Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era: The Limits of Liberal Universalism 3031200888, 9783031200885

Citation preview

NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES SERIES EDITOR: GEORGE CHRISTOU

Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era The Limits of Liberal Universalism

Suzanne Loftus

New Security Challenges Series Editor

George Christou University of Warwick Coventry, UK

The last decade has demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly in their causes and manifestations and that they invite interest and demand responses from the social sciences, civil society, and a very broad policy community. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but with the end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepiece of international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore, a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security to a new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human security, economic security, and environmental security. The topical New Security Challenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda. For an informal discussion for a book in the series, please contact the series editor George Christou ([email protected]), or Palgrave editor Alina Yurova ([email protected]). This book series is indexed by Scopus.

Suzanne Loftus

Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era The Limits of Liberal Universalism

Suzanne Loftus Russia/Eurasia Program, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft Washington DC, USA

ISSN 2731-0329     ISSN 2731-0337 (electronic) New Security Challenges ISBN 978-3-031-20088-5    ISBN 978-3-031-20089-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

I dedicate this book to my grandparents: Alice and Verne, Julia and John. You are role models for all of us.

Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 Management of the Liberal International Order 27 3 Russian-Western Relations: A Trust Never Built 59 4 The Rise of China and the China-Russia Relationship 93 5 The  Limits of Liberal Universalism and the Crisis in Ukraine129 6 Pluralism and Pragmatism in International Relations169 Index181

vii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Introduction When the Cold War ended, liberal democracy and liberal market economies triumphed as the superior form of political and economic governance over authoritarian communism. It was widely believed that nations around the world would converge into liberal democracies as a final form of governance and that great power rivalry would be a phenomenon of the past. Francis Fukuyama famously described the era as the “end of history,”1 an epoch where nations would move beyond great power conflict and focus on the proliferation of freedom and prosperity for all. The “democratic peace theory” influenced American and European foreign policy, asserting that democracies seldom go to war with each other.2 In order to achieve world peace, it was imperative to lead the world to liberal democracy through engagement, trade, liberal policy prescriptions, and military interventions. The idea that democracy would occur naturally as countries liberalized their economies was also part of the Liberal tradition motivating policy at the time. Modernization theorists argued economic development would bring about social and political change as the middle class  Fukuyama (2012).  Doyle (1983a, pp.  202–235, 1983b, pp.  323–353, 1986, pp.  1151–1169, 1997) and Kant (1991, pp. 93–115). 1 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_1

1

2 

S. LOFTUS

would prosper and demand more freedoms.3 These policies were thought to be able to put an end to concerns from the Realist school of International Relations such as “balance of power”4 politics, a natural inclination for states to want to secure their survival by preventing any one state from gaining enough military power to dominate all others through uniting in a defense coalition. Joining the “liberal international order” was meant to be in every nation’s best interest and was believed to be able to transcend the forces of Realism and nationalism. The “liberal international order” can be described as the set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberal internationalism.5 After experiencing such euphoria in the 1990s on the “triumph of liberalism,” today, 30 or so years later, the world has been experiencing a downward trend in democracy observed over the past 16 years.6 In addition, the 2022 National Defense Strategy states that China is the United States’ “most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department” while Russia “poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.”7 The world has changed dramatically since “the end of history” epoch. Instead of the euphoric optimism of the 1990s, great power competition, nationalism, and illiberalism have taken on a more prominent role in international affairs. In the post-Cold War era, China experienced important economic growth, finances ambitious infrastructure development projects around the world, and has more latent power than the United States based on the speed at which its economy is growing and its projected population growth.8 Unlike what was originally hoped by engaging China and integrating it into the liberal international order, China did not politically liberalize. In fact, China has become increasingly more authoritarian illustrated by decisions such as the Communist Party ending presidential term  Lipset (1959, pp. 69–105).  Tarik Oguzlu, “Balance of Power Politics Are Now More Visible Than Ever,” Daily Sabah, July 23, 2020. https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/balance-of-powerpolitics-are-now-more-visible-than-ever 5  Lake et al. (2021, pp. 225–257). 6  Freedom in the World (2022). 7  U.S. Department of Defense (2022). 8  Jessica C. Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics,” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/2019-06-11/world-safe-autocracy 3 4

1 INTRODUCTION 

3

limits in 2018, allowing Xi Jinping to hold office indefinitely.9 Nor has it been the best “rule follower” when it comes to its trading practices. China has engaged in preferential treatment for state enterprises, intellectual property rights, and cyber theft and currency manipulation. It has also broken international law by seizing islands in the South China Sea. As Russia overcame its troubles in the 1990s and experienced important economic growth, it also rejected liberal democracy and forged a more conservative identity for itself in opposition to the West. Relations between Russia and the West gradually deteriorated throughout the post-­ Cold War era. Today, Russia has invaded the sovereign country of Ukraine, blatantly breaking international law. Moreover, as two important powers experiencing antagonistic relations with the West, China and Russia have consolidated a strategic partnership for the future as they aim to promote a “multipolar world order” and put an end to “U.S. hegemony.”10 Some argue that these global trends can be explained by the waning power of the United States. Structural realists argue that a unipolar world order is the least durable of all power configurations due to the natural tendencies of the hegemon to spread itself too thin11 and engage in wasteful policies in the interest of re-making the world in its own image.12 The U.S. practice of “liberal hegemony” as a foreign policy has met its limits. Liberal hegemony can be defined as a strategy that seeks to use American power to spread liberal values to the world. It is about spreading the classic liberal ideals of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and markets.13 In theory, these values are admirable and worth defending. However, spreading them onto the world has unfortunately resulted in negative consequences and has proven unsuccessful in many parts of the world. Not only were military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan unsuccessful and wasteful, but even more tactical interventions such as in Libya or softer democracy promotion efforts such as those applied throughout the Arab Spring or in the various “color revolutions” have had destabilizing consequences.14 As a result of these policies, the United States has faced sharp 9  Max Fischer, “Xi Sets China on a Collision Course with History,” NY Times, February 28, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-china.html 10  Kendall-Taylor and Shullman (2022). 11  Waltz (2000, pp. 5–41). 12  Mearsheimer (2018). 13  Walt (2018). 14  Ron Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings,” NY Times, April 15, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html

4 

S. LOFTUS

criticism among those who find its interventionist behavior to be “hegemonic” or “imperial.” The United States’ reputation as global leader has suffered, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, now regions fraught with instability and terrorism. The United States’ reputation as global financial leader also took a big hit when the world fell into a financial crisis in 2008 that had lasting consequences until this day. The neoliberal economic policies that spread across the globe in the post-Cold War era through the processes of globalization have had mixed results. While they helped alleviate poverty in many parts of the world, and helped Chinese and Indian middle classes prosper, they have led to rising levels of inequality and economic stagnation in the West, which has fueled populist sentiment and political polarization.15 Populist sentiment is characterized by the feeling that the processes of globalization, liberal migration policies, and giving up elements of national sovereignty to supranational institutions have been detrimental to the livelihood of American and European middle classes and to national identity. As democratic trends continue to recede, nationalism and particularly “civilizational” nationalism have taken on a more prominent role in international politics. Internationally, countries in the world from the Philippines to India, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, and China, have adopted a more nationalist and “civilizational” rhetoric in foreign and domestic politics.16 As countries modernized and experienced economic growth in the post-Cold War era, rather than adopting more typically Western characteristics, they have emphasized their own civilizational roots and identities— which in turn shape their national interests. In typically non-Western democracies, these national interests often directly contradict those of Western liberal democracies. Due to the rise in state capacity of non-­ Western states, these contradicting national interests are likely to cause friction—and in the worst-case scenario—war. Forces of nationalism and realism were not carefully anticipated in the quest to universalize a single model of political and economic governance onto the world. This book discusses how the concept of “liberal universalism,” which is the idea that liberal values are universal and should be spread across the world, faced 15  Pallavi Gogoi, “Analysis: How the Rise of The Far Right Threatens Democracy Worldwide,” NPR, January 21, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/21/687128474/ analysis-how-the-rise-of-the-far-right-threatens-democracy-worldwide 16  Acharya (2017, pp. 271–285).

1 INTRODUCTION 

5

pushback from different national and civilizational identities, norms, and interests. The current war in Ukraine is explained through these lenses as a case study. Political pluralism and international pragmatism are argued in this book to be the best way forward in a world with rising non-Western powers with differing sets of interests and identities. Instead of falling into a purely structural realist or liberal argument, this book bridges the gap between the two theoretical traditions and adds the important element of national identity to the discussion through a constructivist framework. A more pragmatic and politically plural international system entails heightened respect for different civilizational identities, forms of governance, and competing interests. It prioritizes diplomacy for navigating differing interests and adopting pragmatic solutions, even if suboptimal. It entails relinquishing the idea that the normative framework of liberal democracy is universalizable. Within liberal democracies themselves, this book discusses the need to revitalize democratic health, minimize polarization, and address grievances. Democratic recession is argued in this book to be a cause of poor policy choices rather than a consequence of a waning liberal hegemon. Similarly, internationally, expecting democracy to proliferate is deemed as too idealistic, even with the presence of a sole liberal hegemon. Liberal democracy is homegrown and largely depends on institutional legacy and civilizational heritage.

A Review of the Literature The Post-Cold War Context After the end of the Cold War, the triumph of liberal democracy over communist authoritarianism encouraged Western powers to envision a future world where all nations would converge into singular models of liberal democracies, reaching a final form of governance in the international community that would ultimately lead to permanent peace.17 Democratization and liberalization processes took place across the formerly Communist world as part of the “third wave of democratization,” a global trend which started in the late 1970s.18 At this time, Russia wanted to “transcend” Cold War politics and build a new and inclusive security architecture on  Fukuyama (2012).  Huntington (1991, p. 13).

17 18

6 

S. LOFTUS

the shared European continent. In contrast, the United States and its European allies were hoping Russia would democratize and liberalize and join the West as a junior partner.19 U.S. engagement strategy in relation to China assumed that increased trade and economic linkages between them would turn China into a “responsible stakeholder” in a U.S.-led global order.20 This belief persisted from George Bush Senior to Barrack Obama. The belief was based on the assumption that economic modernization in China would be followed by political liberalization. Throughout the many years of pursuing a policy of engagement, China was treated as a “preferred nation” and joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. After many years of pursuing a policy of engagement with China, the country opened its economy to the rest of the world without politically liberalizing. China now has the second largest nominal GDP in the world, and the largest when measured in purchasing power parity.21 WTO reviews continue to point out the lack of necessary reforms in China and its continued unfair trading practices.22 In addition, its political regime has become increasingly more nationalist and authoritarian.23 China has also defied the rules of international law by seizing key islands and claiming large swaths of the South China Sea, inconsistent with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.24 Despite this behavior, U.S. policy toward China never evolved until Donald Trump took office in 2017 and started the policy of containment, which Joe Biden continues to apply today. China is investing in research and development, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and quantum mechanics, and is feared to eventually overtake the West in these sectors. Today China is the principal challenger to the United States and its leadership of the international order as it is a strong power with a different political system able to project its influence internationally. Russian-Western relations deteriorated significantly after an initially hopeful period in the 1990s. This had much to do with their differences in how the post-Cold War European security architecture would be managed as well as how international security decisions would be made. Their  Sakwa (2017a).  U.S. Department of State Archive (2009). 21  Investopedia. “The Top 25 Economies in the World.” Accessed August 4, 2022. 22  Katie Silver, “China’s Trade Practices Come under Fire,” BBC, October 21, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-58991339 23  Tsang and Cheung (2022, pp. 225–243) and Shirk (2018), pp. 22–36. 24  U.S. Department of State (2022). 19 20

1 INTRODUCTION 

7

differences stemmed from different worldviews and beliefs about domestic governance. Difficulties also arose based on Russia’s vision of itself as a great power, unwilling to bend to the dominance of others. As Russia’s domestic political system became increasingly authoritarian, the West had trouble accepting the Kremlin’s policy stances in the post-Soviet space and beyond. As NATO and the EU pursued enlargement processes to former communist states after the Cold War, Russia perceived these processes as a “zero-sum” game, which exacerbated its security dilemma and worsened trust. The “security dilemma” in International Relations posits that even in the peaceful pursuit of security, states unintentionally create insecurity and threats to others.25 A “zero sum” game can be defined as a gain for one side equating a corresponding loss for the other side. Decision-making in foreign policy is based on perceptions of the international security environment as well as the intentions of the other. This often leads to escalation which may then lead to war.26 As Walt argues, aggressive behavior does not necessarily arise from evil or aggressive motivations. Yet when leaders believe their own motives are obviously defensive in nature, they will tend to see an opponent’s hostile reaction as evidence of an “evil foreign leader’s malicious and unappeasable ambitions.”27 Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and China have developed a closer relationship based on the two nations’ views of international relations. Russia and China envision a more “multipolar” world order where the United States would no longer hold the position of a sole hegemon.28 Their cooperation can be described as classic “bandwagoning”29 to balance the power of the unipole, only short of a formal defense alliance. A multipolar system would be more favorable to their interests and less dominated by a single normative ideology that is far from being their own. Both view the United States as a declining power and have recently come together in a joint statement on February 4, 2022, solidifying their common vision for the future. The statement asserts that a trend has emerged toward the redistribution of power in the world and that this new era will ensure peace, stability, sustainable development, and the end of American dominance and would stop the West from interfering in the  Jervis (1978, pp. 167–214).  Jervis (1976). 27  Stephen Walt, “Does Anyone Still Understand the ‘Security Dilemma’?” Foreign Policy, July 26, 2022. 28  Kendall-Taylor and Shullman, “Best and Bosom Friends.” 29  Walt (1985, pp. 3–43). 25 26

8 

S. LOFTUS

domestic affairs of other states.30 Together and apart, their influence is significant, particularly in the Global South which depends on Russia for energy, grain, and weapons and on China for infrastructure projects and aid. Their approach to doing business is attractive for many countries that do not wish to reform their domestic policies in exchange for aid, investment, or engaging in trade. In addition to the renewed focus on strategic competition between the great powers of the day, Freedom House indicators suggest that democracy in the world has been in steady decline since the year 2006.31 Populism in the West is on the rise partially due to the unintended consequences of neoliberal economic policy prescriptions advocated by the IMF in the post-Cold War years.32 Although these were quite helpful in taking much of the world out of poverty, the adverse effects of such policies are causing extreme challenges today such as populism and resentment felt in countries that were advised to take on these policies and experienced detrimental results.33 Eventually, liberal economic policies created vast inequality34 throughout the world which thus undermined their viability. The financial crisis of 2008 was the culminating moment which highlighted the dangers of excessive, un-monitored capitalism.35 The results are seen across the European Union where some states particularly in Southern Europe were unable to fully recover from the crisis.36 Other states in Central Europe developed increasingly “illiberal” policies,37 and the United Kingdom altogether left the EU. Meanwhile, across the pond, Donald J. Trump was elected president in 2016, a figure who ran on an anti-liberal platform and who still maintains a solid base of support in the United States. In other parts of the world, nationalism is on the rise as is the occurrence of “civilizational” rhetoric in foreign and domestic politics across nations such as India, China, Russia, Brazil, the Philippines, and countries 30  Alexander Smith, “Russia and China Forge Closer Ties as U.S. is Preoccupied with Struggles at Home,” NBC News, February 14, 2022. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/ world/russia-china-forge-closer-ties-us-preoccupied-struggles-home-rcna15722. 31  Freedom House, “Reversing the Decline.” 32  Putzel (2020, pp. 418–441). 33  Krastev and Holmes (2020). 34  Koechlin (2013, pp. 5–30). 35  Noriel Roubini, “Laissez-Faire Capitalism Has Failed,” Forbes, February 19, 2009. 36   Zamora-Kapoor and Coller (2014, pp.  1511–1516) and Center for American Progress (2020). 37  Rupnik (2018, pp. 24–38).

1 INTRODUCTION 

9

in Central and Eastern Europe. It appears as though the “universalization” of Western liberal democracy and neoliberal economic policies have unintentionally created an international and domestic backlash. With the rising material capabilities of other states in the system, actors will be better able to assert their interests in the international arena. Since rising actors come from a non-Western non-liberal democratic background, their different identities often translate to different interests. An alternative approach to international relations is particularly advisable today as nations will increasingly clash along cultural, political, and material interests as is the case in Ukraine and as could be the case in Taiwan or anywhere else. Domestically, democracy can be saved through the implementation of better policies and is not threatened by a supposed global struggle between democracy and autocracy. Universalism and National Identity Both material and non-material factors motivate relations between states. National identity is a powerful factor when assessing national interests. Identity formation is a process that takes place through historical experiences and relationships with others. Alexander Wendt describes that it is through the interaction that nations have with one another that nations develop their own affiliations, attachments, and identities.38 Social Identity Theory posits that every nation desires positive “national self-esteem” and tries to achieve this using different “identity management strategies.”39 These theories shed light on the behavior of states today in relation to one another. Nations around the world regardless of their geographic position historically always invoke national cultural distinctiveness as a way to build national unity. The United States began by associating its heritage with Greco-Roman civilization as can be seen in the architectural style of the buildings in the nation’s capital. Later on, America would start to view itself as distinct from Europe by forming the well-known idea of “American exceptionalism.”40  Wendt (1999).  Evans (2015). 40  Frederick J Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893),” American Historical Association, Accessed August 4, 2022. www.historians.org/about-aha-­ and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historicalarchives/the-significance-of-thefrontier-in-american-history. 38 39

10 

S. LOFTUS

As for post-colonial states, civilizational identity has always been part of their foreign policy as a reaction to centuries of colonial rule and Western domination.41 China and India are examples of such states, two of the oldest and most advanced civilizations on earth. Modern-day Chinese nationalism began with China’s entry into the globalization process as it faced a strong “other” in Western developed countries. Its relative weakness in economic and military terms sparked a need for national cultural identity.42 Russia is a more recent civilization and political entity shaped by East Slavic identity and the Russian Orthodox Church claiming an identity as “The Third Rome.” Very much like that of Turkey, Russia’s modern civilizational turn and the rise of Putinism came about after a period of potential greater integration with the West. Current national discourse in Russia stresses its unique “Eurasian” civilization separate from European civilization, rejecting Western values and adopting a new form of conservatism. Globally, “civilizational nationalism” is creating an important impact as countries such as India, Turkey, Brazil, China, Russia, and countries in Europe have re-prioritized the element of national identity in political discourse. Coker has argued that these newly established “civilizational states” are using civilizational narratives to their advantage and have often resorted to distorting history in doing so. He views this trend as a particularly exclusionary mode of international relations that underlines “otherness” and leaves no room for a liberal international order.43 Krastev and Holmes argue that the origins of Eastern and Central Europe’s illiberal turn in countries such as Poland and Hungary are rooted in the humiliation that accompanied the acknowledgment of a foreign culture as superior to one’s own and have fueled “politics of resentment.” 44 Frustrations stem from imitating a “superior western model” without fully being able to achieve it nor being extended the same level of respect in a post-Cold War era defined as possessing a lack of ideological alternatives. They argue that Russia, on its side, adopted more of a “mirroring” strategy of the West. While Russia initially tried to mimic the West, Putin’s second term put an end to that imitation model when Russia started to use tactics to show America that it was its equal. The point of Russia’s interference in the 2016 American elections was simply to show that Russia could do to  Acharya (2017, pp. 271–285).  Wu (2012). 43  Coker (2019). 44  Krastev and Holmes (2018, pp. 117–128). 41 42

1 INTRODUCTION 

11

America what America had been doing to Russia. China’s imitation game is described as “imitation by appropriation” whereby it took aspects of the Western model that it found useful for development and rejected any change of identity. China is now the symbol of how one can partially copy a development model successfully while retaining national uniqueness.45 “Western civilization is unique, but not universal.” Those were the words of Samuel Huntington in 1996.46 At the end of the Cold War, Westerners believed that the West had led the world to modern society and that as people in other civilizations modernized, they would also Westernize in the process. It was assumed that as others took on similar patterns of education, work, wealth, and class structure that Western culture would become the universal culture of the world. Huntington argued that this line of thinking was misguided and arrogant because “modern” civilization and “Western” civilization are not one and the same thing— Western civilization emerged before modernity. Western civilization stems from the classic legacies of the Greek and Roman civilizations. It is also based on Christianity—Protestantism and Catholicism and the importance of the rift between the two. It is based on European languages such as Latin, Germanic, and Romance languages. Separation of spiritual and temporal authority is another feature, which contributed greatly to the development of “freedom” in the West. The rule of law is another component inherited from the Romans which developed into Natural Law in medieval times and Common Law in England. As a result of the application of the rule of law, constitutionalism and the protection of human rights took shape against the arbitrary exercise of power. Huntington argues that the relationship between law and shaping behavior was not as poignant in other civilizations. Social pluralism and civil society are other characteristics of Western civilization. Class pluralism included a strong aristocracy, a substantial peasantry, and a small class of merchants and traders. The presence and strength of the feudal aristocracy limited absolutism from taking a firm room in Europe. This differs sharply from empires that existed at the same time in Russia, China, the Ottoman Empire, and other non-Western civilizations. Representative bodies are also features of Western civilization as social pluralism gave rise to estates, parliaments,  Krastev and Holmes, Lights.   Samuel P.  Huntington, “The West is Unique, not Universal,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-11-01/westunique-not-universal. 45 46

12 

S. LOFTUS

and other institutions that represented the interests of the various groups in society. This then paved the way for modern democracy. Self-government became an important characteristic as representation at the national level was supplemented by a measure of autonomy at the local level, not seen in any other civilization at this time. Individualism is another feature. A strong sense of individualism emerged as a result of all the other features and a tradition of individual rights and liberties. Collectivism is a more prominent feature in other civilizations. While none of these are unique to the West, the combination of them is, and has given the West its distinctive quality.47 Based on this assessment, it is no wonder that countries that comprise “Western civilization” have had an easier time consolidating liberal democracy as a form of governance. Institutional legacies pave the way for modern governance. Understanding this reality helps defend the concept of non-intervention as a superior foreign policy choice when it comes to governance. A cross-cultural survey concluded that the values that are most important in the West are the least important worldwide.48 Huntington also argued that modernization and economic development promoted the resurgence of indigenous cultures as opposed to Western imitations, often taking on a religious form and an anti-Western tone. While the West believed that non-Western people should commit themselves to Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law, what was “universalism” to the West often appeared as “imperialism” to the rest.49 Acharya describes the emerging world order as a “multiplex.”50 This entails a multi-civilizational world where one can no longer understand global affairs in terms of the dominance of Western civilization. It will instead be a world where interactions and mutual learning among different civilizations and states will take place. In such a world, there is no room for “liberal hegemony” as a foreign policy or the “universalization” of the liberal normative framework of governance. Some are quite pessimistic about this new world. Coker views this shift as an inevitable path to chaos. He argues that culture has become the “currency of power” in the way that ideology was the currency of power during the  Huntington, “Unique, not Universal.”  Hofstede (1983, p. 53). 49  Huntington, “Unique, not Universal.” 50  Acharya (2017). 47 48

1 INTRODUCTION 

13

Cold War, putting Russia and China and their “civilization state” against the United States and the West. Moreover, he argues that the West is in trouble, as its two “social imaginaries” of Wilsonian liberal internationalism and Kantian European cosmopolitanism are losing ground. The Trump Administration expressed no belief in human rights or democracy promotion, and European Kantian cosmopolitanism appears to have been replaced by a pragmatism that has lost interest in the project. He underlines that while China and Russia celebrate their civilizations, the West is undergoing deep self-criticism about its colonial and imperialist past that leaves no room for a constructive revival. The future world order is headed toward the idea of “cultural coexistence,” and order he fears will only give more power to the great powers and ensure that little powers have no relevance, paving the way for a world of chaos, devoid of social norms, and lawless.51 Democracy and the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order When the Cold War ended, the United States occupied a position of unrivaled aggregate national power. The United States was the sole hegemon of the international system in what could be described as a “unipolar system.” Structural Realism suggests this type of system is the least durable of all power configurations due to the hegemon’s tendency to overextend itself and exceed its economic, military, demographic, and political resources.52 Unipolarity is also argued not to be very durable due to the tendency of weaker states in the international system to balance the power of the hegemon by “bandwagoning” with other powers for a more equitable distribution of power.53 Based on this theory, the “liberal international order” built after World War II which then widened across the globe after the Cold War might have been a momentary outcome of hegemonic forces and will give way as American power declines.54 Contrastingly, liberal internationalists argue that the liberal international order does not need a hegemon to sustain it. The American-led postwar international  Coker, Civilizational States.  Waltz (2000). 53  Walt (1985). 54  Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018; Patrick Porter, “A World Imagined, Nostalgia and the Liberal Order,” Policy Analysis, no. 843 (Washington, DC: CATO institution 2018). 51 52

14 

S. LOFTUS

order was built on a system of bilateral and multilateral alliances which do not in themselves hold liberal properties. As this system began spreading outwardly onto the world, illiberal states became a part of it and made it harder to achieve consensus within it, thus fragmenting it today as states pick and choose their connections to it.55 Challenges today thus stem from a reaction to modernity and a crisis of leadership as opposed to declining American hegemony. As for the “retreat” of democracy in the world today, some are directly tying this to relative power losses of the liberal hegemon. In line with this argument, the 1990s may simply have been an atypical period of overwhelming dominance by the United States and its democratic allies which created a favorable international environment for democracy without which it would not have prospered. In this respect, the processes of democratization and democratic reversals happen in waves depending on the strength of the liberal hegemon. When democratic institutions generate greater trust through delivering economic growth, peace, stability, and public services, the demand for democracy spreads. But when existing democracies appear less worthy of emulation, democratic reversals are more likely to appear.56 In contrast, Levitsky and Way argue that the perceptions of a democratic recession are rooted in a flawed understanding of the events of the early 1990s. At this time, the crises occurring in authoritarian regimes were categorized as democratic transitions when really, they were crises caused by diminished revenues from the USSR and the United States. Economic crises deprived autocrats of the resources needed to sustain themselves in power. These nations then experienced a reversal in the 2000s with rising commodities prices which led to a boost in state capacity and consolidation of their autocratic regimes.57 Similarly, Diamond argues that many of the “transitions” that took place in the “third wave of democratization” were simply a transition to semi-authoritarian rule categorized as “hybrid regimes,” practicing electoral democracy without liberal characteristics.58 Democracy is homegrown and highly depends on institutional legacy. For this reason, the presence of a liberal hegemon is unlikely to change and reconfigure domestic political regimes worldwide, as was  Ikenberry (2020).  Kagan (2018a). 57  Levitsky and Way (2018). 58  Diamond (2002, pp. 21–35, 2018). 55 56

1 INTRODUCTION 

15

demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is important to mention because it signifies that a decline in American power does not have to equate to a decline in democracy as a political regime. Concomitantly, it signifies that the relative rise of China does not have to signify the rise of global authoritarianism. Contrary to popular belief, China is not trying to dismantle the international order nor is it trying to spread its political and economic model of governance onto the world. It is however trying to gain more power and leadership within the order and is creating new nonWestern-­ led institutions such as the BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among others. The growth of China’s influence abroad signifies a shift in global norms spreading in that the world is no longer dominated by a “universal” normative framework to which all should aspire but now has much more room for a multi-civilizational, multicultural, multi-political structure of international relations. Similarly, as Russia gained power in the international system, it was more able to project its influence around the world. As a country with a unique historical trajectory and national identity, Russian national interests were often not in sync with Western interests, leading their relationship to sour. The zero-sum nature of the European security architecture made it practically impossible to reconcile the major normative differences between Russia and the West. Perceptions of insecurity proliferated as a result. Over the post-Cold War era, liberal hegemonic practices were a powerful motivating factor for the development of Russian nationalism and anti-Western rhetoric. Putin’s anti-liberal rhetoric is echoed in populist parties throughout the West and is supported by international actors that have criticized the liberal international order and U.S. hegemony. Today’s great power relations are different from Cold War times. Russia and China don’t have ideologies of their own—they are rather trying to balance American power and create a more multipolar system that is more in line with their national interests. The rise in their material capabilities translates into a heightened ability to assert their national interests abroad, which are partially shaped by their very different national and civilizational identities. It will thus be increasingly challenging if not dangerous to continue the pursuit of “liberal hegemony” or the concept of “liberal universalism” with rising non-Western powers in the system as interests will clash and the likelihood of war will increase. Today, liberal universalism is being challenged by alternative norms. Global norms spreading away from the normative framework of liberalism are visible in international fora such as

16 

S. LOFTUS

the United Nations General Assembly as Russia and China increase their ties with the Global South. Countries heavily engaged in commercial ties with the Chinese are increasingly backing away from supporting Western harangues on China’s human rights abuses.59 In the U.S.-led vote to remove Russia from the UN Human Rights Council after its invasion of Ukraine, 93 countries supported the move while 100 did not, demonstrating that national interests are taking precedence over siding with the West in the increasingly confrontational environment between great powers. A desire to be “non-aligned” is taking shape as countries refuse to take sides.60 Rather than liberal democracy suffering as a result of waning U.S. hegemony, policy choices and domestic considerations are more to blame for these struggles. Free-market policies were initially hailed as an important step in ensuring prosperity and broader freedoms throughout the world, and a wide body of research attests to their economic benefits in terms of reduced unemployment and increased economic growth. However, these policies sacrificed social and political rights in the interest of economic competitiveness.61 People in the rural communities in the American mid-­ west and south have expressed feelings of having become strangers in their own land. The shutting down of coal plants and the shrinking of the manufacturing sector more broadly have led to major social problems related to alcohol and drug abuse, increasing the suicide rate in the country. These issues have fueled politics of resentment in rural America, which blame global trade, racial minorities, and immigrants for their job losses. For Trump supporters, globalization and the immigration that accompanies it connote job losses and a drop in social status and self-esteem. Similarly, the rhetoric behind the Brexit leave campaign alluded to a time before Britain joined the EU, when society was predominantly white Anglo-Saxon, when manufacturing jobs still provided security for unionized workers, and when Britain was a major economic and military world power.62  Piccone (2018).  Shivshankar Menon, “A New Cold War May Call for a Return to Nonalignment,” Foreign Policy, Jul 1, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/nonalignmentinternational-system-alliance-bloc/. 61   Robert Blanton and Dursun Peksen, “The Dark Side of Economic Freedom: Neoliberalism has Deleterious Effects on Labour Rights,” LSE BPP, August 19, 2016. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-dark-side-of-economic-freedom/. 62  Norris and Inglehart (2019). 59 60

1 INTRODUCTION 

17

According to the 2017 Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, almost 56 million people across Europe voted for a left- or right-wing populist party. 63 The vote share of these parties has been on the rise since the 1980s but gained strong momentum after the 2008 financial crisis. Many felt left behind by changes in society which accompany neoliberal economic displacement. As a result, levels of political trust toward European institutions started to decline.64 This mistrust of the “elite” and of establishment institutions among a significant portion of the population has created deep polarization in society between pro-establishment and anti-­ establishment sentiment. In fact, the anti-establishment sentiment is so strong in the United States that only a slim majority (55%) of the population accepts Joe Biden as having legitimately won the 2020 Presidential Elections.65 The constituencies in Western liberal democracies are protesting against excessive liberalism. Fukuyama argues that the problem within liberal democracies stems from liberalism’s weakness in generating bonds of mutual respect and affection among citizens which affects collective consensus. Identity politics are a manifestation of the dissatisfaction with globalization and liberalization and the damaging effects of economic crises on the idea of an open and liberal world order. These dynamics can be seen both on the right and on the left of the political spectrum through the left’s incessant creation of diverse groups with varying interests and the right’s defense of a singular national identity connected to race, ethnicity, and religion.66

63  Andreas J. Heinö, “Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2017,” Accessed August 5, 2022. https://timbro.se/allmant/timbro-authoritarian-populism-index2017/. 64  Diego Muro and Guillem Vidal, “Mind the Gaps: The Political Consequences of the Great Recession in Europe,” LSE Eurocrisis in the Press, June 10, 2014. https://blogs.lse. ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2014/06/10/mind-the-gaps-the-political-consequences-of-the-greatrecession-in-europe/ 65  Maya Yang, “More than 40% in US do not Believe Biden Legitimately Won Election— Poll,” The Guardian, January 5, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/ jan/05/america-biden-election-2020-poll-victory. 66  Fukuyama (2018).

18 

S. LOFTUS

Political Pluralism, International Pragmatism, and the Protection of Democracy Generating bonds of mutual respect and encouraging collective consensus is essential for the health of any democracy. Generating these starts from the consolidation of a healthy national identity. Lepore argues that the American experiment rests on what Jefferson called “these truths,” which include political equality, natural rights, and the sovereignty of the people. She makes a case for an American narrative that encompasses its constant contradictions struggling to define the meaning of its history while stressing the necessity of engaging in this struggle.67 McClay argues that a great nation needs and deserves a great and coherent narrative, as an expression of its own self-understanding and needs to be able to convey this narrative to the youth. The narrative has to be truthful by being honest about the past, but continuing to be inspired by the future.68 While identity shaping is crucial for national cohesion, so are policy choices to minimize grievances. Polarization and populist sentiment are primarily caused by a perceived loss of livelihood and a perceived loss of identity for a significant portion of the American and European middle classes. By re-investing in society, the United States can ensure a better future for itself. By addressing inequality and creating job opportunities for the displaced, the United States is more likely to encourage trust in society. Lack of trust becomes more prevalent when the government is unable to deliver on its fundamental purposes. Part of re-prioritizing domestic politics does entail shifting priorities abroad. But this does not have to equate “isolationism.” Neoconservatives, liberals, and other idealists view the American retreat as disastrous for the liberal international world order and for liberal internationalism. Kagan argues that with the absence of a liberal hegemon the world will resort to violent multipolar competition, instability, insecurity, and domination.69 But America does not have to choose between retreat and full-on engagement. In addition, the alternative to American hegemony does not symbolize the end of international cooperation. There can be international cooperation and multilateralism without liberal hegemony, a concept that validates liberal theories of internationalism. In fact, such a form of international cooperation, with a diminished role of ideology, would increase  Lepore (2019).  McClay (2019). 69  Kagan (2018b). 67 68

1 INTRODUCTION 

19

global stability. Even John Mearsheimer, a die-hard realist has said that promoting an open international economy and creating institutions are likely to succeed because they can be consistent with both a liberal and a realist foreign policy. But democracy promotion on the other hand is not.70 Moreover, the United States would more likely preserve its wealth and way of life by investing in research and development, technology, job creation, and infrastructure as opposed to recklessly spending it in the pursuit of American hegemony abroad or democratizing countries that may not even wish to democratize. The United States can prioritize its relations with like-minded nations as well as engage in nonideological relations with nondemocracies. The book discusses the idea of a more “pluralist” international system that makes room for differing sets of interests, respect for national identity, regime type, and a more pragmatic and diplomatic approach to resolving global problems. While not proposing a concrete model for the future, the book uses the war in Ukraine as an example where pluralism and pragmatism could have avoided the catastrophic war and could potentially avoid many more. Since the end of the Cold War, expanding the EU and NATO was the predominant idea in the Euro-Atlantic space. Essentially, there was no room for any alternative normative frameworks aside from the choice of Euro-Atlantic integration or remaining outside of this framework. Also, there was no notion of any “shared neighborhood” practices with the much larger, non-Western Russian neighbor who had just experienced the collapse of its empire. Pre-2014 war society in Ukraine was divided over EU membership and mostly over NATO membership. The view of Ukrainians was highly dependent on their proximity to Russia and Europe.71 Moreover, the idea of gaining autonomous status within Ukraine was rather prevalent in the Donbas.72 This suggests that there were different visions in Ukraine for the future path of the country as well. Sakwa describes these two visions as the “Monist” vision and the “Pluralist” vision. The Monist vision of Ukraine can be defined by the necessity to gain back an identity that was lost during Russian imperialism and had developed separately from the East Slavic Community of Russia and  Mearsheimer (2018).  Julie Ray and Neli Esipova, “Before Crisis, Ukrainians More Likely to See NATO as a Threat,” Gallup, March 14, 2014. https://news.gallup.com/poll/167927/crisis-­ ukrainians-­likely-nato-threat.aspx. 72  Katchanovski (2017). 70 71

20 

S. LOFTUS

Belarus. Internal debates about the establishment of Russian as a second official language in Ukraine met resistance among this group as it was seen to diminish Ukraine’s identity prior to Russian imperialism. In this vision for Ukraine, Ukraine must rid the society of all elements related to this imperial past and move westward. This vision has become increasingly “nationalist” over the years and has alienated parts of the country that advocated for a more pluralist vision for Ukraine, one that allowed for more autonomy for their regions, having Russian as a second official state language and maintaining relations with both Russia and the West through the continuation of Ukraine’s “non-bloc status.”73 This discrepancy between the East and the West stems back centuries as the country experienced separate historical trajectories as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Russian Empire. The Eastern part of the country shares a much longer history with Russia. The binary structure of European security and normativity increased polarization in Ukraine and increased the likelihood of great power competition over its future. The Minsk Agreement to end the initial Russian-backed separatist 2014 war in Ukraine’s East would have fulfilled the idea of increased autonomy for the Donbas. Many argue that this would have been a “Trojan horse” for Russia to influence Ukrainian politics. But the reality of the situation is that the Donbas and Russia naturally held similar views for the future of Ukraine exhibited by the voting patterns for pro-Russian political parties in that part of the country.74 Even if integrating into Western institutions such as the EU or NATO may not have panned out for Ukraine under such an arrangement, alternative arrangements could have been devised to ensure the security, development, and prosperity of Ukraine as a nation. Frameworks such as the EU and NATO create a binarism whereby if one is a member of these institutions they are automatically in political, economic, and security competition with those remaining outside of this group. This may have strongly appealed to those advocating for the “Monist” vision for Ukraine but ignored a vast segment of the population advocating for a more Pluralist vision and continued ties with Russia.

 Sakwa (2017b, pp. 406–425).  Eurasian Research Institute. “Geography of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine” Almaty, Kazakhstan: Eurasian Research Institute, Accessed August 4, 2022. https://www. eurasian-research.org/publication/geography-of-the-presidential-elections-in-ukraine/. 73 74

1 INTRODUCTION 

21

A RAND study has suggested an alternative architecture for European politics, economics, and security. This proposal was devised by groups of experts from the West, Russia, and the states in between them. The idea was to limit great power confrontation in the region and improve security and prosperity. Removing the binarism is possible through pragmatism and pluralism. RAND’s proposal includes the formation of a new consultative body for major-power engagement on the regional security architecture whereby Russia, the United States, and the EU would regularly consult one another on any changes to the security architecture while taking each other’s views into consideration. Their proposal also includes new norms for the already-existing blocs, whereby no changes are to be made without the consent of the other power, prioritizing regional stability. A “third-way” for states is also proposed, whereby a nation can seek not to be part of any bloc formalized through multilateral security guarantees. The proposal offers solutions for multi-directional trade between economic blocs, establishing dialogue among the EU and the EAEU and the in-between states, and creating new norms for current trade blocs. It would also move efforts on status-neutral management measures for regional conflicts and on agreed settlements.75 If such pragmatic approaches were more often taken, great power rivalry could be avoided. This type of suggestion transcends realism and liberalism as it acknowledges realist security concerns but finds compromises to deal with them without resorting to a world devoid of cooperation that prioritizes nationalism and mercantilism and pure “balance of power politics” or “spheres of influence.” Today’s world is characterized by a multi-civilizational configuration of nations with rising material capabilities and different national interests that cannot simply go away if ignored. To navigate the twenty-first-century challenges, this would be a much more cautious approach to international relations.

Structure of the Book After this introductory chapter, the book proceeds with a chapter on the management of the liberal international order and the evolution of democracy in the world. It analyzes the unintended consequences of liberal hegemony as a foreign policy, neoliberal economic policy prescriptions, and the  Charap et al. (2019).

75

22 

S. LOFTUS

international results of attempting to imitate the Western model of governance. It then proceeds with a chapter on Russian-Western relations after the Cold War which analyzes the main driving forces behind the deterioration of relations. It also explains Russia’s concept of self and post-­Soviet identity. It then proceeds with a chapter on the impact and rise of China’s global influence, a power with a non-Western identity, and its growing ties with Russia. The last major chapter focuses on the Ukraine Crisis and how the major themes of this book come into play in this gruesome unfortunate war. It then closes with a traditional conclusion and makes the case for more political pluralism in the international system as well as increased attention to domestic politics in liberal democracies.

References Acharya, A. (2017). After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order. Ethics & International Affairs, 31(3), 271–285. https://doi. org/10.1017/S089267941700020X Center for American Progress. (2020). Europe’s Lost Decade Demands a Progressive Response. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, May 13. Retrieved August 4, 2022, from https://www.americanprogress.org/article/europes-­ lost-­decade-­demands-­progressive-­response Charap, S., Shapiro, J., Drennan, J.  J., Chalyi, O., Krumm, R., Nikitina, Y., & Sasse, G. (2019). A Consensus Proposal for a Revised Regional Order in Post-­ Soviet Europe and Eurasia. RAND CORPORATION. https://www.rand.org/ pubs/conf_proceedings/CF410.html Coker, C. (2019). The Rise of the Civilizational State: China, Russia and Islamic Caliphate and the Challenge to the Liberal World Order. Polity. Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. The Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 21–35. Diamond, L. (2018). Facing up to the Democratic Recession. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Doyle, M. W. (1983a). Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(3), 205–235. Doyle, M.  W. (1983b). Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 2. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(4), 323–353. Doyle, M.  W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. The American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1151–1169. Doyle, M. W. (1997). Ways of War and Peace. W.W. Norton. Evans, A. (2015). Ideological Change under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory. Demokratizatsiya, 23(4), 401.

