Russian Colonial Expansion To 1917 0720118670, 9780720118674

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Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Monograph Series Number 1

The Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and East Europe) Incorporated Series in Issues Studies Number 4

Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917 Edited by Michael Rywkin With a foreword by Syed Z. Abedin

Mansell Publishing Limited London and New York

First published 1988 by Mansell Publishing Limited 6 All Saints Street, London NI 9RL, England

© Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs and the Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and East Europe) Incorporated, 1988 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 46 Goodge Street, London WIP 1FJ, England. The Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and East Europe) Inc. Treasurer, Prof. A. Skreija, Dept, of Sociology, The University of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182, U.S.A. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the publishers or their appointed agents. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Russian colonial expansion to 1917.— (The Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and East Europe) Incorporated series in Issues studies; no. 4)—(Monograph series/Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs; no. 1). 1. Soviet Union—Colonies—History I. Rywkin, Michael II. Series III. Series 909 JV3011 ISBN 0-7201-1867-0

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Russian colonial expansion to 1917. (Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs monograph series; no. 1) (ASN series in issues studies (USSR and East Europe) ; no. 4) Contents: An overview of the growth of the Russian Empire / Rein Taagepera—Russian colonial administra­ tion / Michael Rywkin—Russian expansion in the Far North, X to mid XVI century / Janet Martin—Muscovy’s conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-1556 / Henry R. Huttenbach—[etc.] 1. Soviet Union—Territorial expansion. I. Rywkin, Michael. II. Series. III. Series: ASN series in issues studies (USSR and East Europe) ; no. 4. DK43.R84 1987 947 87-1628 ISBN 0-7201-1867-0 This book has been printed and bound in Great Britain; typeset in lOpt Times by Columns of Reading, and printed and bound by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King’s Lynn on Windrush Antique Book Wove Cream.

Contents

Foreword. Syed Z. Abedin.

vii

Preface. Michael Rywkin.

xi

I. An Overview of the Growth of the Russian Empire. 1 Rein Taagepera. II. Russian Central Colonial Administration. From the prikaz of Kazan to the XIX Century, a Survey. Michael Rywkin. 8 III. Russian Expansion in the Far North. X to mid-XVI Century. Janet Martin. 23 IV. Muscovy’s Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56. The Conquest of the Volga: Prelude to Empire. Henry R. Huttenbach. 45 V. Muscovy’s Penetration of Siberia. The Colonization Process 1555-1689. Henry R. Huttenbach. 70 VI. Russian Expansion and Policy in Ukraine, 1648-1791. An Outline and Analysis. Stephan M. Horak. 103 VII. The Crimea under Russian Rule. 1783 to the Great Reforms. Edward Lazzerini. 123 VIII. Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813. Muriel Atkin. 139 IX. The Mobile Steppe Frontier. The Russian Conquest and Colonization of Bashkiria and Kazakhstan to 1850. Alton Donnelly. 189 X. The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85. David MacKenzie. 208

V

vi

Contents XI.

Russia’s Central Asian Empire, 1885-1917. Seymour 235

Becker.

Index

257

Foreword

The Turkic peoples of Central Asia were among the first to accept Islam in the seven century A.D., the first century of the Hijra. Thereafter, Islamic civilization had a brilliant flowering in that region. Names like Samarkand, Bokhara and Tashkent even to this day stir luminous memories in the Muslim heart. Memories? Yes! For although these regions are still, in a manner of speaking, Muslim regions, the vigor and vitality that characterized their era of Islamic effulgence has somehow abated. With a reality too painful to contemplate, the Muslim psyche has found comfort and refuge in the distant past and has left the present to fend for itself. Not too long ago at the Rabat summit of Muslim heads of state a vigorous effort was made to include the Indian delegation as an active participant in the deliberations. The proponents of the idea argued that with a Muslim population of 70 million (at that time), India was entitled to legitimate representation in international Muslim councils. The Muslim population of the Soviet Union does not equal that of India. But it is close to a not inconsiderable 50 million. And it is growing. Based on current rates of growth, it is estimated that by the year 2000, the Soviet Muslim population will increase by over 100 percent. Indian Muslims by comparison will increase by only 71 percent in the same period (1980-2000). In 1980, one out of every six Soviet citizens was a Muslim but by the year 2000, one out of three will be a Muslim. In India in 1980, the population ratio was one Muslim out of every ten Indians. Since the total Indian population is estimated to increase by 55 percent as compared to the total Soviet population growth vii

viii

Foreword

of 22 percent, by the year 2000 the Muslim ratio in India will increase to one Muslim out of every seven Indians. Furthermore, since the creation of Pakistan, with the exception of the state of Kashmir in the northwest and a handful of offshore islands in the Indian Ocean, the Muslim population in India is quite diffuse. Indian territories contiguous to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan are wholly non-Muslim territories (again, with the exception of Kashmir). The Muslim regions of the Soviet Union, on the contrary, constitute today (and have constituted since the ninth century) the border lands of the world of Islam. It has been estimated that 75 percent of Russian Muslims live south of the Syr-Darya river in regions that are contiguous to firmly established Muslim lands: Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Chinese Turkestan. Consanguinity of race, language and culture across the borders is significant enough to have caused repeated headaches to the Russian imperium. All these facts put together may not amount to a convincing argument in favor of opening up membership in the organization of the Islamic Conference for the Soviet Union, but they do serve to underscore the strange phenomenon of neglect that the Muslim world as a whole has been guilty of with respect to these pioneer communities of Islam in Central Asia. In Muslim polemics of recent times one hears a great deal about the historic encounter of Islam with the West. Nothing looms larger in Muslim consciousness than the persistent threat that the Muslim world has faced from the West (now represented by “decadent America”) since the twelfth century A.D. This threat has been looked upon as both political and cultural, thus large churiks of Muslim territory fell under the control of sundry Western powers, and Westernization (or Occidentosis) became the order of the day in Muslim societies. > Much of this, however, is now history. Almost all Muslim lands once occupied by West European powers have been relinquished, and with growing confidence the Muslim world is now challenging the hegemony of the West over its mind and thought. But what about the Russians? From Ivan the Terrible’s triumph over the Muslim Khanate of Kazan in 1552 to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the history of the Russian onslaught on the Muslim world is no less long and no less gory. What is more, it still persists. Unlike the West European threat, it is not likely

Foreword ix

to fade away. Besides, it is not directed at land only—oil fields, warm water outlets, strategic waterways, these are all grist to the expanding Soviet mill, but its chief target is the Muslim spirit and no less. As one observer has recently noted: “For the first time since the Prophet’s triumphant return to Makkah, Islam has come face to face with a power determined to eradicate the religion as such and to convert Muslims from faith to infidelity” (Gai Eaton, Islam and the Destiny of Man, London, 1985, p. 25). It is no doubt understandable to an extent that in the first decades of its emancipation, the world of Islam was preoccupied with its own problems of stability and consolidation. But surely the time has now come for it to take a measure of its international Islamic commitments. According to one recent estimate, no fewer than 350 million Muslims live as minorities in non-Muslim states. This figure constitutes close to one-third of the total Muslim world population and can be overlooked in any planning of Muslim futures only at grave peril to the Ummah. The Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs since its inception in 1976 has repeatedly drawn attention to the gravity of this situation. Through its research and publication activities, it has sought to provide accurate and reliable information about the conditions of life of Muslim minority communities in all parts of the world, and particularly of those of the Soviet Union and China. To date, the Institute is the only body of its kind devoted to this essential task. It is hoped that on the basis of the information thus provided, community leaders as well as national and international organizations within the Muslim world and outside it will see the urgency of formulating long overdue policies for the preservation of the Islamic identity of these communities and of ensuring for them, through practicable means, their civil and religious rights. The publication of Russian Colonial Expansion by the Institute may be viewed as a step in this same direction. The book is not, of course, exclusively an account of Muslim encounter with the Russians. But as even a casual student of history would recognize, the tide of Russian expansion has principally been (and continues to be) at the expense of Muslim lands and the Islamic way of life. This would suffice to explain (if, indeed an explanation was needed) the interest the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs has in sponsoring, along with the Association for the Study of the Nationalities, this excellent book for publication.

X Foreword I earnestly hope that Russian Colonial Expansion will receive wide dissemination and that it will be a forerunner of other such studies that will help to awaken the Muslim mind to the full nature and extent of the Soviet threat to the Muslim world, past and present.

Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs, London Syed Z. Abedin Director

Preface Michael Rywkin

The history of Russian colonial expansion is of particular interest, both from the historical point of view and from its continuing relevance in our days. First of all, the Russian Empire is the only one that is still in existence, all other European powers having lost their colonial possessions in the twentieth century. True, the Russian Empire, following the 1917 Revolution, underwent important change; areas conquered throughout its history were given various degrees of autonomy in accordance with the status awarded to them by Moscow (union republics, autonomous republics, autonomous regions, national districts), local languages were recognized, and vast programs of economic, social, medical, and educational assistance were promoted, lifting most of the formerly colonized peoples to the levels of the metropoly. If this were the whole story we should not be able to speak of a survival of a colonial empire. Unfortunately, socio-economic correctives have been balanced by continuous political control. Thus Russian cadres have been maintained in key power positions and in control over native cadres. Russian troops and security forces are as much in charge as during the time of the tsars. Some national or national-religious groups are trusted, others distrusted, all on the basis of their allegiance to Russia. Some nationalities have been punished but rehabilitated, others punished but not “forgiven.” Nationalism is tolerated at the level of nepotism, but rarely above; separatism is viewed as treason. On the other hand, Russian chauvinism, equally suppressed after the October Revolution, is being increasingly tolerated, passing for patriotism. Secondly, the Russian Empire has been the only European

xi i

Preface

empire to acquire colonial possessions not across the seas—a classical colonial pattern—but across endless land masses of steppes, forests and taigas, a situation not always properly recognized as equally colonial. The limits of Russian penetration were either natural obstacles (such as the Pamir Mountains or Pacific Ocean) or opposition from nations strong enough to resist further Russian penetration (Turkey, China, Japan). Works on tsarist Russian colonial expansion are by no means of purely historical interest. They are indispensable background studies for understanding contemporary Moscow policies towards non-Russian nationalities conquered during the process of expansion. And Soviet reactions to Western historical writings on that subject reflect the current standing of the given nationality in Moscow’s eyes. Contemporary Soviet historiography has stressed several prin­ ciples justifying Russian colonial expansion. First of all, the foreign policies of the Russian tsars are pictured as having been almost as peaceful and benevolent as the Soviet ones. Next, Russian conquest of national groups still under punishment, such as the Crimean Tatars, is presented as a defensive measure on the part of Russia; that of nations whose entry into the Russian empire was rather voluntary, such as Armenia or Georgia, is described, on the other hand, in a more balanced (if not always truthful) fashion. Finally, all attempts by conquered nationalities to gain independence from tsarist Russia, while not always condemned (as was done in the 1950s with the Shamil revolt), are slanted to look like social, not national conflicts. Thus the Bashkir eighteenth-century struggle against Russian landlords would be justified, while Kokand’s fight against advancing Russian armies would be seen negatively in the eyes of present­ day Soviet historians. In the case of Muslim peoples, who ever since the sixteenth century have been the main target of Russian expansionism, their conquest is presented in the most distorted way, with Russia appearing as carrier of progress and civilization at the given place and time. Muslim states, on the other hand, are made to appear as both backward and aggressive, Islam as a reactionary faith, and Muslim masses as more oppressed by their own coreligionaries (from feudal lords to merchants) than by conquering tsarist Russian armies. The eleven contributions making up this volume, written by

Preface xiii

ten authors, each a specialist in his (or her) field, have not been conceived as a collection of essays on a related subject. Instead, they were planned as chapters, with areas to be covered and chronological limits set in advance. The story of Russian colonial expansion has been from the outset the key point of this volume, with other matters, however important, relegated to second place. Thus international relations have been discussed in the light of our key issue, and Russia's westward drive (a conquest, but not a colonial one in the proper sense of the word) excluded, except for the Ukraine as part of the southward drive. To make the subject more manageable, we also excluded areas that only temporarily fell into Russian hands (i.e. Alaska, Manchuria, etc.), and avoided the Jewish issue as outside of our scope. In our first chapter, Rein Taagepera presents a short survey of the growth of the Russian Empire, both in comparison to other colonial empires and as measured by a yardstick of average yearly expansion. Michael Rywkin’s contribution deals with the central colonial administration (first in Moscow, then in St. Petersburg) and attempts to trace some political continuity, patterns of gover­ nance and long-term administrative trends as they emerge from the acts of colonial administration. Janet Martin surveys the first Russian colonial expansion, which started even before the Mongol invasion and ended with the absorption of numerous small Finnish tribes dwelling to the north and northeast of Kievan Rus’. The northward extension of Russian territory gave Russia two important advantages: first, a refuge from the Mongols, then a springboard for later movement towards the Volga and the Urals. Henry Huttenbach presents Russia’s conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan as keys to all further colonial expansion. His second piece follows Russia’s jump from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean, accomplished in seventy-five years (as compared to the hundred and fifty years that it took the Americans to reach the Pacific from the Appalachian Mountains). Both expansions, albeit almost two centuries apart, were crucial in propelling these two countries to great-power status at a later date. Stephan Horak’s study of Russian annexation of the Ukraine brings up the problem of primacy among the Slavic nations. The victor in the Polish-Russian struggle for the Ukraine, already strengthened by the conquest of Siberia, became the great power.

xiv Preface

With her western borders secure, Russia was able to turn her attention to the south, towards the Crimea and the Caucasus, with the Cossacks prominent in carrying St. Petersburg’s colonial conquests. Edward Lazzerini depicts the Crimean part of that expansion. With no Poland to contend with, the last Islamic outpost in Europe outside of the Turkish possessions in the Balkans fell into Christian hands in the way a few centuries earlier Muslim Granada had succumbed to Spanish reconquista. Muriel Atkin covers the early Russian thrust into the Caucasus, an inevitable consequence of the elimination of protective Tatar power first from Astrakhan and then from the Crimea. Russia’s role as both the protector of Christian Georgians and Armenians and once again colonizer of Muslim lands clearly emerges in this chapter. It was our original intention to include the Russian pacification of the Caucasus as well, but the requested piece failed to materialize, leaving Muriel Atkin’s chapter alone in covering the Russian expansion into that area. Alton Donnelly deals with the gradual absorption of the Kazakh Steppe, a movement that finally brought Russia to the gates of Central Asia. David MacKenzie follows with the story of the Russian conquest of the three Central Asian khanates and the pacification of the Turkmen tribes, as well as with the initial setting of the Russian colonial administration in that area. Finally, Seymour Becker surveys the consolidation of the Russian colonial empire in Central Asia, the most classically colonial of all tsarist Russian conquests and the most similar to the case of the French North African empire. In both cases, two states were made into protectorates and the central one absorbed (Kokand by the Russians, Algeria by the French). In both cases the conquerors were Europeans, the conquered were Muslims, and in the two cases the justifications given for the conquest were quite similar. Our project on Russian colonial expansion, conceived by the American “Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and Eastern Europe)” and dealing to a large extent with the Russian conquest of Muslim lands, attracted the attention of the London Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. This shared interest has resulted in a common sponsorship, publication, and distribu-

Preface xv The Ethnic Composition of the Population of the Russian Empire (within census borders) Peoples by language group

Russians Ukrainians Belorussians Poles

in 1000s

1719 in %

11,127 2,026 383 —

70.7 12.9 2.4 —

76,672 31,023 6,768 11,208

44.6 18.1 4.0 6.5

_

1914/17 in 1000s in %

Lithuanians Latvians

162

__ 1

1,786 1,635

1 1

Moldavians

—

—

1,216

0.7

Jews Germans

31

_ 0.2

7,253 2,448

4.2 1.4

Tadjiks' Ossetians2

—

—

488 237

0.3 0.1

Armenians

—

—

1,989

1.2

Greeks

—

—

261

0.2

Georgians Kabardians' Cherkes' Chechens' Peoples of Dagestan'

— — — — —

— — — — —

1,748 103 59 253 772

1.0 0.06 0.03 0.1 0.5

Finns Udmurts Estonians Mordva

164 48 309 107

1.0 0.3 1.9 0.7

2,697 535 1,154 1,188

1.6 0.3 0.6 0.7

Tatars' Bashkirs' Chuvash

293 172 218

1.9 1.1 1.4

3,010 1,733 1,124

1.8 1.0 0.6

Azeri Turks' Nogai' Turkmen* Kazakhs' Kirghiz' Uzbeks' lakuts

— 114 — — — — 35

— 0.7 — — — — 0.2

1,996 57 361 4,698 737 1,964 227

1.2 0.05 0.2 2.7 0.4 1.2 0.1

Kalmyks Buriats

200 48

1.3 0.3

169 279

0.1 0.2

Others

301

2.0

3,902

2.26

__

Source: S.I. Bruk, V.M. Kabuzan, “Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia Rossii (1717-1971 gg)”, Sovetskaia etnografía, N. 6 (1980). Notes: ‘Muslims 2Half of them are now Muslims.

xvi

Preface

tion of this volume. Written by ten authors, each of whom is solely responsible for the content of his/her contribution, the work presents some inevitable problems, from a variety of political views and academic approaches, to different methods of presentation and style. But despite all the shortcomings and omissions in the text that our critics might justifiably uncover, this volume, we hope, will provide basic data and proper perspective on a subject too little known, but very much alive: the colonial expansion of the only major world power that still manages to preserve its territorial conquests.

MAP TO CH. 5 — PENETRATION OF SIBERIA MAP TO CH. 6 — 17th CENTURY UKRAINE MAP TO CH. 8 — CAUCASUS AROUND 1800

RUSSIAN EMPIRE. 1917 BORDERS GUIDE TO MAPS (TO TABLE OF CONTENTS)

An Overview of the Growth of the Russian Empire Rein Taagepera

tarting from a tiny core, the Principality of Moscow eventually

S developed into a Russian-dominated empire that now is called the Soviet Union. It is the third-largest empire that has ever existed, ranking after the British and the Mongol empires. Its combination of size and duration is unique in world history, since it has outlasted by far the other large empires. Its slow but relentless growth over five centuries, though not unique, also comes close to the record of steadiness of expansion. These claims will be documented in a later part of this overview. This brief sketch will not describe the methods through which expansion was achieved and maintained. Building a large empire obviously indicates superior ability to organize people socially, by more or less ruthless means.1 This is not to suggest that large empires are the optimal way to run the world. On the contrary, empire-building may prove to be a major foolishness of our species. The following description of growth does not take a stand on whether it was healthy or cancerous. The growth of Muscovy-Russia in terms of its dry land area is shown in Figure 1 where area is plotted versus time.2 This figure further indicates the approximate major areas conquered or subdued by Muscovy-Russia at various time periods.3 First mentioned in chronicles in 1147, Muscovy after 1300 started to incorporate other Russian states at a rate (in terms of square kilometers) that increased as its own size increased. After the destruction of Novgorod in 1478 most Great Russian areas were conquered, and so were some Volga Finnic (Mordvin) and Baltic Finnish (Vote, Vepse and Karelian) areas. By 1533 the conquest of Great Russian areas was complete, and some 1

2 Russian Colonial Expansion

Permian Finnic (Udmurt^Votyak and Komi-Zyrian) and Samoyed (Nenets) areas to the northeast also were controlled. In 1552-1556 the collapse of the Tatar khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan extended Moscow’s grip to Turkish (Tatar, Chuvash, Bashkir) and Finnic (Mari-Cheremis) areas throughout the Volga basin. The overthrow of the Khanate of Sibir in 1581 submitted to Moscow Turkish-Tatar and Ugriç (Mansi-Vogul, KhantiOstyak) populations in the lower Ob basin. Displacement of Lithuania-Poland from northeastern parts of the Ukraine (1667) came simultaneously with further seizure of vast stretches of Tatar and Samoyed lands in the present Western Siberia where the Yenissei became the frontier around 1630. By 1690 the Buryat Mongol, Evenki (Tungus) and Yakut lands could be considered subdued—nearly the whole of present-day Siberia, except the Amur region claimed by China. Kamchatka, and the indomitable Chukchis to the far northeast. By 1700 Russian area expansion slowed down for almost a century. The conquests of Estonia, northern Latvia, and the Finnish Ingermanland around the present Leningrad (1721) were of great strategic and economic importance, but added little to the land mass of the now large empire. Incorporation of Kamchatka and the Chukchi area completed the conquest of northeastern Siberia. East of the Volga, Russian aggression was kept in check for centuries by Bashkir and Kazakh resilience, and by the destruction of a Russian army of invasion by the Turkmen (1717). To the west, Sweden, Poland and the Crimea held their ground, and Russian conquests in the Ukraine alternated with reverses. In 1772 a new wave of major Russian expansion started, as the Russians took from Poland parts of Belorussia. The Crimean Tatar country and the southern Ukraine were annexed in 1783. The partition of Poland in 1793-1795 gave Russia all of the Ukraine east of Galicia, all of Belorussia, Lithuania, and southern Latvia. Between 1801 and 1828, Finland, most of ethnic Poland, Bessarabia, and most of Transcaucasia came under Russian rule. Between 1822 and 1854 Kazakh resistance was gradually crushed, and Russian penetration of the Arctic regions continued from Siberia to Alaska. The latter part of the nineteenth century saw the final slowing­ down of the Russian imperialist push. In 1858-1863, China was forced to cede the Amur and Ussuri districts. In 1863-1875

AïTOverview of the Growth of the Russian Empire 3

Sakhalin was occupied. In 1878 Armenia’s Kars region was taken from Turkey. From 1855 to 1885, the three khanates of Turkestan—today’s Kirghizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and finally Turkmenia—were conquered. Meanwhile, Alaska became untenable and was sold to the USA in 1867. The Russian Empire had reached practically its largest extent ever by 1885. Minor expansion in Pamir (1895), power play in the Balkans, and gradual infiltration of Manchuria led to antagonisms with Great Britain, Austria, China, and finally Japan. In retrospect, the year 1905 marked the end of Russian expansion, and the beginning of the shrinking of the empire. The area of the Soviet Union has never surpassed the geographical size the tsarist empire had in 1904. Southern Sakhalin and claims in Manchuria were lost to Japan in 1905. In 1917-1920 Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia declared and successfully defended their independence, and Romania recovered Bessarabia. Turkey and Poland occupied the Kars region, the western Ukraine and Belorussia, respectively. Under the new name of “Soviet Union” the Russian Empire managed to defeat the emancipation attempts of other non­ Russian areas, at the cost of giving them some cultural and symbolic autonomy. From 1935 to 1945 the Soviet Union reclaimed earlier tsarist conquests in the Baltic states, eastern Finland and Romania, western Belorussia, and southern Sakhalin. It also annexed some areas that had never belonged to the tsarist empire: Tanu Tuva, eastern Galicia, Bukowina, Transcarpathia, Lithuania’s Klaipeda district, a slice of East Prussia and the southern Kuril islands. Of the former tsarist possessions, Alaska, Finland, Poland and the Kars region remained outside the Soviet Union. Like the tsarist empire with its sphere of influence and occupation in Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Iran and the Balkans, the Soviet Union has established a string of satellites and client states at its periphery. The trend of the last twenty years does not suggest that any of them are likely to be eventually absorbed into the Soviet Union, unless Chinese pressure on Mongolia increases. The Russian expansion is seen in Figure 1 to be quite steady. It can be fitted fairly closely by a simple mathematical expression, the so-called logistic equation, which is widely used in biological and demographic studies of growth. The basic model expressed

4 Russian Colonial Expansion

by the logistic equation is the following: growth proceeds first at a constant percentage rate (like money in a savings account at constant interest), but later it gradually slows down as the size approaches an eventual maximum size. This is the way a bacterial colony grows in a laboratory dish with fixed space and food supply. The logistic fit shown as a dashed curve in Figure 1 corresponds to the following equation'.

22.4

A —__________________ 1 + e-.015(t-1690)

where A is the area in million square kilometers, and t is time in years A.D. The maximum stable area reached is 22.4 million square kilometers (which is the present actual area). Time of fastest growth was around A.D. 1690. During its early growth, Muscovy’s land area increased by 1.5% per year, according to this logistic approximation. A similar approximation to the growth of the Roman Empire yields a similar rate of early growth: 1.8% per year. The early Ottoman and US area growths were much faster: 3.2 and 3.6% per year, respectively. One may wonder whether slow growth leads to a better-built and hence more durable empire. Figure 2 shows the Russian area curve in the company of those of some other major empires since 1200.5 As mentioned earlier, the Russian empire is the third-largest ever, surpassed in size only by the Mongol and British empires, and trailed by the Chinese (Manchu), Spanish, French and Baghdad Muslim empires, with Rome a distant twenty-fourth.6 Regarding durability at fairly stable size, Russia has not yet reached the age of such major empires as the Roman-Byzantine, Parthian-Sassanid, Lithuanian-Polish or Ottoman ones. All these lasted at more than half of their maximum size for 4 to 7 centuries. At present Russia has reached 2.9 centuries, but of course its duration is still incomplete. Nonetheless Russia is already among the twenty most durable political entities through­ out history by this criterion, with the list also including such enduring ministates as the Church State and San Marino. When one takes into account both size and duration of empires, Russia comes by far ahead of the British and Mongol empires (which had a short duration—cf. Figure 2) and also of

6 Russian Colonial Expansion

the Roman and Sassanid ones (which stayed small by present standards). A suitable measure of this combined size-duration effect is the so-called “time integral of area,” i.e. the area under the area curve in Figure 2.7 It is 65 million square-kilometercenturies for Russia, while the closest runners-up (British, and post-Mongol Chinese, from Ming to Mao) are around 45, followed by Rome, Baghdad, Han China, Sassanid Persia, SungTang China and the Mongol Empire at 30 to 20 million squarekilometer-centuries. As far as the impact of an empire depends on how much land it controls for how many centuries, Muscovy-Russia-USSR already holds the record in world history. While the combined Chinese empires, from Han to Mao, add up to much more, they are separated by long breakdown periods compared with which Russian times of trouble have been negligible. How long is the Russian empire still likely to last? There is some indication that biological and political entities that grow slowly tend to last longer. More specifically, the duration at half or more of the maximum size tends to be about three times the time it takes to rise from 20 to 80% of maximum size.8 To the extent that this very tentative observation applies, the Russian empire could be expected to retain at least half of its present area for 4 more centuries, since its rise time from 20 to 80% of maximum size was 2.4 centuries and it reached half of its maximum size area around 1690, i.e., three centuries ago. While such projections should not be taken as very precise, they serve to give an idea of how the slow but relentless growth of the Russian empire can be expected to affect the stability of the resulting structure. Forms of government of the empire have changed occasionally, and may change again. Minor or even notso-minor chunks of land may detach themselves. But the bulk of the Russian empire is likely to stay together long after the 1980s, if the experience of past major empires can be taken as a guide.9

Notes 1. For a comparison of American and Russian policies towards technologically simple people, see Taagepera, R., and R. Michelsen (1977), “If the Navajo were in the Soviet Union: a comparative approach to the Russian nationality policy.” In I. Kamenetsky, ed., Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR, Libraries Unlimited, Littleton, Colorado.

An Overview of the Growth of the Russian Empire 7

2. From Taagepera, R. (1968), “Growth curves of empires,” General Systems, 13:171-175, with corrections based on Bjorklund, O., H. Holmboe and A. Rohr (1970), Historical Atlas of the World, Barnes & Noble, New York; Chew, A.F. (1967), An Atlas of Russian History, Yale University Press, New York; Hammond (1968), Hammond Historical Atlas, Maplewood, N.J.; and Kinder, H., and W. Hilgemann (1964), dtv-Atlas Zur Weltgeschichte, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich. 3. Based mainly on Katz, Z., ed. (1975), Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities, Free Press, New York; Rywkin, M. (1963), Russia in Central Asia, Collier Books, New York; and Estonian Soviet Encyclopedia (1968-1976), Eesti Noukogude Entsuklopeedia, Valgus, Tallinn. 4. R. Taagepera (1968). 5. Based on unpublished measurements. The Golden Horde, Ottoman and Spanish empires at times surpassed Russia in size, prior to 1700. They are not shown in Figure 2, in order to avoid cluttering it up. 6. R. Taagepera (1978), “Size and duration of empires: systematics of size,” Social Science Research 7:108-127. 7. R. Taagepera (1978), “Size and duration of empires: growth-decline curves, 300 to 600 B.C.” Social Science Research 7:180-196. 8. R. Taagepera (1979), “Size and duration of empires: growth-decline curves, 600 B.C. to 600 A.D.” Social Science History 3:115-138. 9. These projections can applyz only if humankind does not meanwhile reach a dangerous “megacrisis” due to accelerating population and technology explosion—cf. R. Taagepera (1976), “Crisis around 2005 A.D.?—A technology-population interaction model,” General Systems 21:137-138; and (1979), “People, skills and resources: an interaction model for world population growth,” Technological Forecasting and Social Change 13:13-30.

II Russian Central Colonial Administration From the prikaz of Kazan to the XIX Century, a Survey Michael Rywkin

he business of supervising the central administration in charge

of non-Russian nationalities annexed by the growing Russian T Empire was traditionally entrusted to the empire’s patrician councils: to the Boyar Duma until the time of Peter the Great, to the State Senate thereafter, and to the State Council from 1810 to 1917. Whether this can be conceived as a sign of discrimination against the non-Russians whose affairs were deemed beneath the tsar’s dignity to handle, or rather as a sign of benevolence towards the conquered nations whose Russian administration was thus made accountable to a kind of jury instead of one man, or again to the tsar’s wish to share the rule over the aliens with his country’s peers, remains unclear. According to Kliuchevskii, in the second half of the seventeenth century the Boyar Duma was in control of several prikazy (Posol’skif Pomestnyi, Razriadnyi) as well as of the “colonial” Kazanskii, and had specific hours set aside to hear their reports.1 The fact of accountability to a larger body of peers of the realm meeting in chamber to hear the tsar’s orders, administrative re­ ports and subjects’ complaints must have provided some restraints to the actions of state officials in charge of colonial administration. The latter has been traditionally organized according to territorial principles, each colonial conquest dealt with separately, with no attempt at British-style overall administration concen­ trated in a single “Colonial Office.” It is only when Russia was expanding exclusively eastward, with little success elsewhere, that such unity occurred, by chance, under the umbrella of the central office in charge of Kazan and Siberian territories, namely the prikaz of the Kazan Court. 8

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The appearance of a separate prikaz of Siberia, formerly a desk of the Kazan prikaz, did not change the situation very much because of the close relations between the two prikazy. The togetherness of the two offices was underlined by the fact that both prikazy were, for at least a quarter of a century after their formal separation, headed by the same boyar, sometimes even assisted by the same diaks. This provided for a basic unity in colonial policy. Subsequently, when Russia began to expand southward and westward, and later into the southeast, each newly conquered area, at least temporarily, was provided with its own central territorial administration located in Moscow, or later in St. Petersburg. Thus when at some point in the seventeenth century there existed the prikazy of Kazan, Siberia, Malorussia (Ukraine), the short-lived ones of Lifland (Latvia, 1660-1666) and Lithuania (i.e., conquered areas of the Grand Duchy, 1656-1667), and even a Cossack prikaz, there was no single colonial office to unite them under one roof, each prikaz administration remaining separately accountable to the Boyar Duma. Some conquered nations were placed under; most unusual tutelage. Thus the Kalmyks were moved in 1678 from the Moscow prikaz to the one of the new chetvert’.2 In the nineteenth century, when Russia was pacifying the Caucasus and expanding into Central Asia, again each area was dealt with in a separate manner. It thus appears that the “colonial office” of the Kazan prikaz was an accident of history not to be repeated again.

Stages of Absorption There is in Russian history a clear pattern of downgrading of the conquered lands from being states brought under the rule of the Muscovite crown to being centrally administered colonial terri­ tories, and finally to becoming simple provinces, administratively indistinguishable from neighboring Russian provinces. This transition is clearly visible through the succession of stages of administrative dependence most conquered territories seem to have passed through. At first the conquered state (we are excluding tribal units that did not reach that level) would remain under the jurisdiction of the Posol’skii prikaz (later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Referred to as a separate unit and linked to Russia in the usual

10 Russian Colonial Expansion

feudal tradition of having a common monarch, it would retain if not the essence, at least’a legal form of sovereignty. At the second stage, a territorial prikaz, bearing the name of the conquered state (such as the one of Kazan), accountable not only to the monarch, but to the peers of the realm (Duma, Senate, Council), is in charge. Finally, the former state loses all separate identity and is treated as an ordinary Russian province and its inhabitants as ethnic or national minorities living in the Great Russian Christian Orthodox state. Almost all the conquered lands went through this process of diminishing autonomy: Kazan, Siberia, Georgia, Crimea, even Ukraine. This process, irreversible in the long run, lasted until the end of the tsarist empire in 1917. Thus while the two sister prikazy of Kazan and Siberia together with the Posol’skii shared responsibility for Russia’s eastern policy, the dividing line between their respective jurisdiction in dealing with an eastern nation was that nation’s degree of independence from Russia. Since the prikazy always acted in the name of the monarch, it is often difficult to separate the policy of the tsar from that of the prikaz. What is clear is that passing of jurisdiction from the Posol’skii to a territorial prikaz was a sure sign of decline in the status of the nation concerned. Thus the shift of the Kasimov “tsardom” in Meshchera from the jurisdiction of the Posol’skii prikaz to the Kazan prikaz in the 1660s is considered to be the end of the autonomy of the “Kasimov tsars” (or “tsarevichs”), although their dynasty sur­ vived until 1681 ? While the jurisdiction of the Posol’skii prikaz meant a recognition of formal sovereignty, that of a territorial prikaz was just an acceptance of national-cultural separateness within a framework of residual sovereignty. During the second stage, that of residual sovereignty, when the area was provided with a Moscow- or St. Petersburg-based central territorial administration supervising the one of the territory itself, there were five levels of administrative control: 1. The council (Boyar Duma, Senate, State Council) to which the central territorial administration remained accountable; 2. the above-mentioned administration itself (prikaz, com­ mittee, commission); 3. the provincial administration (headed by a voevoda, namestnik, governor-general, governor), accountable to the central administration;

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4. the city or district administration responsible to the voevoda, governor, etc.; 5. the native self-government at communal levels.

The native elite of the conquered area could seldom aspire to positions within the Moscow or St. Petersburg state councils. The appointment to the prikaz of Kazan in 1604-1606 of Prince Vasilii Kazi-Kordiukovich Tcherkasskii cannot be viewed as a concession to Kazan Muslim natives, the boyar’s family having been converted and Russified since at least half a century prior to his appointment. According to Kokoshkin, the Siberian and Kasimov tsarevichs baptized into the Christian faith, although by rank and chest’ (honor) higher than the boyars, still “do not sit in the duma since they and their states were conquered after military defeat, precedents are lacking, and one may fear something from them.”4 Native presence at the prikaz level seldom went beyond assisting or advising. At the provincial level, only Christians were at some points allowed to share control with the Russians. In Asia, by the time of the October Revolution, only the protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara, formally sovereign, managed to retain full provincial-level control. At the city/district level Russian control was generally milder, but it is only at communal levels that Moscow/St. Petersburg followed a policy of noninterference in native affairs. Thus Russia increasingly sought administrative centralization through tight control at all administrative levels, but consistently stayed away from purely local matters, especially from those involving native customs and religion, except for limited periods of missionary effort in the Volga area and in Siberia, and for attempts to spread Russian as a lingua franca. Thus throughout the centuries the basic colonial policy of Russia was native communal autonomy below, Russian administrative control above.

The Prikaz of Kazan The first among Moscow-based central territorial administrations charged with handling a specific newly acquired possession was the prikaz of Kazan. Its origins date to the times of Vasilii III (1503-1533), when the Meshchera territory of Mordva was wrested from Kazan in the 1520s and a Meshchera Court

12 Russian Colonial Expansion (Meshcherskii dvor) was set up in Moscow to take care of the affairs of the territory, a part of which was left under the nominal rule of its Russian puppet “Kasimov tsars.”5 The Meshchera Court was initially placed under the control of the Posol’skii prikaz (Foreign Office)6, but later combined with the Kazan Court, created in 1553, a year after the takeover of Kazan by Tsar Ivan the Terrible. The Kazan Court was originally orte among several regional administrations created probably out of Boyar Duma desks7 to manage villages taken over by the Crown in areas annexed by the Muscovite state. It was first known as izba (old Russian for office) in the 1560s, sometimes as dvor or dvorets (a court or a palace), and finally as the Kazan prikaz.3 It was already so mentioned in the 1570s, but officially known as such only after 1599. Until the early seventeenth century, the prikaz was still referred to as the “Kazan and Meshchera Court” (Kazanskago i Meshcherskago dvortsa).9 The second part of the name was later dropped. During the reign of Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich (1616-1645), regional departments in charge of ethnic Russian territories were absorbed by the prikaz of the Great Court (BoVshoi dvorets). The one of Kazan, being in charge of non­ Russian areas, was, on the contrary, upgraded to the status of a regular prikaz,™ and became “a fully independent office in charge of general administration, albeit with territorial character.”11 Thus from roughly 1553 to 1720 it administered the territories of the former Tatar kingdoms of Kazan and Astrakhan known as the “Tsardom of Kazan.” From the 1590s to 1637, the newly conquered regions of Siberia were also temporarily under its jurisdiction. By the end of the seventeenth century, the territory adminis­ tered by the prikaz of Kazan comprised the lands of all present­ day non-Russian Volga republics as well as the rest of the Volga basin from the Caspian Sea to the Urals, and was divided into twenty-six provinces.12 The prikaz of Kazan was considered in the sixteenth century to be among the four most important in the Russian administrative system. The three others were the Razriadnyi (General Military Administration), Posoiskii (Foreign Office), and Pomestnyi (Land Holdings and Grants).13 Like other prikazy, the one of Kazan had its headquarters in Moscow and was headed by a boyar or dvoretskii (head of a

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prikaz). assisted by two diaks (officials). The heads of the Kazan prikaz were traditionally boyars (starte officials, members of the Boyar Duma) rather than dumnyi diaks and included a real roster

of high Russian nobility: Shuiskii, Trubetskoi, Dolgorukii, Odoevskii, Sitskii, etc. Its first head was the boyar Danila Romanovich lur’ev-Zakharin, an aide to Ivan the Terrible and a kinsman of his first wife.14 The last was Prince Boris Alekseevich Golitsyn, a top aide to Tsar Peter the Great. However, because of the tradition of appointing as heads of prikazy prominent boyars regardless of ability,15 the real authority in the prikaz often fell into the hands of the better-trained diaks. In the “Tsardom of Kazan,” the prikaz was represented by voevody (military governors), originally several per province, headed by a boyarín i voevoda bol’shoi (boyar and chief governor). Only Peter the Great’s reform of 1708 established the principle of one-man rule.16 All matters under the prikaz jurisdiction were divided among desks (stoly). Among them were justice (sudnyi), finance (denezhnyi), police (streletskii), and general military administra­ tion (razriad).17 The collection of moneys was one of the primary tasks of the prikaz of Kazan: it collected taxes (obrok) from villages belonging to the Crown. This was carried on in the provinces by prikaznye liudi (officials from the prikaz) in charge of overseeing the management of Crown lands.18 The prikaz through its provincial agents collected a variety of transit taxes and duties from merchants engaged in overland and Volga commerce. Only the powerful Stroganov family, entrenched in the Far North, managed to bypass the Kazan State House and deal directly with the prikaz offices in Moscow.19 The prikaz is also known to have collected duties at fairs at nearby monasteries, a task usually assigned to the prikaz qí the Grand Treasury (Bol’shaia Kazna).20 The prikaz of Kazan, like the one of Siberia, was in charge of gathering the traditional Tatar iasak tax, which successfully survived Russian conquest. The prikaz was a disbursing agency as well. Thus it had its own budget, a revenue of over 30,000 roubles by the end of the sixteenth century,21 and paid salaries both to officials in the Moscow headquarters and to those in local offices in the provinces under its jurisdiction, in accordance with a salary scale established for the prikaz.22 The prikaz also paid craftsmen

14 Russian Colonial Expansion

employed in military constructions, foreign experts working on its territory, and local chieftains who supported Russian rule.23 The prikaz of Kazan, like the other regional ones, kept estate grant documents, processed land grants and settled disputes.24 The prikaz also took care of numerous cases of runaway serfs and deserters. In the latter task it cooperated with the Tainyi (Secret) prikaz, the prototype of the Russian secret police. Following the usual pattern of the prikazy system, the prikaz of Kazan acted as a court in adjudicating disputes under its jurisdiction and in prosecuting local officials for graft, theft or incompetence.25 While Muslims were absent from the prikaz hierarchy, there was not much racial or religious discrimination otherwise. Many Muslims served the Crown on equal terms with the Russians in all except the highest positions. Some Belorussian serfs captured during the war against the Polish-Lithuanian state, even though Christian, were sold to both baptized and Muslim Kazan Tatars in the early 1600s.26 After 1563, and long before Siberia, the Kazan lands were places of exile for both domestic enemies and foreign prisoners of war, and the prikaz was in charge of the technical side of deportation matters. Moreover, its headquarters contained cells for the temporary incarceration of offenders under its jurisdic­ tion—the usual practice in the absence of a coherent prison system. In addition, military orders concerning troops from the Kazan territory were channeled through the Kazan prikaz and not directly through the Razriad as in Russia proper. Acceptance of local chieftains coming under the tsar’s sovereignty in neighboring nomadic areas was also handled by the prikaz. Finally, the prikaz was supposed to protect the natives from willful land seizures and extortions by Russian settlers, a task not always carried out with much diligence.27 The Crown was careful not to ignore the prikaz when dealing with “oriental” matters. For example, grain requisitioned in excess of delivery quotas was “borrowed” rather than “taken” from the prikaz’, a demand for silk addressed to the voevoda of Simbirsk bypassed the prikaz, but still directed that half of the merchandise be sent to Kazan. Even the visit of the Persian shah, Abaz, to Moscow in 1664 was handled for the tsar by a Kazan prikaz diak, not by the Foreign Office.28 The prikaz of Kazan insured the economic exploitation of the area by the Crown, the officialdom, the Orthodox clergy and the

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Russian nobility. It provided law, order, and basic protection for the natives in return for their submission to Moscow. Neverthe­ less, during its existence, and despite the encroachments upon its authority by other prikazy, especially by the Razriad—a usual occurrence caused by ill-defined limits of jurisdiction among governmental institutions in pre-Petrine Russia—the prikaz of Kazan managed to maintain a degree of separateness for the “Kingdom of Kazan.” The prikaz disappeared around 1720, when Peter the Great’s reforms of the central government were finally implemented. Its functions were then split among various departments (collegiums) of the new administration. During the 1763 Senate reform, Kazan was assigned to a “desk” (stol) of the Third Department of the Senate, a pale reminder of its former importance;29 the Volga basin became simply a part of Russia, administratively indistinguishable from the rest of the empire.

Siberian Prikaz Following the conquest of western Siberia in the 1580s, the newly acquired territory was entrusted initially to the Posol’skii prikaz (Foreign Office) and to the chetvertnoi prikaz of diak Andrei Shchelkalov, soon afterwards to the Novgorod chef of diak Ivan Vakhromiev, next to the special chetverf (office below the prikaz level) headed by diak Varfolomei Ivanov (1596-1599), and finally, soon afterwards, subordinated to the prikaz of Kazan. For the next thirty-eight years (from 1599 to 1637) Siberia remained under a special department within the prikaz of Kazan.30 In 1637, a separate Siberian prikaz was established, at first managed by the officials in charge of the Kazan prikaz. The importance of the new office reached its summit under the vigorous leadership of the dumnyi diak A.A. Vinius, first appointed in 1695. An enterprising Dutchman’s son, Vinius was instrumental in promoting the exploitation of the mineral resources of the Urals, but he finally ended in disgrace. The prikaz itself fell victim to Peter’s reforms. Reduced to a provincial office in 1710, it was closed in 1725. But owing to an accumulation of unresolved cases, it was reestablished after Peter’s death and survived for another twenty-five years (1730-1755). Afterwards, the area’s administration was not much different from that of the rest of the country, but its non-Russian population remained under special supervision of the Senate

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throughout the 1760s. Thus it was the Senate that in 1759 gave permission to build mosques in Tatar areas.31 Almost a century later, first between 1821 and 1838, then again between 1852 and 1864, a special Siberian committee of the State Council was entrusted with Siberian affairs’ supervision. But after 1864 it was total integration once again, and this time for good. 'During its long existence, the Siberian prikaz was in charge of all Siberian affairs, appointing and firing voevodas, governors, diaks and scores of lesser officials, exercising military authority over troops stationed in the area, collecting iasak taxes from the non-Russians and taxes in kind from the Russians, as well as supervising deportees from Russia proper. The prikaz was also in charge of the so-called “Sable Treasury” (Sobolinaia kazna), a major source of export revenue for the Russian state. Like the prikaz of Kazan, the Siberian prikaz was accountable to the tsar and to the Boyar Duma. To present reports to either of the higher instances, the boyar (or the dumnyi diak) in charge of the prikaz would appear flanked by two diaks. Reports were generally prepared by one of the diaks and decisions taken na verkhu (“upstairs”) were usually rendered immediately upon hearing the report. There were four kinds of decrees or orders issued through the prikaz*.

1. Personal decrees (imennye ukazy), the tsar’s orders addressed to a specific person. They were generally issued after hearing the prikaz presentation of the matter. 2. Ukaznye gramoty, general decrees issued in the name of the tsar, often responses to the prior prikaz presentation. 3. Instructions or memos (nakazy, nakaznye gramoty) setting policies to be followed and usually addressed to the voevoda(s) in Siberia. 4. Simple orders (gramoty) dealing with particular instances and issued by the prikaz itself.32

The prikaz also issued lists describing documents on file and kept track of correspondence with other prikazy, mostly with the Razriad but also with Land Grants and Foreign Affairs.33 An example of such correspondence is the discussion about deported Circassians with the Malorussian prikaz. The prikaz also acted as a disbursing agency, paying its clerks (poddiachie) in Siberia, reimbursing travel expenses, assigning

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moneys for deportees, for grain deliveries to Siberia, and for office expenses.34 A permanent peculiarity of Siberia was the absence of serfdom, a concession made by the authorities to attract badly needed settlers to this enormous and often inhospitable land. Details of local administration in Siberia are too numerous to be included in this chapter. By and large its differences from prevailing all-Russian administrative practices gradually decreased. First known as the “Siberian kingdom,” another jewel in the Muscovite crown, Siberia was ruled by a voevoda assisted by special clerks from the prikaz and responsible to the latter. During Peter the Great’s gubernia reforms, it was made into a governorship divided into two provinces. After the prikaz disappeared, Siberia was split into more governorships and provinces. Catherine the Great was initially reluctant to intro­ duce her 1775 reform of territorial administration into Siberia, but it was finally implemented by 1782-1783.35 Under the newly established Siberian Committee of the State Council, governor-generals in charge of several governorships were appointed (1822). Unlike regular governors, they were entrusted with military powers over their respective regions, a practical necessity given the state of communication at that time. By the last quarter of the century this was still the situation in eastern Siberia and in the maritime provinces, but no longer in western Siberia, already integrated into a standard Russian administrative system. By the end of the century these last traces of special treatment disappeared as well.

Malorussian Prikaz Already prior to the “reunion” of the Ukraine with Muscovy and in reaction to Polish difficulties with the Cossacks under Polish rule, a special Cossack prikaz was set up in Moscow (1616-1646), a forerunner of the Malorussian prikaz.36 However, the Malorussian (Ukrainian) prikaz failed to develop into a fully fledged central administrative institution empowered to conduct its own affairs over some historical lifespan. Organized sixteen years after the closing of the Cossack prikaz and eight years after Khmelnitsky’s oath of allegiance to Russia, it remained indepen­ dent from other prikazy only from 1662 to 1687. At that time it was subordinated to the Posol’skii (Foreign Affairs) prikaz, a

18 Russian Colonial Expansion

state of affairs that lasted until its demise. In 1708 it was reorganized into a “collegium” and was given administrative, judicial, financial and policy powers over the Ukraine, still remaining under Foreign Affairs supervision. Among other matters, it was also in charge of Russian troops operating in the Ukraine, but Moscow’s administrative hold over the area was somehow alleviated by the fact that Ukrainian hetmans remained elected (albeit not without Russian ’ influence on the election process) and nominally still in charge of local self-government. Between 1709 and 1722, Peter the Great’s centralization drive altered the situation, matching hetmans with Moscow-dispatched namestniks (a Russian version of English viceroys), a direct consequence of Hetman Mazepa’s betrayal of Moscow in favor of Sweden before the famous battle of Poltava. Namestniks were supposed to exercise joint authority with the hetmans in the following fields: maintenance of peace and prevention of treason, supervision of foreign relations, appointment of higher officials, imposition of sentences involving capital punishment, distribution (or withdrawal) of land grants. Such extended powers restricted the hetmans' authority to lesser matters. At provincial levels, Cossack starshinas (elders) were matched by Russian comman­ dants in a similar manner. Finally, by 1722 the namestnik-hetman pattern (a forerunner of today’s first Party secretary native, second secretary Russian) was replaced by appointed hetmans. At Peter’s death the Malorussian collegium was abolished and Ukrainian “freedoms,” including elected hetmans, restored (1727), a state of affairs that lasted under Catherine I and Peter II. However, under Empress Anne, it was decided to return to Peter’s practices and during the 1734 vacancy no new hetman was elected. Empress Elisabeth changed this again in 1747, sub­ ordinating the hetman to the Malorussian collegium of the Senate, the heir of the old prikaz. Under Catherine II, the last of the hetmans was forced to resign and the government of the Ukraine was entrusted to an eight-member commission.37 Then, in 1763, the commission was reformed into the newly created Second Department in charge of “governorships under special statute” (na osobom polozhenii), meaning Ukrainian and Baltic areas with their remnants of local self-government.38 In 1764, the position of hetman was abolished for the last time and all local administrative organs dealing with the Ukraine as a

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unit eliminated by 1765. In 1775 the Cossack Zaporozhie sech’, the territorial base of Cossack autonomy, was abolished and in 1781 the division of the Ukraine into traditional voiska (regi­ ments) was terminated. A year later, regular Russian-style gubernias were introduced and provided with standard Russian administrations. Finally, in 1783 the Russian poll tax was extended into the Ukraine. The Malorussian collegium itself lasted a few years longer, probably to wind up its paperwork, and was finally closed in 1786. In 1793, the year of the second partition of Poland, Russian administrative institutions were introduced into the annexed right-bank Ukraine as well. The right of Ukrainians to be judged in accordance with traditional “Lithuanian codes,” still in force in the middle of the century and more democratic than Russian ones, was eliminated as well. For a short time during the reign of Paul I some elements of Ukrainian self-government, such as elected judges, were briefly revived,39 to be terminated by the end of the century.

Georgian Kingdom The case of Georgia is only marginally within the scope of this chapter, Georgia having never been provided with a separate St. Petersburg-based administration, a practice already obsolete at the time of Georgia’s incorporation into the Empire. Neverthe­ less the tsar, having overcome his “extreme disgust... to accept that kingdom into Russian domain, considering appropriation of alien land unjust”40 (1801), provided Georgia with a special local administration under General Tsitsianov, himself a Georgian, but in Russian service. Thus Georgian “expeditions” replaced the usual Russian departments, and Russian police chiefs were given Georgian adjuncts. This special status lasted until 1840, when regular Russian administration was introduced. But owing to Muslim upheavals in the north calling for closer ties with Christian Georgians, some relief was granted: a Russian namestnik of the Caucasus was appointed (1844) and Georgian nobles were again called to assist the new administration. Simultaneously, a Caucasian Committee of the State Council was established in St. Petersburg (1845-1882). Georgia was just one of several territories placed under its jurisdiction. A special Caucasian army was also created (1859) and the namestnik

20 Russian Colonial Expansion

provided with five departments of his own: general administra­ tion, finances, state property, control, and even diplomacy. But throughout the 1860s and 1870s, with the extinction of the Muslim Shamil revolt, the powers of the namestnik were gradually curtailed, first by withdrawing his diplomatic preroga­ tives, then by introducing the 1874 all-Russian city reform. In 1882 the no longer needed Caucasian committee was disbanded and a year later the system of namestniks was abolished. From that time on, Georgia, with the rest of the Caucasus, was treated like an ordinary Russian province.

Conclusion Russia's constant imperial conflict has been between centralized conformity and the variety and diversity of its ethnically alien outlying areas. In addition, nationalities incorporated into the empire were not viewed on equal terms. Variances and leeways granted to each group reflected such variables as their level of development as perceived by Moscow or St. Petersburg, their numerical importance, and their degree of acquiescence to Russian rule. Ethnic closeness to the Russians often played a negative role in the struggle for special treatment, as was the case with the Ukraine. Until Peter the Great, the primacy of the Crown prevailed over that of the empire, and conquered nations were viewed as more “kingdoms” under the same tsar. With the emergence of the concept of Rossiiskaia imperiia (all-Russian empire) as opposed to Russkaia (Russian), former “kingdoms” were pulled down to provincial levels and their specific administrative setups aligned with those of the rest of the country. This tendency was somehow arrested after Peter’s death, but renewed by Catherine the Great. The trend of diminishing local autonomy for newly acquired lands was repeated with each new nineteenth-century conquest, but this was only on provincial levels, since no St. Petersburg­ based central “colonial” office was ever reestablished.

Notes 1. V.O. Kliuchevskii, Boiarskaia duma drevnei Rusi. 3rd ed. Moscow, 1902, pp. 410ff. 2. N. V. Debol’skii, Istoriiaprikaznogo stroia Moskovskago gosudarstva.

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Posobie po lektsiam . . . (St. Petersburg, 1900-1901), p. 498. 3. V.V. Veliaminov-Zernov, “Izsledovanie o kasimovskikh tsariakh i tsarevichakh,” Trudy vostochnago otdeleniia imperatorskago arkheologicheskago obshchestva, III (St. Petersburg, 1866), p. 486-87. 4. Grigorii Kotoshikhin, O Rossii v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha, 4th ed. (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 27. 5. See M. Rywkin, “Russian Colonial Expansion before Ivan the Dread,” The Russian Review, XXXII, no. 3 (July 1973), p. 293. 6. Veliaminov-Zernov, pp. 275 and 485. 7. Debol’skii, p. 461. 8. At some point a combined Kazan-Nizhnii-Novgorod section existed in Moscow’s Razriad (General Military Administration). 9. Mikhail Grigor’evich Kurdiumov, “Opisanie aktov khraniashchikhsia v arkhivakh imperatorskoi arkheograficheskoi kommissii,” Letopis’ zaniatii imperatorskoi arkheograficheskoi kommissii za 1906 god, vypusk 19, p. 165 (item 50). 10. A. Zimin, “O slozhenii prikaznoi sistemy na Rusi,” Akademiia Nauk, Institut Istorii Doklady i soobshcheniia (Moscow, 1954), vypusk 3, p. 175. In the middle of the sixteenth century there existed, for example, dvortsy of Riazan’, Dmitriev, Tver’, Uglich, as well as the dvortsy of Kazan and Nizhnii-Novgorod. Some of them were probably just sections of the Razriad. 11. 1.1. Verner, O vremeni i prichinakh obrazovaniia moskovskikh prikazov (Moscow, 1907), p. 43. 12. M.M. Boguslavskii, Petr I (Moscow, 1948), p. 278. 13. N.P. Likhachev, Otviet surovomu kritiku, Vozrazheniia na retsenziiu D.V. Korsakova o knigie “Razriadnye diaki XVI vieka” (Moscow, 1890), p. 12. 14. According to LI. Smirnov, Ocherki politicheskoi istorii russkogo gosudarstva 30-50kh gg. XVI veka (Moscow-Leningrad, 1958), pp. 203ff, the newly appointed dvoretskii shared Ivan’s lenient approach toward Kazan Muslims, opposing Prince Kurbskii’s demands for their annihilation. For a different view see J.I. Fennell (ed.) Prince Kurbsky's History of Ivan IV (Cambridge, 1965). 15. This custom, known as mestnichestvo, was formally abolished in 1682, but is known to have survived for years thereafter. 16. S. Porfir’ev, “Spiski voevod i diakov po Kazani i Sviiazhsku, sostavlennye v XVII stoletii,” Izvestiia obshchestva arkheologq, istorii i etnografii, XXVII (Kazan, 1911); pp. 63ff gives a full list of governors of both provinces to the times of Peter the Great. 17. Porfir’ev, “Neskol’ko dannykh o prikaznom upravlenii v Kazani v 1627 g.,” ibid, p. 75ff. 18. Boris Nolde, La formation de ÏEmpire Russe. Etudes, notes et documents, vol. I (Paris, 1962), p. 78. 19. A.A. Vvedenskii. Dom Stroganovykh v XVI-XVII vekakh (Moscow, 1962), pp. 279ff, 288ff. 20. Akademiia Nauk. Arkheograficheskaia ekspeditsiia, IV, 427, act. 289.

22 Russian Colonial Expansion

21. Debol’skii, p. 486. 22. Letopis’ zaniatii imperatorskoi arkheograficheskoi kommissii . . . vypusk 21 (1908-1909), p. 25, cites the case of a poddiachii of the Kungur izba in the 1680s. 23. For detailed sources, see Michael Rywkin, “The prikaz of the Kazan Court: First Russian Colonial Office,” Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. XVIII, N.3. (Sept. 1976), p. 298. 24. A.A. Zimin, Oprichnina Ivana Groznogo (Moscow, 1964), note p. 380. 25. Letopis’ zaniatii imperatorskoi arkheograficheskoi kommissii . . . vypusk 31, p. 217 (31 Aug. 1704); Arkheologicheskaia ekspeditsiia, IV, 209 (12 Sept. 1667) and p. 409 (Aug. 1683); “Diela tainogo prikaza,” Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, XXI (St. Petersburg, 1907), p. 503. 26. Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, XXVII, pp. 92-93. 27. For detailed sources, see Rywkin, “The prikaz of Kazan p. 299. 28. Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, XXI, 996, 1003, 1125, 1146-46. 29. Aleksandr Vitsyn, Kratkii ocherk upravleniia v Rossii ot Petra Velikago do izdaniia obshchego uchrezhdeniia ministerstva (Kazan, 1855), p. 67. 30. N.N. Ogloblin, “Obozrenie stolbtsov i knig Sibirskago prikaza (1592-1768),” in Chteniia v imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete, vol. 173 (1895), p. 7. 31. A. Gradovskii, Vysshaia administratsiia Rossii XV111 st. i generalprokurory (St. Petersburg, 1866), p. 179. 32. Ogloblin, pp. 6-9. 33. Ibid, pp. 21-25, 31-32, 52-54. 34. Ibid, p. 65. 35. Vladimir Grigor’ev. Reforma mestnago upravleniia pri Ekaterine II. Uchrezhdeniia o guberniakh 7 noiabria 1775 g. St. Petersburg, 1910, p. 208. 36. Debol’skii, p. 515. 37. M. Florinski. Russia. A History and an Interpretation (New York, Macmillan, 1955), vol. II, p. 555. 38. BSE, vol. 29(A), p. 514. 39. Gradovskii, p. 14. 40. Ibid, p. 121.

Ill Russian Expansion in the Far North X to mid-XVI Century Janet Martin

ne of the primary directions of Russian (Slav) expansion

O from the beginnings of the Kievan State was the north. For the Russians dwelling in Novgorod as well as in the area that became known as Suzdalia the Far North was a frontier not just in the sense that it constituted a border land, but also in the sense that it was an untamed, harsh, inhospitable region. The land, frozen during the long, cold winters, melted into marshy swamps during the brief summers. Blanketed also by forests, the Far North would have been effectively impenetrable had it not been cut by an extensive river system that provided frozen roadways for sleighs in the winter and waterways for boats in the summer. To the Russians whose settled centers hugged its fringes, this region must have been simultaneously forbidding, awesome, and yet compellingly challenging. Drawn along the north-flowing rivers, the Russians entered the forests and swamps that, while spurning the plow, lured explorers with promises of luxurious fur, abundant supplies of fish, and, at the coast of the White Sea, salt and ivory tusks of walruses. Undeterred by the harsh climate and often hostile natives, the Russians penetrated the Far North. That area, as we shall be considering it, consisted of a broad band stretching from the Swedish frontier to the Ob’ River in western Siberia. In the north it was bounded by the White and Barents Seas, while in the south it bordered and merged with the established principalities of Novgorod and Rostov-Suzdal’. We shall consider the southern border of this region to be the line formed by the Sukhona and Vychegda rivers, which combine roughly in the center of the territory to form the North Dvina River. Other major rivers that flow northward across the Far 23

Russian Expansion in the Far North

25

North are the Onega, located west of the North Dvina, and the Pechora, to the east. A final geographic feature of the region, marking the boundary between the European and Asian continents and forming the divide between the Pechora and Ob’ river basins, is the Ural mountain range. Russian exploration, annexation, and colonization of the Far North was sponsored by a number of different political centers. In this chapter we shall examine the motivations, methods, and consequences of the northern expansion undertaken by Novgorod, on the one hand, and the northeastern principalities (RostovSuzdal’ and its successor, Moscow) on the other. We shall further observe the two distinct, yet overlapping, processes that made up their expansion: exploration and political subjugation followed by colonization. Finally, we shall note how both processes were closely linked to the economic, especially commercial, interests of the sponsoring centers, as well as to their political rivalry for possession of the Far North. The Russians turned northward partially because the North was the most accessible frontier. A succession of powerful neighbors to the south, east,;and west continually formed barriers that were overcome only in the sixteenth century when the Muscovite state conquered the Kazan’ and Sibir’ khanates and thus opened the eastern frontier, and in the seventeenth century when the decline of the Crimean Khanate and the retreat of Poland-Lithuania presented opportunities for expansion in the south and west. Prior to Russian expansion and colonization the Far North was also inhabited. Finnish and Ugrian tribes spanned the region. In the west the Ves’ made their home. To their north dwelt the Em’, Karelians, and the nomadic Saamy or Lapps. East of the North Dvina River dwelt the Pechera, the Perm’ (a name referring to both the population of the Vychegda River, later known as the Komi-Zyriane, and to the population of the upper Kama River, later known as Komi-Permiaki), the lugra (Ostiaki or Khanty), the Voguly (Mansi), and, in the extreme northeast, groups of Samoeds.1 But the entire region was sparsely populated, and although these tribes occasionally won battles waged against the Russians, they were unable to withstand sustained pressure from the militarily and economically superior newcomers who would gain dominance over their lands. The natural resources of the Far North constituted another

26 Russian Colonial Expansion

motivation for the Russian advance in that direction. From some of the earliest recorded information on the Russian lands it is clear that even as the Kievan State was forming, Rus’, Slavs, and Ves’ were exporting northern luxury fur to Bulgar-on-the-Volga and Byzantium.2 The drive to acquire fur and other valuable northern commodities may be considered one of the primary stimulants for the earliest Russian expansion into the Far North.

Expansion into the Far North (Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries)

Novgorodian Expansion It was probably in conjunction with this motive that the territory of the Ves’ was among the first targets of Novgorodian expansion. A close association between the Ves’ and Novgorod is reflected in the legend of the invitation to the Varangians to rule Russia, which appears in the Primary Chronicle. According to the legend, which was inserted into the Chronicle in the 1060s, the Chud’ (a generic name for the Finns of the Far North) were one of the peoples who called upon Riurik to be their prince; Beloozero, the eastern part of the Ves’ homeland, became the capital of the domain of one of Riurik’s brothers.3 From the association implied by the legend it appears that at the time it was added to the Chronicle, the Ves’ and Novgorodians enjoyed a close relationship. Archaeological evidence substantiates this and indicates that as early as the mid-tenth century Slavs from the Novgorod area were settling among the western Ves’. During the tenth and eleventh centuries the Ves’ began to adopt Slav burial customs, and from the eleventh century Slav burial mounds were left on Ves’ territory. Also in the eleventh century Ves’ ceramic pottery began to imitate Slavic forms, as did Ves’ agricultural techniques in the twelfth century.4 The economic stimulus also led Novgorodians to the north and northeast during the eleventh century. Expansion to the north resulted in the engulfment of Novgorod’s northern neighbor, Staraia Ladoga, which had been founded by Finns, possibly the Ves’, by the eighth century, but had become a Rus’ stronghold known as Aldeigtjuborg in the early ninth century.5 With the acquisition of Staraia Ladoga in the mid-eleventh century the entire Far North was opened to Novgorod.6 Using the routes extending from this center, Novgorodians pushed northward and

Russian Expansion in the Far North 27

eastward to the very limits of the European continent. One document, known as Prince Sviatoslav’s charter, reveals the extent and nature of Novgorod’s northern holdings in 1137. In his charter Sviatoslav, then prince of Novgorod, stated the amounts of tithes that outlying districts were to pay St. Sophia, the Novgorodian bishopric. In doing so he necessarily listed the districts then subject to Novgorodian political authority and taxation. The charter shows that by 1137 Novgorod had established administrative centers or pogosts not only in the western Ves’ lands, but throughout a territory that stretched northward beyond Lake Onega, down the River Onega all the way to the White Sea. It extended eastward from that line to the North Dvina River and included lands along the major western tributaries of the Dvina. In addition, Novgorod had gained control over lands beyond the lower Dvina and had established pogosts on its eastern tributary, the Pinega River.7 There is some scholarly dispute concerning the order of the establishment of the pogosts or the main directions of Novgorodian expansion. A.N. Nasonov has asserted that the Novgorodians, once they bad absorbed Staraia Ladoga, con­ tinued to push northward, then advanced to the east, and finally went southeastward. They thus progressed in a huge arc across the Far North that led them to the extreme northeastern section of Europe. From this arc they also branched more directly southward to reach the Sukhona River. An opposing interpreta­ tion has been presented by A.V. Kuza. According to his theory, Novgorod’s primary route of expansion was the more southerly approach toward the North Dvina; that is, across the Ves’ lands to the Sukhona River. Kuza maintained that the town of Vologda, located between Novgorod and the upper Sukhona, played a crucial role in Novgorod’s expansion, and the advances to the north were made somewhat later than Nasonov postulated.8 Regardless of which view one favors, both interpretations lead to the conclusion that by the middle of the twelfth century Novgorod had command of a vast portion of the Far North. In the region from the Sukhona River to the White Sea and extending just beyond the Dvina, it exercised control over the largely non-Russian population through administrative centers or the pogosts. From those centers Novgorod not only collected taxes in fur, but kept open and safe the routes, which were lined by the pogosts, that led through the Far North to the Ural Mountains.

