms

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around acceptable political behavior shift means that whether something is a scandal or not can be a matter of public debate (Thompson, 2000, p. 16). In the United States, norms around public memorializing are shifting. They are moving away from a history solely hagiographic and celebratory and toward more nuance that reckons with the limitations of past leaders and their priorities. And yet, given the intense political polarization and the way that history has been mobilized (as the case of the Garden shows), these shifting norms provide a ripe ground for scandal. While many in Trump’s audience would not have found his July Fourth address and his desire to build a statue garden scandalous, the delivery of the address, framed in antagonism, was tailor-made to provoke anger among the left. In turn, it crafted an identity and a story and for Trump’s right-leaning audience to inhabit. They were the populist patriots taking a stand against historical revisionists, elites with PhDs, who were telling them not to celebrate their own country. History, as some of the leftist commentators noted, has become a battleground in the culture wars, meaning memory scandals are likely to persist. Scholars of scandalogy point out that scandals are not a death knell for political culture, but instead, as Thompson (2000, p. 245) notes, struggles over symbolic power. Yet, Thompson (2000, p. 251) recognizes that pervasive scandals can undermine the trust required to sustain democratic institutions. After all, if citizens do not trust the electoral system, their participation is likely to drop, rendering deep distrust self-reinforcing (Thompson, 2000). As the Pew Research Center (2022) shows, Americans of both political persuasions are deeply distrustful of politicians right now. Indeed, while public memory rhetorics are always controversial, their epideictic nature and conservative skew sometimes means they can stabilize the polity amidst uncertainty. For them to do so, however, requires them to be grounded in fact. Trust seems unlikely to flourish when presidents distort historical facts. Seth Cotlar and Richard J. Ellis (2019, p. 1) identify the power of the president as “historian in chief.” As they write, “presidents shape not only the course of history but also how Americans remember and retell that history. Consequential decisions made in the Oval Office are typically accompanied by a justifying minihistory of who we are, who we have been, and who we can become as a people.” Of course, all presidents craft narratives that serve their political ends, and it is often far from clear what lessons leaders should draw from complicated historical times. Yet, Cotlar and Ellis argue for holding presidents accountable for the accuracy of the historical narratives that they tell, noting that some presidents are better teachers than others (Cotlar & Ellis, 2019, p. 3). “But we can recognize that an omniscient, objective history is unattainable without succumbing to a reflexive historical relativism that treats every interpretation of the past as equally valid or plausible,” they note (2019, p. 19). When Trump spoke about American history, he frequently got things wrong (Wilentz, 2020). Even without Trump as historian in chief, the memory scandal will persist as the desire to revisit historical interpretation and its lessons continue to swirl. Another implication of Trump’s memory rhetoric surrounds its ability to prime an audience for persuasion by crafting an identity for them to assume. Given that public

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memory rhetorics are epideictic—they entail praise, blame, and ceremony—they have an important role in democracies. They also are constitutive—they call an audience to take on a particular identity. Trump’s memory rhetoric surrounding the Garden constitutes an audience resistant to a history beyond hagiography. Moreover, it is grounded in attack. Invective, as rhetorical critic Jeremy Engels (2009, p. 313) notes, is “an imperfect coping mechanism for democratic anxieties.” It constitutes notoriously fragile identities. By grounding his memory work in blame of the left, Trump both shored up a boundary around the appropriate use of history while simultaneously suggesting that this boundary was weak. After all, the alleged lefty historical revisionists would not deserve heaps of scorn if they were not, at some level, a threat to democratic unity. Another problem with grounding memory rhetoric in invective is that it tends to “bring out the worst in crowd behavior, turning the people into a chanting, ranting, angry mass, rather than a civil and deliberate public” (Engels, 2009, p. 328). The imagined community appears in the moment of joy that stems from a collective utterance of denunciation, and so the people is formed. Yet, as Engels (2009) warns, invective also often serves to individuate, and therefore, insulate, systemic ills from deliberative critique. While Trump did indeed target a group as his enemy apparent, identifying this group obscured a larger conversation about how to remember amidst the growing diversity of the US polity. Even the critics of Trump’s Garden focused much of their ire on him while largely sidestepping a broader debate about the role of history in a democratic society. Thus, the audience constituted in this memory scandal, and perhaps in memory scandals writ large, is ill-suited to the participative nature of democratic citizenship. Finally, consider the role of trolling in memory scandals. Like public shaming and public memory more broadly, trolling rhetoric often scapegoats individuals to remind audience members of community values (Nicotra, 2016). As a result, it is a powerful form of epideictic rhetoric. Moreover, in its reliance on alleged objectivity and desire to provoke a response (any response), trolling can be difficult to counter (Riche, 2017). As Whitney Phillips (2016, p. 155) notes, if you smoke out the trolls, you run the risk of smoking out the passionate advocates as well. Given a troll’s ability to bring something before public attention, many scholars recommend answering trolling with trolling (Davisson & Donovan, 2019; Phillips, 2016). For those worried about restoring a sense of trust among the polity, however, that seems potentially problematic. While the Troller in Chief is (at least for now) out of office, perhaps a salient takeaway is that free speech and inclusive communities need not be wholly dichotomized (Lieback, 2019, p. 28). Or more simply, heroes rarely pass the test.

References Aden, R. C. (2015). Upon the ruins of liberty: Slavery, the President’s house at Independence National Historical Park, and public memory. Temple University Press.

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Alberti, D. (2021). Historian Michael Beschloss: Trump has ‘no business’ dictating who is an American hero, Axios. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.axios.com/2021/01/19/ trump-national-garden-american-heroes Blair, C., Dickinson, G., & Ott, B. L. (2010). Introduction: Rhetoric/memory/place. In G. Dickinson, C. Blair, & B. L. Ott (Eds.), Places of public memory: The rhetoric of museums and memorials (pp. 1–54). University of Alabama Press. Coe, A. (2020, July 14). Yes, take down the confederate statues. But the founders are different. The Washington Post. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.proquest.com/docview/2423 677546/citation/94D8CDF2F5DC4887PQ/1 Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2021). Social amplification of scandals: One social media effect. In A. Haller, H. Michael, & L. Seeber (Eds.), Scandology 3: Scandals in new media (pp. 11–24). Springer. Cotlar, S., & Ellis, R. J. (2019). Introduction. In S. Cotlar & R. J. Ellis (Eds.), Historian in chief: How presidents interpret the past to shape the future (pp. 1–25). University of Virginia Press. Davisson, A., & Donovan, M. (2019). “Breaking the news . . . on a weekly basis”: Trolling as rhetorical style on last week tonight. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 36(5), 513–527. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2019.1649706 Dessem, M. (2021, January 21). The weirdest, Most odious figures in Trump’s “National Garden of American heroes”. Slate. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://slate.com/culture/2021/01/ trumps-national-garden-of-american-heroes-the-weirdest-worst-choices.html Dionne, E. (2020, July 6). A culture war is all trump has left. The Washington Post, A19. Doss, E. (2008). The emotional life of contemporary public memorials: Towards a theory of temporary memorials. Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.5117/9789089640185 Ekström, M., & Johansson, B. (2008). Talk scandals. Media, Culture & Society, 30(1), 61–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443707084350 Engels, J. (2009). Uncivil speech: Invective and the Rhetorics of democracy in the early republic. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 95(3), 311–334. https://doi.org/10.1080/00335630903156453 Entman, R. M. (2012). Scandal and silence: Media responses to presidential misconduct. Polity. Executive Order on Building and Rebuilding Monuments to American Heroes–The White House. The White House (2020, July 3). Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://trumpwhitehouse. archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-building-rebuilding-monuments-americanheroes/ Executive Order on Building the National Garden of American Heroes–The White House. The White House (2021, January 18). Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://trumpwhitehouse. archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-building-national-garden-american-heroes/ Haller, A., & Michael, H. (2020). Introduction. In A. Haller & H. Michael (Eds.), Scandalogy 2: Cultures of scandals-scandals in culture (pp. 7–15). Herbert von Halem Verlag. Howard, R. G. (2022). Manufacturing populism: Digitally amplified vernacular authority. Media and Communication, 10(4), 236–247. Keohane, J. (2018). Entrepreneurs and immigrants: Representing American identity in the National Museum of American History. In R. C. Aden (Ed.), U.S. public memory, rhetoric, and the National Mall. Lanham (pp. 119–134). Lexington Books. Lieback, H. (2019). Truth-telling and trolls: Trolling, political rhetoric in the twenty-first century, and the objectivity norm | www.aspeers.com. aspeers, 12, 9–36. Massie, V. M. (2016). Donald Trump’s ‘inner city’ has nothing to do with where black people live, Vox. Retrieved July 27, 2022, from https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/9/28/13074046/ trump-presidential-debate-inner-city Maxson, J. D. (2020). “Second line to Bury white supremacy”: Take ‘Em down Nola, monument removal, and residual memory. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 106(1), 48–71. https://doi.org/10. 1080/00335630.2019.1704428 Michael Beschloss [@BeschlossDC]. (2021). Any American who loves democracy should make sure there is never some Trumpy “National Garden of American Heroes,” with names forced on us by federal government. No President has any business dictating to citizens who our historical

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heroes should be. This is not Stalin’s Russia. Twitter. Retrieved June 3, 2022, from https:// twitter.com/BeschlossDC/status/1354147719682682884 Miranda, C. A. (2021, January 20). Trump trolls us on his way out the door with his garden of heroes plan. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.latimes.com/ entertainment-arts/story/2021-01-19/trump-cultural-accomplishments-one-last-troll-with-gar den-of-american-heroes Monument Lab. (2021). National monument audit. Retrieved December 16, 2021, from https:// monumentlab.com/projects/national-monument-audit Nicotra, J. (2016). Disgust, distributed: Virtual public shaming as epideictic assemblage | enculturation. Enculturation: a Journal of Rhetoric, Writing, and Culture. Preprint retrieved from https://www.enculturation.net/disgust-distributed Pew Research Center. (2022). Americans’ views of government: Decades of distrust, enduring support for its role. Retrieved August 2, 2022, from https://www.pewresearch.org/ politics/2022/06/06/americans-views-of-government-decades-of-distrust-enduring-support-forits-role/ Phillips, W. (2016). This is why we Can’t have Nice things. MIT Press. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262529877/this-is-why-we-cant-have-nice-things/ Remarks by president trump at South Dakota’s 2020 Mount Rushmore fireworks Celebration | keystone, South Dakota–The white house. The White House (2020, July 4). Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-south-dakotas-2020-mount-rushmore-fireworks-celebration-keystone-south-dakota/ Riche, D. (2017). Toward a theory and pedagogy of rhetorical vulnerability. Literacy in Composition Studies, 5(2), 84–102. https://doi.org/10.21623/1.5.2.6 Sanchez, J. C., & Moore, K. R. (2015). Reappropriating public memory: Racism, resistance, and erasure of the confederate defenders of Charleston monument. Present Tense, 5(2) http://www. presenttensejournal.org Shiraev, E. B., Icks, M., Keohane, J., & Samoilenko, S. (2022). Character assassination and reputation management: Theory and applications. Routledge. von Sikorski, C., & Kubin, E. (2021). Are we living in a post-scandal era? High-choice media environments, political polarization, and their consequences for political scandals. In A. Haller, H. Michael, & L. Seeber (Eds.), Scandology 3: Scandals in new media (pp. 45–60). Springer. Stevens, A. D. (2021). Trump’s unhinged, tone-deaf list of ‘American heroes’ is a fitting emblem of his presidency, Salon. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.salon.com/2021/01/19/ trump-national-garden-of-american-heroes/ Stuckey, M. E. (2021). Deplorable: The worst presidential campaigns from Jefferson to trump. Penn State University Press. Thompson, J. B. (2000). Political scandal: Power and Visability in the media age | Wiley. Polity. Retrieved August 10, 2022 from https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Political+Scandal%3A+Power +and+Visability+in+the+Media+Age-p-9780745625492 Wilentz, S. (2020, September 23). Opinion | what trump doesn’t understand about U.S. history. Washington Post. Retrieved August 8, 2022, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/2020/09/23/what-trump-doesnt-understand-about-us-history/ Woods, E. T., & Schertzer, R. (2022). Trump has put down his racist dog whistle and picked up a bull horn, The conversation. Retrieved July 27, 2022, from http://theconversation.com/trumphas-put-down-his-racist-dog-whistle-and-picked-up-a-bull-horn-176523

The Many Deaths of Domitian: Scandal and Image Destruction in Imperial Rome Martijn Icks

Abstract The Roman emperor Domitian (r. 81–96 CE) appears to have been a capable administrator, but he scandalized part of the senatorial aristocracy through his self-aggrandizement, his openly autocratic style of rule, and his lack of respect for the Senate. Even though the Caesars possessed unrivalled monarchical power, they had to take account of the norms and expectations of key interest groups, including the senators. Domitian’s controversial reign ended with his assassination, followed by a damnatio memoriae, an official condemnation of his memory by senatorial decree. Statues of the emperor were destroyed, mutilated, or recarved and his name was removed from inscriptions in an attempt at state-induced character assassination. However, a revolt of the Praetorian Guard makes it clear that his violent removal and condemnation were polarizing issues in some circles. When the political situation stabilized again under Trajan, politicians and poets who had supported and praised Domitian realigned their loyalties to the new regime, leading to polarization of a different kind. There was a concerted effort to create the impression that Domitian had been universally reviled by the upper classes, just as Trajan was allegedly universally loved. Some of the moral outrage surrounding the toppled ruler thus appears to have been constructed after the fact to complete his character assassination.

1 Introduction Political polarization, partisanship, and a state of seemingly perpetual scandalization are often seen as typical features of present-day democracies, with their populist tendencies and inflammatory social media landscapes. However, that does not mean these phenomena were wholly unknown to historical societies, even those from a

My thanks to Florian Krüpe for his helpful comments and suggestions. M. Icks (✉) University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_8

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remote past. The Roman Empire was led by autocratic rulers and lacked a public sphere where citizens could engage in political debate. Overt criticism of the monarch was a delicate business and usually spelled trouble for the critic, quite possibly with fatal consequences. Nevertheless, our sources indicate that Roman emperors, too, could be highly polarizing figures and engender a lot of scandalization—especially among the senatorial aristocracy, which had a stake in government and produced most of the surviving literature. A well-known example is Nero, whose blatant disregard for senatorial standards and public performances as an “artist-emperor” earned him the hatred and scorn of at least part of the senatorial elite, but may well have increased his popularity with the plebs (Elsner & Masters, 1994; Champlin, 2003). This article will focus on another emperor who has gone down in history as one of Rome’s canonical “evil tyrants”: Domitian, who ruled from 81 to 96 CE as the last member of the Flavian dynasty. In fact, according to a fourth-century text, the two reviled rulers were named in the same breath when the Senate denounced yet another “bad” emperor, Commodus, as “more savage than Domitian, more foul than Nero” in a joint acclamation (Historia Augusta Author, 2022, Life of Commodus 19.2).1 According to the literary record, Domitian’s 15-year reign constituted a continuous violation of senatorial norms that antagonized the senators and ultimately led to his assassination in a palace coup. His physical death was followed by multiple symbolic deaths, enacted through the vandalization of his inscriptions and images, as well as through hostile speeches and historiographic texts, resulting in a character assassination that has determined his bad reputation to the present day. However, beneath this image of a hated tyrant getting his just desserts lurks a much more complex picture of a controversial monarch whose posthumous reputation was ambiguous and contested. What can the case of Domitian tell us about political polarization and scandalization in imperial Rome? In order to answer this question, we will first briefly discuss the circumstances of the emperor’s reign and assassination. Then we will turn to the way his posthumous reputation was attacked through damnatio memoriae, and how this condemnation was in turn called into question by mutinying Praetorians. We will discuss how Domitian’s status as a “bad emperor” was confirmed in the reign of Trajan, focusing in particular on Pliny’s Panegyricus and how that text constructs Trajan and Domitian as polar opposites. Finally, we will touch on some positive assessments of Domitian which were published during his lifetime, and which show that his deeds and style of rulership could also elicit favorable responses, even if their sincerity may have been questionable.

1

All translations of Greek and Latin texts are taken from the Loeb Classical Library.

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2 Domitian’s Reign and Assassination As one scholar has aptly remarked, “in many ways, Domitian remains an enigma” (Jones, 1992, p. 198). Due to the hostile and at points contradictory literary record, assessing the man’s character as a ruler and a person can only be a tentative exercise. We know that Titus Flavius Domitianus, as was his full name, was born in Rome in 51 CE as the younger son of Vespasian and Domitilla. His father, a man of senatorial rank who held prestigious administrative and military posts under several rulers, seized the imperial throne in a civil war in 69 CE, the so-called “Year of the Four Emperors.” In 79 CE he was succeeded by his elder son Titus, while Domitian was side-lined as the proverbial “spare.” However, 2 years later the younger son unexpectedly gained the imperial purple after all, since Titus died of an illness without leaving an heir. During his years on the throne, Domitian proved himself a dedicated ruler who took an active interest in affairs of state. Lacking the battlefield experience of his father and brother, he tried to gain military prestige by launching several campaigns, with varying success. He also gave the soldiers a significant pay rise to make military service more attractive. The emperor was an avid builder who engaged in many infrastructure projects throughout the provinces, but especially left his mark on Rome. Among other things, he constructed the grand racing track on the Campus Martius that is now the Piazza Navona and initiated the construction of the forum that would come to bear the name of his successor, Nerva. The lavish palace he built on the Palatine hill would remain the dwelling of emperors for centuries to come. According to the contemporary poet Martial, its grandeur put even the pyramids to shame. “The god of day looks upon nothing in the whole world more splendid,” he assured Domitian in one of his epigrams (Martial, 1993, 8.36; see also Zanker, 2002). Both the grand scale of the palace and this superlative rhetorical style bespeak a shift in the nature of emperorship in the years 81–96 CE; whereas more traditional rulers such as Augustus and Vespasian had mostly avoided the trappings of monarchy and had acted as though they were no more than the first among their senatorial peers, Domitian took his rule in a decidedly more autocratic direction. He let himself be addressed as dominus et deus, “Lord and God,” emphasizing the distance between himself and the senators. Rather than ruling in accord with the Senate and showing this body the customary deference, he relied on a small circle of confidants, including men of equestrian rank (lower than senators) and even freedmen. He also grew increasingly paranoid and executed a fair number of senators and courtiers, including at least eleven men of consular rank (Jones, 1992; Southern, 1997; Galimberti, 2016). From the historiographic and biographic sources, which are inclined to take a senatorial, or at least an elite perspective, a picture emerges of a reign riddled with scandals and atrocities. Allegedly, Domitian celebrated sham triumphs for victories he had never gained, dressing up purchased slaves as war captives and displaying booty that actually consisted of imperial furniture (Tacitus, 1914, Agricola 39.1; Cassius Dio, 1925, Roman History 67.7.4). In his arrogance, he renamed the months

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September and October after himself and erected so many victory monuments throughout Rome that an exasperated contemporary wrote the words “It is enough” on one of them (Suetonius, 1914, Life of Domitian 13.2–3). The emperor is also said to have received so many honors “that almost the whole world (so far as it was under his dominion) was filled with his images and statues constructed of both silver and gold” (Cassius Dio, 1925, Roman History 67.8.1). Domitian’s cruelty was equally boundless, with sudden death sentences following upon misleading displays of affection and bogus professions of leniency (Suetonius, 1914, Life of Domitian 11.1–3). Particularly chilling is the story that the capricious ruler once invited several prominent senators and knights to dinner in a pitch-black room, where naked blackpainted servants brought them black food in black dishes, the kind of meal that would usually be offered to departed spirits, while he terrified them with talk about “topics relating to death and slaughter” (Cassius Dio, 1925, Roman History 9.1–5). Some of the stories on record may well be more credible than others, but the works of these authors are all pervaded by a tone of moral outrage and horror. The conspiracy that ended Domitian’s life is hard to reconstruct, especially given the secretive nature of such endeavors, but it seems clear that it originated with the palace staff, among whose number the emperor’s paranoia had also claimed many victims. On September 18, 96 CE, around noon, Domitian was told by his chamberlain, Parthenius, that a man was waiting for him in his bedroom to discuss urgent business. However, this turned out to be a trap. The man in question, a former slave called Stephanus, had a dagger concealed in the bandage he was wearing on his arm. When he stabbed Domitian, a desperate struggle ensued, until other conspirators rushed into the room to finish the job. Some senators and other prominent men were certainly or probably also in on the plan; Nerva, the elderly senator who would become the next emperor, and who was already in the palace when the coup took place; but also the consul Fronto and the commanders of the Praetorian Guard, who were needed to keep the troops stationed in the capital in check. How many others were involved, or at least knew of the plan, is impossible to say with certainty. Even the emperor’s wife, Domitia Longina, has been implicated by a later source, although it seems unlikely that she had an active hand in her husband’s demise (Grainger, 2003, pp. 1–27; Collins, 2009).