1 INTRODUCTION 

23

Freedom in the World. (2022). Reversing the Decline of Democracy in the United States. Freedom House, Washington, DC, U.S.  Retrieved August 4, 2022, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-­world/2022/global-­ expansion-­authoritarian-­rule/reversing-­decline-­democracy-­united-­states Fukuyama, F. (2012). The End of History and the Last Man. Penguin Books. Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Encounter Books. Hofstede, G. (1983). National Cultures in Four Dimensions. International Studies of Management and Organization, 13, 53. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (p. 13). University of Oklahoma Press. Ikenberry, J. (2020). A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (p. 40). Yale University Press. Jervis, R. (1976). Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics. UP. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. Kagan, R. (2018a). The Weight of Geopolitics. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Kagan, R. (2018b). The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World. Knopf. Kant, I. 1991 {1795}. Perpetual Peace. In H. Reiss (Ed.), Kant: Political Writings (pp. 93–115, 2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Katchanovski, I. (2017). The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-Up of Ukraine? In N. Petro (Ed.), Ukraine in Crisis. Routledge. Kendall-Taylor, A., & Shullman, O.  D. (2022). Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 22. Retrieved August 4, 2022, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-­and-­bosom-­friends-­why­china-­russia-­ties-­will-­deepen-­after-­russias-­war-­ukraine Koechlin, T. (2013). The Rich Get Richer. Challenge, 56(2), 5–30. https://doi. org/10.2753/0577-­5132560201 Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (July 2018). Explaining Eastern Europe: Imitation and Its Discontents. Journal of Democracy, 29(3), 117–128. Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2020). The Light that Failed: A Reckoning. Pegasus Books. Lake, D. A., Martin, L. L., & Risse, T. (2021). Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization. International Organization, 75(2), 225–257. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000636 Lepore, J. (2019). These Truths: A History of the United States. W.  W. Norton & Company. Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2018). The Myth of Democratic Recession. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press.

24 

S. LOFTUS

Lipset, S.  M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. McClay, W. M. (2019). Land of Hope: An Invitation to the Great American Story. Encounter Books. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. UP. Piccone, T. (2018). China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations. Brookings Institution. September. Retrieved August 4, 2022, from https:// www.brookings.edu/wp-­content/uploads/2018/09/FP_20181009_china_ human_rights.pdf Putzel, J. (2020). The ‘Populist’ Right Challenge to Neoliberalism: Social Policy between a Rock and a Hard Place. Development and Change, 51(2), 418–441. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12578 Rupnik, J. (2018). Explaining Eastern Europe: The Crisis of Liberalism. Journal of Democracy, 29(3), 24–38. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/ explaining-­eastern-­europe-­the-­crisis-­of-­liberalism/ Sakwa, R. (2017a). Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. Cambridge University Press. Sakwa, R. (2017b). Europe and the Political: From Axiological Monism to Pluralistic Dialogism. East European Politics, 33(3), 406–425. https://doi. org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1326099 Shirk, S. L. (2018). China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), 22–36. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/ articles/china-­in-­xis-­new-­era-­the-­return-­to-­personalistic-­rule/ Tsang, S., & Cheung, O. (2022). Has Xi Jinping Made China’s Political System more Resilient and Enduring? Third World Quarterly, 43(1), 225–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.2000857 U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy. U.S.  Department of Defense, Washington, DC. https://media.defense. gov/2022/Mar/28/2002964702/-­1/-­1/1/NDS-­FACT-­SHEET.PDF U.S. Department of State. (2022). Study on the People’s Republic of China’s South China Sea Maritime Claims. U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State Archive. (2009). Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? U.S. Department of State. Walt, S.  M. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International Security, 9(4), 3–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540 Walt, S. M. (2018). The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. Macmillan.

1 INTRODUCTION 

25

Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772 Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. WU, Y. (2012). Modern Chinese National-Cultural Identity in the Context of Globalization. Transtext(e)s Transcultures 跨文本跨文化 [Online], 7 | 2012, Online since 02 December 2012 connection on 21 April 2023. http://journals. openedition.org/transtexts/456; https://doi.org/10.4000/transtexts.456 Zamora-Kapoor, A., & Coller, X. (2014). The Effects of the Crisis: Why Southern Europe? American Behavioral Scientist, 58(12), 1511–1516. https://doi. org/10.1177/0002764214530649

CHAPTER 2

Management of the Liberal International Order

Introduction After the fall of communism, liberal democracy, and liberal market economies were embraced worldwide as the superior form of political and economic governance. Democratization and liberalization processes took place across the formerly communist world as part of the “third wave of democratization,” a global trend which started in the late 1970s.1 However, today a leading institution measuring freedom in the world has assessed that democracy in the world has been in steady decline since the year 2006. Despite the progress in democratization over a period of almost 40 years where the number of electoral democracies rose from 35 in 1970 to over 110 in 2014, since 2006, there has been a global democratic recession of declining aggregate Freedom House scores.2 Some scholars have argued that current democratic trends are more of a perception than the true representation of reality. Levitsky and Way argue that the state of global democracy has remained stable over the last decade and has improved markedly relative to the 1990s. They argue that the perceptions of a democratic recession are rooted in a flawed understanding of the events of the early 1990s. At this time, many of the crises occurring in 1 2

 Huntington (1991, p. 13).  Freedom in the World (2022).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_2

27

28 

S. LOFTUS

authoritarian regimes were mistakenly categorized as democratization processes. Due to the important loss of support from the Soviet Union and from the United States for anti-communist dictatorships, the end of the Cold War was extremely destabilizing for autocrats. Deep economic crises deprived autocrats of the resources needed to sustain themselves in power. Then in the 2000s due to soaring commodity prices, these nations experienced a boost in state capacity which allowed them to regain strength and confidence in their autocratic ways. Moreover, the geopolitical environment started to change in the 2000s as China, Russia, and other regional powers together with soaring oil prices created more space for autocrats to consolidate and stabilize their regimes.3 Similarly, Diamond argues that many of the “transitions” that took place in the third wave of democratization were simply a transition to semi-authoritarian rule whereby regimes adopted a form of “hybrid” rule, practicing electoral democracy without liberal characteristics.4 Others have argued that the processes of democratization and democratic reversals happen in waves. Studies have shown that democratic institutions generate greater trust when they reliably deliver economic growth, peace, stability, and public services. The demand for democracy spreads from one country to another in regional waves and the reversals of democracy follow the same patterns. In other words, when existing democracies appear less worthy of emulation, democratic institutions are less likely to spread. Similarly, others have argued that the current trends in democratic retrenchment are caused by the inevitable consequence of liberalism’s failures and the rebalancing of power politics.5 In line with this argument, the 1990s may simply have been an atypical period of overwhelming dominance by the United States and its democratic allies which created a favorable international environment for democracy without which it would not have prospered.6 In this sense, politics follow geopolitics. Democracies in Greek city-states proliferated in the fifth century BCE when the Athenian democratic empire rose to power and Sparta’s power was reflected through the spread of Spartan-style oligarchies. Similarly, when the USSR rose to power, communism spread globally. In the later Cold War years when the

 Levitsky and Way (2018).  Diamond (2002). 5  Mearsheimer (2018). 6  Kagan (2018a). 3 4

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

29

United States and Europe gained the advantage and triumphed, democracies proliferated and communism collapsed.7 If a liberal hegemon is then needed for democratic proliferation, Structural Realism suggests that a unipolar world order, or one with a single hegemon, is the least durable of all power configurations due to the hegemon’s tendency to over extend itself and exceed its economic, military, demographic, and political resources.8 Based on this theory, the “liberal international order” built after World War II which then widened across the globe after the Cold War might have been a momentary outcome of hegemonic forces and will give way as American power declines.9 The “liberal international order” can be described as the set of global, rule-based, structured relationships based on political liberalism, economic liberalism, and liberal internationalism.10 Accordingly, when the world is less American it will also be less liberal.11 Neorealists argued that the practice of liberal hegemony, which can be defined as the active pursuit of re-making the world into America’s image and spreading “the rule of law, property rights and other guarantees, at gunpoint if need be,” is what led to American decline today. According to Brown University’s Cost of War project, America’s post-9/11 wars have incurred roughly $5.6 trillion and around 370,000 civilian and combatant deaths.12 Unipolarity is also argued not to be very durable due to the tendency of weaker states in the international system to balance the power of the hegemon by “bandwagoning” with other powers for a more equitable distribution of power. The “balance of power theory” in international relations suggests that states may secure their survival by preventing any one state from gaining enough military power to dominate all others.13 Liberal internationalists see today’s crisis differently. They argue that today’s crisis is one of leadership and modernity and argue that liberal internationalism always prevails in spite of the multiple crises it has endured

 Diamond (2018).  Waltz (2000, pp. 5–41). 9   Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2018; Porter (2018). 10  Lake et al. (2021, pp. 225–257). 11  Ikenberry (2020, p. 10). 12  James Carden, “Why Liberal Hegemony?” The Nation, November 12, 2018. https:// www.thenation.com/article/archive/liberal-hegemony-foreign-policy/ 13  Walt (1987, pp. 17–29). 7 8

30 

S. LOFTUS

throughout history.14 The liberal international order does not need a hegemon to sustain itself and can continue to thrive. In this line of argumentation, the American-led postwar international order has been built on a system of bilateral and multilateral alliances, and this cooperative security does not itself have liberal properties. It was liberal only in the sense that it was an alliance of liberal democracies during the Cold War. After the Cold War, as globalization spread, illiberal states became a part of the liberal order, and the order thus widened in scope, making it more difficult to achieve political consensus within it. The post-World War II liberal international order has thus been fragmented, thereby allowing states to pick and choose their connections to it.15 But even liberal internationalists agree with realist criticism on “liberal hegemony” as a foreign policy in that it does not represent true liberal internationalism as it was intended.16 In this regard, the world does not need the United States to hold disaggregate amounts of power to maintain the international order and the democratic ideal. Reconciling these two theories largely depends on how one defines “the liberal international order.” If it is defined as a system of rules-based multilateral institutions, this does not need a liberal hegemon to sustain itself, as it is rational for states to cooperate on matters of mutual and international concern.17 However, if the definition includes the values of liberal democracy, specific liberal market prescriptions, and the promotion of these values worldwide, the system does need a liberal hegemon to sustain itself, for these values and systems are not naturally universal and require an element of compulsion. That being said, this policy is unlikely to work on the long term due to pushback from national particularism as well as the overextension of the hegemon’s resources in the pursuit of this policy. The spread of liberal democracy through interventions has been destabilizing. It has also not worked in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, interventions on a softer scale have also become contentious, as local leaders start to fear their grip on power is being threatened, as was the case with American democracy promotion in the Arab Spring.18 This issue can take on an even greater threat if Western support of local  Ikenberry (2020, p. 40).  Ibid. 16  Ibid. 17  Keohane (2005). 18  Ron Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings.” NY Times. April 15, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html 14 15

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

31

democracies becomes a zero-sum struggle with a neighboring autocracy which considers its neighbors to be a matter of national security concern, such as in Ukraine and Taiwan. Such issues risk the start of World War III over the wrong ideological framework. In reality, disagreements are not based on a fight between democracy and autocracy as it is often framed in the West, but a fight for national interests and influence. Democracy is homegrown and depends more on domestic institutions than the presence of a liberal hegemon. The struggles the world is seeing with democracy today are not a result of declining American hegemony but a result of flawed domestic policies as well as cultural distinctions in societal governance. Many nations around the world have been employing more “nationalist” or “civilizationalist” rhetoric in their domestic politics as they prioritize retaining their cultural particularities and identity. Similarly, within liberal democracies in the West, excessive liberal policies in the name of globalism and economic efficiency have led to a cultural backlash among middle-class constituencies. While the middle classes in countries such as India and China greatly benefited from neoliberal economic policies as their countries experienced rapid economic growth, the middle classes in Western nations suffered as a result of rapid technological innovation and manufacturing jobs being outsourced to Asia. Moreover, these policies significantly increased inequality in society which directly contributed to growing populist and anti-establishment sentiment and a renewed emphasis on retaining a “lost” “white” and “Christian” identity amidst a hyper-globalized world. The idea of “civilizational nationalism” was invoked in Trump’s anti-liberal rhetoric.19 Populist parties have increasingly gained influence across Europe and the United States and other parts of the world, using the narrative that the establishment is to blame for popular discontent and excessive immigration which threatens their jobs and identity.20 This has exacerbated political polarization in Western societies between those who benefit from policies of globalization and those who appear to lose from them as well as between those who yearn for traditional Western society versus those who advocate for a technocratic liberal international order.21 In other parts of the world, “politics of resentment” in relatively new democracies have also arisen based on resulting frustrations from imitating a “superior  Acharya (2020, pp. 139–156).  Jay et al. (2019). 21  Kimmage (2020, p. 384). 19 20

32 

S. LOFTUS

­ estern model” without fully being able to achieve it nor being extended w the same level of respect. Nations such as Poland and Hungary have shifted course and have established a more nationalist identity.22 China experienced rapid economic growth with its state-led economic model and authoritarian political system and is demonstrating that alternative forms of governance are also viable and can lead a country to great prosperity as well. This does not mean that countries will want to imitate China’s form of governance; it simply represents an alternative normative framework away from liberal democracy. The rise of China will affect global norms in this way. In addition, many third-world nations are finding it easier to do business with China without having “liberal strings attached” which usually require domestic reform in return for aid or investment. Their growing ties are visible in international forums such as the United Nations General Assembly, where countries increasingly back away from supporting Western harangues on China’s human rights abuses.23 Russia has also benefited from the 2000s commodities boom and has become increasingly assertive and authoritarian. Russia has increasingly resorted to destabilizing Western societies through the use of asymmetric tactics to try and lessen the influence of political liberalism, which it believes to be an American-led ideology used for global domination. In addition, the fact that 35 countries abstained from condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows that Russia has important influence abroad. Many developing countries have refused to join the West in its response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. In the U.S.-led vote to remove Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, for example, 93 countries supported the move while 100 did not. It is also important to note that those 100 countries are home to 76% of the world’s population.24

A Brief History of the U.S.-Led Liberal International Order According to a general consensus definition between scholars, an order is an organized group of international institutions that help govern the interactions among the member states.25 The vision for the U.S.-led liberal  Krastev and Holmes (2020).  Piccone (2018). 24  United Nations (2022). 25  Mearsheimer (2019), Brands (2016, p. 2); Ikenberry (2001, p. 23, 45). 22 23

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

33

international order has its roots in the Wilsonian tradition, which is based on a belief that through the processes of multilateralism and modernization, nations of the world would transform politically and socially, leading to peace in the world. Woodrow Wilson had a vision for international cooperation which encompassed collective security and free trade, which would be bound together by rules and norms. However, the interwar years made it difficult to create such cooperation and were instead plagued by the Great Depression and the rise of fascism and totalitarianism in Europe. These issues coupled with the tragedies of World War I also created an environment in American domestic politics that favored non-­ involvement in world affairs.26 A grand shift in liberal international ideas then took place in the late 1930s and 1940s as Franklin D.  Roosevelt’s New Deal became more expansive and progressive. Universal rights and protections gained momentum, as did the solidarity of Western liberal democracies around the world. The idea was to sustain a vision for the world in pursuit of economic and social advancement, which would be led by the United States. Under Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt-era liberal internationalism was incorporated into a wider project of American hegemonic leadership during the Cold War era. After World War II, regional and global institutions led by the United States were created to foster cooperation and shared norms and promote peace. These institutions included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The purpose of these institutions was to provide a rule-based structure for political, economic, and security relations. The liberal idea motivating these institutions was that such cooperative frameworks would encourage economic prosperity and prevent war. As part of this process, the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference was held in July 1944 at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, where delegates from 44 nations created a new international monetary system known as the Bretton Woods system based on free trade and the free convertibility of currencies.  Office of the Historian (2022).

26

34 

S. LOFTUS

At this moment, the U.S.-led international order comprised the liberal democracies of the West and was based on open trade, cooperative security, multilateralism, democratic solidarity, and American leadership.27 Liberal democracies were the foundation of that order, but they also had ties to other nations. Being inside the order was part of a type of bargain, supporting the United States in its fight against communism in exchange for access to its markets and security protection. This order existed alongside the USSR-led communist order throughout the Cold War in a bipolar power structure. There was a clear purpose to the order in the context of the Cold War—a feature that greatly increased domestic support for it as well as enhanced collaborative relations within it.28 European integration, a process occurring simultaneously and based on the same principles, was seen as a desirable alternative for European nations who had lost their empires and whose power did not match that of the United States or the Soviet Union. U.S. foreign policy at this time was that of “containment” toward the Soviet Union, or, halting the spread of Communism rather than actively engaging in the spread of democracy. At this time, there were few attempts to replicate the successes of Germany and Japan, where the United States engaged in active societal transformations after the War. While efforts were made to promote democratic and free-market values around the world, there was no element of compulsion. U.S. interventions to overthrow unfavorable regimes at the time were not intended to transform society but to bolster anti-communist leaders. When the Cold War ended, the United States felt free to use its unrivaled power to resolve international problems that were of strategic concern much like it had in Germany and Japan four decades prior. This occurred alongside the processes of globalization and the spread of the U.S.-led liberal international order outward to the rest of the world. Formerly communist nations were now transitioning to democracies and to liberal market systems. Great power rivalry was at a low ebb and the United States held a strong advantage due to its economy, military, and size and was completely unrivaled by any other nation.

 Ikenberry (2020).  Ibid.

27 28

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

35

Problems with Universalism The post-Cold War presidents in the United States “universalized” American foreign policy and the idea of the “West.”29 Fukuyama famously described this period as “the end of history” whereby all nations would converge into a single prototype of liberal democratic free-market societies—a recipe for peace in the world.30 Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barrack Obama all shared this vision and believed that international politics were a mechanism for increasing democracy and openness. The idea of the “West” was no longer thought to be a unique trait belonging to Western civilization, but a way of life that could be adopted and universalized by nations coming from distinctive cultural heritages. The features that characterize Western civilization include a legacy based on the classical civilizations of Greece and Rome, Christianity, European languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, the rule of law, social pluralism and civil society, self-government, and individualism.31 These features were believed to be “universal” features that all nations should strive to adopt even though their historical legacies have shaped and formed different systems and values. All three of these post-­ Cold War presidents were optimistic about liberal internationalism.32 Clinton was optimistic about economic openness and implemented the Washington Consensus. He aligned the new world order with the process of NATO enlargement and the growth of the European Union, all designed to halt the processes of nationalism and war. While the enlargement of the EU met little resistance, NATO enlargement was met with an initially reluctant foreign policy establishment in the United States. George Kennan, the architect of U.S. containment policy toward the Soviet Union, was the strongest critic and argued that enlargement eastward would receive a catastrophic counterreaction from Russia. He stated in an interview in 1998, “I think it is the beginning of a new Cold War…I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever.

 Kimmage (2020).  Fukuyama (2012). 31   Samuel P.  Huntington, “The West is Unique, not Universal,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-11-01/ west-unique-not-universal 32  Kimmage (2020). 29 30

36 

S. LOFTUS

No one was threatening anybody else.”33 Nevertheless, the process of enlargement was aimed at integrating the economies in Europe, creating institutional peace and cooperation as well as democracy promotion. For these reasons, such security concerns were dismissed based on the idea that expanding liberal democracy would be successful and ultimately create peace in Europe. Bush’s focus on the other hand was more geopolitical, but was nevertheless based on the same premise that liberalism was universal. Bush and his team believed promoting liberalism internationally would be the antidote to terrorism and war and therefore believed it was necessary to impose liberty by force if need be, particularly in the Middle East. After invading Afghanistan in 2001 as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it was advised that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq would be the next appropriate step in this global pursuit of freedom. Both of these wars lasted much longer and turned into unsuccessful processes of re-engineering societies that the United States didn’t understand very much about. Obama’s focus was on the promotion of institutions and partaking in wars of choice to achieve his goals of lifting people out of poverty and promoting multilateralism and human rights.34 Obama now appears as a transition between the ultra-fanaticism of the Bush administration and the belief in retrenchment advocated by Donald J.  Trump. Obama wanted to “lead from behind”35 and avoid getting involved in long, messy wars, particularly because he believed it was time to “pivot to Asia”36 to check the rise of China. U.S. involvement in Libya and Syria which took on this “leading from behind” characteristic however turned out to be no less destabilizing than Bush’s full-on interventions, they were however less costly in terms of resources and American lives. Although the three presidents attempted to “universalize” Western values, this did not occur in practice. “Liberty” did not overtake the Middle East, Russia and China did not liberalize, and the forces of nationalism did not dissipate. These policies inadvertently led to a deterioration of relations with Russia, thereby increasing instability in Eastern Europe. The 33  Thomas L. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs; Now a Word from X,” New York Times, May 2, 1998. https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/opinion/foreign-affairs-now-a-word-­­ from-x.html 34  Kimmage (2020). 35  Charles Krauthammer, “The Obama doctrine: Leading from behind,” Washington Post, April 28, 2011. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-obama-doctrine-leadingfrom-­behind/2011/04/28/AFBCy18E_story.html 36  Lieberthal (2011).

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

37

Arab Spring ultimately resulted in armed conflicts, repression, and increased terrorism in the region. The process of re-engineering Afghan society ended in catastrophic failure 20 years later, and Iraq turned into a failed state which invited the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. And while the intervention in Libya was not unilateral and had UNSC permission, the intervention was strangely similar to one of regime change without giving any thought to the aftermath. It has been argued that the West had historically engaged in repeated covert attempts to be rid of Muammar Gaddafi, and used the uprisings in Libya to support rebel forces and rid Libya of its leader. It is also questionable how much “genocide” was actually going on from the side of government forces prior to the intervention.37 Libya had always been rather problematic for the West, as it refused to open up economically with its vast energy reserves and failed to establish itself as a reliable partner in the U.S. “War on Terror.” Libya was also one of the strongest voices opposing the expansion of NATO and U.S. military power onto the African continent.38 During the NATO intervention, Gaddafi and his convoys were attacked by a NATO aircraft and he was then captured by the National Transitional Council (NTC) rebel forces and killed shortly afterward.39 No serious plan to keep the society stable was implemented after the intervention, which created a leadership vacuum that was filled by countless rebel groups and terrorists, rendering Libya a failed state. The instability spread to Mali and the rest of the Sahel, now a region fraught with terrorism and conflict. While China and Russia did not veto the resolution, during the course of the intervention they called for an immediate ceasefire as many countries began to question how NATO was leading its intervention campaign. The large-­ scale U.S., British, and French ground and air attacks were widely seen internationally as disproportionate, careless of civilian lives, and extending beyond the agreed plan to impose a defensive no-fly zone.40 Then, when the moment came to decide on the removal of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, China, along with Russia, resisted a Western push for a Security  Capasso and Cherstich (2014, p. 381).  Davidson (2017, pp. 91–116). 39  Reuters Staff. “Air strike hit 11 vehicles in Gaddafi convoy—NATO.” Reuters. 21 October 2011. https://www.reuters.com/article/nato-libya-gaddafi-idAFL5E7LL2L 820111021 40  Simon Tisdall, “The consensus on intervention in Libya has shattered,” The Guardian, 23 March 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/libyaceasefire-consensus-russia-china-india 37 38

38 

S. LOFTUS

Council Resolution. Lavrov was heard stating, “We would never allow the Security Council to authorize anything similar to what happened in Libya.”41 Interestingly, this is precisely when Russia began to shift into a more authoritarian direction as the leadership feared the West had similar plans for Russia. Mass effort to lessen Western influence was then implemented into society such as restrictions on media freedoms and labeling every Western-financed institution as a “foreign agent.”42 Carothers illustrates the declining value of democratic aid both as a perception and as a reality.43 The loss of global democratic momentum has encouraged the perception that democratic aid is either not helpful, wasteful, or politically inappropriate. The fact that some of the largest investments in democratic aid were made in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, which resulted in tremendous failures, have de-legitimized its utility. Bush’s emphasis on democracy promotion along with Western support of the color revolutions triggered heightened sensibilities about democracy aid in Russia and other post-Soviet countries. Domestic problems in the West also affect global perception as to whether liberal democracy truly is the right path for development. Another issue undermining democratic aid is simply feebler policy commitment as it has become riskier for many politicians due to its potential for unleashing sectarian conflict as in Iraq and Libya or for giving rise to populist anti-Western politicians in Hungary and parts of Latin America.44 In addition, U.S. political support for democracy promotion abroad has also waned since the Iraq War and other high-profile shocks in the Middle East.45 In Egypt, the administration did nothing as then-President Hosni Mubarak intensified political repression. In Palestine, the United States pressured the Palestinian Authority to hold democratic elections in 2006 which led to the victory of the militant group Hamas. In the Arab Spring, only one democracy resulted from the uprisings while democratic reversals, crackdowns, and state implosions occurred elsewhere. As a result of these setbacks, the 41  Sui Lee Wee, “Russia, China oppose ‘forced regime change’ in Syria,” Reuters, 1 February 2012. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-china-russia/russia-china-opposeforced-regime-change-in-syria-idUSTRE81007L20120201 42  Loftus (2018). 43  Carothers (2015, pp. 59–73). 44  Ibid. 45  Larry Diamond, “Democracy Demotion: How the Freedom Agenda Fell Apart,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-06-11/ democracy-demotion

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

39

American public simply lost enthusiasm for democracy promotion. In September 2001, 29% of Americans agreed that democracy promotion should be a top foreign policy priority. In 2013 that number fell to 18%46 and 17% in 2018.47

The Rise of Populism and Resentment of Liberal Policies The spread of neoliberal economic policies around the world was helpful in taking much of the world out of poverty, but the adverse effects of such policies are causing extreme challenges today such as the rise of populism48 and resentment in countries that were advised to take on these policies leading to detrimental results.49 Eventually, liberal economic policies created vast inequality50 throughout the world which thus undermined their viability. The point of no return was the 2008 financial crisis, which deeply underscored the dangers of excessive, un-monitored capitalism.51 The lingering effects of the crisis have weakened the appeal of liberal democracies on a global scale.52 In the EU, economic stagnation in Southern Europe sparked resentment and feelings of German domination as it demanded continentwide austerity, with a focus on cutting debt. Austerity measures proved to be disappointing for nations across the EU as they failed to recover properly from the crisis and subsequent recession in Europe.53 Due to the lack of a common fiscal policy, some EU states were unable to pull themselves out of the recession, which led to utterly disastrous results for Southern Europe.54 In Central Europe, nationalists defied Brussels and the idea of the liberal international order. Since then, the rise of “illiberal”  Drake (2021).  Pew Research Center (2018). 48  Putzel (2020, pp. 418–441). 49  Krastev and Holmes (2020). 50  Koechlin (2013, pp. 5–30). 51  “Laissez-Faire Capitalism Has Failed,” Forbes, February 19, 2009. https://www.forbes. com/2009/02/18/depression-financial-crisis-capitalism-opinions-­­columnists_recession_ stimulus.html?sh=21e91c7e22ef 52  Kagan (2018a). 53  McKee et al. (2012, pp. 346–350). 54  Max Bergman, “The Effects of the Crisis: Why Southern Europe?” American Progress, May 13, 2020. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/europes-lost-decade-demandsprogressive-response/ 46 47

40 

S. LOFTUS

democracies is more prevalent in the area.55 Economic difficulties along with the 2015 migrant crisis destabilized the continent, causing deep resentment in society toward the liberal elites.56 The United Kingdom left the EU, primarily for reasons of excessive globalization and immigration fears.57 In the United States the trends are similar with the victory of Donald Trump in 2016, who won the U.S. elections with an anti-liberal platform. Neoliberal policies prioritized efficiency over the social contract that initially pioneered post-World War II international liberal principles. Liberal market capitalism after World War II initially comprised social protections, particularly once Roosevelt took office and implemented the New Deal. Free-market policies were initially hailed as an important step in ensuring prosperity and broader freedoms throughout the world, and a wide body of research attests to their economic benefits in terms of reduced unemployment and increased economic growth. However, these policies sacrificed social and political rights in the interest of economic competitiveness.58 Prioritizing efficiency also led to the export of manufacturing jobs to produce goods at a lower cost as well as to the increasing demand and rise of technological automation which further reduced the need for middle-class workers. In the United States, these changes started as early as the 1970s. According to IMF statistics, by the 1980s, all growth in wealth had gone to the top 20% of earners while those without skills or a college education fell behind. Between 1974 and 2015, real median household income of those without a college degree fell by 24% while those with a college degree continued to increase. Meanwhile, the top 1% of earners experienced mass increases in wealth while middle and working classes saw the fewest income gains.59 Populist movements have flourished across the world. According to the 2017 Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index, almost 56 million people

 Rupnik (2018, pp. 24–38).  Ibid. 57  Lord Ashford, “How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why,” Lord Ashcroft Polls, June 24, 2016. https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-unitedkingdom-voted-and-why/ 58   Robert Blanton and Dursun Peksen, “The Dark Side of Economic Freedom: Neoliberalism has Deleterious Effects on Labour Rights,” LSE BPP, August 19th, 2016. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-dark-side-of-economic-freedom/ 59  Rachman (2017, pp. 61–64). 55 56

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

41

voted for a left or right-wing populist party.60 The vote share of these parties has been on the rise since the 1980s, but really gained strong momentum after the 2008 financial crisis. Populist vote share in the national elections of selected EU countries as of March 2018 equaled to 65% in Hungary, 54% in Greece, 51% in Poland, 50% in Italy, 49% in the Czech Republic, 35% in Cyprus, 34% in Slovakia, 32% in Estonia, 32% in Lithuania, 32% in Bulgaria, 26% in Austria, and 27% in France, percentages which dramatically increased since 2008.61 Attitudes toward the EU worsened as people became disappointed that it wasn’t delivering on its intended goals of economic prosperity, protection against crime and terrorism, control over immigration, and efficient public services. Many felt left behind by changes in society which accompany neoliberal economic displacement. As a result, levels of political trust toward European institutions started to decline. According to data from the Eurobarometer, levels of mistrust toward the European Commission rose from 27% to 47% in the period between 2007 and 2013, similar increases of mistrust occurred toward the European Parliament and the European Central Bank.62 The main drivers that push people toward populist parties include financial and economic crises, which have affected people’s incomes and economic opportunities; culture and identity politics—fear of immigration, globalization, and “others” have prompted a cultural backlash; social media and technological developments, which have exacerbated polarization,63 and foreign influence campaigns in Western domestic politics. The Pew Research Center has reported that in democracies across the West, trust in institutions such as the government and media is at an alltime low.64 Norris and Inglehart argue that there has been a “silent 60  Andreas J. Heinö, “Timbro Authoritarian Populism Index 2017,” Accessed August 5, 2022. https://timbro.se/allmant/timbro-authoritarian-populism-index2017/ 61  Statista, “Populist vote share in the national elections of selected European Union (EU) countries as of March 2018,” Accessed August 9, 2022. https://www.statista.com/statistics/883893/populism-in-europe/ 62  Diego Muro and Guillem Vidal, “Mind the Gaps: The Political Consequences of the Great Recession in Europe,” LSE Eurocrisis in the Press, June 10, 2014. https://blogs.lse. ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2014/06/10/mind-the-gaps-the-political-consequences-of-thegreat-recession-in-europe/ 63  Alan de Bromhead, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H. O’Rourke, “Right-Wing Political Extremism in the Great Depression,” Working Paper 17871 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012). http://www.nber.org/papers/w17871.pdf 64  European Commission (2018).

42 

S. LOFTUS

revolution” in cultural values that occurred during the second half of the twentieth century, transforming the culture of post-industrial societies.65 The postwar era’s unprecedentedly high levels of existential security encouraged a gradual rise of post-materialist values prioritizing individual free choice and self-expression. Traditional moral beliefs, social norms, and behaviors reflecting fixed social identities based on faith, family, and nation-state are being replaced by post-materialist and liberal values. The process of cultural change was reinforced by large-scale immigration, rising access to college education, and urbanization. Moreover, the lifestyles and values of younger populations in multiethnic cities differ sharply from those of older less educated and more homogeneous populations in small town, creating deep cultural divisions in American and European societies. Working-class families in the United States after the Cold War began struggling to maintain their middle-class status. Borrowing became more common in order to maintain their usual quality of life but after the 2008 financial crisis, many were left unable to repay their debts. A severe loss of status fueled this anti-liberal revolt in America just as it did in other countries such as Hungary. The appeal behind Trumpism lies with the idea of a lost past, when America was “great,” alluding to a more homogeneous society, U.S. unrivaled power in the world, distant threats of terrorism not concerning the homeland, and traditional gender roles for men and women. One particular issue that has really become problematic and that has bolstered the appeal of populism is the issue of immigration. In Eastern Europe in particular, there is fear that immigrants will enter without assimilating and dilute the national identity. Demographic realities in this part of the world incite additional fear as an aging population, low birth rates and high rates of emigration lead to strong panic about immigration. This reality coupled with the displacement of a large swathe of workers due to the automation revolution has resulted in deep anxiety. The 2015 Refugee Crisis in Europe led to additional resentment among the Visegrad nations toward Angela Merkel and Brussels as they believed her quota system for accepting refugees was unacceptable.66 Populist parties in Europe sharply criticized this policy as being excessively open to the world. Identity is a very emotional point upon which populists can mobilize  Norris and Inglehart (2019).  Laura Smith Spark, “Merkel calls for migrant quotas for EU states to combat crisis,” CNN, September 8, 2015. https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/08/europe/europe-­ migrant-­crisis/index.html 65 66

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

43

s­ ociety as it touches on concepts of belonging versus otherness and is particularly strong under conditions of economic stress or rapid and unpredictable social change.67 Huntington notoriously doubted that a culturally heterogeneous country could be politically well organized.68 He argues that citizenship in America is now defined by values such as the rule of law—values too abstract to bind together people from a vast array of different countries. The so-called liberal elites are often criticized for being “rootless cosmopolitans” inherently disloyal to their co-nationals for these reasons. Fidesz in Hungary has transformed itself into a populist party with the goal of turning Hungary into an “illiberal” democracy headed by Viktor Orban. Orban’s party has politically taken over all elements of the state.69 He gave a famous speech in Romania in 2014 on “illiberal democracy” and outlined his objectives.70 The executive and legislative branches in Hungary are no longer separate entities, and public administration has been filled with party loyalists.71 Similarly to a legislation adopted in Russia in 2012, nongovernmental organizations in Hungary receiving foreign funding have had to register as “foreign agents.”72 In Poland, political divides in the country sharpened with the refugee crisis of 2015 and enabled PiS to adopt an uncompromising anti-immigration position in its election campaign.73 As they took over power in 2015, the party enacted an almost complete takeover of the public administration, including  Evans (2015).  Huntington (2004). 69  Kornai (2015). 70  Barbara Surk, “Hungary’s biggest opposition newspaper shut down,” Politico, October 8, 2016. at https://www.politico.eu/article/hungarys-biggest-opposition-newspapersuspended/ 71  Reuters, “Ruling Fidesz party wants Soros-funded NGOs ‘swept out’ of Hungary,” January 11, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-fidesz-soros/ruling-­fidesz­party-wants-soros-funded-ngos-swept-out-of-hungary-idUSKBN14V0P2; Dalibor Rohac, “Crackdown on Hungary’s NGOs: Mirage or Reality?”, The Budapest Beacon, March 27, 2017, https://budapestbeacon.com/op-ed-crackdown-hungarys-ngos-mirage-reality/ 72  Neil Buckley and Henry Foy, “Poland’s new government finds a model in Orban’s Hungary,” Financial Times, January 6, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/0a3c7d44b48e-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f 73  Ronald F.  Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash.” Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP 16-026 (Harvard Kennedy School, 2016). https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/ getFile.aspx?Id=1401 67 68

44 

S. LOFTUS

remaking public service broadcasting with political appointees. Shortly after the election, the government introduced vast changes to the constitutional tribunal, which the court itself struck down as unconstitutional. The government then packed the court with political appointees, revoking any judicial review of new legislation.74 The National Council of the Judiciary, a formerly self-governing body, was brought under the full control of the parliament. As Krastev and Holmes argue, Hungary and Poland are suffering from politics of “resentment” due to their perceived grievances after attempting to unsuccessfully imitate a model that wasn’t their own. Disappointment with the results of the imitation process as well as resentment toward the West for leading and even imposing a failed idea on the world ensued even though the choice to imitate was entirely their own. Today, leaders in Poland and Hungary loudly condemn the West for assuming that there is no alternative political arrangement other than liberal democracy, that liberalism has abandoned pluralism for hegemony. They underscore that they do not wish to be like the Germans or the French, but would rather govern their societies based on their own interests and historical identity. In the post-Cold War era, the imitation of the West that formerly communist nations undertook, also known as globalization or democratization processes, is described by Krastev and Holmes as “modernization by imitation and integration by assimilation.”75 They argue that part of the root problem with today’s populist rage stems from the implied moral asymmetry and conceit that accompanies the processes of “monitoring” other societies through their transformations into becoming Western liberal democracies, a process which undermines local traditions. After the collapse of communism, East and Central European countries enacted policies formulated by bureaucrats from Brussels and international lending organizations in order to meet the conditions for EU membership. Moreover, what proved even more insulting to this set of nations is that they already considered themselves to be European before Brussels began to “Europeanize them.” This process led to feelings of loss of one’s unique 74  Sheri Berman, “Populism Is a Problem. Elitist Technocrats Aren’t the Solution,” Foreign Policy, December 20, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/20/populism-is-a-­ problem-elitist-technocrats-arent-the-solution/; The Economist, “The Power of Populists,” July 22, 2017. https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21725298when-elites-appear-ineffective-voters-give-radicals-­chance-power 75  Krastev and Holmes, Lights, 7.

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

45

identity, fostering a culture of resentment. As Rene Girard argued, imitation can become an obstacle to the self-esteem and self-realization of the imitators.76 This phenomenon is not unique to Central and Eastern Europe. Globally, a type of anti-liberal, anti-hegemonic countermovement has taken shape in part after the perceived shame of reshaping one’s unique identity to conform to the values of foreigners and being looked down upon for any inadequacies. Outside of the United States and Europe, this movement is visible in India, Brazil, the Philippines, Argentina, South Africa, Russia, and China just to name a few countries whose leaders have been vocal advocates for regaining the nation’s “lost identity” or “protecting” the identity of the nation from the forces of liberalism. The anti-­ liberal counter movement witnessed in this past decade is led by politicians such as Putin and Orban—but Trump was also a radically transformative figure. He rejected the traditional idea that America was an exemplary nation for all to mimic. The narrative Orban, Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte, or Turkish President Recep Erdogan have presented is that they represent the defenders of sovereignty against “liberal subversion.” They have also become closer economically and in their security relationships to Russia and China.77 The forces of neoliberal policies and the processes of globalization have led to a perceived sense of insecurity among Western populations about their livelihood, a reduction in trust in their leaders and institutions, and a tendency to blame excessive immigration on their job losses and threats to national identity. These problems need to be addressed for a liberal democracy to remain cohesive and healthy. Otherwise, political polarization will decay the society from within. In order to address these problems, it is important for establishment parties to bridge their policies with the plight of populist parties. As for the increase in international feelings of nationalism, this is a natural reaction to the processes of universalism and modernization.78 An international system based on political pluralism and pragmatism may be more appropriate in managing the challenges of modernity, particularly in a global system with the rising material capabilities of non-Western, non-liberal states possessing different sets of beliefs, interests, and identities.  Krastev and Holmes, Lights, 29.  Cooley and Nexon (2020a, p. 304). 78  Huntington, “West unique not Universal”. 76 77

46 

S. LOFTUS

The Rising Influence of Non-Western Powers Fukuyama famously described the end of the Cold War as the “End of History,” predicting that all nations would inevitably converge into liberal democracies as this form of governance had triumphed over communist dictatorship.79 Modernization theorists asserted that economic development would lead to democracy as the middle class in society would flourish and inevitably demand civil rights and political liberties.80 The trajectories undertaken by Russia and China point to flaws in this thinking as they liberalized their economies without democratizing. Today Russia and China have increased their global influence and promoted the diffusion of alternative norms and narratives which are in direct competition with the ideals of liberalism. The global distribution of wealth has shifted to the East in the last 50 years. Three of the four largest economies are now in Asia according to the IMF (those of China, India, and Japan). When measured in purchasing power parity, China now has the largest economy. By 2025, two-thirds of the world’s population will live in Asia, 5% in the United States, and 7% in the EU.81 For growth projections, the Economic Intelligence Unit predicts that over the next 40 years the share of the world’s real GDP at PPP accounted for by North America and Western Europe will fall from 40% in 2010 to 21% in 2050, whereas Asia’s share will double to 48.1%. The share of China alone will increase from 13.6% to 20%.82 After the Cold War, the United States was the leading trade partner for Japan, South Korea, and most countries of Southeast Asia—today, China holds this position. It is also the United States’ largest trading partner. This complicates the governance of the liberal international order because instead of Germany and Japan and the United States trilaterally managing the world economy, it is now in the hands of China and the United States to do so, even though they have very different political systems.83 The West served as a model to imitate for many countries after the Cold War. As Krastev and Holmes argue, different countries adopted different forms of imitation of the West after the Cold War which led to various forms of resentment today among nations who sacrificed national identity  Fukuyama (2018).  Lipset (1959, pp. 69–105). 81  Rachman (2017, p. 8). 82  Ibid. 83  Ikenberry (2020). 79 80

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

47

in the pursuit of imitating the Western model. China, on the other hand, practiced imitation of the West as “appropriation.”84 They employed joint venture agreements forcing Western firms to transfer innovative technologies without adapting Western forms of governance. Ultimately, their national identity was not put at risk and resentment did not ensue in the way it did in nations that tried to mimic the West.85 China thus serves as a model that shows that one does not have to be a liberal democracy to prosper. It also serves as an example of how to avoid national backlashes against liberalism—by remaining true to one’s own identity and traditions in the pursuit of economic development. While the United States never intervened in China to establish democracy the way it had in weaker countries, it did so in other less costly ways. In stronger states where forceful interventions were simply not advisable, techniques such as financing and establishing NGOs, supporting more Western-minded politicians and institutions, linking aid, membership in institutions, and trade to the country’s human rights record, and naming and shaming the nation for violations were employed as alternatives. Both Russia and China have reacted negatively to such efforts and have accused the United States of undermining their national sovereignty. China does not enjoy the frequent human rights’ harangues by the United States and accuses it of wanting regime change—China also thought the United States was behind the Hong Kong protests.86 Russia has also protested American support of color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. Since then, Russia has made it very difficult to have any source of foreign aid into the country. The Russia-China partnership has been widely discussed in contemporary international relations. Both aim to facilitate a global environment supportive of their regime at home and look to each other for support in this respect. They have broadly similar views about issues such as the primacy of state sovereignty, the threat of “subversive” liberal influences, and the need for control over domestic politics.87 Traditionally both countries have always advocated for non-interference in internal affairs and respecting diversity of civilizations and modes of governance. They view democracy promotion as a source of instability and are opposed to the  Krastev and Holmes, Lights.  Ibid. 86  Mearsheimer (2018, p. 28). 87  Lukin (2021). 84 85

48 

S. LOFTUS

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm and “color revolutions.” They oppose the export of one civilization or system of ideas to transform other civilizations and the idea of reforming others with “universal values” of human rights, democracy, and freedom. Both oppose the monopoly of Western states on trade, development markets, finance, and technology. Both oppose what they see as a “Cold War mentality,” with NATO in Europe, security mechanisms in Asia-Pacific, and the deployment of missile defense systems in their vicinity.88 While China’s rise truly does pose a challenge to U.S. global leadership, contrary to popular belief, China is not trying to dismantle the international order. It is however trying to gain more power and leadership within the order and is creating new non-Western-led institutions such as the BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among others. After the 2008 financial crisis, China became a lender for countries that were excluded by Western financial institutions. China lent $75 billion to Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan for energy deals. Total Chinese foreign aid assistance between 2000 and 2014 reached $354 billion, nearing the U.S. total of $395 billion.89 China has since surpassed annual U.S. aid disbursals.90 The growth of China’s influence abroad signifies a shift in global norms spreading. Very much as the United States managed to spread soft power influence throughout the world through the processes of globalization, China is now also able to exert such influence. China is already affecting global norms in how countries vote at the United Nations General Assembly91 and is creating a world more favorable to other forms of governance other than liberal democracy. China and Russia basically represent a “value-less” approach to international relations in that they are not promoting any single ideology but rely more on cooperation for national interests. While the global system is unlikely to transform into a bipolar order with two competing ideologies, it is likely to witness more Chinese-led institutions without the added characteristic of political ideology while the West is likely to maintain its value-based ideals for global governance. But should interactions and cooperation take place between countries that support a “value-based order” and countries that prefer  Ibid.  Cooley and Nexon (2020a). 90  Cooley and Nexon (2020b). 91  Mazarr et al. (2018) and Shatz (2016). 88 89

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

49

“value-free” interactions, it will have to take place with political pluralism and pragmatism—otherwise cooperation will not be possible. An example of this is Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan inciting China’s decision to pullback from cooperation with the United States on climate change and security issues.92 More incidents like this will keep happening if the United States continues to promote “value-based” engagement in areas of prime national security concerns to other great powers.

