Scala Christus Est: Reassessing the Historical Context of Martin Luther's Theology of the Cross (Spatmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation / Studies in ... Middle Ages, Humanism and the Reformation) 9783161614729, 9783161617201, 3161614720

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Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation Studies in the Late Middle Ages, Humanism, and the Reformation edited by Volker Leppin (New Haven, CT) in association with Amy Nelson Burnett (Lincoln, NE), Johannes Helmrath (Berlin), Matthias Pohlig (Berlin), Eva Schlotheuber (Düsseldorf), Klaus Unterburger (Regensburg)

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Giovanni Tortoriello

Scala Christus est Reassessing the Historical Context of Martin Luther’s Theology of the Cross

Mohr Siebeck

Giovanni Tortoriello, born 1989; 2012 BA, University of Salerno; 2015 MA, University of Salerno; 2020 doctor of philosophy in Romance Studies, Martin Luther University, HalleWittenberg; October 2021–September 2022 postdoctoral researcher, Martin Luther University; October–December 2022, postdoctoral researcher, University of Erfurt.

 This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 676258. Dissertation to obtain the doctoral degree of the Philosophical Faculty II of the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg. ISBN 978-3-16-161472-9 / eISBN 978-3-16-161720-1 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-161720-1 ISSN 1865-2840 / eISSN 2569-4391 (Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation) The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbiblio­ graphie; detailed bibliographic data are available at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023 Mohr Siebeck Tübingen. www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was typeset by epline in Bodelshausen using Times typeface, printed on non-aging paper by Gulde Druck in Tübingen, and bound by Buchbinderei Spinner in Ottersweier. Printed in Germany.

Preface This book is the result of four years of intense research, which culminated in a doctoral dissertation, successfully defended at the Faculty of Philosophy of Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg on 6 November 2020. I would like to thank all the people who made this work possible and enriched my life and work with their friendship, support, and enthusiasm. First of all, I gratefully acknowledge the funding received from the European Union through a Marie Curie ITN project entitled “The History of Human Freedom and Dignity in Western Civilization”. The participation in the European project has been a rewarding and enriching experience that has given me the opportunity to attend conferences on both sides of the Atlantic, to share ideas, projects, and ambitions with colleagues and friends, and, above all, to mature as a researcher and as a person. My sincere thanks go to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Friedemann Stengel: without his support, constructive criticism and, above all, the constant desire to challenge conventional ideas and open up new research perspectives, this work would not have been possible. I would also like to thank my two examiners of the doctoral committee, Prof. Dr. Bernd Roling and Prof. Dr. Robert Fajen, whose feedback, criticisms, and suggestions have been helpful in correcting and improving this work. The engaging conversations with all the supervisors and partners of the EU project have significantly contributed to my academic growth and to the realization of this work. My deepest thanks to my former fellow Early Stage Researchers (Andrea, Elisa B., Elisa Z., Ilaria, Johannes, Karen, Kristian, Laurel, Michael, Morten, Renze, Sara, and Valeria) for their sincere friendship, enthusiasm, and enriching conversations. My deepest thanks also go to the participants of Prof. Stengel’s Doktorandenkolloquium in Church History (Baptiste, Christiana, Deborah, Hauke, Hirohito, Nora, and Thea) for their feedback and stimulating criticism. Further thanks are due to Conrad, for sharing my daily need for good coffee. I would like to thank all the members and staff of the Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt and of the Interdiziplinäres Zentrum für Pietismusforschng (IZP) in Halle, where I spent many hours studying and researching, and all the professors, staff, and collaborators of the Canterbury Cathedral Archives, the Warburg Institute in London, and the University of Münster, where I spent stimulating periods of research. Special thanks to Frau Annegret Jumm-

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rich, for her support in solving any bureaucratic problem and her outstanding work ethic. I would like to thank my parents, Francesco and Francesca, and my brother Giacomo for their love and support. To Francis and Nicola, without whose help this journey would not have even begun, proving that friendship can be demonstrated with small gestures; to all the friends – those of a lifetime as well as those I have met over the years on trips to Europe and the USA – who directly or indirectly, through a chat or a laugh, have supported me on this journey. To them I dedicate this work and my deepest gratitude for all the affection and love that surrounds me. Gotha, December 2022

Giovanni Tortoriello

Table of Contents Preface  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI

Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part I: The Discourse on Human Nature in the Renaissance and the Reformation Chapter 1: Two Trials, Multiple Interpretations: Reuch­lin, Luther, and the Discursive Context of the Early Sixteenth Century  . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.1 Competing Christologies on the Eve of the Reformation  . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.1.1 Martin Luther’s Theology of the Cross in the Heidelberg Disputation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 1.1.2 Between Sola Gratia and Prisca Theologia: Reshaping Christian Identity in the Late Fifteenth Century  . . . . . . . . 26

1.2 A “Positive Misunderstanding”?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 “Jewish Books Must be Destroyed”: The Aftermath of the Reuch­lin Affair  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Overcoming Scholastic Theology: The Reformation of the University Curriculum in Wittenberg, the Support for Reuch­lin, and Luther’s Secret  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Intersections and Juxtapositions between the Trials of Luther and Reuch­lin  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 A Polarized Discursive Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37 40 47 58 65

Chapter 2: Platonic Anima and Pauline Spiritus: Erasmus’ Concept of Human Nature  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 2.1 Irenism and Philosophia Christi in the Letter to Paul Volz  . . . . . . . . . . . 69 2.2 Homo prodigiosum quoddam animal: Erasmus’ Theological Anthropology in the Enchiridion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 2.3 Origen, Plato, and the Allegorical Reading of the Bible  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

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2.4 The Moral Level of Erasmus’ Pietas and His Critique of the Ceremonies of the Monks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 2.5 Erasmus’ Enchiridion and Luther’s Early Theological Anthropology  . . 102

Chapter 3: Spirit and Flesh: Luther’s Critique of Erasmus’ Anthropology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 3.1 The Dialectic between Flesh and Spirit in Luther’s Dictata super Psalterium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The “Aristotelian Erasmus”: Luther’s Two-Fold Critique of the Soteriology of Erasmus and Biel  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Divine Justice and Pagan Wisdom: Demarcating the Boundaries of Revelation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Body, Soul, and Spirit: Ockhamism and anti-Erasmianism in Luther’s Anthropology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Erasmus and Luther: Reception, Assimilation, and Transformation  . . . .

106 118 130 142 152

Chapter 4: CRUX Sola Est Nostra Theologia: Luther’s Theology of the Cross in Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 4.1 “Dionysius, Whoever He May Have Been”: Luther and the Debate on the Dionysian Corpus in the Early Sixteenth Century  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Solus Amor and Amore Solo: Ficino and the Mystical Ascent to the One through Love  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Pax Philosophica and Divine Union in Pico’s De Ente et Uno  . . . . . . . . 4.4 Theologia Negativa More Scolastico: Eck’s Commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Scala Christus Est: Luther’s Theology of the Cross and the Ascent to God through Christ’s Humanity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Eck and Luther: Two Competing Theologies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

156 166 176 184 198 205

Part II: Theologus Gloriae vs. Theologus Crucis: From the Christian Kabbalah to Luther’s Sola Scriptura Chapter 5: Solam Scripturam Regnare: The Development of Luther’s Scriptural Argument  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 5.1 The Sola Scriptura Argument and Luther’s Grammar of Exclusion  . . . . 212 5.2 The Bible in Translation: The Overcoming of the Vulgate in the Early Modern Times  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216



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5.3 Patristic, Medieval, and Sixteenth-Century Influences in the Dictata super Psalterium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 5.4 The Indulgence Controversy and the Development of Luther’s Scriptural Argument  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 5.5 Sola Scriptura and the Manifold Interpretations of Scripture  . . . . . . . . . 246

Chapter 6: The Spirit and the Letter: The Debate on Biblical Hermeneutics in Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 6.1 In Spirit and in Faith: Grammar, Theology, and Sapientia Crucis in Luther’s Operationes in Psalmos  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Origen and Jerome the Public Targets, Erasmus the Unnamed Enemy: Luther’s Front Against Allegory  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Luther Pro Erasmus: The Dispute between Erasmus and Jacques Lefèvre on Heb. 2:7  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Luther Against Erasmus: The Controversial Interpretation of Gal. 2:11–14  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 The Goat in Leipzig and the Bull in Wittenberg: The Spirit and the Letter in the Luther–Emser Debate  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 “Idle Spirits” and “Theologians of Glory”  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

250 262 282 289 293 309

Chapter 7: Vera Cabala Dominis Nomini: Luther’s Theologia Crucis and the Christian Kabbalah  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 7.1 The Influence of the Christian Kabbalah in Luther’s Dictata super Psalterium  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Vera Cabala Dominis Nomini: Competitive Discourses at the Edge of the Reformation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 The Lord and Our Lord: Deus absconditus, the Tetragrammaton, and the Cross of Christ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Theologus Gloriae vs. Theologus Crucis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Theologia Crucis: Luther’s Rejection of the Christian Kabbalah  . . . . . .

316 325 330 337 343

Conclusions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 Bibliography  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Index of Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 Index of Subjects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

Abbreviations Allen

Opus Epistolarum Des Erasmi Roterodami, eds. P. S. Allen et al., 12 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906–1958) ASD Erasmus Desiderius, Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1969) AWA Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe der Werke Martin Luthers: Texte und Untersuchungen, 10 vols. (Cologne: Böhlau, 1981) CR Philip Melanchthon, Corpus reformatorum: Philippi Melanchthonis opera quae supersunt omnia, eds. Karl Bretschneider and Heinrich Bindseil, 28 vols. (Halle: A. Schwetschke & Sons, 1834–60) CWE Erasmus Desiderius, Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) EAS Erasmus of Rotterdam, Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Werner Welzig, 8 vols. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006.) LW Luther’s Works – American Edition, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehman, 55 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia, 1955–2002) RSW Johannes Reuchlin Sämtliche Werke, eds. Widu-Wolfgang Ehlers, Hans-Gert Roloff, and Peter Schäfer. vol. II.1. De arte cabalistica libri tres: Die Kabbalistik, eds. Widu-Wolfang Ehlers and Fritz Feldentreu: Hebrew text edited by Reimund Leicht (Stuttgart-Bad ­Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2010) WA Doctor Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 72 vols. (Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1930–2007) WA Br Doctor Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefwechsel, 18 vols. (Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1930–1985)

Introduction The news of the death of Martin Luther on February 18, 1546 sparked new debates on the life and soul of the most controversial man in sixteenth century Europe. While some believed Luther to be the last prophet before the second coming of Christ, others thought him to be none other than the Antichrist. Was the dying Luther surrounded by demons and finally caught by the Devil for his eternal punishment, or did he die quietly, waiting for eternal peace in heaven? Two biographies depicting the life and death of the former Augustinian monk who had changed Christendom forever appeared soon after his death. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Luther’s long-time colleague in Wittenberg and the new leader of the Wittenberg movement after Luther’s death, portrayed a clear and vivid image of Luther as the last prophet aroused by God in order to fight against the heresy of the Antichrist. In Melanchthon’s narrative, all the principal protagonists of the Reformation disappear. The men who had helped Luther in reforming the Church were still men. Luther, on the other hand, was a divinely inspired prophet, whose coming prefigured the end of times. The narrative of Luther’s opponents was diametrically opposite. In reaction to Melanchthon’s De Vita Lutheri, Johannes Cochlaeus (1479–1552) published his Commentaria Johannis Cochlaei, De Actis et Scriptis Martini Lutheri Saxonis in 1549, in which he described Luther as a demonic man who was indeed born of a sexual union between his mother, Margarathe, and a demon.1 Seemingly, a new life began for Luther immediately after his death, a life replete with references, quotations, appropriations, and misappropriations.2 In the years following his death, Luther’s legacy remained contested, since the gnesiolutherani questioned Melanchthon’s authority, accusing him of betraying Luther’s original message. After the second half of the sixteenth century, Luther’s name was appropriated towards the construction of orthodoxy.3 Also, 1  For

an English translation of Melanchthon’s and Cochlaeus’ biographies of Luther, see: Philipp Melanchthon and Johann Cochlaeus, Luther’s Lives: Two Contemporary Accounts of Martin Luther, ed. and trans. Elizabeth Vandiver, Ralph Keen, and Thomas D. Frenzel (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). The Latin text of Melanchthon’s life of Luther can be read in the sixth volume of CR. 2  For an overview of Luther’s reception in German literature, see: Norbert Mecklenburg, Der Prophet der Deutschen: Martin Luther im Spiegel der Literatur (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2016). 3  Stefan Michel, Die Kanonisierung der Werke Martin Luthers im 16. Jahrhundert, Spät-

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in the following centuries, the name Martin Luther, so closely associated with the wider notion of Reformation, was used as a signifier, a marker of orthodoxy, of continuity with the religious and spiritual tradition of the sixteenth-century Reformation. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Luther’s theology and its relation to the other reformers (Philipp Melanchthon, Andreas von Karlstadt, Thomas Müntzer) continued to be a matter of contention in the theological debates of the time.4 The emergence of the historical-critical method in the nineteenth century marked the beginning of a renewed interest in Luther and the Reformation as an historical phenomenon. Leopold von Ranke’s monumental Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation (1839–1847) is arguably one of the greatest achievements of nineteenth-century historiography.5 In 1883, on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of Luther’s birth, efforts to create a critical edition of Luther’s works began. What became known as the Weimarer Ausgabe is a collection of more than 120 volumes,6 followed by the new volumes published in the Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe der Werke Martin Luthers: Texte und Untersuchungen.7 In the early twentieth century, the so-called Luther Renaissance gave a definitive impetus to the establishment of Luther research as an academic endeavor in its own right.8 One of the most fascinating and controversial themes to have dominated the theological as well as historical debates regarding Luther in the twentieth century concerns what Luther himself labelled as “the theology of the cross” (theologia crucis). The term itself was coined by Luther in a famous disputation held on April 26, 1518, in Heidelberg. Prominent theologians of the twentieth mittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016). For further discussion on how Luther’s life and works were interpreted in the sixteenth century, see also: Robert Kolb, Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero: Images of the Reformer, 1520–1620, Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999). 4  For recent discussions on this topic, see: Dorothea Wendebourg, So viele Luthers … Die Reformationsjubiläen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2017). 5  For a critical discussion of Ranke’s work as historian, see: Michael-Joachim Zemlin, Geschichte zwischen Theorie und Theoria: Untersuchungen zur Geschichtsphilosophie Rankes, Epistemata: Reihe Philosophie (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1988). 6  Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesammtausgabe (Weimar: Böhlau, 1883). Hereafter quoted as WA. 7  Archiv zur Weimarer Ausgabe der Werke Martin Luthers: Texte und Untersuchungen (Cologne: Böhlau, 1981). Hereafter quoted as AWA. 8  For further discussion on the Luther Renaissance, see the contributions in the following collected volume: Heinrich Assel, Der andere Aufbruch: Die Lutherrenaissance – Ursprünge, Aporien und Wege: Karl Holl, Emanuel Hirsch, Rudolf Hermann (1910–1935), Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1994). See also: Karl Kupisch, “The ‘Luther Renaissance’,” Journal of Contemporary History 2 (1967): 39–49; Mecklenburg, Der Prophet der Deutschen, 145–65.



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century have drawn from this expression coined by Luther to discuss the role of Jesus and his suffering on the cross in Christian theology. The dialectical theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968), just to mention one of the most influential figures of twentieth-century theology, appropriated Luther’s expression “theology of the cross”, discussing its meaning and significance in the dramatic theological context of the first half of the century.9 In the 1970s, the German reformed theologian Jürgen Moltmann (b. 1926) provoked new discussions on the significance of the theology of the cross with the publication of his book Der gekreuzigte Gott,10 as well as with an article on the contemporary significance of the theology of the cross.11 This vivid debate has also generated new publications in systematic theology, which compared Luther’s theologia crucis with other twentieth-century accounts of the theology of the cross.12 Some works have even paralleled Luther’s theologia crucis with William Shakespeare,13 Soren Kierkegaard,14 Blaise Pascal,15 twenty-first century Pentecostalism,16 or feminist theology.17 This list could probably be infinitely extended. The present study aims to investigate Martin Luther’s theology of the cross within its own historical context. This is not to say that the huge amount of systematic or theological discussions regarding Luther’s theologia crucis has not been accompanied by historical research. Indeed, the opposite is true. In the late nineteenth century, Albrecht Ritschl (1822–1889) put Luther’s theology of the cross in contraposition with Aristotelian scholastic metaphysics.18 In the 9  Michael Korthaus, Kreuzestheologie: Geschichte und Gehalt eines Programmbegriffs in der evangelischen Theologie, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 10  Jürgen Moltmann, Der gekreuzigte Gott: Das Kreuz Christi als Grund und Kritik christlicher Theologie (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1972). 11  Jurgen Moltmann, “Gesichtspunkte der Kreuzestheologie heute,” Evangelische Theologie 33 (1973): 346–65. For further discussion on Moltmann’s theologia crucis, see: Korthaus, Kreuzestheologie, 218–301. 12  See for instance: Rosalene Clare Bradbury, Cross Theology: The Classical Theologia Crucis and Karl Barth’s Modern Theology of the Cross (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011). 13  Tibor Fabiny, “The ‘Strange Acts of God:’ The Hermeneutics of Concealment and Revelation in Luther and Shakespeare,” Dialog 45 (2006): 44–54. 14 Craig Hinkson, “Luther and Kierkegaard: Theologians of the Cross,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3 (2001): 27–45. 15  Graham Tomlin, The Power of the Cross: Theology and the Death of Christ in Paul, Luther and Pascal (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2007). 16  David J. Courey, What Has Wittenberg to Do with Azusa? Luther’s Theology of the Cross and Pentecostal Triumphalism (London: T & T Clark, 2015). 17  Deanna A. Thompson, Crossing the Divide: Luther, Feminism, and the Cross (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004); Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, “Zur Kreuzestheologie heute: Gibt es eine feministische Kreuzestheologie?,” Evangelische Theologie 50 (1990): 546–57. 18  See especially: Albrecht Ritschl, Theologie und Metaphysik: Zur Verständigung und Abwehr, 2 ed. (Bonn: A. Marcus, 1887). For Ritschl’s interpretation of Luther, see Frank Hofmann, Albrecht Ritschls Lutherrezeption, Die lutherische Kirche, Geschichte und Gestalten (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998).

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early twentieth century, Walter von Loewenich (1903–1992), while following Ritschl in interpreting Luther’s theology of the cross in contraposition to scholastic metaphysics, asserted, contradicting Ritschl, that the theology of the cross represented the core of Luther’s theology and could not be anchored to a certain moment in Luther’s life.19 From the second half of the twentieth century, Gerhard Ebeling’s existential interpretation of Luther has become more and more influential. Heiko Oberman and his followers have tried to recalibrate our understanding of Luther’s theology of the cross in its relationship with Luther’s nominalist background. Since the late nineteenth century, every single interpreter of Luther has discussed the role of the theology of the cross in Luther’s thought, and tried to situate it in its historical context. The capillarity and pervasiveness of the discussions on Luther’s theology of the cross beg a critical engagement with this huge amount of secondary literature. Throughout the present work, I discuss both the assumptions and presuppositions that moved historical debates about Luther, but also the results that historians of the Reformation have reached in placing Luther in his own historical context. For now, it should be sufficient to highlight two main assumptions, which are widely shared in secondary literature: 1) Luther’s theology of the cross emerged as a reaction to scholastic theology; 2) Luther’s critique of scholasticism merged, and to a certain extent overlapped, with the simultaneous critique against scholasticism by sixteenth-century humanists. These two presuppositions generated a huge amount of discussion: When did Luther break with scholasticism? How did humanism help Luther to overcome scholasticism? Was Luther himself a humanist? How should one conceptualize the relationship between humanism, scholasticism, and the Reformation? This way of problematizing Luther’s theology of the cross can be traced back to the very first time in which Luther used the expression theologia crucis, namely the Heidelberg Disputation. From among the audience, the Dominican Friar Martin Bucer (1491–1551), then student of the theological faculty in Heidelberg and later one of the key protagonists of the sixteenth-century Reformations, was favorably impressed by Luther’s theology. In a letter to Beatus Rhenanus (1485–1547), he advanced the idea that Luther’s theology was quite close to that of Erasmus of Rotterdam. According to Bucer, while Erasmus did so more cautiously and Luther more virulently, both made a common critique of scholastic theology.20 The first historiographer of the Reformation, Philipp Melanchthon, the painter of “Luther the prophet”, helped to reinforce this narrative. However, he did not limit himself to reinforcing the narrative of a common front against scholasticism in the early years of the Reformation; he also created an outright his19  Walther von Loewenich, Luthers Theologia crucis, Forschungen zur Geschichte und Lehre des Protestantismus (München: Chr. Raiser Verlag, 1929). 20  WA 9.160–69.



Introduction

5

toriographical paradigm. As noted by James Michael Weiss, in his biography of Luther, Melanchthon used a series of literary topoi to represent Luther’s theology in the contraposition between the studia humanitatis and the “barbarous” teaching of the scholastics. The theology of Luther, who sided with the former, was in continuity with the reformation of customs and morals endorsed by Erasmus.21 In 1557, Melanchthon wrote an oration in memory of Erasmus for Bartholomaeus Calkreuter of Cross.22 As a good astrologer, Melanchthon emphasized that the position of the stars at Erasmus’ birth, on 28 October 1467, indicated his intelligence, eloquence, and charm. After describing Erasmus’ life, his studies, and his erudition, Melanchthon emphasized a contraposition between Erasmus’ love for learning and the hypocrisy of the “few ignorant monks” who opposed him. Endorsed with God-gifted eloquence, Erasmus rebuked the envy of his enemies. Luther’s prophetic teaching emerged in this context. As Melanchthon put it: “Later the entire body of Church doctrine was cleansed again by the voice of the reverend Doctor Luther; the fact that the Apostolic books and old histories were already in people’s hands was a preparation for this”.23 In Melanchthon’s narrative, Erasmus’ scholarship, in which the renewal of classical culture and the study of the original text of the Bible go hand in hand, was propaedeutic to Luther’s theology. Without Erasmus, Luther could not have rediscovered the true evangelical message. The disagreement between the two men is minimized as “some difference in judgement”, mostly due to their different character, which, however, did not preclude the possibility of Erasmus recognizing Luther as a better interpreter of the Scripture than everybody else. Melanchthon’s description of the studia humanitatis, which reshaped the intellectual landscape of Europe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and, in doing so, created the intellectual conditions for the Reformation to prosper, was conceptualized in the nineteenth century in terms of the relationship between Humanism and Reformation. The word humanism does not belong to the context of the early modern period. The earliest known quotation can be attributed to the German theologian Johann Friedrich Abegg (1765–1840), in 1798. The term was popularized by the German theologian and pedagogue Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer (1766–1848). For Niethammer, humanism designated an educational curriculum based on the study of ancient Greek and Latin literature.24 21  James Michael Weiss, “Erasmus at Luther’s Funeral: Melanchthon’s Commemorations of Luther in 1546,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 16 (1985): 91–114. 22  CR 11. 264–71. For the English translation I follow: Philipp Melanchthon, Melanchthon: Orations on Philosophy and Education, ed. Sachiko Kusukawa and trans. Christine F. Salazar, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 23  Cf. Ibid., 253. 24  To track the occurrences of the term “humanism” in early nineteenth-century Germany,

6

Introduction

The debates regarding the notion of humanism permeated the nineteenth century. Friedemann Stengel has recently investigated how the understanding of humanism was shaped by the philosophical, theological, and political debates of the time. Stengel pointed out that Niethammer’s understanding of humanism as an historical category was further developed in the following years by other scholars, notably the historian of literature Ludwig Wachler (1767– 1838) and the Evangelical theologian and Church historian Wilhelm Zimmermann (1807–1878). It was, however, the historian Karl Hagen (1810–1868) who more clearly conceptualized the historical category of humanism as an intellectual movement of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. For Hagen, the Reformation of the sixteenth century is the result of three movements which opposed the Catholic Church and scholastic theology, namely a popular, a religious, and a humanistic movement. Distinguishing between an “Italian humanism” which was in opposition to religion as such, and a “German humanism” which opposed the Catholic Church, but was not anti-Christian, Hagen could place Martin Luther alongside the “German humanists”, whose main representative Hagen recognized in Erasmus of Rotterdam.25 Stengel noted that, in describing humanism as a pedagogical movement that criticized the Church, Hagen transferred the political debate of his time in the context of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.26 In the mid-nineteenth century, around the period of the political revolts of 1848, the debates on humanism assumed an increasingly political connotation. It is well known that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels distinguished between atheism as a form of “theoretical humanism” and communism as a “practical humanism”. Humanism was no longer conceptualized as a movement in opposition to the Church, but as an atheistic concept.27 One of the prominent figures among the young Hegelians, Arnold Ruge (1802–1880), brought back humanism in the domain of historiography. For Ruge, humanism must be conceived as a pedagogical program. In the early modern period, the humanists restored the essence of the “spirit” of ancient Greece and Rome. In his Die Loge des Humanismus (1851), Ruge labeled theology as a form of mythology, and depicted humanism as an important factor in overcoming the archaic forms of religion. In so doing, humanism helped Christianity to discover its true essence. Indeed, unlike Marx and Engels, for Ruge, I follow: Hubert Cancik, “Humanismus,” in Humanismus: Grundbegriffe, ed. Hubert Cancik, et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 9–16. For further discussion, see also: Martin Vöhler, “Von der ‘Humanität’ zum ‘Humanismus:’ Zu den Konzeptionen von Herder, Abegg und Niethammer,” in Genese und Profil des europäischen Humanismus, ed. Martin Vöhler and Hubert Cancik, Humanismus und Antikerezeption im 18. Jahrhundert (Heidelberg: Winter, 2009), 127–44. 25  Friedemann Stengel, “Was ist Humanismus?,” Pietismus und Neuzeit 41 (2015): 154– 211. 26  Ibid., 179. 27  Ibid., 179–80.



Introduction

7

humanism was not an atheistic concept. On the contrary, just like religion, he saw humanism as helping human beings to find their true essence. Reading history through the eyes of a processus infinitus, a process immanent in the historical development, Ruge equated the spirit of humanism with the spirit of the Reformation as two emancipatory forces.28 The debates regarding humanism, its role throughout history, its value for humanity, and its relationship with religion dominated nineteenth-century discourse. In the second half of the century, the notion of humanism was poised to become a prominent historiographical concept. Two names stand out: Georg Voigt (1827–1891), and Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897). In 1859, Voigt published his Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums oder das erste Jahrhunndert des Humanismus. Like Niethammer, Voigt conceived humanism within the framework of the revival of Greek and Roman culture. In a recent article, in which he analyzed the many histories of philology published during the nineteenth century, Denis J. J. Robichaud has argued that it is impossible to understand Voigt’s conceptualization of humanism as an educational movement in opposition to scholasticism, without taking into consideration the previous histories of philology, in which philologists studied fifteenth-century humanists as antecedents of their own discipline.29 Moreover, Paul Grendler has noted that Voigt highly appreciated humanism, and pictured Francesco Petrarca not only as the founder of the movement, but almost as a heroic figure, the initiator of modern individualism, who battled against the conservative forces represented by the Catholic Church and medieval scholasticism.30 At the same time, moved by a strong normative approach, Voigt criticized the humanists (Giovanni Boccaccio, Coluccio Salutati, Marsilio de’ Marsili), partly because they failed to follow in the footsteps of Petrarch to fulfill their high standard ethical values, but maybe – as Grendler suggested – also because Voigt believed that an “atheistic spirit” sparked from fifteenth-century Italy and permeated the whole humanist movement.31 In 1860, Jacob Burckhardt published his Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien.32 It was not well received at the time of the publication, but in the first half of the twentieth century, it became one of the most influential texts in Renaissance historiography. Burckhardt’s Thesis is well known: he presented the Ren28 

Ibid., 182–88. J. J. Robichaud, “Competing Claims on the Legacies of Renaissance Humanism in Histories of Philology,” Erudition and the Republic of Letters 3 (2018): 177–222. 30  Paul F. Grendler, “Georg Voigt: Historian of Humanism,” in Humanism and Creativity in the Renaissance: Essays in Honor of Ronald G. Witt, ed. Christopher S. Celenza and Kenneth Gouwens, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 293–325. 31  For the presence of a “pagan spirit” in Florence, see ibid., 312–13. For Voigt’s criticism of fifteenth-century humanists, see ibid., 317. 32  Jacob Burckhardt, Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien: Ein Versuch (Basel: Schweighauser, 1860). 29  Denis

8

Introduction

aissance as a period of regeneration, the beginning of a new era in stark contraposition with the “dark” Middle Ages. Paul Grendler noted that, despite the frequent perception that they were in conjunction with one another, Burckhardt and Voigt differed greatly in their account of humanism. This was because while Voigt equated humanism with the study of antiquity, Burckhardt saw the revival of Greek and Latin culture as one part of humanism, a movement he viewed as having emerged from the Italian genius.33 Nineteenth-century debates on humanism created a fertile ground for new debates in the twentieth century, from Martin Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism34 to Louis Althusser’s Anti-humanism,35 without neglecting the political debates regarding the relationship between socialism and humanism.36 From an historiographical point of view, the contribution of three scholars laid the foundation for our understanding of humanism in historical research: Hans Baron (1900–1988), Eugenio Garin (1909–2004), and Paul Oskar Kristeller (1905– 1999). Baron, a German who escaped from Nazi-Germany and spent most of his career in the United States, studied under Ernst Troeltsch, one of the leading nineteenth-century historians of the Reformation. Baron has become famous for coining the term civic humanism in his work, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance.37 Moved by a strong normative approach,38 which he vindicated as necessary to distinguish the positive and negative contributions of certain movements in the development of history, Baron described humanists as the founders of modern political values. The emergence of a republican state in early fifteenth-century Florence, and its resistance against the “tyrannical” Gian Galeozzo Visconti of Milan, assumed for Baron the value of an epochchanging event, that separated the Middle Ages from the Renaissance. The new 33 

Grendler, “George Voigt: Historian of Humanism,” 320. For a recent account, see: Alfed Denker, “Martin Heideggers ‘Brief über den Humanismus:’ Eine biographische und werkgeschchtliche Einordnung,” in Heidegger und der Humanimus, ed. Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski (Freiburg; München: Karl Aber, 2017), 9–19. 35  For the reception of Heidegger in France in the second half of the twentieth century, see: Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism, and Being (London; New York: Routledge, 1995). 36  Florian Baab, Was ist Humanismus? Geschichte des Begriffes, Gegenkonzepte, säkulare Humanismen heute, Ratio fidei (Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2013), 129–32. 37  Hans Baron, “The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican Liberty in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny,” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955). For an assessment of Baron’s academic career, see: Riccardo Fubini, “Renaissance Historian: The Career of Hans Baron,” The Journal of Modern History 64 (1992): 541–74. For a recent discussion of Baron’s Thesis, see: James Hankins, “The ‘Baron Thesis’ after Forty Years and Some Recent Studies of Leonardo Bruni,” Journal of the History of Ideas 56 (1995): 309–38. 38  This has been noticed by Christopher Celenza who pointed out that “in Baron’s view, the historian could, indeed must, make judgments about past figures and past epochs”. Cf. Christopher S. Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance: Humanists, Historians, and Latin’s Legacy (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 37. 34 



Introduction

9

hero, the father of Western political values, was no longer Petrarch, but Leonardo Bruni.39 The opposing views of humanism as an intellectual movement of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by Eugenio Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller represent the two most influential conceptualizations of humanism as an intellectual phenomenon of the early modern period. For Garin, fifteenth-century humanism completely broke with the Middle Ages. Humanists discovered a new way of approaching history and, in doing so, a new understanding of the human being emerged. According to Garin, the rediscovery of classical antiquity and new concepts of human dignity are indissolubly joined together.40 On the other hand, Paul Oskar Kristeller paid more attention to the continuity between humanism and the Middle Ages. Unlike Garin, Kristeller did not conceptualize humanism as a philosophical movement; rather, he defined it primarily as a philological movement.41 James Hankins has pointed out that the opposing understanding of humanism of Kristeller and Garin mirror their different philosophical backgrounds; whereas Garin was influenced by existentialism, Kristeller upheld neo-Kantianism.42 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the term “humanism” received the connotation which later generations of scholars would use in historical research on the early modern period. Meanwhile, the relationship between humanism and the Reformation received huge attention. In a survey of the historiography of the Reformation published in 1940, Wilhelm Pauck described the relationship between humanism and the Reformation as one of the major themes of research in Reformation Studies. Pauck distinguished between the different types of national humanisms: in France, while the “Christian humanism” of Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples was an incentive for the transition from the Middle Ages to the Reformation, Pauck assumed “the secular Italian humanism” to be the main “modernizing” factor;43 in England, Pauck believed that there was no break between humanism and the Church, noting that the most prominent humanist of the country, John Colet, was “primarily a Christian and a Church man and sec39 Ibid. 40  Eugenio Garin, L’umanesimo italiano. Filosofia e vita civile nel Rinascimento, Bibliote-

ca di cultura moderna (Bari: Laterza, 1952); Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi e ricerche, Biblioteca di cultura moderna (Bari: Laterza, 1954). 41  Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains, Rev. and enl. ed., Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, 1961). 42  James Hankins, “Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller: Existentialism, Neo-Kantianism and the Post-War Interpretation of Renaissance Humanism,” in Eugenio Garin: Dal Rinascimento all’Illuminismo, ed. Michele Ciliberto (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2011), 481– 505. For further discussion on the approaches of Garin and Kristeller, see also: Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance, 28–57. 43  Wilhelm Pauck, “The Historiography of the German Reformation during the Past Twenty Years,” Church History 9 (1940): 305–40.

10

Introduction

ondarily a Platonist and a Humanist”;44 in the Netherlands, although the main stress within humanism was upon education, it had, thanks to Erasmus, a special “biblical character”;45 finally, following Gerhard Ritter’s investigation of medieval universities, Pauck pointed out that humanism was an important factor in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Reformation. He assigned a much more prominent role to Luther, however, who, equipped with the Bible, would liberate Christianity from scholasticism. Pauck concluded: “Thus it happened that primarily the Reformation and only secondarily Humanism shaped the character of early modern German civilization”.46 Two main scholars contributed to the configuration of contemporary research on the relationship between humanism and the Reformation: Bernd Moeller (1931–2020) and Lewis Spitz (1922–1999). In 1959, Bernd Moeller published his Die deutschen Humanisten und die Anfänge der Reformation. Moeller described humanism and the Reformation as different in content, but similar in that both were forward-looking movements in opposition to scholasticism. Quoting Martin Bucer’s resumé of the Heidelberg Disputation to prove his point, Moeller introduced an expression which had huge success in subsequent scholarship: “productive misunderstanding” ( productive Mißverständnis). According to Moeller’s account, Bucer was wrong in claiming that Luther’s and Erasmus’ theology coincided; however, this arbitrary account of the events in Heidelberg had a positive result, since it helped Luther and the entire Reformation movement to win the support of the humanists. For Moeller, humanism helped to pave the way for Luther’s theology, and supported Luther in the early years of the Reformation. Thus, he summarized the relationship between the two movements with another expression which has become very popular: ohne Humanismus, keine Reformation.47 In 1963, Lewis Spitz published his work The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists.48 The book is a collection of a series of published articles, which Spitz dedicated to several so-called German Humanists, from Rudolph Agricola to Johannes Reuch­lin. The last one of these prominent figures of early modern Europe is no less than Martin Luther. Spitz described German humanism as a movement characterized by “a romantic cultural nationalism and religious enlightenment” and both these aspects “were of tremendous importance to the Reformation movement”.49 After noting the lack of a common definition of the term humanism itself, Spitz noted that humanism can be understood both 44  45 

Ibid., 316. Ibid., 316–17. 46  Ibid., 317. 47  Bernd Moeller, “Die deutschen Humanisten und die Anfänge der Reformation,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 70 (1959): 46–71. 48 Lewis William Spitz, The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963). 49  Ibid., 2.



Introduction

11

as a philosophical and a philological movement. Regarding the first aspect, he warned that anthropocentrism was a part of Renaissance culture, but it “cannot be applied very generally to Italian much less to German humanism”.50 Regarding the second aspect, for Spitz, humanism cannot be limited to the interest for classical antiquity, but it implied a new way of looking at the past. In this sense, the specificity of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century humanism lay not in the interest in Greek and Roman culture, but in how German humanists approached history.51 Spitz’s conclusions were based on the contribution of German humanism to the rebirth of the evangelical faith. Noting the diversity of positions among humanists, Spitz drew comparisons between the different aspects of humanism and Luther’s theology. Regarding the revival of classical antiquity, humanism helped to pave the way for the Reformation, although Reuch­lin is blamed because “he damaged Biblical studies more than he aided them with the esoteric paraphernalia which he borrowed from the Cabalists”.52 Humanists’ critique of scholasticism is read in continuity with the same kind of criticism Luther made, since neither the humanists nor Luther tried to construct a new metaphysics, but were, instead, in search of a new spirituality.53 Spitz can even draw parallels between Luther’s personal Anfechtungen and Petrarch’s spiritual afflictions, or Ficino’s melancholy.54 Finally, Spitz concluded that “it is almost possible to say that without the younger generation of humanists there could have been no Reformation. Certainly, there would not have been a Reformation such as the one that did take place”.55 However, humanism as a movement is described as a failed movement. This failure lies for Spitz in a work-righteousness or synergistic soteriology. To overcome the old Church and reestablish the evangelical doctrine of faith alone was possible only for a prophet, and this was the role Spitz attributed in his narrative to Luther, who absorbed humanistic scholarship – but Luther’s ultimate goal was much bigger.56 Bernd Moeller’s and Lewis Spitz’s scholarship have built the foundation for subsequent research. An infinite number of articles and books on humanism and the Reformation have been published in the last fifty years or more. Despite differences on individual aspects, there is a general agreement in contemporary scholarship. It should be sufficient to take a look at how the two main handbooks on Luther’s theology summarize the topic. In the Luther Handbuch, Volker Leppin tells us that Luther was highly respected within German 50  Ibid., 4. 51 Ibid. Spitz

refers generically to “Renaissance historiography” without clarifying on which secondary literature he bases his definition of humanism. 52  Ibid., 271. 53  Ibid., 173–76. 54  Ibid., 280–81. 55  Ibid., 291. 56  Ibid., 290–93.

12

Introduction

Humanism. Unlike Zwingli, who read and used the writings of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Luther used only the philological aspects of Italian humanism, deriving, for instance, from Lorenzo Valla. In this sense, Leppin underlines that humanism was a positive impulse for Luther in criticizing and overcoming scholasticism.57 In the same way, in The Oxford Handbook of Luther’s Theology, Robert Rosin emphasized the importance that studia humanitatis had on Luther and the entire Reformation movement.58 Thus, Rosin proposed to slightly revise Moeller’s famous statement ohne Humanismus, keine Reforma­ tion in “no Renaissance education, no Reformation”.59 This brief historical survey has clarified the general agreement among scholars regarding the historical context of Luther’s theology of the cross. Both in the German and in the English-speaking world, two assertions are commonly accepted. First, Luther’s theologia crucis emerged in contraposition to scholasticism; second, Luther’s criticism of scholastic theology was in continuity with the coeval critique that so-called humanists mounted against the theology of the schools. It is the aim of the present study to question this academic consensus. In recent years, the very notions of “Renaissance” and “Renaissance humanism” have come under critical scrutiny.60 Nevertheless, the historiographical paradigm according to which humanism paved the way for the Reformation – a perspective so deeply imbued in nineteenth-century debates – is still taken for granted in Luther studies. In order to overcome this perspective, in the present work, my methodological approach will be as follows: 1) Humanism, as we have seen, is a nineteenth-century term posthumously applied to the early modern period. Augusto Campana,61 Paul Oskar Kristeller,62 and Paul Grendler63 have carefully examined the instances in which the adjective umanista occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The 57  Volker

Leppin, “Humanismus,” in Luther Handbuch, ed. Albrecht Beutel (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 90–93. 58  Robert Rosin, “Humanism, Luther, and the Wittenberg Reformation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther’s Theology, ed. Irene Dingel, Robert Kolb, and L’ubomir Batka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 91–104. 59  Ibid., 92. 60  Christopher Celenza has pointed out that our knowledge of Renaissance texts is still limited and, thus, does not permit a general understanding of the cultural phenomena of the period; see Celenza, The Lost Italian Renaissance, xiii–xx. On the other hand, Patrick Baker has recently pointed out that, in order to supplement the problematic approaches of Garin and Kristeller, it is necessary to analyze how the humanists conceived themselves: Patrick Baker, Italian Renaissance Humanism in the Mirror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 61  Augusto Campana, “The Origin of the Word ‘Humanist’,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 9 (1946): 60–73. 62 Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, 8–12. 63 Paul F. Grendler, “Five Italian Occurrences of Umanista, 1540–1574,” Renaissance Quarterly 20 (1967): 317–25; “The Concept of Humanist in Cinquecento Italy,” in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, ed. Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971), 445–64.



Introduction

13

word umanista occurred only once in texts related to the early Reformation debates, namely in the Epistulae Obscurorum Virorum.64 Luther himself never used the term umanista. Thus, I will put aside the macro-categorization “humanism” in order not to project the nineteenth- and twentieth-century debates onto the context of the early sixteenth century. 2) Other notions, like mysticism and scholasticism, which have been analyzed hand-in-hand with humanism and Reformation, will be analyzed as they were used in a determinate context, rather than supra-historical categories. This will permit a more precise clarification in terms of what sort of “mysticism” and “scholasticism” Luther opposed when he targeted his critics. 3) Having put aside the macro-categorization “humanism”, I will analyze different cultural aspects of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century debates in their contingency and contradictoriness. Thus, I will describe the philosophia Christi and the biblical scholarship of Erasmus of Rotterdam; the Platonic, Hermetic, and Cabbalistic aspects of the works of Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and Johannes Reuch­lin; and the influence that Platonism, Hermeticism, and Kabbalah exercised on some of the early Roman controversialists, like Hieronymus Emser and Johann Eck, who have often been ahistorically categorized as “scholastics” or “scholastic humanists”. The main focus will be on how these different, and sometimes contradicting, cultural movements reshaped the context of the early sixteenth century, in which Luther formulated his cross-centered theology. In doing so, the intention is not to “stabilize” the meaning of Luther’s theologia crucis; rather I will analyze Luther’s theology of the cross as a contingent reaction to different trends of the sixteenth-century debates. There are many reasons to believe that Luther’s theologia crucis emerged in contraposition to scholasticism, and more precisely to Gabriel Biel and to Erfurt exponents of the via moderna. The results of previous scholarship on this field, especially those advanced by the late Heiko Augustinus Oberman, will be often quoted and accepted as correct. Similarly, there are many reasons to believe that the vehement critique of scholasticism, exemplified by the famous satire Epistulae Obscurorum Virorum, created the intellectual conditions for Luther’s critique of scholasticism to be praised and conceived in continuity with the widespread sixteenth-century critique of scholasticism. Again, these aspects will be analyzed as an integral part of the early Reformation debates. The aim of this study is not to deny the undeniable. On the other hand, if one puts aside ahistorical categories and normative judgements, the illusion of a history viewed in terms of a rationalizing process poised between “conservative” and “forward-looking” movements vanish64 “Five Italian Occurrences of Umanista, 1540–1574,” 317. On this aspect, Grendler relies on Campana’s and Kristeller’s scholarship.

14

Introduction

es. Reconstructing the debates of a given period, one can see how what at first glance appears as an overarching dichotomy, on closer inspection seems to be the result of contested and conflicting signifiers. I hope that the present work will contribute by placing Luther’s theology of the cross in its own historical context.

Part I

The Discourse on Human Nature in the Renaissance and the Reformation

Chapter 1

Two Trials, Multiple Interpretations: Reuch­lin, Luther, and the Discursive Context of the Early Sixteenth Century The construction of the historical paradigms of “Humanism”, “Renaissance”, and “Reformation” at the end of the nineteenth century settled a binary contraposition between the exponents of these movements and their opponents: the former, pioneers of a new vision of the world, advocates of reform – of the Church, of religion, and of spirituality in general – the latter, advocates of tradition, the clergy, and the papacy. Future-oriented protagonists propagating an epochal change, variously labelled as “Humanists” and “Reformers”, some of whom belonged to both movements, have been singled out in the chaotic historical development as the progenitors of the modern world. Two historical events, chronologically coeval, have become the quintessential example of the struggle between the advocates of the new world and the conservators of the status quo: Johannes Reuch­lin’s and Martin Luther’s trials for heresy. The latter event has become synonymous with Reformation and Protestantism. The celebration of the 500th anniversary of the publication of the Ninety-Five Theses has reinvigorated the image of Luther as reformer, as the man who led Christianity into a new era by propagating a return to the original message of the Gospel. The former has assumed the connotation of an archetypical struggle, not only between an old and a new way of theologizing, but also between tolerance and intolerance. Being so strictly related to the problem of anti-Semitism, after World War II, the so-called Reuch­lin-affair has also become synonymous with a German counter-history of acceptance and toleration towards the Jews.1 Several presuppositions lie behind this historical construction: 1) an essentialist understanding of cultures that are intrinsically conceived as bearing a certain degree of positive or negative values; 2) a normative approach to historical research through which the positive or negative contributions of a specific culture or cultural tradition to the development of history can be evaluated; 3) a teleological understanding of history by virtue of which 1 

In his careful analysis of the Reuch­lin affair, David Price analyzed the role played by Reuch­lin and his defense of the Jewish books in post-World War II Germany, see: David H. Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 9–12.

18

Part I: The Discourse on Human Nature

certain cultural traditions have contributed to the creation of the world in which we live, understood as the result of the inevitable development of human rationality, while other movements have tried to prevent this development, unaware that their attempt was doomed to failure. As explained in the introduction, in the present work I will put aside all the macro-categorizations that have typified twentieth-century historical research in order to emphasize the singularity of the actual historical positioning. Moreover, I will abstain from the temptation to indulge in every teleological interpretation of the events narrated, and choose to limit myself humbly to the investigation of the historical context(s) in which these events occurred. To that end, in this chapter I analyze the intermingling in the public discourse on the heresy charges levelled against Johannes Reuch­lin and Martin Luther as a result of the battle lines drawn between opposing ideological positions. As in all wars, the protagonists represented their own individual interests. Their different, sometimes contradictory, (self-)positioning should be read while bearing in mind the import of a given statement in a specific historical context. The binary contrapositions between “humanists” and “reformers” on the one hand, and the “scholastic theologians” on the other, needs to be understood as resulting from these different active positionings, rather than from what could be viewed as inherently opposite ideas. For this reason, I start this chapter by briefly discussing the positions on fundamental philosophical and theological questions, such as free will (or freedom of the will), Christology, and the doctrine of justification, in Martin Luther at the time of the Heidelberg Disputation, and in Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, whose controversial understanding of Christianity preceded Luther’s entry into the public debate by 20–30 years, emphasizing their apparent incompatibility. Given that Johannes Reuch­lin was a prominent follower of Ficino and Pico in Germany, I show on what terms Reuch­lin’s and Luther’s trials for heresy were assimilated into the public discourse, and how their cases generated different, variegated, and even contradictory reactions among the leading scholars of the early sixteenth century. The fact that Luther decided to create common ground with someone who followed positions that were antithetical to his own deserves special attention.

1.1  Competing Christologies on the Eve of the Reformation 1.1.1  Martin Luther’s Theology of the Cross in the Heidelberg Disputation The expression theologia crucis has become axiomatic in theology, mainly due to Martin Luther’s use of this term. Its influence on later and even contemporary theological debates can hardly be overestimated. The discussion on how to



Chapter 1: Two Trials, Multiple Interpretations

19

correctly interpret Luther’s theology of the cross, and the significance of such notion in Protestantism in general, has caused much ink to flow. Luther used the expression theologia crucis only in a scattered way in his writings, and almost exclusively in the years between 1518 and 1519, as Jos Vercruysse has noted.2 The years 1518–19 represent a crucial moment in Luther’s life. They are chronologically situated in between the publication of the Ninety-Five Theses in October 1517 and Luther’s excommunication in January 1521. The reaction to Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses was not immediate. As reconstructed by Jared Wicks,3 in February 1518 Pope Leo X gave a mandate to the newly appointed vicar general of the Augustinian order, Gabriele della Volta, to take issue with preaching against indulgences by the Augustinian monk, Martin Luther. In March, the Vicar General in Germany, Johannes von Staupitz, informed Luther of the actions initiated against him by della Volta. Meanwhile, Luther was preparing his trip to Heidelberg to attend the chapter of the German Augustinian Observants. Elector Frederick the Wise, who opposed the sale of indulgences in order to contrapose the House of the Hohenzollern, asked the Bishop of Würzburg and the Count of the Palatinate to assure protection for Luther during his stay in Heidelberg. Moreover, he wrote to Staupitz claiming that he would expect Luther back in Wittenberg after this chapter ended.4 It is in this period of Luther’s life that the expression theologia crucis recurs more frequently. In Spring 1518, Luther notably used the term theologia crucis four times. First, in his Asterisci Lutheri adversus Obeliscos Eckii, a pamphlet published in the debates which contraposed the Wittenbergers Luther and Karlstadt and the Ingolstadt theologian Johann Eck, and led to a direct confrontation between the three men in the famous Leipzig debate the following year, Luther accused Eck of being ignorant of the theology of the cross.5 The matter of discussion was the certainty of salvation of the souls in purgatory: On being criticized on Thesis 16 of his treatise against the indulgences by Eck, who pointed out that souls in purgatory are certain of their salvation, Luther replied that uncertainty was a constitutive aspect of Christian life. Only Christians, and not non-believers, came close to despair, but it was precisely in temptation and suffering that Christians found faith.6 2  Jos E. Vercruysse, “Luther’s Theology of the Cross at the Time of the Heidelberg Disputation,” Gregorianum 57 (1976): 523–48. 3  Jared Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: The First Year (1518),” Catholic Historical Review 69 (1983): 521–62. 4  Ibid., 523–27. 5  WA 1.290.38–39, 291.1–2: Unde sciunt certo? Quia Eckius dicit. Et tenet consequentia iuxta suum Magistrum ab autoritate affirmative. Adeo ignarus est Theologiae crucis, ut credat, ideo illis certum esse, an sint salvandi, quia amici Dei sunt et corpore soluti. 6  For further discussion on Luther’s reply to Eck, see Vercruysse, “Luther’s Theology of the Cross at the Time of the Heidelberg Disputation,” 526–28.

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In the very same year (1518), Luther used the expression theologia crucis in his lectures on Hebrews at the University of Wittenberg,7 in the famous dispute held in Heidelberg in late April, and in his Resolutions Concerning the NinetyFive Theses (Resolutiones disputationem de indulgentiarum virtute) published in August 1518.8 Finally, in his second series of lectures on the Psalms, Operationes in Psalmos, held between 1519 and 1521, one finds a further reference to the theology of the cross9 as well as to Luther’s well-known powerful assertion: “THE CROSS alone is our theology” (CRUX sola est nostra theologia).10 In this section, I will focus my attention on the locus classicus of Luther’s theology of the cross, namely the Heidelberg Disputation. On 26 April 1518, Martin Luther presented the main ideas of his theology before the members of the Augustinian order in Heidelberg. As was the custom in the universities of that time, he wrote for his student and fellow Augustinian Leonhard Beier – a graduate of the University of Wittenberg, who received his masters’ degree that very same year – twenty-eight theological Theses and twelve philosophical Theses in which Luther discussed his view of the doctrine of justification, the nature of human works, and the relationship between God and man, as well as between philosophy and theology. Luther himself presided over the disputation. In introducing the disputation, Luther maintained that the theological paradoxes had been drawn by St. Paul, vase et organo Christi electissimo, and St. Augustine, interprete eiusdem fidelissimo.11 The nature of Luther’s theologica paradoxa is on display in the first and last of his theological Theses. In the first Thesis, Luther asserted that the law is not helpful in the search for God, but rather hinders the process of finding Him. In the last Thesis, Luther contraposes human and divine love: the former looks for what it is pleasing to it, the latter does not find, but creates anew.12 The two opposite extremes are not linked by 7  WA

57.3.79.20–22: Haec theologia crucis est, seu, ut Apostolus dicit: ‘Verbum crucis scandalum Iudeis et stulticia Gentibus’, quia penitus abscondita ab oculis eorum. 8  WA 1.613.21–27: Quo circa nunc vide, Num quo tempore coepit Theologia Scholastica, id est illusoria (sic enim sonat graece), eodem evacuata est Theologia crucis suntque omnia plane perversa. Theologus crucis (id est de deo crucifixo et abscondito loquens) poenas, cruces, mortem docet esse thezaurum omnium preciosissimum et reliquias sacratissimas, quas ipsemet dominus huius theologiae consecravit benedixitque non solum tactu suae sanctissimae carnis, sed et amplexu suae supersanctae et divinae voluntatis, easque hic reliquit vere osculandas, quaerendas, amplexandas. 9  WA 5.300.1–2: Hac theologia crucis omissa periculosissime ambulant in magnis et mirabilibus super se ociosi quaestionarii, quasi non habeant quod lugeant. 10  WA 5.176.32–33. 11  WA 1.353.8–14. For the use of the Church Fathers in the Heidelberg Disputation, see: Heiko Jürgens, “Die Funktion der Kirchenväterzitate in der Heidelberger Disputation Luthers (1518),” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 66 (1975): 71–78. 12  For the contraposition between human and divine love in the first and last Thesis, as well as the contraposition between law and love as a structural aspect of the disputation, see: Jos E. Vercruysse, “Gesetz und Liebe. Die Struktur der Heidelberger Disputation Luthers (1518). (Loi et amour. La structure de la disputatio de Heidelberg de Luther, 1518),” Luther



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human efforts to find God, but only by God’s mercy towards His creature, His love which allows Him to forgive human sins. The first eighteen Theses concentrate on the impossibility of humans to know and please God. Luther emphasizes three notions: human works outside of faith in Christ are always sinful (Theses 1–12), human will is not free (Theses 13–15), and the need to critique the soteriology of late-medieval nominalism (Theses 16–18). According to Luther, there is no distinction between venial and mortal sins. Regardless of how much they can appear good, regardless of human efforts to accomplish meritorious actions, human works outside of faith in Christ are always mortal sins. On the contrary, although they can appear evil or unjust, God’s works are always immortal merits. Just like the works conducted without trust in Christ, so too the works of the righteous are in themselves sinful. What distinguishes human works is, thus, whether or not trust in Christ is present. Luther rejected the notion that human works not resulting from fear in God are dead but not culpable, explaining that he who does not fear damnation is moved by arrogance and self-confidence, and not by faith in Christ. Thus, God considers sins venial not because they actually are venial, but by virtue of the fear in God that is proper only to the believers. The work itself is never meritorious, but humility and fear of God led the unmeritorious human efforts to please before God.13 As a result of his understanding of human works, for Luther free will is only a chimera, an empty word without any actual meaning. Defining the will (voluntas) as a faculty of the human mind and free will (liberum arbitrium) as the ability to redirect the will toward a certain object, fifteenth-century nominalist theologians emphasized that the human will can be considered free only when it can choose between two different options.14 In Heidelberg, Luther drew from this concept but, unlike his nominalist teachers, he applied a stronger notion of original sin. For Luther, original sin affects the will of the individual and the reasoning faculties, leading inevitably to sin. In this sense, the notion of liberum arbitrium becomes meaningless: human beings can choose to stand or sit down, speak or remain silent, eat or fast, but they cannot choose to sin or not Jahrbuch Hamburg 48 (1981): 7–43. In light of Luther’s emphasis on divine love in Thesis 28, Kari Kopperi has interpreted the entire disputation and, thus, Luther’s theology of the cross in terms of theology of love: Kari Kopperi, “Theology of the Cross,” in Engaging Luther: A (New) Theological Assessment, ed. Olli-Pekka Vainio (Eugene, OR: Cascade Publication, 2010), 155–72. For further discussion on Thesis 28, see: von Michael Plathow, “Versohnende Liebe und versohnte Liebe: Zu Luthers 28ten These der Heidelberger Disputation,” Luther 52 (1981): 114–31; Theodor Dieter, “Amor hominis – Amor crucis: Zu Luthers Aristoteleskritik in der probatio zur 28. These der ‘Heidelberger Disputation’,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 29 (1987): 241–58. 13  LW 41.39–40; WA 1.353.15–34, 354.1–6. 14  For the doctrine of free will in late-medieval nominalism, see: Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), 120–45.

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to sin. The desire for sin is an actual sin, and it is inherent in the individual. As Luther put it in Thesis 14, “Free will, after the fall, has power to do good only in a passive capacity but always has the power to do evil in an active capacity”.15 Luther emphasized the paradoxical condition of human beings in their postlapsarian condition: human will can choose among different evils, it is free to sin as it pleases but it is not free not to sin, it is not free to choose for the good.16 After proving that every human action is intrinsically evil because the desires which move the action are evil, Luther launched his attack against Gabriel Biel’s soteriology. The first 15 Theses culminate in Thesis 16, in the repudiation of what Luther considered a subtle form of Pelagianism: “The person who believes that he can obtain grace by doing what is in him adds sin to sin so that he becomes doubly guilty”.17 The doctrine of facere quod in se est was a cornerstone of Gabriel Biel’s soteriology. By drawing a distinction between God’s potentia absoluta and God’s potentia ordinata, Biel emphasized that God created the framework in which a human being could receive grace. It is, however, up to individuals to do their best in order to induce God to bestow grace upon them. The will of the individual must be redirected toward the love of God through reason, whereby the egotistic amor sui must be transformed to create a communal love for the divinity (amor amicitiae). In light of the covenant God Himself has established, despite the incommensurable disproportion between human efforts and the rewards human beings will receive resulting from these efforts, namely salvation through His infinite mercy, God would bestow grace upon the individual. Heiko Oberman has characterized Biel’s soteriology as a dialectic between solis operibus and sola gratia. Biel emphasized that the infusion of grace does not derive from a certain meritorious state in the individual; once, however, the first grace (gracia prima) is received, the believer would have to take the best possible action. Indeed, the infusion of grace regenerates the individual, transforming his egotistic self-love (amor sui) into a genuine love for God (amor amicitiae). In this sense, on the one hand, God created the framework through which the individual can be saved; on the other, in light of this very pactum between God and men, He will necessarily bestow grace upon those who do their best in order to achieve salvation.18 15  Cf. LW 41.40; WA 1.354.7–8: Liberum arbitrium post peccatum potest in bonum potentia subiectiva, in malum vero activa semper. 16  As noted by Notger Slenczka, according to Luther, human will is free but not as far as salvation is concerned. Moreover, Slenczka has noted Luther’s emphasis on human beings’ innate desire to be like God: Notger Slenczka, “Luther’s Anthropology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther’s Theology, ed. Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L’ubomir Batka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 212–32. 17  Cf. LW 41.40; WA 1.354.11–12: Homo putatus, se ad gratiam velle pervenire faciens quod est in se, peccatum addit peccato, ut dupo reus fiat. 18  Oberman summarizes this double aspect of Biel’s soteriology as follows: “By ‘grace



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Unlike Biel, Luther believed that human beings did not have natural capacities to redirect self-love toward a positive and healthy relationship with God. Towards this end, Luther devoted the first 15 Theses to explaining why human works were always sinful and human will was in bondage, in order to criticize, in Thesis 16, Biel’s soteriology based on the notion of facere quod in se est. The two following Theses (17 and 18) offer an alternative to Biel’s soteriology. In Thesis 17, Luther emphasized that the awareness that human efforts toward establishing a healthy relationship with God were doomed to failure should not lead to despair, but rather, instead, should generate humility; in Thesis 18, he concluded that only those who despaired of themselves were fit to receive God’s grace.19 The dichotomy between law and grace characterizes the last Thesis of the Heidelberg Disputation as well. Law produces only wrath, and human works are not able to conform to it. Thus, the righteousness of the individual is not based on works, but on faith. It is what he believes in, not what he does that renders the individual righteous. In Thesis 26 Luther emphatically argued: “The law says, ‘do this’, and it is never done. Grace says, ‘Believe in this’ and everything is already done”.20 Faith in Christ is the watershed moment that distinguishes between righteous and unrighteous actions before God. Luther pointed out that, properly speaking, the works of believers are as sinful and unmeritorious as the works of unbelievers. Because of faith in Christ, however, they are considered righteous before God. The works of believers are only passively righteous, since they are considered righteous only in light of the active works of Christ. The whole disputation is characterized by a vehement and unequivocal affirmation of the centrality of the cross of Christ, without which every attempt to know or please God is vain. Luther’s Christocentric theology reverberates also in his understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology. The twelve philosophical Theses are a continuous critique of Aristotle and, subsequently, of a possible conciliation between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology.21 alone’ – because if God had not decided to adorn man’s good works with created and uncreated grace, man would never be saved. By ‘works alone’ – because not only does man have to produce the framework or substance for this adornment, but God by the two laws of grace is committed, even obliged to add to this framework infused grace and final acceptation. Once man has done his very best, the other two parts follow automatically”. cf. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 176. 19  LW 41.41; WA 1.354.13–16. 20  Cf. LW 41.41; WA 1.354.31–32: Lex dicit ‘fae hoc,’ et nunquam fit: gratia dicit ‘Crede in hunc,’ et iam facta sunt omnia. 21  For an analysis of Luther’s critique of Aristotle in the philosophical Theses of the Heidelberg Disputation, see: Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historischsystematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie, Theologische

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In Thesis 32, Luther attacked Aristotle for believing in the eternity of the world, a notion, according to Luther, directly derived from Aristotle’s denial of the immortality of the human soul.22 Moreover, Luther accused the Stagirite of asserting that in the material world everything derived from matter, arguing that such a mistake derived from Aristotle’s ignorance of the notion of the absolute power of God (Dei potentia absoluta): if Aristotle had been aware of the distinction between God’s potentia absoluta and God’s potentia ordinata, he would not have claimed that matter could exist unformed.23 Luther enumerated those philosophers whose respective philosophical doctrines were better than Aristotle’s philosophy: Plato and his doctrine of universal ideas, Pythagoras and his notion of numbers (who, however, was ranked below Plato’s notion of the participation of ideas), Parmenides and his understanding of the One, and Bibliothek Töpelmann (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2001); Helmar Junghans, “Die probationes zu den philosophischen Thesen der Heidelberger Disputation Luthers im Jahre 1518,” Luther Jahrbuch Hamburg 46 (1979): 10–59. See also Karl-Heinz Zur Mühlen’s analysis of Thesis 25 of the theological theses: Karl-Heinz Zur Mühlen, “Luthers Kritik am scholastischen Aristotelismus in der 25. These der ‘Heidelberger Disputation’ von 1518,” Lutherjahrbuch 48 (1981): 54–79. 22  In 1516, Pietro Pomponazzi published his controversial Tractatus de Immortalitate Animae, which fueled a vehement debate on Aristotle’s theory of the mortality/immortality of the soul. For an overview of Renaissance debate on the immortality of the soul, see: Paul Richard Blum, “The Immortality of the Soul,” in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 211–33. On 19 December 1513, during the Eight Session of the Fifth Lateran Council, the papal Bull Apostolici regiminis declaring the immortality of the individual soul was promulgated. The intellectual context of the promulgation has been a matter of controversy among scholars for a long time. I only draw attention to two contributions. First, John Monfasani, following a suggestion originally made by Paul Oskar Kristeller, has pointed out the influence of Ficino’s Platonism, with his strong critique of Averroist doctrine of the soul, on this decree: John Monfasani, “Aristotelians, Platonists, and the Missing Ockhamists: Philosophical Liberty in Pre-Reformation Italy,” Renaissance Quarterly 46 (1993): 247–76. Eric Constant, taking for granted the Platonic background of the decree, has suggested that Apostolici regiminis should be understood as a dogmatic pronunciation against the so-called doctrine of the “double truth”: Eric A. Constant, “A Reinterpretation of the Fifth Lateran Council Decree Apostolici regiminis (1513),” The Sixteenth Century Journal 33 (2002): 353–79. With regard to Luther and his evolving understanding of the Councils and especially of the Fifth Lateran Council, see: John Headley, “Luther and the Fifth Lateran Council,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 64 (1973): 55–78. Beyond the question of Luther’s interpretation of the Fifth Lateran Council, the problem of Luther’s position on the soul is still a thorny matter in secondary literature. It is well known that in the 1520s, Luther denied the existence of purgatory and developed his notion of the sleeping of the soul. Luther’s position on the matter is ambivalent. For a careful examination of Luther’s changing positions on the soul’s condition after death and the interpretations of his positions in the eighteenth century, see: Friedemann Stengel, “Seele, Unsterblichkeit, Auferstehung: Luther im Aufklärungsdiskurs,” in Das Bild der Reformation in der Aufklärung, ed. Wolf-Friedrich Schäufele and Christoph Strohm (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2017), 98–130. 23  LW 41.41; WA 1.355.12–13: Si Aristoteles absoluta cognovisset potentiam Dei, adhuc impossibile asseruisset materia stare nudam.



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Anaxagoras who should be considered the best of all philosophers if he posited the infinite before form.24 All of these ancient pagan philosophers were mentioned by Luther as examples of philosophers who comprehended reality better than Aristotle did. However, Luther never admitted that pagan philosophers were aware of or could anticipate the mysteries of the Christian faith. He repeatedly pointed out in the theological Theses that the gap between human wisdom and divine revelation was unbridgeable. The wider problem of the relationship between philosophy and theology was clearly set by Luther in the first two philosophical Theses: it is not possible to philosophize correctly without being a Christian, for only when one is moved by faith and, thus, already knows the truth, can one correctly use pagan philosophy. In the following Theses, therefore, Luther did not postulate a continuity between Plato, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Christian theology; he demonstrated how a true Christian theologian could draw from a pagan author in awareness that his doctrine, like every other human knowledge, was necessarily wrong. Corrupted by original sin, human reason, on which philosophy bases its enquiry, naturally rejects the truth.25 Only those to whom the truth has been revealed can discern what is right and what is wrong in philosophy. As Luther put it in the second philosophical Thesis: “Just as a person does not use the evil of passion properly unless he is a married man, so no person philosophizes well unless he is a fool, that is, a Christian”.26 Foolishness in Christ was the common denominator that enabled one to recognize the sinfulness of human works as well as the inquisitiveness and idolatry of human mind. Only through the incarnate God, at the foots of the cross, in suffering and humiliation, does humankind discover that God is love. In the famous Theses 19–22, Luther focused his discussion on the role of the theologian in redirecting the believers to the cross of Christ, the only source of hope as well as the only medicine against desperation for the believers. He contrasted what he called a theologian of glory to a theologian of the cross. Using a series of contrasts, Luther argued that the theologian of glory looks for the invisible through the visible, while the theologian of the cross understands the back of God through suffering and the cross and, thus, the theologian of glory calls the evil good and the good evil, while the theologian of the cross calls a thing what it actually is.27 24 

LW 41.42; WA 1.355.16–25. The problem of Luther’s understanding of reason has been widely discussed in secondary literature. For further academic discussions, see: Karl-Heinz Zur Mühlen, “Der Begriff ratio im Werk Martin Luthers,” in Reformatorisches Profil: Studien zum Weg Martin Luthers und der Reformation, ed. Johannes Brosseder and Athina Lexutt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 154–73; Brian Albert Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005). 26  Cf. LW 31.31; WA 1.355.3–4: Sicut libidinis malo non utitur bene nisi coniugatus, ita nemo Philosophatur bene nisi stultus, id est Christianus. 27  LW 31.31; WA 1.354.17–24. 25 

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Following the critique and rejection of Gabriel Biel’s soteriology, these Theses were commonly interpreted as a contraposition between Gabriel Biel, as “the theologian of glory”, and Martin Luther as “the theologian of the cross”. However, the intellectual context in which Luther was operating was much more variegated. Gabriel Biel and his Erfurt followers are not the only candidates with whom these infamous “theologians of glory” could be identified.

1.1.2 Between Sola Gratia and Prisca Theologia: Reshaping Christian Identity in the Late Fifteenth Century Recent scholarship has recognized that the intellectual context in which Martin Luther moved his polemics against the tendencies of his contemporary culture which tended to minimize the centrality of the cross of Christ is much more complex than what previous generations of scholars were willing to admit. The neo-Kantian paradigm of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century liberal theologians implied a sharp distinction between “Catholic” and “Protestant” metaphysics. Under the umbrella of “Catholic”, liberal theologians could rubricate every form of theology anchored in “philosophical speculation”. The pejorative term “Middle Ages” was broad enough to be able to accommodate the different, contradicting, and diverging theological currents of the centuries which preceded the emergence of Luther’s affair. One paradigm, the contraposition between Middle Ages and Reformation, has had a huge success in Luther scholarship. More recently, the notion that the opposite is indeed true is largely accepted. Instead of a static era, the period in between the twelfth and the sixteenth centuries turned out to be a time of deep intellectual freedom, in which the boundaries between orthodoxy and heterodoxy were not as strictly established, and the doctrines enshrined as orthodox during the Council of Trent were possibilities among others. Indeed, the debates between exponents of the different viae (via antiqua or via moderna), which characterized the university curricula, were much more complex than commonly acknowledged. The very same notions of “nominalism” and “realism” have to be read in light of the debates and tactical positionings, rather than as a function of mere resemblance of two opposing theological schools. Moreover, there is no necessary continuity between fifteenth-century via moderna and fourteenth-century “nominalism”, only posthumously labelled as such. Finally, the use of certain authorities (Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham) on one hand resembles the preference for a certain method and a certain reading of Aristotle’s corpus at the universities; on the other, however, it resembles the discursive use of a ‘condemned authority’ in order to identify the positions of the whole school that deemed it intrinsically heterodox. Thus, if the doctores reales recalled the Paris condemnation against William of Ockham in 1339, interpreting it as a condem-



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nation of nominalism as such, the doctores nominales did not limit themselves to defending Ockham’s orthodoxy, but counterattacked, arguing that John Wyclif’s condemnation in Paris, Prague, and the Council of Constance proved how maintaining realists’ positions inevitably led to heresy.28 While studies based on the scholarship of the late Heiko Oberman have contextualized Luther’s theology in light of his nominalist background, and increasingly more attention has been paid to the mystical tradition that both Luther and his mentor, Johannes von Staupitz, held in high esteem, other sixteenth-century philosophical and theological currents have been neglected by secondary literature. In 1517, the very same year of the publication of the famous Ninety-Five Theses and one year before Luther’s vehement assertion of his theology of the cross, Johannes Reuch­lin published his masterpiece, On the Art of the Kabbalah.29 Divided into three books, the work is an attempt to prove the continuity between the Jewish occult tradition known as Kabbalah, and Christian doctrine. Being under indictment for heresy at the time, Reuhclin dedicated the work to Pope Leo X. In the introduction he explained his choice to write a book on the art of the Kabbalah, a choice which at first glance can appear as unusual as it was unorthodox. Reuch­lin presented himself as a follower and preserver of the intellectual program endorsed by the pope’s father, Lorenzo the Magnificent, and the grandfather, Cosimo the Elder. In 1513, Giovanni di Lorenzo de’ Medici, the second son of Lorenzo de’ Medici and Clarice Orsini, who had grown up in a period of extraordinary intellectual fervor in Florence, became the pope. Some of the most renowned scholars of the time, like Angelo Poliziano, were directly in charge of the education of young Giovanni. It is thus not surprising that Reuch­lin emphasized his admiration for the Medicean Florence, for the scholars who became influential in mobilizing the trends of that period, like Cristoforo Landino, Poliziano, Marsilio Ficino, and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and 28  Maarten J. F. M. Hoenen, “Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Fifteenth Century: Doctrinal, Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the Wegestreit,” in The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400–1700, ed. Friedman L. Russell and Lauge O. Nielsen (Dordrecht: Springer, 2003), 9–36. For further discussion on the role of the via antiqua and via moderna in sixteenth-century German universities, see: Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “Via Antiqua and Via Moderna: Late Medieval Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas 48 (1987): 23–40. 29  Different translations of Reuch­lin’s De arte cabalistica have been published in the last years. The critical text with German translation can be found in the second volume of Reuch­ lin’s Ausgewählte Schriften: Johannes Reuch­lin, De arte cabalistica libri tres, Sämtliche Werke; Bd. 2,1 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2010). Saverio Campanini and Giulio Busi have published an accurate Italian edition: L’arte Cabbalistica (De arte cabbalistica), ed. Giulio Busi and Saverio Campanini (Florence: Opus Libri, 1995). Henceforth quoted as L’arte Cabbalistica. For the English text, I follow: On the Art of the Kabbalah, trans. Martin and Sarah Godman (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993). Henceforth quoted as On the Art of the Kabbalah.

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he sought to preserve the links between their scholarship and his own intellectual enterprise. The narrative construction is typical of early sixteenth-century anti-scholastic polemics: a dark period of decadence that obfuscated the study of language and literature was first overcome by an early generation of scholars, like Francesco Petrarca, Francesco Filelfo, and Pietro Aretino, who restored the arts of oratory and fine speech. In the following generation, Lorenzo de’ Medici and the intellectuals close to him endorsed the restoration of “the wisdom that probes into the past, wisdom that lay hidden until his day in books and memorials of past times”.30 The restoration of this ancient wisdom is painted, in Reuch­ lin’s words, with a divine afflatus: Lorenzo could foresee, as if in a prophetic vision, that educating his son in the ancient philosophy would benefit not only the Medici family, but the entire world. “Your father” – Reuch­lin asserted addressing Pope Leo X – “sowed the seeds of ancient philosophy in his children. With his son they will grow to reach the roof tops; in your reign we shall reap the harvest in every language – Greek, Latin, Hebrew, Arabic, Chaldaic, and Chaldean”.31 An indistinct notion of the Renaissance brought together the search for ancient truth to a generic rediscovery of classical philosophy and literature as well as of the Church Fathers. However, prominent authors of the Medici circles like Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, and, after them, a myriad of sixteenth-century authors who were strongly influenced by these two Italian thinkers, sought the divine origins common to all religious traditions. The term adopted by Ficino to indicate this ancient truth, prisca theologia, has become axiomatic for describing the attempt to find common origins for the different cults of the divinity.32 Ficino extensively discussed the problem, noting that all 30  Johann Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 37; RSW II, 1, De arte cabalistica, 26: ipse tandem patriae inferret quoque illam expultricem vitiorum sapientiam et arcanorum investigandi rationem, quae in libris et monumentis priscorum ad sua usque tempora latuissent. 31  Cf. Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 39; RSW II.1, De arte cabalistica, 30: Semina iecit pater universae veteris philosophiae, quae nunc te filio in culmos surgunt, ut te regnante nobis spicas illius metere licet in omnibus linguis, Graeca, Latina, Hebraea, Arabica, Chaldaica et Chaldiaca, quibus hoc tempore libri tuae maiestati offeruntur. 32  For Ficino’s concept of the prisca theologia, see: Cesare Vasoli, Quasi sit deus: studi su Marsilio Ficino (Lecce: Conte, 1999), 11–50; Moshe Idel, “Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino and in Some Jewish Treatments,” in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 137–58. For the influence of Ficino’s prisca theologia from Agostino Steuco, who coined the term philosophia perennis, to the seventeenth century, see: Maria Muccillo, Platonismo, ermetismo e ‘prisca theologia’: ricerche di storiografia filosofica rinascimentale (Florence: Olschki, 1996); “La ‘prisca theologia’ nel ‘De perenni philosophia’ di Agostino Steuco,” Rinascimento 28 (1988): 41–111. For a general overview of the tradition of philosophia perennis, see: Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia perennis: Historische Umrisse abendländischer Spiritualität in Antike, Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998); Charles B. Schmitt, “Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz,” Journal of the History of Ideas 27 (1966): 505–32. Schmidt-Biggermann’s



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people in every generation seem to have an innate notion of the divinity. The theological presupposition which Ficino took for granted was that divine revelation was not limited to Christian scriptures. For Ficino, there are two sources of divine revelation: firs, in light of its divine origin, the human soul has a natural knowledge of divinity; second, God can reveal Himself through the Word and through revelation. As James Hankins has put it, Ficino considered religion a natural instinct – like drinking and eating – and atheism a physiological problem. As a natural instinct, every form of religion bore a certain degree of truth.33 Platonism and other forms of pre-Christian religions were divinely inspired. Ficino pointed out that the wisdom of prisci theologi differed in degree, but not in nature, from the wisdom of the patriarchs, of the apostles, and of all other Christian authorities. It derived from God just like Christian revelation. The apostles revealed faith in its entirety, so that Christianity represents the final and most perfect revelation, but other religions also enjoyed divine revelation, although to a lesser degree. The question then is what that implied, to what extent the revelation received by pagans was partial, and to what extent the pagans were aware of and anticipated the mysteries that became apparent after the incarnation of Christ. In general, Ficino tended to differentiate between pre-Christian and postevangelical philosophical traditions. For instance, while Ficino could picture Plato as an anticipator of Christian theology and Socrates almost at the same level as John the Baptist, as the one who paved the way for the coming of Christ,34 he had more difficulties explaining why the later Platonists, the very same authors he translated and quoted so often, did not convert to or, in some cases, were even open opponents of the Christian religion. While the distinction between “Middle Platonism” and “Neoplatonism” is alien to Ficino’s vocabulary,35 the Florentine repeatedly distinguished, also for apologetic reasons, between the Christian and the pagan Platonists. A clear example of this tendency can be found in Ficino’s argument regarding the Trinity. As Michael J. B. Allen book has been translated in English: Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Philosophia perennis: Historical Outlines of Western Spirituality in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought, International Archives of the History of Ideas (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2004). 33  James Hankins, “Marsilio Ficino and the Religion of the Philosophers,” Rinascimento 48 (2008): 101–22. 34  For Ficino’s interpretation of Socrates as one of the highest examples of virtue, see: Denis J. J. Robichaud, Plato’s Persona: Marsilio Ficino, Renaissance Humanism, and Platonic Traditions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 111–48. For an overview of the reception of Socrates in the Renaissance, see: James Hankins, “Socrates in the Italian Renaissance,” in A companion to Socrates, ed. Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 337–52. 35  According to Leo Catana, the historiographical distinction between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism has been conceptualized by Johann Jacob Brucker (1696–1770) in his Historia critica philosophica (1742–67), see: Leo Catana, “The Origin of the Division between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism,” Apeiron 46 (2013): 166–200.

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has put it, Ficino was well aware of the subordinationist positions of Plotinus’ three hypostases (the One, the Mind, and the Good) and, thus, the fact that the three hypostases of the Platonists could not be equated with the Catholic dogma of the Trinity. In order to distance himself from Arian heresy, Ficino continuously distinguished in this regard between the majority of the Platonists and the “Christian Platonists”. At the same time, however, he noticed that the terms “leader”, “cause”, and “father” in Plato’s sixth letter could have anticipated the Trinity. Ficino clarified that Plato himself, who mastered and anticipated many Christian notions, was arguably not aware of the Christian Trinity and his text should be read in light of Plotinus’ three hypostases. However, Plato, like the prophets of the Old Testament, could have been moved by a divine spirit to anticipate what was later revealed by Jesus, despite not being aware of the implications of his own words.36 It is this tendency characterized by an openness to the “Other”, a continuous attempt to go beyond apparent differences to find a common divine origin for all religions, that created the intellectual context for the birth and growth of the Christian Kabbalah. It is generally acknowledged that Giovanni Pico della Mirandola must be recognized as the father of this intellectual movement that emerged in the late fifteenth century and exercised a major influence on European cultures in the following centuries.37 After his studies in Padua and Paris, the strongholds of medieval Aristotelianism, Pico became convinced of the possibility of reconciling divergent religious traditions – different only on the surface, but beneath it all imbued with the same divine inspiration. The Jewish theosophical tradition known as “Kabbalah” became the focus of Pico’s concord program. According to this interpretation, Moses received two revelations from God on Mount Zion: one he revealed through the Ten Commandments, but the second one he transmitted orally only to a few scribes. The term “Kabbalah” means reception (receptio), and indicates this hidden tradition transmitted orally from generation to generation. In the famous Oratio which should have preceded the debate of his 900 Theses, Pico explained his understanding of Kabbalah as follows: 36 Michael J. B. Allen, “Marsilio Ficino on Plato, the Neoplatonists and the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity,” Renaissance Quarterly 37 (1984): 555–84. 37  The bibliography on Pico is huge. For a balanced analysys of Pico’s life and his interests in Kabbalah and magic, see: Giulio Busi and Raphael Ebgi, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Mito, magia, qabbalah, I Millenni (Milan: Einaudi, 2014). If not otherwise mentioned, for the Latin text I follow the critical edition established by Garin: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno, e scritti vari, trans. Eugenio Garin, Edizione nazionale dei classici del pensiero italiano (Florence: Valsecchi, 1942). Henceafter quoted as De hominis dignitate e scritti vari. For the English translation of Pico’s Oratio, I follow: Pico della Mirandola: Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, ed. Francesco Borghesi, Michael Papio, Massimo Riva (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Hereafter quoted as Oration on the Dignity of Man.



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I come now to those things that I deduced from the ancient mysteries of the Hebrews and that I cite as confirmation of the sacrosanct and Catholic faith. So that these things not be considered, by those who are ignorant of such matters, imaginary trifles or the fables of storytellers, I wish to explain to all men what they are and what they are like; where they come from; by whom and by how many enlightened authors they are confirmed; and how enigmatic, how divine, how necessary they are to those of our own faith for the safeguard of our own religion against the importunate calumnies of the Jews. Not only the celebrated Hebrew doctors but also some among our own, such as Esdras, Hilary, and Origen write that Moses received from God on the mount not only the five books of the Law that he bequeathed to posterity but also a true and more secret interpretation of the Law. God commanded him to proclaim the Law to the people but never to put the interpretation of the Law into writing, nor divulge it, but to communicate it only to Jesu Nave, who would in turn reveal it, under a solemn vow of secrecy, to his successors among the high priests. The simple story was sufficient to recognize now God’s power, now His wrath against the wicked, His mercy toward the good, and His justice before all. Divine and salutary precepts were sufficient to learn about the goodly and blessed life, the worship of true religion.38

In this long passage, which in Pico’s mind should have immediately preceded the revelation to his listeners that through the Kabbalah one can know the mysteries of the Christian faith, Pico asserts that the ancient Hebrew mysteries preserved orally over many generations are the real content of the Kabbalah. The passage deserves to be quoted at length, since it invokes many notions on which the youthful Count of Mirandola based his understanding of a concordance among religions. First of all, the ancient Jewish mysteries – as Pico put it – were helpful to confirm “the sacrosanct and catholic faith” (ad sacrosanctam et catholicam fidem confirmandam attuli). Chaim Wirszubski has noted two main patterns in Pico’s use of Kabbalah: first, a Christian interpretation of Kabbalistic texts, second, the use of Kabbalistic techniques in order to interpret the Holy Writ unveiling the Christian dogmas within it. According to Wirszubski, while the former is not in any way a new path, the latter should be described as 38  Cf. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, 147–49; De hominis dignitate e scritti vari, 154–56: Venio nunc ad ea quae ex antiquis Hebraeorum mysteriis eruta, ad sacrosanctam et catholicam fidem confirmandam attuli, quae ne forte ab his, quibus sunt ignota, commentitiae nugae aut fabulae circumlatorum existimentur, volo intelligent omnes quae et qualia sint, unde petita, quibus et quam claris auctoribus confirmata et quam reposita, quam divina, quam nostris hominibus ad propugnandum religionem contra Hebraeorm importunes calumnias sint necessaria. Scribunt non modo celebres Hebraeorum doctores, sed ex nostris quoque Esdras, Hilarius et Origenes, Mosem non legem modo, quam quinque exaratam libris posteris reliquit, sed secretiorem quoque et veram legis enarrationem in monte divinitus accepisse; praeceptum autem ei a Deo ut legem quidem populo publicaret, legis interpretationem nec traderet libris, nec invulgaret, sed ipse Iesu Nave tantum, tum ille aliis deinceps succedentibus sacerdotum primoribus, magna silent religione, revelaret. Satis erat per simplicem historiam nunc Dei potentiam, nunc in improbos iram, in bonos clementiam, in omnes iustitiam agnoscere, et per divina salutariaque pracepta ad bene beateque vivendum et cultum verae religionis institui.

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Pico’s innovation.39 Indeed, since the Oratio is the introductory speech of his 900 Theses, one of the main topics of Pico’s planned debate was the confirmation of Christian doctrine through Kabbalah. In Thesis 5 in “my own opinion”, Pico asserted that every Jewish Kabbalist, in accordance with the Kabbalistic science, has to acknowledge the Trinity exactly the way in which it is postulated in Catholic Faith.40 Pico went even further to add as a corollary to this Thesis that once the principles of Kabbalah are accepted, he who knows them can confute those who deny the Trinity, as well as those who accept it in a different manner from the Catholic faith, like the Arians or the Sabellians.41 According to Pico, the confirmation of Christian doctrine does not necessarily have to pass the test of Scripture. The application of Kabbalist techniques, that is of a non-Christian method of reading the Scripture, produces the correct interpretation of the Holy Writ. Paradoxically, according to Pico, Kabbalah can and has to be used against the Jewish people: if they reject the Christian truth after Christianity has proved to be the most excellent religion of all, then the decision to not convert is to their own detriment. The second key theme raised by Pico is the dialectic between a hidden revelation transmitted orally, since it cannot be revealed to anyone and, on the other side, Pico’s intention to reveal the content of this very same occult knowledge in a public disputation. In the abovementioned passage, Pico quoted three authors who confirm that on Mount Sinai Moses received both a written and an oral law: Ezra, Origen, and Hilary of Poitiers. Basing his judgment on a passage of Origen’s commentary on Romans in which the Alexandrian hinted at a double revelation received by the Jews, and at Hilary’s commentary on Psalm 2 in which he refers to the Jewish doctors who had to take care of this hidden revelation,42 Pico argued that two prominent figures of the early Church alrea39  Chaim

Wirszubski, Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 162–63. 40  Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Conclusiones Nongentae. Le novecento tesi dell’anno 1486, trans. Albano Biondi, Studi Pichiani (Florence: Olschki, 1995), 126: Quilibet hebraeus Cabalista secudum principia et dicta scientiae Cabalae, cogitur ineuitabiliter concedere de trinitate et qualibet persona diuina, patre, filio, et spiritu sancto, illud praecise sine additione uel diminutione, aut uariatione, quod ponit fides catholica christianorum. 41 Ibid.: Corellarium. Non solum qui negat trinitatem, sed qui alio modo eam ponunt, quam ponat catholica ecclesia, sicut Ariani, sicut Sabelliani, et similes, redargui possunt manifeste, si admittantur principia Cabalae. 42  For the two references from Origen and Hilary’s texts, I follow Alastair Hamilton, The Apocryphal Apocalypse: The Reception of the Second Book of Esdras (4 Ezra) from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, Oxford-Warburg Studies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 35. As noted by Pasquale Terracciano, before writing the Oratio and Conclusiones, Pico read the Life of Plotinus written by Porphyry in Ficino’s translation. In this text Porphyry reports that Origen, Plotinus, and Erennius received teachings on esoteric knowledge from Ammonius Saccus and agreed not to reveal the content of these teachings. Pico also quotes this passage from Porphyry’s Vita Plotini in the Heptaplus. See Pasquale Terracciano, “The Origen of Pico’s Kabbalah: Esoteric Wisdom and the Dignity of Man,” Journal of the History of Ideas 79



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dy shared the idea of a double revelation received by Moses on Mount Sinai. Concerned with proving that the notion of the twofold revelation is not his invention,43 Pico, in his Apology, reaffirmed that Origen and Hilary clarify Paul and the Gospel of Matthew respectively. According to Pico, Origen noted that in Romans 3 Paul claims that the Jews received eloquia Dei and that the eloquia could not be referred to the written law, adding that in the famous passage II Cor. 3:6 “the letter kills, the spirit gives life”, the word littera refers to the written law, while the spiritual revelation which has not been transmitted by letters is the one which gives life. Extensively quoting Hilary of Poitiers’ De Trinitate, Pico sought to show that Jesus himself, claiming that “The teachers of the law and the Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat” (Mt 23.2), revealed the existence of this oral tradition transmitted by Moses to the scribes. Moreover, the figure of Ezra assumed a prominent role in Pico’s historiographical construction of the divine origins of the Kabbalah, since he identified in Ezra the codifier of the secret tradition transmitted only orally for centuries. Highly interested in apocryphal texts, Pico was convinced that the Jewish scribe Ezra had written down in his second apocryphal book the revelation he himself had received orally from his predecessors. Why had Ezra decided to put an end to the chain of oral succession through which the mysteries of the law had been transmitted since Moses received them from God? Both in Oratio and in Apologia Pico explained that Ezra was forced to do so because of the risk that the revelation would go astray. According to him, during the Babylonian captivity, Ezra had been ordered to transcribe the books of the Law as well as the mysteries transmitted orally up until that point, since the oral transmission was not possible due to the diaspora, which meant that the revelation could be lost forever. Seventy books, coinciding with the number of the seventy ancients of the synedrium, were written containing the mysteries of the Kabbalah.44 (2018): 343–61. Here quoted at 347. For further discussion on Origen of Alexandria’s knowledge of Jewish esoteric tradition, see: Guy Stroumsa, “Clement, Origen, and Jewish Esoteric Traditions,” in Hidden Wisdom: Esoteric Traditions and the Roots of Christian Mysticism, ed. Guy Stroumsa, Numen Book Series (Leiden; Boston; Cologne: Brill, 1996), 109–31. 43  After mentioning his sources, Pico asserts: Ex quibus omnibus satis patere potest non esse confictum a me quod praeter legem scripturam Moyses veram quoque legis expositionem a Deo acceperit, Cf. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Apologia. L’autodifesa di Pico di fronte al Tribunale dell’Inquisizione, trans. Paolo Edoardo Fornaciari (Florence: Sismel, 2010), 184. 44  Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate e scritti vari, 158: Verum postquam Hebraei a Babylonica captivitate restituti per Cyrum et sub Zorobabel instauratum templu ad reparandam legem animum appulerunt, Esdras, tunc ecclesiae praectus, post emendatum Moseos librum, cum plane cognosceret per exilia, caedes, fugas, captivitatem gentis Israeliticae institutum a maioribus morem tradendae per manus doctrinae servari non posse, futurumque ut sibi divinitus indulta caelestis doctrinae arcana perirent, quorum commentariis non intercedentibus durare diu memoria non poterat, constituit ut, convocatis qui tunc supererant sapientibus, afferret unusquisque in medium quae de mysteriis legis memoriter tenebat, adhibitisque notariis in septuaginta volumina (tot enim fere in Synedrio sapientes) redigentur. Apologia, ed. Fornaciari, 182: Per hos autem ⟨mirabiles consiliarios⟩ illi intelliguntur

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Pico’s goal for his disputation was to reveal the content of these seventy books, and he justified his goal before the Tribunal of the Inquisition, claiming that he had chosen to reveal the content of the Kabbalistic books because, after having studied them in-depth, he had found that they revealed most, if not the entirety, of the content of the Christian faith. Because of this, the Jews had wanted to keep them secret. On the other hand, the young Count of Mirandola invited his planned listeners, who in months thereafter became his accusers, to fight the Jews with their own weapons.45 Just like Ficino with his Platonists, so, too, Pico had to face the challenge of defending the very same possibility that divine revelation spread beyond the boundaries of the Christian Church. Having postulated in his 900 Theses the continuity between Christianity and Kabbalah (as well as Platonism, Hermeticism, Pythagoreanism, and Zoroastrianism), he defended himself before the Tribunal of the Inquisition, highlighting that “the holy doctors” who had accused him of heresy had misunderstood the kind of cabala he was talking about. Also, after the charge of heresy, Pico again reiterated the divine origins of Kabbalah. In his Questio quinta, however, he emphasized that in modern times, the divinely revealed Kabbalah had come to be blended by the Jews with nonrevealed practices. Like in ancient times, only wise men were magicians and only afterwards, negromantes had corrupted natural magic with demonic and superstitious practices, in the same way the modern Jews had corrupted the divine Kabbalah. On the one hand, Pico claimed, there was a true Kabbalah (vera cabala), and on the other, a false, superstitious, and demonic corruption of the real Kabbalah. While vehemently denying that he had asserted the truthfulness of these latter practices, Pico proudly declared that he had been the first among quod vocant Habraei sanhedrin id est LXX illos seniores quos elegit Moyses ex precepto Domini, quorum locum mihi videtur tenere cardinales in nostra Ecclesia, et ad imitationem numeri illorum LVV seniorum, ut nunc declarabimus fuerunt redacta misteria cabalae in LXX libros principales tempore Esdrae. Usque enim ad tempus Esdrae de ista doctrina nihil erat scriptum, sed solum ut dixi per successivam receptionem tradebatur, unde cabalisticae nomen accepit. Postquam autem a Babilonica captivitate restituti fuerunt per Cirum, et sub Zorobabel instauratum fuit templum, tunc Esdras qui fuit praefectus sinagogae postquam reparavit legem scriptam Moysi et correxit Testamentum vetus, voluit etiam ut ista secreta Dei eloquia quae usque ad illud tempus scripta non fuerant scriberentur, et hoc quia propter captivitatem gentis non poterant servare illum ordinem tradendi sibi illam doctrinam per manus, et merito erat dubitandum ne propter dispersionem eorum, si non inveniebantur scripta tandem perirent. 45  In the Oratio Pico writes: In plenum nulla est ferme de re nobis cum Hebraeis controversia, de qua ex libris Cabalistarum ita redargui convincique non possint, ut ne angulus quidem reliquus sit in quem se condant. (Cf.: De hominis dignitate e scritti vari, 160). Pico restates the same concept in the Apologia: Neque enim eos Hebraei Latinis nostris commnicare volunt. Cum diligenter perlegerim, inveniens ibi multa, immo paene omnia consona fidei nostrae, visum est mihi habere posse Christianos unde Iudaeos suis telis confodiant, cum ab eis auctoritas cabalistarum, quos habent in magno honore et reverentia negari non possint. (Cf.: Apologia, 184).



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“the Latins” to introduce and study in detail the real Kabbalah, the only proper method to correctly understand the mysteries of the Law.46 What does this general attempt to erase the boundaries between Christianity and other religious traditions imply from a soteriological point of view? What is the role given to Christ in this understanding of a faith that is true and perfect, but no longer the only repository of divine revelation? As Cesare Vasoli and Jörg Lauster have emphasized, Ficino’s Christology is deeply rooted in his cosmology.47 Lauster has noted that in a general attempt to reconcile the Christology of the Greek Fathers with the cosmological understanding of Christ as Logos, Ficino interpreted the Incarnation as the descent of the pre-existent Logos into the sensible world. Considering the central position of man in the universe and God’s goodness that led Him to become Himself, Ficino understood redemption as twofold, moved by man’s ascensus toward God as well as by God’s descensus toward men. In Ficino’s terms, divine grace is constituted by the divine ray. Drawing from Plato’s theory of cognition, Ficino believed that even reflecting on the divine Ideas purified the soul. This process of purificatio generates a desire to ascend to God, to become one with Him, which ultimately devolved into a process of deificatio. In this sense, redemption assumes a peculiar cosmological connotation. Not surprisingly, the person of Christ is understood as the highest example, both in a moral and in a metaphysical sense.48 Vasoli has pointed out how strictly underestimating the importance of dogma as well as conceiving Christ’s persona as the cosmic Logos is related to an attempt to renew Christianity and, at the same time, to form it to fit the paradigm of the prisca theologia, with its afflatus for the common origins of all religions.49 In 46 Pico, Apologia, 192: Verum sicut cum olim magi tantum dicerentur sapientes, necromantes deinde et diabolici viri sapientis sibi falso nomen vendicantes magos se vocaverunt, ita et quidem apud Habraeos res divinas falsis et vanis superstitionibus polluentes, immo in rei veritate quasi nihil a necromantibus differentes, dixerunt se habere secreta Dei nomina et virtutes quibus daemones ligarent et miracula facerent, et Christum non alia via fecisse miracula. Et isti falso sibi cabalistarum nomen vendicaverunt dicentes artem suam esse illam veram cabalam quam revelavit Deus Moysi. Sicut etiam dicunt Salomone et ab Adam et ab Enoch et a similibus. Hanc autem falso vocatam cabalam non solum ego non approbavi in conclusionibus meis aut sequutus sum, sed expresse reprobavi ponens conclusionem specialem de directo contra istam, quae dicit quod miracula Christi non potuerunt fieri per viam cabalae. For further comments on this passage, see Wirszubski, 121–32. 47  Jörg Lauster, “Marsilio Ficino as Christian Thinker,” in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden; Boston; Cologne: Brill, 2002), 45–69; Vasoli, Quasi sit deus, 43–50. 48  Lauster, “Marsilio Ficino as Christian Thinker,” 54–64. 49  Having discussed the problem of deificatio and Christ as Logos in Ficino’s thought, emphasizing the deep differences of Ficino’s spirituality from both the scholastic theologians of his time as well as from the reform movements of the following century, Cesare Vasoli pointed out: “Siamo, piuttosto, in presenza di una religiositä sostanzialmente estranea ai temi essenziali dei dibattiti sui dogmi posti in discussione dalle teologie protestanti e volta, invece, verso il ritorno a un ‘cristianesimo originario’, ‘puro’ ed ‘essenziale’, centrato sul tema della

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this sense, Ficino could go as far as claiming, following Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei, if Christian religion was the highest and purest cult, that the other forms of worship were different only in terms of rituals; to the extent that worship was intended to serve the highest good, irrespective of the differences between the rites, every cult attempted to please God.50 It would be misleading to limit the heresy charges against both Pico and Ficino to a dispute between an institutionalized Church concerned with its own power and its fight for supremacy, against a marginal group of “occult” and “esoteric” thinkers who, devaluing the role of sacraments and dogmas, affirmed the primacy of the individual in touch with the divinity. The sheer volume of texts produced by authors ranging from Plato to Plotinus, Proclus, and Iamblichus, as well the Chaldean Oracles and Hermes Trismegistus that Ficino translated, exercised a deep and enduring influence in the philosophical and theological culture throughout the early modern times. The Christian Kabbalah, whose fatherhood Pico attributed to himself, similarly attracted vehement critics as well as enthusiast adherents in the following centuries, reshaping the very same understanding of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. The impact of Pico’s and Ficino’s scholarship was, however, immediately both deep and widespread. Since the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, different authors in Italy, France, Germany, and England were deeply influenced by these strands of the Renaissance culture. Not even their condemnation was unanimous in the Church. A famous example is Giles of Viterbo, a prior of the Augustinian order from 1507 and, then, vicar general of the order from 1518, who was well acquainted with and deeply influenced by Platonism as well as the Christian Kabbalah.51 Having been named bishop in January 1518, he resigned ‘mediazione cosmica’ e ‘redentrice’ del Cristo-Verbo, rigeneratore del mondo e sull’íntima partecipazione umana alla ‘deificatio’. Una ‘religione’, insomma, che, pur affermando la sua fede nella rivelazione evangelica, ne propone una interpretazione ‘spiritualistica’, ne accentua la convergenza ‘esoterica’ con tutte le massime espressioni dell’ ‘aeterna sapientia’, ne esalta il carattere di unione ‘amorosa’ con la Monade eterna, quando addirittura non sembra accennare al prossimo avvento di una nuova ‘palingenesi’ che ricondurrà uomini e cose alla ‘perfezione’ della loro origine”. Cf. Vasoli, Quasi sit deus, 47. 50  Ibid., 45. For further academic discussions on this topic, see also Friedemann Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance und Hermetismus: Kontexte und Schnittstellen der frühen reformatorischen Bewegung,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 104 (2013): 35–81. See especially pp. 37–42. 51  For a general assessment of Giles’ life and works, see: John W. O’Malley, Giles of Viterbo on Church and Reform: A Study in Renaissance Thought, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Leiden: Brill 1968). For a more recent contribution on Giles by John O’Malley, see also: “Giles of Viterbo: A Reformer’s Thought on Renaissance Rome,” Renaissance Quarterly 20 (2002): 1–11. For the influence of Platonism, Hermeticism, and Kabbalah, see: Daniel J. Nodes, “Humanism in the ‘Commentarium ad mentem Platonis’ of Giles of Viterbo (1469–1532),” Augustiniana 45 (1995): 285–98; John Monfasani, “Hermes Trismegistus, Rome, and the Myth of Europa: An Unknown Text of Giles of Viterbo,” Viator 22 (1991): 311–42; Brian P. Copenhaver and Daniel Stein Kokin, “Egidio da Viterbo’s Book on Hebrew



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the position of vicar general of the Augustinian order just as one of his fellow Augustinians Martin Luther, whom he had met eight years before in Rome, was facing the charge of heresy. At the same time, Giles’ fellow Kabbalist Johannes Reuch­lin was also under the charge of heresy. Thus, we are back where we started, where the simultaneous appeal is made to Pope Leo X by Reuch­lin regarding the intellectual project to return to the mysteries of ancient religions, patronized by Leo’s father Lorenzo the Magnificent, and Luther’s preaching of the theology of the cross.

1.2  A “Positive Misunderstanding”? What binds Ficino, Pico, Reuch­lin, and Luther is that all of them were criticizing scholastic theology, and all of them were accused of heresy and felt the need to return to a deeper form of spirituality. Johannes Reuch­lin explicitly linked his own intellectual program to Ficino and Pico. On the other hand, Luther’s theology of the cross is seemingly opposed to Ficino’s Platonism and Pico’s Kabbalism: in the latter, one can discern a conceptualization of Christ as the WordLogos in conjunction with a tendency to drop the barriers between Christian and non-Christian revelation; in the former, the centrality of the cross is vigorously reiterated as the only way to know God and the only path to salvation. Although so different at first glance, the coeval critique of scholasticism moved by Reuch­ lin and Luther as well as their own trials for heresy were often linked together in the early sixteenth century, as much by their supporters as by their opponents. Before discussing how this happened, it is necessary to introduce a leading figure in the cultural debate of the time, Erasmus of Rotterdam.52 The relationship between Martin Luther and Erasmus of Rotterdam is one of the most complex and thorny historiographical questions. Scholars have exercised their intellect in trying to give a univocal answer concerning how and to what extent Erasmus’ scholarship helped to pave the way for the Reformation. At this point, a series of historical and methodological clarifications are needed. Letters: Christian Kabbalah in Papal Rome,” Renaissance Quarterly 67 (2014): 1–42; Daniel Stein Kokin, “Entering the Labyrinth: On the Hebraic and Kabbalistic Universe of Egidio da Viterbo,” in Hebraic Aspects of the Renaissance: Sources and Encounters, ed. Ilana Zinguer, Abraham Melamed, and Zur Shalev, Brill’s Series in Jewish Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 27– 42; Emma Abate, “Filologia e Qabbalah: la collezione ebraica di Egidio da Viterbo alla Biblioteca Angelica di Roma,” Archivio italiano per la storia della pietà 26 (2013): 413–51; “La Qabbalah in Volgare: manoscritti dall’atèlier di Egidio da Viterbo,” in Umanesimo e cultura ebraica nel Rinascimento italiano, ed. Stefano Baldassori and Fabrizio Lelli (Florence: Pontecorboli, 2016). 52  For Erasmus’ works, I follow the Amsterdam critical edition. In alternative, I use the Latin-German edition. For Erasmus’ correspondence, I follow the critical edition established by Allen. For the English translation, I follow CWE.

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First, it is important to exercise care in clarifying what the term “Reformation” means, as it is historically inaccurate to identify the events which gave birth to the Protestant Churches as the result of the theology and the movement initiated by one single individual, Martin Luther. For instance, as Alister McGrath has pointed out,53 the Church reform movement that took place in Basel and gravitated around the figures of Ulrich Zwingli and Johannes Oecalampadius should be studied as an intellectual phenomenon in its own right. Thus, as this work is concerned with Luther’s theology of the cross, no general conclusion can be drawn from this study regarding the intellectual origins of the “Reformation”. Moreover, the term “Reformation” indicates a teleological movement, emanating from the Catholic and proceeding towards the Protestant Church. At the juncture of the early sixteenth century, however, no “Reformed Church” existed, nor had Luther conceptualized his own theology as an attempt to provoke a schism within the Church and to create a new branch in Christianity. Second, even more caution needs to be applied when investigating the relationship between “Humanism” and “Reformation”. In the introduction, I emphasized how problematic the very term “Humanism” is, especially when applied to Ficino, Pico, or Reuch­lin, but also to Francesco Zorzi, Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, Paracelsus, Giordano Bruno, and many other key protagonists of the sixteenth century. Moreover, just as it is improper to equate the notion of the “Reformation” with the theology of Martin Luther, it is also an oversimplification to discuss the relationship between “humanists and Reformers” in terms of the relationship between the paradigmatic figures of Erasmus and Luther. Indeed, Luther and Erasmus significantly contributed to the theological debate of their time, but first, their own positions neither cover nor exemplify in full the spectrum of positions of the early sixteenth century, and, second, their positions, like that of every other author, can only be understood as reactions to other statements, which is true both in reference to each other (that is, the positions of Luther as a reaction to a certain declaration put forth by Erasmus and vice-versa) as well as to their relationship with other authors. Finally, given these two presuppositions, I would like to emphasize that the historiographical paradigm of a “productive misunderstanding” needs to be abandoned. As we have seen, the expression “productive misunderstanding” was introduced into the scholarly discourse by Bernd Moeller in order to conceptualize the relationship between “humanists and Reformers” in the years 1516–1521. The paradigmatic example of this phenomenon is Martin Bucer’s interpretation of the Heidelberg Disputation. Bucer equated Luther’s statements in Heidelberg with Erasmus’ quest of the Reform of the Church.54 53  Alister

E. McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 29–30. 54  Thomas Kaufmann, “Bucers Bericht von der Heidelberger Disputation,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 82 (1991): 147–70.



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In light of the deep differences between Luther and Erasmus, the expression “productive misunderstanding” should allude, on the one hand, to the improper assimilation of Luther’s theology with that of Erasmus, but on the other to the positive effects this misunderstanding had for gaining consensus on Luther as an individual, as well as on the general movement of reform. The expression, however, relies on different problematic presuppositions: first, the term “misunderstanding” imposes a non-ideological connotation from the author-text perspective, while every text is open to multiple interpretations. Second, Luther’s positions, especially his pro-Plato and anti-Aristotlean statements, could foreshadow the attempt to present himself as an Erasmian.55 In this sense, one should bear in mind that in this period Luther joined the literary custom to graecize his name, signing his works as “Martinus Eleutherius”.56 Third, the adjective “productive” has a positive connotation, which discloses a value judgment regarding the positive effects that this alleged misunderstanding has entailed. Such value judgment is propaedeutic for tracing an arbitrary teleological line, which gives the possibility of reading the relationship between “Humanism and Reformation” as two movements which, albeit different, were joined together in overcoming the “old” scholastic theology. The positive judgment attributed to words like “Humanism” and “Reformation” goes hand in hand with a negative evaluation of scholasticism, and more generally, of ascertaining what is still part of the “old world”, what is still “medieval”. The interminable discussions in secondary literature about when Luther divested himself of his medieval background and became “the Reformer” are symptomatic of this tendency. I claim that, instead of giving positive or negative judgments regarding a certain event, or eluding the complexity through a generic claim to a “misunderstanding”, one should interpret the debates which emerged in relation to Reuch­lin’s and Luther’s trials for heresy in terms of tactical positioning. The discussion here on this topic is not exhaustive, but I would like to emphasize that Luther’s positions in these years are not neutral and could not be elevated to a level “above the discourse”. In fact, Luther’s positions in these years have to be understood in light of his attempt to position himself within a wider context of Church Reform. Analyzing the tactical positioning adopted by Luther is necessary to properly contextualize the words that he chose to attack his opponents, as well as his preaching of the theology of the cross, as I will show in the following chapters. 55  There was a growing interest in Erasmus in the first two decades of the early sixteenth century in the Holy Roman Empire, see: James D. Tracy, “Erasmus becomes a German,” Renaissance Quarterly 21 (1968): 281–88; Robert W. Scribner, “The Erasmians and the Beginning of the Reformation in Erfurt,” Journal of Religious History 9 (1976): 3–31. 56  Jürgen Udolph, Martinus Luder – Eleutherius – Martin Luther: Warum änderte Martin Luther seinen Namen?, Indogermanische Bibliothek (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2016).

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Before moving the discussion to Luther himself, I will briefly summarize the well-known events that characterized the “Reuch­lin affair”. Then I will show how Luther aligned himself with the pro-Reuch­lin movement to finally emphasize that, based on Luther’s own correspondence, he himself had been aware of the divergence of Erasmus’ theology from his own; and yet he needed to avoid an open confrontation with Erasmus during a moment in which the two men had common enemies.

1.3  “Jewish Books Must be Destroyed”: The Aftermath of the Reuch­lin Affair In 1490, Johannes Reuch­lin travelled to Italy with the Duke of Württenberg. In Rome, Ermolao Barbaro, according to the literary custom of the time, graecized his German name to “Capnion”, meaning “little snake”.57 In Florence, Reuch­ lin met Lorenzo the Magnificent and Marsilio Ficino, whom he had already met eight years before on a previous trip to Italy in 1482. Thanks to his travels in Italy, he became acquainted with the works of the Medicean circle. The reading of Giovanni Pico’s works is remembered by Reuch­lin as being of utmost importance for his intellectual career, since it opened the door to the study of the ancient mysteries of Jewish mysticism, which would render him one of the prominent scholars of his time. Reuch­lin was deeply interested in the study of Hebrew before his meeting with Pico. According to a later report by his pupil, grand-nephew, and reformer Philipp Melanchthon, Reuch­lin began to study Hebrew under the Dutch theologian Wessel Gansfort (1419–1489) while he was a student at the University of Paris. Through his correspondence with another Dutch scholar Rudolph Agricola, we know that in 1482 Reuch­lin and Agricola were studying Hebrew under Flavius Mithridates, who later translated Kabbalistic texts into Latin for Pico. On 8 September 1492, Reuch­lin began to study Hebrew under Jacobus Jehiel Loans, a Jew who was private physician to the Emperor Frederick III. Later in his life Reuch­lin also hired to his service the philosopher and biblical exegete Obadiah ben Jacob Sforno, founder of a Talmudic school at Bologna.58 The interest in Hebrew goes hand in hand with Reuch­lin’s interest in Jewish mysticism. Four years after his second trip to Italy, Reuch­lin published his first Kabbalistic work entitled De Verbo Mirifico (1494). Divided into three books, the work represents a dialogue carried out among three men: the Epicurean Sidonius, the Hebrew Barachius, and the Christian Capnion, namely the character who personifies Reuch­lin himself. The dialogue rightfully enters the debate on 57 Price, 58 

Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 31. Johannes Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 10.



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magic of the late fifteenth century, however neither Pico nor Ficino are explicitly mentioned in the text.59 One year before, in a France dominated by the conservative theological faculty in Paris, Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples left his treatise on natural magic De Magia Naturalis, strongly influenced by Pico and Ficino, unpublished.60 Reuch­lin, banking on the support of the Duke of Wüttenberg as well as in light of Germany’s less conservative intellectual environment, felt free to follow in the footsteps of Pico and Ficino, without, however, ever mentioning as his own sources two authors who only some years before had been accused of heresy. In the same way, Agrippa von Nettesheim, despite being heavily dependent on Ficino’s De Vita in his De Occulta Philosophia, never mentioned Ficino by name.61 However, twenty-three years after the publication of De Verbo Mirifico, in De Arte Cabbalistica, Reuch­lin proudly vindicated his intellectual debt to the cultural context of Medicean Florence. After the publication of his De Verbo Mirifico in 1494, Reuch­lin increasingly assumed a widely recognized status in European culture because of his works as translator, philologist, and Hebraist. Among other works, in 1496, Reuch­lin published the satire Sergius and the following year the play Scenica Progymnasmata. Hoc est Ludicra Preexercitamenta or simply Henno.62 In the academic year, 1503–04, Jerome Emser (1478–1527) lectured at the University of Erfurt on Reuch­lin’s Sergius. As Emser later documented, even the young Martin Luther had taken part in this course.63 Reuch­lin, however, gained immense popularity as a Hebraist. In 1505, Reuch­lin published a brief pamphlet entitled “German Epistle: Why the Jews 59  Charles Zika, “Reuch­lin’s De verbo mirifico and the Magic Debate of the Late Fifteenth Century,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 39 (1976): 104–38. 60  Eugene F. Rice Jr., “The De magia naturali of Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples,” in Philosophy and Humanism: Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. Edward P. Mahoney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 19–29; Jean-Marc Mandosio, “Le De magia naturali de Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples: Magie, alchimie et cabale,” in Les Muses secrètes: Kabbale, alchimie et littérature à la Renaissance, ed. Rosanna Camos Gorris (Geneva: Droz, 2013); Jan R. Veenstra, “Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples: Humanism and Hermeticism in the De Magia Naturali,” in Christian Humanism: Essays in Honour of Arjo Vanderjagt, ed. Alasdair A. McDonald, Zweder R. W. M. von Martels, and Jan R. Veenstra (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 353–62. 61  Brian P. Copenhaver, “From Hermes Trismegistus, Proclus, and the Question of a Philosophy of Magic in the Renaissance,” in Hermeticism and the Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe, ed. Ingrid Merkel and Allen G. Debus (Washington: Folger Books, 1988), 79–110. 62  For Reuch­lin’s Henno, see: Jane O. Newman, “Textuality versus Performativity in NeoLatin Drama: Johannes Reuch­lin’s ‘Henno’,” Theatre Journal 38 (1986): 259–74. For an overview of Neo-Latin plays from the fifteenth century until Lessing, see: Florian Hurk, “Roman Comedy in Germany (from Humanism to Lessing),” in The Cambridge Companion to Roman Comedy, ed. Martin T. Dinter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 339–49. 63  Friedemann Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance and Hermeticism: Contexts and Interfaces of the Early Reformation Movement,” Reformation & Renaissance Review 20 (2018): 103–33.

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Have Been in Exile for so Long”, in which he discussed the reasons for the suffering of the Jews. According to Reuch­lin, the reasons for the diaspora cannot be the result of the sin of a single person, but rather must be sought in the collective sin of an entire people. He argued that the insults and blasphemies of the Jews against Jesus and their reluctance to accept Jesus as the Messiah can be considered the real reasons for the diaspora.64 In 1506, Reuch­lin published his De Rudimentis Hebraicis, a Hebrew textbook divided into three books, whose first two comprised a Hebrew lexicon and the third a Hebrew grammar.65 This is one of the texts that made Reuch­lin most famous as a Hebraist and it is well-known that Luther was acquainted with this work at least from 1509. In 1512, Reuch­lin published a commentary to the Seven penitential Psalms, which Luther used for his own commentary on these seven Psalms in 1517. Both a renowned lawyer66 and a leading expert of Jewish culture, in 1509, Reuch­lin was appointed as judge in one of the thorniest controversies of the early sixteenth century: the destruction of all Jewish books, with the exception of the Old Testament. The controversy was initiated by Johannes Pfefferkorn 64  The correct interpretation of Reuch­lin’s Missiue has been a matter of contention among scholars in the last years. Erika Rummel has interpreted Reuch­lin’s booklet as the result of his prejudices against Jews. Rummel argued that scholars like Reuch­lin or Erasmus promoted the study of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew because of their desire to study the classics and the Bible in the original languages, however they were not moved by a “principle of toleration”: Erika Rummel, The Case Against Johann Reuch­lin: Religious and Social Controversy in SixteenthCentury Germany (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 7. In his biography of Reuch­ lin, Franz Posset has vehemently criticized Rummel’s interpretation of Reuch­lin’s Missiue. On the opposite, he argued that the book should rather be understood as a “philo-semitic” text, and that the misperception of this text as anti-Semitic derives only by the later accusations that Reuch­lin’s opponents moved against him: Franz Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 237–51. See p. 238 for Posset’s criticism of Rummel. In turn, Posset has been criticized by Jan-Hendryk de Boer, who in his book on the Reuch­lin affair pointed out the anti-Semitic aspects of Reuch­ lin’s Missiue and argued that Posset’s attempt to interpret the text as “philo-semitic”, an interpretation based also on a Defensio that Reuch­lin published only several years later to respond to his detractors who accused him to change position on the Jews, is “methodologically untenable” (methodisch unzulässig): Jan-Hendryk de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten – Genealogie des Reuch­linkonflikts, Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 396 note 168. David Price, while specifying that in the Missiue Reuch­lin “did not advocate coercive action against Jews”, interpreted Reuch­lin’s pamphlet as an “early expression of medieval anti-Judaism”, an attitude that Reuch­lin would have repudiated in his publications in the later years: Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 112. 65 Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography 251–85. 66  For Reuch­lin’s activity as a lawyer, see: Markus Rafael Ackermann, Der Jurist Johannes Reuch­lin (1455–1522), Schriften zur Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999); Adolf Laufs, “Johannes Reuch­lin: Jurist in einer Zeitenwende,” in Reuch­lin und die politischen Kräfte seiner Zeit, ed. Stefan Rhein (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1998), 9–30; Dieter Stievermann, “Johannes Reuch­lin als Jurist und Rat in württembergischen Diensten,” in Reuch­lin und die politischen Kräfte seiner Zeit, 31–52.



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(1469–1521), a Jew who converted to Christianity between 1503 and 1505,67 possibly due to disillusionment with the failed advent of the Messiah that rabbi and Kabbalist Ascher Lemlein had predicted would occur in 1503.68 In 1507, Pfefferkorn published an anti-Jewish pamphlet entitled JudenSpiegel (Mirror of the Jews).69 Three main proposals characterize the pamphlet: the end of usury, mandatory presence of the Jews at forced sermons, and the confiscation and destruction of all Jewish books, except for the Old Testament. In just two years, between 1507–08, the small pamphlet was published four times (twice in Latin in Cologne, a third time in Cologne again but in Low German, and a fourth time in High German in Nüremberg), sparking anti-Jewish feelings in the Holy Roman Empire.70 In another work published in the same year, Speculum adhortationis Iudaice ad Christum (Mirror of Exhortation to Turn Jews to Christ), the inherent contradiction and ambiguity of a Jew converted to Christianity, who vehemently accuses his own people, emerges more clearly. In this work, Pfefferkorn addresses the Jews, inviting them to convert. On the one hand, Pfefferkorn defends the Jews against accusations of killing little Christian children in order to use their blood for circumcision.71 Pfefferkorn argues that there were certainly Jews who hated and killed Christians, but not for sacrificial rituals.72 On the other side, Pfefferkorn points out that it was necessary to confiscate Jewish books, especially the Talmud,73 not as an act of violence, but to induce the Jews to convert. Po-chia Hsia has noted that “Pfefferkorn alternates between two identities”, a tendency reflected in his language since he calls the Jews “my brethren and people”, but at the same time he strongly criticizes their unwillingness to convert. He also addresses Christians sometimes as “we”, other times as “you”. This tension between the two different identities is balanced in the third book of the work in which he demonstrates his millenarian conviction: God himself is going to intervene in history to fight injustice, and 67  For Pfefferkorn’s biography, see: de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten, 306–7; Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 98–100; Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 294. 68  de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten, 308. 69 A modern bilingual translation in English and German has been recently published: Johannes Pfefferkorn, The Jews’ Mirror (Der Juden Spiegel) trans. Ruth I. Cape, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies (Tempe: Arizona Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2011). 70  L’arte Cabbalistica, XXXV. 71  For the accusation of ritual murder against the Jews in the early modern period, see: R. Po-chia Hsia, The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). 72 Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 302–3; Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 103. 73  For centuries the Talmud has been a target of Christian authors in their anti-Jewish polemics. See: de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten, 315–37. Morevoer, as noted by Posset, in De Verbo Mirifico Capnion asks Baruchias to keep away from the Talmud and Sidonius from Lucretius: Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 239.

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a new golden age under the governance of the Holy Spirit will dawn in which Jews and Christians will live together peacefully under the Christian faith.74 In the years 1508–09, Pfefferkorn published three other anti-Judaic pamphlets: Judenbeicht, in which he mocked Jewish ceremonies, Osternbuch, in which he compared Jewish and Christian Easter, concluding that the former is only a cheap imitation of the latter, and Judenfeind, in which he summarized the main issues addressed against the Jews in the previous pamphlets. In the summer of 1509, also thanks to the advice of Dominican and Franciscan friars whose respective mendicant orders had been advocates of anti-Jewish policies for centuries, Pfefferkorn transformed the invectives of his writings into concrete political action. In July, he met the Duchess Kunigunde of Austria (1465–1520), sister of Emperor Maximilian I, and abbess of the Poor Clares convent in Munich. Convinced by Pfefferkorn’s sermon, Kunigunde wrote a letter to her brother pleading for the destruction of the Jewish books. In August Pfefferkorn met directly with Maximilian I in Padua, Italy, where the emperor was staying because of the war against Venice. The meeting was a success for Pfefferkorn: on 19 August 1509 Maximilian I signed the Padua Mandate, in which he authorized the confiscation and destruction of the Jewish books in which the Christian religion was insulted, and gave Pfefferkorn extensive powers to implement the mandate.75 The Padua mandate required that only books that distorted the true meaning of the Old Testament or insulted Christianity and Christians should be confiscated and destroyed. Nevertheless, on 28 September Pfefferkorn confiscated 168 Jewish liturgical and prayer books in Frankfurt. This was only a half victory for the anti-Jewish preacher, since he could not find those explicitly anti-Christian books against which he had railed so loudly in his writings and sermons.76 The Jews of Frankfurt appealed the legitimacy of the confiscation to all possible legal authorities, and found support in the Archbishop of Mainz, Uriel von Gemmingen (1468–1514). The Archbishop considered that the issue was a matter of canon law, and that his prerogatives had therefore been violated. He questioned the validity of the Padua mandate, and interrupted the confiscation operations which were continuing in the meantime. Price has emphasized that 74 Hsia, The Myth of Ritual Murder, 122–23. This inner tension in Pfefferkorn’s Speculum adhortationis Iudaice ad Christum has been noted and discussed also by Erika Rummel. See: Rummel, The Case Against Johann Reuch­lin, 9–10. 75 Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 109–11. See also: Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 313–15; de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten, 342–43. 76 Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 115–16; de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten, 346–47. As noted by Posset, in December 1509 Pfefferkorn searched unsuccessfully for the infamous Jewish books insulting Christians and Christianity, especially the Nizahon, also in Worms: Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 315–16.



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Archbishop Uriel was actually a proponent of the confiscation of the Jewish books, and by his intervention he was trying to defend his prerogatives.77 Similarly, de Boer has noted that the intervention of the bishop of Mainz is the first case in which an authority asserts its legal space. Such situations would occur throughout the conflict.78 Following the actions of Archbishop Uriel, Maximilian I issued a new mandate on 10 November, the so-called Mandate of Rovereto. Named after the city in northern Italy where the emperor was located at the time it was signed, the mandate instructed the Archbishop of Mainz to appoint a commission to pass judgement on the case of the destruction of the Jewish books. Afterwards, the Frankfurt city council sided with the Jewish community and wrote an open petition to the Emperor to revoke the Rovereto mandate. In May 1510, with the aim of obtaining more tax revenue, Maximilian I decided to suspend the confiscation of the Hebrew books and ordered the return of the books seized up to that time.79 Only two months later, however, in July 1510, probably with the intention of obtaining even greater profits, the Emperor issued a third mandate, the Füssen mandate. Addressed again to the Archbishop of Mainz, the mandate decreed that a commission of experts composed of the theological faculties of four universities (Erfurt, Mainz, Heidelberg, and Cologne) and three private experts, the Dominican Inquisitor Johann von Hoogstraten (1460–1527), the German rabbi who had converted to Christianity, Victor of Carben (1422–1515),80 and Johannes Reuch­lin, should make a decision on the destruction of the Jewish books. The verdict that the Jewish books had to be destroyed would have been unanimous, except that a different counsel emanated from Reuch­lin. Reuch­lin’s argumentation is divided into two parts. First, he addressed the issue of Jewish rights, and affirmed the legal principle of co-citizenship between Jews and Christians on the imperial territory. Second, he analyzed Jewish literature. In his Gutachten Reuch­lin divided Jewish books into seven genres: The Bible, the Talmud, Kabbalah, glosses and commentaries to the Scripture, homiletic, philosophical, and satirical works. According to Reuch­lin, only the openly antiChristian works should be confiscated and destroyed. He identified two books of this genre: Nizahon (or Nizzahon, meaning “Victory”),81 a collection of He77 Price,

Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 117–18.

78  de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten, 348–49. 79  For a discussion of the political and economic

motives behind Maximillian I’s ambivalent decisions, see: Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 118–25. 80  Like Pfefferkorn, Victor of Carben was also a vehement opponent of the Jews and published several anti-Semitic texts. See: Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 291–93; de Boer, Unerwartete Absichten, 383–87. 81  Reuch­lin received a copy of Sefer Nizzahon from bishop Johann von Dalberg (1445–

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brew apologetic texts compiled in the thirteenth or at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and Toledot Yeshu (The Life Story of Jesus), a set of texts which presented a polemical counter narrative of the life of Jesus against both Christian and Muslim stories of Jesus’ life.82 Reuch­lin noted that they were both apocryphal and forbidden by rabbinic authors. Pfefferkorn had asserted that in their prayers Jews blasphemed against Christians and wished for the destruction of the Empire. Reuch­lin, however, analyzed philologically the terms that Pfefferkorn thought represented an accusation, an insult, or blasphemy and showed that Pfefferkorn had misinterpreted their meaning.83 In 1511, Pfefferkorn published his HandSpiegel (Speculum manuale), a vehement critique of Reuch­lin’s Gutachten mixed with personal attacks against the Hebraist.84 Reuch­lin replied in his AugenSpiegel (Speculum oculare), which generated an immediate counter-answer by Pfefferkorn in the BrandSpiegel.85 On 7 October 1512, the Emperor imposed silence upon the contenders (Mandatum Silentii).86 However, the inquisitor Hoogstraten saw in Reuch­lin’s AugenSpiegel the legal ground to begin a process for heresy. Reuch­lin, who in 1513 published a Defensio, was initially acquitted by the Inquisitional Tribunal in Speyer, but soon Hoogstraten reiterated his accusations. In his defense, Reuch­lin published the Clarorum virorum epistolae, a collection of epistles by “learned men” who showed their solidarity and friendship to Reuch­lin. Among others, Reuch­lin published letters from Erasmus of Rotterdam, Giles of Viterbo, Ulrich von Hutten, Giovanni Pico’s nephew Gianfrancesco, and Reuch­lin’s young pupil Philipp Melanchthon. On the one hand, theologians from universities like Cologne and Mainz, including Arnold von Tongern (1470–1540) and Ortvinus Gratius (1475–1522), supported Pfefferkorn; on the other, a front of 1503) in 1494. The manuscript belonging to Reuch­lin, which was destroyed during the Second World War, was full of glosses and marginalia with invectives against the Jews. Posset, however, doubts that the glosses were written by Reuch­lin, since some commentaries were written in Latin, and others in German, whereas Reuch­lin used to adnotate his Hebrew books only in Latin: Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 338–39. 82  A Latin translation of the Toledot Yeshu was made as early as the thirteenth century and included in Raymond Martini’s Pugio Fidei. This translation was then included in several antiJewish tracts in the following centuries. A new translation was made by Thomas Ebendorfer (1388–1464), professor of theology at the University of Vienna, in the early fifteenth century. See: Ruth Mazo Karras, “The Aerial Battle in the Toledot Yeshu and Sodomy in the Late Middle Ages,” Medieval Encounters 19 (2013): 493–533. As Ruth Mazo Karras remembers, Martin Luther read Toledot Yeshu in Martini’s translation in the polemical work Victoria Porcheti adversus impios Hebreos (ca. 1303) by Porchetus Salvaticus (See Ibid., 497). 83  L’arte Cabbalistica, XXXV–XXVIII. 84  Jan-Hendryk de Boer noted that until 1510 Pfefferkorn’s tacks were directed against the Jews. With the publication of the HandSpiegel, Pfefferkorn began to combine criticism of the Jews with personal attacks against Reuch­lin: de Boer, Unerwartete Abischten, 158. 85  L’Arte Cabbalistica, XXXVII–XXXVIII. 86  For Reuch­lin’s reaction to the Mandatum Silentii, see Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455– 1522): A Theological Biography, 489–93.