28 Russian Colonial Expansion

Using those routes the Novgorodians had by the early twelfth century reached and established relations with the northeastern tribes. In the Primary Chronicle there is another tale, dated 1069 but probably actually inserted into the Chronicle in 1118,9 that reflects the results of the Novgorodian expeditions to those distant lands. The tale reads:

I wish to recount a story which I heard four years ago, told by Gyuryata Rogovich of Novgorod: I sent my. servant, said he, to the Pechera, a people who pay tribute to Novgorod. When he arrived among them he went among the lugra. The latter are an alien people dwelling in the North with the Samoyedes. The lugra said to my servant, “We have encountered a strange marvel, with which we had not been acquainted until recently. This occurrence took place three years ago. There are certain mountains which slope down to an arm of the sea, and their height reaches to the heavens. Within these mountains are heard great cries and the sound of voices; those within are cutting their way out. In that mountain, a small opening has been pierced through which they converse, but their language is unintelligible. They point, however, at iron objects and make gestures as if to ask for them. If given a knife or an axe, they supply furs in return. The road to these mountains is impassable with precipices, snow and forests. Hence we do not always reach them, and they are also far to the north.10

From this account it is evident that by the early twelfth century the Pechera, a tribe who probably lived on the Pechora River, were already a tributary of Novgorod. The Novgorodians were familiar with and visited, no doubt to trade, the Pechera’s neighbors, the lugra, who then dwelt in an area spanning the Ural Mountains. But the population that actually inhabited the mountains, with whom the western lugra traded for fur, remained shrouded in mystery and legend, perpetuated by the very lugra who acted as intermediaries between them and the Novgorodians. By the end of the century Novgorod was also demanding tribute from the lugra and Perm’ populations. Those prospective tributaries, however, did not always passively accede to Novgorod’s demands. In 1187 the tribute collectors for both were murdered, and in 1193 Novgorod was obliged to mount a major

Russian Expansion in the Far North 29

campaign against the lugra that resulted in the survival of only eighty Novgorodians.11 With the subjugation of these tribes the Novgorodian empire reached its greatest extent. In the early thirteenth century Novgorod possessed a hinterland that reached the White Sea in the north and the Ural Mountains in the east. It ruled the FinnoUgrian population that dwelt as far east as the Pinega River largely through a network of administrative centers; and it controlled those further east through irregular military expedi­ tions. Both methods were designed to ensure the regular collection of tribute, which was paid mainly in fur pelts. Novgorod, however, had not yet completely secured the Far North. The defiance shown to the Novgorodians by the Perm’ and lugra was not the first the Russians had experienced. West of the Dvina various groups had also resisted Novgorodian domina­ tion. The Em’ waged a struggle against Novgorod from the mid­ eleventh into the thirteenth century. Then the Karelians, some of whom at least had earlier been allied with Novgorod against the Em’, became the chief opponents of Novgorodian dominance. Supported by Sweden, which also sought their allegiance and tribute, the Karelians maintained their opposition until the mid­ fourteenth century.12 The general antipathy toward Novgorodian rule is expressed in a widespread northern legend describing the Chud’ response to the Russians: When the Russians appeared in Chud’ territory, the Chud’ dug pits, and entered them with all their possessions. The (roofs of the) pits were covered with earth and stones, which were supported by wooden stakes. To save them­ selves from the Russians, the Chud’ chopped down or set fire to the stakes; the roofs collapsed and buried everything that was under them.13 Nevertheless, by the mid-fourteenth century Novgorod had suppressed overt native opposition to its rule; it had further extended its authority over the Lapps and other inhabitants of the White Sea shores;14 and it is from this time that it may be considered that Novgorod had effectively pacified its possessions in the Far North.

Suzdalian Expansion Native resistance was not, however, the only source of conflict in the Far North. By the mid-twelfth century Rostov-Suzdal’ had

30 Russian Colonial Expansion

begun to demonstrate its interest in the region and develop a rivalry with Novgorod for control over it. It began by annexing Beloozero. Paradoxically, this eastern portion of the Ves’ land was part of the section of the Far North that had been the first to receive Slav colonists from the Novgorod area. Nevertheless, as Rostov in the course of the eleventh century cast off Novgorodian protection and developed into a distinct principality, it incor­ porated the Beloozero region.15 The date of the annexation is another matter of scholarly dispute; some consider that it occurred in the eleventh century, while others place the event in the early twelfth.16 But by the mid-twelfth century, when Novgorod was master of the rest of the Far North, Beloozero, which geographically constituted a wedge between Novgorod and the Sukhona route leading to the northeast, had already slipped beyond its realm. During the twelfth century Rostov-Suzdal’s princes also inter­ fered in Novgorod’s tribute collection in the Far North and provoked military clashes over that issue in 1149 and 1169.17 At the end of the century the prince of Vladimir made another dent in the Novgorodian North by assuming control over the outpost of Gleden, located near the mouth of the lug River, a tributary that enters the Sukhona shortly before the latter merges with the Vychegda to form the North Dvina. Not long afterward and not far away Prince Konstantin of Rostov founded Ustiug, which superseded Gleden and became a major Suzdalian stronghold on the southern border of the Novgorodian North.18 Economically and strategically important, Ustiug both challenged Novgorodian control and protected the Sukhona route that connected Novgorod with both the North Dvina and, via the Vychegda, its northeastern tributaries. By the time the Mongols invaded the Russian principalities Rostov-Suzdal’ had acquired some Far Northern territory. Its possessions were confined to a few centers located along Novgorod’s communication and trade routes. Rostov-Suzdal’ made little attempt at this time to imitate Novgorod or challenge its dominance over the vast remainder of the Far North. But it did develop these strategically located outposts, attracted settlers to them, and laid the foundations for future challenges to Novgorodian communication, transportation, trade and, ulti­ mately, control over the Far North.

Russian Expansion in the Far North 31

External Influences (Thirteenth Century) But during the thirteenth century, which witnessed the Mongolian debacle in the Russian lands, events occurred in other parts of the world that affected Russian commercial interests and the nature and configuration of Russian political control over the Far North. In Europe, German eastward migration culminated in a crusade conducted by Teutonic and Livonian knights that resulted in the conquest of the southern Baltic coast as far east as Livonia (with the exception of some Lithuanian strongholds). In conjunction with this German burghers and merchants estab­ lished themselves in a string of coastal towns that became the basis of the Hanseatic League. Forming almost exclusive commercial ties with Novgorod for its Baltic trade, the Hansa merchants brought to Novgorod the European demand for wax and fur, specifically squirrel fur by the fourteenth century, to which Novgorod geared its commerce. In the south the Mongols, after conquering the Russian lands, settled in the steppe and built their capital Sarai on the lower Volga. Through demands for tribute, initially in the form of fur, and for commercial northern goods, they stimulated a resurgence of northern export to the South, which had been highly developed in earlier periods, but had deteriorated shortly before the Mongol invasion. The Mongols also provided a network for the further distribution of northern products; using the silk route that extended eastward from Sarai to India and China and westward, via Italian merchants who had ensconced themselves on the Crimean peninsula, to Constantinople and southern Europe, they reexported the northern goods they received from the Russians. These developments in intercontinental commerce affected the patterns of expansion and colonization in the Far North. Novgorod’s focus was on the German trade, and its activity in the Far North may be viewed as a response to the increased European demand for northern gray squirrel pelts. Through the twelfth century, Novgorod’s role in the Far North had been characterized by exploration, followed by the establishment of a relatively loose administration that required tribute payments, open trade routes, and peaceful relations from the native population. Russian colonization, particularly as distance from

32 Russian Colonial Expansion

Novgorod proper increased and agricultural land became scarcer, was limited to small settlements that often included churches and trading posts where hunters and merchants clustered around the pogosts or administrative centers.

Colonization and Further Expansion (Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries)

Novgorodian Colonization By the fourteenth century Novgorod, catering to the growing German trade, deemphasized its explorations of distant lands and collection of tribute in sable from far-off tribes; instead, having pacified the northwestern Finnic tribes, it began to colonize the Far North. In the fourteenth century the region extending between Novgorod and the White Sea in the north and the North Dvina River in the east began to receive Russian settlers. By the end of the century the Dvina Land as well as the districts between it and Novgorod proper contained numerous villages and a sizable, diversified Russian population. Novgorodian colonization of the Far North assumed a variety of forms. In some cases peasants settled and formed their own independent communities, subject only to Novgorodian taxation and justice. In other instances boyars, monasteries, and other large-scale landowners held title to the land, which they rented to peasant residents or settled with their slaves. The relative prominence among these forms of land tenure in the northern districts was in a state of flux throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The few documents dated from the fourteenth century illustrate the variety of forms of land tenure that already existed at that time; they also reflect the tension that existed among the rival landowners and that was resolved by the administration of Novgorodian justice. One of the earliest documents (1315-1322) recording the presence of large-scale estates in the Far North involves a settlement over land rights. The parties to the agreement were Vasily Matveev, the estate-owner, and both the native tribal leaders of the region and small-scale settlers who had preceded Vasily into the district.19 Another settlement, reached in 1375, similarly reflects a quarrel between a Novgorodian boyar, Grigorii Semenovich, and the residents of several surrounding pogosts over the extent of their northern

Russian Expansion in the Far North 33

property. The agreement defined the borders of Grigorii’s estate and bound his neighbors to stay off his land.20 In yet another document, dated in the first quarter of the fifteenth century, Oksentii Grigor’evich sued a peasant community of the lower Dvina region in a dispute over land that the peasants had purchased for a church. The court obliged the peasants to pay a specified sum to Oksentii and assigned the property to the church in perpetuity.21 From the mid-fourteenth century monasteries were rapidly multiplying throughout the Novgorodian Far North, and by the fifteenth century they were substantially increasing their land­ holdings. The main sources of their acquisitions were the properties of boyars and peasants, which the monasteries secured through purchases, gifts, inheritances and foreclosures on mort­ gage loans. The Solovetskii monastery, although founded rela­ tively late with the receipt of its first grant of several islands in the White Sea in the 1460s, became the beneficiary of numerous gifts of land from Novgorodian boyars, many of whom had colonized their estates in the fourteenth century, and also became one of the most prominent;landowners of the Far North.22 By the late fifteenth century, just before Novgorod’s territory was absorbed by Moscow, boyars and monasteries appear to have dominated the Novgorodian Far North, with the exception of the lower Dvina region, where peasant communities predominated. Unlike similar establishments elsewhere in the Russian prin­ cipalities, the Novgorodian northern estates and peasant com­ munities (with few exceptions located in unusual pockets of fertile land) produced little grain. The main additional com­ modities produced were fish and squirrel fur. The peasants paid rent to their boyar landlords and taxes to the Novgorodian government, correspondingly, in rye, oats, fish, and largely in squirrel fur. (Data on monastery rents are insufficient for us to determine whether collections made in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had a similar content. Information based on late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century data but reflecting earlier practices suggests, however, that the monasteries spurned squirrel pelts and preferred to collect their rents in cash and luxury fur.)23 Novgorodian colonization of the western portion of the Far North thus resulted in the creation of a regular supply of squirrel fur for the Baltic market. Novgorodian colonization also affected

34 Russian Colonial Expansion

the native Finnic population. In the early fourteenth century that population was still sizable. But as a consequence of Russian colonization it was progressively converted to Christianity and assimilated, or evicted. When Vasily Matveev made his land settlement, he paid twenty thousand squirrel pelts and ten roubles to the five main native tribes that still dwelt in the Vaga district, the area of one of the major western tributaries of the North Dvina, where he carved out his huge estate. By the second half of the fifteenth century Russian colonists had pushed the natives far to the north, and documents of the 1460s show the five Karelian tribes located around parcels of land being transferred to the Solovetskii monastery, much further north than they had dwelt one hundred fifty years earlier.24 Furthermore, although earlier attempts to impose Christianity on them may have been among the causes of the Em’ and Karelian hostility toward Novgorod, those who remained on their former lands accepted the Russian religion and gradually were assimilated by the Russian population.25 Novgorodian colonization in the Far North from the fourteenth century was probably a response to the economic potential of German commerce and was geared toward supplying the Novgorod market with northern gray squirrel. The colonists, some associated with boyars or ecclesiastical institutions, were primarily peasants, craftsmen, and slaves. They settled in territory previously pacified by Novgorod; that is, in the section of the Far North most accessible to Novgorod, located west of and including the North Dvina River. This area was capable of providing the required squirrel pelts as well as ample supplies of fish, some grain, and a variety of other forest products. By exploiting these resources this portion of the Far North became in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries an important hinterland for Novgorod, supplying the goods that were sold abroad and that brought great wealth to the city. With its focus primarily on the squirrel-producing, pacified lands west of the North Dvina, Novgorod’s interest in the eastern half of the Far North (that section that extended from the North Dvina across the Ural Mountains) waned. But the northeastern Russian principalities, responding to developments of the thir­ teenth century that had created a demand for luxury fur in the southern markets, displayed increasingly greater interest in that territory, its population, and its resources.

Russian Expansion in the Far North

35

The Muscovite Challenge and Victory Already in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries the northeastern principalities had secured control over several strategic points on the southern border of the Far North. During the thirteenth century, while most of the Russian principalities suffered the economic effects of the Mongol invasion, those northern outposts prospered. By the end of the century they had become thriving communities. In 1286, when the Rostov principality had divided between its two princes, care was taken to divide the northern possessions equally. So Prince Konstantin became the ruler of Ustiug along with the principal town of Rostov, while his brother Dmitry acquired Beloozero and Uglich. Ustiug’s growing importance was further signified by the facts that Prince Konstantin made it his capital for a brief period and that in 1290, on the occasion of the completion of a new church, the Bishop of Rostov personally made a journey to Ustiug for the consecration and honored the town and the local authorities by delivering gifts for the church from the Rostov princes.26 Beloozero similarly developed during the thirteenth century. Especially under the rule of its Prince Gleb Vasil’kovich (1237-1278), travel conditions through the principality were improved. Among his achievements was the foundation of several monasteries, including Spasokamennyi, which served merchants and others traveling across Lake Kubenskoe as a way­ station on the route to the Sukhona River. He also ordered the construction of “canals” that provided shorter and more direct channels for river boats than the natural but lengthy and convoluted paths of the rivers flowing through his lands.27 But it was not until the fourteenth century that the north­ eastern principalities began to extend their influence and promote colonization beyond those centers. Then the efforts to gain control of the Far North, particularly the luxury fur-producing northeastern territories, were spearheaded by Moscow, whose princes were, at the same time, gaining the favor of the Golden Horde khans and supervising the flow of tribute and commercial products to Sarai. Early evidence of northeastern Russian interest in the Far North refers to arrangements with Novgorod for hunters from the northeast to exploit the resources of the region.28 But following a dispute between Moscow, on the one hand, and Novgorod and

36 Russian Colonial Expansion

Ustiug, on the other, in 1333 the latter two ceded Vychegda and Pechera, the territories ndttheast of Ustiug, to Prince Ivan of Moscow. This was the first recorded instance of Muscovite territorial expansion into the Far North. Then, in 1364, Prince Dmitry of Moscow, insinuating himself in the midst of a quarrel between two princes of Rostov, claimed both Ustiug and that town’s possessions in Perm’. Three years later, after a quarrel with Novgorod, Prince Dmitry claimed possession of the Pechora, Mezen’, and Kegrola, all regions located between the North Dvina and the Ural Mountains. In addition, the Perm’ population of the Vychegda region transferred its allegiance from Novgorod to Moscow. At about the same time Dmitry gave the Pechera in a grant to one Andrei Friazin.29 Because the reports of most of these land transfers appear in only one, very late chronicle redaction and Novgorod continued to claim suzerainty over these regions and their populations in its treaties with Moscow until well into the fifteenth century,30 the extent of the transferred territory and the permanency or otherwise of the transfers in the fourteenth century remain uncertain. The initiative that resulted in permanent Muscovite possession of Perm’ was launched in the last decades of the fourteenth century, not by the Muscovite prince but by a monk. In 1379 that representative of the Muscovite Church who became known as Stefan Permsky left Ustiug to convert the Perm’ population of the Vychegda River region. In 1383 he was appointed the first bishop of a newly created bishopric of Perm’.31 The formation of the bishopric effectively placed the population of the VychegdaVym’ area under the bishop’s authority and indirectly under the rule of the Muscovite grand prince. Extensive land grants were assigned by the prince to the bishopric for its maintenance; proceeds from the lands were to be supplemented by customs duties paid by merchants and hunters who frequented the Perm’ land.32 The local natives were obliged to pay tribute, largely in sable pelts, to the Muscovite prince.33 The transfer of Perm’ from the relatively benign Novgorodian dominance to Muscovite rule did not occur without resistance. The Novgorod archbishop protested the creation of a new see in territory under his jurisdiction and sponsored military raids in Perm’. But Stefan, supported militarily by Ustiug forces, suppressed the raids; he also went to Novgorod and there arrived at a peaceful settlement with the archbishop, as well as the civil officials.34

Russian Expansion in the Far North

37

More serious, sustained, and violent resistance was mounted by the natives of the area themselves. Led by their religious leaders, who clung to their pagan gods, significant numbers of Perm’ rejected Christianity and refused to accept the rule of the new bishop and the Muscovite prince. When their repeated attacks on the bishop and his converts were repulsed, again by Ustiug forces, this element of the Perm’, as well as their Voguly and lugra (Ostiaki) allies, fled across the Urals toward the Ob’ River.35 Muscovite expansion into the northeast thus assumed a different character from the Novgorodian precedent. The latter in this part of the Far North had been limited to an exercise of authority sufficient only to collect tribute payments. Muscovite rule in Perm’, however, meant for the local population not only tribute payments, possibly at a higher rate than before, but enforced religious conversion, acceptance of the bishop’s direct rule, and, by the fifteenth century, military service in the Muscovite armies.36 In contrast to the success and relative ease with which Moscow annexed the Vychegda Perjn’, its other efforts to expand into the Far North at the end of the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries resulted in sharp resistance and failure. These efforts were directed towards Novgorod’s province, the North Dvina Land. In 1397 Grand Prince Vasily I appealed to the Dvina population to forswear its allegiance to Novgorod and recognize his suzerainty. When the Dvinians accepted, he issued a charter to the Dvina Land while his agents began to collect taxes in his name and assume administrative control over the area. Novgorod responded by gathering an army, attacking Beloozero and Ustiug, and retaking the Dvina Land. Vasily tried twice more, in 1401 and 1417, to seize the Dvina Land from Novgorod. On both occasions Novgorod swiftly raised its armies and successfully defended this vitally important hinterland.37 During this period, however, the Muscovite grand princes and the northeastern Russian appanage princes were, by far less dramatic means, acquiring lands in Novgorod’s Far North. As early as 1315-1322 the princes of Rostov possessed territory bordering the estate of Vasily Matveev. In the course of the fourteenth century a number of Rostov, laroslavl’, Beloozero, and other appanage princes pushed ever further northward and took over lands on the North Dvina’s western tributaries as they continually divided their territories among themselves and

38 Russian Colonial Expansion

pressed to enlarge their dwindling principàlities. By the early fifteenth century their lands cut a channel across Novgorod’s northern territory, stretching from Beloozero in the southwest to the North Dvina River in the northeast.38 By the end of the century the Muscovite grand prince himself was a landed proprietor with an estate bordering those of several Novgorodian monasteries in the area around Lake Onega.39 With the transfer of political rule colonists from northeastern Russia also began to populate the Far North. Novgorodian boyars attempted to curb these encroachments upon their territories. During the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries they repurchased some of the lands or forcibly seized them and evicted their new owners.40 Nevertheless, as the appanage princes became subordinate to the Muscovite grand prince, their northern lands fell increasingly under Muscovite authority, and according to the Treaty of lazhelbitsy, which marked a major defeat of Novgorod by Moscow in 1456, Novgorod boyars were obliged to cede the territories they had acquired from the northeastern princes to Moscow.41 From this time Moscow made steady and sizable gains of Far North territory at Novgorod’s expense. By 1462 Novgorod had also ceded to Moscow all its holdings on the Upper Pinega, the Mezen’ and other eastern tributary rivers of the North Dvina. Although these had been primarily peasant lands, the Novgorodian boyars (as they had done earlier in the case of the northeastern Russian possessions west of the Dvina) raided and repossessed them. Their motive may have been, once again, associated with Novgorod’s Baltic commerce; changing fashions in western Europe had created in the fifteenth century a demand for sable and other luxury fur that the Novgorodians’ estates in the western part of the Far North could not satisfy. Despite its efforts to regain control of the areas further east, in 1471, after another military defeat, Novgorod was obliged to waive all rights to the Pinega and Mezen’ and neighboring territories. In addition, by this time the Muscovite grand prince had already come into possession of vast tracts of land along the White Sea shore, stretching from the mouth of the Onega across the mouth of the Dvina to the mouth of the Mezen’; he also held lands on the shores of the Dvina River.42 With the final defeat of Novgorod by Moscow in 1478 all of the Novgorodian Far North fell into Muscovite hands.

Russian Expansion in the Far North

39

Muscovite Expansion into Northwest Siberia Moscow’s interest in the Far North differed from that of Novgorod. Once the grand prince controlled Novgorod’s terri­ tories and confiscated the Novgorodian boyars’ estates, he converted the rents and taxes from payments in squirrel fur to cash and grain. Moscow’s need for fur in the latter decades of the fifteenth century was for luxury pelts that were sold to the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire (which replaced Sarai as the main southern fur markets) and also to Europe. To satisfy this need Moscow embarked upon the last stage of Russian expansion that we shall consider in this chapter—the extension of Muscovite authority over the tribes dwelling as far to the northeast as the Ob’ River. This phase of Muscovite expansion was accomplished by means of a series of military campaigns. The first target was Perm’ Velikaia, located on the upper Kama River north of Kazan. In 1462 Muscovite armies attacked this population and in the following year the bishop of Perm’ converted them. Ten years later another campaign was mounted to reassert Muscovite control in the area, which was more tightly established when Ivan III took the local prince prisoner and then confirmed him as prince over his own people. In 1505 Moscow replaced the native rulers in Perm’ Velikaia with appointed governors.43 Moscow also conducted campaigns against the Voguly and the lugra tribes, which a century before had allied with the Vychegda Perm’ against Bishop Stefan and had been forced to flee across the Ural Mountains. In 1465 Moscow mounted an attack on the lugra. The native princes who were taken captive recognized the grand prince’s suzerainty, agreed to pay tribute, and were returned as his official governors to their former posts. Subse­ quent campaigns in 1483-1485 and 1499 subdued other segments of the Voguly and lugra tribes.44 By the beginning of the sixteenth century Moscow had subordinated all the northeastern tribes from the North Dvina to the Ob’; these tribes recognized the grand prince as their suzerain, accepted his right to appoint their local rulers, sent contingents to his army, and paid tribute in sable to his treasury. Moscow did not, however, colonize the northeast. Although the colonists from the northeastern Russian principalities had joined Novgorodians in the western portion of the Far North, in

40 Russian Colonial Expansion

the eastern section (with the exception of Ust’vym, the seat of the Perm’ bishopric, and the Pustozersk fortress, which had been built during the 1499 campaign) they founded few Russian settlements before the second half of the sixteenth century. It was only at that time, when English merchants arrived at Arkhangel’sk and Siberia was made accessible by the conquest of Kazan’, that the Russians began to make active use of the avenues across this region and establish some settlements along them. The major colonizing activities that continued to take place before that time occurred within the western half of the Far North. Population figures for a portion of that region suggest that residents were abandoning districts that had been closely integrated into Novgorod’s obsolete fur supply network in favor of other northern locales more suitable for agriculture, salt production, and other developing industries.45 These commercial and indus­ trial shifts laid the bases for new patterns of colonization within the Far North that were to be followed after the mid-sixteenth century and lie beyond the scope of this discussion.

Summary In summary it may be concluded that by the sixteenth century Russia had expanded to include the Far North. This achievement had been stimulated to a large degree by the commercial interests of the Russian principalities, which, responding to somewhat varying foreign demands for northern goods, advanced into the Far North, subordinated the native tribes, and colonized portions of the region. The process by which this was accomplished took several centuries and was undertaken in several stages. It was initiated by the Russians (Slavs) of the Novgorod area. Between the tenth and twelfth centuries they brought the entire Far North to the Ural Mountains under their political domination. The range of their dominion shrank by the fourteenth century, but within its remaining realm Novgorod firmly pacified hostile Finnic tribes and encouraged Russian colonization. From the twelfth century Novgorod encountered a rival in the Far North, the northeastern Russian princes. Although their early ventures were confined to the establishment of strongholds on the southern border of the region, they later assumed dominance over the northeastern tribes in which Novgorod’s interest had waned and they also gradually encroached upon Novgorod’s western terri-

Russian Expansion in the Far North 41

tory, until the Muscovite grand prince Anally annexed Novgorod’s entire northern empire and subordinated all the northeastern tribes to the Ob’ River.

Notes 1. L.V. Danilova, Ocherki po istorii zemlevladeniia i khoziaistva v Novgorodskoi zemle v XIV-XV vv. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1955), p. 204; S.A. Tokarev, Etnografiia narodov SSSR (Moscow: Moskovskii universitet, 1958), pp. 129, 135, 141, 472; N.P: Barsov, Ocherki russkoi istoricheskoi geografii (Warsaw: n.p., 1855), p. 58; Narody Evropeiskoi chasti SSSR, 2 vols., ed. by V.A. Aleksandrov and V.N. Belitser (Moscow: Nailka, 1964) 2: 330, 365, 378, 401. 2. E.g. Puteshestvie Ibn Fadlana na Volgu, ed. and trans, by I.In. Krachkovskii (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1939), p. 74; D.A. Khvol’son, Izvestiia o khozarakh, burtasakh, bolgarakh, madiarakh, slavianakh i russakh Abu-ali Akhmeda ben Omar IbnDasta (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1869), pp. 23, 35; and Ibn al-Fakih in the portion of his text published by A.P. Novosel’tsev, “Vostochnye istochniki o vostochnykh slavianakh i Rusi VI-IX w,” Drevnerusskoe gosudarstvo i ego mezhdunarodnoe znachenie (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), p. 385. 3. D.S. Likhachev, Russkie letopisi i ikh kuïturno-istoriches koe znachenie (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1947; reprint ed., The Hague: Europe Printing, 1966), pp. 92-3; L.A. Golubeva, Ves* i Slaviane na Belom ozere X-XIII vv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), p. 17; V.V. Pimenov, Vepsy. Ocherk etnicheskoi istorii i genezis kuitury (Moscow and Leningrad: Nauka, 1965), p. 52. 4. A.V. Kuza, “Novgorodskaia zemlia,” Drevnerusskie kniazhestva X-XIII vv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 146-9; Pimenov, pp. 58, 74; Golubeva, pp. 21-9; idem, “Arkheologicheskie pamiatniki Vesi na Belom ozere,” Sovetskaia arkheologiia (1962): 66-8, 72. 5. Kuza, p. 152; Gwyn Jones, A History of the Vikings (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 250. 6. A.N. Nasonov, “Russkaia zemlia” i obrazovanie territorii drevnerusskogo gosudarstva (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1951), pp. 73, 79-80. 7. Pamiatniki russkogo prava, 8 vols. (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1953) 2: 116-23. 8. Nasonov, pp. 93ff.; Kuza, pp. 190-2. 9. Likhachev, pp. 177-8. 10. Samuel H. Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzer, trans, and ed., The Russian Primary Chronicle, Laurentian Text (Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of America, 1953), p. 184. 11. Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei, 35 vols. (St. Petersburg— Moscow—Leningrad: Arkheograficheskaia kommissiia. Vostochnaia literatura, Nauka, 1864-1980) 4: 174 (PSRL), Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis* starshego i mtadshego izvodov (Moscow and

42 Russian Colonial Expansion

12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26.

Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1950; reprint ed., The Hague and Paris: Europe Printing, 1969), pp. 40-1 (NPL). NPL, pp. 205, 212-13, 215, 230, 270, 307, 319, 323, 325, 328, 335, 348-9; S.F. Platonov and A.I. Andreev, “Novgorodskaia kolonizatsiia severa,” Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii severa, 2 vols. (Petrograd: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1922), 1:33. V.P. Shliapin, “Iz istorii zaseleniia nashego kraia,” Zapiski severodvinskogo obshchestva izucheniia mestnogo kraia 5 (1928): 30. Danilova, p. 205; V.K. Kuzakov, Ocherki razvitiia estestvennonauchnykh i tekhnicheskikh predstavlenii na Rusi v X-XVII vv. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), p. 228; Narody evropeiskoi chasti, 2: 330, 378. On Novgorodian protectorate over Rostov area, see Nasonov, p. 175; Golubeva, Ves’ i Slaviane, p. 7. Nasonov, p. 178; T.I. Os’minskii, Ocherki po istorii nashego kraia (Vologda: Vologodskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1960), pp. 32-34. NPL, pp. 215, 221. NPL, pp. 222-4; Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod, ed. by K.N. Serbina (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1950), p. 44; “Vychegodskovymskaia letopis’,” in “Dokumenty po istorii Komi,” ed. by P. Doronin, Istoriko-filologicheskii sbomik Komi filíala AN SSSR 4 (1958): 257. Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova, ed. by S.N. Valk (Moscow and Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1949), no. 279 (GVNP); Platonov and Andreev, p. 34. GVNP, no. 284. GVNP, no. 138. S.F. Platonov, Proshloe russkogo severa (Berlin: Obelisk, 1924), reprint ed., The Hague: Europe Printing, 1966), pp. 45-6; Platonov and Andreev, pp. 28, 33; A.A. Savich, Solovetskaia votchina: XV-XVII v. (Perm’: Obshchestvo istoricheskikh filosofskikh i sotsial’nykh nauk pri Permskom gosudarstvennom universitete, 1927), p. 4; idem, “Monastyrskoe zemlevladenie na russkom severe XIV-XV11 vv.,” Uchenye zapiski Permskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta (1931): 161. On the Solovetskii landholdings, see GVNP, nos. 96, 219, 222-3, 298-301. For examples of other monasteries’ land acquisitions, see GVNP, nos. 123-6, 143, 148, 152-3, 155, 157-8, 160-1, 165-76, 224-5, 233-4, 237-9, 243-4. On St. Sophia’s holdings in the Far North, see NPL, p. 391; GVNP, no. 217, and L.A. Zarubin, “Viazhskaia zemlia v XIV-XV w.”, Istoriia SSSR, No. 1 (1970): 184. The data are taken from Pistsovye knigi olonezhskoi piatiny 1496 i 1563 gg. (PKOP), ed. by M.N. Pokrovskii (Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1930) and “Platezhnye knigi,” located in TsGADA, f. 137 (Boiarskie i gorodovye knigi), Klin., No. 2. GVNP, nos. 279, 298, 301-4; Platonov and Andreev, p. 33. NPL, p. 270; Platonov and Andreev, p. 33. Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod, p. 49; A.O. Ekzempliarskii, Velikie i

Russian Expansion in the Far North 43

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45.

udel’nye kniazia severnoi Rusi v Tatarskii period, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg: LI. Tolstoi, 1889-91; reprint ed., The Hague: Europe Printing, 1966) 2: 26, 28. “Opisanie Spasokamennago, chto na Kubenskom ozere, monastyria,” Pribavleniia k vologodskim eparkhial’nym vedomostiam, 1 January 1871,1 April 1871; A. Kopanev, Istoriia zemlevladeniia Belozerskogo kraia XV-XVI v. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1951), p. 20; Os’minskii, p. 43. GVNP, nos. 83, 85; Platonov, pp. 25, 32-33. “Vychegodsko-vymskaia letopis’,” pp. 257-8; Ekzempliarskii 2:36-42; GVNP, no. 87. GVNP, no. 19. “Vychegodsko-vymskaia letopis’,” p. 259. M. Mikhailov, “Ust’vym”, Vologodskie gubernskie vedomosti (1850): 53. Mikhailov, pp. 64, 72; Doronin, pp. 243-7. “Vychegodsko-vymskaia letopis’,” p. 260; Mikhailov, p. 53. “Vychegodsko-vymskaia letopis*,” pp. 258-60; Mikhailov, pp. 41, 43, 62; Tokarev, p. 482. Mikhailov, pp. 12-13, 64; PSRL 26: 276-7, 291; “Vychegodskovymskaia letopis’,” pp. 262, 264. NPL, pp. 392, 396-7, 407-8; GVNP, no. 88. GVNP, no. 279; Platonov, pp. 34-6; idem, “Nizovskaia kolonizatsiia na severe”, Ocherki po ' istorii kolonizatsii severa, pp. 49-50; Platonov and Andreev, p. 35; S.V. Rozhdestvenskii, “Dvinskie boiare i dvinskoe khoziaistvo XIV-XVI vekov”, Izvestiia AN SSSR, Otdelenie gumanitamykh nauk, series 7 (1929): 52; Zarubin, pp. 182-3, 185; Akty sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi istorii severovostochnoi Rusi, 3 vols. (Moscow: AN SSSR, Nauka, 1952-64) 3: 32-3 (ASEI). GVNP, no. 285. ASEI 3: 32-3; GVNP, nos. 110-111; Zarubin, p. 185. GVNP, no. 23; Platonov, Proshloe, p. 41; idem, “Nizovskaia kolonizatsiia,” p. 50. ASEI 3: 30-4; Platonov and Andreev, p. 36; A.L. Shapiro, ed., Agrarnaia istoriia severo-zapada Rossii, 3 vols. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1971-8) 1: 279-80. Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod, pp. 85, 102; “Vychegodsko-vymskaia letopis’,” pp. 262, 264. Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod, pp. 86, 94, 100; “Vychegodsko-vymskaia letopis’,” pp. 263-4; PSRL 26: 275-7, 290-1 ; PSRL 12: 249-50. This conclusion is based on figures taken from PKOP.

IV Muscovy’s Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 The Conquest of the Volga: Prelude to Empire Henry R. Huttenbach

I uscovy’s triumphant annexation and subsequent absorption

M of the Volga valley and its restless inhabitants in the middle of the sixteenth century were pivotal events in the history of the entire Eurasian continent, having far-reaching consequences well beyond those felt directly in the region. The impact of Muscovy’s military victories and territorial gains had immediate repercus­ sions in the leading capitals throughout Europe and Asia. In grafting onto itself this geopolitically significant river network with its fertile adjacent lands, Muscovy transformed itself into a major power ready to challenge such large political entities as the dual kingdom of Poland-Lithuania to the west and the far-flung Ottoman Empire on its southwestern flank. What had seemed to the Catholic and Muslim rulers in Krakow and in the Porte a distant and relatively unimportant Orthodox power, now, with these unexpected acquisitions of the strategic khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, appeared as a viable rival, even as Muscovy was poised to plunge eastward into the vast reaches of the continental ocean that is Siberia. For centuries, the Volga had been a frontier separating the sedentary societies that grew up west of the river from the shifting nomadic peoples who roamed the expanse to the east. Again and again, from the earliest times of recorded history, nomadic hordes would sweep across the Volga and disrupt the agricultural life that had taken root north of the Black Sea. Even in the early formative stages of Kievan Rus’, its Varangian princes recognized that security along the Dnieper meant control 45

46 Russian Colonial Expansion

of the Volga basin. It was no grandiose scheme that spurred Svyatoslav to conquer the Bulgars on the middle Volga and the Khazars on the mouth of the river; on the contrary, his daring campaigns during the 960s were explicitly designed to close the door to the marauding nomads, to the Pechenegs and to the Polovtsy, the former already dominant along the Black Sea littoral and the latter poised to cross the Don River and to further destabilize the steppe lands. As subsequent history bore out, a primary reason for the fall of Kievan Rus’ was the failure of Svyatoslav’s successors to consolidate his empire between the Dnieper and Volga rivers. Because they lost their grip on the Volga, the fatal flood of nomads continued to spill across until the entire region fell under the sway of the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenth century. Historical memory ran deep in the Orthodox Christian East Slavs: recollections of their former glory along the Dnieper echoed in their poetry and prayers. Their chronicles were reverently copied but imaginatively adorned to give emphasis to heroic days before the onset of the humiliation at the hands of the heathen-turned-Muslim. They are replete with recollections of military victories and conquests, as well as dreams of eventual redemption from the onus of occupation and a recapture of the lands that had once been under Slavic and Christian domination. Generations of clerical scribes couched the past in Biblical imagery, portraying the people of Kievan Rus’ with their princes, and those that fell heir to them, as a chosen people destined for ultimate triumph. The years of Mongol tutelage were seen as an interim similar to the exile suffered by the Children of Israel during their exile in Babylon. A deep faith stirred all the élite of the northern principalities that a miraculous time would come when they too would emerge from political darkness and rebuild their destiny between the Dnieper and the Volga. Thus, as political circumstances altered radically during the sixteenth century, and the fortunes of the cluster of Orthodox principalities on the upper Volga showed steady improvement vis-à-vis their Mongol overlords, historical consciousness surfaced again and again to provide Russian princes, especially those of Muscovy, with a motif for political action. The reconquest of the Volga was infinitely more than what it seemed to the observer—the capture of a river route to the Caspian Sea or a foot into the rich forests and steppes to the east: to Muscovy it was nothing less than a

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 47

crusade, a divinely condoned vindication of its historic heritage and a just defeat of those who had usurped its presence along the entire stretch of the river. In order to appreciate the drama (for so it was in the minds of contemporaries) of the struggle for possession of the vital Volga valley—with its prelude, climax and dénouement—one must not only grasp it in its more mundane terms, but also in the emotional fervor of the times. Just as the battle for mastery of the Atlantic Ocean captured the imaginations of western Europeans, so did the contest for control over the strategic riverway give rise to epic visions of a new historic future. The stakes were high; for, as all the antagonists were acutely aware, the fate of the Eurasian landmass lay in the balance. Not only was the heir to the Mongol Empire in question but whether Christianity or Islam would dominate the central landmass of the globe, and, thereby, profoundly change the power balance between two universalist rival cultures for the hearts and minds of man.

II Muscovy’s successes in the Volga valley came in the wake of a complex evolution of political relations with the region to which, originally, all the Russian principalities had been subservient since the imposition of Mongol control in the middle of the thirteenth century. At the outset, Mongol administration estab­ lished a western unit of power based in the city of Saray on the lower Volga; Saray, in turn, was assigned administrative responsibility over the Slavic territories to the northwest, an imperial subregion known as an ulus. It was to Saray that Russian princes had to travel in order to receive the coveted iarlyk granting them the privilege to collect taxes for the khan; and it was from Saray that khans sent forth punitive expeditions into Russian lands whenever the princes failed to acknowledge the overlordship of the khan, military campaigns that tested the true balance of power between the steppeland of the lower and middle Volga and the forest region of the upper Volga. In order to avoid depicting Tsar Ivan IV’s triumph as a unique event, it is necessary to place it in the context of two hundred years of complex power shifts that made possible the revolutionary transition to Muscovy’s overlordship over the Volga domain of

48 Russian Colonial Expansion

the khans, the once invincible territory of the Golden Horde. A psychological and symbolic turning point during the twocentury-long era of Mongol domination took place on 8 September 1380, when Prince Dmitry of the then small principality of Muscovy, in alliance with a handful of other Russian princes, inflicted a surprise defeat upon Khan Mamay’s army, sent to reassert the Mongol authority that he claimed to represent.1 The Russian victory in 1380, coming in the wake of a previous military success—the battle at the Vozha River in 1378—aroused enormous enthusiasm among the Christian Orthodox forces, who interpreted the victory as an event of religious significance. Whereas the battle of 1378 had been seen in purely secular and local terms, namely, as just another incident in the chronic competition between Russian princes and one or another Mongol faction in the respective juggling for political advantage, the 1380 campaign had received the blessing of both Metropolitan Kiprian, the administrative senior official, and Abbot Sergei, the head of the prestigious Holy Trinity Monastery, the spiritual center of Russian Orthodoxy. The latter had sent along with Prince Dmitry two of his monks to give the campaign all the qualities of a crusade, superimposing on the political purpose a religious cause. With the victory, therefore, both prince and Church could claim that divine purpose had been served and that they had read recent human events correctly as providential signs that the misfortunes of the subjugated Christians were about to change. The Velikaia Zamiatna (the Great Confusion) plaguing the Mongol Empire since the assassination of Khan Berdibeg in 1359 had become a signal for Russian national revival and religious independence from a conqueror whose recent turn to Islam had fundamentally altered the morality of Orthodox Russian subservience to Mongol authority. The call to rally around a single prince, making political unity a religious imperative, was a consequence of internal developments in the northeastern Russian principalities, in the middle of which was located the city of Moscow. As a result of its geographic position, Moscow became one of the major Russian cities, soon rivaling the traditional capital, Vladimir, and its princes chal­ lenged those of Tver for primacy, a political duel that repeatedly took them to Saray to argue their case before the khan for possession of the yarlik. One of the more astute Muscovite

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 49

princes to exploit the position of chief tax farmer for the Mongols and thereby enrich his fiefdom was Prince Ivan Kalita (1325-1341). Shortly after his accession, Moscow’s prestige was further enhanced by Metropolitan Peter’s decision in 1326 to transfer his see to Moscow, immediately making the city the religious center of Orthodoxy. No less significant was the building in 1367 of a stone wall around the heart of Moscow, a construction that reflected its wealth and provided it with practically invulnerable defenses against an enemy lacking artillery. Subsequent attacks on the city never penetrated the Kremlin, thereby denying the invaders ultimate political victory, despite the destruction they wreaked on the population and its properties. Hie wealth of Moscow’s princes, the presence of the metro­ politanate, the safety of the city, all combined to account for the rise of Muscovy as a formidable nucleus of power, a fact lost neither to other Russian princes nor to the rival successors of Khan Berdibeg, who tried to play off one against the other, especially those of Tver and Moscow. While the various khans continued to favor one or another in the hopes of keeping political conditions among their Russian satellites off-balance, the real political equation showed itself in 1375 when the military predominance of Muscovy forced a reluctant admission from all the princes that the ruler of Muscovy was indeed a primus inter pares, no matter what the disputing khans dictated. A major force behind this open expression of unity, however tentatively acknowledged, was the Russian Church. In the previous decades, the Church had undergone both a cultural revival as well as a change of heart with respect to its political strategy of survival. Since the early part of the century, religious pioneers had pushed into the wilderness and established monastic centers which brought Christianity to the forest inhabitants. At the same time, the Church produced a spate of religious personalities who, on the one hand, looked with enthusiasm upon this expansion of the faith, yet, on the other, harbored increasing concern over the potential dangers of having to tolerate the dictates of a Muslim overlord. Whereas originally, since the middle of the thirteenth century, the Church had counseled caution, discouraging imprudent acts of defiance against the Mongols, calculating that its survival had precedence over political or secular interests, a century later it began to see

50 Russian Colonial Expansion

the advantages of placing itself under the protection of a single Orthodox monarch backed by the cooperation of the other Russian princes. The rise of Muscovite power, the seeming declining ability of the Golden Horde to exercise the bidding of the Great Khan, and the ominous rise of Islam as the major cultural force among the Tatars combined to motivate the Orthodox Church to preach a policy of national unity around the prince of Muscovy against what it depicted as the forces of evil. The most eloquent voice in favor of this new approach to further the Christian faith was that of Abbot Sergey Radonezhsky, to whom Prince Dmitry had gone for his blessing before the battle of Kulikovo in 1380. For his victory, Dmitry was rewarded with the honorific soubriquet Donskoy, in memory of the momentous battle on the banks of the River Don. More important, Dmitry won for himself a permanent place in the ranks of those Russian princes who were revered as saints for their immortal deeds.2 In the fertile medieval Russian imagination, Dmitry ranked alongside Grand Prince Saint Vladimir (who in the tenth century had brought Christianity to the eastern Slavs) and Alexander Nevsky (who in the thirteenth century had successfully fought off the Swedes); in this context, Dmitry Donskoy was equal to Prince Igor, who in 1185 had saved Kievan Rus’ from the Polovtsy Horde. For years, the ringing verses of the twelfth-century epic The Song of Igor had counteracted the tragic and defeatist verses of the thirteenth-century Slovo o pogibeli zemli russkoi (Elegy to the Ruin of the Russian Land), which sadly commemorated the defeat of the Russians at the hands of the Mongol Horde. Through the years, the calamity had weighed heavily on the Russian psyche till the victory at Kulikovo, a hundred and twenty years later, opened up new vistas of hope and self-esteem, a selfrespect preached by the Church and now made tangible by the triumph of arms. As a testament to the quickened Russian sense of rejuvenation, an unknown poet wrote the resounding verses of the Zadonshchina, a hymn of joy for Russian heroism and an impassioned panegyric to the church militant. Though it would take another century to achieve permanent freedom from the Mongol yoke, the spirit of the Zadonshchina would never again flag despite several severe setbacks in the war against the powers on the Volga. Expectations of their permanent decline, as it turned out, were

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 51

premature. The routing of Mamay’s forces did not strike at the heart of Tataro-Mongol power. Revival came in the form of Khan Timur, who emerged out of Central Asia as the true heir of such personalities as Chingis-Khan, the founder of the Mongol Empire a century earlier. Timur, or Tamerlane, was a master at intrigue and extended his power westward via Tokhtamysh, a general he had won over from the camp of a rival khan. Tokhtamysh steadily moved his army closer to the Volga, forcing Mamay either to declare his loyalty or to pick up the gauntlet and fight for his claim of the Volga region ruled from Saray. In preparation, Mamay sought to tame the Russians and force them to join forces with him, especially the armies of Muscovy. Having failed to assert his supremacy in 1380, Mamay had to face Tokhtamysh alone, losing to him the following year. Whereupon Tokhtamysh lost no time in declaring war on the Russian princes and invading their territories in 1382, inflicting a terrible defeat that left Moscow in flames and the remaining principalities cowed and fragmented.3 With that, Tokhtamysh restored the primacy of the Golden Horde but regranted the yarlik to Prince Dmitry, a generous gesture that, in the long run, proved fatal, for it accelerated the recovery and eventual primacy of Muscovy as a center of power that would in the end permanently overcome the rule of the Golden Horde. Once again the pendulum swung back, this time favoring Muscovy, as political decline broke the Golden Horde asunder. Not surprisingly, tensions developed between Tokhtamysh, now khan of the Golden Horde, and his sponsor the Great Khan Timur in Central Asia. For the next ten years the two waged a bloody war, depleting their wealth and sapping their strength; by the time Timur managed a definitive defeat of Tokhtamysh in 1395, the future of the empire was predictable. At best, it was a pyrrhic victory: in order to restore his authority over the Golden Horde, Timur literally had put the region to the torch before he could extract compliance from its local rulers. It so exhausted Timur’s military capacity that he was unable to mount one more campaign against the Russians, who had shown ambiguous loyalty to Tokhtamysh even after his break with Timur. Timur returned home to Central Asia to recoup but then focused his attention on India till his death, leaving Central Asia, the crossroads of the trans-Eurasian trade, in chaos. The repercus­ sions of the disruption of trade considerably weakened the once

52 Russian Colonial Expansion

affluent Golden Horde, which depended on the caravan routes passing through Saray. The overall economic decline, matched by continuous internal strife (which included the failure of Tokhtamysh to return to power), quickly led to political fragmentation, despite the emergence of a powerful personality in Khan Edigey (Idigu), a former associate of Tokhtamysh. In order to compensate for the loss of revenue, Khan Edigey raised taxes, prompting after his death in 1414 a series of secessions that proved to be irreversible. The breakup of the Golden Horde came about, in part owing to Edigey’s failure to assert his military superiority over the Russian principalities in 1408, a clear sign of the shifting balance of power. In the 1420s the Nogay Horde announced its independence and began to trade directly without Saray’s acting as entrepot. In 1438 the Khanate of Kazan followed suite,4 and in 1449 Khan Geray of the Crimea did likewise with the express hope of ultimately reconstituting the Golden Horde from the Black Sea peninsula, where a lively international trade helped fill his coffers. Without losing much time, Khan Geray began to interfere in the internal politics of Kazan, where he competed with Muscovite agents for control of the khanate. His efforts, however, were thwarted by two factors: his inability to tame the lower Volga, where an independent pirate-khanate based in Astrakhan preyed on all the shipping through the delta channels; and the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the Osmanli (Ottoman) Turks. The latter quickly imposed their hegemony on the entire Black Sea littoral, ultimately forcing the Edigey dynasty to become a vassal state of the new Muslim empire on the Bosporus in 1475.5 Soon thereafter, in large measure because of the political orientation of the Porte, the Crimean Khanate redirected its military power against Poland rather than against its steadily growing neighbor to the north, the Grand Principality of Muscovy. In acting as an extension of Ottoman foreign policy, the Crimea dissipated its energies and forfeited its last opportunity realistically to challenge Muscovy for control of the steppe and of the Volga valley. By the time the Crimea resumed its hostilities against Muscovy in the early sixteenth century (again partially prompted by the sultan), it was too late. There was no viable political unit to reconstitute the Golden Horde other than Muscovy. The rise of Muscovy as a major regional power paralleled the decline and disintegration of the Golden Horde. As the latter

Muscovy’s Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 53

broke apart, the former experienced greater territorial unification and political centralization. While Kazan remained as the only real threat from the east, from the moment of its separation from the Golden Horde its real hold over Muscovy was more circumstantial and theoretical than in actual fact. Were it not for the drawn-out civil war in Muscovy during the 1440s, the real power balance would have emerged far earlier than towards the close of Vasily Il’s reign. After setting up a buffer vassal state under a Kazan prince, the Khanate of Kasimov, in 1453,6 Grand Prince Vasily prepared a major campaign to ward off a counterattack from Kazan in 1459. The outcome was so much in Muscovy’s favor that in 1461 Kazan sued for peace and agreed to pay annual tribute as a sign of its vassalage to the Christian power on the upper Volga. The ascendency of Muscovy continued in the following reign with even greater intensity. Ivan III (1462-1505) managed to bring virtually all the northeastern Russian principalities under Moscow’s jurisdiction, thereby thoroughly transforming the entire political configuration of the region both to the west and east of Muscovy. The gathering of the Russian lands and the uniting of the Orthodox people automatically elevated Muscovy above its two hostile neighbors, Catholic Lithuania and Muslim Kazan. In 1478, Ivan III completed the absorption of the Republic of Novgorod, whose fur empire reached as far as the mouth of the Ob’ River in western Siberia. In 1485, the Grand Principality of Tver finally submitted to its old rival Muscovy after years of flirtation with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In 1489, the lands of Viatka— strategically situated north of Kazan—at long last bowed to Ivan after a major show of force7 that resulted in their complete annexation, a punitive action taken in part for their refusal to honor the 1459 agreement of vassal status.8 Then, in his last year, in 1503, Ivan integrated half of Ryazan (a principality located on the frontier between the forest zone and the open steppe). With each acquisition, Ivan’s Muscovy altered the fundamental power relationship with his neighbors. His triumph over Lithuania, a story apart from this chapter, had its positive consequences in his dealings with Kazan, for it deprived the khanate of its principal ally. Ivan’s primary interest in Kazan was assurance that Muscovy’s trade with Persia along the Volga would not be interrupted, a concern that would be minimal as long as Crimean influence

54 Russian Colonial Expansion

could be kept out of the khanate’s internal politics. The buffer khanate of Kasimov attracted more and more deserters from Kazan, thereby lessening the danger of an attack and serving as a springboard for Muscovite intervention.9 Though Ivan failed to conquer Kazan in the late 1460s, he did manage to extract from the khanate a declaration of vassalage. More important, as a result of his successful negotiation with the Crimean khanate,10 Ivan completely isolated Kazan. His two-month siege of the city in 1487 allowed Ivan to impose his own candidate, Khan Mohammed-Amin. Part of the political arrangement was that all correspondence between Kazan and the Crimea be sent via Moscow. These dual successes, the neutralization of Kazan and the diversion of the Crimea, encouraged Ivan to take the final step of Muscovy’s full emancipation from the east, namely the renuncia­ tion of any form of tutelage. Whereupon in 1476, Ivan publicly terminated tribute payments to the khan of the Golden Horde, an act of humiliation long a source of grievance.11 Khan Ahmed, however, had to delay his punitive campaign until he had assembled allies to launch a viable military force. Both the fouryear delay and his search for a coparticipant were symptomatic of his chronic weakness.13 Though the khan’s preparation caused considerable anxiety in Muscovy, the 1480 expedition sent by Ahmed proved an utter fiasco: the Lithuanians failed to arrive in time, and his own army had to withdraw without engaging the enemy.14 After all the bravura made by Ahmed of being heir to the great khans of former times, his campaign was little more than the theatrical saber-rattling of an impotent splinter group roaming the steppes, a nomadic element no match to the superior state established in the forest zone. His failure quickened the imagination of the entire population of Muscovy as it sensed the opening of a new historic era. The Church counted thousands of converts from Islam as they turned towards Muscovy as the wave of the future; more and more Muslims from Kazan accepted Christianity and many entered the highest ranks of the Muscovite court. At the same time, adventurous peasants moved into the steppeland, out of Muscovy proper and into the rich fertile zone to the southeast, penetrating further and further along the Don watershed. With them they brought not only their pioneering free spirit but a tenacious loyalty to Christianity that transformed them into an

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 55

increasingly potent demographic and military wedge in the midst of the Muslim-dominated steppe. For the Russian Orthodox Church, this promise of greater dominion was nothing less than a divine corroboration of Muscovite eschatology, an optimistic historical perspective that had substituted Muscovy as the political center of orthodox Christianity for the defunct Byzantine Empire. Even before the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Russian Church hierarchy had claimed the right to elect its own metropolitan, breaking from a tradition that granted the right of selection to the Patriarch of Constantinople. The 1448 election by the Church Synod of Bishop Iona of Ryazan came in response to Byzantium’s eleventh-hour alliance with the Papacy in Rome in return for military assistance against the Ottoman Turks, who stood before the Orthodox capital. For the Russians, this affiliation with the Catholic world, especially in the light of the dogmatic decisions taken at the Council of Florence (1438-1443),15 was tantamount to heresy, a betrayal of the true faith, a permanent loss of the right to represent Orthodoxy. In their eyes, this act of infidelity justified Moscow’s claim, after 1453, to being the rightful heir of Byzantium as the spiritual custodian of Orthodoxy. Thus was bom the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, an ideological stance that matured during the reign of Ivan III, less as a concrete goal of foreign policy than as a statement of principle outlining Muscovy’s self-assessment on the stage of history in a time when religious identity was synonymous with political identity. The encroachment into Muslim territory, the winning of Muslim souls and the claim to the imperium that once had been that of the khans, all were expressions of Orthodox Muscovy’s coming of age as the world around it lost its virility. According to its polemicists, among them the stem Iosif Sanin, abbot of the highly influential monastic community of Volokolamsk, the primary function of the secular power was simultaneously to guard the integrity of faith from heresy as well as to extend the range of the Church by expanding the frontiers of the state. The symbolic victory over the remnant of the Golden Horde in 1480 was seen as a divine signal to Muscovy that its march eastward against Kazan was in the context of a just war. The dramatic victories of the Turks, first of the Seljuks and then of the Osmanlis, against both Orthodox and Roman Christian powers, stood as evidence of Muscovy’s lone legitimacy

56 Russian Colonial Expansion

against Islam. The pieceipeal fall of Byzantium, the bulwark of Christianity against Muslim advances—Macedonia in 1371, Bulgaria in 1393, and lastly Constantinople in 1453, not to mention the onslaughts against Poland-Lithuania and the control of the Mediterranean in the latter half of the fifteenth century—all these pointed to Muscovy as the last Orthodox Christian state confronting a new Muslim empire on the Bosporus, replacing the Mongol-Tatar entity that had once dominated the lands east and west of the Volga. The survival of Christianity, in the eyes of Muscovy’s strategists, lay in large measure in wresting control of the Volga valley from the hands of the petty-Muslim khans from Kazan to Astrakhan. The interests of the Grand Prince and of the Metropolitan of Muscovy coincided in their eagerness to gain access to a region rich in souls and rich in resources. Though outright conquest was still out of the question, Ivan Ill’s Muscovy managed to manipulate the politics of the Volga region in the manner that the Golden Horde had once practiced, especially in the latter half of his reign. Seeing Ivan’s suzerainty over Kazan assured, others fell in line: in 1490, an embassy from the Nogay Horde called for an alliance against what remained of the Golden Horde.16 That same year, an envoy from one of the distant Central Asian khanates also paid respects to Ivan.17 Two years later, a mission from Christian Georgia hailed Ivan as the protector of all Christians against the danger of Islam.18 While his grip on the East was constantly undermined by intrigue from within Kazan and conspiracy fostered from without, the essential power relation and its steady evolution in favor of Muscovy remained undisturbed. It was just a question of whether Muscovy was content to remain an external power and play an indirect role in bringing the Volga valley under its aegis or if it would finally decide on direct administration through occupation and annexa­ tion. Though Ivan could have annexed the Kazan Khanate as early as 1487, he decided against it in order not to undermine his relations with the Crimea. The bloody anti-Muscovite revolt in Kazan in 1505, the year of Ivan’s death, and the ensuing massacre of Muscovite merchants may have forced the foreign policy planners to rethink their strategy. During the reign of his successor, Vasily III (1505-1533), the policy of the former reign—the orchestration of Kazan’s politics from afar and a treaty of neutrality with the Crimea—became

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 57

obsolete. The Golden Horde disappeared completely, entirely replaced by the weak Khanate of Astrakhan, which no longer posed a threat to the Crimea. The destruction of the Nogay Horde in 1502 by the Crimea removed its primary rival for control of the southern steppe and terminated the need for an alliance with Muscovy. Instead the Crimea slowly shifted its stance vis-à-vis Lithuania, which eventually led to an arrange­ ment freeing the Crimea to attack Muscovy and to contemplate extending its rule over the remaining Volga khanates. The 1521 attack on Muscovy by Khan Mohammed Girey ushered in a new chapter of confrontation, necessitating a revised policy on the part of Muscovy to safeguard its southern frontier and to protect its eastern flank. The possibility of a pro-Crimea party seizing control of Kazan and the unreliability of Astrakhan as a buffer against Crimean expansion dictated a new approach to the rulers of Muscovy as soon as circumstances permitted. Through the eyes of the Church and its Third Rome orientation, the safety of the Christian kingdom demanded a more aggressive policy, if necessary one of expansion beyond the traditional patrimonial lands. While the Church dictated no specifics, it harbored the same anxieties as the secular authorities when it came to the possible encirclement by heretical powers increasingly politically unified. The joining of the Volga khanates to the Crimea as part of the Ottoman Empire had to be averted at all costs, a goal that was conceived in the last years of Vasily Ill’s reign but, for a number of reasons (among them his death and the ascension of the three-year-old Ivan), had to be delayed.19 Nevertheless, ideology (religious imperatives) and considerations of state (practical calculations) soon overlapped to become virtually mutual complements. While the line of fortifications erected south of Moscow proved sufficient to blunt major attacks from the Crimea, radical measures were called for with respect to Kazan. Even though the years of Ivan’s youth were marred by internecine palace intrigue for control of the Regency, none of the factions disagreed on the urgency of having to intervene in Kazan and to establish some kind of direct Muscovite rule. Despite the shifts from one faction to another between the years 1533 and 1547 military discipline held. A number of raids from the south were successfully repulsed, including a long campaign by Khan Sagib Girey in 1541.20 A purely defensive stance against Kazan, however,

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proved ineffective as the anti-Muscovités in league with Crimean agents gained the upper hand. Throughout the 1540s more and more attacks from Kazan drained off tens of thousands of Russians into captivity, an intolerable loss of manpower. Two campaigns, one in 1547 and a second in 1549, were mounted to force Kazan into compliance and extract a pro-Muscovite policy from it whether it was ruled by sympathizers or not.21 Great expense and time went into the preparations of these expeditions, largely the results of the initiative of Metropolitan Makary. Makary, a staunch disciple of Iosif Sanin, had managed to bring order to the chaos around Ivan. As his first item on the agenda he had Ivan crowned as tsar in 1547 as an open declaration of the autocracy desired by the Church. Next, Makary promoted the campaigns to the east, placing them into the able hands of new advisers he had brought into the court. Though the military might mustered was sufficient to defeat Kazan, the plans came to naught, victims of feudal bickering among the nobility about the appropriate military ranking each one considered his due. Once again, in 1551, after a series of reforms, including the 1549 abolition of mestnichestvo (the system of ranking according to family status,22) a third campaign took shape,23 only this time, very careful preparations preceded the actual attack, including the timing of the battles, a series of diplomatic overtures, and the recruiting of foreign siege experts. Frontline Muscovite fortifica­ tions convinced local tribes to switch their allegiances to Muscovy, their loyalty assured by promises of tax exemptions. A last-minute flurry of diplomatic negotiation fell through under the weight of non-negotiable Muscovite conditions: the return of captives, territorial annexation, and acceptance of a pro-Muscovite khan, conditions calculated, no doubt, to be too onerous to honor, thereby providing a convenient casus belli for the Muscovites, who for some time now had looked to total domination as the only solution to the Kazan problem. Since the collapse of the negotiated formula of 1551 was predicted, all the preparations for war remained in place. As soon as the weather permitted, an attack on the city of Kazan began in the summer of 1552. A combination of the brilliant use of sappers and the application of artillery accounted for a Muscovite victory, which immediately set in motion a series of steps to incorporate Kazan and its territories into the Muscovite system. This, in fact, meant a revolutionary change for the entire

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 59

khanate; for the Muscovites realized that nothing short of an entire revamping of the society and its culture would guarantee its permanent and complete subordination to the authorities in Moscow. The day Tsar Ivan rode into the conquered city, Adashev, his senior adviser, counseled him that the only way to consolidate the victory was to introduce to Kazan a policy of unabashed Russification. Metropolitan Makary must have thought the same.

m The victory of 2 October 1552 unleashed an explosion of joy in Moscow. The young tsar was welcomed as hero and saint. For the populace, the defeat of Kazan provided an opportunity to give expression to an abundance of pent-up national pride and hope for prosperity: what Ivan III had achieved in 1480 had now been crowned by the 1552 triumph of his grandson; having attained seniority, Ivan IV promised to carry on his grandfather’s great tradition of nation building and seemed to possess the ability to overcome the centrifugal forces that had brought Muscovy to the verge of civil war during his youth. The divisiveness of the era of boyar rule, the so-called “Nepravda,” seemed over, thanks to the young tsar. The birth of an heir, less than a month after the conquest of Kazan, guaranteed the continuity of the House of Rurik. Little wonder that Ivan emerged as u hero. No less was he regarded a saint according to Muscovite tradition for his success in leading a Christian crusade against a Muslim state. For the Church, his accomplishment was seen as a pious act of obedience to the preachings of Metropolitan Makary, who, like Abbot Sergey of Radonezh, shortly before the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380, had also preached war in terms of its religious obligation and significance. For the metropolitan, the attack upon Kazan was to be an invasion to eradicate Islam and to make room for Christianity, to complete the work of centuries of patient waiting and preparation. The militant church of Muscovy and the expansionist state were fused in a common mission of historic importance. The work of integrating Kazan began immediately.24 The day after the tsar’s victory march into the city, a solemn but jubilant event took place, the dedication of the ground upon which a splendid cathedral would arise. In the company of senior clergy

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who had traveled with Ivan to Kazan, the young tsar watched as holy water was sprinkled on the former site of a mosque. Where once an Islamic edifice had dominated the proud city, a multidomed Christian architectural monument would serve as a permanent reminder of the supremacy of that religion. Through­ out the city and in its immediate surroundings, plots and large tracts of land were seized to make room for churches and monasteries. Within a decade, monastic communities extended along the banks of the river network of the former khanate, linking with those of Viatka to the north and Kasimov to the west. The thousands of freed Russian captives provided congre­ gations and labor for the religious communities, though their ranks quickly swelled with waves of converts. Nothing was more persuasive to prompt a change of faith than military power, especially in an age which believed that armies were the extension of God’s will. The well-publicized conversion of many high-ranking nobles from Kazan did no harm: these included the last khan, Yadigar, whom Metropolitan Makary personally baptized as Simeon, and Ivan promoted to one of his senior military commanders. Even as the Church engineered its revolution of Kazan, so did the secular authorities impose their stamp on the former khanate. Taking advantage of the huge expanses of land in comparison to the more densely populated Muscovite heartland, the occupying forces allocated generous grants of estates to those who served in the campaign and chose to remain in the new territory. In return for continued military service, thousands of lower-ranking men received land grants that, until the recent conquest, would have been impossible for the land-hungry state to allocate. The majority of the men recruited for the 1552 campaign were demobilized and chose to return home, but many lower-ranking gentry, the sluzhilye liudy, recognized the opportunity of selfaggrandizement and remained in a setting where they would enjoy greater status and advancement as against the more frozen social circumstances prevailing in Muscovy with its attendant conservatism. The lure of the frontier, not the wild frontier of the steppe that drew the likes of Cossacks but the frontier of annexed territories within the borders of the state, offering at once social mobility as well as security—this was the dynamics that propelled the process of Muscovite takeover. In the city of Kazan, Ivan left a military force to supervise the

Muscovy’s Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 61

first stage of the transformation of the conquered region from a Muslim khanate to a Christian province of Muscovy. In charge of the Muscovite forces was the senior voevoda (general) Prince Alexander Gorbaty. In the garrison Ivan stationed in Kazan were one thousand five hundred died boiarskie, military servitors from impoverished gentry who profited from the land grants offered them as bait to keep them on a permanent basis in the new territories. They acted too in the capacity of administrators. Besides them, Gorbaty had three thousand streltsy (musketeers), whose primary function was to guard the city walls in the event of an assault from the several Finno-Turkic tribes in the surrounding countryside. To pacify the hinterland and to project the power of the new rulers of Kazan beyond the city walls, Prince Gorbaty had a few units of mounted Cossacks at his disposal, cavalry forces that regularly patrolled past nomadic tribes giving visibility to the power of the victorious tsar. One other initial step was taken to establish the Muscovite presence. Until 1552, Muscovite trade along the Volga had depended on the goodwill of Kazan. Merchants from Muscovy had had only temporary residence permits and were subject to expulsion whenever the political wind shifted. Their wares could be seized at any time and compensation was unlikely. Now, among the reconstruction plans of the city, there was to be a special merchants’ quarter where Muscovite businessmen could set up permanent quarters and enjoy the undisturbed use of the marketplaces. As for Muscovite shipping, the annexation of Kazan removed one major obstacle along the Volga: fluctuating taxes and tolls for the privilege of sailing through the territories of the khanate. Since the city lay somewhat removed from the Volga itself, special fortifications were erected along the water­ way to protect shipping from marauders, piracy having become a major scourge of trade once the Golden Horde had disintegrated. However, a Pax Muscovitica would not come easily to replace the long-eroded Pax Mongólica. Shortly after the defeat of Kazan, several Tatar murzy (princes) from Kazan who managed to escape the city and join the tribes beyond it began to plan a counterattack by sowing dissent among the nomadic peoples. By the winter of 1552-53, Muscovite spies learned of impending revolts, and in the spring full-scale rebellion broke out on the east bank of the Volga. Rumors from Moscow suggesting that Ivan lacked support for investing more resources into Kazan

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encouraged the anti-Muscovite forces to evict the Christian conquerors.25 With a victory of their own they hoped to restore the status quo that had prevailed between Muscovy and Kazan. News of Ivan’s illness in March and of his impending death further fueled their hopes that an internal political crisis in Moscow might work in their favor.26 Besides, the death of his infant son Dmitry brought on the possibility of a long dynastic crisis that would cripple Muscovite foreign policy.27 But Ivan did not die and recovered to resume Muscovy’s thrust into the Volga, whose tranquility had become a sine qua non for all subsequent Muscovite economic and military plans. Securing the Volga for its own sake rested on economic consideration, trade with the East: to reach the markets of Persia, India and even China depended on a riverine highway either to the transcontinental caravans that headed eastward from the lower Volga or on access to the Caspian Sea in order to link up with the caravans in northern Persia. The promise of even greater trade as a consequence of Muscovite control of the river fortuitously presented itself in the summer of 1553 when English merchants accidentally found themselves in Moscow, after suffering a shipwreck off the White Sea coast. There they learned of the geopolitical advantage of a Muscovy in possession of the Volga and immediately began negotiations for transit rights for Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Central Asian commerce via Muscovy. In order to reap these unexpected benefits (which for Ivan included a vital relationship with a European power, an opportunity to break through the isolation of Muscovy imposed by the Catholic powers in eastern Europe), Muscovy recognized the need not only to stamp out rebellion around Kazan but to complete the process of subjugation all the way to the mouth of the Volga. Thus, in its quest for domination of the riverway, Muscovy became an actor in that greater global drama—the search for trade routes to the Far East—which had the Atlantic Ocean as its major stage. The Volga campaign of 1552 and the forthcoming one of 1554 had a second reason: as a precondition for attacking either Lithuania or the Crimea. While Muscovy’s foreign policy architects were divided on the priorities of these two goals, they were of one mind with respect to the securing of the eastern front as the basis for any aggressive move either southward or westward since both the Crimea and Lithuania could exploit an

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 63

independent Kazan as an ally to open a second front against Muscovy. News of the defeat of Kazan had created great concern, especially in the Crimea, where the khan lost no time in sending help to the rebels in order to frustrate Muscovy’s ambitions. Once in possession of the entire Volga, Muscovy would automatically reduce the Crimea to a permanent secondrate power, and assure its subordinate status to the Ottoman Turks, a condition the khanate hoped to terminate as soon as it had gained control of the entire steppelands stretching from the borders of Poland to the plains inhabited by the remnants of the Nogays along the River Yaik. To thwart this scheme, Muscovy had to follow up on its victory in Kazan with an invasion of Astrakhan. Otherwise, the Crimea could always hold hostage Muscovy’s future foreign policy ambitions. Using the rebellion of the Cheremis and Votiaks as an excuse to go back to war, Ivan ordered an army capable of going well beyond the goal of pacifying the tribes. The campaign was clearly a pretext to go further than the territories of these tribes, whose combined strength was really only a nuisance factor. Without external aid they could not possibly recapture Kazan, which Muscovy defended with cannons and muskets. The rebels quickly dispersed before the superior Muscovite troops; these included large contingents of Kazan Tatars, many of them recent converts eager to prove their loyalty to the tsar. Opposition crumbled and the armies marched on towards Astrakhan, which fell in the summer of 1554 with barely any resistance.28 The victory was almost anticlimactic and seemed to have caused little domestic response, almost as if it were a commonplace event. Yet it accelerated the rate of cultural reconstruction that had begun in 1552. As early as 1553, a stream of Russian peasants in search for more land entered the western parts of Kazan, a process of spontaneous colonization that the authorities did not discourage. Whereas the exodus of peasants to the Don valley meant a loss of manpower and revenue from taxes, the population shift into Kazan was seen as a definite advantage, not least as an equalizer in the still predominantly Muslim region. Besides, they provided instant agricultural labor for the new monastic communities and, overall, lent support to the crash program of Christianizing the entire region. About the time Astrakhan fell, the metropolitan decided to

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make Kazan a separate administrative unit of the Muscovite Church. A special sobor (Church council) was convened where, in the presence of the tsar, the Church hierarchy expressed its agreement that Kazan become an eparkhia (archdiocese) whose jurisdiction would include the wide expanse of the lands of Viatka. The assembled bishops and abbots elected Abbot Guri from Tver to be the first archbishop of the see of Kazan. With considerable pomp and ceremony, Gùri was inaugurated on 3 February 1555. To help the sickly but saintly Guri, the sobor chose a monk, Varsonofi, to accompany him, rewarding the latter with the leadership of the new Monastery of the Transfiguration in Kazan. While the archbishop’s staff handled matters of finance and Church policy in general, the abbot and his monks took on the formidable task of missionary work. Together they received instructions that amounted to making Kazan a springboard for Orthodox Christianity. No expense was spared to keep up the momentum of Christianization. Metro­ politan Makary enjoined all his diocese and monasteries to contribute funds and grain to back up the Kazan mission, a request that amounted to a special tax. Tsar Ivan reserved a tenth of the revenues collected by the state in Kazan for the Church in the newly established eparkhia and added to his munificence large grants of land. Not surprisingly, of all the archdiocese in the Muscovite empire, that of Kazan soon became the wealthiest and most important. (A half century later, it was one of the largest contributors in the campaign of national liberation in 1612 to evict the Poles from Moscow.) The appointment of Prince Piotr Ivanovich Shuisky as voevoda of Kazan in May 1555 brought a highly competent man to complement the work of the Church. In no other region of the Muscovite empire did Church and state work more in tandem and in harmony than in Kazan. Their cooperation needs to be seen in the light of official injunctions to both men made separately by both Tsar Ivan and Metropolitan Makary that the new voevoda and archbishop “take care of their affairs jointly.” To mark the occasion of Kazan as a regional Christian capital, the richly ornamented cathedral, the Pokrovskii Sobor, was formally dedicated on 1 October, three short years after the capture of the khanate. The nine-chapel structure and its golden cupolas was completed in 1557 and could be seen from miles away, a monument to Muscovy’s victory and eastward orientation.