Analytical Conclusions During the highest point of U.S. primacy, when Western nations themselves were also performing at a high standard democratically, liberal democracy was seen as the global standard of political legitimacy and the best system for achieving prosperity and effective governance. Increasingly, this presumption is being called into question as unintended consequences from the policies of liberal hegemony and neoliberal economics have led to major disappointments. The challenges of modernity and rapid technological changes are also not being mitigated with appropriate policy choices. Within Western societies, domestic polarization and inequality have affected the health of democracy and encouraged populist sentiment. Internationally, “civilizational nationalism” has taken on a more dominant place in political rhetoric as a means to re-assert national identity in a hyper-globalized world. The world is also witnessing the rise of nondemocracies as global leaders such as China, which is affecting global norms away from the liberal normative framework. The challenges described in this chapter incite a discussion on the relationship between liberalism and nationalism. As described, even the constituencies in Western liberal democracy are protesting against excessive liberalism and would like to place more emphasis on national sovereignty. Nationalism at its core does not have to be excessive or violent or associated with regime types such as the Nazis. In fact, nationalism is necessary for the establishment of any healthy democracy as it prioritizes national cohesion. Without national cohesion, warring factions leading to excessive polarization and mistrust will destroy national unity. Not only that, but at the individual level it will tarnish the ability of the population to live a 92  The Associated Press, “China halts climate and military dialogue with the U.S. over Pelosi’s Taiwan visit,” NPR, August 5, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/08/05/1115 878668/china-taiwan-pelosi-climate-military

50 

S. LOFTUS

good and meaningful life. Western nations should aim to prioritize their citizens’ well-being, and create a healthy democracy by reducing inequality, minimizing money in politics, creating new jobs for displaced segments of the population, addressing mental health and addiction issues as a public health concern, and easing access to education. Economic efficiency should also not necessarily be the goal but rather economic resilience. Economic resilience consists of fair free trade agreements for domestic workers while also diversifying supply chains and possibly re-­ regionalizing some of them. COVID-19-related shortages in medical protective equipment made the world understand how important it was not to rely on a single point of failure in supplies in case of emergencies such as these. Some argue that nationalism and liberalism are opposed political positions.93 Hazony defines nationalism as a world of nation-states cultivating their own traditions and pursuing their own interests without interference. In contrast, he defines liberalism as an inherently imperialist political philosophy as it claims to be the sole legitimate form of government and justifies spreading it globally. But this doesn’t have to be the case. A healthy form of both can co-exist in an international setting. Because nationalism was discredited by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the political culture in the Western world is defined in direct opposition to regimes such as these. Fukuyama and Hazony both agree that the current crisis is a product of liberalism’s weakness in generating bonds of mutual respect and affection among citizens, thereby affecting collective consensus.94 In terms of forming a responsible foreign policy for the United States, respecting the different interpretations and implementation of universal liberal ideas and national sovereignty is advisable in a world of diverse nation-states. It was made clear that the “universalization” of a single model does not work. This is more in line with a realist foreign policy. Mearsheimer and Walt have argued for “offshore balancing.” This entails forgoing ambitious efforts to remake other societies, deviating responsibility to regional actors for regional security affairs, and concentrating on major priorities. They argue that such a strategy would actually preserve U.S. primacy further into the future and protect liberty at home. This  Hazony (2018).  Fukuyama (2018).

93 94

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

51

strategy respects nationalism abroad, does not aim to impose American values on foreign societies, and focuses on making American society worthy of emulating.95 Neoconservatives, liberals, and other idealists view American retreat as disastrous for the liberal international world order and for liberal internationalism. Stephens argues that a profound crisis awaits the world should America retreat, particularly as adversaries will see this as an opportunity to increase their influence worldwide. He makes a strong case for the continuation and re-establishment of “Pax Americana.” By re-embracing the role as global policeman, Stephens argues that the United States can safeguard peace and prosperity both at home and abroad.96 Kagan fears that a new consensus has grown out of pessimism from lengthy and unsuccessful wars in the Middle East and from the 2008 financial crisis, calling for more restraint in U.S. foreign policy. Trump’s victory in 2016 can be seen as a repudiation of the old strategy of liberal hegemony. This school of thought fears that, absent a liberal hegemon, the world will resort to violent multipolar competition, instability, insecurity, and domination. In other words, a liberal hegemon is needed to underwrite the norms and institutions that govern the liberal international order and to provide security guarantees through its military might. The security conditions are then expected to provide an open economic order where nations can compete and succeed.97 The problem with this line of thinking is that it doesn’t fully recognize the consequences of U.S. interventions and the particularities of national identities and interests. It also overestimates the United States’ ability to transform societies. U.S. interventions have had severely destabilizing consequences, regardless of the positive intention behind them. More importantly, the United States doesn’t have to choose between retreat and full-on engagement. Also, the alternative to American hegemony does not have to symbolize the end of international cooperation. There can be international cooperation and multilateralism without a liberal hegemonic ideology. This era of “great power competition” does not have to turn gruesome. Avoiding war entails adopting more of a “balance of power” approach to 95  John J.  Mearsheimer and Stephen M.  Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing, A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing 96  Stephens (2015). 97  Kagan (2018b).

52 

S. LOFTUS

international relations. Some realists maintain that a balance-of-power system is more stable than one with a dominant state, as aggression is unprofitable when there is an equilibrium of power between rival coalitions. Allowing for a more “balance of power” approach to great power competition would also free up much-needed resources to improve the domestic situation in the United States. This would entail more pragmatic management of international security affairs, finding agreements that would more likely be suboptimal, but would allow for political pluralism and particularities of national interests. The chapter on Ukraine will provide a case study as to what can happen when pragmatic solutions to international security matters are not employed. If the goal is to achieve peace, liberal hegemony as a foreign policy is not the answer, particularly in an era of rising non-Western, non-liberal powers with different identities and interests. The answer rather lies with pluralism and pragmatic multilateralism. As the “third wave of democratization”98 spread through formerly communist countries, the United States was at the height of its power— serving as the example for the world to follow to achieve prosperity, freedom, and development. Just 15 years later it became increasingly evident that imitating the United States and Western Europe was either not entirely possible or not entirely desirable. When nations such as Russia and China prospered without politically liberalizing, this served as an important example—particularly in the case of China. China has become a modern-­day example of how prosperity can thrive in a non-liberal democracy. Modernization theory and liberal assumptions on integration proved incorrect as economic development and engagement didn’t lead to a change in political regime. As it pertains to global democracy proliferation, the argument that “politics follows geopolitics” may be oversimplified.99 Democratic processes have demonstrated to be quite complex and depend on a variety of factors to succeed, particularly domestic-born factors. The presence of a liberal hegemon is certainly not enough for democracy to proliferate. While having a successful liberal hegemon as an example to follow may have been necessary for the initial “euphoria” that took hold after the end of the Cold War, the processes of democratization proved to be much more nuanced and often unsuccessful. Levitsky and Way correctly pointed out how many of the countries that were presumed to be democratizing in the 1990s were only experiencing  Huntington (1991).  Kagan (2018a).

98 99

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

53

economic crises and resumed autocratic practices after economic recovery in the 2000s.100 Moreover, Diamond also correctly pointed out that many who actually did attempt democratization just achieved a “hybrid” status or partial democracy.101 As is mentioned throughout this book, the societal factors that were long institutionalized in Western civilization created the proper environment for democratic proliferation and consolidation. Other countries belonging to different civilizational backgrounds or having experienced different historical legacies may not have had the right institutional ground laid out for the consolidation of liberal democracy. This is significant for two reasons. First, it suggests that universalizing a single model of governance based on Western liberal democracy is a futile endeavor. Second, it suggests that the rise of Russia and China more specifically are not threatening to global democracy—as democracy is homegrown and democratic consolidation is highly dependent on institutional legacy as opposed to external power influence. When it comes to Western liberal institutions such as the European Union or NATO, it is in their right to have a “value-based” approach to managing their politics and enlarging their institutions to those who express interest in doing so. However, this should not necessarily be an “open-ended” or “open-door” issue. These institutions need to make a fundamental choice about their identity and future purpose in the world. They need to decide if their “common values” are the main driving force behind their existence or whether “common interests” are the main driving force. Only when understanding this baseline will it be possible to make sound policy afterward. Enlarging to include weak and unconsolidated liberal democracies will not transform these nations into Western liberal democracies. If these institutions want to enlarge, it must be based on the premise of “mutual interests.” If they wish to persist with a priority of “common values” then there are already some very questionable members within these institutions that do not seem to belong there based on their political systems. If the choice is common values, this does not mean the EU cannot lend its support to nations in the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe—there is ample room for cooperation and trade outside the framework of the European Union.

 Levitsky and Way (2018).  Diamond (2018).

100 101

54 

S. LOFTUS

In line with realist thought, this chapter argues that the spread of liberal democracy through interventions has been destabilizing and unsuccessful. Neoliberal economic policies have also had unintended consequences, and democracy in Western democracies has suffered from populist sentiment and political polarization. When it comes to the sustainability of global democratic governance and whether a liberal hegemon is needed for that, this book argues that democracy is homegrown and depends more on domestic institutions than the presence of a liberal hegemon. The struggles the world is seeing with democracy today are not a result of declining American hegemony but a result of flawed policies as well as cultural distinctions with societal governance. Along with the unintended negative consequences of policy choices, the rise of non-Western powers from a different normative background is also challenging the assumption of liberalism as a universal normative framework.

References Acharya, A. (2020). The Myth of the ‘Civilization State’: Rising Powers and the Cultural Challenge to World Order. Ethics & International Affairs, 34(2), 139–156. Brands, H. (2016). American Grand Strategy and the Liberal Order: Continuity, Change, and Options for the Future (p. 2). RAND Corporation. Capasso, M., & Cherstich, I. (2014). The Libyan Event and the Part for the Whole. Middle East Critique, 23(4), 381. Carothers, T. (2015). Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 59–73. Cooley, A., & Nexon, D. (2020a). Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order (p. 304). Oxford University Press. Cooley, A., & Nexon, D. H. (2020b, July/August). How Hegemony Ends: The Unraveling of American Power. Foreign Affairs, 99(4). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends Davidson, C. M. (2017). Why Was Muammar Qadhafi Really Removed? Middle East Policy, 24(4), 91–116. Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. The Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 21–35. Diamond, L. (2018). Facing up to the Democratic Recession. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Drake, B. (2021, March 2). Americans Put Low Priority on Promoting Democracy Abroad. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-­ank/2021/ 03/02/americans-­put-­low-­priority-­on-­promoting-­democracy-­abroad-­2/.

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

55

European Commission. (2018). Final report of the High-Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation. European Commission. https://ec. europa.eu/digital-­single-­market/en/news/final-­r eport-­high-­level-­expert­group-­fake-­news-­and-­online-­disinformation Evans, A. (2015). Ideological Change Under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory. Demokratizatsiya, 23(4). Freedom in the World. (2022). Reversing the Decline of Democracy in the United States. Freedom House. Retrieved August 4, 2022, from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-­world/2022/global-­expansion-­authoritarian-­ rule/reversing-­decline-­democracy-­united-­states Fukuyama, F. (2012). The End of History and the Last Man. Penguin Books. Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Encounter Books. Hazony, Y. (2018, September 4). The Virtue of Nationalism. Basic Books. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (p. 13). University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, S.  P. (2004). Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. Simon & Schuster. Ikenberry, J. (2001). After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (pp. 23, 45). Princeton University Press. Ikenberry, J. (2020). A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Yale University Press. Jay, S., Batruch, A., Jetten, J., McGarty, C., & Muldoon, O. T. (2019). Economic Inequality and the Rise of Far-right Populism: A Social Psychological Analysis. Community & Applied Social Psychology, 29(5), 418–428. Kagan, R. (2018a). The Weight of Geopolitics. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Kagan, R. (2018b). The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World. Knopf. Keohane, R. O. (2005). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. University Press. Kimmage, M. (2020). The Abandonment of the West: The History of an Idea in American Foreign Policy (p. 384). Basic Books. Koechlin, T. (2013). The Rich Get Richer: Neoliberalism and Soaring Inequality in the United States. Challenge, 56(2), 5–30. Kornai, J. (2015). Hungary’s U-Turn. Capitalism and Society, 10(1). http:// www.kornai-­janos.hu/Kornai_Hungary’s%20U-­Turn.pdf Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2020). The Light that Failed: A Reckoning. Pegasus Books. Lake, D. A., Martin, L. L., & Risse, T. (2021). Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization. International Organization, 75(2), 225–257.

56 

S. LOFTUS

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2018). The Myth of Democratic Recession. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Lieberthal, K. G. (2011, December 21). The American Pivot to Asia. Brookings Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-­american-­pivot-­to-­asia/ Lipset, S.  M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. Loftus, S. (2018). Insecurity and the Rise of Nationalism in Putin’s Russia: Keep of Tradition Values. Palgrave. Lukin, A. (2021). The Russia–China Entente and Its Future. International Politics, 58, 363–380. Mazarr, M. J., Heath, T. R., & Cevallos, A. S. (2018). China and the International Order (p. 18). RAND Corporation. McKee, M., Karanikolos, M., Belcher, P., & Stuckler, D. (2012). Austerity: A failed experiment on the people of Europe. Clinical Medicine, 12(4), 346–350. Mearsheimer, J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press. Mearsheimer, J. (2019, Spring). Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. International Security, 43(4), 7–50. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge University Press. Office of the Historian. (2022, August 9). American Isolationism in the 1930s. U.S.  Department of State. Retrieved August 9, 2022. https://history.state. gov/milestones/1937-1945/american-isolationism Pew Research Center. (2018, November 29). Conflicting Partisan Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/11/29/conflicting-­partisan-­priorities-­for-­u-­s-­foreign-­policy/ Piccone, T. (2018, September). China’s Long Game on Human Rights at the United Nations. Brookings Institution. Retrieved August 4, 2022, from h t t p s : / / w w w. b r o o k i n g s . e d u / w p -­c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 8 / 0 9 / FP_20181009_china_human_rights.pdf Porter, P. (2018). A World Imagined, Nostalgia and the Liberal Order. In Policy Analysis (vol. 843). CATO Institution. Putzel, J. (2020). The ‘Populist’ Right Challenge to Neoliberalism: Social Policy Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Development and Change, 51(2), 418–441. Rachman, G. (2017). Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline. Other Press. Rupnik, J. (2018, July). Explaining Eastern Europe: The Crisis of Liberalism. Journal of Democracy, 29(3), 24–38. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/ articles/explaining-­eastern-­europe-­the-­crisis-­of-­liberalism/ Shatz, H. J. (2016). U.S. International Economic Strategy in a Turbulent World. RAND Corporation.

2  MANAGEMENT OF THE LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

57

Stephens, B. (2015). America in Retreat: The New Isolationism and the Coming Global Disorder. Sentinel. United Nations. (2022). UN General Assembly votes to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council. United Nations. https://news.un.org/en/story/ 2022/04/1115782 Walt, S.  M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances (Vol. 5, pp.  17–29). Cornell University Press. Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772

CHAPTER 3

Russian-Western Relations: A Trust Never Built

Introduction When the Cold War ended, the United States and its allies believed that their victory had symbolized the triumph of liberal democracy over authoritarianism, of free-market economies over communism, that the world had reached its final form of governance and war would be a thing of the past. Francis Fukuyama famously described the era as the “end of history,”1 an epoch where nations would move beyond great power conflict and focus on the proliferation of freedom and prosperity for all. Joining the U.S.-led liberal international order was considered an “absolute” gain, or a win-win situation, as having a stake in the liberal world order as an active member of international institutions would prevent actors from behaving in zero-sum ways. It was argued that an open trading system with multilateral frameworks and norms would discourage nationalism and mercantilism.2 The idea of “institutional constraint” is the driving force behind liberal internationalism’s logic. Robert Keohane argued in After Hegemony that the international system could remain stable in the absence of a hegemon, a prospect that contradicts hegemonic stability theory, which asserts that the international system is more likely 1 2

 Fukuyama (2012).  Ikenberry (2020).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_3

59

60 

S. LOFTUS

to remain stable when a single state is the dominant world power. Keohane showed that international cooperation could be sustained through repeated interactions, transparency, and monitoring, even if American hegemony wanes.3 Other liberal theories influencing policy included the democratic peace theory. This theory asserts that democracies are more likely to cooperate and unlikely to go to war with one another, thereby justifying the spread of democracy around the globe.4 Modernization theorists argued that democracy would occur naturally as countries liberalized their economies. Since the processes of economic development would bring about a middle class, social and political change would be inevitable as people would demand more rights and freedoms.5 The logic was that “balance of power”6 politics was no longer an issue as joining the liberal international order was in everyone’s best interest. Balance of power politics entails ensuring other powers do not gain too much relative power to be able to dominate all others. “Bandwagoning” and alliance formations are the strategies used to build more equilibrium of power in the international system. While admirable in theory, in practice, liberal theories have faced important challenges. Liberal theories are based on the assumption that every nation believes in the universality of liberal political and economic policies, thereby neglecting nationalism, particularism, and political pluralism. They negate the idea that nations have unique identities that shape their developmental path and national interests. They assume that only “bad actors” don’t follow the rules. They negate the hegemonic structure of the system and assume it would look the same if American hegemony wanes. Or even if American hegemony persists, it is understood as benevolent and in the interest of all nation-states. More importantly, the world order created on the premise of liberal theories tends to apply a double standard when it comes to rule-following. When the United States invaded Iraq, no countries imposed crippling sanctions on the country because these would have destroyed the global economy. In other words, powerful actors can

 Keohane (2020, pp. 1–18) and Keohane and Martin (1995, pp. 39–51).  Doyle (1997), Doyle (1983a, pp. 205–235, 1983b, pp. 323–353, 1986, pp. 1151–1169) and Kant (1991). 5  Lipset (1959, pp. 69–105). 6  Walt (1987, pp. 5, 17–29). 3 4

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

61

easily get away with bending the rules—which renders the rules-based system skewed, particularly toward the interests of the powerful. When China and Russia began liberalizing their economies, the idea was that through the forces of liberalization and modernization, their political systems would convert to liberal democracies and they would become “responsible stakeholders” in the international system. Conversely, both countries opened their economies to the world and retained their authoritarian values if not doubled down on them. China engages in unfair trading practices with the West to its advantage, despite joining the liberal market system. China and Russia have undertaken separate paths to prosperity other than the liberal democratic path. They practice forms of state-­ led capitalism and have authoritarian regimes. China has reached an impressive level of prosperity, and while Russia hasn’t reached such levels of development, in the 2000s, its system of governance managed to take the country out of poverty and dramatically reduce crime in society. For these reasons, along with helping the country found a post-Soviet national identity, the regime has political legitimacy inside the country and the consent of the governed.7 Most Russians will say they believe in a “special form of democracy” for Russia that is different from that of liberal democracy. There is a tendency in the West to assume that people who live under autocracy must be wishing for a life under liberal democracy. But as Tsygankov astutely argues, the “strong state” is just another political system and institutional arrangement to concentrate and distribute human resources in the interests of the common good. The strong state does this by relying on centralized and concentrated authority of the executive rather than on checks and balances.8 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 also shows that liberal cost-benefit analyses on whether or not the invasion was “rational” did not determine the outcome of the decision to invade. The argument that “institutional constraint” would lead to peace because there would be simply too much to lose by acting outside of the rules proved not to be the case in this situation. As liberals would argue, this is because Russia is an authoritarian regime, or a “bad actor,” as liberal theories insist that democracies are more peaceful and do not go to war with each other.9 But these assumptions oversee the basic tenants of structural theories that assert that actors  Loftus (2022, pp. 1–30).  Tsygankov (2014). 9  Doyle (1997). 7 8

62 

S. LOFTUS

act according to their national security interests and that liberal democracies themselves have also behaved in horrific ways in the interest of their national security interests.10 While the international community views the invasion as purely “irrational” due to major economic interests that Russia lost as a result, it neglects to see that for the Russian elite, it may have been the most “rational” thing to do according to their national security priorities. While the West believed the post-Cold War era was characterized as one of idealism and liberalism, other actors continued to view international relations through a realist lens. Mearsheimer argued that the United States quickly became consumed in spreading liberal democracy across the globe and ignored the important forces of nationalism and realism in that process, or basically, the forces that would react antagonistically to such a policy. In addition, spreading democracy across the world led to a heavily militarized foreign policy where the United States engaged in endless wars after the Cold War which led to rising insecurity in regions touched by this policy as well as ripple effects felt in other regions. The realist camp that Mearsheimer finds himself in argues that NATO expansion and the Bush doctrine were classic flaws as they were driven by a liberal logic of democratization across the globe. The foreign policy of “liberal hegemony” is therefore doomed to fail due to the forces of nationalism, sovereignty, and self-determination.11 While the West had hoped for a universal convergence on its value system of freedom, democracy, liberal markets, and human rights—China and Russia along with many other rising powers have reacted by doubling down on their nationalism and civilizational identity, which is often in direct contradiction with liberal values. The processes of globalization have helped precipitate this backlash, as nations became fearful of losing themselves to globalism and universalism. This backlash has even been seen within Western countries, as described in the previous chapter. Much of the deterioration of Russian-Western relations has to do with “perceptions and misperceptions” in international politics.12 Decision-­ making is highly based on an actor’s perceptions of the international security environment as well as the perceived intentions of the other. This often leads to issues such as escalation and miscalculations, increasing the  Waltz (1979).  Mearsheimer (2018). 12  Jervis (1976). 10 11

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

63

probability of war. While the West viewed its own actions as benevolent in the spread of democracy and in the enlargement of NATO and the EU, Russia at times perceived these actions as hegemonic and as a direct threat to its national security when these processes interfered with its national interests through zero-sum competition. Concomitantly, Russia’s increasing assertiveness and aggressive policies led the West to perceive that Russia was a revisionist actor that needed to be contained. After the 2014 crisis in Ukraine, due to negative perceptions of one another and poor expectations, escalation between the West and Russia occurred incrementally and ultimately created more insecurity. Here each side’s actions to deal with a potential threat reinforced the other side’s own security fears, which in turn triggered a response that strengthened the former’s original concerns. Each side sees what it is doing as purely defensive in reaction to the other’s behavior. As Walt argues, “aggressive behavior does not necessarily arise from evil or aggressive motivations….yet when leaders believe their own motives are purely defensive and that this should be obvious to others, they will tend to see an opponent’s hostile reaction as evidence of an evil foreign leader’s malicious and unappeasable ambitions.”13 While there is no real solution to prevent the security dilemma from occurring, diplomacy, equilibrium, and pragmatic compromises that are often suboptimal may be the path to take to prevent escalation and war. This chapter delves into Russian-Western relations after the Cold War and describes how the U.S.-led liberal international order faced important limitations when faced with a former great power striving to remain important in world affairs.

Drivers of Change in Russian-Western Relations When the Soviet Union dissolved, the Russian economy struggled to recover from the shock. In 1991, the country adopted radical, market-­ oriented reforms, or “shock therapy,” as recommended by the United States and IMF. As a result of the removal of Soviet price control, hyperinflation ensued, which was aggravated by the 1998 Russian financial crisis. As the official successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia also took up

13  Stephen Walt, “Does Anyone Still Understand the ‘Security Dilemma’?” Foreign Policy, July 26, 2022.

64 

S. LOFTUS

the responsibility for settling the USSR’s external debts.14 Between 1991 and 1998, the Russian GDP contracted by an estimated 40%.15 As the economy liberalized, oligarchs took advantage of the privatization schemes and enriched themselves to the point where they had more power than the state itself. At this time, organized crime and other forms of crime were rampant and the governing elite faced immense constitutional disagreements. At this stage, Russia declared its intention to liberalize and democratize and join the West with the hopes that it would have a significant role in this new architecture. Initially, then-President Boris Yeltsin and thenPresident Bill Clinton had a rather positive relationship. However, a major difference in how Russia and the United States saw the end of the Cold War provided the framework for the continued tensions in the relationship. For Russia, everyone had come out of the Cold War victorious, and it was the moment when Russia and the West would transcend the global order and create a new inclusive security architecture in Europe and an international system where Russia would have an equal say in important security-related decisions as the United States and Europe.16 For the West, the USSR and its autocratic communist system had failed, and Russia would now join the West in a weakened position and become a responsible stakeholder in the U.S.-led liberal democratic world order. Tsygankov details how Russians across the political spectrum rejected Francis Fukuyama’s “End of history” thesis and the liberal normative hegemony it assumed. He asserts that this thinking “denied Russia the legitimacy of its search for a post-Cold War identity of its own,” contributing to the rise of “radically anti-Western forces” in Russia.17 “Democratization” processes in the 1990s in Russia proved unsuccessful for a number of reasons. The system Yeltsin created comprised a powerful presidency resting on charismatic legitimation, a weakened legislature, and ineffective parties and was therefore unstable.18 Oligarchs had control over the state apparatus and the economy was in ruins—a situation that notably worsened after the 1998 Asian financial crisis. The United States was providing advice to Russia at this time and advocated a “loans for 14  Dmitry Sudakov, “Russia Pays Off USSR’s Entire Debt, Sets to Become Crediting Country,” Pravda, August 22, 2006. https://english.pravda.ru/russia/84038-parisclub/. 15  Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, “A Normal Country,” Foreign Affairs, 2004. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/normal_country_foreign_affairs.pdf 16  Sakwa (2017). 17  Tsygankov (2002, pp. 423–446). 18  Gill (2002, pp. 169–197).

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

65

shares” program, which became a later source of Russian resentment, as it saw Western advice as undermining the economy.19 Moreover, a strong civil society was absent in Russia, which made it easier for members of the elite to subvert reform.20 In other words, the liberalization and democratization processes were a time of great instability in Russia, and for that reason, the society has developed a type of cultural aversion to these processes and has instead formed a consensus that the country needs a special form of democracy that is different from that of the West, suitable to its unique development and political model.21 This narrative proved highly significant in Putin’s later transformation of the society back into a more authoritarian direction.22 Experiences shape national perceptions and are part of the constantly evolving process of national identity shaping. Russian history is characterized by the country possessing “great power status.” The 1990s was a time of collective shame both in regard to Russian internal affairs and how Russia conducted its foreign policy in a secondary position to the West. While Russia was hoping its interests would be carefully taken into account in major international security decisions, on many instances this wasn’t the case. For Russia the “liberal international order” started to appear as an exclusively American international order where other important powers’ opinions were neglected. A perception developed that the United States was not the “benevolent hegemon” it claimed to be and that liberal institutions and interventions were just a subtext for American power and domination. Institutions such as NATO and the EU are also viewed as American-led or American-influenced. These were part of the Russian grievances that led to the deterioration of relations with the West and helped shape Russian post-Soviet national identity in relation to the “hostile other,” a term used in constructivist theory in international relations that describes how nations form their identity in relation to their most significant other.23 This identity-shaping concept will be elaborated further in the chapter. When the Cold War ended, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact disintegrated while its counterpart NATO lived on to find a new “raison d’ être.” ThenSoviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev demanded that the alliance  D’Anieri (2019, p. 22).  Evans (2011, pp. 40–51). 21  Levada Center. “Does Russia Need Democracy?” Levada Center, Accessed August 12, 2022. https://www.levada.ru/en/2014/11/05/does-russia-need-democracy/. 22  Sharafutdinova (2020). 23  Tajfel and Turner (1986, p. 19). 19 20

66 

S. LOFTUS

not expand eastward and Russian successors maintained that they were misled on this question. As an organization that was designed to be hostile to the USSR, Gorbachev made it clear to then-U.S.  Secretary of State James Baker that any attempt to extend its zone would be unacceptable.24 Boris Yeltsin continued to press the issue with Bill Clinton, stating that continued enlargement would create distrust among Russia and the United States. Then-Head of Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Yevgeny Primakov, who later became the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, argued that NATO expansion would necessitate a more robust Russian defense posture due to the fact that it was a serious security question. Moscow’s Council on Foreign and Defense policy also warned that NATO enlargement would make the Baltic States and Ukraine a zone of intense strategic rivalry.25 In other words, NATO enlargement was a case of the classic “security dilemma” in international relations theory.26 This theory asserts that even in the peaceful pursuit of security, states unintentionally create insecurity and threats to others. Building armaments, putting military forces on alert, and forming new alliances are all examples of increasing one’s security, which makes other states less secure and leads them to respond in kind. The result is a situation of hostility between actors whereby neither is better off than before. The end of the Cold War did not solve this problem. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Mearsheimer predicted that if the United States withdrew from Europe, security fears would prompt Germany to acquire nuclear weapons.27 That prediction was one reason why the United States did not depart and why NATO did not disband, but many worried that it was unclear where NATO expansion would stop or how far it would go before the West more or less permanently alienated Russia.28 At this moment Clinton faced a choice to expand NATO based on the assumption that Russia would try to dominate its neighbors or to wait until there was a concrete threat. Although the United States decided to 24  Mark Steil, “Russia’s Clash with the West Is About Geography, Not Ideology,” Foreign Policy, February 12, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/12/russias-clash-with-­ the-west-is-about-geography-not-ideology/; UK Defence Forum, “NATO’s Failed Strategy,” Defence Viewpoints. Accessed August 12, 2022. http://www.defenceviewpoints. co.uk/articles-and-analysis/natos-failed-strategy. 25  Steil, “Russia’s Clash”; UK Defence Forum, “NATO’s Failed Strategy”. 26  Jervis (1978, pp. 167–214). 27  Mearsheimer (1990, pp. 5–56). 28  Art (1998, p. 383).

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

67

act preemptively, the latter approach would have been Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan’s preferred choice. Kennan argued that the United States was essentially signing up to protect a series of countries without having the resources nor the intention of doing so in any serious way, pitting an under-resourced NATO against an ever more embittered and authoritarian Russia.29 In Kennan’s long telegram, he argued that the Kremlin’s view of world affairs is guided by a profound sense of insecurity. As a vast, sparsely populated country with important transport challenges, it has a natural tendency to fracture and historically never had a friendly neighbor. The fact that it has no mountain ranges or bodies of water to protect its western borders was a high point of insecurity and led it to suffer repeated invasions. This geographical and historical reality allowed for the emergence of a highly centralized and autocratic leadership to form which was obsessed with matters of internal and external security.30 This is another example of how history can shape strategic culture, threat perceptions, and national identity. Though an enlargement proponent, other warnings emanated from Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott who warned that an expanded NATO that excludes Russia would not contain its expansionist impulses but provoke them.31 In Washington, the debate on NATO enlargement was won by those advocating for support for the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe in order to help create a lasting peace in Europe. The logic followed that it was of little relevance if these new members were of little military value for the alliance or difficult to defend because there would be no real need to. In addition, they viewed enlargement as benign and that it would not be viewed as a threat to Moscow. When Putin became president in late 1999 or early 2000, the state of Russian-Western relations was not as strained as it is today. Putin openly stated that Russia was open to “Westernizing” and possibly even joining NATO. Putin voiced his opposition to NATO expansion and stressed that 29  “George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram,’” February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945–1949, 861.00/2-2246; reprinted in US Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 696–709. https://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/116178 30  Ibid. 31  Steil, “Russia’s Clash”; UK Defence Forum, “NATO’s Failed Strategy”.

68 

S. LOFTUS

Russia must be “an equal partner.”32 In 2001, Putin laid out his thinking on how to navigate NATO-Russia relations. The simplest solution, he argued, would be to dissolve NATO. But since this was not on the agenda for the foreseeable future, the second possible option he argued would be to include Russia in NATO, thereby creating a single defense and security space. The third option could be the creation of a different kind of organization which would set itself these tasks and which would incorporate the Russian Federation.33 None of these suggestions caught on. At the beginning of his tenure as President, Putin displayed softer rhetoric on NATO enlargement due to the status of Russian-Western relations at the time. As relations deteriorated and the hopes for a pan-European security architecture were dashed, rhetoric on NATO enlargement became increasingly hostile. In 2001, after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Putin offered his help and allowed the United States to station bases in Central Asia for its invasion of Afghanistan. However, several key events shaped the future of Russian-Western relations. The unilateral NATO bombings of Yugoslavia both in 1995 and 1999 had profound effects as Russia was essentially against these moves34 but had no real power or influence to affect the outcome. Furthermore, the U.S. withdrawal from the long-­ standing Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 increased Russia’s sense of insecurity. This is a classic example of a state acting outside of liberal institutional arrangements to try and gain more security for itself at the expense of another. The ABM treaty itself was seen by Russia as “the cornerstone of global strategic stability,”35 and abrogating it was seen as a dangerous effort to gain a unilateral advantage. The fact that the deployment of any ABM system would require a basing component in the new NATO members in Central Europe further underscored the strategic impact of NATO enlargement. At this moment, Putin’s rhetoric was more diplomatic as his aim was to foster positive relations with the West. Putin stated that ­confrontation would no longer be an issue between Russia and the West if 32  Kremlin.ru. “Interview to BBC Breakfast with Frost,” March 5, 2000. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24194 33  Peter Baker, “Putin Offers West Reassurances and Ideas on NATO,” Washington Post, July 18, 2001. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/07/19/putinoffers-west-reassurances-and-ideas-on-nato/99892a84-fde0-43d6-aa10-35d9c842c50a/ 34  Joe Lauria, “Yugoslavia: China, Russia Threaten to Block UN Kosovo Resolution,” Radio Free Europe, June 9, 1999. https://www.rferl.org/a/1091495.html 35  Pushkov et al. (2005, p. 56).

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

69

the relationship took the road suggested by British Prime Minister Tony Blair who advocated for a change in the NATO-Russia relationship.36 As the years went by, these mild responses though widely praised in the West produced few practical gains for Russia.37 The NATO-Russia Council was established in 2002 and was considered progress toward the development of an equal partnership.38 Nevertheless, it ignored a serious contradiction: the group was meant to assuage Russia’s concerns about expansion by giving it a larger voice without veto power. Thus, Russia’s “influence” in NATO was predicated upon Russia acquiescing to what it most objected to. As the years went on, Europe and the United States increasingly objected to Putin’s illiberal policies and the relationship became untenable. In the short term, however, it was bitterness over Iraq that halted the warming in NATO-Russia relations.39 A major factor in the deterioration of the relationship was the unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States which broke international law and led to grave instability in the Middle East. Russia objected to the attack, insisting that there was no imminent threat that invoked self-defense and that the resolution in question did not in fact authorize the use of force in 2003.40 The invasion raised many of the same resentments that the intervention in Yugoslavia had. Russia had extensive economic interests in Iraq that it wanted to protect, both in energy and in the form of a large debt owed by the Saddam Hussein regime for weapons purchases. It also sought to resist further U.S. pretensions to global hegemony.41 Russia hoped to take advantage of Western disagreements about Iraq to pursue its goal of bringing Russia into Europe and reducing the United States’ role on the continent. Both Germany and France strongly opposed the decision to attack Iraq, and France joined Russia in threatening to veto a resolution authorizing the invasion. Many Europeans shared Russia’s qualms about U.S. claims to global hegemony and willingness to use military power. But the opportunity to improve relations between Russia and Europe was ultimately lost because of European criticism over Russia’s continued and inhumane approach to the 36  Michael Wine, “Russia Offered Power in NATO,” Chicago Tribune, November 23, 2001. https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-11-23-0111230200-story.html 37  Jim Heinz, “Two Years After Putin’s Rise Russia has Veered to Unexpected Western-­ Oriented Course,” Associated Press, December 30, 2001; Pushkov et al. (2005, p. 56). 38  Danilov (2005, p. 56). 39  D’Anieri, Russia and Ukraine, p. 124. 40  Schmidt and Williams (2008, pp. 191–220). 41  D’Anieri, Russia and Ukraine, p. 125.