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supporters highly critical of scholastic theology formed around Reuch­lin. At this juncture the Reuch­lin-Pfefferkorn controversy assumed European proportions, and reshaped the theological debate of the following years.

1.4  Overcoming Scholastic Theology: The Reformation of the University Curriculum in Wittenberg, the Support for Reuch­lin, and Luther’s Secret The publication of the Clarorum virorum epistolae marked a crucial moment in the theological debate of the early sixteenth century. Reuch­lin positioned himself within a wider movement of theological reform, a movement opposed only by a few conservative theologians eager to defend the primacy of scholasticism, and unwilling to pave the way for a new form of learning.87 This rhetorical strategy made the bifurcation of two opposing fronts more and more explicit. However, not all “famous men” named by Reuch­lin in support of his case identified themselves with Reuch­lin’s scholarship. Erasmus of Rotterdam, to name the most famous individual, despite being one of the most vehement critics of the ignorance of the clergy, disapproved of the style, especially the critiques made by name, in the Letters.88 A step further in the process of the polarization of the theological discourse was made with the publication of the Epistolae Obscurorum Virorum by Ulrich von Hutten and Crotus Rubianus in 1515. The text is a vehement satire against the ignorance of the clergy. Fictitious letters are imagined as having been sent to express solidarity with Ortvinus Gratius, one of the strongest supporters of 87  In his recent book, Jan Hendryk de Boer pointed out that the demarcation against an external enemy, namely scholasticism, described as a barbaric and useless form of knowledge and the simultaneous description of an ideal of true erudition are the hallmarks of sixteenthcentury “humanism” in the Holy Roman Empire. De Boer calls this movement “hegemonic humanism”. See: Jan-Hendryk de Boer, Die Gelehrtenwelt ordnen: Zur Genese des hegemonialen Humanismus um 1500, Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017). 88  Douglas H. Parker, “Erasmus in ‘The Letters of Obscure Men’,” Renaissance and Reformation/Renaissance et Réforme 11 (1975): 97–107. For further discussion, see also: Daniel Ménager, “Erasmus, the Intellectuals, and the Reuch­lin Affair,” in A Companion to Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus, ed. Erika Rummel, Brill’s Companion to the Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 39–54; Lisa Jardine, “Before Clarissa: Erasmus, ‘Letters of Obscure Men,’ and Epistolary Fictions,” in Self-Presentation and Social Identification: The Rhetoric and Pragmatics of Letter Writing in Early Modern Times, ed. Toon Van Houdt, et al., Supplementa Humanistica Lovaniensia (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 385–403. In these years Erasmus assumed antisemitic positions; despite this, after Reuch­lin’s death in 1522 he wrote an Apotheosis Capnionis in which Reuch­lin is compared to Jerome: Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Wurzeln des Antisemitismus: Christenangst und Judenplage im Zeitalter von Humanismus und Reformation (Berlin: Severin und Siedler, 1981), 48–51.

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Pfefferkorn. However, an image of an ignorant and raw clergy emerges from the letters. Outraged, the Dominicans in Cologne burnt the copies of the book. In turn, Reuch­lin labeled them as “burning theosophists” (theosophistae incendiarii).89 Between 1515–17, Pfefferkorn published two new polemical pamphlets, Beschirmung, translated into Latin by Gratius, and Streitbuchlein, in which he accused not only Reuch­lin but also his supporter, Erasmus.90 To defend himself against the vehement satire of the Epistulae Obscurorum Virorum, in 1518 Gratius published Lamentationes Obscurorum Virorum. Meanwhile, Reuch­lin’s camp also counted among its members some of the highest representatives of the Church hierarchy. Under Pope Leo X, the Christian Kabbalah was controversial, but not completely taboo. Bishop Giorgio Benigno Salviati (1445– 1520), one of the papal preceptors, published his Defensio praestantissimi viri Johannis Reuch­lini in 1517 in Cologne, the stronghold of Reuch­lin’s accusers. Benigno himself had been charged with heresy some years earlier for his commitment to introducing the Talmud in Christian doctrine.91 In 1518, Pietro Galatinus (1460–1540) published De arcanis catholicae veritatis. Written probably at the request of the Pope himself, the text represented a fictitious dialogue between Galatinus, Reuch­lin, and Hoogstraten. Galatinus, an expert Hebraist, who himself had studied under Elia Levita, was a committed Christian Kabbalist. Like Pico, he proclaimed the use of the Kabbalah against the Jews in order to prove their obstinacy in not accepting Christianity. The dialogue depicting the dispute between Reuch­lin and Hoogstraten ends with a reconciliation between the two disputants.92 On his side, Hoogstraten wrote an apology against Benigni and an anti-Kabbalistic treatise, Destructio Cabalae, restating his accusations against Reuch­lin and his commitment to the heterodox Kabbalah. In the early sixteenth century, the Christian Kabbalah that Giovanni Pico had unsuccessfully tried to introduce in the Christian context with his 900 Theses had become one of the central matters of discussion (and disagreement) in all of Christendom. 89  90 

L’arte Cabbalistica, XXXIX. For a careful account of Pfeffekorn’s German writings, see: Ellen Martin, Die deutschen Schriften des Johannes Pfefferkorn: Zum Problem des Judenhasses und der Intoleranz in der Zeit der Vorreformation, Göppinger Arbeiten zur Germanistik (Göppingen: Kümmerle, 1994). 91  L’arte Cabbalistica, XXX–XL. 92  For Galatinus’ Kabbalism, see: Alba Paladini, Il De Arcanis di Pietro Galatino: traditio giudaica e nuove istanze filologiche, (Galatina: Congedo, 2004); William Horbury, “Petrus Galatinus and Jean Thenaud on the Talmud and the Toledot Yeshu,” in Jewish Books and their Readers: Aspects of the Intellectual Life of Christians and Jews in the Early Modern World, ed. Scott Mandelbrote and Joanna Weinberg, Brill’s Series in Church History (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 123–50. Galatinus’ fascination with Christian Kabbalah was linked to apocalyptic expectations. He also wrote a commentary to the Apocalypse. See: Antonio Verri, “Il profetismo cabalistico di Pietro Galatino,” Bollettino Storico di Terra d’Otranto, Società di Storia Patria per la Puglia 3 (1993): 189–97; Sharon Ann Leftley, “Beyond Joachim of Fiore: Pietro Galatino’s Commentaria in Apocalypsim,” Franciscan Studies 55 (1998): 137–67.



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Meanwhile, Martin Luther, then a little-known professor at the faculty of theology of the newly founded University of Wittenberg, commented in his letters on the controversy between Reuch­lin and his accusers.93 Luther had sided with Reuch­lin since the very beginning of the controversy. In a letter sent to George Spalatin probably in February 1514,94 commenting on Reuch­lin’s Gutachten, Luther seemed convinced of Reuch­lin’s innocence and explicitly argued that he was not neutral in this dispute, since he found no danger in Reuch­lin’s judgment.95 Luther blamed the zeal of the Colonienses since Reuch­lin did not pronounce an article of faith, but only gave advice (consilium). He saw in this attitude a cogent danger, since every opinion was in danger, and everyone could be accused of heresy. Moreover, he argued that Christians tended to be overcritical amongst themselves, while they did not want to rectify the blasphemies of the pagans. Indeed, the Colonienses did not understand the Scripture. Writing again to Spalatin on 5 August 1514,96 Luther expressed the same concept. Reuch­lin was an erudite man who had been unjustly criticized and accused of heresy by the unlearned theologians of Cologne (the accusation was explicitly directed against Ortvinus Gratius, author of an Apologia adversus Johannem Reuch­ linum). In October 1516, Luther expressed his appreciation of The Letters of Obscure Men to Spalatin for ridiculing the theologastros in Cologne, although he disagreed with the method used by the authors.97 Luther’s position regarding the Reuch­lin affair was undoubtedly favorable to Reuch­lin. One should not therefore generalize, however, uncritically assimilating the movements that criticized the hegemony of scholastic theology at the universities. Heiko Oberman has emphasized that, in virtue of his negative attitude towards Jews and Judaism, Luther was by no means a Reuch­linist.98 Moreover, David Price has noted that the abovementioned letter of 1514 to Spalatin shows the ambivalence of Luther’s position: on the one hand, he defended Reuch­lin, but, on the other, he restated the same anti-Semitic sentiments of Pfefferkorn in contraposition to Reuch­lin’s more tolerant attitude toward the Jews. As Price put it: “Thus, in the midst of his endorsement of Reuch­lin, Luther insists that the Jews ‘blaspheme and curse God’, precisely the contentions of Pfefferkorn, Hoogstraten, Tongern, and others whom Reuch­lin opposed. Luther’s 93  For a discussion of Luther’s correspondence regarding the Reuch­lin controversy, see also Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 522–23. 94  WA Br 1.23–24. 95  WA Br 1.23.5–9: Nosti autem, optime magister, quod et ego hominem in magno habeam pretio et affectu, et iudicium meum forte suspectum est, quia (ut dicitur) liber et neutralis non sum: tamen quia exigis, dico quod sentio; mihi prorsus nihil apparere, in omni ejus scripto consilio, quod periculosum sit. 96  WA Br 1.28–29, Ep. 9. 97  WA Br 1.63–64, Ep. 25. 98 Oberman, Wurzeln des Antisemitismus, 56–59.

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quarrel with the professors in Cologne is merely on the ground that they refuse to see Jewish blasphemy as an inalterable part of God’s plan”.99 A closer look at Luther’s correspondence of these years shows that Luther was fully committed to overcoming scholastic theology, but he was aware also both of the polarization of the theological discourse as well as what such polarization would entail for his own positioning. Regarding the first aspect, it has been well documented in the secondary literature how deeply Luther was involved in the reform of the curriculum at the University of Wittenberg. Since its foundation in 1502, the University of Wittenberg was highly receptive to the new trends of sixteenth-century culture. Maria Grossmann has carefully investigated how the revival of classical literature had permeated the intellectual context of the University of Wittenberg since its very first years.100 Moreover, she has investigated the role of the printing press in the first years of the university.101 With regard to the present work, two publications are of particular interest. The first concerns the works of the Italian jurist Peter of Ravenna (1448– 1508). After a brilliant academic career in Bologna, in 1498, Peter accepted a position at the University of Greifswald before moving to the University of Wittenberg. Three of his works were published in Wittenberg by the printer Nicolaus Marschalk (d. 1525) in 1503, the year in which Peter also gave his inaugural lecture at the University of Wittenberg on the power of the pope and the Emperor, which is one of the works published by Marschalk. When Peter of Ravenna left Wittenberg for Cologne in 1506 out of fear of the plague, he got into trouble with some members of the theological faculty in Cologne who accused him of heresy.102 Charles Nauert has noted that the quarrel between Peter of Ravenna and, among others, the Dominican Inquisitor Jacob von Hoogstraten, who later would become one of Reuch­lin’s main accusers, concerned Peter’s condemnation of the custom that denied burial of the bodies of criminals who repented for their crimes before their death. It was usual at the time to expose the dead body of criminals for some days after their death. Peter went so far as to claim that the German Princes who acted in such a way had committed a mortal sin. The case is interesting because it shows the nuances of academic discourse in the early sixteenth century, as noted by Nauert. One of the main matters of contentions between Peter and Hoogstraten was the question of competence, since 99 Price,

Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books, 217. Grossmann, Humanism in Wittenberg: 1485–1517, Bibliotheca Humanistica & Reformatorica (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1975). 101  Maria Grossmann, “Wittenberg Printing, Early Sixteenth Century,” Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies (1970): 53–74. 102  Ibid., 53–55. For further discussion, see also: Charles G. Nauert, “Peter of Ravenna and the ‘Obscure Men’ of Cologne: A Case of Pre-Reformation Controversy,” in Renaissance: Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, ed. Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), 609–40. 100  Maria



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the former claimed that the case was a specific juridical problem and, thus, he had a better academic background than the members of the theological faculty to judge it, while the latter pointed out that, with Peter having raised the issue of mortal sins, the contention assumed theological significance. Ortvinus Gratius, later a vehement accuser of Reuch­lin along with Hoogstraten, sided with Peter. Moreover, the different practices of controlling the academic discourse worked on different levels. First, theological positions at a time when theology was undergoing the process of dogmatization could more easily arouse charges of heresy; some years before, Hoogstraten himself, having denied the Immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, was obliged to submit to the judgment of the faculty. Second, after an initial agreement to settle the dispute, Peter restated his argument in the revised edition (1507) of the Compendium Iuris Canonicis and, more importantly, he wrote a satirical treatise against Hoogstraten. Therefore, his opponents accused him of not confining the dispute to a purely scholastic level, and Hoogstraten complained that Peter often misquoted him.103 Subtleties and nuances, however, disappeared in The Letters of Obscure Men: Peter’s case is given typological significance and is linked to the Reuch­lin affair. The second work which deserves our attention is the 1505 republication in Wittenberg of John von Kitzscher’s Dialogus de Sacri Romani Imperii Rebus, originally published in Bologna in 1498. In an attempt to answer the question of whether it was true that the good and the evil were separated in the after-life, Kitzscher imagined an allegorical dream in which Pico della Mirandola guides him in the other world, showing him the suffering of the damned, and the beatitude of the ancient virtuous men, who live in splendid cities; at the arrival in the celestial Rome, however, the two travelers learn about the death of Emperor Frederick III. Kitzscher created a fictitious dialogue between Frederick and the Roman Emperor Augustus and Julius Caesar, in order to launch an attack against the decadence of the Empire, as well as against the greed and corruption of ecclesiastical authorities.104 This text shows how, only a few years after his premature death, Pico della Mirandola had already achieved a paradigmatic status in Renaissance culture. We will see later that Luther remembered Pico’s famous trial for heresy, as well as Hoogstraten’s charges against Peter of Ravenna, several times. From the first years of the University of Wittenberg, then, the renewal of classical literature was an integral part of the academic environment. However, a decisive step toward reforming the university curriculum arrived in 1516, when Elector Frederick the Wise gave the mandate to George Spalatin to investigate the activities of the university. Frederick’s initiative opened the possibility of introducing deep changes in the university, both in terms of appoint103  For the entire discussion, I follow: Nauert, “Peter of Ravenna and the ‘Obscure Men’ of Cologne: A Case of Pre-Reformation Controversy,” 614–30. 104  Grossmann, “Wittenberg Printing, Early Sixteenth Century,” 57–59.

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ing new professors and of making changes to the curriculum. Luther himself was heavily committed to renovating the university curriculum, as his epistolary exchanges show. On 8 February 1517, Luther wrote a strident letter to Johann Lang against the blasphemies of Aristotle, Porphyry, and the Sententiaros, namely the commentators of Peter Lombard’s Sentences.105 It is in this rightly famous letter that Luther says that, if he did not know Aristotle was a man in flesh and blood, he would believe he was the devil incarnate.106 He explicitly attacked Usingen, his former professor in Erfurt, and he complained about good books being burnt at the universities, while the blasphemous one were taught. Writing to Lang from Wittenberg on 18 May 1517,107 Luther expressed his joy that the study of Augustine and the Bible was growing at the university, whereas Aristotle was losing his throne. The students, moreover, expressed disdain for Peter Lombard’s Sentences. About one year later, Luther wrote to Lang regarding the reorganization of the university, claiming that the study of the “absurd courses” of Peter Hispanus and Tartaretus was diminishing. He expected that their study would soon be substituted by lectures on the three holy languages, on Pliny, and on mathematics.108 On 2 September 1518, Luther wrote another letter to Spalatin to discuss the necessity of changing the curriculum.109 According to Luther, the students were eager to follow the course on Scripture and did not want to waste their time with useless courses on scholastic theology. He referred to a petition of the students who asked that the course on the Nicomachean Ethics no longer be required for graduation. Indeed, Luther’s expectations had come true, at least in part. During 1517–19, new liberal arts professors were hired. Johannes Aesticampianus (1457–1520), who had published an edition of Pliny the Elder’s Natural History in Leipzig in 1508, was hired to teach this work. The hiring of Aesticampianus was not a coincidence, and fell within the attempt to give the University of Wittenberg the recognized status of an institution that was open and highly receptive to the new learning. Indeed, the dispute between Aesticampianus and the theologians of Leipzig gained considerable popularity in the early sixteenth century. In 1511, Aesticampianus, after being removed from his position at the University of Leipzig, wrote a vehement dispute against his former colleagues 105 

WA Br 1.88–89 (Ep. 35). 1.88.22–23: ita ut nisi caro fuisset Aristoteles, vero diabolum eum non puderet asserere. 107  LW 48.41–42, WA Br 1.99 (Ep. 41). Franz Posset noted that, regarding the critique to the tones used in The Letters of Obscure Men, Luther’s judgment does not differ from the papal bulls against the Letters, Posset, Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 520. 108  LW 48.42; WA Br 1.155.41–45: Caeterum studium nostrum ea proficit spe, ut futurum esse propediem expectemus, nos habere lectiones utriusque, imo triplicis linguae, Plini, mathematicarum, Quintiliani et nonnullas alias optimas, reiectis ineptis illis Petri Hispani, Tartareti, Aristotelis lectionibus. 109  LW 48.80–83; WA Br 1.195–96 (Ep. 90). 106  WA Br



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in the higher faculties, accusing them of boycotting him. Aesticampianus’ polemics were addressed not only against the “theologians”, but also against artists and physicians. However, as Erika Rummel has noted, in The Letters of Obscure Men, Aesticampianus’ case assumed topical significance through two different rhetorical strategies: first, the different accusations of Aesticampianus directed against members of different faculties were not mentioned, and the dispute was carried out only between Aesticampianus and the members of the theological faculty; second, Aesticampianus’ case was paradigmatically linked to the Reuch­lin affair.110 In 1519, Matthew Adrian was hired as the new professor of Hebrew. On 7 November 1519, Luther wrote to Spalatin, referring to the letter Matthew Adrian had written to him, asking him to teach Hebrew at the University of Wittenberg.111 Luther commented that Adrian was forced to leave Louvain because of the tyranny of Louvain’s theologians. Indeed, Adrian, a Jew converted to Christianity, had trouble with the theological faculty of Louvain. Among others, he also had disagreements with James Latomus (c. 1475–1544), after a speech delivered on 21 March 1519 in which Adrian endorsed the necessity of mastering the three holy languages – Latin, Greek, and Hebrew – in order to practice theology. He was appointed Professor of Hebrew at the University of Wittenberg in April 1520, but he was forced to resign the following year.112 It was the hiring of Philipp Melanchthon as the new Professor of Greek in 1518, however, that had a decisive impact on the University of Wittenberg, as well as on the history of the Reformation as a whole. The circumstances that led the 21-year-old Melanchthon to join the University of Wittenberg are common knowledge. The Elector Frederick had personally written a letter to Reuch­lin to offer him a position at his university. Reuch­lin declined the offer, but advised the hiring of his student Melanchthon. Equally well-known is the immediate impact the young Melanchthon had on the life of the university through his famous inaugural address of 29 August 1518, De corrigendis adolescentiae studiis,113 which deeply impressed his older colleague, Martin Luther. Writing to Spalatin on 31 August 1518,114 Luther praised Melanchthon for his inaugural speech in Wittenberg, held only four days after his arrival as “an extremely learned and absolutely faultless address”.115 At the same time, Luther expressed two concerns regarding Melanchthon: first, his failing health and, 110  Erika

Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13. 111  LW 48.132–33; WA Br 1.551 (Ep. 217). 112  For Adrian’s resigning from his position at the University of Wittenberg, see: LW 48.32 n. 1. 113  CR 11.15. 114  LW 48.76–79; WA Br 1.191–92 (Ep. 88). 115  Cf. LW 48.78; WA Br 1.191.22–23, 192.1: Habuit orationem quarto die postquam venerat plane eruditissimam et tersissimam, tanta gratia omnium et adimiratione.

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second, his low salary. Regarding the second topic, Luther feared that the University of Leipzig could offer a better salary to Melanchthon and thus induce him to leave Wittenberg.116 Luther’s concern not only documents the rivalry between the Universities of Wittenberg and Leipzig, but also suggests that the University of Leipzig was in the process of reforming its academic curriculum.117 Indeed, this rivalry between the two universities is testified by treatises written by members of Leipzig university after the famous debate in Leipzig between Eck, Luther, and Karlstadt. The Leipzigers continuously emphasized their commitment as well as the commitment of the whole university to bonae litterae. Johannes Cellarius (1496–1542), who in his report of the Leipzig debate did not withhold positive comments about Eck, is a case in point. In 1519 the University of Wittenberg offered him a position, but he preferred to accept the offer from the University of Leipzig. However, in 1521 he became the new professor of Hebrew at the University of Wittenberg, replacing Adrian.118 In the meantime, in response to accusations that he had praised Eck excessively, he published a short text in favor of Luther in 1520.119 This picture seems to reinforce the common narrative generally described as “the humanist and Reformation movements” allied against scholastic theology. A major emphasis on language, history, rhetoric, and poetry, as well as the critique of the abuses in the Church and the ignorance of the clergy, are commonly conceived as the intellectual factors which created the cultural conditions for Luther’s critique of the Roman Church to flourish and prosper. Albeit partially correct, such a picture represents an underestimation of the complexity of the intellectual context of the early sixteenth century. It is inappropriate to describe these phenomena in a normative way. On the other hand, it is crucial to pay more attention to the tactical positioning of the main protagonists of these debates. In the last thirty years, the inadequacy of general classifications to separate the protagonists of the theological debate of the early sixteenth century has be116  WA Br 1.192.18–23: Ego plane Graecum praeceptorem, illo salvo, alium non desidero. Unum timeo, ne fortae victum nostrae regionis non satis ferat teneritudo ejus: deinde, quod audio, nimium parco stipendio eum conductum, ideo ut Lipsensibus jam gloriabundis spes sit, fore; ut nobis eus quantocius auferant. Nam et solicitatus jam fuit ib eis, antequama d nos perveniret. 117  Erika Rummel has convincingly proved that in the first decade of the sixteenth century the University of Wittenberg constructed its image as a “progressive institution” in opposition to Leipzig. Rummel also added that this image was reinforced by the Leipzig debate: Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany, 19. However, it seems to me that in the months following the Leipzig debate the camps were fluid and the accusations of obscurantism and ignorance mutual. 118  For Cellarius’ account of the Leipzig debate and his subsequent move to Wittenberg, see: David Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponents: Catholic Controversialists, 1518–1525 (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1991), 74–75. 119 Rummel, The Confessionalization of Humanism in Reformation Germany, 21–22.



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come more and more clear. The binary contraposition between “humanists” and “scholastics” has been replaced by a threefold distinction between “humanists”, “scholastics”, and “scholastic humanists”. The label of “scholastic humanists” was introduced in the historiographical debate to explain why many early antiLuther controversialists, despite being well-versed in the scholastic method, at the same time used an elegant Latin style and adorned their rhetoric with classical quotations. Most of the early Roman controversialists, such as John Eck, Hieronymus Emser, or Johann Cochlaeus,120 fall within this highly problematic category. David Bagchi has recognized that not only have these categories been applied ex post to sixteenth-century discourse, but that they also risked hindering the complexity of the historical context. The terms literati as well as its pejorative counterpart, grammatici, were used in a highly polemical sense, both by the advocates and the opponents of the bonae litterae. Even the catch-phrase ad fontes could assume a variety of meanings based on what were taken to be “the sources” of true theology. Moreover, it was also used by the opponents of Luther. Johann Eck, for instance, used it against Luther in his pamphlet written in defense of Hieronymus Emser, in order to picture the Wittenberger as an obscurantist. In the dispute against Luther, Emser also reiterated the cliché that he preferred to “drink directly from the sources”.121 A more accurate historical terminology is clearly necessary. Until new research will not pave the way to clarify the subtleties and contradictoriness of the debates of this period, however, one should avoid the temptation to apply wide categorizations to encapsulate the protagonists of these debates in a certain movement. As this study is primarily concerned with Luther’s theology of the cross, only Luther’s positions formulated in the years 1518–21 will be reconstructed. First, Bagchi has pointed out that Luther never conceptualized the theological debate of his time as a struggle between “humanists” and “reformers”.122 Second, one should recognize that for Luther the renewal of the academic curriculum in the liberal arts was a consequence, but not the precondition of his theology of the cross. Thus, in Luther’s eyes, an agreement on the renewal of the liberal arts was of no value if it was not preceded by a shared understanding of Pauline theology. Third, Luther’s anti-scholastic statements re120  In this work I will focus my attention on Eck and Emser. However, Johannes Cochlaeus was one of the most prolific authors among Luther’s opponents and he was also influenced by Pico and Ficino. For an extensive discussion of his life and works, see: Monique SamuelScheyder, Johannes Cochlaeus: humaniste et adversaire de Luther (Nancy: Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 19), 93. Jan Hendryk de Boer has also emphasized his interest for the bonae litterae and the studia humanitatis: de Boer, Die Gelehrtenwelt ordnen, 14–15. 121 Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponent, 75–79. 122  According to Bagchi, “the opposite of a scholastic was not in Luther’s vocabulary a humanist but an ‘ecclesiastic’. In normal use this meant a clergyman, but Luther used it before and during the Leipzig disputation to indicate one who subscribed predominantly or exclusively to those theological authorities that were canonical or officially approved by the Church”. Cf. Ibid., 78–79.

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semble his attempt to join a wider movement of Church reform. While the legal procedure in Rome for the charges of heresies against him were under process, Luther drew from the anti-scholastic terminology, so widespread in the early sixteenth century, to depict his opponents as unlearned obscurantists, an accusation which, as we have seen, will also hurled at him. Luther’s attitude toward Erasmus of Rotterdam is emblematic of these different tendencies. On the one hand, Luther always seemed to have held Erasmus in very low esteem because, in his eyes, the Dutch scholar misunderstood Pauline theology, although Luther was always willing to admit how impressed he was by Erasmus’ erudition. Moreover, my appeal to pay attention to the tactical positioning of the single authors in relation to the bifurcation of the theological debate generated by the Reuch­lin affair derives from Luther’s continuous recognition that it was counterproductive for him to openly attack Erasmus. There is plenty of historical evidence that Luther was deeply immersed in Erasmus’ scholarship as early as 1516. In that year, Erasmus published his Novum Instrumentum, as well as his edition of Jerome: Luther used Erasmus’ New Testament for his lectures on Romans that he was giving that semester at the University of Wittenberg, and, meanwhile, Luther studied and annotated Erasmus’ edition of Jerome.123 Moreover, as Augustijn has shown, Luther studied Erasmus’ annotations to the letter to Galatians. In Luther’s commentary on this Pauline epistle, published in 1519 – a slightly modified version of a course on the same text held by Luther at the University of Wittenberg in 1516–17 – Erasmus is mentioned several times and, almost always, with approval.124 On 19 October 1516, however, in a letter to Georg Spalatin, Luther requested him to mediate between him and Erasmus. The young professor of theology in Wittenberg wanted to address directly what he considered to be Erasmus’ misreading of Paul. The letter that Spalatin wrote to Erasmus on 11 December 1516 did not arrive.125 While the meaning of this letter for Luther’s own theo123  I will discuss Luther’s annotation to Erasmus’ edition of Jerome in Chapter Three. For further discussion on Luther’s use of Erasmus’ Novum Instrumentum, see: Volker Leppin, Luther und der Humanismus, Jacob Burckhardt-Gespräche auf Castelen (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2019), 39–42. 124 Cornelis Augustijn, “Erasmus im Galaterbriefkommentar Luthers von 1519,” Lutherjahrbuch 52 (1982): 115–32. Recently, Christine Christ-von Wedel has examined the use of Latin Biblical texts in Luther’s 1519 commentary on Galatians and has noted that Luther quoted more often the Vulgate and only rarely Erasmus’ edition: Christine Christ-von Wedel, “Erasmus und Luther als Ausleger der Bibel,” in Auslegung und Hermeneutik der Bibel in der Reformationszeit, ed. Christine Christ-von Wedel and Sven Grosse, Historia Hermeneutica. Series Studia (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 367–80. 125  CWE 4.165–169; Allen, vol. 2, 415–18 (Ep. 501). Not having received an answer, Spalatin wrote again to Erasmus on 13 November 1517 from Altenburg, where one of the castles of the Duke Frederick was located (Ep. 711, CWE 5.199–201, Allen, vol. 3, 140–41). However, Erasmus received this letter only two years later, when he answered it with Ep. 1001 in Allen, vol. 4, 30–33.



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logical development will be addressed in Chapter Three of this work, it is important here to emphasize that Luther’s opinion of Erasmus diminished in the years ahead. Luther’s letter to Lang of 1 March 1517,126 in which he mentioned that he was reading Erasmus and that his opinion of him was waning every day, confirms this. Luther expressed his appreciation for how Erasmus was able to argue constantly and eruditely against the insipience of sacerdos and religiosi, while still confirming his dissatisfaction with Erasmus’ theology. He feared that Erasmus would not promote Christ and God’s grace, and that, in that respect, he was much more ignorant than Faber Stapulensis, since Erasmus held human considerations in higher regard than divine matters,127 Luther warned Lang to be careful in reading Erasmus and not to accept his views without scrutiny, “for we live in perilous times” (tempora enim sunt periculosa).128 With that, Luther had launched a full attack on Erasmus’ scholarship: I see that not everyone is a truly wise Christian just because he knows Greek and Hebrew. St Jerome with his five languages cannot be compared with Augustine, who knew only one language. Erasmus, however, is of an absolutely different opinion on this. But the discernment of one who attributes weight to man’s will is different from that of him who knows of nothing else but grace. I definitely wish to keep this opinion a secret so that I do not strengthen the conspiracy of his enemies.129

First, for Luther, knowledge of sacred languages is not propaedeutic, nor is it necessary to become a good theologian. Before one is a real Christian, erudition of every kind can help one to better understand the Scripture. Second, while Erasmus was accused by many sides of undermining the infallible authority of the Scripture and the Church Fathers because of his philological method, Luther accused him of favoring Jerome over Augustine only because of Jerome’s linguistic skills. Although Luther’s position is clearly in opposition to that of Erasmus, the Wittenberger recognized the inappropriateness of criticizing Erasmus publicly, siding, albeit with different arguments, with the theologians of Paris and Cologne, who in the very same period were highly critical of Luther as well. The sentence, which in the American edition of Luther’s works has been translated as “to keep this opinion a secret”, is worded more strongly in the Latin original (hoc iudicio vehementer celo).

126 

WA Br 1.90 (Ep. 35). WA Br 1.90.18–20: sed timeo, ne Christum et gratiam Dei non satis promoveat, in qua multo est quam Stapulensis ignorantior: humana prevalent in eo plus quam divina. 128  LW 48.40; WA Br 1.90.21. 129  LW 48.40, WA Br 1.90.22–28: video, quod non ideo quispiam sit christianus vere sapiens, quia Graecus sit et Hebraeus, quando et Beatus Hieronymus quinque linguis monoglosson Augustinum non adaequarit, licet Erasmo aliter sit longe visum. Sed aliud est iudicium eius, qui arbitrio hominis nonnihil tribuit, aliud eius, qui praeter gratiam nihil novit. Ego tamen hoc iudicium vehementer celo, ne consensum aemulorum eius confirmem. 127 

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Luther also reiterated the request to keep secret his real opinion about Erasmus in a letter to Spalatin dated 18 January 1518.130 Luther showed the duality of his approach towards Erasmus: on the one hand, he did not want to criticize him publicly because this would support Erasmus’ scholastic opponents who were also Luther’s, while on the other, Luther believed that Erasmus was wrong on crucial theological matters. At the beginning of the letter, Luther remembered that Erasmus considered Jerome higher than Augustine, and if Luther himself would dare to disagree he would be considered unreliable both for being an Augustinian, as well as because of Erasmus’ opinion. Luther then stated his support for Erasmus’ battle against scholasticism: But in the face of all who either passionately hate or slothfully neglect good learning – and that is before all men – I always give Erasmus the highest praise and defend him as much as I can; I am very careful not to air my disagreements with him lest by chance I too would confirm (his enemies) in their hatred of him.131

In this passage, Luther strongly affirms his unwillingness to criticize Erasmus publicly in this period. Having common enemies, Luther has no reason to take a position against Erasmus. However, if he prefers not to attack him openly, this does not mean that Luther agrees with Erasmus. Luther specifies to Spalatin, who asked him to clarify his method of studying Scripture, that his approach is antithetical to that of Erasmus. However, repeating the same concept he had written to Lang the previous year, Luther asks Spalatin to keep his dissatisfaction with Erasmus a secret. In the late 1510s, the theological debate is completely polarized between two main fronts in opposition to each other. As Luther was aware of this bifurcation, he chose not to take a stance against his own front. This tendency was exacerbated in the years immediately preceding and following Luther’s excommunication in 1520, generating a true and proper war of pamphlets.

1.5  Intersections and Juxtapositions between the Trials of Luther and Reuch­lin While it has been long recognized that the Reuch­lin affair helped to pave the way for Luther, however, one should recognize that the relationship between these two major events in the intellectual history of the early sixteenth century is at the same time deeper and more subtle. Recently, Amy Nelson Burnett has pointed out that the Reuch­lin affair contributed significantly to Luther’s own 130  LW 48.52–55; WA Br 1.133–34 (Ep. 57 b). 131  Cf. LW 48.53; WA Br 1.133.27–29: Multi sunt

(ut scis) omni studio occasionem querentes ad Calumniam Bonis Literis. Secretum itaque tibi sit, quod dixi, immo mihi non credas, donec ipse probaveris legendo.



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trial for heresy, to the extent that it undermined the procedures of control of the theological discourse. If the two trials had moved on the double level of the legal proceedings in Rome and the publicity campaign, the latter was instrumental in redirecting the public opinion in judging the former.132 One of the key issues in the debates around both Reuch­lin and Luther was the question of competence. Who was entitled to judge the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of a certain text? The scholastic theologians in Cologne, Louvain, and Paris ascribed this role to themselves. What Reuch­lin tried to do was precisely to undermine scholastic hegemony on tracing the boundaries of orthodoxy. As we have seen, this is a long process which characterized the very same theological debate within late medieval scholasticism. Throughout the fifteenth century, nominalists and realists waged disputes in attempts to prove the intrinsic heretical implications of the positions of the opposing front. The Reuch­lin affair produced what I have called, in the previous pages, a polarization of the theological discourse between scholasticism and anti-scholasticism. Associating this latter category with the wide categorization of “humanism” does not do justice to the complexity, diversity, and contradictions inherent in all the different authors in their battles against scholasticism. Notably, “scholasticism” was also used in this period in a highly polemical sense. Being labeled as a scholastic theologian by Luther, Reuch­lin, or von Hutten always had a pejorative connotation. The following chapters show that some of Luther’s early opponents, like John Eck or Jerome Emser, who Luther himself labelled as “scholastics”, were indeed highly influenced by Platonic and hermetic trends in sixteenth-century literature, as well as by the scholarship of Erasmus of Rotterdam. Emser, for instance, edited the works of Pico della Mirandola and Erasmus. In 1504, he published Pico’s opera in Strasbourg with Willibald Pirckheimer; in 1516, he edited Erasmus’ Enchiridion Militis Chistiani in Leizpig,133 an edition which experienced an immediate success after it was republished in 1519.134 132  Amy Nelson Burnett, “Academic Heresy, the Reuch­lin Affair, and the Control of Theological Discourse in the Early Sixteenth Century,” in Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on the Maturation of a Theological Tradition, ed. Jordan Ballor, David Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema, Studies in the History of the Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 35–48. 133 Desiderius Erasmus, ENCHIRIDION ERASMI ROTERODAMI GERMANI DE MILITE CHRISTIANO, in quo taxatis vulgi superstitionibus ad priscae religionis puritatem, veteris eloquentiae lituo nos prouocat, ed. Hieronymus Emser (Leipzig: Schumann, Valentin, 1516). The work has been digitalized by the ULB library of Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg and it is available at: http://digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/urn/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-139817. 134  ENCHIRIDION ERASMI ROTERODAMI GERMANI DE MILITE CHRISTIANO, in quo taxatis vulgi superstionibus, ad priscae religionis puritatem, veteris eloquentiae lituo nos prouocat. Epistola eiusdem ad Ioannem Coletum Theologum, ed. Hieronymus Emser (Leipzig: Schumann, Valentin, 1519). For the digitalized version of this edition, see the following link: http://digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/urn/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-136546.

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This chapter highlights Luther’s rhetorical strategies during his trial for heresy, and immediately after his excommunication. At least three main tendencies can be noted in Luther’s rhetorical constructions: the choice to not attack members of his own front, the use of a strong language, rich in beautiful biblical metaphors but also in insults and countercharges of heresy, and his selfportrayal as the last of a long series of pious men unjustly accused of heresy by envious theologians. Regarding the first aspect, the relationship between Luther and Erasmus is a case in point. In the previous pages, I have shown that Luther was ready to enter into a dispute with Erasmus as early as 1516. In 1518, however, he recognized that an open dispute with Erasmus might help their common enemies. Thus, he asked both Spalatin and Lang to keep his own dissatisfaction with Erasmus’ theology a secret. The subsequent correspondence between the two men reveals the importance Luther placed on a good relationship with Erasmus. To that end, Luther wrote directly to Erasmus on 28 March 1519.135 In this verbose letter, Luther apologized for addressing Erasmus, “such a great man” whose reader’s hearts “are glowing with gratitude and love”, “without a reverential and honorific introduction”.136 Luther quoted the 1518 introduction to the Enchiridion, thanking Erasmus who had sided with him. He conveyed Karlstadt’s greetings and praises Melanchthon’s learning, sharing with Erasmus his concern for Melanchthon’s health, asking Erasmus to write to Melanchthon in order to exhort him not to work so hard.137 On 14 April, Erasmus wrote to Frederick the Wise in praise of Luther, with the request to protect the bonae litterae. However, he also underscored the point that a common enemy did not necessarily translate to a common cause. Luther reacted to this letter by writing to Spalatin on 22 May 1519.138 Luther waved aside his mention, claiming: “I, however, would have preferred not only not to have been mentioned in it but also not to have been praised, especially by such an outstanding man”.139 Spalatin translated Erasmus’ letter to Frederick the Wise in German and by summer it was already known and had spread to all over Germany. From that moment on, Luther’s and Erasmus’ causes came to be constantly assimilated into the public discourse. While Luther deliberately decided not to attack Erasmus openly, on his side, Erasmus recognized that while he and Luther had common enemies, they did not share a common cause. Just like Luther, however, Erasmus also recognized 135 

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LW 48.116–19, WA Br 1.361–63 (Ep. 163). LW 48.118; WA Br 1.362.12–18. Erasmus, in turn, wrote to Melanchthon on April 22, 1519: ep. 947, Allen, vol. 3, 539–

138  LW 139  LW

48.122–24, WA Br 1.404 (Ep. 179). 48.122–23. WA Br 1.404.4–6: Unum ego nollem, nempe meum nomen in ea non solum nominari, sed & cantari, praesertim a tanto viro.



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the inappropriateness of an open dispute. Moreover, Erasmus saw Luther as a catalyst of divergent and contradicting Church reform movements, and feared for that reason that Luther’s condemnation for heresy would undermine his own attempt to reform the Church. On the other side, Erasmus tried to dissociate himself from Luther. One can already note this twofold attitude in the abovementioned letter to Frederick the Wise. It was, however, the work of propaganda of the Wittenbergers, and even more vehemently, of Ulrich von Hutten, which caused Erasmus to increasingly distance himself from Luther as well as from Reuch­lin. The more these heterogeneous strands were assimilated, the more Erasmus perceived the danger of being involved in someone else’s charge of heresy. The use of the epithets Reuch­liniani, Lutherani, and Erasmici or Erasmisti came to be increasingly instrumentalized by the theologians in Cologne, Louvain, and Paris to pejoratively label the followers of Reuch­lin, Luther, and Erasmus as partakers of movements which, albeit differently, challenged Church authority. In the rhetoric of their opponents, all those who supported Erasmus, Reuch­lin, and Luther were undermining the stability of the Church: having transcended the boundaries of orthodoxy, these movements had heresy as the lowest common denominator. On his side, Erasmus tried to dismantle this rhetorical construction, claiming that the very same idea of the existence of movements pro-Reuch­lin, pro-Luther, or pro-Erasmus himself was intrinsically anti-Christian. On 2 February 1518, Johannes Eck wrote to Erasmus accusing him of being ignorant in Augustinian studies. In this accusation, Eck went so far as to point out that even Erasmus’ followers, the Erasmici, regretted Erasmus’ ignorance of Augustine’s theology.140 In his reply, Erasmus dismissed the faction bearing his own name, emphasizing that he saw no reason to call oneself an Erasmicus. Moreover, he expressed his hatred for this name of discordance (dissidiorum nomina).141 In the famous preface to the Adages (1519), Erasmus claimed not to be a Reuch­linist, nor having supported Reuch­lin, nor being part of any other faction.142 While Erasmus was trying to dissociate himself from Reuch­lin, Luther chose the opposite positioning. More precisely, he chose to depict his own case as 140  Ep. 769, Allen, vol. 3, 211: Nihil autem est quod tibi deesse Erasmici omnes adeo conquerantur, nisi quod A. Augustinum non legeris. 141  Ep. 844, Allen, vol. 3, 335: nihil quidem, in me agnosco, vir egregius, cur quisquam velit esse Erasmicus, et prorsus odit ista dissidiorum nomina, Christi sumus omnes, et in illius unius gloriam pro sua quisque portione sudamus. Arnoud Visser has analyzed this epistolary exchange between Eck and Erasmus with regard to their respective interpretation of Augustine, see: Arnoud Visser, “Reading Augustine through Erasmus’ eyes: Humanist Scholarship and Paratextual Guidance in the Wake of the Reformation,” Erasmus Studies 28 (2008): 67–90. 142  Ep. 1041, Allen, vol. 4, 121: Ego nec Reuch­linista sum nec vllius humanae factionis. Ista dissidii nomina detestor. Christianus sum et Christianos agnosco; Erasmistas non feram, Reuch­linistas non noui.

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the last in a series of unfair trials for heresy generated by the envy of the Parisienses, Colonienses, and Lovanienses. Thus, in Luther’s works during these years, one can easily find long lists of authors unjustly accused of heresy. In the Resolutions to the Ninety-Five Theses Luther claimed: I hardly consider it necessary to state once again what I deny and what I assert. Since, however, the inquisitors into heretical pravity are so zealous that they try to make heretics out of the most Christian Catholics, it will be pertinent to say something about each single item. Note what happened to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Lorenzo Valla, Peter of Ravenna, Johannes Vesalius, and most recently Johann Reuch­lin and Jacques Lefèvre: contrary to their intentions, their well-meant words were perverted and made out to be evil. And why did this happen? For no other reason, in my opinion, than that they neglected to explain every single syllable, so to speak. For such is the grip of simpletons and weak minds on the Church today.143

In Luther’s narrative, the trials for heresy against Giovanni Pico, Peter of Ravenna, Johannes Vesalius, Johannes Reuch­lin, and Jacques Lefèvre and, finally, his own case, are simply the result of the abuse of the institution of the Inquisition: some overzealously scholastic scrutinized every word in search for an excuse to accuse anyone of being a heretic. Everyone was in danger, since it was possible to be accused of heresy for no reason. On the one hand, Luther’s defense strategy aimed to ridicule his opponents; on the other, the Wittenberger winked at all the scholars not aligned with scholasticism who – Luther implicitly suggested – could be the next in being accused of heresy. How deeply Luther was drawing from the rhetoric of The Letters of Obscure Men is evident. In February 1520, the faculty of theology of Cologne and Louvain condemned several passages from Luther’s works as heretical. In countering the Colonienses and Lovanienses, Luther reiterated the same rhetorical construction. He began by remembering Giovanni Pico’s trial for heresy: Who would not find the condemnations of the Louvain and Cologne theologians ridiculous, considering that they have erred so many times in the past? Faithful God, how our excellent professors were blustering when they condemned the conclusions of Giovanni Pico, count of Mirandola, just so that they could insist that their errors were correct! And is there anyone today who does not admire his conclusions, except perhaps some old sophists in some forgotten corner who grind their teeth in silent fury?144 143 Rummel, The Case Against Johann Reuch­lin, 163. WA 1.574.18–26: Non credo necessarium iterum protestari, quid disputem aut quid asseram, Sed cum nostro saeculo sint tam zelosi haereticae pravitatis inquisitores, ut Christianissime catolicos vi conentur ad haeresim adigere, oportunum fuerit super singulis syllabis protestari. Nam quid aliud foecerint Ioannes Picus Mirandulanus, Laurentius Valla, Petrus Ravennas, Ioannes Vesalia et novissime diebus istis Ioannes Reuch­lin atque Iacobus Stapulensis, ut inviti cogerentur et bene sentiendo male sentire, non facile viderim, nisi quod omiserint forte protestationem super singulis (ut dixi) syllabis: tanta est hodie in Ecclesia puerorum et effeminatorum tyrannis. 144 Rummel, The Case Against Johann Reuch­lin, 163; WA 6.183.16–24: Quis ergo Articulos hos damnationis Lovaniensium et Coloniensium toties antehac errantium non rideat nudos



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As in the Resolutiones, Luther pointed out that the condemnations of the theological faculties of Louvain and Cologne are simply ridiculous. Pico’s trial had a vast echo in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. In mentioning this cause célèbre again, Luther tried to reinforce his characterization of his accusers as unlearned and envious sophists. Luther’s overview of unlearned men unjustly accused of heresy by the “sophists” continued with Lorenzo Valla. Valla’s scholarship is put in contraposition to scholastic emptiness. Luther antithetically contraposed Valla’s contribution to improving the quality of learning to the Chrysoppasus of Johannes Eck, one of his main opponents and one of the most vehement accusers of these years, whose work Luther describes as a “nauseating” (mera nausea) “brittle or rather glacial nonsense” (vitrea aut potius glacialia nugamenta). Once again, Luther emphasizes that in moving these absurd charges, these “doctrinal condemnators” (doctrinalium damnatorum) had not only ridiculed themselves; they had also enhanced Valla’s glory.145 Erasmus, Vesalius, and Jacques Lefèvre are swiftly mentioned as further examples of the desire of the Cologne and Louvain theologians to condemn anyone.146 Luther, however, focuses his attention on the link between his own trial and that of Reuch­lin: Then came Johannes Reuch­lin. His case revealed what the theologians of five universities (for God’s sake!) know, opine, and have in mind. It is well known that the ignominious defeat they suffered at the hands of Reuch­lin was galling to the theologians of Louvain and Cologne, that they are trying to save face and regain their old glory by starting the Luther affair. In his case they were not only authentic judges of doctrine in theory but also in practice, burning his books.147 inermesque audere etiam Albim transire? Iohannis Pici Mirandulani Comitis Conclusiones quanto (dei fidem) tumultu damnatae sunt, tantum ut Magistri nostri eximii rectos esse suos errores statuerent! Quas tamen quis est hodie fere qui non miretur, nisi forte senes aliquot sophistae in angulo rabiosa silentia rodentes, quos tamen cognita veritate quantumlibet pertinaces nullus doctrinalis damnator censet haereticos, temerarios, falsos? 145 Rummel, The Case Against Johann Reuch­lin, 163; WA 6.183.26–36: Laurentius Vallensis, primitivae Ecclesiae (meo iudicio) vel reliqua scintilla vel novus fomes, cui Theologorum et pontificum non est extinguendus visus? qui vir ab iis etiam criminatur indoctissimus, qui non uno modo indigni fuissent ei matulam porrigere, cum interim Chrysopassi seu vitrea aut potius glacialia nugamenta illorum libris huius comparata mera nausea sit. At nunc Laurentius is est et quottidie magis fit, cui nec Italia nec universa Ecclesia multis seculis similem habuit, non modo in omni disciplinarum genere (quod nullus adhuc praestitit Magister noster eximius) sed et constantia et zelo fidei Christianae non ficto. Quid hic promovit non modo doctrinalium damnatorum, sed et autenticorum autentica damnatio, nisi quod sese irrisit et hunc magis glorificavit? 146  WA 6.184.24–27: Omitto hic Vuesaliam, Fabrum Stapulensem et arietem illum haerentem cornibus in vespribus Erasmum, et multos praeter hos alios. Quid enim usquam natum est praestantis ingenii et eruditionis, quod non statim sit petitum ignavis istis fucis? 147 Rummel, The Case Against Johann Reuch­lin, 163–64; WA 6.183.37–38,184.1–4: Post hos Ioannes Reuch­lin, in quo deprehensi sunt Theologi quinque universitatum (deo disponente), quid sapiant, quid cernant, quid quaerant doctrinales damnatores. Nec obscurum est, Lovanienses et Colonienses conscientia huius ignominiaeagitatos, quam ex Reuch­lino acce-

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In sketching the most significant events of the Reuch­lin affair, from the condemnations of Reuch­lin’s Eye Mirror by the universities of Louvain, Cologne, Paris, Erfurt, and Mainz, to the verdict in Reuch­lin’s favor by the bishop of Speyer passing the burning of Reuch­lin’s Gutachten, Luther again resorts to mocking his accusers. Indeed, in Luther’s words, the charges for heresy against him are no less than an attempt by the Lovanienses and Colonienses to regain prestige and glory after their defeat by Reuch­lin. In Luther’s narrative, however, from Reuch­lin’s to his own affair, another step has been taken, a line crossed: in burning Luther’s books, the doctrinales damnatores of Louvain and Cologne have become damnatores authentici. In the 1510s, the heresy trials of Johannes Reuch­lin and Martin Luther were so strictly intertwined in the public discourse that their cases generated an impressive number of texts both in support of and against them; pamphlets with compilations of their personal and intellectual biographies multiplied, and both their supporters and their detractors saw their trials as two sides of the same coin. In publishing his Epistolae Clarorum Virorum, Reuch­lin argued for a contraposition between the exponents of a new learning, and the sophist theologians unwilling to give up their academic throne. Reuch­lin was only drawing from a rhetoric which was pervasive in the works of authors like Erasmus of Rotterdam, and which had characterized so many texts of the Italian quattrocento. When Martin Luther got into a firefight with the very same theologians who had accused Reuch­lin of heresy, he played an easy game by using this same narrative and quoting the trial of Reuch­lin, as well as those for heresy of Pico, Valla, or Jacques Lefèvre, as paradigmatic examples of the avarice of the sophists who accused just about everyone of heresy. In 1520, the apex of intersections between the two trials has been reached. While Luther repeatedly linked his own case to Reuch­lin’s, the Dominicans in Cologne, first among them Hoogstraten, narrated the same story but lent it a negative connotation. The Pope’s indecision and inability in firmly condemning Reuch­lin gave new heretics the opportunity to raise their voices. An immediate condemnation of Reuch­lin would have nipped Luther’s schismatic aspirations in the bud. Under pressure from multiple sides, and with the direct counsel of Cardinal Cajetan, Pope Leo X simultaneously intervened to impose sanctions on both Reuch­lin and Luther. The famous bull Exsurge Domine on Luther’s excommunication was handed down on 15 June 1520. Eight days later, on 23 June, Leo X sentenced Reuch­lin in favor of Hoogstraten. Reuch­lin, who never joined Luther’s movement, died on 30 June 1522 in Stuttgart; in 1521 during the Imperial Diet of Worms, Martin Luther was excommunicated, having refused to recant. If the public discourse had been affected by the legal procedure in Rome, perunt, nova hac fabula in Luthero quaerere redemptionem gloriae, ut qui in illo fuerunt damnatores autentici, non doctrinales tantum, exurentes eius libellos.



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in June 1520 the process of intersection between Reuch­lin and Luther’s cases resulted in the common condemnation of the two men by Pope Leo X.

1.6  A Polarized Discursive Context Despite the variegated theological positions characterizing the different movements which aimed to reform the Church in the early sixteenth century, twentieth-century scholars have crystallized the contradictoriness of these debates in the reassuring paradigm of a common theological program of returning to the theology of the Fathers. A monolithic understanding of an historical context entails marginalizing differences and contradictions. This is precisely the reason for which the concept of a “productive misunderstanding” has received such a huge success. In this chapter, I have tried to emphasize the intrinsic contradictoriness and contingency of the debates of the early sixteenth century. I have argued that the statements of Reuch­lin, Luther, Erasmus, Melanchthon, Bucer, von Hutten, Hoogstraten, and Gratius must be viewed as exemplifying concrete positioning. The trials of Reuch­lin and Luther for heresy clearly demonstrate how deeply the former affected the latter on multiple levels. The so-called Reuch­lin affair, indeed, helped to pave the way for a polarized discursive context dominated by charges and countercharges of “obscurantism”, “sophism”, and “heterodoxy”. All these reciprocal accusations have to be contextualized in their specific circumstances. The very same person (as in the case of Luther himself ) could be accused of being both an unlearned sophist and the proponent of anti-scholastic, anti-Catholic theology. In such an intricate situation, it is anachronistic to reproduce one single narrative as if it were the mere reproduction of objective facts. All the protagonists of the theological debates of the early sixteenth century acted within the framework of this contradictory historical context, from which Luther’s theology of the cross emanated, as the ensuing chapters seek to chronicle.

Chapter 2

Platonic Anima and Pauline Spiritus: Erasmus’ Concept of Human Nature The notion of freedom, dignity of man, as well as the related debates on white and black magic, remain one of the thorniest historiographical problems of scholarship on early modern history. In recent years, historical research has largely tried to disentangle the fifteenth- and the sixteenth-century debates on free will, or on human dignity, from a modern interpretation of freedom and dignity. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s famous Oration on the Dignity of Man, a sort of manifesto of Renaissance anthropology, is a case in point. Brian Copenhaver has convincingly shown the anachronism of the interpretations of Pico’s Oratio throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Kantian and neoKantian paradigms have been applied ex post to Pico.1 A second and even bigger challenge has been long recognized in secondary literature: the impossibility to identify a common position on free will among authors categorized as “humanists”. In the late 1940s, Charles Trinkaus pointed out that different and contradictory positions on free will emerged in the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries.2 The role of Lorenzo Valla in the Reformation debate, especially in the dispute between Luther and Erasmus, exemplifies the inappropriateness of macro-categorization in describing single positions. As noted by Trinkaus, despite being a “humanist”, Valla denied free will. Moreover, Erasmus, who in other respects held Valla in high esteem, argued for the affinity of the fifteenth-century Italian philosopher and John Wyclif to the Manicheans, because of their denial of free will. On his side, Luther proudly followed their authority as well as that of Augustine.3 Since modern research recognizes that many aspects of the Renaissance are still not well understood, and that many texts are little known or even completely obliterated, it is no surprise that the relationship between “Luther and the Renaissance” remains an open question. On the one hand, “humanists” and 1 See especially, Brian P. Copenhaver, “Magic and the Dignity of Man: De-kanting Pico’s Oration,” in The Italian Renaissance in the 20th Century, ed. Allen J. Grieco, Michael Rocke, and Fiorella Gioffredi Superbi (Florence: Olschki, 2002), 295–320; “Dignity, Vile Bodies, and Nakedness: Giovanni Pico and Giannozzo Manetti,” in Dignity: A History, ed. Remy Debes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 2  Charles Trinkaus, “The Problem of Free Will in the Renaissance and the Reformation,” Journal of the History of Ideas 10 (1949): 51–62. 3  Ibid., 59–61.

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“Reformers” were considered allies between 1518–1521; on the other, the antithetical positions of Luther and Erasmus have induced many scholars to conceptualize the relationship between the Renaissance and the Reformation as an antithesis between a negative and a positive anthropology. Despite this, often through a systematic approach, parallelism and comparisons have been made between the theological anthropologies of the two movements. Thus, Gerhard Ebeling, after emphasizing that Luther’s anthropology should be considered in opposition to the Renaissance notion of man, dedicated some passages of his famous Lutherstudien to a comparison between Pico della Mirandola and Martin Luther. He asserted that the latter would have assimilated and made his own the famous statements on human dignity of the former.4 In opposition to Ebeling, Friedemann Stengel has recently emphasized that no historical encounter can happen without a concrete reception of texts.5 Considerations very similar to the one just mentioned by Ebeling can also be observed in the work of other scholars. Lewis Spitz, one of the leading scholars on the relationship between “Renaissance and Reformation”, noted in a discussion of Luther’s 1518 Resolutiones disputationum de indulgentiarum virtute that Luther’s statements on human dignity invoke similar assertions by Johannes Reuchin and Giovanni Pico.6 Memories and similarities have to give way to a more accurate analysis of the texts. Only through the encounter of different texts can a declaration be properly received, transformed, and overcome. The historiographical problem of different concepts regarding the human condition after original sin is, thus, still open and a proper investigation of this topic goes far beyond the aim of the present work. The next two chapters analyze Luther’s theological anthropology, which, as he expressed in the years immediately before and following the Heidelberg Disputation, was largely influenced both by the nominalist tradition in which Luther was educated, as well as by different works of Erasmus of Rotterdam that Luther read and studied during his early years in Wittenberg. While the former aspect in Luther’s thought has received close scholarly attention, it seems to me that the latter, despite being a common topic of research in Luther studies, needs clarification. It has been generally assumed that Erasmus and Luther were positively inclined toward each other before their famous dispute in the 1520s. It will be my contention to prove that, on the contrary, Erasmus’ understanding of human beings, as expressed in the Enchiridion Militis Christiani or in the adage Sileni of Alcibiades, worked as a catalyst for Mar4  Gerhard Ebeling, Die philosophische Definition des Menschen: Kommentar zu These 1–19, Lutherstudien; vol. 2 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1982), 203–10. 5 Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance und Hermetismus: Kontexte und Schnittstellen der frühen reformatorischen Bewegung,” 53. 6 Spitz, The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists, 238.



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tin Luther’s positions on human beings, their ability or inability to fulfill good works, and their relationship and attitude toward God. Before moving the discussion to Luther’s works, I will thus describe how the young Erasmus understood the human condition after peccatum Adae. In his attempt to disentangle the historical Pico della Mirandola from the twentiethcentury Kantian representation of his thought, Copenhaver has also noted that little attention has been paid throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to Pico’s Oratio. Despite the essential truth of Copenhaver’s claim, the historian should not limit his investigation to the explicit quotations. Indeed, because of his fascination with the controversial Jewish Kabbalah and the charge of heresy against him, in the early sixteenth century Pico della Mirandola was not an author whose authority could be cited with a light heart. The same is true also for Marsilio Ficino, who, especially after the publication of his controversial De vita libri tres, attracted the attention of ecclesiastical Inquisition. Thus, Johannes Reuch­lin, despite being heavily influenced by both Pico and Ficino, never explicitly quoted the two Italian authors in his De verbo mirifico. In the same way, Francesco Zorzi, who drew extensively in his De harmonia Mundi not only from Pico and Ficino, but from Reuch­lin as well, is silent regarding his contemporary sources. It will be my contention in this chapter to show that, despite never mentioning Pico, Ficino, or any other fifteenth-century author, Erasmus of Rotterdam was indeed highly influenced by the two Florentine philosophers. I claim that in order to correctly contextualize his reading of the Church Fathers, it is necessary to understand how Erasmus’ ideas of freedom and dignity were reshaped by his acquaintance with fifteenth-century literature. Thus, I argue that Erasmus developed his own understanding of the Pauline text as a result of this hybrid reading of different ancient and Renaissance sources, mostly Pico, Ficino, and Origen of Alexandria.

2.1  Irenism and Philosophia Christi in the Letter to Paul Volz In 1518, the publisher Froben issued a new edition of one of Erasmus of Rotterdam’s most appreciated works, the Enchiridion militis Christiani (“The Handbook of the Christian Soldier”). Written in 1501 and published for the first time in 1503 in a collection of works entitled Lucubratiunculae, the Enchiridion represents a sort of summa of Erasmus’ early theological positions. As a preface to the work, Froben attached a letter dated 14 August 1518 that Erasmus wrote from Basel to Paul Volz, a Benedictine abbot and a member of the Sélestat literary society.7 This text is still considered the best explanation 7 

Ep. 858.

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that Erasmus himself gave of his own work. It is in this letter that he uses the famous expression philosophia Christi; he criticizes the frigidity and uselessness of scholastic theology; he expresses clearly that his entire scholarship is aimed at reforming Christianity according to the notion of true piety (vera pietas). It will thus be helpful to analyze the content of this letter, and use it as an exegetical tool to interpret the thought of the young Erasmus. Erasmus begins the letter by claiming that he is not worried that the Enchiridion has been criticized because it does not deal with Scotist problems, as if nothing could be learned without them.8 The aim of Erasmus’ theology is not to enter into infinite disputes of the scholastics, but to show what true piety consists of. Commentators on Peter Lombard’s Sentences can be found everywhere, but no one explains nor looks for true piety. The scholastics examine everything in the smallest detail, but they put no faith in Christ. Even if they were right on every single topic, common people could not understand the content of their work. On the contrary, “the good life is everybody’s business, and Christ wished the way to it to be accessible to all men, not beset with impenetrable labyrinths of argument but open to sincere faith, to love unfeigned, and their companion, the hope that is not put to shame”.9 In contrast to lawyers and physicians who made their topics incomprehensible, theologians were called upon to imitate Christ and make the “philosophy of Christ” as accessible as possible to common people.10 The modern reader encounters two key topics of Erasmus’ thought here: the critique of scholastic theology, and the need for Christ to be accessible to unlearned people. The two topics are closely interrelated. As we will see in greater detail later, Erasmus criticizes scholasticism because he considers it to be “empty”. The great metaphysical constructions of scholastic theology are of no interest to him, since they are not only of no help, but even harmful in the search for true piety. Moreover, Erasmus’ disdain for scholasticism does not come from ignorance; on the contrary, recent studies have shown his familiarity with this tradition.11 His departure from scholasticism was motivated by his appreciation of, and preference for, the bonae litterae and the studia humanita8  CWE 66.73; Allen, vol. 3, 362–63: Nihil igitur me mouent quorundam scommata, qui libellum hunc ceu parum eruditum aspernantur, et qui vel ab elementario quouis scribi possit, quod nihil tractet Scoticarum quaestionum; quasi sine his nihil omnino sit eruditum. 9  CWE 66.74–75; Allen, vol. 3, 363: Et tamen nullius non refert bene viuere, ad quod Christus omnibus aditum facilem esse voluit, non inexplicabilibus disputationum labirynthis, sed fide syncera, charitate non ficta, quam comitatur spes quae non pudefit. 10  CWE 66.75; Allen, vol. 3, 364: Quod turpe est iurisperitis ac medicis, quorum vtrique de industria suam artem reddidere difficillimam, quo simul et quaestus sit vberior et gloria maior apud imperitos; id longe turpius fuerit fecisse in philosophia Christi. 11  Clarence H. Miller, “Some Medieval Elements and Structural Unity in Erasmus’ ‘The Praise of Folly’,” Renaissance Quarterly 27 (1974): 499–511. Miller notes that “men like Erasmus and More borrowed more from their enemies than we are often likely to realize, because they themselves were saturated with the culture they wished to reform”. Cf. 499.



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tis, on the one hand, and for Platonic philosophy, on the other: the former gave him specific philological tools to examine the Bible, the latter philosophical insights to read it beyond the literal sense. In different ways these two aspects had been characteristic of the Italian culture of the previous generation.12 Moreover, Erasmus unites both bonae litterae and Platonic philosophy with a third element: stylistic elegance. Writing to Lord Mountjoy from Paris in June 1500 – a letter included as a preface to the first edition of the Adagia published in Paris under the title Adagiorum collectanea – Erasmus highlights the relevance of his work by pointing out how the most learned men have made full use of these proverbs in their writings. For instance, regarding Plato, Erasmus claims: “To take a prime example: is there anything in the world more splendid than Plato’s philosophy, or more eloquent than his style? Yet he interrupted his dialogues, even though their theme was serious enough, Heaven knows, with adages inserted like highlights at frequent intervals. To me at least the result is that this philosopher’s argumentation affords more pleasure than any comic play”.13 Plato’s use of the adages, and his erudite language help the reader to follow and understand complex philosophical concepts. While scholastics adopted a “barbaric language” that undermined the most illustrious ideas, Italian scholars of the previous generation, dissatisfied with the style as well as the content of scholastic theology, went back to the ancients, bringing an erudite language back to life: To bring my rapid survey at modern times, there are certain authors, Ermolao Barbaro, Pico della Mirandola, and Angelo Poliziano, whom I should not hesitate to include among the greatest. All of these were so dissatisfied with the scholarship and literary standards of their own age that, as it seems to me, they decided to challenge Antiquity on its own ground, and I believe they actually did better than a great many of the ancients themselves; Pico by virtue of his amazing intellectual powers, Ermolao by means of devoted and painstaking work, and Poliziano in the marvelous brilliance and almost more than Attic loveliness of his style. These writers, sharing an ambition to avoid as far as they possibly could the common, that is, mean, jargon of the day, thought that this aim would be fully attained only if they adorned their prose at all points with ancient adages and with those figurative expressions which exhibit a family resemblance to the adage.14 12  Jill Kraye, “The Philosophy of the Italian Renaissance,” in The Routledge History of Philosophy: The Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Rationalism, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 16–69. 13  Cf. CWE 1.258; Allen, vol. 1, 291: Iam primum quid habet orbis Platonis vel oratione facundius vel philosophia diuinius? At is dialogos suos, bone Deus, quantis de rebus, tamen crebris adagiis veluti stellulis quibusdm interspersit, vt me quidem nulla perinde comoedia vt huius philosophi disputatio delectet. 14  Cf. CWE 1.260–61; Allen, vol. 1, 293: Sed vt ad neotericos nostra festinet oratio, non verebor Hermolaum Barbarum, Picum Mirandolanum, Angelum Politianum vel in maximis authoribus ponere; qui suorum temporum vel doctrina vel eloquentia adeo non fuere contenti, vt mihi cum antiquitate certamen sumpsisse videantur, et haud scio an veterum permultos

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Even though only a few years previously Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro had carried on an epistolary debate concerning the relationship between philosophy and eloquence,15 Erasmus almost takes for granted that philosophy and eloquence go hand in hand. Without explicitly taking side with Pico or Barbaro, Erasmus sides with the position defended by Barbaro against Pico, namely that you cannot properly philosophize if you do not express your thoughts in an erudite language. The dichotomy between ancients and moderns which permeates the whole of Eramsus’ corpus is absent from his treatment of the Italian authors, whether philologists (Ermolao Barbaro and Angelo Poliziano) or philosophers (Giovanni Pico della Mirandola). Erasmus uses this opposition to contrast the learned language and pure faith of the ancients to “unlearned disputations” and the overly subtle quibbles of the scholastics. The category of “moderns” in a pejorative sense is never applied by Erasmus to the Italians, precisely because they attained the remarkable achievement of restoring true theology by going back to the ancients. Erasmus expresses even more clearly the necessary coincidence between an erudite language and true philosophy in a letter to Bonifacius Amerbach dated 31 August 1518: Medicine first learnt to speak in Italy through the efforts of Niccolò Leoniceo, an old man deserving of immortal fame; in France through Guillarme Cop of Basel. In Britain the efforts of Thomas Linacre have made Galen lately write such good Latin that he might be thought to write rather badly in his native Greek. He has made Aristotle too speak Latin, so well that, from all that he hails from Attica, he hardly seems to reach the same elegance precesserint, Picus quidem diuina quadam ingenii felicitate, Hermolaus absoluta diligentia, Politianus nitore incredibili venereque prope dixerim plusquam Attica. Iis viris quam esset commune stadium vt a vulgi, hoc est sordido, sermone quam possent longissime abessent, id ita demum se consequturos putarunt, si priscis adagiis, iisque schaematis, que cum hoc genere cognationem habent quandam, orationem passim aspersissent. 15  For the dispute between Pico and Ermolao, see: Hanna H. Gray, “Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence,” Journal of the History of Ideas 24 (1963): 497–514; Quirinus Breen, “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric,” Journal of the History of ideas 13 (1952): 384–412; Jill Kraye, “Pico on the Relationship of Rhetoric and Philosophy,” in Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. Michael V. Dougherty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 13–36; Letizia Panizza, “Pico della Mirandola e il ‘De Genere Dicendi Philosophorum’ del 1485: L’encomio paradossale dei ‘Barbari’ e la loro parodia,” I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance 8 (1999): 69–103. In 1523 Philipp Melanchthon defended the necessity to use an erudite language in an oration in praise of eloquence. In this text, he interpreted Pico’s positions against Barbaro as a joke. See CR XI, 50–66. Some years later, one of Melanchthon’s students, Franz Burchard (1504–1560) wrote a reply to Pico in defense of Hermolaus Barbaro. The work circulated under Melanchthon’s name. Quirinus Breen believed that Melanchthon was the author of the work: Quirinus Breen, “Melancthon’s Reply to G. Pico della Mirandola,” Journal of the History of Ideas 13 (1952): 413–26. Erika Rummel proved that the work has to be attributed to Burchard: Erika Rummel, “Epistola Hermolai nova ac subditicia: A Declamation Falsely Ascribed to Philip Melanchthon,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 83 (1992): 302–5.



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in his own language; through of course before Linacre’s time Argyropoulus among the Italians with George of Trebizond, Theodorus Gaza, Marsilio, and Pico, and in France Lefèvre d’Étaples, had made it clear that philosophy was by no means speechless.16

In Erasmus’ eyes, the process of restoring classical Greek and Latin has been propaedeutic to, and indispensable for, a reform of the core substance of philosophy and theology, a kind of reform that is not tantamount to a modernization, but, rather, represents attempts to re-appropriate a glorious past. Erasmus embodies these concepts in a reading of history, focusing on decay and decadence. In interpreting his Enchiridion, he reiterates that the aim of the work is not to criticize monasticism or ceremonies as such, but their perversion.17 The monastic orders were founded by pious men who commanded their followers to lead a pious life, and yet: “Then gradually, with the passage of time, wealth grew, and with wealth ceremonies; and the genuine piety and simplicity grew cool”.18 In the same way as external ceremonies are good practices, even helpful, when carried out with interior faith, true piety does not consist in practicing them. Indeed, as Erasmus himself claims, “nowhere do I condemn a moderate degree of ceremony; but I cannot endure that holiness from stem to stem, as they say, should be thought to lie in them”.19 In opposition to the empty ceremonies of the monks, Erasmus proposes a Christocentric faith based on piety. The proper meaning and relevance of Erasmus’ pietas is a complex and thorny topic. John O’Malley has summarized the modes of Erasmus’ piety, singling out his tireless efforts to correct morals, his use of the past to correct and not confirm the present, and his cultural comprehensiveness, as some of the key features in his notion of a simple piety intended as a corrective to both popular piety and religious formalities in the upper echelons of society.20 Rather than attempt to gain a complete understanding of Erasmus’ notion of pietas, I am concerned here with how he used theological anthropology to develop and reshape his theology. The notion of the human being in his post-lapsarian condition is strictly related to the doctrine of free will and justification; 16  CWE 6.101; Allen, vol. 3, 384: Medicina loqui coepit apud Italos opera Nicolai Leoniceni, senis immortalitate digni; apud Gallos, Gulielmi Copi Basiliensis. Apud Britannos studio Thomae Linacri sic nuper disertus coepit esse Galenus, vt in sua lingua parum disertus videri possit. Eiusdem opera sic Latine loquitur Aristoteles vt, licet Atticus, vix in suo sermone parem habeat gratiam; licet ante hunc illud certe praestiterint apud Italos Argyropylus, Trapezontius, Theodorus Gaza, Marsilius, Picus, apud Gallos Faber Stapulensis, ne philosophia muta videri possit. 17  CWE 66.88–90; Allen, vol. 3, 374–6. 18  Cf. CWE 66.89, Allen, vol. 3, 376: Deinde temporis progressu paulatim cum opibus accreuerunt ceremoniae, refrixit germana pietas ac simplicitas. 19  Cf. CWE 66.86; Allen, vol. 3, 373: Neque tamen vsquam damnamus moderatas ceremonias, at non ferimus in his puppim ac proram, quod dici solet, sanctimoniae constitui. 20  CWE 66: xxi–xxv.

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it is, thus, indispensable to understand the former in order to correctly evaluate the latter. Moreover, when investigating the context of the reception of Erasmus’ Enchiridion, it is necessary to mention another edition of the text, which was published by Hieronymus Emser in 1515, three years before the famous Froben edition.21 I noted in Chapter One that Emser, who has become famous as one of the strongest opponents of the reformation, edited along with Willibald Pirckheimer an edition of Pico della Mirandola’s Opera published in Strasbourg in 1504, and in that same year as one of Luther’s professors in Erfurt. As I will show in further detail below, Emser understood Erasmus’ thought in terms of the continuity between the Platonic tradition and Christian theology. It is thus not surprising that Martin Luther perceived Erasmus’ and Emser’s positions as being very close. As we shall see, he developed his understanding of human beings in opposition, and as a reaction, to Erasmus’ position. In a 1518 letter to Voltz, Erasmus applied the anthropological concepts he formulated in the Enchiridion to a specific political situation: Pope Leo X’s crusade against the Turks.22 Erasmus formulates his position regarding the war as follows: 21  Emser

was introduced to Erasmus by Willibald Pirckheimer, who presented Emser as “a good scholar and one of your key supporters”. (CWE 4.214, Ep. 527) Emser directly contacted Erasmus for the first time on 15 March 1517. In this letter, he mentioned that he gave the manuscript of the Enchiridion to the printer when it was difficult to find it in Germany (CWE 4.284–86, Ep. 553). 22  Erasmus discussed the opportunity of a crusade against the Turks one year before in his famous Querela Pacis (ASD IV II, CWE 5). The threat of the Turks was also a central political problem in later years. In 1530, Erasmus wrote his De Bello Turcico (ASD V 3; CWE 64). The question of Erasmus’ attitude towards war has been long discussed in secondary literature. Some scholars have identified Erasmus as a pacifist: John C. Olin, “The Pacifism of Erasmus,” Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 50 (1975): 418–31; James D. Tracy, The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and his Political Milieu (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978). Tracy’s book is arguable one of the best account of Erasmus’ political vision. However, in his review of the book, Lewis Spitz recognized how problematic the term “pacifist” can be when applied to Erasmus, arguing that “One wonders how the author justifies calling Erasmus a pacifist, given his recognition of the necessity of power and arms, if pacifism means opposition to war or to the use of military force for any purpose”; quoted from: Lewis William Spitz, “James D. Tracy. The Politics of Erasmus: A Pacifist Intellectual and His Political Milieu. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1978. Pp. 216. $15.00,” The American Historical Review 85 (1980): 407. In the early 1950s Roland Bainton already warned that for Erasmus war was not always forbidden: Roland H. Bainton, “The Querela Pacis of Erasmus, Classical and Christian Sources,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 42 (1951): 32–48. Several essays investigated when war was acceptable according to Erasmus, see: Norman Housley, “A Necessary Evil? Erasmus, the Crusade, and War Against the Turks,” in The Crusades and Their Sources: Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton, ed. John France and William G. Zajac (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 259–79; José A. Fernández-Santamaria, “Erasmus on the Just War,” Journal of the History of Ideas 34 (1973): 209–26. Fred Dalmayr has recently restated the case for Erasmus’ pacifism, picturing Erasmus’ attitude as an example for contemporary inter-religious discussions: Fred Dallmayr, “A War Against the Turks? Erasmus on War and Peace,”



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At this moment war is preparing against the Turks; and whatever the intentions of those who started it, we must pray that it turns out well, not for a chosen few but for all in common. But what do we suppose will happen if, when we have beaten them (for I do not suppose we shall slaughter them to a man), to persuade them to embrace Christianity we set before them the works of Ockham and Durandus and their like, of Scotus and Gabriel and Alvaro? What will they think, what will their feelings be (for though nothing else, they are at least human beings), when they hear these thorny and impenetrable thickets of argument-instances, formalities, quiddities, relativities – particularly when they see so little agreement on them among those eminent religious teachers that they often fight each other until they are pale with fury and reduced to insults and spitting and sometimes even to fisticuffs? These are the Friars Preacher battling at short and long range for their precious Thomas; the Minorites on the other side defending their most Subtle and Seraphic Doctors, shield linked with shield, some speaking as nominalists and other as realists. What if they see it is such a difficult subject that there can be no end to the discussion, what words we should use in speaking of Christ? Just as though you were concerned with some demon very difficult to please, whom you will have called up for your own damnation if you made any slip in the prescribed form of words, and not really with a most merciful Saviour, who demands nothing from us except a pure and simple life.23 Asian Journal of Social Science 34 (2006): 67–85. Nathan Ron has instead suggested that, since Erasmus’ understanding of peace was specifically Christian, the Dutch scholar should be understood as an irenic thinker rather than a pacifist: Nathan Ron, “The Christian Peace of Erasmus,” The European Legacy 19 (2014): 27–42. A recent accurate rhetorical analysis of Erasmus’ “A Most Useful Discussion Concerning Proposals for War against the Turks” has shown how Erasmus’ rhetorical tools were used to dismiss the possibility of a crusade: Terence J. Martin, “The Prospects for Holy War: A Reading of a ‘Consultation’ from Erasmus,” Erasmus Studies 36 (2016): 195–217. Furthermore, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the debates regarding the relationship between Christian and Muslims, and the possibility of a Christian crusade against the Turks, were invigorated after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Erasmus’ position in the early sixteenth century has often been linked to Cusanus’ attitude, as expressed in De pace fidei. However, Nathan Ron, distinguishing between Cusanus’ claims in De pace fidei and in the later Cribatio Alcorani, claimed that Erasmus’ position was closer to Nicholas of Cusa’s Cribatio rather than his De pace fidei: Nathan Ron, “Erasmus’ Attitude toward Islam in Light of Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and Cribratio Alkorani,” Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 26 (2019): 113–36. Erasmus’ De Bello Turcico was published in opposition to Luther’s opinion on the matter. For Luther’s position and for the ongoing discussion regarding the crusade against the Turks, see: George W. Forell, “Luther and the War against the Turks,” Church History 14 (1945): 256–71; Johannes Ehmann, Luther, Türken und Islam: Eine Untersuchung zum Türken-und Islambild Martin Luthers (1515–1546), Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2008); Adam S. Francisco, Martin Luther and Islam: A Study in Sixteenth-Century Polemics and Apologetics, The History of Christian-Muslims Relations (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 23  Cf. CWE 66.75–76, Allen, vol. 3, 364: Adornatur iam bellum in Turcas, quod quocunque consilio institutum, precandum est, non vt paucis quibusdam, sed vt in commune bene vertat omnibus. Sed quid futurum arbitramur, si victis (neque enim vniuersos, opinor, ferro trucidabimus) vt Christum amplectantur, Occamos aut Durandos aut Scotos aut Gabrieles aut Aluaros proposuerimus? Quid cogitabunt aut quid sentient (sunt enim et illi, vt nihil aliud, certe homines), vbi audierint spinosas illas et inextricabilis argutias de instantibus, de formalitatibus, de quidditatibus, de relationibus? praesertim vbi viderint de iis adeo non conuenire inter magnos illos religionis professores, vt frequenter vsque ad pallorem, vsque ad conuicia,

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Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, Gabriel Biel, the “Subtle Doctor” John Duns Scotus, the “Seraphic Doctor” St. Bonaventure, the “Doctor Speculator” Guillaume Durand, and the Spanish canonist Alvarus Pelagius, that is, the champions of scholastic theology, said nothing useful about how to deal with the Turks. Their formalities and the quarrel on the nature of the universals produced only discord in Christianity. According to Erasmus, the best way to defeat the Turks was to show them that Christians do not want to steal their gold or conquer their empire, but instead disclose to them the way to salvation, that is, to Christ. Thus, behaving like Christians does not mean killing as many infidels as possible, but rather converting them to Christianity.24 Winning the war will extend the kingdom of pope and cardinals, but not necessarily the kingdom of Christ. Christ did not die so that an earthly kingdom could pass from the hands of pagans to a limited number of priests, Erasmus concludes.25 Before using arms, Christians should try to win over the Turks through letters and pamphlets. These works should exude the spirit of Peter and Paul. Although their teachings are fully expressed in the Holy Scripture, the Bible is difficult reading even for Christians. Thus, Erasmus suggests that pious and learned men should summarize the whole philosophy of Christ for the “infidels”.26 Erasmus was convinced that the “infidels” could be converted, and he bases this idea on the notion that humanity as a whole shares a common nature. Indeed, he claims: “They are human beings, as we are; there is neither steel nor adamant in their hearts. It is possible that they may be civilized, possible they vsque ad sputa, nonnunquam et vsque ad pugnos inuicem digladientur; vbi Praedicatores pro suo Thoma cominus atque eminus dimicantes, Minoritas contra subtilissimos ac seraphicos doctores iunctis vmbonibus tuentes, alios vt nominales, alios vt reales loqui; si viderint rem vsque adeo difficilem esse vt nunquam satis discussum sit quibus verbis de Christo sit loquendum: perinde quasi cum moroso quopiam agas daemone, quem in tuam ipsius perniciem euocaris, si quid te fefellerit in verbis praescriptis, ac non potius cum clementissimo Seruatore; qui a nobis praeter puram simplicemque vitam nihil exigit. 24  CWE 66.76; Allen, vol. 3, 365: Quod si hic non adsit animus, citius futurum est ut nos in Turcas degeneremus quam vt Turcas in nostras partes pertrahamus. Et vt feliciter cadat Martis semper ancipitis alea, fiet vt latius fortasse regnet Pontifex aut huius cardinales, non vt latius regnet Christus; cuius regnum ita demum floret, si vigeat pietas, si charitas, si pax, si chastitas. 25  Ibid., Allen, ibid.: Neque enim ideo mortuus est Chrisstus, vt opes, vt copiae, vt arma reliquaque illa mundane regni tragoedia, quae quondam penes Ethnicos aut certe prophanos princepes fuit, Etnicis non ita multum absimiles, nunc sit penes sacerdotes aliquot. 26  CWE 66.77; Allen, vol. 3, 365: Non quod nesciam fontem omnem ac venam Christianae philosophiae reconditam esse in Euangelicis et Apostolicis literis, sed sermo peregrinus ac saepenumero perturbatus, tum figurae tropique obliqui, tantum habent difficultatis vt nobis etiam non raro sudandum sit priusquam intelligamus. Commodissimum itaque mea sententia fuerit si muneris hoc viris aliquot iuxta piis ac doctis delegetur; vt ex purissimis fontibus Evangelistarum et Apostolorum, ex probatissimis interpretibus vniuersam Christi philosophiam in compendium contrahant, ita simpliciter vt tamen erudite, ita breuiter ut tamen dilucide.



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may be won over by kindness which tames even wild beasts. And the most effective thing of all is Christian truth”.27 For Erasmus, all human beings share a common and unique nature, which distinguishes them from animals. This leads him to assert that trying to convert the Turks is not a utopian plan, but an actual possibility. Erasmus’ political position on this delicate matter is grounded in his understanding of human nature. We therefore have to understand his theological anthropology in order to appreciate his notion of pietas. Having analyzed the letter to Paul Volz, which precedes the 1518 edition of the Enchiridion, I will now analyze the work itself. The Enchiridion is structured as follows: first, Erasmus explains his theological anthropology, that is, the condition of human nature after original sin, in a Platonic way; second, he uses this Platonic understanding of man as a philosophical basis to legitimize his allegorical reading of the Scriptures; finally, having proven that virtue consists in man’s struggle against his own vices, he gives practical advice on how a true Christian should fight this battle. Theological anthropology, biblical hermeneutics, and ethics are strictly interrelated and influenced each other in the thought of the young Erasmus. I shall discuss these three aspects in the sections which follow in order to show the intrinsic coherence of Erasmus’ Enchiridion.

2.2  Homo prodigiosum quoddam animal: Erasmus’ Theological Anthropology in the Enchiridion Erasmus began the writing of his Enchiridion Militis Christiani soon after his return from England, where in 1499 he had accompanied one of his pupils, William Blount, Lord Mountjoy. In Oxford, Erasmus formed enduring friendships with Thomas More, Thomas Linacre, and John Colet. Through Colet, he came into contact with the works of the Florentines Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Indeed, Erasmus’ anthropology, as expressed in the Enchirdion, seems to be strongly influenced by both Pico and Ficino.28 27  Cf. CWE 66.77; Allen, vol. 3, 365–66: Homines sunt et illi, nec ferrum aut adamantem gestant in pectore. Possunt mollescere, possunt officiis adiungi, quibus mansuescunt et ferae. Et efficax in primis res est Christiana veritas. 28  Raymond Marcel, “Les ‘Découvertes’ d’Erasme en Angleterre,” Bibliotheque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 14 (1952): 117–23. For the relationship between Colet and Ficino, see: Sears Jayne, John Colet and Marsilio Ficino (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). On the other side, in this period, Erasmus and Colet had a dispute on the human nature of Christ whose main discussion concerned if Christ, as a human being, feared his own death. A modern English translation of Erasmus’ answer to Colet, De taedio Iesu. Disputatiuncula de taedio, pavore, tristicia Iesu can be found in CWE 70. For further discussion, on the relationship between Colet and Erasmus, see: James Henry Rieger, “Erasmus, Colet, and the Schoolboy Jesus,” Studies in the Renaissance 9 (1962): 187–94; Daniel T. Lochman, “Colet and Erasmus: The Disputatiuncula and the Controversy of Letter and Spirit,” The Sixteenth Century Journal

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In 1970, Paul Oskar Kristeller interpreted the Enchiridion as essentially a Platonic work, and suggested that both it and The Praise of Folly may have been influenced by Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Symposium.29 Five years later, Marie Cytowska proved that the young Erasmus read Plato in Ficino’s 1484 Latin translation.30 Cytowska discerned two periods in Erasmus’ use of Ficino’s Plato translation: in the first period, in which Erasmus’ knowledge of Greek was limited, he was uncritical in his reading of Ficino’s rendering of Plato in Latin;31 in the second period, Erasmus used his knowledge of Greek to challenge Ficino on his own ground and to show how, in some passages, he had misunderstood Plato or rendered his text in improper Latin.32 In this sense, Cytowska identified the Platonis interpres and Latinus interpres corrected by Erasmus in his Adagia (I, 1, 68; I, 8, 15; I 10, 73; Iv 6, 40) with Ficino himself. More recently, Cornelis Augustijn claimed that the influence of Ficino’s and Pico’s anthropology is quite strong in the Enchiridion, but – without supporting his claims with specific passages – he noted that the Florentines “saw man 20 (1989): 77–88; Peter Iver Kaufman, “John Colet and Erasmus’ Enchiridion,” Church History 46 (1977): 296–312. For Erasmus’ relationship with other members of the Oxford circles, Thomas More and William Tyndale: Heinz Holeczek, Humanistische Bibelphilologie als Reformproblem bei Erasmus von Rotterdam, Thomas More und William Tyndale, Studies in the History of Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1975); Dominic Baker-Smith, “Erasmus and More: A Friendship Revisited,” British Catholic History 30 (2010): 7–25; Matthew DeCoursey, “Erasmus and Tyndale on Bible-reading,” Reformation 1 (1996): 157–64; William Edward Campbell, Erasmus, Tyndale and More (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1949); Alan Stewart, “The Trouble with English Humanism: Tyndale, More and Darling Erasmus,” in Reassessing Tudor Humanism, ed. Jonathan Woolfson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 78–98; Rainer Pineas, “Erasmus and More: Some Contrasting Theological Opinions,” Renaissance News 13 (1960): 298–300; Brian Cummings, “William Tyndale and Erasmus on How to Read the Bible: A Newly Discovered Manuscript of the English Enchiridion,” Reformation 23 (2018): 29–52; Mark Rankin, “Tyndale, Erasmus, and the Early English Reformation,” Erasmus Studies 38 (2018): 135–70. 29  Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Erasmus from an Italian Perspective,” Renaissance Quarterly 23 (1970): 1–14. 30  Maria Cytowska, “Érasme de Rotterdame et Marsile Ficin son maître,” Eos 63 (1975): 165–79. 31  Ibid., 170: “Érasme, adepte du grec de fraiche date, ne possédait sans doute pas non plus de deux manuscrits grecs de Platon, c’est pourquoi les citations grecques que le savant a inséré dans Antibarbari ne sont pas de sa propre traduction mais sont puisées dans la traduction de Ficin. La confrontation du texte de Ficin et de celui d’Érasme révèle irréfutablement que le savant hollandais étaient un lecteur assidu de ses traductions et qu’il les acceptait en cette première période sans réserve”. 32  Ibid., 173: “Dans les rédactions suivantes du recueil Adagia, élaborées par Érasme et parues de 1508 à 1536, on ne trouve presque plus de citations de Platon qui aient été répétées littéralement après Ficin. Cependant bien qu’il ait disposé grâce à son séjour en Italie, des manuscrits grecques des œuvres de Platon et qu’il ait, à partir de 1513, possédé le texte grec imprimé dans l’imprimerie d’Alde à Venise, Érasme ne se séparait pas de la traduction d Ficin qu’il connaissait bien. Mais à cette époque déjà Érasme, connaisseur de grec, Érasme passé maitre dans la façon de rendre toutes les nuances de la langue latine, analysait et critiquait cette traduction”.



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by nature as an equivocal creature, so that the struggle was not directed against sin and its consequences but against man’s baser instincts. Erasmus [however] clearly states that the discord in man is aroused through the action of the devil. Sin corrupted what had been good that came from the hand of the creator”.33 Jean Claude Margolin has suggested a possible influence of Pico’s work on Erasmus through the mediation of Robert Gaguin.34 The modern editors of the Enchirdion, Raymond Marcel and Juliusz Domański in Erasmus’ Opera omnia, and Charles Fantazzi in the Collected Works of Erasmus – despite slight differences – recognize Erasmus’ indebtedness to Pico and Ficino. Marcel noted that there is no explicit reference to any fifteenth-century author in the work.35 If we do not want to run the risk of decontextualizing the Enchiridion, we have to place Erasmus’ silent reception of his contemporaries side by side with his explicit use of his ancient sources, mostly Origen, Jerome, and Augustine. On the other hand, a possible influence of Pico and Ficino has been strongly criticized by two prominent scholars. Ross Dealy has interpreted Erasmus’ early works as the result of his reading of Stoic sources, especially from Cicero’s De Officiis, a work which Erasmus himself edited in 1501.36 John Monfasani has emphasized an alleged ignorance on Erasmus’ side of the contemporary philosophical tradition.37 Regarding Ficino, he claims, contradicting Kristeller’s suggestion of a possible influence of Ficino’s De Amore on Erasmus’ The Praise of Folly, that this presumed influence “is easily explained as reflecting Erasmus’ specific interest in Plato’s theory of ecstasy in The Praise of Folly and does not lead us to any indications that Erasmus read Ficino’s Magnus opus, the Platonic Theology, or any other work of the great Florentine Platonist, though he certainly must have known of the other writings of Ficino and perhaps had dipped into them”.38 In the same way, regarding Pico, Monfasani claims: “I have not found any instances where Erasmus cites or makes use of Pico’s writings”.39 33  Cornelis Augustijn, Erasmus: His Life, Works, and Influence, trans. J. C. Grayson, Erasmus Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). 34  Jean-Claude Margolin, “Pic de la Mirandola et Erasme de Rotterdam,” in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: convegno internazionale di studi nel cinquecentesimo anniversario della morte (1494–1994), Mirandola, 4–8 ottobre 1994, ed. Gian Carlo Garfagnini (Florence: Olschki, 1997), 551–76. Margolin suggested a possible influence of Pico’s Oratio on Erasmus also in “La notion de dignité humaine selon Erasme de Rotterdam,” Studies in Church History Subsidia 8 (1991): 37–56. 35  ASD V–8, 37. 36  Ross Dealy, The Stoic Origins of Erasmus’ Philosophy of Christ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017). 37  John Monfasani, “Twenty-fifth Annual Margaret Mann Phillips Lecture: Erasmus and the Philosophers,” Erasmus Studies 32 (2012): 47–68. 38  Ibid., 53. 39 Ibid.

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Two considerations are now necessary: first, Erasmus was undoubtedly influenced by ancient Stoicism (mainly Seneca and Cicero), however, this does not imply that he did not use other sources. As Monfasani noted, in the Enchiridion Erasmus quotes the Stoic, Aristotelian, and Platonic tradition at the same breath.40 Second, Monfasani’s claim of not having found any passage in which Erasmus directly quotes Pico or Ficino denotes an evident lack in the secondary literature: the common claim of an influence of the Florentines on the young Erasmus has not been supported by the careful analysis of single passages. I understand my contribution to this discussion precisely in trying to show how Erasmus appropriated and reshaped single passages from Pico and Ficino. At the beginning of his Enchiridion, Erasmus claims that peace is the highest good. Although philosophers have promised it, this good can be found only in Christ. The sole way to achieve this peace is to fight vices.41 The Stoics, defined as fortissimis assertoribus virtutis, call “stupidity” (stulticia) the impurity accumulated from vices, whereas the term used by the Bible is “malice” (malicia); both traditions call wisdom (sapientia) the purest virtue (absoluta probitas).42 Christ is defined as “the author of wisdom and indeed wisdom itself” (1 Cor. 1:30), the true light (John 1:9; 1 John 2:8) that alone disperses the night of worldly stupidity, the reflection of the glory of the Father (Heb 1:3). Erasmus points out that Jesus represents redemption and justification to the believers, who are reborn in him, according to the testimony of Paul, but also wisdom.43 From these passages, one can appreciate Erasmus’ rendition of the sapiential dimension of Christ. Given the characterization of Jesus first of all as a teacher of wisdom, the parallelism between Jesus and Socrates in many passages of Erasmus’ early works is not surprising. However, in the young Erasmus, this characterization of Christ as a teacher is not in contradiction with the salvific nature of his incarnation and coming to earth. The two aspects would later be presented as a dichotomy by the Wittenberg Reformers, who accused Erasmus of devaluing the figure of Christ by equating him with one of the pagan philosophers. 40  41 

Ibid., 56. CWE 66.38; ASD V–8.126–28: Pax igitur summum illud est bonum. Ad quam omnia sua studia mundi quoque amatores referent, sed falsam, vt dictum est. Eandem et philosophi suorum dogmatum sectatoribus falso pollicebantur. Christus enim vnus eam donat, quam mundus non potest dare. Ad hanc perveniendi vna ratio est, si cum nobis ipsis ellum geramus, si cum viciis nostris acriter depugnemus. 42  CWE 66.38; ASD V–8.128: Atque ex omnium viciorum genere contracta colluuies a Stoicis, fortissimis assertoribus virtutis, stulticia vocatur, in nostris litteris malicia dicitur, itidem vt omnibus suis numeris absoluta probitas vtrisque sapientia nominatur. 43  CWE 66.38–39; ASD V–8.128: Contra sapientiae author atque ipsa adeo sapientia Christus Iesus, qui verum est lumen, stulticiae mundanae noctem solus discutiens, splendor paternae gloriae: qui nobis in se renatis vti factus est redemptio atque iustificatio teste Paulo, ita factus est et sapientia.



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Despite these later accusations, which Erasmus forcefully countered, in the Enchiridion he is already careful to distinguish between philosophical and Christian truth. He postulates the superiority of Christian revelation, the only source of peace and tranquility of mind. However, Erasmus also admits that, among the philosophers, the doctrine of the Platonists is closest to Christian faith. Indeed, in his description of wisdom, he does not clearly demarcate between a philosophical(human) wisdom and a revealed (divine) wisdom. Drawing from Paul’s language, Erasmus contrasts the wisdom of the world and the wisdom of Christ. The former laughs at Christ and those who follow him, while the latter is the road to salvation. Docility (mansuetudo) and modesty (modestia) are the “attendants” of this wisdom. “Docility makes us capable of receiving the Holy Spirit”.44 The Spirit, then, reinforces our virtue and generates in us an interior joy. The Spirit leads us to the supreme virtue, but the first step in order to travel this route is represented by the precept that the ancients – as Erasmus points out – considered that they had received from heaven: Nosce te ipsum (as expressed in Phaedrus 229E, and quoted by Erasmus in Adagia I VI 95). Here pagan and Christian wisdoms coincide. Indeed, Erasmus notes that this pagan precept is confirmed by Scripture. In the Old Testament the mystical lover in the Canticles says to his spouse: “If you do not know yourself, fairest among women, go forth and follow in the path of your flock” (Song of Solomon 1:17).45 But the path to wisdom is arduous. Knowing oneself is difficult, as even Paul, who had the privilege of access to the mysteries of the third heaven (2 Cor. 12:2), did not want to judge himself (1 Cor. 4:3), thus recognizing that he did not know himself sufficiently.46 Therefore, Erasmus invited Christians to investigate human nature. First, he incorporated the Pauline division between the outer and inner man (homo interior and homo exterior), claiming that “man is a marvelous creature composed of two or three very diverse parts: a soul which is like a divinity and a body which is like a brute beast”.47 With regard to their bodies, he claims, human be44  CWE

66.40; ASD V–8.130: Haec enim modestiam et mansuetudinem comitem ducit. Mansuetudo nos diuini Spiritus reddit capaces; super humilem enim et mansuetum gaudet requiescere. 45  CWE 66.40; ASD V–8.132: Caput autem huius sapientiae esse puta, vt temetipsum noris. Quod verbi e coelo profectum credidit antiquitas et magnis authoribus vsque adeo placuit, vt in eo omnem sapientiae vim summatim contineri iudicauerint. Sed leue pondus huius dogmatis apud nos sit, nisi congruit cum litteris nostris. Minatur sponsae suae mysticus ille amator in Canticis ac foras abire iubet, nisi semet cognorit: “Si ignoras te, o pulchra inter mulieres, egredere et abi post vestigia gregum tuorum”. 46  CWE 66.40; ASD V–8.132: Paulus, cui contigerat vel tercii coeli mysteria discere, semetipsum tamen non audet iudicare, ausurus vtique, si sibi sat esse notus. 47  CWE 66.41, ASD V–8.132: Est igitur homo prodigiosum quoddam animal ex duabus tribusue partibus multo diuersissimis compactum, ex anima veluti numine quodam et corpore tanquam muta pecude.

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ings are inferior to animals. Animals, indeed, possess physical capacities much superior to those of humans: “But”, Erasmus claims, “with regard to the soul we have such a capacity for divinity that we can soar past the minds of the angels and become one with God. If the body had not been added to you, you would be a divinity; if the mind had not been bestowed upon you, you would be a beast”.48 Having been criticized for this notion that man can “become one with God”, (uno cum Deo fieri) in 1518, Erasmus stated that he found nothing more Christian than the possibility of the union with God.49 Then, Erasmus introduces the concept of original sin. He claims that before the fall, the different parts of human beings operated in perfect harmony. Now, however, in their earthly condition, human beings live in a perennial struggle between their corporeal and corrupt body and their incorporeal and eternal soul: Since the body is itself visible, it takes pleasure in things visible. Since it is mortal, it pursues temporal things; since it is heavy, it sinks downward. On the contrary, the soul, remembering its heavenly origin, strives upwards with all its might and struggles against its earthly burden. It despises those things that are transitory; it seeks those that are true and eternal. Being immortal, it loves things that are immortal; being heavenly, it loves that which is heavenly. Like is attracted to like, unless it has been thoroughly immersed in the impurity of the body and by contagion from it has degenerated from its native nobility.50

This dichotomy between the interior and exterior man, between the higher and lower elements of human nature, was a cornerstone of the anthropology of Pico and Ficino. Both these thinkers, despite their disagreements,51 directed their efforts towards proving the mobility of the soul, which could ascend to the spiritual level or descend to the corporeal one. As is well known, this concept is discussed at length in Pico’s most famous and misunderstood work, namely his so-called Oration on the Dignity of Man,52 a brief speech that he planned to give in Rome as a prelude to the 48  CWE 66.41; ASD V–8.132–34: Si quidem corpore vsque adeo reliquo brutorum generi non prestamus, vt omnibus eius dotibus inueniamur inferiores. Secundum animam vero adeo diuinitatis sumus capaces, vt ipsas etiam angelicas mentes liceat praeteruolare et unum cum Deo fieri. Si tibi corpus additum non fuisset, numen eras; si mens ista non fuisset indita, pecus erat. 49  Ep. 843 in CWE 4.690–99. 50  CWE 66.41, ASD V–8.134: Corpus enim, vt est ipse visibile, rebus visibilibus delectatur; vt est mortale, temporalia sequitur; vt est graue, deorsum sidit. Contra anima generis aetherei memor summa vi sursum nititur et cum terrestri mole luctatur; contemnit ea quae videntur, scit enim esse caduca; querit quae vere, quae semper sunt. Immortalis amat immortalia, coelestis coelestia, similis similibus capitur, nisi penitus fuerit corporis immersa sordibus atque a natiua generositate eius contagio degenerarit. 51  I will discuss the controversies between Pico and Ficino in Chapter Four of the present work. 52  Although accepted by Garin in his collection of Pico’s works, in his edition of the 900 Theses, Farmer notes that the title “Oration on the Dignity of Man” does not appear in the 1496 edition edited by Gianfrancesco. See Stephen Alan Farmer, Syncretism in the West: Pico’s 900 Theses (1486): The Evolution of Traditional, Religious, and Philosophical Systems: with Text,



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public discussion of his 900 Theses. Since thirteen Theses were suspected of heresy, Pico was obliged to escape to France, the disputation was cancelled, and the oration was never delivered. Despite this, Gianfrancesco Pico inserted the oration in his 1496 edition of his uncle’s Opera omnia, without including the 900 Theses. Fantazzi has proved that, drawing on Gianfrancesco’s edition, Erasmus quoted other short works of Pico, The Twelve Rules for the Spiritual Struggle (Duodecim regulae Ioannis Pici mirandulae partim excitantes partim dirigentes homines in spirituali pugna) and The Twelve Weapons for the Spiritual Battle (Spiritualis pugna, arma XII).53 Pico’s Twelve Rules is a work which has been almost completely forgotten today, but it was well received in the circles of the Oxford reformers of the fifteenth century. Erasmus’ great friend, Thomas More, translated it, turning the original prose Latin text into an erudite and poetic English version, which he published along with his life of “John Picus”, the two abovementioned duodecalogues, and a third duodecalogus entitled “The Twelve Properties of a Lover”.54 Although Pico’s 1486 “Oration” and his later Twelve Rules might seem to represent opposing positions, Erasmus freely draws on both works: from the Oration to develop his theological anthropology, and from the Twelve Rules to explain how a Christian should behave morally. For this reason, I will further discuss the influence of Pico’s Twelve Rules on Erasmus in the section below on his understanding of morality, but here I will consider the role played by Pico’s Oration in Erasmus’ Enchiridion. In the Oratio, Pico claims, quoting Hermes Trismegistus, that man is a great miracle and, following an unidentified Abdallah the Saracen,55 that there is Translation, and Commentary (Tempe, AR: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1998), 19, note 50. The title De Hominis Dignitate probably appears for the first time in the 1504 Strasbourg edition edited by Emser and Wimpfeling. 53  For the text of Pico’s duodecalogus, I follow the 1557 Basel edition of Pico’s Opera omnia: Ioannes Pico Mirandula, Opera Omnia Ioannis Pici, Mirandvlæ Concordiæq́ ue comitis, Theologorum & Philosophorum, sine controuersia, principis: Viri, siue linguarum, siue rerum, & humanarum & diuinarum, cognitionem spectes, doctrina & ingenio admirando. Svnt Avtem Haec Qvae Ab hoc autore felicissimé scripta sunt …. Item Cabala Ioannis Reuch­lini, ad intelligenda loca quædam Pici, magno usui futura Lectori (Basel: Petri, 1557). 54  For further discussion, see: Stanford E. Lehmberg, “Sir Thomas More’s Life of Pico della Mirandola,” Studies in the Renaissance 3 (1956): 61–74; Vittorio Gabrieli, “Giovanni Pico and Thomas More,” Moreana 4, no. 3 (1967): 43–57; Michael P. Foley, “Paradoxes of Pain: The Strategic Appropriation by Thomas More of Pico della Mirandola’s Spiritual Works,” Moreana 47, no. 1–2 (2010): 9–22. 55  The identity of Abdallah the Saracen mentioned by Pico is still a matter of contention among scholars. For an overview of the literature on this topic, see: Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, 108, note 3. It is worth mentioning that Pier Cesare Bori has suggested that Pico could refer to Anselm Turmeda (1355–1423), a Franciscan friar who converted to Islam and took the name Abd-Allah at-Tarjuman. In 1417 Anselm-Abdallah published his Disputa de l’ase in which a donkey and a monk discusses if human beings are superior to animals or vice versa. See: Pier Cesare Bori, “I tre giardini nella scena paradisiaca del De hominis dignitate di Pico della Mirandola,” Annali di storia dell’esegesi 13 (1996): 551–64. I fol-

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nothing more wonderful than man.56 Dissatisfied with all the reasons given up till then to explain the uniqueness of the human being, Pico gives his own answer: man’s uniqueness consists in his freedom. Thus, he imagines a fictitious dialogue in which God explains to man that he has been created free and placed at the center of the world. Man, in Pico’s words, is the shaper of his own being: It will be in your power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Alternatively, you shall have the power, in accordance with the judgment of your soul, to be reborn into the higher orders, those that are divine.57

As already demonstrated, this is exactly the concept that Erasmus sets out in his Enchiridion. Man’s soul has the ability to elevate itself to the divine level, or to degenerate into a brutish life. The dichotomy between a ferine and a spiritual life is famously expressed by Pico through a series of contrapositions between the former and the latter. Pico explains that Hebrew theology teaches us that Enoch was transformed into an angel of divinity, the Pythagoreans believed that wicked men were transmuted into animals, and Empedocles thought they could even turn into plants.58 He then clarifies how these myths should be interpreted: It is not in fact the bark that makes the plant, but the dull and insentient nature; not the hide that makes a beast of burden, but a brutish and sensuous soul; not the circular body that makes the heavens, but straightforward reason; not the separation from the body that makes an angel, but its spiritual intelligence.   If you see someone who is slave to his belly, crawling along the ground, it is not a man you see, but a plant; if you see someone who is enslaved by his own senses, blinded by the empty hallucinations brought on by fantasy (as if by Calypso herself ) and entranced by their bedeviling spells, it is a brute animal, you see.59

Here Pico agrees with Ficino, who, in order to prove the compatibility between Platonic philosophy and Christian doctrine, emphasized that the human rational soul could not mix with the irrational nature of animals.60 low the digitalized version of this article available at: https://www.brown.edu/Departments/ Italian_Studies/pico/saggi/tre_giardini.html#23su. 56  Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, 108. 57  Cf. Ibid., 116–17: Poteris in inferiora, quae sunt bruta, degenerare; poteris in superiora, quae sunt divina, es tui animi sententia regenerari. 58 Ibid., 124–27: Hinc ille apud Hebreos et Pythagoricos methamorphoses celebratae. Nam et Hebreorum theologia secretior nunc Enoch sanctum in angelum divinitatis, quem vocant, ‫מטטרון‬, nunc in alia alios numina reformant; et Pythagorici sceles‌tos homines et in bruta deformant et, si Empedocli creditur, etiam in plantas. 59  Cf. Ibid., 130–31: Et merito quidem: neque enim plantam cortex, sed stupida et nihil sentiens natura; neque iumenta corium, sed bruta anima et sensualis, nec caelum orbiculatum corpus, sed recta ratio; nec sequestratio corporis, sed spiritalis intelligentia angelum facit. Si quem enim videris deditum ventri, humi serpentem hominem, frutex est, non homo, quem vides; si quem in phantasiae quasi Calipsus vanis praestigiis cecutientiem et, subscalpenti delinitum illecebra, sensibus mancipatum, brutum est, non homo, quem vides. 60  Anna Corrias, “Imagination and Memory in Marsilio Ficino’s Theory of the Vehicles



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Both the initial part of Pico’s Oratio and Erasmus’ description of the human soul in the Enchiridion are thus characterized by a strong dichotomy between an animal and spiritual life. Further reflections on the language of Pico’s Oratio and Erasmus’ Enchirdion are, however, needed. The chameleon man, a great miracle according to the famous passage of the Asclepius described by Pico has become, in Erasmus’ terms, a prodigiosum quoddam animal, and the protean man of Pico’s Oratio has become a Promethean man in the Enchiridion. For both Pico and Erasmus, God has imprinted in the human soul a divine spark which paves the way for self-determination. Being essentially divine, the human soul naturally tends to reunite with the divinity. It is essentially this possibility to determine itself that renders the human condition superior to the angels. The dialectic between the ferine and the spiritual in the human soul is resolved by both authors in terms of a mystical ascent to God. Brian Copenhaver, in order to prove the continuity between the first and the second part of Pico’s Oratio as well as to establish the proper meaning of the text in its own intellectual context, pointed out that the theme of human freedom occupies only a small part of the Oratio.61 In order to explain how human beings should live, Pico draws from Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s On the Celestial Hierarchy, the three highest ranks of angels: Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim. These three angelic ranks represent a threefold way of being: active, contemplative, unitive. The ultimate goal of the Oratio is, thus, the Seraphic life, being one with God.62 As we have seen, according to Erasmus the ultimate goal of human life is also uno cum Deo fieri. It is worth noting that the choice of sources made by Erasmus is peculiar to Pico’s and, thus, one can claim that Erasmus drew it from the Oratio. In focusing his efforts to describe the contemplative life, the life of the philosophers, which is indeed propaedeutic to the successive step of the union with God, Pico draws freely from different Christian and Pagan sources. Among others, he quotes the famous passage of Jacob’s ladder (Gen. 28:12): if human beings want to imitate the angelic life, to touch the ladder of the Lord, and ascend to God, first they have to purify themselves, since, being impure, it is impossible to get in contact with what is pure.63 At the climax of Pico’s description of the of the Soul” The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 6 (2012): 81–114. For Ficino’s interpretation of the Pythagorean tradition, see also: Christopher S. Celenza, “Pythagoras in the Renaissance: The Case of Marsilio Ficino,” Renaissance Quarterly 52 (1999): 667–711. Brian Ogren has argued for a coextensive use of the literal and allegorical meaning by Pico in these passages. Thus, he pointed out that Pico believed in the transmigration of souls. See: Brian Ogren, Renaissance and Rebirth: Reincarnation in Early Modern Italian Kabbalah, Studies in Jewish History and Culture (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 212–37. 61  Brian P. Copenhaver, “The Secret of Pico’s Oration: Cabala and Renaissance Philosophy,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 26 (2002): 56–81. 62  Ibid., 58–63. 63  Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, 146: Has manus, hos pedes, idest totam sensualem partem in qua sedet corporis illecebra quae animam obtorto (ut aiunt) detinet

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human soul’s desire for the divine, the Count of Mirandola quotes the famous myth of the charioteer in Plato’s Phaedrus (244 ff.), rhetorically asking who does not want to fly away from this sinful world and ascend to the heavenly Jerusalem.64 In the same way, Erasmus mixes these two paradigmatic Christian and Platonic metaphors: Therefore, my brother, do not progress slowly by dint of reluctant effort, but by moderate exercise arrive at quick and vigorous adulthood in Christ. Embrace zealously this rule, not to willing to crawl along the ground with unclean animals, but supported on those wings whose growth Plato thinks are induced in our minds by the heat of love and shoot out anew, raise yourself as on the steps of Jacob’s ladder from the body to the spirit, from the visible to the invisible, from the letter to the mystery, from sensible things to intelligible things, from composite things to simple things.65

Plato’s Phaedrus is, indeed, one of Erasmus’ main sources.66 He quotes it again and again in discussing the role of passions and reason in human life. Reading and quoting Plato from Ficino’s 1484 Latin translation, Erasmus also had in front of him Ficino’s short introductions to the Platonic dialogues. These brief commentaries were republished and expanded on by Ficino in 1496 (Commentaria in Platonem). It is not surprising, therefore, that in interpreting Plato, Erasmus had reflected upon them. As mentioned above, Kristeller suggested that the young Erasmus might have been influenced by Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Symposium. This hypothesis must, however, be rejected. As noted by Michael J. B. Allen,67 while Ficino describes love as the principle of cosmic collo, ne a scalis tamquam prophani pollutique reiciamur, morali philosophia quasi vivo flumine abluamus. At nec satis hoc erit, si per Iacob scalam discursantibus angelis comites esse volumus, nisi et a gradu in gradum rite promoveri, et a scalarum tramite deorbitare nusquam, et reciprocos obire excursus bene apti prius instructique fuerimus. 64  Ibid., 164; Quis non Socraticis illis furoribus, a Platone in Pheadro decantatis, sic afflari non velit ut alarum pedumque remigio hinc, idest ex mundo, qui est positus in maligno, propere aufugiens, ad caelestem Hierusalem concitatissimo cursu feratur? 65  CWE 66.88; ASD V–8.216: Tu igitur, mi frater, ne tristibus laboribus non multum promoueas, sed mediocri exercitio cito grandis et vegetus euadas in Christo, hanc regulam diligenter amplexus ne velis cum immundis animalibus, humi reptare, sed semper alis illis nitens, quas Plato putat in animis amoris calore elicitas denuo pullulascere, a corpore ad spiritum, a mundo visibili ad invisibilem, a littera ad mysterium, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia, a compositis ad simplicia temetipsum quasi gradibus quibusdam scalae Iacob erige. 66  It is important to note that a Christian interpretation of the Platonic myth of the charioteer was already common in the Greek Fathers. George Karamanolis has pointed out that Clement of Alexandria sometimes interpreted Christ as the charioteer, and other times substituted Christ with the human soul; Origen used the Platonic myth in the Contra Celsum, and Gregory of Nyssa extensively drew from the myth of the charioteer in his De anima et resurrectione, see: George Karamanolis, “The Reception of Plato’s ‘Phaedrus’ in Early Christianity,” in The Reception of Plato’s Phaedrus from Antiquity to the Renaissance, ed. Sylvain Delcomminette, Peter d’Hoine, and Marc-Antoine Gavray, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2020), 103–18. 67  Michael J. B. Allen, Marsilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus and its Myth of the Demiurge (Oxford; Berkeley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987).



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harmony in De amore, later, in Theologia Platonica, he replaces love with the soul as “the ontological and epistemological mirror of the universe”.68 This notion is repeated and expanded in Ficino’s later commentaries on the Platonic corpus. Moreover, it has been long recognized that in some years of his life Ficino claimed the superiority of the intellect over the will, while in others he claimed the opposite. The ambivalent relationship in Ficino’s thought between two faculties of human mind has been discussed by Paul Oskar Kristeller,69 James Hankins,70 and Tamara Albertini.71 For our purpose here, it is necessary to note that in his commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, Ficino gave a prominent role to reason (ratio) in human nature and, more importantly, he interpreted the myth of the charioteer as a dichotomy between reason and the passions.72 In my view, it is this work of Ficino which influenced Erasmus. Indeed, Ficino’s impact on Erasmus’ Enchiridion becomes explicit if we take into consideration Ficino’s commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus. As we have seen, Erasmus quotes the adage “know thyself” from Plato’s Phaedrus, links it with the Song of Solomon, and argues that if human beings knew themselves, they would understand that they had to follow their spiritual, not their corporeal, nature. Ficino comments on Socrates’ words in Phaedrus as follows: Finally Socrates says that when a man’s intelligence has been purged and he is dedicated to God, he is filled with every good, and he alone is wise, although, outside of himself as it were, he may be derided by the crowd as insane. Next he delves deep into the divine frenzy of legitimate love, which, he maintains, is kindled in the rational soul when the soul, in regarding the body’s beautiful shape, recalls with ease the divine beauty it had once contemplated and flames with desire and frenzy to recover it. He describes the frenzy opposite to this as bestial, not ascending from the body’s shape to divine intuition but descending shamefully to sexual union. He also describes a peculiarly human frenzy midway between the divine and the bestial; it is enkindled in the rational soul of the man who is busy admiring bodily shape but who neither surrenders the divine form entirely 68 

Ibid., 400. Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, trans. V. L. Conant, Columbia Studies in Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 256–83. See also: Paul Oskar Kristeller, “A Thomist Critique of Marsilio Ficino’s Theory of Will and Intellect: Fra Vincenzo Bandello da Castelnuovo, OP, and His Unpublished Treatise Addressed to Lorenzo de’ Medici,” in Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1965), 147–70. 70  James Hankins, “Lorenzo de’ Medici’s De summo bono and the Popularization of Ficinian Platonism,” in Humanistica: Per Cesare Vasoli, ed. Fabrizio Meroi and Elisabetta Scapparone (Florence: Olschki, 2004), 61–69. 71  Tamara Albertini, “Intellect and Will in Marsilio Ficino: Two Correlatives of a Renaissance Concept of the Mind,” in Marsilio Ficino. His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy., ed. Valery Rees, Michael J. B. Allen, and Martin Davies, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden; Boston; Cologne: Brill, 2002), 203–25. 72  For the text of Ficino’s commentary to Plato’s Phaedrus and the English translation, I follow: Marsilio Ficino, Commentaries on Plato: Phaedrus and Ion, ed. James Hankins, trans. Michae J. B. Allen, 2 vols., vol. 1, The I Tatti Renaissance Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 69  Paul

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to oblivion nor recalls it entirely. Consequently he is neither entirely intemperate, nor entirely temperate, but seems, as it were, now incontinent, now continent.73

Not unlike Erasmus, Ficino argues that when the soul liberates itself from the corporeal body, it can freely contemplate God. On a lower level, the soul can also see bodily beauty, recall the divine beauty, and desire to contemplate it. Those, however, who spend their lives seeking out sensual pleasures are no different from animals. Finally, just like Erasmus, he claims that these mysteries have been revealed by Solomon in his Canticle.74 This dichotomy between a contemplative and a brutish life mirrors the opposition between reason and the passions. It is possible to live a contemplative life and, thus, become one with God, only after we follow the dictates of reason. On the contrary, the passions lead us towards earthly things, transforming us into animals. Ficino claims that Plato locates reason in the head, like the prince in his citadel, the power of wrath in the heart, like a military order, fighting on behalf of reason, and the power of desire in the liver, like the mob of craftsmen and peasants.75 In the same way, Erasmus emphatically proclaims that “reason is like a king in the human being”.76 Moreover, he argues that Plato “established the seat of the divine soul, that is, reason, in the brain, as if in the citadel of our city, like a king, in the loftiest part of the body nearest to the heavens”.77 Erasmus goes on to claim that Plato correctly noted that man could reach happiness in this life only by repressing such disorders. However, not all the passions were intrinsically corrupt, and one had to carefully distinguish between 73  Ibid., 44–45: Denique virum purgata mente deo deditum omnibus inde bonis impleri solumque sapientem esse, quamvis quasi extra se positus vulgo derideatur velut insanus. Post haec descendit ad divinum legitimi amoris furorem, quem accendi putat in animo, quando, pulchram aspiciens corporis formam, divinae pulchritudinis, quam quondam contemplatus fuerat facile recordatur, illiusque recuperandae desiderio inflammatur et furit. Sed contrarium huic describit furorem quasi ferinum, a forma corporis non ad divinum intuitum ascendentem sed ad venereum congressum turpiter descendentem. Describit rursus humanum quondam furorem inter divinum atque ferinum, in eius accessum animo, qui admiratione formae corpore occupatus, neque oblivioni divinam tradit omnino, neque penitus recordatur. Quo fit ut neque intemperatus sit omnino neque etiam temperatus, sed modo quasi incontinens modo continens videatur. 74  Ibid., 46: Deinde passiones amantium tam continentium quam incontinentium mutuumque amorem quasi poeta depingit. Quo fit ut non aliter his allegorice indulgendum sit quam canticis Salomonis. 75  Ibid., 162: Plato rationem in capite collocat ut principem in arce, iracundiae vim in corde tanquam ordinem militarem pro ratione propugnaturum, concupiscendi potentiam in iecore tanquam opificum agricultorumque turbam. 76  Cf. CWE 66.42, ASD V–8.136: In homine vero ratio regis vice fungitur. 77  Cf. CWE 66.43, ASD V–8.136–38: Et diuinae quidem animae, id est rationi, tamquam regi in cerebro velut in arce, ciuitats nostrae sedem statuit, corporis videlicet parte editisima coeloque proxima, tum minime bruta, quippe quae et osse sit pertenui neque neruis neque carne onerata, sed sensibus intus forisque longe munitissima, vt illis quasi renunciantibus nihil tumultus in rep. cooriretur, quod non protinus ille persentisceret.



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natural passions, which needed to be controlled and redirected toward virtue, and those that transformed humans into animals. Also, in this case, Erasmus’ main source seems to be – together with his own reading of Plato’s Timaeus – Ficino’s commentary on the Platonic myth of the charioteer in the Phaedrus. In his commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus, Ficino explains that “Socrates defines base love as a certain passion or lust that rebels against the reason; it overwhelms the opinion, which is trying to do what is right, and enraptures it instead with the pleasure of shape”.78 Indeed, in Ficino’s interpretation of the Platonic text, the charioteer represents reason, while the two horses are the appetites: the good horse represents the rational appetite, and the bad horse the irrational appetite. However, in the irrational appetite, wrath is better and less dangerous than concupiscence.79 Discussing the same passage in his Summa, Ficino explains this distinction more clearly, arguing that “the irascible power is more outstanding than the concupiscible and more nearly related to the reason, and that often it raises up for reason’s sake against concupiscence”.80 In this sense, for Plato, it is more obedient to reason, which has a regal position in the human being.81 Following Ficino, Erasmus claims that Plato removes passions from the divine soul. He places the part of the soul which deals with courage and wrath between the brain and the midriff, whereby wrath cannot be considered completely brutish, although it is a passion to be controlled. Plato confined the desire for food and drinks, as well as for sexual appetite, to the region extending from below the midriff to the liver and the stomach.82 In this way, the creator had not only impressed his image on man, but also ensured that the external parts of the body mirrored the internal parts of the soul: the mind is the uppermost part of man, closer to heaven, as proof of his regal nature and its right to lead the entire human body, gradually going down, the nobility of the body de78  Cf. Marsilio Ficino, Phaedrus Commentary, 40–41: turpem amorem definit esse cupiditatem quandam sive libidinem a ratione rebellem, quae superet opinionem ad recta tendentem, et ad formae rapiat voluptatem. 79  Ibid., 44–46: Hinc revertitur iterum ad vires animae dividendas, et rationem quidem aurigam vocat, geminos vero appetitus equos geminos: appetitum rationale equum bonum, appetitum irrationalem equum malum; sed in hoc genere appetitum vergentem ad iracundiam minus malum, declinantem vero ad concupiscentiam magis malum. 80  Ibid., 162–63: Irascibilem concupiscibili praestantiorem putat et rationi propinquiorem, ac saepe pro ratione insurgentem contra concupiscentiam. 81 Ibid.: Ideo illam elata cervice describit magnaniman et audentem, aquilinam, id est regiam, participem pudoris, rationi magis obtemperantem. 82  CWE 66.43; ASD V–8, 138: At mortalis animae partes, id est affectus, vt quaeque rationis vel morigera est vel obstrepera, ita ab ea semouit. Nam inter ceruicem et diaphragma partem animae constituit fortitudinis atquae irae participem, affectum videlicet seditiosum quidem illum et cohibendum, at non perinde brutum, eoque mediocri interuallo a summis imisque semouit, ne vel nimia vicinitate regis ocium perturbet vel infimae plebis contagio corrupta simul in eum coniuret.

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creases until it arrives at the most brutish organs in human beings, that is, the reproductive organs.83 The preeminence of reason, described as a king in the human being, the superiority of the irascible powers to the concupiscent ones, and the discordance which the struggle between these different parts creates in man, are all topics that Erasmus reinterpreted from Ficino’s exposition of the Platonic myth of the charioteer. Furthermore, Erasmus seems to suggest that original sin did not affect rationality, the highest part of human nature. In fact, whenever reason (ratio), in which divine ideas have been implanted, acts autonomously, man tends to be led toward the good. However, reason, like all kings, can be overwhelmed by passions. Thus, Erasmus claims: As a consequence of the divine law that is engraved in him, our king (reason) can be overthrown, but he cannot be corrupted without protesting and seeking redress. If the remaining part of the republic, the common people, obey him, he will never commit any action that is regrettable or pernicious, but everything will be carried out with great moderation and tranquility. It is true that the Stoics and the Peripatetics have slightly different views on the passions, but there is universal agreement that we must live according to reason and not according to the passions.84

Erasmus recalls that, whereas the Stoics considered the passions to be diseases of the mind which needed to be completely eradicated from men, the Peripatetics argued that they should not be eradicated, merely subdued. In the doctrine of the Peripatetics, the passions can be useful in the pursuit of virtue: anger, for instance, can lead us to behave courageously. Finally, Erasmus argues that Socrates in the Phaedo seems to agree with the Stoics when he affirms that philosophy is nothing other than a meditation on death, and claims that men have to distance themselves as much as possible from corporeal and sensible things.85 83 Ibid.: Huius infima pars quam pecorina sit quamque rebellis, vel illa pudenda corporis portio, in qua potissimum tyrannidem obtinet, documento potest esse, quae membris ex omnibus vna frustra reclamante rege obscaenis motibus subinde rebellionem parat. 84  Cf. CWE 66.44.140: Noster autem rex propter aeternam legem sibi diuinitus insculptam opprimi quidem potest, corrumpi non potest, quin reclamet, quin reuocet. Cui si reliqua plebs parebit, nihil ille vnquam neque poenitendum neque perniciosum committet, sed summa moderatione summaque tranquillitate gerentur vniversa. Ac de affectibus quidem Stoici Peripateticique non nihil diuersa sentiunt, quanquam illud conuenit inter omnes, ratione viuendum, non affectu. 85 Ibid.: Atque ob id perfectum illum sapientem suum omnibus eiusmodi motibus tanquam morbis animi vacare volunt, vixque humaniores quidam primos illos impetus rationem preuertentes sapienti concedunt, quas illi phantasias appellant. At Peripatetici non extirpandos affectus, sed coercendos docent. Esse enim nonnullum eorum vsum, propterea quod hos a natura additos opinentur vti quaedam ad virtutem incitabula atque exhortamenta, sicuti fortitudinis iram, industriae inuidiam et item de reliquis. Socrates autem in Phedone Platonis qum nihil aliud putat esse philosophiam quam mortis meditationem, hoc est vt animus quantum potest abducat sese a rebus corporeis et sensibilibus transferatque ad ea, quae ratione, non sensibus percipiantur, cum Stoicis nimirum sentire videtur.



