Russian - Turkmen Encounters: The Caspian Frontier before the Great Game 9781350987876, 9781786732347

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S. Peter Poullada is a specialist on the history and cultures of the tribal peoples of Central Asia. He has travelled extensively throughout the former Soviet republics and western China, and lectures frequently on Central Asian carpets and textiles. He graduated in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University and completed graduate research in Central Asian History and Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. Claora E. Styron is a graduate of L’E´cole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris and the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley. She co-translated M.I. TuganBaranovsky’s The Russian Factory in the Nineteenth Century for the American Economic Association.

‘An excellent and important book that examines the understudied topic of Russian – Turkmen encounters in the Transcaspian frontier region between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries and their changing nature in the context of Russian political alignments and realignments in the Caspian and Central Asian regions, commercial relations, intra-tribal relations and conflicts (for example, the role of the Kalmyks and Kazakhs), migration patterns, and European and Russian perceptions of the Turkmen. This book furthers our understanding of the historiography, in particular the travel diaries of Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii, and makes a valuable contribution to the field of Russian, Central Asian and Caspian studies as well as Russian – Turkmen relations.’ Jo-Ann Gross, Professor of Middle Eastern and Central Asian History, The College of New Jersey ‘This book offers a very unique and insightful perspective on the history of Russia’s encounters with the peoples of Central Asia. Introduced by a very thoughtful background piece by Peter Poullada, the core of the book consists of translations of two rare texts reflecting Russian impressions of diverse Central Asian peoples in the mid-eighteenth century. . . Given the scarcity of English-language primary source materials on Central Asia generally, and particularly for the geography and time period treated in the journals, this book will be a valuable resource for scholars and students alike. It will be especially useful for scholars who work in comparative borderlands and/or imperial history who want to examine imperial counters in the eighteenth century but who do not have immediate access to Russian-language (or Central Asian-language) materials.’ Robert Crews, Associate Professor of History, Stanford University

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

The Caspian Frontier before the Great Game

S. PETER POULLADA With Translations by CLAORA E. STYRON

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published by I.B. Tauris in Great Britain 2018 Paperback edition published by Bloomsbury Academic 2020 Copyright © S. Peter Poullada, 2018 Copyright translation © Claora E. Styron, 2018 S. Peter Poullada has asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. x-xi constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this books is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7845-3701-2 PB: 978-0-7556-0274-2 ePDF: 978-1-7867-3234-7 eBook: 978-1-7867-2234-8 International Library of Central Asian Studies 9 Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

CONTENTS

List of Maps and Illustrations Acknowledgements Note on Transliteration Preface

viii x xii xvii

Part I Russian – Turkmen Frontier Encounters: 1558– 1745 1. The Khan’s Letter

3

2. Astrakhan, the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Long-Distance Caravan Trade

7

3. Turkmen, Uzbeks and Russians

27

4. The Duel for Mangyshlak between Turkmen, Kalmyks and Kazakhs The Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Kalmyks The Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Kazakhs

45 45 50

5. Russian– Turkmen Relations in the Era of Peter the Great Nadir Shah Afshar in Central Asia

55 63

Conclusion

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Part II The Journals of Captain Tebelev (1741) and Captain Kopytovskii (1745) Preface to the English Translation by Claora E. Styron Introduction by V. Razumovskaia, Translated by Claora E. Styron From the Journal of Captain G. Tebelev, 1741 12 June [1741] 14 June [1741] June [1741] 17 (June) [1741] 18 June [1741] 19 June [1741] 22 June [1741] 23 June [1741] 25 June [1741] 26 June [1741] 27 June [1741] 28 June [1741] From the Journal of Captain V. Kopytovskii, 1745 9 June [1745] 13 July [1745] [14 July 1745] 14 July [1745] 16 July [1745] 17 July [1745] 19 July [1745] 21 July [1745] 23 July [1745] 25 July [1745] 26 July [1745] 27 July [1745] 11 August [1745]

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73 79 85 85 86 88 91 92 93 96 96 97 99 100 100 103 103 103 108 108 119 121 123 128 129 130 131 132 134

CONTENTS

Appendix Notes Bibliography Index

135 139 167 175

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LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps Map 1 Central Asia: Trade Routes, Seventeenth– Eighteenth Centuries. Adapted from Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003), Map 34. Map 2 The Caspian Sea, 1755. Source: First Part of Asia, Being Turkey, Arabia, Persia, Most of India and Tartary. Performed by the Sieur D’Anville under the Patronage of the Duke of Orleans MDCCXXXV Revised and Improved by Mr. Bolton MDCCLV, Plates I and II.

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Plates Plate 1 A Turkmen. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1, Plate X, facing p. 298. Plate 2 A Russian merchant. Source: Pallas et al., Views of 18th Century Russia, pp. 78 – 9.

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Plate 3 A Kazakh on horseback. Source: Pallas et al., Views of 18th Century Russia, pp. 120– 1. Plate 4 A Kalmyk. Source: Pallas et al., Views of 18th Century Russia, pp. 42– 3. Plate 5 Kalmyks. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1, Plate IV, facing p. 117. Plate 6 Kalmyk encampment near Astrakhan. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1, Plate V, facing p. 116. Plate 7 Caspian camel. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 2, Plate XXIV, facing p. 352.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book began as a simple translation project, which formed part of a wider research effort into the history of the Turkmen. I would like to thank the tireless work of Claora Styron for all her assistance and translation efforts over the years. She helped to open up for me the wonders not just of Barthold’s Sochineniia, but of so many other Russian sources. For my inspiration and early training in Middle Eastern and Central Asian tribal history, I have to express my deepest appreciation to my intellectual murshid, the late Martin Dickson of Princeton University. I was fortunate enough to take his seminar in the early 1970s that was team taught with the great historian of Central Asia, Joseph Fletcher. I also want to thank those members of Dickson’s intellectual ‘silsila’ whose support, advice and writings have contributed to my development over the years: Robert McChesney, Jo-Ann Gross and John Woods. My interest in combining anthropology and history was influenced by mentors and scholars whose works I deeply respect: Louis Dupree, Richard Tapper and Michael Khodarkovsky. My teacher at the University of California, Berkeley, John Masson Smith, inspired me to continue to pursue the study of all things connected to horses, pastures and nomads in Central Asia. I have

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also benefited greatly, although at a distance, from the studies of Yuri Bregel, a true pathbreaker as an historian of Central Asia, and from the generous counsel of two of his students at Indiana: William Wood and Ron Sela. Above all, I give special thanks to Devin Deweese for all of his guidance, insight and sharing of knowledge. I am grateful for the comments and constructive criticism provided by the anonymous readers of this project, to my skilful editors at I.B.Tauris, Thomas Stottor, Philip Parr and Sara Magness, and to Iradj Bagherzade for taking a chance on an unproven research project. Last, but not least, I want to thank my parents, Leon and Leila Dean Jackson Poullada, who encouraged me at all times in my passion for Central Asia, its peoples and its history; and my companion in life, Nancy, whose constant support has kept me working on this project over the course of many years, and who has joined me on so many travels and adventures from Kashgar to Istanbul.

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

For transcription of Russian the Library of Congress system has been used. For Middle Eastern and Central Asian languages, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Uzbek and Turkmen, I have followed a simplified form of the Library of Congress system used by IJMES, the International Journal of Middle East Studies, modified by the examples of The Cambridge History of Inner Asia (2009) and Yuri Bregel’s translation of Firdaws al-Iqbal (Brill, 1999). These leave out the diacritical marks and render the Persian izafat as – i. It should be noted that transliteration of Central Asian names and terms is a complicated process due to the number of languages involved and the variety of writing systems used by publications covering the region. For example, Turkmen and Uzbek have been written in three different scripts in the twentieth century. I have tried to avoid using the usual transliteration of Russian versions of names and terms that were originally from Persian or Central Asian languages. Terms that commonly appear in English like khan, beg, amir, etc., are left with their usual spellings. A similar approach has been taken with place names like Bukhara, Astrakhan, Samarqand, Isfahan, etc. I have chosen to use the form Khorezm for the region of

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Khiva rather than the more Arabicized version of Khwarazm, in keeping with Bregel’s suggestions that this was how the name was actually represented in Central Asia in the period under discussion.

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Map 1 Central Asia: Trade Routes, Seventeenth–Eighteenth Centuries. Adapted from Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2003), Map 34.

PREFACE

On 12 June 1741 a Russian ship arrived at the Karagan Landing on the Mangyshlak Peninsula, a desolate promontory jutting into the Caspian Sea in what is now western Kazakhstan. Sent from Astrakhan in response to a plea for assistance from the Khan of the Kalmyks, its captain had orders to contact the elders of the Turkmen tribes of Mangyshlak.1 The expedition’s leader recorded the events that followed: [We] dropped anchor about one verst from the shore [. . .] About 7 pm, five Turkmen came up to the shore on horseback and asked for a boat in which four of them came out to the ship. They said they were mergen, that is, hunters, and that they’d come to hunt wild animals. So begins the official journal of the expedition, written by Captain Tebelev and preserved in the ‘Turkmenskie Dela’ (Turkmen File) of the Russian State Archives, along with a second journal, written by Captain Kopytovskii, which records a subsequent expedition to the Turkmen of the Caspian coast in 1745.2 Both of these journals, which combine the dual functions of personal diary and official mission report, were edited and published with a brief

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commentary by the Soviet scholar V. Razumovskaia in the journal Krasnyi Arkhiv in 1939 under the title ‘Iz istorii snosheniia Rossi s turkmenami v XVIII vekov’ (On the history of Russian– Turkmen relations in the eighteenth century).3 The complete text of this article, including Razumovskaia’s introduction and commentary, is presented here for the first time in English translation. While the two journals have been examined by several scholars of Central Asian history over the past 50 years, including Yuri Bregel, Michael Khodarkovsky and Mehmet Saray, arguably they have not received the attention they deserve.4 By making available to a non-Russian-reading audience these scarce, under-appreciated and under-utilized primary sources, this book contributes to an understanding of the ‘frontier encounter’ between the Russian imperial project and the tribal peoples of Central Asia.5 More generally, the journals also serve as excellent examples of mid-eighteenth-century imperial discourse. It is hoped that this study, in a modest way, will assist scholars’ current efforts to reinterpret Russian imperial history and provide a corrective to the Soviet approach to the subject.

The Journals: Narrative Themes and Authorship The journals of Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii are unscripted narratives written in a colloquial style. In their entire and unedited form, they would have constituted official reports from two expedition leaders to the local tsarist authorities in Astrakhan, the Russian imperial regional capital. The two journals follow a similar narrative pattern: 1. The expedition arrives at the Karagan Landing and meets tribesmen on the shore. 2. The Russians seek to make contact with the appropriate tribal elders (starshin in Russian; aq saqals, ‘white beards’, in Turki) in order to deliver a letter from the authorities in Astrakhan.

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3. They meet with various elders, seeking out individuals who might have the authority to negotiate and send a petition for a pledge of loyalty and submission. 4. They try to negotiate the barter or sale of grain, but have difficulty agreeing on the terms of trade and struggle to make the elders understand the proper protocol for sending the petition of submission. 5. They try to gather information on the clan-tribal, social and political organization of the local inhabitants, as well as what is occurring in Khiva and its conquest by Nadir Shah Afshar. 6. In the second journal, they discuss ransom terms for freeing captured Russians who face being sold into slavery to the Uzbeks. 7. They try to establish whether they may build a fort in order to regularize trade and submission. This summary gives a somewhat false impression of coherence to what was, in reality, a chaotic series of encounters. For instance, the missions suffered numerous problems with communication, as every conversation between the Russians and the tribal elders had to be filtered through several translators or interpreters. We can only assume that the authors of the journals accurately recorded what the Turkmen were saying. (See Claora E. Styron’s comments on this issue in Part II of this book.) Both captains also struggled to determine who, if anyone, could speak with authority on behalf of the Turkmen tribesmen, and other confusions and misunderstandings abounded. Nevertheless, all of this was probably typical of Russian encounters with the ‘native peoples’ of Central Asia, for reasons we explore below. Stripped down to their essence, what may we take from these two journals? Above all, they illustrate imperial Russia’s concern with three issues that dominated its interactions with the people of Central Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the oath of allegiance; the terms of trade; and the freeing of Russian

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slaves (which became a much more prominent issue in the nineteenth century). Clearly, for both Tebelev and Kopytovskii, the most important issue in the 1740s was convincing the local Turkmen elders to acknowledge their subject status – a process that was encapsulated in the institution of the shert, the oath of allegiance. This ‘act of submission’ – a long-standing practice dating back to the Mongol domination of Eastern Europe and Inner Asia – has been examined in some detail by Michael Khodarkovsky in his seminal studies of Russia’s relations with the Kalmyks and Kazakhs, in particular Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500– 1800. In this book, Khodarkovsky highlights the radically different perspectives taken by the two sides – Russians and tribal nomads – in many of the negotiations and arrangements surrounding the pledging of the shert.6 In essence, Khodarkovsky argues, the tribal leaders interpreted what the Russians perceived as expressions of submission as treaties between equals, expedient oaths of allegiance or simply temporary petitions for Russian protection against a common enemy. The journals certainly give the impression that the Turkmen elders who encountered Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii were mainly interested in expedient and temporary relief from a short-term problem. In fact, one might even surmise that the elders and their tribesmen viewed Tebelev’s and Kopytovskii’s insistence on the delivery of a petition to the Russian authorities as just another negotiating tactic in their hard bargaining over the price of grain. This raises the second issue that dominates the narrative of the journals: namely, negotiating fair but advantageous terms of trade. Here we descend into the gritty world of commercial transactions which constituted the daily reality of relations across the steppe frontier. Surprisingly, the journals reveal very little appreciation of commercial precedent on either side. Thus, neither of the Russian captains seems to take into account or seeks to exploit the previous 250 years of trading between the merchants of Astrakhan and the

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tribes of the Caspian coast. As Part I of this study will show, there were long and well-established precedents for negotiating terms of trade, and related gift-giving. Yet both captains struggled to communicate and resolve what should have been a simple commercial exchange, failing to capitalize on the original motivation for the expedition, which was to provide famine relief and thereby pull the Turkmen tribesmen into the political orbit of imperial Russia.7 While reading the journals, we need to bear in mind that both of the issues that played central roles in the frontier encounters – the pledging of submission/allegiance and the negotiation of terms of trade – were strongly influenced by Russia’s prior experience in dealing with the tribes of Central Asia, in particular the Kalmyks and Kazakhs. As Khodarkovsky has stated, ‘securing a “pledge of loyalty” [. . .] became the cornerstone of Moscow’s policies toward the peoples it confronted on its southern and eastern frontiers’.8 However, the difficulties of imposing these policies on the tribesmen of Central Asia are very much in evidence in the journals. The essence of the problem for Tebelev and Kopytovskii was to find an appropriate counterparty – a leader who had the authority to speak and act on behalf of all the tribesmen and then cut a deal. Once again, Khodarkovsky has been at the forefront of research into this subject, especially in the context of Russia’s relations with the Kalmyks and Kazakhs. Both of these tribal formations exhibited dynastic structures of central authority, which, while limited, were much more hierarchical than those which Tebelev and Kopytovskii found among the Mangyshlak Turkmen. With respect to the approach taken by the two Russian captains (which was typical of Russia’s military expeditions at the time), Khodarkovsky points out, ‘one of the most distinct features of the steppe societies was the weakness of central authority [. . . yet] Moscow chose to rely on policies [. . .] buttressing the authority of a single ruler capable of curbing his people’s raids and acting as a reliable military ally’.9 Among the Turkmen, and

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especially those inhabiting the Caspian coast, there was no organized hierarchy of leadership that could mobilize support or forge agreements. Even at the clan level, which appears to be the largest unit of socio-political organization in the journals, the elders seem to be acclaimed but not necessarily followed by their kinsmen, and they certainly enjoy no authority over tribesmen from other clans. From a modern anthropological perspective, this feature of Turkmen society, which was highly distinctive and remarked upon by observers from the sixteenth century to the late nineteenth, may be described as ‘acephalous’, given the general absence of a high-level, formal framework for decision-making. Key decisions regarding war, peace or grazing rights were made by consensus among the elders, who operated as leaders of individual encampment units or at the kin-related clan level of social organization. These clans tended to comprise widely scattered encampment bands with strong ties of intermarriage and other connections through membership of raiding parties.10 Given this anarchic social and political context, and the fact that Russian imperial policy favoured seeking out and negotiating with khans – the highest-level tribal leaders – it should come as no surprise that both Tebelev and Kopytovskii suffered considerable frustration and failure in their dealings with the Turkmen. Finally, the third issue that raises its head during the narratives – the captains’ attempts to free Russians enslaved by the Turkmen – appears almost as an afterthought. Although this was not yet a major issue in the 1740s, by the nineteenth century the enslavement of Orthodox Christians by the ‘native peoples’ had become an important casus belli for the Russian Empire in its interactions with the steppe tribes and the Uzbek-ruled polities of Central Asia.11 As stated above, the journals themselves, or facsimiles of them, found their way into the Russian State Archives, where the Soviet scholar V. Razumovskaia studied them during her research for the article she published in 1939. In this period, relations between the

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metropole and the provinces, in this case the semi-autonomous ‘Socialist Republics’ and the Muslim nationalities who resided in them, was an important topic in the political and cultural policies that were designed to encourage and promulgate the creation of ‘national’ identities. Between 1932 and 1939, the Academy of Sciences recruited a number of leading scholars of ‘Oriental Studies’ to compile volumes of primary sources that illustrated the history of the native peoples of the Soviet Union, and especially provided evidence of their relations with Russia in centuries past. It is possible that Razumovskaia’s article, which appeared in Krasnyi Arkhiv, the official journal of the NKVD (the Soviet domestic Secret Police), formed part of this effort.12 Unfortunately, we lack any information about the authors of the journals besides their names and ranks, and the fact that the voevoda (military governor) of Astrakhan sent them on their missions. Neither the texts themselves nor Razumovskaia’s article provides any insight into their backgrounds or why they were chosen to lead the expeditions.13 Furthermore, since neither I nor the translator had access to the Russian State Archives or the original documents, it should be stated that the English versions of the journals that appear in Part II are simply translations from the Krasnyi Arkhiv text. Notwithstanding this, and the possible shortcomings of Razumovskaia’s article, the accounts that were published in 1939 are fascinating narratives that effectively illustrate all the major issues that characterized Russia’s frontier encounters with the Turkmen.

The Value of the Journals The two journals are significant for students of Central Asian history and the Russian frontier because of the paucity of primary sources with information on the Turkmen, especially in comparison with the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs, and because they pre-date by some 70 years better-known accounts of the

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Turkmen by Russian explorers (and spies). As Razumovskaia comments in her introduction: ‘there are very few documents illustrating Turkmen relations before the nineteenth century with Tsarist Russia. There are only twelve files [dela] in GAFKE/ RGADA on Turkmenia’s relations with Russia in the eighteenth century from which these published selections come.’14 In order to appreciate the true value of these journals, we need to understand what makes them unusual, if not unique. Russia’s systematic exploration of the Caspian Sea, the mapping of the coastline and the collection of data about the tribal peoples who lived along its shores, began in the early eighteenth century, under the aegis of Peter the Great. As a result, there are very few pre-1700 sources, even in Russian. Scholars without access to the archives must rely on a limited number of compilations of original documents prepared in the Soviet period under the auspices of the various Academies of Science (each of which is known in Russian as the Nauk) and in particular the Institutes of Oriental Studies (Vostokovedeniyya). These compilations include archival material, travel journals and diplomatic reports from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It should be noted that several recent studies of European accounts of expeditions to Central Asia – and specifically of Russian– Turkmen relations – have made little use of these resources, preferring to focus on the much richer nineteenth-century sources or to take what the historian of Central Asia Nile Green terms a ‘culturalist approach’ to the travel journals.15 Three anthologies of primary documents have served as the principal sources for Part I of this study: Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi, abbreviated as MIUTT, published in Leningrad in 1932;16 Materialy po istorii Turkmen i Turkmenii, abbreviated as MITT, published in two volumes in Moscow and Leningrad in 1938 and 1939, which consists mostly of extracts selected by A.A. Romaskeyevich, A. Iakubovskii and other famous ‘Orientalist’ academics from Arabic and Persian

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chronicles of the eighth to the nineteenth century;17 and an excellent anthology compiled by two Turkmen academics, M. Annanepesov and Kh. Agaev, Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v 18– 19 vv., abbreviated as RTO, published under the auspices of the Turkmen Nauk in Ashkhabad in 1963.18 RTO includes 398 documents drawn from the Russian State Archives, which also house the two journals that are presented in Part II of this book. It is a rich and under-utilized source, and merits more detailed study and translation by scholars of Central Asia.19 All three of these anthologies indicate that the first encounters between Russian merchants and diplomats and the Turkmen occurred on the shores of the Caspian Sea as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. Prior to the reign of Peter the Great, Russian descriptions of such meetings appear only in official accounts of diplomatic missions or merchant caravans (although the two were often one and the same) sent from Astrakhan to the rulers of Uzbek Bukhara or Safavid Persia. However, these sixteenth- and seventeenth-century documents generally contain only cursory references to the Turkmen tribal groups. Unsurprisingly, they focus primarily on the political and commercial machinations at the Uzbek and Persian courts and have little interest in random encounters with tribal groups on the steppe.20 Moreover, when the Turkmen are mentioned, they are almost always portrayed in a negative light – for instance, as pillagers of caravans when diplomatic envoys appeal to the Uzbek or Persian authorities for protection from or redress for attacks. Thus, no attempt is made to provide an accurate description of the inhabitants of the Caspian coast. The Russians display little curiosity or desire to know anything about them. Certainly, there is no attempt to explain the Turkmen’s hostility to – or analyse the nature of their relationship with – their nominal overlords, the Uzbek rulers of Khorezm. Therefore, much of our information about the Turkmen from the period prior to the eighteenth century comes from local

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Persian or Chagatay/Old Uzbek sources written between the midseventeenth and early nineteenth centuries. These accounts are mainly concerned with dynastic political developments within the regions of Khiva, Bukhara and Persia, although they do occasionally mention incidents on the steppe borderlands. Unfortunately for this study, however, they provide very few details on the intermittent encounters between local tribal groups and Russian merchants. In so far as looking for precursors to the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii, there is no doubt that the expansion of the Russian Empire during the reign of Peter the Great led to a significant increase in the number of direct encounters between Russians and the Turkmen. In the early eighteenth century, for the first time in the archival sources, we begin to hear the voices of the Turkmen elders themselves, albeit in the edited and translated form that is also found in the captains’ journals. The earliest accounts to quote the Turkmen directly appear in RTO, in documents relating to the famous expeditions of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii (1715 –18). Sent by Peter the Great to establish forts and trading posts along the eastern coastline of the Caspian Sea, these expeditions ended disastrously after Bekovich-Cherkasskii launched a military campaign with the intention of persuading the Uzbek ruler of Khorezm to accept subjugation to Russia. The reports of subsequent commissions of inquiry into the fate of the Prince and his troops contain fascinating interviews with the Turkmen starshin, the tribal elders from Mangyshlak. These reports, which deserve their own translation and study, are the earliest and most complete records of direct exchanges between the Russian authorities and the Turkmen leaders who lived beyond the frontier. Hence, they provide the first real opportunity to hear the elders’ voices (assuming, of course, that the transcripts are accurate). As such, in parallel with the accounts of Tebelev and Kopytovskii, they presage 150 years of communication, and miscommunication, between the two parties that culminated in

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Russia’s invasion of Transcaspia and the rest of Central Asia in the second half of the nineteenth century. It seems that the failure of Bekovich-Cherkasskii’s expeditions and the Russians’ consequent mistrust of the tribes of Central Asia resulted in a 30-year hiatus in official contact between the imperial authorities and the Turkmen elders. It was only in the 1740s, amid major political upheavals across the Central Asian steppe (described in detail in Part I of this study), that the Kalmyk Khan requested help from Moscow. In response, the Russian Tsar dispatched two expeditions with orders to contact the tribal leaders of Mangyshlak, provide them with grain, establish barter agreements and collect political and scientific information about the character and relationships of the Caspian Turkmen. The journals of Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii, written in 1741 and 1745, respectively, are the official records of these expeditions. Taken together, they represent one of the most complete and informative accounts of Russia’s dealings with the Turkmen prior to the nineteenth century. While the journals deserve detailed analysis because of the rich information they contain on the Turkmen, they also provide important insights into the mid-eighteenth-century Russian imperial world view. Moreover, they aid our understanding of the discourse of the Russian imperial frontier at that time. A number of scholars of Russian and Central Asian history, above all Michael Khodarkovsky, have explored these topics in recent years. I hope that this book will serve as a valuable contribution to some of the research areas delineated by Khodarkovsky and Yuri Slezkine, and particularly by Daniel Brower and Edward Lazzerini in their edited volume Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700– 1917.21 All of these scholars call for a revisionist approach to Russian imperial and colonial history, and the adoption of new perspectives and methods of enquiry with respect to the evolution of imperial rule. As part of this effort, Brower and Lazzerini urge ‘a close reading of the documents left by the colonizers, for their records remain the

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principal account of inter-ethnic relations under imperial rule’.22 Such ‘close reading’ of the two captains’ journals allows us to follow their earnest, but ultimately frustrated, attempts to impose some sort of order on chaotic negotiations with the tribal elders and enforce the shert. While we may sympathize with these two exasperated officers, we should also recognize that their encounters with the Turkmen were inherently unequal. As Brower and Lazzerini point out, ‘those who held the instruments of political power also controlled the terms in which communication took place [. . . investigating] these forms of imperial domination greatly enlarges the scope of the topics relevant to imperial history’.23 The revisionist scholars of Russian history have all been influenced by broader historical interest in the study of premodern borderlands and particularly in the discourses of the European colonial empires that conditioned their interactions in those regions. For instance, Brower and Lazzerini draw on the work of David Spurr when arguing that primary texts such as the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii illustrate the ‘rhetoric of empire’. In particular, they highlight the literary devices that are used in these texts to proclaim the legitimacy of imperial domination.24 This is not the place for a detailed examination of the abundant literature on the role of imperial discourse in European colonialism, but it is worth pointing to a few examples from the corpus of North America history as these provide a useful comparative perspective for the study of Russia’s Central Asian steppe frontier. In the 1970s, Francis Jennings’s The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest explored how ideas of conquest and ethnic supremacy played a major role in the North American colonial experience.25 More recently, Anthony Pagden, in Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, and Olive Patricia Dickason, in The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas, have deepened our appreciation of how the ‘rhetoric of empire’

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conditioned the world views of Europeans and influenced their encounters with native peoples in frontier regions.26 Finally, Russian history scholars may find two studies of the British and Dutch experience in North America particularly rewarding, namely Dean Snow, C.T. Gehring and W. Starna’s In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives about a Native People and Donna Merwick’s, The Shame and the Sorrow: Dutch – Amerindian Encounters in New Netherland.27 All of these studies assist in our evaluation of the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii by providing a comparative perspective and by demonstrating the value of undertaking a close reading of primary sources. The colonial American experience certainly provides numerous accounts of frontier encounters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many of which touch upon themes we also find in the Russian narratives that are presented here: trade agreements, unequal political negotiations, submission, ethnic identity and, above all, the interactions between agents of empire and the cultures, societies and political structures of native peoples. In order for the reader to grasp the full value and context of the captains’ journals, Part I of this book comprises five chapters of detailed historical background, beginning with Russia’s first contact with the Mangyshlak Turkmen. The intention is to challenge the narrow, Russo-centric view of many studies of Central Asia by emphasizing the important role played by myriad non-Russian participants in the events described in the journals. Thus, after explaining the importance of the city of Astrakhan and its merchants in the evolution of relations between the Turkmen and the Russians, we discuss the Turkmen’s relations with the Uzbeks, the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs, tribally organized ethnic groups that played crucial roles in the interactions between the Russians and the Turkmen. Finally, we use Persian and Chagatay sources from both Bukhara and Khiva, as well as Persian chronicles, to explore the campaigns of Nadir Shah Afshar in

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RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

Central Asia in the 1740s. These campaigns and their after-effects led directly to the expeditions of Tebelev and Kopytovskii. Part II begins with a preface by the translator of the captains’ journals, Claora E. Styron, followed by V. Razumovskaia’s original introduction to her 1939 article, and finally the English translations of the two journals themselves.

xxx

Map 2 The Caspian Sea, 1755. Source: First Part of Asia, Being Turkey, Arabia, Persia, Most of India and Tartary. Performed by the Sieur D’Anville under the Patronage of the Duke of Orleans MDCCXXXV Revised and Improved by Mr. Bolton MDCCLV, Plates I and II.

PART I RUSSIAN—TURKMEN FRONTIER ENCOUNTERS: 1558—1745

Herkes Ozige Sultandir, Khan u Sultan gerekmes. Every man is his own Sultan, Khans and Sultans are not needed. Makhtumquli Khan Goklen (1732– 90), National Poet of Turkmenistan The elders replied, [A]s for our people, we’ll never quieten them down as there is neither khan nor sultan over us and all the people are free. From the journal of Captain G. Tebelev (1741)

CHAPTER 1 THE KHAN'S LETTER

In February 1741, Donduk Omba Khan, grandson of Ayuki Khan and ruler of the Kalmyk ulus (domain or realm), which extended across the northern plains of the Caspian steppe from the Volga River to the Emba River, wrote a letter to the Russian cabinet minister Count Andrei Osterman.1 In his message, the Khan described a series of events that signalled a transformation of the political alignments in the Caspian and Central Asian regions. In particular, he expressed his concern about the fate of a large Turkmen tribal grouping that previously had fled their yurts (pasturelands) along the Caspian coast and found refuge along the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus River) in the regions of Khorezm and Bukhara. Now, however, these Turkmen were threatened by the military campaigns of Nadir Shah Afshar in Central Asia. In his letter, Donduk Omba wrote: the Turkmen, who formerly [byvshie] had obligations to my father and grandfather and were subordinate [ poddanstvo] to them, quarrelled among themselves and fell apart, and at that time the Kirghiz-Kazkah [Kazakhs] attacked them and ravaged many of them, and those who remained were no longer able to live in that place and went away to Khiva

3

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

[Khorezm]. And now I have received from my former people in Khiva the news that last autumn [1740] at the time of the capture of Bukhara and Khiva by the Persian Khan Tahmasp [Nadir Shah Afshar], the former Turkmen came from Badakhshan and Bukhara, all of them, and having joined together with our Turkmen and wanting to live in their old locales and join us, they crossed into Mangyshlak [. . .] The above-mentioned people of mine [the Turkmen] who were formerly in Khiva said that the Persians captured Bukhara in August [1740] and conquered Khiva on September 4th and they left Khiva that same September on the 10th, and they heard from the Turkmen that those from the Balkhans [Bukhara?] and from Badakhshan had come together and migrated away in 300,000 kibitkas [nomads’ tents] and had already arrived at the front [western promontory?] of the Mangyshlak region. And they, my Turkmen people, have set up their tents with them in the area of Khashat.2 Donduk Omba’s primary motivation for writing the letter was not simply to inform Count Osterman of these dramatic events, but to make a highly significant request: Then they ordered my people [Turkmen?] to greet me and then to announce to me that when they had chosen a good place to live, they would send an eminent notable to me with notification, just as though I was their master, so I could petition on their behalf to His Imperial Majesty [Tsar Ivan VI] in order that four hundred to five hundred ships with flour [rye?] for sale to be sent to them. For they are not nomadic and are accustomed to grain and where no grain grows, they cannot live [emphasis added]. And it would be good for an ukaz [decree] to be sent to Astrakhan in order that merchants be sent to help them this spring at the opening of the ice [on the Caspian Sea].

4

THE KHAN 'S LETTER

Donduk Omba’s letter, preserved in the Turkmen File of the Russian State Archives and published in RTO, merits detailed study. It exemplifies many of the challenges scholars face when interpreting primary sources that deal with relations between the Russian State and the tribal, nomadic peoples of Inner Asia. One of the key issues that such a document raises, for example, is the question of the language in which it was originally written. Most likely, the chancery in Astrakhan translated the text into Russian from one of the Turkish lingua francas that were in use throughout Inner Asia at the time, with the result that an unknown number of Russifications and other modifications were probably introduced. In addition, terms such as ‘poddanstvo’ must be carefully analysed in the context of what we know about the relations between the Kalmyks, the Russians and the other tribal peoples of Inner and Central Asia in the eighteenth century.3 While all of these issues are worth pursuing further, they would distract from the primary purpose of this study. Donduk Omba’s letter serves here simply as an introduction to the larger topic of Russian relations with the Turkmen of Mangyshlak. Specifically, it is an excellent place to start our discussion of the historical background to the travel journals of Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii. For, later that summer, it was in direct response to Donduk Omba’s request for assistance that the Russian State dispatched the expedition that is so fascinatingly described in Tebelev’s journal. Furthermore, all of those who feature prominently in the journals – the various Mangyshlak Turkmen tribal groups, the Kazakhs, the Kalmyks, Nadir Shah and his Qizilbash (tribal supporters), and even the Uzbeks of Khorezm and Bukhara – are mentioned in his letter. The interactions of these parties, and, in particular, their relations with the Russians, form the basis for the chapters that follow.