70 

S. LOFTUS

war in Chechnya.42 The impression the Iraq War created was that the United States only obeyed the rules of the road when it suited its interests. The invasion eroded the norm against the use of force to resolve disputes, and it badly divided the Western alliance.43 Another major point of contention was the perceived Western involvement in the “Color Revolutions” in Russia’s near abroad which led to a profound sense of insecurity by the Russians that the West was seeking regime change in and around Russia. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was especially damaging for Russian relations with the EU as the two took opposing sides. For the West, it consolidated the view that Putin was part of the problem and that his goals were incompatible with those of the EU. In 2005 the EU parliament voted for Ukraine to be given a clear European perspective, possibly leading to membership. This led eventually to the draft Association’s Agreement that sparked the Ukraine crisis in 2013. While the EU strongly believed that Ukraine must be free to determine its membership goals, Russia saw the EU’s promotion of democracy in Ukraine as a hostile geopolitical move. Normative disagreements drove Russia and Europe apart as the nexus between geopolitics and democratization increasingly dominated the relationship. Here it must be underlined that tensions were not so much about Ukraine being a democracy, but rather that if Ukraine should enter the EU, it could no longer be part of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia’s trading bloc, as the two are incompatible. It would have also made Ukraine part of Europe’s security system, while leaving Russia outside of it, pushing the two states away from each other in social, economic, military, and political aspects. While the West may have viewed these “Color Revolutions” as a series of pro-democracy peaceful protests, Russia viewed these very differently. As global powers are in a constant state of competition, democracy promotion is viewed as a zero-sum game and a lever of strategic power to increase Western influence.44 And if there is increased Western influence in these states, a zero-sum game would entail less Russian influence. As a country that has spent the last 500 years being a dominant player in the Eurasian landmass with Ukraine by its side, “losing” Ukraine to the West was perceived as a real existential threat. Contrary to what many scholars

 Pushkov et al. (2005, p. 57).  D’Anieri, Russia and Ukraine, 126. 44  Lo (2015, p. 40). 42 43

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

71

and analysts say,45 it’s not that Russia cares about its neighbors’ political system, it’s more that it cares about losing relative influence in these nations to the West. Just as importantly though, Color Revolutions are perceived by Russia and China to have serious destabilizing effects as can be seen in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. According to the Kremlin, Color Revolutions are a set of tools used by the West to bring down unfavorable regimes. The tools include the use of media propaganda, and the weaponization and mobilization of popular protests to violently overthrow a government “by the people” to make it appear legitimate. It also provides the opportunity for foreign governments to intervene in order to assist the democratic overthrowers. For Russia, the repeated Color Revolutions happening around the world appeared as American objectives toward “normative hegemony” under the guise of support for human rights.46 The Kremlin sees these efforts as being an intentional cultivation and financing of internal opposition forces. Their techniques also appear to include “professional coordination centers,” the emotional engineering of protesters, information wars, control of mass media, and providing alternative media and public relations specialists.47 There is also a component of military training of rebels by foreign instructors, supply of weapons and resources to anti-­ government forces, application of special operations forces and private military companies, and the reinforcement of opposition units with foreign fighters. Based on these perceptions, Russia adopted the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine of hybrid war which was used in Ukraine in 2014 and in many other instances. This however is a misnomer as it is not really a doctrine, but just symbolizes the prevailing understanding in Russia of Western support of Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, which has prompted them to behave similarly, only by advocating for their own interests.48 For the Kremlin, “democracy” is just code for U.S. influence. The debates being heard today that Russia invaded Ukraine because it  Person and McFaul (2022, pp. 18–27).  Sakwa (2015, pp. 557–558). 47  “US ‘World Leader’ in Color Revolution Engineering,” RT, 25 April 2012, https:// www. rt.com/news/color-revolutions-technology-piskorsky-938/; Sergey Lavrov, at: http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2124391; Allison (2014, p. 1258). 48  Valeriy Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 26, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.; D’Anieri, Russia and Ukraine, 135. 45 46

72 

S. LOFTUS

feared a “proliferating Ukrainian democracy” are flawed. Russia doesn’t care about Ukraine’s political system, it cares about retaining influence inside the country, particularly in the East and South. In all of Ukraine’s post-Soviet history, Russia never actively sought to destroy its democratic system of governance. It just preferred when the Presidents of post-Soviet Ukraine were actively cooperating with Moscow in areas of national interest. The “multi-vector” approach used in Ukraine under certain presidents, or an approach that promoted cooperation with both the West and Russia, was perfectly acceptable for Russia. Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference was a turning point in Russia’s relations with the West as Putin announced that Russia would no longer abide by the U.S.’ lead and would pursue its own independent foreign and domestic policy as a sovereign democracy.49 Russian leadership sought to pre-empt any such color revolution in Russia by adopting a range of measures that included the formation of the youth group “nashi” and restrictions on foreign NGOs. This additional suppression of democracy widened the perceived normative gap between Russia and the West. Russia also began pushing back against the international spread of democracy. Russian emphasis on the doctrine of “no interference” in the domestic affairs of others increased, regardless of whether it was adhering to those principles in its near abroad. Moreover, Russian leaders and theorists openly attacked the notion that values such as democracy are universally valid.50 In 2008 at the critical Bucharest summit, NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would become members one day. The United States wanted to offer them a Membership Action Plan (MAP), but Germany and France stated this was not a strategically sound idea due to Russian security concerns. Former U.S. National Security Council Official Fiona Hill revealed that this move was also opposed by the U.S. intelligence community at the time.51 But neither Ukraine nor Georgia came close to meeting the criteria for membership in 2008, and their entry into the alliance was opposed by several states, making the U.S. stance appear odd. The result was a British-brokered compromise where NATO’s  Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Munich Security Conference, 2007.  Boris Nezhuyev, “Island Russia and Russia’s Identity Politics,” Russia in Global Affairs 2 (June 6, 2017); Tsygankov and Tsygankov (1999, pp. 47–72). 51  Steven Erlanger, “Ally, Member or Partner? NATO’s Long Dilemma Over Ukraine,” NYTimes, December 8, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/08/world/europe/ nato-ukraine-russia-dilemma.html?smid=tw-share 49 50

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

73

then-­Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared that both states would eventually join without giving any specific timeline. As political scientist and Russia specialist Samuel Charap pointed out: “This declaration was the worst of all worlds. It provided no increased security to Ukraine and Georgia, but reinforced Moscow’s view that NATO was set on incorporating them.”52 After this summit, war broke out in Georgia over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Then-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was emboldened by NATO’s rhetoric while Putin had been threatened by it. After initial violence broke out, an attempt to try and reintegrate the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia was followed by a Russian invasion of Georgia. As the local “guarantor of peace,” Russia launched what it labeled a “peace enforcement operation” and backed these breakaway regions, defeated the Georgian army within a week, and officially recognized their independence. This was done at a critical moment when the West backed the independence of Kosovo while Russia and others had objected to it. Under these pretexts, Russia claimed it had the right to recognize these breakaway regions as well. As an attempt to mirror Western actions in encouraging independence movements, Russia agreed to recognize these regions and argued that Kosovo had set a dangerous precedent for similar separatists’ conflicts internationally.53 It was already becoming clear that Moscow’s foreign policy was becoming increasingly assertive and anti-Western. However, it is important to mention that up until this moment, Russian policies were not “revisionist,” or directly breaking the rules of the international order. This “rule-breaking” pattern only began around this time. Russia argues that it is American actions and double standards that have eroded global rules. Their thinking follows the logic that if the United States can act unilaterally, then Russia can too. As of this moment, Russia had discontinued following international law when its national interests were at stake and wanted to “break the American monopoly on breaking the law.”54 52  Samuel Charap, “NATO Honesty on Ukraine Could Avert Conflict with Russia,” Financial Times, January 12, 2022. https://www.ft.com/content/74089d46-abb84daa-9ee4-e9e9e4c45ab1 53  Christian Lowe, “Russia Warns of Kosovo Repercussions,” Reuters, February 15, 2008. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-serbia-russia/russia-warns-of-kosovo-repercussionsidUSL157090420080215 54  Alexander Gabuev and Elena Chernenko, “What Russia Thinks About Multilateralism,” Carnegie Moscow Center, August 20, 2019. https://carnegiemoscow.org/2019/08/20/ what-russia-thinks-about-multilateralism-pub-79709

74 

S. LOFTUS

Though there did seem to be the possibility of resetting relations between Russia and the United States when Dmitry Medvedev temporarily became president of Russia, these hopes were squashed with the Libya debacle. Russia abstained from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, most likely as a symbol of honoring the reset policy that has been adopted between the United States and Russia. This resolution set out to intervene in Libya by establishing a no-fly zone and protecting civilians “through all means necessary” safe a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. However, Special Forces troops from Britain, Italy, France, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates had intervened on the ground after an initial bombing campaign by the French, the Americans, and the British. When NATO started a bombing campaign, Russia accused it of killing civilians and destroying infrastructure. Russia’s issues with the implementation of the resolution stem from concern for its economic interests in Libya, fear of the implications that Middle East unrest would have for the Russian North Caucasus, and worries about the unclear line between humanitarian intervention and regime change. But Russia chose to balance its concerns with its desire to maintain good relations with the United States.55 Libya then turned into a failed state as then-leader Muammar al-Gaddafi was killed and civil war ensued, exactly the outcome Russia feared. As the conflict dragged on, NATO’s bombing campaign experienced “mission creep”56 from protecting civilians to backing the rebels’ campaign to dislodging Gaddafi from power. The result was Gaddafi’s summary execution in October 2011. Not only did Russia oppose such campaigns to overturn leaders, but Russian leaders felt deceived by what to them seemed like a bait-and-­ switch tactic. Russia also suffered significant economic losses due to Gaddafi’s fall, including a $3 billion railroad deal, $3.5 billion in energy deals, and $4 billion in arms sales.57 That the aftermath included the descent of Libya into civil war and the rise of ISIS only confirmed for

55  Center for American Progress, “Understanding the Russian Response to the Intervention in Libya,” Center for American Progress, April 12, 2011. https://www.americanprogress. org/article/understanding-the-russian-response-to-the-intervention-in-libya/ 56  Ian Traynor and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Libya: ‘Mission Creep’ Claims as UK Sends in Military Advisers,” The Guardian, April 19, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2011/apr/19/libya-mission-creep-uk-advisers 57  Lincoln Pigman and Kyle Orton, “Inside Putin’s Libyan Power Play,” Foreign Policy, September 14, 2017.

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

75

Russia that the United States and its partners in the West were sowing chaos in their pursuit of geopolitical gain. When Putin returned to the presidency in 2012 there was a renewed zest on the idea that Russia needed to take a separate path from the West aimed at stabilizing the international system and providing a balance of power to the unconstrained power of the United States. Putin had said in December 2011 that the Americans had attacked Gaddafi’s column with drones, and the Special Forces who should not have been there brought in the so-called opposition fighters and killed him without court or investigation. “Sometimes,” he said, “it seems to me that America does not need allies, it needs vassals. People are tired of the dictates of one country.”58 Meanwhile, the Arab Spring was causing uprisings all across the Middle East and North Africa which Russia blamed the West for instigating. Looking back, the Arab Spring produced modest political, social, and economic gains for some of the region’s inhabitants but sparked horrific and lasting violence, mass displacement, and worsening repression in parts of the region. Only Tunisia made a shift to democracy but is currently reverting back to more autocratic ways.59 As for the other states, Egypt backslid, and Libya, Syria, and Yemen spiraled into protracted civil wars.60 These wars also had devastating consequences not only for the region but also for Europe, which faced a large refugee crisis. Worried these movements would reach Russian soil, Putin tightened controls at home and ensured Western influence would be at an all-time low in the country. According to some sources, a small core of American government-­ financed organizations was promoting democracy in authoritarian Arab states.61 As American officials and others look back at the uprisings of the Arab Spring, they are seeing that the United States’ democracy-building campaigns played a bigger role in fomenting protests than was previously 58  Andrew Osborn, “Vladimir Putin Lashed out at America for Killing Gaddaffi and Backing Protests,” The Telegraph, December 15, 2011. 59  Nadeen Ebrahim, “The Last ‘Arab Spring’ Democracy Is Dangling By a Thread,” CNN, July 27, 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/07/25/middleeast/tunisia-referendum-­ democracy-mime-intl/index.html 60  Kali Robinson and Will Merrow, “The Arab Spring at Ten Years: What’s the Legacy of the Uprisings?” Council on Foreign Relations, December 3, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/ article/arab-spring-ten-years-whats-legacy-uprisings 61  Ron Nixon, “U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings,” NYTimes, April 14, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html

76 

S. LOFTUS

known, with key leaders of the movements having been trained by Americans in campaigning, organizing protests through new media tools and monitoring elections. According to interviews and American diplomatic cables obtained by Wikileaks, a number of the groups and individuals directly involved in the revolts and reforms sweeping the region such as the April 6 Youth Movement in Egypt, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and grass-roots activists like Entsar Qadhi, a youth leader in Yemen, received training and financing by the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, and Freedom House. The work of these groups often provoked tensions between the United States and many Middle Eastern leaders, who frequently complained that their leadership was being undermined.62 Even through the use of “soft power” and influence, destabilizing consequences can ensue and therefore render such policies questionable. Russian-Western relations as well as questions on the overall governance of the international order reached their culmination point in the Ukraine Crisis. Since 2014, relations significantly deteriorated as Russia annexed Crimea and backed separatist rebels in Eastern Ukraine. The West imposed sanctions as a result of those actions which made Russia seek closer ties with China. Since then, Russia has increased its asymmetric tactics on the West to undermine its unity and strength. It has increasingly interfered in election campaigns, invested more in its media outlets to broadcast its narrative and expose Western instances of hypocrisy, supported populist parties across Europe, undermined Euro-Atlantic integration and the transatlantic relationship where possible, interfered in the U.S. elections in 2016  in favor of Donald Trump as well as in other European elections, and recently launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which is discussed in detail in Chap. 5.

Russian Foreign Policy Goals Russian foreign policy has continuously evolved since the breakup of the Soviet Union. At first, Moscow’s plans were to join the West on acceptable terms to Russia as well as to integrate the post-Soviet space into a Russia-­ led bloc.63 Mikhael Gorbachev’s 1989 vision of a “common European  Nixon, “U.S. Groups”.   Dmitri Trenin, It’s Time to Rethink Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 25, 2019. https://carnegiemoscow.org/ commentary/78990 62 63

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

77

home” initiated this foreign policy course followed by Boris Yeltsin’s proposals in the 1990s for a comprehensive partnership with the United States and Europe. Even Vladimir Putin initially spoke about Russia’s “European choice” and advocated for a “Greater Europe” or a space of economic cooperation from “Lisbon to Vladivostok.” Dmitri Medvedev also spoke of proposals for a Euro-Atlantic security space and a common Russia-NATO missile defense system. Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996, finalized partnership agreements with the EU in 1997 and NATO in 1997 and 2002, and became a member of the G8 in 1998. Re-integrating the post-Soviet space was also prioritized through the formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 1999 and the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus which transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. Several key themes re-occur in Russia’s foreign policy documents since its first Foreign Policy Concept in 1993 and highlight its main priorities as a nation. One of these is to re-establish itself as a great power and maintain a sphere of privileged interests.64 The post-Soviet space and the relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States have been a Russian foreign policy priority since the foundation of the new Russian state.65 A second major theme is Russia’s opposition to the eastward expansion of NATO, which has been persistently mentioned in official documents such as the National Security Concept in 2000. From a Russian perspective, NATO has taken on more of an offensive role than its stated defensive role, as it has been the platform for contested military action in Yugoslavia, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq as some of its member states joined the United States in its war efforts through the “coalition of the willing.”66 All of these cases also resulted in regime change.67 Enlarging NATO to incorporate former Soviet countries that used to form a “buffer zone” between NATO and Russia was particularly seen as a security threat. While the majority of Western analysts may believe that NATO enlargement doesn’t actually threaten Russia, the importance of this issue lies with perception. What Russia perceives to be a threat will be a major focus of its foreign policy, regardless of Western views on NATO enlargement. Gauging  Light (2015).  Kuchins and Zevelev (2012, pp. 147–161). 66  CNN, “Bush: Join ‘coalition of willing’” CNN, November 20, 2002. http://edition. cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/11/20/prague.bush.nato/ 67  Lukyanov (2016, pp. 30–37) 64 65

78 

S. LOFTUS

actors’ perceived sense of threat is extremely important for the establishment of diplomatic relations. The problem of designing a post-Cold War security architecture for Europe remained unresolved. Russia sought a unified security system in which it played a leading role and held a veto. That would require dissolving, transforming, or superseding NATO. The West, including the EU, NATO, and their members, whose fear of Russia was growing, opposed dissolving NATO institutions or giving Russia a veto in it. Their implicit solution was for NATO to expand and for disagreements to be managed bilaterally between NATO and Russia. Underpinning this belief was the view that if Russia became a liberal democracy and accepted its role, problems would be minimal.68 The unintentional consequences of the practice of liberal hegemony led to a more nationalist and assertive Russia—which had profound consequences for European and global security. The lack of political pluralism in the resolution of the security disagreements in the European shared neighborhood had profound consequences for regional and global stability. Another recurrent theme in Russian foreign policy documents is the idea of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Due to the West’s “democracy promotion” actions that have at times taken on a military shape, Moscow has staunchly defended the idea of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law at the United Nations (even though it has clearly violated all of those tenants itself but says it is merely acting like the United States). It has been very critical of Western intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and defends its right to sovereignty and independence. The deployment of ballistic missile defense systems close to Russia’s borders has also been recurrent theme in security documents as Russia claims such systems undermine regional and global stability and give an unfair strategic advantage to the countries adopting them. Other Russian foreign policy goals include the formation of a multipolar world order. After the 1999 unilateral NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the theme of establishing a more multipolar world order where international problems would be solved through multilateral cooperation as opposed to unilateral decisions became a top priority in Russia along with re-achieving derzhavnost, or great power status.69 Kuchins and Zevelev argue that the main groups in government that have had a significant influence on Russian foreign policy are the  D’Anieri (2019).  Light (2015).

68 69

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

79

pro-­Western liberals, the great power balancers, and the nationalists.70 The first of these was only influential in the early 1990s but lost steam by the time Putin came to power. From 1993 to 2003, the great power balancers were the most influential. This was led by Yevgeny Primakov through his vision to reassert Russia as an independent great power. After 2003, the drivers of change explained above coupled with the increasing material capabilities of the state shifted foreign policy priorities in a more nationalist direction which was characterized by an opposition to the United States and the West. In parallel, China’s rise also gave Russia an opportunity to break ties with the West if it had to in its quest to weaken American hegemony. There are many misconceptions about Russian foreign policy. One of which is that Russia’s grand strategy is driven by ideology—the ideology of illiberal conservatism. Despite its ties with European populist parties71 or its many criticisms of the excesses of liberalism or its double standards, Russia is not trying to spread an illiberal ideology across the world. Rather, through its narrative, it aims to de-construct liberal normative hegemony. Others have also suggested that Russia’s worldview is motivated by Eurasianist ideology, or nineteenth-century political philosophy about a destiny to unite the Russian and non-Russian peoples sharing common cultures across the territories of the former Russian Empire.72 Eurasianism can be found in certain Kremlin policies but is just one strand of nationalist thought. However, this is more of a tool to encourage national cohesion inside Russia instead of an ideology Russia is trying to spread onto the world. Eurasianism as it pertains to Russian national identity formation is discussed further on in this chapter. Another common misperception about Russia is that it is seeking to reconstruct the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire.73 Putin argues that only great powers like Russia are truly sovereign as small states often depend on powerful states for their economic and existential well-being. Russia aims to hold the dominant position in the post-Soviet space and views other great powers’ influence, particularly that of the United States, as a zero-sum competition.74 It particularly dislikes U.S. support for protests, democracy promotion, and opposition  Kuchins and Zevelev (2012).  Polyakova (2014, pp. 36–40). 72  Mankoff (2011). 73  Ibid. 74  Cooley (2012). 70 71

80 

S. LOFTUS

movements. However, Moscow is much more tolerant of Chinese influence in post-Soviet space because of the lack of an ideological component. Post-Soviet developments have made it clear that Russia will not accept U.S. global leadership, which automatically frustrates attempts to integrate Russia into Western-led structures. The United States on its side also does not tolerate an independent Russian foreign policy, and the West does not tolerate Russia’s domestic political order. These realities have placed a blockage on Russian integration into the West and have created conditions for the return of great power rivalry and value clashes, particularly as Russia’s material capabilities helped the country turn into an important global actor. Russia is one of the few countries in the world that does not submit to others’ hegemony, dominance, or leadership. This sovereignty is particularly valued by both the elite and the population of Russia. They value this independence above the economic benefits of ceding sovereignty. Russia is able politically and militarily to protect its independence, and few states are willing to stake out such a position to preserve their freedom of action.75 To further understand Russian foreign policy objectives, it is useful to analyze its stated grand strategy. According to a comprehensive RAND study on Russia’s grand strategy, its stated grand strategy mostly reflects the reality of how the country behaves internationally, with the exception of Ukraine.76 Based on their comprehensive conclusion, it is safe to assume that what Russia says its goals are can mostly be accepted as true—apart from anything related to Ukraine, where it practices a far more imperialist policy than it states in its grand strategy. According to Russia’s stated grand strategy, the current international system has been destabilized due to the imbalance of power that emerged after the Cold War as the United States became the sole hegemon. The disruptive crises in Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria shook the world and occurred as a result of the lack of counterweight to U.S. power. Their grand strategy is based on a perceived reality that the global order is now in transition toward a polycentric world order where rising great powers such as Russia and China act independently from, and at time in confrontation with, the United States to protect their national interests and restore the balance of power that once provided stability to the international system. Russia’s stated grand strategy makes no mention of exporting its domestic model  Trenin, “It’s Time”.  Charap et al. (2021).

75 76

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

81

to other states. It wishes to build “an attractive brand” and shape the new multipolar world order based on what appears to be transactional diplomacy, regionalism, and respect for national sovereignty.77 An example of how Russia acts on these stated beliefs is in Syria, when then-U.S.-President Barrack Obama did not enforce his stated red lines and Russia instead brokered a diplomatic deal with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and eventually helped him regain control of the country. Russia was against unseating him as the legitimate leader of the country. The Astana process brings Turkey and Iran together with Russia, expands Russian-Saudi strategic dialogue, and works toward a series of compromises and deconfliction zones that would give different groups in Syria and their outside backers a stake in a postwar settlement. Russia’s approach in the Middle East is designed to serve as a message that it is able to foster better results than relying on American power and intervention. Russia has also proposed applying this template to the Persian Gulf, where it has suggested as part of its new collective security concept a reconfiguration of the region. The reconfiguration would entail a renouncement of permanently deployed troops from the United States, and Russia adopting a leadership role in the region to maintain balance and preserve stability given its geographical proximity. One of the priorities of Russia’s grand strategy is to lead an integrated post-Soviet Eurasia to ensure the region is an independent center of global development rather than a periphery of Europe or Asia. Russia’s policies toward its neighbors are varied and range from “laissez-faire” to “imperialist,” with imperialist being the exception rather than the rule.78 Generally, they are categorized as “interventionist” just as their stated grand strategy says. A state with imperialist ambitions would aim for a high level of control over decision-making in the target country. With the exception of Ukraine, Russia has not demonstrated imperialist behavior in the near abroad. According to the study, Russia has resorted to coercion largely in attempts to block outcomes inconsistent with its goals of regional integration, but many times that coercion failed and Moscow reconciled itself to laissez-faire outcomes much as it did in Georgia. Understanding Russian actions in its near abroad can help Western analysts gauge what its real intentions are in the post-Soviet space today, rather than assume it has a grand project to restore the Soviet Union.  Ibid.  Ibid.

77 78

82 

S. LOFTUS

Russian grand strategy views the Russian and U.S. global positions as unique and responsible for ensuring stability in the world due to their status as great nuclear powers. Putin believes that “balance of power” politics is the most stable framework for international relations and ensures extended periods of peace. The stated grand strategy envisions a polycentric world order with predictability, cooperation, and stability which is led by great powers in their respective regions and rejects unilateral actions whereby one great power achieves its national security at the expense of another. This system would retain the main institutions established after World War II such as the UN and the Security Council and countries such as China, India, and Brazil would have more influence within those institutions. In this future polycentric world, Russia views itself as a stabilizer and with a prominent role in the resolution of disputes. The stated grand strategy describes a diminished role for the West and reduced extra-­ regional interventionism. Russian grand strategy does not mention any goal to restore the Soviet Union but does mention the importance of military might to restore balance. Only through strength can Russia avoid becoming a vassal state to the United States or China.

Russian Asymmetric Tactics Russian foreign policy aims to achieve more influence in the world and to lessen the relative influence of the West and tends to do so in hybrid ways. Because it is the weaker power, it pursues its objectives through asymmetric means. It also serves as a mirror to the West in its strategy of “imitation by mirroring” as Krastev and Holmes argue.79 Russia claims the West meddles in other societies through democracy-promoting strategies so it has done so as well through the use of its own propaganda networks, frequent cyber-attacks, bilateral political deals, populist financing, and even election hacking and meddling. Other examples of how it is attempting to gain relative strength compared to the West is through its use of private military companies in Africa and Syria to achieve its goals without attributing any responsibility. Russia sends weapons and PMC instructors to the Central African Republic, Mali, Mozambique, and beyond and is actively involved in the Libyan conflict. Russian presence in Africa is viewed in a different light as it underscores the idea of “collaboration” rather than aid in Africa, representing a relationship based on “equality” rather than on  Krastev and Holmes, The Light.

79

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

83

what some have considered “patronizing aid” from the West.80 Africa is now seeking equal exchanges, as opposed to colonial power relations. Russia’s impact in Africa will certainly affect the way the nations vote at the United Nations, as African countries are the largest voting bloc in the UN and frequently vote together. In recent votes condemning the war in Ukraine and on removing Russia from the Human Rights Council, many African countries abstained from the votes.81 Russian soft power advocates for national, economic, and cultural sovereignty. It is anti-American and anti-NATO and rejects excessive multilateralism. Russia has soft power influence in Europe among populist parties, not only on the basis of conservative values but also on issues such as European integration and the loss of sovereignty that results from supranational institutions and a European continent too submissive to U.S. interests. Putin advocates for a more continentalist Europe as opposed to a transatlantic one. Moscow also plays on the issues of national identity and immigration. The message that is often transmitted is one of the failures of multiculturalism and a call for the protection of European white and Christian identity against an invasion of migrants. This message was particularly powerful in Europe with the influx of refugees coming from Syria and other conflict zones in the Middle East in which the West had intervened, further undermining political liberalism. This message is also convincing for many anti-globalization movements and populist parties. The world is changing, as demonstrated by trends in European and American elections and by the negative criticism that globalization has been receiving. Feelings of a loss of identity and sovereignty are becoming more abundant, as living standards decline for many. A growing proportion of the electorate is now calling for more traditional family and religious values, national identity, and sovereignty. Donald Trump, as well as illiberal leaders in Central Europe and populist movements in Europe, has reinforced Putin’s “brand.” In addition, Russia is a strong player in the BRICS, a group that symbolizes a non-American twenty-first century. It has also recently rebuilt ties with many formerly socialist countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Egypt, Syria, and Venezuela. Russia is also

80  Carlos Mureithi, “How African countries voted on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” Quartz Africa, March 7, 2022. https://qz.com/africa/2138584/how-african-countriesvoted-on-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/ 81  Ibid.

84 

S. LOFTUS

starting to foster ties with nations that were Western allies during the Cold War, such as the Gulf monarchies. Russia transmits its message through a variety of platforms, one of which is an international news agency called Russia Today launched in 2005, that broadcasts in English, Arabic, Spanish, and French in order to “break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on information flows.”82 This channel is not only designed to promote the Russian worldview internationally but also to give a voice to Western dissidents. RT exhibits particular features and hypocrisies of the West that are often not displayed on Western media channels such as instances of racism and social violence, social inequality in the United States, the failures of the European Union to integrate migrants, and dissidents of Western society that do not have an equal voice to the mainstream narrative. In 2014, RT received $310 million in government funding and was expected to receive $400 million in 2015.83 (For comparison, the bigger BBC Group had a $376 million budget in 2014–2015.)84 As of 2022, RT was the leader in terms of state funding among all Russian media. Between 2022 and 2024, RT had planned to receive 82 billion rubles.85 Sputnik, another Russian news agency is developing a similar strategy on social media. “Russia Beyond the Headlines” is now included in many respectable newspapers in more than 20 countries including the Washington Post, the Daily Telegraph, Le Figaro, and La Republica. However, since the invasion of Ukraine, Russian news outlets have been banned in the European Union including on internet search results.86 The United States has also banned RT America.87 82  Craig Timberg, “Russian Propaganda Effort Helped Spread ‘Fake News’ During Election, Experts Say,” Washington Post, November 24, 2016. 83  Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, “Looking West, Russia Beefs Up Spending on Global Media Giants”. The Moscow Times, September 23, 2014. https://www.themoscowtimes. com/2014/09/23/looking-west-russia-beefs-up-spending-on-global-media-giantsa39708 84  Simon Shuster, “Inside Putin’s on-air machine,” Time, March 16, 2015. https://time. com/rt-putin/ 85  Meduza. “RT Remained the Leader in Terms of State Funding among the Media,” Meduza, December 23, 2021. https://meduza.io/news/2021/12/23/rt-ostalsya-liderompo-ob-emam-gosfinansirovaniya-sredi-smi-v-2022-godu-kanal-poluchit-­p ochti-29milliardov-rubley 86  Sam Schechner, “EU Orders Removal of Russian State-Owned Media from Search Results, Social-Media Reshares,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2022. 87  Ted Johnson, “RT America To Halt Production and Lay Off Most Staff After Being Dropped By Major U.S.  Distributors,” Deadline, March 2022. https://deadline.

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

85

Russian Identity Russia has always considered itself to be an equal to the United States and Europe, has no intention of being led by them, and has always defended its position as an independent actor. This national sense of self resonates in Russian society and has garnered Putin high levels of popularity throughout his tenure. Also, as is typical of most great powers, Russia has considered itself an exceptional country with a special mission and feels resentful when treated as anything less than that by Western counterparts. Historically, this exceptionalism has taken on several forms including the “Third Rome,” the pan-Slavic Kingdom, the center of world communism and Eurasianism.88 Alexandre Dugin, a political philosopher close to the Kremlin, has long been a proponent of Eurasianism. This philosophy posits that the world comprises several civilizational spaces including Eurasia, Africa, the Far East, and Europe. By prioritizing regionalism, nations can better retain their autonomy and regional sovereignty and retain the gains made by globalization. This is the first step toward a multipolar world order. These are important values motivating Putin’s regional foreign policy objectives. Eurasianism is shaped by a value system which prioritizes collective identity, non-alignment in global affairs, and the importance of culture and civilization. Russians can be described as possessing a mixture of Slav, Mongol, and Turkish blood and can therefore act as a type of intermediary between Europe and Asia.89 In Eurasianist philosophy, there is a strong sense of who is within the group and who is outside of it. Those outside of it primarily encompass the “West.” In contrast to Eurasianist values, the West is described as possessing egocentric values, as conceiving democracy and liberalism as intertwined, as valuing materialism and secularism, as being utilitarian, as using liberal rhetoric to mask the totalitarian ideological core of liberalism, and as possessing politicians who act primarily on the interests of economic elites. Eurasianism posits that evolution is leading the world to the Western idea, which was the purpose of the “Darwinian system,” and that it is no accident that this view of the world stems from English colonial rule and com/2022/03/rt-america-to-halt-production-and-lay-off-most-staff-after-being-droppedby-major-u-s-­­distributors-1234970503/ 88  Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern,” Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2016). 89  Shlapentokh (2007).

86 

S. LOFTUS

industrial development. It criticizes capitalism as being a framework through which the world is viewed as a series of markets to control, while people are treated in purely quantitative terms. The Russian nationalist movement in general, and Eurasianists in particular, view liberalism as being about ideology and the interests of capital, not the protection of rights. A state can be highly representative without being a democracy while a democracy can enshrine an oligarchy over “the people.” Eurasianists remain cynical about Western claims to “universal values.” In this philosophy, “popular will” is not necessarily manifested in elections, but rather shows the broader contours of social life over time.90 These ideas are central to Russian politics and have shaped society to believe that a special form of democracy is needed in Russia which would be more in sync with Russian traditional values and historical legacy.91 As described in detail in this chapter, after an initial flirtation with the idea of joining the West, Russia quickly dropped this idea, and in the process, dropped the idea of “imitating” the West as though it represented a superior model. Now it has adopted a more combative style of imitation whose goal is to discredit the Western model and sow doubt on the superiority of Western norms and institutions. It now behaves in ways contradicting international law and points out similar past American behavior criticizing U.S. hypocrisy after being reprimanded by the West.92 After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had to rediscover its identity as a nation. At this moment, both the long-standing communist system as well as the 500-year-old imperial legacy were discarded at the same time. Russia, the successor state, had to find its way in the world after having lost substantial territory, economic prowess, and institutional ideology. In the early 1990s, it appeared as though the direction Russia wanted to move in was westward, to define itself as a European power with democracy as its form of governance. With time, however, Russia pivoted away from this direction toward a more “Eurasianist” and nationalist direction and more so recently into an independent and unique entity. Russia today is neither Western nor Asian. Now instead of trying to mimic the West, Russia has decided to move its identity away from the West. Instead of viewing itself as inferior in comparison to the Western economic or political model, it has changed the frames of comparison to a more cultural, or civilizational  Kullberg and Zimmerman (1999, pp. 323–358).  For more on this topic, see Loftus (2018). 92  Krastev and Holmes, The Light. 90 91

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

87

framework, highlighting its uniqueness. This is part of “identity management strategies” espoused by social identity theory as nations interact and form relationships with their significant others. Putin has positioned the West as a threat to Russia’s “civilization” and its unique values and culture. The strategy that Putin has chosen signifies a decisive rejection of the assumption that Western societies should be viewed as the source of moral and political standards for Russia.93 Putin’s main priority has thus shifted from a more economic base to a cultural base, waging cultural warfare with the West. After the Ukraine Crisis in 2014, the Euro-Atlantic was no longer an appropriate space to which Russia could belong. Russia’s violation of international law followed by the imposition of Western sanctions represented a mutual agreement that Russia didn’t belong to this space and that Russia’s membership in the Euro-Atlantic space was never fully consolidated or taken seriously.94 This sentiment of rejection and exclusion went hand in hand with Russia’s new Eurasian discourse and the expansion of Eurasian integration.95 The discourse is centered along non-­ alignment, the independence of nation-states in a global society which is distinct from Westernism. Through the West’s new world order and endof-history rhetoric, it was implied that the West alone had the right to shape the rules of the political system or decide what is considered a developed or a developing country. But the Soviet use of domestic force to rapidly develop heavy industry made it a developed country, though one that did not develop according to the typical pattern of European states. According to Coker, the Russian civilizational state idea is based on the principles of Eurasianism. The National Security Strategy in Russia in 2009 contains cultural distinction as an element, and the military partially exists to maintain the “dignity” of the Russian diaspora. The principle of the “cultural unity” of the Russian people is visible in Putin’s speeches and press conferences. The idea of the “Russkiy Mir” is important and the military is tasked with defending this concept and defending the Russian people’s historical memory. The Russian elite believe it is important to hold a vision of Russia and its special place in history. To them, Christianity  Evans (2015, pp. 401–221).   Anne Clunan, “Constructivism’s Micro-Foundations: Aspirations, Social Identity Theory, and Russia’s National Interests,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 30–September 2, 2012, 6. 95  Dmitri Trenin, “From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ resrep12850 93 94

88 

S. LOFTUS

is dead in the West and the Orthodox religion is the only Christian tradition retaining its values. Coker views these narratives as a manipulation tactic used by the elite to ensure their perpetuation in power and sees the emerging world of “civilizational states” as lawless, amoral, and devoid of global norms.96

Conclusion This chapter described the evolution of Russian-Western relations and key drivers of change. It stressed the importance of “perceptions and misperceptions” in a nation’s foreign policy decision-making. It assessed the limitations of the U.S. policy of “liberal hegemony” as well as the limits of the principles of “liberal universalism” when it came to the West’s relationship with Russia. As Russia gained power in the international system, it was more able to project its influence around the world. As a country with a unique historical trajectory and national identity, Russian national interests were often not in sync with Western interests, leading their relationship to sour. Over the post-Cold War era, liberal hegemonic practices were a powerful motivating factor for the development of Russian nationalism and anti-Western rhetoric. Putin’s anti-liberal rhetoric is echoed in populist parties throughout the West and is supported by international actors that have criticized the liberal international order and U.S. hegemony. The zero-sum nature of the European security architecture made it practically impossible to reconcile the major normative differences between Russia and the West. Perceptions of insecurity proliferated as a result. Had a more pluralist system been implemented or more avenues for diplomacy and collaboration on equal terms between the West and Russia, much of the deterioration of relations could have been avoided. One example of this could have been increased cooperation between “blocs” such as the ability to trade between economic blocs or to deepen security cooperation between the CSTO and NATO. Another could have been a path for alternative arrangements outside of “blocs” which would still ensure the economic, political, social, and military development of neutral “inbetween” states. Liberalism is based on the normative assumption that liberal democracies are the only legitimate form of governance and therefore view any actor’s actions outside of this framework to be “revisionist” or “illiberal”  Coker (2019).

96

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

89

or simply caused by a “bad actor” in the system. Liberalism fails to consider nationalism and particularism, which becomes especially important when dealing with a great power. It also fails to consider the basic security interests of states in the international system and their threat perceptions. As Russia moved in a more authoritarian direction, both Russia and the West mutually distanced from one another—demonstrating the importance that the project of the “liberal international order” places on domestic political factors. But as mentioned, the “strong state” in Russia or in China is also a legitimate form of governance. Just because it does not abide by Western norms and standards it does not mean it is not a viable form of governance.97 It is not realistic to assume that all nations will abide by liberal tenants and principles; in fact it is rather presumptuous. That is why a more pragmatic arrangement between states needs to be formulated in order to preserve peace in the international system.

References Allison, R. (2014). Russian Deniable Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules. International Affairs, 90(6), 1258. https://academic. oup.com/ia/article-­abstract/90/6/1255/2326779? redirected From=fulltext. Art, R. (1998). Creating a Disaster: NATOs Open Door Policy. Political Science Quarterly, 113(3), 383. Charap, S., Massicot, D., Priebe, M., Demus, A., Reach, C., Stalczynski, M., Han, E., & Davis, L. E. (2021). Russian Grand Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4238.html Coker, C. (2019). The Rise of the Civilizational State: China, Russia and Islamic Caliphate and the Challenge to the Liberal World Order. Polity. Cooley, A. (2012, September 20). Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia. Oxford Academic. Retrieved August 13, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199929825.001.0001 D’Anieri, P. (2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War (p.  22). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/97811 08657044 Danilov, D. (2005). Russia and European Security. In D.  Lynch (Ed.), What Russia Sees (p. 56). European Union Institute for Security Studies. Doyle, M. W. (1983a). Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(3), 205–235.  Loftus (2022).

97

90 

S. LOFTUS

Doyle, M.  W. (1983b). Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part 2. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12(4), 323–353. Doyle, M.  W. (1986). Liberalism and World Politics. The American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1151–1169. Doyle, M. W. (1997). Ways of War and Peace. W.W. Norton. Evans, A. (2015). Ideological Change Under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory. Demokratizatsiya, 23(4), 401–221. Evans, A.  B. (2011, January). The Failure of Democratization in Russia: A Comparative Perspective. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2(1), 40–51. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2010.10.001 Fukuyama, F. (2012). The End of History and the Last Man. Penguin Books. Gill, G. (2002). The Failure of Democracy in Russia. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3(2), 169–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/157058 50208438833 Ikenberry, J. (2020). A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order. Yale University Press. Jervis, R. (1976). Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics. Princeton University Press. Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214. Kant, I. (1991 [1795]). Perpetual Peace. In H.  Reiss (Ed.), Kant: Political Writings (2nd ed., pp. 93–115). Cambridge University Press. Keohane, R. O. (2020). Understanding Multilateral Institutions in Easy and Hard Times. Annual Review of Political Science, 23(1), 1–18. https://doi. org/10.1146/annurev-­polisci-­050918-­042625. ISSN 1094-2939 Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security, 20(1), 39–51. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539214. ISSN 0162-2889. JSTOR 2539214. S2CID 29960902. Kuchins, A. C., & Zevelev, I. A. (2012). Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change. The Washington Quarterly, 35(1), 147–161. https://doi.org/10.108 0/0163660X.2012.642787 Kullberg, J.  S., & Zimmerman, W. (1999). Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses and Problems of Russian Democracy. World Politics, 51, 323–358. Light, M. (2015). Russian Foreign Policy Themes in Official Documents and Speeches: Tracing Continuity and Change. In D. Cadier & M. Light (Eds.), Russia’s Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan. Lipset, S.  M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. Lo, B. (2015). Russia and the New World Disorder (p.  40). Brookings Institution Press. Loftus, S. (2018). Insecurity and the Rise of Nationalism in Putin’s Russia: Keeper of Traditional Values. Palgrave Macmillan.

3  RUSSIAN-WESTERN RELATIONS: A TRUST NEVER BUILT 

91

Loftus, S. (2022). Legitimacy and Societal Consent under Putin’s Leadership: State Capacity and National Identity. Russian Politics, 7(1), 1–30. Lukyanov, F. (2016). Putin’s Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful Place. Foreign Affairs, 95(3), 30–37. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/43946855 Mankoff, J. (2011). Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security, 15(1), 5–56. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press. Person, R., & McFaul, M. (2022, April). What Putin Fears Most. Journal of Democracy, 33(2), 18–27. Polyakova, A. (2014). Strange Bedfellows: Putin and Europe’s Far Right. World Affairs, 177(3), 36–40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43555253 Pushkov, A., Danilov, D., Karaganov, S., Trenin, D., & Zagorski, A. (2005). Putin at the Helm. In D. Lynch (Ed.), What Russia Sees. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Sakwa, R. (2015). The Death of Europe? Continental Fates after Ukraine. International Affairs, 91(3), 557–558. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-­ 2346.12281 Sakwa, R. (2017). Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, B., & Williams, M. (2008). The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Relativists. Security Studies, 17, 191–220. Sharafutdinova, G. (2020). The Red Mirror: Putin’s Leadership and Russia’s Insecure Identity. Oxford University Press. Shlapentokh, V. (2007). Contemporary Russia as a Feudal Society. Palgrave Macmillan. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.  C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In S.  Worchel & W.  G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (2nd ed., p. 19). Nelson-Hall. Tsygankov, A. (2002). Rediscovering National Interest After the ‘End of History’: Fukuyama, Russian Intellectuals, and a Post-Cold War Order. International Politics, 39, 423–446. Tsygankov, A., & Tsygankov, P. (1999). Pluralism or Isolation of Civilisations? Russia’s Foreign Policy Discourse and The Reception of Huntington’s Paradigm of The Post-Cold War World. Geopolitics, 4(3), 47–72. https://doi. org/10.1080/146500499084076552 Tsygankov, A.  P. (2014). The Strong State in Russia: Development and Crisis. Oxford University Press. Walt, S. M. (1987). The Origins of Alliances (pp. 5, 17–29). Cornell University Press. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley.

CHAPTER 4

The Rise of China and the China-Russia Relationship

Introduction The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy stated that inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, was now the primary concern for U.S. national security.1 The 2017 National Security Strategy stated that “great power competition returned.”2 The interim NSS in 2022 stated, “We face a world of rising nationalism, receding democracy, growing rivalry with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states.”3 The 2022 National Defense Strategy states that China is the United States’ “most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department” while Russia “poses acute threats, as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.”4 Today, China has the second largest nominal GDP in the world and the largest when measured for purchasing power parity.5 China is investing in its military, research and development, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and quantum mechanics and is feared to eventually overtake the  U.S. Department of Defense (2018).  U.S. Department of State (2017). 3  U.S. Department of State (2021). 4  U.S. Department of Defense (2022). 5  Silver (2022). 1 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_4

93

94 

S. LOFTUS

West in these sectors. Not only has China not become a democracy, but under President Xi Jinping, China has doubled down on its nationalism and authoritarianism.6 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs find that in the case of China and other autocracies, economic development did not lead to democracy because authoritarian regimes can show their public that they can enjoy the benefits of economic development while avoiding political liberalization.7 Similarly, Przeworski and Limongi demonstrate that while politics do influence economic performance, the impact of regime type is not significant on states’ economic growth.8 Today China is the principal challenger to the United States and its leadership of the international order as it is a strong power with a different political system able to project its influence internationally. The U.S. post-Cold War engagement strategy with China assumed that increased trade and economic linkages would turn China into a “responsible stakeholder” in a U.S.-led global order,9 that China would prosper and liberalize politically and grow interdependent with the United States, minimizing the likelihood of war between them. Throughout the many years of pursuing a policy of engagement, China was treated as a “preferred nation” and joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. However, China did not turn out to be the “responsible stakeholder” the United States was hoping for. Today, WTO reviews continue to point out the lack of necessary reforms in China and its continued unfair trading practices.10 Within an institutional set of rules, all actors are expected to abide by certain sets of norms and modes of conduct. If a single nation doesn’t abide by the rules it is considered a form of “cheating,” allowing that nation to gain a relative advantage.11 This defies the purpose of multilateral institutions and liberal logic, which argues that it is within every actor’s vested interest to follow these sets of rules to ultimately achieve “absolute gains” for all parties.12 Instead, China continued to act with “realist” principles on the basis of obtaining “relative gains” or maximizing gains for itself at the expense of others. China’s unfair practices include  Tsang and Cheung (2021, pp. 225–243), Shirk (2018, pp. 22–36).  Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2005, pp. 77–86). 8   Przeworski and Limongi (1993, pp.  51–69), Przeworski and Limongi (1997, pp. 155–183). 9  U.S. Department of State Archive (2009). 10  Silver (2021). 11  Mearsheimer (1994–1995, pp. 5–49). 12  Keohane (2005). 6 7

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

95

preferential treatment for state enterprises, intellectual property rights, and cyber theft and currency manipulation. In addition, it has been “defying the rules” of international law by seizing key islands and claiming large swaths of the South China Sea, inconsistent with the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.13 Despite this behavior, U.S. policy toward China never evolved until Donald Trump took office in 2017 and started the policy of containment, which Joe Biden continues to apply today. Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia and China have also developed a closer relationship based on the two nations’ views of international relations. Both share the opinion that the United States poses a threat to their core interests. Both seek a more multipolar world order away from U.S. hegemony which would allow the global order to be shaped in more favorable terms to their interests.14 They both resent “American moral posturing” and accuse the United States of hypocrisy because they believe that American actions always reflect hard interests. “Moral posturing” has been used as an excuse to legitimize U.S. political domination and military interventions. Both are convinced of U.S. global decline, a prediction that partially stems from the Marxist tradition in international relations that states that a mature capitalist economy like that of the United States must encounter financial crises and class conflicts that will drag it down from the heights of prosperity.15 Government elites and intellectual elites in China and Russia have been voicing their view of U.S. decline since at least 2008. Their joint statement on February 4, 2022, solidifies their common vision for a multipolar future.16 The statement asserts that a trend has emerged toward the redistribution of power in the world and that this new era will ensure peace, stability, and sustainable development. It would ensure the end of American dominance and stop the West from interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. While China’s rise truly does pose a challenge to U.S. global leadership, contrary to popular belief, China is not trying to dismantle the international order nor is it trying to spread its political and economic model of governance onto the world. The most important thing for China is its national interests, and it does not view a world “full of copies of itself” as

 U.S. Department of State (2022).  Kendall-Taylor and Shullman (2022). 15  Nathan (2022). 16  Smith (2022). 13 14

96 

S. LOFTUS

a national interest.17 It is however trying to gain more power, influence, and leadership within the order, and in parallel, is creating new non-­ Western-­ led institutions such as the BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among others. The growth of China’s influence abroad signifies a shift in global norms spreading in that the world is no longer dominated by a “universal” normative framework to which all should aspire but now has much more room for a multi-civilizational, multicultural, multi-political structure of international relations. Just as the United States managed to spread soft power influence throughout the world through the processes of globalization, China is now also able to exert such influence—only not with a specific ideology but a negation of liberal ideology as a dominant normative framework. China is already affecting global norms in how countries vote at the United Nations General Assembly and is creating a world more receptive to other forms of government.