3 Damnatio Memoriae The news of Domitian’s assassination soon hit the streets of Rome. According to the biographer Suetonius, who chronicled the event about two decades later, responses varied widely: “The people received the news of his death with indifference, but the soldiers were greatly grieved and at once attempted to call him the Deified Domitian; while they were prepared also to avenge him, had they not lacked leaders. (. . .) The senators on the contrary were so overjoyed, that they raced to fill the House, where they did not refrain from assailing the dead emperor with the most insulting and stinging kind of outcries. They even had ladders brought and his shields and images

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torn down before their eyes and dashed upon the ground; finally they passed a decree that his inscriptions should everywhere be erased, and all record of him obliterated” (Suetonius, 1914, Life of Domitian 23.1). Judging from this account, Domitian must have been a polarizing figure, as beloved by some as he was hated by others. The soldiers’ wish to have him deified was certainly not unprecedented: several emperors had posthumously been placed among the gods, including Vespasian and Titus. However, others such as Nero had suffered damnatio memoriae, which meant that their memory was cursed, their images were vandalized, and their name was removed from public monuments. Sometimes such actions were undertaken spontaneously, but in other cases, they were sanctioned by an official decree of the Senate (Varner, 2004; Krüpe, 2011; Scholz et al., 2014). In Domitian’s case, the Senate voted for a damnatio despite the soldiers’ protests, trying to impose its own negative view of the deceased ruler on public memory. Like Suetonius, the senator Pliny the Younger described the assaults on Domitian’s images as a cathartic experience. In a famous speech in praise of the emperor Trajan in 100 CE, he recalls that “it was our delight to dash those proud faces to the ground, to smite them with the sword and savage them with the axe, as if blood and agony could follow from every blow” (Pliny the Younger, 1969, Panegyricus 52.4–5). The graphic and bloodthirsty language the orator uses to describe these assaults almost makes it seem as if they are not just aimed against marble or bronze, but against Domitian’s actual corpse (although that had been smuggled from the palace and cremated by a loyal nurse). We are reminded of the posthumous mutilations of other deposed Roman emperors, such as Vitellius and Elagabalus—or, more recently, of the lynching and mistreating of the corpse of the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi when he fell into the hands of rebel soldiers in 2011. A damnatio memoriae can be seen as a form of character assassination, since it deliberately aims to destroy a (deceased) person’s positive reputation (Icks & Shiraev, 2014; Samoilenko et al., 2020). At first glance, it would appear to be a form of erasing: removing someone’s presence from the public sphere and/or collective memory. In effect, though, the name and face of a condemned ruler were never completely obliterated. Sometimes imperial statues were left standing for a while with damaged eyes, ears, and mouths, or a conspicuous gap was left where a name had been removed from an inscription on a public monument. Such measures can best be seen as forms of disgracing, since they served as a very public renouncement of the honor and status that the deposed ruler had once possessed (Varner, 2004, pp. 2–3). But regardless of their exact aim, these and other “memory sanctions,” as they have been dubbed by Harriet Flower, clearly indicate the great worth that the ancient Romans attached to memoria, the commemoration of their culture’s outstanding persons and achievements. Low life expectancy and low literacy rates doomed most men and women to posthumous oblivion, so that only the best and brightest could hope to live on favorably in public memory. A deified emperor would be honored and cherished for generations, while a condemned one would live on in infamy, or might in time be mostly forgotten (Flower, 2006, pp. 1–13).

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The Senate’s decree condemning Domitian’s memory, then, was not a measure to be taken lightly. However, we should not simply see it as an expression of moral outrage against a ruler whose autocratic style and numerous executions of highranking men had scandalized the senators. The damnatio memoriae of an emperor was always about politics as well as emotion. Moreover, it did not only serve the interests of the Senate, but also (and perhaps more importantly) those of the new monarch. Domitian’s damnatio confirmed that his murder had been in the public interest and smoothed the transition of power, justifying Nerva’s rise to the throne even though he was not a member of the Flavian dynasty. Why the choice fell on this man is not entirely clear, seeing that he had little experience with provincial government or the command of armies. However, he had deftly negotiated decades of court politics and may well have been seen as someone who could protect the interests of the other conspirators. His advanced age and the fact that he was childless may also have been points in his favor, ensuring he would be a transitory figure, without potential to grow into another autocrat (Jones, 1992, pp. 194–195; Grainger, 2003, pp. 28–31; Collins, 2009, pp. 92–97). Domitian’s damnatio left a clear impact on the material record, especially in Rome itself. According to Eric Varner, Nerva engaged in “rampant visual cannibalism,” with no less than fourteen portraits of Domitian recarved to represent his successor. These included one of the Cancellaria reliefs depicting the emperor surrounded by gods and allegorical figures, a colossal seated statue of the emperor as Jupiter, and a bronze equestrian statue from the Bay of Naples. Other Domitianic portraits were recarved to resemble Nerva’s successor, Trajan. The Equus Domitiani, a colossal bronze statue of Domitian on horseback that domineered the Forum Romanum, was molten down and is only known from literary sources. Evidently, a considerable effort was made to remove the emperor’s presence from the public sphere, although that goal was certainly not achieved completely. Throughout the empire, some images of Domitian were left standing, including a togate statue from the theatre of Aphrodisias in modern-day Turkey (Varner, 2004, pp. 111–135). Inscriptions show an even more haphazard picture. In Rome, where we would expect the damnatio to hit hardest, only nine out of the 50 extant inscriptions which originally bore Domitian’s name have been vandalized, while in the nearby regions of Latium and Campania this was only one out of twenty. The ratio is higher in some other regions, such as the Iberian Peninsula (16 out of 26) and Western Turkey (44 out of 70), but even here, many inscriptions displaying the name Domitian were left untouched (Grainger, 2003, pp. 49–51). Unlike Stalinist Russia, the Roman Empire was not a totalitarian state where the authorities had near-complete control over textual and visual media. While the Senate could issue damning decrees, it was up to officials and elites throughout Rome and the provinces to follow up on these. Apparently, not all of them felt the urgent need to vandalize or erase Domitian’s name or face. This indicates that the new regime did not have a firm grip on things and was only partially successful in its attempt to portray Domitian as an evil tyrant who had been justly removed.

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4 Mutiny of the Praetorians How volatile Nerva’s position as emperor really was became clear in the summer of 97 CE, when a mutiny by soldiers of the Praetorian Guard plunged the government into crisis. If many senators had been outraged by Domitian’s autocratic reign, the Praetorians were outraged by his murder and the fact that the culprits had not been punished for their heinous deed. As the imperial bodyguard, they were the most formidable military force in Rome and their discontent posed a serious threat to the emperor and his supporters. While Nerva had dismissed one or perhaps both commanders of the Guard upon his accession for failing in their duty to protect the sovereign, this had not been enough to appease the rank and file, who still held Domitian in high regard. Now, under the leadership of a new commander, Casperius Aelianus, they surrounded the emperor in his palace and demanded that he handed over Domitian’s murderers for punishment. Nerva eventually gave in. Two men were sacrificed to the disgruntled Praetorians: Petronius Secundus, the dismissed commander who had quite possibly been in on the conspiracy, and the chamberlain Parthenius, who had sent Domitian to meet his doom in his bedroom. The former was immediately executed, while the latter was horribly tortured before he finally met his end (Grainger, 2003, pp. 94–94). With these sacrifices, a worse crisis was averted. The Praetorians did not demand any further victims, nor did they insist that Domitian should be rehabilitated. Nevertheless, the death sentence they exacted on Secundus and Parthenius implied that Domitian’s demise was to be regretted rather than celebrated, which undermined the legitimacy of the damnatio memoriae. Clearly, then, the question whether the last Flavian had been a “good” or a “bad” emperor was far from settled in 97 CE. Pro-Domitianic sentiments still lingered—not just among the Praetorians, but also among the legions stationed in the provinces. Moreover, the fact that Nerva had been forced to give in to the demands of the soldiers was an irredeemable loss of face. Even before the mutiny, the consul Fronto had already lamented his weak rule, remarking that “it was bad to have an emperor under whom nobody was permitted to do anything, but worse to have one under whom everybody was permitted to do everything” (Cassius Dio, 1925, Roman History 68.1.3). Earlier that year, a senatorial conspiracy to dethrone the elderly ruler had been thwarted. In short, the regime was decidedly wobbly and firm measures were necessary to ensure its survival. In October 97, 2 or 3 months after the mutiny, Nerva announced the adoption of Trajan as his son and successor. It seems likely that the emperor did not have a free hand in the matter, but had to take the preferences of the powerful generals stationed at the northern frontier into account. Trajan was one of these, commanding the legions of the province Germania Superior (comprising parts of Switzerland, France, and Germany). Apart from his military backing, several points spoke in his favor: he was relatively young (in his mid-forties), his father had been a consular, and he had a good political network (Grainger, 2003, pp. 89–102; see also Eck, 2002). When Nerva died just a few months later, in early 98 CE, Trajan’s accession to the throne finally brought stability to the imperial government. Unsullied by

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involvement with the conspiracy against Domitian, his status as a battle-hardened general appealed to the soldiers, while his willingness to respect and cooperate with the Senate earned him the goodwill of the senatorial aristocracy. The rifts in Roman society could finally begin to heal. However, now that the peaceful transition from the Domitianic past had been completed, Domitian’s posthumous fate was sealed.

5 Pliny’s Panegyricus as Character Assassination We have already caught some glimpses of the hostile portrayal of Domitian in historiographic and biographic sources. This negative treatment is typical for emperors who suffered damnatio memoriae and can be seen as a direct equivalent of the destruction and mutilation of imperial images (Varner, 2004, p. 7). Historians and biographers, too, were out to commit character assassination, ensuring that the toppled ruler would live on in infamy as a “bad” emperor. They did not do this on the instigation of the new regime, but followed their own agenda, which was mainly concerned with upholding senatorial/elite standards of “proper” imperial behavior and, in some cases, distancing themselves from “bad” regimes in which they had been complicit. The historiographic discourse discrediting notorious rulers like Nero and Domitian was often a response to the favorable accounts that were composed when they were still in the saddle, turning positive features into their negative counterpoints. However, each author also had his personal interests and came up with his own take on the disgraced monarch, presenting us with variations on the same theme (Schulz, 2019). Historiography and biography were certainly not the only literary genres used for this purpose. Arguably the best example of Domitian’s literary character assassination is Pliny’s Panegyricus. This speech in praise of Trajan was delivered in the Senate on September 1, 100 CE, on the occasion of Pliny’s assumption of a suffect consulship. It has come down to us in the expanded version that the orator later published, but the gist will have been the same in the original: Trajan is praised at length as the best emperor Rome has ever seen and is favorably contrasted to most of his predecessors—in particular to Domitian, who is smeared with every possible crime and vice (especially arrogance and cruelty). The speech thus serves to boost the prestige of the current ruler at the expense of the toppled tyrant, presenting Trajan and the Senate with models for “good” and “bad” emperorship from a senatorial point of view. At the same time, Pliny used the occasion to project his own good character as a distinguished aristocrat moving in the highest circles. He made a strong effort to dissociate himself from Domitian’s reign, though his political career had flourished then, and to attach his star to Trajan’s (Noreña, 2011). As he remarks, rather disingenuously, “I had advanced in my career under that most treacherous of emperors before he admitted his hatred for honest men, but was halted in it once he

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did so,2 preferring a longer route when I saw what the short cuts were which opened the way to office; in bad times I was one of those who lived with grief and fear, and can be counted among the serene and happy now that better days have come” (Pliny the Younger, 1969, Panegyricus 95.3–4). In fact, as Karl Strobel has pointed out, the orator was a “careerist” and “opportunist” who had served as a loyal representative of the regime—regardless of the personal reservations he may have had (Strobel, 2003, p. 304). Throughout the Panegyricus, Trajan and Domitian function as polar opposites whose character traits and actions reflect on each other. Pliny expresses relief and gratitude that Rome is no longer subject to the sway of a haughty autocrat, but enjoys an emperor who acts as a princeps, or first among equals: “Nowhere should we flatter him as a divinity and a god; we are talking of a fellow-citizen, not a tyrant, one who is our father not our over-lord” (2.3). When Trajan first entered the city, we are told, he did not do so lifted up on human shoulders, as Domitian had presumably done, but went on foot. “You towered above us only because of your own splendid physique; your triumph did not rest on our humiliation, won as it was over imperial arrogance” (22.1–2). Likewise, Trajan receives praise because he always greets his subjects graciously, instead of requiring them to grovel at his feet (24.2), and because he goes out of his way to make the senators feel welcome during the morning greetings at the palace, so that they “stay behind to linger on as if in a home we share, though this is the place where recently that fearful monster built his defenses with untold terrors, where lurking in his den he licked up the blood of his murdered relatives, or emerged to plot the massacre and destruction of his most distinguished subjects” (48.1–4). Previous emperors, even the better ones, had been a mixed bag of virtues and flaws, the orator alleges, but that is no longer the case: “Contrast our prince, in whose person all the merits which win our admiration are found in complete and happy harmony” (4.6). Domitian, on the other hand, got what he deserved when the assassins came for him: “Nothing availed him then—not his divinity, nor those secret chambers, those cruel haunts whither he was driven by his fear and pride and hatred of mankind. How much safer is that same dwelling today, and how much happier, now that its master finds protection in popularity instead of cruelty, and seeks the thronging crowds of his subjects instead of solitude behind locked doors” (49.1–2). In praising Trajan and condemning Domitian, Pliny faced a tough challenge. As Shadi Bartsch has pointed out, the same language which was now employed to elevate the former had previously been used to elevate the latter (Bartsch, 1994, pp. 148–147). Pliny was well aware of this conundrum, touching on it more than once in the course of his speech. When in the past orators praised Domitian’s virtues, he suggests, they were really drawing attention to his vices. For those capable of reading between the lines, there was a “hidden transcript” whose meaning undermined the “public transcript” of praise. But of course, this did not apply to

2 In his Life of Domitian, Suetonius likewise makes a distinction between the good start of the emperor’s reign and his later descent into tyranny (from 10.1 onwards).

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the “good” emperor Trajan, who could be lauded with sincerity: “There is no danger that in my references to his humanity he will see a reproach for arrogance; that he will suppose I mean extravagance by modest expenditure, and cruelty by forbearance; that I think him covetous and capricious when I call him generous and kind, profligate and idle instead of self-controlled and active, or that I judge him a coward when I speak of him as a brave man” (Pliny the Younger, 1969, Panegyricus 3.4). The obvious problem with this line of reasoning is that the emperor and the attending senators could only take Pliny’s word for it, even though both the Domitianic precedent and the nature of the genre of panegyric itself put his sincerity into question. Therefore, Bartsch explains, Pliny’s speech lays bare how hollow Rome’s moralistic language had become after more than a century of imperial propaganda and flattery by subjects. As in any autocratic regime, sincere and insincere discourses had become so blurred that they could no longer be distinguished from each other.