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Ficino concludes his Summa to Chapter 31 by describing the internal battle between reason and the concupiscible power: the latter, the bad horse in Plato’s allegory, leads man toward sensible beauty, the former restrains it. This attempt by reason to obstruct the descent into the sensible world incites, even more, the concupiscible power, which, moved by abstinence, becomes even more rebellious against reason; over time, however, reason “tames desire” in a philosopher.86 Erasmus concludes his discussion on the diversity of passions in a similar manner, maintaining that all passions can be constrained by reason and redirected toward virtue. Thus, no one is compelled by vice, as some falsely claim. However, there are people who are more inclined to virtue than others. “Such differences do not proceed from any fundamental diversity of minds, but from the influence of heavenly bodies, or one’s ancestors, or education, or physical make up”.87 According to Erasmus, women are by virtue of their nature more vainglorious, young men more aggressive; but no matter to which kind of passion we are inclined by nature, our reason can control it and redirect it toward virtue. In this sense, Erasmus can conclude: “Therefore, the only road to happiness is first to know yourself and then not to act in anything according to the passions but in all things according to the judgment of reason”.88 This is difficult, but Erasmus emphasizes that Plato correctly believed that “what is beautiful is also difficult”.89 Ficino concludes his description of the allegorical battle between the sensual and the spiritual man by emphasizing that the temperate man, moving from sensible to divine beauty and with heavenly inspiration, comes out victorious.90 Erasmus, on his part, concludes that subduing the corruption of the flesh is not only possible, but is indeed the true essence of Christian life. The reward for victory in this struggle is happiness.91

86 Marsilio Ficino, Phaedrus Commentary, 164: Ratio tandem scilicet in philosopho domat concupiscentiam. 87  Cf. CWE 66.44, ASD V–8.142. Atque vt est alia resp. alia factiosior, ita alius alio ad virtutem propensior, quae differentia non ex animorum discrimine, sed vel ex influxu coelestium corporum vel progenitoribus vel ex educatione vel ex ipso corporis habitu proficiscitur. 88  Cf. CWE 66.46, ASD V–8.142: Haec igitur est vnica ad beatitudinem via, primum vt te noris, deinde vt ne quid pro affectibus, sed omnia pro iuditio rationis agas. 89 Ibid.: ‘At difficile est’, inquies, ‘quod praecipis’. Quis negat? Atqui verum est illud apud Platonem adagium quae pulchra sunt, eadem esse difficilia. The same sentence is quoted also in Adagium II.1.12 (1012). 90  Marsilio Ficino, Phaedrus Commentary, 164: Eiusmodi pugna continentis est, qui postea temperatus evadit tandemque divinus, scilicet a pulchiritudine sensibili ad intelligibilem profectus, divinitusque afflatus. 91  CWE 66.46; ASD V–8.142: Nihil fortius quam vt quis seipsum vincat, sed nullum maius praemium quam beatitudo.

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2.3  Origen, Plato, and the Allegorical Reading of the Bible Having based his anthropology on the concept of the mobility of the rational soul, which he drew from Pico and Ficino, Erasmus applies this notion of the human being to his reading of the Scriptures by equating the Platonic and the Pauline understanding of the human being. This step was not difficult for Erasmus since it had already been done by John Colet. In his Commentary on Romans, Colet identifies the human soul with the Pauline homo interior and the human body with the animal part of man.92 Erasmus emphasizes that the words of the philosophers were meaningless if they were in contradiction with the Scriptures. Therefore, he needs to prove that the conception of man he derived explicitly from Plato – and tacitly from Pico and Ficino – is also found in the Scriptures. He claims that this is exactly what we recognize if we read the Bible beyond its literal sense. In Erasmus’ eyes, there is no contradiction between the Platonic and the Pauline understanding of man. The difference lies in the language – the philosophers expressed the same concept one can read in the Bible but using different words: The authority of the philosophers would be of little effect if all those same teachings were not contained in the sacred Scriptures, even if not in the same words What the philosophers call reason Paul calls either spirit or inner man or the law of the mind. What they call passions he calls the flesh, the body, the outer man, the law of the members.93

Reason (ratio), which, as noted above, Erasmus posits as a king in human nature, is nothing other than the Pauline spiritus or homo interior, while the passions which transform men into animals are nothing other than the Pauline caro or homo exterior. Cornelis Augustijn has claimed that the dichotomy between flesh and spirit is a hermeneutical tool in Erasmus’ thought.94 In the following years, increasingly, Erasmus would give a specifically theological interpretation to these concepts; but this notion is already fully expressed in the Enchiridion and its philosophical basis lies in Platonic philosophy. Having postulated this continuity between philosophy and theology, Erasmus can read Paul’s letters according to the interior struggle in man between 92  “And herein, that the Apostle’s language may be better understood, we must observe that- man consisting of a soul (which St. Paul calls the inner man) and a sentient body (which may be termed, in Platonis’ words, the animal part of man):” Cf. John Colet, An Exposition of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans: Delivered as Lectures in the University of Oxford about the Year 1497, trans. Joseph Hirst Lupton (London: Bell & Daldy, 1873), 16–17. 93  CWE 66.47; ASD V–8.144–46: Iam vero philosophorum leuis sit authoritas, nisi eadem omnia, tametsi verbis non iisdem, sacris in litteris precipiuntur. Quod philosophi rationem, id Paulus modo spiritum, modo interiorem hominem, modo legem mentis vocat. Quod illi affectum, hic interim carnem, interim corpus, interim exteriorem hominem, interim legem membrorum appellat. 94  According to Augustijn, “Of course he took the concepts of ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit’ from Paul, but the significance he gave them rather suggests Platonism”: cf. Augustijn, Erasmus, 53.



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reason and passion. Thus, Erasmus enumerates a series of Pauline passages in order to confirm his platonic interpretation of the Scripture. In the Emser edition of the Enchiridion Romans 7 and 8, 2 Corinthians 4, and Galatians 5 are explicitly presented as the passages which confirm the concordance between Plato and Paul (Concordia Platonis et Pauli).95 Then, Erasmus switches to the Old Testament. Here, Erasmus deals with some of the most controversial biblical passages and uses Origen in order to interpret them allegorically.96 So, in Erasmus’ eyes, the story of Esau and Jacob is a metaphor to indicate the dichotomy between flesh and spirit. According to Genesis, Esau was born before Jacob, but Jacob was the favorite son. Origen interpreted this biblical episode as a metaphor of the dichotomy between the highest and lowest parts in human nature.97 Following his favorite ancient commentator, Erasmus argues: “This is to show that the carnal comes first, but the spiritual is preferred”.98 In the same way, Paul’s declaration that women must obey to men (Eph. 5:22) has to be interpreted in light of the dichotomy between flesh and spirit. Indeed, Erasmus comments: “The carnal passions are our Eve, whose glance the clever serpent attracts daily”.99 Following Origen, Erasmus also interprets allegorically several passages of the Old Testament: in Genesis 16:4–5 Sarah (the passions) has to call Abraham (the reason) “Lord”.100 Sarah herself does not want Isaac (reason) to play with Ishmael (the passions).101 If the Bible shows us that human beings have to submit passions to reason, the Scripture also reveals that winning the interior battle between their brutish and divine natures, human beings attain tranquility of the soul, a perfect harmony. This is the only way to see God, as the Scripture expresses in several passages (“I have seen the Lord and my soul has been saved” – Gen. 32:30 and “No flesh will see me” – Exod. 33:20). The allegorical reading of the Bible leads Erasmus to reconcile the bipartite division of man he had followed up to this point with passages which seem to 95  96 

Enchiridion, ed. Emser, fol. XIII. For the well-known influence of Origen of Alexandria in Erasmus, the classic monography of Andrè Godin is still the best investigation of the theme: André Godin, Érasme, lecteur d’Origène, Travaux d’Humanisme et Renaissance (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1982). For further discussion, see also: Pasquale Terracciano, Omnia in figura: l’impronta di Origene tra ’400 e ’500 (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2012), 133–60; Thomas P. Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification: The Legacy of Origen’s Commentary on Romans (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 129–72. 97  De principiis 2.9.7 PG 11332, as quoted in ASD V–8, note to lines 733–34. 98  Cf. CWE 66.48, ASD V–8.146: Prius enim carnale, sed quod spiritale potius est. 99  Cf. CWE 66.48, ASD V–8.148: Eua nostra carnalis est affectus, cuius oculos callidus ille coluber quotidie solicitat. 100  Ibid.: Origen, Genesim Homiliae, 9.10 PG 12.209 B–C, as quoted in ASD V–8.149, notes to lines 758–62. 101  Ibid., Origen, Genesim Homiliae, 7.2–3, as quoted in ASD V–8, note to line 765.

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propose a tripartite division into body, soul, and spirit. Once again, his main source is Origen (Commentarium in episttulam ad Romanis, 1.5 PG 14 850– 56 and De principiis 3.4 PG 11.320), who interpreted 1 Thes 5:23 (“May your body, soul, and spirit be kept sound for the coming of our Lord, Jesus Christ”), Isaiah 26:9 (“My soul will long for you in the night, but also in my spirit and in my inmost being I shall watch for you until the morning”) and Daniel 3:86 (“Spirits and soul of the just, praise the Lord”) as proof of this tripartite division.102 Therefore, Erasmus comments: From these passages Origen concludes with good reason that there are three parts in man: first, the body or the flesh, the lowest part of us, in which through the fault of our first parents the cunning serpent has inscribed the law of sin, and by which we are incited to base actions and once vanquished, joined to the devil; second, the spirit, by which we reproduce a likeness of the divine nature, in which the supreme maker has engraved with his finger, that is, his Spirit, the eternal law of goodness, drawn from the archetype of his own mind, by which we are glued to God and are made one with him; finally, he established a third and middle soul between the other two, which is capable of sensations and natural movements.103

Then, Erasmus emphasizes the freedom of the soul to attach itself to either the spirit or the body: As in a republic rent by factions, the soul cannot but attach itself to one of the two sides; solicited on this side and on that, it is free to incline to whichever direction it wishes. If it renounces the flesh and goes over to the side of the spirit, it will itself become spiritual, but if it abandons itself to the cupidities of the flesh, it will degenerate into the body.104 102 

CWE 66.51; ASD V–8.152–54. Erasmus also used this tripartite division of the human being, drawn from Origen and Jerome, in his dispute with John Colet, as well in his 1515 Sileni of Alcibiades, see: Jacob Vance, Secrets: Humanism, Mysticism, and Evangelism in Erasmus of Rotterdam, Bishop Guillaume Briconnet, and Marguerite de Navarre, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 20–49. In rule 4 and 5 of the Enchiridion Erasmus combines the Pauline and Origenian tripartite anthropology with the Stoic doctrine of adiaphora: ibid., 36. For Erasmus’ use of Origen in the Enchiridion in relation to his understanding of the human being, see also: David Marsh, “Erasmus on the Antithesis of Body and Soul,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37 (1976): 673–88. 103  Cf. CWE, 66.51; ASD V–8.154: Quibus ex locis non absurde colligit triplicem hominis portionem: corpus siue carnem, infimam nostri partem, cui per genitalem culpam legem inscripsit peccati serpens ille veterator quaque ad turpia prouocamur ac victi Diabolo connectimur; spiritum vero, qua diuinae naturae similitudinem exprimimus, in qua conditor optimus de suae mentis archetypo aeternam illam honesti legem insculpsit digito, id est Spiritu suo; hac Deo conglutinamur vnumque cum eo efficimur; porro terciam et inter ista mediam animam constituit, quae sensuum ac motuum naturalium sit capax. 104 Ibid.: Ea velut in factiosa rep. non potest non alterutri partium accedere; hinc atque hinc sollicitatur, liberum habet, vtro velit inclinare. Si carni renuncians ad spiritus partes sese traduxerit, fiet et ipsa spiritalis; sin ad carnis cupiditates semet abiecerit, degenerabit et ipsa in corpus.



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This description of human nature is perfectly consistent with the bipartite distinction Erasmus had postulated up until now. The body, the lowest part of man, has been corrupted by original sin and, thus, leads him toward earthly things; the spirit, on the contrary, has not been touched by original sin, so that in it the divine image continues to shine, and human beings are moved toward celestial and divine things. Finally, the soul is intended as the natural ability to choose between one of the two extremes. It is clear that for Erasmus this description of human nature differs only in words, but not in substance, from the previous bipartite distinction he drew between body and soul. When, at the beginning of the Enchiridion, he claimed that man is “a marvelous creature composed by two or three different parts put together”, he was not expressing doubts or contradiction, but simply meant that the same concept could be described in two different ways. Erasmus found this tripartite division into soul, flesh, and spirit expressed allegorically in different parts of the Scriptures. In the Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 6:16–17: “Do you not know that he who has relations with a harlot becomes one body with her, but he who clings to the Lord is one spirit with him?”) and in the Proverbs (Prov. 6:24–6: “May they preserve you from the wicked woman and from the deceitful tongue of the foreign woman. May your heart not desire her beauty; do not be captivated by her beckoning glances. The price of a harlot is a loaf of bread, but the adulteress makes off with a priceless soul”), Erasmus noted that harlot, heart, and soul indicated the three parts of men. Finally, he concludes: Therefore the spirit makes us gods, the flesh makes us brute animals. The soul constitutes us as human beings, the spirit makes us religious, the flesh irreligious, the soul neither the one nor the other. The spirit seeks heavenly things, the flesh seeks pleasure, the soul what is necessary. The spirit elevates us to heaven, the flesh drags us down to hell, the soul has no charge imputed to it. Whatever is carnal is base, whatever is spiritual is perfect, whatever belongs to the soul as a life-giving element is in between and indifferent.105

Moved toward heavenly things by the divine spirit in his mind and to carnal pleasures by the brute passions which move his body, man is a creature who lives in a continuous tension between the finite and the infinite, the visible and the invisible, the mortal and the immortal. The Bible, and especially Paul, again and again repeat this ambiguous condition of mankind, which was understood correctly by Plato. Thus, the Bible can be correctly understood only if read through Platonic eyes. 105  CWE 66.52; ASD V–8.156: Ergo spiritus Deos nos reddit, caro pecora, anima constituit homines; spiritus pios, caro impios, anima neutros. Spiritus querit coelestia, caro dulcia, anima necessaria. Spiritus euehit in coelum, caro deprimit ad inferos, animae nihil imputatur. Quicquid carnale, turpe est, quicquid spiritale, perfectum, quicquid animale, medium et indifferens.

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2.4  The Moral Level of Erasmus’ Pietas and His Critique of the Ceremonies of the Monks We have seen that in the Enchiridion Erasmus developed a theological anthropology according to which human beings spend their lives in a continuous struggle between their rational part, created in the image of God, and their irrational instincts, which men have in common with animals. We have also seen that Erasmus interpreted several biblical passages allegorically in order to show that the Scriptures picture the nature of man in accordance with the teaching of the Platonists and, thus, invite believers to battle against the lowest parts of their nature. The final part of the Enchiridion, which I will now analyze, examines how people should behave in order to win their interior battles. This third and last part of the work is the moral counterpart of the previous two: just as men have to follow their interior nature, that is, their rational soul, and dismiss their exterior one, that is, their corrupted body, and just as when reading the Bible, it is necessary to overcome the exterior literal sense and appreciate the hidden spiritual meaning of the text, so, too, from a moral point of view, Erasmus tells his readers to dismiss visible earthly things and aspire to the celestial incorporeal realities. This last part of the Enchirdion, therefore, is Erasmus’ proposal for a different understanding of piety in opposition to the ceremonies of the monks. He feels the necessity of reiterating several times that his critique is not directed against ceremonial practices as such: on the contrary, he thinks that praying, fasting and other similar practices could be beneficial. However, they do not represent the essence of Christian life, since they are almost useless in fighting the afflictions of the human soul. Erasmus identifies three different afflictions: blindness, the flesh, and weakness. Each of these afflictions affects a specific part of human being: blindness corrupts right judgment, flesh moves the will toward vice, and weakness undermines the ability of men to progress on the path to virtue: Therefore, as I begin to say, blindness makes us incapable of distinguishing in our choice of things, so that we pursue the worst instead of the best, and choose the less profitable over what should be preferable to it. The flesh influences the passions in such a way that even if we recognize what is best, we love the very opposite. Weakness causes us to give in to weariness or temptation and thus abandon virtue once we have acquired it. Blindness impairs judgment, the flesh corrupts the will, and weakness destroys constancy.106 106  Cf. CWE 66.54; ASD V–8.160: Ergo (vt coeperam) caecitas facit, vt in delectu rerum fere caecutiamus pro optimis pessima sequentes, potiora minus vtilibus posthabentes. Caro sollicitat affectum, vt etiam si quid sit optimum intelligamus, diuersa tamen amemus. Infirmitas facit, vt virtutem semel arreptam vel taedio vel tentatione victi deseramus. Caecitas officit iudicio; caro deprauat voluntatem; infirmitas frangit constantiam.



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These three afflictions are the consequence of original sin. As mentioned above, in the first part of the Enchiridion, Erasmus explains that, detached from the body, the mind would always choose the good. Now, he explains in more detail how original sin affected the human condition. He says that “even if baptism has removed the stain, nevertheless a residue of the old malady remains in us both as a safeguard of humility and as raw material and a fertile terrain for virtue”.107 This passage is interesting not only because Erasmus devalues the consequences of original sin, in comparison to the Augustinian tradition in which he himself was educated, but, more importantly, because he presents original sin as an incentive, not an impediment, to virtue. Therefore, he can describe the kind of virtue demanded of a Christian and its most extreme, even paradoxical, consequences. He argues that natural affections cannot be ascribed to merit. Loving one’s parents or children is not a merit, since animals also do this. What characterizes Christians is the ability to resist the temptation of the flesh, to do what is apparently against nature. Thus, supposing an extreme situation in which we are obliged to choose between God and our parents, friends, or children, Erasmus emphasizes the freedom of the soul, which, as a neutral agent, can follow the temptations of the flesh, which advises it to be practical, to consider the judgment of people or a possible inheritance; or it can, instead, dismiss these downto-earth considerations and, following the Spirit, choose God and become one with him.108 In an extreme situation like this, in which the natural affections and divine precepts are in conflict, the only true and effective remedy is Christ. There is no possible mediation: believers are forced to choose between their faith in Jesus and the glory of the world; but, as in the first part of the work, the path to a Christian life coincides with the choice of the highest part of human nature and the dismissal of the lowest part. Indeed, Erasmus emphatically argues: “There are only two paths: one which by the gratification of the passions leads to destruction, the other which by the mortification of the flesh leads to life”.109 Soon after, he equates the mortification of the flesh with faith in Jesus Christ: “If you wish to live with Christ, you must be crucified to the world with Christ”.110 It is not surprising, therefore, that faith is the first rule for fighting vice. It is specifically directed against a certain kind of vice: ignorance. Christians must ardently believe in God’s teachings and promises, which are in accordance with 107  Cf. CWE 66.54; ASD V–8, 158–60: Nam etsi labem abstersit baptismus, tamen heret adhuc quiddam veteris morbi relictum in nobis tum ad custodiam humilitatis tum materiam segetemque virtutis. 108  CWE 66.52–53; ASD V–8.156–58. 109  Cf. CWE 66.57; ASD V–8.164: Duae tantum viae sunt: altera quae per obsequium affectum ducit in exitium, altera que per mortificationem carnis ducit ad vitam. 110  Cf. Ibid.: Cum Christo mundo crucifigaris necesse est, si voles cum Christo viuere.

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the law of nature. At the same time, reading the Bible is beneficial, since the Scriptures are able to inspire and transform the human heart.111 Just as there are human affections which are morally neutral, neither intrinsically good nor bad, so, too, there are many aspects of life which can be either beneficial or detrimental to piety. It is here that Erasmus’ notion of piety finds its proper Christological sense. In the fourth rule, he addresses the reader directly: “Place Christ before you as the only goal of your life, and direct to him alone all your pursuits, all your endeavors, all your leisure time and hours of occupation”.112 Christ is the ultimate goal and the measure by which to judge things good or bad. There are things which are intrinsically evil, like bearing ill-will toward someone, and things which are intrinsically good and cannot be made bad, like wishing well to all men. However, there are also intermediate things, which are neither bad nor good in themselves, like eloquence, learning, good health, or beauty. These things must be redirected toward Christ in order to be considered good. The first place among neutral things is occupied by knowledge. It can be used for impious goals, which undermine our pursuit of virtue; in such cases, it is better to know less, and love more. Erasmus argues that the same action can be both good and evil: if we act with Christ as our ultimate goal, the action can be considered virtuous; but if the very same action is done for our own benefit, then it is an obstacle on the path to virtue.113 The mistake of the monks lies precisely in the fact that they fail to pursue ceremonies for the sake of Christ. Forgetting Christ, the monks, and also unlearned people, pray or fast in a superstitious way. They transform pious Christian practices into “Jewish ceremonies”. Erasmus identifies his opponents, the enemies of true piety, as Pharisees who misinterpret Paul’s message and apply his expression “the wisdom of the flesh” to the pursuit of secular learning. These people – as Erasmus had already claimed in the Antibarbarians114 – spend most of their lives vilifying Cicero rather than trying to understand the true meaning of the Pauline Epistles. They fail to understand Paul precisely because they do not understand that when he used the term caro, he had meant the visible realm, not merely lust or sensual pleasures, in opposition to the invisible realm, which he referred to as “spiritus” or “anima”.115 A long-established exegetical tradition identified Erasmus’ disdain for the practices of the monks as a moral cri111 

CWE 66.55–56; ASD V–8.160–62. Cf. CWE 66.61; ASD V–8.170–72: vt totius vitae tuae Christum velut vnicum scopum prefigas, ad quem vnum omnia studia, omnes conatus, omne ocium ac negocium conferas. 113  CWE 66.61–62; ASD V–8.174: Verum quae media sunt, non eodem modo omnia aut conferunt aut officiunt ad Christum euntibus. Proinde pro momento quod habent, sunt assumenda aut repudianda. 114  CWE 23.51. 115  CWE 66.76; ASD V–8.202: Qui si linguam Paulinam tam diligenter obseruassent quam fortiter contemnunt Ciceronianam, intelligerent nimirum Apostolum vocare carnem id 112 



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tique tout court,116 and thus labelled him solely as a moral philosopher. However, in this passage, Erasmus is not simply criticizing the moral corruption of the monks, but also emphasizing their failure to understand Paul. This does not mean, however, that Erasmus’ critique of monastic ceremonies did not have a specific moral significance. On the contrary, his understanding of faith, which, as we have seen, is the first weapon against vice, is inextricably connected to moral good works. In the eleventh rule Erasmus argues that there are two big dangers for the pious: the first is temptation, the second the pride which could arise in the believer on account of having resisted temptation.117 This twofold danger, however, has a twofold remedy: against temptation, we must direct ourselves toward Christ, who gives us the strength to resist and defeat temptation; against pride, we have to recognize that whatever we have been able to accomplish, it is not our merit, but Christ’s.118 As noted by Fantazzi, Erasmus derives these two concepts from Pico’s rules. More generally, he seems to have constructed his rules by expanding concepts he found in those of Pico. In his first rule, Pico describes the path to virtue as a continuous struggle against the flesh, the devil, and the world. If we believe that this is difficult, we need to remember that whoever chooses a life “according to the world” has to face difficulties, struggles, and pains even worse.119 Moreover, it is absurd, Pico argues in the third rule, to believe it is possible to ascend to heaven without engaging in spiritual battle, just as Christ ascended to heaven only after having embraced the cross.120 In the fourth rule, Pico argues that everything can become good if it is redirected to Christ. Thus, in the spiritual struggle, nothing should be ascribed to our own merit, and everything to Christ’s. If we prevent our hand from stealing something we like, we should remember the one whose hand was affixed to the cross; if we resist haughtiness, we should remember the one who abandoned his quod visibile est, spiritum quod inuisibile. Docet autem vbique visibilia oportere seruire inuisibilibus, non contra inuisibilia visibilibus. 116  See for further discussion, Albert Rabil, “Cicero and Erasmusʾ Moral Philosophy,” Erasmus of Rotterdam Society Yearbook 8 (1988): 70–90. 117  CWE 66.106; ASD V–8.256: Pios homines duplex potissimum habet periculum, alterum ne in tentatione succumbant, alterum ne post victoriam in consolatione et gaudio spiritali insolescant. 118  CWE 66.107, ASD V–8.258: Itaque aduersus duplex hoc malum erit remedium, si et in conflictu tuae virtuti diffisus ad Christum caput tuum confugias atque in eius vnius beniuolentia spem omnem vincendi ponas et in consolatione spiritali statim gratias agas illi de suo beneficio, tuam indignitatem humiliter agnoscens. 119 Pico, Opera Omnia, ed. Basel, 332: Si homini videt dura uia uirtutis: quia continue oportet nos pugnare adversus carnem et diabolum, et mundum, recordetur quod quamcunque elegerit uitam, etiam secundum mundum, multa illi aduersa, tristitia, incommoda, laboriosa patienda sunt. 120 Ibid.: Recordetur, stultum esse credere, ad caelum posse perueniri, nisi per huiusmodi pugnam, sicut et caput nostrum Christus, non ascendit in caelum, nisi per crucem, nec debet serui conditio melior esse, conditione domini.

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godly nature to assume the shape of a servant and to be humiliated on the cross; and if we are tempted by wrath, we should remember the one who, being God, assumed human nature and accepted patiently the worst humiliations.121 Thus, the only true remedy against vice is to believe in Christ, praying to him constantly,122 in the awareness that every temptation is followed by a new one.123 In this conflict, whose final victory is much sweeter than any pleasure that can be experienced in living a worldly life,124 the good Christian soldier should remember that even Paul, who ascended to the third heaven and was allowed to know the mystery of divinity, never ascribes anything to his own merit, but always to Christ’s. Therefore, the best remedy against haughtiness is to remember constantly that God humiliated himself in order to save the human race.125 This Christocentric description of the Christian life does not undermine the importance of good works but, rather, emphasizes it. As both Pico and Erasmus argue, the devil’s temptations must be conceived as an incentive to practice vir121 Ibid.: Recordetur, non solum esse aegreserandam hanc pugna, sed optandam, etiamsi nullum inde nobis praemium perveniret, solum ut conformemur Christo Deo et domino nostro, et quoties resistendo alicui tentationi, alicui sensibus tuis vin facis cogita cuinam parti crucis Christi conformis reddaris. Vt quando gulae resistens gustum affligis, recordare, illum felle potatum et aceto: quando manus retrahis a rapina alicuius rei quae tibi placet, cogita manus illius pro te ligno crucis affixas: et si resistis superbiae, recordare illum, qui cum in forma dei esset, pro te formam serui accepisse, et humiliatum usque ad mortem crucis: et cum de ira tentaris, recordare, illum qui Deus erat, et omnium hominum iustissimus, cum se tamen videret quasi latronem et illud, et conspui et, flagellari, et opprobriis omnibus affici, et cum latronibus deputari, nullum tamen unquam aut irae, aut indignationis signum ostendit, sed patientissime omnia ferens, omnibus mansuetissime respondebat: et sic discurrendo per singula, inuenies nullam esse passionem, que te Christo aliqua ex arte conformem, non efficiat. 122 Ibid.: Quod in illis duodecim armis, nec in quocumque alio humano remedio, confidas: sed in sola uirtute Iesu Christi, qui dixit: confidite, ego uici mundum: et alibi: Princeps mundi huius eijcitur foras: quare et nos sola eius uirtute confidamus, et mundum posse uincere, et diabolum superare: et ideo debemus semper petere eius auxilium per orationem, et sanctorum suorum. 123 Ibid.: Recordare, cum unam vicisti tentationem, semper aliam esse expectandam, quia Diabolus semper circuit quem deuoret: quare oportet semper seruire in timore et dicere cum propheta. Super custodiam meam stabo. 124 Ibid., 333: Recordare, quod licet in ipso conflictu, tentationis arma, uideatur pugna: tamen longe dulcius est uincere tentationem, quam ire ad peccatum, ad quod te inclina, et in hoc multi decipiuntur: quia non comparant dulcedinem victoriae, dulcedini peccati. Sed comparant pugnam uoluptati, et tamen homo, qui millies expertus est, quid sit cedere tentationi, deberet semel saltem experiri, quid sit uincere tentationem. 125 Ibid.: Propterea, quod tentaris, ne credas te a Deo derelictum, aut Deo parum gratum esse, aut parum iustum et perfectum, memor sis, quod postquam Paulus uidit diuinam essentiam, patiebatur tentationem carnis, qua permittebat Deus eum tentari, ne de superbia tentaretur: in quo etiam homo debet aduertere, quod Paulus qui erat uas electionis, et raptus usque ad tertium coelum, tamen erat in periculo, ne de suis uirtutibus superbiret, sicut ipse dicit de se, ne magnitudo reuelationum extolleret me, datus est mihi stimulus carnis meae, qui me colaphizet. Quare super omnes tentationes, homo debet maxime se munire, contra tentationem superbiae, quia radix omnium malorum superbia est, contra quod unicum remedium est, cogitare semper quod Deus se humiliauit pro nobis usque ad crucem, et mors, nos uel inuitos, eousque nos humiliabit, ut simus esca uermium.



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tue. According to Erasmus, love is the ultimate teaching of Christ. Loving one another is the moral basis of the Christian life. The Church is the living body of Christ, and every single member has the responsibility to struggle for the soul of his weaker brothers, so that no soul for which Christ died is lost.126 But love, as well as hope and faith, has to be interpreted in the context of Erasmus’ understanding of human reason. One can love something bad, like base pleasure. Only reason, created in the image of God, redirects human thoughts toward God and his son: It is that the mind of one who aspires after Christ should be in complete disaccord with the actions and opinions of the crowd, and his model of piety should be Christ alone and no other. For he is the sole archetype, and whoever departs from it even in the slightest deviates from what is right and runs outside the true path. In a similar vein Plato in his Republic with great earnestness, as in his wont, says that whoever has not imbued his mind with firm ideas about good and evil cannot remain steadfast in the preservation of virtue.127

In Erasmus’ eyes, we can experience Christian love only if we correctly apply our reason. Quoting Socrates, Erasmus notes that bad actions arise from false opinions. Thus, both those who look for happiness in Christ and those who look for it in worldly things feel pleasure in what they do. However, the judgment of the latter is so corrupted by their carnal senses that what they taste as sweet is actually bitter.128 Erasmus stresses that the mass of people live in the Platonic cave, confusing shadows and reality.129 Thus, one recognizes a true Christian if he acts as such. Paraphrasing James 2:14, Erasmus argues that: “One thing is certain beyond the shadow of a doubt, and that is that faith without morals 126  CWE 66.96–97, ASD V–8.212: Quid igitur faciet Christianus? Negliget ecclesiae mandata? contemnet honestas maiorum traditiones? damnabit pias consuetudines? Imo si infirmus est, seruabit ut necessarias; sin firmus et perfectus, tanto magis obseruabit, ne sua scientia scandalizet fratrem infirmum et occidat eum, pro quo mortuus est Christus. 127  Cf. CWE 66.85; ASD V–8.216–18: Ea est vt animus ad Christum anhelantis a vulgi tum factis tum opinionibus quammaxime dissentiat nec aliunde quam ab vno Christo pietatis exemplum petatur. Hoc est enim vnicum archetypum, vnde quisquis vel vnguem discesserit, a recto discedit atque extra viam currit. Proinde Plato, grauiter profecto, vt pleraque, in Politia sua negat eum virtutem constanter tueri posse, qui de turpi atque honesto nullis certis opinionibus mentem imbuerit. 128  CWE 66.86; ASD V–8.218: Huc enim pertinet illud a Socrate non absurde dictum, quanquam ab Aristotele reprehensum, virtutem nihil aliud esse quam scientiam fugiendorum atque expetendorum. Non quod non viderit discrimen inter cognitionem honesti atque amorem, sed quemadmodum Demosthenes pronunciationem primum, secundum ac tercium in eloquentia respondit esse, videlicet adeo praecipuam partem signifcans vt in ea totam esse diceret, itidem Socrates agens cum Protagora argumentis euincit tantum in omni virtute momenti scientiam adferre, vt peccata non aliunde proficiscantur quam a falsis opinionibus. Etenim et qui Christum amat et qui voluptatem, pecuniam, honorem falsum amat, nimirum vtrique dulce, bonum ac pulchrum sequuntur. 129  CWE 66.86; ASD V–8.220: Vulgus sunt, quicumque in specu illo Platonico vincti suis affectibus inanes rerum imagines pro verissimis rebus admirantur.

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worthy of faith is of such little worth that it even contributes to one’s damnation”.130 According to Erasmus, faith without good works is not only useless, but even harmful. Christians can genuinely believe in Christ, but if their reason is corrupted by carnal passions, they will act in an unchristian way and their faith will not save them from eternal damnation. In the Enchiridion, this theme, which will become central, positively and negatively, in the Lutheran Reformation, has its philosophical basis in Erasmus’ understanding of Plato’s ratio. Erasmus’ critique of the monastic practices is, therefore, grounded in the Platonic tradition. Using a Pauline expression (Phil. 3:18) that later Luther reiterated again and again in his polemics, Erasmus labels the monks as “enemies of the cross”, since they fail to understand Paul’s distinction between flesh and spirit and transform true religion into empty and superstitious practices. However, as we will see in next chapter, Erasmus’ and Luther’s understandings of who can be placed among “the enemies of the cross” do not coincide. Indeed, Luther had no problem inserting Erasmus himself into this infamous category.

2.5 Erasmus’ Enchiridion and Luther’s Early Theological Anthropology In his letter to Paul Volz on his rejection of a possible crusade against the Turks, Erasmus emphasized that, after all, all human beings, notwithstanding their religious convictions, shared a common humanity. In the Enchiridion, Erasmus posits that this common humanity is based on an internal struggle between the ferine and divine parts in the individual. Drawing from contemporaries (Pico and Ficino) and the Church Fathers (mostly Origen) he interpreted the Pauline Epistles as being based on this struggle between spirit and flesh, an innate tendency toward the good and evil desires derived by original sin. Through an intermingling of different sources, Erasmus conciliates the Pauline bipartite and tripartite anthropology, while he constantly interprets the term caro as referring only to the lowest parts in the human being. In light of his theological anthropology, Erasmus allegorically interprets several passages of the Old Testament as a battle between reason and passion. He consistently applies Origen’s allegorical reading of the Holy Writ, equating the anthropological dichotomy between spirit and flesh with the hermeneutical distinction between the spirit and the letter. Finally, in the last part of the Enchiridion, Erasmus describes the moral implications of his understanding of

130  Cf. CWE 66.86; ASD V–8.222; Hoc certe indubitatissimum est, fidem sine moribus fide dignis adeo nihil iuuare, vt etiam in cumulum cedat damnationis.



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human nature and moves a persistent accusation against the “ceremonies” of the monks. In 1518, fifteen years after its first publication, Erasmus vindicated the Enchiridion, not only defending the orthodoxy of his early work, but also presenting it as an alternative to scholastic theology. Meanwhile, however, the once littleknown Augustinian monk and professor of biblical studies at the University of Wittenberg, Martin Luther, gained popularity for his critique of the indulgence trade. While the widespread catchphrase, “Erasmus laid the egg that Luther hatched” gave the opportunity to the advocates of a reform of the Church to assimilate Luther and Erasmus in a common quest for reform, as well as to their common detractors to accuse both men of spreading heresies and undermining the authority of the Church, I will argue in the next chapter that precisely the understanding of the human being formulated by Erasmus worked as a catalyst for Martin Luther’s early theological anthropology.

Chapter 3

Spirit and Flesh: Luther’s Critique of Erasmus’ Anthropology Published posthumously in 2002, one year after the death of the author, Heiko Augustinus Oberman’s last article represents a compendium, and the apex, of more than thirty years of the author’s intense research on Martin Luther’s theology. As customary, Oberman situates Luther in his medieval background, especially in terms of continuity and discontinuity with late medieval nominalism. Using Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Fides et Ratio (1998) as a point of departure, Oberman stressed the central role of the Franciscan tradition in reshaping how the relationship between God and human beings was conceptualized in the Middle Ages, which ultimately created the intellectual conditions for Martin Luther’s critique of scholasticism to arise and prosper. While John Paul II depicted Thomas Aquinas’ theology as the system which finds the right balance between faith and reason, Oberman underlined the role of the Franciscan tradition in separating scientia and sapientia, and thus liberating them from their mutually suffocating embrace; while the Catholic scholars of the twentieth century praised Aquinas’ notion of the prime mover as the correct understanding of God, Oberman described the transition from the Middle Ages to the Reformation, which found its apex in Luther’s theology, as “the momentous paradigm shift from God as Being to God as Person”.1 Historians of several disciplines, from Church history to the history of medieval and early-modern philosophy, are indebted to Oberman’s scholarship, for at least two reasons: 1) for having freed our understanding of medieval theology from an excessive emphasis on Thomism underlying the degree of variety, complexity, and contradictions which characterized the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century theology, and 2) for having contextualized Luther’s theology in this complex intellectual context which preceded him, and in which he was educated. Subsequent scholarship has paid ever closer attention to Luther’s theology in its medieval context. Erfurt, the university where Luther received his master’s degree, was considered an important stronghold of nominalism and, thus, Luther’s reception of his nominalist background in his multiform aspects (ecclesiology, soteriology, and anthropology) has been closely investigated. In this context, 1  Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “Luther and the Via Moderna: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough,” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 54 (2003): 641– 70.

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however, the influence of other sixteenth-century cultural trends on Luther has received less attention.2 The vast secondary literature on the relationship between Martin Luther and Erasmus of Rotterdam has been generally addressed in relation to their mutual attitude in the years following the publication of Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses until 1524–26, when Luther and Erasmus became embroiled in a dispute regarding the question of the freedom/bondage of the will.3 In this chapter I  would like to suggest that Erasmus’ influence on Luther dates back to 1515–16. While Heiko Oberman correctly argued that this period in Luther’s life marked the start of his critical distance from the soteriology of Gabriel Biel, I show that the intellectual context in which Luther was developing his own theology was much more complex and variegated. Indeed, Luther’s famous critique of the via moderna has to be connected with Luther’s absorption and critique of Erasmus. In a coherent but unconventional move, Luther assimilated the positions of Biel and Erasmus, judging both of them as intrinsically Pelagian. Thus, I argue that the first 18 Theses of the Heidelberg Disputation have to be understood in light of Luther’s critical engagement with these different trends of sixteenth-century literature. Finally, I point out that Luther’s theological anthropology, generally understood in contraposition to medieval scholasticism, is a reaction against Erasmus’ understanding of the human being in his postlapsarian condition, as delineated in the previous chapter.

3.1  The Dialectic between Flesh and Spirit in Luther’s Dictata super Psalterium Before moving the discussion to 1515–16, a brief look at Luther’s early positions in his first lecture on the Psalms is useful. It is well known that a strong dichotomy between flesh and spirit can be found in the so-called Dictata super Psalterium (1513–15). This dualistic concept of the human being has been the subject of much speculation in twentieth-century scholarship. August Wilhelm Hunzinger’s interpretation of the contraposition between flesh and spirit in the young Luther was set against the backdrop of Luther’s early acquaintance with Plato’s philosophy. Luther’s description of human nature, as being divided into carnal and spiritual components, was interpreted by Hunzinger in light of a 2  The most accurate historical research on the intellectual environment in which Luther was working in his early years in the University of Wittenberg is: Helmar Junghans, Der junge Luther und die Humanisten, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte (Weimar: Böhlau, 1984). 3  For an analysis of the extensive secondary literature on the relationship between Erasmus and Luther, see: Johannes Kunze, Erasmus und Luther: Der Einfluß des Erasmus auf die Kommentierung des Galaterbriefes und der Psalmen durch Luther 1519–1521, Arbeiten zur historischen und systematischen Theologie (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2000), 17–24.



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latent Neoplatonic cosmology.4 In opposition to Hunzinger, Gerhard Ebeling rendered an existential reading of Luther’s work. According to Ebeling, although Luther’s hermeneutics did not come to maturity before 1519 with his second commentary on the Psalms, a substantial change from medieval exegesis can already be seen in the Dictata. Ebeling argued that, by reading the tropological sense of Scripture from a Christological point of view, Luther made the reading and interpretation of the Psalms relevant for the inner life of the believer.5 Finally, in his extensive study of the anthropology of young Luther in relation to the anthropologies of Jean Gerson and John Tauler, Steven Ozment interrogated both Hunzinger’s and Ebeling’s interpretations.6 For Ozment, both Huizinger’s Neoplatonic Thesis and Ebeling’s existential interpretation are inadequate to express and handle the complexity of Luther’s thought. If Ebeling’s existential possibilities look more fruitful than Huizinger’s reference to Neoplatonism to interpret the dualism which pervades the Dictata, Ozment emphasized Luther’s need “to construct an ‘objective context’, in which the existential possibility of faith arises”.7 Despite the huge interest in the Dictata super Psalterium in twentieth-century Luther scholarship, especially in a general attempt to pre-date Luther’s famous Turmerlebnis, in many respects the Dictata remains a puzzling document. The meagre quantity of historical material does not give the historian the proper tools to investigate it. For this reason, I will limit myself to indicating the most relevant anthropological positions assumed by Luther in this early work, in order to show how Luther developed them in the following years. In his first lecture on the Psalms, Luther argues that the human soul is divided into an upper and lower part, with the former still bearing the image of God, the latter completely corrupted by original sin. This understanding of human beings in their postlapsarian condition is strictly intertwined with humility and self-knowledge. It is, thus, my goal in this chapter to briefly describe how these different aspects of Luther’s thought interact in Luther’s interpretation of the Psalms. 4 August Wilhelm Hunzinger, Lutherstudien: Luthers Neuplatonismus in der Psalmenvorlesung von 1513–1516, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Leipzig: Deichert, 1906). 5  Gerhard Ebeling’s influential essay on Luther’s hermeneutics was originally published in 1951: Gerhard Ebeling, “Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 48 (1951): 172–230. This text has been republished in the first volume of Ebeling’s Lutherstudien: Lutherstudien, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1971), 1–68. The essay was translated into English and published in three parts on Lutheran Quarterly in 1993: “The Beginnings of Luther’s Hermeneutics,” Lutheran Quarterly 7 (1993): 129–58. 315–38, 451–68. 6  Steven E. Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson, and Martin Luther (1509–16) in the Context of their Theological Thought, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1969). 7  Ibid., 131.

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Luther explicitly interprets Psalm 103 as proof that the Scriptural terms “Spirit” and “Flesh” refer to a superior and an inferior part of the individual respectively. Indeed, he explicitly asserts: “The spirit is the upper area, while the flesh is the lower area of man in this life”.8 Thus, human beings do turn to the flesh, that is to their lower area, or to the spirit, that is to their upper area. Indeed, Luther claims: And thus man with respect to his reason, or according to the soul is “the firmament between the waters” (that is, between the wisdom of the flesh and of the spirit). But if man turns himself toward the wisdom of the spirit, then his upper area is covered with water, because he does not cover the lower area, but the upper area, with water.9

Two comments are necessary: first, in the passage, by bifurcating humans into lower and upper areas, Luther seems to assert that the higher part of the human being has not been corrupted by original sin or, at least, not been completely corrupted; second, recognizing the existence of an upper level in individuals allowed Luther to claim that human beings, by their own powers, can resort to the spiritual level. Indeed, going by Luther’s metaphor of the human soul as the firmament between the waters, first “man turns to the wisdom of the spirit”, and only then is it covered by water, namely by the wisdom of the spirit. This process of self-knowledge is a process of elevating beyond one’s own self and seeing one’s own sinful condition. In his annotation to Faber Stapulensis’ Quincuplex Psalterium, Luther points out that the comprehension of being a sinner and the consequent feeling of “humiliation” which derives from it, can be achieved through faith, which reveals “I am nothing”.10 The “excessus” is thus the process that leads the individual to elevate beyond oneself (super se) and to recognize one’s nothingness, watching oneself in fogs and clouds.11 The dichotomy between Spirit and Flesh as the antithesis between an upper and lower part in the individual and the correlation of this concept with a proc8  Cf. LW 11.320; WA 4.175.14–15: Spiritus enim est superius, caro autem inferius hominis in hac vita. 9  Cf. LW 11.321, WA 4.175.15–19: Et sic homo prout rationalis vel secundum animam est “firmamentum inter aquas et aquas” (id est inter sapientiam carnis et spiritus). Si autem sese vertit ad sapientiam spiritus, iam superiora eius teguntur aquis, quia non inferiora, sed superiora eius tegit aquis. 10  The passage refers to Psalm 115 (116). In the passage “Credidi, propter quod locutus sum”, Luther glosses: unde Domine labia mea aperies et sic os meum annunciabit laudem tuam, et per consequens peccatum meum, ideo humiliatus sum. (WA 4.519.20–22). Then, annotating “ego autem humiliatus sum nimis”, Luther comments: quia cognovi per fidem me nimis nihil esse. (WA 4.519.23). 11  WA 4.519.26–29: Iste est excessus, quando homo elevatur super se secundum leremiam et illuminatus videt quam sit nihil, et quasi de supra respicit in seipsum in suas nebulas et tenebras, tanquam in monte positus infra respiciens, supra ps. 30 in fine. The most lucid account of the extra nos emphasis in the early Luther remains: Karl-Heinz zur Mühlen, Nos extra nos: Luthers Theologie zwischen Mystik und Scholastik, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1972).



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ess of self-discovery is fully expressed in Luther’s comment on Psalm 95. In Luther’s own words: There are two things in man, the spirit and the flesh. The first line of the verse pertains to the spirit, the second to the flesh. For to be in the presence of God properly belongs to the Church according to the soul, and not according to the body. But in the soul there are intelligence and will, the former is adorned through confession, the latter through beauty; the former by light, the latter by color; the former by faith, the latter by love; the former by understanding, the latter by attitude. Therefore confession is the very light of the mind by which we know ourselves, what we are in ourselves, what God is in us, what we have from ourselves, and what we have from God. But that recognition of both is itself the true twofold confession, namely, of our misery and of God’s mercy, of our sin and of God’s grace, of our evil and of God’s goodness. And this is the entire adornment of the understanding, of reason, and speculatively, of virtue. It brings about that man cannot deny the things that are God’s, nor can he attribute to himself the things that are not his own. Therefore it is most aptly called “confession”, because it confesses and ascribes to each his own. But “beauty” is the good will, the entire adornment of active virtue, the force of speculative virtue, the power by which it loves in itself what is God’s and hates what is its own, as the prior confession showed. But all this is in God’s sight. There it is illuminated for this purpose.12

In this passage Luther divides the soul into intelligence and will. Intelligence, the intellective part of the soul, is adorned by faith and understanding, while will, the practical part of the soul, is adorned by love and attitude. Luther describes love with the traditional nominalist terminology as a “goodwill” which leads the believer to hate what is his own and love what is God’s. In order to love the works of God in man, however, the believer must first recognize what comes from God and what instead is proper to the individual. This happens in the intellective part of the soul through a process of self-knowledge. Through confession, the individual penetrates the self, and in this process of self-knowing, discovers the true nature of the self, what is properly human and what derives from God. 12 

Cf. LW 11.260–61; WA 4.109.13–29: Duo sunt in homine, spiritus et caro. Ad spiritum pertinet primus versus locus, alter ad carnem. Quia in conspectu dei esse proprie secundum animam convenit Ecclesie et non secundum corpus. In anima autem est intelligentia et voluntas: ista per confessionem, hec per pulchritudinem ornatur; ista per lucem, hec per colorem: ista per fidem, hec per amorem: ista per intellectum, hec per affectum. Ergo confessio est ipsa lux mentis, qua cognoscimus nos, quid simus in nobis et quid deus in nobis, quid ex nobis, quid ex deo habemus. Agnitio autem ista utriusque rei est ista vera duplex confessio, scilicet miserie nostre et misericordie dei, peccati nostri et gratie dei, malitie nostre et bonitatis dei. Et iste est totus ornatus intellectus, rationis, speculative virtutis: per hanc enim fit, ut homo non possit negare deo que dei sunt, nec potest sibi attribuere que sua non sunt. Ideo propriissime dicitur “confessio”, quia confitetur et tribuit unicuique quod suum est. Sed “pulchritudo” est bona voluntas, totus ornatus practice virtutis, vis appetitive: quo amat in se que dei sunt et odit que sua sunt, sicut confessio prior ostenderat. Sed hec omnia non nisi in conspectu dei sunt: ibi enim ad hoc illuminatur.

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Luther emphasizes the necessity of holiness and majesty, namely, to turn away from evil and avoid the impurity of the body. However, one must also do good works for this.13 Confession and beauty can be understood as two sides of the same coin. One precedes the other, but the other immediately follows the former. Thus, when the believer recognizes his sins, acknowledges them, and diminishes himself, without blaming God, then he is made strong, beautiful, and learned by God.14 Luther’s theology of humility is strictly connected to self-discovery. Humility must induce the believer to descend into himself. Every form of knowledge of God comes from an understanding of himself, which happens through humility, as Luther explains, commenting on Psalm 17:10.15 Confession is, thus, a process of self-discovery through which the individual also recognizes his sins and moves toward God. Commenting on Psalm 4, Luther emphasizes that “the best way to lift the mind up to God is to acknowledge and ponder past blessings”.16 Remembering the goods received in the past gives the confidence to receive them in the future, whereas forgetting the gifts received in the past moves the mind away from God.17 For the young Luther, this process of acknowledgment begins with thanksgiving and confession. In the sacrament of confession, the believer confesses himself to be godly only when he does not arrogate merit to himself, but only to God. In that sense, a confession to be truly godly does not arrogate merit to the individual, but to God. It is God, who through his kindness, freely bestows gifts to the individual, in adversity as well as in prosperity. The prayer must not ask God anything directly: it involves only praying and keeping everything else quiet. Playing with the etymology of the word “Iudeus”, which means confessor, Luther argues that a true Jew, namely a true confessor, empties himself so that he can be full of God.18 13 

LW 11.261; WA 4.109.37–39, 110.1–12. 11.263; WA 4.110.11–17: Potest et aliter intelligi, quod confessio et pulchritudo idem sit, Hod et heder hebr. Quia eadem gratia, qua ornatur anima, simul confitetur nos esse nihil et ex deo habere omnia. Et ita inquantum nihil sumus, confessio nostra est, inquantum acccepimus, pulchritudo nostra est. Agnosce ergo, quod nihil es, et habes confessionem, et agnosce misericordiam dei et pulcher eris. Tibi esto fedus, et eris deo pulcher. Tibi esto infirmus, et eris deo fortis. Tibi esto peccator, et eris deo iustus. 15  LW 10.119; WA 4.120.30–37, 121.1–28. 16  Cf. LW 10.45; WA 3.42.1–2: Optimus enim modus elevande mentis in deum est preterita bona agnoscere et consyderare. 17  Ibid.; WA 3.42.3–5: Preteritorum enim exhibitio est futurorum certitudo, et fidutiam accipiendi prestant accepta dona in preterito. Econtra tota demersio mentis a deo in infernum est oblivio vel inadvertentia bonorum perceptorum. 18  LW 10.46; WA 3.42.16–23: Cum multa fecissem, vel opere, ore aut aliquo meo membro meruissem, ut intelligas eum nullam iustitiam allegare, nullum meritum iactare, nullam dignitatem ostentare, sed nudam et solam misericordiam dei et benignitatem gratuitam extollere, que nihil in eo invenit, propter quod eum exaudiret, nisi quod invocaret, tacitis omnibus 14  LW



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The gifts which the individual should contemplate while praying are primarily righteousness and mercy. These two are the proper spiritual gifts, and all others can be subsumed in them. The natural gifts belong to the realm of goodness rather than mercy.19 Thus, according to Luther, in a mystical sense, the psalmist refers to Jesus, who is the Savior of mankind and reproves the ungodly Jews, who put their faith in front of God.20 Just as confession and beauty are indispensable for one another, but the former is propaedeutic for the latter, in the same way humility and grace cannot be separated. Luther concludes: “Therefore, as long as confession remains in the heart, so long also beauty; as long as humility remains, so long also grace”.21 But this reciprocal relationship between humility and grace remains, since once the person recognizes the self as sinful, the person then confesses to glorify the self. Luther emphasizes that this would be a false and hypocritical confession in denial that man’s passive view of God is generated by God’s active view.22 In the Dictata, Luther still maintains the notion of an “infused grace”. He asserts that the theological virtues transform the lowest part of the human being from sinful to righteous. Commenting on Psalm 75, he interprets the expression “the foolish of heart” tropologically as “the holy soul or theological virtues, which snatched up the senses of the flesh and the members of sin to make them members of righteousness”.23 The dichotomy between Spirit and Flesh should be understood in the context of the infusion of the Holy Spirit in the individual. Thus, Luther continues, the Gospel reveals that all are carnal and what is of the flesh is damnable.24 Because of this, Luther moves the discourse to include the necessity of men continuously judging themselves. Human beings must aliis. Ecce talis debet esse, qui velit dignus confessor et verus Iudeus coram tanta maiestate apparere. 19  LW 10.47; WA 3.43.18–22: Vides igitur, quod propheta exquisitissime agnoscit accepta dona Dei, que, ut dixi, omnia sub iustitia continentur et misericordia, saltem spiritualia, quibus homo coram Deo aliquid sit. Alia autem sunt naturalia, potius bonitatis quam misericordie sunt, que non iustificant aliquem, licet et ipsa gratis donentur. 20  LW 10.48, WA 3.43.28–33: Nota denique, quod, licet ad totam trinitatem loquatur, que est deus iustitie eius, tamen prophetice loquitur de filio, qui proprie est deus noster, iustitie nostre et salvator: in ipso enim et per ipsum iusti sumus in fide eius. Sicut Apostolus multipliciter disputat. Et in hocipso occulte arguit, immo rotundis verbis, impios Iudeos, qui suam iustitiam statuunt et non habent deum iustitie sue, sed volunt esse populus iustitie sue. 21  Cf. LW 11.264: WA 4.111.38–40: Igitur quam diu confessio in corde manet, tam diu et pulchritudo, quam diu humilitas, tam diu et gratia. 22  LW 11.264; WA 4.112.2–7: Quia tunc vere negatio et turpitudo erit in conspectu Dei, eo quod sit confessio et pulchritudo in conspectu tui, que tamen est vera negatio, immo falsa confessio et ficta pulchritudo. Quia iam nec tu deum conspicis nec deus te, sed tu te et ipse se. Quia conspectus dei passivus, unde oritur confessio et pulchritudo, primum fit ex conspectu eius activo. 23  Cf. LW 11.5; WA 3.522.2–3: anime sancte seu virtutes theologice: que rapiunt sensus carnis et membra peccati, ut faciant membra iustitie. 24  LW 11.5; WA 3.522, 10–12: De celo auditum fecisti Iudicium tuum, hoc est iudicium (id est euangelium), quo ostendit omnes carnales et quicquid carnis est, damnabile esse.

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be angry with themselves, have remorse, and confess their own sins. Luther stresses that this form of penance and confession did not happen in works and speech, but in the heart of the believer. He argues that “speech and deed can be faked in confession, but not thought”.25 The psalmist is teaching to confess before God with pure heart. Luther understands Spirit and Flesh as two forces that wage war against each other in the human being: when the Spirit is quiet, the flesh is disturbed, and vice versa. Thus, it is necessary to crucify the desires of the flesh in order to have peace in the heart.26 The flesh is defined by Luther as “a cave of robbers” (spelunca latronum), in which the senses “are the robbers, constantly on the alert for evil”.27 Since Luther uses the term flesh as denoting only the lower part of the human being, it is not surprising that, in order to purge the flesh from its evil desires, Luther proposes a process which invokes the higher part. Against the flesh, Luther argues that “the conscience (synderesis) cries out and reason objects and stirs up clamor and tumult in the ears of God. The second is that by which the spirit plunders the flesh”.28 Commenting on Psalm 76, Luther further explains how the spiritual part of man is purged by the evil desires of the flesh. He describes the work of God as threefold, to include the works of creation, the works shown to the people of Israel in Egypt, and finally the works of redemption and justification, which are properly and only Christian.29 This latter sort of works can be understood according to a fourfold interpretation: literally, it refers to the works done personally by Christ; tropologically, it refers to the works of the soul against the flesh; allegorically, the works mentioned by the Psalmist refer to the works made in the world against every form of evil; anagogically, they refer to the punishment and the rewards given in heaven and hell.30 Luther emphasizes that the tropological sense is the primary sense of Scripture: once it has been correctly explained, the other three senses follow from it.31 In a tropological sense, “the works of the Lord” indicate the works of confession and penance made to purge and chastise the flesh. However, even at 25  Cf.

LW 11.5; WA 3.523.11–13: Quod autem cogitationem exprimit et non locutionem vel operationem, est quia locutio et operatio potest esse ficta, sed non cogitatio confitendo. 26  LW 11.7; WA 3.524.32–36: Quies secundum carnem est tumultus secundum spiritum, quia pax carnis est turbatio mentis. Econtra turbatio secundum carnem est pax mentis, quia sic terra tremit et quiescit. Caro enim quando crucifigitur et in suis passionibus non sinitur, sed castigatur, pacet tunc habet cor. 27  Cf. LW 11.8; WA 3.525.5–6: Sensus enim sunt latrones semper vigiles ad malum. 28  Cf. LW 118; WA 3.525.10–11: ibi enim clamat Syntheresis et remurmurat ratio et excitat strepitum et tumultum in auribus dei. Altera est, qua spiritus predatur carnem. 29  LW 11.10; WA 3.530.12–24. 30  LW 11.12; WA 3.532.1–8. 31  LW 11.12; WA 3.531.34–37: Tropologiam esse primarium sensum Scripture, quo habito facile sequitur sua sponte Allegoria et Anagogia et applicationes particulares contingentium: utile est pro clariore intelligentia multorum amplius ista opera dei distinguere.



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this early juncture, Luther emphasizes that these works happen in faith. Indeed, Luther argues: God’s work and His strength is faith. This makes people righteous and produces all virtues; it chastises, crucifies, and weakens the flesh, so that it should not have its own work or strength but that the work of God should be in it. And thus it saves and strengthens the spirit. But when this happens, then all who do this become God’s works and God’s strength allegorically. And so the Church is God’s work and strength.32

In this passage, Luther gives preeminence to faith among other theological virtues. This early emphasis on faith could be interpreted as an attempt by the young Augustinian monk to distance himself from scholastic theology, an attempt that ultimately should be understood as an anticipation of what Luther will characterize in his mature theology as sola fide. However, as already mentioned, commenting on Psalm 76, Luther places the three theological virtues on the same level, and emphasizes that the believer is reborn through all of them. These vacillations should not be minimized and read in light of Luther’s later positions. Indeed, Luther’s theological anthropology and soteriology at the juncture of his first lectures on the Psalms is based on concepts that he will later reject. Since this early stage in his career, Luther recognizes that man is passive before God. Luther, however, has ambivalent positions on the doctrine of justification. On the one hand, it has been emphasized that in Dictata one can find an emphasis on sola gratia, while on the other hand, in many passages, Luther explicitly understands the justifying process in terms of the covenantal theology of his Erfurt teachers. Apparently, Luther conceived the soteriological process in terms of an infused grace, which led the believer to pursue good actions. The dichotomy between the spiritual and carnal parts within the individual described above should, thus, be understood as a consequence of God’s infusion of grace. It is difficult to clarify if Luther believed that human activity played a role, albeit minimal, in inducing God to bestow his grace on the individual. The risk is to impose on the early Luther a category of “semi-Pelagianism”, which has dominated the theological debate in the last 500 years, a category which has been used by Luther in a later stage of his career as a signifier to accuse of heterodoxy his opponents. As Denis Janz has emphasized,33 Pelagianism was simply not an option for any Christian theologian in the early sixteenth century. Nobody would have asserted explicitly that salvation can happen outside of the 32  Cf. LW 11.12–13; WA 3.532.13–16: Opus dei et virtus eus est fides: ipsa enim facit iustos et operatur omnes virtutes, castigat et crucifigit et infirmat carnem: ut ipsa non habeat opus suum nec virtutem, sed ut opus dei sit in illa. Et sic salvat et roborat spiritum. Quando autem hoc fit, tunc omnes, qui illud faciunt, fiunt opus dei et virtus dei allegoricum. Et sic Ecclesia est opus et virtus dei. 33  Denis R. Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Thomism: A Study in Theological Anthropology (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983), 16.

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salvific mediation of Christ. Nobody would have explicitly asserted that good works are sufficient to receive God’s grace. The theological debate was centered on the condition to receive grace, not on the actual possibility to be saved outside of God’s grace. Luther’s later positions against what he considered a refined version of Pelagianism, a sort of semi-Pelagianism, which in light of his subtleties, was in Luther’s eyes even more pernicious for the Church than a clear and unequivocal form of Pelagianism, completely reshaped the theological debate in the first quarter of the sixteenth century. In the years 1513–15, the notion of grace as favor dei still remained alien to Luther’s himself. Luther’s early positions on the doctrine of justification emerges in his comments on Psalms 49 and 50.34 Commenting on Psalm 49, Luther underlines that Christians receive everything from God. The believer has to confess that nothing is for himself, but everything for God. This remaining “nothing” is proper to the believer.35 This “emptiness of the self” must be perceived in the heart and expressed in deeds. Anyone, Luther continues, no matter how saintly one is, is a sinner before God and has to think and confess one’s own sinfulness. Without God, what is left in the human being is evil and worthy of damnation.36 Human beings would be judged sinners if God wished to impute (imputare) them for what is in the individuals outside His gifts. However, God does not charge the sinfulness of the individual when the latter acknowledges and confesses the sinful condition.37 The sacrifice of praise consists in acknowledging that the individual is an abyss and ascribes every possession to God. For Luther this is specifically the content of the following Psalm.38 Indeed, commenting 34  For a discussion of Luther’s soteriology in the Dictata, see: Bernhard Lohse, Luthers Theologie in ihrer historischen Entwicklung und in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 66–68. 35  LW 10.233; WA 3.282.31–33: Quia quando deo tribuimus, quod suum est, et reservamus nobis, quod nostrum est, tunc nihil reservamus et ipsum nihil est nostrum, totum autem est dei, ex quo accepimus. 36  LW 10.233; WA 3.282.33–40, 283.1–3: Talis ergo confessio ex vero corde est ipsum laudis sacrificium, scilicet totos nos deo debitos fateri, quicquid sumus, et nihil nobis relinquere omnino. Atque non solum corde, sed et opere nos sic ei confiteri, ut opera ipsa testentur, nos nihil nobis esse et videri. Et ex hoc fundamento fit, ut quilibet quantumvis sanctus necesse habeat de se coram deo omne malum sentire et confiteri et omnino nihil. Et dicere “Tibi soli peccavi”, tibi malus sum, tibi nihil sum. Quia si deus auferat id, quod suum est in nobis, verissimum est id, quod relinquitur, privationem, tenebras et malum esse ac sic damnatione dignum. Quod si aliquid illorum nobis inflectimus, iam fures sumus bonorum Dei et subtractores glorie eius. 37  LW 10.233; WA 3.283.6–9: Quia si deus nobis vellet imputare illud, quod est in nobis ultra eius dona, iam essemus peccatores. Sed hoc salvi sumus, quod ipsam nostram nihileitatem nobis non imputat, quando eam saltem agnoscimus. 38 LW 10.234; WA 3.283.16–20: Hoc est ergo verum sacrificium laudis, scilicet suam totam abyssum agnoscere et omnia, que est, habet, potest, dei bonitate ascribere et confiteri. Quare profunda theologia in isto versu est: qualis et in toto psalmo sequente per singulos pene versus est.



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on Psalm 50, Luther remembers that Paul, in Romans 3:4, uses this Psalm to point out that every man is a liar and only God is righteous. Here Luther divides between the justified and unjustified man: the words of the psalmist and of Paul must be referred only to the unjustified, because the justified are righteous and true.39 Luther then explains what this entails through four theses: first, all men are sinners before and, thus, they are sinners in fact; second, Christ suffered and died on the cross on account of human sins; third, God is not justified in Himself, but in His words; fourth, human beings become sinners when they acknowledge to be as such. With this last assertion, Luther means that the individual must admit to being a sinner, otherwise he openly condemns God and denies that Christ died for his sins. According to Luther, such people are, especially, the Jews.40 Luther accuses the Jews of considering their sins as only figurative and, thus, that these sins can be removed through “the blood of goats”, – that is, through ceremonies. We will see that the question of how the word “ceremonies” in the Pauline Epistles should be correctly understood would become a central concern of Luther’s later writings in contraposition to Erasmus of Rotterdam. In Dictata, however, Luther still believes in the possibility of undertaking good works. Original sin is, for Luther, like the Augustinian tradition of his age pointed out, a force which induces human beings to sin and renders them blameworthy and guilty before God.41 Thus, for Luther, the justified man is the one who accuses the self before God, and, in doing so, justifies God. On the other hand, the ungodly, the proud man, does not admit to being a sinner, and accuses God in the process of justifying the self before God.42 This is understood in light of the nominalist covenant theology: even faith and grace – Luther emphasizes – would not justify themselves if God’s covenant did not do it.43 Thus, it can be argued that, at this juncture, Luther combines an Augustinian emphasis on the sinful human con39  LW 10.235; WA 3.287.22–25: Quare Apostolum pro nunc sequi volumus Ro.3, qui per ipsum probat, quod omnis homo sit mendax et peccator, solus autem deus verax et iustus. Quod debet intelligi de iis hominibus, qui nondum a deo sunt iustificati et deo coniuncti, quoniam tales sunt iusti et veri. 40  LW 10.235; WA 3.288.8–13: Tunc sequitur. Qui non est peccator (id est se non confitetur peccatorem), manifeste contendit deum condennare in sermonibus suis, quibus nos in peccatis esse testatus est. Et Christum non pro peccatis mortuum esse contendit. Et sic iudicat deum et mendacem facere nititur. Sed non vincet neque prevalebit, prevaluit autem deus. Et tales fuerunt Iudei et sunt usque hodie. 41  For further discussion, see: Lohse, Luthers Theologie, 64–66. 42  LW 10.236; WA 3.288.30–33: Quare a nullo iustificatur, nisi ab eo, qui se accusat et damnat et iudicat. Iustus enim primo est accusator sui et damnator et iudex sui. Et ideo deum iustificat et vincere ac superare facit. Econtra impius et superbus primo est excusator sui ac defensor, iustificator et salvator. 43  LW 10. 236–37; WA 3.289.1–3: Immo et fides et gratia, quibus hodie iustificamur, non iustificarent nos ex seipsis, nisi pactum dei faceret.

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dition with the covenant theology of the late medieval Erfurt. Indeed, Luther argues that the reason for which we as human beings are saved is precisely the covenant between God and his creatures. “He” – Luther points out – “made a testament and a covenant with us that whoever believes and is baptized shall be saved. But in this covenant God is truthful and faithful and keeps what he promised. Therefore, it is true that before Him we are always in sins, so that in His covenant and testament which he has established with us He Himself might be the justifier”.44 The justifying process begins with the believer’s admission of his sins. It is the believers who have to look into themselves and acknowledge being sinners. Then the believers are in full agreement with God and, thus, true and righteous with God. Thus, acknowledging one’s own sins is a precondition to receiving God’s grace. Conversely, those who do not admit to being sinners are in a perennial fight with God, since God asserts they are sinners, but they deny it.45 Luther explains the process of justification as an antithesis between justification and judgment: those who justify themselves, judge God, and thus are condemned; conversely, those who judge themselves, justify God and, thus, are saved.46 Therefore, for Luther, confession is the “garment of the Church”, and humility the end towards which the believer must tend, according to the expression that “the one who is most depraved in his own eyes is the most handsome before God and, on the contrary, the one who sees himself as handsome is roughly ugly before God”.47 Those who accuse and judge themselves, Luther continues, will not be accused and judged by God. Nobody will be judged twice for the same thing and, thus, God will not condemn he who has already judged himself and, thus, by the works of God.48 At this juncture, it is clear for Luther whether those who demonstrate humility, as described above, will be justified. This means that those who make good deeds, but become proud because of their good behavior, will not be justified. These people live in the Spirit and mortify the Flesh, but the Spirit is curved in 44  Cf. LW 10.237; WA 3.289.3–7: Ex eo enim precise, quia testamentum et pactum nobiscum foecit, ut qui crediderit et baptisatus fuerit, salvus sit, salvi sumus. In hoc autem pacto deus est varax et fidelis et sicut promisit, servat. Quare verum est nos esse in peccatis coram illo semper, ut scilicet ipse in pacto suo et testamento, quod nobiscum pepigit, iustificator sit. 45  LW 10.238; WA 3.289.36–38: Sed deus dicit vera et iusta: et illi dicit eadem. Ergo et ipse cum deo iustus et verax est. Illi autem cum deo pugnant de veritate, Deus enim illos asserit esse impios, illi autem negant. 46  LW 10.238; WA 3.289.31–34. 47  Cf. LW 10.239; WA 3.291.1–3: Turpissimus sibi est formosissimus Deo, et econtra formosus sibi turpissimus est Deo. 48  LW 10.240; WA 3.291.15–18: Quia si nos ipsos iudicamus, non utique a Domino iudicabimur. Quia non iudicabitur bis in idipsum. Nec potest eum condemnare, qui iam a seipso et per consequens a sermonibus dei iudicatus est.



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on themselves.49 Luther gives the example of the Bohemians who are pure, except in their heart, which is corrupted by their spiritual pride.50 On the other hand, two considerations on the nature of good works in the Dictata must be pointed out: first, consistent with his understanding of the Pauline distinction between Spirit and Flesh as the upper and lower parts in human nature, respectively, Luther never denies that human beings can fulfill works which are good in themselves, even if they are not sufficient to be justified before God; second, good works are the result of a process of self-discovery which create the condition in the individual to receive God’s grace and, thus, to (partially) fulfill God’s commandment of love. Steven Ozment has noted that bonitas is absent from Luther’s discussion of the “meritum de congruo”; as it is ascribed only to God, bonitas is bestowed by God to man and, thus it is present only in the “new man”. In his scholion on Psalm 84, while defending Aristotle, Luther assumes an anti-Aristotelian position in terms of what must be considered good. Luther argues that what is good in a Christian comes from the outside; it is something that emanates from an extra nos, constitutively different from us. Moreover, this good cannot be preserved by the person solely through natural powers. Thus, already in the Dictata, righteousness precedes good works.51 Humility is the condition necessary to receive God’s gifts. The more the individual reaches deep within, the more the nothingness comes to the fore, the greater the potential for humility. The Spirit, intended as the Holy Spirit, penetrates into the believer and redirects him to God. Having received the infusion of the Holy Spirit, the spiritual part – the highest and noblest part of the believer – battles against the evil desires, in order not to defy them. Pride and humility in the young Luther represent two opposite poles. However, the Augustinian friar Martin Luther, already in 1513, recognized that this “clinging to God” happens though Christ. The chariot mentioned in Psalm 104:3 (“Who makest the clouds Thy chariot; who walkest upon the wings of the winds”) is literally Christ. Tropologically, through faith in Christ, we can ascend. Luther interprets this ascent through faith as Jacob’s ladder. This happens when the individual keeps his mind captive to the Word of God. Allegorically, the cloud could be understood as anyone who propagates Christ and carries Him to others.52 49  LW

10.241; WA 3.292.15–18: Ita et “Spiritus rectus” (i. e. Tropologice enim nunc loquor ultra ea, que literaliter in glosa dicta sunt), quia quidem vivunt quidam spiritu et mortificant carnem, sed spiritus eorum inflexus et curvus est in se ipsos pro vana gloria et superbia. 50  LW 10.242; WA 3.292.18–21: Tales sine dubio fuerunt Heretici quidam, qui castissime vivebant. Et hodie Boemi vicini nostri: qui in omni mundicia pene nos excedunt, excepto corde, quod spiritualis superbia polluit. 51 Ozment, Homo Spiritualis, 167–72. See the Scholion to Psalm 84:1 in WA 4.3.26 ff. 52  LW 10.321; WA 4.175.20–27: Qui ponis nubem ascensum tuum: qui ambulas super pennas ventorum. ⌠Litt.⌡ Ad literam de Christo factum est, ut patet act. 1. Secundo quia aquas

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3.2  The “Aristotelian Erasmus”: Luther’s Two-Fold Critique of the Soteriology of Erasmus and Biel In the academic semester of 1515–16, Martin Luther lectured on Romans at the University of Wittenberg. In commenting on Rom. 14:1, Luther pleaded for the wealth and survival of the Church. Pelagian heresy had penetrated the Church in the shape of the nominalist motto facientibus quod in se est, Infallibiliter Deus infundit gratiam.53 The whole Church, according to him, was in danger, since the doctrine of justification, on which it was premised, had been subverted.54 This decisive step in Luther’s own theological development has generally been connected with two main influences: on the one hand, Luther’s acquaintance with Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, on the other, his departure from the nominalist tradition. The reception of Augustine and the Augustinianism in early Luther remains open to further interpretation. Martin Luther took his vows in the Order of the Hermits of St. Augustine on 18 July 1506. He reluctantly took off his habit as a monk only eighteen years later in 1524, three years after having been excommunicated.55 The historical question of how much he knew tectrices dixerat, ex quo sequitur, quod in tegumento et velamento istarum aquarum simus, ac sic sine dubio in nube et fidei umbraculo. In hac autem ascendit Christus et nos ascendere facit. Hec enim ⌠Trop.⌡ est scala Iacob, sed non nisi in somno et visione perceptibilis. Quis enim sciat fidem esse schalam et nubem ascensus, nisi qui mundo dormit et visione spirituali vigilat? 53  For a discussion regarding the doctrine of justification in late medieval nominalism, see: Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 146–84. 54  WA 56.502.14–32, 503.1–5: Huius autem erroris tota substantia est Pelagiana opinio. Nam etsi nunc Nulli sunt Pelagiani professione et titulo, plurimi tamen sunt re vera et opinione, licet ignoranter, Vt sunt, Qui nisi Libertati arbitrii tribuant facere, quod in se est, ante gratiam, putant sese cogi a Deo ad peccatum et necessario peccare. Quod cum sit Impiissimum sentire, putant secure et audacter, Quod cum bonam intentionem forment, infallibiliter Dei gratiam obtinuerint infusam. Deinde incedunt securissimi, certi Videlicet, Quod opera bona, que faciunt, Deo placeant, Nihil timoris amplius habentes et sollicitudinis super gratia imploranda. Non enim timent, Quod eo ipso forte male agant, Sed certi sunt, quod bene agant. || Isa. 44. || Quare? Quia non intelligunt, Quod Deus Impios etiam in bonis operibus sinit peccare. Vbi non quidem coguntur ad peccatum, Sed faciunt, que Volunt et secundum bonam intentionem suam. Quod si intelligerent, in eo timore incederent, quo Iob, cum quo et dicerent: “Verebar omnia opera mea”. Et iterum alius: “Beatus, qui semper est pauidus”. Vnde, Qui Vere bona faciunt, Nulla faciunt, Quin semper cogitant: Quis scit, si gratia Dei hec mecum faciat? Quis det mihi scire, quod bona intentio mea ex Deo sit? Quomodo scio, quod id, quod feci meum, seu quod in me est, Deo placeat? Hii sciunt, quod homo ex se nihil potest facere. Ideo absurdissima est et Pelagiano errori vehementer patrona Sententia Vsitata, Qua dicitur: “Facienti, quod in se est, Infallibiliter Deus infundit gratiam”, Intelligendo per “facere, quod in se est”, aliquid facere Vel posse. Inde enim tota Ecclesia pene subuersa est, Videlicet huius verbi fiducia. 55  The most accurate and comprehensive analysis of the development of the Augustinian Order in the Middle Ages and Luther’s relationship with his Order is Eric Leland Saak, High Way to Heaven: The Augustinian Platform between Reform and Reformation, 1292–1524 (Leiden: Brill, 2002).



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of the Augustinian tradition has been variously investigated. Eric Leland Saak has noted that there is little textual evidence of an influence of the prominent exponents of Augustinianism in Luther’s early production,56 despite the torrent of words in secondary literature on the relationship between Luther and the vicar general of the Augustinian order, Johannes von Staupitz (1465–1524).57 In the early sixteenth century, Augustinians were living a tumultuous period, as they were divided into two opposed factions, the Observants and the Conventuals.58 Vicar General von Staupitz, who proposed to unite the two groups, received the support of Giles of Viterbo. His project, however, was strongly opposed by the Augustinian monk and professor of theology at the University of Erfurt, Johann Nathin (1450–1529). Luther, then a student in Erfurt, sided with Nathin and opposed Staupitz’s project; he then went to Rome in 1510, a trip which gave rise to much speculation ever since. The trip to Rome was a failure, but Nathin’s opposition succeeded in preventing Staupitz from accomplishing his project. In 1511, however, Martin Luther moved to the University of Wittenberg, and became so close to Staupitz that he decided to earn his Ph.D. in Wittenberg. When Luther earned his doctor biblicus in the following year, his fellow Augustinians in Erfurt whom Luther had invited did not take part in the ceremony.59 Since then, throughout his life, Luther considered von Staupitz his “reverend father in Christ”, the man who taught him the Gospel. Despite efforts made in the secondary literature, it is still difficult to establish to what extent von Staupitz’s works actually influenced Luther. There is, however, a well-documented shift in the textual influence of Luther in this period. Arguably, following a suggestion of von Staupitz, Luther increasingly focused his attention on Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, which he read 56  Eric Leland Saak, Luther and the Reformation of the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 90–98. 57  The role of Johannes von Staupitz in the Reformation has received scholarly attention: David C. Steinmetz, “Hermeneutic and Old Testament Interpretation in Staupitz and the Young Martin Luther,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 70 (1979): 24–58; “Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther,” The Sixteenth Century Journal (1980): 23–38; Volker Leppin, “‘Ich hab all mein Ding von Doctor Staupitz:’ Johannes von Staupitz als Geistlicher Begleiter in Luthers reformatorischer Entwicklung,” in Wenn die Seele zu atmen beginnt … Geistliche Begleitung in evangelischer Perspektive, ed. Dorothea Greiner et al. (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2007), 60–80; Markus Wriedt, “Staupitz und Luther: Zur Bedeutung der seelsorgerlichen Theologie Johanns von Staupitz für den jungen Martin Luther,” in Luther als Seelsorger, ed. Joachim Heubach (Erlangen: Martin Luther Verlag, 1991), 67–108. 58  On the historical background of the division between Observants and Conventuals in the Augustinian Order, see: Katharine Walsh, “The Observance: Sources for a History of the Observant Reform Movement in the Order of Augustinian Friars in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries,” Rivista di storia della chiesa in Italia 31 (1977): 40–67; Francis Xavier Martin, “The Augustinian Observant Movement,” in Reformbemühungen und Observanzbestrebungen im spätmittelalterlichen Ordenswesen, ed. Kaspar Ellm, Berliner historische Studien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblo, 1989), 325–45. 59 Saak, Luther and the Reformation of the Later Middle Ages, 202–7.

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in the new edition published in 1504–05 by the publisher Johannes Amerbach. While in his first lecture on the Psalms Luther quoted extensively from Augustine’s Expositions of the Psalms, in the lectures on Romans, Luther used Augustine’s De Spiritu et Littera, Contra Iulianum, De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et de Baptismo Parvulorum and Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum as a starting point for his own understanding of Paul’s epistles. A new emphasis can be discerned that focused on the sinful human condition, and on the impossibility to fulfill good works without grace.60 It is common knowledge that Luther’s criticism of the via moderna that his former professors and fellow Augustinians in Erfurt professed, emanated from his reading of Paul’s epistles through Augustinian lens. In 1514, a new edition of Gabriel Biel’s works was published in Lyon. Based on Luther’s annotations to Biel’s work, it is clear that Luther was distancing himself from Biel’s soteriology as well as late nominalist soteriology. As noted by Alister McGrath, in the annotation to Biel’s Collectorium, Luther notes that, following the concept of free will, Biel endorsed a Pelagian soteriology to the extent that he claimed that it was possible for human beings, through their natural capacities, to love God beyond everything. In Luther’s eyes, in this way, Biel had de facto made God’s grace superfluous.61 Leif Grane has convincingly proved how Luther used Biel’s work to construct his anti-Gabrielists positions in the Disputation against Scholastic Theology held in September 1517.62 One year before, Luther had launched his first public attack against the soteriology of the via moderna. On 25 September 1516, Luther chaired a dispute on human powers without grace: Quaestio de viribus et voluntate hominis sine gratia disputata.63 For his doctoral dissertation as sententiarus, Luther’s student Bartholomäus Bernhardi (1487–1551),64 60  Christoph Burger, Tradition und Neubeginn: Martin Luther in seinen frühen Jahren, Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 106. For further discussion on the reception of Augustine’s On the Spirit and the Letter in Wittenberg, see: Bernhard Lohse, “Zum Wittenberger Augustinismus: Augustins Schrift ‘De Spiritu et Litera’ in der Auslegung bei Staupitz, Luther und Karlstadt,” in Augustine, the Harvest and Theology (1300–1650): Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. Kenneth Hagen (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 89–109. 61  Alister E. McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther’s Theological Breakthrough, 2 ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011), 172–75. 62  Leif Grane, Contra Gabrielem: Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der “Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam 1517.” Acta Theologica Danica (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1962). 63  WA 1,142–51. For a recent analysis of the disputation, see: Matthias Mikoteit, “Autoritätenverwendung in Bartholomäus Bernhardis Disputation der ‘Quaestio de viribus hominis sine gratia’,” in Reformatorische Theologie und Autoritäten, ed. Volker Leppin, Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 19–38. 64 For Bernhardi’s life and his role in the Reformation, see: Dorothea McEwan, Das Wirken des Vorarlberger Reformators Bartholomäus Bernhardi: Der Lutherfreund und einer



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who famously went on to become the first priest to get married,65 presented three Theses which reflected Luther’s own thinking.66 In the first Thesis, Luther claims that, despite having been created in the image of God and being ready for salvation, in light of the original sin, human beings were prone to vanity and only sought the flesh.67 The Thesis is explained through three corollaries: first, “the old man” (homo vetus) can do no more than accomplish vanities;68 second, the carnal man, namely the Pauline homo vetus, must not be mistaken for the sensual man, but should be regarded as whoever has not been regenerated by God in the Spirit;69 third, no non-Christians (infideles) can fulfill the good works before God.70 As a proof for this third corollary, Luther quotes Augustine’s Contra Iulianum in order to argue that without faith in Christ it is impossible to please God. Thus, since pagans also had an innate understanding of the law, one could claim that the Roman censor Fabricius, one of the most paradigmatic examples of the virtuous man in the ancient world, would receive a lower punishment than Catiline, not because he was good, but because he was less impious than Catiline. Fabricius did not have true virtue, but he deviated less from it.71

der ersten verheirateten Priester der Lutheraner kommt zu Wort. Zur zeitgenössischen Diskussion der Priesterehe (Dornbirn: Vorarlberger Verlaganstalt, 1986). 65  Marjorie Elizabeth Plummer, “‘Partner in his Calamities:’ Pastorsʼ Wives, Married Nuns and the Experience of Clerical Marriage in the Early German Reformation,” Gender & History 20 (2008): 207–27. 66  As clarified by Matthias Mikoteit, in a letter to Lang in mid-October, 1516, Luther pointed out Bernhardi’s indebtedness to him for the content of the theses, however Luther was probably not directly involved in the writing process: Mikoteit, “Autoritätenverwendung in Bartholomäus Bernhardis Disputation der ‘Quaestio de viribus hominis sine gratia’,” 20–21. 67  WA 1.145.10–13: Homo, ratione animae Dei imago et sic ad gratiam Dei aptus, suis naturalibus viribus solis creaturam quamlibet qua utitur vanitati subiicit, sua et quae carnis sunt quaerit. 68  WA 1.145.29–30: Homo vetus, vanitas vanitatum universaque vanitas, Reliquas quoque creaturas, alioqui bonas, efficit vanas. 69  WA 1.146.14–16: Carnis nomine dicitur homo vetus non tantum quia sensuali concupiscentia ducitur, Sed (etiam si est castus, sapiens, iustus) quia non ex Deo per spiritum renascitur. 70  WA 1.146.26–27: Etsi omnes infideles vani sint, nihil boni operantes, non tamen aequalem poenam patientur omnes. 71  WA 1.146.34–37, 147. 1–7: Haec verba Augustinus Lib. IV. contra Iulian. cap. 3. tractans ita dicit, interpretando seu explicando de infidelibus: Si fidem non habent Christi, profecto nec iusti sunt nec Deo placent (nam sine fide Deo placere impossibile est), Sed ad hoc eos cogitationes suae die iudicii defendent, ut tolerabilius puniantur, quod naturaliter quae legis sunt utcunque fecerint, scriptum habentes in cordibus opus legis dictans, ut aliis uon facerent quod ipsi perpeti nollent, hoc tamen peccantes, quod homines sine fide non ad eum finem ista retulerint opera, ad quem referre debuerunt. Minus enim Fabricius quam Catilina punietur, non quod iste bonus, sed quod minus malus et minus impius quam Catilina, Fabricius non veras virtutes habendo, sed a veris virtutibus non plurimum deviando. Et paulo supra dicit: Illi, qui naturali lege sunt iusti, haud placent Deo.

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In the second conclusion, Luther asserts that human beings, through their natural powers, cannot prepare themselves for receiving God’s grace, neither de congruo nor de condigno.72 Three corollaries derive from this Thesis: first, Luther denies free will;73 second, he points out that, when man does what is in itself (facere quod in se est), he necessarily sins;74 and third, just as justice is hidden in God, sin is self-evident in oneself.75 As a good nominalist, Luther conceived the will as free when it could choose between at least two mutually exclusive possibilities; as a reader of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, he believed that all human feelings are sinful since they are moved by self-love (amor sui); thus, in Luther’s eyes, free will is only an empty word, since the individual cannot choose to sin or not sin. For the first time in his career, Luther explicitly attacked the soteriology of the via moderna; the critique Luther directed against the scholastic doctors commenting on the Epistle to the Romans in the lecture halls of the University of Wittenberg had become public, and the nominalist facere quod in se est was denounced as a subtle form of Pelagian soteriology. Oberman has carefully investigated the relationship between Luther’s understanding of Iustitia Christi and his critique of Biel’s soteriology.76 Denis Janz has devoted an entire book to proving that Luther’s critique of scholastic theology is addressed to late medieval nominalism, while Luther was unaware of the positions of Thomas Aquinas as well as of the sixteenth-century Thomists. Regarding the 1516 disputation on human nature, Janz concludes: “In this disputation, Luther poses the central question of theological anthropology in precisely the same way in which his scholastic predecessors from the time of Lombard had formulated it: it is the question de potentia hominis ex suis naturalibus. And, though his answer to this question stands out with a new clarity, it is basi72  WA 1.147.10–12:

Homo, Dei gratia exclusa, praecepta eius servare nequaquam potest neque se, vel de congruo vel de condigno, ad gratiam praeparare, verum necessario sub peccato manet. For the distinction between merit de congruo and de condigno see: Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Reformation: Roots and Ramifications, trans. Andrew Colin Gow (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 103–15; The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 169–72; Denise N. Baker, “From Plowing to Penitence: Piers Plowman and Fourteenth-Century Theology,” Speculum 55 (1980): 715–25. 73  WA 1.147.38–39: Voluntas hominis sine gratia non est libera, sed servit, licet non invita. 74  WA 1.148.14–45: Homo, quando facit quod in se est, peccat, cum nec velle aut cogitare ex seipso possit. 75  WA 1.148.35–37: Cum iusticia fidelium sit in Deo abscondita, peccatum vero eorum manifestum in seipsis, Verum est, non nisi iustos damnari atque peccatores et meretrices salvari. 76  Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “Facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam: Robert Holcot, O. P. and the Beginnings of Luther’s Theology,” Harvard Theological Review 55 (1962): 317–42; “‘Iustitia Christi’ and ‘Iustitia Dei’: Luther and the Scholastic Doctrines of Justification,” Harvard Theological Review 59 (1966): 1–26.



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cally nothing more than a strong confirmation of the position already taken in the Romans lectures”.77 Luther’s early attacks against scholastic theology have often been linked to the simultaneous attacks against scholasticism by the so-called “humanists”. In this sense, the 1516 disputation on human will without grace has become a paradigmatic example of the impact on Andreas von Karlstadt’s theological development. During the dispute, Bernhardi claimed that the author of the treatise De vera et falsa poenitentia was not Augustine, since the bishop of Hippo did not believe that human beings could fulfill the law of God through their natural powers. Karlstadt strongly disagreed, but Luther challenged him to prove his sentence. Karlstadt bought an edition of Augustine’s opera in Leipzig, and by April he had apparently changed his mind, since he wrote 151 Theses against scholastic theology in which his interpretation of Augustine was quite close to that of Luther. Meanwhile, Luther triumphantly wrote to Lang that Aristotle’s teaching at the university was on the decline, and in September he wrote his own Thesis against scholastic theology.78 These events have been interpreted as a proof that at this juncture the Wittenbergers shared Erasmus’ theological agenda. Leif Grane emphasized that Luther’s dispute on human powers without grace was his first public attempt to join a wider movement of the critique of scholastic theology. “In 1521”, Grane claimed, “the decisions to make were no longer just a question of style and theological method, but also of doctrine and assertions. It was no longer enough to say: Scripture and fathers against dialectics and sophistry. The period of patristic studies as a common program was over, but in the year since at least 1516 this program had incited all friends of the new learning and of Church reform to unite against their common enemies. Without this time of indecision the whole story of the Reformation might have looked differently”.79 One can easily discern two well-established historiographical paradigms: first, Luther’s critique of the soteriology of the via moderna; second, “humanists” and “reformers” joined together in a common critique of scholasticism. While the former assertion is undeniable, the latter needs to be revised. Grane’s claim that the theological debate before 1521 was not based on “doctrine and assertions” is implausible. Moreover, the existence of a common program of Church reform to return to the theology of the Fathers in the years 1516–21 has 77 Janz,

Luther and Late Medieval Thomism, 23. The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation, 61–63. See also: Jens-Martin Kruse, Universitätstheologie und Kirchenreform: Die Anfänge der Reformation in Wittenberg 1516–1522, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte (Mainz: von Zabern, 2002), 86–94. 79  Leif Grane, “Some Remarks on the Church Fathers in the First Years of the Reformation (1516–1520),” in Auctoritas Patrum: Contributions on the Reception of the Church Fathers in the 15th and 16th Century, ed. Leif Grane, Alfred Schindler, and Markus Wriedt (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1993), 21–33. Here quoted at p. 31. 78 McGrath,

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to be understood in light of the complex network of different positionings described in Chapter One. It will be my contention that, already in this early period, Erasmus’ works functioned as a catalyst for some of the central theological positions assumed by the young Luther. Thus, while theologians like Martin Bucer could confuse and assimilate the positions of Erasmus and Luther in light of their common quest for the Fathers, Luther himself constructed his own position, and his preference for Augustine’s theology, in opposition rather than in agreement with Erasmus. Erasmus’ preference for Origen and Jerome is well known.80 In 1516, Erasmus published his famous edition of Saint Jerome.81 It has long been recognized that Luther quoted Jerome’s opera from Erasmus’ edition. In 1988, Ulrich Bubenheimer found the original copy that belonged to Luther in the library of the Wittenberg Predigerseminar.82 In 2000, Martin Brecht and Christian Peters published it with the hundreds of notes that Luther had written into it.83 Luther’s annotations reveal that at this crucial juncture in his career, the Wittenberger was fully committed to the study of the Church Fathers, mostly Augustine and Jerome, as well as of their contemporary interpreters. Reading Jerome’s works, Luther continued to engage critically with Erasmus and his interpretation of Jerome. Josef Lössl and Arnoud Visser have shown that Luther often found himself in agreement with Jerome, but in disagreement with Erasmus’ interpretation of Jerome.84 One of the key problems Luther found in Erasmus’ edition of Jerome 80 

For the influence of Origen, see the previous chapter. For Erasmus’ reception of Jerome, see: Hilmar Pabel, “Reading Jerome in the Renaissance: Erasmus’ Reception of the Adversus Jovinianum,” Renaissance Quarterly 55 (2002): 470–97; John C. Olin, “Erasmus and Saint Jerome,” Thought: Fordham University Quarterly 54 (1979): 313–21. Volker Leppin has emphasized that Erasmus’ attempt to identify himself and his scholarly achievements with Jerome did not represent a break with medieval theology: Leppin, Luther und der Humanismus, 34. 81  Modern editions of Erasmus’ edition of St. Jerome can be found in CWE 61 and ASD VIII–1. For critical discussion, see Mark Vessey, “Erasmus’ Jerome: The Publishing of a Christian Author,” Erasmus Studies 14 (1994): 62–99; Benedetto Clausi, Ridar voce all’antico padre: l’edizione erasmiana delle Lettere di Gerolamo (Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2000); Hilmar Pabel, Herculean Labours: Erasmus and the Editing of St. Jerome’s Letters in the Renaissance, Library of the Written Word (Leiden: Brill, 2008); Lisa Jardine, Erasmus, Man of Letters: The Construction of Charisma in Print-Updated Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 55–82. For further references and a critical assessment of Erasmus’ edition of Jerome, see: Francesca Sola, “Filologia come ideologia. Un quindicennio di studi su Erasmo editore di Gerolamo,” Adamantius 23 (2017): 500–17. For sixteenth-century Catholic critics of the edition, see: Hilmar Pabel, “Sixteenth-Century Catholic Criticism of Erasmus’ Edition of St. Jerome,” Reformation & Renaissance Review 6 (2004): 231–62. 82 Ulrich Bubenheimer, “Unbekannte Luthertexte: Analecta aus der Erforschung der Handschrift im gedruckten Buch,” Luther Jahrbuch 57 (1990): 220–41. 83  83 Luther’s annotations to Jerome’s works can be found in AWA 8. 84  Josef Lössl, “Martin Luther’s Jerome: New Evidence for a Changing Attitude,” in Jerome of Stridon: His Life, Writings, and Legacy, ed. Andrew Cain and Josef Lössl (Farnham:



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is Erasmus’ interpretation of the expression “works of the law” as referring only to Jewish ceremonies. Luther completely disagreed. While annotating Jerome’s commentary to Gal. 2:16 (“No flesh will be justified by works of the law”) in which Jerome interpreted “works of the law” as a reference to human works and legislation, Luther added the following marginal note: “Note this against those in our own time who interpret it as ceremonies”.85 The contemporary referent which Luther was alluding to in this note was clearly Erasmus. Moreover, Lössl has shown that Luther blamed Erasmus for favoring Origen and Pelagius over Jerome in the interpretation of Rom. 7:23–4. Erasmus interpreted Rom. 7:23 as a contraposition between a law which is active in the body, corrupted by sin, and in conflict with an uncorrupted “law of the mind” (lex mentis). Thus, Erasmus argued that the following passage (Rom. 7:24: miser ego homo) should be understood rhetorically, since Paul was not speaking of himself. According to Erasmus, it is possible to lead a completely ascetic life, as many saints did. The lex mentis can have a complete control upon the sinful, corrupted desires which permeate the human body, according to the stoic doctrine of apatheia. Thus, he showed his surprise for and disagreement with Jerome’s critique of Origen: Jerome blamed Origen precisely for having introduced the stoic concept of apatheia in a Christian framework, but, according to Erasmus, there was nothing more Christian than pursuing an ascetic life.86 Luther did not annotate Jerome’s text, but he did annotate Erasmus’ scholia on it; he noted, that following Augustine, this is an obvious error (errorem apertum). On the other hand, Luther found himself in agreement with Jerome’s definition of the just as he who accuses himself (Deffinitio iusti est serio accusare seipsum).87 Ashgate, 2009), 237–51; Arnoud Visser, “Irreverent Reading: Martin Luther as Annotator of Erasmus,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 48 (2017): 87–109. In his concluding remarks, however, Lössl goes too far in reevaluating Luther’s appreciation of Jerome. He defines Jerome as Luther’s master: Lössl, “Martin Luther’s Jerome: New Evidene for a Changing Attitude,” 251. More appropriately, Visser pointed out that Luther criticized Jerome as well: Visser, “Irreverent Reading: Martin Luther as Annotator of Erasmus,” 100. Martin Schulze stressed the positive influence that Jerome exercised on Luther, but at the same time he pointed out that “when really crucial questions are at stake, Jerome ceases to count”. Manfred Schulze, “Martin Luther and the Church Fathers,” in The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, ed. Irena Backus (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 573–626. 85 AWA 8.67; Tomus 3, fol. 116a, line 50: Hoc nota contra eos qui nostro tempore de ceremoniis accipiunt. Commenting on this passage, Lössl translates it as “Note this against those who in our own time think of the sacraments in such terms (i. e. works)”. Lössl, “Martin Luther’s Jerome: New Evidence for a Chainging Attitude,” 243. However, I believe that it is more appropriate to translate the term ceremoniis as ceremonies, since Luther’s critique of Erasmus lies in the interpretation of the Pauline “works of the law” as referring to all human works. 86  Ibid., 244–45. 87  Ibid., 246–48.

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Finally, Visser has pointed out that Luther’s main critique of Erasmus concerns the doctrine of justification. From Luther’s marginalia, indeed, it is evident that the Wittenberger discerned a Pelagian attitude in Erasmus. Luther could go as far as identifying the Pelagians criticized by Jerome as “clearly Erasmians”.88 Luther’s intense study of Erasmus’ edition of Jerome culminated in his decision to confront the Dutch theologian directly. Erasmus was, at the time, arguably the most acclaimed and renowned intellectual in Europe. Because of Erasmus’ celebrity, Luther felt obliged to take issue with someone whose widespread works – according to him – were spreading heresy in Christendom. On 19 October 1516, Luther wrote a letter to Georg Spalatin, asking him to mediate between himself and Erasmus.89 While recognizing that Erasmus was an erudite man (homo eruditissimus), Luther firmly asserted that Erasmus had completely misinterpreted Paul. The objection he raised against Erasmus was the same he had annotated while reading Erasmus’ edition of Jerome: Paul’s expression “justice of the works” (iustitiam operum) does not refer to Jewish ceremonies nor to a figurative observance of the law. In Luther’s eyes, this mistake derives from an incorrect reading of Romans 5, in which Paul deals with the theme of 88 

Visser, “Irreverent Reading: Martin Luther as Annotator of Erasmus,” 102. Br 1.70–71. This letter has been well known and widely discussed in secondary literature. Despite the fact that the letter was sent only a couple of weeks after the disputation on human will without grace of late September 1516, the two events have been surprisingly separated. An exception is represented by Ernst Wilhelm Kohls. He discussed Luther’s letter to Spalatin of 19 October 1516 in the first volume of his study: Ernst-Wilhelm Kohls, Luther oder Erasmus: Luthers Theologie in der Auseinandersetzung mit Erasmus, 2 vols., vol. 1, Theologische Zeitschrift. Sonderband (Basel: Reinhardt, 1972), 25–30. While in the first volume Kohls did not discuss a possible relationship between this letter and the dispute, in the second volume he argued that Luther’s position in the Quaestio emerged from a simultaneous critique of Erasmus and Thomas Aquinas. See: Luther oder Erasmus: Luthers Theologie in der Auseinandersetzung mit Erasmus, 2 vols., vol. 2, Theologische Zeitschrift. Sonderband (Basel: Reinhardt, 1978), 16–88. Kohls’ assimilation of Erasmus’ and Aquinas’ position is problematic; moreover, Kohls did not get sufficiently into account the role played in this context by late medieval nominalism. Subsequent literature has treated the two issues separately. Thus, Bernard Lohse quoted Luther’s letter to Spalatin, and some lines later he affirmed that Bernarndi’s theses were directed against Gabriel Biel: Lohse, Luthers Theologie, 111–15. In the same way, Leif Grane discussed Luther’s letter to Spalatin and the Dispute on Human Grace Without Will one after the other, but he kept the discussion separate and did not link the two events: Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi Theologicus: Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung der Theologie (1515–1518), Acta Theologica Danica (Leiden: Brill 1975), 110–18. Johannes Kunze also critically analyzed the meaning of the letter, but he did not take into consideration the hypothesis that Luther’s positions in 1516 were influenced by a critical reception of Erasmus’ works: Kunze, Erasmus und Luther, 51–57. Finally, Jens-Martin Kruse discussed the importance of Luther’s letter to Spalatin for Luther’s own theological development (pp.48–50 and 98–100), but he argued that Bernhardi’s dispute is calibrated against scholastic theology: Kruse, Universitätstheologie und Kirchenreform, 78–82. Against this background, I will point out that Luther’s letter to Spalatin on 19 October 1516 proves that the Disputation on Human Will without Grace has to be understood as a critique of both Biel and Erasmus. 89  WA



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the original sin. Luther’s critique on this point could be directed against Erasmus’ treatment of Romans 5 in his Novum Instrumentum since, as noted by James Tracy, in annotating Rom. 5:12–14, Erasmus rejects the traditional usage of this passage for understanding the notion of the original sin.90 According to Luther, if Erasmus had read Augustine’s books Against Julian, On the Spirit and the Letter, and The Two Epistles against the Pelagians, he would have not committed this mistake.91 Not surprisingly, the Augustinian monk Martin Luther describes Augustine as the best ancient commentator, and insists that he has no hesitation in dissenting from Erasmus. Just as Augustine left aside Jerome, Luther set aside Erasmus’ interpretation of the Scripture.92 According to Luther, the correct interpretation of the Pauline Justitia legis is not in reference to Jewish ceremonies, but rather to the Decalogue. Every action, good or bad, performed without faith in Christ is a sin. Fabricius and Regulus are generally conceived as examples of good and just men, but, as pagans, they could not be understood as having known anything about “true justice”. For Luther, nobody becomes just – as Aristotle says – by doing good works. At the same time, being just allows one to perform good works – that is, good works are recognized as such before God only once the person is changed by God himself ( prius necesse est personam esse mutatam, deinde opera), which means that, once the condition of the person before God is changed, then his works are no longer considered sinful.93 Even more harshly, Luther hopes that Erasmus’ mistakes do not contaminate Christendom and expresses his preference for Fabe Stapulensis’ works. Luther, in fact, notes that Faber’s comments are closer to the true meaning of the Scripture and his actions more in line with the dictates of the Bible.94 The letter ends with Luther’s exhortation to Spalatin not to consider him reckless (temerarius) for his critique of Erasmus; he would do this only for the safety of theology. It is clear that Luther perceived Erasmus as a clear danger to theological studies. On his side, Spalatin wrote to Erasmus on 11 December 1516 almost slavishly repeating Luther’s letter.95 Spalatin began his letter with a series of eulogies toward Erasmus, described “as a most learned and distinguished person”, particularly in virtue of his recent edition of Jerome, a work that Duke Frederick appreciated in so far as “he has lately seen with admiration the works of St. Jerome so well restored in your edition that before you corrected them anyone might have supposed we possessed any author’s works rather than Je90  James D. Tracy, “Two Erasmuses, Two Luthers: Erasmus’ Strategy in Defense of De Libero Arbitrio,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 78 (1987): 37–60. 91  WA Br 1.70.5–16. 92  WA Br 1.70.17–24. 93  WA Br 1.70.25–32. 94  WA Br 1.70.33–40. 95  Ep. 501. CWE 4.165–69, Allen, vol. 2, 415–18.

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rome’s”.96 As we have seen before, this is not Luther’s opinion, who instead believed Erasmus had misunderstood both Paul and Jerome. Spalatin then reveals the real purpose of the letter, namely that he was writing on behalf of “an Augustinian priest, as well known for his holiness in life as for his distinction in theology”.97 At the peak of his long and pompous panegyric of Erasmus, Spalatin writes: Why do I say this? With this in mind, kindest of men, to make you more ready to be convinced that I write in a friendly spirit. My friend writes to me that in interpreting St. Paul you understand justification by works, whether under the Law or of a men’s self, as referring to the ceremonial and figurative observances laid down in the Law; and secondly that you would not have the Apostle in his epistle to the Romans to be speaking at all about original sin. He thinks therefore that you should read Augustine in his treatises against the Pelagians, especially the De Spiritu et Littera, also the De Peccatorum meritiis et remissione, the Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, and the Contra Julianum, which are nearly all in volume eight, and see how Augustine has added nothing of his own, but follow the sense of Cyprian, Nazianzen, Irenaeus, Hilary, Olympius, Innocent, and Ambrose; and then you will not only understand the Apostle correctly but also pay much greater reverence to St. Augustine. My friend, then, simply cannot suppose that justification under the Law or by works refers merely to ceremonies; it consists rather in the keeping of the whole Ten Commandments. If all this could take place outside the Christian faith, even if it resulted in characters like Fabricius and Regulus and the most upright men who ever lived, yet among men it would have no more the true flavor of justification than a service-apple can taste like a fig; his view is that we do not become just by performing just actions, as Aristotle supposed, except in a manner of speaking, but that we become just first and then act justly. For the person must be first changed, and then his works; for Abel was pleasing to God, and afterwards his gifts. Although therefore he both excepts and wishes that you should carry world-wide authority, he is afraid that you will encourage people to rush to the defense of the dead, that is, the literal, interpretation, which has filled the work of almost everyone since Augustine.98 96 

Cf. CWE 4.167; Allen, vol. 2, 417: Vidit nuper cum admiratione opera diui Hieronymi te recognitore adeo restituta vt ante tuam castigationem nihil minus quam Hieronymi libros habuisse possimus videri. 97  Cf. CWE 4.166; Allen, vol. 2, 416: Caeterum nuper rogatus a sacerdote Augustiniano non minus vitae sanctimonia quam insignibus theologiae claro. 98  Cf. CWE 4.167–68; Allen, vol. 2, 417: Sed quorsum haec? In hoc modo, mi humanissime vir, vt eo melius et libentius credas beneuole tibi a me scribi. Scribit mihi amicus te in Apostolo interpretando iustitiam operum, seu legis seu propriam, intelligere cerimoniales illas et figurales obseruantias: deinde quod velis Apostolum in epistola ad Romanos non plane loqui de peccato originali. Credit ergo fore vt, si legeris Aurel. Augustinum in libris contra Pelagianos, praesetim de spiritu et littera, item de peccatorum meritis et remissione contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, itemque contra Iulianum, qui omnes fere in octaua parte sunt, atque adeo videris quam nihil Augustinus ex suo sensu, sed Cypriani, Nazianzeni, Hirenei, Hilarii, Olympi, Innocentii, Ambrosii, autoritate sapiat, vt non modo recte Apostolum intelligas, verumetiam maiorem sis habiturus Augustino honorem. Nequaquam igitur amicus noster arbitratur iusticiam legis seu factorum tantum esse in cerimoniis, sed rectius in obseruatione totius decalogi. Quae si fiant extra fidem Christianam, etiam si faciant Fabritios, Regulos, et in vniversum integerrimos viros, apud homines non tamen plus sapere iusticiam quam sorba ficum: non enim, vt Aristoteli visum est, iusta agendo nos iusta effici, nisi ὗποκριτικώς sed iustos



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From Luther’s and Spalatin’s letters, one can deduce that Luther’s denigration of Erasmus derives from the following considerations: 1) Erasmus misinterprets the nature of human works since he does not understand that every human work, outside of the grace of God, is intrinsically sinful; 2) this failure on Erasmus’ side derives from his inability to properly understand the consequences of original sin, which has corrupted the entire individual; 3) owing to this, Erasmus commits the same mistakes that “everyone since Augustine” has, and thus in Luther’s eyes Erasmus repeats the mistake of the scholastic theologians, in claiming in line with Aristotle that people are just because they perform good works. Ultimately, for Luther, Erasmus is a Pelagian. It is now crucial to reflect on the early date of Luther’s dissatisfaction with Erasmus. Luther’s theological break with scholastic theology is generally dated to an unspecified period around late 1514 or early 1515. Luther scholars tend to see Luther’s departure from Erfurt’s via moderna as coeval to his first lecture to the Romans. This departure is generally understood as Luther’s engagement with Augustine’s On the Spirit and the Letter and his anti-Pelagian writings. The new understanding of Paul’s dichotomy between spirit and letter, as derived from Augustine, induced Luther to reject his nominalist background. However, this picture needs to be supplemented with some missing pieces. The first missing piece is Luther’s deep engagement with Erasmus of Rotterdam. The well-known description of Erasmus’ so called “biblical humanism”, which creates the cultural condition for Luther to move his critique of scholastic theology, is misleading. Luther reads and judges Erasmus, and his new version of the New Testament as well as of St. Jerome’s works, for his ability or inability to understand Pauline theology. In other words, the knowledge of the three Holy languages or the accuracy in reading a certain scriptural passage is an ancillary problem. For Luther, the heart of the problem lies in understanding the entire Bible essentially as a message of law and grace. Luther believed that Erasmus failed to recognize the essence of this message. Moreover, Luther’s equally well-known critique of Erasmus’ understanding of the Pauline “works of the law” as Jewish ceremonies is only one part of a wider critique that Luther directed against the Dutch theologian. Both Luther’s annotation to Jerome and his letter to Spalatin dated 19 October 1516 show that Luther believed Erasmus’ mistake to be an inevitable consequence of his incorrect doctrine of original sin. The whole question of theological anthropology must, thus, be addressed and clarified. Furthermore, Luther explicitly links Erasmus’ position with a new form of Pelagianism: in Luther’s eyes, the confactos iusta operari. Necessarium ergo esse prius mutari personam, deinde opera; prius enim Deo Abelem quam eius munera placuisse. Quamuis igitur et speret et cupiat autoritatem tuam fore celeberrimam, vereri tamen te autore extituros qui defensionem mortuae, id est literalis, intelligentiae arripiant, qua pleni sunt omnes pene ab Augustini temporibus.

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sequence of Erasmus’ misleading understanding of original sin inevitably leads to a Pelagian or semi-Pelagian soteriology. In this chapter, thus, I show that in this period Luther developed an anti-Erasmian ontology of the person, which emerged in his public disputes in 1517 and 1518. Luther’s critique of Erasmus goes hand in hand with his critique of Gabriel Biel and the soteriology of late medieval Erfurt. Before moving the discussion to the central problem of theological anthropology, which Luther considered Erasmus’ most problematic position, we need to spend some more pages on another well-known concept of late medieval nominalism strongly criticized by Luther starting from his Lecture to the Romans – namely the doctrine of synderesis.

3.3  Divine Justice and Pagan Wisdom: Demarcating the Boundaries of Revelation As we have seen in the previous pages, in the famous dispute on human powers without grace, Luther mounted a twofold critique against Gabriel Biel and his Erfurt followers, and against Erasmus of Rotterdam. In both Biel and Erasmus, Luther recognized the same tendency to underestimate the consequences of original sin and, thus, to believe in the fictitious doctrine of free will, a doctrine which, according to him, opened the doors to Pelagianism, and thus to heresy par excellence. While asking Spalatin to reject what Luther considered Erasmus’ semi-Pelagianism, the Wittenberg professor was lecturing on the Epistle to the Romans. In the following semesters, he taught on the Epistle to the Galatians99 and Hebrews.100 The choice is clearly programmatic: for Luther, the Epistle to the Romans is where Paul distinctly expressed the essence of the Christian message, namely the doctrine of justification. On the contrary, writing to the Galatians, Paul rebukes the heresy of the Jews who still trusted in their works, rather than in God. In Galatians, he does not intend to preach the Gospel completely, but to confirm and clarify what he already propagated in the Epistle to the Romans.101 99  For a discussion of Luther’s position in his 1516 lectures on Galatians, see: Grane, Modus Loquendi Theologicus, 119–21; Lohse, Luthers Theologie, 80–97. 100  For an interpretation of Luther’s early lecture on the Epistle to the Hebrews, see: Kenneth Hagen, A Theology of Testament in the Young Luther: The Lectures on Hebrews, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Leiden: Brill 1974). Hagen discusses the question of the authenticity of the epistle to the Hebrews in idem, Hebrews Commenting from Erasmus to Beze, 1516–1598, Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Exegese (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1981). See especially 4–8 for Erasmus’ and 8–9 for Luther’s critique of the Pauline authorship of the epistle. 101  WA 57.2.7.27,8.1–3: Ex quo patet, quod in hac epistola non intendit ex integro de gra-



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These early lectures reveal Luther’s efforts to carve out his own position in the different and contradicting sources with which he was dealing in these years. An uncritical view of the Reformation could underwrite the stereotype of Luther engaged in an effort to overcome the anthropology of late medieval nominalism. However, the early date of his critique against Erasmus shows how deeply Luther was struggling with Erasmus’ philosophia Christi, even at this early juncture. Erasmus’ admiration for pagan authors is unmistakable, especially for their understanding of morality and virtue. Contrary to that, Luther gradually expels morality from the soteriological process. For Luther, God is the judge of the hearts of men: the question is whether human beings can have a pure heart and the answer that Brother Martin Augustinianus offers is an unequivocal no. In the abovementioned letter to Spalatin, Luther raised two fundamental critiques about Erasmus’ position: first, Luther argued that Erasmus had completely misunderstood and undervalued the consequences of original sin; second, in light of this misunderstanding, Erasmus had also misinterpreted the nature of human works outside of grace. In the lectures of this period, Luther repeatedly emphasized these points to his students. By the end of 1515, influenced by Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings, Luther developed an understanding of the doctrine of justification, in which human activity was granted very little space in the salvific process, so that all he admitted to was a minimal role for the humans in the process of preparing themselves to receive grace. At the juncture of Luther’s lecture on the Romans, his theology, however, is already soteriologically oriented. For Luther, in the Epistle to the Romans, Paul, in antithesis to every human understanding of justice, proclaims a message of grace. The righteousness of God is conceived as antithetical to the notion of a “human” justice. Luther points out that the terms “righteous” and “unrighteous” have a different meaning in Scripture from that used by philosophers and lawyers: whereas for the latter, righteousness is a quality of the soul, in Scripture it refers to God’s imputed righteousness to the individual. Moral activity still plays an important role in Luther’s theology, as a confirmation of God’s grace.102 Ex suis naturalibus, however, human beings are never just. In recognition of their unrighteousness, it is God’s righteousness that is attributed to them. One becomes righteous not by doing good actions, but by trusting in tia predicare, sicut fecit ad Romanos, sed tantum defendere et confirmare iam predicatam et acceptam. 102  While Leif Grane claimed that moral activity has no theological value for Luther in the Lectures on the Romans, Denis R. Janz disagreed to the extent that “moral activity is inseparably linked to justification as its consequence and confirmation”. Cf. Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Thomism, 20. In the same way, Alister McGrath noted that “it is clear that Luther does not exclude all human activity from justification, in that he formulates this in essentially Augustinian terms”. McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 174.

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God’s Word: the former is the concept of justice formulated by philosophers and lawyers, the latter refers to the righteousness enshrined in Scripture.103 The different meaning of the terms “righteous” and “unrighteous” in the Scripture and in philosophy redirects us to the question of the human condition after original sin. Luther, indeed, argues that “philosophers” and “lawyers” believe that justice lies in the “quality of the soul”. In his first lecture on the Psalms, the Pauline notions of spiritus and caro could, for Luther, coincide with what he designates as the upper and lower part in the individual. Starting from his lectures on Romans, Luther expanded the semantic meaning of the word caro to also indicate the individual in its entirety in his postlapsarian condition. From this moment on, for Luther, original sin takes on a metaphysical connotation, for sin encompasses the entire individual and obfuscates all the parts of his soul. This means for Luther that both the intellect and the will are corrupted by sin. I noted earlier how identifying the possible texts that influenced Luther at the juncture of his Lectures on Romans requires further research. It is, however, worth mentioning that the possibility of a Stoic influence on Luther’s notion on the complete depravity of human nature, and of the concept of simul iustus et peccator, has been advanced by Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle, who stressed that Luther adopted the Stoic paradigm that all sins are equal. As a Christian, however, he could not accept the Stoic notion that some sins are unpardonable.104 I have already shown how Luther, in the Dictata super psalterium, posited a double synderesis in the human being, one in the will and the other in the intellect. This is no surprise since Luther’s former professor in Erfurt, Jodocus Trutvetter, had asserted the same point. The problem of conscience and innate disposition was widely discussed throughout the Middle Ages. Michael Baylor has written a very detailed account of the evolution of the notion of synderesis, and Luther’s contribution to this discussion.105 The term synderesis was introduced to Christianity by Jerome, who used it in his Commentary on Ezekiel. Jerome defines synderesis as an indissoluble spark in the conscience (scintilla conscientiae).106 Baylor has pointed out that there was a general disagreement on the 103 

For this discussion, I follow: McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 185. O’Rourke Boyle, “Stoic Luther: Paradoxical Sin and Necessity,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 73 (1982): 69–93. 105  Michael G. Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the Young Luther, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Beyond Baylor’s contribution which focuses specifically on Luther’s notion of synderesis in relation to medieval theology, the best contribution on the debate regarding conscience in medieval theology is still: Timothy C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Rudolf Branko Hein’s contribution on the notion of conscience is also very valuable: Rudolf Branko Hein, ‘Gewissen’ bei Adrian von Utrecht (Hadrian VI.), Erasmus von Rotterdam und Thomas More: Ein Beitrag zur systematischen Analyse des Gewissensbegriffs in der katholischen nordeuropäischen Renaissance, Studien der Moraltheologie (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2000). 106  Ibid., 60–63. The term synderesis used in medieval scholasticism probably derives 104  Marjorie



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location and ontological status of synderesis and its relationship to conscience throughout the Middle Ages. In the tradition of via antiqua, Thomas Aquinas was the most influential authority. Distinguishing it from conscience, understood as an act of judgment, for Aquinas, synderesis was an innate, inextinguishable habitus. Thus, while not a faculty or a power in the individual, it still gives an innate knowledge of what is good and, thus, it is the ontological foundation of moral life.107 At the other end of the spectrum, William of Ockham strongly criticized the notion of an innate habitus; in Ockham’s moral thought, synderesis plays no role and the universal principle which guides the conscience can be found in practical reason and in Scripture. Unlike Ockham, Gabriel Biel used the notion of synderesis, equating it with practical reason. Thus, in Biel, the common definition of synderesis as scintilla conscientiae given by Jerome stands juxtaposed with the narrower definition of scintilla rationis.108 In order to understand the intellectual context in which Luther was operating, a brief look at the positions of Luther’s professors in Erfurt is necessary. Pekka Kärkkäinen has made a recent contribution in this direction, demonstrating that, unlike Bartholomeus Arnoldi von Usingen, Jodocus Trutvetter was closer to the exponents of via antiqua in considering synderesis as an innate disposition to assent to the good; moreover, he posited a double synderesis, one in the will and the other in the intellect, thus trying to conciliate the different traditions related to the problem of conscience.109 Michael Baylor has pointed out that the concept of a double synderesis is already present in Luther’s early annotations in Erfurt. In these annotations, Luther suggests that in light of the intellectual synderesis, the intellect naturally tends toward the truth, if not obstructed by falsity; in light of synderesis in the will, the will naturally tends toward the good, if not obstructed by evil.110 After using the concept of synderesis in his first lecture on the Psalms, Luther discussed it for the last time in his career in his lecture on the Epistle to the Romans; from a corrupted manuscript of Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel. The term used by Jerome should be syneidēsis. For a discussion of the use of the term synderesis in scholasticism, see: Michael B. Crowe, “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics,” Irish Theological Quarterly 23 (1956): 228–45. In the previous chapter, I emphasized that Origen’s tripartite distinction of the human being influenced Erasmus’ interpretation of 1 Thes. 5:23. Douglas Kries has pointed out that it was Origen’s anthropology which influenced the famous passage in which Jerome uses the concept of synderesis/syneidēsis: Douglas Kries, “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (Synderesis) in Jerome’s Ezekiel Commentary,” Traditio 57 (2002): 67–83. In Hyperaspistes II Erasmus, discussing the innate notion of morality which persists in human beings after original sin, points out that “the scholastics” call it synderesis, but then he immediately adds that he does not know where this definition comes from. See: Vance, Secrets: Humanism, Mysticism, and Evangelism, 29, note 27. 107 Baylor, Action and Person, 20–69. 108  Ibid., 92–93. 109  Pekka Kärkkäinen, “Synderesis in Late Medieval Philosophy and the Wittenberg Reformers,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2012): 881–901. 110 Baylor, Action and Person, 166–68.

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however, in this work, he sharply criticizes the concept that the presence of a synderesis of the will as well as the synderesis of the intellect in the individual entails the possibility of a collaboration between man and God in the salvific process.111 Luther repeatedly uses as point of departure the possibility that pagans could have a proper notion of God, or could love the good. Commenting on the first Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, Luther is deeply concerned about the relationship between human knowledge and the truth revealed in the Gospel, as well as with the possibility of knowing God through human wisdom. The subsequent question is then, if the individual could perform good works without grace, purely through the innate knowledge of what is good. Drawing from Augustine’s On the Spirit and the Letter, Luther argues that in the Epistle, Paul is concerned with rebuking arrogant people, who Luther identifies as the philosophers, for many philosophers had indeed been arguing that it was possible to know God through science and knowledge. One is, thus, virtuous when one possesses love for virtue and knowledge not only in appearance, but in one’s own heart; however, Luther argues that this perspective is misleading. While admitting that there have been men who pursued knowledge for their own sake, these men nevertheless glorified their virtue and wisdom in their heart. Not surprisingly, Luther cites Socrates as the prime example. The image of Socrates as the archetypical wise and good man was widespread in the Renaissance, and Erasmus of Rotterdam reinforced this image of Socrates multiple time in his writings.112 In Sileni of Alcibiades, Erasmus praises Socrates as the highest example of wisdom and virtue: although in appearance he looks sloppy, he is wise in his heart. He only cares for knowledge and wisdom, and not for external appearance.113 Erasmus published his description of the Sileni of Alcibiades in the 1515 edition of Adagia. The first edition of Adagia was published in the summer of 1500 by Johannes Philippi in Paris under the title Adagiorum Collectanea. The Venetian printer Aldus Manutius published a new edition in 1508, entitled Adagiorum Chiliades. Some months before Erasmus’ death in 1536, the eleventh 111  In

his attempt to predate Luther’s critique of the soteriology of via moderna to the Dictata, Steven Ozment argued that in his first commentary on the Psalms, Luther already deprived the notion of synderesis of every soteriological connotation. According to Ozment, this process happened in three ways: “The necessity of special divine grace to awaken the synteresis, the discovery of the soteriologically desubstantial nature of the whole creature (manifest especially in the concept, clamare); and the location of all soteriological resources outside of man in the three-fold advent of Christ”. Cf. Steven E. Ozment, Homo Spiritualis, 199. 112  Raymond Marcel, “‘Saint’ Socrate Patron de l’Humanisme,” Revue internationale de philosophie 5, no. 16 (1951): 135–43; Erasmus Bartholin and Lynda Gregorian Christian, “The Figure of Socrates in Erasmus’ Works,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 3 (1972): 1–10. For Erasmus’ famous expression in the Colloquy “Sancte Socrate, ora pro nobis”, see ASD I, 3. 113  For Erasmus, the practice of virtue is strictly related to the quest for a clean conscience. For Erasmus’ notion of conscience, see: Hein, ‘Gewissen’ bei Adrian von Utrecht (Hadrian VI.), Erasmus von Rotterdam und Thomas More, 304–65.



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edition of the Adagia was published in Basel. Three new versions appeared between the years 1513–15. The 1515 edition was implemented both with expanded versions of texts already published in the previous versions, like Aesop’s fable Scarabeus aquilam quaerit,114 and adages published for the first time, like the abovementioned Sileni Alcibiadis or Erasmus’ famous appeal for peace, Dulce Bellum inexpertis. As his correspondence shows, Luther was well-acquainted with the previous editions of the Adagia as early as 1503.115 I suggest, thus, that Luther’s critique of the possibility that Socrates had a pure heart is a reaction to the new publication of Erasmus’ Adagia. Indeed, Luther reveres Erasmus’ argument, pointing out that Socrates was wise and did care for glory only in appearance – yet he glorified himself for his wisdom in his heart. In Luther’s perspective, it did not matter how much Socrates was wise and just, nor that he did not care for human glory. Pursuing wisdom for the sake of wisdom, according to Luther, was in itself a form of idolatry, and, moreover, an empty attempt to be perfectly just because no one could be completely pure in his heart. While it was true that Socrates did not glorify himself before men, he did glorify himself in his heart. Thus, Luther argues invoking Paul’s observation in Rom. 1:22 “Claiming to be wise, they became fools” that this passage described men like Socrates.116 Here Luther introduces one key distinction in his theology: the distinction between iustitia domestica and iustitia aliena.117 The kind of knowledge that the individual acquires through his own powers (iustitia domestica) is worthless and useless, and must be replaced with a kind of justice that comes from the outside and is properly divine (iustitia aliena). Human justice must die in order to be replaced with divine justice.118 Luther claims that the word “egressus”, which in the Bible refers to the exodus of the Jewish people, allegorically 114  For

a discussion of the 1515 version of this adage, see: Denis Drysdall, “Erasmus on Tyranny and Terrorism: Scarabaeus aquilam quaerit and the Institutio principis christiani,” Erasmus Studies 29 (2009): 89–102. 115  Luther quotes Erasmus’ Adagia in a letter to Johannes Braun or to Jodocus Trutvetter dated 23 February 1503, as reported in WA Br 1, 9–10. For other quotations in the correspondence of the following years, see: WA Br 1.17.44; WA Br 1.23.11; WA Br 1.28.9; WA Br 1.44.25; WA Br 1.61.13; WA Br 1.71.42. 116  WA 56.157.11–19: Sunt enim quidam et fuerunt inter Gentes et Iudeos, qui hoc sufficere putabant, si non ficte et ad faciem hominum, Sed ex animo et medullis virtutes et scientias possiderent, Vt philosophi multi. Et ii licet coram hominibus non statuerent istas Iustitias neque gloriarentur de illis, Sed mero virtutis et Sapientie affectu eis adhererent (quales erant, qui optimi et Syncerissimi et excepto Socrate pauci sunt famati), non tamen continere se intus poterant, quin sibi placerent et apud se saltem gloriarentur in corde tanquam sapientes, tanquam Iusti et boni viri, de quibus hic dicit Apostolus: “Dicentes se sapientes stulti” etc. 117 A still valuable discussion of Luther’s distinction between iustitia aliena and iustitia domestica can be read in Walther Loewenich, Duplex iustitia: Luthers Stellung zu einer Unionsformel des 16. Jahrhunderts, Veröffentlichungen des Institutes für Europäische Geschichte Mainz (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1972). 118  WA 56.158.10–13: Deus enim nos non per domesticam, Sed per extraneam Iustitiam

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means a transformation in the individual, not so much a passage from virtue to vice as from virtue to Christ’s grace.119 Here Luther’s anti-Erasmian perspective emerges in full: the Wittenberger points out that Christian life is not a moral battle against vices, but a renunciation of oneself in order to receive God’s grace. In the first Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, Paul affirms that, although it has always been possible to know God since the creation of the world, pagans knew God, but they did not honor Him. Commenting on Rom. 1:20, Luther points out that the expression “a creatura” had to be interpreted as from the beginning of the creation.120 This implied that the Apostle explicitly endorsed the idea that every human being had an innate knowledge of the divinity. Thus, even pagans could know God. They recognized the existence of an immortal being with infinite power. However, the pagans had perverted the notion of one God in their idolatry to many gods.121 In order to prove that this did not happen by chance, but that it had been a necessary consequence of the perverted nature of human beings, Luther divests the concept of synderesis of the intellect of every possible positive connotation through which one could infer that pagans could have had a proper knowledge of God. Indeed, the fact that pagans had a notion of God undoubtedly proves for Luther that there must have been a form of innate knowledge. This kind of knowledge, however, was perverted, as was every other aspect in the individual.122 Thus, an innate ability to recognize what is true and good still existed in the individual, but this potentiality could never be innately fulfilled: That to all people, and especially to idolaters, clear knowledge of God was available, as he says here, so that they are without excuse and it can be proved that they had known the invisible things of God. His divinity, likewise, his eternal being and power, becomes apparent from the following: “All those who set up idols and worship them and call them ‘gods’, even ‘God’, believing that God is immortal, is eternal, powerful, and able to render help, clearly indicate that they have a knowledge of divinity in their hearts. For with what reason could they call an image or any other created thing God, or how could et sapientiam vult saluare, Non que veniat et nascatur ex nobis, Sed que aliunde veniat in nos, Non que in terra nostra oritur, Sed que de celo venit. 119  WA 56.158.17–22: Et omnis egressus populi Israel olim istam egressionem significauit, quam de viciis ad virtutes exponunt. Et magis etiam de virtutibus ad gratiam Christi oportet exponi, Cum eiusmodi virtutes eo maiora et peiora sunt vitia, quo minus se sinunt putari talia et vehementius timuit quaam sinistra. 120  WA 56.174.15–18: Vel sic. “A creatura mundi” (i. e. a conditione mundi, non solum a nunc temporis) semper ita fuit, Quod Inuisibilia Dei conspiciuntur operibus intellecta, vt infra patebit. 121  WA 56.174.22–25: Cui videtur hic contradicere, sc. quod cognouerint Deum, Sed statim infra soluitur, Scil. licet cognouerint Deum, tamen “non probauerunt Deum habere in notitia” i. e. factis ostenderunt, quasi non cognoscerent. 122  Luther extensively addressed how an innate knowledge of morality does not entail that pagans could know God or perform good works in “How a Christian Should Regard Moses”. The original text can be found in WA 16.363–93. An English translation of this treatise can be found in the Annotated Luther, volume 2, 127–52.



