Russia's Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The History, Context, and its effect on Ukraine 3031345215, 9783031345210

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Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction The History, Context, and its effect on Ukraine Sultan Barakat

Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Sultan Barakat

Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction The History, Context, and its effect on Ukraine

Sultan Barakat College of Public Policy Hamad Bin Khalifa University Doha, Qatar

ISBN 978-3-031-34521-0    ISBN 978-3-031-34522-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34522-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

To Tamim, Seri and Noumay may your generation be more peaceful.

Preface

This book aims to increase our understanding of Russia’s approach to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery, providing Soviet approaches for context and examining Moscow’s policies and selected case studies during the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union up until the present. The idea for the book came after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which was followed far too quickly by public promises of post-war reconstruction. The promises were made in a rather familiar pattern wherein invading powers attempt to justify their political and military actions by lending them a humanitarian face and provoking a rebuilding sentiment as early as possible in the process. We witnessed a similar scenario unfold in the aftermath of the US’ invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and later of Iraq in 2003. However, unlike the US, Russia’s approach to recovery and reconstruction has hardly been studied or documented, leaving a critical gap in how Moscow can be understood and held accountable for its commitments and assurances to those affected. While much of the available literature on reconstruction has been developed by Western academia exploring the complex challenges from a Western liberal perspective, few, if any, studies have been dedicated to the deep analysis of Russia’s approach in war-­ ridden countries, despite its involvement in a number of contexts since the early1990s. The few case studies that exist are mostly focused on historical descriptions and are written by Russian scholars in the Russian language. Given the widely acknowledged restrictions on the freedom of expression across Russia, it is safe to assume that some of those studies should be approached vii

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carefully in order to filter out narratives that may have been directly dictated by Moscow. To help with this task, I have relied on the invaluable assistance of Ms Darya Bobarykina from the Higher School of Economics in St Petersburg. Aside from helping to identify appropriate sources, Ms Bobarykina offered this book professional translation and helped me navigate the different perceptions between Russia and Ukraine when it comes to the language and terminology employed, which I hope has helped to keep this contribution as impartial as possible. This is why the reader may find that throughout the book I have referred to some cities with two different pronunciations interchangeably, reflecting the way they are defined by the relevant side (e.g., Kyiv—Kiev; Zaporizhzhia—Zaporozhie). As 2023 draws to a close, the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues to dominate news headlines and to fill TV screens with images of direct confrontation between two sovereign states. Many conflict analysts had predicted that such images were a thing of the past, as the period following the Cold War had been marked by a significant decrease in the number of interstate wars, while intrastate conflict increased in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Fascinated by this fundamental shift and the opportunities it offered for academic research, scholars have mostly ignored the fact that the vast majority of such internal conflicts had been internationalised in one way or another, with an external state or a group of states intervening in the conflict. Russia in particular has maintained this pattern ever since it inherited the international position of the USSR. This was clearly demonstrated through its intervention in Abkhazia in 1992, its support to the Ossetians against Georgia in 2008, and most recently its support to Syria’s Assad regime in 2015. In the latter case, the Kremlin justifies its intervention by claiming that it has received an invitation with valid consent from the Syrian government to conduct military operations on behalf of the Syrian people and in support of the “war against terrorism.” Meanwhile, when it comes to interventions in neighbouring countries, Russia’s justification relies on “exploiting the ambiguous nature of self-determination” as outlined under international law and on the “self-defence” stipulation in the UN Charter, as this is one of the exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force. Moscow’s claim has always been that ethnic national Russians, who were previously part of the USSR and have become estranged from Russia after its collapse, are being subjected to targeted persecution by ultra-nationalists in those countries (Borgen, 2015).

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However, when it comes to the actual invasion of Ukraine, I have, in fact, named it for what it is, and how it has been recognised by the United Nations and the vast majority of the international community, referring to the conflict as the “war in Ukraine” and not “a special military operation,” as it is defined by Moscow. This reflects my own view, as the author, and is built on my conviction that regardless of the provocations by Ukraine and the West over the past decade or so, which will be outlined later in the book, the ultimate result has been the invasion of a sovereign state and a bloody war that has resulted in the killing of thousands of innocent people and the displacement of many more. Both the invasion and the following annexation of territories will have consequences for future reconstruction, as it is deemed a violation of international law. To comprehend Russia’s contemporary approach to post-conflict reconstruction, it is essential to take a broader historical perspective of the experiences and trajectory of Moscow’s reconstruction strategies in the aftermath of World War II under the USSR. This is crucial in light of the fact that, despite the important political reconstruction and economic reforms that Russia underwent, starting with Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1980s perestroika programme, Russia’s direct military intervention style (and as such approach to reconstruction) has, in fact, changed very little from that of the USSR.  If anything, Moscow has become even bolder in its approaches, supported by the recognition of Russia as a successor state to the Soviet Union and its resulting seat at the UN Security Council and motivated by the protection of fellow Russians that have ended up as vulnerable minorities in former Soviet republics. Therefore, in the introductory Chap. 1, I explore the theoretical and contextual background of contemporary Russia’s interventions in post-­ conflict reconstruction and recovery, including its urge to establish itself as a superpower, capable of forging alliances with the aim of challenging American domination in a unipolar world. Chapter 2 of this book takes a deeper dive into the USSR’s efforts to reconstruct its own nation in the aftermath of World War II, while simultaneously providing humanitarian and economic assistance to other countries. I conclude with a number of assumptions, which I believe have continued to shape Russia’s approach to reconstruction until today. In many ways, the central purpose behind the Soviet Molotov Plan for reconstruction, which started in the late 1940s as a means to counter American influence established through the Marshall Plan, has, somehow, been sustained in Russia’s contemporary approach to aiding conflict-affected countries, especially after the revival of Russian

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pride that accompanied the rise of President Vladimir Putin in 2000. This aim is often to oppose the spread of Western liberalism, rather than delivering sustainable reconstruction and peacebuilding. Chapter 3 examines this assumption in greater detail by exploring the nature and scope of Russian donorship as a re-emerging donor. It highlights the ways in which the Russian approach employs forms of coercive diplomacy, while simultaneously developing its soft power by focusing its aid on education, healthcare, and food security and promoting the Russian language and culture. Unlike Western nations, Russia does not necessarily always seek total reform, but often prioritises achieving minimum security and stability under the banner of non-interference in internal affairs. Chapter 4 examines Russia’s intervention and approach to reconstruction in the Caucasus region through the cases of Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia; these cases highlight how Moscow deals with break-away states and what socalled ‘liberated’ territories can expect to receive for their loyalty to Russia if they remain independent (as have Abkhazia and South Ossetia) or if they are part of the Russian Federation (as is Chechnya). Chapter 5 examines Russia’s role and approach to reconstruction in the international case of Syria, where Moscow has been actively involved since 2015. It explores Russia’s interest in Syria, its active military role in the conflict, and finally sheds light on its contributions to mediation and reconstruction efforts. Chapter 6 introduces the context of the Ukraine crisis and explores Russia’s approach to reconstruction and development in Crimea since its annexation in 2014 as well as examining its statements and some indications regarding the newly annexed republics of eastern Ukraine. Finally, Chap. 7, which serves as the book's epilogue, summarises and synthesises the principles that underpin Russia’s approach to reconstruction and forecast how these principles will likely be put into practice in the Ukrainian regions under Russian control. The book concludes with recommendations for Ukraine concerning its future and reconstruction options, both for territories still controlled by Kyiv and for those currently controlled by Moscow. The reader will notice that I have not included Russia’s involvement in Afghanistan in this book, even though Russia has had a consistent interest in the country since the 1970s. This was for a number of reasons. First, the word limit for the book did not allow for the inclusion of an additional

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chapter which would have necessitated an extensive analysis of the conflict’s history, which spanned several decades. Second, it is difficult to draw conclusions about Russia’s close and direct involvement in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989. The collapse of the USSR within two years of the end of the Soviet-Afghan war meant that Russia became much more focused on internal affairs and its immediate neighbouring countries and did not have the resources to be involved in what has increasingly become a complicated, protracted war in Afghanistan following the US invasion in 2001. Instead, it left the US to lead in Afghanistan and essentially washed its hands of any involvement with the arrival of President Ashraf Ghani in 2014, who chose to reorient the country’s policies entirely towards the US.  At that point, Moscow could no longer compete with the American presence in the region and began focusing its effort and resources on other areas, such as the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in the same year and the operation in Syria in 2015. Although I have decades of experience in post-war reconstruction, I do not claim to be an authority on Russia. In fact, I approached writing this book as an exploratory research project, one that opened my eyes—and, hopefully, will do the same for the reader—to the special nature of Russia’s interventions and approaches to post-war reconstruction. As such, I hope it can be counted as a modest contribution towards a better understanding of an increasingly misinterpreted yet critically important global actor. This book could not have been completed in the relatively short period of time that it was if it were not for the help of a number of amazing colleagues and friends. First and foremost, I would like to acknowledge the critical contribution of Ms Darya Bobarykina from the Higher School of Economics in St Petersburg. Without her generous support, I could not have accessed much of the Russian material. It is important to acknowledge that the views expressed in this book do not necessarily represent her views and that we have often agreed to disagree, with mutual respect. The book has benefitted from the insights and comments of a number of anonymous peer reviewers as well as my former student and colleague Jad Salha. The support and assistance of Laney Stone in editing the book under the most demanding timetable is most deeply appreciated. Last, but not least, I would like to acknowledge the patience and excellent support

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provided to me by my Palgrave Macmillan editors Anne-Kathrin, Birchley-­ Brun, Rubina Infanta Rani, and Estelle Rigaud. Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar

Sultan Barakat

Referrence Borgen, C. J. (2015). Law, rhetoric, strategy: Russia and self-determination before and after Crimea. International Law Studies, 91, 216.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 1.1 Perspectives on Post-War Reconstruction  4 1.1.1 A Vision for Reconstruction  9 1.2 Contemporary Literature on Russia’s Approach to Reconstruction 11 1.3 Intervention Drivers in Russian Policy 14 1.4 Reconstruction Drivers 18 1.5 Securitisation and Stabilisation 19 1.6 A Roadmap Through the Book 21 References 23 2 Moscow’s  Response to Post-War Recovery in the Aftermath of WWII 29 2.1 The Post-WWII Domestic Reconstruction Context 29 2.2 The USSR Approach to the Reconstruction of Eastern Europe 34 2.3 The Marshall Plan 36 2.4 Moscow’s Response to the Marshall Plan: The Establishment of the CMEA 39 2.5 After Stalin Until the Collapse of the USSR 43 2.6 Education 46 2.7 Military Aid 50 2.8 Conclusion 54 References 56

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3 Russia’s  Unique Approach as a (Re)Emerging Donor 61 3.1 Russia as a Non-traditional Donor 63 3.2 The Evolution of Russian Aid 65 3.3 Russia’s Unique Path to Intervention 71 3.3.1 Selective Respect for Sovereignty in Intervention Decisions 72 3.3.2 Distancing Its Policy From Western Humanitarian Liberalism 73 3.3.3 Donorship Without Interference in Domestic Affairs 74 3.3.4 Security and Stability First 74 3.4 Coercive Diplomacy 75 3.5 Humanitarian and Developmental Aid as a Political Tool 76 3.6 Conclusion 78 References 79 4 Intervention  and Reconstruction in the Caucasus: The Cases of Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia 83 4.1 Regional Context 83 4.2 The Roots of Chechen Separatist Movements 84 4.3 The Build-Up to Conflict in the Twentieth Century 85 4.3.1 Leading up to the First Chechen War 85 4.3.2 Russian Participation in the Georgian Civil War of 1991–1993  87 4.4 The Wars 90 4.4.1 The Outbreak of the First Chechen War 90 4.4.2 The Second Chechen War 92 4.4.3 The Russo-Georgian War of 2008  93 4.5 Moscow’s Domestic Response to the Impact of the Chechen Wars 95 4.5.1 Economic Aid 95 4.5.2 Educational and Cultural Recovery100 4.5.3 Results102 4.6 Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Abkhazia and South Ossetia105 4.6.1 Abkhazia105 4.6.2 South Ossetia107 4.7 Conclusion110 References113

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5 Intervention  and Reconstruction in Syria121 5.1 Introduction121 5.1.1 Background of the Syrian Civil War122 5.2 Russian Interests and Motivations in Syria123 5.3 Russia’s Military Intervention126 5.4 Moscow as a Conflict Mediator130 5.5 Reconstruction Efforts and Limitations132 5.6 Conclusion137 References138 6 Ukraine:  The Context, the Case of Crimea, and Moscow’s Commitments to Annexed Territories145 6.1 Introduction145 6.2 Root Causes of Russian Encroachment on Ukrainian Territory148 6.2.1 The Maidan Revolution150 6.3 The Situation in the Donbas153 6.3.1 Peace Agreements: Minsk Protocol and Minsk II153 6.3.2 After the Minsk Agreements155 6.4 Nationalist Concepts Used to Justify War156 6.5 Investments and Development in Crimea158 6.6 Emerging Commitments and Strategies Towards Reconstruction in 2022163 6.7 Conclusion168 References170 7 Conclusion177 7.1 The Pillars of Russia’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy178 7.1.1 Moscow’s Own Path: Non-interference and Sovereignty178 7.1.2 Coercive Diplomacy180 7.1.3 Stabilisation182 7.1.4 A Loyal, Strong State183 7.1.5 Humanitarian and Development Aid as Tools184 7.1.6 Economic Integration and Dependency185 7.1.7 Education187

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7.2 Forecast188 7.3 Recommendations191 7.3.1 Considerations for Kyiv and the West191 7.3.2 Considerations for the Russian Annexed Regions in the Donbas and Eastern Ukraine194 References196 Index199

List of Maps

Map 1.1 The disputed Eastern provinces of Ukraine, which Russia has officially annexed. The orange provinces are claimed by Russia, though still contested, and the red province has been fully controlled by Russia since 2014 Map 4.1 The Northern Caucasus region Map 5.1 Foreign presence in Syria as of March 2021

2 86 124

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List of Tables

Table 3.1

Table 3.2 Table 4.1 Table 6.1

Volumes and structure of ODA provided by the Russian Federation on a multilateral basis (according to the OECD database, 2010–2019, actual assistance provided, million dollars, at current prices) Distribution of Russian official development assistance by country (USD million) Statistics of the Chechen Republic Breakdown of the Ukrainian and Russian population in the four contested eastern provinces of Ukraine

67 70 103 149

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

On 7 February 2022, European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell described Russia’s massing of troops on Ukraine’s border as “the most dangerous moment” in European history since the Cold War during a joint news conference with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington, DC. A few weeks later, on 24 February, Russian troops rolled across the border in what was described by Russian President Vladimir Putin as a ‘special operation’ to protect Russian nationals, but which Ukraine and its Western allies considered to be a full-scale invasion aimed at occupying all Ukrainian territory.1 The consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine—supported and supplied by its Western allies—have been devastating. At the time of writing, there have been some 27,500 civilian casualties (9700 killed and 17,800 injured) recorded by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and almost a quarter of Ukraine’s population of 37 million have been displaced either within the country or outside its borders. Alongside the immediate human costs, much of Ukraine’s economy, infrastructure, civil facilities, and housing has been destroyed, particularly in the Eastern region which has experienced the most intense fighting.

1  According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine’ 2001 Census (the last official census undertaken in Ukraine) Russians made up 17.3% of the overall population. (http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Barakat, Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34522-7_1

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As I write this book, the outcome of the war remains unclear, although on 30 September 2022 Russia announced the formal annexation of the four eastern regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, partially occupied by Russian forces (Map 1.1). Declaring it as the “free will of millions of people,” President Putin called the residents of those regions “our citizens forever.” The annexation was of course rejected by Kyiv and its Western allies. On the same day, an attempt to pass a UN Security Council resolution condemning the referenda used to justify the

Map 1.1  The disputed Eastern provinces of Ukraine, which Russia has officially annexed. The orange provinces are claimed by Russia, though still contested, and the red province has been fully controlled by Russia since 2014

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annexation as illegal was vetoed by Russia with four countries abstaining, including India and China. Meanwhile, the war already had a global political and economic impact, in particular on food and energy markets, and it threatens to escalate even further. The growing food crises in various parts of the world—caused by extreme heat, floods, and droughts and aggravated by the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic—were exacerbated when news of the invasion broke, as year-on-year food prices jumped by 20%, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Prices rose by a further 40% in March, and as the war continued, the termination or reduction in the supply of the most important agricultural commodities from Ukraine and Russia—wheat, maize, sunflower oil and seeds, and barley2—had grave repercussions for the global food market. Energy prices have experienced significant volatility and skyrocketing prices as Ukraine’s allies have sought to decrease purchases and reliance on Russian oil and gas in an effort to diminish Moscow’s war chest, while Russia seeks to use its fossil fuel exports as a political lever. Within weeks of the start of war, amid ongoing destruction, both Ukraine and Russia began waving the flag of post-war reconstruction, with the governments respectively aiming to give hope for an end to the war and to assert the legitimacy of the military actions in the eyes of Russian citizens and the world at large. Ukrainian officials estimated the cost of recovery at US $500 billion to US $750 billion, under the assumption that by the end of the war Ukraine will maintain its sovereignty over the totality of its territories and will use reconstruction as the foundation to modernise its economy and ease its integration into the EU, having fast secured unprecedented financial pledges from the EU, the US, and G7 countries, as well as international financial institutions. Meanwhile, while it has not publicly provided an estimated cost, Russia has used the rhetoric of reconstruction to attempt to assure the local population of its long-­ term commitment and solidarity with the devastated Eastern regions, with Putin repeatedly referring to a commitment by the “whole nation” to rebuilding the devastated infrastructure and economy across the Eastern 2  The two countries had previously been exporting 55.3 million tons (mt) out of a world total of 198 mt of wheat (Russia, 37.3 mt; Ukraine, 18.05 mt); 30.25 out of 192 mt of maize (Russia, 2.3 mt; Ukraine, 27.95 mt); 11.7 out of 22.5 mt of sunflower oil and seed (Russia, 4.6 mt; Ukraine 7.1 mt); and 10 out of 38 mt of barley (Russia, 5 mt; Ukraine 5 mt) (FAO, 2022).

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regions. It is this early emphasis on reconstruction—and the potential global implications of the prevailing reconstruction policy—that inspired me to write this book. Ukraine’s approach to reconstruction will ultimately be relatively predictable, decided in close consultation with its Western allies and likely following a liberal economic model that utilises reconstruction as a means for democratic renewal. What is less certain and requires exploration, however, is how Russia would approach the reconstruction challenge. Throughout this book, I hope to untangle the Russian approach and offer possible courses of action based on case studies and research of Russia’s cumulative experiences from interventions elsewhere, particularly after the end of the Cold War.

1.1   Perspectives on Post-War Reconstruction The definition of post-conflict reconstruction is a contested issue. To start with, there are difficulties in establishing consensus on what constitutes a ‘post-war situation’ and therefore identifying when and where the concept should apply—whether after the signing of a peace agreement, following a specific political process such as elections, after a negotiated or military transfer of power, or when there is a widespread perception in the international community that there is an opportunity for sustained peace. There are two leading schools of thought regarding the conceptual issue of the timing of reconstruction interventions and activities. The first proposes that peace must be a precondition for reconstruction and development. Collier et al. (2008) have shown that it takes five to ten years to achieve the post-conflict transition, with many societies at risk of relapse into violence during this period. Certainly, reconstruction is a long-term endeavour. The second posits that in fact the seeds of long-term recovery are sown through the initiation of reconstruction and development activities when undertaken at an appropriate time during the conflict. I fall in the latter camp, believing that post-war recovery begins in the hearts and minds of those who suffer the horrors of war and seek a transformation in their societies such that there is no return to mass violence. Initiating reconstruction must therefore not wait for the signing of a peace agreement, the holding of elections, the creation of a transitional authority, or the approval of the donor community. Furthermore, a bewildering variety of interventions are undertaken in the name of post-conflict reconstruction, be it initiatives on public

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administration reform, health, women’s empowerment, governance, infrastructure rehabilitation, refugee resettlement, security sector reform, or disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. The terminology around various other interventions has grown to include stabilisation, conflict prevention, post-conflict development, peacebuilding, and state-­ building. It should always be borne in mind that conflict- and crisis-­ affected individuals and communities tend to view the terminologies and categories of international intervention as irrelevant. Yet the field has not always been this crowded. In the late 1980s, when I began to work on the subject, post-war reconstruction worldwide was always discussed in the context of the post-World War II (WWII) Marshall Plan for rebuilding Western Europe. I had the opportunity to meet some of the British and European planners who led reconstruction and were still called upon to offer lessons to other conflict-affected countries. At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was still very little interest in the subject of post-conflict reconstruction within political science and international relations, and what modicum of enthusiasm existed related mainly to the Cold War proxy conflicts in Latin America and some parts of Africa. This situation rapidly changed with the wave of conflicts that emerged in the post-Cold War period. The spread of conflict into Europe with the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s brought the study of civil wars and post-conflict recovery to the surface in the disciplines of political science and international relations. The Dayton Agreement in 1994, which brought an end to the Bosnian War and implemented an internationally-­led transition, caused even further interest in the subject. Before then, conflict and the reconstruction process were seen as political issues which were inappropriate and somewhat off limits to speculate on or investigate too deeply, reflecting the moral value attached to state sovereignty at the time. By the mid-1990s, the leading relief-to-development continuum model had three stages: relief, reconstruction, and development. Despite widespread agreement upon the definitions in the literature, the boundaries between relief, recovery, and development remain in constant flux. A single post-conflict context will likely include several geographical areas and populations at varying stages of crisis and growth. In Syria in 2019, for instance, while some urban areas were undergoing reconstruction, the city of Idlib was experiencing a deadly, high-impact conflict and one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

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The past few decades have witnessed significant growth in theoretical and empirical work on conflict response, whether in humanitarian action, post-war reconstruction, peacebuilding, state-building, stabilisation, conflict resolution, or countless other areas. Yet, an empirically rooted theory of post-conflict recovery has yet to materialise. As Hasic (2004) rightly notes, “the body of knowledge related to post-conflict reconstruction lacks a strong and cohesive theory.” The best attempts at theorisation include Collier et al.’s (2008) empirical analysis of the factors which lower the likelihood of reversion or Addison and Murshed’s (2001) ideological claims that recovery requires the re-establishment of a shattered social contract through just governance and equitable economic growth. Similar but more idealistic notions of human security as a counterweight to national security have risen in popularity, although, as Paris (2002) has noted, the success or failure of interventions in developing and conflict-affected societies reflect the ideals of the intervention more than the forces, processes, and institutional arrangements. Much work in the so-called critical school of peacebuilding has relied upon a distinction between problem-solving and critical approaches. The general aim of problem-solving theory is to make the prevailing social and power relationships work smoothly by dealing with challenges within the given institutional framework. At the same time, a critical approach would not take institutions and social and governance relations for granted but rather calls them into question (Cox, 1981). Such distinctions have formed the basis of an apparent schism between two scholarly camps over the past two decades. On the one side are those that do research on and engage with the predominant policy instruments primarily from an outsider interventionist perspective. On the other side are proponents of the so-called liberal peacebuilding critique, who hold that the enterprise of peacebuilding is a Northern-led endeavour offering the universal solution of neo-liberal economics and electoral democracy to diverse conflict-affected societies regardless of the local context. These differing viewpoints have led to dismissive attitudes on both sides—with charges that the so-called traditional schools are simply servants of the predominant liberal peace framework and, on the other side, that the critical schools engage in an echo chamber that lacks policy relevance and is without empirical engagement with the affected local communities it claims to value. This depiction of antagonism belies a more complex reality. There are, and always have been, a diverse range of approaches to post-conflict recovery. The portrayal of the schism between

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traditional and critical camps reflects an IR-centric bias when the world of those studying conflict response is in fact much larger and more diverse. As the widespread damage brought by conflict affects all levels and sectors of society, so too is the study of conflict response open to countless disciplines. Unlike the incremental, long-term challenges of poverty or under-­ development, war comes with a bang—it disrupts, eliminates, and deforms. In the process, it raises interest from various academic directions. In some disciplines that tend to be overlooked in mainstream political science and international relations, the study of conflict response has become a significant aspect of the field—for example, the protection of identity and cultural heritage in conflict response has gained significant attention in anthropology and archaeology. What is notable, however, is that most, if not all, theoretical discourses related to post-conflict recovery have been dominated by Western academic approaches, even though Russia and the East, in general, have gone through large-scale processes of reconstruction and healing in the aftermath of a multitude of conflicts. This intriguing imbalance has captured my interest, and I offer this book with the hope that it can provide a better understanding of how reconstruction as a process is conceptualised by Russian policymakers, what it entails in terms of Russian national priorities, and, most importantly, if there are ways in which the Russian and the Western approaches to reconstruction can dovetail for the benefit of conflict-­affected communities. Given the increased level of Russian intervention in contemporary conflicts, including the war in Syria, Libya, and, most prominently, Ukraine, an understanding of the Russian perspective is critical for negotiating an end to these conflicts and starting to restore and promote stability in these countries and in the international arena. Instead of attempting to continue in line with the ideological theories—or, more appropriately termed, the ‘philosophies’—of post-conflict recovery, I also draw from bodies of thought in other disciplines and adapt these for post-conflict recovery. When addressing questions of intervention, sovereignty, and global balances of power, the international relations and international development disciplines may provide two of the clearest lenses; additionally, economic, sociological, and psychological theories apply directly (e.g., to collaborative governance, institutional behaviour, and conflict vulnerability). For this book, which entails an exploration of largely uncharted Russian approaches to reconstruction, I will consider the aforementioned

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viewpoints and theories and will apply my 2005 definition of post-conflict recovery, as “a range of holistic activities in an integrated process designed not only to reactivate economic and social development but also to create a peaceful environment, by addressing the emerging deficits in security, political and institutional capacity that will prevent a relapse into violence” (Barakat, 2005, p.  573). In this sense, post-war recovery can be recognised for its corrective dimension in righting wrongs and addressing vulnerabilities rooted in both the past and the present while focusing on future goals. This dual objective of post-war reconstruction is what differentiates it from development in typical environments and conflict-­ affected contexts. It is essential to be involved in coalescing a functioning socio-economic order and in creating strategies that consider and embrace the linkages between violence reduction and a range of other activities. For reconstruction to be successful, it must address the inequalities, vulnerabilities, and social divides that can destabilise the foundation of a society. This requires addressing structural and intersectional inequalities that often caused or exacerbated the conflict, whether these be in terms of ethnic, cultural, tribal, regional, religious, or sectarian identities; urban-­ rural divides; gender; economic opportunity or quality of life; or access to land, resources, or rights. Structural vulnerabilities—including dependency on illicit funds such as narcotics, and political economy constraints, such as elite capture of state structures, business interests, and land allocation may necessitate extensive public sector and state reform, including security sector reform. Furthermore, after periods of violence, societies are left with divisions and wounds which require healing and special attention to repairing and developing social cohesion for peaceful coexistence. No long-term investment in reconstruction can be protected without a genuine reconciliation process. The most fundamental way to initiate reconciliation is to ensure that the rule of law applies to all equally and that everyone has access to justice. Local and traditional systems for achieving justice and reconciliation can be built up to this end; however, the first and most challenging prerequisite for effective reconstruction is providing a secure and stable environment. In many locations, stability and reconciliation have become more difficult to achieve, particularly following the 11 September 2001 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror campaign. It is important to underscore that the understanding of these challenges and applications differs significantly between Russia and the West, as is discussed below.

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1.1.1   A Vision for Reconstruction The concept of a vision as a mental image of where a country or a war-­ affected society ought to be at some point in the future based on a set of goals and aspirations is not specific to post-conflict societies. Visions for national development or social transformation can be seen across many countries and cultures. Successful visions can mobilise societies around a common cause, foster social cohesion, and drive lasting change. Examples of bold visions include those put forth by many post-colonial independence leaders who set out ambitious economic and political development plans, including Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, and Patrice Lumumba in the Republic of the Congo. In East Asia, the massive transformation in Japan’s Meiji Restoration was founded on a vision of opening the country. South Korea embarked on a remarkable development process from the 1960s into the new millennium, driven by a solid national developmental vision and political will. The pan-Arab vision inspired significant political change in the Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s. More recently, remarkable transformations have occurred in the Gulf, where countries such as Qatar have liberalised and modernised under visionary leadership over just 25 years. Yet, countries can also be bereft of any vision and captured by predatory rather than developmental leaders (Evans, 1989). In other cases, an idea pursued by individual rulers with significant autonomy from society can create personalised rules, such as in North Korea or Libya under Gaddafi. Furthermore, the latitude of many developing countries to pursue a national vision of development for much of the late twentieth century was constrained by the power of international financial institutions and the coalescing around the Washington Consensus, which prescribed many reforms and policies through aid conditionality. Whilst developments such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness have since made ownership a vital norm in international aid, this norm does not always shape the realities of societies recovering from conflict, where the capacity to pursue a vision may be constrained. A reconstruction vision is distinguished by its focus on healing the wounds of war and armed conflict. The vision is best understood as a set of comprehensible guiding principles formulated and accessible to a broad spectrum of local and national stakeholders and actors. It is usually value-­ led, based on moving towards a desired future state of affairs. Successful

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visions aim to capture a broad consensus and communicate a path forward or establish peace. They are usually qualitative in focus and function, with the ability to mobilise collective action and initiate voluntary change. Although visions typically speak to people’s aspirations for their society, they need to be translated into operational objectives to be relevant and practical. A reconstruction vision would seek to re-establish a political, economic, social, and institutional order that embraces renewal and conflict transformation as core elements, thus emphasising not only what to achieve but, crucially, how to achieve it. A historical example that supports the need for a shared vision is the role that the Marshall Plan played in the successful transition of Western Europe following World War II (Barakat, 2005; Del Castillo, 2008; Diefendorf, 2009). This approach was described by George C. Marshall in 1947 as follows: It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. This country's role should consist of friendly aid in drafting a European program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.

The transition process was led by one donor, the US, with participation from the recipient states to create a unified vision of the reconstruction of affected states (Knack & Rahman, 2006; Lewarne & Snelbecker, 2004). The US had a clear vision of a politically reformed and economically stable Europe based on revitalising production and industry in economies such as Germany (Lewarne & Snelbecker, 2004). The accompanying strategy was equally clear: to pursue political stability in Europe through economic recovery. With funds centralised in one place, financing the transition process could function much like a budget, without the competing programmes and agendas of multiple national and international actors that have become the norm. These factors allowed for a stable and well-­ managed transition process, which resulted in one of the most well-­ regarded success stories of a conflict-to-peace transition (Chandra, 1996). Similarly, successful change in El Salvador is often attributed, at least partially, to a shared vision concerning peace among national and international actors (Fargen, 2003).

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However, the political environment of many fragile states today is one of extreme diversity, with countless actors that bring their own differing goals and objectives. These goals are not necessarily complementary, and can even compete with each other. A broad consensus among the relevant stakeholders at both local and national levels becomes key to the success of a reconstruction vision. This underscores the importance of the process of developing a vision—through discussions, lobbying, and negotiations— which can simultaneously be used to narrow the differences not only among political decision-makers but also among civil society groups, private businesses, and, most importantly, the affected population. These processes should include the representatives and interests of refugees and internally displaced persons who want to return to their former homes and places of livelihood. For a vision to be effective in mobilising people, it must be shared amongst all stakeholders and be locally rooted. However, new political structures can remain fragile, as new authorities often lack legitimacy and credibility and may be associated with previous systems and partisan interests (Barakat, 2010). It is therefore vital to have the ‘buy-in’ and participation of the society’s various stakeholders, including civil society groups and citizens, during change processes, while at the same time managing expectations considering that some state institutions may not necessarily have the capacity to immediately effect change (ibid.). This important element of localisation is often missing in the reconstruction visions put forward by Russia, as this book shall demonstrate.

1.2  Contemporary Literature on Russia’s Approach to Reconstruction Over the last few decades, Moscow has been an active player in the international arena of post-war reconstruction, yet it is often under-­ acknowledged and misunderstood, and as such either undervalued or overvalued. After its victory in WWII and to oppose the hegemony of the US and its Marshall Plan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) launched the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to help other countries recover from the war’s devastation. Many countries received Soviet humanitarian, economic, and military aid during this period. At the same time, Russia itself faced the daunting need for post-­ war reconstruction on its western border. Despite the massive amount of

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assistance provided by the Soviet Union to other states during the Cold War era and the monumental effort that was undertaken to rebuild the country internally, there is surprisingly little contemporary and comparative literature about the Russian experience in post-conflict recovery, particularly from a Russian viewpoint. Hanson (2003), in his book The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, shows the stages of the USSR’s economic recovery after WWII, providing a critical overview of every period from 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Aidinov (2016) analyses the internal recovery of the USSR with a special focus on the first three years after the war. The author portrays the dilemmas and challenges related to economic modernisation and the development of international trade, both of which were important factors for the country’s economic recovery. Attention in the literature is mainly paid to the different historic phases of Russian aid, such as the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Mirankov, 2012; Shirokov, 2006; Zhiryakov, 2020). It is also possible to find papers that describe Soviet assistance beyond the CMEA framework and analyse it in the context of the USSR’s attempt to spread communism worldwide (Krechetnikov, 2012; Marshall Plan and Soviet Alternative, 2016; Volkov, 2007). This body of work shows the development of CMEA as an initiative competing with the US, designed to maintain the USSR’s sphere of influence against the West. Another part of the literature is devoted to the position of the USSR in the international arena as a donor. Poluboyarinov and Skochko (2020) analyse changes in the geopolitical order after World War II, the rising power of the USSR, the Cold War period, and the ideological competition. The Soviet Union during the Cold War both assisted war-torn states in reconstruction processes whilst also undertaking domestic reconstruction. In another work, Malinovkin et al. (2016) focus on the political tensions of the Cold War era and how the USSR’s reconstruction assistance was used to shore up friendly regimes. Most available studies focus on a single country receiving Soviet assistance and document the history and amount of assistance but do not engage in analysis or in evaluating the impact. An exception to the rule is a study on the rebuilding of Mongolia after World War II, which examines the impact of the Soviet Union on the economic recovery of the country in the fields of agriculture and industry (Manzhikov & Mantsaeva, 2016). Furthermore, limited literature exists on Russia’s role in aid and reconstruction after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Abakumova &

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Ryadinskaya, 2016; Mikryukov, 2012). The literature there tends to be country-specific, and, while it largely focuses on political interest, it uses a general framework to document Russia’s efforts without applying any specific theory. In his book State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism, Taylor (2011) examines Russia’s experience in the North Caucasus and Chechnya, but almost exclusively with a focus on the political aspect of the intervention. Meanwhile, Allison’s (2013) ‘Russia, the West, and military intervention’ focuses on the history of Russian military interventions from the time of the Soviet Union across different periods, linking it with humanitarian aid, the rule of law, and reconstruction. The publication of the ‘Concept of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Area of International Development’ (Russian MFA, 2014), marked a shift in the way Russia approached its role as a global peace and development actor and has motivated a number of scholars to take a thorough look at what shifts the policy revealed. Notable amongst those is ‘The Russian Approach to Public Diplomacy and Humanitarian Cooperation’ (Velikaya, 2018), which highlights differences between Russian and Western approaches to humanitarian intervention and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) principle. Russia’s role in peacekeeping operations and its interaction with the United Nations (UN) are well covered by the work of Bratersky (2018). Most recently, Borshchevskaya’s (2021) ‘Putin’s War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America’s Absence’ analyses the origins of Russia’s current presence in the Middle East and the importance of Syria for the international politics of Moscow, again with an exclusive focus on Russia’s political and diplomatic efforts. Also pivotal is the work of David Lewis (2021, 2022), whose thesis on the emergence of a Russian model for conflict management has been most helpful in providing a broad framework for better understanding Russia’s intervention and peace-­ making policies. In sum, research literature about Moscow’s strategies is limited to the political situation and confrontation with the US and its Western allies. There is a notable lack of literature addressing the Russian perspective on post-conflict reconstruction. Various factors influence this. First is the under-development of the humanitarian-development—and post-conflict reconstruction in particular—discipline of study in Russia. Within Russian academia, it is more common to study the causes and consequences of crises through the lens of Moscow’s political role than post-crisis reconstruction efforts. Second, for most researchers based outside of Russia,

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there are linguistic barriers to knowledge production on this topic as all documents in the Russian Federation are published in the Russian language and are not translated into any other language. Given Russia’s important role in conflict response and political dynamics in several conflict theatres in the Middle East and other regions, there is a clear need to build additional knowledge on the approach Russia takes when considering reconstruction and to what extent this approach is rooted in lessons learned from its past experiences.

1.3  Intervention Drivers in Russian Policy During the 1980s, at the height of the peculiarly balanced bipolar order, frustration was growing in development circles over the underwhelming results of decades of concerted assistance, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which continued to suffer from chronic under-development. In 1992, the World Bank’s Governance and Development report held weak state institutions responsible for impeding development efforts. They argued for “not just less government but better government,” thus giving rise to the new ‘good governance agenda’ (Landell-Mills, 1992). Meanwhile, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of ‘new wars’ with their distinctive mark of high rates of violence against civilians, the concept of unrestrained ‘traditional sovereignty’ came into question as talk of ‘limited sovereignty’ started to gain ground (Kaldor, 1999). Western nations began to distance themselves from earlier Cold War-era absolute sovereignty doctrines to extend their influence into the sphere of domestic affairs of other nations to protect civilians. United Nations Secretary-­ General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s New Agenda for Peace declared in 1992 that “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed,” which was later emphatically reinforced by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in 2001. Thus, the international system moved from non-interventionist norms that upheld a now-defunct bipolar system into a post-Westphalian paradigm with “increasingly intrusive and interdependent economic and security regimes” and an expanded range of policy domains for international humanitarian intervention (Ikenberry, 2009, p. 74). After NATO acted against Russia’s wishes in 1999 in Kosovo—then an autonomous province of Slavic Serbia within Yugoslavia, a traditional ally of Russia with which it shares cultural ties—the Kremlin viewed the intervention as an unacceptable, unilateral violation of international law. At the

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time, Moscow was not in a position to do much beyond condemning the actions and requesting that such an intervention not be repeated, but the action damaged Russian relations with the West, causing Russia to see NATO as emboldened to act with impunity during periods of Russian weakness. With Vladimir Putin’s election as president in 2000, Russia started to challenge the concept of limited sovereignty advocated by R2P, claiming that ‘humanitarian intervention’ is used by the West as a pretext to justify unilateral military action (Riegl & Doboš, 2018, p. 377). While Russia’s approach towards international intervention and security has consistently attempted to build a ‘world guard’ image that is respectful of traditional state sovereignty, largely opposing intervention and regime change in conflict-affected states (e.g., Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Libya, Syria, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Myanmar, and Venezuela), the picture is very different when it comes to states and territories of the former Soviet Union. In these states, Russia seems much more selective in its employment of the concept of sovereignty, using its troops to launch ‘special operations,’ while avoiding any direct reference to war and often siding with anti-government forces demanding greater political and/or cultural autonomy, under the pretext of defending minorities’ rights (in most cases, Russian speaking populations), if not promoting outright secession (e.g., Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova). In doing so, Russia abides by the so-called “Medvedev doctrine—Russia has the right to protect the lives and dignity of ethnic Russians wherever they are located and that Russia identifies certain regions as of a special value and interests for itself” (ibid., p. 69). Contemporary Russian policy in almost every field is linked with the revival of Russian pride, which some mistakenly read as “Moscow [still being] trapped in traditional imperial logic with the application of coercive regionalism and use of military might in support of separatist regions on the European periphery” (ibid., p. 61). However, the more rational justification is the threat Russia feels as a result of both the exclusion of the post-USSR Russia from critical international political decision-making and the astonishing geopolitical change that manifested along its Western borders as the EU and NATO expanded into the former Soviet sphere of influence. In this context, one of the significant threats perceived by Moscow is the spread of Western liberalism and American influence around the globe (Utkin, 2003). Starting from the mid-1990s, the Russian government began to reform its approach to international politics to regain its power

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and influence in a clear attempt to challenge the unipolar international order that dominated world politics following the collapse of the USSR (Clunan, 2019). The fight to erode American hegemony and Western influence remains a core motivation in Russian interventions today. Another perceived threat is the growth of radical, separatist movements and breakaway territories, particularly those that control Russia’s access to global trading routes within the Russian Federation (Stepanova, 2017). In response, Russia committed to two highly destructive wars in Chechnya to reimpose central authority and prevent the establishment of a breakaway republic. The Russian government has consistently implemented a strict, militaristic policy in conflict contexts, which in turn shapes its approach to subsequent post-conflict reconstruction. The West in general and the US in particular have largely underestimated Russia’s military reforms and progress in capabilities as a result of its direct engagement in conflict within the former Soviet Union breakaway republics. This fact was acknowledged by a recent report by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) (Gady, 2015). The tactical and operational weaknesses of the Russian military were notable during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. However, Russia launched military reforms immediately after, which increased the professionalism and capability of military personnel, improved combat readiness with a streamlined command structure, and constantly updated the equipment (Dickinson, 2022). After five months of the Russia-Ukraine war, a prominent US military scholar and strategist says that America had underestimated Russia’s military power and force. Another US Army veteran and principal researcher at the RAND Corporation states that Russian troops “are slowly grinding their way through Donbas” in eastern Ukraine with “massive firepower [and a] very slow, incremental attrition maneuver” that will be “very hard to stop” (Col. Dr. David Johnson, 2022). It is noteworthy that Russia uses its military interventions to project an image of influence and power to the international community and, more importantly, to its own population. Recently, “[against] a background of failed international missions to end armed conflicts—from the Sahel to Afghanistan—Russia has begun to promote an alternative paradigm of peacemaking” based on what has become known as the ‘Syria stabilisation model.’ In this model, Moscow aims to stabilise its ally, which it views as the ‘legitimate’ power, and “prioritises order over justice and advocates short-term goals of conflict management over long-term goals of conflict resolution” (Lewis, 2022, p. 653).

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A common mistake in the way the West, and in particular the US, approaches foreign affairs is the oversimplification of complex issues that are usually driven by cumulative rational grievances against Western policy, instead of blaming an irrational individual. The demonisation of Putin, as was the case before him with Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi, Assad, and others, ignores the underlying drivers of Russian interventions and “feeds into the mass, Western delusion that these problems can be resolved or ameliorated once Putin is out of the way” (Pukhov, 2019). Undoubtedly, as a former KGB member, Putin’s ideology was shaped by the Cold War rhetoric and covert strategies. Nevertheless, it was clear that in his first few years in power between 2000 and 2004, Russia’s foreign policy was forward-looking and leaned towards Western positions as Putin grappled with a serious domestic economic crisis as well as the rise of Chechen terrorism. Russia’s ‘pro-Western’ foreign policy position during those years of domestic crisis was “unappreciated by the United States, which regarded Moscow’s policy as evidence that it was well on its way to becoming a US satellite. Washington drew the conclusion that Russia would always have to accept, unconditionally, any and every decision made by the West” (ibid.). From Putin’s perspective, a series of actions on the part of the US and the West were seen as taking advantage of the period of Russian weakness and absence on the international stage—including NATO’s Eastward expansion as well as interventions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, among others. In 2008, two of these issues were exacerbated, with NATO indicating that both Georgia and Ukraine would be able to join the Alliance in the future—which Putin had explicitly opposed—and with the US, EU, and NATO recognising Kosovo’s independence. This triggered an aggressive push from Moscow, and that same year it went to war with Georgia, supporting the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and thereby limiting Georgia’s ability to join NATO. After Putin’s term as President ended in 2008 following the maximum two four-year terms, he became Prime Minister from 2008 until 2012 while Dmitry Medvedev assumed the presidency—but, by all accounts, Putin maintained significant executive power. Then, in 2012, after a one-­ term break, Putin resumed the presidency. Concerned about the spread of the ‘colour revolutions’ into Russia, Putin consolidated power and projected the image of a strong, vertically managed state and worked to engender loyalty to himself both in the government and in wider society. Putin’s apprehension of losing power was not baseless; from December 2008 to December 2012, Putin’s approval rating decreased from 80%

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(Ocenki rossijskih liderov, 2008) to 65% (Dekabr’skie rejtingi odobreniya, 2015). It can be argued that to avoid falling out of favour domestically, Putin sought to separate the ‘Russian path’ from the Western world, utilising three popular narratives: (a) oppressed Russians in the former territories of the USSR must be protected; (b) Russia as a superpower must be respected; and (c) Russia is a global guardian fighting extreme Islamist terrorists, which the American coalition had failed to defeat. This context helps us to appreciate the extent to which Russia’s approaches in intervention and reconstruction are linked to its domestic politics. We can see that Putin will likely emphasise reconstruction efforts that show Russia as a strong military power, restoring dignity, culture, and pride to Russian populations while ‘saving’ them from ‘humiliation.’