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 65

In the wake of the invasion of Astrakhan came a flurry of diplomatic activity emanating from the steppe. The rise of the Muscovite imperium supplementing that of the khans persuaded many petty rulers to pay obeisance to the tsar. For reasons not too clear, Khan Yadigar of Sibir praised Ivan for his victory and hoped the tsar would accept him as his vassal. Princes as far as the Caucasus asked for the tsar’s protection from both the sultan and from one another.30 Evidently, Muscovy’s military triumphs along the Volga had created a new power balance throughout the Caspian region and in west Siberia. Its irreversibility seemed indisputable, especially through the eyes of the minor khans, who had to risk their political future on being able to guess which of the great powers would endure and with whom to throw their lot. Judging from their spontaneous turn to Moscow, they shared a consensus about its continued success. What had been a relatively minor military engagement, the invasion of Astrakhan, had, in fact, major political implications which entered into the calculations of the peoples in these areas. The invasion had taken place under the camouflage of an intervention to secure the throne of Astrakhan for a pro­ Muscovite candidate. For some time, the politics of Astrakhan had been subject to meddling by both the Nogays to the east and the Crimeans to the west. By 1553, a segment of the Nogays and the khan of the Crimea supported an anti-Muscovite candidate. Had they succeeded, Muscovy’s victory over Kazan would have been seriously compromised. Moscow had no choice but to back up its support for Khan Dervish Ali with a show of force that had to be more than symbolic but sufficient to ward off any Crimean military challenge. Once Muscovy had its puppet firmly established in Astrakhan, it realized that it must keep a permanent military presence there to assure itself of his loyalty and to prevent his déposai. The mouth of the Volga was a prize Muscovy was not about to abandon voluntarily without a fight. A year later, in 1555, the Crimea, backed by Turkish troops sent by the sultan, mounted a counterattack on Astrakhan, but to no avail. Russian troops repulsed the invaders and started the rapid fortification of Astrakhan by garrisoning a permanent force of streltsy there. The half-anticipated defection of Dervish Ali in the midst of the struggle led the Muscovites to the only logical solution to the Astrakhan problem, namely, to take full control of it without

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attempting to keep up the fiction of local autonomy. Faced with the possibility of severe retribution, the population of Astrakhan swore its loyalty to Ivan, hoping they would not be punished for Dervish Ali’s treachery. In his stead, they received not another khan drawn from their midst but a Muscovite voevoda as the tsar’s viceroy; in 1556 Muscovy formally annexed Astrakhan and placed the entire Volga River under its direct control, extending the same program of cultural reconstrúction to the lower Volga as it had adopted in Kazan. To secure the internal tranquility of the conquered regions, the Muscovites hit upon a shrewd plan to neutralize the potential troublemakers who might contemplate renewed rebellion. In preparation for the Livonian War, large contingents of Tatar warriors were attached to the Muscovite army assembled in the northwest. When Ivan launched his campaign for an outlet to the Baltic Sea, he had fighting for him cavalry from the nomadic peoples of the middle and lower Volga. With the best troops siphoned off no plot would get off the ground. In their place heavily armed Slavic soldiers, whose loyalty was beyond question, were stationed in the new territories. It had not taken Muscovy long to apply the ancient imperial principle of divide et impera, a policy whereby a multiethnic domain with the danger of succumbing to centrifugal forces can be transformed into a cohesive body politic with all the diverse parts working at the behest of the central authority. The successful transfusion of Christianity into the peoples of the Volga and the rapid imposition of Muscovite governmental institutions made possible the smooth annexation of Kazan and Astrakhan. What the Mongols had failed to do, namely, to acculturate their Russian subjects by weaning them away from Christianity, the Muscovites managed in a few decades, liiere is little evidence of real resistance to conversion; the Russian clergy did not come with cross in one hand and sword in the other. They were experienced at bringing their faith to non-Christians and they arrived in Kazan and Astrakhan with the assurance of ones bearing a superior culture. The artistic renaissance of Orthodox Muscovy that came to its apogee during the reign of Ivan IV expressed this self-confidence in visible form, from the peaks of a majestic stone cathedral to the delicate miniatures bordering a small wooden icon. The extent of the integration of the length of the Volga can best be measured by its early history till the death of Tsar Ivan in 1584. Its defense depended considerably on the

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 67

cooperation of the local populations. Provocateurs operated among them, constantly trying to destabilize Muscovite rule. Spies of the sultan and friends of Tatar nobles in exile sought to stir up resentments that would prove useful when a counterattack came from out of the Crimea, but no serious rebellion broke out. Muscovite control of the Volga split the Muslim world in the steppelands, and Muscovite influence into Caucasia via the Kabardian tribes threatened to obstruct the Ottoman Empire’s war against the Persian Empire, an epic struggle between the Sunni and Shiite factions of Islam. With the Muscovites able to project their power across the mountains, the war of the reuniflcation of Islam seemed to be permanently frustrated. It was, therefore, essential to the Porte to reassert itself at least on the lower Volga. Its 1569 campaign31 was designed to throw the Muscovites out of Astrakhan. Sultan Selim II and Khan Devlet Girey of the Crimea, each for his own reasons, joined forces that included cannons, ships and a special corps of engineers to dig a canal to link the Don to the Volga. The latter scheme was scrapped, but the daring of its vision is testimony to the determination of the Muslims to oust the Christian enemy. The effort is reminiscent of Philip H’s expediting the Armada against Elizabeth I. Just as the Spanish fleet was defeated by the elements and human daring, so were the Turks, the Crimeans and their Nogay allies destroyed by the heat of the desert between the bend of the Don River and Astrakhan and by the tenaciousness of the Muscovite defenders. Even as lilliputian English ships pricked at the Spanish galleys, so did small Don Cossack detachments harass the dejected, retreating troops as they made their way back to Azov, the nearest port. As in 1588, very few survived to tell the story of their defeat in 1569. Astrakhan survived and its people had remained loyal. Thanks to the arrival of supplies and reinforcements from Kazan, the Muscovite defenders held out; the Volga had proved a veritable lifeline. As in so many instances in the next centuries, control of the Volga would determine the future of Russian history.32 In the same decade, the first advantages of the conquest of Kazan manifested themselves. Pioneering entrepreneurs in search of fur, salt, and iron found Kazan at the doorstep of vast resources. The Stroganov family is the most famous of those who recognized the commercial potential, and quickly consolidated its ties to the court, winning monopoly privileges to harvest fur and

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to mine minerals for the state in the Kama River valley. Since 1558, the Stroganovs had gained permission to colonize, to fortify and to recruit militias in the name of the tsar. In 1568, Ivan IV gave them permission to go beyond the Kama and to penetrate the lands of the Chusovaia River, a tributary of the Ob, the first of the three great rivers that flow through Siberia. Thus, just as the final defense of the Volga took place against the Turks, another chapter in the history of Muscpvy’s territorial expansion opened up, the conquest of Siberia. This next episode rested entirely on the foundation of the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan, without which Muscovy would have remained essentially a Slavic, Christian, and European state. As a result of its victories along the Volga, Muscovy broke out of these confines and became both a Eurasian body politic and multicultural society, one of whose characteristics was its permanent involve­ ment with the Muslim world lying astride its southern frontiers. The repercussions of that proximity still reverberate today and are an integral part of the global dynamics of the contemporary scene.

Notes 1. On the battle of Kulikovo see Troitskaia letopis* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), pp. 419-420. 2. On the twinning of prince and saint see Michael Cherniavsky. Tsar and People (London, 1961). 3. Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei 11, pp. 78-79. (Henceforth: PSRL.) 4. The date of Kazan's break from the Golden Horde is disputed. It is sometimes given as 1445. On the establishment of the khanate see B. Nolde, La formation de l'empire russe, vol. I (Paris, 1952), pp. 1-13. 5. George Vernadsky, Russia at the Dawn of the Modern Era (London, 1959), p. 68. 6. On the Khanate (or “tsardom” as it is referred to in Russian sources) of Kasimov see V.V. Veliaminov-Zernov. Issledovanie o Kasimovskikh tsariakh, Vol. 1. (St. Petersburg, 1863). 7. Ustiuzhskii letopisnyi svod (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), pp. 96-98; Vernadsky op. cit., pp. 100-101. 8. George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (London, 1953), p. 329. 9. Vernadsky, op. cit., pp. 331-332. 10. The first treaty was signed in April, 1480. Sbornik imperators kogo istoricheskogo obshchestva, Vol. 41, pp. 16-20. 11. In fact, Ivan III and his father had not paid any annual tribute since 1452 though, interestingly, they had not stopped collecting it.

Muscovy's Conquest of Muslim Kazan and Astrakhan, 1552-56 69

12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

32.

Dukhovnye i dogovornye gramoty velikikh i udelnykh kniazei XIV-XV1 vekov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), pp. 197 and 209. The khan, in order to avert a military confrontation (which he feared he might lose), had tried diplomatic pressure in order to obtain tribute payments, only to be rebuffed. Kazanskaia istoriia (MoscowLeningrad, 1954), p. 55. An attack in 1460 had failed. PSRL 12, p. 113. The basic source for the 1480 incident is PSRL 6, pp. 225-230. This had to do with the so-called “filioque” clause inserted into the Catholic Apostolic Creed and rejected by the Greek Orthodox. K.V. Bazilevich. Vneshniaia politika russkogo tsentralizovannogo gosudarstva. vtoraia polovina XV veka (Moscow, 1952), pp. 146-166. PSRL 8, p. 228. PSRL 12, p. 232. Vernadsky. Russia at the Dawn, pp. 71-77. George Vernadsky. The Tsardom of Moscow 1547-1682 (London, 1969), Part 1, p. 51. For Ivan IV’s Kazan campaigns in the late 1540s see PSRL 13, pt. 1, pp. 155-176 and pt. 2, pp. 457-517. With its abolition, Ivan won the right to make military appointments according to merit or any criterion other than social standing, as dictated by the mestnichestvo tradition by which ranks were determined according to detailed records kept in the so-called Razriadnye knigi (Tables of Ranks), which chronicled previous rankings. On the 1552 campaign see PSRL 13, pt. 1, pp. 177-223; the definitive monograph on the history of Muscovy’s defeat of Kazan is Jaroslaw Pelenski. Russia and Kazan: conquest and imperial ideology (1438-156ÖS) (The Hague, 1974). For a brief survey of this process see Vernadsky. The Tsardom of Moscow I, pp. 59-63. PSRL 13, pt. 2, p. 523. PSRL ibid, pp. 522-526. PSRL, 13, pt. 1, p. 232. On Astrakhan see PSRL 13, pt. 1, pp. 235 and 274-275; S.M. Solov’ev. Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen 6 (Moscow, 1961), pp. 480-487. Akty arkheograficheskoi ekspeditsii I, No. 241, pp. 260-261. N.A. Smirnov. Politika Rossii na Kavkaze v XVI-XIX vekakh (Moscow, 1958), pp. 26-28. Solov’ev, op. cit., pp. 601-606; N.A. Smirnov, Rossiia i Turtsiia v XVI-XV1I vekakh (Moscow, 1946), pp. 100-159. The strategic benefits were first exploited by Muscovy in the next reign. Alexander Benningsen and Mihnea Berindei, “Astrakhan et la politique des steppes nord pontiques (1587-1588)” in Eucharisterion (Essays presented to Omelijan Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthday), Harvard Ukrainian Studies Vol. 3 (1979).

V Muscovy’s Penetration of Siberia The Colonization Process 1555-1689 Henry R. Huttenbach

he dramatic and dynamic drive eastward across the vast

T Eurasian plain by both private and government agents of Muscovy must rank among the great feats of human enterprise during the European age of exploration. While the Atlantic seaboard peoples sailed across uncharted oceans and settled along the coasts of new continents, Muscovy, the eastern outpost of Christendom, half a century after Columbus, launched its own epic adventure when it crossed the Urals and began to navigate its way across the continent’s rivers. Even as European civilization reached across the Atlantic and Iberian, Dutch, French and English colonists pioneered the way, so did the Great Russians of Muscovy promote the expansion of European culture as they established settlements throughout Siberia. Not unlike the west Europeans’ search for unlimited wealth and souls to convert, Muscovite merchant and missionary entered Siberia with the hope of unimagined success. Just as thousands of humble birth were drawn by legendary opportunities to leave the security of the known and risk the hazards of the new colonies in the New World, so did their Russian counterparts, peasants and crafts­ men, cut their ties with ancestral villages and head for the Siberian hinterland. At the same time, while conquistadores claimed huge tracts of land for their royal masters, Cossacks asserted the authority of Muscovy in the name of their tsars. The century-long Muscovite penetration of Siberia is the other half of that unprecedented moment in history when European history exploded onto the global scene, but with one fundamental difference. Whereas the western nations ultimately lost their grip on their overseas possessions, to become once again lesser actors 70

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on the world stage, Muscovy’s command of Siberia proved permanent, transforming kussia from a secondary power in eastern Europe to a primary state both in Europe and Asia, thanks in large measure to the prowess of its settlers and the astuteness of its administrators.

The Setting of the Stage, 1480-1552 The reign of Grand Prince Ivan III (1462-1505) stands as a turning point in Muscovite history, both politically and psycho­ logically. Till the end of the reign of his predecessor, Vasily II, the grand principality of Muscovy had been a vassal state for two centuries of Mongol and Tatar rulers. Though it enjoyed a senior status among the other Slavic principalities under the domination of the khans (as the principal Slavic state whose rulers were responsible for tax collection, and for the tribute payments to the overlords in the East), Muscovy suffered seriously from internal strife. Throughout Vasily’s reign civil war threatened the disintegration of the principality, and both the grand principality of Tver and the Republic of Novgorod challenged the primacy of Muscovy, even as the power of the Muslim empire receded. Thanks to the vision and persistence of Ivan III the Great, by the end of the fifteenth century Muscovy stood on the threshold of a new era. In the half century of Ivan’s rule, Muscovy accomplished several tasks that radically altered its power relationship with its neighbors and fundamentally influenced its historical self­ assessment. Over the course of his reign, Ivan was able to assert Muscovite hegemony over all other Slavic states in the northeast, including Tver and Novgorod; the former gave him control over the upper Volga and the latter added a northern tier of territory stretching from the shores of the Gulf of Finland to the shores of the Arctic coast. Simultaneously, Ivan managed to tip the military balance of power in Muscovy’s favor by successfully defeating the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and equally successfully defying the last of the Tatar khan’s attempts to send a punitive expedition against Muscovy for its refusal to pay the annual tribute. At the same time, Ivan overcame religious and political challenges to his authority, so that by the end of his reign, the power of the throne had been firmly consolidated and that of the Muscovite state considerably extended to lay the basis for a new

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 73

political entity, Greater Muscovy, whose future rulers enter­ tained new hopes and aspirations as the legacy of Ivan Ill’s triumphs became clear. One of these was to lay claim to the undefined territories to the east once ruled by the Tatars. For centuries, Muscovy and its Slavic neighbors had been on the western fringe of a transcontinental empire that had once included most of China and northern India. The heartland of the Mongol Empire had been Siberia, whose undulating plains had served as a highway connecting east and west, allowing the Mongols to project their will deep into the forests of northeastern Europe where Russian princes reluctantly submitted to the awesome powers of nomadic armies. Over the course of the latter half of the thirteenth and throughout the fourteenth centuries, Russian princes and merchants became aware of the geographic context of the land beyond the forest as the way to India and China. Siberia itself, however, remained an unknown quantity, since the Mongol rulers did not permit the Russians to travel beyond the Volga. Only Novgorod, lying outside the sphere of Mongol rule, acquired a peripheral acquaintance with Siberia as it extended its fur trade along the rim of the Arctic coast of Siberia. Even as Muscovy (then a small principality astride the Oka River, a tributary of the upper Volga) languished under Mongol rule—its capacity to enlarge its territories eastward circumscribed by the Mongol presence on the middle Volga—the Republic of Novgorod circumvented the Mongols and steadily pushed further eastward throughout the latter stages of the Middle Ages. Novgorod’s penetration of the Arctic extremities of Siberia laid the foundations for Muscovy’s later quests for those regions beyond its frontiers. These, however, cannot be fully compre­ hended unless seen in the context of Novgorodian achievements, of which Muscovy became the heir after Ivan Ill’s annexation of the republic in the 1470s. By then, Novgorod had a three-century history of military and trading expeditions into the Arctic zone of Siberia. By the end of the twelfth century, Novgorodian power extended across the Pechora River as a result of four major military campaigns in 1133, 1169, 1187 and 1193.1 In the middle of the thirteenth century, it claimed the region as an integral part of its territories.2 For the next hundred years, Novgorod pushed beyond the land of the lugurs and reached the banks of the River Ob’ across the Ural Mountains, thereby entering Siberia proper,

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making direct contact with the Samoyed people, whose territory extended eastward across the mouth of the mighty Yenisei River, which dominates central Siberia.3 From the middle of the fourteenth to the middle of the fifteenth century, the Novgorodians developed a well traversed route both by sea and river between the Pechora and the Ob’, steadily opening up the area to intensive fur collecting. It was during this stage of Novgorodian economic expansion into Siberia that its agents ran into competition from Muscovy as it too sought to tap the same wealth in the northern forests.4 With the absorption of Novgorod into Greater Muscovy at the end of the fifteenth century, Muscovy inherited the future for the continued exploitation of the northeastern hinterland.5 Perceiving themselves as the successors of the khan, the legitimate heirs of the disintegrating Mongol Empire, Muscovy’s rulers looked eagerly eastward, especially after the acquisition of Novgorod placed them strategically in a more favorable position, removing at least one obstacle from their evolving expansionist vision. Their appetites whetted by Novgorodian achievements, Muscovy now sought to remove the last obstacle between themselves and the uncharted rich lands beyond the Volga, namely the powerful and wealthy Muslim Khanate of Kazan. Both Ivan III and his successor Vasily III (1505-1533) strove via diplomatic intrigue and military intervention to bring Kazan under Muscovy’s control and, thereby, simultaneously gain access to the lower Volga (and thence to the Caspian Sea) and open up the way to Siberia, whose promise of incalculable financial rewards beckoned ever more urgently as the markets of Europe began to swell with silver from Spanish America. Repeated efforts, however, came to naught, despite Muscovy’s growing military prowess; nothing short of the outright conquest of Kazan would assure Muscovy of a permanent access to the treasures of Siberia. Motivated by a potent combination of interests—political, economic and religious—Muscovy’s foreign policy strategists placed the destruction of Kazan high on their list of priorities. Even for those primarily oriented westward, the subjugation of Kazan ranked as a sine qua non, a guarantee of a pacified East while Muscovy concentrated its military efforts westward. In the latter part of Vasily Ill’s reign and during the Regency stage of Ivan IV’s (1533-1547) there seemed to be agreement among the

Muscovy*s Penetration of Siberia 75

architects of Muscovy’s foreign policy élite over the question of Kazan: while those favoring a western over an eastern strategy saw it as a necessary step before continuing the momentum of expansion westward, those preferring a Siberian orientation looked upon the thrust against Kazan as the opening move in Muscovy’s quest to replace the rule of the khan with that of its tsar. Despite their fundamental differences in the long run, the two schools of thought were able to focus Muscovy’s energies successfully against the Khanate of Kazan. The death of Vasily III and the several court crises during Ivan IV’s minority slowed down the ultimate confrontation and defeat of Kazan, despite laudable efforts on the part of the army with strong backing from the Church. By the middle of the century, as soon as Ivan had attained maturity and court intrigue had been reduced to a minimum, Muscovy launched its final blows at Kazan, and, in 1552, triumphantly invaded, occupied and annexed the khanate, thereby becoming the undisputed power on the Volga and the most potent political entity on the western border of Siberia. Between Muscovy and the Pacific Ocean five thousand miles away, there lay the thinly populated territorial expanse of Siberia. After centuries of periodic nomadic invasions from the east, the tide had turned in favor of a sedentary society. Only distant China was in a position to challenge Muscovy for control over Siberia, but relegated it to a territory outside its imperial scope, preferring to limit its visions to the boundaries set by mountains and deserts. This Chinese orientation inward left the field open to Muscovy, a Muscovy throbbing with expan­ sionist energies after centuries of victimization at the hands of nomadic societies. The opening of Siberia with the defeat of Kazan in 1552 ushered in a new era for both Russian and world history. The march into Siberia by Muscovy, however, though of dramatic import, rests, nevertheless, on the long association with the Mongols, through whom the Muscovites acquired a general grasp of the immensity of the continental plain beyond the Volga and whose political domination of the region gave the rulers in Moscow the idea of empire in the East, as well as on the more direct association with Novgorod, whose Siberian experiences provided concrete examples of the boundless resources awaiting them. Combined with the escalating trade stimuli emanating out of western Europe, whose coffers were swelled with gold and

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silver, these made up the historic setting in the middle of the sixteenth century when Muscovy began its move into Siberia. Direct trade with Europe, bypassing Lithuania and the Hansa League ports along the Baltic, received an added boost in 1553 when English merchants sailed around Scandinavia and inaugurated trade with Muscovy, only a year after the defeat of Kazan. For the next decade, English merchant explorers, in quest of a northeast passage and an overland route to India, spurred on the Muscovite desire to venture further into Siberia. French and Dutch merchants also competed for trade with Muscovy after 1562, when Ivan IV’s armies conquered the Livonian port Narva, significantly accelerating Muscovy’s export trade of furs and other forest-related commodities. Thus, in a very real sense, Muscovy’s drive eastward not only paralleled the transatlantic European expansion but was its economic complement. For without the rising demands from the markets to its west, Muscovy would not have promoted its eastern expansion into Siberia with such persistence and determination, grave internal difficulties notwith­ standing. The great fur fever that engulfed Muscovy had its roots in the new wealth of western Europe. Until the middle of the sixteenth century, the forests of Russia and the Arctic hinterland of Novgorod held sufficient stock; fur animals replenished themselves to meet both local and foreign demand. The silver revolution as well as expanding clientele upset the balance between fur resources and demand, forcing fur trappers to look beyond the Urals. Increasing hostility from the Samoyeds at the turn of the century threatened the profitability of the fur trade owing to military expenses. It became, therefore, all the more necessary to find a way into Siberia from a southerly direction. The fall of Kazan in 1552 provided an ideal stepping stone into the fur-rich forests via the Volga’s tributary, the Kama. Indeed, the future of the fur trade looked particularly optimistic, because in 1555 an emissary from Khan Yadigar of Sibir paid his respects to Tsar Ivan, leaving the impression that he was prepared to shift his allegiance to Moscow and become its vassal.6 Not surpris­ ingly, the news triggered off considerable excitement since it opened up a new frontier for a peaceful expansion of the fur trade. Instead of having to combat the uncooperative Samoyeds in the north, the alliance with the Khanate of Sibir to the south offered Muscovite fur traders more favorable and profitable conditions.

Muscoyy's Penetration of Siberia 77

The Opening of Siberia 1558-1584: The Stroganov Initiative One of the first to take advantage of the trading potential of the world east of Kazan was the merchant family the Stroganovs.7 In 1558 the Stroganovs petitioned the tsar for a monopoly right to develop the economic potential of the upper Kama River,8 whose eastern tributaries originated in the Ural Mountains, positioning them directly adjacent to the edges of Siberia. For the next two decades, Stroganov enterprises sprang up in quick succession, including iron and salt mines which required mining technicians and manpower that had to be drawn from the Slavic population and foreigners from central Europe. Before the death of Ivan IV in 1584, a cluster of Stroganov settlements reached as far as the foothills of the Urals, whence the energetic visions of these entrepreneurs cast their eyes eastward. During the 1570s several trips were undertaken to explore the Ob’ basin where, to their surprise, they encountered strong resistance, especially from areas falling under the rule of the khan of Sibir. Faced with the obstacle of native opposition, the Stroganovs had to change their tactics, from peaceful economic penetration to more militant approaches. Since 1558, the Stroganovs had been operating under the mantle of both tsarist approval as well as tsarist protection. The defeat of Kazan had created the circumstances for their unprecedented successes. Testimony for these achievements was the role played by the Stroganovs as one of the major financiers of Ivan’s protracted war from 1562 till 1581 in his bid for a Muscovite presence on the Baltic coast; control of a slice of the Baltic littoral would enhance Muscovy’s trade and remove the need for foreign intermediaries. The Stroganovs were aware that the Livonian War promised greater export profits by removing the fees of the middlemen, which cut considerably into the profits of the fur trade. Thanks to their dynamic activities, the distant Kama region had been rapidly integrated into the economy of the regime. Instead of falling victim to the disruptive rearrangements ordered by Tsar Ivan during the political reign of terror, the Oprichnina (1566-1572), the Stroganovs survived the purge of large landowners and of other powerful families whom the tsar suspected of conspiring against him. His decision to spare the

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Stroganovs and their distant economic empire was not only prudent in the short run «as a pragmatic means to secure the financing of the war against Lithuania and Poland but fortuitous for the subsequent history of Muscovy’s Siberian interests. Had Ivan turned against the Stroganovs and either dissolved their quasi-colony or replaced them with incompetent favorites, the base for future expansion eastward would have been disturbed and Muscovite successes in Siberia set .back a generation or more. It soon became clear to the Stroganovs that further expansion across the Urals rested on sufficient military backing and force to pacify the peoples in the Ob’ watershed. They hit upon the idea of using Cossacks recruited from the Don valley. These experienced steppe horsemen promised to be an ideal instrument for asserting tsarist prerogative in a region where local autonomy was jealously guarded and foreigners, unless they were brief visitors, unwelcome. In the first two decades of their activities in the Kama region, the Stroganovs had relied upon the pishchalniki, both strel’tsy and pushkary (musketeers and artillerists), to protect their properties—salt mines, iron foundries, lumber and fur estates—from the surprise attacks of the Nogays who marauded through the area. The pishchalniki, however, were a static defensive force, useful to ward off attackers and to consolidate control of settlements, such as Solikamsk, the major Stroganov town, and all the other points along the Kama tributaries, the Vishera (which flowed directly from the east) and the Chusovaia (which originated in the southeast not far from Tiumen, both within portage range of the Ob’ system, the Sosva and the Iset). If the Stroganovs were to move eastward, they would need more mobile military forces such as the Cossacks. In trans-Uralia, the Stroganovs sought to extract fur taxes above and beyond their purchases from the Voguls who lived on the western watershed of the Ob’. A few years later, the Stroganov agents, spurred by ever greater markets, made similar demands on the Ostiaks who lived between the eastern banks of the Ob’ and the west side of the Yenisei. Both peoples, however, traditionally fell under the tutelage of the khan of Sibir in Tiumen. With the pressures of fur taxation from the Stroganovs on the one hand and the demands of loyalty to the khan, the Voguls and the Ostiaks offered on occasion strong resistance, in part because of their resentment against additional tax extraction, in part because of encouragement from the murzy Tatar princes,

Muscovÿs Penetration of Siberia 79

who were eager to reestablish their overlordship. During the 1560s this proved somewhat ineffective because of the interprincely rivalry among the Tatars as they fought amongst themselves over the khanate, which eventually toppled the throne of Khan Yadigar, the same who had sworn an oath of loyalty to Tsar Ivan in 1558. In 1563, one of his princely rivals, Kuchum (a descendant of a former khan deposed by a relative of Yadigar) successfully engineered a revolt with the help of the Nogays. As ruler of Sibir and partially beholden to the Nogays, Kuchum set out on an anti­ Muscovy policy to stem its claims of authority in traditional territories claimed by the khans of Sibir, namely, the lands of the Voguls and the Ostiaks. Lacking the power to attack Muscovy, Kuchum thought he could halt the incursions of the Stroganov agents.9 Throughout the 1560s, Kuchum concentrated on con­ solidating his power at home, and, in 1572, in defiance of his own promise made a year earlier, ceased to pay the annual tribute payment. Increasingly involved with the Livonian War, Tsar Ivan could do little except rely on the Stroganovs to assess the situation. The Stroganovs identified several disaffected Vogul and Ostiak tribal chiefs and usecj them as their way into the fur-rich forests, only to discover that without their own military force, their Siberian allies lacked the independent power to protect their hunting grounds from the retribution of neighboring tribes still friendly to Khan Kuchum. It was these circumstances that led to the formation of the Don Cossack units under Ataman Yermak Timofeyevich, who, with the blessing of the tsar, launched the Stroganov invasion of western Siberia in September 1581. With that, the military balance was tipped in favor of the Russians. Though the Cossack force numbered but 540 officers and men, a handful reminiscent of the few soldiers that followed Cortez, their mobility combined with firearms provided more than a match for the Siberian chiefs and their poorly armed men.10 The superiority of the Stroganov forces was forcefully demon­ strated in 1583 when a Vogul attack, instigated by Khan Kuchum, was repulsed and led to the capture of the commanding chieftain, Begbeli Agtakov, by the swiftly pursuing Cossacks. In a brilliant stroke of diplomacy, the Stroganovs released him on the condition he accept the tsar as his suzerain and that he open his territories to the fur agents of the Stroganov company. At the

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same time, the Stroganovs concluded that their economic penetration of west Siberia would not be secure until they had brought the khan of Sibir under their sway, whereupon they commissioned Ataman Yermak to prepare an attack on Tiumen via the Chusovaia River. An attack in the fall of 1581 on Cherdyn (an important Stroganov town in the middle Kama region) by the Vogul prince, Kikhek, an ally of Khan Kuchum, wrought considerable damage but failed to dislodge the Stroganovs and further underscored the need to tame the steppe khanate of Sibir, without whose cooperation the exploitation of west Siberia would be unprofitable. Even as the Livonian War came to a humiliating end in 1582, the Stroganovs launched their first thrust into Siberia from their well-supplied base in the Kama region. Grain, men and weapons bolstered the Cossack expedition. Three hundred pishchal’niki with light cannons loaded on ships built by the Stroganovs proceeded upstream against Khan Kuchum. Backed by the productive capacity of the Stroganov domains in the Kama region, the Cossack force defeated Kuchum at his new capital Kashlyk on the Irtysh, a major tributary of the Ob’. Within a year, the entire Irtysh was under Stroganov control. They promptly built a series of ostrogy (fortified settlements) along its banks. Though reinforcements from Moscow came slowly and harassing attacks from Kuchum continued, the Stroganovs were able to cling to their victories, backed increasingly by Vogul chiefs who transferred their allegiance to Moscow, unaffected by the death of Tsar Ivan IV in 1584. Though the Cossacks quickly withdrew (even before they were replaced by Muscovite musketeer units, the strel’tsy), the fragile connection between Muscovy and west Siberia held. In large measure it did so because of the policies of a senior official in Moscow, Boyar Boris Godunov, a close adviser of the new Tsar Feodor (1584-1598).

The Colonization of West Siberia (1584-1605): The Godunov Legacy Boris Godunov and his family were of Tatar extraction, an ancestral identity that remained distinctly alive throughout the sixteenth century. Having risen through the Muscovite service ranks during the Oprichnina years, Boris Godunov entered the

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 81

inner circle of the oprichniki in 1571; that same year, his sister Irina married the tsar’s second son, Feodor. Three years later, Boris married the daughter of one of the former senior oprichniki, Maria Skuratova. To mark the occasion, Godunov was appointed a kravchii, the second highest post in the court. Then, in 1580, Tsar Ivan elevated him to the influential post of boyar, the equivalent of royal counsellor. The following year, the heir to the throne, Tsarevich Ivan, was killed in an unfortunate incident, making Godunov the son-in-law of the future tsar. In 1584, Ivan IV died and Godunov found himself in charge of supervising the affairs of the Stroganovs and of formulating policies for the recently acquired territories in the East in his capacity as head of the Kazanskyi prikaz (the Kazan Depart­ ment), under whose jurisdiction fell all the lands to the east. As a first step in assuring Muscovy’s control of the region, Boris Godunov approved the sending of an annual contingent of strel’tsy under an officer who was to assume the post of voevoda, military commander, of one of the new settlements. New settlements had begun to spring up in rapid succession, signaling the Russian determination, to rule directly over the native populations. Throughout the 1580s, a number of Russian outposts, each under its voevoda, became the basis of Muscovite administration. The first of these was Obskyi Gorodok where the latysh meets the Ob’, founded in 1585. Another was Tiumen, the former seat of Khan Agidar, which the Russians rebuilt and fortified as an ostrog in 1586. Originally intended as the administrative center for the region, Tiumen lost its primacy to Tobolsk which the Russians had founded in 1587 on the confluence of the Irtysh and Tobol, strategically located to exploit the Ob’ river network and to win control over the steppelands. In short order, by the early 1590s, Tobolsk emerged as the major center of Russian activity in the area. By the middle of the last decade of the sixteenth century, Tobolsk served as the major supply distribution center for provisions transported from central Muscovy. It was in Tobolsk that Moscow stationed the largest garrison of troops, whose assignment it was to push the Tatars as far southward as possible. In 1588 the Cossacks, led by Yermak’s right-hand man, Danilo Chulkov, inflicted a grave defeat on the Tatars, and, in order to secure their victories, built a permanent outpost, Tara, three hundred miles upriver on the Irtysh, from where they blocked the

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repeated though declining attacks by Kuchum and his followers. Relatively free from serious assaults, Tobolsk quickly grew in importance, especially as a fur-gathering entrepot and customs checkpoint for all merchants coming from Muscovy desiring to enter the new colonial region. It was in Tobolsk that its voevoda determined, with the permission of the tsar, where new settlements were to be located. The town grew so rapidly that it required a church as early as 1587, followed by a second in 1588. Indeed, the potential future of Tobolsk proved so attractive that in 1588 or 1589 the first monastic community in Siberia chose to establish itself in the young settlement, a litmus test of the permanence and communal strength conveyed by the Russian fur merchants and the local garrison of five hundred Cossacks. By the turn of the century, Tobolsk assumed the status of a regional capital, with several towns in its Razriad region.11 Before the death of Tsar Feodor in 1598, the process of Russian colonization under Muscovite auspices continued apace, resulting in the complete control of the Ob’ river system. In 1593 the garrison town of Berezov was built in the far north alongside the Ostiak town of Sugmutvash to accommodate the fur agents coming from the upper Pechora. Branching out in the opposite direction, southeastward, the Russians founded Surgut in 1594. The next year they established an outpost, Nosovoy Gorodok, on the mouth of the Ob’, thereby opening up another, more northerly, trade route from the middle Pechora through Uigur country, making possible sea travel during the summer months between Nosovoy Gorodok, through the Obskaia Guba (Ob’ estuary), around the Yamal peninsula and along the Arctic coast westward all the way to the port of Arkhangelsk at the mouth of the Northern Dvina in the White Sea; Arkhangelsk, founded in 1584, was Muscovy’s remaining port after the loss of Narva, and now the exit point for sea exports to Europe. In 1596 an ostrog was built on the confluence of the Ob’ and the River Ket, Narym, situated on the southern extreme of Ostiak territory. Narym pointed east to the Yenisei water system (just as Nosovoy Gorodok, on the mouth of the Ob’, placed the Russians in a position to tap the sable fur riches of the lower Yenisei). Indeed, in response to this challenge, an ostrog complementary to Narym—Makovsky—was built soon thereafter at the portage point linking the Ket to the Yenisei. At the death of Tsar Feodor and the ascension to the throne of Boris Godunov, Muscovite

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 83

access to the entire Ob’ was an established fact. No better proof existed than the rapid compliance of the native populations. Resistance to the penetration of the Cossacks and of Muscovite administrators declined with each show of strength. One after the other, chieftains accepted the tribute demands made by the local voevoda, paying the yasak (fur tax) to the Muscovites instead of to their former Tatar overlords, especially as news of Nogay defeats spread from village to village. Originating with the Mongols (though a Turkic term), the yasak was a form of capitation tax—so many furs per adult male, the number of furs varying from place to place. Instructions sent from Moscow to its voevodas carefully stressed that the traditional quota levied by the former masters was to be honored in order not to alienate the natives, a policy strictly adhered to during the reign of Boris Godunov. With the final defeat of Khan Kuchum in 1598 (the year Godunov ascended the throne) by Ivan Voikov, the voevoda of Tara (on the Irtysh), the bulk of the Ob’ river system lay in Muscovy’s hands and the Voguls and Ostiaks had little choice but to accept Muscovite overlordship—which, if they demonstrated compliance, proved to be relatively benign. Muscovite policy emanating from Tobolsk indicated a single desire, an uninterrupted fur trade; otherwise the Russians stayed among themselves, leaving the natives to themselves. Sympto­ matic of the importance of Tobolsk and of the entire region in the eyes of those in the capital was the senior rank ascribed to anyone assigned to Tobolsk. Only members of boyar families received the voevodaship in Tobolsk, and as visible proof of its status in the administrative order of priorities, Tsar Boris appointed one of his relatives as chief voevoda in 1599. Though the reign of Boris Godunov came to a tragic and abrupt halt in 1605, the momentum of eastern expansion was kept up despite the domestic crises that marked his last years. The founding of Tomsk in 1604 on the upper Ob’ was but a capping stone to his achievements, a bulwark against the violence emanating out of the steppe, a town whose significance would not emerge until two decades later. Of far greater immediate and subsequent importance was the building in 1601 of an ostrog on the River Taz in the heart of unfriendly Samoyed country. Mangazeia (which the Novgorodians had reached in earlier centuries and had been visited by the English in the sixteenth century)12 was founded by a Cossack unit expedited from

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Tobolsk, in order to provide permanent protection for Muscovite merchants who had begun to set up winter quarters there. Additional reasons for the location of the garrison speak for the need to prevent other interests from usurping Muscovy’s authority. On the one hand, independent Russian fur hunters operated extensively throughout the area, rapidly building up a private trade that hoped to bypass the scrutiny of the Muscovite customs officials. On the other hafid, there may have been foreign traders, both English and Dutch, eager to circumvent the fees imposed on furs by Muscovite officials. Quite possibly, the Russian entrepreneurs acted on the foreigners’ behalf since they would have had no other outlet for their illegal wares. To forestall this loss of revenue and to assert Muscovite claims, Tsar Boris ordered the construction of Mangazeia, where a garrison and customs office quickly imposed Moscow’s sovereignty, tamed the warlike Samoyeds, and integrated trade activities under the scrutiny of Tobolsk which, in turn, reported all transactions to the Kazanskii prikaz. The population of Mangazeia grew dramatically. By the end of the decade travelers reported that it had over five hundred buildings. Despite the disruptive turbulence of the post-Boris Godunov era—the Time of Troubles—which wracked Muscovy from 1605 till the election of a new dynasty, the Romanovs, in 1613, Mangazeia thrived and attracted settlers. Its population was almost exclusively Russian, drawn increasingly by the valuable sable to be obtained in the nearby Yenisei basin. While pretender and’ counter-pretender vied for the throne, and rebellions and invasions plagued the western part of the Muscovite empire, its Siberian East remained relatively unaffected, a source of wealth and even power. Profit motivated the continued erection of settlements for the first time on the Yenisei river system. In 1607, two settlements—Turukhanskoe Zimov’e and Imbatskoe Zimov’e—were established by fur traders operating out of Mangazeia in order to allow them to set up a permanent presence in the region and to protect their storages of fur awaiting transportation west. While the grip of Muscovy weakened pending the reestablishment of central authority in 1613, the Mangazeia route to the Yenisei prompted by independent hunters successfully overshadowed the southern route insisted upon by the authorities in Tobolsk. The rivalry between the northern and southern region of Muscovite Siberia continued

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 85

throughout the seventeenth century till 1667, when Mangazeia fell into decline—by which time, however, Tobolsk also had had to bow to new administrative centers further east. In the early part of the century, however, the wealth generated by both routes had its political repercussions. As the economic wealth of the eastern territories manifested itself, so did its role in Muscovite political affairs: the Stroganovs’ financial support of the Livonian War is a case in point. Beginning with the reign of Tsar Feodor, Muscovy began the practice of shipping prominent political exiles to the trans-Kama settlements, where they rapidly integrated into the administrative structure of the region. Most of them hoped to be rehabilitated following Feodor’s death, only to have their hopes dashed by the coronation of Boris Godunov. It was from them that rumours originated accusing Boris of having murdered the young heir to the throne in 1591 as a way of preparing his own way to the throne.13 These rumors eventually proved lethal to Boris’s grip on power. In a fashion reminiscent of the Livonian War years, the role of the Muscovite East and its Siberian hinterland eventually tipped the balance against the Polish invaders in favor of the Russian national revival movement; most of this was financed by eastern money, largely officered by voevody from the East, and fought by recruits that included units of Siberian natives. As political and social calm returned to European Muscovy, and awareness not only of Siberia’s value but also the need to keep its power in check characterized the reigns of Tsar Mikhail and Tsar Alexis Romanov, during whose lifetimes the momentum of expansionism in Siberia accelerated still further.

The Drive to the Pacific, 1505-1649: The Romanov Triumph In one of his first official acts, Tsar Mikhail (1613-1645) sent word to the Stroganovs that he counted on their financial support to overcome the crisis of the royal treasury.14 He needed immediate loans in order to pay the army and keep the strel’tsy and Cossacks supplied with food, uniforms and weapons; the future of the state depended on the Stroganovs’ willingness to continue their loyal support of the regime even as they had done during the Smuta (the Time of Troubles), when they had helped finance Tsar Vasily Shuisky against the Poles.15 Once again. Tsar

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Mikhail wrote, Poland prepared to renew its attacks on Muscovy. To emphasize the urgency that moved him, the tsar had the Church hierarchy and the nobles of the Zemsky Sobor (Assembly of the Land) send the Stroganovs an additional appeal in the name of the looming emergency that threatened once again to put in jeopardy the very existence of the Christian Orthodox body politic in the face of Polish Catholic imperialism. Given the deep penetration of the Church to ' the furthermost Siberian outpost—churches and monasteries already dotted the map along the Ob’—its voice would add both poignancy and influence to the new tsar’s request from the Stroganovs. The centrality of Siberia in Muscovite financial affairs could not be better illustrated than by this letter at the outset of the Romanov era. Yet all was not in order in the far-flung hinterland of the empire. For a decade, from about 1603 (when Godunov’s troubles reached a crisis point) till 1613 (when Muscovy evicted the Poles from Moscow), though Muscovite expansion continued unabated, administrative consolidation suffered, in part because of Moscow’s total involvement with domestic and foreign enemies. In the interim Tobolsk lost some of its grip as a supervisor of trade activities, in part because of the need to suppress major and minor insurrections by the natives and to ward off attacks from new enemies in the steppes, and in part because of the capital’s inability to send sufficient supplies and reinforcements, which momentarily weakened the process of consolidation entrusted to the officials operating out of the Kazanskii prikaz. Between 1606 and 1608, the Samoyeds in the Mangazeia region rose in rebellion protesting the raising of the yasak tax. At the same time, the Ostiaks along the Ket River rebelled for similar reasons. Simultaneously, the Kirgiz along the upper Yenisei struck at the encroaching Russian settlements in the hopes of preventing their further advance. In 1609 and 1610 the Ostiaks once again tried to evict the Russians in their midst, not trusting the promises that the newly assigned military officers (golova) would not abuse their powers and extract higher taxes from them than those agreed upon earlier. Also, to the west of the Kirgiz, on the upper Irtysh and Ob’, the last of the Tatars rallied a new steppe ally, the Kalmyks, in their continued struggle to regain control of west Siberia. An all-out war exploded in 1606 when the Kalmyks made their first attack with a huge army of about 140,000 cavalry.

Muscovy*s Penetration of Siberia 87

Miraculously, a handful of well-armed Russians in each of the isolated settlements managed to hold out against these odds. Superiority of weaponry helped, as well as the quality of the soldiers, who now included a new generation of Cossacks bom and trained in Siberia; besides, several Tatar princes decided to side with the Russians at the last moment. Mutual trade interests, however, tempered the Muscovy-Kalmyk clashes as each sought to stake out territorial claims in order to preserve their economic viability: the Russians needed the forest region but also the horses bred by the Kalmyks; in turn, the Kalmyks needed the steppe ranges, but were eager to obtain firearms from the Russians. Sporadic fighting alternated with diplomatic discussions that were not resolved until the accession of Tsar Mikhail in 1613, when the Posol’skyi prikaz (the Foreign Office) arranged a peace agreement.16 Thus, with the return of a semblance of order in Moscow, it was able to organize a measure of tranquility along its southern rim in Siberia. Nevertheless, whereas the Posol’skyi prikaz, once backed by an undisputed monarch, had the authority to reassert Muscovite claims through sustained diplomacy with its enemies along the Siberian frontier, the Foreign Office was much to blame for the internal matters that plagued the Siberian colony during the decade of the Smuta. Though the Kazanskyi prikaz assumed most of the administrative responsibilities for the organization of Muscovite affairs in the newly acquired Siberian hinterland, the Posol’skyi prikaz continued to function as a mediator in disputes between local chieftains and princes and the government in Moscow. The duality of handling business emanating from Siberia was only natural: while the Posol’skyi prikaz looked upon the management of Siberia essentially in terms of negotiations with foreign rulers, the Kazanskyi prikaz saw Siberia in terms of a colony, as a new administrative unit of Muscovy whose business was essentially domestic. As late as the end of sixteenth century, matters pertaining to the yasak were as often handled by the one as by the other department. This, no doubt, added to the confusion of administrating the tax during the Smuta, no less than the possible corruption on the part of some of the Muscovite officials, who may have squirreled away some of the tax tributes for their own gain: a normal instance of corruption, but one that had serious repercussions—the unrest of the Samoyeds and of the Ostiaks.

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Even as it sought to bring about peace with the peoples outside the borders of its Siberian holdings, the Romanov government was equally determined to put its house in order vis-à-vis the natives under its jurisdiction. As quickly as it negotiated an understanding with the Kalmyks in the fall of 1614, Tsar Mikhail's government hurried to put its administrative house in order inside the borders of the Siberian colony by ordering all Siberian affairs to fall within the confines of the Sibirskyi prikaz (Siberian Department), thereby acknowledging the territorial importance of the new territories. By 1599 there already existed a Sibirskyi stol (Siberian Bureau) as a sub-department of the Kazanskyi prikaz, proof of the growing need to separate the administration of Siberian business from that of Kazan proper. Bureaucratically, this Siberian Bureau must have grown rapidly during the first decade of the seventeenth century, leading to the renaming of the Kazanskyi prikaz in 1614 as the Kazan and Siberian prikaz, elevating the latter to the level of the former territory, though it was still housed within the same administra­ tive government organ and located in Kazan. The actual independence of the Sibirskyi prikaz was but a matter of time as it acquired its own staff and, in time, its separate diak (minister). On and off between 1614 and 1637, the Sibirskyi prikaz had one diak, while the Kazanskyi prikaz had another. In the end, both methods proved unmanageable; bureaucratic rivalry and over­ lapping responsibilities led to the logical solution, the formation of an independent Siberian Department in 1637. By then, the process of expansion had assumed even grander dimensions. Pressed by rising demand and depleting supplies in western Siberia, Russian fur hunters (promyshlenniki as they came to be called in the seventeenth century) and their armed escort (vatagi) pushed steadily eastward into the sparsely populated lands of northern central Siberia, whose fur-bearing animals existed in immeasurable numbers, giving rise to colorful accounts of the unlimited wealth of the Siberian heartland. With extraordinary rapidity, the promyshlenniki moved forward on two broad parallel fronts, navigating their ways across the continental river system of Siberia and building upon the foundations laid in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, which had brought the Russian presence as far as the west side of the Yenisei. The penetration was climaxed by the founding of Turukhansk in 1607. With a speed that contrasts markedly with

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 89

the slow-paced advance of the French fur trappers operating along the same latitude in New France from the St. Lawrence riverway, the promyshlenniki dashed across Siberia in the next two or three decades of the first half of the seventeenth century. In response to this huge territorial acquisition, in 1627 the administration of the Siberian realm was subdivided into two sections (razñady), the northern tier (from Mangazeia eastward) falling under the jurisdiction of Tobolsk and the southern tier assigned to Tomsk.17 The southern tier stretched forward with the founding of Yeniseisk in 1619 at the confluence of the Yenisei and its tributary the Tunguska (which has its source in Lake Baikal). The lake was discovered by a Cossack in 1631, and by 1632 Yakutsk had been founded, a dramatic leap forward in so short a time. Yakutsk was established on the middle Lena, the last of the three great Siberian rivers whose source lies but a few kilometers from Lake Baikal. In 1637 another ostrog, Butalskyi, was built on the Aldan River, a major branch of the Lena, putting the Cossacks of Siberia within striking distance of the Sea of Okhotsk, which they reached under the leadership of Ivan Moskvitin in 1641 and where they built a permanent garrison in 1646. In the meantime, since the founding of Yeniseisk in 1619, several other settlements had straddled the southern tier of Muscovy’s expansion into Siberia: Krasnoïarsk (1628) on the upper Yenisei; Bratskoe (1630) at the middle of the Verkhniaia Tunguska; Ilimsk (1630) on the Him, a minor tributary of the Tunguska River at the portage point to the Lena river system; and Kirensk (1631) on the confluence of the Kirenga and the Him, opening the way to Yakutsk (1632). In 1641, enterprising Cossacks set up the garrison of Verkhneudinsk to the south of Lake Baikal, pointing Muscovite expansion in the direction of China just about the time when the Manchus were set to seize power and erect a powerful barrier against further Russian territorial acquisition. The sea and a mighty empire brought this segment of Muscovy’s eastern expansion to a halt. The northern tier, increasingly directed and financed from Tobolsk (since the underwriting of the long-distance expeditions soon proved beyond the capacity of the most wealthy and daring promyshlennik), moved ahead with equal speed. Originating out of Turukhansk, it developed two branches, an overland (riverine) and sea (Arctic) route. The former led along the lower Tunguska

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(Nizhnaia Tunguska) of the Ob’ river system and linked up with the Lena system via the V.iliuv, which led to the foundation of Zhigansk in 1632 on the lower Lena just north of the Arctic circle, and sufficiently downstream of Yakutsk, also founded in 1632 by the Cossacks sent from Tomsk. This automatically triggered off a fierce rivalry for control of the River Lena which, quite naturally, was claimed by the voevoda of both Tobolsk and Tomsk (which had become an independent regional capital or administrative center in 1629, incurring considerable jealousy and resentment on the part of the bureaucracy in Tobolsk). The disruptive rivalry was astutely neutralized in 1637 when Yakutsk became an independent center of the third Siberian Razriad (region). (A fourth was established around Yeniseisk, but not till 1677.) Meanwhile, an Arctic coastal route also emanating out of Turukhansk started at the mouth of the Khatanga near the Tamyr peninsula and led to the delta of the Lena. Just before the mouth of the Lena, the Cossacks sailed up the Oleniok and established in 1633 the fortress of Olensk, which provided an alternate inland route for the winter months, a route strengthened by an additional ostrog, Anabarsk (1643), about 125 miles to the west. The discovery of the mouth of the Yana River (east of the Lena) led to the founding of Verkhoyansk in 1638. This in turn led to the discovery of the Indigirka (1636), on which two settlements were built in rapid succession, Uliansk (1638) and Podshiversk (1639). Though the purpose of these zimovia (winter quarters) was to collect fur tributes, they all included an ostrog, which lent the settlements a quality of permanence, a Cossack oasis in the far reaches of northeastern Siberia. In 1642 a zimovie was built on the Alazeya River. A year later, the last Siberian river flowing into the Arctic, the Kolyma, could also boast its own Muscovite settlement: Srednekolymsk (1643), followed by Nyzhnekolymsk (1644) and Verkhnekolymsk (1647). In search for yet another river basin whose populace could be taxed for furs, a Cossack expedition sailed eastward in 1647. Stopped by the ice, they tried again, this time under the command of Semeon Dezhnev; and, in 1648, they rounded the tip of the Eurasian continent and sailed through what was later named after the Dutch explorer, the Bering Strait. The next year, in 1649, Dezhnev’s men built an ostrog, Anadyrsk, through which Muscovites eventually gained control of the Kamchatka peninsula. The same year, a Cossack unrelated to Dezhnev’s expedition

Muscovy’s Penetration of Siberia 91

(though informed of his achievements) passed through Anadyrsk and continued south to Okhotsk, the ostrog founded in 1646. Thus, in an epic series of voyages, Muscovite Cossacks, infected by the addictive fur “fever,” crossed and circumnavigated the length and breadth of Siberia. By the time they reached Okhotsk, a cluster of settlements studded the map of Siberia, tiny islands of Russian culture, nuclei of future towns whose hardy populations defied all the odds of hostile nature and inhospitable peoples.

The First Russian Colonists in Siberia, 1581-1649 By mid-century, after a hundred years of uninterrupted expan­ sion into Siberia, a sizable Russian population resided in scattered settlements strung across its vast expanse from the Urals to the Pacific.19 While the total population is a matter of educated guesses, the social composition of the Russian colonists drawn to Siberia can be gauged more accurately. In absolute figures there were about 60,000 people from European Muscovy living amidst a quarter of a million Siberian natives, a ratio of 1:4, though according to some estimates the ratio might have been 1:3. Over the yearsŸ since the construction of the first ostrogy by Stroganov pioneers, the rate of colonization in Siberia had accelerated dramatically with the increase of profitability and with the region’s ability to absorb new settlers. Though growth came unevenly (some settlements had a promising start, but were then abandoned for better sites, or their economic utility had been exhausted), permanence came to the bulk of the original small Cossack encampments, each one growing according to a separate logic dictated by circumstances of geography and policy. And the people who settled around the nucleus of Cossacks and fur agents, though their exact numbers remain unclear, can nevertheless be identified and described, both in broad group outlines and through prominent, exceptional individuals. The faces of the Russian colonizers who pioneered the way into Siberia are not as unfocused or anonymous as they might seem at first glance. As soon as the government recognized the economic signifi­ cance of Siberia (a fact it learned within the first decade of Stroganov activity in the middle of the sixteenth century), it took steps to establish itself as a permanent presence to encourage maximum exploitation of Siberia’s potential and to prevent the

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undue growth of unlicensed profit making. Consequently, the backbone of the colonization process of the Siberian lands by Muscovy was the military-administrative staff, whose strength and institutions guaranteed the safety of those engaged in fur­ gathering and other enterprises to maintain life in the settle­ ments. Without the systematic support from the political center, from Moscow, few settlements would have lasted very long. From the outset, it was Moscow’s policy to attain two goals in Siberia, a permanent presence and agricultural self-sufficiency. Not only did it wish to entrench itself in Siberia in order to ensure itself maximum economic rewards, but it also wanted to minimize its expenses. The core of the Muscovite presence in Siberia was the military administration. At its head was the voevoda, who was simul­ taneously the head of the garrison and in charge of civilian administration. The voevoda system spread to all large and small settlements, the largest of them, like Tobolsk, often having two, a senior and junior voevoda. Their immediate task was to fortify the town and to pacify the natives in the uezd (region) from which they were to collect the yasak. His chief subordinates who acted as officials were drawn from the officers of his unit. He and they had been preselected by the Razriad (office of military affairs) or appointed after their arrival by the Sibirskyi prikaz and were designated as prikaznye liudi (appointees by contract). While the voevodas were from the upper ranks of Muscovite society, usually from the boyar class, the officers came from the middle levels, the died boyarskie. Together they officiated over their assigned uezd and its volosti (districts and villages). Making up the rest of the military contingents were the rank and file, which consisted of various groups of soldiers who formed the core of the army in Siberia. First to arrive were the Cossack units, who supervised the construction of an ostrog and were often quickly reassigned to move on to locate new sites. Cossacks were stationed permanently in either the major towns such as the (regional) Razriad capitals or strategic frontier settlements that required mobile cavalry troops. A second element in the military forces in Siberia were the Streltsy whom Muscovy sent regularly each year to garrison new settlements and to replenish those who needed reinforcement. A third category of soldiers in Siberia consisted of prisoners of war, the so-called litva: these seasoned soldiers came from Lithuania, Poland,

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 93

Sweden, the Ukraine and White Russia.20 To handle the numerous administrative functions, Siberian settlements, especially the regional capitals, had a corps of bureaucrats working in the stol (regional bureau); smaller towns had a prikaznaia izba (local office) to administer their affairs. The senior administrator was the diak, who was assigned by Moscow and had had prior experience in European Muscovy. His subordinates, the podiachie, were recruited from the ranks of the literate residents, merchants, clergy and soldiers, and even exiles. An important task that required a large staff was the operation of the Siberian customs system. Over the years, Muscovy had erected an elaborate control system throughout Siberia to prevent illegal economic traffic and smuggling in which even voevodas were engaged. It was the responsibility of the customs officials, tselovalniki (sworn men), to keep records of the furs collected and exported, of the supplies imported to Siberia, and of the monies collected from monopoly businesses such as alcohol distilleries. Another task was to allot funds allocated by Muscovy for expenses incurred by its officials. By the middle of the seventeenth century, customs officials were a ubiquitous and often shadowy presence spying all over Siberia in their deter­ mination to ferret out offenders. In each Siberian town there was a local bureaucracy headed by pismennye golovy (senior scribes). Their assignment was to keep a medley of records required by Muscovy, tasks that called for a large staff of literate assistants. They kept updated records of each census so that an accurate accounting of the native population was on file. They gathered a variety of other statistics on local matters in order to help the voevoda carry out his orders. Their archives came in handy for the local customs activities and, later, proved an invaluable source for Siberian history. Their uniform task, though, was to prepare frequent otpiski (reports), sent regularly to the Sibirskyi prikaz, where they entered into daily accounting (poddennye zapisi). Yet another Muscovite institution cast a network of activity across Siberia, the iamskoi prikaz (the department of posts). Its function was to assure rapid and regular transportation of goods and personnel in and out of Siberia as well as throughout Siberia. At designated points either coinciding with an ostrog or between far-distant ones, the prikaz established a iam. Here, depending on its location, ships could be repaired, sleds exchanged and

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horses fed. Each iam had storage houses with supplies of wood, rope, fodder, and powder for guns. At each iam travelers could find shelter and a team of craftsmen or other personnel to aid them. Among the other residents in Siberia who came from Muscovy were the families of the senior officials and their servants. While the upper echelon of the Muscovite administration was there on rotating assignment, they were always immediately replaced, so that the office automatically assured a permanent presence, though the specific individuals remained only temporarily. The families and servants of middle-level officials became a more stable population and struck deeper roots in Siberia. Among them were the growing number of merchants who decided to take up residence in Siberia and who built themselves houses in the new towns for their families and their retinue of servants. Another significant element in the evolving Muscovite popula­ tion in Siberia was the peasant. In the first decades peasants came largely from the ranks of the guliashchie liudi (runaways). These consisted of a mixed group: peasants who had left estates in search of free land and people escaping the law (from taxes, from military recruitment, or from criminal deeds). At first they settled independently and tried their hand at agriculture, cultivating land in the vicinity of a growing settlement. Later they were assigned tracts of land by the local administration. In later decades, as the government sought to bring agricultural independence to its Siberian colonists, it shipped groups of peasant laborers to the east. The original groups were sent po priboru (as free contract labor); but since the production of grain in Siberia did not keep up with demand, the government changed its tactics and sent more and more peasants po ukazu (by decree), the latter consisting increasingly of prisoners of war, criminals and unfree peasants. These peasants came to populate the estates of Siberian monasteries and those of crown lands. Still another Muscovite institution whose organizations took root in Siberia was the Orthodox Church. Already endowed with its own distinct history of expansionism, very often ahead of the government, the Church was not slow to recognize its oppor­ tunities in Siberia. At the same time, though, it had to respond not only to its own missionary zeal but also to the needs of Muscovite Christians taking up residence in Siberia. While the monastic movement set up several dozen communities (including

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 95

convents in Yeniseisk, Tinmen, Tobolsk and Verkhoturie) both in and outside of cities with large tracts of lands assigned to each one (hence the need for peasants), the Church built parish churches in the lowliest ostrog. The quality of the clergy varied, many of them forcibly recruited into the staffs of the voevodas, many of them engaged in illegal profitable enterprises, and some of them barely literate, until the Patriarchy in Moscow began to impose some order. In 1621 it set up Tobolsk as the archbishopric of Siberia and began to institute a series of reforms, among them an improvement of the education of the clergy. Each year, young clergymen were brought from European Muscovy, and, by the middle of the seventeenth century, the ranks of the clergy formed a sizable social stratum of the Muscovite population in Siberia, among them highly intelligent and dedicated individuals. These then were the principal components of the Muscovite colonists who settled in Siberia, in general a microcosm of the society they had left behind. With them they brought language, customs, and institutions that rapidly transformed the far-flung settlements into miniature replicas of Muscovite life. Despite huge distances and small númbers (and constant attrition due to deaths and departures), they were not culturally isolated. Each year brought fresh blood, new neighbors from Muscovy, thereby discouraging a serious erosion of identity through lack of contact. Living physically apart from the more numerous natives, they were able to avoid assimilation: intermarriage was never without conversion to Christianity of the prospective bride and her integration into the cultural life of the Muscovite town. Frequent visits by government officials (such as the syshchiki, inspectors responding to chelobytnyia, petitions) and merchants kept each community in touch with the outside world. Ironically, the Siberian population was often better informed of events in central Muscovy than the reverse. Communications were reliable and frequent via the trade routes serviced by the iamskoi prikaz. The rate of official correspondence was voluminous. Thus, though there was a sense of endless space, except in the more remote ostrogy there was no accompanying feeling of isolation. Life in the towns was vibrant and stimulating, though increasingly dictated by orders from Muscovy. In the final analysis, law emanated from Moscow and it was Muscovite policy that shaped life for the European population in Siberia. Though the climate of the frontier gave a sense of freedom, the centralizing forces

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radiating out of Moscow, prevailed. By the middle of the seventeenth century, when Muscovy could claim the length and breadth of Siberia as its own, life in its settlements, from Tobolsk to Okhotsk, was essentially Russian. Thanks to its colonization policy, the conquest of Siberia was not only a political and economic triumph, but a cultural victory, and, it must be added, except for the bloody encounters north of the Amur, one achieved with a minimum of disruption and destruction of native cultures (if compared to the fates of the indigenous peoples in the New World and in Australia). Through the tenacity of its pioneers and the wisdom of its policies, Muscovy successfully extended itself from the Urals to the Pacific in the short span of one century.