6 Celebrating Domitian Pliny was far from the only contemporary facing such problems. Lots of senators, knights, and courtiers must have faced the dilemma of how to disentangle themselves from a disgraced regime with which they had been intimately acquainted, and had profited from. The poet Martial, who had composed many works in praise of Domitian, now dismissed these as insincere, expressing relief that such toadying was no longer necessary: “Flatteries, you come to me in vain, you poor creatures with your shameless lips. I am not about to speak of ‘Lord and God.’ There is no place for you any more in this city,” he rejoices (Martial, 1993, Epigrams 10.72). When Domitian still ruled, he had struck a very different tone, unabashedly lauding the emperor as “the Lord and God of the world” and ensuring him that, even though his grand palace, “whose summit touches the stars,” rivaled heaven itself, the building was “not so great as its lord” (8.2; 8.36). Other poets from Domitian’s reign had addressed their sovereign in a similar manner—especially Statius, who like Martial appears to have courted imperial favor through high-handed praise (Leberl, 2004). At the start of his epic Thebaid, the poet addresses Domitian as “you, glory added to Latium’s fame, whom, as you take on your aged father’s enterprises anew, Rome wishes hers for eternity,” expressing the hope that the exalted monarch will not aspire to co-rule the heavens with Jupiter, but will “remain content with the governance of mankind, potent over sea and land, and waive the stars” (Statius, 2004, Thebaid 1.22–31). Another of Statius’s poems sings the praises of the great bronze statue of Domitian on horseback that the Senate and people of Rome had erected on the Forum Romanum—that same Equus Domitiani that would be molten down after his death: “You yourself shine above the temples, your lofty head surrounded by the pure air” (Statius, 2015, Silvae 1.1). Yet another contemporary poet, Silius Italicus,

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composed an epic set in the distant past, but nevertheless saw fit to include a passage in which Jupiter prophecies the coming of a great emperor, “Conqueror of Germany,” who will outdo the military achievements of his father and his brother, and will eventually, after a long and glorious reign on earth, ascend to heaven to assume his rightful throne (Silius Italicus, 1934, Punica 3.594–629). From the context, it is evident that this predestined ruler is meant to be Domitian. Following Pliny and Martial, we could dismiss such bloated expressions of praise and loyalty as nothing but empty rhetoric, meant to disguise the hostility lurking underneath. Opportunism will certainly have played its part, but there is no reason to suppose this would have been any different when those same authors later sang the praises of Trajan. As long as Domitian ruled, it seems that many poets had no qualms to address him in the elevated terms he desired, just as many senators had no qualms to attend his lavish banquets and to erect statues and monuments to his glory. In other words, they were prepared to play by his rules. This raises the question how far the moral outrage against Domitian’s “arrogance” and autocratic style of display actually went, and how much of it we should attribute to later exaggeration. After all, only a small number of courtiers and senators were involved in the conspiracy against the emperor, and they may have been driven more by a sense of selfpreservation than by ideological motives. If Domitian would have continued to rule for another 30 years, and would have been followed by a successor of his own blood or choice, the history of his reign might well have been written by more sympathetic pens. In that case, it would certainly not appear as the catalogue of scandals and atrocities it is now. We could even speculate that, far from being seen as scandalous, Domitian’s superhuman pretensions and self-aggrandizing displays would have been celebrated as the hallmarks of a “good” and strong emperor, instead of the modest princeps image cultivated by Trajan. But if this was ever a feasible route for history to take, it was cut off once he was toppled and a new regime was founded on the rejection of the old.

7 Conclusion To some of his subjects, at least, the emperor Domitian must have been a polarizing figure. Both the Senate’s fervor in issuing a damnatio memoriae after his assassination and the later mutiny by the Praetorian Guard indicate a ruler who could inspire strong emotions of hatred and loyalty. At the same time, as far as we can tell, the populace of Rome and the provinces were relatively indifferent about Domitian and were not much affected by his violent removal. To most outside the capital, he must have been a distant figure, perhaps little more than a name and a face on a coin. Since the large majority of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire were excluded from the political process and lacked the means to directly witness, let alone interact with, their sovereign, the potential for political polarization and scandalization was low.

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The story is different for the elite, especially the Rome-based senatorial class, but the autocratic nature of imperial rule severely limited their options to express discontent. On the contrary, as the transition from Domitian’s reign to Trajan’s shows, the need to realign one’s loyalties to the new regime led to polarization of a different kind. Despite hints indicating otherwise, there was a concerted effort to create the impression that Domitian had been universally reviled, at least by the upper classes, just as Trajan was allegedly universally loved. These dynamics of posthumous character assassination pose a serious challenge to historians, since they cloud our view of Domitian’s reign. Each time a statue was defaced, a name was erased from an inscription, or a negative account was penned down, the emperor suffered yet another symbolic death. Some of the moral outrage expressed by Pliny, Suetonius, and other contemporaries was probably genuine— but some of it may also have been constructed after the fact, as an overt rejection of a leader and a style of leadership that had now been discredited. The scandalization concerning the emperor’s actions in the literary sources, then, cannot be taken at face value. Like the vandalization of his statues, it was above all a political instrument to signal that one stood on the “good” side—and to make the other side look as “bad” as possible.

References Ancient Sources Cassius Dio. (1925). Roman history, volume VIII: Books 61-70. Translated by Earnest Cary, Herbert B. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 176. Harvard University Press. Historia Augusta Author. (2022). Historia Augusta, volume I. Translated by David Magie. Revised by David Rohrbacher. Loeb Classical Library 139. Harvard University Press. Martial. (1993). Epigrams, volume II: Books 6–10. Edited and translated by D.R. Shackleton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library 95. Harvard University Press. Pliny the Younger. (1969). Letters, volume II: Books 8-10. Panegyricus. Translated by Betty Radice. Loeb Classical Library 59. Harvard University Press. Silius Italicus. (1934). Punica, volume I: Books 1-8. Translated by J.D. Duff. Loeb Classical Library 277. Harvard University Press. Statius. (2004). Thebaid, volume I: Thebaid: Books 1–7. Edited and translated by D.R. Shackleton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library 207. Harvard University Press. Statius. (2015). Silvae. Edited and translated by D.R. Shackleton Bailey. Revised by Christopher A. Parrott. Loeb Classical Library 206. Harvard University Press. Suetonius. (1914). Lives of the Caesars, volume II: Claudius. Nero. Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. Vespasian. Titus, Domitian. Lives of illustrious men: Grammarians and rhetoricians. Poets (Terence. Virgil. Horace. Tibullus. Persius. Lucan). Lives of Pliny the Elder and Passienus Crispus. Translated by J.C. Rolfe. Loeb Classical Library 38. Harvard University Press. Tacitus. (1914). Agricola. Germania. Dialogue on oratory. Translated by M. Hutton, W. Peterson. Revised by R.M. Ogilvie, E.H. Warmington, Michael Winterbottom. Loeb Classical Library 35. Harvard University Press.

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Modern Scholarship Bartsch, S. (1994). Actors in the audience: Theatricality and doublespeak from Nero to Hadrian. Harvard University Press. Champlin, E. (2003). Nero. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Collins, A. W. (2009). The palace revolution: The assassination of Domitian and the accession of Nerva. Phoenix, 63, 73–106. Eck, W. (2002). An emperor is made: Senatorial politics and Trajan’s adoption by Nerva in 97. In G. Clark & T. Rajak (Eds.), Philosophy and power in the Graeco-Roman world: Essays in honour of Miriam Griffin (pp. 211–226). Oxford University Press. Elsner, J., & Masters, J. (Eds.). (1994). Reflections of Nero: Culture, history, & representation. University of North Carolina Press. Flower, H. I. (2006). The art of forgetting: Disgrace & oblivion in Roman political culture. University of North Carolina Press. Galimberti, A. (2016). The emperor Domitian. In A. Zissos (Ed.), A companion to the Flavian age of imperial Rome (pp. 92–108). Wiley Blackwell. Grainger, J. D. (2003). Nerva and the Roman succession crisis of AD 96–99. Routledge. Icks, M., & Shiraev, E. (Eds.). (2014). Character assassination throughout the ages. Palgrave Macmillan. Jones, B. W. (1992). The emperor Domitian. Routledge. Krüpe, F. (2011). Die Damnatio memoriae. Über die Vernichtung von Erinnerung. Eine Fallstudie zu Publius Septimius Geta (189–211 n.Chr.). Computus. Leberl, J. (2004). Domitian und die Dichter. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Noreña, C. F. (2011). Self-fashioning in the Panegyricus. In P. Roche (Ed.), Pliny's praise: The Panegyricus in the Roman world (pp. 29–44). Cambridge University Press. Samoilenko, S. A., et al. (Eds.). (2020). Routledge handbook of character assassination and reputation management. Routledge. Scholz, S., et al. (2014). Damnatio in memoria. Deformation und Gegenkonstruktionen in der Geschichte. Böhlau Verlag. Schulz, V. (2019). Deconstructing imperial representation: Tacitus, Cassius Dio, and Suetonius on Nero and Domitian. Brill. Strobel, K. (2003). Plinius und Domitian: Der willige Helfer eines Unrechtssystems? Zur Problematik historischer Aussagen in den Werken des jüngeren Plinius. In L. Castagna et al. (Eds.), Plinius der Jüngere und seine Zeit (pp. 303–314). K.G. Saur. Southern, P. (1997). Domitian: Tragic tyrant. Routledge. Varner, E. (2004). Mutilation and transformation: Damnatio memoriae and Roman imperial portraiture. Brill. Zanker, P. (2002). Domitian’s palace on the Palatine and the imperial image. In A. Bowman et al. (Eds.), Representations of empire: Rome and the Mediterranean world (pp. 104–130). Oxford University Press.

Part III

Partisanship, Scandals, and Political Culture

America’s First Sex Scandal: The Rhetorical Strategies in the Hamilton/Reynolds Affair Jason A. Edwards and Colleen Alm

Abstract In the summer of 1791, United States Treasury Secretary Hamilton began an affair with Maria Reynolds. Hamilton was blackmailed by Maria and her estranged husband James Reynolds. After making payments to Reynolds, Hamilton believed the affair would never be revealed. Five years later, accusations of infidelity and financial impropriety while he was Treasury Secretary were published. Hamilton proceeded to vigorously defend his reputation. In this chapter, we examine how Hamilton attempted to repair his reputation amid a backdrop of extreme partisanship in the United States. We assert that Hamilton used strategies of attacking his accusers, denial, and bolstering to repair his image. The Hamilton/Reynolds affair provides lessons for how political actors attempted to navigate scandal amid extreme partisanship in early American history but may also offer instructions for its current political culture.

1 Introduction In the modern era of American politics, sex scandals are all too commonplace. Ranging from the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky scandal to Donald Trump’s dalliance with porn stars, there are endless examples of politicians getting in trouble for having extramarital affairs. Moreover, there are a number of studies examining how politicians respond to these scandals (see Achter, 2000; Benoit, 2017; Justice & Bricker, 2022). One period of American history not thought of for scandal is the early republic. The Founding Fathers of America—Washington, Jefferson, Adams, and others—are considered demigods to many in the United States. During this time, however, the United States was rife with crisis and scandal that the history books gloss over and/or never get mentioned. In this paper, we examine one of those scandals; what can be considered America’s first sex scandal involving Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton. Specifically, we look at how Hamilton responded to J. A. Edwards (✉) · C. Alm Department of Communication Studies, Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, MA, USA e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_9

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the accusations of adultery and the greater crime, according to him, of financial impropriety while Treasury Secretary. America’s first sex scandal and Hamilton’s response is worthy of analysis for a few reasons. First, no one, at least within the field of Communication Studies, has examined seriously what has become known as the Reynolds Pamphlet. Despite it being an important part of Lin-Manuel Miranda’s epic Broadway show Hamilton, there is little scholarly analysis within rhetorical studies of this important historical case study. Considering Alexander Hamilton’s importance to American political culture, his rhetoric is worth analyzing. Second, when Hamilton made his arguments in responding to the accusations against him, he used a reputation pamphlet to make his arguments. Famous figures who accused of a variety of offenses often turned to pamphleteering, Thomas Paine’s Common Sense being the most famous, as an effective means of persuasion. The argumentative strategies of pamphleteering, particularly reputation pamphlets, is an important rhetorical phenomenon to take up. Our study is one of the few examinations of reputation pamphleteering and may set the groundwork for future scholarship in the rhetorical history of the early American republic. To that end, we spend the next few pages providing a theoretical framework to examine Hamilton’s Reynolds pamphlet, then we move to the pamphlet itself and end our discussion with conclusions concerning this important part of American history.

2 Theoretical Background: Image Repair Theory Political scandals are nothing new. Communication scholars have spent a considerable amount of time theorizing how rhetors respond to scandals. In particular, the theory of image repair has some of the most robust research applications in this area. William Benoit (2015) is the progenitor of this research. The foundations of this theory can be found in the scholarship of Burke (1970, 1973), Scott and Lyman (1968), and Ware and Linkugel (1973). Benoit synthesized these works that first created two assumptions. First, communication is best conceptualized as a goalrelated activity. Second, maintaining a positive reputation is one of the central goals of communication. In addition to these assumptions, Benoit identifies two elements that are necessary for an attack to have been sustained on one’s image. First, there must be an undesirable act. Second, the individual or organization whose reputation is at stake must be responsible for that undesirable act (Benoit, 2015; Benoit, 1997). Given these assumptions, Benoit (2015) further posited and developed a typology of five strategies rhetors may use to repair one’s image, face, and/or reputation when it has been damaged or attacked. Those five strategies are denial, evading of responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of the event, corrective action, and mortification. Benoit explains that rhetors may employ just one of these strategies, but that they are more likely to employ multiple strategies, combining, for example, elements of reducing the offensiveness and corrective action. The first strategy is

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denial. Denial can take two different forms, simple denial and the strategy of shifting the blame. Simple denial is self-explanatory. It involves repudiating any involvement or responsibility for an event. Simple denial may be evidenced by denying that an event has taken place. Shifting the blame occurs when individuals or organizations attempt to impose responsibility for that action onto another actor. A second strategy of image repair theory is evading responsibility, which consists of four sub strategies (Benoit, 2015). Provocation is the first sub-strategy of evading responsibility and describes the act of suggesting that the wrongful act was in response to another wrongful act, that is, the person provoked them into acting as they did. The classic quarreling children’s defense of “s/he started it!” would be an application of provocation. Defeasibility is a second form of evading responsibility. In applying a strategy of defeasibility, the rhetor claims a “lack of information about or control over important factors in the situation” (Benoit, 2015, p. 76). Rhetors pleading defeasibility might argue that they did not know what was going on. Claiming that the act was an accident is a third way of evading responsibility. If an event is perceived to be an unexpected mishap, then the rhetor might be able to repair his or her image. Again, the child’s excuse for a broken item, “it was an accident” is an application of this form of evading responsibility. A fourth way to evade responsibility for an action is to claim that the rhetor had good intentions. In other words, the individual does not deny the act took place, but by claiming that the undesirable occurrence was the unintended consequence of an action initiated with good intentions, he or she may still be able to evade perceived responsibility for the action. In addition to denying and evading responsibility, rhetors seeking to enhance their images might also attempt to employ strategies which reduce the offensiveness of actions. There are six sub-strategies of reducing the offensiveness of an event. The first of these, bolstering, involves the attempt to lessen the negative perceptions of the rhetor by highlighting the positive traits (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997). Rhetors who engage in bolstering attempt to eliminate (or at least lessen) the negative by accentuating the positive. Another way that rhetors attempt to reduce the offensiveness of an event is to minimize or belittle the negatives associated with the event (Benoit, 2015). Exxon attempted to use minimization following the oil spill from the Valdez, claiming that there were not “tens of thousands” of dead seas animals as reports had suggested but only “300 birds and 70 otters” (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997, p. 42; Benoit, 2015). Differentiation describes efforts to reduce the offensiveness of an event by separating a negative action from a closely linked but more offensive action (Benoit, 2015). One manifestation of differentiation is to change the wording to lessen the negative connotation of an event. For example, steroid users may refer to the illicit drugs as enhancers. Transcendence attempts to reduce the offensiveness of actions “by placing the act in a different context” (Benoit, 2015, p. 77). Typically, in transcendence, a negative act is situated to be less important or less significant when compared to broader goals. To rationalize the mass civilian casualties sustained when the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the excuse is often that millions of lives were spared by not further drawing out

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World War II. A fifth method of reducing the offensiveness of an event is to attack the accuser. Attacking the accuser amounts to an attempt to erode the credibility of one’s attackers and thus lessen the negative claims against the defender (Benoit, 2015). Compensation, the sixth and final method of reducing offensiveness, describes the practice of providing victims with items of value (money, services, etc.) to soften the negative impact of the offensive act. Corrective action and mortification are the fourth and fifth strategies in Benoit’s (2015) theory of image repair. Corrective action attempts to restore or repair the image by returning the situation to the way it was before the undesirable event occurred. As this is often impossible, corrective action also involves efforts to change negative policies or practices or to “make changes to prevent the recurrence of the undesirable act” (Benoit, 2015, p. 79). Benoit and Czerwinski (1997) note that US Air attempted to implement corrective action when they hired independent auditor PRC Aviation to review US Air flight safety operations. Mortification involves the acceptance of guilt or responsibility and the admission of wrongdoing and often accompanied by an apology and a request for forgiveness (Benoit, 2015). Benoit suggests that mortification will be more effective when combined with corrective action. The theory of image repair has been used to examine a variety of case studies of how various rhetors have attempted to repair their damaged reputations. Those case studies can be broken into four broad categories of rhetors: celebrities/sports (see Benoit, 1997; Benoit & Hanczor, 1994; Brazeal, 2008; Kauffmann, 2011; Len-Rios, 2010), religious (Dixon, 2004; Legg, 2009; Smith & Connable, 2021), corporate (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Harlow et al., 2011; Sheffler et al., 2018), and political (see Benoit et al., 1991; Benoit & Nill, 1998; Blaney & Benoit, 2001; Edwards, 2008; Liu, 2008). Image repair has a long track record as being an important lens to examine scandal and the rhetorical responses to them. Thus, we use Benoit’s typology to explore Hamilton’s attempts to refute the claims made about his affair and financial impropriety while he was Treasury Secretary.

3 Political Culture and Pamphleteering in the United States Founding Era The United States founding era is often depicted as a golden age of American politics. Founders chic, promoted by many politicians and pundits, states that politicians in the aftermath of the American Revolution, debated issues civilly and respectfully that was superior to the current state of US partisan politics (Waldstreicher, 2002). That premise is absolutely false. The founding era of the United States—late 1770s to the 1790s—was one of the most tumultuous and partisan times in American history. This period saw the rise of American political parties—Federalists and Republicans—and an escalation of partisan rhetoric. America’s politicians primarily conducted their partisanship through paper wars—

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newspapers, pamphlets, public letters, and broadsides—to persuade the public of the righteousness of their cause and/or position (Freeman, 2002). One of the primary weapons in this partisan fight were newspapers. Famous examples include The Gazette of the United States, Aurora, National Gazette, American Minerva, Porcupine Gazette, and the Commercial Advertiser became the primary voices of political parties (Daniel, 2009; Laracey, 2002; Sheppard, 2007). The journalism in the pages of these newspapers, as Eric Burns (2006) noted, was partisan, scandalous, sensationalistic, overheated, fabricated, but also indispensable in shaping US democracy. Mel Laracey (2002) argued these newspapers became the primary means American presidents and their opponents campaigned, using them to persuade the public of their viewpoints, exalt political heroes, and lambast political foes. Marcus Daniel (2009) stated “political life in the post-revolutionary United States was tempestuous, fiercely partisan, and highly personal” (p. 5). In his book, Scandal and Civility, Daniel examines the life stories of six of the most prominent publishers and editors of the time as representative of a political climate where arguments were not resolved civilly, but incivility, invective, sentiment, and emotion were the argumentative characteristics of the era. Politicians and their supporters used newspapers to openly war with each other. Another weapon in the United States paper war was pamphleteering. Pamphlets became a place where politicians could explicate their arguments in greater detail than in the limited pages of a newspaper. Pamphlets allowed politicians to deepen their arguments and offer extended amounts of evidence about their position. Since the late sixteenth century, pamphleteering became an effective means of cultivating public opinion. Verhoest (2019) asserted that pamphleteering in the seventeenth century created a proto-public sphere where different communication styles competed to influence positions and perceptions. In the United States, pamphlets were an effective means of persuasion. The most famous pamphlet in American history is Thomas Paine’s (1776) Common Sense, which sold 100,000 copies in a matter of weeks. In this pamphlet, Paine laid out the primary arguments for US independence. Starting in late 1776, Paine (1777) followed that up with his pamphlet series entitled The American Crisis where he promoted and revitalized the American cause. Political pamphlets were aimed at circles of elite readers. Thomas Jefferson stated these elites were the “thinking part of the nation” and Alexander Hamilton referred to the audience of these pamphlets as the “first” and “second class” (Freeman, 2002, p. 116). Pamphlets were “dignified in tone and lengthy, they were ideal platforms for presenting a detailed argument” (Freeman, 2002, p. 116). Pamphlets, particular defense pamphlets were, in essence, legal briefs that would be circulated to one’s peers. They were “political publications aimed at attacking foes as much as defending friends, but their defensive tone masked their intensions; like gossip and dinner-table politicking, pamphlets justified and channeled aggression by framing it as something else” (Freeman, 2002, p. 119). Considering Alexander Hamilton was accused of not only a scandalous affair, but of using his office for pecuniary gain, it is little wonder he turned to a pamphlet to defend himself. His arguments would be primarily viewed by those that would wield the greatest influence on his future political fortunes.