1.4  Reconstruction Drivers Following its interventions, Russian troops usually remain in place under the pretext of maintaining stability and providing humanitarian aid. As such, Russia often finds itself embroiled in programmes of physical and social rebuilding in which it attempts to identify, address, and rectify underlying causes of recent conflict so that the foundations for sustainable stability and development can be achieved. However, as will be demonstrated in the coming chapters, the actual reconstruction intervention tends to be minimal (with important variations depending on the context) and limited to achieving basic stabilisation and normalisation without necessarily seeking long-term solutions and major reforms. Russia has no standing agency that specialises in reconstruction, nor does it advocate a standardised plan to guide its post-war reconstruction operations. Instead, Moscow tailors and adapts its reconstruction strategy and actions based on the contextual demands of each situation and, if necessary, creates ad-hoc agencies to undertake the task. The global expansion of state-building support into traditionally sovereign spheres of government (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq) was predominantly driven by the Western assumption that market democracy was the political system most capable of resolving collective grievances through non-­violent means. Russia was largely uncomfortable with this approach, but it lacked the confidence and the capacity to contradict it given its ongoing critical transition and restructuring (including through the political reform movement perestroika).

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The Western approach favours the implementation of democratic institutions, the rule of law, governance reforms, and large-scale foreign aid. However, the overall track record of these Western-led post-conflict interventions in the post-Cold War period following this model has not been successful. In contrast to the US and the EU, which are considered traditional donors, emerging and re-emerging donors tend not to impose political conditions on aid provision. This is motivated by the expectation that a non-hemogenic aid relationship and a policy of non-interference would avert aid dependency. As Russian authorities do not have a systematic approach to recovery, Russia’s intervention approaches do not extend to attempting to (re)build or change institutions or introduce new political systems to war-torn countries. This is one feature that Russia has in common with other emerging donors (e.g., China). In this context, Russia can be seen as a ‘re-emerging’ donor more comparable to ‘non-traditional donors’ that assist conflict-affected states without aid conditionalities (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar) (Paczynska, 2016). Russia’s role as a donor will be explored thoroughly in Chap. 3. This of course does not mean that Russia categorically rejects democratic rule (Jütersonke et al., 2021, p. 954), but is a reflection of the development of its own take on what it sees as ‘managed democracy.’ The case studies examined in this book illustrate the importance that Russia places on the existence of a strong, often hierarchal state in order to provide the conditions necessary for peace, stabilisation, and in some cases democratic progress. Moscow tends to promote power-sharing arrangements as an archetypical solution rather than early elections (e.g., Tajikistan, Syria, Afghanistan). Finally, although Russia has its own take on intervention and reconstruction, over the last decade it has aligned its donor efforts with OECD countries through the “unilateral internalization of the OECD aid reporting system and the endorsement of key OECD aid declarations” (ibid.).

1.5  Securitisation and Stabilisation Policy debates have converged around a ‘security-development nexus’ that maintained a positive correlation between the two, maintaining that development reduces the risk of armed conflict but also requires secure environments. Therefore, security and stability came to be seen as both a result and a precondition of development (Duffield, 2001). These linkages were further underlined by the 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks against the US; the

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conclusion reached at the time by the Bush administration was that Afghanistan and potentially other weak and failed states posed threats to US national security by acting as havens for global terrorism. A policy consensus rapidly emerged within the West that regarded local security issues as global security risks. Russia seemed to agree with this perspective, particularly where it was seen as supporting Russian national interests and interventions, as in the case of Muslim separatists in Chechnya. In conflict zones that were becoming associated with the new buzzwords of ‘state failure’ and ‘state fragility,’ Western institutions argued that the realities of state weakness meant that the coexistence of reconstruction with counterinsurgency was necessary for successful political transitions to be achieved (Fearon & Laitin, 2004, p. 42). Thus, a more “muscular form of stabilization (or intervention) on behalf of the supposed victims of fragility” was increasingly advocated, which led to catastrophic consequences in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Muggah, 2010, p. 40). Western discussions on the means to promote durable peace in post-conflict zones similarly argued that long-term security and the successful transition from a wartime to a peaceful order were contingent on more aggressive international state-building efforts to build strong institutions (Duffield, 2007). Whilst stabilisation in the West as the praxis of reconstruction has a long history, it rose to prominence in contemporary policy debates following the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we witnessed the introduction of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—military units which engage in and safeguard reconstruction initiatives. The control of PRTs, comprised of members from a single coalition country, was decentralised among several international military forces, and their procedures were not standardised. They were able to implement ‘quick-impact projects’ (QIPs) in highly insecure conflict areas to complete small-scale infrastructure projects aimed at fostering goodwill between the military and local people. The example of Afghanistan—where QIPs dominated reconstruction actors’ thinking from late 2001 to 2008—clearly illustrates some of the limitations of this reconstruction modality. Such local interventions often revolved around the premise that minor improvements in local infrastructure, such as the construction of a new water-distribution system or local school, would signify the forthcoming ‘peace dividend’ accrued if stability reigned. PRTs were criticised widely for blurring the line between foreign military and humanitarian work, leading to concerns that humanitarians may come under a greater risk of attack. Additionally, PRTs have had mixed

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success and were not always confined to highly insecure areas where neither the government nor humanitarian actors and NGOs were able or willing to work. Furthermore, critiques of PRTs went beyond endangering humanitarians and focused on their limited impact on reconstruction overall: most critically, the high cost of the operations and the lack of local ownership they engendered. However, they often generated two results: (1) unrealistically raising expectations about the rate at which material conditions would improve; and (2) creating the perception that additional projects would be granted to unstable areas afflicted by violence and insurgency. This second outcome comprises the so-called perverse incentive which I have frequently written about; this dynamic occurs when international assistance is understood (and used) as a counterinsurgency weapon. Rebellious, anti-­ government areas were, according to this logic, awash in assistance, whereas more stable provinces or regions felt unrewarded for supporting international and Afghan governmental efforts. Hence, out of disappointment and rational self-interest, these areas become not inhospitable towards those who would disrupt the peace. Meanwhile, stabilisation from a Russian perspective is focused more on conflict containment and hinges on the existence and maintenance of a strong and stable state capable of governing, providing security, and delivering services, even if that was at the expense of legitimacy and human rights. “Russia appears to be satisfied with a minimalist approach, whereby the main goal should be to stop the fighting and to secure a minimum of political order and stability—a political order in line with its geopolitical interests—rather than a lasting social transformation in which liberal democracy, human rights and good governance can be cultivated” (Mariani, 2022, p. 14).

1.6  A Roadmap Through the Book To understand the current Russian approach to post-conflict reconstruction, it is necessary to adopt a grand historical view of the experience and the changing trajectory of the reconstruction policies Moscow has followed from the early days after World War II under the USSR.  This is significant considering that Russia is the primary (de facto) internationally recognised successor state as it inherited the USSR’s positions, including the UN security council seat (which neither Ukraine nor other successor states opposed at the time). However, recent attempts to challenge this in

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the context of the war in Ukraine have fuelled President Putin’s desire to codify Russia as the legal and official successor state (Zamakhina, 2020). With the theory and context discussed in this chapter in mind, there are several overarching questions I will seek to answer through subsequent chapters. For example, which of the schools of thought regarding the timing of recovery interventions and activities does Russia tend to follow? Does it consider peace to be a precondition for reconstruction and development, or does it prefer to pursue immediate development activities as a way to sow the seeds of long-term recovery? What strategies and principles were developed during the post-WWII context and the Cold War, and how do they influence Moscow’s approach to reconstruction and donorship today? What are the core pillars and principles that are likely to influence Moscow’s actions in Ukraine? Chapter 2 will explore how the USSR was able to rebuild domestically and simultaneously provide humanitarian and economic aid abroad. This approach helped the Soviet Union to project its image as a superpower and to gain alliances to break the unipolar world. I propose that a similar policy can be observed in the twenty-first century, with post-war reconstruction dispatched as a branding tool to boost the nation’s image. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the USSR, Russia went through a decade of self-readjustment that was seized upon by the West to ensure that the global power enjoyed by the USSR was a thing of the past. The revival of Russian pride which accompanied the rise of Vladimir Putin in 2000 has meant that Russia once again became a net contributor of international aid, with particular interest in supporting conflict-affected countries. The nature and scope of Russian donorship will be explored in Chap. 3. To support the arguments put forward in the book, I will analyse four case studies that demonstrate Russia’s complex approach to post-conflict reconstruction. Chapter 4 will examine Russia’s intervention and reconstruction in the Caucasus region through the cases of Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia; and Chap. 5 will examine Russia’s role and approach to reconstruction in Syria. The cases in the Caucasus region will show how Moscow deals with breakaway states and what territories can expect to receive for their loyalty to Russia in two cases: if they remain independent (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) or if they are parts of the Russian Federation (Chechnya). Chapter 5 examines the international case of Syria, where Moscow has been actively involved since 2015.

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A number of pertinent questions also need to be probed when considering past cases, both to fully understand each case and to discern which trends and tendencies will be applicable in forecasting policies in Ukraine. For example, what were the motivations and intended outcomes for each reconstruction process? What does Russia prioritise in its approach to reconstruction? Why does it prioritise these areas, and can we see a difference in its priorities for territories within its borders (Chechnya), in its near abroad (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and further afield (Syria)? To what extent does Russia give attention to creating a shared, locally developed, and owned consensus on the desired end state, which we have established is vital for reconstruction to be transformational? Finally, Chap. 6 discusses the context of Ukraine and explores Russia’s approach to development in Crimea since its annexation in 2014 and its statements and indications regarding the newly annexed republics of Eastern Ukraine. While this book is analytical in nature, each chapter will also provide an overview of the historical context and background to ground the discussion and attempt to flesh out the reasoning and motivations behind Moscow’s decisions and approaches. The book will conclude with Chap. 7, which will highlight and tie together the principles that run through Russia’s approach to reconstruction as a sum of previous experience, and I will put forth a forecast for how these are likely to be implemented in the Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine. The book will conclude with recommendations for Ukraine— both for territories still held by Kyiv and those now held by Moscow—in considering its future and reconstruction possibilities.

References Abakumova, I. V., & Ryadinskaya, E. N. (2016). Osobennosti postkonfliktnogo vosstanovleniya: otechestvennyj i zarubezhnyj opyt. [Features of post-conflict reconstruction: domestic and foreign experience]. Bulletin of the Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University Astafieva, 4(38), 208–214. (In Russ.). Addison, T., & Murshed, S. M. (2001). From conflict to reconstruction: Reviving the social contract (No. 2001/48). WIDER Discussion paper. Aidinov, H.  T. (2016). Vosstanovlenie ekonomiki SSSR v poslevoennyj period (1945–1948). [Restoration of the economy of the USSR in the post-war period (1945–1948)]. Power, 10, 160–164. Allison, R. (2013). Russia, the West, and military intervention. OUP.

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Barakat, S. (2005). Post-Saddam Iraq: Deconstructing a regime, reconstructing a nation. Third World Quarterly, 26(4–5), 571–591. Barakat, S. (2010). After the conflict: Reconstruction and development in the aftermath of war. IB Tauris. Borshchevskaya, A. (2021). Putin's war in Syria: Russian foreign policy and the price of America's absence. Bloomsbury Publishing. Bratersky, M. V. (2018). Rossiya i mirotvorcheskie operacii: konceptual'nye i prakticheskie sostavlyayushchie rossijskoj politiki. [Russia and peacekeeping operations: Conceptual and practical components of Russian policy]. Bulletin of International Organizations: Education, Science, New Economics, 13(1), 157–170. Chandra, N. K. (1996). Marshall Plan, German unification and economics of transition. Economic and Political Weekly, 31(22), 1307–1310. Clunan, A.  L. (2019). Russia’s pursuit of great-power status and security. In Routledge handbook of Russian security (pp. 1–16). Routledge. Col. dr. David Johnson: “it’s a grinding war of attrition, and we need to give them the means to stay in the fight”. Georgia Today. (2022, June 9). Retrieved October 13, 2022, from https://georgiatoday.ge/col-­dr-­david-­johnson-­its-­a­g rinding-­w ar-­o f-­a ttrition-­a nd-­w e-­n eed-­t o-­g ive-­t hem-­t he-­m eans-­t o-­s tay­in-­the-­fight/ Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Söderbom, M. (2008). Post-conflict risks. Journal of Peace Research, 45(4), 461–478. Cox, R. W. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond international relations theory. Millennium, 10(2), 126–155. Dekabr’skie rejtingi odobreniya, doveriya i polozheniya del v strane. [December ratings of approval, trust and state of affairs in the country]. Levada Centre. (2015, November 2). Retrieved September 30, 2022, from https://www. levada.r u/2012/12/20/dekabrskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-doveriya-ipolozheniya-del-v-strane/ (In Russ.) Del Castillo, G. (2008). Rebuilding war-torn states: The challenge of post-conflict economic reconstruction. OUP. Dickinson, P. (2022, March 14). Not just Putin: Most Russians support the war in Ukraine. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/blogs/ukrainealert/not-­j ust-­p utin-­m ost-­r ussians-­s upport-­t he-­w ar-­ in-­ukraine/ Diefendorf, J.  M. (2009). Reconstructing devastated cities: Europe after World War II and New Orleans after Katrina. Journal of Urban Design, 14(3), 377–397. Duffield, M. (2001). Global governance and the new wars: The merging of development and security. Zed Books. Duffield, M. (2007). Development, security and unending war: Governing the world of peoples. Polity Press.

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Evans, J. S. B. (1989). Bias in human reasoning: Causes and consequences. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. FAO. (2022). FAO STAT: https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TCL Fargen, P. W. (2003). Post-conflict reintegration and reconstruction: Doing it right takes a while. Georgetown. Fearon, J., & Laitin, D. (2004). Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states. International Security, 28(4), 5–43. Gady, F. (2015, October 20). How the west underestimated Russia's military power. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://thediplomat. com/2015/10/how-­the-­west-­underestimated-­russias-­military-­power/ Hanson, P. (2003). The rise and fall of the soviet economy. An economic history of the USSR from 1945. Longman. Hasic, T. (2004). Reconstruction planning in post-conflict zones: Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community (Doctoral dissertation). Infrastruktur. Ikenberry, G. J. (2009). Liberal internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 71–87. Jütersonke, O., Kobayashi, K., Krause, K., & Yuan, X. (2021). Norm contestation and normative transformation in global peacebuilding order (s): The cases of China, Japan, and Russia. International Studies Quarterly, 65(4), 944–959. Kaldor, M. (1999). New and old wars. Organised violence in a global era. Stanford University Press. Knack, S., & Rahman, A. (2006). Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients. Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), 176–197. Krechetnikov, A. (2012, July 11). Pochemu SSSR otverg “plan marshalla”? [Why did the USSR reject the ‘Marshall Plan’?]. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2012/07/120711_marshall_ plan_ussr (In Russ.) Landell-Mills, P. (1992). Governance, cultural change and empowerment. Journal of Modern African Studies, 30(4), 543–567. Lewarne, S., & Snelbecker, D. (2004). Economic governance in war torn economies: Lessons learned from the Marshall Plan to the reconstruction of Iraq long report. Prepared for USAID Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination, USAID, Washington, DC. Lewis, D. (2021). Chapter 13: Russian diplomacy and conflict management. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/ publications/marshall-­c enter-­b ooks/russias-­g lobal-­r each-­s ecurity-­a nd-­ statecraft-­assessment/chapter-­13-­russian-­diplomacy-­and-­conflict-­management Lewis, D. (2022). Contesting liberal peace: Russia's emerging model of conflict management. International Affairs, 98(2), 653–673. Malinovkin, V.  A., Panteev, I.  S., & Ershov, B.  A. (2016). Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya SSSR posle vtoroj mirovoj voiny. [International relations of the

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USSR after the Second World War]. Actual Problems of the Humanities and Natural Sciences, 12–1, 176–180. (In Russ.). Manzhikov, E. B., & Mantsaeva, Z. G. (2016). Pomoshch' SSSR v Vostanovlenii Ekonomiki Mongolii Posle Vtoroj Mirovoj Vojny. [Assistance of the USSR in the restoration of the economy of Mongolia after the Second World War]. Bulletin of the Caspian: Archeology, History, Ethnology, 6, 191–195. (In Russ.). Mariani, B. (2022). Russia’s engagement in conflict and post-conflict settings: Growing geopolitical ambitions and “Peace by Force”. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform. Mikryukov, V.  O. (2012). Okazanie gumanitarnoj pomoshchi mchs Rossii kak mekhanizm snizheniya konfliktnosti v mire. [Providing humanitarian assistance to the Russian Emergencies Ministry as a mechanism for reducing conflict in the world]. Scientific and Educational Problems of Civil Protection, 2, 7–11. (In Russ.). Mirankov, D. (2012). Razvitie integracionnyh processov v Evrope vo vtoroj polovine HKH veka na primere deyatel'nosti SEV i EES. [Development of integration processes in Europe in the second half of the twentieth century on the example of the activities of the CMEA and the EEC]. Scientific Notes of the V.I.Vernadsky Crimean Federal University. Economics and Management, 25 (64)(1), 108–118. (In Russ.). Muggah, R. (2010). Chapter two: Stabilising fragile states and the humanitarian space. Adelphi Series, 50(412–413), 33–52. Ocenki rossijskih liderov i polozheniya del v strane (dekabr'). [Assessments of Russian leaders and the state of affairs in the country (December)]. Levada Center. (2008, December 16). Retrieved September 30, 2022, from https:// www.levada.ru/2008/12/16/otsenki-­rossijskih-­liderov-­i-­polozheniya-­del-­v-­ strane-­dekabr/ (In Russ.) Paczynska, A. (2016). Emerging and traditional donors and conflict-affected states: The new politics of reconstruction. Stimson Center. Paris, R. (2002). International peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’. Review of International Studies, 28(4), 637–656. Plan Marshalla i Sovetskaya al'ternativa. [Marshall Plan and Soviet Alternative]. (2016, May 10). Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://cont.ws/@ inance/267264 (In Russ.) Poluboyarinov, P. V., & Skochko, P. S. (2020). Mezhdunarodnoe polozhenie sssr posle vtoroj mirovoj vojny. [The international position of the USSR after the Second World War]. Bulletin Social-Economic and Humanitarian Research, 5(7), 33–40. (In Russ.). Pukhov, R. (2019, March 28). Nato’s growing membership, demonization of Putin drive anti-Western policies. Defense News.

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Riegl, M., & Doboš, B. (2018). Post-soviet de facto states and Russian geopolitical strategy. Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, 12(1), 59–89. Russian, M. F. A. (2014). Concept of Russian Federation’s state policy in the area of international development assistance. OECD. Shirokov, O. (2006). Celi i Funkcii SJeV v Nachal'nyj Period Razvitija. [Goals and functions of the CMEA in the initial period of development]. Bulletin of the Chuvash University, 3, 64–70. (In Russ.). Stepanova, E. A. (2017). Rossiya i SSHA v bor'be s terrorizmom (sravnitel'nye ugrozy i podhody, Siriya, Afganistan, protivodejstvie nasil'stvennomu ekstremizmu). [Russia and the United States in the fight against terrorism ­(comparative threats and approaches, Syria, Afghanistan, countering violent extremism)]. Pathways to Peace and Security, 1(52), 13–54. (In Russ.). Taylor, B. D. (2011). State building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and coercion after communism. Cambridge University Press. Utkin, A.  I. (2003). Americanskaya imperiya. [American empire]. Eksmo. (In Russ.). Velikaya, A. A. (2018). The Russian approach to public diplomacy and humanitarian cooperation. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 39–61. Volkov, A. (2007, July 7). Plan Marshalla. Pochemu Moskva ego otvergla? [Marshall Plan. Why did Moscow reject it?]. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://ria.ru/20070605/66676583.html (in Russ.) Zamakhina, T. (2020, March 2). Putin Predlozhil Popravku o tom, Chto Rossija Javljaetsja Pravopreemnikom SSSR. [Putin proposed an amendment stating that Russia is the legal successor of the USSR]. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://rg.ru/2020/03/02/putin-­predlozhil-­popravku-­o-­tom-­chto-­ rossiia-­iavliaetsia-­pravopreemnikom-­sssr.html (In Russ.) Zhiryakov, I.  G. (2020). K istorii torgovo-ekonomicheskih otnoshenij mezhdu SSSR i stranami narodnoj demokratii posle Vtoroj mirovoj vojny: sozdanie SEV. [On the history of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the countries of people's democracies after World War II: the creation of CMEA]. Bulletin of the Moscow City Pedagogical University. Series: Historical Sciences, 2, 92–104. (In Russ.).

CHAPTER 2

Moscow’s Response to Post-War Recovery in the Aftermath of WWII

To understand Russia’s contemporary intervention policy and its approach to post-war reconstruction, it is important to reflect on Moscow’s historical decisions and experiences during the era of the Soviet Union, starting from the aftermath of WWII through its collapse. This includes the Soviet Union’s efforts to rebuild and shore up allied territories and states in the context of the Cold War.

2.1   The Post-WWII Domestic Reconstruction Context The end of WWII saw the Soviet Union’s emergence as one of the world’s two great military powers, with much of Eastern Europe under its direct control.1 The Soviets suffered the highest number of casualties of any country during WWII, with some 20–27 million people killed before the war finally ended with the fall of Berlin in April 1945. Like most of Europe, the USSR experienced and inherited a considerable amount of urban and rural destruction, with more than 1700 of its cities and 70,000 of its villages damaged. This necessitated a swift reconstruction plan to rebuild the 1  Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia were under direct Soviet control, while the Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which were occupied by Nazi Germany between 1941 and 1944—were reintegrated into the Soviet Union after being annexed as Soviet republics in August 1940.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Barakat, Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34522-7_2

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economy and infrastructure and to revitalise a depleted society, not only at home but also across Eastern Europe and further afield. The loss of livelihoods was also significant, with the majority of livestock killed or taken away and vast numbers of tractors (137,000), grain combines (49,000), cowsheds, and other farm buildings destroyed (McCauley, 1981 cited in Kennedy, 1989, p. 466). Economically, the USSR’s industrial and agricultural output in 1945 fell far short of pre-war levels. The damage and dislocation figures are particularly startling in the German-occupied parts of the USSR, Ukraine, and Belorussia. Transport was hit by the destruction of 65,000 kilometres of railway track, loss or damage to 15,800 locomotives, 428,000 goods wagons, 4,280 river boats, and half of all the railway bridges in the occupied territory. Almost 50 per cent of all urban living space in this territory, 1.2 million houses, were destroyed, as well as 3.5 million houses in rural areas. Many towns lay in ruins. Thousands of villages were smashed. People lived in holes in the ground. (ibid.)

In such circumstances, civilians began repairing both their houses and communities and their relationship with the Soviet Union’s way of governance. Notions of what the new ‘normal’ should look like and what an ideal post-war Soviet Union should encompass generated diverse perspectives, ranging from the strict implementation of ideological purity to a call for inclusivity and ‘elastic versions’ of Soviet rule (Fürst, 2006). The war’s dire consequences surpassed physical destruction; it included the psychological and social impacts on the populace in the form of betrayal, pain, trauma, and societal division. Thus, the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin aimed to use reconstruction to circumvent the trauma that emerged from the war, to calm the population, and to hide the great repression carried out by the regime and thereby avoid massive protests. Although the end of the war brought a halt to the destruction and havoc that ripped Europe apart, it created a new global order in which victorious nations (particularly the US, the UK, and the USSR) scrambled to reinstate their power and domains of influence. This active foreign policy contributed to the thawing of relations and ultimately to the Cold War, turning wartime allies into foes. This also began an armament race that played an important role in directing the reconstruction priorities of the USSR, which focused its industrialisation on manufacturing military hardware.

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One of the most distinctive factors of the USSR’s approach to reconstruction was its reliance on a centralised method of planning based on the adoption of a series of five-year plans. This planning approach was first introduced by Stalin in 1928 when he announced the First Five-Year Plan aimed at industrialising the USSR.  The war interrupted the Third Plan cycle (1938–1941), but in 1945 Stalin resumed the same heavily centralised planning process to guide reconstruction under the Fourth and the Fifth Plans (1945–1955), with the declared aim of not only repairing the war damage but also turning the USSR into a leading industrial power by 1960. Therefore, in addition to improving settlements, it was necessary to revive the destroyed industry and affected agriculture of the USSR’s western republics and regions. This element of continuity did in fact allow many devastated cities and villages to embark on the daunting task of reconstruction during the war years, often as soon as they were liberated. Additionally, the size of the country and its ability to absorb the shock of the war, as well as its pre-war attempts to move a significant portion of its heavy industry eastwards where it could be protected, had helped maintain a level of normalcy in terms of production and markets. Another important feature was the Soviet ability to mobilise its people in a unique form of solidarity around the reconstruction agenda, to the extent that “the restoration of towns and villages has become a truly nationwide cause. Workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia worked selflessly, from gray-haired old men to teenagers” (Winstein, 2018), driven by common ideological beliefs as well as the fear of fascism returning. “The responsibility for restoration and construction in the countryside was assigned by the Soviet government to the collective farms. Special construction brigades were created, which were assigned to certain collective farms. In total, during the years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, 2.7 million residential buildings were built at the expense of the personal funds of collective farmers and rural intelligentsia—2.5 times more than in the three and a half years of the pre-war Five-Year Plan” (ibid.). Another interesting characteristic of Moscow’s approach to reconstruction was its ability to balance the two often opposing priorities of meeting the urgent needs of the war-affected population, particularly in urban areas (housing, food, sanitation, etc.), while pursing long-term development targets for industrialisation and job creation to live up to its ideological promises. The continuity inherited from the five-year planning cycles helped resolve some of the arising challenges and led to the development

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of urban master plans that considered economic planning and optimised the relationship between housing and industry. Special attention was given to the preservation of historical heritage, which served both to reassure and ground people in their sense of belonging to the land and to stimulate social renewal. This focus on social renewal is yet another feature of Moscow’s historic approach to reconstruction, where modernisation of transport infrastructure, improvement of the sanitary condition of cities, construction of sports facilities, housing, schools, as well as the development of public parks and squares progressed in parallel with the industrial revival (Younis & Bakaeva, 2020). The Soviets enacted reconstruction policies to restore the outer trappings of normalcy in an attempt to subdue the inner trauma experienced across the populace. Reintegrating and healing post-war societies is a tremendous challenge and responsibility, and the Stalin regime sought to instead replace the gruesome war memories with a collective memory of a victorious war, spearheaded by Stalin. However, the industrial focus rapidly pivoted to arms manufacturing at the expense of consumer goods and agriculture, with Soviet citizens ultimately bearing much of the cost of rebuilding. One of the most outstanding examples of reconstruction was that of Volgograd (known as Stalingrad between 1925 and 1961), which held an elevated, symbolic importance due to the infamous battle of Stalingrad which ended in Soviet victory in February 1943. There, the restoration of industry and job creation went hand-in-hand with physical and social reconstruction, allowing local enterprises to reach their pre-war levels of production as early as 1946. Partially damaged blocks of buildings were quickly restored, and local authorities and enterprises used Finnish prefabricated units to rapidly erect new housing in the form of barracks. Many residents, realising that they would not receive housing quickly, sought to construct their own private homes, for which they were allocated a seven-­ year loan. By May 1945, half of the housing stock in Stalingrad consisted of private houses. However, reconstruction efforts were impeded by two main factors. First, there was a chronic labour shortage due to the enormous number of Soviet casualties and widespread displacement. To address this, an almost paramilitary level of labour discipline was introduced, particularly after the 1947 nationalisation of enterprises, which relied heavily on demobilised soldiers (almost 10  million) and war prisoners (2.5  million, mostly

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Germans). In a sense, this continued the Gulag2 system of camps that Stalin had established in the 1920s using common prisoners and revolting peasants as forced labour. […] In large numbers, prisoners were involved in the work of removing the rubble and restoring the cities destroyed by the war—Minsk, Kyiv, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Leningrad, Kharkov, Lugansk and a number of others. They erected residential buildings, hospitals, cultural facilities, hotels and urban infrastructure. They also built in cities not affected by the war—Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk. […] Some cities (for example, Minsk) were rebuilt 60% by prisoners, in Kyiv they restored the city center and [in] Khreshchatyk, in Sverdlovsk, entire districts were built by their hands. In 1947, every fifth worker in the construction of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy enterprises was a prisoner, in the aviation industry—almost every third, in the construction of power plants—every sixth. (Apuhtin, 2021)

Second, there was a lack of cash and financial liquidity. Aside from limited loans from the UK, the USSR was unable to agree on reconstruction loans with the US, which at the time had a booming economy with a surplus reserve. Still, the Fourth Five-Year Plan allocated 16.1 billion rubles for new housing construction, “which amounted to 14.5% of the total amount of capital investment in the national economy and exceeded the amounts spent for these purposes in all previous five-year plans combined” (Winstein, 2018). Enormous funds and significant building materials were allocated to implement the November 1945 resolution by the Council of People’s Commissars on the restoration of the 15 largest and oldest Russian cities. Tens of thousands of workers were sent to replenish construction organisations, and most of the people’s commissariats (the government departments) were involved in the restoration work. With the context of the USSR’s domestic post-WWII reconstruction efforts established, this chapter will henceforth focus on the Soviet response to foreign post-war recovery challenges in neighbouring and allied countries in the aftermath of WWII and throughout the Cold War era.

2  The word ‘Gulag’ is an acronym for Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei, or ‘Main Camp Administration.’

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2.2   The USSR Approach to the Reconstruction of Eastern Europe In Eastern Europe, the period after WWII was highly dynamic, with many countries occupied by Soviet troops and notable economic, ideological, and political shifts shaping the new reality of the region. While the war against the common enemies of Fascism and Nazism had resolved, the new international order was fraught with jostling to balance power in the emerging bipolar arena. By 1947, the competition between the US and USSR for influence over Europe was animated through reconstruction efforts. By providing reconstruction assistance under the Marshall Plan, the US played a central role in the rebuilding of the war-torn Western European nations. Moscow viewed this policy as an attempt to spread American domination across Europe. The post-war situation for the countries of Eastern Europe was grim and necessitated a complicated and lengthy recovery process. Poland had lost 6 million citizens during the war, or 22% of the Polish population, and Warsaw and many other cities had been destroyed. The death toll in Hungary was 600,000 people, while the economic losses were estimated to reach 35  billion gold penge, equivalent to seven years of national income (Mirankov, 2012, p. 110). Similarly, Czechoslovakia’s economic situation suffered from its inability to raise industrial production beyond 50% of the pre-war level. Moreover, in Romania, the volume of industrial production was only 48% of the pre-war outputs in 1946, while the Bulgarian industrial production similarly fell to 64% of the pre-war volume (Zwass, 1989, p. 105). In Czechoslovakia, food production was significantly reduced, which led to increased food imports from the Soviet Union (Silina, 1948, p. 161). In 1946, Czechoslovakia also received emergency food aid, as the Soviet Union provided it with 200 thousand tons of wheat, 200 thousand tons of feed, 60 thousand tons of artificial fertilisers, and many raw materials for industrial production (Kuznetsova, 2017). In 1945, the Soviet Union and the People’s Democratic Bulgaria signed the first trade agreement. Following this agreement, the Soviet Union provided Bulgaria with 120 thousand tons of petroleum products, 11 thousand tons of cotton, 73 thousand tons of metal and metal products, and other goods. The same year, Bulgaria had already become dependent on Soviet aid, with 79.6% of imports provided by the Soviet Union and 94.3% of exports being sold to the USSR (Inozemtsev, 1965, p. 141).

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At that time, “economic cooperation began between the USSR and Hungary, and by 1948, the trade turnover between the two nations exceeded the 1938 level by almost 20 times” (ibid., p. 140). In the aftermath of the war, traditional financial and trade relationships among Eastern European countries and between Eastern and Western Europe were significantly weakened, forcing nations to seek out new sources for products that had previously been imported from the West (Global’nyj Sjevooborot, 2004). Eastern European countries turned to each other to meet their needs for trade and economic assistance as they began their road to recovery grounded in socialist ideology. This quickly set them apart from Western countries, a division that was reinforced by warm relations within the Eastern Bloc (the group of socialist Eastern European states under Soviet influence). Progressively, the isolation of socialist economies led to a geographic reorientation that created more internal dependency within the Eastern Bloc in general and on the Soviet Union in particular (Kamenskaya, 2020, pp. 113–114). As one of the superpowers of the new bipolar world order, the USSR increased its influence by providing support to developing countries, in particular through military-technical assistance. To fund its foreign reconstruction and developmental programmes, the USSR retained its significant gold reserve, which also allowed it to eradicate the use of food ration cards as early as 1947 (Plan Marshalla i…, 2016). This strong economic foundation allowed Stalin to develop a Soviet version of the Marshall Plan, which will be discussed in Sect. 2.4. The Soviet Union’s decision to create an ‘economic bloc’ was primarily dictated by a “geopolitical challenge from the United States, which had set a course for a split in Europe” (Volkov, 2007). The US Marshall Plan, discussed in detail in the following section, alongside accompanying embargo policies, had exacerbated the development of the ‘iron curtain’ and was the main contributor to the Eastern Bloc’s economic isolation. These policies drove Eastern European countries to seek to rapidly develop their own consolidated, mutually beneficial, and self-reinforcing economic activity (Shirokov, 2013, p.  86). The Soviet Union understood that it would be unable to compete with the US in an open contest for influence in Western Europe. Therefore, it became determined to create a closed system of states within Eastern Europe to serve as a bulwark against further American expansion. The Soviet Union sought to gain strategic interests and geopolitical influence, expand its territory, and reduce the spill over effect from the West, fearing potential border disputes. These goals

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were presented to the international community as an endeavour to create a closed system that could stand up to American influence through its Marshall Plan.

2.3   The Marshall Plan In the immediate aftermath of the war, the US assisted Europe by supplying necessary goods and resources to prevent hunger and to create normal living conditions to the extent possible. This included mostly food, fuel, and clothing. By mid-1947, the US had already contributed US $3 billion in emergency aid to Europe and extended a US $3.5 billion loan to the UK (Volkov, 2007). European reconstruction was by no means high on the US agenda during WWII. The immediate priority was victory in the war, and an integral part of the victory strategy involved the physical destruction of the industrial base of the Axis powers. In fact, during the war, US planners put forward a scheme for the pastoralisation of post-war Germany. After the war, Germany was divided into four zones under direct militarily occupation by the US, UK, France, and USSR. From the American perspective, the main aims for Germany were denazification and democratisation. George F. Kennan, a key architect of the Marshall Plan, reflected that “we let the economic situation slide for two years, refraining from drawing up any real programme for rehabilitation of our zone” (Kennan, 1968, p. 333). Within months of the end of the war, several factors convinced US political and military leaders of the need to address Germany’s reconstruction and recovery in particular, and European recovery in general. Social and economic conditions across Europe seemed to be getting worse rather than better. In 1946, German national income and production were less than one-third of the 1936 levels. In the UK, food rations were cut to levels below that endured in wartime, and unemployment reached 6 million. The winter of 1946/47 was particularly severe. Politically, the Soviet Union was consolidating its control over Eastern and Central Europe. In Italy and France, communist parties were gaining support. In 1947, the UK announced that it could no longer supply military aid to Greece, which was in danger of a communist take-over. This prompted the US ‘Truman Doctrine,’ or a recognition by the US that a strategy of Soviet containment required its active involvement in Europe and around the world. There was also a growing realisation that the collapse of European

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economies would have a severe impact on the US economy: Europe was the main export market for the US, and without US dollars, Europeans would be unable to buy US goods. There were indications that this could cause the US economy to slip into a recession by late 1947. Nevertheless, most commentators agree that the gathering storm of the Cold War provided the main impetus behind the Marshall Plan. In June 1947, the European Recovery Programme (known as the Marshall Plan) was announced by US Secretary of State General George Marshall in a speech at Harvard University, where he set out an American initiative to provide crucial aid to Western Europe. European states were invited to formulate a joint plan and then submit it to the US. This would avoid a process of competitive bidding between European states and would stimulate European integration. Kennan clearly hoped to force the Europeans to begin to think as Europeans and not as nationalists (ibid., p. 337). It also sent out an important political signal: Germany was to be fully included in the future of Europe. The Plan was also to be comprehensive and result in the self-­sustainability of the recipients. A State Department Planning Staff Paper sent to Secretary Marshall on 23 May 1947 stated the following goals: This European program must envisage bringing Western Europe to a point where it will be able to maintain a tolerable standard of living on a financially self-supporting basis. It must give promise of doing the whole job. The program must contain reasonable assurance that if we support it, this will be the last such program we shall be asked to support in the foreseeable future. (Kennan, 1968, p. 337)

Interestingly, aid was initially on offer to all European states, including the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern and Central Europe. However, the US imposed conditions on involvement in the Plan, which included the opening of state accounts to US scrutiny, full convertibility of currency, opening of the economy to international trade, and avoiding the nationalisation of infrastructure and industry supported by the Plan. The Soviet Union found these conditions unacceptable, and, viewing it as a threat to its position, discouraged Eastern European states from partaking in the programme. These conditions aside, recipients were to be given considerable latitude on how they spent the money. The self-reliance spirit was emphasised in Marshall’s speech, in which he said:

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It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally and to promulgate formally on its own initiative a program designed to place Western Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The formal initiative must come from Europe; and Europeans must bear the responsibility for it. (Kennan, 1968, p. 336)

By August 1947, 16 Western European states presented a plan initially calling for US $28 billion over four years. By December, President Truman presented a US $17 billion plan to Congress. There it met considerable resistance, with concerns raised that as European states warmed to socialism, there was a danger that US investment could be lost via the nationalisation of basic industries. Ultimately, Congress agreed to the disbursement of approximately US $12 billion in economic support to aid construction and financial support. The underlying philosophy behind the Marshall Plan was a belief that prosperity combined with a positive attitude towards European economic integration and interdependence would lead to sustainable peace in Europe. Therefore, the main goals of the Plan were to “rebuild war-­ devastated regions, remove trade barriers, modernize industry, make Europe prosperous again, and prevent the spread of communism” (McLean, 2016). To facilitate this, the Marshall Plan stipulated a reduction of interstate barriers, promoted increased productivity, decreased regulations, and promoted labour union membership and modern business procedures. The economic integration policy of the Marshall Plan was designed to increase trade and economic cooperation between European states. These states also agreed to a range of measures to increase cross-border investment and improve the flow of trade among themselves. From a US perspective, the Marshall Plan was seen as a particular political programme directly related to its efforts to stop the spread of communism into Eastern Europe. In a secret memorandum to President Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall expressed the hope that the economic assistance offered to Europe would “weaken the Kremlin’s stranglehold on Eastern Europe.” Developments in Eastern Europe reinforced this perspective, and the Communist Party takeover in Czechoslovakia in late February 1948 spurred the launch of the Marshall Plan, with its first disbursement of US $4 billion. The Plan’s impacts on Europe’s economic recovery are startling. By the end of the Marshall Plan (1952) Western Europe’s aggregate GNP had

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risen by 32%, agricultural production had risen by 11% above the pre-war level, and industrial production had risen by 40% above the pre-war level (ibid.).