New Beginnings, 1649-1689: The Emergence of Muscovite Siberia While authoritarian, absolute Muscovy exercised centripetal force upon the Siberian lands by appointing its most loyal servants to positions of influence, distance and the individualism nourished by frontier life encouraged contrary centrifugal ten­ dencies. These, as evinced during the reign of Boris Godunov, could have serious ramifications, requiring constant vigilance on the part of those in the capital. One means of curbing insubordination was to institute a system of constant rotation of voevodas. Nevertheless, the opportunities of self-enrichment encouraged a parallel economy that involved almost every functionary, each one paying off the next to cast a blind eye on illegal transactions and tax skimming. Despite rigid bookkeeping by custom accountants, the ledgers were often doctored, as the scribes were themselves inevitably drawn into the web of temptation. The richer Siberia became, the greater the extent of seeking to cheat the system. By the time Tsar Mikhail died, efficient government—much of it designed to minimize private accumulation of wealth—operated side by side with an equally efficient sub-economy that involved practically everyone in the dozens of Russian towns and settlements across Siberia. A profound spirit of defiance, of quasi-independence, characterized the non-European component of the Muscovite empire. The intensity of this rebellious dimension inherent in Russian Siberia—much of it, no doubt, nourished by fresh memories of

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 97

native acts of defiance—manifested itself soon after the accession of Tsar Alexis in 1645. For some time, unrest had accumulated among various strata of the population in response to stringent taxes and regulations of social status: the former affected the townspeople and the latter the peasants. While one felt the sting of government through its numerous monopoly taxes (e.g. on salt, alcohol and tobacco), the other felt the tightening noose of serf laws. Each group resented its inability to escape obligations dictated by the state. The lid exploded in 1648 when a series of uprisings and riots wracked European Muscovy. The unrest quickly assumed political implications, especially as the protests spread eastward into Siberia.21 Spontaneous protests had already broken out in several towns against perceived abuses by voevodas and other high functionaries. First in Tomsk (May) and then in Narym (November)22 unrest expressed itself in the form of riots and insurrection by garrisons of streltsy as they joined the civilian population in venting their anger against both what they considered maladministration and downright extortion. No doubt the mutinies were inspired, in part, by the news from the Ukraine, where Bogdan Khmelnitsky had announced his Cossack revolution against the king of Poland. For a brief moment, the danger of a Siberian break from tsarist rule, fueled by discontented and ambitious Cossacks, lurked on the eastern horizon. But, unlike the weak Polish monarchy, Muscovite central authority quickly snuffed out these Siberian troublespots, where countless exiles harbored ill feelings towards tsarist rule. Numerically too few, the Russian population in Siberia was tamed as overwhelmingly as the non-Russian Siberian natives before it. The reign of Tsar Alexis ushered in a new era for Siberia, characterized externally by continued raids from the steppes by the Bashkirs and increased confrontation with Manchu China along the Amur. In the latter region, as the Muscovites sought to continue the pattern of imposing their rule on native tribes, their agent Erofei Khabarov, instead of placating the local chieftains, aroused their enmity with heavy-handed tactics that ran counter to traditional Muscovite policy. Unlike his predecessors he inflicted ruthless massacres rather than choreographing a careful show of superior force, thereby spurring the native tribes to appeal to Peking for help, bringing into the conflict an ally that had both the power and the will to halt the Muscovites at its

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northern frontiers. For thq, first time, Muscovite troops encoun­ tered an enemy with artillery, forcing them to halt their advance. After numerous military clashes over the next four decades, the Chinese left the tsarist government no choice but to sign the Peace Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, an unqualified diplomatic victory for China, thereby bringing one phase of Siberian frontier history to a close. The abrupt termination of Muscovite expansionism had its counterpart in the internal history of Siberia, especially in the character of its colonization. Whereas fur had dictated the number and kinds of peoples drawn into Siberia from the population centers of the Muscovite empire, agriculture and, above all, mineral resources and mining slowly dictated more and more who would populate the continental hinterland. Primarily silver, but also iron and some tin, altered the evolution of Siberia’s economy and, hence, the composition of its Russian population.23 Not surprisingly, the government stood behind the search for silver and made certain that all finds remained under its control. A pioneer of the silver industry was Petr Godunov, the senior voevoda of Tobolsk, who discovered silver ore in the Urals along the eastern side of the mountains and in the late 1660s opened several mines. Almost at the same time, silver was discovered in the upper Yenisei. In 1669, reports reached the Russians that silver and tin ore were to be found in the vicinity of Nerchinsk. Throughout the 1670s silver mining and silver ore smelting involved more and more people in the Altai region. Rumors of gold further intensified the interest of Moscow, which sent hundreds of mining engineers, smelters and silver experts to staff these new enterprises, not to mention the traditional craftsmen, such as carpenters, to provide support services. Domestic needs stimulated the search for iron as the demand for tools and weapons for the traditional services outstripped Muscovy’s ability to supply them at affordable rates. Registered and unregistered (those unauthorized by the local government) iron forges sprang up all over Siberia. To escape taxes, hundreds of foundries operated outside townships out of sight of the ever­ watchful officials. By the end of Tsar Alexis’s reign, Siberia produced enough iron to satisfy its needs for tool and armament manufacture and even managed to export a modest amount to the European segment of Muscovy.

Muscovy's Penetration of Siberia 99

In response to Moscow’s standing policy of weaning Siberia of its dependency on grain, more and more peasants came to Siberia to cultivate land around the towns. However, ever since the 1649 Ulozhenie (Code of Law), the government resorted to importing peasants en masse, usually serfs from its own estates, relying less and less on voluntarism. Thus, serfdom spread to Siberia and became a fixed institution around the islands of Russian urban colonies. By the end of the century the peasant/serf population had increased sufficiently to achieve the Muscovite goal of making its Siberian settlements agriculturally self-sufficient. On a higher social level, there was an additional element that changed the complexion of the population in Siberia, especially in the larger towns, and particularly in Tobolsk. The practice of exiling prominent persons to Siberia replaced the sixteenth­ century custom of incarcerating them in isolated monasteries in the old North. Several hundred of the urban elite associated with the 1648 rebellions were sent east. A decade and a half later, uncounted hundreds of the Old Believers either found refuge in Siberia or were ordered into exile, including their leader Avvakum and dozens of his priestly followers. Their presence raised the cultural niveau of the area and provided stimulating intellectual exchange for the educated military and bureaucratic officials stationed in Siberia. The most celebrated of the exiles, perhaps, was the Croat Catholic priest, Juraj Krizanic. After his fifteen-year stay in Tobolsk, Krizanic was so deeply impressed by the totality of Siberia and its immense potential that he wrote in 1681 his famous “Historia de Siberia”.24 Despite its flights of imagination and exaggeration, the book conveyed the dynamic atmosphere and daily vitality of life in Siberia far from the restrictive and constrictive world of Moscow. The “Historia” was widely read and helped focus foreign attention upon Siberia, which still remained terra incognita for those outside of Muscovy. In Siberia itself, an intense interest in its geography, ethno­ graphy and history (much of which must have affected Krizanic) stirred among the upper classes. The archives of the regional Razriad capitals were filled with local information. Reports from travelers, explorers and from the local population were assi­ duously collected by the various bureaus of government. The need for interpreters, the demand for information regarding mineral deposits, all stimulated learning about Siberia and its peoples. During his governorship voevoda Petr Godunov

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(1667-1670) ordered the preparation of a map of all Siberia to be compiled from several regional chertezh (maps), and to include the latest geographic discoveries culled from travelers. The project was completed before he left office.25 In 1672, Godunov’s map was revised and duplicated, several copies making their way to Moscow, where two were smuggled out in 1673 by the military attaché of the Swedish embassy. Thus, by the time the period of Muscovite penetration and conquest of Siberia came to a close and the process of consolidation took on new vigor, the Russian population in Siberia had assumed a character and even a culture personality of its own. Though the main outlines of the tsarist regime are noticeable in every town and its institutions, the specific features of the component parts of society have the qualities of a distinct region. Whether one looks at merchants or clergy, at adminis­ trators or peasants, the mark of Siberia sets them apart from their counterparts in European Muscovy. Life was harsher, but there were more opportunities. The same laws prevailed, but there was more room to circumvent and even ignore them. Living in close proximity with non-Europeans encouraged the know­ ledge of other languages and the adoptions of other customs, however superficially. Intermarriage was not infrequent and as much as the ways Of the sedentary Muscovite encroached upon the peoples of the East, so did the more fluid lifestyles of the seminomadic Siberian peoples subtly graft themselves on their European conquerors. Just as the open plains intoxicated those who lived in the Ukraine, so did the silvery silence of the Siberian forests and rivers exercise its magic upon the soul of Muscovites residing in Siberia. Life there may have been a bitter punishment for those condemned to permanent exile, but until the introduction of the cruel exile and penal system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, life in Siberia held its subtle rewards, as the literary and documentary legacy of the first century of Muscovite colonization of Siberia bears testimony. Though Muscovite at heart and in substance, the colonists were also Siberian in personality. While Muscovy could boast a victory, Siberia had not been defeated.

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101

Notes 1. Polnoe sobrante russkikh letopisei III-IV (St. Petersburg) p. 19. Henceforth PSRL. 2. Sobrante gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov I (Moscow, 1813) No. 1. Henceforth SGGD', A. Aksenov, “Snosheniie Novgoroda Velikogo s lugorskoiu zemleiu” Literaturnyi Sbornik (St. Petersburg, 1885) p. 441. 3. PSRL IV 64-5. 4. On Muscovite activity see Novgorodskaia Pervaia Letopis’ (Moscow, 1950) p. 425; Ustiuzhskii letopisets (Moscow, 1950), p. 86; Letopis' russkaia po nikonovu spisku (St. Petersburg, 1790), pp. 44-45. 5. By 1510 there seems to have been periodic if not regular contact with Mangazeia on the River Taz in the heart of Samoyed territory. I. Anuchin, “K istorii oznakomleniia s Sibiriu do Ermaka” Trudy moskovskago arkheologicheskago obshchestva, t. 14 (Moscow, 1890). 6. G. Vernadsky, The Tsardom of Muscovy I (New Haven, 1969), pp. 79-80; the oath of loyalty was formally conveyed and accepted in 1557: SGGD II, No. 68. 7. On the early history of the Stroganovs see A.A. Vvedenskii, Dom Stroganovykh v XVI-XVII vekakh (Moscow, 1962). 8. For the text of the tsarist charter see G.F. Miller, Istoriia Sibiri I (Moscow, 1937), pp. 332-334. 9. For a survey on the rise of Kuchum see B. Nolde, La formation de l'empire russe (Paris, 1952) Vol. I, pp. 156-157. 10. On Yermak’s exploits see S.V. Bakhrushin, Ocherki po kolonizatsii Sibiri V XVI i XVII vekakh (Moscow, 1928) I, Chapter 3; also V.I. Sergeev, “K voprosu o pokhode v Sibir druzhiny Ermaka”, Voprosy istorii (1959) No. I. 11. George Lantzeff, Siberia in the seventeenth century (Los Angeles, 1934), pp. 34-35. 12. Some scholars speak of a regular sea route maintained by the Muscovites in the second half of the sixteenth century between the White Sea and Mangazeia: D.M. Lebedev, Russkie geograficheskie otkrytiia i issledovaniia s drevnykh vremen do 1917 goda (Moscow, 1971), p. 67. 13. LA. Golubtsov, “Izmena Nagikh.” Rossiiskaia assotsiatsiia nauchnykh institutov obschestvennykh nauk. Institut istorii 4 (1929) pp. 55-70. 14. S.M. Solovev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen I (Moscow, 1959) pp. 17-18. 15. Vvedenskii, op. cit. pp. 133-134. 16. G. Vernadsky, “Istoricheskaia osnova russko-kalmytskikh otnoshenii” Kalmyk-Oirat Symposium (n.d.) pp. 11-50. 17. Lantzeff, op. cit. p. 35. 18. Ibid. p. 36. 19. On the estimates of Siberia’s population during the seventeenth century see P.A. Slovtsov, Istoricheskoe obozrenie Sibiri I (St.

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20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

Petersburg, 1886) p. 85;’and B.O. Dolgikh, Rodovoi i plemennoi sostav narodov Sibiri v XVII veke (Moscow, 1960). Lantzeff, op. cit. p. 65. On earlier local disturbances and incidents of popular unrest in Siberia related to the 1648 outbursts see Lantzeff, op. cit. pp. 77-81. S.V. Bakhrushin, Nauchnye trudy Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1956) p. 51. For a general review of mining activities in Siberia see A.A. Kuzin, Istoriia otkrytii rudnykh mestorozhdenii v Rossii do serediny XIX v. (Moscow, 1961). It was first published by G.I. Spassky in Sibirskii vestnik Vols. 17-18 (1822). For further discussion on Godunov’s map see Lebedev op. cit. pp. 25-26; and A.I. Andreev, Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu Sibiri I (Moscow, 1960) pp. 35-42. For a brief history of the background to map-making in Muscovy see Henry R. Huttenbach, “Hydrography and the Origins of Russian Cartography,” Five Hundred Years of Nautical Science 1400-1900 (London, 1981) pp. 142-152.

VI Russian Expansion and Policy in Ukraine 1648-1791 An Outline and Analysis Stephan M. Horak

he expansion by Muscovy to the west and southwest initiated

by Ivan III (1462-1505) after the final collapse of Tatar T supremacy has been explained in terms of three major con­

tributing factors: Ivan’s claim of former Rus’ territories as rightful patrimony; Muscovy’s emerging military superiority over Lithuania; and the Orthodox Church’s insistence on the unification of all Orthodox; people within one state, namely Muscovy. Subsequent additional causes and motives often have played no lesser a role. Among them were the need to enlarge geographical area for a growing population, the desire to obtain more fertile lands to feed the people and the ever-growing army, to promote trade and commerce and, finally, to reach outlets to the outside world and keep them secured. The phenomenal rise and growth of the Russian Empire has been a subject of numerous studies. The most recently published work on Russian imperialism, Professor Henry R. Huttenbach’s “The Ukraine and Muscovite Expansion,”1 offers a chronological account of events leading to the absorption of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. With this in mind, the emphasis here will be placed on additional inquiries, a greater concentration on the economic and military aspects and the areas less stressed in Huttenbach’s essay, though without ignoring the essential flow of events, both for the sake of continuity and for the better understanding of the past within the context of causes and the subsequent effects.

103

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Outline of the Study In analyzing the Ukrainian failure to achieve and to maintain statehood during the turbulent seventeenth century, C. Bickford O’Brien suggested the following explanation:

The Muscovite viewed the “encroachment” upon the Ukraine in a different light. The principle of raison d'état was known in Moscow as in Paris. In the political relations between seventeenth-century states, territorial considera­ tions were paramount.2 What has been submitted here amounts to a legitimization of territorial expansion, in the case of Ukraine prevailing over the basic national rights, including national independence. Back in 1929, R. Flaes, the Dutch scholar, realized that the territorial conflicts of that period as exemplified by the case of Poland were the main forces shaping history and determining the survival and the downfall of nations.3 The Ukrainian contribution to the making of the history of eastern Europe during the seventeenth century remained marginal precisely because of its failure to embody its national existence in an independent nation­ state entity, the only way to recognition at that time. Ukrainian failure to generate internal national-state discipline and unity made it all the easier for Poland, Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire to pursue their raison d'état, which was territorial expansion into a geographical area populated for centuries by the Rusyns-Ukrainians. Also basic to Russia’s drive to the south as well as to her policy toward Ukraine was the desire to gain access to the Black Sea to settle and colonize territories far richer than her own further to the north. The mass migration of Russians into Ukraine, first by landowners, merchants, administrators and then by peasants and workers, created population centers loyal to the Russian state in newly incorporated areas. The settlers became not only agents of Russia’s interest, but watchdogs over the unreliable Ukrainian natives. Finally, geography itself offered a standing invitation to Russians to move south along the Dnieper, Donets and Volga rivers, which crossed open, flat lands lacking natural obstacles for defensive purposes. Within such conditioning factors, Peter I’s policy can be

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regarded as a mise en place of all available elements and Catherine Il’s policy as the final stage in the “drive to the south.” Curiously enough the chain of events leading to the final success of this drive was initiated by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi’s revolt of 1648 against Poland, making Muscovy’s involvements in Ukrainian affairs not only possible, but, in a way, legitimate as well. The newly created state of the Cossack Ukraine in an area bordered by three at that time aggressive powers—Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire, and the Polish Commonwealth—immediately faced the formidable task of survival. Its chances for continuing existence as an independent state were slim at best, needing at least two of the three neighbors to accept its existence. This was, however, not to happen. Survival had to be achieved at the price of compromising national sovereignty. This was exemplified by the Pereiaslav Treaty of 1654, the Andrusovo Agreement of 1667, and by several short-lasting arrangements with Turkey, Moldavia, and Sweden. The sequence of events that followed Russia’s acquisition of the Cossack Ukraine, including the territory of the Zaporizhian Cossacks on the lower Dnieper River, subsequently led to Poland’s partition and to the incorporation by Russia of almost two-thirds of the territory populated by Ukrainians. It also led to the final removal of Turkey from the northern shores of the Black Sea. The two states that failed to support Ukrainian statehood in the seventeenth century one hundred years later found themselves, in turn, threatened by Russia. But by that time Ukrainians serving in the Russian army contributed greatly to Russia’s cause. Like Ukraine, Poland perished without allies willing or in a position to prevent her partition. Precisely within this context Russia’s expansion to the south and southwest into Ukrainian lands deserves special attention.

Russian-Ukrainian Encounter Russia’s seventeenth-century eastward drive, reaching the Pacific Ocean in 1649, was paralleled by a southward advance along the Volga and Don rivers. These sparsely populated regions outside the immediate control of the Crimean Tatars, known as Dikoe pole (Wild land), were easy targets. In fact, during the reign of Ivan IV, the northern parts of Dikoe pole were incorporated into

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the Muscovite state. Thus, by the end of the sixteenth century the Ukrainian ethnic territory, still mainly within the Polish Commonwealth, faced Muscovy in the northeast and east. Direct assault on Ukrainian and Belorussian lands carried out under the banner of “reunification” had to wait until the middle of the seventeenth century. But a series of related events outside of Russia made her first the partner and subsequently the master of the territory. The raid on Poland by Swedish and Cossack armies (1648-1649) facilitated Russia’s involvement in 1654, which resulted in the annexation of the Briansk and Chemyhiv (Chernigov) regions, populated mainly by the Belorussians in the north and Ukrainians in the south. The first inroads into their lands marked a new chapter in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Exactly at that crucial period of Ukrainian history a new era was initiated with the rise of the Cossack movement, a unique band of warriors, social rebels and freemen who for the next two centuries symbolized the whole nation and its history.4 Being of Orthodox faith and primarily of Ukrainian ethnic stock, the Cossacks eagerly responded to Khmelnytskyi’s call for a war against Polish rule. The prolonged struggle took three dimensions—socio-economic, religious, and finally national—which culminated in the creation of an independent state, the Cossack Ukraine, known also as the Hetmanat (Hetmandom). The initial social revolution turned into a prolonged Ukrainian-Polish war, involving Muscovy, Moldavia, and the Crimean Tatars as well. Hetman Khmelnytskyi, realizing the limits of Cossack power in facing the still powerful Poland and dangerously unreliable Tatar partnership, chose the “lesser evil” and accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar Alexei in 1654 for purely military and tactical reasons. The Pereiaslav Treaty, together with secret and often falsified amendments, not only determined the future course of Russian and Ukrainian histories, but became the subject of conflicting interpretations and arguments among historians of the past and present alike, divided along national and ideological lines.5 The treaty itself soon proved to have most disastrous effects upon the fate of Ukraine as opposed to the advantages originally envisioned by Khmelnytskyi:

The Pereiaslav agreement did not bring peace, security, and

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autonomy to the Ukraine, but war, civil strife, and political decline. For many générations the Ukraine was a “trouble zone” whose political instability and military vulnerability posed constant threats to Moscow. These developments were hardly foreseen in 1654. Khmelnytskyi had an inkling of them before his death, but Moscow by then was unwilling to see the union dissolved.6 In the final analysis, the Russians emerged as sole beneficiaries of that treaty, conveniently renamed “an act of reunification.” This act was hardly mentioned in pre-Revolutionary histories, being introduced and loudly celebrated three hundred years later in Soviet historiography. The Pereiaslav Treaty was considered by Ukrainian leaders at the time only as an act of diplomatic maneuvering in the given situation, something to be replaced in time by another, more favorable alliance serving the Cossack State better. It was not considered by the standards of the seventeenth-century diplo­ macy as “valid forever,” as claimed in the present Soviet writings7 promoting the concept of “eternal reunification.” Contrary to Marxist concepts of internationalism, current Soviet emphasis has been placed on nationalism and historical claims, as evident in the official textbook: “The war of national liberation and Russia’s brotherly assistance given to Ukrainians created conditions for a more benevolent economic and cultural develop­ ment of Ukraine.”8 In contrast, Michael Pokrovskii, the founder of Soviet Marxist historiography, did not consider it an act of “reunification,” but of initiation of Russia’s rule over Ukraine, followed by decades of “struggle for the Ukraine.”9 He argued that Moscow’s prime interest was in “the strategically important lands of the Left-Bank Ukraine, the gubernias of Chernyhiv and Poltava. The seventeenth­ century wars with Poland became wars for possession of Ukraine.”10

Ukraine under Russian Rule The Russo-Polish Truce of Andrusovo of 1667 partitioned Ukraine along the Dnieper River with Kiev first temporarily, and then permanently, remaining under Russian occupation. By that time the Ukrainian territory was divided into three different

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parts. The largest, from the San River in the west to the Dnieper in the east, remained within the Polish Commonwealth. Secondly, the Cossack Ukraine (Hétmanat), from the middle Dnieper River to an approximate north-south line drawn from Sumy to Kodak in the east, extended into “Svobis’ka (Slobodskaia) Ukraine,” reaching the Donets River and comprising the region of Kharkiv, Sumy, and Belgohrad. Thirdly, the Zaporizhia (Zaporozhe) lay south of the Kremenchuk-Izium line and between the Boh River in the west and the Donets River to the east, and to the south bordered the territory of the Crimean Khanate. The Treaty of Vilna of 1656 between Muscovy and Poland in the absence of a Ukrainian representation might be regarded as the abrogation of the Pereiaslav Treaty, and the following Andrusovo Truce of 1667 could and should be seen as the final nullification of that treaty. Hence, Russia’s claim to Ukraine based on that treaty from now on must be viewed as an act of force, the articles of the Pereiaslav Treaty providing only a convenient cover. Nonetheless, the Andrusovo settlement provided Russia with the semblance of an international legalization of her annexation of the Cossack Ukraine, initiating the process of absorption not only of the Hetmanat, but also of other Ukrainian territory, including Zaporizhia, which, in fact, was an extension of the Cossack Ukraine. The process of absorbing the Hetmanat into the Russian Empire took over one century (from the enactment of the “Articles of Pereiaslav” in 1659 to the final liquidation of the Little-Russian College in 1781) and was gradually and progres­ sively implemented in various spheres of national existence. Apart from purely political acts delineating the Hetman’s authority, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became the first target of the integrational policy. While in the original text of the 1654 agreement Church affairs were not even mentioned,11 the 1659 text was changed arbitrarily in Moscow without the consultation or knowledge of the Ukrainian partner. The Ukrainian historian Polons’ka-Vasylenko observes: “It was the tragedy of Ukraine’s future history that this falsified document of 1659 became the sole official text of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi’s agreement to be signed by all consecutive hetmans.”12 Indeed the first victim, the Ukrainian Church with its material riches and

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influence, was made to recognize the Russian patriarch as its head. Final elimination of' independence came in 1686 when the patriarch was given the right to nominate not only the metropolitan of Kiev (the prerogative of the patriarch of Constantinople), but also the bishops. This was followed by the dispatch of Russian clergy into Ukraine as well as by the encouragement of the transfer of well-educated Ukrainian clergy into Muscovy. Transferred to Muscovy in large numbers, Ukrainians there enormously enriched Russian culture and education.13 The Ukrainian contribution was “rewarded” with restrictions intended to curtail the freedom, culture and even the use of the Ukrainian language. It was Peter I who first came against Ukrainian cultural individuality. In October 1720, he ordered printing shops in Kiev and Chemyhiv not to publish any books other than religious ones and only in accordance with Russian grammar, to remove linguistic differences.14 This prohibition on publishing books in the Ukrainian language caused a centurylong setback in the development of the modem vernacular Ukrainian language and of Ukrainian literature, and at the same time strengthened St. Petersburg's policy aimed at national homogeneity for the Russian Empire. Another, not always understood aspect of Russian policies was that of utilizing Ukrainian manpower. The first appearance of Ukrainian Cossacks on Russian soil took place during the “Time of Troubles” with Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi first fighting on the Polish side and then turning against the Poles, contributing significantly to their ultimate defeat. A more lasting and certainly more decisive contribution by the Ukrainian Cossacks to Russian wars of expansion began with the Pereiaslav Treaty. It gave Moscow a 60,000-strong Cossack army for the war against Poland (which lasted until the Armistice of Vilna in 1656, to be soon renewed and ending only with the Truce of Andrusovo). After 1667, the Cossack army, reorganized inpolky (regiments), became increasingly involved in Russia's wars against the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire. While the Cossacks’ participa­ tion in the Russo-Polish war was the result of a military alliance, the situation changed rapidly after the Andrusovo Truce. Consolidation of Muscovy’s power over the Left-Bank Ukraine, especially in the confirmation of the elected hetmans, placed the Cossack forces under Russian voevody and generals in time of war.

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Hetman Ivan Samoilovych was ordered by Prince Vasilii Golitsin to accompany him with 20,000 Cossacks to seize the Crimean Peninsula. The Tatar strategy of burning the steppes as well as Golitsin’s failure to secure supplies for his army brought this campaign to a failing halt. Yet it was Samoilovych who was made the scapegoat of the Russian overlordship and exiled to Siberia. In legal terms it meant a violation of Ukrainian autonomy, for Samoilovych was the head of the autonomous entity; by the terms of Pereiaslav Treaty, he could be removed only by the Council of Cossack Elders (starshyny) and was not subject to Russian jurisdiction. Peter’s increasing interference in the Hetmanat’s internal affairs, in addition to forcing Cossacks to participate in Russia’s wars against the Turks and Sweden (the Northern War), resulted in Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s decision to break away from Russia and to seek alliance with Charles XII of Sweden. While initially collaborating with Peter I, he laid solid foundations for the young state in the realm of economy, education, administration, and the army. He became acutely aware of Russia’s danger to Ukrainian national autonomy and her, disregard for still-binding Treaty provisions. He participated in Golitsin’s second campaign of 1689, the failure of which brought new waves of devastating Tatar attacks on Ukraine and contributed much to the general worsening of social and economic conditions.15 In 1695, Peter attacked Azov and Mazepa took from the Tatars several fortifications along the lower Dnieper. One year later, the Cossacks under the command of Colonel lakiv Lyzohub were again instrumental in the attacks on Azov and on fortresses in the mouth of the Dnieper. Mazepa’s plans to build a Black Sea fleet, however, were cut short by Peter’s treaty with the Ottoman Empire in 1700. While retaining Azov for Russia, Peter agreed to return to the Tatars the territory secured by the Cossacks. Their gains, despite the high price in blood, were traded for Russia’s access to the Azov Sea. Yet despite such setbacks, Mazepa succeeded in extending his authority over Zaporizhia and for a while over the Right-Bank Ukraine. This was made possible in 1704 when on Peter’s order he crossed the Dnieper to suppress local unrest against the Poles. On this occasion he incorporated the territories of seven regiments into the Hetmanat (Bilotserkva, Chyhyryn, Bohoslav, Uman, Korsun’, Braitsiv, and Mohyliv). Thus on his own and not Peter’s order, Mazepa, in fact, reunited

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Ukraine as it existed in Khmelnytskyi’s time. This “gathering of Ukrainian lands” and the strengthening of the hetman’s power began to be undermined by Russia’s involvement in the Northern War. From 1700 on, the tsar demanded great numbers of Cossacks to fight against the Swedish king and his ally, the newly elected Polish king Stanislaw Leszczynski. For the next eight years Mazepa’s Cossacks remained involved in military cam­ paigns in Poland and against Sweden in the north. In 1704, the Cossack unit under Colonel Apostol marched toward Cracow, and were met by the Swedish troops and the Poles near the city of Wielun in Silesia. In the ensuing battle, 1,600 Cossacks perished and only 80 returned home. In the winter of 1705-1706 the Swedes were again on the offensive. In March 1706, the hetman, on the tsar’s order, arrived in Minsk with 15,000 men and began to harass the Swedish troops between Minsk and Vilna. During this campaign the Cossacks suffered heavy casualties. Some regiments were decimated and some were taken prisoner. By May the hetman had about 2,000 men left and in June he returned to Ukraine. The tsar demanded not only combat units from Mazepa but also requested that the Cossacks build fortresses at their own expense. In return for their loyal services the Cossacks received little gratitude and recognition. They received no payments, were mistreated and insulted. Such conduct on the part of the Russians must have caused gloom in Mazepa’s mind. Moreover, rumors were spread that the tsar intended to abolish the autonomy of Ukraine and incorporate it into the Russian Empire. In 1707 the tsar ordered Mazepa to surrender the Right-Bank Ukraine to Polish magnates who supported his ally, King Augustus II. Russian generals began to interfere with Mazepa’s authority over his own troops, contributing to the hetman’s suspicion as to the tsar’s real intentions. Despite the fact that some 40,000 Cossacks were drawn into the war against Sweden, the tsar refused to dispatch his troops into Ukraine in 1707 when the Swedes and their Polish allies under King Stanislaw Leszczynski moved their armies toward Ukraine. For Mazepa, this was the last straw. Now he was convinced that Russia’s wars were not in Ukraine’s interest and only exhausted her economic and human resources. Convinced that the tsar cared only for his own land, Mazepa had to choose between the interest of the tsar and his own. To him the tsar’s refusal to defend Ukraine meant also that the

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Pereiaslav Treaty, the basis of his loyalty to Russia, was no longer mutually beneficial and, therefore, no longer binding. Mazepa decided to enter an alliance with Sweden. Tragically for him and Ukraine, that decision ended with the defeat of Charles XII and Mazepa at Poltava in 1709. Soon the political map of eastern Europe and the history of four nations underwent most dramatic changes. For the next two centuries Ukrainian Cossack blood drenched the soil for the expanding Russian Empire. Cossacks fought in Livonia, Lithuania, Saxony and even in Asia. Moreover, Cossacks and Ukrainian peasants alike had to build fortifications and to supply the Russian army with food, horses and various services. Repeated requisitions and plunders contributed to the growing impoverishment of the population in the Hetmanat. Several thousands were annihilated at Baturyn at the hand of the Russians and many more were forced to build the canals in St. Petersburg, from where most of them never returned. While approving the election of Ivan Skoropadskyi as the new hetman (1708-1722), Peter took a whole series of measures to strengthen his own authority in Ukraine. He appointed a Russian minister to oversee the hetman’s activities. All Cossack elders were to be nominated by the Russian tsar. Peter further limited the hetman’s power by taking control of the financial matters of the Hetmanat together with the initiation of land-grant privileges. This, of course, amounted to the introduction of a semicolonial status in the territory, which legally was not yet a part of the Russian state. Furthermore, the influx of Russians into Ukraine, together with restrictions imposed upon local trade, commerce, and the developing industry, began to weaken Ukraine’s demographic structure as well as its socio-economic fabric. The influx of Russians into the towns made the coming incorporation easier. Russian-appointed colonels were eagerly transferring their prime allegiance from the Hetmanat to the tsars. Economic advantages, security and social prestige prevailed over national bonds and feelings. This in turn led to the emergence of characters known as “malorosy” (petty-Russians), eager to denationalize themselves to the point of Russifying their names. Uprooted from their native environment and not yet completely assimilated into Russian culture, they were useful tools in the hands of the tsarist administration. To this end Protosiev, the Russian governor of Kiev, received in 1718 a secret instruction

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from St. Petersburg to compile a list of Ukrainians loyal to the tsar who could be entrusted with positions in the administra­ tion.16 The oppressed were made into oppressors. Peter’s reform, aimed at the creation of a centralized autocratic state, produced a long-lasting blow to the already shattered autonomy of Ukraine. Upon the death of Hetman Skoropadskyi in 1722, Peter abolished the elective Hetmanat, replacing it with the appointed Little-Russian College, comprising six Russian officers headed by a president, Brigadier Velminov. Pavlo Polubotok, the acting hetman of the Cossack army, who protested against the tsar’s illegal act, was promptly imprisoned and executed in a St. Petersburg prison. Only Peter’s death in 1725 reversed for a while the encroachments on Ukrainian self­ rule. A certain relaxation of autocratic practices under the rule of Catherine I, Peter II, Anna, and Elizabeth allowed the Ukrainians some respite and a chance to recover some of their political autonomy. In 1727, the Supreme Privy Council decreed the dissolution of the Little-Russian College and permitted the election of Hetman Danylo Apostol (1727-1734). A skillful statesman, he succeeded in securing “Binding Articles” (RishytyIni punkty), a compromise between Khmelnytskyi’s Statute and Peter’s restrictions. Accordingly, the Cossack army was to be placed under the command of a Russian field-marshal; colonels were to be elected by the Cossack elders and confirmed by the tsar. Moreover, the high court of the Hetmanat was to include three Ukrainians and three Russians. Foreign merchants were permitted again to enter Ukraine, and Russian nobles were free to obtain the land, but Russian peasants were not to be brought into Ukraine. At the same time Cossack property was to be respected and their land could not be confiscated at will. Apostol’s visible achievements in the strengthening of the Hetmanat17 soon created alarm and suspicion in St. Petersburg. His death in 1734 made it possible for Empress Anna to prohibit the election of a new hetman. Instead she created a collective body, the “Administration of the Hetman Office” (1734-1750), consisting of three Russians and three Ukrainians. Instructions given to Prince Shakhovskii, chairman of that Administration, directed him to bring pro-Russian individuals into service, promote intermarriages and isolate Ukrainians from foreign contacts.

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The Russo-Turkish War of 1736-1739 brought new hardships. Russian garrisons stationed in Ukraine since Peter’s time became a permanent burden since their entire cost, including officers’ salaries, were financed from the Hetmanat’s treasury.18 The socalled konsistenskaia dachki resulted in additional taxes in money and kind as well as in labor servitude in support of Russian regiments, which by 1725 increased to ten and consisted of some 30,000 men. At the same time, and especially after 1734, Russian officers and administrators under various pretexts confiscated locally owned land, forcing the peasantry into bondage. Com­ plaints submitted to the College of Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg found little sympathy there. Russian exploitation was not limited to military obligations and forced labor outside of Ukraine. Restrictions were also imposed upon native industry and merchants, and favoritism extended to Russian businessmen and industrialists.19 Ukrainians were pro­ hibited from using the old trade roads to the Baltic ports and Silesia and instead were ordered to export their goods and commodities through ports in Azov, Arkhangelsk and St. Petersburg. Long distances and lack of accessible roads increased transportation costs. Newly imposed export and import duties were designed to inhibit Ukrainians from competing with Russians in foreign trade, and to extract additional revenues for the tsarist treasury. On the other hand, privileges granted to Russians by the Russian administration speeded their influx into Ukraine.20 High-ranking Russian officers sometimes arbitrarily engaged in land seizures. Thus Brigadier Apochynin, commander of the Perevolochna fortress, usurped his estate in 1743, with the support of the governor-general of Kiev, M.I. Leontiev.21 In the tradition of military colonies, Russian regiments claimed huge territories, subsequently divided among their officers. Huge Russian-owned estates in Ukraine, especially those of Menshikov, Potemkin and Rumiantsev, encouraged others to obtain proper­ ties there. Patterns of agricultural colonization flourished, especially during the reign of Catherine II, who was generous in granting estates in the Hetmanat, especially in the Zaporizhia and in the territories gained from the Crimean Khanate.22 Following the abolition of the Zaporizhian Sich (Host) in 1775, Princes Prozorovskii and Viazemskii received one hundred thousand desiatins each. Smaller estates ranging from 1,500 to

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12,000 desiatins in size were given free to Russian nobles.23 Catherine’s favorite, Prince Gregory Potemkin, became one of the largest landowners in Ukraine with an estate of 250,000 desiatins, comprising some eleven towns and over one hundred villages. Russia’s expansion into the southern Ukraine created a need for the bringing in of new settlers to make its rich soil useful and to establish an additional security belt in the form of military colonies. For over a century this role belonged to the Zaporizhian Cossacks, who soon proved to be unreliable, while their “free lands” attracted St. Petersburg’s attention. In Petersburg’s view Russian state interest could only be achieved with the destruction of Zaporizhian independence and by populating the steppe with loyal elements, Russian or any other, willing to remain in tsarist service. Settlement of those territories was not limited to Russians; it extended to Serbs, Croats, Greeks, Germans and others. In the second half of the eighteenth century some 100,000 Germans had been settled in the Volga, the Black Sea regions and in Volhynia. The mass immigration from abroad began in 1751 with the arrival of Serbs and Croats from the Habsburg Empire. Some 10,000 Serbs under the leadership of Ivan S. Khorvat settled in the region of Nova Serbia and soon after (in 1753) in Slavianoserbia, establishing “military colonies” known as “frontier militia.” Foreign colonies were established on both banks of the Dnieper in the territories of the Zaporizhian Cossacks. Hetman Rozumovskyi’s objection to the policy of colonization as being harmful to Ukrainians had no effect. The status of the latter in fact worsened, as they were forced to leave their land to the colonists.24 In order to contain the movement of Ukrainians into the territories open for settlement, the Senate decreed on 2 November 1753 that “it is necessary to appoint a Russian officer to supervise and control the newly established Littlerussian inhabitants, who are settling as Cossacks and refugees from Poland.” Another group of settlers was composed of Russian Old Believers who began to arrive in 1758. They established themselves mainly around the St. Elizabeth fortress25 and were joined by Greek refugees who preferred to settle in and around towns. Catherine II considered German colonists to be useful farmers and granted them privileges not available to native

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Ukrainians. Eventually, most of these groups underwent thorough Russification, contributing thereby to a strengthening of the Russian element in Ukraine. In the final analysis, and as admitted by some Russian historians, the main purpose in settling foreigners was the government’s policy of seeking to secure southern frontiers against the Tatars and their protector, the Ottoman Empire, and to convert the area into “Russian territory.”26

The End of Ukrainian Autonomy Whatever restrictions Catherine H’s predecessors imposed upon the Hetmanat, its basic socio-economic and to a significant degree political-administrative structure survived almost intact, even though supervised by Russian officials. Ukraine remained an entity much different from Russia. Peter I’s installation of the Little-Russian College did not significantly change the internal fabric of society either. This occurred only under the rule of Catherine II. While the nature, substance, and the achievements of Catherine’s rule together with her contribution to Russia’s expansion to the south and west have been sufficiently studied in a voluminous literature,27 her policy in regard to Ukraine deserves still more study.28 To Huttenbach, Catherine’s policy proved to be “the final chapter in the absorption of the Ukraine into the Russian Empire,” and at the same time “a program aimed at the Russification to be achieved through the promotion and strengthening of the similarities between the Cossacks and the Russians, a process which would result in binding Cossacks more closely to the state.”29 As revealed in the instructions to her newly appointed procurator-general, Prince A.A. Viazemskii, Catherine was determined to establish a uniform administrative system for the whole empire and to end local “privileges.” She wrote: “To call them [Finland, Livonia, and Ukraine] foreign countries and to treat them as such is more than a mistake, it may be safely called stupidity.”30 Liquidation of “stupidity” by an enlightened despot meant nothing less than doing away with Ukrainian autonomy. Forceful extension of autocracy, carried out at the expense of non-Russian peoples, remains the most characteristic feature of Catherine’s rule as well as of Russian history. It is unfair to either

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overlook or to justify it, as did the Russian liberal historian Vasily Kliuchevskii,31 with his glorification of the destruction of Ukrainian autonomy by Catherine II. She accomplished much to please the Russian national ego, but at the same time for the Poles, Ukrainians and for many others, she symbolized national oppression, loss of freedom and even of national existence. In the case of Ukraine, a series of events contributed to Catherine’s decision to remove Hètman Cyril Rozumovskyi, despite his personal loyalty to the Crown. Being a staunch defender of Ukrainian autonomy, Rozumovskyi succeeded in transferring the handling of Ukrainian affairs from the Senate to the College of Foreign Affairs, hence restoring some of Ukraine’s special position within the Empire. He insisted on the right of the Hetmanat to maintain financial and budgetary independence and objected to the Cossacks’ participation in Russian wars outside of their homeland. Moreover, his numerous military, judicial, and social reforms aimed at making Cossack Ukraine a modem nation could hardly accommodate Catherine’s centralistic designs and her need for additional revenues to support her wars, her ever-growing bureaucracy, and her lavish court. However, the immediate cause leading to the empress’s decision was Rozumovskyi’s notion to make Ukraine a hereditary Hetmanat and his family a new Ukrainian dynasty. Another, and most disturbing, motive was the position taken by Ukrainian dele­ gates during the session of the Legislative Commission in Moscow in the late summer of 1768.32 There (and despite GovernorGeneral Petr A. Rumiantsev’s violations of some electoral provisions, including the imprisonment of Nizhyn nobles), the majority of the Ukrainian delegates (nobles, Cossacks, and towrispeople) attending the Commission signed a petition demanding the preservation of the autonomy of the Hetmanat. In particular, the program submitted by Hryhorii Poletyka, leader of the delegation, saw the autonomy in the form of a democratic republic of the nobility with an elected hetman. This Ukrainian program became a potential danger to the absolutist designs of the empress and encouraged her to forsake the originally intended reforms for the safety and interest of the empire. By now even semiautonomous status for Ukraine had become intolerably dangerous and only outright incorporation into the empire was acceptable as a final and safe solution to the empress?33

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Annexation meant not only the end of the political system, but also the extension of Russian social, economic, legal, and cultural systems and institutions into Ukraine followed by the dissolution of the Ukrainian fabric as an independent and different entity. The last hetman of Cossack Ukraine was forced to resign in 1764 and was replaced with the second Little-Russian College, now headed by Governor-General Rumiantsev. The process of Ukraine’s incorporation was initiated immediately and, with the dismissal of the Legislative Commission in 1768, no prospects for the preservation of some semblance of autonomy survived. A deluge of orders coming from St. Petersburg during the next twenty-year period removed all signs and manifestations of Ukrainian separateness and culminated in the second and final liquidation of the Little-Russian College in 1781. In 1783, the Russian institution of serfdom was officially extended to Ukraine and all former local privileges were abolished to comply with the 1781 administrative arrangements. In 1782 the territory of the Hetmanat was made into a Little-Russian General Government comprising three gubernias—Kiev, Chemyhiv, and NovgorodSiversk. In 1785, the Ukrainian gentry was granted equal status with the Russian nobility. This not only increased the power and privileges of the landed nobility, but assured its servitude to the throne and accelerated its denationalization. The destruction of the Zaporizhian Host in 1775 was of no lesser importance in the history of Ukrainian people. For almost two centuries this militaristically structured Cossack society not only defended the rest of the Ukrainian people from the Tatars, but also served as a refuge for both liberal and individualistic traditions typical of Ukrainians for centuries. Moreover, it offered safety and freedom to peasants escaping Polish and Russian serfdom. As long as Zaporizhia existed, the landlords dared not burden the peasantry with too heavy a yoke and only its destruction made possible the extension of serfdom to Ukraine. Autocratic Russia had no use for Ukrainian individualism and freedom in an empire built on obedience, serfdom, and oppression. The end of political and administrative autonomy left Ukrainians with only historical memories, social habit, folklore, and an ethnic culture still alive among the masses. By the end of the eighteenth century the former nation-state was reduced to an ethnic group. The Ukrainian situation worsened, affecting the

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fate of the peasantry, the national culture and education, the development of language and literature, and last but not least, national self-respect and pride. All this was the result of Russia’s policy toward Ukraine and of earlier Ukrainian failure to turn away from Russia and to solidify its nationhood. One hundred fifty years later history offered Ukrainians another brief chance to nullify the Pereiaslav Treaty as interpreted by Moscow, and they did it by proclaiming their short-lived independence on 22 January 1918.

Notes 1. Taras Hunczak, ed. Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974. 2. C. Bickford O’Brien. Muscovy and the Ukraine: From the Pereiaslav Agreement to the Truce of Andrusovo, 1654-1667. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963, pp. 127-28. 3. R. Flaes, Das Problem der Territorialkonflikte: Eine Untersuchung über ihre Grundlagen und Eigenschaften am Beispiele der Territorialgeschichte Polens. Amsterdam, 1929, chapters 8-10. 4. On Cossacks see George Vernadsky. Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941; Mykhailo Hrushevskyi. Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy. 10 vols. (esp. vols. 7, 8, 9); Mykola Andrusiak. Istoriia Kozachchyny. Munich, 1946; D.I. levemitskii. Ocherki po istorii Zaporozhskikh kozakov. St. Petersburg, 1879. Gunther Stoekl. Die Entstehung des Kozakentums. Munich, 1953; V.A. Golovutskii. Zaporozhskoe kozachestvo. Kiev, 1957. 5. The following select bibliography represents various and opposite interpretations of this fateful agreement: C. Bickford O’Brien. Muscovy and the Ukraine.', Natalia Polons’ka-Vasylenko. Istoriia Ukrainy. Vol. II. Munich, 1976 (chapter “Pereiaslavs’ka uhoda”); Andrii lakovliv. Ukrains’ko-moskovs’ki dohovory v XV1I-XV111 vikakh. Warsaw, 1934; Oleksander Ohloblyn. Treaty of Pereiaslav. Toronto, New York, 1954; Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiiei: Dokumenty i materialy 1620-1654. 3 vols. Moscow, 1953—54; Ivan Krypiakevych. Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. Kiev, 1954. And his Vyzvolna viina 1648-1654 rr. i vozziednannia Ukrainy z Rosiieiu. Kiev, 1961; Viacheslv Lypyns’kyi. Ukraina na perelomi, 1657-1659. Vienna, 1920; George P. Kulchycky, “Three Attempts at Federation in 17th Century Eastern Europe.” Nationalities Papers, IX: 2: 207-24. 6. O’Brien. Muscovy and the Ukraine, p. 27. 7. Soviet views expressed in numerous books and articles on the occasion of the 300th and 325th anniversaries. See Lowell Tillett. The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969; Mykhailo Braichevskyi. Annexation or Reunification: Critical

Russian Expansion and Policy in Ukraine 1648-1791

8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13.

14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

121

Notes on One Conception. Transi, by George P. Kulchycky. Munich, 1974. Istoriia SSSR. Vol. III. Moscow, 1967, pp. 80, 637; I.G. Rozner, “Osvoboditelnaia voina.” Voprosy istorii, No. 4 (April 1979), pp. 51-64. M.N. Pokrovskii. Izbrannye proizvedenia. Vol. I. Moscow, 1966 ed. Pokrovskii. Izbrannye, vol. I, p. 453. Polons’ka-Vasylenko. Istoriia Ukrainy, vol. II, p. 40; lakovliv, Ukrains'ko-moskovs’ki dohovory, pp. 50-52. Polons’ka-Vasylenko. Istoriia, vol. II, p. 40. On the impact and role of Ukrainian clergy in Russia see F.B. Korchmaryk. Dukhovni vplyvy Kyieva na Moskovshchynu. New York, 1964; Alexander Sydorenko. The Kievan Academy in the Seventeenth Century. Ottawa, 1977; P. Pekraskii. Nauka i literatura pri Petre Velikom. 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 1862. I.R. “Ne dozvaliaiu. Khai krashche ne prosiat.” Radians*kyi knyhar, No. 8 (1930), pp. 6-9. On Mazepa’s period see Oleksander Ohloblyn. Hetman Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba. New York, 1960; Clarence A. Manning. Hetman of Ukraine: Ivan Mazepa. New York, 1957; George Gajecky. The Cossack Administration of the Hetmanate. 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass., 1978. Borys Krupnytskyi. Hetman Danylo ApostoVl i ioho doba. Augsburg, 1948, p. 23. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 131-134. On Ukrainian industry see Oleksander Ohloblyn. A History of Ukrainian Industry. (Reprint of the three-volume study first published in Kiev in 1925 and 1931) Harvard Series in Ukrainian studies, vol. 12. Munich, 1971; Konstantyn Kononenko. Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations Between Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1917. Marquette Slavic Studies, vol. 4. Milwaukee, 1958. The steady decline of Ukrainian-owned factories and the number of Ukrainian merchants by the early nineteenth century produced the following distribution of ownership: Merchants Owners of industrial enterprises 55.6% 44.6% Russians 22.2% 28.7% Ukrainians 20.9% 17.4% Jews 2.4% 5.7% Others 1.9% 3.6% Foreigners (Kononenko. Ukraine and Russia, p. 30). Natalia Polons’ka-Vasylenko, “The Settlement of the Southern Ukraine, 1750-1775.” The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. Vols. IV-V (1955) Special issue. On Russian agrarian policy in Ukraine see Hans Auerbach. Die

122 Russian Colonial Expansion

23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31. 32.

33.

Besiedlung der Südukraine in den Jahren 1774-1787. Wiesbaden, 1965; Polons’ka-Vasylenko. “The Settlement.” E. Efimenko. Istoriia ukrainskago naroda. St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 345. Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii, No. 9921, 29 December 1751; Senatskii arkhiv, VIII, p. 410. Polons’ka-Vasylenko, “The Settlement,” p. 160. A.A. Skalkovskii. Istoriia Novoi Sechi. Vol. II, pp. 38-40. See, for instance, Ian Grey. Catherine the Great: Autocrat and Empress of All Russia. Philadelphia, New York, 1962; Marc Raeff. Imperial Russia, 1682-1825. New York, 1971; David M. Griffiths, “Catherine II: The Republican Empress.” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 21:3 (1973): 323-44. James A. Duran, Jr., “Catherine II, Potemkin, and Colonization Policy in Southern Russia.” The Russian Review, 29:1 (1969): 23-26. Isabel de Madariage. Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. Chapters 4, 20. The only study in English is the one by Zenon E. Kohut, “The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy (1763-1786): A Case Study in the Integration of a Non-Russian Area into the Empire.” Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania, 1975. Henry R. Huttenbach, “The Ukraine and Muscovite Expansion,” in Hunczak, ed. Russian Imperialism, p. 192. Chteniia v obshchestvennoi istorii drevnrossiiskoi pri Moskovskom universitete. Book I, p. 104 (1845). V.O. Kliuchevskii. Sochineniia. Kurs russkoi istorii. Vol. 3. Moscow, 1957 ed., pp. 115-119. On election in Ukraine to the Legislative Commission and debates see G.A. Maksimovich. Vybory i nakazy v Malorossii v Zakonodatelnuiu komissiiu 1767 g. Part I: Vybory i sostavleine nakazov. Nizhyn, 1917; Sbornik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva. Vol. VII (1871); A. Smirdin, ed. Sochineniia Imperatritsy Ekateriny II. 3 vols. St. Petersburg, 1850; Zenon E. Kohut, “The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy (1763-1786).” Also his “A Gentry Democracy within an Autocracy: The Politics of Hryhori Poletyka (1723/24-1784).” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, III-IV, Pt. 2 (1979-1980): 507-519. Kohut, “A Gentry Democracy,” p. 510.

VII The Crimea under Russian Rule 1783 to the Great Reforms Edward Lazzerini

n his mid-sixteenth-century account Of the Russe Common­

Giles Fletcher, English ambassador to the court of I Ivan IV, devoted a chapter to Muscovy’s troublesome southern wealth,

and eastern neighbors, particularly the Crimean Tatars.1 From hearsay and the popular misperceptions of his Russian hosts, he evoked a titillating if dubious vision of Tatar society whose culture as well as political, social, and economic organization had all the distinctions of barbarism and primitiveness. Not only does Fletcher characterize the Tatars as bellicose, savage in their manners, and conniving in their relations with outsiders, but he insists that “knowing no arts of peace nor any civil practice” they are enjoined by nature and custom to “take or steal from any stranger whatsoever they can get.” Such ruthlessness is tempered only by the quaint aboriginal quality of this mythical society: according to Fletcher’s version of reality, the Tatar realm knew no permanent buildings or urban centers, no agriculture or coinage, no learning or written law. Not surprisingly, the facts do not bear out Fletcher’s second­ hand description of Tatar life in the sixteenth century, except insofar as he correctly reveals the military might of the Crimean Khanate and the ability of its rulers to influence events in much of eastern Europe. Supposedly lacking even the rudiments of a state structure, a codified legal system, and a diversified economy, the Tatars ensconced along the northern Black Sea littoral had, on the contrary, achieved a level of social development that equaled or surpassed that of their neighbors. With a complex, stable political structure, the khanate was able to mobilize significant human and material resources to sustain a 123

124 Russian Colonial Expansion sophisticated, literate culture lacking in none of the components expected of a contemporary civilized society.2 By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the khanate would see its pivotal role in eastern European and steppe politics diminished considerably. Changes in the region’s geopolitical balance occasioned by the simultaneous enhancement of Muscovy’s position and deterioration of the Ottoman Empire’s have often been cited as reason enough to explain the rather sudden turn of Crimean fortune. But to this consideration must be added the certain if poorly documented evidence of internal decline. Of particular significance domestically was the reduction of financial resources available to the khans, resources tradi­ tionally sustained by plunder from yearly raids against the khanate’s neighbors, by captives either sold into slavery or ransomed, by tribute money from Poland and Muscovy, and by donations from the Turkish sultan as payment for the khanate’s protection of the Ottoman Empire’s northern marches. Without these substantial annual revenues, not only did the fragile compromise between the khans and the great Tatar clans collapse, thereby throwing Crimean politics into turmoil, but the end of the slave trade undermined perhaps the most important sector of Crimean economic life, with as yet poorly analyzed but clearly profound social consequences. Thus, what Peter the Great’s Russia faced along its expanding southern frontier on the eve of the eighteenth century was the shadow of a once mighty foe, still able to defend its home base, but no longer the uncontrolled terror stalking the steppes or visiting destruction deep into the Russian lands. The ability of the khanate to stave off final defeat at Russian hands until 1783 had less to do with real Crimean strengths than St. Petersburg’s preoccupation with its own domestic problems and its western neighbors, and the short-term success of Tatar diplomacy. The long series of events that culminated in the loss of Crimean independence still awaits its historian, but the final stages that were played out during the reign of Catherine II (1764-1796) have been amply described and analyzed recently.3 While the complex and fluid relationship between Russia and the khanate need not detain us here, we ought to note that four invasions of the peninsula by Russian troops were required between 1771 and 1782 before the empress reluctantly consented to the region’s annexation and ended her years of hopeful

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experimentation with alternative solutions to this border problem.4 Not surprisingly, once made, this decision led to the Crimea’s rapid territorial and administrative reorganization and integration into the Russian imperial system. In the process, however, the Tatar people were promised that their traditional economic, social and religio-cultural life would be little disturbed. How well this promise was kept over the next eighty years and how the Tatar people fared as a minority not only within the empire as a whole but especially within their own traditional territory are the subjects of the remaining pages of this chapter.

Salient Features of Crimean Life under Russian Rule

Administrative Organization Except for scattered and limited outbursts of anti-Russian military action in the immediate aftermath of Catherine’s annexation proclamation, pacification of the Crimea proceeded with exceptional ease. Much of the reason for this can be found in the substantial emigration to the Ottoman Empire of many who might have otherwise offered continued resistance; but also instrumental were those members of the Tatar secular and religious élite willing to accommodate themselves to the new order and serve its interests. The quick end to military conflict permitted Catherine’s agents to move toward establishment of a new political structure that initially combined a Russian military administration with a native civil government. The former was responsible for maintaining the occupation army and defending the empire’s newly acquired province from external attack and internal rebellion. Entirely in Russian hands, it was given the further duty of collecting local taxes. The native civil govern­ ment, on the other hand, in a transparent effort by Russian authorities to smooth the transition from independent khanate to Russian province, was staffed largely by Tatars with experience in the administrative affairs of the old regime. In addition to its reliance on native personnel, the civil government followed the organizational pattern established under the khan: six regions subdivided into varying numbers of districts, all of whose heads wielded broad judicial and police authority.5 This original compromise between Russian and Tatar political interests was too generous to last very long. Within a year, pressure to integrate the region fully into the imperial framework

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led to the abolition of the peculiar and expedient arrangement only recently devised. In its place was installed a unified system with organs typical of imperial practice elsewhere in the realm and with participation by native personnel increasingly restricted. The administrative organization of the region went through a series of changes until 1802, when the government of Alexander I (1801-1825) set its final pre-1917 shape, and in the process the Crimea—by being merged with other Russian territory and settled by Russian and foreign colonists—and its people lost much of their identity and the last vestiges of their independence.6

Demographic Trends What is most striking about the demographic aspect of our subject is the depletion of the native population and the subsequent relegation of the Tatars to minority status within their own homeland. While reliable data are unavailable for the size of the Crimea’s preannexation population—scholars have generally accepted the unsubstantiated total of 300,000 proposed in a number of sources—a survey ordered by Baron Igel’strom in 1784 to determine the socio-economic condition of the region produced an estimate of 150,000 Tatar inhabitants.7 A little over twenty years later, in 1805-1806, statistics compiled for a special commission created to adjudicate land disputes showed a Tatar population of slightly more than 129,000.8 Assuming these figures to be approximately correct and in the absence of fertility and mortality rates, which would have to be startling to prove meaningful in this circumstance, massive emigration must account for the apparent population decline.9 In fact, contem­ porary literary evidence invariably notes the significant level of Tatar flight, mostly to the Ottoman Empire, and offers estimates ranging as high as 100,000-110,000 for this early period. The bulk of those who abandoned their homeland did so following the signing of the Treaty of Jassy in January 1792, which brought to a close the latest Russo-Turkish conflict and dashed Tatar hopes of recovering their independence. Anti-Russian propaganda spread by pro-Turkish elements and the economic threat posed by the influx of colonists further contributed to the exodus. During the first half of the nineteenth century the flood of emigrants receded to a steady trickle sustained by an economic depression particularly severe for many Tatar peasants. The Crimean War, however, set the stage for a second mass exodus

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that involved over 181,000 people by 1863.10 Economic distress, fears of accelerated efforts at Russification through schools and religious institutions, threats of deportation to the Russian interior, and the passage of approximately 16,000 Nogai emigrants through the Crimea on their way to the Ottoman Empire combined to create the panic that resulted in the reduction of the Tatar population by two-thirds. By the time the government, which had initially facilitated the request for exit permission, acted to halt the human tide, the Tatars numbered around 100,000 out of a total Crimean population of close to twice that figure.11 The non-Tatar component—a clear majority by the mid1860s—had gained its demographic prominence as a result not only of Tatar emigration but also of decades of colonization sponsored by the Russian government and private interests. Under the khanate this segment of the population represented no more than a small minority of Armenians, Georgians, Greeks, and Karaim Jews, who, despite their numbers, played a major role in the economic life of the realm. Under Russian colonial administration such traditional Tatar neighbors as these were supplemented in two ways:' firstly by Serbs, Moldavians, Vlakhs, Bulgarians, Poles, Germans, and many other foreigners attracted by financial assistance, free land, and extensive privileges; and secondly by Russian and Ukrainian peasants brought from other areas of the empire by serf owners who had acquired landhold­ ings in the peninsula and needed field hands. While the concept of systematically settling large numbers of foreign colonists in Russia dates from the early 1760s and had resulted in the recruitment of 30,000 immigrants for the Volga region by 1775, the Crimea could boast of a similar number of such settlers only in the 1850s. In addition to the slow pace at which foreigners settled in the region, their presence was always numerically less significant than that of imperial colonists, who accounted for over 70,000 inhabitants of the peninsula on the eve of the Crimean War.12 Taken together, these colonists succeeded in acquiring some of the best land that the Crimea possessed and restricting the opportunities that Tatar peasants might otherwise have had to sell their labors. The economic crisis that plagued the Tatars during much of the early nineteenth century was undoubtedly aggravated by these twin developments.13

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Economic Developments On 30 October 1793, after following a circuitous route that took him from St. Petersburg to Moscow and then down the Volga, a middle-aged academician with a distinguished reputation arrived in Simferopol to gather material on the Crimea’s flora and fauna, topography, economic geography, and ethnography. Petr Semenovich Pallas, at the request of P.A. Zubov, the local chief administrator, took upon himself the additional task of surveying the region’s productive strength and assessing its potential for further development. In his reports to Zubov and in later publications, Pallas was optimistic about the Crimea’s future as a major entrepot serving Russia’s commercial ties with the Mediterranean nations, provided her ports were improved, warehouse facilities expanded, and a more flexible tariff policy initiated. He was equally hopeful that through investment and proper management the natural agricultural wealth of the region would support the revival and development of two potentially lucrative enterprises: viticulture and sericulture. So convinced was he of the future of Crimean wines, for example, that he predicted Russia would one day manage to do without French imports! Much would have to be changed, however, before such rewards could be reaped, and much would depend upon state initiative as well as private capital. To begin with, he argued, the government ought to auction all state-owned land, selling to anyone who would guarantee the property’s use for intensive cultivation and who would take an active interest in improving the yields of his holdings. In addition, the government would have to respond imaginatively and boldly to the problem of acute labor shortage (and the slothful nature of the Tatar peasant) by inviting foreign colonists to settle the region and encouraging voluntary migration of hardworking imperial subjects skilled in various agrarian pursuits: Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles to work the rich valleys and grow grain or raise livestock; Armenians and Moldavians to establish vineyards and silkworm plantations in the hills. Above all, the government would have to overcome the most serious obstacle to economic development by resolving the divisive disputes between Tatars and non-natives over land ownership and between peasants and landowners over the former’s rights and obligations as tenant farmers.14

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Pallas’s hopes for the future of the Crimean economy were only partially realized, and even then provided much less benefit to the native Tatar inhabitants than to those Russian and foreign newcomers who managed to acquire sometimes massive estates or settled in the new port cities of Sevastopol and Balaklava to participate in the expansion of Russia’s southern commerce. Developments in the peninsula’s rural economy provide a case in point. Owing in large measure to the decision not to introduce serfdom into Tatar society and the widespread labor shortage resulting from emigration, agriculture in the hands of estate owners became increasingly specialized and commercialized: by the 1830s and 1840s large-scale enterprises devoted to wheat farming, sheepbreeding, and wine-making, with their promise of generous profits through national and international marketing, had come to dominate the local economy.15 In the process, however, the Tatar peasantry, while legally free from the burdens and restrictions of serfdom, found its traditional rights and access to the land severely diminished in the face of pressure from large landowners. Taking advantage of their socio-political power (bolstered by favorable imperial policies) and greater financial resources, as well as the limited defense that the peasantry could muster on its own behalf, the region’s nobility (including some of its Tatar members) managed over these decades to purchase state lands at undervalued prices, to seize peasant holdings when ownership could not be proved, and to raise the labor demands (barshchina) of their peasant tenants beyond the prescribed three days a week. Particularly onerous was the growing practice of mesiachina, whereby the landowner denied his peasants any land for their own use and obliged them to work only for him.16 Little wonder that so many Tatars opted to emigrate, although in fairness to the local nobility, exploitation of peasants increased throughout the empire in the decades just prior to the abolition of serfdom, contributing to the pauperization of the class as a whole and its decline in absolute number.

Cultural Conditions In 1821 the Russian government commissioned two men to lead an expedition to the Crimea with the goal of surveying the many antiquities scattered across the peninsula. Besides identifying the extant monuments of Tatar and pre-Tatar culture, they were ordered to determine which of these ought to be preserved. In a

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report later submitted through bureaucratic channels, the expedi­ tion’s architectural expert recommended that 41,000 roubles be appropriated from state funds to subvent the task of restoring and maintaining eight structures, including mosques in Kozlov, Eski Sarai, and Feodosiia. Following extensive discussion at the highest administrative level, the Minister of Internal Affairs informed authorities in Tavricheskai^ Gubemiia that 10,000 roubles would be allotted, but only for antiquities of Greek and Italian origin; Tatar and Turkish monuments, being less valuable, would have to rely upon the beneficence of local natives for their survival.17 In this response is reflected an indifference, if not antagonism, toward Tatar culture that probably represents the general attitude of most Russians during this period. At its best, such an attitude contributed nothing to the preservation of splendid mosques, caravanserais, public baths, or fountains, let alone cemeteries or private dwellings; at its worst, it encouraged their destruction in the name of progress. However much a Pushkin, for example, might lament the way in which the khan’s palace in Bakhchisarai had been allowed to decay, poetic indignation could do little to prevent such common but tragic acts as the leveling of major Tatar structures around Simferopol’s great square to make room for an enlarged parade ground.18 And the deaf ears were not only to be found among top bureaucrats: when the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued a circular in 1827 to all provincial governors for information on antiquities in their administrative areas, the response from Tavricheskaia Gubemiia was shocking: only two local officials acknowledged any architectural monu­ ments at all in their districts, and each counted only one!19 Is this to be explained by some conspiracy of silence among the rest, motivated by a conscious detestation of Tatar culture, or does it better reflect bureaucratic incompetence, avoidance of duty, or ignorance as to what an antiquity was? For that matter, ought we not at least entertain the likelihood that many Russians in the Crimea were unable to judge the value of Tatar architectural monuments because the latter were considered to be part of a culture that, however defeated and decadent, still throve and ought to be maintaining those very structures itself? And, finally, given the abandonment of many Tatar buildings as a result of mass emigration, ought we to be surprised by the sometimes cavalier manner in which they were razed by local

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Russian authorities, especially in urban areas (always more important to local Russian interests) where the need for development was most pressing? Until such time as the records of local government are opened to examination, answers to these and other important questions are likely to remain elusive. If the material achievements of Tatar culture suffered from Russian neglect, disdain, and, at times, brutal onslaught, its spiritual aspect endured more subtle forms of pressure that were probably no less destructive for all their apparent harmlessness. From the moment of annexation the Russian government pursued a dual policy regarding the Islamic religion. It preferred, for instance, to leave all matters of dogma, ritual, and familial concern in the hands of clergy unless requested to intervene in appellate fashion by a disgruntled litigant. Even when the government undertook to regulate (though not determine) Islamic practice, as through the code of 1831 and other nineteenth-century decrees, the bases for such regulation were invariably the Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence) and pre-1783 custom. As one commentator observed laconically, in such matters “Kuranic law provejd stronger than state law.”20 But religion is more than dogma and ritual. Generally it also spawns a body of specialists or professional interpreters (in the case of Islam, the ulema) who, because of their wisdom, virtue, or other socially valued personal attributes enjoy a position of leadership among the faithful. Desiring to exploit the social authority of the Tatar ulema, and fearful that if left unfettered this authority could be used to promote anti-Russian sentiment, the tsarist government sought to bind the Islamic clergy to state service. Two approaches were taken. On the one hand, Catherine’s regime moved quickly in the early postannexation years to court clerical loyalty by issuing a number of decrees that: (1) granted salaries to all religious personnel; (2) assured that the clergy would retain their positions, spiritual authority, and control over religious education and vakifi (vast landholdings traditionally serving as revenue-producers to support mosques, schools, and charitable institutions); (3) exempted vakifs and the clergy from state taxation and other levies; (4) bestowed upon the clergy the right to operate movable property and on the mufti (officially recognized as chief cleric) the status of nobility; and (5) ordered allocation of state funds to finance construction of mosques, schools, and caravanserais, as well as the printing and

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distribution of the Kur’qn. Taken together these measures engendered a patron-client relationship that inevitably fostered clerical subservience and self-imposed censorship as largely unconscious expressions of gratitude. On the other hand, the government maneuvered more cautiously but no less effectively to reinforce financial and psychological dependency and restrict clerical autonomy by insisting that civil law was indeed paramount where the corporate status of the clergy, the organizational principles underlying clerical life and authority, the procedures for establishing clerical rank, and the performance of certain duties were involved. In this light, for example, we can discern the purpose behind the creation of an Islamic governing body that ultimately took the form of the Muslim Spiritual Assembly (1794), the promulgation of the code of 1831 (which, among other things, defined the responsibilities of the clergy, their positions, and the procedures for election to high posts), and the requirement for clergy to maintain registers of births, deaths, and marriages beginning in 1834. Such well-aimed thrusts in combination with material and psychic rewards worked remarkably well to achieve for the government its goal of clerical subservience. What the latter’s effect upon Crimean society was, however, is more difficult to determine. Before the 1880s we know virtually nothing about the relationship between the clergy and the faithful to be able to demonstrate that its co-optation had the negative consequences that many have long presumed and which analogous situations would indicate. Yet if complaints by lay and religious reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are a reliable gauge of more widespread attitudes, then state patronage succeeded in diminishing significantly clerical esteem and authority. Servility and obsequiousness had rendered the clergy socially impotent.