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4 Alexander Hamilton’s Rhetorical Strategies in the Reynolds Pamphlet In the summer of 1791, Maria Reynolds went to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s office in Philadelphia to ask for financial assistance. Ms. Reynolds needed help because her husband had abandoned her, and she wanted to return to New York. Hamilton proceeded to go to Ms. Reynolds’s home, where it became apparent, according to him, that financial assistance was not all that she desired (Chernow, 2004; Hamilton, 1797). Throughout the rest of 1791, Hamilton and Maria Reynolds continued their affair. In December 1791, Maria Reynolds informed Hamilton that her husband had returned and found out about the affair. James Reynolds wrote to Hamilton and proposed a solution. He asked for $1000 for the injury Hamilton had caused to his family. If he received the money, he would then leave town. Instead of leaving town, James Reynolds stayed and allowed the affair to continue. Maria Reynolds and Hamilton continued their affair sporadically for the next few months. During this time period, James Reynolds began to ask for small sums of money. Considering Hamilton did not want the public to know about his dalliance with Maria Reynolds, he proceeded to pay the extortion. By June 1792, Hamilton ended the affair (Brookhiser, 1999; Chernow, 2004). In November 1792, James Reynolds and Jacob Clingman were arrested for forgery and concocting a financial speculation scheme with Revolutionary War veterans’ pensions. Initially, James Reynolds reached out to Hamilton for assistance, but he declined to offer any support. Infuriated, Reynolds and Clingman informed Frederick Muhlenberg, Speaker of the House of Representatives and Clingman’s former employer, that they had incriminating information about Alexander Hamilton. Reynolds and Clingman presented their accusations to Muhlenberg, along with Representative Abraham Venable and Senator James Monroe, of Hamilton’s affair with Maria Reynolds and his involvement in the speculation scandal for which they were arrested. Reynolds and Clingman stated Hamilton was the mastermind of the scheme. During this meeting Representative James Monroe and John Beckley, a clerk in the House of Representatives, copied some of the letters Maria Reynolds had in her possession from Alexander Hamilton (Brookhiser, 1999; Chernow, 2004; Hendrickson, 1981; Randall, 2003). On December 15, 1792, Muhlenberg, Venable, and Monroe went to Hamilton’s home and confronted him with these accusations. Hamilton confessed to the affair, but adamantly denied any pecuniary wrongdoing as a means to prove his innocence. He showed letters from James Reynolds to Muhlenberg, Venable, and Monroe of the extortion that Reynolds had attempted. Those letters also provided no evidence of financial wrongdoing by Hamilton. Believing the Treasury Secretary’s story, the three representatives promised to never speak of the matter publicly. Yet copies of Maria Reynolds found their way into the hands of Hamilton’s political archenemy, Thomas Jefferson.

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For a few years, the Hamilton–Reynolds affairs appeared it would never see the light of day. In June 1796, Hamilton, writing under a pseudonym, proceeded to critique the personal life of Jefferson that could very well influence the presidential election to be held later that year. In his opinion piece, Hamilton alluded to Jefferson’s affairs with his slave, Sally Hemmings. Incensed that Hamilton would talk about any private matters publicly, he proceeded to give copies of Maria Reynolds letters to James Callender, a fellow Republican and vehement partisan toward Federalist party politics (Chernow, 2004; Hendrickson, 1981; Randall, 2003). In June 1797, Callender published a pamphlet entitled The History of the United States, 1796, vol. V and VI where he published Reynolds’ letters, accusing Hamilton of having an affair and being involved in the speculation scheme that Reynolds and Clingman were arrested for. For Hamilton, having his affair with Maria Reynolds exposed was bad enough, but accusations of a financial impropriety would be debilitating for his own career. Accordingly, Hamilton published a response to Callender entitled Observations on Certain Documents Contained in No. V & VI of “The History of the United States for the Year, 1796,” In Which the Charge of Speculation Against Alexander Hamilton, Late Secretary of the Treasury, Is Fully Refuted, also known as the Reynolds Pamphlet. In the next section, we analyze the rhetorical strategies Hamilton used to refute the accusations put forth by Callender to attempt to save his reputation.

4.1

Hamilton’s Reynolds Pamphlet Strategies

In the early American republic, accusations of impropriety in the press were not unusual. The more profound the accusation, the more a detailed defense was needed. The primary choice for most rhetors was print. The type of print—broadsides, newspaper essays, pamphlets—were dependent upon the accusation(s) and who was being accused. Alexander Hamilton was one of the most important political figures in America. He was the nominal head of the Federalist Party. His thoughts and ideas carried great sway among many Americans. Because of the accusations brought by James Callender, Hamilton needed a forum for a lengthy defense. Pamphleteering was an ideal means to put up such as defense. As Joanne Freeman (2002, p. 101) noted pamphlets were “long-lived, dignified, and typically aimed at a small circle of ‘men of influence,’ they easily encompassed a lengthy legalistic argument, and writers could assume a certain degree of insider’s knowledge. ‘Defense pamphlets’ were a public means of silencing private conversation; they removed gossip from the shadows and exposed it as malicious lies.” These pamphlets allowed rhetors to explain in detail the logic of their actions, undercut the credibility of their accusers, and provide evidence that would bolster their innocence. Hamilton’s audience for these accusations must have been these “men of influence” because they have a direct impact on his future political career and what kind of weight his own influence would carry into the future. Thus, a pamphlet refuting the

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allegations by Callender was, at least in theory, an ideal place to mount his defense against scurrilous accusations. In this pamphlet, Hamilton used three primary strategies in responding to Callender—attacking the accuser, denial, and bolstering.

4.2

Attacking the Accuser

One of the primary strategies that Hamilton used throughout his defense pamphlet is an attack upon his accusers. As Benoit (2015) argued, attacking one’s accuser is about reducing the credibility of one’s attacker and lessening the negative claims they are attempting to make. Hamilton uses this strategy in multiple ways. First, Hamilton (1797, para. 1) began the Reynolds pamphlet with an implied attack upon James Callender and his publication The History of the United States, volume V & VI. He stated, “the spirit of Jacobinism . . . threatens more extensive and complicated mischiefs to the world than have hitherto flowed from the three great scourges of mankind, WAR, PESTILENCE, and FAMINE.” He later noted that “in gratification of this baleful spirit, we not only hear the jacobin news-papers continually ring with insinuations and charges against many of our most virtuous citizens. . . . periodical pamphlets issue from the same presses, full freighted with misrepresentation and falsehood. . .Even the great and multiplied services, the tried and rarely equaled virtues of a Washington, can secure no exemption” (para. 3). Here, Hamilton maintained American political culture, because newspapers and the “periodical pamphlet,” had become infected with Jacobinism. Jacobinism was a revolutionary political movement that dominated the French Revolution. Eventually, Jacobinism became synonymous with the excesses of France’s Reign of Terror, where political enemies were rounded up, imprisoned, and executed by the thousands (Rude, 1988). While some American politicians admired the virtues of the French Revolution (Thomas Jefferson), for Hamilton, Jacobinism has caused too much damage in France. For Hamilton and other critics of the French Revolution, Jacobinism was nothing but rabble-rousing run amuck (see Daniel, 2009). It created a power vacuum that would lead to political infighting and dictatorship. Hamilton argued that the same spirit had come to America because of scandalmongers like Callender. No “virtuous citizen” was safe; not even George Washington, the most revered figure in American politics, could escape the slings and arrows of Callender’s writings. By equating Callender’s pamphlet with Jacobin political culture, Hamilton attempted to undercut its political efficacy. For Hamilton, Callender was nothing but a rabblerouser out to make a name for himself and some potential pecuniary gain. Therefore, his writings were nothing but “misrepresentation” and “falsehood.” Later in the Reynolds pamphlet, Hamilton (1797) attacked Callender’s insinuations directly. He began the last part of the pamphlet by stating “let me now, in the last place, recur to some comments, in which the hireling editors of the pamphlets No. V and VI has thought fit to indulge himself” (para. 88). Throughout this last portion of the Reynolds pamphlet Hamilton tried to respond to Callender’s reasoning and weaken his conclusions. For example, the former Treasury Secretary wrote “it is

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observed that the dread of the disclosure of an amorous connection was not a sufficient case for my humility and that I had nothing to lose as to my reputation for chastity concerning which the world had fixed a previous opinion” (para. 92). According to Callender’s logic, there must be more than simple fear about public disclosure of an affair and the subsequent blackmail between Hamilton and James Reynolds, Jacob Clingman, and Maria Reynolds. People already knew about Hamilton’s “reputation for chastity” so why did he go to such great lengths to keep this affair a secret. According to Callender’s logic, there must have been a greater crime committed. In other words, where there is smoke there is fire. Hamilton responded to this dubious argument by stating, “no man indelicately principled, with the state of manners in this country, would be willing to have a conjugal infidelity fixed upon him with positive certainty . . . especially a public disclosure” (para. 92). Hamilton went on to declare “the truth was, that in both relations and especially the last, I dreaded extremely a disclosure—and was willing to make sacrifices to avoid it” (para. 93). Hamilton undermined Callender’s “where there’s smoke there’s fire” line of thinking by making a simple “state of manners” argument. For Hamilton, the “dread of disclosure” was more than a sufficient reason for him to take steps to keep the affair and the subsequent payments to James Reynolds a secret. No man who was “indelicately principled” would ever think of having a “conjugal infidelity” exposed to the public. Consequently, it made sense that Hamilton would attempt to keep the affair a secret to protect his family and his reputation. In doing so, Hamilton made Callender’s insinuations less damaging than they actually were. Hamilton (1797) also attacked James Reynolds and Jacob Clingman. He noted, Reynolds and Clingman were detected by the then “Comptroller of the Treasury, in the odious crime of suborning a witness to commit perjury, for the purpose of obtaining letters of administration on the estate of a person who was living in order to receive a small sum of money due to him from the treasury” (para. 25). He further stated that Jacob Clingman and James Reynolds “has ever specified the objects of the pretended connection in speculation between Reynolds and me” (para. 26). Hamilton asserted, “the accusation against me was never heard of ‘till Clingman and Reynolds were under prosecution for an infamous crime” (para. 27). Hamilton referenced “document No. 1” and “document No. 2” which state Clingman and Reynolds could provide evidence that Hamilton was engaged in financial speculation, but the real motive was they were “actuated by a spirit of revenge against me; for he declares that he will have satisfaction from me at all events” (para. 27). The evidence Hamilton provided offered “three important inferences flow from these circumstances—one that the accusation against me was an auxiliary to the efforts of Clingman and Reynolds to get released from a disgraceful prosecution—another that there was a vindicative spirit against me at least on the part of Reynolds—the third, that he confided in Clingman as a coadjudicator in the plan of vengeance” (para. 27). For Hamilton, the accusations by Clingman and Reynolds were acts of political revenge because Hamilton refused to help them when they were arrested for forgery and financial speculation. By mentioning their past criminal history, the fact that Reynolds and Clingman never indicated with evidence the specific criminal connection between James Reynolds and Alexander Hamilton, and letters written by

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Clingman and Reynolds they sent to Frederick Muhlenberg that supposedly implicated Hamilton in financial crimes, while they were in prison, severely weakened the credibility of their accusations. No one who read Hamilton’s defense pamphlet, the evidence he provided, could truly think of Jacob Clingman and James Reynolds as whistleblowers. Rather, they were criminals who were out for political revenge and the basis for their arguments against Hamilton were, at the very least, falsehoods.

4.3

Denial with Evidence

Alexander Hamilton spent most of the Reynolds pamphlet denying the accusations against him and providing evidence, in the form of letters between Maria Reynolds, James Reynolds, Jacob Clingman, and Alexander Hamilton, which supported his strategic denial. About one-third of the way into the pamphlet, Hamilton laid out a timeline of events that included his affair with Maria Reynolds, the blackmail from James Reynolds about the affair, and his encounter with Speaker Frederick Muhlenberg, Representative Abraham Venable, and Representative James Monroe. As he testified, “I proceed in the next place to offer a frank and plain solution of the enigma, by giving a history of the origin and progress of my connection with Mrs. Reynolds, of its discovery, real and pretended by the husband, and of the disagreeable embarrassments to which it exposed me” (para. 34). He went on to declare “this history will be supported by the letters of Mr. and Mrs. Reynolds, which leave no room for doubt of the principal facts . . . shewing clearly that such of hem as have related to money have no reference to any concern in speculation” (para. 34). Hamilton was previewing the next 50% of the pamphlet that would exonerate him of the serious crimes of financial speculation. For the next few pages, Hamilton (1797) narrated a timeline of the affair that began in the summer of 1791 and ended the following year. He offered over 20 different letters that revealed no criminal connection between James Reynolds and Hamilton. He concluded, “these letters collectively, furnish a complete elucidation of the nature of my transactions with Reynolds. They resolve them into an amorous encounter with his wife, detected, or pretended to be detected by the husband, imposing on me the necessity of pecuniary composition with him, and leaving me afterwards under a duress of fear of disclosure, which was the instrument of levying upon me from time-to-time forced loans” (para. 56). Hamilton’s complete denial of the accusations, along with his letters of evidence written between Maria Reynolds, James Reynolds, and himself functioned as an attack against Reynolds and Clingman. The evidence he presented revealed no wrongdoing by Hamilton, while indicting the ethos of his accusers. According to Hamilton’s logic, those people who read the pamphlet and/or elements that circulated in newspapers friendly to Hamilton, could draw no other conclusion that Hamilton was innocent of the crime of financial speculation. Further evidence of Hamilton’s denial and, what he thought was full exoneration, came in his recounting of the meeting between himself, Speaker of the House

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Frederick Muhlenberg, and Representatives Abraham Venable and James Monroe. As noted earlier, when Muhlenberg, Venable, and Monroe learned of Hamilton’s alleged crimes they went to his office and confronted him. Hamilton (1797) disclosed the story of his affair and the “forced loans” made to James Reynolds. He provided copies of correspondence between himself, Maria Reynolds, and James Reynolds that determined no pecuniary crime had been committed. Hamilton wrote, “the result was a full and unequivocal acknowledgement on the part of the three gentlemen of perfect satisfaction with the explanation and expressions of regret at the trouble and embarrassment which had occasioned to me” (para. 72). The former Treasury Secretary’s explanation and evidence convinced three powerful politicians that he was innocent of any crime. Considering there was a “perfect satisfaction” from these prominent politicians, who were not his political allies, should be more than sufficient proof to determine that the suppositions against him were misrepresentations and half-truths. The accusations were nothing more than “an attempt to hold me up as a candidate for the office of President” (para. 102). These falsehoods were part of the Jacobin political culture that was infesting the United States body politic. By denying the accusations and presenting evidence to counter them, Hamilton hoped it would be enough to save part of his reputation as a good and decent public servant who might one day be president.

4.4

Bolstering

The third strategy Hamilton (1797) used was bolstering. Bolstering is a strategy where the rhetor attempts to stress positive traits and deeds to reduce the offensiveness of the offenses committed (Benoit, 2015). This strategy of bolstering was prominently featured in the first few paragraphs of Hamilton’s Reynolds pamphlet. Alexander Hamilton stated “I dare appeal to my immediate fellow citizens of whatever political party for the truth of assertion, that no man ever carried into public life a more unblemished pecuniary reputation, than which I undertook the Secretary of the Treasury, a character marked by the indifference to the acquisition of property rather than an avidity for it” (para. 5). Hamilton emphasized the financial aspect of the accusations against him because they were the most egregious to his reputation. He appealed to his “immediate fellow citizens” that he had no desire for financial gain and that when he took office as Treasury Secretary, he had an “unblemished” record as a public servant. Considering Hamilton, at least according to him, was untarnished in his financial reputation and had no desire to acquire greater financial gain then it stands to reason he was innocent of any kind of monetary misdeed. Simply put, he was a good public servant when he took office as Treasury Secretary, when he was in office, and when he left. Hamilton (1797) furthered this bolstering strategy by recounting how he had been investigated two different times by the House of Representatives because of politics. As he described it, “merely because a member of the House of Representatives entertained a different idea from me, as to the legal effect of appropriation laws, and

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did not understand accounts, I was exposed to the imputation of having committed a deliberate and criminal violation of the laws and to the suspicion of being a defaulter for millions; so as to the have been driven to the painful necessity of calling for a formal and solemn inquiry” (para. 8). Hamilton quoted from the official investigations by the House of Representatives. On both occasions the results “were a complete demonstration that the suspicions which had been entertained were groundless” (para. 10). For Hamilton, his political enemies had pursued accusations of pecuniary wrongdoing before that were proven to be baseless. The accusations made in Callender’s History of the United States, 1796, were part of a larger witch hunt to embarrass the Federalist Party’s most prominent figure. By recounting the previous charges made against him and reading the official conclusions of both House of Representative reports bolster his claim that Callender’s latest impeachments were scurrilous accusations meant to damage his reputation and arrest his ability to be considered for the office of president. Hamilton’s defense pamphlet produced a gamut of reactions. Secretary of War, Henry Knox, called it “humiliating in the extreme” (Brookhiser, 1999, p. 199; Chernow, 2004, p. 535). Federal District Court Judge Robert Troup observed Hamilton’s pamphlet has done him “inconceivable injury” (Chernow, 2004, p. 535). Noah Webster wondered why Hamilton would publish such intimate details of his affair with Reynold and scandalize his family (Chernow, 2004; Hendrickson, 1981). Thomas Jefferson argued that Hamilton’s confessions of adultery seemed to have strengthened suspicions that he was guilty of pecuniary crimes (Randall, 2003). James Madison called Hamilton’s pamphlet an “ingenious folly” that only appeared to implicate Hamilton further (Hendrickson, 1981, p. 85; Randall, 2003, p. 112). The Republican press, particularly James Callender, had a field day with Hamilton’s confession. In a series of articles, Callender attempted to poke holes in Hamilton’s defense. He suggested the evidence he provided was an illusion and were forgeries. In one issue, Callender called upon the former Treasury Secretary to allow him to see his evidence; if the evidence turned out to be genuine then he would confess as much to the public (Hendrickson, 1981). The Aurora, the leading Republican newspaper of the day expressed in a similar fashion that “I have been grossly . . . charged with . . . being a speculator, whereas I am only an adulterer. I have not broken the eighth commandment . . .it is the seventh which I have violated” (quoted in Chernow, 2004, p. 535).