2.4  Moscow’s Response to the Marshall Plan: The Establishment of the CMEA As noted, the USSR was initially invited to participate in the Marshall Plan, but, despite its need for financial aid, Moscow refused as it believed joining would contradict and undermine the country’s sovereignty given the various conditions imposed by the US (Volkov, 2007). In a telegram to Stalin, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and close confidant Vyacheslav Molotov expressed: “Since our position is fundamentally different from the Anglo-French position, we do not expect the possibility of any joint solution on the merits of this issue” (Krechetnikov, 2012). In addition, Stalin’s economic advisor, Yevgeny Varga, along with the USSR’s ambassador to Washington, Nikolai Novikov, similarly did not favour the American plan. In their evaluation of the Marshall Plan, they emphasised that “the plan was in the interests of the Americans” (Ibid., 2012). Furthermore, Moscow was sceptical that economic integration with the West would relinquish the USSR’s control of Eastern Bloc countries and that participation in the Marshall Plan would increase sympathy for the West and make it difficult to highlight capitalism’s shortcomings. Instead, the USSR pushed for a ‘communitarian’ model of European foreign policy, which ushered in a pattern of sovereignty and self-­ determination within the smaller European countries while requiring them to join the USSR in certain joint ventures. This reflected Moscow’s vision of a peaceful Europe based on restoring the countries’ economic potential while instilling a socialist orientation. The Soviet Union framed its approach as the most preferential and gratuitous means to increase the standard of living for neighbouring nations by creating a free market of capital, goods, and services among Eastern European states. To counter the Marshall Plan and to prevent Eastern Bloc countries from receiving US reconstruction assistance, Moscow created an alternative mechanism for accessing Soviet subsidies, raw material, trade, and markets, which was first known as ‘The Molotov Plan.’ As early as September 1947, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia held a special conference under the leadership of the USSR to develop long-term plans for furthering economic ties and the

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coordination of development. This conference created the foundation for the Molotov Plan (Murashko, 1994, p. 996). The Molotov Plan was based on a set of bilateral trade agreements, and was later institutionalised in January 1949 as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to create an economic alliance of socialist countries. The Soviet leadership provided the future CMEA members with raw materials and other supplies practically free of charge. And on December 23, 1948, a decision was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-­ Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on economic relations between the USSR and the countries of people’s democracies. (Kuzmin, 2007)

This aid offered Eastern European countries the option to avoid reliance on US aid and markets, while expanding their trade with the USSR. However, the Soviet economy could not provide Eastern Europe with the level of economic development it had been assured. War reparations factored into Soviet aid calculations significantly, and reparations paid by Germany, Finland, and other European countries to the USSR contributed considerably to its income. And, “[immediately] after the end of the war, the USSR transferred 15% of the German reparation payments to Poland. The amount was equal to the US assistance to France under the Marshall Plan” (Zatsarin, 2016). In 1948 the USSR reduced the required reparation payments from Hungary and Romania by 50% before they were entirely written off soon after. Later, as the Soviet Army had captured most of Germany in the war’s final months, the Soviet government transferred much of its German assets to the administration of Romania and Hungary. By 1949, joining the CMEA had allowed countries such as Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to abandon their payments of reparations to the USSR.  Russian researcher A.  A. Chichkin once worked in the CMEA and claimed that “the total amount of the Soviet Union’s loss of obligatory reparation payments amounted to about $130 billion in current prices” (Chichkin, 2009). In an attempt to reflect the ‘democratic ideals’ behind the plan, CMEA established a permanent Coordinating Council of Representatives of all Interested Countries, which included representation from all member nations, regardless of their size or importance. This ensured that each government had an equal say in the CMEA Council’s decisions, creating a more transparent decision-making process in which each nation was

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given a vote, in line with the original ‘communitarian’ vision advocated by Moscow. The costs of the CMEA, which were estimated around 6.5 million rubles per year, were carried disproportionately by the USSR (34%), followed by Poland and Czechoslovakia (%15 each), Romania and Hungary (12% each), Bulgaria (9%), and Albania (3%) (Stroitel’stvo obshchego rynka…, 2004). The USSR shouldered a significant amount of the cost because the security and ideological underpinning of the CMEA were closely intertwined with the Soviet’s foreign policy goals in Eastern Europe. The ideological factor also played an important role in Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe, as Moscow was determined to shape a socialist standard within the global system. To this end, the “Soviet leadership in 1945–1947 expressed its readiness to provide the states with food products (grain, meat, oil), raw materials, and minerals practically free of charge” (Prokofiev, 2014, p. 152). The CMEA Council was initially responsible for “coordinating economic plans for import-export participating countries and developing plans for economic relations between them” (Shirokov, 2006, p. 67). The Council also dealt with more specific issues, such as coordinating developmental plans for transportation, transit traffic, exchange rates, multilateral engagements, discrimination from capitalist countries, and even assistance in the case of natural disasters (ibid.). Such an ideological approach was one of the main advantages of CMEA.  While Western Europe and the US focused on increasing the countries’ competitiveness, the CMEA pursued a ‘special’ policy of division of labour and distribution of production. For the USSR, the fundamental goal was establishing not only economic but ideological and political cooperation within the framework of the CMEA. For this goal, the USSR was ready to spend any means and resources, even to the detriment of its economic indicators (Sibirskaya, 2020, p. 41). The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries signed countless bilateral deals to facilitate the delivery and sharing of goods. The Soviets primarily delivered grain, oil, cotton, machinery, tractors, and agriculture equipment, while the Eastern European countries delivered raw materials such as iron, coal, and timber. Gradually, through this established cooperation, new regional economic ties were fostered, alleviating the fallout from the war. The transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial economy had been underway in Eastern Europe for some time before the CMEA’s formation. However, the creation of the CMEA gave these states a more

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prominent voice, allowing them to accelerate the transition from agrarian-­ industrial to industrial-agrarian economies. Land reforms were implemented, and a policy of ‘collectivisation’ was introduced to encourage the former peasants to industrialise. As a result, Eastern European nations began to produce a surplus of food, which allowed them to pivot their focus and specialise in other industries. The CMEA struggled with several challenges during its early years of formation; the chief amongst them was the economic split of post-war Europe into two camps. Although, in the early days of victory against Germany, the Western European countries were happy to accept the Soviet Union as an ally, they soon refused to economically engage with Eastern Bloc countries due to the rising influence of the USSR in their affairs. Meanwhile, Moscow prevented Eastern European countries from fostering trade relations with the West (Prokofiev, 2014, p. 153). Another challenge was the political and economic vacuum created by Germany’s defeat, which enabled major American expansion into the affairs of Europe, including Eastern Europe. In 1946, the US tried to use economic sanctions to stop Poland’s nationalisation process (Shirokov, 2013, p. 89). The peak of what Moscow viewed as the US’ economic warfare policy was the decision to end all exports to the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries on 1 March 1948. This policy came in response to the Soviet decision to nationalise all private businesses and industries in the Eastern Bloc countries. The American embargo was a significant blow to the Soviet economy, as it targeted around 50% of all of its international trade goods. This reduced the bilateral trade between the US and socialist countries to US $400  million, further decreasing drastically to just US $1.8  million in 1953 (East-West trade, 1965, p.  48). To bounce back from these economic sanctions, the USSR had to further strengthen its economic ties with Eastern Europe, which replaced the traditional markets and suppliers that were lost due to the war. Despite the democratic trappings in the CMEA’s decision-making, the USSR’s reaction to any sign of dissent from within the Council was often swift and severe. Its agents in Eastern Europe were ready to arrest and suppress protests, including with military force when deemed necessary. The Soviet Union was willing to go to great lengths to protect its interests in the region, and demonstrated a willingness to deploy its military power to achieve its goals. This strategy worked: in less than one year, the CMEA was transformed from a loosely knit economic group of socialist states into

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an organisation with a strong central government and a single, well-­defined goal: to expand and develop the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union. This cumulative process led to the inevitable Sovietisation of Eastern Europe. Moscow set out on a course of military-economic competition with the West, which was carried out at the cost of considerable hardship for most of the country’s population. Still, in a mix of pride, fear, and determination to prevent another war, the spending on the military at the time corresponded with the mass mood of the Soviet people (Bystrova, 2003, p. 240).

2.5   After Stalin Until the Collapse of the USSR In the historiography of the CMEA, there are three phases of development. The first phase spans from the formation of the CMEA until the death of Stalin (1949–1953, discussed above), the second phase covered the period of 1954–1969, during which the CMEA’s economic potential was strengthened, and the third phase began with the development and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Integration in 1971 (Shirokov, 2005, p. 46). During the second phase, the Soviet Union went through rapid and unprecedented expansion under the leadership of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, who dominated politics from 1952 until 1964. The 1950s was the CMEA’s most active decade. Trade agreements were signed with Finland, Poland, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Mongolia, Iran, Belgium, Argentina, France, India, Norway, and other countries. Scientific and technical cooperation agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania were also formed (Plan Marshalla i…, 2016). In 1962, at the 20th Congress, Khrushchev officially proclaimed the USSR to be a socialist state in which the state owned and controlled the ‘commanding heights of the economy’ (strategically important sectors in Marxian economics). He also made it known that the central planning of the economy was to be expanded to cover the entire Soviet economy, which represented a significant shift in the country’s economic policy. Khrushchev linked the development of the second stage of CMEA with the adoption of the ‘Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour,’ which was an agreement between the world’s communist countries to limit capitalism and private ownership in their economies’ means of production. After this, the Soviet Union no longer led the

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CMEA, as other communist countries began to take increasingly important roles in the organisation and shape its trajectory. The second stage was critical for the CMEA because the integration process shaped the organisation’s overall economic potential. The main goal was to strengthen the economic ties between the alliance countries to complement each other’s resources and to become mutually dependent. This took place through the development of joint programmes and projects focused on improving and expanding the existing material and technical infrastructure of the CMEA. Moreover, new economic agreements were signed to facilitate trade and the exchange of goods. Additionally, CMEA member countries worked on the joint development of new industries and the construction of new shared enterprises, which would include socialist countries of other continents (Lipkin, 2017). The first long-term economic plan between the CMEA member countries was the Five-Year Plan, completed in the mid-1950s. The plan aimed to increase economic development and improve the quality of life for the citizens of the member states. “During this period, the mutual trade turnover of the CMEA countries almost doubled: from 4.5 to 8.5  billion rubles. Despite the difficult international situation, the share of these countries in world trade increased from 6.5% to 8.5%” (Orlik, 2000, pp. 274–275). The USSR also provided direct assistance to various allies. “In 1955, agreements on the provision of loans were signed with Finland (40 million rubles), Albania (60 million rubles), and Mongolia (35 million rubles)” (Plan Marshalla i…, 2016). In 1956–1958, agreements on economic cooperation and technical assistance (including through the provision of loans) were signed with many states, including Afghanistan, China, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Syria, India, Burma, North Korea, Argentina, Egypt (400 million rubles for the supply of equipment for the Aswan Dam), Iceland, and Finland (ibid.). Furthermore, the USSR reached agreements providing technical assistance for the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. The USSR even donated a Soviet share in the development of oil fields in northern Iran to the Iranian government (ibid.). The CMEA cooperation model showed the best results during the 1960s and 1970s, and in 1971 the Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Integration was adopted, laying new guidelines for CMEA activities and liberalising the system. After this, CMEA countries experienced an average

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of 66% increase in GDP between 1971 and 1980. War-ravaged Poland showed an impressive GDP increase of 81% during the same decade (Ataulina, 2012, pp.  123–128). The construction of the Soyuz Gas Pipeline in the 1970s, which carried natural gas west for a distance of 3000 km, was held as an example of what ‘fraternal cooperation’ amongst the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia could achieve. The pipeline was even referred to as the ‘Brotherhood’ gas pipeline. Another proud achievement of the period was the improvement of housing conditions for 130 million people across the CMEA countries through the construction and renewal of almost 30  million apartments between 1971 and 1980. This cooperation ensured a relatively stable economic development model, but “by the end of the 1970s, the model of the ‘socialist division of labour’ began to malfunction” (Orlik, 2009, p. 12). For example, the German Democratic Republic (GDR, also known as East Germany) was unable to produce enough goods and services to satisfy the needs of its population. At the same time, the USSR was also facing economic problems, such as a decreasing level of productivity and increasing inflation. The CMEA countries began to compete with each other for limited resources, which led to a decrease in the standard of living for the majority of the population. The growing dynamics of world trade in the 1980s were almost directly associated with a growing demand for foreign products, which was stimulated by increasing world prices without any correlating increase in the physical volumes of trade and a simultaneous fall in the relative merits of traded goods. The USSR initiated the ‘Comprehensive programme of scientific and technological progress of the CMEA member countries until the year 2000,’ which was adopted in December 1985 (Kompleksnaja programma, 1985, p.  14). It set the goal of coordinating community members in the development and use of fundamentally new types of equipment and technology, thereby creating the opportunity to reduce and further eliminate backlog in the scientific and technical aspects. Among the priority areas named were the expansion of the electricity grid to power the national economy, integrated automation, nuclear energy, biotechnology, and the development of new materials and technologies for their production and processing. The programme was designed not only to align member states’ economies with current scientific and technological progress but also to increase community cooperation through the development of direct ties between enterprises and scientific and technical organisations of individual countries, and the creation of joint scientific,

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technical, and production associations. At the same time, an idea was proposed to create ​​ a single socialist market to stimulate other economic relations between the CMEA countries; however, this was never fully implemented (Korolev, 2015, p. 150). Finally, the USSR also used ownership transfers as a way to provide economic recovery support to Eastern Bloc countries. For example, by 1952 the USSR transferred 66 of the Soviet-owned enterprises in East Germany to the ownership of the GDR government. The GDR continued to operate these factories, providing jobs for thousands of people. It also used the income from these factories to build up its military and economy as well as to pay reparations, which were later cancelled as the GDR became an indispensable partner for the USSR in its confrontation with the Western Block (Plan Marshalla i…, 2016). At the same time, the Soviet Union provided subsidies to the citizens of East Germany, which helped reduce the economic problems they had been facing. The approach taken under CMEA stood apart from that of the Marshall Plan; rather than focusing on financial support and conditional loans, Moscow supported reconstruction and revitalisation through various in-­ kind contributions, providing food and energy aid and utilising trade agreements, subsidies, ownership transfers, reparation payment forgiveness, and other strategies to build economic and political strength and co-dependence. The two most important areas where Russia played a critical role in support of not only CMEA countries but also other allies were education and military aid. The reminder of this chapter will explore these areas of intervention in more detail, given the critical role they played during the Cold War and how these priorities continue to influence Russian policy today.

2.6  Education The Soviet Union was considered one of the leading providers of education, with students from all over the world moving there to study. By the mid-1960s, the USSR ranked fourth globally in hosting foreign students (21,000, split roughly 50/50 between Communist countries and developing countries in Asia, Africa, Middle East, and Latin America) and third in scholarships for foreign nationals (15,000), while the US ranked first in both categories (Rosen, 1970, pp.  247–250). The USSR continued to host international students and even increased these numbers through the 1990s until its collapse (Savelyev et al., 1990, p. 80).

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International cultural ties were a critical component of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and an essential element of Soviet diplomacy. The USSR actively promoted educational, cultural, and scientific exchanges with other socialist countries, as well as with non-socialist countries. Moscow sought to develop international cultural relations, including higher education, to advance the cause of communism. The Soviet state used a variety of means to further these aims, including: The organisation of international conferences and symposia, the creation of museums and specialised state museums, the organisation of international exhibitions and competitions, the publication and distribution of literature, and the organisation of scientific research; training of specialists for foreign countries in domestic universities; organising training in the country’s educational institutions, including their construction and equipment; selection and direction of specialists for scientific and language training, teaching and translation work; exchange of students, trainees, and researchers. (Petrik, 2007, p. 132)

Moreover, the Soviet government assisted its Eastern Bloc allies in establishing their own higher education systems, modelled on that of the Soviet Union. It also sought to promote the Russian language and therefore prioritised contributions to training education personnel. The Soviet approach to education was based on a calculated, authoritarian, and bureaucratic approach to the development of education (Pryakhin, 1995, p. 13). This approach was centred on the notion that the purpose of education was primarily to train the masses of workers needed for the future industrial production and military needs of the USSR. Thus, the state viewed education as a means of creating and maintaining a loyal population that would be willing to work and remain faithful to the Communist Party. The Soviet education system proliferated, capitalising on the advantages provided by a communist system that thrived on strategic economic management and training (ibid.). The USSR further supported the integration of totalitarian governance models by training specialists in developing countries to implement a subordinate model of economic and political dictatorship (ibid.). The Soviet approach to education included training national cadres until the early 1960s. This system was implemented on a legal basis through the implementation of bilateral agreements and treaties between the USSR and neighbouring countries (Petrik, 2007, p.  133). The first agreement between the USSR and a European country regarding the

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provision of education and the establishment of higher educational institutions was signed with Bulgaria in 1952. The agreement facilitated the exchange of students between Bulgaria and the USSR, which enabled the establishment of full-scale academic cooperation between the two countries. It established a plan for annually training 150 students in the USSR and providing scholarships for 100 students. The first Bulgarian students to study in the USSR were admitted in 1953. In 1956, the People’s Republic of Azerbaijan, which would later become the independent nation of Azerbaijan, signed an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation with the USSR, making it one of the first countries in the region to establish formal diplomatic ties with the USSR. The agreement laid the groundwork for over a decade of close cooperation between the two countries. In the same year, “an agreement was concluded between the governments of the USSR and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the education of citizens of this state in higher civilian educational institutions of the USSR” (ibid.). In addition, students and teachers who could speak the Russian language increased dramatically. The Soviet government offered free Russian language training to anyone who wanted to learn it. People who received training in the Soviet Union were also allowed to study at the country’s universities. Subsequently, “in connection with the rapid growth of demand for highly qualified specialists, in 1962, it was decided to develop international contacts on a multilateral basis” (Savelyev et al., 1990, p. 81). The CMEA’s Standing Commission for the Coordination of Research in the Scientific and Technical Sphere was established in 1962 at the First CMEA Summit as the highest CMEA body coordinating research in the scientific and technical spheres. It was also responsible for formulating and recommending to the CMEA Council of Ministers the direction for the development of science and technology in the Soviet Union and for coordinating the actions of the various Soviet research institutes and other research organisations. The Commission’s framework included a process of cooperation in training scientific and pedagogical personnel (ibid.). The CMEA’s adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Integration in 1971 ushered in a new phase of education programmes. The cooperation programme was adapted to train scientific personnel at the most prominent national research and educational institutions. This programme included the provision and use of advanced training institutes, specialised courses, seminars, scientific conferences, and internships in particular and international scientific institutions for the advanced training of

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specialist scientists. The CMEA member countries agreed on all of these measures, which supported the continual rotation of teachers and education courses (ibid., p. 82). During this time, there was constant inter-university cooperation, which engendered foreign relations in research and academia. This cooperation stemmed from the agreements and the annual planning of the education exchange between nations. For example, in 1996, a joint academic programme was planned between the University of Georgia and Moscow State University. Participants were able to learn through the other university’s personnel training, which was facilitated by the exchange of scientists for lectures, special courses, established programmes, manuals, as well as joint scientific investigations and international conferences (Savelyev et al., 1990). Beginning in the second half of the 1950s, the Soviet Union started to assist in the development of higher education and trained personnel in ‘third-world’ countries (so-called for their non-alignment with either the US or the USSR), which was regarded as an ideological duty for socialist countries. This assistance was mainly aimed at developing countries with large reservoirs of human resources in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. The USSR shifted its focus to these nations after the collapse of colonialism (during which colonial authorities neglected and even suppressed efforts to develop education and national culture). When these former colonies achieved independence, most lacked proficient federal personnel and the necessary educational and scientific resources for their training (Petrik, 2007, p. 134). By providing scholarships and tuition-free education, the Soviet Union could impart its socialist influence and play a significant role in building these nations to their standards. The support was given in the form of both grants and technical assistance used for the construction of new universities and educational facilities. By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union had established around 50 higher and secondary specialised educational institutions in developing countries (Savelyev et  al., 1990, p.  85). The Soviets even transported their teachers and educators to work in many universities across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Scholarships were mainly provided to students committed to teaching key subjects in developing countries, such as medicine, engineering, and computer science. “Of the total number of those who studied in the USSR from the Third World countries, more than 25 thousand people were in Africa, about 28 thousand people in Asia, and over 7 thousand people in

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Latin America” (ibid.). The USSR used higher education to strengthen international cooperation and to help build communist industries that would fulfil their national interests in developing countries (Petrik, 2007). It should be noted that international scientific forums were a characteristic feature for promoting science in the Soviet system of higher education and in CMEA countries. The Soviet government promoted the global standard of science through its scientific academies, the International Union of Academies of Sciences (IUS), and the World Academy of Sciences (WAS). These forums allowed scientists from different countries to discuss scientific problems and share experiences. The IUS and the WAS often served as forums for resolving political and ideological disputes. Furthermore, “they contributed to the prompt transfer of information about scientific and technical achievements, [and to] the strengthening of scientific contacts between scientists” (Petrik, 2007, p. 134).

2.7  Military Aid The 1950s were a time of highly successful cooperation within the USSR. The economic focus was on constructing factories and infrastructure, which required the collaboration of many industries. This level of cooperation was especially evident in the economic sphere, where the government coordinated the efforts of millions of people involved in extracting and producing raw materials, manufacturing goods, and delivering services. The government also required a high degree of cooperation from its citizens, who were expected to work hard and to contribute to society’s collective goals. After the death of Stalin, this focus quickly shifted to military priorities and led the Soviet Union to become one of the largest arms suppliers in the world (Plan Marshalla i…, 2016). Almost half of the [military] supplies fell on the states of Eastern Europe, primarily the Warsaw Pact countries, Vietnam, China, North Korea, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia. Armament was supplied to the countries of the Middle East and Africa. Weapons were provided free or sold at symbolic prices, mainly on credit. (ibid.)

The share of the total volume of global arms supplies provided by the USSR reached 40% in the early 1980s, and for some types of military equipment and weaponry (e.g., Kalashnikov assault rifles and tanks), it reached 50%. The Soviet Union held the title of the world’s largest

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exporter of arms until the end of the Cold War. This is because military production was the top priority sector in the economy, and it received the largest share of the state budget. The military-industrial complex also employed a significant portion of the working population. The country’s extensive international arms trade was driven by a rising global demand for weapons. The USSR competed with the US and other advanced countries for the right to supply armaments. “In the early 1980s, 25% of all weapons and military equipment produced in the USSR were exported” (Rol’ SSSR v…, 2019). The Soviet Union expended colossal funds and efforts to support friendly regimes in developing countries, including Marxist insurgencies and non-Marxist dictators alike. The Soviets trained and equipped revolutionary armies and provided military advisers to help keep allied rulers in power. According to Western data alone: From 1966 to 1975, the USSR provided developing countries with ammunition and military equipment for $9.2 billion, and from 1978 to 1982, a sum of $35.4 billion. The number of countries that received Soviet military aid in the 1970s and 1980s also proliferated. From 1966 to 1975, 29 countries received assistance; from 1980 to 1984, 36 countries received help. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union accounted for 35% of all military supplies to third-world countries. (Rol’ SSSR v…, 2019)

The USSR was interested in increasing its influence in the Caribbean and Latin America, which was the main reason for its extensive support to Cuba. In 1961—in response to the American blockade on Cuba in 1960— the USSR signed an agreement with Cuba to supply military equipment, beginning a long-lasting military cooperation between the two countries. The military equipment provided included tanks and planes, which helped the Cuban army stand against the US, while fulfilling the Soviet interest of containing American influence. The Cuban army was trained by the Soviet military, and Cuba carried out continuous military exercises with the Soviets. Cuba paid for the military equipment in sugar and oil, which were its main export products at that time. Ultimately, the USSR supplied Cuba with US $48.5 million worth of military equipment, for which Cuba only reciprocated $6 million. These transactions continued with another agreement that increased the value of military supplies provided by the USSR to US $149.5 million, for which Cuba paid only $67.5 million. Both deals were done through ten-year loans from the USSR to Cuba at 2% per annum (Rozin, 2015).

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Such favourable conditions were provided to [s]tates that proclaimed the official Marxist-Leninist ideology or national liberation movements. In exchange, they carried out a policy loyal to the USSR; they paid with whatever they could. Some provided territories for military bases, others paid with bananas and cane sugar, and some simply [received such conditions] because they were against American expansion and declared themselves fighters against imperialism. (Plan Marshalla i…, 2016)

Military-economic aid was also given to some states without a cost, as a means to further Soviet interests. For example, the USSR restored almost the entirety of Egypt’s defence potential after it had consecutively lost three wars with Israel. The Soviet Union provided weapons, military and other equipment, and building materials almost free of charge. Moreover, Soviet military generals trained the Egyptian Army in combat and to operate its equipment more effectively. Later, in 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser asked the USSR leadership to send Soviet military units to the country (Trofimov, 2020). The same policy was pursued in Syria, Vietnam, and Angola. These nations “were able to defend their national independence only thanks to the military assistance of the USSR” (Plan Marshalla i…, 2016). Not only did the USSR send large military and weapons capabilities to these countries, but it also provided them with military specialists. Moscow ultimately used its wartime support as a foundation for post-war relations, including providing reconstruction support, building markets and alliances, and establishing global military bases. In 1954, the Algerian struggle for independence began, which quickly developed into the Algerian War of Independence as the Algerian National Liberation Army and the Algerian National Liberation Front, made up of guerrilla fighters, began to clash with the French military. The war was a significant strategic boon for the Soviet Union, which sent military advisers and weapons to the Algerians (Trofimov, 2020). After the end of the war, Algeria signed a cooperation agreement with the USSR in 1963, which committed to providing reconstruction assistance in the areas of training, agriculture, geological exploration, and building industrial plants (ibid.). Aside from profiting from weapons sales, the USSR used its support for Algeria to gain an ideological foothold in North Africa, while weakening a core Western opponent, France, and sowing disagreement

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among NATO allies as the US was generally against the idea of Europeans maintaining their colonies. This strategy was followed elsewhere in Africa as the Cold War was increasingly defining the relationship between the USSR and the US. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the USSR started to develop a similar interest in Angola as it entered its war of independence against Portugal, which began to lose control of its last African colony. With the support of Cuba, the USSR started to set up training camps and advise the leaders of the three main anti-colonial Angolan political factions, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which were fighting against the Portuguese. As Angola won its independence in 1975 and the war turned into a civil war between the same factions, the USSR and Cuba chose to support the MPLA, which declared that it would take the country on a socialist course and proclaimed the creation of the People’s Republic of Angola. Meanwhile, UNITA turned to China and South Africa for support, while the FNLA allied itself with the US and Zaire. This highlights the ideological divisions between the two superpowers, which were played out in various conflicts around the world and motivated Soviet investment and military aid. As a result of its engagement, “the USSR received operational naval and air bases in southern Africa, and Angola received assistance with weapons and military equipment, as well as military specialists” (Trofimov, 2020). At the same time, the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique also gained its independence in 1975. Again, the Soviets provided military aid and technical assistance to the country, paving the way for close ideological ties. Due to the involvement of Soviet military specialists: A military school in Nampula, a training centre in Nakala, a training centre for border troops in Inhambane, a school for junior aviation specialists in Beira and a driving school in Maputo were formed in the country. Many Soviet officers and soldiers taught the Mozambican military how to handle the supplied equipment. (ibid.)

All in all, during the Cold War and amidst the period of decolonisation, the USSR became one of the most active supporters of the leadership of newly independent countries, providing them with the resources to fight colonial powers and to maintain and consolidate their domestic influence.

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For this reason, Moscow won the loyalty of many newly forming governments, which ultimately became close allies and provided markets for export and locations for global bases.

2.8  Conclusion The Soviet Union’s primary goal in the post-war period was to demonstrate its self-sufficiency and influence, which required economic, social, and infrastructural recovery within its borders and in neighbouring countries. Throughout the post-war period, Moscow used its influence and support in reconstruction and development to bolster its alliances, counter US influence, spread Russian culture, and ultimately shape economic and social realities in its favour. In the aftermath of the war, Stalin deployed reconstruction policies to restore the outer trappings of normalcy, calming the populace and diverting attention away from the repression carried out by his regime. Important characteristics that marked the Soviet reconstruction approach were the use of centralised planning through Five-Year Plans and mobilising the population around a patriotic, nationalist cause. The preservation of historical heritage was used to ground and reassure the population of their sense of belonging to the land to stimulate social renewal. Moscow first prioritised and focused on neighbouring countries with common cultural and geographical ties, and the Soviet Union provided significant aid to Eastern European countries in the immediate aftermath of the war, enabling recovery and creating economic dependency. The USSR viewed the Marshall Plan as an attempt to spread American domination across Europe, and Stalin rejected US reconstruction support and encouraged Eastern European countries to do the same. Through the Molotov Plan and the CMEA, the USSR created an alternative to the Marshall Plan, which led to the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe. The increased isolation of socialist economies ultimately led to a geographic reorientation that created internal dependency within the Eastern Bloc and on the Soviet Union in particular. Unlike the American approach, the Soviets relied mainly on in-kind support to drive reconstruction and expand its influence, through providing energy, food, agricultural, and other resources and utilising subsidies, ownership transfers, reparation payment forgiveness, trade agreements, and other strategies to cultivate economic development and interdependence.

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As the Soviet economy grew and recovered, Moscow began to offer support outside of Eastern Europe, focused on two prongs: education and military support. The USSR was considered one of the global leaders in education, and it sought to use educational linkages as the first step to foster stronger ties with allies, developing international cultural relations and ultimately advancing the cause of communism. Beginning in the second half of the 1950s, the Soviet Union began to assist in the development of higher education and personnel training in ‘third-world’ countries, which it regarded as an ideological duty for socialist countries. Through its training and exchange programmes, Moscow promoted the Russian language and culture, as well as communist ideology. The second prong in this strategy was building alliances and shoring up allies through supplying military aid, which served to grow Soviet military exports, foster alliances and loyalty among allied states, and keep the US in check. Moscow supplied military equipment at favourable rates and in some cases almost free of charge to gain influence in strategically significant areas. During the 1960s, the USSR rejected colonialism and supported various independence movements, providing not only military supplies but also training and specialists, which led to many of the newly independent countries signing cooperation agreements with the USSR. Importantly, the focus on in-kind contributions, developing economic interdependence, and education and military aid remain top priorities in Russia’s current diplomatic and aid approaches. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has taken on the role as the successor state, employing policies that remain fundamentally similar to Soviet thinking. After the collapse of the USSR and the period of ensuing chaos and weakness of the 1990s, Russia seems to have reflected on the great principles and achievements of the Soviet times, and has held up many of these ideas as foundational to the Russian approach and political identity. These include the concepts of using reconstruction and aid to shape social, economic, and political realities in Moscow’s favour and to distract from oppressive policies; appealing to nationalism to create local support for larger goals and sacrifices; investing in and highlighting culture to ground the population in a sense of belonging; rejecting intervention and foreign interference; approaching Eastern Europe and the Russian-speaking world as a collective entity; turning inwards and creating self-sufficiency among close allies in the face of economic isolation and sanctions; countering Western interventions (formerly in the context of colonialism, currently in the context of regime change and institution-building); and improving livelihoods through stability and state control rather than liberal values.

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The next chapter will explore how, after the collapse of the USSR, Russia as the successor state has continued to apply many of these principles and priorities as a (re)emerging donor, while maintaining an approach that is entirely distinct from the Western model of development.

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assessment of the problem of the formation of the Eastern European economic bloc in the light of new sources]. Chuvash University Bulletin, 4, 85–91. (In Russ.). Sibirskaya, A.  V. (2020). Opyt Soveta ekonomicheskoj vzaimopomoshchi dlya Evrazijskogo ekonomicheskogo soyuza. [Experience of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance for the Eurasian Economic Union]. Eurasia Expert, 1–2, 37–42. (In Russ.). Silina, M. A. (1948). Informacionnaja zapiska M.A.Silina V.M. Molotovu s analizom vnutripoliticheskogo polozheniya CHekhoslovakii i prognozom razvitiya strany v 1949 g. [Information note by M.A. Silina to V.M. Molotov with an analysis of the internal political situation of Czechoslovakia and a forecast of the country’s development in 1949]. Prague. (In Russ.) Stroitel’stvo obshchego rynka socialisticheskih stran oboshlos’ sovetskomu soyuzu pochti v 200 milliardov dollarov. [The construction of the common market of the socialist countries cost the Soviet Union almost 200 billion dollars]. (2004). Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://crime.fakty.ua/67564-­ stroitelstvo-­o bcshego-­r ynka-­s ocialisticheskih-­s tran-­o boshlos-­s ovetskomu-­ soyuzu-­pochti-­v-­200-­milliardov-­dollarov (In Russ.) Trofimov, A. (2020). Po Pravu Bratstva: Pjat’ Afrikanskih Stran, v Kotoryh Sluzhili Sovetskie Voennye. [By right of brotherhood: Five African countries in which the Soviet military served]. Istoriya.rf. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from: https://histrf.ru/read/articles/po-­pravu-­bratstva-­piat-­afrikanskikh-­stran-­v-­ kotorykh-­sluzhili-­sovietskiie-­voiennyie (In Russ.) Volkov, A. (2007, July 7). Plan Marshalla. Pochemu Moskva ego otvergla? [Marshall Plan. Why did Moscow reject it?]. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://ria.ru/20070605/66676583.html (In Russ.) Winstein, I. (2018, November 24). Vosstanovlenie i blagoustrojstvo gorodov i sel posle Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojny. [Restoration and improvement of cities and villages after the Great Patriotic War]. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://www.winstein.org/publ/36-­1-­0-­3261 Younis, A., & Bakaeva, N.  V. (2020). Osobennosti Vosstanovleniya Territorij Gorodov, Postradavshih v Hode Boevyh Dejstvij. [Features of the restoration of the territories of cities affected in the course of hostilities]. Tradition and Innovation in Building and Architecture, 663–672. Zatsarin, I. (2016). Kak Sozdavalsja Zapad. K Godovshhine Otkaza SSSR ot Plana Marshalla. [How the West was created. On the anniversary of the Soviet Union’s abandonment of the Marshall Plan]. Istoriya.RF. Retrieved September 22, 2022, from https://histrf.ru/read/articles/kak-­sozdavalsia-­zapad-­k-­69-­ lietiiu-­otkaza-­sssr-­ot-­plana-­marshalla (In Russ.) Zwass, A. (1989). The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance: The thorny path from political to economic integration. Sharpe.

CHAPTER 3

Russia’s Unique Approach as a  (Re)Emerging Donor

The end of the Cold War transformed international relations and the geopolitical system. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s downfall, Russia became the de facto successor state to one of the most influential nations of the twentieth century. After holding superpower status for decades, the collapse of the Soviet Union downgraded Russia’s prominence to that of a regional power with few friends and numerous enemies. For the first time in its modern history, Moscow did not influence the global politics that affected the country’s future. This presented both an opportunity and a significant challenge for Russia as a reinvented international actor. After the fall of the USSR, Russia faced a protracted economic and social crisis, worsened by a series of military conflicts in the middle of the last century. Yet, it nevertheless became integrated into major global governance processes, particularly through its distinct contributions to humanitarian action and peacekeeping, which were aimed at improving Russia’s image both externally and internally, while serving its fundamental national interests (Stepanova, 2007). After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia felt compelled to reinvent itself and to re-establish its place in the world. The new Russia wanted to assert its power and influence in its own ‘backyard,’ the traditionally Slavic lands of the old USSR. This goal suited Russia’s international priorities at the time: establishing power and influence, regaining respect and support, and obtaining more natural resources. At the same time, Russia was

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pursuing a rather assertive foreign policy; however, this was not streamlined and only served to further destabilise its international standing. Its approach to foreign interventions included, according to Lewis (2022), “an emerging Russian model of stabilization [that] prioritizes order over justice and advocates short-term goals of conflict management over longterm goals of conflict resolution.” Additionally, Russia did not have the opportunity to focus on elevating its standing in the humanitarian field as it was forced to prioritise its internal conflicts. The country was involved in a series of military engagements in Chechnya and the neighbouring republic of Dagestan, which required a significant military and financial commitment. With the global rise of prominent terrorist attacks at the turn of the century, the Russian Federation joined other countries in focusing on security, which resulted in a shift in its foreign policy priorities and a significant increase in military spending. Thus, throughout most of the 1990s, post-Soviet Russia’s foreign policy was primarily defined by its internal politics, which led to Russia being one of the Eastern Bloc recipients of Western aid, a new position that “undermined its self-image” and fuelled its drive to escape this position (Brezhneva & Ukhova, 2013). Notably, in the early 2000s, the Russian government vehemently strove to re-establish itself as the ‘great power’ it once was, and to establish its standing in the multipolar, globalised world (ibid.). While the Cold War had officially ended and Russia and many former Soviet states seemed to be reinventing their relationship with the West, Russian foreign policy, particularly after Putin’s election in 2000, resumed an adversarial approach towards the West accompanied by a rising nationalist sentiment that Russia’s loss of its former USSR territory was a travesty. The Russian perception that aid donors held sway and importance in the international sphere and aid recipients were weak fuelled Russia’s decisive transformation into a re-emerging donor. Through this role, Moscow sought to expand its influence within the humanitarian and peacekeeping realms and in conflict and post-conflict zones abroad. Within the last two decades, Russia’s opposition within the United Nations to the use of force, particularly that led by the US, made it a central actor in peacekeeping operations. However, Russia faced limitations in achieving this transformation because it did not attempt to increase its peacekeeping operational capacity. Instead, it was content to provide peacekeeping troops through its long-standing agreements with the UN on a rotational basis, which served as a substitute for a more active military

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presence. Russia’s post-Soviet international mediating role was also limited by the perception that it lacked the necessary degree of neutrality or impartiality expected from an international mediator. Moscow views peacekeeping missions not only as a means of maintaining the political status quo and resolving humanitarian issues but also as a key tool for achieving its goal of defending its national interests, at least in the ‘near abroad’ countries that hold direct strategic or political significance to Russia. Moreover, according to governmental surveys, Russian public opinion significantly prefers the deployment of Russian soldiers inside Russia’s security neighbourhood (i.e., neighbouring countries) rather than in other countries further afield, and Russia generally views peacekeeping involvement as part of its national security strategy (Bratersky, 2018). In this way, peacekeeping missions relate not only to the international agenda but are also used to gain favour and loyalty among some demographics of the Russian population.

3.1   Russia as a Non-traditional Donor Within international academia, donorship can be divided into two general categories: traditional donors and non-traditional donors (also known as ‘emerging’ or ‘re-emerging’ donors, terms which will be used interchangeably for the remainder of this book). The first category of traditional donors includes the established system of donorship conducted by government entities, large foundations, and corporations. These entities have dominated the global architecture of humanitarian aid since the 1950s and 1960s (Palagashvili & Williamson, 2018). Their goals are to alleviate the immediate concerns and suffering of communities in need of aid, rather than focusing or planning for the long-term goals of the community and its development. Traditional donors are also actors who have historically been the primary source of funding in the development assistance sector, typically as bilateral donors, development banks, and multilateral organisations, such as UN entities, the World Bank, and the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (ibid.). These traditional donors still contribute the largest source of development assistance. However, their share of assistance continues to decrease as more and more recipient countries develop their own sources of funding and renewed approaches to donorship. With the arrival of the 1990s and the heightening phenomenon of globalisation, new actors emerged at the forefront of humanitarian aid,

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playing increasingly important roles within the donor community. They tend to be comprised of a set of highly diverse actors in terms of culture, religion, geography, and political power structures, as well as the budgets that they have allocated for humanitarian assistance (ibid.). These non-­ traditional donors include countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Brazil, South Korea, and Russia. These emerging donors have forged partnerships outside the conventional OECD framework, diversifying their funding sources and creating multiple streams of humanitarian aid (Paczynska, 2016). This can make it difficult to ascertain the total amount of funding from each actor, as their contributions to the development assistance sector often originate from various sources. Due to this dynamic donor relationship, the OECD has been put under pressure to change and adapt its development and humanitarian assistance coordination to better suit the needs of emerging donors, which are often more nimble and flexible than the traditional ones. In the past, emerging donors’ assistance was channelled towards their immediate geographic neighbourhood. However, as their interests expanded, they have come to assist a wider geographical range of nations. This has brought them into the sphere of influence of the more traditional donors and forced them to develop new, more dynamic ways of working with OECD states to secure their support (given that non-traditional donors were not always in a position to afford to meet recipients’ needs on their own) while maintaining the autonomy to pursue their own priorities. This has also led to new ways of thinking about the relationship between emerging donors and recipient governments, particularly regarding the degree of recipient government control that is appropriate. Emerging donors, like traditional donors, are interested in supporting poverty reduction and encouraging conditions that are favourable to foreign direct investment. However, in contrast to traditional development donors,  the emerging ones are less focused on long-term development goals. They instead prioritise providing immediate technical assistance and capacity building to help state and civil society organisations work more effectively. They also tend to be bilateral in their approach, focusing on a few countries or issues rather than working at the broader global level. Moreover, emerging donors do not favour conditionalities based on tying assistance to good governance reforms or environmental policies (ibid.). While the traditional donor countries have been the dominant force in development aid over the past few decades, the growing role of non-­ traditional or re-emerging donors has led to a more complex development

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aid landscape, with several actors playing different roles and giving recipient countries multiple options and models. Because of their decades of experience, traditional donors are increasingly able to provide assistance to developing countries that is more tailored to the local context and participatory in nature than the assistance provided by emerging donors. The broader assumption therefore remains that traditional donors are better equipped with the familiarity and know-how of other developmental problems and potential solutions for various conflict situations. And, as such, traditional donors deeply understand the needs of the people they work with, and their funding is well-suited to meeting those needs.

3.2  The Evolution of Russian Aid Russia’s global humanitarian aid primarily consists of modest contributions to the UN and other large-scale humanitarian operations, while its development assistance is closely linked to its foreign policy and tends to focus on health, education, and food security. On the whole, assistance is primarily disbursed through the Russian International Cooperation Agency (RICA), which provides grants in these areas. Unlike the case of other emerging donors, the bilateral assistance through RICA often comes with overt political conditionality designed to promote Russia’s geostrategic interests. These interests mainly relate to promoting stability, managing transnational threats that could spill over from neighbouring countries into Russia (Zürcher, 2016), and supporting Russian national interests. As such, Russia’s development cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus is mostly oriented towards the political, security, and economic component of Russia’s national interests, with the main goal of strengthening regional stability, and in particular of ensuring the security of its energy supply (Degterev, 2013). As discussed in the previous chapter, the Soviet Union launched its first formalised official aid and trade programme in 1953, and its assistance was primarily channelled through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which consisted of the Soviet Union and its partners. The Soviet government intended for the programme to promote economic cooperation with the Soviet Union’s socialist allies, mainly in Eastern Europe. It was initially designed as a limited programme lasting for three years; however, it later expanded to include developing nations in the Global South and was transformed into the Development Assistance Program (DAP) in 1979, which lasted until the collapse of the USSR.

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The Soviet Union pursued an active international development assistance (IDA) policy with countries in the Middle East and South Asia becoming top destinations of Soviet aid, with large infrastructure projects used to project power and gain allies. The assistance was primarily directed at industrialising recipient countries and supporting their achievement of a stable economic position, all in support of the goal of sustaining endogenous growth and creating economic conditions that benefited the Soviet Union. Within two decades after WWII, the USSR was among the world’s largest donors, spending about 1.5% of GDP on aid to poorer partners in South America, Asia, and Africa. According to Fuchs and Asmus (2018) Soviet aid reached a peak of US$1 billion in 1960—“which, as a share of gross national product, was roughly equal to the United States’ aid contributions at the time” (Fuchs & Asmus, 2018). Russia’s history with aid also involves a period during which it was an aid recipient. The collapse of the Soviet Union left a legacy of economic stagnation and political uncertainty in Russia. The resulting economic-­ financial crisis required urgent action (Rakhmangulov, 2010), and the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were called in to help. The World Bank and the IMF provided loans to Russia to ensure economic recovery. By 1990, countries from the former USSR, including Russia, were added to the DAC’s list for development assistance. Aid to these countries did not fall under the definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and was instead referred to as official assistance (OA). In 2005, Russia was excluded from the list of OA recipient countries, reflecting the fact that in the 2000s, Russia gained a favourable position within global energy markets. This enabled Moscow to increase its financial resources, which it used to improve the economy and to reengage in international development assistance programmes as a donor, with its annual volume of ODA reaching US $0.5  billion in 2010 (Potapenko, 2014). However, it was Russia’s chairmanship of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg in 2006 that proved pivotal in restoring its global political ambitions (Beletskaya, 2015, p. 141). Soon after, in 2007, Russia’s position as a new donor was revealed in an official document for the first time: ‘The Concept of Participation of the Russian Federation in International Development Assistance’ (Beletskaya, 2015). This policy document contained references to Russia’s international obligations—the Millennium

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Table 3.1  Volumes and structure of ODA provided by the Russian Federation on a multilateral basis (according to the OECD database, 2010–2019, actual assistance provided, million dollars, at current prices) Category of AID

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

Comprehensive ODA % of GNI Contributions to the core budget of multilateral organisations Debt relief

472

479

465

714

876

1161 1258 1190 999

1227 962

0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.1 170 238 250 351 215 259 490

0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 455 370 534 265

0

424

0

0

0

240

416

424

424

424

424

Data source: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE1

Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus,1 and the Paris Declaration2 (Concept of Participation…, 2007). It reaffirmed the “multifaceted approach of Russia in its development assistance policies that go beyond the previous emphasis on debt relief commitments that Russia made in 2005” (Zaitsev, 2020, p. 65). It also consolidated the relationship between aid and Russian foreign policy, declaring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the prominent actor in aid alongside the Ministry of Finance (Chernenko, 2014). Similar to other emerging donors, it is difficult to estimate the size of Russia’s aid contributions because much of these were either in-kind (food, arms, etc.) or not registered with the OECD. The following table provides a summary of the publicly available information via the OECD. Table 3.1 identifies several trends in Russia’s development assistance over the last decade. First, 2013–2014 witnessed the start of a significant increase in aid which can be linked to Russia’s intervention in both Crimea and Syria. Despite the increase in the amount of ODA provided by Russia, as a percentage of Russia’s GNI, the figure remained at or below 0.1%. 1  The international conference on financing for development held in Monterrey, Mexico, 18–22 March 2002. 2  The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was agreed upon at the Second High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The Declaration sets out five central pillars to improve global aid: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability.

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This of course reflects the figures registered with OECD and does not necessarily reflect the actual amount of aid in cash or in-kind contributions provided globally. The decrease in 2020 reflects a global trend following the COVID-19 pandemic. It is interesting to note that following the annexation of Crimea and the intervention in Syria, Russia’s contribution to multilateral organisations, including the UN, has increased overall, possibly reflecting an attempt to establish a degree of legitimacy as most countries rejected these interventions. Finally, from 2014, Moscow decided to cancel the debt accumulated by several countries, in a move similar to its decision in 2010 to waive Afghan debt (which at the time was not registered by OECD as aid). By 2012, the Russian Federal Agency for CIS Affairs (the Commonwealth of Independent States),3 Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation (known as the Rossotrudnichestvo), which is structurally part of the system of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began to engage in bilateral assistance programmes mainly focused on promoting the Russian language and culture. The Rossotrudnichestvo is a leading agency with the primary mission to strengthen Russia’s global influence, but it is primarily aimed at the CIS countries (Official Website of Rossotrudnichestvo). Another Russian development outreach entity is RusAid, which can be seen as a counterpart to the American government’s USAID. RusAid addresses global challenges such as drug addiction, drug trafficking, and illegal migration. According to the Official Website of RusAid, the programme “helps to establish efficient controls over the epidemiological situation and take timely prophylactic measures as well as provide timely medical aid to the population, especially various risk groups like emigrants, members of their families, injection drug users, and others.” This builds on the proud history of medical advancements in Russia, from Empress Catherine II’s famous 1768 smallpox vaccination rollout through the significant medical and vaccine developments made during the Soviet era. In April 2014, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the ‘Concept of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of International Development Assistance’ was approved, in which bilateral assistance was identified as a priority. The Concept identified both regional and international priorities for assistance. Regionally, the Republics of 3  A regional intergovernmental organisation consisting of former Soviet states established after the dissolution of the USSR.