5

CHAPTER 2 ASTRAKHAN, THE TURKMEN OF MANGYSHLAK AND THE LONG-DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

For over 200 years, from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth century, the principal point of contact between the expanding Russian Empire and the Turkmen tribal nomads lay in the Transcaspian region, along the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea, primarily on the promontories of Mangyshlak and Buzachi, but also extending as far south as the Abu’l Khan (Balkhan) Mountains.1 Intimately connected to these imperial borderlands was the important regional entrepoˆt and administrative centre of Astrakhan, known to the Muslim peoples of Inner Asia as Hajji Tarkhan.2 Located in the delta of the Volga River, approximately 75 kilometres from the Caspian Sea, Astrakhan was one of the most important urban centres of the ulus of Jochi, the thirteenthto-sixteenth-century Turko-Mongol realm commonly known in both Russia and the West as the ‘Golden Horde’.3 In the centuries following the disintegration of the Mongol Empire in the mid-fourteenth century, Astrakhan served as Europe’s window on to the Inner Asian world and, conversely, as

7

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

the principal terminus for the long-distance trade routes that crossed the steppes and brought goods from India, China and Central Asia to Eastern Europe. It was the conquest of Astrakhan by Muscovy in 1556 that transformed Russia into a Eurasian power and brought it into intimate political contact with the tribal peoples of the steppes as well as the oases and urban states of Muslim Central Asia. With the establishment of Muscovite rule in Astrakhan, the Russians also forged direct commercial relations with the merchants and steppe-dwelling intermediaries who played a major role in the long-distance caravan trade that linked the Volga Delta with Urgench and Khiva in Khorezm, Bukhara and the ancient trading communities of India and China.4 Soon after the Russian conquest, Astrakhan boasted numerous specialized hostels and caravanserais (known in the Russian sources as gostinyi dvor), which were dedicated to serving the Eurasian merchant communities and helped to make the city a truly cosmopolitan metropolis.5 For the next 200 years, Astrakhan served as the principal Russian frontier outpost, not just for merchants, but for explorers, diplomatic envoys and military expeditions to the khanates of Central Asia and Safavid Persia. Moreover, as the main terminus of highly important north – south caravan routes from India through Bukhara and the region of Khorezm, the city played a central role in the development of Russian commercial interactions with the steppe peoples of Inner Asia. Many of the latter, such as the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, acted as both useful intermediaries and fearsome pillagers of the caravans. Russia’s political relations with the neighbouring tribal steppe powers were also conducted from Astrakhan, at least until the second half of the eighteenth century, when Orenburg began to take a more prominent role in the rapidly developing Russian Empire. Over the course of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Astrakhan’s merchants and administrators dealt with a succession of tribal nomadic powers: first the Noghays of the

8

THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

Manghit ulus; then the Kalmyks and Kazakhs; and finally their nomadic neighbours to the south, the Turkmen of Mangyshlak. However, in contrast to the Noghays and the Kalmyks, the Turkmen never posed a direct, military threat to the imperial outpost. Indeed, the relationship between Russia and the Turkmen was almost exclusively commercial. Even later, after the rise of Orenburg (founded in 1735 but in its present location since 1744), Astrakhan remained an administrative centre for the Caspian region, as well as the principal entrepoˆt for trading networks that extended to Persia, Central Asia and India.6 Thus, well into the nineteenth century, Astrakhan’s merchants and government officials continued to have extensive and regular dealings with the native peoples of the steppes, including the Mangyshlak Turkmen. The city’s role as the pre-eminent Russian window to the East from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth century is evident in the two journals that appear in Part II of this book. Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii are representatives of the Tsar, and their missions reflect the continuation of official Russian policy towards the Turkmen and other native peoples that was established in the period of imperial expansion during the reign of Peter the Great. Their journals also reveal Astrakhan’s long-standing commercial ties to both Central Asia and the Turkmen tribes of Mangyshlak. Before analysing the dramatic events that prompted Donduk Omba Khan’s letter and the subsequent missions of Tebelev and Kopytovskii in greater detail, it is worth reviewing the earlier history of Astrakhan’s relations with the Turkmen. In addition to the Turkmen, the other groups mentioned in both the Khan’s letter and the captains’ journals – the Uzbeks, Kalmyks, Kazakhs and Persians, all of whom played vital roles in the frontier encounters described in the journals – need to be examined in the context of their relations with the expanding Russian Empire. Accordingly, we will first outline Astrakhan’s relations with the Turkmen from 1556 to 1740, then discuss the complex, tripartite

9

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

dynamic that developed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries among the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, the Uzbeks of Khorezm and the Russians of Astrakhan. Next, we offer a brief appraisal of relations among the Turkmen, Kalmyks and Kazakhs before turning finally to the collapse of Safavid rule in Persia, Nadir Afshar’s rise to power and his military campaigns into Central Asia in the 1730s and 1740s. The fact that the military campaigns of the self-proclaimed ‘Nadir Shah’ – originally an Afshar Turkmen from northern Khurasan – could trigger a petition from the Kalmyks to a senior Russian official, which in turn led to the dispatch of two official missions, vividly demonstrates the interconnectedness of political affairs in mideighteenth-century Central Asia. First, though, if we are to appreciate all of the linkages among the parties listed above, we must go back to the mid-sixteenth century, wherein lie the origins of the complex interactions among the Russians, the Turkmen, the other steppe peoples and various other regional powers. Historical accounts of Russian – Turkmen relations tend to begin with a discussion of Peter the Great’s policies towards the East and especially his sponsorship of several scientific explorations of the Caspian Sea and related military expeditions into Transcaspia and Khorezm.7 Specifically, the disastrous military campaign of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii in 1716– 17 often serves as the opening chapter in studies of the relations between Russia and the Turkmen. Without minimizing the importance of these events and their influence on later Russian policies towards Central Asia, we feel that an examination of earlier contacts between Russia and the Mangyshlak Turkmen is not only useful but essential. A strong case can be made that the genesis of the Russian frontier relationship with the Turkmen dates back to Tsar Ivan IV’s mid-sixteenth-century conquest of Astrakhan. Russia’s first contacts with the Turkmen of Mangyshlak – and with their regional overlords, the Uzbeks of the khanate of

10

THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

Khiva – appear to have resulted from the commercial operations of the long-distance caravan trade, whose terminus was in Astrakhan. There is little documentary evidence that Turkmen acted as intermediaries in this trade or that Russia had any contact with them prior to Ivan IV’s conquest of Astrakhan in 1556. Moreover, we may only speculate about the extent of contact between the merchants of Astrakhan and the nomads of the Transcaspian region prior to that date. Unfortunately, accounts of the journey between Khorezm and Astrakhan in the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth, such as those of Ibn Battuta and Ibn Arabshah, do not provide any evidence of contact with the Turkmen. This may have been because the route they followed was the traditional one that skirted to the east of the Mangyshlak and Buzachi peninsulas. 8 Notwithstanding the lack of documentary evidence, there is little doubt that by the mid-sixteenth century Astrakhan had well-established connections with a network of merchant communities across Eurasia along the east– west and north – south trade routes that linked Europe, China and India. It is less clear when the city’s merchants began to use the sea route across the Caspian and on to landings on the Mangyshlak Peninsula, where the Turkmen would have acted as intermediaries.9 Perhaps the extension of Russian power to the Volga Delta facilitated the opening up of this sea route. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about sea-borne trade on the Caspian, despite evidence in the following centuries of extensive maritime trade with Persia and even tales of pirates attacking the lucrative silk trade. Certainly, though, the direct silk trade between Muscovy and Safavid Persia began after the conquest of Astrakhan.10 As mentioned above, Astrakhan’s pivotal role in these sixteenth- and seventeenth-century trading activities is testified by the presence of gostinyi dvor in the city. The authorities assigned these hostels to members of several important Eurasian

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RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

merchant communities, including the Bukharans and the Khorezmians, who were collectively known as teziki (Tajiks). There were also Persians from the silk-producing Caspian province of Gilan, several different groups of Indian merchants and later, in the eighteenth century, Afghans, who specialized in long-distance horse trading, perhaps the most lucrative caravan trade of all.11 Interestingly, the Armenians’ hostel was located in a prime position within the city walls, perhaps because they were Christians, or because they enjoyed a monopoly in the prestigious silk trade with Persia in the early seventeenth century. The gostinyi dvor were used as commercial depots and as residences for the official diplomatic envoys, who were usually active traders as well as ambassadors, and often spies. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the hostels also served the Russian State by administering taxation and controlling the various merchant communities.12 There has been little research into the extent to which Turkmen formed part of Astrakhan’s registered merchant community or if they were allocated one of the city’s gostinyi dvor in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If they visited the city in this period, most likely they participated in its commercial life as guests of other Central Asian merchant communities. By the reign of Peter the Great, there is evidence that Turkmen elders – referred to in Russian as starshin – were important members of Uzbek missions from the khans of Khiva that presented petitions to the voevoda of Astrakhan, and in 1741 Tebelev suggests that they were regular visitors to the city.13 However, two critical questions remain regarding the commercial relations between Astrakhan and the Turkmen before the eighteenth century. First, prior to the Russian conquest of 1556, to what extent did the merchants of Astrakhan use the sea route across the Caspian, which would have meant crossing the Turkmen-controlled Mangyshlak Peninsula? Second, was there a permanent Turkmen presence in Astrakhan prior to the reign of Peter the Great? In other words, from the mid-sixteenth

12

THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

century to the end of the seventeenth, was there direct and continuous commercial cooperation between the Turkmen and Russian merchants? To answer the first of these questions, we need to examine the trade routes between Astrakhan and Central Asia in greater detail. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the merchant caravans between Astrakhan and Bukhara had the option of using either an overland or a maritime route. The overland route headed northeast from Astrakhan, around the northern coast of the Caspian Sea and across the Yaik (Ural) and Emba rivers, then turned south across the desert to the northernmost cities of Khorezm, passing the Aral Sea to the east and the Ust yurt plateau to the west (see Map 1). The more direct maritime route entailed crossing the Caspian from the Volga Delta and docking on either the Mangyshlak or Buzachi Peninsula on the eastern shore. From there, the merchants’ caravans would travel south-east across the steppes of Transcaspia, over the Ust yurt plateau and on to the oasis cities of Khorezm. According to Aubrey Burton, in the 1640s the sea route involved 25 days’ sailing on a busa, a flat-bottomed boat, followed by another 25 days overland from the Karagan landing on Mangyshlak to Urgench in Khorezm.14 In the mid-sixteenth century the overland route would have passed near the yurts of two Turkmen tribal confederacies – the Salor on Mangyshlak itself and the Esen Eli, whose principal yurt at the time was on the Buzachi Peninsula.15 However, the latter confederacy, which comprised Chodor, Abdal, Arabachi and Igdyr tribal groupings, gradually moved south along the shores of the Caspian Sea until, by the time of Tebelev’s visit, it represented the main Turkmen presence on Mangyshlak. During the second half of the sixteenth century a caravan that followed the overland route from Astrakhan to the Yaik and Emba river crossings, and from there to Khorezm, also would have passed through the yurt of the Noghays, also known as the Manghit ulus. By the seventeenth century, this same territory

13

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

had become a yurt of the Kalmyks. Both of those tribal nomadic powers clashed frequently with the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, especially the Ichki of the Salor confederacy. Indeed, Astrakhan’s merchants may have developed the sea route specifically to bypass the Noghays, and later the Kalmyks, whose relations with both Bukhara and Astrakhan were often hostile. As Burton has pointed out, the merchants surely would have preferred the overland route in the absence of the troublesome Noghays and Kalmyks because it allowed more goods to be carried on each trip. Yet the region’s politics were so volatile that the sea route became a viable alternative, which benefited the Turkmen of Mangyshlak.16 While sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources make it clear that a large number of merchant and diplomatic caravans passed between Astrakhan and Bukhara at regular intervals, the evidence for direct commercial transactions between the Russians and the Turkmen is inconclusive. Hence, we must assume that from the 1550s to the end of the seventeenth century, Russian interactions with the Turkmen occurred primarily when the merchants used the sea route and travelled across Mangyshlak. Moreover, the documentary evidence suggests that even those encounters were usually indirect, with Tatars acting as intermediaries, or incidental to official diplomatic missions that shuttled between Astrakhan, Bukhara, Khorezm and Persia. In such circumstances the Turkmen’s main role seems to have been to provide pack animals, mostly horses and camels, carts and provisions.17 Certainly, relations between the caravans and the Turkmen, as well as other steppe nomads, were not always peaceful. Diplomatic messages between the Russians and the Uzbeks often accuse the nomads of viewing the pillaging of caravans as an honourable pastime. Even in times of relative peace and cooperation between the merchants and the nomads, the caravans were required to pay duties, transit tariffs and other taxes, not to mention protection

14

THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

fees and other extortions, in order to pass through the oasis regions of Central Asia and the nomad-dominated steppes. Moreover, even if a caravan paid its dues to the local Uzbek warlord and hired protection from Turkmen, Kalmyks or Kazakhs, a rival tribal group might still launch a raid. Certain routes were safer than others at various times, depending on the prevailing relationship between the local nomads and their neighbouring state power. For the Esen Eli Turkmen from the early sixteenth century onwards, the nearest organized state power was the Uzbek khanate of Khiva, which ruled Khorezm. As shall be seen below, the relationship between the Turkmen and the Uzbeks was extremely complicated and dynamic, so the merchants could never be certain whether the nomads were minded to cooperate with or disrupt the caravan trade. In summary, for much of the period from 1550 to 1750, the use of the overland and sea trade routes by the merchants of Astrakhan and Bukhara was subject to constant interference and conditioned by power struggles among Russia, the Uzbek khanates of Bukhara and Khiva, and whichever major nomadic power controlled the yurts from the Volga to the Emba: the Noghays prior to the 1620s and subsequently the Kalmyks. Meanwhile, the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, in the form of the Salor and Esen Eli confederacies, played a similar (if less well-documented) role in determining the merchants’ favoured trade route. There is an illuminating illustration of the hazards of the sea route in the first published account of a European encounter with the Turkmen of Mangyshlak: the Englishmen Anthony Jenkinson’s justly famous record of a journey he undertook in 1558.18 Just two years after the Russian conquest of Astrakhan, Jenkinson sailed from the city across the Caspian Sea to a landing on the Mangyshlak Peninsula and from there travelled through Khorezm to Bukhara. His trip followed the arrival in Astrakhan in July 1557 of a group of merchants from Urgench, at that time Khorezm’s leading commercial city, who had been dispatched by

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the newly elected Supreme Khan of the Uzbeks of Khorezm, Hajji Muhammad. The Urgenchi and Bukharan nobles who comprised this trade delegation bore gifts for Moscow and requested the introduction of free trade in the region.19 In response, Moscow commissioned Jenkinson – who was a member of the London Association of Master Adventurers, a newly appointed agent of the Muscovy Company and British ambassador to the court of Ivan IV – to assess the possibility of developing trade links with the Central Asian khanates. His account, a classic example of Tudor travel literature, along with his ‘Letters from Boghor’ (Bukhara) and his associate Richard Johnson’s detailed notes on the trade routes, comprises the first narrative of European contact with either the Turkmen or the Uzbeks. Jenkinson’s voyage across the Caspian took almost 30 days, similar to the sea passages recorded by Tebelev and Kopytovskii almost 200 years later. The exact location of his landing on Mangyshlak is unclear as he writes that a storm prevented the ship from reaching Point Karagan, on the westernmost tip of the peninsula. Instead, his party landed somewhere to the east in what is now known as Mangyshlak Bay, which separates Mangyshlak proper from the Buzachi Peninsula.20 This description of the events that resulted in Jenkinson’s ship overshooting the customary landing place confirms that this was not the first merchant vessel from Astrakhan to visit the Turkmen coast. He goes on to say that they unloaded their goods, met with some natives and attempted to hire pack animals and provisions for their journey across the desert to the city of Vazir, where they hoped to gain an audience with Hajji Muhammad Khan, the Supreme Khan of the Uzbeks of Khorezm. Interestingly, Jenkinson describes his first encounter with a group of predatory tribesmen in the vicinity of the landing point itself, but he does not specifically identify them as Turkmen; rather, he uses the generic term ‘Tatar’ when referring to all of the locals, Uzbeks and Turkmen alike.21 Later in his account, he claims that all of the Mangyshlak tribesmen are considered to be subjects of Timur

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THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

Sultan, the brother of ‘Hajjim Khan’, whom he identifies as ‘King of the Turkmens’. To clarify the issue, he reports that: all the land from the Caspian Sea to the city of Urgench is called the Land of the Turkmens and is subject to Hajjim Khan and his brothers which be five in number and all the country about the said sea [the Caspian] the people live without towns or habitations in the wild fields, removing from one place to another in great companies with their cattle.22 Jenkinson then provides a pithy character sketch of the Mangyshlak Turkmen. He refers to them as ‘a field people [. . .] who are a very bad and brutish people for they ceased not daily to molest us, either by fighting, stealing or begging’. This set the template for what would become a remarkably consistent stereotypical description of the tribesmen of the Mangyshlak Peninsula over the next three centuries. Some 185 years later, Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii clearly shared Jenkinson’s low opinion of the locals, while the literature of the Great Game era routinely depicts them as ‘man-stealing Turkomans’.23 After Jenkinson’s account, there is very little documentary evidence of Russian contact with the Turkmen over the next 70 years, which included the period of Russian history known as the ‘Time of Troubles’ (Smutnoe Vremya in Russian; 1598 – 1613). Of course, this does not mean that the caravan trade between Astrakhan and Bukhara ceased; rather, it simply reflects the paucity of primary sources from this period. Our principal source of information on the trade between the two cities during the seventeenth century is the compilation of diplomatic and commercial documents entitled Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi (MIUTT), which was published in 1932.24 This anthology contains correspondence from the end of the sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth, although few

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RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

of the documents refer directly to the Turkmen. The main subject matter is the bilateral relationship between the Russians and the Uzbeks of Bukhara and Khorezm. Nevertheless, careful study of these sources enables us to gain important insights into the Turkmen’s crucial role in the caravan trade to and from Astrakhan, especially when merchants chose to take the sea route. In addition, other sources provide further information on the Turkmen’s participation in this trade during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, V.V. Barthold, who draws on N. Veselovskii’s study of the diplomatic correspondence between Russia and Persia, cites two encounters between trade missions to Persia and Mangyshlak Turkmen, in 1588 – 9 and 1613. First we learn that the emissary Grigor Vasilchikov sailed from Astrakhan and disembarked at the northerly Kabakli Landing on Buzachi, rather than the usual Karagan Landing on Mangyshlak, then journeyed south to Astarabad en route to the newly crowned Safavid ruler, Shah Abbas, whose court was at Qazvin. Barthold claims that Mangyshlak Turkmen tribesmen then attacked Vasilchikov’s party on their return journey in 1589.25 At that time, during the reign of Hajji Muhammad Khan, the transit trade across the Mangyshlak Peninsula (the sea route) enjoyed the support of the Turkmen of the Ichki (Inner) Salor group, which had formed an alliance with the khans of Khiva. However, Kabakli was probably under the control of Turkmen from the Esen Eli confederacy, who opposed Hajji Muhammad Khan and were infamous for their predatory attitude towards the trade caravans.26 Later, the Ichki Salor would become deeply enmeshed in the political and social world of the khanate of Khiva, while the Esen Eli remained outsiders until the late seventeenth century, due, in part, to their close relationship with the Kalmyks. It should be noted that Vasilchikov’s account is particularly important because it provides the first description in a published Russian source of a Russian encounter with the

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THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

Turkmen. It is also the first to mention the Kabakli Landing on the Buzachi Peninsula as an alternative to Karagan. There is another reference to Kabakli in a report from January 1617, which mentions the presence of Turkmen both there and at Karagan. Barthold, again citing Veselovskii, confirms that the Turkmen’s yurt at that time extended as far north as the Emba River, but that those Turkmen (most likely members of the Esen Eli confederacy) were coming into conflict with the newly arrived Kalmyks, who were also pushing the Noghays out of their traditional yurt between the Yaik and Emba rivers.27 Ultimately, as we shall see, the Kalmyks subjugated the Esen Eli and, after a series of massive raids in the 1630s and 1640s, drove many of the Ichki Salor as well as tribes from the affiliated Tashki (Outer) Salor out of Mangyshlak.28 The evidence presented in the Russian sources allows us to follow the evolution of the Bukhara – Astrakhan trade from the end of the ‘Time of Troubles’ to the reign of Peter the Great, and to trace the interactions of the three main participants: the Russian merchants; the Uzbeks; and the Turkmen. In most cases, the correspondence between these parties addresses diplomatic as well as commercial issues, but it is fair to say that Russia’s relations with the Turkmen during this period were dominated by commercial considerations, many of them linked to the latter’s pillaging of caravans and seizure of captives. The Russians usually looked to the Uzbek khans of Khiva for redress whenever the Turkmen behaved badly, demanding better control or punishment of the unruly tribesmen. Thus, the Russian sources tend to mention the Turkmen by name only in relation to their raiding activities; otherwise, they are treated as passive and silent participants in the caravan trade. After surveying the records from the mid-sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth, which can be considered as the early phase of Russian – Turkmen relations, Burton calculated that the Russians dispatched a total of 15 official embassies – which

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combined the functions of diplomatic and trade missions – from Astrakhan to Central Asia. Several of these visited the khans of Khiva, but most travelled to Bukhara, a more important political and commercial destination. Interestingly, Burton also calculated that Bukhara dispatched more than 40 missions over the same period, although not all of them utilized the sea route that would have necessitated active interactions with the Turkmen.29 It is noteworthy that much of the trade that travelled through the oases of Khorezm and on to Astrakhan in the seventeenth century originated in Bukhara, or from merchant communities that lay even further to the south or east. Relatively few goods originated in Khorezm itself, and even fewer among the Turkmen. Thus, the caravans that passed through Khorezm and the Turkmen yurt may be characterized as transit trade. All of the local participants, be they Khorezmian Sarts (residents of the urban oases) or tribal Uzbeks or Turkmen, acted primarily as intermediaries.30 This is important because intermediaries invariably earned less than sponsors, owners or primary merchants in any long-distance trade transaction. So, while the Khorezmians and Turkmen certainly suffered some loss of revenue whenever a caravan was pillaged, and especially if the trade ceased entirely, the merchants of Astrakhan and Bukhara lost much more. Similarly, the Uzbek rulers of Khiva had to weigh their income from the trade – mainly in the form of customs duties and other taxes on the merchants – against the potential political benefits of other options, such as launching a war against Bukhara. Meanwhile, the Turkmen who acted as intermediaries had to balance their regular – if modest – income from allowing the caravans to proceed without hindrance against the fortune they might make from raiding a single wealthy caravan and ransoming the captives or selling them into slavery. Unfortunately, at present, it is impossible to undertake a detailed analysis of the various parties’ behaviour in the seventeenth century, given the scant information

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THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

provided by the available sources. A comprehensive, scholarly study of the slave trade in Central Asia, taking into account all of the participants, the economic dynamics, the organization and especially the relationship with the raiding activities of the tribal nomads, would certainly help to clarify the issue. Notwithstanding the lack of documentary evidence, we do know that caravans continued to pass through Khorezm without significant interruption over long periods of time. This is scarcely surprising, given that the Uzbeks of Khorezm and their allies, the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, reaped considerable economic benefits from the trade. For instance, Burton suggests that busas left Astrakhan and landed at either the Kabakli or Karagan Landing at regular intervals – perhaps as often as biannually – in the middle of the seventeenth century, and that this trade formed the basis of a thriving and mutually rewarding relationship for the Russians, Turkmen and Uzbeks.31 However, close examination of the documents in MIUTT reveals more of an ebb and flow in the commercial activity over the course of the century, the development of trade relations between Astrakhan and the Khivan khanate, and an enhanced intermediary role for the Turkmen. Specifically, MIUTT contains approximately 50 documents that relate directly to the Turkmen’s role along the sea route, starting with Document #22, which dates from January 1617.32 Importantly, later documents suggest that trade through Mangyshlak ceased entirely between 1646 and 1667, apparently because of a serious breakdown in political relations between Astrakhan and the Uzbeks of Khorezm. In addition, no document from 1679 to 1689 mentions either the Turkmen or the transit trade. This second hiatus may have been due to a local war between the competing Uzbek dynasties in Khorezm and Bukhara, or to a series of contentious disputes between the Russian authorities and the Uzbeks over the activities and treatment of Vasilii Daudov, an emissary from Moscow who visited Khiva and Bukhara between 1675 and 1678.33

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Two key documents in MIUTT mark the start of Uzbek– Russian exchanges relating to the Turkmen. The first of these, the aforementioned Document #22, is a letter from Khoja Yusuf, an envoy of Arab Muhammad Khan of Khiva, to Tsar Mikhael, which notes the recent increase in the number of busas sailing from Astrakhan to Kabakli. This appears to confirm that the preferred landing point for sea-borne trade missions prior to the arrival of the Kalmyks was Kabakli Landing, not Karagan Landing. Mikhael’s response (Document #25) is dated February 1617 and addressed to the Khan himself, although it was sent via Khoja Yusuf. It contains a gramota (official decree) which grants the merchants of Khiva permission to trade with Muscovy and also addresses such issues as customs and other tariffs.34 This exchange facilitated a notable increase in the caravans’ use of the sea route, sustained by the Uzbek ruler Arab Muhammad Khan’s cordial and cooperative relations with both Astrakhan and the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and Buzachi. The good relations and active trade appear to have continued for the next 30 years, much to the benefit of the Turkmen. However, by the 1640s a shift in the relationship can be discerned. A letter from Isfandyar Khan to the Astrakhan voevoda Odoevsky, dated March 1641 (MIUTT, Document #44), requests the dispatch of a regular busa to the Karagan Landing on Mangyshlak, rather than to Kabakli. At the time, this landing was still under the control of the Ichki Salor, who were close allies of the Uzbek Khan. Perhaps surprisingly, this is the first mention of the Karagan Landing in any of the MIUTT documents.35 There are several possible reasons why Isfandyar Khan made this request. First, we know from other Russian documents, and from chronicles written in Khiva, that Kalmyk power in the region reached its height around this time. Conflicts between the Russians and the Kalmyks were disrupting the caravan trade, and both the Ichki and the Tashki Salor on Mangyshlak had suffered extremely destructive

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THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

Kalmyk raids. Second, merchants from Astrakhan, Bukhara and Khorezm may have been unable or unwilling to use the Kabakli Landing, which lay closer to the Kalmyk yurt. Finally, Isfandyar Khan and his Ichki Salor allies may have sensed an opportunity to divert as much trade as possible to Karagan.36 Two more letters, also dating from 1641 (Documents #35 and #52), contain requests for mutual cooperation between Isfandyar Khan and Tsar Mikhael in order to repulse the Kalmyk onslaught. Unfortunately for the Mangyshlak Turkmen, these plans never came to fruition.37 Another highly significant letter is dated September 1646 (Document #74). Addressed to the Astrakhan voevoda Semenovich, it was written by Abu’l Ghazi Khan, the author of two of the most important chronicles of the period, who had succeeded Isfandyar as ruler of Khiva three years earlier. In the letter, Abu’l Ghazi asks why Astrakhan’s merchants have stopped sending regular trading ships to Karagan.38 This question is disingenuous because the Khan must have known that his own policy of attacking the caravans en route to Mangyshlak, and subjugating and displacing the Ichki and Tashki Salors, had poisoned cordial relations among the three principal participants in the transit trade. His seizure of Russian goods and merchants – which he falsely attributed to the Salors – had shattered the stability of the tripartite relationship that had blossomed over the previous three decades. Moreover, the forced migrations of the Ichki Salor from Mangyshlak and the Tashki Salor from the Balkhan yurt, both as a direct consequence of his campaigns, not to mention the ongoing Kalmyk attacks, had disastrously disrupted trade along the sea route and even impaired the operation of the alternative overland route that passed through Khorezm en route to Astrakhan. All of this led to a virtual cessation of the Bukhara – Astrakhan trade via Khorezm for a period of more than 20 years, a hiatus that is paralleled by an almost two-decade interval in the MIUTT documents.39

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It was Abu’l Ghazi’s son, Anusha Khan, who finally reestablished cooperation among the Uzbeks, the Turkmen and the merchants of Astrakhan, and ushered in a decade of buoyant trade. No fewer than 29 documents in MIUTT testify to the flourishing caravan trade that passed through Khorezm en route to Astrakhan, almost exclusively via the Karagan Landing, during Anusha’s reign (1663 – 85).40 Both the Salor and the Chodor (from the Esen Eli confederacy) are mentioned frequently as active participants in this trade; and, for the first time, an Uzbek khan petitions the Russians to establish a fortified trading post at Karagan. The latter subject would be a dominant feature of much of the communication between Russians and Turkmen for the next 125 years.41 Other regional political developments may have had an impact on the free flow of trade through Khorezm and Mangyshlak, such as Anusha’s campaigns against Bukhara, particularly those of 1681 and 1685, which prompted the merchants of the city to redirect their caravans to the Russian outposts of western Siberia. However, internal Russian policies also played a role in determining the level of transit trade, to the benefit of the Turkmen. In the 1670s the Russians prohibited Teziki traders from transporting their goods directly to Moscow, restricting their activities to the frontier towns of Astrakhan, Tobolsk and Troisk. Furthermore, according to Burton, the Astrakhan authorities instructed busa captains to encourage all of the Teziki merchants to redirect their trading activities towards the city. It was hoped that this policy would result in the establishment of greater control over foreign merchants within the Russian Empire. In consequence, there was a notable rise in the number of Bukharan, Khorezmian and Indian merchants in Astrakhan. 42 In keeping with this development, in 1685 Tsarina Sophia ordered the enlargement of existing gostinyi dvor as well as the construction of brand-new hostels for three of the city’s largest merchant communities: the Gilani Persians, the Indians

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THE LONG -DISTANCE CARAVAN TRADE

and the Teziki (Bukharans, Khorezmians and, presumably, Turkmen). However, the prohibition on travel beyond Astrakhan remained in force and, four years later, a new order expelled all foreign merchants who were resident in Moscow or any of the towns along the Volga. These strict regulations persisted until 1697, when Peter the Great finally relaxed the restrictions on the movement of foreign merchants from the East.43 In the next chapter we examine the evolution of the relationship between the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Uzbeks of Khorezm and explore how this influenced the transit trade to and from Astrakhan.

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CHAPTER 3 TURKMEN, UZBEKS AND RUSSIANS

We have suggested that a useful approach to analysing Russian– Turkmen relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is to understand that it was actually part of a tripartite relationship, with the Uzbeks of Khorezm as the third party. With the exception of Yuri Bregel, who occasionally mentions Uzbek–Turkmen relations in his work, albeit with a focus on the nineteenth century, there have been few scholarly attempts to assess the important political and social interactions between these two parties, especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.1 One of the small number of studies in English to address this topic is the unpublished doctoral thesis of George Larry Penrose, which dates from 1975. Most of this study comprises a translation of Abu’l Ghazi Khan’s Shejere-iTerakima (The Genealogy of the Turkmen), but Penrose also argues that the ebb and flow of the Bukhara–Astrakhan transit trade directly mirrored the interaction between the Turkmen and the Uzbeks. Penrose explains that this ‘love–hate’ relationship continually alternated between collaboration and antagonism between 1550 and 1700, and argues that it was ‘a microcosm of traditional nomad–sedentary symbiosis’, meaning that there was at least the potential for a mutually beneficial exchange between the

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two parties.2 In return for their cooperation in the transit trade and the provision of military services, the Uzbeks granted the Turkmen access to pasturelands, and to the bazaars and slave markets of Khorezm. On the other hand, should the Turkmen attack the caravans, rebel or refuse to pay their taxes, or fail to support raids (chapaauls) against the Qizilbash of Persia or campaigns against the rival Uzbeks of Bukhara, then the transit trade would suffer accordingly. Penrose’s analysis is useful but probably overstates the importance of the transit trade in the Turkmen’s relationship with the Uzbeks of Khiva. It also overlooks the differences among the various Turkmen tribal groups. Some, like the Ichki Salor, were relatively reliable allies of the Uzbek khans for much of the seventeenth century, whereas others were implacably hostile and uncooperative with respect to the caravan trade. The practice of granting certain tribal groupings access to pasture and water sources within the territory of Khorezm, and sometimes even rights to agricultural land, along with a political role for elders at court, was probably a more important aspect of what Penrose calls the ‘symbiotic relationship’. Furthermore, Penrose characterizes the seventeenth-century Uzbek khans of Khiva as either pro- or anti-Turkmen. By his definition, Hajji Muhammad, Arab Muhammad, Isfandyar and Anusha were all pro-Turkmen, whereas Abu’l Ghazi was anti-Turkmen.3 However, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the relationship between the various Turkmen tribal confederations – Ichki Salor, Tashki Salor and Esen Eli – and the Uzbek rulers was much more complicated, as it was based on longstanding political, social and economic interactions. While it may be true that the transit trade operated most smoothly when it was mutually beneficial to both the Uzbeks and the Turkmen, many of the other reciprocal arrangements between the two were based on less cooperation or mutuality of interests. Until the second half of the seventeenth century, when there was a significant rise in the

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political power of the Turkmen in Khorezm (part of a general resurgence of tribal power across the region) as well as a concomitant weakening of Chinggisid legitimacy, the relationship between the Uzbeks and the Turkmen had never been one of equals from either a political or a military point of view. Significantly, in the period under discussion, the Ichki Salor, Tashki Salor and Esen Eli never united to form a single body with respect to either the transit trade or political negotiations with the khanate. Of course, the Uzbeks also failed to act with total unity – they had their own tribal divisions – but at least they had a functioning state apparatus that allocated power in accordance with certain Turko-Mongol and Shibanid– Chinggisid traditions.4 This allowed them to formulate short-term policies and take decisive action when necessary. By contrast, between 1550 and 1850, the Turkmen consistently exhibited what Barthold termed ‘militant anarchy’.5 To understand the relationship between the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Uzbeks, and the significance of the former’s anarchic socio-political organization in the politics of seventeenthcentury Central Asia, we must review what is known about these two groups prior to that period. By about 1500, the Turkmen were residing in nomadic encampments scattered across the Mangyshlak yurt, a territory that extended along the Caspian coast from the Balkhan Mountains in the south to the Emba River in the north and eastwards to the borders of Khorezm. According to their own oral traditions, these Turkmen were descended from remnants of the pre-Mongol Turks of Central Asia, known by the tribal names Oghuz and Qangli-Qipchaq. Prior to the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, the principal yurt of these groups was located in the lower Syr Darya region, to the east of the Aral Sea. The connection between the pre-Mongol Oghuz and the Turkmen of Mangyshlak is less certain; nor do we know how or why they came to coalesce by the end of the fifteenth century into what Islamic sources call the Salor and Esen Eli confederacies.6

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Mangyshlak was a marginal frontier zone both politically and geographically, lying between competing ulus of the Mongol Empire (1220– 1360). For three centuries, the region represented an unregulated borderland that served as a refuge for dynastic and tribal dissidents, but also as a troop recruitment centre for several rival Chinggisid (and even Timurid) leaders. An exact date for the arrival of what would become the Salor confederacy on the Mangyshlak Peninsula is hard to establish due to the scarcity of sources that discuss the fifteenth-century history of the region. However, one source tells us that Musa Khan of the Ulugh Horde took refuge with ‘the Turkmen of Mangyshlak’ in the 1490s, although the text does not use the terms Ichki Salor and Tashki Salor.7 These terms are first used in reference to the Mangyshlak Turkmen in mid-sixteenth-century Islamic hagiographical texts,8 although details of their tribal composition are not provided until Abu’l Ghazi’s accounts of the 1660s, in which he refers back to the early 1500s. The Mangyshlak and Buzachi peninsulas were not ideal yurts for pastoral nomads, even assuming they were much less desiccated than they are today. Certainly Mangyshlak has few areas that are well suited for intensive pastoralism. There are no year-round river valleys and few good wells. While ‘Mangyshlak’ derives from the Turkish for ‘a thousand winter pastures’, we are left wondering where the nomads might go in the summer. Even the region of Balkhan, which Abu’l Ghazi describes as the main territory of the Tashki Salor tribes, is a very limited upland area, barely a thousand metres above the surrounding desert. One theory is that the greater Mangyshlak yurt served as a useful refuge zone for a number of tribal peoples from Inner Asia who had fled from the Great Mongol Empire. Bregel has suggested that, under the Mongol Empire’s administrative system of classifying and then assigning pasturelands, Mangyshlak may have been deemed unusable except for outcasts (qazaqs) and other impoverished tribal remnants. Certainly, it was unsuitable for large-scale horse-rearing – the principal

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interest of the military-minded Mongols. Thus, the region was left to the Turkmen, who practised mainly camel- and sheep-based pastoralism.9 There is a need for more research into the Turkmen prior to the Uzbek conquests of the beginning of the sixteenth century if we are to understand how the geography of the area shaped their economy and history. However, we may speculate that the impoverished and politically disorganized Turkmen settled on the Mangyshlak Peninsula specifically because it was of little interest to the Mongols. Indeed, Michael Rowton has suggested that the Turkmen were ‘enclosed’ in this qishlaq (the nomads’ winter quarters), trapped between more powerful enemies on all sides who controlled the region’s more favourable yurts: to the north, the fertile land between the Volga and the Emba; to the east, the oases of Khorezm; and to the south-east, the littoral along the Kopet Mountains of north Khurasan, known as the Atek, which was ideally suited to transhumant pastoral nomadism. Finally, to the south lay the prime pasturelands of Astarabad, the Gurgan– Atrek – Sumbar yurt, which was highly prized by the Mongols and by all subsequent tribally based political realms of Central Asia.10 In one sense, the history of the Turkmen from the thirteenth to the late nineteenth century, and of their interactions with neighbouring great powers, whether Uzbek, Persian or Russian, may be seen in terms of their desire to break out of their enclosure and impoverishment in the Magyshlak yurt. The social organization of the Turkmen remained highly segmented in the centuries after 1500, and they exhibited a deepseated tendency to resist all forms of political centralization or subjugation. They were often depicted as an unruly rabble even after they migrated en masse to the more favourable oases and river valleys to the south and east.11 Another key characteristic that differentiated the Turkmen who ventured out of Mangyshlak from the Uzbeks and other surrounding Central Asian powers was that they were not products of post-Chinggisid political forces.