5 Implications The Reynolds pamphlet is a fascinating document of the early republic. What are some implications that can be drawn from this analysis? First, the Reynolds pamphlet is first and foremost a defense pamphlet. As noted earlier, pamphleteering was a common means for politicians to make an extended argument on a particular issue. Hamilton used a defense pamphlet to defend himself against the accusations made against him. These kinds of pamphlets represent a genre. They were similar in

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construction, strategies for refutation, etc. However, defense pamphlets have been little studied by rhetoricians and/or communication studies scholars. When we were conducting our literature review for this particular paper, we found little to no references concerning pamphleteering in the early American republic, let alone defense pamphlets. Thus, this genre of rhetorical artifacts is a gold mine for exploration. Historians often use pamphlets as evidence to talk about a certain political figure’s life. We assert that pamphlets, particularly defense pamphlets, should be explored in much more depth to determine the types of rhetorical strategies rhetors used and possibly explore some of the more unique defense pamphlets as artifacts that are worthy of study on their own. Perhaps more importantly, this study continues a line of scholarship that demythologizes the founding era as one of civic virtue and republican self-restraint. Marcus Daniel (2009) noted that Americans often portray the modern era of American politics as being obsessed with the politics of character. The Clinton–Lewinsky scandal was the ultimate example of this obsession. Daniel stated “all sides of the political spectrum, however, calling for a restoration of political ‘civility’ and the election of ‘men of character’ to restore public respect for the integrity of the political system” (p. 5). American historian Gordon Wood (1992) wrote in the Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, that the founders were driven by a sense of civic republicanism to create a nation founded on the virtues of liberty and independence. Works like Wood (not necessarily his intention), history books, and general reporting make the founding era appear to be a political golden age in American history, where men of great influence came together, put aside their differences, and promoted the common good for all Americans. That basic premise is a historical misrepresentation. As Daniel (2009) argued, “political life in the postrevolutionary United States was tempestuous, fiercely partisan, and highly personal” (p. 5). The accusations made against Hamilton and his response is merely one example of this “tempestuous, fiercely partisan, and highly personal” era. Incivility and a fractious political public was a highlight of American politics that existed before the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, continued after its formation, and exists to this day (see Burns, 2006; Sheppard, 2007). One might even argue that incivility, not civility, is part of the DNA of American political culture. Scholars might do well in exploring this notion further. How does a politics of incivility and responses to it, as part of American political culture, move it forward? How does it hinder the growth of that political culture or does it? While we cannot generate any sufficient conclusions from our analysis of the Reynolds pamphlet, this notion that incivility is a recent phenomenon in American politics is a misrepresentation of American history. The politics of character, as Daniel (2009) describes, should be studied throughout the expanse of American history to determine its extent and possible influence. Ultimately, it is difficult to determine whether or not the Reynolds affair had a huge impact on Hamilton’s political career. According to Ron Chernow (2004), one of Hamilton’s biographers, he maintained the “Reynolds scandal diminished but scarcely destroyed his political stature” (p. 536). After the Reynolds pamphlet, Hamilton continued to use his pen to influence American public affairs. He secretly

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carried out a campaign to undermine President John Adams’ re-election bid in 1800. Adams would never forgive Hamilton for not supporting him in the election (Randall, 2003). Hamilton was a vocal critic of the Jefferson administration until he was killed in a duel with Aaron Burr in 1804. Whether or not Hamilton could have become president is a historical mystery, but the Hamilton–Reynolds affair became America’s first true sex scandal.

References Achter, P. (2000). Narrative, intertexuality, and apologia in contemporary political scandals. Southern Journal of Communication, 65(4), 318–334. Blaney, J. S., & Benoit, W. L. (2001). The Clinton scandals and the politics of image restoration. Praeger. Benoit, W. L. (2017). Image repair on the Donald Trump “access Hollywood” video: Grab them by the p*ssy. Communication Studies, 68(3), 243–259. Benoit, W. L. (2015). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: Image repair theory and research. State University of New York Press. Benoit, W. L. (1997). Hugh Grant’s image restoration discourse: An actor apologizes. Communication Quarterly, 45(3), 251–267. Benoit, W. L. (1995). Sears’ repair of auto service image: Image restoration in the corporate sector. Communication Studies, 46(1), 89–105. Benoit, W. L., & Czerwinski, A. (1997). A critical analysis of USAir’s image repair discourse. Business Communication Quarterly, 60(3), 38–57. Benoit, W. L., Gullifor, P., & Panici, D. A. (1991). President Reagan’s defensive discourse on the Iran-contra affair. Communication Studies, 42(2), 272–294. Benoit, W. L., & Hanczor, R. S. (1994). The Tonya Harding controversy: An analysis of image restoration strategies. Communication Quarterly, 42(4), 416–433. Benoit, W. L., & Nill, D. M. (1998). A critical analysis of Judge Clarence Thomas’ statement before the senate judiciary committee. Communication Studies, 49(3), 179–196. Brookhiser, R. (1999). Alexander Hamilton: American. The Free Press. Burns, E. (2006). Infamous scribblers: The founding fathers and the rowdy beginnings of American journalism. Public Affairs Books. Brazeal, L. A. (2008). The image repair strategies of Terrell Owens. Public Relations Review, 34(2), 145–150. Burke, K. (1973). The philosophy of literary form (3rd ed.). University of California Press. Burke, K. (1970). The rhetoric of religion. University of California Press. Chernow, R. (2004). Alexander Hamilton. The Penguin Press. Daniel, M. (2009). Scandal and civility. Oxford University Press. Dixon, M. A. (2004). Silencing the lambs: The Catholic Church’s response to the 2002 abuse scandal. The Journal of Communication and Religion, 27(1), 63–86. Edwards, J. A. (2008). The mission of healing: Kofi Annan’s failed apology in Rwanda. Atlantic. Journal of Communication, 16(4), 88–104. Freeman, J. B. (2002). Affairs of honor: National politics in the new republic. Yale University Press. Hamilton, A. (1797). Printed version of the Reynolds Pamphlet. Retrieved January 20, 2022, from https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-21-02-0138-0002. Harlow, W. F., Brantley, B. C., & Harlow, R. M. (2011). BP initial image repair strategies after the Deepwater horizon spill. Public Relations Review, 37(1), 80–83. Hendrickson, R. A. (1981). The rise and fall of Alexander Hamilton. Dodd.

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The Effects of Prototypicality on Punishment of in-Party Political Leaders’ Immoral Behavior Annemarie S. Walter

and David P. Redlawsk

Abstract Political scientists studying the heterogeneous voter responses to political scandals have paid little attention to the importance of group leader prototypicality. Social-psychological literature suggests that prototypical leaders have more leeway in violating moral principles, compared to atypical leaders. We look at whether voters’ response to in-party politicians’ moral transgressions in terms of the politician’s likeability and punitiveness are dependent on their group prototypicality. Punitiveness is people’s intuitive desire for moral punishment and can be seen as a precursor to holding transgressive politicians accountable. Using a sample of US partisan voters, we conducted a between-subject survey embedded vignette experiment in which the transgressors’ prototypicality was manipulated. We find considerable in-party heterogeneity in voter judgements. Atypicality affects how partisans judge in-party leaders involved in moral transgressions as morally transgressive atypical in-party leaders are evaluated more negatively than morally transgressive prototypical party leaders. Being a prototypical group leader does not provide a politician with more transgression credit, but being atypical reduces the likelihood that voters will accept moral violations by such leaders. In addition, the results show partisan differences in response to morally transgressive behavior, namely, Democrats are less lenient toward their in-party transgressor than Republicans, regardless of leader prototypicality.

A. S. Walter (✉) School of Politics and International Relations, University Nottingham, Nottingham, Nottinghamshire, UK e-mail: [email protected] D. P. Redlawsk Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_10

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1 Introduction Political scandals are part of everyday politics. Some political transgressors survive their publicized immoral behavior, while others have to leave their position. In recent years there has been increasing media focus on scandalous behavior at the highest levels of government, especially in the United States during the presidency of Donald Trump. Trump won election in 2016 despite consistent violations of what are normally widely held moral principles. For example, during his campaign he made fun of a disabled reporter, was heard on audio tape bragging that how he could treat women any way he wished because he was rich, and made payoffs to keep women accusing him of sexual assault quiet, just to name a few extreme examples. And yet, these moral violations clearly were not disqualifying in the eyes of enough American voters that he won not only the Republican nomination for President, but the general election as well. As the Trump example suggests, there is considerable heterogeneity in how and whether political candidates and officeholders are held accountable for their misconduct (e.g., Riera et al., 2013; Kauder & Potrafke, 2015) and that not all voters are equally likely to do so (Alexander et al., 2020; Riera et al., 2013). This heterogeneity has puzzled scholars and stimulated extensive research to try to solve this question. Studies have shown that scandal and voters’ characteristics, such as scandal type, the relevance of the scandal, gender and partisanship of the voter, can help explain voters’ heterogeneous responses to politicians’ immoral behavior (Lee, 2015; Carlson et al., 2000; Anduiza et al., 2013). An important explanatory factor is shared partisanship, and various studies report that voters are more lenient toward politicians involved in moral transgressions of a transgressor that is affiliated with their party, so-called in-party politicians than politicians affiliated with another party, so-called out-party politicians (Bhatti et al., 2013; Anduiza et al., 2013; Blais et al., 2017; Walter & Redlawsk, 2019, 2021; Costa et al., 2020; Solaz et al., 2019). Most of this latter work focuses on differences in moral judgments toward in- and out-party candidates. Here, we focus only on in-party politicians in order to examine a key aspect of leadership, the extent to which an ingroup leader is viewed as prototypical, and we do so in the context of moral transgressions. In so doing, we contribute to the handful of studies examining heterogeneity in voters’ moral judgments of in-party politicians (Filindra & Harbridge-Yong, 2022). Political scientists studying the heterogeneous voter responses to political scandals have paid little attention to the importance of group leader prototypicality. However, group leader protoypicality in inter and intragroup processes has been extensively examiend by social psychologists, but primarily in non-political contexts. Work on leader transgressions, which are defined as “violations of social, moral or legal norms” (Abrams et al., 2013) and considered a subcategory of unethical leadership (Davies et al., 2022), finds that the prototypicality of group leaders is not to be neglected, including in the political realm (Chang, 2021). A few political scientists have examined politicians’ prototypicality, but not in the context

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of moral transgressions (e.g., Severson, 2018). Others operationalize the leader’s prototypicality as to the nation, but not the leader’s own party (Morais et al., 2020). Given the limited research and the need to better understand heterogeneous responses to moral violations by politicians, this study seeks to examine co-partisans’ responses to in-party politicians’ immoral behavior, by focusing on the importance of transgressing politicians’ group prototypicality and the resulting evaluations by copartisans and their preferences for punishment of moral violations. We examine voters overall as well as specifically for the two US partisan groups— Republicans and Democrats—separately. This study focuses on politicians’ moral transgressions, which are often precursors to political scandals, which are “actions or events involving certain kinds of transgressions which become known to others and are sufficiently serious to elicit a public response” (Thompson, 2000, p. 13). We look at whether voters’ response to politicians’ moral transgressions in terms of the politician’s likeability and punitiveness are dependent on their group prototypicality. Punitiveness is people’s intuitive desire for moral punishment and can be seen as a precursor to holding transgressive politicians accountable (Hofmann et al., 2018). Using a sample of US partisan voters, we conduct a between-subject survey embedded vignette experiment in which the transgressors’ prototypicality was manipulated. We find considerable in-party heterogeneity in voter judgements. Atypicality affects how partisans judge in-party leaders involved in moral transgressions as morally transgressive atypical in-party leaders are evaluated more negatively than morally transgressive prototypical party leaders. Being a prototypical group leader does not provide a politician with more transgression credit, but being atypical reduces the likelihood that voters will accept moral violations by such leaders. This chapter is structured as follows: First, we will discuss the literature on group prototypicality and transgression credit and the literature on voters’ responses to the immoral behavior of politicians. Second, we will present our study design and stimulus material. Third, we report our analyses’ results. Finally, we draw conclusions and report avenues for further research.

2 Group Prototypicality and Transgression Credit Group members differ in group prototypicality (Hogg, 2016), that is, how well a group member represents the group’s standards, norms, and values (Hogg, 2016). Prototypical group members represent what group members have in common and what distinguishes them from other groups (Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005). The notion of prototypicality is based on group similarity, intergroup differences, group memory, and group history (Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). As the notion of prototypicality draws from intergroup comparisons, this means that group prototypicality is not fixed (Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005). Group members can manipulate their prototypicality by making outgroup comparisons and

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claiming that they represent group prototypicality (Reicher & Hopkins, 2003). Group leaders are assumed to be prototypical for the group. The more prototypical an individual group member is, the more likely that individual is to emerge as the group leader because members view this individual as best representing the identity of the group (Hogg, 2016; Hogg et al., 2012). Group prototypicality matters for inter- and intragroup processes. Research shows that in- and out-group transgressors are evaluated and treated differently (Abrams et al., 2013). The field disagrees over which is judged more favorably and punished more leniently or judged more unfavorably and punished more severely. Some studies show that ingroup members are more favorably judged than outgroup members when involved in transgressive behavior (e.g. Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013; Abrams et al., 2013). However, other research reports that ingroup transgressors are more derogated than outgroup transgressors (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013), this is known as “the black sheep effect.” The magnitude of the so-called black sheep effect is argued to differ for group members and depends on their status within the group, such as centrality to the group (Pinto et al., 2010), that is, group leaders’ transgressive behavior is evaluated differently than a regular group member’s behavior. Ingroup transgressors threaten the norms within the group, the homogeneity of the group, and positive group image. Transgressions by group leaders are potentially an even larger group image threat as they also challenge the perception of the leader as prototype and question the loyalty of the member to the group, and the loyalty between group and leader (Adams et al., 2013). Research has shown that not all ingroup transgressors are equally benefiting from ingroup loyalty and bias (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). Group leaders committing a moral transgression are more favorably evaluated than other group members committing the same moral transgression (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013); this includes political leaders (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). The notion that political leaders are held to a different standard than other party members is also found in a study on the use of political incivility (Frimer & Skitka, 2020). Most work focusing on how voters evaluate transgressions by politicians does not find a black sheep effect; instead voters are more lenient toward in-party politicians involved in moral transgressions compared to out-party politicians (Bhatti et al., 2013; Anduiza et al., 2013; Blais et al., 2017; Walter & Redlawsk, 2019, 2021; Costa et al., 2020). The so-called transgression credit for leaders is dependent on several factors. First of all, leaders lose this so-called transgression credit when they lose their position, ex-leaders are not judged differently than other group members (Abrams et al., 2018). Second, the leader’s transgression credit seems absent when the transgression is self-serving and does not serve group interests (Abrams et al., 2013) or when the leader is not perceived as legitimate (Marques et al., 2021). Third, the effect tends to be mediated by the extent to which group members believe that the role of leader requires that the leader is supported (Abrams et al., 2018). Fourth, a leader’s transgression credit is not unrestricted. For instance, group members did not grant this transgression credit when the group leader’s transgression was making racist connotations (Abrams et al., 2014). Fifth, a leader’s transgression credit is also

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dependent on group size. Members of proportionally larger groups are more tolerant toward their transgressive leaders than members of smaller-sized groups. Members of smaller-sized groups tend to evaluate the transgressive leader as they do other group members (Travaglino et al., 2016). Sixth, transgression credit is also dependent on whether the transgression is publicly known. Transgressions in private are less likely to be punished (Ashokkumar et al., 2019; Chang, 2021). Seventh, the willingness to accept transgressions by a leader depends on the strength of group identification. Deeply aligned members especially prioritize group reputation over moral concerns and are less likely to suggest punishment of transgressive leaders publicly (Ashokkumar et al., 2019). Eighth, not all ingroup transgressions are equally damaging to the group image. Finally, studies argue that leader transgression credit is dependent on their prototypicality, including for political leaders (Chang, 2021; Abrams et al., 2018). Various studies show that transgressive prototypical leaders are evaluated more positively and punished more leniently than transgressive atypical leaders (Abrams et al., 2018). Other studies claim that prototypical leaders are more punished for their moral transgressions than atypical leaders as they constitute a larger threat to the group image than non-prototypical leader transgressors (Chang, 2021). Leaders’ transgression credit dependent on group prototypicality would be moderated by members’ group identification. Some works suggest that prototypical leaders would be in particular punished by strongly identifying group members (Chang, 2021). On the basis of this literature we formulate the following hypotheses: Prototypicality Hypothesis (H1): Voters evaluate a prototypical in-party politician committing a moral transgression more positively than an atypical in-party politician. Voters tend to express lower levels of punitiveness toward prototypical in-party politicians involved in moral transgressions than atypical in-party politicians. Partisanship Strength Hypothesis (H2): Voters who strongly identify with the party will evaluate a prototypical in-party politician committing a moral transgression more positively than voters who weakly identify with the party. Voters who strongly identify with the party will have lower levels of punitiveness toward a prototypical in-party politician engaged in morally transgressive behavior than toward atypical in-party politicians.