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Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both of which declared independence from Georgia, and are discussed at length in Chap. 4) were given priority, alongside other states where Russia implemented economic and social projects in line with its interests, such as Kyrgyzstan (ibid.). Discussing the importance of the Concept, Konstantin Kosachev, who headed the Rossotrudnichestvo between 2012 and 2014, explained that Russia’s past participation in international development assistance was largely limited to making financial contributions to projects prepared by multilateral economic and financial institutions, such as UNDP and the World Bank. This had depersonalised Russian aid, making it difficult for the recipients to acknowledge Moscow’s role. In the new concept, it was argued that Russian aid should aim at solving global problems related to poverty, social, and economic development, as well as the consequences of conflict and crises, while promoting Russia’s national interest and ensuring visibility. These interests vary from the stabilisation of socio-economic situations in neighbouring countries to solving various transboundary challenges. The underlining belief was that the inability to address problems in the adjacent territories may lead to the emergence or aggravation of similar issues within the Russian Federation (Chernenko, 2014). As a result, since 2014, Russia has increased the scale and intensity of its humanitarian aid programme, which mainly focused on conflict-affected areas and funding UN humanitarian operations. Still, the proportion of its GDP dedicated to aid efforts remains far lower than that of many traditional donors (Brezhneva & Ukhova, 2013). Nevertheless, Russia is one of the world’s largest donors of in-kind assistance, providing significant aid to its CIS neighbours, which includes fuel, transport, and construction services. Much of this aid is used to prevent the spread of poliomyelitis (polio) from neighbouring Tajikistan and to combat illiteracy in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are the primary sources of labour migration to Russia. Since 2008, Russia provided US $4.6  billion in assistance to its CIS neighbours in the form of concession loans, technical assistance, and various programmes to reduce the imbalance in regional finances (Moseikin, 2011, p. 60) (Table 3.2). When it comes to recipients of Russian aid, it is clear that the priority is given to (a) traditional allies from the days of the Cold War (such as Cuba and Nicaragua); (b) the post-Soviet countries (such as Kyrgyzstan and Armenia); and (c) China, which has been a critical ally in Russia’s competition with the US. Meanwhile, Syria became a major destination of Russian aid only after Moscow had begun its military operation there in 2015

472.4 272.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

479 198.3 0 10.4 18.5 2.5 60.7 5 0 10.7 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.1 0

2011 465 156.7 6.3 27.7 11.5 4.2 7.9 11.1 8.2 6.9 0.1 0.7 0 0.5 0.1 0.8 2 1.9 0 0.3 0.7

2012 713.7 256.8 2 54.5 23.9 3.7 25.8 12.2 9.2 25.9 9.3 0 0 23.5 1 0.5 3.9 0.3 0 0 0.2

2013

Data source: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE2A#

Total ODA Distributed among countries Cuba Kyrgyzstan China Armenia Nicaragua Tajikistan Syria Serbia Mozambique Guinea Madagascar Zambia Belorussia Ukraine Jordan Vietnam Palestine (Gaza Strip) Afghanistan Uzbekistan

2010 875.9 527.8 141.5 162.2 54.7 5.5 13.8 15.6 5.9 13 6.4 13.4 0 0 2 5.5 2.4 0 0 4 0.9

2014 1161.4 1070.6 417.6 383 70.9 44.3 5.4 25.8 26.1 13.4 9.5 7.4 0 0 3.5 0 5.9 0.2 0 3 0.6

2015 1258 968.8 444.5 251.1 74 50.9 15.2 17.3 5.1 14.8 10.1 8 12.5 0 3.6 7.1 0.6 0.3 8.6 0.1 0.1

2016 1189.6 764.5 368.7 135.3 60.1 16.3 14.6 16.8 21.4 7.2 8.3 3.9 9.3 0 2.4 5.2 1.7 7.2 2.1 0 0

2017

Table 3.2  Distribution of Russian official development assistance by country (USD million)

999.1 633.2 361.5 61.1 59.6 18 7.8 11.8 2.4 7.4 8.1 3.9 9 0 2.9 0 0.7 3.4 2 1 2.3

2018 1227.4 692.9 357.6 100.4 72.7 15.5 3.1 13.4 31.3 7.5 9.7 2.7 9.9 0.2 5.9 0 0.3 1.8 2 2 9.6

2019

8841.4 5541.9 2099.5 1185.4 445.9 161 154.4 128.8 109.4 106.7 61.4 44 40.6 24.2 21.4 19.1 17.5 15.1 15.1 14.5 14.4

In total

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(discussed at length in Chap. 5). In a similar trend, the aid to Ukraine increased in 2014, when support was sent to Crimea on the eve of the annexation of Crimea, and in 2019, when support was sent to Donetsk and Luhansk as the conflict around the self-proclaimed republics escalated. Mirroring the priorities of the Soviet Union discussed in the previous chapter, Russia continued to prioritise education, food security, and healthcare through its aid. For example, to promote food security, Russia sought to improve the efficiency of agricultural production globally by implementing a cooperation programme to help agrarian producers incorporate new technologies and equipment (ibid.). In education, the Russian Ministry of Education has been actively contributing to the improvement of the quality of education in a number of countries since 2008, in particular by developing new curricula and providing professional development for teachers. Finally, between 2006 and 2009 Russia contributed US $323.53 million in the healthcare field (ibid.). In 2015, in collaboration with the UNDP, Russia created a Development Trust Fund, a financial mechanism (financed with US $50  million) for implementing its assistance to countries in the CIS and other regions (Eastern Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, and the small island developing states of the Pacific region), which particularly focused on climate change and the economic development of youth. For example, in 2017, the Development Trust Fund, under its ‘Climate Window’ carried out various climate change mitigation and adaptation activities to protect and support vulnerable communities and ecosystems (O Partnerstve Rossija-PROON). Another thematic area, the ‘Youth Window,’ was also created “to facilitate the implementation of youth opportunities for sustainable socio-economic development at the expense of the Russian Federation allocated to the budget of the Trust Fund” (ibid.).

3.3   Russia’s Unique Path to Intervention Whether one agrees or not with the theory of ‘Russian exceptionalism,’ evidence shows that when it comes to intervention in conflict areas, five main contemporary characteristics distinguish Russian policy. Those characteristics which shall be explored in this section are best understood as a reflection of President Vladimir Putin’s attempt to restore Russia’s great power status by adopting a more robust foreign policy.

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3.3.1   Selective Respect for Sovereignty in Intervention Decisions The principle of non-interference has been central to Russia’s foreign policy over the past two decades. It has allowed it to pursue a more assertive foreign policy, while simultaneously appearing to adhere to the letter of international law. According to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, “we [Russia] are firmly committed to the fundamental principles of international communication enshrined in the UN Charter, primarily the principle of the sovereign equality of states, both large and small” (Lavrov Zayavil o…, 2022). Nonetheless, we can observe that Moscow implements a lens of ‘selective sovereignty’ in its deployment of the principle. This can be seen through Russia’s policy of interference in the cases of its neighbours of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. For example, in 2008 Moscow recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as separate nations from Georgia (discussed in detail in Chap.  4) and unlawfully invaded the Crimea in Ukraine in 2014. Both of these actions show clear disrespect for the notion of state sovereignty. Russia’s recognition of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic in Eastern Ukraine as ‘sovereign republics’ in February 2022—and its October 2022 efforts to absorb these states into Russia under the pretences of an election—further highlight these discrepancies. These operations, along with Russia’s wider invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, have been carried out in defiance of vehement protest from Georgia and Ukraine, two legitimate and independent governments (Klaz & Mariani, 2022). Experts and authorities in Russia, however, have a different perspective. They do not view Russia’s military actions in Georgia and Ukraine as revisionist anti-sovereignty measures, as they do not view the governments of post-Soviet states as fully sovereign, instead considering the collapse of the USSR and the resulting independent countries as illegitimate and incorrect (Lukianov, 2020; Nosovich, 2021). This ultimately leads to any former Soviet state with Russian-speaking populations being seen as fair game for Moscow’s intervention. To this end, Russia upholds the so-called Medvedev thesis, which states that it has the right to defend the lives and dignity of ethnic Russians wherever they may be and that it recognises particular regions as holding unique significance and interests for Moscow (Riegl & Doboš, 2018). Thus, Russian authorities and experts regard the military actions as a response to, or even self-defence against, the West’s aggressive efforts, which are seen as an attempt to alter the status quo and to increase its power in Russia’s rightful sphere of influence (Klaz & Mariani, 2022).

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3.3.2   Distancing Its Policy From Western Humanitarian Liberalism Russia has often expressed scepticism of Western humanitarian operations, particularly when they involve military action. In his first presidential speech in the State Duma in 2000, Putin alluded to military activities by Western countries as being “under the guise of humanitarian intervention” but, in reality, breaching the sovereign rights of nations, in a fashion reminiscent of the covert military activities during the Cold War (Dagi, 2020). Russia has frequently charged Western nations with responding to humanitarian crises selectively in order to achieve their own agendas. This has included accusing the West of employing the principle of the responsibility-­to-protect (R2P) to justify its military interventions leading to regime change, as was the case in Iraq and Libya (Velikaya, 2018). Meanwhile, Russia does not hesitate to use political justifications akin to R2P to support its own military action when it believes that its geopolitical interests are at stake. For instance, as discussed in Chap. 1, Moscow believes that the NATO intervention in Kosovo was an intolerable breach of international law. However, despite its criticism of the West’s propensity for interventionism based on humanitarian concerns, Russia has shown no reluctance to use military force when this is seen as useful to advance its own national interests, as was the case in the secession of both South Ossetia and Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Still, Russia takes pains to avoid using R2P as the legal basis for its armed activities in its neighbouring countries, where it sees itself as having a responsibility to intervene to protect Russian-speaking communities within its ‘near abroad.’ Nevertheless, Russia has so far failed to develop a clear alternative to the liberal peacebuilding and reconstruction model (Sherman et  al., 2011), which means that Russia, like other (re)emerging donors, does not have a streamlined, alternative strategy for the aid it provides. This is because the critical policies of Russian development aid are aimed at balancing its attempt to fit the mould of a traditional donor while simultaneously instrumentalising assistance as a foreign policy tool to consolidate Russia’s national interests, and at the same time distancing itself from Western doctrines. In fact, there is no one organisation in charge of organising Russia’s assistance (Robinson, 2022). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), the Federal

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Agency of Governmental Reserves (Rosrezerv), and the Russian Orthodox Church all play a role as state institutions responsible for the design, finance, and support of Russia’s official foreign humanitarian assistance (Asmus et  al., 2017). The limited role played by Russian NGOs in this space is for the most part indirectly controlled by the state, and “their leaders […] often work for or advise Russian state leadership, including the president’s office” (Robinson, 2022). 3.3.3   Donorship Without Interference in Domestic Affairs In line with other re-emerging donors, Russia applies the principle of non-­ interference in the internal affairs of the recipient country to promote international norms and norms-based forms of governance. Although the principle of non-interference is often invoked by authoritarian regimes that seek to legitimise their rule and escape criticism of domestic violations of international laws and norms, Russia often argues that in order to achieve sustainability, sovereign states must build their domestic policy by themselves without the interference of external actors. Nevertheless, there are occasions when Moscow favours the normative approach to international relations above the concept of territorial integrity, which has led scholars to believe that the claim of non-interference is used solely to justify and legitimise Russian decisions (Riegl & Doboš, 2018). For example, this argument is often used to distinguish Moscow’s foreign policy course from that of the US.  Thus, this principle of non-interference is closely linked with the non-interventionalist foreign policy doctrine, as it prohibits intervention in the domestic affairs of other states (Rowlands, 2008). 3.3.4   Security and Stability First In contrast to the liberal methods of conflict resolution, Moscow holds the perspective that the pursuit of stability should be the main objective of any intervention. It is not concerned with who holds power, as long as they are capable of providing security and stability across the entire territory of a given nation. Moscow believes that this objective could be hampered by democratic processes, which involve elections and sporadic changes in leadership. Russia views democracy and elections as destabilising due to the drastic changes that can take place from one government to the next; it sees an authoritarian ‘strongman’ who can maintain order over a pluralist society—which may otherwise permit terrorist and militant

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organisations to thrive—as far preferable. This principle elucidates how Russia approaches internal political order, as Putinist ideology has stressed the importance of a strong state since the late 1990s (Lewis, 2021). Even as early as 1999, Putin stated, “Russia needs strong state power and must have it,” as a strong state is “the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and driving force of any change” (Lewis, 2020). These narratives reappeared in 2004 during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and later during the Arab Spring in the MENA region, when the ways in which society may rise up against an authoritarian president became all too clear to Putin. For Moscow, stabilising a state affected by conflict or disorder begins with bolstering a cooperative state government. According to Russia’s worldview, the most important role for governments is that they (a) control and manage territory and (b) ensure that people may live decent lives through stable institutions that provide welfare, growth, and security. In the absence of stability, Moscow views standards of good governance, the rule of law, accountability, and individual human rights as absurd. Russia often prefers the pursuit of conflict stabilisation rather than conflict resolution when governments are embroiled in war (Klaz & Mariani, 2022). In practice, this includes approaches to back ‘strongman’ top-down governments with total loyalty to Moscow in order to stabilise political and economic structures and to begin economic support as soon as possible. It is in this context that we can see the Russian narrative that some societies are fundamentally incompatible with participatory democracy, and it frames the introduction of democracy as a contributor to conflict itself.

3.4   Coercive Diplomacy The Russian diplomatic strategy blurs the distinction between war and peace. Power politics, a strategy used by Russia to co-opt groups, split the opposition, and provide some legitimacy to counterinsurgency operations, mixes military involvement with coercive forms of diplomacy. Military action is seen as acceptable and even as a potential requirement for peace negotiations (Lewis, 2021). It is worth noting that Russia has used its extensive nuclear arsenal and military capabilities (left over from the Cold War and heavily invested in since) to ‘punch above its weight’ in terms of its influence in international diplomacy and discussions. Therefore, to maintain a disproportionate influence in negotiations, Moscow leans into destructive capabilities, which, alongside its oil and wheat outputs, give it

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additional diplomatic leverage. In this sense, Moscow often views peace negotiations as a new kind of warfare. Russian philosophy emphasises the necessity of concurrent negotiations, diplomacy, and media operations in order to achieve a complete military triumph. Russian military doctrine argues for the significance of politics and diplomacy in any war and advocates for a crucial role for non-­ kinetic aspects (e.g., information, perception, cyber, infrastructure) in every operation it undertakes (Lewis, 2021). Article 36 of Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy promises that “interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are being developed and implemented in order to ensure strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts” (Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj…, 2015). Thus, Moscow’s capacity to link advances in the negotiating room with actions on the battlefield, as is the case with coercive diplomacy more broadly, is what yields its results. Russia has been particularly successful at tying its use of physical force with diplomatic attempts (Lewis, 2021). From the standpoint of Russian strategic culture, the right-to-protect (R2P), with its coercive component, falls under the sphere of security, where moral and humanitarian considerations do not play a major role. In this paradigm, the right course of action is that which will most directly achieve security, defeat threats or dangers, and remove the source of Russian vulnerability or unease (Dagi, 2020).

3.5  Humanitarian and Developmental Aid as a Political Tool Russia also uses various forms of development and humanitarian aid to achieve its political objectives and to shape the political inclinations of these other states. After supporting the proclamation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign states, Chap. 4 will demonstrate how Moscow took on the role of supporting their economies and began to integrate the republics with the Russian Federation economically, culturally, and politically, earning loyalty in return and enabling Russia to integrate the political and security systems with the states, for example, through providing border security. One of the clearest current cases of Russia’s approach to aid can be found in Syria (discussed at length in Chap. 5). Humanitarian aid became

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a tool that Moscow utilised to maintain its territorial dominance and to ensure the allegiance of the Syrian government. According to the Atlantic Council, a variety of Russian organisations, including the Russian military’s Centre for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides in Syria (CRCSS), along with at least 25 Russian groups (most of which are religious or state-­ affiliated NGOs) are a part of a ‘shadow aid system’ that is a component of Russia’s larger conflict management system (Robinson, 2022). In order to strengthen Syrian sovereignty and central government control, Russia vehemently opposed the delivery of UN assistance across borders to rebel-­ held areas, while simultaneously supporting its own aid network (Lewis, 2022). Paradoxically, Russia is also aware of how crucial reconstruction is to a nation’s long-term stability after a civil war and is therefore reluctant to act alone, as it is aware of its financial limitations. Provided it can maintain its control and influence, the Kremlin would like to participate in rebuilding with the backing of other international players who have more reliable financial standing and can afford the costs of their engagement (Klaz & Mariani, 2022). Moreover, Russia saw opportunities in Syria for its businesses to receive contracts for rebuilding and to pursue a larger involvement in important economic areas including oil and gas, power, agriculture, tourism, and real estate (ibid.). As a result of such a cooperative strategy with various states, Russia gained not only economic and political-security benefits but also loyalty and political support on the international stage. For example, as a way to demonstrate their commitment to Moscow, Syria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia supported its proclamation of the sovereignty of Luhansk and Donetsk Republics, providing Moscow with some perceived legitimacy for its unlawful actions. This echoes the Soviet approach, during which Moscow and the CMEA used their wartime support as a foundation for post-war relations, focusing on in-kind contributions and providing military and reconstruction support, building markets and alliances, and using the fortified alliances and newly cultivated dependence to expand their global military presence and ideology.

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3.6   Conclusion Ultimately, Russia’s approach as a donor and a diplomatic actor is oriented around several core aims. First, to leverage aid to elevate its international standing, presenting itself as an alternative to traditional Western donors that does not condition aid on adherence to liberal democratic norms. Second, to stabilise the socio-economic and political situation in its partner countries, using a top-down approach and focusing on conflict freezing rather than conflict resolution. Third, to build loyalty, reliance, and strong relations with certain neighbouring countries and allies. Fourth, to eliminate or prevent perceived threats or dangers to Russia or its partners. Fifth, to strengthen its political and economic position in the global community and to create favourable external conditions for the development of Russia. Sixth, to structure its foreign policy and donor strategies jointly to fortify its security and economic ties in the region as an ultimate means to ensure that Russia remains the regional hegemon. This goal was heightened in the aftermath of the USSR’s collapse, and in 2014, Russian aid donorship and its engagement in international development became a strategic national interest that helped Russia regain soft power and control in its immediate neighbourhood. As this chapter has shown, Russia saw itself as inheriting the legacy of the Soviet Union, and its approach to global diplomacy and donorship has changed very little, remaining firmly rooted in the lessons, successes, and positions from the Soviet era. Moscow continues to utilise in-kind contributions and to focus on supporting education and military capabilities while spreading its ideology and the Russian language. The Russian strategy to donorship is ultimately based on the principles of non-­ interventionalism, non-interference in domestic affairs, opposition to western humanitarian liberalism, a focus on stability over democracy, coercive diplomacy, and utilising aid as a political tool. To assess the philosophy of the Russian approach to aid and stabilisation, it is possible to state that with the use of coercive regionalism and the deployment of military force in favour of overtaking and creating separatist areas on the edge of Europe, Moscow remains stuck in the old-fashioned logic of the imperial era. Armed confrontations between Russia and Georgia, and subsequently Ukraine, represent a larger geopolitical framework that reflects Moscow’s long-standing displeasure with European developments, particularly the expansion of the EU and NATO into the former Soviet sphere of influence (Riegl & Doboš, 2018).

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Russia’s policies are based on the surrounding situation and remain flexible enough to accommodate conflicting institutional, security, and political logic. Moscow sees a strong state as a core security tool, and places an emphasis on order over justice, the state over civil society, and power over representation. Thus, its approach as a donor in post-conflict scenarios does not seek to address the root causes of conflict—without inclusive, responsive, and reconciliatory processes, healing the divisions that led to the conflict can be difficult. At best, its approach works to suppress the expression of discontentment and conflict through strong-­ handed top-down measures, restoring the outer semblance of peace without creating a solid foundation for its continuation. At worst, it creates fear-based suppression among the populace, allowing issues to fester and spread as non-representative governments fail to respond to the concerns and needs of communities, and even fuelling opposition movements through brutal means of suppression. Russian policies represent a normative attitude that is obviously different from the approaches to conflict favoured by liberal democracies since the 1990s. Russia contests these norms based on its logic of status and security; the spread of norms by Western players has been seen as a serious threat to Russia’s projected status as a great power that is able to influence norms and regulations in the international order. To this end, Moscow rejects the idea of imposed Western democracy, preferring to keep autocratic regimes which have built hierarchal, vertical relations and are able to effectively control the population and the situation. This approach is clearly demonstrated in the subsequent case studies.

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America]. Bulletin of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Series: International Relations, 3, 56–63. (In Russ.). Nosovich, A. (2021, March 3). Postsovetskie strany osypayutsya bez podderzhki rossii i zapada. [Post-Soviet countries crumble without the support of Russia and the West]. Rubaltic.Ru. Retrieved November 4, 2022, from https://www.rubaltic. r u/ar ticle/politika-­i -­o bshchestvo/20210303-­p ostsovetskie-­s trany-­ osypayutsya-­bez-­podderzhki-­rossii-­i-­zapada/?ysclid=la2rbhs75u857150105 (In Russ.) O Partnerstve Rossija-PROON. [About Russia-UNDP Partnership]. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from https://expertsfordevelopment.ru/partners/ (In Russ.) Official Website of Rossotrudnichestvo. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from https:// rwp.agency/ (In Russ.) Official Website of RusAid. Retrieved January 5, 2022, from: http://rusaid.ru/ (In Russ.) Paczynska, A. (2016). Emerging and traditional donors and conflict-affected states: the new politics of reconstruction. Stimson Center. Palagashvili, L., & Williamson, C. R. (2018). Are emerging donors engaging in poor foreign aid practices? A comparison of traditional versus non-traditional aid agencies. A Comparison of Traditional Versus Non-Traditional Aid Agencies. SSRN Electronic Journal. Potapenko, M. (2014). KNR Kak Novyj Mezhdunarodnyj Donor: Osobennosti Politiki Gosudarstva Mezhdunarodnomu Razvitiju. [China as a new international donor: specifics of state policy for international development]. Bulletin of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Series: International Relations, 1, 19–31. (In Russ.). Rakhmangulov, M. (2010). Stanovlenie sistemy sodejstvija mezhdunarodnomu razvitiju v Rossii. [Formation of the international development assistance system in Russia]. Bulletin of International Organisations: Education, Science, New Economics, 5(2), 196–215. (In Russ.). Riegl, M., & Doboš, B. (2018). Post-Soviet de facto states and Russian geopolitical strategy. Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, 12(1), 59–89. Robinson, J. (2022). Russian foreign humanitarian assistance identifying trends using 15 years of open-source data. Marine Corps University. Rowlands, D. (2008). Emerging donors in international development assistance: a synthesis report. PBDD Reports. Sherman, J., Gleason, M., Sidhu, M. M., Jones, B., & editors. (2011). Engagement on development and security: new actors, new debates. Center for International Cooperation, New York University. Stepanova, E. (2007). Gumanitarnyj Potencial Rossii i Vosstanovlenie Ekonomiki Konfliktnyh Zon. [Humanitarian potential of Russia and restoration of the economy of conflict zones]. World Economy and International Relations, 5, 65–78. (In Russ.).

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Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 31.12.2015 g. № 683. [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015 No. 683]. (2015). Retrieved September 22, 2022, from http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/ bank/40391 (In Russ.) Velikaya, A. A. (2018). The Russian approach to public diplomacy and humanitarian cooperation. Rising Powers Quarterly, 3(3), 39–61. Zaitsev, Y. (2020). Novye Vyzovy dlja Rossijskoj Vneshnej Pomoshhi v Kontekste Dostizhenija Celej Ustojchivogo Razvitija. [New challenges for Russian foreign aid in the context of achieving sustainable development goals]. Bulletin of International Organisations: Education, Science, New Economy, 15(1), 63–83. (In Russ.). Zürcher, C. (2016). Russia as a rising donor in the field of post-conflict reconstruction. Paper presented at the Emerging Powers and Conflict-Affected States Workshop, Arlington, VA.

CHAPTER 4

Intervention and Reconstruction in the Caucasus: The Cases of Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia

4.1   Regional Context To understand Russia’s approach to reconstruction, it is critical to explore its history, addressing post-conflict situations in the Caucasus region, which occupies large territories both inside Russia and adjacent to its borders. The Caucasus is characterised by its location at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, its climate and topography, its ethnic and cultural diversity, as well as its millennia-long human history. It has significant energy resources and has the potential to become a transport hub for the growing trade between Europe and Asia, as the most important sea highways of the world pass through the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea (Prokopenko, 2010). Within this region, I will focus on three relevant cases: the Chechnya Republic within Russia and the partially recognised neighbouring territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, located within Georgia and with which Russia has had links for centuries. Russia holds a major economic interest in the region, and access routes from Russia to the Black Sea and to the Caspian Sea pass through Chechnya, as do oil and gas pipeline links. Meanwhile, in the political-security arena, with the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent, Moscow gained not only a buffer zone with the West but also neighbouring loyal states that can bring more legitimacy to the Kremlin’s decisions.

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The Caucasus have long been seen by Moscow as zones of destabilisation and sources of direct threats to Russian security. The chapter will provide significant background and context for these conflicts as well as a comprehensive comparative analysis on Moscow’s attitude towards reconstruction in domestic Chechnya as well as in neighbouring Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as ‘Russian-created’ states. Firstly, it will give a review of the Russian-Chechen conflict. It will then discuss the history of disintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including what motivated Russia to invade Chechnya and to support the independence of Georgia’s breakaway states. This will be followed by an overview of the effects of the conflicts and the features of Moscow’s educational and cultural programmes and reforms. The chapter will conclude with a discussion and evaluation of Russia’s reconstruction efforts in the three states and will highlight the similarities and differences of the strategies Moscow takes in domestic and neighbouring territories.

4.2  The Roots of Chechen Separatist Movements The Russian Civil War was fought at the turn of the twentieth century between the Red Army and the White Army over the territory of Russia, which was in a period chaos after the 1917 October Revolution. After its victory, the Red Army formed territorial divisions, most of which had significant ethnic majorities in their makeup and were controlled by warlords and their armies. The ‘North Caucasian autonomy on the territory of Dagestan and the Terek region,’ which included the modern republic of Chechnya, was one of the states that sought autonomy. The provisional North Caucasian government declared independence on 21 December 1917 and was supported by other Caucasian neighbours (Melikova, 2012, p. 85). However, in 1921, the Russian territory was unified under the Red Army and became the Soviet Union, resulting in the loss of territorial autonomy. The following year, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) approved an All-Russian Central Executive Committee decree establishing the ‘Chechen Autonomous Region’ (Istorija Chechenskoj Respubliki, 2018). Stalin’s ‘Great Purge’ expulsions from 1936 through 1938—targeting perceived opposition and minorities—led to the anti-Soviet uprisings as well as the weakening and undermining of traditional nationalism (Tanrısever, 2000, p. 68). In response to the Soviet Union’s consolidation of power in Eastern Europe, the Red Army’s rapid advance into Muslim

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regions of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet regime’s brutal campaigns, a separatist rebel group emerged in Chechnya, overthrowing the Soviet authorities and proclaiming the creation of a “provisional people’s revolutionary government of Checheno-Ingushetia” (Checheno-Ingushetija Vo Vremena SSSR, 2005). This marked the start of the first armed conflict between Moscow and the Chechens. From November 1941 until February 1942, the conflict was at its most violent, with Soviet troops only being able to subdue Chechen resistance after massive aerial bombardments and the deployment of large Red Army units (Checheno-Ingushetija Vo Vremena SSSR, 2005). In 1944, the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was abolished and divided between Georgia, Ossetia, and Dagestan, allegedly because of its suspected collaboration with the Nazis (Tanrısever, 2000, p. 68). According to some historians, the allegation that Chechens collaborated with Nazis was unfounded, as the Chechen opposition to Soviet authority had in fact begun when the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were still allies (Ellman & Maksudov, 1994, 673). Within a year, some half a million Chechens associated with anti-Soviet resistance were exiled to Central Asia, accused of collaboration with Nazi Germany. By 1957, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was re-established and the survivors of the exile were allowed to return to their territory, excluding the Chechen Republic’s mountainous areas (Istorija Chechenskoj Respubliki…, 2018) (Map 4.1).

4.3  The Build-Up to Conflict in the Twentieth Century 4.3.1   Leading up to the First Chechen War The first conflict in Chechnya, known as the ‘First Chechen War,’ began in November 1990, when the First Chechen National Congress (CNS) elected an Executive Committee and immediately proclaimed an independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (the historical name of the region encompassing Chechnya). “In June 1991, the CNS was transformed into the National Congress of the Chechen People (ACCN). The head of the executive committee, Major General of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev, initiated the proclamation of an independent Chechen Republic” (Malashenko & Trenin, 2002, p. 15). The main goal of the Congress was to secede from the USSR. However, in December, the Russian government refused to recognise the independence and two acting governments

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Map 4.1  The Northern Caucasus region

emerged claiming rule over the same territory: one belonged to the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the other to the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, proclaimed by its leader Dzhokhar Dudayev (Vojna v Chechne, 2020). The revolution in Chechnya began in September 1991, when Dudayev and his followers captured the republican television centre, the Supreme Soviet (akin to the republic’s parliament), and the House of Radio (Vojna v Chechne – Chernaja Stranica…, 2020). The deportation of the Chechen people in 1944, along with their subsequent forced assimilation, had created deep resentments among the Chechen population towards the Russian state. This was exacerbated by the exclusion of the Chechen people from the ‘Great Victory’ in 1945, which was a celebration of national victory in WWII held across the Soviet Union (Saveliev, 2000). The narratives of victimhood, which both Chechen and Russian sides embrace, made it difficult to reach a workable solution to the protracted conflict. President Yeltsin reacted to the declaration of independence by declaring a state of emergency in Chechnya on 8 November 1991 and threatened to restore order by force (Lieven, 1999, p. 63). The Kremlin refused to recognise Dudayev and his supporters as a legitimate government. One of the reasons the Yeltsin administration tolerated General Duayev’s rule in Chechnya for more than two and a half

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years prior was that there was seen to be no pressing need for the Russian state to intervene (Lieven, 1999, p.  101). Moreover, another conflict started to escalate in the region, and Moscow had turned its attention to the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict to the South. 4.3.2   Russian Participation in the Georgian Civil War of 1991–1993 Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were a part of Georgia during Soviet times, had historic ties with Russia and received support from Moscow for their decision to become sovereign states. Historically, from 1810 until 1864, the Abkhaz principality maintained independent rule within Russia. Abkhazia was a subject of the tsarist regime in the Caucasus from 1864 until 1917, and was then declared a Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) on 4 March 1921. Abkhazia joined the Georgian SSR in February 1931 and enjoyed full republican autonomy (Istorija Abhazii Ot…, 2013). South Ossetia was a part of Russia’s Vladikavkaz area up until 1920. Ossetians made up the majority of the population, along with Russians, Georgians, Armenians, and people from other nations (Chernykh, 2022). Georgia sought to acquire South Ossetia after the 1917 revolution and the fall of the Russian Empire, which resulted in a war with significant civilian deaths. South Ossetia experienced a number of pro-Soviet uprisings during the Russian Civil War that demanded accession to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The Georgian army was routed by Ossetian Bolshevik detachments on 8 June 1920, and Tskhinval, the capital of South Ossetia, was taken over. At the same time, the South Ossetian Revolutionary Committee issued an order announcing it would join Soviet Russia. In retaliation, Georgia’s Menshevik-dominated government prepared for a massive invasion of the insurgent area (Okunev, 2020). The Soviet Union solidified its influence, however, and the Georgian Democratic Republic was short-lived. The South Ossetian Autonomous Region first appeared on a map of Soviet Russia in April 1922 (Chernykh, 2022). South Ossetia was intended to be integrated into Georgia as an independent territory after the formation of Bolshevik rule in Georgia. Throughout the Soviet era, the Georgian–Ossetian tension and conflict persisted. Activities to translate South Ossetia’s office work and education into the Georgian language became increasingly popular in Tbilisi in the

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latter half of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s. Assimilation was actively encouraged, but Ossetians vigorously resisted these initiatives.  he Emergence of Conflict in South Ossetia T When the political regime in the USSR began to liberalise in the late 1980s and Georgia’s nationalist movement gained momentum, the situation rapidly worsened. On 10 November 1989, South Ossetia appealed to the Supreme Soviets of the Georgian SSR and the USSR with a request to grant South Ossetia independent republic status, considering the evolving anti-Soviet course in Georgia. The Tskhinval decision on the comparable transition was unilaterally overturned by the highest body of state authority in the Georgian SSR (Chernykh, 2022). Soon after, in December 1990, the South Ossetian Autonomous Region was disbanded by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia and the Georgian National Guard and police troops entered Tskhinval. Sporadic armed conflict persisted throughout 1991. The strategically important mountainous areas around Tskhinvali were under the authority of the Georgian national guard and militia, which bombarded the city, triggering a flood of refugees from the combat zone into Russian territories (1992 i 2008 God…, 2019). The new Georgian government under President Eduard Shevardnadze instigated the next phase of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in the spring of 1992. Georgian detachments approached Tskhinvali by mid-June, raising the possibility of the city’s surrender and ethnic cleansing. Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi consequently gave the order to launch airstrikes on the Georgian army and threatened to bomb Tbilisi (Okunev, 2020). With the cessation of active hostilities and the signing of the Sochi ceasefire agreement on 24 June 1992, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze were joined by delegates from North Ossetia (a republic within Russia) and South Ossetia. On 14 July 1992, joint peacekeeping forces began to operate in South Ossetia as part of the Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian battalions. The peacekeeping force was created as part of the peace agreement between the two warring sides, which was intended to ease tensions between the breakaway region of South Ossetia and the Georgian government. The peacekeepers’ main task was to monitor compliance with the ceasefire and to prevent the resumption of hostilities (ibid.). This was the first peacekeeping operation in the Russian Federation’s history, as stated by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Experts claim that the knowledge Russian peacekeepers obtained in 1992

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was eventually applied to resolving other crises in the post-Soviet region (Unikal’nyj Opyt’, 2022). As the Head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Alexander Kurenkov, added, Today we carry out state tasks on the territory of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics and Ukraine. However, regardless of geography, the priorities of the EMERCOM [Emergency Control Ministry] of Russia remain simple things that [were] laid down back in 1992: efficiency, dedication and comprehensive assistance to people. (Unikal’nyj Opyt’, 2022)

 he Emergence of Conflict in Abkhazia T As Georgia became independent from the USSR, it sought to maintain authority over Abkhazia, while the latter was adamant on seceding from Georgia and attaining its own independence. A compromise could not be achieved, and both sides slid back towards conflict. On 14 August 1992, the Georgian State Council sent its troops to Abkhazia. According to the Georgian police, gangs operating in Abkhazian territory were responsible for train thefts and terrorist assaults on railroad tracks (Volodin, 2012) during the conflict between the new Shevardnadze government and supporters of the recently deposed President Zviad Gamsakhurdia. With the increasing activities of Gamsakhurdia’s supporters, Tengiz Kitovani, the Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia, used this as an opportunity to charge the autonomous republic’s leadership with breaking its agreements to isolate such supporters (Nesterov, 2022). A ceasefire agreement signed on 3 September 1992 required Georgia to displace its forces in the territory of Abkhazia. The State Council’s forces were totally ejected from Abkhazia on 30 September 1993. While Georgia refused to concede defeat and insisted that Abkhazia is a vital component of Georgia, the real outcome of the struggle was Abkhazia’s de facto independence from Georgia (Gitsba, 2016). At the time, Russia’s policy was completely different from its current approach: Yeltsin’s government considered the war to be a Georgian problem, with Russia adhering to the position of preserving the territorial integrity of Georgia in accordance with international law. During the conflict, Russian leadership often convened meetings with the authorities of Abkhazia and Georgia, offered forums for discussions, and served as a middleman in decisions regarding a ceasefire. Due to its own interests in connection to Georgia, and in order to prevent the development of Western nations’ influence in the Caucasus, Russia considered Georgia’s

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interests throughout the process and in its own decision-making (Gitsba, 2017). Abkhazia and Georgia signed an agreement to a ceasefire and to the separation of forces on 14 May 1994, with the support of Russia as a mediator. This agreement was reached as part of the Geneva peace negotiations, which were led by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General and supported by Russia. Russia also participated in the Organisation of Co-operation and Security of Europe (OSCE) and the Group of Friends of the Secretary General (Samutina & Yumatov, 2015). The CIS peacekeeping soldiers arrived in Abkhazia on 23 June 1994. They were modelled after Russian peacekeepers, who were successful in ensuring a truce, and the war moved into a ‘frozen stage.’ By examining the two situations, it becomes evident that South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s regional political inclinations throughout the Soviet era were for either independence or unity with Russia as a last alternative. Additionally, these two instances demonstrate the ethnic nationalism that permeated not only the Georgian SSR but the whole USSR at the time (Stylianos, 2019).

4.4  The Wars 4.4.1   The Outbreak of the First Chechen War After its focus on mediating conflicts on its southern border, the Russian government turned its attention back to domestic challenges, which had reached a tipping point. Due to the escalation of the Ossetian Ingush conflict 1 in October–November 1992, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Committee for National Relations, Sergei Shakhrai, signed an order to bring troops in the region of the administrative border with Chechnya into a state of increased combat readiness (Malashenko & Trenin, 2002). This order caused federal army units to take up positions along the perimeter of Chechnya (ibid.). The main catalyst for intervention was the series of four bus hijackings by Chechen criminals in the Russian North Caucasus (Lieven, 1999, p. 86). In the first three cases, the criminals were seized on Russian soil, or fled to Chechnya, where they were arrested with the help of Dudayev’s 1  The conflict between North Ossetia and Ingushetia over the Prigorodny district, which ended with the departure of the Ingush.

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forces. Dudayev, however, refused to let either the hijackers or the Russian special forces into Chechnya, fearing, not without reason, that Russia would use this as an excuse to occupy part of Chechnya (ibid.). Russian troops invaded the separatist Chechen Republic in December 1994, motivated by Chechnya’s strategic location in the Caucasus Mountains— including its huge oil resources and the presence of oil pipelines on its territory—and the worry that allowing Chechnya to secede would set a precedent for other republics to separate (Abraham, 2001, p. 9). Moscow’s influence over Chechnya gradually eroded between 1991 and 1992. Chechnya was, in fact, functioning as a sovereign state with its own government entities and symbols. When Russian forces entered into the republic in 1994, a full-scale conflict broke out. When Dudayev and his party, the official face of opposition to Russian rule, were repressed, terrorist gangs filled the space and began spreading across the country, particularly in the central region (Istorija Chechenskoj Respubliki, 2018). As a result, a group led by Shamil Basayev, a separatist leader and Islamic militant, seized a hospital in Budennovsk (Stavropol Territory) on 14 June 1995. Following talks, the terrorists were allowed to leave with the hostages, who were released near the Chechen border. These attacks were attempts by Chechens to put “pressure on Yeltsin’s weak government” and retaliate for the Russian occupation of Chechnya (Kashnikov, 2008, p. 70). An OSCE support group had been established in 1995 as a requirement for Russia’s admission to the Council of Europe, and its representatives assisted in negotiating the Khasavyurt peace settlement (Hughes, 2013). The Khasavyurt Agreement was signed on 31 August 1996, calling for the cessation of hostilities and the complete withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya by the end of the year (Hasavyurtovskie soglasheniya (1996), 2021). The deal brought fighting to a halt, but Chechnya remained a de facto autonomous state governed by a coalition of extreme Islamists, Chechen nationalists, and criminal organisations. The Khasavyurt Agreement was not only viewed by many Russians as a humiliating capitulation—not just to the separatists but also to the West—but it also failed to settle the conflict at its core, leaving Russia’s security concerns unresolved. Thus, the spread of liberal principles supporting international conflict resolution began to be seen by Russian leaders as an attack on Russia’s character as a sovereign state as well as a danger to national security (Lewis, 2022). Chechnya threatened to jeopardise the federalisation process at a politically difficult period when the Russian economy was faltering during its

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transition, leading to fears that Yeltsin’s reforms were not delivering economic or political rewards. Yeltsin’s decision to intervene militarily in Chechnya was motivated by his political aspirations and a desire to strengthen his popularity and to increase his chances of re-election. Early in 1994, Yeltsin’s popularity rating was low, and opposition parties, like that of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, were gaining support. Regardless of the state of presidential popularity, Russian policy-making during both Chechen wars was largely incoherent. 4.4.2   The Second Chechen War In the summer of 1999, the second Chechen war began with a Chechen attack on neighbouring Dagestan. Russia was alarmed when Chechen terrorists struck across the country, bombing civilian sites and kidnapping and killing foreigners. The Chechen conflict became inextricably linked to Russian politics, and Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as Prime Minister to bring the situation to an end (ibid., p. 1519). The invasion of Dagestan provided Putin with the justification needed to bring in the Russian military and to correct the appearance of Russian weakness in Chechnya. Putin’s term began with explosions in Moscow apartment complexes in August, which prompted Putin to order the launch of a military operation against Chechen militants. By the spring of 2000, Chechnya was completely occupied by Russian federal troops (Kashnikov, 2008, p.  73). Despite the fact that Russia launched a military operation on the Chechen Republic, terrorist attacks continued. In October 2002, Chechen rebels took over a Moscow theatre showing the ‘Nord-Ost’ musical, holding everyone inside hostage and demanding an end to the Second Chechen War and a withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya (Edwards, 2013, p. 22). On 1 September 2004, on the first day of school in the small town of Beslan (with a mix of Christian and Muslim residents) in North Ossetia, a terrorist group led by Shamil Basayev took over a secondary school (ibid., p. 23). The group demanded that Russia’s military presence in Chechnya be ended once more, and hostages were held captive for three days in sweltering heat with no food or water. The government refused to negotiate with the terrorists, instead using force which led to the death of hundreds of hostages. The conflict stretched on inexorably, with little progress made and no end in sight, and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against the

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US strengthened Putin’s position, giving international credibility to his own ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘war on Islamic extremists.’ Basayev was the mastermind behind both the Nord-Ost and the Beslan terrorist attacks. Analysts argue that achieving the goal of an independent Chechnya was not enough for Basayev and his followers; they were also determined to establish an Islamic homeland, as evidenced by their invasion of Dagestan, a region that had not expressed interest in joining the Chechen struggle (ibid., p. 23). In the early years of Putin’s presidency and of the Second Chechen War, the new president adopted a policy of so-called Chechenisation, appointing Akhmad Kadyrov, a member of the Chechen ruling elite, as Chechnya’s leader. To weaken Chechen opposition capabilities, Putin leveraged tensions among Chechen elites and handpicked Akhmad Kadyrov—a Muslim Chechen who had served in the breakaway government as Chief Mufti and supported independence during the First Chechen War—to support his policies. After Chechen separatists assassinated Kadyrov, implementing this approach proved difficult until Putin bought the loyalty of Kadyrov’s son, Ramzan, formerly a member of the independence movement but who had led his father’s militia. Putin first promised the younger Kadyrov protection, power over the republic, and later significant sums of money to maintain order and rebuild Chechnya (Matejova, 2013, pp.  11–12). Kadyrov became infamous for ruling with an authoritarian grip, running a top-down ‘strongman’ government with total loyalty to Moscow, brutally crushing opposition, carrying out unchecked human rights abuses, and leading a lavish lifestyle. 4.4.3   The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 The Abkhazia and South Ossetia peace negotiations that took place from the early 1990s until 2008 essentially aimed to preserve the status quo at the expense of Georgia’s territorial integrity. No progress has been made on any of the crucial items on the agenda, such as the repatriation of displaced people, the economic recovery of the areas, or a decision on their political status. Throughout the discussion period, the de facto administrations of the separatist areas strengthened their hold on the region while Russian peacekeepers established an artificial boundary (Samkharadze, 2016). A change of Georgian policy trajectory started in 2004 with the new president, Saakashvili, who decided to integrate the territories of

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Abkhazia and South Ossetia back into Georgia, and started an aggressive policy towards them with the deployment of Georgian forces. In September 2006, NATO granted Georgia ‘Intensified Dialogue’ status in order to support the country’s membership aspirations, hitting at the heart of Moscow’s opposition to the Western military alliance’s expansion to include former Soviet republics like Georgia and Ukraine and thus making it imperative for Moscow to maintain its presence in Abkhazia to prevent Georgia from joining NATO (Rytövuori-Apunen, 2019, p. 45). The escalation of the conflict reached its peak in August 2008, when the central Georgian government began bombarding Tskhinvali. The same day, President Putin ordered Russian forces to be dispatched to Georgian territory to aid South Ossetia. Moscow largely considered this intervention as a response to the West’s approach to Kosovo’s separation from Serbia and was used as an opportunity to counterbalance Western influence in the region. According to the Russian Diplomat Ivan Silaev, the concerns of NATO expansion, the placement of missile defence systems in Europe, the recognition of Kosovo, and the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were all considered to be interrelated and necessitated the use of force in the context of Russian self-defence. From Moscow’s perspective, had Russia not responded in this manner, it would have implied that Russia was not a key player in other matters pertaining to European security (Devjat’ Let Posle…, 2020). In five days, Russian troops managed to not only remove Georgian soldiers from the territories of South Ossetia but also moved into Georgian territory, forcing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to halt the aggression. The Russian Federation acknowledged the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It was then in the interest of the two newly recognised republics to forge strong military ties with Russia as they are unlikely to be capable of ensuring their own statehood and security without its support. Russia stationed its air force, navy, and ground forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and announced that the Russian Border Guard Service would guard the frontiers of the two republics (Korolev, 2011). As a result, Moscow has transitioned from being a peacemaker and mediator to directly entering the conflict and acting as a guarantor of the independence and separation of the two states. According to Borgen (2015), Russia’s strategy relied on “exploiting the ambiguous nature of self-determination” as outlined under international law. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov utilised the notion of territorial integrity and the protection of ethnic and national Russians to justify

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the invasion of Georgia. Thus, we can see how the rhetoric and policy of ‘protecting Russians’ who were previously part of the USSR and became estranged from Russia after the 1992 boundaries is a foundational principle in Russian diplomacy that impends on the legality of international norms (Borgen, 2015).