Educational and Intellectual Trends During the late 1860s, officials from the Ministries of Public Education and Internal Affairs met with school administrators, teachers, and local notables throughout the empire to discuss the state of education among non-Russian subjects and the possibility of expanding instruction beyond current limits. At provincial conferences, in official publications, in the press, and in the “fat

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journals” that were so important for the dissemination of information beyond St. Petersburg and Moscow, a seemingly endless stream of opinion poured forth for public scrutiny. Concerning education among the Tatars of Tavricheskaia Gubemiia, the consensus held that the government had accom­ plished little since 1783 to foster secular schooling and instruction and that the quality of native Islamic schools was inferior at best. Such complaints were proffered by Russians knowledgeable of the local situation and echoed by Tatars concerned with the lack of development in the region and their brethren’s cultural retardation.21 Education and intellectual life within Crimean Tatar society had not always been so dismal. During the heyday of the khanate a vigorous literate culture was sustained by a generously supported network of domestic mektebs (primary schools) and medresses (advanced theological institutions) that served well the limited needs of a traditional society.22 The intimate association of religion and education, of course, encouraged the latter’s development, as did the Islamic injunction that boys should study between the ages of six ;and fifteen. How this precolonial, religious educational system was affected by the imposition of Russian rule, however, defies analysis for the present. We might expect that the number of schools would have dwindled during the early nineteenth century as a consequence of population movement and decline as well as of the widespread and worsening economic distress of most Tatars who remained behind. The lack of empirical data, unfortunately, precludes the making of even this basic judgment. Nevertheless, the complaints against the narrowness of the curriculum in the Islamic schools and the poor overall quality of their instruction are borne out by the efforts of native reformers in the 1880s and the following decades. Likewise the absence of any literary activity among the Tatars before the same period attests to the general cultural decay of their society since annexation. We are on somewhat firmer ground when addressing govern­ ment involvement in the education of Crimean Tatars, but even here information is spotty, often contradictory, and maddeningly ambiguous. In general, Catherine H’s promise to respect the clergy’s traditional control of religious education was maintained by her successors. Through the mid-nineteenth century, succeed­ ing administrations showed little interest in either the quantity or

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quality of local Islamic schools and did nothing to foster or hinder their functioning. Only in the areas of language instruction and teacher preparation did the government fitfully develop programs and allocate some public funds. Thus, between 1824 and 1854 several projects were drawn up to introduce the study of Russian and secular subjects into some Islamic schools while establishing a Tatar section within the Simferopol Gymnasium with instruc­ tion of and in the Tatar language. The impediments to full implementation of the various proposals, however, were multiple: chronic underfunding, lack of Tatar texts for classroom use, and, above all, widespread suspicion among Tatars of the govern­ ment’s motives for encouraging the study of Russian. As a result, all but a tiny number of Russified natives (primarily from murza, or noble, families) refused to send their children to the few Russian-sponsored schools or to permit Russian instruction in native institutions. The educational experience of someone like Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (1851—1914), the great Tatar reformer, was thus exceptional for its association with Russian institutions: first the Simferopol Gymnasium, followed by enrollment in Voronezh and Moscow military academies. How exceptional schooling of this kind was for a young Tatar is attested to by figures for the number of enrollees in and graduates of the Tatar section of the Simferopol Gymnasium: only seventy and twentyfive respectively for the period 1827-1854.23 In the 1860s the more serious Russian interest in minority education was stimulated by the desire to bring greater numbers from among such people as the Tatars into the mainstream of imperial life. State-sponsored education, emphasizing instruction of and in the Russian language and involving a more aggressive role for the Russian Orthodox Church, was expected to foster assimilation (sblizhenie) while simultaneously dissipating the political threat that ethnic and religious consciousness posed ultimately to the territorial integrity of the empire. Considered by Russian nationalists as a tool for preserving the status quo, education became instead an instrument for the revitalization of local native culture and the creation of a modern native intelligentsia increasingly critical of Russia’s dominant influence in contemporary society.

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Conclusion In Bakhchisarai, two days after the centennial anniversary of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, Ismail Bey Gasprinskii published the initial number of the first Tatar newspaper, TercümanIPerevodchik. In a lead article hailing the important event of one hundred years earlier, he noted how “on 8 April 1783, the small khanate, worn out by disorder and bloodshed, was made a part of the greatest empire in the world and, under the patronage of a mighty power, received peace and the protection of just laws ...” Continuing in this euphoric vein, he added: “Celebrating this day . . . the Crimean Muslims cannot fail to recall all of those good deeds from which they have already profited for a century.”24 Considering the years of frustration he endured before receiving official permission to publish a newspaper, Gasprinskii might be forgiven the fervor of his gratitude. But hyperbole aside, is there any truth to his assessment of Russia’s contribution to Tatar society? Were the Tatars recipients of Russian beneficence and sympathy ip the years from 1783 to the 1860s? Had they indeed profited from their association with the Russian Empire? Not long ago Western intellectual bias buttressed by the unspoken assumptions of modernization theory might have prompted us to respond affirmatively to such questions. While recognizing that Tatars suffered from Russian political, economic, and social domination, we nevertheless would have emphasized some presumed long-term benefit of Russian (i.e. Western) influence. With a faith bom of the reality of Western political, military, and technological might, we often argued for the universal applicability of the Western experience and the value of its acceptance by other societies. For all who tread the Western path, short-term social dislocation and personal intellectual traumas were small prices to pay for the inevitable rewards of industrialization, social egalitarianism, political democracy, and modem science. More recently this vision of human history has come under sharp attack. Where once Western civilization was proclaimed the ideal against which other civilizations and cultures were to be measured, and where once imitation of the West was a conditio sine qua non of the construction of a better society, now many are much less sanguine about what the West has to offer the rest

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of the world. As a result, answers to questions of the type posed above no longer come as. easily; nor are they as likely to be positive. If we descend from this philosophical level of discourse, however, then the significance of the khanate’s destruction and the incorporation of the peninsula and its people into the tsarist empire is undeniable and clear. By the mid-1860s, after barely eighty years of Russian rule, Crimean Tatar society had been largely integrated into the imperial order. While the peasants had escaped being caught up in the institutional net of serfdom, their autonomy was more apparent than real, especially in view of their economic plight. As for the clergy and remnants of the old murza families, both were transformed into estates in keeping with current Russian practice, and both found their social authority diminished by association with and dependency upon Russian officialdom. Emasculated and servile, the traditional élite could no longer provide independent local leadership. Socially, then, the effect of Russian conquest was substantial and fundamental. The same conclusion, moreover, can be drawn for other aspects of Tatar life. Demographically, the cost to the Crimea was extraordinary; in some shorter periods, staggering. Economically, the establishment of a colonial presence, for all its promise, succeeded only in aggrandizing a minority of the Russified native élite and its colonial counterpart, and aggravat­ ing the difficult conditions under which peasants usually work. Culturally, Tatar society appears to have become a wasteland unable to sustain even a modicum of intellectual, literary, or artistic activity. While the Russian government was hardly solely responsible for the grim condition in which Tatar society found itself by the middle of the nineteenth century, it certainly did little to ease the transformation, which it had a hand in fostering, of a once vital culture.

Notes 1. For this discussion I have used the edition of Fletcher’s work found in L. Berry and R. Crummey (eds.), Rude and Barbarous Kingdom (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp. 191-202. 2. This is one of Alan W. Fisher’s major arguments in Crimean Tatars (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), Chapters 3-5. 3. See Alan W. Fisher, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

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4. On this subject, once again, Alan W. Fisher has added substantially to our knowledge with two studies: “Enlightened Despotism and Islam Under Catherine II,” Slavic Review, XXVII, No. 4 (December 1968), pp. 542-553, and “Sahin Girey, the Reformer Khan, and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, XV, No. 3 (September, 1967), pp. 341-364. 5. The following provides the basic information concerning the first years of Russian administration of the Crimea: F.F. Lashkov, “Statisticheskiia svedeniia o Kryme, soobshchenyia kaimakanami v 1783 godu,” Zapiski imperatorskago odesskago obshchestva istorii i drevnostei, XIV (1886), pp. 91-156; A. Fisher, Crimean Tatars, pp. 70-78. 6. The peninsula was initially combined with territory beyond Perekop to form Tavricheskaia Oblast’ (Tavrida Region). In 1796 Paul I’s government decreed the unification of the oblast" with Voznesenskaia and Ekaterinoslavskaia Gubemii (Provinces) to create the super­ province of Novorossiiskaia. Finally a decree of 1802 redefined the Crimea as part of the province of Tavricheskaia. Meanwhile the internal organization of the Crimea had likewise undergone several changes before the number of uezdy (districts) was set at five in 1838: Simferopol’skii, Feodosiiskii, Evpatoriiskii, Perekopskii, and laltinskii. 7. F.F. Lashkov, “Statisticheskiia svedeniia,” p. 103. 8. F.F. Lashkov, “Sbomik dokumentov po istorii krymsko-tatarskago zemlevladeniia,” Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kommissii, XXVI (1897), pp. 84-154. ' 9. On this subject see: A.I. Markevich, “Pereseleniia Krymskikh tatar v Turtsiiu v sviazi s dvizheniem naseleniia v Krymu,” Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Otdelenie gumanitamykh nauk, 7th series (Moscow, 1928), pp. 375-405 and 7th series (Moscow, 1929), pp. 1-16; and M. Pinson, “Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862,” Güney-Dogu Avrupa Arastirmalari Dergisi, I (1972), pp. 37-56. 10. lu. lanson, Krym. Ego khlebopashestvo i khlebnaia torgovlia (St. Petersburg, 1870), p. 8. 11. See Sbomik dokumentov i statei po voprosu ob obrazovanii inorodtsev (St. Petersburg, 1869), p. 84, n., for the range of figures compiled by different official organs. 12. A. Fisher, Crimean Tatars, p. 93. 13. The question of foreign colonization in Russia generally and in the southern part of the empire particularly is treated in: R.P. Bartlett, “Foreign Colonies and Foreign Rural Settlement in the Russian Empire,” Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, XI (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1979), pp. 210-215, and Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia, 1762-1804, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; also see J.A. Duran, “Catherine II, Potemkin, and Colonization Policy in Southern Russia,” The Russian Review, XXVIII, No. 1 (January, 1969), pp. 23-36.

138 Russian Colonial Expansion 14. This brief introduction to Pallas's views is based upon E. Druzhinina, “Nachalo nauchnogo izUcheniia Kryma,” in Voprosy sotsial’noekonomicheskoi istorii i istochnikovedeniia perioda feodalizma v Rossii. Sbornik statei k 70-letiiu A.A. Novosel’skogo (Moscow, 1961), pp. 345-350. A. Markevich has written a more thorough study entitled “Akademik P.S. Pallas. Ego zhizn,’ prebyvanie v Krymu i uchenye trudy,” Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kommissii, XLVII (1912), pp. 167-242. 15. M. Maksimenko, Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie v Tavricheskoi gubemii nakanune i posle otmeny krepostnogo prava (Simferopol*, 1957), pp. 14-21. 16. Ibid., pp. 8-25, passim. Despite government establishment of several commissions to resolve conflicting claims on landed property in the Crimea, and despite the favorable judgement that some Tatar peasants eventually won after filing suit before these bodies, land ownership remained a source of grave social tension well beyond the era of Great Reforms. The fullest study of this problem prior to 1861 is found in F.F. Lashkov, Istoricheskii ocherk krymsko-tatarskago zemlevladeniia (Simferopol*, 1897), Part III. 17. This episode is recounted in A. Steven, “Delà arkhiva Tavricheskago gubemskago pravleniia, otnosiashchiiasia do razyskaniia, opisaniia i sokhraneniia pamiatnikov stariny v predelakh Tavricheskoi gubemii,” Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kommissii, XIII (1891), pp. 37-41. 18. A. Fisher, Crimean Tatars, p. 95. 19. A. Steven, “Delà arkhiva,” pp. 42-44. 20. I. Aleksandrov, “O musuPmanskom dukhovenstve i upravlenii dukhovnymi delami musul’man v Krymu posle ego prisoedineniia k Rossii,” Izvestiia Tavricheskoi uchenoi arkhivnoi kommissii, LI (1914), pp. 218-219. 21. Sbornik dokumentov, pp. 97-156. 22. See F.F. Lashkov, “Statisticheskiia svedeniia,” pp. 113-115, for statistics compiled by Baron Igel’strom in 1784. The figure for mektebs (26) is clearly too low in relationship to the number of medresses (23). Note also Fisher’s comments concerning Tatar cultural life in Crimean Tatars, pp. 28-36, and in “Crimean Separatism in the Ottoman Empire,” in Nationalism in a Non­ National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, ed. by W. Haddad and W. Ochsenwald (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), pp. 57-76. 23. Sbornik dokumentov, p. 90. 24. “Stoletie,” TercümanIPerevodchik, No. 1 (10 April 1883), p. 1.

VIII Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813 Muriel Atkin

ussian involvement in Caucasian affairs began in the mid­

R sixteenth century, when a few north Caucasian chiefs sought Moscow’s support against local rivals. At the same time, Muscovite conquest of the Tatar lands along the Volga River as far as the Caspian Sea brought Moscow’s frontier close to the northern Caucasus. The arrangement between the tsar and a few powerful individuals was conflated into a Muscovite claim to suzerainty over the north-central Caucasus. Yet the claim remained little more than a rhetorical flourish until the eighteenth century, when Russia, partly by design, partly by chance, engaged intermittently in negotiations and military operations aimed at increasing its authority over the Caucasus. From the start, Russian expansion into the Caucasus took place in a setting which was politically fluid and therefore volatile. The growth of Muscovy to the southeast was part of the restructuring of power that followed the collapse of the Mongol and Timurid empires. In the sixteenth century, three empires, the Muscovite, Ottoman, and Safavi (which ruled Iran from 1501 to 1722), all expanded rapidly by reassembling fragments of the Turco-Mongol empires of the later Middle Ages. The place where all three of these expansionist drives met was the Caucasus. The extension of Muscovy’s border to the northeastern fringe of the Caucasus antagonized the Ottomans and was one of the causes of the unsuccessful attempt by the Ottomans and their Crimean vassals to conquer Astrakhan in 1569. However, until the eighteenth century the more heated rivalry in the Caucasus was between the Ottomans and the Safavis. Both empires claimed parts of the Caucasus, mostly as vassal states, with the 139

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Ottomans’ strength based in the western principalities and the Safavis’ in the center and east. The two empires, for political, religious, and economic reasons, perceived the other’s existence as a threat. Thus the Caucasus was important not only for its intrinsic value as a source of slaves, raw materials, and handicrafts but, more importantly, as a weapon to be used against the enemy. The Ottomans staged seven campaigns against their archenemies in the Caucasus from the start of the sixteenth century until the breakup of the Safavi state early in the eighteenth, although many of the Ottomans’ gains were reversed soon after a campaign ended. Two hundred years of sporadic warfare for control of this region left much of it depopulated and impoverished. Despite repeated Ottoman efforts to dominate the Caucasus the general pattern remained one of Safavi strength in the center and east and Ottoman strength in the west. During much of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, various rulers who attempted to build a new kingdom on the wreckage of Safavi Iran sought also to reclaim the Safavi domains in the Caucasus. At the same time, a weakened Ottoman Empire and an invigorated Russia tried to make themselves masters of the région. While large states fought for control of the Caucasus, local rulers tried to profit from the political instability. The region was so difficult to subdue that many principalities retained a considerable measure of autonomy even when part of some larger empire. The frequent shifts in imperial fortunes from the sixteenth century on created opportunities for alliances among various ambitious rulers so that locally powerful chiefs could expand their domains at their neighbors’ expense and weaker rulers could at least retain local authority. To the Caucasian rulers, Russia was one of several potentially useful allies. However there was a fundamental difference between Russia and the other states that endeavored to dominate this area: from the start of this era, Russia was more centralized than its rivals and became even more so from the eighteenth century on, thus reducing a Caucasian chief’s leeway to preserve his autonomy within the context of an alliance.

The Caucasian Lands and Peoples Although various parts of the Caucasus were repeatedly sub­ jected to rule by states based outside the region, the Caucasus

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posed formidable geographic, political, and cultural obstacles to the consolidation of authority. The mountains themselves consti­ tuted a daunting barrier. Rising south of the Eurasian steppe, the main range, the Greater Caucasus, stretches more than seven hundred miles from the Taman Peninsula, between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, in the northwest to the coast of the Caspian Sea in the southeast. The chain includes Europe’s highest mountain, Mount Elburz, nearly 18;500 feet high, as well as many peaks above 13,000 feet. During the period of Russian expansion in the region there were two main routes across this barrier, the high gorge cut by the Terek River through the center of the chain and the narrow strip of land along the Caspian coast. The first was often blocked by rockslides, floods, and heavy snows, and both could be held by comparatively small numbers of armed men. The part of the Caucasus over which Russia initially claimed authority was so located as to raise the possibility of Russia’s blocking Ottoman access to either of these routes across the mountains towards Iran. The mountains, with their narrow valleys, dense forests, and periodically flooded streams, could render an invading army powerless, as the Russians discovered on many occasions. This inhospitable environment also made difficult the agricultural and pastoral activities necessary to support life. That in turn encouraged the inhabitants’ fragmentation into fiercely hostile groups that frequently raided each other and fought over what good land there was. South of the main range, the mountains extend through the center of the Caucasian isthmus (with river valleys to either side) and then spread out again to the east and west in the Lesser Caucasus, which borders the Anatolian highlands and the rolling hills of southern Azerbaijan. Here the land was better suited to agriculture and animal husbandry; trade and handicrafts were also more developed. Yet the mountains south of the high range could also on occasion provide shelter for those who tried to escape hostile armies or unwelcome political authority. Not surprisingly, this area was one in which a remarkable profusion of ethnic groups survived. In linguistic terms, they belonged to three major groups: speakers of Caucasian languages (including Georgians of the central and western Caucasus, Kabardans of the north center, Chechens and Ingushes of the center, and Lesghis of the northeast); speakers of Turkic languages (including Azeris of the southeast and Qumuqs of the

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northeast); and speakers of Indo-European languages (including Armenians, widespread throughout the region, Iranians of the southeast, and Ossetes of the center). These linguistic distinctions did not necessarily connote a sense of ethnic or national identity. A more important focus of loyalty was religion, which had political as well as spiritual significance. For a Georgian or Armenian to convert to Islam indicated political affiliation with the Ottoman Empire or Iran. The majority of the region’s population was Muslim, although there was a large Christian minority (and a small number of Jews and others). However, to categorize the inhabitants so broadly is to imply a simplicity that did not exist. The Christian community was divided principally between the Monophysite Armenians and the Orthodox Georgians. The Muslims were even more divided. Most of the Muslims of the Greater Caucasus were not converted until some time between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, although in the northeastern zone some had converted much earlier. They adhered for the most part to Sunni Islam, the majority sect championed by the Ottoman Empire. The largest group of dissenters were the “Twelver” Shiites, who lived primarily in the southeast anti along the Caspian coast. In several principalities the Shiites held political power over a Sunni populace. This was a source of recurrent political turmoil in the region, including during the era of the Russian takeover. Even these broad religious affiliations only occasionally proved strong enough to rally support from various groups in pursuit of some common goal. Under most circumstances political loyalty was atomized into groups centered around a tribe or a powerful family. For example, the Kabardans belonged to the larger Circassian (or Adyghe) group that inhabited the northwestern Caucasus. Sometime around the thirteenth century, a faction broke away and moved along the northern side of the Greater Caucasus to the area west of the Terek River. They eventually became known as Kabardans from the name of one of their chiefs. A couple of centuries later, part of this group broke off and moved east of the Terek. These two groups not only fought each other but also were divided internally into warring factions that followed several powerful families, some of whom sought Russian backing while others sought Ottoman support. The kingdom of Georgia, which in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries had dominated much of the Caucasus and adjoining

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territories, began to break, up in the mid-fifteenth century. By the eighteenth century, as Russia began to take a serious interest in Georgian affairs, the kingdom had split into seven principalities. (The two eastern principalities were reunited in the middle of the century and became known as the Kingdom of Georgia.) From the point of view of Russian expansion, the Caucasus could be divided into seven zones: The north-central slopes of the Greater Caucasus, including Kabarda (the focus of much of Russia’s early involvement in the region), Chechenia, and northern Ossetia. Most inhabitants of this region were Sunni Muslims except for the Ossetes, who adhered to their own distinctive variety of Orthodox Christianity. The northeast, Daghestan (the “Land of Mountains”), inhabited by Qumuqs, Lesghis, and a great number of other, smaller groups. Sunni Muslims formed the majority but there were also Shiite and Jewish minorities. (Russia claimed sovereignty over most of these peoples by the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries but could not enforce the claim until well into the nineteenth.) The northwest, between the Black Sea coast and the Kuban River, inhabited by the Circassians and others, all at least nominally Sunni Muslims. (This area remained under the control of the Ottoman Empire or its allies into the 1820s and was not effectively controlled by Russia until much later.) The kingdom of Georgia, in the south-central zone. The Georgian Orthodox Church was the state religion; Armenians and Muslims formed significant minorities. (This kingdom was annexed by Russia in 1801, the first formal integration of Caucasian territory into the Russian Empire.) The western zone, comprising three Georgian principalities at least nominally subject to the Ottoman Empire—Mingrelia, Imeretia, Guria—and Abkhazia. (Russia claimed this area in the early years of the nineteenth century; the Ottoman Empire formally recognized that claim in 1812.) The southwest, especially the Ottoman pashaliks (provinces) of Akhaltsekhe and Kars, which had significant Georgian and Armenian populations. (Part of this zone was taken by Russia in the 1820s or later.) The southeastern Caucasus (northern Azerbaijan), the Muslim-ruled khanates north of the Aras River between Georgia and the Caspian Sea. (Most of these khanates—Ganjeh,

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Qarabagh, Shirvan, Shakki, Baku, Derbent, and Talesh—were acquired by Russia in 1813 but the two westernmost khanates, Yerevan and Nakhjavan, were not taken until 1828.) All of the territory from the southern slopes of the Greater Caucasus up to and including the Lesser Caucasus was known to the Russians as Transcaucasia.

Early Russian Contacts with the Caucasus Russia's first attempt at playing a major role in Caucasian affairs took the form of a short-lived protectorate over the eastern Georgian kingdom of Kakheti. As happened so many times during the Russian takeover of the Caucasus, the initiative did not lie with the Russians themselves. Kakheti had already opened diplomatic contacts with Moscow at the end of the fifteenth century. In the middle of the sixteenth century, its king sought and obtained an assurance of protection from Ivan the Terrible. The tsar sent a Cossack retinue to the king but the Safavi government protested, so the Cossacks were quickly recalled and the protectorate forgotten. Far more important because of the significance Russia ascribed to it was the relationship established with Kabarda at about the same time. Again Moscow responded to an outside initiative. The Kabardans were under pressure from the Ottomans’ vassal, the khan of the Crimea, who strove to extend his authority over the northern Caucasus while the Ottomans themselves took control of the area south of the high mountains. The Kabardans were also at odds with the ruler (the shamkhal) of Tarqu, a Qumuq principality that dominated northern Daghestan. Like many Caucasian factions, these chieftains were accustomed to look for support from powerful outside rulers. Some of the Kabardan chiefs sided with the Crimeans, while their rivals, as well as the shamkhal of Tarqu, asked for Moscow’s support. Although Moscow rebuffed the shamkhal (on the grounds that he was too friendly with the Ottomans), it received several embassies from different Kabardan factions beginning in 1552. The attraction for Moscow was that the Kabardans could prove useful against the Crimean Khanate, which was also Moscow’s enemy. The chiefs who negotiated with Moscow claimed they were speaking for all Kabardans. Muscovite authorities coupled this information with their own view of the new military alliance

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and concluded that all Kabarda was now subject to Moscow. By the early 1560s, Moscow had established a fort on the Terek River, the approximate northeastern frontier of the Caucasus, and provided military aid to its allies in Kabarda. A Russian presence developed spontaneously along the Terek in the late sixteenth century. Free Cossacks gradually began to settle north of the river and raided Crimean and Caucasian territory from their new camps. They became known as the Grebenskii Host and stayed in the region while the official Russian military presence came and went. In the same period, Ivan the Terrible married the daughter of one of the allied Kabardan chiefs. Before long the tsar was forced to reconsider the wisdom of his Kabardan alliance as the Crimeans raided into the heart of Muscovy and with their Ottoman overlords staged an unsuccess­ ful attempt to conquer Astrakhan. Moscow decided that it would be more prudent to avoid provoking the sultan and therefore abandoned the fort on the Terek in the early 1570s. At the same time the Ottomans and Crimeans extended their authority over much of the Caucasus, including Kabarda, where the power of the pro-Moscow faction was broken. From this time until the end of the 1580s there were further contacts between the Muscovites and some Kabardans as well as another brief attempt to establish a fort on the Terek, once again abandoned in response to Ottoman complaints. The first Muscovite-Kabardan accord for which the text has survived was made in 1588. (Only the Russian version survives; there are no Kabardan records of any of the transactions.) Once again, an individual Kabardan chief was represented as speaking for all Kabardans. The two powers agreed to provide military assistance against each other’s enemies. The Kabardan chief recognized Tsar Fedor as his suzerain and the tsar recognized the chief and his heirs as the hereditary grand princes of all Kabarda.1 (The title of “grand prince” was a Muscovite invention, reflecting that state’s ideas of political centralization, not the fragmented nature of Kabardan authority.) At about the same time, Moscow established a new fort on the Terek. Military action against Tarqu initially went well for the Muscovites but soon turned into a rout. Then the pro-Russian Kabardan chief died and another episode of heated internecine warfare broke out. The anti-Muscovite faction prevailed; some pro-Muscovite chiefs were able to preserve enclaves of power and cooperate occasionally with Moscow but

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the scope of relations remained limited. On the local level, Kabardans, other mountaineers, and Armenians traded with Russians at the Terek fort and settled in the village that grew up around it. Some Kabardans settled in Muscovy, where a number of magnates converted to Christianity, entered state service, and were assimilated into the Russian élite (including the princes Cherkaskii). During the seventeenth century there were a few brief contacts between Muscovy and the rulers of several Georgian principalities about the possibility of a military alliance but all this came to nought since Moscow was not in a position to render any military assistance. Throughout the century the steppeland between the Caucasus and Muscovy’s Don and Volga frontier was controlled by Crimeans, their allies, and other tribes, thus hindering Muscovite expansion to the south.

Peter the Great’s Empire Building During the reign of Peter the Great, Russia’s involvement in Caucasian affairs reached ^an unprecedented level. This was partly the result of coincidences that worked to Russia’s advantage, such as the collapse of the Safavi Empire and the willingness of some Kabardans, Georgians, and Armenians to cooperate with Russia against common foes. However, a crucial factor was the character of Peter himself, which led him to capitalize on these opportunities as he pursued ambitious goals. His drive to make Russia a major European military power and the belief he shared with many of his contemporaries that a state is strengthened by expansion led him to war against Russia’s archenemies, the Ottoman Empire and the Crimea. Conse­ quently he sought the cooperation of Caucasian rulers in fighting these powerful adversaries. Moreover, his interest in the keys to western Europe’s strength and prosperity led him to admire Europe’s commercial empires in Asia. For this reason he sought to fashion a Russian equivalent to those overseas colonies out of the Caucasian and Caspian provinces of the moribund Safavi Empire. He expected such an achievement to have the further salutary effect of preventing an Ottoman advance into the same region. Peter began to act on his Caucasian ambitions in 1711, while his troops battled Ottoman allies along the lower Kuban River

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(and he fought the main Ottoman army in the Pruth campaign). That year he sent an emissary to the Kabardans and declared Kabarda under Russian protection, its inhabitants Russian subjects. The following year some Kabardans went to Moscow and essentially accepted Peter’s claim. (They were particularly interested in Russian military aid against the Ottomans and Crimeans.) Peter would have liked to send troops to Kabarda but was unable at any point in his reign to exert effective authority there. A devastating Crimean raid on Kabarda in 1720 was conducted with impunity. All the Russian border commanders could do was to intervene weakly in the continuing internal power struggles, take oaths of loyalty from some chiefs, and keep at the Terek hostages the chiefs provided. (The taking of hostages as a pledge of good faith was a widespread practice in the Caucasus. It was extremely rare for a hostage to be harmed in the event of disloyalty by the person who sent him. A more likely course was for the hostage to be used as a competitor for the ruler’s position.) In any event, Russia’s concessions to the Ottoman Empire, notably the surrender of Azov and the promise not to meddle in Ottoman affairs, made by Peter in the peace settlement of 1711, reduced his ability as well as his inclination to provoke the Ottomans by further involvement in the parts of the Caucasus where Ottoman interests were strong. Peter’s attention shifted eastward to the Safavi Empire and its Caucasian borderlands at a time when developments there seemed to bode well for his success. Peter hoped to make Russia the dominant intermediary in East-West trade, expanding on the* role Muscovy had once played before several European countries established direct sea routes to the markets of India and points east* His goal was to create a trading colony on the western and southern shores of the Caspian Sea and thus give Russia its own version of the western Europeans* various East India Companies. In 1717 Peter’s governor of Astrakhan negotiated a commercial treaty with the Safavi government. The Russian ambassador also brought back information on the sharp decline in Safavi strength. This encouraged Peter to think in terms of military intervention in Iran’s northern provinces with or without the shah’s assent. Such measures were not possible until Russia was finally rid of the burdens of the Great Northern War, which was concluded in 1721. By then events were under way which would prompt Peter to launch one last war. That year Daghestani tribesmen staged a

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destructive raid on the khanate of Shirvan in northern Azerbaijan. The motive for the attack was the Sunni mountaineers' opposition to the Safavis’ militantly Shiite policies but in the process some Russian merchants living in Shirvan were killed and much Russian property carried off. Peter now organized a campaign aimed at subduing the territories along the Caspian coast from the Terek River in the northwest to Astarabad in the extreme southeast. He also hoped to gain control of territory further inland in the Caucasus through joint action with local leaders. Several Georgians and Armenians had proposed military cooperation to the Russians. Foremost among these prospective allies was King Vakhtang of the east Georgian state of Kartli. Though regarded by the Safavis as governor of an imperial province, he had tried to minimize Iranian authority over his realm ever since he came to the throne in 1711. In 1721 he proposed a military alliance to Russia. Peter responded favorably and recommended that their two armies join forces in Shirvan. The Georgians and Armenians marshaled their troops and waited for the Russians to arrive. Late in the summer of 1722, a Russian force of more than 100,000 men sailed from Astrakhan to the mouth of the Terek. Iran was in no position to oppose this threat from the north because the country had already been invaded by a powerful Afghan tribe. The capital was besieged and in October fell to the invaders, who killed the shah. Iran quickly slipped into chaos. As Peter led his troops south through Daghestan, the shamkhal of Tarqu and some Lesghi chiefs adapted to the changing situation by putting themselves under Russian protection. Peter estab­ lished new fortifications along the route, including Fort Holy Cross on the border of Tarqu. A village subject to Russian authority grew up around this fort as Cossacks, merchants, and nomadic tribesmen from the mountains and steppes settled in the area. By the end of September Peter had reached Derbent, which surrendered to the Russians and was occupied by them. Now Peter decided to interrupt the campaign and return to Russia. He had encountered great difficulty in obtaining supplies, large numbers of his soldiers were falling ill, and the Ottomans threatened war unless the Russians withdrew. Leaving behind a small garrison in Derbent, Peter led the rest of his men back to Russia. He never returned to the Caucasus, although Russian troops were sent within the year to garrison Baku on the west

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coast of the Caspian and part of Gilan on the south coast. Russians were assisted in the administration of the occupied territories by locally powerful figures. Thus in Derbent the khan surrendered to the Russians and continued in office, while in Baku the former commander of the Safavi garrison reached an accommodation with his new masters. Peter talked of sending troops to aid Vakhtang, whose situation had become desperate, but in fact there was no attempt to join forces with the Georgians and Armenians. In the meantime the Ottomans also profited from the Safavi collapse by sending troops into eastern Georgia and Azerbaijan. King Vakhtang lost power to a relative who opportunely sought Ottoman backing. Vakhtang, several of his kin, and more than a thousand other Georgians fled to Russia. Many entered Russian service and were accepted into the Russian élite. Some of the Armenians who had looked forward to the coming of the Russians took shelter in the mountains. The Russian authorities encouraged the emigration of Georgians and Armenians from the Caucasus to Gilan. In 1730, with Russian power on the wane in Gilan, the settlers were transferred to Russian-held territory on the west coast of the Caspian. Eventually the Russians and Ottomans resolved their dif­ ferences by partitioning western and northern Iran. The Ottomans recognized Russia’s claim to the western and southern coasts to the Caspian. In return the Russians recognized Ottoman authority over the rest of Azerbaijan, all of the Georgian states, and much of the remainder of western Iran as well. There was no mention of Russia’s claim to suzerainty over Kabarda; therefore the Ottomans did not regard the claim as legally binding.2

The Decline of Russian Influence After the death of Peter the Great early in 1725 Russia’s interest and-authority in the Caucasus declined. Some more posts were established along the western and southern coasts of the Caspian but the plan to occupy the rest of the southern coast was never fulfilled. Russian troops occasionally fought in Daghestan and obtained the temporary submission of a few chiefs but these gains were all short-lived. When a powerful Daghestani chief, the khan of the Avars, volunteered his submission, his offer was rejected on the grounds that his homeland was too remote and of too little

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use to the Russians? With increasing frequency Daghestanis cut Russian communications along the coast. In areas occupied by Russia the situation was not particularly encouraging. The hopedfor commercial boom had not developed; the cost of maintaining the Russian colonies vastly exceeded the revenue they produced. Moreover the Russians suffered terribly from illnesses, which were rampant in the Caspian lowlands. More than 100,000 Russians died, the vast majority from disease, between the start of Peter’s campaign in 1722 and the withdrawal of the last Russian troops south of the Terek in 1735. The most serious threat to the survival of Russia’s Caspian outposts was the revival of the Iranian state under the son of the former shah and a powerful tribal chief. By the end of the 1720s most of Iran south of the Caucasus had been reunited under a centralized authority. Russian authorities entered into negotia­ tions with the shah’s representatives and formulated the Treaty of Rasht (ratified in 1732), according to which Russia waived its claim to any territory south of the Kura River. This included the cession of outposts in the southeastern Caucasus that Russia had hoped to develop into fishjng and trading centers.4 Empress Anna’s government entertained elaborate dreams of expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire and Iran. In connection with these, the refugee king, Vakhtang, was sent to Astrakhan in 1734 to plan Russian conquests in Azerbaijan, but the undertaking was a mere pipedream. All the while, Iranian forces were at work reestablishing authority over the parts of the Caucasus tradi­ tionally claimed by the Safavis. With most of the Russian troops already withdrawn from the Caucasian ports, a new treaty, the Treaty of Ganjeh, was negotiated. Its ratification in 1735 marked the end of the Russian presence south of the Terek River? As a consequence of this pullback, the Terek frontier, which had already been buttressed by Peter’s relocation of some Don Cossacks to its banks, was now further strengthened by the establishment of a new fort, Kizliar, which served henceforth as the base for Russia’s dealings with the eastern Caucasus. Russia ceased to play an active role in the affairs of the southern or eastern Caucasus until the reign of Catherine the Great. In the 1740s a few short-lived vassalage agreements with Daghestani chiefs were concluded but Russia’s position in Daghestan remained extremely weak. Pleas for Russian military aid from the kings of the west Georgian principality of Imeretia

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and the east Georgian principality of Kartti in the 1730s, 1750s, and early 1760s were rebutted, primarily because of the concern that such intervention might provoke a greater degree of Ottoman activity in the southern Caucasus. Russia’s position in the northern Caucasus also suffered in the period between the reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. Ottomans, Crimeans, and their local allies in the mountains and the steppes to the' north raided across the northern Caucasus many times in the late 1720s and the 1730s and engaged in a few small clashes with Russian forces in the process. The power struggle within Kabarda was especially acute. Chiefs who looked to Russia for support were hard pressed and could obtain from St. Petersburg no more than modest financial aid and ineffective diplomatic protests to the Ottomans for encouraging other chiefs. By the early 1730s the Ottomans were particularly insistent about their Caucasian claims because they were concerned about the revival of Iranian strength, in the Caucasus and elsewhere. The waning Russian presence there could not possibly check the Iranians yet might still be an obstacle to an Ottoman campaign against Iran by the traditional route across the northern Caucasus (including Kabarda) to the Caspian coast. The Ottomans also believed Russia was encourag­ ing the Iranians and Georgians to undermine Ottoman authority in the southern Caucasus. (The two empires were also at odds over Poland.) War between Russia and the Ottoman Empire broke out in 1735, when Anna’s ambitious favorite, Count Münnich, invaded the Crimea. The most important battles were staged outside the Caucasus; within the region, Russian strategy concentrated on preventing the opposition from advancing east of the Kuban River. The war was eventually fought to a draw. The Treaty of Belgrade, which ended the conflict in 1739, contained an article that dealt with the status of Kabarda. In the face of unrelenting Ottoman opposition, Russia had already dropped its insistence on suzerainty over Kabarda (based on the sixteenth-century agreements). Instead the two empires agreed on a formula Russia had devised before the start of the war: the independence of Kabarda from Russia and the Ottoman Empire alike. Neither the Porte nor Russia could intervene in Kabarda’s internal affairs, although both could take hostages as a guarantee against hostile actions and could punish offenses.6 The treaty also referred to

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“Greater” and “Lesser” Kabarda because by the eighteenth century Russia assumed that the region was divided into two distinct entities: Lesser Kabarda, more pro-Russian, to the east of the Terek, and Greater Kabarda to the west. However, this arbitrary distinction had nothing to do with Kabardan realities. Within a decade Russia violated the agreement by repeated efforts to mediate Kabarda’s internal wars, which did indeed abate until the late 1750s.

Catherine the Great and the Intensification of Russia’s Involvement in the Caucasus The accession of Catherine the Great returned Russia to an aggressively expansionist policy towards the Caucasus. Although her approach was reminiscent of Peter the Great’s, his activities influenced her only in the general sense of encouraging an interest in the region and demonstrating the possibility of successful operations there. Certainly Peter’s treaty with the Ottoman Empire, by which he recognized Ottoman authority over all the Caucasus except the eastern coast, was a precedent best forgotten from St. Petersburg’s point of view. The resemblance between the policies of Catherine and Peter resulted from the similarity of some of their central beliefs. Both rulers shared the widespread assumption that territorial expansion was an important component of a nation’s greatness. They saw the Ottoman Empire as Russia’s political and economic nemesis. They admired western Europe’s overseas colonies and hoped to use the Caucasus in a similar fashion. Catherine, the avid reader of Enlightenment authors, further justified the extension of Russian authority in the Caucasus on the grounds that this would introduce the benefits of civilization to a region that had known only Asian barbarism. At least as important as the two rulers* predisposition to follow an expansionist course in this region was the fact that many of their undertakings were responses to developments over which they had little control. Catherine’s policy towards the Caucasus in the early years of her reign was a more energetic continuation of her predecessors’ actions in the north-central zone. Until the 1780s, she continued to regard the eastern zones as subject to Iran and was ambivalent about the usefulness of the Georgian states to her ambitions. The end of Elizabeth’s reign and the brief reign of Peter III saw the

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gradual development of a line of forts, known as the Caucasian Line, extending westward along the Terek River from Kizliar. Catherine continued the project and allocated additional funds. She also encouraged the settlement along the Line of moun­ taineers (especially those willing to convert to Christianity) as well as Armenians. The settlers were allowed autonomy in administering their internal affairs with oversight by commanders of the Russian posts along the line. Many Kabardan chiefs were unhappy about the fort construction because the westernmost outpost, Mozdok (about 150 miles upstream from Kizliar), symbolized a claim to valuable Kabardan pastureland. Kabardan and Ottoman protests about the buildup of the Line stimulated the declaration of an aggressive policy by the College of Foreign Affairs, which argued that Mozdok was “far from the natural borders of Kabarda” and that since Kabarda lay between the Russian and Ottoman Empires its borders had to coincide with the interests of those two major powers.7 Russia sought to strengthen its position in the north-central zone by other means as well. The government encouraged the Christianization of the Ossetes and Ingushes through the activities of Georgian and, to a lesser degree, Russian mis­ sionaries. The conversions proceeded at a slow rate, though fast enough to alarm Kabardan chiefs, who saw their considerable influence in Ossetia being undercut by the proselytization and also by the emigration of converted Ossetes and Ingushes to the Caucasian Line. The growth of the Line also attracted Kabardan peasants and slaves, whose masters repeatedly asked for the fugitives’ return, to no avail. Russia was interested in winning over the Kabardan élite, welcoming conversions and also emigration to the Line. Moreover Catherine favored the conversion and Russification of Kabardan, Ossete, and other Caucasian hostages held at the Line, on the grounds that this would civilize them. In 1765 a government school designed to teach mountaineers the Russian language and Russian values was founded. The experiment evoked a weak response and was soon abandoned. A similar effort was made in 1777. Just at this time, when Kabardan opposition to Russia reached new heights, with Kabardans attacking Russian settlements, outside developments strengthened Russia’s position there. In 1768 the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia. Emboldened by early victories, Catherine decided in 1771 to press Russia’s

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claim to Kabarda. She argued that the region had been Russia’s vassal since the sixteenth century—the notion of Kabardan independence being a recent aberration. In 1772 Russia installed its candidate as khan of Crimea. He obliged Russia by signing a treaty that included the cession of Kabarda to Russia. When Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the peace treaty of Küçûk Kainarca two years later, the Russians insisted on a provision leaving the status of Kabarda up to the Crimea because of the proximity of those two territories. The Porte objected and also denied the validity of the Russo-Crimean treaty but had no alternative save yielding to Russia’s demands. Thus Catherine viewed Russia’s suzerainty over Kabarda as sanctioned by international law. She informed the Kabardans that they were now Russian subjects but that she would not interfere in their internal affairs unless they provoked her. The Kabardans were not mollified. Continued settlement along the Caucasian Line drove increasing numbers of Kabardan leaders to oppose Russia. They raided the Line repeatedly and for a few years limited Russian troops to modest defensive measures. The outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire also encouraged Russian interest in the Georgian states. Overtures by King Solomon I of Imeretia shortly before the outbreak of the war evoked no enthusiasm from Russia but after the war began the College of Foreign Affairs saw that the strong anti-Ottoman sentiments of that king as well as King Erekle of Georgia might be useful. Russian troops, aided by Solomon and Erekle, attacked Ottoman positions on the western coast of the Caucasus. Unfortunately for the Russians and Georgians, the campaign was a disaster. Communications between Russia and the front were difficult because the only available route was the narrow path through the center of the Greater Caucasus. Military operations were commanded by the unstable and incompetent General von Todtleben, who behaved badly towards Solomon and Erekle and led his troops to decisive defeat against the Ottomans. Catherine rewarded with medals the two kings for their cooperation but had renewed doubts about the value of the southern Caucasus to Russia. She particularly suspected Erekle of trying to exploit Russia to expand his own realm. Erekle’s request that Georgia be taken under Russian protection was denied during the war, as was a later request that Russia send him troops. The Treaty of Küçük Kainarca contained a vague

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statement that territory which had not formerly been part of the Ottoman Empire would not become part of it in the wake of this treaty. Russia had in mind parts of western Georgia but the wording was so unclear that nothing was resolved. In any case, Russia still recognized the Ottoman Empire’s right to maintain forts on the coast of the west Georgian principalities. For the rest of her reign, even during her second war with the Porte (1787-1792), Catherine forbade Russian initiatives in the southern Caucasus in order to avoid antagonizing the Ottomans. Catherine’s wariness of expansion in the Caucasus was demonstrated by events in Daghestan in 1775. She wanted to avenge the death of a German explorer who had been held captive by a Daghestani khan. Accordingly the commandant of Kizliar decided to make war on the khan. The fighting went badly for the Russians, who advanced to Derbent but were surrounded there and caught short of troops. Catherine was furious with her general for behaving much more aggressively than she had intended. She argued that long efforts to win the goodwill of the Daghestanis could be sabotaged by his actions and that the expedition raised the threat of war not only with the local tribes but also with Iran and the Ottoman Empire. In any event, she believed Russia had no claim to Derbent or Daghestan since the whole area was rightfully subject to Iran. Catherine ordered the expedition’s immediate return to Kizliar. From the late 1770s on, the scope of Russia’s involvement in the Caucasus increased. Catherine herself became more favorably disposed to such a course. Direction of Russia’s Caucasian affairs was entrusted to an even more ardent proponent of expansion, Prince Gregory Potemkin. Potemkin was an extremely ambitious man who had risen from the ranks of the minor provincial nobility to become Catherine’s favorite for a few years and one of the most powerful people in all of Russia. The ambition that encouraged him to expand his viceroyalty in southern Russia at the expense of Russia’s Muslim neighbors further south was also stimulated by his early theological studies, which taught him to abhor the subjugation of Christians to Muslim rule. He looked forward to the creation of Georgian and Armenian states under Russian tutelage. (This was different from his dream of creating an independent Christian kingdom of “Dacia,” with himself as king, out of the Ottoman provinces around the lower Danube. Dacia was to be his own power base, not contingent upon the

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favor of his aging sovereign. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire was perceived as a far more formidable opponent than the small states of the south-central Caucasus.) Yet for all their solicitousness towards the Caucasian Christians, Catherine and Potemkin guided Russian policy along the lines of their own country’s best interests, defined in purely secular terms as political and economic gains at the expense of the Ottomans and Iranians. The substitution of Russian for Muslim hegemony over Christians was relevant only to the extent that this coincided with existing policy.8 Potemkin’s first major undertaking in the Caucasus was to build up the defenses of the Caucasian Line to increase security against the Ottomans on the northeastern coast of the Black Sea and the Muslim tribesmen living on the steppe between the Caucasus and the lower Don and Volga. Therefore in 1777 he ordered the construction of more forts along the Caucasian Line and extended it much further westward towards Azov. Several new forts were located on the northern edge of pasturelands claimed by the Kabardans. In addition to the settlements that developed spontaneously around the new forts, Potemkin initiated a policy of state-directed transfers to establish impoverished nobles, state peasants, retired soldiers, Volga Germans, and others in the vicinity of the Line. He also had Catherine grant estates there to nobles in her favor. Among the recipients was Prince Alexander Bezborodko, Catherine’s sec­ retary and political adviser. The increased development of the Line, in addition to the existing disputes, drove many Kabardan chiefs, including some who had formerly been pro-Russian, into open hostility. Some of the chiefs protested that although they had been under Russian protection since the reign of Ivan the Terrible, they had never been and should not now be Russian subjects.9 The Kabardans’ reaction took the form of mass migrations to more remote mountain areas, especially to Ottoman territory west of the Kuban River, and raids on the Caucasian Line. There was nothing Russia could do to stop the raids, which occasionally resulted in serious casualties and loss of property, until reinforcements reached the Line in 1779. Russia’s punitive expedition in Kabarda did not make a strong impression by itself, but the massing of Russian troops at the Kabardan frontier convinced a number of chiefs to sue for peace.

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Catherine and her subordinates wanted to punish the Kabardans and therefore imposed terms designed to break the power of the Kabardan leadership, while giving Russia a say in the area’s internal affairs. All Kabardan chiefs were required to take an oath of loyalty to Russia and provide Russia with tribute in cash, thousands of head of livestock, and food for Russian soldiers. St. Petersburg redefined the Kabardan border, giving parts of northern Kabarda to Russia. The chiefs were prohibited from preventing their subjects’ voluntary conversion to Christianity. Ordinary Kabardans were allowed to settle on the Russian side of the border even if their masters objected; Russia encouraged the migration particularly of those whose chiefs were anti-Russian. (Prince Potemkin hoped this settlement policy would increase the population of the Line and bolster its security.) The chiefs of “Lesser Kabarda” were made to promise further not to oppress their bondsmen or punish them for voicing just complaints. (This measure was aimed at weakening the power of the élite, not protecting the Kabardan bondsmen, as can be seen from the fact that this policy was inaugurated thirteen years after Catherine had decreed an end to the Russian serfs’ right of petition.) In effect Russian authorities made themselves the judges of chiefs’ actions. Over the next few years Russia continued to build forts ringed by new settlements along the Line as well as deeper into Kabardan and Chechen territory along the road across the mountains to Georgia. Kabardan chiefs protested the continued emigration of their subjects to the Line but took no action when their protests brought no results. Also in the early 1780s a number of Chechen leaders put themselves under Russian protection and sent hostages to the Line. Russian attempts to win over the north Caucasians continued during the 1780s. Prince Potemkin arranged to have a dozen Kabardan nobles as salaried members of his entourage. He also tried to organize militias composed of separate Kabardan, Ossete, and Ingush units. Local chiefs serving in the militia were to receive Russian military ranks and salaries. Only the Kabardan unit was ever organized and it fell apart at the outset of the next Russo-Ottoman war in 1787. Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, engineered by Potemkin in 1783, netted Russia the steppelands north of the western Caucasus. Russia now claimed direct authority over all lands up

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to the Kuban River. With the growth of Russia's holdings north of the Caucasus some administrative reforms were needed. The old guberniia of the Caucasus, administered from Astrakhan, had been designed to handle the modest Russian presence on the northeastern edge of the mountains. That system had already been rendered obsolete by the extension of the Line and the growth of settlements along it. Earlier in Catherine’s reign additional administrative centers had been established at posts along the Line. Now Potemkin transformed the old guberniia into the Viceroyalty of the Caucasus, with his relative, Paul Potemkin, as the first viceroy. Russia’s subsequent territorial gains in the Caucasus were put under the jurisdiction of the viceroyalty. Its capital was initially at the Line, first at Ekaterinograd, then at Georgievsk, both west of Mozdok. In the early nineteenth century the capital was moved to the Georgian city of Tbilisi.

The Russian Protectorate over Georgia In the early 1780s Prince Potemkin led Russia to a much greater degree of involvement in the affairs of the southern Caucasus. The situation seemed favorable for Russia, especially since the kings of Imeretia and Georgia still hoped to find allies to help them handle their perennial difficulties. Prince Potemkin offered no more than expressions of goodwill in response to King Solomon’s requests for protection out of concern to avoid provoking the Porte. There was less need for caution in dealing with King Erekle since Iran was preoccupied by internal disorders and therefore was unlikely to be able to oppose changes on its northwestern frontier. Erekle had already tried unsuccess­ fully to obtain the support of France and Austria when Prince Potemkin began encouraging him to seek Russian protection. Negotiations soon produced the Treaty of Georgievsk (1783). By its terms Russia promised to protect Georgia (as well as establish a garrison there) and also recognized Erekle and his heirs as the country’s legitimate rulers. Erekle disavowed the sovereignty of any other monarch and agreed to conduct his foreign relations under Russian tutelage. Domestic matters remained under the king’s jurisdiction although the Georgian Orthodox Church was incorporated into the Russian church administrative system (the Holy Synod). Russia named Erekle’s fourth son, who was already

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a monk, head of the Georgian Church and.also backed Erekle’s claim to adjoining Azerbaijani and Ottoman territories. Erekle reported to Prince Potemkin that Caucasian Christians and Muslims, too, hoped Russia would take control of the whole region.10 Encouraged by this success Prince Potemkin conceived a plan to make Georgian and Armenian principalities subject to Russia. He intended to take the Azerbaijani khanates with large Armenian minorities (Ganjeh, Qarabagh, Yerevan, and Nakhjavan), remove the Muslims rulers, and then from this enlarged Russian foothold in the Caucasus conquer the Ottoman Empire’s Armenian provinces as well. Prince Gregory was already in communication with the head of the Armenian Church, the catholicos of Echmiadzin, and expected the Russian economy to benefit from acquiring so many new Armenian subjects with their international commercial ties. The Prince might have made at least some progress towards his goal had it not been for the arrogance toward Caucasian Muslims that was a characteristic of Russia’s policies in the region throughout the takeover. Erekle encouraged his ally and neighbor to the southeast, the khan of Qarabagh, to contact Paul Potemkin in order to make an agreement similar to the Treaty of Georgievsk. However, Paul Potemkin’s response (endorsed by Prince Gregory) to the khan’s overtures was to demand submission without negotiation and to threaten to conquer the khanate. Catherine would have preferred a less hostile approach. She believed that an agreement similar in spirit to the one made with Erekle would have served Russia’s interests admirably by demonstrating the benefits of Russian suzerainty to the peoples of the whole region. In any event, her advice arrived too late to undo the damage; the khan was no longer interested in a rapprochement with Russia. Moreover Prince Potemkin had to postpone his plans for a military campaign to realize his Caucasian ambitions because the annexation of the Crimea raised the danger of war with the Ottoman Empire, Russia established a garrison in Georgia in accordance with the Treaty of Georgievsk but the Russian presence created more problems than it solved. Erekle, reassured by the new garrison, stopped paying protection money to some powerful Daghestanis. As a result the offended tribesmen conducted devastating raids in Georgia between 1785 and 1787. The small Russian garrison

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could not control the situation nor could reinforcements be sent from the Line because inhabitants of the northern Caucasus had cut the road across the mountains. Between the devastation of Georgia and the interruption of communications with the Line, the two Russian battalions in Georgia were reduced not only to ineffectiveness but also to near starvation. In 1787 Russia decided the garrison in Georgia served the interests of neither country and recalled the troops. Paul Potemkin did carry out improve­ ments on the road across the Caucasus, which became known as the Georgian Military Highway. Yet the route remained as hazard-prone as before. The Russians learned an important lesson which guided their Caucasian policy henceforth: if Russia was to play any role in the affairs of the southern Caucasus it would have to ensure communications with that area by taking control of all the territory between Georgia and the Caspian Sea. (The Black Sea and western Caucasus did not constitute an acceptable alternate route because of the danger posed by Ottoman military strength there.)

Holy War against Russia The fighting that had severed communications between Georgia and the Line was by far the most serious opposition the Russians had yet faced in the northern Caucasus—the holy war of Sheykh Mansur. Not only were more tribes rallied around a single objective than ever before but also more people at all levels within the tribes were involved. Unlike many of the Caucasian wars, this was not simply a rivalry among élites. Under the sheykh’s leadership, most of the peoples throughout the Caucasus made common cause in defense of Islam and against the Russians. The defense of Islam was more than a theological issue to the holy warriors, some of whom were only recently and superficially converted. Islam represented a whole way of life that was threatened by the growth of Russian power in the northern Caucasus. The Russians themselves used religion in a political sense by attempting to extend Russian influence by spreading Christianity among the mountaineers. The political significance of religion was intensified further by Russian policy since the Treaty of Küçük Kainarca, in which Russia laid the basis for its claim to be the protector of the Ottoman Empire’s Christian subjects. The

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sultan responded by new assertions of his role as protector of all Sunni Muslims. Most Islamic religious leaders in the northern Caucasus came from the Ottoman Empire and were inclined to spread this view of Muslim-Christian rivalry, linked to opposing Russian imperial expansion. The more Russian strength in the Caucasus grew, the more hostile many mountaineers became. In addition to the loss of territory to the Russians and Russian involvement in the mountaineers’ internal affairs, tensions were raised by frequent raiding by inhabitants on both sides of the border. Raids by Russian subjects on mountaineers went unpunished by authorities of the Line but raids by mountaineers on Russian subjects led to punitive expeditions in which homes were destroyed and flocks driven off. Moreover the Russian authorities did not bother to aim such expeditions at the individuals responsible; any “native” was fair game. Sheykh Mansur first came to note in Chechenia in 1785, calling on all Caucasian Muslims to follow him in a holy war (jihad) against the “lawless” Russians. The Avars soon joined the fighting, as did the Kabardans, Qumuqs, and Nogays later in the year. Both sides used the style of warfare to which they were accustomed. The Russians fought in contemporary European style, emphasizing the use of infantry, formal battles, and superior fire-power. They also employed scorched-earth tactics, though it is arguable that these did as much to drive moun­ taineers into Mansur’s camp as to intimidate them into submit­ ting. The mountaineers used cavalry and hit-and-run raids. They were no match for the Russian forts. While Mansur had the support of most of the northern mountain tribes from the Black Sea to the Caspian, their participation came at different times, not in one great concerted effort. Thus both sides had the ability to inflict considerable damage on their opponents without being able to achieve a quick and decisive victory. Under such conditions time was on the Russians’ side. The failure to achieve a speedy victory and the reemergence of intertribal rivalries led to a waning of support among the Chechens and Daghestanis by the later part of 1785. In the second year of the war Mansur’s strength was centered in Kabarda. After Russian victories there, he fled to Ottoman territory west of the Kuban, which served as his base of operations for the following two years. In the meantime war had broken out between Russia and the Ottoman Empire over the issues of Russia’s annexation of the

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Crimea and growing involvement in the Caucasus and Danubian provinces. Once again the most important battles were fought outside the Caucasus. Sheykh Mansur joined forces with the Ottoman undertaking on this front, the drive across the northern Caucasus in 1790. The drive was stopped short at the border of Kabarda by a big Russian victory (in which some Kabardans fought on the Russian side). The following year the Russians took the key Ottoman fortress of Anapa on the northeastern coast of the Black Sea. Sheykh Mansur was captured and sent to Russia, where he was imprisoned until his death three years later. The Treaty of Jassy, which ended the Russo-Ottoman war, brought Russia no territorial gains in the Caucasus. Both sides agreed that all territory south and west of the Kuban (including Anapa) should revert to the Ottomans.12

Attempts to Consolidate Russia’s Position After the war Russia set about strengthening its position in the northern Caucasus. The new commander of the Caucasian Line, Ivan Gudovich, built a series of forts close to the Kuban and, in the face of considerable Opposition, forcibly resettled a few thousand Don Cossacks there. Extensive grants of land near the Caucasian Line were made to Russian notables. However, the government was unwilling to incur the expense of resettling peasants in the viceroyalty, preferring to let voluntary movement supply the needed settlers. Nonetheless the rate of privately organized settlement was slow. There were about 24,000 adult male serfs and state peasants in the province at the beginning of the 1790s. By the early nineteenth century there were only about 4,000 more and the Russian authorities were concerned with blocking the emigration of peasants from the viceroyalty to Siberia.13 Gudovich also wanted to stabilize Kabarda by establishing Russian-directed law and order. Catherine, following Gudovich’s recommendations, authorized a new Kabardan policy in 1792. Her orders restated themes that were characteristic of her overall Caucasian policy: her belief in the beneficial impact of wellordered Russian justice and her confidence that the example of Russia’s benevolent presence would win the loyalty of the Caucasians. On a more specific level she ordered Gudovich to end the Cossack raids that so antagonized the Kabardans, and

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authorized him to carry out his proposed legal reforms. Kabarda was to have a new court system composed of several panels of chiefs and lesser notables elected by their peers and rendering verdicts in accordance with their own laws. However, all major crimes as well as appeals from the Kabardan courts would come under the jurisdiction of a new Supreme Frontier Court at Mozdok. This court included Kabardans as well as Georgian, Armenia, and Tatar representatives but had a Russian officer as president, participation by additional Russian officials, and followed Russian law. The Kabardans rejected the new court system and in 1794 began fighting the Russians once more. Gudovich tried to force acceptance of the judicial reforms by staging harsh punitive expeditions. Some Kabardan chiefs were held prisoner at the Line; the rest were made to swear loyalty to Russia again and to promise not to oppress their subjects. Any chief who withdrew into the high mountains (to be further from Russian authority) would lose his peasants and slaves, who would be taken under direct Russian authority. Despite this attempt to increase Russian control over Kabarda, skirmishes between the mountaineers and the forces at the Line continued over the coming years. Russian influence over Kabarda’s internal affairs remained weak. While Russians thought they had gained the upper hand in Kabarda, events in the southern Caucasus forced St. Petersburg to reexamine its commitment to the whole region. Catherine did not want Russia to be dragged into the common local feuds or any project that was not clearly beneficial to Russia, but she did want Gudovich to protect Georgia in the event of a serious threat. In 1795 Georgia was truly in danger from the man who had made himself master of the greater part of Iran. The separate enclaves into which Iran had been divided since the mid-century had been conquered by the ruthless leader of the Qajar tribe, Aqa Mohammad Khan. He was determined to add Georgia and northern Azerbaijan to his domains since these had been economically valuable and symbolically prestigious parts of the Safavi Empire. King Erekle knew that a large army was directed against Georgia and asked Gudovich for help, but the general sneered at Erekle’s supposed alarmism and refused to take action unless Catherine gave him a specific order to do so. Erekle in desperation agreed to accept help from the Ottoman Empire, with which he was generally on poor terms, but no aid was

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actually provided. In October 1795 the Georgian army aban­ doned its unequal though valiant struggle against Aqa Mohammad. Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, and much of the sur­ rounding area was plundered and devastated. Some Georgian civilians were killed and perhaps as many as 15,000 were carried off into slavery by the departing Iranian army. (Many parts of northern Azerbaijan were also occupied at the same time.) Now Gudovich talked blood and thunder, describing the campaign as the equivalent of an attack on Russia and calling for war with Iran. Catherine took a similar view, although she disappointed Gudovich by giving command of the expedition to Valerian Zubov, the younger brother of her current favorite. The far more gifted Alexander Suvorov had been offered the command first but had turned it down, a reflection of the low opinion that many Russians held of service in the Caucasus. Catherine justified the forthcoming war as serving the interests not only of Russia but also of the inhabitants of the areas to be conquered. She expected Russia to obtain preeminence in East-West trade by establishing the most direct trade route via Iran. She also believed Russian conquest would save the people of Iran and the Caucasus from the brutal oppression of Aqa Mohammad. To oppose the establishment of benign Russian rule was, in the tsaritsa’s eyes, a great moral evil.14 The 1796 campaign was designed to do even more than the one left unfinished by Peter the Great. Young Zubov was to proceed along the Caspian coast through Daghestan and northern Azerbaijan while additional Russian forces in Georgia streng­ thened defenses there and provided support to pro-Russian khans and Armenian leaders in the adjoining principalities. All territories from Georgia east were to be brought under Russian suzerainty either by consent or force. The khanate of Yerevan, the historical and religious heart of Armenia, was to be left along because its proximity to the Ottoman border raised the danger of war with the Porte. Moreover the elimination of Muslim rule over Armenians in Azerbaijan would have to be postponed indefinitely, because Russia did not want to commit the many additional resources that would be required to overthrow khans who might otherwise accept Russian suzerainty. After settling matters in the Caucasus, Zubov was to proceed to the heart of Iran, overthrow Aqa Mohammad, and place a docile client of Russia on the throne.

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Zubov was full of optimism as he began the campaign in April 1796. He boasted that he would reach Esfahan by September. (Apparently he did not know that this was no longer the Iranian capital, which the Qajars had moved to Tehran.) In fact he never advanced beyond the Caucasus and was lucky to escape major troubles. The campaign was mishandled from the start. The collection and delivery of supplies of all sorts were bungled. Too few troops were allocated even for the first stage of the campaign. Gudovich was piqued at being denied command of the operation and therefore did as little as he dared to help Zubov. (Gudovich was recalled from the Caucasus later in the year.) The Russians had great difficulty maneuvering and fighting in the rough Caucasian terrain. Their situation was made still more difficult by the hit-and-run attacks of inhabitants opposed to the Russian presence. Zubov’s major achievement was obtaining the submission of most of the rulers of Daghestan and northern Azerbaijan. This was accomplished for the most part without the use of force. In fact there was fighting only in three khanates and Russian troops occupied but a fraction of the territory in question. Elsewhere the khans submitted voluntarily for a combination of motives, principally opposition to Aqa Mohammad or the absence of alternative courses of action: Aqa Mohammad could not protect his supporters in the Caucasus because he was engaged in battle at the other end of Iran; Ottoman help was not forthcoming; and the anti-Russian alliances among local rulers had proven ineffectual. Zubov made no significant alterations in the internal administrations of the khanates. In the few places where khans were deposed (Derbent, Qobbeh, and Shirvan), Zubov recog­ nized the authority of other local notables. The 1796 campaign was halted abruptly after Catherine’s death in November of that year. Her son, Paul, canceled the undertaking, not only because he took pleasure in countermand­ ing his mother’s orders but also because he perceived the grave problems underlying the bold rhetoric. Zubov’s men were out of the region by the spring of Y197. The Russians’ departure left many Armenians in an awkward position with their enthusiasm for a Russian takeover revealed. As a result there was a wave of Armenian emigration to Russia. With the return of Aqa Mohammad later in the year, many of the rulers who had lately submitted to Russia now either submitted to the shah or were

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ousted. Yet this did not resolve the struggle for the south-central and southeastern Caucasus because Aqa Mohammad was assas­ sinated during the campaign, which then collapsed. His successor spent the next few years consolidating his position and did not make substantial efforts to enforce his claim to Caucasian lands until 1804. Paul never doubted the underlying assumptions on which his mother’s Caucasian policy was based but he did question her methods with far more perspicacity and probity than he has traditionally been given credit for. His primary objection was that Catherine’s tactics were too aggressive, overemphasizing force and intervention in internal affairs while not trying hard enough to win the Caucasians’ loyalty by conciliation. The most unusual aspect of Paul’s attitude was his conviction that the Caucasian peoples, Muslim as well as Christian, had their own legitimate interests and did not exist only to serve Russia’s ends. He saw himself as the benefactor of the Georgians and Armenians but did not want his officials to give those peoples unfair advantage over their Muslim neighbors. He was strongly opposed to the recent judicial reforms in; Kabarda on the grounds that the Kabardans were vassals, not subjects, and therefore Russia should not interfere in their internal affairs. He believed that to coerce vassals into becoming subjects would only increase Russia’s problems by driving the new subjects to hostility.

The Annexation of Georgia For all Paul’s moderation with regard to the Caucasus, he was the one who in 1800 transformed Russia’s presence there by annexing the kingdom of Georgia, replacing the ancient Bagration monarchy with direct Russian rule. This major step was not the result of some long-standing policy but rather a hasty improvisa­ tion in reaction to developments outside Russia’s control. Georgia’s situation looked extremely perilous. The danger of further devastation by Iranians and Daghestanis was all too clear. Moreover Erekle had died in 1798 and his heir, Giorgi, was a weak ruler in declining health. His imminent death was expected to touch off a violent power struggle among Erekle’s many sons and grandsons. There was reason to expect that some of the pretenders would follow common practice and call for outside assistance from the Iranians, Ottomans, or Daghestanis. While

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Giorgi’s emissaries and Russian officials painted a picture of Georgia’s desperate condition, they also encouraged Paul to believe that greater Russian involvement in Georgia would be profitable rather than burdensome because of the widespread Georgian support for such a move and the natural resources the kingdom would put at Russia’s disposal. The detailed plan Giorgi urged on Russia in the spring of 1800 was aimed at preserving the monarchy within the context of an imperial system, reminiscent of the arrangement between earlier Georgian kinds and their Safavi suzerains, with the king of Georgia serving as governor of what was simultaneously an imperial province. However this proposal did not go far enough to suit Paul. Part of his concern was based on his conviction that after Giorgi’s death the appointment of any member of the royal family as imperial govemor/king would cause rival members of the family to start a civil war, the very development annexation was supposed to prevent. There was another problem as well. Continued Bagration authority in Georgia meant the availability of leadership for those dissatisfied with Russian rule. Even Giorgi, when displeased by what he considered insufficient Russian military aid, had made overtures to Iran.15 At the end of December 1800 Paul decreed the annexation of Georgia without specifying the form the new administration would take or the Bagrations’ role in it. The situation was complicated by Giorgi’s death soon after and the time lag in communications between Georgia and St. Petersburg. Paul weighed the possibility of making Giorgi’s son governor but did not make a firm decision, so imperial officials improvised, creating a caretaker government of Russian and Georgian officials. Within Georgia there was much dissatisfaction with the apparent elimination of Bagration rule, while members of the royal family quickly began fighting amongst themselves. Then Paul was assassinated in March 1801 and the Georgian troubles were foisted upon the new emperor, Alexander. Alexander formulated his policy towards Georgia and the eastern Caucasus during the first year of his reign. One of the legacies of Catherine’s involvement in the area wzas the conviction that Russian interests in Georgia were inextricably linked, for reasons of security and economics, to affairs in the eastern Caucasus generally. A forward policy in one sector necessitated a forward policy throughout; even the few opponents of expansion

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shared this assumption. Thus the decision about Georgia was a momentous turning-point in Russia’s takeover of the Caucasus. At first Alexander doubted the wisdom of so extreme a measure as annexation but he was soon won over by the arguments that had influenced his father and grandmother about the ease and benefits to Russia of an assertive policy in Georgia. He was also deeply affected by the argument that the suffering Georgian people looked to him as their savior. On this as on subsequent occasions Alexander revealed a great reluctance to moderate aggressive policies in the Caucasus lest moderation be interpreted as weakness. Several of Alexander’s closest advisers in this period, including the members of his Secret Committee, challenged the expansionist arguments on the grounds that Russia would take on a greater burden than the expansionists admitted at a time when the government needed to concentrate on domestic reforms and that Georgian and Russian interests would best be served by continuing the protectorate established in 1783. Alexander ignored all unwelcome arguments and cut the moderates out of the decision. He went ahead with the annexation of Georgia and the acquisition of all of central and eastern Transcaucasia.16 With Georgia now an integral part of the Russian empire, Alexander ordered that the new province be given an administra­ tive system that turned out to owe far more to Russian practices than to Georgian traditions. Georgia’s new administration was centralized, staffed mostly by Russians, conducted its business in Russian, and followed Russian law. The new system was supposed to be a Russo-Georgian hybrid but the Georgian component was largely illusory. Some Georgians held positions in the administration, in a few cases quite high-ranking ones, but had no real power. Most traditional administrative positions were abolished and their occupants not absorbed into the new system. The Russians saw themselves as Georgia’s benefactors and expected grateful, unquestioning obedience from the local population. The fact that few Georgians or Russians understood each other’s language (and translators were scarce) increased the distance between the Georgians and their new government. Although Alexander intended that the Georgian law code be followed where possible, Russian officials made no serious effort to remedy their ignorance of the subject and followed Russian laws instead. Many Russian officials at all levels executed their

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responsibilities poorly and treated the Georgians with contempt. These factors and the inadequacy of the Russians’ pay stimulated widespread corruption. All the while fighting by members of the royal family as well as Daghestani raids continued and Ossetes closed the road linking Georgia and the Caucasian Line. There was a short-lived uprising against the new regime in one of Georgia’s provinces in 1802.