3 Data and Methods To test our hypotheses we designed a 2x3 between-subjects vignette experiment embedded in the 2022 Cooperative Election Study (CES) administered by YouGov. A sample of American voters was collected between September 29, 2022, and November 8, 2022, and consists of 815 respondents, 499 Democrats, and 319 Republicans. Because we are interested in how co-partisans respond to their own leaders,

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Table 1 Sample descriptives Characteristics Female White Democrats Republicans No high school education High school degree or some college Bachelor’s degree Postgraduate education Age

46.06% 80.99% 60.43% 39.57% 4.83% 47.84 34.10% 13.23% Mean = 52.81 standard deviation = 16.96

Note: N = 786 Table 2 Treatment group Group 1 Morally transgressive prototypical republican leader Group 4 Morally transgressive prototypical democratic leader

Group 2 Morally transgressive atypical republican leader Group 5 Morally transgressive atypical democratic leader

Group 3 Morally transgressive republican leader Group 6 Morally transgressive democratic leader

voters who consider themselves independents not leaning to either party were not included in the sample. Table 1 provides the basic descriptives for the sample. We use the unweighted CES sample for multivariate analysis. The unweighted sample is less female and more likely to be White, than American voters overall, and more likely to be Democrats. Because not all respondents provided complete data on key measures, our final sample for analysis is 786 respondents. See Table 1 for descriptives of the sample. Respondents first indicated their party preference, including whether they were strong, weak, or leaning party identifiers. They were then assigned to one of three versions of a moral violation vignette, with the political leader described as a co-partisan. Thus, there are six groups (three for each party). Table 2 displays the details of each group. Respondents were exposed to a pre-tested vignette which randomly manipulated group leader prototypicality (Prototypical/Atypical/No information on prototypicality). All respondents viewed an in-party vignette with the same moral transgression (giving first access to jobs to supporters, a violation of fairness) since our focus is not to assess responses to moral transgressions by politicians, but how ingroup leader prototypicality affects those responses. As a control, we included a condition where typicality was not described at all. The study was approved by the Internal Review Board of the University of Delaware before it was fielded. The vignettes begin with a generic description of a state legislative leader in the respondent’s party named Patrick Donovan. Donovan is described as either

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Table 3 Vignettes Vignette 1 and 4: Morally transgressive prototypical leader Patrick Donovan is a 4-term [Democratic/republican] state legislator planning to run again. Donovan is the leader of the party in the legislature. He regularly supports the [democratic/ republican] party platform. You see that Donovan is making sure that people who voted for him get first access to jobs. Vignette 2 & 5: Morally transgressive atypical leader Patrick Donovan is a 4-term [democratic/republican] state legislator planning to run again. Donovan is the leader of the party in the legislature. He often does not support the [Democratic/ republican] party platform. You see that Donovan is making sure that people who voted for him get first access to jobs. Vignette 3 & 6: Morally transgressive leader, Prototypicality not described Patrick Donovan is a 4-term [Democratic/republican] state legislator planning to run again. Donovan is the leader of the party in the legislature. You see that he is making sure that people who voted for him get first access to jobs.

“regularly” supporting the party platform or “often not” supporting it, indicating typicality (or this sentence is missing). This is followed by a description of the transgressive behavior. We use a moral violation scenario (giving supporters jobs) that has been extensively pre-tested and used within prior studies (Walter & Redlawsk, 2019; Walter & Redlawsk, 2021). We selected this moral transgression as voters clearly perceive it to be morally wrong, but not so morally wrong that it evokes extreme reactions. In addition, this is a transgression that serves the group interest, which is by some seen as a necessary condition for a leader to be granted transgression credit by their supporters (Abrams et al., 2013). In prior experimental work, group leader prototypicality for political leaders is measured by manipulating policy congruence on the basis of policy positions expressed (Severson, 2018) or voting record (Chang, 2021). We follow Chang (2021) in our approach by describing voting records. Table 3 describes each of the vignettes. The vignettes were pre-tested using an Amazon Mechanical Turk sample of 509 respondents to determine if the prototypical/atypical treatment would have the effects we expected and whether respondents would differentiate between prototypical and atypical politicians. Respondents in the pre-test clearly identified the politician who supports the party platform as prototypical and the one who does not as atypical, across both parties. The vignette that did not identify prototypicality was scored in between the other two, suggesting the manipulation worked as expected. Pretest respondents also generally found the vignettes realistic and easy to understand. After exposure to a vignette, respondents were asked several questions to gauge their response. Here we focus on two key dependent variables: candidate evaluation and punitive reactions. Likeability is measured by asking respondents to “Please use the following scale to indicate how likeable Patrick Donovan is” on a 1 = Unlikeable, 7 = Likeable scale. Combining respondents from both parties, likeability has a mean of 3.81 and a standard deviation of 1.70.

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Table 4 Mokken scaling punitiveness Individual Items Labels Donovan should be removed from office because of his behavior. Donovan should receive a warning for his behavior from other party leaders. Donovan should be reported to authorities because of his behavior. Scale

Mean 2.8766

Hi 0.61461

Z 22.9244

DM Y

3.5458

0.52580

19.4551

Y

3.1298

0.65854

24.6332

Y

H 0.6008

Z 27.369

Rho 0.8089

Punitiveness is measured by asking respondents their levels of agreement with three statements: “Donovan should receive a warning about his behavior from leaders in his party,” “Donovan should be removed from office because of his behavior,” and “Donovan should be reported to authorities because of his behavior.” Statements were shown in random order. Choices were Not at all (1), Slightly (2), Moderately (3), Quite a Bit (4), Extremely (5). We used Mokken scaling to combine the respondents to the three statements into a single composite measure (Mokken, 2011). The composite variable Punitiveness runs from 3 to 15, where higher scores indicate higher levels of punitiveness. The mean of Punitiveness is 9.55 and the standard deviation is 3.47. Table 4 shows the scaling results, which indicate a strong unidimensional scale, with a homogeneity coefficient of 0.60 and a rho coefficient of 0.81.

4 Results We now turn to the results of the experiment. We show the predicted margins estimated through OLS regression analyses. Figure 1 shows that across both parties combined, atypical in-party politicians are evaluated on average 1.42 points more negatively than prototypical in-party politicians. Respondents not receiving prototypicality information show no significant difference in their evaluations compared to those receiving the prototypical vignette, supporting the idea that in the absence of information they assume that a party leader is a typical member of the party. We see similar results in Fig. 2 when we consider the effect of leader prototypicality on voters’ evaluations by party. The only difference is that across all three types of vignettes, Democrats rate the transgressive in-party politician slightly lower than Republicans; however, this small partisan difference is not significant. While Hypothesis 1 had anticipated that prototypical politicians would be evaluated more positively than others, we find that both those described as

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Fig. 1 The effect of prototypicality on evaluations of transgressive in-party politicians Note: N = 786. The figure is based on marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals estimated after OLS regression. The dependent variable is Likeability that runs from 1 to 7, 1 = Unlikeable and 7 = Likeable

Fig. 2 The effect of prototypicality on evaluations of transgressive in-party politicians by partisanship Note: N = 786. The figure is based on marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals estimated after OLS regression. The dependent variable is Likeability that runs from 1 to 7, 1 = Unlikeable and 7 = Likeable

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Fig. 3 The effect of prototypicality on evaluations of transgressive in-party politicians by strength of partisanship Note: N = 786. The figure is based on marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals estimated after OLS regression. The dependent variable is Likeability that runs from 1 to 7, 1 = Unlikeable and 7 = Likeable

prototypical and those with no prototypicality information are both rated more positively than those who are atypical. Hypothesis 2 suggests that partisans’ evaluations of in-party prototypical politicians involved in immoral behavior is dependent on partisan strength. We test this with the model for which results are displayed in Fig. 3, where we examine evaluations by partisan strength for each of the three vignette versions, combining both sets of partisans. We find a significant effect for partisan strength only in the evaluation of the prototypical political leader between strong and leaning partisans. For this leader, strong partisans are less negative than leaning partisans, with weak partisans in between, as is anticipated by Hypothesis 2. When we look at the atypical leader or the case where typicality is not mentioned, there are no statistically significant effects of partisan strength on evaluation. Unfortunately, the sample size is too small to examine this also for Republicans and Democrats separately. Having established that evaluations are conditioned on prototypicality information, we turn to examining punitiveness, that is, the intuitive desire for punishment, which we consider a precursor for actual retributive behavior. Figure 4 displays the levels of punitiveness for each of the treatment groups, combining both sets of partisans. We find a significant difference in punitiveness of 1.3 points between

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Fig. 4 The effect of prototypicality on levels of punitiveness toward transgressive in-party politicians Note: N = 786. The figure is based on marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals estimated after OLS regression. The dependent variable is Punitiveness which runs from 3 to 15, the higher the score the higher the desire for punishment

respondents exposed to a prototypical transgressor versus an atypical transgressor, with higher levels of punitiveness toward the atypical transgressor. There is no significant difference in punitiveness between respondents in the prototypical treatment and the treatment with no mention of prototypicality. Figure 5 displays the same analysis separating Republicans and Democrats. Here again we find no significant difference in respondents’ levels of punitiveness whether exposed to a vignette describing a prototypical transgressive politician or one with no prototypicality information. However, we do see differences in punitiveness for the atypical versus prototypical state legislative leader of 1.17 points for Democrats and 1.47 points for Republicans. As with their lower evaluations, we also observe that Democrats have somewhat higher levels of punitiveness than Republicans. This is best visible in the treatment without information on group prototypicality, with a significant difference of 1.4 points. However, we find no significant differences in respondents’ levels of punitiveness for prototypical and atypical politicians by strength of partisanship, as shown in Fig. 6. As with evaluation, support for our hypotheses on punitive responses is mixed.

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Fig. 5 The effect of prototypicality on levels of punitiveness toward transgressive in-party politicians by partisanship Note: N = 786. The figure is based on marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals estimated after OLS regression. The dependent variable is Likeability that runs from 1 to 7, 1 = Unlikeable and 7 = Likeable

5 Discussion This study used a 3x2 survey embedded between subjects vignette experiment with 786 US respondents to examine how politicians’ prototypicality matters for in-party evaluations and punitiveness in response to morally transgressive behavior. We find mixed support for a set of hypotheses drawn from the literature that suggest prototypical leaders have leeway in violating moral principles, compared to atypical leaders. We contribute to the small number of existing studies examining partisans’ responses to in-party transgressors. In doing so we help to better understand the broader puzzle of voters’ heterogeneous responses to politicians’ immoral behavior. Voter responses are often not what we would expect, in that they may accept moral violations as long as their leaders are seen as prototypical of their party. Nonetheless, more work needs to be done. First of all, this study was limited in sample size, limiting its ability to examine differences across the two parties in some contexts. Higher order interaction analyses could not be carried out to examine how the transgressor’s group prototypicality and voters’ partisan identity strength affect their response to the politician’s immoral behavior. Our findings show that in the absence of information provided respondents assume that the in-party transgressor is prototypical. However, what is prototypicality for a party? In this case we identified it simply as supporting the party platform, following Chang (2021). More work should be conducted on what

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Fig. 6 The effect of prototypicality on levels of punitiveness toward transgressive in-party politicians by strength of partisanship Note: N = 786. The figure is based on marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals estimated after OLS regression. The dependent variable is Likeability that runs from 1 to 7, 1 = Unlikeable and 7 = Likeable

the norms and standards are that partisans expect their leader to follow. There may be better ways to suggest group prototypicality; at the same time, what is typical for one group might differ from another group, making cross party comparison more challenging. What we intend to suggest in the vignette is similar to Severson’s (2018) ideological coherence with the party, as opposed to some type of group disloyalty. We saw that this stimulus elicited a larger response among Republican partisans, even so. Similar to other studies our findings show partisan differences in response to morally transgressive behavior, namely, Democrats are less lenient toward their in-party transgressor than Republicans, regardless of leader prototypicality. However, only a single scenario was used, and it might be one (fairness) of particular interest to Democrats. It would be valuable to verify whether the findings are generalizable to other moral transgressions. Group members’ tolerance of unethical leadership is not stable across time (Morais et al., 2020); members might adjust their (in)tolerance of unethical leadership depending on the electoral success of the morally transgressive leader (Morais et al., 2020). Trump supporters became more tolerant and Clinton supporters less tolerant of unethical leadership in response to Trump winning the 2016 election which may account for the partisan differences we find here.

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The question of voter heterogeneity in responding to scandals, or in this case a moral violation as a precursor to scandal, remains open. It may be, as some research suggests (Walter & Redlawsk, 2019, 2021) that partisanship is a strong identity that can override moral transgressions in the service of winning elections. In this study, it appears a leader should hew closely to the party line (and thus be prototypical) to get this leeway. Moral violations by politicians are sometimes accepted by their own voters, likely in service to the desire to win, leading perhaps to overlooking moral failures. It may be that if a moral transgression ends up rising to the level of a visible public scandal, voters would perhaps begin rethinking their support. While we do not test this here, evidence in the real world shows that from time to time politicians who violate moral principles are electorally punished. The fact that this is inconsistent, however, can be at least in part based on the degree to which voters see the in-party politician as typical, and thus “one of us” versus atypical. Future research should examine the link between moral transgressions and full-on scandal to identify if and when voters’ tolerance of moral transgressions for typical leaders might end. Acknowledgments Annemarie Walter’s research time spent writing this chapter was funded by a Marie Curie Global Fellowship (№892951: 2020-MSCA-IF-2019).

References Abrams, D., Travaglino, G. A., Marques, J. M., Pinto, I., & Levine, J. M. (2018). Deviance credit: Tolerance of deviant ingroup leaders is mediated by their accrual of prototypicality and conferral of their right to be supported. Journal of Social Issues, 74(1), 36–55. Abrams, D., Travaglino, G. A., Randsley de Moura, G., & May, P. J. (2014). A step too far? Leader racism inhibits transgression credit. European Journal of Social Psychology, 44(7), 730–735. Abrams, D., Randsley de Moura, G., & Travaglino, G. A. (2013). A double standard when group members behave badly: Transgression credit to ingroup leaders. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105(5), 799. Alexander, A. C., Bågenholm, A., & Charron, N. (2020). Are women more likely to throw the rascals out? The mobilizing effect of social service spending on female voters. Public Choice, 184(3), 235–261. Anduiza, E., Gallego, A., & Munoz, J. (2013). Turning a blind eye: Experimental evidence of partisan bias in attitudes toward corruption. Comparative Political Studies, 46, 1664–1692. Ashokkumar, A., Galaif, M., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2019). Tribalism can corrupt: Why people denounce or protect immoral group members. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 85, 103874. Bhatti, Y., Hansen, K. M., & Olsen, A. L. (2013). Political hypocrisy: The effect of political scandals on candidate evaluation. Acta Politica, 48, 408–428. Blais, A., Gidengil, E., & Kilibarda, A. (2017). Partisanship, information and perceptions of government corruption. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 29, 95–110. Carlson, J., Ganiel, G., & Hyde, M. S. (2000). Scandal and political image. Southeastern Political Review, 28, 747–757. Chang, J. W. (2021). Leader group prototypicality and reactions to leader transgressions. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 13684302211032284.

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Costa, M., Briggs, T., Chahal, A., Fried, J., Garg, R., Kriz, S., & Slayton, J. (2020). How partisanship and sexism influence voters’ reactions to political# MeToo scandals. Research & Politics, 7(3), 2053168020941727. Davies, B., Leicht, C., & Abrams, D. (2022). Donald Trump and the rationalization of transgressive behavior: The role of group prototypicality and identity advancement. Journal of Applied Social Psychology., 52, 481. Filindra, A., & Harbridge-Yong, L. (2022). How do partisans navigate intra-group conflict? A theory of leadership-driven motivated reasoning. Political Behavior, 44(3), 1437–1458. Frimer, J. A., & Skitka, L. J. (2020). Americans hold their political leaders to a higher discursive standard than rank-and-file co-partisans. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 86, 103907. Hofmann, W., Brandt, M. J., Wisneski, D. C., Rockenbach, B., & Skitka, L. J. (2018). Moral punishment in everyday life. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(12), 1697–1711. Hogg, M. A. (2016). Group members differ in relative prototypicality: Effects on the individual and the group. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, e153. Kauder, B., & Potrafke, N. (2015). Just hire your spouse! Evidence from a political scandal in Bavaria. European Journal of Political Economy, 38, 42–54. Lee, F. L. (2015). How citizens react to political scandals surrounding government leaders: A survey study in Hong Kong. Asian Journal of Political Science, 23, 44–62. Marques, A. G., Pinto, I. R., Leite, A. C., de Moura, G. R., van Prooijen, J. W., & Marques, J. M. (2021). " a right to lead": The role of leader legitimacy on group reactions to transgressive leadership. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 51(4), 350–362. Mokken, R. J. (2011). A theory and procedure of scale analysis. In A theory and procedure of scale analysis. De Gruyter Mouton. Morais, C., Abrams, D., & Randsley de Moura, G. (2020). Ethics versus success? The acceptance of unethical leadership in the 2016 US presidential elections. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 3089. Pinto, I. R., Marques, J. M., Levine, J. M., & Abrams, D. (2010). Membership status and subjective group dynamics: Who triggers the black sheep effect? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 107–119. Randsley de Moura, G., & Abrams, D. (2013). Bribery, blackmail, and the double standard for leader transgressions. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 17(1), 43. Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (2003). On the science of the art of leadership. In D. van Knippenberg & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), Leadership and power: Identity processes in groups and organizations (pp. 197–209). Sage. Riera, P., Barberá, P., Gómez, R., Mayoral, J. A., & Montero, J. R. (2013). The electoral consequences of corruption scandals in Spain. Crime, Law and Social Change, 60(5), 515–534. Severson, A. W. (2018). Partisan affiliation and the evaluation of non-prototypical candidates. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 5(2), 121–147. Solaz, H., De Vries, C. E., & De Geus, R. A. (2019). In-group loyalty and the punishment of corruption. Comparative Political Studies, 52(6), 896–926. Thompson, J. B. (2000). Political scandal: Power and visibility in the media age. Polity Press. Travaglino, G. A., Abrams, D., Randsley de Moura, G., & Yetkili, O. (2016). Fewer but better: Proportionate size of the group affects evaluation of transgressive leaders. British Journal of Social Psychology, 55(2), 318–336. Van Knippenberg, D., & Hogg, M. A. (2003). A social identity model of leadership effectiveness in organizations. In B. M. Staw & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior (Vol. 25, pp. 243–295).

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Van Knippenberg, B., & Van Knippenberg, D. (2005). Leader self-sacrifice and leadership effectiveness: The moderating role of leader prototypicality. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(1), 25. Walter, A. S., & Redlawsk, D. (2019). Voters’ partisan responses to politicians’ immoral behavior. Political Psychology, 40(5), 1075–1097. Walter, A. S., & Redlawsk, D. (2021). The effects of Politician’s moral violations on voters moral emotions. Political Behavior., 45, 1191. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09749-z

Annemarie Walter is Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham and a Marie Curie Global Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Delaware. Dr. David P. Redlawsk is the James R. Soles Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware.