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they believe that it resembled Him if they did not know at all what God is and what pertains to Him? How could they attribute such qualities to a rock or to Him whom they thought to be like a rock, if they did not believe that these qualities were really suitable for Him? When they now hold that divinity is invisible (a quality to be sure, which they have assigned to many gods) and how who possesses it is invisible, immortal, powerful, wise, just, and gracious to those who call upon Him, when they hold fast to this idea so that they confess it also by works, by calling upon Him, worshiping and adoring Him of whom they think that divinity resides in Him, then it follows surely that they had a knowledge or notion of divinity which undoubtedly came to them from God, as our text tell us. This was their error, that they did not worship this divinity untouched but changed and adjusted it to their desires and needs. Everyone wanted to see the divinity in the one who appealed to him, and so they changed the truth of God into lie.123

Through a series of rhetorical questions, Luther points out that there must be an innate knowledge of God in man. The synderesis of the intellect allowed knowledge of the invisible notion of God and His divinity, immortality, and power since the creation of the world. However, it also follows that no pagan worshipped God as God, if the notion of God was changed to suit one’s own desires and wishes, so that, according to Luther, in the hands of the pagans, the Truth itself becomes a lie. For Luther, pagan cultures always fashioned God as they liked, a conviction that served as the definite proof that the innate knowledge of God was useless or even harmless. In fact, he deemed it so depraved that pagans naturally tended to accustom God to their own desires. Commenting on Rom. 1:21, Luther emphasizes that pagans do not glorify God as God, but fashion God to their own image.124 Just like the synderesis of the intellect, Luther also applies the concept of a synderesis of the will, but he deprives it of every positive connotation. The relevant passage is Luther’s comment on Rom. 3:10, where Luther takes a po123  LW

25.157; WA 56.176.26–35, 177.1–11: Quod omnibus, idolatris tamen precipue, manifesta fuerit notitia Dei, sicut hic dicit, ita vt inexcusabiliter possint conuinci se congnouisse Invisibilia Dei, ipsam diuinitatem, item sempiternitatem et potestatem eius, ex hoc aperte probatur, quia omnes, qui idola constituerunt et coluerunt et deos vel Deum appelauerunt, item immortalem esse Deum i. e. sempiternum, item potentem et adiuuare valentem, certe ostenderunt se notionem diuinitatis in corde habuisse. Nam Quo pacto possent Simulachrum vel aliam creaturam Deum appellare vel ei similem credere. Si nihil, quid esset Deus et quid ad eum pertineret facere, nossent? Quomodo hec attribuerunt lapidi vel ei, cui lapidem similem estimabant, si ea non crederent et conuenire? Nunc ei teneant, cum Inuisibilis quidem sit diuinitas (quam in multos tamen deos distribuerunt). Quod qui eam habeat, sit Inuisibilis, sit immortalis, sit potens, sit Sapiens, sit Iustus, sit clemens inuocantibus. Cum ergo hec adeo certe teneant, quod etiam operibus profiteantur, sc. Inuocando, colendo, adorando eos, in quibus diuinitatem esse putabant, certissime sequitur, quod notitiam seu notionem diuinitatis habuerunt, que sine dubio ex Deo in illis est, sicut hic dicit. In hoc ergo errauerunt, quod hanc diuinitatem non nudam reliquerunt et coluerunt, sed eam mutauerunt et applicuerunt pro votis et desyderiis suis. Et vnusquisque diuinitatem in eo esse voluit, qui sibi placeret, et sic Dei veritatem mutauerunt in mendacium. 124  WA 56.178.4–5: non sicut Deum, sed sicut similitudinem imaginis coluerunt ac per hoc non Deum.

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sition against Seneca’s assertion of acting morally, besides other human beings or even the gods become aware of his sins.125 I noted in the previous chapter the Stoic influence in Erasmus’ thought. It is well-known, moreover, that in De servo Arbitrio Luther accused Erasmus of being a Stoic assertor. At the same time, Boyle has pointed out the Stoic background of Luther’s doctrine of sin and justification. Erasmus himself noticed it in a polemical sense against Luther in his Diatribe sive Collatio. Ten years before, however, one can already see how Luther distances himself from contemporary trends in sixteenth-century discourse which held Seneca’s morality in high esteem.126 For Luther’s source regarding Seneca’s assertion that he would act morally even if nobody was paying attention to his behavior, the editors of volume 56 of the Weimarer Ausgabe identify the commentary on the rule of St. Augustine by the Augustinian hermit Tilman Limperger (1455–1535), published in Strasbourg in 1490, or to a similar passage on temperance in the highly influential encyclopedia Margarita philosophica by Gregor Reisch (1467–1525), whose first edition was published in Fribourg in 1503.127 At the same time, in other texts available to Luther, Seneca is depicted as one of the highest examples of morality, temperance, and force of will. Despite his famous satires against the Stoic doctrine in his Moriae Encomium, in 1515, Erasmus edited an edition of Seneca’s works, including the famous apocryphal correspondence between Seneca and Paul. It was not until 1529, while he was in the process of editing Seneca’s works again,128 that Erasmus added a brief introduction, discussing the doubtful authenticity of the correspondence.129 The link 125  It has to be noted that the dichotomy between human and divine justice is one of the central themes of Rom. 3: 1–4. For a critical discussion of Luther’s scholia on these passages, see: AWA 6.70–90. 126  For a careful analysis of Erasmus’ reception of Seneca, see: Winfried Trillitzsch, “Erasmus und Seneca,” Philologus 109 (1965): 270–93. Roland Meyer has emphasized the discontinuity between Erasmus’ understanding of Seneca from the medieval reception of Seneca: Roland Mayer, “Seneca Redivivus: Seneca in the Medieval and Renaissance World,” in The Cambridge Companion to Seneca, ed. Shadi Bartsch and Alessandro Schiesaro, Cambridge Companion to Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 277–88. 127  See notes to line 32 in WA 56.236. Seneca has been a highly influential thinker throughout all the Middle Ages. See Peter Walter, “Senecabild und Senecarezeption vom späten Mittelalter bis in die frühe Neuzeit,” in Der Apokryphe Briefwechsel zwischen Seneca und Paulus: Zusammen mit dem Brief des Mordechai an Alexander und dem Brief des Annaeus Seneca über Hochmut und Götterbilder, ed. Alfons Fürst et al., Sapere (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 126–46. 128  For an accurate discussion of Erasmus’ edition of Seneca and the later edition by Justus Lipsius, see: Jan Papy, “Erasmus’ and Lipsius’ Editions of Seneca: a Complementary Project?,” Erasmus of Rotterdam Society. Yearbook 22 (2002): 10–36. 129  John Sellars, “Stoicism,” in Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Marco Sgarbi (Cham: Springer International, 2017), 1–15. For an overview of the historical background of the alleged correspondence between Seneca and Paul, see: Ilaria L. Ramelli, “The Pseudepigraphical Correspondence between Seneca and Paul: A Reassessment,” in Paul and Pseudepigraphy, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Gregory P. Fewster, Pauline Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2013),



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between Erasmus and Seneca was so well-known in the early sixteenth century that their works were sometimes published together. Thus, for instance, Froben published in 1515 in Basel an edition of Seneca’s satire on the death of the Emperor Claudius, the Apocolocyntosis, with a collection of other works, among which was included Erasmus’ Moriae Encomium and his apology addressed to Martin Dorp.130 On his part, Luther linked his general critique of the synderesis to a more specific attack against Seneca’s understanding of morality131 and, thus, against the very same possibility to perform acts that are intrinsically good. Just as he pointed out that, thanks to the synderesis of the intellect, all human beings shared a natural tendency to know the truth, Luther also admitted that there was a natural inclination toward the good in the will. While Luther conceded that this synderesis of the will held a reminder of doing good, it was only a small portion in the will and did not itself contribute to the accomplishment of good works. Human will, according to Luther, when not moved by God’s grace, naturally tended toward evil. Against Seneca and his assertion of having an uncorrupted will, Luther firmly asserted that human beings, always prone to evil, do not possess this kind of will. The human will is moved towards good only by the grace of God.132 In Luther’s eyes, Seneca’s claim stood in contradiction to the human condition after original sin. Thus, he asks, underscoring an irony: “Would he dare to say that he would wish to do good even if he knew neither the gods nor men cared?”133 Ultimately, for Luther, every good act in the individual was always moved by self-love (amor sui) and, thus, it had to be considered an act of human love for self and not for God. At the juncture of the Lectures on the Romans, for Luther the inner struggle to be just and good is a distinctive characteristic of Christians – and only of Christians. Commenting on Romans 7, Luther emphasizes that the Holy Spirit spreads love (Charitas) in the heart of the believer, freeing will’s tendency to do good. Christian believers are, at the same time, both sinners and not sinners. According to Luther, sin is not eradicated in the believer in a metaphysical 319–36; Maria Grazia Mara, “L’epistolario apocrifo di Seneca e San Paolo,” in Seneca e i cristiani, ed. Antonio Martina (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2001), 41–54; Arnaldo Momigliano, “Note sulla leggenda del cristianesimo di Seneca,” Rivista Storica Italiana 62 (1950): 325–44. 130  It has been suggested that Seneca’s De Morte Claudi could be one of Erasmus’ literary sources for his Adagia 201 Aut regem aut fatuum nasci oportere as well as for his Iulius Exclusus. For the former, see: Elisa Tinelli, “La rappresentazione del potere nel Rinascimento: Seneca nell’Adagio 201 di Erasmo da Rotterdam,” Invigilata lucernis 33 (2011): 203–15. For Erasmus’ Iulius Exclusus, see: Marcia L. Colish, “Seneca’s Apocolocyntosis as a Possible Source for Erasmus’ Julius Exclusus,” Renaissance Quarterly 29 (1976): 361–68. 131  On this aspect, Boyle noted that Luther’s appropriation of Stoic thinking should be limited to epistemology, and to Greek, rather than to Roman Stoicism. Indeed, Luther always rejected Stoic morality: Boyle, “Stoic Luther: Paradoxical Sin and Necessity,” 76. 132 Baylor, Action and Person, 174. 133  As quoted by ibid., 175.

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sense, but only in the sense that sins are not imputed to him before God. What is eradicated from the human heart is the spiritual sin, namely the will to sin. It is properly Christian to be aware of being a sinner, while carnal men do not recognize themselves as sinners, and thus do not fight against their sinfulness. However, not even spiritual men can perform good works. Thus, Paul’s sentence in Rom. 7:16 that he does what he does not want to do should not be interpreted as the acknowledgement of the Apostle of being a persistent sinner, but in the sense that by virtue of the concupiscence in his nature, he does not achieve as much good as he would like. In the same way, Rom. 5:5 should be understood as proof that even Paul could not do good works. The carnal man, who lives outside of the grace of God, has no will at all to do good works. Rather than will (voluntas), Luther points out, it would be more appropriate to define it a ‘non will’ (noluntas). Being unaware of his sinful condition, the carnal man just follows his concupiscence and lives in perennial iniquity. Without the Spirit, man was always “the old” and “exterior” man mentioned by the Apostle. Conversely, enlightened by the light of the Spirit, the believers recognized their sinful condition. This does not entail that Christians can actually perform good works. Luther introduces a distinction between the act of doing (facere) good works and accomplishing ( perficere) good works. In this life, it is possible to do good works but not to fulfill them, for Luther believed that for a good work to be realized, the person had to be moved by an inner desire to do good. Yet even as concupiscence rendered human desire evil, it was impossible to regard the desires of the flesh as good, since these kinds of desires inhabited the heart of every individual. To walk in the Spirit means not to fulfill ( perficere) the desires of the flesh. The Christian lives in the paradoxical condition – having to be just and sinner (simul iustus et peccator) at the same time. He did not sin completely, but neither did he act in a wholly good way. His sins remained, which however, God did not impute as mortal guilt. In Rom. 7:18 Paul claims “For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out”. In Gal. 5:16, he says “So I say, walk by the Spirit, and you will not gratify the desires of the flesh”. According to Luther, the two passages match and should be read as two sides of the same coin in order to be correctly understood. The tinder of sin remains in every believer. This is true even for the Apostle Paul. For Luther, this position, implying that humans can be “saints” through their own natural powers, is intrinsically semi-Pelagian. Luther points out that no one, no matter how saintly one is, lives a perfectly righteous life. Even Paul himself could not reach this goal, since it is simply beyond human possibilities. Since Erasmus had pointed out that in Rom. 7:18 Paul was not speaking of himself, Luther argued that Paul’s claim that no matter how hard he tried he could not fulfill the law, is a reference to himself. Luther’s interpretation of Gal. 5:16 is programmatically anti-Erasmian. As shown in the previous chapter, in the Enchiridion, Erasmus interprets Gal. 5:16



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as a dichotomy between the spiritual and ferine parts in the individual. Linking that to several passages from the Epistle to the Romans, he points out that the law of the mind battles against the law of the members (Rom. 7:13), that those who live in the flesh die, but those who live in the spirit annihilate the deeds of the flesh (Rom. 8:13), and that the spirit renders Christian “Children of God” (Rom. 8:15). In all these passages, the contraposition is not between an extra nos, a spiritual condition derived by God’s bestowed Spirit, but, rather, between the spiritual and carnal nature of the individual. After Erasmus pointed out that the same understanding of the human being described by Paul can be found also in Plato, Luther, commenting on Romans 8, emphatically points out that the breath of the theologian smells of philosophy (Ita olet philosophia in anelita nostro), when one believes that human natural faculties have not been corrupted by original sin. Luther concedes that it is true that human reason looks for the good, but it does so in the wrong way. Human reason looks for and cares only for itself, whereas it is faith that in charity looks for God. In the darkness of sin, human reason is unable to attribute virtues, science, or anything else to God. In the slavery of sin, the human soul does not know God neither in the intellect nor in the will (quod intellectum et affectum). When not enlightened by faith, one could only do evil, even when for all appearances one was doing good actions. Against Biel and Trutvetter, who argued that through synderesis,134 human nature knew and wanted what was good in the universal sense (although it was possible to err in particular cases), Luther emphasized that the opposite was true: human nature could know and want good only in particular cases, but in the universal sense, it neither knew nor wanted the good. It only knew what was good for the individual, but not what was good according to God. As the Scripture says, sin is incurve into human nature so that when the individual looks into himself, he finds nothing but sin. Only divine help from the outside could lift humanity from this condition. This help was charity, without which humans would always sin against the precept of “non concupiscere”. For Luther, it made no sense to equate natural reason with divine grace. According to Genesis III, natural reason was born after original sin and, thus, was prone to and enslaved by sin. Human reason turned to itself whatever it knew, and also bent the will to this depraved knowledge.

134 

WA 56.355, n. 28.

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3.4  Body, Soul, and Spirit: Ockhamism and anti-Erasmianism in Luther’s Anthropology Since the revival of interest in Luther at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, Luther’s anthropology has been persistently contextualized in discontinuity with “Catholic anthropology”, neglecting that in this period of his life Luther was a member of the Catholic Church and no Protestant Church as yet existed. He is typified as a Lutheran before the existence of Lutheranism, and described as the originator of a new vision of the believer and his condition before God. Gerhard Ebeling has become the main representative of a mass of scholarship emphasizing the novelty of Luther’s anthropology, and how this new perspective radically and dramatically changed the understanding of the human relationship with God. According to Ebeling, Luther developed a “relational ontology”, which rendered him distinct from the entire scholastic tradition. Since Ebeling already discerns the seed of this new anthropology in Dictata, precisely in light of this new vision of mankind, Luther was doomed to break with Rome before becoming “the Reformer”.135 More accurate historical approaches have dismantled the anachronism of Ebeling’s macro-construction. Graham White has emphasized that William of Ockham developed a relational ontology much before Luther.136 Reinterpreting Augustine’s De Trinitate, Ockham criticized Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between a lower and upper part in the soul. According to Ockham, the two parts of the soul are different only in relation to their functions: when the soul deals with spiritual things, it has to be called upper, when it has to do with earthly things, it has to be called lower.137 Thus, White concludes that what Ebeling believed to be one of Luther’s innovations is already present in Ockham. What Ebeling defined as a relational ontology is not Luther’s discovery, but an integral part of Ockham’s psychology. For Ockham, there is no real distinction between the different faculties in man. Thus, the different faculties do not possess different 135  See especially Ebeling’s commentary to Luther’s famous Disputatio de homine (1536) in the second volume of his Lutherstudien: Gerhard Ebeling, Disputatio de homine: Die philosophische Definition des Menschen. Kommentar zu These 1–19, vol. 2, Lutherstudien (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1982); Disputatio de homine: Die theologische Definition des Menschen. Kommentar zu These 20–40, vol. 2, Lutherstudien (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989). Ebeling’s description of Luther’s anthropology in “existential” terms has been followed by Wilfried Joest in Wilfried Joest, Ontologie der Person bei Luther (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967). An analysis of how Ebeling appropriated Luther’s relational ontology can be found in Marc Vial, “Fides facit personam. La notion de personne chez Luther et quelquesuns de ses lecteurs contemporains,” Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg, no. 31 (2012): 107–32. 136  Graham White, Luther as Nominalist: A Study of the Logical Methods Used in Martin Luther’s Disputations in the Light of their Medieval Background, Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994). 137  See the quotation reported by White: ibid., 73.



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powers, but only accidental dispositions in the senses. The will and intellect are thus not two different faculties in the human being; they are the same faculties in the rational soul directed towards different objects: when the rational soul is led by the act of understanding, it is called intellect, when by the act of willing, will. White summarizes: “The tendency which Ebeling claimed to be distinctively Lutheran – that is, the avoidance of internal anatomy in the soul, and the use of relational concepts instead – is actually characteristic of Ockham’s psychology. Rather than finding a basic difference between Luther and scholasticism, Ebeling has stumbled upon yet another close resemblance”.138 A dramaturgy of discontinuities, sudden changes, and radical revolutions has pervaded a huge segment of Luther research. A closer look at the actual positions assumed by individual authors has done more justice to the subtleties of Luther’s thought, as well as to the cultural debt that he owed to his predecessors. In the last forty years, Luther scholarship has taken a significant step forward in reconsidering Luther’s relationship with his nominalist background. However, I have suggested above that new research should pay much more attention to the mutual influence of different texts. While Luther was annotating Gabriel Biel, he was also annotating Erasmus’ works and, thus, I argued that his positions regarding soteriology, original sin, and free will emerged from the hybrid reading of these different sources. White’s research showed to what extent Luther’s theological anthropology was indebted to nominalism. Thus, it is now possible to take a step further to reconsider Luther’s theological anthropology in relation to other cultural traditions. As noted, in the Lectures to the Romans, Luther admits that human beings have an innate knowledge of God as well as an innate tendency toward the good, but he deprives this concept of every positive connotation. Luther applies the concept of synderesis in a very refined way, affirming that, because of original sin, human wisdom inevitably leads to a depraved notion of God. Innate human knowledge of God leads to idolatry. Throughout his career, Luther continued to assert that an innate knowledge of God remained in the individual after original sin, but natural knowledge nevertheless does not grant any possibility to gain a proper knowledge of the divinity. This gives rise to a string of questions: How is it possible, according to Luther, to gain a proper knowledge of God? How can the believers get in contact with God? If the human being in its entirety is nothing but flesh, how can one become spiritual? Luther’s answer to these questions is quite straightforward: true knowledge of God can be earned only through the cross of Christ. In his early lecture on Galatians, Luther applies Plato’s dictum that “like knows like”, in the sense that humans can know only what is human, and for this reason God was incarnated by becoming a man in flesh and blood. The ontological community between 138 

Ibid., 74.

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the human and divine soul was consistently evoked in the late Middle Ages, as well as in the Patristic period, to explain why human beings, and only human beings in the created order, have a notion of the divinity. Luther never denied that the synderesis renders the individual able (aptus) to know God and receive salvation. He, however, denied the actual realization of such a possibility as a consequence of original sin. Thus, he inverted the terms of discussion. It is not the shared divine nature between God and man that gives human beings the possibility to know God, but the shared humanity. It is in Christ’s humanity that one can see the Father. Idolatry consists of looking for a direct, unmediated knowledge of God, to try to know God face-to-face – an attitude which Luther labels as a form of haughtiness. Only in Christ’s humanity is it possible to have a proper, non-blasphemous, knowledge of God. In this sense, Luther reworks Plato’s motto simile simili cognosci as the proof that human beings can know only what is properly human, the God incarnate, both God and human. Without the incarnation, true knowledge of God would have been impossible and looking for God beyond His incarnation would ultimately amount to blasphemy.139 In this passage, Luther also hints that knowledge of God derives from faith. Christ is not merely the object of knowledge. Luther emphasizes that knowledge of Christ in virtue of Christ (cognitionem Christi pro Christi) cannot be acquired rationally. It is not a speculative-dialectic process. First, the individual must be transformed at the level of conscience and, then, the mind can be redirected toward Christ as the proper tool to know God. This process happens only through faith, which is not a human work, nor the result of human ontological powers. Luther’s theological anthropology, and his emphasis on faith in Christ as the only proper tool to know God, go hand in hand. Once again, the notion of disruptive change needs to be substituted with more careful evaluations regarding Luther’s indebtedness to scholastic tradition. Bernd Hamm has recently emphasized that faith has always been understood as a relational concept throughout all the Middle Ages. At the same time, in scholastic theology, faith was conceived as the least important among the theological virtues: while faith was a prerequisite for receiving the infusion of the Holy Spirit in the sacraments, love became essential to maintain the Spirit, and to regenerate the human ontologi139  WA 57.II.94.1–14: Hic etiam notandum est: Licet verum sit Christum personaliter in nullo prorsus formari- ac sic glosa illa recta quidem est, sc. fidem seu cognitionem Christi pro ‘Christo’ hic accipi atque intelligi-, summe tamen cavendum est, ne ista cognitio accipiatur speculative, qua Christus tantum obiective cognoscitur. Nam hec est mortua, et demones adeo habent eam, ut miro studio fallant hereticos et superbos per illam. Sed est accipienda ipsa practica, sc. vita, essentia et experiencia ad exemplum et imaginem Christi, ut iam Christus non sit obiectum nostre cognitionis, sed nos pocius obiectum cognitionis eius, ut supra dixit: “Nunc autem cum cognoveritis, immo cum cogniti sitis”. Nam hoc est, quod prius Deus est factus caro, quam caro fieret Deus. Ita oportet in omnibus prius Deum incarnari, quam eos in Deo indivinari, et inde recte habet illud Platonicum: “simile simili cognosci”.



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cal faculties. In this continuous struggle for moral improvement, Christians can always have hope that God will reward their efforts by granting them eternal salvation.140 Luther progressively gave more prominence to faith, thereby excluding every form of moral activity in the soteriological process. This development can be properly understood only in terms of Luther’s continuous dismantling of human ontological faculties, which he conceived as completely obfuscated by sin. Because of the unique language of the Holy Writ, commenting on Galatians 1:10 (an hominibus suadeo), Luther emphasizes that the term hominibus in the Scripture refers distinctly to those who are not reborn in Christ, while the Scripture refers to the believers using the terms “justs” (iusti), “gods” (dei), and other similar terms.141 For those who live outside of God’s grace, it is impossible not to sin.142 Commenting on Galatians 3:3 (cum spiritu cepeteris), Luther argues that “flesh” refers neither to the sensual man nor to the sensuality (sensualitas) which derives from concupiscence, but to every man who lives outside of Christ’s grace (extra gratiam Christi). Based on this interpretation, it is clear for Luther that the expression “being consumed by the flesh” (carne consumari) in Galatians does not refer to luxury, but to those who ask to be justified through works and the righteousness of the law.143 Then, commenting on Gal. 5:19 (Manifesta sunt autem opera carnis), Luther emphasizes that “flesh” is not concupiscence in man. On the contrary, the term should be understood according to the distinction between those who received, and those who did not receive, spirit and grace.144 Every passage mentioned by Luther here was, indeed, interpreted in the opposite sense by Erasmus in the Enchiridion. It is clear that for Luther misunderstanding the human condition after original sin inevitably leads to misunderstanding the doctrine of justification. Privileging human abilities gives rise to the impression that it is possible to be saved by virtue of good works. Moreover, in opposition to Erasmus, Luther presents 140  Berndt Hamm, Der frühe Luther: Etappen reformatorischer Neuorientierung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 65–89. 141  WA 57.II. 58.20–24, 59.1–3: “Hominibus” hic proprie accipitur pro his, qui sunt tantum homines, qui cum sint extra Christum et veritatem et iusticiam, necesse est, ut pleni sint mendacio et vanitate. Et iste usus frequentior est in Scripturis, immo solus cessante littera, … ubi substantiam et hominem creaturam significat. Sic per oppositum homines iusti non vocantur “homines”, sed pocius “dii”, “iusti”, “sancti”, “sapientes”, et ceteris Dei nominibus. Unde psalmo 8: “Ego dixi: dii estis et filii excelsi omnes, vos autem sicut homines moriemini et sicut unus de principibus cadetis”. 142  WA 57.II.79.19–20: Ideo impossibile est non peccare eos, qui bona extra gratiam faciunt. 143  WA 57.II.77.18–22: Hic manifestissime patet, quod “caro” non est tantum sensualis homo seu sensualitas cum suis concupiscentiis etc., sed omnino, quicquid est extra gratiam Christi. Nam certum est, quod Galatas ideo dicit carne consumari, non quia luxurias vel crapulas sectarentur, sed quia opera et iusticiam legis querebant. 144  WA 57.II.103.11–13: Hinc manifeste patet, quod “caro” non tantum pro libidinosis concupiscentiis accipitur, sed prorsus pro omnibus contrariis spiritui et gratie.

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his own understanding of how different passages in the Pauline Epistles on a bipartite or tripartite anthropology should be conciliated. Luther conciliates bipartite and tripartite anthropology of Paul in three different comments which can be seen in his Lectures on Galatians, Lectures on Hebrews, and his Commentary to the Magnificat (1521).145 In his early commentary on Galatians, Luther emphasizes that Paul divides human beings into three parts: animal, carnal, and spiritual.146 The animal man is the sensual man, which, like a beast, acts only according to the five senses.147 The carnal man, instead, is the rational man.148 Finally, the spiritual man is hidden to human eyes, and made in the image of God. Paul uses the term “vir” to refer to the spiritual man. The spiritual man is passive rather than active: he does nothing except receive God unto himself; his life is based on faith, hope, and love, and is completely oriented towards invisible things.149 Luther recalls Augustine’s claim in the twelfth book of his De Trinitate that this division is represented in the Book of Genesis: the serpent corresponds to the animal man, Eve to the carnal man, and Adam to the spiritual man.150 In his lectures on the Hebrews, Luther almost slavishly repeats the same distinction, and further clarifies how the bipartite distinction between soul and body and the tripartite distinction between the animal, rational, and spiritual man should be conciliated. Commenting on Hebrew 4:4, Luther explains the nature of God’s rest in a manner similar to Augustine. The first explanation comes from the fourth book of De genesi ad litteram, in which Augustine explains God’s rest tropologically: God rests when His creatures rest in virtue of His gift. Second, in Chapter 12, Augustine interprets God’s rest in the sense that 145  How Luther conciliates the bipartite and tripartite anthropology has been recently investigated by Ilmari Karimies, who discussed Luther’s position in relation to the Victorine school and Bernard of Clairvaux, see: Ilmari Karimies, “Martin Luther’s Early Theological Anthropology: From Parts of the Soul to the Human Person as One Subject,” in Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Jari Kaukua and Tomas Ekenberg (Cham: Springer International, 2016), 199–218. 146  WA 57.II.77.25–27: Quidam sane intentissime Paulum trutinantes triplicem hominem videri in ipso dicunt, sc. animalem, carnalem, spiritualem. 147  WA 57.II.78.6–7: Igitur “animalis homo” est ipse sensualis homo, tanquam addictus, quia sicut bestia 5 sensibus agitur. 148  WA. 57.II.78.7–8: “Carnalis” autem est homo rationalis seu secundum animam. 149 WA 57.II.78.12–16: Spiritualis homo est ipse absconditus nobis, novus et interior, imago et gloria Dei et vir apud Apostolum vocatus. Hic est, qui soli proprie Deo vacat pocius passivus quam activus, cum nihil aliud faciat, quam quod Deum in se recipiat; cuius vita est in fide, spe et charitate, totus sc. pendens ex. invisibilibus. 150  For Augustine’s theological anthropology in De Trinitate, see: Lewis Ayres, “Between Athens and Jerusalem: Prolegomena to Anthropology in De Trinitate,” Modern Theology 8 (1992): 53–73. In De Trinitate, Augustine also adopts the famous tripartite distinction between memory, reason, and will. For an accurate discussion of the role of memory in De Trinitate, see: Paige E. Hochschild, Memory in Augustine’s Theological Anthropology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).



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he stopped making new creatures. Thirdly, in Chapter 16, God’s rest is understood as the rest for which God requires the blessing of no one.151 Whereas the first and the third explanation justify why “nobody should enter in God’s rest”, Luther finds the second explanation more complicated to clarify. In the Chapter 12 of De Trinitate, Augustine presents a tripartite division of mankind in anima-mens-spiritus. Luther points out that human beings can rest only when they need no further blessing, that is when “God will be all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28).152 Thus, he explains Chapter 12 of Augustine’s De Trinitate as follows: In order that we may grasp in some measure the nature of that rest, it is necessary to note that man, like Noah’s ark, “has three chambers” and is divided into three men. Man is called a microcosm, that is, a smaller world. Every one of those men rests and is disturbed or troubled in a twofold way, namely, either, inwardly or outwardly. In the first place, the sensual man rests outwardly when he takes pleasure in something that is perceptible. This is what it means to rest positively. On the other hand, he is disturbed and troubled when that which is perceptible is disturbed or removed. But he rests inwardly when he rests negatively, that is, when, because of the work of the rational man, he has no work or nothing perceptible to be occupied with, as is clear in the case of men who think or speculate. On the other hand, he is disturbed inwardly when, alongside the disturbance of the rational man, he is confused, as is clear in the case of those who are sad and melancholy. In the second place, the rational man rests outwardly and positively in his rational and speculable objects if they are pleasant. But he is disturbed outwardly if they are sad. He rests inwardly and negatively, however, when he ceases from his work, and the spiritual man occupies himself with faith and the Word. But he is disturbed inwardly when, alongside the disturbance of the spiritual man – namely, when he is in danger of losing faith and the Word – he himself is also disturbed. For this disturbance is the most horrible of all, since it is most profound and is very close to hell. In the third place, the spiritual man rests outwardly in the Word and in faith, namely, positively, as long as the object of his faith, that is, the Word, remains fixed in him. But he is disturbed outwardly when his faith is in danger – as has been said – and when the Word is withdrawn, as happens when faith, hope, and love are tried. For this is the man who “lives by the Word of God” (Math. 4:4; Luke 4:4). He rests, inwardly, however, when he rests negatively, namely, when he is lifted up by faith and the Word in the essential work of God, which is the very birth of the uncreated Word, as He says: “This is eternal life, that they know Thee, the true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent” (John 17:3), that is, the procession of the Son from the Father. And here there is no inward disturbance, for this seventh day has no evening by which it could pass over into another day. And from what has been stated

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LW 29.161; WA 57.III.158.2–7: Beatus Augustinus super Genesin li. 4. ca. 9. tripliciter exponit Deum requiescere. Primo sic, “sicut recte dicitur Deus facere, quicquid ipso in nobis operante facimus, ita recte Deus dicitur requiescere, cum eius munere requiescimus”. Verum hic sensus tropologicus est, quia de effectiva quiete Dei sapit, de qua Isaie 11.: “Requiescet super eum spiritus Domini”, et ultimo eiusdem: “Super quem requiescet spiritus meus”. etc. 152  LW 29.161–62; WA 57.III.158.13–17: Atque 1. et 3. modo potest hic accipi, quando dicit: “Si introibunt in requiem meam”. Secundus modus satis obscurus est. Tunc enim veniemus in requiem eius, quando nullo bono amplius indigere ceperimus. Hoc autem erit, quando secundum Apostolum 1. ad Co. 15. “erit Deus omnia in omnibus”.

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one gets, in a way, a brief exposition of both kinds of theology, namely, the affirmative and the negative.153

In this passage, Luther distinguishes between the sensual, rational or carnal, and spiritual man. Microcosm in the macrocosm, these three dimensions within an individual have their own objects and can be positively or negatively directed to it. Moreover, they mutually influence one another and the respective domains. The sensual man rests positively by freely applying the proper faculty, namely the faculty of perception, and is disturbed when an external impediment impedes the possibility to deal with perceptible objects. Negatively, however, because of his works, the rational man can be inwardly confused and begin to speculate, and outwardly become sad, like the melancholic man. The rational man rests positively in his speculable objects if they are pleasant and is disturbed if they are sad; negatively, he rests inwardly when he takes a pause from his works and the spiritual man occupies itself with faith and the Word, but is disturbed, when in danger of losing faith. Finally, the spiritual man is outwardly disturbed when his faith is in danger, but rests inwardly when it is lifted up by faith in the work of God, the uncreated Word, where there is no inward disturbance. In interpreting the image of the tabernacle of Moses tropologically, Luther still draws on a tripartite anthropological scheme. Before moving the discussion to the human being, Luther clarifies that the tabernacle of Moses has been interpreted as a representation of the created world: the “Holy of Holies” would represent the celestial and invisible things, the “Holy Place” would represent the 153  Cf. LW 29.162–63; WA 57.III.158.18–21, 160.2: Ut aliquatenus apprehendamus illius requiei modum, notandum, quod homo sicut arca Noë est “tricameratus” et in tres homines divisus, scil. sensualem, racionalem et spiritualem. || homo dicitur microcosmos i. e. minor mundus || Quilibet illorum dupliciter quiescit et inquietatur seu laborat, videlicet vel ab intra vel ab extra. Primum sensualis ab extra quiescit, quando in sensibili obiecto delectatur, quod est positive quiescere; rursum turbatur et laborat, quando sensibile obiectum turbatur vel auffertur. Ab intra vero quiescit, quando privative quiescit, i. e. dum cessat ab opere vel obiectis sensibilibus propter opus racionalis hominis, ut patet in cogitabundis et speculativis hominibus; rursum turbatur ab intra, quando ad turbacionem hominis racionalis confunditur, ut patet in tristibus et melancolicis. Secundo racionalis homo quiescit ab extra et positive in obiectis suis racionalibus et speculabilibus, si fuerint iocunda; turbatur autem ab extra, si fuerint tristia. Ab intra vero quiescit et privative, quando cessante opere eius spiritualis homo in fide et verbo versatur; turbatur autem ab intra, quando ad turbacionem spiritualis hominis, scil. in fide et verbo periclitantis, et ipse turbatur, hec enim turbacio est omnium horribilissima, quia intima et proxima inferno. Tercio spiritualis homo ab extra requiescit in verbo et fide, scil. positive, dum obiectum fidei i. e. verbum ei infixum manserit. Turbatur autem ab extra in periculo fidei (ut dictum est) et verbi subtraccione, ut fit in temptacionibus fidei, spei et charitatis; hic est enim homo, qui “vivit in verbo Dei”. Ab intra vero quiescit, quando privative quiescit, scil. a fide et verbo sublatus in opus essenciale Dei, quod est ipsa nativitas Verbi increati, sicut dicit: “Hec est vita eterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum, et quem misisti Ihesum Christum” i. e. processionem filii a patre. Et hic non est turbacio ab intra, quia hic septimus dies non habet vesperam, qua possit transire in alium diem. Et ex his patet aliquo modo utriusque theologie scil. affirmative et negative brevis declaracio.



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visible world, the “seven lamps” would be the seven planets, and the “table of showbread” would be the four elements. However, Luther emphasizes that this interpretation seems to make violence to the text. Thus, he continues to interpret the tabernacle of Moses tropologically. Man is again described as a microcosm, a “smaller world”, whose highest part dwells among things that are divine and invisible. Being God’s dwelling place, the higher reason is represented by the ark of the Lord. The “Holy Place”, instead, represents the lower reason illuminated by the light of natural reason. Finally, the court represents the sensual man, and it is said that the court is five cubits in height to symbolize the five senses. Thus, the “Holy of Holies” represents the intellect, the “Holy Place” the reason, and the court the perception, namely the faculties which characterize the “three men” often mentioned by Paul (animal-carnal-spiritual).154 At this juncture, Luther is still willing to add a further trope to his interpretation, namely the tabernacle of Moses as a symbol of the Church: the “Holy of Holies” symbolizes the triumphant Church, the “Holy Place” is the militant Church, and the court represents the synagogue. By virtue of this, the five-cubits-high court would suggest that the synagogue was based on the five books of Moses. The lampstand with its shaft and seven lamps signifies the Word of God by which the Church is illuminated; the number seven signifies universality; the seven golden lampstands might signify the seven Churches – the Churches taken collectively. Fourthly, the lamps can signify the conscience of the individual. The table and the bread of Presence is the Holy Scripture that the believers receive from the moth as from a table, according to Matt. 2:7. The Ark of the Covenant is Christ himself.155 The tropological interpretation, however, is the one that Luther himself favors. In the abovementioned passage, Luther seems to endorse an interpretation of the Pauline tripartite schema in flesh-soul-spirit as a distinction between three different parts within the individual: the flesh is concerned with earthly 154  LW 29.199–200; WA 57.III.197.6–20: Alii magis tropologice per “tabernaculum” intelligunt minorem mundum id est ipsum hominem, qui secundum portionem superiorem rationis versatur in invisibilibus et in his, quae Dei sunt. Sic enim Deus solus, ut in multis locis Augustinus asserit, habitat et replet mentem superiorem hominis, ac per hoc talis homo vere est archa Domini habens propitiatorium, Cherubin, manna et virgam Aaron. “Sanctum” autem significat rationem inferiorem, quae illuminatur lumine, ut dicunt, naturalis rationis, quod per candelabrum significetur, sensus vero carnis tandem intelligatur per atrium, in cuius figuram atrium habuit quinque cubitos altitudinis, quia 5 tantum sensus. Et breviter ad istum modum sensus est atrium, ratio est sanctum, intellectus sanctum sanctorum, qui sunt tres illi homines a Paulo celebrati, scilicet animalis, carnalis, spiritualis. Et in singulis suus est ritus et sua theologia, suus cultus Dei, quibus respondet triplex illa theologia: simbolica sensui, propria rationi, mystica intellectui. 155  LW 29.200–201; WA 57.III.197.20–4: Tertio alii cum Apostolo hoc loco tabernaculum intelligunt mundum quendam spiritualem, quae est Ecclesia sancta Dei. Et ita [sanctum] sanctorum est Ecclesia triumphans, sanctum Ecclesia militans, atrium Synagoga, cui consonat iterum quinarius altitudinis atrii, quia quinque libris Moysi literalibus continebatur Synagoga.

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and corrupt things, the spirit moved to divine and immortal things, and the soul takes the middle position between the two extremes. It could appear to be a position that is antithetical to the concept of the unity of the being proposed by Via Augustiniana Moderna, and in accordance with Erasmus’ position. However, as shown above, this is one of the key mistakes that Luther detects in Erasmus. These apparent incongruences would be less visible if more attention were paid to how Luther conciliates the Pauline notions of bipartite and tripartite. In his Commentary to the Magnificat, Luther gives a long explanation on how the distinction between soul and body, and the distinction between body-soul-spirit, should be correctly interpreted. Commenting on Luke 1:46 (“My soul magnifies God, the Lord”), Luther focuses on the interpretation of the expression “my soul”. The human soul, Luther explains, following the tripartite schema mentioned by Paul in the last Chapter of his first Epistle to the Thessalonians, can be divided into three parts: body, soul, and spirit. In pointing out that in other passages the Apostle seems to divide the human being into flesh and spirit, Luther clarifies that the tripartite division is a division of the nature, while the bipartite division is a division of the qualities. Thus, the human soul is composed of body, soul, and spirit, and all these three parts can be either spirit or flesh. The spirit, the highest and noblest part, is the part in which the faith and the Word of God dwell. The soul is conceived by Luther as that part, made by the same substance as the spirit, which gives life to the body and, for this reason, is termed as “life” in the Scripture. It remains at work even as people fall asleep, it is governed by reason and, thus, cannot understand incorporeal things but only what reason can understand and measure. Scripture attributes to the soul and the spirit sapientia and scientia: wisdom is a characteristic that is properly spiritual, while knowledge, hatred, sorrow and the like are proper to the soul. The third part is the body which must apply to what the soul knows and the spirit believes.156 Finally, again, Luther offers a tropological interpretation of the image of 156 WA 7.550.19–36; 551.1–13: Wollen ein wort nach dem andernn bewiegen: das erst”Meyn seele”. Die schrifft teilet den menschen ynn drey teil, da S. Paulus 1. Thessal. ult. sagt: “Got der ein got des frids ist, der mache euch heilig durch und durch, alszo das ewer gantzer geist und seele und leip unstreflich erhalten auff die zukunfft unszers herrnn Ihesu Christi”. Und ein iglichs dieszer dreier sampt dem gantzen menschen wirt auch geteylet auff ein ander weisz ynn zwey stuck, die da heissen geist und fleisch, wilch teilung nit der natur, szondernn der eygenschaff ist, das ist, die natur hat drey stuck: geist, seel, leip, und mugen alle sampt gut oder bosz sein, das heist denn geist und fleysch sein, davon itzt nit zu reden ist. Das erst stuck, der geist, ist das hohste, tieffiste, edliste teil des menschen, damit er geschickt ist, unbegreiflich, unsichtige, ewige ding zu fassen. Und ist kurtzlich das hausz, da der glawbe und gottis wort innen wonet. Davon David psal. l. sagt: “Her mach ynn meinem ynnewendigisten ein richtigen geyst”, das ist einen auffgerichten stracken glawben. Widderumb von den unglewbigen psal. lxxvij. “Ihr hertz war nit richtig zu got, und yhr geyst war nit ym glawben zu got”. Das ander, die seele, ist eben derselbe geist nach der natur, aber doch inn einem andernn werck. Nemlich ynn dem, alsz er den leyp lebendig macht und durch ynn wircket, und wirt offt



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the tabernacle of Moses: the sanctum sanctorum as the “Holy Place” where God dwells, with no light illuminating it to symbolize that faith cannot be understood but only grasped in darkness; the sanctum is the soul and the seven lights represent all kinds of activities proper to the soul, like understanding, knowing, or knowledge of bodily and earthly entities.157 The distinction that Luther provides in this passage clarifies how he conceives the relationship between the Pauline bipartite distinction in flesh and spirit, and the tripartite scheme in body, soul, and spirit. For Luther the two distinctions are neither antithetical nor overlapping. In contrast, Erasmus interpreted the two schemas as an internal struggle between the lower and upper faculties in the individual. Annotating Erasmus’ edition of Jerome, Luther labelled this position as intrinsically Pelagian. Luther understood the human soul as a unitary being with different parts related to different objects endowed with different abilities, but with no specific power to redirect the human being to a proper understanding of God. The intellect, the dwelling place of the spirit according to Luther, cannot in itself redirect the lower faculties to divine things. Its role is to receive the grace externally bestowed by God. In this sense, all the three faculties in the human soul can be “spirit”, if they are moved by trust in God. The interior struggle which characterizes the life of a Christian is not a struggle between the faculties in the human soul. Without faith, all the three faculties remain carnal, and the entire human being – nothing but flesh. Enlightened by faith, all three faculties are moved by trust in God. Finally, none of them is able to redirect the individual toward God by virtue of its own natural faculties. Unsurprisingly, since Erasmus based his interpretation of Paul’s understanding of man on Origen and Jerome, Luther notes in the Lectures on the Hebrews that ynn der schrifft fur “das leben” genummen; denn der geyst mag wol on den leyp leben, aber der leyp lebet nit on den geyst. Disz stuck sehen wir, wie es auch ym schlaff unnd on unterlasz lebet unnd wurckt. Unnd ist sein art nit die unbegriflichen ding zu fassen, szondernn was die vornunfft erkennen unnd ermessen kan. Und ist nemlich die vornunfft hie das liechtynn die­ szem hausze, unnd wa der geyst nit mit dem glawben, als mit eynem hohern liecht erleucht, disz liecht der vornunfft regiert, so mag sie nimmer on yrthum sein. Denn sie ist zu geringe ynn gotlichen dingen zu handelln. Dieszen zweien stucken eygent die schrifft viel dings, als sapien­ tiam und scientiam: die weiszheit dem geist, die erkenntnisz der seelen, darnach auch hasz, liebe, lust, grewel und des gleichenn. Das dritte ist der leip mit seinen gelidernn, wilchs werck sein nur ubungen und prauch, nach dem die seel erkennet und der geist glawbt. 157  WA 7.551.13–24: Unnd das wir des eyn gleichnisz antzeigen ausz der schrifft: Moses macht eynTabernakell mit dreyen underschiedlichen gepewen. Das erst hiesz sanctum sanctorum, da wonet got ynnen, unnd war kein liecht drinnen. Das ander, sanctum, da ynnen stund einleuchter mit sieben rohren und lampen. Das drit hiesz atrium, der hoff, das war unter demhymel offentlich, fur der sunnen liecht. Inn der selben figur ist ein Christen mensch abgemalet. Sein geist ist sanctum sanctorum, gottis wonung ym finsternn glawben on liecht, denn er glewbt, das er nit sihet, noch fulet, noch begreiffet. Sein seel ist sanctum; da sein sieben liecht, das ist, allerley vorstannt, underscheid, wissen unnd erkentnisz der leiplichen, sichtlichen dinger. Sein corper ist atrium; der ist yderman offenbar, das man sehen kan, was er thut, und wie er lebt.

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Origen’s and Jerome’s interpretation of Galatians 5 can be considered correct only if one follows Augustine in reading them.158 In the very same passages that Erasmus interpreted through a dichotomy between the higher and lower parts of human nature, emphasizing human abilities to a spiritual ascension to God, Luther saw the very negation of this very same possibility. In doing so, Luther severed the ontological foundation on which Erasmus based his interpretation of human spiritual life. In Luther’s language, terms like “spirit”, “soul”, or “intellect” do not denote the parts in human beings that preserve a divine spark or share a common divine nature with God. The highest part in as individual is no less affected by original sin than the body, the lowest part. What characterizes the spirit for Luther is its capability to receive God’s grace.

3.5  Erasmus and Luther: Reception, Assimilation, and Transformation In this chapter, I investigated Luther’s positions on the condition of human beings after original sin, the notion of synderesis, free will, and the bipartite or tripartite distinction of human faculties. It seems to me that a clear point has emerged: ten years before his dispute with Erasmus, Luther was highly influenced by this Dutch scholar. Luther was not simply reading, annotating, or commenting on Erasmus’ works, he was structuring his own positions in reaction to Erasmus. The textual influences which I have described in this chapter showed how Luther identified in Erasmus an exponent of Pelagian or semi-Pelagian theology, against whom he was fighting. The first 18 Theses of the Heidelberg Disputation, thus, have to be read in light of Luther’s reception through a positive and negative reading not only of the nominalist tradition he acquired in Erfurt, but also of Erasmus’ theology. As always, textual influences are variegated, multifaceted, and often contradictory. While I focused in this chapter on Luther’s negative reception of Erasmus’ theological anthropology, it is worth mentioning that from 1521 onwards, Luther (and Melanchthon) adopted Erasmus’ understanding of grace as favor dei. On his side, Erasmus, arguably influenced by Luther’s position, was more careful in interpreting the semantic meaning of the Pauline term caro, noting that with this word Paul sometimes meant the carnal/corporeal part of man, but at other times the term symbolized the entire individual in his post-lapsarian 158  WA 57.III.163.11–17: In hac igitur re laboravit pre ceteris Origenes et post eum b. Hieronimus ad Gal. 5., ut sit corpus seu caro infima porcio nostra nota omnibus, spiritus vero suprema porcio, qua divinorum capaces sumus, anima vero media porcio inter utramque. Que si intelligantur quomodo et b. Augustinus distribuit hominem in porcionem superiorem et inferiorem ac sensum, plana sunt ac satis dicta superius.



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condition. When the 1520s arrived, the positions of Luther and Erasmus grew further apart. After Luther structured his own positions antithetically to Erasmus, and after Erasmus recognized how far Luther’s theology was from his own philosophia Christi, the presence of a common enemy as well as their coeval critique of scholastic theology was no longer a sufficient reason to share a common front. Erasmus’ decision to stick with the Roman front after Luther’s excommunication in 1521 rendered a public confrontation inevitable. One by one, the veiled critique Luther structured against Erasmus in his early lectures and works re-emerged more boldly in De Servo Arbitrio. In 1517, Luther confided to Lang and Spalatin his dissatisfaction with Erasmus, which – despite his urging to keep that a secret – became public only a few years later.

Chapter 4

CRUX Sola Est Nostra Theologia: Luther’s Theology of the Cross in Context In the previous chapter, I proposed reading Luther’s early positions as a continuous reaction to different texts. In light of the well-known influence of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian works, as well as of Luther’s positive and negative relationship with late medieval nominalism, I focused my attention on the role played by the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam in shaping Luther’s early positions. The depiction of the relationship between Luther and Erasmus needs to be revised in light of Luther’s deep engagement with Erasmus’ scholarship between 1515– 18. Different concepts in Luther’s theology have to be understood against the backdrop of Erasmus’ works: Luther conceived the notion of free will in Erasmus, just like in Gabriel Biel, as “Pelagian”; with late-medieval nominalism, he shared a conception of man as an entire entity, thus departing from Erasmus’ tripartite distinction of the human being. In light of his opposite understanding of the human being after peccatum Adae, Luther perceived Erasmus as an exponent of that work-righteousness soteriology he was fighting against. The first 18 Theses of the Heidelberg Disputation, therefore, have to be understood as Luther’s critique of Gabriel Biel and his Erfurt followers as much as of Erasmus of Rotterdam. Theses 19–22 mark Luther’s proclamation of the theology of the cross. It seems to me that the common appeal in Luther scholarship to explain these Theses in opposition to Erfurt nominalism is both inadequate and misleading. The few utterances of the expression theologia crucis are chronologically situated in the years 1518–19. In this period, Luther and Karlstadt were involved in a harsh polemic against the Ingolstadt theologian Johannes Eck. The exchange of pamphlets between Ingolstadt and Wittenberg led to the Leipzig debate, a capital event in the history of Christianity, which took place between the end of June and the beginning of July 1519. One of the pamphlets against Eck, in which Luther explicitly accused his opponent of being ignorant of the theology of the cross, offers an indication that Luther’s theologia crucis also needs to be interpreted in the context of Luther’s dispute with Eck. In order to correctly understand the positions of Luther and Eck on the eve of the Leipzig debate, the intellectual context of the early sixteenth century needs to be reexamined. As we saw in Chapter One, the debates surrounding the trials of Luther and Reuch­lin for heresy were discursively intertwined. Reuch­liniani

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and Lutherani, some of them self-professed as such, perceived themselves in fight against the “obscurantist” theologians of Cologne, Louvain, and Paris. An essentialist reading of these events has fictitiously constructed a sharp, overarching separation between the progressive “humanists” and “reformers”, side by side in defense of Luther and Reuch­lin, against the conservative scholastics. This narrative cannot grasp the nuances of Eck’s positions in this period and, consequently, fails to offer a more pointed perspective on Luther’s reaction to them. My argument is that, in shaping their respective positions, Eck and Luther were deeply influenced by a debate that had occurred around thirty years earlier between Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. In the last decade of the fifteenth century, Ficino and Pico debated, and often disagreed, on fundamental issues like ontology, the evaluation of the works of pagan philosophers – first of all Plato and Aristotle – and the nature of the human relationship with God. To my knowledge, the influence of the Pico–Ficino debates on the positions of Eck and Luther on the eve of the Leipzig debate has not yet been noticed. In what follows, I first describe Luther’s statements on the Dionysian corpus between 1514–1520, in order to show how he positioned himself in the debates. Second, I briefly summarize the controversy between Pico and Ficino, emphasizing their respective metaphysical positions as well as their common interest in the role of love in promoting a mystical ascent to God. I will then consider how these debates influenced John Eck and, finally, discuss how Luther’s theology of the cross emerged as a highly polemical reaction to these texts.

4.1  “Dionysius, Whoever He May Have Been”: Luther and the Debate on the Dionysian Corpus in the Early Sixteenth Century In the spring of 1521, when Martin Luther remained the most famous, controversial, and divisive man of all Christendom, he was also famously the catalyzer of an entire movement of reform that challenged the power of the Church in Rome. After the Imperial Diet of Worms, where Luther was declared a heretic by the pope and an outlaw by the Emperor, Frederick the Wise attempted to make his professor of theology “disappear”. Hidden in Warburg Castle, Luther continued to write pamphlets, short treatises, and polemical texts in order to clarify his own theological positions, as well as to defend himself from his accusers. In this period, he became involved in a dispute with the man he would later define as his most skilled opponent, the Louvain Professor of Theology Jacob Latomus. Despite having no books at his disposal, Luther was confident



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that he could correct a quotation by Latomus of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, since he knew Dionysius’ works by heart.1 Martin Luther’s deep knowledge of the so-called Dionysian Corpus is no surprise. The influence in the history of Christianity of this enigmatic figure, who became known as Dionysius the Areopagite, is impossible to overestimate. In Acts of the Apostles 17, Luke reports a speech held by Paul in Athens in order to convert the Greeks: while many laughed at Paul, Dionysius, a member of the Areopagus, and a woman named Damaris, converted to Christianity (Acts 17:34) Around 170 CE Dionysius, bishop of Corinth, identified the Areopagite mentioned in the Acts as the first bishop of the Church of Athens. Furthermore, Dionysius was incorrectly identified with St. Denis, who travelled to France and became the patron of France and bishop of Paris.2 The writings of a sixth-century theologian called Dionysius were mistakenly attributed to the Dionysius who had been converted by Paul in Athens. The writings attributed to Dionysius are: the Divine Names, the Mystical Theology, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the Heavenly Hierarchy, and ten letters.3 During a colloquy in Constantinople in 532–33, the Severians, who criticized the Christological definition of the council of Chalcedon (451), quoted Dionysius in support of their Thesis, identifying the author of the Corpus Dionysiacum with the Dionysius converted by Paul in Athens. In response, the Chalcedonians showed their skepticism about the authenticity of these works, noting that the Corpus Dionysiacum was never mentioned by the Church Fathers. The authenticity of the Dionysian corpus was widely debated in the sixth and early seventh century: the lack of patristic reference to Dionysius and the evident similarity with some of Proclus’ passages were compelling arguments against dating these works to the first century. In the seventh century, the Corpus was used by authoritative figures such as Maximus the Confessor, and Pope Martinus I asked to read some passages of the Corpus during the Lateran Council in 649.4 The quotations of Dionysius in the Lateran Council in 649 settled the matter in regard to the authenticity of the Corpus Dionysiacum for almost one thousand years. Dionysius’ works entered the Corpus of the Western Church, and 1  As reported by Knut Alfsvåg, “Luther as a Reader of Dionysius the Areopagite,” Studia Theologica – Nordic Journal of Theology 65 (2011): 101–14. 2 For the myth of St. Denis, patron of France, in the Renaissance see: Jean-Marie Le Gall, Le mythe de Saint Denis: entre Renaissance et Révolution, Époques, collection d’histoire (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2007). 3  For the writing of the Corpus Dionysiacum in its own intellectual context, see: Beate Regina Suchla, Dionysius Areopagita: Leben – Werk – Wirkung (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2008). 4  For these early debates on the authenticity of the Corpus Dionysiacum, I follow the introduction written by Enzo Bellini to the Italian translation of Dionysius’ works edited by Bompiani: Dionigi Areopagita, Tutte le opere, ed. by Piero Scazzoso and Enzo Bellini. Il Pensiero Occidentale (Milan: Bompiani, 2009). See especially 34–36 for the debate between Severians and Chalcedonians.

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widely influenced authors like John Scotus Eriugena, Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, John Tauler, Meister Eckhart, and Nicholas of Cusa.5 The different treatises which compose the Corpus were also translated several times into Latin: translations by Hilduin and John Scotus Eriugena appeared in the ninth century, the Franciscan John the Saracen made a new, although partial, translation in the twelfth century, and in the thirteenth century a new translation was undertaken by Robert Grosseteste. However, in 1431, the vicar general of the Chamaldean order Ambrogio Traversari provided a new translation, and although he was probably initially influenced by Traversari’s version,6 Marsilio Ficino decided that another translation was necessary in order to show the deep continuity between Dionysius and the Platonists. Thus, he decided to provide a translation – as he put it – “in the light of the Platonic reasoning” (Platonica videlicet ratione).7 In 1499, a new edition of the Corpus Dionysiacum was published by Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples in Paris.8 It was Lorenzo Valla who, in his Adnotation to the New Testament, again put into question the dating to the first century of the Corpus. Although Valla’s doubts had a limited influence in the fifteenth century, when Erasmus of Rotterdam’s edition of Valla’s work actually appeared, it undermined the widespread conviction that the author of the Corpus was indeed the Dionysius mentioned 5  There is vast secondary literature on the influence of the Dionysian corpus during the Middle Ages. For a careful examination of the influence of Dionysius until Eriugena, see Stephen E. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition, Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie (Leiden: Brill, 1978). A list of Dionysius’ readers and commentators as well as of the manuscripts in which the Corpus was transmitted can be found in Suchla, Dionysius Areopagita, 220–43. For a discussion of the influence of Dionysius in different authors, see also Werner Beierwaltes’ collection of articles in Werner Beierwaltes, Platonismus im Christentum, Philosophische Abhandlungen (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1998). 6  For Traversari’s influence on Ficino, see: Dennis F. Lackner, “The Camaldolese Academy: Ambrogio Traversari, Marsillo Ficino and the Christian Platonic Tradition,” in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden; Boston; Cologne: Brill, 2002), 15–44. 7  For Ficino’s Latin translation and commentary of the Dionysian Corpus, I follow: Marsilio Ficino, On Dionysius the Areopagite: Mystical Theology and the Divine Names, ed. James Hankins, trans. Michael J. B. Allen, vol. 1, I Tatti Renaissance Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). Ficino’s quotation stating his desire to translate the Dionysian corpus according to a Platonic light can be found in the introduction, xiii. In order to avoid confusion between the text of Dionysius and that of Ficino, the latter’s commentary is hereafter referred to as On the Mystical Theology. 8  For Lefèvres’ edition of Dionysius’ works, see: Eugene F. Rice Jr., “The Humanist Idea of Christian Antiquity: Lefèvre d’Etaples and his Circle,” Studies in the Renaissance (1962): 126–60. For an analysis of the reshaping of the interpretation of Dionysius’ theology from Ambrogio Traversari to Jacques Lefèvre, with a special attention to Ficino’s role in this process, see: Stéphane Toussaint, “L’influence de Ficin à Paris et le Pseudo-Denys des humanistes. Traversari, Cusain, Lefèvre d’Etaples. Suivi d’un passage inédit de Marsile Ficin.” Bruniana & Campanelliana (1999): 381–414.



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in the Acts of the Apostles, which subsequently sparked a wide debate on the authenticity of the Corpus. It would, however, be an oversimplification to picture the influence of the Dionysian Corpus as a homogenous tradition. In light of the alleged canonicity of the Corpus, its influence has been large, its authority as powerful as Paul’s Epistles; in light of the different topics of the treatises, the actual use of the Corpus has been variegated. The role that On the Celestial Hierarchy played in the angelology of the Middle Ages is well known.9 The Mystical Theology and On the Divine Names, on the other hand, deeply influenced the debates regarding what could or could not be said about God,10 as well as the quest for a mystical ascent to God. Moreover, the very same text could be read and used to substantiate contrary positions.11 How did Luther receive and evaluate this monumental and variegated tradition? Luther’s relationship with the mystical tradition during these years has become a fully-fledged subfield of research in Luther scholarship. The series of articles entitled “Luther and the Mystics” has brought to light the variegated complexity of traditions influencing Luther which, in the Middle Ages, with varying degrees of approximation, can be labeled as “mystical”. Mysticism was somewhat taboo in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Protestantism. 9 David Keck, Angels & Angelology in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998); Steven Chase, Angelic Spirituality: Medieval Perspectives on the Ways of Angels (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2002). Dionysius played a central role in the construction of Dante’s Paradiso, see: Diego Sbacchi, La presenza di Dionigi Areopagita nel Paradiso di Dante (Florence: Olschki, 2006). The influence of Dionysius’ On the Celestial Hierarchy diminished in the sixteenth century because of the doubts about the authenticity of the Corpus. See: C. A. Patrides, “Renaissance Thought on the Celestial Hierarchy: The Decline of a Tradition,” Journal of the History of Ideas 20 (1959): 155–66. Drawing on Patrides’ famous article, Feisal G. Mohamed has pointed out that two English authors of the late sixteenth century such as Richard Hooker (1544–1600) and Edmund Spenser (1552–1599) made extensive use of Dionysius the Areopagite’s texts in developing their visions of celestial hierarchy, although they were reluctant to mention the celestial orders as listed by Dionysius: Feisal G. Mohamed, “Renaissance Thought on the Celestial Hierarchy: The Decline of a Tradition?,” Journal of the History of Ideas 65 (2004): 559–82. 10  For Thomas Aquinas’ reshaping of Dionysius’ negative theology, see Alan Philip Darley, “‘We Know in Part:’ How the Positive Apophaticism of Aquinas Transforms the Negative Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius,” The Heythrop Journal (2011): 1–30; Gregory P. Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004). 11  Matthieu van der Meer has investigated how Jean Gerson used Dionysius’ Mystical Theology to substantiate anti-Platonic positions, while Nicholas of Cusa read the same text in a Platonic sense. See Matthieu van der Meer, “Divus Dionysius: Jean Gerson, Nicholas of Cusa, and the Interpretation of Pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystical Theology,” Viator 44 (2013): 323– 42. For the reception of the Corpus Dionysiacum in Cusanus’ works, see also: Hans-Gerhard Senger, “Die Präferenz für Ps.-Dionysius bei Nikolaus Cusanus und seinem italianischen Umfeld,” in Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter: Internationales Kolloquium in Sofia vom 8. bis 11. April 1999, ed. Tzotcho C. Bojadžiev, Georgi Karpriev, and Andreas Speer (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 505–39.

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As Bernard McGinn has pointed out in a recent historiographical survey, the liberal theologians and historians Adolf von Harnack and Ernst Troeltsch, as well as the dialectic theologians Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, argued that mysticism is something alien to Protestantism. Famously, von Harnack emphatically asserted that mysticism is a distinctive form of Catholic spirituality.12 Mysticism was legitimized as a field of study by the historians of the socalled Luther Renaissance. In 1937, in an article entitled Luther und die Mystik, Erich Vogelsang (1904–1944) used nationalist categories to describe the relationship between Luther and mysticism. He divided mysticism into three categories: Dionysian mysticism, a Roman mysticism represented by Bernard of Clairvaux and Bonaventure, and a German mysticism represented by Johannes Tauler, Wessel Gansfort, and the Theologia Deutsch. Luther is described as the last exponent of this German form of mysticism.13 Recently, Else Marie Pedersen has carefully investigated the ideological presupposition on which Vogelsang based his claims.14 In 1966, three papers were presented at the third International Congress for Luther Research under the title Luther und die Mystik. Bengt Hägglund restated the early twentieth-century conviction that Luther’s theology cannot be considered in any sense mystical;15 the Catholic historian Erwin Iserloh, in an ecumenical attempt, emphasized the mystical aspects of Luther’s thought and, thus, the continuity of Luther’s theology with its Catholic predecessors (Bernard and Bonaventure);16 finally, Heiko Oberman argued that Luther’s relationship with mysticism oscillates between a complete rejection of Dionysian mysticism and the absorption of the mysticism of Bonaventure, Tauler, or Gerson.17 Some years later, during a conference on late medieval and Renaissance religion held at the University of Michigan from 20–22 April 1972, Oberman lamented that the separation in the universities of three different field of studies, namely medieval scholasticism, Renaissance, and Reformation, generated detailed analyses of the single aspects of each field, but prevented an overall view of the interconnections and mutual influences among the three fields.18 Draw12  Bernard

McGinn, “Mysticism and the Reformation: A Brief Survey,” Acta Theologica 35 (2015): 50–65. 13  Erich Vogelsang, “Luther und die Mystik,” Luther Jahrbuch 19 (1937): 32–54. 14  Else Marie Wiberg Pedersen, “Mysticism in the Lutherrenaissance,” in Lutherrenaissance: Past and Present, ed. Christine Helmer and Bo Kristian Holm, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 87–105. 15  Bengt Hägglund, “Luther und die Mystik,” in Kirche, Mystik, Heiligung und das Natürliche bei Luther: Vorträge des dritten internationalen Kongresses für Lutherforschung, Järvenpää, Finnland, 11.–16. August 1966, ed. Ivar Asheim (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), 89–94. 16  Erwin Iserloh, “Luther und die Mystik,” ibid., 62–87. 17  Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “Simul gemitus et raptus: Luther und die Mystik,” ibid., 20–59. 18  Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “The Shape of Late Medieval Thought: The Birthpangs



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ing continuities between Jean Gerson’s On Mystical Theology (1407), Johann von Staupitz’s Libellus on Predestination (1517), and Luther’s On the Freedom of a Christian (1520), Oberman read in these trends of fifteenth- and sixteenthcentury literature what he called a “democratization of mysticism”, namely the tendency in these authors to conceive the mystical experience not in terms of union with God, but of the relationship between God and the sinner.19 During the same conference, drawing on Vogelsang, Steven Ozment has incorporated the Dionysian corpus in the Latin tradition, placing the latter in contraposition with the German mysticism of Tauler and Gansfort.20 As with his previous publications, Ozment emphasized the differences in theological anthropology between Luther and the different forms of mysticism, but, at the same time, he restated how deeply Luther was influenced by Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch.21 Thus, he concluded that the novelty of Luther’s theology can be discerned precisely in the merging of nominalism and mysticism.22 In response to Ozment’s paper, the Renaissance scholar Edward Cranz analyzed the relationship between Platonism and mysticism and proposed Cusanus as an antecedent of Luther.23 With the multiplication of the papers on “Luther and Mysticism”,24 the Wittenberger’s criticism of Dionysius the Areopagite and his positive reception of Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch have become common topics in Luther research. Moreover, a growing interest in secondary literature on the relationship between Luther and the Monastic tradition, as represented especially by Bernard of Clairvaux, can be discerned.25 These trends of Luther scholarship have of the Modern Era,” in The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. Charles Trinkaus and Heiko A. Oberman, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 3–25. 19  Ibid., 19. 20 Ozment contraposes a “German” and a “Latin” mysticism in Steven E. Ozment, “Mysticism, Nominalism and Dissent,” ibid., Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions, 67–92. In his book on the anthropology of Luther, Tauler, and Gerson he reports Vogelsang’s classification. See: Homo Spiritualis, 3, note 1. 21  Ozment, “Mysticism, Nominalism and Dissent,” 77–83. 22  Ibid., 92. 23  Edward F. Cranz, “Cusanus, Luther, and the Mystical Tradition,” ibid., 93–102. 24  Beyond the papers analysed above, see also: Alois M. Haas, “Luther und die Mystik,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 60 (1986): 177– 207; Sven Grosse, “Der junge Luther und die Mystik: Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach dem Werden der reformatorischen Theologie,” in Gottes Nähe unmittelbar erfahren: Mystik im Mittelalter und bei Martin Luther, ed. Berndt Hamm and Volker Leppin, Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 187–236. 25  Franz Posset has dedicated significant efforts to prove the continuity between Luther and Bernard. See: Franz Posset, Pater Bernhardus: Martin Luther and Bernard of Clairvaux, Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 2000). Posset has further developed his main argument, namely that in his early years Luther was heavily influenced by Bernard of Clairvaux, in: The Real Luther: A Friar at Erfurt and Wittenberg: Exploring Luther’s Life with Melanchthon as Guide (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 2011). The influence of

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been recently epitomized by Bernd Hamm and Volker Leppin. Bernd Hamm emphasized the diversity and complexity of the mystical tradition from the thirteenth to the early sixteenth century. He pointed out that Luther has to be understood as a mystical theologian in his own right, since he received and transformed some mystical motifs like the hiddenness of God and the concept of Anfechtung.26 Similarly, Volker Leppin emphasized the diversity of the preLuther mystical tradition. He focused his efforts on proving, in particular, how the mysticism of Johannes Tauler and the Theologia Deutsch was appreciated by Johannes von Paltz and Johannes von Staupitz. Following his mentors, Luther read and highly appreciated this tradition to the extent that it became an integral component of his theology.27 This vast scholarship provided us with a better understanding of the different intellectual trends which influenced Luther. There can be no doubt about the importance of Johannes Tauler’s influence. At the same time, however, the application of mysticism as a supra-historical category has obscured the concrete historical context in which Luther was operating. The historian should not limit himself to an attempt to place Luther within these traditions, by basing his judgment on Luther’s positive or negative comments regarding a certain author. One should, on the contrary, reconstruct the different debates which allowed Luther to assume a certain position. Rather than assuming “mysticism” as a supra-historical notion, fixing its meaning through a subdivision in nationalist categories, it is historically necessary to describe how Luther took a position pro- or against mystical theology in, not above, the discourse. Luther’s early engagement with the Dionysian Corpus is well documented. In the Dictata super Psalterium, Luther praised the negative theology of Dionysius as the highest form of theology.28 Following “Blessed Dionysius”, Luther claims that, since God is hidden, one can ascend to Him by way of denials and, Bernard of Clairvaux in Luther’s thought is also emphasized by Theo Bell: Theo Bell, Divus Bernhardus: Bernhard von Clairvaux in Martin Luthers Schriften, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte (Mainz: von Zabern, 1993). Other papers on the relationship between Bernard and Luther include: Else Marie Wiberg Pedersen, “This is Not About Sex? A Discussion of the Understanding of Love and Grace in Bernard of Clairvaux’s and Martin Luther’s Theologies,” Dialog 50 (2011): 15–25; Jack Kilcrease, “The Bridal-Mystical Motif in Bernard of Clairvaux and Martin Luther,” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 65 (2014): 263–79. 26  See: Hamm, Der frühe Luther, 200–50. 27 Volker Leppin, Die fremde Reformation: Luthers mystische Wurzeln (München: C. H. Beck, 2016). 28 WA 3.372.13–19: Secundo secundum extaticam et negativam theologiam: qua deus inexpressibiliter et pre stupore et admiratione maiestatis eius silendo laudatur, ita ut iam non solum omne verbum minus, sed et omnem cogitatum inferiorem esse laude eius sentiat. Hec est vera Cabala, que rarissima est. Namque sicut affirmativa de deo via est imperfecta, tam intelligendo quam loquendo: ita negativa est perfectissima. Unde in Dionysio frequens verbum est “Hyper”, quia super omnem cogitatum oportet simpliciter in caliginem intrare. I will discuss the reference to the vera Cabala in Chapter Seven of the present work.



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through the mystery of Incarnation, God conceals Himself in His humanity.29 Moreover, a mystical terminology can be observed throughout the whole commentary. In his Lectures on the Romans, Luther famously commented that those who follow the mystical theology wish to overcome Christ’s sufferings and directly contemplate the Uncreated Word, before purging their heart through the contemplation of the Created Word.30 While in the Lectures on the Hebrews one can still read Luther’s positive reference to the negative theology of “the blessed Dionysius”, in On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church Luther vehemently attacks Dionysius, “whoever he may have been”: it greatly displeases me to assign such importance to this Dionysius, whoever he may have been, for he shows hardly any signs of solid learning. I would ask, by what authority and with what arguments does he prove his hodge-podge about the angels in his Celestial Hierarchy – a book over which many curious and superstitious spirits have cudgeled their brains? If one were to read and judge without prejudice, is not everything in it his own fancy and very much like a dream? But in his ‘Theology’, which is rightly called ‘Mystical’, of which certain very ignorant theologians make so much, he is downright dangerous, for he is more of a Platonist than a Christian. So, if I had my way, no believing soul would give the least attention to these books. So far, indeed, from learning Christ in them, you will lose even what you already know of him. I speak from experience. Let us rather hear Paul, that we may learn Jesus Christ and him crucified. He is the way, the life, and the truth; he is the ladder by which we come to the Father, as he says: “No one comes to the Father, but by me”.31 29  WA 3.124.29–39: primo quia in fidei enygmate et caligine habitat. Secundo Quia habitat lucem inaccessibilem, ita quod nullus intellectus ad eum pertingere potest, nisi suo lumine omisso, altiore levatus fuerit. Ideo b. Dionysius docet ingredi in tenebras anagogicas et per negationes ascendere. Quia sic est deus absconditus et incomprehensibilis. Tercio potest intelligi mysterium Incarnationis. Quia in humanitate absconditus latet, que est tenebre eius, in quibus videri non potuit sed tantum audiri. Quarto Est Ecclesia vel b. virgo, quia in utraque latuit et latet in Ecclesia adhuc, que est obscura mundo, deo autem manifesta. Quinto Sacramentum Eucharistie, ubi est occultissimus. Unde et illud potest intelligi de incarnatione Christi. 30  WA 56.299.27–28, 300.1–8: Hinc etiam tanguntur ii, Qui secundum mysticam theologiam in tenebras interiores nituntur omissis imaginibus passionis Christi, Ipsum Verbum increatum audire et contemplari volentes, Sed nondum prius Iustificatis et purgatis oculis cordis per verbum incarnatum. Verbum enim Incarnatum ad puritatem primo cordis est necessarium, qua habita tunc demum per ipsum rapi in verbum increatum per Anagogen. Sed quis tam esse mundus sibi videtur, vt ad hoc audeat aspirare, Nisi vocetur et rapiatur a Deo cum Apostolo Paulo Et “assumatur cum Petro, Iacobo et Iohanne, fratre eius”? Denique raptus ille non “accessus” vocatur. 31  The Annotated Luther, vol. 3, 113; WA 6.562.3–14: Atque mihi (ut magis temerarius sim) in totum displicet, tantum tribui, quisquis fuerit, Dionysio illi, cum ferme nihil in eo sit solidae eruditionis. Nam ea quae in “coelesti hierarchia” de angelis comminiscitur, in quo libro sic sudarunt curiosa et superstitiosa ingenia, qua, rogo, autoritate aut ratione probat? Nonne omnia sunt illius meditata ac prope somniis simillima, si libere legas et iudices? In “Theologia” vero “mystica”, quam sic inflant ignorantissimi quidam Theologistae, etiam pernitiosissimus est, plus platonisans quam Christianisans, ita ut nollem fidelem animum his libris operam dare vel minimam. Christum ibi adeo non disces, ut, si etiam scias, amittas. Expertus loquor. Paulum potius audiamus, ut Iesum Christum et hunc crucifixum discamus. Haec est enim via,

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The “blessed Dionysius” of the early lectures has become, for Luther, an unidentified author (quisquis fuerit) who dreamt about mystical theology and celestial hierarchies. It has been generally recognized that the historical reason for this change of attitude lies in the abovementioned note in Erasmus’ New Testament, in which the Dutch scholar reports Valla’s skepticism about the authenticity of the Corpus Dionysiacum.32 Moreover, Luther’s rejection of Dionysius is the result of the wide use by early Roman controversialists of the Areopagite. Two works of the Corpus Dionysiacum are explicitly criticized by Luther in the abovementioned passage: On the Celestial Hierarchy, and Mystical Theology. Regarding the former, David Bagchi has observed that, accepting the authenticity of Dionysius’ works, the early Roman controversialists based their defense of the hierarchical order of the Church on Dionysius’ On the Celestial Hierarchy and On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, pointing out the correspondence between the structure of the Church and the heavenly order described by Dionysius.33 Leif Grane has remarked that Johannes Eck opened the Leipzig debate by quoting Dionysius’ De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia in order to prove the very same point, namely that the same order exists between earth and heaven, the world above and the world below.34 Luther’s critique of Dionysius’ Mystical Theology is, on the other hand, directly connected with his theology of the cross. In the abovementioned passage in On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church, Dionysius, plus platonisans quam Christianisans, is labelled as pernitiosissumus, because those who read him forget what they already know about Christ. In opposition to Dionysius’ mystical theology, Luther calls attention to the Pauline theologia crucis and quotes John 14:6 (just as in the Heidelberg Disputation) as the ultimate example of the struggle between a theologus gloriae and a theologus crucis: when Philip, talking as a theologian of glory, asked to see the Father, Jesus redirected the attention of the apostle to Himself, since it is possible to know God the Father only through the Incarnate Son. Many theologians before Luther – in particular, Bonaventure – supplemented the lack of a proper definition of Christocentric doctrine in the Corpus Dionysiacum. The main argument was that just as Paul barely mentions cherubs in his epistles and his disciple Dionysius fully explained the structure of the Celestial Hierarchy, Dionysius similarly did not exvita et veritas: haec scala, per quam venitur ad patrem, sicut dicit “Nemo venit ad patrem nisi per me”. 32  In the same period, Lorenzo Valla, especially with his confutation of the donation of Constantine, reinforced Luther’s own conviction that the papacy was under the control of the Antichrist: David M. Whitford, “The Papal Antichrist: Martin Luther and the Underappreciated Influence of Lorenzo Valla,” Renaissance Quarterly 61 (2008): 26–52. 33 Bagchi, Luther’s Earliest Opponents, 141–45. 34  Leif Grane, Martinus Noster: Luther in the German Reform Movement, 1518–1521, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 1994), 88.



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pand on the mediatory role of Christ because Paul had already fully dealt with this topic in his epistles. As we have seen, Luther himself had the same attitude in the Lectures on the Romans. Five years later, the intellectual context changed dramatically. Thus, in order to understand Luther’s theology of the cross, it is crucial to clarify the identity of the contemporary followers of Dionysius’ Mystical Theology to whom Luther refers. Luther explicitly struck against these “theologians of glory” in his 1519 Operationes in Psalmos. In commenting on Psalm 5, in a long passage which culminates with Luther’s famous statement, CRUX sola est nostra theologia, Luther argues that many theologians discuss mystical, negative, or symbolic theology, but are ignorant of what they are talking about as well as what they affirm. They know neither what affirmation nor negation are. Moved by their own fantasies, these theologians have to be condemned not only because they err, but because they also induce error in their readers. Indeed, Luther argues that the Italian commentaries on the Dionysian corpus spreading throughout Germany were pernicious, since Dionysian mystical theology was no more than a mere ostentation of human knowledge. Luther concludes that a theologian becomes as such through his life and death, not by realizing, reading, and speculating.35 What were the Italian commentaries to Dionysius that were spreading the heretic “theology of glory” in Germany? In May 1519, two months before the Leipzig debate, Johannes Eck published his own commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology.36 Eck’s work was structured as a chapter-by-chapter commentary to Dionysius’ text. Alongside Dionysius’ Greek text, the Latin translations of three Italian authors are attached, namely the translations by Giovanni Saraceno, Ambrogio Traversari, and Marsilio Ficino. We are not here before a binary opposition between “scholasticism” and “Reformation” – with the latter incarnated by Luther’s theology of the cross and rejection of Dionysius’ mysticism. Nor is the common appeal to authors like 35  WA 5.163.17–29: Multi multa de Theologia mystica, negativa, propria, symbolica moliuntur et fabulantur, ignorantes, nec quid loquantur, nec de quibus affirment. Neque enim quid affirmatio aut negatio sit, aut quomodo utra fiat, noverunt. Nec possunt commentaria eorum citra periculum legi, qd quales ipsi fuerunt, talia scripserunt, sicut senserunt, ita locuti sunt. Senserunt autem contraria negativae theologiae, hoc est nec mortem nec infernum dilexerunt, ideo impossibile fuit, ut non fallerent tam seipsos quam suos lectores. Haec admonendi gratia dicta velim, quod passim circumferuntur tum ex Italia tum Germania Commentaria Dionysii super Theologiam mysticam, hoc est mera irritabula inflaturae et ostentaturae seipsam scientiae, ne quis se Theologum mysticum credat, si haec legerit, intellexerit, docuerit seu potius intelligere et docere sibi visus fuerit. Vivendo, immo moriendo et damnando fit theologus, non intelligendo, legendo aut speculando. 36  Ioan. Eckius, D. Dionysii Areopagitæ, De mystica Theologia lib. I. Graece. Ioan. Sarraceno, Ambrosio Camaldulese, Marsilio Ficino Interprete. Cum vercellensium extractione. Joan. Eckius Commentarios adiecit pro Theologia Negativa Ingolstadij (Augsburg: Miller, 1519). Hereafter quoted as Commentarios.

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John Tauler or Jean Gerson adequate to explain Luther’s use of the category of “mysticism”. In fact, the intellectual context of the sixteenth century has to be described in light of the different process of cultural transfers, which culminated in the stance taken by Eck and Luther at the Leipzig debate. As Eck was deeply influenced by Ficino’s own commentary on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology and Pico della Mirandola’s criticism of Ficino’s Platonism, it is now necessary to take a step back and have a closer look at the intellectual context of late fifteenth-century Florence.

4.2  Solus Amor and Amore Solo: Ficino and the Mystical Ascent to the One through Love In 1489, Giovanni de’ Medici, the future Pope Leo X – the man that in 1519 Luther suspected of being the Antichrist – had been elected future cardinal when he was only thirteen years old. That very same year, Marsilio Ficino published his translation of Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, Proclus’ De sacrificio et magia, Porphyry’s Sententiae, and dedicated them to Giovanni, the second son of Ficino’s patron, Lorenzo the Magnificent.37 On 9 March 1492, the seventeen-yearold Giovanni de’ Medici was named cardinal in a ceremony at the Augustinian monastery in Fiesole. On that occasion, Ficino dedicated to the future pope his translation of Dionysius’ commentaries on Mystical Theology and the Divine Names.38 The editio princeps of Ficino’s edition of the Corpus Dionysiacum, with the dedicatory epistle of 1492, was probably published in late 1496 or in early 1497, soon after the publication of Ficino’s Plato.39 37  It must be noted that a series of demonic and magical treatises translated by Ficino, including Iamblicus’ De mysteriis Aegyptiorum, Proclus’ De sacrficio et magia, and Porphyry’s De divinis atque daemonibus, were re-printed in Germany in 1516 and were available to Luther, as suggested by Stengel. See: Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance und Hermetismus: Kontexte und Schnittstellen der frühen reformatorischen Bewegung,” 44–49; “Reformation, Renaissance and Hermeticism: Contexts and Interfaces of the Early Reformation Movement,” 7–10. 38  For the biographical information on these commentaries and their dedicatory prefaces to Giovanni de’ Medici, I follow the introduction, edited by Allen, in his edition of Ficino’s translation of Dionysius’ works. The publication of Ficino’s commentary on Dionysius’ works soon after his publication of controversial authors like Porphyry, Proclus, or Iamblichus has been discussed in the secondary literature. Cesare Vasoli understood Ficino’s publication of his commentaries to Dionysius as an attempt to prove his own orthodoxy and distance himself from the charge of heresy. On the other hand, against Vasoli, Pietro Podolak noted that Ficino quoted Dionysius’ works more than seventy times from his early works to the 1490s, without any significant change in his attitude: Pietro Podolak, “Le Commentaire de Marsile Ficin au Ps. Denys l’Aréopagite entre Renaissance et philosophie médiévale,” in Le Pseudo-Denys à la Renaissance: Actes du Colloque Tours, 27–29 Mai 2010, ed. Christian Trottmann and Stèphane Toussaint (Paris: Honoré Champion Editeur, 2014), 143–59. 39  For the printing of Ficino’s commentary to Dionysius, see: On the Mystical Theology, xx.



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In the introduction to his commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, Ficino explains that he chose to dedicate the treatise to Giovanni because of his being a priest (antistes): just as he sent to the young cardinal his commentary on Iamblichus who Ficino considered a priest (sacerdotem) who dealt with the sacred mysteries of the Egyptians (sacra Egyptiorum mysteria), now he was dedicating to Giovanni, “the supreme high priest of the Florentines”, his interpretation of the Platonist and Christian Dionysius the Areopagite, a “high priest of the Athenians”.40 Three main topics, typical of Ficino’s thought, emerge from his commentary on the Mystical Theology: a historiographical paradigm which postulates the continuity between Platonism and Christianity, the superiority of the One over the Being, and the quest for a mystical ascent to God. Regarding the first aspect, just as for many other aspects of his prisca theologia, the erroneous chronology of the Corpus Dionysiacum turned out to be very fruitful for Ficino’s historiographical construction. The theological consequences of the misattribution of the Corpus Dionysiacum to the first century have been significant. Modern scholars have proved Dionysius’ dependence on Proclus. Dionysius’ Platonic or Neoplatonic influences are quite clear. Since the time that philosophers and theologians identified the author of the Dionysian corpus as a disciple of Paul, the logical conclusion was that the teachings of Paul in Athens were in essential agreement with Platonic positions. Christ himself, thus, perfected and fully explained a doctrine anticipated by Plato, who in turn derived this wisdom from the ancient theological tradition he learned in Egypt.41 For Ficino, Dionysius’ theology is the ultimate proof of the continuity between Platonism and Christianity. As he writes in the famous letter to Pier Leone da Spoleto (1445–1492) dated 12 May 1491: “I love Plato in Iamblichus. I admire him in Plotinus, but I venerate him in Dionysius”.42 Michael J. B. Allen has convincingly suggested that the aporia of the Corpus’ disappearance was paradoxically useful for Ficino in order to construct the history of revelation through the eyes of the prisca theologia. One of the most complex historiographical challenges Ficino faced in order to defend his position was the apparent incongruity of the dictamen of the prisca theolo40 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 2–3: Post hec autem ad Dionysium Areopagitam Platonicum Christianumque Theologum interpretandum tibi me contuli, precipuum Atheniensium antistitem summo Florentinorum antistiti dicaturus. 41  Plato’s famous trip to Egypt has had a significant and enduring influence in Christian theology. For a critical discussion of the well-known definition of Plato as the “Attic Moses” in the Church Fathers, see: Daniel Ridings, The Attic Moses: The Dependency Theme in some Early Christian Writers, Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia (Gothenburg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995). For further references, see also: Ilaria L. Ramelli, “Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism: Re-Thinking the Christianisation of Hellenism,” Vigiliae Christianae 63 (2009): 217–63. Here quoted at 233, note 65. 42  Cf. Allen, “Marsilio Ficino on Plato, the Neoplatonists and the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity,” 557.

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gia in the aftermath of the skeptic Platonic school. In the third century before Christ, under the leadership of Arcesilas and Carneades, the Platonic Academy took anti-Stoic skeptic positions. Drawing on Cicero and Augustine, Ficino thought that Arcesilas had hidden the true Platonic doctrine in order to protect this sacred wisdom from the attacks of Zeno of Citium. However, according to Ficino, Arcesilas must be blamed, because, by assuming skeptical positions, he had corrupted the true Platonic message. Despite this perversion of the true Platonic message, the divine wisdom Plato received from the Egyptians survived underground. As Allen put it: The true, the golden Platonism, was now a treasure hidden underground. Though providentially guarded for a long while by sibyls, priests, prophets, and divinely inspired poets, it was lost to the academic philosophers themselves, even as the hermeneutical art of interpreting Plato’s dialogues correctly was also lost to them. Materialism was indeed refuted, but with the aporia and the elenchus, not with the Ideas of Plato’s intelligible world.43 The solution provided by Ficino in order to solve the contradiction of a period in the history of Platonic interpretation during which Plato’s works were interpreted skeptically is, thus, to use the notion of a hidden, secret wisdom. Although the official teachings of the third-century Platonic academy diverged from Plato’s teachings – or to be more precise to what Ficino considered to be Plato’s teachings – real wisdom had survived underground through the intervention of divine providence. Ficino could also apply the very same historiographical paradigm to the case of the alleged disappearance of the Corpus Dionysiacum. In the letter to Pier Leone in May 1491, mentioned above, Ficino seemed convinced that the Corpus Dionysiacum disappeared sometime in the third century, soon after the publication of the works of Ammonius and Numenius, who Ficino was convinced had drawn from Dionysius, because of an unspecified catastrophe in the Church. Once again, divine providence had not allowed the teachings of Dionysius to become lost. Instead, they had managed to survive underground and finally reappear in the works of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus. In this way, Ficino reached a double goal. First, he could align his position with the one endorsed by the Church by claiming that the Platonists had stolen ideas from Dionysius, and not vice versa. Allen has pointed out that Ficino never understood the appropriation of Christian ideas by the Platonici as a sort of plagiarism. He understood it positively, as an appropriation of the truest and highest wisdom, which, according to the prisca theologia, is spread and hidden in different theological traditions, which only appear to have different positions. Second, he proved the canonicity of Dionysius, who learned directly from Paul, and in his works limited himself to expand on what he learned from the Apostle. The clear continu43 Ficino,

On the Mystical Theology, xv–xvi.



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ity between Dionysius and the Platonists was further evidence of the continuity between the teachings of Plato and Paul. For Ficino, the aim of Dionysian theology was to overcome and transcend the limits of human understanding. Just as the pagan god Dionysius had overcome the natural limits and transformed himself into the beloved god, the Christian Dionysius, inebriated by the divine wine, was someone who “runs riot everywhere, he pours forth enigmas, he sings in dithyrambs”.44 Ficino describes Dionysius as the “culmination of Platonic discipline” and the “column of Christian theology” (Platonice discipline culmen et Christiane theologie columen).45 As he learned from Paul, with Plato’s confirmation, Dionysus was aware that it was impossible to know God only through rational reasoning. The elevation to divinity had to occur through God who inflames the rational soul, which is given over to Him with love. Praying is the foundation of this ecstatic exaltation.46 It is a well-known fact that throughout his career Ficino presented a five-fold scheme of hypostases: One, Mind, Soul, Quality, and Body. Ficino’s indebtedness to the Neoplatonic tradition has been amply demonstrated. The standard text is, of course, Plato’s Parmenides, which Ficino reads through the eyes of Plotinus and Proclus. Having dealt extensively with the question of the relationship between the One and the Being in his Platonic theology (2.1.1–4; 12.3.5–8) as well as in the commentary to Plotinus (Enneads 6:9), Ficino limits himself to repeating the basic concepts of his ontology. He explains that the rational principle of the Being and the One are different. Just like the non-being is the opposite of the being, in the same way the many is opposite to the One. So, while the being accepts the many unto itself, the One rejects it.47 This proves that the One and the Being are different. The superiority of the former with regard to the latter is explained by Ficino by virtue of the fact that the Being is a participant of the One, and not vice versa; if the opposite were true, then an “infinite many” would exist or nothing would exist.48 The Good follows the Being in the hierarchy. This is proven by the fact that human beings possess a natural de44 Ficino,

On the Mystical Theology, 4–5: Hoc igitur dionysiaco mero Dionysius noster ebrius exultat passim: effundit enigmata, concinit dithyrambos. 45 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 4–5. 46 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 4–7. Quippe cum a Paolo mundi sole didicerit Platone etiam confirmante ipsum universi principium esse intellectu quantumlibet excelso superius, non igitur conatu quodam intelligentie comparari, sed in animum amore prorsus Deo deditum accendi Deum atque ibidem in ardore lucere. As Ficino remembers in this passage, he extensively dealt with the theme of ecstatic exaltation through prayer in his famous letter De adoratione to Bindaccio Ricasoli dated 20 December 1490. 47 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 20–21: Ratio formalis entis ratioque unius diversa est. Nam enti quidem opponitur non ens, uni vero opponitur multitudo. 48 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 22–23: Nec rursum ens est superius uno, alioquin ens quidem non foret unius particeps; essetque sic vel multitudo prorsus infinita vel nihilum,

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sire for the good, both in understanding and in volition. On the contrary, being the final goal of this process, the good is content with itself and does not desire anything else.49 Ficino continues by explaining that God is above essence, and it is impossible to attain knowledge of the divinity through understanding. He explains that there are four cognitive faculties in the human being: sensation (sensus), imagination (imaginatio), reason (ratio), and intellect (intellectus). Sensation acts following the bodies, whereas imagination does not always need the presence of bodies. In acting, however, it follows certain corporeal conditions; reason is mobile and necessarily multiple, since it does not follow the body but betakes itself to things freed from the body; finally, while the intellect puts motion aside, albeit necessitated by the cosmic order, it cannot set aside multiplicity.50 For Ficino, the Platonists, and thus Dionysius as well, seek to prove that pure simplicity is the universe’s principle, and thus is higher than the intellect and the intelligible. Second, the intellect is directed toward an intelligible object that must necessarily be multiple.51 God has imprinted a “paternal characteristic” ( paternum characterem), that is a sort of unity, into what has been created proximate to Himself, namely the intellect and the intellectual souls. The unity in the intellect makes it possible, as Plotinus explains in the sixth book of the Enneads, to attain God as the center of the universe. Thus, God stands above the finite human reason and intellect, however, it is possible to enjoy God when, having put aside all the other powers, the whole soul is brought into its unity.52 This is possible only through love unum vero velut inferius particeps ipsius entis evaderet, statimque amissa simplicitate puram similiter perderet unitatem. Est igitur unum ipsum excelsius ente. 49 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 26–27: Summatim vero neque essentia, neque vita, neque mens se ipsa contenta est, illam enim ad vitam semper annititur, hec ad mentem, mens ad bonum tum intelligendo, tum volendo. Bonum vero, cum in resolvendo sit ultimum, ad aliud non contendit. Solum ergo se ipso contentum est; solum itaque primum. 50 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 12–13. Quatuor cognitionis species sunt: sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus. Imaginatio non semper indiget ad actionem presentia corporum, qua necesaario sensus eget. Verumtamen corporeas quasdam in agendo conditiones sequitur, actionemque mobilem habet atque multiplicem. Ratio non sequitur conditiones particulares corporum, sed iam ad absoluta se confert; mobilis tamen est et necessario multiplex. Intellectus denique motum iam deposuit, dividuam vero multiplicitatem minime, nam et necessitate ordinis eam retinet, et usu declarat sive definiat seu dividat sive componat. 51 Ibid.: Esse vero et intellectu intelligibilique superius Platonici una cum Dionysio probant, quippe cum principium quidem sit ipsa simplicitas infinita, intellectus autem agendo per multiplicem et dividuam actionem ad obiectum intelligibile dirigatur necessario multiplex, quod et proportionem quandam cum intelligentia subeat. 52 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 14–15: Quecunque ab hoc proxime procreantur, intellectus scilicet intellectualesque anime, unitatem hinc quandam quasi paternum characterem sortiuntur. Quo quidem quasi capite vel cardine vel centro suo Deum quandoque tanquam universi centrum possint attingere, quemadmodum Plotinus una cum Dionysio comprobat. Cum igitur nec rationis nec intellectus usu frui Deo possimus, fruituros tamen naturalis ipsa spes et conatus profectusque polliceatur, per unitatem saltem intellectu prestantiorem quandoque



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(solus amor), which is able to transport the rational soul to its summit and unite it with God. Thus, it is love which recalls the soul from multiplicity and back to its unity.53 In this way, the soul is joined with the One, and is able to love the one Good, the principle of all that is Good.54 Ficino asserts that these divine mysteries should not be revealed to the profane. This is what Dionysius teaches, in accordance with the teachings of Plato. For Ficino, profane are those philosophers who, unlike the Platonists, have lowered God to the prime essence (essentia prima), and have failed to understand that the One and the Good are higher than all things, and should be more aptly be called the principle of all things. The most profane are the Epicureans who claim that God is nothing and, when they are obliged to admit His existence, they conceive of Him as the combination of objects and corporeal passions.55 As with many commentators of the Dionysian Corpus before him, Ficino links the ascent to the One with a critique of every form of positive theology, as well as with an endorsement of the negative theology, as the only way to properly describe the divinity. Indeed, Ficino argues that if the ascension to God happens through love and transcends the limits of human reason, this implies that every form of positive theology is inadequate to comprehend the divinity. Ficino argues that something about a particular object cannot be affirmed as true and false at the same time. If the body or the soul is being claimed to be a substance, the same thing cannot not be a substance. When the human mind tries to apprehend God, however, things dramatically change. All the opposites fruemur – quando scilicet, posthabitis ceterarum virium actionibus, anime totius attentionem totam in hanc unitatem tanquam ad centrum a circumferentia collegerimus. 53 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 16–17: Efficere vero id potest aliquando solus amor, cuius propria virtus est traductoria pariter et unifica, per quam animum ab inferioribus transferat ad supremum suum, uniatque supremo. 54 Ibid.: Per quam ipsi uni denique copuletur, quando scilicet amorem nunc in multa bona divisum in unum bonum perfecte coniecerit bonorum omnium principium atque finem. 55 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 18–21: Sicut Plato bis in Epistulis, ita Dionysius hic et sepe alibi vetat secretissima theologie mysteria inter profanos effundere, ne, propter iudicii defectum excessumve superbie, vel falsas vanasque opiniones inde concipiant vel res dignas veneratione derideant. Profanos vero nominat philosophos exceptis Platonicis penes omnes quia nihil altius de Deo cogitaverunt quam quod summus Deus sit mens quedam et essentia prima; nec mirum illud Platonicorum inventum capere potuerunt, ipsum scilicet unum atque bonum esse toto primoque ente intellectuque superius, idque rectius rerum principium nominari. Profanissimos denique iudicat eosdem quos et Plato Epicureos scilicet atque similes, qui nisi quod ipsi pugno stringere possint esse nihil putant. Atque ubi Deum describere compelluntur, ex rebus quibusdam passionibusque corporeis imaginabilibusque componunt. Ficino’s early interest in and later critique of Epicureanism is well known. See: James Hankins, “Ficino’s Critique of Lucretius,” in The Rebirth of Platonic Theology: Proceedings of a Conference held at The Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies (Villa I Tatti) and the Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento (Florence, 26–27 April 2007). For Michael J. B. Allen, ed. James Hankins and Fabrizio Meroi (Florence: Olschki, 2010), 137–54; Alison Brown, “Lucretius and the Epicureans in the Social and Political Context of Renaissance Florence,” I Tatti Studies in the Italian Renaissance 9 (2001): 11–62.

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are reconciled in divine unity. So, affirming something about God means, at the same time, denying something else – both are true in relation to God. For instance, the sentence “God is essence” and the sentence “God is not essence” are both true: the former in the sense that God procreates essence, the latter in the sense that God is not a form created or imagined by human beings, namely as essence.56 A series of images related to the semantic field of light is used to describe the process of apophatic theology.57 The highest step of human ascent to God is both darkness and light: it is darkness because the rational soul proceeds through negation, that is avoiding to give affirmations about God; it is light because through negation we attain the highest truth about God.58 In this way, through divine love, human reason has transcended its own intellectual form. “Thus”, Ficino argues, “the rational soul speaks truths at last about God when it does not speak”.59 This is why, according to Ficino, Plato both affirms and denies everything in the Parmenides (137C–155E). This process of negation concerns not only God, but also the prime matter: as God and the prime matter are mutual opposites, since the former is the highest and the latter the lowest of all things, it is possible to affirm and deny both of everything at the same time.60 The prime matter is the opposite of God: the former is the One without Being, the latter the One 56 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 34–35: Solet apud nos negatio affirmationi sic opponi ut nequeat simul utraque circa idem esse vera. Ubi enim dixeris, “Anima vel corpus est substantia”, non licet dicere vicissim non esse substantiam. Divina vero unitas est tam efficax ut contraria etiam inter se in unum in se conciliet. Cumque sit positione et affirmatione qualibet eminentior, merito a privatione quavis positioni opposita mirum in modum separata censetur, presertim quia, cum nullis indigeat, nullis unquam privata putatur. Summatim vero alio sensu affirmamus, alio vero negamus idem circa Deum. Nempe cum dicis, “Deus est essentia”, Deum intelligis procreare essentiam atque servare. Cum inquis iterum, “Deus non est essentia”, intelligis Deum non esse hanc ipsam que invenitur vel excogitatur abs te essentie formam. 57  For further considerations on the use of these images in Ficino’s commentary on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, see: Thomas Leinkauf, “Marsilio Ficino e lo Pseudo-Dionigi: ricezione e trasformazione,” in Le Pseudo-Denys à la Renaissance: actes du colloque, Tours, 27–29 mai 2010, ed. Stéphane Toussaint and Christian Trottmann (Paris: Champion, 2014). 58 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 8–11: Summus anime ad Deum ascendentis gradus caligo dicitur atque lumen: caligo quidem quatenus animus per negationes quasdam illhuc usque processit, negando videlicet Deum ipsum esse rem hanc aut istam aut illam, vel natura compertam vel a nobis excogitatam; lumen vero qua ratione non aliter de Deo quam ita negando perspicuam consequimur veritatem. 59 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 10–11: Sic igitur animus ita demum vera de Deo loquitur quando non loquitur. 60 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 34–35: His rationibus Plato noster in “Parmenide” omnia quamvis opposita de ipso uno affirmat pariter atque negat. Poterit quinetiam aliquis circa materiam primam idem ferme facere. Verum quoniam Deus atque materia quasi inter se opposita sunt velut supremum et infimum universi, probabiliter opposito quodam pacto, quecumque inter Deum informemque materiam media cadunt, de utroque possumus affirmare pariter atque negare.



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beyond Being. In the hierarchy of Being, they are situated at opposite poles. Just like God, matter is also unintelligible for the human soul.61 In contemplating God, the mind acts in three different ways: first, it uses as many words as possible; second, as few words as possible, and third, no words at all. The mind uses as many words as possible, when it affirms and equally denies God. The mind uses few words when it describes God through relations. Finally, the mind does not use words at all when it does not refer things to God and God to things, and does not affirm anything about God; in using affirmation, it could confuse the finite with the infinite, so the mind has to fall silent.62 In order to approach the Good, the soul has to climb three steps: the corporeal (corpoream), the animate (animalem), and the intellectual (intellectualem). The mind thinks in corporeal terms when it imagines a new sky more beautiful than the earthly sky. It imagines in animate terms, when in one soul every soul is imagined. Finally, the mind thinks of the intellectual summit, whenever it imagines the intellect to be omniform. Beyond all these summits, there is God who lives in darkness.63 Having an innate tendency towards the Good, the rational soul naturally tends towards God, but in order to ascend to God the rational soul has to be purged. This sort of elevation can happen only through love for the divinity. The soul which wants to ascend to God must be propelled by love alone (amore solo) for the first Good. The role of love is to purge the rational soul from all its inferior parts, namely its desire for corporeal things and its imagining them. Liberated from inferior things, the soul is transported to the contemplation of forms, namely the intellectual souls (the forms potentially separable from the bodies) and angelic intellects (the forms actually separated from the body).64 61  For further discussion on Ficino’s understanding of matter, see: Errico Vitale, “Sul concetto di materia nella ‘Theologia Platonica’ di Marsilio Ficino,” Rinascimento 39 (1999): 337– 369. 62 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 36–39: Mens circa Deum tres (ut videtur) gradus agit: in primo verbis quam plurimis utitur, in secundo paucis, in tertio nullis. Quam plurimis inquam, ubi quotcunque obcurrunt de Deo affirmat pariter atque negat, paribus quidem verbis, sed ratione diversa. Paucis autem ubi relationibus utitur, referendo videlicet res ad Deum tanquam ad principium, finem, medium conservantem, convertentem, perficientem. Nullis autem, quando nec ulterius res ad Deum refert, neque vicissim; neque negat quicquam; neque dependens a Deo aliquid Deo quodammodo reddit affirmans. Sed ipsum Deum mox affirmatura, sermonem rumpit intimum, siletque protinus, ne affirmando finiens insolenter reportet pro infinito finitum. 63 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 38–39: Summitatem quidem corpoream cogitamus ubi celum fingitur quasi novum, tanto pulchrius hoc celo, quanto celum hoc est terra formosius. Animalem vero ubi in una anima confingitur omnis anima et quelibet exuberans intellectu. Intellectualem denique siquando intellectum excogitamus sic omniformem ut omnes formas omnesque preferat intellectus. 64 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 42–43: Animus, divini montis fastigium ascensurus, in primis cunctis exhortationibus amore solo primi boni est inflammandus. Et quoniam superni caloris officium est ab inferioribus nos purgare, amoris divini flagrantia purgandus est, tum

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Exhortation has the ability to purge the human soul, learning to show and teach, but only love purifies. Thus, the individual, purified through love, is united to the First Good. With a love metaphor, Ficino concludes that the lover and the beloved are happily united through love.65 The process of ascension to God happens through successive abstractions. If the human being has been created in God’s image, then this entails that God’s image, although obfuscated, is still in man. The process of ascension to God thus becomes a process of going back into oneself, in that recondite part of the human being where God’s image dwells. This process happens in six steps: separating the body from the soul, then separating also the bodily passions from the soul; third, separating the image of the soul’s imagination from reason; separating the discursive arguments of the soul from the reason; separating the multiformity of the reason from the unity of the soul; finally, separating the very same condition of being soul or intellect from the unity of the soul.66 Just like the human being, so, too, the natural world has been created in the image of God and, just as the image of God in the latter is obfuscated, God’s image in the former is hidden by veils. Ficino believed that matter was divine or quasi-divine, and thus that the whole of Creation was continuously speaking to and with God.67 For that reason, Ficino always endorsed the possibility of knowing God through nature, that is of unveiling the hidden veil of the natural world. In his commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, he describes a process of subtraction to find God from the natural world.68 Just as in his Platonic Theology, Ficino attacks the Manichean doctrine that the sensible world was created by a second God, an evil God. On the opposite, he affirms that God is the cause of all things, both sensible and intelligible, and that the sensible world should not be considered pure evil derived from a bad principle, since it is ordained and beautiful.69

ab affectibus, tum ab imaginationibus singularum rerum corporearum. Tum vero monstrante disciplina, eodemque interim amore duce, traducendus est ad contemplandas formas a corporibus separabiles atque separatas, id est ad intellectuales animas et angelicos intellectus. Sol namque divinus in animis quidem fulget velut in luna, in angelis autem velut in stellis. 65 Ibid.: Hactenus exhortatio quidem purgavit sed disciplina monstravit. Amor autem et emundavit et hucusque perduxit. Amor igitur cum amato tandem feliciter copulabit amantem. 66 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 52–53: Si fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, certe est in homine statua Dei quamvis additamentis abscondita. Primo igitur separa corpus ab anima; secundo ab eadem corporeas passiones; tertio imaginationes a ratione; quarto rationales discursiones ab intellectu; quinto intellectualem multiformitatem ab ipsa anime unitate; sexto ab hac unitate animalem intellectualemque conditionem. In septimo gradu (ut arbitror) conquiesces, invenies enim ipsam simpliciter unitatem, id est Deum, sub tali quadam unitate latentem. 67  As noted by Allen in On the Mystical Theology, xxix. 68  Ficino describes this process in On the Mystical Theology, 52–55. 69 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 70–71.



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A third possible way to find God is through the sun. Ficino, as in his De Sole, compares the sun with God. Just like in all good and beautiful things are infused with the light of the First Good, in the same way all things on the earth are infused by the sun’s light. Also, in this case, the process suggested by Ficino to find God is a process of subtraction. In order to find the sun, one would have to take away the gross mixture from the earthly colors, the earthly vapors from the color of the clouds, and, finally, from the stars the “fiery mixture” and the “starry property”. Thus emerges the light itself, that is the sun.70 Beyond this tripartite classification, Ficino focuses his attention on the first way of ascending to God, namely the ascent of the rational soul to God through love. For Ficino, the process of ascension to God is bidirectional: it is moved at the same time by the love of the creature towards its creator, and the love of the creator toward its creature. With a military metaphor, Ficino explains that there is no empire sweeter than the empire of Good. For Ficino, human beings naturally tend toward the Good: they can hate power or infinite wisdom, but not the Good.71 Since the Good is beyond the intellect, human beings cannot enjoy the Good with their intellectual powers: they have to look for it through the very same nature hidden in themselves (occulta natura) with which they were looking for the Good from the beginning and are looking for it still today.72 Thus the possession of the Good will not happen through cognition, but through a substantial possession, which is possible only in the unity of the soul. It is thus impossible for human beings to know exactly how this possession tastes, but a taste of its flavor can be experienced in love. The possession of the Good is sought and bestowed by love. Paraphrasing Paul, Ficino concludes that knowledge will end, but love will last forever (1 Cor. 13:8).73 70 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 54–55: Tertio: forsan invenies similiter ex mundo solari. Cogita colores omnes lucesque rerum: ita ex sole profluere semperque ser vari ut nihil ferme sint aliud quam solis ipsius lumen sub rebus occultum. Quamobrem si abstuleris, a coloribus ubique terrenis terrenam crassamque mixturam, a coloribus vero nubium quandoque fulgentium aqueum terreumque fumum, a lucibus tandem igneis stellaribusque mixturam igneam proprietatemque stellarem, atque, his ita sublatis, lucem pro viribus conservaveris, solem iam habebis. 71 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 28–9: Hinc efficitur ut potentiam quidem et sapientim infinitam possimus odisse, bonitatem vero nequaquam. Cui enim propius naturaliter amor est, inde procul exulat odium. 72 Ibid.: Non quidem intellectu bonum intellectu seperius consequemur, sicut neque intelligibile sensu. Sed eadem ipsa occulta natura tandem attingemus ipsum bonum, intellectu iam vacante, qua naturaliter ab initio, et ante et preter intelligentiam, assidue querebamus et querimus. 73 Ficino, On the Mystical Theology, 30–31: Non erit igitur perfecta possessio boni quasi quedam immaginaria consecutio, qualis fieri solet cognitione, sed substantialis, et intima per unitatem anime facta intellectu superiorem prestantioremque essentia. Verum cum preter intelligentiam fruitio tandem perficiatur, merito nec qualis futura sit exprimi nobis ullo modo potest, gustari tamen interim amore et gaudio quodam inextimabili, quo denique non vacante sicut intelligentia sed crescente absolvitur possessio boni. Que quidem sicut amore quesita est

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4.3  Pax Philosophica and Divine Union in Pico’s De Ente et Uno In 1486, Pico della Mirandola’s ambition of revealing the mysteries of the Kabbalah and the continuity of this hidden knowledge with the Christian religion to all Christendom collapsed under the charges of heresy. The dream of a peace between all religions and philosophies was transformed into the suspicion of subverting the dogmas of the Catholic faith. Writing a biography of his uncle, Gianfrancesco Pico pictured the years that followed the failed Roman debate of the 900 Theses as a period of conversion and meditation, a period in which Giovanni Pico, through a closer relationship with Savonarola, left aside an impious lifestyle as well as a heterodox doctrine and completely dedicated himself to the study of the Scripture. Beyond Gianfrancesco’s apologetic narrative, contemporary scholarship has investigated to what extent Pico repudiated his earlier positions, and to what extent this alleged conversion had been the result of Gianfrancesco’s narrative and edition of his uncle’s life and works.74 Still, in the years 1489–91, many themes that characterized the failed dispute of 1486 can be recognized in Pico’s works. In the Heptaplus, Pico applied his knowledge of Jewish mysticism to propose a Kabbalistic reading of Genesis. In De Ente et Uno, he (re)stated his conviction of the concordance between Plato and Aristotle.75 In the first of the assidue, ita tribuitur et amori. Hinc Apostolus Paulus scientiam nostram in patria desinere inquit, charitate vero nequaquam. 74  Most of the debate in secondary literature has understandably been concentrated on Pico’s famous treatise against divinatory astrology. For a discussion of Pico’s positions regarding astrology: H. Darrel Rutkin, “Mysteries of Attraction: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Astrology and Desire,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 41 (2010): 117–24. Brian Copenhaver has recently discussed the alleged forgery by Gianfrancesco of Giovanni Pico’s Disputationes adversum astrologiam divinatricem: Brian P. Copenhaver, “Studied as an Oration: Readers of Pico’s Letters, Ancient and Modern,” in Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and his Influence, ed. Stephen Clucas, Peter J. Forshaw, and Valery Rees, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 149–98. For the role of Gianfrancesco as editor of his uncle and the similarities between Gianfrancesco’s attacks against astrology and magic in De rerum praenotione and Giovanni Pico’s Disputationes, see the recent contribution by Lucia Pappalardo: Lucia Pappalardo, “Giovanni Pico riscritto da Gianfrancesco? Magia e astrologia tra Disputationes e De rerum praenotione,” Archivio di Storia della Cultura 31 (2018): 53–80. For a specific focus on the attacks against the prisca theologia motif in the twelfth book of the Disputationes, see: Akopyan Ovanes, “‘Me quoque adolescentem olim fallebat:’ Giovanni (or Gianfrancesco?) Pico della Mirandola versus Prisca Theologia,” Accademia (Revue de la Societè Marsile Ficin) 18 (2016 ⌠2019⌡): 75–93. For fifteenth-century authors who accused Gianfrancesco of having hidden his uncle’s real astrological and magical interests, see: Ornella Pompeo Faracovi, “In difesa dell’astrologia: Risposte a Pico in Bellanti e Pontano,” in Nello specchio del cielo: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e le ‘disputationes’ contro l’astrologia divinatoria, Atti del Convegno di studi, Mirandola, 16 aprile 2004, Ferrara, 17 aprile 2004, ed. Marco Bertozzi, Studi pichiani (Florence: Olschki, 2008), 47–66. 75 Pico’s De Ente et Uno has received close attention in twentieth-century scholarship. It has been translated in Italian in Garin’s edition of Pico’s Opera. More recently, Stéphane Tous-



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Theses, according to his opinions, Pico had already formulated the notion of a concordance between Plato and Aristotle: they disagree in the form (quamuis verbis), but not regarding the meaning and the substance (sensu et re).76 Pico also pointed out that the Parmenidean One cannot be identified as vnum absolute, rather it has to be identified as ens vnum.77 These two concepts are at the core of Pico’s disagreement with Ficino. In his edition of Pico’s works, Eugenio Garin edited the original text of Pico’s commentary to Girolamo Beninvieni’s Platonic song, showing how the original text written by Pico was expurgated of Pico’s explicit attacks against Ficino when published by Biagio Buonaccorsi in 1519.78 A second dispute between Pico and Ficino arose with the publication of Pico’s De Ente et Uno.79 In the introduction, dedicated to Angelo Poliziano,80 Pico refers to Poliziano’s dispute with Lorenzo the Magnificent over the One and the Being. As Lorenzo claimed the superiority of Plato over Aristotle, Poliziano asked Pico how to defend Aristotle. Pico, who was working on an entire treatise dedicated to the concordance between Plato and Aristotle until just before his premature death in saint has provided an accurate French edition: Stéphane Toussaint, L’esprit du Quattrocento: Pic de la Mirandole De lʹêtre de lʹun & Réponses Antonio Cittadini. Précédée de Humanisme et vérité, Collections ‘Renaissances’ (Paris: Champion, 1995). A new translation in Italian with a critical edition of the Latin text has been recently published: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Dell’ente e dell’uno con le obiezioni di Antonio Cittadini e le risposte di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, trans. Raphael Ebgi and Franco Bacchelli (Milan: Bompiani, 2010). For the Latin text of Pico’s De Ente et Uno, I will follow this edition, hereafter quoted as De Ente. 76 Farmer, Syncretism in the West, 364: Nullum est quaesitum naturale aut diuinum, in quo Aristoteles et Plato sensu et re non conueniant, quamuis uerbis dissentire uideantur. 77 Farmer, Syncretism in the West, 420: Cum tres fuerint qui dicerent omnia esse unum: Zenophanes, Parmenides, et Melissus, uidebit qui diligenter eorum dicta perscrutabitur, Zenophanis unum illud esse quod simpliciter unum. Vnum Parmenidis non vnum absolute ut creditur, sed ens unum. Vnum Melissi esse unum habens ad unum Zenophanis extremalem correspondentiam. 78 Garin, De hominis dignitate e scritti vari, 10–18. Pico’s 1486 critique of Ficino has become known as “the first Pico–Ficino controversy”. See Unn Irene Aasdalen, “The First Pico–Ficino Controversy,” in Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influnce, ed. Stephan Clucas, Peter J. Forshaw, and Valery Rees, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 67–88; Michael J. B. Allen, “The Birth Day of Venus: Pico as Platonic Exegete in the Commento and the Heptaplus,” in Pico della Mirandola: New Essays, ed. Michael V. Dougherty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 81–113. 79 Maude Vanhaelen, “The Pico–Ficino Controversy: New Evidence in Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides,” Rinascimento 49 (2009): 301–39; Michael J. B. Allen, “The Second Ficino–Pico Controversy: Parmenidean Poetry, Eristic, and the One,” in Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone, Studi e documenti, ed. Gian Carlo Garfagnini, Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento: Studi e Testi (Florence: Olschki, 1986), 419–55. 80  For the relationship between Pico and Poliziano, see Paolo Viti, ed. L’Umanesimo di fine Quattrocento (Biblioteca Mediceo Laurenziana, 4 novembre–31 dicembre 1994), vol. 2 (Florence: Olschki, 1994); Paolo Viti and Fabrizio Lelli, “Pico e Poliziano,” Archivio Storico Italiano 153 (1995): 369–85. See also Poliziano’s use, mediated by Pico, of expressions from the Corpus Hermeticum translated by Ficino: Attilio Bettinzoli, “La lucerna di Cleante. Tracce di ermetismo nei ‘Nutricia’ di Angelo Poliziano,” Lettere Italiane 59 (2007): 3–44.

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1494, aims to show in this short treatise that Plato and Aristotle do not disagree on the matter of the One and the Being.81 Pico’s concord program is based on the detachment of Plato’s original thinking from later interpretations of his works, by those whom we now call Neoplatonists. Ficino did not distinguish between Middle and Neoplatonism, as he perceived the Platonic tradition as a continuum. He thus drew extensively from Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus, considering them the true interpreters of Plato’s dialogues. Giovanni Pico, meanwhile, vehemently attacked this tradition for creating a fictitious discontinuity between Aristotle and his teacher, Plato. After summarizing in the first chapter the main arguments brought by the Academici in support of the superiority of the One over the Being, in the second chapter of De Ente et Uno Pico argues that the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato was wrong. Pico claims it is necessary to directly analyze the texts usually used to prove the superiority of the One over the Being, namely Plato’s Parmenides and his Sophist. Addressing the difference between non-One (non unum) and Nothing (nihil) in Plato’s Sophist, Pico points out that both are equal, and, thus, the One is equal to that which is something (aliquid).82 The longest passage, and the main theoretical effort, is, not surprisingly, dedicated to Plato’s Parmenides. Here the entire philosophical paradigm endorsed by Ficino is criticized. First, according to Pico, the Parmenides should not be read as a dogmatic, but as a dialectic work,83 since this is what Socrates asked Parmenides to do, and this is why Zeno said this art was not suitable for an old person like Parmenides and, indeed, in the whole text nothing is asserted but all is discussed dialectically.84 Second, Pico points out that it is very different to claim the superiority of the One over the Being instead of claiming that, if everything is One, then that One is not an ens,85 which is what Plato actually says, according to Pico. Without mentioning him by name, Pico’s attack is clearly addressed to Ficino’s reading of the Parmenides. In his own commentary to Plato’s Parmenides, Ficino replied to Pico’s critique, restating that 1) the Parmenides is a theological-dogmatic work in which Plato endorses the supe81 

Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 202. della Mirandola, De Ente, 214: Aequalia ergo apud eum, immo eadem sunt non unum et nihil, aequalia item unum et aliquid. 83  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 208: Certe liber inter dogmaticos non est censendus, quippe qui totus nihil aliud est quam dialectica quaedam exercitatio. 84  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 212: Sed citra omnem est controversiam, nisi nos ipsos velimus fallere, id circa quod versaturus erat Parmenides dialecticum esse negocium, neque aliud ab eo Socrates postulaverat. Id autem iuvenilis potius quam senilis officii Zeno iudicaverat. Quibus etiam testimoniis si non credimus, ipsum percurramus dialogum videbimusque nusquam alquid affirmari, sed ubique solum quaeri, hoc si sit, quid consequetur, quid item si non sit. 85 Ibid.: Attende autem etiam, si haec dialectica non sit exercitatio, sed de ente unoque dogma tradatur, quantum haec differant asserere sciliccet unum super ens esse, et hoc asserere futurum ut, si omnia sint unum, illud unum ens non sit. 82  Pico



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riority of the One over the Being, and 2) the Sophist not only does not contradict, but anticipates the Thesis on the One and the Being expounded in the Parmenides.86 In reply to Pico’s critics, Ficino stated: I wish that admirable young man had considered with attention the arguments and discussions above, before attacking his master with such audacity and claiming without fear, in opposition to the doctrine of all Platonists, that the divine Parmenides is simply logical and that Plato, like Aristotle, has identified the One and the Good with being!87

The two positions on the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle are clear: Ficino emphasized that Plato dealt with the highest principle, the One, while Aristotle dealt with the second principle, the Being. Pico instead pointed out that the highest principle is both the One and the Being and, thus, both Plato and Aristotle dealt with the highest principle. The quarrel regarding the relationship between Plato and Aristotle raged throughout Quattrocento. In his 1439 De differentiis Plato et Aristotelis, Georgius Gemistus Plethon derided Aristotle, privileging Plato’s notion of God as more compatible with Christianity. Not surprisingly, Plethon’s treatise sparked harsh reactions, in particular by the Patriarch of Constantinople, Gennadius Scholarios.88 Some years later the polemic was rekindled when George of Trebizond wrote his anti-Platonic treatise Comparationes Philosophorum Platonis et Aristotelis, to which Cardinal Bessarion answered by taking the side of Platonic philosophy (In calumniatorem Platonis, 1457–58).89 Ficino never ex86  For Ficino’s interpretation of Plato’s Sophist, see Michael J. B. Allen, Icastes: Marsilio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist, Five Studies, with a Critical Edition and Translation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). See especially 19–22 for Ficino’s interpretation of the Sophist in the controversy against Pico. Regarding the same topic, see also the discussion by Vanhaelen in: Marsilio Ficino, Commentaries on Plato. Parmendies, ed. James Hankins, trans. Maude Vanhaelen, 2 vols., vol. 2, The I Tatti Renaissance Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), xxix–xxxi. 87 Cf. Commentaries on Plato. Parmendies, 2, 234–35: Utinam mirandus ille iuvenis disputationes discursionesque superiores diligenter consideravisset, antequam tam confidenter tangeret praeceptorem, ac tam secura contra Platonicorum omnium sententiam divulgaret et divinum Parmenidem simpliciter esse logicum et Platonem una cum Aristotele ipsum cum ente unum et bonum adaequavisse! 88  George Karamanolis, “Plethon and Scholarios on Aristotle,” in Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 253–82. 89 James Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance. Vol. 1 (Leiden; Boston; Cologne: Brill, 1990), 165–263. Besides the relationship between Plato and Aristotle, the controversy was informed by other texts. See, for instance, the role of Ptolemy’s Almagest in Michael H. Shank, “The Almagest, Politics, and Apocalypticism in the Conflict between George of Trebizond and Cardinal Bessarion,” ALMAGEST 8, no. 2 (2017): 49–83. Moreover, in her overview of the reception of the pseudo-Aristotelian De mundo in the early modern period, Jill Kraye pointed out how Cardinal Bessarion made use of this text to prove that Aristotle’s God is incompatible with the Christian understanding of God: Jill Kraye, “Aristotle’s God and the Authenticity of De Mundo: An Early Modern Controversy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990): 339–58. Here quoted at 344.

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plicitly joined the dispute. As John Monfasani has shown, he made a very selective use of Aristotle’s works, sometimes quoting him positively alongside Plato, other times as a less prestigious philosopher than the “divine” Plato.90 In De Ente et Uno, Pico twists Plethon back on Ficino. At a time when Ficino had attributed to Pletho the beginning of Platonic studies in Florence, Pico quoted Plethon in refutation of Ficino. After initially placing Hermes Trismegistus as the most ancient among the prisci theologi, Ficino followed Plethon by placing Zoroaster as the first exponent of this ancient tradition.91 Moreover, in the famous introduction to his 1490 commentary on Plotinus, Ficino traces the beginning of the rediscovery of Plato back to an alleged meeting between Cosimo de’ Medici and Plethon during the Council of Florence in 1439.92 Marco Bertozzi has noted that in the Codex Hamilton Pico adds a note in his own handwriting in which he twists Gemistus back against Ficino. Pico points out that the term ens can be understood in two ways: first, everything that is different from nothing, and in this sense, Aristotle used it to claim the co-extensivity of the One and the Being; second, ens can be defined as everything to which the being does not lack. In this sense, the Pythagorean Parmenides used the expression unum est quod est, meaning with the term unum, God. In this way, Parmenides does not admit that the One, unum, is superior to the Being, but he 90  John Monfasani, “Marsilio Ficino and the Plato–Aristotle Controversy,” in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History (Leiden; Boston; Cologne: Brill, 2002), 179–202. 91  For the influence of Plethon on Ficino, see: Paul Richard Blum, “‘Et Nuper Plethon’ – Ficino’s Praise of Georgios Gemistos Plethon and his Rational Religion,” in Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and His Influence, ed. Stephen Clucas, Peter J. Forshaw, and Valery Rees (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 89–104; Schmitt, “Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz,” 509–11; Brigitte Tambrun-Krasker, “Marsile Ficin et le Commentaire de Pléthon sur les Oracles chaldaïques,” Accademia. Revue de la Société Marsile Ficin (1999): 9–48. As noted by Sebastiano Gentile, in his copy of Scholarios’ Replica to Plethon, Ficino himself annotated his indebtedness to Plethon for placing Zoroaster as the first in the catena aurea of the prisci theologi: Marsilio Ficino, Epistolarum familiarium liber I, trans. Sebastiano Gentile, Carteggi Umanistici (Florence: Olschki, 1990), XXII. For a more general discussion regarding the interpretation of Zoroaster in the early modern times, see: Michael Stausberg, Faszination Zarathushtra: Zoroaster und die Europäische Religionsgeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit. Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 1998). The interpretation of Plato as the last heir of the ancient theology, whose first exponent was Zoroaster, has been recently discussed by Hanegraaff, who defined it as “Platonic Orientalism:” Wouter J. Hanegraaff, “The Pagan who Came from the East: George Gemistos Plethon and Platonic Orientalism,” in Hermes in the Academy, ed. Wouter J. Hanegraaff and Joyce Pijnenburg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 33–49. 92  The authenticity of this anecdote has been put into question by modern scholarship. Ficino claimed that in order to revive the study of Plato, Cosimo took care of the education of the young Marsilio. However, in 1439, Ficino was only six years old. For a critical discussion of the alleged meeting between Cosimo and Plethon and the bibliography on this topic, see Gentile’s introduction to his edition of Ficino’s letters: Ficino, Epistolarum familiarium liber I, XIII–LXV.