The Tsitsianov Regime Dissatisfied by the state of affairs in Georgia, Alexander made some personnel changes in 1802, the most important being the appointment of General Paul Tsitsianov to overall command in the Caucasus, concentrating all the most important offices of that region in his hands. Tsitsianov was the most admired (by the Russians) of all the men who served in the Caucasus in the early nineteenth century. He established at least nominal Russian suzerainty over most of Transcaucasia, waged war on many fronts, made some administrative reforms, and achieved martyr­ dom by his assassination at Baku in 1806. Many of the highranking officials in the Caucasus enjoyed some degree of success in manipulating St. Petersburg’s understanding of Caucasian affairs and in convincing the central government to endorse their actions but Tsitsianov was the most successful of them all. Alexander relied on him as an expert on Caucasian affairs, since the general was not only the ranking official on the scene but also a veteran of the 1796 campaign and the descendant of a Georgian prince who had accompanied King Vakhtang into exile. When Alexander made an early attempt to give Tsitsianov detailed instructions (on how to reorganize the administration of newly acquired Mingrelia), Tsitsianov sent him a cutting reply to the effect that he, Tsitsianov, should not be made to clear his moves in advance with distant St. Petersburg and ought not to be given inappropriate instructions. Alexander gave the general his way, asking his approval of policies proposed by the central govern­ ment and requiring only that Tsitsianov send word after any important action had been taken.17 Tsitsianov launched bold initiatives at a time when Russia was preparing for the next phase of the Napoleonic wars. He persuaded his superiors to regard Caucasian Muslims as savages who had to be handled by stern measures and denied direct

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contact with St. Petersburg. He tried to prevent Georgians from influencing authorities in the capital as well, but this was more difficult because of the number of Georgian nobles already living there. When his plans went awry, he shunted the blame onto other people. His martyrdom added to the luster of his reputation and stifled the attempts of a few people to conduct a réévaluation of his methods. Tsitsianov was also a bitter, ambitious man, who felt he had not advanced as rapidly as he deserved, therefore he was determined to use his tour of duty in the Caucasus to impress St. Petersburg. To do that, he had to obtain the submission of as much Caucasian territory as possible, including the western Georgian principalities, where Alexander would have preferred restraint to avoid damaging relations with the Porte. The same consideration drove Tsitsianov to prefer force as the method of expansion because that gave him the chance to win showy victories. He did not make a serious effort to conciliate local rulers—negotiations were not permissible, only humiliating subjection or war. All of the khans of northern Azerbaijan (except the khan of Ganjeh), as well as King Solomon II of Imeretia, were genuinely willing at least to consider becoming Russian vassals to gain backing against local rivals or to prevent the enforcement of Iranian claims of suzerainty. However, the Russian officials’, especially Tsitsianov’s, harsh ways of dealing with the local rulers convinced the latter that the Russian presence merely posed a new problem rather than offering a solution to old ones. Since Tsitsianov was not nearly as good a military leader as he thought he was, his policies greatly compounded the difficulties of Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus. The application of his bellicose methods to northern Azerbaijan and his threatening, insulting correspondence with the Iranian court did much to spark a war between Russia and Iran. The potential for conflict was there in any case, given the two countries’ determination to uphold their Caucasian claims, but the form the war actually took owed much to Tsitsianov’s pugnaciousness. Once the war had begun in 1804, Tsitsianov successfully prevented St. Petersburg from making an early compromise settlement, even though this costly war came at a time when Russia was engaged in major conflicts in Europe. By claiming so much territory in the rapid and aggressive way he did, he spread Russia’s military resources

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thinly over an area where his tactics had intensified anti-Russian sentiments. Moreover his military operations against the Iranians and Lesghis were often poorly conceived and executed and therefore failed to bring Russia any lasting advantage, while further depleting her modest armed strength in the region. Fundamentally Tsitsianov liked having power over others, bending others to his will. He was openly contemptuous of the relatively conciliatory style of Russia’s officials in the Caucasus during Paul’s reign. When things went wrong he was quick to denounce the treachery and cowardice of his subordinates. For the Caucasians he had only contempt. “Asiatic treachery” and “Persian scum” were expressions which came readily to him. As he told Foreign Minister Adam Czartoryski, “among the Asians, nothing works like fear as the natural consequence of force.”18 St. Petersburg gave Tsitsianov few specific directives about how to strengthen Russia’s position in the Caucasus except that Alexander wanted him to avoid antagonizing the Porte and was willing to have the Caucasian principalities brought into the empire as vassal states still under the authority of their rulers. Tsitsianov did not have a detailed plan either. In broad terms he knew that he wanted to regather the Georgian principalities and restore his ancestral homeland to its dimensions at the height of its medieval strength. He also wanted to punish certain Azerbaijani khans and mountain tribes for their anti-Georgian or anti-Russian activities. Like most Russian commanders in the Caucasus during Alexander’s reign, Tsitsianov found that the extension of Russian authority in one locale became of itself a strong argument for further expansion to secure what had already been taken. Apart from these considerations, Tsitsianov res­ ponded to opportunities as they arose to the extent that his means permitted. Tsitsianov began his “reign” by focusing on affairs in the Georgian states and immediately surrounding territories. Within the kingdom of Georgia he increased the size of the Russian bureaucracy and decreased the number of Georgian administra­ tive positions held over from the Bagration era. He also deported to Russia as many Bagrations as he could (some were engaged in rebellion and thus beyond his reach). Only Erekle’s fourth son, Anthony, catholicos of the Georgian Church, was allowed to remain. Tsitsianov attempted to bolster Georgia’s defenses by making improvements to the Georgian Military Highway. To

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stop the persistent raids from Daghestan he sent troops against some Lesghi enclaves on the northeastern border of Georgia in 1803 and obtained the nominal submission of the tribal elders. However, the Lesghi threat to Georgia remained as serious as ever. That same year developments in the western Caucasus were favorable to Russian expansion. The prince of Mingrelia, Gregory Dadiani, was interested in obtaining Russian protection. He had lately profited from disorders in neighboring Imeretia to take some territory, thus continuing an established Mingrelian practice of seeking gains at Imeretia’s expense. However, King Solomon II of Imeretia had strengthened his domestic position and counterattacked with considerable success. Therefore Gregory asked for Russian protection and Tsitsianov obliged. Mingrelia was a useful acquisition. It controlled a strategically valuable section of the Black Sea coast, and its submission also gave Tsitsianov a way to increase the pressure on King Solomon II, who was cool to the Russians because he saw the fate of Georgia as an ominous portent of Russia’s intentions toward all Caucasian states. In any case Mingrelia would have been difficult for Tsitsianov to conquer because of its distance from Russianoccupied territory and the roughness of its terrain. Therefore Tsitsianov and Gregory signed an agreement in 1803 by which the prince became a vassal of the tsar and accepted a Russian garrison in his domain. Gregory and his successor, who owed his throne to Russian intervention, were the most consistently pro­ Russian of the Caucasian rulers and enjoyed more internal autonomy than Russia’s other vassals in the region. Solomon II, now under Russian pressure on his eastern and western borders, sought to make a similar agreement. Tsitsianov would have preferred to oust him but settled for his submission because the khanates of northern Azerbaijan were more important targets. In addition, the general did not want to divert some of his already meager funds from planned military operations to the establish­ ment of a Russian administration in Imeretia. Solomon and Tsitsianov signed an agreement early in 1804. However, Russia’s refusal to back the king’s territorial claims against Mingrelia made him an unreliable vassal. With the submission of Imeretia, Tsitsianov claimed that the principality of Guria had automatically become subject to Russia since Imeretia claimed (but could not enforce) sovereignty over this small principality. However, Tsitsianov’s claim had no force behind it.

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Tsitsianov did not intend to remove all the khans of northern Azerbaijan, but there were two he wanted to eliminate as quickly as possible. These were Javad Khan of Ganjeh and Mohammad Khan of Yerevan. Both ruled territories bordering Georgia and had been dominated by Erekle in the 1780s. The Ganjevis took revenge by playing an active role in the Iranian attack on Georgia in 1795. Mohammad Khan was in a more ambiguous position, under pressure from Iran as well as’Georgia (and then Russia) and suspecting that many of his Armenian subjects favored a Russian takeover. Tsitsianov began token negotiations with both khans, but his threats and insults were aimed at blocking any agreement, thus justifying his use of force. Ganjeh was conquered at the start of 1804. The khan, some of his relatives, and many inhabitants of the capital city were massacred. Ganjeh was renamed Elizavetpol’ in honor of Alexander’s wife and transformed into a district of Georgia. Tsitsianov was pleased with the results. He used the conquest to frighten other khans into submission and also to win Alexander’s praise. The tsar promoted him to general of the infantry, and all those who served in the operation were rewarded. In the summer of the same year Tsitsianov tried to repeat this success in Yerevan. However, his poor leadership of the operation, unexpectedly strong opposition from the Iranian army in the start of what became a nine-year war, and anti-Russian uprisings in Georgia, Kabarda, and Ossetia forced Tsitsianov to give up the campaign. Another unsuccessful attempt to conquer Yerevan was made by Tsitsianov’s successor in 1808. The khanate remained part of Iran for twenty more years. The 1804 uprising in Georgia was a reflection of the widespread disillusionment with Russian rule. Tsitsianov had made some administrative reforms, flring officials suspected of corruption, abolishing some nuisance taxes, and permitting the use of Georgian in legal appeals, but the basic problems remained unchanged. Since his early battles with the Lesghis produced no lasting benefits and he siphoned off so many troops for his Yerevan campaign, Georgia’s security remained a source of grave concern to its inhabitants. The construction of improvements to the Georgian Military Highway led to the draft of Georgian peasants living nearby to provide much of the labor. They were antagonized at being taken away from their farms, the physical danger of their assigned work, and the brutality of the

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Russian overseers. Tsitsianov’s policies also encouraged unrest in Kabarda, where the inhabitants were especially provoked by his attempt to force compliance with the hated judicial reforms. He sent troops from the Line to bum Kabardan villages and subjected the chiefs to characteristic threats like “My blood boils, as in a cauldron, and all my limbs tremble from eagerness to water your land with the blood of criminals. Await, I tell you, my rule by bayonet, grapeshot, and the flowing of your blood in rivers . . .”19 From spring until autumn 1804 anti-Russian violence flared in Georgia, Kabarda, Ossetia, Chechenia, and adjoining mountain districts. At the same time Lesghi raiders plundered Georgia and attacked Russian troops. Enthusiasm for the restoration of the Bagrations found support at all levels of Georgian society, from royal princes, who sought to lead the insurrection, to ordinary peasants. Iran and the Porte encouraged the Bagration princes and mountain tribesmen. As usual the tactics of raid and ambush often worked well for the Caucasians, while the Russians gained victories in formal battles. The uprising quieted for the time being, once Russians mounted punitive expeditions and cold weather brought an end to the traditional fighting season. The Ossetes living on the southern slopes of the Greater Caucasus were the ones who suffered most in the suppression of the uprising. Tsitsianov led a sweep through the area on his return from Yerevan, burning villages and capturing Ossete families, although the leaders of the uprising escaped to remote parts of the mountains. The captives were imprisoned in Georgia where most of them died of neglect. In the wake of the uprising Tsitsianov took measures to increase the Russification of Kabarda. He began to employ the term “Kabardan district” in place of “Kabardan nation” in order to increase the inhabitants’ awareness of being subjects of the Russian Empire. He also tried to force the Kabardans to make more visits to the Line in order to expose them to Russian influence by prohibiting Armenian merchants based at the Line from journeying into Kabarda to trade. He had other plans, including the establishment of a school at the Line to teach Kabardan children Russian and Tatar as well as the use of Kabardans in military units in Russia, but these were left unrealized at his death. In 1805 Tsitsianov used verbal and military threats to obtain

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the submission of three more Azerbaijani khanates (Qarabagh, Shirvan, and Shakki) and fought Iranian attackers with mediocre results. The subjection of the khanates along the Caspian coast was his next priority. There was at least a possibility that he could achieve this without incurring the burdens of another campaign. The khan of Baku, a city-state that was the commercial center of the Caspian’s western coast, was seriously interested in obtaining Russian support against the revived power of neighboring Derbent and Qobbeh. He tried to negotiate a vassalage agreement with Tsitsianov, but the general insisted on taking a share of the khan’s major sources of revenue and establishing a thousand-man garrison in Baku’s citadel. This convinced the khan that he would be reduced to a Russian puppet. Therefore he rejected the proposed agreement, increased his contacts with Iran, and patched up his relations with his neighbors. When the Russian army invaded Baku the khan seemed to yield and arranged a meeting with Tsitsianov outside the city walls in February 1806. The khan did not surrender; instead a member of his entourage shot Tsitsianov dead and the Russian expedition dissolved in confusion. During the Tsitsianov era several Daghestani rulers became Russian vassals, but this had little practical meaning. Some, like the khans of Tarqu and Tabasaran, were weak figures with little ability to control their own subjects, who were often anti­ Russian. Others agreed to submit rather than declare their hostility but then continued to fight the Russians. One of the most powerful Daghestanis, Surkhai Khan of the Ghazi Qumuqs, did not even feign submission. He expressed the attitude of many Daghestanis in a defiant letter to one of Tsitsianov’s successors, We, the people of Daghestan ... are free people; where it pleases us more, we go; we live as we wish, not under strict commands so that all orders be carried out swiftly. We are not your people!20 Daghestan’s terrain was too mountainous for the Russians even to attempt to subdue it by force at this time.

Further Russian Expansion; Wars with Iran and the Ottoman Empire This phase of active Russian expansion in the Caucasus continued after Tsitsianov’s death until the end of the war with Iran in 1813

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(the war with the Ottoman Empire having ended the previous year). The weaknesses of Russia's position in the region became increasingly clear. The soldiers' morale was low and the army’s leadership sometimes querulous or lackluster, only occasionally effective. Much of the territory that Russia wanted to acquire remained either outside its control altogether or only tenuously subject. Russia's first objective after Tsitsianov’s death was the completion of his planned acquisition of the western coast of the Caspian: the khanates of Derbent, Qobbeh, and Baku. Russian troops conquered all three within a few months of Tsitsianov’s death. Baku and Qobbeh were put under direct Russian rule. In Derbent the real power was in Russian hands but the shamkhal of Tarqu was made nominal ruler as a reward for having sent agents into the capital city to frighten the populace with stories of the slaughter the Russians would conduct unless the inhabitants surrendered. The ousted khans fled to areas outside Russian control. The Russians also had to conquer Qarabagh and Shakki, two khanates that had submitted the previous year, because of the widespread antagonism in both places towards the harshness of Russian methods and the ineffectiveness of Russian protec­ tion. Both khans were removed from office. The khan of Shakki fled into the high mountains. Gudovich, who returned to the Caucasus as Tsitsianov’s replacement, appointed a new khan, the chief of a Kurdish tribe from southern Azerbaijan who had fled to Transcaucasia after opposing the establishment of the Qajar monarchy. Gudovich did not think that the new khan’s Shiite beliefs would be more important than the fact that he and his militantly Sunni subjects were all Muslims, but the inhabitants of Shakki saw matters differently and fought the new regime. In Qarabagh the aged khan was killed not because he was a serious military opponent but because he became the target of Russian soldiers’ accumulated frustrations and humiliations. He was replaced by his eldest surviving son. There were many uprisings against Russian authority through­ out the region, with much verbal and some military and financial support from Iran and the Ottoman Empire. However, the various anti-Russian activities were rarely coordinated either among the Caucasians or with the neighboring Muslim empires. The ability of the Caucasians to oppose the Russians was further reduced by the natural and man-made misfortunes that befell the

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area in the early nineteenth century. The battles in the region and the accompanying food requisitions, raiding, and scorchedearth tactics disrupted the region’s ability to support its inhabitants. In addition epidemics and crop failures leading to famines took a heavy toll in lives and weakened survivors, many of whom fled to remote areas. Solomon II of Imeretia was able, with strong support from many of his subjects and some Ottoman help as well, to fight the Russians from 1806 to 1810. At times Solomon and his subjects caused the Russians considerable distress, but eventually Russia was able to spare enough troops to conquer the kingdom, which was then put under direct Russian rule. Sheykh Ali, the ousted khan of Derbent and Qobbeh, escaped to Daghestan. With the support of some local tribes, many of his former subjects, and Iran, he was long able to raid Qobbeh and prevent Russia from exercising effective authority there. This situation set the stage for further Russian territorial conquest in reprisal. In 1811 Russian troops campaigned in southern Daghestan .against Sheykh Ali and his ally, Surkhai Khan of the Ghazi Qumuqs. The Russians burned several villages on the edge of Ghazi Qumuq territory but could not win a decisive victory. To punish Surkhai, the Russians seized the southernmost part of his domains and turned it into a new khanate, Kiura, ruled by Surkhai’s rebel nephew. Kiura was occupied by a Russian garrison; its khan was given the rank of colonel in the Russian army and agreed to provide hostages and tribute. Russian authorities decided not to establish direct rule because there were not enough officials in the viceroyalty for some to be spared for the administration of Kiura. Sheykh Ali’s struggle to regain power lasted until 1813, when the end of the Russo-Iranian war undercut his position. Several Bagration princes also continued the fight to oust the Russians. The most vigorous and persistent of the monarchists was one of Erekle’s sons, Prince Alexander, who had Iranian support. Kabardans and other mountaineers raided the Line frequently, with particularly intense fighting occurring in 1810. The biggest anti-Russián outburst came in 1812, when Georgians, Armenians, and most of the inhabitants of the central and eastern Caucasus attempted to drive the Russians from the region in ill-coordinated bursts of fighting at various times during the year. Iran proclaimed Prince Alexander Bagration king of Georgia and sent troops to his aid, which

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helped to a degree to focus the efforts of the Georgian insurgents. For a time the Russian position was perilous, with many small garrisons around the region cut off and subject to attack by superior numbers. Eventually Russian counterattacks, including the burning of villages and imposition of fines, coupled with victories over the Iranians and Ottomans enabled the tsarist forces to put down the scattered rebellions. During this phase of active Russian expansion, from the Tsitsianov era until 1813, Russia was also at war with Iran (1804-1813) and the Ottoman Empire (1806-1812), a situation that both complicated the problem of subduing the Caucasus and set the stage for additional territorial gains. For the Ottomans the war in the Caucasus was secondary to the fighting in the Balkans. The war effort was further hampered by internal disputes among officials on the Caucasian front. Russian troops were able eventually to take many key Ottoman fortresses in the western Caucasus, even though the process was often an arduous one. The war in the Caucasus was of more central importance to the Iranians, who were able to continue raiding northern Azerbaijan despite Russian defensive efforts. Both sides possessed the differing kinds of strengths ánd weaknesses that enabled them to continue fighting without being able to win a decisive victory. Only on the few occasions when the Russians were able to fight formal battles under favorable circumstances were they able to win handily. Ultimately Russia’s wars with the Ottoman Empire and Iran ended because of developments in the broader setting of the Napoleonic wars. The war with the Porte removed the few remaining restraints on Russian activities in the western Caucasus. In fact St. Petersburg encouraged the generals there to take the offensive in order to divert some of the Ottoman forces from the Balkan theater. In addition to conquering important Ottoman fortresses, in 1810 the Russians took the Turco-Georgian pashalik (province) of Akhaltsekhe, which had served as a base of support for various opponents of the Russians, including King Solomon II of Imeretia and the Lesghis. Russian victories over the Ottomans convinced the ruler of the small western Georgian principality of Guria to agree in 1810 to become a vassal of the tsar. The formal submission agreement was signed the following year. Russian authorities also intervened in the factional rivalry in Abkhazia. The strongest attraction of this western Georgian principality was

180 Russian Colonial Expansion

the coastal fortress of Sukhumi, an important link in the Porte’s communications with the tribes of the high mountains. In 1809 one of the two brothers engaged in a struggle for the throne sought and received Russia’s endorsement. Russia now claimed Abkhazia as a vassal state, but the pro-Russian prince was in a very weak position and received no effective assistance. There­ fore he had to flee to Russian-occupied territory and remained there until 1810, when the Russians took Sukhumi and put their client in power. Russia’s final territorial gain in this phase of expansion was at the southeastern edge of the Caucasus, the khanate of Talesh, a poor, thinly populated area on the Caspian coast south of the Kura River. Alexander was uncertain whether it had any value to Russia, but after it had been taken from Iranian troops in an especially bloody battle at the beginning of 1813 he decided to keep it. Local administration was confided to the current khan, who years earlier had sought Russian backing against the Qajar dynasty but had lost most of his authority because of ineffective Russian protection. The end of Russia’s wars with the Porte and Iran closed the first phase of Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus. By the Treaty of Bucharest, which ended the war with the Ottoman Empire in 1812, Russia kept the western Georgian principalities but restored to the Ottomans the pashalik of Akhaltsekhe and the other captured Ottoman positions.21 Sukhumi was supposed to be returned to the Ottomans as part of this agreement, but the Russians chose not to yield it because of its strategic importance. Russia’s war with Iran was ended in 1813 by the Treaty of Golestan, by which Iran recognized all Russia’s territorial claims in the Caucasus.22 There were some hints at the time of the negotiations that Russia might make some minor territorial concessions as a gesture of goodwill but Alexander was eventually persuaded by his officers on the scene not to do so.

Domestic Affairs The internal affairs of the Caucasian territories Russia acquired by 1813 received much less attention than the military emer­ gencies in the region. Indeed Russia viewed this area primarily in military terms and entrusted the most important positions there to soldiers who occasionally carried out civilian responsibilities as well. Yet some attention had to be given to internal administra-

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tion since parts of the region were incorporated directly into the empire and Russia was dissatisfied with some conditions in the vassal states. Administrative problems were compounded by the poor quality and low morale of the Russians serving there. Service in the Caucasus was generally regarded as a low-status posting for men who were either of little talent or in disfavor with the imperial court. Any position other than the highest military commands was the dead end of an undistinguished career. The obvious unpopularity of the Russian presence frustrated and embittered the officials, who had expected to be welcomed as the bearers of security and progress. Moreover, the Russians were incapable of playing as assertive a role as they would have liked. The need to protect the Line and garrison the territories that came under Russian protection or direct rule as well as fight wars on many fronts spread the Russian military forces thin. Many of the soldiers were barely trained recruits who were of little use. Russia's military strength was reduced further by the recall of some units for service against Napoleon’s armies in Europe and by the increasingly serioys problem of desertion. Civilian officials, who had the option of resigning at will, did so in alarming numbers. Russia’s financial situation in the Caucasus was at least as bad. While the costs of the Napoleonic wars curtailed the amount of money the central government could allocate to the Caucasus, the taxes and tribute collected there were too little to cover expenses. These factors prevented Officers from annexing outright as much territory as they would have liked. Life in the Caucasus was very unpleasant for the Russians in a number of ways. They were exposed to unfamiliar diseases, including the plague. Despite occasional food requisitions, the Russians suffered the effects of periodic famines along with the rest of the population. Distance from familiar settings created awkward social problems and Georgians especially complained of Russian sexual misconduct with female inhabitants. Officials’ salaries were inadequate, especially in light of the famines and the overall inflation resulting from the increased demand created by the Russian presence. Bribe-taking, looting, and embezzle­ ment of public funds remained serious problems among the Russians in the Caucasus throughout the early nineteenth century.

182 Russian Colonial Expansion

The territories Russia açquired in the Caucasus up to 1813 fell into two broad categories: vassal states and those under direct Russian rule. The areas annexed outright became provinces (except for Ganjeh, which became a district of Georgia), while the vassal states retained some measure of their autonomy under incumbent rulers or replacements chosen by Russia. Although some Russian policies were aimed only at one of the categories, many policy features affected the region as a whole. Throughout the Caucasus, Russia attempted to strengthen its position by gradually Russifying the local élite. Rulers who became vassals and usually their elder sons as well were given Russian military ranks and yearly salaries. The specifics varied with the principality’s importance to the Russians, but the rank of major-general was the one commonly given to rulers. Rulers were also given patents of office, swords, and other presents considered symbols of authority. Russia declared itself the guarantor of the succession, usually in accordance with primo­ geniture. Thus St. Petersburg saw itself as legitimizing the position of new rulers by the grant of the symbolic gifts. However only in Mingrelia did Russia intervene successfully in a disputed succession to ensure the throne for the pretender it favored. Elsewhere tsarist officials were occasionally faced with locally popular rulers whom Russia considered usurpers because it had not sanctioned their accession to power. In the areas under direct Russian rule a wide variety of local officials were absorbed into the new administration. The Russian authorities did eliminate many traditional administrative posi­ tions in Georgia, but there and throughout the area Russia had no choice but to employ a goodly proportion of the local officials. In some cases anti-Russian officials were replaced by people of known pro-Russian sentiments from outside the traditional élite. The Russian authorities then accorded the new appointees the privileges of the élite, although the parvenus were not well regarded by many inhabitants. Eligibility for noble status was defined differently in Russia and the newly annexed territories. Similarly, claims to land were often difficult to substantiate to Russian satisfaction because of the paucity of written records. Russia did not grapple with the problem until the 1820s. The highest stratum of the Georgian nobility made the smoothest transition overall: they were recognized as having all the rights and privileges of the Russian nobility by the Treaty of

Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813

183

Georgievsk (1783). Russia also transformed the armies of the annexed and vassal states into militias that were used as auxiliaries to the Russian troops. Education was another way to speed the assimilation of the Caucasus notables. Tsitsianov established a school for children of the nobility in Tbilisi at which a German academic taught Russian and a few other subjects. The small student body was predominantly Russian but with a sizable minority of Georgians and Armenians. There were also a few Muslim students, including the son of the new khan of Shakki. In the vassal states Russia took a number of steps that put sharp limits on the local rulers’ authority. Control of foreign relations was naturally transferred to Russia. Traditional legal systems were allowed to remain in operation, except that vassals were denied the authority to impose the death penalty or deprive a subject of noble status, since both practices were at variance with Russian law. Vassals were required to pay tribute, which constituted a serious economic burden in a region ravaged by so many recent disasters. By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century the vassal states were unable to pay tribute at all. Russia also intervened in the economic affairs of some vassal states, as when it revised the tax rolls in Qarabagh. The strongest curb on the vassals’ autonomy was the presence of a Russian garrison in the capital of each vassal state. In the annexed provinces Russia followed the precedent set in Georgia of creating administrations that were supposed to be hybrids of Russian and local practices but were heavily weighted in favor of the Russian.23 Beginning in 1810 Russian authorities modified their approach slightly in an effort to give the Caucasian élite more influence in provincial government. Thus when Imeretia was annexed in 1810 the existing administration was left virtually intact except for the very highest positions, which were entrusted to Russians. In Georgia from 1812 the process of whittling down the number of administrative positions held by local notables was reversed and the Georgian role in civil and legal administration increased. There was a similar effort to give greater weight to local legal traditions in the annexed khanates on the Caspian coast. Nonetheless all political offenses and major nonpolitical crimes were subject exclusively to Russian law in all the new provinces. Russia’s religious policy in the annexed territories was modeled

184 Russian Colonial Expansion

on practices in the heart of the empire, where religious institutions were regarded as part of the state administrative system. The Georgian Church was the most prone to Russifica­ tion since it too was Orthodox and the catholicos lived in territory annexed by Russia. In the first few years after the annexation of Georgia its Church preserved some autonomy while under the administration of the Russian Holy Synod. Still, Russian authorities made a number of changes, most important of which was the transfer of all Church lands to the state (as was the case in Russia). In 1811 the Georgian Church lost the remainder of its autonomy, including its own patriarchate. Russia attempted much less with regard to the Armenian Church. Although St. Petersburg was on good terms with a number of Armenian clerics living in Russia and sought to ensure that the Armenian catholicos was pro-Russian, the headquarters of the Armenian Church was in the khanate of Yerevan, which remained outside Russian control until 1828. Russian treatment of Muslims in the Caucasus could be quite hostile but was only intermittently so. Still, many local Muslims believed they would be persecuted. In the annexed Muslim territories most but not all land grants used to support religious institutions were taken over by the state. The jurisdiction of Islamic law was drastically reduced to a few family matters. Some Islamic religious leaders received modest salaries from the Russian government and were expected to encourage loyalty to the new regime. Others now had great difficulty in earning a living at all. Some mosques and other religious buildings were seized by the Russians for their own secular or religious use. However, there was no attempt to encourage conversion in Transcaucasia. Public religious observances were not interfered with, nor were Muslim women required to give up the veil (as Georgian and Armenian women were compelled to do). Economic policy in the annexed territories reflected both the Russians’ high hopes and their serious problems. Many officials were advocates of tariff reductions as an economic stimulus. However, they were unable to institute such a policy because of the dire financial straits of the Russian administration in the Caucasus. There were import and export duties on trade within Russia’s Caucasian holdings as well as with the Ottoman Empire and Iran and even with the rest of Russia. Yet Russia’s tariff revenues were slight, since trade suffered in the early nineteenth

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185

century because of the wars and natural disasters in the region. In addition smuggling was widespread. Russia also derived revenue from keeping most of the existing taxes in the annexed areas and imposing some very unpopular new ones, including one on water used to irrigate farm lands. Before the Russian takeover many important economic activities had been exploited by governments through the use of “concessions,” the grant of a monopoly in some field in return for the payment of a fee to the government. Russia continued this practice in the annexed areas, except for tax collection, which was assigned to government officials, and created some new concessions. Many of the concessions were sold to Armenians living in the region or in Russia. There were also long-range plans to improve the Caucasian economy. The settlement of Armenians, Greeks, and Roman Catholics as state peasants on lands confiscated by the government was encouraged. There were attempts to develop areas of the Caucasian economy, notably copper mining, weaving, sericulture, and wine produc­ tion, but the results were unimpressive during the early years of the nineteenth century.

Conclusions Russia had gradually become committed to a course of expansion in the Caucasus from which it could not back down without tarnishing the empire’s dignity. Certain axioms encouraged St. Petersburg officials to involve Russia in Caucasian affairs. The most important were that the region would be a useful base of operations against the Ottoman Empire, provide Russia with easy access to the markets of Asia, and that Russia had an important civilizing duty to perform there. Yet Russia’s growing role in the Caucasus up to 1813 was not the product of any coherent plan of long standing. Most important steps were taken in response to outside stimuli, especially requests for aid from local rulers and armed challenges to Russian authority. Moreover the Russians entered into their ambitious undertakings with little knowledge and somewhat more misinformation about the Caucasus. They did not appreciate the difficulties posed by the terrain and climate, but most of all they misunderstood the inhabitants’ attitudes. Russia’s efforts to assimilate the local élite and make “civilizing” reforms did not evoke the expected enthusiasm. In part this resulted from the fact that the measures,

186 Russian Colonial Expansion

however benevolent their, original intent, had often changed character by the time they were executed by officials on the scene. The most important part of the problem, however, lay in the Caucasians’ and Russians’ fundamentally different notions of what Russian sovereignty entailed. The local rulers had a long tradition of striving to preserve and if possible extend their authority by making agreements with other rulers, both local ones and heads of empires. However, the Caucasian leaders and their subjects were intent on preserving as much autonomy as possible within the context of such agreements. They looked to Russia as one more element in a complex balance of power. The problem was that the Russians expected to exercise a much greater degree of control over their Caucasian vassals than any state had ever done before. Thus Russia was compelled to rely heavily on armed force to maintain its position in the region. By 1813 Russia had conquered a large part of the Caucasus. However, to convert that superficial authority into secure and effective power required many more decades of struggle.

Notes 1. S.A. Belokurov, Snosheniia Rossii s Kavkazom (Moscow, 1889) vol. I, pp. 45-53. 2. 1724 treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Affairs, second edition (2 vols. New Haven, Conn., 1975), vol. I, pp. 65-69. 3. P.G. Butkov, Materialy dlia novoi istorii Kavkaza s 1722 po 1803 (3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1869), vol. I, p. 83, n. 1. 4. Treaty of Rasht, Hurewitz, The Middle East, vol. I, pp. 69-71. 5. Treaty of Ganjeh, T. luzefovich, Dogovory Rossii s Vostokom (St. Petersburg, 1869), pp. 202-207. 6. Treaty of Belgrade, Hurewitz, The Middle East, vol. I, p. 73. 7. N.A. Smirnov, Politika Rossii na Kavkaze v XVI-XIX vekakh (Moscow, 1958), pp. 88-91. 8. M. Atkin, Russia and Iran 1780-1828 (Minneapolis, 1980), pp. 24, 29-31. 9. Butkov, Materialy, vol. II, p. 51, n. 1. 10. D.M. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy 1658-1832 (New York, 1957), p. 183. 11. See for example Sheykh Mansur’s letter to the Kabardans (undated), Kabardino-Russkie otnosheniia v XVI-XV11 vv. (Moscow, 1957) vol. 2, p. 368. 12. Treaty of Jassy, Hurewitz, The Middle East, vol. I, pp. 107-8. 13. Butkov, Materialy, vol. II, p. 255; V.P. Kochubei to P.D. Tsitsianov,

Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813

14.

15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

187

20 July 1805, Russia, Viceroyalty of the Caucasus, Akty sobrannye kavkazskoiu arkheograficheskoiu kommissieiu (12 vols. Tiflis, 1866-1904), vol. II, p. 947. Catherine II, Manifesto to the Caucasian and Iranian peoples, 27 March 1796, N.F. Dubrovin, Istoriia voiny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze (6 vols., St. Petersburg, 1871-1888), vol. Ill, pp. 125-129. Atkin, Russia and Iran, p. 58. Ibid., pp. 60-65. N.N. Beliavskii and V.A. Potto, Utverzhdenie russkago vladychestva na Kavkaze (12 vols. St. Petersburg, 1901-1902) vol. I, p. 109. Tsitsianov to Czartoryski, 26 September 1805, Russia, Viceroyalty of the Caucasus, Akty, vol. II, p. 290. Tsitsianov to the Kabardan chiefs, 4 April 1804, Dubrovin, Istoriia voiny, vol. IV, p. 370. Surkhai Khan to Alexander Tormasov, 13 July 1809, ibid., vol. V, p. 277. Treaty of Bucharest, Hurewitz, The Middle East, vol. I, pp. 194, 195. Treaty of Golestan, ibid., vol. I, pp. 197-198. For a detailed examination of Russian administrative policy in all the Georgian states see L.H. Rhinelander, Jr., “The Incorporation of the Caucasus into the Russian Empire: the Case of Georgia, 1801-1854” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1972); on northern Azerbaijan see Atkin, Russia and Iran, especially pp. 145-53.

IX The Mobile Steppe Frontier The Russian Conquest and Colonization of Bashkiria and Kazakhstan to 1850 Alton Donnelly

he colonization of each area within the Russian Empire

exhibited its own particular features. What these were in T the case of the mobile steppe frontier, basically Bashkiria and

Kazakhstan, can be conveniently discussed in relation to three major conditioning factors and the groups at whose initiative the colonization took place. Russian penetration into this steppe was profoundly affected by the geography of the region, the peoples who inhabited it, and, thirdly, by the development of serfdom, which led to an elemental flight of peasants towards the frontiers. Bashkiria, which lay to the east of the Volga River and astride the southern part of the Ural Mountains, had a mixed topography. In the north and in the mountains it was forested. The remainder of both sides of the Urals was wooded steppe that shaded off into pure steppe to the south. The middle course of the Ural River served as the boundary between the lands of the Bashkirs and those of the Kazakhs to the south. At the beginning of the seventeenth century Bashkir territory encompassed an area approximately three-quarters the size of France. The inhabitants of the forested part engaged in hunting, trapping, fishing, and bee-keeping; but the majority, those who occupied the steppe­ land, were pastoral nomads with all the formidable mobility and military capabilities of the Turco-Mongol nomads. Although several groups of Bashkirs sent delegates to submit to Ivan IV immediately after the conquest of Kazan in 1552, they long thereafter resisted Russian penetration into their land. Before any significant colonization could occur, therefore, it was necessary for the Russians to conquer the native inhabitants. The conquest required two centuries and was accomplished in slow 189

The Mobile Steppe Frontier 191

steps by the building of successive defensive lines of forts and outposts, which pushed the nomads back deeper and deeper into the steppe. Once the fortified line was complete the area behind it became relatively safe for colonization. Thus, the initial agent of the movement into Bashkiria was the state; and the first colonists were the military, followed shortly by thousands of peasants brought in, or recruited locally, to build the forts and outposts and to farm the estates of the military servitors. The Church also contributed significantly to the colonizing of the newly won territories. Priests always accompanied Russian forces, and shortly after the fall of Kazan the Church organized an archbishopric in the former Khanate of Kazan. In order to maintain its establishment and the monasteries which soon followed, the Church required land and peasant labor to farm it. As serfdom gradually fixed its yoke on the Russian peasantry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many peasants from the interior provinces responded by fleeing to the frontier areas despite efforts by the government to restrict their movement. Another major element in the southeastward colonization movement was made up of the non-Russian (i.e. Chuvash, Mari, Mordvin, and Tatar) peasantry of the middle Volga/lower Kama region. Many had settled down to farming long before the Russian conquest of Kazan in the mid-sixteenth century and had fallen into a dependent status subject to their Tatar landlords. These peasants paid tribute (iasak) to Moscow after the conquest, and their burdens grew in conjunction with the enserfment of the Russian peasantry. They, too, ran away in great numbers further eastward into Bashkiria and became a significant component of the colonization movement.

Government-initiated Colonization The Trans-Kama Defensive Line After subduing Kazan the Russians constructed a number of forts in the 1550s to maintain control of the peoples in the former Khanate of Kazan. Kazan itself was fortified and a number of other posts were established. To the east, the Bashkirs, despite their nominal submission to Russia, vigorously opposed Russian penetration. Uprisings of the Bashkirs against Russian encroach­ ments in the last quarter of the sixteenth century led the Russians to build several new forts. Ivan IV had organized the frontier

192 Russian Colonial Expansion

service in 1571 and begun building the first defensive line west of the Volga, establishing the pattern of subsequent steppe con­ quest. In the face of continuing unrest in the Volga valley and to ensure the safety of the Volga route to the Caspian Sea, the government built Samara in 1586, Tsaritsyn in 1589, and Saratov in 1590. Another source of trouble for the Russians came from the nomads outside Bashkiria. In the early seventeenth century the Kalmyks, a branch of the Western Mongols, migrated from their homeland to the lower Volga Valley, where they fought the Nogai Tatars for control of the steppe in that region. In the 1640s the Kalmyks attempted to cross over to the western side of the Volga and simultaneously into Bashkiria but were thrust back by the Russians. Under this pressure and because of continued unrest among the Bashkirs, the government built the first defensive line east of the Volga in the northwestern comer of Bashkiria. Because it was roughly parallel to the lower course of the Kama River it was called the Trans-Kama Defensive Line. The first three posts were Aktachinsk, Sheshminsk, and Menzelinsk. This little line cut off an insignificant part of the region but was the first major step into Bashkiria. Between 1652 and 1657 a new line of eight major forts and associated outposts pushed a considerable distance southeastward.

The 1662-1664 frontier war in Bashkiria A widespread frontier war broke out in Bashkina in 1662, and it took the Russians two years to reestablish order. The causes were many but underlying them were increased demands for tribute and an influx of Russians and Middle-Volga peoples into Bashkiria. Colonists settled on rangeland, inhibiting the move­ ment of the pastoralists. During this war the Bashkirs “burned and destroyed churches and destroyed many villages and settlements and spilled a great amount of blood and killed and took many Russians into captivity and sold them (into slavery).”1 Both Kalmyks and Nogai Tatars joined the Bashkirs in this war. The Russian government was caught unprepared. Marshaling an army of Russians and Astrakhan Tatars, the governor of Astrakhan rushed to the assistance of the forces at the Trans­ Kama Line. At the same time the government took steps to ease the conditions that had stirred up the Bashkirs. The governor of Ufa was replaced, the Russians were instructed to treat the native

The Mobile Steppe Frontier

193

population better, tribute was decreased, and Russians were forbidden to seize or buy Bashkir land.2 Enrolling non-Russian frontier peoples in the Russian military service, a long-standing practice, contributed importantly to the Russian victory. Native leaders, granted land by the tsar in return for service, amounted to a major component of the Russian frontier service. These “service natives” (sluzhilye inorodtsy) in their close association with Russians tended gradually to become Russified. In effect, they became part of the Russian colonizing movement in this region. Unrest on the mobile steppe frontier remained endemic through the remainder of the seventeenth century and during the reign of Peter the Great. At the most critical phase of the Great Northern War (1700-1721), Bashkirs launched attacks on Russian posts and settlements, and were subdued only with great difficulty. By the end of the first quarter of the eighteenth century the Russians had moved rather modestly into Bashkiria. The Trans-Kama Defensive Line, built in the mid-seventeenth century, remained stationary for about eighty years. Ufa was the only major fortified town out in the heart of the country. The defensive line A defensive line consisted of fortified towns established in a line at strategic points near river junctions, fording places, or at likely portages. Forts were surrounded with long palisades, trenches, and earthworks. At each fort a garrison of troops was stationed under a military governor (voevoda), who held civil authority as well as command of the military. Between strongpoints outposts of various sizes filled in the line. Further out in the steppe areas advanced observation towers served as lookouts to give warning of approaching hostile parties. Woods along the defensive line remained uncut to impede the movement of bands of horsemen. Fallen trees with sharpened branches blocked trails through such wooded areas.

Military colonists In view of the conditions, government-sponsored colonists consisted mainly of the military forces required for the conquest and maintenance of order. These forces were of several kinds. The first to serve on the steppe frontier were service men (sluzhilye liudi). They were recruited from various elements of

194 Russian Colonial Expansion

the Russian population and were settled in and near the military posts. For example, the' government settled 215 families of service men in the vicinity of Sergievsk early in the eighteenth century. The town garrison initially included an ataman and two Cossacks from Samara, and one hundred peasants from Crown estates who had been recruited into the Cossack service. Service men were the first settlers in Ufa, Birsk, and in the posts of the Simbirsk and Syzran lines west of the Volga. At first the government provided them with money and grain but, as soon as possible, gave them land for their support, as they were expected to be self-sustaining.3 Military reforms in the reign of Peter the Great, when a professional army was established, made the service men less necessary. Those few who remained were henceforth called “Service Men of the Old Service;” and when the poll tax was introduced in 1724, those in this group were required to pay it, in effect becoming state peasants. A few years later a special decree exempted the service men in the eight towns of the Trans-Kama Line from that tax. All others remained state peasants in classification, except for those officers who ranked high enough to be on the Table of Ranks.

The new Trans-Kama Defensive Line In 1730 the government decided to build a new Trans-Kama Line deeper in Bashkiria. The service men from the old line and 3,000 recruits from the Kazan area were assigned to the construction in 1732. In preparation for garrisoning the new line, the government ordered the organization of four land militia regiments, three mounted regiments, and one foot regiment composed of “Service Men of the Old Service,” including those who were state peasants and those in the old Trans-Kama Line who had been exempted from the poll tax. The first group, which consisted of 29,000 males, contributed one person in thirty for the newly forming regiments; the 5,000 males of the latter group were entirely incorporated into the new units. In 1733, although the line was not complete, the government transferred all four regiments to their new locations. Simul­ taneously the number of common laborers was increased significantly. Altogether some 15,000 peasants from the Kazan gubernia, organized in two shifts, worked on the line. Everyone,

The Mobile Steppe Frontier 195

including the soldiers and men in the land militia, received wages for their work on the line. The Orenburg Expedition While this major construction was in process a new project was planned that soon nullified the whole purpose of the new line. Ivan K. Kirillov, secretary of the Senate and one of Peter the Great’s fledglings who had been strongly influenced by ideas and plans of his mentor in regard to this frontier, proposed a plan to leap over Bashkiria to the middle course of the Ural River, there to build a major fortified town and a series of posts to form a defensive line along that river, thereby surrounding the Bashkirs and bringing them to heel. The town, to be called Orenburg, would be so placed as to deal closely with the Kazakhs to the south and, in addition, to be the launching point for Russian penetration into Central Asia.4 The initiating event for the project came from Mongolia. Expanding outward from their homeland, a federation of Western Mongols clashed with the Kazakhs, driving the latter westward and northward toward the Russian frontiers. The Kazakh khan, Abul Khair, sent an embassy to St. Petersburg in 1730 to request Russian protection, including a Russian fort on the frontier. After working out the details and gathering his forces, Ivan Kirillov set out in 1734 as head of the Orenburg Expedition to carry out this task. Over the next six years, 1735-1741, the Russians fought a vicious war with the Bashkirs, who realized the significance of the Orenburg project to them. They desperately sought to retain the remnants of their freedom. By 1741, however, superior forces brought them to a condition of complete exhaustion. It seemed that Bashkiria had been finally subdued. The composition of the Russian forces in the southeastern steppe territory became more complex when the Orenburg Expedition was organized. Kirillov recruited five companies of service men in Birsk, Ufa, and Menzelinsk. Other companies recruited young men in Siberia to form the Orenburg Dragoon Regiment. Service men from Ufa, Birsk, and Menzelinsk became the Ufa Dragoon Regiment. As the building of the Orenburg Line made the still-building new Trans-Kama Line virtually useless, the latter was aban­ doned, and the land militia regiments located there were

196 Russian Colonial Expansion

transferred to the Orenburg Line. Because they had been moved twice within a few years, the land militia had had little opportunity to develop farms and thus had to rely on the government for support. These regiments were not settled immediately because of the Bashkir war. By 1741, from Samara on the Volga along the middle course of the Ural River to the point of connection with the West Siberian Line the garrisons of the Orenburg Line were composed of land militia, Cossacks, and “Service Men of the Old Service.” Each main post was to have at least two companies, and one regiment was to be stretched over no more than one hundred versts (approximately sixty miles). Later in the 1740s the dragoon regiments were assigned to nine forts along the Sakmara River. The same decree indicates that 3,000 households of “Service Men of the Old Service” were to be settled in the forts of the Orenburg Line. Nevertheless, the Bashkirs rose again in 1755 and in 1773-1775, when they joined in the Pugachev upheaval. Such chronic and enduring resistance explains much about the nature of Russian colonization in this region. The primary agent of colonization was of necessity the military. Despite the defensive line forts and garrisons the frontier remained a restless area. Settlement even behind the defensive line was only relatively safe. Sudden raids by small parties seeking captives to be sold as slaves in the Crimea or Central Asia could, and often did, slip past the defenses of the line. Land grants to military personnel During the seventeenth century grants of land necessitated the assignment of peasant households to farm them. For example, in 1668, after the war with Poland, gentry (szlachta) from the Polotsk area were transferred to the Trans-Kama Line and granted both land and peasants. In this particular case the grants amounted to some 1,600 acres for a regimental commander, 1,300 acres for a cavalry captain, and 1,000 acres for other officer ranks. To accompany the land, twelve peasant households went with the first rank, ten with the second, and six to the lesser ranks.5 In all, the thirty-one grants were settled by thirty-one officers and their households and 154 peasant households. Sometimes land was granted without peasants. In such cases the landlord had to bring peasants from his other estates in the

The Mobile Steppe Frontier 197

interior of the country or acquire them locally. In 1668 the Polotsk gentry received approximately 200,000 acres. As the area behind the defensive line became more secure the government encouraged further colonization. By the 1690s, in addition to the fortified towns and posts, there were several hundred settlements, mostly consisting of a few households in each. Several wealthier landlords in the central provinces, hearing of the fertile lands for the taking, established themselves behind the Trans-Kama Line during the 1670s.

Mine and smelter workers Another form of government-sponsored colonization had to do with the development of the mining and smelting of ferrous and nonferrous minerals in the Ural Mountains and Bashkiria. Although this industry began in the seventeenth century, its major growth resulted from the efforts of Peter the Great to equip his armies in the Great Northern War. Between 1699 and 1725 eighteen major works were established in Bashkiria. They were operated by a force of 5,422 males, most of whom were serfs who had been assigned to the mines and foundries. Peter vigorously encouraged private enterprise and in 1721 permitted manufacturers to buy serfs to be used in their enterprises. Since families went with the laborers, the number of colonists of this kind was significant and remained so to the end of the eighteenth century.

The Cossacks The Cossacks were another frontier defensive force also impor­ tant as colonizers. Although the earlier Cossacks on the lower Volga and Ural rivers were entirely free, in time they were taken into Russian service. The most important group in the frontier area east of the Volga were the Ural Cossacks. Originally known as the laik Cossacks after the old name of the Ural River, they were first mentioned in history in the sixteenth century, when they established a small settlement on the Ural called laitskii Gorodok. In the seventeenth century they became Russian service men, but they retained a significant degree of autonomy. A spirited and unruly group, they acted without regard to their supposed subordination to the tsar. They participated with the dissidents in both the Stenka Razin and the Pugachev rebellions. After the latter upheaval Catherine II abolished their autonomy;

198 Russian Colonial Expansion

their ataman was thereafter appointed by the War Office, and their territory came within the jurisdiction of Astrakhan Gubernia. Their host was renamed the Ural Host and the river’s name changed from laik to Ural also. Their major role on this frontier came in the 1730s with the launching of the Orenburg Expedition and the building of the forts in the Orenburg Line. They served in the garrisons and were prominent in the struggles with the Bashkirs. During the 1730s and 1740s they extended the Orenburg Line downstream to the mouth of the Ural River where it discharged into the Caspian Sea. Other Cossack groups, all formed under government direction from unattached persons in the frontier region, also played a significant role. Thus, we read of Samara, Ufa, Sakmarsk, Isetsk, and Siberian Cossacks. A chart drawn up by Kirillov in'1736 records 869 Cossacks in Orenburg Line forts.6 By 1755 their numbers on the Line had reached 5,000.7 Again, it should be noted that families accompanied many of them. Cossacks were also located in Ufa and in the older posts of the Trans-Kama lines.

Church-sponsored Colonization The Russian Orthodox Church cooperated closely with the government in colonizing the eastern frontiers. Shortly after the fall of Kazan in 1552 Ivan IV ordered three churches built. A number of monasteries quickly followed, and in 1555 Abbot Gurii was appointed archbishop of a new eparchy centered in Kazan. Gurii was instructed to work with the governor of the newly conquered territory and to counsel him, as well as carry out his normal religious duties. Ivan IV specifically ordered Gurii to convert the native peoples to Christianity.8 By the end of the 1550s there were approximately twenty Christian churches in the territory of the former Khanate of Kazan, mostly for the use of Russian settlers. Though Bashkiria remained largely outside Russian control, the Church early penetrated deep within the country. Monasteries are mentioned as existing on the lower Kama and on the Belaia River from the time of Ivan IV and Fedor. Another was built on the Belaia in the reign of Michael and others in subsequent years. In general, the Church received vast grants of land in frontier

The Mobile Steppe Frontier

199

areas, and these awards continued there even after Peter I discontinued the practice elsewhere in the empire. Church land was further distributed to service men who served in Church military units or performed police duties in towns. After Catherine the Great secularized Church lands in 1764 this arrangement died out, and the few remaining holders of Church land were transferred to regular army units in 1774. The Church itself, as well as the service men on Church lands, brought in peasant families and contributed enormously to Russian coloniza­ tion. Within central Bashkiria, however, the successive frontier wars inhibited Church activities. Information is limited, but in Kazan Uezd, which included a significant part of Bashkiria, the Church had about one hundred hamlets under its jurisdiction in 1758.9 The churches, cathedrals, and monasteries served not only as religious centers but points from which Russian culture and influence radiated. Conversion of the native peoples to Chris­ tianity was regarded as a principal means of Russifying them. The Bashkirs remained faithful for the most part to Islam, although the Russians offered inducements for conversion: exemption from taxes for several years, amnesty for criminals, and exemption from military service.10 Peter the Great put great pressure on the upper caste of the native peoples. He issued a decree giving them one year to become Christians or lose their land and peasants. Subsequent decrees clarified this severe demand. Muslim landlords were allowed to retain their land if farmed by non-Christians, but any Muslim peasants who became Christians acquired title to the land they occupied and were liberated.11 In regard to Bashkiria, the information is inadequate to estimate the number of converts. Their numbers, no doubt, remained insignificant. Converted natives often left their villages and joined Russian settlements, where they were quickly assimilated.

Voluntary Colonization, Legal and Illegal

The Russians Voluntary, mostly illegal, peasant migration made up the largest component of the Russian colonists in the Trans-Volga frontier region. As the onerous burdens of serfdom were fixed on the Russian peasantry, many sought to escape by flight eastward in

200 Russian Colonial Expansion

hopes of finding a better life with fewer restrictions and lighter taxes. Russian officials, for the most part, tried to halt the drain because the internal provinces of the Empire suffered from a labor shortage. Yet the frontier posts and newly opened lands required substantial military and labor forces. Consequently, free persons received a ready welcome; runaways, too, but with less enthusiasm. Frontier administrators needed men and they did not enquire carefully into a person’s origins. Runaways flooding into Bashkiria also antagonized the nomads, who continually complained to Russian officials in Moscow (or in St. Petersburg from Peter the Great’s time). For example, in 1694 Moscow ordered the governor of Ufa to keep runaways out of Bashkiria because these migrant Russians, Tatars, Chuvashes, Cheremisses, and Votiaks settled in many villages in (the Bashkirs’) ancient territory. They plowed the fields and cut the hay . . . and because of the great number of people in their territory, the wild animals have fled . . . and the beaver have been wasted. They have begun to kill the animals and catch the fish and there is no place for the horse herds and cattle.12 The problem reached a peak in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A number of decrees issued to control the flight of peasants had little effect, and in 1722 a commission organized to study the matter failed to find a solution. Because much of Bashkiria remained beyond effective government control, the illegal movement continued. Desperate in the face of the Bashkir uprisings, the government made the best of the situation by recruiting many of the immigrants into the various Cossack groups. The central administration, in fact, gave Kirillov the right to register runaway peasants as Cossacks in 1736.13 A count of the forces serving in the Orenburg Line in 1741 showed 5,154 peasant illegals of whom 2,777 were former Crown peasants, 591 Church peasants, 308 landlord peasants, 54 runaways from commercial establishments, and 1,422 unclassified.14 In the 1740s the policy of accepting runaways was changed as the forts brought a higher degree of order and the need for soldiers became less desperate. One of the largest groups of legal settlers in the eighteenth century came from Ukraine. Two thousand who claimed to be

The Mobile Steppe Frontier 201

free persons entered Bashkiria in 1740 to settle in the Orenburg area. Many of these proved to be runaways, which led the government to issue additional decrees to halt illegal movement. Only those with valid passports were authorized to migrate. The Orenburg authorities sent recruiters to the Ukraine to encourage colonists to come to the Orenburg area. The response was so enthusiastic that St. Petersburg felt compelled to prohibit more than one quarter of the inhabitants of a village from migrating. Another reason the government favored voluntary migration into the frontier was the desire to Russify the frontier areas, to Russify in the sense of physical occupation by Russians as well as culturally transforming the native populations. It was considered a necessary prerequisite for stabilizing the country. At first, when the Russian position was weak, there were strict prohibitions on the purchase of Bashkir land to prevent unnecessary unrest. In the mid-1730s, Kirillov thought the building of the proposed Orenburg Line would so strengthen the Russian position that he advocated the repeal of the land-sale regulations that had been introduced in 1649. Down to the end of the eighteenth century land seizures by Russians remained a problem. Sergei Aksakov’s fictionalized account of his< grandfather in A Russian Gentleman is revealing of methods used by Russians to acquire large holdings from the Bashkirs at little cost.

The non-Russians The non-Russian peoples who fled serfdom came into Bashkiria in great numbers. Called teptiars and bobyls in Russian documents, they were chiefly farmers who held Bashkir land. Teptiars paid quit rent and farmed their plots under contractual arrangements with the Bashkir landlord. The bobyls were simply squatters without rights. During the Bashkir wars these groups were impressed into Russian service as laborers on the forts and outposts. Large numbers participated in the Orenburg project in the 1730s and 1740s. Kirillov made a partial census of them in 1735, in which he placed 11,294 males under these classifications. Approximately ten years later a count recorded 28,637 males. A particular group of non-Russians who played a very prominent role on the Russian side in the wars with the Bashkirs were the Meshcheriaks (Mishari). Of Tatar origin, they came into the Russian service shortly after the victory over Kazan and settled near Ufa. Most of them paid quit rent (pbrok) to Bashkir

202 Russian Colonial Expansion

overlords, but in the 1730s, for their loyal support of the Russians, they received title to their estates. Early statistics are lacking, but by 1745 they numbered 1,531 households. If we retroactively apply a 1760 census figure that indicated there were an average of 8.8 persons per household among them, there were over 13,000 in Bashkiria in the mid-1740s. In order to pacify the Bashkirs, the Russians made successful attempts to lure the tribal and clan leaders of the Bashkirs into the Russian camp. The method used was that of granting the title of tarkhan to these leaders. The title, and practice, dated back to Mongol times and exempted the recipient from tribute in return for military service. Kirillov counted some 1,500 such households (approximately 13,200 persons) in the mid-1730s. Out of an estimated population of 100,000 the figure is not unimpressive. In working and associating with Russians these non-Russians became part of the Russian colonization movement. At the end of the eighteenth century the population of Bashkiria was of a most varied ethnic composition. Included were Bashkirs, Russians, Tatars, Chuvashes, Mari, Udmurts, Mordvins, Persians, Bukharans, and other Central Asians. The total population rose from 421,119 persons in the 1762 census to 691,816 in 1794. This significant rise (64%) in such a relatively short time indicates the continuation of in-migration. Most immigrants came from the transfer of state and landlord peasants from the central provinces.15 Another important element in the population growth was the increase in the labor force in the Ural mines and foundries. At the end of the century there were 23,289 assigned male serfs attached to these works. This figure must be considerably enlarged to obtain the total number of workers, because mines and plants also purchased serfs and hired itinerants and runaway peasants. Bashkirs at this time comprised approximately 21% of the total, which means that over a half million inhabitants, or 79% were the descendants of immigrants or recent immigrants themselves. The manner of classification in the censuses pre­ cludes any accurate figure on the number of Russians in Bashkiria. A very crude estimate from a report dated 1800 would be that Russians amounted to about 40% of the total. The non­ Russians from the mid-Volga area, thus, were approximately 39% of the colonists. At this time Orenburg Gubernia, which was basically old

The Mobile Steppe Frontier 203

Bashkina, was divided into ten uezds. The ten uezd centers had a total population of 11,026 persons, the three largest, Orenburg, Ufa, and Cheliabinsk, having over 2,000 each. The continuing importance of the military was evident from the existence of forty-one forts. Most of these (thirty-one) guarded the border between Bashkiria and Kazakhstan to the south. Listed among the major landholders (pomeshchiks) were 546 Russians and 250 Bashkirs and Tatars. One group remains to be mentioned. Catherine the Great created an Office for Colonists in 1763 and invited foreigners to come to Russia, offering free land, self-government, exemption from taxes and military service, and freedom of worship. By 1768 some 23,000 Germans who responded were settled on the east bank of the lower Volga near Saratov and Tsaritsyn. They established prosperous communities and did not mingle much with Russians, and thus managed to retain their language and German culture, at least until their dispersal during World War II.

Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan In many respects the Russian absorption of Kazakhstan, an area of approximately 1,000,000 square miles (about a quarter of the size of all Europe, including European Russia), resembled the movement into Bashkiria. The inhabitants were steppe nomads, formidable warriors on horseback, who long after their nominal acceptance of Russian suzerainty periodically revolted against Russian penetration into their land. In actuality, Russian authority reached only a short distance into the steppe beyond the forts of the defensive line. As in Bashkiria, final subjugation of the Kazakhs came about only when a line of forts had been built along their southern border, in effect surrounding them as the Orenburg Line had enclosed the Bashkirs. The major difference in the conquest of Kazakhstan was that the Kazakhs had enemies who were closer and more threatening than the Russians. The pressure from the Western Mongols and later the Kokandians led the Kazakhs to seek Russian protection. As a result, the absorption of the vast Kazakh steppe cost considerably less military effort and time than had the conquest of Bashkiria. Peter the Great, seeking to increase commerce with the cities of Central Asia and India, came to believe that the Kazakhs were “the key and the gate to all the Asian countries and lands.”16 He

204 Russian Colonial Expansion

reached this conclusion when two Russian probes into Central Asia failed. Nevertheless, in his reign several forts were established on the upper Irtysh river: Omsk (1716), Semipalatinsk (1718), Ust-Kamenogorsk and Pavlodar (1720). In the 1730s Kirillov’s Orenburg proposal focused major attention on the Kazakhs. Severely pressed by the Western Mongols, the Kazakhs were seeking Russian protection. This circumstance led Kirillov to think it possible to leap over the Bashkirs and establish a defensive line along the Ural River, the border of the Kazakh steppe. From there he planned, with Kazakh cooperation, to move directly across the steppe to the Aral Sea and there to construct a fortified town and port, preliminary steps for the conquest of the Central Asian khanates.17 Kirillov fell far short of his goals because the Bashkirs required his full attention, but a nominal protectorate was established over the Kazakhs of the Little Horde (Younger or Little Yüz) and over some elements of the Middle Horde. Nevertheless, while commercial caravans did cross the steppe in the mid-1730s, they traveled at great risk despite Kazakh promises of safe conduct. For the remainder of the eighteenth century the Russians moved towards Central Asia in a double pincer movement, one prong reaching southward up the Irtysh River and the other reaching eastward from the Caspian Sea. In 1749, for example, laik (Ural) Cossacks built several forts along the Emba River, cutting off a piece of the Kazakh steppe. By the late eighteenth century Cossacks and Russian peasants were pushing out into the steppe beyond the defensive line and settling along the Emba, the Or, the Irgiz, the Turgai, the Ishim and the Irtysh rivers. In occupying the prime land and water resources of northern Kazakhstan these colonists disrupted the migration cycles of the nomads. Relations between the Russian settlers and the nomads were surprisingly peaceful until the influx became so great that it seriously disturbed the Kazakhs. Accounts indicate that some settlers learned to speak Kazakh and associated easily with their nomadic neighbors.18 A few Kazakhs even settled down to an agricultural life. As early as 1764 one Kazakh leader requested instruction in farming. The Russians sent farm implements to him and suggested that the Kazakhs send ten youths to Russia to study agriculture.19 Later the situation changed when the Kazakhs turned hostile and raided

The Mobile Steppe Frontier 205

Russian settlements for captives to sell as slaves in the Central Asian khanates. For approximately eighty years the Russians held the line established in the 1740s while extending their authority in Bashkiria. Then about 1825 they began to move south again, this time into the Kazakh steppe. The flow of Russian settlers into northern Kazakhstan increased sharply. Government forces followed closely, building forts and outposts in the steppe to protect the colonists and to bring the nomads under closer control. As government authority reached further south the Russian officials introduced a tax on kibitkas (tents or house­ holds). The growth in Russian power in northern Kazakhstan became evident from the increase in registered Kazakh house­ holds subject to the tax. This number rose from 25,000 in 1837 to over 59,000 in 1844.20 The influx of Russian colonists into their territory and the increasing government interference in their affairs provoked the Kazakhs to rebellion. Several uprisings took place from the early 1830s through the 1860s. The Kazakhs found support against the Russians from the Khanate of Khiva. As a result, General V.A. Perovskii, the military governor of Orenburg Gubernia (1833-1842), decided in 1839 to strike directly at Khiva across the Kazakh steppe in a winter campaign. The expedition was a disastrous failure. The direct attack having failed, the govern­ ment returned to the policy of constructing forts deep in Kazakhstan and extending the two pincers towards the Syr-Darya River, the southern border of Kazakhstan. The new forts in western Kazakhstan included NovoAleksandrovsk on the Mangyshlak Peninsula (1843), Ural’sk (1845) near the Irgiz River, Orenburgsk (1845) on the Torgai River, Raimsk (1847) at the mouth of the Syr-Darya on the Aral Sea, and Karabutaksk (1848) between Ural’sk and Orsk in the old Orenburg Line. From the Siberian end the building of forts towards the south began earlier, with Baian-Aul’sk (1830), Kokchetavsk (1839), Atbasarsk (1840), Karkaralinsk (1842), Aiaguzsk (1842), Aman-Karagaisk (1843), and Vernyi (1854). Once these had been established, Russia was in a position to close the pincers by constructing a line of forts along the SyrDarya, a task soon accomplished. The Russians could now turn their attention to the khanates to the south: Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand.

206 Russian Colonial Expansion

Till the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian government directed the movement into Kazakhstan. Its purpose was not to colonize, but to protect its subjects and trade routes. While unauthorized migration into the region dates from the eighteenth century, it was of minor consequence and limited to the vicinity just south of the defensive line. Not until the final subjugation of the Kazakhs did Russian colonists flood into the choice agricultural areas of Kazakhstan; but that occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and after, and lies beyond the scope of this chapter. To summarize, colonization of the mobile steppe frontier could take place only after the military had made the land secure. Once this was done, the pressures of serfdom led thousands of peasants to flee toward the frontier, seeking land and liberty. About half of those who fled into Bashkiria were non-Russians, the FinnoUgric and Tatar peoples of the western and northern portions of the old Khanate of Kazan, who also fled into Bashkiria to escape the burdens of enserfment after the Russian conquest of Kazan in 1552. As the government establishment was already firmly established in Bashkiria, the runaways did not escape serfdom. Cossacks alone risked living out beyond the defense perimeter, but they were eventually absorbed into state service. It had taken three centuries from the conquest of Kazan to reach the SyrDarya, two for the conquest of Bashkiria alone.

Notes 1. Materialy po istorii Bashkirskoi ASSR, 5 vols., Moscow and Leningrad, 1936-60, Vol. I, p. 178 (hereafter Materialy BASSR). 2. N.V. Ustiugov, “Bashkirskoe vosstanie 1662-1664 gg.,” Istoricheskie zap ¿ski, No. 24 (Moscow, 1947), p. 106. 3. P.I. Rychkov, Topografiia Orenburgskoi gubernii, 2nd ed., 2 vols., Orenburg, 1887, pp. 2, 113, 114. 4. A.l. Dobrosmyslov, ed., Materialy po istorii Rossii, 2 vols., Orenburg, 1900, I, pp. 1-50. 5. G. Peretiatkovich, Povol’zhe v XV11 i nachale XVIII v., Odessa, 1882, p. 261. 6. Alton S. Donnelly, The Russian Conquest of Bashkiria, 1552-1740, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968, p. 175. 7. V.N. Vitevskii, LI. Nepliuev i Orenburgskii krai v prezhnem ego sostave do 1758 g., 3 vols., Kazan, 1889-97, Vol. Ill, fn. g, p. 861. 8. Akty arkheograficheskoi ekspeditsii, 4 vols., St. Petersburg, 1886, Vol. I, pp. 259-260.

The Mobile Steppe Frontier 2&7

9. I. Pokrovskii, Kazanskii arkhiereiskii dom, ego sredstva i shtaty preimushchestvenno do 1764 goda, Kazan, 1906, fn. 2, p. 75. 10. Dopolnenie k aktam istoricheskim, 12 vols., St. Petersburg, 1846-1872, Vol. VIII, p. 89. 11. N. Firsov, Inorodcheskoe naselenie prezhniago Kazanskago tsarstva V novoi Rossii do 1762 goda i kolonizatsiia zakamskikh zemel’ v eto vremia, Kazan, 1869, pp. 4ff. 12. Materialy BASSR, I, 82. 13. Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, first series, 44 vols., St. Petersburg, 1830, Vol. IX, pp. 748-749. 14. V.E. Den, Naselenie Rossii po piatoi revizii. Podushnaia podat’ v XVIII veka i statistika naseleniia v kontse XVIII veka, Moscow, 1902, Vol. 2, Part 2, pp. 221ff. 15. Materialy BASSR, Vol. I, pp. 379ff. The following statistical information from this source. 16. Vremennik Imperatorskago moskovskago obshchestva istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh, kn. XIII, “Smes* ”, p. 15. 17. Dobrosmyslov, I, pp. 1-150. 18. Pamiatnaia knizhka i adres-kalendar’ Ural’skoi oblasti na 1900 g., Uralsk, 1900, p. 234. 19. 1.1. Kraft, Sbomik uzakonenii o Kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei. 20. B.B. Bekmakhanov, Prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii, Moscow, 1957, p. 127.