Forty Years of Political Scandals in Germany and Austria: Differences and Similarities Martin R. Herbers

Abstract The paper comparatively analyzes 22 individual political scandals in Germany and Austria from 1980 to 2020, asking how scandalous communication developed over time in correlation with media-political systems. Germany, for example, introduced privately owned broadcasting stations in 1984, which lead to a rise of entertainment programming and tabloid journalism. With broadband Internet technologies available since the 1990s, scandalous communication shifted from broadcasting to the digital space and took on participatory forms, especially since the advent of social media in the mid-2000s. Similar developments took place in Austria, introducing a dual broadcasting system 10 years later in 1994, with similar developments. Despite these similarities, there are differences in political and media culture: Austria’s public administration upholds institutional politics, making individual actors less relevant. Germany places more emphasis on the personalization of politics. Austria has a long-standing tradition in tabloid reporting, whereas Germany emphasizes informational journalism. Employing qualitative content analysis of newspaper reports, the study investigates scandal initiation, norm breaches, involved individuals, media channels, scandal duration, and consequences. Findings show tabloid journalism’s central role in both systems, with comparable violated norms. Yet, German reporting accentuates individual consequences, while Austrian reporting often ignores them.

1 Introduction: Not Everything Is a Scandal Everywhere all the Time Scandals play a major role in democratic media-political systems. They uncover shortcomings of individual political actors, draw public attention to it, and thus act as functional corrective forces in politics. They make the underlying normative order M. R. Herbers (✉) Department for Communication and Cultural Studies | Centre for Political Communication, Zeppelin Universität | netPOL, Friedrichshafen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Haller, H. Michael (eds.), Scandalogy 4, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-47156-8_11

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for politics and the acceptable behavior of political actors visible and help to foster a shared understanding of the norms and values that (should) drive the politically active audience. Yet, as Kepplinger (2018) states, although being tied to an underlying normative order, scandals are not absolute. They are subject to change: As the underlying normative order of politics changes and provides the basis for acceptable behavior, the idea of a scandal changes as well. Things that might have been scandalous 40 years ago might now be regarded as acceptable, or vice versa. Further, cultural aspects regarding politics and journalism come into play as well: What would be scandalous in one country is acceptable in another one. Things that would be reported on for several weeks in one newspaper are not even deemed newsworthy for another paper. And as one newspaper asks for consequences for the scandalous behavior, the other does not even mention it. Thus, scandals are always subject to a certain political-cultural-temporal constellation. Despite these differences, there are underlying structures of scandal communication which follow a certain nearly universal form. The individual scandals are subject to this form and although being different, are made comparable to one another. Yet, comparative research on scandals remains scarce, despite its academic and social relevance. Academically, research on scandals focusses on single cases (e.g., Kepplinger et al., 2002) and gives insights on their circumstances and contexts. Yet, they omit the dynamic aspects of journalistic and political culture, which only become visible over time and in comparison. Hence, this chapter investigates 40 years of political scandal reporting in Austria and Germany, in order to point out cultural differences and similarities in these cases. Against the backdrop of functional scandal theory (Kepplinger, 2018; Hondrich, 2002) and theories of political and journalistic culture, it conducts explorative qualitative content analyses of selected reports on scandals. To build the argument, the paper employs five major sections: The first section presents a theoretical and methodological framework, which is necessary to conduct the comparative analysis. Starting with an overview on institutional politics and political culture as a backdrop, the chapter develops its theoretical perspectives on the functional theory of scandals. This perspective is placed in the wider context of political culture, emphasizing aspects of political socialization. Building on this, the chapter argues for analyzing scandals in the context of distinct media cultures, that is, Austria and Germany. Leading over to methodological questions of comparative research, the chapter presents its research questions. The second section on methodological aspects of scandal research presents the process of case selection and sampling for this study, as well as insights on its method of computer-assisted content analysis. The third section contains the findings of the analysis and their interpretations against the backdrop of the underlying theoretical perspectives. The fourth section emphasizes limitations and a critique of the methodological approach. Based on this, the fifth section places the findings of this study in the wider context of scandal research and gives implications for further research.

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2 Theoretical and Methodological Aspects: Comparing Political Scandals This section lays the theoretical and methodological groundwork for the analysis. Starting with an overview on institutional politics and political culture as a backdrop, the section bases its theoretical perspectives within the functional theory of scandals. Media and political culture serve as the wider context for scandals, which also have implications for aspects of political socialization. Based on this, the section argues that scandals should be analyzed with their distinct media and political cultures in mind. Discussing methodological questions of comparative research, the section presents the underlying research questions for the empirical analysis provided in the following section.

2.1

Institutional Politics and Political Culture

The political system is a major part of any society, as it is the only system that has the power to regulate other systems of the society and thus society itself. In order to legitimize this function, in democratic systems, power is distributed regularly through elections. In these elections, individual actors are chosen to represent their constituencies in making collective decisions. This more functional-institutional aspect of politics nevertheless places the focus on individuals that should act not out of selfish reasons but should follow strict ethical and normative assumptions for a correct behavior in this role (Schmidt, 2010). Most political scandals thus shine a light on the shortcomings of an individual actor that stand as a pars pro toto for the underlying political system and its structural problems. Apart from this institutional understanding, there is a more “mundane” understanding of politics, as Merelman (1998) points out. It stems from the notion that politics has a certain institutional level that includes institutions on the level of polity (e.g., parties and parliaments), the modes of deliberation and collective decision making (e.g., deliberation) on the level of politics and the content of political deliberation (e.g., family politics, media politics) on the level of policy. This idea is not challenged, it is merely enhanced by the more “mundane” understanding of politics, which takes place in the everyday life of audience members and adds the more individual life-world-level of politics to the discussion. As Herbers (forthcoming) points out, politics is not restricted to the institutional level, it is also part of the everyday life of citizens. Using media to learn about social and political issues through the lens of relevance for their own lives, individuals connect to the institutional level of politics. Through this, the more mundane level of individual decision making is connected to the sphere of collective decision making. Scandals can bridge these spheres of individual and collective politics: They present a breach of norms on the more societal level, yet also are subject to individual relevance and part of sense-making-processes in the individual lifeworld.

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The Functional Theory of Scandals

According to Kepplinger (2018), scandals can be seen as a normative seismograph, which indicates the breaching of societal norms. He defines a scandal as an “upset reaction of a major part of society to an actual or implied calamity.” Despite its impreciseness (what constitutes a major part of society? What are the indicators for a calamity), this definition is quite useful, as it puts moral outrage in its center. Kepplinger (2018) delineates as scandal from the processes of investigative journalism, as the latter has different goal: Investigative journalism seeks to uncover social or political shortcomings in order to hand it over to more formal institutions and organizations that need to deal with them and their consequences, for example, the judicial system. A scandal proper instead seeks to point out shortcomings in order to create a public outrage. Nevertheless, Kepplinger (2018) argues that the moral public outrage can be functional to society, despite having negative consequences for the individual actor: As it showcases the shortcomings and produces outrage, it becomes functional equivalent to the actual social system that should care for it: A scandal about a politician’s personal shortcomings, which leads to her withdrawal from politics, could then be as effective as formally excluding him or her from the party—it is just another way. Kepplinger (2018) gives several elements that constitute a scandal: • The causes for the scandal are damages to persons, things, or the environment in general. Yet, a breach of norms, which is of particular interest here, also counts as a cause for a scandal. • The scandal needs to be caused by a human actor; machines and animals or nature as such can cause catastrophes, but not scandals. • The human actor has caused the scandal for selfish reasons, for example, holding his personal wealth higher than the values of an office he/she represents. • The human actor chose to pursue the acts out of free will, he or she was not forced and could always have decided to act in a different way. • It is vital for a scandal that it is picked up and reported on by professional (legacy) media, as they have the power to reach society-wide audiences and thus emphasize the relevance for the scandalous behavior which is beyond a small group of people affected by it. • The perpetrators of a scandal must face consequences for their scandalous behavior, which can range from stepping back from office or more symbolic acts. • The issue of a scandal varies socio-culturally and temporally, an issue that causes a public outrage today might not have been picked top by the press a few years ago. Based on these elements of a scandal, the functional theory of scandals is based on the idea that scandals provide a benefit for larger society and politics. It operates under the assumption that social systems (e.g., politics or the economy) are functional, when they fulfill a role for greater society, for example, distributing legitimate

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political power. Within this system, there are certain institutions which control its functionality. If they fail, for whatever reason, scandals act as a back-up-system for controlling the system, thus being functionally equivalent to the failed institutions. Despite its valuable contribution to research, the functional theory of scandals is not without criticism. As Kepplinger (2018) argues, the scandal in itself might not be functional to a democratic society, but may have positive effects, such as stricter laws or a greater moral awareness. Yet, many negative effects come to mind, which might prove dysfunctional on an individual or societal level: As many institutions are at the heart of a scandal, the general trust in their functionality might wither. Further, scandals might lead to questionable political decisions in their aftermath, for example, the premature introduction of policies that just address symptoms, but not root causes of an issue. On an individual level, subjects of a scandal might lose their careers or even worse. Hence, Kepplinger (2018) asks for a cost-benefit-analysis of scandals before they are reported, stressing that the scandal is not of social value, but its outcome might be.

2.3

Scandals as a Form of Political Socialization

The functional theory of scandals is based on larger cultural and political assumptions: Societies, as Hondrich (2002) states, follow certain goals. Thus, they permanently must orient themselves regarding these goals: They must check whether they are still on track or if they fail in reaching their targets. Institutions, such as markets, parliaments, or news media help societies in assessing whether they are on the right course. Scandals can act as a part in a larger societal learning process: They provide evidence of failure in reaching a certain goal and thus present opportunities for learning how to correct them. As they follow certain underlying rules and structures—as given in the definition by Kepplinger (2018)—they provide regular learning opportunities and thus can function as a larger institution for societal learning. Scandals teach a society about itself as whole or the assumed and intended function of its parts (e.g., politics) and show ways of sanctioning and/or correcting these trespasses. Hondrich (2002) further points out that the number of scandals rises with its level of democratization and industrialization, as it increases its internal and external differentiation and complexities and thus provides more opportunities for things to go wrong and to be scandalous. The more complex a society becomes, the more visible individual actors become, most prominently leaders of politics and industry, which are mostly scandalized. Legacy media as well as social media are willing to pick up on these shortcomings. Yet, as Kepplinger (2018) argues, the role of social media must not be overestimated: They might uncover a scandal, yet their societal relevance is limited. Only by getting picked up in legacy media, societal-wide scandals arise and become relevant for societal learning in the sense of Hondrich (2002).

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Media Culture, Political Culture, and Scandals

Apart from the functional theory of scandals, which places emphasis on a more societal level, scandals can also be regarded as a vital part of political culture. This approach lays a different emphasis, as it can serve as an integrative way for citizenaudiences to get in touch with ongoing and recent issues in politics and the underlying breaches of norms. As the functional theory of scandals is more about norm correction and societal learning, the cultural perspective is more about the symbolic construction of reality through shared symbols, which are usually mediated. Political culture is inextricably bound to media culture and thus dependent on the underlying media system (Dörner & Vogt, 2012, pp. 12–13). From this point of view, the notion of political culture brings the idea of audiencecitizens as observers of politics into play. These observers do not just passively engage with political processes and their reporting, they actively construct meaning through engaging with the reports on political processes, which might also be scandals. In this regard, political culture is not merely about the facts of a certain political system (e.g., the existence and function of a certain political institution), but about the sense-making processes and the meaning derived from these processes on an individual and collective level. Political culture thus encompasses patterns of observing and sense-making, social norms and values, identities, and ideas about a certain “normality” of a political system which has its effects on everyday life (Dörner & Vogt, 2012, p. 14). Political culture further presents a more impersonal idea of political life, giving notions about how someone “generally” engages with politics, thus getting a collective representation of acceptable and non-acceptable notions of politics. It gives ideas about the “regular functions” of politics and how to deal with its dysfunctional elements (ibid, pp. 14–15). Political culture can also be regarded as a tool for individual and collective political socialization and learning. Members of a political culture learn about the institutions and actors through various stages of socialization, yet also learn how to navigate within these institutions in and for their personal life. Thus, there is a form of internalizing the expectations and regularities of political culture. In this constellation, media play a vital role, as they provide the information necessary to navigate within political culture. Through a shared use of symbols, they integrate the audience-citizens and provide orientation and stability and some form of expected regularity of the political processes. They also point out how and if this regularity is disturbed, for example, by the misbehaving of a certain actor that breaks the norms. Hence, political culture is closely tied to media culture and the underlying media system (ibid, pp. 15–16). The media systems of Germany and Austria share some similarities yet have their unique differences: Both political systems were subject to allied occupation in the aftermath of World War II and were subdivided into sectors, each under control of a different ally. Regarding the experience of a totalitarian media system in the Third Reich, the allies advanced a new media system which focused on variety and

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plurality, emphasizing daily newspapers as the backbone of political information in both countries (Karmasin & Oggolder, 2019). Both the political and the media systems share a highly normative background with the idea that news should be information-driven, yet should uncover shortcomings in politics investigatively (Weischenberg et al., 2006). This is part of the journalistic role conception in both countries. Stemming from a media system consisting mostly of newspapers, the introduction of television news and entertainment television news (infotainment) gave rise to a more entertainment-driven journalism, which caters to the reporting or uncovering of scandals. With the advent of broadband Internet and of course social media, users have been given the opportunity to play their own part in scandal communication and carry them from traditional newspaper outlets to online discussions, thus giving a chance for the scandals to never reach a conclusion (Herbers & Lichtenstein, 2021). In this political-media-culture constellation, especially the legacy media act in a twofold way: On the one hand, they provide a shared understanding of the status quo. In an almost ritualistic way, they provide examples of the regularities and the functioning of the political system. They also act as amplifiers for certain irregularities, for example, an actor that behaves in a certain way (Dörner & Vogt, 2012, pp. 16–17). Both forms are vital for scandals: On the one hand, they are a regular event of political culture, on the other hand, each scandal has its idiosyncrasies, which make them newsworthy. Hence, they are a vital aspect of political culture.

2.5

Comparing Media Scandals: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects

As the theoretical analysis showed, a mediated scandal follows a certain internal logic and consists of distinct elements. At least in the countries of the Western world, which are the scope of Kepplingers’ (2018) analyses, news media and journalists report on scandals in an expectable way. A scandal story in a British tabloid on a corrupt politician might not be unfamiliar to a German reader. Hence, it can be assumed that there are certain standards of reporting on scandals, which are not only based on the internal logic of scandals but are also grounded in standards of journalistic reporting and training. Yet not every form of journalism is the same, there are striking differences between, for example, British and German tabloid journalism or between an American or German understanding of investigative reporting. This is due to differences in journalistic culture, as Hallin and Mancini (2004) point out. Journalistic culture explains the unique cultural ideas of how journalism is understood and conducted, how issues are presented, and scandals are reported within a national media system. For example, German news journalism tends to be fact-centric and informative, American news tends to be more interpretative and opinion-driven (Gans, 2003).

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Scandal reporting thus should follow this assumption as well: As a “universal” form of reporting on social or political shortcomings and breaches of norms, it should be an integral part of reporting in a national media system, but should also follow the unique style of reporting which is influenced by a certain journalistic culture. Hence, comparative research is a must for communication scholarship, as the unique idiosyncratic aspects of a certain media system only becomes visible in comparison. Only researching one country, for example, uncovers a lot but has certain blind spots that are systematically produced by focusing on a single case. In comparison, both blind spots are overcome, and differences and similarities arise and are shown. There is a tradition of comparing media systems in communication scholarship, especially on a political-economical level. Hallin and Mancini (2004) provided the seminal study for this approach and compared European media systems on a variety of levels, deriving three categories of media systems in Europe, which are constantly updated (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2017). Generally, these studies strive to compare media systems on a more structural level, providing complex quantitative indicators to make the unique cases comparable. Political science and research, especially in the study of international relations, has a comparative tradition as well and has provided several methodological insights when comparing political systems. The underlying question is given by the research interests: What are the guiding factors in choosing the countries under comparison? This gives rise to several designs: Countries could be selected through difference or similarity, all according to the research question (Bohnsack, 2013). Regarding the research question of this chapter, German and Austrian scandal reporting should follow the logic of scandal reporting in general yet should also show unique differences based on their individual journalistic and political cultures. The analysis should thus be based on Kepplingers’ (2018) definitory elements of scandal reporting to make them comparable. Yet, different to the methodological design proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), in order to get an understanding of the cultural dimension, a more quantitative analysis is not fruitful, as it is based on certain theoretically derived indicators. As differences in German and Austrian scandal reporting are a research gap, this study opts for an explorative design and qualitative methodology, in order to grasp the unique differences. Although focusing on individual cases in their contexts, the study strives for comparability through the process of categorization provided by qualitative content analysis.

2.6

Research Questions

Derived from the theoretical approaches and the methodological outline, the chapter answers the following research question:

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RQ; What are the differences and similarities of scandal communication in Austria and Germany? As this question is rather broad, it needs further specification in order to make the scandal communication of Austria and Germany more discernible and thus comparable. Following the scandal definition of Kepplinger (2018), the study poses several further research questions, which will further guide the operationalization and the analysis: RQ 1: What was the cause for the scandal? Which person, thing, or part of the environment was damaged? Which social norm was breached? RQ2: Who was the human actor that caused the scandal? RQ3: What was the selfish reason that led the human actor to engage in scandalous behavior? RQ4: Was the scandalous behavior necessary or contingent? RQ5: Which legacy news media reported on the scandal? RQ6: Which consequences did the actor that caused the scandal face? To answer this research question, the study conducts a qualitative content analysis of a sample of political scandals over the course of 40 years, reported in German and Austrian newspapers.

3 Methodological Aspects of Scandal Research Based on the theoretical reflection and the derived research questions, this section gives insight on the methodological and methodical aspects of the empirical analyses. It presents the sampling process and the resulting sample of Austrian and German scandal reports. Further, it shows the process of data acquisition and analysis, using computer-aided qualitative content analysis.

3.1

Case Selection and Sampling

To answer the research questions, we investigated journalistic scandal communication in Austria and Germany. Since there is no directory of all scandals in both countries, our study had to face an unknown population of scandals for each country and overall. In order to overcome this difficulty, we decided to use an explorative approach to answer the research questions. This explorative approach led to the question of sampling. We decided to use a theoretically driven sampling method for picking up scandals for research. This was flanked by several assumptions: – The time observed was from 1980 to 2020, which covers all the major developments in the media systems of both countries.