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Perhaps for that reason they did not subscribe to the traditions of ethno-genesis and legitimacy that derived from the Chinggisid legacy. Hence, their identity narratives did not recognize the primacy of the urugh – the lineage of Chinggis and his descendants. Nor did Turkmen traditions espouse political domination over the urban oasis societies of Khorezm and Transoxania. Their cultural narratives emphasized raiding, not conquering. In fact, any Turkmen involvement in the power politics and socioeconomics of the Khorezm oases was due primarily to their active recruitment by the Uzbeks, who gained control of the region only in the early sixteenth century. The Uzbeks, then, were relative latecomers to Khorezm. Their conquest of Central Asia, specifically the region that became the khanates of Bukhara and Khorezm, occurred against the backdrop of a general breakdown of central authority across the ulus of Jochi after the death of Berdi Beg Khan in 1360.12 The inhabitants of the north-western part of Khorezm and the important urban centre of Urgench liberated themselves from rule by the descendants of Chinggis, but then came under the control of the Qongrats, a Turkicized Mongol tribal grouping whose leaders had the dynastic name ‘Sufi’. Under their first ruler, Huseyn Sufi, the Qongrats unified Khorezm by capturing the southern urban centres of Kat, Khiva and Hazarasp from the ulus of Chagatay.13 As Amir Timur (Tamerlane) began to expand his empire, he first demanded the return of the southern portion of Khorezm from Husayn Sufi and then conquered the whole territory in the course of three campaigns between 1372 and 1379. When the Qongrats supported Timur’s great rival from the ulus of Jochi, Tokhtamish Khan, Timur punished the Sufi dynasty by destroying Urgench. Thereafter, all of Khorezm remained under Timurid provincial rule until Abu’l Khayr Khan – a direct descendant of Chinggis through the urugh of his grandson Shiban – launched an attack in 1431. He stood at the head of a newly formed confederacy of Inner Asian tribal groups known as the Uzbeks.14 The division of

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Khorezm continued for the rest of the fifteenth century: the south, including the oasis towns of Khiva, Hazarasp and Kat, remained under the Timurid rule of Shah Rukh and his successors; the north, including the urban oasis centres of Urgench and Vazir, was controlled by local Qongrat leaders or various invaders from the steppes.15 The Uzbek dynastic rulers of Khorezm and Bukhara in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were either direct descendants of Abu’l Khayr Khan or members of other branches of Shiban’s urugh. Historians generally identify the rulers of Khorezm in this period as members of the ‘Arabshahid’ dynasty, although a better name for them might be ‘Yadigarids’, after Yadigar Khan, a greatgrandson of Arabshah. Hence, we will use the latter term from here onwards. Under the political system that prevailed across most of the Eurasian steppe from 1220 to the end of the seventeenth century, including Russia and much of China, only direct descendants of Chinggis Khan could claim the right to rule an ulus. However, the preferences of tribal leaders and their followers were always a deciding factor in determining which particular Chinggisid descendant gained that right. For this reason, the Uzbek khans had to cultivate the support of the tribal leaders either within the greater Uzbek confederacy or among non-Uzbek groups, such as the Turkmen. At some point, Yadigar’s sons broke away from the coalition formed by Abu’l Khayr in the mid-fifteenth century, and, after gaining the support of a number of nomadic Turko-Mongol tribal groups from the yurt between the Irgiz River and the lower Syr Darya, created their own tribal state. It was Ilbars Khan, a grandson of Yadigar, who conquered Khorezm by exploiting both the collapse of the Timurids of Khurasan and the Safavids’ defeat of a rival Uzbek group led by Muhammad Shibani Khan, a grandson of Abu’l Khayr. Ilbars and his confederates were supported militarily by the Nayman and Uyghur tribal elements within the Uzbek confederacy. These two groups remained the principal supporters of his

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descendants – the khans of the Yadigarid dynasty – until two other Uzbek tribes, the Qongrats and the Manghits, rose to power.16 As far as we can tell from the limited historiographical sources of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there was little or no Turkmen presence in the oases of Khorezm when the Uzbeks arrived. Thus, the newly formed Yadigarid ulus relied mainly on the military support of its own tribal supporters from the steppes, the above-mentioned Nayman and Uyghur, as well as the Qongrats.17 Although the political system the Yadigarid dynasty established in Khorezm eventually incorporated tribal elements from the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, it was similar to the regime that the Uzbeks established in Bukhara. Following longstanding Turko-Mongol political conventions, a Chinggisid urugh (a dynastic ruling clan) gained the military support and allegiance of an il (tribal grouping) in order to occupy and gain control of an ulus (a realm including both people and territory). The Uzbek state system, as practised from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, involved the apportionment of the ulus – including its various yurts (pasturelands), water courses, agricultural lands, qala’ (fortresses) and associated towns and townspeople – among the members of the ruling urugh.18 Thus, the qala’ and oasis towns of Khorezm, and their associated inhabitants, known as Sarts, were divided between a supreme khan – who was chosen by his relatives and acknowledged by the principal tribal leaders who provided military support for the dynasty – and related uncles and brothers, all of whom were granted the title ‘sultan’. As we saw in Jenkinson’s report of 1558, at that time the Supreme Khan was Hajji Muhammad. Meanwhile, his brother, Timur Sultan, controlled Urgench and held official authority over the Turkmen. Subsequently, in the 1640s, during the reign of Abu’l Ghazi, the Uzbek and Turkmen tribes were divided into four groupings, known as tyube. Each of these paired a particular oasis town with a related yurt. This pairing followed a traditional practice, known as khudad, which seems to have originated on the steppes. It is

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difficult to understand the rationale for assigning each Turkmen tribe to a particular tyube, at least from Abu’l Ghazi’s own writings and the Khivan chronicles that incorporated his narrative.19 Unlike the Sarts, who were easily subjugated and became tax-paying ra’iyyat (subjects), the Turkmen tribal groups remained a military threat to the Yadigarid dynasty, albeit one that offered recruitment opportunities. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, it seems that Turkmen groups or even individuals would receive a parcel of land in return for military service and therefore become nukers (or nokers or naukers) – members of the Khan’s personal retinue.20 Nevertheless, the rulers of Khorezm did not expect the Turkmen to abandon their tribal identities and become fully assimilated members of Uzbek tribes. The political system that Abu’l Khayr Khan developed in the fifteenth century had demonstrated its ability to incorporate a number of diverse tribal groups and then mobilize them as an effective military force. It appears that the Turkmen were militarily subjugated by the better-organized Uzbek forces in the early sixteenth century, with the consequence that they had to pay tribute taxes and serve as auxiliary troops. But we do not know the extent to which they were allowed to muster and serve under their own generals (termed serdars or on-begi in the local sources). The principal motivation for recruiting Turkmen into the Uzbek state system was their effectiveness as members of alamans (raiding parties). As we saw earlier, the Turkmen and Uzbek term for a raid itself is chapaaul, although later Western observers sometimes conflated the two terms.21 The alamans were sometimes very large squadrons that were mustered for the purpose of pillaging and capturing booty, mainly from Persians or Bukharans. The recruitment of Turkmen into these alamans seems to have begun not long after the conquest of Khorezm by Ilbars Khan (r. 1510– 18). Having gained control of the region, he and his successors launched regular chapaauls against the Safavid outposts of northern

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Khurasan. As a result, between 1518 and 1524, the Uzbeks managed to subjugate most of the Atek region, from Mehne to Durun. The Turkmen who participated in these campaigns must have earned considerable economic rewards in exchange for their submission to the Uzbeks. Moreover, their gradual infiltration into the Atek seems to have begun during this period. The first reference in the Khivan sources to Turkmen involvement in chapaauls occurs in an account of Uzbek raiding parties of the 1530s. In 1538 Avanesh Khan and the other sons of Amenek Khan repulsed a Bukharan invasion of Khorezm led by Ubaydullah Khan with the help of forces recruited from the Turkmen tribes of the Uzboy yurt. Specific mention is made of the Khizr Eli and tribal groups from the Yaqqa Turkmen, possibly the Goklen, Okhlu or Gireyli, all of whom resided on the northern edge of the Gurgan – Atrek –Sumbar yurt, which bordered the Safavid province of Astarabad.22 In the quiet periods between officially sanctioned chapaauls, the Turkmen were expected to pay barat (tribute tax) to their Uzbek overlords. If they refused to do so, this was interpreted as an act of rebellion. The inevitable Uzbek military reprisal could involve turning one Turkmen tribe against the other. The Khivan chronicle Firdaws al-Iqbal (paraphrasing Abu’l Ghazi) explains: [Ilbars] sent the army to Balkhan and Mangyshlaq which were the places of habitation of the Turkmen [. . . T]he Turkmen tribes had been subjects [ra’iyyat] of the Uzbeks since the time of Ilbars Khan [. . .] and in the time of Sufyan Khan [1530s] Turkmen of the Balkhans and Mangyshlaq who consisted of the tribes of the Ersari, Khorasan Salor, Tekke, Saryk, and Yomut started a rebellion.23 After Sufyan Khan had quashed the rebellion he sent his baratdar (tax collectors) to impose a tribute on all of the Turkmen tribes. It was payable – in proportion to each group’s population – in

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either sheep or grain. Moreover, in addition to the regular barat, the Turkmen were required to hand over a large proportion of the booty they had seized during chapaauls as proof of their submission to Uzbek rule.24 For most of the sixteenth century and even much of the seventeenth, cooperation with the Uzbeks over the transit trade to and from Astrakhan seems to have ranked fairly low in the Turkmen’s list of priorities, at least in comparison to gaining booty or acquiring the rights to graze good pasturelands close to the oases of Khorezm. The available sources offer no clue as to why the Turkmen of the Uzboy yurt were among the first to be recruited into the Uzbek military system, but perhaps it was due simply to their geographical proximity.25 Either way, we know that the Ichki Salor, the Tashki Salor, the Yaqqa and the Atek Turkmen all played active roles in the campaigns against the Safavids and the Bukharan Uzbeks from the 1550s to the reign of Isfandyar Khan in the 1630s. For example, the Turkmen participated in large-scale alamans led by Hajji Muhammad Khan in 1591 and 1592. Turkmen also served as loyal supporters of the Yadigarid dynasty in resisting Bukharan invasions in 1597 and 1598, which earned them considerable political prestige in Khorezm. The Firdaws al-Iqbal describes five occasions between the 1550s and the 1630s when Turkmen tribal groups – especially from the Ichki Salor – made crucial interventions that tipped the balance in favour of one Uzbek leader over another.26 For instance, in 1621 – 2 Isfandyar Khan’s brothers drove him out of Urgench. The deposed Khan pleaded for help from Shah Abbas Safavi, who ordered the Okhlu and Goklen tribes, as well as the Southern Yomut from north of the Gurgan River, to assist him. The next year Isfandyar Khan travelled to Mangyshlak, recruited an army from the Ichki Salor and regained control of Urgench. As the Firdaws al-Iqbal puts it, ‘Isfandyar became friendly with the Turkmen and brought them to his yurt.’27 Thereafter,

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the Ichki Salor played a prominent role in the politics of Khorezm, particularly during the succession contest between Arab Muhammad Khan’s two sons – Abu’l Ghazi and Isfandyar. In 1624 the Ichki Salor participated in the restored Khan’s attack on the Nayman and Uyghur tribes, the two groups that had constituted the backbone of tribal support for the Yadigarid dynasty since the early sixteenth century. Five years later, after the death of Shah Abbas, Isfandyar led a large-scale attack on the north Khurasan borderlands in the Atek region and restored Uzbek dominion over the districts of Durun, Nisa and Abivard, this time with the assistance of Tekke and Saryk troops from the Tashki Salor. However, in 1643, when Isfandyar Khan died and the Bukharan Uzbeks once again tried to seize control of Khorezm, the Ichki Salor groups that by then were well entrenched throughout Khorezm, and especially in Urgench and Khiva, threw in their lot with the invaders. Perhaps this explains why the next khan, Abu’l Ghazi, never trusted them. Indeed, he turned his predecessor’s policy on its head, favouring more traditional supporters from the Uzbek tribes, especially the Nayman and Uyghur, at the expense of the Salor groups. In the words of the Firdaws al-Iqbal, ‘The Turkmen of Khiva did not accept [Abu’l Ghazi’s] authority and read the khutba in the name of Nadir Muhammad [of Bukhara].’ 28 Two years later, Abu’l Ghazi Khan ‘set out with an army, entered Khiva and defeated and crushed the Turkmen’.29 Over the next 20 years Abu’l Ghazi Khan launched at least five campaigns against the Mangyshlak and Balkhan Turkmen in a bid to break their military power in Khorezm and drive them from the region or subjugate them to his rule. He was prepared to exterminate any who failed to submit.30 For instance, in 1646 – 7 he massacred thousands of aq saqals and serdars (clan leaders and warlords) to whom Isfandyar Khan had assigned yurts near the towns of Khorezm. A few months later, he ‘killed three or four

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thousand Turkmen who were pitching their tents and lived in the sands to the south of Hazarasp’.31 Next he turned his attention to the Turkmen who occupied the pasturelands of northern Khurasan. In 1648 he attacked and scattered those who resided at the Serakhs and Tedjend oases. Finally, in 1649, 1651 and 1653 he launched campaigns against the Turkmen of the Atek region, possibly the Qaradashli and some Ersari, as well as Saryk and Imreli tribesmen who roamed along the banks of the Gurgan River. As Firdaws al-Iqbal puts it, ‘In short, by many raids Abu’l Ghazi subjugated all the Turkmen.’32 Unsurprisingly, given the political and military turmoil, the mid-seventeenth century witnessed little cooperation between Turkmen and Uzbeks with regard to the Astrakhan transit trade. Abu’l Ghazi may have succeeded in subjugating the Turkmen, but that did not mean they felt favourably towards the merchants of Khorezm or Bukhara. Indeed, as we have seen, the Russian sources document a total collapse of Bukhara–Astrakhan trade through Khorezm around this time. In the end, the authorities in Astrakhan held Abu’l Ghazi Khan personally responsible for the tribesmen’s pillaging, and the merchants’ busas stopped sailing to the Mangyshlak landings. In addition, several other regional geopolitical developments affected the caravan trade. For instance, the rise to power of the Kalmyks in the first half of the seventeenth century and their long-distance raids against the yurts of the remaining Ichki and Tashki Salors had a significant impact on the merchants’ use of the sea route via Mangyshlak. These raids, and Abu’l Ghazi Khan’s extermination campaigns, led to a huge exodus of the Tashki Salor tribes from the region. Some migrated south, to the Atek, while others – including the Ersari, the Sakar, the Eski and the Khizr Eli – after a brief sojourn in Khorezm, ultimately settled (with the encouragement and permission of the Bukharan khans) along the banks of the Amu Darya. This new Turkmen yurt, which stretched for some 200 kilometres along the middle reaches of the river,

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came to be known as the Lebab (from the Persian lab-i-ab, meaning waterside). A few years earlier, the Esen Eli confederacy – which, according to Tebelev’s and Kopytovskii’s reports, included the Abdal, Chodor, Igdyr, Arabachi and Burunchuq tribes – had started to move south from the Buzachi Peninsula into Mangyshlak. Around the same time, the Esen Eli concluded an alliance with the Kalmyks in the hope that this would help them resist or evade the attacks of Abu’l Ghazi Khan.33 Several documents in the Russian archives record Abu’l Ghazi Khan’s attempts to preserve Khorezm’s transit trade. For instance, he tried to convince the Kalmyks to break their alliance with the Esen Eli in return for redirecting the caravans from the sea route to the overland route, which would have necessitated passing through Kalmyk territory en route to Astrakhan. It is unclear when the Kabakli Landing on the Buzachi Peninsula was finally abandoned, but it was probably during this period. Apparently, those members of the Esen Eli confederacy who remained in the Buzachi yurt were unable to revive the trade. In addition, relations between the Russians and the Kalmyks were so hostile that the Astrakhan merchants and their Bukharan counterparts were unwilling to risk the sea route.34 While both the Khorezm Uzbeks and the Turkmen suffered from the cessation of trade and the attacks of the Kalmyks, the Bukharans seem to have made a separate peace with the latter and continued to use the land routes that ran to the east of the Aral Sea throughout the period from 1640 to 1670. Abu’l Ghazi Khan’s abdication in 1663 and the assumption of power by his son, Anusha Khan, led to a revival in the fortunes of both the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and those who had migrated to Khorezm and become active participants in the political and economic realm of the khanate of Khiva. This was because Anusha Khan accomplished what Abu’l Ghazi Khan had failed to achieve: the restoration of the Bukhara– Astrakhan transit trade via

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Khorezm. Over the next quarter of a century, from 1664 to 1689, the whole caravan trade and especially the sea route flourished, although now the busas landed exclusively at the Karagan Landing on Mangyshlak. Anusha Khan’s reign also witnessed something of a return to the pro-Turkmen policies of his uncle, Isfandyar Khan, although the Khivan chronicles give the impression that the relationship was hardly cordial. The Firdaws al-Iqbal says simply, ‘In Anusha’s time, the Turkmen tribes could not rise in rebellion because they feared his punishment.’35 In short, the Turkmen now behaved as docile subjects of the Khan, rather than power brokers, the role they had played in the 1620s and 1630s. Anusha Khan’s more peaceful relations with the Turkmen and the concomitant revival of the Mangyshlak transit trade are evidenced by a sudden resurgence in the correspondence relating to commerce in the Russian sources: no fewer than 17 of the surviving 18 documents in MIUTT from that era deal with the caravan trade through the Karagan Landing.36 The irony is that the previous Khan’s anti-Turkmen policies clearly failed to mitigate the long-term processes of migration, incorporation and integration of the Ichki and Tashki Salor into the social and economic life of Khorezm. As Penrose says, Abu’l Ghazi Khan succeeded only in damaging Khorezm’s economy through his disruption of the Bukhara– Astrakhan transit trade. His destructive military campaigns against the Turkmen merely weakened Khiva’s position vis-a`-vis the Russians, Bukharans and Kalmyks. They exacerbated the exodus of Turkmen from Mangyshlak to the more densely populated regions of Khorezm, the Atek, Astarabad –Gurgan– Atrek and the Lebab yurt. Overall, then, Abu’l Ghazi’s supposedly anti-Turkmen policies led directly to a notable increase in the power and influence of the Turkmen in Khorezm.37 During the reigns of Anusha Khan himself (1664– 85/6) and his successors Khudaydad Khan and Erenk/Arang Khan (1686– 94), the Turkmen seemed to regain as much political

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influence, social status and territory in Khorezm as they had enjoyed under Isfandyar Khan. One interesting measure by which to gauge the social importance of the Turkmen is that the mothers of both Hajji Muhammad Khan in the mid-sixteenth century and Anusha Khan’s son Erenk Khan were Turkmen. Abu’l Ghazi Khan reports that Aghatay, the father of Hajji Muhammad Khan, took the daughter of a Goklen chief as his wife in the 1550s in the hope of forging an alliance with the Yaqqa Turkmen of the Astarabad– Gurgan– Atrek yurt.38 Similarly, Tokhta Khanim, Anusha Khan’s principal wife, hailed from a Turkmen clan that lived near Dargan Ata. According to both Turko-Mongol and Persian texts, upon Anusha Khan’s death, Tokhta Khanim attempted to place one of her Turkmen nephews on the throne of Khiva. Unsurprisingly, the leading Uzbek tribal amirs objected and swiftly executed the pretender.39 The Yadigarid dynasty came to an end with Erenk/Arang Khan’s death, but the subsequent Uzbek dynasties in no way altered the fundamental pattern of increasing Turkmen entanglement in the politics of Khorezm. As Bregel noted, ‘From the end of Arabshahid [Yadigarid] rule [in 1694,] there was a marked increase in the Turkmen presence in Khorezm.’ In particular, there was a surge in the political influence and military power of the Salor, the Yomut and the Chodor tribes, primarily due to large numbers of these tribesmen gaining access to pasturelands in the region.40 By the reign of Shir Ghazi Khan (1715– 27), the Turkmen in Khorezm itself as well as the nomads who lived in the northern borderlands of Khurasan, in the region that extended from Marv to Astarabad, were considered important and faithful subjects of the khans of Khiva.41 The loyalty and precise identities of the Turkmen who remained on the Mangyshlak Peninsula and participated in the Bukhara– Astrakhan transit trade are less clear. On the basis of the rudimentary ethnographic information contained in the accounts of Tebelev and Kopytovskii, who met only Esen Eli and a handful

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of Salors, it seems that Mangyshlak was sparsely populated by the 1740s, certainly in comparison with a hundred years earlier, when it had been the centre of the Ichki Salor yurt. Moreover, as we shall see, it is difficult to determine the true nature of the relationship between the scattered Esen Eli clans who remained on the peninsula and the Uzbek rulers of Khorezm, because Russian eighteenth-century sources seem undecided whether the Turkmen should be considered subjects of the Kalmyks or of the khans of Khiva. Therefore, before discussing Russia’s policies towards the Turkmen, we must turn our attention to the latter’s relations with the Kalmyks and another great steppe power – the Kazakhs.

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CHAPTER 4 THE DUEL FOR MANGYSHLAK BETWEEN TURKMEN, KALMYKS AND KAZAKHS

The Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Kalmyks As we saw in Chapter 1, the missions of Tebelev and Kopytovskii may not have been dispatched were it not for the request for assistance from Donduk Omba Khan, grandson of the famous Kalmyk leader Ayuki Khan. By the mid-eighteenth century, the Kalmyks no longer represented a major threat to Russian power. Indeed, from the Russians’ perspective, they had been almost totally subjugated. In 1735, Tsarina Anna, in keeping with the policies initiated by Tsar Peter the Great, had selected Donduk from various candidates to be viceroy of the Kalmyk nation. Eleven years earlier, his father, Tseren Donduk Khan, had succumbed to Russian intrigues and signed an oath of allegiance in which he pledged submission to the tsars.1 The decline of Kalmyk power in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, and their subservient position, trapped on the steppe between the Volga and Yaik rivers, pressured on two sides by the Yaik Cossacks and the rising power of the Kazakhs, was the final stage in a long and bitter relationship with the Russians that had

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begun in the early years of the previous century. For almost a hundred years, the Kalmyks had dominated the steppe to the north and north-east of the Caspian Sea, and, as we have seen, even considered the Esen Eli Turkmen to be their subjects. Although the Astrakhan trade was important to these Turkmen of Mangyshlak, their relations with Russia were of secondary importance in comparison with their relationship with the Kalmyks. Imperial Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not constitute an existential challenge to the Turkmen, whereas the Kalmyks certainly did. For instance, the Khivan sources describe a catastrophic Kalmyk raid on the Turkmen in 1639,2 and by the mid-1640s a mass migration out of Mangyshlak was under way. Khorezm itself suffered Kalmyk attacks in 1625 and 1649.3 The exodus of significant numbers of Tashki and Ichki Salor out of the Balkhan and Mangyshlak yurts is confirmed by Abu’l Ghazi Khan’s account of his encounter with Qizil Ayaq Turkmen in the Atek region in the winter of 1640: I arrived at one of the auls [encampments], and meeting a young boy I asked him who lived there, and he responded they were Qizil Ayaq. ‘How did you come to be here?’ I asked. ‘In the past you inhabited Mangyshlak.’ ‘It was the Kalmyks,’ he answered. ‘They attacked us, pillaged us and took away our flocks.’4 Furthermore, when Abu’l Ghazi Khan subsequently took refuge from his brothers, first in Mangyshlak and then as an involuntary guest of the Kalmyks, he noted, ‘At that time the Turkmen of Mangyshlak were completely destitute and disorganized [buzulub] [. . . T]here remained only 700 families and they were under the domination of the Qalmaqs.’5 By the middle of the eighteenth century, the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii reveal that very few Salors and only scattered encampments of Esen Eli remained in the Mangyshlak yurt.

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So who were the ferocious tribal nomads whom the Russians called ‘Kalmyk’ and the Islamic sources named ‘Qalmaq’? They were a confederacy of four tribes who in the late sixteenth century broke away from the western Oyrat Mongols (also referred to in the sources as Junghars or Zunghars – the Mongol term for ‘left wing’), based at that time in the north-west desert of China. Two main tribes, the Torghut and the Dorbet, dominated the confederacy, and the sources often refer to the former as ‘Torghut Mongols’. Their leaders were not descendants of Chinggis and they were Buddhists rather than Muslims – two characteristics that distinguished them from the other major steppe powers of western Eurasia at that time. As a result, the Kalmyks could not claim legitimate authority over Uzbek or Kazakh rulers, and Central Asian chroniclers labelled them ‘infidels’. Yet they were so numerous and militarily powerful that they became the dominant force on the western Eurasian steppe for most of the seventeenth century. They migrated in large numbers with their families and flocks (i.e. they were settlers rather than raiders) across western Siberia in the first decade of that century, penetrating deep into the yurt of the Manghit ulus along the Emba and Yaik rivers and forcing the local nomads, principally Noghays, off their pasturelands. Ultimately, they drove the Noghays across the Volga River and all the way to the Kuban steppe in the north Caucasus. 6 At some point after 1610, the Torghut, Dorbet and Khoshut tribes from the Kalmyk confederacy established themselves in what had been the Noghay yurt.7 Between 1615 and 1620, they also undertook a series of long-distance raids that extended as far as Tobolsk and Tyumen in the north and across the Uzen and Samara rivers to Ufa in the north-west. Their first reported assault on Khorezm took place in 1625, and this may have been when the Turkmen first encountered Kalmyks, probably somewhere south of the Emba River, the traditional boundary between the Noghay and Turkmen yurts. By the late 1630s, the Kalmyks were

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launching major raids against the Turkmen of the Buzachi and Mangyshlak yurts.8 While the Esen Eli and Ichki Salor must have suffered the brunt of these raids, the mass exodus of Tekke, Saryk and Ersari from the Balkhan yurt in the 1640s suggests that the more southerly Tashki Salor were attacked as well. The Southern Yomut and Goklen tribes of the Astarabad– Gurgan– Atrek yurt were least affected by the Kalmyk attacks, although they suffered during the large-scale raid on Astarabad and Mazanderan in 1657– 8.9 As the passage from Abu’l Ghazi Khan’s account demonstrates (see above), the Kalmyk raids comprised much more than killing Turkmen warriors, seizing prisoners and capturing a few camels and sheep. Rather, they entailed the mass removal of flocks and the potential destruction of the Turkmen’s livelihood. The longterm socio-economic consequences for the Turkmen are difficult to determine, but other historical examples and modern anthropological research suggest that, deprived of their herds, they became destitute nomads with very limited options. They may have migrated to the oases, submitted to the Uzbek authorities in the hope of securing access to new pastures for their diminished herds, or become semi-sedentary pastoralists. Alternatively, they may have scattered and tried to join more economically viable tribes. Hence, their impoverishment was often accompanied by a process of tribal disintegration as individual clans or encampment units (oba or aul) sought to attach themselves to more powerful tribes. Even more damaging to ethno-tribal coherence was the process whereby the families of destitute nomadic tribesmen would abandon their clans and offer themselves as mercenaries to regional warlords. Many of these mercenaries ultimately lost their original tribal identities and became nukers (followers or retainers) of their chosen warlord, effectively becoming his tribesmen.10 Perhaps the least desirable option for a destitute Turkmen nomad was sedentarization – that is, substituting agriculture for pastoralism as his principal form of economic activity.11 The seventeenth-century

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sources fail to provide specific examples of sedentarization among the Turkmen in direct response to the Kalmyk raids, but there is some evidence – for example, Donduk Omba Khan’s letter – that the Ersari and other tribal groups residing in the Lebab yurt had essentially abandoned nomadic pastoralism by the middle of the next century.12 The political consequences of the Kalmyk raids are also shrouded in mystery. Was there any sort of resistance, or did the Turkmen simply flee in the face of a much more powerful enemy? Did the Turkmen elders – the aq saqals and serdars – surrender to the Kalmyks? Did the surviving but impoverished Turkmen submit in the hope of regaining some of their herds or simply being left in peace? Were tributary or other pastoral taxes imposed on them as a result of their defeat? Unfortunately, the Russian, Khivan and Bukharan sources provide no definitive answers, although there is some evidence that the Kalmyks continued to consider the Turkmen of Mangyshlak to be subjects of the Uzbek khans of Khorezm, at least for the first half of the seventeenth century, and therefore did not demand tribute from them. However, by the end of the century, the negotiation of political alliances between the Kalmyks and the Esen Eli implies some form of Turkmen submission. Subsequently, Donduk Omba Khan’s letter reveals that the Turkmen who fled back to Mangyshlak in 1740 were viewed as ‘Turkmen who had obligations to [the Kalmyk Ayuki Khan] and were subordinate to him’.13 In addition, it appears that the khans of Khiva considered the Turkmen of Mangyshlak to be their ‘subjects’ throughout the seventeenth century, although the sources provide no details about which tribes were involved in this relationship or whether they included all or some from the Esen Eli confederacy. Certainly, correspondence between Isfandyar Khan and the Russians in the 1630s proposes joint action against the Kalmyks in order to protect the Khan’s Turkmen subjects and preserve the smooth operation of the transit trade. This suggests that the Uzbeks of

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Khorezm believed they had responsibility for guaranteeing the well-being of the Turkmen, even if they did not consider them particularly loyal or subservient subjects.14 Although the ties between the Turkmen who remained on Mangyshlak and the Khivans had weakened considerably by the mid-eighteenth century, there are suggestions in the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii that they still viewed the Uzbeks of Khorezm as their traditional overlords, even though they were prepared to swear allegiance to another power in exchange for protection. By then, though, the principal threat to the Turkmen was not from the Kalmyks, but from the rapidly expanding Kazakhs.

The Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Kazakhs The Kazakhs, the most recent arrivals to the Mangyshlak yurt, feature prominently in the two Russian captains’ journals. As Michael Khodarkovsky writes, ‘If Russia’s relations with the steppe were dominated by the Nogays in the sixteenth century and the Kalmyks in the seventeenth, the Kazakhs took center stage in the eighteenth.’15 Similarly, if the Kalmyks represented the greatest danger to the livelihoods of the Mangyshlak Turkmen between 1620 and 1700, in the eighteenth century it was the Kazakhs, and especially those of the Kishi Zhuz (Lesser Horde). In many ways this was a direct result of Russian policies that encouraged the khans of the Kishi Zhuz and the Orta Zhuz (Middle Horde) to assume responsibility for the tribes of Mangyshlak. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Russians sought to recruit the Kazakhs as allies (or subjects) in opposition to the Kalmyks and the Uzbeks of Khorezm. Indeed, the Kazakhs started to migrate towards the central and western yurts of the Eurasian steppe in response to Russian offers of trade with the fortified outposts of western Siberia. Of course, the ultimate objective was to lure them more tightly into the imperial embrace. Much of the

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transformation of the Volga to Emba yurt – the rich pasturelands to the north and east of the Caspian Sea – from Kalmyk to Kazakh territory, and the subsequent impact on the Turkmen, occurred after the Kishi Zhuz’s submission to the Russians in 1730.16 While Russian policies encouraged the migration of the Kazakhs, it was attacks by their nomadic rivals – the Oyrat Mongols – that provided the impetus. In the early 1720s the Oyrat Mongols themselves had come under enormous pressure from the expanding Qing Empire. In response, they poured into the pasturelands of the Kazakh Ulugh Zhuz (Greater Horde) in the Seven Rivers region (Yeti-su in Turki; Semirechie in Russian) before continuing westwards, attacking the urban centres of the Orta Zhuz along the middle Syr Darya as they went. This precipitated the mass migration of Kazakh tribes towards the yurts that lay to the north-east of the Caspian Sea.17 By the spring of 1726, an encampment of 10,000 Kishi Zhuz tents was within two days’ walk of the Yaik River, which resulted in the displacement of nomads from the ulus of Dorji Nazar Tayishi, the easternmost Kalmyk ruler at that time.18 By the end of the year, the rich pasturelands stretching from the Emba to the Yaik – the yurt that lay closest to the northern reaches of the Mangyshlak Turkmen – had been completely overrun by the Kazakhs, led by the ambitious Abu’l Khayr Khan of the Kishi Zhuz and Baraq Sultan of the Orta Zhuz.19 Therefore, like the movement of the Kalmyk hordes a century earlier, the Kazakh threat comprised more than a series of raids in search of booty; it was the mass migration of an entire nomadic pastoral population that resulted in their occupation of vast swathes of pastureland. It is not known when the Turkmen first encountered the Kazakhs, but Donduk Omba Khan’s petition to Moscow suggests that a large number of the former tribesmen were displaced from the Mangyshlak yurt in the 1730s. Over the course of that decade the Russians negotiated the submission of the Kazakhs and formulated a series of policies towards their nomadic subjects that may have strongly influenced

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Russia’s dealings with the Turkmen. Central to these policies were measures designed to prevent nomads from moving to new yurts, with the intention of minimizing disruption to those who were already considered subjects of the Tsar. Equally important were inducements to cease raiding merchant caravans and instead trade peacefully with the Russian frontier outposts. The ultimate objective was to draw the nomads further into Russia’s commercial and political orbit by means of alliances and trade agreements with their rulers. In short, the Russians adopted a similar approach to the one they had employed with the Kalmyks during the previous century: they hoped that increased trade and lavish gifts would eventually lead to Kazakh dependency.20 All of these issues were discussed in detail by Abu’l Khayr Khan, his sons and the Russian envoy Gladyshev in the months leading up to Tebelev’s 1740 mission.21 However, none of this correspondence touched upon Kazakh relations with the Turkmen of the Mangyshlak yurt. Therefore, it is noteworthy that Donduk Omba Khan felt the need to mention that Kazakh aggression was impoverishing the Turkmen and driving them to Khorezm in his letter to Count Osterman. In doing so, he may have alerted Astrakhan to an unexpected side-effect of their Kazakh policy, one that Captain Tebelev may have been ordered to explore further. In summary, relations between the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Kazakhs of the Kishi Zhuz in the first half of the eighteenth century were strongly conditioned by two significant external influences: first, the complicated protocols of alliance and submission between the Russians and the Kazakhs; and, second, the Oyrat Mongols’ incursions into Kazakh territory. The Kazakhs’ resulting migration, encouraged by the Russians, into the Emba and Yaik yurts and on to the northern fringes of the Turkmen yurt represented a serious threat to the remaining Turkmen of Mangyshlak. The latter responded with petitions to the Russians – not for poddanstvo (submission) but for protetsiia (protection). The Russians, in turn, started to view the Turkmen

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from a new perspective: the relationship was no longer defined only by the traditional trading/pillaging paradigm. Instead, policies that the Russians had used to deal with the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs were now to be applied to the Turkmen. However, two critical questions remained. Who, if anyone, had authority over the Turkmen of Mangyshlak? And who were their legitimate leaders? If they were to enact their new policies, the Russians had to identify which leader – as they had earlier in the eighteenth century with Ayuki Khan of the Kalmyks and Abu’l Khayr Khan of the Kazakhs – had the authority to negotiate trade and protection treaties, and, more importantly, oaths of submission and allegiance. Resolving that conundrum seems to have been one of the principal motivations for Tebelev’s and Kopytovskii’s missions to the Turkmen of Mangyshlak.22

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CHAPTER 5 RUSSIAN—TURKMEN RELATIONS IN THE ERA OF PETER THE GREAT

As we have seen, Russia’s interactions with the Turkmen of Mangyshlak in the seventeenth century occurred within the matrix of a tripartite trading relationship among the Turkmen, the merchants of Astrakhan and the Uzbeks of Khorezm. However, Jenkinson’s mid-sixteenth-century account reveals that Europeans did not always understand the difference between Turkmen and Uzbeks (they were all merely inhabitants of Tartary); and this viewpoint continued, to some degree, throughout the subsequent century, as is evidenced in correspondence regarding the steppe peoples of Inner Asia from that period. Similarly, the term ‘Teziki’, as it was used in Astrakhan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was applied indiscriminately to Muslim traders, whether from Bukhara, Khiva, Balkh or Kabul, and indeed also to Turkmen. Unfortunately, the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century sources provide few insights into the Turkmen’s attitude towards their commercial and political relations with Astrakhan. Thus, it is impossible to know whether they saw themselves as independent

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participants or as subjects of the Uzbeks, Kalmyks or even Kazakhs. From the Russian perspective, however, as the MIUTT documents reveal, the Turkmen tribes that controlled the landing sites of Kabakli and Karagan were just another group of unruly and untrustworthy natives. Russian policies towards the Turkmen during the 150 years from Jenkinson’s voyage to the reign of Peter the Great may be characterized as a constant search for a regional authority that might assume responsibility for governing and controlling this recalcitrant tribal population. Over the course of the seventeenth century, the Russians’ opinion of the Turkmen was dictated primarily by the latter’s cooperation in or obstruction of the transit trade that travelled between Astrakhan and Bukhara. Whenever one of the Turkmen groups plundered a caravan, or disrupted the flow of trade in some other way, they became a problem. Yet the Russians’ preferred solution was not to enter into direct negotiations with the Turkmen themselves; rather, they sought recourse from one of the regional state powers, usually the Uzbek khanate of Khiva. Russia’s view of the Turkmen finally began to change in the early eighteenth century. However, this was not because the Turkmen altered their behaviour or because Russia realized that the collapse of the Yadigarid dynasty had transformed the Turkmen–Uzbek relationship. There is also no evidence that the Russians amended their policy in light of the century-long process of assimilation of the Turkmen tribes into the political, social and economic fabric of Khorezm. Rather, it seems that there was an independent evolution in Russian attitudes towards all of the native peoples of Inner Asia, and especially those of Central Asia. This change may be attributable to the well-documented transformation of cultural, social and political attitudes ushered in by Peter the Great. Here, we are concerned specifically with what the Tsar hoped to achieve through his eastern policies, and how these policies affected the Turkmen.1 Peter’s imperial ambitions with respect to the Caspian Sea, his attitude towards Persia in

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light of the decline of Safavid power and his approach to dealing with the khanates of Central Asia all had a significant impact on the Turkmen. However, notwithstanding the new policies towards the steppe peoples, exemplified by Peter’s more interventionist strategy towards the Kalmyks and Kazakhs, the decision to exploit the collapse of 200 years of Safavid rule in Persia, or the ambitious attempt to gain control of the trade routes to India, it was the long-term goal of curbing Ottoman power that provided most of the impetus for Russia’s non-European foreign policy for much of the eighteenth century. Russia’s interest in expanding its authority into the Caspian region – and transforming the sea into a Russian lake – was driven as much by concerns over Ottoman ambitions to control the Caucasus as it was by an explicit desire to establish control over Persia and Central Asia. Leaving aside these major geopolitical considerations, there is evidence that St Petersburg’s new-found interest in Central Asia, which resulted in a series of expeditions between 1715 and 1725, was ignited by three appeals that focused Tsar Peter’s attention on the region. In response to the first of these, written by Shah Niyaz Khan of Khiva (r. 1698– 1701) in 1700, the Tsar suggested that the Khan should consider becoming one of his subjects.2 The letter that elicited this rather supercilious reply has not survived, so we do not know the precise nature of Shah Niyaz Khan’s appeal, but it was probably no more than an opportunistic request for protection, in this case from attacks by the Kalmyk Ayuki Khan. However, as Russia’s outlook became increasingly imperialistic, it formed the basis for future misconceptions about the willingness of the Uzbek khans of Khorezm to submit to Russian authority. Khodja Muhammad Ashur Beg, an envoy of Yadigar Khan of Khiva (r. 1712 – 13), delivered the second appeal in 1713. He secured an agreement from Tsar Peter’s court to supply the Uzbeks with muskets, cannons and other military equipment for their ongoing conflict with the Kalmyks. More significantly, Ashur Beg is also credited with planting in Peter the Great’s

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already receptive mind the idea that there was gold in the region of the upper Amu Darya as well as the even more tempting notion that the course of the river could be diverted into the long-dry Uzboy channel so that it flowed into the Caspian Sea, which would open up a new maritime and riverine route to India.3 The third and final appeal came from Khodja Nefes, a Mangyshlak Turkmen trader and elder from either the Salor or the Chodor tribe who met with a group of Russian merchants in Astrakhan in 1713. He reportedly confirmed Ashur Beg’s claim that the Amu Darya could be diverted to the Caspian by breaching the main dam that blocked the Daryalyk Channel near the site of Old Urgench in Khorezm.4 This information reinforced Tsar Peter’s determination to establish a maritime and riverine route through Central Asia to India. It eventually found its way into a report commissioned by the Russian Admiralty in early 1714 and drafted by an officer of the elite Preobrazhinksy Regiment, Devlet Kisden Mirza, a Kabard Muslim from the Caucasus who had recently converted to Christianity and was now known as Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii.5 As a direct result of this report, the Tsar commissioned Bekovich-Cherkasskii to launch a series of scientific expeditions to the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea and simultaneously undertake military campaigns across the steppe to Khorezm. In principle, the latter were designed to confirm Peter’s assumption that the Uzbek requests for protection were precursors to formal submission. Bekovich-Cherkasskii set off on his first mission from Astrakhan in April 1715. He carried orders to identify suitable locations for trading posts or forts, explore the course of the Uzboy channel and, if possible, find gold. These expeditions are considered the Russians’ first serious attempts to explore the Caspian Sea, and the first official maps of the region date from this period.6 However, the khanate of Khiva had a new leader following the assassination of Yadigar Khan in 1713 – Shir Ghazi Khan – and he was much less interested in pursuing a policy of

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rapprochement. Nevertheless, the Russians seemed to assume that Shah Niyaz Khan’s original ‘offer of submission’ was still in effect, and therefore that all of Khiva’s subsequent rulers would be equally subservient. Indeed, it was probably this assumption that prompted them to send military expeditions into Khivan territory. Shir Ghazi Khan took a rather different view: he interpreted the Russian incursions as unjustified attacks on Uzbek sovereign territory. It should be noted that the earliest surviving letter published in any of the archival compilations from a Mangyshlak Turkmen elder to the Russian authorities dates from this period. It appears in RTO and comprises a report to the Governor of Astrakhan in which the elder describes the assistance the Turkmen provided to Bekovich-Cherkasskii’s first expedition.7 Several other letters also appear in RTO, all of them forming part of the earliest easily accessible record of communication between the Russians and the Turkmen. Therefore, as an original (although possibly redacted) source, the letters in RTO dated between 1715 and 1721 allow us to hear the voices of the Turkmen of Mangyshlak for the first time. While we must be wary of the degree to which the documents were specially selected for inclusion in the anthology, and of the accuracy (or otherwise) of the translations, nevertheless, these letters deserve more attention and detailed study, for they represent valuable examples of the discourse of the Russian – Turkmen frontier encounter in the early years of the eighteenth century.8 Bekovich-Cherkasskii’s third and final expedition ultimately comprised a full-blown military campaign against the khanate of Khiva, even though the Tsar’s ukaz (edict) to the Prince and his gramota (letter) to Shir Ghazi Khan both suggest that the original intention was simply to re-establish proper commercial and political relations between the two sides. The Russian forces – a combination of Cossacks and elite regiments – set off from Yaitsk (later Guryev) in June 1717, accompanied by several Tatar