4.5   Moscow’s Domestic Response to the Impact of the Chechen Wars 4.5.1   Economic Aid Ravaged by two wars, the United Nations called Grozny, Chechnya’s capital, the most destroyed city on earth (BBC News, 2007). This was in large part due to Moscow’s tactic of extensive heavy artillery bombing campaigns that targeted the city centre and outskirts alike, essentially flattening huge swaths of the city with little concern for civilian deaths or the precision of its strikes. In addition to a large part of Grozny, about two dozen large villages were destroyed, roads and bridges were damaged, forests were wiped out, and nearly a third of arable fields were spoiled (Tishkov, 2001, p. 36). Except for a few petrochemical industries, most production facilities were destroyed, with significant pilfering of these properties. Both wars had taken an extraordinary toll on the Chechen population and institutions, resulting in forced displacement, the erosion of state and public institutions, systems disintegration, and widespread insecurity. Moscow saw the need to invest in these core areas to create stability and to avoid the risk of a rising insurgency. The Kremlin’s reconstruction efforts first started in 2000, during active military actions in Chechnya. In 2000, Nikolai Koshman stated that the large sum allocated to Chechnya included funds for maintaining the Russian army presence as well as for the Ministry of Interior Affairs (Elbuzdukayeva, 2010, p. 52). The main challenges that the Governmental Commission for the Restoration of the Chechen Republic, led by Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko, faced in 2000 were creating a mechanism for financing the republic’s reconstruction, as well as a system to manage the process and a functioning executive branch. Programmes implemented between 2000 and 2001 were largely unsuccessful due to continued conflict and the fact that the

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Chechens themselves were poorly equipped, trained, or motivated to implement the rehabilitation projects. Following roundtable meetings organised in the republic in December 2000, the Forum on Conflict Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) published the ‘Plan for Post-Conflict Reconstruction of Chechnya’ as a roadmap for donors and organisations involved in its implementation. This document identified three key areas of activity to stabilise the situation in the republic: (1) initiation of a coordinated process of reconstruction in Chechnya; (2) implementation of the political settlement process under the leadership of the Chechen Republic and with the population’s participation; and (3) strengthening the rule of law and order and the protection of human rights (Plan postkonfliktnoj rekonstrukcii, 2001). The Consultative Group developed the following long-term post-conflict reconstruction objectives for the region: Strengthening the rule of law and protecting the rights of the population; meeting the basic needs of the population; ensuring the personal safety of citizens of the republic; economic development (in particular, reducing unemployment and enhancing access to education); harmonisation of relations between Chechnya and neighbouring regions. (ibid.)

The eventual reconstruction of the republic’s key infrastructure required for a functional economy was expected to eventually attract foreign direct investment and to serve as the foundation for intensive economic development in the region. Since 2001, more than 464 billion rubles have been channelled to Chechnya from the federal budget alone, in the form of subsidies, subventions, and grants (Na Vosstanovlenie Chechni…, 2014). Aid to the republic reached the highest amount (in terms of total volume of transfers to the region) in 2007 (Poltrilliona posle vojny, 2014). A significant portion of the funds was allocated within the framework of special federal targeted programmes, which included the restoration of infrastructure, social security, human resources, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to the growth of industry and agriculture. The reconstruction funding focused on erasing the obvious scars from the war and establishing a positive and helpful image of the federal government, aiming to bring the republic firmly under Moscow’s control. At the same time, the complexities of the regional economy’s underlying conditions demanded a strategic approach to reconstruction.

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Therefore, Moscow put in place a programme entitled ‘Restoration the Economy and Social Sphere of the Chechen Republic’ from 2002 to 2007. Its main goal was “to restore the economy and social sphere of the Chechen Republic and create conditions for their further development” (Decree of December 21 2001 N 889). The programme’s objectives encompassed “the restoration of residential buildings and utility facilities; healthcare facilities, education, culture, and sports; transport and road facilities; ensuring the functioning of TV and radio broadcasting and print facilities; [and] restoration of the branch of the economy of the Chechen Republic” (Decree of December 21 2001 N 889). Expected results included the: Improvement of the living conditions of the population; return to places of permanent residence on the territory of the Chechen Republic of the Commonwealth of residents who had been forced to leave them; production of industrial and agricultural products to supply the internal needs of the Republic; increasing the employment of the laborious population; [and the] creation of conditions for ensuring law and order and public safety in the republic. (Decree of December 21, 2001 N 889)

Russia’s approach to rebuilding Chechnya is conveyed in language that resonates with the recipient republic and places an emphasis on solidarity and support. The Chechen Republic’s Committee for the Support of Small Business and Entrepreneurship launched the programme ‘From Survival to Prosperity’ in 2005, in collaboration with the Small Business Support Fund. Russia sought to discourage any increase in support for radical groups through the creation of jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities, as, in Moscow’s view, unemployment could breed extremism (Elbuzdukayeva, 2010, p. 59). The development of peasants’ farms was the main focus of this programme (V Chechne razrabotana programma…, 2005). Its overall purpose was to develop a new business-minded middle class, modernise peasants, and establish a thriving new economy with market rationality to bring political and social stability to the Chechen Republic (Tamaev & Baidarova, 2015). The actual financing of the programme, according to the data from the Federal Treasury, amounted: To 46,933.0 million rubles. According to it, 41.5 billion rubles were allocated from the federal budget. As a result, 71 schools, 70 medical institutions, 48 km of main heating pipes, more than 484 km of electrical networks, 428 communication facilities, [and] residential buildings with a total area of

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679,000  square meters were restored, [among] other objects. (Ramzan Kadyrov zaprosil…, 2011)

Creating a stable Chechnya for individuals returning after displacement was a top priority. To encourage displaced people to return home, funds were set aside for housing and utility rehabilitation, public sector employee wages, and child benefits, and special measures for unemployment benefits were implemented. Federal authorities also compensated residents of the republic for the damages. The first payments of compensation began in 2003; in 2011, the estimated number of applicants was 165  thousand people. Most of them received compensation payments of about 350 thousand rubles for the lost property. The last compensation was paid in 2012: the last 9600 applicants received a total of 3.4 billion rubles. (Myasina & Solopov, 2014)

Progress in repairing road infrastructure, the agricultural sector, health care, and educational institutions was also touted by the administrations both in Moscow and in Grozny (Lenott & Ioshii, 2003). In 2008, “the government approved a new FTP [Federal Target Program] ‘Social and Economic Development of the Chechen Republic for 2008–2012’ with total funding of 124  billion rubles” (Reshiev et  al., 2015, p.  14). The programme covered both the social and economic sectors of the republic. The following were the most important aspects of the programme’s success: Clear interaction between the federal centre and the Government of the Chechen Republic in its implementation; in full and [strict accordance] to the schedule, financing of program activities; real proportions of funding sources for the program, including the opportunities and terms of the republic; [and] strict control over the implementation of program measures by the Head of the Chechen Republic R.A. Kadyrov. (ibid., p. 16)

Cities and communities, education facilities, health care and services, infrastructure, and economic facilities were all essentially rebuilt as a result of the programme’s implementation. The fact that Grozny is recognised by the UN as the world’s most dynamically developing post-conflict city also confirms the effectiveness of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts (Mahrovskiy, 2009).

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In 2010, the government approved a socio-economic development strategy for the North Caucasus Federal District until 2025, signalling a shift from short-term thinking and repair for the region towards long-­ term investment. The following objectives guided the development of the strategy: To provide conditions for the advanced development of the real sector of the economy in the constituent entities of the Federation that are part of the North Caucasian Federal District [consisting of Chechnya and six other states], the creation of new jobs, and an increase in the standard of living of the population. (Order of September 6, 2010 N 1485-r)

The rapid inflow of financial aid left Chechnya fully reliant on Moscow and the absence of checks and balances increased the potential for corruption, motivating some local leaders to work with and on behalf of Moscow to optimise the frail administrative apparatus and soften opposition in the conflict’s aftermath. As corruption became a means of buying loyalty and support, Moscow turned a blind eye in the interest of developing social stability, knowing it could access the Chechen people through their local political and power brokers (Zabyelina, 2013, p. 39). By targeting economic recovery, Moscow expects the corrupt practices of individuals, groups, and state institutions to ultimately diminish. There is a tenuous presence of international aid organisations in Chechnya; however, the involvement of humanitarian agencies and programmes on behalf of the UN, the EU, and the OSCE has been limited due to persisting difficulties with local authorities and the Russian government (Zabyelina & Arsovska, 2013, p.  19). Moscow did not allow the West to be involved in the Chechen crisis as it considered that this domestic crisis in Russia would be beneficial for the US, which it feared would support Chechen rebels. Thus, Moscow was concerned that the engagement of outsiders could lead to the further destabilisation of the country and the possible secession of the region. Overall, while Moscow has invested significantly in improving the conditions in Chechnya during and following the war, its approach of prioritising immediate repairs and ‘greasing palms’ in order to buy total loyalty has created a fragile peace and stability that is mainly attributed to highly individualised governance. This governance is based on Kadyrov’s Moscow-backed repression, lacks progress or investment towards genuine reconciliation, and operates with almost no accountability for extensive

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human rights abuses. Despite the investments made, the republic continues to grapple with economic inequality and poor social infrastructure. The main outcomes of Moscow’s reconstruction activities have been Chechnya’s experience in implementing and maintaining these operations. Fundamental issues are unlikely to be addressed under the current political administration and the arrangement of vertical and authoritarian power between Moscow and Grozny. 4.5.2   Educational and Cultural Recovery In addition to economic and infrastructure repair, the education system plays a variety of roles in post-war countries. The Chechen Republic recognised the value of education and worked to expand its education system with the resources available. In February 2000, the Russian government agreed to a one-year programme to restore the Chechen Republic’s educational system. The goal of the programme was “to create legal, economic, organisational, and methodological conditions for ensuring the functioning and, in the future, the development of the education system” (Order of February 25, 2000 N 616). This project was funded by both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education. Addressing basic education needs through assistance early on makes it possible to build an orderly transition out of protracted and devastating crises into phases of recovery and development. Several educational programmes, such as ‘Success of Every Child,’ were launched in Chechnya in 2018. The aim of the project was “to create a system for identifying, supporting, and developing the abilities and talents of children and youth” (Order of December 13, 2018 N 366-r). The focus on children and youth was seen as critical to Moscow’s goals of combating extremism through economic prosperity, as education is seen to break the poverty cycle by providing future generations with better economic opportunities. Another initiative was the establishment of a modern school with the goal of providing children with the opportunity to obtain a high-­ quality general education in circumstances up to modern standards, regardless of where they live (Order of December 13, 2018  N 364-r). Because the budget difference between this project and others was so substantial, it appears that the republic sincerely prioritised educational reforms, and focused on delivering quality education to children living in rural areas.

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Many cultural heritage sites were destroyed during the Chechen Wars, including the National Museum of the Chechen Republic, which had 90% of its artefacts looted or destroyed during the war (Astalov, 2021, p. 108). When Ahmad Kadyrov gained power in June 2000, he made a concerted effort to restore the Chechen people’s historical and cultural heritage, and the museum was highly prioritised (ibid., p. 109). The damaged historic building in which the museum had been located was not restored; instead, it was demolished and rebuilt from the ground up in order to contribute to identity formation. This demonstrated Moscow’s support for the republic’s heritage and distinct identity, signalling that by remaining within the Russian Federation, the republic would not need to suppress its culture or religious practices. It also echoes the Soviet strategies that had focused on social renewal and cultural heritage to bind and ground the population in the territory and identity. Grozny has become the best example of Moscow-financed reconstruction and economic development (Bifolchi, 2018, p. 256). National cultural revival and social restructuring initiatives were developed in line with the President’s Decree and in accordance with Moscow’s national aims and strategic objectives for the period up to 2024. On 1 January 2019, the national initiative ‘Culture’ was implemented. This initiative was aimed at simplifying access to cultural events for people in different regions of Russia, including the Chechen Republic. It involves the reconstruction of cultural facilities, the renovation of libraries and cinemas, as well as the restoration of theatres (Vpervye v Rossii…, 2020). The following year, six rural cultural houses underwent extensive restoration. In a step towards restoring Chechnya’s literary heritage, libraries were rebuilt and renovated to meet modern standard requirements. National projects were also responsible for “festivals; grants in the form of subsidies to non-profit organisations for the implementation of creative projects; organisation of exhibitions about the Chechen Republic’s cultural heritage; [and] advanced training of creative and managerial personnel in the field of culture” (Chechnya. Nacionalnomu Proektu, 2021). It is possible to highlight several core features of the cultural approaches in Chechnya. First of all, one of the main priorities was the development of education according to Moscow’s centralised standards. This strategy primarily aimed to culturally integrate the region into the Russian system and to support economic goals to combat radicalisation. Moreover, it catalysed the spread of the Russian language, which is an important strategy for deterring secession, as local languages can be considered one of the

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components of self-determination. At the same time, the Kremlin did not prohibit local culture and traditions; on the contrary, it supported the restoration of various historical sites and did not intervene in regular religious practices. 4.5.3  Results In this section, we will examine the results achieved with the millions of rubles invested in Chechnya following the war. This table highlights a number of socio-economic developments which have improved the Chechen public perception of Russia, especially since Moscow granted Chechnya autonomy within its borders. According to a governmental study conducted in August 2003, 78% of Chechen residents favoured Russian Federation membership, while only 19% opposed it (Tsygankov, 2006, p.  1091). Some data from surveys in Dagestan, the largest area in the North Caucasus, also points to strong support for Russian authority (ibid.). Social and economic data alone, however, do not provide an accurate picture of the situation in Chechnya. Positive trends mask a deeply troubling domestic landscape marked by rising political repression. As demonstrated in Table 4.1, over the past 15 years, the number of unemployed people has decreased by 46%, which can be attributed to the policy of social and economic development of the Chechen Republic for 2008–2012, which sought to create 95,000 new jobs. The unemployment bump in 2020 can be explained by the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, GDP figures indicate effective development; according to the World Bank, Chechnya’s GDP increased steadily through the 2009–2018 period, reaching 101.3% in 2018. The number of organisations providing primary, secondary, and postsecondary education has increased by 12% (from 484 to 543 organisations), professional theatre patrons have increased by more than 200%, and museum visits have increased from 18,900 to 236,300 visits, showing that the tourism industry is slowly driving economic growth. Following Ramzan Kadyrov’s appointment as President of the Republic in 2007, the number of security incidents decreased significantly, with the number of terrorist attacks over the decade falling from 997 in 2008 to 9 in 2018 (S Okonchanija Vtoroj Chechenskoj, 2019). Analysts, on the other hand, have questioned the long-term viability of Putin’s strategy of subjugating, stabilising, and rebuilding Chechnya. While still far below

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Table 4.1  Statistics of the Chechen Republic Description

2005 2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

The number of unemployed registered with the public employment service (as of the end of the year), per thousand people Gross regional product (total [in current prices], per billion rubles) The number of families registered as needing housing (at the end of the year) as a percentage of the total number of families Emergency housing stock, by thousand m2 of the total area of residential premises Number of organisations carrying out educational activities on educational programmes of primary, basic, and secondary general education

332.7 232.2

99.5

74.8

57.4

56.2

49.9

50.5

125.2

22.9

70.7

150.0

154.4

201.7 216.0 223.9 241.6

…

15.9

23.5

23.0

23.0

23.0

22.0

21.0

18.4

18.4

…

…

…

…

…

75.5

99.2

152.8

337.3

484

462

495

507

521

527

527

531

543

(continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Description

2005 2010

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Number of hospital organisations + number of outpatient clinics, units Number of spectators of professional theatres, per thousand people Number of museum visits: total, per thousand people Surplus, deficit (−) of the consolidated budget, per million rubles

130

205

92

97

103

95

116

113

111

31.0

35.9

231.3

212.7

234.9 256.3 280.3 384.2

99.4

18.8

16.5

237.6

253.9

276.1 284.3 294.4 388.7

236.3

…

−844.6 −2398.5 −757.5 946.4 401.3 357.8 −170.0 −1256.4

Data source: Chechen Statistical Yearbook (2021)

the levels of violence in the early 2000s, a resurgence in lethal insurgent strikes in Chechnya from December 2015 to 2017 led more observers to doubt Moscow’s assurances that the Jihadist threat has been eradicated (Soleimanov, 2017). Despite the implementation of various programmes, the number of families in need of housing has increased, the supply of emergency housing is increasingly critical (with the needs having increased by five times in the last three years), the number of hospitals and outpatient clinics has dropped, and the budget deficit has grown by 48.8% in 10 years. In short, despite the reduced unemployment rate, the Chechen economy continues to struggle. Moscow’s ambitious plans for Chechnya’s development are based on generous development aid programmes but are hampered by the authorities’ laxness, propensity for corruption, and the unaddressed root causes of the separation movement, making the reconstruction agenda in Chechnya likely to be hampered (Zabyelina, 2013, p.  40). Additionally, Moscow

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governs Chechnya through a patron-client relationship between the President of Russia, Putin, and the Head of Chechnya, Kadyrov. This structure undermines the authority, legitimacy, and power of the client state, ultimately leaving Grozny without strong institutions and in a fragile position when a power transition next arises. The reconstruction and developmental success of Chechnya has been described as: A Russian political model which the Kremlin has tried to adapt and apply in the rest of the North Caucasus and could even be used in Syria [through] trying to support financially and [militarily] a local leader, in this case Bashar al-Assad, with the aim of establishing a Russian outpost in the region. (Bifolchi, 2018, p. 257)

In 2022, 14 years after the end of the Second Chechen War, Chechnya is still the fourth most funded republic in the Russian Federation, demonstrating not only its continued needs following the wars but also Moscow’s prioritisation of the Kadyrov regime and maintenance of peace (Danilov, 2022).

4.6   Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Abkhazia and South Ossetia 4.6.1  Abkhazia For Abkhazia, the post-conflict period started much earlier than for South Ossetia. Abkhazia gained relative peace after the war with Georgia in 1993, but its situation worsened due to the economic blockade Yeltsin imposed on the state. Before Russia’s interference in the conflict, Georgia inflicted US $13 billion in material damage, according to Sergei Bagapsh, the second president of the self-declared Abkhazian Republic, who noted that “if we take into account the damage caused by the blockade to the economy of Abkhazia, this amount will increase significantly” (Rossija Snjala Jekonomicheskuju…, 2008). The infrastructure in Abkhazia was in poor condition, particularly its transport sector. For instance, the Sukhumi airport was inoperable and the Abkhaz railway never recovered from the war in the early 1990s (Rossija Snjala Jekonomicheskuju…, 2008). After the 1992–1993 Abkhaz conflict, Russia began supporting reconstruction efforts and providing investment.

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Along with economic investments from Russia, since 2002, Moscow has made it a policy to enable Abkhazian people to access Russian citizenship, which has expanded their options for living, working, studying, and travelling abroad, providing them with economic benefits (ibid.). The majority of people living in Abkhazia now have Russian passports, yet Abkhazians do not pay any taxes to the Russian Federation (Ashotov, 2019). While there may be many motivations for this, including solidarity with the Abkhazian people, this policy presents a pathway to de facto expand Russia’s borders into the republic, ensuring that Moscow will have even stronger justifications under its policy to ‘protect Russian peoples’ as the residents of Abkhazia now not only have historic ties to Russia, but are legally Russian citizens. This also makes any attempt by Georgia to reclaim the territory even more difficult and complex, while fundamentally eliminating the importance of the republic’s ‘independence,’ which Russia had claimed to support. Moscow’s acknowledgment of Abkhazia’s sovereignty was one of the most important factors in its post-war development. Russia provided access to its market for local products (wine and citrus fruits), contributing to the Abkhazian economy while receiving certain benefits. At the same time, the Russian market influenced the restoration of traditional agricultural specialisations, such as the cultivation of tobacco and essential oil crops. Meanwhile, Russian tourism demand has boosted the production of building materials, coal mining, and logging of valuable types of wood, putting the Abkhazian budget on better footing (Gorazhankin, 2008). According to President Putin: “Russia will be next to the Abkhaz people and will help overcome the problems of the past years, [and] will help Abkhazia to get on its feet” (Vladimir Putin Uveren…, 2011). In 2009, 10.9 billion rubles were allocated to Abkhazia for “the restoration of health, education, social and cultural facilities, agriculture, transport and engineering infrastructure, housing and communal services, and administrative buildings damaged as a result of hostilities”(Rossijskaja Pomoshh’ Pojdet…, 2010). According to Ozgan, Abkhazia’s Minister of Economy from 2005 to 2011, the allocated funds were used to rebuild the water supply and sewerage system, restore and modernise healthcare facilities, and repair ministries, universities, and heritage sites such as the Abkhaz State Drama Theatre, and the Russian Drama Theatre (Rossijskaja Pomoshh’ Pojdet…, 2010). In 2014, as part of the ‘Investment Program for the Promotion of the Republic of Abkhazia’s Social and Economic Development,’ schools reopened, and the reconstruction of residential

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buildings, houses, basements, hospitals was completed (Ogneva, 2015). Schools were renovated under the target programme ‘Rossotrudnichestvo.’ Moscow’s approach includes creating options for teaching to be conducted in the Russian language. While the main subjects are taught in Russian, there remain schools that teach in Russian, Abkhaz, and even Armenian. Russian universities have been provided with special target quotas for Abkhazians pursuing higher education (Snegiryov, 2021). However, not all of this funding was allocated effectively, and, as in Chechnya, corruption reduced the efficacy of reconstruction efforts in Abkhazia. In 2010, for the first time, the Accounts Chamber of Russia looked into where the allocated funds were spent in Abkhazia and found misallocation and violations of 347 million rubles. The Accounts Chamber audit revealed that 6 billion rubles were spent inefficiently, having been left “hanging” in unfinished construction. Seventy-two criminal cases were initiated, but the missing 347 million rubbles were never recovered («Novye Izvestija»: Pochemu Rossija…, 2020). 4.6.2   South Ossetia In the smaller republic of South Ossetia, on the other hand, the conflict was not resolved until 2008. Vladimir Blank, the Russian Deputy Minister of Regional Development, stated in August 2008 that out of the more than 7000 structures in Tskhinvali, roughly one in ten could not be reconstructed, and 20% were destroyed in some way. Irina Gagloeva, a South Ossetia government spokeswoman, estimated that around 70% of the city’s residential structures were destroyed. Sergei Shoigu, the Russian Minister for Emergency Situations, later stated that more than 2500 residential structures had been damaged, of which 1100 were not eligible for reconstruction. Ten border communities along the South Ossetian peninsula were “totally wiped off the face of the earth,” according to the commander-­in-chief of the Russian Ground Forces (Vojna v YUzhnoj Osetii…, 2008). According to the South Ossetian authorities, the damage caused by the conflict at the end of August 2008 was valued at around 100 billion rubles. A subsequent estimate of 41 billion rubles was made by the South Ossetian State Committee for the Restoration of the Republic. Georgian President Saakashvili estimated the cost of the war’s damage to Georgia at US $2  billion (around 50  billion rubles) (Rossija Snjala Jekonomicheskuju…, 2008).

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The total amount that Moscow spent on the restoration and economic development in South Ossetia within the framework of its comprehensive plan was 9.61 billion rubles during the period of 2008–2010, and in 2011 the programme was completed. The funds were allocated to reconstruct almost all sectors, including education, healthcare, energy, and more, such as: [Eight hundred and sixty-eight] different objects or activities, including energy, education, health care, culture, roads, engineering infrastructure, and housing facilities. In the social and infrastructural spheres, 257 items out of 265 have been fully reconstructed; in education—28 facilities [have been rebuilt, in] healthcare—18 [facilities have been rebuilt], including the Central Republican Hospital [which] has been completely renovated. In addition, [reconstruction efforts have repaired] 11 gas supply facilities; 55 energy supply facilities; 60 objects of road infrastructure; 18 buildings of state and municipal authorities; [and] 23 objects of engineering infrastructure. (Realizacija Kompleksnogo Plana…, 2011)

While reconstruction efforts created a degree of dependence on Russia, during Russia’s two-year presence, specialists have been trained to continue the restoration efforts (Programma Vosstanovlenija Juzhnoj Osetii…, 2018). South Ossetia also had its own construction industry, and Russian Minister of Regional Development Viktor Basargin noted that several infrastructure projects have been undertaken in the republic, bolstering this industry (Basargin: Stroitel’stvo – peredovaya…, 2012). Since 2015, Russia has funded an educational programme that improves systems of preschool and general education, recreation for children, infrastructure and catering at schools, as well as the safety of educational organisations (Rossija pomozhet modernizirovat’…, 2019). Moreover, Moscow has shifted South Ossetia into the same educational system as the Russian Federation (Dzagoeva, 2018). In both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has continued the Soviet tradition of spreading its model of education and used language and educational exchange to strengthen ties with the two breakaway republics and to reinforce their Russification. Later, in 2018 and 2019, more than 4.5 billion rubles were allocated for the implementation of Russia’s ‘Investment Program for the Recovery and Development of South Ossetia.’ Putin claims that funding for South Ossetia comes from two sources: investment expenditure from the Russian budget and Russian support for the Republic of Abkhazia’s budget—via funds given for wages, upkeep, and ongoing repairs to buildings and

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structures for the restoration and construction of new facilities (Juzhnuju Osetiju Pochti…, 2010). Mirroring its policy in Chechnya, Moscow has made efforts to stabilise conditions for the development of the economy, improving the investment climate, establishing small and medium-sized businesses, and creating new jobs, as well as enhancing the pension system (‘Vosstanovleno Pri Pomoshhi Rossii’…, 2018). South Ossetia has informally become a Russian region with Russian money, passports, and a Russian governmental structure, run on Russian investment. There is no sign of any investors in South Ossetia other than Russia. Additionally, Anatoly Bibilov, who won the presidential elections in South Ossetia with about 55% of the vote, campaigned on the promise of joining Russia in 2017 (Integracija i Degradacija…, 2018). Despite the similarities between Russia’s strategic engagement approaches in Chechnya and South Ossetia, the reconstruction budget for South Ossetia is smaller than for Chechnya. The financial support to South Ossetia during the reconstruction phase was delayed and mediocre in its effectiveness. Residents complained that there have not been any significant improvements, and that many people who have lost their homes have not been relocated (Galimova, 2012). For example, “a one-room flat with no hot water costs around 5000 rubles per month, which is unaffordable to many, with teachers’ and doctors’ monthly wages roughly equalling the same amount” (ibid.). Given its limited funding and monitoring in South Ossetia, it is possible that Moscow views the republic as lower in strategic importance, which could be due to the lack of extremism emerging from the area and the small population and size of South Ossetia in comparison to Chechnya and Abkhazia. Many of the humanitarian actions taken, according to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were motivated partially by the number of Russian residents in the republics. Russia exploited this narrative and, following the Soviet tradition of donorship, used its humanitarian aid to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to achieve broader political and strategic objectives that were not humanitarian in essence. The establishment of the South Ossetian separatist government has given the Kremlin another asset—a military outpost deep in the Caucasus region (Troianovski, 2018). The outpost, located near the town of Zugdidi in western Georgia, allows Russia to monitor South Ossetia’s borders. The outpost gives Moscow a military presence near Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran. It also strengthens Russia’s hold on Abkhazia. Finally, Russian authorities and businessmen use South Ossetia for trade operations with the Donbass region of Ukraine (ibid.).

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As the region’s major source of investment, Russia came to play an important and effective role in the region’s economic sustainability. Despite its strong support for the de facto administrations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 1990s, Russia insisted that it was not a party to the conflict. It continued to refer to itself as a “mediator,” according to Vyacheslav Kovalenko, the Russian Ambassador to Georgia, while simultaneously sending aid to Abkhazia (Rossija ne yavlyaetsya…, 2008). Recently, in August 2022, the deputy prime ministers of South Ossetia, Dzambolat Tadtaev, and of Abkhazia, Kristina Ozgan, joined Russian Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov to sign two inter-state agreements on aid to the republics. Both sides agreed to implement the Russian government’s plan for South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s socio-economic growth from 2022 to 2025. Reshetnikov emphasised that Abkhazia and South Ossetia had and continued to benefit from Russian assistance, particularly in tackling societal difficulties. According to Reshetnikov, two brand-new agreements were signed, which “are now based on a comprehensive, systematic strategy based on governmental programs for the development of the republics rather than merely the completion of discrete tasks” (Rossija Podpisala Soglashenija…, 2022).

4.7   Conclusion Russia’s approach to reconstruction in the Caucasuses has been motivated by a combination of underlying political goals alongside an interest in the wellbeing of Russian peoples. In Chechnya, after a brutal bombing campaign that levelled its capital combined with propping up a top-down authoritarian ruler to keep the republic in check, Moscow invested huge sums of money in the region in an attempt to show the population being a part of the Russian Federation brought benefits. The approach was based on an understanding that (i) poor economic conditions breed extremism; (ii) any suppression of Chechen culture could exacerbate historic grievances; and (ii) loyalty and top-down, repressive order could be bought and propped up through bankrolling reconstruction efforts. This understanding shaped a comprehensive approach to creating stability and beginning reconstruction plans and investment, even in the midst of the Second Chechen War. The investments in the economic conditions, educational system, relocation and reimbursement of displaced citizens, and cultural institutions all acted as a ‘carrot,’ demonstrating the benefits of continued ties to Moscow. It served to paint a stark contrast to the alternative ‘stick’

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approach, which Moscow had deployed during the wars through its brutal and indiscriminate bombing campaigns of the capital city and other areas, which led to thousands of civilian causalities. In this sense, Moscow’s approach domestically reflects its guiding principle of coercive diplomacy, using both a ‘stick’ and a ‘carrot’ simultaneously, deterring opposition both through fear and ruthless oppression and through the calculated benefits of maintaining positive relations with Russia. Interestingly, through Kadyrov, Moscow created a system that continued a brutal approach against separatist militants while simultaneously cultivating goodwill among and support for the local civilian population. However, despite a fraught and complex history between Chechens and Moscow, Moscow’s post-conflict reconstruction approach did not include deeper reconciliation or targeted efforts to meaningfully address historic grievances or concerns. Rather, Moscow focused on repairing the external and obvious signs of the war and securing a loyal government in Grozny. The reconstruction efforts in Chechnya highlight the ways in which Russia continues to follow the Soviet approach to dealing with minority groups in a way that is fundamentally different from other democracies: providing flexible autonomous arrangements, creating patron-client relationships, and accessing the local population through pro-Moscow administrative bodies. In both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia’s approach to reconstruction aimed to solidify economic ties between Russia and the breakaway republics, creating markets and furthering its own economic interests, while continuing the rhetoric and policy of ‘protecting Russians’ who were previously part of the USSR and became estranged from Russia after the 1992 boundaries. Ultimately, Russia sought to improve conditions through policies similar to those it used in Chechnya, focusing on economic prosperity, education, infrastructure, and social services. It also strengthened tourism and trade between the two countries, creating a level of integration that would make continued alliance with and dependence on Russia the republics’ only viable option going forward. Through its reconstruction efforts, Moscow sought to bring a higher standard of living to its allies not only because of their historic ties or the presence of Russians but also to demonstrate the benefits of an alliance with Russia and to reduce temptations for these states (or other allies) to re-join Georgia or to align with the EU or NATO. Moscow also used its humanitarian aid to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to achieve broader strategic objectives that were not humanitarian in

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nature, moving its troops into the republics and gaining a stronger grip on a strategic region, creating a buffer zone with the West, diminishing the chances of Georgia’s ascension to NATO, as well as creating loyal states to publicly support Moscow. Echoing the approaches of the USSR, this has ultimately enabled Moscow to gain a buffer against the West, a military presence near Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran, and additional political and economic allies. In South Ossetia, almost 99% of residents now have Russian citizenship, as do roughly 85% in Abkhazia. The policy of allocating Russian citizenship to residents presents a pathway to de facto expand Russia’s borders and one day ultimately absorb the republics into the Russian Federation. In all three cases, Moscow sought to be seen as caring for Russian people and Russia’s allies, demonstrating support and respect for heritage and some form of self-determination, even if this was ultimately a facade of autonomy while the government was either overtly controlled or entirely dependent on Moscow. The Soviet focus on education and spreading Moscow’s ideology and language can also be seen in all three cases, alongside the aim to create social renewal, balancing urgent post-war needs with long-term development goals. However, all three cases appear to remain in a state of fragile stability. They depend completely on Moscow, and through the top-down governments and dependent ties, they rely heavily on current relationships with the Kremlin rather than strong institutions and a foundation of reconciliation and conflict prevention. For example, by cutting economic ties with Georgia and the West, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now vulnerable to the instability that comes with economic challenges in light of the current sanctions on Russia. Similarly, Chechnya’s population is just as vulnerable as it was before the wars to the appeals of extremism if similarly economically impacted, showing much of Moscow’s reconstruction efforts to be a band-aid solution. Furthermore, corruption has eroded the effectiveness of some policies and threatens the sustainability of the structures and institutions created. Ultimately, the different approaches taken in the Caucasus demonstrate that Moscow significantly prioritises reconstruction investment within its own borders when compared with investments in external or peripheral neighbouring states, even when the majority of residents are ethnic Russians. Having examined Russia’s approach to reconstruction within its borders and in neighbouring republics, in the next chapter we will discuss the case study of Russian involvement further afield, in Syria.

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CHAPTER 5

Intervention and Reconstruction in Syria

5.1   Introduction Over the past decade, Syria, a key Russian ally that occupies an important geopolitical position in the Middle East, has experienced one of the most destructive wars of the twenty-first century. The Syrian conflict broke out in March 2011 in the context of the Arab Spring—the mass movement of revolutions and protests in the Arab world—that began in Tunisia after the street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself alight to protest police brutality. The event set in motion a chain of uprisings that engulfed several Arab countries, including Syria. The civilian-led opposition in Syria was established with the revolutionary aim of ousting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose family had by that time ruled Syria for four decades. As the Assad regime brutally suppressed civilian protestors in 2011 and 2012, the protests transitioned into an armed rebellion, which evolved into a highly internationalised civil war. This has involved a range of competing regional and international powers—including the US, the Gulf States, Iran, and, most importantly, Russia—that influence the dynamics of the conflict. This chapter provides the context of the war and examines Russia’s interests in Syria, its active military role in the conflict, and finally sheds light on its contributions to mediation and reconstruction efforts.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Barakat, Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34522-7_5

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5.1.1   Background of the Syrian Civil War To understand Russia’s presence in Syria, it is imperative to understand that the Syrian conflict has its roots in the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. The Assad government’s arrest and torture of schoolchildren who had graffitied anti-government slogans spurred demonstrations in rural Dara’a, on the outskirts of the Syrian capital Damascus (Hinnant, 2014). Security forces responded swiftly and harshly, carrying out mass arrests and fired on demonstrators (ibid.). Within weeks, the ruthless response triggered a wave of mass demonstrations throughout Syria’s largest cities, and the Syrian government continued its policy of brutally supressing civilian protestors throughout the country. Since 2011, experts and observers alike speculated that the political process would develop differently in Syria than in other Arab Spring countries (Shishkina, 2013). In response to the government’s extrajudicial mass arrests, torture, killings, and policy of cutting off communications and utilities, defectors from the official government Syrian Arab Army (SAA), together with civilians, began taking up arms by the summer of 2011. The armed Syrian opposition emerged as a decentralised network of opposition groups and battalions, and between 2011 and 2012 this network would include the Free Syrian Army (FSA; now the SNA: Syrian National Army), an umbrella of franchise brigades and battalions; local militias; and the alQaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra (Winter, 2013). Outside the battlefield, civilians organised themselves into autonomous provincial groups—known as Local Coordination Councils (LCCs)—to address local welfare needs, and into political bodies—such as the Syrian National Council—to advance the aim of overthrowing the Syrian government. However, Syrians were divided in their views regarding a vision and strategy for a post-Assad Syria. The early involvement of Iran, China, and Russia in propping up the Syrian government’s military front was countered by competing regional and international powers, notably the Gulf States, Turkey, and the US, which transformed the asymmetric civil war to an internationalised proxy conflict. From 2013 to 2016, the Salafist armed opposition—including Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)— grew to become the most powerful segment of the Syrian opposition. Until 2016, ISIS accumulated the largest surface area of terrain in

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comparison to all conflict parties. 1 These groups were better endowed in terms of financial, military, and human capital resources, and also had greater internal discipline, obedience, and cohesion owing to their historic roots in al-Qaeda. By the second half of 2013, ISIS 2—which had initially operated on the periphery of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and previously been active exclusively in northern Syria—emerged as a major force against the Syrian government and other rebel forces. From the second half of 2013 onwards, ISIS began to operate independently in the south of Syria. Until their rift in 2013, ISIS maintained close connections to the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, and was also loyal to its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. In 2014, however, ISIS began fighting Jabhat al-Nusra, and by June, ISIS announced the creation of the Islamic Caliphate and another name change: the Islamic State (IS), whereby IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed himself the caliph, assuming the head of the IS global jihad movement (Map 5.1).

5.2  Russian Interests and Motivations in Syria Russia’s interests and motivations in Syria revolve around three key concerns: Russia and Syria’s close, historic ties; opposing global and regional Islamic extremism, particularly relevant to Russia given the presence of millions of Muslims domestically (Kabasakalova, 2016); and countering the West’s global domination and influence. The Russo-Syrian alliance stretches back to the Cold War, and at present the Assad regime is Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East. Russia had military bases in Syria prior to its 2015 intervention, and Syria has long been an important purchaser of Russian military equipment (Trenin,   See the Institute for the Study of War maps, available at: https://www. understandingwar.org/publications?type%5B%5D=map&tid%5B%5D=322&field_ lastname_value=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC 2  The origin of ISIS, however, can be traced back to 2003 when the US led a coalition of forces to invade Iraq, removing President Saddam Hussein from power and aiming to bring democracy to the country. Though coalition forces attempted to pursue ‘nation-building’ through massive expenditure on reconstruction, development, and security, this campaign ultimately engendered a long period of deep instability for Iraq and its neighbours (Truyevskiy, 2017, p. 149). By 2005, as Iraq became enveloped in a multi-sided war among Sunni and Shiite militias and a state-led counter-insurgency campaign, the Islamic State of Iraq emerged (Ryzhov et al., 2019). 1

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Map 5.1  Foreign presence in Syria as of March 2021

2014). Hence, Russia has significant geostrategic interests in the stability of the Assad regime. In the UN Security Council, Russia demonstrated its commitment to securing not only its core interests but also those of Assad by propping up the regime, weakening the no-fly zone, and excluding a unified Syrian opposition from the ‘Geneva process’ of negotiations. Moscow also sought to expand its physical presence in Syria by establishing de facto protectorates in key locations, such as the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia, which are critical to the Assad regime’s ability to resupply its forces in the field. Russia views the presence of large number of violent Islamic terrorist groups in Syria as a threat to both its external and internal security. Russian intelligence sources estimate that 4000 foreign fighters from Europe and the US have been recruited into Syria since the self-proclamation of the Islamic State (Melkonyan, 2015). These individuals represent a major threat to the security of their countries of origin due to the risk of

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continuing terrorist activities upon their return. For Russia, the potential participation of Russian citizens and ethnic Chechens in ISIS activities poses a significant threat (Vanichkin, 2015), and it considers the Caucasus and the Volga regions to be the most likely sources of sympathy emerging from within Russia (Melkonyan, 2015). In its view, the most dangerous consequence of the strengthening of ISIS’s positions in the Middle East is its expansion or encouragement of similar movements in the Caucasus and Central Asian countries bordering Russia. Further military support from Moscow for the Syrian and Iraqi governments has also led to open threats against Russia from the jihadists. In fact, Russian analysts consider the growing strength of Islamist factions in the Syrian opposition by 2014 to be a turning point in Russia’s policy towards the Syrian opposition. Surkov (2021, p. 120) writes that “until 2014, Russia was more inclined to take into account the proposals of Western countries and the Syrian opposition, and also allowed negotiations on political transit through the formation of interim authorities.” Mikhail Bogdanov, the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East, has also stated that Russia was guided by the provisions of the Geneva Communiqué of 2012 and was ready to provide a platform for an informal dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition (Padenie Rezhima Asada…, 2013). However, by 2014, according to Surkov (2021), “Russia had stopped perceiving the Syrian opposition as a constructive force … the secular oppositionists were replaced by Islamists, including radical ones, and in case of the collapse of the Assad government, an Islamist regime would come to power in Damascus. This way, Moscow found in Assad a guarantor of the preservation of the Syrian statehood.” In the very beginning of the operation, during US President Barack Obama’s administration, Moscow was ready to collaborate with the American forces in Syrian lands. But with the change of the American administration and with its new strategy, all ties were cut and Moscow regularly accused the US of illegally occupying Syrian territories. The secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Nickolay Patrushev, stated that “unlike Russian troops, the American contingent is in Syria without the consent of the legitimate Syrian government and the decision of the UN Security Council, and, therefore, illegally” (Interv’yu Sekretarya Soveta bezopasnosti…, 2019). Moscow began its military operation in Syria by appealing to Russian public opinion and proclaiming its goal to be combating the terrorists that the American coalition had failed to destroy (i.e., ISIS).