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gives to God the appellative of ens. Thus, in claiming that the One is superior to the being, the Academici are claiming that the One is superior to God, which is impossible. At this point, in the Codex Hamilton, Pico adds that many Platonists also understood the words unum and ens in the same way. Drawing from a letter Plethon wrote in response to Bessarion, Pico notes that Plethon and the Emperor Julian agreed that the word ens had to be attributed to God. Ficino, having attributed the revival of Plato to Plethon, and having thanked Pico for his support in translating and commenting on Plotinus one year earlier, is now accused by Pico of misunderstanding Plato’s thought.93 In the general attempt to deprive Ficino of the sources he had used to substantiate the superiority of the One over the Being, Pico needed to make a further, but decisive step: to divest Ficino of the apostolic authority of Dionysius the Areopagite. Just like Ficino, Pico was convinced of the authenticity of the Corpus Dionysiacum; just like Ficino, for Pico Dionysius’ works prove the continuity between Pauline theology and the prisci theologi; unlike Ficino, however, according to Pico, Dionysius asserted both that the One and the Being were convertible, and that the One being superior to the Being depending on the meaning attributed to ens. In De divinis nominibus I,6, Dionysius quotes Exodus 3:14. Later, the Vulgate version of this passage ego sum qui sum becomes paradigmatic of the Thomist ontological position that for ens it is necessary to understand God. In extrapolating this passage from Dionysius, Pico concludes that the Areopagite supports the idea that, just like what is One cannot be many, what is not Being is nothing, and admitting that God is nothing is unacceptable. After distinguishing two ways in which it is possible to understand the word ens, and explaining that in the first way ens would mean God and, thus, equal to the One, as Pico clarifies, it is only in the second definition of ens that it is possible to say that the One is superior to the Being. Pico distinguishes between essere as an abstract name and ens as a concrete name, whose abstract name is essere of which it participates. In this second sense, the word ens cannot be applied to God, and it is correct to say that the One is superior to the Being. This is the Neoplatonic interpretation of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides. Not surprisingly, Pico has now the opportunity to extensively quote Dionysius.94 93  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 218: Quin et inter ipsos etiam Platonicos sint quibus dogma illud non placeat, unius scilicet appelationem, quae entis nomine sit superior, Deo attribuendam, non autem entis. Nam et Iulianus Augustus magnus inter Platonicos, nulli ait magis entis cognomen convenire quam Deo, et a Iuliano non dissentit Gemistus, in eo libro in quo Bessarionis quaestiones dissolvit. For the interpretation of this passage and the original passages in Julian and Plethon, see Bertozzi’s comments in Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 22–27. 94  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 224–26: Vocamus auten tunc Deum unum non tam enuntiantes quid sit, quam quomodo sit omnia quae est et quomodo ab ipso alia sint: “unum eniminquit Dionysius- dicitur Deus quia unice est omnia”, rursus: “unum dicitur quia ita princi-

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The next step, however, is to prove the continuity even of this second understanding of the relationship between the One and the Being with Aristotle, and in the Aristotelian tradition. Thus, Pico points out that Aristotle also upholds the same point. Drawing from Aquinas’ commentary to the Book of Sentences, Pico interprets the Aristotelian distinction of ens in substantia and accidens, implying that God, the Platonic One, is above the Being.95 The positions of Dionysius the Areopagite and Thomas Aquinas are complementary for Pico. In a surprising move, in his commentary to the Parmenides, in order to prove that being and good are not the same, Ficino quotes Aquinas’ claim that essence cannot vary according to degrees of goodness. However, the ontologies of Ficino and Thomas Aquinas are at opposite ends of the spectrum, since Thomas supported the convertibility of the One and the Being.96 For Pico – unlike Ficino – the apophatic theology of Dionysius and the positive theology of the scholastics are not in contradiction. It is possible to claim positive things about God. On the other hand, the process of ascension to God is punctuated by subtractions and negations. Pico dedicated the second part of the Oratio to describe the steps of a mystical ascent to God. In the same way, in De Ente et Uno, accompanied by Dionysius’ works along a path which Ficino had already traversed in so many of his works, Pico shows how the individual can ascend to God, step by step and moved by pure love for the divinity, in a process which culminates in the annihilation of the self. In the Oratio, Pico describes a five-fold process of ascension: when the individual has climbed the hierarchy and overcome the nutritive, sensitive, rational, and intellectual powers of his soul, he will draw himself to the unity of his soul, becoming one with God the Father; in De Ente et Uno, as well, the ascension to the night where God dwells is described as a five-fold process. In the first step, one recognizes that God is neither body nor the form of the body. Second, in order to conceive God as purely simple, one needs to subtract all the divine attributes. Pico, noting that life or justice are particular beings, invites subtracting their particular deterpium omnium est quae sunt, sicut omnium numerorum, principium unitas est”. Quapropter si, ut volunt Academici, Plato in prima positione Parmenidis affirmat unum esse ente superius, non erit illud unum aliud quam Deus; quod et ipsi fatentur communi consensu asseverantes de primo rerum omnium principio ibi a Platone tractari. 95  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 226: At – dicet quispiam – hac saltem ex parte discors erit Aristoteles a Platone, quod Aristoteles nunquam ita ens accipit ut sit sub uno Deumque non comprehendat, quod Plato facit. Hoc qui dicunt Aristotelem non legerunt. Facit enim et ipse hoc et longe clarius quam Plato. Nam sexto Primae Philosophiae libro ait dividi ens per se in decem genera. Dubium nullum, apud bonos interpretes sub hoc ente Deum non contineri, qui neque est ens per accidens, neque sub ullo decem generum continetur in quae dividitur ens per se. Vulgata item apud Peripateticos est illa divisio qua dicitur ens dividi in substantiam et accidens. Quod cum fit, ita accipimus ens, ut Deus supra ens sit et non sit sub ente, quemadmodum docet Thomas primo libro Commentarium in Theologicas Sententias. 96  As noted by Maude Vanhaelen in Ficino, Commentaries on Plato. Parmenides, xxxii– xxxiii; The Pico–Ficino Controversy, 328.



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minations in order to have life itself, justice itself, the ens which is not a particular ens but the ens as such, the ens which is universal in light of its perfection.97 The third step is the realization that all the names attributed to God (Being, One, True and Good) are inadequate to describe Him. Since they indicate something concrete, God, who is Being itself, One itself, True itself, and Good itself is above being, one, true, and good.98 At this stage, however, Pico admonishes that one is still in the light, while God made his dwelling in darkness.99 In order to penetrate the darkness, one has to recognize that the human intellect is infinitely inferior to God. The first three stages have been described by Dionysius in his Symbolic Theology, in the Theological Institutions, and On the Divine Names. In Mystical Theology, the divine Dionysius went beyond and, penetrating the darkness of the Divinity, admitted that it is not possible to say anything about God, neither in affirmation nor negation.100 As in the Oratio, the process of subtraction culminates in the union with God. After that Dionysius’ concept of Ekstatikos permeated the fifth chapter of De Ente, in the tenth and last chapter Pico describes the love which reunites the creatures with their Creator. The human soul, in penetrating its own divine origins, can find happiness only in possessing what is higher; wandering on the earth as a foreigner, it moves closer to happiness, renouncing earthly things. Ambition, greed, and avarice must be put aside. Going back to the unity of their souls, moved by love for the divine, human beings created in the image of God, which is pure spirit, will not be carnal anymore but remain spiritual, and they will “fly back” to the Father, “the diaphanous light of Truth”.101 97  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 234–36: Et quoniam vita ens quoddam est, sapientia item ens quoddam, pariterque et iustitia particulare ens, quia scilicet iustitia non sapientia, utique si particularitatis et terminationis conditionem his adimas, quod supererit non hoc aut illud ens erit, sed ipsum ens, sed simpliciter ens, sed universale ens, non praedicationis universalitate, sed perfectionis. 98  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 236–38: Adhuc duo supersunt gradus quorum alter nominum arguit deficientiam, alter nostrae intelligentiae accusat infirmitatem. Haec enim nomina: ens, verum, unum, bonum, concretum quid dicunt et quasi participatum. Quare rursus dicimus Deum super ens, super verum, super unum, super bonum esse, quia scilicet ipsum esse est, ipsa veritas, ipsa unitas, ipsa bonitas. 99  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 238: Verum adhuc in luce sumus, Deus autem posuit tenebras latibulum suum. Pico derives this expression from Psalm XVII, 12. This image enjoyed enormous success in Christian theology. For an overview, see De Ente, 434, note 51. 100  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 238–40. 101  Pico della Mirandola, De Ente, 268–70: Admonere autem in primis nos praesens disputatio videtur, ut si esse beati volumus, beatissimum omnium imitemur Deum, unitatem in nobis, veritatem bonitatemque possidentes. Unitatis pacem turbat ambitio et sibi herentem animum extra se rapit et in diversa quasi lacerum trahit atque discerpit. Veritatis splendorem et lucem in ceno, in caligine voluptatum quis non amittet? Bonitatem furacissima nobis furatur cupiditas, idest avaritia. Bonitatis enim peculiare hoc: communicare aliis bona quae possides. Quare cum quaereret Plato cur Deus condidit mundum, respondens ipse sibi “bonus” inquit “erat”. Haec sunt illa tria, superbia scilicet vita, concupiscentia carnis et concupiscentia oculorum, quae, ut scribit Iohannes, ex mundo sunt et non sunt ex Patre, qui ipsa unitas, ipsa veritas, ipsa

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4.4  Theologia Negativa More Scolastico: Eck’s Commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology Much as his contemporaries admired his great mind, throughout the centuries, Pico della Mirandola became the archetype of the learned man, the quintessential inquisitive Renaissance man, insatiable and on a never-ending quest for something new. Pico’s concord program and his great dream of a pax philosophica have become the symbols of that great intellectual season that began with the arrival of the Byzantine scholars in Italy for the Council of Florence. In order to exist, every conceptualization of learnedness needs its un-enlightened counterpart. While nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarship constructed a striking dichotomy between the “dark” Middle Ages and the Renaissance, whose inevitable anachronism has, in the last forty years, been the object of accurate historical research with special attention to the paradigmatic case of Pico himself, the seeds of this contraposition can be found in the debates against the “sophistry” of scholasticism. A growing challenge to the common way of philosophizing and theologizing arose from different quarters, first from the outside and then also within the universities themselves. The breakthrough of the Reuch­lin affair polarized the discourse on two opposite fronts. While the anti-Reuch­linists accused Reuch­lin of being a “Judaizer”, and his supporters mere grammarians (grammatici) ignorant of theology, the pro-Reuch­linists labeled their opponents as unlearned obscurantists. Among the many scholastics accused of obscurantism, Johannes Eck has a place of (un)pride.102 Born on 13 November 1486, Eck attended the universities of Heidelberg, Tübingen, and Cologne and he earned his Ph.D. in theology from the University of Freiburg. He was appointed professor of theology at the University of Ingolstadt in 1510. In 1514, he published his Chrysopassus praedestinationis, which resulted from a series of lectures Eck gave at the University of Ingolstadt.103 In 1516, he published a commentary to Peter of Spain’s Summae Logicales.104 In the 1510s, Eck pictured himself as a proponent of the bonitas est. Fugiamus hinc ergo, idest a mundo qui positus in maligno; evolemus ad Patrem ubi pax unifica, ubi lux verissima, ubi voluptas optima. Pico’s lux verissima has been translated in Italian as la diafana luce del vero (271), a rendering I followed in the main text. 102 For Eck’s biography, see: Erwin Iserloh, Johannes Eck (1486–1543): Scholastiker, Humanist, Kontroverstheologe, 2, Katholisches Leben und Kirchenreform im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung; 41 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1985). The methodological approach of Erwin Iserloh’s is more balanced than that of other Catholic scholars. For an explicit apologetic interpretation of Eck, see: Max Ziegelbauer, Johannes Eck: Mann der Kirche im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung (St. Ottilien: EOS-Verlag, 1987). 103  For Eck’s works between 1513–15, see: Johann Peter Wurm, Johannes Eck und der oberdeutsche Zinsstreit 1513–1515, Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte (Münster: Aschendorff, 1997). 104  For Eck’s works on logic in this period, see: Arno Seifert, Logik zwischen Scholastik



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new learning and was also perceived as such by many of his contemporaries.105 However, Eck’s positions on usury in support of the interest of the Fugger, the powerful family of bankers and merchants, and his vehement critiques of Erasmus and “the grammarians” during his dispute with Ulrich Zasius marked him as an example of a scholastic theologian intolerant of the new learning.106 In 1520 Eck’s fame as a vir obscurus grew: As Pope Protonotary, he popularized the papal bull Exsurge Domine against Luther in Germany, adding several names of other men who deserved to be condemned as heretics; in the same year, a vehement satire against Eck (Eccius Dedolatus), apparently written by Willibilald Pirckheimer, became highly popular throughout Europe.107 The last five hundred years have reinforced this negative picture of Eck.108 At first glance, the “obscurantist” Eck and the ingeniorum Phoenix Giovanni Pico della Mirandola seem to have little in common. As I suggested in Chapter One, the essentialist approach which divides the supporters of Luther and Reuch­lin eager to go back ad fontes and reestablish true theology, versus the followers of medieval scholasticism, needs to leave room for a more accurate historical approach that takes into better account the subtleties of the different positions. Indeed, the contraposition between theologians who wanted to go back to the theology of the Fathers, and those who preferred to “theologize” following the scholastic method cannot be read as the mere resemblance of a preexisting dichotomy between the two fronts. Rather, it is the result of a process of positioning and counterpositioning. As noted in Chapter One, Eck, who was reckoned as an enemy of the new learning in many quarters, explicitly accused Luther of being an obscurantist, contraposing Luther’s theology to the famous motto ad fontes. und Humanismus: Das Kommentarwerk Johann Ecks, Humanistische Bibliothek (München: Fink, 1978). 105  Peter Walter, “Johannes Eck (1486–1543) und der Humanismus,” in Johannes Eck (1486–1543): Scholastiker – Humanist – Kontroverstheologe, ed. Jürgen Bärsch and Konstantin Maier, Eichstätter Studien (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 2014), 106–30. Here quoted at 109–15. 106  See: Steven W. Rowan, “Ulrich Zasius and John Eck: ‘Faith Need Not Be Kept with an Enemy,’” The Sixteenth Century Journal 8 (1977): 79–95. 107  Thomas W. Best, ‘Eccius dedolatus:’ A Reformation Satire, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1971). 108  For an examination of secondary literature on Eck until 1980, see: Johannes Burkhardt, “Das Bild des Johannes Eck in der Geschichtsschreibung,” in Johannes Eck (1486–1543) im Streit der Jahrunderte: Internationale Symposium der Gesellschaft zur herausgabe des Corpus Catholicorum aus Anlaβ des 500. Geburtstages des Johannes Eck vom 13 bis 16 Nov. 1986 in Ingolstadt und Eichstätt, ed. Erwin Iserloh, Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988), 8–36. For an analysis of how Eck portrayed himself in his autobiography, see: Ingo Trüter, “Johannes Eck (1486–1543): Academic Career and Self-Fashioning around 1500,” in Scholarly Self-Fashioning and Community in the Early Modern University, ed. Richard Kirwan (New York: Routledge, 2016), 59–78.

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Besides being well-versed in scholastic commentaries, Eck was very familiar with the theology of the Church Fathers. As noted by Walter Moore,109 on the eve of the Leipzig debate, a paradoxical situation emerged concerning the theology of the Fathers: Eck, Erasmus, and the two Wittenberg theologians Luther and Karlstadt accused each other of not having read sufficiently, or not having correctly understood the works of Augustine. On 2 February 1518, John Eck wrote a letter to Erasmus criticizing him for favoring Jerome over Augustine in his 1516 edition of Jerome’s opera.110 Eck found Erasmus’ judgment almost blasphemous (impudentissimum) and restated that the teaching of Augustine, “light and first column of the Church” (Ecclesia lumen and primas Ecclasiae columnas), should be favored over the other Fathers.111 Erasmus replied on 15 May 1518 emphasizing his admiration for Augustine, but restating his preference for Jerome and Origen.112 It is in this epistle that he famously stated to learn more from one page of Origen than ten of Augustine.113 While he was corresponding with Erasmus regarding the interpretation of the Fathers, Eck published his Obelisci, his reply to Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses. In defense of Luther, Karlstadt harshly criticized Eck in his CCCLXX Conclusiones. Ironically, Karlstadt mounted the same accusation against Eck that the Ingolstadt professor had mounted against Erasmus: that of misunderstanding Augustine.114 Under the influence of Luther, Karlstadt based his interpretation of Augustine on his anti-Pelagian writings: according to this interpretation, after an early period in which he granted too much scope to human freedom, during the Pelagian controversy Augustine denied humans any role in the justifying process.115 Two years before, more precisely, on 19 October 1516, Luther asked Georg Spalatin to act as a mediator between himself and Erasmus: in Luther’s eyes Erasmus had not studied Augustine correctly and, in light of his preference 109  Walter L. Moore, “Doctor Maximus Lumen Ecclesiae: The View of Augustine in John Eck’s Early Writings,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 13 (1982): 43–54. 110  The interpretation of the Fathers is only one of the criticisms raised by Eck against Erasmus. For an analysis of the other theological issues in the epistolary exchange between Eck and Erasmus, see: Walter, “Johannes Eck (1486–1543) und der Humanismus,” 125–9. 111  Ep. 769, in Allen, vol. 3, 208–212. 112  Ep. 844 in Allen, vol. 3, 330–38. 113  Ibid., 337: Plus me docet Christanae philosophiae vnica Origenis pagina quam decem Augustini. 114  As noted by Moore, “Doctor Maximus Lumen Ecclesiae: The View of Augustine in John Eck’s Early Writings,” 44. 115  In 1517, in their respective Theses against scholastic theology, both Luther and Karlstadt already criticized the idea that Augustine excessive loquitur regarding the bondage of the will in order to rebuke the heretics. Volker Leppin has recently pointed out that the Wittenbergers were aware of Eck’s Disputation held in Vienna in September 1516. Thus, Leppin argued that the positions of Karlstadt and Luther positions in 1517 cannot be properly understood without taking into consideration their familiarity with Eck’s scholarship: Volker Leppin, “Der Einfluss Johannes Ecks auf den jungen Luther,” Luther 86 (2015): 135–47.



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for Origen and Jerome, he had underestimated the consequences of original sin. On his side, Eck replied to Karlstadt that in order to rebuke the heretics regarding the role of grace to perform good works Augustine excessive loquitur, but he never denied free will. For Eck, after original sin the will (voluntas) is not only passive, since he believed that a natural instinct toward the good remains in the individual. In sum, three positions can be discerned: Erasmus favored Jerome and Origen over Augustine because of Augustine’s positions against free will in his anti-Pelagian writings, Luther and Karlstadt praised Augustine precisely for the reasons why Erasmus disparaged the bishop of Hippo, and finally Eck, against both Erasmus and the Wittenbergers, tried to draw a line of continuity between the earlier and later Augustine. As it was for Erasmus and Luther, so for Eck the reception of the Church Fathers provides an insight into his own theological positions. The attempt to portray Augustine as a defender, not a denier, of free will alerts us to the fact that Eck, through the authority of Augustine, defended what he considered a true Catholic position regarding free will. Eck, however, goes far beyond that. Despite being considered the quintessential scholastic philosopher, he endorsed the need to overcome the philosophy of the universities in favor of a mystical theology, whose foundation could, in his eyes, be ultimately traced back to the very foundation of Christianity – namely to Paul and his main disciple, Dionysius. Eck’s indebtedness to Pico’s concord program is explicit. A new hermeneutical method which would have resurrected the original, divine, source from which all philosophies derive their own scintilla veritatis is foundational for Pico’s conciliatory program. A new hermeneutical approach is also programmatic of Eck’s works: since the publication of his Chrysopassus (1514) he endorsed a mystical theology according to the scholastic method. Far beyond that, in Chrysopassus, Eck proposed inserting into the scholastic tradition the ancient theology of Orpheus, Hermes Trismegistus, Plato, and Aristotle.116 Pico’s plan to conciliate and put in continuity the affirmative theology of the scholastics with the negative mystical theology of Dionysius was supported and expanded by Eck in his commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology. In the Introduction, Eck presents Dionysius as the one who revealed the holy arcane mysteries of Christian faith (arcana mysteria fidei nostra). The very common Renaissance pattern of restoring true theology is immediately introduced: Eck admonishes, indeed, that the holy theology of Dionysius risked being extinguished through being substituted by the commentaries to Peter Lombard’s Sentences. Nicholas of Cusa, Germanorum doctissimum, is praised as someone 116 As noted by Georgette Epiney-Burgard, “Jean Eck et le commentaire de la Théologie mystique du Pseudo-Denys,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 34 (1972): 7–29.

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who has reintroduced negative theology into Western Christendom.117 In the Leipzig debate, Eck draws again and again from Cusanus.118 Without slavishly following Dionysius’ text, which presents a threefold distinction in affirmative, symbolic, and mystical theology, Eck divides theology into four different kinds: affirmative (affirmativa), symbolic (symbolica), assertive (assertiva), and mystical (mystica). Affirmative theology investigates truths about God directly. It can deal both with concepts introduced by the creatures as well as truths revealed directly by God.119 Indeed, this theology can investigate the Bible or the natural world, as does Aristotle in the twelfth book of Metaphysics. Thus, it can be revealed, or it can come from natural knowledge; it is, moreover, called “commune” because it has been transmitted by the Fathers.120 117 Eck, Commentarios, fol. Aij.r: Quamuis autem is, de superbenedicta prima omnium causa, philosophandi modus, per negationes et ablationes multis annis neglectus fuerit, Theologis more Parrhisiensium non contemnendo, in elucubrandis Petri Longobardi sententijs, summis vigilijs dies noctesque laborantibus: Reuiruit tamen modo Theologia negatiua, effundente se passim Chalcographorum diligentia, magna librorum copia: quae enim tot annis emarcuerat, et obrura ac desolata iacens, caput iam demum profert, lucerna eius Nicolaum Cusanum Germanorum doctissimum, et rubeo Galero insignem, splendidissime acensa: quem plusculi aetatis nostrae et superioris, non paenitendi Theologi, in ea explicanda et dilatanda non segniter secuti sunt. 118  See, for instance, WA 2.283.22; WA 2.284.14–29; WA 2.302.36–40. An attempt to draw a connection between Cusanus and Luther is quite common in Luther scholarship. As mentioned above, in the 1972 conference on late medieval and Renaissance religion held at the University of Michigan, Edward Cranz suggested that Cusanus could be conceived as a predecessor of Martin Luther. The standard book on the relationship between Cusanus and Luther is: Reinhold Weier, Das Thema vom verborgenen Gott von Nikolaus von Kues zu Martin Luther (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967). I will discuss the topic of the “Hidden God” in Luther’s theology in the last chapter of the present work. In recent years, Knut Alfsvåg has repeatedly drawn attention on “similarities” between Cusanus and Luther: Knut Alfsvåg, “Cusanus and Luther on Human Liberty,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosphie 54 (2012): 66–80; “The Centrality of Christology: On the Relation Between Nicholas Cusanus and Martin Luther,” Studia Theologica– Nordic Journal of Theology 70 (2016): 22–38. Alfsvåg’s analysis, however, moves on a systematic level. In the same interpretative line and with the same methodological approach, Joshua Hollmann, drawing from Alfsvåg’s scholarship, proposed a “comparative reading” of Cusanus’ De docta ignorantia and Luther’s The Freedom of a Christian: Joshua Hollmann, “Nicholas of Cusa and Martin Luther on Christ and the Coincidence of Opposites,” in Nicholas of Cusa and the Making of the Early Modern World, ed. Simon J. G. Burton, Joshua Hollmann, and Eric M. Parker, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 153–72. As repeatedly suggested, systematic comparisons have to be abandoned and an historical approach preferred. For a recent contribution on Luther’s ecclesiology and its relationship with the fifteenth-century view of the Church, especially Cusanus’, see: Richard J. Serina, “‘Papista Insanissima:’ Papacy and Reform in Nicholas of Cusa’s Reformatio Generalis (1459) and the Early Martin Luther (1517– 19),” ibid., 105–27. 119 Eck, Commentarios, fol. Aiijv: Affirmativa communis est quae de Deo directe veritates inquirit secundam affirmationes optimas et intelligibiles vel in creaturis repertas vel a Deo revalatas. 120 Ibid.: Bifida est haec Theologia, alia enim naturalis est: qualis dici potest duodecimae Metaphysicae Aristotelis Stagyritae: ita enim et ipse Metaphysicam, ultramundanam philoso-



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Symbolic theology must be defined as one which, through sensible things, elevates the soul to the understanding of invisible things.121 For the definition of affective theology, Eck quotes Gerson, who defined it as an extensio animi toward God moved by love.122 Eck notes that this is the kind of theology of love discussed in the Song of Songs. It has a long tradition in Christianity, whose main representatives are identified as Bonaventure and Bernard of Clairvaux, a tradition that culminates in Gerson. As Eck notes, Gerson posits the basis for this theology, namely the love which unites the creature and the Creator, in synderesis: Ponit eam Gerson in Synderesis. Finally, the Mystical or Negative theology transcends the understanding of the creatures; through ablationem it ascends to the cognition of God, dwelling in the fog of human ignorance.123 This is, according to Eck, the kind of theology which leads human beings to transcend the fog in which God is hidden and to contemplate “the hidden God”. Gerson wrote about it in the treatise De Anagogico verbo, but the main modern representative of this theology is Cusanus. Eck quotes Cusanus’ works De beryllo, de docta Ignorantia, De quaerendo Deum, and De venatione sapientiae, and emphasizes that Cusanus developed a mystical negative theology in all of his works.124 Affirmative theology is the one taught at universities, symbolic theology is used in sermons, affective theology in prayer, and finally mystical theology gives human beings the possibility to overcome their limits and ascend to higher degrees.125 phiam, Theologiam appellari voluit: et ex creaturis nascitur. Altera vero est supernaturalis divinitus revelata patribus, prophetis, apostolis, et ecclesiae. Commune appellabo hanc Theologiam, quod communiter tradita sit in sacra scriptura: et a Theologis communiter sit tractata. Hanc beatissimus pater amplexus est in libro Hypotyposeon, de diuinis nominibus, et utraque Hierachia. 121 Ibid.: Symbolica Theologia seu significatiua est quae iuxta congruentiam sensibilium proprietatum cum declaratione spiritualis intelligentiae ad invisibilium cognitionem animum eleuat. 122  Ibid. fol. Aiiijr: Affectiua Theologia diffinitur a Gersone esse extensio animi in deum per amoris desiderium. 123 Ibid.: Mystica Theologia seu negatiua est qua mens omnes creaturas et seipsam trascendens, ad dei cognitionem per ablationem ascendit, expectans in caligine actualis ignorantiae omnium. 124 Ibid.: Habet autem haec affectiuam Theologiam comitem Excitante enim deo, animus per eam naturalis intelligentiae limites supergressus, in amatum deum, mirabiliter transformatur: hinc est quod et S. Bonaventura et Gerson vterque librum praetitulauit de mystica Theologia: cum talem solum tractarent affectivam: Scripsit tamen de Mystica Theologia in se, Gerson in tractatu de Anagogico verbo et hymno gloriae: Scripsit hic beatissimus pater Dionysius, scripsit Cusanus Germanorum doctissimus in libro de docta ignorantia, In libro de quaerendo Deum, de Beryllo, de venatione sapientiae, et vbique eius opuscula et excitationes per istam Theologiam negatiuam sussarcinantur. 125 Ibid.: de Theologia affirmativa communi, qua frequenter in scholis utimur, Symbolica qua in sermonibus et contionibus ad populum, Affectiva in devotis meditationibus: Mystica vero apud altioris gradus homines, has omnes supergreditur.

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Like Pico della Mirandola, Eck restates the importance of the theology of the universities. According to him, scholastic and mystical theology are not in contradiction, however, they operate on different levels, whereby mysticism is a higher form of theology: only through mysticism is it possible to ascend to mysteries of the Godhead. Eck, who in previous years had a dispute with the converted Jew and Kabbalist Paolo Ricci,126 distances himself from other forms of theology. The tradition of the prisci theologi is, indeed, interpreted as a profanation of the mystical theology of Dionysius. Egyptians, Chaldeans, and the Kabbalists, in investigating the deepest mysteries, often make deals with demons and, through these demonic pacts, try to make miracles and achieve supernatural powers. The Kabbalists, in particular, through an implicit reference to the Kabbalistic reading of the Tetragrammaton, are attacked for their pretense of possessing a special knowledge of the powers of the divine name. Symphorien Champier, Ludovico Lazzarelli, and Pico della Mirandola are blamed for endorsing this tradition.127 The reference to these three authors is quite indicative. Drawing on Ficino’s scholarship on Hermes Trismegistus, Ludovico Lazzarelli (1447–1500) wrote new translations and commentaries to the Corpus Hermeticum. His highly influential Crater Hermetis, a fictitious dialogue between Lazzarelli himself and King Ferdinand of Aragon, follows Ficino in assimilating Christian theology and the writings attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, drawing also extensively from Christian Kabbalah.128 In 1505, Jacques Lefèvre, whose 126  Bernd Roling, “Der Streit zwischen Paulus Ritius und Johannes Eck um die Existenz der Weltseele,” in Reuch­lins Freunde und Gegner: Kommunikative Konstellationen eines frühneuzeitlichen Medienereignisses, ed. Wilhelm Kühlmann, Pforzheimer Reuch­linschriften (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2010), 125–42; Aristotelische Naturphilosophie und christliche Kabbalah im Werk des Paulus Ritius, Frühe Neuzeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2012), 445–71. 127 Eck, Commentarios, fol. Aiiijr–v: In illa n. Magna arcana et secreta mysteria diuine intelligentie tradunt, quamuis ab Ethnicis et cabalisticis nomen mysterii quasi prophanatum sit. Nam et Iudei et Aegyptij, vtraque gens de mysterijs gloriatur: sed praeter secretiorem sensum diuinorum eloquiorum (qui proprie Cabala est nuncupatus, ait Symphoranus champerius) mille quoque Hebraeorum insanias Cabalae acceptas, iuniores retulere/fingentes habere secreta nomina dei quibus demones illigarent, et mirabilia operarentur: placentulas item/quibus comestis quis sapiens et doctus euadat. Lazarelus ob eam causam in Hermetis cratere ait Diuina secreta esse cepit: eius tamen operatio (si vnum tantum excepero) omnes penitus latet. Picus Ioannes doctissimus comes Cabalam a receptione dictam autumat: sed haec extra institum: prosequitur Symphorianus de prophanatione mysteriorum. Sic apud Aegyptios scientia mysterialis erat atque per eam antiquitus apud Aegyptios sensum sacrarum litterarum a Mercurio Trismegisto traditus et successione receptus intelligeretur: factum est vt nomine mysterij Aegyptii, Graeci, et latini postmodum aburerentur: et maxime Iamblychus, Proclus, Porphyrius, Synesius, Psellus, Pythagoras, et Apuleius, qui mille infamias Aegyptiorum in mysteriis acceptas in Mercurium retulit, fingens se habere secreta Mercurij quibus demones illigaret, et mirabilia per oracula et symulachra operaretur, Haec igitur prophanata mysteria non tradit Thologia mystica: sed arcana a deo reuelata, nos ad eius cognitionem et amorem sursum ducentia tradit et docet: vt procursu libri videbimus. 128  For further discussion, see: Chiara Crisciani, “Hermeticism and Alchemy: The Case of Ludovigo Lazzarelli,” Early Science and Medicine 5 (2000): 145–59; Claudio Moreschini, Dall’ ‘Asclepius’ al ‘Crater Hermetis.’ Studi sull’ermetismo latino tardo-antico e rinascimen-



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first translation of Hermes Trismegistus appeared in 1497, published a new edition and translation of Corpus Hermeticum, adding Lazzarelli’s Crater Hermetis. Symphorien Champier (1471–1539), the personal physician of Antoine, Duke of Lorraine (1489–1544), published his Liber de quadruplici vita in 1507. In this edition, he also published a commentary to the Definitiones Asclepi following Lazzarelli’s translation.129 Finally, Pico’s Oratio begins with the quotation from the Asclepius that man is “a great miracle”. Pico will come to be one of the main sources of Eck’s commentary; indeed, even as Eck repeatedly referred to him as doctissimus comes, Eck never approved of Pico’s Hermetism and Kabbalism.130 This is no surprise, for during the very same years, Gianfrancesco Pico, whom Eck met in 1516, tried to detach his uncle’s legacy from the controversial and unorthodox Kabbalah. Paradoxically, Eck admitted that Dionysius’ mysticism was close to other forms of non-Christian mysticism, however, he attributed this closeness to the misappropriation by non-Christian authors of Dionysius’ corpus. In this way, on the one hand, Eck had apologetically distanced himself from the tradition of prisca theologia, always at the border of Christian orthodoxy, and on the other, in light of theological proximity, he opened the door to quote Dionysius and his master Paul, hand in hand with the prisci theologi. This latter aspect is characteristic of Eck’s commentary. Indeed, a closer look at the sources reveals the variegated collection of authors with whom Eck was familiar. Eck mastered different commentaries to Dionysius. Among the Greeks, he quotes only the scholia, attributed to Maximus the Confessor.131 Eck’s knowledge of the Latin commentators to Dionysius is more extensive: from Thomas Gallus to Robert Grosseteste, from the Carthusian Hugh of Balma to the more recent commentaries by Ficino and Lefèvre d’Étaples. In light of the variegated influence of Dionysius’ text in medieval theology, Eck can also draw extensively from Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, Eck was very familiar with the Platonic authors translated by Ficino, as well as with Ficino’s tale (Pisa: Giardini, 1986); Paul Oskar Kristeller, “Marsilio Ficino e Lodovico Lazzarelli. Contributo alla diffusione delle idee ermetiche nel Rinascimento,” Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. Lettere, Storia e Filosofia 7 (1938): 237–62. 129  See Jean Dagens, “Hermétisme et cabale en France de Lefèvre d’Etaples à Bossuet,” Revue de littérature comparée 35 (1961): 5–16. For further discussion, see also: Isidore Silver, “Plato and Ficino in the Work of Symphorien Champier,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 55 (1993): 271–80. 130 Eck discusses Pico’s and Reuch­ lin’s Kabbalism also later in the commentary. See fol. Fij ro. 131  Since Hans Urs von Balthasar claimed that most of the scholia on the Corpus Dionysiacum attributed to Maximus the Confessor were written by John of Scythopolis, the question of the relationship between Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor has been much debated. Some scholars have, however, stressed the influence of Dionysius on the works of Maximus. See: Andrew Louth, “The Reception of Dionysius in the Byzantine World: Maximus to Palamas,” Modern Theology 24 (2008): 585–99.

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translation of the Corpus Hermeticum. It is worth noting that, as the commentary was structured in propositions in order to explain single statements from Dionysius, at the same time Eck constantly quotes well-established Christian authorities along with pagan sources. Thus, in Propositio III, explaining that God is the cause of everything, Eck quotes Augustine, Chrysostomus, Hermes Trismegistus, Albert the Great, and Aristotle alongside one another,132 or Aquinas, Plato, and Plotinus hand-in-hand to explain the participation of the superior realm in the inferior world.133 In order to demonstrate that Dionysius’ apophatic theology was the highest and purest form of mystical theology, Eck needed to prove two main points: 1) Dionysius was a contemporary of Paul, and 2) as a consequence, the Platonici drew from Dionysius and not the other way around. In order to prove the former aspect, Eck took issue with Valla’s note to Acts 17:34 that Erasmus published in 1514. As recalled earlier, Luther used this passage in Erasmus’ Novum Instrumentum to put into discussion the apostolicity of Dionysius and his works. At the same time, Eck mounted two critiques of Valla and Erasmus. First, he argued that the reference in Dionysius of the eclipse which happened during Jesus’ crucifixion did not disprove the first-century dating of the Corpus, since the eclipse could have also been seen in Athens.134 Second, regarding the problem of the lack of quotations from the Dionysian Corpus in the Church Fathers, Eck quotes Pico who claimed that Dionysius’ books were hidden by the heretics. For this reason, Jerome could not have mentioned Dionysius among his classification of illustrious men. In Eck’s own words: We can easily explain why Jerome did not quote Dionysius, about which Erasmus complains, neither is it necessary for all the books to be examined by S. Jerome, although diligent, since many books were hidden in bleak locations since the ancient times, and have been rediscovered only recently, like, for instance, the books by Cornelius Tacitus recently discovered in Saxony; Eusebius, a man by no means indiligent, frankly admitted that many books did not make their way to him; this is subtsantiated by the highly learned Count Pico who affirmed that the books of Dionyius were hidden by the heretics.135 132 Eck, Commentarios, 133  Ibid., fol. E ijv.

fol. Cijv.

134  Ibid., fol. Avr: Huic enim communiter recepte sententiae Laurentius Valla et Erasmus Roteradomus Germanorum addo etiam latinorum elegantissimus in annotationibus xvij capitis Actuum apost. adversantur. Increpamntes communem sententiam e tribus Dionysiis vnum reddentem s. Areopagitam, Galliarum apostolum, et horum librorum autorem. Primo quidem Aeropagitae iudices erant non philosophi: at Dionysius summus fuerit philosophus. Dein ex solis eclypsi passionis domini tempore, eum autorem mundi periclitasse, deprehendere non potuisse: cum consentaneum non sit eas tenebras Athenas usque pervenisse: nam si tanto spacio deliquium per universum orbem contigisset, aliquis certe seu latinus seu graecus scriptor eius rei meminisset: et epistolam super hac re Dionysii nomine confictam, deridet Laurentius. 135  Ibid., fol. Avir: Quod vero ne a Hieronymo quidem citatum Dionysium conqueritur Erasmus, facile diluimus, neque enim necessario est omnes libros a S. Hieronymo quantumus diligente, fore perlustratos, cum plures libri situ et squalore delitescentes, a veteribus praeteriti, hodie quoque reperiantur, veluti nuperis annis Cornelii Taciti libri quinque in Saxonia



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In this passage, Eck not only reaffirmed the authenticity of the Corpus Dionysiacum on dogmatic grounds but, through the case of the rediscovery of Tacitus’ Annales,136 turned a philological argument against Valla and Erasmus, an argument which would also support Pico’s claim that Dionysius’ books were hidden by heretics. Having asserted the authenticity of the Dionysian corpus, Eck can comment that Dionysius’ works were the highest expression of Christian mysticism – the texts in which all the wisdom Paul received from God, and which he only partially revealed in his letters, was completely enshrined. Eck’s indebtedness to Ficino’s commentary is quite evident. From Ficino, Eck explicitly draws different ontological and epistemological concepts. Like many scholastic theologians before him and like Ficino himself in his commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, Eck introduces a four-fold division of human cognitive faculties in sense, imagination, reason, and intellect.137 Ratio applies general principles to particular things in order to analyze and explain them, while intellectus embraces the general meaning of the things capturing their principles.138 Clarifying the limited possibilities of the human mind, Eck discusses how to transcend them – the proper topic of mystical theology. He praises Ficino for elegantly explaining that, as the ultimate goal of the human soul was to free itself from its corporeal burdens, there were three stages for contemplation: corporeal, animal, and intellectual. Paraphrasing Ficino, Eck noted that human beings thought corporeally about God when they imagined a reperti sunt: et Eusebius vir haud quaquam indiligens, ingenue fatetur innumerabiles libros ad se non pervenisse: suffragatur nonnihil Picus doctissimus comes libros Dionysii occultatos ab hereticis affirmans. (The English translation of this passage is mine). 136  The codex of the first six books of Tacitus’ Annales was rediscovered in the monastery of Corvey. After coming into possession of the codex, Pope Leo X commissioned Filippo Beroaldo the Younger (1472–1518) to publish it. The first edition was published in Rome in 1515. On the publication of the edition princeps of Tacitus’ Annales, see: Claudio Buongiovanni, “I libri I–VI degli ‘Annales’ di Tacito tra ecdotica ed esegesi umanistica. Il caso di Filippo Beroaldo il Giovane,” Incidenza dell’Antico 14 (2016): 109–26. Eck mentioned the publication of Tacitus’ Annales also in his speech Contra Grillos held at the University of Ingolstadt on 8 October 1515: Walter, “Johannes Eck (1486–1543) und der Humanismus,” 113. 137 Eck, Commentarios, fol. Biiijr: Sicut prisci tradiderunt philosophi, quattuor sunt gradus cognitiui proposito nostro deseruientes .s. sensus, imaginatio, ratio, et intellectus. 138 Ibid.: Eo etiam sit quod intellectus principiorum habitus constituitur quoniam principia sunt contractiora conclusionibus quibus immobiliter adheremmus: magna enim sunt principia in virtute, parua quantitate, ut vulgo dici solet: unde intelligentes rationantibus sunt praestantiores: Ratio enim currit, per ramos remote a principijs, in particularibus desudans: intellectus se contahit ad radice ipsis principijs et quae proxime his infunt innitens. Ratio explicat seque diffundit ac passim dilatat in omnes angulos: intellectus contra se conplicat et contrahit. Ratio principia ipsa passim extendit et quibus uis obviantibvus applicat, et ita eorum evidentiam et virtutem eneruat ac extenuat: intellectus vero ad principia reducit, et omnia ad principia resolvit: quo evidentior sit eorum veritas et certitudo. Ratio investigatrix est sedula, noua semper inueniens, et unum post aliud quaerens, ac unum ex altero eliciens: intellectus vero simplici obtutuaspicit rem quam intelligit. Infero ad unum, quod multa legentes cum ratione, sine intellectum seipsos plurimum confundit: adeo quae satius fuisset eos pauciora legisse.

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new and better sky than the earthly sky; they thought through the senses when in one soul they imagine all souls; and, finally, they thought intellectually when they imagined an omniform intellect. Beyond these three summits, God would dwell in eminent incognito, above all words and all intelligence.139 In his commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, Ficino described three ways to know God: through the human soul, through the natural world, and through the sun. Paraphrasing once again Ficino’s comment, Eck discusses how the human soul, the natural world, and the sun can be understood as symbols of God. In Ficinian terms, Eck describes the human soul as the image of God and, for this reason, a statua dei is still hidden in the soul. In the six-fold process of abstraction described by Ficino, at the sixth step the soul would reunite with its simple unity and, in doing so, make contact with its divine nature. In the same way, even the natural world was created in the image of God: just like the human soul, the creation is a statua dei as well. Again, Eck summarizes the process of subtraction described by Ficino in order to have the principle of all the rays, the light, which in its simplicity is a symbol of God in this world. Regarding the sun as a symbol of God, Eck limits himself to report that Ficino gave solid reasons to show how the sun should be understood as a symbol of God.140 139 

Ibid., fol. Cvv: Veraciter syncero spirituali lumine, sine velo, hoc est sine symbolis et imaginibus deus solum his apparet qui impura hoc est corporalia que sunt a materia affecta, et spiritualia que cum a materia sint aliena pura hic dicuntur, supersiliunt: et ita summitates omnes preteruolant et supergrediuntur. Unde Ficinus hic eleganter tres posuit ut ita dixerim summitates, primam corpoream statuit, alteram animalem, tertiam intellectualem. Corpoream cogitamus ubi caelum fingitur quasi novum tanto pulchrius hoc caelo quanto coelum hoc terram est formosius. Animalem vbi in una anima confingit omnis anima, tanque apex animarum, sicut Stagyrita ait vegetatiuam ac sensitiua contineri in intellectiua. Sicut Trigonum in Tetragono. Intellectualem vocat quando intellectum cogitamus sic omniformem, ut omnes formas, omnesquae praeferat intellectus: at non sufficit ad has summitates ascendere sed horum ascensum oportet transilire et supergredi si ad immensi boni notionem velit accedere: cum ipse sit in eminentissimo incognito, et lucidissimo vertice supra omne verbum, et super omnem intelligentiam. 140 Ibid., fol. D iiijr: Assert Mars. Ficinus ad huc tria symbola huius ablationis que lubet in praesentia renarrare: et sunt istas s. homo, mundus, sol: Homo enim est imago dei: ideo in homine est statua die, licet additamentis abscondita: aufer ergo corpus ab anima: aufer rursus corporeas passiones: aufer item imaginationes a ratione, et rationales discursus ab intellectu: aufer preterea intellectualem multiformitate ab ipsa vnitate animae: sexto rursus separa animalem intellectualemque conditionem ab hac vnitate: In septimo vero gradu inquit, vt arbitror conquiesces: inuenies enim ipsam simpliciter vnitatem i. deum sub tali quadam vnitate latentem. Illa ablatio facile intelligitur per ea quae c. i. par. ii. diximus. Mundus item est statua dei, multis velaminibus operta aufert primo materiam, et habebis ubique celum: aufer dein huic celesti mundo dimensionem, seruatis formis et moribus: aufer rursus motum: aufer dein formatum radios velut in se divisos: Lumen tunc in se absolutissimum, simplicissimum, et immensum, imago est ipsius latentis dei sub hoc mundo: sic ergo deus ablatione inueniri potest in Microcosmo, hoc est paruo mundo homine, et macrocosmo idest maiori mundo si ita liceat dicere quoniam Honorius vehementer repugnat huic sententie. Increpans eum qui homine microcosmum appellauit, tanquam oblitum humanae naturae et dignitatis suae cum homo non in mundo sed mundus subsistat in homine ut ipse latissime explanat: sed redeamus ad institutum:



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Finally, just like Ficino, Eck points out that love is the medium which connected human beings to their creator. At the beginning of his work, he clarifies that a superior faculty still remains in the human being after peccatum Adae, namely synderesis and, following Gerson, he collocates it in the will, defining synderesis as an affectus voluntatis. This implies that human beings have an intrinsic desire towards the Good. Naturally tending toward God, human beings overcome their limited faculties ascending to the First Good through love. Drawing from Ficino, Eck concludes that, through love, the human mind flies beyond the fog behind which the divinity is hidden. Love vivifies and transforms human beings.141 In Eck’s and Ficino’s commentaries to Dionysius, one can find the same description of the three ways to contemplate God, the same understanding of the condition of the human being after original sin, the same emphasis on love as the medium which unites the whole created world as well as human beings with God. Eck’s ontology, however, is diametrically opposed to that of Ficino. Shortly before the abovementioned passage, Eck indeed strongly criticizes Ficino for conceiving the One as superior to the Being. Drawing from Pico’s De Ente et Uno, Eck states that the One and the Being are interchangeable, since one should properly understand the word ens as referring to God.142 The influence of the doctissimus comes Pico does not stop there. As already anticipated in the introduction to his comment, Eck clarifies that Dionysius’ negative theology, and the affirmative theology of the universities are not in contradiction. Pico, according to Eck, had brilliantly established the continuity between these two ways of theologizing, which are different but do not exclude one another. Moreover, in Eck’s eyes, Pico also definitely proved the continuity between Plato and Aristotle. The two prominent philosophers of the ancient world were brought together as the highest example of the requisite continuity to link apophatic theology (Plato) and affirmative theology (Aristotle).143 Prosequitur Ficinus simili ferme ratione symbolum de sole at satis superque sit haec deduxisse: quod ingeniosus quisque ex suo promtuario, plurima huiusmodi symbola inuenire et adducere potest: ad alia transeamus. 141  Ibid., fol. Bvir: Verum haec omnia amore potius conficit quae cognitione: idcirco pro excessu Ficinus extensionem posuit: qua mens ad caliginem euolet: quae vtique extensio sit per amorem fervido in anima pura ac veritatis studiosa in deum: amoris namque vis est transferre et viuificare ac transformare. 142  Ibid., fol. Biiijv: Hoc tamen O candide lector te non praetereat M. Ficinum hoc loco expiscatum esse vnum esse supra ens, quod Platonici affirmant contra Stagyrite sententiam, qui ea conuerti li.iiij. primae phia astruit. Aequale aiit enti constituit Mars. intelligibile: vnum aut quod est deus, est supra intelligibile, itaque vnum est supra ens: verum haec digito monstrasse sufficiat, cum non sit oppositi nostri pugnantes Accademici et Licij sententias controuertere: et doctissimus comes Io. Picus afffatim peculiari opere hanc discutiat digladationem: quamuis ego cum Arist. sntiam, entis rationem, precellere rationem vnius: quemadmodum haec. Deus est hanc ratione praeit, deus est vnus. 143  Ibid., fol. Ciijv: Ex quo peritus consestim inducet, Theologiam affirmatiuam non opponi theologiae mysticae et negatiuae: dicit affirmans, deum esse bonum, sapientem, iustum,

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Pico’s dream of a pax philosophica is, at the same time, made his own and transformed by Eck. The continuities between Plato and Aristotle, Dionysius and Thomas Aquinas, and mystic and scholastic theology are repeatedly endorsed and demonstrated, based on the very same arguments brought forth by Pico in De Ente et Uno. The discontinuity between Christian and non-Christian mysticism is, as already mentioned, programmatically announced in the introduction. Commenting on Mystical Theology 1.III, however, Eck asserts that the arcane mysteries should not be revealed to the unlearned crowd.144 Not surprisingly, he quotes the prisci tempores sapientes Hermes Trismegistus, Plato, and Pythagoras as his own sources. Their teaching is juxtaposed with Paul’s decision not to write down what he saw when he was caught in the third heaven.145 Paul’s raptus in the third heaven is the quintessential mystical experience. Unlike Paul, Moses asked to see God face-to-face. A direct knowledge of the divinity is, however, impossible. Nobody ever saw God; nobody could have ever seen Him. The very essence of God remains unknown to human beings in this life. A momentous taste of the divine nature is possible in ecstatic love. In this sense, the revelation provided by Dionysius is superior to that of Moses. What Moses could not see face-to-face, Paul saw in raptu, and his mystical experience was reported by Dionysius.146 potentem, fortem et cum Mysticum dicit eum his omnibus superiorem / nulla prorsus repugnantia / eo quod quisque pro suo modulo loquatur / et in sua consideratione verum dicit. Thomas Aquinas libro contra gentilos concordiam paciscitur hoc modo. Nomina inquit affirmari de deo propter nominis rationem / negari vero propter signandi modum quae ratio currat suo Marte: ad mentem tamen beatissimi patris statim dicimus, deum esse superiorem et affirmatione et negatione: ideo ob infinitam dei perfectionem am positiones quae remotiones in se claudentem, nullam esse hic oppositionem, quia bonum apparet huic esse aliquid perfectionis attribuit deo: non tamen eum praeterit, non posse intelligere bonitatem dei ut in se est. Sic ait ioan. Picus de Plat. et Arist. quorum primus deum super intellectum et intelligibile locat / alter eum intellectum, intelligentem, et intelligibilem appellat, neque tamen vnque alteri repugnat: sed vterquem deum magnificare intendebat et extollere. 144  Ibid., fol. Cv: Arcana mysteria non efferantur in vulgum maxime indoctum. 145 Ibid.: Graviores prisci tempores sapientes omnes summo conatu et studio precauerunt ne arcana et mysticorera ad manus indoctorum peruenirent: Sic Hermes Trismegistus Aesculapio, Pythagoras et Plato auditoribus praeceperunt non quemadmodum nunc vagabundi litteratores, praeceptiunculas quasdam, maioris lucri gratia, discipulis publicandas fide praestita interdicunt. His sacer Dionys. hic Timotheo quoque in mandatis dedit vt curaret ne haec mystica ad indoctorum aures peruenirent. Didicerat hoc ab optimo praeceptore diuo Paulo cui non licebat profari, ea quae in raptu viderat: testabat tamen se loqui sapientiam inter perfectos e quorum numero et conlegio fuit beatiss. pater Dionysius et cur discipuli hoc negligerent que tam accurare Iesus saluator praeceperat, ne darent lanctum canibusque, aut margaritas proiicerent ante porcos. Non enim est multidunis audire sermones dei: quare clamabant ad Moysen loquere tu nobis et audiemus, et non loquatur nobis deus. 146  Ibid., fol. Dr: Deum nemo vidit vnquam. Suffragatur illud odoriferum vas electionis Sanctus Paulus Timotheo scribens Rex regum qui lucet habitat inaccesibilem quem nullus hominum vidit, sed nec videre potest. Glossa interlinealis inquit. Homo in hac vita: ita vbique sacra scriptura hanc videtur viatoris differentiam ponere ab existente in termino quoniam pro statu viae non possit videre deum. Mitto hic quae communis Theologiae Doctor controuertit



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Affirmative theology can tell us that God is ens and that God is not accidens, that He is a substance – not a corporeal substance, but, rather an incorporeal one, and so on. Human knowledge proceeds from what is clear to what is unclear, from what is known to the unknown.147 At a certain stage, however, human knowledge has to recognize its infirmity. God is above negation and affirmation. In Him, all the opposites coincide. In light of God’s infinite power as well as because of the limitations of human faculties, the union with God can be only tasted, never fully experienced. The individual transcends himself, excessus mentis, in an ecstatic experience, exstasis. Eck makes full use of all Dionysius’ terminology to describe the fleeting, sudden, and still eternal moment in which the mystical is one with God. In this transcendent experience one can recognize the very essence of Paul’s theologia crucis, which his faithful disciple Dionysius has written down. Just as Socrates admitted to knowing not to know, Paul claimed to know only Christ crucified.148 Incomprehensible and ineffable, God is beyond whatever human beings can say or even only think. Transcending human ignorance, Paul enjoyed the splendor of divine light. The very same form of docta ignorantia was discussed and understood by Socrates and Parmenides, as reported by Plato in his Parmenides, as well as by Hermes Trismegistus.149 Alphonsus in prologo, et de sancto Paulo ait Hugo (vt eum refert Sybilla Monopolitanus) cum habuisse talem notitiam dei in raptum qualem Adam habuerit in paradyso: sed nemo est qui nesciat, aut nescire possit etiam si velit, Adam non habuisse notitiam intuitiuam Dei. Accedat nobis quoque magnus ille Gregorius qui inquit. Quamdiu hic mortaliter viuitur videri per quasdam imagines deus potest sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non potest: hic est quod Moyses qui cum Deo de facie ad faciem loquebatur adhuc petebat vt se ostenderet: Refert Nicolaus Lyranus Numeri duodecimo. Hebraicos interpretes dicere quod per ista verba, Ore ad os loquor dei. Et caete, non detur intelligi ac si viderit essentiam dei: sed solum innuitur excellentia quaedam suae prophetiae: nam cum Aaron et Marya opponerent se Moysi quod non solum per Moysen locutus esset Deus sed etiam per eos Deus voluit ostendere altiorem gradum prophetiae Moysi datum quam alijs: et recte ex causis dicendi sumitur intelligentia dictorum. Accedit ultimo quod beatissimus pater Dionysius negat Moysen vidisse deum, aut cum eo congressum: quamuis inferius in theophanijs profundius diui patris sententiam exposituri sumus. 147  Ibid., fol. Diiijv: Ut si Deus est ens et non est accidens / est ergo substantia: et non est substantia corporea erit ergo incorporea substantia: et sic descendendo per spiritum qui est potentialis vt anima / vel actus per se subsistens vt deus, angelus: et sic euidentius est deum esse ens quam substantiam, et euidentius est ipsum esse substantiam quam spiritum etc. In negationibus vero contingat ascendere: quia sic negationes inferiorum sunt euidentiores / vt quod deus non sit lapis, est euidentius quam quod non sit corpus: modo naturalibus processus est a notioribus .i.phys. ideo proceditur ascendendo. 148  Ibid., fol. Dvr: Cum enim deus sit deitate, bonitate, ac substantia superior: etiam si cum venatione intellectus quaesiuerimus / in tota tamen intelligibilium sphera a nobis inueniri non potest vt iam saepe inculcauimus: post ea quam aut omnium ablatione supra sensum et intellectum ascenderimus, caliginem illam intuemur, hoc est dei inaccessibilitatem et incomprehensibilitatem: iam tunc vere dicere possumus cum Socrate. Nos hoc solum scire / quod nichil sciamus: et quod Paulus ad Corinthios ait: Non me iudicaui aliquid scire inter vos / nisi Iesum, et hunc crucifixum. 149 Ibid.: Ingressi enim ignorantiae sacrae lucem et divini luminis splendore exoculari cla-

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Equating the statements of Socrates and Paul, drawing from Cusanus, Eck interprets the Pauline wisdom of the cross as a form of docta ignorantia, the supreme expression of the mystical theology which Paul’s disciple Dionysius wrote down in his works. In Eck’s narrative, Cusanus revitalized the study of mystical theology, Pico showed the continuity of affirmative and mystical theology and, finally, Eck himself presented his work as the definitive synthesis of these two different traditions, theologia mystica more scolastico.

4.5  Scala Christus Est: Luther’s Theology of the Cross and the Ascent to God through Christ’s Humanity On the eve of the Leipzig debate, Johannes Eck proposed a conciliation of scholastic theology with other forms of theologizing, a conciliation of Aristotle with Plato, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Hermes Trismegistus. In his commentary on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, Eck stated the primacy of Christian mysticism over non-Christian traditions, and interprets Dionysian mysticism as the highest form of theology – the supreme expression of Paul’s cross-centered theology. According to Eck, however, Paul’s sapientia crucis is a form of docta ignorantia, which was not alien to the prisci theologi who shared with Paul and his disciple Dionysius the same afflatus for a mystical ascent to God. This allows us a return to Luther’s accusation that the commentaries on Dionysius which come from Italy spread heresies in Germany. At the same time, we are now in a better position to evaluate Luther’s positive statements regarding Plato, Anaxagoras, and Parmenides in the Heidelberg Disputation. Finally, in light of what said in the previous paragraphs, it is possible to properly contextualize Luther’s antimetaphysical statements and the subsequent proclamation of a cross-centered theology. As explained in Chapter One, the philosophical Theses of the Heidelberg Disputation are characterized by a series of critiques against Aristotle. Plato, Anaxagoras, and Parmenides are presented as better philosophers than the Stagirite. Thesis 1, however, clarifies the nature of the relationship between theology and philosophy, and sets the ground for the correct explanation of the successive Theses: memus ad deum. Defeci in atrijs tuis domine, illud vnum fatentes ipsum intelligibiliter et ineffabiliter esse super omne illud quod nos dicere possumus aut cogitare: Et hoc est quod sacer Dionys. in epistola ad Gaium affirmat, ignorantiam perfectissimam esse scientiam: et deum melius attingi ignorantia quae abijcit/quam intelligentia, quae colligit: Id quod omnes antiqui viderunt ethnici deum s. esse inuisibilem: Mirabatur Socrates, Si non manifestum esset hominibus, non fore eis possibile diuina inuenire: et Parmenides ad Socratem ait, neque cognoscimus diuini quicquam nostra scientia. Hermes qui videbatur deplanare tamen viam cognoscendi deum, eam fecit alto altiorem. Extende te ipsum inquit in magnitudine sine termino: emerge ex corpore: totum supergredere tempus: eternitas esto: sic deum denique noueris.



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He who wishes to philosophize by using Aristotle without danger to his soul must first become thoroughly foolish in Christ.150

The problem in Luther’s eyes is, thus, not Aristotle himself, but every attempt to philosophize, which fails to start and culminate in the theology of the cross. During the meeting of the Augustinian order in Heidelberg in April 1518, Johannes von Staupitz solicited Luther for the publication of his Resolutions to the Ninety-Five Theses. As the Theses on the indulgences had already caused much speculation, Luther planned to publish a point-by-point clarification of each Thesis in February 1518. In April, however, the text was still not ready for publication. Luther only provided the definitive text to the printer in August 1518, and sent a copy to his superiors, the vicar general of the Augustinian order von Staupitz, Bishop Hieronymus Schulz (1460–1522), and Pope Leo X.151 In explaining Thesis 58, Luther again discussed the harmfulness of Aristotle’s philosophy for Christianity, and defended his right to criticize Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, and Alexander of Hales as well as their disciplines since, despite being good men, they had often erred.152 In Luther’s eyes, in the last 300 years studies in the universities have been focused only on Aristotle (in uno Aristotele).153 In order to overcome and expunge Aristotle one did not have to try to conciliate Aristotle with other philosophers: Here I appear to be bold, brazen, and presumptuous. If I only had time and leisure to account for this boldness of mine and instill confidence in my words, perhaps I could show that this opinion of mine is not so unfounded. I would not harmonize Aristotle with Plato and others, which Giovanni Pico della Mirandola attempted, but paint Aristotle in his own colors as he deserves to be painted. He is by profession a master craftsman of words, according to Gregory Nazianzen, and a mocker of brilliant men. Therefore if God permitted such a great cloud and darkness to prevail for so long a time in such outstanding minds, how can we be so confident in our own works, instead of looking upon all our efforts with suspicion, as Christians should, in order that Christ alone may become our light, righteousness, truth, wisdom, and our total possession.154 150  Cf. LW 41.41; WA 1.355.1–2: Qui sine periculo volet in Aristotele Philosophari, necesse est ut ante bene stultificetur in Christo. 151  For the publication of Luther’s Resolutions to the Ninety-Five Theses, see the introduction to the English translation in LW 31.79. 152  LW 31.125; WA 1.611.21–26: Et si S. Thomas, B. Bonaventura, Alexander Ales sint insignes viri cum suis discipulis Antonino, Petro Paludano, Augustino Anconitano praeter Canonistas, qui omnes eos sequuntur, tamen iustum est eis praeferre veritatem primo, deinde et auctoritatem Papae et Ecclesiae. Nec mirum est, tantos viros in hoc errasse. Nam in quantis, quaeso, B. Thomam etiam Scholastici errasse arguunt! 153  LW 31.125; WA 1.611.26.30: Immo quod maius est, iam plus trecentis annis tot universitates, tot in illis acutissima ingenia, tot ingeniorum pertinacissima studia in uno Aristotele laborant, et tamen adhuc non solum Aristotelem non intelligunt, verum etiam errorem et fictam intelligentiam per universam pene ecclesiam spargunt. 154  LW 31.125; WA 1.611.34–40, 612.1–4: Audax, impudens, temerarius forte hic videor, atque utinam mihi tantum superesset aetatis et ocii, ut huius temeritatis meae rationem reddere et verbis meis fidem facere possem, forte efficerem, ut non frustra sic sapere viderer. Non

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After an initial attack on scholastic theology which had kept Christianity “captive to Aristotelianism” for more than three hundred years, Luther’s critique became more accurate and specific than what twentieth-century Luther scholarship has commonly recognized. Indeed, Luther did not limit himself to a general critique of scholasticism; he put a stroke against those tendencies that had attempted to overcome scholasticism through a conciliation of Aristotle with Plato and other heathen philosophers. Giovanni Pico’s concord program is, in Luther’s eyes, antithetical to and in competition with the restoration of a crosscentered theology. In order to substitute the principle of “Aristotle alone” of the scholastics with his own maxim of “Christ alone”, Luther points out that every attempt to harmonize pagan philosophy is contradictory within itself. Not having received a divine revelation, the pagans are doomed to trust only their natural mind, which inevitably leads them to contradiction. In the same vein, when in Theses 36–39 of the Heidelberg Disputation Luther pointed out that Plato’s ideas, Pythagoras’ notion of numbers, Parmenides’ concept of the One, and Anaxagoras’ notion of the infinite before the form of things, should all be preferred to Aristotle’s philosophy, Luther tried to prove that, when understood correctly, Aristotle was in contradiction with other philosophers. Just like the Stagirite was harmful for theology, other philosophers should also be privileged over him in natural philosophy. Luther’s anti-Aristotle polemic in the Heidelberg Disputation is a critique of every attempt to overcome the cross of Christ. Two years later, in On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church, Luther denounced Dionysius for a similar attempt to minimize the centrality of the cross; Luther, indeed, referred to Dionysius as “more Platonic than Christian”. In the Resolutions to the NinetyFive Theses, Luther restates the centrality of the cross against Pico’s program of concord. The solus Christus project is indeed in opposition to every form of concordance between Christian and non-Christian traditions, as well as any attempt to harmonize the different pagan traditions. At the core of Luther’s theologia crucis, one can thus find a twofold polemic against the quest for a mystical ascent to God, as well as against what Luther perceived as empty sophistical discussions about the Being. As we have seen, since his early years Luther had endorsed a Christocentric reading of Dionysius’ text. The centrality of the cross in Luther’s theology finds his plastic manifestation in the reshaping of the metaphor of Jacob’s ladder. In a 1514 sermon on the assumption of the Virgin Mary, Luther interAristotelem cum Platone et aliis concordarem, quod Ioannes Picus Mirandulanus cepit, sed Aristotelem suis coloribus pingerem, sicut dignum est pingi eum, qui ex professo est artifex verborum (ut Gregorius Nazanzenus ait) et illusor ingeniorum. Si itaque per tantum tempus in tantis ingeniis permisit deus tantum nubis et tenebrarum dominari, quid adhuc nobis ita securi placemus et non potius (sicut Christianos decet) omnia nostra suspecta habemus, ut solus Christus sit lux, iusticia, veritas, sapientia, omne bonum nostrum?



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prets Gen. 28:12 in light of John 14:6: nobody can ascend to the Father without knowing the Son. It was, indeed, dangerous to try to know God the Father without the mediation of the Incarnate Son. It was an attempt to know the invisible through the visible, as Paul claimed in Rom. 1:20.155 The connection between the image of Jacob’s ladder and the words of Jesus in the gospel of John is almost indissoluble in the early Luther. In the Lectures on Hebrews, he points out with almost the very same words that the humanity of Christ is the ladder to ascend to God and it is, thus, impious to try to know God through human cognitive faculties, as the metaphysicians do.156 Ultimately, the ladder dreamt by Jacob in Gen. 28:12 is nothing else than the cross of Christ,157 and thus Luther can vehemently assert that “Scala stat in terra”.158 As we saw in Chapter Two, both Pico della Mirandola in his famous Oratio and Erasmus of Rotterdam in his Enchiridion interpreted the image of Jacob’s ladder in terms of the ascent to God. Later, in his De Arte Cabalistica, Reuch­lin gave a specific Kabbalistic interpretation of Gen. 28:12. In Reuch­lin’s work, the Kabbalist Simon points out that apprehension of God is impossible in this life, if not with ladders and chains. Thus, Simon notes that the Greeks refer to the Homeric chain, while the Jews look at the Scripture and refer to Jacob’s ladder which joins together heaven and earth.159 In the Operationes in Psalmos, Luther applies his theology of the cross against Eck’s commentary to Dionysius the Areopagite. At closer inspection, 155  WA 4.647.19–23: Omnis ascensus ad cognitionem Dei est periculosus praeter eum qui [Mos. 28, 12.] est per humilitatem Christi, quia haec est scala Iacob, in qua ascendendum [Joh. 14, 6.] est. Nec est alia via ad patrem nisi per filium Ioannis 14. Unde ait: “Nemo venit ad patrem nisi per me”, et hoc per affectus secundum illud [Rom. 1, 20.] Apostoli Rho. 1. “Invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur”. 156  WA 57.99.1–10: Notandum quoque, quod prius humanitatem Christi quam divinitatem recitet, ut eo ipse regulam illam approbet Deum fideliter cognoscendi. Humanitas enim illa sancta scala est nostra, per quam ascendimus ad Deum cognoscendum, Gene. 28. Unde et Ioan. 6.: “Nemo venit ad patrem nisi per me”. Et iterum: “Ego sum ostium”. Igitur qui vult salubriter ascendere ad amorem et cognicionem Dei, dimittat regulas humanas et methaphisicas de divinitate cognoscenda et in Christi humanitate se ipsum primum exerceat. Impiissima enim temeritas est, ubi Deus ipse humiliavit se, ut fieret cognoscibilis, quod homo aliam sibi viam querat proprii ingenii consiliis usus. 157  WA 9.494.17–21: Scala Christus est, quia Christus est via. Ex Iohanne: querentibus Thoma et Philippo de via ad patrem, Christus negat, aliam esse viam nisi sese. 2. Et in hac scala, in hoc Χριστῷ oportet herere, constanti et forti fide. Defigendi oculi, defigenda fides in Χριστόν. 158  WA 9.494, 24–33: Scala stat in terra, idest natura humana Christi descendit ac tetigit, immo adsumpsit formam contemptissimam pauperis pueri. Deinde eciam se admiscuit peccatoribus, Ita ut offenderentur eciam sanctuli Φαρισαῖοι. Item offendebat, quod legem non servabat, quia sabbatum violavit. Item ubi similitudinem peccatorum accepit, coram deo in passione ποιηθεὶς ἁμαρτία. Et hac scala premitur terra, idest offenditur ratio et prudentia carnis his Christi formis. 4. Deinde cum Χριστὸς in sic humilibus formis cognitus est, tum ascenditur et videtur, quod est deus. 159  Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 243–5.

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indeed, Luther’s commentary to Psalm 5 is a point-by-point refutation of Eck’s positions. Luther clarifies at the beginning of his comment that the scope of the Psalm is to pray against the hypocrites, and the deceitful and false prophets who seduce and deceive the people of Christ with their human tradition. In doing so, the prophet attacks a mere pretense of justice and, thus, the abuse of Theology.160 Soon after condemning Dionysius and his commentators, Luther moves to the discussion on the nature of faith and good works, vehemently rejecting Peter Lombard’s interpretation of faith in Romans 5 as the expectation of a reward for good actions, labelling it as the ruin of the whole theology. From such a definition which locates faith in the realm of human merits, it can only derive an ignorance of Christ and His cross.161 As usual, Luther inverts this framework, claiming that faith does not derive from good works, rather faith precedes good works, which, in turn, become meritorious because of faith itself.162 In the following passage in Romans 5:3–4, Paul claims that tribulation produces patience, patience produces virtue, and virtue produces hope. Thus, Luther focuses his attention on the nature of hope in the conviction that it is necessary to comfort trembled and weak consciences. For Luther, the question of individual conscience is the central problem confronting the believers, since, just like affliction, pain, and suffering do not derive from sins, no matter how bad they might be, but from evil feelings, in the same way, happiness, joy, and prosperity are the result of good feelings in the believers. According to Luther, in Romans 5:3–4 Paul does not address hope, but more precisely the assurance of the heart which derives from hope. It is this kind of feeling, through which the believer can deal with every tribulation. The believer should even desire 160  WA 5.125.12–20: Certum est hoc psamo non agi de passionibus et tribulationibus, nec enim persona psallentis ullo verbo in hoc sonat, sed universa querela est super iniquis et iniustis et malis. Quare scopus est meo iudicio talis, quod propheta orat contra hypocritas, operarios subdolos, falsos prophetas, qui populum dei et haereditatem Christi humanis et suis traditionibus seducunt, quales Christus Matt. vij. et ioh. X. Lupos rapaces, Apostolus Tit. i. Vaniloquos et mentium deceptores vocant. Et ut ad nostra saecula veniamus, sicut psalmo praecedente iuris, ita in hoc Theologiae impiam professionem et abusum persequitur. 161  WA 5.163.30–35: Rursum illud Apostoli Ro. v. obiicitur Tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia probationem, probatio vero spem, spes autem non confundit. Hic certe Apostolus spem in merita collocare videtur, ita ut hinc Magister Seutentiarum cum universa theologorum turba diffinitionem spei amplectantur illam: Spes est certa expectatio praemii, ex meritis proveniens. Neque enim aliam spem illi habent, nisi quae est in meritis. Ex qua sententia quid aliud potuit sequi quam ruina universae theologiae, ignorantia Christi et crucis eins et oblivio (ut apud Hieremiam queritur) dei diebus innumeris? 162  WA 5.163.38–40, 164.1–4: Quid autem nobis ad hoc dicent, quod fidem, spem, charitatem ipsimet confitentur infuses esse virtutes et principia omnium bonorum? Neque enim etiam ipsi merita ante charitatem fieri dicunt. Tum cum charitate simul infundi spem et fidem constanter asserunt, ergo eorum quoque sententia non spem ex meritis, sed merita ex spe provenire certum est, et tamen spem diffinientes vertunt hanc sententiam sibique contradicunt, spem ex meritis producentes.



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tribulation, because in suffering hope, which is in the heart, it is made manifest.163 Moving from the problem of hope in the believer to a question of the feelings in the individual conscience, Luther discusses where this hope has to be sought. Hope in God means, for Luther, hope in God’s mercy: while the ungodly will recognize his sins again and again and be trapped in an unfruitful attempt to reconcile his relationship with God through good works, the godly will never despair despite his many sins, and neither rejoice because good things happen to him. In this context, Luther restates his preaching of a theology of the cross. He contrasts those who look for hope in their own natural powers, and those who are willing to find it in tribulation and suffering. The believer initially confronts temptation before finding himself, and is then assured before God. Hope lies hidden in suffering. In tribulation, the believer who has been passively made righteous also becomes aware of his condition before God. Paradoxically, for Luther, the assurance of pleasing God comes after experiencing real suffering. Quoting John Tauler, Luther emphasizes that God is never sweeter and more pleasing to his children than after probation under tribulation.164 After praising Tauler as homo dei, Luther distinguishes between active and passive life: the former does not create trust, but presumption; on the other hand, a passive life must be preferred, which destroys and mortifies the active life, so that nothing remains of human merits and human beings cannot therefore glorify themselves.165 According to Luther, a passive life is the only way to trust God. A passive life allows one to rest in faith and rely on God in order to be sanctified, whereas those who live an active life as their only virtue trust more in themselves and their own life than in God’s mercy.166 Only a truly passive life lets us conform 163  WA 5.164.38, 165.1–2: Perspicuum ergo est, Apostolum non tam loqui de spe ipsa obtenta quam de certitudine cordis in spe, dum homo post tribulationem et infusionem spei (quando sibi sine spe videtur esse) sentit, se sperare et credere et diligere. Tunc enim gustatur, quam suavis sit dominus, et incipit homo esurire et sitire magis pati, quo spem maiorem operetur tribulatio. 164  WA 5.165.18–20: Hinc Taulerus, homo dei, et experti dicunt, deum suis filiis non esse unquam gratiorem, amabiliorem et dulciorem ac familiariorem quam post tribulationis probationem. 165  WA 5.165.30–37: Videamus nunc verba Apostoli, qui spem vocat opus probationis, probationem patientiae, patientiam tribulationis, quae Magister nimis expressit, cum appellavit merita, ex quibus provenit spes, aut certe non satis intellexerunt merita illa. Activa sane vita, in qua multi satis temere confidunt, quam intelligunt quoque per merita, non producit nec operatur spem, sed praesumptionem, non secus ac scientia inflat. Ideo addenda est vita passiva, quae mortificet et destruat totam vitam activam, ut nihil remaneat meritorum, in quo superbus glorietur. 166  WA 5.166.1–8: Ablatis autem cunctis etiam operibus bonis ac meritis, si hic sustineamus, deum invenimus, in quo solo fidimus, ac sic spe salvi facti sumus. Quocirca operarii sancti, etsi tota fiducia dicant, se confidere in deum, ubi tamen vita eorum activa (quae tota virtus

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to the example and image of Christ, whose active life, although made of magnificent works, led to nothing, as it was considered iniquitous by men and forsaken by God; on the contrary, passive life generates pure hope in God, and only then is man truly holy and pure.167 Luther’s dichotomy between a passive and an active life clearly has a strong mystical aspect, as the reference to Tauler confirms. It is evident that in Luther’s eyes this kind of mysticism is not only not in contradiction with the theology of the cross, but it is even propaedeutic to the receiving of that extra nos represented by God’s gifts. According to him, it is necessary to mortify human merits, to annihilate the self, to free human beings from what they improperly believe to be the best part within themselves in order to freely receive God. On the other hand, Luther launches his final attack against other forms of mystical theology that he perceives as a human attempt to avoid suffering and tribulation. Paraphrasing the Song of Songs (“Tell my beloved that I am sick of love”), Luther describes the human soul’s yearning for love as a taste for suffering and the cross, in opposition to the quest of the mystical theologians to ascend to the darkness where God dwells: This leading or being led is what the mystical theologians call “going into darkness”, and “ascending above entity and non-entity”. But I much question whether such understand themselves: for they make all these things elicited acts, and do not believe them to be the sufferings and feeling sensations of the cross, death, and hell. But only the cross is our theology!168

In reaction to Eck’s mysticism, Luther asserts – he would repeat the same concepts in On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church – that proper mysticism demands pure trust in God, a trust which goes beyond the comprehensible and the visible. The human soul, according to him, can no longer remain central to a process of ascension which culminates in union with God. The very same possibility that the soul can return to its unity and, thus, reunite with its divine nature, is denied. Only the Word of God works inwardly; it is the Word which moves, cleanses, purifies, and impregnates the human soul. On the other hand, eorum est) coeperit tentari vel despectu coram hominibus vel turbine conscientiae coram deo, statim deficiunt ostenduntque, se magis in vitam suam praesumpsisse, quam in dei miserieordiam sperasse. 167  WA 5.166.11–19: Sola vero passiva vita purissima est, ideo et spem et gloriam operatur, atque in hoc oportet, nos conformari imagini et exemplo Christi, regis et ducis nostri, qui per activam quidem vitam incepit, sed per passionem consummatus est, omnibus scilicet operibns eius tam multis tam magnificis adeo in nihilum redactis, ut non solum coram hominibus sit cum iniquis reputatus, sed et a deo derelictus. Adeo scilicet omnia a nobis aufferenda sunt, ut nec optima dei dona, idest ipsa merita, reliqua sint, in quibus fidamus, ut sit spes purissima in purissimum deum: tunc demum homo vere purus et sanctus est. 168 WA 5.176.29–33: Hinc ductum Theologi mystici vocant In tenebras ire, ascendere super ens et non ens. Verum nescio, an seipsos intelligant, si id actibus elicitis tribuunt et non potius crucis, mortis infernique passiones significari credunt. CRUX sola est nostra Theologia.



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the attempt to transcend one’s own nature is denounced by Luther as a way of overcoming the cross of Christ and the discussion on the nature of Being labelled as mere sophistry. Thus, Luther polemically concludes with the very famous assertion: CRUX sola est nostra theologia!

4.6  Eck and Luther: Two Competing Theologies Luther’s theology of the cross has become the topic of a great deal of speculation over the last five centuries. His implications have also become a central topic of discussion in the theological debates of the twentieth century, and his anti-scholastic presuppositions are widely discussed in secondary literature. Despite this overwhelming explosion of theological and historical research, this work goes on to show that Luther’s statements need to be recalibrated even further in the intellectual context of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Every statement here seeks to locate the meaning of Luther’s work and words through the lens of a specific historical context and, in discontinuity with previous research on Luther’s theology of the cross, I argue that Luther’s proclamation of a cross-centered theology arose in reaction to Johannes Eck’s commentary on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology. In their discussions on the ontological status of Being at the end of the fifteenth century, Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola disagreed on the vexata quaestio of the relationship between the One and the Being; however, they did agree that through love, human beings could overcome their finite abilities and unite, although only in sudden moments of ecstatic exaltation, with God. Both Pico and Ficino presuppose that all humanity shares an innate tendency towards the First Good and the First Truth. Well aware of the controversy between Pico and Ficino and drawing extensively from Nicholas of Cusa, Johannes Eck accepted the core argument of Pico and Ficino, namely that human beings are moved by an innate and inextinguishable tendency to reunite themselves to their creator. Love is the only bridge between the finite and the infinite. In light of the unbridgeable gap between the creatures and their creator, the mystical-ecstatic experience can be only tasted, but never fully or lastingly experienced in this life. Finally, Eck interprets the cross-centered passage of the Pauline Epistles in Cusanus’ terms as a form of docta ignorantia. Despite all the repeated claims that Luther’s theology of the cross has to be understood in opposition to “medieval scholastic theology”, I have tried to resurrect the contingency of Luther’s statements on the theology of the cross. First, I pointed out that in his 1518 Resolutions to the Ninety-Five Theses, Luther does not limit himself to criticizing the 300 years of captivity to which the Church has been condemned by scholastic theologians who abused Aristotelian metaphysics. Rather, he went further than that and criticized every attempt at con-

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ciliation among pagan authors, an attempt he correctly identified in Pico della Mirandola. Second, in commenting on Psalm 5 in the Operationes in Psalmos, Luther’s famous statement CRUX sola est nostra theologia has to be understood as a reaction to the recent publication of Eck’s commentary on Dionysius. In further describing the battlefront of viewpoints and positions, this chapter further enriches the Chapter One by highlighting new subtleties. Eck’s accusation of Luther and Karlstadt of being obscurantists, and his attempt to present himself as an encyclopedic man well-versed in all disciplines, can be properly understood only if one takes into consideration how deeply and extensively Eck drew on the works of Nicholas of Cusa, Marsilio Ficino, or Pico della Mirandola. In the meantime, Luther presented himself as the last in a long series of theologians unjustly accused of heresy, in the company of cause célèbres like Pico, Reuch­lin, or Jacques Lefèvre. Thus, on the eve of the Leipzig debate, Eck and Luther are in competition, each in an effort to gain a wider consensus among the critics of scholastic theology: the former proposing a conciliation between mystic and scholastic theology, the latter aiming to substitute scholastic theology with his theology of the cross. In his critique of Eck’s commentary on Mystical Theology, Luther rejected the possibility of a mystical ascent to God. In denying that human beings can ascend to God, Luther constantly redirects the attention to the cross of Jesus. Luther famously asserted that the Bible is the book, the only book, in which the story of the cross is told. The believer thus knows God through the divinely-inspired Bible. In order to re-examine the theology of the cross, the next step is to investigate the intellectual context in which Luther’s Sola Scriptura emerged. This will be the topic of the second section of this work.

Part II

Theologus Gloriae vs. Theologus Crucis: From the Christian Kabbalah to Luther’s Sola Scriptura

Chapter 5

Solam Scripturam Regnare: The Development of Luther’s Scriptural Argument Hand in hand with his theologia crucis and his faith-alone soteriology, Luther’s hermeneutics and his principle of Sola Scriptura has become one of the central themes of Luther research. The rediscovery of the manuscripts of Luther’s early lectures represented the perfect opportunity to investigate how this young Augustinian monk read and taught the Bible during his early years in Wittenberg. The explosion of the indulgence controversy led Luther to rethink the relationship between Church and Scripture. Luther’s final break with Rome is indissolubly linked to his proclamation that the only infallible authority on which to base one’s own faith was Scripture. The development of the strands of “new hermeneutics” in Protestant theology in the second half of the twentieth century transformed the hermeneutical discussion into the central theological problem.1 Gerhard Ebeling, one of the key exponents of this movement, dedicated considerable attention to Luther’s hermeneutics.2 Although he explicitly endorsed the need to understand Luther in his own terms, one can discern striking parallels between Ebeling’s theological agenda and the “new hermeneutics” he discovered in Luther. Ebeling famously asserted that the history of the Church is nothing other than the history of Scriptural exegesis.3 Ebeling’s research on the young Luther has sparked a multitude of works on Luther’s hermeneutics. Scholarly interest has focused attention on the development of Luther’s hermeneutics and the relationship, in terms of continuity 1  For

a discussion on the development of “The New Hermeneutic,” see: Anthony C. Thiselton, “The New Hermeneutic,” in New Testament Interpretation, ed. Howard Marshall (Exeter: The Paternoster Press, 1977), 308–33. 2  The publication of Ebeling’s famous essay on the beginning of Luther’s hermeneutic has been discussed in Chapter One. For Ebeling’s life and scholarship, see: Albrecht Beutel, Gerhard Ebeling: Eine Biographie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012). For a recent discussion and contextualization of Ebeling’s theology, see: Ruth Görnandt, Die Metaphysikkritik Gerhard Ebelings und ihre Vorgeschichte, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016). As many other topics in Luther research, hermeneutics was also long discussed by the scholars of Luther Renaissance. The seminal article on this topic is: Karl Holl, “Luthers Bedeutung für den Fortschritt der Auslegungskunst,” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte, 544–82. Vol. 1. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1921. Ebeling starts his discussion of Luther’s hermeneutics quoting Holl. 3 Beutel, Gerhard Ebeling, 119.

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and discontinuity, between Luther and the patristic and medieval exegetes. Ebeling’s issue with his insistence that the seeds of Luther’s theology of the cross has to be individuated in Luther’s hermeneutics, which the reformer already developed in his first lectures on the Psalms (1513–15), tied the scholarly discussion on Luther’s hermeneutics to the more general discussion on how and when Luther’s so-called “Reformation breakthrough” took place.4 If the question to be debated is the originality of Luther’s hermeneutics, which inevitably led the reformer to rediscover the Gospel and, thus, his message of salvation through faith thanks to the mediation of the Incarnate Word, 4  For Ebeling’s understanding of the theology of the cross, see: Korthaus, Kreuzestheologie, 214–17. Ebeling’s Thesis linked Luther’s “new hermeneutics” with the beginning of Luther’s Reformation breakthrough. According to Ebeling, although he still used the medieval Quadriga, Luther’s Christological approach to the Psalms represented a break with the past. The major challenge to Ebeling’s Theses is represented by James Preus, who argued that it was not the conjunction between the tropological and the Christological sense of the Old Testament that represented the novelty of Luther’s hermeneutics, but the reappraisal of the literal-historical sense. According to Preus, Luther made this alleged discovery during the second part of his lecture, as attested by his changing approach to the Penitential Psalms. See: James Samuel Preus, From Shadow to Promise: Old Testament Interpretation from Augustine to the Young Luther (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969). Preus’ argument was strongly criticized by John J. Pilch, who argued that Preus did not sufficiently take into account tensions and vacillations in Luther’s exegesis both in the Dictata and in his later works: John J. Pilch, “Luther’s Hermeneutical ‘Shift’,” Harvard Theological Review 63 (1970): 445– 48. In contrast, Bernard McGinn wrote a more positive review of Preus’ book, while noting critically that the first part of the book, focusing on some prominent figures in biblical hermeneutics between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, does not do justice to the changes that took place this period in the way that the Old Testament was read and interpreted: Bernard McGinn, “Preus, James Samuel, ‘From Shadow to Promise. Old Testament Interpretation from Augustine to the Young Luther’ (Book Review),” Church History 39 (1970): 541. A useful overview of existing literature on Luther’s hermeneutics, which I followed in my discussion of the secondary literature on the topic, can be consulted in: William M. Marsh, Martin Luther on Reading the Bible as Christian Scripture: The Messiah in Luther’s Biblical Hermeneutic and Theology, (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2017), 10–27. In this work I will challenge the dichotomy of “medieval exegesis” vs. “Luther’s hermeneutics”. For this reason, it may be useful to briefly summarize how this paradigm has been consolidated in Luther studies. Indeed, the common assumption of Ebeling and Preus is that they both regard Luther’s exegesis as a break with the past, despite the fact that the two scholars disagreed on what exactly constitutes the novelty of Luther’s hermeneutics and when Luther developed it. Subsequent studies have reiterated the concept that Luther’s hermeneutics represent a break with medieval hermeneutics. This tendency is well represented by Scott Hendrix: Scott H. Hendrix, “Luther against the Background of the History of Biblical Interpretation,” Interpretation 37 (1983): 229–39. The dichotomy between medieval exegesis and Luther’s hermeneutics is ubiquitous in the secondary literature, even when attempts have been made to distance themselves from the interpretation of Ebeling and Preus. For example, Darrell R. Reinke took for granted that Luther’s hermeneutics is a departure from medieval hermeneutics, but, unlike his predecessors, he argued that Luther’s break with medieval exegesis stems from a psychological change produced by a long exposure to and deep familiarity with the biblical text: Darrell R. Reinke, “From Allegory to Metaphor: More Notes on Luther’s Hermeneutical Shift,” The Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973): 386–95.



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the historical context in which Luther developed these ideas has been investigated in terms of their discontinuity vis-à-vis scholastic theology. In other words, the question focused on the point when Luther stopped being a scholastic exegete, and discovered the Reformation principle of Sola Scriptura. Thus, Luther’s medieval background is often seen as a burden, from which, at a certain point in his life, Luther could liberate himself. At the same time, he could also liberate his personal Anfechtungen and the gospel from scholastic metaphysical speculation. Regarding the relationship between Luther’s rediscovery of the Gospel and the contemporaneous rediscovery of the ancient texts endorsed by the so-called “humanists”, much attention has been devoted to the extent to which the desire to return to the original sources influenced Luther, and gave him the philological tools to overcome late medieval scholasticism. I have shown in Chapter One how the widespread Renaissance conviction of the need to return to an earlier, uncontaminated period in the history of Christianity was used by Luther to catalyze around himself and the Wittenbergers the different instances of reform that characterized the Christian Church in the early sixteenth century. This tendency should not be understood as a real convergence of common and shared theological concepts, but as a positioning in the inflamed debates that led the Wittenbergers to question several practices of the Church and, finally, to break with Rome. In this sense, contemporary research on the debates between Luther and his opponents has proved very fruitful in order to understand how Luther shaped and used the Sola Scriptura principle. Friedemann Stengel has recently warned against an unhistorical understanding of the expression Sola Scriptura, which has become normative in Protestant theology. He has noted that Luther himself used the expression only ten times in his writings and, more importantly, that he developed his hermeneutics in contrast to his early opponents (especially John Eck, Sylvester Prierias, Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, and Hieronymus Emser). Thus, Stengel concludes that it would be more appropriate to refer to a Sola Scriptura argument, which Luther used to rebuke the positions of the early Catholic controversialists.5 Furthermore, the sola emphasis cannot be ascribed solely to Luther. Thus, for instance, with regard to the study of Scripture, in introducing the 1516 edition of Erasmus’ Lucubrationes, Nikolaus Gerbellius (1485–1560), one of Froben’s assistants in Basel, constructs an opposition between the studia elegantiora and the sophistarum spinis with a series of sentences introduced by the word sola. In this context, sola is used to emphasize that only sacred literature is a field of sufficient worth to merit dedicated study.6 5  Friedemann

Stengel, Sola scriptura im Kontext: Behauptung und Bestreitung des reformatorischen Schriftprinzips, Forum Theologische Literaturzeitung (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2016). 6  Desiderius Erasmus, D. Erasmi. Roterodami Viri vndecunque doctissimi Lucubrationes,

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In this chapter, I will thus focus on how Luther understood the role of Scripture in relation to the authority of the Church and the Councils in his early years in Wittenberg, in order to show how the debates generated by the dispute on indulgences shaped Luther’s positions on Scripture. At the beginning of the chapter, I will analyze the context in which Luther most clearly endorsed his Sola Scriptura argument, namely in the Assertio omnium articulorum, written in response to the bull of excommunication Exsurge Domine. In order to contextualize how Luther came to proclaim Scripture as the only reliable authority for Christians, I follow a twofold path. First, I show that the early sixteenth century saw a profound transformation in biblical scholarship thanks to the emergence of a growing philological movement, which challenged the authority of the Vulgate and produced new translations of biblical texts. Second, I distinguish between two periods in Luther’s early positions regarding the Scripture, demarcated by the breakthrough of the indulgence controversy: on the one hand, I describe Luther’s hermeneutical positions in his early biblical lectures, and then I summarize the main debates between Luther and his Roman opponents that compelled the Wittenberger to formulate his scriptural argument ever more clearly. After this brief overview of different aspects of the biblical exegesis in the early sixteenth century, I show how this picture can be supplemented by further historical research.

5.1 The Sola Scriptura Argument and Luther’s Grammar of Exclusion On 15 June 1520, Pope Leo X published the bull Exsurge Domine, in which he condemned as heretical forty-one positions assumed by Luther in his writings.7 The pope accused the Wittenberg Augustinian Monk of wanting his own teachings to substitute the practices of the Church, as well as the Church’s interpretation of the Bible, an interpretation in accordance with the exegesis of the Church Fathers. Leo X asked Luther to recant under the threat of excomquarum Index positus est facie sequenti, ed. Nicolaus Gerbel (Argentina: Schurerius, 1515), 3r: Hoc modo reuiruerunt literae, quae tot emarcuerant casualibus. Hac via refloruerunt studia elegantiora, quae tot aruerant sophistarum spinis. Hoc cultu resplenduerunt Moines bonae arte, quae tot argutiarum tenebris obscuratae inhorruerrant. Sola sola restat adhuc sacrarum peritia literarum: digna sola cui manus auxiliares adhibeant, cui studium omne consecretur, cui cedant vniversa. Sola adhuc vetus illa, et sancta diuinarum scripturarum cognitio. Sola adhuc vera et antiquissima sapientia caput inter nubila condit. 7  See Violet Soen, “Arise, O Lord (Exsurge Domine),” in Encyclopedia of Martin Luther and the Reformation, ed. Mark Lamport (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2017), 38–39. For an analysis of how twelve of the forty-one statements condemned are quoted in the bull, see Hans J. Hillerbrand, “Martin Luther and the Bull Exsurge Domine,” Theological Studies 30 (1969): 108–12.



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munication. The subsequent events are common knowledge. Luther refused to recant, and on 3 January 1521 he was formally excommunicated with the issuance of the bull Decet Romanum Pontificem. While the bull of excommunication left open the possibility for Luther to recant, Luther rejected this possibility during the Imperial Diet of Worms in April 1521, emphasizing his distrust of the pope and the councils, whom he thought very often contradicted each other, and asked that the alleged heresy of his statements be proven through the Scripture (testimoniis scripturarum) or by plain reason (ratione evidente). Refusing to recant, Luther famously proclaimed the captivity of his conscience to the Word of God (capta conscientia in verbis dei).8 In response to Pope Leo’s Exsurge Domine, Luther published his Adversus Execrabile Antichristi Bulla in late 1520,9 and an expanded version of the same pamphlet was published in German under the title Widder die Bullen des Antichrists.10 In the Latin version, Luther replied to six accusations, while in the later German version he added his responses to six other allegations. In March 1521, Luther published his Assertio omnium articulorum per bullam Leoni X novissimam damnatorum, his point-by-point answers to all the Theses that the pope had condemned as heretical. In this text, for the first time, Luther used the famous expressions Sola Scriptura: Indeed, how many mistakes have been discovered in all the writings of the Fathers! How many times they disagree among each other! Who has not twisted the meaning of Scripture? Every time Augustine merely disputes, nothing is defined! In his commentary Jerome asserts nothing. How can we count on someone who so often persists in being mistaken, fighting against himself and the others, doing as he likes with the Scripture, asserting nothing, if we do not read them with judgment according to the authority of Scripture? Nobody is at the level of the Scripture, nor is it necessary, although the ancients were closer [to the source], that they were more diligent in scriptural interpretation. Indeed, nobody should oppose me, the authority of the Pope, or of the saints, if they are not supported by Scripture. Nor, as it has been said, do I want to judge all the doctors and interpret Scripture according to my own judgment. These are not considerations which look for the truth of God, but one’s vanity, or else bring me the author, who was never wrong, who never twisted Scripture, who never fought against the others and against himself, who never doubted. I do not want to discuss with all doctors, I just want that only Scripture reigns, nor that Scripture is interpreted according to my own or the spirit of every other man, rather that it has to be understood through [Scripture] itself and according to his own spirit.11 8  WA

7.838. 2–8: Quando ergo S. Maiestas vestra dominationesque vestrae simplex responsum petunt, dabo illud neque cornutum neque dentatum in hunc modum: Nisi convictus fuero testimoniis scripturarum aut ratione evidente (nam neque Papae neque conciliis solis credo, cum constet eos et errasse sepius et sibiipsis contradixisse), victus sum scripturis a me adductis et capta conscientia in verbis dei, revocare neque possum nec volo quicquam, cum contra conscientiam agere neque tutum neque integrum sit. 9  WA 6.595–612. 10  WA 6.614–29. 11  WA 7.98.27–40, 99.1–2: Iam quanti errores in omnium patrum scriptis inventi sunt!

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Constructing a dichotomy between human traditions (the Fathers, the councils, the pope, and the Church) and divine wisdom, against the pope’s appeal for the usage of tradition in the Church and the authority of the Fathers, Luther argued that a proper knowledge of God cannot be based on human authority, which is doomed to contradiction and thus unreliable. Luther vehemently asserted that, as the Holy Writ was the only reliable testimony of the Word of God, only the Scripture could reign in Christendom (solam scripturam regnare). The hermeneutical argument of Sola Scriptura was coherently and explicitly formulated by Luther as early as 1520. Luther, however, does not use the expression Sola Scriptura as a close principle, but as an argument against the attacks of his opponents. As already shown, in Assertio Luther uses the argument that every teaching in the Church had to be based on the authority of the Scripture, against Pope Leo’s appeal to the Fathers as well as the common traditions of the Church. Indeed, at the beginning of the work, Luther clarified that he was not inclined to follow the exegesis of the Fathers. Luther declared his unwillingness to admit to being wrong, only because his interpretation departed only slightly from the interpretation of Jerome or Augustine. The Fathers could only be followed on the condition that they based their teachings on Scripture.12 This was their principle as well. In the same way, even the teachings of the pope and the Church could only be followed if their judgment was based on Scripture. In Exsurge Domine, Pope Leo X argued against an individual interpretation of the Scripture by the single believer (scripturas sacras proprio spiritu interpretandas).13 In Assertio, Luther responded with the assertion that neither Augustine nor all the Fathers observed this practice, since they had interpreted Scripture individually and based their theology on such interpretations. Luther even argued that it was a specific Satanical trick to move believers away from Scripture. Divinely inspired and infused by the presence of the Holy Spirit, Scripture had the power to change the spirit of the believer, who chose to apply Quoties sibi ipsis pugnant! Quoties invicem dissentiunt! Quis est, qui non saepius scripturas torserit? Quoties Augustinus solum disputat, nihil diffinit! Hieronymus in commentariis fere nihil asserit. Qua autem securitate possumus alicui niti, quem constiterit saepius errasse, sibi et aliis pugnasse, scripturis vim fecisse, nihil asseruisse, nisi autoritate scripturae nos omnia eorum cum iudicio legerimus? Nullus attigit scripturae aequalitatem, sicut nec debuit, quanquam vetusti illi propius accesserint, quod in scripturis diligentiores fuerunt. Nemo ergo mihi opponat Papae aut sancti cuiusvis autoritatem, nisi scripturis munitam, Nec statim vociferetur, me unum velle omnibus doctiorem videri et scripturas proprio spiritu intelligere. Haec enim non sunt vociferationes quaerentium dei veritatem sed suam vanitatem, aut eum afferat autorem, quem constet nunquam errasse, scripturas torsisse, aliis et sibi pugnasse, dubitasse. Nolo omnium doctior iactari, sed solam scripturam regnare, nec eam meo spiritu aut ullorum hominum interpretari, sed per seipsam et suo spiritu intelligi volo. 12  For a balanced examination of Luther’s treatment of the Fathers in the Assertio, see: Taras Khomych, “Luther’s Assertio: A Preliminary Assessment on the Reformer’s Relationship to Patristics,” Annali di Storia dell’Esegesi 28, no. 1 (2011): 351–63. 13  As quoted by ibid., 7. For Leo X’s position against a personal interpretation of Scripture, see also: Leppin, Luther und der Humanismus, 19.



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it to their reading. Slowly, by repeatedly reading Scripture, the human spirit would be substituted by the divine Spirit in the believer. Luther’s Sola Scriptura emerged as a concrete reaction against the papal bull of excommunication. While Pope Leo X pointed out that it was common practice among all heretics to impose their own opposing readings of Scripture against the consensus established in the Catholic tradition, Luther subjugated the latter (human) tradition to the authority of the Scripture. Luther’s scriptural argument thus follows a fine line to discern the proper relationship between the authority of the Scripture and the authority of the pope, the councils, and the Church Fathers. If, in 1520, in reaction to the threat of excommunication, Luther had asserted that only Scripture had to reign in Christendom, it must be emphasized that in both the previous and the following years his positions regarding the relationship between the sources of authority in the Church changed. In order to demythologize Luther’s Sola Scriptura, placing it within its own historical context, it is therefore necessary to contextualize how Luther shaped his own position in relation to, and as a reaction against, the different and contrasting scriptural arguments that emerged in the early sixteenth century. A second methodological and historical problem requires clarification. A cliché in Luther research is that Luther’s long exposure to the biblical texts had led him to rediscover the Gospel. The theological and unhistorical bias beyond this assertion is evident: first, in contrast to the theology of the Middle Ages concerned with logic, deduction, and syllogism, Luther returned the biblical message to the center of discourse; second, the relationship between the biblical text and its reader, Martin Luther, is conceived as univocal and monolithic. While the former consideration bears a certain degree of truth, it is the latter bias which undermines its historical value. A book is not a singular entity; on the contrary, the power of the written word is exercised to the extent that the reader continuously reads and discusses its meaning in an interplay between interpretation and over-interpretation. A continuous dialectical relationship between the original text and its reader(s) generates an indefinite production of new interpretations and meanings. In a certain epoch, a certain text could assume diverging – and perhaps even contradicting – interpretations. The very same text can give birth to a multitude of distinct discourses. We need, therefore, to address a twofold problem: first, how Martin Luther, among the infinite signifying possibilities of the original text, namely the Bible, privileged the position that he labeled as Sola Scriptura; second, how Luther’s scriptural argument arose in reaction to the multiple interpretations that the very same original text had sparked. These two aspects were strictly intertwined, and mutually influenced one another. The early sixteenth century represented a period of change in terms of how the Bible was produced, read, and interpreted. This attitude towards the Bible as a book produced a number of debates on the

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authority and interpretation of the Bible. In order to show how these phenomena are historically intertwined, I now focus, first, on changes in how the Bible was produced and read in the early modern era, and, second, on how Luther’s argument of Sola Scriptura emerged from the debates of his own time.

5.2  The Bible in Translation: The Overcoming of the Vulgate in the Early Modern Times There is an established scholarly pattern of correlating the invention of the printing press with the rise of European Reformation movements. While many aspects of this process need further investigation, the explosion of book production that characterized the period between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries is indisputable. Recently, Eltjo Buringh and Janluiten van Zanden attempted to quantify the development of book production from the sixth to the eighteenth century. According to their estimates, while 13,552 manuscripts were published in Western Europe in the sixth century, more than one billion books were published in the eighteenth century.14 Because of the long period taken into consideration, this development should be seen as a process. The lowest level of manuscript production was reached in the seventh century, with only 10,639 manuscripts. Production grew in the following two centuries, during the so-called Carolingian Renaissance. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the production of manuscripts consistently increased, with 1,761,951 and 2,746,951 manuscripts written and published respectively. This rapid growth declined in the mid-fourteenth century, however, as a consequence of the decimation of the European population, due to the Black Death.15 The invention of the printing press heralded an unprecedented increase in the volume of literary production. Buringh and van Zandend noted: The acceleration of book output after 1454 continued until the end of the sixteenth century; in the year 1550 alone, for example, some 3 million books were produced in Western Europe, more than the total number of manuscripts produced during the fourteenth century as a whole. During the rest of the early modern period growth continued, but at a slightly slower pace (somewhat under 1 per cent per year).16 What implication does this unprecedented amount of book printing carry for one specific book, namely the Bible? It is no surprise that the very first book 14  Eltjo Buringh and Jan Luiten Van Zanden, “Charting the ‘Rise of the West:’ Manuscripts and Printed Books in Europe, A Long-Term Perspective from the Sixth through Eighteenth Centuries,” The Journal of Economic History 69 (2009): 409–45. 15  Ibid., 412–18. 16  Ibid., 419.



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published using movable metal-type was the Bible itself.17 This famous edition, known as the Gutenberg Bible, marked the beginning of a series of publications which slowly transformed modes of approaching, reading, and understanding the Holy Writ. Greek and Latin renderings, polyglot editions and vernacular translations multiplied throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On the one hand, these publications attracted a widespread audience for the Bible as a book, on the other they sparked a multitude of debates regarding not only the validity of individual translations, but also the theological implications of specific renditions of the text. Historical research has broadened our knowledge of the complexity and diversity of biblical studies in the Middle Ages. The pioneering work by the British Historian Beryl Smalley (1905–1984)18 has sparked scholarly interest in several practices of medieval biblical studies, such as a growing interest in long neglected periods, like the Early Middle Ages,19 the development of the medieval four-fold reading of Scripture,20 and influences on Jewish and Christian interpretations in the context of cross-cultural and interreligious conflicts.21 If in the 1980s William J. Courtenay had to plead for greater historical surveys on the development of biblical studies in the Middle Ages,22 we are now in a far better position to appreciate the nuances of medieval exegesis and avoid enduring clichés, including the unhistorical tendency in Reformation Studies to blame medieval exegesis for an (alleged) excessive use of allegory. Caution needs to be exercised when applying binary contrapositions between the Middle Ages and the Reformation; new studies on the mutual influences of the variegated hermeneutical practices till the Reformation are still needed. For the purpose of the present study, the following remarks should suffice. First, the binary overarching contrast between a medieval allegorical reading of 17  For

this edition, see: Janet Ing, Johann Gutenberg and His Bible: A Historical Study, Typophile Chap Book (New York: The Typophiles, 1988); Stephan Füssel, Gutenberg und seine Wirkung (Frankfurt; Leipzig: Insel Verlag 1999), 13–20. 18  Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 2 ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970). For a bibliographical survey on scholarship on biblical studies in the Middle Ages, see: Christopher Ocker and Kevin Madigan, “After Beryl Smalley: Thirty Years of Medieval Exegesis, 1984–2013,” Journal of the Bible and its Reception 2 (2015): 87–130. 19  Robert E. McNally, The Bible in the Early Middle Ages (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2005); Gillian Rosemary Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 20  Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale: les quatres sens de l’Écriture, 4 vols. (Paris: Aubier, 1959–1964). 21  Devorah Schoenfeld, Isaac on Jewish and Christian Altars: Polemic and Exegesis in Rashi and the Glossa Ordinaria (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013); Benjamin Williams, “Glossa Ordinaria and Glossa Hebraica Midrash in Rashi and the Gloss,” Traditio 71 (2016): 179–201. 22 William J. Courtenay, “The Bible in the Fourteenth Century: Some Observations,” Church History 54 (1985): 176–87.

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Scripture, and the emphasis on the literal sense of the Bible typical of the Reformation, needs to be abandoned. While a proper contextualization of Luther’s emphasis on the literal sense will be proposed in the following chapter, it is helpful to emphasize that the requirement to understand the literal sense of the Holy Writ was recognized well before the sixteenth century. Nicholas of Lyra (1270–1349) represents a paradigmatic case. As a Franciscan friar, head of the order in France, and arguably one of the most influential biblical exegetes of the Middle Ages, Lyra emphasized the need to base one’s own exegetical practice on the firm ground of literal interpretation, without, for this reason, undermining the need to go beyond the literal sense in search of the allegorical meaning of Scripture. For this author, the literal and the allegorical sense of the Scripture are indissolubly linked. Indeed, Lyra became famous as the biblical exegete for two works. The fist was the monumental Postilla literalis (1322–1331), in which he gave his literal interpretation of the biblical text, focusing his attention on the grammatical structure of the syntax, the meaning and etymology of individual words, and the context in which the specific utterances were written. The second was the shorter Postilla moralis (1339), in which he drew a moral sense from individual passages of the Scripture. As a biblical exegete, Lyra accepted the validity of the Vulgate as a reliable translation of the Bible. However, being proficient in Hebrew, he could compare the Latin translation of the Old Testament with the original Hebrew, sometimes criticizing what he saw as an inaccurate translation. Since he did not know Greek, however, he could not do the same for the New Testament. In 1333, Lyra published his Tractatus de differentia nostrae translationis ab hebraica littera Veteris Testamenti, in which he explained the differences between the Hebrew and Latin Vulgate of the Old Testament. The emphasis on the need to understand the literal sense goes hand in hand with the apparent recognition of the multiplicity of the sense of Scripture. Christological reading of the Old Testament were often supported. Lyra’s authority as a biblical exegete, both in the eyes of his contemporaries, as well as in the following centuries, was grounded in his proficiency in Hebrew. He was also learned in Rabbinic commentaries. It is well known, for instance, that he made full use of the commentary to the Talmud written by the French Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac of Troyes, known as Rashi (1040–1105).23 Jeremy Cohen24 23 Wolfgang Bunte, Rabbinische Traditionen bei Nikolaus von Lyra: Ein Beitrag zur Schriftauslegung des Spätmittelalters, Judentum und Umwelt (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1994). 24  Jeremy Cohen, “Scholarship and Intolerance in the Medieval Academy: The Study and Evaluation of Judaism in European Christendom,” The American Historical Review 91 (1986): 592–613.



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and Deeana Copeland Keppler25 have pointed out the inherent ambivalence of Lyra’s use of this rabbinic text. At the beginning of his Postilla literalis, Lyra defended his choice to use Rashi’s commentary in order to appreciate the literal sense of the Hebrew text. At the same time, during his commentary, Rashi himself is criticized repeatedly by Lyra because of his failure to understand the Christological implications of the Old Testament. In a period when, following the expulsion of Jews from France in 1306, many theological debates on the possibility of knowing Christ solely through reading the Old Testament arose, and Lyra himself held a quodlibet disputation on the topic at the University of Paris in 1309,26 Lyra warned against “Judaizing” the reading of the Bible. He blamed Rashi and all the Jewish commentators for deliberately concealing Christ from the Old Testament. Moreover, as argued by Irven Resnick, Lyra’s polemic has to be contextualized within Christian accusations against the Jews of falsifying the scriptural text. According to Lyra, Jews deliberately falsified parts of the Old Testament in order to conceal the Christian truth inscribed within it. Thus, Lyra argued for the requirement to preserve the Hebrew text while, at the same time, he underlined the need to search for ancient copies of the text in order to prove “Jewish lies”.27 Lyra’s exegesis of the Bible was inevitably shaped by his own theological convictions. For instance, he adopted several concepts derived from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Lyra interpreted the famous expression ex fide in fidem in Rom. 1:17, the central passage for Luther’s interpretation of faith, in terms of a distinction between fides informis and fides charitate formata, namely the believer’s development from a state of unformed faith freely given by God, to faith formed by love.28 In adopting the distinction between the literal and spiritual meaning of Scripture, Lyra emphasized that Moses had prophesized about the Messiah, and Moses, the prophets, and all the authors of the Old Testament could have consciously implied a Christological referent in their text. Thus, in the Old Testament there is a literal-historical meaning which refers to the Jewish people, and to the time when human authors wrote, whereas the second meaning refers to Christ, when the prophecies of the Old Testament were fulfilled.29 25  Deeana Copeland Klepper, The Insight of Unbelievers: Nicholas of Lyra and Christian Reading of Jewish Text in the Later Middle Ages, Jewish Culture and Contexts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 26  Ibid., 82–108. 27  Irven M. Resnick, “The Falsification of Scripture and Medieval Christian and Jewish Polemics,” Medieval Encounters 2 (1996): 344–80. 28  Jerry H. Bentley, Humanists and Holy Writ: New Testament Scholarship in the Renaissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 26–30. 29 Ebeling, “The Beginnings of Luther’s Hermeneutics,” 136–37; “Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik,” 183–84.

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The inflamed theological debates throughout the sixteenth century rendered the Bible the most controversial book of European Christendom. With the invention of the printing press, a multitude of new editions were printed. Three main lines of the edition can be discerned: new translations of the whole or of single books of the Bible in Latin, Greek, or Hebrew, polyglot editions of the Bible, or translations of the Bible in a vernacular language.30 These scholarly achievements were made possible by the development of several factors. These included the invention of the printing press, but also involved the study of biblical languages and the search for new manuscripts with which to bring the biblical text “closer” to the original version. These two latter aspects are interrelated with two cultural phenomena in the fifteenth century: an emergent philological method that was being increasingly applied to the reading of classical literature and the Bible and interest in ancient mystical traditions, like the Jewish Kabbalah. The development of early forms of the philological method applied to Scripture can be largely traced to the contributions of two eminent fifteenth-century scholars: Lorenzo Valla (1405/7–1457) and Giannozzo Manetti (1396–1459). Both worked on the biblical text during the same period. Valla – whose demonstration that the Donation of Constantine was a medieval forgery gave rise to debates in his own time, and proved even more controversial in the early sixteenth century31 – produced a series of annotations to the New Testament. Probably written in two different periods of his life, between 1435–48 and then between 1453–57, the Annotations represent Valla’s attempt to improve the text of the Vulgate on the basis of Greek manuscripts. Although his choice of manuscripts was not always accurate, Valla emphasized the need to master Greek to read the New Testament. He criticized several aspects of Jerome’s translation, and went so far as to notice that Jerome did not translate the Bible ex novo, but had reworked a previously existing translation. Valla’s work as a biblical philologist is marked by a continuous emphasis on the need to restore the New Testament with a better text by comparing the Latin Vulgate with the Greek manuscripts in his possession. This was because of numerous corrupted passages, the results of mistakes made by the copyists or of alterations made for theological reasons.32 30 

For a careful account of practices of biblical translation and exegesis in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see: Alastair Hamilton, “Humanists and the Bible,” in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed. Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 100–17. 31  Mariangela Regoliosi has shown that Valla’s confutation of the Donation of Constantine had little impact during Valla’s lifetime, while the popularity of the text increased in the second half of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries: Mariangela Regoliosi, “Lorenzo Valla e la Riforma del XVI secolo,” Studia philologica valentina 10 (2007): 25–45. 32  Hamilton, “Humanists and the Bible,” 104–5.



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Unlike Valla, Giannozzo Manetti extended his scholarship to the whole Bible. Working at the papal court of Nicholas V, Manetti endorsed the notion of a completely new translation of the Holy Writ. He did not succeed in his aim, but translated the entire New Testament and the Psalter; this was the first translation of the Bible since Jerome’s Vulgate. While Manetti’s translation of the Psalter circulated in manuscripts, however, his translation of the New Testament was never printed. As a Hebrew scholar, Manetti provided his reader with his own translation of the Psalter, and two translations attributed to Jerome. For the New Testament, Manetti based his translation on four manuscripts: a copy of the Vulgate (Pal. Lat. 18), a Greek version of the New Testament (Pal. Gr. 171), and two Greek gospels (Pal. Gr. 189 and Pal. Gr. 229).33 It has been long considered whether, and to what extent, Manetti knew of and used Valla’s Annotations. Annet den Haan has recently pointed out that Manetti did use Valla’s Collatio in the interpretation of single words or passages. However, Manetti’s method of translation changed over time: he became less concerned with the translation of a single word, and more and more with rendering an entire sentence in a flourishing Latin style. In this way, he became more independent from Valla’s scholarship.34 Jerome’s Vulgate was the starting point for both Valla and Manetti. It seems however that while Valla was willing to deviate from the Vulgate’s translation on passages which could have implied controversial theological positions, Manetti was more reluctant. In this regard, 1 Cor. 15:10, non ergo autem, sed gratia Dei mecum, is a case in point. While Manetti retained the wording in the Vulgate text, arguably following his Greek sources, Valla, based on one of his Greek manuscripts, added an article to the Vulgate version rendering non ergo autem, sed gratia Dei quae est mecum. This new translation led Valla to put into question the scholastic doctrine of cooperative grace.35 In the mid-fifteenth century, Pope Nicholas V was willing to support the work of both men, in order to amend the Vulgate and make available a new translation of the Bible. Neither project was printed, however. Only with the development of the printing press, would new translations of the Bible be published, at the end of the century. For scholars of the Old Testament, the growing interest in the original text of the Bible was inevitably linked with the study of oriental languages. The study of Greek, Hebrew, Chaldean, and Arabic at the universities of Paris, Bologna, Salamanca, and Oxford was promulgated during the Council of Vienne in 1312.36 In the mid-fifteenth century, the study of lan33  Ibid., 102–4. 34  Annet Haan, “Giannozzo

Manetti’s New Testament: New Evidence on Sources, Translation Process and the Use of Valla’s Annotationes,” Renaissance Studies 28 (2014): 731–47. 35  Ibid., 745–46. 36 Bentley, Humanists and Holy Writ, 15. For further discussion on the decree on language at the council of Vienne, see: Robert Weiss, “England and the Decree of the Council of

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guages and the study of hermetic, Pythagorean, and Platonic works, sometimes mistakenly attributed to ancient oriental traditions, went hand in hand. The growing significance of the Christian Kabbalah exemplifies how what appeared to be different tendencies of early modern culture were in fact originally linked and even influenced one another. Indeed, Hebrew was believed to be the language of creation, and thus there was a widespread conviction that miracles could be performed through an arrangement of certain Hebrew words. The Hebrew alphabet was believed to possess the operational power to change and reshape reality.37 It is no surprise that Pico della Mirandola concluded his 900 Theses by linking magic and Kabbalah, and that Reuch­lin began his career with a work on the magical power of words (De verbo mirifico). Reuch­lin also became more and more notable as the leading Hebraist of his time, publishing Hebrew grammar books and lexicons, and culminated his career with his De arte cabbalistica. On the eve of the sixteenth century, the study of biblical texts could be linked with magic, alchemy, and astrology. Three scholars who had intellectual or personal connections with the Medici environment of late fifteenth-century Florence embarked on new translations of the Bible: Agostino Giustiniani, Sante Pagnini, and Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples. Faber Stapulensis, dreading the charge of heresy, left unpublished his work on natural magic, inspired by Pico and Ficino. In 1504 Stapulensis published his influential and widely circulated Quincuplex Psalterium. This book presented five versions of the Psalter: the Vetus Latina, the Vulgate, and the three translations attributed to Jerome (the versio Romana, Gallicana, and iuxta Hebraicum).38 In the discussion of the text of the Psalter, Kabbalistic explanations emerged repeatedly. Perhaps because of the charge that he was practicing illic-

Vienne on the Teaching of Greek, Arabic, Hebrew, and Syriac,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 14 (1952): 1–9; Bernhard Bischoff, “The Study of Foreign Languages in the Middle Ages,” Speculum 36 (1961): 209–24. 37  See Saverio Campanini, “The Quest for the Holiest Alphabet in the Renaissance,” in A Universal Art: Hebrew Grammar across Disciplines and Faiths, ed. Nadia Vidro, Irene E. Zwiep, and Judith Olszowy-Schlanger, Studies in Jewish History and Culture (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 196–245. 38  Lefèvre’s biblical scholarship has attracted much scholar attention. Augustin Renaudet’s book on Lefèvre is still a valuable discussion on the topic: Augustin Renaudet, Prereforme et humanisme a Paris 1494–1517 (Paris: Librairie d’Argences, 1916). A more recent account is represented by: Guy Bedouelle, Lefèvre d’Etaples et l’intelligence des écritures, Traveaux d’Humansme et Renaissance (Genève: Droz, 1976). Also widely discussed is the relationship between Lefèvre and the Reformation. Thus, David Steinmetz, for instance, dedicated some pages to Lefèvre in his book on the “forerunners” of the Reformation: David C. Steinmetz, Reformers in the Wings: From Geiler von Kaysersberg to Theodore Beza (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), 32–37. Recently, this theme has been explored by Christoph Schönau: Christoph Schönau, Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples und die Reformation, Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationsgeschichte (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2017).



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it magic, however, Lefèvre did not explicitly support a Kabbalistic reading of Scripture.39 Influenced by Lefèvre, the Dominican Agostino Giustiniani (1470–1536) planned to edit a polyglot edition of the Bible. He was unable to accomplish this ambitious project, and he only published the Psalter. His polyglot edition of the Psalms, entitled Psalterium Hebraeum, Graecum, Arabicum, et Chaldeum, cum tribus latinis interpretationibus et glossis, was published in 1516. It comprised the original Hebrew text, a Latin translation by Giustiniani, Jerome’s Latin version, a Greek version close to the Septuagint, a translation in Arabic, and the Aramaic Targum with a Latin translation. Understandably, Jacques Lefèvre’s edition of the Psalter is quoted throughout. The scholia and the comments mirror Giustiniani’s interest in Platonism, Hermetism, and Kabbalah. In his earlier Precatio pietatis plena ad Deum omnipotentem composite ex duobus et septuaginta nominibus divinis, Hebraicis et Latinis una cum interprete, Giustiniani had dealt with the Kabbalistic theme of 72 attributes of the divine nature. In his Polyglot Psalter, the quotations from the Hebrew and Kabbalistic literature are used to prove the truthfulness of the Christian faith.40 Finally, Sante Pagnini (1470–1541), who was a student of Pope Leo X, began working on a new translation of the Bible as early as 1493. After mastering Hebrew and Greek, he could base his translation on the original languages of both the Old and New Testament. His translation of the entire Bible, which Luther consulted, was not published before 1527–28.41 Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, new editions of the Bible based on the Hebrew text multiplied. Interest in the Hebrew language and the fascination for the Kabbalah remained inextricably linked throughout the early modern period. Thus, for instance, Robert Wilkinson has emphasized the Kabbalistic background of the scholars who worked on the publication of the Antwerp Polyglot Bible, printed between 1568 and 1572.42 If Giustiniani and Lefèvre edited only the Psalter, two competing translations, one of the New Testament and the other of the entire Bible, reshaped the theological debate of the early sixteenth century: Erasmus’ New Testament and the Complutensian Polyglot Bible of Alcala. 39  Robert J. Wilkinson, Tetragrammaton: Western Christians and the Hebrew Name of God: From the Beginnings to the Seventeenth Century, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 331–35. 40  For Giustiniani’s life and works, see: Aurelio Cevolotto, Agostino Giustiniani: un umanista tra Bibbia e Cabala (Genova: ECIG, 1992). For further discussion, see also: Hartmut Bobzin, “Agostino Giustiniani (1470–1536) und seine Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Arabistik,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft/Supplement (1990): 131–39. 41  Gilbert Dahan, “La Bible de Santi Pagnini (1528),” in La Bible de 1500 à 1535, ed. Gilbert Dahan and Annie Noblesse-Rocher, Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, Sciences religieuses (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), 261–81. 42  Robert J. Wilkinson, The Kabbalistic Scholars of the Antwerp Polyglot Bible, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

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Erasmus’ edition of the New Testament, printed in Basel in 1516, is a work of capital importance in the theological debate of the early sixteenth century, and which exercised a significant and persistent influence on subsequent biblical scholarship. The author himself, however, was unsatisfied with this edition. The announcement in 1502 that work had begun for the publication of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible induced Johannes Froben, Erasmus’ printer, to hasten the publication of Erasmus’ edition of the New Testament. Indeed, the Polyglot Bible was published in 1520, only four years after the publication of the first edition of Erasmus’ Novum Instrumentum.43 His dissatisfaction with the first edition of his work led Erasmus to publish a second edition as early as 1519. The third annotated edition was printed in 1522, and the fourth (1527) and the fifth (1532) editions were published during Erasmus’ lifetime. The Novum Instrumentum was reprinted multiple times after Erasmus’ death; the two editions published in Amsterdam in 1623 and 1633 became the standard text of the New Testament until the nineteenth century. This vast amount of literary production influenced, and in turn was influenced by, contemporary publications of other editions of the Bible; the Complutensian Polyglot Bible, for instance, influenced the 1527 and 1532 editions of the Novum Instrumentum.44 De Jonge has convincingly pointed out that Erasmus’ New Testament was not intended as a new version based on Greek manuscripts, but as an improved version of the Latin Vulgate. It was understood as such not only by Erasmus himself, but also by his accusers.45 Drawing from de Jonge’s scholarship, James Keith Elliott has recently emphasized that the Greek text was mainly used by Erasmus to justify his editorial choices. It has also been noted that the 1516 edition was very close to the Vulgate, while Erasmus’ choices in the following editions were increasingly independent.46 Erasmus’ edition was based on several manuscripts. During his travels throughout Europe, and especially during his sojourn in England, Erasmus consulted numerous copies of the New Testament and annotated different readings. When he arrived in Basel, however, he did not have many manuscripts at his disposal. Erasmus consulted the Dominican Library in Basel, where John of Ragusa (1380–1443), the Dominican who presided the Council of Basel, stored 43  For a critical examination of the mutual influences between Erasmus’ Novum Instrumentum and the Complutensian Bible, see: Ignacio Garcia Pinilla, “Reconsidering the Relationship between the Complutensian Polyglot Bible and Erasmus’ Novum Testamentum,” in Basel 1516: Erasmus’ Edition of the New Testament, ed. Martin Wallraf, Silvana Seidel Menchi, and Kaspar Von Greyerz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 59–77. 44  James Keith Elliott, “‘Novum Testamentum editum est:’ The Five-Hundredth Anniversary of Erasmus’ New Testament,” The Bible Translator 67 (2016): 9–28. 45  Henk Jan de Jonge, “Novum Testamentum a nobis versum: The Essence of Erasmusʼ Edition of the New Testament,” The Journal of Theological Studies 35 (1984): 394–413. 46  Elliott, “‘Novum Testamentum editum est:’ The Five-Hundredth Anniversary of Erasmus’ New Testament,” 13–14.



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some of his manuscripts. Erasmus’ New Testament is essentially based on two twelfth-century codices,47 both today considered to be inferior witnesses.48 One of these two codices was borrowed from Erasmus by Reuch­lin, who was using it for his bilingual edition of the Psalter. The codex does not have the last six verses of the book of Revelation, and Erasmus was harshly criticized because he translated the Latin Vulgate into Greek in order to add the six missing verses. While Erasmus defended himself at first, arguing that these verses were missing in all six manuscripts, in the 1527 edition Erasmus drew the Greek text from the Complutensian Polyglot Bible.49 The limited number of manuscripts at his disposal did not prevent Erasmus from commenting on the need to restore a more accurate text, and to warn against the corrupting effect of human transmission of texts, including the Bible. As Jerry Bentley has pointed out, Erasmus not only repeatedly blamed what he called the arrogance of the scribes who introduced their own lessons into the biblical text and thus corrupted it, but at one point he went so far as to attribute an error to the evangelist Matthew himself, who in his Gospel (2:6) misquoted Mic. 5:2.50 Erasmus’ Novum Instrumentum sparked many theological discussions. Erika Rummel has summarized three main arguments which were used against Erasmus’ New Testament and his biblical scholarship as a whole: first, philologists are not qualified to comment on Scripture; second, the Vulgate is a divinely inspired translation since Jerome was inspired by the Holy Spirit when he wrote it; third, since the Greeks were schismatic, a translation based on the Greek text might introduce heretical interpretations into the Latin Church. Unsurprisingly, in 1531, the Faculty of Theology in Paris formally condemned Erasmus’ New Testament.51 Beyond the problem of competence and the legitimacy of a grammarian to (re)translate the Bible and thus put into question the divine inspiration of the Vulgate, critics were concerned with the theological implications of Erasmus’ translation of single passages. Famously, Erasmus’ controversial translation of John 1:1 in the Vulgate text was in principio erat Verbum, while Erasmus translated it as in principio erat Sermo. This translation sparked a scandal. Erasmus apologetically noted that the use of the word sermo instead of verbum is attested in the Church Fathers. Moreover, Erasmus explained his preference for sermo 47  See: Bentley, Humanists and Holy Writ, 124–27; Elliott, “‘Novum Testamentum editum est:’ The Five-Hundredth Anniversary of Erasmus’ New Testament,” 19–22. 48  Jerry H. Bentley has pointed out that it is misleading to apply the results of nineteenthcentury scholarship to Erasmus’ work: Bentley, Humanists and Holy Writ, 137–39. 49  Ibid., 128. 50  Ibid., 139–42. 51  Erika Rummel, “The Textual and Hermeneutic Work of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam,” in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation: From the Renaissance to the Enlightement, ed. Magne Saebo (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 215–30. Here quoted at 218–19.