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notables from Astrakhan, a Kalmyk guide (provided by Ayuki Khan) and the ubiquitous Khodja Nefes. It is unclear whether Bekovich-Cherkasskii was instructed to obtain Shir Ghazi Khan’s oath of submission, but he was certainly ordered to secure the release of a number of Russian captives – an issue that would become an increasingly important facet of Russia’s relations with Central Asia throughout the rest of the century.9 After surviving a harrowing march in oppressive heat across the steppe in which many pack animals and provisions were lost, the force engaged in several skirmishes with raiding parties sent out from Khiva. Shir Ghazi Khan imprisoned Tsar Peter’s first envoy – the Astrakhan noble Kireitov – but on the basis of information from the duplicitous Kalmyk guide, who appeared to be playing both sides, he finally allowed Bekovich-Cherkasskii to present letters from the Tsar. Then, in what the Turkmen historian Murad Annanepesov describes as an act of ‘unwarranted and unpardonable credulity’, Bekovich-Cherkasskii agreed to the Khan’s proposal that he should divide his forces among the Besh Qala’ – Khorezm’s five fortresses – which were subsequently assaulted and defeated one by one. All of the Russian officers were killed, the foot soldiers were sold into slavery (mostly in the market in Bukhara) and Bekovich-Cherkasskii himself was brought before Shir Ghazi Khan and cruelly executed. Eyewitnesses reported that he insisted to the end that he was the Tsar’s ambassador, not a military leader, and should be treated in accordance with diplomatic protocols.10 Thus, Peter the Great’s initial efforts to assert Russian dominance over the Caspian and into Central Asia ended in ignominious defeat. One consequence of this failure was a reassessment of Russian policy towards the East. Indeed, the documentary evidence suggests that there was a complete cessation of official correspondence among Russia, Khiva, Bukhara and the Mangyshlak Turkmen for almost 25 years. Annanepesov points to several Turkmen attempts to convince the Russian authorities that this cessation of relations was

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unjustified because Turkmen had played no part in the massacre; in fact, they had tried to help Bekovich-Cherkasskii at every opportunity. Citing the RTO documents as well as an 1853 article by A.N. Popov which contains a number of survivors’ accounts, including that of Khodja Nefes, Annanepesov attempts to marshal evidence in support of the official Soviet doctrine of longstanding friendship between Turkmen and Russians. In particular, he highlights eyewitness statements that Bekovich-Cherkasskii saved Khodja Nefes’s life by allowing him to hide in a cart for three days and thereby avoid the massacre. Nevertheless, and despite Khodja Nefes’s impassioned testimony under interrogation in Astrakhan and Kazan, over the next several decades the Russians abandoned the Caspian trading forts and terminated all contact with the Turkmen because they held them partly responsible for the deaths of Bekovich-Cherkasskii and his officers. To some extent, this was justified, as Shir Ghazi Khan’s forces included a number of Turkmen nukers; and, incited by the Khivans, the Balkhan Turkmen had attacked Russian settlements on the Caspian coast.11 The Bekovich-Cherkasskii debacle was a significant event in Russia’s early colonial history. Indeed, it occupies such a prominent place in Russia’s perception of its historical relations with Central Asia that it is instructive to contrast the Russian perspective with that of the Uzbeks, as reflected in their own version of what happened in 1717. The Khivan chronicle Firdaws al-Iqbal is concise and to the point: In the year of the Hen, one of the Russian ‘toreler’ [a Chinggisid term for princes], Dowlat Keray [Devlet Giray],12 together with Andrey Guburnat and 30,000 Russians, arrived in the region of Aral, coveting the Shaykh Jabil Mountain, which is a gold and silver mine, and indeed wishing to conquer Khorezm. The khan charged the Qongrat Qul Muhammad Ataliq and the Nayman Amir

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’Avaz Inaq, with an innumerable army, to defend the country. They made a false peace with Dawlat Keray, and under the pretext of a feast, sent the enemies of the Muslim community to the hospitality of the depths of hell.13 Despite a series of official inquiries into the causes of the massacre, the Russians continued to ignore numerous pleas from Mangyshlak elders for a resumption of the transit trade through Karagan until 1741, when Count Osterman received Donduk Omba Khan’s request for assistance. However, this did not mean that Russia lost all interest in its southern and eastern borders. Perhaps the most striking consequence of the failure of BekovichCherkasskii’s mission was the reorientation of Russia’s foreign policy towards Persia. From 1717 to 1725, Peter the Great exploited the collapse of Safavid rule to invade the south-western coastal regions of the Caspian Sea and frustrate Ottoman imperial ambitions in the region. In addition, between 1720 and 1722, during the leadership of Governor Volynskii, several expeditions left Astrakhan to explore the south-eastern Caspian coast. It was on one of these missions that Soimonov mapped eastern Mazanderan and Astarabad. These borderland regions under Safavid rule were the traditional ulka (assigned territories) of Qajar regional governors who, with their tribesmen, defended the empire’s frontiers against incursions by the Gireyli, Goklen and Yomut Turkmen residing in the Astarabad– Gurgan – Atrek yurt. Soimonov’s reports include perhaps the first record of contact between the Russians and the Turkmen of this region.14 Although these invasions of Persian territory did not lead to an immediate improvement in Russia’s relations with the Mangyshlak Turkmen, they did mark a major expansion of Russian power in the Caspian basin. From the time of Tsar Peter’s death in January 1725 to the dispatch of Captain Tebelev’s mission to Mangyshlak in June 1741, a number of transformative events across western Eurasia

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had a major impact on relations between the Russians and the Turkmen. The most significant of these was the aforementioned collapse of Safavid rule in Persia and the consequent decline of Qizilbash power in the north Khurasan borderlands. This disintegration of the Safavids’ control over Persia’s frontier with Central Asia had an immediate and profound effect on the Turkmen tribes of the Astarabad– Gurgan– Atrek and the Atek – Akhal yurts. The devolution of power from central Isfahan to the various peripheral regions of the former Safavid Empire resulted in 15 years of localized conflicts and rivalries that seriously compromised the borderlands’ defences.15 Sensing an opportunity, in the 1720s and 1730s the Uzbeks of Khorezm, well supported by their Turkmen nukers and allies, launched a series of annual chapaauls against the weakened Qizilbash garrisons across the ulka – from Astarabad and the Atek to the Marv and Tezhend oases. Adding to the confusion was the presence of nearly a dozen Safavid pretenders who attempted to legitimize the ambitions of various regional warlords. One of these warlords – Nadir Afshar – finally managed to overcome his rivals by harnessing the support of the last remaining Safavids. A member of the Afshar oymaq (one of the Qizilbash tribal groups), he first took the name Tahmasp Quli Khan (the slave of Shah Tahmasp) before being declared Nadir Shah in 1736.16 His rise to power and struggles against the Uzbeks and Turkmen in the north Khurasan borderlands eventually escalated into a full-scale invasion of Central Asia and the consequent flight of many Turkmen. This, in turn, prompted Donduk Omba Khan’s plea for help and the missions of Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii.

Nadir Shah Afshar in Central Asia Along with the Uzbeks, the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs, Nadir Shah Afshar played a major role in determining the fate of the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, as revealed in the journals of Tebelev and

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Kopytovskii. Nadir Afshar grew up in the final years of the seventeenth century near Abivard, a frontier town of the Safavid Empire, at the eastern end of the Atek – Akhal yurt, near presentday Ashkhabad. The Afshar oymaq were minor members of the provincial Qizilbash military administration. However, unlike other regional leaders who rose to prominence amid the remnants of the Safavid Empire – such as Fath Ali Khan Qajar, his son Muhammad Hasan Qajar and Karim Khan Zand – Nadir Afshar did not enjoy hereditary status as a tribal or even clan chieftain. Hence, he had to assemble a loyal army of mercenaries over the course of a decade of warfare, raiding and marriage alliances in the 1720s. This force was held together almost entirely by Nadir Shah’s military genius. Moreover, he was politically adept, as shown by his skilful manipulation of Shah Tahmasp, who appointed him Qurchi-bashi (commander-in-chief) in 1726. Thereafter, Nadir Afshar consolidated his power until he was able to declare himself Shah at the quriltai (tribal assembly) at Mughan in 1736.17 Nadir Shah’s significance in Russian – Turkmen relations derives primarily from the consequences of his Central Asian campaigns of the early 1740s, but he also had a major impact on the Turkmen of Khorezm and the north Khurasan borderlands in an earlier period. Indeed, the Uzbeks of Khorezm and their Turkmen allies were significant foes of Nadir Afshar and the Qizilbash garrisons from the 1720s onwards. The chronicler Mehdi Khan Astarabadi explains, ‘As the frontiers of Khurasan frequently endured attacks and pillaging by the Uzbeks and Turkmen from Khwarazm [Khorezm] and because Khurasan province had been ruined by their raids, Nadir Shah thought continually of revenge and retribution against Khwarazm.’18 When reviewing Nadir Shah’s Central Asian campaigns, it is worth remembering the direct link between these attacks and Tebelev’s and Kopytovskii’s missions to the Turkmen of Mangyshlak. Donduk Omba Khan’s letter to the Russians was

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triggered by the massive migration of Turkmen in the autumn of 1740 into territories once considered to be under Kalmyk control. On receipt of his request for assistance, the Governor of Astrakhan was promptly instructed to dispatch Tebelev on the first official Russian mission to the Mangyshlak Peninsula in 23 years in order to establish what had caused the exodus. Unlike Tebelev when he embarked on his mission, we have a good idea of the basic course of events, largely due to Astarabadi’s detailed account. In June 1740, not long after returning to Khurasan from his conquest of India, Nadir Shah departed from his capital, Herat, with a substantial portion of his Indian invasion force. The army passed through the newly conquered Afshar dominions of Maruchaq, Andkhoi and Aqcha before arriving at Balkh at the start of August.19 They then marched north to the Amu Darya, where they were joined by teams of boat-builders from the Punjab campaign. Having constructed a flotilla of 1,000 ships, Nadir split his forces in two and proceeded downriver, with most of the troops marching along the southern (or left) bank. In mid-August they reached Kerki and entered the region of the Bukharan khanate known as the Lebab yurt, a strip of fertile riparian land which boasted canals, lush pastures, irrigated fields and towns. This had been the primary yurt of the Ersari and a number of other Turkmen tribes since the midseventeenth century, when the khans of Bukhara had awarded them the territory. On arrival, Nadir Shah ordered his son, Riza Quli, to lead 8,000 men through the yurt and on to the main river crossing at the town of Chardjui, approximately 200 kilometres downriver, where they would build a bridge of boats to enable the troops to cross to the Bukharan side. Meanwhile, Ali Quli Afshar, Nadir’s favourite nephew, crossed the river at Kerki itself and led a smaller detachment along the northern (right) bank, parallel to Riza Quli’s forces. Astarabadi recounts that Ali Quli was instructed:

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to set up crossings and to protect the tribesmen and inhabitants that were submissive and obedient, but to punish the disobedient [. . . S]everal of the tribes put their necks in the collar of obedience, others who tried to plunge from the path of obedience and to flee were condemned to death and pillaged.20 Another passage from the same text is even more illuminating. With respect to the Turkmen who were living on the southern bank, between Kerki and Chardjui, Astarabadi states: ‘Riza Quli Mirza was unsuccessful in amassing spoils because the population of that province had already migrated to Khwarazm [Khorezm].’21 Another Persian chronicler, Muhammad Kazim of Marv, who witnessed the campaign in person, more or less corroborates this version of events: Nadir Shah commanded that 500 boats with sails be loaded with provisions and sent from Kerki to Chardjui. Having learned of the arrival of the Shah that threatened them, the Turkmen loaded their women and children on camels and other animals and fled to Mangyshlak.22 Unfortunately, our main Khorezmian Uzbek source, the Firdaws al-Iqbal, is strangely silent on these early stages of the campaign. It takes up the story only after Nadir Shah has launched his attack on Khiva, and even then there is no mention of a sudden, massive influx of Turkmen into Khorezm. A less well-known contemporary Bukharan Uzbek source, the Tarikh-i-Rahim Khani (also known as the Tuhfat al-Khani) of Muhammad Vefa Karminagi, reports: ‘The Turkmen tribe and all the army of the steppe decided to protect their property and to defend their families and children, so they set out en masse into the desert and went to their yurt.’ However, this passage may be describing events that occurred after the Battle of Hazarasp, which was fought a few months after the

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march to Chardjui, in November 1740. Moreover, it is possible that Karminagi simply read and paraphrased one of the aforementioned Afsharid Persian chronicles: note the similarity between his text and Muhammad Kazim’s account of the Turkmen’s flight. Finally, Karminagi’s use of the term ‘yurt’ is somewhat problematic. In the Russian translation of his account, which appears in MITT, ‘yurt’ is translated as ‘homeland’, as if to imply that this region was the original base of the Turkmen, rather than simply an area that they happened to occupy at the time.23 Thus, we cannot be certain which geographic location Karminagi is describing. If he is referring to the Mangyshlak yurt, then the term makes sense only if we interpret it to mean the Turkmen’s original homeland, rather than somewhere within the region of Bukhara or Khorezm. Regardless of the exact meanings of these terms, we have four contemporary accounts that all refer to the flight of the Turkmen inhabitants of the Lebab yurt in search of refuge somewhere to the west: Donduk Omba Khan, Astarabadi, Muhammad Kazim and Karminagi. However, the exact moment when this mass migration began, the number of Turkmen who fled and their final destination all remain unclear. After receiving the submission of the Bukharan Uzbeks, Nadir Shah crossed back to the southern bank of the Amu Darya, entered Khorezm, and repulsed several attacks by Yomut and Tekke (Turkmen) war parties that Ilbars Khan of Khiva had dispatched against him. He finally defeated the combined Uzbek and Turkmen forces in battle at Fitnak in November 1740 and captured and executed Ilbars Khan.24 By the end of the year, Nadir Shah had set up a puppet Chinggisid khan whose loyalty to Afsharid dominion in Khorezm was assured. While still in Khiva, before departing for Khurasan, he met with two Russians, Muravin and Gladyshev, who originally had been sent to Abu’l Khayr Khan, leader of the Kazakh Kishi Zhuz, to investigate the situation in Central Asia. Their reports, as well as those of two English merchant-envoys, George Thomson and Reynold Hogg, provide further information on

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events in Khorezm. They reveal that Nadir Shah liberated 12,000 captive slaves, mainly ‘Persians’ who had been seized in raids on Khurasan (in theory Shi’a, but some may have been Kurds), as well as ten Russians.25 This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of Nadir Shah’s relations with the Russians, but it is worth noting that the latter withdrew their armies from Persia without ever coming into direct conflict with him. There is reason to believe that each side was determined to maintain good relations with the other. Perhaps, in light of their respective conflicts with the Ottomans and the Uzbeks, they both adopted the policy of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’. The era of indirect Afshar rule in Khorezm from 1740 to 1745 also merits brief mention if we are to gain a full understanding of the complex interplay among the various parties during this crucial period of Central Asian history – the Uzbeks of Khorezm and Bukhara; the Kazakhs; Nadir Shah’s Qizilbash governors; and the Khorezm Turkmen – as well as the impact this convoluted situation had on relations between the Russians and the Turkmen of Mangyshlak. At first, Nadir Shah attempted to install a Bukharan pretender as Khan of Khiva, then supported the claim of Abu’l Khayr Khan, Russia’s Kazakh prote´ge´. However, the Yomut Turkmen of Khorezm led several revolts against Afshar rule, most significantly in 1743– 4, when they managed to seize control of the khanate. However, in 1745 Nadir Shah finally sent his nephew Ali Quli to pacify the region. The latter subsequently defeated the Yomuts and their Turkmen allies, mostly Chodors and Salors, and drove them out of southern Khorezm.26 This may have resulted in a second mass migration to Mangyshlak and possibly explains the reports of the Turkmen’s presence at the Karagan Landing that appear in Kopytovskii’s journal.

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CONCLUSION

Part I of this book has attempted to show how the missions of Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii to Mangyshlak was preceded by two centuries of interactions between the Russians and the Turkmen across the Caspian frontier, their joint involvement in the long-distance transit trade between Central Asia and Astrakhan, and complicated interrelations among the Uzbeks, the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs. Contact between the Russians and the Turkmen became more direct over the course of the seventeenth century, and by the end of that century their relationship was strongly conditioned by Russia’s prior experiences with other native peoples of the Eurasian steppe, principally the Kalmyks and Kazakhs. The major issues revealed in the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii – terms of trade, building fortified trading posts, gift-giving, freeing captive Russians and protocols of protection, submission and allegiance to the Tsar – were all familiar themes for the Russians after their extensive dealings with other tribal steppe peoples. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that these subjects were also of paramount importance in the mideighteenth-century frontier encounters that the journals describe. As they were written some 70 years prior to the better-known report of Muraviev, often considered the earliest detailed Russian

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account of the Turkmen, the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii represent a useful starting point for any examination of Russian imperial expansion in Central Asia. The two captains’ missions mark the beginning of 150 years of increasingly direct and contentious contact between the Russians and Turkmen, culminating in the defeat of the Yomut in 1874, the subjugation of the Tekke at Goktepe and Marv in the 1880s and ultimately the conquest and occupation of the whole of Turkmenia.

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PART II THE JOURNALS OF CAPTAIN TEBELEV (1741) AND CAPTAIN KOPYTOVSKII (1745)

First published in Krasnyi Arkhiv, Istoricheskii Zhurnal, vol. 2, no. 93, 1939. Extracts and introduction by V. Razumovskaia. Translated from the Russian with preface and annotation by Claora E. Styron.

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION Claora E. Styron

To further his imperial ambitions, Peter the Great needed interpreters and translators in order to communicate with the nomadic and sedentarized people living on his south-eastern frontier. He ordered young men to learn Turkish, Tatar and Persian.1 However, 15 years after his death, when Captain Tebelev sailed in 1741, the Tatar language, a vestige of the once-powerful Mongol Empire, was still the lingua franca or common language of communication between the Russians and the nomadic peoples. Like Major-General Tevkelev, the ‘architect’ of Russia’s policies towards the Kazakhs and Vice-Governor of Orenburg, both Captain Tebelev and Captain Kopytovskii, in sailing to the Turkmen on Mangyshlak, were instructed to keep journals, or diaries, in which they recorded information about their travels among the nomadic peoples on the Russian frontier. Those journals were actually government reports destined finally for the Foreign Office.2 They were written in a form and style which have the appearance of a contemporary personal narrative with journalistic panache.

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More importantly, the journals of Captain Tebelev and Captain Kopytovskii were the final products of a chain of oral interpretations and written translations across as many as five languages – Kalmyk, Kazakh, Turkmen and Tatar to Russian. The captains were obliged, because they did not know the languages of the frontier, to inscribe in their journals what they thought had been orally interpreted and transmitted to them via the battery of interpreters and translators travelling with them. The chain of interpretation was a multi-step process that passed through a number of individuals both to and from the Captain and undoubtedly was time-consuming, even by the standards of the day. An interpreter (tolmach) was often illiterate and transmitted his findings orally. A translator ( perevodchik) could both read and write, and knew how to compose letters, petitions, contracts and promissory notes, and how to formulate the elaborate forms of address and appropriate phrasing requisite in addressing dignitaries and high government officials. As the journals of the two captains reveal, the interpreters played a pivotal role in their understanding of local customs and practices, reading clues, tones, gestures of non-verbal language, interpreting information and, in effect, mediating between them and the nomadic people. As such, it has been noted, ‘Russian interpreters accompanying embassies to nomadic peoples were often held responsible for insufficient gifts and were routinely threatened, beaten and otherwise abused.’3 In their diaries Captain Tebelev and Captain Kopytovskii refer by name to some of their interpreters, in particular a Tatar Musa, or Musa Utenov, from the Astrakhan yurt, who travelled with both expeditions. He was probably a Nogai whose people in 1650 had been allowed by the Tsar to settle in a walled compound outside Astrakhan, but not bring weapons into town.4 The Russians also used freed or escaped Russian prisoners who had been held captive in Central Asia as interpreters. Captain Tebelev, for example, also

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travelled with a Monastyrskii who, owing to his Russian name, may have been one of them, if not a Christianized Tatar. Significantly, both expeditions were accompanied by an abyz (Muslim cleric). The same word is also used to mean a literate man. The abyz wrote the letters and petitions, and likely served as a scribe for the captains in writing their journals. This raises the question of how Captain Tebelev and Captain Kopytovksii, in the to and fro of conversation and turmoil of boisterous disputes, were able to document what was being said. Did they work from recall or dictation in their cabins on the ship? Were they always accompanied by a scribe who recorded what the interpreter was saying? In the twenty-first century, with its fascination for information technology, the methods by which that chain of communication between the captains and the nomads took place would be interesting to establish in detail. From another perspective, the historians Yuri Slezkine and Michael Khodarkovsky have both written that, more often than not, regardless of what words were exchanged or finally written down, there were contradictory subtexts and understandings implicit in communication between Russian government officials and the nomadic peoples.5 Several rich subtexts are implicit in the journals of the captains. Hunger was a bargaining chip on both sides. Historically, translators and interpreters have played exceptional roles in the encounters between different societies and cultures. For example, Alexander the Great travelled with many interpreters; Corte´s, during his invasion and conquest of Mexico, was assisted by the multilingual Malinche; Sacajawea guided and interpreted for Lewis and Clark’s exploration of the Pacific Northwest. An important player in the Russian advance into Central Asia in the early eighteenth century was the Tatar translator Tevkelev, who eventually became a major-general and, in the 1740s, was the de facto Governor of Orenburg. He was instrumental in implementing tsarist policy towards the Kazakhs

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of the Lesser Zhuz (Orda or Horde) who had become Russian subjects in 1731 and were raiding the Turkmen of Mangyshlak in the 1740s. In 1939, the journals of Captain Tebelev and Captain Kopytovksii were excerpted, edited and published by V. Razumovskaia in Krasnyi Arkhiv under the general title ‘Iz istorii snosheniia Rossii s turkmenami v XVIII vekov’, along with several other documents which also related to Russo-Turkmen relations in that period. The journal was the organ of the Central Archive of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). Razumovskaia added a few annotations, which appear in round brackets, and some footnotes; and she noted omissions with ellipses. There are unclarified points such as discontinuities in the narrative of Captain Kopytovskii’s journal and in the numbered sections in which it appears to be organized – for example, between Sections 39 and 44 and Sections 64 and 69, among others. Noteworthy is the omission of the 25 points presented by the Turkmen mullah Murat Niaz to Captain Kopytovskii in Section 27. Little is known about Razumovskaia, although she also wrote an introduction to Vasilii Bakunin’s ‘Opisanie istorii kalmytskogo naroda’, which appears in the same volume of Krasnyi Arkhiv. As English translator of Razumovskaia’s selections, without recourse to the originals, which are in the Russian State Archives, I edited and annotated the text and completed and expanded the footnotes. All of my annotations appear in square brackets. Where sentences and paragraphs are very long, I have added punctuation and some new paragraphs to differentiate between speaking voices obscured in a chain of interpreters. Eighteenth-century Russian is characterized by a grammar in flux, with sparse punctuation, irregular spelling and verb forms; sometimes there are multiple variants of an individual’s name, such as that of Mukhammed Berdy bek. All original spellings and variants of personal names have been retained unless otherwise indicated. The names of clans

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and tribes have also been retained as they appear in Razumovskaia’s excerpts, with contemporary spellings added in square brackets: for example, Umut [Iomut]. Transliterated words follow the Library of Congress system for Russian transliteration. I am grateful to Viktor Zhivov for his counsel and kind attention with regard to certain passages, and to Yuri Slezkine for his careful reading of the final manuscript.

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INTRODUCTION V. Razumovskaia Translated by Claora E. Styron

For a long time trade routes in Central Asia had attracted the attention of the [Russian] tsars who wanted to secure a preeminent position in trade relations between East and West. Those routes either lay overland across the steppes of the Kazakhs and the Nogai or over the Caspian Sea from Mangyshlak to Astrakhan. But safe passage of merchant caravans from Central Asia to Russia was impeded by the nomadic peoples of the steppe: ‘. . . traders from Khiva, Bukhara, Balkh, and India with lots of goods for Russia don’t dare travel to the town of Guriev because the merchants are attacked and ruined by the Kalmyks, or robbed, murdered, and taken prisoner by the Turkmen of Karagan’.1 In order to improve routes to the markets of the East the Russians needed to establish a commanding position on the isthmus between the Black and Caspian seas and in the territories occupied by the Kirgiz-Kaisats [hereafter, Kazakh] orda. Regarding the significance of the Kazakh orda [moving camp] to Russian trade routes with Central Asia, Peter the First [hereafter, Peter the Great] observed, ‘Although the Kirgiz-Kasaits orda are a people of the

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steppe . . . those people are the key and gate to all the Asian countries.’2 The government of the tsars gave particular attention to the question of securing safe passage for merchant caravans to Central Asia across the Kazakh steppe. In 1763, a special treaty was signed with the Khan of the Kazakhs in which henceforth, ‘the Khan guaranteed safe passage of merchant caravans and goods from East to West, and if there were mishaps in Kirgiz-Kasaits territory resulting in losses or harm, as was sometimes the case, then the Khan would consider himself responsible’.3 However, despite the allegiance of the Kazakhs to Russia and diplomatic relations between the khans and the tsars of Russia, the plundering of Central Asian caravans continued in the Kazakh steppe. Therefore, it became an urgent matter to find safer trade routes for Russian and Central Asian trade. The nearest and safest route lay across the Caspian Sea through the Mangyshlak [Peninsula] and further along the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, which was occupied by Turkmen tribes. Trade relations between Russia and the Turkmen had begun a very long time ago. It is known that merchants from Astrakhan traded with Turkmen along the coast of the Caspian Sea as far back as the seventeenth century. The major trading station was Tiub Karagan, a promontory on the Mangyshlak Peninsula. There was a small landing stage [pristan] to which Astrakhan merchants shipped goods. Trade relations assumed greater importance with the Turkmen in the eighteenth century during the reign of Peter the Great who was very interested in ‘the opening of a free trade route for merchants to Bukhara, Badakhshan, Balkh, and India’.4 Peter the Great understood the paramount importance of water routes for his time and gave special attention to their development in his relations with the East. It was his intention to do this not only on the Caspian Sea but also on the Amu Daria River[,] turning its course from the Aral Sea to a former channel.

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On 29 May 1714, Peter issued a decree to equip an expedition for Khiva, and in 1715, Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii was ordered to go to the Caspian Sea to explore the eastern littoral and to resolve ‘whether it is true or not that the Amu Daria River, having made its course from Bukhara, exited into that sea?’ Bekovich-Cherkasskii had learned that in the Turkmen steppe there was a dried-up valley, the Kunia Daria (ancient river), that flowed from the Amu Daria River to the Caspian Sea. On both sides of the dried-up valley ancient dwellings, abandoned towns and excavations of irrigation ditches could be seen, and ‘it is known that there used to be water in that valley’. In 1716, Peter the Great met with Bekovich-Cherkasskii who reported to him in person at Libav that ‘there is evidence of the mouth of that river in the Bay of Krasnovodsk [also referred to as Krasnye vody, Red Waters]’. Peter dispatched Bekovich a second time with a detachment of 6,000 men and commanded him to build a fort for 1,000 men ‘in the harbour where the mouth of the Amu Daria once was’. Then he was to proceed to Khiva as ambassador and survey the course of the river and any dams on it and, if possible, determine whether the river [Amu Daria] could be diverted into its ancient channel once other outlets to the Aral Sea had been dammed. Bekovich-Cherkasskii on his second expedition to the Caspian Sea established forts at Tiub Karagan [and] at the southern end of the Bay of Krasnovodsk, [and] on Alexander Bay[,] named for Bekovich. In 1717, Bekovich perished on the march to Khiva along with his entire detachment, and the forts he had established were demolished by the Turkmen. The demise of the Bekovich expedition did not deter Peter, however. In 1722, with the aim of securing Russian trade on the shores of the Caspian Sea, he undertook a campaign to Persia. A contemporary of Peter’s, Soimonov, who had explored the eastern littoral of the Caspian and accompanied Peter on his Persian campaign, wrote in his journal, An Exploration of the

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Eastern Littoral of the Caspian Sea, that Peter, on strengthening his position on Caspian shores, was counting on [a journey of] only 12 days from Astarabad to Balkh and Badakhshan, then to all Bukhara, the centre of all eastern commerce, and that no one would be able to obstruct that route.5 After the death of Peter the Great, expeditions continued to be sent to explore the Caspian Sea. In 1741, Captain Tebelev travelled on the ship of a merchant named Loshkarev ostensibly to trade on the eastern shore. Captain Kopytovskii went in 1745, then Lodyzhenskii in 1764, and a host of others have left interesting writings about the shores of the Caspian Sea. We publish here, after editing for redundancies and fine detail, the travel journals of Captains Tebelev and Kopytovskii as well as some correspondence from the Foreign Office at the time of Catherine II about the desirability of establishing trade on the Mangyshlak route by building a Russian fort, and about the methods the Tsarist government employed to strengthen influence over the Turkmen tribes.6 There is material published about the Turkmen, which is already known in academic circles,7 that illuminates to some extent the social relations of the Turkmen tribes of the Transcaspian. Those tribes that were experiencing continual destruction by the Persian army during its attacks on Balkh, Badakhshan and Bukhara sought safety by shifting their nomadic territories. For example, in 1741, the Kalmyk Khan, Donduk Omba, a Russian subject, reported to the Foreign Office that a number of Turkmen tribes had come to their ancestral nomadic territories on Mangyshlak8 as a consequence of the Persian Nadir Shah’s campaigns against Khiva and Bukhara. Because of those events, as well as being in extreme need of grain, those tribes were interested in establishing permanent relations with Russia; the clan– feudal hierarchy of those tribes, counting on strengthening its own position, was not even opposed to swearing allegiance to Russia.

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However, repeated petitions by the Turkmen to become subjects of Russia did not impede their raiding of Russian trade caravans[;] moreover, not only content with taking merchandise, they took captives and later sold them in the markets of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand. Even though the Turkmen elders in their petitions said that it would be desirable to build a fort on Mangyshlak, in actuality they revealed no particular desire to see Russian troops there, and did not identify suitable sites on the Caspian coast to construct a fort, and also impeded the research efforts of Russian expeditions on the coast. To Lodyzhenskii, who said that he was looking for a location to develop a ‘suitable harbour’, the Turkmen announced they would not allow a fort to be constructed, and they hampered productive research ‘and fired on the expedition with guns’. The government of Russia, in turn, procrastinated about the question of accepting the Turkmen as subjects, reckoning that it would be of no use at all to Russia for the Turkmen, in the opinion of the Tsarist government, ‘in wanting to become Russian subjects were counting on being made safe by the building of a fort but as soon as danger was past, they would regret it [that decision] and abandon [that] fort, dispersing in all directions’. For that reason, it decided ‘to take them in hand without taking them as subjects’. In order to deserve the ‘mercy’ of the Tsarist government, it was proposed that they ‘conduct themselves sweetly with the merchants from Astrakhan who travelled to Mangyshlak for their benefit, and not to instigate effronteries, commit any harm or obscenities, and to permit those merchants to pass freely who wanted to proceed on with their goods from Mangyshlak to Khiva, and also to attend to their every need’. It was also proposed to the Turkmen to return all the Russians to Russia that they had captured and to assist any Russians who found themselves in unfortunate circumstances on the Turkmen coasts. Only after there was real evidence that the Turkmen had fulfilled the

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proposals made to them would the Tsar of Russia promise to receive them as subjects. In addition, the Tsarist government used the Kazakh khans, who were its subjects, to subjugate the Turkmen to its influence. Pir Ali, the son of a Kazakh khan, was dispatched to Mangyshlak to act as a Turkmen khan ‘so as better to observe those people’. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century were the Russian tsars finally successful in ‘taking in hand’ the freedomloving Turkmen. Only after military expeditions marked by the exceptional savagery of the ‘White generals’ were the Turkmen people at last subjugated and placed under the cruellest of colonial yokes from which they were liberated by the Great October Revolution.

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FROM THE JOURNAL OF CAPTAIN G. TEBELEV, 17411 Translated and edited with annotations by Claora E. Styron

12 June [1741] We arrived at the landing in Mangyshlak at 9 am and dropped anchor about one verst from the shore [1 verst ¼ 0.663 miles or 1.06 kilometres]. We couldn’t see any sign of habitation on shore or in the mountains. About 7 pm, five Trukhmen [hereafter, Turkmen] came up to the shore on horseback and asked for a boat in which four of them came out to the ship. They said they were mergen, that is hunters, and that they’d come to hunt wild animals, that three of them had guns which they’d left on shore, and that they lived in the mountains about a day’s ride from the landing in 15 kibitkas [kibitka is the Russian term for the Turkmen oi – a nomad’s tent that is commonly called a yurt in English]. Their people didn’t know the ship had arrived because they lived in different places in the mountains, while others lived on far islands that are one, two, and five days’ journey away. They said they were all old Turkmen inhabitants called Mangyshlak in accordance with

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their place [of origin]. There were some new people but they were few in number because the many that had arrived from Khiva had gone back because they suffered no offence from the Persians; as a result, some of the Turkmen had gone into Persian service more from need for which the Persian Shah had decreed a stipend of twenty roubles or more be given. It was impossible to get any news about those Turkmen except what they said; they didn’t know how many Turkmen had come, even from their own people, [or] where they were camping. They promised to give the news of the ship’s arrival to all the other ulus, and from ulus to ulus it was already known that the first to board the ship, according to Loshkarev’s2 previous custom, would be given ten camels from his bailiff. The same day, around 2 pm, the Interpreter Monastyrskii with the Turkmen Mengeli (who had been sent to Astrakhan from their Turkmen elders) were sent in a boat to the island where the elders Kinzhal-Bakhsha and Kanbarbek were nomadizing. It lay off shore two miles from the landing but bad weather prevented them from reaching the island so they turned back . . .

14 June [1741] Around 9 pm the Interpreter Monastyrskii, the Turkmen elders Kinzhal-Bakhsha, Kanbarbek and his son, and other Turkmen, arrived on shore where the elders stayed late with their Turkmen while the Interpreter with the Turkmen Mengeli came out to the ship. Monastyrskii the Interpreter said, as he’d been ordered, that when he’d arrived before the elders he’d announced, with their permission, [that] His Excellency Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn, Governor of Astrakhan, had sent grain for sale in order to satisfy their needs, and that he had a letter for them from His Excellency. In order to receive that letter and to set prices on the supplies of

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grain and other goods, their elder Turkmen nobles could come out to the ship as before without any fear of danger. Monastyrskii the Interpreter said that on arriving on the island at 14 am [the only example of nautical time in these excerpts ¼ 2 pm], he met first with the elder Kinzhal-Bakhsha, then went with him to the other elder, Kanbarbek, and made his announcement as ordered. Twenty Turkmen gathered, and Mengeli, who had been sent by the elders [to Astrakhan], announced that His Excellency had bestowed a kaftan on him and that he had been given satisfaction on taking his leave, and those elders let him keep it for his efforts. Those same elders that had gathered came with Interpreter Monastyrskii to the ship. (Monastyrskii added) it was not possible to learn their wants and intentions in conversation but it was clear that they greatly desired that grain be shipped to them as before. It wasn’t possible to learn how many people live on that island as there are very few, but the elder Kinzhal-Bakhsha had four kibitkas and Kanbarbek had thirteen; there were also two or three in other locales; it was impossible to learn their total number as the island is big and those Turkmen don’t just stay on one but roam from island to island to remote places and into the mountains. They are armed, as before, with weapons, mainly sabres and breech-loading firearms. Exactly where they roam and where they want to live was impossible to find out. (He was ordered to ask), are there now or were there in the past any Kalmyk envoys among them, and if so who are they, who sent them and for what purpose, and how did the Turkmen respond and what do they intend to do? (Monastyrskii said), whether Kalmyks were there now as before he couldn’t say for certain, but on several other occasions, on the side, he had asked how the Kalmyks treated the Turkmen, and whether they traded with each other. They answered that they had not seen Kalmyks in their region for a long time. They asked Monastyrskii’s interpreter, where are they today and on what

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mountain-ridge are they sitting? [Monastyrskii’s interpreter] replied that the Kalmyks are in the same place as before but it wasn’t possible to get more detailed information as no one could provide it. That same day the elders Kanbarbek and Kinzhal-Bakhsha and the Turkmen set off with them.