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– The scandals had to be political and had to involve at least one political actor. – The scandals needed to have a certain media resonance and should be reported on for at least a week. – The material should be in a written form, as newspaper archives in both countries are more easily accessible online and offline in both countries. Television broadcasts and social media posts are not as systematically archived; hence they were only added sporadically. – The scandal should still be in collective memory, as they can serve as an integrative force in political culture. Its mere mention should evoke at least a general idea of the scandal. – The sample size should be about 20 cases for each country as this is the quantity needed to derive theoretical satiation in this line of research (Meyen et al., 2019), allowing statements which are more universal than the reporting of a single case study. Keeping these assumptions on mind, we conducted a sample of n = 22 cases of scandals in Austria and Germany (n = 14 for Germany and n = 8 for Austria). Sampling was conducted by graduate students of Zeppelin University in the course of the research seminar “Strategies of Political Communication: Scandalisation” in the course of April 2022. The scandals under investigation are (Table 1): Each of the students was assigned a case and given the instruction to 1) conduct a search for material on this scandal in German and Austrian newspaper archives, using striking keywords relevant to the scandal. This amounted in a variety of newspaper articles for each case. Additionally, the students were instructed to perform a more unstructured search on the scandal on Google News and YouTube, in order to uncover “archival material” on the scandals (e.g., old television broadcasts uploaded to YouTube). These additional data were used to get a more contextual impression of the scandals, which is crucial for understanding their political impact. The main analysis was conducted on the newspaper samples.

3.2

Computer-Assisted Content Analysis

After sampling was completed, students were instructed to perform a qualitative content analysis of their sampled material. To make the coding comparable and show underlying structures in reporting on scandals, the explorative nature of the analysis was flanked by an analytical instrument, consisting of theory derived questions (Table 2): Apart from this more theory-driven coding, a residual category was introduced to capture any material that was relevant for the research question yet was not covered by the above stated coding instructions/questions. This open category provided background information on the scandals and was used to interpret the results yet did not lead to a new category of coding.

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Table 1 Sample of Austrian and German Scandal Reports, own depiction # 1

Year 1982

Country Germany

Name of Scandal Flick-affair

2

1984

Germany

Hitler-diaries

3

1984

Germany

Kießling-affair

4

1987

Germany

Barschel-affair

5

1993

Germany

Amigo-affair

6

1999

Germany

CDU-partydonations

7

2002

Germany

Miles-affair

8

2003

Germany

Munich CSU-scandal

9

2011

Germany

10

2011

Germany

Plagiarismscandal National socialist underground

11

2011

Germany

Wulff-affair

12

2015

Germany

13

2020

Germany

VW-emissionscandal Facemaskscandal

14

2020

Germany

Cum-ex-scandal

15

1985

Austria

16

1999

Austria

Glycolwinescandal Operation spring

17

2000

Austria

Short Description The Flick-corporation covertly donated to the German Ministry of Economy. The newsmagazine stern unknowingly published fake diaries of Adolf Hitler. General Kießling of the German armed forces is accused of homosexuality and retired early. Politician Uwe Barschel spreads libel about his competitor Björn Engholm. Later, Barschel is found dead, the circumstances of his death are still unknown. Bavarian prime minister and his “amigos” are accused of corruption. The German conservative party CDU under chancellor Helmut kohl takes various illegal donation. Kohl downplays the donation as “Bimbes [peanuts].” Several members of the German parliament use the “miles” of the Lufthansa frequent flyer program which they collected on their business trips for personal vacations. A group of young members of the Bavarian conservative party (CSU) tries to manipulate internal elections. German minister of defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg loses his doctorate due to plagiarism. The right-wing terror organization National Socialist Underground murders immigrants in Germany from 2000 to 2006. With the suicide of its members, it is brought to light that German police and secret service knew of these activities but did not stop them. Christian Wulff, president of Germany, retires due to accusations of corruption. German car manufacturer VW faked emission liminalities, backed by politics. During the COVID-19-pandemic, several members of the German conservative party took advantage of their office to acquire face masks. Olaf Scholz, then mayor of Hamburg, is connected to the head of the Warburg bank, which is accused of cum-ex-crimes. Scholz publicly fails to remember his involvement. Austrian winemakers used the anti-freeze agent glycol to stretch their wine. Austrian police forces conduct wide raids against drug dealers and target innocent persons. (continued)

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Table 1 (continued) Name of Scandal Hump-dumpaffair

#

Year

Country

18

2004

Austria

Homepagescandal

19

2008

Austria

20

2008

Austria

Liechtensteintax-scandal Death of Jörg Haider

21

2009

Austria

Skylink-scandal

22

2019

Austria

Ibiza-affair

Short Description Viennese politician Hilmar Kabas insults President Thomas Klestil as a “lump” (scoundrel), yet says he meant to say “hump or dump” (nonsense words). Minister of finance Karl-Heinz grasser accepts a homepage worth 250.00 euros as a “gift” from lobbyists. Austrians are involved in the tax scandal as well. Right-wing politician Jörg Haider dies in a mysterious car crash, the course of his investigations uncovers his homosexuality. The construction company instructed to build an airport terminal raises its costs significantly after changing its top personnel for political reasons. Vice-chancellor HC Strache meets with an alleged niece of a Russian oligarch in Ibiza and discusses acquiring independent media companies and circumventing laws for party donations.

Students used the software MaxQDA for coding the material following the coding instructions, analyzing the cases assigned to them in the first step. A second step of coding saw a comparison between the analyzed cases: In an open setting, the findings of each case were compared to the others, which lead to an early identification of “clusters” of similarities and differences in the data.

4 Findings This section presents the findings of the comparative empirical analyses. Following the research questions, it provides insight from the data and interprets them against the backdrop of functional scandal theory.

4.1

Findings

After data acquisition and analysis was completed, the results were compiled into clusters in order to give insights on the major differences and striking similarities between Austrian and German scandal reporting. Regarding the first research question, we asked for the causes of the scandals. From the n = 14 observed German cases, corruption (n = 5) and fraud (n = 3)

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Table 2 Operationalization of research questions Research Question RQ1: What was the cause for the scandal? Which person, thing, or part of the environment was damaged? Which social norm was breached?

Operationalization and Coding Instruction Summarize the scandal in one sentence and point out the actors and the social norm that was breached.

RQ2: Who was the human actor that caused the scandal? RQ3: What was the selfish reason that lead the human actor to engage in scandalous behavior? RQ4: Was the scandalous behavior necessary or contingent?

Identify the human actor by its name. Identify any selfish reasons that lead to the scandalous behavior. Indicate if there is none given. Identify if the report states whether the scandalous behavior was contingent. Indicate if this is not stated in the report.

RQ5: Which legacy news media reported on the scandal?

Identify the first legacy news media that reported on the scandal by researching news databases. Identify the consequences the actor had to face and indicate if there are none.

RQ6: Which consequences did the actor that caused the scandal face?

Example Austrian vice-chancellor HC Strache meets with an alleged niece of a Russian oligarch in Ibiza and discusses acquiring independent media companies and circumventing laws for party donations. HC Strache. Personal ambitions to political power.

HC Strache could have acted otherwise by being skeptical about the alleged niece of a Russian oligarch by performing his due diligence. Sueddeutsche Zeitung.

HC Strache retired from his office.

constituted most of the causes for scandals. Several other causes (e.g., tax evasion) were only reported once, as can be seen in Fig. 1. A different picture emerges about the Austrian cases. Based on the n = 8 observed cases, there was a wider variety of causes for scandals over the last 40 years, only with two reasons standing out: Corruption (n = 2) is the leading cause for scandalization in Austria as it is in Germany. Yet, extreme cases of rightwing-populism (n = 2) are also among the most common causes for scandalization in Austria. Other reasons for scandals are manifold and reported in Fig. 2. The second research question was asked for the human actor that caused the scandal. As the individual actor is not that relevant for the analysis as the office he or she holds, we reported the official role the actor had at the time of the scandal. For the n = 14 cases, only two groups of actors are more likely to be involved in a scandal, namely, Federal Ministers (n = 2) or regular members of a political party (n = 2). Other groups of actors, ranging from CEOs to local politicians, can be accused of scandalous behavior too, yet not that often, as Fig. 3 states. In the n = 8 Austrian cases, there is a wide variety of actors that can be involved in the scandal. There are no clusters here, as each case under observation presented a

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Fig. 1 Causes of scandals in Germany

Fig. 2 Causes of scandals in Austria

unique actor in a certain role, ranging from CEO to ordinary citizens. The variety of the cases is given in Fig. 4. The third research question asked for the selfish reasons of the human actor that led to the scandal. Going through the data set, we coded any instances for selfishness given in the reports as a “yes,” or respectively a “no.” We also coded, whether there

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Fig. 3 Actors that caused the scandal in Germany

Fig. 4 Actors that caused the scandal in Austria

were no insights on the selfish reasons for the involved actors. For the n = 14 German cases, half of them gave an indication for the selfish reasons of the actor (n = 7), only one case reported explicitly that there were no selfish reasons that

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Fig. 5 Contingency of behavior of German actors

caused the scandal. The other n = 6 cases showed no indication for or against a selfish reason in the reports. The Austrian cases present a similar picture: Of the n = 8 cases, half of them reported a selfish reason for the scandalous actions (n = 4), while the other n = 4 cases showed no indication for or against selfishness. The third option, that the actor caused the scandal out of an unselfish motivation, was not given (n = 0). The fourth research question asked whether the actor had an option to avoid the scandal or to undertake any actions that mitigated the scandalous behavior. We coded a “yes” if this was stated in the report directly, “implied” if this statement was given indirectly, “no” if the actor had no option to act otherwise, and “n.a.” if the report gave no hint on this. For the n = 14 German cases, n = 6 stated that the behavior that led to the scandal could have been avoided. There are n = 3 cases where this is at least implied. Only one case stated that there was no other option, while n = 3 cases gave no indication here. The results are presented in Fig. 5. In the n = 8 Austrian cases, there is a similar distribution: The actions could have been contingent stated n = 3 reports directly, and n = 3 reports in an indirect way. Only two reports gave no insights here, as Fig. 6 shows. Research question number five asked for the legacy media outlet that reported the scandal. We coded the name of the media outlet that first reported on the scandal and re-coded it according to its type (e.g., quality newspaper, local newspaper), to give a broader indication, as unique newspapers might have gone out of business over the course of 40 years. For the n = 14 German cases, there is a striking cluster of n = 9 cases, where a quality news magazine initially reported on the scandal, following two cases of quality newspapers and two cases of boulevard journalism that were the first to report a scandal. Only one local newspaper was the first to report a scandalous case. Fig. 7 shows these results.

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Fig. 6 Contingency of behavior of Austrian actors

Fig. 7 Legacy media that reported on the scandals in Germany

In the n = 8 Austrian cases, there is quite a different outcome to report: In three cases, the Austrian Revenue Service (Bundesrechnungshof) was the first organization to report a scandal, followed by n = 3 cases of quality newspapers that initially reported on a scandal. The other two cases were reported by a boulevard newspaper or a local newspaper, as Fig. 8 indicates. The sixth and final research question asked for the consequences of a scandal. We openly coded these outcomes and clustered the answers to overarching categories,

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Fig. 8 Legacy actors that reported on the scandals in Austria

Fig. 9 Consequences for the actors in Germany

also indicating if there were no consequences reported. The n = 14 German cases gave a clear outcome: In n = 9 cases the actor responsible for the scandal had to retire from his or her current position, one case reported imprisonment of the actor, one actor had to face an investigation and a questioning by the German parliament. Only two cases were inconsequential, as Fig. 9 states. The n = 8 cases of Austrian scandals present a different picture: In the majority (n = 5) of the cases, the actors that caused a scandal face no consequences at all, only

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Fig. 10 Consequences for the actors in Austria

in one case the actor had to retire from his current position. If there are consequences reported, they are impersonal: In one case, stricter laws were implemented, in the other case the political party of the scandalous individual actors saw losses in votes in the following general election. Fig. 10 gives insights on these findings. Against the backdrop of these individual findings, we can answer the overarching research question on the differences and similarities of Austrian and German scandal reporting over 40 years in the following way: In German scandal reporting, the major reasons for scandals are corruption and fraud, especially by people that hold public office, such as Federal Ministers but also “regular” members of a political party. They usually engage in scandals out of selfish reasons, which could have been avoided. Usually, quality news magazines are the driving forces behind scandal communication, which generally leads to the retirement of the actors from their offices. In Austrian scandal reporting, there are manifold causes for scandals, yet corruption in office and extreme right-wing-populism are the main reasons why scandals are reported. Yet, there is a clear group of people more likely to engage in scandals. Although “anyone” could become the initiator of a scandal, this is usually done out of selfishness and could have been avoided. The most striking difference to German scandal reporting is that political institutions and quality newspapers are the main organizations that pick up on scandals in Austria. A further major difference is that the actors that engage in the scandals face no consequences, only impersonal consequences stem from the scandals. Only in extreme cases, the actors face retirement.

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5 Limitations This section provides information on the limitations of the study. Critiquing the processes of data acquisition and the theory-driven sampling processes, the section shows how the insights of this exploratory study provide a starting point for further research. Although the analysis showed several striking differences and similarities between scandal reporting in Austrian and German newspapers, these findings must be seen against the backdrop of the study. One of the major limitations of this study lies in the process of data acquisition. As it was conducted during a seminar and later enhanced through more in-depth analyses during the seminar’s coursework, it relied heavily on the idiosyncrasies of the cases. As the sample consisted of scandals of various political significance (e.g., the Ibiza-Affair or the Cum-Ex-Scandal versus wine stretched with glycol), the newspaper reports on these cases differed significantly as well. Further, not all newspaper reports were immediately accessible as they were often hidden behind paywalls or newspaper archives asking for significant charges to access the data. Thus, access to data was limited, yet produced a data set that was able to answer the underlying research questions. A further limitation of this study is the theory-driven sampling process, stemming from its explorative design. As the study set out to investigate differences between Austrian and German scandal reports, it faced a gap in research and literature. As comparative scandal research is relatively scarce, it depended on similar research designs (e.g., the analyses of Hallin & Mancini, 2004) and had to adapt its methodology accordingly. Focusing on the individual contexts of the cases as well as making them comparable was made possible through qualitative content analyses, which emphasized the individual context and the overarching features. Thus, the explorative design is a limitation, yet also a strength of this study. It emphasizes the idiosyncrasies of each case against the backdrop of the universal design of scandal communication brought forth by Kepplinger (2018). Keeping these limitations in mind, the findings of the study gave unique insights into Austrian and German Scandal communication and provided a starting point for further investigation.

6 Implications for Further Research This section provides a starting point for further research. It addresses the interpretation of the findings in the light of functional scandal theory, as well as theoretical aspects of journalistic and political culture. The following implications for further research stress the necessity for more complex comparative analyses, turning to digital media as well as legacy media.

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Based on these major takeaways from the findings, there are several implications for theoretical reflection and further research.

6.1

Interpretation and Theoretical Reflection

The findings of this study can be interpreted against the backdrop of functional scandal theory and the ideas on political and journalistic culture. Regarding the functional theory of scandals provided by Kepplinger (2018) or Hondrich (2002), the findings of this study show that the elements of a scandal are generally found in all the cases under observation. Yet, a variety of actors that engage in scandalous behavior show that scandals are not restricted to the political system. Hence, any social system can be subject to scandalization, but the political system is more likely, as it has regulatory functions for other social systems—any breach of norms here has consequences for other systems as well. Hence, scandal reports observe political actors on all levels, from party members to the head of state, both in Germany and Austria. This indicates the socialization function of scandals for wider society that Hondrich (2002) emphasizes. The contingent selfish behavior of the actors is prominently visible in nearly all scandal reports, which can act as an indicator for journalistic framing (Entman, 1993): Journalists not just point out a problem, they also hint at the moral implications of the problem, which is in most of these cases selfish behavior that could have been avoided. In presenting the reasons for the behavior, journalists also legitimize their actions on reporting on the scandal, by pointing out the normative misbehavior of the actors. There are striking differences in the legacy (media) organizations that report on scandals: Over the course of 40 years, quality newsmagazines are the most prominent organizations in Germany that initially report on scandals. Hence, they are highly functional for regulating the normative order of a society. In Austria, political institutions take on this role in the same way quality newspapers do. Political institutions, who are often at the heart of scandals, can serve as functional equivalents to journalistic reporting in scandals—this finding should be investigated in further research. For a scandal to be functional, the actors of the scandals must face consequences to bring an end to the disturbance of the normative order of a society. In Germany, most of the actors faced retirement from office, as where in Austria, most of the actors faced no personal consequences, yet some impersonal consequences arose, such as stricter laws or loss in votes. The last two findings can be connected to ideas of journalistic and political culture in Austria and Germany: Austrian political and journalistic and political culture is on the one hand eager to point out scandals by a variety of actors, yet nearly none of them face direct consequences. Austrian political institutions are eager to uncover

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scandalous behavior as well, indicating the prominent, yet behind-the-scenes role of the political administration in this country. German political and journalistic culture is more driven by an investigative understanding of journalism, aiming at critiquing and controlling actors holding office. Any scandalous behavior generally leads to retirement of the actors involved and journalism is very vocal about it.

6.2

Implications for Further Research

The study showed that although there are nearly universal elements of scandal reports on the content side, journalistic and political culture make a difference: Scandalized actors in Austria seem to hold their offices despite their shortcomings, German reports focus on corruption and fraud in office, leading to retirement of the actors. This has implications for the wider political process, which is beyond the scope of this study, but could be the starting point for further investigations for the underlying norms of the political-journalistic systems. There are structural similarities between German and Austrian reports on scandals, which can be attributed to journalistic culture, role understanding, and journalistic training. Based on these indications, future research on scandals could investigate the production side of scandals into account, against the backdrop of unique cultural differences: How do German journalists pick up scandals and why do Austrian political institutions engage in uncovering scandalous behavior? Comparative research is useful to uncover these journalistic and political cultures: Following studies could include countries with unique media systems, such as the United Kingdom, which is highly tabloid driven, or Italy, which enjoys a highly partisan press. Both countries—compared to Germany and Austria—would deal with scandals differently. Longer periods of time should be observed in order to gain insights on changes and similarities beyond a single case in time. Going beyond the legacy media—online media-divide and taking a hybrid media system into account (Chadwick, 2017), further research could include the role of online communication for the initiation and consequences of scandals: Are scandals that started online as consequential for the involved actors as scandals that are driven by the legacy media? How do scandals traverse from online to legacy media (Herbers & Lichtenstein, 2021). This is especially of interest, when taking a comparative stance: How do the global social-media-platforms influence local reports on scandals? Can local scandals become a global problem? These and other questions could further advance the functional theory of scandals by taking (inter-)cultural aspects into account.

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