National Identity Due to Japan, Britain, France, and Germany’s “successful” development trajectories after World War II, it was assumed China would evolve similarly. Because their economic growth occurred concurrently with social progress, it was assumed that democracy would be an outcome of economic growth in other cases too.18 In contrast, economic growth in China has been achieved through stable communist rule—suggesting that democracy and growth are not mutually dependent. In light of this distinction, it is important to take into consideration each nation’s history and culture when assessing its prospects for democratization and liberalizing.19 The Chinese political system is rooted in the country’s history and is a legitimate form of rule inside China. In fact, the Chinese elite often argue that their system is superior to that of the West.20 China has always had a skeptical view of foreign engagement. For much of its history, China was under threat by foreign powers such as Japan, the United Kingdom, and France. Foreign engagement is therefore pursued with caution as it is associated with uncertainty and even humiliation based on what China  Krastev and Holmes (2020).  Lipset (1959, pp. 69–105). 19  Loftus (2018). 20  Mitter and Johnson (2021). 17 18

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

97

sees as its “Century of Humiliation” after the British victory in the Opium Wars of the 1840s. The Opium Wars represented a critical juncture in modern Chinese history and revealed China’s vulnerabilities as an international power. After its defeat, China ceded the territory of Hong Kong to the British, opened treaty ports to trade with foreigners, and granted special rights to foreigners operating within these ports. The lesson that Chinese students learn today about the Opium Wars is that China should never again let itself become vulnerable to other countries.21 The Century of Humiliation generated a collective trauma and an ideology of victimization which Chinese society continues to carry today.22 Coker argues that the rise of the “civilizational state” in China and elsewhere, and narratives surrounding the “Century of Humiliation” or Mao’s “Cultural Revolution” are used selectively and include important factual historical omissions. In other words, the idea of the “civilizational state” is based on “cherry-picked” historical data, creating an imagined narrative overly focused on the past and highly exclusionary. Coker argues that both Russian and Chinese leaders try to legitimize their behavior by claiming to represent different moral and social values than the rest of the world. Ultimately though, whether Russia and China’s “civilizational states” are earnest or not, the reality is that they are part of a global movement that is gaining traction. Coker argues that these challenges could give birth to a new post-liberal international order, which he sees as destabilizing, lawless, and devoid of norms and values.23 As the Soviet Union collapsed, the Soviets and the Chinese analyzed the failures of communism in different ways. While it was understood that communism as an ideology had been discredited and that the future wouldn’t be about spreading communism around the world, they had very different views about the existence of the communist political party. Then-General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev believed that his mission was to rescue socialism from the corruption of the communist party. In contrast, Deng Xiaoping, Former Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission of the People’s Republic of China, believed it was the disintegration of the Soviet party that led the USSR to crumble. Deng and his successors retained the idea  Asia Pacific Curriculum (2022).  Ford (2015), Miller (2013). 23  The Rise of the Civilizational State: China, Russia and Islamic Caliphate and the Challenge to the Liberal World Order, Cambridge: Polity (2019). 21 22

98 

S. LOFTUS

that the party must be dominant nationally, which would allow it to manage China’s economic development. Gorbachev believed communism failed because it didn’t manage to build a socialist society. Deng perceived communism to succeed as the communist party united the Chinese state and Chinese society. For this reason, the fall of the USSR was seen as an example of what not to do for China if it wanted to preserve and improve upon its success as a nation. The West served as a model to imitate for many countries after the Cold War. As Krastev and Holmes argue, different countries adopted different forms of imitation of the West after the Cold War which led to various forms of resentment today among nations who sacrificed national identity in the pursuit of imitating Western models. China, on the other hand, practiced imitation of the West as “appropriation,”24 taking what it believed was useful but rejecting modalities that were not their own. They employed joint venture agreements forcing Western firms to transfer innovative technologies without adapting Western forms of governance. Ultimately, their national identity was not put at risk and resentment didn’t ensue in the way it did in Eastern Europe. The legitimacy of the current regime in China partially lies with the fact that President Xi Jinping minimizes foreign ideas and influence on Chinese society and reinforces Chinese identity. Xi Jinping aims to restore China to greatness and has turned Marxism into a nationalist ideology resisting foreign pressures. Referencing traditional culture and traditional moral virtues appears to realign the CCP with societal expectations.25 Each nation desires national self-esteem as previously elaborated. This can be gained by identifying oneself with a group in relation to certain out-groups, memories of the past national self, and the national aspirations for the future.26 Identities then form interests which then garner national self-esteem and can retain the elite’s form of preferred order, particularly in times of great change.27 Identities are also shaped through relations with one’s “significant other,” and cooperation heavily depends on whether or not recognition is extended to the Self by the Other.28 A nation may seek to imitate another nation that is seen as being more  Krastev and Holmes, Lights.  Kubat (2018), Tsang and Cheung (2021). 26  Mercer (1995, p. 241). 27  Clunan (2012). 28  Wendt (1999). 24 25

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

99

successful and adapt a strategy of “social mobility” to try and join the more successful group of nations.29 Otherwise a nation could try and compete with these nations, thereby implying an acceptance of the criteria for the assessment of status among nations but trying to change its ranking. In this identity management strategy, a nation will try to accumulate more of these criteria, such as economic development, military strength, or a sphere of influence.30 Alternatively, nations can also reject the frame of comparison and seek positive distinctness by altering the frames of comparison. One can also choose to compare themselves with nations possessing a lower status rather than the higher-ranking ones. While Russia and China may have adopted the first strategy in their process of accumulating wealth, once both nations achieved a certain level of economic development, they became more assertive of their ideas, identity, and interests and adopted this latter identity management strategy called “social creativity.”31 China describes its system as superior to the West, and Russia claims to have a much higher moral standard than the West. Both criticize liberalism’s failures and quest for global domination. They also began associating more with the Global South, changing the group of nations to which they compare themselves. By changing the frames of comparison, they have gained legitimacy in global strategic competition. Today’s age of rapid communication and technological innovation allows people to know each other and communicate much more. However, it has also highlighted our many differences. Today’s populism and identity-­based wars on universalism are symptoms of this. As Krastev and Holmes have argued, China could indeed represent the “end of the age of imitation,”32 or an end to a world where one single military and economic power will spread their own values across the globe.

An Overview of China’s Domestic Ambitions China wants to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”33 and develop its military, economy, and society. China plans for new development programs of “dual circulation.” This is based on accelerating  Larson and Shevchenko (2010, pp. 63–95), Clunan (2012, p. 10).  Larson and Shevchenko (2010, p. 7). 31  Tajfel and Turner (1986). 32  Krastev and Holmes, Lights. 33  Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Latvia (2022). 29 30

100 

S. LOFTUS

domestic consumption to promote growth, shifting to higher-end manufacturing, obtaining key technologies, and attracting foreign investment for these. China also plans to turn its armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army, into a “world-class” military by the end of 2049 to help China become a “great modern socialist country.”34 The accelerating pace of the PRC’s nuclear expansion may enable it to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027. In 2021, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.8% making China the second largest military spender in the world.35 China’s other development programs include the “Made in China 2025” project which aims to reduce its dependence on foreign technology and promote technological manufacturers in the global marketplace by the year 2025. “China Standards 2035” aims to set global standards for emerging technologies in areas such as artificial intelligence and advanced communications technology by 2035. It has also planned to adopt “Smart Cities.” Due to the increasing rate of urbanization, the problems associated with extra waste disposal, traffic pollution, and energy consumption will be tackled through the adoption of data-sharing smart technologies including the Internet of Things (IOT) to improve energy efficiency, minimize greenhouse gas emissions, and improve quality of life. The central government will play a prominent role in the development and implementation of these “Smart Cities.” It is thanks to this technology that China was able to fight the spread of the coronavirus more effectively. China has also invested significant resources into furthering technological innovation, including the development of 5G, AI, new energy vehicles, and cloud computing. In 2020, the National People’s Congress passed a $1.4 trillion fiscal plan to support technological innovation in these fields.36 China is using its tech giants Alibaba and Huawei to support its smart cities development and deployment.37 As China begins to export its technologies for Smart Cities abroad, the West expresses privacy concerns, particularly concerning China’s potential for spying or obtaining personal data. Xi aims to promote the “Chinese dream” and rejuvenate the nation. He aims to enrich the Chinese population while retaining total control of the nation through the powerful CCP.  China cares more about itself and  Office of the Secretary of Defense (2021).  Ibid. 36  Gibson and Bremner (2021). 37  Lai (2022). 34 35

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

101

about preserving the power of the CCP more than achieving global domination. In 2017 Xi Jinping asserted that China would not import a foreign model, nor would it export a Chinese model. Chinese officials consistently stress the uniqueness of China’s development path.38 That being said, the United States currently faces a near-peer competitor in all domains, as will be described below.

Strategic Competition with China In comparison with the Cold War, today there is a much higher level of economic interdependence between the rival great powers. China is a much more important economic challenger than the USSR was during the Cold War. Additionally, there are much more cultural exchanges today between China and the United States than there were back then. Technology is also an important factor as it has changed and developed so much that it has become harder for the powers to conceal military activity from one another.39 At the height of its power, the USSR in the mid-­1970s had a small advantage in population and its GNP was 60% of that of the United States. China today has four times the population size and is 70% as wealthy. Based on those indicators, if China’s economy continues to grow at 5% annually, it will have more latent power than the United States.40 While many fear that China is trying to export its illiberal authoritarianism and mercantilism into the world, Xi seems uninterested in transforming others’ identities. Exporting China’s goods are more important than exporting its ideology. Authoritarianism itself is not an ideology—it is a form of rule. Xi and Putin are united not in an ideology but in a disagreement over U.S. unipolarity and regime change policies which could threaten their own hold on power. China has no interest in dismantling the international order. It rather desires more power within it, for the United States to have less ideological global domination, and to create a world where different forms of governance can preserve their sovereignty and not be threatened by regime change. Just as China did not change into a liberal democracy when the West integrated it into Western institutions, there is no reason to think other nations, particularly consolidated  Weiss (2019).  Fergusson (2020). 40  Weiss (2019). 38 39

102 

S. LOFTUS

democracies, will change political ideologies when integrated into Chinese-­ led institutional arrangements. Today’s competition is a struggle over trade, investment, currency, technology, and influence. China wants to de-Americanize the world, not replace a global liberal ideology with a global anti-liberal ideology. It actually wants to diminish the role of ideology in the world. China’s unsuccessful experience with the geopolitics of imitation in the country’s history when it imported Soviet institutions may help explain why it has no interest in pursuing such a strategy in its power projection onto the world. Its import of Soviet institutions after 1949 taught it an important lesson that imitation triggers resentment and makes the imitator live in constant vulnerability. In addition, China was once a great exporter of Maoist ideology and directly experienced the failures of that approach to foreign policy.41 However, it is important to note that while China is not threatening to impose authoritarian governments all over the world, it does have the ability to skew global standards for trade and investment in its favor and influence global norms.42 As the threat of China intensified, U.S. policy shifted and became more confrontational toward China. The two countries have increased disputes over issues such as trade, technology transfer, and cyber espionage. The state of their relationship became abundantly clear as the two powers blamed one another for the outbreak of the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic.43 Tensions surrounding Taiwan and the East and South China Seas have grown. Xi Jinping has said “reunification” with Taiwan “must be fulfilled” and has not ruled out the possible use of force to achieve this. China sees self-ruled Taiwan as a breakaway province that will eventually be part of the country again.44 Despite the ability of the United States and China to have maintained a peaceful relationship throughout the post-­ Cold War years, today there is fear of increasing potential for confrontation between the two. Particularly as Joe Biden has asserted that the United States would be willing to use force to defend Taiwan.45 But the political situation inside Taiwan is not as clear as it is painted out to be. Western media make it seem like independence is desired by the entire  Krastev and Holmes, Lights.  Dobbins et al. (2019). 43  Ordoñez (2020). 44  BBC (2021). 45  Ibid. 41 42

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

103

country. Taiwan is ruled by two dominant political coalitions that have shifted from being in power since 1988. The Pan-Blue Coalition and the Pan-Green Coalition have opposite stances on the question of independence. The former favors a Chinese and Taiwanese dual identity over an exclusive Taiwanese identity, and favors greater friendly exchange with Mainland China, though still opposing the Communist Party. In a popular poll, 50% of the population of Taiwan expressed wanting to retain the status quo of no unification and no independence, 38% wanted independence, and 5% wanted reunification with China.46 China intends to pursue “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan promising a “one country two systems” approach to the question.47 It is unclear how Taiwan will react when faced with the issue, but its current rhetoric rejects such offers.48 In the event of such a move on Taiwan, the actions of the United States will determine whether great power war would occur. The United States has vested interests in Taiwan, particularly due to its production of semi-­ conductors. The United States also considers it its duty to defend Taiwan due to its democratic values and principles. That potential war would be a war over values and interests, very much like the ongoing war in Ukraine. China’s strategic ambitions also require a form of regional primacy in Asia which is a key driver in the military confrontation between the United States and China.49 But their competition extends beyond the Asia-Pacific region as well. The classic “security dilemma” is present here which may lead the United States and China to confront one another militarily one day. China views the United States’ regional influence, network of military bases, and naval and air presence as a potential threat. Beijing accuses Washington of trying to contain China and keep it permanently vulnerable.50 As China has grown wealthier, it has responded in kind by building military forces that can challenge the U.S. position. Here each side’s actions to deal with a potential threat reinforce the other side’s own security fears, which in turn triggers a response that strengthens the former’s original concerns. China’s defensive actions have made its neighbors less secure. They have responded by moving closer together politically, renewing ties with the United States, and building up their own military forces.  Yu-fu and Chin (2021).  Garcia and Tian (2021). 48  Ibid. 49  Heath et al. (2016), Ochmanek (2015). 50  Walt (2022a). 46 47

104 

S. LOFTUS

Part of China’s plan to reposition itself as a global superpower is its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, a multi-billion-dollar infrastructure development project. However, the BRI has faced important criticism. Chinese loans can create “debt traps” which result in Chinese ownership of critical infrastructure in recipient countries.51 But according to the Center for Global Development, the BRI is unlikely to cause a systemic debt problem as Beijing’s credit to developing countries only amounts to 2% of their $6.9  trillion accumulated debt between 2000 and 2016.52 Other explanatory factors for this debt include Western colonial legacies, austerity measures, unfair commercial terms, and dollar-denominated payment requirements.53 Other criticisms the BRI has met are with importing Chinese workers instead of hiring local populations. However, McKinsey conducted field surveys at more than 1000 Chinese companies across eight African countries in 2017 and found that 89% of employees were African, which added nearly 300,000 jobs for African workers.54 The BRI’s non-discriminative and lower governance standards approach remains attractive to developing countries, especially as it pertains to transparency issues and social responsibility. In addition, Western-led organizations have neglected infrastructure-building projects as they tend to be risk-­ averse, which allows China to fill the gaps in much-ignored poor countries.55 China’s involvement in developing countries has had positive development outcomes such as economic growth, job creation, and provides an alternative to austerity in times of crisis.56 China is particularly popular in Africa and Latin America for these reasons. Notable praise also stems from the Middle East which finds the initiative to be helpful for the region to exploit its energy resources, create jobs, and diversify the economy.57 Due to the unpopular U.S. War on Terror, Beijing has leveraged the disappointment of many countries in the region. Trade between China and the Middle East grew by 350% from 2005 to 2016, and Chinese FDI reached $29.5  billion in contrast with Washington’s $6.9  billion.58 Ties with Saudi Arabia are particularly growing through bilateral deals reaching  Hurley et al. (2018, pp. 1–37).  Dreher et al. (2017), Brautigam (2009). 53  Acemoğlu and Robinson (2017), Omotola and Saliu (2009). 54  Jayaram et al. (2017). 55  Milanovic (2017). 56  Cavanna (2019, pp. 10–37). 57  Kamel (2018, pp. 80–81, 89). 58  Kaiser-Cross and Mao (2018, pp. 186–87). 51 52

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

105

$65 billion in value and Saudi investments worth $20 billion in the ChinaPakistan economic corridor.59 Iran and Beijing have also increased their ties.60 Also, countries like Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka which experienced initial hiccups with the BRI have since softened their stance and continue to collaborate with China on large-scale infrastructure development projects.61 These projects are funded through new institutions created by China such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). In essence, these are alternatives to Western-led institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (WB). The Chinese Exim Bank has spent $12.5 billion more in loans to Sub-Saharan Africa than the WB in the past decade.62 The AIIB, established in 2016, has over 64 active projects amounting to $12.24  billion, ranging from motorways in Pakistan to a prosperous village project in Uzbekistan.63 In other words, China offers an alternative source of funding for areas and projects which the IMF and WB have not been inclined to finance.64 While China has also requested to increase its contribution to the IMF, the United States has veto power and did not approve this.65 Developing states have been seen to be increasingly moving away from existing banks due to their overly bureaucratic and slow nature.66 Chinese-led institutions offer an alternative to the “Bretton-Woods” institutions such as the IMF and WB, also because they exclude Western states from holding powerful positions within them. China also established new forums of cooperation such as the 14  +  1 forum with Central and Eastern Europe, which aims to advance existing ties regarding China’s Belt and Road Initiative, specifically focusing on transport infrastructure.67 This forum used to be the 17 + 1, but the Baltic states have decided to leave the initiative amid deteriorating relations between China and the EU. These Chinese-led institutions have an influence on the international order as they increase Chinese soft power and encourage moving away from the Washington consensus.  Saudi Arabia Signs 20 Billion USD in Agreements with Pakistan (2019).  Seng (2018). 61  Schmall (2018), Myanmar: China-Backed Port Project to Move Ahead (2018). 62  Chin (2012, pp. 211–230). 63  Aiib.org (2019). 64  Chin (2012). 65  Dollar (2022). 66  Ibid. 67  Ekman (2016). 59 60

106 

S. LOFTUS

The risk factors that could lead to confrontation between the United States and China include rapid changes in the balance of power, persistent military crises, and arms races.68 Given the catastrophic consequences that war usually leads to, “hybrid” tactics have shown to be increasingly beneficial at achieving desired results. China has built a significant capability to gain support among other countries’ elites and public officials and has invested substantial resources in strategic communication aimed at improving its image abroad. It funds Confucius Institutes, teaching Mandarin around the world. It also invests in English language print and broadcast media. It also uses coercive techniques such as banning corporations from operating in China unless they abide by the Taiwan and Tibet policy. American Airlines, Delta, and United all removed references to Taiwan from their websites at the will of the Chinese government.69 The competition for influence between the United States and China is thus primarily non-military for the moment. China’s main tools for influence-seeking include economic attraction and coercion; informational and narrative-­ shaping, diplomatic engagements, increasing Chinese power in international organizations, and cultural engagement programs.70 China holds the perception that hybrid tactics are effective against the United States due to its attachment to “outdated” paradigms of linear escalation and the challenges it faces from simultaneous international threats.71 The United States also takes advantage of hybrid methods to coerce others while avoiding war through the imposition of sanctions, supporting political opposition, and offensive cyber operations. But these tactics are unlikely to be effective against China.72 The race for technological leadership is an important challenge as it could not only enable rapid economic growth but also allow China’s military to gain an edge on the battlefield.73 So far, China seems to have an advantage over the United States in the area of big data sets on the military application of artificial intelligence, but the United States retains a modest lead in AI technology development due to its advantage in the semiconductor sector.74 While the United States still holds the advantage  Heath and Lane (2019).  Weiss (2019). 70  Mazarr et al. (2021). 71  Connable et al. (2016). 72  Gompert and Binnendijk (2016). 73  Mazarr et al. (2018) 74  Waltzman et al. (2020). 68 69

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

107

diplomatically, economically technologically, and militarily, China is quickly narrowing the gap in comprehensive national power. It is also narrowing the gap in influence in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and in multilateral trade regimes.75 Russia and China are known to regularly veto United Nations Security Council votes to protect countries from international demands to protect human rights and block humanitarian interventions. China’s growing influence in Africa and Latin America has influenced these nations to vote this way in the UN general assembly and oppose human rights resolutions.76 According to a study on the foreign policy implications of Chinese trade in developing countries, Flores-Macias and Kreps find that the more trade a country has with China, the more they are likely to side with China on matters relating to foreign policy.77 After a report was published by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet condemning China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang province, Muslim countries in Asia and Africa remained silent. Additionally, 70 countries led by Pakistan made a joint statement at the Council calling on countries to stop interfering in China’s internal affairs.78 Diplomatically, China’s influence over ideas and global norms is increasing, but the United States retains an advantage due to its network of global alliances and partnerships.79 However, competition is fierce in the information domain, extending to the role of democratic ideals and shaping global trade and technology norms and standards.80 While the competition today doesn’t include a major ideological one, China does place a great emphasis on nationalism. But the fear that China is exporting its social and economic model is unfounded. China has offered alternatives to U.S.-led international institutions, has created a world safer for authoritarian regimes, and has not been an advocate for liberal values. Nevertheless, it is not planning to spread autocracy throughout the world at the expense of democracy. However, China has made it easier for other authoritarians to thrive as it has demonstrated that development does not require democracy. It also lends its support to autocracies through international institutions. It may become increasingly more difficult for the  Mazarr et al. (2018), Shatz (2016).  Ibid. 77  Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013, pp. 357–371). 78  Abdeleli (2022). 79  Scobell et al. (2018). 80  Watts et al. (2020). 75 76

108 

S. LOFTUS

West to hold leverage in the Global South as China’s approach to multilateralism is much more pragmatic and less driven by ideology and “strings attached” to reform domestically in exchange for aid. As China’s influence continues to rise, political pluralism will need to be the driving philosophy toward third parties as nations will seek business ties and relations with the United States, China, Russia, and the EU simultaneously—and fighting for influence in third countries is a sure way to lead to great power proxy war or great power war. As will be discussed in the chapter on Ukraine, the structure of the security and normative architecture on the European continent didn’t allow for political pluralism to flourish, as Ukraine was given a binary choice between collaborating with the West and collaborating with Russia throughout its development as an independent nation. Only during times when it applied a “multi-vector” approach to collaborating with both the West and Russia was there stability and minimal risk of war.

China-Russia Nexus The Russia-China partnership has been widely discussed in contemporary international relations. Their “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era” is set to promote “the building of a new international relations based on mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win-­ win cooperation.”81 When Xi came to power in 2013 and Putin returned to office the year prior, a relationship between the two formed based on mutual interests and has important strategic significance for current world affairs. Both rule their respective countries with authoritarian tendencies and share similar worldviews which allows them to set their natural differences aside. From their perspective, their relationship is seen as critical to global order and stability.82 However, the West does not see their relationship in such a positive light. While analysts diverge on their thinking, many believe their relationship poses a direct challenge to the rules-based international order.83 Views on both sides are strengthened by the state of relations today between China and the West and Russia and the West. A new “binarism” appears to be emerging, particularly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with the West and its partners on one side, and

 Bilaterals.org (2019).  Ying (2016). 83  U.S. Department of State (2017). 81 82

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

109

the Russia-China strategic relationship on the other.84 Many other nations find themselves in between, reluctant to take sides.85 Some have called this a “new Cold War.”86 Understanding their relationship boils down to their mutual interests and vision for the world. Both aim to facilitate a global environment supportive of their regime at home and look to each other for support in this respect. They have broadly similar views about issues such as the primacy of state sovereignty, the threat of “subversive” liberal influence, and the need for control over domestic politics.87 Traditionally both countries have always advocated for non-interference in internal affairs and respecting diversity of civilizations and modes of governance. They view democracy promotion as a source of instability and are opposed to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm and “color revolutions.” They oppose the export of one civilization or system of ideas to transform other civilizations or ideas and reform others with “universal” values of human rights, democracy, and freedom. They have strong feelings on national unity and hold firm stances on the issues of Chechnya and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. Both respect the United Nations as being the center of the international postwar order to observe international law. As members of the Security Council, they’ve held close consultations on issues such as Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran and reforming the UNSC and opposing any attempt to act alone outside of this framework. Both oppose the monopoly of Western states on trade, development markets, finance, and technology. Both oppose what they see as a “Cold War mentality,” with NATO in Europe, security mechanisms in the Asia-­ Pacific, and the deployment of missile defense systems in their vicinity.88 China and Russia frequently face sharp criticism from the West on their domestic and foreign policies, which encourages them to move closer together in their shared view of the West unjustly imposing their value system onto others. Beijing is under attack for its military activities in the South China Sea, its treatment of Uighurs Muslims, its influence operations in foreign countries, its mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic, and its “wolf warrior diplomacy.” Wolf warrior diplomacy refers to the  Wright (2018).  Menon (2022). 86  Wintour (2022). 87  Lukin (2021, pp. 363–380). 88  Ibid. 84 85

110 

S. LOFTUS

new confrontational and combative style that Chinese official rhetoric adopted since Xi Jinping came into office whereby diplomats and commentators denounce any perceived criticism of the Chinese government and its policies.89 Russia has been criticized for its military interventions in Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and more recently its full-scale invasion of the latter as well as its poisoning of Sergei Skripal and Alexei Navalny and its many influence operations. The EU and the United States imposed sanctions on Russian officials over the poisoning and jailing of Alexei Navalny and also sanctioned Chinese officials along with Britain and Canada over human rights abuses in its far western Xinjiang region. After these occurrences, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi called for all countries “to stand together to oppose all forms of unilateral sanctions” and rejected Western attempts at “imposing their own rules on everyone else, which they believe should underpin the world order.”90 For Russia, the survival of its regime is of prime importance to the ruling elite. The elite in Russia do not view China’s rise as much of a threat and therefore accept the material asymmetry between them. Russia perceives the West to want regime change in Russia and perceives that China contrastingly does not seek to undermine Putin’s rule or interfere in Russian domestic politics. Both China and Russia have perceived the United States to be engaging in regular regime change efforts and fear they will try to do the same on their territories. The “color revolutions” were perceived by both as being inspired by the West. The protests in Ukraine in 2014 and the protests in Hong Kong in 2019–2020 reinforced this view. This view may explain why China tacitly accepted Russia’s annexation of Crimea, even though this move goes against its main beliefs in international politics of discouraging separatists and independence referendums—which is a dangerous precedent based on Chinese views toward Taiwan. But because it saw Russia’s actions as a response to Western-led color revolutions, it accepted them. After the protests in 2011–2012 in Russia, Putin doubled down on his power to prevent “western influence” from destabilizing the regime. The regime began mobilizing against the West, discrediting Western NGOs and naming them “foreign agents,” and launched a hybrid campaign against the West to sow discord and discredit and destabilize liberal democratic systems. In the early 1990s Russia was weakened and humiliated,  Jiang and Westcott (2020).  Albert (2021).

89 90

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

111

but also wanted to restore its great power status, and China believed it had the potential to do so. Due to its awareness of Russian concerns about the increasing gap in power differentiation between them, China played its cards right and adopted a strategy of “reassurance” toward Russia.91 This was part of its larger strategy of keeping a low profile in foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping.92 This successful diplomatic move along with the continued deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, and China’s rise as a potential global hegemon brought the two giants much closer together. In 1996 Russia and China under Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin signed a joint statement announcing their “partnership of strategic coordination based on equality and benefit and oriented toward the 21st century,” which formally established their “strategic partnership.”93 Their vision for a multipolar world order was reflected in their “Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order,” adopted as early as 1997.94 In 2001 they signed the Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. China has no such friendship treaty with any other country. Nonetheless, this relationship was very limited throughout the 1990s and 2000s with very modest economic cooperation or diplomatic and cultural contact. In the face of American unipolarity, NATO eastward expansion, U.S. strategic relations with countries in the Indo-Pacific, Western monopoly over trade and finance, and the rise of terrorism, China and Russia deduced it was in their best interest to forge closer ties with one another. They initiated a series of multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the China-Russia-­ India Trilateral Dialogue. The SCO was formed by China and Russia in 2001 joining forces with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on the basis of mutual trust and respect for diverse civilizations and common interests. The SCO is a political, economic, and security organization comprising the eight-member states of China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and includes four observer states who are interested in full membership (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia) and six “Dialogue Partners”  Weidacher Hsiung (2021, pp. 447–479).  Goldstein (2020, pp. 164–201). 93  Bekkevold (2022). 94  China-Russia: Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order (1997, pp. 986–89). 91 92

112 

S. LOFTUS

(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey). In 2021, the decision was made to start the accession process of Iran to the SCO as a full member, and Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia became dialogue partners. Iran’s accession to the SCO, along with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, is another step toward the geopolitical consolidation of continental Asia, where China and Russia are playing leading roles. The SCO is the world’s largest regional organization covering approximately 60% of the area of Eurasia, 40% of the world population, and more than 30% of global GDP.95 Collectively, the members of the SCO account for almost 20% of the world’s oil reserves and 44% of its natural gas.96 The members are also large food producers and have plans to develop diversified supply chains. On September 16, 2022, members of the bloc also agreed to expand trade in national currencies. The BRICS was also formed under the coordination of China and Brazil for emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China in 2009 with South Africa joining in 2011. This organization helped mitigate some of the negative effects of the global financial crisis in 2007–2008. In fact, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Argentina, Turkey, and Egypt all have future plans to join the group. This is an important development as this institution aims to promote the “de-dollarization” of the global economy through encouraging trade transactions in the currencies of the member states. After the Ukraine Crisis in 2014, Russia leaned on China as a counterweight against the United States which was embraced by China as its own relationship with the United States was deteriorating. The U.S. “pivot to Asia” under Obama was established after it observed a more assertive Chinese foreign policy, which China saw as an attempt to contain it.97 Thus, when Russia pivoted to China in 2014, China’s embrace served as a response to the U.S. pivot to Asia policy. China intended to send a message that it had the option of strengthening relations with Russia to counterbalance what it perceived as U.S. strategic encirclement. In 2010, China surpassed Germany to become Russia’s main trading partner. In 2014, when sanctions were imposed, the dollar’s share in Russia’s export of goods and services ranged between 75% and 80%. Subsequently, Russia reached several agreements on trade in national currencies, so that by the  Iran looks east after China-led bloc OKs entry (2021).  Nadin et al. (2022). 97  Kaplan (2012). 95 96

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

113

end of 2020 the share of the dollar in Russia’s trade fell to 48%.98 Bilaterally, China and Russia have cut their use of the dollar from 90% of transactions in 2015 to 51% in 2019.99 In June of 2019, both countries agreed to switch to national currencies in bilateral trade to move away from the US dollar. Since 2014, Russia has been gradually reducing its dollar holdings and has sought to partially decouple from the Western financial system.100 In the military domain, Russia is helping China build a missile attack early warning system, something only Russia and the United States currently possess.101 They expect to increase their cooperation on strategic missile defense, hypersonic, and nuclear power submarines. China and Russia have increased their joint military exercises, sharing best practices, high-level cooperation in the defense industry, and sharing technology. This has increased the defense potential of the PLA which is in the interest of both countries. Russia has become China’s main source of oil imports and high-end military items such as S-400 anti-air missile systems and Su-35 multipurpose fighter jets to help modernize the PLA, intended to significantly complicate U.S. military planning toward China.102 The Sino-­U.S. rivalry is expected to intensify in a bipolar structure as the rivalry between two rival powers in a bipolar structure always does.103 China also helps Russia technologically as it has surpassed Moscow in AI, shipbuilding, and drones. China’s goals also stretch toward developing both Central Asia and the Arctic region, and it wouldn’t be able to fully penetrate these areas without Russia’s acquiescence. Russia lays claim to a large portion of the Arctic Ocean and has vested security interests in it. China is seeking to gain more access to the region’s resources for its Polar Silk Road project.104 Moscow has been more accommodating toward Beijing in its aspirations in the Arctic due to cuts in ties with the West and needs Chinese collaboration to carry out major projects there. Generally, Russia hopes to gain more Chinese investment into the northern sea route.105 China is now a major

 The Moscow Times (2021).  Simes (2020). 100  Korsunskaya and Marrow (2021). 101  Korolev (2020). 102  Kashin (2019). 103  Waltz (1979). 104  Xinhua. (2018). 105  TASS (2019). 98 99

114 

S. LOFTUS

foreign stakeholder in a liquefied natural gas project.106 On the other hand, the United States starkly rejects Chinese presence in the Arctic and says it cannot be trusted based on its aggressive behavior elsewhere.107 In the words of Dmitri Trenin, their relationship is like a “great power entente.”108 This is a harmonious association of major powers based on common interests, perception of common threat, and a degree of security policy coordination. They both adhere to great power logic of spheres of influence. Moscow defers to Beijing on east Asian issues and China recognizes Russia’s leading political role in the post-Soviet space and Middle East.109 China’s economic penetration of Central Asia has not caused the level of pushback from Moscow that was initially expected. These countries first of all approach China cautiously out of fear their economies would be swallowed by China if they enter into a free trade agreement. Also, many of the people in these regions exhibit Sinophobia and may even choose to want to hedge with Moscow against China’s rise in the region. Contrary to Russian-Western disagreements over Ukraine in their shared neighborhood, Russia and China have been able to co-exist in Central Asia. They have an understanding that Moscow is the main political military partner and ally and Beijing is the primary economic force.110 This can be described as great power pragmatism, which is by far the most stable approach to great power competition today. It also diminishes the likelihood of war. However, there is evidence of increasing Chinese influence in Central Asia as Russian power weakens in light of the war in Ukraine. Still though, Beijing is expected to temper its rising influence in the region on account of Russian interests. Scholars have attempted to explain their relationship in a variety of ways. Welch Larson and Shevchenko argue that China and Russia share a common identity of pride and humiliation with respect to their relationship with the West as they strive to achieve great power status.111 Lukin argues that economic and geopolitical interests have driven the countries together in spite of their differences.112 Korolev & Portyakov argue that

 Humpert (2019).  Digges (2019). 108  Trenin (2015). 109  Kortunov (2017). 110  Zogg (2019). 111  Larson Welch and Shevchenko (2019). 112  Lukin (2018, pp. 576–583). 106 107

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

115

the pressures of the international system strengthen their partnership.113 According to the Realist school of thought, stability in the international system is best achieved by maintaining a balance of power. Power structures exist by the mere existence of other actors and the potential harm they can create.114 Due to this reality, China wanted to improve its relations with Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union to balance the power of the United States. Their long-standing border disputes were thus resolved and an agreement was finally settled in 2004. With the United States as the sole global hegemon, China adopted a two-pronged approach of cooperation and opposition. China needed to cooperate with the United States to achieve economic growth and integration into the world economic order, but still wanted to balance U.S. power dominance and stand up for its regime and security interests. Establishing closer relations with Russia was the strategic way to achieve the latter. This is a tendency among nation-states, one that was not foreseen by liberal theories which argued multilateralism would transcend realist concerns such as the balance of power theory. Relations between Russia and China reached their peak as the two nations signed a joint statement that their friendship had “no limits.” In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China increased its support for Russia, stating that it was the “bloc mentality” and NATO enlargement that led to the war. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said that the Russia-China relationship “rises above the model of military and political alliance in the Cold War era” and that this symbolizes “a new model of international relations” which involves not causing confrontation or targeting other nations. In the joint statement, Xi Jinping voiced his opposition to NATO enlargement and expressed support for Russia’s “proposals to create long-term legally binding security guarantees in Europe.”115 Some argue that China and Russia’s relationship is nothing to worry about due to their historical grievances and their likelihood to compete against one another rather than form an alliance. These scholars prioritize unit-level analyses of each country’s domestic political system which reveals a high level of incompatibility.116 On the other hand, systemic scholars argue that their relationship is one to be feared and that  Korolev and Portyakov (2018, pp. 411–437).  Waltz (1979). 115  Bloomberg. (2022). 116  Lo (2017, pp. 231–49), Brenton (2013). 113 114

116 

S. LOFTUS

their union will pose a serious challenge to U.S. hegemony.117 Korolev’s study raises similar points and argues the importance of both levels of analysis but stresses the importance of the structural level which is also seen to possess re-shaping outcomes for domestic-level considerations.118 This book makes more of a systemic argument while also underlining the importance of cultural variations and argues that the unipolar moment is giving way to a system where non-Western powers are gaining leverage internationally. Russia and China’s partnership is significant, as it allows their norms to spread. Based on the significant level of economic cooperation nations have with China as well as energy, weapons, and food supply cooperation with Russia, the Global South is unwilling to take sides in the war in Ukraine despite Western pressures to do so. This is highly symbolic of the state of global power relations and shows that supporting and imitating the West is not the only path toward the future of development and international relations. Even though China and Russia are strategic partners, it would be naïve to assume they would be so close as to agree on everything. That is why they give their relationship lots of space and lots of vagueness. No official alliance is needed, they just share a similar strategic outlook and worldview and find themselves united in their desire to see an end to the unipolar post-Cold War world order. China’s rivalry with the United States will continue to shape its economic relations with Russia. One area where this is already taking place is the import of soybeans. The trade war with the United States forced China to replace it with Russia as one of its main importers of this product. In a bipolar system, the two rivals are also likely to see their independence as a mutual vulnerability.119 This could mean that China and the United States could seek to start decoupling from each other, which will increase China’s cooperation with Russia and compel other states in the system to choose sides. China announced it will cease cooperation with the United States on areas of climate change and military cooperation after Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. And Russia announced it will no longer allow the United States to observe its nuclear activities as outlined in their START agreement. This shows that cooperation is highly based on diplomatic relations, which are at an all-time low right now. If the United States wants to maintain cooperation with China  Nemets (2006), Ambrosio (2017, pp. 110–56), Wishnick (2017, pp. 114–32).  Korolev (2022). 119  Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 117 118

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

117

and perhaps Russia again in the future, it will have to be on a much more pragmatic level based on a type of “great power entente” coupled with political pluralism, pragmatic internationalism, and negotiated security agreements.

Analytical Conclusions No theory of international relations is without flaws, but existing theories provide frameworks for understanding global dynamics and can be complementary. Realism in international relations is useful for understanding the behavior of nations when their power or security is threatened or the behavior of a great power when it is rising to or falling from power. Constructivism is useful for understanding national identity and interests. And Liberalism correctly asserts that international cooperation is rational, particularly in this day and age. But unfortunately, despite it being rational, international cooperation is highly contingent upon diplomatic relations. And positive diplomatic relations are highly contingent upon seeking mutual understanding and compromises. Liberalism in its extreme form, or in the form of a “crusade” to achieve “the end of history” objective, also fails to take into consideration cultural and national particularities. As this chapter demonstrated, China is rising as a power and gaining more influence throughout the world. This rising influence is threatening the United States, which has held disproportionate aggregate power since the end of the Cold War and is experiencing relative decline. Realism predicts that the existing hegemon will react by containing the rising potential hegemon. U.S. policy toward China only really changed in 2017 under Donald Trump, who abandoned engagement and pursued containment as “great power competition” returned. Trump initiated a trade war against China in 2018 and undermined Huawei and other corporations that threatened American technological leadership. Under Trump, the United States also developed closer relations with Taiwan and challenged Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. Joe Biden could have abandoned the containment strategy to return to engagement but chose to support this strategy. Recently, Joe Biden implemented a series of tough controls on the export of American chip technology to China, a blow to China’s semiconductor industry.120 The U.S.  Innovation and Competition Act easily gained bipartisan support in the Senate. The bill labels China “the greatest 120

 Schuman (2022).