June [1741] Around 6 pm, the elders arrived at the ship with the other Turkmen and when they were seated I [Captain Tebelev] announced on the authority of my instructions, in an appropriate manner, that we desired a reply from them to the following: l. [sic] Your envoy, the Turkmen Mengeli, upon his arrival in Astrakhan, announced to the Governor, His Excellency Prince Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn, that he’d been sent by your elders with another Turkmen, Adny Durdy abyz [Muslim cleric], who had a letter from you. But that Adny Durdy abyz deserted Mengeli on the way. Mengeli didn’t know what was in that letter but he transmitted the order orally from you that your elders and the Turkmen people who migrated to live in this region of Mangyshlak are petitioning that trade be renewed with the Russians and that part of the trade agreement say that more than a sufficient quantity of grain be sent you. They waited a while for your Turkmen envoy, Adny Durdy abyz, to show up with the letter in order to respond and return it as you requested, but that Turkmen didn’t appear. So not to lose time and trusting Mengeli’s oral petition from you, I have shipped supplies of grain and other goods for sale to satisfy your people and you may order bartering to begin as was the custom in the past. When this supply and the other goods are sold, allow me to take a message to His Excellency, like the letter from your

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Turkmen Adny Durdy abyz, that from now on grain be shipped to you for your greater needs in a reliable way according to His Excellency’s means, and may your envoy, the Turkmen Mengeli, depart much pleased from Astrakhan. The following reply was received: We sent a letter to Astrakhan requesting that grain be sent to us. We are grateful that His Excellency today has shipped it to sell to us. But the other envoy we sent has disappeared somewhere, we don’t know why really. Perhaps he went to the Kalmyk ulus for his own affairs but why would he have lingered there? We wrote to Astrakhan to send two or three ships with grain supplies as many people had come from Khiva to Mangyshlak and we wanted to have grain shipped to sell as before. Turkmen came to us in Mangyshlak from Khiva when the Persian shah and his troops came to Khiva.3 They didn’t want to be under his control and they left and came into our territories last fall, but because of lack of water and forage here, they didn’t want to remain because they had lots of livestock. When spring arrived and the grasses appeared they went back, but we don’t know for sure where they are now. A few remained here in our locales4 among our kibitkas. How many there are in all is impossible to know because our Turkmen go to many places. We have lived in this place called Mangyshlak for a very long time, having settled here some two hundred and ten years ago, and we roam from place to place as needed from the Emba [River] itself as far as Tiub Karagan, our nomadic territory, while others, like the elders Bakhsha and Kanbarbek, stay on the islands because they are afraid of the Kazakhs who often attack in parties as happened this spring. The Turkmen sent out three parties and drove off from the Kazakhs some horses and iazyry.5 Then a Kazakh

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dispatch [vysilka ] attacked the Turkmen and seized a small number of horses and prisoners from the remaining party. Recently, the Kazakhs sent two men to beg for peace and an exchange of prisoners; to assure them that was what we desired we released two prisoners to them and asked them to send us two good old men with whom we could draw up a treaty. Once we were subordinate to the Kalmyk khan and during that time we ravaged the Kazakhs with the Kalmyks, although the Kazakhs rode to us at that time with a proposal, but we and the Kalmyks were rebuffed and given proper retribution. But now there are few of us in these parts, not like before, and we are in danger from the Kazakhs because of that. At the end of those words, the Turkmen asked to start trading and I handed over the letter sent to them and asked that they dignify it with a reply. As I saw that I could get no further in conversation with them and that they demanded an agreement on the sale of flour, I submitted the following: When you were under the authority of the Kalmyk Khan and, profiting from that, communicated to the Kalmyks your desire for protection for your dwellings from Kazakh attacks, and that grain and other products be shipped as before, that was very good. But if you desire to be under the higher authority of His Imperial Majesty6 and under His allmerciful power and protection, you would be able to profit greatly and get every satisfaction. That is why I am offering you my friendly counsel. Would it not be to your benefit to dispatch two or three of your elders to Astrakhan who could report about your needs and circumstances to His Excellency and talk with Him personally, so that His Excellency could commit to assisting you?

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(The elders replied), [W]e are now as we were before under the authority of His Imperial Majesty, and like you we respect the one Russian Tsar, and your counsel to send an envoy is most acceptable to us. The elder Kanbarbek gestured to his son, Bek Amurat by name, who was not older than thirty. We will dispatch him with the message that it is our desire always to be in His Majesty’s great power as long as he continues to send us [grain] supplies for sale. I repeated, That’s excellent that you, Kanbarbek, would like to send your son, but would it not be better for some of your elders to accompany him to report about all events and circumstances? If your envoys desire to go to the high court of His Imperial Majesty to submit your petition to be subjects, then His Excellency with pleasure would send it with His report, and would be the best to advise you, and because of His efforts you would sooner become the beneficiaries of His [Majesty’s] great mercy and that would be better than working through the Kalmyks. (The elders replied), [Y]our advice is very useful to us, however we want to discuss it among ourselves because the mountain aksakal [white beards] or elders from our dwellings have not yet arrived. But we know it is better to rely on the mercy of His Imperial Majesty than on the Kalmyks as we have never had any from them and have not seen them for a long time. It has been like that since Aiuki Khan died, and we are afraid to ride to them because of the Kazakhs. Then they asked to let them trade while explaining that we elders always set the price before and the goods were traded at that price. They began to haggle with the bailiff and propose to barter for goods, how much for each sack and commodity, here’s the list for that, and after trading they began to barter their goods again.

17 (June) [1741] The mountain Turkmen arrived at the shore at 3 pm and requested the boat to the ship, which had been sent with the purchased

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goods. When it [the boat] arrived on shore those mountain Turkmen began to fight with the people who were debarking from the ship, and they seized the boat and fifteen of their men came out to the ship and began to ask, as they boarded, about a courier they had heard had been sent from Astrakhan. Then I explained that thanks to their petition, grain supplies had been sent with me because your elders and all your people had dispatched a special messenger to Astrakhan. I was going to present it to them, but they were not listening to me and began to shout, We don’t know who was sent. If grain was shipped to us it’s up to us to set the price and not Kanbar[bek] and Kinzhal, as we are the aksakal. They started to argue and fight among themselves and some of them struck the elder Kinzhal-Bakhsha saying, [Y]ou’re not an aksakal but a sheep-herder, and we don’t know where you live but we’ve lived here a long time and this is our landing. They also quarrelled with Kanbar[bek] but didn’t dare strike him. When I tried to give the order that I didn’t allow fighting, those Turkmen shouted, [I]t’s none of your business. We’re quarrelling among ourselves, not with you Russians. The ship’s pilot in the bow explained to me that they always quarrel and fight when they haggle over prices, but we Russians don’t get involved. I was scarcely able to influence them, but some of them paid attention to me and began to calm down the others and say, [I]t’s nothing, it’s our custom.

18 June [1741] Mambet Berdy, a Turkmen of the Burunuchiuk [sic] clan, rode up to the shore at 5 pm, and said the local elders and Turkmen have sent me to the ship to find out about a messenger sent from Astrakhan. I [Tebelev] explained the contents of the letter in a few words and said that the elder Kanbarbek had taken that letter. He [Mambet Berdy] asked, [I]s it written to him or is it written to everyone? I explained that the letter was written to the elders and

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to all the Turkmen people, and that Kanbarbek had come to the ship with some other elders and Turkmen and had taken the letter saying, [W]hen all the elders have come together we’ll read it through and give a reply. At that [one of] the Turkmen said, [W]e don’t know that Kanbarbek, he lives on the islands but this is where we live in these places and the landing is our landing, and because he agreed on a price for goods without waiting for us, we’ll set our own price as in the past; besides the customs duties must be taken in the same amount as in the past. I [Tebelev] answered, I don’t know your chief elder, but I’ve brought grain to sell for your benefit, according to your petition, and you can read about it in the letter that has been sent to you, and then we can, as is proper, proceed to discuss. Mambet Berdy replied, [T]hat’s in order, we’ll come to the ship tomorrow, and he went ashore after taking his leave. After that, Kanbarbek sent his son on shore for an hour or two who returned to the ship to report, they are all very angry at us for setting the price on goods before they arrived. They are demanding the letter as if my father never had been here. Then Kanbarbek said, [M]y people and I have exchanged our goods for grain and that’s none of their business. I’ll go to them myself and find out what it is they want and let you know here at the ship. He went ashore with his son and didn’t come back.

19 June [1741] In the morning, the elders Mamet Keldy batyr’, Khodzha Berdy Bakhshi, Sunguran Onbegi, Karabatyr’, Bachabek with 30 [other] Turkmen came out to the ship. When they sat down they asked me to whom I had brought the letter? I explained the circumstances regarding the letter as I had done to the other elders before. They listened to everything and said, [T]hat envoy, Mengeli, should be punished as he doesn’t know what to report in Astrakhan on behalf of the local elders, [and] so should Kanbarbek for setting a price

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without us, elchi [a high Kalmyk position, according to M. Khodarkovsky], that’s an envoy. We only propose to set the price for grain according to previous custom. They began to talk among themselves and to ask the bailiff for something to eat. I began to engage them in conversation about the Kazakhs and how they attacked and ravaged the Turkmen and how the Turkmen resisted them. They answered, [T]he Kazakhs ride up to us every year and drive off our livestock and sometimes take our people prisoner. That’s because our Turkmen live in isolated places; there’s always a guard in the Iraklin Mountains [also Irakmen] near Mertv Kultuk, and if the Kazakhs are gathering to come into our locales, the guard lets us know; the Turkmen go high above us here upon the mountain. Those who can take their livestock with them where the Kazakhs cannot reach them and they chase off the remaining livestock which they round up again when they return. They lose some livestock, and people are taken prisoner on both sides. Now there is no guard on watch because they have heard about the grain shipment and all boats have come to the landing in a rush to buy . . . They started asking to trade and came to an agreement with the bailiff and did not set a higher price than in previous years even though the bailiff explained that the old sacks of flour were shipped in small hands [a term of measurement] but today all were shipped in large hands which is the reason the price should be higher. They all shouted and abused him for coming to an agreement with Kanbarbek earlier, others wanted to fight but some of the other Turkmen would not allow it and beat them off. Loud shouting arose among them; some said, [D]on’t take the goods by force, and others cried, [W]e won’t set a price higher than in previous years and we won’t back down. The elders were telling me that the bailiff should take the same price as before and if he won’t back down we’ll seize it as it suits us, even at that high price, and let him [the bailiff] pay us according to previous custom for landing fees, customs duties, and tributes for the aksakal and

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the dellial (A dellial is a trusted individual from the elders who observes constantly to make sure no offences are committed by the Turkmen during trading; he guards and observes the bailiff to be sure the exchange goes well, and the Turkmen don’t object to that.) I asked them why formerly they took duties for the landing and for tariffs on goods. They pointed at the Interpreter and at the Tatar Musa (an interpreter from the merchant Loshkarev) and said, [T]hey know why. But they denied it and it was impossible to have a reliable conversation because all the common Turkmen were shouting at their own elders who could not quieten them down and did not dare to oppose them. Then the elders and other Turkmen announced, [I]f you sell us grain, sell it at the old price[;] if you won’t sell at that price, we’ll quit the landing. Seeing that those Turkmen had begun to set the price according to their will and that more of them were coming on board the ship, in order to remove them they were told that if they left the ship and went ashore, we would reckon on a price so there would be no loss and we would be able to come to an agreement. But the elders said again, [W]e’ll not pay more than the old price, while the others shouted, [Y]ou’re pushing us out of the ship, either you push us out or we’ll push you out! I said to the elders that it appears they want to seize the goods by force and I will not allow that; it could come to a brawl and it is better to settle business without arguing; we have not come to fight, but we have brought grain to sell for the needs of you and your people. The elders replied, [A]s for our people, we’ll never quieten them down as there is neither khan nor sultan over us and all the people are free . . . Finally the bailiff agreed on the old price with them, each item is on the list. But we bargained not to take out customs duties this time and a tribute for the elders and dellials was left to discretion. As soon as the agreement was reached they began to barter and transport flour to shore. On the same boat at first twenty Turkmen came out to the ship from the shore, then eleven more came whom we did not want to let on board. But the elders and other Turkmen

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said they were good people of noble origin [poroda], and now the bartering continued and it was impossible to restrain them though we were constantly vigilant. Many of them spent the night on board the ship in order to get fed, and we gave them fresh water to drink as in previous years, and the ship’s pilot explained that in a given year there could be fifty to sixty Turkmen on one ship . . .

22 June [1741] In the morning, people from the Burunchuk and Ikdyr race of Turkmen came and started a fight with the Obdal’ [Abdal] on the ship. Some of them called out to us, why did we want to sell grain to some and not to others? They were told that you know, among yourselves, who should do the buying and we have brought grain to sell as you requested and whoever wants to can buy. Many came up to the bailiff to sell to them and the bailiff released all the remaining flour for sale. As the soldiers on guard would not allow them to approach the enclosure, one of the Turkmen brandished a whip at a soldier. I ordered him to be repulsed, and I said to the elder, Mamet Keldy batyr’, [I]f your Turkmen behave so brazenly I’ll order my Russians to counter with a good rebuff. As you see yourselves, our Russians do not touch them, but do not let them enter into places that are forbidden, but what is the reason for your Turkmen to strengthen their forces? The elder of that Turkmen who had threatened the soldier struck him three times with a whip because they were of the same lineage, and it was obvious that he did it because of his own shame, because afterwards he said we are not able to control them.

23 June [1741] The Tatar Musa from the Astrakhan yurt [also called the Tatar yurt, a territory outside Astrakhan] (who was sent by the merchant

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Loshkarev as an interpreter) said he had heard from Akbazar, brother of the Turkmen elder, Mamet Keldy batyr’, that the Turkmen who had come to Mangyshlak from Khiva and gone back in the spring were from two clans, the Eteki [Teke] and the Emmudy [Iomut]. They had settled down on the island side of the Balkhan [Mountains], while fifty of their kibitkas stayed in Mangyshlak around Karabugaz, and another clan, Ridzhedti on Mangyshlak, stayed in the locale of Akbuz on the Iaik [River] side in thirty kibitkas. How many kibitkas had left Mangyshlak that Turkmen did not know, but it was the poor ones who went back towards Khiva while those with enough livestock remained near the Balkhan Mountains. The Tatar Musa had also heard that a khan, who had been installed by the Persian Shah in Khiva, had been expelled from the khanate by the people of the Aral Sea [Araltsy] in coalition with the Khivians who had gone over to them [the people of the Aral Sea] when Khiva was captured, and in his place they had installed [enthroned] the son of the Kazakh Abulkhair-khan, and what will happen to that [former] Khan installed by the Persian side is impossible to find out up to now.7

25 June [1741] The elder Kanbarbek came to the ship and said in conversation the others do not know about the letter he had sent to Astrakhan on the advice of Kinzhal Bakhsha and his Turkmen, because as you see for yourself the people are free and there is disagreement among us. When a lot of Turkmen came from Khiva and wanted grain, as he had been an elder here for a long time, he dispatched a petition to bring grain here and settled on a price for it that angered the others. Then he said he had been here for a very long time and, in years past, there were many Turkmen at this landing, but when the Kazakhs ravaged them and captured many kibitkas as prisoners, he was also taken prisoner. He escaped from prison to

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Khiva where the Khan of Khiva assigned him to live with the Turkmen, but he did not want to live there and came back to Mangyshlak with his family and kibitka. Then ten, forty, then fifty kibitkas gathered around him until there were three hundred kibitkas, some of whom went back to Khiva, while others were captured and taken prisoner by the Kazakhs. Today in Mangyshlak there are no more than 200 kibitkas and there remain very few that came from Khiva and they are dispersed among our kibitkas. But here our people are extremely wilful, they neither look nor listen because there is no chief over them, which is why I went myself to petition in Astrakhan that we remain under the authority of the Kalmyk Khan as in the past, and for an order to be issued to establish a vataga at this landing, that is a small fort, where ships bearing goods and supplies could unload and sell, and the goods would be safe from the Kazakhs in that fort if anything remained, and people could buy from time to time. On my arrival in Astrakhan I would have stayed in the Kalmyk ulus, but he hoped that no unfortunate incident would happen to me. At which I asked him, [W]hat are you afraid of and from whom? Kanbarbek answered that anything could happen. At that I replied, [Y]ou worry for nothing. If a man falls ill suddenly and dies on the way, that’s the will of God. It is impossible that something bad could be done to you by us; you can make this conclusion from [be persuaded by] everything, how every sort of benefaction was showered on you by the Russian side and you were never abandoned even though you inhabit such desolate places, and you were always supplied with grain and other goods for sale to meet your needs, and [only] when you went away from Mangyshlak were the shipments of grain and goods stopped. But today there is all the more reason to treat you with favour while we await your petition letter and, in trusting your oral petition via your envoy about your desire to have grain supplies shipped to sell, which we thank you for respectfully and beg you most humbly be used henceforth always to keep you well satisfied.

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Kanbarbek, after listening to that, announced that, of course, he would go to Astrakhan because he had been there before . . .

26 June [1741] Khodzha Niaz, son of the former Turkmen Sultan Sidomet, came out to the ship at 2 pm. He was twenty-three years old and with him from the elders was Perdei Kardy, the son of Perdei, whose father was the head man under the aforementioned Sultan. He said that they were camped near Karagan in only 100 kibitkas and others from their clan called Soldyr [Salor] were camped near the Balkhan Mountains in 200 kibitkas. When they heard that grain had been shipped for sale from Astrakhan, twenty men had ridden to the landing, but the local Turkmen there would not allow them to buy and were hateful towards them. That is why we camped farther away from Mangyshlak, and if His All-Merciful Sovereign Majesty would take us by decree under His merciful protection [zashchishchenie], we would bring our people from the Balkhan Mountains. The aforementioned elder replied, I will go myself with my most humble petition to Astrakhan. In reply I offered them every possible assistance, and if they wanted to be under the most merciful protection [ protektsiia] of His Majesty and were seeking the means to do that . . . I advised them to give advance notice by their petition, and that they could come with me now to Astrakhan to do that. His Excellency by His ceaseless endeavours on their behalf would be able to obtain favours more quickly from His Imperial Majesty, and they would receive complete satisfaction in Astrakhan. The aforementioned elder replied, [I]t’s not possible at all for me or the Sultan’s son to go because we have been separated from our ulus and only a few people have come here. If the Sultan’s son were sent alone he would still be a young man and he would be unable to present the petition suitably. If I were to go, that would be dangerous because of attacks by the locals here that could wreak

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devastation on our scattered Turkmen. But we have come now to ask your advice and receive your counsel [and] as we hear only good things from you, of course, towards spring we will gather all our ulus together, and I will go or we will send another good man – he pointed at the Sultan’s son – we will allow him to go, who said himself he would stay the course and, of course, he would go only when a ship arrives at the landing when he would be able to get information about what precautions to take . . .

27 June [1741] The elders Mambet Keldy Batyr’, Kara Batyr’, Khansa Berdy Bakhsha, and Kanbarbek came to the ship at 5 am . . . They asked for paper and copying ink which I gave them, then while conferring all together, they composed their letter which they handed to me. Then I asked them, [I]s this your reply to His Excellency’s letter? They answered in response, [W]e wrote about everything so they would send grain to us from now on. Towards evening, the elder Kanbarbek announced that he was preparing to go to Astrakhan, but because his ulus was so far away he had nothing to take with him. I replied, [A]lthough you do not have anything now, on the way you will lack for nothing from us and, upon your arrival in Astrakhan, your every need will be satisfied.

28 June [1741] As the elders of the Turkmen people were preparing to leave the ship, the bailiff rendered homage to them as authorized . . . (The elders said), [W]e wrote [in the letter] that two or three ships with grain supplies be sent because there are many Turkmen here who have left Khiva but who went back in spring, but some remain here in Mangyshlak. Today we have reliable news that those Khivians who left for the people of the Aral Sea [Araltsy] at

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the attack on Khiva by the Persian Shah Tamas Khan [Nadir Shah] have joined with the Kazakhs and the people of the Aral Sea and elected the son of the Kazakh Khan Abulkhair as Khan of Khiva, and they arrived in Khiva two months ago. The [other] Khan appointed by the Shah of Persia escaped with a few others to the Akhshikh (elevated place in the Khan’s home where khans and others could seek refuge when they were in danger of being overthrown, [and] from where they could negotiate for release alive, or for someone to join their side and rescue them. But people can be starved out in that place and it can be destroyed), and, he said, [L]et’s hope the new Khan is really in power already and of course he will deal with the former one, and we are expecting information soon about whether they will let him live or kill him . . . The Tatar Musa from the Astrakhan yurt, who had been sent by the merchant Loshkarev as an interpreter, said that in talking with the Turkmen they had told him which lineage [poroda] and how many kibitkas were on Mangyshlak. On the islands, fifty kibitkas of the Obdal’ [Abdal] lineage; fifty-seven of the Burunchuk lineage; eighteen of the Ikdyr lineage. In the mountains in different locales, twelve kibitkas at four days’ ride from the landing on the route to Khiva of the Saldyretz [Salor?] lineage; thirty-two of the Bedzhadzhi [Buzachi?] lineage at three days’ ride towards Akbugaz between the mountains and the landing; fifteen of the Burunchuk lineage at Karagan; fiftyseven of the Soldyr [Salor] lineage near the Balkhan Mountains; twelve towards the Arak [Iraklin or Irakmen] of the Ikdyr lineage. A total of two hundred and fifty-three . . .

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FROM THE JOURNAL OF CAPTAIN V. KOPYTOVSKII, 17451 Translated and edited with annotations by Claora E. Styron

9 June [1745] I set out on my course from Astrakhan to the landing in Mangyshlak in the shmak, Goose.2

13 July [1745] I arrived safely at the landing in Mangyshlak. 1 That same day at 5 pm, I sent Musa Utenov [Interpreter] and three Turkmen from the Kazakhs to announce my arrival to the elders, that I’d been sent by His Excellency, the Councillor [of the Embassy] and Governor of Astrakhan, Vasilii Nikitich Tatishchev,3 to enquire after their well-being and to say that I was bringing a letter to them from the Councillor, and that they could approach me to accept it in complete safety. He [Musa

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Utenov] and the Kazakhs were ordered to conduct themselves with secrecy and discretion among the Turkmen in order to learn the size of their population, if they lived together or in separate places, whether their fighting men and stock-owners had enough supplies, and, in speaking with them, to ascertain their mood and if their desire and intentions were sincere to become subjects of Her Imperial Majesty [Empress Elizaveta Petrovna, 1741– 62]. That same day, around 8 pm, from the ship we observed many people gathered on shore around Musa the Tatar and the Kazakhs, so an ial4 was sent to row them to the ship where they arrived at 10. Musa the Tatar said that after we landed on shore and had gone about 2 versts [1 verst ¼ 0.663 miles or 1.06 kilometres] we met twenty Turkmen who stopped us and asked where we were going. We said that we had been sent to the elders to announce the arrival of the ship and the Captain on board and they could meet. To that they replied, [W]e have already been sent to tell everyone about the ship’s arrival and there is no need for you to go on. I said I would be glad to make the announcement to everyone. They did not allow us to continue and instead brought us back on horseback to the landing. Musa the Tatar said his escorts were Bauvlet Berdy, first cousin of Kanbarbek, and Pirzhamambet, blood brother of Karabatyr’, and the named son of Onbegi Sungurap who everyone considers his son, but I do not know his name. Kanbarbek’s brother told me on the way that he and all his household had lived in the Khiva environs. But the Persians [under Nadir Shah] came to Khiva, it is rumoured 40,000 strong, and they fled in fear to another station, but he did not say how many had fled. Other Turkmen from Mutovshchin fled to the Balkhan Mountains because they did not want to become the Persian Shah’s subjects. They had over 1,000 kibitkas. The Shah dispatched a special messenger to them from the Persian Khan promising every favour and considerable compensation if they would swear allegiance and provide troops, but only if they were from the nobility. They thought about

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sending the poor and people on foot but when they heard that he wanted better they refused him, and sent here for his brother, Kanbarbek, in Mangyshlak to come and advise them. Also they asked him on their behalf to petition the Russians not to stop sending shipments of flour for their nourishment as it was possible they would all come to Mangyshlak, for they did not want to become subjects of the Persian Shah because the word of the Persians was extremely unreliable and could not be trusted. My brother [Kanbarbek] told the envoy that he would try to see about the shipment of flour but he could not ride to us in this warm weather, only after it got cooler. Musa said that a Turkmen, Nefee mergen’ [hunter], [T]old me that the Turkmen living on the islands had captured a boat with Russians in it that summer. He did not know how many. They had escaped from the Turkmen in a boat but were recaptured near the Karagan Landing, and now were in the Igdir ulus of Baubek batyr’. He had seen a Russian man without toes, and a woman and a peasant of Persian race[;] he did not see any more, but he had heard they had captured seven men and women. When I [Musa] arrived at the ship, Kanbarbek’s brother and Kasim of the Gurban clan, who was not a noble elder, and the others, said they wanted to come aboard ship, but I told them, [W]ait a bit until I announce your arrival to the Captain. 2 That same day, at twelve after midnight, I [Kopytovskii] dispatched the ial to transport those mentioned above to the ship, and gave the order not to seat many people so as to observe any trouble, and to stay away from the shore. I sent Tatar Musa to decide who to seat. He brought ten Turkmen to the ship around 12.30 pm, and Tatar Musa announced: Among them by name were the elders Kasim and Bauvlet, Kanbarbek’s second cousin, and Prizhamambet, blood brother of Karabatyr’. Kasim said that when they were

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living in Mangyshlak they quarrelled a lot with the Kazakhs, but that summer, a month and a half ago, they had made peace, and because of that the Kazakhs had driven 1,000 sheep to them to sell which they bartered one measure [konets] of sheeting [biaz’] per sheep. After the sale they went back, but some of their Trukhmen left to trade with them. He did not say how many. Then he talked about Khiva . . .5 3 I ordered Musa to enquire about the former Khan of Khiva who had ruled over them, and also where the Umut [Iomut] Turkmen were[;] were they not the Shah’s subjects? Kasim the elder explained, [T]he Khan still rules in Khiva but we don’t have news of what is happening there now. The Umut [Iomut] Turkmen never were the Shah’s subjects and it can be supposed that he [the Shah] sent [his people] to bring them into being his subjects. Today we are sending our Turkmen to Khiva to trade and to find out what is happening there. Then Kasim and the others asked, [W]hat has the Captain come to us for, to trade or for something else? 4 I ordered them [the interpreters] to announce that I had been sent from Astrakhan by His Excellency, the Councillor and Governor of Astrakhan, Vasilii Nikitich Tatishchev, for their well-being and that I carried a letter and that they should all gather together so I could explain it orally and hand it over to them. Then I ordered it announced that today I had expressly dispatched four men to their elders to declare my arrival to their elders and to learn when they would come to meet with me, only Kanbarbek’s brother, Bauvlet Berdy, had not permitted this and turned them back. Why? They replied, [I]t’s all well and good to have a meeting and we will listen to what you have to say. We turned back your emissaries

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because they had gone too far and would not know where to find the others. Yesterday we sighted the ship and sent out the news to everyone. We are hoping they arrive tomorrow. [Your envoys] were brought back because they would have to ride through mountains and canyons, and so that our Turkmen would not cause them any harm, as we are a free people. They went ashore at l pm. 5 That same day at 5 pm, Tatar Musa was dispatched with the Kazakh Grigorii Nikitin, because he could converse in Tatar, to the Turkmen elders in the nearest ulus which they said was not more than 10 versts away. They were to announce for everyone to assemble and come to me, and meanwhile to find out what is against my previous order that had been sent before, and especially to learn the names of the captured Russians and how many men and women were there, and who kept them. They returned at 6 pm with four Turkmen. Tatar Musa said that one of them identified himself as Aitudu, an elder of the Gurban clan that migrates from Mangyshlak to the Emba River, a journey of over one week, but lives mostly in Mangyshlak, but because of internal dissension they had gone to live near Khiva many years ago. But this past summer, 12,000 Persians came to Khiva . . . More than 700 of our kibitkas left Khiva, and more than 1000 kibitkas6 of the Aiumut [Iomut] of the Buzakeev [Buzachi?] clan left for the Balkhan Mountains. We, he said, all desire to be better off as subjects of Her Imperial Majesty [hereafter HIM] rather than roam about like that. Then Aitudu asked, [H]as the Captain come to trade or for some other purpose? 6 I [Kopytovskii] ordered them to announce that I had been sent by His Excellency the Governor General of Astrakhan for their

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benefit and that all the elders should assemble so I could transmit a letter to them and explain it orally. Aitudu said, [I]t is altogether appropriate that the announcement be made to everyone[. W]e will wait on shore[. W]e are hoping that Kanbarbek and the other elders will arrive tomorrow. He said he would spend the night in an ulus not more than 10 versts away. They went ashore after 6 pm. 7 At that time, Tatar Musa and Kazakh Grigorii were sent to the nearby ulus where the elder Kanbarbek was spending the night, to ask questions as written in the first point [Section 1], then to learn in secret whether anyone was there from the Kalmyk ulus of Donduk Dashi,7 or if there were Turkmen from his domains and exactly what they were there for. On dismissing them, it was observed that there were no Turkmen on shore, and so I went ashore with six soldiers as guards to look around for a suitable site to build a fort. I went more than one verst from the landing towards the mountains but there was no suitable place to build a fort: 1) The mountains were very high and steep with many gorges between them; they were composed of chalky rock that dislodged in the rain. 2) There was no fresh water. There was only one well with fresh water between the landing and the mountains. I did not find any more. The landing was very safe for vessels. As night was falling, it would have been dangerous to look farther.

[14 July 1745] On the 14th, Tatar Musa and the Kazakh returned by boat and said, [W]e stayed overnight in the ulus near the landing where Kanbarbek and the elders had come. But during the night it was impossible to talk with anyone because there was so much shouting over the division of baggage. He said, [T]hough we asked what

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baggage they were shouting about, no one told us. At that time, Kanbarbek’s blood brother, Egenbek atalyk, rode up with twenty men leading two horses. He [Egenbek] said he was being dispatched to Khiva to find out what was happening there, if all was well as before, and he was taking the Khan a gift horse. If there were disturbances because of the Persians, they would survey where to stake out the countryside and where to attack them. Then he [the interpreter] said, [O]ne Turkmen told us that Kanbarbek’s brother had a Russian he was taking to sell in Khiva. In the morning, we [Musa and the Kazakh] asked Kanbarbek’s brother not to allow his Russian to be taken to Khiva but to hand him over to the Captain. He told us, [W]e didn’t steal the Russian; he was captured by someone else and he [the captive] begged us not to sell him to the Russians but anywhere else, only not to Russians. We saw many weapons in the ulus such as bows and arrows. The Turkmen who rode up had very few. The ulus was made up of only three kibitkas and there were few stock animals. In conversation, we heard that they do not have much livestock and for their nourishment hunt wild goats [saiga]. Also there are no manufactories [ fabrika]. They weave only peasants’ cloth [armiak] and make their living mainly by robbery. They ride to the Kazakhs and to Persia . . .

14 July [1745] 8 A call from the crowd on shore at 11 am [literally 11 hours after midnight] to send Tatar Musa. I sent him at once to find out who had arrived and, if they were not all there, to ask them to wait for the other elders as I should transmit and explain orally the Governor of Astrakhan’s letter for the benefit of everyone together. When Musa returned to the ship he announced that elders of three clans had assembled, Kanbarbek of the Delin clan, Karabatyr’ of the Gurban clan, Onbegi Sungurap of the Mengli

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Khodzhina clan. Kanbarbek and companions said, [W]e are from the three clans that are the principal clans, above all. If we have to wait a long time for all the others, and if the letter is not handed over to us, we will leave, of course. We will not detain that special person dispatched to Khiva, for it is time for him to go, but we will delay him long enough, for it is in our interest for him to know and tell the other Turkmen people about it. 9 I sent Tatar Musa again to ask them to wait until tomorrow as I had orders to transmit the letter that I had brought at a meeting of the elders of all the clans and to explain orally that I was there for the good of them all. I also ordered him to ask Kanbarbek not to let his brother transport the Russian to Khiva but to let him stay here, and, if necessary, I would pay a ransom. I ordered him to persuade them, if possible, to await the arrival of all the elders because I wanted them to hear these conversations. Musa returned to the ship and said that Kanbarbek and companions said, [T]here’s no reason for us to wait, let him wait for those elders and do the explaining to them! We are going to ride to the ulus. They gave orders to saddle the horses. They also ordered Egenbek atalyk, Kanbarbek’s brother, to set out to Khiva. Someone ordered for all to mount their horses. Then I [Musa] said, [T]here is no need to get upset[. I]t’s better to wait until tomorrow, then if no one shows up, he [Kopytovskii] will transmit the letter to you. But they were all shouting, [W]e don’t want to wait, and gave the order, Let’s go, let’s ride! Of course we won’t wait, we’re riding to our ulus! 10 At their declaration, it was necessary to dispatch the ial to fetch them to the ship, as I feared I exacerbated them and they would leave. Transported to the ship from the Delin clan was Kanbarbek with two blood brothers, the first, Egenbek atalyk, then Murat, both of the Karaesaul clan, Karabatyr’ of the Gurban clan, and

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Onbeg Sungurap of the Mengli-Khodzhina clan, as well as relatives and kinsfolk. In all 59 people, and what is more they talked. Kanbarbek and his companions said, [W]e here on the ship are from three clans . . . Why have you brought us here, explain, please, why you have ordered us to wait for the elders from other clans, for we are not going to wait because no matter who comes we are senior to them and they are junior to us. Because of that we have sent someone to tell them to come, but even though you have dispatched someone from your people they will not get there because the distance is far, and because among us there are free people who will kill and do what they want and you will never be able to find out anything. Although the elders from the three clans will not be here, there are people from our clans here who will hear what you say and tell us. 11 Then I said again to them that I had been sent to their elders by His Excellency [. . .], and that I was carrying a letter, which I handed over to them. Kanbarbek’s brother took it and pressed it to his forehead and then passed it on to Kanbarbek who took it and broke the seal and asked me if the abyz8 [Muslim cleric, literate man] sent with me could read it. I ordered the abyz who had been sent with me to read the letter to them. After he had read the letter, Kanbarbek and the others said it wasn’t so bad and thanked me. Then they said that as regards a letter sent with our consent via the Khivian envoy9 who said he was to petition on our behalf, [W]e did not sign that letter or put a seal or stamp, because that has never before been our custom, and we used to write in this simple manner, in the same way as we address now the appropriate authorities. 12 At their statement, I ordered them [the interpreters] to say, [T]hough you sent a petition via the Khivian ambassador to the

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court of HIM10 and though it was indeed fitting and appropriate that you become Her Majesty’s subjects and dispatch some noblemen from the elders, it is not appropriate to conduct your affairs through an external ruling ambassador. And if you are to become subjects of HIM, every kindness and satisfaction will be fully yours, and if, I may say so, you are to dispatch representatives, it would be appropriate to dispatch nobles and wise elders who would be able to confer with the Governor of Astrakhan on your behalf, and what is more explain your submission at the court of HIM as well. Kanbarbek with the others replied, We sent a petition via the Khivian ambassador because he was going to the court of HIM and he promised to petition on our behalf. Now we see that you have been sent by the Governor of Astrakhan, that you speak truthfully and we trust you. We will send elders from the nobility to confer with the Astrakhan Governor. And what is more, at the court of HIM, they will request that we living here in Mangyshlak become Her subjects. For many years it has been our desire to be Her subjects, but the times did not allow it. In past summers there were many of us here; there was much trade with the Russians at the Karagan Landing. People travelled from Khiva ready to trade. Because of internal dissension among ourselves many people left Mangyshlak for Khiva, others went to the Balkhan Mountains. Today we hear that the Persian army is in Khiva, that all the Turkmen have left, many for Mangyshlak and others to places nearby here. Wherever they are or whoever they are, they will be glad to hear that we are going to become the subjects of HIM, never mind that neither we nor the others have ever been the subjects of anybody. What we desire now is to be the subjects of HIM. We will either choose someone else or go with the petition ourselves, the elders, I, Kanbarbek of the Delin clan, Karabatyr’ of the Gurban clan, Onbegi Sungurap of the MengliKhodzhina clan. We will also dispatch someone from a fourth clan who is on the way.

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Your intentions as expressed to me [Kopytovskii] are entirely honourable. I think we have agreed that it would be useful to build a fort here 1) to provide protection from hostile attacks and a place for your families to hide without fear of harm and 2) to protect the Russian merchants who will come to trade grain and other goods with you. Many people are afraid to travel here without a fort or place with a defence. When a fort is constructed many would want to come here to trade, and that would be to your considerable benefit. We thank you for that. We all want to build a fort. When we are at the court of HIM we will request to become Her subjects as well as to build a fort and to whom it should belong. But it is not necessary to put that in the letter as we, the principal elders, will go ourselves and not send others. They live very far away and it is not possible to wait for them. They will not be here for at least two weeks. We don’t need them as we are the principal clans. We will go ourselves to the court of HIM and become subjects then many more of us will go to the court and request to become Her subjects . . . 14 . . . then they said, If you have flour and other things to sell to our people, tell us and name your price exactly. Were you sent here to trade or was it for something else? If that’s the case, give the order to sell and keep the price low as we do here. We’ll set a price, as is our custom, and once set, all will comply and buy without argument . . . 17 I ordered them [the interpreters] to announce, I have already said to you a number of times that I was not sent for trade, but for your well-being, and the letter I brought and handed over to you explains that. You can see there are 150 sacks of flour [rye] for sale for your needs (what is more I had intended to give a certain

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amount as gifts to the elders which had to be done in secret so no one would discover it, for if it were discovered, the others would take the gifts given in secret to the elders and share them to everyone’s delight [satisfaction]). Then those elders, without asking the price per sack, ordered that a well-used silk and cotton sash be bartered for one sack and asked how many sacks of flour they would give for this sash, the price of which, by Astrakhan standards, is not more than 80 kopecks. 18 At their declaration I announced through the interpreters, [Y]ou should, of course, first finalize your petition and what you desire for HIM’s court, then we will set a cash price on the flour, and for those without money the goods to barter, but one sash is not worth a chetvert [a measure of grain ¼ 277 pounds or 8 poods] of a sack. 19 As they appeared favourably inclined, I ordered two sacks of flour to be released at their request,11 then ordered the interpreters to say, I’ve heard that Kanbarbek’s brother, Egenbek atalyk, has a Russian he is taking to sell in Khiva. I beg you not to take him there but to give him to me. Yes, I beg you to do this and to find the others and bring them to me. If you do this, of course, His Excellency, the Councillor and Governor of Astrakhan, will reward you generously for your service, and you will receive praise at the court of HIM upon your arrival. Kanbarbek and the others said, [T]hat affair is none of our business because that brother of mine is riding to Khiva and it would be impossible for us to take him away, unless you and he reach an agreement, then we would be glad to deliver him, but he [the person in possession of the Russian prisoner] does not listen to our arguments and does not return the prisoner, that is our custom, we give nothing for free . . . He must be given something in return for that Russian.