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instead of verbum, arguing that while the latter referred to a single utterance, the former properly meant speech. Thus, according to Erasmus, sermo rendered the Greek Logos more accurately, and helped to indicate the mystery of the relationship between the First and Second person of the Trinity.52 Another controversial translation which had major implications for the theological debate of the early sixteenth century is represented by Rom. 5:12. As is well known, Rom. 5 deals with original sin. As I point out in Chapter Three, Luther’s Augustinian interpretation of original sin should be understood as a reaction to Erasmus’ position on the post-lapsarian condition of human beings. Since the Enchiridion Militis Christiani, Erasmus had emphasized that original sin affects the lowest part of the individual, the Pauline caro, while the highest part, the Pauline spiritus, remains untouched by adamite sin. This notion also reverberates in Erasmus’ translation of Rom. 5:12 in the Novum Instrumentum. The Vulgate connects the sin of Adam and the sin of all other men with the relative pronoun in quo; Erasmus preferred the adverb quatenus, instead of in quo. The change is slight, but the theological implication is enormous. The Vulgate translation suggests that all men inherited the sin of the first man, Adam. Erasmus, however, notes that in the original Greek the sentence is not a relative but a causal clause. For this reason, he substitutes in quo with quatenus, but his translation implies that the passage should refer not to original sin, but only to actual sins. In conjunction with this passage, Erasmus also slightly modifies the Vulgate’s translation of Rom. 5:14. The Vulgate’s passage in similitudinem prevaricationis Adae is rendered by Erasmus as ad similitudinem transgressionis Adae. Erasmus’ translation implies that the infants who died before receiving baptism, and even some pagans, could be saved.53 This translation sparked infinite polemics and vehement accusations that Erasmus was a Pelagian. Martin Luther, for instance, repeatedly scolded Erasmus in this regard. In the early 1520s the anti-Erasmian trend became so strong in the Wittenberg circle that Philipp Melanchthon read a letter written by Konrad Pellikan to Luther, in which Pellikan derided Erasmus’ Pelagianism.54 Many other sixteenth-century polemicists made the same accusations, despite being opponents of Luther. Robert Coogan has emphasized that Erasmus’ translation of Rom. 5:12 is also the central matter of discussion in his dispute with Edward 52  Catherine A. L. Jarrott, “Erasmus’ ‘In Principio Erat Sermo:’ A Controversial Translation,” Studies in Philology 61 (1964): 35–40. Erasmus wrote two versions of his Apologia de In principio erat sermo. For an analysis of the differences between the two versions, see: Denis Drysdall, “The Two Versions of Erasmus’ Apologia de In principio erat sermo and the Role of Edward Lee,” in Acta Conventus Neo-Latini Upsaliensis (set, two volumes). Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Congress of Neo-Latin Studies (Uppsala 2009), ed. Astrid SteinerWeber, Acta Conventus Neo-Latini (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 363–72. 53 Robert Coogan, “The Pharisee against the Hellenist: Edward Lee versus Erasmus,” Renaissance Quarterly 39 (1986): 476–506. 54  Ibid., 478–79.



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Lee.55 In the early 1520s Luther’s supporters and opponents agreed that Erasmus was, indeed, a Pelagian. A third controversial passage is represented by the so called comma Johanneum. In order to elucidate the intellectual context within which this dispute arose, it is necessary first to shift the focus from Erasmus’ New Testament to its rival, the Complutensian Polyglot Bible. The publication of the first polyglot edition of the entire Bible was the result of the collaboration of different scholars, who worked under the patronage of Cardinal Francisco Ximenez de Cisneros (1436–1517). The Complutensian Polyglot Bible was published in six volumes. The first five volumes contain the Old Testament, and are structured as follows: the Latin Vulgate at the center of the page, with the Greek and Hebrew text to the right and the left respectively; at the bottom half of each page are the Aramaic text (left) and its Latin translation (right). The fifth volume, the New Testament, is divided into two columns with the Latin and Greek texts. The six volume is a dictionary of Greek and Hebrew.56 Previous scholarship on the Complutensian Bible saw in it a unique attempt to substitute the Vulgate with a new Latin text, whereas modern scholarship generally agrees that the scholars involved in the project accepted the Vulgate text as authoritative, and were not willing to amend it on the basis of the Greek or Hebrew texts.57 Thus, unwilling to alter the Vulgate, the main challenge the editors faced was to establish an authoritative text for the Greek, Hebrew, and Aramaic. Most of the manuscripts on which they based their texts have yet to be identified. Still – as noted by Chinchilla – the editors were forced to justify, if only for themselves, the use of manuscripts that came from “heretical” Jewish and Byzantine communities.58 As mentioned above, the rivalry between the two main biblical projects hastened the publication of Erasmus’ New Testament. At the same time, it also delayed the publication of the Alcalá Bible. Although the Complutensian Bible was completed and ready for publication in 1517, it was only published in 1520, since Erasmus had gained exclusive publication rights. The rivalry, however, did not just concern the potential monetary gains from the printing market and, thus, the economic success of the two projects; soon, theological disputes arose. 55 Ibid.; Erasmus, Lee and the Correction of the Vulgate: The Shaking of the Foundations (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1992), 25–52. 56 Bentley, Humanists and Holy Writ, 91–92. 57  Rosa Helena Chinchilla, “The Complutensian Polyglot Bible (1520) and the Political Ramifications of Biblical Translation,” in La traducción en España, ss. XIV–XVI, ed. Roxana Recio (León: Universidad de León, 2017), 169–90. Bentley considered the editors of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible as “extremely conservative philologists”: Cf. Bentley, Humanists and Holy Writ, 97. 58  Chinchilla, “The Complutensian Polyglot Bible (1520) and the Political Ramifications of Biblical Translation,” 175.

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Diego López de Zúñiga (d. 1531), one of the fiercest critics of Erasmus and better known by the Latinized version of his name Jacobus Lopis Stunica, was involved in the creation of the Alcalá Bible. For some time, Stunica, who unlike Erasmus had mastered both Hebrew and Aramaic, had held Erasmus’ scholarship in low esteem. Cardinal Ximenez, however, had impeded the publication of Stunica’s criticism of Erasmus. After Ximenez’s death, Stunica published his Annotationes contra Erasmus in 1520 in which he even charged Erasmus with Arianism. Moreover, just like the Edward Lee, who shared Stunica’s concern with Arianism, Stunica was concerned with Erasmus’ exclusion of the comma Johanneum from his New Testament, which Erasmus did not consider a part of the original text of John’s Gospel. According to 1 John 5:7–8, there are three witnesses in heaven (the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit), which are one and the same entity. This passage was long considered the standard rebuttal to anti-Trinitarianism. It is accepted as the original in the Vulgate, despite being mentioned only in a few Greek manuscripts. As Bentley has noted, in the modifications which they introduced in their edition, the editors of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible did not limit themselves to inserting the comma, thereby accepting Thomas Aquinas’ argument that the passage was expelled from older manuscripts by anti-Trinitarian heretics. They even added it in their Greek text by translating the Latin of the Vulgate into Greek.59 Erasmus, on the other hand, decided not to insert the passage in his Novum Instrumentum. He justified his decision by explaining that he did not find the passage in any of the Greek manuscripts at his disposal, noting that it was even Jerome’s opinion that the passage was added by Latin copyists in order to rebuke the Arian heresy. Lee and Stunica, however, accused Erasmus of fostering Arianism. When a new Greek manuscript containing the passage appeared – the Codex Montfortianus, arguably a forgery – Erasmus inserted 1 John 5:7–8 in the third edition of the New Testament. However, he put into question the authenticity of the manuscript, and quoted patristic authorities that legitimized his choice to consider the passage a later interpolation.60 It is precisely in this context that Martin Luther issued his own translation of the Bible in German. Luther’s so-called September Testament, namely his translation of the New Testament, was published in September 1522. The German translation of the Old Testament was published in three different editions: a first translation containing the books of Moses was published in July 1523, the translation of the books from Joshua to Ester was printed in January 1524, and, finally, the remaining books were published in October 1524. Translations of individual books were published throughout the span of Luther’s career, and the 59 Bentley, Humanists and Holy Writ, 95. 60  Ibid., 152–53. For further discussion,

see also: Joseph M. Levine, “Erasmus and the Problem of the Johannine Comma,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58 (1997): 573–96.



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entirety of Luther’s German Bible was published in 1534.61 It is well known that this accomplishment can in no way be ascribed to Luther himself; it was, in fact, the result of the collaboration of different scholars, among which Melanchthon worked on the Greek text, and Mattheus Aurogallus on the Hebrew.62 Luther’s Bible has been long surrounded by a mythological aura. Recent research has, however, shown that the vernacular Bible translation is not at all the prerogative of the early sixteenth century, nor the specific result of Luther’s scriptural principle.63 Moreover, Luther’s translation led his Catholic opponent Hieronymus Emser to publish an alternative translation. Their opposing theological positions clashed, in how they rendered the meaning of the Bible in German. Just as with the translations in Latin, Greek, or Hebrew, which were published in the same period, the problem revolved around the theological implications of a specific translation. In the case of Luther’s Bible, the translation of passages such as Luke 1:28, the passage of the angel greeting Mary, which Luther rendered as holdselig (“sweet”), instead of the formulation in the Vulgate – voll Gnaden (“full of grace”)64 – sparked vehement theological debates. The most controversial passage in Luther’s translation is, of course, Rom. 3:28. Following his own theological presuppositions, Luther added the word allein (sola) to the text, translating So halten wir es nun, daβ der Mensch gerecht werde ohne des Gesetzes Werke, allein durch den Glauben.65 In Emser’s translation of the Bible, the adjective allein disappears. The Roman side took issue against Luther for adding a word that was not present in the Greek text.66 In his Open Letter to Translation in 1530, Luther acknowledged that he was aware that allein was not present in the original text, but emphasized the need to render the proper theological meaning of the passage as clearly as possible – and for Luther this meant salvation through faith alone. 61  Siegfried Raeder, “The Exegetical and Hermeneutical Work of Martin Luther,” in Hebrew Bible, Old Testament: The History of its Iterpretation: From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, ed. Magne Sæbø and Michael A. Fishbane (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 363–405. 62 Hans Volz, “Melanchthons Anteil an der Lutherbibel,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 45 (1954):196–233; Stefan Michel, “‘Die Luthers Sanhedrin:’ Helfer und Mitarbeiter an der Lutherbibel,” in Die Bibel Martin Luthers: Ein Buch und seine Geschichte, ed. Margot Käßmann and Martin Rösel (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2016), 117–35. 63  For a careful account with critical examination of the inaccuracies of secondary literature on this topic see: Andrew Colin Gow, “The Contested History of a Book: The German Bible of the Later Middle Ages and Reformation in Legend, Ideology, and Scholarship,” The Journal of Hebrew Scriptures 9 (2009), http://www.jhsonline.org/Articles/article_115.pdf. Last access: 14/11/2019. 64  Charlotte Methuen, “‘These four letters sola are not there:’ Language and Theology in Luther’s Translation of the New Testament,” Studies in Church History 53 (2017): 146–63. 65  As quoted by ibid., 146–47. 66 Stengel, Sola scriptura im Kontext, 91–95.

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Beyond the German editions of the Bible produced by Luther and Emser, vernacular translations of the Bible were published all around Europe: William Tyndale published his English translation in 1527,67 Antonio Brucioli translated the New Testament in Italian in 1530 and published an Italian translation of the entire Bible in 1532;68 and in France, Pierre Robert Olivétan published La Bible Qui est toute la Saincte escripture, with an introduction written by John Calvin.69 Simultaneously, following in the footsteps of Reuch­lin, Erasmus, Jacques Lefèvre, and the editors of the Complutensian Polyglot Bible, new editions of the Bible in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew multiplied. The quest for a return to the original text of the Bible gave birth to a multitude of competing and contrasting texts.

5.3  Patristic, Medieval, and Sixteenth-Century Influences in the Dictata super Psalterium On 18 October 1512, the twenty-nine-year-old Augustinian monk Martin Luther earned his doctorate in theology at the University of Wittenberg, with a disputation chaired by Karlstadt.70 A few months later, in August 1513, when Luther began to lecture on the Bible, he chose to lecture on one of the biblical books he was most acquainted with, namely the Psalms. In order to prepare his first lectures on the Psalms and during the entire period of his lectures, Luther – as the catalog made by the editors in the Weimarer edition shows – continuously consulted different sources: patristic, medieval, and contemporary.71 For his patristic sources, Luther made full use of Augustine, Cassiodorus, and Jerome. Luther mainly quoted Cassiodorus for his rhetorical skills, while Jerome was appreciated as a philologist and Bible translator;72 already in the 67  See: Morna D. Hooker, “Tyndale’s ‘Heretical’ Translation,” Reformation 2 (1997): 127– 42; Stanley R. Maveety, “Doctrine in Tyndale’s New Testament: Translation as a Tendentious Art,” Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900 6 (1966): 151–58; David Ginsberg, “Ploughboys versus Prelates: Tyndale and More and the Politics of Biblical Translation,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 19 (1988): 45–61. 68  See: Giorgio Spini, Tra rinascimento e riforma: Antonio Brucioli (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1940). 69  Horst Kunze, Die Bibelübersetzungen von Lefèvre d’Étaples und von P. R. Olivetan verglichen in ihrem Wortschatz, Leipziger romanistische Studien (Leipzig; Paris: Droz, 1935). 70  Robert Kolb, Martin Luther and the Enduring Word of God: The Wittenberg School and its Scripture-centered Proclamation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), 31: Raeder, The Exegetical and Hermeneutical Work of Matin Luther, 365. 71  WA 55.1.65, n. 2 as quoted by Erik Herrmann, “Luther’s Absorption of Medieval Biblical Interpretation and His Use of the Church Fathers,” in The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther’s Theology, ed. Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L’ubomír Batka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 71–90. Here quoted at 73. 72 Raeder, The Exegetical and Hermeneutical Work of Martin Luther, 367.



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Dictata, however Luther had shown a preference for Augustine as a biblical exegete. It is, however, still a matter of contention exactly which Augustine influenced Luther. The reception of Augustine in the two hundred years between 1300–1500 has received significant scholarly attention in order to establish the Augustinian tradition immediately prior to Luther. The question is further complicated by the fact that Luther was an Augustinian monk. The next problem, therefore, was whether the Augustinian Hermits, and more specifically the German Observant branch, whose leader was Johannes von Staupitz, represented a specific approach to reading Augustine’s works.73 It is clear that Augustine was interpreted in different ways in the early sixteenth century. In the previous chapter, I showed how Erasmus, Luther, and Eck could use and interpret Augustine (or sometimes pseudo-Augustine’s works) in light of their theological positions. It cannot, however, be doubted that Augustine strongly influenced Luther before the young Augustinian monk marked his debut on the scene of European theological discourse. It is, indeed, by virtue of his reading of Augustine – and Augustine’s interpretation of Paul – that Luther built on his early dislike for Erasmus. It is certain that Luther had begun his detailed study of Augustine by 1509 at the latest. Recently, it has been suggested that Luther even lectured on Augustine during his period in Erfurt.74 There is, however, a clear shift in Luther’s early understanding of Augustine. In Dictata super psalterium, Luther frequently consulted Augustine’s Enarrationes in psalmos; however, he did not show any particular knowledge of Augustine’s anti Pelagian writings and his work, On the Spirit and the Letter.75 From his lectures on Romans, as shown in Chapter Three, Augustine’s writings against the Pelagians become the cornerstone of Luther’s theology and a key tool for Luther’s interpretation of Paul.76 It is the later Augustine, the one of the disputes against the Pelagians, that Luther considered the “interpres fidelissimus” of Paul’s teachings.77 This is indicative of how the development of Luther’s hermeneutics went hand in hand with the substantial changes in Luther’s understanding of the human postlapsarian condition. In other words, the interpretation of 2 Cor. 3:6 in the dichotomy between the law and the Gospel also entails a new appreciation for the text of the Bible itself. 73  For the variegated reception of Augustine in the Middle Ages, see: Eric Leland Saak, Creating Augustine: Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press). In the first part of the present work I discussed Saak’s contribution to the discussion regarding Luther’s reception of Augustine. 74  Pekka Kärkkäinen, “Augustinian, Humanist, or What? Martin Luther’s Marginal Notes on Augustine,” in Studia Patristica: Papers presented at the Seventeeth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2015, ed. Markus Vinzent, John T. Slotemaker, and Jeffrey C. Witt (Leuven: Peters, 2017), 161–66. 75  For the use of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian writings see Chapter Three. 76  Herrmann, “Luther’s Absorption of Medieval Biblical Interpretation and His Use of the Church Fathers,” 79. 77  WA 1.353.12–14.

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In the early sixteenth century, the Fathers were used as identifiers of a specific positioning attributed to a contemporary author. We will see in the next chapter that, in criticizing Origen and Jerome, Luther positioned himself in antithesis to the most famous follower of these two ancient authors, namely Erasmus of Rotterdam. For now, I would like to focus on how Luther’s reading of the Church Fathers was mediated by medieval exegesis. It is well known that during his early lectures, Luther regularly consulted the Glossa Ordinaria, a twelfth-century collection of excerpts from the Church Fathers and the early medieval exegetes. The use and consultation of the Glossa ordinaria was such a regular practice for medieval commentators of the Bible that – as Karlfried Froehlich noted78 – the copies of the glossa in the library catalogues in the late Middle Ages were not organized under the letter “G”, but under the letter “B”, that is Biblia glossata or Biblia cum Glossa Ordinaria.79 Froehlich pointed out that Luther’s extensive use of Glossa Ordinaria should not be conceived as limited to his early lectures. It is highly probable that Luther continued to consult the Glossa during his entire career, even after he abandoned the Glossa-Scholia commentary style.80 It must also be remarked that, although Luther always conceived every form of glossa to Scripture as a human addition to God’s Word, he never dismissed the usefulness of the glosses as such. In his later years, he even contemplated the possibility of writing his own glossed version of the Bible.81 As Froehlic noted, Luther seemed to have had a poor opinion of the comments in the Glossa Ordinaria and may have perceived the Glossa as a product of scholastic theology, which means that for Luther the excerpts of the Fathers he read in the Glossa derived from a specific reading – or rather misreading – of the Fathers by scholastic theologians.82 This hypothesis is confirmed by Luther’s desire to read the original text of the Fathers in contrast to his disinterest for the complete text of such influential medieval authors like Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, it is possible that Luther never directly engaged with Aquinas’ text, but was acquainted with only some excerpts of Aquinas’ works.83 Thus, while Luther chose to read the works of the Fathers that most interested him, it is generally assumed that the Glossa Ordinaria remained an important source 78  Karlfried Froehlich, “Martin Luther and the Glossa Ordinaria,” Lutheran Quarterly 23 (2009): 29–48. 79  Ibid., 31. 80  Ibid., 37. 81  Ibid., 43–45. 82  Ibid., 38–43. 83  The question of how much Luther read of Aquinas is still an open matter. It has been long considered that Luther did not have a first-hand knowledge of Aquinas’ works. One of the main critics of this Thesis is Denis Janz. I discussed his work on Luther and late medieval Thomism in Chapter Three. For his argument that Luther possessed a good knowledge of Aquinas’ works, see: Denis R. Janz, Luther on Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor in the Thought of the Reformer (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989).



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of knowledge for Luther’s understanding of medieval theology. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note that Luther’s highly polemical remarks regarding the glossa do not exclude the possibility that Luther used the Glossa to interpret specific passages of Scripture. In this sense, Erasmus’ case is quite emblematic. It is well known that Erasmus was highly critical of medieval exegesis. However, de Jonge has definitively proved that Erasmus made extensive use of the Glossa, without acknowledging it.84 Luther was, of course, also familiar with the medieval exegesis of the Bible through Peter Lombard’s Sentences, a mandatory text for students of theology at sixteenth-century universities and one on which Luther himself had lectured. Regarding the medieval exegetes as such, Luther consulted and engaged critically with Nicholas of Lyra, Paul of Burgos, and Hugo of St. Cher. As already shown, the Franciscan Nicholas of Lyra interpreted the distinction between letter and Spirit in terms of the historical meaning of the events narrated in the Old Testament: In commenting on the Psalms, Lyra thus paid much attention to the way that the history of the people of Israel was interpreted. This line of interpretation was also followed by Paul of Burgos (1351–1435), a Spanish Jew converted to Christianity, who glossed Lyra’s Postillae. As to why Luther rejected this distinction is discussed below. It is, however, worthwhile to remember the popular catch phrase that circulated in the early sixteenth century: Si Lyra non lyrasset, Lutherus non saltasset.85 Finally, among Luther’s contemporaries, Johannes Reuch­ lin and Faber Stapulensis took pride of place. Reuch­lin’s influence on the young Luther is generally restricted to his Hebrew scholarship. It is well attested that Luther consulted Reuch­lin’s Hebrew grammar, and his commentary to the Seven Penitential Psalms (1511). Some examples of the extensive use that Luther made of Reuch­lin’s Hebrew scholarship will be helpful: in commenting on Psalms 4:1,86 32:2,87 51:4,88 and 55:21,89 Luther followed Reuch­lin’s translation in his edition of the Seven penitential Psalms. Moreover, Luther used Reuch­lin’s Hebrew grammar (De rudimentis hebraicis) to interpret the Hebrew word “Hiphil”, “Be wise” in Psalm 2:10 (“O Kings, be wise”) as a transitive verb of the third form.90 In the same way, commenting on Psalm 68:12, Luther drew from Reuch­lin the rule that, in Hebrew, a noun could be taken for one individual or 84 

Henk Jan de Jonge, “Erasmus und die Glossa Ordinaria zum Neuen Testament,” Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis/Dutch Review of Church History 56 (1975): 51–77. 85 As quoted by Charles P. Carlson Jr., Justification in Earlier Medieval Theology (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), 64. 86  LW 10.44. 87  LW 10.146. 88  LW 10.237. 89  LW 10.258. 90  LW 37, note 12.

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for a number of individuals.91 Moreover, Franz Posset has noted that Luther drew from Reuch­lin his understanding of the Hebrew word “dabar”, which means “word”, as well as “thing” and “to speak”. In his Rudiments, Reuch­ lin pointed out that the word “dabar” indicated that God created by speech, and Luther followed this interpretation both in his Dictata super Psalterium and thereafter.92 In 1517, Luther published his own commentary to the Penitential Psalms. In the introduction of the work, Luther informs his readers that, in addition to St. Jerome’s translation, he used the recently published commentary of “Doctor Johannes Reuch­lin”.93 According to Ebeling, it is, however, in Faber Stapulensis’ Quincuplex Psalterium that Luther found his way towards a Christological interpretation of the Bible. Ebeling’s main point is that in the Dictata, Luther inaugurated a Christ-oriented interpretation of the Scripture, influenced by Faber’s rejection of Lyra’s distinction between a literal-historical and a spiritual sense of the Old Testament. Indeed, in his annotation to Faber’s Quincuplex Psalterium, Luther explicitly rejected Lyra’s distinction between the historical and spiritual referent of Psalm 40. Luther argued that while Lyra interpreted the Psalm Christologically, he failed to do so correctly, losing himself in the forest of history. Luther accused Lyra of doing the same with other Psalms, whereas Luther himself argued that the meaning of Christ (sensus Christi) is the only actual referent of the Psalms.94

91 

LW 10.329, note 10. Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 770. The most accurate account of Luther’s Hebrew scholarship in his early years is still: Siegfried Raeder, Das Hebräische bei Luther: Untersucht bis zum Ende der ersten Psalmenvorlesung, Beiträge zur historischen Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1961). See also Raeder’s examination of Luther’s use of the masoretic text of the Bible: Siegfried Raeder, Die Benutzung des masoretischen Textes bei Luther in der Zeit zwischen der ersten und zweiten Psalmenvorlesung (1515– 1518), Beiträge zur historischen Theologie (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967). 93  WA 1.158.3–10: Gnade und frid von gott, dass nit ymand wunder habe, lieben frunde Christi, von dem text dißer sieben psalmen, Ist zu wissen, dass derselb yn etlichen versen umb klerer vorstands willen uber die gemeynen translation nach der translation sancti Hieronymi genomen ist, auch darzu beholffen die translation doctors Johannis Reuch­lin yn seyner hebreischer septene. 94  WA 4.492.2–8: Hunc psalmum Lyra exponit de Christo, coactus ex allgatione Christi, quod non faceret alias, sed iret retrorsum in antiquam sylvam hystoriarum, sicut facit cum multis aliis psalmis, qui tamen multo expressius de Christo loquuntur. Semper fugit, ne mysticum pro literali sensu accipiat, non advertens quoniam sensus literalis absconditus est valde, ita quod nisi Dominus aperuisset apostolis sensum, nec ipsi eum intellexissent. Unde ‘Christi sensum’ appellat apostolus, quia scil. a Christo et de Christo est. 92 Posset,



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5.4  The Indulgence Controversy and the Development of Luther’s Scriptural Argument A deep knowledge of medieval exegesis, a developing relationship with Augustine’s works as well as with other Church Fathers, a growing familiarity with the recently published works of Reuch­lin, Erasmus, and Faber Stapulensis: these are the ingredients of Luther’s intellectual development in his early biblical commentaries. By 1520, however, Luther’s hermeneutics was firmly grounded in the primacy of Scripture. In Assertio omnium articolorum, Luther vehemently asserted that only the Scripture has to reign in Christendom. It is not by chance that Luther stated the superiority of Scripture over any other authority in his response to the excommunication bull Exsurge Domine, issued by Pope Leo X. In order to position Luther in his intellectual context, it is necessary to consider how he developed his scriptural argument both in opposition and as a reaction to the charges mounted against him by the early Roman controversialists. Recent scholarship has, indeed, noted that the first responses to Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses moved the spectrum of the debate from the narrower field of preaching on indulgences to the wider and thornier problem of authority. Slowly, Luther’s more controversial positions on soteriology and ecclesiology drew the attention of his opponents: the more his opponents based their arguments on papal decrees, councils, tradition, or the exegesis of the Fathers, the more Luther defended his own positions through the authority of Scripture. Contrary to the tendency to describe these debates as Luther’s breakthrough against “unbiblical” or “unevangelical” teachings of his opponents, it is historically relevant to describe how Luther developed his understanding of the relationship among the different sources of authority in the Church, in the years immediately preceding his excommunication. As early as 20 January 1518, the Dominican preacher of indulgences, Johann Tetzel, attacked Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses in a disputation held at the Chapter of the Saxon Dominican province at Frankfurt an der Oder. The dispute resulted in the publication of 106 Theses by Tetzel himself and his protector Conrad Wimpina, rector of the University of Frankfurt an der Oder.95 In this text, Luther was explicitly accused of undermining papal authority. A wider campaign orchestrated by Tetzel and other fellow Dominicans portrayed Luther throughout the first months of 1518 as a persistent heretic. Afterwards, the internal procedure opened against Luther by the vicar general of the Augustinian Order, Gabriele Della Volta, who was the successor to Giles of Viterbo from February 1518 after Giles was nominated to be a bishop, failed to silence the Augustinian of Wittenberg. Luther was also supported and protected by Frederick the Wise. 95 

The Theses have been republished in the Corpus Catholicorum, vol. 41.310–37.

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Eventually a processus ordinarius was opened in Rome against Luther with the charge of heresy, around May 1518.96 The magister of sacri palatii Sylvester Prierias (1456/7–1527) was appointed to judge the orthodoxy of Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses. Prierias was a Dominican who developed anti-conciliarist positions well before the beginning of the indulgence controversy.97 He composed a strong papalist treatise entitled In praesumptiosas Martini Lutheri conclusionis, de potestate papae, Dialogus, published in Rome in June 1518. This text is particularly important for the development of Luther’s Sola Scriptura. As Bernard Lohse has noted, Prierias grounded his rejection of Luther’s teaching on indulgences on four main propositions. These stated that: 1) the Church has its representative in the college of cardinals, but its power in the pope, who is the head of the Church; 2) the entire Church, a council, and the pope cannot err in matters of faith or morals – they can be deceived for a certain while, but at the end the truth emerges due to the help of the Holy Spirit, and thus the pope is infallible in the exercise of his office; 3) those who deny the infallibility of the Church and the pope are heretics; 4) in light of the previous propositions, Prierias equates the actual practices of the Church, and specifically the selling of the indulgences, with the presupposition of Church infallibility, thus he who questions the practice of indulgences, as Luther did, is a heretic.98 Prierias maintained in his third proposition that the authority of Scripture derived from the authority of the Church and the pope. In his reply, Luther, who in his Ninety-Five Theses placed the authority of both Scripture and the pope at the same level, pointed out that the pope and councils could err, except in matters of faith.99 Jared Wicks has underlined that at this juncture Luther perceived himself as a defender of Catholic tradition, in opposition to the innovations introduced by scholastic theology endorsed by the Thomist Prierias. Thus, against Prerias’ quotation of Aquinas as an authority, Luther replied sarcastically, asking: Rogo ubi hic Scriptura, Patres, aut Canones sonant?100 96 For

a careful examination of the events of this period of Luther’s life, see: Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: The First Year (1518),” 523–28. 97  For Prierias’ works before the indulgence controversy and for an examination of the secondary literature, see: Carter Lindberg, “Prierias and his Significance for Luther’s Development,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 3 (1972): 45–64. 98 As quoted by Lohse, Luthers Theologie, 123–25. For further discussion on Prierias’ arguments, see also: Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: The First Year (1518),” 530–31. 99  Cf. Lohse, Luthers Theologie, 125. See also the discussion of Luther’s refutation of Prierias by Volker Leppin: Volker Leppin, “Die Genese des reformatorischen Schriftprinzips: Beobachtungen zu Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Johannes Eck bis zur Leipziger Disputation,” in Reformatorische Theologie und Autoritäten: Studien zur Genese des Schriftprinzips beim jungen Luther, ed. Volker Leppin, Spätmittelalter, Humanismus, Reformation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 97–140. 100  Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: The First Year (1518),” 531.



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In mid-1518, Luther could still quote Scripture, the Fathers, and the Canons in the same breath. These three authorities are placed in contrast to Thomas Aquinas, who is repeatedly quoted by Prierias. In defending what he considered “true Catholic tradition”, at this juncture Luther does not emerge as an anti-papalist. His position has to be understood as less severe than the one endorsed by the magistri sacri palatii Prierias, but not at all as an attack on the authority of the pope. In summer 1518, however, Luther’s opponents moved the matter of discussion from the sale of indulgences to papal authority. This shift in the debate had enormous consequences for the meeting between Luther and Cardinal Cajetan in Augsburg. Tommaso de Vio, known as Cardinal Cajetan, was the leading Thomist of his time. A Dominican like Tetzel, Wimpina, and Prierias, by 1518 Cajetan was already recognized as a prominent theologian for his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.101 Independently from Luther, he had already discussed the issue of indulgences, defending papal power to sell indulgences. As noted by Lohse, his position regarding papal infallibility was, however, milder than that of Prierias, since he admitted that a pope could be a heretic.102 In August 1518, Cajetan was in Augsburg as delegate of Pope Leo X for the Imperial Diet at Augsburg to argue for a crusade against the Turks,103 when Leo commissioned him to judge Luther’s case. The meeting between Cajetan and Luther in October 1518 subsequently became one of the most famous in the history of the Reformation. The encounter came to nothing: despite Cajetan’s attempt to settle the dispute, at the end of October Luther decided to leave Augsburg and return to Wittenberg. For the purpose of the present work, it is noteworthy to underline that the matter of contention between the two men circled around the papal bull Cum unigenitus promulgated by Pope Clement VI in 1343, which Cajetan quoted to support his position on the treasure of the Church and which Luther criticized on the basis of Scriptural arguments. Unlike Prierias, Cajetan did not charge Luther with heresy, but recognized in the works of the Wittenberger two errors: a relativization of papal power in the use of the treasure of indulgences, and a misunderstanding of the state of the penitent in order to receive absolution. The latter point refers to Luther’s statement that it was not the sacrament that saves, but faith in the sacrament (fidei sacramenti). Cajetan rejected this notion, arguing that this kind of faith, and the 101  Armand

Maurer, “Cajetan’s Notion of Being in his Commentary on the ‘Sentences’,” Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966): 268–78; Franco Riva, Analogia e univocità in Tommaso de Vio ‘Gaetano,’ Pubblicazioni dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1995); Marcel Nieden, Organum Deitatis: Die Christologie des Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 102 Lohse, Luthers Theologie, 127. 103  For further discussion on Cajetan’s view of Islam, see: Michael O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries: Motive and Method, St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 96–102.

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certitude of salvation for the believer that Luther discerned within it, is simply impossible. For Cajetan, Luther confused the notion of faith (fides), which is indeed necessary to receive the sacrament of penance, but it does not grant absolution from sins without proper contrition.104 At the last moment, Cajetan decided not to charge Luther’s notion of fides sacramenti as being contrary to the teachings of the Church. He may have taken this course of action to overcome the impasse and to find an agreement with Luther, or perhaps because he did not want to equate his own position with the doctrine of the entire Church.105 Whatever was the reason to drop the charge against Luther’s fides sacramenti, Cajetan asked Luther to take a step back on his position on the treasure of the Church, namely, that the merits of Christ were enhanced by the merits of the saints. Cajetan thus defended the doctrine of indulgences as an application of the thesaurus, quoting the papal bull Cum Unigenitus by Pope Clement VI. If the papal bull was the starting point, however, he inferred from it a series of arguments derived both from Scripture and from the works of other theologians. Luther’s position on Cum Unigenitus, however, was diametrically opposed. According to Luther, in his Extravagante Clement had not properly quoted the Scripture and, thus, its reading permitted different interpretations. In his account of the meeting with Cajetan at Augsburg, indeed, Luther pointed out: “Nothing is proven in the bull. Only the teaching of St. Thomas is trotted out and reiterated”.106 In the Acta Augustana, Luther constructed a twofold rhetoric: on the one hand, he subordinated Cum Unigenitus and papal decrees in general to the higher authority of Scripture; on the other, he restated his obedience to the Catholic Church and tried to show how the papal bull could be read in continuity with Luther’s statements in his Resolutions to the Ninety-Five Theses. Regarding the first aspect, Luther brings a series of scriptural arguments against Cajetan’s reading of Unigenitus. Basing his interpretation on Rom. 8:18, Matt. 6:12, and Matt. 25:9, as well as on Augustine, Luther denies the possibility that the merits of the saints could be extended to other human beings, since even the saints were saved only by the mercy of God. Luther’s critique of Clement’s Extravagante goes hand in hand with his criticism of the “unbiblical” scholasticism, here represented by Cajetan, who prefers to quote an “obscure” papal decree on the authority of Scripture. It is precisely at this point that Luther’s critique touches the controversial point of papal authority. Luther does not limit himself to subordinate papal decrees to Scripture, but he goes so far as to point out that not only the general council, but also every believer who uses a better authority, is above the pope in matters of faith. In order to sup104  105 

Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: The First Year (1518),” 546. Ibid., 549–51. 106  The Annotated Luther, vol. 1, 132; WA 2.8.8–9: nihil inde probari, sed recitari dumtaxat ac narrari opinionem S. Thomae.



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port his point, Luther quotes the controversial dispute between Peter and Paul in Antioch (Gal. 2:11–14), in which Paul blamed Peter for his hypocrisy. If the pope was the successor to Peter, his decretals had to be obeyed, but only if they agreed with the Scripture and with previous decretals.107 In one and the same move, Luther restates his obedience to the authority of the pope and, at the same time, relativizes the nature and extent of this obedience. Cajetan himself admitted that popes could err. Luther expanded the implications of the human nature of the pope and deduced that popes have to be obeyed, to the extent that they agree with Scripture. Thus, the subordination of the authority of the pope to that of Scripture is clearly expressed: Indeed, I did not possess the extraordinary audacity to discard so many important clear proofs of Scripture on account of a single ambiguous and obscure decretal of a pope who is a mere human being. Much rather, I considered it proper that the words of Scripture, in which the saints are described as being deficient in merits, are to be preferred to human words, in which the saints have more merits than they need. For the pope is not above, but under the word of God.108

Constructing a powerful dichotomy between God’s Word and human decrees, Luther reaches his narrative climax, subordinating the human words of the pope to the God-inspired Word of the Bible. Luther implicitly blames Cajetan for his “extraordinary audacity” in dismissing the relevance of scriptural passages, and this gives Luther the opportunity to portray scholasticism as an improper distortion of Scripture and, thus, of true Catholicism. As others did during the same period, Luther freely draws in his polemic from the widespread anti-scholastic discourse of the early sixteenth century. The Reuch­lin affair is mentioned as a continuity to his own case. Luther points out that the very same people who plagued Reuch­lin for such a long time were now plaguing him, “an inquiring disputant”, for no reason other than their opposition to those who searched for truth.109 In a period of renewed interest in 107  WA 2.9.18–25: Praeterea, quam multae decretales priores correctae sunt per posteriores, ideoque et hanc forte pro tempore suo corrigi posse. Panormitanus quoque, li: i. de elect. c. Significasti, ostendit, in materia fidei non modo generale Concilium esse super Papam, sed etiam quemlibet fidelem, si melioribus nitatur auctoritate et ratione quam Papa, sicut Petro Paulus Gal. ij. Quod et illo i. Chorin. xiiij. confirmatur: Si fuerit alteri sedenti revelatum, prior taceat. Ideo sic vocem Petri esse audiendam, ut tamen liberior sit vox Pauli eum redarguentis, porro omnium superior vox Christi. 108  The Annotated Luther, vol. 1, 137; WA 10.37–39, 38.1–3: Ego vero non eram tam insigni temeritate, ut propter unam decretalem pontificis hominis tam ambiguam et obscuram recederem a tot et tantis divinae scripturae testimoniis apertissimis: quin potius arbitrabar quam rectissime verba scripturae, quibus sancti describuntur deficere in meritis, incomparabiliter praeferenda verbis humanis, quibus scribuntur abundare, cum Papa non super, sed sub verbo dei sit iuxta illud Gal: i. 109  The Annotated Luther, vol. 1, 129; WA 2.6.12–14: Vexaverunt iam diu Ioannem Reuch­ lin secretarium consultorem, vexant nunc me quaestionarium (ut sic dixerim) disputatorem, nec consilia nec disputationes passuri.

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Latin, Luther mentions the famous orator Cicero, in order to ridicule his accusers who invented “a new Latin language”, in which telling the truth has to be considered as to placing the Church in danger.110 Cajetan himself is, of course, always addressed with the most revered titles, but since he was a Dominican, Luther was able to construct an archetypical dichotomy between his own theologia ecclesiastica and the scholastic theology based on that “extraordinary audacity” which led to a disregard of scriptural proofs. In the autumn of 1518, therefore, the debate was focused on what it meant to be “properly” Catholic. After subordinating the authority of the pope to the authority of Scripture, Luther was still willing to prove that Unigenitus can be read in agreement with his interpretation of Scripture, and not as Cajetan did: Briefly, if the Extravagante is to be retained as authoritative, it is thus clear that the merits of Christ must, of necessity, be understood in a twofold sense. On the one hand, according to the literal and formal sense, the merits of Christ are a treasure of the life-giving Spirit. Since they are his very own, the Holy Spirit apportions them to whomever he wills. On the other hand, according to the nonliteral, effective, sense, they only signify according to the letter and the incidental consequences, a treasure created by the merits of Christ. And as the Extravagante quotes Scripture in a nonliteral sense, so also it understands the treasure, the merits of Christ, and all other concepts in a nonliteral sense. For this reason, it is ambiguous and obscure, and affords a most proper occasion for debate. In my Theses, on the other hand, I spoke in terms of the proper sense [of treasure].111

Clement VI’s bull Unigenitus is a less authoritative proof than Scripture – but there is a way in which the papal decree can be read in agreement with the Scripture. Luther points out that the only way to avoid placing Clement’s bull into opposition with Scripture is to assume that the pope mentioned the merits of the saints in a nonliteral sense, because, as Luther emphasized several times, the merits of human beings are not worthy of the salvation of other human be110  The Annotated Luther, vol. 1, 129; WA 2.6.21–31: Nunc, mi lector, quod ago tale est: video libellos edi et rumores varios spargi de actibus meis Augustensibus, quanquam vere nihil ibi egerim quam quod et tempus et sumptus perdidi, nisi id satis abunde fuerit operis, quod novam audivi linguam latinam, scilicet quod veritatem docere idem sit quod Ecclesiam perturbare, adulari vero et Christum negare, id est Ecclesiam Christi pacificare et exaltare. neque enim video, quomodo non tu sis barbarus Romanis et Romani tibi, si hanc nescieris eloquentiam, etiam si alias Ciceronis eloquentiam superes. Igitur ne in alterutram partem vel amici nimio elevent vel inimici nimio deprimant causam, volo ipse in publicum dare ea, quae obiecta mihi et quae a me responsa fuere, simul vel hoc testimonio notum facturus, me praestitisse satis arduam et abunde fidelem obedientiam. 111  The Annotated Luther, vol. 1, 140–41; WA 2.12.23–30: Breviter: Itaque patet, quod merita Christi necesse est dupliciter accipi, si salva debet Extravagans consistere, Uno modo proprie et formaliter, et sic sunt thesaurus vitae spiritus et propriissime a solo spiritusancto distributus, cui voluerit, Alio modo improprie et effective et literaliter pro eo quod meritis Christi effectum est, Et sicut Extravagans improprie inducit scripturas, ita etiam improprie thesaurum, improprie merita Christi et omnia improprie accipit. Quo factum est, ut esset ambigua, obscura et occasio iustissima disputandi: ego autem proprie locutus sum in meis positionibus.



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ings. The subordination of papal decrees to the authority of Scripture is, thus, based on the “clarity” of the latter in opposition to the “obscurities” of the former. In his counterarguments against Cajetan, Luther goes ever more towards scriptural primacy, linking it with the correlative notion of the intrinsic clarity of the biblical text. While he was developing his scriptural argument with more precision, Luther was still committed to showing not only his Catholic identity, but also his obedience to the Roman Church. During his stay at Augsburg, and soon after his return to Wittenberg, he wrote an open appeal to Pope Leo X and a plea for a general council. In his appeal to the pope, Luther complained about the false accusations made against him by his opponents, and wrote his own version of the events following the publication of the Ninety-Five Theses, in order to inform the ill-informed pope about what actually transpired. In this treatise, Luther was still willing to affirm that in the voice of the pope, he recognized the voice of Christ.112 In his appeal for a council, Luther rebuked the accusation that he had wanted to criticize the pope or attack the Church, but he restated that Christians had the right and the duty to criticize their fellow-Christians when they erred; this also included the pope, as testified by Gal. 2:11–14. Furthermore, Luther pointed out that the decrees of the pope and the councils need to be tested on the basis of Scripture.113 Meanwhile, after Luther emphasized that no papal decision had been made on the matter of indulgences, and asked Pope Leo to take a position, Cajetan worked to achieve this goal. On 9 November, Leo published the bull Cum Postquam in which, following Cajetan’s indications, the pope stated the validity of indulgences in remitting punishment for the souls in purgatory, on the basis of the merits of Christ and the saints.114 In the autumn of 1518, Luther finally claimed the subordination of papal authority to that of the Scripture, but he was not willing to deny papal authority as such. This tension reverberated in a third dispute, the famous Leipzig debate against Johannes Eck. As recalled in the previous chapter, an exchange of pamphlets begun with Karlstadt’s critique of Eck, and continued with the reply of the Ingolstadt professor, and the subsequent intervention of Luther on Karlstad’s side resulted in the direct confrontation between the three men in Leipzig in July 1519. On the eve of the Leipzig debate, the reception of Eck’s commentary on pseudo-Dionysius reshaped Luther’s concept of the theology of the cross. Eck’s position also influenced Luther with regard to ecclesiology. Heiko Augustinus Oberman has convincingly argued that, in 1518, the Wittenberg front entered the debate with two divergent arguments, the strong papalism of Sylvester Prierias on the one hand, and Eck’s more conciliarist position, which 112 

Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: The First Year (1518),” 553–54. Luthers Theologie, 132–34. 114  Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: The First Year (1518),” 556. 113 Lohse,

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were closer to the ecclesiology of Jean Gerson than to Pope Boniface VIII’s bull Unam Sanctam. It was precisely their shared divergence from Prierias that gave Eck and the Wittenbergers the possibility of finding common ground on ecclesiology,115 even if Luther and Karlstadt partly constructed their ecclesiology in opposition to Eck.116 The events in Leipzig and their impact on Luther’s developing ecclesiology are well known. In one of the pamphlets which preceded the dispute, Luther himself asked for a confrontation based on the authority of Scripture. Not scholastic theology, but the divine Word would set the standard to settle a theological dispute. Like Karlstadt, who made a similar plea, Eck too was willing to follow Luther on this path. Luther’s accent on the centrality of Scripture at this juncture cannot be understood as a singular principle. Indeed, both in the treatises which preceded the dispute, as well as in the debate in Leipzig, arguments drawn from the Fathers, the Councils, and Church History are used at the same level of scriptural proofs by the three contenders. Luther’s contrast was between scholasticism and the true sources of Christianity. In this light, Eck was pejoratively labelled as an exponent of scholasticism and Aristotelian philosophy. While Eck and Luther agreed on the use of non-scholastic sources in order to substantiate their positions, their interpretation of papal authority and Church History sharply conflicted. It is well known that Luther affirmed obedience to the pope, but denied the divine authority of the papacy as an institution. Luther’s arguments were based on a series of Scriptural arguments. He dismissed the use of standard biblical passages to prove the divine institution of the papacy, namely Matt. 16:18 and John 21:17. The former, according to Luther, did not deal with the Roman Church, but with all Churches, since Jesus was not addressing only Peter, but all of the apostles. The passage “Feed my sheep” in John 21:17 did not refer to the pope, but only to the office of preaching God’s Word given to Peter as well as to the other apostles.117 The two arguments were derived partly from Scripture and partly from the Fathers (the interpretation of Jerome, Chrysostom, and Augustine was quoted by Luther to legitimize his own position)118 or by Church History (John 21:17 cannot refer to the pope, since he 115  Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “Wittenbergs Zweifrontenkrieg gegen Prierias und Eck: Hintergrund und Entscheidungen des Jahres 1518,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte (1969): 331–58. 116  As noted in the previous chapter, Volker Leppin has proved that Luther and Karlstadt constructed some arguments in their respective Theses against scholastic theology in opposition to Eck’s dispute in Vienne. This did not prevent the Wittenbergers and the Ingolstadt Professor from sharing a common ground for debate, as Leppin has noted: Leppin, “Der Einfluss Johannes Ecks auf den jungen Luther,” 144. 117  As noted by Volker Leppin, Luther based his interpretation on the meaning of the Latin verb pascere: “Die Genese des reformatorischen Schriftprinzips: Beobachtungen zu Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Johannes Eck bis zur Leipziger Disputation,” 135–36. 118 Grane, Martinus Noster, 59.



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is not the shepherd of all Christians, nor of non-Christians119). The papacy must be obeyed, even as a human institution. For Luther, the need to obey the pope was based on Romans 13, which binds submission to higher powers to maintain unity in the Church, and on the consideration that the pope could not have remained the head of the Latin Church for centuries without God’s approval.120 During the dispute in Leipzig, Eck famously accused Luther of spreading the “Hussite virus”. Eck stated that Luther’s position regarding the papacy coincided with that of Hus, and that these ideas had already been condemned during the Council of Constance. Luther vehemently rejected the charge of being a Hussite, but pointed out that some of Hus’ claims were indeed true and evangelical. In order to support the claim of the divine origin of the papacy, Eck drew from an impressive amount of quotations from Scripture, the Fathers, the Councils, and Church History. As Bernard Lohse has noted, both Eck and Luther could quote different examples from Church History to substantiate their positions. Eck mentioned the appeal to Pope Leo I by the Constantinopolitan patriarch Flavian to maintain the doctrine of the two natures of Christ, the human and the divine, during the Christological controversies of the fifth century; Luther, on the other hand, emphasized that no Church Father ever endorsed or was aware of the primacy of the Church in Rome over the other Churches.121 As a result of their different interpretations and different use of the sources, both Luther and Eck were convinced that they had disproved the position of their opponent. Eck claimed to have quoted proofs from the Scripture, from the Fathers, and from Church History to demonstrate the divine origin of the papacy; Luther insisted that Eck’s quotations did not disprove his scriptural arguments. The debate in Leipzig had far-reaching consequences for the discourse on Scripture in the early sixteenth century. Eck claimed victory for proving a shared understanding of the nature of the papacy from different sources, and, thus, for proving that Luther had departed from the true “Catholic” tradition. There was a widespread attempt in the polemics of the early Roman controversialists to prove that Luther had put his own theology above, and in contrast with, the shared Catholic tradition.122 On his side, after Leipzig, Luther placed a higher emphasis on the primacy of Scripture. Eck’s quotations from the Fathers 119 

Ibid., 61.

120  Ibid., 57–59. 121 Lohse, Luthers

Theologie, 140. his 1525 Enchiridium locorum communium adversos Lutherum et alios hostes ecclesiae Eck formulated the notion that individual interpretation of Scripture can never be correct if it is not in agreement with the interpretation of the Church. All of the Roman controversialists moved this counter-argument against Luther’s emphasis on the primacy of Scripture. For an accurate reconstruction of these debates, see: Ekkehard Mühlenberg, “Scriptura non est autentica sine authoritate ecclesiae (Johannes Eck): Vorstellungen von der Entstehung des Kanons in der Kontroverse um das reformatorische Schriftprinzip,” Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 97 (2000): 183–209. 122  In

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and Church History were labelled as irrelevant by Luther, since they did not touch directly on his remarks on how to correctly interpret Matt. 16:18–19 and John 21. After the Leipzig debate, the authority of the Fathers and their human words held less weight for Luther than the Divine Word, encompassed in Scripture. Moreover, the opinions of the Church Fathers could diverge from Scripture. For this reason, as Volker Leppin points out, Luther conceptualized what he called the “Augustine rule” (regula Augustini). Quoting Augustine, Luther emphasized that the writings of theologians, including the Church Fathers, must be judged by their adherence to Holy Scripture.123 Prierias, Cajetan, and Eck represented three different understandings of papal authority, as well as three different understandings of the relationship between Church and Scripture. In rebuking their arguments, Luther reshaped his own position regarding Scripture and ecclesiology. In so doing, he increasingly advanced the authority of Scripture over any form of human knowledge and authority. The rhetorical frame Luther used in these debates pictured a distinct contrast between scholasticism and his own theologia ecclesiastica. If in 1518 and 1519 the line of demarcation between the different sources of authority in the Church had not yet been clearly delineated, Luther’s excommunication marked the final break toward the Sola Scriptura. After the discovery of the “horrible truth” that “we are all Hussites”, Scripture became the only instrument for discerning the true Church from the false. At the beginning of 1520, Luther’s scriptural argument came to be tinged with an apocalyptic afflatus. The discovery that Eck had ultimately been right in pointing to a continuity between Luther and John Hus, and that Hus had been burnt alive precisely for preaching evangelical doctrines, led Luther to conceptualize the role of Scripture in the context of the imminent battle with the Antichrist. For Luther, it was the specific characteristic of the Devil’s activity, to lead people away from God’s Word. Ultimately, this ability to confuse and mix God’s words would be the only real weapon the Devil could wield against Christians. With Luther’s excommunication and the incendiary events that dramatically shook Europe in the mid-1520s, a new phase began. With it, a new series of debates emerged regarding Scripture, its interpretation, and its role with tradition. Indeed, Luther’s sola formulas generated the confrontational attitude of his opponents, who saw every sola as a departure from the true Catholic doctrine based on the teaching of the Church, and the followers of Luther’s anti-Roman protest, who often found themselves in deep disagreement with Luther himself. Regarding the first aspect, it is worth noting that the Roman Church condemned what it perceived as individualistic readings of Scripture in the period immediately prior to the indulgence controversy. On 19 December 1516, 123  Leppin, “Die Genese des reformatorischen Schriftprinzips: Beobachtungen zu Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Johannes Eck bis zur Leipziger Disputation,” 131.



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the Fifth Lateran Council promulgated the bull Supernae maiestatis praesidio, in which clerics were bound to follow the scriptural interpretation of the theologians whose teachings had been accepted and judged as orthodox by the Church. The bull is addressed against the rise of millenarian expectations, mostly derived from Savonarola’s preaching in Florence. As noted by Brandmüller, the possibility of receiving special revelation from the Holy Ghost to enlighten the Scriptural text is not denied, however, the claim to be inspired by the Spirit must be judged and verified by the pope.124 In the following year, the Synod of Florence restated the same point against the Italian prophet Francesco da Meleto (1449–1517). In his two works, Francesco prophesized the imminent conversion of Jews and Muslims to Christianity and, thus, a subsequent new era of religious peace. In 1512 he published his Convivio de’ secreti della Scriptura Sancta, dating the conversion of Jews to Christianity to 1517, thirty years after the Jewish expulsion from Spain and Portugal; in the Quadrivium temporum prophetarum (1514), he added the further prophecy that Muslims would convert to Christianity in 1536.125 The Synod of Florence reiterated the decree of the Fifth Lateran Council, judging the statements of Francesco da Meleto as heretical, and declared that whoever distorted the meaning of Scripture, departing from the interpretation of the Church, should also be condemned.126 Only a few months later, the indulgence controversy erupted. In rebuking Prierias, Cajetan, and Eck, Luther clarified and modified his attitude toward the pope, the Church, and the Scripture. At the apex of these debates, in the 1520 Assertio omnium articolorum, he claimed that only Scripture could reign in the Church. Luther’s statements regarding the need to be first enlightened by the Spirit in order to properly understand the Bible sparked the rise of theologians and sometimes self-declared prophets, who based their own interpretation of Scripture on their claim to have received a divine revelation. Geist, geist, geist!127 Luther exclaimed, emphasizing the continuous claims on multiple sides of spiritual revelation. On the one hand, at the beginning of 124  Walter Brandmüller, “‘Traditio Scripturae Interpres:’ The Teaching of the Councils on the Right Interpretation of Scripture up to the Council of Trent,” The Catholic Historical Review 73 (1987): 523–40. 125  For Francesco da Meleto’s prophecies, see: Cesare Vasoli, “La profezia di Francesco da Meleto,” Archivio di filosofia, no. 3 (1963): 27–80; Stefano dall’Aglio, “L’altra faccia dello pseudoprofeta Francesco da Meleto scrivano della SS. Annunziata di Firenze,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 67 (2005): 343–51; Eugenio Garin, “Paolo Orlandini e il profeta Francesco da Meleto,” in La cultura filosofica del Rinascimento italiano, ed. Eugenio Garin (Florence: Sansoni, 1961), 213–23. 126  For Francesco’s condemnation at the Synod of Florence, see: Brandmüller, “‘Traditio Scripturae Interpres:’ The Teaching of the Councils on the Right Interpretation of Scripture up to the Council of Trent,” 38–39; Anna Morisi Guerra, “La profezia di un impolitico: la condanna di Francesco da Meleto al sinodo fiorentino del 1516,” Cristianesimo nella storia 20 (1999): 579–93. 127  As quoted by Susan Schreiner, Are You Alone Wise? The Search for Certainty in the

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the 1520s, the Wittenberger movement was dominated by a messianic afflatus. Unsurprisingly, Luther himself claimed a special revelation for himself. Thus, for instance, in answering Casper Schwenckfeld, who based his claim that the bread and the wine in the Eucharist cannot be identified with the blood and body of Christ on the inspiration of the Spirit, Luther stated that God promised not to let him err.128 On the other hand, especially after the defeat of the peasants in 1525, Luther distanced himself from these politically charged movements. In the treatises of this period, Luther attacked an “unmediated” reading of the biblical text. In coining the adjective Schwärmer, which came to have significant implications as a signifier against heretics in later Protestantism, Luther equated all his opponents through the accusation of spiritualism. In the mid-1520s, the Bible and its authority reigned throughout Europe, but its interpretations had become the most incendiary fuel for both the defenders and the critics of the Roman Church alike in the apocalyptic afflatus which propagated throughout Christendom.

5.5  Sola Scriptura and the Manifold Interpretations of Scripture Biblical studies underwent a sea change in the early sixteenth century, due to different cultural currents which both contrasted and mutually influenced one another. Among these different tendencies, I emphasized here the importance of the growing interest in biblical languages. This was sometimes accompanied by an emergent philological method, as in the case of Valla and Erasmus, and sometimes with the simultaneous study of Hermetic and Kabbalistic texts as with the case of Reuch­lin, Jacques Lefèvre, and Agostino Giustiniani. With different aims and ideas, these authors produced new editions of the Bible, which on the one hand enhanced the cause of biblical studies, but on the other sparked new debates on the correct interpretation of the Scripture. Martin Luther acted as a biblical scholar in this context. In my brief overview of the development of his Sola Scriptura, I have emphasized that existing scholarship has shed light on two interesting aspects: 1) Sola Scriptura is not a principle that Luther discovered all at once; 2) Luther developed his scriptural argument in opposition to the early Roman controversialists. Around 1520, while the Roman controversialists emphasized that the interpretation of Scripture provided by the Roman Church was the only possible correct interpretation, Luther, unlike in previous years, admitted that a hiatus occurred with the conquest of the papacy by the Antichrist. At this juncture, the authority of the Early Modern Era, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 96. 128  Ibid., 89–90.



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Scripture is above the Church. The true Church of Christ is where the Scripture is preached. On the basis of this chapter, I would like to develop the picture that has emerged here in two different ways. First, in the next chapter I will emphasize that Erasmus of Rotterdam’s biblical scholarship played an important, albeit ambivalent, role in the development of Luther’s hermeneutics. It helped him to overcome the medieval quadriga, but it also induced him, through a negative reception, to marginalize allegory and to place a stronger influence on the notion of scriptural clarity. In the final chapter, I will once again reflect on how Luther’s preaching of a cross-centered theology was contemporaneous to Reuch­lin’s affair, thus identifying Christian Kabbalah as a catalyst for Luther’s theology of the cross.

Chapter 6

The Spirit and the Letter: The Debate on Biblical Hermeneutics in Context In their famous and controversial dispute on the freedom/bondage of the will, Erasmus of Rotterdam and Martin Luther pictured two different understandings of the human condition after original sin. While Erasmus emphasized that a divine spark remained in the individual even after original sin, Martin Luther rejected this idea. Regarding soteriology, Erasmus argued that the individual cooperates with God in the salvific process, although in his view the role of human being was minimal; Martin Luther emphasized that salvation was not a transaction, and did not therefore take place through an interplay of good works and divine mercy. For Luther, salvation would be freely bestowed by God upon the believers and, thus, Erasmus as well as everyone else who attributed even minor significance to the role of the individual in the salvific process should be considered a Pelagian. Both Luther and Erasmus saw a close link between soteriology and theological anthropology. Chapter Three demonstrated the extent to which Luther’s image of the man in his postlapsarian condition was constructed in opposition to that proposed by Erasmus. Aside from anthropology, another area of dispute between Luther and Erasmus was biblical hermeneutics. The positions the two theologians assumed are antithetical: Erasmus maintained that the biblical text was complicated, full of parables and rhetorical figures and, thus, needed to be carefully interpreted. Martin Luther, meanwhile, countered by emphasizing the clarity of the central message in the Scripture. During the same period in which he became embroiled in a dispute with Erasmus, Luther also rebuked the positions of those he labelled as “enthusiasts”. In the 1520s, Andreas von Karlstadt, Thomas Müntzer, Sebastian Franck, and others accused Martin Luther of being unable to differentiate between the literal and unfruitful sense of Scripture and the proper spiritual meaning of the biblical text. In response, Luther pointed out that the Spirit did not speak inwardly within the individual, but only through the mediation of the external Word. In this sense, the role of the Spirit and the limits of its activity assumed significant relevance in the construction of Luther’s exegetical position. The development of Luther’s scriptural interpretation is one of the central themes in Luther Studies. Too often, however, Luther’s Sola Scriptura has been described as a principle that Luther discovered, and thereafter coherently ap-

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plied throughout his career. Just as for every other aspect of Luther’s thought, however, in order to reconstruct Luther’s position in its historical context, it is necessary to set aside the concept of an “evangelical breakthrough” and, instead, scrutinize Luther’s position in light of the historical context. In this chapter, I will focus my attention on the development of Luther’s understanding of the spirit-letter distinction from a hermeneutical perspective. As Luther’s hermeneutic starting principle was the theology of the cross, it is necessary to clarify historically how, and in reaction to what tendencies, Luther developed his hermeneutics. Addressing this problem, I point out that Luther’s positions at the juncture of his second lecture on the Psalms have to be understood as a critical reception to the scholarship of Erasmus of Rotterdam. I argue that, while Luther appreciated Erasmus’ overcoming of the medieval quadriga and his attention to the literal grammatical interpretation, it was in reaction to Erasmus’ emphasis on the intrinsic contradictions within the Scripture that Luther refined his notion of the clarity of the biblical text. As mentioned above, this aspect manifested itself in their public dispute. I also emphasize the deep influence that Erasmus exercised on Luther, which is demonstrated by the interpretation of single passages. One passage in which Luther followed Erasmus’ exegesis (Heb. 2:9), for example, and another in which he distanced himself from Erasmus (Gal. 2:11–14) serve as key cases in point. Finally, I show that in the development of Luther’s scriptural arguments, Hieronymus Emser, who followed in the footsteps of both Erasmus and the Christian Kabbalists, also played a significant role.

6.1  In Spirit and in Faith: Grammar, Theology, and Sapientia Crucis in Luther’s Operationes in Psalmos Under the influence of Augustine’s De Spiritu et Littera, Martin Luther emphasized that the famous Pauline passage 2 Cor. 3:6 “The letter kills, the Spirit gives life” should not be understood as a distinction between a literal, unfruitful reading of the Scripture and a deeper, spiritual meaning of the biblical text. The Pauline distinction between spirit and letter is a contrast between the dead-killing letter and the life-giving grace. This assumption led Luther to break with much of the theological tradition that preceded him. In 1519–21, Luther gave his second lecture on the Psalms, which he published under the title Operationes in Psalmos. This text is generally considered the first product of Luther’s mature exegetical positions. For the first time in his career, Luther did not adopt the well-consolidated scheme of the fourfold interpretation of Scripture. Throughout the Middle Ages, the relationship between the Old and the New Testament was long conceived in terms of the fulfillment of the prophecies of the Old Testament. Against this ex-



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egetical tradition, Luther began with his intention to expose the literal sense of the Psalms. The literal sense is, for Luther, always Christocentric or, more often, Gospel-centric, in that Luther interprets the referent of the Psalms to be Christ, but more often he reads the Old Testament text as a reference to the faith of the Gospel, namely salvation through faith alone.1 What does Luther mean by a literal reading of the Psalms? How does this literal reading of the Psalter relate to the spiritual meaning of Scripture as a whole? Since his first lecture on the Psalms, Luther adopted a strong Christological reading of the Old Testament. Following Faber Stapulensis, he went beyond Nicholas of Lyra and claimed that Jesus was the historical referent of the prophecies of the Old Testament. Unlike Lyra, Luther considered the prophecies of the Old Testament as not having a double referent – an historical and a spiritual referent, the former referring to a certain character of the Old Testament and the latter to Christ. In fact, every prophecy refers to Christ, both historically and spiritually. Since the beginning of the controversy over indulgences, Luther used Scripture as an argument to refute the use and abuse of indulgences, as well as to substantiate his early critiques of papal authority.2 The Leipzig debate marked a crucial point in Luther’s nascent understanding of the role of Scripture in the Church. As David Bagchi has pointed out, Luther’s early opponents emphasized the continuity between the Church’s interpretation of Scripture and the spiritual meaning of the Holy Writ. Cochlaues, Eck, and Emser argued that no hiatus could exist between the Church and the Scripture. According to them, it is a peculiarity of heretics to place themselves outside the Church and use, or rather misuse, the Holy Writ to legitimize their heresies. Setting themselves outside of the Church, the heretics – so the Roman controversialists – were doomed to grab only the literal meaning of Scripture, and fail to understand the spiritual one. Moreover, the controversialists developed the 1  I use the term “Gospel-centric” or “Evangelic-centric” in opposition to Christological following Siegfried Reader in his investigation of Luther’s hermeneutics in the Operationes in Psalmos: Siegfried Raeder, Grammatica theologica: Studien zu Luthers Operationes in Psalmos (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1977). Luther’s “Christocentric” or “Gospel-centric” reading of the Old Testament has been long discussed in secondary literature with regard to Luther’s interpretation and use of the Old Testament. Beyond the already-mentioned studies by Ebeling and Preus, one of the most quoted texts is Heinrich Bornkamm’s study on Luther’s use of the Old Testament: Heinrich Bornkamm, Luther und das Alte Testament (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1948). Bornkamm emphasized that Luther interpreted the Old Testament in light of the New Testament. Moreover, Christine Helmer has investigated Luther’s understanding of the Trinitarian hermeneutic of the Old Testament: Christine Helmer, “Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic and the Old Testament,” Modern Theology 18 (2002): 49–73; “God from Eternity to Eternity: Luther’s Trinitarian Understanding,” The Harvard Theological Review 96 (2003): 127–46. Recently, William Marsh has reiterated the concept that Luther read the Bible as a “Christian Scripture”. Marsh stressed that in the prefaces to the Bible, Luther interpreted Christ as the sensus literalis of the Old Testament: Marsh, Martin Luther on Reading the Bible as Christian Scripture, 224. 2 Stengel, Sola scriptura im Kontext, 41–52.

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argument of a consensus ecclesiae. According to them, through the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the Church, the Fathers, and the councils interpreted Scripture homogenously according to its spiritual meaning. Luther, the last of a long list of heretics, interpreted Scripture only according to its literal sense, and thus his continuous references to the Bible were ultimately deemed worthless. While before 1520 the debates circled around the meaning of Scripture, its relationship with the Church, and the role of the interpretation of the Fathers, following Luther’s excommunication, the Scriptural argument lost weight in the eyes of Luther’s opponents. Once Luther was declared a heretic, there was no need to prove his heresy with scriptural arguments, since Luther’s heresy was sufficient proof of his misunderstanding of Scripture.3 Meanwhile, Karlstadt, Franck, Müntzer, and others accused Luther of relying on the literal, rather than the spiritual, “proper” sense of Scripture. The correct interpretation of the spiritual meaning of Scripture was, thus, the central matter of debate in the early 1520s. Accused of relying on the literal sense both by the Roman controversialists as well as by the so-called “radical reformers”, during that period, Luther chose to clarify what constituted the spiritual meaning of the Holy Bible. The sensus spiritualis, according to him, did not lie generically in the revelation of Christ as the Messiah, but more specifically in Christ’s death and resurrection in the cross. The sensus spiritualis of the Holy Writ was the sensus fidei. Faith in Christ revealed the overall meaning of the biblical text and the inherent dichotomy between law and grace which characterized the Scripture. In reading the Bible, one had to evaluate every passage according to the law-Gospel distinction, which meant asking oneself if that specific passage revealed sins or pronounced the forgiveness of sins. Thus, every passage had to be read in the light of Christ. The overall meaning took precedence over, and was propaedeutic for, a correct understanding of the singular meanings. This implies for Luther that only those who have faith in Christ know the real meaning of the Bible. Without faith, one can correctly decipher a single passage, but will always miss the relation between that passage and the rest of the Bible. For Luther, solus Christus and sola crux are the focus of attention and a point of departure for the correct interpretation of the Bible, without which no correct interpretation is even possible. With the theology of the cross as the starting point of Luther’s exegetical method, how does it relate to the literal sense of the Scripture? First, Luther points out that the Holy Spirit has decided to openly reveal the spiritual meaning of the Bible. Thus, at a plain level, the literal meaning of Scripture is clear. Second, the theologian is required to pay attention to the meaning of the single words so as not to confuse the message of a single passage. In Luther’s perspective, the sola crux position assumes primacy for understanding Scripture as a 3 Bagchi,

Luther’s Earliest Opponents, 163–68.



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whole; the literal meaning, however, has its own relevance in the understanding of single passages. In the Operationes in Psalmos, one can find a good example of how Luther conceived the relationship between the literal and spiritual sense of the Scripture. It goes without saying that the Psalter has its own textual characteristics, and Luther’s discussion follows the peculiarity of the text on which he is commenting. upon. I focus here, by way of example, on Luther’s comments on the first two Psalms. Luther’s exegetical method follows these patterns: an explanation of the literal-historical meaning of the individual words, a focus on the “Christocentric” or “Gospel-centric” referent of the Psalm, and the clarification of the role of the single Psalm in relation to the rest of the Bible. Let me follow this process in greater detail. After a brief excursus against the philosophers who looked for blessedness in virtue, while the psalmist claims that blessed are only those who love the law of God,4 Luther begins his discussion about Psalm 1 by first giving consideration to “matters that are grammatical and yet theological”.5 Luther analyzes Verse 1 word by word to explain the literal meaning of each term. “Blessed” in Hebrew can refer both to “blessed people” and to “blessed things”. It indicates that blessed are those whose affairs do not diverge from God, since “as you are, so God is to you”, namely the condition of the creature depends on its relationship with the creator.6 The word “man” (vir) can have three meanings in the Holy Writ: age (as in 1 Cor. 13:11),7 sex (as in Matt. 1:16),8 or humanity (1 Sam. 26:15).9 This third sense is, according to Luther, the one which the psalmist used in this instance, since he refers both to the “blessedness” of men and women.10 4  LW 14.287; WA 5.26.30–32, 27.1–6: Communis mortalium de beatitudine quaestio est neque ullus est, qui non optet esse bene sibi odiatque male esse sibi, attamen omnes, quotquot sunt, aberraverunt a verae beatitudinis notitia atque ii magis, qui maxime eam inquisierunt, ut philosophi, quorum nobiliores in virtute aut opere virtutis ipsam collocaverunt, quo caeteris facti infoeliciores se et huius et futurae vitae bonis pariter privarunt. Vulgus etsi crasse delyrabat, in voluptatibus carnis beatum esse cupiens, saltem huius vitae bonis potitum est. Hic autem de coelo sonans, omnium studia detestatus, unicam beatitudinis omnibus ignotam affert definitionem, Beatum esse, qui legem dei diligat. 5  LW 14.287; WA 5.27.8: Sed primo grammatica videamus, verum ea Theologica. 6  LW 14.287; WA 5.27.9–15: Hebraeus numero plurali dicit “Aschre”, Beati vel beata, ut Beata viri, qui non abiit, ac si dicat, omnia bene habent viro illi, qui &c. Quid disputatis? quid vana concluditis? illud unicum margaritum si quis vir invenerit, ut legem dei diligat et ab impiis separatus fuerit, huius omnia sunt optima, quo non invento quaeret omnia bona nec unum inveniet. Ut enim mundis omnia munda, ita diligentibus omnia dilecta, bonis omnia bona et in universum: qualis tu es, talis et deus ipse tibi, nedum creatura. 7  1 Cor. 13:11: When I became a man, I gave up childish ways. 8  Matt. 1:16: Jacob was the father of Joseph, the husband of Mary. 9  1 Sam. 26:15: And David said to Abner, “are you not a man?” 10  LW 14.288; WA 5.27.19–24: “Vir” in scripturis Tripliciter dicitur, aetatem, sexum virtutemque significat. Aetatis nomen est: i. Corin. xiij. “Cum factus sum vir, evacuavi, quae erant

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Regarding the Latin verb “He has departed” (abiit), or the Hebrew “he has not walked”, Luther notes that in Scripture the verb “to walk” means “to live”.11 “Council” could refer to “principles” or “doctrines”. The psalmist chose this word, according to Luther, to criticize the pride of the ungodly: first, because the ungodly disdains the law of God and chooses to follow their own counsel; second, because they are convinced of being wise, and disguise their errors with the mere appearance of wisdom.12 Finally, the word “ungodly” (impious) is interpreted by Luther, following Hilary of Poitiers, as referring to those who have evil feelings about God.13 As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, Luther’s position slowly changed from conceiving “ungodly” from being proud to being an unbeliever. Indeed, in this passage, Luther emphasizes: “For ungodliness is, strictly speaking, the crime of unbelief and is committed in the heart”.14 Thus, this passage gives Luther the opportunity to foreground one of his key doctrines, namely that piety and impiety do not allude to behaviors but to attitudes, namely to the source of behaviors. Whoever believes in God lives a good life, and whoever does not believe in God necessarily falls into evil. Thus, Luther concludes, the pious person lives through faith, the impious through unbelief.15 The grammatical explanation of these passages allows Luther to explain what constitutes a sinner, and how sinfulness and ungodliness should be correctly understood. Thus, Luther interprets the remaining words of Psalm 1:1 in this light: “has stood” (stetit) means stubbornness, the excuses made by the parvuli”. Sexus: Mat. i. “Iacob genuit Ioseph virum Mariae”. Ioan. iiij. “Vade, voca virum tuum”. Virtutis: i. Reg: xvi. “Ait David ad Abner: Nunquid non vir tu es?” Atque hoc tercio modo hic beatus vir dicitur, ne muliebrem sexum ab hac beatitudine excludat. 11  LW 14.288; WA 5.27.25–27: “Abiit”, aptius hebraice “lo alach”, non ambulavit, non ingressus est, non incessit, quod et graecum ουκ επορευθη habet. Notum autem est, more scripturae ambulare et ingredi methaphoricos idest, quod vivere seu conversari. 12  LW 14.288; WA 5.27.31–37: “Consilium” hic sine dubio pro decretis et doctrinis accipitur, cum nulla stet hominum conversatio, nisi certis decretis et legibus formetur serveturque. Taxat autem eo verbo impiorum superbiam et perditam temeritatem. Primum quod non in lege domini dignentur ambulare, sed proprio se regunt consilio. Deinde consilium appellat, quod prudentiam sonat, et viam, quae errorem nesciat. Nam haec est perditio impiorum, quod in oculis suis prudentes. 13  LW 14.288; WA 5.28.9–10: “Impius”, qui hebraice “rascha” dicitur, rectissime apud S. Hilarium is dicitur, qui male de deo sentit. 14  LW 14.288; WA 5.28.10–11: Impietas enim proprie vitium incredulitatis est et corde perpetratur. 15  LW 14.289; WA 5.28.11–20: Tu ergo haec duo semper contraria habeto, fidem dei et impietatem sicut legem dei et consilium hominum. Nam quando de pietate et impietate agimus, non de moribus, sed de opinionibus agimus, hoc est de fontibus morum. Qui enim orthodoxus in deum est, non potest nisi bona facere, bonos mores prestare. Quod si etiam septies in die cadit iustus, toties tamen resurgit. At impii corruunt in malum et non resurgunt. Hii, quia increduli sunt, nullum opus bonum faciunt, totum autem quod agunt, pulchra species est, umbra illa Behemoth, qua et se decipiant et simplices alliciant. Igitur pius est, qui ex fide vivit, impius, qui in incredulitate vivit.



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proud with “words of malice” (verbis maliciae);16 “seat” (cathedra) refers to be a master, as in Matt. 23:15, “the scribes sit on Moses’ seat”;17 and on the word “pestilence” ( pestilentia) Luther notes that the Hebrew refers to the mockers or those who are scornful, and there are two kinds of scornful people: those who accuse the Psalter of being deceitful, and those who, under the appearance of sound doctrine, spread “the poison of their false teachings”.18 The explanation of the “grammatical and yet theological” meaning ends here. Luther’s exegesis continues analyzing how the words of the psalmist apply to the contemporary Church. First, he claims that Scripture “prudently refrains from mentioning sects and persons”.19 Thus, this Psalm, as all others, have specific implicit referents. Psalm 1, for instance, refers primarily to the Jews.20 The custom in Scripture not to mention specific persons is necessary so that, being eternal, the scriptural text can be applied to all people in every time, despite changes in custom, place, time and usage. Indeed, godliness and ungodliness do not change.21 For this reason, Luther emphasizes that “we, too, like the holy fathers, apply the Psalm to that generation which is contemporaneous with us”.22 One of the main criticisms made by Luther in his early years against monks, priests, and bishops, was that they were doubly sinners: not only were they sinners, but they also denied being as such. This Psalm, thus, does not only refer generally to godliness and ungodliness, but mainly to double sinners.23 Luther therefore directly addresses the readers as if the contemporary referents of the Psalm were self-evident: 16 

LW 14.289; WA 5.28.28–30: “Stetit” pertinaciam signat duramque cervicem, qua erecti excusant se verbis maliciae, facti incorrigibiles in impietate sua, quod pietatem eam existiment. Stare enim tropo sacrorum firmum esse significat. 17  LW 14.290; WA 5.28.35–36, 29.1–2: “Cathedra”, “Sedere in cathedra”, est docere, magistrum ac doctorem esse. Matt. xxiij. “Super Cathedram Mosi sederunt scribae” &c. Sic sedere in throno, regnare seu regem esse, ut in libris Regum frequens est: “Sedere in solio” principem esse, “sedere in tribunali” iudicem esse. 18  LW 14.290; WA 5.29.3–6: “Pestilentia” etsi non est ad verbum translatio, satis bona energia redditum est, nam heb. illusorum derisorumve habetur. Sunt autem illusores, quos per psalterium dolosos et linguam dolosam accusat, ut qui sub specie sanae doctrinae venenum erronei dogmatis propinant. 19  LW 14.290; WA 5.29.19–20: Imprimis id in scripturis observandum, quam prudenter abstineat a nominibus sectarum et personarum. 20  LW 14.290; WA 5.29.20–21: Nam cum hoc psalmo sine dubio Iudeorum populus taxetur primo. 21  LW 14.290; WA 5.29.27–30: Et hoc fieri fuit summe necessarium, ut verbum dei, cum sit aeternum, omnibus omnium hominum saeculis conveniret. Nam etsi varient per tempora mores, personae, loca, ritus, eadem tamen vel pietas vel impietas transit per omnia saecula. 22  LW 14.291; WA 5.30.1–2: Quare et nos exemplo sanctorum patrum psalmum ad eandem generationem, quae nobiscum agit vitam, trahamus. 23  LW 14.291–2; WA 5.30.24–27: Sed audi: psalmus iste non tantum impios taxat et peccatores. Nam omnis homo extra Christum impius et peccator est, sed eos potissimum, qui duplici peccato peccant, ut qui, cum impii sint, non hoc agnoscunt, insuper consilium parant, in quo ambulent et impietatem colorent.

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Now who do you think this means in our time? I would not dare name such persons, lest I draw upon myself the implacable enmity of certain priests, monks, and bishops. For the generations of the ungodly have always been mostly intolerant of the Word of God and have filled heaven with martyrs for no other reason than that they maintained that by it they were doing God a service (John 16:2). They looked on themselves as fighting for the godly when they stubbornly accused the truly pious of ungodliness.24

It would have been impossible for the sixteenth-century reader not to recognize the referents of the ungodly mentioned in the Psalm as Luther’s opponents, as well as “the truly pious” unjustly accused of ungodliness. Indeed, Luther describes the ungodly with the typical characteristics he used in his early polemical works: people who only observe ceremonies, grant importance to works and prayers, and those who fight amongst one another on the basis of merits, privileges, and regulations.25 All of these people can be recognized through a general rule: in Luther’s words, “they are confidently secure in their lives and do not have the fear of God before their eyes”.26 Luther applies this definition of ungodliness in the interpretation of the entire Psalm. When in Verse 4 the psalmist contrasts the tree that prospers in all it does (1:3) to the ungodly (1:4 “nor so the ungodly”), Luther repeats the list of the ungodly he made while commenting on Verse 1 (Jews, heretics, and all people far from God), stating again that all those who do not have faith in Christ are ungodly and, thus, also the believers have to fear the Word of God, not put aside their faith.27 The subsequent part of Verse 4 is, thus, applied by Luther to the Jews as well to the ungodly within the Church.28 After explaining who the ungodly are, commenting on Verse 5 (“Therefore the wicked will not stand in the judgment, nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous”), Luther points out that the ungodly will not be with the just in 24  Cf.

LW 14.292; WA 5.30.31–36: Quos autem putas nostro saeculo tangat? Ego non ausim personatus nominare, ne in quorundam sacerdotum, religiosorum, episcoporum implacabilem charybdim impingam. Nam semper fuit hoc genus impiorum hominum impacientissimum verbi dei, caelumque replevit martyribus non alia causa, quam quod se obsequium deo praestare arbitrarentur et pro pietate certare sibi visi sunt, veros pios impietatis pertinacissime accusantes. 25  LW 14.292; WA 5.30.37–9, 31.1–3: Scito tamen et non dubites, hos tangi, qui solis caerimoniis, ritibus aliisque pompis pietatis lucent, vestibus, cibis, locis ac temporibus, aut ad summum operibus et orationibus pietatem metientes, praesertim illi, qui pro suis observanciis, privilegiis, dignitatibus, potestatibus, iuribus in implacabiles dicordias sese dividunt, et quodvis facere ac pati prompti sunt, quam mutua charitate invicem cedere et humiliari. 26  LW 14.292; WA 5.31.3–5: Hos esse impios istos, hoc argumento deprehendas, quod securi fidentesque sunt in vita sua, nec est timor dei ante oculos eorum. 27  LW 14.305; WA 5.42.14–19: In heb. semel “Non sic” dicitur, sed hoc parum habet momenti. Et cum audis impios recordare eorum, quae de impietate supra diximus, ne cum impiis hoc verbum releges tantum ad Iudaeos, haereticos et nescio quosi longe positos, ne forte et tu dei timore posito hoc verbum dei non reverearis. Sed cum impius sit, qui sine fide Christi est, tremendi sunt tibi hi sermones, ne et tu inveniaris impius. 28  LW 14.306; WA 5.43.11–22.



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the presence of God. Interpreting “judgment” (concilio) as referring to an office (officium), the first part of the verse means that the ungodly will have the power to judge on the believers, while the second part signifies that they will never join the believers in their congregation.29 Since the reference is to a spiritual dimension, it must be understood as referring to the afterlife, for believers had to be aware that in this life they could be governed by ungodly men.30 These men are rulers in appearance, or seem to partake in the life of the Church, but “in spirit and truth” the ungodly are never rulers of the believers, neither do they share the life of the congregation.31 Through this dichotomy between appearance and true faith, Luther explains the last verse (“For the Lord knows the way of the righteous, but the way of the wicked will perish”), since the ungodly are regarded by men as if they could rise in judgment, but God sees within their heart and He knows that they do not belong to His Church. The ungodly person pretends to be righteous, but through “the wisdom of the cross” one has to recognize that only God knows the way of the righteous; only He knows the hearts of men.32 Sapientia Crucis is the key term in this passage, since it is in the cross that the believer finds God and can correctly understand the Scripture. This Psalm, as with all other Psalms, has to be understood through the wisdom of the cross, which is faith in Christ. While commenting on Verses 1–2 and 4–6, Luther focuses his attention on the dichotomy between godliness and ungodliness, in his comment to Verse 3 he pays more attention to what it means to have faith in Christ. After explaining in the comments on the first two verses that the only sin is unbelief, and before emphasizing the condition of the ungodly destined to be separated from God, Luther interprets the metaphor of the tree as referring to the true believer. In this verse, just as in every other instance in which this meta29  LW 14.307; WA 5.44.23–27: Est itaque sensus: Impii nunquam eo ascendent, ut sint iudices et rectores fidelium, sed neque in concilio, idest congregatione eorum, hoc est, nec de primatibusnec infimatibus iustorum erunt. Apertius ergo erat: Ideo non surgent impiiin iudicium neque peccatores in concilium iustorum, prorsus non censebuntur inter servos dei. 30  LW 14.308; WA 5.44.37, 45.1–4: Ita et Christus, ut intelligeremus praesidentiam non esse rem ipsam fidelis, multos impios in hac vita remunerat tam vili mercede. Tolerandi itaque sunt utrique sicut palea intra triticum usque ad ventilationis diem. 31  LW 14.308; WA 5.45.11–13: Revera et in spiritu nunquam praesunt, nunquam intersunt impii fidelibus, licet tanta specie vitae fulgeant, ut nulli magis praeesse et interesse fidelibus putentur. 32  LW 14.309; WA 5.45.22–33: Tam speciosa (inquit) est via impiorum, ut apud homines videantur surgere in iudicium et concilium. Sed ille, qui non fallitur, novit vias eorum et scit eos impios esse, et coram eo non sunt in ullo Ecclesiae suae numero. Novit solos iustos, impios non novit, idest non approbat. Proinde quod illi minime omnium credunt, via eorum peribit, peribit inquam, quae tanto successu crescit, ut aeterna videatur futura. Vide, quam nos a specie prospera absterreat et varias tentationes et adversitates nobis commendet. Nam hanc viam iustorum homines omnino reprobant putantes, et deum ignorare eam. Quia sapientia Crucis haec est, ideo solus deus novit viam iustorum, adeo abscondita est etiam ipsis iustis, dextera enim eorum ducit eos mirabiliter, ut sit via non sensus, non rationis, sed solius fidei in caligine et invisibilia videntis.

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phor returns in Scripture, as in Matt. 7:17, the tree represents a man. A good tree represents a good man, and a bad tree an evil man. In this case the psalmist allegorically describes someone who has faith in Christ as the spiritual man. Luther underlines the use of the passive verb “it is planted”, ( plantatum est), which, according to him, indicates that just as the tree does not grow by itself but only by virtue of being planted, human beings do not naturally follow ethical commandments purely out of love of justice; such a love needs to be planted and cultivated by God, who transforms the believer from Adam to Christ.33 The “streams of water” which irrigate the tree are, thus, an allegory for divine grace.34 In his comments on this Psalm, Luther repeatedly emphasizes that what he is looking for is the spiritual sense of the text: he explains that without faith, the good tree cannot flourish, and he points out that “the prophet speaks through the spirit”.35 Several pages later, he underlines that since the prophet speaks spiritually, he has also to be heard spiritually.36 As we have seen, in this Psalm the spiritual sense lies in faith in Christ: the metaphor of the good tree allegorically describes the believers as well as the dichotomy between godliness and ungodliness, which is but a distinction between believers and unbelievers. In other Psalms, however, Luther maintains that the historical-spiritual referent of the text is the person of Christ. This is the case of Psalm 2. Quoting Acts 4:24–28, Luther claims that since the establishment of the primitive Church, this Psalm has been interpreted Christologically: “That David was the author of this Psalm, and that it speaks of Christ, is established through the authority of the primitive Church”.37 In order to find the referent of the text in Christ, Luther needs to overcome a specific difficulty regarding the literal meaning of the terms, but he is quite willing to stretch the literal sense in order to apply the text to the person of Christ. In elucidating the grammatical meaning of Verse 1, Luther notes that the expression “The kings of the earth” should be applied to Pilate and Herod, the two men who condemned Christ to death. Historically speaking, however, Pilate was not a king. Luther insists that Christ is the only possible referent of the text, and for this reason the word “king” refers to Pilate as well. He finds two possible explanations for the application of the word “king” to Pilate: “It is necessary, then, that we untie this meaningless knot: Either Pilate is called a king along with Herod, or he is called king following 33  LW 14.300; WA 5.37.22–27: “Plantatum est”, inquit, in quo distinguit hanc palmam ab iis, quae sponte nascuntur, ut quae cura et cultu alieno non sua natura talis sit, scilicet ex ea, quae sponte et natura crevit, excisa et arte sicut surculus alio plantata. Hoc est, quod dixi, “Voluntatem in lege domini nulli a natura inesse, sed agricolante et plantante patre celesti et nos ex Adam in Christum transferente”, nobis e coelo conferri. 34  LW 14.300; WA 5.37.28: “Decursus aquarum” rivos certe graciae divinae intelligit. 35  LW 14.305; WA 5.42.28–29: Item in in spiritu loquentem audi in spiritu. 36  LW 14.308; WA 5.44.31: Dixi in spiritu loqui prophetam, ideo in spiritu audiendum. 37  LW 14.313; WA 5.47.27–28: Hunc psalmum esse a David factum et de Christo loqui, cogit autoritatis primitivae Ecclesiae, de qua Lucas Act. Iiij.



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the Scripture, in which it is customary for a name of a part to be applied to the whole”.38 Having explained how to interpret the term “kings” to apply to Pilate as well, Luther applies all the other words to the historical characters of the crucifixion tale: the “rulers” as the chief priests, the “heathen” as the Roman soldiers, and “the people”, as the Jewish people who assisted in the crucifixion.39 “In vain”, instead, refers to the fact that Jews and Gentiles are unable to defeat the Kingdom of Christ: the more that they try to hinder and defeat Christ, the more they ridicule themselves and promote what they try to oppose.40 The entirety of Verse 3 is interpreted allegorically. “Break” means to despise, the “bonds” refer to the commandment of Christ, “rejects” signifies disobedience, and “yokes” are the judgment which restrain human beings to follow their fleshly nature. However, Luther is careful to clarify what he means by allegorical meaning: I do not mean to speak allegorically after the manner of the modernists, as if another historical sense were to be sought underneath, other than that which is expressed. What I do mean is that he has expressed the true and proper sense in figurative language.41

In regard to the figures of speech in Scripture, Luther points out that Verse 4 is a tautology. The tautology, Luther remarks, is a common figure in the Holy Writ and it has a specific function: to comfort and console the believer. Just as the unbeliever will not understand the meaning of the Scripture, no matter how many times a concept is stated, on the other side, the Spirit gives consolation to the believers by repeating to “those who have been trained in the sufferings of Christ” that God sustains them.42 While in Verse 4 David uses a tautology to console the believers, in verse 5 he uses it to restate God’s wrath against the 38  Cf. LW 14.313; WA 5.4812–14: Reliquum est, hunc nihili nodum dissolvamus: Aut Pilatum regem appelatum cum Herode aut tropo scripturae usitatissimo nomine partis totum appelatum. 39  LW 14.314; WA 5.4817–19: Iam per principes intelligi sacerdotum principes, per gentes milites Romanos sub Pilato, qui Ihesum comprehenderunt, flagellaverunt, crucifixerunt, per populos vulgus Iudaeorum seu Israel, ut ipsi dicunt, satis clarum est. 40  LW 14.315; WA 5. 49.19–24: “Inania” dicit, quo verbo pene totius psalmi argumentum comprehendit. Vult enim propheta ostendere, Christum a deo patre institum regem, multis et magnis gentium et iudaeorum regum et principum resistentibus consiliis, studiis, furoribus non potuisse impediri, sed adeo illos inaniter omnia consumpsisse, ut et seipsos irriserint et eo ipso, quo restiterunt, magis promoverint regnum Christi. 41  Cf. LW 14.318–19; WA 5.51.36–38: Non autem allegoricum dico more recentiorum, quasi alius sensus historialis sub eo sit quaerendus, quam qui dictus est, sed quod verum et proprium sensum figurata locutione expresserit. 42  LW 14.320; WA 5.52.36–39, 53. 1–4: Quod benignus spiritus pro nostra paraclesi et consolatione facit, ne scilicet in tentatione deficiamus, sed in certissimam spem nos erigamus, quia veniens veniet et non tardabit. Quare etsi in humanis locutionibus Tautologia viciosa et superflua videatur, in rebus tamen dei summa necessaria est, propterea quod spes (ut ait Sapiens), quae differtur, affligit animam, vera, inquam, spes quae in passionibus et cruce laborat. Duta est enim omnis mora iis, qui in passionibus Christi exercitantur. Ideo opus habent firmissima et securissima promissione dei, qua sustententur.

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unbelievers. The verse is interpreted as meaning that God would command in a way to show and prove His wrath against the ungodly. The destruction of Jerusalem is interpreted by Luther as proof of divine intervention in history to punish the ungodly, a proof of divine wrath against the Jews.43 While God compassionately introduces anxiety in the believers, and this happened even to Christ on the night of Gethsemane, He acts in wrath against the ungodly.44 The second exegetical problem facing Luther, in his attempt to interpret this Psalm Christologically, lies in Verse 6 (“I have been sent as King by Him in Zion, His holy hill”). As explained earlier, Luther does not distinguish between the historical and the spiritual referent of the Psalms, for they are taken to coincide in the person of Christ. As the verse is in first person, in order to prove there is no double referent – an historical one for David, and a spiritual one for Christ – Luther claims that it is Christ who is speaking of himself.45 Drawing from Faber Stapulensis’ Quincuplex Psalterium, Luther notes, however, that the Hebrew text speaks in the person of the Father. Luther dismisses the question of which one of the two interpretations is correct as unimportant, since both are acceptable. The Hebrew fits better with the interpretation of the Father. Luther, however, does not appreciate Faber’s interpretation, who paraphrased the meaning of the verse as “I have anointed My King”, because the verb “anointed” (unxisti) is taken from Verse 2.46 Thus, in his commentary, Luther maintains that Christ was speaking of himself in this verse. In light of that, the reference to Mt. Zion becomes an allegory for the Church. Despite not being limited to a physical place – since, as Luther repeats in these years, where the Word is there is also the Church – the Church itself was founded in a physical place. Similar to the distinction between godliness and ungodliness in Verse 1, here Luther applies the question to the contemporary problem of the Church. One of the most significant matters of disagreement between Luther and Eck during the Leipzig debate was the primacy of the Roman Church. In his contemporary Operationes in Psalmos 43  LW 14.323; WA 5.54.27–31: Ergo “loqui in ira” est eradicare, destruere, disperdere, hoc est, quod Iudaeis contigit, qui dixerunt “Ne forte veniant Romani et tollant locum nostrum et gentem. Melius est, ut unus moriatur, ne tota gens pereat”. Has inanes meditationes irrisit dominus, dum id, quod impius timuit (iuxta proverbia), venit ei, et per Romanos eradicavit, destruxit et disperdidit eos. 44  LW 14.323; WA 5.55.7–12: Nec solum destruet et disperdet eos, sed et conturbabit eos, quia foris pugna, intus pavore eos consumpsit. Conturbat sane et filios suos miroque pavore exterret sicut Christum in horto, sed in misericordia. Iudeos vero, dum a Romanis vastarentur et occiderentur, perpetuo incipiente pavore conturbavit. Impossibile est enim, ut impius moriens non expavescat aeterne pavore. 45  LW 14.324; WA 5. 55. 38: Hic mutatur persona, non enim David de se loquitur, sed Christus. 46  LW 14.324; WA 5.56. 6–9: Stapulensis putat dici posse: Ego autem unxi regem meum nixus verbo fidelium, Act. Iiij., ubi dixerunt: Convenerunt adversum puerum tuum Ihesum, quem unxisti. Sed videntur verbum”unxisti” non ex isto verso, immo ex secundo sumpsisse.



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Luther states, as he did in Leipzig, that while the Churches in Rome and Constantinople battled over their superiority, the Church in Jerusalem preserved its modesty. Since it was the first Church to have been founded, all other Churches derive from it. As Christ is its bishop, if one Church should have primacy over the other, it is the Church in Jerusalem that would be the one to be granted this right.47 Finally, Luther applies this concept to the contemporary Church, stating his common critique against the hegemony of Rome: I do not speak this because I condemn the hegemony of the Roman Church, but because I detest the extortion of it by force and fury, as if it were a precept of God, when it ought to be established through the mutual agreement of believers and the bonds of love. Certainly, it should be a rule, not of domineering strength but of ministering love. I condemn the arrogance, but I commend the object.48

The Christological reference of the Psalm, which in this case Christ himself reveals speaking in the first person, goes hand in hand with the sensus fidei. Understanding that Christ is the historical-spiritual referent of the Psalm is both empty and impossible, without faith in Him. Verse 7 (“In proclaiming His commandment”) reveals the spiritual sense of the Psalm. According to Luther, the commandment mentioned in this Psalm is the preaching of Christ’s crucifixion. The Son of God, Luther emphasizes, is the object of the whole Gospel.49 In accordance with his argument of the clarity of Scripture, Luther explains why, apparently, the Holy Spirit had decided not to express the spiritual sense more clearly ( planius verba). Luther explains that throughout the Bible the Holy Spirit follows the same method used in the Gospel of John, namely, that God the Father reveals Jesus as His Son. Rather than Jesus proclaiming himself Son of God, it is God the Father who reveals Jesus as being His Son, so that nobody can deny it.50 As preaching is the real office of a Christian priest, Luther uses the words of the psalmist to attack his contemporaries: 47  LW 14.325; WA 5.57.2–10: Simul spiritu sancto magistro Ecclesia Hierosolymitanae haec modestia servata est, ut nunquam de primatu et dignitate cum aliis Ecclesiis certaret, sicut Romana et Constantinopolitana certaverunt diuturno et scandaloso certamine, cum tamen illa (si primatus quaerendus esset) omnibus iuribus anteferri caeteris debuisset, tum quod Christus ipse pontifex illius fuerit, rex constitutus a deo patre, tum quod ecclesia tota ibi exorta, exinde natae omnes Ecclesiae, vereque mater Ecclesiarum ipsa sola, ibi omnes Apostoli et discipuli velut presbyteri fuerint. 48  Cf. LW 14.326; WA 5.57.13–17: Non quod damnem Romanae Ecclesiae Monarchiam, sed quod detester eam vi et impetu extorqueri ac velut praecepto dei arrogari, quae mutuo fidelium consensu et charitatis vinculo debuerat stabiliri, ut esset non dominantis potestatis, sed servientis charitatis Monarchia. Arrogantiam damno, rem commendo. 49  LW 14.328; WA 5.59.6–33. 50  LW 14.329; WA 5.59.34–37, 60.1–2: Sed dices: Si hoc voluit spiritus, cur non planius verba disposuit in hunc modum: Annunciabo dei praeceptum, quod ego sum filius eius, hodie genuit me &c.? Respondeo: Spiritus sanctus ubique sui similis est. Sic enim et in Euangelio

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Where are you now, you miserable and ambitious people, who, in your ambition, either seek the offices of this King in the Church or uselessly hold them, who do not proclaim the decree of God and do not preach Jesus Christ crucified, the Son of God, for the salvation of believers but collect treasures, abound in pleasures, and indulge in every possible pomp?51

Based on the analysis of Luther’s commentary on Psalms 1 and 2, it is now possible to provide a series of considerations. First, Luther’s assertion is that the general sense of the Bible precedes the meaning of individual passages. Thus, the meaning of individual Psalms has to be understood in light of the overall meaning of the Bible. Siegfried Raeder has pointed out that, unlike in the Dictata, in the Operationes, the general meaning is represented by a Gospel-centered reading of the Holy Writ. However, in some cases, Luther still reads the Old Testament passages as a prophecy concerning the person of Christ. Thus, Luther reads Psalm 1 in terms of faith in Christ, while he reads Psalm 2 as a reference to the future coming of Christ the Messiah. Second, Luther maintains that the Christological reference is clearly expressed in the literal sense of the text. Equating the literal and the spiritual sense, Luther marginalizes a reading which looks for the spirit in the letter of the Holy Writ. Third, Luther applies every Psalm to the contemporary situation of the sixteenth-century Church.

6.2  Origen and Jerome the Public Targets, Erasmus the Unnamed Enemy: Luther’s Front Against Allegory In the preceding pages, I emphasized that Luther read the Psalter allegorically, in order to apply the Psalms to the sixteenth-century Church. Despite this use of allegory, Luther also repeatedly criticized the allegorical reading of the Bible. We have already seen that, in commenting on Psalm 2, Luther had clarified that “allegorical” referred to the figurative language used in the Psalm, and not to a deeper, recondite meaning in the text. This apparent contradiction has been widely discussed in secondary literature, and is sometimes interpreted as Luther’s reaction to the over-allegorizing tendencies of medieval exegesis.52 Iohannis, quando de se suaque divinitate loquitur, omnino id observat, ut auctoritatem patris semper adducat et totum, quod ipse est, in patrem referat. 51  LW 14.330–31; WA 5. 60.31–35: Ubi estis nunc miseri et ambitiosi homines, qui vices huius regis in Ecclesia vel ambitiose quaeritis, vel infructuose tenetis, qui non annunciatis dei praeceptum, non praedicatis Ihesum Christum Crucifixum filium dei in salutem credentium, sed thezauros colligitis, deliciis affluitis, lascivitis in omni pompa rerum? 52  For instance, Scott H. Hendrix argued: “Luther’s exegesis, therefore, differed from the medieval tradition not in the absence of allegory or of Christological interpretation of the Old Testament but rather in his aversion to excessive allegorizing and in his willingness to find the legitimate meaning in the grammatical and historical analysis of the text”. Cf. “Luther against the Background of the History of Biblical Interpretation,” 234.



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At other times, however, it is interpreted as an inconsistency in Luther’s position.53 My main argument is that Luther’s simultaneous use and critique of the allegory can only be properly understood by taking into consideration other cultural trends in the sixteenth century. In this chapter, I focus on Luther’s reception of the biblical scholarship of Erasmus of Rotterdam, who extensively discussed the role of allegory in the correct interpreting the Bible. While Johannes Kuntze has pointed out that there is substantial agreement between Luther and Erasmus in criticizing an excessive use of allegory, even if the reasons for which the two theologians shared this position differed,54 I argue that Luther used Erasmus’ work in order to reshape, and somewhat limit, the concept of allegory. Luther’s position against allegory, thus, emerged in opposition to that of Erasmus. Before discussing Erasmus’ hermeneutics, it is helpful to take a closer look at Luther’s critique of the allegory. In commenting on Psalm 22, the last one of the Psalms covered in the Operationes in Psalmos, Luther mounted a vehement attack against allegory. Moreover, he clarified why he believed that allegory was an improper way of reading Scripture in his contemporary commentary on Galatians (1519). Galatians 4:4 is one of the standard passages for endorsing an allegorical meaning of Scripture, since Paul himself is said to have interpreted Sara and Agar, the two wives of Abraham, as allegorical references to the two testaments. Commenting on this passage, Luther discusses the use of the quadriga, the common way of reading Scripture. He uses as an example “Jerusalem”, which, applying the fourfold method, can literally signify a Jewish city, tropologically a pure conscience or faith, allegorically the Church of Christ, and analogically the paradise, or the heavenly Jerusalem.55 In the same way, taken literally, Isaac and Ishmael are the two sons of Abraham, but they can be interpreted allegorically to signify the two testaments, or the synagogue and the 53  According

to Gerhard Ebeling, Luther abandoned the use of allegory altogether in 1519 in his second interpretation of the Psalms. However, Luther’s departure from medieval exegesis would not always be consistent. As Ebeling put it, Luther’s transition from medieval to Reformation exegesis “results in the radical abandonment of the Quadriga and also in a fundamental critique of allegory. However, while the abandonment of the Quadriga is consistent, theoretical insights and practical consequences do not correspond fully in regard to allegory. There remains a certain measure of inconsistency in his use of allegory, which he continues to practice from time to time in his scriptural exegesis”. Cf. Ebeling, “The Beginnings of Luther’s Hermeneutics,” 131. Christine Christ von Wedel has recently criticized Ebeling for creating a fictitious contraposition between Luther, conceived as the Bible commentator who went beyond the allegorical approach typical of the Middle Ages, and Erasmus, who instead continued to use allegory to interpret the Bible: Wedel, “Erasmus und Luther als Ausleger der Bibel,” 375–76. 54 Kunze, Erasmus und Luther, 247–50. 55  WA 2.550.20–25: Verum quod pene transieram de mysticis et allegoricis quoque aliqua videnda sunt, quando haec res postulat et tempus. Habentur in usu quatuor sensus scripturae, quos literam, tropologiam, allegoriam, anagogen vocant, ut Hierusalem iuxta literam Civitas Iudeae metropolis est, tropologicos conscientia pura vel fides, allegorice ecclesia Christi, anagogice coelestis patria.

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Church, or also law and grace; tropologically they refer to a contrast between flesh and spirit, virtue and vice, grace and sin, and finally, in the anagogical sense, they can be interpreted as referring to heaven and hell, but also to angels and demons, the saved and the condemned.56 In judging the utility of the quadriga for interpreting Scripture, Luther admits its utility for those who like to experiment with this method on the condition that they do not abuse it. One can add this reading, only if it does not undermine the clear sense of Scripture. Indeed, Luther remarks that the quadriga was not used by the Fathers, it does not help to elucidate grammar, and in general it should not be used to prove a theological point.57 Thus, under the authority of Augustine, Luther launches a long attack against the understanding of allegory by Origen and Jerome. He explains that both, in separating the literal from the spiritual sense of Scripture, incurred “inextricable difficulties” (difficultates inextricabiles) in their attempt to go beyond the literal sense. In contrast, Augustine explained that the spiritual man is not the one who looks for the spiritual meaning of Scripture. Letters signify nothing other than “law without grace” (lex sine gratia), while the spirit is the grace bestowed upon the individual by God, not the allegorical meaning of the Holy Writ.58 How deeply Erasmus drew from Origen and Jerome for his theological anthropology, and how vehemently Luther disagreed with his position, was addressed in Chapter Three. This antithesis also possessed a hermeneutical dimen56  WA 2.550.25–28: Ita Isaac et Ismael hoc loco literaliter filii duo Abrahae, allegorice duo testamenta seu synagoga et ecclesia, lex et gratia, tropologice caro et spiritus seu virtus et vitium, gratia et peccatum, anagogice gloria et poena, coelum et infernus, immo aliis angeli et daemones, beati et damnati. 57  WA 2.550.29–35: Permittatur sane is ludus iis, qui volunt, modo ne assuefiant aliquorum temeritati, scripturas pro libidine lacerare et incertas facere: quin potius ad capitalem legitimumque sensum haec velut accessoria ornamenta adiiciunt, quibus vel oratio locupletius ornetur aut exemplo Pauli rudiores velut lactea doctrina mollius foveantur, non autem in contentionibus pro stabilienda fidei doctrina proferantur. Nam ista quadriga (etsi non reprobem) non scripturae autoritate nec patrum usu nec grammatica satis ratione iuvatur. 58  WA 2.551.16–34: Illud magis monendum, quod et supra dictum est, apud Origenem et Hieronymum sensum spiritualem eum videri, quem hic Apostolus allegoriam vocat. Literam enim ipsi figuram et historiam accipiunt: mysticum autem et allegoricum spiritualem dicunt, et virum spiritualem, qui sublimiter omnia intelligat, nihil (ut inquit) iudaicae traditionis admittat. Hac regula incedit fere totus Origenes et Hieronymus et, ut audacter dicam, non raro in difficultates inextricabiles labuntur. Verum expeditius mihi incedit beatus Augustinus. Nam ut omittam illud, quod mysticus sensus sit vel allegoricus vel anagogicus aut omnino qui aliud habet in recessu quam in fronte ostenditur, et huic opponatur historicus sensus aut figuralis, haec tamen duo vocabula “litera” et “spiritus”, “literalis” deinde et “spiritualis intelligentia” segreganda sunt et in sua propria significatione servanda. Nam litera, ut idem psal. lxx. pulchre et breviter dicit, est lex sine gratia. Quod si verum est, omnis lex litera est sive allegorica sive tropologica, denique, ut supra diximus, quicquid scribi, dici, cogitari citra gratiam potest. Sola gratia autem est ipse spiritus. Unde spiritualis intelligentia non dicitur, quae est mystica vel anagogica, qua et impii praestant, sed ipsa proprie vita et experimentalis lex in anima per gratiam digito dei scripta, et omnino totum illud impletum, quod lex praecipit ac requirit.



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sion. I argue that not only did Luther and Erasmus read 2 Cor. 3:6 in contrast to one another, but Luther’s critical attitude towards the allegory was derived from an ambivalent reception of Erasmus’ scholarship. Together with his Novum Instrumentum and the Paraphrases and Annotations to the New Testament, Erasmus published two texts summarizing his exegetical positions during these years: the Paraclesis, id est, Adhortatio ad christianae philosophiae studium, and the Methodus perveniendi ad veram theologiam. Paraclesis was published as introduction to the 1516 edition of the Novum Instrumentum, while an expanded version of the Methodus, entitled Ratio verae theologiae, originally planned by Erasmus as the introduction to the second edition of the New Testament, was published as an autonomous work in 1518 by Martens press in Louvain. In January 1519, Froben decided to publish the copy that Erasmus had already sent him, intended for publication in the second edition of the New Testament. Beathus Rhenanus wrote an introduction, dedicating the work to the vicar general of Constance, Johannes Fabri.59 A new edition of the Ratio was published in 1520, and further changes were made for the editions published in 1522 and 1523.60 In a letter to Spalatin dated 13 March 1519, Luther wrote that Froben had sent him a copy of this work.61 In light of this historical connection, as well as of Luther’s familiarity with Erasmus’ previous scholarship, my argument is that some of the positions that Luther assumed in the Operationes in Psalmos emerged from a critical reception of this work. On the one hand, Luther agreed with Erasmus’ critique of scholastic theology and monastic orders, as well as with his insistence on the need to overcome the medieval quadriga and to read the passages of the Old Testament allegorically in order to refer them to the sixteenth-century Church. On the other hand, Luther’s critique of allegory should be read against the backdrop of his opposition towards Erasmus on the overall interpretation of Scripture. As noted in the previous chapter, Erasmus’ interpretation of God’s Word as sermo sparked spirited debates in the early sixteenth century. Manfred Hoffmann has emphasized that Erasmus’ use of allegory and rhetorical method to apply a Christological interpretation of Scripture – his first goal – and his second, to interpolate ethical teachings from the text of the Holy Writ were both based on the reconciling power of God’s Word. In this context, the first goal of the biblical scholar is to discern the process of accommodation through which God’s Word has been inscribed in the manifold words of the Scripture.62 Con59  60 

CWE 41.481. CWE 41.185–90. 61  Wa Br 1. 360.35–38: Nascitur mihi indies magis ac magis subsidium & praesidium pro Sacris literis. Erasmus noster edidit Rationem & Methodon quandam ad studium Sacrarum literarum, Eam Frobenius nobis misit. 62  Manfred Hoffmann, “Erasmus on Language and Interpretation,” Moreana 28, no. 2–3

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versely, Mary Jane Barnett has pointed out that if Erasmus admitted and continuously restated the metaphysical authority of Scripture, he also developed a method that required greater attention to actual linguistic practices at the intersection of two historically contingent phenomena: the transmission of the text, and the manifold readings of human interpreters.63 The risk of undermining the divine authorship of Scripture was paramount for Erasmus’ critics; the debate on the spiritual reading of the Holy Writ had achieved prominence well before the messianic, apocalyptic, and often political revolutionary interpretations of the Holy Bible unsettle early sixteenth-century Europe. Erasmus was assailed on many fronts after the publication of his successful (and controversial) edition of the New Testament, and his exposition of his own exegetical method created ambivalent tensions between the unquestionably divine authorship of the Bible, and the proper role of the human interpreter. Three characteristics of the time require a more detailed discussion, for they framed Erasmus’ approach to reading Scripture: the growth of a philological method applied to Scripture, the ongoing critique of excessive allegorizing and spiritualistic tendencies, and, in light of these latter critiques, the emphasis on a rhetorical method, which assumes the divine authorship of the Scripture and which, at the same time, takes into account the literal peculiarities of the individual passages. Unsurprisingly, metaphysical assumptions are at the forefront. Indeed, at the beginning of his Ratio, Erasmus emphasizes the uniqueness of the Holy Writ. As the product of the Word of God, it is necessary to approach the Scripture with reverence. Quoting 1 Cor. 14:1, Erasmus points out that the Scripture is a prophecy,64 but “prophecy”, as Erasmus clarifies, is a gift of that eternal Spirit.65 We can thus only hear the Word of God when we approach it with pure heart. Moses was admitted before the burning bush only after he removed his footwear. For Erasmus, Moses removed his shoes in order to assist the miracle of the bush which burned as an allegory for the soul freed from earthly passions: only those who liberated their souls from carnal desires can properly approach Scripture.66 In light of the peculiarity of the Holy Writ, Erasmus aims to illustrate a philosophy that is neither Platonic nor Stoic, nor Peripatetic, but properly (1991): 1–20; Rhetoric and Theology: The Hermeneutic of Erasmus, Erasmus Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993). 63  Mary Jane Barnett, “Erasmus and the Hermeneutics of Linguistic Praxis,” Renaissance Quarterly 49 (1996): 542–72. 64  CWE 41.492; EAS, vol. 3, 124: Paulus enarrationem arcanae scripturae non philosophiam, sed prophetiam vocat. 65  Ibid. 41.492, EAS, vol. 3, 124: Prophetia vero spiritus illius aeterni donum est. 66  Ibid. 41.492, EAS, vol. 3, 124: Eodem spectat, opinor, quod cum iuxta montem Horeb properaret, accurens ut proprius conspicaretur inusitatum miraculum ardentis rubi nectamen exusti, non prius admissus est ad divinum colloquium, quam abiceret calciamenta pedum. Quid pedes nisi affectus? Quid pedes liberi calciamentorum onere nisi animus nullis terrenis ac fluxarum rerum cupiditatibus oneratus? At verius et efficacius nobis loquitur deus in arcanis libris quam Mosi de rubo locutus sit, si modo puri accesserimus ad colloquium.



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divine; our mind, sharing this divine nature, can free itself from the passions and rest in tranquility, so that the image of the eternal divine truth (aeternae illius veritatis imago) can shine in human beings like in a mirror.67 Before the Word of God, the normal relationship between text and reader disappears. According to Erasmus, in the case of the Scripture, it is the reader who must be transformed by the text. Moreover, when an apparent contradiction emerges, the reader has to set aside every doubt and ensure that contradiction is not a divine attribute. The reader must not dare to criticize the Scripture, but must assume that what seems to be in contradiction with the divine nature or with the doctrine of Christ is, in reality, the inability of the reader to comprehend the text in general, or a rhetorical figure in a specific passage – or it is possible that the codex is corrupted.68 According to Erasmus, the correct approach to Scripture, however, entails not only a process of liberating oneself from earthly passions; it is equally important to have a specific set of skills, not least the mastery of the three holy languages.69 As is well known, Erasmus himself mastered Latin and Greek, but not Hebrew. In a famous and oft-quoted letter to Wolfgang Capito, Erasmus urged his correspondent not to study Hebrew, pointing out that studying Hebrew has only brought confusion to Christianity with the spread of vague doctrines on the Talmud, the Kabbalah, and the Tetragrammaton. He goes so far as to claim that he would prefer that knowledge about Christ was tainted by the scholastic philosophy of Duns Scotus rather than by “this nonsense” penetrating Christianity and, finally, he points out that Christians should focus on the study of the New Testament rather than the Old Testament, for with the coming of Christ the truth had been revealed, so that the Old Testament resembled merely a shadow of truth.70 However, in his Ratio, as a general principle, Erasmus points out that the knowledge of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew are necessary in order to read the original texts. He provides several examples of well67  CWE 41.491; EAS, vol. 3, 122: Et ut in praecipiendo minimum est negotii, ita est in praestando plurimum, nimirum ut ad hanc philosophiam non Platonicam aut Stoicam aut Peripateticam, sed plane caelestem animum afferamus ea dignum, non tantum purum ab omnibus, quoad fieri potest, vitiorum inquinamentis, verumetiam ab omni cupiditatum tumultu tranquillum ac requietum, quo expressius in nobis, velut in amne placido aut speculo levi et exterso, reluceat aeternae illius veritatis imago. 68  CWE 41.494; EAS, vol. 3, 128: Hic si quid occurrit, quod parum congruat in naturam divinam aut quod cum Christi doctrina pugnare videatur, cave calumnieris quod scriptum est; sed te potius crede non assequi quod legis, aut subesse tropum in verbis aut codicem esse depravatum. 69  CWE 41.496; EAS, vol. 3, 130: Iam quod ad eas attinet litteras, quarum adminiculo commodius ad haec pertingimus, citra controversiam prima cura debetur perdiscendis tribus linguis, Latinae, Graecae, et Hebraicae, quod constet omnem scripturam mysticam hisce proditam esse. 70  Ep. 298, Allen, vol. 3, 19–29, Rummel, “The Textual and Hermeneutic Work of Desi­ derius Erasmus of Rotterdam,” 220.

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known exegetes who shared this viewpoint. The most prominent among the ancient theologians was Augustine, and among the moderns, Thomas Aquinas.71 Moreover, Erasmus praises those who returned to the study of language later in life, like Augustine, who took up Greek when he was already a bishop, or Rudolph Agricola, who was not ashamed to learn Hebrew at an older age. Of course, Erasmus can include himself in this list, despite he committed only occasionally to the study of Hebrew.72 The need to learn Latin, Greek, and Hebrew is, of course, strictly intertwined with the process of reading the text in the original language. Erasmus thus points out that Jerome correctly refuted the claims of Hilary of Poitiers and Augustine that reading the Septuagint was enough to understand the Old Testament. Explicitly criticizing Augustine, whose insistence on the importance of learning the three holy languages he had mentioned only few lines previously, Erasmus noted sharply that In Contra Cresconium Donatistam (2, 27–33), commenting on a difficult passage, Augustine had suggested relying on the Greek translation – as if that were more accurate than the original.73 Erasmus considered reading the original text of the Bible as an indispensable tool to access divine wisdom. The endorsement of the study of biblical languages thus represented an apology and a prideful vindication of his own work as translator of the New Testament: a vindication of his vital contribution with the publication of the Novum Instrumentum toward the improvement of theological studies; an apology against all the accusations of simultaneously undermining both the divine authority of the Bible as well as the divine inspiration of his most accurate translator, Jerome. Indeed, on this last point, Erasmus clearly emphasized the historical contingency of the reception of the biblical 71  CWE 41.499, EAS, vol. 3, 138: In quibus est et Augustinus inter antiquos precipuus et ipse neotericorum omnium mea sententia diligentissimus Thomas Aquinas, quorum utrumque mihi parum propitium esse velim, si aut mentior aut contumeliae causa haec dico, ne quid interim loquar de ceteris cum hoc haudquaquam conferendis, meo quidem iudicio. 72  CWE 41.499–500; EAS, vol. 3, 138–40: Quod si Catonis exemplum leviter nos movet, ipse divus Augustinus iam episcopus, iam senescens ad Graecas litteras puero degustatas quidem sed fastiditas reversus est. Rudolphus Agricola, unicum Germaniae nostrae lumen et ornamentum, annum egressus quadragesimum Hebraeas litteras discere nec erubuit, vir in re litteraria tantus, nec desperavit, homo natu tam grandis; nam Graecas adulescens imbiberat. Ipse iam quinquagesimum tertium ingressus annum ad Hebraicas litteras olim utcunque degustatas cum licet recurro. 73  CWE 41.500; EAS, vol. 3, 140–2: Porro sententiam Hilari et Augustinii, qui putant in veteris instrumenti libris nihil requirendum ultra Septuaginta translationem, satis in epistolis ac praefationibus ipse refellit Hieronymus, et si non refellisset ille, satis refellebat insignis ille lapsus Hilarii in dictione hosanna divo quoque Ambrosio ad eundem inpingente lapidem. Sed more hominum fit, ut tantum quisque probet, quantum se assequi posset confidat. Ad interpretationem Septuaginta vetus testamentum contulit Augustinus, multo magis idem facturus ad Hebraicam veritatem, si litteras eas tenuisset. Idem alicubi disputans cum Cresconio, ni me fallit memoria, cum adversarius adduxisset testimonium ex ecclesiastico, cuius sensus esset absurdus, iubet, uti Graecam translationem consulat, velut illinc peti posset certior veritas.



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text. Through a series of rhetorical questions, he emphasized the loss of many philological works by Jerome, such as his revised edition of the Gospels,74 noting that scribes often erred and corrupted the sacred codices,75 or that the very same work of translation implied a loss of the precision from the original text.76 Finally, Erasmus definitively rejected the notion of the Vulgate as divinely inspired translation: Let the truth be told: however godly the man, however learned, he was a human being and able both to be led astray and to lead astray. Many things, I would imagine, escaped his notice, many things led him astray. Finally, what of the fact that not even those annotations with which Jerome restored these texts are well understood if you are completely ignorant of the languages on whose evidence he depends?77

The study of the Bible cannot be dissociated from the study of the biblical languages. A proper understanding of the Vulgate translated by an expert like Jerome, vir trilinguis, requires the knowledge of the biblical languages. Knowledge of these languages will clearly show that Jerome’s translation is problematic in many parts, full of mistakes, precisely because it is the result of the work of an erudite man – yet still a man. At the same time, Erasmus restates both his admiration for Jerome and the need to go beyond Jerome’s translation of the Bible. With the provocative expression liceat vera loqui, Erasmus launches his accusations against his opponents, the “sophists” who, ignorant of the biblical languages, cannot appreciate Jerome’s erudition. Even they, however, seek to rely only on the Vulgate repeating again and again: Mihi satis est Hieronymi translatio.78 After learning the “original languages”, however, how should one go about reading the Bible in order to interpret it correctly? The starting point for Erasmus is that the Bible is the only true manifestation of the Word of God. The apparent contradictions are due to the limited abilities of the human mind. Yet in 74  CWE 41.498; EAS, vol. 3, 134–36: Quid, quod permulta ab Hieronymo restituta temporum iniuria interciderunt, velut novum testamentum ad Graecam veritatem emendatum, velut obelorum et asteriscorum notulae, veluti prophetae commatis, colis et periodis distincti? The term novum testamentum appeared in the edition of 1522, in substitution for the word “Gospel” in the previous edition, as reported by CWE 41.498, n. 46 and Holborn, 135, n. 23. For a critical discussion of Jerome’s revision of the Gospel, see: Stefan Rebenich, “Jerome: The ‘vir trilinguis’ and the ‘Hebraica Veritas’,” Vigiliae Christianae (1993): 50–77. 75  CWE 41.498; EAS, vol. 3, 136: Quid, quod scriptorum vel errore vel temeritate sacri codices tum olim vitiati sunt tum hodie passim vitiantur? 76  CWE 41.498, EAS, vol. 3, 134: Quid, quod quaedam ob sermonum idiomata ne possunt quidem ita transfundi in alienam linguam, ut eandem lucem, ut nativam gratiam, ut parem obtineant emphasin? 77  Cf. CWE 41.498–99; EAS, vol. 3, 136: liceat vera loqui. Quamlibet vir pius, quamlibet eruditus, homo erat et falli potuit et fallere. Multa (ut opinor) illum fugerunt, multa fefellerunt. Postremo quid, quod nec ea commentaria, quibus Hieronymus ea restituit satis intelliguntur, si linguas, quarum testimoniis nititur, prorsus ignores? 78  CWE 41.498; EAS, vol. 3, 134.

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that the biblical text itself could be corrupted in specific passages, Erasmus was concerned that this process had consequences not just for the individual readers of the Bible, but in particular also for theology. While historically an errata lectio could bring about a corrupted version of the single passage, the relationship between Scripture and its readers relied on the metaphysical notion of God’s Word adapted into human language. God has been obliged to adapt the sacred mysteries revealed in the Bible to a language that, at least in part, can be understood by the limited capacities of human mind. Invoking a sentence he had already written in the Enchiridion,79 Erasmus claims that through allegories, divine Wisdom stumbles (balbutit) with the human mind.80 An allegorical reading of the Bible is, thus, necessary to decipher how the language of eternal truth has been translated into human terms. Furthermore, an allegorical reading of some passages of the Old Testament, such as those that incite war or hate for the enemy, is necessary because their validity vanished after the promulgation of the Gospel. Here, the common polemic against scholastic theology, which characterizes Erasmus’ opera as a whole, goes hand in hand with Erasmus’ method for reading Scripture. As in this period Erasmus was caught in harsh polemics against Johannes Eck, Jacob Latomus, and many others, the Dutch scholar emphasized that the dialectic could not be considered the only way to approach theological studies: On the other hand, certain people who have relied on dialectic alone reckon that they are sufficiently informed to discuss anything at all. They attribute so much to this discipline that they suppose the Christian faith is finished and done for if it is not secured by the support of dialectic, though meanwhile they disdain grammar and rhetoric as utterly superfluous. And Augustine does indeed approve of anyone who grasps the principles of logical deduction, provided there is no trace of the disease peculiar to this skill – obstinate disputation and a passion for wrangling.81

When Johannes Eck and Jacob Latomus – among others – accused Erasmus of being ignorant of theology because he was unskilled in logic, Erasmus rebuked these critics. He noted that even though “certain people” considered rhetoric useless, and dialectic the only indispensable discipline for theological studies, they 79  ASD V–8, 120: Balbutit nobis diuina sapientia et veluti mater quaepiam officiosa ad nostram infantiam voces accomodat. 80  EAS, vol. 3, 400: Verum in allegoriis, ut huc redeamus, quoniam his omnis fere constat divina scriptura, per quam aeterna sapientia nobiscum veluti balbutit, praecipua cura ponenda est, quae nisi succurrunt, praesertim in veteris testamenti voluminibus, maxima pars fructus perierit lectori. 81  Cf. CWE 41.502; EAS, vol. 3, 144–46: Porro quidem sola dialectica freti satis instrctos sese putant, ut quavis de re disserant, tantumque tribuunt huic disciplinae, ut actum existiment de fide Christiana, nisi dialectices praesidiis fulciatur, cum interim grammaticam ac rhetoricam ceu prorsus supervacaneas aspernentur. Et probat quidem Augustinus, si quis connexionum rationes teneat, modo absit peculiaris huic arti morbus, pertinax contentio ac libido rixandi.



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were, in fact, incapable of discussing anything else. Through the authority of Augustine, Erasmus launched his accusation against the common “disease” of all the dialecticians, namely being trapped in endless and unproductive disputations. The abovementioned passage is only the beginning of a vehement and wider critique of scholasticism. Erasmus did not limit himself to defending the importance of grammatical skills for theology, but he underscored the significance of this knowledge for understanding the Bible and, thus, to master theology as a discipline. In Erasmus’ eyes, dialectic is useless for a proper understanding of Scripture, while philosophizing is harmful because the Holy Writ is full of parables and rhetorical figures which can only be properly understood with the help of literary skills. As demonstrated below, Erasmus pictured Jesus and Paul as skillful rhetoricians, rather than as dialecticians.82 In opposition to the dialectic method, Erasmus proposed a rhetorical approach to the Scripture, for which a twofold division which considers the history of Christianity and the community of believers is indispensable. Erasmus divides Church history into five epochs. The first era is the one before the coming of Christ; the second the one immediately preceding the coming of Christ as well as the first predication of the Apostles, until when it was forbidden for them to preach about Jesus as the Son of God; the third era is the period when Jesus revealed himself to the world, preached, and made miracles, but law had not forbidden him to do so yet; the fourth epoch refers to the period when the Gospel was disseminated all over the world, when Roman emperors ended the persecution of Christians, and the Christian Church prospered; vacillations within the Church characterize the fifth and the last period, an era of degeneration in which the Church loses the original spirit of Christianity.83 In the same way, the people surrounding Christ can be divided into three circles, with Christ at the center. The first circle comprises priests, cardinals, and popes, who are successors of Christ and, thus, closer to Him; the members of the first circle transmit the light, namely the Word of God, to the princes, who place themselves at Christ’s service, with laws and weapons to defeat an enemy in a just and necessary war or to punish rebellious spirits; finally, the third circle comprises commoners, the most naïve segment of the population, which will, however, also be united with Christ, even if Erasmus admits that a certain hierarchy among the three circles must be acknowledged.84 82 

On this point, Barnett noted that “Erasmus’ linguistic task is much more specifically defined by the nature of his sixteenth-century Latin readers, and in trying to evoke a Paul that speaks with rhetorical decorum to these readers, Erasmus inevitably makes Paul speak differently. In the very process of accommodating the text to the understanding of its contemporary readers, the humanist goal of ad fontes is necessarily compromised by a movement in the other direction, toward an always new historical moment”. Cf. Barnett, “Erasmus and the Hermeneutics of Linguistic Praxis,” 559. 83  CWE 41.527–32; EAS, vol. 3, 186–92. 84  CWE 41.532–37; EAS, vol. 3, 192–98.