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 David MacKenzie

uring the quarter century after 1860 tsarist Russian military

Dforces conquered the vast region south of the Kazakh steppe centering around the oases of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya

river valleys. Filling a political and military vacuum, the Russians advanced southward to the natural boundary formed by the Pamir and Hindu Kush mountain ranges. In that region, called Turkestan in the tsarist era, Russia built an administration and implanted Russian civilization in the heart of Asia. This chapter will describe the causes of this Russian expansion, the agencies involved, the process of conquest, and administrative and colonial policies pursued by the tsarist government down to 1885, the year marking the end of active expansion there. Why did Russia, already a vast empire, move southward into a heavily populated oasis region and take responsibility for governing millions of hostile Central Asian Muslims? Did the conquest result from planned expansion by the regime in St. Petersburg or from unauthorized advances by ambitious frontier generals and governors? Was the conquest part of Russia's “manifest destiny” to fill a power vacuum and reach natural frontiers on the borders of India, Afghanistan and Persia? The absorption of the Kazakh steppe between 1730 and 1850 appears to have been largely a natural process of filling such a vacuum: in the early eighteenth century struggles between the Kazakh tribes and Kalmuks to the east had seriously weakened both peoples. From Orenburg (founded 1734), the chief Russian base, opera­ tions continued for a century in the Kazakh steppe against minimal resistance from the nomadic tribesmen. Finally, between 1836 and 1846 the Kazakhs under the able Kenesary Kasimov 208

210 Russian Colonial Expansion

waged a desperate struggle for independence, but by 1850 Russian rule had been consolidated over that region. South of the Kazakh steppe and east of the Aral Sea lay a large area of desert and semidesert interspersed by the heavily populated oases of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya valleys. In the early nineteenth century the Muslim khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand competed for political and military control. Lacking internal cohesion or national consciousness, they had shifting, illdefined frontiers and were comparable to the medieval feudal principalities of western Europe. Their rulers, though theoretically absolute, exercised only limited authority over disparate and contending tribes. Frequently at war with one another or fighting against Persia, Afghanistan or China, they could not combine against the Russian advance. In the oases were mostly settled Uzbek and Tadzhik farmers and traders who conducted a flourishing though primitive commerce. Roaming the steppe were Kirghiz, Karakalpak and Turkmen nomads who frequently raided the oases and kept their towns in turmoil. In 1850 the population of the three khanates was roughly 5 million: about 3 million in Bukhara, 1.5 million in Kokand and some half million in Khiva. Major cities included Tashkent (60-80,000), Bukhara (70,000), Kokand (30-40,000), and Samarkand (30,000). In Bukhara lived chiefly Uzbeks, Tadzhiks and Kirghiz; in Kokand Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kazakhs, and Kirghiz; and in Khiva, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kazakhs, and Karakalpaks. The towns contained also Persians, Jews, Arabs and Gypsies. Kokand, the least cohesive of the khanates, began to disintegrate internally before the Russians attacked it. In 1842 the Bukharans captured and sacked Kokand city: while Tashkent, the khanate’s chief commercial center, recovered its former autonomy. Bitter rivalry between the Persian-speaking urban population of the Fergana valley and the Kipchak Uzbeks of the north tore Kokand apart, making it highly vulnerable to Russian penetration.1 In the post-Crimean era Russia advanced from the Kazakh steppe into the oasis region for a variety of reasons. Obvious was the factor of geographical contiguity. With no natural barriers short of the Hindu Kush, it seemed only natural for frontier administrators and military men to fill this power vacuum before the British or some other power did so. In an age of manifest destiny, the expansion of a more advanced power at the expense

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 211

of primitive, tribal states was widely regarded as inevitable and beneficial to mankind. More controversial are the economic factors in Russian expansion. Understandably, Soviet historians emphasize as primary and decisive such elements as the search for markets, raw materials (especially cotton), and control of trade routes by a greedy Russian bourgeoisie. Russian commer­ cial and industrial leaders, they argue, urged and pressured St. Petersburg to absorb the khanates and end disorder there. A Soviet historian, N.A. Khalfin, affirms that lu.A. Gagemeister, a leading economist and Foreign Office official, stressed in 1857 the dazzling prospects for Russia of eastern markets, development of cotton growing and extensive trade with Central Asia and the Orient if the khanates were conquered and their institutions reformed.2 However, there is little concrete evidence to suggest that Russian industrialists had much financial interest in Central Asia at a time when they possessed inadequate capital resources to develop areas in European Russia. On the contrary, it appears that Russian private interests had to be prodded and subsidized before they involved themselves reluctantly in Central Asia. Military and prestige factors were important in promoting expansion into the oases. Tsarist local administrators and military men, seeking pretexts for action, claimed that their advances comprised an inevitable response to defend trade against attacks on caravans and on natives under Russian rule by nomads operating from the khanates. They were quick to raise the security argument, that residents of the Russian steppe and loyal nomads must be protected against unprovoked aggression. They agreed furthermore that such advances would establish a continuous line of Russian forts in the steppe, create shorter, more easily defended boundaries, and thus lower the costs of imperial defense. Franker military leaders emphasized the advantages of seizing positions that would enable Russia to threaten the British in India during crises elsewhere, notably in the Turkish Straits or the Balkans. A key reason for expansion was that local commanders and governors sought glory, promo­ tion, and adventure through easy victories over numerous, but undisciplined, native forces. Far from St. Petersburg and thus thrown back largely upon their own policies and resources, they were tempted into risky advances in the hope that victory would provide rewards and justify their actions. Also, the tsarist regime, having suffered a recent humiliating defeat in the Crimean War,

212 Russian Colonial Expansion was anxious to recoup its military fortunes in a region where there was little danger of conflict with a major power. Expansion could be justified by the arguments of necessity and the “white man’s burden” theme that spreading Christian Russian civilization to “natives” living in squalor and tyranny was a highly creditable endeavor. Leaders such as Foreign Minister A.M. Gorchakov believed that it was inevitable for relatively advanced Russia to rule backward contiguous native peoples. Such factors together accounted for a cautious imperialism on the part of the tsarist Russian government, whereas its agents in the field favored more rapid and reckless expansion. Russia’s advance into Turkestan could be viewed as the counterpart of European imperialism in Africa and Asia, or the American conquest of the western plains. Russian leaders divided over the issue of Central Asian expansion. Generally the strongest advocates of advances were military men and governors on the frontier and a few nationalistic diplomats such as N.P. Ignat’ev, who had headed an important diplomatic mission to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858, then negotiated the Treaty of Peking with China in 1860 before becoming director of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry in 1861. Those close to the scene of action were usually the most militant and impatient. The agency most directly involved in the Central Asia campaigns and administration was the War Ministry whose chief, D.A. Miliutin (1861-1881), was a liberal patriot favoring moderate expansionism. Some officers, notably in the General Staff’s Asiatic section like Colonel V.A. Poltoratskii, urged more drastic action. On the other hand the Foreign Ministry, headed by the cautious, Europe-oriented Gorchakov, opposed advances in Turkestan for fear they might cause friction or even war with Britain. The Ministry’s Asiatic Department, strongly nationalistic and expansionist under Count Ignat’ev’s direction (1861-1864), under his successors, P.N. Stremoukhov and N.K. Girs, opposed reckless action. The Finance Ministry, under the cautious and pacific M.Kh. Reitern (1862-1878), emphasizing the Treasury’s impoverished condition, opposed any major expenditures to subdue or administer Turkestan. Under the Russian autocratic system Alexander II had to make the final decisions, though he rarely acted with the decisiveness of his predecessor or successor. Tempted like other members of the imperial family by the glory and prestige to be

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 213

garnered in Turkestan at minimal cost, Alexander II generally favored Miliutin’s course of moderate expansionism. He sought to keep the expansionist and anti-expansionist elements in his government in balance, but during the mid-1860s, as will be shown below, he sometimes lost control of the situation as reckless frontier generals pursued their own independent policies with relative impunity, usually rewarded by the emperor as long as they succeeded. In 1854 the Russian government decided that eventually the remaining gap in Russia’s defenses in the Kazakh steppe should be closed, although no major action was contemplated while the Crimean War continued. For the next decade a series of Russian probing operations into Turkestan revealed the khanates’ weak­ ness and disunity. In July 1853 a Russian force under General V.A. Perovskii of Orenburg captured the Kokanese fortress of Ak-Meshit’ on the Syr-Darya River. Renamed Fort Perovskii, it became the principal Russian advanced base. By 1855 three additional Russian forts, comprising the so-called Syr-Darya Line, extended along the unofficial boundary with Kokand. Placed under a separate commander, the Line was subordinated to the governor-general óf Orenburg and comprised the left pincer of the Russian advance through the steppe. On the eastern flank Russian forces under Colonel G.A. Kolpakovskii con­ structed Fort Vernoe and in 1860 at Uzun Agach repelled a major Kokanese attack. This success was followed up by the occupation of Pishpek and the Issyk-Kul region by forces subject to the West Siberian governor-general in Omsk. In 1857 young Count Ignat’ev’s diplomatic mission to Bukhara and Khiva had confirmed the weakness and vulnerability of the Muslim khanates. Ignat’ev, Governor-General A.A. Katenin of Orenburg, and members of his military staff urged St. Petersburg to authorize occupation of the towns of Turkestan and Tashkent in order to “close the lines” and consolidate Russia’s position in Central Asia, but to no avail. Finally in 1863 St. Petersburg sanctioned a cautious advance. In February a special committee of ministers had advocated closing the remaining several-hundred-mile gap between the SyrDarya and West Siberian lines. A reconnaissance led by Colonel M.G. Cherniaev, then under Orenburg’s command, without authorization advanced right to Turkestan city, then bombarded and captured the town of Suzak. Since the Caucasus had already

214 Russian Colonial Expansion

been subdued and the danger of European intervention in the Polish insurrection had passed, the War and Foreign ministries were encouraged to authorize a line-closing operation. The Russian campaign against Kokand in 1864 was conducted with small forces, obsolete weapons, and little money. Noted Colonel A.G. Serebrennikov, who chronicled Russia’s Central Asian campaigns: Military operations in the conquest of Turkestan region fill many glorious pages in the records of our fighting past, and our army can be justly proud of them, especially the Turkestan troops, as a brilliant example of how one can achieve tremendous results with insignificant resources.3

Conducted by two small Russian detachments totalling about 4,000 men, the line-closing operation met weak Kokanese resistance. Colonel Chemiaev, commanding the larger (2,500 men) West Siberian detachment, received 150,000 roubles of leftover funds from the Omsk commissarist, men of uncertain discipline, and antiquated weapons effective only against an inferior foe.6 Although Kokand had a “regular” army of some 12,000 men (counting fortress garrison and irregulars the number rose to over 40,000), its troops were undisciplined, ill-trained and poorly equipped. Initial skirmishes revealed a great Russian organizational and technical superiority. By late June 1864 Cherniaev’s force advancing from Vernoe had linked up with Colonel N.A. Verevkin’s detachment moving southeastward from the Syr-Darya Line. The Russians suffered as much from heat and lack of water in the steppe as from enemy action.7 Subsequently, however, the Russians met stiffer resistance from Kokanese formations, which usually outnumbered them greatly. Thus Cherniaev’s “reconnaissance” of Chimkent, a fortified town at the edge of Tashkent oasis (19-22 July), proved abortive. Viewing Chimkent’s formidable walls and the huge Kokanese concentrations in and near the town, Chemiaev realized that he could not storm the fortress with but 1,300 men. After inflicting a severe defeat upon the Kokanese, he withdrew, surmising correctly that they could not maintain such large forces there for very long.8 Chemiaev warned his superiors:

They [the Kokanese] have commanders not inferior to ours, artillery which is much better [sic] . . . , infantry armed with bayonets, and resources [on the spot] considerably greater

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 215

than ours. If we do not crush them now, in a few years it [Kokand] will become a second Caucasus.9

The closing of the lines and the fall of the holy city of Turkestan to the Russians spurred Kokand to invoke its most effective weapon against Russia: to unleash “holy war” in the name of Islam. Nonetheless, Chemiaev returned to Chimkent in September with a reinforced detachment, routed Kokanese troops before the town, followed them into it, and swiftly captured Chimkent and its citadel. Some panic-stricken Kokanese troops leaped from the heights to their deaths and the rest were killed by the Russians.10 Seeking to rationalize their defeat, the Kokanese glorified Cherniaev and vastly inflated the size of the Russian forces: Chemiaev is clearly a hero. Even lions grow rigid with fear unable to withstand his terrible mien and truly heroic onslaught. The Russian troops are countless, never tire, and come in masses and masses.11 Emboldened by this victory and contrary to his instructions, Chemiaev mounted an unsuccessful and costly “reconnaissance” of Tashkent in early October 1864. His force suffered another partial reverse in December when a Cossack sotnia (a squadron of cavalry containing about 130 men) at Ikan was badly mauled by the main Kokanese army. Fifty-six Cossacks were killed and forty Russian heads were presented by Alimkul, the Kokanese commander, to the ruler of Kashgar.12 Nevertheless, the following spring, disregarding warnings from his superiors to await reinforcements, Chemiaev on his own authority advanced to Tashkent and defeated Alimkul’s army, mortally wounding Alimkul himself. Cutting off Tashkent’s water supply, he besieged the city with a force of 1,950 men and twelve cannon. In mid-J une 1865 Cherniaev launched a predawn assault with scaling ladders against that large fortified city defended by some 30,000 Kokanese. After two days of stubborn fighting in the streets, Tashkent surrendered. Reported Cherniaev:

This exploit could only have been achieved by troops already hardened and used to victory . . . Please call the Emperor’s attention to this handful of tireless, fearless warriors who have established the prestige of the Russian name in Central Asia.13

216 Russian Colonial Expansion

Alexander II commented: “A glorious affair,” and rewarded Cherniaev’s successful act’ of disobedience with decorations for the officers, promotions, and silver roubles for the troops. The capture of Tashkent provoked a debate among Russian leaders over what to do with it and other occupied territories and where to stop in Central Asia. The Foreign Ministry, opposing major expansion for political and financial reasons, repudiated permanent occupation of Tashkent oasis for fear that it would “place no limits to our advance into the heart of Central Asia but would . . . involve us directly in all the wars and disorders there. This would lead to an eventual advance to Kokand, Bukhara, then beyond.”14 Instead, Gorchakov favored leaving the settled oasis region, including Tashkent, under the khanates' control. In a joint memorandum the Foreign and War ministers explained why Russia should halt at Chimkent: Every new conquest, by lengthening our frontiers, requires a considerable increase in military resources and expendi­ tures e.g. and weakens Russia. It is more beneficial for us to halt on the frontiers of the settled population of Central Asia than to include that population among the subjects of the Empire, thus taking on ourselves new cares about their organization and security.15

On the other hand, Major General Chemiaev, named military governor of Turkestan in February 1865, urged the annexation of captured Tashkent to Russia. Tashkent has not merely been conquered and completely pacified but has been so firmly joined to Russia that to get rid of it now is impossible. The inhabitants do not under any circumstances wish to go either to the Kokanese or the Bukharans. Creating an independent khanate would scarcely please them: they foresee after that civil strife and arbitrary rule.16

Orenburg’s governor-general, N.A. Kryzhanovskii, while repudiating reckless expansion and promising to restrain Cherniaev, boldly restated Russia’s imperial mission in Asia: It is time to stop catering to the languages and customs of our weak neighbors [the khanates]. We can compel them to conform somewhat to our customs and impose our language

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 217

on them. In Central Asia we alone must be the masters so that with time through us civilization can penetrate there and improve the lives of those unfortunate offspring of the human race.17 Journeying to Tashkent, Kryzhanovskii sought to foster the creation there of a separate khanate under Russian protection but was frustrated by Cherniaev, who favored annexation. However, the director of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry objected strongly to permanent Russian occupation or annexation of Tashkent as encouraging indefinite expansion: It can scarcely accord with the Government’s aims to take charge of the fate of all Central Asia, penetrating to Bukhara ... In no case could this be justified by requirements of our trade or general considerations.18

As differences escalated between Chemiaev and Orenburg, the War Minister resolved in November 1865 to remove Cherniaev as military governor of Turkestan. His “willfulness, disobedience, and petty tyranny amounted to clear violations of the basic rules of the military service.” Cherniaev, “acting contrary to the instructions which he received, found himself with a handful of troops face to face with two enemies: Bukhara and Kokand.”19 Chemiaev retorted that only he, the local commander, knew the situation well enough to frame sound policies. Thus when the emir of Bukhara arrested his envoys, Cherniaev advanced with his main striking force to Dzhizak, a fortified town ihside Bukhara, provoking war with that khanate which St. Petersburg considered to be premature. He returned to base only after failing to capture the town and was replaced as military governor by General D.I. Romanovskii, War Minister Miliutin’s understudy. Cherniaev’s military exploits and single-minded imperialism committed Russia eventually to absorb the entire oasis region of southern Central Asia. However, as military governor of Turkestan (1865-1866) he did little to build a sound administra­ tion. While permitting a maximum of native self-government and winning much support from Uzbeks, Cherniaev left financial chaos to his successors.20 Romanovskii, though criticizing Cherniaev’s reckless expan­ sionism, found himself compelled to continue the conflict with Bukhara. In May 1866 at Irdzhar his forces shatterd the emir’s army—the largest and best-equipped Central Asian force yet put

218 Russian Colonial Expansion into the field—with minimum casualties. Romanovskii credited the Cossacks primarily for. victory: For the first time in Central Asia our Cossacks moved in formation and in mass as a regular cavalry with its own artillery and rocket launchers.21

Then he captured Khodzhent, key to the rich Fergana valley, and argued, that Russia needed it in order to defend the transChirchik region. Renewing the offensive against Bukhara in September, Romanovskii captured Ura-Tiube, Dzhizak, and lani-Kurgan. This provoked objections from the Foreign Ministry, which warned that Alexander II opposed new con­ quests and desired peace with Bukhara.22 Obeying St. Petersburg’s directives willingly and frustrating Kryzhanovskii’s efforts to provoke war with Kokand as well as Bukhara, Romanovskii explained why Russia should halt at its present frontiers in Central Asia:

I always belonged to the moderate group which, not rejecting military operations if necessary, considered it far better for us to try to subordinate our Central Asian neighbors to our influence by a strong, solid administration of the regions near their borders and use our moral influence on them rather than attempt direct conquest of the khanates.23 Experience under Cherniaev and Romanovskii revealed the disadvantages of subordinating an expanding Turkestan region to distant Orenburg. Leaders in St. Petersburg, recognizing that Turkestan required an orderly and permanent administration, in 1866 authorized the annexation of the Tashkent region to the empire. While a provisional statute remained in effect there, a Steppe Commission toured the area in 1865-1866 studying native customs and social structure. At meetings in St. Petersburg in the winter of 1866-1867 the Steppe Commission, over protests from the self-interested Kryzhanovskii, recommended creating a separate Turkestan governor-generalship composed of Syr-Darya and Semirechye provinces. The Committee of Ministers approved this in the form of a Temporary Statute that was to be tested in practice by the governor-general. Civil and military power would be concentrated in the hands of military authorities, leaving all nonpolitical local affairs to traditional native hierarchies. On 11

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 219

July 1867 an imperial decree established the Turkestan governor­ generalship under the War Ministry. Three days later General K.P. Von-Kaufman (1818-1882), a successful field commander and administrator, was appointed as its first governor-general with plenary powers over administration, the military, finances and diplomacy.24 When General Kaufman entered Tashkent on horseback in November 1867 accompanied by Cossacks with bared sabres, most Uzbeks realized that Russian rule would be permanent. An old Tashkenter recalled:

Before General Kaufman’s arrival we had seen several Russian generals in Tashkent: Cherniaev, Romanovskii and Kryzhanovskii . . . We were amazed that they went around the city on foot, visited our homes, exchanged greetings . . . and let us live as before, but we were still unacquainted with Russian laws But then General Kaufman arrived.25 At his arrival, disorder and insecurity prevailed in Turkestan, Russian policy depended much on neighboring Muslim rulers, and many Uzbeks awaited liberation. Kaufman reported to the emperor: All this indicates the necessity to strike at Bukhara, inducing it by force of arms to make peace, and then by a single stroke subdue unconditionally the lands occupied by us so far, remove any thought or possibility of subordina­ tion to other than the Russian state. And then work calmly on reforms in the region which are needed to build the administration here on more rational foundations than before, and forever consolidate Russian authority here.26

For Kaufman building Russian prestige and power necessarily took precedence over consolidating the administration of Turkestan. Initially Kaufman tried diplomacy. Concluding a short-lived peace with Bukhara, strongest of the khanates, he established a boundary between Dzhizak and lani-Kurgan. However, Muzaffar-ad-Din, the truculent emir, utilized this breathing spell to try to forge a coalition of Asian states, the Ottoman Empire and Britain against Russia. Although he failed, in March 1868 the Bukharan war party led by the dominant Muslim clergy declared

220 Russian Colonial Expansion

holy war against the Russian Empire. Total Russian forces then in Turkestan numbered only about 11,000 men, of whom 1,785 were sick. Since the emir could concentrate up to 100,000 men, these Russian forces seemed inadequate to guarantee security or maintain Russian prestige. However, the Russian striking force of eleven infantry battalions, twenty-one sotnias of Orenburg and Ural Cossacks, and four batteries of field artillery, each with thirty-two guns, proved capable of handling any Bukharan threat.27 Bukhara’s “regular” forces of some 15,000 men, including twelve infantry battalions, twenty to thirty cavalry companies and 150 field artillery pieces, were far inferior to the Russian army in armament, training and discipline. Bukharan troops could neither shoot accurately nor march in step, and only some ten percent of their artillery was usable. Antiquated arms and lack of martial qualities made the emir’s army unreliable, although it had defeated Central Asian rivals and generally maintained order inside Bukhara.28 Manpower counted for little in the Russo-Bukharan military showdown of 1868. General Kaufman marched to Samarkand with 8,300 men, and occupied the town without resistance. Leaving a small garrison there, he advanced to Katta-Kurgan where on Zeravshan heights on 2 June his army routed the main Bukharan force at the Battle of Zerabulak. Faced by a Russian bayonet charge, the Bukharan regulars fled in panic, abandoning everything. Tens of thousands of Bukharans were routed, with Russian losses of only two killed and thirty-one wounded. Meanwhile some 65,000 Bukharans and their allies besieged Samarkand, defended by only 600 Russians, but Kaufman’s speedy return rescued the beleagured defenders.29 Bukharan resistance was broken. The peace settlement of July 1868 opened Bukhara to Russian commerce and made it dependent upon Russia, which controlled the khanate’s water supply through the Zeravshan valley. Kaufman’s decisive victories consolidated Russian power and prestige in all Central Asia. When the Foreign Ministry insisted that Kaufman return captured Samarkand to Bukhara, he refused: “I could not commit such sacrilege against the prestige, honor and rights of Russia.” Since Central Asians respect only force, he argued, retrocession of conquered territory would undermine their respect for Russia. Traveling to St. Petersburg, Kaufman persuaded Alexander II that Russia must retain Samarkand.30

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 221

Meanwhile, overcoming great obstacles, Kaufman established a solid Russian administration in Turkestan. Its center, Tashkent, lay over a thousand miles and a month’s difficult journey from St. Petersburg; it was a Russian island in a Muslim sea. Buildings, personnel and communications, all required for orderly govern­ ment, had to be built from scratch. However, Kaufman possessed awesome authority to meet the challenge. By the imperial manifesto of 17 July 1867 he could “decide all political, frontier and commercial affairs, dispatch trusted envoys to neighboring states, conduct negotiations and sign treaties or resolutions affecting Russia’s relations with those countries.”31 These plenary powers were enumerated in an impressive document bound in gold which Kaufman had received personally from the emperor. He displayed it to Central Asian envoys in order to prove that his authority came directly from the White Tsar. Uzbeks called him “the semi-tsar.”32 Kaufman’s chancellery, whose direction he entrusted to A.K. Geins of the former Steppe Commission, became the “nerve center of the regional administration.”33 Beginning operations with only three clerks, their assistants and two bookkeepers, it administered two provincés (pblasti) each ruled by a governor combining civil and military authority and aided by a provincial board. The provinces were subdivided into districts (uezdy) each run by a commander and two assistants, one a native. City commandants governed the chief towns (Tashkent, Vemyi etc.), while natives governed their own villages and rural districts. Kaufman applied the Temporary Statute gradually and cautiously. In January 1868 he told leading Russian officials and Uzbek leaders that natives could run local administration, courts, and collect local taxes as long as they cooperated. Should Russian benevolence meet resistance, he would intervene directly in their affairs. As a Tashkent organizational commission began work, Uzbek officials were elected and installed in office (February 1868) by the governor of Syr-Darya province.34 Special commis­ sions were sent to rural districts to conduct a census, reorganize tax collection, and introduce a new administration. Warned Kaufman: These [native] rights will not bring proper benefit unless commission members acquire the natives’ trust in them and their intentions. Both can be achieved only by irreproachable

222 Russian Colonial Expansion

honesty, patient and gentle treatment of the Kirghiz, and by a sincere desire, on the basis of the new laws, to improve their position.35 By 1869 governments were operating in Turkestan at all levels and order and peace prevailed. Claimed Kaufman’s report:

The formation of definite systems of administration and taxation, clarification of fundamental rights, privileges and obligations of the population, and organization of a proper native court system were accepted by the population with confidence and goodwill toward [Russian] authority.36 Impressed by Kaufman’s initial accomplishments, War Minister Miliutin noted that his implementation of the Temporary Statute had greatly enhanced Russia’s position in Central Asia. He praised Kaufman’s vigor and efficiency, choice of able sub­ ordinates, and his victory over Bukhara.37 However, the symmetrical, centralized administrative system, prescribed by the Statute, often worked poorly in practice. Kaufman repeatedly suggested changes, only to be blocked by jealous officials in St. Petersburg, notably in the Finance Ministry. Furthermore, in 1868, 1873, and 1875 Kaufman was absorbed by military campaigns; even in peacetime he was often distracted by routine military matters. Noted lu. luzhakov, a Kaufman subordinate:

All old Turkestaners remember how much and how intensively day after day K.P. Kaufman and his frequent replacement, G.A. Kolpakovskii, worked . . . They were free of official duties only during dinner and when sleeping.38 Many district commanders and military governors, incapable of handling both military and civil problems, emphasized their military tasks and shirked administrative responsibilities. Local self-government in rural areas proved impractical for illiterate tribesmen, and Uzbek landowners and urban merchants often manipulated elections of native officials. At the town and district levels there were too few Russian officials to supervise native elections and institutions properly. In 1877, therefore, Kaufman abolished native urban self-government, transferring its functions to Russians; natives retained political posts.39 Since Kaufman had

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 223

to recruit his officials from the leftovers of the poorly educated Russian bureaucracy, corruption became endemic. For local commandants he was limited to the army, which rarely assigned able officers to administrative duties. Kaufman was plagued by accusations from the Finance Ministry that his administration was corrupt, extravagant and that deficits were increasing. Worried by this, Kaufman levied heavier taxes on the native population.40 Agencies of the Ministries of Finance and State Control opposed, as Miliutin noted, everything beyond the narrow confines of bureaucratic procedure. To limit this ministerial interference, the Turkestan governor-general had to carry his case right to the emperor.41 He deplored the attitude of many Petersburg officials: I seek to increase this region’s revenues . . . and will achieve much more if I am not hindered by various formalities. I am worn out with various ridiculous demands of the Ministries of Finance and State Control ... I desire only the welfare and development of the region entrusted to me, not at Russia’s expense but at the expense of this region’s resources.42

Throughout his administration Kaufman expanded Turkestan’s original boundaries. In 1868 lands taken from Bukhara in that year were joined in the Zeravshan district. With Bukhara humbled, little Khiva Khanate aspired to lead Central Asian Muslims. The deserts guarding Russia’s most troublesome Central Asian neighbor had twice (1717 and 1839) frustrated Russian punitive expeditions. Now from Krasnovodsk, estab­ lished in 1869 by the Caucasus command as a military and commercial base on the eastern short of the Caspian Sea, Russian reconnaissance expeditions, operating in a region inhabited by fierce Turkmen tribesmen, enveloped Khiva on three sides. Recurrent disputes flared between Russia and Khiva over boundaries and Khivan raids into Russian-controlled territory. Failing by diplomacy to induce Khiva to return Russian captives and abandon support of nomadic chieftains raiding Russian territory, General Kaufman finally convinced St. Petersburg of the “unnatural, abnormal and . . . intolerable order of relations of the Khanate of Khiva to us.” The conference approved an expedition under Kaufman to seize Khiva’s capital and subject the khanate to Russian influence. Marshaling overwhelming forces totaling 13,000 men, Kaufman

224 Russian Colonial Expansion

planned to converge on Khiva from Tashkent, Krasnovodsk, Mangyshlak and Orenburg. Desert wastes between Russian territory and Khiva represented a much greater obstacle than Khiva’s army. A Caucasus detachment, suffering terribly from heat reaching 150 degrees Fahrenheit, returned futilely to its base. Kaufman’s own Tashkent detachment of 5,200 men and some 3,000 camels almost perished in the desert. An American correspondent, L.A. MacGahan, related:

They [Kaufman’s troops] could not advance and they dared not retreat . . . The men were without water and camels almost exhausted, the artillery horses already suffering. The thermometer marked 100 degrees of Fahrenheit. Kaufman realized that the consequences of retreat would be disastrous: The Russians only maintain their authority in Central Asia by convincing the people that they are invincible and infallible. One mistake, one defeat, and this illusion would be destroyed.

When a native guide miraculously discovered water in the desert, the expedition was saved.43 As Kaufman approached Khiva, he discovered that General Verevkin’s Orenburg detachment already had matters in hand. Verevkin’s subordinate, Colonel M.D. Skobelev, had bombarded Khiva, silenced enemy fire, and stormed and captured the north gate. Skobelev was now ordered to retire in order to allow Kaufman to make a triumphal entry into Khiva. For this “exploit” Kaufman received the coveted St. George’s Cross. The Khiva expedition cost over seven million roubles, although the town could have been occupied for far less by the Orenburg detachment alone.44 Insisting that Khan Muhammed Rahim submit to him personally, Kaufman then freed all slaves in the khanate, limited the khan’s power, and imposed a large indemnity upon Khiva. By the Russo-Khivan treaty of August 1873 Khiva, like Bukhara, became a Russian protectorate with the khan as the “obedient servant” of the Russian emperor, conducting foreign relations only with Tashkent’s consent. Disregarding Foreign Ministry objections, Kaufman annexed to Russia much Khivan territory: the Ust-Urt Plateau, the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, the left bank of the lower Syr-Daria,

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 225

and the right bank of the lower Amu-Daria with Kyzyl-Kum desert as Amu-Daria region (ptdel). On the Amu’s right bank forty miles from Khiva he had Fort Petro-Aleksandrovsk constructed to police the khanate. Since the Russian conquests of the mid-1860s the truncated Kokand Khanate had preserved a precarious existence. Within it severe strife between Kipchaks and Kokanese caused turmoil and progressive political deterioration. In 1875 the Kipchak chieftain, Abdurakhman-Avtobachi, heading elements resenting the khan’s Russophile policy, forced Khan Khudoiar to flee and proclaimed as khan his eldest son, Nasr Eddin. After Abdurakhman declared holy war on Russia, bands of Kipchaks invaded Russian territory. In August 1875 General Kaufman with a powerful force stormed Abdurakhman’s base, the fortress of Makhram, and shattered the Kipchak-Kokanese army, killing over 2,000 men. Against little resistance he occupied the cities of Margelan and Kokand. The Russo-Kokanese treaty of September 1875 ceded all lands north of the Naryn River that were annexed to Turkestan as Namangan region; the khanate was placed under Russian overlordship. After new disorders had broken out, General Skobelev stormed Andizhan (January 1876) and captured the obdurate Abdurakhman. Kokand Khanate was abolished and its remnant incorporated into Turkestan as Fergana Province, subsequently the Empire’s chief cotton-growing region. Such conquests greatly expanded Russian Turkestan and enhanced its strategic importance. After the Khiva expedition, Russia extended its sway to the Amu-Darya, Turkestan could be supplied directly from European Russia, and a foothold was secured in the Turkmen steppe. British attention shifted from the readily defensible Afghan mountains to the vulnerable Iranian and Turkmen plains. The absorption of Kokand brought Russia close to Bukhara and India. Rejoiced one Russian militant: “Each victory flourish sounded by the Russian army in Turkestan reverberated painfully in the hearts of our ill-wishers [the British], who looked enviously at our political and military progress.”443 In May 1878, during severe Anglo-Russian tension over the Turkish Straits, Kaufman mobilized 20,000 men, the largest Russian force hitherto gathered in Central Asia, and planned to include Bukhara and Afghanistan in Russia’s sphere. His officer boasted: “Now we shall march to India and drive out the English.”45

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Between 1873 and 1881 the Caucasus command and Turkestan subdued the Turkmen tribes and annexed the Transcaspian region. After the fall of khiva, General N.N. Golovachev, a subordinate of Kaufman, attacked the Yomud tribe of Turkmen and occupied Khvarezm oasis. When the primitive Yomuds could not pay the large money indemnity demanded by Kaufman, thousands were massacred in July 1873 in probably the worst atrocity committed during Russia’s conquest of Central Asia.46 The Caucasus command, having established a Transcaspian district, sent expeditions deep into Turkmenia and in 1877 occupied Kizil Arvat. During 1878-1879 St. Petersburg made plans to annex lands along the northern boundaries of Persia and Afghanistan. In the spring of 1879 the Caucasus command sent a 6,000-man force under General I.D. Lazarev to occupy strategic positions in Akhal Teke oasis, ostensibly to protect the Krasnovodsk-Khiva caravan route. Lazarev died in August and was replaced by Major-General Lomakin. The grossly over­ confident Russians failed to conduct a preliminary reconnaissance of the defense of Dengil-Tepe. Their assault was repelled by the Turkmen, and the Caucasus regiments fled, abandoning their wounded. Out of 3,000 men the Russians lost 464. In this report Lomakin referred to this affair as “a reconnaissance,” but this reverse dealt a heavy blow to Russian prestige in Central Asia.47 War Minister Miliutin, alleging a rising British threat to the Caspian region and the need to restore Russian prestige, persuaded Alexander II to authorize a massive campaign against Akhal-Teke. An army of over 11,000 men under General Skobelev, supported by a railway constructed southeastward from the Caspian Sea (later the Central Asian Railroad), was sent there. During the campaign the Russians had more trouble with the climate and natural obstacles than from the Turkmen (946 died of disease and exposure). In January 1881, after an arduous siege, Skobelev stormed Geok Tepe in the greatest battle of the Russian conquest of Central Asia. After overcoming heroic Turkmen resistance and suffering some 400 casualties, Skobelev conquered the fortress and massacred some 8,000 Turkmen refugees. In May Akhal oasis was annexed to Russia while Colonel A.N. Kuropatkin occupied Ashkhabad. The first steps on the road to India had been taken.48 In Turkestan the Kaufman era was drawing to a close. Excessive responsibility and hard work had taken their toll.

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 227

When Kaufman returned to Tashkent from St. Petersburg late in 1878, he was worn out. “The former wise and energetic organizer had been replaced by an apathetic governor-general,” noted Fedorov, “and the entire organizational machinery suddenly ground to a halt.” Deeply shaken by the assassination of Alexander II on 1 March 1881, Kaufman later that month suffered a massive stroke leaving him paralyzed and speechless; effective authority was transferred to G.A. Kolpakovskii.49 Subsequently, Kaufman’s administration was criticized severely by officials in the Finance Ministry; by General Chemiaev; and by the American diplomat, Eugene Schuyler. F.K. Girs, heading an investigation commission sent from St. Petersburg in 1882, alleged that Kaufman’s rule had been extravagant, corrupt, and inefficient, and that it had alienated the native population. A governor-general, Girs argued, should supervise, not direct (upravliat’) the administration. Accusing Kaufman of repeated violations of the Temporary Statute of 1867, Girs recommended approval of a new administrative statute (which he had helped block in the 1870s), transfer of much authority to the central ministries in Petersburg, strict economy, and higher indirect taxes in Turkestan.50 Chemiaev alleged that deficits in Turkestan had risen steadily because of Kaufman’s luxurious surroundings and “huge salaries” paid to his officials. In 1872, claimed his newspaper, expenditures had exceeded revenues in Turkestan by 350 percent. Such lavish and unproductive expenditures by the Turkestan administration to maintain two armies, one to write, the other to fight, is scarcely justified by the present situation in Central Asia.51

And Schuyler utilized an anonymous Russian report of 1871 which claimed: Most of the functionaries of our [Kaufman’s] administration in Central Asia have been distinguished by their bad characters. They have wasted the money of the Crown on their own pleasures.

In a diplomatic report Schuyler stated that although the worst abuses had been committed by subordinates, “the general tone set by the governor-general is such as to render it almost hopeless to expect anything better.”52

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However, Kaufman, his subordinates, and respected non­ partisan Russians refuted most of these criticisms convincingly. Kaufman's official report (proekt) presented a picture of orderly government, economic prosperity, and financial solvency in contrast with previous administrative disorder and financial chaos. His regime had obtained strong native support and had left undisturbed all native institutions compatible with Russian control. Rising tax receipts had covered all civil expenditures and some military costs.53 Enjoying consistent support from Alexander II and War Minister Miliutin, Kaufman had won loyal coopera­ tion from his subordinates. G.P. Fedorov, who served under Kaufman and his successors, wrote:

Terrible for the enemies of Russia, a vehement opponent of all intrigue ... he combined brilliant military and fighting capacities with outstanding administrative talent . . . With his broad views, a marvelous education, pure as crystal and accessible to all, a better choice [as governor-general] could not have been made.54 Finally, in the 1920s Academician V.V. Bartol’d, an impartial expert on Central Asia, described Kaufman as “the organizer of the Turkestan region” who left “good memories of himself both among Russians and, as far as is known, among natives.”55 Kaufman opposed Russian colonization of the already heavily settled oases of southern Turkestan but favored colonization in the Kazakh steppe where population was sparse. In 1868 Russian colonization began in the fertile region of Semirechie, primarily to establish a permanent Russian population on the Chinese frontier. Fourteen Cossack settlements already existed there, having taken over the nomads’ winter pastures and the choicest lands of settled Kirghiz and Kazakhs. Believing such Cossack settlements to be outdated, Kaufman urged their replacement by European Russian peasants. Thus by 1881 about 30,000 Russians had settled in Semirechie, some forming new settlements and the rest joining existing Cossack communities. Russian colonization of southern Turkestan prior to 1885, however, was negligible.56 In May 1882, right after Kaufman’s death, General Cherniaev was named governor-general of Turkestan by Alexander III. His appointment reawakened British fears that Russia would resume expansion in Central Asia. In St. Petersburg in June Cherniaev advocated an immediate Russian annexation of Bukhara and

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 229

Khiva to strengthen the empire strategically and economically. However, a special conference in St. Petersburg flatly rejected his suggestion, and Foreign Minister N.K. Girs instructed Cherniaev to uphold the status quo.57 Before departing for Tashkent, Cherniaev promised the emperor to reduce expenses, eliminate useless institutions, and make Turkestan profitable. Returning in triumph to Tashkent, Cherniaev found that Turkestan no longer possessed a decisive voice in the making of policy in Central Asia. Administrative changes in 1882 had divided Russian Central Asia into two governor-generalships: the Steppe under Kolpakovskii in the north, and Turkestan in the south. Furthermore, Transcaspia under the Caucasus command was directing the Russian advance deep into Turkmenia. At first Cherniaev contented himself with eliminating institutions created by his predecessor. After his aide, V.V. Krestovskii, reported that the Tashkent Public Library had become “a public reading room with a rather low and partly tendentious character,” Cherniaev abruptly ordered it closed. Next he abolished the chemical laboratory, but this caused so many objections that he ordered it restored the following year. As he destroyed Kaufman’s creations, the 'governor-general commented: “It is time to stop this Offenbach [operetta] affair.”58 As governor­ general Cherniaev adopted few of the constructive measures needed to develop Turkestan. Meanwhile Cherniaev continued, at least privately, to espouse Bukhara’s annexation to Turkestan. In December 1883 Tashkent prepared to support the emir militarily against Afghanistan, and Cherniaev apparently requested permission from War Minister Vannovskii to attack it. British Ambassador Thornton learned that Cherniaev had submitted a plan for the invasion of India should Anglo-Russian relations rupture.59 However, in February 1884 Cherniaev was abruptly ordered to St. Petersburg and removed as Turkestan governor-general, apparently for dis­ regarding the chain of command and advocating war with Britain over Afghanistan. Replacing him was General M.O. vonRozenbakh, a quiet career officer who “knew as little about Turkestan as about Zululand.” He restored the Tashkent Public Library and other institutions abrogated by Cherniaev while reducing Turkestan’s deficit by twenty-eight percent.60 In Turkmenia, after the Russians incorporated Akhal-Teke oasis in 1881, only the eastern tribes, chiefly in Tedzhen, Merv

230 Russian Colonial Expansion

and Pendjeh oases, remained independent. A Russo-Persian convention of December 1881, settling the frontier east of the Caspian Sea, strengthened Russia’s southern flank. To the east only Merv oasis now separated Russian Turkmenia from Bukhara. Previously the British had shown little concern, and in October 1877 the India Office in London wrote Lord Lytton, Viceroy of India:

Merv would bring to Russia neither revenue, nor subjects, nor security. Save as a basis for further advance towards India, the permanent occupation of Merv would be a needless and wanton waste both of money and of military force.61

Tribesmen from Merv were coming to Russian-controlled Ashkhabad to seek protection from Persian raids. At an imperial conference in St. Petersburg of August 1883 General Cherniaev’s plan to exert direct Russian pressure on Merv was rejected, although it was recognized that Merv would provide a convenient link between Turkestan and Transcaspia. Indirect Russian pressure on the divided Mervian chiefs proved decisive. Early in 1884 some of them placed themselves under Russian protection, and in March the entire oasis was incorporated into Russia.62 In London this provoked a severe case of “Mervousness” since many considered Merv the key to India. The British response was to press construction of strategic railroads to Quetta . in Afghanistan. With Russia now coterminous with Persia and Afghanistan, Lord Kimberley expressed concern that “Russia will use her position in Central Asia rather as a means for bringing pressure to bear on us as regards the affairs of the Turks.”63 Delimitation of the Afghan boundary now became an urgent matter for London. Sir Peter Lumsden, appointed chief British commissioner, went to the Afghan frontier while Russia played for time as its forces advanced southward. At the end of 1884 a large force of tribesmen and Russian regulars pushed south of Sarakhs to threaten Zulfikar Pass, regarded by British officers as essential for defense of Afghanistan. In February 1885 the Russians approached Pendjeh, which the British considered Afghan territory. For several weeks war seemed imminent. Even the anti-imperialist Liberal prime minister of Britain, William Gladstone, agreed that Zulfikar Pass must remain Afghan as a bulwark of India’s defense. On 29 March there occurred a serious

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 231

clash between Russians and Afghans that threatened to unleash war between Britain and Russia. However, there were no further Russian advances, as both sides shrank back from the brink of conflict. In 1885 a frontier settlement was roughed out that left the strategic Zulfikar Pass to Afghanistan, and all details were settled by Russian and British commissioners by 1887. After reaching the Himalaya and Hindu Kush Mountains and probing the British power sphere, the Russian advance in Central Asia ceased.64 The conquest of Turkestan revealed that Russian forces, though smaller numerically, were usually vastly superior to those of the Central Asian khanates in all important military respects: training, discipline, armament, morale and leadership. Superior technology, firepower, and skill in using it facilitated Russian victories. Isolated Russian reverses resulted from inadequate reconnaissance, overconfidence, or recklessness. Central Asians, fighting poorly in the field, resisted fiercely behind fortress or town walls. Receiving little outside aid, the khanates could often induce their men to fight only by appealing to their Muslim faith. The desert as well as climatic and sanitary conditions often proved greater obstacles to Russian conquest than native resistance. Russia conquered Turkestan at minimal expense, small forces and few casualties, except against the Turkmen. Russia’s absorption of Turkestan filled a power vacuum in Central Asia, enhanced imperial prestige, and promoted Russian commerce by creating order and security in the region. Once the Turkestan governor-generalship was established in 1867, General Kaufman overcame numerous obstacles to build a generally effective Russian military administration, expand Turkestan’s boundaries, and begin to develop its economic potential. However, Russian rule in Turkestan was overcentralized, often corrupt, and complicated by interference and carping criticism from St. Petersburg ministries. Despite its decisive victories over the khanates, Russia had to maintain many more troops in Turkestan in proportion to population than the British in India. As of 1885 Turkestan’s economic value to Russia was minor and hotly debated, and Russian settlers in the region remained few. Valuing Turkestan then primarily for its strategic importance, Russian leaders generally cared little about and remained suspicious of the native population. Only later, when Turkestan had been linked firmly by railway with the metropole, would the region’s great economic potential be realized.

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Notes 1. Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (London, 1964), pp. 31-47. For the khanates prior to the Russian conquest see also: Mary Holdsworth, Turkestan in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1959); Eugene Schuyler, Türkistan (2 vols., New York, 1876); N.A. Khalfin, Rossiia i khanstva Srednei Azii (pervaia polovina XIX veka) (Moscow, 1974); and O.A. Sukhareva, Bukhara XIX-nachalo XX v. (Moscow, 1966). 2. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii k Rossii (60-90-e gody XIX veka (Moscow, 1965), pp. 84-85. 3. Turkestanskii krai. Sbornik materialov dlia istorii ego zavoevanii (Tashkent, 1908-15) (henceforth Turk, krai), XVIII, 165-72, Gorchakov’s report to the emperor, 31 October 1864. 4. See David MacKenzie, “Expansion in Central Asia: St. Petersburg vs. the Turkestan Generals (1863-1866),” Canadian Slavic Studies, III, no. 2, pp. 287-290; and Ivo Lederer (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1962), pp. 248, 391, 496. 5. Turk, krai, XVII, iii. 6. D. MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General M.G. Cherniaev (Athens, Ga., 1974), p. 36. 7. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie; jp. 156; M.A. Terent’ev, Istoriia zavoevaniia Srednei Azii (3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1906), I, 286-87. 8. M.G. Cherniaev, “Sultany Kenesary i Sadyk,” Russkii vestnik, CCIII (August 1889), pp. 36-38. 9. Turk, krai, XVII, 116. 10. Russkii Turkestan, vypusk III (Moscow, 1872), appendices p. 73, Cherniaev to Diugamel’, 25 September 1864. 11. N.I. Veselovskii, Kirgizskii rasskaz o russkikh zavoevaniiakh v Turkestanskom krae (St. Petersburg, 1894), pp. 35-36. 12. On the Battle of Ikan (December 1864) see “K,” “Delo Ural’tsev pod Turkestanom v dekabre 1864 g.,” Voennyi sbornik, XLIII (May 1865), pp. 115-124; Turk, krai, XVIII, 229-234; and Ia. Polferov, “Pozornoe delo,” Istoricheskii vestnik, XCVII (December 1904), pp. 1011-1016. 13. Russkii Turkestan, III, documents, pp. 91 ff., Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, 7 July 1865. 14. Turk, krai, XVIII, 165-172, Gorchakov to Alexander II, 31 October 1864. 15. Ibid., pp. 196-202, Memorandum of the War and Foreign Ministers to the Emperor, 20 November 1864. 16. Ibid., XX, Cherniaev to V.A. Poltoratskii, 15 August 1865. 17. Ibid., XX, 47-48, Kryzhanovskii to Stremoukhov, 3 September 1865. 18. Ibid., pp. 66-70, Stremoukhov to D.A. Miliutin, 17 September 1865. 19. Otdel rukopisei biblioteki Lenina, Miliutin Papers, k. 15, no. 3, 11, 122-123 reverse.

The Conquest and Administration of Turkestan, 1860-85 233 20. For the debate over Cherniaev’s governorship see Schuyler, II, 203, 210 (favorable) and Golos (St. Petersburg), 19 March 1875, “K voprosu ob upravlenii sredneaziatskoi okrainoiu,” pp. 1-2 (cited in Mackenzie, “Kaufman of Turkestan . . .,” Slavic Review, XXVI, No. 2 (June 1967), p. 283). 21. Terent’ev, I, 344-348. 22. Turk, krai, XXII, 147, Miliutin to Kryzhanovskii, 1 November 1866. 23. Ibid., pp. 176-178, Memorandum of Romanovskii, November 1866. 24. Mackenzie, “Kaufman,” p. 265. 25. N.P. Ostroumov, Sarty (Tashkent, 1896), p. 282. 26. Voenno-istoricheskii sbornik, II (1916), pp. 159-160. Alexander II commented: “I find this very sensible.” 27. Lyko, Voennyi sbornik, LXXXIX (May 1871), pp. 33-34. 28. Seymour Becker, Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 116-117; L.F. Kostenko, Puteshestvie v Bukharu (St. Petersburg, 1871), p. 105; Terent’ev, I, 408-411. 29. Ibid., pp. 421-425; Kaufmanskii sbornik (Moscow, 1910), xxiii-xxvi. 30. E. Tolbukhov, “Ustroitel’ Turkestanskogo kraia,” Istoricheskii vestnik, CXXXII (June 1913), pp. 904-907. 31. “Gramota vysochaishykh polnomochii,” cited in Khalfin, Prisoedinenie, p. 225. 32. K.P. Kaufman, Proekt vsepoddaneishago otcheta . . . (St. Petersburg, 1885), pp. 6-7; Terent’ev^ I, 384. 33. R.A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917 (Berkeley, Calif., 1960), p. 65. 34. A.I. Dobrosmyslov, Tashkent v proshlom i nastoiashchem (Tashkent, 1911-1912), pp. 93-98. 35. N. Frederiks, “Turkestan i ego reformy,” Vestnik Evropy, IV, no. 6 (June 1869), pp. 691-692. 36. Kaufman, Proekt, p. 7. 37. ORBL, Miliutin, k. 16, no. 1, 1.24 and 28. 38. lu. luzhakov, Itogi dvadtsatisemiletnago upravleniia Turkestanskim Kraem (St. Petersburg, 1895), p. 17. 39. Ibid., p. 15ff. 40. Terent’ev, III, 295-296; for the critique of Kaufman’s administration see MacKenzie, “Kaufman,” pp. 276ff. 41. ORBL, Miliutin, k. 16, no. 3, 1.147 and reverse. 42. Kaufmanskii sbornik, Lxxv-Lxxvi. 43. J.A. MacGahan, Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva (London, 1874), pp. 166-171. 44. Schuyler, Türkistan, II, 331ff. 44a.L.F. Kostenko, “Turkestanskie voiska,” Voennyi sbornik, CII (April 1875), p. 205. 45. Kaufmanskii sbornik, Lxvii-Lxviii; I.L. lavorskii, Puteshestvie russkogo posol’stva po Afganistan* (St. Petersburg, 1882-1883), p. 1; A.K. Geins, Sobranie sochinenii, III, 381-390. 46. Terent’ev, II, 267-270. 47. Ibid., Ill, 6-26.

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48. On the Akhal-Teke campaign see ibid., Ill, 88-199 and N.I. Grodekov, Voina v Turkmenii. Pokhod Skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg. (3 vols., St. Petersburg, 1883). 49. G.P. Fedorov, “Moia sluzhba v Turkestanskom krae (1870-1906),” Istoricheskii vestnik, CXXXIV (September 1913), pp. 54-55. 50. F.K. Girs, Otchet revizuiiushchago, po Vysochaishemu poveleniiu Turkestanskii krai (St. Petersburg, 1883), pp. 9-10, 367, 461-462. 51. Gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii muzei (Moscow), Chemiaev Papers, k. 8. “Turkestanskie pis’ma”-II, 11.86-96; Russkii mir (St. Petersburg), 30 January 1875, p. 1. 52. Schuyler, Türkistan, II, 225; Schuyler to Jewell, 7 March 1874 in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1874), p. 817. 53. Kaufman, Proekt, pp. 8-9. 54. Fedorov, “Moia sluzhba,” p. 805. 55. V.V. Bartol’d, Sochineniia (Moscow, 1965), III, 297ff. 56. Wheeler, pp. 76-78. 57. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie, pp. 408-413. 58. Dobrosmyslov, Tashkent, pp. 163-165. 59. Foreign Office, Public Record Office (London), 65/1203, Thornton to Granville, no. 43, 24 February 1884; 65/1204, 17 March 1884; Mackenzie, The Lion, pp. 224-225. 60. Fedorov, p. 444; Terent’ev, III, 340-342. 61. R. Greves, Persia and the Defense of India (London, 1959), p. 30. 62. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie, pp. 358-364. See M.N. Tikhomirov, Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii (Moscow, 1960). 63. Kimberley to Ponsonby, 12 June 1884, cited in Greaves, pp. 3-4; Greaves, p. 65. 64. MacKenzie, “Turkestan’s Significance to Russia (1850-1917),” The Russian Review, XXXIII, No. 2 (April 1974), p. 177.

XI Russia’s Central Asian Empire 1885-1917 Seymour Becker

Colonial Administration he motives that had drawn Russia into Central Asia in the

quarter century before 1885 continued to shape her policy T toward her new possessions in the following decades. Those motives had been more defensive than aggressive. First, there had been the need for a stable and secure frontier in a region divided among weakly organized nomadic tribes and petty states that were continually threatened by each other and by centrifugal forces within each. Second, Russia had been concerned lest the British extend their influence into the political vacuum between the Caspian Sea and China. For these reasons St. Petersburg had sanctioned, sometimes in advance and sometimes after the fact, the conquests of her often headstrong field commanders in Central Asia. By 1885 Russian control extended southward to the borders of Persia and Afghanistan. A formal understanding had been arrived at with Britain in 1873 setting the Amu-Darya as the line of demarcation between the Russian and British spheres of influence, but in order to serve effectively that line had to be extended both to the west and to the east. In 1885, after a Russian advance southward from the Merv oasis had resulted in a clash with Afghan troops, St. Petersburg and London defined the Russo-Afghan boundary in the arid wastes inhabited by nomadic Turkomans southwest of the lower Amu-Darya. Exactly a decade later, after Russian and British military units had made less than friendly contact in the alpine valleys of the Pamir region, the Russo-Afghan frontier was settled eastward to the Chinese border. 235

236 Russian Colonial Expansion

Once Russian control of Central Asia had been established by right of conquest and recognized by Great Britain—the only great power in a position to dispute it—St. Petersburg’s principal interest was to maintain that control at the least possible cost. This meant preserving the native khanates that had survived the period of conquest as Russian vassals and keeping to a minimum the burdens of government in the territories that had been annexed. The khanates of Bukhara and Khiva long remained ideal instruments of Russian control: the traditional authorities retained full responsibility for internal affairs while relinquishing contact with any foreign state but Russia. St. Petersburg thus enjoyed all the advantages of empire with none of the costs. Kokand, however, failed to satisfy Russia’s requirements for stability, dissolving instead in internal strife in the mid-1870s and thereby forcing Russian annexation. Although the colonial authorities in Tashkent, capital of the Turkestan government­ general, persistently advocated the annexation of both Bukhara and Khiva right down to 1917, St. Petersburg, and particularly the Foreign Ministry, just as consistently opposed the assumption of any further governmental responsibilities in Central Asia. The reason were the cost in men and money and the desire not to alarm the British by destroying the political symmetry along the Amu-Darya—a Russian protectorate (Bukhara) to the north and a British client-state (Afghanistan) to the south. In the annexed territories administrative units were formed in ways that often had little to do with rational decision-making. In 1882 the government-general of the Steppe, with its capital at Omsk, was established for General G.A. Kolpakovskii, who, as governor of Semirechie, would otherwise have been subordinate to the new Turkestan governor-general, M.G. Chemiaev, Kolpakovskii’s junior in rank. The government-general of the Steppe consisted of Semirechie, detached from Turkestan, and Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk, detached from the government­ general of Western Siberia. Turkestan was thus reduced to SyrDarya and Fergana oblasti, and Zeravshan okrug. In 1886 the latter district was enlarged at Syr-Darya’s expense and renamed Samarkand oblast. The Transcaspian oblast, the conquest of which in 1881-1884 had been directed from Tiflis, was left under the control of the viceroy of the Caucasus until 1890, when it was placed directly under the Ministry of War. A final reshuffling of lines of responsibility took place in 1898, motivated by the war

Russia's Central Asian Empire 1885-1917 237

minister's desire to provide General A.N. Kuropatkin, com­ mandant of the Transcaspian oblast, with a satrapy equal to the Caucasus. The government-general of Turkestan was accordingly enlarged by adding to it both Semirechie and Transcaspia. In fact Kuropatkin did not occupy the post created for him until 1916, for in 1898 he became minister of war. In that capacity he kept Transcaspia under his personal control until his resignation in 1904, when the oblast belatedly passed into Tashkent’s charge. As befitted Turkestan’s exposed position in any conflict with Britain, administrative responsibility for the region remained in the hands of the war ministry. The government-general of the Steppe and two other steppe oblasti, Turgai and Uralsk, like any metropolitan gubernii, were the responsibility of the ministry of internal affairs. Russia had no colonial ministry, for territories such as Central Asia, no matter how distinct from the metropolis in their culture or ethnic composition, were not perceived as colonies. All nine Central Asian oblasti were ruled by military governors appointed by the minister of war or of internal affairs with the approval of the other minister and of the governorgeneral, when the oblast in question was subject to one. The exception was Transcaspia in 1890-1898, where the commandant was, like a governor-general, appointed directly by the emperor. The oblasti were divided into uezdy, each administered by a military commandant. Thus military administration prevailed right down to the uezd level—and below, if the local police chiefs are included. Apart from police functions, local administration was dele­ gated to popularly elected institutions and officials. In districts colonized by Russians, these institutions were the ones created for the peasant estate after the 1861 emancipation of the serfs in Russia: a two-tiered structure of communes and volosti (town­ ships). The Muslim natives of Central Asia were legally classified as inorodtsy (aborigines) and thus had neither the full rights nor the obligations of the tsar’s Russian subjects. The natives were nevertheless given self-government institutions modeled on those of the Russian peasantry. Among the sedentary population— which included almost all the Uzbeks and Tadjiks of Turkestan— several neighboring kishlaks (villages) constituted a volost. Among the nomads—the great majority of the Kazakhs of the Steppe and Turkestan and most of the Kirgiz and Turkomans of Turkestan—a volost was composed of several neighboring auls

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(encampments). In each kishlak or aul the heads of household formed an assembly which elected an elder, and also one deputy for every fifty heads of household to sit in the volost assembly. The latter body chose the volost head and the judges of the native courts. In Transcaspia the native officials were appointed by the uezd commandant instead of being elected, and elections were suspended by the Turkestan governor-general in areas of unrest after the 1898 Andizhan uprising. Elected volost heads and judges had to be confirmed in office, and could be dismissed by the oblast governor—as could kishlak and aul officials by the uezd commandant. Native towns were divided into quarters and given a two-tiered administration similar to that in rural areas. Native officials were salaried and held office for three years. Justice, taxation, and irrigation were the primary responsi­ bilities of the native self-government institutions. The Muslim courts had jurisdiction over petty crimes and civil suits involving either sedentary or nomadic natives exclusively. All other cases came before the Russian courts, which also served Russians living in Central Asia. If both parties agreed, a case normally subject to the jurisdiction of a Muslim court could be transferred to a Russian court. Taxation was simplified and made somewhat less burdensome in comparison with the precolonial period. The volost was responsible for the collection and payment of the land tax levied on each kishlak', among the nomads the volost paid a uniform tax on each household. Merchants paid excise taxes. Supervision of the main irrigation canals was charged to canal elders appointed by the oblast governor; branch canals were the responsibility of officials elected by the village assemblies. The institutions of native self-government in Central Asia were no more intended to prepare the population for a greater measure of autonomy in the future than were the institutions of peasant self-government in European Russia. In each case the central government was simply delegating responsibility for local matters to suit its own convenience, since it lacked both the personnel and the funds to assume those burdens itself. Nor was St. Petersburg trying to preserve traditional Muslim society from the disruptive impact of alien rule. The new institutions did bear some resemblance to those that had served the sedentary population before the conquest, but there were significant differences. Formal elections replaced the choosing of leaders by

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consensus, and elected kazis (judges), each with exclusive jurisdiction over a given district, replaced kazis appointed by the khans for their knowledge of the written Muslim law and available to any litigants who sought their services. Thus violence was done to traditional conceptions and practices by the Russians' sense of order and administrative regularity. Among the nomads the new institutions were a radical break with traditional patterns of government, under which clan and tribal elders served as leaders and interpreters of the unwritten customary law. Now headmen and judges were elected by volost assemblies, which normally included representatives of at least two different kinship groups. The assault on traditional nomadic institutions was at least in part deliberate. By weakening traditional loyalties, St. Petersburg hoped to diminish the potential threat to Russian rule from these warlike tribes. The Muslim population adjusted to the unfamiliar institutions in ways that were understandable if not always admirable. The buying of elections and bribing of the Russian officials who supervised the working of the self-government institutions became all too regular features of the system. Even more serious was the lack of understanding that separated the Russian colonial administrators from their subjects. Russian officials normally had no more knowledge of the local languages than the natives had of Russian. Both were dependent upon interpreters, usually Volga Tatars, who doubled as clerks for the usually illiterate native officials. Russian lack of interest in the local languages was but one aspect of the disdainful attitude of Central Asia’s new rulers. Beginning with Governor-General von Kaufman, Tashkent treated the Muslim culture as beneath notice, confident that the natives would abandon it once they had been exposed to the superior ways of the Russians. In the meantime Russia’s “civilizing mission” was confined to the suppression of slavery and the slave trade, of torture, and of corporal and capital punishment. But the colonial administration was hardly an effective advertisement for the superiority of Russian culture. Russian officials were too few in number, overworked, poorly paid, and often of low quality. Officers were frequently assigned to Turkestan as a punishment for some infraction or dereliction. They were prone to accept bribes and extort money from the native population, and sometimes even

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the rulers of the vassal khanates. Such administrative deficiencies were reported by official investigators from the 1880s on, but no effective correctives were ever introduced.

Economic Development Economic motives had not loomed large in the Russian conquest of Central Asia, and the advent Of Russian rule had little immediate impact on Russia’s trade relations with the area or on the Central Asian economy. The end of the American Civil War once again provided the Russian textile industry with a reliable source of abundant, inexpensive, and high-quality fiber in the American South. Russia’s Central Asian colonies and protec­ torates quickly reverted to their former role of a secondary source of supply of lower-quality cotton. Nor did Russia move effectively to close Central Asia to British and Indian goods until 1881, when customs posts were established on Turkestan’s frontiers with Bukhara and Khiva. And not until 1894 was Bukhara also secured against British and Indian goods by advancing the Russian customs frontier to the Bukharo-Afghan border. Only the coming of the railroad, by binding the Central Asian economy firmly to that of the metropolis, produced significant change in the region. Although dozens of projects had been discussed in the 1860s and 1870s for a rail link between European Russia and Turkestan, it was only during the campaign against the Teke Turkomans that a short railroad was built in 1880-1881 eastward from the coast of the Caspian Sea as far as Kizil Arvat. And only after the clash between Russian and Afghan troops in 1885 did St. Petersburg authorize the extension of the Trans­ caspian Railroad in order to strengthen Russia’s strategic position in Central Asia. In 1888 the line reached Samarkand, and a decade later it was extended to Tashkent. Built and operated by the Ministry of War, the railroad’s original purpose was military. The transport of goods for trade, however, quickly overshadowed the transport of troops and war material. Its economic impact was enormous, but the Transcaspian Railroad suffered from a serious disadvan­ tage: it followed a long and circuitous route between Turkestan and Russia that included a sea passage across the Caspian. The opening in 1906 of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad, also built

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primarily with strategic considerations in mind, shortened the rail distance between Tashkent and Moscow by over one quarter, and the travel time by more than one third. The railroad made possible the development of Central Asia into the primary source of supply of raw cotton for the textile industry of European Russia. In the early 1880s GovernorGeneral von Kaufman had encouraged the introduction into Turkestan of American upland cotton, superior in quality to the local variety. Only after the inauguration of the Transcaspian Railroad substantially lowered transportation costs between Turkestan and the metropolis, however, did the cultivation of the American variety spread rapidly, and with it the production of cotton for the Russian market. St. Petersburg stimulated cotton production in Central Asia by placing a protective tariff on foreign cotton from 1887. The combined results of the growing cultivation of the American variety, lower transport costs, and a protected market were striking. In the second half of the 1880s Russian Central Asia’s cotton production grew fourfold; in the period 188&-1907 the cotton exports of the Turkestan governmentgeneral alone to the metropolis increased by over 1100% ; and by 1911 Central Asian cotton was supplying half of Russia’s total needs. Until the mid-1880s Bukhara and Khiva had been the source of over half of all the Central Asian cotton exported to the metropolis, but the two protectorates’ share declined steadily until it stood at only 15% by 1914. In Bukhara the coarser local variety continued to be cultivated, in contrast to Turkestan, where by 1914 the American variety had totally replaced native cotton. While in the khanates cotton remained of secondary importance to grain, occupying only 5% of the cultivated land in Bukhara as late as World War I, in Turkestan (without Semirechie) by 1913 cotton was planted on almost 20% of the irrigated acreage. In Fergana oblast, which contained two-thirds of the cotton acreage in the government-general, cotton occupied 36-38% of the sown area on the eve of the 1917 revolution. As a result of their concentration on cotton, Fergana and some other parts of Turkestan became grain deficit areas. To encourage this trend toward monoculture, from 1893 St. Petersburg maintained a low freight rate on grain shipped to Turkestan. The inaugura­ tion of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad facilitated the delivery of inexpensive grain to Turkestan, and this was one of the motives behind the decision on the eve of World War I to build

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the Turkestan-Siberian Railroad from Novo-Nikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk) on the TranSsiberian line to Tashkent. Only the northernmost segment, from Novo-Nikolaevsk to Semipalatinsk, was completed before the Revolution. The coming of the railroad established Central Asia as a supplier of primary products for the metropolis. Not only cotton but fresh fruit was shipped from Turkestan, and the Steppe oblasti provided cattle and grain. Some local industry developed but was limited almost exclusively to the processing of agricul­ tural products. Ginning and pressing cotton fiber and extracting oil from cottonseed accounted for 85% of Turkestan’s total industrial production in 1914. Natives constituted two-thirds of the industrial labor force in the Steppe and three-quarters in Turkestan, but they were confined to unskilled and semiskilled jobs. By contrast, three-quarters of the Russian workers in Central Asia were skilled, and Russians held all the managerial positions. Four-fifths of all railroad workers were also Russian. Economic development promoted the growth of Central Asia’s cities. In Turkestan’s three core oblasti (Syr-Darya, Samarkand, and Fergana), where urban life was an ancient tradition, old cities grew rapidly, especially those that served as administrative centers or were located on the railroads. Turkestan’s cities remained predominantly native in population, although the major ones acquired significant Russian minorities. Tashkent’s population increased from 120,000 in 1877 to 271,000 in 1914, by which time it was the seventh largest city in the Russian Empire. In 1914 Kokand had a population of 120,000, and Samarkand, Andizhan, Namangan, and Ashkhabad all had between 50,000 and 100,000. In the Steppe oblasti, with their nomadic way of life, most towns were Russian establishments, founded as military outposts between the early seventeenth and late nineteenth centuries. The major ones formed an arc along the northern perimeter of the Steppe from Uralsk in the west to Semipalatinsk in the east. Vemyi, the capital of Semirechie, also belonged to this group. With one exception, the largest towns of the Steppe in 1911 had between 25,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, the overwhelm­ ing majority of whom were Russians. Omsk, capital of the Steppe government-general, more than tripled in population after the Transsiberian Railroad reached the city in the mid-1890s; its population in 1911 was 128,000. The integration of Central Asia into the Russian economy

Russia’s Central Asian Empire 1885-1917 243

brought benefits, at least to some Central Asians, but also had a disruptive effect, partially undoing the initial positive impact of Russian rule on the peasantry of Turkestan. In an attempt to drive a wedge between the peasantry and the privileged élite, Governor-General von Kaufman had effected a radical land reform, transferring title from the khans and the landowning aristocracy to those who actually worked the land. Only lands held by Muslim ecclesiastical institutions were left untouched. But as Turkestan specialized increasingly in producing for export to the metropolis and became dependent on food imports, the peasants found that they were at the mercy of cotton and grain prices, which were affected more by world demand and supply than by local conditions. A bumper harvest in the United States, the world’s largest exporter, depressed the price of cotton even if Turkestan’s crop was smaller than usual. The Russian banks that opened branches in Turkestan after the coming of the railroad loaned working capital to the native merchant-brokers who purchased the raw cotton from the many small peasant pro­ ducers. These merchant-brokers often advanced money, seed, and consumer goods such as tea to the peasants at exorbitant rates of interest. A poor harvest, low cotton prices, high grain prices, or any combination could throw a peasant into hopeless debt. Many lost their recently acquired land and reverted to the status of sharecroppers, as land once again became concentrated in the hands of the wealthy. Some natives grew rich by acting as agents of cotton brokers and ginners—loaning money and seed to peasants and sometimes acquiring land. Others prospered by themselves becoming processors of cotton fiber and seed or distillers and vintners for the Russian community in Central Asia. Native craftsmen, on the other hand, experienced more loss than profit from the development of closer economic links between colony and metropolis. The railroad brought a flood of Russian manufac­ tures—especially textiles and metalwork, but also pottery and leather and wooden goods—which were often cheaper than, and sometimes superior to, native wares. On the whole, economic development was probably beneficial in the long run for the population of Central Asia. Its disruptive impact on the traditional economy of the region was painful but unavoidable. Russia’s policy of using Central Asia as a source of

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primary products and a market for finished goods was in no way different from that of other contemporary imperialist powers. As a relatively underdeveloped industrial power herself, Russia undoubtedly had less of an economic impact on Central Asia than a more developed power would have had, as for example in providing the region with the costly infrastructure of a modern economy, such as a comprehensive rail network.