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At their words, it was necessary to trade. He asked for 30 sacks of flour and 5 arshins of cloth for a kaftan. Then Kanbarbek’s brother [Egenbek] said, I made a pledge to that Russian that I would never sell him to the Russians or the Tatars, but in Khiva or Bukhara, as he was always begging me about this. I asked him, Why not the Russians? He said that when he lived in Astrakhan he had knifed a Kalmyk woman and her children to death. That was the reason he fled. And you see, he [Egenbek] said, [W]e recaptured 5 men and a woman in a boat near the landing at Tiub Karagan, and that Russian fell to my lot. I will not accept less than 20 sacks of flour and 5 arshins of cloth and I’ll only hand him over at such a low price because we all desire to become HIM’s subjects, but in Khiva I can get over 100 roubles. 20 In light of what the elders said I was obliged to give 20 sacks of flour from the crown and 5 arshins of cloth, including one cloth from Tatar Musa, then I sent them ashore, with half the flour, to fetch the Russian who was hidden in a canyon. When they had got him, I gave them the remaining flour. When he was brought to the ship I questioned the muzhik [Russian peasant] and ordered that his words be translated for the elders to understand. My name is Ivan Semenov, son of Kuznetsov. I’m a manor serf of Lavrenti Ivanov, a burger in Astrakhan. I ran away two months ago with my wife, Katerina, daughter of Stepanov. Ivan Grigoriev, who belongs to His Excellency, the Councillor and Governor of Astrakhan, Vasilii Nikitich Tatishchev, ran away with us, as well as Andrew Nikitin and his wife, Praskova Ivanova, and their two-month-old son Gerasim belonging to a citizen of Astrakhan, Alexei Sviatov. There also was Stepan but whose son he is and who he belongs to I don’t know. And there’s Alexander Petrov, son of Chernaev . . .

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21 I asked the elders if it would be possible to look for the Russians and return them to me . . . The elders answered, [W]e’ll do everything possible to hand over those Russians and will send a message for that purpose to Tiub Karagan, as we know who has them. 22 Then I gave an order for them to be fed[;] according to their custom, a plate of honey with kalach [special dry bread] was put out for every two men. And I asked [the interpreters] to find out in conversation if anyone from their Turkmen could conduct our Russian safely as far as the Aral Sea near Khiva, then to Astrakhan, for a payment in grain supplies or money. They could negotiate with me. To that the elders replied, [I]t is impossible at this time to find such volunteers because the Persian army has come to Khiva. We don’t know what is happening there now but are sending Kanbarbek’s brother, Egenbek atalyk, to enquire today. When he returns, and if he says all is well, then there could be many volunteers, even though the place is far away . . . 25 A call from shore came at 9 am for Musa the Tatar, who was dispatched. When he returned at 12 [hours] after midnight [i.e. 12 pm] he said that Kanbarbek and the other three clans are saying that he12 wants us still to wait for the others who will not be here for a month, we don’t need that . . . Then he said, [T]hey said tell the Captain to send us two sacks of flour so we and our people have something to eat, and we will come to him tomorrow. Others were saying, [W]hy are we waiting, it’s better to return home. Kanbarbek said, Let’s just wait until tomorrow. Others were shouting, [W]hy are you the ones who are going with the petition? It’s better to send someone else. A mullah, the

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Turkmen Murat Niaz, confounded them above all . . . I13 took him aside and asked him, [W]hy are you doing that[?], and he said for one sack of flour he would tell me all I needed to know. I answered that of course that could not be because his elders were listening. I asked many Turkmen, while I was on shore, if they would conduct the Russian to the Aral Sea but no one came forward. 26 Around 1 pm, I sent one sack of flour, at their request, so they would not leave. I ordered it announced that I had sent two sacks yesterday and would send more when necessary. I ordered Musa to announce secretly, so that no one could observe, a gift of 5 sacks of flour to each elder. For if he speaks to someone in a whisper, or takes him aside and another person observes it, they will not release the Tatar unless he discloses under oath what he spoke in secret and the promises he made. lf he makes the oath they will believe him and the elders will take the gifts away, hiding them from everyone. When Tatar Musa returned he told me, [W]hen I arrived on shore I went to the elders and said that one sack of flour was sent and last night two were given, making three in all. And in future, if appropriate, it will happen again. They all began to talk and say the Captain is laughing at us! We ordered two and he sends one! The two skins [sacks] that we took yesterday we gave to the man we have dispatched to Khiva. Then I said in secret to one of the elders from the mountains that the Captain ordered me to say that when your petition is completed and you are all ready to depart, he will give you each 5 sacks of flour. He went over to the others and asked, What are you all shouting about? What we have received has been fine. It is impossible to take it all from the ship! That quietened them down and then they said, [W]e will come to the ship tomorrow to conclude the whole affair.

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27 I sent Tatar Musa ashore to fetch the Turkmen mullah Murat Niaz with his aforementioned 25 points [a reference to a section of the diary that is not included in these excerpts]. I received him in my cabin and during our conversation promised him a sack of flour. I asked whether many clans had arrived and of those clans which was the pre-eminent one, and how many people and kibitkas were in each. Do they all really want to become the subjects of HIM? Do they want to build a fort today? What are the elders thinking, do they want to take the petition themselves or send someone else? What else had he heard from the elders of the 3 clans, [and] as for the others, will they come here or not? Please tell me. The mullah Murat Niaz said there are 6 clans here in all. In order of pre-eminence: 1) the Delin clan of the elder Kanbarbek with 600 kibitkas, 2) the Gurban clan of the elder Karabatyr’ with 100 kibitkas, 3) the Mengli-Khodzhina clan of Onbegi Sungurap with 100 kibitkas, 4) the Ugryn clan of Shapyk Niaz batyr’ with 100 kibitka, 5) he had not heard from the Burunchuk clan of Alibai, but Pir Nazar mergen’, a noble of that clan, was there with l00 kibitkas and 6) Bavbek Batyr of the Ikdyr clan, a noble with 100 kibitkas. I expect, he said, that many from their clans will be coming today from Khiva, but I don’t know how many. Our elders are thinking about travelling themselves to the court of HIM but others are begging them not to go but to send someone else, but I think they will go and not send others. I approached Shapyk Niaz batyr’ of the Ugryn clan, the fourth clan, and said it would be better if he went, but he said he did not want to. They all want to become subjects of HIM, to construct a fort, and let it be included in their petition that Turkmen would come from all over to become subjects of HIM because there is no other place except Russia where they can expect to get food. 28 I ordered him again to ask, Are there any envoys among you from the Kalmyk ulus of Donduk Dashi or Turkmen from his domains

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on any sort of business, moreover, besides your Turkmen people, from what do they have their revenues and by what do they live, do they have manufactories, or a lot of cattle, and by what do they make their livelihood? The mullah Murat Niaz answered, [T]here were no emissaries from the Kalmyk ulus of Donduk Dashi or his Turkmen domains. When Kanbarbek was in Astrakhan, he visited the Kalmyk ulus then returned to Mangyshlak, but he never was among the local Kalmyk and Turkmen and never spoke about it. But, he said, we don’t have any large-horned animals, only horses, camels, sheep and goats, and not a lot of them. There are no manufactories [ fahrika] but the women weave armiak [peasants’ cloth] and the men go away to raid the Kazakhs and to Persia, for we are all armed, we know how to beat the mountains for wild goats. There is burmet [coarse cotton] and biazi [cotton or wool] too, which is bartered in Khiva for savry [the leather part of a horse’s saddle] and other goods, whatever one has [in one’s possession], but mainly for captured iazyry [slaves].

16 July [1745] 29 At 8 am they called from shore to send the ial, which was sent that hour and at 9 am, the elders, Kanbarbek of the Delin clan, Karabatyr’ of the Gurban clan, Onbegi Sungurap of the MengliKhodzhina clan and Shapyk Niaz batyr’ of the Ugryn clan, came on board the ship with four more men. They announced on their arrival, [W]e have been thinking it’s impossible for us to go to the court of HIM because we have too much to do here and if we left we’d be away for a long time. We all have business here that can’t be done without us as we are the seniors and Kanbarbek is the most senior of all. We’ve considered who else to send from the others, what is your advice to us?

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30 I ordered them [the interpreters] to reply, [A]s you wish, but my counsel is that I keep my word to you and not change it by the hour. It would be most unseemly to give attention to many frivolous conversations, for you see yourselves the letter from His Excellency, the Councillor and Governor of Astrakhan, to you that I brought with me. We want to assist you in expediting the petition from your nobles and wise men to the court of HIM . . . 31 They answered, [T]here’s nothing more to say, we’ll go ourselves. We want to write our petition to HIM now. Order your abyz to write a fine letter to the Governor . . . Then they said a second time, [P]lease order your abyz to write our petition and our letter as we don’t have anyone who knows how to write. 32 At their request I ordered the abyz, who was sent with me, to write their petition to become subjects of HIM and [also] about the building of a fort. In the letter to His Excellency [. . .], I ordered the abyz to include the exact number of kibitkas in each clan and its male population. When it was written I ordered him to read it aloud so that they could affix their stamps and seals. Then I announced that it would be proper for them to make an effort to find the Russians and that His Excellency [. . .] would reward them generously as, I told you before, a man belonging to His Excellency is among them. Then I ordered to say about the flour that it would be given to them when they were completely seated in the boat for departure, in order that the others who would observe [the distribution of the flour] would not reproach you. 32[sic] The abyz read the letter and the petition. All four elders said, [E]verything written is in order, we will affix our stamps and seals

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to the petition when our people arrive from the ulus but better still we will take it ourselves to the ulus, for there is much to do in the ulus and when that is settled we will go to Astrakhan and send camels to pick up the flour[. W]hen they bring it we will head for Astrakhan. We did not put our population in the petition because we don’t know it for sure, just the number of kibitkas . . .

17 July [1745] 35 They called from shore for the ial at 7 pm. Kanbarbek, Karabatyr’, Onbegi Sungurap, Shapyk Niaz batyr’ and five other men were escorted to the ship. Kanbarbek and his companions said, We leave today for our ulus because we have business there; what’s more, a Kazakh envoy is there and we must release him and take care of our domestic affairs. As regards departure for Astrakhan, we’ll return in 9 days, no less. Today we’re sending for the Russians (prisoners) on the islands . . . For each host of the Russians we need 10 sacks of flour per Russian, and for our eight envoys, ten sacks. 36 I ordered them [the interpreters] to say that was a huge amount to request and that I thought 10 sacks for two would be enough, and for their eight envoys, two sacks. Kanbarbek and his companions said: [I]f he does not give more than ten [sacks] for the two men, let it be so; and he has to give our envoys one sack for each of them because they have far to travel and if he refuses to give nobody will go and they will not take less; and they also said that I promised to give them [as a gift] five sacks each and this is the quantity we need for without it our households will have nothing to eat, and let him [Kopytovskii] supplement the three sacks that have already been given by seven sacks for each [of us] and we will be satisfied.

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37 At those words of theirs I was obliged to promise I would give them [the flour] when they had brought back . . . 38 At 4 pm Tatar Musa announced the elder Alibai of the Burunchuk clan and the noble Pir Nazar mergen’ to whom everyone of that clan deferred. But the elders did not defer at all to Alibai. With them came thirty-two men. In conversation I told them that I had been sent from Astrakhan by the Governor [. . .] to their elders and that I carried a letter that I had recently transmitted, after a long meeting, to the elders Kanbarbek, Karabatyr’ and Onbegi Sungurap. Pir Nazar mergen’ said, [W]e have seen the letter from the Astrakhan Governor, and we desire in every possible way to become subjects of HIM, and we sent a petition via the Khivian ambassador who promised to solicit on our behalf. 39 Although it is fitting for you to become subjects of HIM and to send elders from the nobles, it is inappropriate to solicit through an external ambassador and to send your petition through him to the court of HIM. Pir Nazar mergen’ replied, [W]e sent a letter via the Khivian envoy; it was ordered that he deliver it to the elder Kanbarbek as he was in Astrakhan at the time. But he did not know a letter would be sent to him so he returned to Mangyshlak, and the envoy’s letter was left behind. But now the elders, Kanbarbek, Karabatyr’, Onbegi Sungurap and Niaz batyr’ will go with the petition to the court of HIM, as we, their people, trust them because they are senior . . . Then he said, [W]e will go shore for the night and return to you again in the morning. At 6 pm they went ashore.

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19 July [1745] 44 They called from shore at 9 pm to send Tatar Musa who was dispatched with the ial to escort the elders Kanbarbek, Onbegi Sungurap and Shapyk Niaz who, as said above, were planning to go to the court of HIM with their petition. They said, [W]e were in the ulus and released the Kaisats [Kazakh] envoy and also [an envoy] from the Umut [Iomut] Turkmen. They asked us for you to let them come on board the ship just to look around and, we are asking you, please transport them here and feed them as you have fed us. 45 At their request, I dispatched the ial with one of their men and Tatar Musa. I ordered not to seat many people, to avoid the others who could cause trouble. Around 3 pm the envoys from the Umut [Iomut] Turkmen and the Kaisats were escorted to the ship with eight Mangyshlak Turkmen, among whom was a Mambet Berdybek of the Ugryn clan upon whom, I heard, the Khan of Khiva had bestowed the rank of bek last year. I engaged them in conversation and asked them to tell me where they were from, and had they had business here in the past[?] The Kazakh envoy replied, I was sent here from Abulkhair Khan on general business, my name is Kiiat of the Ishikh clan. We used to quarrel and fight constantly with the Turkmen, but now we have mutually agreed to make peace and will not quarrel again. I asked for a meeting with you on your ship but don’t have any business. The envoy from the Umut [Iomut] Turkmen said, I was sent to the Mangyshlak elders about our affairs. My name is Tagan. We are nomadizing mainly around the Balkhan Mountains where we came from Khiva a short time ago. Two months ago the Persian army came, it’s rumoured with 40,000 men. We don’t really know

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how many. Expecting a surprise attack, we retreated further into the Balkhans. We are thinking of living in our ancient dwelling place on Mangyshlak but we don’t really want to live there. We don’t know, he said, what is happening in Khiva now. Only we have heard that the Persian Khan and the Khivian are living in Khiva and there is no destruction. They are just waiting for the Shah’s decree about some business we don’t know anything about. 46 Then I ordered honey and rusks to feed them according to their custom and then had them all conducted ashore. I wanted to learn more from them but that was not possible as they said, [I]t’s time for us to go. As the ial pulled away from the ship, Mambet Berdybek of the Ugryn clan shouted, threatening us, [W]hen I get to shore I’ll smash your ial because you have put a high price on the flour which I’ll never buy and which I don’t need. I’m not afraid of Russians! 47 When I heard his evil intention, I was afraid something might actually happen. Observing their audacity, I ordered the ial to come alongside the ship again and asked the elders, Kanbarbek and companions, to remain on board the ship and I ordered the same to the above-mentioned Mambet Berdybek. And I ordered to bring only the envoys. On the ship, I asked Kanbarbek why this Mambet Berdybek was threatening me. Had I not treated him kindly and satisfied him as I had you? Kanbarbek and his companions replied, Why bother with him? He doesn’t know himself what he’s blabbering about. And they began to argue among themselves. 48 I ordered Musa to pay attention to their dispute and who said what . . . He said Karabatyr’ and Onbegi Sungurap asked

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Mambet Berdybek, Why do you talk like that to the Russians and threaten to smash their boat? Don’t you know they are not afraid of your threats? You come on board and say to us that we would serve the Russians for a sack [of flour]. You are pleased about that, but we are content with the Russians even if they don’t send flour. Do you think that by acting alone you will get something from the Khan of Khiva or the Kazakhs? Aren’t the Khivians dying like dogs while the Kazakhs are content with the Russians? Don’t you know that if the Russians didn’t bring flour here you’d have to give a horse for a sack and you could never do that. When they bring us more we will all live here together as before. And you threaten the Russians and spit at them in your heart! Mambet Berdybek replied, I didn’t say I’d smash the ial[. W]hoever said I did is lying. You would serve the Russians for one chetvert of flour. I say you are afraid of them, but I don’t need them. Karabatyr’ spoke[: Y]ou’re denying now that you said you would smash the ial which is what Tatar Musa heard. We will settle with you later because you received the Kazakh envoys without asking us and today received two Khivians without telling us for we are the elders here and you just brag that the Khan of Khiva made you a bek and because of that you are bigger than us, but you are not bigger, many people are bigger than you . . . You had better shut up; instead you began to threaten, and the people are offended by your menaces. And if the people hear that you behave in this way and make the Russians angry the time is not far off when they will leave. You are not so hot [semenist].14 The only hope is that you are three brothers and you think everyone is afraid because of that. But no, the Russians will not feel scared. Mambet Berdybek replied, I’m not afraid of Russians, you can say what you like, I’m not afraid of Russians and I don’t need them . . .

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52 Twelve Turkmen arrived together in the same boat. I asked which clan were they from, what kind of people they were, where did they live, their population, and the number of their kibitkas. They answered, [W]e are from the Buzachiev [sic] clan, I’m the elder Menglibai, and the noble Shiuish is with me. We live three days’ ride from here. We came here from Khiva over a month ago because it was difficult to live around Khiva without grain. The Persian army came there, we don’t know why it came, or how large it was, but we left because we heard that the Russians had brought flour and we were glad to hear that. We are 300 kibitkas and we have come here to buy flour today . . . And we want to become subjects of HIM and that is also a reason why we left Khiva. They said to Karabatyr’ and Sungurap, [P]lease don’t leave us out when you are shown mercy at the court of HIM. Karabatyr’ and Sungurap replied, We don’t go to petition for ourselves alone but for everyone. They said, [W]e trust you and we hope you will include us in your petition as we have no one who can write and it’s a long way to send somebody. At this Karabatyr’ and Sungurap said, [P]lease give an order to barter three sacks of flour so they don’t go away empty-handed and order them to be escorted ashore. We will stay on board the ship so no one starts anything. They bartered three sacks of flour and went ashore in the ial. 55 The sailor, Gavril Plekhanov, quartermaster at the time, was ordered to go in the ial and not pull in close to shore nor let anyone get in on the return trip. When that ial came back with two men and Mambet Berdybek, who wanted to smash it on the 19th, I asked the sailor and the rowers to explain themselves [.W]hy had they brought back people against orders? They replied, [W]hen we arrived onshore the Turkmen began to unload the flour, someone crawled out of the water and sat down

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in the ial. We said, [W]e have orders to take no one in the boat, there’s nothing to do on the ship, at which he shouted and threatened and refused to get out of the ial and was joined by two more men. Because of his insolence we were afraid to quarrel further and create an even bigger incident so we brought them with us. 56 I gave the order to row them ashore and not to let anyone into the ial, and to say, [T]here’s nothing of interest for you on the ship, as it was almost evening, but Mambet Berdy remained on board the ship and I was afraid to dispatch him by force. Karabatyr’ and Sungurap said, [S]end us ashore; we will ride to the ulus tomorrow and make preparations to depart; we will return on Friday and before that send people and camels. As for Mambet Berdy, don’t pester him, he’ll stay here with you, since he does not go with us. At that Mambet Berdy said, [Y]ou go. I’ll stay here as I have things to do. 57 When the ial arrived at the ship, I ordered Musa to ask him what his business was here. Musa said, He’s saying, I’ve come to barter for flour and why won’t they let me? Yesterday they lied about me in saying I’d smash the ial, but that’s all Kanbarbek’s affair, and I’ll take care of him soon. 58 I ordered him [Musa] to say, [T]his is the third time we have told you we have flour and you ask the price. We cannot sell it cheaper. If Tatar Musa happens to have [flour] I’ll order [him] to sell it to you alone . . . Come back tomorrow. It’s too late now. I ordered all of them conducted to shore. For security, I commanded four soldiers to accompany the rowers in case there was any trouble onshore, and I ordered them to land farther away from the people

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onshore so they could debark and take off quickly before anyone could get to them to help. Musa said that he answered, Give an order to barter and I’ll be back tomorrow. When the sailor Gavril Plekhanov and Mulka Iddemrich of the Astrakhan garrison, Samara regiment, and the Kazakh Grigorii Nikitin returned they reported that when one of the ial landed then pulled away from shore, Mambet Berdy shouted and threatened, If you come on land we will destroy your ial and ship and kill all of you! His younger brother was even more threatening.

21 July [1745] 59 In the morning and after the big meal, there was continuous shouting from the shore for Tatar Musa. I dispatched him at 4 pm with the abyz in a small boat of mine and ordered them to stay out of range of gunfire and only to enquire whether the Igdyr clan had arrived and then to return. But as they approached the shore, five men rode out from a ravine up to the shore and into the sea and fired guns at them. When he returned Musa said, [W]e thought we were faurther out from shore than a weapon could reach. We asked if there were any new arrivals and everyone shouted for us to come closer. I said, No way, but tell us what your business is. I saw a man on horseback gallop out of a ravine. It was evident that someone had been on guard watching for the boat from the ship. Five men galloped up to the shore and shouted to me to approach. I retreated quickly. They [the horsemen] went to higher ground because of the weather and rode into the sea firing at us from guns, and a bullet went right past us all. It was Mambet Berdy and his two brothers; his own blood brother shot at us, but I don’t know his name.

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60 After that they shouted at us all evening and called for Tatar Musa. I ordered him to talk to them through a speaking trumpet and say the ial would not be sent until the elders and Kanbarbek and companions had come, and that we did not have any business with them nor they with us. Musa said the people shouting from shore say they are not the people who fired on us. They say, [W]e are giving an oath according to our custom, not to cause you trouble and, they said, [D]on’t judge the rest of us by what that laggard did; please come to us.

23 July [1745] 62 After midnight, around 12, seven Turkmen arrived by boat from the islands to buy flour. At the same time, a naked Turkmen swam out to the ship from shore because of the weather. Musa explained, [T]he Turkmen said that he was sent by Pir Nazar mergen’ of the Burunchuk clan to ask to be received on board, and that they would not commit any outrage against the Russians, but if someone did, it would dishonour that person, but not his clan; and he asked if he would be received or not . . . 63 Pir Nazar mergen’ and Edna-Mengli came on board the ship at 1 pm. I asked in conversation where he had been and on what business he had come to the ship? Pir Nazar mergen’ said, [W]e were in our ulus when yesterday [some people] rode up shouting a lot that a boat had been sent for us but that we had not been summoned to the ship. We heard that Mambet Berdy had fired at your people, and he has done a very bad thing which is an offence to all the people, and they will kill him, of course, if you don’t send the boat to shore any more.

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We want to become subjects of HIM. Our people have taken counsel and propose to send a special petition independently as we don’t want to be written in with Kanbarbek and his companions because our clan is senior to their clan, and it is pointless for them to consider themselves senior. If you don’t believe us, ask the people of our Burunchuk clan. 64 I [Kopytovskii] ordered them [the interpreters] to say, [I]t is my duty, in my opinion, to see that your petition is written for all the clans, not just one clan, and that it is sent with the consent of the elders of all the clans, whoever and how many you may choose, but not from just one clan, as I have said before, what is in your best interest is what expresses your will. But I have nothing to do with your elections or which clan is senior. You should talk about that with your elders . . .

25 July [1745] 69 Around 6 pm, many Turkmen arrived onshore and were shouting for the ial. It was evident that the elders had arrived. Tatar Musa was dispatched in a small boat to find out who had come and if Kanbarbek and his companions were among them. If so, he has to land the boat, then the ial would be released. As the Tatar did land, I dispatched the ial, and soon Kanbarbek, Karabatyr’, Onbegi Sungurap, Shapyk Niaz batyr’, and eight other Turkmen were conveyed to the ship. They said they had only come to transport to shore the flour that was promised to them. They said they would not leave the ship until the flour had been transported, then they would set out on their trip. They said they would not be able to turn over the five Russian fugitives but they could tell me who had them and that they would not be sold just anywhere. About my earlier question,

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they said, [W]e have eight Turkmen, among them a mullah, to serve our four people for their needs in Astrakhan, and what’s more they are going to meet their kinfolk. 70 At their declaration, I ordered flour distributed to all four of them, counting on 25 sacks in 4 chetverts to each, and one sack to the Turkmen mullah Murat Niaz, as I had promised. And after delivery, it was to be transported ashore. Then I asked him to enquire in conversation whether they had brought anyone with them who knew how to write. Then I said, [T]he elder Alibai and Pir Nazar mergen’ of the Burunchuk clan are here with me on the ship and they promised to await your counsel, have you met with them yet? Kanbarbek said Sungurap has someone who can write, but Karabatyr’ and Shapyk Niaz batyr’ will place their signs because no one in their clan can write; then they said they would wait until morning because they had sent for a kaftan for Kanbarbek that would be brought early. Then they answered, [W]e met with the elder Alibai and Pir Nazar mergen’ and Pir Nazar mergen’ told us, [W]e don’t want to be written into the petition with you, and they went away to their ulus. Next they said, [T]here is nothing more to expect, no one else is coming, we must set out in the morning, and when we become subjects of HIM we will tell all the others and they will want to become subjects, too.

26 July [1745] 71 The kaftan was brought to him [Kanbarbek], and, as the winds were propitious, we prepared to set sail on our course. I ordered him to say that it appears to me that this place is not a suitable one for a fort because it lacks fresh water.

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Kanbarbek answered, [W]e know a very suitable location we call Kara Akyn near Tiub Karagan where there is lots of water flowing into the sea from springs, and it has a safe landing place for ships, and when an order is given to build a fort, we will show you the place ourselves.

27 July [1745] 72 We did not get to Tiub Karagan but remained at anchor because of foul winds. That same day the elders ordered the abyz sent with me to read again their petition [to HIM] and their letter to His Excellency [. . .] For the reading they entered my cabin and affixed their seals and signs. Then I ordered it announced that I had brought something for their pleasure; I had wanted to bake bread and to make kalach on the boat here but it was impossible because I did not have any wheat flour, what is more the ship’s commander had told me it would be impossible to bake bread on the ship because 1) there was danger from fire, 2) the stove was small and in poor condition, so for the pleasure of their elders we were giving them a sheep. The navigator, Pavel Lebedev, gave three pounds of his own dried rusks, as an allowance, to please their attendants. Tatar Musa said that Kanbarbek and his companions said, [W]e don’t have anything with us to nourish ourselves, and the Captain would have ordered bread baked to make kalach to please us. But if it is impossible to make bread and kalach, then give an order to satisfy our people with rusks. 73 I asked Kanbarbek to be reminded that he had told me earlier that the Persian army was in Khiva, but he did not say how large it was or why it had come, and that he had promised to tell me on the way. Could he oblige me now?

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FROM THE JOURNAL OF CAPTAIN V. KOPYTOVSKII , 1745

Tatar Musa said Kanbarbek replied, [T]he Persian army numbering 30,000 had come not to destroy Khiva but actually to subjugate the Turkmen people because last year the Turkmen living in the Khiva region had increased all sorts of actions against the Khivians. We objected that a Khivian had gone to the Shah and told him to send his army in order to make all the Turkmen his subjects. That was why the army was sent. The Umut [Iomut] Turkmen did not know the army had come, but when they found out, they mounted a surprise attack. A big battle took place between them in which many Turkmen were killed, but the Turkmen killed twice as many Persians and went away to the mountains. They [the Persians] sent an emissary bearing gifts to try to convince them to become subjects of the Shah. They refused and sent an envoy to me to request the Russians to ship flour to sell, as they were coming to live in Mangyshlak. I sent him back to encourage them, said I would try to petition on their behalf. Next, he said, another [envoy] was sent to me from those who came to your ship; I sent him back to them. Then I dispatched my son to tell them all to come to Mangyshlak. I ordered him to say that I had to go to the court of HIM to swear allegiance for myself and for them, and that I promised to ask the Governor of Astrakhan to send a ship to Mangyshlak with flour to sell. They trust me, of course, and they will come to Mangyshlak, but it is too bad that we will be away travelling for such a long time. 74 At that I announced that as soon as the winds were fair we would hasten to set sail. Musa responded that Kanbarbek said, [I]f we sail close to the shore some of us could leave the ship and take boats so we would arrive in Astrakhan sooner and speed our request to send a ship with flour, according to the petition. Then all the Umut [Iomut] Turkmen and other new arrivals would be pleased to have supplies for, of course, they are relying on our assurances to them and they will not delay . . .15

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11 August [1745] 83 We arrived at the Blinov station where a soldier from Astrakhan, Ivan Mukovnin, debarked and brought back two sheep and 100 game birds [chiurek]. I ordered him to give the elders one of the sheep and fifty game birds. They killed, cooked and ate them immediately, and we went on our way. That same day, at 6 pm, we landed safely in Astrakhan where I found lodgings for them and gave them the other sheep and fifty game birds.

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APPENDIX

Letter of the Kalmyk Khan Donduk Omba1 to Cabinet Minister Count A.I. Osterman concerning Nadir Shah’s conquest of Khiva and Bukhara, a massive migration of Turkmen to Mangyshlak, and the possibility of supplying them with grain.

13 February 1741 Before this, the Turkmen, who formerly [byvshie] had obligations to my father and grandfather and were subordinate [poddanstvo]2 to them, quarrelled among themselves and fell apart, and at that time the Kirghiz-Kazkah [Kazakhs] attacked them and ravaged many of them, and those who remained were no longer able to live in that place and went away to Khiva [Khorezm]. And now I have received from my former people in Khiva the news that last autumn [1740] at the time of the capture of Bukhara and Khiva by the Persian Khan Tahmasp [Nadir Shah Afshar],3 the former Turkmen came from Badakhshan and Bukhara, all of them, and having joined together with our Turkmen and wanting to live in their old locales and join us, they crossed into Mangyshlak, and the names of their elders are:4

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RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS . . . . . . . . .

Son of Vekil, son of Dzhumat-Nazaev Bekete, son of Zamanbek Son of eguz beks, Eguzerbek Er-Sarin [Ersari], also Dzhananbek Ersarin Teari Berdi Salorinov [Salor] Khandzhal Bakshi Ekdereev [Igdyr] Alibai Donduriev [Dondur?] [of the Alibai Yomut?] Khambar Abdalov [Abdal] Kutlu Membet Buruntsugaev [Burunchuk?] Nazar Alaiariev [Jalayir/Ali Eli?] or [Chovdor/Juvaldar/ Davaldor?]

Then they ordered5 my people [Turkmen?] to greet me and then to announce to me that when they had chosen a good place to live, they would send an eminent notable to me with notification, just as though I was their master, so I could petition on their behalf to His Imperial Majesty [Tsar Ivan VI] in order that four hundred to five hundred ships with flour [rye?] for sale to be sent to them.6 For they are not nomadic and are accustomed to grain and where no grain grows, they cannot live. And it would be good for an ukaz [decree] to be sent to Astrakhan in order that merchants be sent to help them this spring at the opening of the ice [on the Caspian Sea].The above-mentioned people of mine [the Turkmen] who were formerly in Khiva said that the Persians captured Bukhara in August [1740] and conquered Khiva on September 4th and they left Khiva that same September on the 10th, and they heard from the Turkmen that those from the Balkhans [Bukhara?] and from Badakhshan had come together and migrated away in 300,000 kibitkas [nomads’ tents] and had already arrived at the front [western promontory?] of the Mangyshlak region. And they, my Turkmen people, have set up their tents with them in the area of Khashat.7 And during their stay there in the Turkmen ulus, when those Turkmen were migrating away from Khiva, word was sent

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expressly to them from the Shah [Nadir Shah] that although they had routed his army and killed people, he, the Shah, bore them no anger and they could nomadize wherever they wanted as long as they gave him troops. And those Turkmen did not agree to that and continued to nomadize here [in Mangyshlak]. Then another messenger came to them from the Shah and announced to them that the Shah would grant them first place among all his troops and more than the customary monetary rewards, and bestow on them the status of tarkhan [tax free],8 but they did not agree and continued nomadizing here, and henceforth those mentioned above are obliged to act in accordance with my will. And you, deign to inform His Majesty about this and I will commit to your judgement what measures should be taken. [On the letter is the seal of Kalmyk Khan Donduk Omba.] Source: AVPR[I] (Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi [imperii]), F. Turkmenskie dela, 1741, op. 133/1, d. 2, ll. 1 – 2 ob. As published in Kh. Agaev and M. Annanepesov (eds), RusskoTurkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII – XIX vv. Sbornikh Arkhivnikh Dokumentov, Ashkhabad, Akademiia Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, 1963, Letter #27, page 58. Translated by Claora E. Styron.

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NOTES

Preface 1. For the geography and history of the Mangyshlak Peninsula, and more generally the Mangyshlak yurt (territory/pasturelands), see Yuri Bregel’s article, ‘Mangishlak’, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edn, Vol. 4, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1960– 2002, pages 415– 17. Bregel updates and extends the article by V.V. Barthold that appeared in the first edition of the Encyclopedia. The letter from the Kalmyk Khan is found in a compilation of primary sources: Kh. Agaev and M. Annanepesov (eds), Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII – XIX vv. Sbornikh Arkhivnikh Dokumentov, Ashkhabad, Akademiia Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, 1963 (henceforth RTO). A full English translation of the letter is provided in the Appendix of this volume. 2. Tebelev’s journal is from File #4, 1741 and Kopytovskii’s journal is from File #2, 1745 in the State Archives, known in the Soviet era as GAFKE (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv feodal’no krepostnicheskogo epokhi) and today as RGADA (Rossiskaia gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnikh aktov). 3. V. Razumovskaia, ‘Iz istorii snosheniia Rossi s turkmenami v XVIII vekov’, Krasnyi Arkhiv, Istoricheskii Zhurnal, vol. 2, no. 93, 1939, pages 210– 37. 4. Mehmet Saray, ‘Russo-Turkmen Relations up to 1874’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 3, no. 4, 1984, pages 15–48. Both Yuri Bregel and Michael Khodarkovsky make references in several of their studies to the RTO compilation, which includes correspondence relating to both Tebelev’s and Kopytovskii’s expeditions. See Yuri Bregel, ‘Mangishlak’ and ‘Nomadic and Sedentary Elements among the Turkmen’, Central Asiatic Journal, vol. 25, 1981, pages 5–37 and M. Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads,1600–1771, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992.

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NOTES TO PAGES xviii – xx 5. Two terms used here need further clarification: ‘frontier’ and ‘tribal’. As Khodarkovsky asserts, we should distinguish between frontiers and borders: a frontier is a region, a borderland, which forms a marginal territory, so it is a geopolitical area. A border, ‘by contrast, is a clearly demarcated boundary between sovereign states’ (M. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire,1500 – 1800, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2002, page 47). Here, ‘frontier’ is used to mean ‘an uncertain divide’, in Khodarkovsky’s usage, ‘porous and poorly defined’, a zone of interactions rather than a well-defined boundary (Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, pages 2 – 3). In fact, we could say that, for many colonial empires, beaches were just such zones – what the historian Greg Dening calls ‘arenas of exchange’ (Greg Dening, Islands and Beaches: Discourses on a Silent Land, Marquesas, 1774– 1880, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1980, page 43). See the discussion in David R. Brower and Edward Lazzerini (eds), Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples,1700– 1917, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997, page xvi. I have also chosen to use the terms ‘tribe’ and ‘tribal’ in their most generic senses, fully appreciating these are problematic terms and that there has been extensive debate and much controversy among anthropologists and historians as to the specific socio-political forms of organization they describe. Whether one sees the social organization of the steppe dwellers of Central Asia as essentially kin-related or as a function of some combination of kinship and politics, the greater problem is the inadequacy and imprecision of the terms that are available to us in English. There are few alternatives aside from ‘tribe’ and ‘clan’, and the same problem exists in Russian, where the most common term encountered in the literature on Central Asia (and highly tainted by Soviet ideology) is the hybrid rodoplemena, which is loosely translated as ‘clan – tribal’. There are more terms in the Persian, Chagatay and other local Islamic sources, but a similar lack of precision: qabila, ashireh, tayefe, tire, il, el, ulus, boy, oymaq, uruugh, qaum and many others. These represent a mixture of Mongol, Turkic, Persian and Arabic descriptions, all used by oasis- and urban-based chroniclers and literate observers in Central Asia for their ‘tribally organized’ peoples. For a fuller discussion of these issues, readers are encouraged to explore the work of Richard Tapper, especially ‘Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East’, in P. Khoury and J. Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Berkeley, University California Press, 1990, pages 48 – 73, and his ‘Introduction’, in Richard Tapper and Jon Thompson (eds), The Nomadic Peoples of Iran, London, Azimuth Editions, 2002, pages 18 – 23. 6. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, pages 51– 6.