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The Scripture should be read in light of the distinctions between the five different epochs and the three circles. Mutable customs and human traditions contrast with the eternal truth of Scripture. It is, therefore, necessary to apply the distinction between the different epochs in reading Scripture. When this is done, the apparent incongruities vanish. Moreover, the members of the three circles are sometimes closer to the center, namely to Christ, and at other times they are in closer proximity to the arc of the circle. From this double distinction between epochs and circles, Erasmus conceptualizes his critique of the institutionalized Church. Convinced of the degeneration of true piety in the early sixteenth century, Erasmus thought that the members of the first circle, namely the ecclesiastical order, were not close to Christ. As a result, he mounted explicit attacks against several practices of the sixteenth-century Church. Following Luther’s publication of his Ninety-Five Theses in October 1517, Christendom was shaken by the polemics on the practice of indulgences. Before Luther’s attacks began, Erasmus had already satirized the practice in his 1511 Moriae encomium, and launched a new attack in his Letter to Paul Volz.85 At this juncture, he was aware of Luther’s critics of indulgences.86 In his Ratio, Erasmus argued that popes do not occupy the most preeminent segment of the first circle, because they promulgate the so-called pardons and indulgences.87 In addition, Erasmus also blamed other papal decrees, such as the request of the annates, the defense of Peter’s treasure with arms, or the war against the Turks. Although these could be aspects of Christian daily life, popes should rather be concerned with the philosophy of Christ.88 Thus, Erasmus concluded that even if it is from Christ that the purest source of light and innocence emanates, popes, as human beings, are weak and, thus, it is impossible that in their prescriptions they are not driven by human affection and thus lack the innocence of Christ.89 85  For

Erasmus’ critiques of indulgences and the debate that this position generated, see CWE 41, 535, n. 217. For the preaching of indulgences in the Low Countries, Erasmus’ home country, see: Charles M. A. Caspers, “Indulgences in the Low Countries, c. 1300– c. 1520,” in Promissory Notes on the Treasury of Merits, ed. Robert Swanson, Brill’s Companion to the Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 65–99. 86  As emerges from Ep. 785: 39, n. 39. 87  CWE 41.535; EAS, vol. 3, 196: Proinde cum summi pontifices condonationibus et indulgentiis, ut vocant, segnes aut fortasse desperationi proximos erigunt ac fovent, donec ad meliora proficiant, non versantur in summa circuli sui parte. 88  CWE 41.535–36; EAS, vol. 3, 196–98: Iidem dum legibus cavent de decimis praedialibus ac personalibus extorquendis, de usu pallii redimendo, de annatis, ut appellant, exigendis, de patrimonio Petri, ut vocant, armis vindicando, de subigendis bello Turcis deque aliisinnumeris, ut donemus eos tractare rem ad communem vitam necessariam aut certe utilem, nemo tamen dixerit eos versari in eo, quod proprium est philosophiae caelestis. 89  CWE 41.536; EAS, vol. 3, 198: Christus, ut purissimus ille fons omnis lucis et innocentiae, praecepit ea, quae caelum sapiant. Pontifices homines, et hominibus infirmis, atque adeo varie infirmis, pro tempore praescribunt, quod videtur expedire. Proinde fieri non potest, quin in horum quoque placitis interdum insint quaedam, quae sapiant humanos affectus et in quibus innocentiam Christi desideres.



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Furthermore, Erasmus allegorically reads some passages of the New Testament as an admonishment of Church corruption. In Matt. 23:23–24, Jesus lashes out against the hypocrisy of the Pharisees and the scribes. Screaming several times “Woe unto you” against the scribes and Pharisees, while at the same time being understanding and indulgent of the ignorance of the people, Jesus sought to signify that it was the responsibility of cardinals, bishops, priests, and princes to enhance piety among the common people.90 Moreover, the second instance of Jesus’ anger in the Gospel was the result of the avarice of the merchants in the Temple. Noting that these were the only two instances of Jesus’ anger, Erasmus points out that these two passages emphasize the main sources of corruption in the Christian Church – corruption which Erasmus perceived as endemic in his own time, and which led him to claim: “So in our day there are many who prefer that evangelical teaching remain silent, as it opposes the pattern of their own lives”.91 Unsurprisingly, this entire passage from Erasmus’ Ratio culminates in a long and vehement attack against corruption in the Church and the loss of “real” spirituality by the monastic order and the members of the clergy. Priests, cardinals, and bishops are intent on presiding over empty ceremonies. They live religion only in appearance; they pretend to be believers, but their heart is not moved by faith and charity. Apologetically, Erasmus stated his belief in the importance of rituals; however, he simultaneously stressed that in Christian life an excessive importance is placed on ceremony to the detriment of true godliness. Thus, common people rely on ceremonies, rather than concentrating their efforts towards the pursuit of true religion. Ultimately, Erasmus was convinced that the problems in the Church were rooted in the abuse of ceremonies.92 Accordingly, Erasmus notes that the clergy need not be obeyed when their sermons diverge from true piety, as Christ himself shows when he called Peter “Satan”.93 The very same criticism against the monastic order and the members of the clergy can also be read in Luther. Unsurprisingly, the positions of Luther 90 

CWE 41.618–69; EAS, vol. 3, 338: Annotandum interim et illud, quod Christus ubique fere miseretur turbae simplicis, in solos Pharisaeos, scribas et divites vae formidabile intonat, videlicet indicans in episcopis, theologis ac principibus esse situm, ut populi vigeat aut frigeat pietas. 91  Cf. CWE 41.622; EAS, vol. 3, 342: Ita nostris quoque temporibus plerique sunt, qui taceri malint doctrinam euangelicam ut cum ipsorum vitae instituto pugnantem. 92  CWE 41.617–68; EAS, vol. 3, 336: Non probo vero, quod humanis constitutionibus tota paene Christianorum vita caerimoniis oneratur; quod his nimium tribuitur, pietati minimum; quod his freti simplices studium verae religionis negligunt; quod ob has magnis tragoediis scinditur tranquillitas Christiani corporis. Iam annis fere quidecim vidimus magnos rerum tumultus, schisma, bella, expilationes. Si quis requirat fontes, comperiet totum hoc malum e caerimoniis ducere originem. 93  CWE 41.619; EAS, vol. 3, 338: Non admittendum cuiusquam hominis consilium, quod avocet a pietate, docet exemplo suo, cum Petrum paulo ante collaudatum satanam appellat.

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and Erasmus were assimilated during this period.94 As we have seen, however, Luther structured his critique of ceremony and external appearances, critically engaging with Erasmus’ work. Moreover, Manfred Hoffmann has pointed out that, for Erasmus, Christ – at the center of the three circles – teaches innocence, simplicity, and humility, and is thus an ethical figure. These ethical dimensions of Christ’s message, however, are inextricably linked to the theological virtues of faith, love, and hope: while fides is the first opportunity to establish a relationship with God and spes conveys the individual in the direction of the future life in Christ, charitas is the underlying principle of Christian life.95 While both Erasmus and Luther could use allegory to criticize the customs, practices, or lack of spirituality in the Church, albeit against the backdrop of different theologies, Luther found Erasmus’ notion of allegory to be quite problematic. Indeed, Erasmus went beyond the critique of the contemporary Church in the application of allegory. Taking for granted that reading the Bible meant reading the true Word of God, and that the only goal of the reader was to become transformed and illuminated by this Word, men could diligently investigate the content of the Holy Text. In order to clarify Erasmus’ notion of allegorical reading of the Scripture, it is necessary to emphasize that Erasmus founded his method in the literal sense. Erasmus also developed a rhetorical method to correctly read books comprised of a number of individual books, such as the Bible, in order to grasp the nuances of each individual book and of the single passages in specific books. Through a process of collation (collatio), the exegete has to recognize and classify the different theological loci. Erasmus claimed that in order to solve the apparent incongruities within the Bible, one must compare the passages that deal with the same topic, and thereby allow an allegorical understanding of the passages that literally contradict each other. Erasmus viewed the application of the fourfold meaning for scriptural interpretation with caution. He emphasized that it is not sufficient to address the different meanings (historical, tropological, allegorical, or anagogical) in which the eternal truth shines in the different passages. First, a rhetorical method must be applied to the interpretation of every single passage, because without being aware of issues such as who is talking and to whom, and in which historical moment, what the goal of a passage is, and what precedes and follows individual statements, readers will inevitably lose sight of the specific theological locus with which they are dealing. Erasmus emphasized that it is, indeed, in this sense that the language and sermons of John the Baptist and Christ are different; moreover, it is one thing to preach to an unlearned crowd, and quite another 94 

For further discussion on the critique of the monastic orders by Erasmus and Luther, see Guido dall’Olio, “Tre critici della vita monastica: Lorenzo Valla, Erasmo da Rotterdam, Martin Lutero,” Studi Francescani 112 (2015): 335–58. 95  Hoffmann, “Erasmus on Language and Interpretation,” 10–11.



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for Jesus to preach to the apostles. The style of address differs even more, depending on whether Jesus is preaching to the apostles before or after they had received his instruction. It is the collation of the different loci that allows even the most obscure passages to be clarified.96 Second, after collecting different passages addressing the same topic, it is necessary to consider how the fourfold meaning is treated in each passage. Praising Origen for his treatment of Abraham put to the test by God, for instance, Erasmus emphasizes how many different meanings can be found in this passage without diverging from the literal sense of the story.97 According to Erasmus, the meaning of the text is not adequately captured in the literal sense, and sometimes it becomes necessary to depart from it in order to achieve a unitary vision of the Bible. The method of taking the personae into account needs to be applied mostly to the Old Testament. In some cases, however, it is also a useful method for interpreting the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles. Jesus’ words in Matt. 5:13–4 (“You are the salt of the earth […] You are the light of the world”) and Matt. 5:48 (“Be perfect, therefore, as your heavenly Father is perfect”) thus refer to all Christians, but most of all to those who are in charge of the Church.98 It is precisely in light of the division in personae and time, as expressed in the fivefold division of Church History, that the meaning of some passages of the Old Testament must be read allegorically, and not literally. Doctrines such as polygamy, sacrifices, or hate of the enemy vanish in front of the light of the Gospel.99 96  CWE

41.523; EAS, vol. 3, 178: Accedet hinc quoque lucis nonnihil ad intelligendum scripturae sensum, si perpendamus non modo quid dicatur, verum etiam a quo dicatur, cui dicatur, quibus verbis dicatur, quo tempore, qua occasione, quid praecedat, quid consequatur. Siquidem alius sermo decet Ioannem Baptistam, alius Christum. Aliud praecipitur rudi populo, aliud apostolis. Rursus aliud praecipitur apostolis adhuc rudibus, aliud formatis iam et institutis. Aliter respondetur insidiose interrogantibus, aliter simplici animo sciscitantibus. Denique series ipsa narrationi altius repetita sententiam aperit alias obscuram. Saepenumero locorum collatio nodum explicat difficultatis, dum quod alibi dictum est tectius, alibi dilicidius refertur. 97  CWE 41.509; EAS, vol. 3, 156: Haec copiosius et elegantius ab Origene disseruntur, haud scio maiorene voluptate lectoris an fructu, cum tantum interim in historico sensu versetur. 98  CWE 41.526; EAS, vol. 3, 184: Quamquam autem personarum observata ratio plurimum habet momenti in veteris instrumenti litteris, velut in prophetis, in psalmis, in cantico canticorum, tamen frequenter et in novo testamento locum habet, praesertim in Paulinis epistolis. Quaedam autem ita proponuntur, ut ad omnes quidem pertineant, at non citra discrimen. Quod genus est, quod cum apostolis loquens dicit: Vos estis sal terrae, vos estis lux mundi, sic ad omnes Christi religionem profitentes pertinet, ut praecipue tamen ad episcopos ac magistratus. Item cum ait: Estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est, omnibus suis ostendit, quo sit enitendum. Quamquam id maxime praestandum iis, qui praesunt ecclesiae Christi. 99  CWE 41.527; EAS, vol. 3, 184: Ut personarum igitur, sic et temporum observata varietas obscuritatem discutit in arcanis litteris. Neque enim quidquid Iudaeis vel imperatum est vel interdictum vel permissum, ad Christianorum vitam est accomodandum. Non quod in veteris instrumenti libris quicquam sit, quod ad nos non pertineat, sed quod pleraque pro tempore tra-

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Scripture is full of parables and rhetorical figures which make it difficult to understand. Indeed, Erasmus noted that the language of Paul and the Gospel is highly complex. He emphasizes that “in almost all his discourses Christ speaks obliquely through figures and tropes”.100 In the same way, Erasmus also portrayed Paul as a master of rhetoric, and, indeed, according to Erasmus, the Apostle made full use of his literary skills to spread the Gospel. Moreover, Christ used deceptions such as enigmas and allegories to ensure that the essence of his teaching was deeply imprinted upon the apostles. For Erasmus, such “deception” is not necessarily wrong; it is, on the contrary, legitimate when used for a noble aim. Paul’s application to himself of a past veil sins (Tit 3:3: “At one time, we too were foolish, disobedient, deceived and enslaved by all kind of passions”) is a metaphor: in reality Paul was never such an evil man, but he portrays himself as evil in order to not offend the sinful.101 Correctly applying the method of distinguishing between the personae, one also has to interpret Rom. 7:24, in which Paul laments for his flesh, rebelling against his Spirit, as not a reference to the apostle himself, but to a person still weak and unable to control his sinful desires.102 For Erasmus, it exists as a form of simulatio, which cannot be equated with lying or deception. Instead, it is a rhetorical tool that helps to engrave moral teachings in the mind of the listener. As already noted, Luther argued (in opposition to Erasmus) that in this passage Paul was really writing about himself. Erasmus urged his readers to cultivate their literary sensibilities to appreciate the divine language. As the scholastics had transformed the study of theology to empty and harmful sophistries, it was necessary to reform the theological curriculum to integrate the dialectic and liberal arts. In this context, one can see how, in light of the reform of the theological curriculum, the solus Christus and the Sola Scriptura passages assume a particular connotation. In Erasmus’ eyes, the Bible was not a book that could be understood through logic and deduction, rather, it was a book that had the power to move readers emotionally. For this reason, literature came closest to theology as a discipline, and masterdita ad typum et adumbrationem futurorum perniciosa sint, nisi trahantur ad allegoriam, veluti circumcisio, sabbata, delectus ciborum, victimae, odium inimici, bella hoc animo suscepta gestaque, turba uxorum aliaque his consimilia, quae partim desierunt esse licita, partim tamquam umbrae ad coruscantem euangelii lucem prorsus evanuerunt. 100  Cf. CWE 41.523; EAS, vol. 3, 178: Et quoniam totus ferme Christi sermo figuris ac tropis obliquus est. 101  CWE 41.578; EAS, vol. 3, 266: Eramus enim, inquit, aliquando et nos insipientes et increduli, errantes, servientes, desideriis et voluptatibus variis, in malitia et invidia agentes, odibiles, odio habentes invicem. Numquam huiusmodi fuerat Paulus, sed talem se facit fuisse, ne quid illos offenderet. 102  CWE 41.526; EAS, vol. 3, 182–84: Itidem Paulus in epistola ad Romanos capite septimo, cum multa questus de carne sua spiritui rebellante tandem exclamat: Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?, non sua voce loquitur, ut opinor, sed alterius cuiuspiam adhuc imbecillis, et qui cupiditatibus suis etiamnum impar esset.



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ing it, a task that included reading pagan authors, was propaedeutic and indispensable to achieving proficiency in theology. The standard polemic against the dominance of Aristotle in the universities, and the proposal of a new emphasis in the curricula on grammar, rhetoric, and literature, go hand in hand, since Erasmus stressed that even while one can understand Scripture without mastering Aristotelian philosophy, one cannot do so without a proper knowledge of grammar, rhetoric, and literature.103 Since Jesus himself was a rhetorician, if one really wanted to rely on Christ alone, then it was necessary to master classical literature. Pagan literature, indeed, could be useful to develop a literal sensitivity, which could be applied to enjoy and appreciate the biblical text, especially for moral interpretations of certain passages. For instance, knowing the story of Tantalus, who was sent by the gods into Tartarus, where, hungry and thirsty, he could not satisfy hunger or thirst, frames the parable of the rich man (Luke 12:16–20). Despite taking care of his wealth, the rich man cannot enjoy it, and the parable shows the perniciousness of avarice. Another example is the story of Phaethon, who drives the chariots of the sun. This story can be allegorically interpreted as a moral precept for all those who take up magistracy but are incapable of bearing the office.104 In this sense, Erasmus affirmed that other sources are needed in order to correctly understand Scripture.105 Erasmus conceptualized his method not as a renewal of biblical studies, rather as a return to the example set by the Church Fathers. The opposition between the ancient commentators (Origen, Basil, Chrysostom, and Jerome) and scholastic theology is thus not surprising; from the Fathers emanate a river of gold and oracles of eternal truth, while, on closer inspection, the empty sophistries of the scholastics seem to vanish like dreams.106 In Erasmus’ appreciation for the ancients, Origen of Alexandria takes pride of place. He excelled in deciphering allegory, and just like Chrysostom, he was most careful in examining commonplace statements.107 His allegorical reading of the Bible transported the 103  CWE 41.514; EAS, vol. 3, 164: Cuiusmodi vero citra philosophiam Aristotelicam non audere theologum profiteri, sine grammatica, sine rhetorica, sine omnis antiquae ac politioris eruditionis cognitione vel antesignanum ordinis theologici profiteri deque his rebus magno supercilio pronuntiare, de quibus Paulus e tertio caelo reversus non ausus est hiscere? 104  CWE 41.505–06; EAS, 3, 150: Nec illud, opinor, inutile fuerit, si theologiae destinatus adulescens diligenter exerceatur in schematis ac tropis grammaticorum rhetorumque, quae non magno negotio ediscuntur, etiam praeludat in fabulis ad allegoriam explicandis, praesertim iis, quae ad mores bonos pertinent, veluti si Tantali fabulam accomodes ad divitem incubantem et inhiantem opibus suis, nec tamen fruentem, si Phaetontis ad periculosam temeritatem suscipientis magistratum, qui magistratui gerendo non sit idoneus. 105  CWE 41.523; EAS, vol. 3, 168–70. 106  CWE 41.510; EAS, vol. 3, 158: Tantum illud dicam in genere, si quis huius rei promptum aliquod argumentum requirat, veteres illos theologos, Origenem, Basilium, Chrysostomum, Hieronymum cum hisce recentioribus componat conferatque: videbit illic aureum quoddam ire flumen, hic tenues quosdam rivulos, eosque nec puros admodum nec suo fonti respondentes. 107  CWE 41.506–07; EAS, vol. 3, 152: Et quoniam professio theologica magis constat

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reader beyond the realm of the literal interpretation. Origen’s homily on Genesis is a model of a text whose language is inflammatory, exemplifying that the power of the faith is stronger than human feeling.108 Erasmus appreciated both the style and content of the works of the Alexandrian Father. In Erasmus, as well as in Origen, truth and allegory and pleasure and utility went hand in hand. For all these reasons, according to Erasmus, Origen should be considered the best commentator of the Bible. An uncritical reading of these passages could give the impression of a stark contrast between Luther’s emphasis on the literal sense of the Scripture and Erasmus’ preference for an allegorical reading. At this juncture, however, Erasmus’ position towards the relationship between the literal and the allegorical is structured through subtle nuances. One can discern three fronts that eventually reshaped Erasmus’ notion of allegory: the critique of scholastic theology, the rejection of Christian Kabbalah, and the simultaneous critique of monastic allegory. We have already analyzed the first aspect. The debates on the competence and skills of the “true theologian” induced Erasmus to vindicate his own rhetorical method as far superior to the dialectic of the scholastics. The other two fronts deserve special attention. First, Erasmus positions his own search for a spiritual approach to reading the Holy Writ in opposition to that of the Christian Kabbalists. In reshaping the notion of an allegorical reading of the Bible, Erasmus repeatedly recognized the existence of a hidden meaning in the Scripture and the need to search for it. The application of the Jewish Kabbalah to Christianity, however, seemed to be of no help in this regard. First, Erasmus noted that Pythagoras, the author that Reuch­lin had held in such high esteem, did nothing more than teach some “magical numbers”. Moreover, he argued that the tendency to “philosophize” on the numbers (thirty, sixty, or one hundred), applying a Hebraic tradition to Christianity, was a useless venture.109 A final stroke against the Christian Kabbalah is then provided with these words: Nor that I would say that a mystery does not somewhere lie hidden in numbers, but that in certain cases alien and distorted interpretation seem to be proposed more to display intellectual ability that to produce godliness, for with these they obscure the sacred teaching, just as Plato obscured philosophy with his numbers. And yet now and then we want these petty comments to serve as the base on which we build a structure of serious dogmas. It affectibus quam argutiis, quas in ethnicis quoque philosophis ipsi rident ethnici, Paulus in Christiano detestatur, idque non uno in loco, conveniet non segniter per aetatem in hoc genere exerceri, quo postea dexterius in theologicis allegoriis locisque communibus tractandis versari possis. In illis felicissimus est Origenes, in his creberrimus est Chrysostomus. 108  CWE 41.507; EAS, vol. 3, 154: Cuius rei si quis exemplum requirat, legat Origenis homiliam de Abraham iusso filium immolare, in quo typus et exemplar ob oculos ponitur fidei robur omnibus humanis affectibus esse potentius. 109  CWE 41.670; EAS, vol. 3, 416: Iam in numeris passim philosophantur, de numero tricesimo, sexagesimo, et centesimo, rem Hebraicam ad Graecos aut Latinos numeros accommodantes.



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is simplest and also, I think, closest to the truth to take the ten, the five, and the one to mean the very much, the moderate, and the very little.110

In criticizing the Christian Kabbalah, especially the use of Kabbalah to interpret numbers and combinations of numbers and letters, which Reuch­lin widely discussed in his De Arte Cabalistica, Erasmus reshaped his notion of allegory. Positioning himself against the Christian Kabbalah helped Erasmus to distinguish between a proper and an improper allegorical reading of the Holy Writ. Second, Erasmus emphasized that the opposite tendency must also be rejected, which is to deny the utility of allegory completely for reading Scripture. In his Apologia adversus monachos, where he defended his use of allegory, Erasmus provided a simple definition of allegory as an interpretation that departs from the grammatical sense.111 In his Ratio, Erasmus emphasized his complete disagreement with “those who disdain all allegories as arbitrary and dreamlike”.112 Erasmus pointed out that it is indeed necessary to interpret some passages of the Old Testament allegorically, which, according to him, is exactly what Jesus and Paul had done. At the same time, the opposite tendency can be observed in “those people who they themselves invent the story they explain by allegory”.113 This is arguably a reference to Gesta Romanorum, a book of stories interpreted allegorically, and which was highly popular in the early sixteenth century.114 In taking issue with the Christian Kabbalah, Erasmus criticized what he perceived to be an excessively spiritualized reading of the Scripture. At the same time, he also rejected the complete denial of the utility of allegory, advanced by Spanish monks, as yet more absurd. The search for the proper role of allegory in his own exegetical method led Erasmus to build a “space in-between”, a space in which allegory needs to be used and not abused. On each page, Erasmus painstakingly described a rhetorical method for tackling Scripture. Allegory is, thus, the ultimate tool when the analysis of figures and tropes, as well as the collation of different pages, do not generate a satisfactory comprehension of that specific passage. In this light, Erasmus could blame even his favorite ancient commentator, Origen, for his excessive use of allegory: 110  Cf. CWE 41.671; EAS, vol. 3, 418: non quod negem alicubi in numeris latere mysterium, sed quod in quibusdam ascita detortaque videantur afferri magis ad ostentationem ingenii quam ad fructum pietatis; sic enim his obscurant sacram doctrinam, quemadmodum Plato suis numeris obscuravit philosophiam. Et tamen has commentatiunculas aliquoties basim esse volumus, cui seria dogmata superstruamus. Simplicissimum est, quo idem verissimum esse puto, decem, quinque, et unum posita esse pro plurimo, mediocri et minimo. 111  As quoted in CWE 41.673, n. 970. 112  CWE 41.673. 113  Cf. CWE 41.73; EAS, vol. 3, 422: qui fastidiant omnes allegorias tamquam rem arbitrariam somniique simillimam. 114  I follow the editors of CWE 41 who suggested this reference at p. 674, n. 972.

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Moreover, I must in general advise the reader that in these matters Origen frequently errs, as do Ambrose, Hilary, and any others who gladly imitate Origen. For in their zeal to impose allegory upon the text, they quite unnecessarily banish the grammatical sense. Therefore, whoever wishes to treat sacred literature seriously will observe moderation in interpretation of this sort. Moreover, it would be safest in tracing out allegories to follow the sources, many of which the Lord himself opened up for us; Paul also some. But if anyone sometimes permits himself to indulge in allegories, he will be granted more forbearance when he does in exhortation, in consolation, in rebuke, than in asserting the truth.115

Origen, the Church Father whom Erasmus praises so highly, the one who should be considered the best interpreter of Paul for his ability to discern allegorical meanings of the biblical text, is paradoxically also blamed for his excessive use of allegory. In Erasmus’ appreciation, Origen tended, like Ambrose and Hilary who followed him, to impose allegory on passages which could easily be understood literally. For Erasmus, the literal-grammatical sense has to be considered first, but when contradictions arise, it is important to rise above the literal sense through the use of allegory. Yet as Erasmus cautioned, allegory must be used sparingly, for its abuse presents an inevitable trap for every exegete of the Bible into which even the best commentators fall. The critique against Origen and his followers is a passage that Erasmus added in the 1523 edition of his Ratio, when he was already familiar with Luther’s Operationes in Psalmos;116 thus, one can suspect that this passage was added as a reaction to the criticism levelled by Luther against Origen’s use of allegory. On the other hand, when Luther read the Froben edition of Erasmus’ Ratio in 1519, he was presented only with praise for the Alexandrian. Luther’s insistent attempts to locate his critique of allegory by blaming Origen and Jerome, highlights the urgent need to recall that the contemporary and unnamed referent of the critique is Erasmus himself. By 1519, Erasmus had developed his own exegetical method. In his Ratio, he explained step by step how the exegete of Scripture needed to apply rhetoric in order to understand a text as complex as the Bible. The precedence of the literal sense over the allegorical is repeatedly underlined. The problem which Erasmus must then address is of the proper use of allegory, and Erasmus locates this 115  Cf. CWE 41.671–72; EAS, vol. 3, 418: Quin illud in genere mihi lector admonendus est hac in re frequenter peccare Origenem, Ambrosium., Hilarium, et si qui sunt alii, qui libenter Origenem imitantur, qui nonnunquam studio inculcandae allegoriae sensum grammaticm submovent, cum nihil sit opus. Quare qui volet litteras sacras tractare serio, mediocritatem servabit in huiusmodi. Tutissimum autem fuerit in pervestigandis allegoriis sequi fontes, quos nobis non paucos ipse dominus aperuit, nonnullos et Paulus. Quod si quis sibi permittit in his ludere nonnunquam, huic plus erit veniae in exhortando, in consolando, in reprehendendo quam in asserenda veritate. 116  As James Tracy has noted, Erasmus mentions Luther’s Operationes in Psalmos positively in a letter to Justus Jonas in May 1519. He also repeats his appreciation for Luther’s commentary on the Psalms in subsequent letters: Tracy, “Two Erasmuses, Two Luthers: Erasmus’ Strategy in Defense of De Libero Arbitrio,” 39.



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at the intersection of those excessive tendencies to allegorize, represented by Origen or the Christian Kabbalists – who sacrificed the literal sense at the altar of allegory – and the categorical rejection of the use of every form of allegory. In his own method, Erasmus locates allegory in this “space in-between”, in different tendencies of sixteenth-century culture. The analysis of Erasmus’ Ratio now offers the possibility of contextualizing Luther’s exegetical positions in the Operationes in Psalmos as a simultaneous absorption and rejection of Erasmus’ positions. Luther’s preference for the literal sense of the Bible can be read in continuity with Erasmus. Since 1513, however, Luther had accepted Jacques Lefèvre’s notion of the literal spiritual reading of the Old Testament. This already distinguished Luther from Erasmus, and led him to a different understanding of the significance of a grammatical approach to the text of the Scripture. Luther’s emphasis on grammatical meaning corresponded with his conviction that the literal-spiritual meaning of the Bible had been clearly revealed. While Erasmus could emphasize how one might interpret a certain passage differently, praising Origen for his multiform readings of the text, Luther understood the analysis of the grammatical sense as always bound and subordinate to the theology of the cross. It is the sapientia crucis that renders the proper Christological meaning of the Psalms. Furthermore, while Erasmus could still accommodate a tropological interpretation of the Bible, Luther marginalized the tropological sense. For Luther, faith in Christ is the essence of the Psalms, and of the overall Bible. For that reason, Luther could follow Erasmus in applying the Psalms to sixteenth-century Church. Corruption and a lack of spirituality in the Church and among the members of clergy are held to be blameworthy by both Erasmus and Luther. Yet they both disagree in regard to the cause of this degeneration, as well as to the location where true spirituality lies. Despite his continuous use of allegory, Luther vehemently denied the usefulness of allegory in understanding the spiritual sense of Scripture. Like many other aspects of his theology, his assertions against allegory have been long interpreted as a rejection of medieval hermeneutics. As in the case of theological anthropology or the overall topic of “Luther and Mysticism”, such an approach is based on an indisputable and unhistorical dichotomy between “Medieval” and “Renaissance/Reformation”. In abandoning a teleological reading of history, the multiform contingency of the historical contexts is allowed to emerge. Luther followed Erasmus to the extent of overcoming the medieval quadriga; however his hermeneutics contain a simultaneous critique of Erasmus’ notion of allegory. While Erasmus positioned his understanding of allegory between a complete reliance on the literal sense and the risk of over-allegorizing, Luther went a step further to criticize allegory as such. The semantic meaning of allegory is further narrowed, because for Luther allegory is only a figure of speech and, unlike for Erasmus, Spirit does not lie hidden in the text of the Holy Writ.

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While for Erasmus rhetoric and theology work together to overcome the literal to discern the spiritual sense of the Bible, for Luther rhetoric has no place in the process of revealing the spiritual sense of Scripture. The spiritual-literal meaning of the Bible lies submerged in the realm of the theology of the cross. Simultaneously appropriating Erasmus’ statements and then going beyond them, Martin Luther reshaped the notion of the literal and allegorical sense of the Bible, relocating the semantic space of these two categories within his wider conception of theologia crucis.

6.3  Luther Pro Erasmus: The Dispute between Erasmus and Jacques Lefèvre on Heb. 2:7 Luther emphasized that the overall meaning of the Scripture was clear. The only proper message of the Holy Writ was that salvation could be achieved through Christ alone. While embarking on the interpretation of single passages, the overall meaning of the Bible must nevertheless be viewed as a unitary book. This does not, however, imply that for Luther the interpretation of individual passages was always clear, or that such passages were subordinated to the general meaning. Moreover, the Sola Scriptura argument did not imply that the interpretations of other exegetes should not be applied in order to clarify the meaning of individual passages. Beyond Luther’s reception of Erasmus’ Ratio, I emphasize that Luther would use Erasmus’ interpretation of select passages, sometimes agreeing with him, and at other times disagreeing. I begin with the interpretation of Heb. 2:7. In the 1516 edition of the New Testament, Erasmus criticized Jacques Lefèvre’s interpretation of Heb. 2:7. Lefèvre had replied to Erasmus’ critique in the second edition to his commentary to the Pauline Epistles. In turn, Erasmus wrote an apology, the main contents of which were incorporated in the 1519 edition of his New Testament.117 The matter of contention was Lefèvre’s proposal to translate Heb. 2:7: “Thou madest him a little lower than God”, rather than “a little lower than the angels”, as it was normally translated. Heb. 2:7 is a quotation from Psalm 8:6, which Lefèvre had already discussed in his Quincuplex Psalterium. Lefèvre did not accept the common translation, arguing that it was blasphemous to consider Jesus lower to any created being – including the angels. He maintained that there had therefore been a mistake in the translation: the Hebrew term Elohim should be translated as “God”, and not as “angels”. According to Lefèvre, the Epistle to 117  For a general assessment of the dispute, see Erika Rummel, Erasmus and His Catholic Critics, 1515–1522, 2 vols., vol. 1, Bibliotheca humanistica & reformatorica (Nieuwkoop: Hes & De Graaf, 1989), 48–61.



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the Hebrews was originally written in Hebrew, and that explains the misleading translation of Psalm 8:6 in the Septuagint. In order to avoid the exegetical difficulty of applying a plural name (Elohim) to God, Lefèvre pointed out that it refers to the hypostatic union between the divine and human nature of Christ. Thus, Lefèvre concluded – rejecting the interpretation of Heb. 2:7 made by no less an influential figure than Thomas Aquinas – that the mistake derived from an improper translation from the Hebrew to the Greek.118 In his annotation to this passage, however, Erasmus favored the common interpretation of Aquinas, rather than the new exegesis proposed by Lefèvre. He noted that the real exegetical problem in correctly interpreting this passage was actually represented by the phrase “a little lower”. While the word Elohim could mean both angels or God in Hebrew, one should explain in which sense Jesus was made to be “lower” with respect to a created being. Erasmus solved the exegetical dilemma, claiming that the phrase should be translated as “for a little while”, a reference to the fact that Jesus was positioned lower than the angels only for the period of his human life. In the second edition of his commentary to the Pauline Epistles, Lefèvre launched vehement accusations against Erasmus. He defended his interpretation of Heb. 2:7, and labelled Erasmus’ exegesis as unworthy of a Christian; following these accusations, passions became inflamed. In July 1517, as soon as he read Léfèvre’s remarks against him, Erasmus wrote an apology entitled Apologia ad Iacobum Fabrum Stapulensem.119 In his reply, Erasmus regretted the strong accusations that Lefèvre had hurled against him, noting his dismay that Lefèvre had moved the discussion to a personal level. The recriminations against Lefèvre are quite long, and occupy many pages of Erasmus’ apology. Leaving aside the personal accusations and discussing the matter at stake, Erasmus firmly asserted that Lefèvre’s position was simply untenable. He recalled his annotations to this passage, where all the different positions related to Heb. 2:7 were listed, without explicitly siding with any one of them. He even went so far as to claim that in that moment he had favored Lefèvre’s (and Jerome’s) interpretation of this passage, but he did not dare admit to it explicitly, so that an interpretation approved by many Church Fathers, first among them Augustine, would not be labelled as heretical.120 Thereafter, however, he rebuked Lefèvre’s exegesis point by point. 118  Ibid., 49. 119  ASD IX–3;

an English translation is available in CWE 83. CWE 83.24; ASD, IX–3.106: Interim quod institueram persequar. Nihil video causae, Faber eruditissime, cur mihi impingendum putaris quod vtranque lectionem recenseo neutra reiecta. Nihil enim aliud hic de nobis queri potes. Et fauebam et faueo tuae Hieronymique sententiae, sed mihi tum non est visum sic alteram recipere, vt alteram velut impiam et haereticam repudiarem, quae talis non est visa sacrosanctis ecclesiae doctoribus et in primis Augustino qui hunc locum non veretur ad hunc interpretari modum. 120 

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First, Erasmus addressed the question of the language in which the Epistle to the Hebrews was originally written. Being aware of the Kabbalistic influences that emerged both in Lefèvre’s Quincuplex psalterium and in his commentaries to the Pauline Epistles, Erasmus criticizes Lefèvre´s use of Talmudic, Kabbalistic, and rabbinical authors who have little in common with the Christ of the Gospel.121 The improper use of these sources, according to Erasmus, had led Lefèvre astray, leading him to believe that the Letter to the Hebrews had been originally written in Hebrew. Erasmus denies that possibility. Moreover, he adds that Paul tended to follow the Septuagint, and not the Hebrew edition.122 Later on, in his apology, Erasmus points out that even if Lefèvre was correct and the Epistle was originally written in Hebrew, Lefèvre’s argument would be unconvincing and his acceptance problematic, since this would entail that many other exegetes were mistaken. Drawing from Lefèvre’s admission that Athanasius, Theophylactus, and Augustine had interpreted Heb. 2:7 to mean that Jesus occupied a lower position than the angels, Erasmus suggests that his opponent claimed that they had been mistaken owing to the erroneous text of the Septuagint. Erasmus, in contrast, admits that, as men learned in Greek and Latin, but without proper knowledge of Hebrew, it was possible for Athanasius, Theophylactus, and Augustine to have been misled by an improper translation. But then, Erasmus rhetorically asks, how is it possible that such champions of Christian faith did not recognize this teaching as heretical?123 In placing himself in line with the teaching of the Church Fathers, Erasmus relies on their authority to defend himself against Lefèvre’s charge of heresy: if Erasmus has simply repeated the teachings of Athanasius, Theophylactus, and Augustine, without siding with them explicitly, this meant either that the three ancient Fathers were heretics, and thus, in following them, Erasmus could be accused of heresy, or that Athanasius, Theophylactus, and Augustine were not heretics and, by virtue of association, neither was Erasmus. 121  CWE 83.21; ASD, IX–3.102: Iam de annotationibus quas ex cabalisticis et talmudicis et rabbinis Iudaeorum adducit, primum paucas deinde plerasque etiam frigidas, in praesentia non disputabo pluribus. Hoc tantum fatebor, mihi quicquid vsquam adhuc hauriri video ex apocryphis Hebraeorum libris, maxima ex parte aut suspectum haberi aut videri frigidum nec magnopere facere ad nostrum Christum. 122  CWE 83.24; ASD, IX–3.106: Primum apud me certe non constat hanc epistolam a Paulo scriptam Hebraice, etiam si plerique id opinentur. Deinde si nusquam Paulus sequitur aeditionem Septuaginta, donabo fortassis non videri probabile hic voluisse sequi. Quod si compertum est, vt est, eum aliis locis frequenter vti ea, prodigiosum non sit si idem hic fecisset, praesertim cum in Actis apostolorum cum Hebraeis agens Esaiae locum non iuxta Hebraicam veritatem, sed iuxta Septuaginta aeditionem adducat. 123  CWE 83.23; ASD IX–3.104: Si istud vsque adeo constat, doctissime Faber, et si altera lectio falsa, impia, haeretica, et diuinae scripturae aduersa, quin hoc persuades orbi christiano? Quin synodum imploras vt tantus error ex omnibus ecclesiae codicibus aboleatur? Quin Ambrosii, Hilarii, Augustini, Chrysostomi, Theophylacti et, ne persequar omnes, vniuersorum orthodoxorum, vno excepto Hieronymo, vicem deplores, qui per omnem aetatem sic legerint, sic scripserint, sic docuerint?



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Having denied that the Epistle was originally written in Hebrew and then translated to Greek, when errors may have crept into the translation, Erasmus discusses how the passage should be correctly interpreted. He points out that in all three holy languages “paulo minus” can be interpreted in the temporal sense, and can thus refer to the very short period of Christ’s human life. The worst accusation that Lefèvre mounted against Erasmus was that by applying the passage to the short period of Christ’s human life he had implicitly denied the Trinity, because he had denied the unity of the hypostasis. Erasmus strongly rejected this accusation, asserting he knew perfectly well that Jesus “has certain attributes by reason of his divine nature and others by reason of his human nature, yet they are predicate of him under either title, on account of the oneness of his hypostasis (if you allow me to employ the expression), to the extent that he may be called God when he is said to have wept, and sorrowed, and died, and been crucified as the Lord of glory, and in turn may be called man when he is said to be equal to God the Father”.124 Erasmus emphasizes that he never claimed that Christ’s human nature had diminished him to any degree in comparison with God. However, having assumed a human form, Christ was not only inferior to God, but to the angels as well precisely in light of his humanity. Lefèvre accused Erasmus of impious doctrines unworthy of Christ and God, because he had applied the adjective “abject” to Christ, which for Lefèvre had proved that Erasmus’ approach was contrary to the Spirit and in accordance with the letter. In his response, Erasmus asserted that he did not apply this adjective to Christ as a form of blame, but to emphasize that he was so humble as to be “abject” in the humiliation of the cross, even without fault.125 As a rhetorical strategy, Erasmus contrasts Lefèvre’s Christology with that of Paul: he claims that, while Lefèvre, celsitudinis ac maiestatis admirator, highlights God’s sublimity, Paul, humilitatis admirator, emphasizes Christ’s human nature, his suffering, and his death on the cross. According to Erasmus, these are two different ways to venerate the same God, although he prefers the Pauline accent on Jesus’ lowliness.126 In doing so, Eras124 

Cf. CWE 83. 26–27; ASD IX–3.108: Adduci non possum vt credam te vsque adeo male sentire de Erasmo, vt me putes adeo stupidum aut indoctum vt numquam legerim apud theologos Iesum Christum vnam esse personam, eundem Deum et hominem, et quanquam quaedam in illum competunt ratione diuinae naturae, quaedam humanae, tamen vtrocunque nomine de illo praedicari propter hypostaseos vnitatem, si ita permittis me loqui, adeo vt recte Deus dicatur fleuisse, doluisse ac mortuus esse et Dominus gloriae crucifixus, rursus homo dicatur aequalis Deo Patri. 125  CWE 82.31–32; ASD IX–3.116: Nec hoc sentio quod videris interpretari Christum aut simpliciter inferiorem aut ita fuisse angelis hominibusue inferiorem vt esset deterior, sed tamen aliqua parte fuisse his inferiorem. Certe mihi videtur hoc nomine multum descendisse ac deiecisse sese infra angelos quod assumpserit corpus et animam morti, cruciatui doloribusque obnoxiam. 126  CWE 83.35; ASD IX–3.118: Nec ob id ilico tuus erit aduersarius qui hac parte Christum contempletur, nec tu illius quem magis capit sublimitatis admiratio. Vterque vnum eun-

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mus seeks to align his own interpretation with that of Paul and cast Lefèvre’s interpretation as a departure from the interpretation of the apostle. Thus, while nominally presenting Lefèvre’s position as legitimate, he is implicitly accusing his opponent of disagreeing with Paul. By all appearances, rebuking Lefèvre’s accusation of misunderstanding the communicatio idiomatum is one of Erasmus’ main concerns.127 He goes as far as to turn this accusation against Lefèvre himself. First, Erasmus argues that “Lefèvre’s Aristotle” proves that “more” and “less” do not fall into the category of substance and, thus, Faber falls into a logical fallacy in his claim that Jesus was more a man than every other man. Erasmus argued instead that it was possible to state he was a better man but not “more a man”.128 Second, regarding the accusation that Erasmus diminished the majesty of Christ “in himself” (in se), Erasmus replied that he was ready to confirm this assertion only if the words in se would be understood as “in reality” (vere). Erasmus points out that if one were to admit that Christ had really suffered and had been crucified, then it is correct to claim that, having embraced human nature upon himself, Christ had been diminished in se.129 Erasmus is implicitly suggesting that Lefèvre runs the implicit risk of assuming gnostic positions, as he himself remembered some pages before, quoting Augustine and his rejection of Marcion’s heresy (“the heresy of one Marcus, or Marcion, I think, which taught, so Augustine tell us, that Christ suffered not in reality but in his imagination”130). Moreover, Erdemque Christum veneramini sed alter altera ex parte. Nec tu, celsitudinis ac maiestatis admirator, officis humilitatis laudibus nec hic, humilitatis contemplator, quicquam illius sublimitati detrahit, quod vtraque res in Christum competat ob diuinam naturam in qua semper fuit Deus et ob humanam infirmitatem quam dignatus est assumere in tempore. 127  John J. Bateman noted that in his 1521 Paraphrase of this passage Erasmus eliminated the expression fecisti inferiorem, which could be misinterpreted as implying that the Son was created inferior to the Father, substituting it with the Latin verb demisere. See ASD VII–VI.49. Erasmus maintained the interpretation of the passage as referring to Christ’s human life. He paraphrases Heb. 2:7 as follows: Quid est homo quod memo res eius, aut filius hominis quod curam habes illius? Demisisti illum paulis per infra angelos. (ASD VII–6. 48). 128  CWE 83.45; ASD IX–3.128: Hic si tibi res esset cum homine sophistico, vide quo pacto tueri possis Christum omnium maxime vere hominem esse, quum iuxta tuum Aristotelem magis et minus non cadat in substantiam, vt Christus magis homo dici possit etiam si melior cunctis hominibus dici debeat. 129  CWE 83.47; ASD IX.3.130: Si in se accipis pro vere, dicam in se fuisse diminutum qui vere fuerit diminutus. Fateris assumpta natura humana susceptisque cruciatibus Christum fuisse diminutum. Verum autem eam assumpsit vereque fuit afflictus, vere igitur fuit diminutus. Sin quum in se dictis, sentis absolute, simpliciter et per se, fateor absolute summum et ne nihil videar ex tuis libris hausisse, plusquam infinite summum. 130  CWE 83.45; ASD IX.3.128: Iam quod scribis Christum opinione Iudaeorum fuisse derelictum a Patre non solum frigidulum est, verumetiam ab omnium veterum interpretum sententia dissentiens, quasi hoc Christus illic queratur Patri quod Iudaei male de se sentiant, pro quibus paulo ante orauerit. Et haud scio an praestiterit, mi Faber, hulcus hoc existimationis in totum non tangere, ne cui minus incipiat displicere Marci cuiusdam aut Marcionis, opinor, haeresis qui, vt autor est Augustinus, docuit Christum non vere sed putatiue passum.



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asmus attacks Lefèvre’s claim that there is no relationship between the human and the divine, but that there is one based on identity and equality between Christ and God. Erasmus argues that there can be no relationship between two equal things, as Aristotle points out in De Caelo 1.6 (274a7) and in Physics 8.1 (252a).131 There is a relationship between the finite and the infinite, but there can be no relationship between two infinites. Thus, in the same way, Christ is neither inferior nor superior to God, He is simply equal to Him.132 The last point raised by Erasmus concerned the authenticity of the Epistle to the Hebrews. He noted that the Epistle had been inserted into the New Testament canon quite late in Church history. Also, in his Ratio, Erasmus noted that, because of his dubious authenticity, the Epistle to the Hebrews should carry less weight than the Epistles to the Romans or to the Corinthians. The fact that the paraphrase to this Epistle was placed at the end of his 1521 Basel edition of Paraphrases raised Noél Bëda’s suspicion that Erasmus’ decision had been a conscious one, and was intended to demonstrate the lesser importance of the Epistle. On the other hand, Erasmus replied that the editor had decided to put the Paraphrase to Hebrews at the end of the book for the simple reason that it was the final paraphrase that he had written.133 The dispute between Lefèvre and Erasmus was widely commented on throughout European intellectual circles. In the inaugural ceremonies of the Leipzig debate, Peter Mosellanus (1493–1524) invited the contenders (Eck, Karlstadt, and Luther) to follow the example of Erasmus: although the dispute went so far as to lead the two contenders to the unusual practice of attacking each other by name, Mosellanus emphasized that in his Apologia Erasmus had shown “a very Christian spirit” in rejecting, without personal animosity, the charges of impiety that a friend had made against him.134 One year before Leipzig, in his lecture on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Luther provided an overview of all the exegetical traditions related to Hebrews 2:7 as he presented the argument between Lefèvre and Erasmus to his students. Luther emphasized that Heb. 2:7 should not refer to man, but only to Christ, just as in Psalm 72:8 “He will rule from sea to sea” refers to Christ, and not to the emperor. Luther rejected the interpretation that the verse referred to human dignity and, thus, the whole passage had to be interpreted as men being created slightly lower than the angels.135 131 

The two references are quoted in ASD IX–3.133, note to lines 1170 and 1170–71. CWE 83.49; ASD IX–3.132: Etenim vt Aristoteles negauit finiti ad infinitum esse proportionem, ita sensit nec inter infinita duo esse proportionem, si quid credimus interpretibus. 133  See the introduction to the Paraphrase to the Epistle to the Hebrews by John J. Bateman in ASD VII–6.21–37. 134 Rummel, Erasmus and His Catholic Critics, 1515–1522, 1, 52–53. 135  LW 29.126; WA 57.3.116.8–13, 117.1–10: A multis laboratum est in isto versu exponendo. Magna pars doctorum, precipue Hieronimus, aliquoties Aug⌊ustinus, Ambro⌊sius, Crisostomus videntur eum de simplici humanitate intelligere. Sed breviter dicimus: licet de 132 

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Then, turning to examine the dispute between Faber and Erasmus, Luther argued that Faber had failed to prove his point. First, it was more likely that the Epistle had been written in Greek rather than in Hebrew, because Paul rarely quoted the Bible in Hebrew, and, thus, the passage did not contain a translation error. Furthermore, the senders of the letters were Gentiles. Therefore, Luther approved Erasmus’ interpretation and affirmed that “a little lower” referred to the short period of time spanning Christ’s human life, rather than his diminished dignity.136 Luther concluded that the passage should be interpreted to mean that Jesus had been forsaken and deserted by God or the angels for a little while, namely for three days. In contrast to Faber, Luther argued that the interpretation of the Hebrew word Elohim made no difference for the correct interpretation of the passage. It could refer equally to God or to the angels, or to any person in a high position. Luther, however, sided with Faber – at least in claiming that the word should be interpreted as referring to God, because it was God who caused Jesus to be forsaken by His divinity as well as being abandoned by the angels’ protection.137 homine possit intelligi abusive scil. ceu si quis illud psal. 71.: “Dominabitur a mari usque ad mare” abusive de Cesare intelligeret, quod de solo Christo intelligitur, vel illud psal. 127.: “Filii tui sicut novelle olivarum” de aliquo patrefamilias acciperetur, cum de filiis Ecclesie dicatur: proprie tamen non potest nisi de Christo intelligi. Aut necesse est verba precedencia et sequencia miris tormentis et crucibus cogi ad eum sensum. Igitur qui putant hic esse dictum de dignitate humane nature, quod proxima sit angelis, abusivam sequuntur intelligenciam, que mors est vere intelligencie. Alii de Christo intelligunt, quod sit minor angelis non secundum animam, sed secundum corpus passibile. Verum hec eciam intelligencia non sufficit, cum non sit tantummodo angelis minor factus, imo ipsemet dicit: “Ego autem sum vermis et non homo”, Psalm. 21. 136  LW 29.127; WA 57.3.117.10–17, 118.1–12: Tercio Stapulensis sic haberi dicit in Hebreo: “Minuisti eum paulominus ab Eloim”, quod Deum significat, et non “a Malachin”, quod angelos significat. Sed huic rursus obstat Erasmus, primo, quod non tantum Deo minor factus sit, sed eciam “novissimus virorum”, ut supra, unde pocius debuit dicere non “paulominus”, sed multo maxime minoratum a Deo. Secundo, quod “Eloim” Hebraice non tantummodo significat Deum, sed angelos, imo iudices et quoslibet in potestate constitutos, ut Exodi 21. de servo perpetuo dicit: “Offerat eum dominus ‘diis’ i. e. Eloim Hebraice, hoc est iudicibus et sacerdotibus. Adde et hoc, quod Stapulensis piissime quidem movetur, sed non efficit, quod voluit, scil. Apostolum hanc epistolam Hebraice scripsisse et ideo Grecum interpretem non fideliter transtulisse eundem in verbo “Eloim”. Primo, quia Apostolus rarissime allegat Biblia iuxta Hebreum, ut patet Ro. 3. et D Bl. 25b multis aliis. *Tercio verisimilius est epistolam hanc non Hebraice, sed Grece scriptam esse, cum ad eos scribat, qui conversi ad Christum per Gentesque dispersi Septuaginta translacione utebantur. Quartus tandem Erasmus sentit illud “paulominus” non referri ad modum dignitatis imminute, sed ad breve tempus, quo fuit minoratus, ut in glosa, et Crisostomus habet. Sed adhuc restat scrupulus, videlicet quod nihilominus Christus brevi illo tempore minoratus est longe plus quam “ab angelis”. 137  Ibid; WA 57.3.119.2–9: Est ergo sensus: Fecisti eum, ut esset derelictus et desertus a Deo seu ab angelis, et hoc ipsum non diu, sed paululum, imo minus paulo i. e. brevissimo tempore, scil. triduo, quia tradidisti eum in manus peccatorum. Nihil ergo refert, an “Eloim” hoc loco Deum, angelos, iudices seu quoscunque sublimes significet, licet apcius pro “Deo” acci-



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In light of this interpretation, Luther concluded that Heb. 2:7 must have been corrupted by a scribe or the translator. It cannot mean that Jesus was lower than the angels in his dignity, but it must be applied to the previous verse, namely, that it refers to the short duration when Jesus was forsaken and crucified. From a pastoral view, Luther claimed that the Holy Spirit wanted to offer consolation to the believer, demonstrating that while each suffering and every tribulation would last for only a short while, the rewards would be eternal.138 Since the wrath of God is necessary to extirpate sin from human nature, true Christians should happily accept every suffering, because – Luther concluded – “God kills in order to make alive, He humiliates in order to exalt”.139

6.4  Luther Against Erasmus: The Controversial Interpretation of Gal. 2:11–14 In Gal. 2:11, Paul recounts his dispute with Peter, where Peter had behaved hypocritically: he ate with pagans converted to Christianity when the Christian Jews were not around, but avoided them when the Jews could see him. Thus, since other people, even Barnabas, had followed Peter’s example, Paul expressed his obligation to intervene and rebuke Peter for his hypocrisy. Paul blames Peter in front of everybody for complying with the old law, and for not following the truth of the Gospel. This controversial passage generated a famous disagreement between Jerome and Augustine over its correct interpretation – a disagreement which sparked further contention in the sixteenth century when Erasmus sided with Jerome, and Luther with Augustine.140 The positions of Jerome and Augustine peretur; nam fecit eum Deus non solum a divinitate derelinqui, sed eciam a defensione angelorum et universae potestatis, que in mundo est. 138  LW 29.129; WA 57.3.121.15–18, 122.1–5: Textus iste vel ab interprete vel notario corruptus est, quippe cum vel nullum iota eum sensum generet, quod Christus sit minor factus modico quam angeli. Denique in Greco eadem verborum est forma, que superius, “minuisti eum paulominus ab angelis”. Ideo potest sic ordinatus fuisse intelligi textus: Eum autem, qui minus quam modico (id enim significat ‘paulominus’) minoratus est ab angelis In quo nos consolatur spiritus sanctus, ut in tempore passionis pacienciam et spem habeamus, quia modica est tribulacio et eterna consolacio. 139 LW 29.130; WA 57.3.121.14–16: Talis autem destruccio fit per cruces, passiones, mortes et ignominias. Ideo Deus mortificat, ut vivificet, humiliat, ut exaltet. 140  For an assessment of the dispute between Erasmus and Luther, see: Karl Holl, “Der Streit zwischen Petrus und Paulus zu Antiochien in seiner Bedeutung für Luthers innere Entwicklung,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 38 (1920): 23–40. Kenneth Hagen, “Did Peter Err? The Text is the Best Judge: Luther on Gal. 2:11,” in Augustine, the Harvest, and Theology (1300–1650): Essays Dedicated to Heiko Augustinus Oberman in Honor of his Sixtieth Birthday, ed. Kenneth Hagen (Leiden: Brill, 1990), 110–26. Johannes Trapman, “Erasmus on Lying and Simulation,” in On the Edge of Truth and Honesty: Principles and Strategies of Fraud and Deceit in the Early Modern Period, ed. Toon van Houdt, et al., Intersections (Leiden: Brill,

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were almost antithetical. On the one hand, Jerome argued that Peter’s disassociation from the Christian Gentiles, as well as Paul’s rebuke of Peter’s behavior, were two forms of simulation (simulatio). They behaved as they did in order to avoid scandalizing the Christian Jews (Peter) and the Christian gentiles (Paul). No real dispute had occurred between Peter and Paul, according to Jerome. On the other hand, Augustine believed that the dispute was real: Peter had made a mistake and behaved hypocritically, and Paul had rightly reprimanded him for that behavior. For Augustine, the category of simulation could not apply to this occasion. Instead, the “fake” dispute between Paul and Peter would be a form of lying (mendacium).141 In his annotations to the New Testament, Erasmus devoted a long note to Gal. 2:11–14. Like Jerome, but unlike Augustine, Erasmus pointed out that Paul and Peter pretended to have a dispute in order not to scandalize their fellow Christians. Their behavior would fall within the category of simulatio, not mendacium. Thus, in Erasmus’ eyes, Peter was not really at fault, and both Peter and Paul had behaved correctly, although their behavior was simulated. Erasmus noted that sometimes one should not be afraid to commit a venial sin, when the latter is done out of charity. Johannes Trapman142 and Kenneth Hagan143 have noted that most medieval interpreters followed Augustine’s interpretation. Trapman regards Adriaan Florensz (1450–1523) as a notable exception among Erasmus’ contemporaries. Florensz, professor at the University of Louvain before he was crowned Pope Adrian VI, not only favored Jerome’s exegesis in his commentary on the Sentences, but even added that Augustine had criticized Jerome without having correctly understood him.144 In his 1519 commentary on Galatians, Luther followed the interpretation of this passage put forth by Augustine, Aquinas, and Lyra. I noted in the previous chapter that in the Augsburg Colloquies with Cardinal Cajetan, Luther used Gal. 2.11–14 as an argument in order to vindicate his right to correct a fellow Christian who was behaving wrong, even if this person was the pope. Luther’s interpretation of this passage is in opposition to that of Erasmus. As his main concern was to reject Erasmus’ position, he focused on Erasmus’ argument to substantiate Jerome’s exegesis and, in particular, on Erasmus’ interpretation of the term “face”, which, according to Erasmus indicated that Paul 2002), 33–46. Peter G. Bietenholz, “‘Simulatio:’ Erasme et les interprétations controversées de Galates 2:11–14,” in Actes du colloque international Érasme (Tours, 1986), ed. Jacques Chomarat (Genève: Droz, 1990). Schulze, “Martin Luther and the Church Fathers,” 604–9. 141  Trapman, “Erasmus on Lying and Simulation,” 34. 142  Ibid., 35. 143  Hagen, “Did Peter Err? The Text is the Best Judge: Luther on Gal. 2:11,” 113. 144  Trapman also suggested that Erasmus could have been influenced by Adrian Florensz’s exegesis, since he attended Florensz’s lecture in Louvain in 1502–3. See: Trapman, “Erasmus on Lying and Simulation,” 35.



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reproached Peter’s behavior only in appearance. At the beginning of his commentary on Galatians 2, Luther positioned himself against Jerome, who argued that Paul did not return to Jerusalem after seventeen years, as he lacked confidence in his teachings.145 Luther, on the other hand, sought to refute “the fable” that the apostles had left Jerusalem and were dispersed throughout the world.146 Luther discussed Gal. 2:3–5 as a controversy on the freedom from, or the necessity of, the law. In his teaching, Paul brought with him Barnabas, a Jew, and Titus, a Gentile who converted to Christianity, to suggest that the Gospel frees the Christian from the old law. However, this passage does not discuss what constitutes the works of the law. Luther distanced himself from Jerome who, following “his master” (suo doctus) Origen, interpreted the passage to mean that a Christian could avoid doing the works of the law. Luther specified that the laws must be put aside only from a soteriological standpoint, in the sense that nobody would be saved through their works, nor did good works contribute to the salvation of the individual. Unlike the other apostles, Paul and Barnabas sometimes carried out the works of the law, and at other times they did not, in order to prove that the new law freed the Christians from the old Jewish precepts. Luther emphasized that the new law established by Christ bound people only to love their neighbor. The respect or lack of respect for the law had to derive from love, and it had no implication for the salvation of the individual.147 Luther thus put a stroke against the members of the religious orders who were so committed to accomplishing the law though external worship, rites, and ceremonies that they completely forgot and erased the freedom that the Gospel gives to Christians.148 It is a critique that clearly resembled Erasmus’ accusations against the external ceremonies of the religious orders. 145  LW 27.199; WA 2.475.35–36, 476.1: Ideoque non sua causa ascendit, quasi timuerit (ut Hieronymus sentit), ne falsum per decem et septem annos praedicasset, sed ut ostenderet aliis, non in vacuum sese cucurrisse, approbantibus et caeteris Apostolis suum cursum. 146  LW 27.200–1; WA 2.476.31–37: Iterum nota, quod post annos quatuordecim Paulus invenit Apostolos In Hierusalem aut saltem Petrum et Iacobum et Ioannem, si non omnes, et cum illis confert. Non quod me torqueat adeo fabula de divisione Apostolorum anno tertiodecimo facta et sic iactata, quam ut moneam, ne in similes nugas (quae plurimae hodie sunt) facile labamur, contra apertissimas scripturas sine iudicio quodvis superstitionis figmentum titulo quocunque pietatis ornatum acceptando. 147  LW 27.202–3; WA 2.477.29–35, 478.1–5: Ceterum tota vis huius controversiae consistit non in operibus legis, quaecunque illa sint, sed in necessitate et libertate operum legis. Non enim opera legis et lex ipsa sic sunt mortificata et finita pro Christum, ut ea nullo modo liceat operari (quemadmodum d. Hieronymus ex Origene suo doctus non uno loco contendit). Sed tantum ut absque eis salus esse credatur per solum Christum, qui finis legis est, in quem futurum erant praecepta. Postquam enim Christus advenit, legis opera sic abrogavit, ut indifferenter ea haberi possint, non autem amplius cogant, sicut infra c. Iiij. pulchrum dabit paradigma de haerede parvulo. Ideo caeteri Apostoli ea fecerunt cum Iudeis fidelibus: Paulus autem et Barnabas aliquando fecerunt, aliquando non fecerunt, ut ostenderent ea prorsus esse Adiaphora et talia, qualis esset ille, qui faceret. 148  LW 27.204; WA 2.478.10–15: Quocirca gravissime errant nostri seculi homines, maxi-

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According to Luther, in Scripture the term “person” means something completely different from the meaning it has assumed at the universities: whereas the scholastics intend “person” to mean a rational and indivisible substance, in Scripture it means an external quality through which what is or is not spiritual can be judged.149 The implication that Luther does not directly address in this passage is that the only “external quality” is the Spirit. It is the Spirit that grants man the certitude to judge what is spiritual or is not spiritual. Moreover, according to Luther, every time Scripture issues an invitation to address the person, it entails revisiting the person’s inward condition. Thus, Luther points out that “man always looks upon the persons, never at the heart. For this reason, he always judges wrongly. God never looks upon the persons; he always looks at the heart. For this reason, he judges people rightly”.150 Finally, commenting on Gal. 2.11–14: Luther opposes the interpretations of Jerome (and Erasmus), arguing that Paul was not a hypocrite in his reproach of Peter. In fact, Paul opposed Peter with all his heart because Peter was committing a mortal sin, namely the sin of unbelief.151 Luther substantiates his interpretation, pointing out that, “according to face” does not mean according to appearance; as he explained above, “face” indicates the heart of the individual, the true feelings. Although Luther is clearly reacting against Erasmus’ interpretation of this passage, he takes the opportunity to launch his vehement accusations against corruption in the monastic orders and the clergy.152 Erasmus, who was often me Clerus et religiosi, qui propter pompas externi cultus, propter ritus et cerimonias suas, quibus usque ad incurabilem perditionem animarum sunt impliciti, ita fastidiunt alios, qui simili specie non speciuntur, ut et sine fine litigent et audeant protestari, nunquam velle eos communia cum illis sentire et habere. 149 LW 27.206; WA 2.480.11–15: Et notabis “personam” hoc loco longe aliter accipi quam in scholis nunc usus habet. Non enim rationalem individuamque substantiam, ut illi dicunt, sed externam qualitatem vitae, operis aut conversationis significat, iuxta quam homo de homino iudicare, laudare, vituperare, nominare potest, et quicquid non fuerit in spiritu. 150  Cf. LW 27.206; WA 2.480.19–21: Homo semper respicit personas, nunquam cor: ideo semper male iudicat. Deus nunquam respicit personas, semper autem cor: ideo iuste iudicat populos. 151  LW 27.211; WA 2.485.30–37: Porro, an Petrus in hoc peccaverit (ut vocant) mortaliter, viderint alii. Hoc scio, quod ii, qui tali simulatione cogebantur ad iudaismum, nisi fuissent per paulum reducti, periisent, quia non in fide Christi sed in operibus legis iustificari coeperunt. Ideo Petrus cum caeteris praebuit efficax, scandalum non morum, sed fidei et aeterna damnationis. Nec Paulus tam fidenter restitisset, si leve et veniale periculum hic fuisset: conqueritur enim, Euangelii veritatem fuisse desertam: at veritatem euangelii non sequi, iam infidelitatis crimen est. 152  LW 27.215; WA 487.4–10: Hunc autem locum Apostoli quam vellem cunctis Christianis esse cognitissimum, praesertim religiosis, clero et non paucis superstitiosis, qui propter leges pontificias aut sua statuta non raro subvertunt euangelicam et fidem et charitatem, nec tantum habent iudicii, ut, si postulet fraterna charitas, omittant onera sua, nisi denuo per pecunias emerint et dispensationes et indulta, cum nec pontifices nec ecclesia possit quicquam statuere, nisi quatenus libera permittatur charitas mutuaque beneficentia.



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praised in this period for his erudition and scholarship, is never mentioned in this passage. Luther limits himself to remark that Jerome misunderstood Paul.153

6.5 The Goat in Leipzig and the Bull in Wittenberg: The Spirit and the Letter in the Luther–Emser Debate In the previous chapter, I argued that Martin Luther’s Sola Scriptura has to be analyzed as an argument that he developed in opposition to his Roman opponents, as well as to other exegetical traditions of the Renaissance. In my view, it is impossible to overemphasize the influence that the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam exercised on this process. Luther’s marginalization of allegory, his emphasis on the clarity of Scripture, as well as the notion of the Bible as sui ipisius interpres, were constructed in opposition to Erasmus’ scholarship. Luther was convinced that the central message of Scripture lay in faith in Christ, and that this message was expressed openly for the believers. While he considered the unitary meaning of Scripture to be clear, however, Luther drew the interpretation of single passages from other exegetes. I have therefore shown that Luther followed Erasmus in the interpretation of Hebrew 2:7, while he disagreed with him regarding the interpretation of Galatians 2:11–14. Regardless of how a particular biblical passage was interpreted, the cross remained for Luther the only marker with which to test the correct interpretation of the Scripture as a whole. As Luther’s Sola Scriptura was still an argument in the 1520s, historians should pay heed to how Luther developed it in contrast to other interpreters. While Luther did not have an open debate against Erasmus before their famous controversy regarding free will (1524–25), early Roman controversialists played a crucial role in the development of Luther’s Sola Scriptura. I will focus my attention in this chapter on the controversy between Hieronymus Emser, and Martin Luther, showing how this debate induced Luther to clarify his Sola Scriptura with greater precision. Hieronymus Emser studied law and theology at the University of Tübingen and Basel.154 In 1504, he lectured on Reuch­lin’s Sergius at the University of Erfurt, and Martin Luther was among his students; in that very same year, together with Jakob Wimpfeling, he edited Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s opera. As already noted, in 1515 he also published an edition of Erasmus’ Enchiridion Militis Christiani. Before moving to Leipzig he was secretary to Cardinal Raymond von Gurk (1435–1505), then papal legate on the indulgences; upon Cardinal Raymund’s recommendation, he entered the service of Duke George of 153  154 

LW 27.217; WA 2.488.3–4: Paulum non fuisse a d. Hieronymo satis intellectum. For biographical information on Emser, see: LW 39.107–10.

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Saxony (1471–1539), later one of the strongest opponents of the Reformation.155 In those years Duke George was very committed to the process of the canonization of the twelfth-century Saxon Bishop Benno of Meyssen (d. 1106). Emser went to Rome in 1510 to make the case for Benno’s canonization and, in 1517, he published a biography of Benno, who indeed was proclaimed a saint in 1523.156 As we have seen in the previous chapter, Emser’s translation of the Bible played a prominent role in the theological debates of the early sixteenth century. The controversy between Emser and Luther began on the eve of the Leipzig debate.157 A small incident occurred a year before the confrontation between Luther and Eck in Leipzig: Emser invited Luther, who was in Dresden to preach at the Castle Church, for dinner; during the dinner, however, one of the guests complained that he did not want to share dinner with a man charged with heresy. As a good host, Emser settled the dispute, but Luther suspected that it was actually Emser himself who had truly inspired the critics.158 After the Leipzig debate, which Emser himself attended as a spectator, Emser wrote a pamphlet in Luther’s defense. Since Luther’s words in favor of Hus in Leipzig sparked enthusiasm among the Bohemians in Prague,159 on 19 August 1519, as eye-witness to the debate between Luther and Eck, Emser wrote an open letter to John Zack, administrator of the archbishopric in Prague and provost of Leitmeritz, reassuring him that Luther was not sympathetic to the Hussite heresy. Franco Motta has recently noted that, while nominally defending Luther’s orthodoxy, Emser had emphasized that it was possible to note continuity in one specific aspect between Luther’s claims in Leipzig and the Hussite heresy, since both claimed that papacy was a human, not a divine, authority.160 155  For further discussion of Duke George’s role in the debates of the early sixteenth century, see: Christoph Volkmar, Catholic Reform in the Age of Luther: Duke George of Saxony and the Church, 1488–1525, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 2017). 156  See: David J. Collins, “Bursfelders, Humanists, and the Rhetoric of Sainthood: The Late Medieval Vitae of Saint Benno,” Revue bénédictine 111 (2001): 508–56; Reforming Saints: Saints’ Lives and Their Authors in Germany, 1470–1530, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 157  Beyond the text printed in the Weimarer Ausgabe and the Corpus Catholicorum, the most accurate edition of the dispute is: Martin Luther, and Hieronymus Emser, “Luther und Emser. Ihre Streitschriften aus dem Jahre 1521,” in Flugschriften aus der Reformationszeit, ed. Ludwig Enders (Halle an der Saale: Niemeyer, 1890). Hereafter quoted as Enders. Some of Emser’s publications against Luther have been recently reprinted in Adolf Laube and Ulman Weiß, Flugschriften gegen die Reformation (1518–1524). (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997). 158  The anecdote is reported in LW 39.107. 159  For the spread of Luther’s treatises in Bohemia, see: Frederick G. Heymann, “The Impact of Martin Luther upon Bohemia,” Central European History 1 (1968): 107–30. With a specific attention to the Utraquists, see: Zdeněk V. David, Finding the Middle Way: The Utraquists’ Liberal Challenge to Rome and Luther (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003), 45–79. 160 Franco Motta, “La cattura del Minotauro. Il Lutero dei controversisti cattolici,” in



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While nominally defending Luther’s orthodoxy, Luther himself believed that Emser was actually trying to trap him surreptitiously. On the one hand, if Luther accepted Emser’s testimony of the events in Leipzig, he would have tacitly admitted to holding heretical positions during the debate; on the other hand, if he rejected Emser’s narrative, he could have been accused of siding with the Hussite heresy. Convinced of Emser’s deceptive behavior, Luther wrote a pamphlet against his former professor in September entitled Ad Aegocerotem Emserianum Additio.161 Luther accused Emser of cowardice, and expressed greater respect for Eck’s attitude, who openly charged Luther with heresy, rather than resorting to a pretense of his defense – a pretense through which Emser was actually trying to substantiate the accusation of heresy against him. Eck joined the dispute, siding with Emser in his Pro Hieronymo Emser contra malesanam Lutheri Venationem responsio.162 Afterwards, in a new pamphlet entitled A Venatione Lutheriana Aegocerotis Assertio, Emser explicitly accused Luther of criticizing the practice of indulgences only because his Augustinian order did not share in the profits from their sale. For a while the controversy appeared to be waning, but in 1520 Luther was excommunicated in the papal bull Exsurge Domine. After the publication in August 1520 of Luther’s Address to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation, in December 1520 Emser wrote a vehement pamphlet entitled Against the UnChristian Book of the Augustinian Martin Luther, Addressed to the German Nobility (Wider das Unchristliche Buch Martin Luthers an den deutschen Adel).163 Despite reading only one part of Emser’s treatise, given to him by friends in Leipzig, Luther wrote an immediate reply – To the Goat in Leipzig.164 Luther ironically addressed Emser as “the goat of Leipzig” because Emser’s coat of arms, comprising a shield and a helmet with a goat, was pictured on the title page of his writings. Moreover, Luther and Melanchthon were wrongly convinced that Emser had drafted another attack against Luther published by Melchior Lotter in Leipzig in October of the same year, under the pseudonym of Thomas Radinus. Originally published in August in Rome, the pamphlet was actually the work of the Italian Dominican Tommaso Radini Tedeschi (1488– 1527). In 1521, Melanchthon replied under the pseudonym of Didymus Faventinus, to whom Thomas Radinus addressed his counter-response in his Oratio in Lutero: un cristiano e la sua eredità, 1517–2017, ed. Alberto Melloni (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2017), 677–700. 161  WA 2.656. 162  This text has been digitized by Halle University Library and can be found at the following link: http://digitale.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/urn/urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:1-470586. 163  Laube and Weiß, Flugschriften gegen die Reformation, 229–69. For a critical discussion of this text, see: Saskia Braun, “‘Wider das unchristliche Buch Martin Luthers …:’ Zur rhetorischen Komposition in Hieronymus Emsers ‘refutatio’ auf Luthers Adelsschrift” Daphnis 38 (2009): 491–526. 164  WA 7.262–65; for the English translation, see LW.105–13.

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Philippum Melachthonem Lutheranae hereseos defensorem, published in Rome in May 1522 and dedicated to the new pope, Adrian VI.165 The beginning of 1521 was marked by a vehement and rapid exchange of pamphlets. Emser published To The Bull in Wittenberg,166 accusing Luther of heresy. Luther replied in a brief pamphlet entitled Concerning the Answer of the Goat in Leipzig,167 which Emser mocked in a satirical pamphlet Reply to the Answer of the Raging Bull in Wittenberg.168 Emser raised the central theological issues in his Against the Un-Christian Book of the Augustinian Martin Luther, addressed to the German Nobility. In this text, Emser wields three weapons against Luther: the sword, namely the Holy Scripture, the long spear, namely ecclesiastical tradition, and the short dagger, namely the exegesis of the Church Fathers. Emser, like Eck in Leipzig, emphasized the essential continuity between these three aspects: the true spiritual interpretation of the Holy Writ cannot be separated by ecclesiastical usage and a the shared interpretation of the Fathers; they are complementary and in full agreement. Luther responded in his Answer to the Hyperchristian, Hyperspiritual, and Hyperlearned Book by Goat Emser in Leipzig, including some thoughts regarding his companion, the fool Murner (Auf das überchristlich, übergeistlich, und überkünstlich Buch Bocks Emsers zu Leipzig Antwort. Darin auch Murnarrs seines Gesellen gedacht wird).169 Besides a short excursus at the end of the work, in which Luther responded to the treatises written against him by the Strasbourg Franciscan friar Thomas Murner (1475–1537), Luther argued against the usage of two of the three weapons deployed against him by Emser on the discursive battleground, namely the ecclesiastical usage or Goliath’s spear (I Sam. 17:45) and the authority of the Fathers, Job’s dagger (II Sam. 20:8).170 According to Luther, there was only one legitimate weapon – namely, Scripture. Regarding Emser’s long spear, Luther argued that Emser’s appeal to ecclesiastical usage was an invalid argument since, if accepted, the idolatry of the heathens, who worshipped idols for more than four hundred years, would be legitimized.171 Second, Luther pointed out that Emser falls into the logical fal165  Tommaso Radini Tedeschi, Orazione contro Filippo Melantone, trans. Flaminio Ghizzoni (Brescia: Claudiana, 1973). For further dicussion on the dispute between Radini Tedeschi and Philipp Melanchthon, see: Robert Stupperich, “Melanchthon und Radini: Zum Kampf um Luthers Gedanken in Italien,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 100 (1989): 340–52. 166  Laube and Weiß, Flugschriften gegen die Reformation, 221–28. 167  WA 7. 271–83; LW 39.117–36. 168  Enders, 27–44. 169  WA 7.614–88; LW 39.137–224. I follow these two editions for the original German text and for an English translation respectively. 170  LW 39.156; WA 7.63.221: Deyn langer spieß ist Goliath spieß, und deyn kurtzer degen Joabs degen. 171  LW 39.156; WA 7.632.22–23: Wo gewonheyt gnugsam were, hetten die heyden die aller besten entschuldigung, die mehr den viertausent jar gewonet feyn abgott antzubetten.



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lacy of affirming the following: for defending the role of priests through usage, Luther mocked his opponent as a “new philosopher” (newem philosopho), arguing that Emser had proved the antecedent ( prius), namely the priestly estate, through the consequent ( posterius), namely the ecclesiastical usage, and then he begged the question of its foundation ( principium petere).172 In failing to prove the legitimacy of ecclesiastical usage in theological debate, “the new philosophers”, Emser and Radini, had contradicted Aristotle’s logic that it was wrong probanda per probanda probare und petere principium.173 In opposition to Emser’s appeal for ecclesiastical usage, Luther emphasized that usage could not change the precepts of the Holy Scripture. Usage applied to external, mutable human customs, while the decrees of Scripture are eternal and immutable.174 Emser’s defense of the priestly estate was invalid, since it was not based on Scripture. For this reason, Luther emphasized that spiritual priesthood did not exist as such, but was an invention of canon law that the ritual of consecration rendered the official priests spiritual and, because of this, canon law had to be burned and destroyed.175 On the other hand, Luther also argued that all Christians were priests, to the extent that they believed in Christ. The official priests had the duty and responsibility to be servants of the com172  LW 39.157; WA 7.632.24–33: Du soltist zuvor beweyßen, das die gewonheit recht und auß gott were, so meynstu, es sey gnug, das gewonheit heisse. Und das ich dir newem philo­ sopho auch etwas auß der philosophia furschlah, du soltist nit prius per posterius beweyßen et principium petere: ich ficht den priesterstand an, der ein ursach und anheber geweßen ist diser gewonheit, und nit widerumb, so antwortistu myr durch die gewonheit: das ist eben, als wenn ich sprech, der rock sol den schneyder und der schuh sol den schuster machen. Syhe ßo eyn kostlich kluge philosophia hastu, das gnug were, wen es Her Thomas Rhadinus, Emßers schwester eyniger bruder geredt hette, denn der selb philosophiert auch auff die weyß. 173  LW 39.162; WA 7.637.14–20: Und das ichs ende, das des geystis schwerd, gottlich wortt yn allem streytt gellte, zweyffelt niemant, aber das gewonheit, wenn sie gleych gutt were, und menschen lere gellten, solt Emser zuvor beweysset haben. Nu lessit er das schwerd liegen, das do gilt, und furet gewonheit mit menschen lere, die doch nit gelten. Wo ist hie der hohe grosse philosophus Er Thomas Radinus, der Aristotilem ym esell stall fand? Hatt nit Aristotiles geleret, das nit recht sey, probanda per probanda probare unnd petere principia? 174  LW 39.157; WA 7.633.8–12: Alßo lerne, lieber Bock, das keyn gewonheyt muge ettwas ynn der schrifft und artickeln des glaubens wandeln odder vornewen, sondern sie bleybt alleyn ynn eußerlichen wandelbaren wercken und geperdenn, ynn wilchen wider Christlich noch priesterlich standt, sondern alleyn ampter, dienste und der gleychen werck werden angeben und volnbracht […]. 175  LW 39.157–58; WA 7.633.16–25: Wyr alle mit dem gantzenn hauffen seyn priester, on des Bischoffs weyhen, aber durch das weyhen werden wir der andernn priester knecht, diener und amptleut, die do mugen abgesetzt und wandelt werden, gleych wie ynn den stifft kirchen ein priester der andern Probst, Dechant, Cantor, Custos unnd der gleychen amptman ist. Das aber das geystlich recht fast nit mehr thut, denn das es solche amptleut zu priester und geystlich macht (das es auch da selbs von geystlich recht heysset), hebett unnd treybt solch dingk zu hoch und vorplendett die wort der heyligen schrifft; und das niemant mehr priester und geystlich heysset denn solch pfaffen knechte, schleusset nit widder mich: Ja es ist darumb zuvorprennen und zuvortilgen.

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mon priests and messengers of the Gospel.176 Ultimately, against Emser’s long spear, Luther pointed out that every human traditions (traditiones hominum) and human laws (menschen gesetz) were inevitably in opposition to, and tended to obscure, divine law.177 Recently, Timothy Wengert has warned against an unhistorical understanding of Luther’s remarks regarding priesthood. In noting that the famous expression “priesthood of all believers” never appeared in Luther’s writings, and that Article V of the Augsburg Confession deals with “priesthood” (Das Predigtamt), Wengert emphasized that only in the seventeenth century and, more precisely, in Philipp Jacob Spener’s Pia Desideria and in his preface to the sermons of Johannes Arndt, can one find a lengthy discussion of what has become known as “the priesthood of all believers”.178 What is worth noting is the impact of the Luther-Emser dispute for the later debate on the role of clergy. Geoffrey Dipple has argued that Luther’s remarks against Emser sparked further anti-clerical feelings.179 Moreover, David Bagchi has highlighted that the Roman controversialists also recognized the political implications of Luther’s statements in asserting a continuity among all forms of authority and, thus, the obedience owed to it. In undermining the role of the priestly estate, Luther had, at the same time, also undermined the need to obey the political order.180 For the purpose of this study, it is important to emphasize that Emser blamed Luther for misunderstanding the notion of priesthood, because he had relied on the grammatical sense of the Scripture, adding that ecclesiastical tradition carried more weight than the mere literal sense of Scripture. The controversy between Luther and Emser continued throughout the following years, as the two men focused on the correct interpretation of the role of clergy.181 The second weapon Luther wanted to remove from Emser’s arsenal was “the short dagger”, namely the interpretation of the Holy Scripture made by 176  LW 39.158–59; WA 7.634.11–16: Der priester ist ein botte und knecht ynn dem werck, ßo muß yhe eyn ander der rechte priester seyn. Ich meyn yhe, das sey klar gnug beweysset, das wir alle priester sein, und diese priester nit anderley priester, sonder knecht und ampt leutt sein (wie droben gesagt ist) der gemeynen priesterschafft, und nit tzweyerley priesterschafft yn der Christenheit seyn, wie dir getrewmt hatt. 177  LW 39.158; WA 7.633.25–28: Es haben altzeyt traditiones hominum, menschen gesetz, schadet und vortunckelt gottliche gesetz. Wie Christus Matt. 15. und Paulus ynn allen orternn leret. Drumb hettistu Bock den bleyern degen woll gesparet, biß das du butternn odder weche keße schneyden wurdest. 178  Timothy J. Wengert, “The Priesthood of All Believers and Other Pious Myths,” Institute of Liturgical Studies Occasional Papers (2006): 92–115. 179  Geoffrey L. Dipple, “Luther, Emser and the Development of Reformation Anticlericalism,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 87 (1996): 38–56. 180  David Bagchi, “‘eyn Mercklich Underscheyd:’ Catholic Reactions to Luther’s Doctrine of the Priesthood of All Believers, 1520–25,” Studies in Church History 26 (1989): 155–65. 181  Luther’s reply to Emser’s Quadruplica, entitled Dr. Luther’s Retraction of the Error Forced Upon Him by the Most High Priest of God, sir. Jerome Emser, Vicar in Meissen can be found in WA 8. 241–54. An English translation is available in LW 39.225–38.



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the Church Fathers. Emser was convinced of an essential continuity both between the teachings of the Church and the Fathers, as well as among those of the Fathers themselves. The Fathers could disagree on specific topics, but their overall interpretation of the biblical text was compatible, according to Emser. Luther based his reply on two main arguments: the clarity of the Scripture, and the continuity between his own exegetical method and the exegesis endorsed by the Fathers. First, Luther repeatedly emphasized that the overall meaning of the Scripture was clear, claiming that if the Spirit spoke to the Fathers, then the Spirit would surely have revealed the truth with far greater clarity in the Scripture, God’s own work. Thus, Luther rhetorically asks, “Who told them that the fathers are clearer than Scripture and not more obscure?”182 In this sense, the Scripture is the norma normans, the rock on which to substantiate every human teaching. In Luther’s own words, it is “the sun and the whole light from which all teachers receive their light, and not vice versa”.183 In mocking Emser once again (and also Thomas Radinus) as a “new philosopher”, Luther pointed out that Aristotle, in accordance with human reason, taught that what is obscure had to be enlightened with that which is certain and clear. Luther went as far in his polemic as to point out that, following reason, even peasants could draw the same conclusion.184 Every human teaching, including the teachings of the Fathers, had to be illuminated through the Scripture. Attacking Eck further for his positions on this matter in the Leipzig debate, Luther stated that the teachings of the Fathers had to be scrutinized and accepted only if they were based on clear passages in the Scripture. As we have seen, the debate on the correct interpretation of the Fathers, and to what extent their teachings had to be questioned, was one of the main theological debates throughout the first decade of the sixteenth century. Erasmus was vehemently criticized for going too far in claiming the fallibility of the Fathers. A gulf opened between those who argued that the teaching of the Fathers had to be accepted (despite occasional errors or disagreements) because they were in general agreement with Scripture, and those who pointed out that the Fathers often erred and their teachings should only be accepted if they were 182  LW 39.164; WA 7.638. 26–28: Das nu solch gauckel geschwetz erkant werde, frag ich sie widerumb, wer hat yhn gesagt, das die veter liechter denn die schrifft und nit auch finsterer sein? 183  LW 39.164; WA 7.639. 1–2: Drumb ist zu wissen, das die schrifft on alle glose ist die sonne und gantzis licht, von wilcher alle lerer yhr licht empfahen, und nit widderumb. 184  LW 39.166; WA 7.640.22–27: Und die weyl der Bock ein newer philosophus worden ist, muß ich yhm auch seynen Aristotilem darbringen, und beweysen, wie geleret seyn Rhadinus drynnen sey. Aristotiles hatt geschrieben, und die natur leret es auch die pawrn on Aristotilem, man muge nit finster und ungewiß dinck mit finster und ungewiß beweyssenn, viel weniger das licht mit der finsterniß, ßondernn was finster und ungewiß ist, muß mit liecht und gewissem erleuchtet werden.

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in accordance with Scripture. During this period, Luther repeatedly positioned himself on the latter front, further developing his Sola Scriptura argument. However, one should not underestimate how Luther discursively constructed his Sola Scriptura in continuity with the teachings of the Fathers, eventually turning the short dagger against Emser himself. An uncritical and unhistorical understanding of Luther’s Sola Scriptura could give the impression that Luther was working exclusively with the biblical text. However, just like the early Roman controversialists and in reaction to their positions, Luther substantiated his own scriptural argument with the authority of the Fathers. Indeed, Luther emphasized that the Fathers themselves adopted this exegetical method. Setting his notion of scriptural primacy in continuity with the interpretation of the Fathers, Luther pointed out that, when the Fathers interpreted a controversial passage in the Scripture, they clarify it by quoting a clearer passage. In Luther’s own words: When the fathers teach something, they do not trust their own teaching. They are afraid it is too obscure and too uncertain; they run to Scripture and take a clear passage from it to illuminate their own point, just as one puts a light into a lantern, as Psalm 18:28 says, “Lord, you light my lantern”. In the same way, when they interpret a passage in Scripture they do not do so with their own sense or words (for whenever they do that, as often happens, they generally err). Instead, they add another passage which is clearer and thus illuminate and interpret Scripture with Scripture, as my goats would certainly discover if they would read the fathers correctly.185

Emphasizing continuity between his Sola Scriptura and the hermeneutics of the Fathers, Luther pointed out that the Fathers were perfectly aware that the Bible should be interpreted through the Bible. It would have been meaningless and counterproductive for the Fathers to quote themselves in their struggles against the heretics. They could interpret the Scripture through their own faculties, which they often did, and which is why the Fathers had also erred. Unlike the early Roman controversialists, however, the Fathers knew that only the Scripture could be used to interpret the Scripture. Thus, Luther concluded that Emser had misunderstood both the Scripture and the Fathers; indeed, he had blasphemed against both, accusing the former of being obscure, and the latter of not admitting their own obscurity and thus not illuminating Scripture with Scripture.186 185  Cf. LW 39.164; WA 7.639.3–11: Wo die vetter ettwas leren, ßo trawen sie yhrer lere nit, sorgen, sie sey zu finster und ungewiß, und lauffen yn die schrifft, nemen eynen klaren spruch darauß, damit sie yhr ding erleuchten, gleych wie man licht yn ein laternn setzet, wie ps. 17.”Herr, du erleuchtist meyn latern”. Desselben gleychen, wenn sie eynen ort der schrifft außlegen, ßo thun sie es nit mit yhrem eygen synn odder wortt (denn wo sie das thun, wie offt geschicht, da yrren sie gemeyniglich), ßondernn bringen eynen andern ort erzu, der klerer ist, und alßo schrifft mit schrifft erleuchten und außlegen, wie das meyne Bocke wol finden wurden, wenn sie die vetter recht leßen wurden. 186  LW 39.164; WA 7.369.11–13: Aber nu sie ubirhyn lauffen und widder schrifft noch veter recht ansehn, ists nit wunder, das sie nit wissen was schrifft oder vetter leren.



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Having deprived Emser of his short dagger and long spear, Luther moved the discussion to how to wield the sword. Around 1521, however, Luther’s interpretation of Scripture had become indissolubly linked to his apocalyptic expectations. Thus, in order to correctly contextualize how Luther distinguished between letter and Spirit, and law and grace, it is necessary to emphasize the interconnection between Luther’s scriptural exegesis and his realist eschatology.187 After the discovery of the “horrible truth” that the papacy was ruled by the Antichrist, Luther began to read Scripture more and more in expectation of the imminent end of the world. First, Luther argued that the reform of ecclesiastical practices suggested by Emser was impossible. On the other hand, human teachings and canon laws had to be destroyed, or at least reduced as much as possible, as they hindered the letter and the Spirit of God. They had to be substituted by the correct preaching of the message of law and grace of the Gospel. In emphasizing the need to set aside human laws and ceremonies, and give prominence to the preaching of the Spirit, Luther stated that the recovery of the true meaning of the Gospel prepared the ground for the second coming of Christ. He thus interpreted several biblical passages in messianic terms. For instance, Luther interpreted Matt. 24:15 as a reference to the pope sitting on the apostolic sea, “the holy place”, teaching only external works and habits.188 Moreover, quoting Matt. 7:15 (“Beware of false teachers, who come to you in sheep’s clothing but inwardly are ravenous wolves”), Luther argued that the reference to “sheep’s clothing” indicates the excessive preoccupation of Church members with “temporal” concerns while their hearts are not moved by faith.189 In that sense, human teachings (menschen lere) should be considered as the very instrument that the Antichrist deploys to lead people away from God. Luther concluded that idolatry is nothing less than the replacement of God’s law by human teachings, like the cows of Bethaven (Hos. 4:15–16), Aaron’s calf, or the idol of Baal.190 Luther claimed 187  See: Heiko Augustinus Oberman, “Teufelsdreck: Eschatology and Scatology in the ‘Old’ Luther,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 19 (1988): 435–50. 188  LW 39.191; WA 7.664.21–24: Seyntemal Aaron, der ubirst priester, selb an das gulden kalb fiel, und Christus sagt Matt. 24. das solch scheyn unnd gleyssen auch die außerweleten vorfuren mochtenn. Wenn der Bapst nit ßo grossenn anhang unnd scheyn hette, ßo kund er nymmer Endchrist seyn. 189  LW 39.192; WA 7.662.14–22: Item da sagt Christus von Mat. 7. ‘Sehet euch fur fur den falschen lerern, die zu euch komen yn schaffs kleyder und ynnewendig sein sie reyssende wolff’. Was sein schaffs kleyder denn solch eußerlich heyligkeit ynn kleydern, schuehen, platten, esszen, trincken, tagen und stetten? wilchs als zeytlich ding seyn, ynnewendig aber ym glauben, der ein ewige heylickeyt gibt und auff ewigen guettern steht, sein sie gar nichts, ja nur vorstoerer desselben und reyssend wolff, das auch S. Paulus 1. Timo. 2. bekennet und sagt:”Sie haben ein geperde der frumkeyt und ist nichts dahyndenn, leren und lernen ymmer kummen doch nymmer zu dem waren erkentniß”. 190  LW 39.194; WA 7.664.17–21: Und was ist ynn allen propheten die groeste muhe, denn wider die menschen lere zu streytten und gottis wort allein ym volck zurhalten? Alle aboeot-

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that, as prophesied, the Antichrist would lead many people astray and, indeed, saw the support that the Pope received from monks, bishops, priests, princes, and universities as additional proof that the Church in Rome was under the control of the Antichrist. Luther interpreted the animal with two horns, resembling a lamb but speaking like a lion represented in Revelation 13:11, as a prefiguration of “the crowd of papists” who “appear to be Christians yet preach like the devil”. Finally, quoting Daniel 11:37–38, Luther accused the “papists” of defending the prohibition of clerical marriage only for the sake of appearance. As the prophet claimed, the Antichrist would substitute God’s teaching with his own, erect an idol, Maozim, comprising papal decretals and teachings, in order to bind spirituality to external laws.191 Christ himself would come to save His Church, for only He can remove idolatry from His Church as He will do in the Last Day, whereas humans could only go so far as to avoid “the sheep’s clothing”.192 Luther’s hermeneutical positions are tinged with an Apocalyptic afflatus: the End of Time is approaching, and the Antichrist is working to keep the Christians away from God’s Word. The correct spiritual interpretation of Scripture, for Luther, constituted the only weapon Christians had at their disposal to avoid being led astray by the Antichrist. Thus emerges yet again the central problem of the debates on the spiritual understanding of the Scripture, which Luther addressed in a section entitled “On the Letter and the Spirit” (Von dem Buchstaben und Geyst). The central passage is, of course, 2 Cor. 3:6 “The letter kills, but the Spirit gives life”. As we have seen, following Augustine, and in opposition to a tradition which could be traced back to Origen, and which had leading supporters in the early sixteenth century such as Erasmus, Luther interpreted this passage as a contrast between two kinds of preaching, between law and grace, and not as terey ist nit anders den menschen lere, da sein die kelber Bethauen, Item das kalb Aaron, der abgott Baal und der gleychen. Und wer kan sich fur solchen leren gnug vorwaren? 191  LW 39.195; WA 7.664.24–35; 665.1–4: Es muß scheyn und anhang da seyn, aller Bi­ schoffen, aller pfaffen, aller munch, aller Universiteten, aller fursten, aller geweltigen. Nur ein stuck lessit yhn gott nit zu decken, da regen dem Esel die oren erfur, das ist, er achtet das gottis wort nit, predigts auch nit, hatt gnug, das man seyn lere predige, an dem gesang erkennet man was er fur ein vogel ist. Wie Johannes in Apocalyp. eyne bestien sahe, die hatt zwey horner, als were sie ein lamb, und redte doch wie ein trache, also ist Papisten hauff antzusehen, als weren sie Christen, predigenn aber wie der teuffel, davon hatt Daniel xi. gesagt: Das der Endchrist werd nit achten den gott seyner vorfaren, wirt auch desselbenn lere nit treyben, wirt auch nit ehliche weyber habenn, wirt aber seynen gott Maozim ehren ynn seyner statt, das ist, er vorpeutt die ehe nur zum scheyn yhm und seynen Papisten, und richtet auff an gottis statt und seynes Euangelium den oelgoetzen Maozim, sein decret und sein lere, will unnd byndet die geystlickeyt an eußerlich ortt, wie Christus sagt:”Sie werden sagen: hie ist Christus, da ist Christus”. 192  LW 39.192; WA 7. 662.24–26: Christus muß selbs abethun durch den jungsten tag, sonst wirt nichts drauß. Hie sehen wir klar, das wir die schaffs kleyder solln fliehen, das sein menschen gesetz und werck.



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a distinction between the spiritual and the literal meaning in the Scripture. Furthermore, as emphasized previously, Luther pointed out that the literal and the spiritual meaning coincided as the Holy Spirit had plainly revealed the message of the Scripture. The clarity of the Scripture is, thus, one of the main arguments that Luther used against Emser. In Wider das unchristliche Buch Martin Luthers Augustiners an den deut­ schen Adel, Emser emphasized the need for an allegorical interpretation of Scripture. The literal sense is unfruitful, and thus it is necessary to look for the hidden, spiritual sense in the Holy Writ. In order to support his position, Emser named, alongside Origen and Hilary of Poitiers, some of the most recognizable figures of the Renaissance – namely Pico, Reuch­lin, Faber Stapulensis, and Erasmus. In the Quadruplica, Emser insisted that as the Scripture was obscure and apparently contradictory, it was necessary to go beyond the purely literal sense and invoke the allegorical interpretation of Philo and Origen of Alexandria.193 In opposition to that, Luther paradoxically argued that Emser’s two-level distinction between a killing letter and a life-giving spirit would give rise to the claim that “the letter and the literal meaning kill Christ and the Holy Spirit with all the angels and saints”, since they also read the Scripture according to the literal sense.194 The passage where Luther rejected Emser’s distinction between the letter and the Spirit is Galatians 4:22, in which Paul says that Abraham had two sons, Isaac and Ishmael, by two women, Sarah and Hagar. As Luther himself reported, Emser’s interpretation is that Abraham is Christ, that the two women are the two testaments, and the two sons the people of the two testaments. Luther actually never denied the correctness of this interpretation, and it could have not been otherwise, since this is the interpretation of Paul.195 However, Luther emphasized that the overall meaning of 2 Cor. 3:6 cannot be applied to the spiritual, allegorical interpretation of this passage. Luther claims: Now not only the saints but also the worst sinners, indeed, even the devils in hell, hold to this same meaning. So step onto the battlefield, my Emser, strike out merrily with the blade and say that all the devils and knaves are alive and holy since the Holy Spirit gives life. Now admit it: is it not true that if you take this piece of Origen, Dionysius, Jerome, and many others, you have taken almost all their skill? Is not Scripture here clearer than all of them put together? With what do I test, judge, condemn, and defeat them all so that no one can deny it, other than with the same passage of St. Paul which they take as their 193  Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance and Hermeticism: Contexts and Interfaces of the Early Reformation Movement,” 17. 194  LW 39.176; WA 7.648.7–10: lieber sprich hie, bistu anders der man, der nit mit der scheyden hewbt und nur mit der schneyden wundett, das der buchstab und schrifftlich synn todte Christum und den heyligen geyst mit allen engelln und heyligenn. 195  LW 39.176; WA 7.648.12–14: Widderumb das Abraham sey Christus, die zwo frawen sein zwey [Gal. 4, 24.] testament, die tzween suen seyn zweyer testament volck, wie S. Paulus außlegt, das ist der geystlich synn (als yhr sagt).

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basis, namely “The letter kills, the Spirit gives life” (II Cor. 3:6)? What kind of glosses do I add? Is not the text itself so clearly against them that everyone is forced to say Yes?196

Origen, Jerome, and Dionysius the Areopagite are used in Luther’s polemic as archetypes of an overinflated spiritualistic reading of the Bible. Their theology consists almost exclusively in applying allegory to Scripture. However, the Scripture is clear and the interpretation of the Fathers, even Augustine, has to be judged in light of the Scripture. In order to refute the need to look for the spiritual meaning of the Holy Writ, Luther emphasized that even those passages in seeming contradiction, or which at first glance do not make sense, have to be interpreted literally. Lev. 11:6–7 forbids the Jews to eat pigs and rabbits and it has to be understood as such, as Christ and the Apostles did. It is precisely the aim of the devils to superimpose a new meaning on these kinds of passages, and to interpret them as a prohibition against carnal teachings.197 As we have seen in the previous pages, Erasmus made exactly the opposite point. Having described Jesus and Paul as skillful rhetoricians, in Ratio, the Dutch scholar emphasized that some passages in the Old Testament had to be interpreted allegorically, as Jesus and Paul had also done. Luther, on the other hand, marginalized the tropological sense of the Scripture, and insisted that no moral interpretations of these passages were needed. The literal sense had to be upheld, which meant that Aaron was just Aaron. Since one’s own conscience could not be assuaged by knowing that Aaron, spiritually speaking, referred to Christ, Luther noted that in Hebrews 9–10, Paul himself interpreted Aaron to mean Christ. This, however, according to him, was not a new spiritual sense, but should be properly called the literal-spiritual sense – both literal and spiritual, because the Spirit itself had plainly revealed it to be so in the words of the Apostle.198 196  Cf.

LW 39.176; WA 7.648.14–25: Nu haben den selben synn nit allein die heyligen, sondern auch die ergiften ßunder, ja auch die teuffell ynn der helle. Szo tritt nu auff den plan, meyn Emßer, haw mit der schneyden frisch dreyn, sage, das alle teuffell und buben lebendig und heylig sein, die weyll der geyst lebendig macht. Nu bekenne recht: ists nit war, wenn du diß stuck nympst Origeni, Dionysio, Hieronymo und viel mehren, ßo hastu fast all yhr kunst genommen. Ist nit hie die schrifft klerer denn sie allesampt? wo mit probir, urteyl, richte, nydder­lege ich sie alle sampt, das niemand leugnen kan, denn mit dem selben spruch S. Pauli, den sie fur yhren grund [2. Cor. 3, 6.] haben, nemlich “der buchstab todtet, der geyst macht lebendig”. Was thu ich hie fur glossen zu? Ist der text selb nit ßo klar wider sie, das yderman gefangen muß “ja” sagen? 197  LW 39.176; WA 7.648.26–31: Alßo muß man ynn der gantzen schrifft handeln, auch ynn den alten figurn, als das die Juden, keyne saw noch hasen essen durfften, darumb das die saw und haße nit widderkewet: das war der schrifftlich buchstabischer synn. Nu habenß also vorstanden und gehalten David, alle heylige propheten und Christus mit seynen Jungern selbs, unnd wo sie nit hetten alßo vorstanden und gehalten, ßo weren sie wider gott gewesen. 198  LW 39.178; WA 7.649.31–34,650.1–4: Aber der geystliche, den Emßer auffblesit, gillt yn keynem hadder, hellt auch den stich nit, und ist nichts an yhm gelegen, ob yhn keyn mensch wiste, wie ich ym buch vom Bapstum beweyßet habe: denn ob niemandt wiste, das Aaron geystlich Christus were, lege keyn macht dran, man kanß auch nit beweyßenn. Man muß Aaron las-



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In this way, Luther was able to reach a twofold aim: to uphold the need to retain the literal sense of the Scripture and, at the same time, to explain why many passages of the Old Testament can and must be interpreted Christologically, without having to conclude that a spiritual meaning should be applied to the Old Testament. Furthermore, Luther’s understanding of the Scripture and the Spirit goes hand in hand with his own theological anthropology. The Scripture is clear in itself and sui ipsius interpres, but only those who are spiritual can appreciate the clarity of Scripture. Instead of looking for recondite meanings in the Holy Writ, true believers recognize that the Scripture is divided into the Old and the New Testament, the former preaching the law and the latter the Gospel. The interpretation of 2 Cor. 3:6 is central to Luther’s rejection of Emser’s approach to Scripture. Luther opposed Emser, quoting the words of Paul in Romans 7:14, “Divine law is spiritual but I am carnal”, and Rom 7:7, in which Paul links this passage to the Commandment “non concupisces”, (“you shall not covet”). Luther took Paul’s message in Romans to mean that the law itself was spiritual, while human desires were sinful, and thus always doomed to failure, since it was not possible to fulfill the commandment of non concupiscence. Here the anthropological and the hermeneutical aspects of Luther’s theology are linked. The Scripture had to be read entirely as a message about law and grace, and as such its literal meaning was clearly expressed in the Gospel and in its salvific message.199 Luther ironically juxtaposed Paul and Emser, for while Paul claimed that “the spiritual law kills”, Emser, “the man with the spear, dagger, and cutting sword”, interpreted it as referring to the life-giving spiritual meaning.200 The different interpretations by Emser and Luther of 2 Cor. 3:6 show two different understandings of the Spirit. For Emser, the Spirit lies hidden in the Scripture, whereas Luther rejects the notion that the Pauline distinction between the letter and the Spirit had to be interpreted as the dichotomy between the Mosaic law inscribed in tablets, and the Spirit of God transmitted through the preaching of the Gospel. Thus, “Christ’s letters” represent the hearts of the Christians.201 senn schlecht Aaron bleybenn ym eynfeltigen synn, es sey denn das der geyst selb auffs new anderß außlege, wilchs als denn eynn new schrifftlich synn ist, wie S. Paulus tzu den Hebreern auß Aaron Christum macht. 199  LW 39.177; WA 7.649.6–10: Weytter S. Paulus Ro. 7. “spricht dasgottlich gesetz ist geystlich, ich byn aber fleyschlich”, und nennet eyniß auß den zehen gepotten, nemlich das “non concupisces, du solt nit boeßes begeren”, disputirt da selbs mit reychen wortten und weyß­heytt, wie dasselb geystlich gesetz todtet. Was wiltu hie thun, Emser? 200  LW 39.177; WA 7.649.10–13: Wo bistu, man mit dem spieß, degen und schneydende schwerd? S. Paulus sagt alhie “das geystlich gesetz todtet”, du sprichst “der geystlich synn macht lebendig”, pfeyff auff, laß hoeren deyne kunst: wilchs ist der schrifftlich und wilchs der geystliche synn ynn dissem gepott “Non concupisces”? 201  LW 39.182; WA 7.653.29–34: Seyn das nit klare wortt von predigeten gesagt? Hie sehenn wir klar, das S. Paulus zwo taffeln nennet und tzwo predigett. Moses taffeln waren steynern, da das gesetz ein geschrieben ist mit gottis fingernn Exo. xx.; Christus taffeln odder (wie

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The Spirit – divine grace – is inscribed in the hearts and cannot be contained in any letter.202 Underscoring his conviction that the Spirit does not inhabit the written letters and is conveyed only through the preaching of the Gospel, Luther pointed out that a proper understanding of Scripture can survive without the spiritual meaning, but not without an emphasis on the literal meaning. Again and again, Luther blamed Emser for referring to Origen. In refuting the distinction between the literal and the spiritual sense in the Scripture, Luther mocked Emser, asking rhetorically, Wo ist deyn Origenes (“Where is Your Origen?”).203 It would have been impossible for Luther’s contemporaries not to note the link between Origen and Pico della Mirandola, the author whose works Emser edited in 1504. The well-known defense of Origen’s orthodoxy by Pico in his 900 Theses and in Apologia became a cause célèbre in the Renaissance. Moreover, Erasmus’ appreciation of Origen is equally well known. In Erasmus’ Enchiridion, which was edited by Emser, Erasmus repeatedly praised Origen for his allegorical reading of the Bible. Moreover, as noted above, while still praising Origen as one of the best commentators of Paul, in Ratio, Erasmus warned his readers against Origen’s excessive allegorizing. If Emser, on his part, quoted the variegated reception of Origen in the Renaissance to support the necessity of an allegorical reading of the Bible, Luther remarked that Origen’s mistake was precisely his excessive emphasis on the allegorical meaning of the Scripture, and, because of this, his books have been rightly prohibited.204 Luther, however, went beyond this perspective: through his well-known critique of the damned Origen, he put a stroke against all the interpreters of Scripture whose quest entailed a search for the recondite meaning inspired by the Holy Spirit. The propaedeutic notion for Luther’s critique of this exegetical tendency is the strong affirmation that the true theologians pay attention to the meaning that the Spirit itself has chosen to reveal clearly and openly: The Holy Spirit is the simplest writer and adviser in heaven and on earth. This is why his words could have no more than the one simplest meaning which we call the written one, or the literal meaning of the tongue. But (written) words and (spoken) language cease to er hie sagt) Christus brieff sein der Christenn hertzen, ynn wilche nit buchstaben, wie ynn Moses taffel, ßondern der geyst gottis geschrieben ist durch des Euangelii prediget und Apo­ stell ampt. 202  LW 39.182–13; WA 7.654.9–12: Dießen geyst kan man nu yn keyne buchstaben fassen, lessit sich nit schreyben mit tindten ynn steyn noch bucher, wie das gesetz sich fassen lessit, sondern wirt nur ynn das hertz geschrieben, und ist ein lebendige schrifft des heyligen geysts on alle mittell. 203  LW 39.175; WA 7.648.7. 204  LW 39.178; WA 7.650.16–20: Darumb ist vortzeytten Origeni recht geschechen, das man sein bucher vorpott: er gab sich zu seher auff den selben geystlichen synn, der nit nott war, und ließ den noettigen schrifft synn farenn, denn damit gaht die schrifft unter und macht man nymmer mehr grund gute Theologen. Es muß der eynige rechte hewbt synn, den die buchstaben geben, alleine thun.



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have meaning when the things which have a simple meaning through interpretation by a simple word are given further meaning and thus become further things (through a different interpretation) so that one thing takes on the meaning of another.205

In emphasizing the need to retain the literal meaning of Scripture, Luther underlined the danger of superimposing an alien meaning upon the text, or erroneously mixing different passages and thereby perverting their original meaning. Luther’s emphasis on the literal meaning has to be correctly understood. It cannot be conceived as univocal. As I have emphasized earlier, at this juncture Luther often interpreted the Psalms Christologically, and sometimes, even prophetically. The first line of the abovementioned passage is crucial to contextualize Luther’s position correctly: The Holy Spirit, the only real author of the Scripture, is clear and unequivocal. Luther’s conviction that the Scripture was characterized by clarity of meaning led him to come to two conclusions: first, the literal text also conveys the spiritual message of the Scripture, and in that sense the two aspects should not be separated. Luther pointed out that just as a painting could signify a living man but did not carry a dual meaning for that reason, it is not possible to claim that Scripture had a double meaning, a literal and a deeper spiritual one.206 In order to understand Scripture correctly, the literal meaning should always be maintained. Furthermore, like Erasmus, Luther noted that Scripture is full of ornaments of speech, especially the Prophets (also called schemata in Greek or figure in Latin), but, unlike Erasmus, Luther did not deduce that these figures of speech render the Scripture unclear, nor that the letter can be defined as “a veiled or hidden word”, as Augustine had done for a period.207 The second aspect Luther inferred from the notion of a clarity of Scripture is that it is agreeable that the Spirit Himself inserted further meanings into the 205  Cf.

LW 39.178; WA 7.650.21–26: Der heylig geyst ist der aller eynfeltigst schreyber und rether, der ynn hymell und erden ist, drumb auch seyne wortt nit mehr denn eynen einfeltigsten synn haben kunden, wilchen wir den schrifftlichen odder buchstabischen tzungen synn nennen. Das aber die ding, durch seyne eynfeltig wort einfeltiglich bedeuttet, ettwas weytter und ander ding und also ein ding das ander bedeuttet, da seyn die wort auß und hoeren die tzungen auff. 206  LW 39.179; WA 7.650.31–3, 651.1: Das ein gemalet bild eynen lebendingen menschen bedeutt on wort und schrifft, soll darumb nit machen das du sagist, das worttlin “bild” habe tzween synn, eynen schrfftlichen, der das bild, eynen geystlichen, der den lebendigen menschen bedeut […]. 207  LW 39.179–80; WA 7.651.25–34: Viel vornunfftiger haben hie geyrrett, die den buchstaben nennen ein vorbluemett, vordackt wort, wie Augustinus auch weyland gethan, als wenn ich sprech “Emser ist ein grober Esell”, und ein einfeltiger mensch den wortten folgett, vorstund, das Emßer ein recht Esell were mit langen oren und vier fuessenn, der were durch den buchstaben betrogen, ßo ich durch ein solch vorblumet wort hett wollen antzeygen, er habe ein groben unvorstendigen kopff. Solch blumen wortt leret man die knaben ynn den schulen und heyssen auff kriechß Schemata, auff latinisch figure, darumb das man damit die rede vorkleydett unnd schmuckt, gleych wie man ein leyb mit eynem kleynod tzierdt. Der selbenn blumen ist die schrifft voll, sonderlich ynn den propheten […].

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Holy Writ, but one is not allowed to look for them, unless it proves impossible to substantiate the meaning through other, clearer passages in Scripture. Indeed, Luther pointed out that Paul called the veiled and secret meanings of the Scripture mysteria; the early Fathers called it anagogas, or, alternatively, allegory. Luther sought to substantiate his own claim through the usual contrast in his polemic between the De Spiritu et littera of Augustine, the only teacher who, according to him, had correctly interpreted 2 Cor. 3:6, and Jerome and Origen, who had misunderstood Paul.208 After refuting the fourfold layers to the meaning of the Scripture (literal, allegorical, anagogical, and tropological),209 Luther claimed that rather than the literal meaning, one should more properly called it “grammatical, historical meaning” (grammaticum, historicum sensum), as he had already done in the Operationes In Psalmos. Perhaps even better, one could use the expression of Paul in 1 Cor. 14:2–19 and call it the “meaning of the tongue or of language” (der tzungen oder sprachen synn).210 Beyond this meaning, there is the one that Paul calls mysteria, which in the specific case of Gal. 4, is the reference to Christ, the Gospel, and the new alliance. However, Luther preached caution in the use and search of the mysteria: “But here it is necessary that no one invent mysteries on their own, as some people have done and are still doing. The Spirit himself must do it – or else one must prove it with the Scripture”.211 It should be clear now that the unchallenged picture in the secondary literature of Luther as a biblical scholar in search for the historical meaning of the Bible is untenable. Luther felt free to interpret the Old Testament Christologically, to the extent that he believed the Holy Spirit himself had revealed to be 208  LW 39.180; WA 7.652.8–19: Kanstu dich nu demuetigen und mich nit ßo gar vorachten, hoere mir zu, ich wil dir thun, alß ich Christlicher pflicht meynem feynd schuldig bynn, und meyn gottis gabe dir nit frembden, wil dir diser sach eyne bessere unterricht thun, denn du bißher (an rum zu reden) von keynem lerer emphangen hast, außgenommen S. Augustino, ob du den gelesen hettist de Spiritu et Litera, der andern wirt dichs keyner leren. Allis, was du geystlich synn heyssest mit Origene und Hieronymo, wirstu ynn der gantzen Biblien nit eynen buchstaben finden, der mit euch stymme. S. Paulus heysset es mysteria, vorporgene, heymliche synn. Daher die aller elltisten vetter genennet haben Anagogas, idest remotiores sensus, separatas intelligentias. Zu weyllen auch allegorias, wie S. Paulus selbs nennet Gal. 4. aber da ist noch keyn geyst, wie woll der geyst solchs gibt, als wol als auch den buchstabenn und alle guetter. 209  LW 39.180–81; WA 7.652.19–22: Wie wir sehen 1. Cor. 14. “Der geyst redet die heymlichen synn”, doch hie ettlich auß unvorstand habenn der schrifft vier synn gegeben, literalem, allegoricum, anagogicum, tropologicum, das keyn grund nyrgend bestehet. 210  LW 39.181; WA 7.652.23–26: Darumb ists nit wol genennet schrifftlich synn, weyl Paulus den buchstaben gar viel anders deuttet denn sie. Besser thun die, die yhn nennen grammaticum, historicum sensum, unnd were feyn, das man yhn nennet der tzungen oder sprachen synn, wie S. Paulus 1. Cor. 14 lauttet […]. 211  LW 39.181; WA 7.652.34–37: Aber hie ist nott, das nit ein iglicher von yhm selb my­ steria ertichte, wie ettliche than und noch thun, der geyst muß es selber thun, odder auß der schrifft muß man es beweyßen, wie ich ym buchle vom Bapstum geschrieben habe.



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Christ the actual referent of a given passage of the Old Testament. Luther’s caution regarding the search for the Spiritual sense of the Scripture, on the other hand, has to be firmly contextualized. Indeed, soon after criticizing the inappropriateness of the twofold distinction between literal and spiritual meaning, through the metaphor of the picture, Luther stated clearly that his critique is addressed to those who are in search of new mysteries in the Bible: Likewise, even though the things described in Scripture mean something further, Scripture should not therefore have a twofold meaning. Instead, it should retain the one meaning to which the words refer. Beyond that we should give idle spirits permission to hunt and seek the manifold interpretation of the things indicated besides the words. But they should beware of losing themselves in the hunt or the climb, as happens to those who climb after chamois, and as also happened to Origen. It is much more certain and much safer to stay with the words and the simple meaning, for this is the true pasture and home of all the spirits.212

For Luther, every literal meaning of the Bible can be understood as spiritual, since the real spiritual meaning of the Bible is only faith in Christ. The search for the spiritual meaning of the Holy Writ starts and ends with the literal meaning of the text. The Spirit has plainly revealed the true spiritual meaning, that is, salvation through Christ alone, and those who are enlightened by the Spirit can easily discern it. On the other hand, there are “idle spirits” that are not satisfied with the literal text and look for further meanings. Luther pointed out that, like Origen, they are doomed to fall down in the attempt to climb for the spirit beyond the letter. In order to understand Luther’s rejection of a spiritual meaning hidden in the explicit text it is necessary to pose a further question: who are these “idle spirits”, these hunters of the spiritual meaning of the Bible to whom Luther refers?

6.6  “Idle Spirits” and “Theologians of Glory” Throughout the years 1518–19, Martin Luther and Philipp Melanchthon envisioned Luther’s scholarship in continuity with Erasmus’ works. Erasmus’ letter to Frederick the Wise was printed in Wittenberg to substantiate the narrative that Erasmus supported Luther’s cause. Many other central characters of the early Reformation debates, such as Ulrich von Hutten and Martin Bucer, fur212  Cf. LW 39.179; WA 7.651.1–8: also ob wol die ding, ynnn der schrifft beschrieben, etwas weytters bedeutten, soll nit darumb die schrifft tzwispeltigen synn habenn, ßondern den eynigen, auff wilchen die wort lautten, behalten, Unnd darnach den spacirer geysten urlaub gebenn, außer den wortten die manigfeltige deuttung der anzeygten dinger zu jagen und suchen, doch das sie zusehen und sich selb nit vorjagen noch vorsteygen, wie den gemsen steyger geschicht, als auch Origeni geschehen ist. Es ist viel gewisser unnd sicherer an den wortten unnd eynfeltigen synn bleyben, da ist die rechte weyde und wonung aller geyster.

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ther corroborated this narrative. If one assumes the contingency of these statements, the common claim that Erasmus paved the way for Luther needs further investigation. In this chapter, I emphasized the influence of Erasmus’ scholarship on Luther in the years 1518–19. Not only did Luther use Erasmus’ edition of the New Testament, he also studied Erasmus’ Ratio seu Methodus perveniendi ad veram theologiam in depth. Luther’s ambivalent reception of this work can be summarized as follows: 1) Luther shared Erasmus’ concerns about overcoming the medieval quadriga basing the exegesis on the literal meaning of Scripture; 2) both Luther and Erasmus allegorically interpreted the Old Testament in their critique of the status of the sixteenth-century Church; 3) through a critique of Origen and Jerome, Luther simultaneously distanced himself from Erasmus’ understanding of allegory; 4) while Erasmus emphasized the importance of the tropological sense and, thus, the need to adopt a variegated exegetical method in order to understand it properly, Luther further developed the notion that the central message of Scripture was clear and did not lie in any form of morality, but only in faith. After noticing that Luther made use of Erasmus’ scholarship selectively in order to clarify the meaning of single passages, I focused my attention on the dispute between Luther and Hieronymus Emser, his former professor in Erfurt and the editor of both Pico della Mirandola and Erasmus. Emser blamed Luther for relying on the literal-grammatical sense of the Scripture. In doing so, Luther was deemed to have misunderstood the Bible, and to have placed his own teaching against that of the Catholic Church. For Emser, it was the peculiar tendency of heretics to base their teachings on the literal sense of the Bible. Luther replied to these charges on multiple levels. He emphasized that 2 Cor. 3:6 was not a distinction between the literal and the spiritual sense, but, rather, a dichotomy between law and Gospel. Given that, he stressed that the Spirit worked in the heart of the believers and did not lie hidden in the text of the Bible. For this reason, Luther repeatedly accused Emser of following the “idle spirits” who, unsatisfied with the sense the Holy Spirit had plainly revealed, hunted for a deeper spiritual meaning hidden in the Bible. It is my contention in the following chapter that, given that Emser was the editor of Pico’s Opera, Luther’s remarks against these “idle spirits” needs to be contextualized within his general rebuke of the Christian Kabbalists, who would then emerge as the real targets of Luther’s statements in the Heidelberg Disputation against the “theologians of glory”.

Chapter 7

Vera Cabala Dominis Nomini: Luther’s Theologia Crucis and the Christian Kabbalah Luther’s later years have become famous, sadly, for his treatises against the Jews,1 which were exploited four centuries afterwards in Nazi Germany.2 One of Luther’s main concerns in these years was an ongoing polemic against Jewish Kabbalah. Indeed, in his infamous treatise, “On the Jews and their Lies”, Luther briefly touched on the question of the Jewish understanding of the ineffable name of God, and the magical and mystical notions that are related to it, and then directs his reader to the publication of a treatise entirely dedicated to this topic. In March 1543, Luther published his On Schem Hamphoras,3 which represented a rebuke of the Kabbalistic understanding of the magical powers associated with the name of God. At the beginning of the work, Luther claimed that he is now convinced that it is impossible to convert the Jews. To hope to convert them is like hoping to convert the Devil.4 In On the Jews and Their Lies, Luther claimed that four lies should be associated with Jewish people: first, Jewish arrogance because of their conviction of being the descendants of the patriarchs; second, the claim of being the 1  Luther’s anti-Jewish writings, as well as Luther’s attitude towards Jewish people, have received enormous attention in Luther scholarship. For a discussion of Luther’s writings regarding the Jews from his 1523 Daβ Jesus Christus ein geborener Jude sei to his later antiJewish pamphlet, see: Thomas Kaufmann, Luthers ‘Judenschriften:’ Ein Beitrag zu ihrer historischen Kontextualisierung, 2 ed. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013); Oberman, Wurzeln des Antisemitismus, 157–83. 2  For the use of Luther’s anti-Jewish writings in Nazi-Germany, see: Christopher J. Probst, Demonizing the Jews: Luther and the Protestant Church in Nazi Germany (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012). Over the centuries, the reception of Luther’s anti-Jewish works was unfortunately widespread. For the nineteenth century, see: Dorothea Wendebourg, “‘Gesegnet sei das Andenken Luthers!’ Die Juden und Martin Luther im 19. Jahrhundert,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 65 (2013): 235–51.Thomas Kaufmann discussed the reception of Luther’s writings on the Jews from the sixteenth to the twentieth century in Thomas Kaufmann, Luthers Juden, 2 ed. (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2015), 141–70. On the same theme see also: Johannes Wallmann, “The Reception of Luther’s Writings on the Jews from the Reformation to the End of the 19th Century,” Lutheran Quarterly 1 (1987): 72–97. 3  WA 53.600 ff. I follow the English translation by Gerhard Falk: Gerhard Falk, The Jew in Christian Theology: Martin Luther’s Anti-Jewish ‘Vom Schem Hamphoras,’ Previously Unpublished in English, and Other Milestones in Church Doctrine Concerning Judaism (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1992). 4  Ibid., 160.

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“chosen” people of God in light of the circumcision; third, the fact of receiving the law directly from God; fourth, Jews claimed that God gave them the Promised Land, namely the land of Canaan and Jerusalem.5 In Luther’s eyes, the most pernicious threat goes beyond Jewish lies – namely, their magical use of the name of God. Quoting from the Italian theologian Porchetus (died c. 1315) who, at the beginning of the fourteenth century wrote a widely circulated antiJewish pamphlet entitled Victoria Porcheti adversos impios Hebraeos, Luther argued that, on his way to Jerusalem, Jesus saw a stone upon which the Ark of the Lord was set and which bore the words “Schem Hamphoras”. Whoever could decipher and pronounce the ineffable name of God could then do whatever he wanted. For Luther, the Jews were blind for not recognizing Jesus as the Messiah, and they subsequently opened their eyes to the Devil. Luther argued that the Jews ate the Devil’s excrement.6 Any rational person, Luther argued, recognizes that the four letters of the ineffable name cannot be used to perform miracles. The Jews concentrate on the power of the letters, and they do not recognize Jesus as the Messiah. Luther then examined the numerology behind the four letters. For Luther, the Jews, who do not understand their own religion, are devils and prisoners of the Devil, who claim to transform them into gods and angels. Ultimately, according to Luther, the Jews are aware that Christianity is the only true religion, but they reject it in their hate of God.7 Luther discussed how “the circumcised holy men” (as Luther sarcastically referred to the Jews) attribute miracles to “empty, dead, and miserable letters” which “are, and cannot be anything but single, dead, powerless letters, although the Jews act as though it were the same as God’s Holy Scripture”. Since the letters are in themselves powerless, Luther emphasized that whatever the Jews claim to achieve with them is the result of a pact with the devil, because, “after all, Satan and all godless names and words are also cast in holy letters”.8 In defiance of God’s commandment, the Jews claim that everyone, even the godless, can perform miracles through the divine power contained within the ineffable name. Luther accused Jews of idolatry: divinizing the letters in the Schem Hamphoras, they set above God as many gods as letters constitute the Schem Hamphoras. “It is said”, Luther argued, “there are 216 of them as will follow, that is, they pray to 216 thousand devils and not the right God whom they insult so and whose divine honor they steal with the Shem Hamphoras; they are the same ones who appropriate the miserable letter”.9 Luther also protected himself from a possible accusation against Christians that they were practicing illic5 

Ibid., 67. Ibid., 73. Ibid., 74. 8  Ibid., 134. 9  Cf. Ibid.,176. 6  7 



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it magic, and argued that Christians do not divinize the words in Baptism or in the Eucharist, but admit that it is God alone who performs miracles according to His will. God is present in the water during Baptism, because He has promised this and blesses the Christian community with His grace and power.10 The rhetorical strategy followed by Luther is to assimilate Jewish and papal magic: just like the Jews, the pope has his own Schem Hamphoras. He has filled the world with tricks, idols, and magic, and claims to wash away sin through water; “he seeks to imitate God like a monkey”.11 Heinrich Bullinger, Zwingli’s successor in Basel, after reading Luther’s infamous anti-Jewish writings, commented: “If that famous hero Reuch­lin were to return to life, he would declare that Tongern, Hoogstraten, and Pfefferkorn had returned to life in this one person, Luther”.12 While Bullinger portrayed the late Luther as a reincarnation of the anti-Jewish polemicists who accused Reuch­lin of heresy, and tried to confiscate and destroy Jewish books, at the beginning of his career in the 1510s, Luther reached out to Reuch­lin and extended his support against Tongern, Hoogstraten, and Pfefferkorn. Much scholarly attention has been paid to Luther’s late anti-Jewish writings. Much less attention, however, has been paid to Luther’s relationship with and attitude to the Jews in his early years in Wittenberg. As we have seen, in his late treatises Luther repeatedly criticized the Jewish Kabbalah as a demoniac practice. What, then, was Luther’s attitude regarding the Kabbalah in his early years, and how did he react to its growing dissemination? In the early sixteenth century, the sheer volume of literary production reshaped the European intellectual landscape. The hybrid contacts among different cultures which characterized the previous century contributed, on the one hand, to modifying the perception of what constituted Christianity, and what it meant to be a Christian, and, on the other, to an unprecedented openness towards different religious traditions. This was the case not only in relation to the other two monotheistic religions, Judaism and Islam, but also with respect to Egyptians, Chaldeans, and pre-Christian religiosity in general, which assumed a new status and a new relevance for Christianity. As the bearers of irenic ideas, in their attempt to reshape the understanding of the Self and its relationship with the Other, these tendencies faced ostracism from the most conservative corners of Christian theology. While the institutionalized Church tended to centralize its power through the powerful instrument of the charge of heresy, these ideas infiltrated into mainstream theology, influencing some of early Luther’s opponents, such as John Eck and Hieronymus Emser. 10  Ibid., 176–77. 11  Ibid., 177. 12 As

218.

quoted by Price, Johannes Reuch­lin and the Campaign to Destroy Jewish Books,

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In the final chapter of the first section, I emphasized that Luther’s powerful statement “Only the CROSS is our theology” aroused in opposition to Eck’s assimilation and discussion of the abovementioned irenic tendencies of the Renaissance. Now, the discussion must turn to another strand of these tendencies, namely the Christian Kabbalah. I briefly described the main debates that were generated in the aftermath of the Christian Kabbalah in the Chapter One. How did these ideas influence Martin Luther? While a growing interest regarding the Kabbalistic interest of other Reformers (Andreas von Karlstadt,13 Ulrich Zwingli,14 and Andreas Osiander15) has become apparent in recent years, existing scholarship has inconsistently addressed the relationship between Luther’s theology and the Christian Kabbalah. The German evangelical theologian and Church historian Siegfried Raeder focused, in different publications, on Luther’s knowledge of the Hebrew language, his use of the Masoretic text, and his interpretation of the literal-spiritual sense of Scripture. In his main work, which has rightly become one of the standard texts on Luther’s hermeneutics, and more specifically on Luther’s second lecture on the Psalms, he dedicated a few pages to Kabbalistic influences on the young Luther.16 This simultaneous acknowledgment of Luther’s familiarity with the works of the Christian Kabbalah and the marginalization of the impact of these works on Luther’s own work has characterized the scholarship of subsequent years. A paradigmatic example is provided by Alister McGrath’s influential book on Luther’s theology of the cross. McGrath made a sharp distinction between Reuch­lin “the philologian”, and Reuch­lin “the kabbalist”: In McGrath’s view, it was Reuch­lin’s philological scholarship, and more generally “the lighter aspects of Renaissance culture”, that enlightened Luther’s “theological breakthrough”.17 Thus, regarding Reuch­lin’s Kabbalism, McGrath commented: “It may also be noted in passing that Reuch­ lin illustrates the darker side of humanism: although the movement is usually regarded as encapsulating the higher ideals of humanity, its darker and irrational side can be seen from Reuch­lin’s obsession with the cabala, although it 13  Hans Peter Rüger, “Karlstadt als Hebraist an der Universität zu Wittenberg,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 75 (1984): 297–308. 14  Alfred Schindler, “Huldrych Zwingli e Giovanni Pico della Mirandola,” in Dall’Accademia Neoplatonica Fiorentina alla Riforma. Celebrazioni del V Centenario della morte di Lorenzo il Magnifico (Firenze, palazzo Strozzi, 30 Ottobre 1992) (Florence: Olschki, 1996), 51–65; Irena Backus, “Randbemerkungen Zwinglis in den Werken von Giovanni Pico della Mirandola,” Zwingliana 18 (2010): 291–309. 15  Anselm Schubert, “Andreas Osiander als Kabbalist,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 105 (2014): 30–54. 16 Raeder, Grammatica theologica, 59–80. Following Raeder, Heiko Oberman also briefly discussed the antikabbalistic positions assumed by Luther in his early writings: Oberman, Wurzeln des Antisemitismus, 58–59. 17 McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, 52–71.