Russian Colonization In the first two decades after the conquest, the Russian presence in Central Asia had consisted almost exclusively of officers and civil servants. From the mid-1880s, however, improved com­ munications and closer economic links drew a rapidly increasing number of temporary and permanent Russian settlers from many different walks of life: merchants, technicians, railroad and industrial workers, and peasants. In the three core oblasti of Turkestan and in Transcaspia twothirds of the Russian immigrants down to 1911 were urban, inhabiting the Russian settlements that were laid out alongside established native towns. These settlements, with their straight, wide streets bordered with trees, their European-style public buildings—including hotels, theaters, and museums—their sewage systems and gas (later electric) lighting, provided a striking contrast to the labyrinthine alleys and windowless facades of the native quarters. Tashkent, the political and commercial capital, had far and away the largest of the Russian settlements, containing 84,000 residents or 31% of the city’s total population on the eve of World War I. Samarkand was second with a settlement of 14,000 or 14% of the total. Kokand contained 6,000 Russians—5% of the population. Russians, however, were but a small proportion of the total population of these four oblasti— less than 4% of a population of 5.3 million in 1911. By contrast, in Semirechie in the same year the Russian minority was 17% in a population of 1.2 million, and in the four Steppe oblasti 40% in a population of 3.8 million. In these five oblasti towns were entirely Russian in aspect and predominantly Russian in popula­ tion. In 1911 Russians accounted for 48% of the urban population in Semipalatinsk, 50% in Semirechie, and 80-86% in Akmolinsk, Turgai, and Uralsk. Four out of five Russians in these oblasti, however, were not urbanites but agricultural colonists.

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Russian peasant colonization in Central Asia began very slowly and hesitantly, gained real momentum only after a generation, and then turned into a flood that transformed the demographic and economic characteristics of large parts of the region. After the conquest St. Petersburg, acting as the heir to the previous rulers, claimed ownership of all uncultivated land. Nomads were given rights of usage, but the state retained the implicit right to determine the acreage needed by the nomads. As guardians of the empire’s frontiers, Cossacks had long been settled in an arc along the northern periphery of the Kazakh Steppe from the Caspian Sea to the Chinese border. Civilian peasant colonization began in Semirechie in 1868, in Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk in 1875, and in Turgai and Uralsk in the 1880s. Advancing deeper into the steppe from the Cossack settlements, Russian peasants practiced the same dry farming of grains introduced into the area by the Cossacks, and like the latter also raised cattle and horses. Governor-General von Kaufman was an advocate of Russian colonization in the steppe to preclude its settlement by the native agriculturists of the oases. St. Petersburg, however, was initially opposed to the resettlement of peasants from the metropolis out of concern for the potentially destabilizing effect on the peasantry of European Russia. The government’s position, backed up by the Steppe authorities in Omsk, did not prevent a certain amount of unauthorized colonization by squatters renting land from the Kazakhs. The crucial shift in the government’s attitude came between 1889 and 1896 as emigration came to be seen as a means of easing the problem of rural overpopulation in the metropolis. In the Resettlement Act of 1889 the state offered land allotments, tax exemptions, and interest-free loans to peasant colonists, but permission to migrate was conditional on the ministries of both Internal Affairs and State Domains being satisfied of the need to emigrate and the availability of free land. Over half the peasant emigrants continued to leave without permission in order to avoid these restrictions. During this period the government began reducing the acreage deemed necessary for the Kazakhs in order to enlarge the pool available for colonization by Russians. An indispensable precondition of large-scale migration was convenient and affordable transportation. This was provided by the construction in 1892-1894 of the West Siberian sector of the Transsiberian Railroad between the Ural Mountains and Omsk.

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Debarking from the trains at either Petropavlovsk or Omsk, peasant emigrants from the metropolis found themselves on the very threshold of fertile grasslands previously untouched by the plow. The railroad made the long move easy, and special rates for migrants made it inexpensive. The establishment in 1896 of the Resettlement Administration signified the government’s definitive resolution to promote colonization in Siberia and the Kazakh Steppe both to relieve rural overpopulation and peasant discontent in European Russia and to strengthen the Russian presence in the remote reaches of empire along the Chinese frontiers. A government survey of the previous year had already earmarked 48% of the area covered as “surplus” and thus available for resettlement. Russian squatters were at the same time given protection against the claims of natives. In 1904 a new resettlement law finally eliminated the requirement of special permission for removal to Asiatic Russia, thereby initiating virtually unrestricted internal migration. The severe and widespread peasant uprisings of 1905-1907 in the metropolis brought a new urgency to the government’s resettlement policy. The norms defining the land needs of the nomads were lowered, thereby enlarging by 70% the pool of land available for colonization. So anxious was the government to increase this pool that it declared “surplus” even some lands farmed by sedentary Kazakhs and Kirgiz. An investigatory commission headed by Senator Count K.K. Pahlen in 1908 cautioned against too hasty a program of settlement, lest the impoverishment of the native population raise their anta­ gonism toward Russia to dangerous levels. Such warnings went unheeded. After a tour of inspection in 1910 Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin and Director of the Department of Agriculture A.V. Krivoshein urged the continuation of rapid colonization in order to Russify the borderlands, promote their economic develop­ ment, and encourage the transformation of the nomads into agriculturists. In the same year Turkestan’s three core oblasti (Syr-Darya, Samarkand, and Fergana), together with Semirechie, were for the first time opened to colonization on the same basis as the Steppe oblasti. Previously only land newly brought under irrigation had been open to settlement in Turkestan. In fact there was little colonization in the core oblasti before the 1917 revolution. In the protected native khanates Russian colonization was forbidden.

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Between 1896 and 1916 just under a million and a half Russians migrated to Central Asia. This figure constitutes 30% of the total migration to Asiatic Russia during these years. Over 1 million remained in Central Asia, the rest returning to the metropolis. Net immigration was 206,000 in the decade 1896-1905 and 834,000 in the period 1906-1916. Some 300-500,000 settlers had arrived before 1896. Of the total net immigration in 1896-1916, 56% settled in Akmolinsk oblast (primarily in its northern half), 24% in Turgai and Uralsk (largely along their northern peripheries), 19% in Semipalatinsk (again along the northern periphery) and Semirechie (primarily in the east and south), and only 1% in Syr-Darya (mostly in the southeast). This massive influx of Russians raised their percen­ tage of the population of the Steppe oblasti from 20% in 1897 to 40% in 1911. Russian colonization had a dramatic impact on the traditional economy of the Steppe. Between 1906 and 1916 the sown area in the four Steppe oblasti increased by almost four times, with 95% of the increase the result of Russian colonization. In 1916 Russians farmed from 64% to 96% of the cultivated land in the Steppe oblasti and 36% in Semirechie. Unlike the native agriculturists, who practiced subsistence farming, the Russians produced for the market. In 1910-1916 between one quarter and three quarters of the annual grain harvest was marketed; this surplus originated on the farms of Russian colonists. So promising was this new granary that beginning in 1911 St. Petersburg planned two new railroads to facilitate the influx of colonists and the export of grain and livestock: a South Siberian Railroad running parallel to the Transsiberian from Uralsk to Semipalatinsk and a Turkestan-Siberian Railroad from the Transsiberian southwestward via Semipalatinsk and Vernyi to Tashkent. World War I interrupted both projects. As the sown area expanded, the nomads’ pastures were reduced, continuing a process that had been going on for many decades. The foundation of Cossack settlements along the northern rim of the Steppe beginning in the eighteenth century had already blocked the traditional seasonal migration routes of some of the nomads and expropriated much of the best winter grazing lands in the river valleys. Large-scale peasant coloniza­ tion from the 1890s cut additional migration routes and severely reduced grazing lands. Nomads were forced to find other

248 Russian Colonial Expansion

pastures, often on marginal land in the more arid southern districts of the Kazakh Steppe. Reduced pastures led tô reduced herds and reduced incomes. At the same time Russian and Tatar traders became regular visitors among the nomads, creating new consumer wants and increasing the nomads’ dependence upon the traders’ wares, such as tea and manufactured goods. The process was in many ways similar to the impact of the westward movement of white traders and settlers upon the Plains Indians of North America. Russian policy encouraged the settlement of nomads by offering tax exemptions for the first five years and reductions for the next five to nomads who took up agriculture. Most of those who accepted the government’s offer were poor; the wealthy found little attraction in the sedentary life. By 1916 roughly 30% of the Kazakhs had settled down as agriculturists, but many had little or no land or land of marginal value; many were agricultural laborers. Some nomads shifted to a semisedentary grain and livestock economy. The transition from nomadism to agriculture proceeded furthest in the northern districts where Russian colonization was densest and the impact on the natives greatest. In these northern uezdy, by 1916 Russians owned most of the livestock as well as most of the cultivated land. Native herds of livestock were increasing in the final decade of tsarist rule after their earlier decline, but the increase was primarily in the more arid southern districts of the Steppe which were not suitable for Russian peasant colonization. The settlement in only two decades of over a million Russian colonists in the northern and eastern districts of the Kazakh Steppe was the result of St. Petersburg’s attempt to solve the problems of rural overpopulation in the metropolis and frontier security against China with scant thought for Russia’s colonial subjects. The disruption caused in the latter’s traditional way of life and economy fostered grievances that contributed in a major way to the rebellious outburst that was soon to shake to its foundation Russia’s Central Asian empire.

The Muslim Response However disruptive of traditional ways was the growing Russian presence in Central Asia, St. Petersburg by and large left the Muslims to adjust as best they might, confident that in the long run close contact with Russia could only prove beneficial. From

Russia's Central Asian Empire 1885-1917 249

the beginning General von Kaufman had followed a policy of not pressing Russification upon the natives lest they be provoked into rebellion. He preferred to wait and let the Muslims see for themselves the advantages of Russia's superior culture. Accord­ ingly, Kaufman prevented the Russian Orthodox Church from establishing a new diocese in Tashkent and from carrying on missionary activity in Turkestan. At the same time he kept the Muslim Religious Administration in Ufa from extending its jurisdiction to Turkestan out of fear that the encouragement of their co-religionists would strengthen the Turkestanis’ resistance to Russian influence. The result of this hands-off policy was that the culture of the Muslim community underwent relatively little change in half a century under the tsars. The rule of the infidel did, however, undermine the authority of the kazis (judges) and mullahs (learned men) and of the traditional morality they represented. Education might have served as a powerful agent of cultural change, but there was little progress in this area. Before the conquest there were no schools among the nomads of the Steppe and Semirechie. By 1913 the Russians had established only 157 native schools in these five oblasti—containing a Muslim population of 3.3 million—to train clerks and interpreters for the civil service. In the same year an additional 267 schools served the Russian population of 1.7 million in these oblasti. Among the sedentary population of Turkestan there was a long-established system of grammar schools (maktabs) and seminaries (madrasas). At the turn of the century some 5,900 of the former and 400 of the latter existed for a native population of 5.1 million in the Turkestan government-general minus Semirechie. Russian schools for the natives made little headway in Turkestan: a quarter century after their introduction there were only 89 of them in 1911. Graduates of the traditional maktabs. having spent sgven or eight years reading by rote from the Koran, soon forgot what little they had learned unless they went on to a madrasa. Literacy rates were 2-3% for the adult sedentary Muslim population of Central Asia, 1% for the nomads. In the entire empire only the natives of Siberia had lower rates. The movement for educational reform among Russia's Muslims begun by the Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gasprinskii reached Turkestan in the late 1890s; by 1916 there were 166 of his “newmethod” schools in Turkestan and 18 in Semirechie. In these

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schools reading, writing, and Arabic grammar were taught by European pedagogical methods, and the curriculum included also subjects not taught in the maktabs, such as mathematics, history, geography, and Russian. The colonial administration was very suspicious of the new-method schools and their supporters, known as djadids, for fostering notions of a Muslim cultural and political awakening and modernizing reform as well as ties with Turks and other Muslims beyond the empire’s frontiers. Although the new-method schools had little impact on the masses, they did serve as a focus and a nursery for the small reformist native intelligentsia, which favored some degree of secularization and modernization of Muslim culture via selective borrowing from Russia. Moral and financial support came largely from the segment of the urban middle class that was in closest contact with the Russians. The development of this new intelligentsia, the bearers of a modern Muslim national consciousness, received a great boost from the revolutionary events of 1905-1907 both in Russia and in the Muslim world from Morocco to Persia. From mid-1907, however, with the advent of the Stolypin reaction, St. Petersburg did all it could to repress the movement, refusing to legalize the liberal reformist Union of Muslims, closing many Muslim newspapers, and reducing the number of Duma deputies from Muslim areas. The short-lived second Duma, elected in January 1907, had included four deputies from the Steppe and six from Turkestan among its thirty-one Muslim members. In the third and fourth Dumas neither Turkestan nor the Steppe was represented. Not only the colonial authorities but the traditionalist mullahs in Turkestan opposed the modernist reformers, their schools, and their newspapers. St. Petersburg showed more interest in repressing the small native reformist intelligentsia than in alleviating the causes of the popular discontent that was mounting against Russian rule. In the first two decades after the conquest, the fresh memory of crushing defeats helped keep the Muslims of Central Asia peaceful. Moreover, for purposes both of defense and internal policing, the Russians maintained up to 45,000 troops in the region. Fearing to give the native population training in arms, St. Petersburg both exempted them from conscription into the Russian army and rejected the idea of organizing native auxiliaries; the lesson of the Indian Mutiny of 1857-1858 against

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Britain was not lost. The only Muslim army in the area was the pitifully trained and poorly armed forces of the emir of Bukhara, which in fact were increasingly inadequate even to maintain order within the boundaries of the protectorate. In short, there was little prospect of reversing the decision of the 1860s. From the mid-1880s, however, there were instances of native revolts, often led by mullahs, who, as defenders of the traditional culture, were ardently opposed to Russian rule. Such revolts were especially frequent in Fergana, a hotbed of extremist cults. In their ignorance of and contempt for native culture, the Russian rulers continually offended local sensibilities. For example, public health measures which to the Russian mind were clearly necessary were perceived by the natives as violating custom and the supernatural order. A case in point was Russia's efforts to combat cholera in Tashkent in 1892, which provoked serious riots. More serious was the Andizhan uprising of 1898, which was planned over a period of many months by conservative mullahs and members of the old Kokandian ruling élite, and aimed at the reestablishment of Kokand's independence and the expulsion of the infidel fropi Central Asia. Peasant support was largely due to the one-third decline in cotton prices in the preceding several years, but the leadership was motivated by concern for its decreasing prestige and authority as the younger generation turned away from the traditional culture. The revolt was suppressed in a matter of days, but Russia’s wariness of the native population was permanently heightened. Many reforms were considered in the wake of the revolt, but the only measures implemented were the stationing of additional troops in Turkestan and the arming of Russian colonists. The 1905 revolution in Central Asia was confined to the Russian population, the Muslims remaining aloof. During the next decade bands of dispossessed Muslim peasants-turnedbrigands infested some rural areas and with considerable popular support attacked Russian administrators and settlers. The most serious troubles, however, occurred in the protected native states, where dissatisfaction was directed not against the Russians but against the native regimes. In Bukhara peasants were taxed eight times as heavily as peasants in Russian Turkestan, and the native administration was even more rapacious and offered even fewer benefits than did the Russian colonial authorities. In 1910 tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in the

252 Russian Colonial Expansion

emir’s capital led to several days of rioting, which ended only when Russian troops arrived by railroad from Turkestan. As a result of these events, Tashkent pressed once again for the annexation of Bukhara. Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin agreed that such a step was in the long run inevitable, but he regarded the present moment as inopportune. The Foreign Ministry remained wedded to the policy of nonintervention in the protectorates, but that policy soon proved bankrupt in Khiva, whose continued existence was threatened by a series of Turkoman revolts against the ruling Uzbeks between 1912 and 1916. Shortsighted attempts by Tashkent to mediate between the khan and his Turkoman subjects only aggravated the situation. The upshot was the establishment of a permanent Russian military presence in Khiva to protect the khan and a plan, forestalled by the 1917 revolution, for a Russian military commissar to supervise the native government and see that required reforms were imple­ mented. While the need for drastic revision of Russia’s policy toward the protected native states was thus becoming ever more apparent, trouble was also brewing in Turkestan and the Steppe oblasti. Demands from the liberal Muslim intelligentsia for equality between natives and Russians in religious and other matters, an end to Russian colonization, and the restitution of lands taken unjustly from the nomads all went unheeded, and popular resentment against Russian settlers and Russian rule kept growing, largely unperceived by the colonial authorities. World War I added to the discontent in several ways. The cessation of cotton imports from abroad led St. Petersburg to impose a ceiling on the price of Central Asian cotton at a level 50% above that of 1913, lest shortages drive the price even higher. No ceilings were placed on the grains and manufactured goods that Central Asia bought from the metropolis, however, and their prices rose to four times the 1913 level during the course of the war. In addition, special war taxes were levied, draft animals and carts were requisitioned, and natives were conscripted for field work on Russian farms, especially in Semirechie, to replace Russians called up for military service. The spark that ignited this highly combustible situation was the decision in late spring 1916 to make good the severe army manpower losses by mobilizing the Muslims of Central Asia for service behind the front lines. Why the labor draft was necessary

Russia’s Central Asian Empire 1885-1917 253

and how it would work were never adequately explained to the native population, either before or after the 25 June decree ordering the mobilization of 250,000 men in Turkestan and 243,000 in the four Steppe oblasti. The result was the revolt that began in early July in Samarkand oblast and quickly spread to Tashkent and Fergana. Usually acting spontaneously and without leaders, the rebels turned their wrath primarily against the native officials who were responsible for selecting the draftees and who were themselves exempt. These officials were often hated for their corruption and long collaboration with the colonial authorities. The rebels were mostly from the urban working class and the peasantry; the middle class, which had a more realistic idea of Russian strength, held aloof. The uprisings remained local and uncoordinated and were quickly quelled by the arrival of Russian troops. By the end of July the core regions of Turkestan were pacified and the labor draft postponed until mid-September, when it would interfere less with work in the cotton fields. In early August, however, Semirechie exploded. Kirgiz and Kazakhs attacked Russians officials and colonists, and the latter responded by taking the law into their own hands and repaying the atrocities committed by the Muslims in kind and with interest. At the cost of many lives the revolt was quelled here as well by the end of August, and was followed by a mass flight of Kirgiz into Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang). While Semirechie was still in revolt the Turkomans of Transcaspia also rebelled, many of them crossing into Persia; armed clashes between Russian troops and Turkomans lasted until December. In the last quarter of the year the revolt spread to the four Steppe oblasti, but here the bloodshed was much less; only in Turgai did the revolt assume truly serious proportions. Perhaps the size and density of the Russian population in the northern uezdy discouraged Muslim attacks. The uncoordinated nature of the uprisings of 1916 and the fact that they occurred sequentially rather than simultaneously in the four centers of revolt meant that the continuation of Russian rule in Central Asia was at no time seriously threatened. The damage, however, was far from minimal. In Turkestan Russian losses included 2,300 civilians killed and 1,400 missing (over 85% of these victims were in Semirechie); 259 soldiers dead, wounded, or missing (the majority in Transcaspia); 24 Russian and 55

254 Russian Colonial Expansion

native officials killed; and 9,000 Russian farmsteads destroyed (mostly in Semirechie). In the Steppe Russian losses were only a small fraction of what they were in Turkestan. Native losses in lives and property were much heavier than those of the Russians. The combined effects of death and emigration reduced the Muslim population of Semirechie by 15-20%. Between 110,000 and 180,000 natives were finally mobilized in Central Asia in the last quarter of 1916 and early 1917—instead of the half million originally envisioned. Kuropatkin, who arrived in Turkestan as the new governor­ general in early August, had a number of ideas for reforms to alleviate the problems revealed by the 1916 revolt: more Russian officials at the uezd level and more effective administration generally, with Russians assuming more responsibility for native welfare instead of leaving it to the Muslim officials; better communication between the colonial administration and the natives; greater protection for the land rights of both nomads and peasants who had fallen into serious debt; and subsidized grain imports from European Russia and Siberia. Like Kuropatkin’s plan for Khiva, these proposals for reform had not been implemented when the tsarist regime collapsed in March 1917.

Conclusion The troubles in Bukhara and Khiva in 1910-1916 and the revolt of 1916 in Turkestan and the Steppe were clear evidence of the bankruptcy of half a century of Russian rule in Central Asia. Russia’s failure stemmed both from a refusal to recognize the responsibilities of empire and from her own backwardness and poverty. Initially St. Petersburg’s interests in Central Asia were limited to frontier security and the exclusion of British influence from the area. Later Turkestan took on additional importance as a reliable source of raw cotton, and still later the Steppe came to be viewed as a convenient area for the relief of rural overpopulation in the metropolis. The native population, when it was considered at all, was viewed with distrust and contempt, and little thought was given to its needs. The habit of focusing on the needs of the state to the virtual exclusion of any concern for those of society was of course an old one in St. Petersburg. Coupled with the very limited material means at the disposal of the rulers of a land as

Russia's Central Asian Empire 1885-1917 255

economically underdeveloped as Russia was in the late nine­ teenth century, this habit ensured that few enough social benefits were conferred upon the populace of the metropolis, let alone the tsar’s second-class subjects in Central Asia. On the one hand, Russian rule did provide peace and order, the abolition of slavery and cruel punishments, a modest measure of economic development, and a skeletal infrastructure of transportation, communications, and irrigation networks. Small islands of modern civilization were established in the Russian settlements that developed next to the native towns of Turkestan and in the Russian towns of the Steppe. On the other hand, Russian rule brought almost none of the further benefits conferred on non-Western peoples by the more developed imperialist powers, such as honest and efficient government and the education of natives for administrative and managerial roles. The corruption of officials and their abuse of power, never strangers to Central Asia before the conquest, continued unmitigated and were even exacerbated by the imposition of several layers of often corrupt, incompetent, and indifferent Russian officials over the local Muslim authorities. The readiness and ability of Russian troops to quell any revolt removed the most effective traditional restraint on the misuse of authority. The illiteracy of the colonial population was not diminished, but the integrity of its culture was inevitably undermined by the presence of infidels wielding irresistible political and military power. Under the impact of cheap Russian manufactures, new consumer wants, and the trend toward monoculture, the economic condition of the urban and rural masses also suffered. The strains resulting from World War I brought to the breaking point the tensions accumulated over decades in Central Asia, as elsewhere in the empire, including the metropolis. By 1917 Russian policy stood in need of radical reform, but it was left for the Romanovs’ Bolshevik successors to find a new relationship between Russia and her Central Asian colonies and protectorates.

Bibliography 1. Allworth, Edward, ed., Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule (New York, 1967).

256 Russian Colonial Expansion 2. Bacon, Elizabeth E., Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966). 3. Becker, Seymour, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). 4. Demko, George J., The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916 (Bloomington, Ind., 1969). 5. Galuzo, P.G., Turkestan—koloniia (Ocherk istorii Turkestana ot zavoevaniia russkimi do revoliutsii 1917 goda) (Moscow, 1929). 6. Pierce, Richard A., Russian Central Asia 1867-1917 (Berkeley, Calif., 1960). 7. Sokol, Edward Dennis, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore, 1953). 8. Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, vol. II, 1892 edit. (St. Petersburg, 1912). 9. Wheeler, Geoffrey, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia (London and New York, 1964).

Index

Abaz, Shah 14 Abdurakhman-Avtobachi, Kipchak chieftain 225 Abkhazia 144, 179 Adashev, adviser to Ivan IV 59 Afghan tribe, invading Iran 149 Afghan troops, clashing with Russians 235 Afghanistan 208, 210, 226, 229-31, 235-6 mountains 225 Africa, European imperialism in 212 Agidar, Khan 81 Ahmed, Khan 54 Aiaguzsk 205 Akhal-Teke oasis 226, 229 Akhaltsekhe 144, 179, 180 Ak-Meshit’ 213 Akmolinsk 236, 244, 247 Aksakov, Sergei 201 Aktachinsk 192 Alaska 2, 3 Alazeya, River 90 Aldan, River 89 Aldeigtjuborg 26 Alexander 1 126, 168-72, 180 wife of 174 Alexander II212-13, 216, 218, 220, 226, 228

assassination of 227 Alexander III 228 Alexander Nevsky 50 Alexis (Alexei), Tsar 85, 97, 98, 107 Ali, Sheykh 178 Alimkul 215 Altai region 98 Aman-Karagaisk 205 American Civil War 240 American South 240 Amu-Darya, River 210, 225, 235, 236 Amur, River 96, 97 Amur district 2 Anabarsk 90 Anadyrsk 90-1 Anapa 163 Andizhan 225, 242 uprising 251 Anglo-Central Asian commerce 62 Anglo-Persian commerce 62 Anna (Anne), Empress 18, 114, 151, 152 Anthony, catholicos of the Georgian Church and son of Erekle 172 Apochynin, Brigadier 115 Apostol, Colonel 112

257

258 Index Apostol, Danylo 114 Aqa Mohammad Khan 164-7 . Arabs, living in Turkestan 210 Aral Sea 204, 205, 210 Aras, River 144 Arctic Sea and coast 82, 89-90 Arkhangel’sk 40, 82,115 Armada, Spanish 67 Armenia 3, 156,165 Armenian Church 160,184 Armenian representatives in Kabardan lawcourt 164 Armenians 127, 128, 185 as allies of Russia 149-50 in the Caucasus 143,144,147, 154,160,166, 178, 183 merchants 175 women, compelled to give up veil 184 Ashkhabad 226, 230, 242 Armistice of Vilna 110 Asia 11, 72,113,147,185, 208, 212, 216; see also Central Asia attempt to form coalition of states 219 “barbarism” of 153 Asiatic Russia 246 Astarabad 149 Astrakhan 12, 45, 52, 56, 63, 65-8, 139,146, 148, 149, 151,159, 192 khanate of 2, 45, 57 Astrakhan Gubernia 198 Atbasarsk 205 Atlantic Ocean 47, 62, 70 Augustus II (of Poland) 112 Australia 96 Austria 3,159 Avars 150, 162 Avvakum, leader of the Old Believers 99 Azerbaijan 142, 149-51, 164-6, 171-4,177, 179

khanates 160,173,176 khans 172, 174 territories claimed by Georgia 160 Azeris (people) 142 Azov 67, 111, 115, 148,157 Azov Sea 111, 142 Babyton, exile of Children of Israel in 46 Baghdad Muslim empire 4, 5 Bagrations (Georgian rulers) 167-8,172, 175 Prince Alexander 178 Baian-Aul’sk 205 Baikal, Lake 89 Bakhchisarai 130,135 Baku 170, 176,177 khan of 176 khanate of 145, 177 Balaklava 129 Balkan theater in Russia's war with the Ottoman Empire 179 Balkans 3, 179, 211 Baltic area 18 coast 31, 77 Finnish 1 states 3 Baltic Sea 66 Barents Sea 23 Bartol’d, V. V. 228 Bashkir wars 192-3, 195-6, 198, 200, 201 Bashkiria 189,191-3, 195, 197-203, 206 Bashkirs 2, 97, 189, 191-3, 195, 199-203 Battle of Kulikovo 50, 59 Battle of Poltava 18, 113 Battle of Zerabulak 220 Baturyn 113 Begbeli Agtakov, Vogul chieftain 79

Index 259 Belaia, River 198 Belgohrad 109 Beloozero 26, 30, 35, 37-8 Belorussia (White Russia) 2, 3, 93 Belorussians in Briansk and Chemyhiv 107 serfs, captured 14 Berdibeg, Khan 49 Berezov 82 Bering Strait 90 Bessarabia 2, 3 Bezborodko, Prince Alexander 157 Birsk 194, 195 Black Sea 45, 46, 52,105, 106, 111, 116, 142, 144, 157, 161, 163 coast 173 northern 123 Boh, River 109 Boris Godunov, Tsar 80-5, 96 Bosporus 52, 56 Boyar Duma 8-10, 12, 13, 16 Bratskoe 89 Briansk region 107 Britain 3, 229-31, 251 British Empire 1, 4, 6 Bukhara 11, 210, 212, 213, 216-20, 222-5, 228, 230, 236, 240, 241, 251, 252, 254 city 210 emir of 217, 219, 251 khanate of 205, 210, 219-20, 236 Bukharans, in Bashkiria 202 Bukhara-Afghan border 240 Bukowina 3 Bulgaria 56 Bulgarians, in the Crimea 127 Bulgar-on-the-Volga 26 Buryat Mongol lands, subdued by 1690 2 Butalskyi 89 Byzantine Empire (Byzantium) 26, 55,56

Caspian region 226 Caspian Sea 12, 46, 62, 74,139, 142,144, 148-50, 161, 177, 192,198, 204, 223, 224, 226, 230, 235, 240, 245 coast 142,148,149,165, 176, 180,183 Catherine 118,114 Catherine II (“the Great”) 17, 18, 20,106,115-18, 124-5,133, 151,153-60,163-9, 197 Catholic powers, isolation of Muscovy imposed by 62 Catholic rulers in Krakow 45 Caucasia 67; see also Caucasus Caucasian languages 142 Caucasian Line 157-8,163, 170 Caucasians, battle tactics of 175 Caucasus 9, 19-20, 65, 67, 139-86, 213, 236-7; see also Armenia; Georgia; etc. Christians in 156-7, 159-60 economy 184-5 Muslims in 143, 144, 160-2, 170, 184 provinces 163 Caucasus command 223, 224, 226, 229 Central Asia 9, 51, 195,196, 202-4, 211-13, 216-18, 220, 225-31, 235-55 Muslims in 208, 223 Central Asian khanates 56,205,231 Central Asian oblasti 237 Charles XII (of Sweden) 111, 113 Chechenia 144, 162, 175 Russian forts and settlements in 158 Chechens (people) 142, 162 Cheliabinsk 203 Cherdyn 80 Cheremisses (people) 63, 200 Cherkaskii, princes 147; see also Tcherkaskii

260 Index

Cherniaev, Colonel (later General) M. G. 213-18, 227-30, 236 Chemyhiv (Chernigov) 107,108, 110,119 Chimkent 214-16 China 3, 31, 62, 73, 75, 89, 97-8, 210, 212, 235, 248 frontier with Russia 228, 245 pressure on Mongolia 3 Chinese Empire 4, 6 Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang) 253 Chingis-Khan 51 Christendom 70 Christian Orthodox body politic, threat to 86 Christianity 34, 37, 46, 47, 50, 54-7, 59-60, 63-4, 144, 147, 154, 158, 161-2, 198-9 as unifying factor in Muscovy 48-50, 54-5 conversion of Kazan to 54, 59-60, 63-4 Orthodox Church 49-50, 94,103 Chud* (people) 26, 29 Chukchis (people) 2 Chulkov, Danilo 81 Church State 4 Chusovaia, River 68, 78, 80 Chuvashes (people) 2, 191, 200, 202 Circassians 16 College of Foreign Affairs 115, 118, 154, 155 Constantinople 31, 52, 55, 56 Cortez, Hernando 79 Cossack movement 107 Cossack prikaz 9, 17 Cossack Ukraine (Hetmanat) 107, 109-19; see also Ukraine Cossacks 18-19, 60, 70, 78, 80-3, 85, 87, 89-92, 97, 106, 109-14, 118, 149, 197-8, 200, 204, 206, 215, 218, 228;

see also Don Cossacks; Isetsk Cossacks; Muscovite Cossacks; Sakmarsk Cossacks; Samara Cossacks; Siberian Cossacks; Ufa Cossacks; Ural Mountains, Cossacks of; Zaporizhian Cossacks armies of, raid on Poland by 107 settlements in the Steppe 247 Council of Florence 55 Cracow (Krakow) 45,112 Crimea 2,10, 31, 52, 54, 56-7, 62-3, 67, 111, 123-36, 155, 158,160,163, 196 economy 128-9 independence, events leading to loss of 124 khan of 145, 155 Crimean Khanate 25, 39, 52,109, 115,123-4, 127, 145 Crimean Tatars 106-7,110-11, 123,133 society 123-4, 133,136 Crimean War 126, 127, 210, 211, 213 Crimeans, raids by 127, 152 Croats, in southern Ukraine 116 Czartoryski, Adam 172 “Dacia” 156 Dadiani, Gregory 173 Daghestan 144,145, 149-51, 156,162, 165,167, 173,176, 178 chiefs 151, 176 Daghestanis, raids by 148-9, 160-1,170, 173 Danube, River, lower 156 Danubian provinces 163 Dengil-Tepe 226 Derbent 145, 149-50, 156,166, 176-8 khanate of 177

Index 261 Dervish Ali, Khan 65-6 Devlet Girey, Khan 67 Dezhnev, Semeon 90 Dikoe pole (Wild land) 106 Dmitry, brother of Prince Konstantin 35 Dmitry, infant son of Ivan IV 62 Dmitry, prince of Muscovy (Dmitry Donskoy) 36, 48, 50,51 Dnieper, River 45, 46, 105,108-9, 116 lower 106, 111 middle 109 Dolgorukii, head of Kazan prikaz 13 Don, River 46, 50,106 lower 157 valley 63, 78 Don Cossacks 67, 79, 151, 163; see also Cossacks Donets, River 105, 109 Dutch merchants, trade with ' Muscovy 76 Dutch traders in Siberia 84 Dvina Land 32; see also North Dvina Land Dzhizak 217-19

East Prussia 3 Echmiadzin, catholicos of 160 Edigey, Khan 52 education in the Caucasus 183 in Central Asia 249-50 in the Crimea 131-4 Ekaterinograd 159 Elburz, Mount 142 Elizabeth, Empress 18, 114, 153 Elizabeth I (of England) 67 Elizavetpol’ 174 Em’ (people) 25, 29 Emba, River 204

England, prospects for trade via Muscovy 62 English traders in Siberia 84 Erekle, king of Georgia 155, 159-60,164,167,174 Anthony, son of 172 Esfahan 166 Eski Sarai 130 Estonia 2, 3 Europe 31, 39, 70-1, 74, 76, 82, 171,181,203 central 77 eastern 62,105,113, 123-4 northeastern 73 southern 31 western 75, 76, 210 European Muscovy 85, 91, 93, 95, 97,100 European Russia 203, 211, 225, 238, 245, 246, 254 textile industry 241 Europeans, western 47 Evenki lands 2

Fedor (Feodor) I 81, 83, 85,146, 198 death of 82, 85 Fedorov, G. P. 227, 228 Feodosiia 130 Fergana 225, 236, 241, 242, 246, 251,253 Fergana valley 210, 218 Finland 2, 3,117 Finnic areas 2 Finnish Ingermanland 2 Finnish tribes 25, 32, 40 Finno-Turkic tribes 61 Finno-Ugrian population, rule by Novgorod 29 Finno-Ugric peoples in Bashkiria 206 Flaes, R. 105 Fletcher, Giles 123 Fort Holy Cross 149

262 Index Fort Perovskii 213 Fort Petro-Aleksandrovsk 225 . Fort Vernoe 213, 214 France 159 French Empire 4 French merchants, trading with Muscovy 76 Friazin, Andrei 36 Gagemeister, lu. A. 211 Galicia, eastern 3 Ganjeh 144,160,174, 182 khan of 171, 174 Gasprinskii, Ismail Bey 134, 135, 249 Geins, A. K. 221 Geok Tepe 226 Georgia 10, 153-6,159-61, 164-5, 167-75, 182-4 kingdom of 19-20, 143,155, 167 representatives in Supreme Frontier Court 164 Georgian Church 144,159-60, 184 Georgian states, principalities, etc. 150,153,155, 156,160, 171, 172 Abkhazia 144, 179-80 Guria 144, 179 Imeretia 144, 151,155,159, 171, 173,178, 179, 183 Kakheti 145 Kartli 149, 152 Mingrelia 144, 170, 173, 182 Georgians 149, 150, 152, 167 in the Crimea 127 insurrections 150-1, 178-9 language 142, 169, 174 under Russian rule 182-3 willingness to cooperate with Russia 147, 149 women, compelled to give up veil 184 Georgie vsk 159 Geray, Khan 52

Germans in the Crimea 127 in the southern Ukraine 116 of the Volga 157 Ghazi Qumuqs 176, 178 Gilan 150 Giorgi, king of Georgia 167-8 Girs, F. K. 227 Girs, N. K. 212, 229 Gladstone, William 230 Gleden 30 Godunov, Boris, see Boris Godunov, Tsar Godunov, Petr 98-100 Golden Horde 48, 50-7, 61 khans 35, 54; see also Tokhtamysh Golitsin, Prince Vasilii 111 Golitsyn, Prince Boris Alekseevich 13 Golovachev, General N. N. 226 Gorbaty, Prince Alexander 61 Gorchakov, A. M. 212, 216 Great Northern War, see Northern War Grebenskii Host 146 Greeks in the Caucasus 185 in the Crimea 127 in southern Ukraine 116 Grigor’evich, Oksentii 33 Gudovich, Ivan 163-6, 177 Gulf of Finland 72 Guri(i), Abbot 64, 198 Guria 144, 173 Gypsies 210

Habsburg Empire 116 Hanseatic League 31, 76 Hetmanat, see Cossack Ukraine Himalayas 231 Hindu Kush mountain range 208, 210, 231 “Historia de Siberia” 99

Index 263

Holy Trinity Monastery 48 Huttenbach, Henry R. 103,117

laik (Ural) Cossacks 197, 204 laitskii Gorodok 197 lani-Kurgan 218, 219 laroslavF 37 latysh, River 81 Idugu, Khan, see Edigey Igel’strom, Baron 126 Ignat’ev, Count N. P. 212, 213 Igor, Prince 50 Ikan 215 Him, River 89 Ilimsk 89 Imbatskoe Zimov’e 84 Imeretia 144, 151, 155, 159, 171, 173, 178, 179, 183 India 31, 51, 62, 73, 76, 148, 203, 208, 211, 225, 230, 231 India Office (London) 230 Indigirka, River 90 Ingushes (people) 142, 154, 158 Iona, bishop of Ryazan 55 Iran 3, 143,149-52,156,157,159, 164-8,171, 174-80, 184; see also Persia; Safavi Empire plains, vulnerable to Russian expansion 225 Iranian army 165, 174, 180 Irdzhar 217 Irgiz, River 204, 205 Irtysh, River 80, 204 upper 86, 204 Iset, River 78 Isetsk Cossacks 198 Ishim, River 204 Islam 46, 47, 54-6,131-2, 143, 144,161-2, 199 Islamic law 184; see also Kur’anic law Islamic schools 133 Issyk-Kul region 213 lug, River 30

lugra (people) 28, 29, 37, 39, 73 lur’ev-Zakharin, Danila Romanovich 13 luzkahov, lu. 222 Ivan, son of Boris Godunov 81 Ivan I (“Kalita”) 36, 49 Ivan III 39, 53-6, 59, 72-4, 103 Ivan IV (“the Terrible”) 12,13, 47, 57-66, 68, 75-81,106, 145,146,157, 189,191,198 ascension to the throne 57 death of 66, 77,80, 81 Ivanov, Varfolomei 15

Japan 3 Javad Khan 174 Jews 144, 210; see also Karaim Jews Kabarda 144-6,148,150,152-5, 162-4, 167, 174, 175 Kabardan chiefs 145,154,157,164 Kabardans 67,142-4, 146-8, 157-8,162 Kakheti 145 Kalmyks 9, 86-8, 192 Kama, River 68, 76 lower 198 upper 25, 39, 77 Kama region 77, 78, 80 lower 191 Kamchatka peninsula 2, 90 Karabutaksk 205 Karaim Jews 127 Karakalpaks (people) 210 Karelia 1 Karelians 29, 34 Karkaralinsk 205 Kars 3, 144 Kartli 149, 152 Kashgar 215 Kashlyk 80 Kasimov, Kenesary 208 Kasimov 10, 60

264 Index Kasimov continued khanate of 53, 54 “tsardom of” 10-12 Katenin, General A. A. 213 Katta-Kurgan 220 Kaufman, General K. P. Von 219-29, 231, 239, 241, 243, 245, 249 Kazakh steppe 204, 205, 208, 210, 213, 228, 245, 246 Kazakhs 2,195, 203-6, 208, 210, 228, 237, 246, 253 Kazakhstan 189, 203-6 Kazan 39, 40, 53-68, 74-6, 88, 189, 191, 194, 198, 206 khanate of 25, 45, 52, 61,74, 191,198,206 “tsardom” or “kingdom” of 12, 13, 15 Kazanskiiprifazz 8-15,81,84,86-8 Kegrola 36 Ket, River 82 Khabarov, Erofei 97 Khair, Abul, Kazakh khan 195 Khalfin, N. A. 211 Khanti-Ostyaki (people) 2, 25; see also lugra Kharkiv 109 Khatanga, River 90 Khiva 11, 210, 212, 213, 224-6, 240, 241, 252, 254 khanate of 205, 223, 236 Khmelnitsky, Bogdan (Bohdan Khmelnytskyi) 17, 97, 106-9, 112, 114 Khodzhent 218 Khorvat, Ivan S. 116 Khudoiar, Khan 225 Khvarezm oasis 226 Kiev 108,110,119 Kievan Rus’ 45, 46, 50 Kievan State 23, 26 Kikhek, Vogul prince 80 Kimberley, Lord 230

Kipchak Uzbeks 210 Kipchak-Kokanese army 225 Kipchaks 225 Kiprian, Metropolitan 48 Kirenga, River 89 Kirensk 89 Kirghiz (Kirgiz) (people) 86, 210, 222, 228, 237, 246, 253 Kirghizia 3 Kirillov, Ivan K. 195,198, 200-2, 204 Kiura 178 Kizil Arvat 226, 240 Kizliar 151,154, 156 Klaipeda district 3 Kliuchevskii, V. O. 8, 118 Kokand 214-18, 225, 236, 242, 244, 251 khanate 205, 210, 225 Kokanese (Kokandians) 203, 213, 225 Kokanese army 214-15 Kokanese fortress of Ak-Meshit’ 213 Kokchetavsk 205 Kokoshkin, G. 11 Kolpakovskii, Colonel (later General) 213, 222, 227, 229, 236 Kolyma, River 90 Komi-Permiaki (people) 25 Komi-Zyrian areas, brought under Russian control 2 Komi-Zyriane (Vychegda), River 25 Konstantin, Prince (of Rostov) 30, 35 Kozlov 130 Krasnoiarsk 89 Krasnovodsk 223, 224 Krasnovodsk-Khiva caravan route 226 Kremlin (of Moscow) 49 Krestovskii, V. V. 229

Index 265

Krivoshein, A. V. 246 Krizanic, Juraj 99 Kryzhanovskii, General N. A. 216-19 Kuban, River 144, 152, 157, 159, 162,163 lower 147 Kubenskoe, Lake 35 Kuchum, Khan 79-80, 82, 83 Kura, River 151, 180 Kur’an 132 Kur’anic law 131; see also Islamic law Kuril Islands 3 Kuropatkin, Colonel (later General) A. N. 226, 237, 254 Kuza, A. V. 27 Kyzyl-Kum desert 225

Lapps 25, 29 Latvia 2, 3, 9 Lazarev, General I. D. 226 Lena, River 89, 90 Leningrad 2 Leontiev, M. I. 115 Lesghis (people) 142, 144, 172, 175,179 chiefs 149 Lesser Kabarda 158 Leszczynski, Stanislaw, king of Poland, see Stanislaw Leszczynski Lifland 9 Lithuania 2, 3, 9, 53, 57, 62, 72, 76, 78,92, 103, 113 Lithuania-Poland 2; see also Poland-Lithuania Lithuanian allies of Khan Ahmed 54 Lithuanian-Polish empire 4 Little Horde 204

Little-Russian College 117, 119; see also Malorussian collegium Livonia 31, 113, 117 Russian conquest of Narva 76 Livonian knights 31 Livonian War 66, 77, 79, 80, 85 Lomakin, Major-General 226 London 230 Lumsden, Sir Peter 230 Lytton, Lord 230 Lyzohub, Colonel lakiv 111

Macedonia 56 MacGahan, L. A. 224 Makary, Metropolitan 58-60, 64 Makhram 225 Makovsky 82 “malorosy” 113 Malorussia 9; see also Ukraine Malorussian collegium 18, 19; see also Little-Russian College Malorussian prikaz 17 Mamay, Khan 48 Manchu China 4, 97 Manchuria 3 Manchus 89 Mangazeia 83-5, 89 region 86 Mangyshlak peninsula 205, 224 Mansi (people) 2, 25 Mansur, Sheykh 161-3 Margelan 225 Mari (people) 191, 202 Mari-Cheremis 2 Matveev, Vasily 32, 34, 37 Mazepa, Ivan, Hetman 18,111-13 Mediterranean nations, Russia’s commercial ties with 128 Menshikov estate in Ukraine 115 Menzelinsk 192, 195 Merv 229-30 oasis 235 Mervian chiefs 230

266 Index Meshchera 10, 11 Court 11-12 Meshcheriaks (Mishari) 201 Mezen’, River 38 Mezen’ region 36, 38 Michael, Tsar 198; see also Mikhail, Tsar Middle Horde 204 Mikhail, Tsar 12, 85-8, 96; see also Michael, Tsar Miliutin, D. A. 212, 217, 222, 223, 226, 228 Mingrelia 144, 170, 173, 182 Minsk 112 Mohammed-Amin, Khan 54 Mohammed Girey, Khan 57 Mohammed Khan 174 Moldavia 106, 107 Moldavians 127, 128 Mongol Empire 1, 4, 6, 47, 48, 72, 73, 139 Mongol Horde 50; see also Golden Horde Mongolia 3, 195 Mongols 30, 31, 46-50, 73, 75, 83 Western 192, 195, 203 Mordva 11 Mordvin areas 1 Mordvins (people) 191, 202 Morocco 250 Moscow 54, 57, 118, 128, 133, 241 as location of administration of conquered territories 9-13 as “Third Rome” 55 construction of Kremlin 49 English merchants in 62 eviction of Poles from 64, 86 military academy, enrollment of Ismael Bey Gasprinskii 134 restrictive nature of life in 99 visit of Kabardans 148 Moskvitin, Ivan 89 Mozdok 154, 159, 164

Muhammed Rahim, khan of Khiva 224 Münnich, Count 152 Muscovite Church 64, 94 Muscovite Cossacks, in Siberia 91, 92 Muscovy administration of Siberia 15-17, ’ 88, 91-6 annexation of Perm’ 36-7 colonization of Siberia 80-5, 91-100 conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan 25, 45-68 encroachment on Ukraine 105 financial importance of Siberia to 84-6, 98 in the Far North 35-41 initial penetration of Siberia 39-41, 70-80 rate of growth of 1, 4 “reunion” with Ukraine 17 trade along the Volga 61-2 trade in Siberia 84 war with the Kalmyks 86-7 Muslim courts in Central Asia 238 Muslim culture 130-2,184, 239 Muslim ecclesiastical institutions 131-2, 243 Muslim Spiritual Assembly 132 Muzaffar-ad-Din 219-20 Nakhjavan 145, 160 Namangan region 225, 242 Napoleonic wars 170, 179, 181 Narva 82 Narym 82, 97 Naryn, River 225 Nasonov, A. N. 27 Nasr Eddin, Khan 225 Nenets (people) 2; see also Samoyeds “Nepravda” (period of boyar rule) 59

Index 267

Nerchinsk 98 Nevsky, Alexander, see Alexander Nevsky Nizhyn nobles 118 Nogay Horde 56, 57 Nogays (Nogay Tatars) 65, 79, 162,192 North America, European settlement of 248 North Dvina, River 23, 25, 27, 32, 34, 37, 38 North Dvina Land 37 Northern War 111, 148,193, 197 Nosovoy Gorodok 82 Nova Serbia 116 Novgorod 1,15, 23, 26-41, 53, 72-6 archbishop of 36 Novgorod-Siversk 119 Novo-Nikolaevsk (Novosibirsk) 242 Nyzhnekolymsk 90

Orenburg Dragoon Regiment 195 Orenburg Expedition 195-6, 198 Orenburg Line 196, 198, 200, 201, 203, 205 Orenburg-Tashkent Railroad 241 Orenburgsk 205 Orsk 205 Orthodox Church, see Christianity Osmanli (Ottoman) Turks 52, 55; see also Ottoman Empire Ossetes 143,154,158, 170,175 Ossetia 144,174, 175 Ostiaks 25, 37, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 87; see also Khanti-Ostyaki; lugra Ottoman Empire 4, 39, 45, 52, 57, 67,106,110, 111, 117, 124-7, 139, 141-58, 160-7, 177-80,184,185, 219 Ottoman Turks, conquests by 55, 63

Ob’, River 37, 39, 41, 53, 73, 74, 81-3, 86, 90 basin 2, 25, 77 O’Brien, C. Bickford 105 Obskaia Guba 82 Obskyi Gorodok 81 Odoevskii, head of Kazan prikaz 13 Oka, River 73 Okhotsk 91, 96 Sea of 89 Oleniok, River 90 Olensk 90 Omsk 204, 213, 236, 242, 245-6 Onega, Lake 27, 38 Onega, River 25, 27 Oprichnina (reign of terror) 77, 80 Or, River 204 Orenburg 195, 201, 204, 208, 213, 216-18, 220, 224 Gubernia 202, 205

Pacific Ocean 75, 91, 96,106 Pahlen, Count K. K. 246 Pallas, Petr Semenovich 128,129 Pamir region 3, 208, 235 Parthian-Sassanid Empire 4 Paul 119,166-8,172 Pavlodar 204 Pechenegs (people) 46 Pechera (people) 25, 28 Pechera (territory) 36 Pechora, River 25, 28, 36, 74, 82 Pendjeh oasis 230 Pereiaslav Treaty 106-11, 120 Perevolochna fortress 115 Perm’ (people) 28, 29, 36, 37 Perm’ (region) 36, 39, 40 Perm’ Velikaia 39 Permian Finnic areas 2 Permsky, Stefan (Bishop Stefan) 36-7, 39 Perovskii, General V. A. 205, 213

268 Index Persia 53, 62, 208, 210, 226, 230, 235, 250, 253; see also Iran; Safavi Empire Persian Empire 67; see also Safavi Empire Parthian-Sassanid 4 Sassanid 6 Persians in Bashkiria 202 in Turkestan 210 Peter I (“the Great”) 8, 13, 15, 17, 18,20,105,110-15,117,124, 147-53,193-5,197,199,203 Peter II18, 114 Peter III 153 Petropavlovsk 246 Philip II (of Spain) 67 Pinega, River 27, 29 Pishpek 213 Podshiversk 90 Pokrovskii, Michael 108 Pokrovskii Sobor (cathedral) 64 Poland 2, 3,17,19, 52, 63, 78, 85-6, 92, 97,105-12,116, 124,152,196 Poland-Lithuania 14, 25, 45, 56; see also Lithuania-Poland Poles, in the Crimea 127,128 Poletyka, Hryhorii 118 Polons’ka-Vasylenko, N. 109 Polotsk 196-7 Polovtsy (people) 46 Polovtsy Horde 50 Poltava 108; see also Battle of Poltava Poltoratskii, Colonel V. A. 212 Polubotok, Pavlo 114 Posolskyi (Posol’skii) prikaz 8-10, 12, 17, 87 Potemkin, Paul 159-61 Potemkin, Prince Gregory 116, 156,158-60 Potemkin estate in Ukraine 115 pre-Tatar culture 129

Protosiev, governor of Kiev 113 Prozorovskii, Prince 115 Pugachev rebellion 196, 197 Pushkin, Alexander 130 Pustozersk fortress 40 Qajars (people) 164, 166 monarchy 177 Qarabagh 145, 160, 176, 177, 183 khan of 160 Qobbeh 166, 176-8 Quetta 230 Qumuqs (people) 142, 144, 162; see also Ghazi Qumuqs

Raimsk 205 Reitem, M. Kh. 212 Revolution, October 11 Riurik, Prince 26 Rogovich, Gyuryata 28 Roman Catholic powers, Turkish victories against 55 Roman Catholics, settled in the Caucasus 185 Roman Empire 4, 6 Romania 3 Romanovs 85 Bolshevik successors to 255 era 86 government 88 Romanovskii, General D. I. 217-18 Rome, Papacy in 55 Rostov 35-7 Rostov-Susdal’ 23, 25, 29-30 Rosenbakh, General M. O. von229 Rozumovskyi, Cyril, Hetman 116, 118 Rumiantsev, Petr A. 118 Rumiantsev estate 115 Rurik, House of 59 Russe Commonwealth, Of the 123

Index 269

Russian Empire, rate of expansion 1-4, 6, 103,189-91 Russian Gentleman, A 201 Russian Orthodox Church 48,134, 184,198-9, 249 Russian Siberia, independence of spirit in 96-7 Russians 23 (and throughout) bourgeoisie 211 colonists 32-4, 63, 70, 86, 91-6, 105,113,191,199-201, 244-8, 252, 253 craftsmen 34, 70, 98 hunters 32, 88 Old Believers 99,116 peasants 32-4, 63, 70, 94, 99, 105, 191,204,224-6, 237 seized as slaves 192 traders and merchants 82, 84, 95,115, 244 Russo-Crimean treaty 155 Russo-Georgian hybrid administration 169 Russo-Iranian war 178,179 Russo-Khivan treaty 224 Russo-Kokanese treaty 225 Russo-Polish Truce (of Andrusovo) 108 Russo-Polish war 110 Russo-Turkish conflicts 115,126, 158,162-3 Rusyns-Ukrainians 105 Ryazan 53

Saamy (people) 25 Safavi Empire 139,141,145, 147-9,164, 168; see also Iran; Persia Sagib Girey, Khan 57 Sahaidachnyi, Petro, Hetman 110 St. Elizabeth Fortress 116 St. Petersburg 115,128,168 as seat of government 9,10, 16,

20,195, 200, 208, 211, 218, 221-3, 227, 230, 231 building of canals 113 execution of Pavlo Polubotok 114 St. Sophia, Novgorodian bishopric 27 Sakhalin 3 Sakmara, River 196 Sakmarsk Cossacks 198 Samara 192,194, 196 Samara Cossacks 198 Samarkand 210, 220, 240, 242, 244 Samarkand oblast 236, 246, 253 Samoilovych, Ivan, Hetman 111 Samoyed territory, conquest of 2, 83-4 Samoyeds (Samoeds) 25, 28, 74, 76,86 San, River 109 San Marino 4 Sanin, Iosif 55, 58 Sarai (Saray) 31, 35, 39, 47, 51, 52 Sarakhs 230 Saratov 192, 203 Sassanid (Persian) Empire 4, 6 Saxony 113 Scandinavia 76 Schuyler, Eugene 227 Selim II, Sultan 67 Seljuks 55 Semenovich, Grigorii 32 Semipalatinsk 204, 236, 242, 244, 247 Semirechie (Semirechye) 218, 228, 236, 242, 244, 247, 249, 252, 253 Serbs, settlement by 116, 127 Serebrennikov, Colonel A. G. 214 Sergei, Abbot, of Radonezh 48, 50, 59 Sergievsk 194 Sevastopol 129 Shakhovskii, Prince 114

270 Index Shakki 145, 176, 177 khan of 177, 183 Shamil revolt 18 Shchelkalov, Andrei 15 Sheshminsk 192 Shiite faction of Islam 67, 177 Shiites 143, 251 Shirvan 145, 149,166, 176 Shuiskii, head of Kazan prikaz 13 Shuisky, Prince Piotr Ivanovich 64 Shuisky, Vasily (Tsar), see Vasily Shuisky, Tsar Siberia 2, 8-19, 23, 40, 45, 53, 65, 68,70, 72-100, 111, 163, 195, 236, 246, 249, 254 razriady 82, 89, 90, 92, 99 Siberian Cossacks 198 Siberian prikaz 15-17, 88, 92, 93 Siberian stol 88 Sibir 76 khan of 76-9 khanate of 2, 25, 76 Silesia 115 silk route 31 Simbirsk 14, 194 Simeon, adopted name of Khan Yadigar 60 Simferopol 128,130 Gymnasium 134 Sinkiang 3; see also Xinjiang Sitskii, head of Kazan prikaz 13 Skobelev, Colonel (later General) M. D. 224-6 Skoropadskyi, Ivan 113, 114 Skuratova, Maria 81 Slavianoserbia 116 Slovo o pogibeli zemli russkoi 50 Smuta, the (the Time of Troubles) 84, 85,87, 110 Solikamsk 78 Solomon I, king of Imeretia 155, 159 Solomon II, king of Imeretia 171, 173,178, 179

Solovetskii monastery 34 Song of Igor, The 50 Sosva, River 78 South Siberian Railroad 247 Soviet Union 1, 3 Spanish America 74 Spanish Empire 4 Spasokamennyi Monastery 35 Srednekolymsk 90 Stanislaw Leszczynski, king of Poland 112 Staraia Ladoga 26, 27 Stefan, Bishop, see Permsky, Stefan Stenka Razin rebellion 197 Steppe oblasti 242 Stolypin, P. A. 246, 252 Stremoukhov, P. N. 212 Stroganovs 13, 67-8, 77-80, 85-6, 91 Sugmutvash 82 Sukhona, River 23, 27, 30, 35 Sukhumi 180 Sumy 109 Sung-Tang China 6 Sunni faction of Islam 67,143 Sunni Muslims 143,144,162,177, 251 Supreme Frontier Court 164 Surgut 82 Surkhai Khan 176,178 Suvorov, Alexander 165 Suzak 213 Suzdalia 23, 29-30 Sviatoslav, prince of Novgorod 27 “Svobis’ka (Slobodskaia) Ukraine” 109 Svyatoslav, ruler of Kievan Rus’ 46 Sweden 2, 18, 29, 106,107,111-13 Syr-Darya, River 205, 206, 213, 224 valley 208, 210 Syr-Darya Line 213, 214

Index 271

Syr-Darya province 218, 221, 236, 242, 246, 247 Syzran 194 Tabasaran, khan of 176 Tadjiks (Tadzhiks) 210, 237 Talesh 145 Taman peninsula 142 Tamerlane, see Timur Tamyr peninsula 90 Tanu Tuva 3 Tara 81 Tarqu 145, 146, 149, 176, 177 Tashkent 210, 213, 215-19, 221, 224, 227, 229, 236, 237, 240-2, 244, 247, 249 oasis 214, 216 Public Library 229 Tataro-Mongol power, revival under Timur 51 Tatars 2,16, 50, 67, 72, 73, 86, 117, 119, 124-9, 133-6,200, 202, 206 architecture 130 from Astrakhan 192; see also Astrakhan culture 123-4, 129-32 in Kazan, see Kazan; Kazanskii prikaz princes, escaping from Kazan 61 representatives at Supreme Frontier Court 164 supremacy, collapse of 51-2, 103 from the Volga 239 warriors, in Muscovite army 66 Tavricheskaia Gubemiia 130, 133 Taz, River 83 Tbilisi 159,165, 183 Tcherkasski, Prince Vasilii KaziKordiukovich 11 Tedzhen oasis 229 TerciimanIPerevodchik 135 Terek, River 142, 143, 146, 149, 151,153, 154

Terek chiefs, taken as hostages 148 Teutonic knights 31 “Third Rome,” Moscow as 55 Thornton, British Ambassador 229 Tiflis 236 Timofeyevich, Yermak, Ataman 79 Timur 51 Timurid empire 139 Tiumen 78, 80, 81, 95 Tobol, River 81 Tobolsk 81-6, 89, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98,99 Todtleben, General von 155 Tokhtamysh, khan of the Golden Horde 51-2 Tomsk 83, 89, 90, 97 Torgai, River 205 Transcarpathia 3 Transcaspia 226, 229, 244, 253 Transcaspian oblast 236-8 Transcaspian Railroad 241 Transcaucasia 2,145, 169,170,177 trans-Chirchik region 218 Trans-Kama Defensive Line 191-7 trans-Kama settlements 85 Transsiberian Railroad 242, 245, 247 trans-Uralia 78 Trans-Volga frontier region 199 Treaty (see also Armistice of Vilna; Pereiaslav Treaty; Truce of Andrusovo) of Belgrade 152 of Bucharest 180 of Ganjeh 151 of Georgievsk 159, 160, 182-3 of Golestan 180 of lazhelbitsy 38 of Jassy 126, 163 of Küçük Kainarca 155, 161 of Nerchinsk 98 of Peking 212

272 Index of Rasht 151 ofVilnal09 Trubetskoi, head of Kazan prikaz 13 Truce of Andrusovo 108 Tsaritsyn 192, 203 Tsitsianov, General Paul 19, 170-6,183 death of 176, 177 era of 176,179 Tungus lands 2 Tunguska, River 89 Turco-Mongol empires 139 Turco-Mongol nomads 189 Turgai 237, 244, 245, 247, 253 Turgai, River 204 Turkestan 3, 208, 210-31, 236-44, 246, 249-55 Turkestan-Siberian Railroad 242, 247 Turkey 3,110; see also Ottoman Empire sultan 124 Turkic languages spoken in the Caucasus 142 Turkish monuments in the Crimea 130 Turkish Straits 211, 225 Turkish-Tatar populations, rule by Moscow 2 Turkmen (Turkomans) 2, 210, 223, 226, 235, 237, 252 ofTeke240 of Transcaspia 253 Turkmenia 3, 225, 226, 229 Turks 55,67, 111,250 Turukhansk 88-90 Turukhanskoe Zimov’e 84 Tver 48,49, 53,72 Udmurts (people) 202 Udmurt-Votyak areas, brought under Russian control 2

Ufa 192, 194, 195,198, 200, 201, 203, 249 Ufa Cossacks 198 Ufa Dragoon Regiment 195 Uglich 35 Ugrian tribes 25 Ugric populations, brought under Moscow rule 2 Uigur country 82 Ukraine 2, 3, 9,17-19, 93, 97, 100,103, 105-20, 200; see also Cossack Ukraine Ukrainian Orthodox Church 109 Ukrainian-Polish war 107 Uliansk 90 United States 3, 4, 243 Ural, River 189, 195-8, 204 Ural Mountains 12,15, 25, 27, 28, 34, 36, 39, 70, 73, Th 78, 91, 96, 98,189,197, 202, 245 Cossacks of 197, 204, 220 Ural’sk 205, 237, 242, 244, 245, 247 Ura-Tiube 218 Ussuri district 2 Ustiug 30, 35-7 Ust-Kamenogorsk 204 Ust-Urt Plateau 224 Ust’vym 40 Uzbekistan 3 Uzbeks 210, 217, 219, 221, 222, 237, 252 Uzun Agach 213

Vakhromiev, Ivan 15 Vakhtang, king of Kartli 149-51, 170 Vannovskii, Russian war minister 229 Varangians 26, 45 Varsonofi, monk 64 Vasil’kovich, Prince Gleb 35

Index 273

Vasily I 37 Vasily II 53, 72 Vasily III 11, 56, 74 death of 74 Vasily Shuisky, Tsar 85 Velikaia Zamiatna (the Great Confusion) 48 Velminov, Brigadier 114 Vepse areas 1 Verevkin, Colonel (later General) N. A. 214, 224 Verkhnekolymsk 90 Verkhneudinsk 89 Verkhniaia Tunguska 89 Verkhoturie 95 Verkhoyansk 90 Vernyi 205, 221, 242, 247 Viatka 53, 60, 64 Viazemskii, Prince A. A. 115,117 Viliuv, River 90 Vinius, A. A. 15 Vishera, River 78 Vladimir, Saint 50 Vladimir 30, 48 Vlakhs (people) 127 Voguls (Voguly) 25, 37, 39, 78-80 Voikov, Ivan 83 Volga, River 2, 11, 13, 45, 46, 51, 53, 56, 61-3, 65-8, 74-6, 105,106, 116, 127, 139, 189, 192,194, 196,197 basin 12, 46 lower 31, 47, 52, 62, 66, 67, 74, 157, 197 middle, people of 45, 66, 73, 191,192 upper 46, 53, 72, 73 valley 45, 47, 52, 56, 192 Volga Finnic areas 1 Volga khanates 57 Volga republics, present-day 12 Volhynia 116 Vologda 27

Volokolamsk, monastic community 55 Voronezh 134 Vote areas 1 Votiaks 63, 200 Vozha, River 48 Vychegda, River 23, 25, 30 Vychegda Perm’ (people) 39 Vychegda region 36 Vychegda-Vym 36 West Siberian Line 196 Western Siberia 2, 236 White Russia, see Belorussia White Sea 27, 29, 32, 33, 82 coast 23, 29, 38, 62 Wielun 112 World War I 241, 244, 247, 252, 255 World War II 203

Xinjiang 253; see also Sinkiang Yadigar, khan of Kazan 60 Yadigar, khan of Sibir 65, 76, 79 Yaik, River 63 Yakut lands 2 Yakutsk 89, 90 Yamal peninsula 82 Yana, River 90 Yenisei (Yenissei), River 2, 74, 82, 84, 89 basin of 84 lower 82 upper 86, 89, 98 Yeniseisk 89, 90, 95 Yerevan, khanate of 145, 160, 165, 174,175, 184

Zadonshchina 50 Zaporizhia (Zaporozhe) 109, 111, 115, 119 Zaporizhian Cossacks 106, 116

274 Index Zaporizhian Host 115, 119 Zemsky Sobor 86 Zeravshan district 223 Zeravshan heights 220 Zeravshan okrug 236

Zeravshan valley 220 Zhigansk 90 Zubov, P. A. 128 Zubov, Valerian 165-6 Zulñkar Pass 230-1