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NOTES TO PAGES xxi – xxiii 7. It would be interesting, perhaps in a further study, to contrast these negotiations with the records of contemporary interactions across other parts of Russia’s steppe frontier; for example, at the forts of the Orenburg Line. 8. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, page 52. 9. Ibid., pages 30 – 1. 10. The topic of Turkmen tribalism will be taken up again in Part I. Suffice to say that besides the work of Bregel, ‘Nomadic and Sedentary Elements’, the most careful examination, using nineteenth- and twentieth-century studies, can be found in the works of Paul Georg Geiss and Adrianne Edgar. See Paul Georg Geiss, ‘Turkmen Tribalism’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 18, no. 3, 1999, pages 347– 57, and the chapters ‘Tribal Communal Commitment’ and ‘Turkmen Acephalous Political Order’ in his Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia, London, Routledge Curzon, 2003, pages 28 – 85, 97 – 106. Edgar tries to grapple with the topic in several places in her definitive study of the creation of the Turkmen SSR: Adrienne Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Turkmenistan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004, especially pages 6– 9 and 20 – 9. 11. Mehmet Saray, ‘Russo-Turkmen Relations’, pages 27 – 8, and Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, pages 21–6. While it would be simplistic to assign the motivation for Russia’s conquests in Central Asia predominantly to the issue of slave rescue and the suppression of the Uzbek slaving industry, the topic did receive considerable attention and press coverage in Russia, and indeed the rest of Europe, throughout the nineteenth century. Rescuing captives held special meaning especially in light of Russian views on the treatment of Orthodox Christians within its empire and across the borderland regions. See Michael Khodarkovsky, ‘“Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects”: Constructing Non-Christian Identities in Early Modern Russia’, in Brower and Lazzerini (eds), Russia’s Orient, pages 27– 57. 12. It is worth noting Razumovskaia’s words at the end of her introduction to the journals: ‘only after military expeditions marked by the exceptional savagery of the “White generals” were the Turkmen people at last subjugated and placed under the cruellest of colonial yokes from which they were liberated by the Great October Revolution’. This comment seems to satisfy the ever-present need at the time for an academician to pay homage to Soviet ideological considerations. On Soviet nationality policies, see Adrienne Edgar’s study of the creation of the Turkmen SSR: Edgar, Tribal Nation, especially the discussion and references on pages 4 – 5 and ‘Why Create National Territories’, pages 43– 51. 13. The RTO compilation of documents contains some useful background information: see Letter #31, ‘Instruction from the College of Foreign Affairs to the Astrakhan Voyvoda Prince M. Golitsyn, dated March 21, 1741’,

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NOTES TO PAGES xxiii – xxiv page 62, and Letter #32, ‘Report of the Astrakhan Voyvoda to the College of Foreign Affairs about the Sending of a Merchant Ship with Grain to Mangyshlak, dated April 28, 1741’, page 63. 14. See Razumovskaia’s Introduction in Part II of this volume, note 6. 15. Nile Green (ed.), Writing Travel in Central Asian History, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2014, page 3. While useful and stimulating in its various approaches to the subject, and although it contains an extensive bibliography of travellers’ and secondary studies on travel to Central Asia, this study does not provide translations of the texts, so it cannot contribute to the objective of furthering our close reading of the sources. Green’s singular contribution is to widen our horizons by discussing travel accounts of Central Asia from non-European sources: Ottoman, Persian, Mughal and Chinese. Ron Sela’s very useful chapter, ‘Prescribing the Boundaries for Knowledge: Seventeenth Century Russian Diplomatic Missions to Central Asia’, pages 69 –88, concentrates on five journals written in the seventeenth century by diplomats whose focus, unsurprisingly, is on the courts, urban oases and rulers to whom they have been sent and not the random encounters they might have had with nomadic tribal peoples on their journeys. The most comprehensive recent attempt to catalogue European travel accounts of Central Asia is Svetlana Goroshina, Explorateurs en Asie Centrale: voyageurs et aventuriers de Marco Polo a Ella Mallart, Geneva, Editions Olizane, 2003. However, it is more of a bibliography than a scholarly study of the subject, and its section on the Turkmen begins only with sources from 1839. The earlier sources listed by Goroshina have a non-specific regional Central Asian focus, and they are mainly diplomatic and commercial accounts. Similarly, while Yuri Bregel’s three-volume Bibliography of Islamic Central Asia, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995, lists a large number of published primary sources on the Turkmen and Turkmenistan, they date, with few exceptions, from the nineteenth or twentieth century. By far the most comprehensive list of Russian primary non-archival sources, travel journals and published official reports is in the bibliography of Catherine Poujol’s dissertation: ‘La Russie et L’Asie Centrale: voyages et expeditions de 1714 a` 1840’, Paris, 1985. While Poujol makes use of some of the compilations of archival documents published during the Soviet era, she largely ignores the Russian – Turkmen relationship, preferring (like many others) to focus on the Uzbek khanates of Bukhara and Khorezm. 16. Akademi Nauk SSR, Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi. Chast I: Torgovlia se Moscovskim gosudartsvom i medzhdunarodnoe polozhenie Srednei Asii v XVI –XVII vv, Leningrad, 1932 (henceforth MIUTT): a compilation of archival documents and official reports from Russian

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NOTES TO PAGES xxiv – xxix

17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27.

diplomats and merchants who travelled to Central Asia. (Note that all references to MIUTT are to Part 1, unless otherwise stated.) A.N. Struve et al., Materialy po istorii Turkmen i Turkmenii: Iranskie, Bukharskie, Khivinskie istochniki, Vol. 2, Moscow and Leningrad, 1938. The first volume provides extensive but edited extracts from Arabic and Persian sources from the ninth to the fifteenth century, while the second includes Persian and Chagatay sources from Iran, Bukhara and Khiva from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Rather confusingly, Vol. 2 was published in 1938, while Vol. 1 appeared the following year. See note 1, above, for publishing details. Most of the documents in this treasure trove of information are official letters, covering all aspects of Russia’s relations with the Turkmen from 1714 to 1869. Some of these are in the form of petitions that contain the earliest-known transcriptions of authentic Turkmen ‘voices’. Although many of them may have been dictated to the Turkmen (as indicated in Tebelev’s and Kopytovskii’s journals), mistranslated or edited by government officials before they entered the archives, they deserve much greater attention from scholars of Central Asia and from historians interested in imperial discourse and frontier interactions. For an excellent study of these earlier accounts with a summary of their contents, see Sela, ‘Prescribing the Boundaries’. Brower and Lazzerini, Russia’s Orient. Ibid., pages xvi – xvii. Ibid., page xvii. Ibid. David Spurr, The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1993. Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1975. See also the list of comparative frontier studies under the heading ‘Frontier Encounters’ in the bibliography for Brower and Lazzerini, Russia’s Orient, pages 326– 7. Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France, 1580– 1800, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995; and Olive Patricia Dickason, The Myth of the Savage and the Beginnings of French Colonialism in the Americas, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1984. Dean Snow, C.T Gehring and W. Starna (eds), In Mohawk Country: Early Narratives about a Native People, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1996 – a fascinating anthology of primary sources covering the period 1634 – 1810. For comparative purposes, the Dutch experience is explored in: Donna Merwick, The Shame and the Sorrow: Dutch – Amerindian Encounters in New Netherland, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

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NOTES TO PAGES 3 –7

Chapter 1 The Khan’s Letter 1. The text can be found in Kh. Agaev and M. Annanepesov (eds), RusskoTurkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII – XIX vv. Sbornikh Arkhivnikh Dokumentov, Ashkhabad, Akademiia Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, 1963 (henceforth RTO), Document #27, page 58. 2. For information on Donduk Omba Khan, see discussion in Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600– 1771, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992, pages 195– 213, especially page 211, regarding his appointment by the Russians and the use of the title ‘khan’. 3. Personal communication from M. Khodarkovsky to the translator of Donduk Omba’s letter, Claora E. Styron. See also his comments on the use of translators by the Russian government in Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500 – 1800, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2002, pages 70 – 4.

Chapter 2

Astrakhan, the Turkmen of Mangyshlak and the Long-Distance Caravan Trade

1. The Big and Small Balkhan Mountains lie just to the east of the port city of Kraznovodsk, now Turkmenbashi, in south-west Turkmenistan. See Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 2003, page 3, Map One. It is not known why they were called the ‘Abu’l Khan’ Mountains. 2. The date of the founding of the city of Hajji Tarkhan is unclear from the sources available to us. It became the second-most important town of the western portion of the ulus of Jochi after the capital Saray, which was located farther up the Volga River. Ibn Battuta visited Astrakhan in 1332 and reported: ‘we came to the city of Al-Hajji Tarkhan. “Tarkhan” in their usage means a place exempted from taxes. The person after whom this city was named was a Turkish pilgrim, a saintly man, who made his residence at its site and for whom the sultan gave exemption to that place [. . .] So it became a village, then grew in size and became a city, and it is one of the finest of cities, with great bazaars, built on the River Itil [Volga] which is one of the great rivers of the world. It is here that the sultan [Ozbek Khan] resides until the cold grows severe and this river freezes over.’ H.A.R. Gibb adds in a footnote that the name ‘Hajji Tarkhan’ also appears on Golden Horde coins minted in the city during that era. See Ibn Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta: AD 1325– 1354, trans. and notes by H.A.R. Gibb from the Arabic

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NOTES TO PAGES 7 –8 text of The Rihla, ed. C. Defremery and B.R. Sanguinetti, New Delhi, Munishiram Manoharlal, 1999, Vol. 3, pages 496– 7 (reprinted by permission of the Hakluyt Society). 3. With regard to the term ‘Golden Horde’, I prefer the more accurate political and geographical term ‘the ulus of Jochi’. George Vernadsky argues that the term ‘Golden Horde’ (‘Zolotaia Orda’ in Russian) did not come into common usage until it appeared in the Russian sources as late as 1564. See Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953, page 140. The use of the expression ‘Golden’ is equally suspect. There has been some disagreement among scholars over the correct names for the various subdivisions of the ulus of Jochi and the appropriate colour symbolism associated with them. See the comments by Thomas Allsen in his article ‘The Princes of the Left Hand: An Introduction to the History of the Ulus of Orda in the 13th and early 14th centuries’, AEMA, vol. 5, 1985, pages 5 – 38, especially the discussion on page 6. For a more recent analysis of the different territories of the Mongol Empire and the complexity of the ulus system, see Peter Jackson, ‘From Ulus to Khanate: The Making of the Mongol State, 1220– 1290’, in Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan (eds), The Mongol Empire and its Legacy, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1999, pages 39 – 56. Yuri Bregel’s definitive views on the issue of the correct names for the various divisions of the ulus of Jochi are as follows: ‘In Turkic, the names of these “ulus” were used with color descriptors: Aq-Orda (White Horde) for the right or western wing, and Kok-Orda (Blue Horde) for the left or eastern wing, in accordance with the traditional association of the cardinal points with color. The Ulus of Batu (the Aq-Orda), whose center was on the lower Volga, was the region that later became known to the Russians and in the West as the “Golden Horde”, but this name was not used by the Mongols and Turks. In Islamic countries the Ulus of Jochi was also known as the “khanate of Qipchaq”’ (Bregel, An Historical Atlas, page 38). In fact, the full Turko-Mongol name for the ulus of Batu in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries may have been ‘altin bosaghli aq orda’ – ‘the White Orda of the Golden Threshold’ – which suggests the Russian expression. For the official definition of the term ‘ulus’, which I believe can best be translated as ‘realm’ as it incorporates the concepts of people, state and region, see G. Doerfer, Turkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963, Vol. 1, pages 175– 8. 4. For trade routes, see Map 1. The distinction between Khorezm as a geographical place name and the political entity referred to here as the khanate of Khiva is worth noting. The use of the term ‘khanate of Khiva’ prior to the eighteenth century is actually anachronistic. The town of Khiva itself did not become the capital city of the khanate until the reign of Arab

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NOTES TO PAGES 8 –10 Muhammad Khan, who reigned from 1603 to 1622. Prior to that, the seat of government, or more accurately the residence of the supreme khan (the primus inter pares among the leaders of the Uzbek ruling lineage), was first Vazir and then Urgench (now Kunya or ‘Old’ Urgench). In the Chagatay and Persian sources the territory was always Khorezm or Khwarazm. It was the Russians who began to refer to the state from the beginning of the eighteenth century as the ‘Khivinskoe Khanstvo’, while earlier, before the time of Peter the Great, they had referred to Khorezm and its people mainly by the term ‘Urgenchi’. See Yuri Bregel, ‘The New Uzbek States: Bukhara, Khiva and Khoqand: c.1750–1886’, in Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen J. Frank and Peter B. Golden (eds), The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, page 398, note 13. 5. Audrey Burton, The Bukharans: A Dynastic, Diplomatic and Commercial History, Richmond, Curzon Press, 1997, page 460 describes the gostinyi dvor. 6. The first settlement called Orenburg was established by Ivan Kirilov on the orders of Tsarina Anna Ivanovna at the junction of the Yaik (Ural) and Or rivers in 1735. This location later became the city of Orsk. It was moved 200 versts down the river in 1741, and another 50 or so versts downstream, to its present location, two years later. Thus, the official foundation date for Orenburg is 1743. See Alton Donnelly, The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria, 1552– 1740: A Case Study in Imperialism, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, pages 59– 62 and 64 – 75. The main primary sources for the early history of Orenburg are two studies by P.I. Rychkov: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1896) and his more famous Topografiia Orenburgskaia (1887). Thanks to these studies, we have access to much more complete information about the political and social setting in Orenburg than we possess for Astrakhan. As far as this author is aware, there is no equivalent study or compilation of official documents that provides evidence for the social and commercial history of Astrakhan. For more on Orenburg, see the relevant sections in Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500– 1800, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2002, pages 156– 163. In his footnotes and bibliography, Khodarkovsky refers to a slightly different version of Rychkov’s work – Topografiia Orenburgskoi gubernii – from a 1949 compilation of sources. 7. It was not until the end of the eighteenth century, and mainly during the nineteenth, after Muraviev’s mission to the Turkmen, that one can clearly identify official Russian policies towards the Turkmen and the inhabitants of the Transcaspian region in general. As this volume indicates, prior to that time, Russo-Turkmen encounters were incidental, indirect or subsumed by policies directed towards other parties – the Kalmyks, Kazakhs or Uzbeks of Khorezm. That is why many historians use the date of Muraviev’s travels,

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NOTES TO PAGES 10 –12

8.

9.

10.

11.

1819, as the commencement for the narrative of Russian – Turkmen relations. See, for example, Mehmet Saray, ‘Russo-Turkmen Relations up to 1874’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 3, no. 4, 1984, pages 15 – 48, and his The Turkmen in the Age of Imperialism: A Study of the Turkmen People and Their Incorporation into the Russian Empire, Ankara, Turkish Historical Society, 1989. For studies focused more on explorations, see Michael Beard, ‘European Travelers in the Transcaspian before 1917’, Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique, vol. 13, no. 4, 1972, pages 590–9. The Russian geographer L.S. Berg, who wrote a definitive account of the exploration of Transcaspia, published in the same volume as Barthold’s A History of the Turkmen People, began his coverage of the subject with the expeditions of BekovichCherkasskii in the early eighteenth century. See L.S. Berg, Istoria Issledovaniia Turkmenii, in Turkmenii, Vol. 1, Leningrad, Akademi Nauk SSR. Even Razumovskaia’s introduction to the journals of Tebelev and Kopytovskii is silent on the period prior to Peter the Great, as if there were no encounters nor any sort of relationship between Russians and Turkmen during the 160 years from the conquest of Astrakhan to Peter’s reign. The caravan from Saray to Urgench that Ibn Battuta joined in the 1330s reveals that merchants travelled the routes across the north-east corner of the greater Mangyshlak yurt. Unfortunately, he does not provide information about any steppe dwellers he may have encountered on his route from Saraychiq on the Yaik to Urgench. See Ibn Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Battuta, pages 539 – 41. Audrey Burton, Bukharan Trade: 1558– 1718, Papers on Inner Asia No. 28, Bloomington, RIFIAS, 1993; the trade routes from Bukhara are discussed on pages 4 – 10. Although somewhat repetitious, the discussion of trade and trade routes in Burton’s later historical study contains much more detail and new information on merchants, caravans and Central Asian trade in general. See Burton, The Bukharans, especially pages 391 – 7 for information on the land and sea routes from Bukhara to Astrakhan. The most comprehensive analysis of the Persian silk trade and specifically connections with Russia can be found in Rudolph P. Matthee, The Politics of Trade in Safavid Iran: Silk for Silver, 1600 –1730, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, especially pages 30– 1 and 218–23. He discusses the new trade regime introduced by the Russians in 1667 which created a monopoly for the Armenians in the silk trade between Persia and Russia that went by way of Darband and Astrakhan to Moscow (pages 192 – 7). Burton, Bukharan Trade, page 44; on the issue of horses, specifically, page 28. See Burton, The Bukharans, pages 460– 96 for the various developments in Astrakhan regarding the teziki gostinyi dvor. On the Afghans and the Inner Asian horse trade, see especially J.L. Gommans, The Rise of the Indo-Afghan

147

NOTES TO PAGES 12 –16

12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Empire, 1710 – 1780, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999. Khodarkovsky (Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600– 1771, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992; and Russia’s Steppe Frontier) also mentions the importance of Astrakhan as the preeminent horse market for the nomadic peoples of the Inner Asian steppe, particularly the Kalmyks and Kazakhs. Burton, The Bukharans, pages 460– 84 and 490– 2, in reference to the various decrees of the tsars in the seventeenth century that attempted to regulate the Eurasian merchant communities of Astrakhan. It would have been common practice at the time for starshin to engage in commercial activity. We can certainly point to the case of Khodja Nefes, a Turkmen whom Ayuki Khan assigned to assist the Russians during the reign of Peter the Great (Khodarkovsky Where Two Worlds Met, page 158). Also see references to Turkmen elders in Astrakhan in Kh. Agaev and M. Annanepesov (eds), Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII– XIX vv. Sbornikh Arkhivnikh Dokumentov, Ashkhabad, Akademiia Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, 1963 (henceforth RTO), Document #11. Tebelev’s journal describes a merchant called Kanbarbek, who stays in the ‘Tatar yurt’ during his visit to Astrakhan, perhaps implying that he did not reside in one of the gostinyi dvor in the city itself. Burton, Bukharan Trade, page 5. Her source is Akademi Nauk SSR, Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi. Chast I: Torgovlia se Moscovskim gosudartsvom i medzhdunarodnoe polozhenie Srednei Asii v XVI– XVII vv, Leningrad, 1932 (henceforth MIUTT). On the land and sea routes from Bukhara to Astrakhan, see Burton, The Bukharans, pages 391– 4 and 395– 6. See also the comments by Richard Johnson, one of Anthony Jenkinson’s companions on his journey from Astrakhan to Bukhara in 1558: ‘Notes Gathered by Richard Johnson in Boghar with Jenkinson about the Distances and Ways from Russia to Cathay’, in Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia, Vol. 1, ed. E.D. Morgan and C.H. Coote, London, Hakluyt Society, 1886. For the distribution of the Turkmen tribes in the sixteenth century, see Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 73, Map 38A, and Chapter 3, note 11, below. Burton, Bukharan Trade, page 5, and The Bukharans, pages 392– 3. Anthony Jenkinson, ‘The Voyage of M. Anthony Jenkinson, Made from the City of Moscow in Russia to the City of Boghor in Bactria in the year 1558’, in Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia, page 65. Jenkinson, ‘The Voyage’, pages 42–100. Burton, Bukharan Trade, page 1. Jenkinson, ‘The Voyage’, page 64.

148

NOTES TO PAGES 16 –19 21. Jenkinson, ‘The Voyage’, page 66 passim. 22. Jenkinson, ‘The Voyage’, page 72. On the issue of Timur Sultan, brother of Hajji Muhammad, and his authority over the Turkmen of Mangyshlak, see also Abu’l Ghazi Bahadur Khan, Histoire des Mongols et des Tatares, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. P. Desmaisons; Vol. 2, Chagatay text; St Petersburg, 1871– 4; single-volume reprint, Amsterdam, Philo Press, 1970 (all references are to the Philo edition). For Timur Sultan Uzbek, see text page 235, trans. page 273. 23. Jenkinson, ‘The Voyage’, page 65. The phrase ‘man-stealing Turkomans’ occurs repeatedly in English-language sources from the second half of the nineteenth century, especially from the Great Game literature. For example, see Charles Marvin, Merv, the Queen of the World and the Scourge of the ManStealing Turkomans, London, 1881, as well as works by V. Baker and Edward O’Donovan. For a good contemporary list of these narratives, see George Curzon, Russia in Central Asia, London, 1889, which contains an extensive bibliography on the Turkmen, pages 453 – 4. 24. See note 14, above. 25. V.V. Barthold, A History of the Turkmen People, in Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Vol. 3, trans. V. and T. Minorsky, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1962, pages 142– 3. This is a translation of Barthold’s Ocherk istorii turkmenskogo naroda, which originally appeared in Vol. 1 of Turkmenii, Leningrad, 1929. It was later reprinted in Barthold’s collected works, Sochineniia, Moscow, 1963, Vol. 2, pages 547– 623. Barthold quotes from Veselovskii, Pamiatniki diplomat i torgovikh snosheny Moskva s Persiei, Vol. 1, pages 106– 11. 26. Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi, Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, ed. Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1988, and Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, trans. and annotated Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1999 (henceforth Firdaws). See Firdaws, 1999, page 552, note 149: ‘the name Hasan-Eli (in Turkmen Esen-Eli) [. . .] was originally applied to the group of tribes, which included Chowdur, Igdir, Bozachi, Abdal and Arabachi who lived on the Manqishlaq [. . .] In the Khanate of Khiva in the nineteenth century these five groups were considered as parts of a single tribe, the Chowdur.’ 27. The Kabakli Landing is mentioned in a January 1617 document. See MIUTT, Document #22, pages 122– 3. Furthermore, Barthold cites a source from 1613 that suggests the yurt of the Esen Eli had expanded north to the Emba, but would soon be attacked by the arriving forces of the Kalmyks. See Barthold, A History of the Turkmen People, page 152, citing Veselovskii, Pamiatniki, page 351. 28. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text pages 314– 16, trans. pages 337– 8. See also Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 56.

149

NOTES TO PAGES 20 –27 29. Burton, Bukharan Trade, page 2. 30. Yuri Bregel, ‘The Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva’, Journal of Asian History, vol. 12, no. 2, 1978, pages 120– 51. 31. Burton, The Bukharans, pages 392–3. 32. MIUTT, pages 122 – 279. 33. Burton, The Bukharans, pages 308– 22 describes the fascinating and controversy-filled journey of Daudov. 34. MIUTT, Documents #22 and #25, pages 12– 23 and 129 – 31. 35. MIUTT, Document #44, pages 155–6. 36. Landing at Karagan instead of Kabakli would have involved a relatively minor change to a caravan’s route. Instead of passing around the eastern end of Mangyshlak Bay and going to the southern shores of the Buzachi Peninsula, the merchants would have turned west further to the south and passed through the Mangyshlak Peninsula itself. Both routes seem to have been in use from the 1550s to the 1630s. 37. MIUTT, Documents #35 and #52, pages 143– 6 and 167. 38. MIUTT, Document #74, pages 199–200. 39. There are no documents at all from 1654 to 1669, probably reflecting a total breakdown in communication between those years, and the exchanges pick up in earnest only in 1673. It is possible that there were unofficial, private merchant activities between Astrakhan and Mangyshlak during the hiatus, but there is no primary source evidence to support this theory. 40. MIUTT, Documents #78 to #106, pages 210– 53, deal with the transit trade and related issues. 41. MIUTT, Documents #87, #93, #98 and #102, pages 225, 232, 239 and 247, all discuss building a fort or fortified trading post on Mangyshlak. It is worth noting that these exchanges are between the Russian authorities in Astrakhan and the khans of Khiva, and as such they do not provide us with any insights into what the Turkmen of Mangyshlak may have wanted. The idea that a permanent Russian military and commercial presence on Mangyshlak might lead his Turkmen ‘subjects’ to seek allegiance to the Tsar may not have occurred to Anusha Khan or the Uzbeks. 42. Burton, Bukharan Trade, page 63. 43. Ibid., pages 64– 5.

Chapter 3

Turkmen, Uzbeks and Russians

1. Yuri Bregel, Khorezmskie Turkmeny v XIX veke, Moscow, Vostochnaia Literatura, 1961. There is a wealth of documents from the Uzbek side on the situation in Khorezm at the end of the eighteenth and early nineteenth

150

NOTES TO PAGES 27 –29

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

centuries, including the chronicles of Mirab Munis and Agahi as well as the archives of Khiva, which served as the main source for Bregel’s 1961 study. These allow for detailed explication of Uzbek– Turkmen relations for that period, but examination of the relationship in earlier centuries is much more difficult and less grounded in routine – and therefore unbiased – economic, judicial and commercial primary sources. I have been unable to review the discussion of Turkmen– Uzbek relations in the edited volume by Karryev, Moshkova, Nasonov and Iakubovskii, Ocherk iz istorii Turkemskogo naroda i Turkmenistana v VIII– XIX, Ashkhabad, 1954, pages 216– 27, but their analysis of this issue during the first half of the seventeenth century is noted in Bregel’s ‘Uzbeks, Qazaqs and Turkmens’, in Nicola Di Cosmo, Allen J. Frank and Peter B. Golden (eds), Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, especially page 234, note 48. G.L. Penrose, ‘The Politics of Genealogy: An Historical Analysis of Abu’l Gazi’s Shejere-i-Terakima’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1975, page 24. Penrose, ‘The Politics of Genealogy’, pages 13 – 24 and 29– 30. The Shibanid – Chinggisid dynasty was descended from Chinggis’s grandson Shiban. Penrose, ‘The Politics of Genealogy’, page 13, quoting Barthold’s Twelve Lectures, in Sochineniia, Moscow, Izdatelstvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1968, Vol. 5, pages 186– 8. Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Leiden, E.J. Brill, page 72 and Maps 36A and 36B. Bregel’s text, with the accompanying maps, comprises the distillation of over 40 years’ study and serves as a comprehensive history of the Turkmen, albeit one that is even briefer than Barthold’s A History of the Turkmen People (which concentrates on the pre-Mongol period). An even more cogent summary of the latest scholarship on Turkmen history can be found in Bregel, ‘Uzbeks, Qazaqs and Turkmens’, pages 229–36. The historical maps in Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, which are based largely on Abu’l Ghazi’s work and the Safavid sources of the seventeenth century, show that by the sixteenth century the Turkmen tribal groups were distributed across five adjacent but distinct yurts. The northernmost yurt was the Buzachi yurt of the Esen Eli confederation of tribes (Chodor, Abdal, Igdir and Arabachi), although, as we have seen, they were under attack from the Kalmyks and had moved south into Mangyshlak itself by the early seventeenth century. Next, to the south, lay the two contiguous Mangyshlak yurts of the Ichki Salor and, further south, the Ersari, who were considered part of the Tashki Salor grouping. To the east, along the Uzboy channel of the Amu Darya, extending from the Balkhan Mountains north-east to Lake Sarikamish,

151

NOTES TO PAGES 29 –30 lay the Uzboy yurt of Ali Eli, Khizr-Eli and Tiveji Turkmen, known as the Uch Il (‘three tribes’). Bregel’s map also includes a smaller group, the Qaraoyli, who may have been connected to the Tiveji. To the south-west of the Uzboy, around the Balkhan Mountains, was the Balkhan yurt of the remaining Tashki Salor: the Yomut, Tekke, Sariq and Khorasan Salors, as well as several smaller tribes, such as the Saqar, Ata and Eski. Finally, in the frontier region comprising the borderlands of the Persian province of Khorasan, which after about 1500 was controlled by the Safavid state, lay the Astarabad–Gurgan– Sumbar yurt, where the so-called Yaqqa (‘coastal-border’) Turkmen pastoralized. In the early sixteenth century this was the yurt of the Gireyli, Goklen, Okhlu and Eymur-Imreli tribes, although after a century of struggle with the Qizilbash forces of the Safavid state it came to be controlled by the southern or Qara Choqa Yomut. It should be remembered that the period from 1500 to the mid-seventeenth century saw massive migrations of all these Turkmen tribal groupings, leading to a complete redistribution of their populations in the Transcaspian, Khorezm, north Khurasan borderlands and the Lebab region along the middle reaches of the Amu Darya. See Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Map 38B, for a summary sketch of these movements. More details on the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century migrations (as well as a much less comprehensible map) can be found in Yuri Bregel, ‘Etnicheskaia karta iuzhnoi Turkmeni i Khurasana v XVII–XVIII vv’, Kratkie Soobshcheniia Instituta Etnografia Akedemi Nauk SSR, vol. 31, 1959, pages 14–26. (There is a rough English translation and summary of this article: ‘Ethnic Map: The People of Southern Turkmenistan and Khorasan in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century’, Central Asian Review, 1960.) 7. See Yuri Bregel, ‘Mangishlak’, Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edn, Vol. 4, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1960 – 2002. The reference to the Turkmen and Musa Khan is from V. Trepavlov, The Formation and Early History of the Manghit Yurt, Papers on Inner Asia No. 38, Bloomington, RIFIAS, 2001, page 43, quoting the ‘Posol’skaiia kniga’, page 50. 8. V.V. Barthold, ‘Otchet o komandirovke v Turkestan, 1904’ (Report on a journey to Turkestan, 1904), in Sochineniia, Vol. 8, Moscow, Izdatelstvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1973, page 147ff., draws attention to two unpublished mid-sixteenth-century hagiographical manuscripts relating to the Kubraviya Sufi shaykh, Huseyn Khwarazmi, that mention the Turkmen of Mangishlaq and confirm the division of the Salor confederation into Ichki and Tashki. Along with the Ottoman Admiral Sidi Ali Reis, Katib-i-Rumi, they represent some of the earliest primary sources regarding the situation of the Central Asian Turkmen in the sixteenth century. The hagiographical manuscripts in question are Jani Mahmud Ghijduvani’s Miftah al-Talibin and Sharaf al-Din (or Shihab al-Din) Husayn b. Kamal

152

NOTES TO PAGES 30 –31 al-Din Husayn Khwarazmi’s Jaddat al-Ashiqin. See also Devin Deweese, ‘The Sayyid Ata’i Presence in Khwarazm during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’, in Devin Deweese (ed.), Studies on Central Asia in Honor of Yuri Bregel, Bloomington, RIFIAS, 2001, page 247, especially note 5, which refers to other articles by Deweese that also make use of these sources. 9. On the issue of Mangishlaq as a viable yurt, see Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 72, paragraph 3, and additional comments in his ‘Uzbeks, Qazaqs and Turkmens’, page 231. For a ground-breaking analysis of the assignment and military use of pastureland under the Mongol imperial system, see John Masson Smith, ‘Mongol Nomadism and Middle Eastern Geography: Qishlaqs and Tumens’, in Reuven Amitai-Preiss and David O. Morgan (eds), The Mongol Empire and its Legacy, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1999, pages 39– 56. Technically speaking, a yurt includes both a qishlaq (winter pasture) and a yaylaq (summer pasture) and perhaps even an il-yolu (the tribe’s migration route between the two pastures). However, this holds true only for the purest transhumant nomads; often only the qishlaq was considered the homeland or principal yurt. A careful examination of the greater Mangishlaq region, its historical geography and ecological evolution would be necessary to reach a full understanding of why the Turkmen came to live there, how they practised their form of pastoral nomadism and why they departed. We can certainly learn more from late nineteenth- and twentieth-century studies of the region and its inhabitants, but it is difficult to say whether such research will clarify the situation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, let alone in earlier periods. There is a need for more productive research using not only written sources but also oral legends, as well as evidence from archaeological and climatological studies. 10. Michael Rowton, ‘Enclosed Nomadism’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 17, no. 1, 1974. Bregel makes use of Rowton’s ideas in his article ‘Nomadic and Sedentary Elements among the Turkmen’, Central Asiatic Journal, vol. 25, 1981, page 8. The plight of pastoral nomads who have been ‘enclosed’ by stronger political forces, either other nomads or sedentary powers, is a topic for further analysis, but such research should be grounded in solid historical examples, rather than left to theoreticians and ahistorically oriented anthropologists or social scientists. For example, the work of Richard Tapper (see later citations) has been a model of balancing anthropological research with historical sources and insights into the lives of tribally organized pastoral nomads in the Middle East and Central Eurasia. 11. In keeping with their reputation as unruly subjects and Barthold’s characterization of their ‘militant anarchy’, the Khivan chroniclers Mirab Munis and Agahi offer the following description of the Turkmen in reference

153

NOTES TO PAGES 31 –34

12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18.

to their role in the politics of Khorezm in the 1760s: ‘It is about the Turkmen tribes (aqvam) that the words “They themselves did the wrong” are said, and it is about their [deeds] that the words “Will shed blood” are written. Among these tribes (tava’if) especially the tribe (tabaqa) of the Yomud and the tribe (qabila) of the Chowdor, are the chiefs of the villains and rebels and the heads of the disobedient and obstinate.’ See Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi, Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, ed. Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1988, and Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, trans. and annotated Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1999 (henceforth Firdaws), text page 229, trans. page 101. For a concise summary of early Uzbek history, see Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, pages 40, 44 and page 48, paragraph 4. Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 42, paragraph 2. The definitive work (which merits an English translation) on the origins and development of the Uzbek state prior to the sixteenth century and the time of Muhammad Shibani is Boriway Akhmedov, Gosudartsvo kochevykh uzbekov, Moscow, Izdatelstvo Nauka, 1965. He examines in great detail the rise of Abu’l Khayr Khan and the creation of the Uzbek tribal confederacy of the sixteenth century. See also Yuri Bregel, ‘Abu’l-Kayr Khan’, in Encyclopedia Iranica, Vol. 4, ed. E. Yarshater, London and New York, Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, 1983– , pages 331 – 2. Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 48. Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, pages 50 and 52 for details of the Yadigarid Uzbeks. See also the relevant sections (which largely paraphrase Abu’l Ghazi but include some interesting additional details) in Firdaws; and Yuri Bregel, ‘Tribal Tradition and Ethnic History: The Early Rulers of the Qongrats According to Munis’, African and Asian Studies: Journal of the Israel Oriental Society, vol. 16, no. 3, 1982, pages 357– 98. Yuri Bregel, ‘The Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva’, Journal of Asian History, vol. 12, no. 2, 1978, pages 120– 51. For an examination of the Uzbeks’ political systems, mainly that of Bukhara, see R.D. McChesney, Waqf in Central Asia, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991, pages 49 – 60. See also his discussion of the appanage system and Uzbek history in ‘Central Asia in the 10th– 12th/18th – 18th Centuries’, in Encyclopedia Iranica, Vol. 5, ed. E. Yarshater, London and New York, Center for Iranian Studies, Columbia University, 1983 –, pages 176– 93. Although not directly relevant to the politics of Khorezm, also see his ‘The Amirs of Muslim Central Asia in the XVII Century’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 26, 1983, and his chapter in the Cambridge History of Inner Asia, ‘The Chinggisid Restoration in Central Asia: 1500 – 1750’, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pages 277 – 302.

154

NOTES TO PAGES 34 –36

19.

20.

21.

22.

In addition, see the fascinating, controversial but seminal essay on appanage by Martin B. Dickson: ‘Uzbek Dynastic Theory in the Sixteenth Century’. Trudy XXV-ogo Mezhdunarodnogo Kongressa Vostokovedov, Moskva 1960 (Proceedings of the 25th International Congress of Orientalists, Moscow 1960), vol. 3, 1963, pages 208– 16. Firdaws, text pages 135 – 6, trans. pages 45– 6. See especially the extensive notes in Bregel’s 1999 translation on ‘khudad’ (page 548, note 107) and pages 559–62, notes 250 and 253. Abu’l Ghazi himself does not mention his reforms in the Shajarat-i-Turk. This may be because the sections on his own reign were recorded by his son, Anusha Khan, or at least under his supervision. Approximately 15 pages of the original text (and 15 pages of Desmaisons’s translation) cover the reign of Abu’l Ghazi himself. These are mainly devoted to descriptions of his military campaigns. See Abu’l Ghazi Bahadur Khan, Histoire des Mongols et des Tatares, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. P. Desmaisons; Vol. 2, Chagatay text; St Petersburg, 1871– 4; singlevolume reprint, Amsterdam, Philo Press, 1970, text pages 319 – 34, trans. pages 342– 58. (All page references are to the Philo edition. Henceforth Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire.) Bregel, Khorezmskie turkmeny, especially chapters 5 and 6. See also the examples of land distribution documents on pages 231–61. The ‘noker/nuker/nauker’ system was based on the principle of land in return for military service. The connection between the recruitment of nuker from tribal populations, the land grants for pasturage, farming or both in Khorezm and Bukhara and the military or raiding parties demands further research in its sixteenth- and seventeenth-century context and within the parameters of the Chinggisid– Uzbek system of government. How the alaman were formed, who participated and who did not, how they were led, the booty, payment and hostage arrangements and how the institution may have developed and evolved over the centuries all demand further study. Several scholars have made unsatisfactory attempts to explain ‘chapaaul’ and ‘alaman’: see Mehmet Saray, ‘The Alamans or Raiding Parties of the Turkmen’, Asian and African Studies, vol. 16, 1982, pages 399– 402. Equally unsatisfactory is A.A. Rosliakov’s ‘Alamany’, Sovietskaia Etnografiia, No. 2, 1955, pages 41 – 53. Considering the importance of this topic for understanding Central Asia and the activities and livelihoods of, as well as the relations between, the Turkmen and the Uzbeks, a comprehensive study is long overdue. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text page 225, trans. page 241; Firdaws, text page 112, trans. page 32. Although the events of 1538 feature the recruitment of Turkmen by Uzbek princes attempting to recover Urgench from the Bukharan Uzbeks led by Ubaiullah Khan, there may have been earlier

155

NOTES TO PAGES 36 – 40

23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

occasions when the minor Uzbek sultans of the Khurasan borderlands (the Atek – Akhal region) recruited local Turkmen for their raids into Safavid territory. We know of at least one in the 1520s or 1530s (during the reign of Buchuga Khan or his successor Avanesh Khan) that crossed the Gurgan River, entered Astarabad and raided as far west as Mazanderan. See Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text pages 211 – 15, trans. pages 225– 30. See also Firdaws, text pages 110 –13, trans. pages 30– 2. Firdaws, text page 107, trans. page 29. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text page 210, trans. pages 224 – 5; Firdaws, text page 109, trans. page 30. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, trans. page 241; Firdaws, text page 113, trans. page 32. Both narratives mention the recruitment of the Khizr-Eli Turkmen from the Uzboy yurt. See the numerous references to raids on Safavid Qizilbash territory in Khurasan as well as raids against the Bukharan Uzbeks in the period 1550 to 1630, mainly under the leadership of Hajji Muhammad Khan: Firdaws, text pages 113– 32, trans. pages 32 – 43. Firdaws, text page 131, trans. page 41. Of the Safavid sources, the most comprehensive is the Tarikh-i-’Alam Ara-yi-’Abassi of Iskander Beg Munshi Turkman, which was written between 1616 and 1629 but incorporates earlier chronicles from the sixteenth century. The standard (two-volume) edition was edited by Iraj Afshar in 1971, and an English translation (although in many places it should be considered a summary rather than a verbatim translation) was published by Roger Savory in 1978. For a very useful and complete bibliographic summary of all the Safavid chronicles, see Andrew J. Newman, ‘Appendix II: Key Chronicles and Travellers’, in Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire, London, I.B.Tauris, 2006, pages 135–43. Firdaws, text page 135, trans. page 45. ‘Reading the khutba’ is the Islamic custom of mentioning the name of the current overlord during Friday prayers. Firdaws, text pages 135– 6, trans. pages 45 – 6. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text pages 306–20, trans. pages 338– 43; Firdaws, text pages 133 –8, trans. pages 43– 7. Firdaws, text page 136, trans. page 46. Firdaws, text page 137, trans. pages 46– 7. While Munis makes several references to Kalmyk attacks on Khorezm in this period, there is no mention of the mass migration of Turkmen into the region, nor of their movement further east into the Lebab yurt along the middle reaches of the Amu Darya, which most likely occurred around this time. For Bregel’s analysis of the Esen Eli, see Firdaws, 1999, page 552, note 149. Bregel seems to support the idea of the division of the Mangishlaq

156

NOTES TO PAGES 40 – 42

34.