118 

S. LOFTUS

geopolitical and geo-economic challenge for United States foreign policy” and calls for treating Taiwan as a sovereign state of “vital” strategic importance.121 The U.S.-China rivalry is likely to persist. Both nations are currently seeking to lessen their mutual vulnerabilities. According to the U.S.-China Investment Project, Chinese FDI to the U.S. peaked in 2016 at $46.45 billion. In 2021 Chinese FDI in the United States stood at $4.7 billion.122 Neorealists argue that a unipolar world order is the least enduring of all types of power configurations as the hegemon exceeds its capacities by overstretching itself and as other powers bandwagon together to contain its power.123 Russia and China have bandwagoned over the years to contain the power of unipole, and the United States has wasted important resources in its “forever wars” in the Middle East. It can be assumed that the world is moving toward a more bipolar or multipolar power configuration. Within a multipolar or even bipolar structure, the United States will not be able to exert its influence on the entire globe without facing opposition from other powers with differing interests. Realism assumes that all nations are insecure due to a lack of global authority that can prevent states from attacking each other. Due to this insecurity, states will always look for ways to make themselves more secure and will compete for power. Realism is a theory that aims to explain the root causes of conflict and seeks to discourage it by understanding where it is likely to arise. Unlike what critics have said, realism may be devoid of values or ideals but that is simply because the actions used to achieve said values and ideals tend to result in insecurity and human suffering.124 As Walt argues in a convincing Foreign Policy article, Realism is unpopular in the United States because it runs counter to the idea of “American exceptionalism.” While the ideals behind U.S. foreign policy may truly be for the greater good of humanity, the methods the United States has used to achieve these goals have been questionable. Instead of framing the world between “good” states and “bad” states, blaming all things evil on the latter, realism assumes that all states will act on their vital interests in potentially horrendous ways, something Western nations have been reluctant to admit. American efforts to contain communism led to tens of  Mearsheimer (2021).  Fergusson (2020). 123  Waltz (1997). 124  Desch (2003, pp. 415–26). 121 122

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

119

thousands of American deaths in South Vietnam, not to mention up to 2 million local civilian deaths.125 Such “vital interests” also led the United States to help a genocidal regime come to power in Cambodia and create a rebel army in Nicaragua against the regime which ultimately led to a war that killed 30,000 Nicaraguans. Not to mention the invasion of Iraq in 2003, an occupation that initially lasted eight years but had much longer reaching consequences and killed hundreds of thousands of people, though the number of casualties remains disputed.126 In other words, since all states compete for security, Realists see compromise as the only way to manage conflict. In contrast, idealists such as neoconservatives and liberals assert that “evil” regimes and leaders are responsible for all trouble in the world, so the only solution to the evil in the world would be to eliminate such leaders.127 This chapter has explained the rise of China in material and non-­ material terms and its ability to project influence throughout the world. Exporting the Western system of governance did not work on China, as China simply evolved by mimicking what was beneficial for its own growth and rejecting any attempts to change its domestic politics. By doing so, China has achieved great wealth and maintained a strong national identity and culture and serves as an example to other countries that one does not need liberal democracy to experience economic growth. China and Russia serve as a basis for alternative norm spreading and challenging the dominant liberal normative framework. China however is not trying to export its political and economic model onto the world. Russia and China have partnered together in their view on the world and international relations. They seek to balance the power of the hegemon while paving the way for a multipolar world order devoid of ideological and military domination by one single power. The world is entering a new phase beyond the universal normativity of Western liberal democracy. That is not to say liberal democracy will no longer be popular, it will just not be the only path forward for development and international relations. Instead of trying to “win” in great power competition, the goal should be to avoid war. The best way of doing this is to put ideology aside and reach pragmatic agreements on matters of international security, even if these agreements are suboptimal. Keeping the peace also takes the form of a general “balance of power”  The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica (2022).  Hagopian et al. (2013). 127  Walt (2022b). 125 126

120 

S. LOFTUS

arrangement whereby no power gains disproportionate  strength. It is unfortunately too late to reach such pragmatic solutions with Ukraine to avoid war, but it may not be too late with cases such as Taiwan. This is not to suggest that the fate of these nations is controlled by their neighboring great powers. Rather, it suggests the formulation of pragmatic and pluralist solutions to problems based on negotiations and diplomacy that benefit all parties, regardless of the suboptimality of the final agreement.

References “China-Russia: Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order”. (1997). International Legal Materials, 36(4), 986–989. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020782900015138 “Iran Looks East After China-Led Bloc OKs Entry”. (2021, September 18). France 24. “Myanmar: China-Backed Port Project to Move Ahead”. (2018, November 8). Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/situation-­report/myanmar-­china-­ backed-­port-­project-­move-­ahead “Saudi Arabia Signs 20 Billion USD in Agreements with Pakistan”. (2019, February, 19). Asia News Network. https://asianews.network/2019/02/19/ saudi-­arabia-­signs-­20-­billion-­usd-­in-­agreements-­with-­pakistan/ Abdeleli, A. (2022, October 11). Why Arab and African countries stand with China at the UN. swissinfo. https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ why-­arab-­and-­african-­countries-­stand-­with-­china-­at-­the-­un/47961448 Acemoğlu, D. and Robinson, J. (2017, January 20). The Economic Impact of Colonialism. Center for Economic and Policy Research Policy Portal. https:// voxeu.org/article/economic-­impact-­colonialism Aiib.org. (2019). Members and Prospective Members of the Bank. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.aiib.org/en/about-­aiib/governance/ members-­of-­bank/index.html Albert, E. (2021, March 24). China and Russia Show Solidarity. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/china-­a nd-­r ussia-­s how-­s olidarity-­ at-­meeting-­of-­foreign-­ministers/ Ambrosio, T. (2017). The Architecture of Alignment: The Russia-China Relationship and International Agreements. Europe-Asia Studies, 6(1), 110–156. Asia Pacific Curriculum. (2022). The Opium Wars in China. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://asiapacificcurriculum.ca/learning-­module/opium-­wars-­ china BBC. (2021, October 9). China-Taiwan Tensions: Xi Jinping Says ‘Reunification’ Must be Fulfilled. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­asia-­china-­ 58854081

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

121

Bekkevold, J. I. (2022). Imperialist Master, Comrade in Arms, Foe, Partner, and Now Ally? China’s Changing Views of Russia. In S. Kirchberger, S. Sinjen, & N. Wörmer(Eds.),Russia-ChinaRelations.Springer.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­ Bilaterals.org. (2019, June 6). Joint statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Development of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Collaboration in the New Era. https://www.bilaterals. org/?joint-­statement-­of-­the-­people-­s Bloomberg. (2022, April 29). China Calls Russia Relationship a ‘New Model’ for the World. Times. https://time.com/6172135/china-­russia-­relationship/ Brautigam, D. (2009). The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford University Press. Brenton, S.  T. (2013). Russia and China: An Axis of Insecurity. Asian Affairs, 44(2), 231–249. Cavanna, T. P. (2019). Unlocking the Gates of Eurasia: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for U.S. Grand Strategy. Texas National Security Review, 2(3), 10–37. Chin, G. (2012). Two Way Socialization: China, the World Bank, and Hegemonic Weakening. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 19(1), 211–230. Clunan, A. (2012, August 30–September 2). Constructivism’s Micro-Foundations: Aspirations, Social Identity Theory, and Russia’s National Interests. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (p. 6). Connable, B., Campbell, J. H., & Madden, D. (2016). Stretching and Exploiting Thresholds for High-Order War: How Russia. In China, and Iran Are Eroding American Influence Using Time-Tested Measures Short of War (p.  2). RAND Corporation. de Mesquita, B. B., & Downs, G. (2005). Development and Democracy. Foreign Affairs, 84(5), 77–86. Desch, M. C. (2003). It Is Kind to Be Cruel: The Humanity of American Realism. Review of International Studies, 29(3), 415–426. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/20097863 Digges, C. (2019, May 24). Russian–Chinese Relations Are Warming the Arctic. Bellona. https://bellona.org/news/arctic/2019-­05-­russian-­chinese-­relations-­ are-­warming-­the-­arctic Dobbins, J., Shatz. H.  J., & Wyne. A. (2019). Russia Is a Rogue, Not a Peer; China Is a Peer, Not a Rogue Different Challenges, Different Responses. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE310.html Dollar, D. (2022, Summer). The AIIB and the ‘One Belt, One Road. Brookings. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ the-­aiib-­and-­the-­one-­belt-­one-­road/ Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. J. (2017, October). Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance

122 

S. LOFTUS

Dataset. AidData Working Paper #46. https://www.aiddata.org/publications/aid-­c hina-­a nd-­g rowth-­e vidence-­f rom-­a -­n ew-­g lobal-­d evelopment-­ finance-­dataset Ekman, A. (2016, November). China’s Regional Forum Diplomacy. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https:// www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_44_China_ diplomacy.pdf Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Latvia. (2022). Speech by Xi Jinping at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ ce/celv/eng/xwdt/t1889004.htm Fergusson, N. (2020, December 17). Cold War II. National Review. https:// www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2020/12/17/cold-­war-­ii/ Flores-Macías, G. A., & Kreps, S. E. (2013). The Foreign Policy Consequences of Trade: China’s Commercial Relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992–2006. The Journal of Politics, 75(2), 357–371. Ford, C. A. (2015). China Looks at the West: Identity, Global Ambitions, and the Future of Sino-American Relations (p. 90). University Press of Kentucky. Garcia, C., & Tian, Y. L. (2021, October 9). China’s Xi Vows ‘reunification’ with Taiwan. Reuters. Gibson, T., & Bremner, B. (2021, October 27). The Domestic Promise and Potential Threat of China’s Smart Cities. Bloomberg. www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2021-­10-­27/china-­plan-­for-­smart-­cities-­spurs-­domestic-­wonder-­ global-­worry Goldstein, A. (2020). China’s Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance. International Security, 45(1), 164–201. https://doi. org/10.1162/isec_a_00383 Gompert, D.  C., & Binnendijk, H. (2016). The Power to Coerce: Countering Adversaries Without Going to War (p. 35). RAND Corporation. Hagopian, A., Flaxman, A. D., Takaro, T. K., Esa Al Shatari, S. A., Rajaratnam, J., Becker, S., Levin-Rector, A., Galway, L., Hadi Al-Yasseri, B. J., Weiss, W. M., & Murray, C. J. (2013). Mortality in Iraq Associated with the 2003–2011 War and Occupation: Findings from a National Cluster Sample Survey by the University Collaborative Iraq Mortality Study. PLOS Medicine, 10(10). Heath, T.  R., Gunness, K., & Cooper, C.  A. (2016). The PLA and China’s Rejuvenation: National Security and Military Strategies, Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities. RAND Corporation. Heath, T.  R., & Lane, M. (2019). Science-Based Scenario Design: A Proposed Method to Support Political-Strategic Analysis. RAND Corporation. Humpert, M. (2019, April 29). China Acquires 20 Percent Stake in Novatek’s Latest Arctic LNG Project. High North News. https://www.highnorthnews. com/en/china-­acquires-­20-­percent-­stake-­novateks-­latest-­arctic-­lng-­project

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

123

Hurley, J., Morris, S., & Portelance, G. (2018, March 4). Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective (pp. 1–37). Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/ examining-­debt-­implications-­belt-­and-­road-­initiative-­a-­policy-­perspective Jayaram, K., Kassiri, O., & Sun, I.  Y. (2017, June 28). The Closest Look Yet at Chinese Economic Engagement in Africa. McKinsey Report. https://www. mckinsey.com/featured-­insights/middle-­east-­and-­africa/the-­closest-­look-­yet-­ at-­chinese-­economic-­engagement-­in-­africa Jiang, S. and Westcott, B. (2020, May 29). China is Embracing a New Brand of Foreign Policy. Here’s What Wolf Warrior Diplomacy Means. CNN. https:// edition.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-­wolf-­warrior-­diplomacy-­intl-­hnk/ index.html Kaiser-Cross, S., & Mao, Y. (2018). China’s Strategy in the Middle East and the Arab World. In J.  Eisenman & E.  Heginbotham (Eds.), China Steps Out: Beijing’s Major Power Engagement with the Developing World (Vol. 174, pp. 186–187). Routledge. Kamel, M. S. (2018). China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for the Middle East. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 31(1), 80–81., 89. https:// doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2018.1480592 Kaplan, R. (2012, January 20). China’s Reaction to the U.S.  Pivot to Asia. Carnegie Endowment. https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/01/20/china-­ s-­reaction-­to-­u.s.-­pivot-­to-­asia-­pub-­46585 Kashin, V. (2019, October 22). Tacit Alliance: Russia and China Take Military Partnership to New Level. Carnegie Moscow Center. https://carnegie.ru/ commentary/80136 Kendall-Taylor, A., & Shullman, D. O. (2022, June 22). Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen After Russia’s War on Ukraine. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved August 4, 2022m, from https:// www.csis.org/analysis/best-­and-­bosom-­friends-­why-­china-­r ussia-­ties-­will-­ deepen-­after-­russias-­war-­ukraine Keohane, R. O. (2005). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. University Press. Korolev, A. (2020, November 20). China–Russia Cooperation on Missile Attack Early Warning Systems. EastAsiaForum. https://www.eastasiaforum. org/2020/11/20/china-­r ussia-­cooperation-­on-­missile-­attack-­early-­warning-­ systems/ Korolev, A. (2022). China-Russia Strategic Alignment in International Politics. Amsterdam University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048552733 Korolev, A., & Portyakov, V. (2018). China-Russia Relations in Times of Crises: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation. Asian perspective, 42, 411–437.

124 

S. LOFTUS

Korsunskaya, D., & Marrow, A. (2021, June 3). Russian Rainy-Day Fund to Get Out of All U.S. Dollar Assets. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­ russia-­r eserves/russian-­r ainy-­d ay-­f und-­t o-­g et-­o ut-­o f-­a ll-­u -­s -­d ollar-­a ssets-­ idUSKCN2DF1R9 Kortunov, A. (2017, November 13). Pyongyang Starts and Wins. What Can the Losers Do? Russian International Affairs Council. https://russiancouncil.ru/ en/analytics-­and-­comments/analytics/pyongyang-­is-­starts-­and-­wins-­what-­ can-­the-­losers-­do-­/Lendon Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2020). The Light that Failed: A Reckoning. Pegasus Books. Kubat, A. (2018). Morality as Legitimacy under Xi Jinping: The Political Functionality of Traditional Culture for the Chinese Communist Party. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 47(3). https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261 804700303 Lai, O. (2022, April 14). Top 10 Smart Cities in China. Earth.Org. https://earth. org/smart-­cities-­in-­china/ Larson, D., & Shevchenko, A. (2010). Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy. International Security, 34, 63–95. Larson Welch, D., & Shevchenko, A. (2019, September 18). Quest for Status: Chinese and Russian Foreign Policy. Yale Scholarship Online. https://doi. org/10.12987/yale/9780300236040.001.000. Lipset, S.  M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69–105. Lo, B. (2017, April 3). A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World. Lowy Institute Papers. Loftus, S. (2018). Insecurity and the Rise of Nationalism in Putin’s Russia: Keeper of Traditional Values. Palgrave Macmillan. Lukin, A. (2018). Introduction: Russia in the Asia-Pacific. Asian Politics and Policy, 10(4), 576–583. Lukin, A. (2021). The Russia–China Entente and Its Future. International Politics, 58, 363–380. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-­020-­00251-­7 Mazarr, M. J., Frederick, B., Drennan, J. J., Ellinger, E., Eusebi, K. E., Rooney, B., Stravers, A., & Yoder, E. (2021). Understanding Influence in the Strategic Competition with China. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/ research_reports/RRA290-­1.html Mazarr, M. J., Heath, T. R., & Cevallos, A. S. (2018). China and the International Order (p. 18). RAND Corporation. Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994–1995). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3, Winter), 5–49. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2021, November/December). The Inevitable Rivalry America, China, and the Tragedy of Great-Power Politics. Foreign Affairs. https:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-­1 0-­1 9/inevitable-­r ivalry-­ cold-­war

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

125

Menon, S. (2022, July 1). A New Cold War May Call for a Return to Nonalignment. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/nonalignment-­ international-­system-­alliance-­bloc/ Mercer, J. (1995). Anarchy and Identity. International Organization, 49(2), 241. Milanovic, B. (2017, May 17). The West is Mired in ‘Soft’ Development. China is Trying the ‘Hard’ Stuff. Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-­ development-­professionals-­network/2017/may/17/belt-­road-­project-­the-­ west-­is-­mired-­in-­soft-­development-­china-­is-­trying-­the-­hard-­stuff Miller, M.  C. (2013). Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China (p. 2). Stanford University Press. Mitter, R., & Johnson, E. (2021, May–June). What the West Gets Wrong About China. HBR. https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-­the-­west-­gets-­wrong-­about-­ china Nadin, R., Nijhar, I., & Mami, E. (2022, September 23). Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit 2022: Key Takeaways. ODI Report. Nathan, A. J. (2022, June 4). Why China Threads the Needle on Ukraine. Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/04/china-­ukraine-­decline-­ russia/ Nemets, A. (2006). Russia and China: The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance. The Journal of International Security Affairs, 11. Ochmanek, D. (2015). Sustaining U.S. Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Region: Why a Strategy of Direct Defense Against Anti-access and Area Denial Threats Is Desirable and Feasible. RAND Corporation. Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2021). Annual Report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic China 2021. U.S.  Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/0 3/2002885874/-­1/-­1/0/2021-­CMPR-­FINAL.PDF Omotola, J.  S., & Saliu, H. (2009). Foreign Aid, Debt Relief and Africa’s Development: Problems and Prospects. South African Journal of International Affairs, 16(1), 91. https://doi.org/10.1080/10220460902986180 Ordoñez, F. (2020, March 23). U.S., China Accuse Each Other of Mishandling COVID-19. NPR Morning Edition. Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1993). Political Regimes and Economic Growth. The Journal of Economic Perspective, 7(1), 51–69. Przeworski, A., & Limongi, F. (1997). Modernization: Theories and Facts. World Politics, 49(2), 155–183. Schmall, E. (2018, September 26). Asian Victors May Find Anti-China Campaign Vows Hard to Keep. Associated Press. https://www.apnews.com/ ee0de0e8342e4e33aaabf1ead1427aac Schuman, M. (2022, October 25). Why Biden’s Block on Chips to China Is a Big Deal. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/ 2022/10/biden-­export-­control-­microchips-­china/671848/

126 

S. LOFTUS

Scobell, A., Lin, B., Shatz, H. J., Johnson, M., Hanauer, L., Chase, M. S., Cevallos, A. S., Rasmussen, I. W., Chan, A., Strong, A., Warner, E., & Ma, L. (2018). At the Dawn of Belt and Road: China in the Developing World. RAND Corporation. Seng, P. (2018, March 19). Belt, Road Initiative and China-Iran Cooperation. Mehr News Agency. https://en.mehrnews.com/news/132929/Belt-­Road-­ Initiative-­and-­China-­Iran-­cooperation Shatz, H. J. (2016). U.S. International Economic Strategy in a Turbulent World. RAND Corporation. Shirk, S. L. (2018). China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), 22–36. Silver, C. (2022, June 27). The top 25 Economies in the World. Investopedia. Silver, K. (2021, October 21). China’s Trade Practices Come Under Fire. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-­58991339 Simes, D. (2020, August 6). China and Russia Ditch Dollar in Move Toward ‘Financial Alliance’. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/ International-­r elations/China-­a nd-­R ussia-­d itch-­d ollar-­i n-­m ove-­t oward-­ financial-­alliance Smith, A. (2022, February 14). Russia and China Forge Closer Ties as U.S. is Preoccupied with Struggles at Home. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews. com/news/world/russia-­china-­forge-­closer-­ties-­us-­preoccupied-­struggles-­ home-­rcna15722 Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.  C. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In S.  Worchel & W.  G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (2nd ed., p. 19). Nelson-Hall. TASS. (2019, April 20). Posol Rossii v KNR: RF I Kitay imeyut real’nye perspektivy sotrudnichestva v Arktike. TASS. https://tass.ru/ekonomika/6353386 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. (2022, August 11). How Many People Died in the Vietnam War?. The Moscow Times. (2021, April 27). Dollar Falls Below 50% in Russia’s Export Mix. The Moscow Times. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/04/27/ dollar-­falls-­below-­50-­in-­russias-­export-­mix-­a73749 Trenin, D. (2015). From Greater Europe to Greater Asia?: The Sino-Russian Entente. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://www.jstor.org/ stable/resrep12850 Tsang, S., & Cheung, O. (2021). Has Xi Jinping Made China’s Political System More Resilient and Enduring? Third World Quarterly, 43(1), 225–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.2000857 U.S.  Department of Defense. (2018). Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy US Department of Defense. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/ Documents/pubs/2018-­National-­Defense-­Strategy-­Summary.pdf U.S. Department of Defense. (2022). Fact Sheet: 2022 National Defense Strategy. U.S.  Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/28/ 2002964702/-­1/-­1/1/NDS-­FACT-­SHEET.PDF

4  THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 

127

U.S. Department of State. (2017). White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America. U.S. Department of State. (2021). Interim National Security Strategic Guidance 2021. Department of State. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-­content/ uploads/2021/03/NSC-­1v2.pdf U.S. Department of State. (2022, January 12). Study on the People’s Republic of China’s South China Sea Maritime Claims. U.S. Department of State. https:// www.state.gov/study-­o n-­t he-­p eoples-­r epublic-­o f-­c hinas-­s outh-­c hina-­s ea-­ maritime-­claims/ U.S. Department of State Archive. (2009). Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? U.S. Department of State. Walt, S.  M. (2022a, July 26). Does Anyone Still Understand the ‘Security Dilemma’? Foreign Policy. Walt, S. M. (2022b, June 13). Why do People Hate Realism So Much? Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/13/why-­do-­people-­hate-­ realism-­so-­much/ Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley. Waltz, K. (1997). Evaluating Theories. American Political Science Review, 91(4). Waltzman, R., Ablon, L., Curriden, C., Hartnett, G. S., Holliday, M. A., Ma, L., Nichiporuk, B., Scobell, A., & Tarraf, D.  C. (2020). Maintaining the Competitive Advantage in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. RAND Corporation. Watts, S., Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N., Harris, B.  N., & Reach, C. (2020). Alternative Worldviews: “Understanding Potential Trajectories of Great Power Ideological Competition”. RAND Corporation. Weidacher Hsiung, C. (2021). China’s Technology Cooperation with Russia: Geopolitics, Economics, and Regime Security. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 14(3), 447–479. https://doi-­org.eres.qnl.qa/10.1093/ cjip/poab009 Weiss, J. C. (2019, June 11). A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/china/2019-­06-­11/world-­safe-­autocracy Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics (p.  35). Cambridge University Press. Wintour, P. (2022, June 22). 2020. US vs China: Is This the Start of a New Cold War? The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/22/ us-­v-­china-­is-­this-­the-­start-­of-­a-­new-­cold-­war Wishnick, E. (2017). In Search of The ‘Other’ in Asia: Russia–China Relations Revisited. The Pacific Review, 30(1), 114–132. Wright, T. (2018, September 12). The Return to Great-Power Rivalry was Inevitable. Brookings Institute. Retrieved August 10, 2022, from https:// www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-­r eturn-­t o-­g reat-­p ower-­r ivalr y-­w as-­ inevitable/

128 

S. LOFTUS

Xinhua. (2018, January 26). China’s Arctic Policy. China Daily. https://www. chinadailyasia.com/articles/188/159/234/1516941033919.html Ying, F. (2016). How China Sees Russia. Foreign Affairs, 95(1), 97. Yu-fu, C., & Chin, J. (2021, Aug 11). Nearly 90 Percent of Public Identify with Taiwan: Poll. Taipei Times. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archi ves/2021/08/11/2003762406 Zogg, B. (2019, November 8). Cooperation, Co-existence or Clash? China and Russia’s Ambitions in Central Asia. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat. com/2019/11/cooperation-­c o-­e xistence-­o r-­c lash-­c hina-­a nd-­r ussias-­ ambitions-­in-­central-­asia/

CHAPTER 5

The Limits of Liberal Universalism and the Crisis in Ukraine

Introduction The current war in Ukraine can be traced back to 2014, when the Russian Federation first violated Ukraine’s territorial integrity in its annexation of Crimea and incursion into Eastern Ukraine to support local insurgencies. This chapter aims to explain the root causes of the war by assessing the domestic political situation in Ukraine and Russia as well as the tensions in the development of their post-Soviet relationship and their relations with the West. The mainstream viewpoint on the crisis in Ukraine is that Russia is a revisionist and revanchist state led by an evil dictator, that seeks to re-­ establish the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire, and that countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia are all victims of these expansionist policies.1 This line of thinking also assumes the Russian Federation has larger plans to attack the Baltic states and Poland—thereby justifying a strategy of pursuing strength rather than “appeasement” when approaching Putin and his expansionist goals in order to minimize the chance of a wider war in Europe. Using this logic, NATO enlargement after the Cold War was necessary in order to protect former Soviet States from their aggressive neighbor who would one day seek to dominate them again. Rather than relying on this conventional wisdom, this chapter addresses 1

 Seddiq & Haltiwanger (2022).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_5

129

130 

S. LOFTUS

the problems with the structure of the European security architecture in the context of the fall of empire in Eurasia, as well as ideational debates in the international system and domestically within Ukraine to explain the crisis. To explain the logic does not mean to endorse it or justify it, but seeking a more comprehensive understanding of the roots of the conflict can help avoid similar conflicts in the future and can help solve the current situation by finding a long-­term solution to the war. After the Cold War, the successor state of the former Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, had been substantially weakened, yet was hopeful to begin the new post-Cold War era with its Western partners. Russia wanted to “transcend” Cold War politics and build a new and inclusive security architecture on the shared European continent and have an equal say in international security affairs.2 On the other hand, the West was hoping Russia would democratize and liberalize and join the West as a junior partner after its defeat in the Cold War. To expect Russia to integrate into such ways suggests a singular vision for the European security architecture, one that is based on Euro-Atlantic integration and liberal democracy. However, an alternative vision for Europe had been presented by Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev—advocating for ideas similar to a “Shared European Home” or for a free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok, or for a new security architecture for Europe that would transcend Cold War blocs. These proposals were refuted for a number of reasons, one of which may have been the perception that Russia wanted to drive a wedge between the United States and the EU or push out American influence from the continent. Also, it was easier to dismiss Russian concerns while it was weak. While the West had no malicious intent in enlarging NATO and the EU, the enlargement process was perceived as a zero-sum game for Russia, exacerbated the “security dilemma,” worsened trust, and contributed to the deterioration of relations with the West. Ukraine today is, unfortunately, the victim of these contesting issues and has been called a state in the “borderlands” between the interests of Russia, the EU, and NATO.3 However, the issues in Ukraine are not just about the interests of other states—Ukraine is an independent actor with independent interests and did seek a path toward European integration. While the debate over Ukraine is currently being framed as one about 2 3

 Sakwa (2017b).  Sakwa (2016).

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

131

defending Ukraine’s “inherent right to choose” which future it wants for itself, this chapter argues that there has been a constraining binarism in Europe that has placed states in the former Soviet Union into an insecure position. The very nature of the architecture characterized by belonging in either Russia’s bloc or the European bloc has made relations very “zero-­ sum” and created zones of contention in states of the former Soviet Union. Instead of this binary choice, a more comprehensive approach to European security could have avoided much of the tension between Russia and the West. The RAND Corporation conducted a study on this issue and proposed a new security architecture for Europe whereby economic and security arrangements in post-Soviet states would be more inclusive of both Russian and Western interests while ensuring the security and development of these states.4 Unfortunately, such an arrangement was never implemented. Aside from these differing visions for a post-Cold War order, Ukraine suffers from internal divisions that make it more susceptible to outside influence. While this current war has certainly affected public opinion about Russia in Ukraine, historically, a good portion of Ukrainian people saw the development of their nation as being alongside, instead of separately from, their neighbor Russia.5 The divisions in Ukrainian society can be demonstrated through voting patterns which have identified that the West of the country is more likely to vote for pro-Western presidential candidates while the East and the South are more likely to vote for Russia-­ friendly candidates.6 While the “snap” elections in 2014 six months after the disintegration of the Yanukovych regime showed more of a consensus throughout the country, it is important to note that voter turnout was much higher in the West, due to the dissolution of the Party of Regions prior to that election (the party that was historically representative of voters in the East and South) and the ongoing hostilities in the Donbas at this time which didn’t allow for most of the ballot boxes to be open there.7 In other words, these pro-Western and pro-Russian differences in stance within government and among the people not only led to political polarization in the country but it also allowed external powers to push for their agendas inside Ukraine. Former presidents of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma  Charap et al. (2019).  Masters (2022). 6  Eurasian Research Institute (2022). 7  Sonne (2014). 4 5

132 

S. LOFTUS

and Viktor Yanukovych were known to have practiced more “multivector” foreign policies cooperating on equal terms with the EU and Russia, an approach that minimized tension. On this issue, Sakwa describes two different visions existing within Ukraine on the future development of the country—namely the “Monist” vision and the “Pluralist” vision.8 The Monist vision of Ukraine can be defined by a necessity to gain back an identity that was lost during Russian imperialism, which had developed separately from the East Slavic Community of Russia and Belarus. Internal debates about the establishment of Russian as a second official language in Ukraine meet resistance among this group as they believe it would minimize Ukraine’s identity prior to Russian imperialism. In this vision for Ukraine, Ukraine must rid the society of all elements related to this imperial past and move exclusively westward. This vision has become increasingly “nationalist” over the years and has alienated parts of the country that advocated for a more pluralist vision for Ukraine, one that allowed for more autonomy for their regions, having Russian as an official state language and maintaining relations with both Russia and the West through the continuation of Ukraine’s “non-bloc status.”9 These societal tensions became very visible in the 2014 crisis. When Yanukovych was overthrown, albeit questionably, and a new interim government was established, “anti-Maidan” protests erupted in the East and the South of the country and in Crimea. It was then that Russia annexed Crimea and held a local referendum for the peninsula to re-join Russia. Some of the protests in the East and South of the country developed into local insurgencies, two of which declared their independence from Ukraine, the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic, both forming the “Donbas” region. Though the violence dissipated between the Russian-backed insurgencies and the government forces in the East throughout the years, the conflict never turned “frozen” and instead “simmered” for eight years. Then, in early 2022, Russia decided to officially recognize the independence of these regions and launched what it called a “special military operation” in Ukraine.

8 9

 Sakwa, “Europe and the political.”  Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine (2010).

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

133

A Brief History of Post-Soviet Ukraine The first President of post-Soviet Ukraine was Leonid Kravchuk from the Communist party who led the country from 1991 to 1994. The second President of independent Ukraine Leonid Kuchma led from 1994 to 2005 and ran on a pro-market, pro-Russian platform. In 2004, the first pro-­ Western president, Viktor Yushchenko, was elected in a repeat runoff election against Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian candidate. The Ukrainian Supreme Court called for the runoff election to be repeated because of widespread electoral fraud in favor of Yanukovych in the original vote. Public protests prompted by electoral fraud played a major role in that presidential election and led to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, a series of protests and political events led by politicians such as Yulia Tymoshenko, head of the Batkivshchyna party in Ukraine, who then became Yushchenko’s prime minister. While Yushchenko was in office, Ukraine applied for a Membership Action Plan in NATO, despite there being very low popular support for joining the alliance.10 In addition, this went against the Ukrainian constitution which specified a “non-bloc” status for itself and identified as “neutral.” After Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Parliamentary Chairman Arsenii Yatseniuk signed a statement calling for consideration on Ukraine’s entry into the NATO membership action plan at the Bucharest summit, the Parliamentary Opposition prevented the parliament from functioning in a protest against joining NATO.  The parliament was blocked from January 25, 2008, to March 4, 2008, until reaching a protocol of mutual understanding.11 At the Bucharest summit, George W. Bush offered backing to Ukraine for its membership into NATO, a move that Putin was quick to criticize. Although NATO did not offer a MAP to Ukraine in 2008, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members despite protests from Germany and France on the matter. Later that year, NATO decided to work out an Annual National Program of providing assistance to Ukraine to implement the reforms required to accede to the alliance without referring to a MAP. This program is usually how countries participate in the MAP, by submitting individual annual national programs on their

 Razumkov Centre (2022).  Party of Regions blocks rostrum in parliament: Ukraine News by UNIAN (2008).

10 11

134 

S. LOFTUS

preparations for possible future membership. These programs cover political, economic, defense, resource, security, and legal aspects.12 In the next presidential elections in Ukraine, President Yushchenko was not re-elected for a second term due to his inability to tackle corruption or instill the economic reforms the country needed. Pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych then ran again in 2010 with the Party of Regions, the party most popular in the East and South of the country, against Timoshenko, Prime Minister of Ukraine from February to September 2005 and from December 2007 to March 2010. Tymoshenko leads the Batkivshchyna political party, supports Ukraine’s integration into the European Union, and strongly opposes the membership of Ukraine in the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union. She also supports NATO membership for Ukraine. In this election, Yanukovych won the elections fairly. When Yanukovych came to power in 2010, he took prospects for NATO membership off the table and adhered to the non-bloc principles in the original constitution of Ukraine. NATO and Ukraine did continue to cooperate in the framework of the Annual National Program though. Official statements also stated that the continuation of Ukraine-NATO cooperation did not exclude the development of a strategic partnership with Russia,13 signs that Yanukovych was pursuing a “multivector” foreign policy. Yanukovych also extended Russia’s lease on the base in Crimea which allowed its Black Sea Fleet to be stationed in Sevastopol by 25 years in return for cheaper gas. Renewing the lease was not on the agenda should a pro-Western candidate have won the election. But despite having good relations with Russia, Yanukovych was still committed to Ukraine’s political and economic integration with Europe. Ukraine is a country with a rich history comprised of legacies from Russian rule, Austro-Hungarian rule, and Polish-Lithuanian rule. The Western part of Ukraine having been under Austro-Hungarian and Polish-­ Lithuanian rule speaks Ukrainian as their first language. Many are Greek Catholic and are inclined to vote for pro-Western presidents. This part of the country has developed a much stronger sense of Ukrainian nationalism than the people residing in the East. The Eastern population is mostly Russian-speaking, Russian Orthodox, and has been more inclined to support pro-Russian presidents. As described by Adrian Karatnycky, Ukrainian 12  North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2022), NATO To Work Out National Programme Of Assistance To Ukraine For Acceding Alliance (2008). 13  Interfax Ukraine (2010).

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

135

expert in the Atlantic Council, an important division in the country is between those who view Russian imperial and Soviet rule more sympathetically versus those who see this as a tragedy.14 A contentious issue in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history is the issue of the state language policy. In 1989 the law on the Languages in the Ukrainian SSR was in force.15 This law stipulated that the state had to ensure the comprehensive development and functioning of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of life. Other languages though would still have constitutional protection.16 Then in 2012, a law called “on the principles of the state language policy” gave the status of regional language to Russian and other minority languages so they could be used in courts, schools, and other government institutions where national minorities exceeded 10% of the population.17 The division on this policy was sharp. The Party of Regions, or the party supported most in the East and the South, supported this policy whereas the opposition did not. The opposition believed that the law undermined and supplanted the role of the Ukrainian language.18 After the Maidan Revolution, the parliament voted to repeal the law, but the acting president vetoed it to stabilize the already chaotic situation and growing divides between the East and West of the country. In order to accommodate the interests of all of Ukraine he decided to keep it.19 The attempt to revoke the law outraged people and became another trigger for pro-Russian separatism in the East of the country. When elections were held, pro-Western candidate Petro Poroshenko became the newly elected president of Ukraine in 2014 and called parliament’s actions a mistake as his goal was to reunite the country. This law was eventually ruled out as unconstitutional in 2018.20 In 2019 the country adopted the law “on the provision of the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language” which requires Ukrainian to be spoken in all official sectors, spurring discrimination against Russian-­ speaking minorities. Ukrainian now has to be the primary language in  Eve Conant (2014).  [On languages in the Ukrainian SSR] (1989). 16  rada.gov.ua (1996). 17  Elder (2012). 18  Riabchuk (2012). 19   Ukraine’s parliament-appointed acting president says language law to stay effective (2014). 20   Constitutional Court declares unconstitutional language law of KivalovKolesnichenko (2018). 14 15

136 

S. LOFTUS

schools even in Russian-speaking areas and obliges shops, restaurants, and the service industry to engage customers in Ukrainian.21 Officials in Kyiv claim the initiative is meant to revitalize a national language that was subjugated during the Russian Empire and then during Soviet times. Moscow, which has continuously accused Kyiv of “Russophobia” and stalling peace efforts in the war in Donbas, has condemned the language laws because it destroys the country’s unique multicultural space. In comparison, in other post-Soviet states with a significant ethnic Russian minority such as Kazakhstan, Russian and Kazakh have both always had the status of being official state languages.22

The Events of 2013–2015 and Their Aftermath To understand today’s war, it is important to understand the events of 2013–2015 in Ukraine. When Viktor Yanukovych was president, he was on the verge of signing an Association’s Agreement with the European Union but instead opted for a counter-proposal from Russia.23 Protests broke out on the Maidan square protesting Yanukovych’s sudden change in policy. Polls show that Ukrainians were almost evenly split over support of the Maidan. There was a strong regional divide between Western and Central Ukraine supporting the Maidan while opposition to the movement was coming from the East and South. An analysis of polls, videos, and photos shows that protesters were primarily from Western and Central Ukraine.24 While these protests were initially a result of his change in policy, this movement was replaced by a much stronger movement which protested the way in which the government was dealing with the original protests. The government sent in special police units called Berkut which used violence against the protestors and implemented strict anti-­protesting laws.25 Around the same time, a law granting more power to the

21  European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Ukraine— Opinion on the Law on Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, Venice Commission, 121st Plenary Session (Venice, 6–7 December 2019). Accessed August 15, 2022. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf= CDL-AD(2019)032-e 22  Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Article 7 (2022). 23  Walker (2013). 24  KIIS (2013a). 25  Reuters in Kyiv (2014).