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Through this narrative, Russia was able to position itself domestically as a global guard against terrorist activities. Russia’s intervention in Syria must also be understood in the context of growing Russian ambitions to challenge the role of the US in the Middle East. The principle of non-interference and sovereignty is one of the major principles that the Kremlin used to argue against American interventions in Syria. The current Russian position on Syria has been shaped by Western actions in Libya and the ensuing crisis, which Moscow took as a demonstration of the pitfalls of allowing foreign powers to intervene in the internal affairs of its strategic regional allies (Bagdonas, 2012). Moscow believes that if Assad were to be forcibly removed from his position, Syria would experience a similar scenario to Libya after the overthrow of the Kaddafi regime. Syria is also an important arena in which Moscow has been attempting to advance a ‘post-West’ global order that “centers on a multipolar, competitive world characterized by a diminished role of the United States and an elevated Russian status” (Yacoubian, 2021). The same view is advanced by Shangaraev (2018), who writes that: “Russia is pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy, trying to earn a reputation among the countries of the Middle East region as a strong, non-ideological and reliable political force that is able to use both diplomatic methods and, if necessary, resort to force to stabilize the situation in the region and resolve conflicts.” In the UN Security Council, particularly between 2011 and 2013, Russia consistently blocked draft resolutions that it felt could provide justification for a foreign invasion in Syria (Surkov, 2021, p. 121). It is possible to argue that Putin has used the conflict in Syria as a platform to showcase his country’s military and diplomatic might—and to pursue its geopolitical interests in the Middle East without being hindered by the West by using its veto power in the UN Security Council. Indeed, Moscow’s subsequent decision to intervene in Syria in 2015 was motivated by the very real prospect that the armed Syrian opposition could overthrow the Assad regime, which the Kremlin judged to be an unacceptable threat to its interests.

5.3  Russia’s Military Intervention Prior to Russia’s formal military involvement in Syria beginning in 2015, it had been selling arms and military equipment—including small arms, fighter planes, and missile systems—worth over $1.5 billion to the Syrian

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government since 2011, despite much scrutiny from the international community (Grove, 2013; Grove & Solomon, 2012). Supplied under Soviet-era contracts for the purpose of defence against external threats, the provision of these arms—mainly through Russia’s arms dealer, Rosoboronexport—was justified by Russian diplomats on the basis that they were not being used against civilians, in part because they were “of a defensive nature” (Grove & Solomon, 2012; Russia supplying arms…, 2012). They also contended that at that point Syrian rebels, including al-­ Qaeda fighters, were being armed by other countries—a claim challenged by Western and Gulf States—which raised the need to even out the firepower on the battlefield (Russia supplying arms…, 2012). In 2011, along with China, Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that, among other sanctions, would have imposed an arms embargo on Syria (ibid.). In a televised press conference in July 2015, Assad publicly disclosed for the first time that the SAA was suffering from “a shortfall in human capacity” and that his government had been forced to give up certain areas to Syrian rebels in order to maintain control of more important ones (Samman & Barnard, 2015). A few months later, on 30 September 2015, the Federation Council—the upper house of Russia’s parliament—authorised a military intervention in Syria to start that same evening, marking the first time since the end of the Cold War that Russia entered into an armed conflict outside the borders of the former Soviet Union (Daher, 2018). A statement addressed to Reuters from the Syrian President’s media office revealed this to be in response to an official request that Assad had personally made to Putin in a letter asking for greater military support (Syria’s Assad wrote…, 2015), seeming to confirm at least one aspect the intervention’s legality. The official line for Russia’s motives behind its military intervention also cited concern over the Islamic State’s growing strength and global influence—Putin’s press secretary, Dimitry Peskov, stated that “the main task is the fight against terrorism and support for the legitimate government of Syria in the fight against terrorism and extremism” (Peskov: Zadacha VVS RF, 2015). At the same time, the legal basis of Russia’s operation was questioned by Western countries, which referred to the international legal conditions necessary to invoke the principle of intervention. These conditions are based on two factors: the validity of consent, and the legitimacy of the inviting authority. The West has expressed uncertainty in relation to Russia’s intervention on both factors. First, in reference to the validity of consent, the International Law Commission, under Article 20, stipulates

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that the condition of valid consent requires clearly established and expressed approval (International Law Commission, 2001). Although Russia has not provided official documentation outlining the specific request of the Assad regime, it argues that Assad’s invitation and clear military and diplomatic relationship with Russia fulfils the requirement of consent within intervention by invitation (Daher, 2018). Second, the condition of Assad’s authoritative legitimacy has been contested by various scholars due to the Assad regime’s loss of effective control in the majority of eastern Syria to opposition parties. Legal scholars contend that authority is derived from a regime’s effective control over its territory; however, emerging notions concerning the legitimacy of the state’s governmental authority in times of human rights violations and abusive policies raise questions on what constitutes legitimate governance (Fox, 2014). Additionally, “the use of indiscriminate violence against the Syrian population brought several States to call on Assad to resign from office invoking, again, his lost legitimacy” (Odendahl, 2015). Although it is difficult to recognise an official opposition actor within the Syrian war, there has been international advocacy calling for Assad’s removal, underscoring the question of his authoritative legitimacy. Airpower, provided by the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), was the principal form of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, and was supplemented by ground forces and technical and military personnel support for the SAA and Syrian naval forces, including for air defence and long-range missile strikes (Russia’s War in Syria, 2020, p. 140). The VKS was notably active: it averaged around 40–50 sorties per day, with peaks as high as 100–130 per day (Russian air group…, 2015). Whilst the nominal target of the Russian intervention was the Islamic State, it became clear early on that the target in fact included any opposition elements against Assad— including civilians (Cumming-Bruce, 2020; Daher, 2018; Quinn, 2016). To preserve the integrity of the Syrian state, Russia sought to indiscriminately wipe out the entirety of the Syrian opposition, which it and the Syrian government conveniently and reductively labelled as ‘terrorist organisations’ (Russia’s War in Syria, 2020, p. 140). Various analyses support the claim that the vast majority of Russian airstrikes did not target the Islamic State (More than 90%’ of Russian…, 2015), and a 2015 Reuters analysis showed that 4 out of 5 Russian airstrikes—then totalling 64—did not target IS-controlled areas (Stubbs, 2015). Earlier that month, US State Department spokesman John Kirby said, “greater than 90% of the strikes that we’ve seen [Russia] take to date have not been against ISIL or

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al-Qaida affiliated terrorists” (More than 90% …, 2015). A 2018 study by Janes, the open-source defence intelligence agency, found that just 14% of Russian and Syrian strikes since September 2015 had targeted IS (Study: Russian Support, 2018). Moreover, according to Daher (2018) the proportion of Russian airstrikes targeting the Islamic State in 2016 was comparably low, with 26% aimed at terrorist groups in the first quarter of the year, 22% in the second quarter, and 17% in the third. Rather, the majority of Russian airstrikes occurred in civilian areas held by the opposition, resulting in a disproportionately greater loss of lives in civilian areas as opposed to legitimate military targets. This seems to be due to Russia’s military intervention aiming to recapture territories lost by the Assad regime to various opposition forces in order to pacify the threats to their own regional interests. Additionally, Russia has employed indiscriminate weapons, such as barrel bombs and cluster munitions, against innocent civilians, medical facilities and schools, as well as humanitarian aid workers and supplies. Bombs and munitions from Russian aircraft have also been deployed in the civilian-­ dense areas of Idlib, Douma, Dayr az-Zawr, and Aleppo (Idris, 2017). The scale and form of Russia’s military intervention inflicted widespread destruction in Syria, particularly in the rebel-held north-western area of the country (Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama) (Russia’s Devastating Impact…, 2020). Local and international human rights watchdogs have documented Russia’s deliberate and systematic targeting of local civilian hotspots and vital infrastructure, including residential areas, markets, factories, mosques, hospitals, and schools (Syria: Russia’s shameful…, 2015; Russia’s Devastating…, 2020). Russia’s ‘scorched-earth’ policy in Syria, coupled with the use of cluster munitions and unguided bombs (with an impact up to the size of a football pitch for a single bomb), has inflicted bloody, indiscriminate, large-scale destruction of public spaces, critical infrastructure, and entire neighbourhoods (Syria: Russia’s shameful…, 2015). The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported in early 2016 that six months of Russian airstrikes had killed around 2000 civilians (Russian airstrikes in Syria…, 2016) This destruction was also responsible for the displacement of millions of Syrians within and outside of Syria. Furthermore, the Russian military went on to advise the Syrian government during its sieges of rebel-held cities, including Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta, both of which saw the effective displacement of almost two million Syrians cumulatively (Chehayeb, 2022).

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Russia’s military intervention in Syria greatly weakened the Syrian opposition as a whole and simultaneously allowed Assad to focus on recapturing key territory (Study: Russian Support…, 2018). The same 2018 Janes study cited earlier found that the Syrian government’s area of control increased from less than two-fifths of Syria to almost half of it from September 2015—the beginning of Russia’s intervention—to March 2018 (ibid.). Perhaps the clearest articulation of this reality came from Assad himself, who on 21 November 2017, during bilateral talks between Russia and Syria in Sochi, remarked on Russia’s intervention: “I have conveyed to him [Vladimir Putin], and on his behalf to the Russian people, our gratitude for Russia’s efforts to save our country. I would like to highlight the contribution of the Russian Armed Forces and the sacrifices they have made to achieve this goal. … We will never forget this” (Syrian president Bashar…, 2017). In 2021, the Russian Ministry of Defence reported on “tests of unique technology for guiding the latest tactical strike drones. As a result, it was possible to achieve high rates of efficiency and accuracy of hitting targets in real time” (V Sirii ispytali…, 2021). This narrative allows Moscow, known to bomb areas with dense civilian populations and critical civilian infrastructure, to accuse the US and its allies of being the perpetrators of the continued disordered air strikes and civilian casualties.

5.4   Moscow as a Conflict Mediator Though a participant in conflict, Russia was involved in early efforts to advance the Syrian negotiation process under the auspices of the United Nations through the ‘Geneva process’ peace talks which took place from 2012 until 2017. Russia sees its unique conflict mediator role as one that adopts a “normative approach” involving “direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict without international interference and regime change” (Vahshiteh, 2018, p. 515). Russia also held direct negotiations with the Syrian government along with representatives of the opposition. At the Kremlin’s initiative, two rounds of intra-Syrian consultations were held in Moscow in January and April 2015. In 2017, after a change in US administration, the US and Russia ceased engaging in Syria negotiations through the Geneva process. This led Moscow to create its own platform for negotiations in Astana, showcasing the unique Russian approach to negotiation formats. During the ‘Astana process’ as it was known, Russia’s role and perception as a mediator grew

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as it convened parties with the goal of determining Syria’s future political order (Abramova, 2018, p. 136). The foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, and Turkey discussed cooperation on the Syrian issue on 20 December in Moscow, and on 31 December the UN Security Council approved a resolution put forth by Turkey and Russia in support of a ceasefire in Syria and the Astana peace negotiations (Kak prohodili …, 2017). The Astana process involved direct talks between the Syrian opposition and the government (Vahshiteh, 2018, p. 521), though they yielded limited results. However, according to the chief spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Igor Konashenkov, “the political will, shown by Russia and its partners in Astana, played a decisive role in ending the bloodshed and ensuring the transition to a peaceful life in Syria” (V Minoborony Rossii…, 2018). A joint statement of Astana guarantors noted that “the working group is a unique mechanism that has proven its relevance and effectiveness in building confidence between the Syrian parties and agreed to take measures to continue its work” (Sovmestnoe zayavlenie Prezidentov…, 2020). The next round of negotiations at Astana took place in January, yielding progress in the form of an uninterrupted discussion process and the convening of parties that had previously appeared unreconcilable. The principal accomplishment of the conference was the agreement reached by Russia, Turkey, and Iran to establish a tripartite body to oversee the SAR ceasefire. The Astana negotiation format led a shift away from diplomatic alliances controlled by the West and towards adaptable constellations of non-­ Western regional countries, sometimes with conflicting interests. Iran and Turkey were part of the Astana process alliance that leveraged each country’s ability to command military troops on the battlefield to establish and enforce a ceasefire. Political analysts view the Astana process, which combined regional diplomacy with national-level peace negotiations, as having offered “an entirely new approach to peace-making” (Lewis, 2022), in which Moscow’s negotiating strategy “was to limit the agency of the rebels and instead relegate them to becoming proxies of regional players, as opposed to a bottom-up discussion that involved all interested parties” (ibid., 2022). Russia was also involved in brokering an agreement with the US to create ‘de-escalation zones’ intended to establish ceasefires in specific areas and to give military commanders the freedom to negotiate with each other without interference from above. This was intended to allow humanitarian aid to reach civilian populations that had been cut off by fighting. However,

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it seems that all has been done in an effort to stabilise the Assad regime, in line with Russia’s general approach towards its allies. The Kremlin has maintained that the domestic Syrian crisis should be solved by the Syrian people themselves. To this end, Russia initiated the Congress of the Syrian National Dialogue, which can be considered one of the most significant events in the political settlement of the Syrian crisis. The National Dialogue became the first event in which antagonists agreed to gather round the same table for negotiations, which raised hope that this could lead to further negotiations and to an end to the crisis. At the same time, the results achieved in Astana are questionable, and we can again see examples of Russia’s use of double standards. During the Geneva process, Moscow clearly supported the idea that Syria should manage its domestic affairs without interference. But during an Astana meeting, it was the Kremlin that suggested developing a new Constitution for Syria. Moreover, the opposition was not featured as a prominent member of the format, which slowed the negotiation process. Finally, Russia has also played an intermediary role leading efforts to return the Arab League seat to the Syrian government.

5.5  Reconstruction Efforts and Limitations The Astana process signified the start of Russia’s reconstruction efforts in Syria. The scale of damage and destruction from over ten years of war in Syria is extensive. The 2018 estimates from the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) on the cost of the conflict are over US $400 billion in terms of losses in GDP and physical capital (Cost of Syria War, 2018). Damage assessment data gathered by the World Bank in 2016 shows that the housing sector saw the most damage across the country by far, even in comparison to the education, energy, health, roads, and water and sanitation sectors (The importance of planning…, 2016). Throughout a decade of conflict, Syria has also witnessed its currency, the Syrian lira, plummet in value, its economy rapidly contract, and has lost skilled labour and experienced significant brain drain (Asseburg, 2020). Staffan de Mistura, one of the three former UN-appointed mediators for Syria, said in November 2017 that reconstruction is expected to cost at least US $250 billion (‘No preconditions’ accepted…, 2017), an amount five times the size of Syria’s pre-war GDP (Ways out of Europe’s…, 2021)—this is expected to be much higher now.

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The hefty cost of Syria’s reconstruction will likely only be borne with the cooperation of the international community, yet this prospect is dimmed by competing visions over Assad and his government’s place in a post-war Syria, along with other concerns. Though Russia is willing to work with Assad, Western countries (and most members of the Arab League) have expressed clearly—and through legislation in some cases (e.g., the US’ Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act)—that they will not provide reconstruction assistance to the current Syrian government without the assurance of a power-sharing agreement. Statements made by EU diplomats make clear that the prospect of reconstruction funding is to be utilised as a financial ‘carrot’ to incentivise a political solution to the conflict in Syria. In the words of an anonymous French diplomat: “We will not pay for a false peace. This is one of our few pressure levers on the Russians” (Baczynska & Irish, 2016). Furthermore, several Western diplomats expressed the view that Russia should foot the bill for reconstruction due to its role in causing massive damage, along with the Assad regime (Wintour, 2016) at the height of the siege of Aleppo in November 2016. However, Russia affirmed that it could not finance the responsibility of reconstruction alone, and has made several failed attempts to enlist the assistance of the West and the Gulf States (Ramani, 2019). As it stands, Russia is one of the few countries permitted by the Syrian government to provide reconstruction assistance, due to its stance during the war and its willingness to offer assistance without conditionalities on Assad and his government’s future (Asseburg, 2020). Russia’s reconstruction efforts in Syria are led primarily by Russian private companies and secondarily by Russian state institutions. The bulk of Russia’s reconstruction efforts in Syria take two, profit-generating, forms: resource extraction and long-term investment projects (ibid.). Whilst profit generation is a key feature of Russian assistance, due to the country’s struggling economy and its desire to be compensated for the heavy costs it incurred during its intervention in the conflict, it is also an extension of the decades-long Russian economic influence in Syria (Al-Allaf & Said, 2021). Since 2017, multiple contracts in an array of sectors have been drawn up and implemented between Russian private companies— who have links with Putin’s government—and the Syrian government and Syrian political-business elite in mineral resource extraction and construction. Taking the form of public-private partnerships, these initiatives often involve privatising former government-run institutions and transferring

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them from the jurisdiction of public sector labour regulations to the private sector, which offers less protection for Syrian workers (ibid.). One such company—owned by Russian oligarch and a friend of Putin, Gennady Timchenko—is the Stroytransgaz Logistic Company (STG) that currently runs the Syrian state-owned General Company for Phosphate and Mining (near Palmyra), the General Fertiliser Company (GFC, near Homs), and the commercial Tartous Port (near Russia’s base in Tartous) after signing contracts in 2018 and 2019 (ibid.). The Syrian Parliament and the STG agreed in 2019 for the Russian company to invest $200 million in restoring three factories of the General Fertiliser Company within two years, from which STG would receive a 65% share of GFC’s revenues for 40 years. Though daily fertiliser production has increased as a result of Russian investments, production levels are still far short of pre-2011 levels, and although STG is investing in an industry that Syria otherwise does not have the financial resources to operate, the government is nevertheless losing decades of revenue and increasing its dependency on Russia (ibid.). In addition to fertilisers and phosphate, Russian private companies are also involved in the extraction of other mineral resources like oil and gas: in 2018, STG, along with other Russian companies such as Zarubezhenft, Technopromexport, and Zarubezhgeologiya, began oil and gas exploration and started to operate thermal power plants in the country (Rossijskie Neftegazovye Kompanii…, 2018). Humanitarian aid became a tool Moscow utilised to maintain its territorial dominance and to ensure the allegiance of the Assad government. According to the Atlantic Council, a variety of Russian organisations, including the Russian military’s Centre for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides in Syria (CRCSS), along with at least 25 Russian groups (most of which are religious or state-affiliated NGOs) are part of a “shadow aid system” that is a component of Russia’s larger conflict management system (Robinson, 2022). This shadow system was not subject to recognised international norms, and “[under] this system, aid networks did not partner with Syrian state institutions—a requirement for Western organizations working in the country” (Al Shami, 2022). In order to strengthen Syria’s central government control, Russia vehemently opposed UN assistance delivery across borders to rebel-held areas, while supporting its own aid network (Lewis, 2022). During discussions on the renewal of the cross-border assistance delivery system in 2020, Russia pressed the UN to be more open with its aid provision in Syria, thereby drawing attention away from its own failures (Robinson, 2022).

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“Russia used this aid system as a guise to cover its interference in Syria’s societal infrastructure as it pursued demographic and ideological shifts conducive to its strategic goals,” facilitating Syria’s client-state status by depleting Syrian resources and increasing dependence on Russia (Al Shami, 2022). The majority of Russia’s humanitarian deliveries to Syria remain unspecified. Reconstruction efforts in the form of infrastructure rehabilitation, humanitarian assistance, and capacity building and training are typically led by Russian state institutions, including the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of the Warring Parties (CPVS, also known as the Russian Reconciliation Centre for Syria), the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Defence. By the CPVS’ own reporting: “944 educational and 230 medical institutions were restored; five road bridges and 1,125  kms of roads were restored; 1,064 kms of power lines were re-laid; [and] 193 water supply facilities; 299 bakeries, 771 electrical substations, and 14,446 industrial enterprises began their operations” by January 2020 (V Aleppo Vosstanavlivajut…, 2020). The CPVS also reports that from 2016 to 2021, it carried out 3,090 humanitarian missions to 731 communities across Syria (Dagres, 2021). The Russian military assisted the Syrian government in restoring infrastructure in 345 villages after the conflict; since its launch in 2018, the Russian interdepartmental coordination centre has rebuilt around 1,000 educational institutions. (V sirii pri podderzhke, 2021)

As was the case in the Caucasuses, Russia focused on education, specifically Russophile education, as a core component of recovery. Given that Syrians have restricted access to higher education in Western nations due to sanctions, Syria’s move in this direction appears inevitable. Russia has been collaborating with Syrian institutions both to create scholarship programmes for professionals with various degrees of education and to improve teachers’ professional development (Berenkova, 2019). Russia has also continued to promote the spread of the Russian language. In 2017, a centre for the study of the Russian language opened at Damascus University (Akinshin, 2017). Furthermore, the Centre Rassvet (‘Dawn Centre’ in English) for the Study of Russian Language and Culture was opened in 2021, providing space for up to 300 children to explore Russian culture, traditions, and customs in addition to studying the Russian language. Moreover, excursions to Russia are planned in order to familiarise

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students with cultural landmarks and take part in a variety of creative activities (V Sirii nachal rabotu…, 2021). In the context of its concern for the survival and continuity of the Syrian state, Russia has also continued its tradition of in-kind technical assistance, and has provided training and education to Syrian civil servants. In February 2017, the Russian Ministry of Defence established a mine clearance centre—as a branch of the Russian Armed Forces’ International Mine Action Centre—and trained more than 1200 Syrian military engineers in demining. In an effort to further cement ties between the two nations, in December 2019, the Russian Ministry of Education launched the 7.4-billion-ruble Centre for Open Education in Russian Language to teach Syrians the languages spoken across the Russian Federation, and by 2020, the Centre had taught 100 Syrian teachers the Russian language (Rossija vydelila bolee…, 2020; Uchitelja russkogo jazyka…, 2019). In recent years, Russia and Syria have begun to shift their coordinated reconstruction focus towards economic interests and the struggle for energy resources. Syria has also become increasingly interested in attracting foreign investment and occupying a profitable niche in the regional and trans-regional economy. Another Russian contribution to Syria’s reconstruction includes the restoration of Palmyra, one of Syria’s six World Heritage Sites. 3 This is an initiative which some analysts have deemed as Russia’s “way to revive the Syrian regime through the tourism sector” (Al-Khateb, 2014). Whilst some of Russia’s reconstruction efforts in Syria have been productive, their effectiveness and utility to Syrian society are limited by their lack of effective cooperation and coordination with a representative body of Syrians (as opposed to the current system run by the state’s business-­ political elites); their scale and inconsistency; and the ongoing sanctions imposed against Syria by many Western countries, the Arab League, and others.

3  In November 2019, an MoU was signed between the Russian State Hermitage Museum and the Syrian Museums and Antiquities Authority to restore historical facilities and artefacts in Palmyra.

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5.6  Conclusion Syria is one of the most difficult but important cases of recent Russian reconstruction policy, and Putin has called for Russia’s intervention experience in Syria to become “a model for resolving regional crises” (Latuhina, 2019). The top Russian priority in Syria is the preservation of Assad’s regime. As an authoritarian state, it is vital for the Kremlin to maintain autocratic rule in its important allied countries, and Moscow backs Assad as a legitimate ruler and a representative of a strong state. As discussed in Chap. 3, one of the tools of Russian peacebuilding is support for a ‘vertical hierarchy.’ Assad has become the same vicegerent of Putin as had Kadyrov in Chechnya and the presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Similarly, Russia has encouraged the adoption of Russian language and the further integration of the Syrian government and people with the Russian Federation, seeking to solidify the alliance while promoting its own export markets, culture, and tourism. A loyal ally in the form of a stable Syria is needed for Moscow to not only establish its strategic geopolitical positions in the Middle East but also support its security goals of suppressing Islamic extremism and the Islamic State. Similar to the Caucasus, Syria has experienced a high level of terrorist activity, and the Kremlin seeks a ‘strong’ leader to control it to prevent its spread, regardless of the civilian costs. Furthermore, by gaining another loyal, indebted ally, Moscow has also gained support to legitimise its actions in the international arena. Illustrating this point, the states of Syria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia demonstrated their loyalty by being among the few to accept the proclamation of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk as sovereign republics. Assad’s loyalty to the Kremlin was further cemented through reconstruction projects as well as economic cooperation with Russia. Even though Russia does not have the resources to fund the full reconstruction on such a scale and cannot rely on the financial help of NATO countries, it has fulfilled an important role for Assad as the first to step in and provide some measure of reconstruction, humanitarian, and security support. At the same time, Syria has become increasingly important as an ally to Russia. In Moscow’s present situation facing multiple sanctions, it has had to look for new solutions to support its economy. In this context, Syria not only imports Russian products but also provides it with privileged trade routes to the Mediterranean Basin as well as the Black Sea. Syria’s geographical

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position makes it valuable to Moscow as a key transport hub and transit corridor, as well as a potential host for future pipelines. Moreover, Moscow plays an important role as a mediator in the Syrian conflict, launching various formats of negotiations that allow the opposition and government to engage. Russia views groups with arms and political power as the entities with the ability to start and stop violence, and therefore believes that peace talks should be limited to those with such power. Russia also has the ability to use its military might to back up its negotiating position. This can be useful for negotiating short-term agreements, but a settlement that is solely based on power runs the danger of being unsustainable if it includes new patterns of repression that lead to fresh outbreaks of violence. Overall, the successful deployment of Russia’s forces in Syria allowed it not only to obtain a new geopolitical status, but also to become a key participant in the Syrian post-conflict settlement and reconstruction. This was facilitated by the Russian policy of multilateralism and its system of alliances developed in the Middle East, which solidify Russia’s presence in the region as an influential force and prevent its influence from being undermined. While Moscow has continued to follow its historical theme of prioritising educational and military support while providing in-kind support in the form of technical assistance, it does not yet have a clear strategy for the restoration of Syria given its financial limitations, and continues to assert that this must be done with the participation of the global community. While Russia was heavily engaged in Syria, it simultaneously began increasing its involvement in neighbouring Ukraine. The next chapter will explore the Russian interventions in Ukraine, and will ultimately bring together the lessons from Russia’s engagement in Syria and the Caucasuses to explore future reconstruction potentialities in Ukraine.

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CHAPTER 6

Ukraine: The Context, the Case of Crimea, and Moscow’s Commitments to Annexed Territories

6.1   Introduction The Russo-Ukrainian War cannot be examined in isolation from other conflicts in post-Soviet states, in part because Russia’s military and diplomatic interventions in this space serve to solidify its hegemonic influence in the region (Chausovsky, 2022). This includes Russia’s backing of Abkhazian and Ossetian secessionists in Georgia and its leading role in advancing regional peace agreements that reinforced it as a “security guarantor” (Kofman, 2018). As an example, Russia plays a significant role in the Nagorno Karabakh region in the South Caucasuses, where, together with Turkey, it brokered a settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia to halt the violence that resurfaced in late 2020, and sent a peacekeeping force (Aslund, 2020). Similarly, in Central Asia, Russia deployed forces as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to Kazakhstan at the president’s request to support the government to ‘stabilise’ the country and suppress protestors after violence erupted in Almaty (Kazakhstan: Why are there…, 2022). Its role in the CSTO and support of allied ruling governments reinforce Moscow’s status and interests in the region and demonstrate Russia’s concern over losing influence in the former Soviet region, in particular to the West (Dubnov, 2022). From Putin’s perspective, the European security order was redrawn in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, during the brief period of Russian weakness and disarray. With the Soviets missing from © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Barakat, Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34522-7_6

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the international arena during the Gulf Crisis of 1991 as well as the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US was able to extend its dominance in international affairs, particularly in the Middle East. However, over the last 15 years, American hegemony has declined. As a result, the global system has been shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar order, in which the US and its European allies compete with the strategic alliance between Russia and China on a global and regional level. While the US has maintained its influence in many European and Asian countries, for a variety of reasons, it no longer possesses the power or influence to solely determine outcomes in the international system. In this context, Moscow’s imperialistic ambitions have grown rapidly. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new government of the Russian Federation still had significant influence over the five Central Asian ‘stans’: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2008, having gained increasing power and capabilities in light of increased oil prices and economic relations with Europe, and against the backdrop of the Bucharest Summit in which NATO opened the door to welcome Georgia and Ukraine to join, Moscow chose to move against Georgia and to support Abkhazian and South Ossetian sovereignty. Through this approach and support to these breakaway republics, it extended its border patrols southward and opened the possibility of future annexation of these territories. In 2014, Moscow took its next big step by annexing Crimea from Ukraine. Each of these developments set the stage for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Putin targeted Ukraine and took an immense risk due to several core strategic interests at stake in Ukraine. Firstly, Russia views the possibility of Ukraine—and other post-Soviet states, such as Georgia—joining NATO as a threat to its security. Moscow fears that Ukrainian membership in NATO will lead to Western powers amassing forces directly along Ukraine’s borders with Russia. During the period from 2000 until 2020, NATO expanded significantly in Europe with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia joining the alliance—the vast majority of which were previously part of the Soviet Union or within the Soviet sphere of influence (Kremlin: We can…, 2022). Furthermore, by supporting and engaging in conflicts in both Georgia and Ukraine, Moscow was able to undercut the trajectory of both countries joining NATO, as the ongoing disputes over the ‘separation’ of these breakaway republics led to neither

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country remaining in control of its full territory (a requirement of NATO members). In December 2021, as he massed Russian military capabilities on Ukraine’s border, Putin issued a list of demands that he said must be met in order to de-escalate the situation. The demands focused on restricting NATO enlargement, withdrawing NATO “military infrastructure” to pre-1997 locations, and ending NATO security cooperation with non-­ members (Dixon & Sonne, 2021). Whilst the demands did not explicitly mention Ukraine, Putin used the threat of a pending crisis or war there to push for wider systemic changes that would strengthen the Russian position not only in Ukraine but in the wider post-Soviet space. In other words, Putin gave NATO an ultimatum: revise the provisions of its founding charter and abandon its post–Cold War members or Ukraine would be invaded and overtaken. From Russia’s perspective, the Ukrainian military being trained by Western instructors is a complete violation of the 2015 ‘Package of measures for the fulfilment of the Minsk agreements,’ which mandates the withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from Ukraine under the monitoring of the OSCE. Moscow also claimed that advanced weapons are transported from Western countries to Kyiv (Burunov, 2022). According to available data, since 2015, roughly 200 Canadian instructors have been stationed in western Ukraine’s Yavorsky training facility, where they alternate rotations with British and American instructors to teach the Ukrainian Army (Canada begins withdrawal…, 2020). Putin viewed this training as hostility, and has said that NATO and the US are trying to encircle Russia using Ukraine as a pawn (Khurshudyan et al., 2022). To the Western world, this military support is viewed through the perspective of helping democratic Ukraine in the face of ‘Russian aggression,’ though this has led to the engagement of Western countries in the conflict between Kyiv and Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas. In a similar vein, the Kremlin opposed Ukraine beginning the process to join the EU, which would situate the country as a more independent member of a greater bloc, rather than a part of Moscow’s former USSR orbit. If it were to join the EU and continue down a path of tackling corruption and investing in democratic institutions, Ukraine’s political and economic decisions could become more difficult for Moscow to manipulate.

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Secondly, Putin has framed the narrative around an interest in ‘defending’ Russian ethnic minorities outside of Russia. According to the latest population census undertaken by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine in 2001, Russian nationals represent 17.3% of the overall population (around 8.3 million people). Although this represents a significant decline from the previous census that was undertaken in 1989, just before the declaration of Ukraine’s independence when Russians constituted 22.1%, Russians remain the second most numerous population of Ukraine. This fact coupled with Putin’s denial of Ukrainian sovereignty led him to depict Ukraine as ‘Kyivan Rus,’ the historic birthplace and antecedent of the Russian state, with Kyiv as its capital (Hill, 2022). Putin’s assertion that Kyiv and parts of Ukraine were formerly Russian territories stems from a need to create a historical justification for Moscow’s invasion and control of Ukraine. Putin emphasised that “modern Ukraine was entirely created by communist Russia” (Putin: sovremennaya ukraina…, 2022) and claims that “Ukraine has never had a stable tradition of its true statehood, and since 1991 has taken the path of mechanical tracing of foreign models, far from both Ukrainian history and realities” (ibid.). According to government surveys, a large share of the Russian population supports Putin’s inaccurate claim that Ukraine has always been part of Russia (Yekelchyk, 2022) (Table 6.1).

6.2  Root Causes of Russian Encroachment on Ukrainian Territory The build-up to the crisis can be better understood by examining the full context, particularly of Crimea. During its centuries-old history, power on the Crimean Peninsula was held by various rulers. In 1774, the Empress of Russia Catherine II achieved the independence of the Crimea from the Ottoman Empire, and later in 1783 the peninsula was completely annexed by the Russian Empire (Kak Krym Prisoedinilsja …, 2018). In February 1954, USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to transfer Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR so that the ‘advanced Ukraine’ would bring the ‘lagging’ peninsula up to its level, thereby resolving organisational and technical problems for the North Crimean water utility. Ukraine was responsible for bringing water to the Dnieper arid steppes and semi-­ deserts in the north and in the centre of the peninsula (Yakunin, 2019). As a result, Crimea became part of the Ukrainian SSR with Khrushchev’s

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Table 6.1  Breakdown of the Ukrainian and Russian population in the four contested eastern provinces of Ukraine The contested eastern provinces of Ukraine

Population in 2001

Luhansk

2,540,200 1,472,400 991,500 76,300 4,825,600 2,744,100 1,844,400 237,100 1,926,800 1,364,100 476,800 85,900 1,172,700 961,600 165,200 45,900 2,024,000 492,200 1,180,400 351,400 48,457,000 37,699,546 8,383,061 2,374,393

Donetsk

Zaporizhzhian

Kerson

Crimea

Ukraine

Population Ukrainians Russians Others Population Ukrainians Russians Others Population Ukrainians Russians Others Population Ukrainians Russians Others Population Ukrainians Russians Others Population Ukrainians Russians Others

Actual population % 2001 Census

1989 Census

100.0 58.0 39.0 3.0 100.0 56.0 38.2 5.8 100.0 70.8 24.7 4.5 100.0 82.0 14.1 3.9 100.0 24.3 58.3 17.4 100.0 77.8 17.3 4.9

100.0 51.9 44.8 3.3 100.0 50.7 43.6 5.7 100.0 63.1 32.0 4.9 100.0 75.7 20.2 4.1 100.0 26.7 65.6 7.7 100.0 72.7 22.1 5.2

Source: The All-Ukrainian Population Census Data, 2001, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, (http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/)

adoption of the decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 5 February 1954, which reasoned that there was territorial and economic commonality between Ukraine and Crimea. According to the data for 1959, the Crimean population at the time was 70% ethnically Russian (Kak Krym Prisoedinilsja …, 2018). On 19 November 1990, the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR entered into an agreement for a period of ten years, where they pledged to mutually respect the borders of the republics at the time of signing. In February 1991, following the collapse of the USSR and a referendum, the Crimean region became an autonomous republic known as the Republic of Crimea,

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which at the same time Kyiv considered to be a constituent part of Ukraine. In October of the same year, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Crimea adopted a statement that the act of transferring the peninsula to Ukraine was carried out “without taking into account the opinion of the people” (Yakunin, 2019). The ‘Act on the Declaration of the State Independence of the Republic of Crimea’ was approved by the Supreme Council on 5 May 1992. The republic’s constitution, which reflects its democratic sovereignty as a part of Ukraine, was approved the following day. In response, the Supreme Council of Ukraine issued a decision ordering the Act’s repeal because it was in conflict with the Ukrainian constitution and violated Crimea’s autonomy (Malaev, 2017). On 21 May 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation declared the aforementioned decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 5 February 1954 “null and void from the moment of its adoption.” The reason given was that it violated the Constitution of the RSFSR and the legislative procedure. Later, the Russian parliament stated that the issue of the status of Crimea was the subject of an agreement between Moscow and Kyiv, taking into account the will of the Crimeans (Yakunin, 2019). The Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine unilaterally repealed the presidency and the 1992 constitution of the Republic of Crimea on 17 March 1995. The Supreme Council of Crimea enacted a new constitution on 1 November that excluded the presidency and sovereign power. A new constitution for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was enacted in October 1998, aligning it with Ukrainian basic legislation. This was in use until 2014 (Malaev, 2017). In summary, leading up to the events of the 2010s, it is possible to say that Moscow held onto resentments that after the collapse of the USSR, the Crimean Peninsula became a part of Ukraine even despite the revocation of the Khrushchev decision. With Putin’s growing imperial ambitions, this territorial dispute became an obvious target for demonstrating Russian assertiveness and might. 6.2.1   The Maidan Revolution The starting point for the Russian-Ukrainian crisis can be considered November 2013, when the official pro-Russian Ukrainian government headed by Moscow-backed President Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union, despite the popularity of the agreement and the fact that earlier that year the Ukrainian parliament had

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overwhelmingly approved the association with the EU. Instead, he chose to move closer to Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. Supporters of European integration demanded the resignation of the president and his government, and waves of protests that began in Kyiv spread to other Ukrainian cities and regions in the ‘Euromaidan protests’ that began in November 2013. The ensuing large-scale movement came to be known as the ‘Maidan Revolution’ or ‘Revolution of Dignity,’ which protested corruption, police brutality, the power of oligarchs, the Kremlin’s control over the Ukrainian government, human rights violations, and other issues. However, the authorities of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) supported the Russian-backed Yanukovych. On 4 February 2014, the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic decided to initiate an all-Crimean survey on the status of the peninsula “in the conditions of crisis and the zeal for power of groups of the national-fascist persuasion” (Istorija Vossoedinenija Kryma…, 2019). On 22 February, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament) voted to remove President Yanukovych from office. Yanukovych was widely seen as corrupt and following Putin’s orders rather than the will of the Ukrainian people. The speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Alexander Turchinov, was appointed as the temporary President of Ukraine until elections could be held on 25 May. Putin viewed this as a coup d’etat, claiming that Yanukovych was illegally removed from power, and refusing to recognise the authority of the newly appointed president (Matveev, 2015). On the same day that Turchinov was appointed, the statute designating the Russian language as a regional language in a number of the country’s regions was repealed. This decision sparked massive protests, mostly among the Russian-speaking populace in the south-east of Ukraine and Crimea (Istorija Vossoedinenija Kryma…, 2019). On 23 February 2014, pro-Russian residents of Crimea, unwilling to recognise the new Ukrainian government headed by Turchinov, began a protest in front of the Crimean Republic’s Supreme Council. The main demand of the protesters was the separation of Crimea from Ukraine. On 27 February 2014, the Supreme Council of the Crimean Republic set the date for a referendum on the status of Crimea for 25 May of the same year, and on 1 March, deputies of the Sevastopol City Council—Sevastopol being the largest city in Crimea and administratively separate from the Crimean Republic—voted to go against Kyiv and to support Crimea’s referendum on expanding its autonomous status (ibid.).

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On 1 March, Deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea Sergei Aksyonov—who was affiliated with the Russian Unity party and allegedly had links to organised crime groups—appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin with a request for assistance in bringing stability back to the peninsula following the protests. The administration of the President of the Russian Federation responded that it would not ignore the Prime Minister of Crimea’s call for support in maintaining peace and serenity on the autonomous region’s territory (Prem’er-ministr Kryma poprosil, 2014). Putin promptly requested the Federation Council to deploy Russian military forces on Ukrainian soil until the social and political situation returned to normal (V.Putin s ponimaniem otnessya…, 2014). As a result, Russian Armed Forces entered Crimea, sovereign Ukrainian territory, with the declared purpose of supporting social and political stability. In a surprise move, the Supreme Council of Crimea requested inclusion in the Russian Federation on 6 March and moved the referendum date forward, from 25 May to 16 March 2014, and Sevastopol and Crimea signed a Declaration of Independence on 11 March. In the ensuing Crimean referendum—which was illegal under the Constitution of Ukraine and not recognised by most countries on account of both the presence and influence of Russian forces and a lack of internationally recognised election observers—96% of voters are said to have voted to join the Russian Federation (Vdovychenko, 2020). The following day, on 17 March, the Supreme Council of the Republic passed a resolution declaring Crimea to be an independent sovereign state. The agreement for the Republic of Crimea’s admission to the Russian Federation and the creation of new subjects within the Russian Federation was then signed the next day by Vladimir Putin, Sergei Aksenov, Vladimir Konstantinov, Alexei Chaly, and the Chairman of the Crimean State Council (Istorija Vossoedinenija Kryma…, 2019). With the loss of the pro-Russian electoral bloc of Crimea and Sevastopol, the Ukrainian political pendulum that had been balanced between Russia and the West for decades had suddenly swung towards pro-Western sentiment, exacerbated by Russia’s role in Crimea and the Donbas (discussed below) (Moiseenko & Karmelyuk, 2022, p. 69). The Russian annexation of Crimea demonstrates several key issues. First, it highlights the strategic importance of the Black Sea for Russia. Moscow sees the Black Sea as a crucial resource and a key way to maintain dominance over smaller states in the region. The annexation has indeed increased Russia’s strategic dominance in the area, and Russia has improved

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its Black Sea military capabilities with its subsequent consolidation and fortification of the peninsula. Prior to its takeover of the peninsula, the operational capabilities of the Russian defence forces in Sevastopol, a Russian naval facility in Crimea for which Moscow had paid Kyiv a yearly lease since the end of the Soviet Union, were constrained. After the capture of Crimea, Moscow expanded Sevastopol’s military capabilities (Joja, 2019). Since 2014, Russia has been militarising the Crimean peninsula, which has allowed it to block opposing nations’ access to the Black Sea and to extend its own military might far into the Mediterranean (Sukhankin, 2017).