35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40. 41.

Turkmen into the Esen and the Soyun. However, the latter name appears to be a variant pronunciation of the term ‘Sayin Khani’. I prefer to follow Barthold’s suggestion that ‘Sayin Khani’ was used by Persian sources in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries (and then Safavid sources in the seventeenth century) to identify the Turkmen of Central Asia, in recognition of their links to the ulus of ‘Sayin Khan’ – namely Jochi Khan, son of Chinggis. Akademi Nauk SSR, Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi. Chast I: Torgovlia se Moscovskim gosudartsvom i medzhdunarodnoe polozhenie Srednei Asii v XVI– XVII vv, Leningrad, 1932 (henceforth MIUTT), Documents #73 and #74, pages 198 –200, and Document #16 (Part 3), pages 319– 24. Firdaws, text page 138, trans. page 47. MIUTT, Documents #85– 102, pages 223–48. George L. Penrose, ‘The Politics of Genealogy: An Historical Analysis of Abu’l Gazi’s Shejere-i-Terakima’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1975, page 35. Summarizing the results of Abu’l Ghazi’s policies, Penrose proposes a link between the Khan’s shift to a more ‘pro-Turkmen’ position and his writing of the Shejerei-Terakima. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text page 254, trans. page 257. Aghatay is termed ‘Aqatay’ in the Firdaws al-Iqbal. Firdaws, text pages 146– 7, trans. pages 52 – 3. Mirab Munis refers to Tokhta Hanim as ‘a Turkmen of Darghan’, and while it is not certain which tribe she was from, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Salor predominated in the Darghan region, in the northernmost portion of the Lebab yurt. We are told that Tokhta Hanim’s nephew, the pretender, looked just like Arang Khan and had been ‘brought up together with the khan’. Firdaws calls him the ‘Turkmen-zada’, a term modelled after the usual princely title of ‘Amir-zada’ – son of the Amir. Bregel, in Firdaws, 1999, pages 565– 9, note 285, points out that contemporary Persian-language sources from the region, written within the purview of the Bukharan khanate, provide different versions of the death of Arang Khan and the events from 1694 to 1710. The sources he cites are Muhammad Amin Kirak-Yaraqchi’s Muhit al-Tavarikh and Khwaja Quli Bek Balkhi’s Tarikh-iQipchaq-Khani, unpublished manuscripts that have I have been unable to consult. Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 58, paragraph 2. V.V. Barthold, A History of the Turkmen People, trans. V. and T. Minorsky, in Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Vol. 3, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1962, page 156.

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NOTES TO PAGES 45 – 48

Chapter 4 The Duel for Mangyshlak between Turkmen, Kalmyks and Kazakhs 1. Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992, page 177. 2. Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, page 83. Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 2003, page 56. 3. Abu’l Ghazi Bahadur Khan, Histoire des Mongols et des Tatares, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. P. Desmaisons; Vol. 2, Chagatay text; St Petersburg, 1871–4; singlevolume reprint, Amsterdam, Philo Press, 1970 (all references are to the Philo edition; henceforth Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire), text page 314, trans. page 337. See also Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi, Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, ed. Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1988, and Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, trans. and annotated Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1999 (henceforth Firdaws), text pages 137–8, trans. page 47. 4. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text page 316, trans. page 338 (emphasis added). This is my own translation, not taken from Desmaisons’s French version, which lacks some details. 5. Abu’l Ghazi, Histoire, text page 316, trans. page 338. 6. Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, pages 5– 12 for a summary of the Kalmyks’ origins and social structure. 7. Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 56, emphasizes that the Kalmyks who migrated west to the Volga and Emba yurt, then raided south into Mangyshlak and Khorezm, were ethnically, if not politically, part of a great ‘Oyrat’ Mongol rise to power on the steppes of Inner Asia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Oyrats were perhaps the greatest military power in Eurasia for almost a century, until the rise of Qing China. They made frequent and devastating attacks on the yurts of the Kazakhs and contributed to driving them westwards, as well as raiding into Uzbek territory along the Syr Darya. In many Islamic sources both the western Kalmyks and the Oyrats of Jungharia are referred to as ‘Qalmaq’, causing confusion about which of the two groups is meant. For Kalmyk– Noghay interactions, see Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, pages 77– 81. 8. Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met, pages 80– 3. 9. Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 56, Map 28. 10. For an early attempt to discuss the process of sedentarization among the Turkmen, see Yuri Bregel, ‘Nomadic and Sedentary Elements among the Turkmen’, Central Asiatic Journal, vol. 25, 1981, pages 5 – 37. Studies by

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11. 12.

13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

such anthropologists as Tapper, Khazanov and Irons, as well as the study of south-west Persian nomads by Barth, are all essential texts in the debate over the interactions between nomads and farmers and the process of sedentarization. The topic was of particular interest to social scientists in the 1960s and 1970s because so many Middle Eastern and Central Asian governments implemented ‘modernization’ policies that were designed to sedentarize pastoral nomads. In addition, Soviet Marxist rhetoric called for the historical development of society through the process of sedentarization. For a full summary of the anthropological literature, see the essays and bibliography in R. Tapper and J. Thompson (eds), The Nomadic Peoples of Iran, London, Azimuth Editions, 2002, and especially pages 18 – 22. The most comprehensive study of the interactions between nomads and the non-nomadic world is by Anatoly Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, 2nd edn, Madison, UW Press, 1994, especially pages 233– 90. Bregel, ‘Nomadic and Sedentary Elements’, discusses the possible evolution of sedentarization among the Turkmen. Kh. Agaev and M. Annanepesov (eds), Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII – XIX vv. Sbornikh Arkhivnikh Dokumentov, Ashkhabad, Akademiia Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, 1963 (henceforth RTO), Document #27. See translation at the beginning of Chapter 1 and Appendix. RTO, Document #27. See translation at beginning of Chapter 1 and Appendix. Akademi Nauk SSR, Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi. Chast I: Torgovlia se Moscovskim gosudartsvom i medzhdunarodnoe polozhenie Srednei Asii v XVI– XVII vv, Leningrad, 1932, Documents #22 and #25, pages 122– 3 and 129– 31. Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500– 1800, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 2002, page 146. A detailed description of the movement of the Kazakhs to the west and their interactions with the Russians is in Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, pages 146– 83. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, page 150; Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, page 56 and Map 28. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, pages 184 – 7. Ibid., page 189. Ibid., pages 161– 9. Ibid., page 159. RTO, Documents #30 and #31, pages 62 – 3, regarding the objectives of Tebelev’s mission, and Document #36, page 68, which discusses the reasons for Kopytovskii’s mission.

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NOTES TO PAGES 56 – 61

Chapter 5 Russian –Turkmen Relations in the Era of Peter the Great 1. Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999, pages 57– 9. 2. Akademi Nauk SSR, Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i Turkmenskoi. Chast I: Torgovlia se Moscovskim gosudartsvom i medzhdunarodnoe polozhenie Srednei Asii v XVI –XVII vv, Leningrad, 1932 (henceforth MIUTT), Document #118, pages 272– 3. 3. C. Poujol, ‘Voyageurs Russe et l’Asie Centrale: naissance et declin de deux mythes, les reserves d’or et la voie vers l’Inde’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 4, 1985, pages 59– 73. 4. There is no detailed study in English of Peter the Great and Russia’s policies towards the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The best non-Russian summary of the policies, expeditions and campaigns of Bekovich-Cherkasskii is by a French geographer, Rene Letolle: ‘Les Expeditions de Bekovitch-Tcherkassy en Turketan (1714 – 1717) debut de l’infiltration russe en Asie centrale’, in T. Zarcone and C. Poujol (eds), Boukhara-La-Noble, Cahiers d’Asie Centrale Nos. 5 – 6, Aix en Provence/Tashkent: Edisud, 1998, pages 259 – 84. The most comprehensive and useful study in Russian is Murad Annanepesov, Ukreplenie Russko-Turkmenskikh vzaimootnoshenii v XVIII –XIX vekov (The Strengthening of Russo-Turkmen interrelations in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries), Ashkhabad, Bilim, 1981, especially pages 18 – 38. 5. Kh. Agaev and M. Annanepesov (eds), Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII– XIX vv. Sbornikh Arkhivnikh Dokumentov, Ashkhabad, Akademiia Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, 1963 (henceforth RTO), Document #1, page 25; Letolle, ‘Les Expeditions’, page 263, including biographical information on Bekovich-Cherkasskii that Letolle has taken from V.V. Barthold’s La Decouverte de l’Asie. In spite of his name (Cherkaskii) it appears that he was actually a Kabard from the Caucasus, not a Circassian. 6. Letolle, ‘Les Expeditions’, page 281. 7. RTO, Document #2, page 26, dated 25 July 1715, from the Mangishlaq Turkmen starshin Seid Muhammad Sultan to the Governor of Astrakhan. 8. RTO contains six documents from the Mangishlaq Turkmen to the Russian authorities from the period of Peter the Great, 1715 – 21: Documents #2, #8, #10, #11, #12 and #22. 9. RTO, Document #5, page 27 and Document #6, page 28. 10. For detailed descriptions and analyses of the Bekovich-Cherkasskii campaign, see Letolle, ‘Les Expeditions’, and Annanepesov, Ukreplenie Russko-Turkmenskikh. 11. Annanepesov, Ukreplenie Russko-Turkmenskikh, pages 30 – 8.

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NOTES TO PAGES 61 – 67 12. ‘Dowlat Keray’, ‘Devlet Giray’ and ‘Devlet Kisden Mirza’ are all alternative versions of Bekovich-Cherkasskii’s Muslim name. 13. Shir Muhammad Mirab Munis and Muhammad Riza Mirab Agahi, Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, ed. Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1988, and Firdaws al-Iqbal: History of Khorezm, trans. and annotated Yuri Bregel, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1999 (henceforth Firdaws), text pages 155– 6, trans. pages 57– 8. 14. RTO, Documents #7, #8, #10, #11 and #12, pages 29 – 33. 15. Laurence Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958, page 177; and see Letolle, ‘Les Expeditions’, page 274. 16. John Perry, ‘The Last Safavids’, Iran, vol. 9, 1971, pages 59 – 71. 17. The definitive study in English of Nadir Shah remains, for now, Laurence Lockhart, Nadir Shah, London, Luzac, 1938. Peter Avery contributed a useful, detailed chapter on Nadir’s extraordinary career to the Cambridge History of Iran, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991 – ‘Nadir Shah and the Afsharid Legacy’ – Vol. 7, pages 3–62. More recently, Michael Axworthy has attempted to revise the historical record, although he has little new to add to Lockhart’s study. See Michael Axworthy, The Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant, London, I.B.Tauris, 2006. The literature on the Qizilbash and the oymaq is extensive, although there is no definitive study. One of the earliest remains one of the most useful: V. Minorsky’s introduction to his translation of Tadhkirat Al-Muluk: A Manual of Safavid Administration, London, Luzac, 1943, especially pages 12–40, which focus on the Qizilbash. The most recent – and somewhat controversial – appraisal of Safavid political and military organization, the Qizilbash and the oymaq is Willem Floor, Safavid Government Institutions, Costa Mesa, Mazda Publications, 2001, pages 124–71. 18. A.N. Struve et al., Materialy po istorii Turkmen i Turkmenii: Iranskie, Bukharskie, Khivinskie istochniki, Vol. 2, Moscow and Leningrad, 1938 (henceforth MITT), page 142 (P.P. Ivanov’s translation of Astarabadi’s original text). 19. Lockhart, Nadir Shah, page 186; Jonathan Lee, The ‘Ancient Supremacy’: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh:1731– 1901, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1996, pages 62 –72. 20. MITT, page 140 (P.P. Ivanov’s translation of Astarabadi’s original text). 21. Ibid. 22. MITT, page 159 (P.P. Ivanov’s translation of Muhammad Kazim’s ’Alam Ara-yi Nadiri, also known as the Kitab-i-Nadiri). 23. MITT, page 145 (P.P. Ivanov’s translation of the Tarikh-i-Rahim Khani, which exists only in manuscript form; see A.A. Romaskeyevich’s long note in MITT, page 145, regarding this source).

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NOTES TO PAGES 67 – 79 24. Firdaws, text pages 165 – 7, trans. pages 64 – 6. See also Firdaws, 1999, pages 578– 80, notes 362–8. Mirab Munis has little to say about Nadir Shah’s invasion of Central Asia. His narrative begins only with Nadir’s departure from Bukhara and, unsurprisingly, focuses on Khorezm. 25. For Gladyshev and Muravin, see Catherine Poujol, ‘La Geodiste russe et le Chah de la Perse: Khiva 1740’, Moyen Orient et Ocean Indien, XVI– XIX Siecle, vol. 1, 1984, pages 86– 100. For the accounts of Thomson and Hogg, see Jonas Hanaway, An Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea, London, 1753, Vol. 1, pages 345– 57. 26. For the Yomut rebellion and the Afshar reconquest of Khorezm, see Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 2003, page 58.

Preface to the English Translation 1. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963, page 259. 2. Personal communication from Viktor Zhivov, University of California, Berkeley. See also Grigorii Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseiia Mikhailovicha, commentary by A.E. Pennington, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980, page 3. 3. Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500– 1800, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 2002, page 74. 4. Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier, page 217. 5. See, among others, Yuri Slezkine, ‘Naturalists versus Nations: EighteenthCentury Russian Scholars Confront Ethnic Diversity’, in Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini (eds), Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700– 1917, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1997, pages 27– 57; Michael Khodarkovsky, Where Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1660– 1771, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1992.

Introduction The notes are as they appear in V. Razumovskaia’s original article, followed by Claora E. Styron’s annotations in square brackets. 1. MID, Khiv. posol’sk. kn. No. 3, ‘Stateinyi spisok russkogo poslannika Vasiliia Daudova’. [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Book of the Embassy of Khiva No. 3, ‘Report of the Russian Ambassador Vasillii Daudov’.]

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NOTES TO PAGES 80 –89 2. ‘Amu i Uzboi’’, Samara, 1879. [Amu i Uzboi, Trudy obshchestva po issledovaniiu budushchikh torgovikh putei Srednei Aziiu, St Petersburg, 1879, pages 4 – 7. The same passage is translated more fully in Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 2002, page 149: ‘. . . even though the Kazakhs were a nomadic and unreliable people, they were both the key and the gates to all of Asia’. See also Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v 16 – 18 vekakh: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Alma-Alta, 1961, No. 24, page 31.] 3. GAFKE [Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv feodal’no-krepostnicheskoi epokhi, 1931– 41; now RGADA – Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnykh aktov], Gos. Arkhiv, razriad. XVI, delo 5. 4. Solov’ev, v. IV. [S.M. Solov’ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen. St Petersburg, 1894– 5.] 5. Opisanie Kaspiiskogo moria ot ust’ia r. Volgi, ot pritoka Iarkovskogo do ust’ia r. Astrabatskoi, published by Soimonov in 1731; a second edition appeared in 1783. 6. There are very few documents illuminating Turkmen relations before the nineteenth century with tsarist Russia. There are only 12 files in GAFKE [RGADA] on Turkmenia’s relations with Russia in the eighteenth century from which these published selections come. [See also the later selection of documents from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII–XIX vekakh, Ashkhabad, ANTSSR, 1963.] 7. See Materialy po istorii turkmen i Turkmenii, Moscow – Leningrad, AN SSSR, 1937– 8. [Henceforth MITT.] 8. GAFKE [RGADA], MID, Turkmenskie dela, d. No. 3.

From the Journal of Captain G. Tebelev, 1741 V. Razumovskaia’s notes are followed by Claora E. Styron’s bracketed annotations. 1. GAFKE [Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv feodal’no-krepostnicheskoi epokhi, 1931– 41; now RGADA – Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnykh aktov], F. Turkmenskie dela, No. 4, 1741, page 14. 2. Loshkarev was a merchant from Astrakhan who had his own ship in which he sailed to trade in Mangyshlak. 3. See page 238. [Reference to another document Razumovskaia published in Krasnyi Arkhiv, vol. 2, no. 93, 1939, entitled ‘From Notes about the Turkmen, 21 February 1746’, which refers to a letter from the Kalmyk Khan Donduk Omba to Osterman.]

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NOTES TO PAGES 89 –133 4. 5. 6. 7.

On Mangyshlak. Prisoners. Empress Anna Antonovicha [Empress Anna Ivanovna, 1730– 40]. In 1740, the Persian Shah [Nadir Shah] attacked Khiva, ravaged the town of Khanki and captured Il’bars-khan who was ensconced there. The people of Khiva selected the Kazakh Abul-Khair Khan of the Kirgiz-Kaisats [Kazakhs] as their Khan.

From the Journal of Captain V. Kopytovskii, 1745 V. Razumovskaia’s notes are followed by Claora E. Styron’s bracketed annotations. 1. GAFKE [Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv feodal’no-krepostnicheskoi epokhi, 1931– 41; now RGADA – Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv drevnykh aktov], F. Turkmenskie dela, d. No. 2, 1745, ll. 30 – 67. 2. Shmak, a local type of seagoing vessel. 3. Tatishchev, V.N. (1686–1750), historian. He participated in the capture of Narva, the Battle of Poltava, and the Prussian campaign. Subsequently, he was appointed head of the Ural Mining and Metallurgical Industries. In 1741, in Tsaritsyn he was appointed Governor General of Astrakhan. 4. Ial, small rowboat with two or four oars. 5. Repetition of p. 211 [in Razumovskaia’ s introduction]. 6. As in original [manuscript]. 7. Donduk Dashi, son of the eldest son of the Kalmyk Khan, Aiuki of Chakdorjab; he ruled the Kalmyks as a viceroy from 1741 to 1761 and was named Khan in 1757. 8. A Muslim cleric [also a literate man]. 9. At the Turkmen’s request, the Khivian ambassador transmitted their petition to become Russian subjects in 1745. 10. Elizaveta Petrovna [Empress Elizaveta Petrovna, 1741– 62]. 11. The elders requested that two chetverts of flour be released for their personal needs. 12. Captain Kopytovskii. 13. Musa. 14. As in original [manuscript]. [Professor Zhivov feels that ‘fecund’ is ‘probably the best translation for semenist but it does not make much sense’. I think ‘hot’ works better, given the colloquial nature of the exchange.] 15. [Soon after, the four Turkmen elders – Kanbarbek, Karabatyr’, Onbegi Sungurap and Shapyk Niaz batyr’ – departed on a journey that would last 14 months. They spent 43 days in St Petersburg and finally arrived home

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NOTES TO PAGES 133 –135 empty-handed on 1 October 1746, transported from Astrakhan on the government ship the Goose. See Murad Annanepesov, Ukreplenie RusskoTurkmenskikh vzaimootnoshenii v XVIII–XIX vekov, Ashkhabad, Bilim, 1981.]

Appendix Original notes from Kh. Agaev and M. Annanepesov (eds), Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v XVIII–XIX vv. Sbornikh Arkhivnikh Dokumentov, Ashkhabad, Akademiia Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, 1963 (henceforth RTO) are in Roman type. Claora E. Styron’s notes are in italics. 1. Donduk Omba, grandson of the Kalmyk Khan Ayuki, in 1735 was appointed chief ruler of the Kalmyk people; in 1736, for services to the Tsar’s government during the Turkish [Ottoman] War, he received a patent to the title of Khan. 2. According to Michael Khodarkovsky (personal communication): This is not an original letter as Annanepesov claims in RTO, but a translation into Russian from the Kalmyk (Zaya Pandita script) in which Donduk Omba wrote his letters. The question then becomes, Did the Russians translate it adequately [. . .] since few original letters have survived? Secondly, assuming they translated correctly, what did ‘poddanstvo’ mean in this case? Poddanstvo does mean the subject status. We know that some Turkmen tribes, mostly from the Mangyshlak Peninsula, were referred to as the subjects of Ayuki Khan, Donduk Omba’s grandfather. We do not know what it meant in practice. Did they pay a tax? I highly doubt it. Most likely, to prevent raids against them, the Turkmen accepted the Kalmyk khan as their political suzerain and submitted a few hostages to assure their peaceful intentions. In other words the status of subject was understood differently among the nomadic peoples. It was essentially a peace agreement, sometimes with an unequal distribution of power among the participants. But the Russians always used the word to underline the superior status of the Russian tsar and in this case applied it to Donduk Omba . . . One should always take the Russian sources published by Soviet scholars with a grain of salt, and a big one. The selection of sources was not immune from ideological considerations and the publication was often sloppy. For instance, what does ‘translation from the Turkmen’ [which Annanepesov uses to describe the Turkmen missives in RTO] mean? There was no Turkmen language until the twentieth century. The correspondence took place in Turki, a common Turkic dialect that was understood and used throughout Eurasia for centuries. In the case of Donduk Omba the letter would have been written by him or his scribe and then translated into Russian, or Turki then Russian, most likely at the Astrakhan chancery.

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NOTES TO PAGES 135 –137 3. Reference to Nadir Shah and his campaigns in Bukhara and Khiva. Nadir Shah is called here, erroneously, Tahmasp Khan. [Before he assumed the title ‘Shah’ at the quriltai of Moghan in 1736, Nadir was known as Tahmasp Quli Khan, the ‘slave/servant’ of Shah Tahmasp II, the last Safavid Shah.] 4. Along with the proper names listed here, in most cases in distorted form, are the names of the Turkmen tribes to which the representatives belonged. [Names have been kept in the Russified forms in which they appear in the letter.] 5. ‘Ordered’: the verb is prikazat’, meaning to order, command; a prikaz is an order, ordinance, writ, enjoinment. 6. Annanepesov notes that in the second volume of The History of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic this section is incorrectly transcribed as ‘four to five ships’. He says Donduk Omba actually wrote ‘four hundred to five hundred’, as presented here. The important point is that it was certainly an alarming situation. 7. Kashira? See Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500– 1800, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 2002, pages 88, 90 and 94. 8. ‘Tarkhanstvo’, the right to different kinds of privileges. The Tarkhans paid no taxes or duties and frequently were not bound by legal responsibilities.

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174

INDEX

Anusha Khan, 24, 28, 40 – 1, 42 aq saqals see starshin Arab Muhammad Khan, 22, 28 Aral Sea, 80, 97, 100– 1 Armenians, 12 Ashur Beg, Khodja Muhammad, 57–8 Astarabad, 18, 31, 36, 41, 42, 48, 62, 63 Astarabadi, Mehdi Khan, 64, 65–6, 67 Astrakhan, 7– 10, 39, 55– 6 and trade, 11 –13, 17– 20, 24 – 5 see also Golitsyn; Tatishchev Atek, 31, 36, 37, 38 Avanesh Khan, 36 Ayuki Khan, 3, 45, 49, 53, 57, 90

Abu’l Ghazi Khan, 23, 27, 28, 30, 34 and Kalmyks, 46, 48 and Turkmen, 38– 9, 40, 41 Abu’l Khayr Khan, 32 –3, 35, 51, 52, 68, 123 abyz (Muslim cleric), 75, 120– 1 Adny Durdy, 88– 9 Afghans, 12 Aghatay, 42 Aitudu, 107– 8 alamans (raiding parties), 35– 6, 37, 155n.21 Ali Eli, 136, 151n.6 Ali Quli Afshar, 65– 6, 68 Amenek Khan, 36 Amu Darya, 39– 40, 58, 65 –6, 80– 1 Anna, Tsarina, 45 Annanepesov, Murad, 60 – 1

175

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

China, 8, 51 Chinggis Khan, 33 Chinggisids, 29, 30, 31 – 2 Chodor confederacy, 24, 42 customs duties, 94– 5

Bachabek, 93 bailiffs, 94– 5, 96 Balkh, 55, 65, 79, 80, 82 Balkhan, 30, 46, 48 Baraq Sultan, 51 barat (tribute tax), 36 – 7 Barthold, V.V., 18, 19 Bauvlet Berdy, 104, 105 Bavbek Batyr, 118 Bek Amurat, 91 Bekovich-Cherkasskii, Prince, 10, 58 – 62, 81 Berdi Beg Khan, 32 Besh Qala’, 60 borders, 140n.5 Bregel, Yuri, 27, 30, 151n.6 Buddhism, 47 Bukhara, 8, 24, 33 and trade, 17 – 20 Burunchuk clan, 118, 122 Buzachi, 18, 30 Buzachiev clan, 126

Daudov, Vasilii, 21 Delin clan, 118, 119–20 diplomatic missions, 19– 20 Donduk Omba Khan, 3 –5, 45, 49, 52 and letter, 135–7 and Turkmen, 64 – 5, 67 Dorbet, 47 Egenbek, 109, 110, 114, 115 Elizaveta Petrovna, Empress, 104 Emmudy clan, 97 Erenk/Arang Khan, 41, 42 Ersari tribe, 36, 39, 48, 49, 65, 136, 151n.6 Esen Eli confederacy, 13, 15, 18, 28, 29, 40 Eski tribe, 139, 151n.6 Eteki clan, 97

caravans, 8, 11, 18 –21, 40– 1 and routes, 13– 15 Caspian Sea, 11, 13 and Peter the Great, 57, 81– 2 Catherine II, Tsarina, 82 and HIM court, 107, 112, 113, 114, 118, 120, 122–3, 126 chapaauls (raids), 28, 35 –7, 63, 155n.21

Firdaws al-Iqbal, 36, 37 –8, 41, 61 –2 flour see grain frontiers, 140n.5 Gilan, 12 Gireyli tribe, 36, 62, 151n.6

176

INDEX

Gladyshev, 52, 67– 8 Goklen tribe, 36, 37, 48, 151n.6, 162 gold, 58 Golitsyn, Mikhail Mikhailovich, 86–7, 88–91 gostinyi dvor (hostels), 8, 11– 12, 24– 5 grain, 86 – 7, 88 – 96, 98– 9, 100– 1 and Kopytovskii, 113–14, 116–18, 121–2, 127–9, 130–1 Gurban clan, 118, 119– 20 Gurgan, 31, 36, 41, 42, 48, 62, 63, 151n.6

Ilbars Khan, 33– 4, 35– 6, 67 India, 8, 12, 57, 58, 65 interpreters, 74 –6; see also Monastyrskii; Musa Utenov Isfandyar Khan, 22, 23, 28, 37– 8, 49 Ivan IV, Tsar, 10, 11

Hajji Muhammad Khan, 16, 18, 28, 34, 37, 42 Hazarasp, Battle of, 66 – 7 HIM court see Catherine II, Tsarina Hogg, Reynold, 67 –8 horse trade, 12, 147n.11 Huseyn Sufi, 32

Kabakli Landing, 18, 19, 22– 3, 40 Kabul see Balkh Kalmyks and Astrakhan, 9 and decline, 45– 6 and Esen Eli, 19 and Oyrat Mongols, 158n.7 and raids, 22– 3 and rise, 39 and Turkmen, 14, 15, 46 – 50, 87– 8, 90– 1 and Uzbeks, 40 Kanbarbek, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92– 4, 97– 9, 100 and Kopytovskii, 105, 108, 109– 11, 112– 13,

Jenkinson, Anthony, 15, 16– 17, 55 Jochi (‘Golden Horde’), 7, 32, 145n.3 Johnson, Richard, 16 journals, 73– 4, 76; see also Kopytovskii; Tebelev

Ibn Arabshah, 11 Ibn Battuta, 11, 147n.8 Ichki Salor confederacy, 18, 19, 22– 3, 28, 29, 37– 8 Iddemrich, Mulka, 128 Ikdyr clan, 118 il (tribal grouping), 34

177

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

Khoshut, 47 khudad, 34 Khudaydad Khan, 41 Kinzhal-Bakhsha, 86, 87, 88, 92, 97 Kirgiz-Kaisats see Kazakhs Kishi Zhuz (Lesser Horde), 50, 51, 52 Kopytovskii, Captain, 9, 75, 82 and journal, 73 – 4, 76, 103– 34

114–15, 116–17, 121, 124–5, 130– 3 Karabatyr’, 93, 100, 109– 11, 121, 124– 5, 131 Karagan Landing, 22 – 3, 81 Karminagi, Muhammad Vefa, 66– 7 Kasim, 105– 6 Kazakhs, 9 and trade routes, 79– 80 and Turkmen, 50– 3, 84, 89– 90, 94, 105– 7 Kazim, Muhammad, 66, 67 Khansa Berdy Bakhsha, 100 Khiva, 8, 145n.4 and expeditions, 58– 60 and trade, 20 and Turkmen, 15, 97 – 8, 100–1, 107 Khizr Eli, 36 Khodarkovsky, Michael, 50, 75 Khodja Muhammad Ashur Beg, 57– 8 Khodzha Berdy Bakhshi, 93 Khodzha Niaz, 99 – 100 Khoja Yusuf, 22 Khorezm, 8 and Kalmyks, 47 and Nadir Shah Afshar, 67– 8 and trade, 20, 21 and Turkmen, 41– 2, 153n.11 and Uzbeks, 32 – 4, 38

Lebab, 39 – 40 Lebedev, Pavel, 132 Lodyzhenskii, 82, 83 Mambet Berdybek, 92 –3, 123, 124– 5, 126–8, 129– 30 Mamet Keldy, 93, 96, 97, 100 Manghits, 34 Mangyshlak, 9, 29– 31 and confederacies, 13–14, 15 and Jenkinson, 16– 17 and Kopytovskii, 103– 34 and Tebelev, 85– 101 Mengeli, 86, 87, 88 Mengli-Khodzhina clan, 118, 119– 20 Mikhael, Tsar, 22, 23 MIUTT (Materialy po istorii Uzbekskoi, Tadzhikskoi i

178

INDEX

Orenburg, 8, 9, 146n.6 Orta Zhuz (Middle Horde), 50, 51 Orthodox Christians, 141n.11 Osterman, Count Andrei, 3, 52, 135 Ottoman Empire, 57, 62 Oyrat Mongols, 47, 51, 52, 158n.7

Turkmenskoi), 17– 18, 21– 2, 24 Monastyrskii, 75, 86– 8 Mongols, 29– 31, 47, 51, 52 Muhammad Shibani Khan, 33 Mukovnin, Ivan, 134 Murat Niaz, 117, 118, 119 Muraviev, 69– 70, 146n.7 Muravin, 67– 8 Musa Khan, 30 Musa Utenov, 74, 95, 96– 7, 101 and Kopytovskii, 103– 4, 105– 6, 107, 108– 10, 116– 18, 123, 124– 5, 127– 9 Muslims, 47, 55

pastureland, 30 –1 Penrose, George Larry, 27 – 8, 41 Perdei Kardy, 99 Persia, 63, 86, 133 and Peter the Great, 57, 62, 81 – 2 and trade, 12, 18 Peter the Great, 9, 99 and Caspian Sea, 10, 81– 2 and eastern policies, 56 – 8, 60 and Kazakhs, 79 – 80 and trade, 25 and water routes, 80– 1 Pir Ali, 84 Pir Nazar, 118, 122, 129– 31 Plekhanov, Gavril, 126, 128 poddanstvo (submission), 3, 5, 52, 135, 165n.2 politics, 31 – 2, 34, 49 prisoners see slavery Prizhamambet, 105

Nadir Shah Afshar, 3, 104– 5 and military campaigns, 10, 63 –4, 65 –8 Naymans, 33– 4, 38 Nefes, Khodja, 58, 60, 61 Nikitin, Grigorii, 107, 108, 128 Noghays, 8 – 9, 13, 14, 15, 47 nukers (nokers, naukers), 35, 155n.20 October Revolution, 84 Odoevsky, 22 Oghuz, 29 Onbegi Sungurap, 109– 11, 121, 124– 5, 131

179

RUSSIAN – TURKMEN ENCOUNTERS

qala’ (fortresses), 34, 60 Qalmaqs see Kalmyks Qangli-Qipchaq, 29 qazaqs (outcasts), 30 Qing Empire, 51 Qizil Ayaqs, 46 Qizilbash, 28 Qongrats, 32, 33, 34 raids, 15, 20– 1, 28, 35 –6, 83 and Kalmyks, 19, 23, 47– 8 and Kazakhs, 52 Razumovakaia, V., 76 Ridzhedti clan, 97 Riza Quli, 65, 66 Rowton, Michael, 31 RTO (Russko-Turkmenskie Otnosheniia v, 18–19 vv.), 59 Safavids, 11, 33, 35– 6 and collapse, 10, 57, 62, 63 Sakar tribe, 39 Salor confederacy, 13, 15, 24, 30, 42 Sarts, 34, 35 Saryk tribe, 36, 38, 39, 48 sedentarization, 48– 9, 158n.10 Semenov, Ivan, 115 Semenovich, 23 serdars (generals), 35, 38, 49 Shah Abbas, 18, 37 Shah Niyaz Khan, 57, 59

Shah Rukh, 33 Shapyk Niaz, 118, 121, 131 Shir Ghazi Khan, 42, 58 –60 Sidomet Sultan, 99 silk trade, 11, 12, 147n.10 slavery, 20– 1, 89– 90, 141n.11 Slezkine, Yuri, 75 Soimonov, 62, 81 –2 Sophia, Tsarina, 24 starshin (tribal elders), 12 Sufyan Khan, 36 Sumbar, 31, 36, 151n.6 Sunguran Onbegi, 93 Tarikh-i-Rahim Khani, 66 Tashki Salor confederacy, 19, 22 –3, 39 – 40 and Uzbeks, 28, 29, 37, 38 Tatar Musa see Musa Utenov Tatars, 14, 73 Tatishchev, Vasilii Nikitich, 103, 106, 107– 8 Tebelev, Captain, 9, 74 –5, 82 and journal, 73 – 4, 85 – 101 Tekke tribe, 36, 38, 48, 67, 70, 151n.6 Tevkelev, 75 – 6 teziki (Tajiks), 12, 24 Thomson, George, 67– 8 ‘Time of Troubles’, 17, 19 Timur Sultan, 16 –17, 32, 34 Tokhta Khanim, 42, 157n.39

180

INDEX

Ubaydullah Khan, 36 Ugryn clan, 118, 119– 20 Ulugh Horde, 30 Ulugh Zhuz (Greater Horde), 51 ulus (realm), 30, 34, 86; see also Kalmyks; Jochi; Manghits Urgench, 8, 15– 16, 32 urugh, 32, 33, 34 Uyghurs, 33– 4, 38 Uzbeks, 18 and Bekovich-Cherkasskii, 61 – 2 and Kalmyks, 49– 50 and Khorezm, 32– 4 and organization, 34– 5 and Persia, 63 and raids, 35– 7 and Russia, 19 and trade, 21 –2 and Turkmen, 27– 9, 37– 8, 150n.1

Tokhtamish Khan, 32 Torghut, 47 trade, 21 – 2, 28, 37 and Astrakhan, 8, 9, 11– 13 and delegations, 15 – 16 and Karagan Landing, 22 –4 and Kopytovskii, 115 and routes, 79 – 80 see also caravans; grain translators, 74 tribute, 36– 7, 94– 5 Tseren Donduk Khan, 45 Turkmen, 9 – 11 and Anusha Khan, 40– 2 and Astrakhan, 12– 13 and caravans, 14 – 15, 18– 21 and Donduk Omba Khan, 135– 7 and Jenkinson, 16– 17 and Kalmyks, 46 – 50 and Kazakhs, 50 –3 and Nadir Shah Afshar, 64 –8 and organization, 31– 2, 34 –5 and raids, 35– 6 and Russia, 55 – 7, 59 – 61, 62 –3, 82 –4 and trade, 80 and tribute, 36– 7 and Uzbeks, 27– 9, 37– 40 see also Mangyshlak tyube, 34 –5

Vasilchikov, Grigor, 18– 19 Veselovskii, N., 18, 19 Yadigar Khan, 33, 57, 58 Yadigarids, 33– 4, 35, 42 Yaqqa tribe, 36, 37, 42, 151n.6 Yomut confederacy, 42 yurts (pasturelands), 3, 13–14, 15, 19, 20; see also Astarabad; Balkhan; Gurgan; Kalmyks; Mangyshlak; Sumbar

181

Plate 1 A Turkmen. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1, Plate X, facing p. 298.

Plate 2 A Russian merchant. Source: Pallas et al., Views of 18th Century Russia, pp. 78–9.

Plate 3 A Kazakh on horseback. Source: Pallas et al., Views of 18th Century Russia, pp. 120–1.

Plate 4 A Kalmyk. Source: Pallas et al., Views of 18th Century Russia, pp. 42–3.

Plate 5 Kalmyks. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1, Plate IV, facing p. 117.

Plate 6 Kalmyk encampment near Astrakhan. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 1, Plate V, facing p. 116.

Plate 7 Caspian camel. Source: Pallas, Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire, Vol. 2, Plate XXIV, facing p. 352.