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is probably better illustrated by the widespread fascination occasioned by the Faust legend”.18 More recently, in his biography of Reuch­lin, Franz Posset once again posed the problem of Reuch­lin’s influence on the young Luther. In emphasizing Luther’s use of Reuch­lin’s philological works, Posset concluded that in Luther “there was no theological reception of Reuch­lin’s Kabbalistic thought”.19 Drawing on Raeder’s scholarship, Posset is keenly aware of Luther’s engagement with Reuch­lin’s Kabbalistic works, however, through a normative approach, he limited himself to note that Luther seems to have a negative attitude towards Kabbalah, and his hermeneutics seems not to be influenced by the emergence of the Christian Kabbalah. Thus, he concluded: “Without doubt, Reuch­lin the Hebraist made history in Luther’s and other Reformers’ exegetical theology, but Reuch­lin the Cabalist did not”.20 Finally, Anselm Schubert dealt with the wider topic of the influence of Christian Kabbalah in the Wittenberg Reformers, dedicating some pages to Luther, but concluded that while Karlstadt was indeed influenced by Kabbalah, Luther was not.21 It is well known that Luther immediately used the new texts produced by Faber, Reuch­lin, and Erasmus for his early lectures. Luther studied Reuch­lin’s De rudimentis hebraicis, as well as Faber Stapulensis’ Quincuplex Psalterium, in preparation for his first lectures on the Psalms. Luther’s annotations to Faber’s commentary on the Psalms is indicative of the attention Luther paid to this work. In 1516, Erasmus’ edition of the New Testament was published in Basel. In that year, Luther was lecturing on the Letter to the Romans, and he purchased a copy of Erasmus’ New Testament, in order to provide his students with an improved text provided by Erasmus. Should the influence of these authors be restricted to the philological side of their works? I demonstrated in the previous chapters that this is an oversimplification of the impact that Erasmus’ biblical scholarship had on Luther. This is not the case, however, either for Reuch­lin or for Faber. Reuch­lin’s “philological” works are full of references to the Jewish Kabbalah. Jacques Lefèvre’s positions varied in a general attempt to avoid charges of heresy, but in his Quincuplex Psalterium, one can still read numerous references to the hermetic and Kabbalistic discourse. Was Luther unaware of, or simply disinterested in these ideas? Was he, like a nineteenth-century philologist, able to separate the biblical scholarship of Reuch­lin and Faber from their neo-Platonic, hermetic, and Kabbalistic influences, making full use of the former while being disinterested to the latter? As we have seen, the answer of the 18  Cf. Ibid., 63–64. 19 Posset, Johann Reuch­lin 20  Ibid., 771. 21  Anselm Schubert,

(1455–1522): A Theological Biography, 770.

“Die Wittenberger Reformation und die christliche Kabbala (1516– 1524),” in Anwälte der Freiheit! Humanisten und Reformatoren im Dialog, ed. Matthias Dall’Asta (Heidelberg: Univ. Verl. Winter, 2016), 167–80.

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(few) scholars who dealt with the influence of Christian Kabbalah on Luther’s early works is yes; my answer is that this stark dichotomy between philology and Kabbalah is the product of nineteenth-century culture. In the early sixteenth century, however, philological and Kabbalistic interests overlapped and influenced one another – thus the narrative of the young Luther influenced by humanistic scholarship requires revision. This chapter aims to show that the Christian Kabbalah played an important role in Luther’s overall intellectual development, and, more specifically, on the conceptualization of Luther’s theology of the cross. First, I discuss Luther’s simultaneous use and critique of the Kabbalistic techniques to read the Old Testament in his first lecture on the Psalms. The focus then moves to the crucial years 1518–19, when Luther explained his concept of a theologia crucis, in order to prove: 1) Luther’s subtle critique of the Christian Kabbalah in the very same years in which he was supporting Johannes Reuch­lin against the theologians who accused him of heresy, and 2) the development of Luther’s hermeneutics in relation to his Kabbalistic interests. Finally, I argue that, since the theology of the cross was Luther’s hermeneutical starting point, the Christian Kabbalists were the principal targets against which Martin Luther calibrated his theology of the cross.22

7.1  The Influence of the Christian Kabbalah in Luther’s Dictata super Psalterium In Chapter Three, I showed that in his Dictata, Luther conceived the notion that human beings are composed of an inferior and a superior part. Starting with his Lectures on Romans, he used Ockham’s understanding of the “person” as a unitary creature in rejection of Erasmus’ ontology. From a hermeneutical perspective, this implies that in the Dictata Luther could still read 2 Cor. 3:6 as a distinction between a literal and spiritual reading of the Scripture. As noted throughout this work, there were traditionally two main lines of interpretation for the Pauline reference to the killing letter and the saving spirit in 2 Cor. 3:6. The first was the contrast between a literal interpretation of the text of the Bible versus its deeper spiritual meaning; the second was the contrast between the law of God and life-giving spirit. David Steinmetz has pointed out that during his

22  To my knowledge, two attempts have been made in the enormous secondary literature on Luther’s theology of the cross to link Luther’s theologia crucis and the expansion of Christian Kabbalah: Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance und Hermetismus: Kontexte und Schnittstellen der frühen reformatorischen Bewegung,” and Heinrich Assel, “Der Name Gottes bei Martin Luther,” Evangelische Theologie 64 (2004): 362–77.



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first lectures on the Psalms, Luther used both interpretations of the spirit-letter distinction.23 Luther emphasized that the Holy Scripture is a unique text. It cannot be understood intellectually, nor can it be correctly interpreted outside of faith in Christ. The task of interpreting the Scripture thus lies not in the power of the interpreter, but in the text itself.24 The Scripture is its own interpreter (sui ipsius interpres). A logical deductive process is both inadequate and unproductive for grasping the complexity of Scripture. Only the interpreter who has already been changed by the works of the Holy Spirit can grasp its true meaning. Luther’s emphasis on the tropological sense of the Old Testament left avenues open for the application of different exegetical methods to find the correct spiritual interpretation of the Old Testament. The Christological reading of the Psalms that he derived from Faber left unanswered the question of how to find Christ in the Old Testament. In Chapter Five, we saw that Luther made full use in the Dictata of different exegetical traditions, from Augustine and Jerome, to Nicholas of Lyra and Paul of Burgos. It must be added that, in his search for a Christological reading of the Old Testament, Luther found a fruitful partner in the Christian Kabbalah. At the beginning of his lecture, Luther clarified that the Psalms should be read Christologically. The Christological reading that Luther applied in his Dictata super Psalterium, however, is quite different from the one that he endorsed in his Operationes in Psalmos. In the period between his first and second lectures on the Psalms, Luther’s perspective changed; it diverged from a hermeneutics that found in Old Testament prophecy a premonition of the future coming of Christ, to a Gospel-centered reading which emphasized that the whole Scripture should be read according to the dichotomy between law and grace. Although the Old Testament teaches not just law, and the New Testament not just Gospel, in the Operationes in Psalmos, Luther understood the relationship between the two parts of the Holy Writ in terms of how they focus on the central and unique message of Christianity – salvation through Christ alone. In the Dictata, however, a variety of hermeneutical avenues to locate the Christological referent in the Old Testament remained available. Luther emphasized in the Dictata that every prophecy should refer literally to Christ, unless the text explicitly denied this possibility.25 Luther faced the challenge, however, of understanding how to find Christ veiled in the prophecy of the psalmist. As we have seen, one of the main concerns of the Christian Kab23  Steinmetz, “Hermeneutic and Old Testament Interpretation in Staupitz and the Young Martin Luther,” 44. 24 Lohse, Luthers Theologie, 52–53; Steinmetz, “Hermeneutic and Old Testament Interpretation in Staupitz and the Young Martin Luther,” 41. 25  WA 3.13.6–7: Omnis prophetia et omnis propheta de Christo domino debet intelligi, nisi ubi manifestis verbis appareat de alio loqui.

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balists was precisely how to locate Christ buried in the prophecy of the Old Testament – to find the life-giving Spirit under the veil of the dead letter. A closer examination of the Dictata shows that Luther was perfectly aware that a Kabbalistic reading of the Scripture could offer a solution to decipher the prophecies of the Old Testament in a Christological sense. Commenting on Psalm 64 (65), for instance, Luther explicitly praised Christian Kabbalah: This is the true Cabala, which is extremely rare. For as the affirmative way concerning God is imperfect, both in understanding and in speaking, so the negative way is altogether perfect. Therefore a frequent word in Dionysius is “hyper”, for beyond every thought one must simply step into the fog. Nevertheless, I do not think that the letter of this Psalm is speaking about this anagogy. Therefore our theologians are too rushed when they argue and make assertions so boldly about matters divine.26

In this passage Luther equated Kabbalah with the negative theology of Dionysius. Luther not only affirmed that praising God is imperfect, but also that every human thought is inferior to God, and thus inadequate for the task of achieving a proper comprehension of His Divinity. The roots of the affirmative theology cannot lead to God; indeed, God has to be praised in a negative way, through silence. This is, according to Luther, “the real Cabala”, which, however, is very rare (rarissima). Whereas the affirmative way of talking and thinking about God is imperfect, by contrast, the negative way is perfect. Luther was proposing a contrast between a Kabbalistic-Dionysian negative theology, and the theology of the universities. Indeed, Luther positively quoted Dionysius because of his frequent mention of the word hyper, which, for Luther, indicated that divine knowledge is far beyond human understanding. In order to know God, the believer must walk in “the fog”. For this reason, Luther criticized the theologians of the universities, who are too rushed in making their assertions about God. Theology cannot be treated through dispute; rather, it should be contemplated in ecstatic silence. Experiencing this kind of rapture and being enlightened by the Holy Spirit makes a true theologian, rather than one crowned as such by the universities. Those who have experienced true theology know that affirmative theology cannot understand anything about God.27 26  LW

10.313, WA 3.372.16–21: Hec est vera Cabala, que rarissima est. Namque sicut affirmativa de deo via est imperfecta, tam intelligendo quam loquendo: ita negativa est perfectissima. Une in Dionysio frequens verbum est “Hyper”, quia super omnem cogitatum opertet simpliciter in caliginem intrare. Attamen litteram huius psalmi non puto de hac anagogia loqui. Unde nimis temerarii sunt nostri theologi, qui tam audacter de Divinis disputant et asserunt. 27  LW 10.313; WA 3.372.22–27: Nam ut dixi, affirmativa theologia est sicut lae ad vinum respectu negative. Et hec in disputatione et multiloquio tractari non potest, sed in summo mentis ocio et silentio, velut in raptu et extasi. Et hec facit verum theologum. Sed non coronat ullum



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Contemporary scholarship has correctly pointed out that in the Dictata, Luther used different “mystical” authors to overcome scholastic theology. The positive influence of Dionysius the Areopagite on the young Luther has also been recognized. It is, however, surprising that despite the explicit connection between Kabbalah and Dionysius’ theology, little attention has been given to the former. In commenting on this passage of Luther’s early lectures on the Psalms, Volker Leppin has correctly emphasized the contrast between mystical and scholastic theology in the young Luther. Leppin, however, does not mention the Kabbalah. He moves the discussion to Luther’s reception of Bonaventure, Bernard of Clairvaux, John Tauler, and the Theologia Deutsch.28 Paul Rorem has noted that “Luther honors the transcendent hiddenness of God, beyond human works and thoughts, and links such humility with the mysterious ‘Cabala’, although without indicating what he understood by that name”.29 Although Luther neither mentioned any source nor clarified what he actually meant by Kabbalah, it is important to note that the expression vera Cabala was used by Pico in his Apologia. Pico distinguished between a “true” and a “false” Kabbalah in order to separate his own endorsement of the Kabbalah from the heterodox black magic. Pico’s Apologia was available to Luther in the 1504 edition of Pico’s Opera, edited by Emser and Pirckheimer. In order to prove that Luther’s positive reference to the Christian Kabbalah is not a mere nominal appreciation of one of the most influential and controversial currents of biblical scholarship of the early sixteenth century, I focus on Luther’s commentary on Psalm 98, in which Luther agreed with the Christian Kabbalists on the ineffable name of God – that is, the Tetragrammaton. According to Pico and Reuch­lin, Jesus’ name in Hebrew is nothing other than the Tetragrammaton with the addition of the Hebrew letter “shin”, that is “s” in the Roman alphabet. Pico affirmed this in the seventh of his Kabbalistic conclusions. Drawing on Pico, Reuch­lin widely discussed the same topic in his De Verbo Mirifico.30 In the Dictata super Psalterium, Luther agreed with the Christian Kabbalists on this specific topic. Indeed, commenting on Psalm 98, he argued that St. Jerome, in a letter to Pope Damasus I, proved that “Osanna” is a corrupted readulla universitas, nisi solus spiritus sanctus. Et qui hanc viderit, videt quam nihil sciat omnis affirmativa theologia. Sed hec plura forte quam modestia patitur. 28  Volker Leppin, “Luther’s Roots in Monastic-Mystical Piety,” in The Oxford Handbook of Martin Luther’s Theology, ed. Robert Kolb, Irene Dingel, and L’ubomír Batka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 49–61. 29  Paul Rorem, “Martin Luther’s Christocentric Critique of Pseudo-Dionysian Spirituality,” Lutheran Quarterly 11 (1997): 291–307. 30  These ideas influenced other authors, such as Agrippa von Nettesheim. For a discussion of the influence of Pico’s and Reuch­lin’s cabbalistic interpretation of Jesus’ name in Agrippa, see: Pierre Béhar, “From the Cabala to the Glorification of Woman: Agrippa von Nettesheim’s ‘De nobilitate et præcellentia fœmini sexus’,” German Life and Letters 67 (2014): 455–66. Here quoted at p. 459.

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ing. In Hebrew it is, rather, two words, namely “Hoshi ana”, that is, “save, I beg you” or “O save”. Luther thus argued that the name “Jesus” came from “saving”, as the angel says to Joseph in Matt. 1:21. Luther added, however, that this does not mean that “Jesus” did not originate from the Tetragrammaton through the addition of the letter “s” (“shin”). In this passage, Luther explicitly agreed with Pico and Reuch­lin: on the one hand, he interpreted Jesus’ name as symbolizing his salvific mission, and, on the other, he pointed out that the Christian Kabbalist interpretation that was carried by Pico and Reuch­lin was correct.31 Luther’s reference to the Christian Kabbalist reading of the Tetragrammaton is thus not a full endorsement, but a latent possibility, which can be actualized only when the interpreter is in the status of ecstatic silence mentioned in the commentary on Psalm 64. For Luther, this is a rare and complex reading, which is not necessarily in contradiction with a proper understanding of the Scripture. The criticism of the assertiveness of scholastic theology, alongside the simultaneous need to find a humbler way to venerate God, permeated the entire commentary. In his commentary on Psalm 66, Luther stated the problem clearly: For this reason we theologians commonly mention the holy name of God so irreverently, especially in our arguing and even in our praying, because we do not know how to extol [it] with our tongue. And we argue so boldly about the trinity of Persons, even though their three names are exceedingly formidable and should never be uttered without a trembling of the heart. We argue about the formal and real distinction the way a cobbler argues about his leather. I believe that we would be better instructed by God inwardly if we would take these so holy names into our mouth with humility and reverence, than if we move ahead foolhardily through our subtleties. For thus the saints, when they have taken God’s name into their mouth, are inwardly so stunned by the majesty of Him whom they have mentioned openly that they repent, as it were, for having taken His name into their mouth. This is what it means properly to extol with the tongue.32 31  LW 11.271; WA 4.120.5–15: Sciendum secundum b. Hieronymum ad Damasum: corrupte legitur “Osanna”, sed sunt due dictiones, ut sic”Hoschi ana”, ide est “salva obsecro”, sive “O salva”. Nam “Ana” seu “Anna” est dictio obscerantis, que apud nos pro “O” interpretatur vel obsecro. Ut ps. 117. “o Domine, salvum me fac, o Domine, bene prosperare”. Et ps. 114. “o Domine libera animam meam”. Et 115. “o domine, quia ego servus tuus”. Exo. 32. “obsecro, peccavit populus iste peccatum maximum”. Ideo potest vel post vel ante poni, ut “Ana hoschi”, vel “hoschi ana”. Inde venit nomen Iesu a salvando, ut Angelus exposuit Luce 2. “Ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum &c”. Nec obstat, quod a nomine tetragrammaton dicitur venire. Nam tetragrammaton per assumptionem litere Schin iam in significationem coincidit cum “Osi”. 32  Cf. LW 10.322; WA 3.382.7–17: Inde enim nos theologi iam irriverenter sanctum dei nomen vulgo nominamus, presertim in disputando et etiam orando, quia sub lingua exaltare nescimus. Et audaciter de trinitate personarum, quarum tamen tria nomina sunt tremenda vehementer et nunquam sine tremore cordis proferenda, ita disputamus, de distinctione formali et reali, sicut sutor de corio suo disputat. Credo quod, si cum humilitate et reverentia tam sacra nomina in os sumeremus, melius intus erudiremur a deo, quam sic per nostras subtilitates in temeritate profecimus. Sic enim sancti, quando nomen Dei assumpserint in os, ita intus stupent



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As in his comments on the previous Psalm, Luther contraposed the boldness of scholastic theology with the necessity of approaching God’s Word reverently. Unsurprisingly, the passage is immediately followed by a criticism of Aristotle, who is condemned for having taught this kind of verbosity and boldness in dealing with divine matters. Thus, Luther expressed his hate for Thomists and Scotists, who uncritically followed this path.33 The inability of scholastic theology to venerate the Holy name of God, and the appreciation for the vera Cabala, and for the spirituality of Dionysius go hand in hand in the Dictata. It seems, however, that later in his commentary Luther found the application of the Jewish Kabbalah to be a deleterious way of interpreting Scripture. This viewpoint emerges in his commentary to Psalm 118. Glossing the title, Luther quoted Augustine, who in his Enarrationes in Psalmos had claimed that he had explored the depths of this profound Psalm in order to understand the concealed meaning of the text. Unlike Augustine, Luther claimed to have followed the simple sense (simplice sensu) of the text: “Sed nos simplice sensu procedamus”, adding that this Psalm could be understood on both a prophetical and a moral level. Prophetically, the Psalm referred to believers in Christ in their fight against the pharisaical corruptions ( pharisaica corruptelas), referring specifically to those who are immaculate in via (Christians and true believers) in opposition to those that are maculate (the Jews and the heretics). Morally, the Psalm argues that righteousness stemmed from pride, for which reason the Psalmist does not say Beati immaculati in an absolute sense, but adds the expression in via, “in progress”, to highlight that the condition of a true believer was characterized by a fight for morality – his expression of faith in perpetual progress, and never completely accomplished. In a prophetical-literal sense, the Psalm prefigures the advent of Christ and the creation of his Church; in a moral and doctrinal sense, it is a request ( petitio) for the spiritual advent of Christ through grace. In this tension towards the future, Luther emphasized that just as the Church always tends toward the future glory (ad futuram gloriam), so the soul of the believer must always tend toward moral perfection.34

ad maiestatem eius, quem foris nominaverunt, ut velut peniteant, quod nomen eius in os sumpserint. Et hoc est proprie exaltare sub lingua. 33  LW 10.322; WA 3.382.19–25: Sed quia ex Aristotele didicimus loquaciter et audacter de rebus disputare, putamus eandem loquacitatem et audaciam etiam ad divina transferendas. Hinc est, quod ego odio habeo opiniones istas tam audaces Thomistarum, Scotistarum et aliorum, quia sacrum dei nomen, in quo signati sumus, quod celum, terra et infernus tremit, adeo sine timore tractant et exaltant super linguam, deprimunt autem sub lingua. 34  WA 4.284.17–21: Qualis est modus Ecclesie procedentis usque ad futuram gloriam, talis est cuiuslibet anime proficientis usque ad perfectionem. Ideo sicut Ecclesia semper alios et alios producit, ita anima semper alia et alia opera bona procreat. Et ideo in hoc quoque psalmo semper alia et alia petitio repetitur, que tamen idem petivit.

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In Luther’s interpretation, this Psalm asks for Jesus, and reveals the Gospel. However, Jews and heretics are prone to a literal understanding of the text, and they cannot see its literal-prophetic meaning which refers to Christ.35 Iudicia iustitie should be soteriologically interpreted as Christ’s passion which justifies, and, morally, it should be interpreted as the affliction and crucifixion of the believer according to the example of Christ. Iudicia condemnationis is the condemnation of the unjust. Thus, Luther concluded, one faith, one Lord, one Church: omnia sunt eadem omnibus.36 Luther pointed out that in writing this Psalm, the prophet had glimpsed the spiritual law, namely the Gospel into the Mosaic law.37 The law of Moses is not bad (maculata) in itself, as those who do not understand the spiritual sense of the Scripture claim.38 It possesses both the signifying letter (literam significantem) and the spirit signified through the letter (spiritum significatum per literam).39 The Gospel would thus have a twofold aim: to judge and to show sins, and to castigate the old man in order to benefit interior justice.40 “Testimonium” had to be understood as a reference to the future. Just as the grace of God did not appear in its entirety to the ancients, who could still prophesy, in the same way, the Christians would not be what they could be, even as the new law testified to their future glory. Luther still maintained that the spiritual sense was hidden in the literal sense of the Scripture: “spiritus in litera latent”.41 I have argued in the previous chapter that later in life Luther vehemently rejected this notion, during his dispute with Hieronymus Emser. As we have seen, in the Dictata Luther insisted that the Scripture was a unique text, one whose mysteries only the believers could truly grasp, and, thus, emphasized that the Spirit could be found in different degrees in the individu35  WA 4.285.32–36: Quia lex nova latebat clausa in veteri lege et expectabatur produci et revelari per Christum venturum, ideo totius huius psalmi intentio est (ut dixi) petere Christi adventum et revalationem euangelice legis. Unde ait: “Non abscondas a me mandata”: Iudeis enim, qui literam tenent, usque hodie manet absconditum Euangelium et opertum. 36  WA 4.289.21–26: Iudicia iustitie primo sunt passiones Christi, quibus iustificamur effective, secundo moraliter sunt afflictiones in carne et concrucifixiones Christi exemplares, quue similiter iustificant, tercio verba Euangelii, que carnem crucifigunt cum concupiscentiis suis. Nam iudicia condemnationis sunt punitiones impiorum, que non sunt iucunda. Inde communio sanctorum. Una fides, unus Dominus, una Ecclesia: omnia sunt eadem omnibus. 37  WA 4.305.19–21: Igitur propheta intuitus oculis spirituaibus legem Mosi, videns in ea latere et clausam esse legem fidei, evangelium gratie et promissa invisibilia, sicut sub cortice nucleum aut sub terra thezaurum. 38  WA 4.306.8–11: Est autem hic primo notandum, quod lex Mosi non est mala nec maculata in se, sed quia scribe, qui eam non cum spiritu intelligebant et docebant, faciunt eam maculatam. 39  WA 4.306.11–12. 40  WA 4.310.15–18: Sic enim Euangelium iudicat, id est arguit peccata, ut vitentur, et castigat veterem hominem, ut proficiat iustitia interioris. Et que ad ista duo pertineat in Euangelio, sunt iudicia, quia damnant peccata et carnem peccati. 41  WA 4.314.23.



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al: the more enlightened the believer by the Spirit, the more his feelings and emotions would be directed toward God, and the more he could appreciate and discover the meaning of the Scripture.42 In this passage, Luther used the dichotomy between letter and spirit to distinguish between law and grace: it is not possible, he argued, to retain the old law, which is merely letter, in the heart; on the other hand, it is the peculiarity of the new spiritual law to delve deep into the heart of the believer.43 According to Luther, true understanding of the Scripture was not gained through a logic-deductive process. Nobody could rationally understand the literal-prophetic sense. From 1509, when he was annotating Augustine and Peter Lombard, Luther emphasized a complete and unbridgeable gap between human reason and divine revelation.44 Commenting on Psalm 118, he distinguished between the intellect as understood by philosophers, and what he calls a theologicus intellectus.45 In the believer, the intellect is not the same as that of philosophers who speculate on nature and knowledge; it is moved only by faith and it is the only bridge between the visible and the invisible. Thus, only those who have the law in their own heart can scrutinize it in the Scripture. The theological intellect is a gift of the Gospel which redirects human speculation to a safe and healthy notion of God.46 Criticizing a philosophical definition of intellectus, Luther pointed out that in the Holy Scripture the term intellectus does not refer to a power of the human soul. Whereas in philosophy sensus and intellectus refer to sensible things and the capacity of abstraction respectively, in theology, intellectus is the ability to recognize and contemplate the cross of Christ through faith. Ultimately, theologicus intellectus is the only bridge toward the invisible which has come visible through the cross of Christ. Commenting on Luther’s scholion on Psalm 118:105, Steven Ozment noted that it is misleading to interpret this passage in anti-intellectual terms.47 For Luther, affection and intellect are in corre42  WA 4.322.28–30: Hoc facit spiritus, qui, ut dixi, in differentibus gradibus est in nobis. Et semper revelat literam magis ac magis ac novos spiritus creat et affectus in nobis, ut curramus viam mandatorum eius. 43  WA 4.324.8–11: Non autem nisi in toto corde potest hec lex custodiri: humana enim et exterior potest tantum ore vel manu custodiri sine corde. Unde sepe in vetere lege et prophetis precipit deus ex toto corde se coli et legem suam custodiri, quod tamen lex illa non potuit dare, quia erat litera. Sed ideo tamen precepit, ut Christum optarent et peterent pro impletione eius. 44 See: Lawrence Murphy, “The Prologue of Martin Luther to the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1509): The Clash of Philosophy and Theology,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 67 (1976): 54–75. 45  WA 4.324.1–4: Igitur intellectus est a domino solo, sicut dicit: “Erunt omnes docibiles dei”. Quare non est philosophorum aut naturalis iste intellectus, quo etiam visibilia speculamur, sed theologicus et gratuitus, quo per fidem res non apparentes contemplantur. 46 Ozment, Homo Spiritualis, 112–14. 47  Ibid., 115–17.

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lation, and faith redirects both toward the cross of Christ. After noting that in Luther’s scholion the object of faith is the Word of God, Ozment remarked: Faith is concerned with what is “invisible” but not “inaudible”, i. e., with what is incapable of rational comprehension and speculative grasp but not incapable of being heard, believed, trusted, and followed: the verbum dei. And hearing, believing, trusting, and following the Word of God does not exclude “understanding” – fides practica “illumines” – but places it in this peculiar dimension demanded by the nature of the “object” of faith.48 Luther emphasized that only through theological intellect can one properly understand Scripture.49 He emphatically argued that faith is wisdom: fides enim est sapientia.50 Only through faith can one discern the proper meaning of Scripture, namely Christ. God promised to send a Messiah, and He kept his promise. He sent his Son who revealed Him, but – Luther asked rhetorically – what would be the point if nobody recognized the salvation that derived from Christ? Quoting Eccles. 41:14, Luther noted that a hidden treasure and an occult wisdom (sapientia occulta) are useless. God sent His own Son, so that the true believer could know Him through His Son. To emphasize Jesus’ salvific mission was thus Luther’s primary concern in this passage. Not surprisingly, he opposed those who look for the Hidden God instead of Jesus the Savior: Thus, a lot of people deduce the name Jesus from these two, “Iah Savah”, that is the hidden God, as Johannes Reuch­lin says. And nicely, nothing would prevent it else besides the Angel interpreted it in a different way saying: “You will call him Jesus, since he will save his people from their sins”.51

The search for the secret names of God and their power is criticized by Luther as a speculative attempt to look for the Hidden God. Luther explicitly targeted Reuch­lin for endorsing such a mystical understanding of the name of God. Indeed, as we have seen, Reuch­lin scrutinized this notion at length in De Verbo Mirifico, and subsequently in De Rudimentis Hebraicis. Luther was also aware that Reuch­lin was not alone in endorsing a theosophical understanding of the name of God; numerous authors (multi) have indeed speculated on it. Brian Copenhaver has noted that, in commenting on Psalm 77 in his Quincuplex Psalterium, Jacques Lefèvre argued that Nicholas of Cusa should be praised for pointing out that the name of Jesus could be rendered both as IHESVHE or IHEVHE, adding 48 

Ibid., 117. WA 4.338.22–26: Intellectus proprie est Allegorias In Scripturis et creaturis agnoscere, et ultra id, quod videtur oculis aut sensu percipitur, etiam intus intellectu aliud percipere: quod est utilissimum donum contra Iudeorum, haereticorum insidias, qui Scripturas et creaturas false adducunt et seducunt simplices, qui non interior penetrare possunt. 50  WA 4.339.3. 51 WA 4.337.10–14: Multi proinde hoc nomen Ihesu deducunt ab istis duobus, scilicet “Iah Sava”, id est deus absconditus, ut Iohannes Reuch­lin dicit. Et pulchre, nisi obstaret vel saltem alio modo Angelus ad Ioseph interpretaretur dicens: “Vocabis nomen eius Ihesu, ipse enim salvabit populum suum a peccatis eorum”. 49 



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that Pico della Mirandola and Reuch­lin followed Cusanus in investigating the name of God.52 In 1514, at the same time as Luther’s first lectures on the Psalms, Lefèvre published his edition of Cusanus’ opera, in which Cusanus’ short treatise On the Hidden God was published. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Lefèvre specifically applied his Kabbalistic knowledge in his comments on Psalm 118. While commenting on Psalm 96, Luther could still accept the Kabbalistic interpretation of the Tetragrammaton. In his scholia to Psalm 118, however, this interpretation is presented as simply antithetical to the scriptural text. The balance had begun to shift. In the years that followed, Luther began to emphasize in strong terms the risk of a Kabbalist reading of the Scripture.

7.2  Vera Cabala Dominis Nomini: Competitive Discourses at the Edge of the Reformation Despite the use of positive language to address the Christian Kabbalah, in the Dictata Luther demonstrated a certain reluctance to apply Kabbalistic techniques to interpret the Old Testament Christologically. In his commentary to Psalm 118, Luther saw in the Kabbalah an attempt to look for the Hidden God. As noted earlier, in the years 1518–19, Luther clarified his hermeneutical position and he increasingly developed the notion of scriptural clarity. I will contend here that Luther’s developing understanding of the letter as a pure sign was in opposition to the theosophical understanding of the name endorsed by the Christian Kabbalists. In the years 1516–19, there was a lively interest in the Christian Kabbalah in Wittenberg. In the summer semester of 1516, Andreas von Karlsdadt lectured on Giovanni Pico’s Apologia.53 In May 1517, George Spalatin bought a copy of Reuch­lin’s De Arte Cabalistica.54 In 1518, Reuch­lin’s protégé, Philipp Melanchthon, arrived in Wittenberg. Melanchthon was not himself a Kabbalist, but in order to improve the study of Hebrew language, he tried to bring Johannes Böschenstein (1472–1540) with him to Wittenberg. Böschenstein had studied under Reuch­lin, and was a fully committed Kabbalist. In 1518, Böschenstein – who would later go on to teach Hebrew to Zwingli – published a Kabbalistic exposition of the Tetragrammaton. This publication, in which also Melanchthon took part, was dedicated to Frederick the Wise.55 52  Brian P. Copenhaver, “Lefevre d’Etaples, Symphorien Champier, and the Secret Names of God,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes (1977): 189–211. 53  Schubert, “Die Wittenberger Reformation und die christliche Kabbala (1516–1524),” 171–77. 54  Ibid., 169. 55  Regarding this publication, I follow: Wilkinson, Tetragrammaton: Western Christians and the Hebrew Name of God, 299–300.

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In a letter to Spalatin dated 22 February 1518, Luther affirmed that he already read Reuch­lin’s On the Art of the Kabbalah, and appreciated the criticism against scholastic theology contained in the second book of the work.56 At the same time, however, the positive vocabulary which characterized Luther’s early reference to the Kabbalah was substituted by more accurate references to what sort of Kabbalah one should follow.57 As I demonstrated in Chapter One, from 1517 on the lawsuits waged by both Luther and Reuch­lin were clearly interconnected. It was thus counterproductive for Luther to criticize Reuch­lin openly, and engage in a dispute with a man who was facing the very same enemies as himself. While siding unequivocally with Reuch­lin, Luther developed his hermeneutics in opposition to the Christian Kabbalah. In 1518, the year following the publication of Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses and Reuch­lin’s On the Art of the Kabbalah, Luther launched an explicit and sharp criticism of the Christian Kabbalists. He made a very precise and selective choice of words in his critique of the Christian Kabbalah. In his 1518 Decem praecepta Wittenbergensi praedicata populo, a collection of sermons on the ten commandments, Luther claimed: Thus, first let’s see the most ignorant, among which first of all we come across superstitious people, soothsayers, and those followers of that form of Jewish superstition regarding the name of the Tetragrammaton which comes from Jewish fables. It is clear that they assume the name of the Lord in vain, because they assume the name of God not for the salvation of the soul nor for the glory of God, but for their own curiosity, for a pact with the Devil through signs, words, and gestures, as I said above. Indeed, they do not care about the salvation of the soul and, thus, even less about God whom they glorify, but only about satisfying their own concupiscence. Thus, just as they disdained God in their heart and glorified themselves against Him, now they profane his name in their mouth and assume it in vain.58 56  LW 48.56–59; WA Br 1.150.14–17: Quod & Iohanne Reuch­lin in secundo libro Cabalȩ suȩ satis affirmat. Quod si ulla necessaria est Dialectica, naturalis illa ingenita sufficit, Qua homo promptus est conferre credita cum creditis & sic concludere vera. In 1730, two fragments attributed to Luther with the annotations to Reuch­lin’s De Arte Cabalistica and Erasmus’ New Testament were published. These annotations can be consulted online at the following link: https://books.google.it/books/about/Duo_D_Martini_Lutheri_ Fragmenta_philolog.html?id=dEyamgEACAAJ&redir_esc=y. These fragments have not been accepted as authentic by the editors of WA. 57  For further discussion on the language used by Luther when referring to the Kabbalah, see: Schubert, “Die Wittenberger Reformation und die christliche Kabbala (1516–1524),” 168–69. 58  WA 1.431.6–15: Videamus itaque primum rudiores, inter quos primo occurrunt supersticiosi, sortilegi et quidam ex iudaicis fabulis supersticiosa quaedam de nomine tetragrammaton fingentes. Quod hii nomen domini in vanum assumant, patet, Quia nec ad salutem animae nec ad gloriam dei assumunt nomen dei, Sed ad curiositatem suam, ad pactum daemonum in signis, verbis, gestibus, ut supra dictum est. Non enim id curant, an salutem animae inde consequantur, multo minus, an deus in hoc glorificetur sed tantum ut suae satisfaciant concupiscentiae. Igitur sicut illi deum abiecerunt de corde suo et vanum foecerunt in semetipsis con-



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In this passage, Luther defined the Jewish reading of the Tetragrammaton as a “superstitious Jewish fable”. With a clear reference to the magical practices of the Kabbalists, Luther pointed out that people pretend that sortileges (sortilegi) can be performed in the name of God. These people, in Luther’s eyes, do not invoke the name of God for God’s glory, nor for the benefit of their own soul. These practices are always performed out of vain curiosity; signs, words, and actions, while illusionary, are presented as miracles through a pact with the devil (ad pactum demonum). The connection that Luther makes between magic and Kabbalah is not at all surprising. Pico della Mirandola, in his 900 Theses, also connected magic and Kabbalah, declaring them as the best sciences to prove the divinity of Christ. Reuch­lin’s De Verbo Mirifico is entirely dedicated to proving the power of the “wonder-making word”. The Kabbalistic reading of the Tetragrammaton, which, in 1513–14 Luther could still associate with the very same words of the angel to Joseph, had become, in 1518, a demoniac practice that perverted the true meaning of the Scripture and tried to superimpose on it a different, alien meaning that did not derive from God’s Word. Paradoxically, Luther’s position on the Christian Kabbalah did not seem very different from that assumed by the Dominican Jacob Hoogstraten, who accused Reuch­lin and every Kabbalist of practicing black magic. As the target of one of Hoogstraten’s pamphlets, Luther was unwilling to provide help to Hoogstraten, and the Dominicans in general, in their anti-Kabbalistic crusade. Moreover, Luther consistently pictured himself as an eradicator of the misrepresentation of Christianity increasingly tied to scholastic theology. In this ideologically charged environment, in which Hoogstraten believed that Reuch­lin’s Kabbalah and Luther’s justification by word went hand in hand (and for which Hoogstraten ultimately accused Luther of being a Kabbalist), Luther carefully positioned himself in the pro-Reuch­lin movement and, at the same time, tacitly criticized Reuch­lin’s Kabbalism. This ambivalent positioning appears quite clearly in Luther’s 1519 Commentary on Galatians. As shown in the previous chapter, commenting on the second Chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians, Luther inveighed against the corruption of the Church, especially of the monastic order, and also criticized Erasmus’ interpretation of the famous dispute between Paul and Peter in Antioch. In the same way, he nominally praised the Kabbalah while simultaneously proposing an anti-Kabbalistic interpretation of God’s name, its power, and how it should be worshipped. Commenting on Gal. 2:6, Luther applied his usual distinction between an improper understanding of the doctrine of justification based on outward works, and a justification by faith that entailed an internal trust in God. Luther went on to discuss how the believers should relate to God’s name. When tra primum, Ita et nunc nomen eius polluunt in ore suo et frustra assumunt. The English translation of this passage is mine.

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the invocation of the divine name is made in the heart and is drawn from it, it is clear that the human heart is one and the same with God. Thus, it is impossible that the heart of the man who lives in faith does not participate with this virtue, when it is filled with God’s name. The reasoning was that as the Lord’s name is pure, just, and holy, when it reaches the heart of the believer, it renders it like God Himself. For this reason, all the sins of the believers who take the Lord’s name in that spirit are forgiven, as an act of justice towards the sinner. Harboring faith and charity in the heart, the believer is free from every law.59 According to Luther, this is why Christ asked Christians to preach His name, for only those who believe in Him will be saved. Luther addressed the reader rhetorically, asking “If your conscience is harassed and you are a sinner, what could you do?” For Luther, the right answer, of course, was not to trust in one’s individual power, but only in God, and to have faith in Him. Only in Christ can one see and appreciate that God is just, sweet, faithful, and truthful. On the other hand, without the justice of Christ, it is impossible to have a pure heart, since human justice is not true justice: those who have faith in Christ assume the Lord’s name in truth (in veritatem), while those who adhere to human justice assume it with vanity (in vanitatem) because, in virtue of their own confusion, they transform God’s glory into their own glory.60 At the apex of his presentation of his own theology of the Word, Luther vehemently criticized what he considered antithetical to his understanding of justification by Word: 59  WA 2.490.17–33: Invocatio autem nominis divini, si est in corde et ex corde vere facta, ostendit, quod cor et nomen domini sint unum simul et sibi cohaerentia. Ideo impossibile est, ut cor non participet eiusdem virtutibus, quibus pollet [Röm. 10, 17.] nomen domini. Cohaerent autem cor et nomen domini per fidem. Fides [Ps. 22, 23.] autem per verbum Christi, quo praedicatur nomen domini, sicut dicit: Narrabo [Ps. 102, 22.] nomen tuum fratribus meis, et rursum: Ut annuncient in Syon nomen domini. Sicut ergo nomen domini est purum, sanctum, iustum, verax, bonum &c., ita si tangat tangaturque corde (quod fit per fidem) omnino facit cor simile sibi. Sic fit, ut credentibus in nomine domini donentur omnia peccata et [Ps. 25, 11.] iusticia eis imputetur “propter nomen tuum, domine”, quoniam bonum est, non propter meritum ipsorum, quoniam nec ut audirent meruerunt. Iustificato [Joh. 1, 12.] autem sic corde per fidem, quae est in nomine eius, dat eis deus potestatem filios dei fieri, diffuso mox spiritu sancto in cordibus eorum, qui charitate dilatet eos ac pacatos hilaresque faciat, omnium bonorum operatores, omnium malorum victores, etiam mortis contemptores et inferni. Hic mox cessant omnes leges, omnium legum opera: omnia sunt iam libera, licita, et lex per fidem et charitatem est impleta. 60  WA 2.490.34–39, 491.7: Ecce hoc est, quod Christus nobis meruit, scilicet praedicari nomen domini (id est misericordiam, veritatem dei), in quod qui crediderit salvus erit. Igitur si te conscientia vexat et peccator es et quaeris fieri iustus, quid facies? An circumspicies, quaenam opereris aut quo eas? Non. Sed vide, ut nomen domini vel audias vel recorderis, hoc est, quod deus est iustus, bonus, sanctus, et mox huic adhaere, firmiter credens, eum esse tibi talem, et simul tu iam talis es, similis eius. Verum nomen domini nusquam clarius videbis quam in Christo: ibi videbis, quam bonus, suavis, fidelis, iustus, verax sit deus, ut qui proprio filio suo non pepercerit. Hic te per Christum trahet ad seipsum. Sine hac iusticia impossibile est, cor mundum esse: ideo impossibile est, iusticiam hominum veram esse. Hic enim assumitur nomen domini in veritatem, illic assumitur in vanitatem, quia hic deo gloriam, sibi confusionem, illic sibi gloriam, deo contumeliam reddit homo.



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This is the real cabala of the name of the Lord, not of the Tetragrammaton, about which the Jews speak in the most superstitious manner. Faith in the name of the Lord, I say, is the understanding of the law, the end of the law, and absolutely all in all. But God has placed this name of God’s own Christ, as God foretold through Moses.61

The “real Cabala of the name of the Lord” – as Luther called it – is not the one which deals with the Tetragrammaton, which the Jews address in a very superstitious way; in fact, it is antithetical to it. It is the very opposite of faith. Faith in the Lord’s name, Luther asserted, is the true understanding of the law and its end. Finally, for Luther, the Lord’s name can be found only in Christ, as Moses himself prophesied. The choice of words used by Luther in this passage is, notably, the very same as in his Decem praecepta: he did not directly attack the Christian Kabbalists, but praised instead a “real cabala”, which has nothing in common with that endorsed by Pico della Mirandola and Reuch­lin. As his rhetorical strategy Luther adopted a positive language, instead of an open critique – namely, to contrast his understanding of the Word of God and the Kabbalistic interpretation of the Tetragrammaton. Luther, however, was explicit in pointing out that the “Kabbalah of the Tetragrammaton” constituted a misleading approach to the Lord’s name. It was not only an attempt to mold God to the dictates of human desires, it is also the result of human glory. In the Heidelberg Disputation, Luther defined the theologian of glory as one who looks for his own fame and glory, rather than for that of God. Moreover, in stressing the difference between a comprehension of the Lord’s name through faith, and its understanding through the Kabbalistic techniques, Luther rebuked the inclination to marginalize and decentralize the cross of Christ; against these tendencies, he emphasized the centrality of the cross as the only proper medium with which to access God. Finally, Luther pointed out that Christ was the only subject of Moses’ prophecy. Luther was well aware that, for the Christian Kabbalah, there existed the notion that beyond the Decalogue, Moses also received a secret revelation on Mount Sinai, which was transmitted orally amongst the sages for centuries. The Kabbalah thus represented the preserved secrets that Moses received directly from God on Mount Sinai. In pointing out that Moses predicted the advent of Christ, Luther detracted from the notion of an occult and secret knowledge transmitted orally from generation to generation. While the Christian Kabbalists asserted that the actual content of the secret tradition conveyed by Moses was the name of the Messiah, Luther saw in the Scripture only the revelation of the fulfillment of God’s promise to send His Son for the salvation of humanity. According to Luther, what should have been revealed had been do so with clarity, so that the 61 Cf. The Annotated Luther, vol. 6, 549; WA 2.4917–11: Haec est vera cabala nominis do-

mini, non tetragrammati, de quo Iudei superstitiosissime fabulantur. Fides, inquam, in nomen domini est intelligentia legis, finis legis et prorsus omnia in omnibus. At in Christum posuit hoc nomen suum, sicut per Mosen praedixit.

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search for a secret and occult knowledge was destructive, and would inevitably led to idolatry. In providing a contrast between a true Kabbalah, namely his theology of faith though the Word, and a false Kabbalah, namely the Christian Kabbalist reading of the Tetragrammaton, Luther emphasized two differences which separated him from the Christian Kabbalists. First of all, for Luther, unlike Reuch­ lin, the Word of God did not work within the individual; it did not produce an ontological change in the believer. This always implied for Luther that the Word could be apprehended only through its proper medium, namely by listening to a preacher or by reading the Holy Writ. This represents the second point of difference which Luther emphasized in his critique of the Christian Kabbalah: for while the Kabbalists insisted that Scripture should be investigated in search of the true meaning that the Holy Spirit had hidden within it, Luther emphasized that the letter in itself had no power, but represented instead an external sign to redirect the focus toward the Spirit. No doubt, Luther did not oppose the notion that the Holy Spirit was the real author of the Scripture, imprinting hidden meanings into the Holy Writ. The true theologian, however, according to him, should be very careful to avoid focusing his attention on the search for such mysteries, forgetting the Gospel in the process, and should also avoid searching for God the Father in His majesty without the mediation of the Incarnate God. The role of the Christian Kabbalah in the conceptualization of Luther’s understanding of the Hidden God requires clarification. In what follows, I  will show that Luther widened his critique of the Kabbalah, both in his Lectures on Romans and in his Operationes in Psalmos, as a way of looking for the Hidden God, a critique he formulated as early as his Dictata super Psalterium.

7.3  The Lord and Our Lord: Deus absconditus, the Tetragrammaton, and the Cross of Christ As we have seen, in his commentary on Psalm 118 in the Dictata super Psalterium, Martin Luther criticized Johannes Reuch­lin for his reading of Jesus’ name as meaning “The Hidden God”. Although the expression Deus absconditus can be found only few times in Luther’s works, the question of how the “Hidden God” related to the “Revealed God” has received significant attention from Luther scholars. This interest in Luther’s notion of the Hidden God was mostly sparked by Luther’s use of this concept in his dispute against Erasmus. In his De servo Arbitrio, Luther noted that human beings should not be concerned with the “Hidden God”. They should pay attention only to God as far as He is revealed. Christ, the Incarnate Word, is thus the true object of faith.62 62  For

a careful discussion of Luther’s distinction between the hidden and the revealed



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Explaining further how to distinguish properly between the hidden and the revealed God in his 1538–42 Lecture on Genesis, Luther argued that the Devil tempted Adam and Eve by promising that they could become like God. Original sin can thus be characterized by dissatisfaction with what God has decided to reveal to his creatures.63 Against this diabolic temptation, the believer must have a solid faith in Christ.64 Luther thus distinguished between the hidden and the revealed God as follows: For one must debate either about the hidden God or about the revealed God. With regard to God, insofar as he has not been revealed, there is no faith, no knowledge, and no understanding. And here one must hold to the statement that what is above us is none of our concern […] Such inquisitiveness is original sin itself, by which we are impelled to strive for a way to God through natural speculation […] God has most sternly forbidden this investigation of the divinity.65

The Hidden God, in other words, lay beyond human knowledge. Original sin had led human beings to speculate about the Hidden God, but this amounted to nothing more than idle curiosity and a strike against faith. By contrast, Luther argued that the object of faith had to be the “Revealed God”. Notably, in his 1516 Lectures on Galatians, Luther had reworked Plato’s expression, “the like knows the like”, to emphasize that finite human beings could not know God because of the irreducible distance between the creator and His creatures. For this reason, God had become flesh, revealing Himself to humanity. In the Lecture on Genesis, Luther stressed this concept as far as putting in God’s words the sentence: “From an unrevealed God I will become a revealed God. Nevertheless, I will remain the same God. I will be made flesh, or send My Son”.66 As God made flesh is the proper object of faith, those who follow and believe in His Word also have an implicit proof of being predestined for salvation. God in De Servo Arbitrio, see: Brian Albert Gerrish, “‘To the Unknown God:’ Luther and Calvin on the Hiddenness of God,” The Journal of Religion 53 (1973): 263–92; Volker Leppin, “Deus absconditus und Deus revelatus: Transformationen mittelalterlicher Theologie in der Gotteslehre von ‘De servo arbitrio’,” Berliner Theologische Zeitschrift 22 (2005): 55–69. 63 WA 43.458.3–5: Sunt haec Diabolica et venenata tela et ipsum peccatum originale, quo seduxit Diabolus primos parentes, cum diceret ‘Eritis sicut dii’. Non enim erant contenti revelata divinitate, qua cognita beati erant. 64 WA 43.458.28–29: Opponenda est autem cogitationibus istis vera et firma cognitio Christi. 65  Cf. LW 5.43–44; WA 43.458.37–40, 459.1–6: Aut enim disputandum est de Deo abscondito, aut de Deo revelato. De Deo, quatenus non est revelatus, nulla est fides, nulla scientia et cognitio nulla. Atque ibi tenendum est, quod dicitur: Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos. Eiusmodi enim cogitationes, quae supra aut extra revelationem Dei sublimius aliquid rimantur, prorsus Diabolicae sunt, quibus nihil amplius proficitur, quam ut nos ipsos in exitium praecipitemus, quia obiiciunt obiectum impervestigabile, videlicet Deum non revelatum. Quin potius retineat Deus sua decreta et mysteria in abscondito. Non est, cur ea manifestari nobis tantopere laboremus. 66  Cf. LW 5.44–45; WA 43.459.24–26: Ex Deo non revelato fiam revelatus, et tamen idem Deus manebo. Ego incarnabor vel mittam filium meum.

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After his first lectures on the Psalms, Luther went on to connect the problem of correctly distinguishing between the Hidden and the Revealed God with a proper reading of Scripture. Chapter Four demonstrated that the quest for a mystical ascent to God endorsed by Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, Johannes Reuch­lin, Erasmus, and John Eck, each with their own philosophical and theological positions, was reworked by Luther in a strictly Christological sense. Human beings would not be able to ascend to God through their own abilities, for Christ was the only ladder that connected sinful human beings with their creator. Luther’s Christological reorientation of the metaphor of Jacob’s ladder can be found as early as in his first lecture on the Romans, and culminated in his attack against Eck’s comment on Dionysius’ Mystical Theology in the Operationes in psalmos. Hand in hand with his rejection of Dionysius the Areopagite and his fifteenth- and sixteenth-century commentators, Luther distanced himself from the Christian Kabbalah. The first part of his lecture on Rom. 5 is dedicated to dismissing the possibility of a supra-intellectual understanding of God. Luther emphasized that the knowledge of the Uncreated Word happens through the mediation of the Created Word. A long critique of those whom Luther considers “enemies of the cross of Christ” follows this passage (Phil. 3:18). This passage is particularly interesting because, as early as his first lecture on Romans, Luther found both Reuch­lin and his accusers culpable of undermining the central role of Christ. According to Luther, those who venerate the relics, but are not ready to follow Christ in tribulation, are superstitious and are in their heart “enemies of the cross”. Luther regretted, however, that theologians and popes take the Pauline expression “enemies of the cross” to refer only to the Turks and Jews, as the theologians of Cologne who accuse Reuch­lin did, and as reflected by the Apostolic Bulls and the glosses of the Jurists. According to Luther, the anti-Reuch­lin pamphlets published in those years by Arnold von Tungern and Johannes Pfefferkorn represent a complete misunderstanding of the real problems in Christendom. In the true and proper sense, those who accuse everyone of being heretical, but are not ready to suffer by emulating Christ, are themselves the real enemies of the cross. Who other than popes and jurists hate suffering, and love abundance, Luther emphatically wonders?67 67  WA 56.301.18–25, 302.1–9: Rudes et pueriles, immo hipocritȩ sunt, Qui Crucis sanctȩ reliquias externe summe venerantur Et tribulationes aduersitatesque fugiunt et abominantur. Patet, Quia Tribulationes in Scriptura proprie Vocantur crux Christi, 1. Corinth. 1.: “Vt non Euacuetur crux Christi”. || “Qui non accipit crucem suam et sequitur me”. || Et ad Gal. 5.: “Quid adhuc persecutionem patior? Ergo euacuatum est Scandalum crucis Christi”. Et | Phil. 3.: | “Quos flens dico Inimicos crucis Christi”. Sic Nostri theologi et pontifices nunc nihil aliud per “Inimicos crucis Christi” intelligunt nisi Turcas et Iudȩos, Sicut Colonienses contra Iohannem Reuch­lin Et Bulle Apostolorum et Iuristarum Glose. Sed ipsi sunt propriissime “inimici crucis Christi”. Et verum Est, Quod Solum Amici crucis sunt Inimici eius, secundum illud psalmo 37: “Amici mei et proximi mei aduersum me”. “Et Qui me laudabant, aduersum me



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Luther’s anti-scholastic and anti-ecclesiastical afflatus led him to side with Reuch­lin and against the Dominicans, without, however, overtly endorsing Reuch­lin’s positions. When Luther moves the discussion from the level of corruption and greed in the Church to the theological interpretation of the passage, Luther’s anti-Kabbalistic positions resurface. Luther insisted that there are two kinds of enemies of the Cross: the first comprise the violent, the second the intelligent. The violent seek vengeance against those who offend them, the clever flee the tribulations and want to please everyone.68 In this second category are those who, in order to escape suffering, deprive Jesus of his title as savior.69 There is no explicit mention in this passage of who these “enemies of the cross” are, but the implicit targets of these accusations appear to be the Christian Kabbalists. In the previous semester Luther had attacked the Kabbalistic reading of the Tetragrammaton for this very reason – namely, stripping Jesus of his epithet as savior. Jesus, the savior, was thus for Luther also the epistemological mediator between God and human beings. The object of human knowledge should be addressed to the Incarnate God. The redemptive event of the cross also reveals the real nature of God. In the cross, God does not reveal Himself as the wrathful God of the Old Testament, but as the merciful God who loved His creature to the point that he suffered and died in the humiliation of the cross. The Mighty God reveals himself sub contrariis, where one would not expect to find Him. Only those who find God in the cross can also know the “Hidden God”. In this dialectic between hiddenness and revelation, a proper reading of the Scripture, the only place that contains knowledge of God, becomes crucial. After his first critique of the Kabbalistic techniques as the means to find Christ in the prophecies of the Old Testament, the balance of Luther’s hermeneutics slowly changed. In the second lecture on the Psalms, Luther seemed ready to emphasize that the literal sense of the Holy Writ had to be maintained, since the Iurabant”. Nam Qui sunt, qui magis odiant tribulari et pati quam pontifices et Iuriste? Immo quis magis diuitias, Voluptates, ocia, honores et glorias querit? 68  WA 56.302.17–28: Duo genera sunt Inimicorum Crucis Christi. Primum est Violentum, alterum astutum. Violenti sunt, qui per vim crucem Christi euacuare Volunt et omnibus cornibus suis in ipsam feriunt; ii sunt, qui vindictam querunt in offendentem Et non volunt nec possunt quieti esse, donec vindicentur. Et ii in multa mala corruunt, Vt odia, detractiones, maledicta, gaudia de malo proximi et dolor de bono eiusdem. Astuti autem sunt, qui fuga crucem deserunt, Scil. qui nulli dicere et facere volunt veritatem, Sed omnibus placere, palpare, adulare, nullum offendere, Vel certe in solitudinem (saltem ea causa) secedentes. Et hos proprie Gal. 6. tangit, quando dicit: “Quicunque enim volunt placere in carne, ii cogunt vos circuncidi, tantum vt crucis Christi persecutionem non patiantur”. 69  WA 56.303.10–17: Unde Cum Dominus habeat Nomen Saluatoris, Adiutoris in tribulationibus in multis locis, Qui noluerit pati, quantum in ipso est, spoliat eum suis propriis titulis et nominibus. Sic enim Nullus erit ei homini Ihesus i. e. saluator, quia non vult esse damnatus; Nullus eius Deus creator, quia non vult esse nihil, cuius ille sit creator. Nullius est potens, Sapiens, bonus, quia non vult in Infirmitate, stultitia, penalitate sustinere eum.

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Spiritual sense had been plainly revealed in the Gospel. However, this did not prevent Luther from continuing to interpret some of the Psalms allegorically. Particularly interesting for the dialectics of hiddenness-revelation, relevant for the analysis here, as well as for Luther’s understanding of the correct reading of the Tetragrammaton, is Luther’s comment on Psalm 8.70 According to Luther’s summary, Psalm 8 is about the name of God, the people of Christ, and the destruction of Christ’s enemies. Focusing his attention on the meaning of the word torcular (“wine-presses”), Luther referred to the interpretation of Nicholas of Lyra and Augustine. On the one hand, Lyra understood the meaning of torcular (in Hebrew Gitith) in a literal sense, as a reference to musical instruments; however, Luther noted that the ancient fathers ( prisci patres) interpreted the word torcularia as a mystical reference to Christ’s passion; finally, Augustine understood the term as signifying the ministry of the Word of God in the Church.71 Departing from the literal interpretation of Lyra, Luther sided with the “mystical” understanding endorsed by Augustine, although understanding “wine-presses” as suffering is not alien to the meaning of Psalm 8, since “the word of the Cross crucifies the old man, and compels him to endure many and various sufferings”.72 According to Luther, however, the interpretation of “wine-presses” as symbolizing the Word of God was more suitable to the threefold aim of the Psalm: the exaltation of the name of the Lord (nomen domini in terra magnificatum), the obedience of His people to Christ ( populus Christo subiectus), and the destruction of His enemies (destructus inimicus).73 Moreover, in support of this hypothesis, Luther pointed out that similar terms, like grapes and ears of corn, wine, and wheat mystically refer to the people, instructed or hardened by the predication of the Word.74 70  For

the quotations in English translation from Luther’s commentary to Psalms 5 and 8 in his Operationes in Psalmos, I follow: Martin Luther, A Manual of the Book of Psalms: Or, the Subject Content of All the Psalms by Martin Luther, trans. Henry Cole (London: Seeley & Burnside, 1837). Hereafter quoted as Cole. 71  WA 5. 249.16–27: Proinde, quandoquidem literam quaerimus, prope in Lyranam eo sententiam, qui Githith arbitratur esse instrumenti musici nomen proprium. Aut concedendum est priscis patribus, qui mysteria secuti per torcularia intelligunt martyria passionesque Christi et Ecclesiae, Siquidem et nonnulli alii psalmi notantur aliquo insigni praeter usum vocabulo (ut videbimus suo loco), quo moveremur ad spiritum quaerendum. In his relicto cuilibet suo iudicio Torcularia mystice esse passiones recte dicitur, ut Isa. lxiij. “Torcular calcavi solus”, quod omnes de passione Christi intelligunt. Verum B. Augustinus satis erudite per torcular intelligit ministerium verbi dei in Ecclesia, in quam sententiam plures scripturae consonant, ut Isa. v. “Et torcular extruxit in ea”. Sicut enim boves in area terentes significant praedicatores, i. Cor. ix. Ita et calcantes in torculari eosdem significant. 72  Cole, 390; WA 5.249.37–39: Neque sic tamen alienum est a proposito, passiones intelligi per torcularia, quod verbum crucis et crucifigat veterem hominem et pro se cogat varias sustineri passiones. 73  WA 5.249.30–31. 74  Cole, 389; WA 5.249.27–29: Hinc vinacia et palea, triticum et vinum in scripturis pas-



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Commenting on Verse 1, “O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in all the earth”, Luther noted that, in Hebrew, this is a single verse and that one of the names of God mentioned here by David is the Tetragram, and another is Adonai. Unlike the Tetragrammaton, Adonai refers not only to God, but also to human beings. Luther pointed out that many names, and not just one, could be attributed to God; for that matter, everything “good” could be attributed to God. The name of God is His proclamation, whereby what underlies the hope and the belief in Him is that He is known, loved, and feared as the only one who is really wise, just, true, and all the other predicates that can be attributed to God. The glory of the name of the Lord is in opposition to the glory of the names of men: when the name of the Lord is glorified, the name of men is reduced to nothing and despised by us and all others alike.75 Luther continued distinguishing between the expressions “Lord” and “our Lord”. Lord represents the “all high Godhead dwelling in himself”, and the latter his kingdom, through which he governs and rules us by the word of faith, which has been revealed and realized in Christ’s incarnation. Albeit with another terminology, here Luther used the distinction between Deus absconditus, signified with the word “Lord” in this Psalm, and Deus revelatus, which refers to the expression “Our Lord”. For Luther, this distinction is necessary to correctly understand the relationship between the first verse and the title of Psalm 8: the name of the Lord, namely God revealed in the incarnation of Christ, is made great by the wine-press of preaching humbling all the nations to faith and grace in Christ.76 Luther summarized the meaning of the entire verse as “a certain intercourse between God and man through Christ, formed by a wonderful and all-sweet communion”.77 Luther further explained that this communion happens through the intercourse of name and praise. The name of the Lord, namely Deus revelatus, is thus the object through which human beings can create this communion with God. On the one hand, the believers praise and celebrate Christ; on the other, Christ Himself is close to those who confess and acknowledge His name before men. Luther described this process as both vertical and horizontal: Christ connects the believer and God in His Majesty, so that the believer can be glorisim significant populos, verbo dei vel eruditos vel induratos, de quibus non est nunc locus dicendi. 75  Cole, 391; WA 5.250.4–17. 76  Cole, 392–93; WA 5.251.15–18: Placet autem, duo illa vocabula “domine” et “dominus noster” in hunc modum distingui, ut priore summa divinitas representetur in seipsa manens, Posteriore vero regnum et cura eius, quo nostri dominatur c regit per verbum fidei, quod per Christi incarnationem impletur, qui est propitiatorium nostrum, “in quo habitat omnis divinitatis plenitudo corporaliter”. 77  Cf. Cole, 393; WA 5.253.10–11: Est ergo summa huius versus haec, quod inter deum et homines quoddam mutuum est, per Christum mirabili et suavissimo commercio contractum.

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ous before God, and, at the same time, for the believers, it is admirable to glorify God’s name with their fellow humans.78 Christine Helmer has pointed out that Luther’s interpretation of the expression “my Lord” as a Christological reference in his later commentary on Psalm 101:1 led Luther to interpret “My Lord” as “the object of faith that spans the infinite amplitude between divinity and humanity”.79 The same is true for Luther’s exegesis of Psalm 8:1 in his Operationes in Psalmos. “Our Lord” must be interpreted as a reference to Christ – true man and true God. Only when the object of human worship and invocation is referred to Christ the Incarnate God, can the believer also have real contact with “the Lord”, the first Person of the Trinity. Christ is the only bridge between the human and the divine. According to Luther, in order to correctly understand the relationship between man and God, it is necessary to place one’s trust in Christ. Indeed, Luther argued that it is also necessary to understand that human love does not precede God’s love. To claim the opposite would entail succumbing to the same mistake of the Pelagians in regard to free will, since that would mean ascribing to man the possibility of undertaking good works. Thus, one should be very careful not to confuse what is ascribed to the tree itself, to the grace of God, and what the fruits of this tree are, namely the good works. It is God alone that makes the tree good so that the tree produces good fruit. Thus, this passage refers to the initial grace, not to the final grace. Neither this Psalm nor any other passage in the Scripture exhorts to perseverance in good works. In this sense, according to Luther, those who magnify the Lord feel joy in their heart and their praise of the name of the Lord on earth is no less than heavenly.80

78  Cole, 395–96; WA 5.253.14–20: Atque hoc est nomen domini esse magnificum, admirabile, celebre, et magnae opinionis in terra, hoc enim per Christi adventum factum est. Rursus Christus ipse eos, qui sic se praedicant, confitentur coram hominibus et nomen eius cognoscunt, praecingit se et transiens ministrat eis, laudat, praedicat, confitetur coram patre et angelis eius in coelis et cognoscit, et congoscit nomen eorum, ipseque eorum gloria et laus est in coelis, sicut ipsi sunt gloria et laus eius in terra. 79  Cf. Helmer, “Luther’s Trinitarian Hermeneutic and the Old Testament,” 58. 80  Cole, 397–98; WA 5.254.11–22: Ideo prudenter est observanda, ne id, quod de fructu loquitur, de arbore ipsa intelligamus, quod Cahos si misceatur, sequitur error ille Pelagianorum de libero arbitrio, qui nobis tribuit initium boni operis. Deus enim solus facit arborem bonum ante nos et sine nobis, quae necessario et prior est fructibus. Verum fructus quoque necessarium est esse priores premio. Quare hic locus psalmi, et si qui similes, non ad gratiam initialem, sed ad finalem, ipsum scilicet praemium, quod redditur primae gratiae et suis fructibus, pertinet, ita ut intelligamus, his et similibus locis nos provocari ad perseverantiam in bonis fructibus promissione ista mutuae beneficentiae dei. Sic qui conversus laudat deum, hoc est vivit accepta gratia ad laudem dei in terris, Hunc rursum simul et inaeternum laudat deus in coelis.



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7.4  Theologus Gloriae vs. Theologus Crucis So far, three concepts have emerged in my investigation of Luther’s reception of Christian Kabbalah: 1) the anti-scholastic discourses of the early sixteenth century overlapped to the extent that Luther defined his own theology as a vera Cabala; 2) despite this, Luther criticized the Christian Kabbalah, pointing out that the Kabbalistic reading of the Tetragrammaton was nothing other than an unfruitful attempt to grasp the Hidden God, 3) at the same time, Luther equated Kabbalah with a magical and demonic practice. The discussion now turns to Luther’s preaching of the theology of the cross in the Operationes in Psalmos. Throughout his second commentary on the Psalms, Luther’s understanding of the spirit-letter distinction moves in an opposite direction to that of the Christian Kabbalists. In the dispute with Emser, Luther repeatedly emphasized that the spirit resided in the heart of the believer, and was not hidden in the scriptural text. Since Emser searched for the spirit in the biblical text, Luther charged him with being a Kabbalist.81 This opposing understanding of how the Spirit works lies in two similarly opposing cosmologies. It is well-known that Pico, in his Heptaplus, interpreted the seven days of creation to equate Christ, the Logos, with the Sephirah Tiphereth.82 Luther’s cross-centered theology stands at the opposite end of this description of the Logos-Christ. The cosmologies in the interpretations by Luther and Reuch­lin of Psalm 19 are thus very different. In De arte Cabalistica, quoting the Gate of Light Chapter 2, “The Sabbath is a Mystery of the Living God”, Simon points out that the Kabbalist understands the Sabbath as contemplating the divine, as “a symbol of the world above, the eternal jubilee, where all works cease”.83 Moreover, Simon notes that the Bible refers twice to the Sabbath (in Deut. 5:12, “Keep the Sabbath day”, and in Exod. 20:8, “Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy”), which he interprets “as referring to the joining of the powers of the soul to the mind, to achieve direction of contemplation towards the world above”.84 Commenting on Psalm 19, Simon interprets it as a dichotomy between the sensible and the intelligible world: “There are waters beyond the heaven which are in the intelligible world”.85 81  WA 2.670.7–9: Deinde optimo Magistro grammaticae nunc demum scio, quod “pasce oves meas” significat “este Monarcha et dominus omnium”: forte post haec et novam cabalam Emserianam sperare oportet. 82  Stengel, “Reformation, Renaissance and Hermeticism: Contexts and Interfaces of the Early Reformation Movement,” 17. 83  Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 237–39; RSW II.1, De arte cabalistica, 356: Extat nanque symbolum mundi superioris, hoc est Iobelei aethernitatis, ubi cessat omnis labor. 84  Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 239; RSW II.1, De arte cabalistica, 256: videlicet animae vires coniungendo menti ad contemplationis profectum iuxta mundum superiorem. 85  Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 241; RSW II.1, De arte cabalistica, 360: et sunt aquae, quae supra coelos sunt in mundo intelligibili.

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In the Operationes in Psalmos, Luther rejected a cosmological understanding of this Psalm. As Siegfried Raeder has noted, Luther expressed his conviction that the intention of the psalmist is to preach about the new law. In Luther’s eyes, the references to “heaven” and “firmament”, “days” and “nights”, should not be read allegorically to signify the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world, rather they have to be interpreted in the context of the propagation of the Word, which is the only connection between this world and the other. Luther based his interpretation on the authority of Paul in Rom. 10:18.86 The opposing interpretations by Luther and Reuch­lin of Psalm 19 shed light on the degree to which Luther’s hermeneutics was constructed antithetically against Christian Kabbalah. Beyond that, Luther’s preaching of a Cross-centered theology finds, in the Christian Kabbalah, the target of an alleged “theology of glory”. In Chapter Four, I have emphasized that Luther’s powerful statement in the Operationes in Psalmos, CRUX sola est nostra theologia, has to be read as his dismissal of Johannes Eck’s commentary to the Mystical Theology of Dionysius the Areopagite. As Eck had drawn extensively on Cusanus, Ficino, and Pico della Mirandola, Luther launched his attack against Eck and the fifteenth-century commentators and interpreters of the Dionysian corpus. Since Dictata super Psalterium, Luther had often commented simultaneously on Dionysius and the Christian Kabbalah, as discussed in the foregoing pages. Unsurprisingly, the same is true also for his commentary on Psalm 5 in Operationes in Psalmos. Indeed, after commenting on Psalm 5, Luther added an excursus on God’s name, the Tetragrammaton. This excursus offers Luther the opportunity to explain how a theologian of glory (the Christian Kabbalists) interprets the Scripture, and how a theologian of the cross (Luther himself ) should reject this kind of interpretation and foster a proper reading of the Scripture through the lens of Christ’s cross. In commenting on the passage “And they that love Thy Name”, Luther moved the discussion to the question of the name of God. He argued that the Jews attribute ten names to God, and that they celebrate rather superstitiously the one that they call Tetragrammaton. Through the Tetragrammaton, they promise great miracles and they disdain and blaspheme the name of Jesus. The Jews, according to Luther, entertain “the superstition” that they can attain salvation of their souls through the name of God, and – Luther remembered – this kind of superstition has rapidly entered Christianity as well. People believe in the miraculous power of the four-letter name, just like magicians pretend they can achieve great wonders through the letters.87 86 

Raeder, “The Exegetical and Hermeneutical Work of Martin Luther,” 375. 273–74; WA 5.184.5–13: Hebraei decem nomina Dei iactant teste etiam d. Hieronymo, inter que illud magna superstitione celebrant, quod Tetragrammaton vocant, cuius virtute nescio quantum tutelae et operationis sibi promittunt, cum interim per impiam incredulitatem et blasphemiam nominis Christi sine fine nomen dei sui assumant in vanum, nec ali87  Cole,



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Luther reversed the Christian Kabbalistic stance on the possibility of uncovering the mysteries of Christian faith through Kabbalistic techniques: for Luther, every practice outside the realm of faith is blasphemous; indeed, despite the fact that every word of God possesses almighty salvific power, it can only be possessed through faith. It is thus not the name of God, but the faith in the name of God which is valuable for human salvation. If – Luther pointed out – the four-letter name of God has this miraculous power, then all the practices within the Church would become completely useless. Finally, Luther argued that it is not credible that the Church of Christ, despite being inspired by the Holy Spirit, did not discover these things before.88 These passages clearly exemplify Luther’s rejection of the syncretic tendencies to assimilate Jewish mysticism and Christian faith. Luther’s main argument is that, if everyone, regardless of religious affiliation, could know the mysteries of Christian faith through a Kabbalistic reading of the ineffable name of God, then all of the practices within the Church would become meaningless. For Luther, the mystical interpretation of the Tetragrammaton should be left to the Jews, while the Christians should consider all the names of God equally holy. However, he does not deny the peculiarity of the four-letter name compared to other names that reveal the secrets contained in the New Testament. Luther emphasized that the meaning of the Tetragrammaton is still ineffable, and what needed to be revealed was already shown in the New Testament. Thus the Jews’ obstinacy in seeking to understand the true meaning of the ineffable name of God, rather than believing in Jesus’ cross, proves to be to their detriment.89 Luther asked his reader to assume, for the sake of argument, that the Jews were right and that the mysteries of Christian faith are concealed in the Tetragrammaton, namely the Holy Trinity and the name of the Father, the Son, and quid minus curant, quam ut nomine domini salutem animarum sibi parent. Dimanavit autem et in Christianos eorundem superstitio, ut passim iactent, scalpant, figant, gestent quattuor istas litteras, sive impii sive pii sint, nihil curantes, velut Magi in literis et characteribus virtutes se habere presumentes. 88  Cole, 274; WA 5.184.14–24: Nos vero, sicut decet christianos, oportet hoc scire, quod sine fidei pietate omnia sunt superstitiosa et damnabilia, adeo ut nec Christus nec deus ipse ulli sit salutaris, nisi per fidem habeatur. Quare quodlibet nomen dei, immo quodlibet verbum dei, omnipotentis est virtutis in salutem corporis et animae, si fidei reverentia possideatur. Non itaque nomen, sed fides in nomen domini facit omnia, nec unum altero efficatius est. Si enim nomen Tetragrammaton solum tantae virtutis est, stulte facit Ecclesia, quod non in ipso, sed in nomine potius Patris et Filii et Spiritussancti benedicit, baptisat et omnia sacramenta sua perficit. Mirumque sit, Ecclesiam Christi, quae spiritum dei habet, haec nondum novisse, quae omnia novit, quae dei sunt. 89  Cole, 275; WA 5.184.32–36: Veruntamen quando omnia illis contigerunt in figura, ut nec iota nec apex frustra scriptus credatur, non negarim, in nomine Tetragrammaton aliam et singularem prae caeteris figuram fuisse signatam, in novo scilicet testamento revelandam, unde et tunc ineffabile habitum est et etiannum habetur Iudaeis, quia revelatum eiusdem mysterium pertinacissime exhorrent.

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the Holy Spirit. He then began to analyze the number and significance of the four-letter name. The single letter means: beginning (Jod), this (He), and (Vaf ), this (He).90 Literally, the four-letter name means Principium istius et istius. Luther admitted that this interpretation matches perfectly with the mystery of the Trinity: The Father is the beginning of this, namely the Son, and of this, namely the Holy Spirit. However, this is in Luther’s eye only a shadow of the meaning of the Trinity: the mystery of the Trinity was not revealed in the Old Testament, and, quoting Matt. 11:27, “neither the Father, nor the Son, is known by anyone but by him to whom they are revealed”, Luther pointed out that, despite being revealed in the Gospel, the mystery of the Trinity can be properly grasped only by those who are enlightened by the Holy Spirit.91 Regarding the number Four, Luther argued that a quadrate made of two simple proportions, of which one is equal to one and two to two, signifies the unity of the paternal substance from which proceeds the Son and the Holy Spirit, represented by the two simple proportions in the quadrate.92 Regarding the letters themselves, the letter He represents a soft breath like a wind, indicating that the proceeding in the divine persons is not carnal but spiritual. Both the first syllable and the whole name terminate with the letter He: the former indicates the procession to the Son, the latter to the Spirit.93 Luther ended his analysis of the mystery of the Trinity hidden in the Tetragrammaton at this point. The whole discussion is meaningless, Luther pointed out, since these alleged mysteries have been revealed in all languages. Thus, there is no longer any particular need of the Tetragrammaton in order to understand God, no more need than there is of the Hebrew language.94 90  The meaning of the single letters composing the Tetragrammaton is discussed by Reuch­ lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 450; Reuch­lin, in turn, quotes Pico’s Conclusions. 91  Cole, 276; WA 5.185.1–12: Quod ut faciamus verisimile, ex ipsis literis, ex numero, ex significatione earum argutemur. Significatio est haec: Iod principium, he ista, vaf et, he ista componantur grammatice et latine, resultabit haec oratio: principium istius et istius. Quod cum nomine sanctae Trinitatis per omnia convenit, quod pater in divinitate sit principium istius, scilicet Filii, et istius, scilicet Spiritussancti. Nam ista pronomina ‘istius et istius’ obscurius Filium et Spiritumsanctum representant, sicut conveniebat illi testamento, in quo non erat revelandum, sed indicandum dumtaxat mysterium trinitatis. Sed nec patris nomen clare expressum est, licet nomine principii plus notificetur quam Filius et spiritussanctus, in quo simul significatum est, nulli esse, sicut Christus Matt. xi. dicit, cognitum patrem neque filium, nisi cui fuerit revelatum. 92  Cole, 276; WA 5.185.26–30: Ita in quadrato huius divini nominis significatur unitas paternae substantiae, ex qua unus procedit filius aequalis eidem simpla proportione prima, ex utroque autem spiritussanctus secunda processione, velut altera proportione simpla aequalis patri et filio, sicut proportio duorum ad duo et unius ad unum aequalis est geometrice. 93  Cole, 277; WA 5.186.3–6: Tercio ex ipsis litteris ac naturam earum syllaba prima terminat proportionem primam in literam He, quae est lenis spiritus, ut indicet, processionem illam in divinis esse non carnalem, sed spiritualem et suavissimam ac blandissimam. 94  Cole, 277; WA 5 186.15–18: Haec, inquam, et si qua sunt similia, videntur esse in Tetra-



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Having claimed that the mystical reading of the Tetragrammaton is essentially useless, Luther put a definite stroke against the Christian Kabbalists, further asserting that searching for the “Pentagrammaton” in the Tetragrammaton was blasphemous. As I have shown, the Pentagrammaton is achieved by adding the Hebrew letter shin (“s”), which represents the Holy Spirit, to obtain the name of Jesus. Reuch­lin had already explained this concept in great detail in his De verbo mirifico, in a general attempt to conciliate Christian dogmas with Kabbalah and the prisca theologia. As I have shown, Luther, in his first lecture on Psalm, first endorsed the Kabbalistic reading of the Pentagrammaton, and at a later stage expressed his reluctance to accept an interpretation that sought to transcend the hiddenness of God. In Operationes in Psalmos, however, Luther categorically rejected a Kabbalistic reading of the Tetragrammaton in the Pentagrammaton. Luther claimed: But there are some who think that the Tetragrammaton is the name of Jesus, the letter Schin being added; which, indeed, I wish were true and to be proved. But, since the Evangelist Matthew, 1:21, gives to his name the meaning of salvation, where the angel says to Joseph, “And, thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins”, and since the Tetragrammaton, as I said, is of no etymology at all, it will be difficult to defend such an opinion. Not to mention also, that in the Hebrew word which signifies salvation, there is the necessary or substantial letter (as they call it) ain, which the Tetragrammaton will not admit, and the which name Jesus, formed from it has not. But I leave others to exercise their judgement in this matter. I have thus made these observations to guard all against the superstition of the Jews.95

If a mystical interpretation is possible but essentially worthless, to look for Jesus’ name in the ineffable name is simply misleading. The salvific nature of Christ should be acquired through Jesus’ humanity, that is, through the cross. It is worth noting that, whereas in his first lecture on the Psalms Luther had explicitly mentioned Reuch­lin for his (wrong) interpretation of the Pentagrammaton, in his Operationes in Psalmos – a published book, unlike the early lectures on the Psalms – he did not explicitly name Reuch­lin as the target of his critique. In light of the juxtapositions between his trial and Reuch­lin’s trial for heresy, Luther preferred not to criticize Reuch­lin in public. However, as the analysis of grammato veteri figurata, nunc vero in omnibus linguis revelata, ut iam tetragrammato non sit opus, non magis quam tota lingua hebrea pro intelligendo deo. 95  Cf. Cole, 279; WA 5.187.7–16: Sunt qui putent, Tetragrammaton esse nomen Ihesu intersecta litera schin, quod optarim esse probatum et verum. At quando Matthaeus Euangelista c. ij. salutis etymologiam illi tribuit, dicente angelo ad Ioseph “vocabis nomen eius Ihesum, ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum”, Tetragrammaton vero (ut dixi) nullius sit etymologiae prorsus, difficile erit idipsum tueri, ut id taceam, quod in hebraeo vocabulo, quod salutem vel salvatorem significat, necessaria et substantialis, quam vocant, litera sit Ain, quam et Tetragrammaton non admittit, et nomen Ihesus exinde constitutum non habet. Verum aliorum in hac re iudicium esto. Haec pro vitanda superstitione Iudaeorum dicta sunt.

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Luther’s text in its broader intellectual context has shown, the Christian Kabbalah worked as a catalyst for the development of Luther’s theology of the cross. In the excursus on the Tetragrammaton in Luther’s commentary on Psalm 5, the theoretical basis on which the hermeneutics of the Christian Kabbalists rests is systematically rendered meaningless. While Pico and Reuch­lin emphasized that the anagogical sense of the Scripture, the sense with which a Kabbalistic interpretation should be identified, shows in which direction one should head,96 Luther pointed out that faith in Christ comes first. Only then is it possible to interpret the Old Testament in Christian terms. The literal interpretation of the Old Testament is Luther’s counterargument against the mystical interpretation endorsed by the Kabbalists. Instead of looking for the occult meaning of the Old Testament in a search for Christ, Luther emphasized that a theologian of the cross understands the Old Testament in light of the New Testament, the new Law as the fulfillment of the prophecies of the Old Law, what was not revealed, yet in light of what has been revealed. The theosophical understanding of the word of the Christian Kabbalists is dismissed by Luther as a dangerous, pernicious practice which inevitably leads to demonic magic. The theologian of the cross reads the words of the Old Testament as a sign whose signification is the salvific message of the Gospel. The Christ of the Gospel is the proper sensus spiritualis of the Scripture. Kabbalistic interpretations of the Old Testament appear, in Luther’s eyes, as a human attempt to overcome the cross of Christ. Rereading Luther’s powerful statements on the theology of the cross in his Heidelberg Disputation, the proper meaning of Theses 19–21 reemerge in their historical context. In his De arte cabalistica, Reuch­lin stated: Finally, we must emphasize this universal applicable limit: although it is the work of a Kabbalist precisely to read one thing but understand it in a different way, nevertheless he will keep to the inviolable rule that good must be understood as good and bad as bad, lest he apply black to white or day to night.97

Since every statement results from another statement, Luther reworked this sentence from Reuch­lin’s De arte cabalistica in Thesis 21 of the Heidelberg Disputation: A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian of the cross calls a thing what it actually is.98 96 Posset,

Johann Reuch­lin (1455–1522). A Theological Biography, 555. Reuch­lin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, 311; RSW II.1, De arta cabalistica, 472: Ultimo est nobis intendanda universalis haec meta, quod, tametsi cabalistae sit officium aliud legere ac aliud intelligere, tamen inviolabiliter istum quisque observet canonem: in bons bona, in malis mala, ne albo nigrum applicet aut diem nocti. 98 Cf. LW 41.40; WA 1.354.21–22: Theologus gloriae dicit malum bonum et bonum malum, Theologus crucis dicit id quod res est. 97 



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For Reuch­lin, if one maintains the regula aurea not to confuse evil and good, one would have to scrutinize the depths of Scripture in order for the hidden meaning which the Holy Spirit impressed on it to reemerge. A Kabbalist does precisely this: he reads the Holy Writ and, through an ars combinatoria, finds in it a different, but not a new meaning, he finds that this different meaning has always been there, but it had been hidden to the eyes of the multitude and only a few could see: the Spirit buried in the letter. In a specular and contrary manner, Luther labeled this way of reading the Scripture as the activity of a theologian of glory. Throughout his career, Luther never denied that the Holy Spirit impressed a hidden meaning in the text of the Scripture. However, he denied the search for such occult meaning as a healthy way to relate to the Scripture. The Scripture is for Luther an abyss whose profundities are inscrutable to the human mind. The theologian of glory can successfully decipher the hidden meaning of certain passages of the Scripture, but at a certain point his insatiable desire for knowledge will lead him to go deeper and deeper and, eventually, to confuse good and evil. Contrary to that, according to Luther, the theologian of the cross is acquainted with the literal meaning of the scriptural text. As the sensus spiritualis is the revelation of the Gospel, he does not need to look for other occult meanings. The Messiah of the Old Testament has been revealed. If one reads the entire Scripture through the eyes of the Gospel, then its meaning becomes clear and unequivocal. In the folly of the Cross, the true theologian finds Christ and, through Him, he finds God as well. In rebuking the Christian Kabbalah as a subtle attempt to overcome the cross of Christ, Luther slowly went in the direction of affirming the concept of the clarity of Scripture. In its literal sense, the meaning of the Scripture is clear. Increasingly for Luther, the Scripture becomes the norma normans of Christian life, and the suffering of Christ on the cross the lens through which the interpretation of the Holy Writ must be carried out. Solus Christus and Sola Scriptura become one and the same thing.

7.5  Theologia Crucis: Luther’s Rejection of the Christian Kabbalah An uncritical application of Kristeller’s Thesis regarding humanism has generated a widespread conviction in Luther scholarship that Luther was influenced by the philological works of Johannes Reuch­lin and Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, while he was essentially disinterested in the Kabbalistic interests of these authors. Here and there, Luther writes about Kabbalah, but the widespread conviction tells us that these quotations are little more than scattered references with no specific value for Luther’s intellectual development.

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Seeking to interrogate this perspective in this chapter, I emphasized that Luther was very familiar with Kabbalistic scholarship as early as his first lecture on the Psalms. In Dictata, indeed, Luther equated an inward, supra-intellectual understanding of the Word of God with the Kabbalah and Dionysian spirituality. At this juncture, he seemed willing to use these sources to move his critique of the logic-deductive process of Aristotelian philosophy and scholastic theology. In commenting on Psalm 118, however, Luther severely criticized both Johannes Reuch­lin and Kabbalistic scholarship in general. While Nicholas of Cusa, Pico della Mirandola, Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples, and Johannes Reuch­ lin discussed how to interpret the ineffable name of God and its magical powers in different ways, Luther dismissed the question as unfruitful speculation, and hollow attempts to search for the Hidden God. After the publication of Reuch­lin’s De arte cabalistica in 1517, Luther’s critique of the Christian Kabbalah and his preaching of a cross-centered theology became joined. In the years 1518–19, on the one hand, Luther repeatedly presented his own theology as a vera Cabala, but on the other, he launched vehement accusations against the Christian Kabbalists to the effect that they practiced a reading of the Scripture that entailed belief in magic and demoniacal practices. These critiques overlap with the simultaneous marginalization of the Christological referent in the Old Testament in favor of a Gospel-centered approach, a process which can now be read in Luther’s ambivalent reception of Kabbalistic scholarship. In the meantime, Luther’s understanding of the Spirit seems to point to another difference between him and the Christian Kabbalists: whereas the latter believe that the Spirit lies hidden in the text, Luther repeatedly maintained that the Spirit lay in the heart of the believer. Consequently, he emphasized that it is the peculiar nature of a “theologian of the cross” to be satisfied with the literal sense of Scripture, without looking for the meaning hidden beyond the letter. In an excursus at the end of his commentary to Psalm 5, Luther gave a powerful example of his understanding of the distinction between a “theologian of glory” and a “theologian of the cross”. In discussing the proper interpretation of God’s ineffable name, Luther deprived a Kabbalistic understanding of the Tetragrammaton of every meaning. While Pico and Reuch­lin emphasized that it was possible to prove that Jesus is the Messiah through the Kabbalah, Luther asserted that there was no need for messianic or Christological interpretations of the prophecies of the Old Testament. At the heart of Luther’s rejection of Christian Kabbalah lies the conviction that, if the Jews wanted to convert to Christianity, they had no other choice than to believe in the Gospel. In Luther’s eyes, the text of the Bible had to be read in light of its overall message, which is simple and clear, namely salvation through Christ alone.

Conclusions On 26 April 1518, Martin Luther chaired a dispute during the General Chapter of the Augustinians in Heidelberg. Luther’s student and fellow Augustinian, Leonard Beier, defended twenty-eight theological Theses and twelve philosophical Theses written by Luther himself. This seemingly insignificant event has become the epicenter of debates, waged over the past five centuries, over the theology of the cross. Upon his return to Wittenberg, on 18 May 1518, Luther wrote to Georg Spalatin to tell him what had transpired in Heidelberg,1 namely that the Disputation had gone well, the discussion had been fruitful, and his ideas well accepted. On the other hand, the theologians of Erfurt had rejected Luther’s theology: “My theology is like rotten food to the people from Erfurt”, Luther commented ironically.2 The Wittenberger revealed that his former professor Jodocus Trutvetter, “the doctor from Eisenach”, had written him a letter to rebuke his Theses. On 8 May, Luther tried to meet Trutvetter in person, but in vain.3 In his letter to Spalatin, however, he added that he later met with Trutvetter after all. According to Luther’s account of the events, the positions between the two men were irreconcilable: Trutvetter accused Luther of being ignorant of theology; Luther, on the other hand, showed his disdain for the subtle dialectic distinctions Trutvetter used against him. Thus, Luther commented: “They obstinately cling to their neat little distinctions, even when they confess that these are confirmed by no other authority than what they call the wisdom of natural reason, which for us is the same as the abyss of darkness. We preach no other light than Jesus Christ, the true and only light”.4 Luther had travelled from Heidelberg to Nurnberg, before joining the Erfurt delegation on its journey to Erfurt; finally, he had travelled from Erfurt to Wittenberg. During the trip from Nurnberg to Erfurt, Luther shared the carriage with another former professor from Erfurt, Bartholomaeus Arnoldi. Luther had 1  Ep. 75, WA Br 1. 173–74; 2  Cf. LW 48.61–62; WA Br

LW 60–63. 1.173.29–30: Erffordiensibus mea Theologia Est Bis Mortem

Crambe. 3  WA Br 1.173.no. 12. 4  Cf. LW 48.62; WA Br 1.173. 36–40: Suis distintiunculis pertinaciter inherent, etiam si confiteantur non esse aliqua authoritate firmitas, nisi dictamine (ut vocant) naturalis rationis, quod apud nos idem est, quod chaos tenebraaarum. Qui non praedicamus aliam lucem quam Christum Ihesum, lucem veram et solam.

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tried to bring Usingen around to his viewpoint, but he related to Spalatin that he did not think that he had been successful. As Luther commented: “I left him pensive and wondering. How terrible, to grow old in false suppositions”.5 Luther concludes the letter expressing his hope that the younger generation could be instructed in true theology, rather than in the subtleties of scholastic theology. The letter is signed, “Friar Martin Eleutherius”. Luther “the Reformer” on the one hand, “the scholastics” Trutvetter and Usingen on the other: the contrast between Reformation and scholasticism has been understood to provide the key to interpreting the Heidelberg Disputation and Luther’s theology of the cross for centuries. Theological considerations, ecumenical interests, and confessional biases have long dominated the discussion on Luther’s theologia crucis. The last fifty years and more have witnessed a growing interest in the “historical Luther”. Historical research has reconstructed different aspects of the intellectual environment in which Luther was educated, such as the differentiation in the universities between the via antiqua and the via moderna, or the nominalist distinction between potentia dei absoluta and potentia dei ordinata. We are thus now in a better position to understand to what extent Luther distanced himself from the Erfurt nominalists, and to what extent he himself remained a nominalist. In brief, previous scholarship has given us a wider and more accurate picture of Luther’s medieval background, which the simple contrast between Reformation and scholasticism could not grasp. This picture, meanwhile, is further complicated by the role played by another movement, which from the nineteenth century onwards has been labelled as “humanism”. Another letter set out the matter of discussion: after attending the Heidelberg Disputation, Martin Bucer wrote to Beatus Rhenanus that in Heidelberg Luther had loudly proclaimed the same program of Church Reform that had been endorsed by Erasmus of Rotterdam. For nineteenth- and twentiethcentury historians, this meant that two movements – humanism and the Reformation – despite their manifest differences, collaborated in the years immediately preceding Luther’s excommunication in a common program to reform the university curriculum and the spirituality of the Church. The main goal of the present study has been to challenge this academic consensus. A growing amount of secondary literature has set aside the strong distinction between Reformation and scholasticism demonstrating Luther’s indebtedness to his Erfurt teachers. In a similar vein, I began with the assumption that the characterization of the events between the years 1516–21, as the product of a struggle between two progressive movements in opposition to a medieval heritage, required a more precise historical investigation.

5  Cf. LW 48.63; Wa Br 1. 174.42–43: Cogitabundum & miranbundum reliqui, tanta res est in opinionibus malis Inveterasse.



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In Chapter One, I emphasized that vehement accusations against scholasticism of sophistry and obscurantism were launched from many quarters. On the other hand, the targets of these accusations reacted by accusing their opponents of undermining the authority of the Church, and devaluing the prestige of university professors. This led, in turn, to the polarization of the theological debate, which is well represented by the case of Martin Luther and Johannes Reuch­lin. In the very same period, both Luther and Reuch­lin were forced to tackle charges of heresy. Their trials were deeply interconnected in the public discourse. The supporters of Luther and Reuch­lin blamed the scholastics for wanting to monopolize theological discourse, charging everyone who disagreed with them with heresy; on the other hand, scholastic theologians blamed their accusers for not being sufficiently proactive in logic and dialectic and, thus, unskilled to judge on theological matters. The inquisitor who orchestrated the trial against Reuch­lin, Johannes Hoogstraten, linked the affairs of both Reuch­lin and Luther, judging them as stemming from a common threat against scholasticism. In turn, Luther repeatedly positioned himself in the pro-Reuch­lin camp, describing himself as the last in a long series of men unfairly accused of heresy by the theologians of Cologne, Louvain, and Paris. In light of the inflamed debates concerning Luther and Reuch­lin, but also because of the publication of satirical pamphlets such as the famous Epistulae Obscurorum Virorum, Luther and Erasmus were often considered in these period as proposing quite similar ideas – if not ideas that were the same. As I have demonstrated, this conviction requires clarification on two levels. The first refers to the condition of human beings after original sin. During the years 1518–21, as their respective correspondence shows, both Luther and Erasmus pointed out that a common front could not be forged through a common enemy; however, they also recognized that publicly criticizing one another could not but help their common enemies. In 1516, one year before the publication of the Ninety-Five Theses and his subsequent trial for excommunication, Luther was prepared to enter a dispute with Erasmus. He wrote an inflamed letter to Spalatin, portraying Erasmus as a Pelagian, and asking Spalatin to discuss these accusations with Erasmus. I have argued that the famous Quaestio de viribus et voluntate hominis sine gratia disputata, held at the University of Wittenberg in September 1516, should be considered the result of Luther’s engagement with, and reaction to, Erasmus’ scholarship. This dispute has become famous as the first time that Luther publicly criticized the positions of his former professors in Erfurt, namely Trutvetter and Usingen, without explicitly mentioning them. I have argued, however, that Luther assimilated his critique of Erasmus and the Erfurt nominalists: in both these trends of early sixteenth-century culture Luther perceived the impending threat of Pelagianism. In Luther’s eyes, both Erasmus and Gabriel Biel (and his Erfurt followers) were misled by the fictitious doctrine of free will, and granted too much to human powers without grace.

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Furthermore, I have argued that Luther constructed his theological anthropology in opposition to Erasmus. Highly influenced by ancient authors (especially Origen) and fifteenth-century authors (in particular, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino), Erasmus reconciled the bipartite (body and soul) and the tripartite (body, soul, and spirit) distinctions of the human being, in order to prove that it is possible to elevate oneself to the spiritual level – to be one with God. In turn, in discussing the conciliation of this bipartite and tripartite anthropology, Luther denied this possibility. For him, human beings could not achieve the spiritual level through their own powers. When they are not generated by an external entity, the God-gifted Holy Spirit, human faculties are always prone to evil. The second aspect of the relationship and mutual influences between Luther and Erasmus I clarified refers to hermeneutics. Luther has become famous for his motto Sola Scriptura. I argued that Luther used his scriptural argument in order to rebuke the early Roman controversialists. The more his accusers quoted the Church Fathers, the councils, and Church tradition, the more that Luther defended himself quoting the Scripture. At this stage, his behavior did not imply a challenge to or a critique of papal authority. In 1520, Luther used the expression Sola Scriptura for the first time in his response to Pope Leo X’s bull Exsurge Domine, which warned against the interpretation of Scripture by individual believers. Luther’s Sola Scriptura thus emerged as a concrete reaction to Leo X’s threat of excommunication. While he was clarifying and reshaping his scriptural argument, Luther studied Erasmus’ biblical scholarship. In Ratio seu methodus perveniendi ad veram theologiam, Erasmus explained what he considered to be the correct method to read the Holy Writ. Erasmus argued that since the Bible is a highly complex book, the interpreter needs to develop a range of skills to approach it. Among others, these included proficiency in the three holy languages, and a deep knowledge of grammar and rhetoric. Paul and Jesus themselves were, in Erasmus’ eyes, skilled rhetoricians. Thus, in order to correctly interpret the Bible, one has to scrutinize the nuances of individual passages, and the specific characteristics of the particular book in question. The literal sense of the text needs to be carefully examined. With regard to the Old Testament, however, it is necessary to interpret some passages allegorically, in order to preserve the general meaning of the Bible. Luther read Erasmus’ Ratio around January 1519, in the period in which he began his second lecture on the Psalms. In the Operationes in Psalmos, one can recognize Luther’s critical engagement with Erasmus’ scholarship. Just like Erasmus, Luther paid increasing attention to the grammatical meaning of single words, and applied the Psalms to the contemporary situation in order to criticize the practices of the sixteenth-century Church. Unlike Erasmus, however, Luther emphasized that the Bible is a simple and clear text, whose unitary meaning is salvation through Christ alone. During this period,



Conclusions

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Luther repeatedly criticized the use of allegory by Origen and Jerome. Through a doxological use of the Church Fathers, Luther implicitly criticized the most famous sixteenth-century follower of Origen and Jerome – Erasmus of Rotterdam. Luther’s critique of the allegory, which has always been understood in secondary literature as generic rejection of the medieval tendency to allegorize, actually turned out to be a distinctive reaction against the scholarship of Erasmus. A stark dichotomy between Luther “the Reformer” and scholastic theology has long been based on incorporating all the early Roman controversialists into the overall category of scholasticism. Notwithstanding that, it has also been recognized that some of Luther’s early opponents were influenced by sixteenthcentury cultural trends, which originated outside the university setting. Thus, the term “scholastic humanists” was adopted to describe this phenomenon. Setting aside this macro-categorization, and paying greater attention to the subtleties and nuances of the historical context, the contingency of single positions re-emerges. In the present work, I focused my attention on Luther’s encounter with two major early Roman controversialists, Johannes Eck and Hieronymus Emser. The dispute between Eck, Karlstadt, and Luther, which took place in Leipzig in 1519, has become one of the major events in the history of the Reformation. The Leipzig debate is generally considered to be a paradigmatic example of the struggle between scholasticism, represented by Eck, and the Reformers, Luther and Karlstadt. Against this common assumption, I have argued that the historical context needs to be investigated in light of several processes of cultural transfers which informed the positions of both Eck and Luther. In the late fifteenth century, a dispute arose between Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola – the former affirming the superiority of the One over the Being, the latter pointing out that the One and the Being are equivalent. Ficino and Pico, however, shared a deep interest in hermetic, platonic, and Kabbalistic texts. Ficino famously used the expression prisca theologia to refer to a pre-Christian tradition, starting with Zoroaster and culminating with Plato, which, to a certain extent, anticipated the coming of Christ. In his famous Oratio, Pico quoted Hermes Trismegistus in order to point out the magnificence of human beings. Despite often being described as a “scholastic”, Johannes Eck was highly influenced by the hermetic strands of Renaissance culture. In his 1519 commentary to pseudo-Dionysius’ Mystical Theology, Eck adopted a twofold attitude regarding the contradicting tendencies of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century literature. On the one hand, he strongly criticized the grammatici, like Valla and Erasmus, while on the other, he emphasized the need to unshackle scholastic theology and introduce it to the hermetic trends of the Renaissance. In what he calls theologia negativa more scolastico, Eck placed the theology of the prisci tempores sapientes in continuity with the philosophy of Aristotle. At the same time, Eck interpreted the cross-centered passages of Paul’s epistles in terms of

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Nicholas of Cusa’s docta ignorantia. It is precisely against this text that Luther reacted in the Operationes in Psalmos, claiming that CRUX sola est nostra theologia. For Luther, just as human reason cannot understand divine matters, the pagan philosophers, who based their judgments on reason, inevitably contradicted one another. For this reason, Luther criticized Pico della Mirandola’s attempt to reconcile the positions of Plato and Aristotle. Against Dionysius the Areopagite and his fifteenth- and sixteenth-century followers (mostly Ficino, Pico, and Eck), he noted that the whole discussion on the being and non-being is without merit. While Eck quoted Paul hand in hand with Hermes Trismegistus and Socrates, Luther argued for the uniqueness of the Christian message. Ultimately, an historical analysis of the positions of Eck and Luther around 1519 shows that we are not in front of an overarching contrast between scholasticism and Reformation, but instead of two competing understandings of the crosscentered passages of the Pauline Epistles. Hieronymus Emser was also highly influenced by the platonic, hermetic, and Kabbalistic tendencies of Renaissance culture. Just like Trutvetter and Usingen, Emser was a former professor of Luther in Erfurt. In 1504, Emser edited Giovanni Pico’s Opera omnia with Willibald Pirckheimer. Later, he also edited Erasmus’ Enchiridion Militis Christiani. The debate between Emser and Luther revolved around the correct interpretation of Scripture. Luther initially attacked Emser for his use of ecclesiastical authority, and the interpretation of the Church Fathers, hand in hand with Scripture. In 1521, Luther considered Scripture as the only legitimate weapon on the theological battleground. Second, Luther and Emser disagreed on the nature of the Holy Writ as a text, and how to read it. Emser pointed out that Scripture is obscure; the Holy Spirit has hidden the true spiritual meaning behind the literal sense. On the other hand, Luther argued that the Holy Spirit decided to reveal the spiritual message of the Bible, plainly and clearly. Thus, one should pay attention to the literal sense, and not search for the Spirit hidden in the letter. Aware of Emser’s Kabbalistic interests, Luther, who explicitly accused Emser of being a Kabbalist, launched repeated accusations against all the “hunters” of the Holy Spirit under the letter of the biblical text. My final thesis is that these “seekers of the Holy Spirit”, to whom Luther refers in his dispute with Emser, were none other than the Christian Kabbalists. Under the use of the generic term “humanism”, previous scholarship has dismissed the problem as insignificant for the correct contextualization of Luther’s theology of the cross. It has been correctly noted that Luther was highly interested in, and made full use of, the nascent philological tendencies of sixteenthcentury culture. At the same time, it has been also assumed that Luther was essentially disinterested in Kabbalah, which was often normatively characterized as a darker aspect of Renaissance culture. The final chapter represents an attempt to revise this historiographical bias.



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In 1486, Pico della Mirandola claimed in his 900 Theses that no science better proves the divinity of Christ than magic and Kabbalah. Johannes Reuch­ lin followed Pico by spreading the knowledge of the Christian Kabbalah in Germany. Reuch­lin’s De arte cabalistica was published in 1517, the very same year as Luther’s Ninety-Five Theses. While he was supportive of Reuch­lin during his dispute with Johannes Pfefferkorn, Luther launched accusations against the Kabbalah, which he understood as a demonic practice. While Pico used the term vera Cabala in order to distinguish between a “false Kabbalah”, associated with black magic, and a “true Kabbalah”, linked to white magic, Luther assumed that the Kabbalah was always linked to black magic. In Luther’s works of these years, the vera Cabala – an expression that Luther arguably derived from Pico – coincided with his doctrine of justification by faith. Moreover, in the Operationes in Psalmos, after charging Eck and emphasizing the centrality of the cross in theology, Luther made an example of “theologians of glory” and “theologians of the cross”. In a long excursus on the ineffable name of God, the Tetragrammaton, Luther contrasted Kabbalistic hermeneutics with his own Gospel-centered reading of the Bible. For Luther, the application of Kabbalistic techniques to find Jesus buried in the prophecies of the Old Testament, led inevitably to a misunderstanding of the general sense of the Bible. As with his dispute against Emser, Luther emphasized that there is no need to search for the spiritual sense of the Holy Writ, since the Holy Spirit plainly revealed it. In his De arte cabalistica, Johannes Reuch­lin argued that it is the duty of a true Kabbalist to mix letters and numbers and, thus, to read each thing with a different meaning. According to Reuch­lin, the only regula aurea the Kabbalist should follow is to not mix good with evil. In the Heidelberg Disputation, reworking this text he was reading only few months before, Luther pointed out that “a theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil. A theologian of the cross calls a thing what it actually is”. In light of these historical connections, I argued that the Christian Kabbalah is the real target against which Luther moved his accusations versus “the theologians of glory”. Luther’s stay in Heidelberg, and his return to Wittenberg, marked a direct and harsh confrontation with his former professors, Trutvetter and Arnoldi. Luther’s proclamation of the theology of the cross has been persistently described as a one-way road from scholasticism to the Reformation. In the present work, I have tried to reconstruct the paths that other authors covered with their texts: from Erasmus to Pico, and from Emser to Eck. These paths sometimes crossed one another until they reached Luther on his way to Heidelberg. In investigating the intellectual context of the early sixteenth century, I had the opportunity to question different historiographical paradigms which have long dominated Renaissance and Reformation Studies. Many problems remain open, and questions unanswered. For instance, beyond his commentary to Dionysius’ Mystical

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Theology, to what extent was Johannes Eck influenced by Hermeticism, (neo) Platonism, and Kabbalah, both in his earlier and later works? How did Luther conceptualize his understanding of demonology and magic, in relation to the magic discourse of the Renaissance? Did the apparent differences in the approaches taken by Luther and Karlstadt to the Christian Kabbalah play a role in their later disagreement? I hope that my study represents a fruitful contribution to stimulate new research on the intellectual context of the early modern period.

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Index of Names Abegg, Johann Friedrich 5–6 Abdallah the Saracen 83 Adrian, VI Pope, see Florensz, Adrian Adrian, Matthew 53 Aesticampianus, Johannes 52–53 Agricola, Rudolph 10, 40, 268 Agrippa von Nettesheim 38, 41, 319 note 30 Albertus Magnus 26, 158, 191–92 Alexander of Hales 199 Althusser, Louis 8 Alvarus, Pelagius 76 Ambrose, Bishop of Milan 128, 280 Amerbach, Bonifacius 72 Amerbach, Johannes 120 Ammonius 32 note 42, 168 Anaxagoras 25, 198–200 Andreas von Karlstadt 2, 19, 54, 60, 123, 155, 186–87, 206, 230, 241–42, 249, 252, 287, 314–15, 349, 352 Antoine of Lorraine, Duke 191 Antonini, Giles (Giles of Viterbo) 36–37, 46, 119, 235 Aquinas, Thomas 26, 76, 105, 122, 126, note 89, 133, 142, 158, 159 note 10, 182, 191–92, 196, 199, 219, 228, 232, 236–37, 268, 283, 290 Arcesilas 168 Aretino, Pietro 28 Aristotle 52, 72, 117, 123, 127–29, 156, 176–182, 187–88, 192, 195–200, 219, 277, 286–87, 297, 299, 321, 349–50 Arndt, Johannes 298 Arnoldi, Bartholomaeus 133, 345–46, 351 Athanasius 284 Augustine of Hippo 20, 52, 57–58, 61, 67, 79, 118–131, 134, 142, 146–47, 152, 155, 168, 186–87, 192, 213–14,

230–31, 235, 238, 242, 244, 250, 264, 268, 270–71, 283–86, 289–90, 303–4, 307–8, 317, 321, 323, 334 Augustus, Caesar Emperor 51 Aurogallus, Matthew 229 Balthasar, Hans Urs von 191 note 131 Balma, Hugh of 191 Barbaro, Ermolao 40, 71–72 Barnabas 289, 291 Baron, Hans 8 Barth, Karl 3, 160 Basil of Caesarea 277 Beier, Leonard 20, 345 Benno of Meissen 294 Bernhardi, Bartholomäus 120 Bernard of Clairvaux 146 note 145, 160– 61, 189, 319 Beroaldo, Filippo the Younger 193 note 136 Bessarion, Cardinal 179–181, Biel, Gabriel 13, 22–23, 26, 76, 106, 118, 120, 122, 126 note 89, 130, 133, 141, 143, 155, 347 Blount, William Lord Mountjoy 71, 77 Boccaccio, Giovanni 7 Bonaventure, Saint 76, 158, 160, 164, 189, 191, 199, 319 Böschenstein, Johannes 325 Braun, Johannes 135 note 115 Brucioli, Antonio 230 Brucker, Johann Jacob 29 note 35 Bruni, Leonardo 9 Brunner, Emil 160 Bruno, Giordano 38 Bucer, Martin 4, 10, 38, 65, 124, 309, 346 Bullinger, Heinrich 313

384

Index of Names

Burckhardt, Jacob 7–8 Burgos, Paul of 233, 317 Buonaccorsi, Biagio 177 Caesar, Julius 51 Cajetan, Thomas de’ Vio Cardinal 64, 211, 237–41, 244–45, 290 Calkreuter of Cross, Bartholomaeus 5 Calvin, John 230 Campana, Augusto 12 Capito, Wolfgang 267 Carneades 168 Catiline 121 Cellarius, Johannes 54 Champier, Simphorien 190–91 Chrysostom, John 192, 242, 277, 284 note 123 Cicero 79–80, 98, 168, 240, Claudius, Emperor 139 Clement VI, Pope 237–40 Clement of Alexandria 86 note 66 Colet, John 9, 77, 92 Conrad, Wimpina 235, 237 Damasus I, Pope 319 Della Volta, Gabriele 19, 235 De’ Medici, Cosimo 27, 180 De’ Medici, Giovanni see Leo X, Pope De’ Medici, Lorenzo 27–8, 37, 40, 166, 177 Dionysius, the Areopagite 85, 157–58, 161–74, 181–84, 187–198, 200–202, 205–206, 241, 303–304, 318–19, 321, 332, 338, 349–51, 354 Dorp, Martin 139 Durandus, Guillaume 75 Eck, Johannes 13, 19, 54–55, 59, 61, 63, 155–56, 164–66, 184–198, 201–206, 211, 231, 241–45, 251, 260, 270, 287, 294–96, 299, 313–14, 332, 338, 349–52 Eckhart, Meister 158 Emser, Hieronymus 13, 41, 55, 59, 74, 83 note 52, 93, 211, 229–30, 250–51, 293–310, 313, 319, 322, 337, 349–51 Engels, Friedrich 6 Erasmus, Desiderius 4–6, 10, 13, 37–40, 46–48, 56–65, 67–103, 106, 115, 123–

35, 138–41, 143, 145, 150–53, 155, 158, 164, 185–87, 192–93, 201, 211, 223–28, 230–33, 235, 246–47, 249–50, 262–93, 299, 302–10, 315–16, 327, 330, 332, 346–51 Eriugena, John Scotus 158 Eusebius of Caesarea 192 Fabricius, Roman censor 121, 127–28 Fabri, Johannes 265 Ferdinand II, King of Aragon 190 Ficino, Marsilio 11, 13, 18, 24 note 22, 27–30, 32 note 42, 34–41, 69, 77–82, 86–92, 102, 156, 158, 165–82, 190–91, 193–95, 205–6, 222, 332, 338, 348–50 Filelfo, Francesco 28 Flavian, Patriarch of Constantinople 243 Florensz, Adrian (Pope Adrian VI) 290 Franck, Sebastian 249, 252 Frederick III (Emperor) 40, 51 Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate (the Wise) 19, 51, 53, 56 note 125, 60–61, 127, 156, 235, 309, 325 Froben, Johann 69, 74, 139, 211, 265, 280 Galatinus, Pietro 48 Gallus, Thomas 191 Gansfort, Wessel 40, 160 Garin, Eugenio 8–9, 12 note 60, 82 note 52, 177 George of Saxony, Duke 293–94 George of Trebizond 73, 179 Gerbellius, Nikolaus 211 Gerson, Jean 107, 159 note 11, 160–61, 166, 189, 195, 242 Giustiniani, Agostino 222–23, 246 Gratius, Ortvinus 46–49, 51, 65 Gregory of Nazianzen 128, 199 Gregory of Nyssa 86 note 66 Grosseteste, Robert 158, 191 Hagen, Karl 6 Hägglund, Bengt 160 Harnack, Adolf von 160 Heidegger, Martin 8 Hilary of Poitiers 31–33, 128, 254, 268, 280, 303



Index of Names

Hilduin 158 Hispanus, Peter 52, 184 Hooker, Richard 159 note 9 Hugh of St. Cher 233 Hunzinger, Wilhelm August 106–7 Hus, Johann 244 Iamblichus 36, 166–68 Iserloh, Erwin 160 Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples 9, 41, 57, 62– 64, 73, 108, 127, 158, 190–91, 206, 222–23, 230, 233–35, 246, 251, 260, 281–88, 303, 315, 317, 324–25, 343–44 Jerome of Stridon 56–59, 79, 124–29, 132–33, 151–52, 186–87, 192, 213–14, 220–25, 228, 230, 232, 234, 242, 264, 268–69, 277, 280, 283, 289–93, 298, 303–4, 308, 310, 317, 319, 349 Jesus of Nazareth 3, 30, 33, 42, 46, 80, 94, 97, 111, 147, 163–64, 192, 201, 206, 242, 251, 261–62, 271, 273, 275, 277, 279, 282–89, 304, 312, 319–20, 322, 324, 330, 333, 338–39, 341, 344– 45, 348, 351 Johann von Dalberg 45 note 81 Johann von Hoogstraten 46, 48–51, 64– 65, 313, 327, 347 Johann von Kitzscher 51 Johann von Paltz 162 Johann von Staupitz 19, 27, 119, 161–62, 199, 231 John of Ragusa 224 John of Scythopolis 191 note 131 John Paul II, Pope 105 John the Baptist 29, 274 Julian, Emperor (The Apostate) 181 Kristeller, Paul Oskar 8–9, 12, 24 note 22, 78–79, 86–87 Kunigunde of Austria, Duchess 44 Landino, Cristoforo 27 Lang, Johann 52, 57–8, 60, 121 note 66, 123, 153 Latomus, James 53, 156–57, 270 Lazzarelli, Ludovico 190–91 Lemlein, Asher 43

385

Leone da Spoleto, Pier 167–68 Leo X, Pope 19, 27–28, 37, 48, 64–65, 74, 166, 193 note 136, 199, 212, 214– 15, 223, 235, 237, 241, 348 Limperger, Tilman 138 Linacre, Thomas 72–73, 77 Loans, Jacobus Jehiel 40 Loewenich, Walter von 4 Lombard, Peter 52, 70, 122, 187, 202, 233, 237, 323 Lotter, Melchior 295 Luke, Evangelist 157 Luther, Martin 1–6, 10–14, 17–27, 37– 42, 46–47, 49–65, 68–69, 74–75, 102– 3, 105–53, 155–66, 185–88, 192, 198– 206, 209–19, 223, 226–47, 249–65, 272–74, 276, 278, 280–82, 287–352 Manetti, Giannozzo 220–21 Manutius, Aldus 134 Marcion 286 Marsili, Marsilio de’ 7 Marschalk, Nicolaus 50 Martini, Raymond 46 note 82 Martinus I, Pope 157 Marx, Karl 6 Maximilian I, Emperor 44–45 Maximus the Confessor 157, 191 Melanchthon, Philipp 1–2, 4–5, 40, 46, 53–54, 60, 65, 72 note 15, 152, 226, 229, 295, 309, 325 Meleto, Francesco da 245 Mithridates, Flavius 40 Moeller, Bernd 10–12, 38 Moltmann, Jürgen 3 More, Thomas 77, 83 Mosellanus, Peter 287 Murner, Thomas 296 Müntzer, Thomas 249, 252 Nathin, Johannes 119 Nicholas V, Pope 221 Nicholas of Cusa 36, 75 note 22, 158, 187–89, 198, 205–6, 324–5, 338, 344, 350 Nicholas of Lyra 218–19, 233–34, 251, 290, 317, 334 Niethammer, Friedrich Immanuel 5–7

386

Index of Names

Numenius 168 Olivétan, Pierre Robert 230 Origen of Alexandria 31–33, 69, 79, 86 note 66, 93–94, 102, 124–25, 133 note 106, 151–52, 186–87, 232, 264, 275, 277–81, 291–92, 303–4, 306, 308–10, 348–49 Orpheus 187, 198 Orsini, Clarice 27 Osiander, Andreas 314 Pagnini, Sante 222–23 Paracelsus 38 Parmenides 24–25, 178, 180, 197–98, 200 Pauck, Wilhelm 9–10 Paul, Apostle 20, 33, 56, 76, 80–81, 92– 93, 95, 98–100, 115, 120, 125–31, 134–38, 140–41, 146, 149–52, 157, 159, 163–65, 167–69, 175, 187, 191– 93, 196–98, 201–2, 231, 239, 263, 271, 276, 279–80, 284–86, 288–93, 298, 303–6, 308, 327, 338, 348–50 Pellikan, Konrad 226 Peter, Apostle 76, 239, 242, 272–73, 289–92, 327 Peter of Ravenna 50–51 Peter of Spain, see Hispanus, Peter Petrarca, Francesco 7, 9, 11, 28 Phaethon 277 Philo of Alexandria 303 Philippi, Johaannes 134 Pico della Mirandola, Gianfrancesco 46, 82 note 52, 83, 176, 191 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni 12– 13, 18, 27–28, 30–41, 46, 48, 51, 55 note 120, 59, 62–64, 67–69, 71–74, 77–85, 92, 99–102, 156, 166, 176–85, 187, 190–93, 195–96, 198–201, 205–6, 222, 293, 303, 306, 310, 319–20, 325, 327, 329, 332, 337–338, 340 note 90, 342, 344, 348–51 Pirckheimer, Willibald 59, 74, 250 Plato 24–25, 29–30, 35–38, 71, 78–79, 86–89, 91–93, 95, 102, 106, 141, 143– 44, 156, 166–69, 171–72, 176–81, 187, 192, 195–200, 278, 331, 349

Plethon, Georgius Gemistos 179–81 Pliny 52 Plotinus 30, 32 note 42, 36, 167–70, 178–81, 192 Poliziano, Angelo 27, 71–72, 177 Pomponazzi, Pietro 24 note 22 Porchetus 46 note 82, 312 Porphyry 32 note 42, 52, 166, 178 Prierias, Sylvester 211, 236–37, 241–42, 244–45 Proclus 36, 157, 166–69, 178 Radini Tedeschi, Tommaso 295, 297 Raymond von Gurk, Cardinal 293 Rashi (Solomon ben Isaac of Troyes) 218–19 Regulus, Marcus Attilius 127–28 Reisch, Gregor 138 Renaudet, Augustin 222 note 38 Reuchlin, Johannes 10–11, 13, 17–18, 27–28, 37–42, 45–51, 53, 56, 58–59, 61–65, 155–56, 184–85, 191 note 130, 201, 206, 222, 225, 230, 233–35, 239, 246–47, 278–79, 293, 303, 313–16, 319–20, 324–27, 329–30, 332–33, 337–38, 340 note 90, 341–44, 347, 351 Rhenanus, Beatus 4, 265, 346 Ricasoli, Bindaccio 169 note 46 Ricci, Paolo 190 Ritschl, Albrecht 3–4 Ritter, Gerhard 10 Rubianus, Crotus 47 Ruge, Arnold 6–7 Salutati, Coluccio 7 Salviati, Benigno Giorgio 48 Saraceno, Giovanni 158, 165 Savonarola, Girolamo 176, 245 Scholarios, Gennadius 179, 180 note 91 Schulz, Hieronymus 199 Schwenckfeld, Caspar 246 Scotus, Duns 26, 75–76, 267 Seneca 80, 138–39 Sforno, Obadiah ben Jacob 40 Smalley, Beryl 217 Socrates 80, 87, 89–90, 101, 134–35, 178, 197–98, 350



Index of Names

Spalatin, Georg 49, 51–53, 56, 58, 60, 126–31, 153, 186, 265, 325–26, 345–47 Spener, Philipp Jacob 298 Spenser, Edmund 159 note 9 Spitz, Lewis 10–11, 68 Stapulensis, Faber, see Jacques Leféve d’Étaples Stunica, Jacobus Lopis (Diego López de Zúñiga) 228 Tacitus, Cornelius Publius 192–93 Tantalus 277 Tartaretus 52 Tauler, John 107, 158, 160–62, 166, 203– 4, 219 Tetzel, Johann 235, 237 Theophylactus 284 Tyndale, William 78 note 28, 230 Tongern, Arnold von 46, 49, 313 Traversari, Ambrogio 158, 165 Trismegistus, Hermes 36, 83, 180, 187, 190–92, 196–98, 349–50 Troeltsch, Ernst 8, 160 Trutvetter, Jodocus 132–33, 135 note 115, 141, 145, 345–47, 350–51 Turmeda, Anselm 83 note 55

387

Ulrich von Hutten 46–47, 59, 61, 65, 309 Uriel von Gemmingen, Archbishop of Mainz 44–45 Valla, Lorenzo 12, 62–64, 67, 158, 164, 192–93, 220–21, 246, 349 Vesalius, Johannes 62–63 Victor von Carben 45 Visconti, Gian Galeazzo 8 Vogelsang, Erich 160–61 Voigt, Georg 7–8 Wachler, Ludwig 6 Wimpfeling, Jacob 83 note 52, 293 Wyclif, John 27, 67 Ximenez de Cisneros, Francisco 227–28 Zack, John 294 Zasius, Ulrich 185 Zimmermann, Wilhelm 6 Zoroaster 180, 349 Zúñiga, Diego López see Stunica, J­ acobus Lopis Zwingli, Huldrych 12, 38, 313–14, 325

Index of Subjects Allegory 92–95, 112–13, 117, 135, 210 note 4, 249–282, 293–309, 334–38, 348–49 Antichrist 1, 164 note 32, 244–46, 301–2 Anticlericalism 73, 96–102, 255–57, 271–74, 297–98 Aristotelianism – concordance with Platonism and Hermeticism 176–82, 187, 195–98, 349– 50 – Luther’s critique of 23–26, 39, 117, 123, 127–30, 200–6, 242, 321 – Erasmus’ critique of 70–77, 276–78 Augustinianism 118–22, 231 Conscience 132–41, 143–44, 149, 202–5, 213, 263–64, 304, 328 Christology 18–37, 153–65, 225–26, 285–87 Church Fathers – in the Early Roman controversialists 185–87, 299 – in Erasmus 92–96, 277–78, 283–84, 289–90 – and Luther’s Sola Scriptura argument 213–14, 242–44, 298–300 Conciliarism – in the Early Roman Controversialists 236–37, 241–43 – in Luther 237–41, 243–44 Concupiscence 89, 140 Cross, Theology of the 2–4, 18–26, 196– 206, 337–44, 349–54 Deification (deificatio) 35–36 Facientibus quod in se est – in Gabriel Biel 22 – Luther’s critique of 20–23, 118–23

Heidelberg Disputation – Martin Bucer’s interpretation of 3, 38, 346 – 19th and 20th century interpretation of 2–4, 10 Humanism – 19th century construction of 6–8 – Garin’s and Kristeller’s interpretation of 9 – and Reformation 9–14 Jacob’s Ladder – in Erasmus 86 – in Luther 117, 200–1, 332 – in Pico 85 – in Reuchlin 201 Justification, doctrine of 11, 21–23, 35– 36, 80 111–31, 145–46, 249, 322, 327– 28, 351 Kabbalah – and magic 34–35, 222, 326–28 – Kabbalistic interpretation of Scripture 31–32, 222–23, 337 – Eck’s critique of 190–91 – Erasmus’ critique of 267, 278–81 – Luther’s critique of 311–44 Law and gospel 23, 123–29, 231, 252, 264, 302–5, 310, 316–17, 322–23 Leipzig Debate 19, 54 note 117, 155– 56, 164–65, 186–88, 198, 206, 241– 44, 251, 260–61, 287, 294–95, 299, 349 Mysticism – and scholasticism in Eck 188–90 – in Ficino 172–75 – in Pico 182–83

390

Index of Subjects

– Luther’s use of 108, 162–63, 203–4, 318–19 – Luther’s critique of 163–66, 204–6 Nominalism 21, 26–27, 105, 142–43 Original sin – Erasmus’ understanding of 82–86, 90– 91, 95–97, 226–27, 249 – Luther’s understanding of 21–22, 118–41, 249, 331 Pelagianism 22–23, 113–14, 129–130, 226–27, 347 Platonism – and Hermeticism 34, 223 – in Pico–Ficino controversy 177–81 – in the young Luther 106–7 Prisca Theologia – Eck’s interpretation of 191–92 – in Ficino and Pico 26–37, 166–69 Reason – reason and will in Ficino 86–88 – in Erasmus’ Enchiridion 88–94, 101–2 – in Luther 108–9, 112 Scholasticism – in Eck 188–90, 195–96 – in Pico 182 – Erasmus’ critique of. 70–76, 265, 270– 71, 277–78 – Luther’s critique of 47–63, 113, 120– 23, 198–200, 236–42, 265, 319–21, 326–27, 345–46

Scripture – German translations of 228–29 – Kabbalistic interpretation of 30–32, 201, 321–25, 342–43 – Letter–Spirit distinction 250–62, 274– 81, 293–311 – polyglot translations of 223–28 – tropological interpretation 107, 111– 12, 117, 146–50, 210, 263–64, 281, 304, 310, 317 – vernacular translations of 230 Sola Scriptura – Luther’s development of 212–16, 235–47 – Early Roman controversialists critique of 251–52 Spirit and flesh – in Ficino 91 – in Pico 82–84 – in Erasmus 81–82, 89–95, 140–41 – in Luther 140–41, 144–53 – in Ockham 142 Synderesis – in Eck 189, 195 – in Jerome 132 – scholastic discussions on 132–33 – in Luther 112, 133–44 Will, freedom of – in Eck 186–87 – Luther’s denial of 21–22, 120–22, 336, 347