6.3  The Situation in the Donbas After the Verkhovna Rada removed Yanukovych from office, both Crimea and the south-eastern regions of Ukraine (including the Donbas, a region consisting of both Donetsk and Luhansk) did not recognise this decision. The Crimean crisis exacerbated ethnic tensions, and pro-Russian separatists backed by Moscow in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions conducted a referendum two months later to follow suit and declare independence from Ukraine (Conflict in Ukraine, 2022). Immediately after Crimea was annexed, pro-Russian demonstrations spread across the nation more widely. The protests took place in Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. On 6 April, demonstrators occupied the regional state government buildings in Kharkov and Luhansk after storming and occupying those of the regional administration in Donetsk. On 7 April, pro-Russian demonstrators, in some cases supported by Moscow and including Russian troops, in Donetsk and Kharkov proclaimed their respective people’s republics, but the revolt was put down. Meanwhile, the Luhansk People’s Republic declared itself independent from Ukraine on 27 April. 6.3.1   Peace Agreements: Minsk Protocol and Minsk II Beginning in 2014, France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine attempted to broker a ceasefire in the Donbas through the Minsk agreements. The agreements include provisions for a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weaponry, and full Ukrainian government control throughout the conflict zone. Attempts to negotiate a diplomatic settlement and a satisfactory resolution, however, have failed (ibid.). When a Malaysian Airlines

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passenger aircraft was shot down over Ukrainian airspace in July 2014, likely by a Russian-controlled missile, the situation in Ukraine became an international crisis, putting the West at increasing unease with the spread of the war and with Russia. On 5 September 2014, the governments of Ukraine, Russia, and the two self-declared republics of Donetsk and Luhansk agreed to the terms of the first agreement, known as the Minsk Protocol, which called for a halt to hostilities, the exchange of prisoners, and the removal of heavy weaponry from the front (Mellen, 2022). A new ceasefire deal was struck on 15 January 2015, and the second agreement, known as Minsk II, was signed in February 2015. Ukraine and Russia were the only two parties to the agreement. The negotiations were overseen by France and Germany, as well as the OSCE. According to Russia’s reading of the Minsk agreements, separatist-held areas were awarded “special status,” granting them, and hence Moscow, a de facto veto over aspects of Ukrainian security and foreign policy. At the time, Moscow sought to limit and reverse Ukraine’s growing contacts with Western nations and aspirations for NATO and EU membership (Galeotti, 2021). However, the implementation of the Minsk agreements quickly stalled. Although Kyiv’s official line is that Ukraine will implement the Minsk agreements when and if Moscow holds up its side of the deal (which is to say, withdrawing its forces and its support for separatist rebels), many officials view the agreements as setting the terms for an unjust victor’s peace. Russia’s armed interventionist policies since 2014—particularly its annexation of Crimea and instigation of the wars in the Donbas and support for their breakaway governments—have only deepened resentment among Ukrainians towards Moscow. Meanwhile, Western countries’ assistance to Kyiv has grown, fuelling Moscow’s perception that a Western-allied Ukraine poses a threat to Russia (Russia-Ukraine: Diplomacy, 2022). In the second Minsk peace agreement, Minsk II, nine of thirteen points cover conflict management, whereas four sections address political matters. Articles 11 and 12 outlined constitutional reforms that emphasised decentralisation and elections in the Donbas (Factbox: What are the Minsk agreements 2022). In the view of many Ukrainians, merely fulfilling the Minsk agreements is a concession to Russian military aggression by awarding gains to an illegal invasion and instigation of war. Russia and Ukraine each have their own unique interpretation of the Minsk agreements, which lack common ground. In essence, the Minsk II

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agreement simultaneously adhered to two opposing interpretations of sovereignty: either Ukraine is sovereign (according to Ukraine), or it is not (according to Russia) (Allan, 2019). 6.3.2   After the Minsk Agreements Peace was short-lived following Minsk II, and by October 2014 fighting had broken out in the Donbas region with increased vigour and the ‘Donbas War,’ as it came to be known, became a largely frozen conflict by mid-2015, evolving into a trench war. According to Moscow, due to Ukraine’s failure to comply with the agreements’ obligations, no arrangements or agreements could be made to terminate the war (Sukhankin, 2017). In Russia’s interpretation, full implementation of the Minsk agreements would entail a level of autonomy for Donbas that would enable the self-proclaimed independent governments, and thereby Moscow, to defy Ukrainian policies. Ukraine, on the other hand, considers the agreements to be unfair, and that it had signed when Kyiv was in a position of weakness using the only diplomatic channel available to halt the conflict in the face of heavy losses. For Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to fully implement the Minks agreements in line with Russia’s interpretation would be seen as essentially surrendering stolen territory to Moscow, and would be political suicide. Since late 2014, the Donbas War and violations of the ceasefire along the line of contact continued, with diplomatic progress remaining very limited. Between 2014 and 2018, the death toll in the Donbas had risen to some 13,000, with up to 30,000 wounded, 1.4 million displaced, and 3.4  million people in Ukraine in need of humanitarian aid. In January 2020, the UN appealed for US $158 million for humanitarian assistance and the protection of vulnerable populations related to the war in the Donbas (European Parliament, 2020). As part of its war with Ukraine, Russia has also carried out cyber-attacks on Ukraine that led to Kyiv-wide electricity blackouts in 2015 and 2016 and included the infamous NotPetya attack on Ukrainian private companies that, according to the US government, resulted in US $10  billion worth of global damages and was deemed “the most destructive and costly cyberattack in history” (O’Neill, 2022). The Russian language had also continued to be a stumbling block in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada updated the “On Education Law” in September 2017, calling for a gradual restriction

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on the use of Russian and other national languages in Ukraine’s educational system, ultimately deciding that Ukrainian should be the only language of instruction in secondary schools and higher education institutions (Kak na Ukraine…, 2021). This became one of the points that caused further rifts with Russian populations, and one which Moscow would use to argue that Kyiv oppressed Russian-speaking minorities. In 2019, there was finally some diplomatic progress. Two prisoner swaps—including the release of Ukrainian filmmaker and 2018 Sakharov laureate Oleg Sentsov—took place in September and December of 2019. The reintegration of Donetsk and Luhansk into Ukraine with a special status was proposed in October 2019 at a fresh round of discussions under the Normandy framework with France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia, but this was ultimately unsuccessful. Other concerns remain unresolved, such as the removal of Russian-backed troops, elections in separatist-held regions, and a designated ‘special status’ for the Donbas region. The issues of Ukrainian non-alignment and the status of the Donbas are strategically linked, as autonomy for the Russian-aligned separatist regions has provided a de facto veto on Ukrainian NATO membership. Preventing Ukraine, Georgia, and other neighbouring states from joining NATO is one of the Putin’s key policy objectives. Putin also seeks to use coercive diplomacy to force NATO to reduce its current military presence in Eastern Europe, which includes a recurring schedule of drills in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all of which were once part of the Soviet Union (Burns, 2022). In light of the large-scale and full-out 2022 invasion and subsequent war, the south-eastern part of the country and the Donbas region have become the focus of the battle for territory (with Russian forces occupying Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions at the time of writing) and the front lines continue to shift in the region, making a framework for negotiating a ceasefire in the Donbas a much larger, more complex prospect.

6.4  Nationalist Concepts Used to Justify War In the cases of both Crimea and Donbas, it is possible to view nationalist sentiments and ideas as the source of conflict. The use of nationalist rhetoric by Putin’s administration served as justification for the rapid annexation of Crimea. With a few notable exceptions, this narrative worked domestically in Russia, elevating Putin’s popularity to previously unheard­of heights. Putin has now positioned himself as the defender of both

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ethnic Russians abroad and of Russia’s national interests (Kolstø, 2016). Moreover, populist concepts arose within Russia, taking the shape of a wider idea that “we, the Russians,” should defend the integrity of the Russian language in opposition to the Ukrainian state’s desire to mainly use the Ukrainian language, which has inaccurately been framed as Kyiv’s desire to eliminate the Russian language and culture. The nationalist factions within Russia, which the Kremlin had just won over with its rhetoric and annexation of Crimea, were enraged by the reporting on protests and bloodshed in eastern Ukraine that followed the Russian takeover of Crimea. The nationalist interpretation of the Crimean annexation implied that not only Russians on the peninsula but also Russian speakers everywhere in Ukraine were subject to discrimination and had a right to resist Ukrainian governance (Kolstø, 2016). In 2021, Putin suggested that Russophobia was the first step towards genocide, and stressed that “we need to act very carefully so as not to devalue the meaning of these concepts” (Tsukanov, 2021). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in 2022 that “the West and Kyiv had grossly ignored the rights of Russian people in the Donbas for eight years, now Russia will itself protect the rights of Russian citizens” (Lavrov: my budem zashhishhat’…, 2022). The building of these concepts and the narrative of the Western-backed Ukrainian persecution of ethnic Russians enabled Putin to spread a counter-­narrative that ‘Nazism’ was spreading in the territory of Ukraine, and to appeal both to Russian fears and to compassion for fellow Russians. Putin is extremely attentive to the ways in which the politics of historical understandings shape culture, national identity, geopolitics, and even military objectives, as evidenced by his lengthy speech on 24 February 2022 declaring a ‘special military action’ in Ukraine. He seeks historical justifications to gain support for his actions, even employing a Holocaust narrative in support of his claims of growing Russophobia and the ‘humiliation’ of Russian-speaking populations. The Kremlin’s principal justification for spreading the Holocaust myth seems to be an effort to use negative soft power against former Soviet satellite states and to harken back to the deep-­ seated sense of pride felt about the Soviet Army’s triumph over Nazi Germany in WWII, or ‘the Great Patriotic War.’ While Ukraine is the most well-known target of contemporary Russian interventions justified as efforts to ‘de-nazify’ a territory, similar charges and verbal attacks have been made in recent years against Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as a result of Putin’s integration of the Holocaust narrative into Russian

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foreign policy. The use of a narrow interpretation of history, particularly those pertaining to the Holocaust narrative, and national identity and pride has become a crucial component of Russian diplomatic and political practice (Joyce, 2022).

6.5   Investments and Development in Crimea Prior to February 2022, Moscow considered two regions of Ukraine to be Russian: Crimea and the Donbas (which was only formally annexed in 2022), and in October 2022, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions were also annexed. Within its region, Moscow is primarily interested in investing in the development and reconstruction of territories which are in subordination to the Russian government. At the same time, Russia has never had any specific strategy for reconstruction in the areas that it has annexed in Ukraine. We can see this ad hoc approach in Crimea. While Crimea had not suffered from significant conflict or damage, Moscow nevertheless claimed that during the ‘Ukrainian period’ of Crimea’s history, the infrastructure of the peninsula fell into decay and required investment and reconstruction support. This statement is in opposition to the stated goal of Khrushchev, which was to support Crimea’s development by including it in Ukraine. According to Russia, due to Ukrainian negligence, in 2014 the roads were in poor condition, the park of municipal equipment and public transport were worn out, and the tourism and industrial sectors were neglected (Burov, 2015). After the annexation, Moscow sought to begin early implementation of important energy and infrastructure projects, which provided a new impetus for the economic development of the region, and, in turn, expanded and strengthened the base for the provision of medical, educational, and other social services on the Crimean Peninsula. In the infrastructure sphere, three projects were designed to solve the transport problem: the building of a transport bridge (the Kerch Bridge) across the Kerch Strait, thereby connecting Russia to Crimea; a new terminal complex for the Simferopol airport; and Tavrida highway, which connected the Kerch Bridge with the western part of the peninsula (Znamenshchikov, 2019). At the same time, nearly all new roads and bridge development in Russia came to a halt due to the prioritisation of the Kerch Bridge. Only ten new roads were constructed nationwide in Russia in 2017 (Wilson & Urcosta, 2019).

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To explain the high priority of the Kerch Bridge, it is necessary to highlight its strategic importance for Moscow. First, the bridge can assist Russian militarisation of the peninsula and serve as a rationale for the deployment of more soldiers (based on the claim that the bridge and its supporting infrastructure need to be protected) (Militarisation of the Peninsula, 2021). Its importance has been brought into focus recently through the explosion on the bridge in October 2022, and Moscow’s proclamation of the incident as a terrorist act. Second, after the annexation of four regions—Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson— the Kerch Bridge may become a way for Moscow to deploy military forces to those territories. Finally, the bridge and Russia’s growing influence over the Kerch Strait have become another way for Moscow to exercise coercive diplomacy: having gained control over the Strait, the Russian government can implement a strategy of selective transit permission to Ukrainian and foreign ships. This strategy was used in 2018 when Russia bombarded three Ukrainian ships and forcibly took the crew members hostage. Additionally, in July 2021, Putin signed a directive allowing the National Guard to blockade portions of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov (ibid.). Furthermore, with the seizure of Melitopol city and its port, Moscow sought to cut off Ukraine’s access to and support from the sea. Connected with its historic and nationalist narrative, Moscow has allocated funds for the reconstruction of cultural heritage sites and public spaces in Sevastopol. Over the years since the annexation of Crimea, more than six billion rubles have been allocated for these purposes. Funds for such projects are directed to Sevastopol in various ways: some of them are included in the federal development programmes, which Russia adopted in 2014, some projects are done at the expense of local Crimean municipal budgets, and others are financed through public organisations controlled by Russia (Akselrod et al., 2020). The document outlining the development strategy in Crimea is the ‘Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 11 August 2014 No. 790’ on the approval of the federal target programme ‘Social and economic development of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until 2022.’ According to this document, the total amount of financing for the Federal Target Programme for the Development of Crimea (FTP) is 914,507.5  million rubles, including from the federal budget (863,722.11 million rubles), budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation (i.e., the Crimean peninsula itself) (19,726.11 million rubles), and extra-budgetary sources (31,059.28  million rubles)

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(Decree of August 11, 2014 No. 790). Until 2020, Moscow pursued these development projects and simultaneously addressed and eliminated restrictions imposed by Ukraine on transport and engineering infrastructure, the power supply and energy complex, and the water supply. The FTP pays particular attention to the development of the industrial complex, social sphere, tourism, and recreational areas. Along with the specified FTP goal of the speedy harmonisation of regulatory documents that determine political, social, urban planning, property, land, and other issues of importance, Putin also signed the Federal Constitutional Law No. 5 of 26 June 2016, the main goal of which is to ensure the speedy integration of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into a single legal entity of the Russian Federation. To accelerate the integration of economic entities of the peninsula into the economic activity of Russia, on 28 July 2016, Putin signed a decree on the transformation of two federal districts: the ‘Southern’ and the ‘Crimean’ into a single ‘Southern Federal District.’ The economic development of the peninsula was prioritised, and the policy for this was laid out in the 29 November 2014 Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 377-FZ entitled ‘On the Development of the Republic of Crimea and the Federal City of Sevastopol and the Free Economic Zone in the Territories of the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance Sevastopol.’ Following this policy, the operation of a ‘free economic zone’ (FEZ) in the city of Sevastopol began on 1 January 2015. It was created for a period of 25 years with the possibility of subsequent extension and provides for special legal regimes for entrepreneurial and economic activities. The FEZ is one of the most effective tools for attracting investment to the economy of Crimea and Sevastopol.1 To implement its roadmap, Moscow uses regulatory and legal mechanisms to integrate the territories and has expressed its intention to improve the FEZ mechanisms, including through providing concessional loans to 1  The actual volume of capital investments in 2015 amounted to 294 million rubles. The total volume of declared investments under the concluded contracts in 2016 amounted to 2.7  billion rubles, and the number of jobs planned to be created through the FEZ in Sevastopol was 2700. As of 1 January 2017, the real capital investments amounted to only 1499 million rubles. With a cumulative total from 2015 to 2016, the actual volume of capital investments by the participants of the FEZ (companies that invest in or work in Crimea) increased to 1.7 million rubles. As of 1 January 2019, on an accrual basis since 2016, the FEZ participants made capital investments in the amount of 4.8 million rubles (The Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 377-FZ).

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the FEZ participants (companies that invest in or work in Crimea). The Kremlin has noted that particular attention will be paid to the programme of concessional lending for the development of rural areas. It has also noted its intention to provide support for the construction of residential buildings, roads, and engineering infrastructure (Koroleva, 2021). As another part of this economic development, some projects have focused on reducing the level of unemployment. To this end, ‘State Programme of Labour and Employment of the Population of the Republic of Crimea’ was implemented in 2018 for a period of five years (Resolution of November 7, 2017 N 575). Continuing the core strategy discussed in the previous cases, Moscow has also prioritised education both to contribute to the population’s employment prospects and to serve to further integrate the region with Russia. From 2014 through 2016, Russian universities provided quotas for the education of Crimean graduates financed by the Russian government (Since 2017, Crimeans…, 2015). The Russian Ministry of Education declared that it considered the level of education in Crimea under Ukraine to not be competitive with Russian standards. To this end, the ‘State Programme for the Development of Education in the Republic of Crimea for 2016—2025’ was launched with the goal of improving the quality of education in Crimea. Between 2014 and 2019, “funding for education has increased by almost three times, for culture by three and a half times, and for sports by almost four times. Over 200 school buses and 30 modular kindergartens had been purchased, 19 new schools are under construction to address space shortages, and over 20,000 new spots for kindergarten students have been created” (Sidorov, 2019). To create these new spots, ten preschool buildings have been constructed, six of which have been put into operation. Since 2014, 13 schools and 36 pre-school institutions have been built. In 18 out of 25 regions of Crimea, 90% of children have access to pre-school education (Za Pjat’ Let…, 2019). By 2020, almost 33 billion rubles have been invested in the Crimean education system, of which 16.7 billion were under the framework of the FTP (Kak Izmenilsja Krym…, 2019). Despite the creation of the FEZ and vast subsidies given to the region, the peninsula’s economy has become heavily militarised, pushing out other industries. Through its revival of the military industry in Crimea, Russia has created advantages for its sizable military facilities located in Feodosiya, Evpatoriya, Sevastopol, and Kerch in Crimea. However, due to

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the deficiencies in other areas, Crimea’s overall socioeconomic standing among the 85 Russian Federation territories is only 40th, and it ranked only 69th in terms of living standards (Wilson & Urcosta, 2019). A decrease in small enterprises has been evident: in 2014, there were 15,553 small private businesses, but by 2018, there were just 1382 (ibid.). Previously, 31.2% of the workforce was employed by small firms; as of 2019 that is only 19.5% (ibid.). Finally, due to the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, many large companies have left the peninsula. After a wave of fresh sanctions in 2022, Russian businesspeople in Crimea “have nothing to fear,” according to President Putin. He noted that banks that previously refrained from opening on the peninsula out of concern that they would be subject to Western regulations would now be free to do so, among other things. Putin has thus identified the West and the sanctions against Russia as the main contributor to the decline of businesses in Crimea, and further declared that the state will encourage the growth of local businesses in Sevastopol and the Crimea (Gromova, 2022). In addition to the role Western sanctions play in the ‘underdevelopment’ of Crimea, a high level of Russian corruption impacts the investment results. Igor Astakhov, Deputy Director of Russia’s Federal Road Agency (FRA), asserted that the Ministry of Construction of Crimea “could not produce proper documentation for 368 million rubles out of the 582 million rubles (US $10.2 million) [of federal funds] allocated” in 2014 for the reconstruction of Crimean roads (Crimea: Corruption fuelling, 2015). As demonstrated throughout the case studies in this book, corruption is not a new phenomenon for Moscow, and it can be concluded that such flows of unaccountable funds lead to two results: (a) a loyal administration that Moscow has enabled to line its pockets, and (b) the overall economic dependency of the peninsula on Moscow. According to the reports of the Governor of Sevastopol on the activities of the Government of Sevastopol for 2015–2018, we can see that Moscow mainly focused on the modernisation and development of transport infrastructure and supplying reliable energy (primarily due to the commissioning of new generating capacities, the creation of an energy bridge, and the replacement of obsolete regional networks). It has further prioritised educational, cultural, and medical programmes, and it has ensured a stable supply of clean water (although the long-term water supply remains an issue as it originates in Ukraine).

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6.6  Emerging Commitments and Strategies Towards Reconstruction in 2022 While Crimea has experienced significant strategic investment as a key territory for Russia, the approach taken in the Donbas has differed. However, the Kremlin has held up the investment in Crimea as an example of its intentions elsewhere in annexed Ukrainian territories. According to Putin, for eight years, Crimea and Sevastopol have developed steadily. He added that it was the duty of Russia to pull the region out of the ‘humiliation’ that it had endured under the Ukrainian government, and that it is Russia’s obligation to help its brethren in the Donbas, although he noted this would take significant time (Putin soobshchil o gotovnosti…, 2022). Moreover, he stated that Donbas region was in the same position as Crimea and these regions’ accession to Russia was a choice about development (Lazareva, 2022). After Russia formally annexed the Luhansk and Donetsk Peoples Republics (alongside Kherson and Zaporizhzhia) on 30 September 2022, it opened the door for the Kremlin to make concrete policies and allocations for reconstruction. According to Moscow, its aid and development efforts prioritised education and providing accommodation. At the same time, the situation remains complicated as on 9 November, the Russian Ministry of Defence ordered the Russian army to withdraw from the territory of Kherson which was previously proclaimed the territory of the Russian Federation. These shifting fronts and territorial dynamics make it difficult to say if Moscow has given up on claiming and investing in this area or if it will consider the territory as a part of Russia in the future. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation announced on 10 February 2022 that since April 2014, the Ukrainian military had shelled the DPR and LPR, killing 2.6  thousand civilians and injuring 5.5  thousand more. Over 2.2  thousand civilian infrastructure facilities have been totally or partially destroyed over approximately eight years. We can bring the past experiences and commitments together to examine Moscow’s possible future reconstruction approach in the context and aftermath of its so-called special operation, which began on 24 February 2022 with its invasion of wider Ukraine, and remains ongoing at the time of writing. First, it must be noted that for the damaged areas across its territory, Ukraine estimated the cost of reconstruction to be between US $500 billion and US $750 billion, and had presented a reconstruction plan to the

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EU and its Western allies, which had been rejected. Kyiv also hopes that the West will spend funds from blocked and seized Russian assets on reconstruction, and Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated, “we believe that the confiscated assets of the Russian Federation and Russian oligarchs should be the key source of recovery. The frozen assets of the Russian Federation, according to various estimates, range from 300 to 500 billion dollars” (Plan Vosstanovlenija Ukrainy, 2022). Russian authorities protest the statement, claiming it has not destroyed civilian facilities and calling the proposal to utilise frozen assets unfair. It is expected that the West will continue its support for Ukraine’s anti-corruption and pro-­ democratic institutional development measures. However, given its track record in commitments versus funds sent, the West is likely to give only part of the funds requested with strict oversight on the spending. Furthermore, with the war ongoing and civilian infrastructure frequently being targeted, the Ukrainian government also does not have a comprehensive reconstruction plan. For its part, the Kremlin appears to have initiated the invasion without a correct assessment of Ukrainian capabilities, and therefore vastly underestimated the demands and amount of damage and destruction that would result from the war. It does not appear to have invaded with a plan for reconstruction, nor does it have a budget comparable to that of the West that would be able to complete the necessary restoration and repairs. While Moscow is unlikely to contribute to or support the reconstruction of any territory ultimately held by Ukraine, in areas that it controls and attempts to annex as the war continues, it may make investments similar to its efforts in the other cases discussed in this book. Moscow is said to be prepared to allocate 3 billion rubles for the development of the four newly annexed territories. This amount of money is far higher than what was allocated to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but less than what is allocated to Chechnya, and likely less than what is required considering how the front has moved to the south and east. It is important to note that there is no committee to track how these resources are used. Further, economic sanctions imposed by the West will contribute to Moscow’s goal of stemming any alternative options for the regions but to rely economically on Moscow, which may lead to a similar economic situation as in Crimea. The Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development, Marat Khusnullin, stated that Russia will rebuild all “liberated” regions of Ukraine—in other words, all regions which accepted the

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Russian government (Husnullin zayavil o planah, 2022). For this purpose, the leading political party in Russia, ‘United Russia,’ has created a headquarters in the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LDNR) for humanitarian cooperation, which involves the relevant ministries, deputies, citizen representatives, and volunteers. The activities of the headquarters cover a wide range of issues, including the logistical matters of humanitarian aid delivery, the coordination of volunteer activities, and the management of responses to other requests for assistance. The headquarters also contribute to the legal support of humanitarian activities and works to harmonise the laws of Russia and the LDNR (“Edinaja Rossija” otkryla…, 2022). As a strategy for rebuilding cities under Russian control, different Russian regions were given the task of rebuilding specific conflict-affected ex-Ukrainian territories (using the same twinning strategy that Ukraine had proposed to the West). For example, the largest cities of Donetsk and Luhansk will be restored by Moscow at the expense of its municipal budget. St. Petersburg was paired with Mariupol, which has suffered the most from the conflict. According to Konstantin Ivashchenko (ex-director of Azovmash2), who was appointed mayor of Mariupol, 70% of the houses in the city were damaged, and 15–20% of the housing stock cannot be restored. The Telmanovsky and Novoazovsky districts adjacent to Mariupol were also assigned to Moscow Oblast for restoration. According to Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov, the region intends to “help as much as possible, both with roads and with infrastructure,” as well as with the construction of social and educational institutions. By 1 September 2022, the Moscow region had supported the restoration of five schools (Yakovlev, 2022). The Russian Defence Ministry announced that centralised municipal authorities have been restored in all Russian-controlled settlements in Ukraine. However, these have been restored under Moscow-appointed officials that support the Kremlin’s agenda. The department added that food was adequately supplied in the regions. Furthermore, the Kremlin has stated that pensioners and mothers who have more than three children in the ‘liberated territories’ of Ukraine have been given aid in the amount of a one-time payment of 10,000 rubles (~ US $150). This approach matches what we have seen Moscow focus on historically, first strictly prioritising housing and immediate population needs,  Azovmash is a significant research and production complex.

2

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contrary to the Western approach which also prioritises building institutions, social cohesion, and addressing ecological and health issues (Principles of the Green, 2022). Since the very beginning of its ‘special operation,’ in Ukraine, Russia has often announced that it is sending humanitarian convoys to locations where military actions are ongoing. According to the head of the National Defence Control Centre of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev, since the beginning of the operation, Russia has delivered over 48.5 thousand tonnes of food aid and humanitarian supplies to the Donbas and Ukraine (Rossija Dostavila Na Ukrainu…, 2022). Putin ordered Khusnullin to ensure that basic infrastructure and heating was adequate for the people of Donbas so that the winter conditions remained similar to previous years. On 29 July, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister stated that a schedule for the necessary repairs is being created, adding that within three years, whatever cannot be restored will be rebuilt. The primary plan for the reconstruction of Mariupol is slated for the same time frame. The Russian government stated that a new transportation interchange hub will be built, the railway will be active, and the complete tram service will be restored. The master plan for Mariupol’s redevelopment includes plans to use colour and architectural solutions at Mariupol airport to give the city a completely new appearance (Putin odobril master-plan…, 2022). The Russian government has also indicated its intention to issue housing certificates to all citizens requiring accommodation within the Donbas (Sertifikaty Na Zhil’e, 2022). Moscow is also subsidising relocation, providing special vouchers to pay for apartments for those who do not want to wait for their apartments to be rebuilt. These vouchers are said to give recipients the ability to choose any town in the Donbas region to reside in. The Russian government has also asserted that students who graduate in the Donbas will be able to receive Russian diplomas, and that orphans will receive all social support required. In line with its policy of the Russification of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow announced that the citizens of Donbas and Russian-held territories in Ukraine will be able to work in Russia without immigration papers and to obtain Russian citizenship in a simplified way. It is also worth noting that many human rights reports have found cases of Ukrainians in Russian-occupied territories, including Mariupol, having their Ukrainian passports confiscated and being forcibly relocated to Russian territory without consent or legal representation. In this sense, Moscow seems to be attempting to speed up this process of growing Russian citizenship and

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ties, in this case forcibly. This strategy also serves to support Putin’s narrative within Russia that Ukrainian refugees have been forced to flee and have sought refuge in Russia. It is interesting to note that the Crimean region has also been participating in restoration of ‘liberated’ territories in various ways, for example, through sending agricultural machines and providing electricity. This can be interpreted as a way for the Russian government to showcase the recovery of Crimea after its annexation. The Integration Committee on ‘Russia—Donbas,’ which is a permanent Russian association, was created to provide support from Russia to ‘Russian compatriots’ living in the territories of the LDNR, in the “exercise of their rights, ensuring the protection of their interests and preserving the all-Russian cultural identity” in accordance with part 3 of Article 69 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as well as providing “assistance in the processes of political, humanitarian, economic, social, cultural and other integration of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Lugansk People’s Republic with the Russian Federation” (‘Russia-Donbas’ official website). Finally, since the beginning of the war, Moscow continuously proclaimed its goal to be the demilitarisation of Ukraine. At the same time, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that “any weapons in Moscow’s arsenal, including strategic nuclear weapons, could be used to defend territories incorporated into Russia” (Pamuk & Nichols, 2022). In other words, the Russian government has publicly put all options on the table to keep its acquisition of new territories from being re-taken by Kyiv. This highlights another example of Moscow’s use of coercive diplomacy: Moscow began using the threat of nuclear attacks frequently, while at the same time denying its use of nuclear weapon in violation international law. Similarly, Moscow has also used the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Station as a threat and political pawn, as the station was taken over by Russian forces and is in danger of malfunctioning and causing a nuclear disaster due to nearby fighting and changes in plant management and supplies. Mistreatment, including allegations of torture and murder, of the plant managers who are required to keep safety protocols in place has led to an erosion of incentives for these crucial workers to remain and carry out their duties. After an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which recommended the cessation of fighting near the station, among other changes, Moscow saw the significance and fragility of the situation and has sought to use this against Kyiv and the West.

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On 21 September 2022, Putin announced a partial mobilisation in Russia, which is expected to bring 300,000 more Russian soldiers into the conflict and demonstrating a significant escalation of Moscow’s involvement. At the same time, Russia has begun to struggle with budget shortfalls, and many Russian cities had to cancel New Year celebration events in order to instead contribute funds to the Russian army. This stretching of already thin resources may indicate that at the end of the war, Russia is unlikely to have the budget to rebuild the territories it annexes, and their development will decline.

6.7  Conclusion In addition to its efforts to counter and undermine pro-Western movements in Ukraine, Russia has been involved in the invasion of Ukrainian territory since 2014. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula not only fulfilled its imperialistic expansionist goals, but also contributed to its geopolitical interests in the Black Sea. Furthermore, Putin has been focused on historical nationalist narratives that centre around the idea of reviving the Russian culture, an obligation to ‘protect’ territories populated by Russians, the denial of Ukraine’s sovereignty, and appealing to Russian pride and historical triumphs. As such, he has asserted that Russia “had to protect” the Russian population in Crimea and the Donbas from a Ukrainian “threat.” Russia’s military actions have thus far not directly increased the security of the Russian populations in the region, instead causing widespread loss of life, livelihoods, housing, infrastructure, and general destruction and devastation. In some cases, huge swaths of cities such as Mariupol have been destroyed without regard for civilian infrastructure or causalities in a way that reflects Moscow’s tactics in Grozny. Some commitments have already been made to reconstruct territories captured from Ukraine in 2022, in Moscow’s attempt to showcase the benefits that it can offer to newly acquired territories. Alongside investments made, the first step in Russia’s post-conflict policy aims to prevent future secession movements in the newly annexed regions. To do so, Moscow seeks to put in place strong, vertically managed, paid-off, pro-­ Russian governments. This would not only result in the new governments of the annexed republics supporting and executing ideas and directives from Moscow, but in taking the lead in countering local anti-Russian movements. To achieve this, the Kremlin removes local officials such as

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mayors and replaces them with unelected officials who are loyal to Moscow. Moscow also seeks to buy the support of officials and the population through corruption and indirect economic means, creating various infrastructure projects as a key priority to both benefit and enable Russian military action and to bolster local economic development. In the territories it holds, Moscow is likely to next prioritise cultural and educational development, focusing on improving educational institutions and linking them with Russia. Moscow pays special attention to the education in newly acquired regions, not only to harmonise them with Russia’s education system, but also to shape history classes and history books because, as Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation states, “Ukrainian school textbooks and manuals distort history and form hatred for Russia in children” (Alakoz, 2022). In line with former Soviet approaches to engendering loyalty to the state via the education system, Moscow now views it as extremely important to ‘re-educate’ and change the course of the young generation’s mindset to avoid opposition and protests in long-term. Moreover, the education system has been used in Russia to ensure that students learn only official government statements and positions, with teachers who disagree or express dissent being removed and even arrested. Furthermore, Moscow’s focus on education and rebuilding schools aims to show a positive image of the government caring for Russian children and their future. To this end, Moscow has also proclaimed a special focus on orphans. This is linked with the tradition from Soviet times of grounding a population in a connection to a collective, nationalist past through rebuilding different cultural facilities, such as theatres and museums (similar to approaches seen in Chechnya). Overall, it is apparent that Russia did not enter the war in the Donbas nor begin its wider invasion of Ukraine with a reconstruction plan for restoring the extensive damage in the annexed territories. In some cases, it is beginning to craft plans to reconstruct certain areas and cities in a piecemeal fashion, but the financial constraints it has demonstrated show that, as in Syria, the decisions to destroy significant swaths of civilian infrastructure have been made without any assurance of its ability to restore or replace them. As in previous cases, Moscow seems to be placing special attention on infrastructure that benefits its military and further integration with Russia, as well as education, culture, and humanitarian aid, supporting a positive image of the Russian government.

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In the next and final chapter, I will summarise the core principles of Russia’s approach to reconstruction and will provide my forecast for how Moscow is likely to deploy these principles in Ukraine in the current context. I will conclude by offering recommendations both to Ukraine and to the Russian-controlled territories for how best to consider reconstruction prospects going forward.

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Moiseenko, R., & Karmelyuk, V. (2022). «Russkaja Vesna» v Dobase. V VIII Respublikanskoj konferencii molodyh uchjonyh, aspirantov, studentov. [“Russian Spring” in Dobas. In the VIII republican conference of young scientists, postgraduates, students]. In Scientific and technical achievements of students, postgraduates, young scientists of the construction and architectural industry (pp. 69–76) (In Russ.). O’Neill, P. (2022, January 26). How a Russian cyberwar in Ukraine could ripple out globally. Technology Review. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https:// www.technologyreview.com/2022/01/21/1043980/how-­a -­r ussiancyberwar-­in-­ukraine-­could-­ripple-­out-­globally/ Pamuk, H., & Nichols, M. (2022, September 25). Lavrov pledges ‘full protection’ for any territory annexed by Russia. Reuters. Retrieved October 15, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/lavrov-­un-­pledges-­full-­protection-­ any-­territory-­annexed-­by-­russia-­2022-­09-­24/ Plan Vosstanovlenija Ukrainy Ocenili v 750 Milliardov Dollarov. [Recovery plan for Ukraine was estimated at $750 billion]. (2022). RiaNews. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://ria.ru/20220704/vosstanovlenie­1800149152.html (In Russ.) Prem’er-ministr Kryma poprosil putina o pomoshchi. [Prime Minister of Crimea asked Putin for help]. TASS. (2014, March 1). Retrieved November 14, 2022, from https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-­panorama/1013127 (In Russ.) Principles of the Green post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. (2022). Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://en.ecoaction.org.ua/green-­post-­war-­ reconstruction-­ukraine.html Putin odobril master-plan razvitiya Mariupolya. [Putin approved the master plan for the development of Mariupol]. TASS. (2022, July 29). Retrieved November 16, 2022, from https://tass.ru/politika/15343015 (In Russ.) Putin soobshchil o gotovnosti pomoch’ v vosstanovlenii DNR i LNR. [Putin announced his readiness to help restore the DPR and LPR]. Moscow 24. (2022, July 20). Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://www.m24.ru/news/ vlast/20072022/483193 (In Russ.) Putin: sovremennaya ukraina celikom i polnost’yu byla sozdana kommunisticheskoj rossiej. [Putin: Modern Ukraine was entirely created by communist Russia]. TASS. (2022, February 21). Retrieved October 15, 2022, from https://tass. ru/politika/13791307 (In Russ.) Rossija Dostavila Na Ukrainu i v Donbass Svyshe 48,5 Tysjachi Tonn Gumpomoshhi. [Russia delivered over 48,500 tons of humanitarian aid to Ukraine and Donbas]. RiaNews. (2022). Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://ria.ru/20220727/gumpomosch-­1805456520.html (In Russ.) Russia-Ukraine: Diplomacy is the best hope for heading off a deeper crisis. (2022). International Crisis Group. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://

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www.crisisgroup.org/europe-­c entral-­a sia/eastern-­e urope/ukraine/ russia-­ukraine-­diplomacy-­best-­hope-­heading-­deeper-­crisis Sertifikaty Na Zhil’e i Vosstanovlenie Mariupolja. Chto Obsudil Putin s Husnullinym. [Certificates for housing and restoration of Mariupol. What Putin discussed with Khusnullin]. TASS. (2022). Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://tass. ru/nedvizhimost/15344711 (In Russ.) Sidorov, A. (2019). 2014 – 2019. Itogi Krymskoj Pjatiletki. [2014 - 2019. Results of the Crimean Five-Year Plan]. Ok.Crimea. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://ok-­crimea.ru/krym/stati/2019/5789/2014-­2019-­itogi-­kryimskoy-­ pyatiletki/ (In Russ.) Sukhankin, S. (2017). Russia pours more military hardware into ‘Fortress Crimea’. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14(147), 14. Trevelyan, M. (2022, February 21). Factbox: What are the Minsk agreements on the Ukraine conflict? Reuters. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-­a re-­m insk-­a greementsukraine-­conflict-­2022-­02-­21/ Tsukanov, I. (2021). Putin: What is happening in Donbass resembles genocide. Sputnik News. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://sputniknews. com/20211209/putin-­w hat-­i s-­h appening-­i n-­d onbass-­r esembles-­a -­ genocide-­1091396012.html V.Putin s ponimaniem otnessya k pros’be S.Aksenova i poprosil SF RF razresheniya na vvod vojsk v Krym. [V. Putin was sympathetic to the request of S. Aksenov and asked the Federation Council of the Russian Federation for permission to send troops to Crimea]. Neftegaz.RU. (2014, March 1). Retrieved November 14, 2022, from https://neftegaz.ru/news/politics/247440-­v-­putin-­s-­ ponimaniem-­otnessya-­k-­prosbe-­s-­aksenova-­i-­poprosil-­sf-­r f-­razresheniya-­na-­ vvod-­voysk-­v-­krym/ (In Russ.) Vdovychenko, N. (2020). Pan-Slavism, Russian populism and the annexation of Crimea. Diggit Magazine. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://www. diggitmagazine.com/articles/pan-­slavism-­russian-­populism Wilson, A., & Urcosta, R. B. (2019, April 30). Crimea: Russia’s newest Potemkin village. ECFR.  Retrieved October 17, 2022, from https://ecfr.eu/article/ commentary_crimea_russias_newest_potemkin_village/ Yakovlev, V. (2022, June 10). Rossiya budet vosstanavlivat’ osvobozhdennye territorii Ukrainy: Kto komu pomozhet: Moskva. [Russia will restore the liberated territories of Ukraine: Who will help whom: Moscow]. Fed Press. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://fedpress.ru/article/3028586 (In Russ.) Yakunin, I. (2019). Prisoedinenie Kryma k Rossii. [Annexation of Crimea to Russia]. Komsomolskaya Pravda. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https:// www.kp.ru/putevoditel/interesnye-­f akty/prisoedinenie-­k ryma-­k -­r ossii/ (In Russ.)

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Yekelchyk, S. (2022, June 02). Opinion: Sorry, Mr. Putin. Ukraine and Russia are not the same country. Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https:// www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/06/ukraine-­r ussia-­n otsame-­country-­putin-­ussr-­00005461 Za Pjat’ Let v Rossijskom Krymu Sozdali Okolo 21 Tysjachi Mest v Detskih Sadah. [About 21,000 kindergarten places have been created in Russian Crimea in five years]. Komsomolskaya Pravda Crimea. (2019). Retrieved September 24, 2022, from https://www.crimea.kp.ru/online/news/3398798/ (In Russ.) Znamenshchikov, A. (2019). Respublika Krym i Sevastopol’: Pervye itogi realizacii gosudarstvennyh programm v ekonomicheskoj i social’noj sferah. [The Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol: The first results of the implementation of state programmes in the economic and social spheres]. Management Consulting, 10(130), 100–109. (In Russ.).

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Russia has an extensive history of providing post-war reconstruction support domestically, in its ‘near abroad’ region, and to allies further afield. This began with the USSR’s colossal reconstruction efforts following World War II, during which it created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), acting as an alternative to the US Marshall Plan and successfully ushering in a period of reconstruction and economic exchange throughout the Eastern Bloc. For half a century, Moscow was the centre of political gravity in the East. As a superpower, the USSR defined itself as having defended the world from the threat of Nazism, opposed colonialism, proliferated communist ideology, and defied American hegemony, all while forging its own unique path. As the superpower ‘big brother’ state, the Soviet Union acted as a patron state for allied countries around the world, supporting them to overcome economic difficulties and ‘protecting’ them from Western influence and manipulation. The situation changed suddenly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when Russia became the smaller, de facto successor state of the USSR. During the ensuing period of chaos and weakness from the 1990s through the early 2000s, Russia was briefly absent from the international stage as it focused on domestic economic issues and its own conflict and terrorism challenges in Chechnya. However, after achieving relative stability within its borders, Russia re-emerged on the global stage as a non-­ traditional donor and resumed its support and participation in the post-war reconstruction and development of other countries. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Barakat, Russia’s Approach to Post-Conflict Reconstruction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34522-7_7

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As this book has shown, Moscow’s approach today remains fundamentally based in Soviet thinking and policies, carrying over both the USSR’s ideological ambition and its divisive geopolitical approach. It has shown the historic roots of Moscow’s approach to reconstruction: using aid to both shape social, economic, and political realities in its favour and to distract from domestic issues; appealing to a sense of nationalism and promoting the Russian language and culture; centring the principle of sovereignty when it suits Moscow’s aims; approaching Eastern Europe as a collective; creating economic self-sufficiency in the face of economic isolation; and rejecting Western values and institution-building. President Vladimir Putin, who has led Russian policy since 2000, is seemingly driven by Russia’s grand historical narrative and a goal of restoring Russia’s nationalist pride and singular power in the international order. It is important to place the core pillars of Russia’s policy into the current context, as Putin will ultimately decide how they are applied. Putin’s decreasing approval rating between 2008 and 20121 alongside the generally positive Russian perception of the West and Ukraine2 likely contributed to a shift in Russian foreign policy to separate the ‘Russian path’ from that of the West and its associated democratic values. Putin’s narrative of oppressed Russians as justification for the annexation of Crimea in 2014 dramatically changed public opinion,3 while increasing Putin’s approval ratings4 (Otnoshenie k Vladimiru Putinu…, 2014), and we can expect similar narratives to shape the Russian steps in Ukraine.

7.1   The Pillars of Russia’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy 7.1.1   Moscow’s Own Path: Non-interference and Sovereignty One of the most important ideas that shape Russia’s foreign policy is the principle of non-interference. The concept is rooted in Soviet strategy, having emerged as a response to the American Marshall Plan. According  This fell from 80% to 65%, as discussed in Chap. 1.  In 2012 around 55% of the Russian population had a positive perception of the West (the US and the EU) and 69% saw Ukraine as an ally (Rossiya na mezhdunarodnoj arene, 2016). 3  From the beginning of 2014, the Russian public’s negative attitude towards the West and Ukraine doubled (Otnoshenie rossiyan k…, 2015). 4  Putin’s approval ratings increased to 74% during this time (Otnoshenie k Vladimiru Putinu…, 2014). 1 2

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to various Soviet politicians and economists, the main goal of US support was to impose its political ideology by rebuilding the domestic institutions of other countries. The USSR rejected this approach, identifying a respect for sovereignty and self-determination as the core distinction of the CMEA. Along with the creation of a special market among its allied bloc countries, Moscow expected countries it assisted to align with its communist ideology and to avoid interactions with the West. The evolution of the Cold War was inextricably linked with these conflicting post-conflict engagement and donorship policies. The foundation of current Russian foreign policy is rooted and somewhat defined by this opposition to the West and US influence, which it sees as something that must be countered and contained. Therefore, Moscow seeks to create its ‘own Russian path’ which is distinct from that of the West and more favourable for nations seeking to preserve their own culture and sovereignty. As Putin has said, “our [Russian] civilisation is off the beaten track, it has its own way. And there is not a drop of swagger and a sense of superiority in this. This civilisation is ours. That’s what matters to us” (Istoriya vossoedineniya Kryma…, 2019). Non-interference and sovereignty remain core fixtures in the official Russian narrative. For example, this was used as one of the main anti-­ American arguments in Syria, as Assad’s request for Russia to conduct military operations was held as proof that Russia was the legal actor responding to an acting government’s request, while Western nations meddled illegally in sovereign affairs. The position was elaborated by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Valeriy Gerasimov, who said: the interference of Washington and its allies in the internal affairs of the countries of the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia led to the formation of hotbeds of conflict and increased tension in these regions. Events are developing in a similar scenario in individual states of Latin America. (Nachal’nik General’nogo shtaba…, 2019)

The same accusation can also be found in the Russian discourse about Ukraine. At the same time, Russia does not uphold this principle in its ‘near abroad’ region or in countries that were formerly part of the USSR.  Russia has been actively involved in different conflicts on other sovereign territories without the approval of the acting government or the UN. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 highlights this dichotomy.