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

137

presidency was also passed.26 In other words, the corruption and authoritarianism that the government was exhibiting was the primary reason for mass protests which later turned violent. However, videos, testimonies, admissions by some Maidan leaders, and other evidence show that the Maidan opposition leaders were also responsible for manipulating the violence and attacking the police.27 This series of event came to be known as the “Revolution of Dignity.” However, there is evidence that the protest movements were also infiltrated by radical wings of the opposition, radical nationalists, and neo-­ Nazi organizations who participated in violent attacks and began seizing government buildings such as Kyiv City Hall and the Trade Union Building.28 The far-right elements also attacked the parliament which led to a violent confrontation with the special police and interior troops units. The opposition-led protesters also seized regional administrations, police, and security services in the center and Western part of the country.29 Ukrainian scholar Ivan Katchanovski has documented the results of the “Maidan Massacre” trials that have gone on for the last seven years. According to testimonies from eyewitnesses, forensic specialists, pro-­ Maidan collaborators, and victims of the shootings, the famous “Maidan Massacres” that killed 49 protesters and wounded 157 more were mostly perpetrated by snipers from a pro-Maidan, oligarchic, and far-right opposition alliance shooting from Hotel Ukraina in a false-flag attempt. Videos have also been documented to corroborate the accompanying evidence.30 The goal was to de-legitimize Yanukovych and place the blame on his police force. Other scholars such as Black & Jones, Cohen, Hahn, Lane, Mandel, and Sakwa have also suggested that this power transition was a violent overthrow of the government by means of a false-flag massacre of the police and protesters.31 Having come under significant pressure from the opposition and from Western governments, Yanukovych signed a deal with the leaders of the  Hall (2017, pp. 161–171).  Ivan Katchanovski, The “Snipers’ Massacre” on the Maidan in Ukraine. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 3–62015b. https:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658245 28  Katchanovski (2017), Ishchenko (2016, pp. 453–472). 29  Ibid. 30  Katchanovski (2021). 31  See Black and Johns (2015), Cohen (2018), Hahn (2018), David (2016, pp. 623–644), Mandel (2016, pp. 83–88), Sakwa (2015). 26 27

138 

S. LOFTUS

pro-Western opposition and with leaders of France, Germany and Poland and Russia. This deal called for early elections and the formation of a unity government and an end to the violence. Vitaly Klitschko, Oleh Tyahnybok, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk signed on behalf of the opposition, which had been camping out on Kyiv’s main square since November 2013. However, even after this agreement was officially signed, the Maidan protestors did not accept the deal and would not end the protests or the violence unless Yanukovych resigned.32 An ultimatum threatening the use of force was issued to Yanukovych to resign by the next morning. The head of the Maidan Self-Defense stated that this ultimatum was a decision made by “the institutional bodies of the Maidan,” adopted by a military council set up by the Maidan Self-Defense and the far-right Right Sector.33 Ultimately, out of fear for his life after several reported assassination attempts,34 Yanukovych fled Kyiv but never officially resigned and even made a statement from abroad that he was still the rightful President of Ukraine.35 At this point, he had lost quite a bit of support from his own government, and the Ukrainian parliament voted him out of office and established an interim government.36 However, the decision to remove the President has been argued to have violated the Ukrainian constitution in that it did not undergo the established impeachment processes and lacked constitutional majority.37 Moreover, it has been reported that many deputies from the Yanukovych Party of Regions and the Communist Party voted under the threat of violence to oust Yanukovych and replace him with Maidan leaders.38 The United States and the EU backed this overthrow and recognized the new government of Ukraine. In fact, the United States was highly involved in selecting the members of the interim government.39 Recorded phone calls between the Assistant U.S.  Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and then-American Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt suggest that the United States helped install Arsenii  Malik et al. (2014).  Kalnysh (2015), Katchanovski (2020, pp. 5–29). 34  Ibid. 35  Baunov et al. (2015). 36  Sindelar (2014), Mamlyuk (2015). 37  Kachanovski, “The far Right”; See also Black and Johns, The Return; Cohen, War with Russia; Hahn, Ukraine; Lane, “International Context”; Mandel, “Conflict in Ukraine”; Sakwa (2015, 2016). 38  Kovalenko (2014). 39  Mearsheimer (2014). 32 33

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

139

Yatsenuk as the leader of the interim government. Then-Vice President Biden was also implicated, showing strong preferences for candidates that were then placed into office such as Yatsenuk and Valentyn Nalyvaichenko.40 This suggests that the United States had very clear ideas about what the outcome should be in Ukraine and was actively trying to pursue those goals.41 This radically changed the course of Russian-Western relations and Russian-Ukrainian relations for the foreseeable future. Russia called this an “unconstitutional American-led coup d’état.”42 The Ukrainian parliament argued that Yanukovych withdrew from his duties in an unconstitutional manner in circumstances of urgency, which thus called for early elections. While there is no evidence that these events were orchestrated by the United States, it fervently supported the Maidan movement and the overthrow of Yanukovych despite any evidence pointing to instances of false-flag operations or assassination attempts on the President. Along with Yanukovych’s ouster came the disintegration of the Party of Regions, or the party that the population of Donbas mostly voted for which was significantly more pro-Russian than other parties. Seventy-two deputies left the party after the Maidan Massacres and the remaining deputies either supported key opposition demands or did not vote in the parliamentary vote to ouster the president. In the parliamentary elections that were to be held six months later, the Party of Regions chose not to participate as it argued these to be lacking legitimacy since the residents of the Donbas would not be able to vote. After Yanukovych’s ouster, anti-Maidan protests and secessionist sentiment arose in Eastern and Southern Ukraine as well as in Crimea due to the installation of an anti-Russian interim government consisting of a coalition of the parties Batkivshchyna, UDAR, and Svoboda, the first two being pro-Western and pro-Ukrainian nationalism parties, and the last being a far-right ultra-nationalist party. In March 2014, Russia annexed Crimea after holding a local referendum to secede from Ukraine. Crimea’s relationship with Ukraine had been contentious after the fall of the Soviet Union exhibiting waves of important separatist sentiment until a final decision was made to grant it a special autonomous  Kachanovski (2022).  BBC (2014). 42  Jonathan Masters, Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia, Council on Foreign Relations, Last updated April 1, 2022. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia 40 41

140 

S. LOFTUS

status within Ukraine.43 The 2014 referendum in Crimea overwhelmingly voted to join the Russian Federation,44 a referendum that was labeled as illegal by the international community. In Southern and Eastern Ukraine, counter-protests against the new interim government broke out and turned into a pro-Russian insurgency.45 These initially peaceful protests in the Donbas expressing discontent with the new Ukrainian government escalated into an armed conflict between the self-declared independent separatist forces of the Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic and the Ukrainian government. Russia then launched a hybrid campaign consisting of a combination of disinformation tactics, irregular forces, equipment, volunteers, and military support for the separatists.46 Judging by the anti-Russian composition of the new interim government in Kyiv, Moscow calculated that unless it seized Crimea, its lease on the base of Sevastopol would be revoked or, worse, Crimea could eventually end up in the hands of NATO. This, along with the issue that Crimea consisted of mostly ethnic Russians and that it was Russia’s perceived duty to “protect” these people from the “extremist” developments in Kyiv, was the justification used for the intervention. The annexation of Crimea encouraged separatism in other regions of Ukraine with significant ethnic Russian populations such as Donbas, Kharkiv, and Odessa. The overthrow of the government had led to a power vacuum in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions which had been strongholds of Yanukovych and his Party of Regions. Separatists started to seize and occupy regional administrations, security services (SBU), and police headquarters in these areas. One of the leaders of the movement, Igor Strelkov, and other members of his armed group of Russian nationalists arrived from Russia via Crimea and seized police headquarters in the towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk in the Donetsk Region on April 12, 2014. The Ukrainian government and the West have portrayed these events in the Donbas as being purely led by Russian military and intelligence units. They identified Strelkov’s unit as being a Russian military intelligence unit, but Strelkov was actually a retired officer of the Federal Security Service. Despite the various interpretations of these events, it is plausible to conclude that in both the Donbas and Southern Ukraine and the “Euromaidan” in Kyiv and other parts of  D’Anieri, Russia and Ukraine.  Morello et al. (2014). 45  Leonard (2014). 46  Fedorov (2019). 43 44

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

141

the country, foreign governments alone could not have been able to covertly seize power to produce such large numbers of activists and supporters. The West and Russia did however support opposing sides within the internal conflict.47 A Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) survey conducted in 2013 demonstrated that support for separatism was much stronger in Donbas compared to other regions.48 The majority of Donbas residents backed various forms of separatism.49 Prior to April 2014 many separatist leaders, specifically in Donbas, had called for federalism and regional autonomy in Ukraine. The survey results showed that 23% of the respondents in Donbas favored autonomy as a part of federal Ukraine, 8% supported independence of their region, and 23% favored the region joining Russia. Preserving the pre-war status of their regions within a unitary Ukraine, but with expanded powers, had support of 9%. Ethnic Russians, other ethnic minorities, Communist Party likely voters, younger people, adherents to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (the Moscow Patriarchate), and men all expressed stronger, statistically significant support for separatism.50 Russia initially supported the separatists in Donbas by providing weapons, recruitment, and training. The Ukrainian government created the Anti-Terrorist Operation to neutralize the separatists through the use of military force against pro-Russian forces in April 2014 until 2018. This was then renamed as the “Joint Forces Operation” (JFO).51 This operation managed to shrink the territory under the control of pro-Russian forces.52 It was then that Russia began a conventional invasion of the Donbas and helped separatists regain that lost territory.53 Russia remained vague and denied the presence of regular armed forces but has confirmed the presence of military specialists arguing it was its duty to deploy them to defend the Russian-speaking population.54 According to the casualties list compiled by the United Nations Office on Human Rights, between April 2014 and December 2021 there were a total of around 14,400  Katchanovski (2017).  KIIS (2013b). 49  Pavković and Cabestan (2013, pp. 1–19), Katchanovski (2006). 50  Ibid. 51  Katchanovski (2017). 52  Kofman et al. (2017). 53  Ibid; Katchanovski (2017). 54  Ibid. 47 48

142 

S. LOFTUS

deaths. Three thousand four hundred of these were civilians and 6400 were from the forces of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics.55 About 4600 were from the Ukrainian armed forces and the volunteer militias, and about 400–500 were from Russian armed forces.56 According to several sources, certain groups were much more ideologically motivated and prone to use force such as paramilitary units and special police battalions which were seemingly organized by the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations with help of the government and oligarchs.57 The violence by separatists and the central government also had major roles in the escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war. Some first-hand accounts describe these separatist movements as completely endogenous and described the crisis as a civil war. Russia scholar Anna Matveeva followed the rebels and interviewed them and gathered that they were self-motivated.58 She argued that the Donbas residents had legitimate, long-standing grievances against the government in Kyiv in the post-Soviet period, which “exploded” into violence with the Euromaidan, when identities became polarized. Matveeva demonstrates that Moscow was “dragged into the conflict,” and that it was not prepared to repeat the Crimean scenario in the Donbas. She shows that the presence of Russian military personnel was a necessity because the locals were poorly trained and not very well prepared.59 As mentioned, an analysis of various sources, in particular Ukrainian media reports, suggests that Ukraine became a U.S. “client state” after the “Euromaidan” and during the conflict in Donbas. The U.S. government had obtained influence over appointments of top officials and over policies of the Ukrainian government, in particular, concerning the conflicts in Crimea and Donbas.60 Top U.S. government officials generally expressed unconditional backing of the Ukrainian government policies concerning the conflict in Donbas, and the United States provided free of charge

55  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Conflict-related civilian casualties in Ukraine, Accessed August 15, 2022. 56  Bilal Kenasari (2015). 57  Ivan Katchanovski, “The far right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan massacre in Ukraine,” Labor and Society (2020): 5–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/lands.12457 58  Matveeva (2018). 59  Ibid. 60  Mostovaia (2015).

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

143

military training and military equipment to the Ukrainian forces.61 Similarly, there is evidence, including separatist sources, that suggests that the separatist republics in Donbas became de facto client states of Russia at the end of summer 2014. Soon after the direct Russian military intervention in August 2014, almost all separatist units in Donbas were brought under the de facto overall command of Russian military “curators” or advisers. The violent conflict in Donbas can thus be defined as a civil conflict with both direct and indirect military intervention of a foreign state.62 The separatist conflict in Donbas is similar to violent conflicts and secessions in other post-Soviet states, such as Transdniestria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Like in Donbas, separatist movements in these countries emerged in regions populated by ethnic minorities after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The central governments of these countries also refused to offer autonomy to these regions and relied on military or police forces and paramilitary units to suppress separatism. These attempts failed largely because of military interventions by Russia. Similarly, Armenia intervened militarily and directly in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where a significant ethnic Armenian population resides. Anatol Lieven has astutely argued that these conflicts occur as a result of the fall of empire and were never properly understood in this wider context.63 In the case of the post-­ Soviet space, the fall of the empire was the fall of a land empire, which had critical consequences as opposed to the sea-borne British, French, and Spanish empires. In former land empires, the old core imperial nation remains adjacent to its former colonies, with its own population often extending across the borders. This has also been visible in the case of Turkey which has Kurdish minorities in neighboring Syria, Iraq, and Iran and has expressed aspirations to join with them in one Kurdish state. Additionally, Germany in the 1920s and 1930s as the successor state to the German and Austrian empires faced a similar issue only in the opposite direction when large German minorities in neighboring states desired reunification with Germany. Lieven argues that the countries of the former Soviet Union contain both of these features.

 Katchanovski (2017).  Ibid. 63  Lieven (2022). 61 62

144 

S. LOFTUS

Michael Wolffsohn, a German historian, has made the argument that in such circumstances, “federalism” is the answer to peace.64 One could argue that if these nations had accepted these zones as autonomous regions in a federal state, then Russia, or any other nation, would have never had the opportunity to destabilize them. Federalism can be considered a more “pluralist” arrangement to warring faction and different identities living together under one national entity. The Minsk Agreement, for example, which will be discussed below, would have been a “pluralist” solution to Ukraine’s internal contradictions. Alternatively, Lieven has suggested that perhaps the best that can be hoped for is the establishment of formal or informal arrangements like in Malaysia and the Baltic States, where the indigenous populations monopolize the government and security forces, while the Chinese and Russian immigrant populations dominate the commercial economy.65 While the most violent parts of the initial war in Ukraine took place in 2014 and 2015, the war simmered on for eight years until the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Attempts to end the war peacefully were made several times through the various Minsk Accords. The first one was drafted in 2014 by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine which consisted of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE mediated by France and Germany in the Normandy Format. An agreement was signed on September 5, 2014, but failed to stop the fighting. A revised agreement was signed on February 12, 2015, consisting of a package of measures including a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, release of prisoners of war, constitutional reform in Ukraine granting self-government to certain areas of the Donbas, and restoring control of the state border to the Ukrainian government. The violations of the Minsk Agreement occurred on both sides and were eventually stalled. Disagreements over the order of events were the main disruptors. In addition, disputes emerged over the role of Russia as Russia claimed it was just a mediator in a conflict between Ukraine and the separatist regions and pushed the Ukrainian government to negotiate with them directly. Once Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky entered office, he was quoted as saying he would not speak to these factions directly and had no intention of talking to terrorists.66  Wolffsohn (2022).  Lieven, “Fall of Empires.” 66  Hall (2021). 64 65

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

145

Additionally, and likely most importantly, Kyiv believed that the Minsk agreement would violate its sovereignty by allowing these regions to self-­ govern as it was perceived as a Russian Trojan Horse inside Ukraine. Officials in Kyiv argued that former President Petro Poroshenko only signed the agreement initially at the “barrel of a gun” and that this agreement didn’t represent Ukraine’s interests. Russian involvement in the Donbas made the security situation much harder for the central government to control. But based on the “separatist sentiment” recorded in 2014, autonomy for the Donbas could have provided a politically pluralist and pragmatic arrangement for the country and would have prevented Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Pluralist agreements such as these mitigate the effects of the aftermath of the fall of empire as well. Unfortunately, the structure of the European security architecture also played no role in easing Ukraine’s political, economic, and ideational struggles and exacerbated its relationship with Russia. In December 2021, Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov announced that “Kyiv is not fulfilling the Minsk Agreements. The Ukrainian armed forces are touting that they have started to employ U.S.-supplied Javelin anti-tank missile systems in Donbas and are also using Turkish reconnaissance strike drones. As a result, the already tense situation in the East of that country is further deteriorating.”67 The security situation in the Donbas significantly deteriorated around this time as the OSCE mission reported greatly intensified shelling.68 On February 15, 2022, the Russian Duma voted to appeal to President Putin to recognize the self-proclaimed LNR and DNR.69 Russia went on to officially recognize these territories on February 21, 2022.70 Following that decision, on February 22, 2022, President Putin said that the Minsk agreements “no longer existed”, and that Ukraine, not Russia, was to blame for their collapse, accusing Ukraine of genocide in Donbas in his comments.71 Russia then invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, in what it called a “Special Military Operation” to “de-Nazify” and “de-­ militarize” the country.72  TASS (2021).  OSCE Reports More Than 1500 Ceasefire Violations in a Single Day in Ukraine (2022). 69  Russia Briefing (2022). 70  Roth and Borger (2022). 71  The National Post (2022). 72  Rai and Tidman (2022). 67 68

146 

S. LOFTUS

Two Visions for Ukraine Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the tensions over Ukraine’s future could be summarized in a discussion over monism and pluralism.73 The 2014 war in the Donbas, if one accepts the premise that it was not a purely Russian provocation and creation, can be analyzed as a conflict between the monist vision of Ukrainian statehood and the pluralist alternative demanded by the Donbas insurgents. However, the sustained violence can be blamed on external powers and their support for each of the sides through the supply of weapons and trainings.74 The monist vision of Ukraine is derived from the view that Ukraine evolved separately from Russians and Belarussians as opposed to there being one single East Slavic community. In the post-Communist era this idea was reinforced by “post-colonial” ideas which encouraged moving away from the Russian imperial legacy. Coming from this perspective, accepting Russian as an official language in Ukraine obstructed the importance of the Ukrainian language and accepted a hegemonic interpretation of its existence as a country. This vision for Ukraine seeks a trajectory that is completely separate from Russia. This vision for Ukraine is unwaveringly supported by Western nations. The more pluralist vision for Ukraine was advanced by the Russophone population and by Russia. In this view, Ukraine is pluricultural and comprises Ukrainians, Russians, Ruthenians, Gagauze, Hungarians, Jews, Romanians, and Crimean Tatars. From this view, it is the failure to represent this pluralism constitutionally that provoked the crisis of 2014. Numerous studies have shown that while secessionism wasn’t strong in the early days of Ukrainian’s independence, by the time the interim government was designated in 2014 with its particularly narrow form of monist nationalism, a countermovement in favor of pluralism had formed in the Eastern and Southern parts of the country. Due to the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine throughout the last eight years, this voice and vision have been increasingly persecuted. These debates for Ukraine had become internationalized with the West supporting the monist view and Russia supporting the pluralist view, exacerbating the conflict even more. Just as the idea of “Greater Europe” is tainted because of its association with Russia, so is the idea of Ukrainian

 Sakwa, “Monism to pluralistic dialogism.”  Sakwa (2015, 2016).

73 74

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

147

federalism, even though the latter has had a great deal of support throughout Ukrainian history among the Eastern parts of the country and Crimea. While Russia is no doubt a nationalist power, its vision for the world is a pluralist one. Since the end of the Cold War, expanding the EU was the predominant idea in the Euro-Atlantic space. Compared to the six founding members of the European Economic Community in 1957, the EU now comprises 27 member states. Many of the EU member states are also NATO members, rendering the “European choice” more of an “Atlanticist” choice. Society in Ukraine was divided over EU membership and mostly over NATO membership. The view of Ukrainians is highly dependent on their proximity to Russia and Europe. According to Gallup polls, in 2013 nearly half of Ukrainians (46%) in the East viewed NATO as a threat while 43% saw it as neither a threat nor an entity that would offer protection. Contrastingly and similarly, only 8% in the West and 18% in Central Ukraine saw NATO as a threat, with 46% and 44% respectively seeing it as neither a threat nor offering protection.75 The same regional divisions applied for the prospects of EU membership. In 2013, majorities in the West and Central areas of Ukraine approved of EU leadership. In the East, 19% approved of EU leadership. While Ukrainians’ attitudes changed after 2014, approval of Russia at the time of the 2013 Gallup survey was highest in the East (60%), which is home to many ethnic Russians. Approval of Russia’s leadership was much lower in the Central region (42%) and particularly low in the West (25%).76 Throughout the last eight years of this conflict, percentages have changed demonstrating more of a proclivity toward joining Western institutions. This is partially because many of the most pro-Russian respondents live in the rebel-held territories and in Crimea, which were de facto no longer part of Ukraine and did not partake in the polls. During pre-war times, NATO membership was only supported by pro-Western presidents, but not the majority of the Ukrainian people themselves. However, this started to change in 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursion into Eastern Ukraine. Since June 2014, the percentage of people expressing interest in joining NATO rose to 47%, a much higher figure, but still not the majority.77 In 2021, 58% of respondents chose the EU and 21% chose joining a  Ray and Esipova (2014).  Ibid. 77   Majority of Ukrainians would favor Ukraine membership in EU and NATO— poll (2016). 75 76

148 

S. LOFTUS

Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. If a referendum were held on joining NATO, 54% would vote to join the military alliance.78 Ukraine’s unwillingness to offer autonomy to the Donbas regions through the Minsk Agreement led Russia to believe that the only way to regain leverage in a Ukraine that was moving further and further westward was to accomplish this militarily. Defensive realism asserts that the anarchical structure of the international system encourages states to maintain moderate and reserved policies to attain national security.79 Contrastingly, offensive realism assumes that states seek to maximize their power and influence to achieve security through domination and hegemony.80 Defensive realists argue that such aggressive expansion upsets the tendency of states to conform to the balance of power theory making them less secure.81 As discussed in previous chapters, balance of power theory asserts that states can secure their survival by preventing any one state from gaining enough military power to dominate all others.82 And if one state becomes much stronger, the theory suggests that states will unite in a defensive coalition not to be taken advantage of by the much stronger power. A balance of power system is arguably a more stable system than one with a dominant state, as this renders aggression unprofitable.83 While defensive realists don’t deny that expansionist policies and interstate war occur, they argue that these events are not endemic and that structural issues such as the security dilemma and geography and elite beliefs and perceptions explain the outbreak of conflict.84 Because Russia believed the West to be consistently “enlarging” into its “sphere of influence,” Russia perceived these actions as a form of hegemony which “upset” the “balance of power” on continental Europe. This was a classic case of the security dilemma which led Russia to act “offensively” to aggrandize its power and security. If both the West and Russia were to act in “defensive” realist ways, they would avoid conflict by not expanding at the expense of the other. Applying defensive realist principles to achieve a balance of power is recommended—but this doesn’t have to signify a “return to spheres of  International Republican Institute (2021).  Waltz (1979). 80  Mearsheimer (2001). 81  Layne (2002/2003, pp. 120–164). 82  Kegley and Wittkopf (2005). 83  Ibid. 84  Hellmann and Taliaferro (2000, pp. 171–172, 179). 78 79

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

149

influence.” Pluralist and pragmatic arrangements can be devised in contested areas and shared neighborhoods that would be to the benefit of all parties and avoid future wars. These arrangements would help soften the security dilemma and would also help resolve ethnic tension that tends to arise after the fall of an empire.

The European Security Architecture The idea of a more inclusive security architecture for Europe to avoid zero-sum games could have been crafted as a way to achieve a more stable balance of power. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of a “Common European Home” in the final days of the Soviet Union in his speech to the Council of Europe in 1989. The idea encompassed a vision of a Europe comprising different social systems yet united through respect for sovereignty and political pluralism.85 This would have transcended the bloc politics of the Cold War. Others shared similar ideas such as Charles de Gaulle in his idea of a broader common European space and Nicholas Sarkozy in his idea of pan Europa.86 Medvedev spoke of a new security architecture for Europe as did Putin, calling for the geopolitical unification of all of “Greater Europe” from Lisbon to Vladivostok to create a genuine strategic partnership87 and a free trade zone from the Atlantic to the Pacific.88 In the end, the “monist” vision for Europe dominated which may have precipitated the deterioration in Russian-Western relations and exacerbated pre-­ existing tensions between Russia and Ukraine and within Ukraine itself. Russia had frequently vocalized its concerns about NATO enlargement and Western military support to Ukraine.89 International legal norms and agreements on the European security architecture posit that every nation has the right to choose any alliance they wish to join and that “spheres of influence” are not acceptable in the post-Cold War international order. Article 10 of the NATO Founding Treaty90 states that NATO “may” then  Address given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the Council of Europe (6 July 1989). https:// www.cvce.eu/obj/address_given_by_mikhail_gorbachev_to_the_council_of_europe_6_ july_1989-en-4c021687-98f9-4727-9e8b-836e0bc1f6fb.html 86  Traynor and Harding (2008). 87  Putin (2010). 88  Commonspace.eu (2012). 89  Charap and Boston (2022). 90  The North Atlantic Treaty (1949). 85

150 

S. LOFTUS

accept said nation if it is in the interest of all member states. However, according to the Charter for European Security, each state is free to choose its alliance so long as it does not strengthen its security at the expense of another state.91 The two post-Cold War orders, one built on the UN charter and the other built on the liberal peace system were both incorporated into the various documents at the end of the Cold War. But tension remained between the declared sovereign right of nations to choose their own security alignment and the indivisibility of security in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The contradiction was then repeated in the Charter of Paris for New Europe in 1990.92 It is this very contradiction that contained the seeds for later conflict. The Charter for European Security in 1999 also included the same contradictions.93 The OSCE’s Astana Declaration also discussed establishing a security community and a commitment “to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, rooted in agreed principles, shared commitments, and common goals.”94 In this respect, the freedom of states to choose their military alliances was balanced by the “obligation not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states.”95 The tension between these contradictions was heightened by the geopolitical climate in the shared European neighborhood and competing special visions. On the one side there was the Euro-Atlantic system. Though intended for the Cold War, it was not dissolved after 1989 but enlarged to include former Warsaw Pact member states. Zbigniew Brzezinski though passionate about NATO enlargement was also wary of the consequences of dividing European security and suggested the model of a “transcontinental” system of collective security.96 The NATO enlargement process could have been mediated by a pan-continental framework to lessen the divide that NATO represents in Europe with Russia on one side of it and most nations on the other. These ideas are more in line with the vision of a more common European home. The failure to come to a mutually agreed upon consensus and compromise eventually led to the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.  Graef and Kühnfebruary (2022).  Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990). 93  OSCE (1999). 94  OSCE (2010). 95  Russian Foreign Ministry (2022). 96  Brzezinski (1995). 91 92

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

151

Structural realism does not justify Putin’s invasion, but it does recognize that these behaviors happen between states when they believe their core security interests are at stake. Moral condemnation also does nothing to prevent these behaviors. The “security dilemma” arises due to the steps one state takes to increase its security which then makes other states less secure and leads them to respond accordingly thus making all states less secure in the end. A classic example of this is the countries of Eastern Europe wanting to increase their security after the Cold War to feel protected from Russia by entering NATO or getting close to it. These moves were viewed with alarm by Russian leaders. The Security Dilemma is an ongoing warning that states cannot lose sight of the dangers that arise when one threatens what another state regards as a vital interest. Realists have long warned against having an overly idealistic foreign policy, whether in the context of the Vietnam War, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, or the pursuit of open-ended NATO enlargement. On December 17, 2021, Russia submitted two draft European security treaties reminiscent of Medvedev’s 2009 proposals. The demands made were to stop NATO enlargement, to end the deployment of weaponry or military forces on the border with Russia, and return to NATO’s force posture in 1997 when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed. Additional items were mentioned such as removing the INF range nuclear strike weapons systems from Europe and not meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. The document specifically addressed to NATO focused on the danger of military exercises. Due to the tense nature of Russia’s demands and its substantial buildup of troops around Ukraine at this time, European and American leaders engaged in high-level diplomatic talks with Putin on a regular basis for several months to try and mitigate tensions. For the first time in 30 years, Russia’s security concerns were being discussed at the highest diplomatic levels. In any case, the coercive diplomacy tactics used by Russia were understandably unwelcomed and all the proposals were rejected. Throughout the last 30 years, it was argued that there was no need to revisit the Helsinki principles and hold a “Helsinki 2.0” conference—even though reform was very much needed. At this time, Moscow promised a “military-technical” response if its demands were not met. Then, on February 22, 2022, to everyone’s dismay, it invaded neighboring Ukraine, which it considered to be an American bulwark on its border run by “nationalists” and “neo-Nazis.”

152 

S. LOFTUS

While the Normandy Format leaders had met prior to the war, the Minsk processes were leading nowhere. Both sides disagreed on what the clauses meant, the order in which they were meant to be followed and continued to violate the agreements. In the days prior to the war, the OSCE Monitoring Mission reported intense shelling on the frontlines and 1500 ceasefire violations in one day.97 It has been reported that over 80% of the civilian casualties since 2018 caused by active hostilities were on the separatist side.98 In the rest of Ukraine, stricter laws on the use of the Russian language and culture were implemented in 2019. The law made the use of Ukrainian compulsory in all walks of life such as political campaigning, schools, universities, scientific, cultural and sporting activities, book publishing, printed mass media, television and radio broadcasting, in economic and social life, and hospitals and nursing homes. Special exemptions existed for languages “native” to Ukraine such as Crimean Tatar, English, and other EU languages. But Russian, Byelorussian, and Yiddish were not part of these exemptions.99 The history of the country was being presented in a manner that negated any positive representation of Russo-­ Ukrainian ties and even presented a more favorable picture of Nazi collaborators during World War II.100 Russian language newspapers and TV were shut down, and opposition leader Viktor Medvedchuk was placed under house arrest.101 Russian concerns also included the flood of weapons pouring into Ukraine, both lethal and defensive in nature. Since 2015, the CIA had also been training Ukrainian Special Forces and intelligence officers in guerilla warfare.102 From Moscow’s view, Ukraine was seen as a platform to contain Russia.103 While the EU renewed sanctions on Russia for not implementing the Minsk Accords every six months since 2014, it hardly applied any pressure on Ukraine to fulfill its promises and never said a word about the “Ukrainization Program” going on in the country which technically runs counter to EU norms and values.104 In any case, none of this justifies an invasion. But it is important to analyze the root causes of the issues.  France 24 (2022).  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (2022). 99  Venice Commission “Ukraine—Opinion on the Law”. 100  Gromyko (2022). 101  Ibid. 102  Dorfman (2022). 103  Maté (2022). 104  Gromyko, “Writings on the Wall.” 97 98

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

153

An Alternative Security Architecture This book has argued for more political pluralism and pragmatism in international relations, particularly in contested areas. Others have begun to vouch for similar arrangements such as the mentioned RAND study, which developed a consensus proposal for a revised regional order in post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia. This proposal was devised by groups of experts which included representatives from the West, Russia, and the states in between them. The revised order would limit great power confrontation in the region and thus improve security and prosperity. Today the security architecture in the region is defined by the rivalry between NATO and Russia (and the CSTO). All the states in between are negatively affected by the contest. Similarly, the economic integration of the region is subject to great power competition whereby the states need to choose between signing a DCFTA and an agreement with the EAEU. The blocs are incompatible and therefore require a choice, deteriorating economic ties with the other bloc. Moreover, there is no regular dialogue between blocs. As for the prolonged conflicts in the region, very little progress has been made to achieve any settlement. Rival powers are thus pursuing incompatible goals that create binary choices for these states, rendering the regional order unstable. Some see the problems as potentially getting resolved by waiting for the other side to collapse, implode, or weaken and then imposing their desired outcome. But this strategy has only caused instability and wishful thinking with no guarantee of outcomes. RAND’s proposal included the formation of a new consultative body for major-power engagement on the regional security architecture whereby Russia, the United States, and the EU would regularly consult one another on any changes to the security architecture while taking each other’s views into consideration. Their proposal also included new norms for the already-existing blocs, whereby no changes could be made without the consent of the other power, prioritizing regional stability. A “third-way” for states was also proposed, whereby a nation can seek not to be part of any bloc formalized through multilateral security guarantees. It would offer solutions for multi-directional trade, establish dialogue among the EU and the EAEU and the in-between states, and create new norms for current trade blocs. It would also move efforts on status-neutral management measures for the regional conflicts

154 

S. LOFTUS

and on agreed settlements.105 However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has dampened potential avenues for cooperation between the West and Russia for the foreseeable future, and such a proposal was intended for a solution to security tensions in the pre-invasion European continent. Nevertheless, updating the European security architecture would have finally put an end to the zero-sum nature of the current order and promoted additional stability. Unfortunately, this was not done in time to prevent further deterioration of relations between the major powers, and Ukraine is currently bearing the brunt of such failures. During Russia’s buildup of troops around Ukraine, Russian expert Michael McFaul argued that it was time for a “Helsinki 2.0” to negotiate with Putin and deter him from invading his neighbor.106 This agreement would have refreshed and modernized the Helsinki Accords signed during the Cold War which managed to stabilize the continent. The agreement could bring back to life obsolete arms control agreements and provide a larger framework for European security which could help resolve the issues around Ukraine. Relations between Russia and the West deteriorated substantially after Putin came into office. Moscow grew progressively more disappointed in NATO expansion, condemned the invasion of Iraq, and expressed disdain for American support for the color evolutions in its near abroad. Washington grew disappointed with Russia as it launched the second Chechen war, grew more autocratic, invaded Georgia and recognized the breakaway provinces, annexed Crimea, and supported separatists in Eastern Ukraine. Increasingly, previous security agreements between Russia and the West began breaking down. Helsinki 2.0 would have started with steps to revamp transparency, so each country could keep an eye on the other to monitor troop deployment, weapons deployments, and military exercises. It could also have served as a platform to limit American missile defenses in Europe in return for Russian limits on missile defense on the European theater. A re-establishment of many of the frayed treaties such as the INF treaty could have been discussed. In this framework, diplomats could also reduce the amount of conventional weaponry on the continent and apply regional limits such as in the Baltics or Black 105  Samuel Charap, Jeremy Shapiro, John J. Drennan, Oleksandr Chalyi, Reinhard Krumm, Yulia Nikitina, Gwendolyn Sasse, “A Consensus Proposal for a Revised Regional Order in Post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia,” (Satna Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019). https:// www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF410.html 106  McFaul (2022).

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

155

Sea region. But most importantly, on the issues of indivisible security, negotiations could have made progress by focusing on larger issues. Russia could have withdrawn from Eastern Ukraine, and the United States could have committed to not installing offensive missile defenses in Europe that could intercept Russian weapons. The agreement would have also included new provisions on noninterference, or not meddling in each other’s affairs or elections. Helsinki 2.0 could have been a platform to try and create an independent arbitration tribunal that could adjudicate security claims. The idea behind both McFaul’s proposals and the RAND proposal was to find a renewed way to share the European neighborhood and prevent war. Unfortunately, war happened, and that may be largely because none of these compromises were ever attempted.107 The original Helsinki accords managed to keep stability in Europe, a revised one to signify the end of the Cold War was overdue and never came.

Global Dynamics After World War II, the “liberal international order” was founded but comprised two different systems. One system took other great powers into consideration and was a realist in nature, established the United Nations and its Five Permanent Member States, and formed laws, norms, and practices for the global system. Internationalism was advocated but there was no “liberal” element to state-on-state relations. Parallel, a U.S.-led arrangement of institutions based on more liberal ideas took shape. This included an open trading and financial system created within the framework of the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944; and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949. When the Cold War ended, this order took on a different shape and the liberal order widened in scope to become truly global and universalized while the realist order based on sovereignty took a back seat. During this post-Cold War era, there could no longer be separate “spheres of influence” such as during the bipolar era, as the world was now unipolar. No power was able to contest the lead of the United States at this stage. However, Russia and China gained relative power by the mid-2000s and began asserting themselves on the international scene, creating competition for the United States. Although the U.S.-led liberal order considered itself to be “idealist,” to others in the  Ibid.

107

156 

S. LOFTUS

system it was more expansionist. Realists in international relations theory have termed American foreign policy as being a policy of “liberal hegemony.”108 The response of the international community to this war has been very divided, with the democratic West on one side and most of the developing world on the other. This is not to say Russia actually has many supporters of the war. Rather, many nations in the Global South do not feel the need to take sides on a matter they feel doesn’t concern them and do not appreciate any pressure by Western powers to try to make them do so. Not to mention, many of these nations have beared the brunt of U.S. military incursions themselves, and have therefore viewed their response to this war as one depicting double standards. The reaction of the international community to the war in Ukraine represents the current geopolitical era in which the world finds itself. At the United Nations vote on condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many countries outside of the West abstained, voted against, or did not vote at all.109 China and India are very notable examples. China abstained not because it supports Russia’s war, but because it is against U.S. hegemony and has signed a joint statement with Russia about their shared views on the future of international relations in a multipolar world.110 While China has always been a strong backer of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, its larger foreign policy priorities led it to abstain from the vote. China has blamed NATO for “messing up” Europe and fears it will do the same in the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the world.111 India has a vested economic interest in Russia112 including significant arms sales and has historically been part of the “non-aligned movement,” which has evolved into “strategic autonomy.” Strategic autonomy prioritizes self-sufficiency and independence. It seeks to keep Indian decision-making insulated from external pressures while still maintaining foreign partnerships.113 President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda has accused the West of “double standards” in the Ukraine conflict and has also expressed his preference for Chinese diplomacy which does not  Mearsheimer (2018), Mearsheimer (2019, pp. 7–50), Porter (2020), Walt (2019).  Ferguson (2022). 110  Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development, China Aerospace Studies Institute, February 4, 2022. 111  Davidson (2022). 112  Kirbyjen (2022). 113  Smith (2020). 108 109

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

157

interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations.114 He has previously spoken out about Western interference in Africa. The leader of the country’s Special Forces Command tweeted: The majority of mankind (that are non-white) support Russia’s stand in Ukraine. Putin is absolutely right! When the USSR parked nuclear armed missiles in Cuba in 1962 the West was ready to blow up the world over it. Now when NATO does the same they expect Russia to do differently?115

This stance may have been encouraged as a way to get back at the European Union Parliament’s recommendation to sanction individuals responsible for human rights’ abuses in Uganda including Kainerugaba who was named in a complaint to the International Criminal Court.116 Similarly, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa criticized NATO expansion into Ukraine arguing that Russia perceived a “national existential threat” from NATO.117 In response to the African abstentions, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated that there was “there’s no neutrality in this.”118 Stating that there is no neutrality in this matter puts these countries in an awkward position and suggests that they are not free or capable to take their own stance on the matter. She also indicated that the United States needed to do “additional work to help these countries understand the impact of Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine” suggesting that African nations are not capable of coming up with their own moral position on the matter without the help of the United States. It must be noted that their “neutrality” is not solely derived from economic interests in Russia, as many African nations including South Africa have far greater trade relations with the EU and the United States.119 In addition, European nations are accepting millions of Ukrainian refugees with open arms while refugees from conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa were received tepidly to say the least,120 a double standard which has further alienated countries from that region.

 Asiimwe (2022).  Ibid. 116  European Parliament (2021). 117  Ferreira (2022). 118  United States Mission to the United Nations (2022). 119  Obadare (2022). 120  The Associated Press (2022). 114 115

158 

S. LOFTUS

Many of the countries in the Global South have declined to join Western campaigns to sanction Russia’s economy and isolate it diplomatically. Messaging around the war stemming from Ukraine and the West has taken on a form of being about the survival of the “international rules-based order” and “democracy.” This is where the Global South becomes disconnected as the West demands that they make costly sacrifices by cutting off economic ties with Russia to uphold a “rules-based order,” which to them, hasn’t been rules-based at all. To many observers, this rules-based order has simply allowed the United States to violate international law with impunity. The West’s messaging on Ukraine has once again demonstrated insensitivity and lack of perception, and it is unlikely to gain the support of countries that have often experienced the worse sides of the international order.121 From the vantage point of the Global South, no other country or bloc has undermined international law, norms, or the rules-­ based order more than the United States and the West. Such examples include the U.S. withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council over its criticism of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, withdrawing from the World Health Organization during the COVID pandemic, sanctioning senior officials of the International Criminal Court for seeking to investigate American war crimes in Afghanistan, illegally invading Iraq, the “global war on terror” which has destabilized the Middle East and North Africa and led to many deaths, regime change in Libya, the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s ongoing support for the Saudi war in Yemen, and supporting and praising armed Ukrainian resistance against Russian invaders while condemning Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation and outlawing nonviolent economic opposition to that occupation.122 At the inception of the establishment of the “rules-based” order after World War II, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized covert operations to overthrow governments and arm regional revolts. Now the United States is demanding that countries in the Global South make costly sacrifices and have little regard for their vulnerabilities and security needs. They wonder why they need to make unbearable sacrifices to uphold American exceptionalism. The damaging consequences of American interventionism play a significant role in the calculations of countries across the Global South. NATO, for instance, does not have such a good reputation in large parts of Africa due its military intervention in Libya which had profound  Parsi (2022).  Ibid.

121 122

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

159

ripple effects across the Sahel and led to a significant increase in terrorism in the region. While most nations in the Global South do seek close relations with the United States, due to its unilateralism they also desire counterweights to balance U.S. power when needed. Multipolarity in the system benefits them greatly as it offers a degree of protection against excessive American adventurism. In addition, the war in Ukraine is largely seen as a European affair and not a global one. Former Indian national security adviser Shivshankar Menon stated that most Asian capitals regard the conflict as a war “over the European security order—not an epochal global conflagration.” In other words, getting involved in what seems to them as a regional conflict makes little sense, particularly if this is a fight for the “rules-based order” that gave the West an unfair advantage. Additionally, portraying this war as one between democracy and autocracy further alienates the broader Global South.123 A Cambridge University study from October 2022 revealed global attitudes toward the United States, China, and Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine. The study involved gathering data from 30 global survey projects spanning 137 countries representing 97% of the world population. They observed a marked difference between high-income democracies and emerging economies and the Global South. The war in Ukraine has galvanized democratic societies worldwide which now stand more firmly behind the United States than ever. But in Eurasia, North and West Africa, societies have moved closer to China and Russia over the course of the last decade. The war in Ukraine has precipitated these trends. As a result, China and Russia are now narrowly ahead of the United States in their popularity among developing countries.124 Portraying the war in Ukraine as being one between democracy and autocracy does not capture the dynamics and intricacies of international structure, culture, history, and interests. Framing it as such is also not the right way to capture true international support for Ukraine. At the root, the fight stems from a failed design of the European security architecture which did not allow space for political pluralism and encouraged zero-sum competition which inadvertently encouraged revanchism from a former superpower which happens to have the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. In  Ibid.  A World Divided: Russia, China and the West, Bennett Institute for Public Policy: University of Cambridge, 20 October 2022. https://www.bennettinstitute.cam.ac.uk/ publications/a-world-divided/ 123 124

160 

S. LOFTUS

principle, Putin doesn’t care if a nation is a democracy—rather, he cares about “bloc politics” and even formed his own blocs as a response to the EU and NATO.  If all the countries surrounding Russia are in blocs in which Russia is not welcome, it creates insecurity for Russia. In addition, due to its self-image as a “Great Power” and its desire for influence in its near abroad, there is also the element of wanting to retain influence over Ukraine. Unfortunately, that is how great powers operate.125

Conclusion This chapter has described the evolution of Ukrainian politics and identity formation after the fall of the Soviet Union and has underlined the differences in the visions Ukrainians had for the future of their country depending on which part of the country they resided. Ukraine’s identity as a nation was divided between those that sought a “monist”126 future for Ukraine based on an identity completely separate from Russia, and those who sought a more pluralist arrangement based on their geographic and cultural affinities with Russia. Ukraine’s inner divisions made it all the more susceptible to foreign influence. The chapter has also focused on analyzing the crisis in Ukraine through the cultural and structural lens this book adopts and argues that “liberal universalism” showed its limits when it came to Ukraine, a country situated between Russia and Europe in the aftermath of the fall of empire. The limits of liberal universalism are also visible in the response of the international community to the war whereby much of the Global South has refused to take sides in a fight that has been framed as being one about “democracy versus autocracy” and about the “defense of the liberal international order” and find Western hypocrisies unattractive. This chapter argues that the constraining binarism in the Euro-Atlantic space did not allow for pluralist political, economic, and security arrangements to take shape and placed the “in-between” states, or those outside of formal blocs, in a position of extreme insecurity. This was particularly unadvisable in the context of the fall of the recent land empire. The binarism in the Euro-Atlantic space increased the “security dilemma,” created constant friction between Russia and the West and placed Ukraine in a position of deep insecurity. The architecture creates a perpetual  Mearsheimer, Tragedy Great Power Politics.  Sakwa, “Europe and the political.”

125 126

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

161

contradiction between the indivisibility of security and the freedom to choose security alignments. A new European security structure that took the interests of all parties into consideration would have prevented the war, as would have the correct implementation of the Minsk Agreement once the war had started in 2014. The war in Ukraine is a consequence of the failures to reconcile these differences and the failures of achieving more balanced policies in the shared European neighborhood. To avoid catastrophic wars, political pluralism, pragmatic international relations, and reaching fair agreements on disputed security issues is the only way to manage twenty-first-century international relations, an era characterized by rising multipolarity and competing interests.

References [On languages in the Ukrainian SSR]. (1989, October 28). Legislation of Ukraine. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/ 8312-­11#Text “Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Article 7”. (2022). Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Retrieved November 4, 2022, from https://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution “Constitutional Court declares unconstitutional language law of Kivalov-­ Kolesnichenko”. (2018, February 28). Ukrinform. https://www.ukrinform. net/rubric-­polytics/2412584-­constitutional-­court-­declares-­unconstitutional-­ language-­law-­of-­kivalovkolesnichenko.html “NATO To Work Out National Programme Of Assistance To Ukraine For Acceding Alliance”. (2008, December 3). Ukrainian News Agency. https:// ukranews.com/eng/article/166745.html “OSCE Reports More Than 1500 Ceasefire Violations in a Single Day in Ukraine”. (2022, February 19). France 24. “Party of Regions blocks rostrum in parliament: Ukraine News by UNIAN”. (2008, January 25). Ukrainian Independent Information Agency. https:// www.unian.info/politics/99877-­verkhovna-­rada-­to-­resume-­work-­on-­tuesday-­ yatseniuk.html “Ukraine’s Parliament-Appointed Acting President Says Language Law to Stay Effective”. (2014, March 1). ITAR-TASS. http://en.itar-­tass.com/world/ 721537 Asiimwe, G. (2022, March 17). Museveni Slams EU-Us for Double Standards Over Russia Ukraine War. Chimpreports. https://chimpreports.com/ museveni-­slams-­eu-­us-­for-­double-­standards-­over-­russia-­ukraine-­war/

162 

S. LOFTUS

Baunov, A., Jarábik, B., & Golubo, A. (2015, February 25). A Year After Maidan: Why Did Viktor Yanukovych Flee After Signing the Agreement with the Opposition? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/59172 BBC. (2014, February 7). Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-­europe-­26079957 Bilal Kenasari, M. (2015, October 3). US Says About 500 Russian Soldiers Killed in Eastern Ukraine. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/ us-­says-­about-­500-­russian-­soldiers-­killed-­in-­eastern-­ukraine/68091 Black, J. L., & Johns, M. (Eds.). (2015). The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia. Routledge. Brzezinski, Z. (1995). A Plan for Europe. Foreign Affairs, 74(1), 35. Charap, S., & Boston, S. (2022, January 21). U.S.  Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet? RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/01/ us-­military-­aid-­to-­ukraine-­a-­silver-­bullet.html Charap, S., Shapiro, J., Dienes, A., Afontsev, S., Balas, P., Crudu, R., Dobbins, J., Filipchuk, V., Galoyan, D., Kuhn, U., & Popov, A. (2019). A Consensus Proposal for a Revised Regional Order in Post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/ CF400/CF410/RAND_CF410.pdf Charter of Paris for a New Europe. (1990). CSCE. https://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-­documents/documents-­1/historical-­documents-­1/673-­1990-­ charter-­of-­paris-­for-­a-­new-­europe/file Cohen, S.  F. (2018). War with Russia: From Putin & Ukraine to Trump & Russiagate. Hot Books. Commonspace.eu. (2012, February 27). Putin Has Vision of a Europe Stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Commonspace.eu. https://www.commonspace.eu/commentary/putin-­has-­vision-­europe-­stretching-­atlantic-­pacific David, L. (2016). The International Context: Russia, Ukraine and the Drift to East-West Confrontation. International Critical Thought, 6(4), 623–644. Davidson, H. (2022, April 29). China Says Nato Has ‘Messed Up Europe’ and Warns Over Role in Asia-Pacific. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2022/apr/29/china-­s ays-­n ato-­i s-­m essing-­u p-­e urope-­a nd-­ warns-­over-­role-­in-­asia-­pacific Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine. (2010, May 29). Art. IX, Electronic Version. http://gska2.rada.gov.ua/site/postanova_eng/Declaration_of_State_ Sovereignty_of_Ukraine_rev1.htm Dorfman, Z. (2022, January 13). CIA-Trained Ukrainian Paramilitaries May Take Central Role if Russian Invades. Yahoo News. CIA-trained Ukrainian paramilitaries may take central role if Russia invades (yahoo.com).

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

163

Elder, M. (2012, July 4). Ukrainians Protest Against Russian Language Law. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/04/ukrainians-­ protest-­russian-­language-­law Eurasian Research Institute. (2022). Geography of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine. Eurasian Research Institute. Retrieved August 13, 2022, from https://www.eurasian-­research.org/publication/geography-­of-­the-­presidential-­ elections-­in-­ukraine/ European Parliament. (2021, November 2). Human Rights Breaches in Uganda, Rwanda and Kazakhstan. European Parliament. https://www.europarl. europa.eu/news/en/press-­r oom/20210204IPR97122/human-­r ights-­ breaches-­in-­uganda-­r wanda-­and-­kazakhstan Eve Conant. (2014, January 31). How History, Geography Help Explain Ukraine’s Political Crisis. National Geographic. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/ science/article/140129-­protests-­ukraine-­russia-­geography-­history Fedorov, Y. E. (2019). Russia’s ‘Hybrid’ Aggression Against Ukraine. In R. Kanet (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Russian Security. Routledge. Ferguson, E. (2022, March 3). Which Countries Abstained from UN Vote on Ukraine? Result of General Assembly’s Resolution on Russia Explained. iNews. https://inews.co.uk/news/un-­v ote-­u kraine-­r ussia-­c ountries-­a bstained-­ general-­assembly-­result-­resolution-­explained-­1495346 Ferreira, E. (2022, March 17). Ramaphosa Condemns War, But Not Russia Specifically. Mail & Guardian. https://mg.co.za/news/2022-­03-­ 17-­ramaphosa-­condemns-­war-­but-­not-­russia-­specifically/ France 24. (2022, February 19). OSCE Reports More Than 1500 Ceasefire Violations in a Single Day in Ukraine. France 24. https://www.france24.com/ en/europe/20220219-­l ive-­o sce-­m onitors-­r epor t-­d ramatic-­i ncrease-­ in-­ukraine-­ceasefire-­violations Graef, A., & Kühnfebruary, U. (2022, February 14). A Letter from Moscow: (In) Divisible Security And Helsinki 2.0. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks. com/2022/02/a-­letter-­from-­moscow-­indivisible-­security-­and-­helsinki-­2-­0/ Gromyko, A. (2022, March 1). When Writings on the Wall are Ignored. Russian International Affairs Council. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-­and-­ comments/comments/when-­writings-­on-­the-­wall-­are-­ignored/ Hahn, G. M. (2018). Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War”. McFarland Books: Lane. Hall, B. (2021, April 25). Ukrainian Leader Calls for Revamp of Peace Process to End Donbas War. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ ed40d675-­16b3-­4a35-­a157-­b9bf0078b507 Hall, S. G. F. (2017). Learning from Past Experience: Yanukovych’s Implementation of Authoritarianism After 2004. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 8(2), 161–171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2017.04.001

164 

S. LOFTUS

Hellmann, G., & Taliaferro, J.  W. (2000). Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?). International Security, 25(1, Summer), 171–172, 179. Interfax Ukraine. (2010, May 26). Havrysh: Ukraine-NATO Cooperation Not Excluding Strategic Partnership Between Moscow. Kyiv Post. https://www. kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-­p olitics/havr ysh-­u kraine-­n ato-­ cooperation-­not-­excluding-­str-­67685.html International Republican Institute. (2021, December 17). IRI Ukraine Poll Shows Support for EU/NATO Membership, Concerns Over Economy and Vaccines for COVID-19. International Republican Institute. https://www.iri.org/ resources/iri-­u kraine-­p oll-­s hows-­s uppor t-­f or-­e u-­n ato-­m embership-­ concerns-­over-­economy-­and-­vaccines-­for-­covid-­19/ Ishchenko, V. (2016). Far Right Participation in the Ukrainian Maidan Protests: An Attempt of Systematic Estimation. European Politics and Society, 17(4), 453–472. Kachanovski, I. (2022, September). Russia-Ukraine War and the Maidan in Ukraine. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Kalnysh, V. (2015, February 2). Andrei Parubiy na maydane. RBK -Ukraina. https://daily.rbc.ua/rus/show/andrey-­parubiy-­na-­maydane-­i-­po-­nam-­i-­po-­ berkutu-­rabotal%2D%2D17022015132900 Katchanovski, I. (2006). Cleft Countries: Regional Political Divisions and Cultures in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Moldova. Ibidem-Verlag. Katchanovski, I. (2017). The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-Up of Ukraine? In N. Petro (Ed.), Ukraine in Crisis. Routledge. Katchanovski, I. (2020). The Far Right, the Euromaidan, and the Maidan Massacre in Ukraine. Journal of Labor and Society, 23(1), 5–29. Katchanovski, I. (2021, August). The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: Revelations from Trials and Investigation. SSRN Electronic Journal Conference: 10th World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4048494 Kegley, C. W., & Wittkopf, E. R. (2005). World Politics: Trends and Transformation (10th ed., p. 503). Wadsworth Publishing Co Inc.. KIIS. (2013a). https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=216&pag e=1&y=2013&m=12 KIIS. (2013b). Maidan-2013: Who Is Standing, Why And For What? 2013 Report. https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=repor ts&id=216&page=1 &y=2013&m=12 Kirbyjen, J. (2022, March 18). Why India Isn’t Denouncing Russia’s Ukraine War: New Delhi’s Balancing Act Reflects Its Interests in Keeping a Longstanding Relationship with Russia. VOX. https://www.vox.com/22982698/india-­ russia-­ukraine-­war-­putin-­modi

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

165

Kofman, M., Migacheva, K., Nichiporuk, B., Radin, A., Tkacheva, O., & Oberholtzer, J. (2017). Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (p. 44). RAND Corporation. Kovalenko, O. (2014, February 24). Sotnyk, yakyj perelomyv khid istoriyi: Treba bulo dotyskaty. Ukrainska Pravda. www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2014/ 02/24/7016048 Layne, C. (2002/2003). The ‘Poster Child’ for Offensive Realism: America as Global Hegemon. Security Studies, 12(2, Winter), 120–164. Leonard, P. (2014, April 14). Kiev Government to Deploy Troops in Ukraine’s East. Yahoo News. Lieven, A. (2022, June 20). What the Fall of Empires Tells Us About the Ukraine War. Foreign Policy. “Majority of Ukrainians Would Favor Ukraine Membership in EU and NATO— Poll”. (2016, February 4). UNIAN Information Agency. https://www.unian. info/society/1255397-­m ajority-­o f-­u krainians-­w ould-­f avor-­u kraine-­ membership-­in-­eu-­and-­nato-­poll.html Malik, S., Gani, A., & McCarthy, T. (2014, February 21). Ukraine Crisis: Deal Signed in Effort to End Kiev Standoff. The Guardian. https://www. theguar dian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-crisis-pr esidentclaims-deal-with-opposition-after-77-killed-in-kiev Mamlyuk, B. N. (2015, July 6). The Ukraine Crisis, Cold War II, and International Law. The German Law Journal. Mandel, D. (2016). The Conflict in Ukraine. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 24(1), 83–88. Masters, J. (2022, April 1). Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ ukraine-­conflict-­crossroads-­europe-­and-­russia Maté, A. (2022, March 5). By Using Ukraine to Fight Russia, the US Provoked Putin’s War. Aaron Mate. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from https://mate.substack.com/p/by-­using-­ukraine-­to-­fight-­russia?s=r Matveeva, A. (2018). Through Times of Trouble: Conflict in Southeastern Ukraine Explained from Within. . McFaul, M. (2022, February 11). How to Make a Deal with Putin: Only a Comprehensive Pact Can Avoid War. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2022-­02-­11/how-­make-­deal-­putin Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Norton. Mearsheimer, J.  J. (2014, September/October). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. Foreign eAffairs.. https://www.foreignaf fairs.com/ar ticles/r ussia-­f su/2014-­0 8-­1 8/ why-­ukraine-­crisis-­west-­s-­fault

166 

S. LOFTUS

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2018). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press. Mearsheimer, J.  J. (2019). Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order. International Security, 43(4, Spring), 7–50. Morello, C., Constable, P., & Faiola, A. (2014, March 17). Crimeans Vote in Referendum on Whether to Break Away from Ukraine, Join Russia. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/crimeans-­begin-­ vote-­o n-­r ussia-­r eferendum/2014/03/16/ccec2132-­a cd4-­1 1e3-­a 06a-­ e3230a43d6cb_story.html Mostovaia, I. (2015, June 19). Shpion, vyidi von! ZN UA. http://gazeta.zn.ua/ internal/shpion-­vyydi-­von-­_.html North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). Membership Action Plan. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm Obadare, E. (2022, March 22). Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine May Drive a Wedge Between the West and Africa. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr. org/blog/russias-­invasion-­ukraine-­may-­drive-­wedge-­between-­west-­and-­africa OSCE. (1999). Istanbul Document 1999. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/5/39569.pdf OSCE. (2010, December) Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a security Community. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/6/74985.pdf Parsi, T. (2022, April 12). Why Non-Western Countries Tend to See Russia’s War Very, Very Differently. MSNBC. https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-­ opinion/ukraine-­russia-­war-­looks-­very-­different-­outside-­west-­n1294280 Pavković, A., & Cabestan, J.  P. (2013). Secession and Separatism from a Comparative Perspective: An Introduction. In A.  Pavković & J.  P. Cabestan (Eds.), Secessionism and Separatism in Europe and Asia: To Have a State of One’s Own (pp. 1–19). Taylor & Francis. Porter, P. (2020). The False Promise of Liberal Order: Nostalgia. Polity Press. Putin, V. (2010, November 26). Speech Delivered to the Fourth Berlin Economic Leadership Meeting. Süddeutsche Zeitung. http://premier.Gov.ru/events/ news/13120/; rada.gov.ua. (1996, June 28). Constitution of Ukraine. Ukrainian Rada. https:// web.archive.org/web/20110521190059/http:/www.rada.gov.ua/const/ conengl.htm Rai, A., & Tidman, Z. (2022, July 15). Dozens Dead and Airports Bombarded After Putin Invades Ukraine—Live. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-­missile-­strike-­r ussia-­nuclear-­war-­ latest-­b2123730.html Ray, J., & Esipova, N. (2014, March 14). Before Crisis, Ukrainians More Likely to See NATO as a Threat. Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/167927/ crisis-­ukrainians-­likely-­nato-­threat.aspx

5  THE LIMITS OF LIBERAL UNIVERSALISM AND THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

167

Razumkov Centre. (2022). Sociological Poll: “How Would You Vote If the Referendum on Ukraine’s NATO Accession was Held the Following Sunday? (Recurrent, 2002–2009). Razumkov Centre. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from https://web.archive.org/web/20140502193915/http://www.razumkov. org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=46 Reuters in Kyiv. (2014, January 17). Ukrainian President Approves Strict Anti-­ protest Laws. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ jan/17/ukrainian-­president-­anti-­protest-­laws Riabchuk, M. (2012, June 28). Playing with Ambiguities: Ukraine’s Language Law. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/playing-­ with-­ambiguities-­ukraines-­language-­law/ Roth, A., & Borger, J. (2022, February 21). Putin Orders Troops Into Eastern Ukraine on ‘Peacekeeping Duties. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2022/feb/21/ukraine-­putin-­d ecide-­r ecognition-­breakaway-­ states-­today Russia Briefing. (2022, February 15). Russian Parliament Votes to Give Sovereign Recognition to Donbas. Russia Briefing. https://www.russia-­briefing.com/ news/r ussian-­p arliament-­v otes-­t o-­g ive-­s over eign-­r ecognition-­t o-­ donbas.html/ Russian Foreign Ministry. (2022, January 27). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Answer to a Media Question. https://www.rusemb.org.uk/fnapr/7060 Sakwa, R. (2015). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. I.B.Tauris. Sakwa, R. (2016). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. I.B.Tauris. Sakwa, R. (2017a). Europe and the Political: From Axiological Monism to Pluralistic Dialogism. East European Politics, 33(3), 406–425. https://doi. org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1326099 Sakwa, R. (2017b). Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order. Cambridge University Press. Seddiq, O., & Haltiwanger, J. (2022, February 24). Biden Says Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Shows He has ‘Much Larger Ambitions’ and Wants to ‘Re-establish the Former Soviet Union’. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider. com/biden-­putin-­ukraine-­invasion-­trying-­to-­restore-­soviet-­union-­2022-­2 Sindelar, D. (2014, February 23). Was Yanukovych’s Ouster Constitutional? Radio Free Europe. Smith, J. M. (2020, November 6). Strategic Autonomy And U.S.-Indian Relations. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/strategic-­autonomy-­ and-­u-­s-­indian-­relations/ Sonne, P. (2014, May 25). Poroshenko Declares Victory in Ukraine Presidential Election. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001 424052702304811904579583413180447156 TASS. (2021, December 9). Moscow to Thwart Any Provocations by Kiev in Donbass, Russian Military Chief Warns. TASS. https://tass.com/ world/1373123

168 

S. LOFTUS

The Associated Press. (2022, February 28). Europe Welcomes Ukrainian Refugees But Others, Less So. NPR. https://www.npr.org/2022/02/28/1083423348/ europe-­welcomes-­ukrainian-­refugees-­but-­others-­less-­so The National Post. (2022, February 22). Putin Says Ukraine’s Minsk Peace Process is Finished, Blames Kyiv. The National Post, Reuters. https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-­pmn/crime-­pmn/putin-­says-­ukraines-­minsk-­peace-­process-­ is-­finished-­blames-­kyiv The North Atlantic Treaty. (1949). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved August 15, 2022, from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf Traynor, I., & Harding, L. (2008, November 15). Sarkozy Backs Russian Calls for Pan-European Security Pact. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2008/nov/15/nicolas-­sarkozy-­russia-­european-­security UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, January 27). Conflict-Related Civilian Casualties in Ukraine. United States Mission to the United Nations. (2022, May 10). Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a Media Roundtable in Brussels. https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-­b y-­a mbassador-­l inda-­t homas-­ greenfield-­at-­a-­media-­roundtable-­in-­brussels-­belgium/ Walker, S. (2013, December 17). Vladimir Putin Offers Ukraine Financial Incentives to Stick with Russia. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian. com/world/2013/dec/17/ukraine-­russia-­leaders-­talks-­kremlin-­loan-­deal Walt, S. M. (2019). The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley. Wolffsohn, M. (2022, April 11). Eine andere Jüdische Weltgeschichte. Verlag Herder.

CHAPTER 6

Pluralism and Pragmatism in International Relations

Democracy and Geopolitics As the “third wave of democratization”1 spread through formerly communist countries, the United States was at the height of its power—serving as the example for the world to follow to achieve prosperity, freedom, and development. Just 15 years later it became increasingly evident that imitating the United States and Western Europe was either not entirely possible or not entirely desirable. When nations such as Russia and China prospered without politically liberalizing, this served as an important example—particularly in the case of China. China has become a modern-­ day example of how prosperity can thrive in a non-liberal democracy. Modernization theory and liberal assumptions on integration proved incorrect as economic development and engagement did not lead to a change in a country’s political regime. As it pertains to global democracy proliferation, the argument that “politics follows geopolitics” may be oversimplified.2 Democratic processes have demonstrated to be quite complex and depend on a variety of factors to succeed, particularly domestic-born factors. The presence of a liberal hegemon is certainly not 1 2

 Huntington (1991, p. 13).  Kagan (2018).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2_6

169

170 

S. LOFTUS

enough for democracy to proliferate. While having a successful liberal hegemon as an example to follow may have been necessary for the initial “euphoria” that took hold after the end of the Cold War, the processes of democratization proved to be much more nuanced and often unsuccessful. Levitsky and Way correctly pointed out how many of the countries that were presumed to be democratizing in the 1990s were only experiencing economic crises and resumed autocratic practices after economic recovery in the 2000s.3 Moreover, Diamond also correctly points out that many who actually did attempt democratization just achieved a “hybrid” status or partial democracy.4 As mentioned throughout this book, the societal factors that were long institutionalized in Western civilization created the proper environment for democratic proliferation and consolidation. Other countries belonging to different civilizations do not have the same institutional legacy in place for liberal democracy to consolidate. This is significant for two reasons. First, it suggests that universalizing Western civilization, and with that, Western forms of liberal democracy, is a futile endeavor. Second, it suggests that the rise of Russia and China more specifically is not threatening to global democracy—as democracy is homegrown, and democratic consolidation is highly dependent on institutional legacy and domestic politics as opposed to external power influence. Today, rhetoric stemming from Western nations over the war in Ukraine is being framed as a global struggle between “democracy” and “autocracy.” Nancy Pelosi also stressed this division in her provocative visit to Taiwan in August of 2022 when she said, “Today the world faces a choice between democracy and autocracy.” This type of rhetoric presupposes a division in the world between democracies and nondemocracies and is sure to aggravate those outside of the democratic camp. It also suggests that the main issue between great powers is regime type as opposed to national security concerns. With respect to the war in Ukraine, many in the Global South have refused to take sides in the war, as they do not view this as a global fight for freedom or as a fight for the preservation of the liberal international order.

3 4

 Levitsky and Way (2018).  Diamond (2018).

6  PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

171

A Nationalist Pushback to Liberalism While the United States and its European allies believe in the spread of global liberal democracy, autocracies don’t believe in the spread of global autocracy. Autocracy is not an ideology, but it is a form of rule over a state. Liberal democracy on the other hand is an ideology—one that is especially engrained in Western civilization. The increased prevalence of “civilizational nationalism” in national rhetoric has a direct correlation with the dominance and “universalization” of the liberal normative framework stemming from Western civilization. Huntington correctly stated, “Modernization and economic development neither require nor produce cultural westernization. To the contrary, they promote a resurgence of, and renewed commitment to, indigenous cultures.”5 Interestingly, this process is also occurring within Western liberal democracies themselves where the processes of globalization have led to a cultural backlash against liberal cosmopolitanism.6 The fact that these policies are causing such pushback both at home and abroad begs the question of whether these policies should evolve. With the United Kingdom leaving the EU, with political figures such as Trump having substantial political support, and with the resurgence in nationalist rhetoric in Russia, China, and India, among other countries, it is obvious that culture and civilization have taken on more importance in international relations today. The “culture wars” in the West as well as the nationalist pushback against Western universalism in much of the non-­ Western world indicate that civilizational norms are tapping into people’s hearts and portraying their need for belonging. This can be tied to the desire for “positive national self-esteem” and the lengths that elites will go to achieve this with the support of their constituencies.7 Russia and China have increasingly referred to the “civilizationist” aspect of their state. This is defined not according to ethnic, national, or territorial terms but as the embodiment of a unique civilization. This is important for geopolitics as it transcends the “norms” of Western liberal universalism toward more cultural particularism.8 For this reason, an international system based on pluralism and pragmatism should be the way forward for the twenty-first century in order to ensure continued cooperation and avoid war.  Huntington (1996).  Norris and Inglehart (2019). 7  Evans (2015). 8  Pabst (2021, pp. 26–42). 5 6

172 

S. LOFTUS

Populist narratives throughout Europe and the United States underline the importance of national identity and sovereignty. Their rising popularity suggests that there may be a crisis with liberalism in that it has failed to generate bonds of mutual respect and affection among citizens and has thereby affected collective consensus. Identity politics according to Fukuyama are a manifestation of the dissatisfaction with globalization and liberalization and the damage done to the idea of an open and liberal world order by recent economic crises.9 If the root of the issues has been identified, then the solution can present itself more clearly. In this case, national unity has suffered at the hands of excessive globalization and liberalism. If efforts are made to dramatically reduce inequality, prioritize the domestic economy, and provide new jobs for workers who have lost their livelihood—there would be less grievance in society. Less grievance is a step forward toward renewing trust in institutions and shaping a national narrative that unites the population.

The Russia-China Challenge The rise of Russia and China as challengers to the U.S.-led liberal international order also represents challenges to the normative framework associated with this leadership. The United States still holds the lead in all material capabilities, but China is catching up. However, the rise of China does not have to be feared if international relations are managed correctly. As discussed, the rise of China represents more of a normative challenge as well as a competition in the realms of trade and technology as opposed to a major existential threat. China is not trying to export its system of governance onto the world. China represents an example of a non-Western non-democratic country rising and prospering, thereby challenging all the assumptions for a “golden model” of development. While China’s rise truly does pose a challenge to U.S. global leadership, contrary to popular belief, China is not trying to dismantle the international order. It is however trying to gain more power and leadership within the order and is creating new non-Western-led institutions such as the BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and could be shaping a parallel order. The growth of China’s influence abroad signifies a shift in global norms spreading. Very 9

 Fukuyama (2018).

6  PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

173

much as the United States managed to spread soft power influence throughout the world through the processes of globalization, China is now also able to exert such influence. China is already affecting global norms in how countries vote at the United Nations General Assembly and is creating a world more favorable to other forms of government other than liberal democracy. The Chinese leadership will signify less “liberal” aspects of international conduct, particularly with the Global South. Western states have no reason to change or modify their liberal international values, can and should continue to abide by their principles, and form coalitions with like-minded partners as they already do. But at the same time, they must be ready to face a world where theirs is not the only legitimate path to development. Two parallel orders may eventually emerge but still cooperate with one another in the framework of global institutions. But cooperation will have to take on a more pragmatic approach. Vladimir Putin on his side has warned in a recent speech that “a new stage in world history” is coming. He denounced the “model of total domination” by the West and asked why the leaders of the West should “impose their own rules of conduct based on the illusion of exclusivity” which he believed was “inherently racist and neo-colonial.” He went on to describe how the dominance of the West owed itself to “the robbery of other peoples both in Asia and in Africa.” Putin said that the global “elites” were now “terribly afraid” that other parts of the world “may present their own options for development” and that there was no stopping this new era, “No matter how much Western and supranational elites strive to preserve the existing order of things.”10 Russian-Western relations have progressively deteriorated in the post-­ Cold War era due to the unwillingness of both sides to accept each other’s foreign and domestic policies. Though this was true on a global scale, the most important disagreement between them was in regard to the European shared neighborhood. Neither could come to an agreement on the postCold War European security architecture. Internationally, the spread of liberalism across the world sometimes through violent means was perceived as being hegemonic and as an American pursuit of global domination. Russia in turn responded by doubling down on its nationalism and asserting its interests in aggressive ways. Many assume that Russia acts the  Cole (2022).

10

174 

S. LOFTUS

way it does because it has always been an “imperialist power”11 and because Putin is a “KGB thug.”12 But to explain all Russia’s actions through this framework is pure attribution bias, or the tendency to see our own behavior as a response to circumstances but to attribute the behavior of others to their basic nature.13 No country takes decisions in a vacuum. Each country has its perceptions of others and interactions with others and makes decisions based on its national interests.14 If this is understood as a basis for international relations, actors can anticipate other actors’ behavior and reach pragmatic solutions on contentious issues instead of doubling down on policies that seem like an adequate response to a “bad actor” in international relations. As mentioned, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan aggravated Beijing. Why would the United States intentionally exacerbate an-already fragile situation? This is partially because it views China and all other autocracies as “bad actors” and does not accept its national interests as legitimate. The issue over Taiwan and Ukraine is exactly the type of “contentious” issue this book speaks about. While it is unfortunately too late to prevent a catastrophe in Ukraine, it is not too late to prevent a similar catastrophe in Taiwan. Emphasis on diplomacy to ensure a pragmatic outcome that satisfies the interests of all parties is the solution, even if the agreement reached is a suboptimal arrangement. In such an agreement, every party has to compromise on something valuable in order to achieve an outcome that is acceptable—though not ideal. In game theory, this would be a “Nash equilibrium.” Game theory is the analysis of how decision-makers interact in decision-making to take into account the reactions and choices of the other decision-makers.15 Nash equilibrium is a concept of game theory where the optimal outcome is one where no player has an incentive to deviate from their chosen strategy after considering an opponent’s choice.16 The problem is that actors don’t seem to want to compromise, and that is why war occurs. That is the tragedy of international relations.17

 Bildt (2022), Hartnett (2022).  McCain Institute (2022). 13  Kelley (1967). 14  For more on Political Realism, see Carr (1964), Morgenthau (1962), Waltz (1979). 15  Quackenbush (2022). 16  Chen (2022). 17  Mearsheimer (2014). 11 12

6  PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

175

Governance and Culture While Russia briefly attempted to democratize, this attempt was futile and ended up helping shape the future narrative of Russia’s need for a special form of democracy led by a strong ruler, exemplified by Vladimir Putin. Putin remains widely popular in Russia, at first for turning the country back on a course of economic success and after for helping to shape Russia’s post-Soviet national identity grounded on conservatism.18 The post-Cold War era viewed liberal democracy as the only legitimate form of governance and hence adopted the strategy of liberal hegemony. But the “strong state” in Russia or China is also legitimate form of governance. Just because it does not abide by Western norms and standards does not mean it is not a viable form of governance, particularly if it has popular consent.19 Hungary and Poland also possess “legitimate” forms of “illiberal” governance. However, the issue with those countries is more complicated because they also seek to be part of liberal institutions that promote “liberal values.” Herein lies a contradiction that must be addressed. Either the EU and NATO (which comprises even more “weak” democracies) adopt “mutual interests” as their common goal and feel free to maintain current illiberal members and even enlarge to include other “weak” democracies, or they maintain their “values-based” approach and close their doors to any form of illiberalism. Their “in-between” modus operandi will only lead to failure. Their approach to unconsolidated liberal democracies such as countries in the Balkans or even Turkey creates an air of superiority between the “in-group” and the “out-group”. As discussed, in order to establish positive national self-esteem,20 the Self reacts to actions by the Other and will cooperate as long as it is extended recognition.21 Otherwise relations become uncooperative. Turkey for example has been on standby to join the EU for more than three decades. Today, Turkey’s relations with the West can be described as problematic. In the Balkans, “waiting fatigue” is the prevalent feeling as the EU and NATO extend what are perceived as “false promises” to one day join their institutions.22 This is sure to backfire one day.  Loftus (2018).  Loftus (2022, pp. 1–30). 20  Evans, “Ideological Change.” 21  Wendt (1999). 22  Dempsey (2022). 18 19

176 

S. LOFTUS

The West served as a model to imitate for many countries after the Cold War. As Krastev and Holmes argue, different countries adopted different forms of imitation of the West after the Cold War which led to various forms of resentment today among nations who sacrificed national identity to pursue imitation of Western models. China, on the other hand, practiced imitation of the West as “appropriation.”23 They employed joint venture agreements forcing Western firms to transfer innovative technologies without adopting Western forms of governance. Ultimately, their national identity was not put at risk and resentment didn’t ensue in the way it did in nations that tried to mimic the West. The legitimacy of the current regime in China partially lies in the fact that President Xi Jinping minimizes foreign ideas and influence on Chinese society and reinforces Chinese identity. Xi Jinping aims to restore China to greatness and has turned Marxism into a nationalist ideology resisting foreign pressures. Also, by referencing traditional culture and traditional moral virtues, the CCP realigns itself with societal expectations.24

Wherefore Liberal Hegemony? Neoconservatives fear that any evidence of “American retrenchment” abroad would lead to chaos and the deterioration of the liberal international order.25 Similarly, idealists fear retrenchment would reduce American security, prosperity, and global cooperation.26 But the liberal international order was initially a set of bilateral and multilateral arrangements created after World War II that then spread outward into the world after the Cold War.27 This arrangement itself does not need a hegemon to sustain it as it is rational for actors to participate in it. However, the shape that the order took on after the Cold War enabled the United States to hold disproportionate power within it, giving it a hierarchical shape. Inevitably, as American power relatively declines and as other powers relatively rise, the order will be less “hierarchical.”28 The only way to ensure that such an order does not collapse is to reduce the role of ideology within it. If this is  Krastev and Holmes (2020).  Kubat (2018), Tsang and Cheung (2021). 25  Wright (2020). 26  Brooks et al. (2012/2013, pp. 7–51). 27  Ikenberry (2020, p. 40). 28  Ikenberry, A World Safe. 23 24

6  PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

177

not pursued, the world is more likely to witness the formation of two separate orders—one led by the United States and its democratic partners that places a high emphasis on liberal values and another order led by China and nations who prefer to conduct international relations pragmatically and value-free. A world with relative American decline will not experience any major shifts in global regime types. Nevertheless, “norms” will most certainly be affected. Global norms can be defined as “the shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior accepted by states and intergovernmental organizations that can be applied to states, intergovernmental organizations, and/or nonstate actors of various kinds.”29 This is not something the United States can really control as rising actors possess more influence in the world than they used to and may not possess the same set of norms and values as the United States. The only thing the United States can really do is prevent rising actors from dominating world affairs through “balance of power politics” and through healthy competition in research and development and technological innovation. Very much as Russia and China “bandwagoned” to balance the power of U.S. hegemony, the United States can do the same with China’s rise by partnering with like-­ minded democracies around the world. That is not to say that the United States needs to have a committed presence everywhere—in fact, that policy is rather wasteful and provocative. In a world with rising powers, diplomacy and pragmatism between great power interests are crucial. Mearsheimer and Walt have suggested the policy of “offshore balancing” whereby the United States delegates regional affairs to regional powers while continuing to be the defender of last resort. In essence, the aim is to remain “offshore” as long as possible, while recognizing that it is sometimes necessary to come “onshore.” This policy is the safest choice for the twenty-first century, as is “political pluralism” and “pragmatism” when coming to agreements on contentious issues. Offshore balancing would reduce the amount of resources spent on defense and allow for greater domestic investment and consumption. It would save and protect American lives and solve the problem of “free-riding” on American protection. It would also encourage America’s allies to invest more in their own defense. This policy could also reduce terrorism. Mearsheimer and Walt explain how military occupation fosters nationalist resentment and  Khagram et al. (2002).

29

178 

S. LOFTUS

increases terrorism as an asymmetrical tactic to protest against foreign presence. Bin Laden, for example, was motivated by the presence of U.S. troops in his homeland of Saudi Arabia. American occupation also undermines local institutions and creates ungoverned spaces where extremism can flourish.30 Since the end of the Cold War until Donald Trump was elected president, American politicians and strategists assumed the general public was in broad agreement with the parameters of U.S. foreign policy. It was generally accepted that sustained U.S. power abroad was indispensable to managing an international system that promotes peace and stability through integration and creating the conditions for the spread of liberal values. The fact that Donald Trump, a President who did not espouse any of these ideas, won the presidency, shows that policymakers and strategists were blind to what was going on inside their country. A 2016 Pew poll found that 57% of Americans agree that the United States should “deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs the best they can.”31 Both Trump and Bernie Sanders found receptive audiences when they questioned the practice of democracy promotion abroad, of subsidizing the defense of allies, and of repeated U.S. military interventions. Hillary Clinton was the only one defending the status quo at the time and ended up losing the election. If Americans really want to encourage the spread of liberal democracy, the best way to do so is to set a good example. Other countries will more likely emulate the United States if they see it as a just, prosperous, and open society. And that means doing more to improve conditions at home and less to manipulate politics abroad. This book has described trends, identity, interests, and norms in the post-Cold War era and has exposed the limits of liberal universalism, or the limits of the liberal normative framework espoused by Western powers. These policies have reached limits both on a structural level and on a cultural level. These policies have reached their limits both internationally and domestically as has been described. As the global order sees the rise of non-Western, non-liberal powers, international norms, identities, and interests are likely to take on pluricultural characteristics. Based on these international differences, coming to agreements on contentious security issues will prove much more challenging but all the more necessary. The adoption of a more pragmatic form of international governance will  Mearsheimer and Walt (2016).  Ibid.

30 31

6  PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

179

minimize the risk of war. The tragic war in Ukraine serves as an example of how the old order has reached its limits. Unless the world wants to continue witnessing such tragedies, new forms of collaboration and diplomacy must pave the way for a new future.

References Bildt, C. (2022, February 25). Putin’s Imperial Delirium. Project-Syndicate. https://www.project-­s yndicate.org/onpoint/putin-­u kraine-­i mperialist-­ fever-­dream-­by-­carl-­bildt-­2022-­02 Brooks, S.  G., John Ikenberry, G., & Wohlforth, W.  C. (2012/2013). Don’t Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment. Quarterly Journal: International Security, 37(3, Winter), 7–51. Carr, E. H. (1964). The Twenty Years’ Crisis. Harper Perennial. Chen, J. (2022). Nash Equilibrium. Retrieved August 5, 2022, from https:// www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nash-­equilibrium.asp Cole, B. (2022, July 21). Putin Warns West Current World Order Is Over and New Era Is Coming. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/russia-­putin­moscow-­west-­economics-­world-­order-­1726686 Dempsey, J. (2022, June 30). Judy Asks: Are the EU’s Enlargement Promises Credible? Judy AsksCarnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategi ceurope/87423 Diamond, L. (2018). Facing up to the Democratic Recession. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Evans, A. (2015). Ideological Change Under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory. Demokratizatsiya, 23(4). Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Encounter Books. Hartnett, L. (2022, March 22). The Long History of Russian Imperialism Shaping Putin’s War. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/02/long-­history-­russian-­imperialism-­shaping-­putins-­war/ Huntington, S. P. (1991). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (p. 13). University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, S.  P. (1996, November/December). The West is Unique, Not Universal. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 1996-­11-­01/west-­unique-­not-­universal Ikenberry, J. (2020). A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (p. 40). Yale University Press. Kagan, R. (2018). The Weight of Geopolitics. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Kelley, H.  H. (1967). Attribution Theory in Social Psychology. In D.  Levine (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation. University of Nebraska Press.

180 

S. LOFTUS

Khagram, S., Riker, J.  V., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (2002). Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. University of Minnesota Press. Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2020). The Light that Failed: A Reckoning. Pegasus Books. Kubat, A. (2018). Morality as Legitimacy Under Xi Jinping: The Political Functionality of Traditional Culture for the Chinese Communist Party. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 47(3). Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2018). The Myth of Democratic Recession. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy in Decline? Johns Hopkins University Press. Loftus, S. (2018). Insecurity and the Rise of Nationalism in Putin’s Russia: Keeper of Traditional Values. Palgrave Macmillan. Loftus, S. (2022). Legitimacy and Societal Consent under Putin’s Leadership: State Capacity and National Identity. Russian Politics, 7(1), 1–30. McCain Institute. (2022). John McCain Was Right: Vladimir Putin is a Thug. Retrieved August 5, 2022, from https://www.mccaininstitute.org/resources/ in-­the-­news/john-­mccain-­was-­right-­vladimir-­putin-­is-­a-­thug/ Mearsheimer, J. (2014). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.  W. Norton & Company. Mearsheimer, J.  J., & Walt, S.  M. (2016, June 13). The Case for Offshore Balancing. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-­ states/2016-­06-­13/case-­offshore-­balancing Morgenthau, H. (1962). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. Alfred Knopf. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism. UP. Pabst, A. (2021). Civilization and Liberal Democracy. Polis. Political Studies, 4, 26–42. https://doi.org/10.17976/jpps/2021.04.04 Quackenbush, S.  L. (2022). Game Theory and Interstate Conflict. Retrieved August 5, 2022, from https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-­9 780199743292/obo-­9 780199743292-­0 071.xml#:~:text= Game%20theory%20is%20the%20analysis,of%20decisions%20made%20by%20 people Tsang, S., & Cheung, O. (2021). Has Xi Jinping Made China’s Political System More Resilient and Enduring? Third World Quarterly, 43(1), 225–243. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.2000857 Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley. Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. Wright, T. (2020, March/April). The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw from the World. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/2020-­02-­10/folly-­retrenchment;

Index1

A Authoritarianism, 5, 15, 94, 101 Autocracy, 31, 159, 160, 170, 171, 174 B Belt and Road Initiative, 104, 105 BRICS, 96, 105, 111, 112 C Civilization, 9–13, 85, 87, 109, 111 Civilizational nationalism, 171 Client state, 142, 143 Cold War, 59, 62–66, 80, 84, 88 Color revolutions, 70–72 Communism, 97, 98, 118 Cooperation, 171, 173, 176

Crimea, 129, 132, 134, 139, 140, 142, 147, 154 Culture, 152, 159 D Democracy, 1–5, 8, 9, 12–22, 59–63, 65, 67, 70–72, 75, 78, 79, 82, 85, 86, 88, 93, 94, 96, 101, 102, 107, 109, 119, 130, 158–160, 169–171, 173, 175, 177, 178 Democratization, 27, 28, 44, 52, 53 E Empire, 11, 19, 79, 130, 143, 145, 149, 160 Eurasianism, 10, 79, 85, 87

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. Loftus, Russia, China and the West in the Post-Cold War Era, New Security Challenges, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20089-2

181

182 

INDEX

European Union (EU), 33, 35, 39–41, 44, 46, 53, 63, 65, 70, 77, 78, 84

Monism, 146 Multilateralism, 18 Multipolarity, 3, 7, 15, 18

G Globalization, 30, 31, 34, 40, 41, 44, 45, 48, 62, 83, 85, 171–173 Global South, 99, 108, 116, 156, 158–160

N Nash equilibrium, 174 Nationalism, 2, 4, 8, 10, 15, 21, 93, 94, 107, 173 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Neoliberalism, 40, 40n58, 41, 49, 54 Neutrality, 157 Nexus, 108–117 Normativity, 20, 171, 172, 178 Norms, 5, 13, 15, 21, 171–173, 175, 177, 178 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 7, 19, 20, 33, 35, 37, 48, 53, 62, 63, 65–69, 72–74, 77, 78, 88

H Hegemon, 59, 80 Hegemony, 3, 14–16, 18, 19, 21 Hybrid, 28, 53 I Identity, 3–5, 9–13, 17–20, 22, 31, 32, 41, 42, 44–47, 49, 51–53, 60–62, 64, 65, 67, 79, 83, 85–88, 96–99, 101, 103, 114, 117, 119, 132, 142, 144, 160, 172, 175, 176, 178 Ideology, 96–98, 101, 102, 108, 119 Immigration, 31, 40–42, 45 Inequality, 31, 39, 49, 50 Interests, 60–63, 65, 69–74, 77, 80, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 173, 174, 177, 178 L Legitimacy, 61, 64 Liberalism, 2, 15, 17, 21, 28, 29, 32, 36, 44–47, 49, 50, 54, 62, 79, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89 M Maidan Massacre, 137, 139 Minsk Agreement, 144, 145, 148, 161 Miscalculations, 62

O Order, 94–98, 101, 105, 108–111, 115, 116, 118, 119 P Particularism, 171 Perceptions, 62, 63, 65, 67, 71, 77, 88, 89 Pluralism, 5, 11, 18–22, 108, 117, 146, 149, 153, 159, 161, 169–179 Populism, 8, 39–45, 99 Post-colonial, 146 Pragmatism, 5, 13, 18–21, 114, 169–179 Putin, Vladimir, 65, 67–70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 79, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88

 INDEX 

R Realism, 2, 4, 21, 148, 151 Regime, 28, 34, 37, 47, 49, 50, 52, 169, 170, 176, 177 Revisionism, 63, 73, 88 Revolution of Dignity, 137 S SCO, 111, 112 Security architecture, 5, 6, 15, 21, 130, 131, 145, 149–155, 159 Security dilemma, 63, 66, 130, 148, 149, 151, 160 Separatism, 135, 140, 141, 143 Sovereignty, 62, 78, 80, 81, 83, 85 Structure, 11, 15, 20–22, 130, 145, 148, 159, 161

183

T Taiwan, 102, 103, 106, 109, 110, 116–118, 120 U Ukraine, 61, 63, 66, 70–73, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 129–161 Unipolarity, 101, 111 Universalism, 12, 62, 99, 129–161, 171, 178 V Values, 3, 4, 10, 12, 173, 177, 178 W War, 170, 171, 174, 179 West, 6, 8, 11