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According to former President Medvedev, Russia had to protect the Caucasus region (specifically the states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) from Georgian aggression (Medvedev: gruziyu nado…, 2017). This different approach was justified in two main ways. First, Moscow could not allow NATO expansion into Georgia nor Western influence on Georgia’s government. Second, it framed the intervention as preventing destabilisation in the Caucasus, which could spill over into its own borders in a region that had been troublesome. Interestingly, because Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia, Russia was able to frame its support of the secessionist movement as supporting self-­ determination, though this support seems limited to states seeking to align with Russia. This became a blueprint for Russian actions in Ukraine, both in Crimea in 2014 and in Donbas region beginning the same year, and culminating in the full-scale invasion of 2022. The justification given by the Kremlin was once again the self-determination and protection of the oppressed Russian minorities in those territories (Koshechkina, 2022). It is also interesting to note that Moscow uses not only Russian heritage, but also the presence of a population holding Russian passports to justify its military interference. In Crimea, many residents held Russian passports, and even though Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not yet parts of Russia, the vast majority of these populations now hold Russian passports. This allows Russia to argue that the Russia citizenry legitimises its intervention as an ethno-nationalist state. On 21 September 2022, Putin stated that “Russia’s sovereignty, its traditions and freedoms must be fought for,” demonstrating how he has blended the idea of defending Russia’s own sovereignty with taking over territories in which Russian populations reside (Putin zayavil, chto…, 2022). 7.1.2   Coercive Diplomacy Russia leads negotiation processes alongside military operations through its coercive diplomacy approach. Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic tactic used to resolve armed conflicts and crises that pose a danger of war without resorting to full-scale war. It combines military threats and the symbolic use of force with rewards and promises (Jakobsen, 2016). According to Tkachenko (2017), this diplomatic approach did not exist in the Soviet period, and I posit that it emerged during the Chechen Wars, when Russia started to develop its own strategy for stability and conflict

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resolution. The guiding ideas of Moscow’s Chechen campaign would shape its follow-up operations in Syria and abroad. The Chechen campaign represented the top-down, state-centric imposition of a political regime that rejected liberal standards and pluralistic politics as unstable and unreliable. It was built using a set of standards that valued sovereignty and hierarchical power over any assertions of fairness or human rights. Moscow also utilised amnesties and informal discussions, and asserted that its stabilisation method had moral merit in addition to disputing the relevance of liberal principles pertaining to the laws of war and human rights. Moscow moved freely between military action and coercive diplomacy, rejecting negotiations with insurgents and choosing instead to engage politically through the appointment of a strongman on the ground. Moscow’s military actions stopped only when it was able to establish this strong, loyal ally as a proxy to control the destabilised region through violence. Coercive diplomacy was also used in the Russo-Georgian War. Despite the displaced Russian peacebuilding forces there, when Tbilisi sent troops into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow immediately invaded the territories, preferring to engage in talks from a place of strength that demonstrated both control over Georgian territory and a willingness to escalate the situation. Russia’s strategy in Syria aimed to create a vertical model of peace enforcement, using many of the same tools for both the initial counter-­ insurgency campaign and the subsequent phase of peace consolidation, combining violence, mediation, and regional diplomacy into a comprehensive conflict management strategy. Russia developed proxies that were dependent upon its support, which it was thereby able to directly influence and use simultaneously to force outcomes and facilitate the asymmetric mediation process. Through the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and Refugee Migration Monitoring in the Syrian Arab Republic (CRCSS), which Russia established in February 2016 following ceasefire discussions with the US, it carried out a counter-insurgency campaign concurrently with talks engaging rebel groups. Prior to negotiations, combatants were forced to agree to either surrender to government forces or to leave the region and travel to designated de-escalation zones through the use of siege tactics and aircraft bombardment. The majority of fighters eventually relocated to Idlib after government troops occupied other de-escalation zones.

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This blending of conflict and negotiation was not a passing occurrence; rather, it became the main element of Russia’s forceful mediation technique. The use of proxy violence to affect battlefield dynamics and mould political discussions among various parties was meticulously negotiated by Russia—and subsequently Turkey (Lewis, 2022). The Astana process gave the three parties (Turkey, Iran, and Russia) the ability to discipline one another by use of force, hence lowering the likelihood of military war. However, in doing so, it rendered political exclusion and violence as integral components of developing a political settlement. This coercive strategy can be found in the case of Ukraine as well. Following the Euromaidan protests, a number of military drills were conducted close to the Russian-Ukrainian border in the spring and summer of 2014, against the backdrop of escalating hostilities between Kyiv and armed Donetsk and Luhansk independence supporters (Zhukov, 2014). The strategy was also used before the current war, when, in March 2021, Russia sent troops to its southern borders, placing pressure on Ukraine. Moscow clarified the army movement as training operations and emphasised that neighbouring nations were not under risk (Anisimova, 2021). Later, in August 2021, Russia and Belarus conducted joint military trainings. These can be interpreted as Putin aiming to add strength to Russia’s diplomatic position as it pressured Ukraine and NATO to meet its demands. Ultimately, its strategy of coercive diplomacy has succeeded in avoiding a full-scale war only in cases where Russia’s adversaries have bent in the face of coercion and threats. 7.1.3  Stabilisation The Western approach to post-conflict reconstruction is focused on the sustainable, locally owned improvement of society and the development of institutions to ultimately bring stability. Russia does not share this view of post-war reconstruction, instead embracing an immediate focus on facilitating a ‘return to normal.’ Moscow does not try to develop new governmental system in other states, and, moreover, criticises the West for doing so. Putin views this state-building as dangerous, stating that this approach was applied to “Libya or Iraq until these states or state structures were destroyed by the forces of our various Western partners” (Otvety na voprosy francuzskih…, 2016). Additionally, Russian political activist and political scientist Sergey Markov stated that “those countries in which the Americans are increasing their influence (and we are talking about Iraq,

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Ukraine, and Afghanistan) are in a ruined state” (Zalyan, 2021). Moreover, while it is not completely opposed to democracy, as an authoritarian state, Russia lacks any motivation to introduce or promote democracy in other countries, preferring instead to support and install supportive regimes. The Russian perspective holds that the most humanitarian approach is the establishment of immediate, top-down peace, rather than opening the door to the unreliable changes that can come through democratic systems subject to elections. As discussed in Chap. 1, I posit that it is essential that the reconstructing actor be involved in coalescing a functioning socio-economic order and addressing the inequalities, vulnerabilities, and social divides that can destabilise the foundation of a society. While we have shown that Russia certainly seeks to establish a hierarchical functioning order, the case studies and experiences shown in Ukraine thus far do not demonstrate that Moscow is prepared to address deep-seated social divides, preferring instead to restore the immediate outer trappings of normalcy. Taking the opposite viewpoint from George C. Marshall in 1947, Putin does not seek to engage the population in the development of a locally owned vision for reconstruction, preferring instead to invest in Russia’s strategic priorities. If it can be said that Moscow has an overarching reconstruction vision for the annexed areas of Ukraine, it would be a top-down vision of integration with Russia rather than a bottom-up, value-led vision from the region. As we can see in each case study, Russia first emphasises rebuilding infrastructure, particularly that which benefits Russian military actions and strategy and that which meets the immediate needs of the population. 7.1.4   A Loyal, Strong State In order to achieve this rapid stabilisation, Moscow aims to rapidly establish a top-down, strong state. This is rooted in Soviet strategies; as we have explored, under the CMEA, Soviet authorities supported allied authoritarian regimes to build their influence and global support. The Chechen campaign exemplified the focus on establishing a top-down, state-centric political regime. Russian soldiers and Chechen proxies both used violence as the main ordering factor for political stability. While it can be seen as controversial that Chechnya, a region rich with mineral resources including oil, receives the level of funding that it does from Moscow, the flows of untracked money can be seen as a political tool. Moscow

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maintains Kadyrov’s loyalty by providing resources which are not expected to reach their official intended purpose in full. As discussed in Chap. 4, despite the corruption, various infrastructure projects are implemented in Chechnya, but Moscow’s secondary goal with this aid is to ensure a thoroughly loyal administration in Grozny. Later, it became important for Moscow to maintain pro-Russian governments in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Crimea, where it supported figures and parties supported alignment with Russia, and again used corruption to buy this loyalty. While Syria is considered ‘far abroad’ for Russia and has never been a part of the Soviet Union, Moscow is nevertheless interested in keeping President Assad in power, a figure who the Kremlin views as (a) able to control armed terrorist groups; (b) an important ally that will support Russia on the international stage; and (c) a stabilising ruler whose overthrow may lead to chaotic civil wars which are worse for the population overall (Moscow cites the examples of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Libya after the fall of the Kaddafi regime as scenarios to avoid). Moscow supports the strong, authoritarian tactics of the Assad government and views them as justified for managing opposition and maintaining order. 7.1.5   Humanitarian and Development Aid as Tools After saving or installing the allied, strong state apparatus, Russia proceeds to introduce humanitarian and development aid. As was demonstrated in the Caucasus region examples, the Russian governance, reconstruction, and aid strategies are inextricably linked with corruption. By lining the pockets of a newly installed government, Moscow ensures both their loyalty and their continued dependence. One of the clearest current cases of Russia’s approach to aid can be found to Syria. Moscow used humanitarian aid and a “shadow aid system” as a way to maintain its territorial dominance and to ensure Assad’s loyalty, contributing to its larger conflict management system (Robinson, 2022). Russia opposed UN assistance delivery to rebel-held areas to strengthen the Assad government’s control and has pressed the UN to be more open with its aid provision, while simultaneously supporting its own aid network (Lewis, 2022; Robinson, 2022). Paradoxically, Russia is also aware of how crucial reconstruction is to a nation’s long-term stability after a civil war, and, mindful of its financial limitations, in some cases is therefore reluctant to act alone. Provided it

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can maintain its control and influence, the Kremlin would prefer to participate in rebuilding with the backing and shared responsibility of other international players that have more reliable financial standing (Klaz & Mariani, 2022). Humanitarian and development aid became one of the crucial elements in calming Crimean society following the upheaval and annexation in 2014. As such, “in 2013, 12.8 billion rubles of income and 13.6 billion of expenses were pledged [to Crimea]. In 2019, [Crimea had] almost 193 billion rubles of income and almost 193 billion rubles of expenses. The budget of the republic not only increased 15 times, but for the first time in history became deficit-free” (Zhukova, 2019). Such financial investments serve to demonstrate the advantages of formally joining the Russian Federation. Russian assistance has been directed at re-establishing regular life in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and parts of Ukraine through projects such as building and the removal of explosive ordnance. Meanwhile, Moscow currently delivers humanitarian aid to the captured regions of Ukraine to stabilise cities. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated that “Russia will rebuild all the liberated territories of Ukraine, the relevant decisions have already been made” (Husnullin zayavil o…, 2022). At the same time, in light of sanctions and the increasing costs of the ongoing war, an adequate budget to do so has not yet been demonstrated. The Russian government has made no statements about the restoration of territories that reject its control. 7.1.6   Economic Integration and Dependency Through its economic development support, Moscow also cultivates the economic dependency of the reconstructed regions. This is developed through the interdependency between Moscow and the controlling strong state and the conditionality of aid. The billions of rubles in subsidies given to Chechnya over ten years serve to create economic dependency on Moscow, as it contributed to a higher standard of living in Grozny, which now relies on the central government to maintain. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as discussed in Chap. 4 and above, Moscow became the republics’ main economic partner, and funded their pro-Russian governments. If the republics were to shift away from Moscow, they will have no choice but to re-join Georgia to maintain their economies. In Syria, economic

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dependency was created largely due to the sanctions imposed on Syria, leaving Assad with few choices in the economic partners. Moreover, Russia sees economic opportunities in reconstruction. In Syria, Moscow found a foothold for its businesses to gain contracts to rebuild and to pursue involvement in important economic areas including oil and gas, power, agriculture, tourism, and real estate (Klaz & Mariani, 2022). As a result of such a cooperative strategy with various states, Russia gained not only economic and political-security benefits, but also loyalty and political support on the international stage. For example, as a way to demonstrate their commitment to Moscow, Syria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia all supported its proclamation of the sovereignty of the Luhansk Republic and the Donetsk Republic, providing Moscow with some perceived legitimacy for its unlawful actions. The same strategy of creating economic dependency has been seen in Crimea and will be seen in the newly annexed territories of Ukraine. In Crimea, Moscow tried to show that the region was underdeveloped and ‘humiliated’ by Ukraine. This argument required the government to invest heavily in infrastructural development, allocating billions of rubles. While the peninsula has received massive subsidies from Moscow, as was discussed in Chap. 6, due to the economic sanctions, high level of corruption, and militarisation of the peninsula, development continues to move slowly. The situation is different in the recently annexed republics of Luhansk and Donetsk as well as in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, where the Russian military has destroyed entire cities and significant civilian infrastructure, which requires a different approach and a focus on housing. Still, Moscow can be expected to use a similar overall approach as it attempts to demonstrate that it is more advantageous for the population to join Russia than to remain in Ukraine. To this end, Moscow has subsidised people’s relocation in the Donbas, providing them with special vouchers to pay for housing. However, if the region remains under Russian control, due to the harsh economic sanctions and expected corruption, it is unlikely to see rapid, full economic recovery or further development, but will have no alternative development choices due to the ensuing economic isolation. Moscow has declared that it will use the strategy of ‘twinning’ cities inside Russia to be responsible for the restoration of the linked cities in Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine. This plan can be seen as a uniting strategy which may help to assimilate ‘new cities’ into Russia while laying the groundwork for long-term economic integration and dependence.

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7.1.7  Education A core pillar of the Russian development strategy is its emphasis on education. As discussed in Chap. 2, this has been one of Moscow’s most effective soft power tools since Soviet times. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet educational system was isolated from that of the West, but the USSR sought to provide and support education in poorer allied countries. This was a core strategy to spread communist ideology, as well as the Russian language and culture, globally. Education continues to play a critical role in Russian development policy. In post-conflict contexts, Moscow focuses on rebuilding schools and creating opportunities for students to study in Russia. As discussed in Chap. 5, despite being in Moscow’s ‘far abroad’ and having no significant Russian population, Moscow created scholarship programmes in Syria, opened a centre to teach Russian language and culture, and organised exchange trips for students to visit Russia. This follows the ‘cultural diplomacy’ tradition used during the Cold War, strengthening ties and intellectual exchange between Russia and its allies. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow funded education systems following the Russian model, to enable easier integration with the Russian system and to promote the Russian language and interest in studying in Russia. This serves to increase the integration between the newly independent republics and Russia, setting them on a course to be easily absorbed and integrated into the Russian Federation. In Crimea, the implementation of the Russian educational system began immediately after its annexation. Moscow emphasised that its education system was superior to that of Ukraine, declaring that quotas would be used to ensure that students from Crimea would have the opportunity to study in Russian universities. Deputy Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan Vladimir Bobkov noted that “since the Crimea has become a part of Russia, education on the territory of the republic acquired ‘ideological harmony’” (Kak izmenilos’ obrazovanie…, 2021). In the ongoing war of 2022, Moscow still emphasises the importance of education and rebuilding schools. The spread of the Russian education system and perspective has become crucial for Putin. Putin used his historical narrative to justify the invasion of Ukraine; therefore shaping the historical education for residents is one of the most significant propaganda avenues, and can be quickly deployed in schools and universities. Having withdrawn from the Bologna Process system of education, the Russian

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government has cart blanche to teach its own interpretations and narratives within its educational institutions. To this end, the Russian government has decided to publish a history textbook that will include new chapters on a special military operation and the exploits of the Russian military (V Rossii reshili…, 2022). The central goal of this educational indoctrination is to prevent future opposition and to engender friendly attitudes towards Moscow.

7.2  Forecast Here I would like to briefly forecast how these principles and strategies, in the context of Putin’s overarching political goals, might be applied in the current context in Ukraine. It is critical to emphasise that Moscow does not have a clear reconstruction strategy for the wider region, nor a specific ministry dedicated to reconstruction. However, looking at the historical context and evolution of the Russian ideology and approach, alongside the strategies and principles used in Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Syria, and Crimea, I expect Russian reconstruction and investment in Russian-controlled areas to be defined by the following approaches. Focusing on establishing stability and conflict management over conflict prevention: As illustrated throughout this book, Moscow views the creation of stability as the primary, most effective way to bring vertical peace and prosperity to a post-conflict population. It prioritises the immediate stability of an area over justice, human rights, institution-building, representative governance, or the cultivation of any liberal or Western values. This approach may allow resentments and divisions to fester in newly annexed regions, creating a scenario in which rebuilding efforts are fundamentally disconnected from deeper strategies of violence reduction. Further, as reconciliation is initiated through the equitable application of the law, continued civilian abuses and the continued persecution of dissenting groups may undermine what stability Moscow has been able to create. At the same time, the case studies have shown that the Russian military and subsequent loyal regional governments are likely to continue to carry out human rights abuses in practices similar to those seen in Chechnya, as a component of Moscow’s strategy to use violence as the ordering factor for stability. The ‘Syria stabilisation model’ can also be taken as an indicator that this has become the core principle upon which Moscow will base subsequent reconstruction actions.

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Establishing top-down, ‘strongman’ governments at all levels: The historical context and case studies have demonstrated the importance that Russia places on the existence of a strong, hierarchal state in order to provide the peaceful conditions necessary for stabilisation. As a part of this stabilisation, the first step in Russia’s demonstrated post-conflict policy aims to prevent the future secession of its newly annexed regions. To achieve this, Moscow needs to put in place a strong, vertically managed, paid off, pro-Russian government. The establishment of this control over the local governments will not only mean that the new regional government will support and execute ideas and directives from Moscow, but also that it will prevent any anti-Russian movements within the society. To achieve this, local officials such as mayors will be removed and replaced with unelected officials who are loyal to Moscow. In Russian-captured territories of Ukraine, due to the level of resistance and opposition, the proximity on Russia’s border, and Moscow’s ongoing need to spin a specific narrative and to silence alternative views and reports, Putin is likely to follow a governance approach similar to that in Chechnya in terms of delegated governance of the republics. Buying loyalty through corruption: As demonstrated throughout the case studies, it is likely that a significant percentage of the funds allocated to reconstruction and development aid will be unaccounted for, and will ultimately line the pockets of regional administrators and officials. Moscow sees paying off these figures as a way to ensure an administration is loyal as well as to engender economic dependency of the region on Moscow. As seen in Grozny, this may lead to a higher standard of living in some of the republics’ capitals, but will ultimately stifle the economic recovery and prosperity of the regions and ensure long-term dependency on Moscow. Creating economic dependence on Moscow: Through this corruption and due to the sanctions that are likely to remain on Russia and the loss of positive relations with Ukraine, the annexed territories are likely to become economically isolated and entirely reliant on Moscow for trade, subsidies, and economic activity. Additionally, the economic situation is likely to shift as it transitions into a military economy that is highly dependent on Moscow and troop placements for its prosperity, limiting the republics’ future political and economic options. Militarisation of the region: As the annexed regions of Eastern Ukraine become Russia’s frontier with the West, given Russian patterns and geopolitical goals and coercive diplomatic tactics, it is likely that these

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regions will primarily become a military frontline. Depending on the direction of the war and the peace negotiation process, this region could become the front of a frozen conflict, a demilitarised area, or a buffer zone with the West. Regardless, while this transformation comes with its own patterns of investment, economic activity, and special attention from Moscow, ultimately it will remain a frozen frontier. Framing dissent as terrorism: Putin’s concern over his domestic support and the lessons learned from the support he gained after ‘subduing’ Chechnya and integrating Crimea will likely motivate his actions in the newly annexed regions. In line with Putin’s narrative of ‘Nazism’ in Ukraine and his pursuit of wiping out terrorist and secessionist movements, Ukrainian groups opposed to Russian control are likely to be labelled as terrorist and ‘pro-Nazi’ groups. The persecution and demonisation of any opposition is likely to keep the domestic areas in a state of constant military and police crackdown, diverting funds that could otherwise be used for reconstruction into ongoing local military, police, or intelligence operations. Investing limited resources in its fringe regions: The Donbas and other newly annexed regions of Ukraine can expect only partial reconstruction and development under Russia. Unlike Chechnya, the Donbas and regions of Eastern Ukraine are not a core part of Russian territory. And, unlike Crimea, they have suffered heavy damage and are less strategically important aside from the fact that they maintain a wide land border with adversarial Ukraine. Therefore, they are likely to remain a fringe region in Russia. Residents of these areas may have hoped that in joining Russia, their fate would transform from that of a fringe region of Ukraine to one of priority in the Russian Federation; however, they are likely instead to transition from a fringe region of Ukraine to a fringe region of Russia. Therefore, the previous cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia serve as the best examples to draw from and indicate the direction these regions may be heading in. They are likely to receive some funding from Russia, focused on infrastructure for military needs, housing, education, and overall integration of the regions with the Russian Federation; but will not see standards of living transform. Russification of the population: Moscow is certain to continue to dispatch its post-war reconstruction efforts as a branding tool to boost its image as an ethno-nationalist state. It will likely follow the strategy used in Crimea, investing in educational reforms to promote the Russian language and Putin’s version of history as well as aiming to shift public opinion

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against Ukraine and engender ethno-nationalist loyalty to Russia. The education system will be harmonised with that of the Russian Federation, and exchange programmes and university spots within Russia are likely to be reserved for students from the annexed regions to encourage movement and the gradual Russification of the population. In an approach used since post-WWII, Russian cultural sites and heritage will also receive investments to ground the population in a shared identity and a sense of belonging in the republic and the wider Russian Federation. Crucially, Russia will seek to issue Russian passports (and is likely to continue forcibly capturing Ukrainian passports) as quickly as possible in order to use the widespread presence of Russian citizens to justify future military engagement and escalation in line with its coercive diplomatic strategies. Further, Putin will likely seek to build nationalism and deter dissent through the takeover of media sources, ensuring that Russian state media is the primary source for most residents.

7.3  Recommendations 7.3.1   Considerations for Kyiv and the West For Kyiv, it is important to respond to the grievances of the Russian population of Ukraine, which were present before Russia annexed Crimea, and had been pushed aside and left largely unaddressed. Ignoring these issues allowed the grievances to grow and contributed to the Russian population feeling marginalised. This created a situation in which governance mistakes, such as the change in recognising Russian as a regional minority language, ignited deep disputes between the western-facing part of the country and the eastern-facing part of the country. By listening to the grievances and concerns as well as preserving the status of the Russian language and culture, Ukraine may have been able to prevent the local support that, while limited, has enabled Moscow to interject into the narrative and ultimately influence and claim these regions. Taking these grievances seriously and adopting assurances of cultural protections for the Russian population will be critical during the peace negotiation process, and ensuring these Russian areas are equally prioritised and funded in terms of reconstruction will avoid exacerbating grievances and division. NATO could recognise its mistake in advancing eastward and failing to heed Moscow’s warnings that its expansion would cross a line, which have been clearly articulated since Yeltsin’s time. I posit that there have not

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been sufficient shifts in geopolitics from a security perspective significant enough to justify the push eastwards. Rather, it is the military industry pushing for NATO expansion, and this drove Moscow back to its Cold War thinking and justified its rise in military investment and activity. Sweden and Finland joining NATO has left frighteningly few neutral spaces, with extensive shared borders between Russia and NATO that could serve as a flashpoint for a worldwide conflict. Furthermore, I postulate that the EU has made a mistake in aligning itself with Ukraine too quickly. Whereas France and Germany were able to serve as mediators in the Minsk agreements, they and other European nations quickly relinquished any opportunity to play a meaningful mediating role by siding with Ukraine and providing funding for its defences. Unfortunately, this has led to the absence of neutral mediators on the continent that can hope to broker peace in good faith. The most important consideration for Kyiv is that it cannot rest assured that it will receive the funding necessary to sufficiently rebuild, and must ensure that at the end of the conflict, its borders and boundaries are agreed, firmly established, and objectively monitored in order for it to have any hope of effective reconstruction. There are several reasons for this. First, from the Western perspective, Ukraine has become the eastern frontier of security for the US and its Western allies. As such, it will likely be considered to be too vulnerable for serious, long-term investments. While it may receive aid to ensure the needs of the population are met and basic infrastructure is functional to facilitate military and civilian movement, it is unlikely to receive private sector investment, financial grants, and other investments that require the assurances of long-term stability. As long as it remains a front with Russia and on adversarial terms with Moscow, it will be seen as a powder keg for future conflict. It is therefore in Ukraine’s interests to ensure that whatever settlement is reached with Moscow be sustainable—including based on political agreements that look beyond any temporary Russian weakness (as discussed, Ukraine itself did not adhere to the Minsk agreements because it thought them to be agreed during a period of its own weakness)—and well-defined to encourage investment to return to the country. Second, the economic fallout of the war has been difficult and challenging for the West, particularly the UK.  This has impacted currency

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devaluation, energy,5 subsidies to the population, food prices,6 and overall cost of living, among other impacts (Jones, 2022). Given the scale of these costs, it is unlikely that Europe will remain in a position to support Ukraine in its full aspirations of reclaiming its pre-2014 territory. Even if Western donors do commit to providing funds for full reconstruction, history has shown that they are unlikely to fully deliver on these commitments. By looking at examples such as Afghanistan and Iraq—countries where the US and Western allies were clearly responsible for the costs incurred—we can see that funding needs were not adequately met.7 In fact, assistance for critical humanitarian crises has recently been cut, with the needs and costs in Ukraine given as an excuse for the shortfall. This exemplifies the likelihood that other future crises will distract Western governments, leading to Kyiv’s requests falling to a lower political priority. Third, in addition to the economic pressures and distractions that are likely to arise, it is important for Ukraine to examine how the EU and the West has dealt with the country overall. In the face of a dramatic invasion which remained widely covered on Western media and appealed to the Western sense of camaraderie based on democratic values, public pressure rose to support the Ukrainian people. However, we have seen this support begin to wane in various ways. One example is the unprecedented welcoming of Ukrainian refugees, who were eagerly accommodated in Europe at the start of the conflict, but have since found themselves with dwindling 5  UK wholesale gas futures have been volatile, increasing by 40% since the invasion started and almost 100% since the start of the year. UK gas prices have increased five-fold since March 2021, and in the first two weeks after the invasion, the prices of oil, coal, and gas went up by around 40%, 130%, and 180% (Adolfsen et al., 2022). 6  Wheat prices have jumped by 20% following Russia’s invasion. 7  Up until 2021, the US government spent 20 years and US $145 billion trying to rebuild Afghanistan, including its security forces, civilian government institutions, economy, and civil society. The US Department of Defense has also spent US $837 billion on warfighting (Sopko, 2021). According to Moscow, 30% of the total sum was stolen (Auditor nazval 30% iz…) Meanwhile, the US spending in Iraq of US $61  billion represents 28% of the total allocated for reconstruction and it is roughly equivalent to 7% of the funds allocated to weapons and direct combat, and roughly less than 2% of the projected total cost of the war. What is also clear from an analysis of the funds spent on reconstruction is that the majority of the US funds have been (1) spent creating and training security forces and rearming the military or (2) lost to profiteering, waste, fraud, or careless misappropriation of funds towards unwanted or ill-advised projects. Additionally, some of the funds allocated for ‘reconstruction’ were in fact spent by military commanders with an eye primarily to their efficacy in counter-insurgency and ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns rather than with a comprehensive reengineering or an overarching Iraqi perspective and needs in mind (Lutz, 2013).

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support from hosts and host governments, as short-term emergency arrangements and the goodwill and sacrifice associated with them are challenging to sustain over the long term. It is also important to consider the political shifts that come with democracy. Moscow has continued to use funding as well as covert and cyber operations to buy loyalty and appeal to right-leaning political groups in the US, the UK, and across Europe, which in some countries divides public opinion of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict between domestic political parties. This leaves support for Ukraine in a brittle state, dependent on certain parties maintaining power as well as the population continuing to rank it highly among priorities in the face of dire domestic economic challenges. Fourth, Ukraine remains economically dependent on food exports, which is ultimately linked to the country’s national security and stability. Agriculture also employs a significant portion of the population, meaning that prolonged interruptions in exports will negatively impact Ukraine’s economic trajectory. In order to export its food, Ukraine will require Moscow’s cooperation to access ports and to re-establish its connection with international markets. Without the restoration of functioning and efficient relations with Moscow, reconstruction and Kyiv’s ability to fund reconstruction and entice citizens to return will be extremely challenging. 7.3.2   Considerations for the Russian Annexed Regions in the Donbas and Eastern Ukraine While Russia will make efforts to support the reconstruction of areas that it annexes, residents of the annexed and Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine cannot rely on Russian investment to fully restore the region after the destructive war. Even though Russia was the main state to propose and to support the sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the financial support it has provided has not been enough to deliver the needed economic boost to the republics. Chapter 4 explored how, while post-war Chechnya was one of the most dynamically developing areas in Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have stagnated economically. This demonstrates that although Moscow played a core role in the breakaway republics’ sovereignty and is increasingly integrating them into the Russian Federation, it does not consider the territories as fully Russian areas and therefore is not willing to allocate the same levels of funding as it does for strategic regions within its borders.

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Further, Moscow’s funds have been significantly depleted, and its formerly gainful role as an energy supplier to Europe is likely to continue to deteriorate, leaving Russia largely tied to and dependent on China and other Asian export markets, which will take it time to develop. The case studies of Chechnya and Syria both demonstrate Moscow’s wartime strategy to extensively bomb densely populated areas, seemingly undeterred by incurring hugely expensive damage to vital infrastructure. In the case of Grozny, Moscow invested heavily in rebuilding the area due to its strategic and political significance, as well as the agreement made with the Kadyrov family. In the more recent example of Syria, however, we can see that Russia intentionally destroyed vast swaths of infrastructure while it was not in a financial situation to repair or rebuild the damaged areas. Moreover, it used reconstruction and development arrangements with the Syrian government to create beneficial business opportunities that would help the Russian economy, but left funds spent inefficiently. Ultimately, Syria remains devastated while Moscow attempts to persuade other governments to help to shoulder the reconstruction costs under the Assad regime. While the recently annexed regions in Ukraine are much closer to Russia, they are likely to find themselves in similar positions, in that Russia will be unable to fund the full reconstruction but will also be unable to persuade wealthier countries of the region to provide reconstruction funding. Creating clear and stable borders will be critically important for the Donbas and other areas of Eastern Ukraine under Russian control, as this will be the only path for the area to develop beyond that of a fringe region mainly used by Moscow to host military deployments. While the ‘twinning’ approach linking damaged captured Ukrainian cities with Russian cities may lead to some piecemeal successful reconstruction, this approach demonstrates the lack of an overarching regional reconstruction strategy. This is especially significant as it will likely indicate significant reliance on Russia and a lack of regional strategic visioning and planning, leaving the rural areas likely to be overlooked and the idea of a level of ‘independence’ for the regions highly unlikely. Further, long-term agricultural investments will only be sustainable with reliable water and other services as well as crop cycles that remain uninterrupted by outbreaks of skirmishes. If the Russian-controlled areas are able to exist within stable, internationally recognised boundaries, their own local and municipal revenues could also be used for reconstruction. However, the likelihood of a rapid economic recovery for Russia and its

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newly annexed territories remains uncertain, particularly in light of the current sanctions, the amount of time it will take Russia to transition its export markets to Asia, and the global transition away from coal (which is abundant in the Donbas), oil, and gas. In what has become a highly internationalised war, neither Ukraine nor Moscow-controlled areas in Eastern Ukraine can rely on full reconstruction support from external sources. In my view, the most effective peace agreement would include provisions such as demilitarised, internationally monitored buffer zones—perhaps following the example of the United Nations buffer Zone in Cyprus, which has prevented war between Turkey and Greece since 1964—provisions for exports, guarantees of Ukrainian policies to protect Russian minorities, and guarantees of Russian policies to protect and allow the repatriation of Ukrainian populations. Only through such guarantees of stability will either areas receive adequate (though likely still lacking) funding for reconstruction, the necessary private sector investments, and industry and economic opportunities beyond the military industrial sectors to return to the region.

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Jakobsen, P. V. (2016). Coercive diplomacy (pp. 476–486). The Sage Handbook of Diplomacy. Jones, B. (2022, March 14). The economic impact of conflict in Ukraine. CBI. Retrieved November 16, 2022, from https://www.cbi.org.uk/articles/ the-­economic-­impact-­of-­conflict-­in-­ukraine-­feb-­25th-­2022/ Kak izmenilos’ obrazovanie v krymu za sem’ let v sostave RF. [How education in Crimea has changed over the seven years as part of the Russian Federation]. RiaNews. (2021, March 15). Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://crimea. ria.ru/20210315/Kak-­izmenilos-­obrazovaniya-­v-­Krymu-­za-­7-­let-­v-­sostave-­ RF%2D%2Dvlasti-­1119357345.html (In Russ.) Klaz, S. B., & Mariani, B. (2022). Fragmentation of peacemaking in Syria: Reality and perception. PeaceRep: The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform. Koshechkina, V. (2022, February 24). Putin ob”yavil o nachale voennoj operacii po zashchite Donbassa. [Putin announced the start of a military operation to protect the Donbass]. Lenta.ru. Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://lenta.ru/ news/2022/02/24/operation/ (In Russ.) Lewis, D. (2022). Contesting liberal peace: Russia’s emerging model of conflict management. International Affairs, 98(2), 653–673. Lutz, C. (2013). Reconstructing Iraq: The last year and the last decade. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. Medvedev: gruziyu nado bylo ostanovit’, inache bylo nel’zya. [Medvedev: Georgia had to be stopped, otherwise it was impossible]. EADaily. (2017, August 8). Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://eadaily.com/ru/news/ 2017/08/08/medvedev-­gruziyu-­nado-­bylo-­ostanovit-­inache-­bylo-­nelzya (In Russ.) Nachal’nik General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii general armii Valerij Gerasimov vstretilsya s predstavitelyami voenno-­diplomaticheskogo korpusa, akkreditovannymi v Rossii. [Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov met with representatives of the military-diplomatic corps accredited in Russia]. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. (2019, December 18). Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more. htm?id=12437675@egNews (In Russ.) Otnoshenie k Vladimiru Putinu. [Attitude to Vladimir Putin]. Levada Centre. (2014, December 3). Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://www.levada. ru/2014/12/03/otnoshenie-­k-­vladimiru-­putinu/ (In Russ.) Otnoshenie rossiyan k drugim stranam. [The attitude of Russians to other countries]. Levada Centre. (2015, October 29). Retrieved September 30, 2022, from https://www.levada.ru/2014/12/08/otnoshenie-­rossiyan-­k-­drugim-­ stranam-­8/ (In Russ.) Otvety na voprosy francuzskih zhurnalistov telekanala TF1. [Answers to questions from French journalists of the TF1 TV channel]. Official Website of President of

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the Russian Federation. (2016, October 11). Retrieved October 1, 2022, from http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53081 (In Russ.) Putin zayavil, chto Rossiya budet borot’sya za svoyu nezavisimost’ radi velikogo budushchego. [Putin said that Russia will fight for its independence for the sake of a great future]. TASS. (2022, September 21). Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://tass.ru/politika/15824763 (In Russ.) Robinson, J. (2022). Russian foreign humanitarian assistance identifying trends using 15 years of open-source data. Marine Corps University. Rossiya na mezhdunarodnoj arene. [Russia in the international arena]. Levada Centre. (2016, March 17). Retrieved September 30, 2022, from https://www. levada.ru/2012/12/18/rossiya-­na-­mezhdunarodnoj-­arene-­5/ (In Russ.) Sopko, J. F. (2021). What we need to learn: Lessons from twenty years of Afghanistan reconstruction. Tkachenko, S. L. (2017). The coercive diplomacy of Vladimir Putin (2014–2016). In The Russian challenge to the European security environment (pp. 115–136). Palgrave Macmillan. V Rossii reshili vypustit’ “pravil’nyj uchebnik istorii” so specoperaciej. [In Russia, they decided to release a “correct history textbook” with a special operation]. MK.ru. (2022, August 30). Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://www. mk.ru/politics/2022/08/30/v-­r ossii-­r eshili-­vypustit-­pravilnyy-­uchebnik-­ istorii-­so-­specoperaciey.html (In Russ.) Zalyan, R. (2021, August 15). «Amerika slomalas’»: pochemu SSHA ne smogli prinesti mir v Afganistan i chto budet dal’she. [“America is broken”: Why the US failed to bring peace to Afghanistan and what will happen next]. Vechernyaya Moskva. Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://vm.ru/politics/905547-­ pochemu-­s sha-­n e-­s mogli-­p rinesti-­m ir-­v -­a fganistan-­i -­c hto-­b udet-­d alshe (In Russ.) Zhukov, O. (2014, October 12). Rossijskie vojska otozvany s uchenij na granice s ukrainoj. [Russian troops withdrawn from exercises on the border with Ukraine]. MK.ru. Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://www.mk.ru/politics/2014/10/12/putin-­vozvrashhaet-­voyska-­s-­ucheniy-­v-­rostovskoy-­oblasti. html (In Russ.) Zhukova, A. (2019, March 18). Posle vhozhdeniya v rossiyu byudzhet Kryma uvelichilsya v 15 raz. [After joining Russia, the Crimean budget increased 15 times]. Crimea.kp. Retrieved October 1, 2022, from https://www.crimea.kp.ru/ daily/26954.5/4007642/ (In Russ.)

Index1

A Abkhazia, viii, x, 17, 22, 23, 69, 72, 76, 77, 83–112, 137, 164, 166, 180, 181, 184–188, 190, 194 Annexation, ix–xi, 2, 3, 23, 68, 71, 146, 152, 154, 156–159, 167, 168, 178, 185, 187 Arab Spring, 75, 121, 122 Astana, 130–132, 182 B Basayev, Shamil, 91–93 Beslan, 92, 93 Black Sea, 83, 152, 153, 159, 168 C Caucasus, x, 13, 22, 65, 83–112, 125, 137, 180, 184 Centre for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides in Syria (CRCSS), 77, 134, 181

Chechenisation, 93 Chechen Republic, 85, 86, 91, 92, 95–98, 100–104 Chechnya, x, 13, 16, 20, 22, 23, 62, 83–112, 137, 164, 169, 177, 183–185, 188–190, 194, 195 Coercive, x, 15, 75–76, 78, 111, 156, 159, 167, 180–182, 189, 191 Cold War, viii, 1, 4, 5, 12, 14, 17, 22, 29, 30, 33, 37, 46, 51, 53, 61, 62, 69, 73, 75, 123, 127, 179, 187, 192 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 68, 69, 71, 90 Comprehensive Program of Socialist Integration, 43, 44, 48 Corruption, 99, 104, 107, 112, 147, 151, 162, 169, 184, 186, 189 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), 11, 12, 39–46, 48–50, 54, 65, 77, 177, 179, 183 Crimea, x, 23, 67, 68, 71–73, 145–170, 178, 180, 184–188, 190, 191

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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INDEX

D De-escalation, 131, 181 Development Assistance Program (DAPP), 65, 66 Donbas, 16, 147, 152–158, 163, 166–169, 180, 186, 190, 194–196 Donetsk, 2, 71, 89, 137, 153, 154, 156, 159, 165, 182, 186 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 85, 86, 90, 91

I Infrastructure, 1, 3, 5, 20, 30, 32, 33, 37, 44, 50, 66, 76, 96, 98, 100, 105, 106, 108, 111, 129, 130, 135, 147, 158–166, 168, 169, 183, 184, 186, 190, 192, 195 International Development Assistance (IDA), 66 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 122, 123, 123n2, 125

E Education, x, 46–50, 55, 65, 71, 78, 84, 87, 96–98, 100–102, 106–108, 111, 112, 132, 135, 136, 156, 161, 163, 169, 187–188, 190, 191 EMERCOM, 73, 89 Emerging donor, 19, 64, 65, 67 Europe, 5, 10, 29, 30, 34–39, 42, 54, 78, 83, 94, 124, 132, 146, 193–195 European Union (EU), 1, 3, 15, 17, 19, 78, 99, 111, 133, 147, 150, 151, 154, 164, 178n2, 192, 193

K Kadyrov, Ramzan, 98, 102, 184 Khasavyurt, 91 Kherson, 2, 153, 156, 158, 159, 163, 186 Khrushchev, Nikita, 43, 148, 150, 158 Kosovo, 14, 17, 73, 94

G Geneva, 90, 124, 130, 132 Georgia, viii, 15, 17, 69, 72, 78, 83–85, 87–90, 93–95, 105–107, 109–112, 145, 146, 156, 180 Grozny, 95, 98, 100, 101, 105, 111, 168, 184, 185, 189, 195 H Hegemony, 11, 16, 146, 177 Humanitarian aid, 13, 18, 63–65, 69, 76, 109, 111, 129, 131, 134, 155, 165, 169, 184, 185

L Lavrov, Sergei, 72, 94, 157 Luhansk, 2, 71, 77, 137, 153, 154, 156, 159, 163, 165, 182, 186 M Marshall Plan, ix, 5, 10–12, 34–43, 46, 54, 177 Minorities, ix, 15, 84, 111, 148, 156, 180, 191, 196 Minsk Protocol, 153–155 Molotov Plan, 39, 40, 54 N Nationalism, 55, 84, 90, 178, 191 NATO, 14, 15, 17, 53, 73, 78, 94, 111, 112, 137, 146, 147, 154, 156, 180, 182, 191, 192 Nazism, 34, 157, 177

 INDEX 

Non-interference, 19, 72, 74, 78, 126, 178–180 Nord-Ost, 92, 93 O Official Development Assistance (ODA), 66, 67 Oil, 3, 3n2, 41, 44, 51, 75, 77, 83, 91, 106, 134, 146, 183, 186, 193n5, 196 P Paris Declaration, 9, 67, 67n2 Peacekeeping, 13, 61–63, 88, 90, 145 Putin, Vladimir, x, 1–3, 13, 15, 17, 18, 22, 62, 71, 73, 75, 92–94, 102, 105, 106, 108, 126, 127, 130, 133, 134, 137, 145–148, 150–152, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166–168, 178–180, 178n4, 182, 183, 187–191 R Referendum, 149, 151–153 Refugees, 5, 11, 88, 167, 193 Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 13–15, 73, 76 RusAid, 68 Russian International Cooperation Agency (RICA), 65 Russophobia, 157 S Saakashvili, Mikheil, 93, 94, 107 Secession, 15, 73, 99, 101, 168, 189 Second World War (WWII), 5, 11, 12, 29–56, 66, 86, 157

201

South Ossetia, x, 17, 22, 23, 69, 72, 73, 76, 77, 83–112, 137, 146, 164, 166, 180, 181, 184–188, 190, 194 Sovereignty, 3, 5, 7, 14, 15, 17, 39, 72, 77, 106, 126, 146, 148, 150, 155, 168, 178–181, 186, 194 Soviet Union, vii, ix, 12, 13, 15, 22, 29, 29n1, 30, 34–37, 39–43, 46–52, 54, 55, 61, 65, 66, 71, 78, 84–87, 127, 145, 146, 153, 156, 177, 184 Special operation, 1, 15, 163, 166 Stalin, Joseph, 30–33, 35, 39, 43–46, 50, 54, 84 Syria, x, 5, 7, 44, 52, 67, 105, 112, 121–138, 169, 179, 181, 184–188, 195 T Tartus, 124 Traditional donor, 19, 63–65, 69, 73 U Ukraine, vii–x, 1–4, 1n1, 7, 15–17, 21–23, 30, 71, 89, 137, 138, 145–170, 178, 178n2 UNDP, 69, 71 United Nations (UN), ix, 1, 13, 21, 62, 63, 65, 68, 69, 77, 95, 98, 99, 130, 134, 155, 179, 184, 196 United States (US), vii, 3, 30, 33, 34, 62, 66, 93, 99, 105, 107, 121, 147, 155, 162, 163, 165, 177, 178n2, 179, 181, 192 V VKS, 128

202 

INDEX

W West, ix, 8, 12, 13, 15–17, 20, 22, 35, 39, 42, 43, 45, 62, 72, 73, 83, 91, 94, 99, 112, 123, 127, 131, 133, 145, 152, 154, 157, 162, 164, 165, 167, 178, 178n2, 178n3, 179, 182, 187, 189–194

Y Yanukovych, Victor, 150, 151, 153 Yeltsin, Boris, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 105, 191 Z Zaporozhie, viii Zelenskyy, Volodymyr, 155